

thievery, starvation, prostitution, and perhaps history's biggest black market operation. After years of Fascist rule, city politics underwent a revival, although a corrupt one. It was a *Beggars' Opera* world in which small criminals sometimes got caught, but big ones usually prospered, with the complicity of local administrators or the Allied troops, who brought much-needed food, clothing, and other essentials. There was no systematic allocation of these supplies among the Neapolitans, giving ample incentive to local politicians and crooks to traffic in stolen goods. War often deposits this sort of chaos in its wake, but rarely does it find so thoughtful a reporter. At one point, Lewis, dining in a restaurant, observes that all the Italian patrons' overcoats were made from stolen U.S. army blankets. His writing is precise and evocative: "Ragged, hawk-eyed boys . . . wandered among the tables ready to dive on any crust . . . to snatch up left-overs . . . I couldn't help noticing the intelligence—almost the intellectuality—of their expressions. No attempt was made to chase them away. They were simply treated as nonexistent."

—Geoffrey Best ('79)

**BLOWING ON
THE WIND: The Nuclear
Test Ban Debate, 1954–1960**
by Robert A. Divine
Oxford, 1978
402 pp. \$14.95
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ISBN 0-19-502390-0

In March 1954, more than 200 Marshall Islanders and the 23-man crew of the Japanese fishing trawler *Lucky Dragon* suffered classic symptoms of radiation poisoning (nausea, fever, bleeding gums) as a result of a U.S. nuclear bomb test on Bikini Atoll. The blast was part of a U.S. effort to stay ahead in the nuclear arms race, which had accelerated when the Soviet Union detonated its first hydrogen bomb in August 1953. After the *Lucky Dragon* incident, public debate over atmospheric testing intensified. Divine, a University of Texas historian, gives us a well-documented account. Proponents of an atmospheric test ban included prominent scientists (Linus Pauling) and politicians (Adlai Stevenson). Senior U.S. military men opposed a ban, but they played a minor role in the Washington debate; far more influential in arguing against a ban were Atomic Energy Commis-

sion chairmen Lewis Strauss and John A. McCone, physicist Edward Teller, and a succession of civilian Secretaries of Defense (including Charles E. Wilson). Strauss & Co. insisted that the risks to health of occasional bomb tests were insignificant compared to the risk of allowing the Soviet Union to gain an edge in the nuclear arms race. Their argument was rejected by President Eisenhower, who recognized the essentially political nature of the issue. In 1958, he began negotiations with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev on a test ban and imposed a moratorium on U.S. atmospheric tests that lasted until 1962. In August 1963, Eisenhower's successor, John F. Kennedy, signed a limited nuclear test ban treaty in Moscow, barring U.S. and USSR atmospheric testing. It was a prelude to SALT.

—David MacIssac ('79)

**THE HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY**
Vol. 1: An Introduction
by Michel Foucault
Pantheon, 1978
168 pp. \$8.95
L of C 78-51804
ISBN 0-394-41775-5

Does it seem that everyone these days talks about sex? Foucault, a noted French social historian, tries to account for our attitudes about sex and for our public obsession with it. He refutes a traditional hypothesis (put forth by Freud, as well as Marx) that modern industrial societies, particularly during the Victorian era, have increasingly repressed sexuality. Talk about sex (indeed, sex itself), he speculates, was not so much repressed as channeled into a variety of "discourses." Doctors, psychologists, educators, and sociologists all formed their own distinct vocabularies for describing sexuality. Because of their emphasis on *how* we talk about it, sexuality entered all aspects of our lives (Foucault calls this the "deployment of sexuality"). Today, many teachers, social scientists, therapists, and other specialists believe that they have lifted curtains of repression surrounding sex. In fact, says Foucault, they have further structured popular attitudes toward sex, thereby shaping behavior. He argues that the constant analysis of sex stems from the West's continuing obsession with creating systems of knowledge (e.g., psychol-