



The Hiroshima Prefecture Industrial Promotion Building, one year after the August 6, 1945, explosion of a U.S. atomic bomb directly overhead. The blast, equivalent in explosive power to 20,000 tons of TNT, killed 75,000 Japanese and leveled much of the city.

America's Peace Movement 1900–1986

Since it emerged as a serious political force after the trauma of World War I, the heterogeneous American peace movement has often tapped widespread popular longings: for a world without war, for an end to costly U.S. interventions overseas, and, most recently, for relief from the nuclear threat.

Such sentiments have been understood by U.S. presidents. "I am a pacifist," declared Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1940. "We are all pacifists." Peace, observed John F. Kennedy in 1962, "is the rational end of rational men." Long before his Reykjavik meeting last October with Mikhail Gorbachav, Ronald Reagan told a Eureka College audience: "Peace remains our highest aspiration."

In fact, since Hiroshima, world peace of a sort has been maintained in the shadow of the Bomb. Despite an arms race, Soviet expansionism, and bitter local conflicts (e.g., Korea, Vietnam), World War III has not erupted. America's NATO partners in Western Europe remain free and unscathed. Since the tense 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and the Soviets have avoided direct confrontation and they have taken some steps (e.g., improving the East-West "hot line") to keep it that way. Deep differences in ideology, national purpose, and behavior divide the superpowers; men still die in battle (Afghanistan, El Salvador, Nicaragua); but the whole world is not engulfed.

How has the peace movement affected America's role in the world? Since 1900, its supporters have included many of the nation's notables—Mark Twain, Andrew Carnegie, Henry Ford, Albert Einstein, Benjamin Spock. Its allies, at times, have included leaders in both parties and in the White House. Its varied, often controversial, teachings have helped shape America's political culture to the present day. Here our contributors examine the peace movement's genteel beginnings, its strong impact before World War II, its stormy evolution in the Nuclear Age.

‘BRIDLING THE PASSIONS’

by Ralph D. Nurnberger


June 28, 1914. Sarajevo, capital of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Gavrilo Princip, a member of the Serbian terrorist organization the Black Hand, shot Austrian archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife Sophie. The death of the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary set off a chain reaction. By late August, most of Europe was engaged in World War I. The ultimate victims of Princip's revolver would be more than eight million war dead—and the dreams of the leaders of a trans-Atlantic peace movement that had been growing, particularly in America.

Americans at first believed that, as President Woodrow Wilson insisted, the war was one “whose causes cannot touch us.” The U.S. press displayed what the *Literary Digest* called a “cheering assurance that we are in no peril” of being drawn into Europe's bloody quarrel. “Peace-loving citizens,” said the *Chicago Herald*, owe “a hearty thanks to Columbus for having discovered America.”

Indeed, “peace” was a flourishing cause in the United States on the eve of the Great War. Since 1900, nearly 50 new peace organizations had appeared, among them groups endowed by Boston publisher Edward Ginn (the World Peace Society) and Scottish-born steel magnate Andrew Carnegie, whose benefactions had been capped by a \$10 million gift in 1910 to establish the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Carnegie thought the Endowment, based in Washington, D.C., could help government officials hasten “the abolition of international war,” the “foulest blot” on civilization. As late as 1913, the editors of the *Peace Forum* could declare war obsolete: Statesmen “realize how ruinous it could be for them to fight.”

Thus August 1914 was doubly shocking to peace advocates. The Reverend Frederick Lynch, head of the Church Peace Union, a U.S. organization of antiwar clergymen recently launched with a \$2 million Carnegie gift, thought that the world had “gone mad.” James Brown Scott, secretary of the Carnegie Endowment, felt “dazed.”

The peace movement had grown up at a time of ferment. Europe, that ancient cockpit of conflict, had survived almost a century without prolonged armed confrontation (the German seizure of Alsace-Lorraine from France in 1870–71 had failed to ignite a larger conflict). While the Great Powers were occupied with empire-building, science and technology had brought such advances as Charles Darwin's ideas on evolution, Max Planck's quantum theory of energy (1900), and Albert Einstein's theory of relativity (1905), as well as



Planting a "Peace Tree," Washington, D.C., 1910. The men at center—Andrew Carnegie, President William H. Taft (with spade), Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, and Elihu Root—aimed to end all war by "arbitration."

ways of making steel and steam and internal-combustion engines. Still, there was reason to share Henrik Ibsen's fear that the rapidly advancing world was "sailing with a corpse in the cargo."

The ambitious Germans were building a large navy, and along with their neighbors were embracing such military innovations as conscription (used by all the Continental powers after 1871), the torpedo, the mine, the machine gun, and smokeless gunpowder (patented by Alfred Nobel between 1887 and 1891). *The Future of War* (1902), by Polish scholar Ivan Bloch, and *The Great Illusion* (1910), by British economist Norman Angell, argued that armed conflicts would henceforth engulf whole nations. To Angell, war was now unthinkable; to Bloch, it was "impossible except at the price of suicide."

Across the Atlantic, immigration and industrialization were re-drawing the social landscape in the United States.

From only 35,000 miles at the end of the Civil War in 1865, U.S. railroads had grown to nearly 200,000 miles of track by 1900. As Americans moved West, new arrivals landed in force; nearly 1,285,000, mostly from Eastern Europe, debarked during 1907 alone. Between 1880 and 1910 the urban population tripled to 45 million; by 1920, most Americans were city and town dwellers. As

demands increased for better housing, improved working conditions, and access to political power, reformers launched the Progressive Era. Civic clubs, church groups, and new mass-market magazines like *Collier's* and *McClure's* all embraced what Kansas editor William Allen White called "the cult of the hour," a faith "in the essential nobility of man and the wisdom of God." Human progress was possible if the proper mechanisms could be put to work.

Reformers like Jane Addams set up settlement houses to help the urban poor; muckraking journalists investigated the sources and uses of wealth; unions sought to upgrade labor conditions; the Women's Christian Temperance Union took on "Demon Rum." But of all the reform goals, "peace" was the most socially respectable.

'Cult of Cranks'

Peace had been a human preoccupation for centuries, of course, going back well before St. Augustine's fifth-century assertion that "it is more honorable to destroy war by persuasion than to destroy men by the sword." In America, peace had first been the province of such religious sects as the Mennonites, the Brethren, and the Society of Friends (Quakers). Secular interest in peace appeared early.* But the *organized* movement began in 1815, with the founding of "peace societies" in New York by David Low Dodge and in Massachusetts by Noah Worcester. Both grew out of Northern opposition to the inconclusive struggle with Britain in the War of 1812. The Massachusetts group became part of the New England-based American Peace Society, launched in 1828 by William Ladd.

The Civil War divided Ladd's group, many of whose members backed the Union for its antislavery stance. Alfred Love, a deeply pacifist Quaker wool merchant, broke away to start a rival Universal Peace Union in 1866. By 1890, the "movement" consisted mainly of the American Peace Society, Love's group, and a few even smaller organizations. Most Americans were uninterested in the cause.

But by the late 19th century America was becoming a world power. Commodore Matthew C. Perry's ships had opened Japan to the West, financiers like J. Pierpont Morgan were forging links with European capital, and the 1898 Spanish-American War, highlighted by easy naval victories in Cuba and the Philippines, seemed to show

*Benjamin Rush, the Philadelphia physician and signer of the Declaration of Independence, proposed a cabinet-rank secretary of peace in 1789.

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that America could play a global role, as Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power upon History* (1890) said it must. The movement's aims grew beyond mere opposition to violence; indeed, a new generation of peace-group leaders often disdained "pacifists." Inspired as much as unnerved by technology, these leaders sought "practical" and "scientific" means of barring wars. And, they felt, their country was now strong enough to be heard.

The movement's ideas—that nations would abide by codes of international conduct; that U.S. democratic traditions would keep America out of "unjust" wars and permit combat only to preserve freedom—reflected the convictions of its upper-middle-class leadership. Members of peace societies were mostly Northeastern, Anglo-Saxon, and well educated; nearly two-thirds had professional degrees. They shared a faith that Americans, at least those like themselves, were morally blessed and could show others (especially the Europeans) how to avoid conflict. Peace, wrote Hamilton Holt, editor of the *Independent*, in 1911, was "a practical political issue," one on which "it seems destined that America should lead." The peace movement was "no longer a little cult of cranks."

Musing on Lake Mohonk

Typically, its leaders had come to prominence during the business expansion of the late 19th-century Gilded Age, a term coined by one of Andrew Carnegie's confidants, Mark Twain. Few were veterans of war or the tempering trials of elective politics. But they were men used to telling others what was best for them.

Educators like Stanford's president David Starr Jordan and Columbia's Nicholas Murray Butler, who scorned the "useless sentimentalism" of older peace societies, joined the movement to stress *rational* solutions to international problems. Editors and publicists (Holt, Edwin D. Mead) promoted peace proposals. Lawyers, viewing peace as a legal challenge, were much in evidence.

None were more so than Elihu Root, a New York corporate attorney who served presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt as secretary of war (1899–1904) and state (1905–09). "Square Root" was stern, aloof, and a brilliant administrator, "the wisest man I ever knew," said Roosevelt. Around him grew a "Root cult" of lawyers and State Department officials like James Brown Scott, a former law professor, absorbed with peace-through-law ideas. During the years before World War I, these "legalists" dominated the movement. Their views captivated the man who did most to give the peace cause visibility, Andrew Carnegie.

Carnegie arrived in America in 1848, and started out as a \$1.20-a-week bobbin boy. By the century's end, the mills he built in the Pittsburgh area produced a fourth of the nation's Bessemer steel

and profits above \$40 million a year (in pre-income tax days). Carnegie's largesse to the cause of peace began even before the 1901 sale of his business for \$480 million to J. P. Morgan, which made Carnegie (said Morgan) the "richest man in the world." More than his money, Carnegie's personal force and his contacts with political leaders in America and Europe lent respectability to the movement.

Like other peace leaders, Carnegie shared the social-Darwinist philosophy that the strongest and "best" elements in society would thrive. He regarded Anglo-Saxon, Protestant ideals as the glory of civilization; wherever they were adopted, peace and order would follow. Among those who agreed were Alfred and Albert Smiley, Quakers and ardent Progressives who owned a hotel on upper New York State's Lake Mohonk, where they had often held conferences on improving conditions for Indians and Negroes. Persuaded that the old peace societies' lack of influence stemmed from their habit of decrying war without proposing remedies, the brothers hosted a meeting on peace in June 1895. The educators, editors, lawyers, businessmen, clergy, politicians, and generals invited were directed not to dwell on the "horrors of war or the doctrine of 'peace at all hazards.'" They should explore "scientific" ways of settling disputes.

Remember the *Alabama*

New York University Law School dean Austin Abbot argued that conflicts should be "submitted to human reason, and some competent arbiter shall decide what is right." At length, the conferees agreed that "the feasibility of arbitration as a substitute for war is now demonstrated." The Smileys decided to make the "Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration" an annual event, at which guests in black tie could carry on their deliberations while invigorated by fine cuisine and the bracing Catskill Mountains air.

Arbitration was not a new idea. During the fourth century B.C. the Greek historian Thucydides described as "criminal" nations that would not submit disputes to a "tribunal offering a righteous judgment." In 1306 a Norman lawyer, Pierre Dubois, called for a Congress of States, a court of arbitration that could use economic and military sanctions to maintain peace. In America, by the late 19th century the settlement of labor issues by third parties had won acceptance. Arbitration had also been used in international disputes.

One example was the *Alabama* case, involving a U.S. claim against Britain for damage caused during the Civil War by a Confederate raiding ship that sailed with British crewmen and arms. Eager to restore good relations with Washington, the British dropped an earlier refusal to arbitrate (because "national honor" was involved). In 1872 an arbitral commission awarded the U.S. government \$15.5 million for losses wrought by several British-backed raiders. America

and Britain, Carnegie asserted, had "taught the world Arbitration."

Even as the Smileys' guests were conferring at Lake Mohonk in 1895, President Grover Cleveland's Democratic administration jumped into a boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana (now Guyana) that London had refused to arbitrate. Cleveland was harassed both by charges that he was pro-British (anathema to Irish-American Democrats) and by congressional calls for arbitration. His secretary of state, Richard Olney, told London that under the Monroe Doctrine America was "practically sovereign" in the Western Hemisphere, and hinted that Congress would demand military action if the British did not arbitrate. When Lord Salisbury, the prime minister, demurred, Cleveland announced that Washington would decide the border issue and view British failure to comply as aggression.

The Lake Mohonk conferees, seeing Anglo-American rapprochement as a key to world peace, urged the two countries to negotiate an arbitration treaty covering future disputes. Although Salisbury thought arbitration "one of the great nostrums of the age," Britain was approaching a war with the Boers in South Africa. Peace with Washington looked attractive. In January 1897, Olney concluded an arbitration pact with the British ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote. Although the newly elected Republican president, William McKinley, endorsed it, the Senate rejected the treaty, out of a concern that it would limit U.S. sovereignty. Still, U.S. peace advocates saw the Olney-Pauncefote accord as a model for the future.

40 Bishops, 27 Millionaires

Indeed, "peace" seemed to be gaining momentum.

The year 1897 also brought Alfred Nobel's endowment of an international peace prize. With military costs soaring, in 1898 the Russian tsar, Nicholas II, invited all nations to a conference the following year to discuss "the great idea of universal peace."

Although that year would also see the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the conflict hardly ruffled U.S. peace advocates. A few pacifists were opposed; Alfred Love was burned in effigy in Philadelphia for his pains. But the jingoist view of McKinley's secretary of state John Hay that the fight against Spanish imperial oppression was "splendid" was widely shared. To American Peace Society secretary Benjamin Trueblood, the war was "a temporary disturbance." The Mormon Church, ending a half-century of pacifism, supported McKinley. Suffragist Elizabeth Cady Stanton said that "though I hate war," she would be "glad" to see Spain "swept from the face of the earth."

Focusing on the tsar's conference, due to convene in The Hague in May 1899, Boston clergyman Edward Everett Hale and publicist Edwin Mead began a journal, the *Peace Crusade*, to tout the event and build support for an international arbitration panel. At the confer-

HENRY FORD'S 'PEACE SHIP'

On November 24, 1915, at New York City's Biltmore Hotel, automaker Henry Ford faced waiting newsmen. "We're going to try to get the boys out of the trenches by Christmas!" he announced. "I've chartered a ship and some of us are going to Europe." Ford's ultimate aim: "To stop war for all times."

So began a strange 17-month odyssey. Shocked by the carnage of World War I and fearful that America would join it, Ford aimed to end the European conflagration with "faith and moral suasion." He would set up a conference of nonbelligerents who would keep sending peace proposals to the combatants—too proud to cease fire on their own—until acceptable terms were found.

The idea had come out of the International Congress of Women held earlier that year at The Hague. One participant, a stout Hungarian feminist-pacifist divorcée named Rosika Schwimmer, went to the United States to seek sponsorship. The Wilson White House turned her down. Not so Ford, who, at age 52, was so horrified by the war that he would "give all my money—and my life—to stop it." At the Biltmore, Ford said he had asked 100 "representative Americans"—state governors, businessmen, educators, peace workers—to join the conference project. Press coverage of the "flivver diplomacy" plan was unflattering. One headline: FORD CHARTERS ARK, PLANS RAID ON TRENCHES. Said a Boston *Traveler* editorial: "It is not Mr. Ford's purpose to make peace; he will assemble it." Although such invitees as Harvey Firestone, Helen Keller, and Luther Burbank wished Ford well, the only acceptee who was well known in Europe was Chicago reformer Jane Addams.

The "Ford Peace Ship"—the Scandinavian American Line's *Oscar II*—sailed from Hoboken on December 4, as a dockside band played "I Didn't Raise My Boy To Be a Soldier" and cheers rose from a crowd that included Thomas Edison and William Jennings Bryan. But during the 15-day voyage to Christiania (now Oslo), Norway, the 143 peace pilgrims—Ford and 68 conference delegates, 35 students, 28 journalists, and 11 hangers-on—were embroiled in what a news dispatch from the ship called "teapot tempests and hencoop hurricanes" on various issues. The delegates included "name" folk like Addams and *McClure's Magazine* publisher S. S. McClure, but most were obscure writers, teachers, clergymen, and activists—"the queerest lot,"

ence, the 26 delegations responded to the urging of the U.S. representative, former Cornell president Andrew D. White, to "give the world" the beginning of a "practical scheme of arbitration." A "Permanent Court of Arbitration" was created where countries could have disputes settled by third-party judges selected from a list. The American Peace Society's president, Robert Treat Paine, descendant of a signer of the Declaration of Independence, thought the Hague meeting transcended "any human event which has ever taken place."

There were many doubters, among them Theodore Roosevelt, who had succeeded McKinley as president in 1901. A strong navy and an "efficient, though small army" were still vital, he said. "No

wrote one observer, *New York Times* correspondent Elmer Davis.

Put off by the advance publicity—including the revelation that a “black bag” that Schwimmer carried did not, as intimated, contain messages of support by officials of the warring nations—European pacifists refused to embrace the expedition in Norway. Ford, weary of the squabbling and pleading influenza, sailed back to New York four days after *Oscar*'s arrival. As Schwimmer, styling herself the group's “expert adviser,” led a tour of neutral countries in search of backing, troubles mounted. The secretary of the Anti-War Council, an influential peace society based in the Netherlands, wrote to Ford that he was “familiar with Mrs. Schwimmer and her ways,” and was wary of extending any cooperation.

In February 1916, Schwimmer et al., having recruited unofficial representatives from Denmark, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands, organized the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation in Stockholm. After much wrangling, the delegates composed an *Appeal to the Belligerents* calling for, among other things, the creation of a world congress. The Appeal, like the conference itself, was well publicized—and ignored by both the Allies and their foes.

Back home, Ford soon forgot the peace mission. He had opposed military preparedness—“No boy would ever kill a bird if he didn't first have a sling-shot or a gun.” But, in February 1917, when Germany announced all-out submarine warfare in the Atlantic, he assured President Wilson that Ford plants would produce arms if needed. The mission was told that all Ford funding—he spent \$520,000—would be cut off on March 1. Six weeks after the end of what newsmen dubbed Ford's “grand tour pacifism”—and historian Walter Millis called “one of the few really generous and rational impulses of those insane years”—America was at war and the Yanks were bound for the battlefields of Europe.



Rosika Schwimmer

Hague Court will save us if we come short in these respects.” Privately, he disliked “the Carnegie crowd” and thought arbitration “nonsense.” With peace as with temperance, he wrote, the “professional advocates” tended toward “a peculiarly annoying form of egotistic lunacy.” Still, in 1905 Roosevelt cheered those advocates by naming as his secretary of state Elihu Root, who set about preparing for the second Hague conference, due in 1907.

As it approached, peace advocates held rallies in Chicago, Baltimore, St. Louis, and San Francisco. A four-day National Arbitration and Peace Congress in New York, underwritten by Carnegie, drew more than 40,000 observers; the 1,253 delegates, among them eight

cabinet members, two former presidential candidates, four Supreme Court justices, 19 members of Congress, 40 bishops, 10 mayors, 60 newspaper editors, 18 college and university presidents, and 27 millionaires, shuttled among sessions in Carnegie Hall and banquets at the Astor Hotel. Reflecting Root's influence, TR's message to the meeting endorsed arbitration as the best method "now attainable" for ending disputes. Washington would seek "a general arbitration treaty" and "power and permanency" for the Hague Court.

Root, Scott, and other legalists valued arbitration as a step toward a formal international court with permanent judges and an accepted legal code. Wars, Root argued, were best prevented not by arbiters, but by rulings on "questions of fact and law in accordance with rules of justice." Yet the 1907 Hague conference did not create a world court; delegates could not agree on how to select judges.

Taft's Lament

The legalists did not abandon that goal. But for the time being Root's focus shifted to bilateral arbitration treaties. A series of them (with Britain and six other countries) had been negotiated by Secretary Hay, and amended into meaninglessness by the Senate. Root felt that even weak pacts were better than none. He negotiated 24 that the Senate accepted; the treaties were watered down to exempt disputes affecting the "vital interests, independence, or honor" of the involved nations.

Prospects for arbitration rose after William Howard Taft, a conservative lawyer with close ties to the peace movement, succeeded Roosevelt in 1909. In a remarkable New York speech that year, Taft embraced treaties that did *not* exempt disputes involving "national honor" or "vital interests." Unlimited arbitration of international disputes "will be the great jewel of my administration," said Taft.

Carnegie, not previously a strong Taft backer, was thrilled. "No words from any Ruler of our time," he wrote the president, were so "laden with precious fruit." He decided to back Taft's treaties, and to finance a study/advocacy foundation, the Carnegie Endowment.

Although Taft did conclude general arbitration pacts with Britain and France, the president had mixed feelings on arbitration as a means of preventing war. It was "strange," Taft said later. In espousing arbitration even on matters of national honor, "I had no definite policy in view. I was inclined, if I remember rightly, merely to offset the antagonism [in Congress] to the four [new] battleships for which I was then fighting, and I threw that suggestion out merely to draw the sting of old Carnegie and other peace cranks." Now it was becoming "the main fact" of his term.

Taft campaigned in 24 states for his treaties, which the *Los Angeles Times* had called the most praiseworthy presidential initia-

tive since the Emancipation Proclamation. The opposition was led by Roosevelt, Mahan, and Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Henry Cabot Lodge (R.-Mass.). Lodge disliked both "mushy philanthropists" and the notion of creating a body that "might consist of foreigners" assuming powers that rightly belonged to "the President and the Senate." Roosevelt felt that the nation should never arbitrate matters "respecting its honor, independence, and integrity." Ending his friendship with Taft, TR ran against him as a "Bull Moose" Progressive in the 1912 presidential campaign.

In the Senate, Lodge led efforts to amend the arbitration pacts to death before passage. Then both Taft and TR lost the 1912 race to Democrat Woodrow Wilson. As for the treaties, Taft lamented that he hoped "the senators might change their minds, or that the people might change the Senate; instead of which they changed me."

Despite their setbacks at The Hague and at home, the legalists' influence in the movement expanded. Root and Scott had launched the American Society of International Law in 1906; Scott edited the *American Journal of International Law*. In 1907 Root helped establish an international court: the Central American Court of Justice, a regional dispute-settling body. Scott and Baltimore lawyer Theodore Marburg formed the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes in 1910; that year Root was made the Carnegie Endowment's first president, and in 1912 he became the first sitting or former U.S. secretary of state to win the Nobel Peace Prize.* Carnegie funds flowed to other organizations, such as the American Peace Society, which set up a Washington headquarters.

Swords into Plowshares

The arbitration advocates and legalists enjoyed proximity to power. Root once said that the Carnegie Endowment was "almost a division of the State Department, working in harmony [with it] constantly." But Woodrow Wilson's arrival in the White House was unsettling. Peace leaders, while pleased with Wilson's moralistic approach to foreign policy, were not sure where he stood. He had joined the American Peace Society, but he had not been active in the movement or comfortable with its leaders' hopes for arbitration and a world court.

When Wilson, as president, sent troops in 1914 to settle a border dispute with Mexico, some peace leaders called for arbitration (though most did not; nationalism seemed more important, particularly in the case of a smaller nation in the Western Hemisphere). They did not hail Wilson's choice as secretary of state: Indiana-born William Jennings Bryan, the three-time Democratic presidential can-

*The others: Frank B. Kellogg (1929), Cordell Hull (1945), George C. Marshall (1953), Henry A. Kissinger (1973). The only U.S. presidential winners: Theodore Roosevelt (1906) and Woodrow Wilson (1919).

didate and eccentric "Prince of Peace," who liked to give supporters miniature plowshares made from a melted-down sword. Bryan's favored antiwar device was "conciliation treaties," which would have nations submit disputes to an international commission for investigation before going to war; as he saw it, the study period, usually about a year, would allow passions to fade and peace to prevail.*

After August 1914, everything changed, including the peace movement.

Initially, the mainstream peace leaders and organizations opposed American intervention in the war. But they soon favored U.S. participation to save the hard-pressed British and French, to defend the idea of international law. The Carnegie Endowment, the American Peace Society, the Church Peace Union, and the New York Peace Society were all ahead of Wilson as he gradually veered from peace candidate in 1916 (his reelection slogan: "He Kept Us Out of War") to warrior in April 1917, when he committed the nation to a struggle that would "vindicate the principles of peace and justice."

Women, Wobblies, Social Workers

Many Progressives, worried that a war effort would eclipse domestic reform, also veered around—with a nudge from philosopher John Dewey. He wrote in the *New Republic* that the war had come at a "plastic juncture" in history and could well yield benefits, such as progress in "science for social purposes." The mainstream press, especially after America declared war on Germany, was not gentle to diehard peace advocates. When Columbia fired two faculty members for opposing the sending of conscripts to Europe, the *New York Times* said that the university had "done its duty."

With the peace establishment's turn toward intervention, antiwar activity was increasingly dominated by political figures previously not active on foreign policy issues—notably on the Left.

Among them was labor organizer Eugene V. Debs, founder of the American Socialist Party and the International Workers of the World (the "Wobblies"), who opposed U.S. involvement in the European struggle. He was jailed for three years after giving an antiwar speech in 1918, joining more than 1,500 other Americans arrested under a wartime antisediton law. Women's rights activists concentrated on peace questions: Jane Addams, Carrie Chapman Catt, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and Anna Howard Shaw opposed what Catt called the movement's "over-masculinized management." A Woman's Peace Party emerged in 1915. That year, too, New York City social workers, socialists, and union members formed the American

*Bryan negotiated several such "cooling-off" treaties, but World War I erupted as they were being signed. Britain signed less than a month after the shooting began. (The Germans never signed, but Bryan somehow felt they had endorsed his idea "in principle.")

Union to agitate against any U.S. military build-up. But they were not the kindred spirits of the lawyers and legalists who had sought to eliminate war before 1914. Nor did they ever command a wide following among intellectuals and prominent politicians; their turn would come much later.

Essentially, the "establishment" peace advocates like Root, Scott, Holt, Carnegie, and Butler were *conservative* reformers. They hoped to maintain the relative stability in Great Power relations that had marked the late 19th century, and firmly believed that the use of Anglo-American legal concepts could accomplish that. During the deceptive calm of the prewar years, they had become increasingly optimistic, encouraged by their own prestige and the acceptance of many of their proposals by high U.S. officials. But while they considered themselves "internationalists," they ignored violence in colonial areas, accepted U.S. preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, and, most important, failed to recognize Europe's growing rivalries and the rise of German militarism.

For a time, their views were often echoed abroad. Three years before Sarajevo, the London Peace Society's secretary declared that "never were Peace prospects so promising." But those who dealt with the world as it was saw things differently. Speaking of arbitration, Lord Salisbury expressed amazement at "those who could have believed in such an expedient for bridling the ferocity of human passions."

Elihu Root, as president of the Carnegie Endowment board until 1925, continued to believe. So did James Brown Scott and Nicholas Murray Butler. Looking to the future, when Europe was in flames early in 1915, ex-president Taft, Hamilton Holt, Theodore Marburg, and Harvard's president A. Lawrence Lowell established the League to Enforce Peace, dedicated to devising measures (e.g., economic sanctions) to *compel* compliance with the verdicts of a world court. Among those opposed was Root, who had been awarded his Nobel Prize in part for his work on arbitration.

As World War I raged on, Root and James Brown Scott remained convinced that "world opinion" would supply all the enforcement power an international court might need. However, like many others, Andrew Carnegie, who died at 83 in 1919, the year after the Armistice, never recovered from the shock of 1914. "All my air-castles," he said, "have fallen about me like a house of cards."
