

**THE
WILSON
QUARTERLY**
WINTER
1977

**A NATIONAL REVIEW
OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION**

WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
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Editor's Comment

We welcome amplifications, counter-arguments, and corrective data from *Quarterly* readers; their letters add to the variety of ideas and solid information which this magazine was established to promote. On the closing pages of this issue appear the first such communications, including a refreshing postscript by historian Thomas Cripps to Russell Lynes's "Highbrow, Lowbrow, Middlebrow" (published in our Autumn 1976 issue). This section will be expanded.

Such dialogue is important. We cast our net widely, seeking diversity of viewpoint and scholarly approach in the Periodicals section, in our book reviews, in our longer essays. No single *Quarterly* essay or group of essays can supply the last word. We present political scientist Aaron Wildavsky's "cautionary tale," written with Jack Knott, as much for what it says about the complexity of government as for what it says about Mr. Carter's theory of government; Mr. Wildavsky's views are not shared by all his peers. Similarly, those social scientists who here discuss recent changes in the American family reflect some, but not all, scholarly approaches in the field.

Our essays, then, are intended primarily to "open up" subjects of importance or to reexamine current developments from new scholarly perspectives. Each Background Books survey, besides providing a guide to further reading, is designed to complement the essays by signaling the existence of other opinions and information. We do not regard any subject as exhausted by one *Quarterly* exposure; we expect to publish more essays on the Soviet Union, for example, by other specialists in the future. So the dialogue will continue, even among scholarly contributors to the *Quarterly*.

A last note. Many subscribers report tardy delivery of the Autumn issue. The explanation: The Postal Service was swamped in October by the diversion of business from United Parcel Service, idled by a strike. Second-class mail, including this magazine, was considerably delayed, while most first-class mail went through. As a result, some subscribers received their *Quarterly* bills before they received the first *Quarterly*. To these readers, in particular, we express our regrets and apologies.

Peter Braestrup

PERIODICALS

*Reviews of articles from periodicals
and specialized journals here and abroad*

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

Making Sense Out of Welfare

"Welfare, Poverty and Jobs: A Practical Approach" by Brock Adams, in *Challenge* (Sept.-Oct. 1976), 901 N. Broadway, White Plains, N.Y. 10603.

The present welter of income-assistance programs for the poor are little more than "stop-gap measures" that fail to provide any appreciable degree of constructive aid, says U.S. Representative Brock Adams (D.-Wash.), chairman of the House Committee on the Budget.

Predicting a protracted public debate over welfare, poverty, and jobs in the next two years, he proposes a federally financed and administered program of grants, rebatable tax credits, and tax relief for the poor that would provide a basic income floor at approximately 75 per cent of the poverty level (now slightly under \$5,500 for a non-farm family of four) and also include work incentives.

Social insurance programs (e.g., social security, unemployment insurance) have been stretched and distorted to the point that their effectiveness is strained and their financial soundness placed in jeopardy, Adams contends. And the multitude of food, health, child-care, housing, and other in-kind programs for the poor are a "threat to maximum work effort and a barrier to consistent welfare policy."

Adams says his alternative, drafted in 1974 by the Joint Economic Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, offers greater flexibility and equity. It would replace the existing food-stamp program and AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children). Federal management would relieve states of a heavy financial and administrative burden and allow them to concentrate on providing social services and administering supplementary benefits for a smaller caseload.

While adding between \$8 and \$15 billion to net federal outlays, such a welfare reform plan, Adams argues, would cost less than continuing Congress's present practice of ad hoc expansion of individual programs. He calls his general income supplement "essential" if a federal jobs program (e.g., as embodied in the pending Humphrey-Hawkins bill) is to avoid luring large numbers of low-paid workers into the public sector: "Supplementing the wages of workers with low and modest incomes is cheaper than providing them with public jobs, is less disruptive of the private economy, and is more practical administratively. Special public-service jobs should be reserved for persons with long-term difficulties in the labor market."

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*Federalism
Triumphant*

"The Court Found That Congress Exceeded Its Power" by Sarah C. Carey, in *Nation's Cities* (Sept. 1976), 1620 Eye St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

In June 1976, the Supreme Court ruled 5 to 4 (in *National League of Cities v. Usery*) that Congress had exceeded its power in extending the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and municipal employees. This "unprecedented" interpretation of the Constitution is likely to have far-reaching impact on federal-state relations, writes Carey, a Washington attorney formerly associated with the National Urban Coalition.

The key issue was not that the FLSA provisions would increase the costs of state and local government by millions of dollars. Rather, it was the effect that the "budget crunch" resulting from these outlays would have on functions essential to a state or local government's independent existence. Left still undefined is the question of precisely when and how the federal government can legitimately interfere with non-federal governmental functions.

The Court's decision had the immediate effect of absolving states and localities of the costs involved in implementing the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act. But it remains to be seen whether public-employee unions will not achieve the same end by persuading Congress to require state and local governments to observe the FLSA provisions as a condition for receiving revenue-sharing funds and other federal grants.

However, Carey calls the Court's decision "a validation of the principles of federalism" and predicts that it may well serve "as the basis for additional decisions preserving state powers and even restoring authority that has eroded over the past decades."

*Getting a Handle
On Technology*

"Technology Policy and Democracy" by Barry M. Casper, in *Scientific American* (Oct. 1976), 415 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.

Neither a proposed "science court" nor forums in which advocates debate the scientific aspects of public-policy proposals would be sufficient to establish democratic control of technology in America, argues Casper, a physicist at Carleton College.

Proponents of the "science court" idea, he says, assume it is desirable to separate the scientific from the non-scientific elements of policy issues (e.g., the anti-ballistic-missile and SST debates), when, in fact, this tends to give technical matters more significance than they sometimes deserve. The use of expert advocates to argue policy issues in adversary proceedings can be useful, but asking other scientists to act as judges in a "science court" ruling on the "presumptive validity" of scientific "facts" is potentially subject to abuse.

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Adversary forums, when properly structured, can promote the evaluation of expert opinion, generate debate, and further the tradition of public dialogue on policy issues. "Public adversary processes offer the best hope for a democratic alternative to 'presumptive validity,'" says Casper, who proposes such techniques for congressional hearings (where opposing experts now rarely confront each other) and on television as a public service.

Although such a mechanism might improve the quality of information provided to the public, its effects may be inconsequential if the decision-making process itself is not substantially altered. Casper sees two problems which must be overcome: The lack of "accountability" and the regrettable fact that long-range federal planning for technology is currently dominated "by alliances of bureaucrats in federal agencies, technocrats in industry and government laboratories, and their congressional patrons."

Zero-Basing the Georgia Budget

"A Look at Zero-Base Budgeting—The Georgia Experience" by George S. Minnier and Roger H. Hermanson, in *Atlanta Economic Review* (July-Aug. 1976), School of Business Administration, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Ga. 30303.

In contrast with traditional "incremental" budgeting systems, zero-base budgeting requires budget planners to "start from zero" by identifying anew each year every function of each government agency and the costs associated with each.

Governor Jimmy Carter introduced zero-base budgeting to Georgia in 1972 and predicted that the procedure would soon be copied throughout the nation. Accounting professors Minnier and Hermanson, of Georgia State University's School of Business Administration, studied the Georgia experience and, in terms of more effective government, concluded that "zero-base budgeting appears to have served the best interests of the state."

Their interviews with state government department heads, however, revealed varying degrees of dissatisfaction with the system, chiefly because of an apparent lack of say in the decision to implement it. Of 13 department heads interviewed (in 1974), only two indicated strong support for zero-base budgeting and none could provide an instance in which the new budgeting system had reallocated money in their own departments. Carter argued that the reallocation of funds was largely due to his Executive Reorganization Act of 1972 but that "the detection of need for consolidating similar functions within state government" came from zero-base budgeting.

Overall, the authors conclude, zero-base budgeting in Georgia provides improved financial planning prior to budget preparation, higher

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quality management information, and increased involvement of personnel "at the activity level" in the state's budgeting process. The major disadvantage is the added time and effort required for budget preparation.

Lifetime Legislators

"The Essential Reform" by David Lebedoff, in *Harper's* (Oct. 1976), 2 Park Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016.

Our present system of congressional reapportionment is a disaster, says Lebedoff, a Minneapolis lawyer and treasurer of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota. By leaving reapportionment to be determined by state legislatures, single-party rule in every district is virtually assured.

"The result is a Congress in which nearly every seat is permanently safe," Lebedoff argues. (In 1972, despite the biggest presidential landslide in recent history, only three per cent of incumbent seats in the House were lost.) With little real chance for partisan contest, political parties atrophy. One-party dominance of congressional districts has put the House of Representatives out of touch with the people and eager to avoid tough decisions that can be ducked with impunity. The controversial issues (abortion, busing) have gone to the federal courts by default.

Thanks to this system, "we are burdened with lifetime legislators, whose tenure is threatened only by senility, death, or scandal," writes Lebedoff. "They can fudge and avoid and delay all they want, and not be held accountable."

His solution? Take congressional reapportionment away from the state legislators and give it to a federal reapportionment board with a general mandate to avoid single-party dominance.

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*Triangular
Asymmetry*

"Trilateralism: 'Partnership for What?'" by Richard H. Ullman, in *Foreign Affairs* (Oct. 1976), 428 East Preston Ct., Baltimore, Md. 21202.

"Trilateralism" is the fashionable word among those American specialists (e.g., Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Columbia professor and former director of the Trilateral Commission) who believe that closer coordination among the United States, Japan, and Western Europe in dealings with the communists and the Third World can help resolve many of America's foreign-policy problems in the 1970s.

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But Ullman, professor of international affairs at Princeton and director of a Council on Foreign Relations "1980s Project," asks whether there is enough continuity and mutuality of interest among the "trilateral" nations to make the idea work. They use very different decision-making processes; trilateral matters evoke varying degrees of interest and approval among their citizens. And as countries like Mexico, Brazil, India, and Iran join the "advanced nation club," the shared economic characteristics which now distinguish the West and Japan from the rest of the world will become less distinct.

Moreover, the top-priority relationship between Washington and Moscow inevitably means that consultations in NATO are overshadowed by bilateral discussions between the two superpowers. Similarly, U.S. relations with Peking are too heavily influenced by the American-Soviet relationship to be conducted in close harmony with Tokyo. While more effective inter-allied consultations and coordination are clearly possible, says Ullman, "there is, and will continue to be, less to trilateralism than meets the ear."

Agonizing Reappraisals

"U.S.-Israeli Policies: Reading the Signs for '77" by Mark A. Bruzonsky, in *Worldview* (Sept. 1976), 170 E. 64th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

In the spring of 1975, the United States completed a much-publicized "reassessment" of its Middle East policy that was begun in the days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Bruzonsky, a Washington writer and consultant on international affairs, asserts that the results of that study are "nicely camouflaged" but nevertheless clear in a Brookings Institution report of December, 1975, entitled "Toward Peace in the Middle East."

The report was prepared by a study group headed by Roger W. Heyns, former chancellor of the University of California at Berkeley, and signed by such influential American Jewish community leaders as Philip Klutznick and Rita Hauser. It proposed: an Israeli pullback to its 1967 borders; Israeli recognition of the principle of Palestinian self-determination; resolution of all outstanding issues (probably at Geneva), including the status of Jerusalem; step-by-step implementation, with multilateral and bilateral (U.S.-Israeli) security guarantees.

It is within this framework that the United States is likely to press for a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1977, Bruzonsky says, making diplomatic confrontation between Washington and Tel Aviv almost inevitable. Pressure on Israel was momentarily eased by the Lebanese civil war and the American elections. But Israeli and U.S. goals are now firmly set on a collision course, says Bruzonsky, who predicts that the Jewish state "will sooner or later be forced to alter basic political positions."

Ultra-nationalist factions within the Israeli government are still determined to force a confrontation with Washington over the occupied

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territories or the status of Jerusalem, in hopes of deterring further movement toward a settlement imposed by Washington, Bruzonsky says. But Israel is militarily and economically more dependent than ever on the United States, and there has been massive erosion of past U.S. support, both in Congress and in the American Jewish community. Israel faces possible diplomatic isolation, and perhaps greater dependence on the nuclear option.

Coöperative War

"Coalition Warfare" by Robert W. Komer, in *Army* (Sept. 1976), 1529 18th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Following "the trauma of the Vietnam War," the U.S. Army is today concentrating on the defense of Western Europe. But Komer, a Rand Corporation analyst and former White House staffer under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, thinks the Army is neglecting the most crucial part of the NATO mission—the special needs of "coalition warfare." To wage war coöperatively, U.S. forces and their NATO counterparts must harmonize "doctrine, tactics, and procedures," and use standardized or interchangeable equipment. If land war broke out in Europe today, U.S. troops would be hard put to provide artillery support for allied forces, read their allies' maps, or even communicate with them by radio. In past wars, we improvised and got by. But today, "there will be no time to *ad hoc* it again after war starts"—the Warsaw Pact powers would attack too swiftly and NATO forces would be heavily outnumbered.

Preparing for coalition war offers financial advantages as well. Military budgets could be stretched further if NATO members shared the costs of developing expensive weapons systems. "At a conservative estimate, it could take 20 years to create an ideal coalition structure from the present mess," Komer argues, but the process must begin soon, with Washington in the lead.

*Arms Control in
A Nuclear World*

"Who Will Have the Bomb" by Thomas C. Schelling, in *International Security* (Summer 1976), 9 Divinity Ave., Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

By the 1990s, few if any countries will lack the technology and trained personnel to make nuclear weapons out of indigenously produced fissionable material, predicts Schelling, professor of political economy at Harvard. Prior possession or tests of a nuclear explosive will not be the decisive factor—rather, it will be the speed with which a nation can assemble an arsenal of nuclear weapons, in the right place, with the right delivery system.

The fact of proliferation will not make any less important, or even less effective, the kinds of institutional commitments, safeguards, and precedents that constitute present-day arms control. However, the

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U.S. policy emphasis must shift from "physical denial and technological secrecy" to strategies that curb the incentives to use and/or possess nuclear weapons of terrorist organizations as well as nation states. Possession itself can be "mischievous," but the most decisive inhibitions are those on the actual use of nuclear weapons (e.g., fear of retaliation and a variety of sanctions that may be directed at countries that violate treaties or abandon non-nuclear status).

In this context, Schelling believes that most countries—China and the U.S.S.R. included—will accept international arrangements to guard against diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to weapons. But two risks will remain: the theft of explosive nuclear materials and the more serious problem posed by military revolts and internal disorder within a nuclear-armed country.

One dilemma is the extent to which our own sophisticated safeguards against accidental or unauthorized detonation should be shared with countries not bound by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. While the United States may not wish to reward these nations by offering them advanced technology to guard against misuse, some of the most effective American safeguards involve electronic locking devices and other design features which render a bomb inoperative if tampered with.

The Legalties of Economic Coercion

"The Arab Oil Weapon: A Reply and Reaffirmation of Illegality" by Jordan J. Paust and Albert P. Blaustein, in *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* (vol. 15, no. 1, 1976), Box 8, School of Law, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 10027.

The only published legal argument that defends the Arab "oil weapon" and the blacklisting of foreign firms as legitimate weapons of political action is a 1974 article (*American Journal of International Law*) by Ibrahim Shihata, legal advisor to the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development. Shihata describes the withholding of oil from certain states as an "instrument of flexible persuasion" complementing other Arab military and diplomatic measures in the struggle to achieve a favorable resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

No Arab government which employs the "oil weapon" and blacklisting has produced a "white paper" or any other legal justification for its action, say Paust and Blaustein, law professors at the University of Houston and at Rutgers, respectively.

Rebutting Shihata's principal argument, the authors cite the United Nations Charter and the customary law of reprisal as requiring "that any strategy of coercion, economic or otherwise, be proportionate to the 'necessity' of the situation." They likewise reject Shihata's contention that U.N. Charter provisions designed to regulate international coercion are inapplicable in time of war. Shihata's claim that oil contracts and other trade agreements are "political favors" extended by

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the Arab nations—and can be withdrawn at any time—“seems to be contrary to Moslem law as well as to civil and common law contract principles.”

Finally, the authors argue, it is archaic and contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to contend that curbing the production of primary commodities is purely a sovereign, internal affair.

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Storm Signals Fly For Multinationals

“The Washington Struggle Over Multinationals” by Richard L. Barovick, in *Business and Society Review* (Summer 1976), 870 Seventh Ave., New York, N.Y. 10019.

Why are America's great multinational corporations under attack these days, who are their enemies, and what can they do in self-defense?

Barovick, editor of the *Washington International Business Report*, suggests that the public controversy began in Congress with the debate over the proposed Foreign Trade and Investment Act of 1971, a bill calling for import quotas, control over export of U.S. capital and technology, and heavier taxation of foreign income earned by American corporations. The Act, sponsored by Senator Vance Hartke (D-Ind.) and Representative James A. Burke (D-Mass.), with enthusiastic labor support, failed to pass or even be voted out of committee, thanks to heavy lobbying by the multinationals; and later disclosures of possible influence by individual multinational firms on American economic and foreign policy prompted a new look at multinationals by several diverse groups.

The AFL-CIO, with its enormous lobbying power, is the multinationals' most formidable foe. The unions contend that the goals of the multinationals no longer parallel American national interests and that their expansion overseas has weakened the job market and the industrial base at home while stimulating foreign economies. The labor movement has allies with other complaints, ranging from tax reformers and *pro bono* law firms to Nader-type public-interest groups, church organizations, and the New Left.

Chiding the multinationals for their poor public relations and lack of foresight, Barovick warns that their headaches are not going to disappear. The American multinationals, he says, must seek outside advice and learn to anticipate such questions as improper payments to officials abroad and the role of American corporations in countries where human rights are violated. Even then, such issues as taxation of foreign income remain focal points of domestic political hostility toward the multinationals and dim their long-range prospects.

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*The Debtor's
Dilemma*

"Primrose Path to Bankruptcy" by Vern Countryman, in *The Nation* (Sept. 4, 1976), 333 Sixth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10014.

The Federal Bankruptcy Act falls far short of giving the debtor the "fresh start" the Supreme Court said was one of the law's primary purposes, writes Countryman, professor of law at Harvard. It's like "applying a Band-Aid to a gaping wound."

Originally passed by Congress in 1898, the Act was last revised significantly in 1938 and still reflects the attitudes and practices of an earlier era. For example, archaic state laws still prevail regarding the property a debtor may keep to make his "fresh start." In Connecticut, the debtor may retain (as he could in 1821) "ten bushels each of Indian corn and rye," and South Carolina exempts, as it has since 1895, a \$1,000 homestead.

The bankruptcy problem is growing rapidly. The number of Americans applying for remedy under the federal act rose from 10,000 in 1946 to 255,000 in 1975. (A Brookings Institution study found that the typical bankrupt is a 36-year-old married industrial worker with three years of high-school education, three children, yearly income of \$5,200 and \$5,000 in debts.) Most overburdened debtors seek "straight" bankruptcy under which their nonexempt assets are liquidated and the proceeds, after payment of court costs, are applied to the claims of creditors. The debtor preserves what exempt assets he can under prevailing state law and obtains a bankruptcy discharge of his debts.

A federal Bankruptcy Commission studied the problem for two years and proposed some major reforms in 1973. Now Congress is looking at a variety of suggested changes. Some would treat consumer debtors more harshly, others would ease their plight. Enactment of legislation that might improve the present "Band-Aid" law, says Countryman, is at least a year or two away.

*Occupational Sexism
In the Soviet Union*

"Occupational Segregation and Public Policy: A Comparative Analysis of American and Soviet Patterns" by Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, in *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* (vol. 1, no. 3, Part II), 5801 Ellis Ave., Chicago, Ill. 60637.

There are many similarities in the patterns of female employment in the United States and the Soviet Union, despite much-publicized differences in approach to the issue of women and work.

In America, says Lapidus, professor of sociology and political science at Berkeley, the de facto segregation of most women into low-status, low-paying jobs reflects a culture which traditionally has upheld male primacy in the economic realm. Such traditions are expressly repudiated by the Soviet regime, which officially promotes full equality for

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women and supports their dual role as workers and mothers through generous maternity legislation and child-care programs. Thus, 85 per cent of all Soviet females between the ages of 20 and 55 are employed, almost all of them full time. (In the U.S., 41.3 per cent of the women between 20 and 55 are employed full time.)

Nevertheless, sizeable inequalities exist in the Soviet Union. Occupations with large numbers of low-status, clerical personnel are dominated by women (e.g., workers in the credit and state-insurance fields are 81 per cent female; in government and economic administration it is 63 per cent). Eighty-five per cent of all medical personnel are women, but men hold half the top jobs (chief physicians and executives of medical institutions). Only one-fourth of the junior scientific workers and assistants, and two per cent of the university professors and members of scientific academies are women. Lapidus reaches the obvious conclusion: "Economic participation does not, in and of itself, guarantee equality of status and authority for women."

A Home Is Not a House

"Mobile Homes: High Cost Housing in the Low Income Market" by Philip Weitzman, in the *Journal of Economic Issues* (Sept. 1976), 509-J Business Administration Building, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pa. 16802.

More than 9 million Americans now live in mobile homes (once known as "house trailers"), mostly on permanent sites. With no significant help from the federal government, mobile homes have captured a major share of the housing market (22 per cent of total housing starts and 33 per cent of single-family home starts in 1973). Weitzman, an economist at the City University of New York, argues that mobile homes are not the bonanza for low-income families that they appear to be.

High annual finance charges of 11 to 14 per cent on an installment purchase contract, rapid depreciation (15 years of useful life as a primary residence), and little or no built-up equity make the \$7,000 mobile home (average 1972 price) no bargain for the home buyer who can scrape together the \$2,905 down payment for an FHA-insured \$27,600 house (1972 prices).

Mobile-home purchasers (usually young married couples or the elderly) benefit from lower move-in costs (down payment, closing costs and furniture costs average \$1,675 for the mobile home and \$6,525 for the small house). But they get no chance to build up an equity in an asset that tends to appreciate in value.

The mobile-home boom, Weitzman notes, has done little to ease the housing problems of the very poor and minorities confined to central cities. Yet by offering blue-collar workers cheap housing in mobile-

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home parks, these dwellings relieve the pressure on government agencies to compel economic and racial desegregation of the suburbs. They also indirectly benefit the middle-class home buyer by diverting demand for housing credit from the real-estate mortgage market to commercial lending institutions which finance mobile-home purchases.

To give families with annual incomes below \$6,500 a better housing break, Weitzman urges federal intervention in the mortgage market to help reduce down payments for conventional low-cost homes and revives the controversial suggestion of the President's Commission on Urban Housing (1968) that the federal government acquire land for lease for subsidized housing unencumbered by local building codes and zoning ordinances.

RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

Energy by the Acre

"The Long-Range Prospects for Solar-Derived Fuels" by William G. Pollard, in *American Scientist* (Sept.-Oct. 1976), 345 Whitney Ave., New Haven, Conn. 06511.

The long-range prospects for unlocking the solar energy in plant life to produce solid, liquid, and gaseous fuels look promising. So writes Pollard, a physicist and retired executive director of Oak Ridge Associated Universities.

He predicts that methanol and ethanol, made from plant material, will become competitive with gasoline when and if prices for crude oil reach \$50 per barrel, or \$8 per million Btu, in 1975 dollars. The basic method for producing both solid fuels and methanol from biomass is pyrolysis, a process in which wood, leaves, grass, or similar materials (e.g., the organic component of municipal solid wastes) are heated in a closed container by partial burning of the feedstock with air or oxygen introduced in a controlled manner.

The products are a low-Btu gas, volatile vapors, and a solid carboniferous char (a low-ash, sulfur-free fuel with a heat value equal to that of Eastern bituminous coal). The vapors, when condensed, can be mixed with the ground char to form a free-flowing powder, or "char oil." Typically, 450 pounds of char oil are obtained from each ton of undried raw feedstock having a moisture content of 50 per cent.

Liquid alcohol fuels for cars and trucks can be produced by pyrolysis (operating at higher temperatures), by enzymatic hydrolysis, or fermentation (5 million barrels of ethanol can be produced from 3 million tons of cellulose from municipal or agricultural wastes). Methane gas can also be generated from agricultural and animal wastes by anaerobic digestion which has advantages over char-oil production because

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the leftover sludge is rich in plant nutrients and can be used as fertilizer.


Pollard foresees the day when "farmers will derive nearly as much income from the sale of their annual product to an energy-conversion industry as they do from the sale of food and fibre, when forest management will yield an annual income from energy feedstocks comparable to that from logging and pulpwood production."

**Quantities of Quads
Beneath the Gulf**

"A Huge New Reserve of Natural Gas Comes Within Reach" by William M. Brown, in *Fortune* (Oct. 1976), 541 North Fairbanks Ct., Chicago, Ill. 60611.

With public debate focused sharply on the potentials and hazards of atomic power, American scientists are now quietly investigating a vast new domestic source of energy that could surpass the nation's immense coal reserves.

This energy is in the form of methane—CH₄, the simplest natural hydrocarbon and the chief constituent of natural gas. It lies dissolved under pressure in reservoirs of hot salt water deep beneath the Gulf of Mexico and coastal areas of Texas and Louisiana. Brown, a staff member of the Hudson Institute, reports that the U.S. Geological Survey estimated in 1975 that geopressurized salt water in onshore reservoirs alone contained 24,000 quads of methane within normal



Adapted from Fortune map by Joe Argenciano based on one prepared by Paul H. Jones of Louisiana State University.

Vast quantities of natural gas dissolved under pressure in reservoirs of hot salt water lie deep beneath the Gulf of Mexico and coastal areas of Texas, Louisiana, and northeastern Mexico.

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drilling range. (A quad is an energy unit equal to one quadrillion Btu's. The United States currently consumes about 70 quads of energy a year.) Other energy specialists have concluded that the energy locked into the geothermal methane zone beneath the Gulf may total a phenomenal 105,000 quads.

The oil and gas industry is aware of the methane-laden water but has long considered it merely an expensive nuisance. The 1973 oil embargo and subsequent price increases for all forms of energy suddenly made methane commercially interesting; the hot water in which it is contained is also a potential source of geothermal power.

The technology for drilling and completing wells and separating the natural gas from the water already exists. The environmental problems arise from the probable subsidence of the land as water is withdrawn and from the need to dispose of great quantities of hot salt water drawn from the earth.

A Lawyer Looks At Outer Space

"Earth Exposure to Martian Matter: Back Contamination Procedures and International Quarantine Regulations" by George S. Robinson, in *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* (vol. 15, no. 1, 1976), Box 8, School of Law, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 10027.

As the Soviets demonstrated with their unmanned lunar program, the technology exists to recover soil samples from alien planets by means of unmanned spacecraft. NASA is now planning a Mars Surface Sample Return mission; by the early 1980s, the earth's biosphere could be subjected to extraterrestrial organisms with the potential for creating a serious "biological accident," according to Robinson, assistant counsel of the Smithsonian Institution and author of the first interdisciplinary study of the scientific, legal, and administrative steps taken by the United States to protect the earth's biosphere from extraterrestrial contaminants.

With space exploration evolving almost totally for reasons of national prestige and commercial exploitation, it is not at all clear that the legal problems involved in warding off biological contamination can be resolved in an international forum before the first NASA launch date in 1980. For one thing, quarantine and its application to persons (e.g., an astronaut exposed to contamination while conducting earth orbital space-lab tests of Martian material) "can shatter the integrity of basic provisions in the United States Constitution if authority to quarantine is not drafted with care and precision," says Robinson. What official, for example, has authority to apprehend, detain, and quarantine indefinitely a person exposed to Martian matter?

Since Martian contaminants would first be introduced into international airspace and waters, the United States should take the lead

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in establishing a multinational agreement dealing with space activities and quarantine protocol, jurisdiction, legislation, and regulations. Robinson offers a detailed draft agreement which, as a minimum, forces communication among interested parties.

*A Pessimistic Look
At Nuclear Terror*

"Nuclear Sabotage" by Michael Flood, in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (Oct. 1976), 1020-24 E. 58th St., Chicago, Ill. 60637.

If terrorism is partly theater, then nuclear terror makes for gripping theater. Flood, a chemist at the University of London, predicts increasing threats to nuclear power facilities by terrorists bent on blackmail and public attention.

No nuclear installation has yet been sabotaged in such a way as to release radioactivity, but Flood lists a total of 11 attacks, mostly bombings, against nuclear installations and facilities in the United States and abroad since 1969. Another 23 threats and hoaxes were directed at facilities in the United Kingdom between 1966 and 1975. More than 175 such threats were aimed at similar installations in the United States, including one by a hijacker who, on Nov. 12, 1972, vowed to crash a plane into the experimental reactor complex at Oak Ridge, Tenn. There have also been more than 100 acts of vandalism and sabotage at nuclear plants in this country.

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*On the Trail of
The Livable City*

"The Limits of Suburban Growth" by David R. Goldfield, with comments by Joseph Zikmund and Jeffrey K. Hadden, in *Urban Affairs Quarterly* (Sept. 1976), Sage Publications, Inc., St. George's House, 44 Hatton Garden, London EC1N8ER.

The city-to-suburb exodus that marked the 1960s may have ended with revitalized cities luring back former residents and even attracting a few in-migrants, writes Goldfield, professor of environmental and urban systems at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.

Using the Washington SMSA (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area) as a model, Goldfield bases his conclusions on four premises: that with birth rates declining and more women entering the job market, there will be an increasing demand for affordable, high-density dwellings; that inflation, high interest rates, and climbing construction

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costs have stunted the growth of suburbia; that congestion, pollution, and even higher gas prices make a decline in "automobility" inevitable; and that rehabilitation of city housing, the availability of rapid public transportation, and the spread of urban problems to suburbia make the city an increasingly attractive place to live for the middle class.

Challenging Goldfield, Zikmund, a political scientist at the Illinois Institute of Technology and Sociology, and Hadden, a University of Virginia sociologist, argue that demographic shifts in the Washington area are not representative of the nation because of the huge federal presence there. (The "singles revolution" has helped make one-fifth of all households in the area "single households"; average household size has dropped from 3.22 persons in 1968 to 3.03 today; the birth rate in the Washington SMSA fell by 40 per cent between 1960 and 1970.) Zikmund and Hadden note separately that in other areas the dispersal of industry to the suburbs opens new, nearby job opportunities, encouraging continued suburban growth, while most cities are still doing little to create attractive residential environments.

Good inner-city housing is not cheap, says Zikmund, especially "when one adds fix-up costs, crime insurance and parking costs." Hadden adds that only if lower birth rates become permanent will demand for high-density housing be stimulated. He believes that Americans have accepted higher gasoline prices and that the drift outward toward cheaper land will probably continue.

In a rebuttal, Goldfield argues that the Washington, D.C., area may be the harbinger of future trends precisely because it is an atypical metropolis. "As the fastest-growing region in the 1960s, it led America's transition to a suburban nation," he writes. As in Minneapolis, Baltimore, and Jacksonville, the local government has joined bankers, builders, and landlords to rehabilitate run-down residences by collectively using the financial means available. Washington will not experience a new building boom and thus relieve the area's housing shortage. But with huge carrying charges and local antipathy stalling apartment construction in suburbia, Washington, like New York City, offers many spacious, old row houses that can be rehabilitated and subdivided to equal the per-acre density of high-rise public housing projects.

Pricing Education

"The Value of College As Seen by a Non-Economist" by Harold Howe II, in *The College Board Review* (Summer 1976), Box 2815, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan once recalled the advice an Oxford professor offered his students—that the only purpose of a university education is to know "when a man is talking rot."

Howe, the Ford Foundation's vice president for education and research, goes considerably further in arguing against economists who now seek to measure the value of a college degree solely in "cost

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benefit" terms. While acknowledging that the material rewards and job opportunities for college graduates are declining, he argues that advanced education can enrich the personal lives of students and contribute significantly to their future involvement in civic affairs. The investment of both personal and public funds "is as justified for the development of personal and civic attributes as it is for the economic."

Much of the present concern with higher education seems to be with what it costs and how to pay for it. But too little thought has been given to the possibilities of restructuring an educational process which occupies many Americans from the age of five to 22. Howe suggests dropping a year from high school and a year from college; he would add programs at the pre-kindergarten level and the equivalent of one year of free higher education for all adults, to be used all at once or in courses taken at different times over a period of years.

Medical Care For the Dying

"Optimum Care for Hopelessly Ill Patients" by the Clinical Care Committee of Massachusetts General Hospital; "Orders Not to Resuscitate" by Mitchell T. Rabkin, M.D., Gerald Gillerman, J.D. and Nancy R. Rice, J.D.; "Personal Directions for Care at the End of Life" by Sissela Bok, Ph.D., in *New England Journal of Medicine* (Aug. 12, 1976), 10 Shattuck, Boston, Mass. 02115.

The issue of prolonging the life of a terminally ill patient has received widespread public attention, largely because of a June 1976 decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court. That decision authorized removal of artificial life-support systems for a comatose patient, Karen Ann Quinlan, in accordance with her parents' request. Three articles in the *New England Journal of Medicine* reflect not only the public's interest in this area, but also the medical profession's new willingness to discuss the matter and to set standards for the application or withdrawal of life-sustaining measures.

The Critical Care Committee of Massachusetts General Hospital proposes a four-part classification system for critically ill patients, based on a six-month pilot study involving 209 admissions to that hospital's intensive care unit. Under this system, treatment for the four categories of patients ranges from two types of "maximal therapeutic effort without reservation" to "selective limitation of therapeutic measures" and, finally, to discontinuation of all therapy.

The Critical Care Committee also recommends that an advisory group be created to consult with physicians on terminal cases but that the ultimate decisions about treatment classification should rest with the responsible doctor. The proposed role for patients and their families is minimal.

A different approach is offered by Dr. Rabkin, of Boston's Beth

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Israel Hospital, and his co-authors, Gillerman and Rice, both attorneys. They propose hospital procedures for issuing "Orders Not to Resuscitate" by means of cardiopulmonary techniques. The authors stress that these "Orders" should be given only after extensive discussion with patients and their families. Other guidelines they propose:

—A physician should not be allowed to issue the orders without the informed choice and consent of the patient, but if the latter chooses death, "the physician is legally required to respect such instructions."

—In the case of minors or those considered unable to understand the risks and alternatives and make a deliberate choice, the physician and an advisory committee can issue the orders with the consent of the patient's immediate family.

The third article, by Bok, of Harvard's School of Public Health, supports the idea of the "living will," whereby healthy people indicate how they wish to be treated should they become gravely ill. However, the author suggests language to correct what she sees as vague or incomplete provisions in the standard document currently in use (which has been legally recognized by one state, California).

The Universal Job Squeeze

"Worldwide Job Crisis Faces University Graduates" by Malcolm G. Scully, in *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (Sept. 27, 1976), 1717 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

For recent college graduates in the United States, Australia, Canada, the Soviet Union, and Western Europe, the chances of finding jobs compatible with their training are slight, writes *Chronicle* editor Scully. The problem is particularly acute in France, where an estimated half of the university graduates in recent years have been unable to find any employment at all. In the Soviet Union, there are too many specialists in some fields and widespread employment of skilled people outside their field of training.

Educators disagree on whether the current job crisis in industrial nations is a "portent" of changing manpower needs or a "cyclical phenomenon" caused by the economic recession of the early 1970s and the increased enrollments of the 1960s. (In Italy and Germany, university enrollment more than doubled between 1964 and 1974.) There is some concern that, in countries already politically restive, large numbers of unemployed or underemployed college graduates "could form a threat to political stability."

Governments' responses have varied: France, Australia, and Canada have emphasized more vocational training in the university; Germany has placed a ceiling on student enrollments; and Sweden has set limits, not only on total college enrollment (38,000) but also on the number of students in each field of study.

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*Publishing and
Perishing*

"Confronting the Journal Publication Crisis: A Proposal for a Council of Social Science Editors" by James L. McCartney, in *The American Sociologist* (Aug. 1976), American Sociological Association, 1722 N St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

If rising production costs and dwindling income do not kill off the sociology journal within 10 years, the failure to provide current information to scholarly readers may do so, writes *Sociological Quarterly* editor McCartney.

Sociology-journal publishing is grossly inefficient, even when compared with other academic publications. Most sociology journals are small (under 2,000 pages a year), and their average manuscript rejection rate is high (82 per cent for 39 journals surveyed). An academic sociologist, compelled by a tightening job market to "publish or perish," may spend a year submitting his manuscript to various journals before it is finally accepted, then wait another year before publication. Yet there are 177 unrelated journals of sociology today, each with its own style and requirements. As a result, the time and money spent by a scholar preparing a manuscript for submission increases with each rejection. Some do not appear in print until four years after they were first presented.

McCartney fears that it may never be possible to make the printed sociology journal an economical and efficient mode of communication. He suggests a council of editors to plan for a shift to the "electronic journal" of the future, when sociologists communicate by computer, perhaps the only answer to the current information bottleneck.

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*Trouble for
Technology*

"Has the U.S. Lost Its Initiative in Technological Innovation?" by Jerome B. Wiesner, in *Technology Review* (July-Aug. 1976), Room E19-430, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. 02139.

The answer to the question posed by the title of this article by MIT president Wiesner is "no, not yet," but the trends are unfavorable. If the United States appears to have lost the ability to innovate rapidly enough to cope with the growing complexity and scale of current problems such as chronic unemployment and rural to urban population shifts, it is not for lack of good technical ideas.

The slowdown in the pace and quality of innovation and productivity

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increases can be traced to several other factors, notably the shift toward replacement technology. "New generations of processes and devices—new energy sources, new transportation systems, new pollution controls—are usually far more complex and costly than those they replaced." They take longer to plan, develop, and construct, and thus their financing becomes increasingly more difficult for private industry.

Moreover, U.S. government policies (e.g., patent policies) often do not encourage industry to take advantage of new technology arising out of federally sponsored research and development. Government attempts to bar potential health hazards often impede the development and marketing of certain products, particularly pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals.

Withdrawal of Pentagon financing of basic research in 1970 damaged both basic and applied research, says Wiesner; major research universities that perform most of the fundamental and exploratory work leading to technological innovation now suffer from both reduced government subsidies and the pressures of inflation.

"The United States," Wiesner concludes, "has moved in recent years from a situation in which all our forces, commercial and public, encouraged the innovation which created our spectacular scientific and industrial capabilities to a situation in which there are ever-increasing deterrents to creative change."

Genetic Research And Social Ills

"XYY: The Dangers of Regulating Research by Adverse Publicity" by Bernard D. Davis; and, "The XYY Male: The Making of a Myth" by Jon Beckwith and Larry Miller, in *Harvard Magazine* (Oct. 1976), P.O. Box 301, Uxbridge, Mass. 01569.

Last May, after a year of bad publicity and harassment, scientists abandoned a long-term research project at Harvard Medical School on genetic abnormality and behavior. Dr. Davis, professor of bacterial physiology at the medical school, defends the genetic project; Beckwith, professor of microbiology and molecular genetics at Harvard, and Miller, a third-year medical student, deplore it.

The research centered on the extremely small number of children born with three sex-determining chromosomes instead of the normal two. Investigators in several countries have found that the extra male chromosome pattern, shown as XYY, was 10 to 20 times more frequent in inmates of institutions for the criminally insane than in the general male population. This discovery prompted press accounts erroneously reporting that an extra male chromosome invariably causes excessive aggressiveness and "criminality."

The aborted Harvard study, which entailed the identification of XYY infants and then follow-up observation and therapy, was "in the

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clinical tradition of trying to detect, observe, and ameliorate a potential health problem," Davis argues. Critics of the program, he contends, waged a "crusade against evil" which distorted the issues and impaired free intellectual exchange chiefly because of a conviction that any attention to genetic factors in behavior will have unhappy social consequences.

Beckwith and Miller argue that previous studies showing XYY males to be anti-social were tainted with error and bias; they cite other research revealing no significant correlation between the genetic abnormality and aggressive behavior. Because of sensational publicity accorded "criminality genes," the Harvard study "may have created serious problems in the lives of the observed children that would not have occurred otherwise." In addition, Beckwith and Miller say, any conclusions reached by the study might be invalid because there was no "control group" of "normal" children, studied alongside the XYY children, to rule out any possibility of bias.

Experiments of this sort, they argue, reinforce the notion that genetics, rather than "social and economic deprivation," are to blame for social problems. Noting hasty proposals by criminal-justice specialists for the identification and preventive detention of XYY males, Beckwith and Miller urge greater public participation in decisions to conduct scientific research.

Triumph Over Pestilence

"The Eradication of Smallpox" by Donald A. Henderson, in *Scientific American* (Oct. 1976), 415 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.

For the first time in medical history, doctors, epidemiologists, and roving health workers may have eradicated a deadly, pestilential disease—smallpox. The last known case was reported on Aug. 9, 1976, in Ethiopia. If no new cases are reported during 1977 and 1978, and if a World Health Organization commission is satisfied with the reporting, smallpox will be declared to have been eradicated from the earth.

Henderson, chief medical officer in charge of smallpox eradication at the WHO in Geneva, explains that when the campaign began in 1967, smallpox was considered endemic in 33 countries, with 11 others reporting imported cases. As successive centers of infection were eliminated, epidemiologists evolved increasingly effective methods of reporting, quarantine, and mass vaccination. WHO's efforts have now narrowed to two remote areas of Ethiopia.

To achieve success, health workers visited rural schools and market places to collect rumors of unreported smallpox cases, and as incidence declined they offered progressively greater rewards for fresh information. Special rosters listed every person living within a one-mile radius of an infected village. Guards were hired to cordon off the homes of smallpox patients and to ensure that all visitors were inoculated; meticulous records were maintained.

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Dr. Edward Jenner's (1749-1823) pioneering work with smallpox vaccines, Henderson explains, led eventually to two post-World War II developments—the reusable, bifurcated needle (requiring one-fourth as much vaccine as the older “scratch” technique) and a soluble, freeze-dried vaccine that made possible the successful WHO campaign. Field workers carried the two in shirt-pocket kits.

The total 10-year eradication effort cost less than \$250 million. According to Henderson, vaccine production and quarantine measures no longer necessary will save between \$1 and \$2 billion a year. Eradication of smallpox will represent a major milestone in the history of medicine. The logical next step? Applying the lessons learned to programs for controlling diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus, measles, poliomyelitis, and tuberculosis.

The Saga of the Harvestable Tomato

“Tomato Technology” by William H. Friedland and Amy Barton, in *Society* (Sept.-Oct. 1976), Box A, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.

Huge demands for capital investment; an abrupt two-thirds drop in labor requirements and a shift from imported Mexican field hands to American housewives; survival of only the largest growers; vertical integration of the processed-tomato industry—these and other largely unanticipated changes came quickly after Californians developed a mechanical harvester and bred a new tomato solely for the machine.

In this “tomato case study,” Friedland, a sociologist at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and Barton, of the Community Development Research Laboratory at the same university, analyze the sharp discrepancies between the original worries that produced sudden change in the tomato industry and the social effects that followed.

Convinced that acute shortages of labor would result from federal outlawing of the “bracero” program, under which Mexican field workers were imported to California each year at harvest time, the University of California set to work seriously in 1947 on an ill-defined machine to pick an as-yet-undeveloped tomato.

By 1961, a firmer, more easily detachable fruit had been bred and a \$25,000 mechanized harvester was on the market. Similar machines now sell for more than \$70,000 and require vast acreage to realize their potential. Despite costs of equipment and land, the percentage of machine-harvested tomatoes climbed from one per cent to 99.9 per cent between 1962 and 1970, while the number of growers declined from 4,000 to 597, and the work force fell from 50,000 to 18,000.

The surviving farmers transformed their California Tomato Growers Association into an effective weapon against processors who had previously exploited them. But despite the sophisticated new production system, labor relations remain backward. Unionization is coming. The challenge to organized labor is whether it can unionize a work force made up largely of women employed only at harvest time.

ARTS & LETTERS

Caveat Emptor

"The Print's Progress: Problems in a Changing Medium" by Judith Goldman, in *Art News* (Summer 1976), 121 Garden St., Marion, Ohio 43302.

The 1960s saw a revival and proliferation of print-making and selling, which is now big business. Lavish ads in the mass media lure buyers into paying large sums for "original" prints which may be reproductions of little value. Sets of six "authentic lithographs" by Renior were recently advertised and sold by mail for \$2,250 per set. In fact, they were reproductions of Renior paintings which hang in a Paris museum.

"The print is ready-made for deception," writes *Art News* contributing editor Goldman, because the technology of modern printing "can create reproductions barely discernible from originals." Even prestigious art-auction houses (Christie's, Parke-Bernet) have been deceived by unauthorized reproductions passed off as original prints. Goldman defines an original print as an image *meant* to be a print, and a reproduction as an *exact* duplication of a work that already exists in another form. Terms signifying originality—signing, numbering, editioning, restrikes—are intended to guarantee authenticity, but they can also be manipulated to defraud buyers.

The College Art Association of America is currently drafting standards for the marketing of fine prints, and the Illinois and California legislatures have passed print laws to protect consumers. But these laws are ineffective, says Goldman. Existing civil statutes may be better (e.g., the publisher of the Renior prints was charged with mail fraud in New York and ordered to offer all purchasers a full refund).

How can the buyer avoid deception? Many specialists believe that the only real protection is knowledge and the avoidance of all but reputable print galleries.

Peter Pan in America

"Adulthood in American Literature" by Kenneth S. Lynn, in *Daedalus* (Fall 1976), 7 Linden St., Cambridge, Mass. 02130.

Psychic immaturity—a refusal to acknowledge and assume adult responsibilities—lies at the core of the American literary tradition, writes Kenneth Lynn, a historian at Johns Hopkins. The fact that most of the prominent writers of 19th-century America grew up in families where the father was either "dead, missing, physically crippled, or financially inept suggests the possibility that fears about growing up affected their literary imaginations," but this is not the main source of their immaturity. "The childish qualities of nineteenth-century

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American literature had their origins in the historical circumstances that fostered childishness in an entire civilization," Lynn argues.

Natty Bumppo's wanderings in James Fenimore Cooper's *Prairie* (1827) reflect the inclinations of an entire nation to rely upon isolation, rootlessness, and economic opportunism to provide painless solutions to social problems. Nathaniel Hawthorne's *Scarlet Letter* (1850) offers an exception to this obsession with escapism. But the literary landscape is studded with childish themes, childish characters, and childish points of view depicted in books like Mark Twain's *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer* (1876).

Publication of *Sister Carrie* by Theodore Dreiser in 1900 reflected the disillusioning events of the preceding decade—the disappearance of the frontier, the rise of the trusts, the outbreak of bloody industrial strikes—and represented the skeptical perspective of a novelist who saw modern society as "a trap from which no one, male or female, could possibly escape."

Still, the immaturity of American literature did not end there. Child heroes gave way to "the sad-faced adolescents of *The Sun Also Rises* and *The Great Gatsby*." Historical events influenced the shifts between immaturity and adulthood. As depression gripped the nation in the 1930s, William Faulkner and John Steinbeck turned soberly to history and family life. Kurt Vonnegut became a cult figure in an age of unprecedented prosperity. Today, Norman Mailer and Jerry Rubin personify the adolescent urge; they are creatures of a society still reluctant to come of age.

Laughter In America

"Nineteenth Century American Humor: Easygoing Males, Anxious Ladies, and Penelope Lapham" by Alfred Habegger, in *Publications of the Modern Language Association* (Oct. 1976), 62 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10011.

Cultural historians have long viewed American humor as developing out of a struggle between differing visions of what American life should be—one earthy, ribald, vernacular, the other genteel and refined.

Habegger, a professor of English at the University of Kansas, proposes an additional dialectic: between male and female. "The social basis of American humor may have been the staggering difference in our ideal gender roles." There is a long-standing tradition in the United States that women have no sense of humor, Habegger notes. There are no women humorists to speak of, and during the classic period of American humor, the 1860s, humor, like politics, was a club for men only—a masculine world of saloons, smoking cars, and barbershops.

The prevalent 19th-century jokes were crude anecdotes of domestic strife recounted in the vernacular by wise fools like Artemus Ward (1834–67), a favorite of Abraham Lincoln. The personae of these tales

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were the ideal male types—unregenerate loafers who never took themselves seriously and who defied refined cultural norms perceived as feminine. The most savage expressions of misogyny—persisting to James Thurber's day—were sketches of humorless scatterbrains tyrannizing their husbands in stifling parlors. The male defense was frequently a resort to sarcasm that was lost on the wife, but not on the audience, a device perfected by comedian George Burns.

Habegger also documents an authentic vein of feminine wit, based on epigrams and swift repartee rather than the primitive devices of dialect and local color. The personae of the female satirists were superiors, not idiots. The first American fictional heroine with a thoroughgoing sense of humor is Penelope Lapham in William Dean Howells's *The Rise of Silas Lapham* (1885). Her humor is part of an easygoing nature; her refusal to be oppressed by decorum is in the mainstream of vernacular male humor. However, Penelope's fate (exile to Mexico) demonstrates that not even Howells could tolerate a high-spirited woman for long.

PRESS & TELEVISION

Priestifying Journalists

"The Imperial Press" by Tom Bethell and Charles Peters, in *The Washington Monthly* (Nov. 1976), 1028 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

The rapid postwar transformation of journalists from craftsmen to "professionals" resembles the advancement in status achieved by doctors and lawyers in the 19th century. Most of the net effects are good, say Peters, editor-in-chief of *The Washington Monthly*, and Bethell, a contributing editor. But the professionalization process contains elements of "priestification"; it encourages claims of special privilege which may not always redound to the public interest.

Peters and Bethell, for example, are concerned over the self-righteousness which accompanied efforts by the American Newspaper Guild to build support for CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr in his confrontation last fall with the House Ethics Committee. Both Schorr and the "Fresno Four" (the *Fresno Bee* newsmen jailed briefly for disobeying a judge's order by printing secret grand jury testimony) equated the journalist's right to protect the confidentiality of his sources with the privileges of confidentiality that accrue to doctors, lawyers, and the clergy. But in the case of the latter, the privilege inhibits the broad dissemination of information, whereas with journalists, the reverse is true and the result is not always to the good.

The authors argue that the self-interest of the press (e.g., the competitive eagerness to be first and to sell its product) may also prevent

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adequate consideration of the public interest. (Clay Felker, owner of the *Village Voice*, which printed the "secret" House committee report obtained by Schorr, admitted that he decided to publish the report without really reading it.) In response to official abuses of power which resulted in a self-aggrandizing "imperial presidency," professional journalists seem to be creating an "imperial press" which is sometimes guilty of the same kinds of excesses that newsmen have been trying to expose.

Political News As TV Drama

"Captives of Melodrama" by Paul H. Weaver, in *The New York Times Magazine* (Aug. 29, 1976), 229 W. 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

Television news is "not primarily information but narrative . . . governed not by a political bias but by a melodramatic one," observes Weaver, a *Fortune* editor and former Harvard assistant professor of government. Analyzing nightly news coverage of the 1976 presidential primaries by ABC, CBS, and NBC, he finds the contenders depicted as actors in a gripping drama, starting in the snows of New Hampshire.

Carter, Weaver argues, was "lucky enough and clever enough" to benefit from TV's own biases. The Georgian put his big effort into the early primaries, won them, and thereby was established on TV as "front-runner"—despite later losses. In running "against Washington," Carter was in fact also running against an image that TV, with its simplistic news treatment of government, helps perpetuate. And, because TV likes a candidate who can be portrayed as having been raised out of obscurity by the people, Carter emerged the "good guy."

The problem, Weaver contends, is that TV's biases in coverage constantly intervene between the candidates and the voters, diminishing the voters' ability to choose on the basis of their own perceptions.

The Nature of News

"Novelty Without Change" by E. Barbara Phillips, in *Journal of Communication* (Autumn 1976), P.O. Box 13358, Philadelphia, Pa. 19101.

The nature of daily journalism, with its emphasis on "the concrete, the particular, and the individual," inhibits the development of broad insights into changing American realities, says Phillips, a former journalist now teaching sociology and urban studies at San Francisco State.

After working 13 months at two radio stations, one television affiliate, and a daily newspaper, Phillips interviewed newsmen working in large northeastern cities and surveyed 165 reporters, editors, and producers from various backgrounds. She concludes that newsmen share certain mental habits and a special perspective on social reality which is

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dominated by "people," not abstract structures or unseen social forces.

These shared mental habits are linked to the conventions of journalistic writing, constraints of time and space, and an intellectual approach that cuts up reality into bits called "news items" but refuses to fit the pieces into a conceptual framework. "Making connections between events is disallowed by the journalistic format," says Phillips. "Possible links between items, say, one story concerning a 'racial disturbance' and another on high unemployment among black youth, are not suggested." Stories that deal with abstract concepts or developing situations are considered boring. The result is a media mosaic that does not add up to a coherent overview.

Television on the Psychiatric Ward

"Television in the Hospital: Programming Patients' Delusions" by Harriet Wadeson, A.T.R., and William T. Carpenter, Jr., M.D., in *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* (July 1976), 49 Sheridan Ave., Albany, N.Y. 12210.

A study of drawings and other art work by acute schizophrenic patients reveals a marked impact of television on delusion-formation, according to Dr. Carpenter, of New York's Albert Einstein College of Medicine, and Wadeson, an art therapist. Their observations were based on clinical and research experience with 55 schizophrenics hospitalized at a National Institute of Mental Health research unit. Provided with drawing materials and encouraged to express themselves, 16 of the 55 (29 per cent) spontaneously depicted delusions associated with programs seen on television. In some instances, these patients' delusions were influenced by other electronic media as well, such as radio and recordings.

One patient watched a program involving a theft and became convinced that a hospital aide, a female patient, and he himself had committed a crime. Another patient was affected by sensational news events to the point of being certain she was one of whatever victimized mass she had just seen. Most of the patients drew pictures revealing that they believed the television programs were transmitted to send them particular messages. In one patient, however, the paranoia had become so pervasive that she believed she was on camera while undressing and that TV commercials displayed prizes for a numbers racket run by the hospital staff.

The authors advocate further investigation of this phenomenon, especially since so many patients chose to weave televised material into their art when it was neither alluded to nor requested. "It is unwarranted to assert that viewing television has a causative relationship to psychosis generally, or to delusion-formation specifically," they say, "but there is a reason to question the wisdom of confined patients spending many hours watching television."

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*The Selling
Of Jimmy Carter*

"The Man Who Sold Jimmy Carter" by Paula Smith, in *Dun's Review* (Aug. 1976), 666 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10019.

Jimmy Carter was a virtual unknown when he launched his bid for the presidency in January of 1975. The promotion effort which helped bring him from obscurity into national prominence ranks as one of the more remarkable events in American political history. It was largely the work of one man, Gerald Rafshoon, a 42-year-old Atlanta advertising executive, says *Dun's Review* staff writer Smith.

Carter has what Rafshoon calls "slow charisma . . . the longer you listened to him, the more involved you got and the more apt you were to have a good feeling about him." Using five-minute television commercials, Rafshoon had Carter spend 40 to 50 seconds discussing each of five or six issues. TV station managers dislike five-minute political spots because of a fear of boring viewers, and the Carter forces had to file a complaint with the Federal Communications Commission before some stations would agree to sell time in key cities.

Switching later to two-minute television spots that were easier to place, Rafshoon focused on particular geographic areas and generally tried for frequency rather than "reach"—buying six spots that would get to 35,000 viewers each, rather than one that would reach 200,000, and concentrating on off-hours rather than expensive prime time.

"While Carter's message was consistently less than startling," writes Smith, "his avoidance of quick, easy answers was evidently a plus." Pollster Pat Caddell found strong positive shifts in opinion to Carter where the candidate's TV advertising was heavy. It was a propaganda effort that emphasized the candidate, that seldom relied on carefully rehearsed scripts, and avoided the slickness which often results when media specialists try to impose their creative formulas on the product.

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*The Changing
Church Scene*

"The Evangelicals: New Trends and New Tensions" by Richard Quebedeaux, in *Christianity and Crisis* (Sept. 20, 1976), 537 W. 121st St., New York, N.Y. 10027.

Those who conjure up visions of "hellfire" and theological conservatism when they hear the words "fundamentalist" or "evangelical" are in for a surprise. Ever since the 1960s, profound changes have been quietly and steadily taking place among evangelicals in the areas of Scripture, social concern, ecumenical relationships, and church lead-

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ership, writes Quebedeaux, consultant to the United Church Board for Homeland Ministries.

From the late 19th century, evangelicals have believed in the "total inerrancy" of Scripture. But the 1960s saw a doctrine of "limited inerrancy" developing, which asserts Scriptural infallibility on matters of faith and conduct, but not of history and the cosmos (including biology and geology).

Among previously conservative or apolitical evangelicals there has been a growth in social awareness, culminating in the 1973 Chicago Declaration of Evangelical Social Concern, which amounted to "a confession of evangelical complicity in the racism, sexism, militarism, and economic injustice of the wider U.S. society." The "leftward trend" among younger evangelicals now embraces sub-groups from the Catholic left and Christian remnants of the counter-culture "Jesus Movement" to black evangelicals and "charismatics." The women's movement has made substantial gains within all these sub-groups, says Quebedeaux. The Evangelical Women's Caucus, a fellowship of evangelical feminists, is growing steadily.

Evangelical conservatives and the mass of some 40 million "mainstream evangelicals" remain mostly Republican (outside the South) and preoccupied with prohibitions against smoking, drinking, dancing, and the like. But younger evangelicals have almost universally rejected these taboos, although they remain "conservative" in regarding premarital and extramarital intercourse and homosexual practice as totally unacceptable.

Mainstream evangelicals and mainline Protestants are showing ever-increasing signs of ecumenical cooperation, and a new generation of evangelical leaders is emerging. One of them, says Quebedeaux, is David Allan Hubbard, president of Fuller Seminary and a Conservative Baptist minister, who combines "preaching ability, charm and political savvy." As president of the Association of Theological Schools in the United States and Canada, the accreditation body for all North American theological seminaries, he is well situated to help develop a better relationship between evangelicals and mainline Protestants.

*Striving for
Social Justice*

"The Boston Church and Desegregation"
by Frank J. Harris, S.J., in *America*
(Sept. 11, 1976), 106 W. 56th St., New
York, N.Y. 10019.

When the Boston School Committee declared itself unable to desegregate the city's public schools, the U.S. District Court on May 10, 1975, imposed a plan of its own. A majority of parents, teachers, and students in America's most Catholic metropolis were furious.

Not without some prodding, writes Harris, who is a staff member of Boston's Citywide Coordinating Council, the court's principal monitoring agency, the Catholic Church took important steps to change the climate of hatred and fear—and changed itself in the process.

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The U.S. Civil Rights Commission was critical of church leadership during the 1974-75 school year, finding it "not as effective as it could have been in identifying and supporting moral issues confronting Boston during Phase 1 desegregation." By the start of the following academic year, the stated position of the Church was clear; Cardinal Humberto Medeiros urged Bostonians to "actively, earnestly and courageously strive to insure justice, quality education and human dignity."

Written regulations forbidding the use of Catholic schools as havens from desegregation were issued to all pastors and principals. Auxiliary Bishop Joseph J. Ruocco wrote all the city's priests urging that they appeal personally to opinion-makers in the community and seek out young people to explain that the alternative to acceptance was "futile and self-perpetuating violence." Bishop Ruocco spent hours encouraging priests and nuns to deepen their involvement, and, in response, they spent thousands of hours in projects ranging from riding school buses to sponsoring informational gatherings.

The Boston experience, says Harris, shows that many Catholics have still not accepted the social teachings of the Church. Some priests disagreed with the court order and thus felt relieved of any further obligation to promote racial justice. Yet there were people who were seeking leadership in a troubled time and who now look to the Church for continued direction and support.

Religion-As-Illusion

"Jesus in the Now: The New Revivalism" by Scott Edwards, in *The Humanist* (Sept.-Oct. 1976), 923 Kensington Ave., Buffalo, N.Y. 14215.

There is a strong spirit of revival stirring in America—one with links to the past but also imbued with elements which make it unlike all the revival movements that have gone before.

Edwards, a political scientist at California State University, Hayward, finds three things to note about the "New Revivalism": its essential harmony with the liberal ethos of our society; its adoption of mass communications and the moral outlook that goes with this technology; and its embrace of charismatic beliefs and practices.

The new revivalism is at peace with "the hazy liberalism that largely governs popular feelings in America about social and political matters." Its theology remains fundamentalist, but this does not prevent evangelist Oral Roberts from embracing modernism to the extent of offering TV specials with all the modes and rhythms of mass entertainment. Evangelism and popular culture have become so fused as to be indistinguishable, says Edwards.

In its use of electronic mass communications, the new revivalism has accepted a moral atmosphere which is congenial to pictures and sounds but not to language. Words like "praise the Lord" and "let Jesus into your life" have no meaning when displayed against a tele-

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vision background of mass fantasy. The tendency of the new revivalism to reflect, and perhaps even shape, popular consciousness is also found in its leaning toward the charismatic—a belief in special powers to heal, to communicate in unknown tongues, to experience ecstatic self-renewal.

The vigor of the new revivalism shows, among other things, that what Americans want is not a religion attuned to politics and social causes but a religion of immediacy and feeling. It rejects the intellectualism that has characterized much discussion of religion in recent years. The new revivalism, says Edwards, “announces the coming of religion-as-lifestyle . . . as packaged illusion.” Jesus is not the judge and renouncer of the world, he is simply “a helping friend, a friend with magical powers.” All that is required is to “smile, be happy, praise the Lord—and be sure of your place at the Rapture with Pat Boone, Johnny Cash, and the World Action Singers.”

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La Dolce Vita

“The New Class” by Mauro Lucentini, in *Commentary* (Nov. 1976), 165 E. 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

Italy has become the first major Western nation to produce a “New Class,” a “self-appointed, self-serving state elite,” of the kind described by the Yugoslav intellectual Milovan Djilas.

This New Class, says Lucentini, American correspondent for the Milan daily *Il Giornale Nuovo*, is the product of close cooperation between the Communists and the dominant left wings of the “Center-Left” parties that have ruled Italy for almost 15 years. A “miracle of political subtlety” has permitted these two, ostensibly hostile, elements to cooperate in transferring assets from private hands to the state and in distributing them among the New Class in the form of jobs, privileges, and subsidies.

The public payroll in Italy, poorest and least productive of the Western industrial nations, is 10 times as large, in proportion to its population, as that of the United States. “More than half of the total Italian labor force has already retired on official pension plans,” Lucentini reports. “Most Italian art, most Italian education, most of Italian culture is financed by the government and serviced by political proteges.”

With a strong boost from the “economic miracle” which saw Italy prosper in the late 1950s, the New Class grew strong when the Socialist Party was allowed into the government in 1961. As a result, a “full-fledged client system was initiated, with all bureaucratic and paragonovernmental positions, down to the last errand boy, being shared

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among parties." In 1970, the creation of 20 new regional authorities produced an instantaneous doubling of the bureaucratic structure.

The New Class dominates the communications media through control of the state broadcasting monopoly, which distributes millions of dollars worth of jobs and salaries under a rigid formula based on relative party strength. Education and culture are virtual fiefdoms of the New Class. If the Communists ever achieve power in Italy, says Lucentini, one can safely predict that they will become the "guarantors" of this comfortable elite and that "the corrupt, nepotistic aristocracy that has been formed in Italy would settle down to its final and undisturbed reward."

*Coca-Chewing:
Nature's Remedy*

"Andean Coca Chewing: A Metabolic Perspective" by Ralph Bolton, in *American Anthropologist* (Sept. 1976), 1730 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.

For years, outsiders have made repeated attempts to halt coca-leaf-chewing by the Indians of the Andes, despite the lack of convincing evidence that the habit is any more harmful than drinking coffee.

A body of mythology has grown up around coca use, says Bolton, an anthropologist at Pomona College. The Incas are said to have prohibited its use by any but priests and nobles. In modern days, it has been regarded as a serious medical and social problem because of its presumed psychological effects. But in the amounts ordinarily consumed by the Indians, coca produces no euphoric effects. "Indians do not chew coca to become stoned," he writes.

Native explanations for the coca habit are chiefly physiological. Habitual users almost invariably say that coca provides them with energy for work, while reducing their feelings of fatigue; it keeps them warm and helps alleviate their hunger.

Bolton argues that coca-chewing is a response to chronic low blood glucose concentrations among Andean Indians. In a manner not yet clearly understood, coca tends to impede lowering of blood glucose levels for several hours. With data collected from a small sample of moderately hypoglycemic (low blood sugar) subjects, he was able to show that they regularly consumed significantly more coca than subjects with normal blood sugar. Blood glucose levels are partially determined by nutritional factors, such as low protein, and Indians whose diets are high in carbohydrates and low in animal protein tend to chew more coca than those who eat eggs or meat every day.

While Indians chew coca for various reasons, the evidence suggests that coca may be critical for the adaptation and survival of some hypoglycemic Indians under conditions encountered at high altitude. Past campaigns by national and international agencies to abolish its use in Peru and Bolivia have failed. But if future efforts succeed, "the cultural and biologic consequences could be devastating."

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*Sexual Inequality
Soviet Style*

"Indoctrination as a Female Political Role in the Soviet Union" by Joel C. Moses, in *Comparative Politics* (July 1976), The City University of New York, 22 W. 42nd St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

Although a high proportion of women may be found among deputies elected to local city and village soviets (councils), women have traditionally been under-represented in key policy-making organs of the Soviet Union, particularly the All-Union Central Committees and state councils of ministers.

Based on an analysis of all Soviet women known to have worked in regional Communist Party bureaus between 1955 and 1973, Moses, a political scientist at Iowa State University, concludes that most females who persist in seeking higher office are channeled into the position of "indoctrination specialist," a sex-typed niche, requiring no technical training, travel, or innovative thinking, that keeps women stuck in the local bureaucracy. Because Soviet working women are also expected to be housewives and mothers, they are not rotated from job to job the way male professionals are.

Recruiting women to uphold orthodoxy reinforces the stereotypes of men as achievers and women as scolds and nuisances. It is built into the Soviet political system, Moses concludes, that women remain lowest and last.

*The Business
Of Smuggling*

"Smuggling: Symptom of a Deeper Malaise" by Philip Bowring, in *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Sept. 24, 1976), P.O. Box 47, Hong Kong.

Smuggling exists everywhere in the world, even within the European Economic Community, writes Bowring, business editor of the *Far Eastern Economic Review*.

It is especially persistent in Southeast Asia, from Bangladesh to the Philippines, for the following reasons: long common borders joining many countries in a relatively small geographic area; heavy reliance on customs duties for revenue-raising; the existence of well-developed trading networks linked through regional Chinese family and clan ties; weak government controls; ubiquitous bureaucratic corruption; demand for luxuries either banned or subject to heavy duty; shortages of basic commodities, from textiles to medicines, due to inadequate production or incompetent official distribution.

In strict economic terms, smuggling does little harm. The key factor, Bowring concludes, is that "smuggling is an attempt to get around the controls which governments impose on economies." Unless those controls are honestly and efficiently administered, they not only encourage smuggling, but increase the economic problems and dislocations that the controls and taxes were created to resolve.

RESEARCH REPORTS

Reviews of new research by public agencies and private institutions

“Predicting Earthquakes: A Scientific and Technical Evaluation with Implications for Society”

Panel on Earthquake Prediction of the Committee on Seismology, Assembly of Mathematical and Physical Sciences, National Academy of Sciences, 2101 Constitution Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20418.

Earthquake prediction holds great potential for saving lives, reducing property damage, enhancing the safety of vulnerable installations, such as dams and nuclear power plants, and making possible more rapid recovery after an earthquake.

Some small earthquakes have already been predicted in a scientifically credible way in the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan, and most researchers are optimistic that larger quakes will eventually be predicted as well.

Two techniques are currently employed: statistical methods to estimate the likelihood of earthquake occurrence in a given area and geophysical techniques to monitor precursory phenomena (e.g., changes in seismic waves and ground elevation, variations in concentrations of radon gas in ground water).

The National Academy of Sciences panel urges a long-term effort to develop a reliable and effective earth-

quake-predicting capability. At least 10 years of effort and a financial commitment several times current levels (\$10 to \$11 million by the federal government in fiscal year 1976) would be cost effective and in the national interest. (It estimated that a great earthquake, similar to the 1906 San Francisco tragedy, could claim more than 10,000 lives and cause damage exceeding \$10 billion.)

The panel believes that scientists will probably predict a California earthquake of at least moderate severity within the next five years, but that routine announcements of reliable predictions are at least 10 years away.

There will be false alarms and the public must be made aware of this prospect. Even the best system will not be infallible. The panel urges that a formal procedure be established now to evaluate earthquake predictions and advise relevant agencies concerning their validity.

“The United States in the World: New Directions for the Post-Vietnam Era?”

Potomac Associates, 1707 L St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Authors: Robert W. Tucker, William Watts, and Lloyd A. Free.

The foreign-policy context facing President Jimmy Carter differs sharply from that which existed four years ago. In this analysis, Potomac Associates, a non-partisan, tax-exempt research organization, looks at current

policy issues within the framework of shifting public attitudes and the apparent readiness of Americans to support new ideas and initiatives.

The authors of the study trace the “Nixon-Kissinger reformulation” of

foreign policy during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the failed promise of détente, the new militancy of the Third World, the Vietnam defeat, and the incapacitation of the executive branch brought about by Watergate.

Using polling data collected since 1964 by the Institute for International Social Research, and by the Gallup Organization, the study shows that in response to new domestic concerns the priorities of the American people have undergone a "complete reversal" over the last 12 years. Whereas a 1964 poll shows that the five items of greatest concern that year were all related to foreign affairs and defense, by 1976 "keeping our military and defense force strong" had dropped to eleventh place, below 10 domestic issues.

At the same time, the American people have by no means ceased to concern themselves about the country's prestige and national security. A full 52 per cent believe the United States should maintain its dominant world position "at all costs, even going to the brink of war." Even though Americans tend to feel that at least some progress has been

achieved in handling international problems during the last year or two, they rate U.S.-Soviet relations as "only fair" and almost seven out of 10 Americans expect these relations to remain the same or worsen. There is rising public concern about the danger of a major war and about maintaining respect for the United States overseas. The number of "isolationists" (using test questions devised in 1964) has risen from eight to 23 per cent since 1964.

The authors sense a "quickenning nationalist spirit" in America that offers the new President an opportunity to forge a new consensus among people who have been, and are, sharply divided on many questions. The American people, they conclude, yearn for a coherent and positive approach to foreign policy "that combines firmness with strength, reinforced allied relationships, wariness of a Soviet adversary that insists on playing the game of détente by its own rules, and a more carefully drawn definition of national security that would avoid an unwarranted intervention abroad leading to another Vietnam."

"The World Price of Oil: A Medium Term Analysis"

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
1150 17th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Author: Hendrik S. Houthakker.

After 1985, conventional but complicated supply-and-demand will determine the world price of oil, regardless of any moves by OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). In the interim, Houthakker says, the major oil-importing nations could discourage precipitous OPEC price increases by taking several counter-measures, notably by imposing a tariff on imported oil.

Without suggesting that it could be easily arranged, Houthakker recommends a uniform tariff on crude oil and petroleum products levied by all members of the International Energy

Agency (Europe, North America, and Japan), the levy to be in addition to any existing national tariff and to apply as well to any exports from North America to other consuming areas.

An IEA import tax, by transferring funds from OPEC back to oil-importers, would improve the latter's balance of payments. The principal effect would be to discourage imports by the IEA countries to the point where OPEC could not increase prices further without risking loss of sales and the collapse of the cartel. OPEC would be powerless to retali-

ate because most of its members are heavily dependent on oil revenues.

Houthakker, a Harvard economist, argues that the United States is a big enough importer to influence world oil production by imposing an import oil tax unilaterally, but not big enough to threaten OPEC with total collapse. The United States could take other steps to depress oil prices before 1985, however, including the stockpiling of crude and enactment of a federal energy policy.

In a provocative postscript, Houthakker suggests that because electricity can now be generated more cheaply in some parts of the world from nuclear fuels than from oil and other fossil fuels, the price of oil may some day be derived from the price of uranium. Rough calculations indicate that, at an oil price of \$10 per barrel, uranium oxide might be worth as much as \$150 or \$200 per pound, about four times the highest price reached in recent years.

“World Population Trends: Signs of Hope, Signs of Stress”

Worldwatch Institute, 1776 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Author: Lester R. Brown.

“Sometime near the beginning of this decade, the rate of world population growth reached an all time high and then began to subside,” writes Brown, president of Worldwatch Institute, a private research organization created to study global problems.

On the positive side, from 1970-75 no geographic region experienced a rise in population growth rate (births over deaths), while reductions by one-half and one-third occurred in Western Europe, North America, and East Asia. This reflects the widening availability and use of contraceptives, abortion, and sterilization and increased incentives to limit family size. On the negative side, in the same period, there was a tragic rise in death rates in food-deficient regions of South Asia and Africa.

With world population nearing 4 billion, the pressure on diminishing food reserves is too great to be offset by a falling birthrate. Severe deple-

tion (perhaps irreversible) caused by chronic over-fishing, over-grazing, over-plowing, and deforestation, becomes visible in poor countries when droughts or floods create thousands of ecological victims (e.g., Ethiopia, Bangladesh). Furthermore, affluent nations can no longer rescue poorer ones due to their own lack of food reserves and rising prices.

Some governments with low per-capita incomes are now seeking zero population growth. But many poor nations lack both the statistical data required and an understanding of the necessity for population control. Pointing to China's reduction of births from 32 to 19 per thousand persons within five years, Brown suggests that governments can shape policies that satisfy family-planning needs and offer women alternatives to continuous childbearing. Their only other choice will be increased suffering as death rates rise.



The Presidency

The coming of a new President often spurs scholarly reëxamination of the presidency as an institution. Intellectual fashions change; most recently, for example, Vietnam and Watergate have brought a sharp reaction against earlier academic enthusiasm for the “strong presidency” with Franklin D. Roosevelt as model. Analysts now write of curbing presidential powers, not expanding them. Other researchers focus on less-publicized issues, such as White House organization and the process of governing. Here, Stephen Hess, scholar and former presidential aide, portrays the modern presidency as it appears to the man who occupies the Oval Office. And, in what they call a “cautionary tale,” political scientists Jack Knott and Aaron Wildavsky discuss what good government seems to mean to our 39th President, Jimmy Carter.



PORTRAIT OF A PRESIDENT

by Stephen Hess

Twice I have served on White House staffs—at the end of one administration (1959–61) and at the beginning of another (1969). All presidencies, of course, are different. But one could hardly fail to observe differences that were exclusively a product of time. *Beginnings* and *endings* are different. There are differences of pace, attitude, objectives, and response, not only between administrations but also within each one.

What follows is a composite portrait of a President over the course of his years in office. (Exceptions to generalities are noted.)

I attempt to see the presidency as it appears to a President, in the "presidential context." Much of the current literature focuses on the powerfulness of the office. My conclusion is not that the office is unpowerful. Rather, the accent is on presidential constraints. Often in the following pages the President will seem a hapless giant, surrounded by enemies, hemmed in by competing power centers, responding to events that he did not create and cannot control. This is how the presidency increasingly looks to the man who occupies the White House. The vantage point may help to explain why Presidents act the way they do.

Every fourth even-numbered year, on a Tuesday between the second and eighth of November, a President is elected. If he is not the incumbent, he has a period of grace until January 20 during which he can organize his administration without having to assume the responsibilities of office. He brings to this task certain knowledge and experience, obligations and commitments.

The odds, however, are great that he has not held an executive position in the federal government.* He may, in fact, never have been an executive. Some of his experiences will be of considerable value; for example, Lyndon Johnson's understanding of the workings of Congress and Dwight Eisenhower's understanding of the workings of the Pentagon. By the act of running for the presidency, all elected Presidents should have gained some useful understanding of public opinion. But no matter how much he may have thought and read about the presidency, the most startling fact about a new President is the depth of his ignorance about the *job* to which he has just been elected. At least two recent Presidents have commented on this phenomenon. The

* Of the modern Presidents, Franklin Roosevelt through Gerald Ford, only FDR had ever served as a political executive in Washington, having been Assistant Secretary of the Navy during World War I.

Stephen Hess, 43, is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and, currently, a U.S. Representative to the United Nations General Assembly. Born in New York City, he graduated from Johns Hopkins (1953) and taught political science there before going to the staff of the Eisenhower White House (1959-61). In 1969, he was deputy assistant for urban affairs on President Nixon's staff. He has been a Fellow at the Institute of Politics at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government (1967-68). His books include America's Political Dynasties (1966), The Republican Establishment (with David S. Broder, 1968), and Nixon: A Political Portrait (with Earl Mazo, 1968). At Brookings, he wrote his new Organizing the Presidency, in which he urges strong presidential reliance on the Cabinet officers and virtual elimination of the White House staff. His essay is drawn from that book, and abridged by permission of the publisher (© 1976, the Brookings Institution).

learning period for a new President has been estimated by one scholar as taking about 18 months. One consequence is that a new President makes some of his most important decisions at a time when he is least capable of deciding wisely.

The White House staff will be largely filled by those who have surrounded the candidate during the campaign and who have his trust. They bring to their jobs an understanding of the President, loyalty, and in some cases a set of skills that are transferable from the campaign, such as press relations and scheduling. Their primary interests, however, usually have been in the art of politics, not governance. While they are apt to begin their White House duties in a personal-services relationship with the President, they will eventually acquire more and more governmental responsibilities; Presidents have a habit of giving the jobs at hand to the persons at hand. Some of these former campaign workers may be qualified to assume operational assignments, but not because they were campaign workers. One need only look at why they were in the campaign. Often their chief qualifications—and an important one in a campaign—was availability; their chief motivations may have been the expectation of excitement, an excess of zeal, or hero worship.

The policy commitments of a new President are found in his campaign speeches, in the party platform, and to a lesser degree in the promises of other members of his party. These commitments are usually vague, given the tendencies of elective politics. In no sense can they be considered a presidential program. A program has a price tag and relates to available funds. One consequence is that at the time Congress is inclined to be most responsive to the wishes of a President, he is least able to make his wishes known in concrete terms.

People Problems

On the morning after his victory, a President-elect is consumed with thoughts of Cabinet-making and other matters of personnel selection. No shadow Cabinet waits in the wings. A new President suddenly discovers how few people he knows who are qualified to assume major posts in government. "People, people, people!" John Kennedy exclaimed three weeks after his election, "I don't know any people. I only know voters."

A President-elect has obligations and political debts, but they are not necessarily to those with the backgrounds he now needs. Sometimes he picks incompetents for his Cabinet. Often he turns

to strangers. With each appointment, a President makes a contract to share his responsibilities. If it turns out that the appointee and the President disagree, the appointee can quit or the President can fire him. Either action is a tacit admission of failure on the part of the President. More often, the President and the appointee split their differences and the President loses some part of the direction of his administration.

The Danger of "Afterglow" Disasters

The problems of presidential transition may be exacerbated by animosities between the incoming and outgoing Presidents and/or by tensions between the incoming President and the civil service.* If the newly elected President is from the party out of power, he probably campaigned against "bureaucracy," "red tape," and the "failures" of government programs. Almost all Presidents-to-be ascribe an alien political coloration to the permanent government. Franklin Roosevelt considered it too conservative; Richard Nixon considered it too liberal. The new President is not necessarily paranoid. He is committed to change and perhaps even to reductions in programs and personnel. As a result, the permanent government may well see its interests as threatened.

On taking office, the new President finds he is confronted with a backlog of decisions that need to be made. Government has a way of treading water during presidential campaigns as it waits to see who will be its next leader. And decisions postponed build pressure for resolution. Thus the President at first is presented with great opportunities and great dangers.

The dangers are compounded by the arrogance of the incoming administration. For two years or more the candidate and his closest advisors have been working toward a single goal. The goal has been incredibly difficult and complex to achieve. Gaining it has been a rare achievement that comes to few. They have a right to believe that they succeeded because of their skill, intelligence, political understanding, and hard work. It is not surprising that some of the greatest presidential disasters—even to second-term Presidents—have come in the immediate afterglow of election victories.†

* The problems are naturally greatest when the President-elect has defeated the incumbent President (FDR and Hoover in 1932) and least when both are of the same party, although problems can still exist in the latter case (Theodore Roosevelt and Taft in 1908), but they are apt to be caused by bruised egos rather than lack of cooperation.

† Among the disasters that followed election victories have been the Roosevelt court-packing plan (1937), Kennedy's Bay of Pigs (1961), and Johnson's decision to escalate the Vietnam war (1965).

The new President also finds he has inherited a variety of organizational arrangements that were created to deal with his predecessor's problems. Each administration over time invents a variety of offices that reflect the special talents or deficiencies of appointees, rivalries between advisers, pet projects of the President, and constituent pressures. Sometimes new Presidents will overreact to this legacy, as when Kennedy quickly jettisoned the National Security Council machinery of the Eisenhower administration so that he was left without an appropriate evaluative capacity at the White House when an early foreign policy crisis arose.

Each President soon comes to agree with Woodrow Wilson: "Governments grow piecemeal, both in their tasks and in the means by which those tasks are to be performed, and very few governments are organized as wise and experienced men would organize them if they had a clean sheet of paper to write upon." Yet no matter how inefficiently or illogically the government is organized, there are those who like it that way. Congress, special-interest groups, and bureaucrats have grown comfortable with existing arrangements and have a vested interest in their continuation. The public is not usually much concerned and hence is hard to mobilize for such bloodless matters as structural change. Presidents fret a lot about the ill-fitting shape of government, but generally they conclude that serious attempts at restructuring are no-win propositions. Neither the voters nor the annals of history reward them for such efforts. So (with the exception of Roosevelt and Nixon) they propose only marginal reforms.

Responses to the Past

Much of the tone of the new administration is a response or reaction to the outgoing administration. Eisenhower felt strongly the necessity of establishing a sense of calm after what he considered the divisiveness of Harry Truman's government. In the wake of Kennedy's assassination, Johnson stressed the need for continuity. Gerald Ford's open behavior was meant as an antidote to the dark side of the Nixon presidency.

Other elements of a President's inheritance start to come into focus. He finds that it will not be until his third year in office that he will be able to operate under a budget that his own appointees have initiated. Even then much federal spending will be in "uncontrollables" (e.g., veterans' benefits, Medicare) and not subject to his influence. His power to appoint only extends to some 3,000 people out of a government civilian work force of over 2 million.

Some officials have term appointments and cannot be removed before their time is up. The new President must abide by laws and treaties that were not of his making. There are traditions that he cannot ignore except at great risk. He begins to realize that government is like a continuously moving conveyor belt. He jumps on while it is in motion. It cannot be stopped in order for him to engineer change.

His ability to act, he finds, is also limited by external considerations: whether the nation is in the midst of war or peace, whether the gross national product is rising or falling, the rate of inflation, the balance of payments, the composition of the Supreme Court and Congress, and the size of his electoral mandate. Once in office, President Kennedy was fond of quoting Thomas Jefferson's dictum, "Great innovations should not be forced on slender majorities."

Yet the new administration begins in a state of euphoria. Reporters are inclined to be kind. Congress is quiescent. There is not yet a record to defend. The President, for the only time, takes a broad-gauged look at existing policies. His popularity ratings in the polls will never again be as high.

An adviser to Presidents summed up the importance of an administration's early months:

Everything depends on what you do in program formulation during the first six or seven months. I have watched three presidencies and I am increasingly convinced of that. Time goes by so fast. During the first six months or so, the White House staff is not hated by the cabinet, there is a period of friendship and coöperation and excitement. There is some animal energy going for you in those first six to eight months, especially if people perceive things in the same light. If that exists and so long as that exists you can get a lot done. You only have a year at the most for new initiatives, a time when you can establish some programs as your own, in contrast to what has gone on before.

Then the administration has its first foreign crisis and its first domestic scandal. Weaknesses in personnel begin to appear. The novelty of new personalities wears off for the press. The President introduces his legislative program. The process known as "the coalition-of-minorities" takes hold. Every presidential action will alienate someone. The longer he is in office, the more actions he must take, and, collectively, the more sizable the body of those in opposition will be. Groups that would not attack him when his

popularity was high now become vocal. His poll ratings start to drop at a rate of some six percentage points a year.*

By the end of his first year the President should have learned two important lessons: first, that the unexpected is likely to happen; second, that his plans are unlikely to work out as he had hoped. The Soviet Union launches Sputnik. A U-2 is shot down. There is an uprising in Hungary, a riot in Watts, a demonstration at Berkeley, U.S. missiles that he thought had been removed from Turkey were not removed. The Chinese explode a nuclear device earlier than his intelligence forecasts had predicted. The President finds that much of his time is spent reacting to events over which he has no control or trying to correct the errors of others.

Presidents start to turn inward, some sooner than others, the rate depending on personality factors and the ratio of successes to failures. Reading the morning newspapers becomes less satisfying. They bring bad news. They never seem to get their stories straight. Editorials and columns note only the things that go wrong. The President holds fewer news conferences. He looks for ways to go over the heads of the press corps, such as televised speeches. He grants exclusive interviews to friendly reporters.

Do It Yourself

Some members of his Cabinet, he feels, have "gone native." They badger him on behalf of their departments' clients. Others he finds long-winded or not very bright. There are now longer intervals between Cabinet meetings. He tells his appointments secretary to make it difficult for certain department heads to get in to see him alone.

Time is running out on his first term. Things are not getting done, or are not done fast enough. He begins to feel that if he wants action he will have to initiate it himself—meaning through his own staff. The White House staff grows bigger, despite his early promises to reduce its size. Decisions that used to be made in the departments now need White House clearance. Bottlenecks develop as too many agencies are funneled through too few presidential assistants. Programs that the President wishes to give high priority are placed directly within the Executive Office.

The midterm congressional elections approach, and the President tries to restore his luster at the polls. He always fails.† His

* The only exception is Eisenhower, whose popularity *increased* by some two and one-half percentage points a year in his first term.

† The only modern President to have his party gain seats in both houses of Congress in a midterm election was Franklin Roosevelt in 1934.

party loses seats. The new Congress is less receptive to the President's wishes. This process was described by Lyndon Johnson late in his administration:

You've got to give it all you can that first year. Doesn't matter what kind of majority you come in with. You've got just one year when they treat you right, and before they start worrying about themselves. The third year, you lose votes. . . . The fourth year's all politics. You can't put anything through when half of the Congress is thinking how to beat you. So you've got one year. That's why I tried. Well, we gave it a hell of a lick, didn't we?

The President now devotes a larger part of his time to foreign policy, perhaps as much as two-thirds. This is true even if his pre-presidential interests had been mainly in the domestic area. He takes trips abroad, attends summit meetings, greets heads of state at the White House. Like Kennedy, he believes that "the big difference" between domestic and foreign policy "is that between a bill being defeated and the country [being] wiped out." But he also turns to foreign policy because it is the area in which he has the most authority to act and, until recently, the least public and congressional restraint on his actions. Moreover, history usually rewards the foreign-policy President, and the longer a President stays in office, the larger in his mind looms his "place in history."

The Third-Year Exodus

During the third year, the exodus from government begins. Many of those who were attracted to the glitter of a new administration find that they cannot spare any more time away from their "real" careers, especially if they come from the highly competitive corporate world; others find that their government experience has created nongovernment offers they cannot refuse; some realize they made a mistake in coming to Washington, or their families are urging them to return home. "Fatigue becomes a factor," Henry Kissinger noted in 1972. "I always thought my mind would develop in a high position." But he found that the "mind is always working so hard that you learn little. Instead, you tend to work with what you learned in previous years." The lure of a waning administration is not great and so the President often turns to careerists, promoting from within.

Personal alliances and rivalries by now have had full opportunity to develop within the administration. Remembering his experiences on the Truman staff, Clark Clifford recalled how "you

develop areas of resistance. You come up with an idea, and you could guarantee in advance those men in government who would take the opposite position, just because you favored something."

The President may have taken office with only the most limited notions of what he wanted to do, but by the second half of his term he has accumulated a long list of his positions, which must be promoted and defended and which will determine whether he is reelected or not. He now has strong feelings about what is in the national interest and what must be done—regardless of the popularity of his actions. He has come to see the national interest as uniquely his to uphold. When announcing the decision to send troops into Cambodia in the spring of 1970, President Nixon told the American people, "I would rather be a one-term President and do what I believe is right than to be a two-term President at the cost of seeing America become a second-rate power and to see this Nation accept the first defeat in its proud 190-year history." There may have been some posturing in his statement, yet his is a posture that is eventually assumed by all Presidents. The lines harden.

The Fourth Year

As the administration enters its fourth year, the President's attention snaps back to domestic considerations. The political quotient that enters into each presidential act becomes more determining. Appointments are made with an eye to mending fences in his party. Programmatic decisions of high risk may be deferred. "Wait until next year, Henry," Roosevelt told Treasury Secretary Morgenthau in May 1936, "I am going to be really radical." Some members of the administration join the campaign staff, others continue to perform their duties with an eye to the election payoff of actions taken. The President finds excuses to make "nonpolitical" speeches around the country. By summer he is nominated for a second term and begins active campaigning.

If the President is reelected, it is largely on the basis of the past—the state of the nation during his incumbency—rather than his promises for the future. What is unspoken is that his next four years will be less productive than the previous four years. There are some exceptions. Wilson in 1917 and Roosevelt in 1941 had opportunities to preside over "just" wars. Generally, however, at least since Jefferson, the second term is downhill.*

* See John Pierson, "Is a Second Term Always Downhill?" *Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 1973. He claimed that Theodore Roosevelt's second term was "uphill" and that the second terms of Coolidge and Eisenhower were no worse than their first terms.

But first the newly reelected President will make an effort to recast his administration by bringing in new people or by giving new assignments, as Nixon did in 1973. He will take advantage of his renewed popularity by pushing his legislative program, as Johnson did in 1965. He will unveil pet schemes that he had previously kept to himself, as Roosevelt did in 1937. In the President's fifth and sixth years—as in his third—there is considerable maneuvering room to shape events. (Although deaths and a resignation have meant that some Presidents did not get their full allotment of years in office.)

A Losing Game

Then, as Harold Laski noted as far back as 1940, the two-term tradition (now the two-term limitation) "operates decisively to weaken his influence in the last two years on his reign. Few Presidents have had substantial results to show during that period." The President's party again loses seats in the midterm election—a signal for potential presidential candidates to start increasing their visibility. One way to make news is to attack the incumbent. The attention of the press gradually shifts to these new men. Some of the President's executives resign to enter the embryonic campaigns. The personnel pattern of the first term repeats itself, only it is now even more difficult to recruit from outside government. The President will continue to hold the nation's attention if there is a serious international crisis; otherwise, he must try to manufacture interest through summit meetings, foreign travel (the more exotic the better), and by attaching himself to major events, such as space exploits, disaster relief. Foreign powers may prefer to stall various negotiations until a new President is installed. The last year of his administration is also an election year for the House of Representatives and a third of the Senate, with predictable consequences for the President's legislative program.

In the final July or August, the national conventions nominate two men to run for President. The President will campaign for the nominee of his party, but fairly casually; he does not see it as his battle.

After the new man is elected, there is no longer any vital force in the administration. On January 20, the President watches his successor being sworn in. He is now an instant elder statesman.

This account stresses the institutional forces that press in upon a President. But, of course, being President need not be a grim experience. Depending on his personality, a President may

have a very good time.

And being President need not be an unproductive experience. Each President does realize some of his legislative goals and prevents by veto the enactment of other laws that he feels are not in the nation's best interests. His authority in the conduct of war and peace is substantial. He uses his unique position to preach doctrines that have a better chance of entering the public consciousness than the competing ideas of other politicians. His power and influence may be limited, but they are also greater than those of any other individual.

Essentially a Caretaker

Still, the experience of being President was different from what he thought it would be or from what he learned in his civics textbooks. Four years or eight years seemed like a very long time from the outside, a very short time when he was in office. Never long enough to do any real planning—to think about where the country ought to be even in the next decade and to design programs to get from here to there. His time was largely consumed by crises and the demands of others, bargaining with congressmen, feuds, small symbolic acts, worrying about getting reelected, finding people for jobs and getting rid of them (usually by “kicking them upstairs”), approving budgets that he could only change around the edges. He never really “ran” the government as he had expected. Rather, the President found that he was essentially a caretaker: his job was to keep the social fabric intact; to keep the peace if possible; to defend the nation from aggressors; to maintain the nation's place in the world, even by force; to attempt to balance economic growth and stability; to deal with those concerns that were identified through the elective process, and at best to make some new initiatives that the history books would record as his.



JIMMY CARTER'S THEORY OF GOVERNING

by Jack Knott and Aaron Wildavsky

"Seek simplicity and distrust it."

ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD

If President Carter didn't believe what he says or act on his beliefs, there would be little reason to study his words as predictors of his deeds. Yet, as we shall show, he does care about his beliefs and he does act on them. Why, then, if Carter is a believer, has it been so difficult for observers to determine what he believes or what he will try to do in office? Because we have all been looking in the wrong place. President Carter does change his views on substantive policies, such as tax reform, medical care, and busing. He is not an ideologue of policy, but changes his mind, like most of us, as the times and conditions change.

Our hypothesis is that Carter's basic beliefs are about procedures for making policy—procedures about which he speaks with passion, determination, and consistency. His concern is less with particular goals than with the need for goals, less with the content of policies than with their ideal form—simplicity, uniformity, predictability, hierarchy, and comprehensiveness.

Therefore, if there is a danger for President Carter, it is not that he will support unpopular *policies*, but that he will persevere with inappropriate *procedures*. The question is whether he views his procedural criteria merely as rough guidelines for formulating public policy or as immutable principles of good government. If they are hypotheses about governing—subject to refinement or abandonment in the face of contrary evidence—there is no reason for alarm; but if he does not allow his theories of governing to be refuted by experience, we are all in for hard times.

Of all the Democratic presidential candidates in the primaries, Jimmy Carter was criticized most for his alleged vagueness on

policy. Some people saw him as a fiscal conservative who would cut government spending; others wondered about his plans for costly social programs. Actually, his campaign staff put out numerous papers outlining his proposals on issues ranging from busing to abortion to welfare.¹ The problem was not so much that he did not say specific things about issues but that he placed greater emphasis on methods, procedures and instruments for making policy than on the content of policy itself.

The response of Stuart Eizenstat, Carter's chief "issues" advisor, to a question last summer about what issues would dominate the campaign will serve as an illustration. Eizenstat grouped the issues into three types: one centered on the present lack of long-range federal planning; a second emphasized openness; a third dealt with government reorganization.² With all three, the emphasis was not on policy outcomes but on administrative instruments. (Long-range planning, like openness and reorganization, is not a policy but an instrument used to produce policies.)

Carter on Procedures

In contrast to the other candidates, Jimmy Carter made numerous statements during the campaign and during his term as Governor of Georgia (1971-75) in which he explicitly emphasized principles of procedure for making public policy. Although we are aware of the possibility that these statements are in part rhetoric, his ideas do comprise a coherent philosophy, with recurrent and

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identifiable themes about how government ought to work; and we shall show that he put them into practice as Governor of Georgia.

In his own words, a major purpose of reorganizing the federal government is to "make it simple." He favors "drastic simplification of the tax structure";³ "simple, workable, housing policies";⁴ "simplification of the laws and regulations to substitute education for paper shuffling grantsmanship";⁵ "simplification of the purposes of the military" and a "fighting force that is simply organized."⁶ Rather than the "bewildering complexity" we now have, he intends to create a "simplified system of welfare."⁷ His praise goes out to the state and local governments that have devised "simple organizational structures."⁸

How does he intend to simplify? When Carter became Governor of Georgia, he reduced the number of agencies from 300 down to 22. He has proposed a similar nine-tenths reduction in the number of units at the federal level—from the present 1,900 down to around 200.⁹ His rationale seems to be a general one: the fewer the agencies, the better.

Another way to simplify administrative structure, according to Eizenstat, is "to make sure that duplicating functions are not performed by one agency and that, in fact, we don't have a situation whereby duplicating programs are being administered by more than one agency."¹⁰ Carter has repeatedly stated that one of the purposes of his proposal to introduce "zero-base budgeting" (as he did in Georgia) is "eliminating duplication and overlapping of functions."¹¹ In restructuring the defense establishment, Carter would like to "remove the overlapping functions and singly address the Defense Department toward the capability to fight."¹²

The Uniform Approach to Policy

A third way President Carter intends to simplify policy is through uniformity. He plans to reform the welfare system by providing a uniform national cash payment varying only according to cost of living.¹³ He intends to standardize the tax structure by eliminating loopholes, thus treating all income the same.¹⁴ To create uniformity, Carter would grant a direct subsidy for new housing.¹⁵ He would also standardize medical treatment—"We now have a wide disparity of length of stay in hospitals, a wide disparity of charges for the same services, a wide difference in the chances of one undergoing an operation"—and make criminal justice uniform by "eliminat[ing] much of the discretion that is

now exercised by judges and probation officers in determining the length of sentences."¹⁶

"There's just no predictability now about government policy," Carter has complained, "no way to tell what we're going to do next in the area of housing, transportation, environmental quality, or energy."¹⁷ He believes in "long-range planning so that government, business, labor, and other entities in our society can work together if they agree with the goals established. But at least it would be predictable."¹⁸ And: "The major hamstring of housing development is the unpredictability of the Federal policies. . . ."¹⁹ In agriculture, the greatest need is a "coherent, predictable and stable government policy relating to farming and the production of food and fiber."²⁰ In foreign affairs, other nations are "hungry for a more predictable and mutually advantageous relationship with our country."²¹ Unpredictability led Carter to condemn Henry Kissinger's policy of no permanent friends and no permanent enemies with these words: "I would . . . let our own positions be predictable."²²

Shared Goals Make Predictable Policies

If only we agree on long-range goals, according to Carter, then we can work together and make our policies predictable. The format of his thinking follows: long-range planning entails the explicit delineation of goals; once goals are known (and agreed upon), policies become predictable. This predictability reduces conflict and increases cooperation.

His theory of conflict explains how Carter would expect to deal with a recalcitrant Cabinet: "The best mechanism to minimize this problem is the establishment of long-range goals or purposes of the government and a mutual commitment to these goals by different Cabinet members. . . ." By getting early agreement, "I can't imagine a basic strategic difference developing between myself and one of my Cabinet members if the understanding were that we worked toward the long-range goals."²³ When asked how he would resolve differences with the Congress on foreign policy, his response was: "I hope that my normal, careful, methodical, scientific or planning approach to longer-range policies . . . would serve to remove those disharmonies long before they reach the stage of actual implementation."²⁴

A major Carter campaign criticism of President Ford was that he "allowed the nation to drift without a goal or purpose."²⁵ By contrast, when Carter became Governor of Georgia, his administration attempted to identify long-range goals: ". . . during

the first months of my term, we had 51 public meetings around the state, attended by thousands of Georgians, to formulate specific long-range goals in every realm of public life. We spelled out in writing what we hoped to accomplish at the end of two, five, or even 20 years. . . ."²⁶ Only if government has clearly defined goals, Carter believes, will people be prepared to "make personal sacrifices." One of his favorite quotes from the New Testament is: "If the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself for the battle?"²⁷ But suppose others prefer to march to their own music? How would Carter contend with conflict?

If openness is not a form of godliness for President Carter, it must come close. He has proposed an "all-inclusive 'sunshine law' . . . [whereby] meetings of federal boards, commissions, and regulatory agencies must be opened to the public, along with those of congressional committees."²⁸

Carter's espousal of openness is connected in his own mind with direct access to the people. Just as he favors giving the people open access to governmental decision-making, he plans, as President, to speak directly to them. He values openness "to let the public know what we are doing and to restore the concept in the Congress that their constituents are also my constituents. I have just as much right and responsibility to reach the people for support as a member of Congress does." He has also said that he plans to restore Franklin D. Roosevelt's "fireside chat,"²⁹ accept "special responsibility to by-pass the big shots," and to act, as it were, as the people's lobbyist.³⁰ Should his policies be thwarted by special interests, Carter says he will go to the people. At times, Carter identifies himself *as* the people. In reviewing his experience with consumer legislation in Georgia, he said: "The special interest groups prevailed on about half of it. I prevailed—rather the Georgia people prevailed—on the other half."³¹

What is consistent in these proposals is Carter's opposition to the intermediate groups—lobbyists who stand between government and citizen or a palace guard that stands between a President and Cabinet. They fracture his conception of comprehensive policy-making.

President Carter prefers to make changes comprehensively rather than "timidly or incrementally." As he has put it:

Most of the controversial issues that are not routinely well-addressed can only respond to a comprehensive approach. Incremental efforts to make basic changes are often foredoomed to failure because the special interest groups can benefit from the status quo, can focus their

attention on the increments that most affect themselves, and the general public can't be made either interested or aware.³²

The same theory guides his efforts on government reorganization:

The most difficult thing is to reorganize incrementally. If you do it one tiny little phase at a time, then all those who see their influence threatened will combine their efforts in a sort of secretive way. They come out of the rat holes and they'll concentrate on undoing what you're trying to do. But if you can have a bold enough, comprehensive enough proposal to rally the interest and support of the general electorate, then you can overcome that special interest type lobbying pressure.³³

In a word, "the comprehensive approach is inherently necessary to make controversial decisions."³⁴

Changing everything at once, then, is part of Carter's political theory: comprehensive change enables one both to identify the public interest by considering the merits of opposing claims and to serve that interest by requiring opponents to fight on every front simultaneously, thus diluting their forces while concentrating one's own. The bigger the change, the greater the public attention—and the more likely it becomes that the public interest will prevail over private interests.

A central ingredient in Carter's comprehensive reforms is their inclusiveness. A characteristic Carter phrase is "a complete assessment of tax reform in a comprehensive way." He wants to "establish comprehensive proposals on transportation and energy and agriculture."³⁵ He favors a "comprehensive nation-wide mandatory health-insurance program" and a "drastic reorganization of the health care services in the U.S."³⁶ Although we could go on, one more example from foreign affairs must serve: since "the old international institutions no longer suffice," Carter feels that "the time has come for a new architectural effort."³⁷

Since special interests—"those who prefer to work in the dark, or those whose private fiefdoms are threatened"—care only about themselves, they prevent inclusive decision-making.³⁸ To avoid this pitfall, Carter wants to restructure the federal bureaucracy, the health system, the welfare system, the tax system, the criminal-justice system, and international institutions.

According to Carter, the comprehensive approach offers a final, decisive solution to problems. On the basis of his experience with government reorganization in Georgia, he has become a lead-

ing advocate of what is called the one-step process.³⁹ In the Middle East, he wants to devise an "overall settlement rather than resuming Mr. Kissinger's step-by-step approach."⁴⁰ He contends that with Soviet cooperation we can achieve "the ultimate solution" there.⁴¹ He aims at achieving an "ultimate and final and complete resolution of New York City's problems, fiscally."⁴²

Predictable, Uniform, Simple

Who can object to making governmental policy predictable so that people know what to expect?

Predictability is preferable, but is it possible? To be more precise, is predictability for one agency (and its clients) compatible with predictability for others?

Is predictability consistent with uniformity, another managerial quality that President Carter seeks? One could get broad agreement, for instance, on the desirability of smoothing out the economic cycle by maintaining a steady low level of unemployment. A major instrument used to accomplish this objective is varying the level of government spending. Immediately it becomes evident that predictability in employment (assuming that it could be achieved) is mutually exclusive with predictability in expenditure policy. Similarly, predictability for recipients of governmental subsidies means that all who meet the qualifying conditions receive the guaranteed sum. However, predictability for governmental expenditures (and, quite possibly, for taxpayers) requires fixed dollar limits, not open-ended entitlements. Yet if there are limits, potential beneficiaries cannot know in advance how much they will receive. Since all policy results cannot be predictable, decisions about whose life will be predictable and whose won't are political as well as administrative.

The same is true for uniformity and simplicity. Uniformity on one criterion—say, population—means diversity on other criteria, such as wealth or race or geography. Imagine that President Carter wishes to make good his promise to subsidize the arts, an intention we would like to see realized. Will money be allocated by population (which favors urban density), by area (which favors rural folk), by need (which favors those who are doing the least), or by past performance (which means that those who have will get more)? A uniform policy means that all these differences cannot simultaneously be taken into account.

Comprehensiveness, in the sense of fundamental and inclusive change, often contradicts predictability and simplicity. Fundamental changes, precisely because they are far-reaching, are un-

likely to be predictable. That is how the cost of the food-stamp program grew from an expected few hundred million dollars to more than \$8 billion; it is also how indexing Social Security against inflation had the unanticipated consequence of (among other things) threatening to bankrupt the system. Thus, acting inclusively, so as to consider all (or almost all) factors impinging on a particular problem at a specific time, is, by its very nature, opposed to predictability, which requires that programs established in the past not be undone in the near future. But zero-base budgeting, the epitome of comprehensiveness, requires reexamination of all major programs every year, the very opposite of predictability.

With Slices for All, How Large a Pie?

Uniformity also lives uneasily with comprehensiveness. Programs that are both uniform and comprehensive may be too expensive. For example, if public housing must be provided everywhere on the same basis or not at all, there may be no public housing. Similarly, a desire to have a uniform level of benefits across all welfare programs for all eligible citizens might lead to a choice between much higher taxes or much lower benefits. "Cashing out" all benefits from food stamps to Medicaid and Medicare might add up to so large a sum that it would not be voted by Congress. Hence, the choice might be between a variety of disparate programs or much lower levels of benefits. Upgrading all eligibles to the highest level of benefits will increase costs, and downgrading all to the lowest level will increase anger. Thus uniformity may come at too high a price in suffering or in opposition.

A word should be said about the relationship between uniformity and individuality. We do not always equate fairness with being treated like everybody else; we would, on occasion, like to be treated as individuals. To be uniform, regulations must place people into large and homogeneous categories. Every effort to take account of special characteristics in the population leads to its further sub-division and to additional provisions in the regulations. It is this effort to treat people in terms of their individual characteristics that leads to the proliferation of rules and regulations.

President Carter's desire for uniformity has led him to advocate a single principle of organization whereby administrative agencies are formed on the basis of function or purpose.⁴³ He would have all activities involving education or health or welfare

or crime, to mention but a few, in the same large organization. As a general rule, one can confidently say that no single principle or criterion is good for every purpose. Suppose that reducing dependency on welfare is a major purpose of the Carter administration. Would this mean that education for employment, rehabilitation in prisons, improvement of health, mitigation of alcoholism, and Lord knows what else should go under welfare?

The New Look: Top-Light and Bottom-Heavy

Carter's strain toward simplicity has led him to advocate reorganization of the federal government. Leaving aside campaign rhetoric about 1,900 federal agencies (a sum that equates the tiny and trivial with the huge and important), reducing the number of agencies at the top of the hierarchy necessarily increases the number at the bottom. If there were only 10 big departments, each could have 190 sub-units, and if there were 10 at each level, an issue would have to go through 19 bureaus before it was decided. The President might find this simpler because fewer people would be reporting directly to him. But he also might discover that finding out what is going on is more difficult. The existence of gigantic departments makes it difficult for anyone—Congress, secretaries, interest groups, citizens—to see inside. Conflicts between different departments about overlapping responsibilities and conflicts revealing important differences are submerged under a single departmental view.

One of the few things that can be said about organization in general is the very thing President Carter denies—namely, that a considerable quantity of redundancy (yes, overlap and duplication) must be built into any enterprise.⁴⁴ When we want to make sure an activity is accomplished, as in our lunar missions, we build in alternative mechanisms for doing the same thing so that one can take over when the other (or others) fail. Efficiency, the principle of least effort, must be coupled with reliability, the probability that a given act will be performed. A naive notion of efficiency, for example, would suggest that the elderly and the infirm be provided with either a visiting service or an office to which they can come or call. The more one wishes to assure that services to the elderly are actually delivered, however, the more one will invest in multiple methods. Of course, there must be a limit to redundancy; but if we ever actually succeeded in eliminating all overlap and duplication, most things would work only once and some things not at all. It is ironic that in the public sector, administrative reforms often aim at monopoly or concen-

tration of power, while reforms in the private sector often aim at competition or dispersion of power.⁴⁵ Our constitutional mechanisms for coping with abuse of power, the separation of powers, and checks and balances are, after all, forms of redundancy. The House and Senate and Presidency overlap in jurisdiction and duplicate functions. That is why they quarrel and why we have been safe.

Carter's criteria cannot guide choice. Their proverbial character—look before you leap, but he who hesitates is lost—becomes apparent when they are paired with equally desirable criteria: the elimination of overlap and duplication detracts from reliability; predictability must go with adaptability; uniformity is worthy but so is recognition of individual differences. President Carter's criteria for decision-making, we conclude, are individually contradictory and mutually incompatible.

Zero-Base Budgeting

The practical embodiment of Jimmy Carter's administrative theory is zero-base budgeting. Here, if anywhere, we can learn what it would mean for him to practice what he preaches. Imagine one of us deciding whether to buy a tie or kerchief. A simple task, one might think. Suppose, however, that organizational rules mandate comprehensiveness; we are required to alter our entire wardrobe as a unit. If *everything* must be rearranged when *one item* is altered, the probability is low that we will do anything. Being caught between revolution (change in everything) and resignation (change in nothing) has little to recommend it. Yet this is what a zero-base, start-from-scratch, comprehensive approach requires. If one could actually start from scratch each year, the only zero part of the budget would be its predictability, for zero-base budgeting is a-historical. The past, as reflected in the budgetary base (common expectations as to amounts and types of funding), is explicitly rejected. Everything at every period is subject to searching scrutiny. As a result, calculations become unmanageable. Figuring out how everything relates to everything else or, worse still, how other things would look if most things were changed, defeats every best effort. Consequently, attempts to apply intelligence to programs about which something can and needs to be done are defeated by mounds of paper. The trivial drowns out the important because if everything must be examined, nothing can receive special attention. What did Carter do?

According to the originator of zero-base budgeting, the Governor concentrated his time on "reviewing policy questions, major

increases and decreases in existing programs, new programs and capital expenditure, and a few specific packages and rankings where there appeared to be problems." In other words, he devoted his time and talent to increases and decreases from the previous year and a few problem areas, just as his predecessors had done.⁴⁶

How Well Did It Work in Georgia?

Interviews with participants in zero-base budgeting in Georgia (aside from showing that 85 per cent thought no shifts in spending had been made and the other 15 per cent thought shifts had occurred but were unable to recall any) reveal that, when fiscal conditions changed in 1974 and 1975, Carter asked for entirely new budget submissions.⁴⁷ Why? The departmental budget analysts in Georgia explained that their priority rankings changed under different funding levels. But the point is that a budgetary process must be able to accommodate change; if it has to be altered every time funding levels change, then zero-base budgeting is really a cover term for unknown and unspecified future procedures.

The main product of zero-base budgeting is, literally, a list of objectives. Rarely, however, do resources remain beyond the first few. The experience of the various federal commissions on national priorities, for instance, is that there is no point in listing 846 or even 79 national objectives because almost all the money is gone after the first few are taken care of. If you allow us one or two national budget priorities—say social security supported entirely from general revenues—you can skip the others because there won't be anything left to support them. Carter knows this. But he would argue that zero-base budgeting requires agencies to supply alternatives. Unless agencies are rewarded for reducing the size of their programs, however, they will manipulate their priorities, placing politically sensitive and otherwise essential items at the bottom, so as to force superiors to increase their income. This might explain why Carter did not lower the zero-base cutoff point to include lower priority items when there was an increase in funds or raise this point when there was a decrease in funds.⁴⁸

On balance, the people who conducted the interviews feel that the zero-base system has benefited Georgia's administration because it increased information about, and participation in, the budgetary process. However, these increases might just as well have resulted from the introduction of *any* novel procedure which

centers attention on the budget. The investigators also believe that as the participants gain more experience, shortcomings will be overcome. Perhaps; it is always possible to believe that more of the same will lead to improvement.

Measuring "Success" in the Carter Era

The overwhelming emphasis that President Carter places on procedural instruments could leave his administration vulnerable to massive displacement of goals; that is, it could result in having success defined, at least within his administration, by degree of governmental effort rather than by degree of social accomplishment. To use prisons as an example: the amount agencies spend, the number of new programs they initiate, and the uniformity of their procedures could replace increase in rehabilitation or reduction in crime as measures of success. That is how agencies succeed in making the variables they can control—i.e., their own efforts and procedures—the criteria against which they are measured.

By putting the emphasis on agreement about objectives, as Carter does, critical problems of how to relate people and activities so that citizens get good results tend to be subsumed under generalities about the desirability of having objectives. If public agencies must have objectives, they prefer a greater rather than a lesser number, so that the consequences of their activities are likely to fit under one of them. Moreover, the objectives of public agencies tend to be multiple and conflicting because different people want different things. Consequently, the objective of limiting the costs of medical care can (and does) coexist with the opposing objective of increasing the quantity and quality of such care. Reconciling these differences is not made easier by telling bureaucrats that their strategic behavior—staking out multiple objectives so they can always claim they have achieved something—has become sanctified as a virtue.

Why, if our views have any credence, has Carter come to hold untenable beliefs about procedures for making policy? Perhaps they were inculcated at Annapolis; but one could just as well argue that he chose to go there because he wanted an instrumental approach to decision-making.⁴⁹ No doubt his father's influence was important ("My daddy . . . was a meticulous planner like me."),⁵⁰ but this could have become mere compulsiveness instead of a well-developed pattern of thought and work. No candidate since Herbert Hoover, the Great Engineer,⁵¹ would have thought it important to talk to the public about so arcane

a subject as zero-base budgeting, going so far as to include it in his five-minute television spots last year. Perhaps these views make sense to Carter under the circumstances within which he has operated in the years since he has become a public figure.

Let us remove the burden from Carter and place it where it belongs, on ourselves, by asking why a highly intelligent political executive might interpret his experiences so as to reinforce his belief in an instrumental-cum-technological view of public policy-making. Why, to us, does Carter seem to know worse rather than to know better?

At the outset we can dispose of the cynical view that Carter's ideas on procedures are purely political—that favoring efficiency, opposing the “bureaucratic mess” in Washington, promising more service at less cost⁵² are simply non-controversial positions that project a useful image of a candidate as an effective manager. Reorganization not only suggests rationality, it is also a useful cover for gaining control over positions and agencies that would increase the proposer's power (*viz.*, Carter's proposal that the President appoint the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board).⁵³ Coördination is often a synonym for coercion. To all this we reply, “Yes, but.” Yes, politicians are (and ought to be) political, but Carter pursues his procedural proposals above and beyond the call of duty or interest—and he acts on them. No one who has read his gubernatorial messages or observed the consistency and tenacity with which he personally pursued zero-base budgeting, reorganization, and all the rest can doubt his commitment.⁵⁴ Carter cares and Carter acts. Why, then, does he persevere with unsuitable procedures for public policy-making?

Why Is Carter a Good Executive?

Carter knows himself well enough to believe that he would avoid many pitfalls of his procedures by applying himself to Washington's problems with energy, intelligence, and a demand for excellence.⁵⁵ We agree. In fact, we think it is these attributes—and not his procedural principles—that have brought him whatever success he has enjoyed as an executive. (Other life-forms experience a phenomenon called “adverse selection,” in which general success is mistakenly attributed to specific attributes that are then wrongly selected as worthy of propagation.)

Yet if Carter is mistaken in his procedural approach, as we think he is, he may be on solid ground in an area that we have not covered—the area of public confidence. He recognizes (and has emphasized) that citizens have a right to understand their

government if they are being asked to support it; simplicity and predictability of governmental activity could help in achieving that support. If citizens are to regard government as fair and equitable, their perception that services uniformly treat like people alike might well give them that impression. Carter's concern for how government looks to the people might motivate him to prefer procedures to improve that appearance.

A concern for appearances as a prerequisite for obtaining support to undertake action apparently animates Carter's behavior in other areas as well. His three election campaigns (for the state legislature, for governor, and for president) may be fairly characterized, we believe, as socially conservative, whereas his actions in office have thus far been politically progressive. He takes care to identify himself with the social stance of the electorate so that citizens will feel he is one of them—even if all of them will not be able to agree with programs to distribute income or services in favor of the disadvantaged. As governor of Georgia, his need to keep close to the electorate limited his financial aspirations for state spending; but he did spend new monies for the rural poor, for the mentally handicapped, for prisoners, for those who had the least. After Watergate, no one should look down upon efforts to improve the appearance as well as the performance of government.

But what happens if appearance goes one way and performance the other? Suppose, in other words, that the demands of public policy-making are at odds with the appearance of order and neatness. Objectives are often multiple and conflicting; varied interest groups formulate and reformulate their goals and alliances; there is no single organizing principle good for all times and purposes, nor a single locus of authority in a federal political system. Symmetry, simplicity, uniformity—hence understandability and predictability—may not be achievable if we also want a welfare state and pluralistic politics. How much confusion and complexity is *built in* the things we want government to do and the ways a democratic society insists on doing them? The Carter administration will enable us to put this hypothesis to the test.

We are concerned that President Carter will pursue procedures regardless of their efficacy, and that he will regard opposition to his procedural prescriptions as, if not exactly the work of the devil, at least irrational, a product of ignorance and special interests, not subject to the usual rules of evidence. The comprehensive, scientific approach, which is supposed to work to promote harmony, has as a basic assumption the lack of conflict. If agreement does not result from openness, if seeming support for

long-range goals breaks down under short-range pressures, will President Carter be able to tolerate the frustration?

His own recipe for controlling conflict is to make it boil over; comprehensive change, in his view, forces opposing interests into public debate where Presidents can confront and overcome them. But how often can this be done? Agitating some of the interests some of the time is not the same as upsetting most of them most of the time. Interests are people, lots of people who depend on government, the very same people to whom Carter must appeal for support. If he can space his appeals out so that he is not fighting on every front at once, he may have a chance; but if he has to fight simultaneously on many fronts, he (and the nation with him) may be in for a difficult time.

"He-The-People"

If he does not get his way, President Carter has promised to go directly to the people. He wishes both to incorporate and transcend group interests. Incorporation works by including virtually all groups in the initial stages of policy formation. Through coöptation, he hopes to commit them to support his programs (or at least not to oppose them vigorously). Transcendence works by investing hierarchy with morality. In order to reflect the people's will, the best way to organize government is to make it democratic at the bottom and centralized at the top.⁵⁶ The President, then, as chief hierarch and ultimate definer of the public interest, leaps over group interests through direct contact with the populace. President Carter would rather interpret the inchoate desires of the mass of people than bargain over who gets what the government offers. Nor will he content himself with being the mediator of contending interests, merely keeping the score and announcing the winners. Group interests breed divisiveness, while the public interest breeds unity. Instead, "he-the-people" will interpret their victory.

President Carter's theory of governing suggests opportunities for leadership but also obstacles to success. To reorganize the executive branch, he will have to overcome the clientele it serves and the representatives they elect. To put through major reforms, he will need financial support from a Congress accustomed to making its own budget. Should his initiatives falter, private interests may appear to have triumphed over the public interest. According to his own philosophy, he will be compelled to appeal to the people to protect his programs. But in the end, even the people may prove ungrateful; for if they fail the President, it will

appear that they have given in to their private interests instead of standing up for their public duties.

The most worrisome aspect of Jimmy Carter's theory of public policy-making is his assumption that discussion will lead to agreement on long-term objectives, which will assure support for present programs. Carter's views on conflict could survive only if past objectives determined future administration. This view of policy politics is untenable because the price of agreement is likely to be vagueness and because administration involves altering ends by changing means. When specific acts require a choice between how much inflation versus how much employment, or how much preservation of natural resources versus how much consumption, it becomes evident that agreement in general need not mean (and has often not meant) agreement in particular. Since conditions change, the agreements that Carter negotiates in time of plenty may have to be renegotiated in times of austerity. Administration of programs would be of little interest if it did not involve continuous redefinition of objectives.

Jimmy Carter as President

What, then, is Jimmy Carter likely to do as President? Contingency may overwhelm concern. Another huge oil price increase, a resurgence of inflation, or a military involvement may do more to shape what a President will do than his own initial ideas worked out under much different circumstances. Personality may prevail over policy. From listening to his policy pronouncements, who would have predicted Franklin D. Roosevelt's eagerness to abandon the deflationary, low-spending policies he advocated during his first presidential campaign? Confronted with crises, policies frequently pass away, but long-learned modes of problem-solving often remain. FDR's administration was characterized by eclecticism. He had a willingness to try and a readiness to abandon programs, an incorrigible optimism as well as a love of conflict, even when (or precisely because) it led to contradictions that gave him room to maneuver. These operative administrative theories proved more permanent indicators of his behavior than his past policies. So too, we think, Jimmy Carter's theory of governing will better indicate his behavior in office than what he says about substantive issues.

Like most Americans, we voted for Carter and worried about him at the same time. Contrary to our fears, there is evidence that Carter can (and does) learn from experience. On busing, for example (we are not passing judgment on the correctness of

his stand but rather on his way of thinking about the problem), Carter realized that wealthy parents often avoid the policy by sending their children to private schools or by moving their family out of the area. Despite good intentions, it is mostly the black children who get bused and pay the price. The policy did not achieve the immediate objective of school integration or the more distant objective of better school performance. Carter's proposal has been to substitute a voluntary program for the mandatory one. He places emphasis upon changing the school system from within by getting black persons in administrative and teaching jobs.⁵⁷

Another area in which his policy indicates a positive response to past unsuccessful attempts is his handling of racial and civil disturbances. As Governor of Georgia, he discovered that the normal, massive presence of state troopers during civil disorders not only served to aggravate the situation but used up enormous police resources. So he set up biracial community civil-disorder units composed of three persons dressed in civilian clothes. After the disorder, the units were replaced by permanent local committees.⁵⁸ When Carter tried to influence the choice of legislative leaders in Georgia, he learned this caused more trouble than it was worth. He vowed not to do it with Congress. Many more examples exist. The question is whether Carter will apply the same standards to procedures, including procedures for handling conflict, as he does to policies.

Read this as a cautionary tale for President Carter and his supporters. There is, after all, no reason to believe that former President Ford followed better procedures or even that he paid much attention to procedures at all. Because Carter is explicit about his own philosophy, because he cares about procedures, we have been able to be critical. But people who care are also likely to perform. If they care too much, however, they might substitute rigidity for right action. Having been forewarned, perhaps Carter will be forearmed to search for weaknesses in his strengths.



NOTES

1. "Jimmy Carter Presidential Campaign Issues Reference Book," July 24, 1976. Cited hereafter as "Issues Reference Book."
2. "Issues: Clearer and More Detailed," *National Journal Reports*, July 24, 1976, p. 1028.
3. "Head-to-Head on the Issues," *U.S. News and World Report*, September 13, 1976, p. 21.
4. "Issues Reference Book," p. 20.
5. "Issues Reference Book," p. 13.
6. "Interview on the Issues—What Carter Believes," *U.S. News and World Report*, May 24, 1976, p. 19; and "Issues Reference Book," p. 30.
7. "Issues Reference Book," p. 13.
8. Jimmy Carter, *Why Not the Best?*, Broadman Press, 1975, p. 147.
9. "Jimmy Carter: Not Just Peanuts," *Time*, March 8, 1976, p. 19.
10. Stated by Stuart Eisenstat, Carter's policy advisor, in *National Journal Reports*, July 24, 1976, p. 1029.
11. *New York Times*, April 2, 1976, p. 2; and *U.S. News and World Report*, May 24, 1976, p. 19.
12. "The View from the Top of the Carter Campaign," *National Journal Reports*, July 17, 1976, p. 1002.
13. *U.S. News and World Report*, May 24, 1976, p. 23; and James P. Gannon, "The Activist: Carter, Despite Image of Outsider Favors Do-More Government," *Wall Street Journal*, April 2, 1976, p. 23.
14. "What Carter Would Do As President," *U.S. News and World Report*, July 26, 1976, p. 18.
15. "Issues Reference Book," p. 20.
16. *U.S. News and World Report*, May 24, 1976, p. 23; and July 26, 1976, p. 18.
17. *U.S. News and World Report*, May 24, 1976, p. 18.
18. "Jimmy Carter on Economics: Populist Georgia Style," *Business Week*, May 3, 1976, p. 66.
19. "Excerpts from an Interview with Jimmy Carter," *New York Times*, March 31, 1976, p. 20.
20. "Issues Reference Book," p. 15.
21. "Carter: Seeking Clearer Goals," *Time*, May 10, 1976, p. 24.
22. *U.S. News and World Report*, May 24, 1976, p. 19.
23. *National Journal Reports*, July 17, 1976, p. 997.
24. "Excerpts from the Interview with Carter on his Concepts in Foreign Policy," *New York Times*, July 7, 1976, p. 12.
25. "Carter Says Ford Fails to Check Nation's 'Drift,'" *New York Times*, August 18, 1976, p. 1.
26. Carter, *Why Not the Best?*, p. 114.
27. Jimmy Carter, National Press Club, Announcement Speech for Democratic Presidential Nomination, December 12, 1974.
28. "Issues Reference Book," p. 14; and Albert R. Hunt, "Carter and Business," *Wall Street Journal*, August 12, 1976, p. 15.
29. *U.S. News and World Report*, September 13, 1976, p. 20.
30. "Carter Tells Film Stars about Poverty in the South," *New York Times*, August 24, 1976, p. 17.
31. *National Journal Reports*, July 17, 1976, p. 998.
32. *National Journal Reports*, July 17, 1976, p. 999.
33. "State Structural Reforms," *National Journal Reports*, April 5, 1975, p. 506.
34. *National Journal Reports*, July 17, 1976, p. 999.
35. *U.S. News and World Report*, September 13, 1976, p. 21.
36. *Wall Street Journal*, April 2, 1976, p. 23.
37. Eleanor Randolph, "Carter Hits 'Lone Ranger' Foreign Policy of Kissinger," *Chicago Tribune*, June 24, 1976, p. 5.
38. Carter, Announcement Speech, December 12, 1974.
39. *National Journal Reports*, April 5, 1975, p. 506.
40. *U.S. News and World Report*, July 26, 1976, p. 18.
41. "Where Jimmy Carter Stands on Foreign Policy," *Chicago Tribune*, May 8, 1976, p. 10.
42. "Excerpts from an Interview with Jimmy Carter," *New York Times*, March 31, 1976, p. 20.
43. This principle has had a long history, having been proposed in 1911 by the President's

Commission on Economy and Efficiency: "Only by grouping services according to their character can substantial progress be made in eliminating duplication." Quoted in Peri E. Arnold, "Executive Reorganization and Administrative Theory: the Origin of the Managerial Presidency," paper presented at 1976 Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 1976, p. 6.

44. Martin Landau, "Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap," *Public Administration Review*, vol. XXIX, no. 4, July/August 1969, pp. 346-358.

45. Lewis Dexter has emphasized that modern Western society has followed the route of competition not monopoly as a means to clarify issues and procedures. He cites the example that U.S. anti-trust laws are "deliberately designed to impose redundancy and duplication on industry." See Lewis Anthony Dexter, "The Advantages of Some Duplication and Ambiguity in Senate Committee Jurisdictions," p. 174. First staff report, Temporary Select Committee of United States Senate on Committee Jurisdiction, chairman Adlai Stevenson, issued September, 1976.

46. Peter Phyr, *Zero-Base Budgeting: A Practical Management Tool for Evaluating Expenses*, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1973, p. 97. Quoted in Aaron Wildavsky, *Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes*, Little, Brown and Co., 1975, p. 295.

47. George S. Nimier and Roger H. Hermanson, "A Look at Zero-Base Budgeting—The Georgia Experience," *Atlanta Economic Review*, July-August, 1976, pp. 5-12. In 1974 there was an increase in available funds, and in 1975 a decrease.

48. Nimier and Hermanson, pp. 5-12.

49. See, for example, Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover's speech delivered in Brooklyn on April 9, 1958, p. 5, in which he complains about inefficiency in bureaucracy: "If over-organization lengthens our lead time we must heed Thoreau's cry of 'simplify, simplify.'"

50. Quoted in Bruce Mazlish and Edwin Diamond, "Thrice Born: A Psycho-history of Jimmy Carter's Rebirth," *New York*, no. 9, no. 35, August 30, 1976, p. 32.

51. Hoover was an unrelenting champion of organization by "major purpose under single-headed responsibility" as a means for making agencies easier to manage and more efficient. See Peri E. Arnold, "Executive Reorganization," pp. 13-14, 20. Securing broad reorganization authority subject to Congressional veto is also the approach Carter took in Georgia and hopes to repeat in Washington. See *U.S. News and World Report*, July 26, 1976, p. 17.

52. Although Carter, like any good engineer, knows it is not possible to maximize simultaneously on more than one dimension, his language sometimes suggests the opposite: ". . . I assure you that my primary concern will be providing the maximum amount of services for the least cost." State of Georgia, *Governor's Reorganization Message*, March 1, 1971, p. 18.

53. The Reorganization Act in Georgia, for instance, removed an entire administrative level, leaving those positions open to appointment by the Governor. See T. McN. Simpson, III, "Georgia State Administration: Jimmy Carter's Contribution," paper delivered at 1973 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, November 1-3, p. 10.

54. For a discussion of Carter's contribution to Georgia administration, see Simpson, p. 10.

55. Carter's qualities as an executive are evoked in the instructions he gave to members of the study group involved in making recommendations for reorganization in Georgia: "Studies of this nature are a full-time job. You cannot drop by to chat with a department head for a few minutes and then go back and write a report. If that were all that is required, I would do the study myself during the next two months. Somebody has to get out in the field and find out what is really happening and why. That is not a part-time job; it means spending eight hours a day working with the state employees and another four or five hours that night analyzing what was learned. It means writing and rewriting the report so that each point is clearly and concisely stated, backed by adequate detail, able to stand up to any question and practical for implementation." State of Georgia, *Governor's Reorganization Message*, p. 18.

56. In New York City, John Lindsay "rationalized" the city administration by consolidating and eliminating all intermediate structures, thus forming the "Office of Collective Bargaining." It soon became the sole target of public-employee union demands, thereby greatly strengthening the union's position. In Jack Douglas's apt description, the rationalization "swept away all the hedgerows behind which he [Lindsay] could have hidden." See Jack D. Douglas, "Urban Politics and Public Employee Unions," in *Public Employee Unions: A Study of the Crisis in Public Sector Labor Relations*, Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco, California, 1976, p. 103.

57. "Issues Reference Book," p. 21.

58. "Issues Reference Book," p. 21.

BACKGROUND BOOKS

THE PRESIDENCY

To understand the institution of the presidency as it has evolved in the United States, it helps to read as many books as one can about individual Presidents. Much in the American experience has depended on the character and talents of that man in the White House.

Books about the 38 men who have variously diminished, enhanced, and, in some cases, abused the power of the presidency range from the superb to the mediocre. Many Presidents—Theodore Roosevelt among them—have yet to receive first-class scholarly treatment.

In chronological order, after the collected letters and biographies of the Virginia dynasty and the Adamses,* we have such major studies of Presidents and their times as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s **Age of Jackson** (Little, Brown, 1945, cloth, 1963, paper).

Andrew Jackson made the presidency, in the Roman phrase, "the tribune of the people." Schlesinger gives us a life-size portrait of "Old Hickory," an analysis of his frontier-style presidency, and a class interpretation of the tumultuous politics of the Jacksonian Age.

Charles Grier Sellers, in **James K. Polk, Jacksonian, 1795-1843** and **James K. Polk, Continentalist, 1843-1846** (Princeton, 1957 & 1966), chronicles most of the life of Jackson's successor, the controversial former congressman and governor of Tennessee, who led the United States into its first foreign military adventure, the war with Mexico.

Historical treatments of Abraham Lincoln, the nation's closest approximation to a secular saint, have ranged widely in tone, from hero-worship to the debunking of what Richard Hof-

**The Wilson Quarterly*, Autumn 1976, page 129.

stadter described as Lincoln's "self-made myth."

Carl Sandburg's massive **Abraham Lincoln: The Prairie Years and The War Years** (Harcourt, Brace, 1939, 6 vol., cloth; 1954, abr. ed. 1 vol., cloth; 1974, paper; Dell, 1959-75, 3 vol., paper) evokes the man, his humor, and the deep sorrows of the Civil War with a wealth of anecdotal detail and quoted letters.

But for World War I, Woodrow Wilson might have gone down in history as a domestic reformer. Instead, his dramatic postwar efforts on behalf of the League of Nations have eclipsed his productive first "New Democracy" administration. Perhaps the best portrait is drawn in Alexander and Juliette George's **Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study** (John Day, 1956; Dover, 1964, reprint). Their analysis of the impact on the future President of a strict Calvinistic creed and a demanding Presbyterian-minister father remains the most successful "psychohistorical" treatment of any President.

The frequent dismissal of the Presidents of the 1920s as barely worthy of notice can be a mistake. Robert K. Murray's scholarly **The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding and His Administration** (Univ. of Minn., 1969), based on the Harding papers, substantially revises the orthodox view of the portly Ohioan. Murray describes him as "an extremely hard-working President" who had "a superb feel for the right political action at the right time." In **A Puritan in Babylon: The Story of Calvin Coolidge** (Macmillan, 1938; Peter Smith, 1973, reprint), William Allen White, journalist-biographer par excellence, relates "this obviously limited but honest, shrewd,

sentimental, resolute American primitive" to his time, "those gorgeous and sophisticated Roaring Twenties."

In some ways, the most tragic President was Herbert Hoover, elected in the boom year of 1928. His single term ended with the Great Depression. Eugene Lyons's **Herbert Hoover: A Biography** (Doubleday, 1964) covers Hoover's presidency and his later career of distinguished public service.

Countless books have been written about Franklin D. Roosevelt. A good single-volume study is Rexford Guy Tugwell's intimate **The Democratic Roosevelt: A Biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt** (Doubleday, 1957, cloth; Penguin, 1969, paper). The author, a major New Deal figure, concludes that no one ever caught more than a glimpse of FDR's decision-making process, which "went on in his most secret mind."

In **Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox** (Harcourt Brace, 1956, cloth, 1963, paper), James MacGregor Burns discusses FDR's artful domestic policy leadership up to World War II, taking his title from Machiavelli's characterization of the Prince who must be "a fox to recognize traps and a lion to frighten wolves." In a second volume, **Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom** (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970, cloth, 1973, paper), Burns finds duality between the "man of principle, of ideals, of faith, crusading for a distant vision" and the "man of *Realpolitik*, of prudence, of narrow, manageable, short-run goals, intent always on protecting his power and authority."

The three volumes of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s **Age of Roosevelt** (Houghton Mifflin, 1957-60, cloth, 1976, paper) take FDR only through his first term. In **The Crisis of the Old Order**, the author finds the New Deal's origins in the social and economic chaos after World War I, bringing the story through

the elections of 1932. In **The Coming of the New Deal** and **The Politics of Upheaval**, he analyzes the evolution of the presidency as FDR developed his special political style. Two more volumes are in preparation.

We have, as yet, no broad scholarly biographies of the Presidents who have served in the White House since Roosevelt, but there are many excellent treatments of their operating styles, foreign and domestic policies, relations with Congress, and ways of running the White House.

Most retrospective accounts by newsmen and other contemporary observers of the presidency-in-action (down to those by White House dogkeepers and seamstresses) fade quickly. A surprising exception is Irwin H. (Ike) Hoover's **Forty-Two Years in the White House** (Houghton-Mifflin, 1934). This collection of backstage anecdotes and personal observations by a man who joined the White House custodial staff in 1891 provides some legitimate historical footnotes.

Worthwhile "insider" literature for more recent administrations includes **The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years** by Emmet John Hughes (Atheneum, 1963, cloth, 1975, paper) and **Decision-Making in the White House: The Olive Branch or the Arrows** (Columbia, 1963, cloth & paper) by Theodore C. Sorensen. Hughes served as a White House speechwriter. He analyzes the weaknesses as well as the strengths of his sometime employer: Ike's staff system, for example, "essentially left to others the initiative for both information and execution." Sorensen, one of John F. Kennedy's closest advisors, seeks to answer, without complete success, the question "How does a President make up his mind?"

Two other insider books by former aides to Lyndon Baines Johnson deserve

mention. George E. Reedy's **The Twilight of the Presidency** (World, 1970, cloth; New American Library, 1971, paper) is a considered attack on the once-revered concept of the "strong presidency," which took FDR as its model and, as Reedy sees it, led LBJ into serious excesses. He observes that during both the Johnson and early Nixon years, the President was "treated with all of the reverence due a monarch"; somehow, he argues, the office must be brought back to human scale.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.'s study of the office, **A Presidential Nation** (Norton, 1975), is another revisionist interpretation with little of the memoir about it. Califano faults other parts of the federal system for having "lost the will and institutional capability to provide checks and balances to the exercise of presidential power."

The Nixon period dramatically brought home the importance of the President's psychological make-up. Toward the end of Richard Nixon's first term, political scientist James David Barber published **The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House** (Prentice-Hall, 1972, cloth & paper), in which he develops an elaborate personality typology for 20th-century Presidents, beginning with William Howard Taft. His analysis of Nixon (Active-Negative), whose "emotional energy is taken up with resisting the 'temptation' to lash out at his enemies," was written long before Watergate.

A growing literature on special aspects of the presidency, dating back several decades, includes Richard F. Fenno, Jr.'s **The President's Cabinet: An Analysis of the Period from Wilson to Eisenhower** (Harvard, cloth, 1959; Vintage, paper, 1967). This gloomy study of how the bureaucracy weakens the cabinet system suggests why the President's own staff later grew in size and responsibility.

The electoral process dominates Edward Stanwood's **A History of the Presidency**, first published in 1898 and later in several revisions carrying the original narrative to 1928 (Houghton Mifflin, 1898; Kelley, 1975, reprint). Stanwood traces, administration by administration, the rise of parties, the transformation of the electoral college, the emergence of party conventions, and party realignments. An up-to-date supplement is **Presidential Elections: Strategies of American Electoral Politics** by Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky (Scribner's, 1976, 4th ed., cloth & paper). This sophisticated text examines the difficult process of restructuring the presidential nominating system since 1968.

Broader studies of the Chief Executive began to be read in earnest with the appearance of Harold J. Laski's **The American Presidency: An Interpretation** (Harper, 1940; Greenwood, 1972, reprint). Laski, who taught for years at Harvard, saw the presidency through an Englishman's eyes, noting that the British system "makes responsibility for action clear and direct and intelligible," whereas, between the U.S. Congress and the White House, ultimate responsibility often remains ambiguous.

In the wake of Watergate and Vietnam, much recent scholarship calls for limitations on the Office of the President. Erwin C. Hargrove, in **The Power of the Modern Presidency** (Temple Univ., 1974, cloth; Knopf, 1974, paper), examines what he terms "the crisis of the contemporary presidency" in the areas of foreign policy, domestic policy, and the President's relations with the bureaucracy. One check on power that Hargrove urges is "for Congress to open up the White House" by requiring top presidential staffers to seek Senate confirmation and to testify before congressional committees.

Newly issued last year is an update of

AS PRESIDENTS SEE THEMSELVES

Thirteen Presidents have left memoirs of one sort or another, exclusive of diaries and collected letters. According to **The Presidents of the United States 1789-1962**, a bibliography compiled for the Library of Congress by Donald H. Mudge: "John Adams did not get beyond the Revolution, nor Jefferson beyond his return to the United States from France in 1790. Van Buren's is considerably longer and more diffuse, but it was left incomplete before it reached the Presidency. Fillmore's is only a brief sketch of his youth. Lincoln prepared only some brief sketches for the press. Grant's **Personal Memoirs** [Webster, 1885-86; Peter Smith, 1969, reprint] deserve their fame, but death broke in as he struggled toward Appomattox. Theodore Roosevelt's **Autobiography** [Macmillan, 1913; Octagon, 1973, reprint] includes his retrospect of his administration and is an outstanding achievement. Coolidge's of 1929 is bare of political or administrative detail. The full-dress **Memoirs** of Hoover [Macmillan, 1951-52, 3 vols.] and of Truman [Doubleday, 1955-56, 2 vols.] represent a new departure in Presidential writing and must always remain a primary source of the first importance." Eisenhower covered his wartime experiences (1942-45) in **Crusade in Europe** (Doubleday, 1948) and his White House years in **Mandate for Change, 1953-1956** and **Waging Peace, 1956-1961** (Doubleday, 1963-65). Lyndon Johnson's **Vantage Point: Perspective of the Presidency, 1963-1969** (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971, cloth; Popular Library, 1972, paper), written in Texas after he retired from public life, largely constitutes a defense of his administration. Nixon's memoirs are now in preparation at San Clemente.


Richard E. Neustadt's **Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership with Reflections on Johnson and Nixon** (Wiley, 1976, cloth & paper). This classic, first published in 1960 and reportedly studied as a text by John F. Kennedy, puts it all together: the roots of presidential power, factors of personality and style; constitutional powers and limits, political opportunities and constraints.

Finally, we turn back to Edward S. Corwin's rigorous constitutional history of the presidency. The fourth edition of **The President, Office and Powers, 1787-**

1957 (New York Univ., 1957, cloth & paper) has now been supplemented by a collection of 12 essays by the late Princeton historian Corwin, **Presidential Power and the Constitution** (Cornell, 1976) edited by Richard Loss. These heavily footnoted essays may be hard going for the general reader. But those who stay the course will gain a deeper appreciation of the problems that today complicate the workings of America's greatest political invention: the democratically elected one-man executive who is at once monarch and commoner, premier and head of state.

—Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr.

EDITOR'S NOTE. Mr. Cornwell, professor of political science at Brown University, is the author of **Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion** (Indiana Univ., 1965).



DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES IN THE U.S., BY SEX OF HEAD AND PRESENCE OF CHILDREN UNDER 18, 1975

Source: "Household and Family Characteristics: March 1975," Table I, *Current Population Reports, Population Characteristics*, Series P-20, No. 291, issued February 1976, U.S. Bureau of the Census.



The Changing Family

Alexis de Tocqueville saw the American family, so different from the European, as an exemplar and bulwark of sober democracy. Writing in the 1830s, he noted the “species of equality [that] prevails around the domestic hearth,” the informality between parents and children, the early independence of sons and daughters, and the general belief that “though their lot is different,” men and women are “beings of equal value” to society.

Since Tocqueville’s visit, of course, much has changed. The family has been affected, like other American institutions, by the shift from farm to city, by technology, by individual mobility. Of late, something like a family upheaval has taken place, widely publicized but only dimly understood. The new statistics on marriage and remarriage, working wives, fertility rates, divorce, “female-headed” households are dramatic. But the change has been accompanied by little comprehensive analysis by scholars of its social causes and effects. There has been a trickle of specialized studies—on women, on child care, on family welfare policy. The futurologists have been busy. But solid research is scarce.

On the following two pages, as a reminder of Tocqueville’s time, we reproduce part of an 1838 guide to “domestic happiness.” Next, as an indication of the current scholarly “state of the art” we present some basic statistics and three essays on the family as an institution in the 1970s. Economists Heather L. Ross and Isabel V. Sawhill survey the family’s changing role. Educator Mary Jo Bane discusses the children most affected—those in “female-headed” families. Finally, from yet another perspective, social psychologist George Levinger examines the trends, reviews the research, and notes some of the unanswered questions.

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mistake in history, geography, grammar, or indeed on any other subject. There are, I am persuaded, many wives of such keen feelings and high spirits, (and such wives deserve to be treated with the utmost delicacy,) that they would rather receive a severe and bitter scolding in private, than a rebuke in company, calculated to display ignorance or folly, or to impair them in their own opinion, or in that of others.

"To sum up all you now have heard,
Young men and old, peruse the bard:
A female trusted to your care,
His rule is pithy, short and clear:—
'Be to her faults a little blind;
Be to her virtues very kind
Let all her ways be unconfid'
And place your padlock on her mind.'"

—••••—
RULES FOR WIVES.

I. Always receive your husband with smiles—leaving nothing undone to render home agreeable—and gratefully reciprocating his kindness and attention.

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II. Study to gratify his inclinations, in regard to food and cookery; in the management of the family; in your dress, manners, and deportment.

III. Never attempt to rule or appear to rule your husband. Such conduct degrades husbands—and wives always partake largely in the degradation of their husbands.

IV. In every thing reasonable comply with his wishes with cheerfulness—and even as far as possible anticipate them.

V. Avoid all altercations or arguments leading to ill humour—and more especially before company. Few things are more disgusting than the altercations of the married, when in the company of friends or strangers.

VI. Never attempt to interfere in his business, unless he ask your advice or counsel; and never attempt to control him in the management of it.

VII. Never confide to gossips any of the failings or imperfections of your husband—nor any of those little differences that occasionally arise in the married state. If you do, you may rest assured that however strong

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the injunctions of secrecy on the one hand, or the pledge on the other, they will in a day or two become the common talk of the neighbourhood.

VIII. Try to cultivate your mind, so as, should your husband be intelligent and well-informed, you may join in rational conversation with him and his friends.

IX. Think nothing a trifle that may produce even a momentary breach of harmony, or the slightest uneasy sensation.

"Think nought a trifle, though it small appear;
Small sands the mountain, moments make the year,
And trifles life. Your care to trifles give,
Else you may die ere you have learn'd to live."
Young.

X. If your husband be in business, always, in your expenditures, bear in mind the trying vicissitudes to which trade and commerce are subject; and do not expose yourself to the reproach, should he experience one of them, of having unnecessarily expended money, of

6

which you and your offspring may afterwards be in want.

XI. While you carefully shun, in providing for your family, the Scylla of meanness and parsimony, avoid equally the Charybdis of extravagance, an error too common here; as remarked by most of the travellers who visit this country.

XII. If you be disposed to economize, I beseech you not to extend your economy to the wages you pay to seamstresses or washerwomen, who, particularly the latter, are too frequently ground to the earth, by the inadequacy of the wages they receive. Economize, if you will, in shawls, bonnets, and handkerchiefs; but never, by exacting labour from the poor, without adequate compensation, incur the dire anathemas pronounced in the Scriptures against the oppressors of the poor.

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WHAT THE STATISTICS SHOW

As can be seen from the graph on the opposite page, the three basic measures of American family formation and dissolution have changed in recent years.

The first-marriage rate is approaching an all-time low.

The divorce rate is at an all-time high.


The remarriage rate is down slightly.

Until the end of the 1960s, all three trend lines followed a roughly parallel pattern. They dipped together to simultaneous "lows" during the Depression years, rose rapidly to "highs" immediately after World War II, declined together in the 1950s, and then began to part company. During most of the 1960s, the divorce rate and the remarriage rate continued their parallel rise (this is not surprising, given the fact that three-fourths of all divorced women and five-sixths of all divorced men remarry). But the rate for persons getting married for the first time leveled off, then dipped slightly between 1970 and 1974. In the 1970s, the divorce rate began to climb spectacularly, and the remarriage rate declined modestly.


While there may be no agreement about the reasons for the divorce rate being 2.5 times what it was at the end of the 1960s, it is clear—as can be seen from the graph opposite—that the realities of particular time periods affect the disposition of people to marry, divorce, or remarry. In the 1930s, the Depression's pinch created a downturn in all three rates. The mood of relief and release following World War II generated a temporary but substantial increase in all three rates. In the 1960s and 1970s, it seems clear that the changes in the rates have been due, in part, to new perceptions of the institution of marriage itself.

A declining fertility rate may also have contributed to the rise in the divorce rate. Women with small families are more likely to be in the labor force and therefore financially more independent of their husbands. And as family size has declined, the proportion

FIRST-MARRIAGE AND REMARRIAGE RATES



DIVORCE RATE



Note: The first-marriage rate is based on first marriages per 1,000 single women 14 to 44. The divorce rate is based on divorces per 1,000 women 14 to 44. The remarriage rate is based on remarriages per 1,000 widowed and divorced women 14 to 54.

Source: Arthur J. Norton and Paul C. Glick, "Marital Instability: Past, Present, and Future," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1976.

of children in the average family who are of pre-school age has declined. This development has tended to free the mother to earn wages outside the home and, more and more, to become a potential divorcée.

Among other factors which may have stimulated the recent rise in divorce is an increase in premarital conceptions. As a 1972 study for the U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future has shown, premarital conception is conducive to divorce; consequently, an increase in family formation under such circumstances tends to increase the overall divorce rate. In 1971, the first-child premarital conception rate was about 58 per cent for black women and 20 per cent for white women.

The "Most Likely to Dissolve"

Young age at marriage, low education, low income, and low-status occupation have also been traditionally linked to family breakup.

Results of the 1970 census showed that among persons who married for the first time between 1901 and 1970, the proportion of men divorced was twice as high for those who married before the age of 20 as for those who married in their late 20s. Similarly, the proportion was twice as high for women who married before 18 as for those who married in their early 20s. One reason for these statistics, perhaps, is that a substantial proportion of those who married at a later age delayed marriage until they had finished college. Among both men and women who had ever married, the highest proportion who were known to have been divorced after their first (or most recent) marriage was among those who had not completed high school.

The median age at first marriage for men and women in the United States was first computed for 1890, when it was 26.1 years for men and 22.0 years for women. From the turn of the century to the mid-1950s, there was a fairly constant decline in these ages. They reached the youngest level in 1956—22.5 years for men, 20.1 years for women. In 1974, the median age at first marriage was 23.1 years for men and 21.1 years for women. The median age for men had remained the same since 1967.

One reason for the "steadiness" of men's ages at first marriage, and the continuing "olderness" of women, is what demographers call the "marriage squeeze." Given the tradition that women marry men a few years older than themselves, a squeeze situation arose in the mid-1960s because more women 18 and 19 years old were entering the marriage market than were men 20

and 21. The women were products of the post-World War II baby boom, whereas the men were born during the war years, when birth rates were down.

The marriage squeeze may also have contributed to a recent pattern of delayed marriage, particularly among young women, beyond ages that have traditionally been considered prime years for first marriage. In 1960, 28 per cent of the women between 20 and 24 were single; in 1974, 40 per cent were.

The proportion of persons in the "ever divorced" category is highest for relatively disadvantaged groups, although the increased incidence of divorce has been occurring at all socioeconomic levels. According to data from the 1970 census, men 35 to 44 with low incomes and a low level of educational attainment were more likely to have been divorced than men in the same age bracket who had higher incomes and more education. Yet between 1960 and 1970, the increase in the proportion of divorced men was more rapid among men in the upper than in the lower levels. Thus there is less difference than there used to be in the divorce rates for poor men and well-to-do men.


There is also less difference among women—but not for the same reason. Although the proportion of divorced women in the 35-to-44 age bracket went up by nearly one-half during the 1960s, the percentage of divorced women in the highest income brackets rose more slowly than among other women. In other words, the percentage of divorced among upper-status women was converging with that of other women by increasing *more slowly* than the average, whereas for upper-status men the percentage of divorced was converging with that of other men by increasing *more rapidly* than the average.

These trends show that the recent increase in divorce has been pervasive with regard to social and economic levels and that socioeconomic differences in divorce are now smaller than they used to be.

Divorce: The Racial Differences

The incidence of divorce is uniformly higher for blacks than for whites, although both display generally similar patterns by social and economic characteristics. In 1970—again in the 35-to-44 age bracket—19 per cent of black men who had ever been married were known to have had a divorce (compared with 15 per cent among white men) and 23 per cent of black women who had ever been married were known to have had a divorce (compared with 17 per cent for white women).

**CHILDREN UNDER 18 LIVING WITH TWO PARENTS,
BY RACE**



Sources: U.S. Census of Population: 1960, Detailed Characteristics, U.S. Summary, Final Report PC(1)-1D, table 185; U.S. Bureau of the Census. Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 271, "Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1974," tables 4 and 5; U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1970 Census of Population, Vol. II-4B, Persons by Family Characteristics, tables 1 and 8; U.S. Bureau of the Census.

A further indication of the higher rate of marital disruption among blacks is the difference in the proportions of people who reported themselves as separated but not divorced. In 1970, eight per cent of all black men between 35 and 44, and 15 per cent of all black women in that age group, were reported as separated, whereas the rate for both white men and white women was less than two per cent.

Although there is an increasing similarity in the pattern of marital disruption displayed by the two racial groups, differences continue. For example, the percentage of children who are living with two parents has been declining steadily among both races, but is consistently lower among blacks. In 1974, 50.7 per cent of all black children under 18 were living with two parents, compared with 86.7 per cent of the white children. (See graph above.)

The Working Mother

Although the sharp rise in the divorce rate is most dramatic, the family is changing in several other ways, some of which have remained relatively obscure.

The first and most widely recognized trend is the increase in the number and percentage of working mothers. Here are some

statistics about one type of working mother—the one who lives with her husband and children:

☐ As of March 1974 (the latest time for which figures are available), 51 per cent of such women with children aged between six and 17 were in the labor force—that is, either working or seeking work. In 1948, the figure was 26 per cent.

☐ Since the early 1950s, mothers of school-age children have been holding jobs at a greater rate than have married women without children.

☐ The most rapid (and recent) increase in entry into the job market has been among mothers of pre-school children. In 1974, one of every three such women was in the labor force; in 1948, it was one of nine.

☐ Two-thirds of all working mothers had full-time jobs in 1974.

It is now the younger mother—particularly the one under 25 years of age—who is most likely to enter the labor force. One reason for this is that younger mothers feel the need to supplement the relatively low earnings of a young husband just beginning his career. In general, it is in households in which the husbands have incomes below \$5,000 that the wives are most likely to be working. In families at this income level, almost half the mothers are under 25. And all of these working mothers—including the youngest ones with the youngest children—work because they have to.

But this does not mean that all the mothers whose families need the extra income have jobs. Only mothers with at least a high-school education are likely to find work. Because the overwhelming majority (68 per cent) of family heads below the poverty line have not completed high school, this means that the wives in families which most need the extra income tend to be the least able to get a job.

Yet mothers in middle- and high-income families are showing the most rapid increase as job-holders—entering the work force at a higher rate than married women from *low*-income families did in the early 1960s.

The working mothers with the highest rate of labor-force participation are the single parents. And here, too, it is among the younger generation that single parenthood has been growing the most rapidly. By 1974, among parents under 25 heading a family, one out of four was without a spouse (it was one out of about seven just six years earlier). Their incomes are usually low.

In sharp contrast, the proportion of single-parent families in the “over \$15,000” income bracket has remained consistently be-

low two per cent. But it would be a mistake to conclude that a well-to-do intact family runs little risk of disruption. This is because the breakup of the family usually results in a lower income for the new, single-parent head (in the overwhelming majority of cases, the mother).

There are few single parents with incomes as high as \$10,000. In 1973, the median income for all families headed by a male with a wife present and at least one child under six was \$12,000; the corresponding figure for a single-parent female-headed family was \$3,600 (far below the poverty line). In the small proportion of father-headed, single-parent families with pre-school children, the average income was \$9,500.

In other words, it is the single-parent mother who finds herself in severely strained financial circumstances. And if she is under 25, her degree of economic deprivation is likely to be extreme. Such a mother, when all her children are under the age of six, must make do with a median income of only \$2,800. There are more than 1.5 million mothers in this age group, and they

"The survival rate of married or remarried women in a sample of 52 women with an average age of 75 was higher than that of the never-married, the separated, the unremarried divorced, or the unremarried newly widowed..."



Drawing by Lou Myers. © 1976 The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

constitute one-third of all female-headed families with children under six. (See further discussion on pp. 87-92.)

As for the future, no one can tell for certain how many children will be born to American families, but there are a few indications.


The fertility rate for American women—the number of babies born per 1,000 women—dropped 25 per cent between the start of the 1970s and November 1975.

Other fertility patterns show that women born between 1935 and 1940 had an average of 1.0 children by age 22, while women born in a four-year period 15 years later were estimated to have an average of only 0.5 children by the same age. This is at about the same level as for women whose childbearing occurred during the Depression.

In 1975, three out of every four American wives aged 18 to 24 said they expected to have no more than two children, whereas in 1967 the proportion was only 45 per cent. Moreover, one-third of the women aged 40 to 49 in 1975 already had given birth to four or more children; among women who were in their 20s in 1975, only one out of 10 said she expected to have four or more children.

If such women live up to their expectations, the percentage of children who come from large families will be relatively tiny, and the fertility rate will be close to the minimum required for replacement of the population.

EDITOR'S NOTE. *The bulk of the material in the foregoing article was drawn from "Marital Instability: Past, Present, and Future" by Arthur J. Norton and Paul C. Glick, in volume 32, no. 1 of The Journal of Social Issues, and from "Reality and Research in the Ecology of Human Development" by Urie Bronfenbrenner in volume 119, no. 6 of the Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society. Mr. Norton is chief of the Marriage and Family Statistics Branch of the U.S. Bureau of the Census; Mr. Glick is senior demographer in the Population Division of the U.S. Bureau of the Census; Mr. Bronfenbrenner is professor of human development and family studies at Cornell University.*



THE FAMILY AS ECONOMIC UNIT

by Heather L. Ross and Isabel V. Sawhill

Looking at the family over the long sweep of history, it is clear that its old economic functions have been changing in character and diminishing in importance. These shifts have large, but often ignored, implications for both the family and American society.

In an early, pre-industrial stage, technology was limited and unchanging. Most economic activity took place within the household, and production and distribution were organized by custom and tradition. High mortality rates and low productivity meant that on the farms and in the towns life was short and living conditions were harsh—an existence which was accepted fatalistically. In this society the family played a central role, since economic and social status were defined by birth, family ties, and local custom. Most importantly, the family was a productive unit, and physical strength—typically a male attribute—was an essential element in survival.

During the industrial stage of development, going from the 18th century to the present, new technology and the benefits of specialization caused production to shift from home to factory. In Western Europe and America, living standards rose, death rates fell, and individuals felt a greater sense of control over their environment and their social institutions. Social status was determined increasingly by one's occupation and less and less by membership in a particular family. To some extent, the family itself became a more specialized unit whose major responsibility was the creation and socialization of children. But because it had been stripped of some of its basic economic functions, the family was no longer the central institution in society.

Today's declining fertility, the loosening of kinship ties, and the shrinking of the "extended" family into its present "nuclear" form can be viewed as adaptations to industrialization. Children

are no longer needed to help on the farm or to provide for one's old age. Smaller families are more mobile and less costly to support. At the same time, as a vestige of an earlier era, the household remains an economically primitive organization; roles within the family continue to be somewhat dominated by custom and tradition—examples being the often arbitrary division of tasks between men and women and the continued authority of the male head of household.

During this current stage, however, the family continues to play a crucial but unpublicized economic role in redistributing resources. In the industrialized world, East or West, the family, not the state, is still the major agency for transferring money from those who work (primarily male breadwinners) to those who do not or cannot (primarily dependent women and children). In America, government accounted for \$74 billion in such one-way transfers in 1970, private charity accounted for \$20 billion, and the family for \$313 billion. Indeed, as economist Kenneth Boulding has suggested, much of the nation's nagging poverty problem stems from the inability of individual families to fill this role of supporting dependent citizens, as in the case of many female-headed households.

The shift from the "productive" to the "distributive" household is now a matter of history. It is of interest only because it places recent family trends in some perspective. Futurologists have made it fashionable to speculate about a further shift, but it is difficult to substantiate these projections.

A third stage of family development is still unfolding. We may speculate that its inception came with the recent extension of technology to those responsibilities which have remained

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*Isabel V. Sawhill, 39, is director of the program on research for women at the Urban Institute in Washington, D.C., her native city. A graduate of New York University (B.A., 1962; Ph.D., 1968), she has taught at Goucher College, where she was head of the economics department from 1971 until she joined the Urban Institute staff in 1973. She and Ms. Ross are co-authors of *Time of Transition: The Growth of Families Headed by Women* (1975) from which this essay has been adapted (© 1975, The Urban Institute).*

rooted in the family—especially control over reproduction—and that its fruition will be marked by equality between the sexes, and families operating largely as consumption (income-pooling) units.


The present “distributive” family will become at least partially obsolete in America if and when (1) fertility declines to the point where a large proportion of families contain few or no children, (2) women’s job opportunities increase to the point where the present male-female division of labor has little economic justification, and (3) child-care and household tasks are increasingly turned over to specialized institutions, or living and working arrangements change the focus of such activities.

Smaller Families, Larger Incomes

It is already obvious that women’s economic position has been changing rapidly. The proportion of women in the labor force increased from 25 per cent in 1950 to 43 per cent in 1970. Currently, more than *half* the married women with school-age children are working, and each generation of women is spending an increasing proportion of the family life cycle in paid employment. In addition, there is evidence that over the longer run, women’s earnings have risen relative to men’s. Far more women are financially independent than ever before. Along with these labor-force trends, we find that younger women are planning much smaller families than in the past, and the fertility rate has dropped from 3.6 births per thousand women in 1961 to about 2.0 in 1971.

The increased employment of women appears largely due to an expansion of job opportunities in predominantly “female occupations” (e.g., white-collar work). Thus, current decisions about family size are closely related to the job opportunities available to women, which are an important determinant of the “cost” of children. Moreover, as the market earnings of women increase, a greater demand is created for day care, prepared foods, commercial laundries, and other market substitutes for those services historically provided by wives within the home. This trend also provides the basis for a reallocation of duties between husbands and wives, although there is little evidence that men are taking on child-care and other domestic tasks as women enter the world of paid work. This disequilibrium has undoubtedly contributed to the strains that modern marriages face.

These social trends appear likely to shape the future character of the family. But, once set in motion, they may set up a dynamic and partially self-generating reaction which also needs

EARNERS IN HUSBAND-WIFE FAMILIES, 1973


Source: *U.S. Working Women*, Bulletin 1880, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, 1975.

to be considered. For example, as "two-paycheck families" become the norm, two things are likely to happen.

First of all, society will adjust to their existence with changes in hours of work, living arrangements, availability of supportive services, and the like, making the "two-paycheck" pattern more attractive.

Keeping Up with the Two-Paycheck Joneses


Second, there will be strong economic pressures on single-earner families who will find themselves increasingly at a competitive disadvantage in terms of standards of living. It is difficult enough to keep up with the Joneses under normal circumstances, but when both Joneses are working it becomes virtually impossible. In 1974, the median income in younger families with a working wife was \$15,000, compared with \$12,000 where there was only one earner (even though wives' participation in the work force goes down as the husband's income goes up and women earn only about 60 per cent of what men do).

More and more families may be discovering that their economic welfare is tied up as much with the ratio of earners to non-

earners in the household as with wage levels. This doesn't mean that all families will forfeit the choice of children and full-time homemaking—in fact, affluence could itself enable an increasing proportion of families to choose these “luxuries.” But it has been shown that people make such decisions on the basis of their *relative*, not their absolute, income positions; and the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses effect can be expected to play an important role. Thus, future trends will depend partly on the example set by upper-income families. Will the relatively well-educated women in these families remain content with a homemaking role? If they do insist on working, they will help set a social and economic standard for other families which will be difficult to ignore.

In sum, as we see it, the economic status of women is very much in flux, and the “distributive” family may be slowly becoming obsolete. Women have an increasing number of economic choices outside traditional family arrangements, and men, as a result, have lessened economic responsibilities within them. Along with these economic changes—perhaps even partly *because* of them—cultural norms and personal expectations appear to have been shifting. What we find, then, is that people are moving in and out of marriage more freely than in the past because marriage is less and less bound up with social and economic status. Rising divorce rates may be viewed as an indicator of changing personal aspirations, coupled with greater economic opportunities for women.

The future of the family will be shaped by how people respond to these changing circumstances. The growing financial independence of women will certainly affect individual decisions pertaining to marriage, divorce, childbearing, and household formation—decisions which are likely to result in continued growth of female-headed families. However, at some point this growth is likely to level off. Once women have achieved a greater measure of economic independence, and family roles and responsibilities have adjusted to the new realities, those marriages that continue to form and endure will be based—to a greater degree than ever before—on the personal satisfactions they provide husband and wife and not on economic needs.



CHILDREN, DIVORCE, AND WELFARE

by Mary Jo Bane

In 19th-century America, children who had lost one parent were not uncommon. As health conditions improved, fewer children lost parents through death. Today, parents rarely die young. Most children who lose parents lose them through divorce.

With the divorce rate rising rapidly, the proportion of children affected is increasingly large—larger even than the proportion of children affected by parental death at the turn of the century. Children of disrupted families will become a prominent feature of the American social landscape in the next few years, but as yet we have not faced up to the magnitude of the trend or its costs.

Statistics abound. In 1975, for example, about 15 per cent of all the nation's children lived in female-headed, one-parent families. This proportion has been rising—only about 7.4 per cent of all children lived in female-headed families in 1954. But such figures understate the scope of what is happening. One problem with these percentages is that they reflect “net” numbers—added to by children who come into “single-parent status” in a given year, subtracted from by other children who turn 18 or whose parents reconcile or remarry. Thus, the percentage of children who were living in single-parent families during a given year does not show how many were affected *at some point* during their entire childhood by a divorce or a parental death.

To obtain better data on longtime trends, I used a large survey conducted by the Census Bureau in 1967. My analysis shows that the proportion of children affected by family disruption of all kinds in this century has been large—between 25 and 30 per cent. However, the importance of divorce as a cause of disruption has increased considerably; among those children born in 1941–50, more were affected by divorce than by death. Now, as the “plus” effect of rising divorce rates overcomes the “minus” effect of falling death rates, the total proportion of children affected by disruption is beginning to rise.

The number of divorces granted in the United States went from 377,000 in 1955 to approximately 1,026,000 in 1975.

The proportion of *all* American children under 18 involved in a divorce each year has gone steadily up from 0.6 per cent in 1955 to an estimated 1.7 per cent in 1975. One can estimate that about 14 per cent of the children born in 1955 had parents who were divorced during the next 18 years.

Making predictions for children born after 1955 is difficult. But a rough estimate of total disruption involving American children can be made by adding up the various causes. Based on recent divorce rates, it appears that the parents of about 30 per cent of the children growing up in the 1970s will be divorced.* Adding annulments, long-term separations, parental deaths, and illegitimacy brings the total proportion of children affected by disruption to 40 to 45 per cent.

This estimate is roughly consistent with the proportion of children now living in one-parent families at any given time. The average duration of a disruption—before the child reaches adulthood or the parent remarries—is about six years; thus the number of children in single-parent families at any time is about a third of the number who will be in such families over an 18-year period. Since about 15 per cent of all children in the United States were in female-headed families in 1975, 45 per cent might be so situated at some point during their childhood.

This prospect does not fit America's conception of the typical family, and it calls for some fresh thinking.

What, if anything, should be done?

Should American parents be allowed to form and dissolve their marriages as they wish—as they do now—with society assuming that parents will take responsibility for their children?

*I have assumed that the proportion of children involved each year during the next decade will be the same as in the early 1970s, a fairly conservative projection. The proportion affected by a divorce at some point during their childhood is about equal to the proportion involved each year multiplied by 18, assuming that most children are involved in only one divorce. Using this logic, the 1974 data suggest that 29.5 per cent of the children born around 1970 will be involved in a divorce by 1988.

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CHILDREN UNDER 18 INVOLVED IN DIVORCE, 1955 to 1972

Total number of divorces granted		Mean number of children per decree	Total number of children	Number per 1000 children
377,000	1955	0.92	347,000	6.3
393,000	1960	1.18	463,000	7.2
479,000	1965	1.32	630,000	8.9
708,000	1970	1.22	870,000	12.5
773,000	1971	1.22	946,000	13.6
845,000	1972	1.20	1,021,000	14.8
915,000	1973	1.17	1,079,000	15.9
977,000	1974	1.12	1,099,000	16.4
1,026,000	1975	1.1*	1,129,000*	17.1

* estimates

Calculations by Mary Jo Bane. Sources: Monthly Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 25, No. 1, Supplement April 14, 1976. Advance Report Final Divorce Statistics 1974; Monthly Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 24, No. 13, June 30, 1976. Provisional Statistics. Annual Summary for the United States 1975; and various publications of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports P-20 Series in "Marital Status and Living Arrangements."*

Or should we make the responsibilities for children more public, as often advocated by those who have sought to liberalize both divorce laws and welfare benefits?

Social-science research does not help much in answering these questions. First of all, the research provides no clear insights into how divorce affects children. Few would quarrel with the popular notion that children are better off in happy stable families than in unhappy unstable families. However, increasingly vigorous debate has arisen over questions of how bad the effects of disruption are and what really causes them.

It is widely believed that divorce is bad for children; this belief was long supported by studies which seemed to show that children from broken marriages were more likely than others to be delinquent, psychologically disturbed, low achievers. But recent critics of the research on father absence and marital disruption argue that most of those studies did not separate out the effects

of disruption from the effects of poverty, which so often accompanies family breakup. Other studies that, in my opinion, adequately take into account economic status challenge the popular belief that divorce *per se* is psychologically disastrous for children; they show that there are few differences in school achievement, social adjustment, and delinquent behavior between children from one-parent and two-parent homes of comparable economic status.

More relevant, perhaps, are those recent studies which compare children from disrupted marriages with children from unbroken but unhappy homes. When such comparisons are made, even the small disadvantages of children from broken marriages depicted in other studies disappear. One study, for example, found that adolescents in divorced homes showed "less psychosomatic illness, less delinquent behavior and better adjustment to parents, and did not differ significantly [from those in unhappy unbroken homes] on school adjustments or delinquent companions." But again, the research in this complicated area is far from definitive; amid all the conflicting claims, much serious work remains to be done.

The Money Problem

In contrast to emotional problems, the financial handicaps of female-headed families and the children in them are clear. In 1974, the mean family income of male-headed families was \$13,788 and of female-headed families, \$6,413. Perhaps the most important U.S. Census statistic is that in 1974, 51.5 per cent of children under 18 (and 61.4 per cent of children under six) in female-headed families lived below the poverty level; a disproportionate share of these children are black. These data suggest that doing nothing will consign an increasing number of children of divorce to poverty and its related difficulties.

The realistic responses seem to boil down to assuring increased parental responsibility for children after divorce or having the government assume more of the costs of raising children. Liberal opinion has, in recent years, tended to de-emphasize the importance of parental support for children in female-headed families and to emphasize bigger government subsidies.

There are good reasons for this. Child-support is hard to collect. In some cases, a father's ability to support his children is stretched to the limit by remarriage and the financial burdens of a new family. In other cases, the ex-husband's income is simply too low to share. The mother's income is, of course, another

source of support, and one which can become more important if wages and work opportunities for women improve. But child-care is an important task which cannot be coupled with full-time employment outside the home. So to hold a job, a mother must pay someone else to provide child-care while she works, and thus ends up with far less net income than most other workers. In short, such families seem to need more income than they are capable of earning or collecting from the absent father.

However, the liberals' emphasis on more generous public welfare has provoked understandable resentment. Many Americans ask why some parents are required to support their children while other parents (those who separate or divorce) are not. Thus, any expanded welfare or income-maintenance scheme for single-parent families will have to include provisions for ensuring that both parents contribute as best they can to the support of their children.

One can imagine schemes which would work better than the present welfare system.* A "maintenance allowance" guaranteed by the federal government, for example. Under such a plan, needy families headed by women would receive allowances that would bring them up to a poverty-line income. The subsidy could be financed by an increase in the social security tax. Courts would set the amount of maintenance awards to be paid by absent fathers on the basis of their ability to pay. The money would be collected by the court or other agency, perhaps the Internal Revenue Service, and turned over to the social insurance agency up to the amount of the federal guarantee. Support payments above the level of this allowance would go directly to the family. Well-off fathers would thus get no special relief; they would have to support their children to the same extent they do now.

A Matter of Fairness

A guaranteed maintenance allowance would have many obvious benefits for single-parent families. It would also, of course, raise some major problems, the largest being cost. But the real test for such a program will probably come in people's perceptions of how fair and necessary the system is.

Divorce and separation are well on their way to being widespread phenomena in the United States. But low-income people

*The federal-state "Aid to Families with Dependent Children" program paid out \$8.4 billion for 11,328,000 adults and children in fiscal 1975. The average monthly payment per family under AFDC was \$220.22. Of the AFDC families, 76 per cent were "female-headed households" (in 1973). The official "poverty line" for a non-farm family of four in 1975 was \$5,500 per year.

are still more likely to divorce than are high-income couples; blacks are somewhat more likely to divorce than whites. At any given time, a much larger proportion of blacks than whites report themselves as separated. Likewise, the proportion of black children living in female-headed families is much higher than the proportion of white children.

These high black-white differentials have contributed to a widespread sentiment that the single-parent family is "their" problem—that of poor blacks in central cities—and not "ours." The racial differentials are not likely to change until the relative income position of black families further improves. What is likely to happen quite quickly in the meantime, however, is that divorce, separation, and single-parent rates among the well-off will rise to levels so high that the problem cannot be ignored. If 20 per cent of the children of the non-poor wind up living in single-parent families for an interval during their childhood, which is entirely possible, the general public may adopt a more generous attitude.

But neither a "guaranteed maintenance allowance" nor a more generous AFDC subsidy is likely as long as the public believes that such subsidies are incentives to family breakup. It seems to me there are only two ways to eliminate potentially bad incentives. One is a fairly foolproof system for allocating support responsibilities between divorced parents and collecting a proper level of payment from absent fathers. The other is a general program of children's allowances that would ensure a level of economic decency *regardless* of family type. Neither would be easy or free of red tape, and both would be costly.

Yet it seems clear that the *economic* problems of female-headed families ought to be the first concern of American policy-makers who worry about the effects of marital disruption on children. They are real problems and they are solvable. Given present trends, the need to examine solutions seems compelling.



WHERE IS THE FAMILY GOING?

by George Levinger

Imagine, for a moment, two contrasting models of society. In Society X, all marriages last for a lifetime. In Society Y, no marriages are allowed to continue beyond the partners' fourth wedding anniversary. In the first society, the barrier against family breakup is very strong; in the second, there is no barrier.

Society X assumes a stability which has not been uncommon in the history of the Western family; even today, it remains the ideal in much of America and in many regions of the world. The marital vow is here considered sacred; it represents a contract not only on earth, but also in heaven. The vow creates a bond between man and wife; it also ties together irrevocably two families and their communities. In Society X, one's marriage is as important as one's birth and death. The spouse becomes, in all likelihood, the mother or father of all one's children; only in widowhood does one continue living without the partner.

Family relationships in Society X are remarkably stable. Once allied through the nuptial bond, kinship lines are unbroken unless death comes before there are children; the couple is part of a larger clan—of parents and grandparents, aunts and uncles, cousins and nephews. The adventurous may find such social stability excessively static; they may feel oppressed by the pressures of family and community.

Now consider a society where family relations are founded on instability. Society Y emphasizes the individual's mobility and readiness to cut ties of intimacy, and the exploration of many successive personal relationships. In Society Y, all marriages by law are temporary; if and when they attain the statutory four-year limit, their warranty expires and they become officially null. One's marriage is like a four-year college course or a stint in the army.

The recurrent dissolution of intimate relationships in Society

Y makes its citizens more dependent on larger institutions—government, corporations, unions. It encourages job changes and geographical shifts. The care of children, their financial support, and their assimilation into adult society become to a large extent the responsibility of the state. So do the care and comfort of aging parents or ex-spouses. Neighborhood and family ties fade.

While citizens of Society Y believe that this system enables them to “maximize self-growth” and “fulfill personal happiness,” the total society is also affected. Adults are so busy with the formation, maintenance, and termination of personal relationships that they pay little heed to the workings of the larger community; left in charge is a managerial elite.

While Societies X and Y present almost polar opposites, they do share one common property. Both illustrate the effect of the rigid application of rules that may fit reality under some conditions but become sources of strain or even social pathology under other conditions.

A flat ban on divorce may make sense in a tightly knit society where there is little geographic movement, great homogeneity among eligible partners, and little change in people's tastes or opportunities over the course of their lives. But if the same injunction remains intact in a culture of instability and impersonality—such as modern Western urban culture—the prohibition itself may become a source of marital strain. Despite formal adherence to the marriage contract, the frequency of informal violations—infidelity, desertion, separation—goes up. For example, in Catholic Italy, before divorce was legalized, some observers estimated that 40,000 de facto divorces occurred annually in the 1950s.

Similarly, Society Y's prescription of regular breakup—which some contemporary writers appear almost to advocate—is also likely to be intolerable. It may fit a kind of Brave New World where all adults move to new locations every four years, where childbirth is highly restricted and child-rearing is an impersonal function. But where such conditions do not prevail, a ban on

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permanent marriage would be oppressive.

In short, marriage and family—which involve our most personal relationships—are inseparable from the nature of the society in which they exist. High divorce rates in the America of the 1970s reflect far more than the aggregate of individual choices and actions or fluctuations in social mores. They also reflect broad changes in economic conditions, social mobility, and technology.

But the interplay of these forces is extremely difficult to disentangle. We have demographic and economic data; we have polls showing changes in attitudes toward marriage; we have statistics on church attendance, divorce decrees, welfare rolls; we have studies of divorcées in Boston; we have national studies of “happiness” by researchers in Michigan and analyses underway elsewhere of the effects of new “no-fault” divorce laws. But such studies vary greatly in their scope, method, and conclusions.

We don't have answers to some basic questions. Are the increases in divorce rates due mostly to (1) a lowering of barriers around the marital relationship, (2) a lowering of the attractiveness of staying married, or (3) a rise in the attractiveness of alternatives outside of marriage?*

The Eroding Barriers

We know that American divorce laws have been liberalized over the past half-century and that attitudes toward marriage have changed. According to a 1974 Roper Survey, some 60 per cent of all Americans believe in divorce as “a way out of a marriage that isn't working.” No good media research studies seem to be available, but analyses of trends in news coverage, popular fiction, and television dramas would probably show a large increase in sympathetic or neutral portrayals of divorce over the last three decades. We also know that divorced American politicians are no longer disqualified in the eyes of voters from seeking election or reelection.

It is likely that, today, spouses' feelings of obligation toward marriage are lower than those of previous generations. For some people, this decline may be related to their own experience of

*My own social-psychological approach to divorce and separation assumes that people stay in marriages because (a) they are attracted to them and/or (b) they are barred from leaving them by law, custom, or economic penalties. Furthermore, I assume that, consciously or not, men and women compare a current relationship with alternative ones. If the internal attractions and the barriers surrounding the present relationship become distinctly weaker than those of a promising alternative, the result is apt to be breakup. This theoretical perspective translates the effects of cultural trends, social pressures, or economic shocks into psychological forces experienced by individuals or couples.

divorce. Others' attitudes may be shaped by a history of divorce in their parents' marriage. Indeed, an increasing proportion of American children whose parents have been separated are growing up—children who are therefore less likely to expect a permanent marriage in their own future. In a 1976 analysis of national survey data, two Iowa sociologists, Hallowell Pope and Charles W. Mueller, found that children from homes broken by divorce were slightly more likely to go through divorce in their own marriages than were those who grew up in intact homes or in homes broken by a parent's death. This "intergenerational transmission effect" of divorce rates is not yet well understood; obviously, if this effect were found to be stronger, the impact over time on American society could be considerable.

The Ties That Bind

Another past "barrier" to family breakup has been the spouses' religious beliefs. Practicing Catholics, Jews, and conservative Protestants have tended to have far lower divorce rates than non-church attenders, according to reputable data. As religious orthodoxy weakens, so does the churches' overall influence in holding marriages together.

If barriers to divorce have grown weaker, have marriages also become less attractive? Who knows? There are few good data to answer that question. The more extreme representatives of the women's liberation movement, as well as certain popular male writers, argue variously that conventional marriage is repressive for women and inhibiting for men. Nevertheless, judging by the polls, the average American views "getting married" as less important to a successful life than was the case decades or centuries ago. Almost all young people today still aspire to get married *eventually*, and most divorced people try to get remarried (although more men than women succeed). Most Americans—men and women alike—expect their spouses to continue being in love, to remain sexually compatible, to enjoy similar interests and activities, and to resolve all conflicts through honest communication. However, research on "happiness" suggests that the early peak experiences are eventually followed by a slide toward a more prosaic routine which does not match earlier expectations.

If Americans in the 1970s tend to demand more of a "good" marriage, they may also be quicker to rate a marriage as "bad." In the 1974 Roper Survey, for example, about half of all respondents said that a *sufficient reason* for considering divorce is "no longer being in love"; agreeing with that statement were 59 per

cent among 18-29-year-olds, and 45 per cent among 50-59-year-olds. While younger people revealed somewhat higher expectations than older people, all segments of our society placed high demands on marriage, demands that are often hard to meet in the real world of jobs, children, and installment payments.

On a more concrete level, census and other survey data show clear evidence that a husband's low income and low employment stability are associated with marital instability. For example, Phillips Cutright, in a 1971 analysis of 1960 U.S. census data, found that a husband's income was a far clearer clue to intact marriage than either his occupation or his education. In a more recent analysis, sociologist Andrew Cherlin found a husband's job stability to be even more important than his income. So did Heather Ross and Isabel Sawhill in their 1975 analysis of data from the University of Michigan's *Panel Study of Income Dynamics*. They concluded that layoffs, discrimination, and marginal employment help explain high marital breakup rates among low-income blacks.

What Makes the Grass Greener?

Even if a marriage seems unattractive and the costs of terminating it are low, it will not be broken unless some alternative becomes more attractive, unless the grass looks greener elsewhere. What, then, are the social forces that have enhanced alternative attractions?

Oddly enough, researchers have only recently recognized that the husband's income and employment are only one part of the divorce picture. As women's own income-earning opportunities have risen, as their aspirations to independence have climbed, they have become able to consider divorces that earlier seemed financially impossible.* Other research indicated that a wife's independent income at all economic levels is correlated with a propensity toward divorce; my own research at a divorce court in Cleveland, Ohio, indicated that female divorce applicants who earned wages were significantly less likely to dismiss their divorce suits than were those who did not. Hence, the rising participation of married women in the labor force, especially in the professions, seems likely to have future impact on family stability. Again, no one knows what offsetting effects might also occur.

Because state or federal programs of aid to dependent children subsidize low-income, one-parent families, but not low-

*According to survey data analyzed by Cherlin in 1976 and other data reported by Ross and Sawhill in 1975.

income, two-parent families, another potential economic incentive is provided for marital breakup. But Oliver C. Moles's analysis of 1960-1970 welfare programs suggests that any link between divorce and the level of welfare payments is tenuous at best. Others, notably Ross and Sawhill, have suggested that rather than promoting marital breakups, such payments may tend to deter already-separated welfare mothers from seeking remarriage to the available men whose low incomes may not match government support to single mothers.

At all income levels, the divorced or separated woman no longer suffers the social stigma of two decades ago. If we believe evidence that divorce rates rise with the social acceptability of divorcées, then this shift signals another important weakening of barriers to divorce.

The ethic of "self-actualization" is important, too. Not only in the literature of the women's movement, but in Western cultures generally, we have witnessed a rising desire to pursue individual happiness, variously defined. The achievement of "self-growth" in career or in romance often seems to conflict with continued obligations to those others who are near and dear. Like Hollywood stars, American middle-class spouses may seek out external opportunities or pursue the paradox of an "open marriage," and thereby fatally neglect their existing obligations.

Curbing Breakups

Let us now look at the other side of the issue. What social policies act to keep down the rate of marital breakup? While easier divorce and separation may provide American society with necessary escape valves, their benefits may eventually become lower than their costs—costs to children, to family and friends, to the social fabric, and especially to the ex-partners themselves. And these costs, variously perceived, have already elicited public declarations from politicians, church leaders, and academics in favor of "preserving the family."

If increasing legal permissiveness (such as "no-fault" divorce) over the past decade has tended to erode the barriers against divorce, a reversal would tend to raise them. In some totalitarian societies—such as the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China—reversals of policy have indeed occurred. After an early post-revolutionary period of official permissiveness, government policy changed to make divorce difficult and unlikely.*

*Soviet policy shifted again; the Russians now have a "Western" divorce rate.

American social policy lacks coherence; it is, instead, a contradictory patchwork attempting to satisfy competing interests. If divorce is tolerated, or even tacitly encouraged, by local social custom in Beverly Hills, on Park Avenue, or in Watts, there are many communities where more traditional views prevail. Few Americans, it may be assumed, are in favor of going all the way back to something like Society X. But if divorce trends continue, some reaction in social and legal policy may indeed occur during the next decade, if only to ward off the spectre of something like Society Y.

Perhaps the most palatable device for increasing the seriousness of marital commitments would be to make it more difficult for people to get married in the first place. Increasing the obstacles to "quickie" marriage may merit some social experimentation—raising the legal age for marriage or requiring lengthy engagements, for example. Making it harder to marry might force men and women to consider marriage more carefully and enable them to predict better what their marriage would be like.

An obvious major contributor to disruption of American families is economic instability, as we have seen. Subsidies that would support two-parent families (as distinguished from one-parent families headed by the mother) might help increase the attractiveness of remaining married for low-income people with children. Such a policy might be part of a federal program of reducing extreme financial distress in general—notably by increasing low incomes. We do not know if money alone would lessen the high breakup rate in poor families; we only know that the poor divorce more than the non-poor.

A Hazy Picture

Finally, a "psychological" note. The current hazy picture of personal and social dissatisfaction suggests that many Americans' "interpersonal expectations" have risen faster than the ability to meet them. Is it possible to foresee political leadership that will, among other goals, seek to encourage American men and women to become more realistic in their expectations, and hence lower the risk of disillusionment?

One doubts it. The United States is still a country heavily committed to optimism, personal enhancement, and change for the better. Moreover, the constant thrust of political rhetoric and consumer advertising, of themes in women's magazines and television drama, is to stir great expectations, to create confidence in quick remedies ("fast, fast, *fast* relief"), and to evoke visions of

a richer life for all. Such visions, indeed, are implicit in much of the "advocacy" research dealing with marriage, divorce, and the changing socioeconomic role of men and women. We may be in for continuing tumult.

Already, conflicting views of the family and its future are reflected (and often distorted) in the current debates over abortion laws, the Equal Rights Amendment, "no-fault" divorce legislation, day-care programs, and welfare reform. But as I have indicated in this essay, serious gaps still exist in scholarly knowledge of the social causes and effects of family disruption. We know some important statistics. We know America is somewhere between Society X and Society Y; but exactly where we are headed, and why, remains largely conjectural. In any case, when a national debate on family policy begins, as it surely will if present divorce trends persist, none of us should overestimate the efficacy of policy-makers in hastening or reversing changes in the role and structure of the American family.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Listed below are specialized studies cited in this essay or otherwise worthy of note:

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
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"The Intergenerational Transmission of Marital Instability: Comparisons by Race and Sex" by Hollowell Pope and Charles W. Mueller, in *Journal of Social Issues* (vol. 32, no. 1, 1976).

"Marital Instability by Race and Income, Based on 1960 Census Data" by J. R. Udry, in *American Journal of Sociology* (no. 6, 1967).

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BACKGROUND BOOKS

THE CHANGING FAMILY

As always in periods of unusual upheaval, some people profit. Among them these days are the American writers, editors, publishers, and sellers of popular books on such subjects as "Creative Divorce," "Utopian Motherhood," "How To Be Your Own Sex Therapist," "Part-Time Fathering" (for the "Second-Time Single Man") on through a seemingly endless list that demonstrates, if nothing else, the existence of a vigorous sub-industry in U.S. publishing.

Some of the self-help manuals have serious ideas behind their exhortations; some avoid the turgid prose that characterizes much of the published research on marriage and the family; some may even provide practical advice to the troubled. But make no mistake. These are not books. They are "products," so designated by their manufacturers and in the book trade journals.

A great deal of the academic writing and publishing in this field is also "product"—though never so described in periodicals like the *Journal of Marriage and the Family* and the *American Sociologist* where both work-in-progress and reviews of published books by recognized specialists and new researchers appear. Too often, professional jargon ("decoupling," "dyads," "serial monogamy," "serial polygamy," "the coefficient of preservation") fails to cloak advocacy or hack work aimed at the college textbook market.

In short, books on marriage and the family are legion, but few are worthy of the general reader's attention. Several notable technical studies of women, black families, and the effects of modern life on children have been published

in recent years. These are, however, too narrow to provide sufficient perspective on the broader causes of contemporary discontents. For a longer-range view of changes in marriage and the family, we turn to two books that introduce to American readers the promising new work begun in the 1960s and '70s by European social historians of the *Annales* school.

These scholars combine the techniques of demography, anthropology, sociology, economic history, biology, linguistics, group psychology, and other disciplines. Their close attention to shifting marital patterns in France and elsewhere has produced a new understanding of the forces behind fundamental changes in the family from the 16th through the 19th centuries. Some of their esoteric findings are available in **Family and Society: Selections from the *Annales* Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations** (Johns Hopkins, 1976, cloth & paper) edited by Robert Forster and Orest Ranum. This book can be recommended to readers with an interest in minutiae, the significance of which they may wish to ponder for themselves.

Much wider in its appeal is Edward Shorter's breezy **The Making of the Modern Family** (Basic Books, 1975), the first successful synthesis of *Annales* papers and similar historical work done by Philippe Ariès, Etienne van de Walle, John Demos, author of **A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony** (Oxford, 1970), and scores of other European and American scholars. Shorter, associate professor of history at the University of Toronto, brings the story down to our own perplexing time.

His rueful conclusion: "Towards the

end of the eighteenth century a transformation in domestic life occurred, the shift from traditional to nuclear family. I argued that 'capitalism' was the driving force behind that change. What master variable is at work today though, I must say, is unclear. . . . I think that things are much more complex than just the 'wish to be free' suddenly popping itself into the consciousness of the millions and millions of anonymous women about whom this book has mainly been."

The best path to understanding the social forces that are disrupting American family life in the 20th century may eventually emerge from scholarship of the *Annales* sort applied to the recent past. If so, the four-volume study, **Five Thousand American Families—Patterns of Economic Progress** edited by Greg J. Duncan, James N. Morgan, et al. (Institute for Social Research, Univ. of Mich., 1974-76, cloth & paper) is a move in the right direction. The Michigan researchers, investigating the economic well-being of their 5,000 subject families over an extended (seven-year) period, learned much as well about changes in family composition (often as a result of divorce and remarriage).

It is in the interpretation of such raw data to depict causes—not only effects—that problems arise, however. Much of even the better social science output in this field is excessively colored by the author's own biases or acceptance of current fashion. Many of Shorter's comments, for example, seem clearly derived from first-hand experience. And a tendency to reflect the attitudes of the moment flavors the prolific output of Jessie S. Bernard, emerita professor at Pennsylvania State University, who is to the sociology of American marriage what Margaret Mead is to the anthropology of family life in primitive cultures. Her first book, written with her

husband, L. L. Bernard, and published in 1934, was on sociology and the study of international relations. After that she switched to "interpersonal relations."

Mrs. Bernard's successive volumes (and views) on courtship, dating, mating, and marriage, the renovation of marriage, divorce, remarriage, teen-age culture, women, wives, mothers, the future of motherhood, the future of parenthood, and related subjects constitute a veritable fever chart of American family life.

For example, her **American Family Behavior** (Harper, 1942), a straightforward textbook, marches firmly forward to the optimistic conclusion that, although "a certain amount of malfunctioning and maladjustment is inevitable," social science "will help us discern trends and give us methods of adjusting family life to them."

How changed her tone 30 years later! In **The Future of Marriage** (World, 1972, cloth & paper), Mrs. Bernard explores such matters as the different perceptions of the same marriage held by husband and wife, as seen in their contradictory answers to interviewers' questions concerning sex, money, who disciplines the children, even who mows the lawn. She now says that marriage has a future but not with its traditional form retaining a monopolistic sway. As options, she sees many different living arrangements, including "temporary permanent" marriages for child-rearing, and new relationships for middle age and beyond, including, perhaps, polygynous combinations (one man, more than one woman). In an autobiographical afterword she adds that she did not "expect this book to turn out to be on the destructiveness for women of marriage, with its 'structured strain'—a result all the more remarkable because most of the facts had been generally known. . . . I had reported many of

them myself a generation ago. This time round, however, they looked different. The message of the radical young women had reached me."

Only the demographers seem able to preserve a certain detachment. The outstanding compilation of American data is **Marriage and Divorce: A Social and Economic Study** by Hugh Carter and Paul C. Glick (Harvard, 1976, rev. ed.), based on statistics gathered by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, where Mr. Glick is a senior demographer. Its authors note that though their new research "highlights extensive recent changes in life-styles relating to marriage," it also "documents the continuing preference of a vast majority of post-adolescent adults for life as married (or remarried) persons." Many of the changes, they say, "may be properly interpreted as reflections of a deep desire for greater satisfaction from married life, even if delayed marriage or divorce is required to realize it."

A few scholars have turned to the study of fiction to help illuminate the puzzles of family life and marriage. Among them is William J. Goode, sociologist and author of an important work on marriage and kinship in Arabia, Africa, India, and the West entitled **World Revolution and Family Patterns** (Free Press, 1963, cloth, 1970, paper).

With Nicholas Tavuschi, he compiled **The Family Through Literature** (McGraw-Hill, 1975, paper), organized to fit the framework that Goode uses in teaching students about the family as institution. It includes excerpts that range from Tolstoy to Portnoy.

Jenni Calder, in **Women and Marriage in Victorian Fiction** (Oxford, 1976) also analyzes the work of Tolstoy—along with that of Jane Austen, Thackeray, Dickens, George Eliot, Meredith, Hardy, Gissing, Marie Corelli, Mrs. Gaskell, and others. The sharp images of family life—good and bad—that she has chosen mirror an institution that was, in the 19th century, essentially static and well-defined, hence easier to portray than is now the case (one is led to speculate whether a connection exists between the growing instability of family life and the decline of the novel in the mid-20th century). Not that the writers of the Victorian era were invariably successful in dealing with their basic material. Tolstoy's **Anna Karenina** may be as fine a book about marriage as we will ever have. But in an 1889 short story, "The Kreutzer Sonata," even Tolstoy finds himself, in Ms. Calder's view, defeated by "the contradictions of marriage and family life" in a way that suggests "we should not under-estimate their depth and influence."

—Lois Decker O'Neill, Associate Editor (Books)

knowledge of this country have grown considerably. A trickle of doctoral dissertations and monographs in the early 1960s had swelled into a flood of books by 1970. An Institute of the U.S.A. was established under Grigorii Arbatov in 1968 to serve as a new governmental "think tank." A new semi-popular journal, *USA*, appeared in 1970, devoted to the analysis of American politics, economics, and foreign policy; its circulation has now reached 33,000.

Today, Soviet specialists on the United States can be found in Leningrad, Kiev, Tbilisi, Tomsk, and other cities, in addition to Moscow, with its numerous academic centers and governmental institutes and agencies. Though far less numerous than American students of Soviet affairs, devotees of *beldomologiia*, or White-House-ology, constitute an industry capable of mounting frequent conferences on American topics, producing articles for the press, and providing confidential advice to senior government policy-makers.

The American Enigma

Why has "America-watching" achieved such prominence in the U.S.S.R.? The reasons do not differ greatly from those underlying the spread of Soviet studies in this country. There is genuine curiosity, to be sure. But with so much of their national budget tied up in the military, Russians too consider it important to "know their enemy," or, more politely put, to understand their partner in détente. Beyond this, there is a crucially important factor not present in American study of the U.S.S.R., namely the desire to study carefully a nation whose experience offers much that can be adopted or adapted in the U.S.S.R. Like the Japanese, the Russians are past masters at such international borrowing. This process has gone on since before Peter the Great, and will continue regardless of the fear of some Americans that the Soviet Union will, as it were, steal the raisins from their cake. *What Does America Have to Teach Us?*, asked a book published in Moscow in 1908. Along with their other tasks, the Soviet *Amerikanisty* are charged with finding today's answers to this question.

S. Frederick Starr, 36, was born in New York City, grew up in Cincinnati, and studied ancient history at Yale (B.A. 1962). He earned an M.A. degree at King's College, Cambridge, in Slavonic languages and literature (1964), and took his Ph.D. in history at Princeton (1968), where he became an associate professor in 1975. He has lived and studied in Moscow and Leningrad. His books include Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia, 1830-1870. He is executive secretary of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies at the Wilson Center.

This new "knowledge industry" requires solid information. This has always been a problem for Russians interested in America. The first detailed information on North America did not reach Russian leaders until nearly a century after Columbus. For the next 200 years Russians had to learn about this continent through the works of West European writers, rather than at first hand. In spite of a number of engaging travel accounts on America written by Russians in the 19th century, the United States remained, for most educated subjects of the Tsars, more the embodiment of one or another abstract principle than a real country inhabited by real people. Interest in the United States reached something of a peak in the first years after the 1917 revolution, but it was hard data on American industrial methods rather than broader information on American society that Russians were seeking and getting. And amidst the general paranoia of the Stalin years, broad scholarly inquiry was severely hampered.

Listening to the VOA

During the last 15 years this situation has changed dramatically for the better, at least for the specialist. Leading Soviet officials, journalists, and scholars feel obliged to be better informed than in the past, and have good access to American publications not otherwise available to the public at large. They use them extensively, if selectively, in their writings on this country.* The now unjammed Voice of America is never cited as a source, but any serious Soviet Americanist will expect to log several hours a week in front of his short-wave radio.

The flood of direct impressions taken home by travelers to this country is perhaps even more important. With some 12,000 Soviet visitors to the United States each year, there are now Russians in nearly every profession who have followed Khrushchev's call. The most fortunate among them have been able to study here, thanks to the various cultural exchanges that have flourished since 1958. True, there are those who, like Louis XVIII, have learned nothing and forgotten nothing, and, equally true, the pages of such leading publications as the Union of Soviet Writers' *Literary Gazette* are open to such people. But the expanding fund of direct impressions makes it more difficult to pass off the most egregious

*Examination of the footnotes of the journal *USA* indicates that the *New York Times* and the *International Herald Tribune* far outstrip all other papers in popularity, while among weeklies it is *U.S. News and World Report* rather than *Newsweek* or *Time* to which Soviet students of American affairs turn. Notwithstanding their lingering suspicion that Wall Street runs the country, the *Wall Street Journal* is all but ignored as a source for articles on the United States. So are most counter-culture publications.

distortions as fact. Writing on the United States has grown more sophisticated, if only to satisfy the rising expectations of better educated Russians.

No amount of information, of course, can by itself enable a person from one culture to decipher accurately the signs and symbols of another. In the end, the underlying assumptions and predilections of the observer will come into play, whether through the choice of subjects to which he is drawn or through the manner in which he chooses to treat them. At the deepest level, such assumptions are built into language itself. To take but one example, how can one expect Russians to take seriously the recent American debate over the Privacy Act when their language contains no precise word for "privacy"? Language aside, such assumptions have become crystallized in specific attitudes toward America, some of which have long recurred in Russian accounts.

A fairly representative compendium of such notions is the volume *Stars and Stripes*, published by a well-traveled Russian nobleman, Ivan Golovin, in 1856. Borrowing a phrase from Diderot, Golovin charged that America's distinction was to be like a fruit which begins rotting even before it has ripened. Diderot, in fact, had been speaking of Russia, and not America, but the notion of a United States both youthful and decadent held great appeal for both conservative and radical writers before 1917 and for Communist writers down to the present. As recently as June 15, 1976, readers of *Pravda* were treated to an article on America in this vein entitled "A Society Without a Future."

A Contradictory Approach

No less curious than the sustained, almost Wagnerian, decline ascribed to America is the way in which that image has been able to coexist with the equally persistent acknowledgment—even awe—of American scientific and technological progress. The founder of Russian publicist writing on the United States, Pavel Svinin, spoke warmly of American machines in his *Picturesque United States of America, 1811-1813*, and his heirs have never begrudged praise in this area. As Stalin put it, "Soviet power and American technique will build socialism." Such a view assumes that technology is culturally neutral, a point that was implied by N. N. Inozemtsev, the director of Moscow's Institute for International Economics and International Relations, in the first number of the monthly *USA*. While affirming that the American system "deforms" its own scientific and technological achievements, Inozemtsev argued that such matters as the combination of central-

ization and decentralization in American corporations, the American method of wholesaling, and the system of decision-making in the area of research and development "are all of interest to us, since concrete general principles relating to the scientific and technological revolution are coming to light through the American experience."

Without even acknowledging the apparent contradiction, Soviet commentators simultaneously elaborate both images. One reason they have not rejected the age-old idea of American decline is that it has proven useful in analyzing various current issues. It enabled Soviet observers to deal relatively calmly with the United States amid the furor of Vietnam, and to accept Watergate without surprise. Similarly, 75 years ago it underpinned the research of the brilliant Russian Americanist, Moisei Ostrogorsky, in whose eyes the United States had even then ceased to possess a Constitutional government in the strict sense. Writing for an audience that eventually included thousands of Americans, Ostrogorsky was the first scholar anywhere to analyze the combined impact of wealth, political parties, and a mass public on America's Constitutional heritage. His gloomy but profound insights justify his being ranked after Alexis de Tocqueville and Sir James Bryce as the most astute foreign observer of this country.*

An Extension of Europe

Confronted with a civilization so different from their own, some Russian scholars have avoided coming to grips with its distinctive aspects by declaring categorically that America is "nothing else but a continuation of European development." These words, by the 19th-century socialist, Alexander Herzen, could have been uttered by countless recent Russian writers. This view has two important corollaries: first, it has led Russian observers to neglect until recently the study of American culture and social psychology; and, second, it has served to justify the mechanical application to America of categories of analysis derived from the study of Western Europe.

A Russian nurse, A. N. Paevskaia, returning from her studies in Boston in the 1890s, asked, "What have [the Americans] given the world? What noble, honest, great human idea has been borne by them?" Assuming the answer to be "nothing," Russians have long neglected all but those few American writers and artists

*Ostrogorsky's best-known work is *Democracy and the Party System in the United States, A Study in Extra Constitutional Government* (1910). The latest edition in English was published by Arno Press in 1974.

deemed by them to be "progressive"—Theodore Dreiser, Mark Twain, Jack London, Sinclair Lewis. Many other American authors whose works would give Russians a more multi-dimensional impression were for long untranslated.

In this respect too the last few years mark a sharp break with all previous Russian experience. The first Russian translation of *Moby Dick* came in 1961—after a century of neglect. Then, in rapid succession, came works by William Faulkner, F. Scott Fitzgerald, J. D. Salinger, Thomas Wolfe, William Styron, and even Kurt Vonnegut. Henry James, who acknowledged his debt to the Russian writer Turgenev, was also hauled from oblivion. But authors like Henry Miller and William Burroughs, whose works Russians judge to be pornographic, remain beyond the pale of acceptability, as do the writings of certain Black Nationalists, "reactionary" writers such as Herman Wouk, "fascists" like Ezra Pound, and writers known for their critical views on the Soviet Union, such as Saul Bellow.

By comparison with any other time in the last half-century, the situation has dramatically improved, and with important results. Reviewing the recent burst of translations, one American critic has noted that "Soviet translations of American literature belie the image of America as a cultural desert. Indeed, it projects an image of a culture that is both varied and vibrant. . . ."

With the gradual acceptance of America as a country possessing its own rich and diverse culture, the tendency automatically to impose on it the categories of analysis developed for the societies of Western Europe has come under scrutiny. One of the peculiarities of Soviet writing on America has always been its use of terminology not normally used by Americans themselves. There is nothing inherently wrong with this, of course, provided that the analysis succeeds in bringing greater clarity to the problem at hand. Endless polemical allusions to the American "proletariat," to the "reactionary manipulators of Wall Street," and to unspecified "progressive forces" have not had this effect, however.

Gone Is the Proletariat

This too is changing, at least among specialists. A. N. Melnikov's 1974 volume *Contemporary Class Structure of the USA* succeeds in getting to the real groups and strata that comprise American society today. Basing his analysis on an exhaustive study of U.S. census returns, Melnikov divides and subdivides his subject into ever more refined units, reveling in the specific at the expense of the hackneyed general categories of "capitalist," "worker," and

so forth. American labor, he finds, is no "solid, undifferentiated mass," any more than it is uniform in world view, work, or wealth. Nor, significantly, is labor seen on the verge of revolt—no great revelation, perhaps, but not an observation quite in line with the old Soviet faith.

The politics of détente have hastened the abandonment of the polemical vocabulary. It was well and good for *Pravda* to rail against the evils of American "monopolies" so long as the Soviet government was not entering into contracts with them. Nowadays, the more discrete term "firm" has become *de rigeur*. In a recent article, the Control Data Corporation was described as simply a "problem-solving organization," in spite of its excellent standing on the New York Stock Exchange. And what has become of the much-maligned capitalist, with his top hat, cigar, and jowls? Presto! He has been transformed into a "businessman," an "entrepreneur" (*delovoi chelovek*), or even a "manager," i.e., the sort of person one can do business with. Meanwhile, "bankers" are now "financial circles" and the "proletariat" has dropped from the scene entirely.

This shift has its parallel in the manner in which Soviet writers describe the American political process. Here again, the Stalin era bequeathed to the present Soviet generation of leaders a dangerously simplified notion of how American politics works. America being a capitalist country, it followed that businessmen could bring about whatever legislation they considered to be in their interests. On this doctrinal assumption, the Soviet campaign in favor of the U.S.-Soviet trade bill was directed almost entirely towards sympathetic leaders of American industry. The unanticipated passage of the 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment linking trade with Jewish emigration threw Moscow's White-House-ologists into confusion. Congress, it turned out, *did* count, and the successful Congressional drive against the illegal acts of the Nixon administration only confirmed it. In 1974, the Moscow leadership sent to Washington a prestigious group of parliamentary experts to see how the separation of powers actually functions.

The absence of contending political parties in the U.S.S.R., the Russian tradition of centralized authority, and the Soviet legal system's stress on duties to the State rather than rights against it present real barriers to Russian perceptions. Even when they have mastered the facts of a given case, Soviet observers will frequently misread American motives—not just because they are inhibited by ideological blinders, but because they honestly cannot conceive of people basing their actions on the abstract principles which sometimes impel us. This is particularly true in the case of

Americans who criticize the U.S.S.R. on civil libertarian grounds. "Like young harlots (although many of these people are quite gray-haired), they swing from one modish political current to the next. . . ." Thus one prominent Soviet Americanist characterized liberal critics of détente.

Nonetheless, sustained contact with American affairs has led a good number of Soviet analysts to a quite realistic understanding of American political processes. Whatever their ideology tells them about the structure of power in capitalist societies, they have come to appreciate the might of press and public opinion in America. And while Marxism-Leninism requires that they consider every Western government to be a conspiracy against "the people," the new wave of Americanists are fairly united in viewing American politics as relatively open and relatively adaptable to changing conditions.

Awe Leads to Error

In their eagerness to avoid the exaggerated statements on America's impending doom that have given rise to so many Soviet jokes in the past, Moscow analysts at times have erred by overestimating American strengths. Thus, Soviet economists analyzing our economy on the eve of détente failed to anticipate the impact of inflation here—and hence found themselves later having to adjust their prognostications downward rather severely. More recently, inflation and unemployment in America have been treated extensively in such Soviet journals as *World Economics* and *International Relations*, but Moscow specialists insist that America's boldness in the scientific and industrial areas will sustain its lead over the other large Western countries for the foreseeable future and, by implication, over the Soviet Union as well.

How, then, can we summarize such new Soviet perceptions of the United States? At the least, one can say that the specialists' views are based upon more and better information than those of their predecessors, and that this information covers more diverse aspects of American life than ever before. Moreover, the establishment of an organized, officially sanctioned field of inquiry dealing with American affairs has created an environment which encourages Soviet writers to elaborate their conceptions of this country in greater detail and to engage in open debate with one another when differing lines of interpretation emerge. This dialogue, and the wealth of impressions on which it feeds, has weakened, though not destroyed, many of the shibboleths that have long formed Russian opinion on this country.

During the past year, for example, Soviet scholars have sought to come to grips with the Bicentennial. Some Russian authors have seen the ideology of the American Revolution as marking a watershed in mankind's liberation from tyranny; others have condemned that same ideology as a hypocritical mask hiding selfish interest; while still others have flatly denied that the Revolution produced much of an ideology in the first place; each writer supporting his case with ample citations of the works of American scholars. A Soviet synthesis on this or other American issues will in all likelihood emerge, and such syntheses will inevitably take on the colorations of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. But very diverse positions have been defended or rationalized in terms of Marxism-Leninism in the past, and there is reason to think that American interpretations could contribute to the formation of official Soviet views in the future.

The Gains Are Limited

The Soviet rediscovery of America has occurred not through a few dazzling leaps but through hundreds of small steps. No great works of synthesis have appeared, but one can cite literally hundreds of competently written studies on small—even minute—topics, each the result of some specialist fulfilling the plan of work set out for him by the council of his institute or university. Thanks to this effort, a country that was once seen as simply the embodiment of such abstractions as “capitalism,” “imperialism,” or “technocracy” is now recognized as being infinitely complex and, to the intelligent Soviet observer, endlessly intriguing.

Unlike Soviet studies in this country, which have floundered as the old cliché of “totalitarianism” and the newer clichés about “interest groups” have in turn lost their hold, Soviet interest in the United States has blossomed through contact with America's complexity. Competition for entrance to the English-language primary and secondary schools in major cities is intense, and the graduates of such institutions compete fiercely for places in the major institutes and universities that offer programs of American studies. The fact that American studies have attracted an inordinate number of the sons and daughters of Moscow's political elite both reflects and contributes to the intellectual and social prestige such studies now enjoy.

Even so, the more realistic perceptions of this country promoted by the U.S.S.R.'s better *Amerikanisty* remain largely confined to a small circle of specialists and enthusiasts, much like the Marlboros they smoke or the American cut of the suits they wear.

The newer and more subtle perceptions of the United States have yet really to penetrate the schools, for example, where both textbooks and standardized curricula remain firmly rooted in the frozen soil of the Cold War. Soviet mass journalism is often no better. Gennadii Vasiliev of *Pravda* recently reported from Washington that under the American system of free enterprise it is quite normal for babies to be sold like commodities; the same correspondent used the resignation of U.S. Commissioner of Education Bell last May as an opportunity to demonstrate to Soviet readers that Americans cannot send their children through college on the salary of \$37,800 that Bell had been receiving. In both instances Mr. Vasiliev could base his story on evidence gleaned from the American press. Just as in the textbooks, however, the evidence was presented in a thoroughly distorted and, as the Soviets say, "one-sided" manner.

Mr. Vasiliev's heavy-gaited approach to the United States is not uncommon among Soviet journalists, TV newscasters, and film-makers, but it is by no means universal. Indeed, the same attitude of open-minded curiosity that informs some specialized studies on the United States is to be found among the staff of three of the Soviet Union's most authoritative mass newspapers: *Pravda*, the voice of the Communist Party; *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, the organ of the Communist youth movement; and *Izvestiia*, the government's mouthpiece. Within the last two years, three Soviet correspondents have produced accounts of their travels in America which are exceptionally revealing not only of the attitudes of the writers themselves but, equally important, of the interests of their mass audience.

Messages from the Sponsor

One of the writers is Boris Strelnikov, an old pro. A veteran of both World War II and many decades on the staff of *Pravda*, Strelnikov has turned out his share of anti-American boilerplate; his 1975 best seller, *The Land Beyond the Ocean*, is by no means free of thrice-told tales of American perfidy. Strelnikov's pages are punctuated from time to time with sermonets—messages, as it were, from the sponsor. But he has a capacity for presenting ambiguity as well, as when he describes his meeting with a family of hardy dirt farmers in Wisconsin. With unfeigned respect, he recounts Warren Miller's efforts to hold out against the expanding agro-businesses, and correctly identifies his hero as an heir to the Jeffersonian ideal. This "man from the land" will lose, however, and Strelnikov obviously feels for him. But wherein lies the am-

biguity? Both the author and his Soviet readers know that their own government has also opted for agro-business, just as they realize that literally millions of Russian Warren Millers were exterminated as *kulaks* [rich peasants] during Stalin's collectivization drive.

Why did *The Land Beyond the Ocean* sell 100,000 copies overnight after having already been serialized in some of the largest mass publications in the U.S.S.R.? Virtually any book on America will find a large Soviet audience, but the fact that Strelnikov had as his coauthor Vasilii Peskov surely did no harm. A popular writer on nature, Peskov was a leading figure in the effort to rescue Lake Baikal from polluting industries. Unlike most previous Russian writers on America, Peskov notices the land itself. The intensity of the scenery—dramatic rather than lyrical—is described with the freshness and enthusiasm that only a sensitive visitor can attain. And to readers who have heard only how Americans desecrate nature, Peskov's long passages on the popularity of bird-watching and on the system of National Parks could only come as an intriguing revelation.

California as Microcosm

The Soviet thirst for reliable descriptions of American life is strong but not indiscriminate, which makes for an increasingly competitive situation among those writers who choose to enter the field. As the U.S. correspondent of *Pravda* and his colleague from *Komsomolskaia Pravda* were producing their several volumes on this country, *Izvestiia's* veteran Washington correspondent, Stanislav Kondrashov, also decided to get in on the act. Kondrashov could have written on many American themes. In the end he chose California, where, as he put it, "one can discern sharp and clear, as through a magnifying glass, the features of contemporary American society."

In *A Meeting with California* Kondrashov is a superior tour guide. He takes his readers—100,000 of them—to a few usual sights and many unusual ones. Even a familiar subject like the Los Angeles freeways assumes a new aspect as he compares the seemingly fused cars and drivers to mythic centaurs. More portraitist than social diagnostician, Kondrashov's talents are enhanced by an impressive capacity for sympathy. Whether he is introducing Russians to an anti-war clergyman or to the topless dancers of San Francisco, he manages to illuminate the personality of his subject. He grinds few axes.

Kondrashov visited California at the height of the post-Cam-

bodia agitation and returned again in 1973. His initial impressions were of a state—a country—that considered itself to be on intimate terms with the future. With uneasy fascination he compares the *vivace* tempo of Los Angeles life with the *allegro* of New York and the *moderato* of Moscow. He found the West to be inhabited by attractive and affable boosters, whom he treats with that peculiar blend of admiration, toleration, and condescension that the Old World has often reserved for the New. Concluding a chapter on the McCarthy campaign of 1968, he quotes James Reston:

Maybe life will not be changed by this drive for self-analysis and self-perfection, but there is nonetheless something inspiring and even majestic in these debates. Whatever one might say about America today, she is taking up the great questions of human life. She is asking what is the sense of all this wealth? Is poverty inevitable or intolerable? What sort of America do we really want? And what should be its relations with the rest of the world?

Returning in 1973, Kondrashov reflects on a California that has become “more modest, more sober, and more frugal”:

No longer raging and having grown tame and settled, California looks to the future without bravado and with even a certain trepidation and humility, a future which it now sees as an inaccessible sphinx rather than a self-confident sharpster who smiles so that all will know how well his affairs are doing and how they could not be otherwise.

Is this Kondrashov's America? Yes, but not without reservations. Like many of the Soviet Union's more sophisticated observers of the United States, he is far less prone than his predecessors to leap to sweeping generalizations. No less important, he knows that his Russian public does not want them. Why, I asked him, has the lowly travel account flourished as the most popular genre for Soviet *Amerikanistika* while more ambitious monographs gain currency largely among specialists? Kondrashov answered bluntly: “In a travel account one is not obliged to reach any final conclusions.” In a changing world, this approach is a promising alternative to dogmatism.



THE AMERICAN VIEW OF RUSSIA

by William Zimmerman

There are now more American specialists who know much more about the U.S.S.R. than did their counterparts 30 years ago—or than their counterparts knew about Tsarist Russia prior to the Revolution in 1917.

But their knowledge is not widely disseminated; consequently, numerous misconceptions about the Soviet Union persist in the United States. Indeed, the gap in knowledge between academic specialists and others professionally preoccupied with the Soviet Union—policy-makers and journalists, for example—is often substantial.

This is not to say that the academic specialists themselves do not have what historian Adam Ulam calls “skeletons in their filing cabinets.” For despite their substantial progress in accumulating knowledge, American scholars who study the Soviet Union have had their share of misconceptions, biases, and blunders.

What I shall try to do here is to discuss what those misconceptions have been, give the reader some idea of why it is so difficult to acquire knowledge about the Soviet Union (even though we have become better at it), and note several misperceptions of the U.S.S.R. that appear to me to be widely held in the United States. The only way to begin is by taking a step or two backward.

The Early Years

During the period between World Wars I and II, any Americans who wanted information about Soviet rule would have benefited from W. H. Chamberlin's *The Russian Revolution*, which remains one of the best books on that subject. By reading Samuel Harper's *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*, they could have got a sense of the process of political socialization. But on the whole, there were few scholars in the field, and their studies were often distortingly legalistic. As Ulam has remarked: “The average Anglo-

American academician approached categories like 'the police state,' 'terror,' and 'totalitarianism' with the same trepidation and distortions as the Victorian novelist felt when he had to allude to the sexual act." Americans in the 1930s who wanted to know about the Soviet system would have been better off reading the novels of Arthur Koestler or—if they had been available in English—the emigré journals of the Mensheviks.

After World War II, the situation changed drastically. With the onset of the Cold War, American research on the U.S.S.R. burgeoned, thus illustrating, perhaps, that scholarship, rather than trade, follows the flag. An impressive array of scholars and scholarship emerged. What had been a trickle of competent American scholarship in the 1930s became a freshet and then a flood—thanks largely to the pump-priming of major foundations and the U.S. government. At a few universities, great centers of professional competence on the Soviet Union developed. Under the auspices of Harvard's Russian Research Center alone, well over 30 books appeared in the 1950s, including Merle Fainsod's *How Russia is Ruled* (1953), a landmark in the development of Soviet studies. [See Background Books, page 128.] An increase in quality and sophistication accompanied the growth in quantity. American scholars had become—without doubt—the world's most competent repository of detailed information about the periods of high Stalinism (1936–41 and 1947–53).

A Darker Side

But there was a dark side to the picture of American Soviet studies in the 1940s and 1950s, just as there had been between the two World Wars. Scholars' conceptions of the Soviet system too often led them to extrapolate from the periods of high Stalinism to other periods of Soviet history. To be charitable, it should be noted that the disposition to extrapolate the universal from the time-defined particular is a natural human failing.

How did such extrapolations cloud American scholarship on the Soviet Union in the 1950s? And what effect have they had in this decade?

First, analysis by American specialists in the early 1950s frequently ruled out even the possibility of many of the significant changes which occurred in the Soviet Union following Stalin's death in 1953. All too often they implied that the Soviet system was nonreactive to the external world (except in the most mechanical sense) and that it was able to mobilize the entire society to the regime's purposes while remaining insulated from the in-

fluence of all domestic constraints.

The general picture they painted in the 1950s was of a static, self-perpetuating, totally politicized Soviet Union in which "politics" did not exist (except during a succession crisis set off by a dictator's death). The aversion to terms like totalitarianism and terror had been more than overcome. It was widely asserted that terror was the linchpin of the Soviet system; that mass purges were a permanent feature of the Soviet system; that the Soviet leader, like the Tsar, dies in office; that the outcome of a succession crisis would inevitably result in an omnipotent dictator; that (given the party-state's monopoly over the means of communication and violence) major overt dissent was inconceivable; that in foreign policy there *had* to be a main enemy, the United States; that the shifts in Soviet foreign policy (and in what was perceived as the monolithic world communist movement) were to be understood to turn almost totally on the question of which states—among those not then in either the U.S. or Soviet camp—to align with and for how long.

Extrapolating the Unextrapolable

Second, there was a tendency by Americans to extrapolate findings based on a reading of the record of high Stalinism to other periods of Soviet history. Consequently, the distinctions between the Leninist and Stalinist periods were often obscured, and the entire Stalinist period was treated as whole cloth. There was, in short, a systematic bias which led Soviet specialists to believe that change—at least change uncontrolled by the regime—was not possible. (Alexander Dallin, Stanford University's distinguished student of Soviet foreign policy, says that he once asked an American Soviet specialist about the likelihood of fundamental change in the Soviet Union. To which the specialist replied: "It won't happen—but if it does, I'll be sure to miss it.")

Why was American scholarship on the Soviet Union so static

William Zimmerman, 40, is professor of political science and director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Michigan. He is a graduate of Swarthmore (B.A., 1958), George Washington University (M.A., 1959), and Columbia (Ph.D., 1965). In addition to teaching, he is currently working (with Zvi Gitelman and Morris Bornstein) on a long-term study of "The World Economy and Soviet-East European Relations." It is scheduled for completion in 1979. Mr. Zimmerman is chairman of the research and development committee of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies and a member of the academic council of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies at the Wilson Center.

and faulty in the 1950s? Dallin attributes part of it to an "intuitive and often well-founded belief" that no one ever "incurred a risk to his professional reputation by taking a hard line—even if later such a posture proved to have been unwarranted." Then, of course, there was the very human desire to avoid being wrong—or, even worse, ignored. Anxiety on this score was undoubtedly magnified by the fact that widely predicted changes did not occur (such as "the great retreat" politically, which, it was asserted, would accompany the turning away from the radical social patterns of post-revolutionary Russia). American specialists were also guilty—unwittingly—of accepting too readily Soviet depictions of the Soviet Union; thus, Stalin's claims of monolithic unity found their reflections in the American scholar's image of a Soviet Union characterized by absolute control and a hierarchy in which politics was absent. Finally, a major role must be accorded the temper of the times—the context of the Cold War. One can make this point more systematically, but I have always thought the atmosphere was epitomized by a typographical error contained in the introduction to one of the most influential studies of totalitarianism. It said: "This issue runs like a red threat through all the papers and discussions. . . ."

In the 1960s and early 1970s, Soviet studies advanced rapidly. The concentration of expertise continues today in political science, history, and Slavic language and literature, but the shortage of sociologists, anthropologists, and economists persists. Geographically, the diffusion of expertise has proceeded apace. Whereas in the 1950s concentrations of Soviet specialists could be found only at Harvard and Columbia, centers equally capable of sustained research are now operating at Michigan, Indiana, Chicago, Wisconsin, Stanford, Berkeley, UCLA, and Washington; and serious work is also being done at numerous other schools.

Access to the Soviet Union has also broadened. While historians have comprised a disproportionately high percentage of the scholars visiting the Soviet Union, some sociologists, economists, and political scientists have also had lengthy research stays there. Such a pattern was inconceivable in the 1950s. But the problems of data availability remained exceedingly difficult. Even by contrast with Yugoslavia or Poland, for instance, the time and effort required to obtain data remained staggeringly large, to say nothing of the problem of "disinformation"—memory holes and deliberate misrepresentations of events. Only in the recent past has there emerged the beginning of concrete sociological investigation of Soviet society by Soviet sociologists—research of the sort conducted by Yugoslav and Polish social scientists for two

decades now. Systematic mass surveys of political attitudes in the Soviet Union by Americans and by collaborative teams of American and Soviet social scientists are not even on the horizon. The aggregate data sources—statistical yearbooks and the like—remain incomplete (and, by Yugoslav and Polish standards, methodologically primitive). Yet in recent years an American specialist on Soviet foreign policy could obtain access to unpublished dissertations or conference papers and could interview specialists on Soviet–U.S. or Soviet–Third World relations in the institutes of the Academy of Sciences; the student of local government could interview local government and party officials, and a sociologist with sufficient *chutzpah* could sit in the browsing room of a police station reading an unclassified police journal unavailable in the West.

The easing of the Cold War, changes in the Soviet Union itself, and developments in the social sciences had their impact on the general orientation of American specialists on the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. and its basic organizational structure were depicted in developmental terms of adaptation and coöptation. The Communist Party, long regarded as an instrument of repression that would have a decreasing role in an increasingly modernized Soviet Union, came to be viewed as performing what Professor Jerry Hough of the University of North Carolina termed a prefectural role in ensuring and expediting plan fulfillment and in adjudicating competing claims for resources. With the publication in 1963 of *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised*, by Columbia professor Marshall Shulman, the reactive tendencies of Soviet foreign policy began to receive proper emphasis.

The New Crop of Specialists

The 1960s and 1970s have produced a whole new cadre of Soviet specialists who are less preoccupied with immediate policy relevance. These scholars also have extensive research experience in the U.S.S.R., as well as a thorough acquaintance with the methods and approaches of their respective social-science disciplines.

But unlike the dénouement of a Soviet novel, there is no assurance that this story will have a happy ending. Due partly to a vague expectation that peace will break out between the United States and the Soviet Union, partly to a legitimate new emphasis on domestic U.S. concerns, there has been a marked decrease in public attention to Soviet affairs in recent years—and in the availability of research funds as well. Although there has been some reversal in the trend of declining support over the last

year or so, the decrease has led to the underutilization of research capabilities at the university centers. Moreover, at many universities, specialists in Soviet anthropology, economics, and sociology are not being replaced when they leave. And these are the fields where the need for analysts is greatest.

As for the current state of the art, the pendulum may have swung too far in a new direction. Whereas a major flaw in the 1950s was the unthinking use of Stalinist concepts, today's problem may well be the mechanical application to the Soviet scene of models and scholarly concepts developed in and for an American context. In addition, the newly acquired ability of specialists on the U.S.S.R. in this country to speak the same jargon as their disciplinary confreres in the social sciences has further compounded their difficulties in communicating with the public.

The New Misconceptions

A casual reading of recent Congressional testimony, major American newspapers, news magazines, and journals of opinion leaves me convinced that the relatively sophisticated knowledge of Soviet specialists has not reached the public or the policy-makers. As a consequence, a number of misconceptions about the Soviet Union are widely held. In my view, these are the major ones:

Disputes within the Soviet Union are viewed too much in terms of dissenters vs. the regime. Witness this exchange in 1974 between Senator Claiborne Pell (D.-R.I.) and Professor Shulman:

Professor Shulman: We know quite a lot in this country about the dissidents. We know quite a lot about the officialdom, the establishment types. What isn't sufficiently understood or appreciated in this country is that the political life of the Soviet Union involves a very rich and complex spectrum, that there are many positions. There are degrees of involvement in a system. There are people who are involved in the system and yet are critical of it in one way or another. . . . There are people who are trying to modernize it . . . not necessarily to liberalize it in the Western sense, but to modify the system.

There are many forces for change within the Soviet Union which are not sufficiently appreciated in this country. . . . It is important that there are the dissidents . . . but the effective change is likely to come in the other whole range of in-between positions.

Senator Pell: . . . I never read about what you are saying now.

Just as the diversity of orientations toward change is not appreciated, so are the sources of support not understood. Here the *non-specialist* academic is as liable to perpetuate error as anybody else. For example, Hans J. Morgenthau, a distinguished student of international politics, recently remarked that the Soviet system "has to rely primarily on nothing but deception and terror"; and Richard Pipes, a scholar truly knowledgeable about 19th-century Russia and the early Soviet period, described the current Soviet regime as "a government devoid of any popular mandate." Statements such as these serve to suggest only that the Soviet Union is, by our values, a rather crummy place. They show no appreciation of the visceral nationalism of a substantial fraction of the Soviet citizenry—a nationalism generated by victory in World War II, by perceptions of how things are in comparison with the bad old days, and by the satisfaction that comes from being citizens of a world power.

Another pervasive misconception is that there are no personal incentives and rewards in the U.S.S.R. Many Americans fail to appreciate the immense role of material (and non-material) incentives there, 40 years after Stalin condemned the *petit-bourgeois* notion of egalitarianism. Incentives associated with plan fulfillment are so powerful, in fact, that they explain, in part at least, why innovation is often difficult to achieve in Soviet factories. The preoccupation with fulfilling short-term plans, using established methods, does not allow much room for innovations that might make production more efficient later. The incentive structure also precludes attention to social overhead costs—in much the same way that the profit motive does under capitalism. The results—polluted rivers, smog, and so on—are often the same.

Americans also may not understand the role of incentives in Soviet life because of two related misconceptions. One is that all jobs are allocated by the state; the other is that work plans are specific down to the last detail. Both are wrong. Job choice is not totally defined by the state; for example, it remains difficult for Moscow to get people to work in the far north—even though substantial bonuses are offered for accepting such assignments. An impressive network of rural hospitals and clinics has been built throughout the country, but few physicians are willing to staff them. Similarly, plan instructions are fairly general; enterprise managers have some leeway in determining how a given plan is to be fulfilled.

Although Americans do have a fair understanding that high politics comes into play where the right to rule the Soviet Union is at stake, they seem unaware of the importance of resource-

allocation and institutional controversies—that is, disputes about who gets what and who decides who decides. This lack of awareness is not surprising; news of such matters is not the kind that even the *New York Times* deems fit to print.

Lack of awareness in these areas contributes, in turn, to another misconception—one that is something of a mirror image of the treatment of Watergate by the Soviet press (Who is behind Watergate? Enemies of détente!). Some Americans who know something about the Soviet Union tend to explain political events there too much in terms of American-Soviet relations, often without a shred of evidence. Some examples: In advocating improved relations with the U.S.S.R., one Senator said, “We should remember that Nikita S. Khrushchev was removed from power primarily because his advocacy of détente with the West was opposed by Soviet conservatives and the Soviet military”; former Ambassador Averell Harriman, in discussing Leonid Brezhnev’s commitment to détente, observed archly, “We know what happened to Khrushchev.”

We do know what happened to Khrushchev. What is far less clear is *why* it happened. However, it is almost certain that he was not removed primarily because of conservative and military opposition to détente. Why, then, was he deposed? An awareness of the *Soviet* context of Soviet politics would lead one to look first to events inside the Soviet union, to agricultural failure and to organizational controversies. Such an orientation would lead to an examination of policy decisions by the successful conspirators following Khrushchev’s removal in 1964. These included an initial continuity in foreign affairs, the easing of Khrushchev-imposed restrictions on private gardening plots on the collective farms, and the unceremonious abandonment of Khrushchev’s pet scheme for bifurcating the Communist Party at the regional (*oblast*) level into separate committees for agriculture and industry.

Myths about Soviet Foreign Policy

Misconceptions with respect to foreign policy also abound. One is that the Soviet Union has, in George Meany’s words, “broken every international agreement.” This is what a colleague of mine calls a false fact. It is based on a true fact—namely, that the U.S.S.R. blithely disregarded its nonaggression treaties with the erstwhile Baltic states—but it ignores the country’s good record in observing commercial and other treaties.

Where the interested public appears to have the greatest

knowledge gap is in the area of Soviet foreign policy as it relates to Eastern Europe. I do not think the public realizes that some credence should be given to Soviet claims that it was exploited *economically* by its Eastern European client states in the 1960s—a price it was willing to pay because of the political benefits of bloc cohesion. Also, there seems little awareness here that the energy crisis has prompted the Soviet Union to encourage its Eastern European client states to become *less* dependent on it for sources of energy. And the quiet revolution in Polish trade has gone almost unnoticed in the American press. Whereas in 1970, 63% of Polish trade was with Comecon (the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), this had dropped to 47% by 1974. In 1970, 27% of Poland's trade was with the West; by 1974, it had grown to 44%. A shift of that magnitude has only one parallel in the history of Eastern Europe after the communist takeovers—the trade reorientation that Romania undertook in the 1960s as part of its deliberate strategy to extricate itself from Soviet domination.

Hedrick Smith's Best Seller

For a special illustration of the gap in perception between American specialists on the Soviet Union and informed generalists, I turn to a brief consideration of Hedrick Smith's *The Russians*. [See Background Books, page 127.]

I do not pick on Mr. Smith because he is an easy target. On the contrary, he learned a lot during his stint as Moscow correspondent for the *New York Times*. I focus on his book because, as a best seller, it may have reached a larger public than have the combined works of all the academic specialists on the U.S.S.R. now at work.


His book is a voyage of discovery: Mr. Smith candidly tells us when his previous conceptions were altered, and provides us with a vicarious sense of having been there. But the armchair traveler is likely to be misled by his narration (the accuracy of which I do not dispute) in two important respects. His tales of the Moscow elite's affluence, corruption, and cynicism are likely to impart a mistaken conception about this elite when compared with other elites. After the "thirteenth-month" payment, the "Kremlin ration," the special access to consumer goods, the special holiday, medical facilities, and all the other perquisites which power, status, and *blat* (influence) obtain, it is still true, as the British sociologist Mervyn Mathews has observed, that the Soviet elite "is by international standards poor."

The reader is also likely to be misled in some respects about ordinary Soviet citizens. One gets a sense of the regime's strong support from the Soviet "hard-hats" and of the nostalgia for Stalin on the part of some. Unfortunately, one also gets the impression that Moscow is representative of the Soviet Union and that the Russians and the Soviet citizenry are either synonymous or on their way to becoming so. As a result, the reader is likely to be much more persuaded of the progressive Russification of the Soviet Union than is warranted by the evidence. Mr. Smith quite properly reports the "persistent official efforts to promote the learning of Russian." But his readers are nowhere made aware that the 1970 census shows the U.S.S.R. to be less Russian than did the 1959 census or that assimilation has been modest (even when non-Russians adopt Russian as their principal language, they do not declare themselves Russians ethnically). As University of Michigan historian Roman Szporluk has written: "Eleven among the 15 major Soviet nationalities which possess their own 'Union Republics' increased at a higher rate than the Russians" during the years 1959-70. In the five Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia, and Uzbekistan), the three Transcaucasian Republics (Armenia, Azerbaidzhan, and Georgia) and in Lithuania, the population of the titular nation increased as a proportion of the total population of the republic and the Russian fraction decreased (except in Lithuania, where each increased marginally).

The Knowledge Gaps

In short, specialists on the Soviet Union do have an expertise which differentiates them from journalists, policy-makers, and the general public. The gaps among and between them stem partly from the specialists' failure to disseminate their knowledge. And even though the specialists know a lot about a lot of areas of Soviet life, much (that is researchable) remains to be learned. Little is known about the urban lower classes, their lifestyles and their beliefs. Soviet mass culture is largely unexamined. At the elite level there exists only the merest beginning of an understanding of the links between social background, attitude, and behavior. The emerging social and political role of the scientific elite has been only modestly explored. Research on resource-allocation controversies and the connection between issue and policy process is not far along. The connection between U.S.-Soviet and Soviet-East European relations has been insufficiently explored. One could go on. So much still needs to be known that

one can only welcome the glimmer of a renewed awareness that continued study of the Soviet Union should have some place in national research priorities. What gives an added importance to the American (and, more generally, the Western) study of the Soviet Union is that Western specialists are doing what remains exceedingly difficult for Soviet citizens to do: they are objectively analyzing the contemporary Soviet Union and keeping straight the historical background that lies behind the Soviet present.



BACKGROUND BOOKS

THE SOVIET UNION

As economic and cultural exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union increase, more Americans are turning to books for help in penetrating the enigma that is everyday Russia. Enjoying the widest readership are three recent popular accounts by U.S. journalists who worked in Moscow: Robert Kaiser's ambitious, somewhat disjointed **Russia: The People and the Power** (Atheneum, 1976, cloth; Pocket Books, 1976, paper); Jerrold and Leona Schechter's intimate **An American Family in Moscow** (Little, Brown, 1975), with contributions by the Schechter children who attended Soviet schools; and Hedrick Smith's fat, anecdotal **The Russians** (Quadrangle, 1976, cloth; Ballantine, 1977, paper).

"Are they becoming more like us?" Smith asks. Not really, is his answer. Most Western scholars agree. Despite the two countries' apparent similarities (size, economic growth, technological advance), the Russians live in a political culture difficult for Americans to grasp.

This reading list, which focuses on the domestic aspects of the Soviet period, is necessarily limited. It starts with history—general accounts, studies of the bloody formative years and of the Stalin regime—and goes on to books about contemporary Soviet politics, the legal system, social structure, ideology, and science in Russia today.

The U.S.S.R. was born in revolution, and for a serious but eminently readable account of the Revolution's origin, the upheaval and civil war, and the careers of Lenin, Trotsky, and other founders of the system in the early years, **The Bolsheviks: The Intellectual and Political History of the Triumph of**

Communism in Russia by Adam B. Ulam (Macmillan, 1965) is a good place to start. The classic study by Barrington Moore, Jr., **Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power: The Role of Ideas in Social Change**, first published in 1950 and newly reprinted (White Plains: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1976), provides a political and social chronicle from the Revolution to the late 1940s.

Alec Nove's **An Economic History of the U.S.S.R.** (London: Allen Lane, 1969, cloth; Penguin, 1972, paper) presents in lay language an analysis of Soviet economic policies and practices from 1917 to the present, with emphasis on the forced collectivization of agriculture and the development of heavy industry under the first Five-Year Plan (1928–33).

For the years up to 1930 the encyclopedic **A History of Soviet Russia** by Edward Hallett Carr (London; Macmillan, 1950–71) serves as the basic reference. More manageable works that shed light on the central phenomenon of Stalin's rise to power in the late 1920s include: Moshe Lewin's **Lenin's Last Struggle** (Pantheon, 1968), which shows how the Revolution's unresolved problems, especially the latent opposition of the peasantry, plagued the Moscow leadership; Stephen F. Cohen's **Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888–1938** (Knopf, 1973), in which Cohen argues that the more moderate policies advocated by Nikolai Bukharin (who briefly emerged as an alternative to Stalin) were politically feasible and as logical an extension of Leninist thinking as Stalin's despotic policies; and Roger W. Pethyridge's **The Social Prelude to Stalinism** (St. Martin's, 1974), an analysis of the "social ingredients"

that, the author believes, contributed as strongly to Stalin's rise as did his vaunted mastery of political skills.

Despite Stalin's enormous impact on Soviet history, much about the man remains shrouded in mystery. A recent biography, **Stalin As Revolutionary, 1879-1929: A Study in History and Personality** by Robert C. Tucker (Norton, 1973), is the first of three projected volumes of psycho-history probing the relationship between Stalin's personality and his political behavior.

Less concerned with explaining Stalin than with understanding his role in history is Soviet dissident historian Roy Medvedev. In **Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism** (Vintage, 1973) Medvedev recounts, in detail that stuns the reader, the terror and purges of the 1930s. This and other accounts of the ferocities that marked the Stalin era—most notably, sections of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's chilling **The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956** (Harper & Row, 1974, cloth; 1975, paper)—suggest a leadership divorced from society. Yet interviews with persons displaced from the Soviet Union as a result of World War II revealed broad prewar support for the Stalin regime and approval of its policies, as Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer show in **The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society** (Harvard, 1959). And a just-published study by Vera S. Dunham, **In Stalin's Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction** (Cambridge, 1976), uses what the author calls "the perishable output of safe writers" of popular fiction to document what she terms the "Big Deal" between the managerial class and the regime.

The nearly 24 years since Stalin's death have brought significant changes in Soviet politics and society. The basic book on the practice of government in the Soviet Union remains the late Merle Fainsod's **How Russia Is Ruled** (Har-

vard, 1963, rev. ed.). Fainsod's description of the Communist Party organization and the management of the country's social and economic life is now being updated by Duke political scientist Jerry F. Hough for 1978 publication.

Meanwhile, readers interested in the pressures on policy-makers may turn to the somewhat specialized but highly readable **Interest Groups in Soviet Politics** edited by H. G. Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths (Princeton, 1971), in which the roles of such contending "establishment" groups as the military, economic managers, and jurists are thoroughly examined.

Other worthy books on recent Soviet politics include a collection of essays by Zbigniew Brzezinski, **Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics** (Columbia, 1969) and the two volumes of memoirs, **Khrushchev Remembers** (Little, Brown, 1970, cloth; Bantam, 1971, paper) and **Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament** (Little, Brown, 1974, cloth; Bantam, 1976, paper), dictated by one of Stalin's successors in the Kremlin, Nikita S. Khrushchev.

Of late there has been a trend in Western scholarship away from Kremlinology toward a sociological approach. No more sophisticated work for the general reader exists in this category than Wright Miller's deceptively simple **Russians as a People** (Dutton, 1961). An important new addition is **Class and Society in Soviet Russia** by Mervyn Matthews (Walker, 1973), in which official Soviet socio-economic and demographic data are used to describe the class structure (workers, peasants, intelligentsia) and such matters as migration to the cities from the backward countryside, self-perpetuation of the elite, competition for higher education, and the discrepancies between adolescent expectations and real job opportunities.

The survival of religious life and of "national" or ethnic aspirations are dis-

cussed in **Religion and Atheism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe** edited by Bohdan R. Bociurkiw and John Strong (Univ. of Toronto, 1975) and in **Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union** edited by Erich Goldhagen (Praeger, 1968)—notably in John Armstrong's long essay, "The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union: The View of the Dictatorship."

The activities of a variety of persons who stand outside the one-party political process in Russia are exhaustively covered in **Dissent in the U.S.S.R.: Politics, Ideology, and People** edited by Rudolf L. Tökés (Johns Hopkins, 1975).

Perhaps because the absence of legality was so pervasive under Stalin, the evolution of the Soviet legal system since his death holds special interest. In **Justice in the U.S.S.R.: An Interpretation of Soviet Law** (Harvard, 1963, rev. ed. cloth; 1974, paper) Harold Berman describes post-Stalin reforms and advances his own thesis about the "parental" or educative role of Soviet legal institutions. In a more popular vein, George Feifer's **Justice in Moscow** (London: Bodley Head, 1964) provides an eyewitness report of a series of Moscow criminal trials. On the strength of the trials he attended, Feifer concludes that, though rough and informal

by American standards, ordinary Soviet criminal justice is not unfair.

Crime persists in Russia as elsewhere. How Soviet experts explain this problem and what they are trying to do about it is the subject of Walter D. Connor's **Deviance in Soviet Society: Crime, Delinquency, and Alcoholism** (Columbia, 1972).

What of tomorrow? The future of Soviet society, many of its own spokesmen assert, will depend upon the achievements in one particular field—science. To many Westerners as well, the long-uneasy relationship between Soviet ideology and Soviet science appears crucial. Soviet gerontologist Zhores Medvedev (twin brother to historian Roy) tells us in **The Medvedev Papers** (London: Macmillan, 1971) about the frustrations resulting from bureaucratic interference. These and other tensions are explored by Loren Graham in **Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union** (Knopf, 1972). But Graham argues that despite exceptions (the Lysenko genetics controversy being the best-known in the West) the interaction between Marxist philosophy and scientific research has been creative and provides an increasingly sound take-off point for basic long-range scientific inquiry.

EDITOR'S NOTE. *Susan Gross Solomon and Peter H. Solomon, Jr., both Soviet studies specialists and associate professors in the Department of Political Economy at the University of Toronto, and S. Frederick Starr, executive secretary of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies at the Wilson Center, coöperated in the selection of the books above and provided comment on a number of the titles.*

CURRENT BOOKS

FELLOWS' CHOICE

THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM: Capitalistic Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century

By Immanuel Wallerstein
Academic Press, 1974, 410 pp.
\$16.50 cloth, \$4.95 paper
L of C 73-5318
ISBN 0-12-785920-9

An authority on contemporary Africa, sociologist Wallerstein turned to history to discover the broad characteristics of independent states and empires. One thing led to another. In this weighty, complex book he offers the first of a projected four volumes on the largest social system he could identify: the "world economy" that came into being between 1450 and 1640 and reached from Peru to the Danube. Its durability, Wallerstein argues, has been due to the multiplicity of strong, competing states within it, which prevented its transformation into a single empire. Why modern capitalism required this framework, how its geographical and social sectors related to one another, and how power shifted within the system are the main themes he pursues. Though heavily indebted to recent French, Italian, and English historiography, the book is a striking indication of the surprising vitality that neo-Marxist perspectives have begun to develop in American scholarship.

—John Higham

JAPAN FACES CHINA: Political and Economic Relations in the Postwar Era

By Chae-Jin Lee
Johns Hopkins, 1976
242 pp. \$12.50
L of C 75-40408
ISBN 0-8018-1738-2

Even before diplomatic relations between Japan and the People's Republic of China were established in 1972, the two nations had consolidated mutually satisfactory economic links, which, says the author, "had an unmistakable influence over the direction of political relations between their governments." Chae-Jin Lee's penetrating work complements Marius B. Jansen's standard history of Sino-Japanese relations from 1894 to 1972 (see *The Wilson Quarterly*, Autumn 1976, page 131) by developing in full, largely from Japanese sources, the story of rapprochement and cooperation from 1949 onwards.

—Joseph S. Sebes, S.J.

**POLITICAL ECONOMY
PAST AND PRESENT: A
Review of Leading Theories
of Economic Policy**

By Lord Robbins
Columbia, 1976
203 pp. \$12.50
L of C 76-7264
ISBN 0-231-04128-4

Lord Robbins, retired chairman of the *Financial Times*, long a professor at the London School of Economics, presents a concise overview of classical economic theories in the light of contemporary problems. He deals at length with Adam Smith, Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, and Hume; later theorists, including Keynes, get less attention. The treatment is thematic: What do these thinkers say about such basic matters as consumption, the organization of production, the stability of the economic system as a whole (tendency to glut? to inflation?), welfare and income distribution, international trade? Robbins is committed to the European liberal (free market) tradition, which he sees as having been in no way undermined by modern economic developments.

—Jon McLin

**THE PEASANTS OF
LANGUEDOC**

By Emmanuel Le Roy
Ladurie
Univ. of Ill., 1974
370 pp. \$16
L of C 74-4286
ISBN 0-252-00411-6

Twentieth-century studies of old French rural society have produced some of the finest historical reading available. Le Roy Ladurie's book first appeared in France in 1966 and justly acquired a reputation as a classic. The sharply abridged 1969 edition has since been translated into English. A "total history" of the Languedoc peasantry, it opens at the end of the 15th century and closes with the beginning of the 18th. The Languedoc story pits agricultural production, which remained mostly stagnant, against the demographic curve (the two blades of the Malthusian scissors). In the mediation between food and population, nature and culture were both so intractable that the chief mediator could only be death.

**PEASANTS INTO
FRENCHMEN: The Mod-
ernization of Rural France
1870-1914**

By Eugen Weber
Stanford, 1976, 615 pp. \$20
L of C 75-7486
ISBN 0-8047-0898-3

Weber's book covers all of rural France, from the birth of the Third Republic (1870) to the start of World War I. By the time it opens, the class that governed France had long since moved away from the policies and values of a traditional culture that Le Roy Ladurie describes as "destructive of its own economic foundations." Not so the peasants. Economic backwardness reinforced the chasm between "carnivorous" urban havens and the "herbivorous" rural territory, where,

in 1863, one-fifth of the people did not even speak French. With the ruthlessness of B-movie villains, though employing civilized weapons (schools, roads, savings banks), Republican governments moved to colonize the minds and life of a peasantry for which ancestral tradition soon ceased to be the only rational option.

It is a pity that neither of these fine books has adequate maps.

—Joaquín Romero-Maura

**THE FILE ON THE TSAR:
The Fate of the Romanovs
—Dramatic New Evidence**
By Anthony Summers and
Tom Mangold
Harper, 1976, 416 pp. \$12.50
L of C 75-25050
ISBN 0-06-012807-0

Two British journalists have unearthed evidence that only Nicholas II and his son Aleksei were shot in July 1918 by the Bolsheviks in Ekaterinburg: The Czarina, Alexandra, and her four daughters were seen as late as December in Perm, 200 miles away; George V and Lloyd George refused them asylum in England; pressure from Kaiser Wilhelm kept the women alive until after Germany's defeat; a German diplomat predicted that the Bolsheviks would fake a massacre; in 1919 White Russian investigators ignored pertinent testimony in order to create martyrs; today's forensic experts question evidence of a massacre. The author's credible spade-work and judicious conclusions make *File* a good read for historical detectives, amateur and professional.

—Robert C. Williams

PLAGUES AND PEOPLES
By William H. McNeill
Anchor Press/Doubleday,
1976
369 pp. \$10
L of C 76-2798
ISBN 0-385-11256-4

Historical writing usually assumes good public health, almost always mistakenly so. This work stands apart. Taking world history as his preserve, McNeill gives us a book that bristles with linkages between the devastations of plagues and the development of political and social elites; between disease and the decline of Rome, the structure of society in India, settlement patterns in China. World history is the story of communication, including the spreading of contagion among civilizations. Exchanges of microorganisms and parasites, McNeill shows, have gradually converted the isolated disease pools of antiquity into one interlocking world pattern.

—F. Gregory Campbell

NEW TITLES

*History***THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1750-1925**

By Herbert G. Gutman
 Pantheon, 1976, 664 pp. \$15.95
 L of C 76-7550
 ISBN 0-394-47116-4

PERSPECTIVES AND IRONY IN AMERICAN SLAVERY

Edited by Harry P. Owens
 Univ. Press of Miss., 1976
 188 pp. \$8.50 cloth,
 \$3.50 paper
 L of C 76-18283
 ISBN 0-87805-074-4
 ISBN 0-87805-025-6 pbk.

For decades, American historians put credence in Ulrich Bonnell Phillips's *American Negro Slavery*, an anatomy of the South's "peculiar institution" that appeared in 1918. Later researchers focused on slavery's variety or long-term impact on Afro-Americans. Only recently have young revisionists examined the life of the slaves themselves; Gutman's new book is an awkwardly constructed but important example of this approach. He depicts the ironically persistent cohesiveness of the black family in the face of the slave masters. Its eventual fragmentation, he contends, came with the Great Depression, much later than other historians have assumed.

For the general reader, the results of additional recent research appear in handy form in papers given at a University of Mississippi conference in 1975. The essays edited by Owens provide a sampling of new methodologies and points of view that preoccupy contemporary historians. They include Carl Degler's comparisons of slavery in the United States and Latin America, Eugene Genovese's Marxist analysis, David Brion Davis's discussion of slavery's impact on the "American mind," Stanley Engerman's "cliometrics," William K. Scarborough's unyielding faith in the "virtues" of the slave South, John Blassingame's view of the "slave community," and Kenneth Stampp's reminder that historians in this field must depend on "treacherous," elusive sources.

TOWARD A WARLESS WORLD: The Travail of the American Peace Movement, 1887-1914

By David S. Patterson
 Indiana, 1976, 339 pp. \$15
 L of C 75-28916
 ISBN 0-253-36019-6

In this balanced critique, Colgate historian David S. Patterson examines the American peace movement before World War I, a time of general tranquility and expanding interest in international affairs. Placing his subject in the broad context of the Progressive era, he shows that a general "shift in emphasis from

moral absolutes to specialized, utilitarian knowledge" paralleled the peace movement's change from simply opposing "imperialism" and "war" to advocating permanent international institutions such as a world court. Despite increasing membership and generous financial help from industrialists like Andrew Carnegie, however, the American peace movement failed to make a significant impact on Washington policy or even to develop a unified agenda for action. Why? In addition to external pressures, Patterson cites internal weaknesses: "ambiguous motives, divided loyalties, flawed perceptions, misguided tactics and strategy," and the upper-middle-class "elitism of peace advocates."

DIPLOMATS AND BUREAUCRATS: The First Institutional Responses to Twentieth-Century Diplomacy in France and Germany

By Paul Gordon Lauren
Hoover, 1976, 294 pp. \$11
L of C 75-29785
ISBN 0-8179-6531-9

Paul Lauren, a historian at the University of Montana, presents a compact account of the responses of the French and German Ministries of Foreign Affairs to the dramatic changes in European society brought about by World War I. Acceding to public demands for more open and accountable diplomacy, officials in Berlin and Paris transformed their simple, isolated ministries into complex, rational, and "politically active" bureaucracies. Although handicapped by insufficient analysis of his own rich data, Lauren is particularly interesting on innovations by both governments to promote overseas trade and to assume new responsibilities for internal, domestic propaganda.

GOYA and the Impossible Revolution

By Gwyn A. Williams
Pantheon, 1976, 194 pp. \$15
L of C 76-5945
ISBN 0-394-49304-4

Williams is a Welsh historian noted for his study of the French Revolution, *Artisans and Sans Culottes* (1968). He now makes a bold attempt at interpreting Goya's mind as a microcosm of the turbulence and contradictions of the Spain in which the artist lived until 1824, when he left France to paint and die in exile four years later. One virtue of Williams's book is that it provides a vivid, capsule account of Bourbon rule, Napoleon Bonaparte's installation of his brother Joseph as King of the Spaniards, the civil war of 1808-14, the famine of 1811-12, the Restoration of the

Bourbons, and the Revolution of 1820 as these events are viewed today by historians. Goya's Liberalism led him inexorably to the desperation (and mental breakdown) revealed in the "black paintings" and in later engravings and drawings. Not always totally convincing, Williams's dual portrait of the man and his time nevertheless deserves attention.

**THE MAN WHO LOST
CHINA: The First Full Bi-
ography of Chiang Kai-Shek**
By Brian Crozier
with Eric Chou
Scribner's, 1976, 430 pp.
\$12.95
L of C 76-10246
ISBN 0-684-14686-X

Crozier, for 10 years the *Economist's* specialist on Chinese and Far Eastern affairs, has produced the first full, "unauthorized," English-language biography of Chiang Kai-Shek. The Generalissimo died at 87 in 1975 on Taiwan. By then, he was head of a Republic of China that had been expelled from the United Nations, while the regime of his rival, Mao Tse-tung, on the mainland had been given U.N. membership. Chiang, a tragic figure because of his own inadequacies, gets sympathetic treatment from Crozier and Chou. They blame his ultimate failure to keep the mainland partly on the historical accident that "forced him to share the Chinese scene with a man still more exceptional than he," who "had the edge over him in ideology," and more importantly on the blunder of his initial policy of non-resistance to Japanese aggression in 1931. This decision made clear his order of military priorities: "bandits and other rebels first, foreign invaders second" and in the end "sealed his own fate."

Contemporary Affairs

**THE CONCEPT OF THE
POLITICAL**
By Carl Schmitt
Rutgers, 1976, 105 pp.
\$8 cloth, \$3.50 paper
L of C 76-10977
ISBN 0-8135-0821-5
ISBN 0-8135-0833-9 pbk.

Just as France's novelist Celine, though a Nazi collaborator, is now regarded by many as a pioneer of contemporary fiction, so the early work of Carl Schmitt, a key theoretician of the Total State, who joined the Nazi Party soon after it came to power, appears to be coming into vogue again in the field of political theory. Schmitt (born in 1888 and still living in West Germany) is so controversial that none of his work has until now been

available in English. His translator, George Schwab, in an introduction to this 1932 work, tries (in vain) to dispel its ideological taint. Schmitt's discussion of the "friend-or-foe" distinction in politics has little to offer us theoretically, but between the lines he does reveal the inner conflicts and sensibilities typical of those German conservatives who ended up on the Nazi side of the fence.

**PERCEPTION AND MIS-
PERCEPTION IN INTER-
NATIONAL POLITICS**

By Robert Jervis
Princeton, 1976, 445 pp.
\$22.50, cloth, \$11.50, paper
L of C 76-3259
ISBN 0-691-05656-0

Drawing examples from a wide range of historical literature, UCLA political scientist Robert Jervis analyzes how decision-makers in international affairs perceive new information, relate it to recent events and beliefs, and derive lessons from history. In applying social psychology to dozens of situations as diverse as the origins of World War I and the Gulf of Tonkin incident (1964), Jervis examines common misperceptions, e.g., exaggerating the unity and prescience of one's opponents and overestimating the importance of one's own nation as target or protagonist. Psychologists might ask for the use of more current research from their field of study; historians might prefer to see Jervis's psychological concepts applied in greater depth to fewer historical cases. But such flaws are minor in an innovative book.

**CHINA AS A MODEL OF
DEVELOPMENT**

By Al Imfeld
Orbis, 1976, 159 pp. \$5.95
L of C 76-4827
ISBN 0-88344-053-9

The People's Republic of China as "a model, a plan, a point of departure, not always a reality" is the subject of this lucid development study by a Swiss priest with degrees in theology, sociology, and journalism. For the rest of the world, he believes, the Chinese model should stimulate "an examination of conscience." Comparing China to India exaggerates the Chinese success; comparing it to Japan minimizes it. Comparisons among the three countries show that varying levels of ethnic uniformity, indigenous political continuity, and cohesive yet flexible ideologies have helped to place Japan first, China second, and India third in development in Asia since the late 1940s.

**THE CHANGING FACE
OF TIBET: The Impact of
Chinese Communist Ideology
on the Landscape**

By Pradyumna P. Karan
Univ. of Ky., 1976
114 pp. \$18.50
L of C 74-18935
ISBN 0-8131-1318-0

When the Dalai Lama fled Lhasa in 1959, he left behind a people who until the early '50s had not used the wheel. Tibet supported vast numbers of its Mahayana Buddhists as monks and nuns (760,000, or a fifth of its population, were in monasteries in 1885) in an economy based on subsistence agriculture and a lively trade in musk and yak tails (the latter used for ritual fans in Hindu India and Santa Claus beards in the West). After less than 20 years of Communist rule, Tibet is much changed, with a 9,000-mile network of high-altitude military roads, six jet airports, factories, communal farms, new suburbs with straight streets and piped water, and a capital that has expanded around the Dalai Lama's old Potola palace to include a 30,000-square-meter shopping area. Karan was the first civilian geographer named Surveyor General of India; he is now chairman of the Department of Geography at the University of Kentucky. In this book, illustrated with photographs and excellent maps, he marshalls new information from Tibetan refugees, official Chinese news releases, American and British monitors based in Hong Kong, and other sources. His conclusion: "So far" the People's Republic of China "has had limited success in remolding Tibetan minds, but striking success in remolding the face of Tibet.... The old Tibet that fascinated the world for centuries has ceased to exist."

**SETTING NATIONAL
PRIORITIES: The Next
Ten Years**

Edited by Henry Owen and
Charles L. Schultze
Brookings, 1976, 618 pp.
\$14.95 cloth, \$6.95 paper
L of C 76-27205
ISBN 0-8157-6764-1
ISBN 0-8157-6763-3 pbk.

Many advocates engaged in making a case for given policies fall into such traps as reliance on false analogy, the unwarranted projection into the future of existing data, and high-minded moralizing that ignores the full impact of their proposals. In this seventh annual Brookings "budget book," written from a moderate Democratic viewpoint, with the time horizon lengthened to 10 years, the authors outline what the U.S. government *must* do in terms of what it *can* do. The issues analyzed cover a broad spectrum—foreign, economic, and defense policies, safety regulations, income security. If, as Owen and

Schultze hope, the end of eight years of divided government will make public controversy about policy less simplistic, this compendium of modest, pragmatic proposals could be a citizen's mainstay.

THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION

By Michael N. Danielson
Columbia, 1976, 443 pp.
\$17.50 cloth, \$6.95 paper
L of C 76-7609
ISBN 0-231-03697-3
ISBN 0-231-08342-4 pbk.

In terms of housing for minorities and the poor, the United States is retreating from its commitment to an open society, says Princeton professor Danielson. Two primary factors contribute to the retreat: fragmentation of authority and responsibility among local governments in big urban areas hampers concerted action to equalize opportunities; and there is a weakening of commitment to open housing goals on the part of Washington. Danielson strongly favors moves to lower suburban barriers that affect low-income and minority families but is pessimistic that much can be done, given the limited impact of legal rulings in separated areas. In this cogent study, he uses the evidence for open housing selectively to support his own point of view, scorning different perspectives or alternative arrangements. But even those who disagree with him will find his book stimulating and provocative.

THE POLITICS OF ADOPTION

By Mary Kathleen Benet
Free Press, 1976
235 pp. \$8.95
L of C 76-14287
ISBN 0-02-902500-1

Ms. Benet traces the history of adoption of children as it has been practiced and regarded in Eastern and Western civilizations, relating past experience to present-day research, particularly in the United States. Practical, moral, psychological, highly political questions always crop up, reflecting larger issues of kinship, race, poverty, and nationalism. In a foreword, psychologist Robert Jay Lifton (whose wife was an adopted daughter) addresses himself to contemporary Americans, pleading that "we are surely capable of evolving a system of adoption which opens out toward truth." He recommends reconsideration of "the strange legal policy of the sealing of records" and the "equally strange role of adoption agencies in perpetuating the whole constellation of de-

ception and illusion" that surrounds adopted children. Useful background information, soberly written, but short on statistics that might have provided a clearer picture of adoption today.

Arts & Letters

AMERICA AS ART

By Joshua C. Taylor
Smithsonian, 1976, 320 pp.
\$25 cloth, \$9.60 paper
L of C 76-4482
ISBN 0-87474-900-X

No Copley? Homer? Eakins? No Sargent? This catalog, writes Taylor, director of the National Collection of Fine Arts, is not simply a survey of highlights of American art. Instead, it shows many robust, lesser-known works selected to support the thesis that certain "attitudes about America" became inseparable from its art, and some art "became an identifying mark of America." Eight studies or "moments" when art and the identity of America came close together—from the 17th-century Indian maiden transformed into the goddess "America" to contemporary artists' responses to uniformity and isolation—are featured among 336 black-and-white and 10 color illustrations. The combination of John G. Cawelti's text and a stunning series of George Catlin's Indian paintings makes the chapter on "The Frontier and the Native American" particularly effective.

MYTHS

By Alexander Eliot, et al.
McGraw Hill, 1976, 320 pp.
\$34.95 to May 31, 1977
\$39.95 thereafter
L of C 76-20186
ISBN 0-07-019193-X

Visually and intellectually, this is a cosmic coffee-table book. In it, Eliot retells many of the world's major myths, from American Indian creation stories to the Tower of Babel legend in many cultures, without scanting detail. Authoritative contributors back him up: Mircea Eliade analyzes the historical development of myth interpretation; Joseph Campbell outlines the emergence of myths in different parts of the world, tying them to 16 pages of good maps; and Detlef-I. Lauf provides informative captions and ingenious graphics to accompany the more than 1,300 well-chosen illustrations (many in full color) of mythological motifs in art from the world's ancient and modern civilizations.

**A HISTORY OF MODERN
POETRY: From the 1890s to
the High Modernist Mode**

By David Perkins
Harvard, 1976, 623 pp. \$17.50
L of C 76-6874
ISBN 0-674-39941-2

First of two volumes, this history of modern British and American poetry examines the period beginning at the turn of the century, when poets moved away from the Romantic legacy through political utterance to diffuse expressions of individual consciousness. Perkins, professor of English at Harvard, provides a broad overview of critical trends and major aesthetic approaches. His treatment of most individual careers is brief, but he gives more space to Ezra Pound and T. S. Eliot, two of the three giants whom he considers to have been the shapers of modern poetry. This volume breaks off with their early work, however. Only the output of W. B. Yeats, the third of his giants, is analyzed *in toto*, to his death in 1939. Yeats's life work, in the author's view, reflects the whole period, culminating in (Perkins-defined) "modernism." A nourishing, readable reference work.

TALES OF POTOSI

By Bartolomé Arzáns de
Orsúa y Vela. Edited by
R. C. Padden
Brown Univ., 1975, 209 pp.
\$12.50
L of C 74-6574
ISBN 0-87057-144-3

Arzáns (1676-1736), a chronicler of Old Peru, wrote the three-volume *Historia de la Villa Imperial de Potosí*, a year-by-year account of his Andean hometown from its beginning with the discovery of silver in 1545 through its prime as the New World's largest city to its decline in the late 17th and 18th centuries. He enlivened the narrative with brief tales of the city's lusty inhabitants. These stories, translated by Frances López-Morillas and excerpted by Padden, a professor at Brown, center on Potosí's miracles, scandals, and ethnic strife (transplanted Basques against transplanted Castilians, Estremadurans, Andalusians, Creoles). The sporting priest who wore gold undergarments and robes of pearls and perfumed velvet ("he was all one great scent, so that folk knew from some distance away that Don Francisco Aguirre was approaching") is but one of the notables whose eccentricities are recorded, along with heroic kindnesses and dramatic conversions, violent crimes, the "unchastity of high-born women." Often moralistic, in the accepted literary fashion of his time, Arzáns' *Tales* bring to life a vanished, baroque Spanish America.

**THE SEXUAL LABY-
RINTH OF NIKOLAI
GOGOL**

By Simon Karlinsky
Harvard, 1976, 333 pp. \$14
L of C 76-16486
ISBN 0-674-80281-0

The 19th-century Russian writer Nikolai Gogol (*Dead Souls, The Inspector General*) was a veritable cornucopia of psychological and sexual obsessions. Once the Victorian tendency to see him as an earnest realist and social critic began to wane after 1900, the Freudians went to work on him. They brought to light his flight from women and his self-described "inner filth" of homosexuality. One might think that there wasn't any need for a book on his "sexual labyrinth." Simon Karlinsky believed there was—and proves himself correct. Without regard for the conventions that stifled much earlier scholarship, he scrutinizes the tortured world of Gogol's mind and demonstrates the relevance of his personal Minotaur to his literary masterpieces. The resulting book is clear enough for the layman, erudite enough for the expert.

Science & Technology**A SCIENTIST AT THE
WHITE HOUSE: The Pri-
vate Diary of President
Eisenhower's Special As-
sistant for Science and
Technology**

By George B. Kistiakowsky
Harvard, 1976, 448 pp. \$15
L of C 76-19013
ISBN 0-674-79496-6

Duke University historian Charles S. Maier in his introduction calls this diary "a documentary contribution of the first rank." Ukrainian-born chemist Kistiakowsky served in the White House from July 1959 until Kennedy's inauguration—through nuclear-test-ban problems, Khrushchev's visit, the U-2 "incident," and other crises that kept him close to international politics. Charged, in effect, with helping Ike make policy for science and make science serve policy, Kistiakowsky faithfully recorded meetings, conversations, and maneuvers (his own and others). His acerbic, disarmingly egotistical journal entries make entertaining reading. For example: "Attended a luncheon at the Atoms for Peace Awards affair at the Academy and sat in exceedingly boring company. Had the mild satisfaction of embarrassing Bob Wilson, the new AEC commissioner, for whom I have no special love because of his views on science, nuclear test ban, etc. . . . he . . . asked if I had been in any way involved in the development of the implosion atom bomb during the war, so I

announced that yes, I was in charge of it, which so confused Mr. Wilson we had very little to say to each other during the rest of the lunch."

**ENERGY AND CONFLICT:
The Life and Times of
Edward Teller**
By Stanley A. Blumberg
and Gwinn Owens
Putnam, 1976, 492 pp. \$12.95
L of C 75-43812
ISBN 0-399-11551-X

Blumberg and Owens, two Baltimore journalists, base this first full account of the life of "the father of the H-bomb" on Edward Teller's unclassified papers and on lengthy interviews with their controversial subject, his scientific colleagues, and his friends. They provide fresh and interesting material on Teller's youth and education in Europe. Their main concern, however, is Teller's major role in America's race with the Soviet Union in the late '40s and early '50s to develop advanced nuclear weapons; and their most significant argument is that "the Russians achieved not only the first experimental nuclear fusion on earth, but also produced [in 1953] the first deliverable hydrogen bomb." Unfortunately, this claim is based on the misreading of incomplete evidence. It flaws an otherwise good popular biography, which more thorough research outside Teller's circle could have made a better book.

**PENGUINS: Past and Present,
Here and There**
By George Gaylord Simpson
Yale, 1976, 150 pp. \$10
L of C 75-27211
ISBN 0-300-01969-6

The first European discoverers of penguins thought they were geese. Simpson, a well-known biologist, writes—for "adults who do not necessarily know much about penguins but for whom there is nothing that they do not really want to know"—a history of man's association with these beguiling birds that is also a witty treatise on their biological uniqueness. His chapter on "the basic penguin" answers many questions about their unbirdlike attributes, such as why they can't fly and why they stand up in such a formal, funny way. Other chapters cover the ecology and behavior of the 18 species—and their surprisingly wide distribution, from Antarctica to New Zealand, to Peru, to the Galápagos and the Falkland Islands, where, until recently, November 9 was a school holiday traditionally devoted to penguin-egg hunting.

**THE SPACEFLIGHT
REVOLUTION: A Socio-
logical Study**

By William Sims Bainbridge
Wiley, 1976, 294 pp. \$16.95
L of C 76-21349
ISBN 0-471-04306-0

This sociological study of the development of space flight doubles as lively and plausible revisionist history. Bainbridge, a Harvard Ph.D. in sociology with an undergraduate degree in physics from Yale, now teaches at the University of Washington. He sees an underground conspiracy (conscious and unconscious), fostered by rocketry experts and their friends in the science-fiction fraternity, to influence governments and industries in various countries throughout the 20th century. Their goal: the exploration of space. Their political means: the (often) amoral exploitation of nationalism and conflict.

New Books by Fellows and Former Fellows

- COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM: The Soviet, Chinese, and Yugoslav Models.** By Gary K. Bertsch. Freeman, 1976.
- VALUES AND COMMUNITY IN MULTI-NATIONAL YUGOSLAVIA.** By Gary K. Bertsch. Columbia, 1976.
- ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JACOB KLEIN.** Edited by Samuel Kutler, Eva Brann, et al. St. John's College Press, 1976.
- AMERICA IN OUR TIME.** By Godfrey Hodgson. Doubleday, 1976.
- STATE AID TO PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION.** By A. E. Dick Howard. Charlottesville, Va.: The Michie Co., 1976.
- NATIONALITY AND POPULATION CHANGE IN RUSSIA AND THE U.S.S.R.: An Evaluation of Census Data, 1897-1970.** By Robert A. Lewis, Richard H. Rowland, Ralph S. Clem. Praeger, 1976.
- ENERGY POLICIES OF THE WORLD: Canada, China, Arab States of the Persian Gulf, Venezuela, Iran.** Vol. 1. Edited by Gerald J. Mangone. Elsevier, 1976.
- MONETARISM.** By Chiaki Nishiyama. Tokyo: The Oriental Economist Co., 1976.
- WHAT IS NEW LIBERALISM?** By Chiaki Nishiyama and F. A. Hayek. Tokyo: Tokyo Newspaper Co., 1976.
- COMRADE KIRILLOV (a novel).** By Raja Rao. New Delhi: Orient Paperbacks, 1976.
- INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN THE WESTERN WORLD 1959-1971.** 2 vols. Edited by Andrew Shonfield. London: Oxford, 1976.
- THE AMERICAN POLICE STATE: The Government Against the People.** By David Wise. Random House, 1976.

PAPERBOUNDS

THE LIFE OF RICHARD WAGNER.

By Ernest Newman. Cambridge, 1976. 4 vols. 2,573 pp. total. \$8.95 each, \$29.95 set

The Bayreuth centennial has prompted a surge of Wagneriana. Among new books and reissues is this first paperback printing of Newman's massive work, which is avuncular and quarrelsome (he rebuts other biographers, Wagner's critics, and critics of his own earlier editions of the *Life*). Newman forgives the unpleasant genius who composed *Tristan and Isolde* for his anti-Semitism, his constant begging for money he never intended to repay, everything, but scolds Wagner while describing all in minute detail: Vol. 1, birth to 1848; Vol. 2, 1848-60, banishment from Germany, marriage to Minna; Vol. 3, 1859 (sic)-1866, spectacular failure of *Tannhäuser* in Paris, meeting with his patron, the "mad" King Ludwig II of Bavaria; Vol. 4, 1866-83, marriage to Cosima Liszt, the *Ring*, the building of Bayreuth, Wagner's relationship with Nietzsche, death.

THE COLLECTED POEMS OF GEORGE OPPEN. New Directions reprint, 1976. 256 pp. \$3.75

Though not nearly as well known as his fellow Objectivist, William Carlos Williams, George Oppen has been published regularly since 1932 (six books), won the Pulitzer Prize for poetry in 1969, and was nominated last year for the National Book Award. Strong, taut, direct, and loving (of daughter, of wife, of streets, houses, of Daedalus as remembered by that "old potterer" his father), Oppen almost always succeeds in doing what he says a poet must do:

"not come to feel that he has a thousand threads in his hands," [but] "somehow see the one thing; / This is the level of art / There are other levels / But there is no other level of art."

AUTO WORK AND ITS DISCONTENTS. Edited by B. J. Widick. Johns Hopkins, 1976. 112 pp. \$2.95 (cloth, \$8)

This collection of essays by scholars possessing years of experience in auto plants and union bargaining blows sky-high a number of deeply entrenched journalistic and academic beliefs about the attitudes of industrial workers toward their jobs. "Alienation" as a personality characteristic, the researchers find, is no greater among production workers—whether or not on the assembly line—than among plant managers or the owners of the means of production.

KATHE KOLLWITZ: WOMAN AND ARTIST. By Martha Kearns. Feminist Press, 1976. 237 pp. \$5.50

This biography of German graphics artist and sculptress Käthe Kollwitz (1867-1945) is written from what artist Kearns calls a "contemporary female perspective." A major theme is the importance of women as inspiration in Kollwitz's life and dominant subjects in her work. Thirty-three illustrative black-and-white plates show her lifelong identification with the German working class, whose women, says Kearns, are "heroic in the epic of everyday." The author also chronicles the evolution of Kollwitz's political thinking and its influence on her work, much of which was destroyed by the Nazis.

THE PARADE'S GONE BY. By Kevin Brownlow. Univ. of Calif., 1976. 593 pp. \$9.95

The author's interviews with 1920s film stars, directors, producers, and others bring back the movies' Silent Era through oral history intelligently recorded in the 1960s. Brownlow is an English film-maker born in 1938 who began collecting silent films at the age of 11. He supplements his own work with reportage from early issues of *Photoplay*, a movie magazine he credits with being as tough-minded about Hollywood as *Variety* is about the entertainment industry in general. His argument is that silent feature films showed greater artistic development, particularly in lighting, staging, and direction, than did subsequent sound films.

RUSSIAN FAIRY TALES. Collected by Aleksandr Afanas'ev. Pantheon, 1976. 663 pp. \$5.95

The tales in this collection began to appear in 1866 and were soon staples of the Russian child's bookshelf. They also became a monument of 19th-century ethnography and provided the occasion for Vladimir Propp's milestone linguistics studies (1928). These stories (of the ambitious mayoress, the "snotty" goat who turned into a handsome youth and married the girl, princes and peasants and crystal mountains) were first published here in 1945 and are now available in a reprint of the 1975 hardcover edition. They are doubly welcome: because of what they say about Russian popular culture and because their magic, violence, and action make them as exciting to modern children as anything on TV.

THE LIFE AND DESTINY OF ISAK DINESEN. [Photographs] collected and edited by Frans Lasson. Text by Clara Svendsen. Univ. of Chicago, 1976. 227 pp. \$8.95

Not the average family's photograph album, this annotated collection, published in cloth in 1970, traces the odyssey of Baroness Karen Blixen (1885-1962), the Danish novelist and humanitarian known as Isak Dinesen. Blixen's constrained girlhood, disastrous marriage, recurring illnesses, 17 exhausting and exhilarating years in Kenya, and struggle to become a successful writer are described in vignettes accompanying over 200 pictures. Despite her experience of life as painful and tragic, Blixen never bowed to her family's counsel, "One must resign oneself to the inevitable," nor to Denmark's apathy toward her work. She persevered to produce *Seven Gothic Tales*, *Out of Africa*, *Winter's Tales*, *Shadows on the Grass*, and other stories, many of them published first in English.

DOCUMENTARY EXPRESSION AND THIRTIES AMERICA. By William Stott. Oxford reprint, 1976. 361 pp. \$4.50

Not since Alfred Kazin's *On Native Grounds* (1942) has the American cultural and literary scene been so successfully synthesized as in this guide to the art, writing, films, photographs, and broadcasts of the 1930s. Stott's thesis is that all of these forms of expression are essentially "documentary" because "each is, or is assumed to be, actually true." He awards highest honors to James Agee and Walker Evans for *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men*.

Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat

by George F. Kennan

"I have always been regarded by the United States establishment as an oddball, and I *am* a strange mixture of a reactionary and a liberal," George Kennan said in a lengthy *Encounter* interview last September. "It is perfectly true that in my attitude toward what is going on in the United States and Western civilization . . . I am worried and profoundly pessimistic."

Long a student of Russia, Mr. Kennan was U.S. Ambassador in Moscow during the Stalin era, and a career diplomat already known inside the State Department for his lucid dispatches to Washington. He became known to the American public through his much-cited, often-misunderstood 1947 article in *Foreign Affairs* advocating "containment" of Soviet expansionism. In recent years, he has, on occasion, outraged both liberals (with his critiques of egalitarian "mediocrity") and conservatives (by his antipathy to nuclear weaponry). In this essay, Mr. Kennan views the special burdens borne by American career diplomats, ranging from the "domestic-political distractions of their official masters," to popular distrust of their profession as "elitist," to the growing role of non-diplomats in foreign policy. He suggests, in effect, a fresh look.

Many of the forms of discomfiture experienced in the American effort to reconcile professional diplomacy with democracy are ones felt to some extent in every country where government is to a significant degree responsive to the popular will.

In the service of any such country there are times, I am sure, when the diplomatic professional finds himself

resenting the intrusion of domestic-political considerations into what he thinks should be the pure and rarified air of enlightened national interest, times when he longs for more concise, consistent, and sensible instructions from his own Foreign Office, times when he regrets his great distance, geographic and even intellectual, from those charged with the

making of policy. The American diplomat senses a certain community of experience with all these foreign colleagues—a certain comradeship in adversity—knowing that at least a part of his experience is theirs as well.

Nor is this sense of comradeship restricted entirely to diplomats who represent regimes we are accustomed to call "democratic." The distinctions between such regimes and ones of another character are not sharp enough to permit of any such clean distinction. Even the most tyrannical dictator has to give heed at times to domestic-political restraints of one sort or another on the plenitude of his power. He, too, is always to some extent in a competitive position, domestically.

Thus every foreign policy is to some extent a mixture of foreign-political motives and impulses with domestic-political ones; and every governmental leader, as he formulates and articulates foreign policy, appears partly as the protagonist of the general interests of his entire nation but partly also as a competitor in the struggle for domestic power, representing the interests of one particular faction against its domestic-political rivals, actual or potential.

Diplomats and Conservatism

This being so, all diplomats suffer to some extent from what we might call the domestic-political distractions of their official masters. Those who serve authoritarian regimes probably suffer the least, because here the intrusion of domestic-political considerations is usually at a minimum. But all suffer to some extent. And this, incidentally, is why the diplomat tends to be a conserva-

tive: he longs instinctively for a high concentration of authority behind him—for a government which knows what it is doing, which remains in office long enough to gain the confidence of other governments, which devises wise, far-seeing policies and sticks to them.

In all of this, the American diplomat is no exception. But he does suffer from some burdens that are unique in intensity if not in nature; and I think we should note what some of these are.

The peculiar impediments that rest upon the United States government in the conduct of foreign policy are ones that flow partly from institutions, imbedded as these are in the revered and almost ancient Constitution, but partly also from deeply ingrained traditions, customs, and habits of thought—all those things that Tocqueville referred to as *les manières* and to which, incidentally, he attributed greater importance, as determinants of national behavior, than to institutions.

The American federal government has, except in the field of taxation, relatively few powers or responsibilities of interior administration. Much of what in Europe would be called interior administration is left to the individual states; but insofar as such powers devolve upon the central government, they are largely left to the law-making powers of the Congress and thereafter to the haphazard and wholly unstructured judgments of the courts of law. The executive branch of the government hardly enters into the process of administration as an executive agent. The courts are required to decide literally hundreds of questions which in any European democracy would be decided by the internal admin-

istrative apparatus on the basis of the policies of the government then in power. But the courts decide questions, of course, on the basis of law, not of policy; and the executive branch of the government has as little influence over the decisions of the courts as it has over the Congress that passes the laws in the first place.

Domestic Limitations

This has important implications from the standpoint of foreign policy. I have often had occasion to point out that to conduct the foreign policy of a nation means to shape the behavior of that nation in all those aspects of its behavior which have a significant impact on the lives and interests of other peoples—even those aspects which are not customarily thought of as matters of foreign affairs. But this, precisely, is what the executive branch of the United States government, controlling neither Congress nor the courts, is in a very poor position to do. The President and the Secretary of State are expected to communicate with other governments concerning those as-

pects of American behavior which affect them; but it is a behavior they do not, and in many instances cannot, control. Thus they find themselves forced, in many instances, into the position of helpless intermediaries between internal and external forces both of which lie beyond their effective power of influence.

One might suppose that this deficiency would be at least in some degree remedied by the influence of the two major political parties which, after all, supply the senior personnel for both the executive and legislative branches of the government. But these, in contrast to their European equivalents, are not ideological parties. They are competing instrumentalities for the arrangement of consensus among a large number of vocal and powerful interest groups within the body of the citizenry; and their concept of their function is purely pragmatic. They have no strongly held ideas of their own, particularly not any of a theoretical or philosophical nature; and they experience no shame over the lack of them. If there are occasionally important issues on which the parties

*George Frost Kennan, 72, is professor emeritus of historical studies at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J. A native of Milwaukee, he was graduated from Princeton in 1925 and then began what was to become a distinguished career as a Foreign Service Officer (his first post: vice consul in Hamburg). Because of his diplomatic experience and command of the Russian language, Mr. Kennan accompanied Ambassador William C. Bullitt to Moscow to reopen the American Embassy in 1933. He served there as Second Secretary until 1937; as Minister-Counselor, 1944-46; and as Ambassador, 1952-53. After 25 years in the State Department, he turned to the writing of diplomatic history, then served as Ambassador to Yugoslavia (1961-63) before resuming his alternate career as a writer and educator. Among his books are two that won the Pulitzer Prize: *Russia Leaves the War* (1956) and *Memoirs 1925-1950* (1967). He was a Wilson Center Fellow in 1974-75. His article here is an adaptation of a lecture he gave recently at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva.*

differ, these are more apt to reflect the geographic or professional interests of the elements to which they look for electoral support—not ideological considerations. Their task, as they conceive it, is to seek votes, not to shape opinion. Their counsels are the last place where anyone would look for the evolution of long-term, consistent policies.

It is, incidentally, with regard to the nature of the pressures that determine the conduct of these political parties that my view would diverge somewhat from that of my esteemed friend and colleague, Louis Halle. He sees the deficiency of American diplomacy primarily, as I understand it, in its helplessness before the tyranny of mass opinion. I see it rather in its helplessness before the pressures of various highly organized lobbies and interest groups, which intimidate the legislators and cause American foreign policy to be conducted in the interests of minorities rather than of the population at large. And it is with the resulting deficiency—the lack of rational, informed, and consistent policy, founded on the interests of the nation as a whole and the needs of world peace and stability—that the American diplomat has, in the first instance, to contend.

The Anomalous Diplomat

Secondly, this diplomat has to recognize that he is himself something of an anomaly within the traditional structure of American government—something for which there is not, and could not be, any fully natural and accepted place. He is not politically appointed—a circumstance which is sometimes a source of irritation, one suspects, for politicians, who see him as preëempting positions

and salaries that might otherwise be used to reward political supporters. But he is also not, or at least should not be, a member of that great body of lower-level servicing personnel known as the civil service, which constitutes the overwhelming majority of those, other than the political appointees, who serve the government. But between these two categories of people who work for the government—the political appointees and the domestic civil servants—there is no third category, familiar to American politicians and to public opinion generally, to which the Foreign Service could be assigned.

With minor exceptions the United States has no tradition at all of a self-administered career service within the *civilian* (as distinct from the military) sector of government. To the extent, therefore, that the American Foreign Service remains a career service, immune to political appointment and resistant to control by the domestic civil service, it tends to become an object of bewilderment and suspicion in the eyes of Congress, of the political parties, and of much of the press. And yet the legislators and the party politicians, in particular, are precisely the people on whom the Foreign Service is of course dependent for its appropriations, its salaries, and the physical premises and facilities with which it has to work.

Underlying this organizational isolation, and in part explaining and reinforcing it, is an even more widespread and serious Foreign Service burden—namely, a deeply ingrained prejudice against people who give their lives professionally to diplomatic work. This prejudice operates within the political establishment in the first instance but also with much

of the press and portions of the public.

Meritocracy in a Democracy

The late French ambassador, Jules Cambon, in the celebrated series of lectures he once delivered before the French *Académie* (published in 1926 under the title of *Le Diplomate*), observed that "democracies will always have ambassadors and ministers; it remains to be seen whether they will have diplomats. . . . [Diplomacy] is a profession that requires of those who practice it some cultivation and a certain *habitude du monde* [roughly: sophisticated view of the world]." But, he went on, to find people with these qualities, and to bring them together in a professional service, requires a certain process of selection; and this, he thought, would always be disagreeable to democratic tastes because "democracies have a difficult time tolerating anything that resembles selection."

However true these words might be with respect to other countries, they could not be more true of the United States, particularly at this time. We live, as we all know, in an age when egalitarianism is the prevailing passion, at least in many intellectual and political circles. We seem to stand in the face of a widespread belief that there is no function of public life that could not best be performed by a random assemblage of gray mediocrity. For people who see things this way, the idea of selecting people for any governmental function on the basis of their natural suitability for that sort of work must be rejected; because to admit that some people might be more suitable than others would be an elitist thought—hence inadmissible.

And not only is selection *per se* distasteful to many Americans, but the particular qualities that would have to underlie any proper selection for professional diplomacy are especially odious. The very idea of this *habitude du monde* of which Cambon spoke is repugnant to many because the experience essential to its acquisition is one that cannot be obtained within our society; it can be obtained only by residence and work outside it.

To many people in journalistic and political life this *habitude du monde* is particularly disturbing, because it seems to imply on the part of the professional diplomat a certain deliberate self-distancing from those great currents of mass reaction and emotion to which American society is uniquely vulnerable and by which journalists and politicians, above all others, are carried, of which they are the spokesmen, and in the reflection of which they find their inner security. To them, the outlook of the diplomatic professional is a challenge—all the more provoking because it is one they cannot meet on its own ground. And the result of this is that the diplomat comes only too easily to be viewed as a species of snobish and conceited elitist, *dépaysé*, estranged from his own country and countrymen, giving himself airs, looking down upon his fellow citizens, fancying himself superior to them by virtue of his claim to an esoteric knowledge and expertise in which they cannot share and which by the very fact of its foreign origin challenges the soundness and adequacy of their world of thought.

And in this way there emerges, and finds partial acceptance, the familiar stereotype of the American diplomat as a somewhat effeminate, rather Anglicized figure (the British are

usually made the victims of our inferiority complexes), as a person addicted to the false attractions of an elegant European social life, usually to be found at parties, attired in striped pants, balancing a teacup, and nursing feelings of superiority towards his own country as he attempts to ingratiate himself with the hostesses and the officials of another one. The fact that there is no substance for this stereotype—the fact that what little substance it might once have had passed out of our lives decades ago, the fact that this particular professional dedication involves today a great deal of hard work, much discomfort, much loneliness, a dedication to the service of the nation far beyond what most people at home are ever asked to manifest, and, last but not least, in many instances no small amount of danger—all this is of no avail. The stereotype exists. It persists. It is gratifying to many egos. It will not soon be eradicated.

A Service without Defenders

The multiplicity of critics and detractors of the American Foreign Service would not be so serious, perhaps, if it were balanced by any considerable body of defenders; but this, unhappily, is not the case. The Department of State, which theoretically controls the Service and ought properly to defend it, has neither the ability nor the will to act very effectively in this direction. The ability is lacking because, of all the departments and agencies of the United States government, the Department of State is perhaps the only one that has no domestic constituency—no sizeable body of the citizenry, that is, which understands its function and is concerned for it, no special

interest groups who stand to profit by its activity and are ready to bring pressure to bear on Congress on its behalf. Lacking these things, it has little domestic influence. And the State Department's own will to defend the Service is also often lacking, because the Department is normally headed and administered by people without foreign-service experience—sometimes even by people who share the very prejudices and failures of understanding just referred to.

A diplomatic service, to be what it should be, would have to be self-administered. Only people who have some personal knowledge and experience of the substance of its work could fully understand its needs. But the Service has for decades been administered, as a rule, by people of whom this could not be said. With the exception of the brief incumbency of Christian A. Herter (1959–1961), it is hard to think of the name of any Secretary of State over the last half-century who was seriously interested in the Service as an organization, who had understanding for it, and was concerned to improve it. For most of these men, so far at least as I personally could see, the Foreign Service was a strange duck, not fully comprehensible and of uncertain value, for the further fate of which it was best to avoid responsibility.

Our Crowded Outposts

The helplessness of the American Foreign Service makes itself felt particularly in its relations with the other departments and agencies of the United States government. These latter tend to see, one suspects, in the American diplomatic and consular missions abroad pleasant and convenient places for the stationing of personnel. They sometimes view

with envy and disapproval the exclusive preëmption of such stations by the Department of State. They have long insisted, and with much success, on the right to supply those stations with abundant personnel of their own. The worst offenders are the military and the intelligence and security services; but there are many others as well. The result is that today the American official establishments in other countries are said to contain more people sent out by other departments and agencies of the government than by the Department of State; and they are, for this reason, only partially under the State Department's control.

Generalist vs. Specialist

This phenomenon of the preëmption of a large part of the staffing of the American missions abroad by agencies of the government other than the Department of State is, of course, closely connected with a theoretical problem which has long bedeviled the discussion of the problems of professional diplomacy. This is the perennial question of "generalists vs. specialists"—more specifically, the question of the relative value, in diplomacy today, of the generally trained diplomatist as compared with that of the functional specialist: the economist, the scientist, the public expert, the sociologist, the anthropologist, etc. It is often argued that in the face of the growing complexity of international life, together with the fact that many questions are now treated in highly specialized multinational forums, the role of the generally trained diplomatist, schooled in the handling of political relations with other governments at the bilateral political level, is fading; and that the diplomacy of

the future is unavoidably going to be conducted, increasingly, by large bodies of specialists schooled in the intricacies of one or another of the technical and functional aspects of modern life. This is a view, incidentally, which naturally finds support among those who consider it unnecessary and undesirable that diplomacy should flow exclusively from a single disciplined coördinating center and who think that it would be more "democratic" if there were a greater involvement of the common citizenry and if the impulses and initiatives sprang from a multitude of private or semi-private sources.

The thesis of the greater and growing usefulness of the technical and scientific expert is of course agreeable to agencies of the government other than the State Department because most of the people they would like to station abroad belong to this category. But it is also congenial to the outlooks of many people outside the governmental establishment. Americans have a general inclination to place confidence in the expert. He is reassuringly free, as a rule, from anything resembling Cambon's *habitude du monde*. His American integrity is not suspected of having been contaminated by long residence abroad or familiarity with foreign tongues. He does not deal with the political aspects of foreign relations. He is thus seen as a relatively safe and dependable sort of person—honest, sensible, and down-to-earth—in contrast to the professional diplomat who gets involved with foreign societies and makes himself, as one suspects, the spokesman for foreign values.

Although I could discuss this problem at length, let me say only that no one questions the need for expert

assistance in the conduct of foreign relations in this age. Many of the problems that arise have highly complex technical or scientific implications of which the policy-maker needs unquestionably to be informed. But the generalist—the person of wide cultural horizons and knowledge of the world at large and experience with its bitter political problems—is needed, too. And of the two, the generalist occupies the more central and essential position; for without his guidance and coordination of their efforts the experts, however admirable, would produce only chaos.

Faced with the obstacles I have just described, the American Foreign Service has had a troubled and discouraging history. Established in 1924, and initially administered by people who had some personal experience or familiarity with diplomatic work, it functioned for a few years more or less as it had been intended to function. Admission was only at the bottom, by competitive examination. The examinations were well-designed, severe, and impartially administered. The persons admitted were few and, for the most part, well selected. The results, as it seems to me, were relatively good.

But with the onset of the economic crisis, at the beginning of the 1930s, the lack of understanding for the Service in wider circles of the political establishment began to make itself felt. Congress, during certain of the years of the economic crisis, neglected to appropriate money for further recruitment into the Service, thus starving it of personnel and seriously disrupting its age structure. Then, during World War II, it was decided that diplomatic work represented in wartime an inferior form of service as compared with military

service; and recruitment was again suspended for a time, on the theory that the Service should not compete with military conscription.

The Era of Lateral Entry

It was unavoidable, in these circumstances, that when the war came to an end, the Service was far too small, numerically, for the expanded postwar functions it was now being called upon to perform; and this then became the excuse for transferring into the Service large bodies of surplus personnel from the bloated and now redundant special wartime agencies. This was not always unfortunate. Among these, there were always some competent and even talented people. But the original standards of selection had of course been violated.

By the early 1950s a situation had been created in which only a minority of those who went by the name of Foreign Service Officer had entered at the lowest rank and in the normal manner; the others had simply been grafted onto the Service, mostly at intermediate levels, without competitive examination. This situation has, I understand, been somewhat improved in recent years, but by no means entirely corrected.

It should also be mentioned that in the years after World War II the positions of senior administrative authority came to be staffed, both at home and abroad, by a new race of professional administrators usually chosen from outside the Service itself. Their selection and appointment reflected, one must assume, a view on the part of higher circles in Washington that there was such a thing as a pure administrative science, divorced from deep acquaintance with the substantive aspects of an

organization's work.

I would not like to oversimplify this question. There are indeed certain abstract administrative principles that are applicable to any large organization, and certain useful forms of administrative experience that can be acquired in fields of work other than the one in which one ultimately serves. Not only that, but many of these administrative experts proved to be useful and dedicated people who soon developed, as they served abroad, a fifth sense for what diplomatic work was all about. But the addition of this component to the Foreign Service added importantly both to its numbers and to the bureaucratic cumbersomeness of the organization.

The Mockery of a Dream

It is not surprising, in these circumstances, that the American Foreign Service we know today bears only a limited resemblance to what its founders, in 1924, expected it to be. Commanding understanding neither in official nor in private opinion; the helpless football of a thousand minor abuses and jealousies at the hands of official Washington; vastly overstaffed; its official premises in other countries cluttered with people who were never intended to be diplomats and never will be; theoretically governed by a Department of State as helpless in the jungle of Washington bureaucracy as is the Service itself; actually governed by a confused interaction of budgetary experts, congressional committees, professional administrators, labor union organizers, and mathematical computers;—the American Foreign Service stands today, for many of us old hands, as a sad mockery of the dream of those who

established it, the dream of a rigorously selected, highly qualified, dedicated, and disciplined corps of career officers, entrusted with the performance of the traditional diplomatic and consular functions, and enjoying the confidence at home that the importance of their work, and their high standards of devotion and integrity, warranted.

The roots of this situation go back, as we have seen, to a number of causes. But there is one which I have not mentioned thus far and which deserves particularly to be emphasized. In the hope of placing it on a sound basis, the Service has been subjected, since World War II, to a long series of investigations (usually by outsiders) and attempts at reform. Some of these have been better, some of them worse. But their greatest deficiency has lain not so much in their nature—in the nature, that is, of the various reforms proposed or attempted—as in their frequency and in the resulting lack of consistent treatment of these problems over long periods of time. In a professional career organization of this nature (and, I suspect, of any other nature) there is at least a 15-year interval between cause and effect—between the vital administrative decisions and the most important results. It is approximately this span of time that has to elapse between the initial recruitment of the beginning officer and his emergence as a mature and experienced diplomat entrusted with senior responsibility. If the process of training and advancement is to be fully effective, the treatment of the officer must be consistently adhered to over this 15-year period. Plainly, this cannot be the case with a Service which is delivered up every four years or

so to a new panel of investigators and a new set of administrative chiefs, each bringing to his tasks not only his own ideas but his own ignorance of what has been done before.

Yet the Species Survives

It might seem surprising, in these circumstances, that I should venture to speak at all, as I have been doing here, of the American diplomatic professional; and yet I have good reason for doing so. Because the truth is that notwithstanding all these obstacles and discouragements there are to be found within the ranks of this service today, not always visible to the naked eye through the forest of bureaucratic excrescences by which they are surrounded but there nevertheless, an amazingly large number of talented, imaginative, and devoted younger people who fully deserve the name of "diplomat" in the best sense. They are there, and they do what they do, not *because* of the system by which they are chosen and governed, but *in spite* of it. They represent, one can only conclude, a mutation of the species. They are born, not made.

It would seem that somehow or other, perhaps because of the multiplicity of national origins out of which our population has been formed, American society has the capability of producing out of its own midst, by its own mysterious genetic processes and other influences, a considerable number of people qualified by taste, temperament, and character for the pursuit of a diplomatic career, capable of learning by themselves in their work what others have failed to teach them, capable of acquiring in that field of endeavor, with little help from Wash-

ington, a competence which is as valuable to their own country (and, some of us like to think, to other countries as well) as it is unappreciated by most of those whom they serve.

It is of these people—of this unsung minority of what you might call self-taught and self-encouraged public servants—that I am speaking when I use the term "American diplomat." They have no organization and no collective authority of their own. Not all are even technically career people. They are not easy to identify—except by their own colleagues. They find themselves organizationally lost in a much larger body of people, most of whom share neither their experience nor their outlooks. Many resign at a tragically early stage and seek less frustrating channels of self-expression. Nobody in Washington cares.

But they do exist. They exist in larger numbers than anyone has a right to expect. And they stand as the refutation, at least in the United States, of Cambon's first assertion: that whereas democracies would always have ambassadors, it was a question whether they would ever have diplomats. The United States government, I am happy to say, still has both. At times they are even identical. Their existence may serve as a reminder that the dream of providing my country with a professional diplomatic arm commensurate in quality with its weight in world affairs is not a lost cause. Perhaps some day one or another of those surprising turns that do from time to time occur in American political life will provide us with the basis for a new and more promising attack on this time-honored but retractable problem.

LETTERS

We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer's telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication.

"Highbrow, Lowbrow, Middlebrow" in 1977

"I was in love once—many times," says Eve Arden in the Hollywood biography of songwriter Cole Porter.

One feels the same way toward Russell Lynes's 1949 essay "Highbrow, Lowbrow, Middlebrow" [*The Wilson Quarterly*, Autumn 1976]: I once thought of updating Lynes—many times.

With due deference to Mr. Lynes, here is my 1977 postscript.

No longer are highbrows only an aggregate of tweedy writers for "little magazines" pecking away at books on criticism of criticism, confidently serving that "adequate little wine" upon a chaste table. Instead, a stratified division of labor has emerged in a greatly enlarged academia, ranging from manufacturers (monograph writers) to wholesalers (anthologists of colleagues' articles), retailers (of pop social science), and discount marketers (text-book writers).

Currently first among unequals in the New Order is the academic highbrow who earns his keep by studying the culture of the lowbrow—the "Pop Kutch" that F. R. Leavis, Ernest Van Den Haag, and Dwight MacDonal'd once viewed with alarm and contempt. No longer the hunter stalking his prey among the uncut pages of obscure quarterlies, the 1977 highbrow culls his data from *Ace Comics*, content analyses of Slim Gail-

lard's "Ovoutie O'Rooney," and grainy Westerns shot on Monogram's backlot. At the Popular Culture Association he solemnly reads his paper on "Lon Chaney's Wolf Man as Tragic Hero."

Of course, the new highbrow cannot be too "pop." Yale's Erich Segal remained highbrow after writing *Love Story* but had to be unfrocked after writing *R.P.M.*, a campus epic, for Hollywood's Stanley Kramer.

Despite assaults by egalitarian forces, Lynes's central perception of American taste remains valid in our own day: the highbrow may embrace lowbrow culture while regarding the middlebrow as an enemy who dilutes highbrow culture and praises lowbrow culture for all the wrong reasons. The highbrow perfects his Negro *patois* and says "dig?" to his acquaintances when he means "*verstehen Sie?*" secure in the knowledge that his status insulates him from the charge of using poor grammar. But the middlebrow resolutely communicates from behind a shield of standard American English.

Thus, for a variety of reasons, highbrow culture remains impervious to middlebrow assault. In 1977, as in 1949, no adult outside the highbrow ranks reads the novels of Henry James. While the lowbrow thirsts for the *National Enquirer*, the middlebrow may outgrow James Michener and take on John Barth, but no amount of status-striving will compel him to read James's *Daisy Miller*—even though he saw the movie ("loved it, hated her"). Which reminds me: unlike the middlebrow, the highbrow cannot merely see a movie; he must read the original script in paperback, making nasty marginal notes where film and script differ.

In his preferences among secular objects, the highbrow was almost outflanked in recent years. His taste in conspicuously unpretentious wines was

muddled by his own teenagers' preference for even cheaper "pop wines." His taste in Danish furniture, Mexican crafts, and oaken Victorian pieces was despoiled by reproductions for the middlebrow market and by skyrocketing prices.

As a result, the highbrow has been driven to a preference for technique over material. He no longer buys paintings that can be had on the cheap at Mother's Day sales. He buys signed and numbered prints that can be appreciated only through an educated awareness of the techniques of etching and printing.

On occasion, perhaps influenced by the "back to the land" movement, he now may make his own wines—each "a bit frivolous" but developing character. He frets less about his gate-leg table and more about what he serves upon it. He cooks now, and ventures well beyond making hollandaise sauce in his Waring blender. He prefers Chinese viands—not supermarket Cantonese, but Hunan (for the *nuances*)—because the technique of cooking is so intricate.

One could go on, but the point is that distinctions of taste remain hard-edged and firm as ever. All things considered, the highbrows of 1977 may view the sociocultural turmoil with no less alarm than did Russell Lynes's dilettantes when they concluded that "things have gone too far" toward middlebrow appropriation of both highbrow and lowbrow culture. Apparently time cannot wither, nor television stale, the American impulse to keep up with the Jones's or reach out beyond them.

*Thomas Cripps, Professor of History
Morgan State University, Baltimore, Md.*

Brazil: A Negative View

Having spent several weeks lecturing in Brazil last summer, I was interested in both essays on that country in your Autumn 1976 issue ["Yankee Impressions and Brazilian Realities" by Robert

A. Pakenham and "Race and Slavery in Brazil" by Leslie B. Rout, Jr.].

Though slavery was abolished long ago, as Professor Rout pointed out, Brazil is hardly a racial paradise today. There were few dark-skinned persons in the university audiences I addressed; the only black professor I encountered was an American Fulbright lecturer on dance, teaching in Salvador.

I was distressed to find the universities bereft of their best social scientists by purges and pressures since the mid-1960s. Of those who remain, few dare to collect data or analyze them in ways that might reflect poorly on the regime's *raison d'être*, i.e., the promotion of security and development.

If this is a model for the Third World, it may come from the pages of George Orwell or Franz Kafka. Many of the lessons that Brazil gives the world, I fear, are negative.

*Walter Clemens, Fellow
Kennan Institute, The Wilson Center*

Brazil: The 1930-64 Period

Your Brazil chronology [page 67, Autumn 1976] gave too little attention to the 1930-64 period, when Brazil emerged from a faltering, largely one-crop (coffee) economy to experience diversification and growth as never before. Notably underemphasized was the role of Getúlio Vargas, who became President in 1930 and remained a vital force until his death in 1954. And, although the designation of Brasília as capital in 1960 was noteworthy, you ignored the elections that eventually touched off the 1964 military takeover; the period of the Quadros-Goulart administrations (1960-64) was one of great political turmoil throughout Brazil and neighboring Latin American countries as well.

M. Samuel Michel, Cocoa, Fla.

The chronology was abbreviated by the editors for reasons of space. Mr. Michel's amplifications are appreciated.

Magna v. Magna

In "The American Future: A Dialogue" [*The Wilson Quarterly*, Autumn 1976] Alvin Weinberg is quoted on page 48 as discussing the shift to taconite from "magna" type iron ore. Was this intended to read magma-type iron ore?

James F. Egart, Gaithersburg, Md.

Yes. We erred.

Benjamin Franklin in French?

On page 129 [of the Autumn 1976 issue], concerning *The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin* it was stated that "this work, translated from the French in which diplomat Franklin wrote it, was first published in London in 1793."

Franklin did not write his memoirs in French.

John F. Cox, Department of English
Mohave Community College, Kingman, Ariz.

Mr. Cox is correct. We regret that we inadvertently gave new circulation to an old misunderstanding. The full story, as pieced together by Library of Congress specialists, is complicated.

By their account, Franklin began writing his autobiography in 1771 in English in England. First, he did a three-page outline. Then he wrote the first of four installments. It was informal in style and intended only for his family. He did not pick up the autobiography again until 1784 in Paris, where he wrote the second of the projected four parts in a more formal manner directed to the public.

In 1788 he wrote a third section. He gave this section and the two earlier ones to his grandson Benjamin Franklin Bache to transcribe. Bache made two "fair copies," one of which was sent to Franklin's good friend Louis Guillaume Le Veillard, mayor of Passy.

This copy, minus seven final pages (the fourth part) that Franklin wrote before he died, was the first to be pub-

lished, in 1791, in a French translation; only the first installment of the manuscript was published at that time. The last 200 pages of this French version were taken from an unauthorized British biography of Franklin.

Sometime later Franklin's literary executor, William Temple Franklin, traded the original four-part manuscript, much crossed out and written over, for the Veillard three-part "fair copy." From this "fair copy" came the first English edition of the autobiography, again embracing only the first part, which was published in 1817-18. Another French translation, this time a full text based on both the original and the "fair copy," was published in France in 1828. Many English editions, as we stated, came later. In 1865, John Bigelow, American envoy to France, discovered the complete original manuscript and in 1868 published the first English version of the entire autobiography in four parts. In time, the original manuscript was acquired from the Veillard heirs. It is now in the Huntington Library in San Marino, California. Present-day scholarly editions are based on those published versions of 1791, 1818, 1828, and 1868, and the original manuscript.

CORRECTIONS

Readers seeking the complete texts of two articles in *Science* mentioned in our Autumn 1976 issue will find "Ocean Boundaries and Petroleum Resources" in the Mar. 12, 1976 issue and "Family Configuration and Intelligence" in the Apr. 16, 1976 issue. The exact dates were inadvertently omitted during the editing process.

Two new Brookings Institution books, *Industrial Organization in Japan* and *How Japan's Economy Grew So Fast*, were erroneously described as "edited" by their authors in reviews on page 134 of our Autumn 1976 issue.

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