John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, argued, against upholders of "military tradition," that segregation both during and after the war had left white units undermanned and black units burdened with more troops than they could absorb. The Air Force took the first progressive step, integrating months before Truman's executive order of July 1948 called for equal opportunity in all services. But not until the Korean War, when blacks proved themselves in combat beside whites, was integration completed in the Army and Marine Corps. During the 1960s, reformers in Kennedy's Defense Department joined with civil rights leaders to make the military an instrument of broad social uplift. Requiring the services to boycott civilian businesses that practiced segregation, the reformers were oddly negligent when it came to promotion practices that clearly favored whites within the services themselves. MacGregor, a historian at the Army's Center of Military History, believes that more high-level attention to internal reform might have prevented the build-up of racial tensions that so troubled the services in the late '60s and early '70s.

## ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN ANCIENT GREECE by M. I. Finley Viking, 1982 326 pp. \$22.50

Democracy, tyranny, slavery, and empire are terms frequently misused in describing ancient Greece. What did they mean to the inhabitants of Athens, Sparta, and the other city-states? In this collection of essays written over the past 30 years, Finley, a Cambridge classicist, reveals an enormous diversity within Greek institutions and some surprises: Sparta's military victories ultimately destroyed its model military state by bringing "non-equals" into the army, providing opportunities for ambitious individuals, and puncturing xenophobia. Freedom reached its apogee in those city-states where chattel slavery flourished (in fact, slavery and democracy may have originated in Greece at the same place, Chios, at roughly the same time, the sixth century B.C.). Yet within various states there were often radically different notions of bondage. In Sparta, for example, "helots" belonged to the state, whereas, in

The Wilson Quarterly/Summer 1982 122 Athens, slaves belonged to individuals. Finley ranges from such topics as technical innovation (there was relatively little, despite advanced Greek science) to marriage practices in Homeric Greece and interstate relations within the Athenian "empire." On themes that have drawn other classicists into pedantic praises or harsh revisionism, his unfailing "instinct for the concrete" delivers particulars that express the era.

Looking at American security policy since

## Contemporary Affairs

STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy by John Lewis Gaddis Oxford, 1982 432 pp. \$25

World War II, and at the assumptions of the men who shaped it, Gaddis, an Ohio University historian, discerns two rival approaches to Soviet containment—"symmetrical" and "asymmetrical." The latter, first articulated by George Kennan in an influential article published in the late 1940s, prescribes a variety of means-diplomatic, political, economic, and military—to counter expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union. Stressing overall U.S. and Western strengths, Kennan believed it unwise to respond to every communist takeover (such as the one in China) as a threat to U.S. security. But his blueprint was revised almost immediately by Paul Nitze and other Truman advisers: Their symmetrical approach defined as vital any interest threatened by the Soviets or their allies; they proposed meeting any act of aggression with a direct show of force. Truman believed the country could bear the cost of direct military confrontations such as that in Korea. Eisenhower did not. Fearing the longrange economic burdens of large military expenditures, he reduced defense spending (as a share of the GNP) and chose a policy of brinksmanship (e.g., reliance on nuclear weapons) reinforced by a network of worldwide alliances and by negotiations with the Soviets. Rejecting Ike's prudence, Kennedy and Johnson believed that America possessed the economic and military might to check any communist threat. Vietnam demonstrated

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