It's hardly a secret by now that the oil industry is undergoing a period of dramatic change. Worldwide, crude oil availability exceeds demand, and there's far more than enough refinery capacity to turn crude oil into petroleum products. Competition in all phases of the business is fierce, and profit margins are razor-thin.

Against this background, a protectionist chorus is sounding its siren song. Tariffs or some other trade barriers are needed, the protectionists say, to protect U.S. refiners and marketers of petroleum products. To which we say: Protectionist measures are a "cure" that's worse than the disease.

The big problem with protectionism is that it makes no economic sense, for these reasons:

1. The consumer ends up paying for the tariff and for the misallocation of capital and labor that always follows the erection of trade barriers.
2. Encouraging, through protectionism, the construction or continued operation of inefficient or unnecessary facilities inevitably makes the nation less competitive in world markets.
3. Protectionist measures in any one nation always encourage retaliatory actions in other nations. If America closes a door to foreign products, American exporters will find foreign doors closed to them.

It is particularly ironic that some in the oil industry are looking to government to solve their problems. If a decade of federal controls of various types hadn't preempted the free market, the current industry rationalization would almost certainly have occurred less traumatically over the years.

In the 1960s and '70s, substantial refinery capacity was constructed in expectation of ever-rising demand. In the mid-'70s price controls in the U.S. (that didn't end until 1981) kept consumer prices artificially low, and further stimulated demand. When demand dropped sharply in the 1980s after the price of crude oil had soared, the industry was left with massive overcapacity.

Are the memories of the public and some segments of the oil industry so short as to invite a new round of government intervention? Surely, they must remember all the arguments that were mustered in the 1960s and '70s against the policy of overriding the free market by government edict. The industry then was pointing out that inefficient refiners were being subsidized first by so-called import rights and later by the entitlements program—so much so that some operators went into the refining business for the purpose of receiving these subsidies. Precisely this misallocation of capital is exacerbating today's problems.

But painful or not, the industry is adjusting to the new market realities. Since 1980, U.S. refinery capacity has been reduced by about 17 percent (19 percent in Europe) even as billions of dollars have been and are being invested to upgrade most of the remaining capacity to yield the products now in demand.

Despite the refinery closings, the U.S. still has ample capacity—about 16 million barrels a day, which is more than total product demand, including imports. Even in the event of an international supply disruption, America has the capacity to refine all its domestic production plus the drawdown from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and still have as much as 3 million barrels a day of capacity in reserve.

Given the reality of an industry making the transition to a changed marketplace—and the fact that product imports pose no real threat to national security in the event of a supply disruption—the arguments of those who favor protectionism hardly seem to make sense.

Trade barriers aren't needed by the petroleum industry. They're bad economics. They drive up the prices paid by the American consumer. And, in the long run, they only worsen the problems they're supposed to solve.
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Editor's Comment

The Wilson Center embraces eight special programs, each with its own visiting Fellows, conferences, and scholarly publications. None is more active, or more important in its field, than the 10-year-old Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, now headed by Herbert J. Ellison. Many of the Institute's Fellows do research and write books on Russian history; others examine a wide range of current matters—the economy, science and technology, military policy, foreign relations, demography, ethnicity, literature. With its weekly meetings and major conferences, the Institute provides a unique rallying point in Washington for government Sovietologists and specialists from academe elsewhere in America and abroad.

Of late, after a decline during the short-lived Soviet-American "dé-tente" a decade ago, American research on the Soviet Union is enjoying renewed financial support from private foundations and the federal government. Congress has authorized $5 million a year to "national institutions" for Soviet studies. Besides the Kennan Institute, the chief research centers include Harvard, Berkeley, Indiana, Michigan, Columbia, and the University of Washington.

In this issue of the Quarterly, we publish some results of the increased research effort (see pages 47-87), which, among other things, has shed new light on daily life in the other superpower.
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ISSN-0083-3376  VOLUME IX  NUMBER 4
Ronald Reagan's sweeping re-election reinforced electoral, institutional, and policy trends in American politics that could have far-reaching consequences—the reversal of the federal role in providing social services, the strengthening of support for the Republican party, the reinvigoration of Congressional discipline, the renaissance of national party finance and organization, the toleration of large deficits, and the development of a new strategy for national defense. This volume explores how these and other changes have given a new direction to American politics. "...the most convincing interpretation yet presented of the Ronald Reagan era in American government." David Broder, Washington Post.

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Democratic Prospects

What is the future of the national Democratic Party after its rout by Reagan in 1984?

"First and foremost, [the Democrats' prospects depend] on whether the New Politics coalition continues to dominate the party," says Huntington, a Harvard professor of government. "If it does, the party will remain a minority and its vision . . . that of a minority party."

New Politics coalition? This is Huntington's label for the heterogeneous constellation of political minority groups that became active during the 1960s (e.g., women, blacks, liberal activists, and Hispanics). Their spokesmen dominated the Democratic Party during the 1970s. They filled an ideological vacuum left by the party's New Deal veterans, epitomized by Hubert Humphrey, who lost to Richard Nixon in the tumultuous election of 1968.

The ascendancy of these minority Democrats has also ushered in the notion of "categorical representation" and quotas on party committees. This "reform" stemmed from the belief that various elements in the electorate are best represented by their own kind. Geraldine Ferraro, Huntington argues, was chosen as the party's vice presidential candidate in 1984 "because she was a woman," not because she broadened the appeal of the Democratic ticket to voters of both sexes.

"Carried to an extreme," Huntington says, this approach "becomes . . . antipolitical," promoting party divisiveness rather than compromise and unity. It also has left the Democrats seemingly "captive to 'special interests.'"

Huntington believes that the Democrats made other errors in 1984. In registration drives and party appeals, they "reached down" (into special interest groups) instead of "reaching out" (capturing ambivalent Republicans and Independents) to broaden their support. They de-
developed an image as a "minority coalition," losing 75 percent of white Southerners, 67 percent of young professionals, and 52 percent of middle-income folk to President Reagan on Election Day. And party spokesmen provided no coherent vision of the American future.

How can the Democrats again command majority support? Not easily, Huntington says. The New Politics must go, the New Deal liberal coalition (blue-collars, Southerners, minorities) must be revived, and the party leaders must "set forth a new vision of where their party stands and what sort of country they want." These measures, combined with stronger central leadership, an "ideologically balanced" ticket, and more "moderate, responsible" positions that will attract "young, affluent voters" may give the party a chance to win in 1988.

All in all, Huntington says, the Democrats must become once more a "party of access," shedding their spokesmen's preoccupation with various factions and attempting instead to welcome and conciliate a diverse constituency.

A Confident People?


In 1983, Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider, Fellows, respectively, at the Hoover and American Enterprise institutes, published The Confidence Gap, a book documenting Americans' loss of faith in their leaders. Even President Jimmy Carter had warned in 1979 of "a growing disrespect for government . . . churches . . . schools, the news media, and other institutions."

Now, assessing popular reactions to the optimistic leadership of President Reagan, many public opinion analysts have declared that the malaise has ended. The Gallup organization, for example, found in January 1985 that "52 percent of Americans currently express satisfaction with 'the way things are going in the nation,' three times the 17 percent who did so four years ago—and higher than at any time since the measurement was started in 1979." The CBS/New York Times polling service reported similar results.

Lipset disagrees. He argues that "there is good reason to conclude that the confidence gap still exists. Most Americans remain suspicious of their leaders and of the way their institutions are performing. Good times presided over by a president who is upbeat . . . have helped to increase the level of confidence, but it is a change in mood linked to economic effectiveness and presidential performance, not to a sustained conviction that all is well."

A Harris survey in the fall of 1984, Lipset points out, did show that public confidence in "government institutions" (the White House, Congress, Supreme Court, and the military) has risen since 1983. But the same poll also demonstrated that trust in the "most powerful private
institutions—major companies, organized labor, and the press—has declined since the mid-1960s. In fact, surveys of "high confidence" in "ten major institutions" by the National Opinion Research Center and Harris showed a drop in optimistic responses, from 48 percent in 1966 to 31 percent in November 1984—below the previous nadir of 33 percent (the average of three polls) recorded in 1973–74, during the Watergate hearings.

Lipset believes that Americans' lack of faith in their institutions and leaders is not superficial. It cannot be explained simply in terms of past presidential difficulties, past economic woes, or the media's past obsession with "bad" news. "Logically," he writes, "if bad political or economic news undermines faith in institutions, good news should be restorative. Yet the revival [of confidence] is far from complete."


The rise of lynching in the United States, from the late 1800s to the early 1900s, is one of the bleaker chapters in America's history. Anti-lynching legislation, despite a strong fight in Congress to enact it, never became law.

Rable, a historian at Anderson College, writes that the rhetoric of the South's "rear-guard opposition" to federal antilynching laws, as late as 1940, was reminiscent of the proslavery arguments of the antebellum South. "As usual in Southern politics," observes Rable, "the race question overshadowed all others."

From 1882 until 1901, the number of lynchings of black males in the United States suddenly rose to more than 100 per year, mostly in the racially segregated former Confederate states. Southern liberals protested. But rationalizations for the killings abounded, notably the argument that mob justice deterred black men from raping white women.

The issue came to national attention in 1920, when Rep. Leonidas C. Dyer (R.-Mo.) introduced a bill in Congress to make lynching a federal crime. Endorsed by President Warren G. Harding, the bill was passed in the House of Representatives but died in the Senate, as Southern Democrats and GOP conservatives assailed the notion of renewed federal meddling in the South. However, behind the states' rights rhetoric, Rable suggests, "lay deep fears about the consequences of social equality between the races."

Rable suggests that "state [police] efforts, fear of congressional legislation, and . . . improvements in race relations at the local level" may have helped to reduce the number of lynchings between 1922 and 1930. In 1934, senators Edward Costigan (D.-Colo.) and Robert Wagner (D.-N.Y.) introduced another antilynching bill. Again it was defeated.

From 1937 on, "it became impossible to separate Southern rhetoric
In 1921, The World newspaper of New York City reported that the Ku Klux Klan, widely linked to lynchings of blacks, was growing faster in the Northern and Western United States than in the South.

against antilynching legislation from ... growing anti-Roosevelt sentiment,” prompted mainly by Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal programs, Rable says. (Roosevelt supported the antilynching bill privately but never endorsed it publicly, realizing it would never pass.) In fact, two Gallup polls in 1937 showed that a majority of Southerners wanted to criminalize lynching. Democrats again revived the Wagner bill in 1938. But this time a successful Senate filibuster, lasting a month and a half, was accompanied by outright race-baiting. Theodore G. Bilbo (D.-Miss.) said the bill would “open the floodgates of hell in the South.” Richard B. Russell (D.-Ga.) predicted the onset of “a soviet Negro republic.” In 1940, a Senate coalition of Southern Democrats and GOP conservatives finally buried the issue.

“Southern conservatives,” says Rable, “correctly saw the antilynching bill as ... part of a larger ... civil rights agenda” — to which they were opposed.

Western strategies to deter nuclear war have long been tied to other objectives: to discourage Soviet advances; to prevent nuclear escalation in the event of a weapons accident; to curb adventurism on the part of small nuclear powers.

But, by trying to achieve so many objectives at once, Western strategists have twisted clear, logical policies into incoherent doctrines, "muddling" issues for everyone.

So much the better, says Betts, a senior Brookings Fellow. He believes that policy inconsistency can be a virtue, that a little cloudiness in its defense doctrines gives the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) more room to maneuver in the event of a crisis.

The chief contradiction, Betts contends, is that "what is right for deterrence is wrong for defense, and what is wrong for war is right for peace." In other words, a large nuclear stockpile does deter Soviet aggression; but if nuclear deterrence fails, then conventional forces (tanks, aircraft, artillery, etc.) will prove more useful in defending Western Europe. Another difficulty involves keeping nuclear threats credible (reducing the likelihood of all-out war) without inadvertently provoking war. Betts calls this dilemma the "Great White Lie . . . [the] pretension that we would allow America to be destroyed in an attempt to save Europe." Why maintain the Lie? One reason, says Betts, is that "it allows the allied nations on both sides of the Atlantic to unite amicably for deterrence, even though interests would diverge if it came to defense" against a Soviet onslaught.

What is the best posture for NATO in the shell game of deterrence? Betts opts for a "modestly incoherent" defense strategy that "accepts some risk in several dimensions rather than incurring high risk in one of the dimensions." Specific suggestions: an overall build-up of NATO conventional defenses; a commitment to nuclear escalation before surrender (modified by a "no early first use" declaration); and an increase of safeguards against accidental escalation (deploying fewer tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, for example).

Betts sees this mixed bag of defense options as inconsistent, but "politically logical," because it offers the broadest set of possibilities to avert or contain conflicts with the Soviet Union. "Muddling is necessary to preserve NATO," he writes, "because either extreme alternative—nuclear or conventional—aggravates the suppressed differences in European and U.S. interests, differences that [pose] a greater potential threat to Western deterrent capability than any incremental difference in the [East-West] military balance."
How much foreign aid actually reaches the hands of the needy? Not enough, say critics of U.S. foreign-aid policy. Despite such complaints, the budget for nonmilitary economic assistance abroad has grown from $3.9 billion in 1974 to $8.8 billion in 1984.

Good Intentions, Wasted Dollars

For more than a decade now, America's foreign aid policies have cost the taxpayers much, but accomplished little.

So argues Eberstadt, a Harvard population researcher. A "perversion of foreign aid" has occurred not because Americans are stingy with their wealth or lack compassion for the world's poor. Rather, a program once aimed at Third World economic development has degenerated into a system of support subsidies and handouts.
Shortly after World War II, Eberstadt explains, President Harry Truman initiated "development assistance," designed to promote economic self-sufficiency in poor countries overseas. The World Bank, beginning in 1946, was set up to "facilitate investment for productive purposes" in countries needing an industrial base. Even the United Nation's Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) was limited to providing only "immediate relief needs."

However, during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (1961-69), U.S. foreign aid policy shifted. Meanwhile, under Robert McNamara, the World Bank granted low-interest loans, unlikely to be repaid, and attempted a "global transfer" of public funds from rich to poor nations: The Bank's budget increased ten-fold during McNamara's tenure (1968-81), with Washington providing the lion's share. The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) now sought mostly "to quell domestic discontent in low-income regions" through direct economic relief. An extreme case was war-torn South Vietnam, which, in 1966, absorbed 43 percent of AID's worldwide development grants.

Foreign aid slowly became an issue in the debate over Vietnam and White House prerogatives in foreign policy. Congress resolved to restrict the government's ability to direct AID policy: twice President Richard Nixon's foreign aid proposals were rejected. Then came the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, which hemmed in AID with red tape. It targeted funds for "basic human needs" (food, health care, shelter, etc.) and outright, no-strings-attached grants to Third World governments. No longer was U.S. aid aimed at long-term economic development.

In Eberstadt's opinion, this "New Directions" policy, still in effect, has been disastrous. During the 1960s, at least, "the United States could point to a number of self-reliant and prospering economies—Greece, Taiwan, and South Korea among them—which had 'graduated' out of American development aid. Since the 'reforms of 1973,' there have been no new graduates."

Lessons or Non-Lessons?

A decade after the fall of Saigon (on April 30, 1975), the widespread American desire to forget about the Vietnam War has given way to a desire to learn its "lessons."

Fromkin and Chace, respectively an international lawyer and a New York Times editor, find serious impediments to clear analysis. "The lesson of Vietnam, if there is one," they say, "cannot be applied because we still do not agree about what happened."

Did successive U.S. Presidents—Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson—increase the U.S. commitment to a non-Communist South Vietnam out of ignorance of the slim chances for success? Was each increase in U.S. in-
volvement made necessary by the previous one? Opinions vary, although most scholars' answer is No.

Were supporters of the gradualist Johnson policy in Vietnam correct when they blamed the news media for undermining vital public support, or was the policy itself fatally flawed? For their part, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger believe that they negotiated a satisfactory end to the war in 1973, but that Congress, by cutting aid to Saigon in 1973–74, made Hanoi's victory inevitable. Fromkin and Chace contend that merely holding the legislative or executive branches responsible for the policy failure is not much of a "lesson."

Some argue today that U.S. help to South Vietnam should have been limited to economic aid (as is now advocated by foes of U.S. military involvement in Central America). Such arguments ignore the fact that economic programs take a long time to bear fruit. Once the threat becomes military, as it was in South Vietnam, "it is hard to see how that threat could have been blunted by other than military means."

Why the United States intervened in Vietnam, what national interests were served, what steps could have brought success, what moral purpose was achieved, what political costs were incurred or avoided by U.S. persistence—all these questions still stir disagreement over the evidence. "If we could all look at that terrible experience through the same pair of eyes," say the authors, "it could teach us much. We cannot, so it cannot."

ECONOMICS, LABOR, & BUSINESS

"Techno-philia"

America's corporate executives are accused frequently of aiming only at maximizing the next quarter's profits. Leontief, a 1973 Nobel laureate in economics now teaching at New York University, adds a new charge: tunnel vision.

He believes that Big Business is planning future capital investments without adequately gauging the economy-wide effects of the introduction of new technologies. Consider the steel mill manager trying to decide whether to purchase an advanced electric furnace. He assumes that the price of electricity will follow recent trends, as will the demand for steel. By these criteria, a new furnace does not seem economical.

But what if electric utilities cut prices by adopting new technologies and the auto industry designs new cars that raise the demand for high-strength steel?

Leontief contends that there is a way to anticipate such "ripple effects" of new technology: the "input-output" method of economic anal-
ysis that he created during the 1930s.

He and his colleagues have developed a computer model that divides the U.S. economy into 89 sectors: appliance manufacturers, retail stores, insurance companies, etc. It shows how a change in the output of one will affect the inputs to the other 88 (and thus their outputs), and what effects these alterations will have throughout the economy.

Looking at the potential effects of the introduction of computerized telecommunications and industrial robots in each sector, they found economic plusses for all but three—education, hospitals, and other health services. Investing in new technology in these three areas would improve the quality of their “products” but would not yield commensurate returns for the economy as a whole. The reason: The necessary public subsidies would draw capital away from other sectors. But public officials, Leontief adds, cannot expect economists to tell them whether any further outlays for, say, education are advisable. That is a political question.

Increased investment in advanced technology would make sense for the remaining 86 groups. However, in each case, the choice between old and new technologies is not an all-or-nothing proposition: The trick is to discover the optimum combination. As yet, input-output analysis cannot supply those answers, Leontief concedes. Economists will first have to amass “data, data, and more data.”

Tokyo, U.S.A.

"Japan’s Real Trade Policy" by Kiyohiko Fukushima, in Foreign Policy (Summer 1985), 11 Dupont Circle, Washington, D.C. 20036.

In disputes over the causes of America’s $36.8 billion trade deficit with Japan, tempers have flared on both sides of the Pacific.

Fukushima, an economist at the Nomura Research Institute, suggests that Americans listen to the Japanese side of the story. He believes that Japanese businessmen have been falsely stereotyped as economic marauders, while in fact, "Japan has been playing a helpful, vital role in supporting a liberal international economy."

Instead of hoarding their earnings, Japanese corporations have been investing heavily overseas, creating new industries and jobs. From 1951 to 1972, Japan invested $303 million directly in U.S. and Canadian manufacturing industries. By 1982, the total rose to $3.9 billion. It reached $16.5 billion in March 1984. (By then, Japanese companies were majority stockholders in 300 U.S. manufacturing firms, employing 73,000 workers.) As a result of Tokyo’s 1984 liberalization of Japanese lending laws, the nation has become one of the biggest suppliers of credit to the Third World.

Now that they are on top, "Japanese industries are dealing with foreign competitors not by crushing them, as their British and American predecessors did," Fukushima says, "but by launching business cooper-
ation ventures and by making direct investments." American workers are now building Hondas; Japanese steel companies are selling advanced cold strip mill technology to their U.S. counterparts.

Washington, Fukushima says, is using Japan as a scapegoat. With a growing deficit that absorbs two-thirds of all national savings, an overvalued dollar, a diminishing competitive edge in several key industries, and excessive borrowing from overseas, the United States is largely responsible for its own economic woes. Not only has Japan opened its markets to U.S. businesses, but in 1983 the Japanese people spent $182 per person on American products, compared with $157 in the European Common Market countries.

However, Japan cannot assume America's role of world economic leadership, Fukushima writes. It lacks military power; its exports account for only eight percent of world trade; protectionism is restricting Japanese economic growth. Japan must further liberalize its economy, opening its vast telecommunications market to Western corporations and developing a long-range strategy to encourage foreigners to sell in Japanese markets. But, for its part, the United States must meet its own international economic responsibilities.


"The benefits our people can receive from the commercial use of space literally dazzle the imagination," President Reagan declared in the summer of 1984. Osborne, a contributor to the Atlantic, praises the President's vision but finds flaws in his plan to accelerate the commercial development of space.

Since it was established in 1958, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has invested more than $200 billion in space exploration. Several space industries are now burgeoning, with sales of some $23 billion a year. Satellite communications already generate revenues of about $3 billion annually. Remote sensing of Earth's weather patterns, pollution, oil, gas, and mineral deposits promises to yield substantial profits. So do launching and supplying space projects.

Manufacturing in space—"materials processing"—will undoubtedly be a boon for American industry. In near-zero gravity, drugs, alloys, and crystals can be produced with a precision and cost-efficiency that are physically impossible to achieve on earth. Crystals for computer chips, for instance, can grow flawlessly when suspended in space. Urokinase, a life-saving drug that dissolves blood clots, currently costs $1,200 a dose when made on Earth. Space production could cut the price to $100, according to a NASA study.

The United States has no monopoly on the space trade. The Soviet Union got on board in 1971 with Salyut 1, a rudimentary station. It has conducted 1,500 materials processing experiments in space; the United States, only 100. The French, West German, and Japanese governments
Images of man in space—wildly futuristic in the 1950s—were domesticated in the 1960s. Here: the Jetsons, a popular American TV cartoon family.

are working hand-in-hand with businesses to get space projects off the ground. The grand project of the Reagan administration is an $8 billion space station, which NASA hopes will be launched in 1992, exactly 500 years after Christopher Columbus voyaged to the New World. Permanently hovering in geosynchronous orbit, it would serve as a laboratory, observatory, storage depot, and oasis for space workers.

Osborne thinks Reagan’s desire to ease government out of space is the wrong tack to take. Since the U.S. government “created the marketplace” for space products, he points out, it should aggressively procure “whole technologies rather than specific products . . . beyond what might be cost-efficient in the short-run.” As NASA has already shown, federal investment in space-related technologies can have enormous future payoffs, ranging from computer chips to Teflon skillets.

The Swedish Model


From the mid-1930s through the late 1960s, Sweden’s pioneering “welfare state” defied the doomsayers. Achieving full employment, a low rate of inflation, steady growth, greater income equality, and political stability, the Swedish Model held up surprisingly well.

But in 1974, the long rise of Sweden’s gross national product (GNP)
ended. Stagflation set in. Investment waned. Labor strife grew. The population rose to nearly 8.3 million. Lundberg, an economist at the Stockholm School of Economics, traces the problem to the reigning Social Democrats’ dogged adherence to an outdated economic blueprint.

During the 1930s, even before John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) proposed that government spending could stabilize a free market economy, Swedish economists were trying to blend public works projects, job training, and high taxes to achieve a generous welfare state and high industrial productivity. The Social Democratic Party, which came to power in 1932, put these ideas into practice, appealing to the cooperative spirit of disparate labor and business groups. The result was steady prosperity through the rest of the Great Depression, and no real crisis until 1974.

The Model fell apart, Lundberg suggests, after the Social Democrats lost the political power necessary to balance welfare programs with a healthy free-enterprise system. During the late 1960s, the old consensus on national priorities gave way to infighting on the Left and opposition from the Right. Sweden then became vulnerable to gyrations in the international marketplace during the early 1970s: oil price hikes, trade imbalances, devalued currencies, and worldwide recession.

By the late 1970s, the world marketplace had pitted Sweden’s export industries against lower cost competition that they no longer could match. The Parliament nevertheless expanded the full-employment policy, pressing private industry to hire more workers and keep them longer. Redistributing income (via taxes and handouts) conflicted with incentives to produce. Taxes and wages rose, capital investment fell, profit margins narrowed. The domestic climate became less hospitable to private entrepreneurs. All in all, the Swedish “progress machine” ran out of steam.

Can Sweden get back on the right track? Lundberg believes it can. “The fall of the Swedish Model is, at bottom,” he says, “a political crisis.” Among other things, the country must “privatize” some public services, cut taxes, and stop penalizing private industry. “In a world of so much policy mismanagement,” Lundberg remarks, “Sweden might come out relatively well after all.”

SOCIETY

Unemployment And Crime


In the eyes of some legislators, unemployment and homicide ride the same roller coaster: Murder follows unemployment, up and down. At least twice during the last decade, the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) of the U.S. Congress has issued reports supporting that notion.
Wilson and Cook, who teach public policy at Harvard and Duke, respectively, reject the theory that the unemployment rate is directly linked to the homicide rate. They do not, however, deny that "economic conditions may have some effect on the crime rate," which includes many types of crimes against property.

In 1976, JEC Chairman Hubert Humphrey stated that a "1.4 percent rise in unemployment during 1970 is directly responsible for . . . 1,740 additional homicides." Humphrey based his remarks on the research of M. Harvey Brenner, a Johns Hopkins University professor who analyzed the relationship between changes in the homicide rate and fluctuations in unemployment, inflation, gross national product (GNP) per capita, and youthfulness of the population, from 1940 to 1973. According to Brenner, annual one-percent increases in unemployment correlated with a 5.7 percent increase in homicides over a five-year span.

Wilson and Cook find several flaws in Brenner's work. First, Brenner did not take into account noneconomic factors, such as the repeal of capital punishment during the early 1960s. In addition, Brenner fails to allow for World War II, when unemployment and homicide rates simultaneously fell, in part because large numbers of young men were drafted. If data from the war years are withdrawn from Brenner's analysis, then the homicide rate declines as unemployment rises.

Brenner's 1984 study (underlying the JEC's second report) analyzed yearly changes in homicide rates from 1950 to 1980 relative to drug and alcohol use, disposable income per capita, and a ratio of the unemployment rate of young males (statistically the highest homicide group) to the overall jobless rate. There he concludes again that worsening economic conditions spur crime. But Wilson and Cook argue that independent researchers have had difficulty duplicating Brenner's test results, casting doubt on their validity.

Whether or not unemployment and crime are, in fact, linked is only part of the problem to the authors. "Crime control is not a very good reason for designing national economic policy," they state. "There is no need to make extravagant, and unsupportable, claims about how [economic prosperity] will bring order and safety to our streets."

"How Poor Are the Poor?" by Christopher Jencks, in The New York Review of Books (May 9, 1985), 250 West 57th St., New York, N.Y. 10107.

Even in Washington, the idea that certain federal poverty programs have not only failed to help the poor of working age but also have harmed them has gained in popularity. The resulting debate has been given new impetus by Charles Murray's 1984 book, Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950–1980.

Murray, a Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, contends that the Great Society of the 1960s actually halted 15 years of progress against poverty resulting from post–World War II eco-
nomic growth [see “Looking Back” by Charles Murray, WQ, Autumn 1984]. Murray asserts that “basic social indicators took a turn for the worse” during the 1960s. Jencks, a sociologist at Northwestern University, replies that the official overall poverty rate fell from 19 percent in 1965 to 13 percent in 1980, when adjusted for inflation. Medicaid and Medicare, he adds, not only improved poor people’s health but also may have helped to lower infant mortality. Life expectancy, in fact, rose more from 1965 to 1980 than from 1950 to 1965. And the improved “material condition” of the poor occurred in spite of the fact that demographic changes (more youths, more elderly) during this period should have pushed the poverty rate up, not down.

Murray argued that generous welfare policies have discouraged marriage (or remarriage) among poor, unwed mothers. His hypothetical case of Harold and Phyllis illustrated this point. They discovered that living together and collecting government benefits is more profitable than marrying and working. But most unwed mothers (53.2 percent in 1984, according to the Census Bureau), Jencks points out, live with their parents, not their boyfriends; trends in illegitimacy and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits do not clearly correlate; out-of-wedlock births after 1960 rose among movie stars and college graduates as well as among welfare recipients. “Broader changes in attitudes toward sex, law, and privacy,” Jencks suggests, are more likely responsible for this unhappy evolution.

Jencks does, however, credit Murray with getting the debate over U.S. social policies back on the right track. Unlike many conservatives, Murray “does not simply ask how much our social policies cost . . . but whether they work.” And Murray reminds well-intentioned reformers that federal handouts must not “reward folly or vice”; even “progressive” policies for the poor must involve penalties as well as preferments.

A key problem in U.S. social uplift programs, Jencks notes, stems from the liberal notion that the abusers of the system repeatedly deserve a “second chance.” This tolerant view “is intimately related to the larger problem of maintaining respect for the rules governing rewards and punishments in American society. As Murray rightly emphasizes, no society can survive if it allows people to violate its rules with impunity on the grounds that ‘the system is at fault.’”

Supporting Your Elderly Parents


“Honor thy father and thy mother,” the Bible instructs (Exodus 20:12). The Reagan administration, in 1983, told state Medicaid officials that they could legally require children to help support their elderly parents. Are the two dicta at odds?

Callahan, director of the Hastings Center, sees a conflict. He believes that “enforced legal obligations of children toward parents are mutu-
Americans aged 65 and older received $132.2 billion in Social Security cash benefits in 1984. The same age group got $27.1 billion in 1971.

ally destructive.” In terms of strengthening family bonds, government support for the elderly “makes considerable sense.” More than half the states in this country now have statutes, seldom enforced, that require children to support needy parents, Callahan notes. Yet despite the increase in the number of elderly Americans during the last decade (one-quarter of whom were poverty-stricken in 1980), only 10 percent of U.S. citizens believe children should bear this burden, compared with 50 percent in the mid-1950s.

This change of sentiment does not mean that children are suddenly abandoning their parents. In fact, Callahan says that gerontologists deny that “the caring family has disappeared, and that the elderly are isolated from their children.” The number of elderly Americans living with their children or other relatives has indeed declined (from three-fifths in 1960 to one-third in 1980.) And only one percent of the elderly now depend on their children financially. Yet, Callahan notes, “60–80 percent of all disabled or impaired [elderly] persons receive significant family help.”

The crux of the matter is money, not health care. The question is: Who should pay the bills? Favoring continued federal support, Callahan quotes an elderly American: “We don’t like to take money from our kids. . . . They don’t
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like giving us money, either. . . . So we all sign a political contract. . . .
The young people give money to the government. I get money from the
government. That way we can both get mad at the government and
keep on loving each other.

PRESS & TELEVISION

Libel Chill


Following two much-publicized libel trials (Gen. William Westmoreland and Ariel Sharon against CBS News and Time, respectively), investigative journalists in the United States seem to be backing off difficult stories. But are they?

Massing, a contributing editor of the Columbia Journalism Review, believes that "a chill has indeed set in." After interviewing more than 150 reporters, editors, and media lawyers at news organizations, he was surprised by "the number of journalists willing to concede that libel is indeed forcing them to back off." Paul Hogan, managing editor of the Tampa Tribune, says, "We've been a little less aggressive" since losing $380,000 in a 1981 libel verdict. The publisher of the weekly Main Line Chronicle in Philadelphia, Pa., (hit by nine lawsuits) bluntly says: "I changed my editorial policy. I decided not to do any investigative work."

Libel cases may appear to have risen in number recently but in fact have not. What has changed, however, is "the willingness of juries to rule against the news media" and give "megawards," Massing notes. (Before 1980, only one libel award ever exceeded $1 million. Since then, two dozen have been handed down, he reports.)

The libel problem, however, goes deeper than actual libel. Just the threat of lawsuits wastes newspapers' money on legal advice and skyrocketing libel insurance premiums. Major news organizations can swallow million-dollar legal bills. Smaller newspapers may choke. Homer Marcum, the "litigation-weary" editor of the weekly Martin Countian in Kentucky, has paid more than $20,000 in legal bills—out of his own pocket. Jack Anderson, the syndicated columnist, laments that libel trials cost him $25,000 apiece. Yet some journalists believe the "chill" is just a self-serving fantasy. "I have not seen where Westmoreland has had any chilling effect whatsoever on our work," says Mark Nykanen, an NBC correspondent.

In Massing's eyes, the future of the free press is not so bleak. He points to several factors: the creation of the Libel Defense Resource Center in 1981; successful countersuits by news organizations (such as NBC's $200,000 award against Lyndon LaRouche, chairman of the National Democratic Caucus); the Minnesota Newspaper Association's
“hotline” to advise worried editors on deadline. Plaintiffs, too, are realizing there must be a better way to fight libel than through court battles. After he dropped his case against CBS last February, General Westmoreland told the National Press Club: “The route of the libel suit is not good, either for the plaintiff or defendant.”

_The Televised Church_


On April 16, 1984, _USA Today_ ran the following headline: “TV Preachers Not Hurting Local Church.”

This headline encapsulated a two-volume study by the Annenberg School of Communications and the Gallup Organization. In 1978 and 1983, Gallup had surveyed more than 1,500 people on their religious-television viewing and churchgoing habits, as well as their commitment to religious values and positions on prominent moral and ethical issues. The study’s conclusion, as stated by George Gerbner, Annenberg’s dean and the principal author, was that evangelical broadcasters “do not reduce the number of people going to local churches.”

Gaddy and Pritchard, professors of journalism at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and Indiana University, respectively, wondered how that conclusion could be drawn from the available data. After analyzing the same data—using the same techniques as Annenberg/Gallup, but with more comprehensive controls—they found that the analysis was correct but that the conclusion had been overstated. Their analysis suggests, rather, that “the more people watched religious television, the less frequently they attended church.”

Specifically, they found that a Protestant who watches 45 minutes of religious television per week (an average amount) would attend church about nine times for every ten times a non-viewing Protestant would—assuming the two were alike demographically, with similar values.

Statistically, people who watch religious programs do attend church more frequently than the population at large. The average Protestant, for example, goes to church slightly more than twice a month; and approximately 29 percent of those surveyed said they watched some religious TV. The question on the minds of television analysts (as well as parishioners) is whether those TV viewers would go to church more often if there were no religious programs to watch.

Gaddy and Pritchard maintain that the data are still shaky. But when more factors about each person’s religious beliefs and TV watching patterns are taken into account, the numbers seem to indicate that since “staying at home with the television set takes less effort than leaving home to go to church,” many would-be churchgoers probably spend Sunday morning watching the tube.
For Lenin, Trotsky, and Mao, there was only one Karl Marx. But since the 1930s, when scholars unearthed Marx's early writings, many Western intellectuals have suggested that real Marxism has "a human face."

The new Marxism is based not on the materialistic *Das Kapital* (1867) but on Marx's earlier writings on alienation and other themes. Meanwhile, writes Himmelfarb, a City University historian, biographers are fashioning a "new Marx," most recently in *The Meaning of Karl Marx* (1984) by Bruce Mazlish, a noted "psychohistorian." Himmelfarb doubts that it makes sense to interpret a thinker in terms of his personal life (rather than his writings) and contends that Mazlish and his colleagues are offering sanitized versions of Marx's life.

Where Mazlish sees Marx as "a great creative battler, always striving for a better world," Himmelfarb sees an unpleasant man "whose personal life testifies to his own inability to coexist even with his fellow socialists." The details of Marx's personal life do not, in her view, support the usual portrait of an admirable humanist. Marx was remembered by his sisters as a "terrible tyrant" who did not even attend his father's funeral. He fathered an illegitimate child, whom he refused to acknowledge. Two of his daughters committed suicide.

"The most significant psychological fact" about Marx, Himmelfarb argues, was his consistent "denial" of his own life. He was a philosopher who demanded the abolition of philosophy; an intellectual who denied the importance of ideas (in favor of materialism); an intellectual who...
"cannibal" who turned on his mentors (notably Hegel); and the descendant of a long line of rabbis who was, Himmelfarb contends, an anti-Semite. ("What is the worldly religion of the Jew?" Marx asked in 1844. "Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money.")

The rise of the "new Marx," Himmelfarb concludes, is part of an intellectually dishonest effort to dissociate contemporary Marxism "not only from the Marxism that has become an instrument of tyranny, but also from the Marxist histories that have been so conspicuously belied by history."

Raymond Aron: The Ethics of Responsibility

Raymond Aron (1905–83) appears to be another. Although he died two years ago, the encomiums are still rolling in. The author of some 40 books ranging from Introduction to the Philosophy of History (1961), to The Century of Total War (1954), to Clausewitz (1976), this historian-philosopher-journalist fits clearly into no modern category. At the time of his death, says Shils, a sociologist at the University of Chicago, Aron was "the most esteemed writer in the world on modern society and contemporary international politics."

Born in Paris, Aron graduated in 1930 at the top of his class from the Ecole Normale Supérieure, a year ahead of Jean-Paul Sartre. He taught history and philosophy in German and French universities during the 1930s, then served France during World War II. From 1947 until his death, he was a columnist for the French daily Le Figaro (1947–77) and the weekly L'Express (1977–83), as well as professor of sociology at the Sorbonne in Paris (1955–68).

A socialist before World War II, Aron broke ranks with the French Left in 1955, when he published The Opium of the Intellectuals. In it he criticized Sartre and other Marxists for their unquestioning support of the Soviet Union. Aron's other targets included French colonialism in Algeria, the chauvinism of Charles de Gaulle, and the French student revolt of 1968.

Hassner, who teaches at the University of Paris, explains that Aron always tried to distinguish between alterable and inevitable trends in world affairs, persistently scrutinizing historical ironies. In War and Industrial Society (1958), for instance, he argued that new military technology has made wars more terrible but, at the same time, has made

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total war less likely, and actual wars more limited. "Peace is impossible, war is unlikely," he once said. In human affairs, Shils says, Aron stressed "the ethics of responsibility" over the "ethics of conscience," characterized by "a readiness to accept disagreeable truths." He wrote about the Common Market, Soviet totalitarianism, the thought of Nietzsche and Lenin.

Hassner believes that a quotation from the 17th-century mathematician Blaise Pascal best sums up Aron: "Greatness is not displayed by standing at one extremity, but rather by touching both ends at once and filling all the space between."

**Questioning Obedience**


In 1974, social psychologist Stanley Milgram published a disturbing book called *Obedience to Authority*. He described a series of laboratory experiments in which ordinary Americans were convinced to "torture" subjects with electric shocks.

Sabini and Silver, both psychologists, argue that instead of simply bemoaning such human weakness, educators should seek to correct it. In Milgram's 1962 experiment, conducted at Yale University, individual volunteers were asked to "teach" another "volunteer" (actually an actor). The "pupil" was strapped into a chair, with electrodes attached to his arm, and instructed by the "experimenter" to repeat a list of paired words. The experimenter told the "teacher" to administer an electric shock when the student erred. The (fake) generator had 30 switches, from 15 to 450 volts. With each error, the experimenter increased the voltage, until the pupil complained, shrieked, and, eventually, seemed to lapse into unconsciousness. Sixty-five percent of the volunteers obediently administered shocks up to the 450-volt mark.

Why did they go along with Milgram's plan? Not because they could not tell right from wrong, argue Sabini and Silver. Rather, social circumstances made it uncomfortable for them to act morally and halt the "lesson."

Entrapment—the gradual increases in the shock treatments and thus the volunteers' commitment to the process—clouded clear-cut choices. Embarrassment in the presence of an authority figure led the volunteers to fear abandoning their "duty." ("You have no choice," some were told, "you must go on.") Even among those who refused to continue the experiment, none simply got up and left; they passively resisted until the experimenter gave up.

The volunteers were also paralyzed by their belief that "only evil people do evil things and that evil announces itself." Others were reassured by the experimenter's promise that he would assume responsibility for anything that happened.
Sabini and Silver doubt that lectures will teach people to disobey immoral commands. Classroom role-playing and other practical experiences, they contend, are needed to teach the young that "doing the morally right thing does not always 'feel' right."

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**SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY**

**Educating Snails**


Snails are a delicacy to some, a slimy nuisance to others. But to two American scientists, these mollusks are providing tantalizing clues to the mystery of human thought and memory.

Daniel Alkon, of the Marine Biological Laboratory in Woods Hole, Mass., has devoted most of his career to studying snails, specifically the genus *Hermisenda*, writes Hall, a *Science 85* contributing editor. Alkon subjected the snails first to bursts of light and then to rotation. Slowly he conditioned them to contract when a light is shown as if rotation were imminent—in the same manner that Ivan Pavlov, the 19th-century Russian physician, taught dogs to salivate at the ring of a bell.

Alkon traced the *Hermisenda*’s ability to "learn" to a change in their neurological chemistry. Every time certain snail neurons are stimulated, the flow of potassium through the cell membrane is altered. Repeated long-term arousal disrupts the cell’s "resting state," the way it was before stimulation, allowing it to "associate" the sensation of light with rotation.

Alkon believes humans learn by constructing "whole sets of associations" in a manner similar to the snails', "even if it’s the most complex association, such as remembering riding a bicycle or remembering what your father’s and mother’s faces looked like."

Eric R. Kandel, a Columbia University neurobiologist expected soon to win the Nobel Prize, began analyzing nerve clusters in *Aplysia* snails in 1962. Since then, he has identified many neurological changes that take place during "habituation" (an underreaction) and "sensitization" (an overreaction) to a stimulus. Kandel believes, in contrast to Alkon, that learning mainly involves a chemical change in nerve synapses (where nerve endings meet) rather than in the cell membranes. Kandel’s theory may help to explain how the one trillion neurons in a human brain can associate and remember daily experiences.

Hall notes that Alkon and Kandel both believe "evolution latches onto hardy mechanisms and that what works for invertebrates might also work . . . with obvious improvements . . . in humans." The two scientists are still a long way from proving that human learning follows the pattern of the snail’s response to stimuli. But last year Alkon reported discovering startling similarities between some learning mecha-
nisms in *Hermissenda* and those in rabbits.

Why should researchers continue to study snails instead of other creatures? Because, says William Quinn, a fellow neuroscientist, snails are "built like an old Philco radio, with simple circuits and large, easily identifiable components."

*Tinkerers And Scientists*

Scientists and technologists have lived off each other's creations for centuries. But scientists always seem to get the credit. McKelvey, a physics professor at Clemson University, maintains that technologists have unfairly been pushed to the back seat, that they have furthered scientific progress no less than have scientists themselves.

Hans Christian Oersted's discovery of magnetic fields in 1819 would not have been possible without "voltaic cells," or batteries—a purely technological creation. Alessandro Volta (1745–1827) built a battery from discs of dissimilar metals separated by pads moistened with salt solution. It generated current, although Volta did not know why. Not until 40 years later did the physicist Michael Faraday correctly explain how batteries operated.

The great discoveries of the 15th and 16th centuries, too, grew out of two simple inventions: the clock and the lens. Newtonian mechanics, the stepping stone to modern physics, became possible when small time intervals could be measured. And telescopes, which allowed astronomers to grasp the true shape of our solar system, depended on well-ground lenses. Galileo, who is credited with building the first telescope in 1609, probably got the idea from an optician in the Netherlands, who received a patent in 1608, McKelvey says.

Isaac Newton found that refracting telescopes (with multiple lenses) broke up light like a prism and abandoned them in 1666 for reflecting telescopes (with mirrors). But John Dolland, a self-educated British optician, proved Newton wrong by designing achromatic telescopes, which showed clear images without refractions. His discoveries in 1758 led to the microscope, which allowed biologists to study cells and eventually pioneer microbiology, cytology, and immunology.

Other endeavors also owe more to new instruments than to revolutionary changes in thought. Artists and chemists with little knowledge of light or physics invented photography. Lee De Forest's experiments with vacuum-tube triodes in 1904 led to radio. The classic examples of an uneducated "tinkerer's" contribution to technology: Thomas Edison's phonograph (1877) and incandescent lamp (1879).

McKelvey laments the modern rise of competitive group research that discourages adventurous spirit. Through neglect, he believes, society is driving tinkerers like Edison into extinction. What might help? More private and public support for "a few 'obviously' unsound projects and 'clearly' unprofitable lines of thought."
After the Black Death ravaged Europe in the 14th century, garlic was used as protection against the plague. Folklore held vampires responsible for the dreaded epidemic, and garlic acquired a reputation as an antivampire agent.

Garlic and Onions

"Eat no onions nor garlic, for we are to utter sweet breath," muttered Bottom in Shakespeare's A Midsummer Night's Dream. Legendary in medicine and literature, the odorous bulbs have been credited with everything from curing tumors and cardiac problems to keeping vampires at bay.

Behind such claims lies more than a grain of truth. According to Block, a research chemist, the juices of garlic and onions "display a remarkable range of biological effects." They provoke intriguing questions of chemistry. Why, for example, do these members of the lily family emit so pungent an odor when cut, making people cry? The first clue was uncovered in 1844, in the laboratory of German chemist Theodor Wertheim.

Wertheim identified the active ingredient, or "essence," of garlic by boiling it in water and distilling the oils. He called the liquid "allyl" (from Allium sativum, garlic's botanical name). One hundred years later, Chester J. Cavallito in Rensselaer, N.Y., soaked garlic in ethyl alcohol and came up with a colorless, smelly liquid called allicin. Further experiments showed that allicin killed certain fungi and bacteria, sometimes faster than penicillin.

"The Chemistry of Garlic and Onions" by Eric Block, in Scientific American (Mar. 1985), P.O. Box 5919, New York, N.Y. 10164.
PERIODICALS

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

But the original question was only half-answered. Why is uncut garlic odorless? That answer came in 1948 when Swiss chemists learned that allicin was the product of two other chemicals (allinase and alliin) that are mixed together during cutting and crushing. Onions contain an oil chemically similar to alliin. When it is cut or crushed, alliin combines with another chemical to produce the “lacrimary factor” (LF)—which makes people cry. Discovering the onion’s LF helped to explain why old-fashioned kitchen methods for cutting up onions work: Chilling onions makes the LF less volatile, and peeling them underwater washes the water-soluble LF away.

In 1971, Block discovered ajoene, another compound in garlic that explains its “antithrombotic factor” (its ability to prevent blood clots) and makes the pungent plant at least as effective as aspirin. Block also found that garlic powders, pills, oils, and extracts—though often touted for their medical properties—contain virtually no ajoene. The likely reason: Steam distillation washes it out.

RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

Confessions of An EPA Man


At first, Ruckelshaus recalls, the EPA aimed, grandly, to harmonize industry with nature. Congress created the agency in response to popular fears of imminent “ecocatastrophe.” Expectations were high. The 1970 Clean Air Act gave the EPA only 90 days to set standards that would rid the nation of its most noxious air pollution. EPA administrators believed that they knew how to solve environmental problems but were quickly frustrated by gaps in the scientific understanding of pollutants.

Nevertheless, by prescribing “scrubbers” for industrial smokestacks, catalytic converters for cars, and sewage treatment plants for cities, the EPA was able to conquer many of the nation’s most visible pollution problems. Today, attention has shifted to invisible threats—carcinogens in the soil, air, and water. Once again, the EPA is bedeviled by unreasonable popular expectations.

Ruckelshaus stresses the value of the EPA’s most essential (and most unpopular) policy-making tools: “risk assessment” (estimating a pollutant’s threats to human health) and “risk management” (deciding what to do about those risks). Scientists must estimate the number of indi-
individuals who might die from a specified level of exposure to various toxins. Then regulators must decide how to intervene—if at all—by weighing the costs and benefits of regulations for industry, workers, and the public. These cold, analytical methods dismay many Americans. Industry leaders and some scientists, on the other hand, argue that scientific knowledge has not advanced far enough to make firm judgments possible.

Ruckelshaus would alter the EPA's role, leaving it with the power to set broad national pollution standards that would be applied by local government. That would reduce the dangers of excessive, abstract regulations while giving ordinary people a voice in deciding what risks they are willing to bear.

Deadly Fibers


To the touch, asbestos—a fibrous, fireproof mineral—is soft and inviting. But this insulator has stirred widespread alarm because of its latent carcinogenic properties.

Zurer, an editor at Chemical and Engineering News, believes that the asbestos "crisis" stems from ignorance. Long used for electrical insulation, building fireproofing, and auto brake linings, asbestos since the 1960s has been linked by scientists to fatal lung diseases (chiefly asbestosis and mesothelioma). These findings spurred the U.S. Occupational Safety & Health Administration to regulate airborne fibers in workplaces in 1971, encouraged workers sick from exposure to file lawsuits in 1982, and alarmed ordinary citizens over asbestos in their offices, homes, and schools during the last year.

In 1984, Congress gave the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) $50 million to help local school districts inspect their facilities for friable, uncovered insulation. The EPA estimates that 15 million schoolchildren and tenants in some 700,000 private and commercial buildings have been exposed. School officials and landlords nationwide are now hurrying to remove the insulation for fear of future lawsuits. Yet, Zurer points out, no one knows exactly how hazardous low-level exposure is. And sloppy removal can worsen the situation by blowing asbestos fibers into the air.

Asbestos is dangerous only when fibers of a specific size are inhaled and stick in the respiratory tract. The body can expel most fibers, but those remaining have been shown to irritate lung tissues and provoke cancers. The greatest unknown is asbestos's "threshold level" of exposure—the maximum amount that can be inhaled without causing illness. Some researchers say there is no safe level; others say that no one has found it. One obstacle is incomplete data. The relevant lung diseases may be latent up to 30 years, but accurate records of workers' ex-
posure go back only to 1972. Thus, the risks of low-level exposure must be extrapolated from data on high-level exposure. To make matters worse, many different mineral compounds bear the label “asbestos,” each with a different level of toxicity.

Not surprisingly, scientists have been unable to produce universal safety guidelines. The price tag for removing all asbestos from the nation’s schools and office buildings: an estimated $20 billion. Zurer doubts that such extreme measures are necessary, or even practical—especially since wary insurance companies are refusing to cover contractors who do this work.

Reassessing Nuclear Meltdowns

Six years after its near "meltdown," Three Mile Island (TMI), the nuclear power plant in Harrisburg, Pa., is still synonymous with disaster in the public mind. But to many nuclear scientists and engineers, what did not happen at TMI is more interesting than what did, spurring a reassessment of nuclear accidents in general.

Following the TMI mishap, observes Norman, an editor at Science, scientists were surprised by the absence of radioactive iodine in the environment surrounding the stricken nuclear plant. Previous meltdown models predicted the formation of an iodine vapor cloud, which is potentially fatal and difficult to contain. However, as Norman notes, "it is now widely accepted within the nuclear research community that the chemistry underlying the earlier predictions was faulty."

Studies of TMI by the American Nuclear Society (ANS), the Industry Degraded Core Rule-making Program (IDCOR), and the American Physical Society (APS) showed that U.S. reactor containment vessels can withstand pressures twice as high as the design indicates. They also found that more radioactive particles stay inside the plant—instead of escaping—than was expected. Airborne fission products stick to walls, equipment, and pools of water.

Both the ANS and IDCOR favor reducing the “source term”—estimates of radioactivity released during an accident. But the APS researchers caution against "sweeping conclusions." They warn that tests of containment vessels are far from conclusive and that many chemical reactions which occur during a meltdown are not well understood. In addition, the United States (unlike France) has no single, standardized nuclear power plant design, which means that hazards could vary greatly from site to site.

The nuclear power industry now wants the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to change some regulations based on these new findings. But because the prestigious APS refuses to endorse the more optimistic conclusions of the other two groups, Norman reports, the NRC is not likely to oblige. Too many questions remain, and the APS says that four more years will be needed to answer them.
F. Scott Redemed

"F. Scott Fitzgerald at the End" by Jeffrey Hart, in *Commentary* (Mar. 1985), 165 East 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

F. Scott Fitzgerald, of *Great Gatsby* fame, died in Hollywood in 1940; at age 44, he was an alcoholic with a fading literary reputation. Hart, who teaches English at Dartmouth College, thinks a reassessment of the author's last years is overdue.

Hart sees signs of a special maturity in Fitzgerald's later work, including the screenplays he wrote for Hollywood at the end of his career. His work on *Madame Curie* (between 1938 and 1939) forced him to step beyond the adolescent self-absorption of his earlier writings into an "adult world of love and of achievement based on professional commitment." Fitzgerald himself had changed; he shuttled between a shaky marriage to Zelda, his great love, and a Hollywood affair with columnist Sheilah Graham. After MGM let his contract lapse, he churned out more than 17 short stories, several of them "first-rate" in Hart's view.

But the literary yield of Fitzgerald's Hollywood stint, says Hart, turns up in his final incomplete manuscript, *The Last Tycoon* (1940). In it he describes a compelling character, Monroe Stahr—based on MGM's boy-wonder chief, Irving Thalberg. A stenographer at Universal Pictures at age 17, Thalberg rose to head production for MGM at 25. Unlike Gatsby and other Fitzgerald heroes, Hart notes, Stahr overcomes "any seriously disabling moral weakness." He is "a new kind of Fitzgerald hero"—a hardworking, uneducated artist and entrepreneur, a "romantic professional" who believes in the American dream.

Stahr, like Thalberg (and Fitzgerald), dies young, but not tragically. He works hard to the end. Hart sees "something grimly heroic in Fitzgerald's transmutation of his own mortality [his failing health] into art." Monroe Stahr, as Hart points out, bears the name of James Monroe (whose Monroe Doctrine affirmed a unique American destiny), while Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln appear too as characters in the story. Fitzgerald ultimately reaffirms his belief in American values—captured in the sterling line: "America is a willingness of the heart."

Mr. Wu


It would be hard to find a more extreme case of a divergence between art and life than Evelyn Waugh (1903–66). At his London club or at parties, the author of *Vile Bodies* (1930), *Scoop* (1938), and other hilarious novels did not stop at being a curmudgeon. Outside his home, he could be a nasty fellow.
“In its whimsy, in its obliquity, sometimes in its cruelty, Evelyn Waugh’s comedy is not for everyone,” notes Epstein, the editor of the American Scholar. Typical of Waugh’s comic vision is a passage in Black Mischief (1932) describing young Basil Seal’s view upon awakening on an alien sofa after a night of excess: “There was a gramophone playing. A lady in a dressing jacket sat in an armchair by the gas fire, eating sardines from the tin with a shoe horn.” Waugh’s humor, Epstein says, “would not have been possible if not dressed out in his carefully measured prose . . . the straight face from behind which the smashing punch lines are delivered.”

The English writer’s personal life was far from carefully measured. A convert to Catholicism at age 27 (after his first wife left him for another man), later a heavy drinker and drug user, Waugh was renowned for his social brutality. Posted to Yugoslavia during World War II, he even chided his second wife, Laura, for her letters. “[There is] no reason to make your letters as dull as your life. I simply am not interested in Bridget’s children. Do grasp that.” At a testimonial dinner honoring him late in life, he pointedly directed his ear trumpet away from the keynote speaker. “You have no idea,” he told a friend, “how much nastier I would be if I was not a Catholic.”

Waugh was doctrinaire on religion and a frank political reactionary. He cherished an idealized vision of life during England’s Victorian era; he had an “instinctual aversion to all social progress.” Yet he also had a romantic side, most apparent in the popular Brideshead Revisited (1945). Literary critic V. S. Pritchett, however, saw a change in Waugh’s vision. His early works are inspired by the notion that human beings are mad; his later World War II trilogy, Sword of Honor (1952–61), “draws on the meatier notion that the horrible thing about human beings is that they are sane.”

For all his eccentricities, however, Waugh was a loving husband and father, and a devoted companion to his few friends. “Evelyn Waugh, alias Mr. Wu,” wondered writer Chips Cannon in 1934. “Is he good trying to be wicked? Or just wicked trying to be nice?”

Hopper’s Art

Edward Hopper’s famed paintings of urban scenes—closed shops, empty streets, and lonely souls bathed in the light of dusk—are noted for their general feeling of desolation.

“It is not the figures themselves . . . that establish the element of loneliness,” contends Strand, a critic and painter. Rather it is “something in the formal disposition of the painting.”

To him, the answer lies in Hopper’s use of trapezoidal shapes and missing or sealed-off vanishing points to structure his images—instead of conventional, rectangular, one-point perspective. “We often feel left
behind, even abandoned, while something else in the painting, usually a road or tracks, continues,” Strand writes. *Approaching the City* (1946), for instance, exemplifies the unsettling effect of a nonexistent vanishing point, which leads a viewer’s eye nowhere. Against a bleak background of buildings, smokestacks and clouds, a featureless concrete wall gradually darkens and descends underground. The gloom, Strand says, is created by the picture’s “determination to disappear into itself. . . . It is a work that invites the viewer in only to bury him.”

Similarly, in *Nighthawks* (1942), one of Hopper’s best known paintings, the customers gathered in the all-night diner are not obviously disconsolate. Again, says Strand, Hopper uses compositional geometry to affect the onlooker’s mood subliminally.

Not all of Hopper’s works, though, are tinted with loneliness. *Early Sunday Morning* (1930), for example, depicts the barren streets and closed shops of a universal Main Street. The scene has a standard, rectangular perspective that invites the viewer in instead of pushing him away. Says Strand: “It is a quiet, peaceful scene that would inspire loneliness only in those who derive comfort from being able to shop seven days a week.”


*The Wilson Quarterly/Autumn 1985*
Mr. Gandhi’s India

Only hours after the assassination of Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984, power passed to her son, Rajiv, now Prime Minister. Kreisberg, director of studies at New York’s Council on Foreign Relations, believes that the change in leadership promises to brighten India’s future and ease tensions between India and other nations.

Rajiv Gandhi’s insistence on calm and unity during the turmoil following his mother’s death and his firm handling of the Union Carbide chemical plant disaster in Bhopal show him rising to the demands of his office. Since then, he has moved to reform Indian politics by refusing to endorse the re-election bids of nearly half his Indian Congress Party’s state legislators. While Gandhi has not been able to root out corruption, observes Kreisberg, “older ministers can see all too clearly that new and younger substitutes are ready and in training to fill their shoes.”

Solving India’s problems, however, will take more than a political housecleaning. Although India has enjoyed economic buoyancy since 1982, urban and rural poverty levels have stayed roughly the same for the past 30 years. Some 16 million entrenched bureaucrats have hindered New Delhi’s attempts to tap the entrepreneurial talents of India’s relatively well-educated, middle-class population.

More troubling than the economy has been ethnic and religious strife. The Punjab, India’s richest state, has witnessed violent clashes between Sikhs and Hindus. Such internal conflicts affect India’s relations with its neighbors—especially Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. Many Hindus, for example, accuse their Moslem neighbors in Pakistan of encouraging dissidence among the Sikhs. Meanwhile, southern India harbors “secret” training camps for Sri Lankan Tamil guerrillas. At issue is Tamil autonomy from Sri Lanka’s ruling Sinhalese Buddhists. Residents of the northeast Indian state of Assam would like Gandhi to stop the influx of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.

In contrast to his approach on domestic issues, Rajiv Gandhi’s conduct toward Pakistan and India’s other neighbors is much like that of his mother—abrasive. Relations with the major powers (except for the Soviet Union) also have been tenuous for nearly a decade. Says Kreisberg: “The Indians have seen the Soviets as friends, the United States and China . . . as adversaries, and Japan, France and Britain . . . as trading partners.”

But Kreisberg suspects that Gandhi will eventually exhibit “a greater willingness to avoid confrontation, to deal with problems quietly and with at least the appearance of understanding.” As evidence of Gandhi’s more open nature, he notes that the Prime Minister does not seem to share his mother’s distrust of the United States, a country that he plans to visit twice this year.
Poland's 'Flying' University

Few phenomena better illustrate Poland's tradition of intellectual resistance than the Latajacy Uniwersytet, or "flying university."

Its most recent manifestation, relates Buczynska-Garewicz, herself a former flying university professor, appeared in January 1978. Thirty-seven professors and 15 writers issued a declaration lamenting "a dangerous disintegration of culture" and the "transformation of an intellectual into a performer of tasks." They set up the clandestine Towarzystwo Kursow Naukowych (TKN), or Society for Academic Studies. Over a two-year period, 500 students took courses in literature, philosophy, and history—holding classes in private homes.

Polish intellectuals developed their first underground educational system in the period from 1883 to 1905—a response to the continued partition of their country between Russia, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary. Holding classes in Russian-ruled Warsaw, notes Buczynska-Garewicz, the teachers aimed "to preserve Polish as the medium of instruction and to teach the language and literature in elementary and secondary schools."

During the Nazi occupation (1939-44), the underground educational movement was reborn. Teachers and students risked death or the concentration camps. Thus, scholarship became synonymous with courage, declares Buczynska-Garewicz, "so much so that the Polish people believe that one who is not courageous cannot be a good teacher."

Courage has been no less important in the present age. When the TKN opened in 1978, police immediately arrested its first lecturer and occupied his apartment. The group remained together for two more years, disbanding only after Premier Jozef Pinkowski's government agreed to reinstate several TKN professors at Warsaw University.

Since the imposition of martial law by Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski in 1981, the prospects for education once again look bleak. But if the past is any indication, the Polish flying university is sure to fly again.

Japan's Literary Liberation

Between 1945 and 1952, U.S. Occupation authorities under Gen. Douglas MacArthur tried to reshape the Japanese psyche, in part through literary censorship. Rubin, a scholar at the University of Washington, contends that, in an odd way, American censors liberated Japanese authors from their country's own prewar strictures.
OTHER NATIONS

Before the victorious Allies took over, Japanese writers were forced to work within the confines of the Emperor’s code, which stressed “wholesomeness” and family values. “Dangerous thoughts” (individualism, socialism) briefly bloomed in print after the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05). Then Tokyo clamped down again. Restrictions tightened as the Japanese military increased its political power during the 1930s and took the country into World War II.

In contrast, the U.S. Army’s Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) was relatively permissive. Outside of deleting some references to food shortages and to romances between American GIs and Japanese women, the censors left new fiction largely unscathed—although several novels exploring the U.S. atom-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were banned outright until the CCD was disbanded in 1949.

By then some 110 serious literary magazines were being published; novels and books of literary criticism filled bookstores. “Just as people hungered for food,” observed critic Nakamura Mitsuo, “they hungered for literature.” Many postwar writers (Niwa Fumio, Hayashi Fumiko, Funahashi Seiichi) vividly described war horrors and explicit sex, a new phenomenon in Japanese literature. The “quintessential postwar work,” in Rubin’s opinion, is Tamura Taijiro’s Gates of the Flesh (1947), in which five young prostitutes struggle to survive in bombed-out Tokyo. Sakaguchi Ango produced a landmark essay, “On Decadence,” that describes war as “a source of ultimate fulfillment and love and mindless ecstasy of destruction.”

Ironically, the American censors dealt most harshly with an ancient art form, kabuki theater. By December 1945, Rubin says, they had reviewed 518 classic plays and banned 322 of them because they championed “feudal” values—militarism, blind loyalty to leaders, the subservience of women. But updated kabuki, with actresses and modern music, was a flop. Within a year, the Americans relented.

China’s Young


In mainland China, 20 years of ideological twists and turns have left many Chinese disillusioned and wary of politics. Nowhere is this malaise more evident than in the troubled Communist Youth League (CYL), which is charged with indoctrinating the young and scouting for new Party members.

During the topsy-turvy Cultural Revolution (1966–76), fierce disputes over the correct ideological line left the CYL largely moribund, reports Rosen, a University of Southern California political scientist. In 1978, new leaders were installed in Beijing at a national CYL Congress. But membership has shown no great gains. The CYL added 26 million new names to its roster between 1978 and 1982 but suffered an equal number of dropouts: Only 20 percent (48 million) of the na-
When Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong declared that "to rebel is justified," Chinese youths took him at his word. In the fall of 1966, millions of young Chinese descended on Peking to hail the 73-year-old leader under the banner of "Red Guards."

Run mostly by aging Communist Party ideologues, the league has had difficulty adapting to Beijing's new "pragmatism." Some national and local CYL functionaries have dug in their heels against the new Party line. Others have sponsored membership seminars on business management, modern farming techniques, and other practical matters. But CYL cadres have no training in these fields themselves. Such efforts have flopped. In 1980, the CYL estimated that 30 percent of its 2.2 million local branches were virtually inactive.

CYL political instructors find their students far more interested in physics and chemistry than in Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought. Part of the problem, Rosen says, is that the CYL has not been able to fashion a revised ideology that reconciles traditional "redness" and "love of the collective" with Party Chairman Deng Xiaoping's new emphasis on individual initiative and economic growth. League propagandists have argued for several years over what role model to hold up for the nation's youth. Should it be a hardworking peasant lad or a brilliant, young mathematician?

The CYL is now trying to recruit more local leaders from prosperous farm families and the ranks of the college-educated. Rosen doubts this is the answer. The once powerful youth league, he says, has yet to develop a relevant mission in China's "new age of materialism."
"The New Middle Class and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia."
Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard Univ., 1737 Cambridge St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138. 36 pp. $4.95.
Authors: Mark Heller and Nadav Safran

The history of Middle Eastern politics since World War II has shown that traditional monarchies fall when a restive, secular middle class reaches a "critical mass." That has happened in Egypt (1952), Iraq (1958), Yemen (1962), Syria (1963), and Libya (1969). Saudi Arabia could well be next, according to Heller and Safran, respectively a professor at Tel Aviv University and the director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies.

Saudi Arabia (population: 10.5 million), the world's 12th largest nation in land area, is ruled as a religious monarchy. All power is vested in King Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud. No political parties and no national assembly exist; all law is by royal decree.

The nation's middle class, Heller and Safran say, has emerged as "a pivotal social formation." Confronted with a major economic setback or military embarrassment, it "may very well turn against the regime."

The new Saudi middle class is a by-product of the nation's oil industry, which has grown rapidly over the last 20 years. In 1965, the Saudis earned only $700 million in oil revenues. In 1981 that figure was $102.1 billion. Today, Saudi Arabia is the world's largest oil exporter.

The petroleum boom compelled the monarchy to create a modern bureaucracy, promote industrialization, and bolster the regime's military forces. Between 1965 and 1985, the number of civil servants grew from 3,600 to 56,000. Some 170,000 Saudis have a post-secondary education—many having studied abroad, especially in Great Britain and the United States.

Altogether, these members of the middle class now make up 8.1 percent of the work force—a four-fold increase over 20 years ago.

In promoting modernization, the authors assert, the Saudi regime may have hastened its own demise. Fervently nationalistic, the new middle class is beginning to question "the most sensitive areas of the regime, such as the privileges of the ruler, the basis of the political order, and the religious and cultural underpinnings of both." The new class is also hostile toward "imperial" foreigners and resents it when "native rulers are insufficiently resistant to 'neo-colonial' relations with the West."

Several conditions could prompt a revolution. The regime's failure to meet the middle class's rising economic expectations would be one of them. A military setback would also damage the regime. Heller and Safran present several scenarios: rebel seizure of the oil-producing Hasa region; a territorial dispute with neighboring Yemeni republics; or Saudi participation on the losing side of another Arab-Israeli war.

So far, the Saudi monarchy has successfully coped with social change, perhaps owing to its great wealth, vast territory, and the omnipresence of the royal family. Some 3,000 male members of the royal family hold key positions in the central and provisional governments.

Even so, the authors say, the odds that a political crisis will erupt and "produce upheaval" within the next 10 years are "considerably greater than even."
"The Elusive Exodus: Emigration from the United States."
Population Reference Bureau, P.O. Box 35012, Washington, D.C. 20013. 17 pp. $3.00.
Authors: Robert Warren and Ellen Percy Kraly

"The facts . . . contradict the notion that everyone wants to come to the United States and no one wants to leave."

So argue Warren, an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) statistician, and Kraly, a Colgate University demographer. Between 1900 and 1980, the United States legally admitted 30 million immigrants. But during the same period, 10 million people left the country to settle elsewhere.

Most emigrants, the authors say, are not U.S. citizens but recent immigrants who return to the "Old Country" (usually in Europe, Asia, or Latin America) because they are unemployed, disillusioned with American life, or just plain homesick. Thus, immigration and emigration tend to rise and fall at the same time. Between 1900 and 1914, for example, 13 million foreigners streamed into the United States, while four million people chose to leave.

From foreign immigration data, Warren and Kraly deduced that more than 100,000 Americans now leave their homeland each year. One-third of them resettle in Mexico or Canada. Another third head for European nations; Great Britain and West Germany are the most popular points of destination.

Today's emigration data, Warren and Kraly concede, is sketchy. The INS stopped keeping emigration records in 1957. Nevertheless, "immigration is accompanied by a substantial outflow"—a fact not without consequences. Washington, for example, distributes some federal funds to the states on the basis of current population estimates. Those figures would change if statisticians accounted for the Americans and non-Americans who leave the country each year.

Twentieth Century Fund, 41 East 70th St., New York, N.Y. 10021. 178 pp. $10.00.
Rapporteur: Peter Braestrup

After the unprecedented barring of journalists by the U.S. military for two whole days after the October 1983 Grenada invasion, there was much protest by the news media and calls by some journalists for (unlikely) redress in the federal courts. Cooler heads prevailed.

However, the Twentieth Century Fund, a nonpartisan foundation, summoned a 13-person task force of military folk, senior newsmen, and scholars to examine the military-media issues raised by the Grenada episode and to suggest remedies.

As the Fund report's mini-history makes clear, military-media relations in war zones have never been free of friction, even during World War II. In the interests of security and practicality, some curbs have always been placed on reporters. Of the 180 American journalists accredited to Gen. Dwight Eisenhower's headquarters in London, only 27 were allowed to accompany allied forces to the Normandy beaches on D-day (June 6, 1944). During the 1950-53 Korean War, reporters sought (and finally got) World War II–
RESEARCH REPORTS

style field censorship as competition spurred rival wire service reporters to reveal U.S. troop movements and other information useful to the foe. (Even after censorship, Newsweek published a map showing U.S. unit locations.) Yet security violations brought few reprisals from the military.

In South Vietnam, amid periodic dust-ups between Saigon reporters and officials, American journalists enjoyed a degree of access to the battlefield and freedom from censorship that astonished their Western European colleagues. Even so, over a decade few reporters violated the voluntary “ground rules” on disclosure of security matters set by U.S. officials, and most violations were minor.

Until Grenada, U.S. civilian authorities and military commanders regarded planning for maximum feasible press coverage of combat as routine. Why the change?

It was due partly to senior military perceptions, adopted by younger officers, that starting in Vietnam, the news media (especially television) had become untrustworthy, ignorant, hostile to the military, and thus an intolerable burden.

Widening the “culture gap” was the lack of exposure of younger newspeople to the military (the draft ended in 1973) but generous exposure to antimilitary sentiments on college campuses during the 1970s. The task force recommends more schooling for career officers on the First Amendment and on the strengths, weaknesses, and diversity of the media, and more schooling of journalists in military matters.

But the task force concludes that, besides common sense, the key to improved military-media relations in future battle areas lies in a return to the pre-Grenada tradition, at the direction of the president as Commander in Chief. To keep Washington officials and their critics honest, to enlighten the public on the deeds of its sons in battle, says the task force, “the presence of journalists in war zones is not a luxury but a necessity.”


Dept. of Sociology, Univ. of Chicago, 1126 East 59th St., Chicago, Ill. 60637. 68 pp.

Authors: William Julius Wilson and Kathryn M. Neckerman

The alarming increase in the number of female-headed black families has caused scholars to think anew about the plight of the black family. Wilson and Neckerman, a professor of sociology and researcher, respectively, at the University of Chicago, believe that the situation has worsened because young black women are “facing a shrinking pool of ‘marriageable’ (that is, economically stable) men.”

The data show a rapid disintegration of the black nuclear family. In 1960, of all black families, 22 percent were headed by a single, separated, or divorced woman; by 1983, that figure had nearly doubled. Consequently, the number of black children growing up in fatherless families has skyrocketed, increasing 41 percent during the 1970s.

A large portion of these families is headed for economic hardship. In 1982, of all married-couple families in the United States, 7.6 percent lived in poverty. For female-headed black families the figure was 56 percent.

The authors point out that female-headed households have increased not because more young black women are having babies; in recent years, their fertility rates have stayed about the same. Instead, the percentage of black
mothers who are married has declined sharply. Between 1960 and 1980, the proportion of never-married black women, ages 15–24, grew from 30 to 69 percent. And the incidence of separation (now 22 percent) and divorce (now 20 percent) increased sharply too.

Why are more and more black men and women either not getting married or not staying together?

Wilson and Neckerman try to answer that question by discrediting several common explanations. Black family problems cannot be traced to "the lingering effects of slavery." They cite historian Herbert Gutman's finding that most black families were headed by both parents up until World War II.

Nor is the problem related to welfare, which, according to some social commentators, entices women to forego marriage (or remarriage) in order to qualify for more lucrative benefits. Welfare payments, the authors point out, vary from state to state. Several studies have shown little correlation between out-of-wedlock births and benefit levels.

Instead, more black women are raising children alone because the "male marriage pool index" has shrunk in recent years. In other words, fewer young men are in the position to support a family. Between 1930 and 1980, the proportion of employed adult black males fell from 80 to 56 percent.

If present trends continue, the authors warn, the year 2000 "will see 70 percent of all black families headed by single women and fewer than 30 percent of all black men employed. The human costs of such continued erosion of the black family are socially, politically, and morally unacceptable."

"Constitutional Inequality: The Political Fortunes of the Equal Rights Amendment."
Author: Gilbert Y. Steiner

What killed the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)? Steiner, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, examines the feminist struggle in detail.

In 1970–72, Rep. Martha Griffiths (D.-Mich.) and her allies in the Senate pushed the ERA through Congress by margins well over the two-thirds majority required for an amendment to the Constitution. From there the ERA went to the state legislatures. Thirty-three (of the required 38) states had ratified it by late 1974. Then it stalled. Congress extended the ratification period until 1982—in vain. In 1983, a reintroduced ERA failed to get the necessary votes in the House and died.

Many factors were to blame. The first was the rise of the antiabortion "pro-life" movement, which reacted to the Supreme Court's 1973 Roe v. Wade decision decriminalizing most abortions. The abortion debate divided politicians—and seemed to link the ERA to "pro-choice" feminists.

The second was Congress's 1980 renewal of draft registration—for men only. That made the adoption of the ERA—which did not discriminate between the sexes—no longer politically feasible.

ERA proponents could seek victory in the courts, says Steiner. The U.S. Supreme Court could establish gender as a "suspect classification" (like race) in violation of the Constitution's Equal Protection clause without considering abortions or women in combat, subjects on which it has previously ruled.
"The main task of the Five Year Plan," proclaims this 1971 poster, "is to ensure a significant rise in the material and cultural standard of living. . . ." Since the mid-1970s, the Soviet GNP—which grew at an average annual rate of nearly five percent from 1960 to 1975—has stagnated, rising in 1980 by only 1.4 percent.
Soviet Life, 1985

Why is the Soviet system, with so many problems, as stable as it is? Princeton University’s Stephen F. Cohen argues that the Kremlin has provided most Soviet citizens with security, national pride, and modest “improvements in each succeeding generation’s way of life.” Other Sovietologists contend that, thanks to the regime’s success in repressing dissent, blocking foreign influence, and curbing travel abroad, most Soviet citizens do not know what they are missing. The Kremlin’s “command economy” gives the military ample weaponry and thus buttresses Soviet claims to superpower status; otherwise, the system simply muddles along. In some ways, the average Russian industrial worker fares no better today than his American counterpart did 50 years ago. Here, three scholars present their findings on the Soviet “quality of life.” Sociologist Mark G. Field examines health care; political scientist Henry W. Morton surveys urban housing; and sociologist Mervyn Matthews describes the experience of the sizable Soviet underclass.

IN SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH

by Mark G. Field

“Either the louse defeats socialism,” Vladimir I. Lenin warned in 1919, “or socialism defeats the louse.”

As Lenin spoke, the parasite was spreading a deadly typhus epidemic throughout the Soviet Union. Ultimately, of course, Soviet-style socialism won the battle, but not before some three million lives were lost. Other infectious diseases, such as smallpox, relapsing fever, and even plague, claimed an additional five to seven million lives between 1916 and 1924.
Today, deadly infectious diseases are no longer a serious problem for the Soviets. As in the West, heart disease and cancer now rank as the leading causes of death. The Soviet Union provides free medical care to each and every one of its citizens, and it claims more than double the number of hospital beds per 10,000 people (115) and nearly twice as many doctors (some 850,000) as the United States. (And Soviet doctors still make house calls.) Moscow, Leningrad, and a few other major cities boast large medical research institutes. Americans and other foreigners sometimes travel to Soviet hospitals for special medical treatments. About 50 U.S. citizens have visited the Helmholtz Institute of Ophthalmology, which has pioneered treatment of retinitis pigmentosa, a hereditary disease that usually leads to blindness.

By the early 1970s, however, there were signs that something had gone awry. Moscow simply stopped publishing some kinds of medical data—presumably to avoid embarrassment. In fact, Murray Feshbach, a Georgetown University demographer, has shown that the 1970s dealt the Soviet Union unprecedented reversals in some vital health indicators. Alone among the world’s industrialized nations, it experienced a rise in infant mortality. Indeed, death rates are up for all age groups. A Soviet male born in 1966 could expect to live 66 years; by 1979, male life expectancy at birth had dropped to 62, below that of Costa Rica (66.3), Syria (63.8), and Yugoslavia (65.4).

**Not Enough Ammunition**

Such setbacks probably reflect growing Soviet social problems more than they do defects in Soviet doctors or hospitals. Alcoholism, a diet high in cholesterol, and hypertension (a product of overcrowding and poor living conditions in Russian cities) contribute to heart disease. Poor diets increase the risk of cancer. Frequent abortions among Soviet women can lead to later complications during childbirth.

Yet the Soviet health care system is clearly in trouble. Between 1955 and 1977, the share of the Soviet gross national
product (GNP) allotted to medical care dropped by more than one-fifth, to about two percent, even though outlays kept growing in absolute terms. Moscow's medical budget was $28 billion in 1979. Meanwhile, the United States was struggling to hold down total public and private health care costs below $212 billion, nine percent of the GNP.

Western medicine is a capital-intensive enterprise, dominated by CAT scanners, heart-lung respirators, and radioisotope machines. Soviet health care is, by contrast, labor-intensive. "Like the Red Army of an earlier era," notes Harvard University's Nick Eberstadt, "Soviet physicians assault the adversary in huge numbers, but without sufficient ammunition." (Also thrown into the battle are 2.7 million nurses and fel'dshers, or paramedics.)

The quality of care varies widely—it is generally better in the cities than in the countryside, better in the Russian west than in the Asian east. But nowhere is it particularly good (except perhaps in the special facilities reserved for the Soviet elite). The Soviets offer far more hospital beds (3.2 million in a
land of 269 million) than any other nation. But, by Western standards, there is very little in Soviet hospitals besides beds. Medical equipment is scarce and often of 1940’s or 50’s vintage. It can take a week or more to obtain simple blood tests and x-rays. There are only a few dozen kidney dialysis machines in the entire nation. If American hospitals sometimes do too much for their patients, Soviet hospitals are guilty of doing too little. One might say that many of them are dormitories for people who do not feel well.

There is also a difference in the ethos of Soviet health care. In the West, medicine is regarded chiefly as an expression of humanitarian concern for the individual, and its quality reflects that emphasis. The Soviets view medical care as essential for the good of society, much as an army uses its medical corps to maintain its troops’ fighting capacity. As an old Bolshevik slogan recently revived by the Soviet press puts it: “Your health is the property of the republic!”

**Doctors as Technicians**

The Soviet Ministry of Health Protection oversees the sprawling system of medical research institutes, hospitals, sanatoriums, polyclinics, and dispensaries from its Moscow headquarters. The Ministry pays doctors’ salaries and is responsible for all health facilities, but city governments and factories foot the bill for construction costs within the vast “territorial” network that serves the general public. The smaller and far superior “closed” network runs by separate rules and is restricted to all but Communist Party officials, leading scientists, and other members of the elite. The military relies on its own doctors and hospitals.

For average folk—everybody from university professors to steelworkers—the neighborhood polyclinic is the center of medical care. Here one finds the general practitioners, dentists, and psychiatrists who serve as the Soviet equivalent of the “family doctor.” (In the big cities, specialized dispensaries tend to expectant mothers, the mentally ill, and other distinctive groups.) In theory, there is one polyclinic manned by 20 general practitioners for every 40,000 people, housed in a storefront, a freestanding building, a factory, or sometimes even an ordinary apartment. Also in the polyclinic are pediatricians (one for every 800 children under 16) and part-time specialists. This is the “ground floor” of Soviet medicine, where Soviet citizens take their aches and pains, their migraine headaches and swollen ankles.
More likely than not, they will be offered a dose of common-sense advice and a prescription like "Take two aspirins and call me in the morning"—when aspirins are available. The polyclinics also dispense penicillin and tranquilizers, as well as camomile tea (for ulcers) and nettle leaves (for arthritis). Medicinal herbs are widely used.

Most Soviet vrachi (doctors) practice a kind of common-sense, low-technology medicine, based on the assumptions that most illnesses cure themselves, that few patients ought to be referred to specialists, and that the rest are beyond remedy. That is about all they can offer. Soviet medical training lasts only six years (including internship) and begins right after high school, at age 18. Unlike American schools, with their eight years of graduate instruction and their professional problem-solving bent, Soviet medical institutes offer basic vocational education. The curriculum stresses hands-on learning and memorization of standard "protocols" of treatment for each condition. Innovation is not encouraged (nor is it often technologically feasible): By 1980, Soviet heart surgeons had performed a cumulative total of 800 coronary bypass operations; their U.S. counterparts completed 137,000 during 1980 alone.

Doctoring tends to be a low-status, low-paying occupation. The newly minted M.D. begins her career (70 percent of all doctors in the USSR are women) after three years of mandatory service to the state, usually in a remote region. She will draw a salary of about $183 monthly, only 75 percent of the average national wage, and she will live in the same apartment buildings, stand in the same lines, and (except for top medical researchers and administrators) receive the same medical care as any ordinary working woman.

Meeting the Death Quota

At the clinic, patients are assigned to a single doctor, so friendships can develop over the years. (It is hard to imagine that patients feel much affection for their dentists, who usually work without novocaine and are notoriously quick to pull teeth.) The talk during a visit to the polyclinic doctor is as likely to turn to neighborhood gossip as it is to medical matters. But when the waiting lines are long, as they often are, little time remains for chit-chat or the social graces. Polyclinic doctors are expected to see about five patients an hour; yet the Soviets' own studies show that it takes at least five minutes to fill out the numerous forms required by employers and the medical bureaucracy for each patient.
THE 'GREEN SERPENT'

"It is Russia's joy to drink," said Saint Vladimir of Kiev during the 10th century. "We cannot do without it." A millennium later, Saint Vladimir's assessment still rings true. Moscow has restricted the publication of alcohol consumption data since the mid-1950s. But according to Vladimir Treml, professor of economics at Duke University, evidence from retail statistics, trade journals, and other sources indicates that the USSR ranks first in consumption per capita of vodka and other "strong" alcohol. Alcoholism pervades Soviet society, reducing labor productivity, and, by most accounts, increasing crime and divorce rates. Treml estimates that the zelenaia zmeia ("green serpent")—the Russian nickname for vodka—stands behind only heart ailments and cancer as a cause of death.

During the past 25 years, consumption of state-produced alcoholic beverages has risen by 6.9 percent annually per capita. Much of the increase can be attributed to a growing number of teen-age and female drinkers. Alcoholism is worst among the Slavic and Baltic peoples. Only the Muslims of Azerbaydzhan, Central Asia, and parts of Georgia remain temperate, drinking half as much as the Slavs. The difference is partly reflected in lower Muslim rates of crime, divorce, and morbidity.

What explains the surge of alcoholism in the USSR? Part of the answer may involve economics. The past three decades have seen both a shorter workweek and an increase in average real income. Without a comparable improvement in the availability of consumer goods and services or of entertainment and leisure facilities, drinking became the easiest way to escape boredom. A 1981 survey of youth hostel workers near Moscow found that a third of them drank "because they had nothing else to do."

Other factors include demographics. By some accounts, urbanization in the USSR has brought with it feelings of alienation among millions of transplanted country folk. A lasting male-female imbalance—the result of severe manpower losses in World War II—has made many Soviet women heavy drinkers. In 1979, a Literaturnaia Gazeta (Literary Gazette) survey of female alcoholics found that half of them drank simply to relieve loneliness.

Not even the Kremlin is satisfied with this basic health care. "The work of polyclinics, dispensaries, and out-patient clinics, which handle 80 percent of all the sick, must substantially improve," Leonid Brezhnev declared in a 1977 speech. "Unfortunately, in a number of places they lag behind the possi-
Whatever the cause, the consequences of alcoholism are there for all to see. Using Soviet forensic medicine statistics, Treml calculates that deaths from alcohol poisoning alone rose from about 12,500 during the mid-1960s to 51,000 in 1978. Such mishaps often result from the Russian popot—a massive binge, usually on an empty stomach. The increase in fatalities is probably due to the use of low-quality alcohol in home-made samogon, a vodka-like liquor that now accounts for almost one-third of all alcohol consumed in the USSR. In addition, the relatively high price of vodka—a half-liter bottle costs roughly five rubles, or 12 percent of the average Soviet worker’s weekly wage—has driven many Soviets to drink not only more samogon but also after-shave lotion, cleaning fluid, varnish, and industrial alcohol.

Heavy drinking has invaded the Soviet workplace. During the 1970s, Soviet economists S. Strumilin and M. Sonin estimated that drunkenness regularly reduced labor productivity by 10 percent. (At the Nizhny Tagil Metallurgical Combine, for example, drunken workers caused 908 on-the-job accidents in 1982.) Factory managers compound the problem by dispensing vodka or industrial alcohol as a bonus to hard working employees.

Moscow has made serious efforts to combat alcohol abuse. In the Ukraine, coal miners reporting to work must take daily sobriety tests. In Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities, sobering up stations, or vytrezvitel’, provide overnight confinement for drunks picked up by the police. The guilty must pay fines; their names are reported to their employers. In 1979, between 12 and 15 percent of the Soviet adult population spent at least one night in these vytrezvitel’. (In the United States—where drinking problems are serious by Western standards—about 0.6 percent of all adults are arrested annually for drunkenness.) Other penalties are more severe: In 1980, Trud reported that one drunk driver who killed six people in Moscow with a ZIL-555 dump truck had been sentenced to death.

Ironically, efforts to reduce consumption can only go so far. Taxes on liquor supply 12 percent of the USSR’s annual revenues. That fiscal reality has thwarted any consistent and sustained campaign against drinking. One Moscow store manager summed up the dilemma. “We do have a conscience,” he told Pravda in 1978, "...but we have our plan, and we want to receive a bonus.”

This essay is adapted from a longer paper by Vladimir Treml in Soviet Politics in the 1980s (1984) and used by permission of Westview Press.
rural areas, speedy ambulance service can be had by dialing 03. But that is no guarantee of quick admission. In the Siberian city of Irkutsk, for example, all emergency admissions are dispatched to a single city hospital after 3:00 p.m. Medical hospitals sometimes refuse to accept patients who are terminally ill. (They must be taken home, since there are virtually no nursing homes.) The reason: Exceeding the "death quota" that the Ministry of Health assigns to every hospital would invite an investigation by Moscow.

Nevertheless, one out of every four Russians is hospitalized every year (compared to one of seven Americans). Surgery, abortions, and broken bones are the ordinary hospital physician's stock in trade. Specialized hospitals exist for the treatment of cancer, heart problems, and the like.

Once inside a hospital, patients sometimes find it hard to leave. Generous quotas fix the length of hospitalization for each operation—the stay after an appendectomy is 10 days; a hysterectomy, two weeks. But the rules also prevent patients from leaving before their allotted time is up, even if they are already fully recovered. Soviet citizens seem to have adapted to this system: Three San Francisco doctors who have treated many Soviet émigrés note that the "quality of care is judged by a Russian patient as length of time in bed." Indeed, the San Francisco Russians are suspicious of hospital physicians who are eager to send them home.

**A Lethal Indifference**

The Soviet hospital is a world of top-to-bottom rules, regulations, and quotas. If the number of appendectomies performed at a hospital falls below the annual target set by the Ministry of Health, more cases magically appear on the books. The same is true of hospital occupancy rates. Otherwise, the authorities in Moscow might trim next year's budget. Bureaucratic hugger-mugger extends all the way to the top. A few years ago, Dr. Boris Petrovskii, then Health Minister of the USSR, announced that 60 new special purpose hospitals had been built. "However," he added, "in some cities they exist only formally." By this, Petrovskii meant that the hospitals existed only on paper.

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*Moscow condemns abortion and banned it between 1936 and 1955, but it is now available upon demand, except in the case of first pregnancies. Western demographers estimate that the average (non-Muslim) Soviet woman has six abortions during her lifetime; abortions outnumber live births by 4 to 1. Abortion is a major means of birth control, in part because contraceptive pills are in short supply and not widely accepted and because diaphragms come in only one ill-fitting size.
Soviet citizens proudly point to the low cost of health care. This cartoon from Krokodil depicts a patient trying to leave a U.S. hospital without first settling his $2,000 bill.

In the wards and operating rooms of Soviet hospitals, the bureaucratic indifference that seems merely annoying in shops and government offices turns lethal. One Moscow cardiology clinic is reportedly located on the top floor of a five-story walk-up. Physicians, reduced to the status of state functionaries, often resort to practicing medicine by the numbers. If a patient exhibits some of the symptoms of, say, appendicitis, he may well be wheeled into the operating room without benefit of any further medical tests.*

Frequently, as American doctors treating Soviet émigrés have discovered, patients are kept in the dark about the nature of their illness. The “nine-to-five” mentality flourishes: Soviet physicians will not hesitate to drop everything as soon as their shift ends. Their bedside manner is notoriously chilly. In a 1977 survey of citizens’ complaints about the quality of medical care in Kiev, Literaturnaia Gazeta told of one doctor who said to a patient: “You have a stomach ulcer and diabetes. You will not survive an operation. I simply do not know what to do with you.”

There is no real deterrent to insensitivity and incomple-

*According to Feshbach, data from the Russian Republic for 1971–76 reveal that more than 25 percent of all cancer cases and 18 percent of heart- and blood-related diseases were misdiagnosed.
Patients are seldom assigned to the same doctor on return visits to the hospital, and the doctors know that the patients and paychecks will keep coming no matter what they do. Physicians can be fired for gross errors, but medical malpractice suits and the payment of damages to patients are unheard of. And although the Soviets repeat ad infinitum that socialized medicine has removed the capitalistic “cash nexus” between doctor and patient, it is not uncommon for patients to purchase a bit of special care—a ruble or two to a nurse to ensure a regular change of sheets, much more to convince a superior specialist to take one’s case.

Despite it all, patients seldom question the judgment of doctors. To do so would be nekul'turno, an act of arrogance. Naturally, physicians encourage that attitude—as any bureaucrat would—to make their work easier.

Mud Baths and Mare’s Milk

Bureaucratic arteriosclerosis poses some peculiar hazards. Strictly enforced regulations dating from the days when it was believed that most infectious organisms were brought into hospitals from the outside require visitors to shed their coats at the hospital door. Inside, however, hygiene is slackly maintained.

William A. Knaus, a young Washington, D.C., internist, is one of the few American physicians to have spent a great deal of time in Soviet hospitals. In Inside Russian Medicine (1981), he tells of an American named David who was hospitalized for chronic gastritis in Moscow’s Botkin Hospital. Because Westerners are sometimes brought there, the Botkin, a compound of pre-revolutionary and newer buildings, is probably above average. On David’s floor, there were three toilets for 76 men. “These had no seats,” Knaus writes, “and, unless one brought a morning copy of Pravda, no toilet paper.” To make matters worse, Soviet nurses dispense enemas as freely as their American counterparts give back rubs. The toilets at the Botkin constantly overflowed onto the bathroom floor.

More than negligence is involved. The Soviets lack the disposable syringes, needles, and other implements that Western doctors take for granted. Transfusions, for example, are typically performed with steel needles and red rubber tubing, which are then rinsed and reused. Knaus also witnessed intravenous solutions being poured from open jars and doctors performing a minor operation without surgical gowns or masks. As a result of such lax enforcement of sterility, the incidence of postoperative infections is very high, affecting almost one-third of all surgery...
patients—roughly equivalent to the rate that prevails in Afghanistan, according to Knaus.

Shortages, which plague the lowliest rural polyclinic and the best Moscow hospitals, also affect the quality of care. Not only do doctors occasionally run out of certain antibiotics, insulin, glycerine (for heart patients), and other drugs, but even bandages, absorbent cotton, thermometers, and iodine can be difficult to procure at times. The pattern extends to basic equipment. Last year, a West German company began construction of the first wheelchair factory in the Soviet Union; today, patients who cannot walk are carried about on stretchers. A female physician told Knaus, "With a stethoscope like [yours], I could become the best doctor in Siberia." Sometimes even the black market cannot compensate for the legal economy's shortcomings. "Like many other foreign residents in Moscow," notes New York Times correspondent Hedrick Smith, "I was frequently approached by Russian friends with urgent pleas for help in obtaining critically needed medicines, unavailable at any price in Moscow."

Perhaps the brightest spot in the Soviet health care system is the sanatorium. There are about 2,280 of these scattered around the country, most of them devoted to the treatment of particular ailments (arthritis, diabetes, hypertension) that do not require regular hospitalization. Here the average citizen can get the kind of individualized care in relatively pleasant surroundings that is lacking elsewhere. A typical stay lasts 24 days, marked by a doctor's visit every fourth day, mud baths and mineral water baths on alternating days, sound wave and heat treatments, regular exercise, and generous portions of food (including kumys, or mare's milk, which is believed to have strong curative powers).

**A Fundamental Illness**

Access to the sanatoriums is controlled by labor unions, which distribute tickets as rewards to productive workers in lieu of raises, or to those workers who require special treatment. The sanatoriums serve some eight million Soviets annually. Tickets are highly prized. Often, a long wait, a bit of negotiation, and perhaps a few well-placed gifts are necessary to secure the privilege of a visit. Nobody knows if the sanatoriums' rather unorthodox treatments are effective, but patients seem to leave feeling happier. As one sanatorium doctor told Knaus, "A person's emotional reaction to disease is very important." In a way, these sanatoriums function as the Soviet Union's sugar pills.
Soviet leaders can turn abroad for medical help. Leonid Brezhnev, here stumbling at a 1978 meeting with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany, reportedly had a pacemaker implanted by British surgeons.

At the apex of the Soviet medical pyramid is the complex of medical institutions, rest homes, and dispensaries that are reserved exclusively for the members of the Kremlin elite and their families, and that parallel the other perquisites of rank such as private dachas, chauffeured limousines, seaside vacation homes, and access to restricted shops selling foreign or scarce domestic goods.

Even at the top, though, the limitations of the Soviet system still show. Restricted hospitals provide the best that Soviet medicine has to offer in the way of doctors, drugs, and technology (much of it imported from the satellite countries or

*Distinctions of rank persist within the Kremlin polyclinic. A Soviet endocrinologist told Knaus that “deputy ministers and persons of lower rank are seen in regular private cubicles, but ministers have special examining rooms . . . There are carpets on the floor, bookcases, a leather couch, and heavy red drapes over the windows. It is like a living room, not a clinic.”

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Cardiovascular problems are the concern of a growing number of Soviet medical researchers. In 1983, Moscow christened a vast, new 23-building headquarters for its national Cardiology Research Center, built at a cost of some $117 million. The scientists have their work cut out for them: While deaths from heart disease and other cardiovascular ills dropped steadily between 1960 and 1980 in the United States, they doubled in the Soviet Union. Alcoholism is a major contributing factor, along with smoking, which is on the increase despite vigorous public health campaigns. (Since 1977, some cigarette packs have borne the warning: "Smoking is Hazardous to Your Health.") Cancer, the number two killer and also on the rise (as it is in the United States), is the domain of other specialized hospitals and research institutes.

**No Easy Cure**

Accidents, poisonings, and injuries, long the third leading cause of death (as in the United States) have also increased in number, but apparently not as rapidly as respiratory diseases. According to Feshbach, the incidence of influenza, pneumonia, and similar maladies quintupled between 1960 and 1979; they may now constitute the Soviet Union's number three cause of death. Other infectious diseases—whooping cough, diphtheria, measles, mumps, scarlet fever—have also been on the rise. The explanation? Feshbach speculates that Soviet vaccines and medications are inferior in quality, insufficiently refrigerated during shipping, and administered under unsanitary conditions that nullify their effects. And it is also possible that vaccine manufacturers are diluting their products to meet their production quotas.

The harshest indictment of Soviet health care, however, is the unprecedented upsurge in deaths of children before their first birthday. Between 1970 and 1980, these increased by

*If past performance is any guide, there is little cause for optimism about Soviet research. Russian medical scientists have pioneered a few new medical techniques—an ultrasound treatment that shatters gallstones without surgery, a surgical procedure called radial keratotomy that alleviates severe myopia—but they lag behind in most areas. One reason is money. The United States outspends the Soviet Union 25 to 1 in medical research. Complicating matters is the lack of cross-fertilization between theory and practice. Physicians are barred from laboratories, and researchers are confined mostly to their institutes and seldom teach.*

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roughly 25 percent, to 28 per 1,000 births. Better medical reporting in remote rural areas may account for 25 to 50 percent of the rise, but poor maternal health, exacerbated by smoking and drinking, as well as the revival of widespread infectious diseases doubtless play a large role. A concerted prenatal care and education effort by Moscow seems to have had little success. (The Soviets have published no official data on infant mortality since 1975.)

What conclusions can one draw about the overall quality of medical care in the Soviet Union?

With its plethora of physicians and hospital beds, Soviet medicine seems impressive. Its progress since the 1917 Revolution has been monumental. And yet the quality of care is low by Western standards. Indeed, in some respects, it resembles what one sees in the Third World.

Part of the problem is the Kremlin's tightfisted approach to medical care, which is unlikely to ease as long as military budgets remain high. But it would be foolish to argue that there is nothing wrong with Soviet medicine that a few billion rubles would not solve. The problem is not only that Soviet hospitals are short of cash but that the factories do not manufacture certain antibiotics, sutures, or respirators, and that the medical industry's suppliers do not deliver sufficient raw materials and component parts. The dead hand of bureaucracy is everywhere. The ills of Soviet medicine are the same as those of the Soviet system in general, and they cannot be cured without first treating the underlying problems.
THE HOUSING GAME

by Henry W. Morton

In "The Exchange," a story by the late Yuri Trifonov, a popular Russian writer who often dealt with the stratagems of the Soviet urban middle class, a Moscow woman changes her official apartment registration and legally moves in with her husband's dying mother—whom she hates.

She makes the shift for one important reason: to prevent the old lady's precious single room from reverting, upon her death, to the state. The woman reckons that, through the bartering system used by millions of city folk, she will be able to use the place to swap for more space for her family.

As the story suggests, urban housing remains one of the Soviet Union's major problems. Housing was bad under the tsars; it grew worse during Josef Stalin's reign (1924–53), when headlong industrialization policies drove peasants to urban factory sites and World War II destruction left more than 25 million homeless. The crowding of many families into one apartment became universal. By 1950, the average city resident had less than five square meters (about seven feet by seven feet) of living space to call his own. As late as 1960, some 60 percent of all city families lived communally, sharing rooms with others.

I vividly remember sitting in the office of M. I. Romanov, the vice-chairman in charge of housing for the Leningrad District of Moscow, one day in 1964. In four and a half hours, he saw 31 people, all of them seeking separate apartments. They came as supplicants entreating an official representative of Soviet power to grant them this favor, small for him but enormous for them, that would immeasurably improve their lives. Only three, all very sick, got satisfaction. The others accepted their fate with resignation, except for a few who began berating Romanov for having failed them in their hour of need.

Stalin's successors decided to try to eliminate the housing shortage, and since 1957 the state has built an average of 2.2 million units yearly, far more than any other country. In most cities, old housing districts are now outnumbered by new ones, ranging from "Khrushchev slums," four- or five-story walkups thrown up in the late 1950s,* to clusters of taller elevator build-

*Appalled by the housing shortage, Nikita Khrushchev approved hasty, slipshod construction. "Do you build a thousand adequate apartments or 700 good ones?" he asked. Rapid urbanization argued for mere adequacy. The USSR had two cities (Moscow and Leningrad) of more than one million in 1926; today it has 23, and apartments are the staple. Single-family houses may not be built in towns of more than 100,000.
ings (nine to 25 stories) built during the 1970s and '80s to limit urban sprawl. By 1982, the average urban living space per capita was up to nine square meters, or almost 100 square feet.

Typically, however, some citizens have fared better than others. Some Soviet families I knew and officials I interviewed in Moscow and Leningrad during the 1970s had their own apartments; a decade earlier, they were squeezed into one room and sharing kitchens and toilets with strangers. The knowledge that a class of housing "rich" exists has bred resentment among the millions of housing "poor" still awaiting a place of their own.

Even today, 40 years after World War II, the USSR has the worst housing shortage of any industrial nation. New construction notwithstanding, Soviet cities are still overwhelmed by the numbers of people who have come to them, or want to. Twenty percent of urban "households" were sharing apartments in 1980, and five percent lived in factory dormitories. The Soviet government claims that every year 10 million people improve their living situation in one way or another. But no statistics are published (as they are in other countries) on the gap between numbers of households and housing units. Yet the gap remains wide. Between 1973 and 1982, new marriages exceeded the number of new housing units built by 6,175,226. Young Soviet couples are destined to live with in-laws for years, perhaps decades.

Not surprisingly, good housing, being scarce, is one of the Soviet regime's rewards to the deserving. Along with a car and a country dacha, an apartment is one of any city family's most sought-after material goals. Unlike an auto, which costs about four times the average annual pay of an industrial worker, and an even more expensive dacha, a state-owned apartment is allocated free to the fortunate family that gets one. Rent, heavily subsidized, typically accounts for only five percent of a family's monthly earnings (versus roughly 30 percent in America).

But low cost does not mean easy availability. Government agencies allocate state housing and approve all private housing transactions. (The state owns 75 percent of all urban units.)

*The Soviet cost of housing, as a percentage of income, was the lowest in the world when it was set in 1928. It has never been raised. The cheap rent, which today covers only one-third of the average cost of maintaining state-owned housing, is very popular with city-dwellers, although they pay for the rent subsidy through higher prices for clothing and other goods.

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"A new home is coming to the country, and with it, a new way of life." Despite the optimism of this 1960 poster, most rural folk still live in izbas, squat log cabins that lack indoor plumbing.

They do not do so on the basis of need, and never have.

After the Bolshevik Revolution, homes and apartments of the nobility and the bourgeoisie were divided among workers and peasants; some got more than others. In Hope Abandoned (1974), the second volume of her memoirs, Soviet author Nadezhda Mandelstam recalled how, during the early 1920s, writers in favor with the regime received privileged housing, even if only a room, as well as extra food rations; those not so highly regarded received nothing. Today, quarters are still apportioned, to a certain extent, by degree of "favor":

- The "least favored" urban-dwellers are those clustered beyond the borders of Moscow, Leningrad, and other large cities; they commute long distances to work by bus or train. Living in crowded tenements and dormitories, often in sight of the city's outermost high-rise buildings, they are the Soviet "urban poor," who lack access to the amenities of the cities in which they toil, such as shops, theaters, and parks. Comfortable suburbs, as Westerners know them, do not exist.

- The "less favored" folk are usually relegated to shared apartments and dormitories, but these quarters are within the city limits. Possessing a legal right to live there, they can at least aspire to an apartment of their own. Meanwhile, they can enjoy urban amenities.

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The "more favored" families have their own apartments in new housing districts—desirable, even though commuting to work may take an hour by bus and subway and shopping is difficult because the best stores are clustered in the center of the city.

The "most favored" citizens live in or near downtown. They are often members of the nomenklatura—officials of important political, military, state security, economic, scientific, cultural, educational, and worker organizations. The most heavily subsidized city-dwellers, they pay the same low rent per square meter as those elsewhere in shared apartments. The most advantaged thus become the system's biggest beneficiaries.

Closed Cities

Whether they are old inner-city residences or new, prefabricated apartment blocks that seem to have sprung from a single blueprint, most urban housing structures are not "differentiated" for middle-class or working-class folk. In one older building, a typical 450 square-foot apartment with four bedrooms, kitchen, and one bath may house: a retired couple; a factory worker and his divorced wife and their daughter, all still together because he cannot find other lodging; a widow; and a young couple who work during the day and study at night. Another apartment of similar size may have only two families. A third may accommodate just one (privileged) family.

But "differentiation" is increasing. Government departments, the armed forces, the Committee of State Security (KGB), individual factories, and other organizations build apartments solely for their own employees. In the buildings erected by the Writers' Union on Moscow's Red Army Street near Dynamo Station, high-ranking people not only get first crack at apartments but can also obtain them for their relatives.

Class also counts in cooperatives, the state-built apartments primarily purchased by professionals and other members of the "intelligentsia" who pay to get better housing faster than ordinary workers. The down payment for a two-room (plus kitchen) unit may be 6,500 rubles, more than three years' pay for the typical industrial worker averaging 175 rubles a month. And space in the rare co-op that is near a subway station (most are built in remote districts) may require bribes of 1,000 rubles to the co-op chairman and the inspector who processes the application. Still, owners exhibit much pride of place. A Moscow engineer told a Westerner: "See our block... We live in one made up entirely of cooperative apartments. Around us—over there,
and there—are workers’ apartments. You see the difference very clearly in the mornings. The lights in workers’ homes go on at seven, or earlier. In cooperative housing they may not be on until eight or nine.”

Most of the Soviet Union’s smaller cities and towns are unexciting and short of meat, butter, and better quality consumer goods and services. But the authorities do not want Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov, and other better supplied centers to be overrun by migrants; permission to move to the Big City is rarely granted. No lists of “closed” cities are published, but entry is controlled by a system built around the propiska, a residence permit that is affixed to the internal passport that everyone must carry. To live in a large city one must have a propiska. To be eligible for this permit, one must have housing. For that one needs—a propiska!

For a would-be migrant from perhaps the Caucasus or Murmansk, success depends on several factors, among them the popularity of the city (Moscow is the hardest to get into) and the person’s profession, need, and “trustworthiness” based on his kharakteristiki (references). The steps, from acquiring a propiska to receiving comfortable housing, may take decades.

Without the sponsorship of, say, a government agency or factory, or an apartment elsewhere to exchange, one’s chance of moving to a prized city is next to nil. The more prestigious an individual’s job, the greater the demand for his skills, or the higher his party rank, the better his chances. Ordinary laborers may also succeed, if their services are needed—and if dormitory beds are available. A person from the provinces may become a dvornik, the live-in concierge who cleans the hallways of an apartment building and serves as an agent for the local police; it has been difficult to get Muscovites to take such work.

**Beating the System**

How does the would-be urbanite proceed? First, a residence must be acquired; the propiska is always for a specific street address. Thus, to get on a waiting list for an apartment, one must first find a room to occupy as a subtenant. Then one goes to the local housing office to see the pasportist, the official in charge of residence permits. He takes the propiska application to the district police station, where it is processed.

The next hurdle, for one who gets a propiska, is to move into an apartment of his own. If one already enjoys the minimum “sanitary norm” of nine square meters of space, getting on the waiting list for new quarters is virtually impossible—without
Muscovites peruse apartment exchange notices. Compounding the urban housing shortage is the fact that retired people make up a large portion of the cities' population and have no desire to move to more primitive rural areas.

connections. In newer towns, of which there are now over 1,000 in the Soviet Union, housing is controlled primarily by the industries that "run" the area. In older towns and large cities, as much as half or more of the residential stock is owned by the municipality. A commission of the local district council decides who goes on the waiting list, and in what order.

In Leningrad, for instance, priority consideration is promised to (among other categories) long-time permanent residents with less than seven square meters of space, those living in housing declared unfit, and those who have worked for many years in some local enterprise. Some applicants can legally be taken out of turn, such as holders of high awards like Hero of the Soviet Union, and World War II invalids.

Still other categories of people may be entitled to more than the standard nine meters of space. Most of these categories were established in the early 1930s by Stalin as part of a campaign against egalitarianism intended to reward those citizens who could do most for industrialization. Those favored include a deliberately vague category of "responsible workers"—colonels and higher ranks in the military, inventors, and industrial efficiency specialists. Particularly blessed, presumably because many work at home, are writers, composers, sculptors, archi-

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tects, and scholars who are Ph.D.s. They may have 20 square meters above the norm.

The propiska system, like other controls in Soviet society, is in the good Russian tradition—beatable. One quick route out of the provinces and into Moscow, Leningrad, or Kiev is to find a marriageable resident with a propiska. A 1970 Izvestiya article told of a "marriage broker" named Leonid Kazakevich. A resident of Baku, he got into the business when he married a woman named Marina to obtain his Moscow residence permit (it cost him a car). To recover expenses and make further profit, he married Lyuba, Natasha, and Margarita in succession so that they could live legally at his address. Then he began to arrange marriages for others. He made thousands of rubles before he was apprehended.

Fictitious divorces are another urban stratagem. A Soviet account in Sotsialisticheskaya Zakonnost' (Socialist Law) tells of a "Leonid" and his family of three who were all living in one room when they got on the waiting list for a larger apartment. By the time they were assigned a three-room flat, Leonid refused to give up his room, arguing that he had divorced his wife. Later it was found that all four still lived together and that they had exchanged their housing and the "divorced" husband's room for grander quarters.

In the Soviet "society of connections," who you know will dictate how well you are housed—as well as what food you eat, what clothing you wear, and what theater tickets you can get. While it may be essential at some point to "buy" an official, more important will be one's blat (influence) or family ties. Many commodities can be obtained only as a favor, which must be repaid, and a good apartment is one of the scarcest commodities. "Too often the decisive factor is not the waiting list," a Pravda article complained, "but a sudden telephone call... [after which] they give the apartments to the families of football players and the whole queue is pushed back."

Trading Up

And like any scarce commodity, housing is hoarded. Why give up something valuable when it can be put to good use in exchange for something else? As the woman in the Trifonov story well knew, two apartments (or parts of them) can be swapped for a larger apartment, held as a stand-by in case of divorce, or used for rental income and as a legacy to one's children.

Those discouraged by the official allocation process can also try their luck in the officially sanctioned housing market, a
THE PRICE OF PROGRESS

Early in the evening of September 15, 1983, one billion gallons of caustic potassium waste burst through a dam at the Stebnikovskii Fertilizer Plant in L'vov Province, roughly 650 miles south of Moscow.

Cascading through Ukrainian villages and grainfields to the Dnestr River, the toxic flood killed plant and animal life along the river for 300 miles. "L'vov Canal"—the name given the spill by U.S. Embassy officials—led to a high-level Soviet investigation. Almost two years later, Izvestiya announced the jailing of five officials at the plant for, among other things, "a lack of the necessary technical and working discipline."

In the past, Moscow has not released comprehensive information about environmental problems. Western scientists are still puzzled by a 1958 accident at a nuclear waste dump in the Ural Mountains of Chelyabinsk Province—a mishap that scarred a 50-square-mile area. Levels of conventional pollution are no easier to verify. One underground, or "samizdat," book, The Destruction of Nature in the Soviet Union (1980), describes wide-scale abuses of land, sea, and air. As yet, no documentation of its assertions exists.

Even Soviet leaders now admit that pollution, once dismissed as a "capitalist evil," has become a socialist reality. Three months after L'vov Canal, Communist Party Secretary Yuri Andropov stressed that "the protection of nature requires even more persistent . . . efforts." The Soviet press notes that cities from Lipetsk to Leningrad suffer from air pollution; that oil spills, agricultural pesticides, and chemical wastes are poisoning the waters of the Baltic, Black, and Caspian seas; and that many nuclear plants suffer from faulty design. Some 300 miles south of Moscow are the iron ore deposits of the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly. Visitors to the area can see pits 1,500 feet deep next to 300-foot mounds of rich, black earth. In 20 years, none of the topsoil has been returned to the land.

Overall, pollution of air and water in the Soviet Union is probably slightly lower than in the United States, largely because Soviet manufacturing output is roughly half that of the United States. But the centrally planned Soviet economy creates problems not encountered in the West. Driven by a bonus system that rewards output alone, Soviet factory managers pursue production quotas with single-minded devotion. They will gladly incur fines for polluting in order to earn a year-end production bonus. As V. Petrov, the Soviet author of Ecology and Law (1982), observed, "Victors are not judged." The USSR has no counterpart to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Instead, bureaus such as the Health Ministry and the Water Inspectorate must find and punish polluters on their own.

Another obstacle to a balanced environmental policy is ideology. The exploitation of nature by man figures prominently in the Soviet production ethic. One example: The Soviets are pressing forward with plans to reverse the northward flow of Siberia's Ob' and Irtysh.
rivers in order to bring water to the vast, arid plains of Central Asia
to the south. Tampering with the river system has had unhappy re-
sults elsewhere. Twenty years of tapping the sources of the Aral
Sea—once the world’s fourth largest inland body of water—has left
it half its former size. By the year 2000, it will be dry. Not only will
the region’s climate change, but concentra-
tions of salt from the
lake bed will poison sur-
rounding farmland.

The USSR does have
an “unofficial” conserv-
ation movement. But
access to pertinent data
is restricted; scientists
and technocrats, not or-
dinary Soviet citizens,
are usually the environ-
mentalists. Their efforts
have met with little success. During the 1960s, in an unprecedented
act that brought okrana okruzhayuschei sredi (environmental protec-
tion) into the Soviet vocabulary, the scientific and literary commu-
nity fought the construction of a pulp plant on the shores of Siberia’s
Lake Baikal. The Ministry of Timber, Pulp and Paper, and Wood Pro-
cessing built the factory anyway. But it did agree to install pollution
control devices—the first in the industry’s history. Unfortunately,
the machinery has not worked properly, and the USSR Academy of
Sciences reported in 1977 that the lake was “on the brink of irrevers-
able changes.”

The record of pollution-control technology is equally dismal in
other areas. In Kazakh’s capital of Alma Ata, a manufacturing center
in the Tian Shan mountains near the Chinese border, fewer than
one-third of the factories have filtration equipment. Smoke pollu-
tion there in 1976 was 11.6 times the maximum permissible level;
soot, 27 times; and coal dust, 31 times. Since then, the levels have
risen—a sign that air filters and sewage treatment plants remain an
afterthought in the minds of Five Year Planners.

In theory, the centralized Soviet regime could quickly rescue
Mother Nature. Compared to Western governments, the Kremlin
wields enormous decision-making power. National wilderness pre-
serves can be—and have been—established at the stroke of a pen.
But Moscow frequently bends the rules that it makes. Logging and
mining on the preserves is not unusual. Until the Soviets adopt a
consistent policy, their environment will continue to suffer.

—Susan Finder

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man Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union.
world of various private deals. Except in the case of cooperatives, where the price is set by the government, the cost of a transaction is based on a going rate that is always much higher than the permitted price, and therefore illegal.

People can trade up to better housing, provided they have a room or apartment—state-owned or cooperative—registered in their name already. Notices that begin “I am exchanging” are plastered all over kiosks, bus and trolley-bus stops, lamp posts, fences, and building walls, and a Bulletin for Housing Exchanges is published in most large cities.

**Walking Want Ads**

The ads tend to be revealing. A Moscow Bulletin offering: “Adjoining. 18 & 7 m² (one additional family with 4 persons), kitchen 9.5 m², hot water, 8th floor of an eight floor bldg., lift, balcony, incinerator; Denis Davidov St. (Kutusov Metro Station); telephone number; from 5 P.M. Wanted: 2 rooms in different bldgs. except ground floor in the Kiev, Kuntsevo districts.”

The ad indicates that a couple is divorcing and seeking separate rooms. They wish to remain close to their excellent location near the center, yet not too far from the Moscow woods. The phone is a big plus. That the flat is communal (“one additional family”) and that the rooms are adjoining rather than off a hallway are drawbacks.

The ideal Moscow apartment has one more room (including the kitchen) than the number of persons living in it. It should be in the center of town in an old brick or stone building with high ceilings and have gas, hot water and central heating, a toilet separate from the bathroom, and a balcony as well as a telephone. It should be on an upper floor, but not the top (the roof might leak), close to a subway station, and equipped with an elevator and an incinerator.

Would-be swappers haunt the Bureau of Housing Exchanges in every large city for months, even years, while poring over notices and contacting “interested parties.” Suggestions that municipal bureaus could help out with match-ups via computers have fallen on the deaf ears of officialdom. What does function is a lively open-air “stock market” in rooms and apart-

*The Soviets claim to have 24 million phones, for a population of over 262 million. (The United States has 151 million phones, for 235 million people.) Though all but four million of the phones are in urban areas, many city-dwellers lack them, and even those who are equipped are bedeviled by inadequate directories. Some areas have no books. Moscow’s book contains no residential numbers; one obtains a private number by calling information and supplying the party’s patronymic and birth date.*
ments that operates near the bureau. The New York Times's Hedrick Smith described the scene outside the bureau on Moscow's Prospekt Mira on a blustery November Sunday:

"Hundreds of people, hands thrust in their pockets and scarves wound tightly against the cold, carry placards around their necks or hand-scrawled signs pinned to their sturdy cloth coats. Occasionally, they would pause to converse quietly in twos and threes and then walk on.

"But these are not Soviet strikers, they are walking want ads: Muscovites advertising apartments for exchange, eager to improve their living quarters... At the far end of the lane, students and officers swarm around a few landlords offering a room, a bed, or a small apartment for rent. Some students turn up their noses at a two-room unit in an old building with gas heat but no indoor plumbing. But a middle-aged woman and a married couple, less fussy, compete for it. In minutes, the apartment is gone for 50 rubles monthly, paid a year in advance."

5,000-Ruble Shacks

Strong sponsorship helps. A Moscow family of three had a car accident in which the wife was killed. The widower's parents, living about 100 miles away, wished to move to the capital to be with their bereaved son and three-year-old grandson. The grandfather was a retired senior Army officer with a two-room apartment. After months of trying, the grandfather, lacking a sponsor, failed to organize an exchange. Finally he visited prominent Army colleagues in the capital. With their help, and much bribe money, he arranged a chain of exchanges involving families in five cities. The grandfather and his wife got permits for a one-room apartment in Moscow.

An even more complex exchange was arranged by Andrey D. Sakharov, the nuclear scientist and dissident, before he was exiled to Gorky in 1980. The Sakharovs wanted to move with their daughter, son-in-law, two small grandchildren, and Sakharov's mother-in-law into a four-room Moscow apartment occupied by three other households. In all, the exchange involved 17 persons and five apartments and took a year to arrange. Then it was vetoed by the district soviet executive committee in Moscow. The declared reason: One of the women involved in the deal already had six square meters of living space above the legal norm and would gain another three-quarters of a square meter if the shuffle were permitted.

Diplomats, armed forces members, bureaucrats, and others who are transferred temporarily may profit from subleasing.
Every Wednesday, Vechernaya Moskva (Evening Moscow) publishes ads for such sublet rooms and apartments, which may rent for 50 rubles per month or more—the cost of, say, a decent watch, or one-fourth of the price of a suit. If the renter has a propiska, a sublease is usually approved even though officials know that the real rent will be many times higher than the legal fee of a few rubles. Like the high co-op prices, illegal rents are overlooked: In a zero-vacancy situation, black market rentals are a necessary safety valve.

Second homes are also in demand. Each summer more than 25 percent of all Muscovites and Leningraders rent a country dacha.

High party and government functionaries enjoy state-owned dachas, and other senior officials may even own theirs. For less favored city folk, finding and renting a dacha, however small, is a major project, and the annual search begins as early as February. The joy of discovery can turn sour, as a writer related in Sovetskaya Kultura (Soviet Culture): “A friend once rented a dacha and in the summer found that the small house had been divided into nine different ‘closets’ for as many families. We finally found a suitable dacha, but the price was staggering. For the same amount, the entire family could have gone

A row of modest dachas in the countryside near Moscow. Elsewhere, just east of the capital, near the village of Uspenskoye, are dachas of the elite—multi-story houses surrounded by several acres of land and high walls.

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on holiday to the Black Sea for three months." In the sunny Baltic republics, a room in a private home will cost four rubles a day, even with three or four people sharing it.

Those who try to buy are shocked to find that a little shack called a khibarka costs about 5,000 rubles. A comfortable country home with four or more rooms and modern conveniences will sell for anywhere from 15,000 rubles—a bit more than the cost of a new Volga car—to 50,000 rubles. Of course, one can build, provided one can obtain a plot of land, which in theory belongs to the state.

Mushrooms in the Rain

One way to get a plot is to buy an abandoned farmhouse. ARTICLE 73 of the Land Code, which implies that land can be transferred only between permanent residents in a rural community, is an obstacle, but it is not insurmountable. "If you can come to an understanding with the local soviet," maintains a dacha expert, "to help them in some way or simply bribe them, you can get a dacha cheap, from 800 to 4,000 rubles."

All in all, getting housing na levo (under the table or through influence) is a well-established practice that lubricates rusty bureaucratic machinery. Trying to sniff out which bureaucrats will accept money is tricky because a bribery conviction carries a sentence of eight years. But if an official openly asks for money, there is probably no problem.

Not all bribe-takers can be trusted, however. A middle-aged lady in Astrakhan, rumored to have contact with an important member of the city's executive committee, asked 800 to 2,500 rubles in return for help in getting an apartment. Said the report in the journal Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya (Socialist Industry): "In four years some 40 desperate apartment seekers, including professional people and party members, paid her a total of 50,000 rubles in bribes before it was discovered that she had no contacts at all."

After a new Party secretary in Georgia, a republic well known for its citizens' high living and disdain for regulations, denounced corrupt housing practices in 1972, a flurry of investigations ensued. It was found, for instance, that a construction cooperative in Tbilisi that initially had announced it would build three housing units of 160 apartments went on to erect 16 high rises with 1,281 apartments—many were sold for high profits to families who did not even live in Tbilisi. In Armenia, the directors of the semiconductor factory in the satellite-town of Abovyan decided to build new housing "for their workers" 11
miles away in the center of Yerevan, Armenia's capital. All 48 units were assigned to the factory's management.

Local party and government officials, state bank directors, and others often use their influence to build oversized homes (far in excess of the 60 square meters of space permitted for such persons' households) on illegally assigned plots, using stolen building materials and purloined state machinery. They may own several private homes, although legally only one is allowed per household, while still maintaining a state-owned apartment in the city. Pravda once reported that in Zaleschchiki, a resort town on the Dnestr River in the Ukraine, "two- and three-story homes are popping up like mushrooms in the rain" with illegal dimensions (average space: 100 square meters) on illegally obtained plots. In Georgia in 1974, it was found that 990 "imposing" mansions were built in the small community of Tskhvari-chamia with materials and manpower whose costs, for the most part, were charged to the state. The intended occupants included the first secretary of a district committee in Tbilisi and the deputy director of the Tbilisi restaurant trust.

And so on. Self-aggrandizing provincial officials, and those of the small republics, are periodically criticized and sometimes even removed for their sins. But the travails of honest functionaries also get some notice, as in Leningrad writer Daniil Granin's poignant novel, The Picture.

The story deals with a provincial Party boss named Losev, mayor of Lykov, a small town. "Everywhere in his job," Granin writes, "he kept running into the bloody problem of housing. The shortage of living space tormented him relentlessly day in and day out. . . . People waited for flats, for a room, for several years; the queue did not get any shorter. It was a kind of curse."

New housing blocks rose in Lykov, but demand climbed faster. "All the neighborhood kids, who had only just been born, were suddenly shaving or putting on makeup and then getting married, and sitting in his office—plump, doleful madonnas and strapping great lads with moustaches—all asking for flats. Their rapid growth and fecundity mortified him. He was besieged on all sides by queue jumpers; everyone's circumstances were urgent, catastrophic, unique . . . ."

This was not the struggling 1950s or '60s. The Picture was published in 1980.
POVERTY IN THE SOVIET UNION

by Mervyn Matthews

In August 1978, while visiting the Soviet Union, I decided to take the local train from Moscow to Vladimir, the capital of a former principedom some 100 miles to the east.

At Moscow's Kursk station, a rather disheveled man in his mid-30s boarded the crowded car and proceeded to address his fellow riders. "Comrades," he began, "would you help me?" He then went on to relate how, as an epileptic, he could find no steady work and was surviving on a pension of a mere 25 rubles a month—about $37.50 according to the prevailing official exchange rate, and less than one-sixth the average Soviet wage. Ending his speech, he went around the car with hat in hand, collecting a few rubles and kopecks.

The panhandling seemed to upset none of the other passengers. But to me, a foreigner in Moscow, so open a declaration of hardship came as a surprise.

Westerners familiar with the beggars and street people of New York, Paris, or London would have trouble finding their counterparts on the broad avenues that cross the Soviet capital. People whom we would recognize as "poor" tend rather to congregate at places like the waiting hall of Kiev Railway Station, where crowds of homeward-bound peasants huddle on wooden benches, surrounded by overstuffed suitcases bound with string; or at Danilov Cemetery on the city's outskirts, where indigents stand by the gates, soliciting spare change from passers-by and keeping a watchful eye out for the local militia. None of these locales are on the visitor's standard Intourist itinerary.

Statistical evidence of poverty is equally well hidden. The official ideology is discreetly silent about its existence. Theoretically, the advent of the workers' state was to ensure the gradual elimination of social evils. During the late 1920s, Josef Stalin encouraged that belief by suppressing the publication of data pertaining to crime and other "negative" social phenomena; later, he had the compilers of the 1937 census arrested. Soviet statisticians have since been obliged to reconcile their bleak pictures of socialist reality with bland socialist theory.

As outside observers, we must consider ourselves grateful to Nikita Khrushchev, leader of the USSR from 1953 to 1964, who relaxed the censorship of some scholarly findings and al-

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allowed the publication of (idealized) *minimum* family budgets. But even today, the term “poor” cannot be used in official Soviet publications to describe any social group. To avoid any embarrassing semantic problems, Soviet sociologists still rely on the euphemism “underprovision,” or *maloobespechennost*, in place of “poverty.”

During the late 1950s, the Kremlin instructed a number of institutes to assess the minimum consumption requirements of a contemporary urban family. By 1965, several “minimum budgets” had been prepared. One of the later variants, published by G. S. Sarkisyan and N. P. Kuznetsova in 1967, may still serve, with reservations, as a yardstick for measuring poverty in the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1980s.

The budget covered the monthly needs of an urban worker’s family, comprising a husband and wife, both working, a 13-year-old boy, and an 8-year-old girl. With due allowance for state subsidies and services, the monthly expenses were set at 51 rubles and 40 kopecks per head.

Food purchases took up a relatively high proportion of expenses (56 percent); clothes required some 20 percent; housing and communal services, such as laundry and garbage collection, claimed only 5.4 percent, partly because they were state-subsidized and partly because provision of these services was meager.* The small sums allocated for furniture and household goods—among them a TV set and refrigerator—betokened spartan accommodations. No funds were allotted for medicine and education, since both were provided by the state at no cost. There was no provision for savings.

Sarkisyan and Kuznetsova also devised a minimum budget for the early or mid-1970s. The new version required an income per capita of 66.6 rubles but maintained roughly the same proportion of expenditures. It required two after-tax wages of 133.2 rubles each—a national average reached only by 1976. No detailed changes seem to have been made in Sarkisyan and Kuznetsova’s original figures—at least, no one has published them. If we revise them by a very cautious four percent to cover inflation,

*In 1984, an average-size U.S. family (2.7 “members”) with total earnings of $10,116 (below the poverty threshold of $10,614 for a family of four) spent 33 percent of its income on housing, 22 percent on food, 18 percent on transportation, and five percent on clothing.

Mervyn Matthewes, 52, teaches Soviet studies at the University of Surrey in England. He received a B.A. from Manchester University (1955) and a D.Phil. from Oxford University (1962). Among his works are *Class and Society in Soviet Russia* (1972), *Privilege in the Soviet Union* (1978), and the forthcoming *Poverty in the Soviet Union.*
During the famed "kitchen debate" on July 24, 1959, Premier Nikita Khrushchev brushed off Vice President Richard Nixon's guided tour of an American kitchen exhibit in Moscow, saying: "Many things you've shown us are interesting but they are not needed in life."

The 267-ruble poverty threshold allowed for in the mid-1970s would rise to about 278 rubles in 1981. By then, the average Soviet wage had reached 172.5 rubles, or $233 according to the (admittedly artificial) official exchange rate. After taxes, two working parents would have taken home about 310 rubles, still uncomfortably close to the earlier "minimum threshold."

The question of how many of the USSR's 270 million inhabitants are poor can be answered only in terms of probabilities. The Soviet Union publishes no comprehensive data on wage and income distribution. To do so would reveal the existence of a socioeconomic pecking order, a distinctly capitalist phenomenon that undermines the theory of a unified, egalitarian society.

Only by examining articles in Soviet labor journals, directors' handbooks, and the few available generalized statistics can one gain some idea of the extent of poverty in the Soviet Union. In rough fashion, these sources suggest the nature and size of those groups that cling to the bottom rungs of the Soviet income ladder, as well as those higher up.

Disparities in income between the richest and poorest folk
do not seem to be nearly so great in the Soviet Union as they are in the United States. If one were to depict the income distribution of the USSR’s 114 million nonfarm labor force in the shape of a diamond, it would be much shorter on the top, much broader at its midpoint, and much longer on the bottom than its U.S. counterpart. Nonetheless, differences in income have at times been serious enough to trouble the leadership itself—including Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, who both made big efforts to narrow the differentials.

At the top of the income diamond are the elite members of the Soviet “intelligentsia,” a group defined broadly by Lenin in 1904 as “all educated people, representatives of mental labor as distinct from representatives of physical labor.” The very pinnacle is made up of the top party and state officials, marshals in the Soviet Armed Forces, and first secretaries of artistic organizations like the Union of Musical Composers. Just beneath them, one might find directors of academic research institutes, factory managers, and slightly lower ranking military and diplomatic personnel. During the early 1970s, such people probably accounted for the roughly 0.20 percent of the Soviet citizenry that received monthly salaries of 450 rubles or more.

Poverty for 40 Percent

Moving down the diamond, one encounters professors at universities or research institutes, engineers, artists, writers, and a horde of middle-grade Party and state officials. The physical laborers most likely to earn above 200 rubles are those in mining and heavy manufacturing: Coal miners in the Kuznetsk Basin, steel mill workers in the Urals, and oilmen in western Siberia might earn anywhere from 200 to 300 rubles a month.

The Soviet labor force, however, still contains many low-skilled industrial laborers and poorly paid service sector workers (perhaps 30–40 million in 1981). Although in general most of these Soviet workers toil at less skilled tasks than their U.S. counterparts, some occupations that are well paid in the United States bring little remuneration in the USSR. A Soviet doctor, for example, might earn only 120 to 170 rubles. Less remarkable is the fact that teachers could take home from 85 to 135 rubles, or that janitors, cleaners, and doorkeepers could earn as little as 70 rubles a month.

Most surprising, however, is that so many Soviet citizens evidently received less than the 133.2 ruble single-income poverty threshold contained in the Sarkisyan-Kuznetsova budget. Counting the 13.2 million collective farm members—most of
THE COST OF LIVING:
A TALE OF THREE CITIES

Keith Bush, director of Central Research for Radio Liberty, compared the purchasing power in 1982 of industrial workers in the capitals of the United States, France, and the Soviet Union. His calculations of how much work-time is required to buy certain items are based on average gross earnings and prices as of December 1981.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Washington</th>
<th>Paris</th>
<th>Moscow</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(minutes of work-time)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loaf of white bread (one pound)</td>
<td>7.26</td>
<td>8.16</td>
<td>7.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One pound of sausages</td>
<td>14.97</td>
<td>34.01</td>
<td>72.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One dozen eggs (cheapest)</td>
<td>9.33</td>
<td>15.33</td>
<td>55.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One pound of fish (cod)</td>
<td>27.66</td>
<td>53.51</td>
<td>21.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One pound of butter</td>
<td>25.40</td>
<td>21.77</td>
<td>100.68</td>
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<tr>
<td>One roll of toilet paper</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>16.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One bottle of aspirin (cheapest)</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>246.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One pack of cigarettes (20 cigarettes)</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One subway fare (two-mile ride)</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(hours of work-time)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monthly rent</td>
<td>51.00</td>
<td>39.00</td>
<td>12.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Color TV</td>
<td>65.00</td>
<td>106.00</td>
<td>701.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(months of work-time)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Small car</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>53.00</td>
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whom earned less than 100 rubles a month—the “poor,” as defined by Soviet statistical parameters, must have numbered no less than two-fifths of the entire Soviet population in 1981.

Salaries tell only part of the story. Many higher ranking Soviet citizens live not just on their official income but by means of a special network of goods and services. As journalist Hedrick Smith observes, such advantages "are beyond the reach of ordinary citizens because they are a dividend of political rank or personal achievement in the service of the state."

A large proportion of the country's wage earners also
manage to supplement their income by dabbling in the illegal "second," or "black," economy: Petty bureaucrats solicit bribes; delivery men haul freight on the side; doctors, plumbers, and house painters make undeclared house calls. Having control over fewer commodities or services, poor families evidently reap fewer rewards from any illegal activities, perhaps 20 to 25 rubles a month.

Those Soviet citizens who, by hook or by crook, cannot make ends meet may turn to the state for support. Pensions are normally paid to men over 60, women over 55, and to those who are disabled, widowed, or have lost their principal means of support. (Others eligible for some state assistance include some eight million single-parent households.) In 1981, the Soviet Union dispensed 35.4 billion rubles in pension payments of various kinds. Divided among the country’s 50.2 million recipients, that worked out, in crude terms, to only 58.8 rubles a month—below the 66.6 ruble per capita poverty threshold. (In addition, the minimum monthly pension for peasants was set at a mere 28 rubles.) Many elderly citizens take jobs after reaching retirement, a trend strongly encouraged by the authorities. Others survive by pooling resources with their children.

Three Decades Behind

Such conditions mock the 1961 Communist Party Program’s expansive prediction that, by 1980, the Soviet Union would boast “the highest living standards in the world.” Indeed, the survey that my colleagues and I have conducted among Soviet emigres suggests that members of the Soviet “underclass” live under significantly worse conditions than their Western counterparts. Sponsored by the U.S. National Council for Soviet and East European Research, this work drew on the responses of 348 families, all of whom left the USSR after 1977. They were chosen on the basis of their income per capita (below 70 rubles) and asked not only to describe their living accommodations but also how their lives compared with those of other Soviet citizens.

The past three decades have seen impressive gains in the overall Soviet standard of living. Since 1950, real consumption per capita has risen at an average annual rate of 3.4 percent—equivalent to a tripling of the goods and services purchased by the average Soviet citizen.

Yet as economist Gertrude Schroeder points out, “Soviet living standards remain drab and essentially primitive by Western standards and also compare unfavorably with much of Eastern
Even those statistics that the Soviet authorities are proud enough to publish show a big lag. In 1981, some 65 percent of all Soviet households had refrigerators, against over 90 percent in the United States, 85 percent in Spain, and 80 percent in Poland. Only 55 percent had washing machines, versus 74 percent in the United States, 90 percent in Italy, and 80 percent in Yugoslavia. If the living standards of the average Soviet citizen trail two or three decades behind those of the average U.S. resident, those of the Soviet poor are certainly even less advanced.

No Fruit, No Lettuce

Nowhere is this truth more evident than in their diet. Food ranks as the most important consumer commodity of the poor, taking up over 60 percent of the income of families in the émigré sample. The diet they reported was in many respects way below the norms stipulated by the idealized 1967 Sarkisyan-Kuznetsova budget. In general terms, the Soviet poor today eat as well as the average Soviet citizen did some 15 years ago. But the average Soviet citizen still consumes far less meat, fruit, and vegetable oil and vastly more bread, potatoes, and milk than his American counterpart.*

Those émigrés whom we interviewed reported that they had bought very few vegetables other than the most common, such as cabbage, beets, onions, and carrots. During the winter, 60 percent purchased no fruit and 25 percent no lettuce or other salad vegetables. One-third rarely, if ever, ate imported oranges, lemons, and bananas, or cakes and other confectionaries.

Lack of income was not the only problem. Excluded from the network of restricted stores used by the more influential and affluent, the poor had to purchase much of their food at state enterprises, where long queues all too often lead to nothing but neat, empty shelves. The collective markets run by peasant farmers offer a more reliable supply of market produce, but the prices are usually at least double those of the state shops.

Surprisingly, 28 percent of those interviewed termed their diet "satisfactory"; another 10 percent had no particular opinion, which amounted to the same reaction. Most likely, their answers reflected perennially low expectations or an ignorance of what might be bought under more plentiful conditions.

*In 1980, for example, Soviet consumption per capita of beef (11 kilograms) stood below not only that of the United States (46.9 kg.) but also below that of Poland (18.5 kg.) and Yugoslavia (14.8 kg.). To judge from data published by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Americans who lived in households earning from $6,000 to $10,000 in 1977—when the poverty threshold was $6,191—annually consumed 30 percent more meat and fish, 45 percent more fruit, and roughly the same amount of vegetables as those interviewed in the émigré survey.
Feelings about the supply of clothing, however, were much less benign. Sixty-seven percent declared that clothing was an "acute problem," and another 30 percent called it a "problem." Almost daily, Pravda and Izvestiya feature articles or letters lamenting the quality and quantity of Soviet clothing; in February 1985, Soviet Premier Konstantin Chernenko devoted much of a Politburo speech to discussing a chronic shortage of footwear. The "poverty" wardrobe detailed by Sarkisyan and Kuznetsova contained, for some reason, a relatively lavish assortment of garments. The husband, for example, was assumed to have a winter coat, a light coat and mackintosh, two suits, working clothes, a "half coat," two pairs of trousers, seven pairs of socks, shirts, linen, and hats. Shoes, oddly enough, were omitted.

In their wisdom, Sarkisyan and Kuznetsova allotted 43 rubles per month to cover clothing costs. But clothing, at least in Moscow, is relatively expensive. In 1982, a T-shirt cost $4.17 (versus $1.79 in Washington, D.C.); a pair of men's socks, $3.45 (versus $2.50); a men's raincoat, $121.70 (versus $69.95). By our estimates, the Sarkisyan-Kuznetsova wardrobe—including shoes—would have cost a minimum of 1,100 rubles per person, which at 43 rubles per head would mean the equivalent of eight
and a half years' wear on every item.

After food and clothing, housing ranks as the greatest expense facing the poor. Sarkisyan and Kuznetsova budgeted five percent of family income for shelter. The results of our sample suggest that, in reality, the poor spend far more. While the average rent in state-supplied housing was indeed quite low (about nine rubles a month), payments for rent, electricity, gas, telephone, heating, cleaning, and repairs together ran at 20 rubles, or nine percent of family income.

Tight control of urban development and private construction has retarded the formation of outwardly "poor" neighborhoods. But standardized housing at nominal rents, public amenities, and the absence of commercial interests all serve to mask, rather than remove, social inequality. When asked whether richer people in Soviet society had better quality accommodations, 90 percent of the respondents considered that was indeed so. The poor were thought to have less of the influence needed—through membership in the Communist Party, deputyships in the local soviet, trade union posts, and so on—to quicken their progress through housing waiting lists, or to find larger apartments.

To what degree do the poorest people in the Soviet Union feel themselves to be a group apart? Only about two percent of the sample admitted to being "very poor" and 21 percent to being "poor" at all. About 13 percent thought that they were not poor, while the remainder, or nearly two-thirds, had no clear conception. (The monthly median income per capita of these families was a mere 59 rubles.) When asked whether they regarded "the urban poor" as a separate group in Soviet society, only one-quarter of the sample replied that they did.

Waiting for Better Days

Perhaps the Soviet poor are in some ways inured to hardship because they feel that such conditions are shared by all fellow citizens. About 90 percent of the respondents believed that poverty was widespread—estimates varied from 25 percent to 80 percent of the population. Meanwhile, no less than 99 percent thought that the average wage in Soviet society was considerably lower than the officially published figure. As Robert Kaiser observed in Russia (1976), "There appears to be no embarrassment or sense of inadequacy in a Russian family when parents and children dress in the same shapeless clothes, [or] when the two-room flat is not equipped with an upholstered sofa or colorful curtains."
By all accounts, those who are poor in the Soviet Union blame both society and state for their difficulties. Most of our émigré respondents saw alcoholism as the most important general cause of poverty. Close behind drinking came an "absence of material incentives" and "wrong government policy concerning pay."

None of these factors seems likely to change or disappear soon. Despite a recent crackdown on heavy drinking, few Soviet-watchers predict a lasting decline in alcohol consumption. Over the past decade, the Soviet economy—never a fount of "material incentives" such as personal cars, tape recorders, or home appliances—has become even more sluggish. Finally, Communist Party Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, depicted by many poorly informed Western journalists as a young progressive, is pushing for less, rather than more, equality of income. Last April, he announced that "we must ... eliminate from our distributive mechanism equal pay tendencies, unearned income, and all that contradicts the economic norms and moral ideals of our society."

The theoretical beneficiaries of the classless socialist state, the Soviet poor, like their peasant forebears in the days of the tsars, must wait for better days.
Westerners' attempts to understand life in the Soviet Union have always been hampered by shortages of reliable information, a secretive political system, and a history and culture that present a tangle of Western and Oriental influences.

Enigma number one, writes Oxford's Ronald Hingley, is *The Russian Mind* (Scribner’s, 1977). Ivan the Terrible, the great 16th-century tsar, was imperious enough to order the slaughter of an elephant that failed to bow to him, yet too superstitious to order the arrest of a “lunatic naked monk” who wandered the countryside denouncing him as “a limb of Satan.”

Today’s Russians, says Hingley, share Ivan’s propensity to do “everything in excess” and his radically contradictory traits: “Broad, yet narrow; reckless, yet cautious; tolerant, yet censorious; freedom-loving, yet slavish; independent, docile, tough, malleable, kind, cruel.”

Extremes are characteristic of the Russian past, judging by Nicholas V. Riasanovsky’s scholarly *History of Russia* (Oxford, 1963; 4th ed., 1984). A Berkeley historian, he begins his chronicle with the creation of the first Russian state during the ninth century. Noting that “the Bolsheviks won control of a backward agrarian country and transformed it into the second greatest industrial power in the world,” Riasanovsky argues that the Soviet Union is still, in many respects, a developing nation.

*Twentieth Century Russia* (Houghton, 1960; 5th ed., 1981) is Donald W. Treadgold’s comprehensive volume on recent developments, from the fall of Tsar Nicholas II in 1917 to the last years of Leonid Brezhnev’s reign.

Inequality is a key feature of the new “classless” society. One handy indicator, sociologist David Lane writes in his survey of *Soviet Economy and Society* (N.Y. Univ., 1985), is the number of medals awarded. During the first 23 years of Communist rule, when egalitarianism was still strong, only 1,900 citizens were singled out for praise (and perquisites) as Heroes of Labor, Honored Artists, and the like. Between 1946 and 1957, however, Moscow handed out 196,600 such decorations.

Soviet researchers themselves have identified four elements of “social stratification.” They see class divisions between urban workers and collective farmers (13 percent of the population), as well as distinctions between urban and rural folk, between blue- and white-collar workers, and between people with different skills and incomes in various occupations.

In the Soviet Union (as elsewhere), Lane notes, this translates into social and economic inequality. In the pecking order of the collective farm, for example, the agricultural expert stands above the tractor operator, who overshadows the field laborer.

A more exhaustive study of inequality is Mervyn Matthews’s *Class and Society in Soviet Russia* (Walker, 1972).

In *The Contemporary Soviet City*, edited by Henry W. Morton and Robert C. Stuart (Sharpe, 1984), Richard Dobson, a Soviet analyst at the United States Information Agency, notes that the Soviet school system is one of the chief means by which inequality is perpetuated. The schools provide “all youngsters with free access to any type of education that they may wish to pursue.” The catch is that at the best schools there are only a limited number of openings.
and favoritism is not unknown. Yet, Dobson adds, Moscow does deliver on its promise of education for the masses. It introduced universal 10-year secondary education during the 1970s (although the legal minimum is eight years), and it claims a literacy rate of 99 percent.

About 20 percent of Soviet high school students go on to some kind of college, reports University of Birmingham researcher John Dunstan in *Paths to Excellence and the Soviet School* (NFER, 1978, cloth & paper).

Journalist Susan Jacoby sees some similarities between Soviet schooling and her own education in American parochial schools. "Both were deeply concerned with perpetuating an ideology as well as transmitting knowledge," she writes in *Inside Soviet Schools* (Hill & Wang, 1974, cloth; Schocken, 1975, paper). "Both were more interested in obtaining 'right' answers than questioning minds; both set strict standards of conduct for their students; both adopted certain authoritarian tactics in the classroom, at least partly because of severe overcrowding."

Jacoby adds some interesting qualifications and found some schools to which she would have been happy to send her own children. She also discovered genuine policy differences among educators. And while, on paper, the Soviet curriculum seems more advanced, Soviet and American students receive roughly comparable schooling.

Outside the schools, children enjoy a kind of privileged existence. Coddled, overdressed, hugged, and pampered at every opportunity, Soviet kids live in a fantasy world of parental indulgence. Detsky Mir (Children's World), a huge toy store in downtown Moscow, is a kind of Everychild's F. A. O. Schwarz, a haven of plastic and glitter and rapturous delight that epitomizes the Soviets' sentimental view of childhood.

Yet, notes *New York Times*man David K. Shipler in his dour survey of Russian life, *Russia: Broken Idols, Solemn Dreams* (Times Books, 1983, cloth; 1984, paper), even children's toys contain bitter lessons. Cheaply made, they quickly break. "They teach something about the child's powerlessness over his world...promoting...later contentment within an adult system that is also physically deprived."

Comparing *Two Worlds of Childhood: U.S. and U.S.S.R.* (Russell Sage Foundation, 1970, cloth; Touchstone, 1972), Cornell psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner finds much to recommend the latter. As he and his wife discovered, child-rearing is very much a collective business: "When our youngsters...would run about the [park] paths, kindly citizens of all ages would bring them back by the hand, often with a reproachful word about our lack of proper concern for our children's welfare."

Bronfenbrenner finds that while Soviet children are more conformist than their American peers, they are also much less prone to "anti-social behavior." One reason: Parents and other adults enjoy much more authority over children, peer groups much less, than in the United States.

Children may enjoy a somewhat privileged existence, but their mothers bear a double burden. Marxist theory calls for equality of the sexes (albeit somewhat ambiguously), and the Soviet constitution forbids gender discrimination, notes Berkeley's Gail Warshofsky Lapidus in *Women in Soviet Society: Equality, Development, and Social Change* (Univ. of Calif., 1978, cloth; 1979, pa...
per). But the realities of Soviet life largely rob such promises of meaning.

Women suffer most from the Soviet economy's failings. About 85 percent of women between the ages of 20 and 55 work. They have little choice: A second paycheck is a must for most families. Yet women are often relegated to low-status, low-paying jobs. They earn roughly 70 percent as much as men. At home, they are still expected to fill the traditional roles of wife and mother. That means cooking meals, standing in line to shop daily (prepared and frozen foods are scarce), and handling household chores without dishwashers and other modern appliances. Day-care centers accommodate only 37 percent of preschool children.

Yet feminism does not have much of a following in the Soviet Union. "The inspiration and the theoretical rationale" for a reassessment of women's roles, Lapidus concludes, will have to come from the West.

William M. Mandel's view of Soviet Women (Anchor/Doubleday, 1975) is much more optimistic. He notes, among other things, that "sexploitation" is absent from movies and magazines.

One of the great compensations of Russian life is the special intensity and warmth of friendships and family life. In a curious way, observes émigré sociologist Vladimir Shlapentokh, these are also "subversive" relationships. In Love, Marriage, and Friendship in the Soviet Union (Praeger, 1984), he writes that "connections" are indispensable in obtaining many of life's necessities—clothes, food, jobs. One minor example: Soviet people know by heart the sizes of all their friends and will buy them shoes or shirts if a shipment should arrive suddenly at a local store.

Andrea Lee's Russian Journal (Random, 1979, cloth; 1984, paper) provides an intimate first-person account of Russia. During her 10 months in Moscow with her student-husband, she attended drunken all-night parties, listened to unprovoked emotional confessions, and visited country dachas.

Pressed by a Russian friend to defend what he considered Americans' materialism and shallow friendships, she said that she found her Russian acquaintances at least as obsessed with money and possessions as were her American friends.

"Oh no," he responded. "In a capitalist society, you can't help but think about money—to the detriment of friendship. We Russians are poorer. Our lives are Spartan, and because of that, we have more time to consider things of the heart."

—Bradford P. Johnson

EDITOR'S NOTE: Bradford P. Johnson, a Washington attorney, is Senior Associate of the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies.
Between 1970 and 1980, the number of college students majoring in English dropped by 53 percent; in philosophy by 36 percent; and in history by 57 percent, according to a report last year by the National Endowment for the Humanities. Undergraduates believe that science, engineering, or business will do them more good in the job market. But leading corporations and medical schools, such as IBM and Johns Hopkins, are now recruiting students with liberal arts backgrounds. This turnabout is no surprise to Cleanth Brooks, the noted scholar and literary critic. He contends that the humanities provide "the necessary complement" to our technological prowess. If literature cannot replace religion as a source of values, he says, the service it does render is great: "It lets us observe and overhear men and women as they choose, make decisions, or express their inmost hopes and fears."

by Cleanth Brooks

A technological age—especially an extremely brilliant and successful one—has difficulty in finding a proper role for literature. Such a society sees literature as a diversion, as a mere amusement at best; and so it is classed as a luxury, perhaps an added grace to adorn the high culture that the technology itself has built. Yet such homage obscures the real importance of literature and all of the humanities. It classes them as decorative luxuries, whereas in truth they are the necessary complement to our technological and industrial activities.
For over a century the problem of the real relation of literature to science, theoretical and applied, has been with us. In fact, the very development of an industrial society raises the question of the value of literature.

In a famous poem, Matthew Arnold tells us how, on Dover Beach, he had listened to the "melancholy, long, withdrawing roar" of the outgoing tide, and in it had found an emblem of the ebb tide of religious faith. Science was clearly destined to become technician-in-chief to civilization, but what about the values by which mankind lived? What was there to take religion's place? Arnold prescribed literature, and especially poetry. Poetry was invulnerable to science, for it had no factual underpinning for science to sweep away. It was fictional, a creation of the imagination.

More and more [Arnold wrote in 1880] mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us. Without poetry, our science will appear incomplete, and most of what now passes with us for religion and philosophy will be replaced by poetry.

With such a concept as this, no wonder that Arnold could claim that "the future of poetry is immense," for in effect he was entrusting to poetry the direction of the whole human enterprise.

How has Arnold's prophecy fared? Not so well, I should say. Though our intellectuals are still influenced by poetry, the ordinary citizen is hardly aware of it, and if he were, he would be puzzled by its specifications. He wonders why science, this beneficent magician, cannot tell us what to do as well as how to do it. In any case, he would be utterly baffled by the notion that fictions conceived by the imagination and not tied to the facts of this world could possibly interpret for us the facts of life.

I myself believe that, in asking poetry to replace religion and philosophy, Arnold laid upon poetry a burden it cannot possibly bear. As we should expect, the religious intellectuals of our time, such as T. S. Eliot, Walker Percy, and Flannery O'Connor, reject the notion altogether. At the other extreme, the fundamentalist man in the pew also instinctively rejects it just as roundly. Yet we owe Arnold a debt for having located the problem rather accurately and for assessing the strain that it had already set up in industrialized Great Britain by the middle of the 19th century.

In any case, his suggestions about the role of poetry in modern culture are worth further exploration. They have, I would point out, a peculiar relevance to culture in the United States. Let me indicate why. In the first place, we are a pluralistic society encompassing a number of religious faiths and cultural
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backgrounds. In the second place, our constitutional separation of church and state forbids the teaching of institutionalized religion in state-supported schools and colleges; yet the problem of the inculcation of ethical standards and ultimate values becomes more and more urgent. It is intensified by such matters as the general breakdown of various traditions, the erosion of the family, the cultural rootlessness of much of our increasingly mobile population, and the growing secularism generated by a highly technological civilization.

So even if Arnold was wrong in believing that poetry could alone supply our culture with the proper goals, ends, and purposes, it may well be worth considering what poetry, and literature in general, can do. We are scarcely in a position to reject any available help from whatever source. Literature at least focuses attention on mankind’s purposes, wise or unwise, and upon values for which men and women have lived and died.

In fairness to Arnold, his task of analysis was more difficult than ours, for in his day the boundaries of science were not so clearly marked out as they have since become. One of the best concise statements on the limits of science appeared last year in an article entitled “The Frontiers and Limits of Science,” written by Victor F. Weisskopf, a distinguished physicist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He sums up as follows:

... important parts of human experience cannot be reasonably evaluated within the scientific system. There cannot be an all-encompassing scientific definition of good and evil, of compassion, of rapture, or tragedy or humor, or hate, love, or faith, of dignity, and humiliation, or of concepts like the quality of life and happiness.

In short, it is impossible for science to define for us the quality of happiness that Thomas Jefferson declared was the right of each of us to seek to attain. To have that choice taken away from us either by peer pressure, by the brainwashing of a totalitarian

Cleanth Brooks, 78, is Gray Professor Emeritus of Rhetoric at Yale University. Born in Murray, Kentucky, he received his B.A from Vanderbilt University (1928) and his M.A. from Tulane University (1932). A Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University, he received a B.Litt. degree in 1932. In addition to his teaching, he has served as cultural attaché at the U.S. Embassy in London. Among his books are Modern Poetry and the Tradition (1939), The Well-Wrought Urn (1947), and, with Robert Penn Warren, Understanding Poetry (1938). This essay is an excerpt from the annual Jefferson Lecture delivered by Mr. Brooks on May 8, 1985. Copyright © 1985 by Cleanth Brooks.
regime, or even by the seductions of our immense advertising industry is to lose some part of our humanity. Computers are programmed by human beings; but human beings move toward the state of computers when they allow themselves to be programmed by other human beings. Accepting, then, the fact that we cannot expect guidance from the hard and objective sciences such as mathematics and physics, what do the humanities offer in the way of guidance? And in any case, how can they make any impression on a society that prides itself on being practical and getting down to the hard facts?

An answer to the second question might run like this: A world reduced to hard facts would thereby become a dehumanized world, a world in which few of us would want to live. We are intensely interested in how our fellow human beings behave—in their actions, to be sure, but also in the feelings, motives, purposes that lead them into these actions. The proof is to be found even in the situation comedies of the TV shows or the gossip columns in the magazines and newspapers. We want to know the facts, but we crave the whole story too—its human interest and what we call its meaning.

For example, consider a celebrated incident, the loss of the White Star liner Titanic, which sank in the North Atlantic when she struck an iceberg. How did the poet Thomas Hardy deal with the incident in a poem which he called "The Convergence of the Twain"?

Of many of the facts Hardy makes no mention at all. He does not tell us that the date of the disaster was April 15, 1912, and that it happened on the Titanic's maiden voyage; that she was, at 46,000 tons, the largest ship afloat; that over 1,500 lives were lost; that the ship, though warned of ice ahead, was traveling at high speed; or that she was regarded as unsinkable, with double bottoms and 16 water-tight compartments.

Hardy does refer to some of these facts early in the poem but only obliquely—by references to the pride that the Titanic excited and men's con-

Thomas Hardy
dence that they had at last conquered the sea itself with this mighty craft. What evidently caught Hardy’s imagination was that the ship and the iceberg had, with precision timing, arrived at the same spot at the same instant, just as if destiny had employed a split-second timetable for the whole affair; and he reminds his reader that while the liner was being built in the Belfast shipyard, nature had all along been preparing the mountain of ice far away on the coast of Greenland. Here are the closing stanzas of the poem:

And as the smart ship grew
In stature, grace, and hue
In shadowy silent distance grew the Iceberg too.

Alien they seemed to be:
No mortal eye could see
The intimate welding of their later history,

Or sign that they were bent
By paths coincident
On being anon twin halves of one august event,

Till the Spinner of the Years
Said “Now!” And each one hears,
And consummation comes, and jars two hemispheres.

I remarked earlier that as human beings we want more than mere information. We want meaning and we want wisdom, but those elusive commodities are always in short supply. In the Book of Proverbs we learn that “wisdom crieth . . . in the streets,” but it goes on to imply that “no man regardeth.” If this was the situation several millennia ago, it remains so today. Secretly we may hunger for wisdom, but our overt craving nowadays is, of course, for information. Data banks are much in vogue and they are highly useful, but they are not equipped to pay off in the currency of wisdom.

A recent New York Times editorial matter-of-factly referred to ours as “the age of information.” The poet T. S. Eliot, in choruses from The Rock, makes much the same point, but with a rather different implication.

Endless invention, endless experiment,
Brings knowledge of motion, but not of stillness;
Knowledge of speech, but not of silence;
Knowledge of words, and ignorance of the Word. . . .
Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?
Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?
The first line quoted involves a serious pun. "Endless" invention and experiment means, of course, unceasing invention and experiment, but "endless" also means "without purpose, goal, or end,"—experiment conducted for its own sake, invention carried out merely to be inventive. In Eliot's verse the two diverse meanings actually support and emphasize each other. In this way, poetry is often packed more richly with meaning than is prose.

Yet it is important that we understand how wisdom is mediated to us through literature. It had better not be presented didactically. In my boyhood days, as I recall, our scornful retort to an exorbitant demand was "You must want salvation in a jug." Salvation does not come in a jug, nor is wisdom a bottled essence. Of all people, the literary artist must not seem to be running an old-fashioned medicine show, entertaining us in order to persuade us to buy a product. John Keats, that remarkable poet and very wise young man, put it well: "We hate poetry that has a palpable design upon us."

In an all-too-well-known poem, "A Psalm of Life," Henry Wadsworth Longfellow tells his reader that

\begin{quote}
Life is real! Life is earnest!
And the grave is not its goal;
"Dust thou art, to dust returnest,"
Was not spoken of the soul.
\end{quote}

Such moralistic doggerel is not poetry, and it obviously does have a palpable design on us. Whatever the merit of that palpable design, the verse is tired, limp, and insipid. Jefferson was wise in these matters. He once remarked that "a lively and lasting sense of filial duty is more effectually impressed on the mind of a son or daughter by reading [Shakespeare's] King Lear than by all the dry volumes of ethics."

In a poem entitled "Provide, Provide," Robert Frost has
used a cunning device to remove any taint of the didactic. On the surface the poem seems to be giving his reader the same counsel that the villainous Iago gave to his dupe, Roderigo: “Put money in thy purse.” Wealth will solve all problems. Frost’s poem begins:

The witch that came (the withered hag)
To wash the steps with pail and rag,
Was once the beauty Abishag,

The picture pride of Hollywood.
Too many fall from great and good
For you to doubt the likelihood.

A former movie idol has squandered or perhaps been bilked of her fortune and now ekes out her existence as a scrub woman. Such things do happen to screen beauties, former heavyweight boxing champions, and even rock stars. But why does Frost name this woman Abishag? With a certain grim humor, Frost went to the Bible for his movie star’s name. When King David grew old and ill and, even when covered with bedclothes, could not get warm, his servants and courtiers scoured the whole land to find a beautiful maiden to put into the royal bed to warm the poor old fellow up. The beauty’s name was Abishag. But King David still ‘gat no heat’ and was soon gathered to his fathers.

The poem continues with Frost’s advice to the reader on how to avoid this modern Abishag’s fate. But we had better take the whole poem into account for a proper understanding of just how seriously Frost is speaking when he says to his reader:

Die early and avoid the fate.
Or if predestined to die late,
Make up your mind to die in state.

Make the whole stock exchange your own!
If need be occupy a throne,
Where nobody can call you crone.

Some have relied on what they knew;
Others on being simply true.
What worked for them might work for you.

No memory of having starred
Atones for later disregard,
Or keeps the end from being hard.
Better to go down dignified
With boughten friendship at your side
Than none at all. Provide, provide!

"Go down dignified," "boughten friendship"—these very phrases are instinct with Yankee folk wisdom. Boughten friendship—store-bought friendship we would say in the South—is cold comfort indeed on one's death bed. Not much warmth in that; still, it's better than nothing at all.

In spite of this outward show of worldly wisdom, the poet has hinted of other ways out. He reminds us that some have relied on "what they knew" and other on "being simply true"—on knowledge and integrity. Yet why does he throw into his poem this allusion to the philosophers and the saints only as a kind of afterthought—almost like a man saying: Oh, by the way, I'll just mention this for the sake of the record, though I assume you wouldn't be interested? He does so because the cunning old artist knows that no emphasis often constitutes the most powerful emphasis of all.

Poems that nourish the human spirit can be dry and witty like this one rather than exalted and sonorous like the poems of Aeschylus and Milton. The house of poetry has many mansions.

William Butler Yeats's "Prayer for My Daughter," a very different kind of poem, also contains wisdom, and even a strain of prophecy. But true to its title, it is content to be a troubled father's prayer for his child. Because of its prophetic character, it may be interesting to put it beside John Maynard Keynes's celebrated book, The Economic Consequences of the Peace. Keynes's treatise and Yeats's poem were, by the way, both published in 1919, the year after the end of the War to End All Wars.

Keynes foretold the disastrous consequences of the Treaty of Versailles, predicting what would happen under the peace terms to the economy of defeated Germany and the consequent ruin of the rest of Europe.

Yeats's focus is on the future of his infant daughter, and he envisages the troubled years through which she must live. Yeats could not and did not specify the terrible happenings ahead, but he correctly sensed the dangers, and now in 1985, it is easy for us to name them: the Great Depression, the rise of Hitler, the Second World War, the Cold War, and the threat of nuclear destruction.

The poem tells of a stormy night in the west of Ireland. The wind is howling in off the Atlantic, past the medieval tower in which the poet was then living. As he paces beside the cradle that holds his sleeping child, he tells us:

From "Prayer for My Daughter" by W.B. Yeats.
I have walked and prayed for this young child an hour
And heard the sea-wind scream upon the tower,
And under the arches of the bridge, and scream
In the elms above the flooded stream;
Imagining in excited reverie
That the future years had come,
Dancing to a frenzied drum,
Out of the murderous innocence of the sea.

In this context, we are likely to associate innocence with the infant daughter, but the poet speaks of the "murderous innocence" of the sea. The phrase may be startling, but it is accurate. When we have in mind the destructiveness of a hurricane or a great earthquake, "murderous" seems a proper adjective, yet we know that there is no murder in the heart of nature—no motivation at all, mere senseless indifference. Indeed, the Good Book itself tells us that the rain falls upon both the just and the unjust, and so apparently do the showers of volcanic ash. We have to acquit all of them of guilt. They are innocent by virtue of their sheer mindlessness.

Yet we have not done with the word innocence: Late in the poem Yeats will set forth a third kind of innocence, the innocence that is not at all mindless, but the product of love and self-discipline.

What are the gifts that the poet prays his daughter may receive? Beauty, yes, but not so much as to make her vain and haughty. He wishes for her a "glad kindness" and courtesy. These hoped-for endowments are summed up in one concrete image:

May she become a flourishing hidden tree
That all her thoughts may like the linnet be,
And have no business but dispensing round
Their magnanimities of sound,
Nor but in merriment begin a chase,
Nor but in merriment a quarrel.
O may she live like some green laurel
Rooted in one dear perpetual place.

So, as a counter to the destructive wind, the poet proposes the laurel, hidden and sheltered from the blast and firmly rooted in its own "perpetual place."

Yet likening his daughter's thoughts to the songs of the linnet perched in the tree, especially when coupled with the father's petition that she may "think opinions are accursed," is
probably calculated to affront every woman. Does Yeats want the girl to grow up to be a pretty little charmer without a thought in her head—to possess no opinion of her own?

By no means. Yeats knew his Plato well, and he is here following Plato's distinction between an opinion and an idea. An opinion can claim at best to represent no more than a probability. Absolute truth is to be found only in the divine ideas implanted in the soul, to be recovered by the deepest self-discovery. The later stanzas confirm that such is his meaning, for the poet will declare that the worst of evils is the "intellectual hatred" characteristic of an aggressive, opinionated mind, and that if the soul can rid itself of all hatred, it "recovers radical innocence" and finds

... that it is self-delighting,
Self-appeasing, self-affrighting,
And that its own sweet will is Heaven's will;
She can, though every face should scowl
And every windy quarter howl
Or every bellows burst, be happy still.

Here the earlier figure of the laurel tree, "rooted in one dear perpetual place," is still very much alive in the poem. Consider the phrase "a radical innocence," for radical comes from the Latin radix, a root, and a radical innocence is not merely a basic or essential innocence, but one that is rooted deep in the soul.

Why the poet's reference, however, to "bellows" in the last line of the stanza? "Or every bellows burst, be happy still"? Because the poet wants here to give the scourging wind a human reference. The aggressive, opinionated person imitates the destructive wind by pumping his own malice out of a mind full of hate.

Earlier in the poem, the poet had remarked that he had himself seen the "loveliest woman born / Out of the mouth of Plenty's horn"—that is, out of

William Butler Yeats
the very cornucopia of richness—a woman dowered with all the gifts that nature could give her, "because of her opinionated mind" exchange them "for an old bellows full of angry wind!" This is a bitter lament for what Yeats believed had happened to Maud Gonne, the woman he had loved so passionately earlier in his life.

In the concluding stanza of the poem, Yeats turns his thoughts to the kind of bridegroom he could wish for his daughter. He prays that whoever he may be, he will

... bring her to a house
Where all's accustomed, ceremonious;
For arrogance and hatred are the wares
Peddled in the thoroughfares.
How but in custom and in ceremony
Are innocence and beauty born?
Ceremony’s a name for the rich horn,
And custom for the spreading laurel tree.

We miss the point and vulgarize this noble poem if we read the last stanza as a prayer for a wealthy son-in-law. The authoritative words are "accustomed" and "ceremonious." These qualities have nothing to do with conspicuous display, or even the possession, of wealth. A word to which I would call your attention once more is innocence. Beauty and innocence, which we usually assume are the random gifts of nature, are in fact, so the poet insists here, born out of ceremony. Ceremony is the true horn of plenty, and the laurel tree, which can withstand the storms of history, is custom. This indeed is to invert our usual notions. For bodily beauty—Yeats again is borrowing from Plato—is the outward reflection of a beautiful soul. Innocence here is the fruit of the disciplined soul that has come truly to understand itself. Such a person is incapable of harming anyone. So the term innocence is here neither the babe's lack of experience nor the blind indifference of nature, but the soul's clear-eyed mastery of experience and of itself. Perhaps this is the kind of wise innocence to which great literature may return us if we can learn how to read it.

In this magnificent poem every word plays its proper part, and every image breathes life into an idea. For the poem is also a powerful humanistic document: not the bare skeleton of an abstract argument, but that argument fleshed out into an entity that possesses a life of its own.

Yeats's prayer for his daughter may not be at all your prayer. You are not asked to accept it as the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth. But who of us could not find mind and imagination stimulated by it? The poem is not didactic in any schoolmasterish sense. Perhaps this is just the value of poetry and of literature in general: It lets us observe and overhear men and women as they choose, make decisions, or express their inmost hopes and fears. That in itself is a service of the utmost importance, for we can learn from the experience of others.

Such is the service rendered by great literature throughout history. It provides dramatic accounts of men and women in conflict with nature and with other human beings, and often with themselves. This last conflict William Faulkner regarded as the greatest theme possible—the "human heart in conflict with itself." But though the phrasing is Faulkner's, the theme itself is found as early as in Homer's epics.

The conflict within the heart—the tug between two loyalties, two evils, or what appear to be two equally precious goods—is probably the most instructive of all. Sophocles' Antigone and his Oedipus, Shakespeare's Othello, Macbeth, and Mark Antony, are only a few of an illustrious company. They are not properly called role models, for they represent failure as well as triumph, and for most of us any direct imitations of them would be out of the question. But an acquaintance with them through literature provides something far better than simple imitation. The way they live and choose to die tests the human spirit to its limits. Through the magic of language, their creators can pass on something of their experience to us.
Nearly 150 years after his Presidency, Andrew Jackson remains a model of the “strong” Chief Executive. Alonso Chappel’s painting of the victor of the Battle of New Orleans hints at the “native strength” Nathaniel Hawthorne saw in the general. It “compelled every man to be his tool that came within his reach; and the more cunning the individual might be, it served only to make him the sharper tool.”
Perhaps no American period has been more subject to reinterpretation by scholars than the 1829–1837 Presidency of Andrew Jackson. The craggy Tennessee general was the first man outside the colonial gentry to reach the White House. His life was tumultuous. (How many Chief Executives had once fought duels and even killed a man?) But so were his times. Modern political parties, corporations, and a vigorous press all emerged, as did something called Jacksonian Democracy. Yet what was that exactly? During the 1920s, historian Carl Russell Fish christened the era the “age of the common man.” By the mid-1940s, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., was declaring Jackson to be (with Thomas Jefferson) the founder of American liberalism and, by implication, the patron saint of the New Deal. A debunking followed, as other scholars argued that Jackson and his crowd were mere opportunists. Now, a new biography by Robert V. Remini of the University of Illinois restores much of the Schlesinger portrait but celebrates Jackson’s faith in liberty in terms that Reagans might applaud. Here, Harry L. Watson examines how Old Hickory became a president for all seasons.

OLD HICKORY’S DEMOCRACY

by Harry L. Watson

Still dressed in mourning for his recently deceased wife, a tall, erect, gray-haired figure emerged from the U.S. Capitol at noon on March 4, 1829. Waiting for him on the wide East Lawn that balmy day were some 15,000 spectators—ladies in plumes and brilliant silks, gentlemen in ruffled shirts and broadcloth, farmers in homespun, hunters in fringed buckskin. On seeing the man they variously called Old Hickory, the Old Hero, and the Old Chief, they roared their approval of the about-to-be-inaugurated seventh President of the United States.
Andrew Jackson, 61, the self-made soldier-senator from the Tennessee frontier, had whipped the outgoing John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts, a crabbed and unpopular symbol of Eastern elitism. He had won 56 percent of the votes cast by an electorate that sensed wrenching change and sought fresh leadership. “I never saw anything like it before,” marveled Daniel Webster, the august Bay State senator. “Persons have come 500 miles to see General Jackson, and they really seem to think that the country is rescued from some dreadful danger.”

Rousing the Rabble

Surveying the sea of faces, even the doyenne of Washington society was flushed with democratic enthusiasm. The sight of “a free people,” recalled Margaret Bayard Smith, “collected in their might, silent and tranquil, restrained solely by a moral power, without a shadow around of military force, was majesty.” Jackson met the plaudits with grave dignity, bowed low, and completed the inaugural quickly. A short address, more cheering, another bow, and then back through the Capitol to mount a white horse for the ride up Pennsylvania Avenue.

What ensued has survived as the most enduring tableau of Jacksonian Democracy. The throng of spectators that followed the new President, Mrs. Smith recalled, was made up of “country men, farmers, gentlemen, mounted and dismounted, boys, women and children, black and white.” Expecting entertainment and a handshake from “the Gineral,” they crowded into the White House until the windows burst open. Well-wishers stood on the chairs and muddied the carpets. China and cut glass crashed to the floor as people stretched for drinks and ice cream, until someone thought to carry tubs of punch out to the lawn. After a while, worried aides spirited Jackson to his suite at Gadsby’s Hotel. The raucous scene was more the result of poor planning than of some unleashed popular barbarism, but polite society did not remember it that way. As Mrs. Smith saw it, “The Majesty of the People had disappeared, and a rabble” took its place. “What a pity, what a pity!” Could the United States survive the reign of the people?

I

THE 'GET FORWARD' ERA

As Jackson took office, the country was being transformed anew. True independence had come with the British defeat in the War of 1812—the war that had made Old Hickory a national hero. That the Indians no longer posed any threat east of the Mississippi River was also in part a result of Jackson’s military prowess. Americans were thus free to develop their empire, and movement and innovation were in the air. As Baltimore editor Hezekiah Niles observed in an 1815 piece in Niles’ Weekly Register, the nation had an “almost universal ambition to get forward.”

By the time of Jackson’s inauguration, the U.S. population had reached nearly 13 million, many of these recent arrivals from Germany and Ireland; Jackson’s own parents had come from northern Ireland to work a small farm in the Carolina backcountry. With Missouri’s admission in 1821, the Union had crossed the Mississippi and now included 24 states.

Surging foreign demand for cotton and other raw materials, along with British investment, helped finance rapid develop-
ment. “Internal improvements” came swiftly.

Turnpikes were built; on the Cumberland Road, the coach travel time between Baltimore and St. Louis was cut from four weeks to 94 hours. The Clermont, Robert Fulton’s 1807 marriage of the steam engine and the sailing vessel, led to fleets of churning sidewheelers. Within three years after the completion of the state-financed Erie Canal, linking New York City and the Great Lakes in 1825, a group of private investors broke the ground for the first railroad, the Baltimore and Ohio. Along with banks (there were 329 in business by Jackson’s inauguration) and insurance firms, the companies formed to build such marvels became the first American corporations.

Emerson’s Lament

The Transportation Revolution spurred growth. Textile factories rose beside the streams of New England, spinning cotton supplied by the planters who moved into Alabama and Mississippi following the defeat of the Indians there by Jackson’s militiamen during the War of 1812. New river cities such as Cincinnati and Pittsburgh sprung up in the wilderness, while such older ports as Philadelphia and Boston grew apace and New York marched to urban supremacy. Demand would increase for all sorts of inventions—the telegraph, the mechanical reaper, various machine tools, the Colt revolver, and even anesthesia.

Europe was transfixed. “Amerika,” Germany’s Wolfgang von Goethe declared in 1831, “du hast es besser.” But not all Americans were sure. Fearful that expansion had loosed a plague of sin, Protestant ministers launched the Second Great Awakening, a religious revival that, at least in the hinterland, made evangelical piety the unofficial standard of respectability. (It would inspire reformers like Elizabeth Cady Stanton and William Lloyd Garrison to try to erase remaining imperfections in an improving world.) Nascent unions joined a chorus of reform.

Self-doubt was spurred by generational change. America, as Alexis de Tocqueville would observe on his 1831–32 journey around the country, was losing “her greatest men.” John Adams and Thomas Jefferson both died on July 4, 1826, the 50th anniversary of American independence. Two years before, when the Marquis de Lafayette returned from France for a final tour, Americans welcomed the “Nation’s Guest” with an outpouring of anxious commemoration. They yearned to show this old ally that the new nation’s ideals still lived.

Concern about those ideals afflicted intellectuals. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, Herman Melville, and
Walt Whitman would all be fascinated by their age’s vitality but often repelled by its materialism. James Fenimore Cooper, a squire from upstate New York who believed rural folk to be America’s “heart,” would return in 1833 from a long stay in Europe to be shocked by what the “get forward” ethic had wrought. “The desire to grow suddenly rich has seized on all classes,” sneered John Effingham, the embittered aristocrat in Cooper’s 1838 novels Homeward Bound and Home as Found. Disgusted by the speculation in land and goods that gripped New York particularly, Effingham took perverse satisfaction in a great 1835 fire that wiped out Manhattan’s warehouse area. The desire for gain has absorbed “all principles,” he fumed. “National honor . . . the ordinary rules of society, law, the constitution, and everything that is usually so dear to men, are forgotten, or are perverted in order to sustain this unnatural condition of things.”

That burst of literary creativity known as the American Renaissance began to shape a combination of outward confidence and private skepticism that would be characteristic of American art. If Hezekiah Niles’s readers were all looking forward, many writers noticed that some were secretly glancing over their shoulders. “Our age is retrospective,” Emerson would lament in “Nature,” his famous 1836 essay. “It builds the sepulchers of the fathers. . . . The foregoing generations beheld God and nature face to face; we, through their eyes.”

II

‘DANGEROUS’ HERO?

The first six presidents—the Virginia Dynasty planters (Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe) and the Yankee Adamses of Massachusetts (John and John Quincy)—all came from prominent colonial families. Andrew Jackson stood apart.

Born on a modest farm, he had been raised in the wild and had the combativeness to match. Jefferson had been heard to judge the willful Tennessean “dangerous” and “unfit” for the presidency. When in the early 1820s President Monroe asked Jefferson about appointing Jackson to the U.S. mission to Russia, the ex-President replied, “Why, good God! He would breed you a quarrel before he had been there a month!”

From newspapers, handbills, and a campaign biography, voters knew Jackson’s story well: his early orphanhood, his wounding at age 13 during the Revolution, his bout of dissipation.
before reading law in Salisbury, North Carolina, his early lawyering in burgeoning Tennessee. As a Nashville attorney who prosecuted debt cases and protected the land claims of big speculators, he won the trust of the rich men who were coming to dominate middle Tennessee, married into a leading family, and rose in politics. He invested in land and slaves until, by the 1790s, he could claim to be a planter and gentleman of substance.

Then came a brush with disaster in land speculation, after which he pulled back from the unbridled pursuit of wealth that absorbed most of his Nashville friends. Jackson had himself elected
Major General of the Tennessee militia in 1802 and worked at improving the troops while struggling to repair his fortunes. Undiminished was his reputation for volatility and violence. Forever “challenging” those who crossed him, he was wounded three times in duels and, in an 1806 encounter, killed his opponent.

Jackson was bedridden in Nashville—recovering from a pistol wound received in a brawl with Thomas Hart Benton, a future Missouri senator and Jackson ally—when he was called into service in the War of 1812. Within a month, he was leading Tennessee and Kentucky militiamen against Britain’s Creek In-
His forces got off to a sluggish start, and at one point he had six soldiers executed for desertion. But he swept the Creeks from vast expanses of Alabama. On his own authority, he then moved on to Spanish Florida, where he smashed a British force at Pensacola in November 1814.

His great stroke came in January, when he led 3,500 men in rebuffing a larger force of British regulars under Gen. Sir Edward M. Pakenham that had advanced on New Orleans to use it as a pawn in negotiations. In the final battle, his troops suffered just 71 casualties, versus more than 2,000 for the British. But his feat had no strategic effect; neither side knew that a peace treaty had been signed in Belgium three weeks earlier.

Even so, after a war of many disasters, especially the 1814 burning of Washington, D.C., the Battle of New Orleans made Jackson a hero. His "wisdom" and "personal example," the Washington National Intelligencer declared, "seemed to instil into every breast his own patriotism and heroic courage." The New York Evening Post argued, "If we had a Jackson everywhere, we should succeed everywhere." Exulted Kentucky senator Henry Clay: "Now I can go to England without mortification."

III

REDEFINING 'LIBERTY'

The second war of independence led to a new interest in the concept of liberty, national and personal, that would help to shape Jacksonian Democracy. Over the last two decades, historians have focused on the fact that those who led the Revolution and wrote the Constitution were driven not just by such concrete concerns as British taxation. They shared a complex set of attitudes that has come to be called "republican ideology" and that drew on the English tradition of dissent.

Since the days of John Locke and the Glorious Revolution of 1688–89, when the English Bill of Rights put parliamentary power over royal power, Englishmen had been used to thinking that liberty could only be protected by a balance in government between royal, aristocratic, and popular elements. While most politically active Englishmen were satisfied that such a balance had been achieved by the 18th century, there were dissident intellectuals who worried that the Crown had suborned Parliament by bribing its members with pensions, places, and other types of "preferment." These True Whigs warned that liberty...
was endangered by corrupt royal ministers who served the “monied interests” more faithfully than the “common good.”

True Whig writings were more popular in America than in England. The colonists, like the English dissidents, felt isolated from power. Viewing any expansion of government as an assault on liberty, they rebelled against efforts to consolidate England’s sway in the New World; thus the Revolution. With the insistence in the Declaration of Independence that the “just powers” of government could derive only “from the consent of the governed,” “republicanism” became the American creed. Even the lofty Webster spoke reverently of “the people’s constitution, the people’s Government; made for the people, made by the people; and answerable to the people.”

Thus, presidents had a burden put upon them. They had to advance the common good, yet not be swayed by popular folly. The conventional wisdom was Jefferson’s view that “there is a natural aristocracy among men,” determined not by birth but by “virtue and talents.” Good republican voters had to entrust affairs to these men, who had “the most precious gift of nature for the instruction, the trusts, and government of society.”

The republican faith did not rest on leaders or constitutions, but on the virtue of the citizenry. As a typical Fourth of July orator pointed out to his rural North Carolina audience in 1824, “A system devised in heaven, would fail to command the respect of a licentious and abandoned people.” Unless they clung to virtue, voters might sell their liberties, much as the English had been seduced by the glitter of royalty and aristocracy. America, as Samuel Adams said, had to be a “Christian Sparta” to survive.
The republicans felt that virtue would grow out of particular social conditions. "Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God," Jefferson had intoned. That is, virtue flourished only among independent folk—farmers, artisans—who were neither rich enough to rule others nor so poor as to have to sell themselves into subservience. To have republican government, republican society must be preserved.

But what was republican society? That was the great issue as the Age of Jackson approached.

The answer depended on which republican you asked. Jefferson had looked to a society of simple yeomen, led by natural aristocrats who happened to resemble strongly the Sage of Monticello; like Britain's True Whigs, he opposed the "monied interests," which he associated with the urban commercial economy. Printer Thomas Paine and the artisans of Philadelphia pointed to themselves as exemplars of republicanism. Lawyer Alexander Hamilton, eager to create a commercial and manufacturing nation, drew up his plans for the republic with the needs of merchants and moneymen in mind. The competing definitions of the common good would give rise to conflict between debtors and creditors, Easterners and Westerners, Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians.

Fortunately for the Union, early America could tolerate such differences. Most people were fairly self-sufficient farmers. They owned land, or could hope to. Remembering his youth in 18th-century Virginia, Anglican minister Devereaux Jarrat wrote that "none of my ancestors, on either side, were either rich or great, but had the character of honesty and industry, by which they lived in credit among their neighbors, free from real want, and above the frowns of the world."

'Alabama Fever'

Every rural town had a blacksmith and a miller, and cities like New York and Philadelphia had mechanics and craftsmen. But generally, families filled their own needs. Land gave most men a prized independence, a social analogue to the political independence that they had won from Britain.

Yet by Jackson's time all this was changing. The ratio of farm folk to city- and town-dwellers, 15 to 1 in 1800, was down to about 10 to 1 and falling. Businessmen developed a low-cost "putting-out" system in which workers made goods at home. This cut the need for artisans, as did factories. The Massachusetts shoe and textile workers were among the first Americans to experience a lifetime of wage earning.
And even where the republican ideal was strongest, not all citizens were equal. The typical area had a few people who ran things. "Go into every village in New England," John Adams observed in 1797, "and you will find that the office of justice of the peace, and even [legislators], have generally descended from generation to generation, in three or four families at most." As a boy, Jarrat recalled, "we were accustomed to look up to what were called gentle folks as beings of a superior order. For my part, I was quite shy of them, and kept off at a humble distance."

Through marriage and business ties, the gentry were self-perpetuating. Families like the Adamses in Massachusetts and the Clintons and Livingstons in New York continued to dominate the politics of their states. In part, it was a desire to break their hold that united the upstart politicians who would be called "Jackson men" or "Jacksonians."

They would form the Democratic party, which would hold its first national convention (in Baltimore) in 1832, on the eve of Jackson's second term. But in the 1810s and '20s, they were just finding their paths to power. The smart, compact "Red Fox," the New York boss Martin Van Buren, was a tavern-keeper's son who sensed early that the old aristocracy could be "displaced" by parties organized at the grassroots and tightly disciplined; he
As a politician, Andrew Jackson styled himself a "servant of the people," but he lived (or wanted to live) like a man of privilege. His lands in Tennessee produced cotton, picked by what he once called his "cursed negroes." In the White House, he spent much of his $25,000 presidential salary on fine furnishings and spirited entertaining. He owned race horses, though not just for sport: The 1805 winnings of a stallion named Truxton helped him out of one of his many financial scrapes. His pride was the Hermitage, his estate near Nashville. After an 1834 fire, he rebuilt the manse with a high false front—needed to frame a Greek revival portico like the ones he admired at the White House and at George Washington's Mount Vernon.

Jackson was born on March 15, 1767, in the Waxhaws, a wooded area on the border of North and South Carolina. Two weeks earlier, his father had died of an injury suffered while lifting a log. Jackson's mother hoped he would be "an ornament of the pulpit," but young Andrew was not so destined. A neighbor recalled him as a "roaring, rollicking, game-cocking, horse racing, card-playing, mischievous fellow." At age 13, during the Revolutionary War, he and a brother were captured while trying to take a British-held church. When he refused to polish a Redcoat's boots, the officer swung a saber at him, scarring his head and hand. As prisoners both boys had smallpox, and only Andrew survived. His other brother was killed in battle; his mother soon died. "I felt utterly alone," Jackson recalled.

Of all the pains he suffered, few were as deep as those that came with his marriage to Rachel Donelson, whose mother owned the house where Jackson lived as a prosecuting attorney in Nashville. A pipe-smoking frontier lass known as "irresistible to men," Rachel had a husband, Captain Lewis Robards. But romance blossomed, and in 1790 she and Jackson eloped to Mississippi. Robards followed the pair, eventually into Kentucky, and at one point had Jackson arrested. In 1791, Jackson and Rachel married, thinking that Robards had divorced her. But he had not, a fact that forced the two to marry again (in 1794) and to suffer taunts about "adultery" ever after. Insinuations about Rachel helped trigger an 1806 duel between Jackson and Charles Dickinson, a noted marksman. Jackson coolly let Dickinson fire first and took a bullet near his heart (it was never removed). Then he killed Dickinson with his single shot.

Though Jackson professed to be the trustee of Thomas Jefferson's ideals, he was no Sage of Monticello. He read little and wrote poorly, preferred the comfort of cronies, and was forever smoking a pipe or chewing tobacco—the cause, perhaps, of the hacking cough and
headaches that long plagued him. Thin (140 pounds on a six-foot, one-inch frame) and wan, he was always trying nostrums: bloodletting, fasting, diets, doses of calomel, brandy, whiskey, and salt.

He was quick—"the most rapid reasoner I have ever met," said Louis McLane, one of his Treasury secretaries. Yet he cared little for "the niceties of language" (as another Cabinet member put it) or for detail in general. His life, wrote diplomat Nathaniel Niles, was "dictated by emotion in contradistinction to reason."

As Tennessee's first U.S. Congressman, he opposed a 1796 resolution thanking Washington for his farewell address, protesting that such speeches were only for "countries that have a king." Testifying in the 1807 trial of his friend Aaron Burr, who had lost the 1800 presidential race to Thomas Jefferson, killed Jefferson's ally Alexander Hamilton in a duel, and was now accused of a treasonous plan to break up the Union, Jackson said that Burr had been railroaded with the kind of hearsay "they used in the French Revolution when they wanted to cut a man's head off because he didn't agree with them."

As President in 1833, while traveling by steamboat to Virginia, Jackson was struck by a man he had discharged from the Navy for theft; had the fellow not been hustled away, Jackson swore, he "would never have moved with life from the tracks that he stood in." Two years later, at a Washington ceremony, a mentally deranged bystander aimed two pistols at Jackson, and both misfired. Instead of recoiling from the man—the first would-be presidential assassin, Richard Lawrence—the Hero lunged after him; Jackson was still "boiling with rage" when aides escorted him to safety. He believed that political mudslinging had hastened his ailing Rachel's death after his election in 1828; after her funeral he cried, "May God almighty forgive her murderers as I know she forgave them. I never can!"

Jackson knew he was uncommonly willful. When an aide warned in 1832 that Maine would raise a clamor about the way he had settled a territorial dispute with Canada, Jackson shot back, "I care nothing about clamors, sir, mark me! I do precisely what I think is just and right." His confrontational style was one key to his popularity. After Jackson's testimony at the Burr trial, a Richmond editor wrote admiringly that he "spared none. His style of speaking was rude but strong. It was not the political oratory Eastern audiences were accustomed to hear." Even his foes conceded his "magnetism."

Was Jackson's hickory-hardness a posture? He could be relaxed and genial. One observer described him and Rachel at an 1815 ball: "The general a long, haggard man, with limbs like a skeleton, and Madame le Générale, a short, fat dumpling bobbing opposite each other like half-drunken Indians, to the wild melody of 'Possum up de Gum Tree,' and endeavoring to make a spring into the air." During the controversy over the Bank, Jackson shocked several visiting businessmen with his vehemence on the issue. Afterwards, he chuckled, "They thought I was mad." No man, concluded a Jackson aide, knew better "when to get into a passion and when not."
The 363-mile Erie Canal linking the Hudson River and Lake Erie was opened in 1825. It brought immigrants to Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois.

would serve Jackson as Secretary of State, Vice President, and chief Kitchen Cabinet confidant. Other Jacksonians were men like the gruff David Henshaw, who parlayed a fortune made in wholesale drugs into a machine that challenged the Yankee old guard in Massachusetts; and the firebrand Sen. Isaac Hill of New Hampshire, who, as owner, editor, printer, and newsboy of the New Hampshire Patriot, had at 21 begun a long war against a state oligarchy he felt had kept his family poor.

The Jacksonians saw themselves as restorers of the Jeffersonian tradition. They found their chance to act in the time of flux that came with the Transportation Revolution.

People in the rural East, overcrowded with big families, rushed to the all-but-free land in newly opened Western areas. "The Alabama fever rages here with great violence," fretted a North Carolina planter in 1817. "I am apprehensive, if it continues to spread as it has done, it will almost depopulate the country... Some of our oldest and most wealthy men are offering their possessions for sale and desirous of removing."

Hard decisions faced both the farmers who moved and those who stayed. Specializing in a cash crop like cotton or wheat meant losing self-sufficiency. The new methods urged by "book farmers" required sophistication; producing for the market might mean
borrowing to buy a reaper or a slave. Should a man risk his capital by taking on debt, or should he keep his independence? Would the new ways bring a bonanza or bankruptcy?

These came to be viewed as moral and political questions. Could liberty survive if artisans and farmers were in thrall to banks and other businesses? On the other hand, how could a poor nation remain free? Was not government obliged to build up the national welfare by fostering internal improvements?

Such questions had to be faced. Promoters of banks and transportation companies made change a political issue by seeking subsidies—privilege—from government. Many citizens felt that, as John C. Calhoun of South Carolina would write in 1826 to Jackson, “liberty never was in greater danger.” An issue “has been fairly made... whether the real governing principle in our political system be the power and patronage of the Executive or the voice of the people.”

The need to redefine liberty and virtue preoccupied the political energies of the 1820s. It would be Jackson’s greatest achievement to set the terms of the debate and to propose a solution with which the nation would wrestle for years to come.

IV

‘DESPOT’ OR DEMOCRAT?

To many Americans, Old Hickory’s War of 1812 feats had seemed a providential vindication of the republican ideal, and there had long been talk that he should be president. In 1817, James Monroe had prior claim, however, so Jackson waited. Meanwhile, he fought some more. On his own authority—Monroe’s approval came later—he wrested more Indian territory in a series of ruthless negotiations and, while tracking a fugitive band of Seminoles, conquered Spanish Florida, hanged two British agents, and otherwise provoked international outrage.

Such exploits reinforced an image of Jackson as a hot-headed backcountry outlaw. A Richmond editor was said to scarcely ever retire “without apprehension that he would wake up to hear of some coup d’etat by the General.” But by 1823, when he became a Tennessee senator, Jackson was widely viewed as a statesman who combined the common touch of the self-made man with the poise and determination of a natural aristocrat. A Massachusetts man who met him in Washington wrote his wife that Jackson’s reputation as “extremely rash and
James Fenimore Cooper found them "corrupting" and "vulgar." Alexis de Tocqueville felt that they made "coarse appeals" to popular passions, tended to "assail the characters of individuals," and employed crass editors who had no "weight in the eyes of the public."

What appalled such highbrows, but delighted the rising numbers of middle- and working-class Americans, was the Jackson era's boisterous "penny press," a new breed of cheap, wide-circulation newspapers. Starting in 1833 with the first successful one, Benjamin Day's *New York Sun*, these papers were to launch the prosperous, politically independent, and increasingly professional modern U.S. press.

In 1830, America had 650 weekly and 65 daily papers. But most were low-circulation "six-penny papers." Often put out by a lone editor, these were printed on large, unwieldy "blanket sheets" and sold by yearly subscription (about $8, a week's pay for a skilled worker) to a narrow readership. Some papers, with names such as the *New York Daily Advertiser* and the *Journal of Commerce*, catered to businessmen, with shipping news and items from the European press. Others were openly bankrolled by political parties, various splinter groups, and even individual politicians. Amos Kendall, an editorial writer at the *Washington Globe*, the "Jackson paper" in Washington, D.C., would take dictation at the White House from the President in the evening as he lounged on a couch and smoked and then rework his jottings into "news." He wrote letters to papers in the hinterland and cited them in the *Globe* as evidence of pro-Jackson public opinion.

The penny papers declared political independence and portrayed themselves as service journals. "The object of this paper," read the *Sun*'s first issue, "is to lay before the public, at a price within the means of everyone, ALL THE NEWS OF THE DAY, and at the same time afford an advantageous medium for advertising."

In two years, the *Sun* was selling 15,000 copies a day. It was followed by the *New York Transcript*, the *New York Herald*, started with $500 by the Scotsman James Gordon Bennett, and Horace Greeley's *New York Tribune*. Others appeared in Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. By 1840, the nation had 1,141 weeklies and 138 dailies. Total readership, then 300,000, rose faster than the population.

Urbanization played a role. So did technology—rotary presses, the telegraph (invented in 1844)—and such advances as a handy tabloid size, "newsboys" who hawked papers on the street for cash, and prepayment for advertising. But the penny press's most striking novelties were editorial. The papers described political events as inconsiderate, tyrannical and despotic," was unfounded: "He is very mild and amiable . . . and his manners, though formed in the wilds of the West, exceedingly polished and polite."

In particular, Jackson was polished for the 1824 election, which was to choose a successor to Monroe, the last Virginian.
straight news items and meanwhile sought new fields of interest. They covered divorce and murder trials, reported crimes, carried birth announcements and obituaries, and gloried in "human interest" items. (A front-page story in the Sun's first issue told of a Vermont boy who could not stop whistling, performing "with astonishing shrillness" even "when asleep.")

At the Herald, which would become the largest U.S. paper in the decades before the Civil War, the resourceful Bennett spiced up dull news of trade ("The spirit, pith, and philosophy of commercial affairs is what men of business want") and reported the doings of the rich. Earlier, he said, no one had covered "the graces, the polish, the elegancies, the bright and airy attributes of social life," which had "an originality" that Europe's "worn-out races" lacked.

All this required an innovation: paid newsmen. The editor of the Transcript observed in 1834 that none of the city's 11 established journals had a reporter, but the Transcript and another "NEWS paper" (namely the Herald) had four men "to obtain the earliest, fullest, and most correct intelligence of every local incident." By 1837, Bennett had two Washington staffers, reporters in Jamaica and Key West, and occasional correspondents in Philadelphia, Boston, and London. The "scoop," a word not coined until the 1880s, was prized.

The staid, old six-penny papers barred ads for, say, businesses that operated on the Sabbath, lotteries, and theaters. The penny sheets were less choosy. They took "want ads" and flogged patent medicines. Explained the Boston Daily Times: "One man has as good a right as another to have his wares, his goods, his panaceas, his profession, published to the world in a newspaper, provided he pays for it."

Not all publishers found such mold-breaking profitable. An early failure (too few ads) was the Ladies' Morning Star, a New York daily started in 1836 to champion the "claims and rights of that class of young women who live by their daily labor." But the broad impact of the penny press was great. In Discovering the News (1978), sociologist Michael Schudson argues that these papers advanced literacy by offering news that ordinary folk hungered to know. The brash, "read-all-about-it" upstarts also sped the nation's transformation from a land "still cradled in aristocratic values, family, and deference, to an egalitarian market democracy, where money had new power, the individual new standing, and the pursuit of self-interest new honor."

In the absence then of disciplined national parties, several candidates stepped forward. Monroe's Treasury Secretary, Georgia planter William H. Crawford, was closest to the old presidential model: Virginia-born, popular with Congress, committed to patrician "politics as usual." Three other contenders...
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represented younger leadership with ideas about a much stronger federal role: Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, the stiff, erudite son of the second President and favorite of New England; the humorless Calhoun, now Secretary of War; and Kentucky's ebullient Clay, Speaker of the House of Representatives, advocate of an "American system" of protective tariffs and roads and canals that would help develop the country.

During the campaign, Crawford suffered a stroke, and the others fell into unseemly bickering. Enter Old Hickory, nominated by the Tennessee legislature.

The graying farmer/warrior, long in fragile health, had cast himself as a Cincinnatus, affecting disinterest while persuading himself and others that he alone could restore the purity of the old republic. Whatever his future, "I am perfectly at ease," he had written to his nephew in 1822. "I am fast going out of life, but my fervent prayers are that our republican government may be perpetual." The people, "by their virtue, and independent exercise of their free suffrage, can make it perpetual."

Blifil and Black George

But they did not make him president. His candidacy had caught the public imagination and that of the rising Jacksonian pols. Yet while he led the field, he fell short of an electoral vote majority. The election went to the House, an event which had taken place only once before (in the tied Thomas Jefferson–Aaron Burr race of 1800) and would never again. Clay threw his support to Adams, the second-place candidate, making him president by a narrow margin. Adams then named the Kentuckian his Secretary of State and appeared to anoint him as his successor. It was a perfectly logical transaction among Washington insiders, but Jacksonians were outraged. A "corrupt bargain," they charged, had violated "the will of the people."

Adams pushed on. If earlier Americans saw liberty threatened by power, he dared to assert that "liberty is power." He called for many federal projects—roads, canals, even an astronomical observatory. If the nation was to "slumber" and "proclaim to the world that we are palsied by the will of our constituents, would we not doom ourselves to perpetual inferiority?"

Congress was aghast. Palsied by their constituents? Had the man no shame? Wasn't the scandal of his election offensive enough? Did he have to show further contempt for the sovereign people?

For the next four years, Congress ignored Adams's proposals. The Virginia senator John Randolph likened the staid President
and the high-living Clay to the villains of Henry Fielding's 1749 novel, *The History of Tom Jones*. They were "Blifil and Black George," "the puritan and the black-leg." Clay asked for a duel with pistols. He and Randolph survived unharmed.

The growth that Adams championed threatened to make small farmers and artisans dependent on landlords, employers, and bankers. Southerners had other reasons to fear Adams's big-government ideas. Cotton had given new life to slavery, and planters would brook no interference with it. As recently as 1820, Northern congressmen tried to force abolition in Missouri as a condition for statehood. Later a rebellion almost erupted among the slaves of Charleston, underlining the slaveholders' vulnerability. Anything that strengthened the federal government might enable an antislavery majority to assault what Southerners delicately called their "peculiar institution." "If Congress can make banks, roads, and canals under the Constitution," warned North Carolina's senator Nathaniel Macon in 1824, "they can free any slave in the United States."

Increasingly, Southerners measured candidates by the degree of their commitment to human bondage. To many of them, Georgia's Crawford seemed ideal in 1824. In 1828, they could turn to Jackson. He owned some 150 slaves and was a known opponent of centralized power.

V

'THE GENERAL' IN COMMAND

Only Adams and Jackson ran in the 1828 race, but it too made history, as the most slanderous of U.S. election campaigns.

Jacksonians called the President a libertine, a would-be dictator, "King John II," a "pimp" who had procured a woman for the Russian Tsar, a Sabbath-breaker who rode "like mad" on Sundays. They charged that Adams, who bought a billiards table and a chess set for the White House, had used public funds to install "gaming tables and gambling furniture."

Adams's allies portrayed Jackson as a bloodthirsty adventurer. Pro-Adams papers called his previously married wife, Rachel, an "adultress"; a pro-Adams handbill described Jackson's shooting of militiamen for desertion in Alabama and asked if "this man, who carries a sword cane and is willing to run it through the body of anyone who may presume to stand in his
way, is a fit person to be our President."

Behind the mudslinging were real differences. Jackson's friends presented him as a limited-government man: Only as necessary for national security would he back the internal improvements and high tariffs on imported goods (costly to the South) that Adams favored. The Hero's vague talk of "reform" (he had no platform as such) appealed to those who had no fondness for the establishment and nothing to gain from a market economy. The election proved that fears of economic change, centralized power, and corruption were more compelling to voters than the federally guided progress that Adams offered. Jackson won not only 56 percent of the 1,155,340 votes cast, but also 178 electoral votes (to Adams's 83). He swept the South and West and also took Pennsylvania and most of New York.

Expanding the Empire

At the end of Jackson's eight-year Presidency, Clay would say that he had "swept over the Government . . . like a tropical tornado." But in the beginning there were few signs of approaching storms. Reflecting the nation's expansive mood, the Hero sent the sloop-of-war *Vincennes* off to show the flag on the first round-the-world cruise by a U.S. Navy ship. In his brief first inaugural, he was specific only about federal indebtedness, which he thought "incompatible with real independence" and promised to wipe out—and did, in 1835–36.

Like many 19th-century thinkers, Jackson had an ideal of the republic as a feature of the "middle landscape," equally removed from the savagery of the wilderness and the decadence of the Old World. He had faced these enemies in his wars with Indians and the British. As President, he would restore republican values by fighting barbarism (Indians again) and decadence (now corruption).

His first opportunity came quickly. After the election, Georgia outlawed its Indian population's tribal government and declared tribal land to be state-owned. This action was an assault on the Five Civilized Tribes of the Old Southwest—the 50,000 or so Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Seminoles who sought peace with the white newcomers. They farmed, held black slaves, and often adopted Christianity. But the settlers wanted

*Though Jackson shaved spending down from $16,394,843 in 1828, by 1833 it was up to $23 million. What erased the federal debt were receipts from tariffs and sales of western lands. (By 1840, more than one-third of the population lived west of the Appalachian Mountains.) At a banquet marking the occasion, Sen. Thomas Hart Benton declared that the "long unseen" sight of a debt-free major nation at last stands "revealed to the astonished vision of a wondering world!" Federal indebtedness returned in 1837, never to be wiped out again.

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...
Corruption proved to be a tougher foe than the "savages." Jackson hunted out "Treasury rats" and other dishonest or incompetent officials. Insisting that most federal jobs, then seen as lifetime sinecures, could be made "plain and simple" enough to be filled by anyone, he announced a principle of "rotation in office." Government would no longer be "an engine of support for the few at the expense of the many."

Yet the anticorruption drive was hit-or-miss. Eighteen months after the inaugural, a Jackson ally cited only 919 out of 10,093 officeholders removed, over half of them postmasters. Nor did Jackson devise systems for prosecuting embezzlers or examining nominees. A Jackson appointee, Samuel G. Swartwout, named Collector of the Port of New York in 1829 over the protests of local Jacksonians, was the first man found to have stolen more than $1 million from the Treasury. (He fled to England.)

**Warring on Privilege**

Jackson was convinced that Adams appointees had used their positions to electioneer for him, much as royal minions subverted the electoral process in 18th-century England. To root out this evil, he claimed "a duty to dismiss" all those who were appointed "against the will of the people" or had gotten involved in campaigning. This was translated by Sen. William A. Marcy, a power in Van Buren's New York machine, as meaning "to the victor belong the spoils of the enemy." But the number of Jackson appointees was not great, and most historians have agreed that, as Clinton Rossiter wrote in *The American Quest* (1971), the spoils system "did its share in developing a government that reflected and guarded the interests of the people."

Another source of corruption, in the republican tradition, was "commerce," and Jackson saw evidence all around him. Almost everywhere businessmen sought privileges—charters, exemptions, tariffs, monopolies—for planned investments in banks, canals, railroads, and factories. Jackson thought this intolerable: government favor being bid for by ambitious men operating, as Van Buren put it, "in conjunction with minor classes of politicians...and backed by a little army of cunning contractors." He signaled his aim to end such "unequal" support by vetoing an 1830 appropriation to a Kentucky firm, the Maysville Turnpike Road Company. When warned that his own advisers feared the political fallout from this assault on a practice much beloved by politicians, especially in the growing West, Jackson snapped, "Yes, but don't mind that!!"

Jackson came to regard tariffs as the worst kind of unequal
South Carolina's "nullification" of tariff law led to a crisis and a rallying cry—Daniel Webster's 1830 call for "Liberty and Union, now and forever," a principle for which hundreds of thousands of Americans would later die.

legislation because they helped one area at the expense of another. Manufacturers wanted stiff government levies on foreign products. As a military man, Jackson saw the need to build up suppliers of textiles, munitions, and other essential items; he also needed votes from Northern industrial areas. In the campaign, he declared for a "judicious" tariff while opposing any system that favored one region.

During Adams's last year, Congress passed a high tariff that aided the North but hurt the agricultural South, which had to pay more for the goods it bought. After the election, Jackson's Southern supporters expected relief from the new President, but Jackson largely stayed out of the controversy.

Eventually, South Carolina rebelled. At an 1832 convention called by its states-rights leaders, the tariff was declared "nullified," and "King Andrew" was dared to attempt to collect in the port of Charleston. Jackson was already on bitter terms with the leading nullifier, Sen. John C. Calhoun, who while serving as his Vice President had secretly planned the South Carolina revolt.
While threatening to organize a 30,000-man army to invade the state to enforce the federal law, Jackson issued a proclamation declaring that “disunion by armed force is treason.” Embracing a constitutional view usually associated today with Webster and Abraham Lincoln, he insisted that the Constitution “forms a government not a league.” Because the nation was created by the people, individual states “cannot possess any right to secede.”

Though Jackson always regretted not having had the “most base, hypocritical and unprincipled” Calhoun hung for treason,* cooler heads prevailed. Clay and Calhoun framed a compromise under which the tariff was gradually cut, and the crisis passed.

The Bank as Monster

By 1832, when he glided to an easy re-election (over Clay), Jackson was at war with another presumed evil: banks. Suspicious of financial manipulation since his early troubles in Tennessee, he once said that “ever since I read the history of the South Sea Bubble [an 18th-century British banking scandal], I have been afraid of banks.” Their role became the greatest controversy of his administration.

In Jackson’s day, the government issued no national paper currency, and there was no Federal Reserve System (it was not created until 1913). Hundreds of small banks (788 of them by 1837) set up under state charters issued their own money. The focus of Jackson’s ire was the largest lender, the Philadelphia-based Bank of the United States (BUS).

The BUS was semi-official, chartered by Congress in 1816. Of its $35 million in capital, one-fifth was put up by the government. It had a monopoly on the government’s banking business, and its notes—expected to become the basis for a stable national currency—were used in paying federal taxes. It presented notes issued by smaller banks for collection in gold or silver specie as soon as it received them; this discouraged the lesser banks from issuing more notes than they could redeem, a temptation that was strong in western areas where new arrivals liked to borrow cash to buy land from the government. The Supreme Court had upheld the bank’s constitutionality, and under the leadership of the distinguished Nicholas Biddle, its key role in the nation’s growing commerce seemed secure.

But not to Old Hickory: Like Jefferson and England’s True

*He did not even duel with the “Nullie,” except with a famous exchange of toasts. At an 1830 dinner commemorating Jefferson’s birthday, Jackson rose and, glaring at Calhoun, hoisted a glass to “Our Federal Union—it must be preserved.” To which Calhoun, reportedly trembling, responded: “The Union—next to our liberty, the most dear!”

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Whigs, he resented the growing importance of intangible wealth and the seemingly irresponsible power of paper money financiers. He called the BUS a “Monster,” a “hydra of corruption” that was “dangerous to our liberties” because it used its power to subvert the democratic process. It was known to advance funds to congressmen, keep key politicians on retainer (Webster, the bank’s “counsel,” borrowed nearly $18,000 from it during the 1830s), and lend freely to publishers (among them James Gordon Bennett of the New York Herald). BUS officers were said to have tried to harass Jackson supporters and help Adams in the 1828 campaign. When, in 1832, Congress passed a bill extending the bank’s charter for another 30 years, Jackson told Van Buren, “The bank is trying to kill me, but I will kill it.” He vetoed the bill with what ranks as his most important policy statement.

Jackson versus the Bank of the United States. Proponents saw it as part of an “American system” fostering economic independence. The Jacksonian theorist William Gouge thought “government should have no more concern with Banking and brokerage than it has with baking and tailoring.”
The bank's charter, Jackson said, was "a present of some millions" to private stockholders, many European. "Every man is equally entitled to protection by law," he wrote. Thus when lawmakers "grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of society—the farmers, mechanics, and laborers . . . have a right to complain of the injustice of their Government."

Webster would charge that Jackson was "trying to inflame the poor against the rich." But Jackson truly saw himself as fighting for the "farmers, mechanics, and laborers," the bedrock of republican society, who had no need or opportunity to gain government favors. He would protect their liberty by destroying an institution that could reduce their political rights to insignificance.

A Charge of Tyranny

Public opinion divided sharply on the issue, and more so when Jackson in 1833 announced that he would withdraw government deposits from the BUS and place them in state banks. Jackson believed he had to cripple the BUS before it could use its power to obtain a new congressional charter. This was no idle fear: Biddle had called the veto "a declaration of war" and was fighting back hard—even causing a recession by calling in loans and refusing credit to persuade the business community that the BUS was indeed indispensable.

When Roger B. Taney, the Jackson-appointed Treasury Secretary (he was never confirmed by the Senate), withdrew the government's funds from the BUS, the step outraged merchants, bankers, commercial farmers, and other credit users who wanted a centralized banking system. They had accepted the veto, believing that another charter would be passed later. But they saw deposit removal as an assault on property rights. The Boston Advertiser thundered that "for the first time, perhaps, in the history of civilized communities, the Chief Magistrate of a great nation . . . is found appealing to the worst passions of the uninformed."

To his political opponents, Jackson's action seemed especially highhanded. The legislation that had created the Treasury Department required its Secretary to report not to the President but to Congress, suggesting that the Executive had only limited authority over the department. Arguing that the primary threat to republican liberties was not the rise of commerce but presidential usurpation of power, Clay led what would be a major congressional assault on executive power and authority—and the greatest until 1868, when Andrew Johnson's foes tried to impeach him for attempting to force out a Secretary of War who
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was admired on Capitol Hill.

Proposing Senate resolutions censuring Jackson, Clay charged that a “hitherto bloodless” revolution was moving the nation from a republic to a dictatorship; if the “approaching tyranny” was not stopped, America would have an elective monarchy, “the worst of all forms of government.” Three months of debate ensued, with Webster and Calhoun warning of “despotic power” in the White House. The resolutions finally passed in March 1834, but Jackson’s Democrats were vindicated by smashing victories in the subsequent congressional elections.

Clay, Calhoun, and Webster established an opposition party. Claiming affinity to the English dissident tradition, they took the name “Whigs” and tried to rally voters against “King Andrew I.” Yet the Whigs were at best loosely organized by the 1836 election. Jackson’s chosen successor, Van Buren, edged out Webster and three other rivals. By the end of the Red Fox’s term, however, two-party competition was firmly established.

The BUS was crippled, finally collapsing in 1843, but Jackson’s victory meant little in the long run. Larger forces were at work. As he left office, a fire of speculation was spreading that would end with the Panic of 1837. This was a scare about the soundness of the banking system that drove many institutions to stop redeeming their notes in gold and silver specie, which in turn led to an economic depression that extended into the 1840s.

Van Buren subsequently created a complete divorce between Washington and banking through an “independent Treasury” plan; it remained in place until the creation of the Federal Reserve. Yet Jackson failed to eliminate the use of credit and paper money as the basis for the nation’s business. With the demise of the Philadelphia “Monster,” New York became the nation’s financial center. Old Hickory’s attacks on vested commercial interests had invigorated democratic ideology, but the growth of America’s market economy continued uninterrupted.

VI

JACKSON’S LEGACY

In his farewell address, Jackson recalled Washington’s warning. “You must remember, my fellow citizens,” he said, “that eternal vigilance . . . is the price of liberty.” Jackson was not referring to any foreign threat. “It is from within, among yourselves, from cupidity, from corruption, from disappointed
ambition and inordinate thirst for power—that factions will be formed and liberty endangered."

How to guard against all this? Jackson furnished a clue in an 1833 letter to Indiana district attorney Tilghman A. Howard. He called "equality among the people in the rights conferred by government" the "principle of freedom." As Jackson saw it, the ideological basis for democracy was laid in the need for strict legal egalitarianism to protect the republican union from the pull of hostile interests. Unlike James Madison, who in *The Federalist* (1787–88), essay No. 10, had explained his faith in a variety of competing factions, Jackson put his faith in the single interest represented by the "great body of the people." Jackson believed that equality, to survive, required a perpetual defense; a grand coalition of voters who had more to gain from equality than from legislated favoritism was needed to stand against "the predatory portion of the community." He thought that this coalition had first appeared in Jefferson's time, under the Democratic-Republican (or just Republican) banner, and had reassembled to put him in office and rescue the republic from corruption. Though many Jefferson followers ended up as Jackson foes, Old Hickory continued to believe that he had only revived the Jefferson coalition. He was proud to have "labored to reconstruct this great Party and bring popular power to bear with full influence upon the Government."

**Parties, Patronage, Parades**

Here Jackson was repeating a lesson learned earlier, in the rough school of New York politics, by Van Buren. Building on "Little Van's" methods, Jacksonians organized clusters of activists in other states. They controlled patronage in the post office, customs, and other public jobs, and made loyalty essential to get them. They summoned voters to conventions, organized caucuses to keep local legislators in line, established newspapers to put out party views. (Motto of the Jackson paper in Washington, D.C., the Washington Globe: "The world is governed too much.")

To communicate with voters (and cow the opposition), the Jacksonians held mass meetings and parades. An outsized example was "The Grand Triumphant Tour" of 1833. To put the nullification war in the past, Jackson made a month-long trek from the Capital through New England by "steam car," boat, and horse carriage that, wrote biographer Robert Remini, "caused an emotional debauch. The delight, the happiness, the pure joy shown by the people in seeing their President had never been expressed in quite the same way before." Previously, only
Abolitionist agitation led to Virginia's Nat Turner Rebellion, an 1831 eruption of racial violence. Jackson, said one paper, brought "mobocracy."

Washington and Monroe had traveled the country, and neither worked crowds (or drew them) as the Hero did.

To many Americans these developments seemed highly ironic, even disgraceful. A man who had promised to sweep away corruption had wound up promoting it, through patronage. A man who had evoked the old republic laid the groundwork for machine politics. Partisanship was widely viewed as the very antithesis of republican morality—a judgment that, in one version or another, has persisted.

Old Hickory's foes found that they could not oppose Jacksonism successfully without embracing its methods. By 1840, the Democrats were confronted by a Whig party that was equally committed to political democracy*—and to winning at the Jacksonians' own game. The Whigs picked their own War of 1812 general, William Henry ("Old Tip") Harrison, 67, a farmer from North Bend, Ohio, and ran a race that would set the standard for all to follow. There were campaign songs, torchlight parades, much overblown rhetoric. Whig promoters turned Harrison's substantial farmhouse into a humble log cabin; a brand of Old Cabin Whisky (in cabin-shaped bottles) was put out by a Philadelphia company called E. C. Booz. The Whig Springfield (Massachusetts) Republican declared that Old Tip would "strike his plough into the soil of corruption in Washington—

*For white males, anyway. Even for them, broad suffrage was slow in coming; for example, it was not until the 1850s that property owning requirements for the right to vote disappeared everywhere. For women, the march toward the 19th Amendment, which in 1920 guaranteed their suffrage, began with small steps—such as Kentucky's 1838 move to grant limited voting rights to widows with school-age children.
ton, and turn it to the light of the sun." Van Buren was flayed as an "aristocrat" who offered workers "50 cents a day and French soup" instead of the Whigs' "$2 a day and roast beef."

Harrison defeated Van Buren with 53 percent of the popular vote. The old politics, that of the decorous jousting among candidates from the gentry, was gone.

While the Democrats looked back to the simplicity of the old republic, Whigs looked ahead to the promise of a business economy. They argued that development would help all and were more skeptical of the benefits of wide-open democracy. (John Quincy Adams, who would not be "palsied" by the popular will, became a Whig.) But the parties did not pit monolithic classes against each other. There were rich and poor in both, and in both men of average means were a majority. Background mattered: Northern Protestants tended to be Whigs, Catholics and German and Irish immigrants were often Democrats.

No Bodies, No Souls

Yet the "age of the common man" was far from an era of economic and political equality. Nor was it an interlude of classless government between the early aristocracy and the plutocracy of the Gilded Age during the 1880s and '90s. Jackson himself, in the Bank veto message, said that the aim of equal protection under the law was not to ensure an equal distribution of wealth but "the full enjoyment of the gifts of Heaven and the fruits of superior industry, economy, and virtue." What he opposed was government favor "to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful." Without such aid, he assumed, time and chance would break up large fortunes and prevent the growth of a permanent upper class. Individuals would then be free to gain wealth, but "aristocracy" could never gain a foothold in America.

Jackson also recognized implicitly that a degree of wealth or achievement was necessary to seek public office. Having his own aristocratic ambitions, he was undisturbed that officeholders (like those in every era) were better off than the average voter. Finally, the legal barriers that kept women, blacks, and Indians subordinate to white men concerned Jackson not at all. Criticism of such inequality was far more common in the Whig Party, which later inspired the Republican Party of Abraham Lincoln.

Andrew Jackson's democracy grew out of an attempt to preserve the kind of society in which republican virtue could flourish—a society based on small property holders who enjoyed liberty as freedom from monopolists or the holders of privileges. But he triumphed only at the polls; the commercial growth, in-
dustrialization, and urbanization that undercut his ideal rolled on, during his White House years and after.

It was once common among historians to explain this by asserting that Jacksonians were not opposed to economic development but only to a system that limited opportunity to a favored few. Jackson's own words would seem to belie this, as do those of some of his followers. Benton started out as a servant of John Jacob Astor's American Fur Company. But during the 1820s and '30s, his experience as a Democratic politician turned him against the vision of a corporate economy, and the Missouri senator became a foe of paper money and the credit system. "I did not join in putting down the Bank of the United States to put up a wilderness of local banks," he cried in 1837. "I did not strike Caesar to make Anthony master of Rome!"

Some scholars, led by historian Marvin Meyers (The Jacksonian Persuasion [1957]), have also argued that the "Jackson men" were confused—that they rejected development in their speeches but furthered it in their behavior. This charge is not quite fair. Studies have shown that the leading promoters of economic change—bankers, industrialists, transportation magnates—normally joined the Whig party. Jacksonians who turned to business careers were usually exceptions or latecomers.

The Jacksonians wanted to prevent the rise of business, not just democratize it. They agreed with the influential economic theorist William M. Gouge, who campaigned against companies ("these artificial creatures") with an old aphorism: "Corporations have neither bodies to be kicked nor souls to be damned." As the Jackson men understood it, a corporate economy would inevitably lead to an undemocratic society.

Stopping the Engine

The Jacksonian reform agenda was not lengthy. Special privileges were to be taken away from corporate enterprise and the vote was to be given to everyone who deserved to be included among the "people." That was about it. But over time the advantages of economic development became more and more obvious to the well-placed men who led the Democratic party. By the early 1850s, Democratic state legislators were chartering banks and subsidizing new railroads as willingly as any Whigs.

And development proceeded, though the Jacksonian yeoman farmer seemed unaware that his ultimate fate was extinction. His outrage was not given voice until the Populist uprising, the 1890s rebellion of farmers who felt victimized by a hard-money policy designed to favor Eastern banks and business. But
by then, America’s industrial economy was in place.

Who are the legitimate heirs of Jacksonian democracy? Though liberals and conservatives may both lay claim to the Jackson mantle, it belongs exclusively to no one.

Jackson’s talk of liberty, property, egalitarianism, and democracy in support of an older, purer society had conservative overtones. But he moved to his goal by developing an ideological justification of a wider democracy. The true conservatives of his day—men such as Webster, Clay, and Justice John Marshall—viewed all this with dismay. As late as 1834, the Boston Courier would declare that “it is as proper for a blacksmith to attempt to repair watches, as a farmer, in general, to legislate.”

Liberals and reformers of subsequent times have been gratified to note that Jackson demanded that society’s basic decisions be made by the “great body of the people.” (No matter that he did not include women or blacks in “the body.”) But conservatives have also drawn on the Jacksonian reform tradition. Persuaded that liberal social engineers became entrenched in government and flouted the popular will in their drive for “entitlements” during the 1960s and ’70s, prophets of the New Right have used Jacksonian rhetoric in their war on Big Government.

The Jacksonians’ lasting contributions have thus been procedural rather than programmatic. The people, they said, must
make the major decisions, and their will must not be filtered through a self-interested gentry. Today, these principles make the Jacksonian legacy available to any American with a message—liberal, conservative, or radical.

That legacy calls for a government committed to preserving "liberty," however defined. Jackson himself did not see government as the threat to liberty. He worried about the "aristocracy and monopoly" that government fostered. Americans who fear that overbearing bureaucrats are the main danger to liberty are faithful to certain strands of the Jacksonian message, though they may be forgetting Jackson's anticorporate theme. Likewise, those who see racial or sex discrimination—or pollution, exploitation on the job, deception of consumers, or the possibility of a nuclear holocaust—as the central hazards are not borrowing directly from Jackson, but they have not violated the basics of his legacy.

The language of Jacksonian Democracy may be so widely usable because it was so vague. Early in his second term, Jackson described his mission thus: "If only I can restore to our institutions their primitive simplicity and purity, can only succeed in banishing those extraneous corrupting influences which tend to fasten monopoly and aristocracy on the constitution and to make the Government an engine of oppression to the people instead of the agent of their will, I may then look back to the honor conferred upon me, with just pride."

Jackson's "restorationist" objectives were a response to the onset of serious economic change. But they offered no means of coping with change except removing government support for it. They spelled out a stirring demand for democratic participation in government, but they offered no definition of what a democratic and industrial future should be.

Thus, in a sense, the triumph of Jacksonian Democracy included a failure of democratic vision. The Jacksonian linkage of progressive methods and nostalgic objectives would both plague and inspire his admirers long after his Presidency.

In the end, perhaps without fully realizing it, Jackson was an innovator who took the nation in a dramatically new direction and, at least psychologically, set the framework for all subsequent national action. A generation earlier, George Washington played a similar role. A century later, so would Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
"In their speech they produced 'strange' accents and inflections to the English language, and they no longer wore powdered wigs and silk stockings. They were restless and aggressive and highly mobile. More than anything else, they were consumed with a desire to be better off, to make money, to succeed in business . . ."

And how to succeed? "The answer was simple. Work! That was the first command of this new society."

Such were the "new" Americans who emerged in the Jackson era, writes Robert V. Remini in his fat (638 pages), anecdotal, and somewhat breathless *Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Democracy, 1833–1845* (Harper, 1984). "They no longer seemed English or European in any way. They had their own unique characteristics now that set them off as an individual people."

Remini's book, third in a trilogy, is the most positive academic appraisal of Old Hickory since *The Age of Jackson* (Little, Brown, 1945, cloth; 1963, paper) by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., whose portrayal of Jackson as a 19th-century FDR stirred scholarly debates for years. While all agree that the age was (as Daniel Webster said) "full of excitement," historians have differed in their measurements of the general himself.

Few have been as underwhelmed as Samuel Eliot Morison: in *The Oxford History of the American People*, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1965, cloth; Mentor, 1972, paper), he argues that Jackson "catered to mediocrity" and was so flawed ("too personal and instinctive") that "it is doubtful whether he should be included in the ranks of the really great Presidents."


James Parton's early study, first issued during 1859–60 in three volumes and most recently published in condensed form as *The Presidency of Andrew Jackson*, edited by Robert Remini (Harper, 1967, paper), made history itself, signaling the debut of modern American biography. Seeking popular success, Parton talked to Jackson cronies (such as Sam Houston of Texas) and retraced the general's march to glory (including the Indian campaign sites) in search of telling detail. And he found it—e.g., when one Jackson chum expressed regret that, due to a brawl with Thomas Hart Benton, the general was "not in a condition" to join in the War of 1812, Jackson replied, "The devil in hell, he is not."

Closer still to the subject was the great George Bancroft, the first scholar to attempt a comprehensive study of the nation's past. He published 10 volumes between 1834 and 1874, which are now most accessible in the abridged *History of the United States of America from the Discovery of the Continent*, edited by Russel B. Nye (Univ. of Chicago, 1966, paper).
The eclectic Bancroft—he knew Jackson, founded the United States Naval Academy as Secretary of the Navy in 1845, and served as ambassador to England and Prussia—was a "root and branch Democrat and the best writer in the U. States," in Martin Van Buren's judgment. Sharing the dialectical world view of the Hegelian nationalist historians in Germany, he regarded America as the highest point yet reached in man's quest for the perfect state, which he thought should be "a determined, uncompromising democracy."

As some saw them, however, the young nation's achievements were mixed. Alexis de Tocqueville, who published Democracy in America in 1835—best read now in Richard D. Heffner's 1956 condensation (New American Library, paper)—found his affection for Jacksonian egalitarianism tempered by concern that as the gentry declined and "a middling ability becomes common," a "tyranny of the majority" might appear.

As Burns notes, Charles Dickens, having won fame for The Pickwick Papers (1836–37) and other fusillades against England's Victorian establishment, toured America during 1842 only to be disappointed. U.S. politics were fraught with "despicable trickery at elections; underhanded tamperings with public officers; cowardly attacks upon opponents, with scurrilous newspapers for shields, and hired pens for daggers."

Russel Nye, in Society and Culture in America (Harper, 1974), details the flowering in the arts during the years around Jackson's Presidency. The painters included not only ornithologist John James Audubon and portraitist Gilbert Stuart but also the men of the Hudson River school (Asher Durand, Thomas Cole, Samuel F. B. Morse, et al.) who focused on the natural world and framed a Yankee version of the Romanticism that would sweep the arts in Europe as a reaction against complexity and commercialization.

Writers, too, were voicing worry about the pursuit of wealth. Squires such as James Fenimore Cooper and plainer folk such as Nathaniel Hawthorne shared the Jacksonians' qualms about the accretion of power in the hands of bureaucrats and businessmen. "Instead of setting man free," argued the Washington Globe's Amos Kendall, industry "only increased the number of his masters."

None agreed more than the Transcendentalists, the influential if unworldly band of New England thinkers led by Ralph Waldo Emerson, Bronson Alcott, Margaret Fuller, and others. They were wary of economic growth and disliked the new commercial middle class; Americans, they felt, must rediscover simplicity and espouse "Self-Reliance," the title of the widely read 1841 Emerson essay.

What the Transcendentalists preached was practiced by Henry David Thoreau. On July 4, 1845—less than a month after Andrew Jackson's death—he left his parents' Concord, Mass., home to begin his two years of solitary homesteading on nearby Walden Pond. Thoreau was an odd duck, a loner and nearmisanthrope, but his observations struck chords among at least some of the "new" Americans who were remaking the country during and after Jackson's day. "In the long run," he wrote in Walden (1854), "men hit only what they aim at. Therefore, though they should fail immediately, they had better aim at something high."
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POPE JOHN XXIII: 
Shepherd of the Modern World 
by Peter Hebblethwaite 
Doubleday, 1985 
550 pp. $19.95

On October 11, 1962, Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli, then 80 years old and in the fourth year of his reign as Pope John XXIII, shook the Catholic Church as it had not been shaken for a century. The occasion was his opening address to the Second Vatican Council. Over the previous 100 years, the Church had been in an increasingly defensive state of mind, nervous about developments in Western intellectual life, anxious about the very possibility of change within its own household. Roncalli, in just three paragraphs, both challenged the doomsayers and set his Church on the path toward a dialogue with modernity:

"In the daily exercise of our pastoral office, we sometimes have to listen, much to our regret, to voices of persons who, though burning with zeal, are not endowed with too much sense of discretion or measure. In these modern times they can see nothing but prevarication and ruin. They say that our era, in comparison with past eras, is getting worse, and they behave as though they had learned nothing from history. . . ."

"We feel we must disagree with those prophets of gloom, who are always forecasting disaster, as though the end of the world were at hand."

"In the present order of things, Divine Providence is leading us to a new order of human relations, which, by men's own efforts and beyond their very expectations, are directed toward the fulfillment of God's superior and inscrutable designs. And everything, even human differences, leads to the greater good of the Church."

It would be hard to imagine a more revolutionary papal statement in 1962. What could history teach a Church used to considering itself the bearer of timeless and immutable truths? How could human differences contribute to a Church that tended to identify "unity" with "uniformity"? John XXIII would not live to see the completion of his Council (he died after its first Period, in 1963). But the bishops of the universal Church took "Good Pope John" at his word. The great achievements of the Council—among them the renewal of Catholic liturgical life, the recovery of the Church's Biblical heritage, the concept of ecclesiastical authority as "collegial" rather than autocratic, the ecumenical outreach to the churches of Eastern Orthodoxy and the Reformation—are all at least related to John's winsome optimism and his faith in the human future.

The results of the Johanine Revolution cannot be fully measured as yet. Roman Catholicism, a generation after John XXIII, continues to be buffeted by the changes that Roncalli encouraged, some emanating from quarters that he might have found worrisome. But that John XXIII's...
brief, five-year pontificate was the most significant in Catholic history since the Reformation seems as certain as any historical judgment can be.

Elected as a transitional figure at the age of 76, Roncalli was expected to be a force not for upheaval but, instead, for calm, pastoral continuity. The strength of Hebblethwaite's biography is its tracing of the roots of Roncalli's perspective and style. Twenty years in such Vatican diplomatic outposts as Bulgaria and Turkey had given Roncalli an experience of ecumenism unusual for an Italian ecclesiastical careerist. Five years in Paris as the first Papal Nuncio after World War II put the future pope in the center of Western intellectual ferment—and no doubt taught him the necessity of a more open conversation between ecclesiastical and secular thinkers. His early career gave strong indications that Roncalli would do more than keep St. Peter's chair warm for a younger successor. And, as Hebblethwaite shows, the reformist members of the College of Cardinals supported Roncalli's candidacy in 1958, overcoming those who wished to soldier on in the style of Pope Pius XII.

Hebblethwaite is less successful explaining how Catholic theologians had been laying the groundwork for Pope John's revolution during the generation before Vatican II. The reforms of the Council did not spring solely from John's intuitive sense of what was needed. The British journalist is also too kind in his assessment of John's Ostpolitik. The subsequent record makes it clear that Roncalli was entirely too sanguine about Nikita Khrushchev's attitudes toward religious life in the Soviet bloc. The Kremlin was aggressively suppressing the Church at precisely the time the Pope was urging rapprochement.

Hebblethwaite claims to have written the "definitive biography of Angelo Roncalli." It is an immodest assertion, particularly since the Pope's archives will not be opened until 2038. Further scholarship is needed before then to clarify the relationship between pre–Vatican II Catholic theology and the intuitions of John XXIII, and to gain a more precise sense of what Roncalli meant when he described the Council as a "New Pentecost" for the Church. For the time being, Hebblethwaite's book can serve as an invitation to further study of a remarkable man who believed that optimism was not a sin but a religious requirement.

—George Weigel '85
"Dressed in coarse osnaburg gowns; their skirts ‘reefed with a cord drawn tightly around the body, a little above the hips’ (the traditional ‘second belt’); long sleeves pushed above the elbows and kerchiefs on their heads, female field hands were a common sight throughout the antebellum South."

In a book filled with vivid images, Jacqueline Jones shows how black women, from the days of slavery to the present, have waged a superhuman struggle to fill their double roles as low-paid workers and as sustainers of family and community life.

Under slavery, black women toiled in the fields or (if the plantation was big enough and the labor sufficiently specialized) in the "Big House" from sunup to sundown. Come evening or the weekend, they worked for themselves, spinning, weaving, cooking, washing, caring for their own children—in short, accomplishing the myriad domestic tasks that ensured survival and fostered community.

After emancipation, Afro-American women entered the wage-labor force in higher proportions than women of any other ethnic group. Excluded from most industries and from the "pink collar" sales, secretarial, and service jobs that eventually opened to other working-class women, many found themselves trapped in domestic service. Only during the late 1960s, when civil rights legislation outlawed discrimination on the basis of race and sex, did significant numbers of black women begin to move into jobs once held exclusively by whites.

Long-term economic trends, however, along with federal policies under the Reagan administration, have undermined those gains. Afro-American women find themselves trapped again—in the service industries where they are now concentrated, Jones contends. Depression-level unemployment among young black men, combined with a declining ratio of "marriageable" men to women, has left large numbers of black women supporting their children alone. (Some 42 percent of black families are "female-headed," according to 1984 U.S. Census figures.) If much has changed in the lives of black women over the last 200 years, much, as Jones shows, has remained the same.

By writing the first sweeping study of the black working-class women's experience in this country, Jacqueline Jones, a historian at Wellesley College, has helped to fill a crucial gap. Afro-American history, by and large, has had little to say about gender, while women's history has usually focused on white women.

Not surprisingly, her undertaking draws her into many a longstanding dispute. The controversy over Daniel Patrick Moynihan's famous 1965 report, "The Negro Family: The Case for National Action," is one. Did slavery create a "matriarchal family" in which men were absent or ineffectual? Have female-dominated families been among the causes of present black poverty? Historians have usually responded to those questions with a resounding No. Against all odds, they maintain, enslaved men and women
created strong, resilient families that served as buffers against dehumanizing circumstances. Throughout the 19th century, moreover, two-parent households were the norm in black communities.

More recently, feminist scholars have entered the fray. They charge that the historians have adopted a dangerous line of defense: By taking the degree to which Afro-Americans achieved two-parent households as a measure of social health, American historians have reinforced the notion that female-headed families are by definition pathological. They have also undervalued a pattern of female autonomy and responsibility that has prevailed regardless of household structure.

But if most feminist scholars make the case for relative sexual equality in the black community, Jones paints a bleaker picture. Whenever possible, she argues, slaves imposed their own sexual division of labor. With freedom, patriarchal families emerged. Women have taken a back seat to masculine authority even within the confines of black family and community life.

Jones’s emphasis on oppression is bound to stir controversy, as will her discussion of its origins—variously gender, race, and class. At times she relies on the all-purpose notion that black women are the victims of multiple oppression. Then she seeks to weigh one influence against another. Confusion sometimes results. In one chapter, she documents how much black and white tenant women in the 19th-century South had in common. Economic factors appear to outweigh racial ones in determining the lot of women on tenant farms. But then she does an about-face, arguing that the differences between black and white female tenants’ lives were more significant than the similarities. Race now seems to outweigh economics as the cause of black women’s victimization.

But such difficulties are more a sign of the author’s reach than a fundamental flaw. Despite interpretive snarls, her book is one of those important works of synthesis that precedes rather than culminates closer studies of social reality. As such, it should provide a starting point for a new round of painstaking research.

—Jacqueline Hall ’85
At the beginning of the 15th century, in two distant parts of the New World, two separate peoples, the Incas of the Central Andes and the Aztecs of the Valley of Mexico, emerged triumphant among their various rivals. Then, in little over a century, after creating the most extensive empires ever formed in the Americas—complete with paved roads and aqueducts, state-run schools, and magnificent architecture—the Incas and Aztecs virtually dissolved in the face of a handful of Spanish conquistadores. To explain the internal decay of these two empires, scholars have usually blamed material factors, namely population changes and food shortages. Conrad and Demarest, archaeologists at, respectively, Indiana University and Vanderbilt University, point to the role of religion. "Both nations," write the authors, "saw themselves as people with a mission: Conquest was not merely their right but their sacred duty." Their beliefs demanded constant warfare and unceasing territorial expansion. To nourish the sun for his daily struggle with darkness, the Aztecs fed their sun god the blood of enemy prisoners, a gruesome practice that reached almost catastrophic proportions by the late 15th century: In 1487, at the dedication of the Great Temple at Tenochtitlán, more than 10,000 captured warriors were sacrificed during a four-day ceremony. Among the Incas, kings were revered as direct descendants of the sun and considered to be immortal. Their mummies were treated like living beings: They were fed, clothed, consulted, and routinely carried about to official Inca ceremonies. The deceased king even retained his worldly goods and property, cared for by his panaqa (all male heirs except the king's successor). Hence, each new Inca king had to acquire land and wealth by conquering new territories and imposing heftier taxes. Soon the most fertile lands in the Central Andes were
owned by mummies, and conflicts broke out among rulers, *patagas*, and the heavily burdened peasants. On the eve of Spanish conquest, the empires of both the Incas and the Aztecs were precariously overextended and plagued by widespread internal strife.

Benjamin Franklin stands out in the memory of most Americans as the paragon of common sense, industry, frugality, and patriotic duty. Franklin's darker side comes out in the story of his relationship with his bastard son, William. Historian Randall, a former investigative reporter, recounts the tale. Born in Philadelphia around 1730, William was the issue of Franklin's union with the all-but-illiterate Deborah Read (later his common-law wife). In his son, Franklin saw the beginnings of a family political dynasty rivaling that of the Adamses of Boston. William fought in the French and Indian War (1754–63), served as postmaster of Philadelphia, contributed (without paternal acknowledgment) to his father's scientific work, and studied law in England. In 1763, he returned to America to become governor of the New Jersey colony; his father remained to lobby for American interests in Britain, living lavishly with a "substitute" family that included a mistress and William's illegitimate son. When Franklin returned home in 1775 to join the growing revolutionary movement, he discovered that William was now a confirmed Loyalist. Writing William out of his will (and then out of his autobiography), Franklin gave orders for his son's arrest during the Revolution; later, he attempted to halt the prisoner exchange that would eventually free him. The two saw each other only once after the war, in London. Franklin, 79, presented his son, now residing in Britain, with a list of debts extending back to William's schooldays. Livid, William signed over all his holdings in America. The irony that surfaces in Randall's account is that Franklin, a man of such strong principles, could never forgive his son for standing by his own.
In 1887, traveling through fig and apricot orchards near the Santa Monica foothills, Horace and Daeida Wilcot found the spot for their model California community. Mr. Wilcot, a wealthy Los Angeles real estate man, promptly purchased the orchards, offered free land to Protestant churches, and prohibited saloons and liquor stores. Some 30 years later, Hollywood had acquired a different character. Movie director D. W. Griffith's recreation of Babylon towered over Sunset and Hollywood boulevards, providing Southern California with one of its more enduring metaphors. Historian Starr, in this sequel to his *Americans and the California Dream, 1850–1915* (1973), tells the story of Southern California between 1860 and 1930 with colorful vignettes and brief "exemplary" lives. The first "Anglo" settlers in the post–Civil War era built ornate haciendas and affected the dress and manners of their predecessors, the Spanish landowners. But by the 1890s, the "Mission Myth" had yielded to Mediterraneanism—the "persistent belief," writes Starr, "that California should take as its aesthetic model the art, architecture, and lifestyles of Southern Europe." As massive water projects and refrigerated railroad cars turned the region into the fruit-and-vegetable capital of North America, an unusually progressive middle class flourished. This group of lawyers, businessmen, and academics, Starr explains, made "non-threatening, even respectable, such notions as the public ownership of utilities, prison and hospital reform, social welfare, public housing, workmen's compensation, and other social programs." At the same time, the region accommodated the likes of Harrison Gray Otis, publisher of the *Los Angeles Times*, and Charles Crocker, part-owner of the Southern Pacific Railroad, men who "regarded California as a feudal fief which their parents' generation had seized through force of will." Appropriately, Starr ends with the rise of the movie industry during the 1920s. A land that promised to fulfill all dreams, Southern California had become "a stage set, a visualization of dream and illusion which was, like film, at once true and not true."
Contemporary Affairs

HABITS OF THE HEART: Individualism and Commitment in American Life
Univ. of Calif., 1985
355 pp. $16.95

The title comes from Alexis de Tocqueville, the 19th-century French aristocrat whose Democracy in America (1835) not only analyzed society in the new American republic but also predicted the dangers that it would face. "Habits of the heart" are those values that shape the national character, and none, as Tocqueville foresaw, would be more powerful in America than individualism. Indeed, his book was largely a survey of those phenomena—the family, religion, local and national politics, associations—that he hoped would check unbridled individualism and save the fledgling democracy from disintegration. The authors of this book (professors, variously, of sociology, philosophy, and religion) report that many of Tocqueville's fears have come true. Interviewing hundreds of mostly middle-class Americans, the authors find that the majority have no "language in which to articulate their reasons for commitments that [go] beyond the self." Submersion in careers, wanton consumerism, a general retreat from public life, cynicism about politics and politicians, a fear of commitment in personal relationships—all exist as widespread symptoms of self-absorption. Reinforcing this unhealthy trend, the authors believe, is the growing popular emphasis on a "therapeutic" ethic. Originating in the mental health professions, this ethic enshrines "personal fulfillment" and self-knowledge as life's paramount goals. The authors' main accomplishment is to hold up a clear mirror to contemporary American society; they also recall the Biblical and republican traditions that once successfully instilled self-denial and public-mindedness in many American citizens.

COUNSELS OF WAR
by Gregg Herken
Knopf, 1985
409 pp. $18.95

In his first book, The Winning Weapon (1980), Herken, a Yale historian, treated America's growing dependence on the nuclear deterrent as the keystone of national defense during the early years of the Cold War. Here he turns to
the specialists—scientists, military men, civilian advisers—who have played a role in the development of U.S. strategic policy during the nuclear age. Thinking about the unthinkable are, according to Herken, two broad groups: One is represented by military historian Bernard Brodie, who, as early as 1946, declared that the "ultimate weapon" left the U.S. military establishment with "no other useful purpose" than the prevention of war with the Soviet Union. The other is epitomized by presidential adviser Paul Nitze: Standing in the rubble of Hiroshima, he foresaw the possibility of future nuclear wars in which one side might emerge "victorious." Brodie and Nitze, of course, are only two of the men who have variously argued over U.S. nuclear strategy since Harry Truman's day. Herken describes the strategists' institutional habits—among them the Pentagon, the Rand Corporation, and the Hudson Institute—and their often macabre jargon: city-busting, the Sunday Punch, fail-safe, MAD, Peacemaker, and "sunshine unit" (for unit of radiation). In the end, White House nuclear arms policies often owe more to political considerations than to all the diagrams, charts, and top-secret reports. In 1961, though fearing an arms race, President John F. Kennedy bowed to pressure from the military and Congress and proposed to build 1,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Herken names no villains, but his chronicle echoes Lord Salisbury's warning that "you should never trust in experts."

**PRETORIA'S PRAETORIANS:**

Civil-Military Relations in South Africa

by Philip H. Frankel

Cambridge, 1984

215 pp. $44.50

During the late 1940s, South Africa was an "esteemed member of the international community, a prime mover behind the Charter of the United Nations." Today, after more than 35 years of National Party rule, marked most dramatically by its policy of institutionalized racism (apartheid), South Africa has become a "pariah state," routinely denounced in the UN Assembly it once fostered. One striking result of international isolation and internal racial tensions has been the increased militarization of South African society. Frankel,
a political scientist at the University of Witwaterstrand, describes the ties between the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the civilian sector—the prime minister, the bureaucracy, and the business community. Underlying this relationship, Frankel explains, is the "total strategy," a counter-revolutionary national development plan conceived by the French general André Beaufre in response to his country's experiences in Algeria and Indochina. Studied by all officers at South Africa's Joint Defence College, the strategy stresses the coordination of nonmilitary (i.e., industrial, scientific, technical) and military resources. It also calls for nationwide psychological mobilization, literally a "total" effort, to destroy the will of any adversary. For their part, civilian leaders have backed increased defense expenditures (which are more than 10 times greater today than they were 12 years ago) and have encouraged the SADF to participate in industrial policy-making, education (through cadet programs in white schools), the media, and police activities. Thanks to such affinities, it is highly unlikely, Frankel concludes, that the Defence Force will ever emulate Third World military establishments, overthrowing the civilian government to install one of its own men. Ironically, this also means that the military leaders will not likely become a force for moderation—although, with 40 percent of their personnel "non-white," they could well lead the way in reducing racial inequalities.

Arts & Letters

CAHIERS DU CINEMA
Vol. 1, The 1950s:
Neo-Realism,
Hollywood, New Wave
edited by Jim Hillier
Harvard, 1985
305 pp. $22.50

If the names of the contributors to this renowned film magazine read like a roster of the great French directors of the 1960s, it is no coincidence. During the 1950s, François Truffaut, Jean-Luc Godard, and Eric Rohmer, among others, used the pages of the Cahiers as a forum for articulating their cinematic principles and prejudices. Their essays and
reviews, selected by Hillier, a professor of film studies at England’s Bulmershe College, are lively, combative, frequently iconoclastic, particularly those devoted to a radical re-evaluation of American films. Most intellectuals in post–World War II Europe viewed Hollywood films as slick, commercial, and vapid. The Cahiers writers, by contrast, often treated them with reverence. Rohmer, praising Hollywood as “that haven [for filmmakers] which Florence was for painters of the Quattrocento,” goes on to enumerate the virtues—efficacy, elegance, economy—of American direction, acting style, cinematography, and scriptwriting. Elsewhere, he praises Nicholas Ray’s Rebel without a Cause as possessing the dramatic elements of high Greek tragedy. André Bazin’s tribute to the deceased Humphrey Bogart is a sharp cameo portrait of the actor: A hero for the times in his “distrust and weariness, wisdom and skepticism,” Bogart never “depended in any respect on the character of the roles he embodied.” The writers also delve into Japanese and Italian cinema, and frequently refer to the Truffaut-formulated “auteur theory”—the belief that a single directoral vision should dominate the shaping of a film. Not surprisingly, these men indulge in some fraternal backslapping, praising such fledgling efforts as Truffaut’s 400 Blows and Alain Resnais’s Hiroshima mon amour.

“Everything is poor, even the grass,” complained French painter Auguste Renoir, in 1877, about another artist’s unflattering depiction of his beloved Seine. The Paris that Renoir painted in such rich and sunny hues had been dramatically transformed during the third quarter of the 19th century—thanks largely to the urban renewal and economic development plans of Baron Hausmann, Napoleon III’s prefect of the Seine. Hausmann’s broad boulevards changed working-class districts into zones of amusement and commerce, while factories and workers relocated to the outskirts of the city. Music halls, or
cafés-concerts, sprang up along the boulevards, and new parks vied with industry and pollution along the Seine just outside Paris. Reacting variously to these changes was a new generation of artists, many of them Impressionists. To Clark, a Harvard art historian, the formal inventions of these painters—pictorial flatness, spatial ambiguity, visual brilliance—are as much matters of social history as of aesthetics. Amidst the "Hausmannized" settings of Paris and its environs, Impressionists recorded new forms of pleasure-seeking and the posturings of throngs of bank tellers, clerks, shopgirls, and prostitutes who now seemed to fill the city. Neither proletarian nor bourgeois, this aspiring mass became the "alter egos of the avant-garde." Clark focuses on what he considers the exceptional paintings—Manet's Olympia, Argenteuil, les canotiers, and Un Bar aux Folies-Bergère, and Seurat's La Grande Jatte. Superior to the "decorative" works of Impressionists such as Renoir, these masterpieces dealt with the anxieties of modern urban life and pursued elusive questions: How did the denizens of the transformed city feel about their environment and themselves? How were distinctions preserved in a seemingly classless society? At what cost were the pleasures of the new city bought?

THE MODEL
COMPANY TOWN:
Urban Design through Private Enterprise in Nineteenth-Century New England
by John S. Gamer
Univ. of Mass., 1984
288 pp. $25

Company towns—there have been approximately 2,500 in the United States alone—have long been described as places where greedy corporations pay captive workers miserable wages and charge them high fees for run-down houses and shoddy provisions. Garner, a professor of architecture at the University of Illinois, focuses on Hopedale, Mass., to show how many 19th-century company towns defied this generalization by tastefully integrating workplace and homes. The Draper Company, a textile machinery firm, owned the town lock, stock, and barrel between 1856 and 1916. It was, indeed, a paternalistic arrangement that left almost no decision-making to the worker-residents.

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However, Garner insists, living conditions in Hopedale and similar towns were vastly better than those in cities that offered wider choices of employment. One-half of a well-ventilated, two-family house with indoor plumbing, sewer and gas connections, and a yard on a paved street rented for five dollars a month, about 13 percent of a machinist’s monthly pay in 1883. As the Draper company prospered, other amenities were added: a marina, football field, tennis courts, library, town hall, and extensive parklands. Few workers quit the Hopedale “Abode of Comfort, Peace, and Happiness”—precisely management’s goal. Fore-runners in many respects of such “new towns” as Reston, Va., Woodland, Tex., and Jonathan, Minn., company towns “never posed a serious alternative to conventional urban development,” says Garner. Nevertheless, they were often examples of good site planning, landscaping, architecture, and environmental management.

Science & Technology

**METAMAGICAL THEMAS:**
*Questing for the Essence of Mind and Pattern*
by Douglas R. Hofstadter  
Basic, 1985  
880 pp. $24.95

Reducing the human mind to its physical components leaves us with atoms, revolving electrons, and firing neurons. The parts seem no more “human” than the microchips of a computer. Yet somehow these elements arrange themselves in patterns that have resulted in Chopin’s *Etudes* and Shakespeare’s plays. How? Author of the prize-winning *Gödel, Escher, Bach* (1979), Hofstadter here continues his search for an order underlying the manifold expressions of human thought. In 33 essays and miscellaneous commentary, he touches on alphabets, numbers, translation, magic, art, music, games, self-referential sentences ("This sentence is false"), even U.S. military policy. Such questions as how we can make sense of the nonsensical “F y c r d ths’” cause Hofstadter to wonder whether computers can be programmed to do the same. Elsewhere, he argues that “making variations on a theme is really the crux of cre-
The epithet "self-made man" fits few people so well as Otto Rank. Born Otto Rosenfeld in 1884, the second son of a Viennese Jewish artisan, he was forced to attend a manual trade school despite early intellectual leanings. Estranged from his alcoholic father, the young locksmith found a powerful substitute in the figure of Sigmund Freud, the pioneer of psychoanalysis. Freud, in turn, was so impressed by the manuscript of Rank's first book, The Artist, that, in 1905, he brought Rank into the inner circle of the psychoanalytic movement. For two decades, Rank served as one of Freud's closest colleagues, standing last as other analysts (notably Carl Jung) broke away. But even Rank began to have differences with the Master. The widening fissure between the two men is the heart of this sympathetic biography by Lieberman, a Washington psychiatrist. Rank's emphasis on the patient's will, the conscious life, and the present ran counter to Freud's past-oriented investigations into the unconscious and the unresolved sexual tensions of infancy. After the inevitable break in 1926—the year Rank moved abroad, first to France and then to America—orthodox Freudians attacked him as both shallow and unstable. But Rank's ideas took root in Amer-
ica. His undogmatic approach, his advocacy of short-term analysis, and his emphasis on self-fulfillment appealed to American mental health specialists—a more pragmatic bunch, by and large, than their European counterparts. Lieberman’s biography has two distinctions: It traces the sources of the optimistic, self-improvement bias in American psychotherapy; and it sheds light on the rivalries that developed between Freud and his many rebellious "sons."

**THE VIEW FROM AFAR**

by Claude Lévi-Strauss
Basic, 1985
311 pp. $24.95

The process by which human cultures construct meaning (largely through myths) has long been the focus of Lévi-Strauss’s extensive ethnographic studies. As a result of his efforts, the renowned French anthropologist has become known as the Father of Structuralism. In one of the 23 essays collected here, he explains how he adapted his methodology from the Russian-born linguist Roman Jakobson. Just as languages consist at their base of phonemes—sound units such as “ba” and “do”—myths, according to Lévi-Strauss, consist of mythemes such as the word sun. Alone, the mytheme is, like the phoneme, “a purely differential and contentless sign.” Its meaning, explains Lévi-Strauss, results from its combination with other mythemes. He studied scores of world cultures to locate the elements undergirding kinship systems, marriage rules, even cooking practices. His belief that cultural arrangements influence biological evolution, even racial development, has pitted him against sociobiologists and other biological determinists; several essays here continue Lévi-Strauss’s arguments against them. Elsewhere, in one of his reflections on contemporary Western culture, he inveighs against strictly subjective tendencies in modern painting. Only if painters return to seeing their work as “a means of knowledge—that of a whole outside the artist’s work”—would a craftsmanship inherited from the old masters regain its importance.”
CURRENT BOOKS

PAPERBOUND


It probably originated in the Gobi Desert during the late 1320s and was spread, east and west, by Mongol horsemen. From a Black Sea port, fleas and rats carrying the Y. pestis bacilli were transported, via Genoese merchant ships, to southern Italy. Between 1347 and 1351, the Black Death—a combination of bubonic, pneumonic, and septicaemic plague strains—ravaged Europe, reducing its population by 25 to 50 percent. Gottfried, a Rutgers historian, offers a succinct but thorough account of the disaster that hastened the decline of Europe’s medieval order. The manorial economy, a fixed social system, scholastic philosophy, arcane medical practices, traditional attitudes toward life, death, time, and money—all were among the victims of the pestilence. Gottfried also looks at the plague’s immediate, human effects. While some potential victims abandoned work and families to pursue their basest whims, others became models of piety. Touring groups of flagellants mortified themselves in a desperate attempt to “atone for the sins of the world.” Some fanatics launched bloody anti-Semitic pogroms. The Black Death left Europe, in the words of a popular contemporary poem, “a world turned upside down.”


Born in Martinique in 1925 and trained as a psychiatrist in France, Frantz Fanon wrote perhaps his most famous book, The Wretched of the Earth (1961), while working for Algerian independence during the late 1950s. “It is hardly surprising that [this book] has been the pretext for a facile praising or damning of the author,” writes Gendzier, a Boston University historian. In it, Fanon, a black man, condoned violence as a legitimate means by which the colonized could achieve independence. Moreover, he contended that armed struggle would help the participants purge themselves of the humiliations of colonialism. Behind this argument, shows Gendzier, was Fanon’s life-long effort to analyze the mentality of the oppressed, particularly those of dark skin. Though Fanon died (of leukemia) in 1961, his ideas, variously invoked, survived among Western intellectuals, Third World radicals, and American Black Power advocates during the 1960s and ‘70s.


In 11th-century Japan, Murasaki penned what it is widely hailed as the world’s first novel, The Tale of Genji. These translations of her personal diary and poetic memoirs provide insights into the mind of their witty, melancholic author as well as a vivid sense of the aristocratic court life of Heian Japan. The diary is particularly strong on personality quirks and fashions, musings about the status of women, political and literary gossip. Sei Shonagon, author of The Pillow Book, is characterized as “dreadfully conceited. She...littered her writings with Chinese characters, but they left a great deal to be desired.” Modest Murasaki, who hesitated “to reveal her learning in front of my women at home,” would never dream of doing so at court. The running commentary by Bowring, a Cambridge Orientalist, is helpful, but many of Murasaki’s poems stand gracefully on their own: Be close, you say; / But the first thing I met / On getting close / Were your feelings / Thin as summer clothes.
"Guilty or Innocent?" ABC asked viewers of its 1977 docudrama The Trial of Lee Harvey Oswald. A ballot in TV Guide allowed them to vote. Presumably having watched ABC's fictional trial, 79 percent of the "jurors" who voted "guilty" felt that Oswald was part of a conspiracy.
History
As Soap Opera?

by Steven Lagerfeld

In 1492, Christopher Columbus was welcomed to the New World by scantily clad dancing girls. Gen. George Custer was court-martialed for his performance at the Little Big Horn. Wayne Williams did not commit the Atlanta Child Murders.

That is not, to paraphrase Walter Cronkite, the way it was. It is the world according to television’s “docudramas.”

In Hollywood, or at network headquarters in New York, somebody thought that Columbus’s actual landfall in the Indies was a bit dull. General Custer’s death alongside his men at the Little Big Horn was a historical inconvenience. The producer of The Atlanta Child Murders (1985) disagreed with both the jury that convicted Wayne Williams and the appellate court that upheld the verdict.

For the past 10 years or so, ever since the commercial success of The Missiles of October (1974), about the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Big Three television networks have been airing more and more “fact-based dramas.” During the 1984–85 television season (from September to April), the networks broadcast 24. “When a [character] is known, the audience gets involved more easily,” one NBC executive said recently in explaining the increase in docudramas. “If [a program] is just fictional, it would be less attractive.”

Traditional “pure” documentaries score low in the Nielsen audience ratings and, like television histories, suffer from the fact that their creators cannot get all aspects of the story on film. As Hollywood producer Alan Landsberg explained at an Academy of Television Arts and Sciences (ATAS) symposium on docudramas in 1979:

As one who has struggled . . . long in the vineyard of the pure documentary, and finally found it a frustrating form, I was delighted to find that docudrama is an avenue that can communicate more than the existing or
shootable film allowed. After all, I could film the bloody White House for just so long, and I couldn’t get into the damned Oval Office where the action was, so I was forced to conclude that the action going on inside the White House was my guess as to what happened. Now in the docudrama, at least, I can mount that guess so you can properly see it.

What is a “guess” and what is not? Where does the “docu” end and the “drama” begin? The audience is never told.

Of course, as nearly everyone in the TV business quickly points out, Shakespeare mixed fact and fiction in *Richard III* and his other historical plays. But the Bard called it theater, and his histories were performed on the same stage as his comedies and tragedies. Docudramas, on the other hand, appear side-by-side with TV news and documentaries, and they make claims to historical truth. Moreover, if anyone in Shakespeare’s audiences somehow mistook his fiction for fact, the confusion was limited in scope; the Globe Theater held only about 2,000 people. A popular docudrama may be seen by 80 million Americans or more.

Of necessity, docudrama enters the realm of fiction as soon as a scriptwriter picks up his pen to write a line of dialogue. How does he know what President Dwight D. Eisenhower said to Mamie over dinner? Or what Marilyn Monroe said between the sheets?

The makers of docudramas maintain that such invention is inconsequential if done “in the spirit” of the truth. As *Roots* producer David Wolper put it: “I do not think we are dealing in fiction because we are inventing words between people... Whether a man said exactly ‘I love you, my dear’ or ‘My dear you are beautiful and I love you’ is not relevant.”

The courts apparently agree. In 1976, NBC broadcast *Judge Horton and the Scottsboro Boys*, a docudrama in which the chief witness against the nine black “Scottsboro Boys” in the racially charged 1931 Alabama rape case was called a “whore,” a “bum,” and a “perjurer.” (After several retrials, four of the men were convicted.) The real-life witness filed a $6 million libel suit against NBC. As scriptwriter John McGreevy testified in federal court, those lines of dialogue were pure invention. Yet, deciding that they were not written with reckless disregard for the truth, the judge in the case dismissed the suit.

The spirit of the truth often dwells in strange places. ABC’s *Young Joe, the Forgotten Kennedy* (1978) shows the eldest Kennedy son volunteering for the dangerous World War II mission...
Roots, broadcast in eight episodes in 1977, was more a conventional historical drama than a docudrama. TV critics compared it to Gone with the Wind, which it replaced at the top of the all-time TV ratings.

that cost him his life. "I'm glad I'm not going with you, Joe," says a fellow flyer named Mike Krasna. "Like us," remarked novelist Mark Harris in TV Guide, "Krasna is at first suspicious of Joe Kennedy's wealth and aristocratic bearing." His acceptance of Kennedy encourages viewers to accept him too. The problem: Not only was the Krasna-Kennedy dialogue made up, so was Mike Krasna. He never existed.

The less trivial cases include ABC's Collision Course: Truman and MacArthur, a 1974 docudrama about the conflict that ultimately led President Harry S Truman to relieve Gen. Douglas MacArthur of his command of U.S. forces in the Far East during the Korean War. As Collision Course relates, Truman and MacArthur met for the first time at Wake Island in 1951. On TV, an arrogant MacArthur circles Wake in his plane, trying to get Truman to land first. After finally being ordered to land, MacArthur keeps the Commander in Chief waiting for 45 minutes before joining the welcoming committee on the airstrip and later gets a severe tongue-lashing from Truman.
In reality, MacArthur reached Wake Island the night before Truman did and greeted him promptly. MacArthur was not dressed down. Truman "radiated nothing but courtesy and good humor during our meeting," the general later recalled. "He had an engaging personality, a quick and witty tongue, and I liked him from the start." Collision Course’s creators apparently relied almost exclusively on the aging ex-President’s hazy recollections 10 years after the fact, which appeared in Merle Miller’s Plain Speaking. Unfortunately, TV offers few opportunities to insert “footnotes” indicating that other versions or interpretations of events exist, and docudramatists rarely take advantage of them.

Grounding Axes

Docudramatists have taken a special interest in the private lives of the presidents. There was Eleanor and Franklin (1976), Ike (1979), which focused on Eisenhower’s alleged romance with his wartime aide, Kay Summersby, and Backstairs at the White House (1979), a grand tour of White House domestic life during much of the 20th century. History as soap opera. In 1976, Christopher Lasch, a University of Rochester historian, wrote that docudrama “reduces great lives to ordinary lives, heroes to ordinary citizens indistinguishable in their perceptions and feelings from everyone else, at the same time that it invests them with the spurious glamour of stardom.”

Sometimes docudrama writers and producers have an ax to grind. The Trial of Lee Harvey Oswald (1977), on ABC, in effect argued that President John F. Kennedy’s assassination was the work of a conspiracy that may have included the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Mafia, and anti-Castro Cubans. The scriptwriters created scenes in which President Lyndon B. Johnson tried to squelch a federal investigation and Oswald hinted that “they” would never let him live to tell the truth.

Capital punishment was the villain in Kill Me If You Can, which was broadcast twice by NBC during the late 1970s and once by CBS in 1983. The producers played down the crimes of California sex offender Caryl Chessman (played by Alan Alda) and lingered over his extended, gruesome execution in the gas chamber. The last scene showed a telephone ringing, with a moments-too-late reprieve for Chessman—pure fiction.

A more amusing case was noted by Wall Street Journal critic Martha Bayles, who observed that CBS’s Christopher Columbus (1985) portrayed the Italian-born “Admiral of the Ocean Sea” as
tormented over the enslavement of New World Indians and relatively indifferent to their gold. (His Spanish second-in-command, by contrast, was depicted as a stereotypical conquistador.) Actually it was slavery that left the great explorer unmoved; his interest in precious metals was keen. The fact that the production of the show was handled mostly by Italians, Bayles speculated, may have had something to do with the way reality was rearranged.

Few of the regular TV critics who write for the nation’s newspapers and magazines have strained to keep the docudramatists honest. In reviewing CBS’s Robert Kennedy and His Times (1985), for example, Tom Shales of the Washington Post declared the show a success “not because its portrayal of Robert Kennedy is so authentic and complete but because it successfully reconstructs the sensibilities of a decade.” Among the inauthenticities were scenes showing Kennedy enthusiastically backing the 1963 March on Washington led by the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., although Kennedy and his brother, John, were ambivalent at best about the march. The show neglected to mention that when he was the U.S. Attorney General,
### TOP 25 MADE-FOR-TV MOVIES 1961–1984

According to Variety magazine, six docudramas, appearing here in bold-face type, can be counted among the 25 most popular made-for-TV movies since 1961. In order of their ratings, the 25 are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Film</th>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rating*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. THE DAY AFTER</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. HELTER SKELTER, pt. 2</td>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>37.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>(A dramatization of the Charles Manson murders.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. LITTLE LADIES OF THE NIGHT</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. HELTER SKELTER, pt. 1</td>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. THE WALTONS’ THANKSGIVING STORY</td>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>33.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. NIGHT STALKER</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. A CASE OF RAPE</td>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. DALLAS COWBOYS CHEERLEADERS</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>33.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. BRIAN’S SONG</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>32.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>(The story of Chicago Bears running back Brian Piccolo and his losing battle against cancer.)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10. WOMEN IN CHAINS</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. JESUS OF NAZARETH, pt. 1</td>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. SOMETHING ABOUT AMELIA</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>31.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. HEIDI</td>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>31.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. MY SWEET CHARLIE</td>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. THE FEMINIST AND THE FUZZ</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>31.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. SOMETHING FOR JOEY</td>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Dramatization of the relationship between Heisman-trophy winning football star John Cappelletti and Joey, his leukemia-stricken brother.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>18. DAWN: PORTRAIT OF A TEENAGE RUNAWAY</td>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. KENNY ROGERS AS THE GAMBLER</td>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. COWARD OF THE COUNTY</td>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. THE AMAZING HOWARD HUGHES, pt. 2</td>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. SARAH T.—PORTRAIT OF A TEENAGE ALCOHOLIC</td>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. CALL HER MOM</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MISS JANE PITTMAN</td>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>30.8</td>
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</table>

* Represents the percentage of all households with television sets (85 million in 1985) watching.
Kennedy authorized FBI wiretaps on King's telephones.

However, CBS's *The Atlanta Child Murders* (1985) went too far, even for the TV critics. They were almost unanimous in condemning it. For his part, Abby Mann, the show's producer, forthrightly declared that he was engaged in a "crusade" to demonstrate that Atlanta's black mayor was at first indifferent to the murders, which eventually claimed the lives of nearly two dozen ghetto children between 1979 and 1981, and that the city's police department botched the investigation. Mann's docudrama strongly implied that Wayne Williams, the man convicted in 1982 of two of the murders and assumed to have committed the rest, was railroaded by authorities eager to get the story off the front pages.

**Martians and Mr. Lincoln**

Mann uncovered no new facts that might have justified an exposé. Indeed, he left out a number of crucial details, notably the fact that the killings stopped after Williams's arrest. *The Atlanta Child Murders* was ostensibly based on the official records and trial transcripts. But, as John Corry of the *New York Times* noted, evidence on television is different: "A smile is meaningful; a leer says something else. Truth shall be known by a character's persona. Jason Robards, the defense attorney, could not possibly be on the wrong side; he's far too decent for that . . . Rip Torn, the prosecutor, is only another politician."

The CBS verdict: not guilty.

Television did not invent the docudrama. Ironically, the probable progenitor, Georges Méliès's silent film *L'Affaire Dreyfus* (1899), concerned another trial, the court-martial in which French Army officer Alfred Dreyfus was convicted of treason. Méliès re-created the trial days after the event itself; it was so effective that some of the actual participants thought that they saw themselves on the screen.

D. W. Griffith's fictional silent film on life in the post-Civil War South, *Birth of a Nation* (1915), which cast the Ku Klux Klan in a favorable light, was another landmark. Griffith was one of the first directors to use cuts, montage, and even a soundtrack (preplanned sheet music for theater orchestras) purposely to shape audience perceptions. In 1922 came the first commercially successful U.S. documentary, *Nanook of the North*. By the

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*For a fuller historical treatment, see the chapter on docudramas by Tom W. Hoffer, Robert Musburger, and Richard Nelson in *TV Genres* (Greenwood Press, forthcoming), edited by Brian Rose.*

*The Wilson Quarterly/Autumn 1985*
1930s, the Hollywood studios were churning out film biographies of famous Americans: Abraham Lincoln, for example, was the subject of three films between 1930 and 1940 (and also appeared as a minor character in eight other movies). Orson Welles's thinly veiled portrait of newspaper magnate William Randolph Hearst, *Citizen Kane* (1941), created a whirlwind of controversy. On radio, Welles had discovered the power of simulated newscasts and studio sound effects in his famous 1938 *War of the Worlds* broadcast, describing an invasion of New Jersey by Martians.

Radio gave birth to the famous *March of Time* series, which featured actors speaking lines attributed to the powerful and famous. In 1935, the *March of Time* moved to the nation's movie houses. As the stentorian "Voice of Time" narrated, a blend of stock footage, re-enactments, and news film dealing with such subjects as Hitler's rise to power, the strange career of Pierre Deibler, France's chief executioner, and the life of Father Divine, the black religious leader, appeared on the screen. The *New York Times* politely called it "an interesting, well-made supplement to the newsreel, standing in about the same relationship to it as the weekly interpretative news magazine bears to the daily newspaper."

The *March of Time*’s imaginative interpretations were often criticized. Sen. Huey ("Kingfish") Long of Louisiana was enraged when, after helping the film-makers re-enact scenes from his career, he found himself lampooned on the screen. A few *March of Time* episodes were recycled for television, but the series died in 1951. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, few examples of docudrama appeared on TV. One reason was that the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) "fairness doctrine" required networks airing controversial programs to give free time to opposing points of view. All in all, it was easier and more profitable for the networks to stick to Westerns and variety shows.

**A Cheer for Miss Pittman**

By the early 1970s, several things had changed. The fairness doctrine had been relaxed. Rising production costs prompted the networks to kill off money-losing situation comedies and other weekly series long before the end of the official TV season. This created a short "second season" that was ideal for made-for-TV movies and docudramas of one to five episodes. And programmers discovered a strong appetite for news and news-as-entertainment in the viewing public. (*Sixty Minutes* de-
Soviet film-maker Sergey Eisenstein's landmark Potemkin (1925) recalled a 1905 uprising against Russia's Tsar Nicholas II. But this famous scene, showing the Tsar's soldiers massacring civilians, was fictional.

Distributed in 1968 but climbed to number one in the ratings in 1974.) Last, but far from least, the networks discovered that docudramas could be lucrative. A modestly successful show such as The Atlanta Child Murders, which claimed some 50 million prime-time viewers, generates advertising revenues of about $4.2 million per hour.

What is different about today's docudramas on TV, compared to their radio and film predecessors? The size of the television audience is one distinction, and Americans' apparent tendency, amid a general decline in educational achievement, to turn to TV for news, commentary, and even history is another. Despite its inherent flaws as an information medium, TV has a peculiarly compelling quality that other media lack. Thus, in a speech during his tenure as governor of New York, Hugh Carey paid tribute to a heroic black American, Jane Pittman. Pittman, however, was the fictional protagonist of CBS's The Autobiography of Miss Jane Pittman (1974).

A side effect of the docudrama trend is the creeping pollution of "hard" TV news by what TV people call "entertainment
values.” On CBS, a 1981 documentary, *In Defense of the United States*, opened with a film clip of a simulated nuclear explosion at Omaha, Nebraska; CBS News paid $87,000 for the special effects. On ABC’s *20/20*, a “re-creation” of President Reagan’s treatment in a Washington hospital emergency room during the hours following the 1981 attempt on his life aired in 1982. Meanwhile, some local TV stations began opening their 11 P.M. newscasts with stories related to the evening’s docudrama.

Even without the deliberate injection of fiction, it is extremely difficult to convey “the facts” on TV. The medium demands that reality be selected, compressed, and reorganized into brief, dramatic film “stories”; no matter how conscientious they are, news and documentary producers seldom do justice to what cannot be shown on film. And they must cater to the presumed tastes of their mass audience. “Talking heads” who explain the complexities of a major story make boring TV. As David Wolper put it, “The medium is there to get the big audience, and I don’t want to waste that. . . . You may want to take the two hours and have two people sit down and discuss the subject. I consider that a crime because you’ve wasted two hours of time with which I can reach 80 million people.”

At the ATAS symposium, Wolper and his fellow docudramatists complained about the scattered criticism of their art. David Susskind defended his colleagues as “men of artistic integrity; these are men you can’t corrupt; these are men that won’t be rushed.” Scriptwriter David Rintels complained that critics were creating “an unfair, and unhealthy, skepticism in the audience’s mind.” Among the suggested remedies that emerged: The networks should run disclaimers before their docudramas and consider airing panel discussions by specialists afterwards. The genre should be renamed—“theater of fact” and “historical drama” were proposed. The networks were unenthusiastic.

For lack of alternatives, TV critics for the nation’s newspapers and magazines must supply the public’s chief antidotes to miseducation-by-docudrama. This task involves some extra work, but the critics would best serve their readers by firmly holding docudramatists (and documentary-makers) to the facts, as best they can be determined.
A PERSPECTIVE

A Pitch for World Harmony

by S. Frederick Starr

Last January, the trustees of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation in Chicago awarded grants totaling $25 million for a variety of studies of how the East-West arms competition might at last be (peacefully) ended. The news prompted a rush of proposals for further studies from within and beyond academe—among them the following, in a travel-stained envelope bearing a four-rupee stamp and a blurred postmark from India:

A Proposal to the MacArthur Foundation

Dear Madam/Sir:

My mother, who lives in Brooklyn, N.Y., has sent me a clipping from the New York Times saying that you are giving away $25 million for research on arms control and the reduction of global tension. I am writing to apply for an equivalent amount and include the results of my research herein. You are free to disseminate them in any way you wish, and I am even prepared to waive film rights.

Please send a certified check for $25 million to my account –D470361 at the Immigrant Savings Bank in Brooklyn.

The bank will forward funds as needed to the ashram here in Bhubaneswar, where I am pursuing my research and giving a series of innovative lectures with naqqara accompaniment.

In announcing your initial allocation of resources, you mistakenly assume that the arms control industry in academe and the think tanks are capable of solving the problem of global tension. Perhaps you were intimidated by all the talk of those MIRVs, the SS-20s, the MX, ICBMs, and those scary Trident II SLBMs. Or maybe you were awed by the warhead counts, even though a hundred or more "atomic devices" could be stored in the senior citizens' center near my mother's home in Brooklyn without fear of detection and without much impact on social life along Ocean Parkway either.

The fact is that all of this is quite irrelevant to the great issue of peace. Fearsome as they are, the nuclear arsenals are not the cause but the consequence of world tension.

Now, after two successive sabbaticals in Bhubaneswar, I am prepared to reveal the cause of tension that has...
so far eluded the specialists back in America. As I will show, the true cause of global tension can be measured with mathematical precision and has in fact been monitored for over three centuries. Unfortunately, as I will also show, these continuing measurements disclose that the world has now reached a moment of peril.

While it may not be required by the terms of your grant, I am also providing gratis a list of five simple steps for reducing tension and establishing international harmony.

But first, let me introduce the cause of world tension that has heretofore eluded discovery. Recall any recent evening at a concert of the local symphony orchestra. As you settled into your seat and began working on that stubborn morsel of beef Wellington lodged between your upper molars, the oboist sounded an A to tune the ensemble. Now, that note he plays is precisely 440—repeat 440 cycles per second. If his A has a frequency of 435 vibrations per second, the orchestra will be flat, and if his A = 445, the orchestra will play sharp.

How, you may wonder, did A get set at 440?

Back in 1939, the International Standards Association met in London and agreed that this should be the standard A worldwide. Note that for several decades before 1939 the worldwide standard for A was only 435 cycles. Note, too, that the rise in pitch occurred in 1939. Immediately thereafter the most cataclysmic war in history broke out.

Was this a coincidence?

By no means.

The history of modern civilization, properly analyzed, reveals that rises in pitch are invariably associated with mounting tensions among peoples. Back in the 16th and 17th centuries, domestic musicians in Europe pitched their charmingly serene virginals at a frequency far lower than what we use today. Outside the home, though, religious wars were ripping European society asunder. It is no accident that in so feverish an atmosphere church organs would have been pitched to an A pegged two full tones higher than what we use today.

The Age of Reason saw the end of religious wars and a general effort to calm things down—to be "reasonable." Pitch plummeted. Handel's fork intoned 422.5 cycles, while Mozart's piano was tuned to a mere 421.5. During the relatively civilized 18th century, A stood roughly at 415-425 cycles per minute.

The 19th century was an age of blood and steel, of empires and revolutions. By 1811, the Paris grand opera had crept up to 427 cycles. Within a few decades after the Revolution of 1848, the Paris pitch soared to a perilous 446. Meanwhile, the London Philharmonic cranked up to a frantic 452.5, as the British mounted the desperate Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava in the Crimea.

Fortunately for Western civilization, the Paris Academy in 1859 doused the fires by establishing A at 435, making possible (after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870) the robust yet moderate belle époque. Common sense triumphed throughout Europe in 1885 when 435 was acknowledged as the "international pitch."

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S. Frederick Starr, 45, is president of Oberlin College.
military. The Army held fast to a more psyched-up pitch. It took the redoubtable Col. J. A. C. Sommerville a whole generation to bring the King's military bands down to 435. His final victory in 1929 marked the end of England's expansion of its world empire.

Even this brief sketch demonstrates the subtle but elemental tie between musical pitch and human tension. There are solid, acoustical reasons for this.

For a stringed instrument to produce a higher pitch, its strings must be in great tension. This in turn produces a commanding tone, lacking in nuance and texture but strident and aggressive. Lower string tension, by contrast, means a softer tone, more subtle and textured—in a word, more peaceful. A high-pitched orchestra generates a near frantic excitement. Low-pitched orchestras foster the opposite qualities. Beware when whole societies adopt a higher pitch. Excitability and mayhem cannot be far off.

Now, gentlemen and ladies of the MacArthur Foundation, please pay close attention. It is my unpleasant duty to inform you that orchestral pitch is once more rising throughout the world and thereby placing civilization at risk. When Joseph L. Robinson tunes up the New York Philharmonic, he hits an $A = 442$, the same pitch now used by the St. Louis Symphony and other leading American orchestras. In high-tech Boston, the "best and the brightest" have driven $A$ up to a dizzy 445. There is a certain tradition of such reckless heights on the Charles River: scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology once clocked the Boston Symphony under Serge Koussevitsky at 447-49!

America's NATO partners seem to be competing for dubious records. To be sure, the English and Dutch, with their phlegmatic traditions, have
kept to a 440. But the Berlin Philharmonic under Herbert von Karajan has soared as high as 450 cycles per second, which oboist John Mack of the Cleveland Orchestra characterizes as “absolutely mad.” French orchestras are commonly tuning to 444, a practice that no doubt played a part in the revival of a more activist foreign policy there under François Mitterrand.

Lest you think that our NATO allies are the sole perpetrators of this dangerous new hyperactivity, let me assure you that the Warsaw Pact orchestras are also tightening their strings. The Leningrad Philharmonic has been tuning to 444–46 for a number of years. Moscow orchestras, situated close to the Kremlin nerve center of the Soviet superpower, strain even higher. The more subservient Warsaw Pact nations follow suit. When the Czech Philharmonic toured the United States recently, it was pitched so high as to be unable to perform with American organs that were tuned to 440.

Who is to blame for this mounting threat to peace?

The obvious scapegoats are the conductors, to whom union contracts regularly assign the power to set pitch. Sadly, too, there are all too many musicians ready to follow their lead blindly. Mr. Albert Cooper makes some of the best flutes in the world in the garage behind his London home. Cooper is also doing a lively business these days retooling the instruments of big shots in his field up to 442, 444, and even 446. The renowned Powell firm in Boston is now manufacturing flutes to these high pitches as well, thus establishing itself as a prime cog in the musical/industrial complex. Other makers are following suit.

What, if anything, can be done to resist this frightening upward spiral? Some might place their hope in citizen activism. Unfortunately, I must tell you, the strongest champions of lowered pitches are all frank reactionaries. These partisans of early music would have us go all the way back to the pitches of Mozart’s day, clearly an impossibility.

The only hope of ameliorating this situation is through prompt action at the national and international level. Once you have accepted my research and made it widely available, we need not wait. As promised, I offer herewith, gratis, a series of measures that could provide the basis for lowered pitch and hence assure domestic and international tranquility.

The United States should pave the way to negotiation by a dramatic unilateral act. I strongly recommend that all orchestras tuning to anything higher than $A = 434$ be banned by the federal government forthwith, and that oboists who persist in tuning orchestras to higher pitches be subject to federal prosecution with mandatory sentencing.

After this confidence-building measure, the United States should invite the USSR to join in umbrella negotiations at Geneva leading to a comprehensive treaty on pitch. This treaty must include provisions to

1. Establish $A = 434$ as the new international pitch.
2. Freeze the production and deployment of instruments pitched above $A = 434$.
3. Provide on-site inspection by stationing authorized representatives of each country in the other country’s concert halls. (This will guarantee that the treaty is mutually verifiable.)
4. Assure nonproliferation of higher pitches by banning the sale of instruments tuned above $A = 434$ to other countries, especially those in the Third World.

The figure 434 is proposed for the following reason: 440 is obviously unacceptable because it led to World War II, while 435 prevailed on the eve of World War I. Hence, 434.

It is recognized that the difficulty of enacting these proposals all at once will be great. (An international institute named for Colonel Sommerville might be established to elaborate them in greater detail.) Through negotiations, interim "build-down" schemes might be fruitfully explored, so as to allow the production of a few new high-pitched instruments on the condition that a greater number of existing high-pitched instruments be destroyed. Realistically, one cannot expect that the international musical/industrial complex will be dismantled overnight. Messrs. Cooper, Powell, and hundreds of manufacturers of high-pitched instruments must be given time and tax concessions to help them retool. As the comprehensive treaty on pitch takes hold, supplemental treaties might be negotiated to curb the sonic excesses of the electric guitar industry as well, a further contribution to world peace. Fair compensation must be provided to all, lest a dangerous coalition form among disgruntled manufacturers and aggressive elements in the music world and the general public.

The point is that the reduction of global tension is no simple matter. The artistic committee of the Pittsburgh Orchestra, for example, took the bold step of proposing that pitch be dropped back to 440 from the higher stratosphere it had reached. Conductor André Previn agreed, and the benign reform was effected. Along the way, however, there was anxiety, suspicion, and general angst. Eventually the orchestra, the music critics, and the population there readjusted to $A = 440$ and life is calmer in the Steel City. Indeed, no one now wants to return to the bad old days. But the struggle for peace is not an easy one, as your Foundation, by now, understands so well.

Yours truly,

Sybil Schwartz, Ph.D.
Scholar-in-Residence
Bhubaneswar, India

NOTE: Dr. Schwartz has been published in Art Forum and other journals. She is seeking tenure, anywhere, as she awaits the MacArthur Foundation’s reply.
We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer's telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editor's requests for comment.

**COMMENTARY**

**Al Smith for President**

Lawrence J. McCaffrey's beautifully written "Irish America" [WQ, Spring 1985] suggests that Al Smith was defeated for president in 1928 because he was a Roman Catholic.

The Democratic Party that nominated Smith was a distinct minority. Of the eight previous national contests, it had lost six (four by real landslides). Pennsylvania and Minnesota had not been in the Democratic column since before the Civil War. The Democratic candidate in 1920 received only 35 percent of the vote, and in 1924, a paltry 29 percent.

Furthermore, while personally honest, Smith had made his career through Tammany Hall, a byword for machine corruption since the days of Thomas Nast. His opponent, Herbert Hoover, candidate of the majority Republicans, had won fame as an engineer, author (Smith had not even attended high school), and Cabinet member. Hoover's efforts to feed Europe's hungry after the First World War had also won him decorations from allied governments. Finally, in 1928, America was at peace, and her factories were busy.

Certainly anti-Catholicism was open and ugly in 1928. It probably cost Smith several states in the South, but their electoral votes made no difference in the outcome. On the other hand, Smith's religion helped him to carry Massachusetts and Rhode Island, normally Republican. Al Smith might have made a fine president, but he would not have won in 1928 even if he had been a Presbyterian (like the thrice-defeated William Jennings Bryan).

*Professor Anthony James Joes*  
*St. Joseph's University*  
*Philadelphia, Pennsylvania*

**Japan, Flipside**

The Japan we usually read about is a nation of hardworking, sober-minded organization types, so it comes as a welcome change to read about comics, best sellers, and popular movies ["Japan's New Popular Culture," WQ, Summer 1985].

Until social historians started working on problems of *mentalité*, not much of this was of interest. Art and literature that stood the test of time were the only sort that seemed worth writing about, and the films that counted were those that won international acclaim. But popular culture has its own rules, and the story of the way popular interest in Kurosawa's *Rashomon* was kindled only after its reception abroad is a familiar one.

Such study presents some problems for foreign students of Japan. The small corps of Westerners able to appreciate Japanese literature and competent to translate it is very small, so its members want to be sure their efforts focus on texts of lasting cultural value. Why translate something that is not going to endure? Yet, in Japan, as in other countries, what endures is not necessarily what is most popular.

Some of the things these articles describe represent a diffusion of culture downward. Thirty years ago one saw subway riders engrossed in rather intellectually taxing monthly magazines, but these have given way to weekly sheets with much more coverage of current scandal. Popular comics, including, as Frederik L. Schodt points out ["Reading the Comics"], the *guro* and the *ero* (grotesque and erotic), now threaten to eclipse even those weeklies. Sports papers also compete with the more prestigious dailies.

During the 1950s, Japan's establishment was still shaken by defeat, and a
new structure was only just visible. Now it is sometimes hard to see anything else, and a release and retreat into privatism, fantasy, and irrelevance take the place of wrestling with the larger questions of national future and personal well-being. In all of this, Japan is not exceptional. Magazines with pictures but little text and casual horror without real fear become popular only as the furor of war recedes from public memory.

Professor Marius B. Jansen
East Asian Studies Department
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Cross-over Culture

What strikes me most about the Japanese popular culture is how interrelated are the forms—cartoons, popular novels, feature films, and television.

One extremely popular type of film which Jim Bailey ["At the Movies"] does not take into account is the feature animation. Adapted from manga magazines or television cartoons, these large-screen versions of their print and broadcast cousins hit the theatres every year during school vacation time (March and August) and play to huge audiences. One 1984 manga adaptation, Kaze no Tani no Naushika (Naushika of the Windy Vale), was not only a great box-office hit but a critical success as well, drawing the attention of the adult film-going audience. The Toho studio’s biggest money-maker for 1984 was also its latest in a long series adapted from a popular TV cartoon, Do
doraemon, a giant blue cat who might be considered the Japanese equivalent of Garfield.

Many of the popular novels Fumiko Halloran considers ["Best Sellers"] have also been transformed into feature films. Almost Transparent Blue even won its author the chance to direct his first film. Ms. Halloran’s article demonstrates the fluidity of these connections between writing and performing. Not only are written works routinely adapted to some performance medium, but performers fre-
quently become popular writers (as in the cases of Tetsuko Kuroyanagi and Takanobu Hozumi), and popular writers become film directors or television commentators. Film director Nagisa Oshima is now a popular writer and has gained special renown as a game show participant on television.

The latest trend, internationally as well as in Japan, has been for musicians to become actors, as in the case of composer Ryuichi Sakamoto, who appeared in Oshima's *Merry Christmas, Mr. Lawrence* in 1983 with rock superstar David Bowie.

This matter of what we might call "cross-over culture" is certainly not new. Three hundred years ago, Saikaku made popular what is now known as the nonfiction novel; and his contemporary, the playwright Chikamatsu, made the docudrama a great success. Each of these writers drew on popular accounts from the news of their day to create new forms that in their day were considered part of mainstream popular culture and that today have become "pure literature," part of high culture. In Japan there has been a predilection for adapting one form of expression to another.

The films cited by Mr. Bailey for devoting attention to matters international, however, have not been as important or influential as his comments make them seem. Such films as *Unditi* (Races, made by a former film critic now resident in Los Angeles) and *Rongu Ran* (Long Run, directed by a still photographer noted for her photographic study of New York's Harlem) may have been internationally minded, but not many people went to see them. Foreign settings for Japanese movies have become extremely popular recently, but these films, where they have succeeded with the Japanese public, have done so more because of the stars they feature than their exotic locales.

It also seems to me that the whole matter of "Westernization" is by now moot. That Japan is westernized is taken for granted by young Japanese, which may be one reason why movies with foreign settings and subjects are not terribly successful now that movie-makers have the wherewithal to make them: The whole world is so readily available to young people that the vicarious thrill of being cinematically transported to a foreign land is no longer there.

The most popular subject for Japanese movies is still home and family, as the seemingly endless Tora-san series proves. But it has recently been joined by a spate of satires of family life that have proven quite popular and have produced the year's best film in each of the past two seasons: *The Family Game* in 1983 and *The Funeral* in 1984.

*The Funeral* is a fascinating example of just how pervasive "cross-over culture" is in the Japanese popular arts: It is a film directed, in the *shishosetsu* (I-novel) tradition that has dominated Japanese literature throughout this century, by a popular actor and essayist based on his own experience and even utilizing his family's residence as a set and his actress-wife in the lead role. It has been enormously successful.

David Owens, Assistant Director
Japan Film Center
New York, New York

Learning by Contrast

The articles on Japanese Popular Culture are incisive, well informed and comprehensive.

The most obvious point raised by the essays is the value of studying another country's popular culture. In this day of rapid communication, popular culture is the *lingua franca* of the world, the one thing that all nations, to one degree or another, have in common. It is therefore vital that all people, and especially we in the United States, know all we can about the popular culture of other lands.

For example, the Japanese, with half the population of the United States, publish nearly as many book titles as we. Does that mean the titles published in Japan are less elite, more attractive to the general population than those in the United States? Or is the United States perhaps pricing itself into functional illiteracy by keeping book costs too high.
Another issue about best sellers is depth. We need to know more about the content of books. In Japan, detective fiction, for example, works in ways quite different from its parallel in the United States. There it has much greater respect for individuals' privacy and rights, and less violence. Yet American detective fiction is very popular in Japan today, with translations flowing from many presses. Will American violence modify or alter Japanese detective fiction—and for the better or the worse?

As for pornography, what should we learn from Japanese customs of seeing it quite differently than we do? Their families read pornography together: The father reads the first page and passes it on to the mother, who reads it and then passes it on to the children, one by one. What are the implications? Japanese TV has at least 50 acts of violence in its shows every day, yet Japanese society is not nearly as violent as American. What are the differences?

There are scores of other subjects that should be studied in Japanese culture: sumo wrestling, baseball, bathing, dressing, and eating habits. . . . The Japanese Popular Culture Association already has several publications available, and more are promised.

The study of international popular culture needs to be pushed ahead. There is no likelier country than Japan to concentrate on.

Ray B. Browne, Director
Center for the Study of Popular Culture
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, Ohio

Case Law

I found A. E. Dick Howard's essay on James Madison a pleasant synopsis [WQ, Summer 1985], but I confess to being disconcerted when he asserted that Madison's view of the role of the federal courts in the new government, "that the judicial branch would assert the right of judicial review, was borne out in 1803 when Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison...."

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Hillsdale College proudly adheres to the non-discriminatory policy regarding race, religion, sex, or national or ethnic origin that it has maintained since long before governments found it necessary to regulate such matters.
Justice John Marshall handed down the Supreme Court’s decision in *Marbury v. Madison*. In fact, the Supreme Court in 1796, confronted by a dispute between Madison and Hamilton over whether a carriage tax was an excise tax or a “direct tax,” unanimously declared the tax unconstitutional (*Hylton v. U.S.*, 3 Dall. 171). There was no challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction. Nine years later, Marshall first declared a statutory provision unconstitutional, but jurisdictionally he simply took the path of precedent.

> John P. Roche, Dean
> Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
> Tufts University
> Medford, Massachusetts

**A Matter of Precedent**

Under the heading “Clubs” in the article on New Orleans [WQ, Spring 1985], S. Frederick Starr states that the Boston Club, founded in 1841, is the oldest extant men’s club in the country. Southern Marylanders know that honor belongs to the South River Club near Annapolis. The exact date of its founding is uncertain because fire destroyed the old minute book in 1740, the year that John Gasaway deeded land for the club’s present home. Before that time, the club met in the homes of Thomas Gasaway and other members. The new minute book begins with the meeting held on February 11, 1742, the year the present clubhouse was completed.

Descendants of early members and allied families continue to meet quarterly. The 25 members of the South River Club firmly believe that they belong to the oldest continuous social club in America, though the misguided members of a club in New York dispute that claim.

**Isabel S. Cunningham**

**Annapolis, Maryland**
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The Wilson Quarterly/Autumn 1985
"This is an interesting and absorbing study. Hanson's critical use of American history is persuasive and distinctive, and he will find a large audience." — William E. Connolly, University of Massachusetts

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