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Editor's Comment

To some degree, this issue of the Quarterly illustrates the persistent "unknowns" that face scholarly researchers. For example, our contributors to the cluster of articles on "public opinion" describe the polling techniques—and their results—that now permeate research in politics, sociology, and economics. Yet, even as they discuss surprising trends in public attitudes, they resist trying to explain why Americans change their minds about Presidents, wars, government spending. The truth is that no social scientist, pollster, or politician has been able to pin down the causes of shifts in public opinion; happily, people remain mysterious and unpredictable.

Another "unknown" is the future course of the law as it relates to matters of race, even as the Supreme Court this spring considers new cases dealing with "affirmative action" in employment. Reviewing the Court's key decisions since Brown v. Board of Education 25 years ago, A. E. Dick Howard analyzes the unanticipated complexity of civil rights issues; he suggests only that some issues will be far from resolved by Brown's 50th anniversary in the year 2004.

A third set of imponderables arises in our consideration of the U.S. military. Questions of defense strategy, of "how much" to commit to the peacetime military in terms of money and manpower, have been debated repeatedly since the republic was founded. The debate is underway again. A Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) is in sight, yet a steady Soviet military buildup has not abated. Our contributors examine the ups-and-downs of U.S. attitudes toward defense since 1783, the current scope of both American policy and of Soviet efforts, and the state of the Pentagon's six-year-old experiment with the all-volunteer force. All supply insights; none claims to predict the future shape of Soviet-American competition.

Elsewhere in this issue, the "unknowns" are less troublesome. Paul E. Johnson describes the revivalist Second Great Awakening of 1831 in Rochester, N.Y., and Alan Henrikson gives a wry account of the evolution of maps—and how they have represented man's view of his world. Our green cover celebrates the coming of spring.

Peter Braestrup
A "neoconservative" movement, born in reaction to the turmoil of the 1960s, is taking center stage in American politics, writes Steinfels, executive editor of Commonweal. The neoconservatives "are setting the agenda for our national political life, laying down the ground rules for public discussion."

Neoconservatism has no place for social turbulence, political conflict, or cultural experimentation. Its spokesmen prize moderation and stability. Most of its leading figures are one-time liberals; many are prolific and gifted essayists. Among them: Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer. They complain of a "crisis of authority" brought on by a "New Class" of liberals and leftists who have made excessive demands on the modern welfare state and thereby undermined its authority.

On the international front, the new conservatives worry about Russia's growing military strength and warn of a potential U.S. "failure of nerve." On the domestic side, they contend that the federal government has been overcommitted since the 1960s and faces insoluble problems, notably the existence of an urban "underclass" culture that thwarts outsiders' efforts to overcome poverty, slums, and unemployment.

The neoconservative purpose, says Steinfels, is to "reassert and protect legitimate authority" by resisting new federal programs, giving more responsibility to state and local government and the private sector, and attacking the adversary culture of the "New Class."

Neoconservatives are asking useful questions about culture and morality (e.g., Does affluence undermine virtue?) that mainstream liberalism has avoided. They have responded to a thirst for a firmer American ideology in a changing world. The danger for neoconservatism, however, lies in its sudden success and its cozy relationship with a "New Class."
with Big Business. "There is a grandeur in its professed stoicism," Steinfelds warns, "that will not survive the discovery that this philosophy of restraint applies to everyone but the rich and the powerful."

Travels with Harry

"Truman and MacArthur: The Wake Island Meeting" by John Edward Wiltz, in Military Affairs (Dec. 1978), Eisenhower Hall, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kans. 66506.

The Wake Island meeting between President Harry S Truman and General of the Army Douglas MacArthur on October 15, 1950, has occupied an important niche in the literature of the Korean War and in subsequent controversy involving the two men.

The purpose of the meeting, says Wiltz, a historian at Indiana University, was not to settle U.S. policy toward Taiwan or win assurances from MacArthur that the Chinese Communists would not intervene in Korea, as some celebrated authors have contended (notably Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Richard H. Rovere in The General and the President, and the Future of American Foreign Policy, 1951). Nor was it intended to ensure that MacArthur clearly understood the administration's overall Far Eastern policy (see Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession, 1966).

Truman's decision to fly half way around the world had less lofty aims. It stemmed from a suggestion by his administrative assistant, George Elsey, during a presidential cruise on Chesapeake Bay in early October 1950. Congressional elections were at hand, and Elsey reasoned that Truman could capture some valuable press attention by a dramatic meeting with MacArthur, who was then basking in the na-

Department of State photograph, courtesy Harry S Truman Library.

President Truman's celebrated meeting with General MacArthur on Wake Island on October 14, 1950, may have been only "presidential theater."
The Wake Island meeting produced no discussion or decisions that dealt with America's approach to problems in the Far East and no serious consideration of the likelihood of Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean fighting (which came one month later), says Wiltz. There were no conference agenda and no preliminary staff discussions, and the two men's conversation skipped from topic to topic with no attempt to probe complex issues. It is impossible to disprove the claim that Truman gave MacArthur a private "dressing down" for attempting to question the administration's proposals for "neutralizing" Formosa (as Merle Miller writes in Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S Truman, 1973), but those present at Wake Island dismiss the notion and MacArthur himself never indicated in any way that he had been rebuked.

The historical importance of Wake Island was negligible, Wiltz argues. Even as "presidential theater" it was of doubtful value. Truman won widespread publicity, but on election day in November the Democrats suffered serious reverses.


New citizen action organizations are springing up to represent the interests of low- and middle-income people at the state and local level. Collectively, "they are the liberal counterpart of the 'New Right,'" say Peirce and Hagstrom, contributing editors of National Journal.

These progressive groups focus on economic issues. They avoid such matters as affirmative action, abortion, gay rights, and illegal immigration. They represent a shift away from the one-issue protest movements of the 1960s and from the heavy emphasis on lobbying in Washington for federal subsidies to help the very poor.

The new organizations include: The Conference on Alternative State and Local Public Policies, which sponsors an annual meeting of public officials and community organizers; a string of statewide groups of which the best known are Massachusetts Fair Share, the New Orleans--based Association of Community Organizations for Reform (ACORN), and California's Citizens Action League (CAL); and Youth Project, a Washington-based organization that funnels money from large foundations to grass-roots groups.

These groups variously claim credit for reductions in proposed electric rate increases in Massachusetts, an adjustment in California utility rates to benefit the small consumer, and winning free dental care for poor children in Vermont. Some urge their members to run for local political office. Many are forming alliances with organized labor to oppose tax reduction proposals that seem to benefit corporations and
PERIODICALS

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

The new progressives share with their conservative opponents determination to make state and local governments function more efficiently. Ultimately, say Peirce and Hagstrom, many of them seek more equitable distribution of wealth and income and the creation of government-financed business ventures under public control.

An End to Benign Neglect

“Puerto Rico: Out of the Colonial Closet” by Jose A. Cabranes, in Foreign Policy (Winter 1978/79), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

From 1952 until the mid-1970s, Puerto Rico (population 3.2 million) prospered under its Commonwealth relationship with the United States. In 1975, however, the island’s economy, which had become closely tied to that of the United States, almost collapsed. The “Operation Bootstrap” boom, built on cheap labor and U.S. capital, was ended by worldwide recession and foreign competition.

Today, writes Cabranes, former special counsel to the Governor of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth is a veritable welfare case struggling under fiscal austerity and highly dependent on U.S. handouts (unemployment rose above 22 percent in the mid-1970s and still hovers around 20 percent).

Three bitterly divided political movements that have shaped Puerto Rico’s history since the beginning of the century are still at work today: one supports statehood; one favors total independence; and an intermediate faction would refine the current Commonwealth relationship by transferring more power from Washington to Puerto Rico. In the 1976 general elections, the combined votes of the statehood (48.3 percent) and independence (6.4 percent) parties constituted a clear majority for the first time since the Commonwealth was created in 1952.

Political change in Puerto Rico is inevitable, Cabranes says. Instead of practicing “benign neglect,” Washington should develop closer contacts with the entire spectrum of political leaders and be ready to support the outcome of the 1981 referendum on the island’s future.

PUERTO RICAN GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS SINCE COMMONWEALTH BEGAN

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The Pursuit of Quality

"Reform' and Judicial Selection" by Adlai E. Stevenson III, in American Bar Association Journal (Nov. 1978), 1155 East 60th St., Chicago, Ill. 60606.

Traditionally U.S. Senators have controlled the selection of nominees for federal district judgeships in their states. At the request of the Carter administration, and in the interest of "reform," merit selection commissions are being established in 24 states to recommend candidates for 152 federal judgeships. Justice Department guidelines suggest that members of these new selection panels include nonlawyers, women, and minorities.

Senator Stevenson (D.-Ill.) has serious reservations about the merit commission idea. The difficulty in filling federal judgeships, he writes, is not in finding qualified candidates but in convincing them to give up profitable law practices for judicial office. Commissions, operating in the public eye, are less likely to produce superior candidates than is an Attorney General, a President, or a Senator. Moreover, a formal commission, with public procedures, may opt for a "safe" consensus and name mediocre candidates.

A nominee recommended by a Senator is currently screened by the Department of Justice, the FBI, and the Committee on the Federal Judiciary of the American Bar Association and must pass muster with the Attorney General and the President. Finally, the President’s nominee must be confirmed by the Senate, where the Judiciary Committee actively seeks public comment.

The reformers' charge that judicial recommendations by elected officials are subject to the abuses of partisan politics is unfounded, says Stevenson, because "there is no political advantage in recommending unqualified persons." Finding top-flight judicial candidates requires "initiative, discernment, and a willingness to back unpopular choices."

Town Meetings for Cities?


The demand for greater citizen participation in local government has grown sharply in recent years. During the late 1960s, federal advocates saw "maximum feasible participation" as a therapeutic form of classical democracy that would give citizens a heightened sense of community pride.

Instead, participation has become a means by which spokesmen for special interest groups compete in open hearings for an impact on public policy. "We asked for classical democracy; we got pluralism," writes Bryan, a political scientist at the University of Vermont.

The "participation" model most frequently cited is the New England
town meeting, once described by Thomas Jefferson as “the wisest invention ever devised by the wit of man for the perfect exercise of self-government.”

Only in Vermont has the town meeting retained much vitality; attendance stays high despite the fact that the towns have been steadily losing power to the state government. On the average, about one-quarter of a town’s registered voters attend an annual town meeting lasting some 3 hours and 25 minutes. About 37 percent of those present speak. Attendance and participation appear to be unaffected by the level of partisan political activity or local per capita income. Small towns draw bigger crowds than large towns do.

One needs a town before one can hold an effective town meeting, says Bryan. To succeed in cities, the town meeting concept should be used only in neighborhoods with clearly defined political boundaries and considerable social stability, and the people must have the power to decide things. To call for town meetings in an unsuitable urban environment, as many reformers still do, is romanticism.

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The Public’s Role in Foreign Affairs

Automatic public support for presidential decisions in foreign affairs has dwindled sharply since the end of the Vietnam War. The American people are now eager to have more say in the formation of foreign policy, says Yankelovich, a public opinion pollster.

Public mistrust of presidential leadership in foreign affairs is “an almost accidental byproduct” of a larger decline of confidence in government that has been growing for 20 years. In 1964, for example, 70 percent of Americans believed in the competence of government officials; by 1978, such confidence was down to 30 percent.

Yankelovich does not share the concern of those who fear that the public is too ill-informed and changeable on foreign issues. The judgments of the American people may appear to be inconsistent and unstable, particularly in the early stages of debate on matters like the Panama Canal treaties or détente. However, there is evidence in polls that Americans are now carefully weighing practicality and moral principles. For example, strong sympathy and support for Israel’s right to exist is mixed with a concern for the plight of the Palestinians, a conviction that Egypt is sincerely committed to peace, and an interest in retaining a secure supply of Saudi Arabian oil.

Americans are once again interested in seeing the United States take an active role in world affairs, but Vietnam taught them to examine the
full implications of foreign policy decisions. Government officials err in assuming that the public always demands simple, unambiguous choices. In the long run, says Yankelovich, public noninvolvement in foreign affairs is dangerous; it leaves the people uninformed and therefore "manipulable, apathetic, and panic-prone."


In the best-known cases of "intelligence failure," the most crucial mistakes are usually made by the decision-makers, not by the professionals who gather information and analyse it, writes Betts, research associate at the Brookings Institution.

Washington's failure to anticipate the Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor in 1941, for example, occurred both because evidence of the impending attack did not flow efficiently up the chain of command and because the evidence contradicted existing strategic assumptions. Pearl Harbor led eventually to the establishment of a Watch Committee and National Indications Center in Washington, but both failed to produce timely U.S. reactions to warnings of the 1950 Chinese intervention in Korea or the 1973 October War in the Middle East.

Marginal improvements in U.S. intelligence analysis have been made since World War II. There is a healthy diversity in estimates of the military power of our adversaries. Coordination of military and civilian intelligence activities has improved. There is a regular effort by the Intelligence Community Staff to measure the "objectivity, balance, and responsiveness" of intelligence studies. New systems for monitoring vital messages have alleviated, though not cured, the weaknesses in military communications that contributed to crises involving U.S. intelligence collection missions in the 1960s (e.g., the U-2 and Pueblo incidents).

No intelligence system is perfect, says Betts. But he offers two general guides for reform: "Anything that facilitates dissent and access to authorities by intelligence producers, and anything that facilitates skepticism and scrutiny by [intelligence] consumers" is good.


The essence of U.S. strategic doctrine, says Ehrhardt, a National Security Council arms control analyst, is to deter nuclear war with relatively low outlays for weapons and a minimum of international tension
through the credible threat of inflicting catastrophic damage on the enemy should deterrence fail.

Soviet strategic doctrine is more aggressive. It seeks to deter nuclear war while energetically pursuing other strategic and foreign policy goals in competition with the West. In the event that deterrence fails, the Soviets want to increase the likelihood that Russia would win a nuclear war and survive as a nation.

Ermarth argues that U.S. strategic thinkers have too long assumed that U.S. and Soviet doctrine are rather similar and becoming more so. The next 5 to 10 years, he warns, are likely to see mounting U.S. anxiety about the adequacy of both our deterrent forces and our strategic doctrine.

An essential component of U.S. doctrine is the concept of existing "stability," in the Soviet-American military balance. New weapons systems are discouraged, lest they endanger that "stability." The Russians, however, reject that notion. Washington's failure to recognize such basic differences in outlook has had dangerous consequences, says Ermarth. U.S. officials have underestimated the competitiveness of Soviet strategic policy and the need for a competitive U.S. response. And by projecting U.S. views onto the Soviets, they have underestimated the difficulties of achieving genuine strategic stability and overestimated what has been and can be achieved through Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

Worst of all, Ermarth concludes, Americans' excessive confidence in strategic stability has encouraged Moscow to pursue a more assertive foreign policy. The United States should now deemphasize "stability" and develop a more dynamic strategic doctrine of its own.

Is Defensiveness a Sound Defense?


President Nixon, like every American postwar President, was determined to be tough in foreign policy, and yet he operated wholly within the framework of a certain defensiveness that has characterized American diplomacy since the end of World War II.

"To Nixon, toughness was not a question of resources but of resolve," writes Wildavsky, a Berkeley political scientist. Like John F. Kennedy, he intended not to be pushed around—or appear to be pushed around—by the Russians or anyone else. Both men hoped to acquire a reputation for being tough without constantly having to act tough.

In some instances, Nixon was able to combine verbal threats and symbolic gestures to control dangerous crises. In September 1970, for example, when Syrian tanks moved into Jordan to support Palestinian efforts to topple King Hussein's government, Nixon placed U.S. forces on alert and said he would support Israeli air strikes against the
Syrians, who subsequently withdrew. But his repeated efforts to pressure Moscow to force Hanoi to sue for peace met with failure.

Toughness in U.S. foreign policy has been intended only to preserve the status quo, to ward off threats or attacks by others, says Wildavsky. It is the natural reaction of "a satisfied superpower happy to hold on and unwilling to act except when provoked." The United States acts like a defensive power because it is a defensive power. Except for supplanting Soviet influence in Egypt after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Nixon took no actions that put the United States in a stronger position than it was before.

Can defensiveness provide a sound defense? Not in the long run, Wildavsky argues. There is no deterrence if the aggressor does not risk losing as much as he hopes to gain. Tough talk and no action is just an invitation to the aggressor to try again.

*No Amazons Are They*

The image of the Israeli fighting woman firing a weapon in combat alongside her male counterpart is a myth, writes Landrum, a U.S. Air Force manpower analyst. Women in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) serve almost exclusively in administrative and technical jobs that require little or no training, in order to free men to fight.

In contrast to American service women, who enjoy equality with men in pay and wide career opportunities, Israeli women do not seek or obtain parity with men in the military.

All women are drafted into the IDF as enlisted personnel at the age of 18 for 24 months, but because of exemptions for marriage, pregnancy, religious convictions, and lack of education, only 55 percent of the draft-age women actually serve (compared with 95 percent of Israeli men).

Women conscripts train for only three and a half weeks. They have no field exercises or night training, and their handling of weapons is minimal. Only 10 percent of them become regulars. Women officers are selected through identification in training and by interview.

Female draftees with high IQs and at least 12 years of education may apply for technical training as airframe and engine mechanics or electronic specialists. They serve an extra 12 months and are not released.
for marriage. Women are no longer accepted for flight training; until late 1977, they were permitted to serve as pilots if they could pass the severe entry requirements demanded of men and finish combat training.

Israeli women in the IDF perform an essential but auxiliary role, says Landrum, one that is secondary in their minds to marriage and motherhood—and one that subjects them in wartime to the least chance of injury or capture by the enemy.

The reconstruction of postwar Western Europe and the creation of the Atlantic Alliance (1949) were historic achievements of American foreign policy, even though they were more the result of improvisation than of any grand design. The Alliance brought an awkward dependence on U.S. nuclear power, but it also helped create unprecedented economic prosperity, political unity, and stability.

Today, the Atlantic partnership seems passé, says Nerlich, vice president of the European-American Institute for Security Research in Los Angeles. There is no longer the old rapport between Western Europe and the United States. Pro-American political parties are a rarity in Western Europe, and an anti-American stance is a political necessity in places like Greece.

Although Soviet military power is growing and Western Europe's dependence on the United States increasing, politicians on both sides of the Atlantic view national interests in narrow, competitive terms. Such attitudes led, for example, to futile U.S. efforts to pressure West Germany into a policy of more rapid economic growth so as to ease pressure on the U.S. dollar.

Maintenance of the Alliance is still the cornerstone of West European survival, says Nerlich, but Western Europe's vital interests now extend beyond the framework of institutions like NATO. Meanwhile, key U.S. leaders, notably in Congress, who have been traditionally most committed to trans-Atlantic cooperation, now take issue with various European moves. They oppose European initiatives for dealing with the radical Left (e.g., permitting the Communists to share power in Italy), establishing close ties with Arab oil-producers, or competing with the United States in markets, such as Latin America, for high technology.

How Washington and Europe each handle their relations with the Middle East and other "third parties" will be crucial, says Nerlich. Joint action in international affairs can reinforce the old ties, but it will take strong political leadership on both sides of the Atlantic to overcome domestic special interests and to design policies to reduce present U.S.-West European cleavages.
Migrant Workers: The New Militants

"Foreign Workers in Western Europe" by Suzanne Berger, in The Journal of The Institute for Socioeconomic Studies (Winter 1978), Airport Road, White Plains, N.Y. 10604.

U.S. officials have already discovered that millions of illegal aliens provide a vast pool of low-cost labor for menial work that unemployed Americans refuse to do. Western Europe is learning that foreign labor poses serious problems for the future.

Despite rapidly rising unemployment, says Berger, M.I.T. political scientist, 7 million immigrants work at jobs in Western Europe that host country nationals could perform. Typically, these jobs are tough and dirty and require few skills. In France, for example, where there are 900,000 unemployed and 1.9 million foreign workers, one-third of the migrants work at sanitation jobs, 27 percent work in construction trades, and 20 percent hold auto assembly line jobs.

Postwar labor shortages drew millions of foreign workers on temporary visas to Western Europe from North Africa, India, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Portugal, and Spain. By 1975, almost 20 percent of the

![Diagram showing foreign workers as percent of total labor force in various European countries.]

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

West European countries are discovering that foreign workers are a permanent part of their domestic labor force, an essential element even in times of economic recession and high unemployment.

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work force in Switzerland, 11 percent in France, 10 percent in West Germany, and 8 percent in Britain was made up of migrants. The "guest workers" were attractive to employers because they would work long hours for low wages; they prudently avoided unions and political activity.

Changes in the 1970s, says Berger, have revealed some of the costs and long-term dangers of relying on foreign labor. Growing numbers of foreign workers are sending for their families and making plans for long-term residence. They are becoming more militant, demanding better pay and working conditions. Tension is mounting between foreigners and natives, both in the crowded urban neighborhoods where migrants concentrate and in the factories. Extreme-left activists in France and Italy are trying to organize migrants as "the new proletariat of West Europe."

Yet, migrant workers cannot simply be expelled and replaced by unemployed nationals. In France, the status of 420,000 Algerian migrants is protected by treaty. Moreover, under existing EEC legislation, migrants from one Common Market country working in another cannot be sent home. West European governments are reluctant to send migrants back to Spain and Portugal for fear of creating turmoil in those fragile new democracies that might destabilize the rest of Europe.

The children of these migrants are likely to be a volatile problem when they reach working age, Berger warns. Unlike their parents, they are anxious to cut their ties with the past; no longer do they expect to live in the country of their parents' origins. They will want to be fully integrated; yet, because of cultural and other differences, their chances of upward mobility and full citizenship are poor.

**Taming the Giants**


During the mid-1960s, it was fashionable to predict that future international business would be dominated by multinational companies and that U.S. multinationals would dominate the world market. Neither prediction has proved correct, says Franko, a professor at the Center for Education in International Management in Geneva, Switzerland.

U.S. multinationals are still a major force, and U.S. direct investment overseas continues to grow at respectable annual rates of 10 to 12 percent. But the domination of world industry by U.S. companies has not come to pass. In fact, their international competitive position has been eroded; European and Japanese companies are now moving into foreign manufacturing at a faster rate than U.S. companies.

In 1976, the United States owned 68 (or 44 percent) of the world's 156 largest companies in the 13 most important industrial categories, but this was down from 111 (or 71 percent) in 1959. Continental European interests increased their ownership of these companies from 24 to 40, with particular gains in chemicals, automobiles, primary metals,
commercial banking, and pharmaceuticals. U.S. overseas manufacturing operations probably peaked in 1968 when 540 subsidiaries were established or acquired. In 1974–75, the 187 largest U.S. multinationals were setting up or acquiring only some 200 subsidiaries per year.

The non-American competitive surge, says Franko, came as a result of growing foreign exports by continental European and Japanese multinationals and their development of sophisticated technology and managerial skills. The quadrupling of oil prices by OPEC countries also gave a great boost to the demand for energy-saving products and processes that were already on hand in resource-short Europe and Japan.

What about the future? U.S. multinationals must now compete with a variety of new trading companies, import houses, and retailers to provide private investment capital, technology, and marketing expertise to the Third World. The competition will get fiercer.

Cornering the Food Market

"Who's Who in the Thanksgiving Business" by Jim Hightower, in The Texas Observer (Nov. 17, 1978), 600 West Seventh St., Austin, Tex. 78701.

Food is America's largest business, amounting to $223 billion in 1977, but farmers are no longer in charge of the food industry; control has passed to processors and retailers who absorb 60 cents of every food dollar spent.

This immensely profitable industry, with its more than 30,000 food processing companies, gives a superficial impression of robust competition. In fact, says Hightower, editor of The Texas Observer, just 50 national processors control about 90 percent of the industry's profits.

The two largest of these consumer-product conglomerates are foreign-owned: Unilever, a British-Dutch firm that owns such brands as Lipton tea, Imperial margarine, Knox gelatine, and Good Humor ice cream and Nestlé, a Swiss corporation that owns such U.S. brands as Nestea, Libby McNeil and Libby canned goods, Stouffer, and Taster's Choice coffee. The largest U.S. food conglomerate is Beatrice Foods Company, a Chicago firm with 1977 sales of $6.4 billion and owner of Dannon yogurt, LaChoy Chinese foods, Sunbeam bread, and more than a hundred other brands.

Thanks to mergers, there is shrinking competition in the food industry, says Hightower. (Del Monte, the largest processor of fruits and vegetables, was recently bought by R. J. Reynolds; Green Giant is now a subsidiary of Pillsbury; and Tropicana has merged into Beatrice Foods.) The top three brands now share 91.7 percent of the market for table salt, 98.4 percent of the market for gelatin desserts, and 86.1 percent of the market for catsup.

Economists Russell Parker of the Federal Trade Commission and John Connor of the Department of Agriculture have calculated that monopoly control of the U.S. food manufacturing industry cost consumers in 1975 at least $12 billion in higher prices. Hightower argues that the monopolistic trend in the food industry can and should be
reversed. He urges more direct marketing by farmers to consumers, tougher antitrust enforcement, graduated corporate income taxes, and a limit on the tax deduction for advertising expenditures.

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**REligion & PHILosophy**

*Defining Religion*  

The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Constitution as creating three categories of religious exemptions: the mandatory, the permissible, and the forbidden.

The exemption of the Amish, for example, from compulsory high school education, is a constitutionally mandated exemption; the inclusion of churches in property tax exemptions is constitutionally permissible; and a special income tax deduction for tuition paid to a nonpublic elementary or secondary school is constitutionally forbidden.

One practical consequence of religious exemptions, says Whelan, professor of law at Fordham, is that government must distinguish between claims for exemption that have merit and those that do not. (Massage parlors, for example, have incorporated as "temples of divine love" in an effort to avoid paying taxes.) Of necessity, government must reduce religious exemptions to legal formulas and statutes that define which sort of institutions are exempt and which are not—all within the framework of the constitutional guarantee of religious liberty.

As the churches see it, religious exemptions should be decided on the basis of what is necessary, desirable, or undesirable.

During Prohibition (1919–33), many American churches needed—and got—an exemption for the sale and transportation of sacramental wine. But exemptions that tempt the uncommitted or the antireligious to profess religion to avoid paying taxes are undesirable. So are those that attempt to make artificial distinctions between the "religious" and the "exclusively religious" activities of churches.

Recent Internal Revenue Service rulings, for example, require the tax-exempt charitable, educational, health, and welfare agencies of churches to file annual financial reports. It would be wiser for Congress to mandate that certain types of organizations—with or without religious affiliations—file financial reports than for the IRS to determine whether an organization is sufficiently "religious" to be exempt. Why? Governments should not deny the religious right of churches to define themselves. The more refined that legal classifications of religion become, the greater the danger that government will constrict the concepts of church and religion. "The Founding Fathers meant that government should respect the roles of religion and churches in American society," says Whelan, "not define them."
All More's writing were inspired by Platonism. "His mind was not merely dipped, but steeped, in Platonism," says Trevor-Roper, and this strong Platonic influence, with its underlying idealism, has long been overlooked or ignored by More scholars. At the very least, *Utopia* was a blueprint for making equality both perfect and lasting and for permanently excluding tyranny from a corrupt society. Philosophically, it proposed an antihistorical, antitheological world view that was repellant to "civic humanists" like Thomas Cromwell in the court of Henry VIII, who believed that the highest duty of a scholar was to serve his king.

Two events hastened the fading of More's intellectual appeal. The first was the circulation of Machiavelli's *Prince* (first published in
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1513), a cynical work that was antithetical to the idealism of Plato's Republic as well as to More's Utopia and that espoused a pragmatic philosophy Cromwell firmly embraced. The second was the advent of Martin Luther and the Reformation, which undermined ecumenical Christianity. After 1522—and until 1935—Utopia was read as mere fantasy, and More's genius fell into disrepute.

PRESS & TELEVISION


Educational television was launched with great expectations 25 years ago, prompted in part by a shortage of grade school and college level teachers. Today, both closed-circuit TV in the classroom and instructional TV intended for home audiences have yet to catch hold.

Its supporters contend that the new technology was sabotaged by teachers' unions in the grade schools and by the intellectual snobbery of professors in the colleges. This explanation is simplistic, replies Smith, director of development projects at the Maryland Center for Public Broadcasting.

Educational TV, he writes, received a fair test during the 1950s, but it failed to deliver the educational gains for large masses of students that it promised. For example, "Sesame Street," public TV's showcase children's series, reaches only 5 percent of the television audience during the so-called "children's hour"; it has not attracted its target audience of underprivileged, inner-city youngsters. Few public television stations or publishers still produce instructional series for grade school children, and the Ford Foundation no longer funds educational TV experiments.

While on-campus college students have become increasingly hostile to standard educational television instruction, there is an audience of ambitious, middle-class, over-30 men and women willing to accept college-level instruction at home by television, says Smith. Yet the University of Mid-America, created by the University of Nebraska, discovered that home-study students in an accounting course using only printed texts performed as well on examinations as those who had also watched all of the course's expensively produced TV segments.

Such examples suggest that, at its best, educational television cannot succeed simply as a video version of what the average teacher does in the classroom. It does not impart information efficiently. To survive, Smith argues, it must play to the strength of the medium and utilize the superior teacher-performer who, by intellect and personality, can inspire students to want to learn.
The continuing conflict between the courts and the news media is often said to result from two conflicting constitutional rights—the First Amendment right of the press to be free to publish without censorship and to protect its news sources and the Sixth Amendment right of an accused person to a fair trial.

This is a fallacy; these two constitutional rights are not in conflict at all, argues Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde. A constitutional right "is a claim that runs against the government—usually not a claim that the government do something for you or me, but that it refrain from doing something to us... Only a government can violate a constitutional demand."

A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to a proper trial, but he has no constitutional right against the press, nor does he have the right to have the government act against the press (e.g., through court-ordered restrictions on the media), says Linde. To assume that the First and Sixth Amendment rights conflict "transforms the defendant's fair-trial claim against the state into a claim against the media...a classic example of 'let's you and him fight.'"

Linde concedes that this broad view of press freedom may make it difficult to obtain a conviction "untainted" by prejudicial pretrial disclosures or sensationalism but contends that the prosecutor's role has never been easy. He asks more self-policing by the press, leaving editors and reporters "out there all alone with their consciences."

The ranks of Western Europe's newspapers have thinned noticeably in recent years as a result of inflation (especially the rising price of newsprint) and declining revenues. Although the governments of Sweden, West Germany, and Great Britain were initially reluctant to step in to halt the steady attrition, says Hollstein, professor of communication at the University of Utah, they are now increasingly inclined toward granting subsidies to help assure a diverse and competitive free press.

Since 1950, the number of Swedish newspapers has dropped from 240 to 146, and the number of cities with competing papers has fallen from 51 to 20. When more closures seemed imminent in 1971, the Swedish parliament approved direct financial aid to newspapers with smaller circulations than their competitors. These subsidies, along with other help, such as cheap postal rates and tax exemptions, now total about $130 million a year. There is no evidence that the subsidies...
PRESS & TELEVISION

have compromised press independence; however, government aid has not improved the circulation of weaker newspapers.

In West Germany, where the government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has been debating press subsidy plans, conservative publishers (including Axel Springer, who owns Die Welt and many other papers and controls 25 percent of the country's daily newspaper circulation) have opposed direct government aid in favor of tax concessions and an opportunity for publishers to own shares in a proposed third commercial TV network.

The difficulties of British newspapers have prompted only indirect government aid (notably exemption from certain taxes), despite a doubling of newsprint costs since 1974, chaotic labor troubles, and antiquated printing facilities. Publishers in Britain, fearing interference by the state, are leery of outright financial support.

Central to the issue of subsidies, says Hollstein, is the question of "whether newspapers supported even in part by government can remain independent and uncorrupted." Beyond this, he adds, the West European nations are still trying to determine "whether subsidies can keep marginal newspapers afloat over the long term, whether governments will be willing, if necessary, to subsidize the newspaper press indefinitely, and whether readers will tolerate a subsidized press."

SOCIETY

What's 'Best' for the Child

"Psychology and Day Care" by Alicia F. Lieberman, in Social Research (Autumn 1978), 66 West 12th St., New York, N.Y. 10011.

Approximately 4.5 million American women with children under age six are now employed. The children of these women—an estimated 6 million—are cared for in a variety of ways: half are watched at home by a father, housekeeper, or relative; one-third are supervised outside the home by neighbors, relatives, or women who care for groups of children on a regular basis; others go with their mothers to work or stay home alone.

Only 6 percent of these children are enrolled in day-care centers, because space is either not available or not affordable. The average private center charges $20 a week per child, and "quality" day care with "enriched" programs costs twice as much.

Day care for children outside the home has long been controversial, says Lieberman, a research psychologist at the National Institute of Mental Health. Proponents of federally-funded day-care centers argue that group environments stimulate "cognitive development" more than home environments. Opponents contend that day-care children
risk psychological wounds caused by maternal deprivation. According to Lieberman, there is no conclusive evidence to support either of these assumptions.

Arguing about day care versus home care ignores the fact that most working mothers do not have a choice. Federal policymakers should examine a variety of alternatives. Instead of funding programs aimed at putting welfare mothers to work and forcing them to leave their children in costly federally-funded day-care centers, Lieberman asks, why not give the money directly to the woman as a guaranteed income and let them care for their children at home? Lower-middle-class mothers contemplating work solely because of financial need might be offered the chance to remain out of the job market and to stay with their children through government subsidies or no-interest loans. The government would get its money back when the child reaches school age and the mother returns to work.

*Curing Teen-Age Highway Deaths*  

The number of American students enrolled in high school driver education courses more than doubled (from 1 million to 2.5 million) between 1962 and 1972. Contrary to the arguments made by proponents of driver education, however, these high school courses do not reduce highway fatalities among teenage drivers. Indeed, such instruction leads to higher death rates by enabling young people to start driving at an earlier age.

Data from 27 states analyzed by Robertson, a behavioral scientist at Yale, and Zador, a statistician with the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, indicate that most teenagers who had high school driver education would not have obtained licenses until they were 18 or 19 if the education had not been available. The data also show that the fatal crash rate per 10,000 licensed drivers among 18-19 year olds was not reduced by earlier driver education. (A 1975 British study reached the same conclusion.)

In 1975, some 4,000 drivers under 18 years of age were involved in fatal crashes in the United States. In half those crashes, only one vehicle was involved, and either the occupants of that vehicle or pedestrians were killed. Thus, removing drivers under 18 from the highways would prevent at least 2,000 fatal crashes per year, without even counting crashes in which other vehicles were involved.

The authors concede that some driver training programs may have small effects, positive or negative, that do not show up in aggregate statistics. But high school driver education would have to reduce fatal crashes at least 60 per cent merely to offset its effect of increasing licensure among 16- and 17-year-olds.
What accounts for the CB radio fad? There are an estimated 32 million citizen band radio users in the United States today, up sharply since the 1974 truckers' protests and the new 55-mile-an-hour speed limit. Are CB enthusiasts seeking to retrieve a sense of Gemeinschaft (community) lost in today's impersonal society? Or do they use the CB radios installed in their trucks and autos merely to warn each other of police speed traps?

Distinguishing between the fanatical devotee and the casual user, sociologists Kerbo, of California Polytechnic State University, and Holley, of Southwestern Oklahoma State University, and Marshall, a psychologist at the Carl Albert Mental Health Center, McAlester, Okla., studied CB enthusiasts through questionnaires, interviews, and observation at "CB breakers," carnival-like gatherings of CB club members. The authors found that the average "breaker" participant was 31 years old, from the "working or lower middle class," with 12.5 years of schooling.

CB enthusiasts listened to their CB radios an average of 6.4 hours per day. The primary reason given for purchasing a CB radio was not to avoid police speed traps (less than 10 percent gave that as a reason) but to communicate with friends (64 percent) or to talk with strangers (33 percent). The authors found that 69 percent of those questioned felt that other people seemed more friendly since they began using a CB; estimates of the number of new friends acquired through CB radio ranged from 1 to 500, with a sample average of 67.8.

CB users show a somewhat higher than average sense of isolation but not of anomie or social alienation, according to the authors. They use the radio to chat on a less-than-personal level (there are informal taboos against discussion of religion, politics, or personal beliefs). It is not "community" they seek but a less intense sense of sociability lost in modern industrial society. For the CB enthusiast, a person with a CB radio is, by definition, more friendly, less of a stranger.

For six years or so, subway passengers in New York City have had to endure the sight of graffiti on the sides of subway cars. They are multi-colored and so large as to be difficult to decipher. There are no pictures, "messages," or even references to sex; simply names or nicknames,
often with a number attached, such as "Taki 137" or "Kid 56." They deface the insides of the cars as well, often obscuring signs, maps, and even windows.

The graffiti, writes Glazer, professor of education at Harvard, contribute to a pervasive sense among New Yorkers of "the incapacity of government, the uncontrollability of youthful criminal behavior, and a resultant uneasiness and fear."

Why can't graffiti be controlled? Most of the graffiti artists (about 500 of them, at any given time) are known to police. They begin at age 11, marking the inside of cars with felt-tip pens, and graduate to spray-painted displays that may cover the sides of several cars. After 16, they move on to other activities, often to serious crime. (Police studied the careers of 15-year-old graffiti artists apprehended in 1974; three years later, 40 percent had been arrested for more serious offenses, such as burglary and robbery.)

New York City authorities find it impossible to control graffiti "artists" who deface subway cars with spray paint.

No deterrents seem effective. Judges are reluctant to send graffiti artists to overcrowded juvenile detention centers where there is already insufficient room for muggers and rapists. Forcing them to clean up graffiti requires too much costly supervision. Subway storage yards are too large to be guarded effectively.

There are no graffiti on trucks, Glazer notes, because truck drivers beat up kids they find trying to deface their vehicles. Nor are there graffiti on commuter railroad cars, perhaps because maintenance men for those lines are believed to be armed with shotguns loaded with buckshot. Such deterrents, of course, are difficult to incorporate into an orderly, regulated, and humane system of law enforcement.

"Graffiti raise the odd problem of a crime that is, compared to others, relatively trivial but whose aggregate effects on the environment of millions of people are massive," says Glazer. New York style graffiti came out of nowhere; they afflict no other U.S. mass transit system, except that of Philadelphia. Perhaps the problem will go away just as unexpectedly, before a solution can be found.
Beyond Zero
Growth

Most of the world's developed countries are now approaching zero population growth, and, if present trends continue, the populations of Europe and Russia will begin to decline at the turn of the century. The population of the United States will stop growing at a total of about 253 million in the year 2015.

The drop in population growth, says Westoff, director of population research at Princeton, cannot be attributed to "the pill" or Women's Lib. With the exception of the baby boom after World War II, the U.S. birthrate has been falling more or less steadily for the past 200 years, the result of "a change in the economic value of children, from a source of income in agrarian economies to a considerable drain on income in industrial and postindustrial economies."

All the present evidence indicates that in the next century the population of the industrial world will continue to decline, says Westoff. Divorce and cohabitation are on the rise (an estimated 1 million U.S. couples, or 2 percent of all couples living together, are unmarried). A growing number of women are choosing to postpone having children or to have none at all.

At least 10 European governments have expressed concern over the low-fertility trend and a few (e.g., Romania, Hungary) have temporarily raised their birthrates by restrictions on abortion and by the adoption of incentives, including family allowances. Westoff, however, doubts that anything less than a massive investment of public funds to reward child-bearing will halt an industrial country's eventual drift toward zero population growth, followed by population decline.

The Tell-Tale Lock

The analysis of hair promises to be an effective complement to blood serum and urine analysis in medical diagnosis. Simple to obtain, hair samples are relatively easy to analyze and do not deteriorate with storage. Studies have already shown that trace elements, such as lead, arsenic, cadmium, and mercury, accumulate in hair at concentrations at least 10 times higher than those present in blood or urine, writes Science correspondent Maugh.
Several American research teams are compiling data on normal concentrations of trace elements so that hair analysis can be used to monitor exposure to pollutants. Norman F. Mangelson, at Brigham Young University, for example, is analyzing current trace element concentrations in the hair of mice and squirrels collected in Utah's Lake Powell Recreation Area, the site of a proposed coal-fired power plant. Having established the "normal" levels, Mangelson plans to continue testing rodent hair to monitor the emission of pollutants by the power plant.

Such analysis may also help in the diagnosis and treatment of disease. Children with cystic fibrosis, for example, have as much as five times the normal concentrations of sodium in their hair. And victims of juvenile-onset diabetes have below-normal concentrations of chromium, suggesting that hair analysis might be used in screening potential diabetics.

The presence or absence of certain amounts of trace elements is also related to certain learning disabilities and mental abnormalities, writes Maugh. Studies of schizophrenics have revealed below-normal concentrations of cadmium and manganese and above-normal concentrations of lead and iron; this suggests that manganese chloride may be effective in the treatment of schizophrenia.

The utility of hair analysis is growing, says Maugh. It has already proved to be far more accurate than urinalysis in spotting heroin use; more sophisticated analytical techniques, such as chromatography-mass spectrometry, may eventually permit the detection of both harmful and therapeutic chemical agents.

Mindless Overproduction


The number of small, family farms in the United States has been declining steadily for the last half century. Today, there are fewer than 2.8 million American farms, roughly half the 1940 total, and less than 1 percent of them produce 25 percent of the nation's farm commodities. According to Winter, professor emeritus of history at Central Connecticut State College, the chief villain is technology.

The advent of ultra-sophisticated agricultural techniques, fostered by the federal government's "mindless policy of encouraging overproduction," he writes, has forced all farmers to make costly investments in chemicals and complex machinery. Saddled with heavy debt, a farmer can lose his land after just a few poor crop seasons. Repeated high-yield plantings, without proper crop rotation and other conservation measures, also invite wind and water erosion.

Technological farming, Winter argues, may now have reached the point of diminishing returns as fuel and petroleum-based products, especially chemical fertilizers and pesticides, become more costly.
Moreover, modern technology may produce less per acre than traditional farming. (Labor intensive, but technologically backward, cotton cultivation in Egypt produces yields averaging 50 percent per acre above those of a modern U.S. cotton grower.)

The individual American farmer lacks effective representation in Congress and the news media, Winter argues. “Agribusiness” corporations, which produce, process, and market commodities, benefit from government decisions favoring the middleman and food processor, while the small farmer is often forced to sell his crops at prices below what it cost to produce them. (In 1977, for example, Iowa corn that cost $2.21 a bushel to produce was selling for $1.55 to $1.68 per bushel.)

The end result, Winter warns, may be the replacement of the stubbornly independent farmer by a “rural proletariat” living on “collective and corporate farms under central bureaucratic management.”

Trendy Biology


Ever since Charles Darwin proposed his theory of evolution more than 100 years ago, he has been attacked, more and more feebly, by religious fundamentalists. But what the literal interpreters of the Bible have been unable to dislodge from the century’s body of approved scientific truth, leftist scientists are seriously threatening, writes Bethell, a Harper’s editor.

Now, in this “age of compulsory equality,” some well-known biologists have been deriding the validity of Darwin’s theory of natural selection, or survival of the fittest. Indeed, several avowed Marxists on the Harvard faculty, including Stephen Jay Gould, professor of biology and geology, have accused Darwin of consciously promoting the cause of laissez-faire capitalism in his glorification of the struggle for survival.

Their supporters have accused Edward O. Wilson, Harvard entomologist and author of Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975), of fomenting racism through his belief in the determining effect of genes on certain broad elements of human behavior. Such a theory, the Marxists claim, suggests that individuals are not necessarily born with equal attributes and that there may be racial differences in inherited characteristics. At a 1978 meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Washington, demonstrators poured water over Wilson’s head and accused him of genocide, fascism, racism, and sexism.

Although Bethell says that Darwin’s theory has the critical weakness of being too general to prove or disprove, he looks askance at the leftist trend in biological science that rejects unrestrained competition as incompatible with the ideals of Marxist egalitarianism. The ideological critique of science today is dominated by this left-wing assault, not only on Darwinian theory and Wilson’s sociobiology but also on genetic research with its possible dangers of governmental manipulation and
social control.

There is one redeeming aspect to the controversy, says Bethell. It reminds us that science can easily become "too influential, too all-pervasive, too dominant as a way of perceiving the truth about the world" and that an occasional ideological attack can help to keep it healthy.

Charles Darwin's theory of evolution has generated continuous controversy since publication of *Origin of Species* in 1859. Today, left-wing biologists attack Darwin's ideas as hostile to Marxist egalitarianism.


Newborn babies of different ethnic groups exhibit remarkable differences in temperament and behavior.

Freedman, a behavioral scientist at the University of Chicago, and Harvard pediatrician T. Berry Brazelton developed the Cambridge Behavioral and Neurological Assessment Scales. These are a group of simple tests of basic human reactions that could be administered to any normal newborn in a hospital nursery. The tests were applied first to Chinese and Caucasian infants in a San Francisco hospital. The babies "behaved like two different breeds," Freedman reports.

Caucasian babies cried more easily and were harder to console. Chinese babies adapted to almost any position in which they were placed; for example, when placed face down in their cribs, they tended to remain in that position rather than turning to one side as the Caucasians did. Similarly, Caucasian babies reacted to having a cloth pressed briefly over the nose by turning away or swiping at the cloth with their hands, while the Chinese babies breathed through their mouths, accepting the cloth without a struggle. When a light was repeatedly shown in the baby's eyes, Caucasian babies continued to blink long after the Chinese babies had adapted to the light and stopped blinking.

The same tests performed on Navaho newborns showed even greater
calmness and adaptability (Navaho and Chinese babies may be similar because the Navaho were part of a relatively recent emigration from Asia, Freedman suggests.) Differences can also be detected in the behavior of newborns in Africa, Europe, India, and Australia; Australian aborigines, for example, struggle against the cloth over the nose as much as, or more than, Caucasians but, like the Chinese, are easy to calm.

Freedman believes the tests show that human behavior is both genetically and environmentally influenced. It is time, he concludes, that we abandon two long-cherished myths: that we are all born alike, and that culture and biology are separate entities, unrelated to each other.

The Demise of the Parson-Naturalist


By 1830, discoveries in geology, physics, biology, and other sciences had begun to challenge traditional British theological beliefs.

These developments soon sparked bitter feuds between clergymen and scientists in late Victorian England. But the real controversy, says Turner, a Yale historian, arose from the professionalization of British science and the struggle for control of education. On one side, he writes, were aggressive, professional scientists who believed that science should be pursued without regard for religious dogma or the opinions of religious authorities. On the other side were supporters of the Anglican Church who wished to maintain a large measure of control over education and retain religion as the source of moral and social values.

During the first half of the 19th century, British science was characterized by amateurism, aristocratic patronage, minimal government support, limited job opportunities, and "peripheral inclusion within the clerically dominated universities and secondary schools." After 1850, all this changed. Membership in the major scientific societies increased sharply, and membership rules were changed to favor men of genuine scientific achievement rather than socially acceptable amateurs. The substantial role of the "parson-naturalist" and the "academic clergyman-scientist" came to an end. (The percentage of members of the Royal Society who were Anglican clergymen fell from 9.7 percent in 1840 to 3.1 percent in 1899.)

The Oxford Movement, which sought to separate the Church of England from secular influences, and a revival of English Roman Catholicism added to the mood of conflict and confrontation. The Education Act of 1870, authorizing the creation of state-funded secular schools, undermined Anglican pretensions to a monopoly of control of education, the established Church's chief claim to social utility, says Turner. All this made it easier for men of science to argue that scientific education and professionalism offered the best hope for assuring the strength and economic well-being of the nation. And the scientists soon won.
The fate of the harp seal, Canada's most publicized wildlife species, has become the subject of a complex and emotional debate between seal hunters and environmental groups. Since the early 1960s, North American conservationists have campaigned vigorously to abolish the early spring seal hunt in the northwest Atlantic, focusing on the clubbing to death of white-pelted harp seal pups in the Gulf of St. Lawrence but ignoring the hunts among smaller stocks in the White Sea and Greenland Sea.

The issue is not clear-cut, says Lavigne, zoologist at the University of Guelph, Ontario. But the general public has become confused by the deluge of superficial and often contradictory information furnished by experts and nonexperts to the news media. The amount of public attention focused on the controversy is excessive, considering that the harp seal is not an endangered species and the gross economic value of the sealing industry to Canada (estimated at between $1.5 and $5.5 million annually) is small.

"In reality," Lavigne contends, "multimillion dollar fish stocks off the east coast of Canada appear to be more depleted than the harp seal stock at the present time, but to date no organization has mounted a campaign to save herring or cod stocks from over-exploitation."

Why? Because the young, white harp seal pup has a photogenic appeal far superior to that of a cod or herring, the publicity helps generate contributions and support for environmental groups. The "self-perpetuating emotional debate" over the harp seal will serve no lasting purpose, says Lavigne, unless it helps create an informed concern for all over-exploited resources—something that has yet to happen.

"The Harp Seal Controversy Reconsidered" by D. M. Lavigne, in Queen's Quarterly (Autumn 1978), Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, K7L3N6.

Though not officially an endangered species, the photogenic baby harp seal has become a useful symbol for environmental groups seeking funds and popular support.
With demand for natural gas on the increase and domestic production on the wane, the United States may be importing as much as 1.6 trillion cubic feet of gas per year by 1985 (100 times the current rate), according to industry predictions.

For shipment by sea (from Algeria, for example), the gas can be converted to a liquid that occupies only 1/600th its original volume by supercooling it to --259° F, transported in specially constructed tankers, and then regasified at special port facilities. Public concern over the danger of fire and explosion at LNG (liquified natural gas) installations has led to tight government regulation (more than 130 federal, state, and local permits must be obtained before building an LNG facility).

Fear of accidents persists. According to San Francisco engineering consultants Keeney, Kilkarni, and Nair, the fears are exaggerated. They calculated the potential hazards of a proposed 1 billion cubic-feet-per-year LNG degasifying terminal at Matagorda Bay, Tex., in a sparsely populated area between Galveston and Corpus Christi, and concluded that the chances of an accident with substantial loss of life was one in 2.71 trillion.

The authors studied four types of possible accidents: natural hazards, such as earthquakes and hurricanes; manmade hazards, such as plane crashes; other mishaps at the terminal, such as terrorist attacks; and tanker accidents. They determined that an LNG spill on water posed the greatest danger—although LNG itself does not burn, the warm water temperatures would quickly convert the liquified gas into a flammable vapor that could be ignited by a variety of sources such as spark plugs and pilot lights.

Noting that fatal accidents at coal-fired electric generating plants run far higher than those at either nuclear or LNG facilities, the authors conclude, "It is a curious fact that we tend to take for granted the hazards in conventional energy systems ... and to focus our concern on the public risk involved in proposed new energy developments."

The global problem of malnutrition is not simply a question of producing enough food; it is also a question of politics and economics.

A country can be said to have a "food problem," writes McLin, a member of the American Universities Field Staff, when one or more of
the following conditions exist: when undernutrition is unacceptably severe (as in India, where millions suffer from malnutrition despite adequate domestic stocks of cereal grains); when the financial burden of mounting food imports becomes intolerable (as in Egypt); when the degree of dependence on imported food is politically unacceptable (e.g., Japan's heavy dependence on unreliable supplies of U.S. soybeans); and when there is a need to slow a decline in the agricultural work force because of the slow growth of alternative jobs in industry (as in Mexico).

The extent to which governments try to cope with the "food problem," says McLin, varies greatly. Emperor Haile Selassie's government in Ethiopia refused to acknowledge an acute famine in 1972–73, because to do so would have been an admission of bureaucratic failure. In the Philippines, President Ferdinand Marcos holds down prices paid to farmers—thereby discouraging efficient production—in order to provide low-cost food to politically volatile city dwellers.

Wealthy, industrialized countries respond to Third World food problems on the basis of domestic politics and economic self-interest (e.g., controlling the home market for commodities like rice and sugar to protect their own producers). The Western nations have cut their financial aid to Third World agriculture since 1975 and have still not established an international system of grain reserves to guarantee supply and stabilize prices.

Attitudes may be changing. Industrial countries now see the merit of enhancing the purchasing power of Third World countries by forgiving old debts and granting new loans. And some Third World countries, notably India, are beginning to see that boosting family income in rural areas can help build a healthier domestic economy. If this sort of awareness does not spread to other countries in Asia and Latin America, McLin warns, growing violence and revolution will become new elements in "the politics of food."

The High Price of Wasted Resources


Predicting "serious upheavals" in the world economy over the next two decades, Levy, a consultant on Middle Eastern oil, says that the OPEC oil-producing countries are likely to experience a "wave of disappointment, frustration and resentment" at the failure of their internal economic development programs. Such sentiments are likely to affect their policies on oil production and pricing as they seek to subsidize weak new industries, maintain expensive new health, welfare, and education systems, and support modern military forces.

Many of the OPEC countries confront an environment that is hostile to the creation of a modern economy: harsh climates; lack of arable land, water, power, and other resources; illiteracy; scarcity of manager-
ial talent or experience; a small skilled labor force.

At the same time, these countries eagerly seek to engage in domestic oil refining, petrochemical production, and tanker transportation—activities requiring large capital investment and offering little hope of long-term profit. There is already surplus refining and petrochemical capacity in many world markets.

On the other hand, non-communist world oil consumption is likely to rise from the 1977 rate of 51 million barrels daily to 62 million barrels per day in 1985, says Levy. OPEC oil prices will certainly increase more rapidly than in the past to make up for "losses" due to inflation and the fall of the dollar. By the mid-1980s or early 1990s, "when the specter of imminent oil shortages begins to haunt the world," pressures for major advances in the real price of oil can only grow.

It is essential, Levy argues, that the oil-exporting and oil-importing countries work constructively together to help the OPEC nations use their oil revenues wisely and to maintain a pricing system that will not endanger the non-communist world's economic and political system. "We cannot much longer afford a situation in which the importing countries waste a substantial part of their energy," he concludes, "while the producing countries waste a substantial part of their oil revenues."

Coal and Acid Rains

When the Carter administration decided, more or less, to shift the United States back to a coal-based economy, the inevitable environmental penalties were considered a bearable cost of assuring a secure and abundant energy supply. But after reviewing recent scientific evidence of coal's effects on health, ecology, and climate, Alexander, a Fortune associate editor, suggests that these penalties now appear to be "dangerously high."

Until recently, scientists assumed that the main health hazard from coal smoke was sulfur dioxide (SO$_2$), which seemed to attach itself to coal soot and ash and then find its way into the human respiratory tract. But the work of Harvard toxicologist Mary O. Amdur and others has now convinced most specialists that the greatest health risk actually comes from sulfate compounds (e.g., sulfuric acid and sulfates of zinc and iron) formed when SO$_2$ mixes with oxygen and airborne pollutants. Thus, one common strategy adopted to control air pollutants—the use of tall smokestacks to disperse SO$_2$ before it settles to the ground—may actually worsen the hazard by allowing time for SO$_2$ to form sulfates and then spreading the tiny, nearly unfilterable sulfate droplets to the winds.

Recent studies indicate that America's prevailing west-to-east winds have tended to concentrate sulfate levels in the northeastern states with observable ecological effects. Sulfates and nitrates mix with precipitation to form "acid rain" (some New England rainwater now has the...
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acidity of vinegar); lakes in New York's Adirondack Mountains, once filled with trout, are now devoid of this species; and tree growth in some northeastern forests has apparently been stunted.

Environmentalists discuss these issues in "uncharacteristically muted tones," Alexander writes, perhaps out of defensiveness over misguided air pollution technologies they espoused in the past, perhaps out of fear that derogation of coal will promote nuclear power, an alternative many of them dislike even more.

Whatever the case, Alexander concludes: "It appears we have little choice but to continue burning coal... But with the immense invoice of known and hidden costs that come with coal... a prudent civilization would hold its consumption of coal to a minimum."

ARTS & LETTERS

Born to Fail

"The Liberated Heroine" by Diana Trilling, in Partisan Review (no. 4, 1978), Boston University, 19 Deerfield St., Boston, Mass. 02215.

A new presence has arrived on the literary scene, says critic Trilling. This is the liberated heroine, "a fictional creation whose first concern is the exploration and realization of female selfhood."

No sudden apparition, she has been evolving throughout literary history. From Clytemnestra and Antigone, to Henry James's Isabel Archer and the modern creations of Joan Didion, Jean Rhys, Doris Lessing and Lisa Alther, "the history of heroine-ism would seem to be an endlessly reiterated story of failure," says Trilling.

The traditional heroine was bound to the reality of home and family; she existed to please, to help, and to wait for her menfolk. But she was also "an exceedingly protean phenomenon." She represented fortitude as well as flightiness; she was both dependable and impetuous, submissive and spirited.

In more modern literature, the spirited heroine predominates, but, like Madame Bovary before her, she always suffers defeat. Male and female writers alike deal harshly with spirited heroines, persuading Trilling that literature, in effect, uses these women to test society's tolerance for change. Judging by the regularity with which the female is still defeated in current fiction, Trilling concludes that "even at revolutionary moments such as our own, culture cannot tolerate very much alteration in the relation of men and women."

Today's liberated heroines believe that if their lives are to be saved, they must be saved now. Their median age seems to be about 40. They share a quest for freedom (from husbands, children, responsibility) and a strong penchant for discussing their psychiatric problems. Money is never a problem. And sex looms large. "The multiple female orgasm has somewhat the same place in present-day liberated fiction that cas-
serole cookery had in Mary McCarthy's The Group (1966)." Observes Trilling, "No serious male writers . . ., not even Henry Miller, have treated women as much like sex objects as women writers now treat themselves."

The Art of Self-Improvement

In his Autobiography, Benjamin Franklin (1706-90) tells of scoring a propaganda success "among the powdered heads of Paris" simply by refusing to wear a wig while serving as Ambassador to France from the rebellious American colonies. One and a half centuries later, Black Muslim leader Malcolm X abandoned attempts to tame his kinky reddish hair with lye solutions and instead let it grow naturally as a symbol of liberation.

Malcolm X (1925-65) and an earlier black leader, Booker T. Washington (1856-1915), share far more in common with Franklin than a sense of personal imagery. There was a bit of the con man in each of them, says Whitfield, historian at Brandeis University, yet all three subscribed to the values of the "Protestant ethic."

An obsession with education pervades the autobiographies of Franklin, Washington, and Malcolm X as they describe their struggles to escape poverty and obscurity. Likewise, all embraced Franklin's famous list of virtues: industry, frugality, humility, sincerity, cleanliness, an appreciation of the value of time.

In his autobiography, Up From Slavery (1901), ghostwritten by a white public relations man named Max Bennett Thrasher, Washington criticizes slavery for "having taken the spirit of self-reliance and self-help out of white people." As principal of Tuskegee Institute, he advocated black capitalism and racial conciliation. (The motto of Tuskegee's black class of 1886 was "There is Always Room at the Top!")

Malcolm X (see The Autobiog-
raphy of Malcolm X, published in 1965) transformed himself from Malcolm Little to “Detroit Red” to “Satan” to Malcolm X to el-Hajj Malik el-Shabazz. Although he was stunned by the grandeur of Mecca during his 1964 pilgrimage, he was frustrated by the Arabs’ passivity expressed in the phrase insha Allah (“God willing”). Like Franklin, he believed in self-help as well as self-control.

Never mind that these three autobiographies have the usual errors and omissions, says Whitfield (even the editors of the standard Yale edition report that Franklin’s Autobiography is “not notably accurate”). They stand as fascinating testaments to the belief that personal fulfillment is man’s highest social ideal.

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**OTHER NATIONS**

**British Medicine 30 Years Later**

Have a sore throat, a broken leg, or a heart attack in Britain today, and you will receive prompt and efficient medical attention at no cost. But develop varicose veins, a hernia, or some other ailment calling for elective surgery, and you may have to wait months for treatment or go to a private doctor and pay for quicker care.

This, says Malone, medical writer for the Miami Herald, is British socialized medicine after 30 years of the National Health Service (NHS). “Britons now receive a more comprehensive range of medical services than most Americans,” he declares. And their health care is much cheaper. Britain spends about 6 percent of its GNP on health care, the United States almost 9 percent of a much larger GNP.

National Health Service is Britain’s most popular public service, according to the polls, with an 80 percent approval rating. It provides free treatment equally to all classes of people. It has removed most of the urban-rural disparities in quality of medical care. And it has given British doctors freedom to exercise their professional judgment without complicated review boards and fear of malpractice suits. Every doctor pays $78 per year for malpractice insurance, and large negligence awards are rare.

On the negative side, nonurgent matters take time; one can wait two years to get a hip replacement operation. British doctors are the worst paid in the Common Market (up to $39,000 for a specialist and about $19,500 for a general practitioner; the median for all U.S. doctors in 1976 was $63,000), and hospital facilities are antiquated.

Britain’s chronic economic difficulties have forced a pioneering reassessment of certain medical therapies. Two recent studies, for example, showed that the survival rates for heart attack victims were just as good or slightly better for patients sent home within a few hours of
their attacks as for those who remained in coronary intensive care units.

In Britain, salaried doctors under NHS have the primary responsibility for holding down health care costs. They must function within budgetary limits, and they are paid no more for prescribing costly treatment or surgery. With U.S. health care costs skyrocketing, says Malone, most British analysts expect to see some form of nationalized medicine in the United States, sooner or later.

**Grim Choices for the Future**

"The Indian Dilemma—Coercive Birth Control or Compulsory Pregnancy" by Tim Black and Malcolm Potts, in Contemporary Review (Nov. 1978), 61 Carey St., London WC2A 21G.

India's abandonment of its policy of sterilization has put the country back where it was in 1952 when it launched the world's first national family planning effort on the Gandhian principle of "abstinence."

Family planning in India has passed through a five-stage cycle, say Black and Potts, who are, respectively, director of European operations for Population Services International and executive director of the International Fertility Research Program in the United States. Early drives to bring standard birth control methods and services to urban and rural populations through health clinics were followed in 1972 by the introduction of mass vasectomy camps and liberalization of abortion laws. Major incentives for sterilization (e.g., payment of as much as 60 rupees in some areas) brought dramatic results: vasectomies jumped from 1.6 million in 1968 to 3.1 million in 1973. But red tape hampered the effort to provide inexpensive, legal abortions.

In April 1975, Indira Gandhi decided on a coercive approach, raising the legal age of marriage and pressuring men to submit to sterilization. The number of forced sterilizations probably represented only a small fraction of the total. But crude tactics were often used (one 19-year-old unmarried man was told he could not get a driver's license unless he was vasectomized), and they turned the public against the whole idea.

Today, India lacks any real family planning policy and the population (625 million) is growing by 1 million each month. Legal compulsion—requiring sterilization of husband or wife in families over a certain size—was never tested. Four Indian states passed such legislation, but it never went into effect.

Whether a compulsory sterilization policy could ever be applied without inequities is doubtful, say Black and Potts, but "we should be cautious about condemning compulsion if we are unable to put forward alternative effective strategies." Soon other nations, including Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria, and Brazil, will face the choice between attaining social and economic gains through compulsory birth control or "suffering the oppression of [population increase through] unwanted pregnancy."
The Fading Hope of European Unity

The nine-member European Community, whose component elements (Common Market, Coal and Steel Community, Euratom) date back more than 20 years, has a huge bureaucracy in Brussels engaged in a broad range of activities, but it has failed in its initial goal of creating a united Western Europe.

The Community seems able to play a mediating role in settling some conflicts (e.g., over farm exports), but it cannot mobilize popular support for new ventures, writes Scheingold, a political scientist at the University of Washington. Its leaders continue to promise comprehensive programs to deal with regional development, the energy shortage, monetary difficulties, restraints on business competition. But they only produce ad hoc schemes for coping with particular aspects of these general problems.

The reason there is no European Monetary Union, no comprehensive energy plan, no scheme for distributing regional development funds, Scheingold argues, is that these matters impinge on the domestic political problems of the Common Market states, such as inflation and separatist movements.

Community officials have only minimal contact with political party leaders and interest groups in member countries. There is no real provision for popular participation in Community institutions and hence no real popular support. However, some interest may develop this year with the first direct election of delegates to the largely impotent European Parliament.

Scheingold concludes that “the future of the European Community is reasonably secure but rather unexciting.” It is useful enough to endure, but the Community lacks either the will or the means to advance European integration, let alone develop truly supranational institutions with the power to override member states.
OTHER NATIONS

The Woes of Swiss Wealth

With the highest annual per capita income (about $16,000) in the industrialized world, Switzerland enjoys an enviably low unemployment rate (0.3 percent of the labor force) and a consumer price index that creeps up at less than 1 percent a year. Such factors have made the Swiss franc the world’s strongest currency; but now that very strength, writes *Fortune* correspondent Tinnin, threatens to create a domestic economic crisis.

When President Carter moved to rescue the dollar in November 1978, the Swiss franc was worth nearly two and a half times as much, relative to the dollar, as in 1971. For a time, Switzerland withstood the inflationary consequences of its appreciating currency by a restrictive monetary policy and a labor force that settled for annual wage increases of 1.5 to 2 percent (often less than half of the productivity gains achieved). The rise of the Swiss franc also made imported raw materials cheaper, including oil from OPEC countries that listed prices in U.S. dollars.

But as the franc has skyrocketed, Swiss exports (especially textiles and watches) and tourism, which make up 45 percent of Switzerland’s gross national product, have been priced out of world markets. To cut production costs, Swiss industrialists have begun to move part of their manufacturing abroad—with a corresponding loss of jobs in places like Lausanne, Geneva, and Basel.

All of this erodes the Swiss tradition of political compromise and fiscal restraint. Over the last year, the money supply has been allowed

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*The sharp 1973–74 rise in oil prices sent inflation rates soaring in the industrial nations. But, while the Swiss, West Germans, and Japanese brought their inflation under control, the United States did not.*
to expand at an alarming 18 percent (compared to 5 percent and less earlier), raising fears of future inflation; and the head of the Federation of Swiss Trade Unions, Richard Müller, has called for a future general strike to protest management decisions to shift jobs abroad. Bankers and currency traders are widely perceived as profiteering from the sharp jumps in the value of the franc.

Ultimately, Tinnin writes, the health of the Swiss economy depends on that of the dollar. If the dollar stabilizes in value, Switzerland can probably adjust without major changes. But if the dollar continues to slide, the Swiss may even be forced to resort to currency controls and import quotas.

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**Japan—the New Corporate State?**

When the OPEC countries quadrupled their oil prices in 1973, many economists believed that energy-poor Japan would be ruined. Now, five years later, Japan has weathered an economic slump and finds itself in an enviable international position. Its annual GNP is growing again at a healthy 5 or 6 percent after regressing in 1974 and, most surprising, Japan registered an $11 billion trade surplus in 1977 after showing a $4.7 billion deficit in 1974.

This period of adjustment to an unprecedented period of “stagflation” may have been a turning point for Japan, says Taira, a University of Illinois economist. Japanese management, labor, and government jointly accommodated to the crisis creating what amounts to a “new corporate state.”

Accommodation did not come easily. Sharp price increases (the consumer price index rose 11.7 percent in 1973 and 24.5 percent in 1974) produced a wave of hoarding, including a brief hysterical rush to stockpile toilet paper. Organized labor’s efforts to keep up with inflation brought the level of strikes and other labor disputes to an all-time high in 1974—at the cost of nearly 10 million working days. By 1975, however, the inflation rate had been cut in half to 11.8 percent and stagflation, with the growing fear of joblessness, had reduced worker militancy.

“An informal interdependence” now marks labor-management negotiations, Taira says, with government playing an important, but unofficial, role. (In 1977, business and labor negotiators discussed asking for tax cuts as an alternative to wage increases.) There are as yet no rules or machinery for tripartite bargaining, and no binding contracts have been signed. Japan must be regarded as no more than an informal corporate state. But Taira foresees a time when “negotiations among national-level interest groups, with the government’s participation, may replace market forces and pluralistic (that is free and decentralized) collective bargaining.”

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Sunset legislation, which provides for the automatic termination of government agencies unless they are recreated by statute, is a growing response to public resentment over lackluster government performance.

First conceived by the Colorado unit of Common Cause in 1975, Sunset laws have now been enacted in 29 states. They are meant to increase government accountability by establishing a timetable for executive and legislative evaluation of programs, laws, and agencies. The threat of termination provides the incentive for rigorous analysis.

"Sunset should not be a tool for those out to destroy government," says this Common Cause report. "Nor should it be mere rhetoric designed to placate the public." The authors propose guidelines for any workable Sunset law. Among them:

- Programs and agencies in the same policy area should be reviewed simultaneously by legislative audit and review committees in order to encourage consolidation and responsible elimination of unnecessary government bodies; consideration should be preceded by competent and thorough preliminary study.
- Review committee membership should be rotated and should have review criteria to guide their oversight functions; there should be safeguards against arbitrary terminations, and the public should have access to information and meetings.
- In its review of current Sunset legislation, Common Cause finds that most state Sunset laws follow these principles. All provide for automatic termination of government agencies, except in Alabama, which requires action by both houses of the state legislature.
- Nineteen of the laws require preliminary evaluation reports that can help legislators refine the goals and purposes of government agencies. Twenty-five of the states establish a periodic termination schedule, and all but three require public hearings.
- Federal Sunset legislation placing almost all federal programs on a 10-year termination schedule was passed by the U.S. Senate on October 11, 1978, but no final action has been taken in the House of Representatives, where proponents expect to push for a vote in the current 96th Congress.
“The Ungovernable City: The Politics of Urban Problems and Policy Making”
The M.I.T. Press, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. 02142. 219 pp. $4.95.
Author: Douglas Yates.

In the 1960s, many government officials assumed that the nation’s urban problems could be eliminated with enlightened leadership and large infusions of money. By the early 1970s, however, it was apparent that the new urban programs launched during the administration of President Lyndon Johnson were having little effect.

The problem, says Yates, a political scientist at Yale, is one of government. The average city’s policymaking system “is incapable of producing coherent decisions, developing effective policies, or implementing state or federal programs.”

Yates argues that urban policymaking is fragmented, overburdened, and reactive. City hall “may be forced to worry about a snowstorm one week, a wave of crime in its schools the next week, and a decision by the state or local government to shut down a city program in the third.”

In addition, mayors and other high-level administrators do not exercise enough control over public service employees to ensure quality performance. Nor can they ensure that money is spent efficiently. City bureaucracies are usually so decentralized that it is impossible to know how essential services are allocated.

In Yates’ analysis, city government is caught between the forces of neighborhood interest groups and higher level government. He suggests a “hybrid” solution that combines centralization and decentralization to ease the burdens on city government.

Some of a city’s operating, planning, and financing responsibilities for transportation, housing, welfare, and education would be taken over by the state and national governments. Services with a strong neighborhood impact, such as police, fire, and education, would be decentralized to increase the powers of neighborhood-level institutions, both community organizations and government departments.

“Alcoholism Among Soviet Youth”
Author: Sergei Voronitsyn.

The Soviet Union is the undisputed world leader in consumption of strong varieties of alcohol (notably vodka), although it ranks only 12th in the overall quantity of alcoholic beverages consumed. What concerns Soviet officials, says Voronitsyn, analyst for Radio Liberty, is that young people are being introduced to alcohol at an early age with serious repercussions for health, job productivity, and social harmony.

Soviet studies show that 90 percent of alcoholics in the USSR started drinking at age 15 and 33 percent of them before the age of 10. Some 80 percent of juveniles began drinking with parental consent, and adolescent
alcoholism is on the rise. Laws restricting the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors are constantly violated. State economic plans assign sales quotas that government employees often meet by illicit sales to teenagers. One food store manager in Moscow told Pravda in October 1978, "We do have a conscience, and we also have children. We do not want them to become drunkards. But we have our plan, and we want to receive a bonus."

Official Soviet efforts to combat alcoholism appear to be punitive rather than therapeutic. Violating regulations on the sale and consumption of alcohol can result in a heavy prison sentence, transfer to a lower-paid job, loss of bonuses and travel privileges, and forfeiture of one's place on the waiting list for an apartment.

Occasional articles in the Soviet press urge the creation of an All-Union Temperance Society to lead the fight against alcoholism. But they have received no endorsement from official quarters. Suggestions for some form of prohibition have been rejected.

The ambiguous attitude of Soviet authorities, says Voronitsyn, has its origins in decisions taken during the early years of Soviet rule. In 1925, a wine tax and a state vodka monopoly were instituted as "temporary" measures to help finance economic development. Joseph Stalin saw the dilemma. In 1927, he told a delegation of foreign workers, "it would be better to stop producing vodka since it is an evil. But then it would be necessary to sell ourselves temporarily to the capitalists, which would be an even greater evil." To halt vodka production, he said, would mean forfeiting 500 million rubles of income with no guarantee of reduced alcoholism because the peasants would then make their own and risk poisoning themselves.

"Postharvest Food Losses in Developing Countries"
Author: Board on Science and Technology for International Development.

By conservative estimates, at least 107 million metric tons of food were lost worldwide in 1976 as a result of spillage, contamination, attack by insects, birds, and rodents, deterioration in storage, and other postharvest problems.

The amounts lost in cereal grains and legumes alone would provide more than the annual minimum caloric requirements of 168 million people (one-quarter the population of India), according to this National Research Council study.

Losses are not concentrated at any single stage. Southeast Asian rice-loss estimates indicate that a few percent of a crop are lost in harvesting, a few percent in immediate postharvest handling, and a few percent each in threshing, drying, storage, and milling. With perishables such as fruits and vegetables, losses accelerate rapidly, "often becoming total within weeks or even days."

"Given modern technology and sufficient resources, it is theoretically possible to conserve most food commodities almost indefinitely," says the report. It is, however, an undertaking that requires careful planning and cost-benefit estimates. Low-cost cooling systems "offer the greatest possibility for extending the life of perishables . . . making this a priority area for research."

Traditional cereal grain varieties survive better in storage than newer
RESEARCH REPORTS

varieties selected for high yields, because they dry more readily and have a thicker seed coat that resists rodents and insects.

Reducing postharvest food losses by 50 percent, which the U.N. General Assembly has recommended as a 1985 goal, would save an estimated $5.75 billion worth of food annually. This would greatly reduce, or even eliminate, the present need of some countries to import large quantities of food.

THE FOOD PIPELINE

Courtesy of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council

"Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory"
Editors: David Butler and Austin Ranney.

Interest in the use of popular referendums has been growing since the early 1970s, particularly in Western Europe and the United States.

Britain invoked a referendum for the first time in 1975 when it asked for voter approval of the government's decision to join the European Economic Community. Greece and Spain used referendums in moving from dictatorship to constitutional democracy in the mid-1970's. And regional separatists in Quebec have announced their intention to hold a referendum on secession from Canada.

There is little published information on popular referendums, report Butler, a Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford, and Ranney, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Their study is an attempt to fill the gap. Starting with the 18th century, they survey the history of referendums in the United States, Australia,

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France, Scandinavia, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland (a country described as being "addicted" to referendums).

Constitutional issues, such as a change in the electoral system or the status of a monarchy, have dominated popular referendums held worldwide since 1900. Territorial issues, such as membership in the EEC, rank second. Social issues, such as divorce, the status of religion, and prohibition of alcoholic beverages, place third. Abortion, homosexuality, and capital punishment have largely been avoided. Only Switzerland and various American states have put these questions to popular vote.

Critics of referendums argue that they force a decision between two alternatives and discourage compromise. When compromise appears unlikely, however, referendums can be useful in ending debate and producing a decision that has legitimacy.

Referendums have been "valuable adjuncts to representative democracy," Ranney and Butler conclude, and "they are almost certain to increase in number and importance."

"In The Wake of the Tourist: Managing Special Places in Eight Countries"
Author: Fred P. Bosselman.

Tourists inevitably change the nature of the landscape they visit. The problem, says Bosselman, a Chicago attorney and consultant on land development policy, is how to control these changes so that tourism "enhances, rather than destroys, the qualities the tourist seeks."

Two areas where the development of tourism has been controlled with relative success are Mt. Fuji in Japan and the Lake District in England. Both are national park regions consisting of a mixture of public land and publicly regulated private land.

Britain's Lake District is managed by a planning board that must approve any new development proposals for the area. Local control is emphasized. The park region around Mt. Fuji is supervised partially by local officials and partially by the national Environment Agency, which administers new building standards and other development regulations.

Even formal planning, however, does not guarantee success. One effort by the French, for example, to develop an area of the Mediterranean coast at Languedoc has been disappointing. Although the project brought highways, harbors, hotels, and condominiums to a neglected area, the planners forgot the environmental costs. What once was a "vital wetland resource, which provided a breeding area for marine life, a bird habitat, and flood absorption area, has been lost," Bosselman writes.

In many urban areas, planning has come too late. Hotel construction booms have already grossly altered two of the world's most popular tourist centers—Jerusalem and Acapulco.

In rural areas of Europe, however, the problem is not hotel construction but what Bosselman calls "recreational sprawl"—the proliferation of campgrounds and cottages used by
"self-catering" tourists. While not denying the negative impacts of tourism, Bosselman notes its positive benefits. "Insofar as the tourist seeks the beautiful, the exciting, or the authentic, the economic benefits he brings may provide the incentive to create and maintain these qualities," he writes. If local popular support is present, the technology and legal means can always be found to preserve natural attractions.

"Disparity Reduction Rates in Social Indicators"
Overseas Development Council, 1717 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. 80 pp. $3.00.
Author: James P. Grant.

In 1975, World Bank president Robert McNamara estimated that 900 million people were living in "absolute poverty." They were subsisting, he said, "on incomes of less than $75 a year in an environment of squalor, hunger, and hopelessness."

The World Bank, the Club of Rome, and others have called for a global effort to overcome the worst aspects of severe poverty by the year 2000. Their goals: an average life expectancy of at least 65 years, an infant mortality rate of 50 or less per 1,000 live births, and a literacy rate of at least 75 percent.

Grant, who is president of the Overseas Development Council, proposes a new standard—a Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) on a scale of 0 to 100—as an indicator of social progress. The PQLI integrates infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy into one rating. A PQLI of 100 is defined as the condition that will probably exist in the most highly developed countries by the year 2000 and in which all basic human needs are satisfied. Present PQLIs range from Niger’s 14 to Norway’s 97 (the United States rates a 93).

Progress toward the satisfaction of human needs can be measured by the rate at which the gap, or discrepancy, between the PQLI of a developing country and the ideal 100 is being narrowed. This is defined as the Discrepancy Reduction Rate (DRR). If a developing country is merely to halve the discrepancy between its present PQLI and the ideal 100 by the year 2000, it will have to achieve an annual average DRR of about 3.5 percent.

Such rapid progress will be difficult, but possible, even for countries with low income levels. Between 1960 and 1975, Sri Lanka, with a per capita GNP of $200 in 1976, increased life expectancy from 61 to 68 years, increased literacy from 61 to 78 percent and cut infant mortality from 57 to 45 per 1,000 births for an overall annual DRR of 3.5 percent.

The exact recipe for achieving rapid progress remains elusive, but improvements in nutrition, housing, and health care are essential.

Since the poorer Third World countries are in no position to carry the whole burden, Grant concludes, annual global assistance to them between 1980 and 2000 will have to total $12 to $20 billion.
As this Steinberg drawing suggests, Americans' opinions, if nothing else, vary greatly. The voice of the people on major issues is complex, cacophonous, and often contradictory. Surveys gauging "approval," "disapproval," or "no opinion" on social and political questions are thus very blunt instruments. Even pollsters advise caution.
Public Opinion

Narcissus was captivated by his reflection in a pool; Americans today seem obsessed with their reflections in the polls. Opinion surveys have been conducted on a "scientific" basis for more than 40 years. They are widely used by academics, corporations, politicians. Yet contradictions and imponderables remain. What effect do polls have on political life? When should they be trusted? How useful are they? "The people's voice is odd," Alexander Pope once wrote. Here Public Opinion editors David Gergen and William Schambra look at polling's past and present; and analyst Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. offers his views on what Americans are thinking—and how their thinking has changed.

POLLESTERS AND POLLING

by David Gergen and William Schambra

America, so it seems, is under siege. Armies of men and women, equipped with clipboards and pencils, sweep across the land, prying and probing into people's minds. The results are served up in hundreds of public opinion surveys for newspapers, TV networks, corporate managers, cabinet officers, and White House staffers.

Consider just a few of the questions that have been put to people in recent months:

- Do you believe in Unidentified Flying Objects? George Gallup recently asked. (Fifty-seven percent now say yes, compared to only 46 percent 12 years ago.)
- What food do you like best? That question came from Burns Roper, who found 61 percent naming American food, only 9 percent selecting French.
- Which is stronger, Louis Harris wanted to know, the
United States or the Soviet Union? (For the first time in history, a plurality of Americans say the Russians are second to none.)

Will you wind up in heaven or hell? The Iowa Poll found that nearly all Iowans believe they will be saved, but one-third of them describe a neighbor as a “sure bet” for hell.*

The only question pollsters rarely seem to ask is: What do you think of polls? Proctor and Gamble did ask once. It found that people had less confidence in pollsters than in the military or organized labor but more than in the President or Congress. Hardly a ringing vote of confidence, but even George Gallup, the dean of the profession, would argue that some skepticism is justified. Too often poll results are distorted or misinterpreted. In 1972, for example, an early Boston Globe survey showed Edmund Muskie leading George McGovern in the New Hampshire Democratic presidential primary, 65 to 18 percent. Although preprimary polls are notoriously unreliable, some reporters seized upon the 65 percent figure as Muskie’s benchmark. When the Maine Senator defeated McGovern by a tidy 46 to 37 percent, McGovern, not Muskie, was declared the real “winner.”

Birth of the Polls

Although such tales—and there are many of them—may reflect more on the use of polls than on the polls themselves, the surveys, too, have their limits. The numbers are never exact. Slight differences in the wording of questions may dramatically affect the outcome. The forces that shape public opinion—Presidents, the media, political parties, “feelings”—have yet to be sorted out with much precision.

Nonetheless, the polls deserve to be studied with care. There

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*The Gallup poll on UFOs was taken March 3-6, 1978. The food survey is from Roper Reports, 78-9, September 23-30, 1978. For surveys on the relative strengths of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., see Harris surveys taken in December 1976 and July and November 1978. The Iowa Poll was taken in August 1977.

David R. Gergen, 36, is a Resident Fellow of the American Enterprise Institute and managing editor of Public Opinion magazine. Born in Durham, N.C., he graduated from Yale University (1963) and received his law degree from Harvard (1967). He has served as President Nixon’s chief speechwriter (1973-74), as a consultant to Treasury Secretary William Simon (1974-75), and as special counsel to President Ford and director of the White House Office of Communications (1975-76).

William Schambra, 29, until recently associate editor of Public Opinion, was born in Freeport, Texas. He received his B.A. from Michigan State University (1971) and is currently working on his doctorate in political science at Northern Illinois University.
are many reputable surveys; when read properly, they can tell us much. Even misinterpreted polls deserve our attention if their findings are widely heeded. In short, the polls, like television, have taken too firm a grip on our perceptions to be ignored.

America’s current interest in polls has deep historical roots. Driven by the practical needs of politicians in search of voters, newspapers in search of readers, and businessmen in search of customers, Americans have been taking surveys for more than 150 years. The first political poll was published in 1824, after the *Harrisburg Pennsylvanian* surveyed the citizens of Wilmington, Delaware, “without Discrimination of Parties,” on their preference for President. It showed Andrew Jackson was the two-to-one favorite over John Quincy Adams. The *Raleigh* (North Carolina) *Star* later showed Jackson with a seven-to-one lead. Old Hickory lost the election, however, and would probably have scoffed at the “bandwagon” theory—the controversial notion that high poll ratings attract additional support to a candidate. (Few pollsters today take the idea seriously.)

Politicians soon began to canvass potential voters in order to plan their campaign strategies. Political canvasses sought only party identification, not attitudes, but they were considered so valuable that, in 1896, the Republican National Committee spent $3.5 million for the most thorough voter survey ever undertaken. Long after 1896, Republicans enjoyed safe majorities, and such polls no longer seemed necessary; Democrats were usually too poor to afford them.

Newspaper editors, meanwhile, smelled a good story. During the 1880s and ’90s, they had begun taking “straw polls,” sampling whoever was handy in street cars, trains, and local taverns. In 1883, General Charles H. Taylor, editor of the *Boston Globe*, devised an election-night reporting system to project statewide winners and losers based on voting returns from selected precincts—just as television networks do now. Soon the *Globe* was joined in the straw-polling business by the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *St. Louis Republic*, and the *Los Angeles Times*. Straw polling reached its peak in the 1920s and the ’30s.

### A New Breed

The most famous straw poll in history was taken in 1936 by a popular weekly magazine, *Literary Digest*. The *Digest* mailed out 10 million sample presidential ballots (along with magazine subscription blanks) to Americans who owned telephones or automobiles—in short, to a relatively affluent minority. But they failed to recognize this inherent upper-class (and Republi-
can) bias. When the Digest’s projected winner, Republican Alf Landon, came in on Election Day well behind Democrat Franklin Roosevelt and 19 points below the poll’s projected result, straw polling was finished as a serious undertaking.

But better days for polling lay ahead.

In 1935, three of the fathers of modern techniques—George Gallup, Archibald Crossley, and Elmo Roper—individually began taking new kinds of surveys based on the “scientific” findings of psychologists, statisticians, and market researchers. Gallup’s organization was a direct outgrowth of his doctoral thesis on sampling techniques. (He was also the personal pollster for his mother-in-law in 1932; that fall she became the first woman elected Secretary of State in Iowa history.)

In the hands of this new breed, random sampling and sophisticated data analysis became standard practice. The pollsters did suffer one further disaster—the projection by Gallup and others of a victory by Dewey over Truman in the 1948 presidential election—but for the most part, the industry has been marked by steady growth. In recent years, growth has been spectacular. According to a Census Bureau official, American firms and research organizations spent $4 billion on opinion polls for political, commercial, or scholarly purposes in 1978.

Who Asks What?

Today there are more than a half-dozen well-established, commercial U.S. firms that take public opinion polls. Among the most respected are Gallup, Harris, Yankelovich, Sindlinger, the Opinion Research Corporation, Roper, and Cambridge Research Reports. There are also two independent survey units at universities (the National Opinion Research Center, or NORC, at the University of Chicago and the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan). In recent years, the three commercial networks, along with the New York Times (in conjunction with CBS News), the Washington Post (initially with the Associated Press), and the Los Angeles Times, have also begun national polling, even between election years, and have either formed their own polling staffs or hired university professors as consultants.

All of these represent only the public side of the industry.

There are also many companies, such as Audits and Surveys in New York City, that work strictly for commercial clients—advertisers, manufacturers, and marketing specialists. Indeed, the real profits in the opinion industry are in commercial polling. Most of the major pollsters make little or nothing on their public polls but gross high sums for exclusive surveys—on
Even federal census-takers had trouble getting answers, as shown in this 1880 woodcut. During the Gilded Age, politicians and newspaper publishers began taking "straw-poll" surveys of their own—generally consisting of unsophisticated "man-in-the-street" interviews. Today, the refusal rate for pollsters' interviews is high and growing.

toothpaste, detergent, new movies—conducted under private contract. In addition, they earn considerable sums by providing private (or proprietary) reports to commercial clients on a subscription basis. For example, Cambridge Research Reports, headed by President Carter’s chief polling adviser, Patrick Caddell, sells a series of four private surveys a year at a cost of $20,000 per subscriber.

There are a dozen or so reputable state polls—Mervin Field of California and the Iowa Poll are among the best—and scores of small commercial firms, not to mention the half-dozen major political pollsters whose services are considered de rigeur for any serious candidate for high office.*

The federal government has also become a major sponsor of surveys in recent years. Franklin Roosevelt was the first President to recognize their potential utility. In 1939, he signed on Hadley Cantril, a Princeton psychologist, to monitor public opinion on the war in Europe. Roosevelt’s concern was how to prepare Americans for a war they did not want.

Under pressure from conservative Congressmen, most of the government’s polling activities were halted after V-J Day, and occupants of the White House thereafter showed little interest in

*Prospective candidates for the 1980 presidential nominations have already begun lining up pollsters: Ronald Reagan is consulting with Richard Wirthlin, John Connally with Lance Torrance, George Bush with Robert Teeter, and President Carter with Patrick Caddell.
their revival until the arrival of John F. Kennedy. Louis Harris had served as a personal pollster for Kennedy in the 1960 campaign, and JFK carried his interest in polls into the Oval Office. Lyndon Johnson was a noted devotee, frequently fishing newspaper clippings of current poll results from his back pocket to remind visiting diplomats and White House reporters of what the "people" thought of him. (He discontinued the practice when his popularity ratings fell below the 50 percent mark.)

Today, polling is flourishing in Washington again. Over the past two years, scores of major surveys have been commissioned by federal agencies (though the congressional watchdog, the General Accounting Office, has recently questioned whether officials fully understand the results). The polling industry has also spread to other nations: Both Gallup and Harris have international affiliates (Gallup has 26, from Finland and Spain to India and Brazil), and indigenous firms have also sprung up. Political use of polls has stirred such intense controversy in France that the National Assembly acted in 1977 to ban publication of voting surveys during the week before election day. Authoritarian regimes in several Third World countries have begun to commission private polls in order to stay in touch with—or manipulate—"the public pulse." No doubt Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi wishes there had been a George Gallup in Iran.

What to Look For

Professional pollsters are not immune to controversies within their own ranks. How accurate are the polls? How can they be improved? Many of these debates on methods are comprehensible only to statisticians and psychologists. That doesn't necessarily mean, however, that laymen can't tell a good survey from a bad one. Here are some things to look for.

Method of Sampling. A few newspapers, like the Chicago Sun Times and the New York Daily News, continue to take straw polls before elections. All claim a long record of success. It was a Sun Times straw ballot that supposedly alerted Senator Charles Percy to his re-election troubles in Illinois and spurred him into an extraordinary (and successful) campaign effort in 1978. Serious researchers believe, nonetheless, that straw ballots lack credibility, and no professional pollster uses them today. Not without reason: In one recent election, an Illinois straw poll was right on the overall outcome of the election but wrong on every district in the state.

The most reliable method is "random sampling." Working
with census tracts and computers, survey firms randomly select the districts that are to be canvassed, the homes within the districts, and even the adults within the homes. No one is chosen because of any personal characteristic (e.g., race, sex, age, or religion); geography is the only variable. Every major commercial firm and university research unit now uses random sampling.

**Beware of Breakdowns**

*Sample Size.* Most national polls include the opinions of approximately 1500 people. Working with the laws of probability, statisticians have determined that, 95 percent of the time, a random survey of 1500 persons will produce results that have a margin of error of plus or minus 3 percent. In other words, a survey of 1500 people showing that 55 percent favor passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) means that if the same poll were repeated 20 times, it would in 19 instances show support for ERA between 52 and 58 percent; in the 20th instance, the level of support would probably be above or below that range.

Dictates of economy as well as probability have led to the choice of a 1500-person sample for most national and state polls. To increase the size raises the cost without a corresponding decrease in the margin of error; decreasing the size of the sample lowers the cost but raises the margin of error to intolerable levels. A random sample of 400 respondents, for example, has a margin of error of plus or minus 6 percent, so great that many observers would dismiss the poll results as meaningless.

For the same reason, the reader of national polls should be wary of opinion breakdowns by region, age, race, and so on. A random national poll of 1500 adults, for instance, will include only about 175 blacks; reports on their attitudes will be subject to a margin of error of 8 to 10 percent. (To correct for that deficiency, some polls sample a much larger total in order to produce more reliable numbers on subgroups.)

*Type of Interview.* The polling profession is divided on interviewing. Most professionals once thought that in-person interviews were more reliable—in part because they avoided the bias inherent in questioning only those households rich enough to afford a telephone. (Ten percent of U.S. white households and 15 percent of nonwhite households still do not have telephones.) In recent years, the costs of person-to-person interviewing have skyrocketed; so has the refusal rate for doorstep interviews (it often exceeds 20 percent). Almost to a man, the pollsters have crossed over to telephone interviews.
The Pollster. One of the most delicate questions in the polling profession is whom to trust. Deservedly or not, George Gallup has long been respected within the profession as the straightest pollster of the lot. While some of his critics claim that his surveys reflect an overly optimistic view of the public mood, the majority of survey professionals place considerable faith in his results. Louis Harris also commands respect; his questions are among the most imaginative in the profession. But to some, his polls are tainted by past alliances with John F. Kennedy and the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. Harris also tends to be pessimistic about the currents of American opinion, frequently focusing on what he sees as rising alienation.

Do People Lie?

The team of Yankelovich, Skelly, and White is enormously influential, and Daniel Yankelovich himself, a professor of psychology at Columbia University, is regarded as one of the most discerning men in the profession. Another leading figure, Albert Sindlinger, has attracted critics for his economic theories on monetary supply and household incomes, but many politicians, such as Richard Nixon, John Connally, and (reportedly) Thomas P. O'Neill have paid close attention to his overnight political telephone surveys.

Outside the commercial firms, the two major university research units—NORC at Chicago and the Survey Research Center at Michigan—have sterling reputations. Their shortcoming, if one can call it that, is that some of their data only becomes available several months after it is gathered.

Interpreting the Polls. Even if one has a random poll of 1500 respondents conducted by a responsible organization, determining the significance of that particular survey can be tricky. One critical factor is the way a question is asked. In an important 1975 essay, “The Wavering Polls,” sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset points out that, in 1953, two surveys taken by NORC showed a 37 percent variation in assessments of the Korean conflict. In August, NORC asked: “As things stand now, do you feel the war in Korea has been worth fighting, or not?” Only 27 percent said yes. But a month later, when NORC asked whether “the United States was right or wrong” to have sent in troops, 64 percent said the policy was right. The second question, in effect, tested “patriotism,” not attitudes on a specific topic.

More recently, anyone who has followed the fortunes of President Carter has seen that his popularity at any given moment may vary by as much as 20 points, with Gallup nearly
THE PRESIDENT AND THE POLLS

From 1945 on, Gallup pollsters have asked people how they think the President is doing his job. The "approval curves" (below) for all Presidents from Truman to Ford tell the same story. Each President begins with great popularity; the trend from there is gently downward, with occasional, short-lived sharp ups and downs. Finally, toward the end of his term, barring death or resignation, the approval curve turns up slightly: "He wasn't so bad after all." As added consolation, every President can count on being on the "Ten Most Admired People" list from inauguration until death. Even Richard Nixon was back on this chart in 1977 after a three-year absence.

The upward "blips" in a President's approval curve can often be traced to the so-called rally-round-the-flag effect. Whenever the President acts decisively or is involved in an international crisis, he can expect a sharp increase in support. Examples are numerous: Truman after the Berlin blockade (1948); Eisenhower after the U-2 incident (1960); Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs (1961); Johnson after sending troops to the Dominican Republic (1965); Nixon after the Cambodian invasion (1970); Ford after the Mayaguez incident (1975). Unfortunately, from the White House viewpoint, such sharp upturns are generally transitory and have little effect on the long-term slide.

So far, President Carter's popularity appears to be following the classic pattern. He took office with a 75 percent approval rating that has since fallen steadily—with no sharp drops—to 42 percent (January 1979). On one occasion—after the 1978 Camp David summit talks—his approval rating climbed suddenly by about 17 points, but within months it sank back into a slowly falling curve.

![Approval curves for various presidents](image)

always showing the highest ratings and NBC/AP the lowest. The range reflects both differences in question wording and how people's attitudes are categorized by the survey firm. Harris, for instance, asks people if the President is doing an "excellent, pretty good, only fair, or a poor job," and then counts "only fair" as a negative response. Critics have argued that "fair" may be high praise from, say, a taciturn New Englander.

In 1978, the Washington Post, in consultation with Gary Orren, a political scientist, tested Carter's popularity more extensively. The newspaper found that a large number of people had mixed feelings; they neither fully approved nor fully disapproved but, depending on the way a question was worded, could be counted in one column or the other.

Such mixed feelings create a second, nontechnical kind of problem in interpreting the polls: When people answer a question, do they really know what they are talking about? Or do they simply throw out an answer—perhaps the answer they think is expected of them—in order to appear well informed or just to get rid of the interviewer?

No one knows. Yet the history of polling fairly brims with incidents that give one pause. Roper found in 1964 that many people would not admit to an interviewer that they planned to vote for presidential candidate Barry Goldwater; Goldwater did four percentage points better when people were given secret ballots. Again in 1964, the Survey Research Center discovered that 64 percent of adults polled remembered voting for John F. Kennedy in 1960 (when Kennedy gleaned only 50 percent of the vote). In the post-Watergate era, a similar phenomenon attends people who cast their ballot for Nixon but disavow it today. Indeed, if people had actually voted the way they now claim to have voted, George McGovern might have won. He certainly would have carried California.

Views of Katmandu

Our own experience suggests that when people answer questions dealing with personal experience, their views tend to be well considered, lending the poll results more credence. Thus, when 54 percent of respondents told Louis Harris in 1969 that drinking was a very serious problem in the United States, and when that number increased to 76 percent in 1977, the change was a signal that something significant was happening in people's drinking habits—or, at least, in their views of drinking.

In sharp contrast, polls that ask people what the United States ought to do in a far-flung corner of the globe, such as
Afghanistan, deserve little serious attention. A large number probably think Afghanistan is in Africa. While the public's instincts have generally proved to be sound over the years, the information base of the average American should not be overestimated. In 1964, 62 percent of Americans surveyed thought the Soviet Union was a member of NATO. And as recently as last February, 77 percent of those surveyed in a *New York Times/CBS* News poll could not identify the two nations involved in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. (Nevertheless, 63 percent favored a new SALT treaty.)

**Questions in a Vacuum**

Daniel Yankelovich cautions that because of the malleability of public opinion on foreign policy, it is far more important for Washington policy makers to understand the general sentiments that guide the public than to heed their views on specific problems. For example, Americans today are firmly opposed to engaging in "another Vietnam" but, at the same time, are also opposed to Russian adventurism. White House planners would be well advised to take both attitudes into account.

A further caveat is that surveys must be seen in context. A nationwide Roper poll in 1978 reported that in the event mainland China invaded Taiwan, only 16 percent would favor the use of American troops. Considered in isolation, it would be easy to interpret this result to mean that the public's commitment to the U.S. defense treaty with Taiwan is tenuous at best.

If the poll is read in the context of other surveys, however, one quickly realizes that most people do not want to send U.S. troops *anywhere* in defense of sworn allies. A Gallup survey of April 1975 found that only if Canada were invaded would a majority (57 percent) back troop commitments; a bare 37 percent said they would support sending troops to England and 27 percent to West Germany.

Having said this, we have probably left the impression that Americans are now unwilling to defend their allies. Again: look at the context. Any question on troop commitment is hypothetical. Once a real crisis arises, attitudes can change quickly. On the eve of the 1970 U.S. entry into Cambodia, for example, the Harris Poll found that only 7 percent favored sending U.S. forces into that country, while 59 percent were opposed. But after President Nixon actually sent in the troops, 50 percent told Harris that Nixon was right, and only 43 percent expressed doubts. The interplay between the President and public opinion is enormous: he can shape it, but, of course, it may break him.

*The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1979*
Somewhere between the polls asking about personal experiences and polls asking about attitudes toward Katmandu are those dealing with domestic issues such as inflation, taxation, unemployment, hospital costs, and the like. These, too, merit caution. When surveys gauging "consumer confidence" show a sharp, downward plunge over a period of months, they should send an immediate signal to Congress and the White House that a recession may lie ahead. But a survey showing that the public, 85 percent to 15 percent, favors a constitutional amendment to balance the budget should be treated with care. People are probably not demanding the suggested solution—one they may not have thought much about; instead, they are demanding that their leaders do something, anything, to control inflation.

It may seem after all these caveats that survey research can’t give us a solid indication of what people are thinking. And American politicians and newsmen have developed an appetite for polls that should probably be curbed. Poll-worship short-circuits those institutions—the President, Congress, and Supreme Court—that were established precisely because public opinion on many issues is ill formed or difficult to discern. Seymour Martin Lipset argued for this sober view of polling when he counseled "humility, caution, and recognition of complexity" for all those involved in survey work. If the public, and its leaders, recognize these constraints, he wrote, we might restore the role of judgment and active leadership in decision-making, "rather than the pattern of leaders following followers, which is currently so prevalent."

There is still an important place for polling in American affairs. In a democracy, it is vital for the elected leadership to recognize long-term, deep-seated trends in public opinion. Are people pessimistic or optimistic about the future? Are people confident or worried about our status as a world power? Are people satisfied or dissatisfied with their financial situation?

Surveys on topics such as these won’t, and shouldn’t, tell our leaders how many ICBMs they should concede to Moscow in the next round of SALT. But these polls will keep us tuned in to the general level of health—or disease—in the body politic and give us some sense of what Americans will support.
Public opinion is highly volatile and complex. Fissures open up—only to close months later. Most people adopt “liberal” positions on some issues, “conservative” ones on others; Edmund Burke may have been right when he called public opinion a coquette.

On a national level, unpredictable left/right divisions are tantalizing: Americans seem immune to neat pigeonholing by political scientists. For example, a 1978 New York Times/CBS News survey found that those who described themselves as “liberals” were far more likely than self-described “conservatives” to support sending U.S. troops and equipment to halt Soviet advances in Africa.

As we edge toward the 1980 presidential election, campaigns are being mounted from the left, right, and center. Rival organizers for Kennedy and Carter, Brown, Reagan, Connally, and others are publicly confident that their candidate’s fingers rest accurately on the public pulse. They can’t all be right.

Neither can all nonpartisan opinion researchers. But we can afford to be more aloof. Unlike politicians, we need not be occupied with appeasing every shift of opinion for electoral gain. We are thus freer to ponder long-term currents—the tides of public opinion, not just the transient swirls and eddies.

It is a cliché these days to say that Americans are moving away from “liberal” values and perspectives and toward a more “conservative” stance. Passage of California’s Proposition 13 by a whopping two-to-one margin last year and the subsequent nationwide “tax revolt” are frequently cited as evidence. Lewis Uhler, a political conservative who heads the National Tax Limitation Committee, argues that the new popular resistance to big government portends a challenge to the free-spending tendencies in vogue since the New Deal days. Senator George McGovern (D.-S.D.) worries that liberalism is now America’s “lost vision.”

Those who believe Americans are moving rightward can point to more than a “tax revolt.” During the Vietnam era, U.S. colleges were awash in protest demonstrations; today, career-conscious and seemingly docile students concentrate on making
the grade. Opinion surveys show widespread concern over the perceived deterioration of the family. A 1978 Yankelovich study finds two-thirds of all Americans endorsing "more emphasis on religious beliefs."

Up with Government

The public is also taking a much tougher stance on crime—and punishment: Seven out of 10 Americans, the highest proportion in a quarter century, support the death penalty for convicted murderers. Almost 9 out of 10 think the courts are too lenient. It is not hard to see why many politicians, pollsters, and newsmen assume that Americans are "moving right."

The only problem with the assumption is that it is fundamentally wrong.

Let’s look at what I see as the more important trends.

Big Government. Despite a clamoring for tax cuts and a heavy dose of anti-Washington rhetoric, there is still no sign that the U.S. public wants to cut back substantially on the post-Depression spending habits of the federal government. In many instances, polls show just the opposite. In 1964, 64 percent of Americans surveyed agreed that "the government in Washington ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost." By 1978, 85 percent wanted the federal government to assume this responsibility.

Over and over again, when asked if they want to cut back on spending for public services, the public today says no. People in all social classes, from all regions of the country, and of all political persuasions now endorse heavy outlays for most social services (such as schools, hospitals, police, environmental protection). Ninety-one percent of those who describe themselves as "working class" and 90 percent of those who say they are "upper class" maintain that we are spending either too little or the right amount "to improve the educational system." Ninety-four percent of professionals and 95 percent of unskilled workers take a

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WHAT'S RIGHT? WHO'S LEFT?

The problem of using standard labels like liberal or conservative is that liberalism/conservatism is not a simple, one-dimensional continuum. In fact, there is a series of distinct dimensions, and an individual may occupy quite different positions, relative to the general public, on each of them—"liberal," say, on domestic economic policy, "centrist" in foreign affairs, "conservative" on some cultural and lifestyle issues. It is perfectly possible—one is tempted to say likely—for a person to be moving in opposite directions at the same time.

For example, a 1976 Washington Post survey of leaders of the women's movement predictably found them well to the left on most social issues. Yet a deep respect for individual merit often pulled them perceptibly rightward. Thus 64 percent "strongly" disagreed that government should limit the amount of money a person is allowed to earn.

Similarly, U.S. professors feel strongly that there should be some sort of income "floor" for the disadvantaged; most tend to support preferential hiring for minorities. But 85 percent reject, in principle, government efforts to achieve equality of results instead of equality of opportunity.

In short, terms like liberal and conservative are ideological categories, but large numbers of people do not hold views that are as coherently packaged as the term ideology implies.

similar stand on upgrading the nation's health care. And 73 percent of grade-school-trained Americans and 81 percent of U.S. college graduates want to maintain or increase expenditures "to improve the condition of blacks."

Civil Liberties. Americans now frequently appear more tolerant than they did in the past. If a person wanted to make a speech in your community "against churches and religion," people were asked, "should he be allowed to speak or not?" In 1954, 37 percent of the public favored letting such a person speak; by 1977, the proportion had risen to 62 percent.

Should someone who favors "government ownership of all railroads and all big industries" be allowed to teach in a college or university? Only 33 percent said yes in 1954; two decades later, the figure was 57 percent.

Civil Rights. Despite some angry clashes over busing—in Boston, Cleveland, and elsewhere—Americans have become
more supportive of the rights of minorities. In 1968, 63 percent of the U.S. public agreed that "blacks have a right to live wherever they can afford to, just like white people." Ten years later, 93 percent endorsed the right of black Americans to live anywhere they chose. Only 42 percent of the public stated in 1958 that they would vote for a qualified black for President if he were nominated by their party; by 1978, the proportion had exactly doubled.

Almost everyone now agrees (94 percent in a recent New York Times/CBS News poll) that barring someone from a job solely because of race is "wrong." And on the sensitive issue of interracial marriage, the proportion of those who disapproved fell from 72 percent in 1963 to the current 54 percent. In all of these areas, moreover, the attitude of Southern whites has increasingly come to mirror the opinion of the nation at large.

Granted, massive school busing to achieve a "racial balance" is unpopular—among growing numbers of blacks as well as whites. So is preferential hiring. Neither has ever been endorsed by a majority of whites, and many blacks appear to have withdrawn their support. That black and white Americans have grave doubts about some of the means used to attain the end of civil rights should not be construed as a reaction against the basic principle of egalitarianism itself. Compensatory education programs and laws curbing job discrimination receive virtually unanimous approval.

**Slippage on ERA**

*Rights of Women.* Just over half of Americans surveyed in 1970 favored "most of the efforts to strengthen and change women's status in society today." By 1978, with such efforts increasing, well over two-thirds of the populace (72 percent) indicated their approval. Less than a third of the electorate was prepared to vote for a qualified woman for President in 1937; that figure has climbed to 81 percent. What about a married woman, not in financial need, going out and getting a job? Only a fifth of the public supported the idea in 1938, but almost three-quarters do four decades later.

Admittedly, support for the specific legal affirmations embodied in the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) has slipped—from 74 percent in 1974 to 58 percent in 1978. This decline in support must be seen in context. First, backing for the amendment remains widespread and strong. Second, there is evidence that the earliest surveys on ERA were picking up unconsidered positive responses to the words "equal rights," much
CHANGING U.S. ATTITUDES

SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC SPENDING: 1978

NATIONAL

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<th></th>
<th>TOO LITTLE OR ABOUT RIGHT</th>
<th>TOO MUCH</th>
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<td>Improving and protecting the environment</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10%</td>
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<td>22%</td>
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<td>Improving the conditions of blacks</td>
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LOCAL

<table>
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<td>13%</td>
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<td>Public schools</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services (welfare, counseling, mental health, etc.)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47%</td>
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The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1979
the way people will automatically endorse “party reform” or “honesty in government.” Some real slippage in ERA approval has occurred, as often happens when public debate matures over time. But much of the statistical drop can be attributed to the unrealistically high initial ratings—a phenomenon that also comes into play in political primary polls.

**Underlying Trends**

*Personal Life.* There is markedly less opposition to premarital sex, legalized abortion, and the use of marijuana than there was a decade ago. Thirteen percent of the public in 1969 approved legalization of marijuana; 31 percent approved nine years later. Less than one-sixth of the adult population in 1969 accepted legalized abortion for a married woman who simply wanted no more children; now, 4 out of 10 adults do.

In sum, the trends of four decades belie the current view of a generalized “shift to the right.” Certainly Americans are upset about welfare, busing, government inefficiency, and criminal justice. They are concerned about taxes and inflation. Yet these attitudes are best interpreted as notes of caution or dismay, not as a sweeping indictment of the interventionist state. (Most supporters of Proposition 13, for example, believed that large cutbacks in revenue would not result in reductions of the government services they were accustomed to.) The underlying trends of the 1960s and ’70s are clear enough. And they are not conservative, in any sense of that much abused term.

The simplest way to conceive of trends in national opinion is as vectors—forces with a certain magnitude and a certain direction. Vectors are not necessarily simple; most result from the combination of smaller vectors of different magnitudes and varying directions. Looking at the various elements can be as revealing as examining the composite.

Whatever the “averages” might suggest, groups within the populace take distinct and differing stands on many of the issues coming before them. Blacks are more liberal on many social issues than whites, for example, and old people more conservative than young. Jews are further to the left than Protestants. Leaving race and religion out of the picture, there are differences between college graduates and those with only high-school diplomas. These differences in the breakdown of opinion vary in importance. However, some of them persist, appear across a wide range of questions, and have roots deep in the American social structure. “Class conflict” is of central importance, even in the United States where it has been relatively
muted. And a basic change has occurred in this area since the New Deal days.

During the Roosevelt years and indeed up through the 1950s, the central class conflict in this country was between the middle class and the working class. This confrontation was always somewhat fuzzy and only partly reflected in Democratic or Republican party affiliation, but it was tangible nonetheless.

On a broad array of economic and social questions, groups identified by one or more facets of middle-to-upper-middle-class status (higher incomes, jobs as managers or professionals, a college education) differed sharply, in a generally conservative direction, from the working class—that is, from blue-collar workers, those with lower incomes, or those with only a grade-school or high-school education. The college-trained segment of the population, for example, gave consistently less backing to New Deal social programs than did people with high-school and grade-school educations. High-school graduates provided more support for government ownership of utilities (telephones and electric power), for extension of the vote to 18-year-olds, and even for the idea that husbands should pay their wives a weekly wage for housework.

Today, much of this has changed. The primary class conflict is no longer between the lower income group and the middle class but rather pits a lower-middle against an upper-middle class. What we have is a "new conservatism" and a "new liberalism." And in a reversal of the New Deal relationship, it is now the higher status group that is the more "liberal."

Today's Class Lines

Neither of these groups, I should add, is "conservative" in the Ronald Reagan sense. Both take the liberal "political economy" of the New Deal for granted, and they are not prepared to dismantle it. But still, these two new groupings occupy markedly different places in contemporary society.

Current differences between higher- and lower-status groups are sharpest on the broad array of social, cultural, and "lifestyle" questions. Thus, 70 percent of Americans with five or more years of college training believe that a pregnant woman should be able to get a legal abortion simply because she wants to; only 45 percent of high-school graduates and 33 percent of those without secondary school diplomas agree. Adultery is described as "always wrong" by less than half of those with five or more years of college, but 81 percent of persons with less than a high-school education express disapproval.
This contrast goes further. In the New Deal era, higher status groups were more resistant to public spending. No longer. The National Opinion Research Center has examined public attitudes on a range of federal spending programs: improving the condition of black Americans, welfare, space exploration, environmental matters, health, urban problems, education, crime, drug addiction, defense, and the like. For almost all of these, college-educated Americans favor increased public spending to a greater degree than do their less-educated counterparts. The less well educated showed more support for greater outlays in only three areas: to halt the rising crime rate; to fight drug addiction; and to provide for national defense. In all other indexes, the class and opinion patterns have been turned on their heads.

The Educational Divide

Interestingly enough, traditional "bourgeois" values today find greater support from among the working class than from the ranks of college-educated professionals, even as the country has become more liberal. The high-school-trained segments of the population place more stress than do the college-trained on the importance of hard work, on "duty before pleasure," on frugality and the avoidance of debt, and on the material attainments that the bourgeoisie has historically associated with "success."

Conversely, the college-trained, when compared to the high-school- and grade-school-educated, urge less emphasis on money, more on "self-fulfillment," less on making "sacrifices" for one's children.

Is it valid to look at this class divide primarily in terms of education? In fact, one often reaches the same conclusions if one looks at occupation or income. Yet, in the 1970s, education, not income or occupation, is the key variable. Differences separating the basic occupational categories (professional, managerial, white-collar, blue-collar) are more modest than those that education alone produces. More striking, when education is held constant—that is, when only people with college degrees or only the high-school-educated are considered—the occupation-related differences disappear completely: professionals, managers, office and retail clerks, and blue-collar people who are college graduates show virtually identical distributions on the entire range of issues we have been discussing. By way of contrast, if occupation is held constant, education-linked variations are sharp within each occupational category.
### OPINION DIFFERENCES BY EDUCATION

#### VIEWS ON DOMESTIC ISSUES

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<tr>
<th>U.S. SPENDING TOO LITTLE ON:</th>
<th>less than high school</th>
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#### VIEWS ON FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE

| U.S. should cut back defense spending | 33% | 28% | 39% | 44% | 60% |
| U.S. should cut back defense spending if it means U.S. strength falls behind U.S.S.R. | 18 | 19 | 38 | 61 | 58 |
| Communistism not worst kind of government | 40 | 46 | 60 | 69 | 74 |
| CIA should not work inside foreign countries to strengthen pro-American elements | 35 | 30 | 40 | 46 | 61 |

In sum, then, the primary class conflict is no longer between
the lower and middle classes, defined by differences in the
sources and amounts of income, but between the lower-middle
and upper-middle classes, classes that are shaped largely by
education.

A New Intelligentsia

What lies behind these new class lines?

Two key developments set the stage. First, the upper-middle
class in the United States has shed much of its identification
with the business world. Increasingly, large segments of the
broad, new upper-middle class think of themselves primarily as
professionals—business administrators, engineers, accountants,lawyers, and so on—all responding to intellectual values rather
than the profit orientation traditionally associated with busi-
ness. Along with their counterparts in the growing public sector,
these upper-middle-class professionals have become the core of
a new "intelligentsia."

Louis Harris has found confirmation of one aspect of this
argument. Noting that, in the contemporary United States, "at
the key executive level, more people [are] employed in pro-
fessional than in line-executive capacities," he puts special em-
phasis on the fact that "the one quality that divided most
professionals from line executives in business organizations was
that the professionals felt much more beholden to their outside
discipline—whether it be systems engineering, teaching, sci-
entific research, or other professional ties—than to the particular
company or institution they worked for."

The critical factor in creating the intelligentsia has been the
extraordinary expansion of higher education in the post–World
War II period. The number of students enrolled in degree-credit
programs in the country’s colleges and universities—now about
10 million—is seven times greater than what it was on the eve of
World War II. College students now make up nearly 5 percent of
the total population of the country, compared to just over 1
percent in 1940. Some 16 percent of all Americans 21 years or
older—about 21 million people—have completed at least four
years of formal college training.

As the American upper-middle class has been transformed
into an intelligentsia, there has been a second and equally im-
portant development: A new bourgeoisie has appeared on the

*I use "intelligentsia" to include not only intellectuals—people involved in the creation of
new ideas, new knowledge, new cultural forms—but also that far larger community whose
training gives them some facility in handling abstract ideas or whose work requires them to
manipulate ideas rather than things.
scene in an interesting kind of replacement phenomenon. The working class of the depression decade included people who were, disproportionately, “have-nots,” and it formed opinions accordingly. Today, skilled manual workers and those in related blue-collar occupations have moved decisively into a “have,” rather than a “have-not,” economic position. In a wonderfully American semantic contradiction, a large segment of the working class has become middle class, with cherished values and substantial economic interests to protect.

A complex set of precipitating events is involved here. The United States saw a tremendous spread of economic well-being in the first three decades after World War II, when the median income for all American families jumped from $5,665 to $11,120 (in 1972 dollars). Individual families, even with inflation, gained more purchasing power in this brief span than in all preceding periods of American history combined. A lot of people have moved a long way.

Public opinion possesses a certain inertia; it is slow to get started in a particular direction, and once on the move it is hard to stop. The trends I have identified—toward greater liberalism in general, with the better educated Americans at the forefront—are inertial trends. They will not be deflected easily. What do they tell us about our society?

I believe they reflect the development in the United States of what Daniel Bell has called a postindustrial society marked by affluence, the critical importance of the “knowledge” and communications industries, and the rise of new kinds of jobs (such as “services”), lifestyles, social classes, and centers of power.

What I have called the intelligentsia—its outer boundaries would be the tens of millions of Americans who have been to college—is in many respects the advance guard of this new society. The content of most serious magazines, newspapers, and network television news broadcasts is shaped by them. The result is a kind of two-step transfer of ideas and information from the intelligentsia via the media to the nation at large.

Opinion polls bear this notion out, and I suspect they will for many years to come.
Fifty-seven years ago, Walter Lippmann wrote that the pictures inside the heads of human beings, "the pictures of themselves, of others, of their needs, purposes, and relationships" are their "public opinions." Those pictures "which are acted upon by groups of people, or by individuals also acting in the name of groups, are Public Opinion with capital letters."

These definitions, from Public Opinion (Harcourt, 1922, cloth; Free Press, 1965, paper) are as precise as any we are likely to get. Writing long before the advent of TV news, Lippmann emphasizes the barriers to informed opinion, notably the "comparatively meager time available [to citizens] in each day for paying attention to public affairs" and "the distortion arising because events have to be compressed into very short messages." His conclusion, that "public opinions" must be organized not by the press but for the press "if they are to be sound," is one on which political scientists, sociologists, and for-hire pollsters have been attempting to act ever since.

Much of the best work on the art of determining public opinion and the factors that influence it has been published only in obscure specialized journals. Some articles are available in anthologies, including Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz's Reader in Public Opinion and Communication (Free Press, 1950; 2nd ed., 1966). This widely used compendium opens with a brief history of the concept of vox populi from Roman times (Machiavelli in The Prince observed that "Not without reason is the voice of the people compared to the voice of God").
cians who pander to the people's prejudices and exploit their many legitimate fears. But they argue that national leaders must accurately gauge public opinion before making decisions if there is to be any chance of successful implementation.

Cantril worked in Lyndon Johnson's White House. His father, psychologist Hadley Cantril, established the Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton in 1940. One of the elder Cantril's many books, The Human Dimension: Experiences in Policy Research (Rutgers, 1967), is an engaging account of his own and others' polling efforts for the Franklin Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations. He includes Lloyd Free's early study of the Cuban people's support for Fidel Castro, ignored at the time; it showed 86 percent of the urban population expressing enthusiasm for his regime. After the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion attempt in 1961, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., then Special Assistant to JFK, wrote to Free that he only wished "a copy had come to my attention earlier."

In War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (Wiley, 1973, cloth & paper), John E. Mueller finds that the Korean and Vietnam wars each inspired support and opposition from the same sectors of the population with one "striking exception"—the "Jewish subgroup" that solidly supported the Korean War but opposed the war in Vietnam.

The possible effect of TV campaign "horse-race" coverage is a matter of argument in the United States today. In Polls, Television, and the New Politics (Chandler, 1970, paper only), Harold A. Mendelsohn and Irving Crespi look carefully at the function of polls in presidential elections 1952-68. They dispute the theory that voters tend to favor candidates who look like winners on Election Day.

Leo Bogart, in Silent Politics: Polls and the Awareness of Public Opinion (Wiley, 1972, cloth; Orbis, 1977, paper), finds much disturbing in both the techniques employed by opinion research specialists (e.g., weighted questions) and the uses to which data is put. Every major election in recent years has brought forth inquests on the political effects of polls, he reports, and even minor politicians have called for direct restrictions on the pollsters. In 1968, the mayor of Rockledge, Fla., a Romney supporter, incensed that his candidate had withdrawn from the New Hampshire primary on the basis of a poll "before the people had a chance to vote for or against him," persuaded his city council to draft an ordinance forbidding national pollsters to quiz Rockledge residents about their politics.

On the plus side, Bogart concludes that the best opinion research forces pundits and politicians to recognize that the opinions of the apathetic and disengaged cannot be equated with those of an informed citizenry aware of its stake in the issues and its own accountability. This, he writes, "makes polls a factor in the political process rather than merely an account of it."

EDITOR'S NOTE: Many titles were recommended by Wilson Center Fellows Gladys and Kurt Lang, who are studying media coverage and public opinion during Watergate.
Religion and Society:

A SHOPKEEPER'S MILLENNIUM

"Despotism may govern without faith," Alexis de Tocqueville noted in 1831, "but liberty cannot." The French observer arrived in the United States during the Second Great Awakening, an evangelical revival that shook the new republic from Tennessee to Vermont. Its legacy was manifold: political cleavages that lasted throughout the 19th century; revised notions of "individualism"; the first stirrings of adaptation to a new and more impersonal urban society. With millennial optimism, Americans of all classes now felt that human initiative, not just divine will, could establish God's Kingdom in this life. It was a new vision of what the nation might become. A new breed of historians has begun to probe this and other aspects of early U.S. social history. Using church records, tax lists, census schedules, diaries, and letters, they meticulously try to reconstruct life in small communities as a means of illuminating a much larger landscape. Paul Johnson's A Shopkeeper's Millennium, a portrait of society and religion in 19th-century Rochester, is the most recent example and one of the best. We present selections from it here, adapted and abridged by the editors.

by Paul E. Johnson

In November 1830, the evangelist Charles Grandison Finney faced an audience of merchants, master craftsmen, and their families at Third Presbyterian Church in Rochester, New York. The people at Third Church were inheritors of New England Calvinism, and they knew that the world was beyond their control. In 1815, the town's Presbyterians had declared themselves impotent before a God who "foreordained whatsoever comes to

pass.” Revivals had been eroding this idea since the 1790s, but most Rochester Protestants still inhabited a world where events, in historian H. Richard Neibuhr’s phrase, were a glove on the hand of God.

Finney had been fighting that idea since the middle 1820s. Now he turned to the audience at Third Church, stared down from the pulpit, and said flatly that if Christians united and dedicated their lives to the task, they could convert the world and bring on the millennium in three months—not the physical reign of Christ but the reign of Christianity. His audience stirred. Then scores of people rose from their seats, many of them weeping, and pledged their lives to Jesus.

Wilderness Boom

Similar scenes took place in towns and cities throughout the northern United States in the winter of 1830–31. The Second Great Awakening made new hearts in hundreds of thousands of middle-class men and women and set them off on a massive and remarkably successful crusade to remake society in God’s name. In Rochester alone, church membership doubled in six months.

The revival moved west into Ohio and Michigan, east into Utica, Albany, and the market towns of inland New England. In 1831, membership in Vermont’s Congregational churches grew by 29 percent, Connecticut’s by more than one-third. Even New York City and Philadelphia felt the revival’s power. Never before had so many Americans experienced religion in so short a time. Evangelist Lyman Beecher, who watched with excitement from Boston, declared that the awakening of 1831 was “the greatest revival of religion that the world has ever seen.”

It took a century for Beecher’s words to fall on scholars’ ears. It was Gilbert Barnes, a historian of the antislavery movement writing in the 1930s, who first “discovered” the revival of 1831. In his view, the evangelical, you-can-change-the-world spirit soon affected the antislavery movement, leading abolitionists to reject their earlier, “gradualist” techniques. Other scholars noted that the evangelists quickly brought a new power and dynamism to the burgeoning temperance, moral reform, and missionary societies in Jacksonian America.

Political scientists, meanwhile, have discovered a confused and fragmented opposition to Jacksonian Democrats coalescing

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*The First Great Awakening occurred during the 1730s and ’40s. Revivalistic fervor broke out in preacher Jonathan Edwards’ parish in Northampton, Massachusetts—a surprising work of God” he called it. It quickly spread throughout British North America.*

*The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1979*
in the 1830s, with support centered in the areas hit hardest by the revival and with issues and organizational methods taken directly from the evangelists. When elections had pitted Federalists against Jeffersonian Republicans, members of different denominations had lined up on opposing sides. Now political contests found evangelical Protestants on one side and nearly everyone else on the other. That division can be traced into the 20th century.

If so much came out of the revival of 1830–31, precisely what went into it? Were revivals a response to insecurities engendered by a dog-eat-dog economy? Did they result from spiritual emptiness among men and women who moved too often to establish new social ties or maintain old ones? Rochester, New York, is an ideal place to look for some answers. The sequence of rapid urbanization, religious revival, and political and social reorganization struck that community with uncommon force.

Rochester was the first of the inland boom towns created after 1815 by the commercialization of agriculture. In 1812, the site of Rochester was unbroken wilderness. By 1830, the forest had given way to a city of 10,000, the marketing and manufacturing center (it furnished guns and nails, shoes, wagons, furniture, farm tools) for a broad and prosperous agricultural hinterland.

Little Commonwealths

The perfect mill site at the falls (the Genesee River drops 200 feet within what is now downtown Rochester) had attracted attention from the beginning. When workmen digging the Erie Canal reached Rochester in 1821, they found a busy village of 1,500 merchants, artisans, and small manufacturers, all living symbiotically with the thriving countryside around them. In 1818, the town exported 26,000 barrels of flour; by 1828, 200,000 barrels.

There were fortunes to be made here, and they were promptly secured by families like the Rochesters, the Stones, the Whittleseys, the Bissells. Upward mobility was not absent; Abelard Reynolds, for example, went from boyhood poverty to a

Paul E. Johnson, 36, was born in Los Angeles, Calif. He received his B.A. from the University of California, Berkeley (1965), and his doctorate from the University of California, Los Angeles (1975). A specialist in U.S. social history, he is currently assistant professor of history at Yale University. A Shopkeeper's Millenium (1979) is his first book.
Charles Grandison Finney at age 40, in a portrait painted two years after his revival effort in Rochester. With other evangelists such as Lyman Beecher and Jedediah Burchard, Finney helped spread the Second Great Awakening among hundreds of thousands of middle-class families.

Greek Revival mansion on Rochester's stately Fitzhugh Street. This rags-to-riches story was acted out with considerable frequency, but all such men were soon connected by marriage or partnership with the town's ruling elite.

Indeed, this churchgoing, wealthy to middle-class group of shopkeepers, merchants, millers, and manufacturers—the core of Finney's revival—was remarkably stable and close-knit. In 1827, 42 percent of Rochester proprietors were in business with relatives; 56 percent had partnerships with other members of the business elite. Of the "top tenth" families in 1827, 71 percent were among the top tenth 10 years later. They controlled the commerce and the churches and tried hard to shape local political life.

Of course, all of them had come from someplace else (most from deeply Calvinist New England), but ties between families and between generations of the same family were uncommonly strong. Because capital was hard to come by, the leading families were anxious to intermarry. Finney's converts were the most firmly rooted people in town.

The city's humbler folk were more transient. In 1827, only 21 percent of adult males in Rochester were independent proprietors; the others worked for them. Most Rochestarians were laborers and journeyman craftsmen. Few of them went to church. These young drifters, most of them single with no family responsibilities, moved about constantly. One-fourth of the work force possessed no particular skill and looked for casual work along the Erie Canal, around the mills and loading docks, and in the streets. In its lowest reaches, Rochester was a funda-
mentally unstable, blue-collar society. Fewer than one in six of its poorer residents would stay as long as six years.

The existence of these two extreme societies, one rich and Calvinist, the other poor and unchurched, is testimony to a process that had been evolving since the Revolutionary War. The small, family-centered shop (what Jonathan Edwards had called the "little commonwealth"), where laborers generally lived with the employer and were under his continual supervision, moral and otherwise, was in decline. By 1834, for example, only 1 in 20 journeyman shoemakers lived with his employer. Master and wage earner were now different and opposed kind of men. In 1829, a Rochester newspaper editor had occasion to print the word "boss" and followed it with an asterisk. "A foreman or master workman," he explained. "Of modern coinage, we believe."

Take the case of Everard Peck, publisher of a small weekly newspaper. After his marriage in 1820, his household consisted of seven persons, some undoubtedly his employees. By 1827, we know that four journeyman printers and bookbinders were living under his roof. He was aware of his responsibilities as head of an extended family, of his "duty," as he wrote to his father-in-law, toward the employees in his care.

The End of Patriarchy

But even as merchants and shopkeepers talked of patriarchy, the intimacy on which it depended fell apart, a victim of economic growth. By 1830, Peck operated printing offices and a daily newspaper, a bookstore, a paper mill and warehouse, and speculated extensively in Rochester real estate. While he continued to board employees, he could hardly board them all, and his attention, in any event, was engaged in operations that went far beyond relations with young printers and bookbinders. This same estrangement was occurring in stores and workshops all over Rochester.

Such separation could never be complete. Even with 10,000 inhabitants in 1830, Rochester was still a small city. Nearly every family lived within 750 yards of the Four Corners, the central business district; residents of the most exclusive streets could look across their back fences and see the new working-class neighborhoods. And every night the sounds of quarrels, shouting, and laughter from the poorer quarters invaded their newly secluded domestic worlds.

To upright Rochesterians, the world seemed to be slipping
from their grasp. They were on top of a city they owned but could not control. Drunkenness especially was widespread, along with its attendant ills. Where a friendly dram with the employer had once been customary after a hard day's work, now laborers returning to their neighborhoods stopped at the tavern or local grocery. A rowdy theater had opened up on State Street, a circus on Exchange. Workers seemed to have no compunction about violating the Sabbath. Tocqueville described the streets of Boston on a Sunday in 1831 as virtually deserted. A Sunday in Rochester, with its processions of barges on the Erie Canal and a business-as-usual atmosphere at the warehouses, was a different story.

**Impasse**

Rochester proprietors (like almost everyone else in the city) had migrated from villages in which the public peace was secure. Troublesome outsiders and dissidents were expelled; the others were governed by household heads, the disciplinary machinery of the church, and a web of community interrelationships. But in Rochester in the middle 1820s, troublemakers numbered into the hundreds, and they lived outside the families, churches, and social networks that the proprietors controlled. There remained one institution with the power to stop them: the village government. Although that body was authorized in 1826 to arrest drunkards and gamblers and close down the theater, circus, and dramshops, the power was never used.

One reason was that the property requirement for voting eligibility had been dropped by the New York State legislature in 1823. Workers wouldn't vote for men who attacked their amusements.

Merchants and masters were also fragmented. A mysterious murder in 1827 had split the middle-class elite into Masons and anti-Masons. While all agreed on the general principle of temperance, they split again into those who favored coercion and those who favored persuasion. For the same reason, the citizens divided into Sabbatarians and anti-Sabbatarians on the question of Sunday work. Politically, the ruling middle class was split into Bucktails and Clintonians, religiously into Episcopalians and Presbyterians. In short, from 1827 until 1830, rich Christians did little else save fight in public.

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*The Bucktails and Clintonians were rival factions of the Republican Party in New York State. The former was headed originally by Martin Van Buren, the latter by Governor De Witt Clinton.*
This was the situation in 1829 when a worried Josiah Bissell, elder of the Presbyterian Church, wrote to Charles Grandison Finney. Bissell described a few of the "specimens of the large budget of evils rolling through our land and among us," dwelling on the moral dangers of canal-side life. And, he confessed, the good people of Rochester, squabbling among themselves, felt powerless to do anything about it.

Finney came to Rochester in September 1830. For six months, he preached in Presbyterian churches nearly every night and three times on Sunday, and his audience included members of every Protestant sect. During the day he prayed with individuals and led an almost continuous series of prayer meetings. Soon there were simultaneous meetings in churches and homes throughout the village. Pious women went door to door praying for troubled souls. Businessmen closed their doors early and prayed with their families. "You could not go upon the streets," recalled one convert, "and hear any conversation, except upon religion."

'A Trembling Hope'

Revival enthusiasm began with the rededication of church members and spread to the people closest to them. Inevitably much of it flowed through family channels. Finney claimed one Samuel D. Porter, for instance, as a personal conquest. But clearly he had help. Porter was an infidel, but his sister in Connecticut and his brother-in-law, Everard Peck, were committed evangelicals. Porter came under a barrage of family exhortation, and in January Peck wrote home that "Samuel is indulging a trembling hope." Hope turned into assurance eight months later; Samuel promptly joined his sister and brother-in-law in praying for the soul of their free-thinking father. The revival made an evangelist of every convert.

Who were these converts? Most of them came initially from the proprietor class: master craftsmen and manufacturers, lawyers, doctors, forwarding agents, master builders, shoemakers, coopers—in short, the entrepreneurs whose quest for wealth and privacy was directly responsible for disordered relations between the middle and working classes.

Finney's revival enlarged every Protestant church, broke down sectarian boundaries, and mobilized a religious community that had at its disposal enormous economic power. To each convert the question came: "Lord, what wilt thou have me do?" The answer was obvious: Unite with other Christians and change the world. The world, however, was filled with bad
In 1827, Rochester was a city with few upper-class enclaves and many mixed neighborhoods. By 1834, however, pockets of affluence were embedded in, but distinct from, working-class wards. In the 1838 map above, the central business district is outlined in red; broken lines mark the boundaries of prosperous blocks. The surrounding working-class neighborhoods were rarely more than a street away.
habits, bad people, and bad institutions that inhibited revivals and whose removal must precede the millennium. Among church members who had lived in Rochester in the late 1820s, the right course of action seemed clear. With one hand they evangelized among their own unchurched poor. With the other they waged an absolutist and savage war on strong drink. The theater on State Street was closed down and turned into a livery stable; the circus became a soap factory. Converted grocers emptied casks of whiskey into the streets. Mission workers flooded working-class wards with tracts and alms. Increasingly the wicked had no place to go. By the early 1830s, hundreds of working men had joined the revival.

Why did so many wage earners take the road pointed out by their masters? Many were sons and younger brothers of Finney’s middle-class converts, and no doubt many others were trusty employees who followed their masters into church. Still others may have been drawn to evangelists who proclaimed a spiritual rather than a worldly aristocracy among men.

No Earthly Solution

But with all of this said, the most powerful source of the workingman’s revival was the simple fact that Rochester’s laborers worked for men who insisted on seeing them in church. Working men who did not join churches had trouble finding jobs. In 1836, a free-thought editor announced that clerks were being forced to attend revival meetings. He quoted one of them: “I don’t give a d–n. I get five dollars more a month than before I got religion.” By 1834, Rochester’s new Whig Party—an evangelical party led by the recently feuding “rich Christians” and other converts—carried every ward in the city’s elections.

Thus, the Rochester revival served the needs of entrepreneurs who employed wage labor. Rochester was not unique; in the few towns that have been studied over time, revivals followed the same chronology and served the same functions. Everywhere enthusiasm struck first among masters and manufacturers, then spread through them into the ranks of labor. The workingman’s revival of the 1830s was effected through missionary churches, temperance and moral reform societies, and Sunday schools that were dominated by rich evangelicals. The

*Not everyone backed the revivals. Some middle-class husbands saw them as subversive of their authority over their wives. One man wrote of Finney’s visit to his home: “He stuffed my wife with tracts and alarmed her fears, and nothing short of meetings, night and day, could alone for the manyfold sins my poor, simple spouse had committed, and at the same time, she made the miraculous discovery that she had been ‘unevenly yoked.’ “
What of the master himself? If we are to render his turn to
religion intelligible, we must understand that he experienced
disobedience and disorder as religious problems, problems that
had to do not only with safe streets and the efficient production
of flour and shoes but also with the "rightness" of new relations
of production.

It was a dilemma that had no earthly solution. Rochester
masters assumed the responsibility to govern wage earners. At
the same time, they had severed the relationships through
which they had always dominated those men. Resistance in the
workshops, the failure of the temperance crusade, and the re-
results of elections in the 1820s dramatized what had become an
everyday fact of life: Workmen no longer listened when proprie-
tors spoke.

The revival of 1831 healed divisions within the middle class
and turned businessmen and masters—in Rochester and
throughout the Northeast—into an active and united missionary
army. Governing their actions in the 1830s was the new and
reassuring knowledge that authoritarian controls were not nec-
cessary. The new pious enclaves within the working class pro-
vided employers with dutiful workers and Whig votes. Workmen
who continued to drink and carouse and stay away from church
were no longer considered errant children; they were free moral
agents who had chosen to oppose the Coming Kingdom. They
could be hired when they were needed and fired without a
qualm when they were not. By the middle 1830s, there were two
working classes in Rochester: a large, church-going minority
tied closely to the sources of steady work; and a floating major-
ity that faced insecure employment and stifled opportunities.

Thus a nascent industrial capitalism became attached to
visions of a perfect moral order based on individual freedom and
self-government; old relations of dependence, servility, and
mutuality were defined as sinful and left behind.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Interested readers may also wish to consult the follow-
ing books: Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, by Paul Boyer
(1978); Rochdale, by Anthony F. Wallace (1978); and The Burned-Over
District, by Whitney R. Cross (1950).
Race and Education:

THE ROAD FROM 'BROWN'

A quarter of a century ago, in Brown v. Board of Education, the U.S. Supreme Court spoke with one voice in outlawing "separate but equal" schools for black and white children. Such unanimity has been rare in recent years, as a divided Court has looked beyond de jure segregation in the South to deal with de facto segregation in the North. At the same time, the goals of colorblind justice and desegregation have been superseded by more complicated disputes over affirmative action and court-ordered integration strategies. Here, constitutional historian A. E. Dick Howard retraces the "tortuous path" the Supreme Court has taken since Brown.

by A. E. Dick Howard

May 17, 1954, was a quiet, sunny Monday in Washington. As the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court took their seats, there was no impending sense of drama. In the first order of business, 118 lawyers were admitted to the Supreme Court Bar. In the second, the Court disposed of a case involving monopolistic milk practices in Chicago.

At 12:52 P.M., Chief Justice Earl Warren began reading from a slip of paper before him on the bench: "I have for announce-ment the judgment and opinion of the Court in No. 1—Oliver Brown et al v. Board of Education of Topeka." He continued reading in a monotone. Only as he rolled toward the conclusion was there any indication of which way the court would go.

"Does segregation of children in public schools," Warren asked, "solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal education?" He paused.
Feelings ran high after the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education. But a massive Southern reaction, hinted at in this cartoon from the Alexandria (Virginia) Gazette, failed to materialize. Southern politicians first sought legal methods of preserving the status quo.

"We believe that it does."

The Court's decision was unanimous, as Warren considered it had to be.¹

In the more than 150 years between Brown and the Constitutional Convention of 1787, race had been—as it still is—one of America's most intractable problems. Even as they laid down the framework for a free society, the authors of the Constitution countenanced the anomaly of slavery. That they were not completely comfortable with this compromise may be inferred from their use of such euphemisms as "other Persons" or "such Persons," the words slaves or slavery never appearing in the Constitution.

Successive generations sought to resolve the great issue of the place of blacks and other minorities in a predominantly white society. Sometimes the initiatives were epochal, as with the abolition of slavery (in 1863) and the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution (in 1865–70). Sometimes, a business-as-usual philosophy prevailed, as when the Supreme Court, in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), sustained Louisiana's "separate but equal" law for white and black passenger accommodations on railways.

¹Joining Warren were Justices Hugo Black, Stanley Reed, Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas, Robert Jackson, Harold H. Burton, and Sherman Minton.
The modern landmark, of course, is the Court's 1954 ruling in *Brown v. Board of Education*. Yet, during the two decades before *Brown*, courts, politicians, and others had begun to erode the foundations of legalized racial discrimination. In 1947, Branch Rickey and Jackie Robinson broke the color line in baseball. In 1948, the Supreme Court forbade the enforcement of restrictive clauses that kept blacks out of white neighborhoods. That same year, President Truman ordered immediate desegregation of the armed forces. And in 1950, the Supreme Court chipped away at *Plessy* itself, holding in *Sweatt v. Painter* that Texas could not satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment simply by establishing a separate law school for Negroes.

*Sweatt* and similar decisions paved the way for *Brown* by looking beyond the question of whether physical facilities were equal to the subtler issue of whether whites and blacks alike enjoyed the full intangible benefits of the educational process.

"With All Deliberate Speed"

In *Brown*, the Supreme Court swept aside the old doctrine of separate but equal. In a single opinion by Chief Justice Warren, the Court took judicial notice of the view that putting Negro children in separate schools "generates a feeling of inferiority ... that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." The Justices concluded that racially segregated schools are "inherently unequal."

Decreeing a principle was one thing, enforcing it another. Aware that practices entrenched for generations—from school segregation to Jim Crow laws—were not likely to be wiped out overnight, the Court moved cautiously. A year after the first *Brown* decision, the Justices handed down a second unanimous decree looking to local school authorities and federal district courts to carry the main burden of school desegregation. *Brown II*, as this decision is known, made a household word of the phrase "with all deliberate speed"—the pace at which desegre-
Southern segregationists turned to tactics of delay. In 1956, 96 Southern Congressmen signed the "Southern Manifesto," denouncing the school decisions as a "clear abuse of judicial power."

The Battle of Little Rock

During the decade after Brown, the Supreme Court gave little guidance to lower federal court judges in the South, who had to carry the burden of applying Brown to local conditions. (One commentator called these judges, most of them native white Southerners, the "Fifty-eight Lonely Men.") Nor did the judges have much help from the President or Congress. President Eisenhower made no comment on the Supreme Court's decision; some, like Earl Warren, thought him personally opposed to school desegregation. But events in the country at large soon began to bring civil rights ever more into the consciousness of the average American.

In 1957, for example, Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus sought to prevent nine Negro students from entering Little Rock's Central High School. The Justices of the Supreme Court cut short their recess and issued an opinion—perhaps the only opinion ever actually to be signed by all nine Justices—declaring that personal opposition to Brown was not to stand in the way of the legal rights of Negro children. President Eisenhower sent one thousand Army paratroopers into Little Rock to enforce the order.

In the 1960s, the civil rights movement gathered momentum. In 1962, a federal court order to enroll a black student, James Meredith, at the all-white University of Mississippi resulted in a violent confrontation between local rioters and federal marshals. Before the rioting subsided, two persons had been killed, and Oxford, Mississippi, home of "Ole Miss," had been occupied by 14,000 federal troops.

The next year, 1963, saw a massive, peaceful March on Washington, led by Martin Luther King. The pressure was on. Although it had been largely inactive on racial matters in the decade after Brown, Congress, at President Johnson's urging,
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the first major civil rights legislation since Reconstruction. The 1964 measure sought to curb discrimination in a number of areas, including such public accommodations as motels, restaurants, and theaters. In 1965 Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act, knocking out literacy tests and other devices used to limit voting by blacks.

Yet, from 1954 through the mid-1960s, lower federal courts tended to give the Brown decision a limited interpretation. A federal court in South Carolina, in a widely noticed 1955 opinion, distinguished between desegregation and integration:

Nothing in the Constitution or in the decision of the Supreme Court takes away from the people freedom to choose the schools they attend. The Constitution, in other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination.

And for a decade and more, the Supreme Court did little to build a fire under district judges.

Finally, 14 years after Brown, the Court, in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, (Virginia), served notice that it had lost patience with token desegregation. Now the Justices talked, for the first time, of an affirmative duty to eliminate racial discrimination "root and branch." A school board, they decreed, must come forward with a plan that "promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now."

In his first term as President, Richard Nixon filled four vacancies on the Supreme Court, his first appointee (in 1969) being Earl Warren's successor as Chief Justice, Warren Burger. In his 1968 campaign, Nixon had few kind words for the Warren Court's liberal record on matters of civil rights. Some observers wondered if Justices appointed to the Court by Nixon might not harbor an attitude once expressed by presidential speechwriter Patrick Buchanan: "The second era of Reconstruction is over; the ship of integration is going down; it is not our ship; it belongs to national liberalism—we cannot salvage it, and we ought not to be aboard."

Colorblind Justice?

Whatever the pundits' expectations—or apprehensions—the Burger Court in its early years presented, like the Warren Court, a unified front on desegregation. In April 1971, Chief Justice Burger spoke for a unanimous Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. Burger's opinion reiterated the broad range of equitable powers available to a
WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAID

In the view of some historians, a strong statement of support for the Brown decision from then President Dwight D. Eisenhower might have dampened some of the racial strife that ensued. But Eisenhower made no such statement until after leaving the White House. Why? In The Memoirs of Chief Justice Earl Warren, published shortly before Warren's death, the former Chief Justice offered one explanation:

I have always believed that President Eisenhower resented our decision in Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny. Influencing this belief, among other things, is an incident that occurred shortly before the opinion was announced. The President had a program for discussing problems with groups of people at occasional White House dinners. When the Brown case was under submission, he invited me to one of them. I wondered why I should be invited, because the dinners were political in nature, and I could not participate in such discussions. But one does not often decline an invitation from the President to the White House, and I accepted. I was the ranking guest, and as such sat at the right of the President and within speaking distance of John W. Davis, the counsel for the segregation states. During the dinner, the President went to considerable lengths to tell me what a great man Mr. Davis was. At the conclusion of the meal, in accordance with custom, we filed out of the dining room to another room where coffee and an after-dinner drink were served. The President, of course, precedes, and on this occasion he took me by the arm, and, as we walked along, speaking of the Southern states in the segregation cases, he said, "These are not bad people. All they are concerned about is to see that their sweet little girls are not required to sit in school alongside some big, overgrown Negroes."

Fortunately, by that time, others had filed into the room, so I was not obliged to reply.


federal judge in order to integrate local schools. Among the options: redrawing attendance zones, "pairing" schools, and requiring the busing of students.

In a companion case to Swann, the Court, again unanimously, struck down a North Carolina statute forbidding school authorities to consider race in the assignment of students to schools. The 1971 cases made it clear that, in formulating remedies for racial discrimination in the schools, federal judges were not to be "colorblind." Race had become an affirmative tool: "Just as the race of students must be considered in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race be considered in formulating a remedy.”

The Court’s unanimity in school cases was not to last. The
split came in 1972. In *Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia*, five Justices voted that the city of Emporia, Virginia, should not be permitted to withdraw from a joint, county-city school system if the result would be to interfere with desegregation of the county schools. By the time of *Wright*, four Nixon appointees were sitting on the bench: Harry A. Blackman, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger. All four dissented.

**Detroit: The Focus Shifts**

The end of unanimity is not the only noteworthy aspect of the Burger Court's race cases. In the 1950s and '60s, school desegregation was regarded by many as pre-eminently a problem of the South. The landmark Warren Court cases generally arose in Southern school districts. By the early 1970s, the problem had migrated, and the Justices on the Burger Court were being asked to decide whether desegregation of schools would be the law of the land in the North as well as in the South. To what extent, for example, should the largely white Northern suburbs be expected to share the burden of giving an integrated education to the black children of the inner cities?

In 1974, the Burger Court heard a case, *Bradley v. Milliken*, involving metropolitan school consolidation in a Northern city, Detroit. A lower federal court had concluded that, in order to make desegregation effective in Detroit's predominantly (70 percent) black schools, the court's order would have to include the outlying, largely white, suburban school districts—a 2,000 square mile area around the city. A majority of the Justices (Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stewart) concluded that the district court had gone too far. Only if there were findings of constitutional violations, such as intentional segregation, in the outlying districts (as well as in the city itself) could the federal court order metropolitan integration.

The Detroit case marks a turning point in court-ordered school desegregation. For the first time in two decades, the court had drawn a line on "racial balance."

The 25 years since *Brown v. Board of Education* reveal what a tortuous road courts, litigants, and citizens have been obliged to tread. In that quarter century, federal judges have acted, in effect, as school boards for many school districts. They have told local authorities to build this school or close that one, have

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*By 1972, the 11 Southern states had fewer blacks in all-black schools and more blacks in predominately white schools than the 39 states outside the South. Between 1968 and 1972, the proportion of black children in the South attending all-black schools dropped from 68 to 9 percent. The national average: 11.6 percent.*
reassigned teachers and students alike, have redrawn attendance districts, have ordered massive busing, and have put schools in receivership. Desegregation decrees have provoked hostility and political reaction. No longer has one section of the country been able to write the problem off as belonging to another. Little Rock had its Central High School in 1957; Boston had its South High School in 1975.

On the political front, the push for integration has moderated. Congress passed a watered-down version of President Nixon's antibusing legislation, and in 1974 President Ford signed into law further antibusing measures, limiting busing to no farther than "the next nearest school." J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, a Norfolk, Virginia, editor and constitutional specialist, recently observed that the "single-mindedness of national purpose" on race has given way to "a decade of accommodation and compromise."

To some extent, the Burger Court's handling of school desegregation issues reflects the temper of the times. More to the point, however, the issues that the Court has had to face in the 1970s go well beyond those dealt with by the Warren Court. In the 1950s and '60s, the Supreme Court, when it did not simply leave matters to the lower courts, concerned itself with dismantling the legacy of state-imposed, de jure segregation in the South. The Burger Court has traveled new and uncharted terrain, particularly the problems of de facto racial imbalance in Northern metropolitan areas.

Curbing the Judges

Even so, the Burger Court has been much readier than was the Warren Court to impose limits on the powers that federal judges may exercise in school cases. In a 1976 ruling (Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler), the Court held that once a school district has complied with the Fourteenth Amendment, a federal judge abuses his discretion by requiring "year-by-year adjustments" of attendance zones in order to prevent racial imbalance resulting from a "quite normal pattern of human migration."

In other rulings, the Court has added to the plaintiff's burden of proof in race cases. In Washington v. Davis (1976), the plaintiffs attacked District of Columbia police tests that black applicants failed out of proportion to their numbers. The Court held that proving disproportionate impact is not enough to support a finding of racial discrimination. The rule of Washington v. Davis has been invoked in numerous school cases. In 1977, the
Court overturned a lower court's "sweeping" decree in a Dayton school desegregation suit and remanded the case with the pointed reminder that federal remedies must be tailored to the nature of the constitutional violation, if any. Racial imbalance was not enough; there must be proof of action by the school board "which was intended to, and did in fact, discriminate against minority pupils, teachers, or staff."

**From Brown to Bakke**

One of the casualties of the years since Brown has been a ready reliance by judges on social science data. In Brown, the Court contended that segregation retarded a Negro child's educational development, believing this conclusion to be "amply supported by modern authority." In a footnote—the famous Footnote 11—the Court cited a number of social science studies, including Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma*.

With the use of massive busing to achieve "racial balance" in the schools, social science findings about the effects of integration on black children have been hotly debated. Looking at studies of busing, Rand Corporation sociologist David Armor has questioned the assumption that school integration enhances blacks' educational achievement, aspirations, self-esteem, or opportunities for higher education. It is even possible, he argues, "that desegregation actually retards race relations." Other scholars, including Harvard's Thomas F. Pettigrew, have charged Armor with presenting "a distorted and incomplete review of this politically charged topic."

The University of Chicago's James S. Coleman, whose famous 1966 report has been frequently cited in support of school desegregation, has more recently complained that his findings have been used "inappropriately" by the courts "to support the premise that equal protection for black children is not provided unless racial balance is achieved in schools." In 1975, Coleman added fuel to the fire with a study concluding that school desegregation was a major cause of "white flight" from big cities. As for his earlier contention that integration would improve the quality of education, Coleman declared in a recent interview: "What once appeared to be fact is now known to be fiction."

Even among judges, 25 years after Brown, there is greater skepticism about the competence of courts to make social pol-

By the early 1970s, the Supreme Court’s unanimity on race cases had disappeared. In Bakke v. Regents of the University of California (1978), a split decision reflected differing sentiments in the country at large.

Several Justices, including Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist, have repeatedly aired a preference for deferring, when possible, to the legislative and political process. In the field of education, the Burger Court has clearly shown a reluctance to second-guess the professionals. When the Court, in *San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez* (1973), refused to use the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to require states to equalize spending among rich and poor school districts, Justice Powell commented: "We are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of wisdom superior to legislators, scholars, and educational authorities" in the several states.

The Burger Court is also sensitive to the values of localism—the right of communities to have a major say in the operation of their schools. When the Court in 1974 ruled against interdistrict busing in the greater Detroit area, Chief Justice Burger made clear his unwillingness to let a district judge be the "school superintendent" for the entire metropolitan region, noting that such an action "would deprive the people of control of schools through their elected representatives."

In the years after World War II—the era of Brown—efforts to deal with racial discrimination focused on purification of process—ensuring the access of Negroes to the ballot, to schools, to opportunity. As time passed, the emphasis of antidiscrimina-
tion law shifted to results, for example, legislative or judicial attempts to integrate housing or schools. Twenty-five years after Brown, the tension is evident between the two approaches, between the ideal of a colorblind society, in which race is not relevant to one's deserts, and the conscious use of race to achieve a more egalitarian social or economic order.

A symbol of the tension is the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. Arising out of Allan Bakke's challenge to a special admissions program for minority applicants at the medical school of the University of California at Davis, the Bakke case split Court and country alike. Many agreed with Yale's late Alexander Bickel that a racial quota is "a divider of society, a creator of castes." Yet, for others, it was hard to be indifferent to studies (such as that of the Educational Testing Service) suggesting that if law schools were to ignore race in reviewing applications, the percentage of blacks among first-year law students would drop from 5.3 percent to between 1 and 2 percent.

New Doubts, Old Frustrations

In deciding Bakke, the Justices divided sharply. Six Justices wrote opinions, and they could not agree either on the meaning of the relevant federal statute (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) or on the application to the case of the equal protection clause. Five Justices voted to require Davis to admit Bakke, but five Justices (not the same five—only Justice Powell was found in both groups) thought that universities might use race as one factor among other factors in the admission process.

No one walked away empty-handed from the Bakke decision, neither those advocating affirmative action nor those opposed to it. But if the Justices split the difference, they did so more by accident than by design. Justice Powell cast the decisive, centrist vote, but the other Justices arrayed themselves to the left or right of him. The scattering of views in Bakke epitomizes the disagreements in the country at large. In Brown, a unanimous Court laid down a broad principle in a single brief opinion. In Bakke, the Justices spread their frustrations over six opinions and 154 pages.

Bakke is symbolic in yet another way. For all the controversy and attention the case aroused (69 amicus curiae briefs were filed, a record number in a Supreme Court case), it left most of the hard questions about "racial preferences" and "affirmative action" to the political process. At the same time, while being more cautious about the reach of federal judicial power, the Burger Court shows no propensity for limiting the
power of Congress, at least where the legislators make clear their intentions.

During the decade between Brown and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal courts carried most of the burden of pursuing racial equality. Today the issues are more complex. Less often do they turn on a priori notions of racial equality. The bedrock of Warren Court jurisprudence, of course, remains; federal courts still have ample powers to implement Brown. But the Supreme Court today is more restrained in its faith in judicial solutions.

Underlying the Brown decision was an essential optimism, the pursuit of a colorblind society. A quarter of a century later, we remain a long way from that goal. People of good will disagree. Many who hailed black access to voting and public education are not so sure about "affirmative action." The picture has become even more clouded by periodic manifestations of black separatism—black doubts about the advantages of integration. Indeed, many blacks now oppose busing (47 percent v. 40 percent in favor, according to a 1977 Gallup poll). "I shed no tears for cross-district busing," commented Detroit's black mayor, Coleman Young, when informed of the Supreme Court's 1974 ruling overturning the lower court's busing order.

When sociological data yield uncertain results, when root causes of inequality remain elusive, when well-intentioned citizens dispute what "justice" requires, it is not surprising that judges also pause. Much has been accomplished since Brown, some of it through the courts, some through legislation and executive action. Many of the uglier and more rigid manifestations of racial discrimination have been removed.

But celebration is premature. When Thurgood Marshall, the NAACP lawyer (and now Supreme Court Justice) who guided the Brown case to its conclusion, was interviewed after the decision in 1954, he predicted that segregation in all its forms, de jure and de facto, would be completely eliminated by 1963, the 100th anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation. He was wrong. It is a safe bet that those who believe we will have written "finis" to this chapter of American history by Brown's 50th anniversary will also be wrong.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Interested readers may wish to consult Simple Justice, by Richard Kluger (1976); Disaster by Decree, by Lino Graglia (1976); and From Brown to Bakke, by J. Harvie Wilkinson, III (1979).
This 1920 U.S. Army recruiting poster stressed the psychic benefits of military service rather than the career training and high pay emphasized today. America had just demobilized after World War I; its regular forces totaled less than 344,000 men, including a proud horse-cavalry contingent.
A new debate in Washington began this spring over the state of the nation's defenses. Even as it urged approval of a new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) with Moscow, the Carter administration cited a continuing Soviet arms build-up that threatened to upset the global "strategic balance" in the mid-1980s. The President asked Congress for a modest increase in the Pentagon's budget for 1980, reversing his earlier pledges to cut military costs. The request marked the latest in a long series of shifts in U.S. concern about the nation's security. Here, historians Samuel F. Wells, Jr. and David MacIsaac trace the ups-and-downs of U.S. defense policy since the republic's early days; editor Peter Braestrup summarizes the 1979 defense debate; and sociologist Charles Moskos examines the strengths and weaknesses of the all-volunteer force.

A 'MINUTEMAN' TRADITION

by David MacIsaac and Samuel F. Wells, Jr.

In 1784, shortly after the end of the War for Independence, the Continental Congress agreed with Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts that "standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican government." So saying, the Congress ordered the post-Revolutionary Army reduced to 80 caretakers (at Fort Pitt and West Point), banned any officers above the rank of captain, and asked the states for 700 militia to guard the western frontier.

Not long afterward, in The Federalist, James Madison wrote:

"The liberties of Rome provided the final victims to her
military triumphs; and the liberties of Europe, in so far as they have ever existed, have with few exceptions been the price of her military establishments. A standing force therefore is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary, provision.”

Such antimilitary sentiments were reinforced by what Madison called the “happy security” afforded by America’s geography: the broad oceans long made it possible for Americans to dismiss the notion of external threats to their existence. George Washington warned against “entangling alliances,” and the preoccupations of the European states with “balance of power” strategies and politics seemed distant and reprehensible.

The new republic devoted its prime energies to the development of the North American continent. The rising business class saw the military professionals as economic parasites, removed from the competitive strivings of the market place; as time went on, reformers and intellectuals saw the military as alien to an egalitarian unregimented democracy. Then as later, Harvard’s Samuel P. Huntington once observed, American political thinkers did not understand and were hostile to “the military function” in society.

The persistent amalgam of distrust, cost-consciousness, and isolationism helped sustain the amateur “Minuteman” tradition. Throughout the 19th century, Presidents and Congresses relied on a small regular force in peacetime, calling upon militia and volunteers to help the United States survive a second conflict with Britain (1812-15), triumph in an expansionist war.
with Mexico (1846–48), and preserve the Union (1861–65). Not surprisingly, there was little systematic thought given to what kinds of military forces—or strategy—the nation’s foreign policy might someday require. Even after it gained Great Power status by defeating Spain in 1898 and acquiring the Philippines and Puerto Rico, the United States had no regular army of consequence; the Navy, while its battleships symbolized America’s new industrial might, was unprepared for any major role across the Atlantic or Pacific.

**Over There**

After the outbreak of World War I, the United States watched the European carnage from afar. Woodrow Wilson’s administration authorized the selling of munitions to France and England against Imperial Germany and Austria-Hungary but responded with only diplomatic protests to German submarine attacks and British blockading. Even as they started a naval build-up in 1916, President Wilson and Congress did little to ready the Army for possible conflict. Indeed, Wilson actively discouraged advance military planning. When he reluctantly concluded that only by joining the Allies could he protect U.S. interests and influence the peace settlement, Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war.

Conscription, war production, and “meatless days” began. But mobilization took time. Not until early 1918, almost a year after declaring war, did the United States get significant numbers of fresh troops across the Atlantic to join the exhausted Allies. The Yanks arrived in force just in time to help stave off the German offensives of March 1918 and thus assure victory for the Western powers eight months later. Though tardy, the American effort was crucial—more than 2 million soldiers and enormous tonnages of supplies went overseas to help “make the world safe for democracy.”

Their brief but costly World War I experience did not convince Americans back home that their country should use its new power abroad to safeguard the peace. Instead, the draftees and volunteers were demobilized; the Senate rejected both the Versailles Treaty and membership in the League of Nations; and, in 1923, the last of the regular Army occupation troops returned home from the Rhineland. Postwar Europe was left to the Europeans—including Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. Washington turned to “normalcy,” congressional attacks on the arms industry (“Merchants of Death”), attempts at Big Power naval limitation, low military budgets, and later, the over-
whelming trauma of the Great Depression.

Between 1936 and the outbreak of World War II in 1939, a handful of preparedness advocates began to sound the alarm over Nazi rearmament, Japanese aggression in China, and Italian and German intrusion in the Spanish Civil War. In response, the America First movement—a hodgepodge of Midwest populists, pacifists, New York socialists, and fiscal conservatives—appealed to widespread isolationist sentiment. With a modest ship-building revival underway by the late 1930s, the Navy secretly prepared Plan Orange, its plan to protect the Philippines and Hawaii against the resurgent Japanese Navy. The Army, always more vulnerable to the nation’s political moods, had only 190,000 men and almost no modern equipment when the Nazis invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. In June 1940, a few days after Hitler’s conquest of France, the House of Representatives passed the Selective Service Act reinstating conscription—by only two votes. And only then did Franklin D. Roosevelt feel he had enough public support to undertake serious rearmament.

To a far greater extent than Americans realized at the time, the second World War was much like the first. Victory came only when one of the two opposing coalitions eventually brought to bear its superiority in numbers—of men, ships, bullets, aircraft. Much of the technology was new—radar, the long-range bomber, the aircraft carrier, the German “V-2” missile, and, of course, the atomic bomb. But the decisive element, in the end, was the material and manpower superiority of the Allies.

After the victory in 1945, some things were forgotten: the early U.S. defeats; the importance of British resistance; the delays in arming and organizing U.S. forces; the preponderant role of Soviet armies in the two-front war against Germany; the serious weaknesses of the Axis powers.

**Truman and the Bomb**

But certain “lessons” were firmly implanted in the minds of many who led the war effort and of many who served. These were: (a) the need for military readiness in peacetime, especially in the new era of long-range bombers and atomic weaponry; (b) the desirability of countering threats to U.S. security overseas, rather than “in our own backyard”; and (c) the critical importance of technology and a strong industrial base. The war, in imparting these lessons, was to shape the world view of an entire generation of U.S. leaders, notably Harry S Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson—and
Neither President Truman nor his former colleagues in Congress at first understood the foreign policy implications of the wartime experience. A possible postwar economic depression was high on their list of worries, and so was voter reaction to wartime burdens. Demobilization proceeded rapidly. By June 1947, with little protest from any quarter, the nation's military manpower had dropped from more than 12 million to a little over one and a half million, including token occupation forces in Germany and Japan. To an aggressor, the United States suddenly posed no effective military threat, short of using its few existing atomic bombs.

**Neither War nor Peace**

But 1946 was not 1919. A new world had dawned for America, heralded by its rise to a position of relative strength unsurpassed in its history, by the survival of another great power—the Soviet Union (about which Americans knew little and distrusted much)—and by the emergence of new weapons promising an age of potential massive destruction. The dramatically altered international situation produced new attitudes in Washington toward military forces. Americans traditionally had divorced war and peace, allowing only limited roles for diplomats during war and for military men during peacetime. Now a postwar consensus developed that embraced the need for the United States to organize and use military power, even without actual combat, in the exercise of its new responsibilities as a world leader. America's long epoch of "free" security had come to an end.

The threat to America's interests posed by the Soviet Union proved difficult to define precisely. Joseph Stalin seemed far stronger than he was. The military could do little but attempt to prepare for the worst possible contingency, namely, overt Soviet aggression. Events in Eastern Europe, Iran, Turkey, and Czechoslovakia—followed quickly by the blockade of Berlin and the first Russian atomic explosion in 1949—had the effect of setting in concrete the policy of "containment," first spelled out in George Kennan's famous "Mr. X" article on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" (*Foreign Affairs*, July 1947). While Kennan stressed economic means for containing Soviet "expansionism," Washington saw a military deterrent as more urgent.

Providing the necessary funds, however, raised again the troublesome question—intermittently on the nation's agenda from 1775 to 1979—of how much defense spending is enough.
Portrayed above are the principal current deployments worldwide of U.S. military manpower, ground units, and forward Navy carrier forces. Air Force deployments are not shown. The general pattern has not changed since the mid-1950s, after the U.S. rearmed under the impetus of the Korean War.

From the end of World War II to the outbreak of war in Korea, neither President Truman nor Congress felt the nation’s economy could support a major increase in military outlays; instead, the President, like most Americans, tended to rely on the newly independent Air Force (primarily its Strategic Air Command) to deter or prevent all-out Soviet aggression. Despite the Navy’s short-lived "revolt of the admirals," the Air Force got the lion’s share of rigidly controlled defense budgets.

As the Cold War intensified, Congress reinstated the draft in 1948, but few were drafted. Cut and cut again, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps were stretched thin around the world—from General Douglas MacArthur’s understrength garrison in Japan
War. However, Communist China is no longer seen as an adversary; France is no longer in NATO; U.S. manpower in NATO is down from 434,000 in 1962; U.S. access to overseas bases has declined; the Soviets now have an "open ocean" Navy and are active in Africa.

to the token units under the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Germany. In 1949, to conserve its forces, the Defense Department brought home its occupation troops from South Korea.

Even as U.S. non-nuclear strength declined (and development began, after much internal debate, on the H-bomb), an ad hoc State-Defense study group, led by Paul H. Nitze, head of State's Policy Planning Staff, explored the nation's defense needs in light of the Soviets' newly-demonstrated atomic capability. The Soviets were seen as achieving an ability to attack the United States by 1954, making their superior ground strength count for more than ever before. Moscow could fight general or
limited wars, encourage subversion, rupture the Western alliance, undermine American will. In its report, NSC-68, the Nitze group told President Truman on April 7, 1950, that the United States should greatly increase its defense spending to right the balance and deter war.

Truman endorsed the idea in principle. But he was not willing to try to push an unreceptive Congress into accepting an expensive new military build-up. Nor was Truman quite ready to endorse Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s conclusion that “what we must do is create situations of [allied] strength. . . . If we create that strength, then I think the whole situation in the world begins to change. . . .” The B-29 bomber and the Air Force, Truman apparently hoped, would be deterrence enough.

Korea and Rearmament

A few months later, on Sunday, June 25, 1950, the Soviet-equipped North Koreans invaded Syngman Rhee’s Republic of Korea, and President Truman and his advisors felt there was no choice but to respond—without atomic bombs. With a United Nations mandate but no congressional declaration of war, Truman ordered General MacArthur to intervene first with air power, then with his troops from nearby Japan. Once again, the United States paid a high price for unpreparedness—in dead soldiers and lost ground. Many Americans saw the communist invasion as part of a worldwide Kremlin plan for aggression, with Western Europe and NATO as the next target. Truman himself likened the Korean invasion to Hitler’s early moves in the 1930s; not to respond would be to repeat the West’s failure before World War II to halt aggression at the outset.

The 1950–53 Korean War ended in a truce as a stalemate following MacArthur’s victory over the North Koreans, Communist China’s massive intervention, and bitter fighting. Truman fired MacArthur in 1951 after the latter broke with the President over his indecisive “limited war” policy—for a time, the frustrations of the seesaw war gave a certain resonance to MacArthur’s charge that there was “no substitute for victory.” But the independence of South Korea was preserved (at a cost of 34,000 U.S. dead alone), and the NATO governments, even as they worried over MacArthur, were heartened by proof that the United States would go to war, if necessary, to support an ally.

Korea was a shock to Congress and the country. Even though the cost and duration of the conflict soon made it extremely unpopular, its chief critics were not the Left, then in a subdued state, but the Right, who saw any willingness to forego
“victory” against communism as softheadedness or worse.

Yet, the North Korean attack provided the impetus for what amounted to American rearmament. Despite its origins in Northeast Asia, the war’s principal enduring military results were a sizeable build-up of U.S. forces in Europe, a growing nuclear arsenal, and a heavily-reinforced Strategic Air Command with bases in Spain, Morocco, Okinawa, Britain, and Guam, all within striking distance of the Soviet Union. The Navy got a go-ahead on new ships; the Marine Corps deployed amphibious forces in the Mediterranean and the western Pacific.

All this was fostered by Dwight D. Eisenhower, the hero of victory in Europe in World War II, who won election in 1952 promising, as the Republicans put it, to solve the problems of “Korea, communism, and corruption.” He surrounded himself with advisers like Treasury Secretary George Humphrey and Defense Secretary Charles Wilson, who felt strongly, in the wake of the Roosevelt-Truman era, that the greatest threat to the United States lay in excessive federal spending. At first, Eisenhower’s authority in defense matters was unchallenged; he cut back on the costly conventional forces and, like Truman before Korea, put his primary faith in the nuclear deterrent (“more bang for a buck”), but he continued substantial shipments of military equipment to NATO allies, Taiwan, and South Korea.

**Eisenhower’s New Look**

In military terms, the new approach placed heavy reliance on nuclear weapons, not only against Soviet attack on the United States but against overt aggression of any kind. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles christened this new strategy in a speech during January 1954 when he called for an ability to “respond instantly, by means, and at places of our choosing” to aggression launched anywhere in the world. What was needed was a “maximum deterrent at a bearable cost.” The doctrine of “Massive Retaliation” had no sooner been announced than it came in for severe criticism by the new breed of “policy intellectuals” in the Pentagon-subsidized “think tanks” like RAND and in the universities. Economists, historians, and political scientists, the new strategists, began to examine and propose new concepts of defense, both nuclear and conventional.* The impracticality of invoking nuclear retaliation in less than mortal

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The American military crises became an immediate focus of their criticism; reflected in the press, if not in Congress, it led to increasingly fuzzy statements from the Eisenhower administration as to whether nuclear weapons would actually be used in every case of communist aggression.

The budget-conscious Eisenhower "New Look," concentrating on SAC and development of ballistic missiles for both the Air Force and Navy, involved substantial reductions in conventional forces, especially the Army. Despite direct appeals by the military to the President, Eisenhower enforced the cuts. Army Generals Maxwell Taylor, Matthew Ridgway, and James Gavin retired to write critiques, among which Taylor's *Uncertain Trumpet* (his name for massive retaliation) would wield decisive influence in the following administration. The military was poorly prepared even for those bloodless interventions that occurred during Eisenhower's tenure (notably in Lebanon and the Taiwan Straits); but the nation felt secure behind its ever-increasing nuclear shield.

**JFK's 'Flexible Response'**

The Russian launching of Sputnik in October 1957 was interpreted in the West as a Soviet lead in the development of a nuclear-armed ICBM force.* Eisenhower's hopes for a summit agreement with Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev on arms control were torpedoed by the downing of an American U-2 "spy plane" over Soviet territory. As the 1960 election campaign got underway, John F. Kennedy and the Democrats in Congress exploited fears of a nonexistent "missile gap." Once again, the question of "how much is enough for defense" surfaced in peacetime election politics. "More" was the Democrats' answer.

Kennedy assumed the Presidency determined to restore "vigor" to American policy abroad and to resist communist aggression wherever possible. He sought a more powerful nuclear deterrent plus a stronger conventional force. He wanted a "flexible response" to counter both Soviet conventional ground threats in Europe and Khrushchev's declared support for "wars of national liberation"—including one in South Vietnam. Discovering that there was no missile gap, he nonetheless initiated a massive increase in strategic nuclear forces toward a ceiling of 1,000 Minuteman and 54 Titan ICBMs and 41 nuclear submarines, each capable of carrying 16 Polaris missiles. Coming

*Actually, Sputnik was an experiment; The Soviets did not develop a "serious" ICBM capability until the late 1960s.
on top of a significant lead in strategic bombers, this missile buildup was based on the premise that it would give the United States a degree of nuclear superiority that the Soviet Union could not hope to match without unacceptable strains on its economy. The idea was also to create a nuclear force that would be sufficiently large, dispersed, and well protected to enable enough of it to survive a surprise Soviet attack and retaliate in kind.

All this cost money, but the "Berlin Wall crisis" of 1961 (when JFK partially mobilized U.S. reserves) helped convince Congress to go along with the administration's new effort, even as Kennedy sought agreement with Moscow on a partial ban on atomic testing. If the New Frontier faced difficulties in Congress on domestic spending, its military budgets had little trouble.

Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, symbolized the "New Frontier" image of efficiency and toughness. A dynamo who regularly beat his military aides at squash, McNamara imposed new analytic criteria of cost effectiveness on the Pentagon bureaucracy. Theoretically neat, McNamara's concepts met with stiff resistance from the service chiefs who resented his intrusions into the domain of military expertise. Impervious to unquantifiable matters such as morale or esprit, the Secretary ranged high and low in his efforts to impose control. When he saw that the Air Force had adopted a plane originally designed for the Navy (the F-4 Phantom), he decided that the next generation of fighter aircraft should be similarly "joint-purpose." The variable-wing TFX fighter-bomber that he forced on the services resulted in the costly F-111A and F-111B, neither of which was in the end adopted by the Navy.

Confrontation over Cuba

Two Cuban crises further strained relations between the military and their civilian superiors. There was the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 where, equipped and trained by the CIA, 1,500 anti-communist Cubans came ashore in a futile effort to topple Fidel Castro's two-year-old regime; Kennedy and McNamara tended to blame the service chiefs and the CIA. Then came the 1962 Cuban missile crisis when the Soviets secretly emplaced medium-range missiles on Castro's island within range of most of the U.S. South. Once again the President expressed dismay over the attitudes of some of the service chiefs who seemed all too willing to risk Armageddon, insensitive to the nuances of finding a solution short of direct attack on Cuba. Subsequent critics have blamed the President himself for
raising the ante beyond reasonable proportions in the confrontation.

In the end, the incident revealed clearly to both sides the advantages of nuclear superiority, especially when combined with local air and naval hegemony. A U.S. blockade and the threat of further action against Cuba resulted in Khrushchev's decision to pull out the offending missiles—in return for Kennedy's promise not to invade Cuba. Chairman Khrushchev soon paid a heavy price for over-extending Soviet power; he was ousted in 1964. His successors in Moscow apparently decided to avoid further serious confrontations until they could eliminate the disparity in strategic forces between the United States and the Soviet Union; a steady Russian build-up soon began.

**Johnson's Limited War**

Within a year of Kennedy's untimely death, Lyndon Johnson had secured sweeping congressional authorization for offensive action in Vietnam through the August 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution. He won election that fall in his own right, partly on an apparent campaign pledge not to enlarge the Vietnam War. Largely untutored in foreign affairs, he relied heavily on Secretary McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and other former Kennedy advisers. Vietnam was far away, yet Kennedy had sought to shore up the Saigon regime with aid and 16,000 "counter-insurgency" advisers. The nature of the conflict was complex. But American civilian officials believed their overwhelming technological and military superiority could ultimately deter the North Vietnamese from trying to take over South Vietnam.

Bombing began, little by little. Congress, having forfeited its authority after Tonkin Gulf, sat back, approved the sharply increased defense outlays, and hoped for the best. There was a grim consensus, in the press and on Capitol Hill, on the need to draw the line against Soviet- and Chinese-backed "wars of liberation," without bringing on World War III.

Reluctant to embark on a land war in Asia, the Joint Chiefs recommended drastic measures or none at all. For personal and symbolic reasons, the President wanted desperately to avoid losing Vietnam to the communists. But he wanted both "guns" and "butter." He was unwilling to pay the price of a full-scale effort by mobilizing the reserves, increasing taxes, and possibly risking his "Great Society" social programs in Congress. Temporizing, Johnson, McNamara, and their civilian advisers in 1965-68 approved step-by-step increases in ground and air operations...
Since 1971, the federal government has been spending relatively less on "guns" than on "butter." In 1949, U.S. defense cost $11.5 billion, or 30.3 percent of all federal outlays and 4.5 percent of the gross national product; spending for "human resources" (ranging from housing to education to welfare) was $10.6 billion, or 27.3 percent of the federal budget and 4.1 percent of the GNP. Thirty years later, defense spending totals $114.5 billion—23.2 percent of the federal budget and 5.0 percent of the GNP. About $259 billion, or 52.5 percent of the federal budget and 11.3 percent of GNP, goes to human resources.

but rejected military urgings to carry the war to communist sanctuaries in North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. In his incremental efforts to avoid defeat, Lyndon Johnson greatly misused his nation's military forces, prolonged the war, created inflationary pressures at home, soon divided his own party and the country, and assured the victory of Richard M. Nixon.

Nixon brought to office in 1969 the outline of a grand design, worked out with the help of his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger. Its goals were improved relations with the
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and an end to the costly U.S. military role in Southeast Asia. In Vietnam, "peace with honor," not "victory," was the goal. The administration pursued a dual strategy: continued (fruitless) negotiations with Hanoi and a build-up of Saigon's fragile forces ("Vietnamization") while slowly pulling out U.S. troops to appease domestic opinion.

Locking the Barn Door

After the Cambodian "incursion" of 1970 and strong bombing of the North in 1972, the United States ended its direct involvement in Vietnam in January 1973. Under the Paris peace accords, the Nixon administration gained a nominal cease-fire and the release of most of the POWs held by North Vietnam. That was all. South Vietnam was left with a superior Soviet-equipped enemy force on her territory and no realistic hope of U.S. support when Hanoi's victorious final drive began in 1975. It was the first war America had "lost."

During his first term, Nixon made significant progress toward reshaping great power alignments. He began the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Russians in late 1969. He used a dramatic trip to Peking in February 1972 to re-establish relations with a longtime adversary; within three months, the new Sino-American cordiality helped bring the Soviet Union to agreement in the SALT I treaty.

Although the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy radically changed the international environment, Pentagon decision-making began to return to pre-McNamara patterns. Even as he pressed Nixon and Kissinger for faster troop withdrawals from Vietnam, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, a former U.S. Representative from Wisconsin, left the service chiefs to operate without interference in matters of detail.

The Democratic Congress asserted its authority by actively criticizing both the administration's policies in Vietnam and its proposals for defense spending. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D.-Mont.) even urged withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe. In November 1973, as the Watergate scandal grew, Congress passed, over Nixon's veto, the War Powers Act; it set a 90-day limit on hostilities initiated by the President without congressional approval and allowed any combat commitment to be terminated by a concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress. Congress locked the barn door on Richard Nixon long after Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson had rushed through it.

The 1972-74 Watergate scandals gradually pre-empted the
attention of the White House, Congress, and the media. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the attendant Arab oil boycott added the "energy crunch" to the agenda. The armed services shifted to a shrunken, all-volunteer force. Defense budgets dropped as low as 15 percent below the pre-Vietnam level, in real terms, and congressional liberals urged deeper cuts to "re-order national priorities."

Replacing the disgraced Nixon in August 1974, Gerald R. Ford suffered for the sins of his predecessors as he sought to restore public confidence that had been eroded by Vietnam and Watergate. In defense matters, the consensus on Capitol Hill was "no more Vietnams"—and no more CIA subsidies for the foes of a Soviet-backed faction in Angola’s civil war. At the same time, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger (1973–76), like Melvin Laird before him, had to cope with a major change in the "strategic balance"; in 1971, the Soviets surpassed the United States in numbers of strategic land-based and submarine-based missile launchers. And the Soviet build-up was continuing. Over a 30-year period since World War II, the United States posture had gone from atomic monopoly under Truman to nuclear superiority under Kennedy to nuclear "sufficiency" under Johnson to "essential equivalence" under Nixon—and was on the verge of what officials of a new administration would call "rough equivalence." It seemed to Ford that the post-Vietnam decline in U.S. military spending had to stop, and, finally, it did in 1976.

**Questions for Carter**

Gerald Ford left to his successor a year later an uneasy new "strategic balance" with the Soviets, now active in Africa and Southeast Asia; the continuing arms limitation (SALT) talks with Moscow; and a tentative rapprochement with Peking. If antimilitary sentiment had receded in Congress, worries about inflation had not. And the increasing costs of modernizing the military—with cruise missiles, $385,000 MXI tanks, $8 million jet fighters, and $1 billion nuclear submarines—made almost every new Pentagon weapons decision a matter of controversy.

There were other military issues awaiting the new Carter team: After Vietnam, was the United States prepared to intervene anywhere outside the NATO area, or was disengagement the better part of valor, as some Democrats suggested? In case of surprise attack, were there alternatives to massive retaliation against Soviet cities, such as focusing on Russian military targets (the "counterforce option")? Could the volunteer force...
provide enough men to maintain U.S. readiness, or, in effect, was America again relying on the old "Minuteman" tradition to beef up its forces in time of war? Could diplomacy again be divorced from military power, as it was prior to 1945?

Most of these issues had their antecedents in past American experience. They were inflamed by the chronic tensions between the military's needs on one hand and the values of a liberal democracy on the other. The issues were not likely to fade away.

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**THE CHANGING OUTLOOK**

*by Peter Braestrup*

Seeking the Presidency in 1976, Jimmy Carter ran on a platform calling for cuts in defense spending of $5 to $7 billion. He assailed the Pentagon's "swollen bureaucracy" and the cost overruns of defense contracts. To many, it seemed as if Jimmy Carter (Annapolis '46), with his talk of welfare reform and national health programs, had opted for more "butter" instead of more "guns," that he tilted, on matters of defense, toward his party's doves. Yet today, this pledge to reduce Pentagon spending seems to have gone the way of Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1932 pledge to slash federal outlays as a means of countering the Great Depression. New realities tend to crowd in on the man in the White House.

As President, Jimmy Carter ordered the gradual withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from South Korea, canceled the costly B-1 bomber project, and, last year, vetoed a fourth nuclear-powered aircraft carrier for the Navy. But a major problem became increasingly apparent to him in 1978: For all the energies and hopes he had committed to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, the Soviet Union was not relenting in its 15-year expansion of military power that, among other things, threatened to upset the Soviet-American strategic balance by the mid-1980s.
After considerable internal White House debate, the President decided last fall to propose to Congress a 3 percent real increase in defense spending—matching a commitment obtained by Carter from America’s NATO allies. Most significantly, the increase was proposed in a fiscal 1980 overall federal budget of $532 billion that was otherwise restrained to contain “the threat of accelerating inflation” in a time of economic uncertainty.

The post-Vietnam slide in real U.S. defense outlays had been arrested by the Ford administration and Congress in 1976, but last year defense spending was still below the pre-Vietnam level when inflation was taken into account. As Defense Secretary Harold Brown and Carter’s other national security advisers saw it, there was no choice but to begin to counter Moscow’s steady effort, notably in the field of land-based intercontinental ballistics missiles. Here, Soviet advances in ICBM warhead size, explosive power, and accuracy were seen as endangering the “survivability” of the American 1,000 Minuteman ICBMs in their fixed underground silos in the Western states.

Not to develop a new, hard-to-locate ICBM—the mobile MX missile or some variant—would risk the destruction of a major portion of the U.S. nuclear deterrent force in the event of a Soviet surprise first strike. As Harold Brown viewed it, the risk of such a Soviet attack might be small, but the consequences would be too enormous to contemplate without taking remedial action. Moreover, the very existence of such vulnerability would make the U.S. nuclear deterrent less credible, and hence less effective.

Matters of Perception

“It may be too late if we wait much longer,” Brown told Congress as he presented the proposed $125 billion defense budget in late January. Such talk has a surrealistic quality in an age when both Russia and America already have the power to destroy each other—and the rest of civilization—in a matter of minutes. Yet, to defense planners, perceptions of relative strength and advantage are important, especially when the prime purpose of U.S. military power is to deter the use of military power by the adversary. To the President and his Defense

Peter Braestrup, 49, is editor of The Wilson Quarterly and a former Wilson Center Fellow. Born in New York City, he graduated from Yale (1951), served as a Marine in Korea (1952), attended Harvard as a Nieman Fellow (1960), and, among other assignments, covered the military in Washington and Vietnam as a reporter for the New York Times and Washington Post.
Secretary, it seemed clear that the relative decline in U.S. military effort had to be corrected—not only to "redress the balance" with the Soviets but also to reassure allies in Europe and Asia that the United States, however chastened by the 1965–73 Vietnam trauma, was no longer demoralized by it.

**Hawks vs. Doves**

President Carter's decision did not occur in a political vacuum. Since 1975, Soviet-Cuban activity in Africa and Moscow's continuing arms build-up had convinced most Western leaders that the détente of 1972–73 and the SALT talks did not mean an end to Soviet-American competition. Opinion polls and congressional sentiment showed the erosion of the opposition to increased defense spending that had prevailed since the peak of the Vietnam War. Although liberal Democrats sharply criticized Carter's exemption of defense from his general budget down- hold, their complaints were muted by the generalized "tax revolt" against added government spending seemingly embodied in the passage of Proposition 13 in California.

The strongest attacks on the Carter defense budget came from the "hawks." Chief among them was Senator Henry Jackson (D.-Wash.), a critic of the impending SALT II treaty and the leading spokesman for those Democrats who contended that, if anything, the President was still too sanguine in his appraisal of Soviet military progress and too indecisive in responding to new troubles abroad. For his part, General David C. Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified that the Carter budget provided "the lowest level [of security] the nation should risk" and hinted that he would welcome congressional increases to "preserve the U.S. power and influence upon which world stability depends."

How much is enough? The senior military leaders, the Joint Chiefs, have generally wanted "more" as an added hedge against disaster. The civilian leadership has usually wanted "less," worrying about the economy, congressional opposition, or competing claims on the federal budget. In early 1979, President Carter and Defense Secretary Brown were clearly not embarking on a rearmament effort of the magnitude seen in the Korean War period. Nor were they attempting to match the kind of peacetime build-up sought by Kennedy and McNamara in 1961–63 in a quest for nuclear superiority and a "flexible response" to perceived communist threats.

Rather, Carter and Brown, even as they acknowledged the Soviet advances, seemed to count on having enough time—and
### CHANGES IN U.S. DEFENSE FORCES

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**NOTES:** The strategic bomber force now consists of 348 B-52s, armed with short-range nuclear attack missiles (SRAM) and, come 1981, with longer-range subsonic cruise missiles. The Polaris-Poseidon missiles are embarked aboard 41 nuclear-powered submarines—with the first new Trident missile submarine coming into service in 1981. The strength of Army divisions now varies between 14,000 and 17,000 men: Marine divisions have almost 16,000 men. Air Force, Navy, and Marine tactical wings vary in size between 60 and 72 combat aircraft; all told, the United States has some 2,700 tactical fighter and attack aircraft, including the Air Force’s new F-15 and F-16 jets and the Navy’s new F-14. Not until 1981 will the Air Force’s 26 wings be fully equipped. Three of the Navy’s aircraft carriers are nuclear-powered; its amphibious ships can carry one and a half Marine divisions. The long-range airlift force includes 234 C-141 transports and 70 C-5A’s (plus 218 civil airliners available in emergencies).

*Source: Department of Defense*

*The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1979*
HAROLD BROWN: THE SOVIET EFFORT

In his 1980 budget statement to Congress, Defense Secretary Harold Brown last January outlined his views of the Soviet military posture. Excerpts:

Most disturbing of all, the Soviets have undertaken a long-term military build-up that still continues. What lies behind this build-up is a subject for debate. There can be no doubt, however, about the fact of the build-up itself.

We have attempted to measure the scale of the Soviet effort in a number of different ways. All of them underline certain indisputable trends. Among the most significant:

— The steady growth of the Soviet defense effort. Over a period of more than 15 years, the growth rate has probably averaged in the vicinity of 3 percent a year in dollars, and between 4 and 5 percent a year in rubles. In other words, this growth has been at about the same rate as the growth in the overall Soviet economy.

— The general magnitude of the effort. We estimate that, on the average, it has accounted for somewhere between 11 and 13 percent of Soviet gross national product (GNP). Other analysts put the level of effort at 15 percent or higher.

— The size of the Soviet effort relative to that of the United States. We believe that when the two programs are measured in U.S. prices, the Soviet effort came to equal ours by about 1971, and now exceeds it by something like 25 to 45 percent (with retirement costs excluded on both sides), depending on which the ruble or the dollar measure is used.

These trends are consistent with what we know about the growth and improvement in Soviet military capabilities. Military manpower has risen from about 3.4 million in 1964 to roughly 4.4 million in 1978—not counting armed border guards and internal security policy. Strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) have risen from approximately 450 in 1964 to 2,500 in 1978. The ground forces have been expanded from 148 divisions in 1964 to over 170 divisions in 1978, and the Soviet tactical air forces have gone from about 3,500 to 4,500 first-line combat aircraft.

The seriousness with which the Soviets have undertaken—and give every sign of continuing—this effort is as impressive as its magnitude. One reflection of that seriousness is the emphasis in Soviet military doctrine on the achievement of balanced war-fighting capabilities in both nuclear and non-nuclear forces. Another has been the steadiness of purpose evident in the build-up. The

enough technological superiority—to restore the “strategic balance” without recourse to expensive crash programs. A SALT treaty with Moscow, Brown told Congress, would not end the arms race or lower its costs; but it would put certain constraints on total numbers of ICBMs and permit the Pentagon to develop new ways to make its land-based ICBM force less vulnerable to surprise attack.

Apparently, Carter and Brown were also banking on being
Soviets expanded their effort as our own grew in the 1960s. But, then, theirs continued to expand as ours began to decline [in the 1970s]. Whether the Soviet efforts in [the strategic nuclear] realm have been worth the cost remains problematic. The United States did not find its numerical nuclear superiority particularly useful or usable when it had it. The Soviets, of course, are different. Should they somehow obtain a perceived nuclear superiority, they might mistakenly try to use it for political advantage. But it seems doubtful that they would be any more comforted by nuclear equivalence than we were by nuclear superiority in the past.

Differences in force deployments, and in the contributions of allies, are part of what make U.S. and Soviet military capabilities so hard to compare. For example, they must carry a burden with their Far Eastern deployments—a burden amounting to between 11 and 20 percent of their total defense effort—that we no longer find necessary to incur on anything like a comparable scale.

The Soviets must add a host of other difficulties. It would seem plausible that some portion of the Soviet force in Eastern Europe has at least one additional mission: the need to watch Soviet friends. As far as we can tell, the slowdown in [Soviet] economic growth has been sharper than the Soviet leadership had anticipated. Nonetheless, all of the evidence available to us on Soviet defense programs under way and planned suggests that the long-term trend in allocation of resources to defense is likely to continue into the 1980s.

able to avoid any sustained combat by United States' non-nuclear ("general purpose") forces in Europe or the Mideast for the next few years—until serious post-Vietnam weaknesses were corrected. The Navy, General Jones noted, was no longer big enough to cope with a two-ocean war; a NATO emergency would require all its efforts in the Atlantic. The readiness for combat of many Army and Marine units was a matter of dispute. All the services, Brown observed, were short on training, equipment
maintenance, stocks of ammunition. Thanks to its post-Vietnam reliance on volunteers, the armed services had shrunk since 1972 by 300,000 to just over 2 million people in uniform, the lowest level since before the Korean War; and the Carter administration made no proposals that would increase this active-duty strength, revive the draft, or provide what the Joint Chiefs considered adequate Army ready reserves.

Aside from its (inherited) no-draft policy, the Carter administration’s approach was squarely in the mainstream of peacetime U.S. policy since the mid-1950s: (a) trying to maintain a strategic nuclear force (now a “triad” of bombers, missile-firing submarines, and ICBMs) as a deterrent to Soviet attack; (b) deploying most overseas ground and tactical air strength to Western Europe to support NATO; (c) sustaining a Navy strong enough to protect wartime supply lines to Europe and Japan; (d) keeping at home both back-up forces for NATO and Asia and a “fire brigade” of Marines and Army paratroopers for use in the Mideast or elsewhere; (e) deploying the Navy’s Sixth Fleet (two carrier task forces, a Marine amphibious team) in the Mediterranean and the Seventh Fleet (of like size) in Far Eastern waters; (f) basing a Marine division in Okinawa plus air units in Japan’s home islands as back-up forces for Asia.

President Carter, under heavy criticism from all sides in Congress and the military, stretched out his timetable for withdrawal of all U.S. ground troops from Korea.

The administration’s heavy emphasis on Europe, its thinning out of forces committed to Asia, and its resistance to (costly) Navy ship-building have provoked congressional criticism. The volunteer force is a matter of debate. So is the rate of growth in defense outlays. Opinions differ on Soviet intentions. Yet the U.S. policy of global deterrence is generally accepted. Once again, the question in Congress is how much effort is now required, in fact, to sustain it.
THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

By Charles Moskos

One enduring consequence of the Vietnam War and America’s accompanying political trauma has been the abolition of the draft. Since the “peace with honor” of January 1973, the United States has tried what it has never tried before—to maintain a worldwide military deployment without conscripts.

This effort did not stem from a “military” decision aimed at improving the nation’s future capabilities vis-à-vis the Soviet Union or its clients. Essentially, the decision was political: Washington’s response to growing middle-class reaction to Selective Service and the past burdens of the war itself.

Despite the qualms of many analysts in and out of the military, the all-volunteer force was endorsed by both a Republican President and a Democratic Congress. The armed services, already grappling with the racial disputes, drug problems, and insubordination of the early 1970s, had no choice but to try to make it work.

After six years, sufficient time has elapsed to permit an initial appraisal of the all-volunteer experience, and in the Pentagon and in Congress, such appraisals are now underway. Most of the ensuing Washington debate—and the headlines—have been dominated by those who see only near-total success or near-total failure. My analysis indicates that, as yet, the all-volunteer force is neither.

It is important to remember that many of the “people problems” afflicting the military today cannot simply be blamed on the “all-volunteer” concept. They also stem from changes in American manners and mores, from prosperity, from confusion over America’s world role, from a preoccupation with “rights” rather than “duties,” from a decline in educational standards. Given the legacy of the late 1960s and early ’70s, it is surprising that the services have done as well as they have.

Let’s first look at quantity. The most obvious result of the end of the draft has been a sharp decline in the peacetime military force level:

¶ In 1964, just before the Vietnam build-up, the active duty strength of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines was about 2,600,000 men and women; about 191,000 or almost 25 percent
of all Army troops were draftees, and four of every ten volunteers for all services joined up because of draft pressure.

In 1978, the active force stood at 2,069,000, with yet another cut (20,000) slated for 1979. In short, ending the draft has forced down Pentagon manpower, and, hence, to some degree, hurt U.S. military readiness, especially for nonnuclear war.

Lowered manpower goals have enabled the hard-working recruiters across the country to come close to their annual quotas (134,748 in 1978), albeit not without an occasional minor scandal over the enrollment of youths later found to be criminals or illiterates. High youth unemployment in the 1970s, especially among minorities, and the Pentagon’s emphasis on enlisting more women have further eased the recruiters’ task.

But, even in terms of quantity, inescapable constraints loom ahead. Last year, just over 2.1 million American males reached age 18. By 1985, there will be only 1.8 million 18-year-old males. Overall, by 1990, the number of males in the prime recruiting group, aged 18–24, will be 17 percent below the 1978 figure. Unless the armed forces are cut further, the Pentagon will still have to draw on this group for as many men as are now recruited. A rise in women enlistments and a decline in standards for male recruits are commonly proposed as ways to offset this impending shrinkage of the manpower pool. Yet, the demands of combat and an increasingly complex military technology impose constraints here, too.

Reviving ROTC

By and large, the four services have been able to attract enough new junior officers—the Army and Marine second lieutenants who lead rifle platoons and the Navy ensigns who stand deck watches. Except for physicians and certain technical specialties, there has been no shortage of newly-commissioned ensigns and second lieutenants in the all-volunteer era. Retention of experienced pilots and officer-technicians, attracted by higher pay and easier working conditions in civilian life, is an-
other matter.) During the 1948–73 era, the pressure of the draft helped sustain Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) enrollment on campuses and also prompted college graduates to volunteer for other officer candidate programs. Enrollment in ROTC, now the major source of junior officers for all services except the Marines, hit a low of 63,000 in 1974 and climbed to 86,000 in 1978.*

The Absent Middle Class

When it comes to quality of enlisted personnel being recruited under the current system, the debate grows stronger in and out of the Pentagon. Overall Defense Department statistics—those cited most frequently by Pentagon officials—mask important differences among the services.

The Air Force has consistently had the biggest share of high school graduates among new three-year recruits, perhaps because its enlisted contingent—of mechanics, technicians, and logistics types—is largely barred from combat roles (jet fighters are flown by officers). The Navy has onerous requirements—notably long tours of sea duty—but it has been able to increase its proportion of high school graduates and ranks second. The Marine Corps, with its esprit and a high ratio of combat troops, comes in third; the largest and least glamorous of the services, the Army, ranks fourth and last.

Since the end of the draft, an average of less than 60 percent of male Army entrants have possessed a high school diploma. In 1964, the last peacetime year before the Vietnam War, high school graduates accounted for 71 percent of Army draftees and 60 percent of Army volunteers. The decline in the educational levels of the all-volunteer Army must be contrasted with the overall increase in high school graduates among U.S. males aged 18 to 24 years—from 66 percent in 1964 to 76 percent in 1977. About 17 percent of the draftees in 1964 had some college; the corresponding figure has been around 5 percent for entrants in the all-volunteer Army.

Recruits with high school diplomas, Pentagon studies show, are not necessarily braver or more patriotic. But they tend to have far fewer discipline problems, higher motivation, and

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* Bowing to student and faculty pressures during the Vietnam era, Yale, Harvard, and Stanford among others, jettisoned ROTC. New units were created at less renowned institutions, particularly in the South and Southwest. All told, 280 campuses had ROTC units in 1978—contrasted with more than 350 campuses and a much larger 230,000 student enrollment in the mid-1960s. As for West Point, Annapolis, and the Air Force Academy, the number of applicants has risen since 1973; each service academy is limited by law to a student body of 4,417.
greater adaptability to the demands of military training and the new technology. Even so, the Navy, in particular, finds that many of its high school graduates do not possess the reading ability required for shipboard tasks. The Army and the Navy have begun a series of remedial courses for enlisted men, with or without high school diplomas, designed to bring them up to eighth grade reading levels; roughly 25 percent of all Army recruits in 1977 read at sixth grade level or below.

The problem of "quality" should not be simply attributed, as it often is, to the increase in black enlistments. Racial minorities have done well in all the services.* The proportion of blacks has always been highest in the Army, a trend that has become more pronounced during the all-volunteer era. Blacks made up 34.9 percent of male Army recruits in fiscal year 1978 and 36.7 percent in the first quarter of fiscal year 1979. Although other minorities are less reliably tabulated, an overall figure of at least 6 percent, most of them Hispanic, is a conservative estimate. All told, four out of ten men now entering the Army's enlisted ranks are from these minority groups, which together account for only 18 percent of the nation's population.

Within Army enlisted ranks, as elsewhere in the services, the racial make-up varies by branch and career field; blacks tend to be concentrated in "low skill" fields, while whites are disproportionately found in technical specialties. For example, a 180-man Army rifle company or artillery battery may be made up of 50 percent blacks, 10 percent other minorities, with white officers and mostly black senior sergeants.

The educational level of blacks in America has lagged behind that of whites. But the decline in educational levels of new

*Blacks in 1978 accounted for 17 percent of the Army's sergeant majors and 22 percent of the master sergeants—the top two enlisted grades—although blacks only accounted for 12 percent of Army strength 15 years ago when most of today's noncoms first enlisted.
Army male recruits is not correlated with the increasing number of black soldiers. Indeed, since the end of the draft, the proportion of high school graduates among blacks entering the Army has exceeded that of whites, and this is a trend that is growing. In fact, today's Army is the only major arena in American society where black educational levels surpass those of whites, and by quite a significant margin.

What is happening is this: Whereas the black soldier is fairly representative of the black community, white recruits of recent years are coming from the least educated sectors of the white community. My stays with Army line units—infantry and armor—also leave the distinct impression that many of our enlisted white soldiers are coming from nonmetropolitan areas. I am struck by what I do not find in line units—urban and suburban white youths of middle-class origins. In other words, the all-volunteer Army is attracting not only a disproportionate number of minorities but also white youths who, if anything, are more uncharacteristic of the nation's broader social mix than are our minority soldiers.

Sports Cars and Stereos

One of the main premises of the 1970 Gates Commission—the blue-ribbon presidential panel that produced the rationale for the all-volunteer force—was that recruitment for the armed services should be guided by marketplace conditions and monetary inducements.

But moves to tie military pay to that of the civilian sector preceded the creation of the all-volunteer force. In 1967, soldier pay levels were formally linked to those of the Federal Civil Service and thus, indirectly, to the civilian labor market. In 1977, a Rand study concluded that career military personnel are now better paid than their civilian counterparts. A new recruit does pretty well too; a draftee got $78 a month in 1964, but today's 18-year-old volunteer gets $419 a month, plus free room and board and medical care.*

A visitor to an Army unit today can see clear signs of the young single GI's new buying power, starting with the sports

*Nevertheless, in order to fill the ranks, it has been found necessary to offer additional cash bonuses. In 1978, extra payments of up to $2,000 were authorized for men willing to enlist in the ground combat arms—armor, infantry, artillery—for longer than normal two-year tours and who meet specified educational and aptitude standards. The Pentagon's reliance on cash inducements, however, may have accelerated the "erosion of benefits," such as access to military medical care for dependents, and the uncertainty over pensions that have corroded the morale of career officers and noncoms since the end of the draft.

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cars in the base parking lot. Despite the introduction of fast-food items and more varied menus, fewer and fewer soldiers are eating their meals in the “dining facility” (mess hall). In Germany, the typical young unmarried soldier invests money in an inordinately expensive stereo system or saves up to fly commercially to the United States to take his 30-day leave back home. In the United States, increasing numbers of single soldiers rent apartments off base and maintain bunks in the barracks only for inspection purposes—a custom virtually unheard of in the draft Army. One result of the single soldier’s new disposable income has been the decline of barracks life and unit esprit.

Finding Babysitters

When I visit Army units, it becomes clear that the racial violence in many Army outfits (and in the Navy and Marines, as well) of the early 1970s has largely receded, though one detects a latent Klan spirit among some white soldiers. Crime is a problem, partly because there is more to steal from today’s better paid soldiers than there was from the 1964 draftee. Marijuana use is widespread, as it is among American youth generally. Hard drugs still worry commanders in a few units, yet outsiders may exaggerate the problem. Alcohol abuse throughout the ranks has become a command concern.

Noncoms find it harder to enforce discipline than before; and if the anarchy of the early ’70s has abated, the new enlistee is often quick to assert his “rights” if he feels put upon. The day when many enlisted men were better educated than their sergeants has gone, to the dismay, surprisingly enough, of many senior noncoms. A visitor is struck by the old sergeants’ fond memories of the university graduates who served under them.

One unanticipated consequence of the shift to an all-volunteer force—and higher pay—has been a marked increase in marriage among the junior enlisted ranks. In 1977, the proportion of married personnel in the pay grade E-4—the average junior enlisted rank—was 46.7 percent, a figure almost double that of 1964. Today just about every major military base in the United States from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to Camp Pendleton, California, is ringed by trailer camps or shoddy apartment complexes where many of the young marrieds live an existence close to the poverty line, a condition that exacerbates what are often already unstable family lives. In West Germany, for lack of on-base housing, young Army couples live “on the economy” where they face cultural isolation, as well as financial distress as the U.S. dollar declines.
Oddly enough, the sharp increase in the number of young enlisted marrieds—a growing number of whom are service couples—runs directly counter to the national trend toward later marriage. And combat readiness suffers. Too often, one hears stories of infants being deposited in the orderly room ("Can't find a babysitter"!) when an Army unit is placed on alert. In West Germany alone, the U.S. military must evacuate 160,000 wives and children in the event of Soviet attack.*

Life has never been easy for the young recruit—even under the softened regimen of the post-Vietnam era. In basic training, he still has to rise before dawn, respond to orders, test himself physically, get along with a host of new comrades in barracks. And, after basic training, there is often a letdown.

Here occurs one source of enlisted discontent that had no counterpart in the peacetime draft era. This is "post-entry disillusionment." The draftee's expectations were never high, hence

*By contrast, in South Korea, Army troops serve 13-month tours without dependents.
he was not unpleasantly surprised; indeed, he often—at least in hindsight—found the Army not so bad on its own terms. In all-volunteer recruitment, however, a consistent theme has been the stress—out of necessity, to be sure—on what the service can do for the recruit in the way of training in skills transferable to civilian jobs.

Although the advocates of the all-volunteer concept do not emphasize it, the irreconcilable dilemma is that many military assignments—mostly, but not exclusively, in the ground combat arms and aboard ship—do not and cannot have direct transferability to civilian occupations.

Post-entry disillusionment relates directly to the extremely high rate of attrition in the all-volunteer force. Since 1973, more than one in three recruits have failed to complete their initial enlistments: they were discharged for disciplinary reasons, personality disorders, or job inaptitude. Attrition rates are even higher in the Army and Marine combat units and in heavy labor categories, such as boiler tenders aboard Navy ships.

Moreover, the desertion rate in the all-volunteer force is twice as high as that in the pre-Vietnam period—17.8 per thousand enlisted personnel in 1977 compared to 7.9 percent in 1964. What makes the current desertion figures especially troublesome, of course, is that they occur on top of the high attrition rates.

These unsettling statistics lead us to the clear relationship between socioeconomic background and soldierly performance. High school graduates and those with some college are more

**EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF ARMY MALE RECRUITS: 1964-78**

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than twice as likely to complete their enlistments successfully. The evidence is also clear, contrary to conventional wisdom, that high aptitude, better-educated soldiers do better across the board—in “low skill” jobs as well as in “high skill” jobs. The shortage of such quality manpower has hit hardest at the combat arms and the crews of Navy warships, where “low aptitude” recruits tend to be assigned.

Thus the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, increasingly dependent on more complex weaponry and communications gear, are bedeviled by problems of manpower quality even as the Pentagon faces overall problems of quantity when the manpower pool shrinks during the 1980s. This spring, even the Air Force, for the first time began to have trouble recruiting qualified youths.

Buying Alternatives

What to do? Influential specialists in Congress, including Senator Sam Nunn (D.-Ga.), see little prospect for a competent U.S. military force in the 1980s without recourse to some sort of compulsory national service. Barring a manifest new Soviet threat, most Congressmen and Carter Administration officials see no chance of a return to a peacetime draft. Adverse public opinion is one key reason. And there are other questions. If Selective Service is revived, who should serve, when not all are needed?

Yet, most internal Pentagon proposals for better “manpower utilization” in the all-volunteer force have not addressed the central question: getting more able young men into the services, particularly into the ground combat arms or onto warships. Neither lowering physical/mental standards for men, nor even greater emphasis on remedial programs and “human relations,” nor increasing the number of women, nor greater reliance on civilian personnel fit the imperatives of combat readiness in tank, artillery, and infantry units or on Navy warships.

As I see it, the difficulties in the all-volunteer force do not originate in the death of conscription or in the efforts of service recruiters. The crucial flaw has been an informal redefinition since 1971 by Congress, the executive branch, and many “policy intellectuals” of military service as a function of “supply and demand variables,” as a “job” to be filled through “market in-

* A March 1977 Gallup poll showed 54 percent of respondents opposed to a return of the draft and 36 percent in favor. The Selective Service system is in “deep stand-by”; proposals to revive registration of young men have been made in Congress, but no such pre-emergency plans have been urged by the White House.
centives." In effect, starting with the Nixon Administration, we have sought to "buy" an alternative to the draft.

This Pentagon emphasis on individual cash compensation and material self-interest has helped move the U.S. military away from professionalism and institutional loyalty and esprit—the intangibles that also sustain Americans in uniform—toward an organizational mentality more and more resembling that of any civilian occupation. At its extreme, this mentality turns service people into "employees"—with the recent talk of military unionization as a natural by-product.

A New GI Bill?

Even at the recruiting level, inducements based mainly on economic incentives will be increasingly inadequate to provide the services with quality manpower. Studies show that high pay motivates low-aptitude youths—high school dropouts, those with poor grades—to join while having little attraction for more qualified youths.

Happily, proposals are being made to get the Pentagon away from simple cash inducements and to attract better-qualified young men. My own suggestion, advanced in congressional testimony last summer, was that the services offer potential recruits the option of a two-year enlistment (the old draft obligation) to be restricted to candidates for the combat arms, heavy labor jobs aboard ship, and other hard-duty fields.

The quid pro quo for such an assignment would be generous education benefits—along the lines of the GI bill for World War II veterans.* It would amount to four years in college in exchange for two years in the combat arms. The conditions of service would be honest and unambiguous, eliminating the "post-entry disillusionment" syndrome. Moreover, the recruit would be obligated to serve part-time in the reserves after discharge from active duty, thereby alleviating a major post-Vietnam gap in our defense posture.†

There is some evidence that a sufficient number of middle-class and upwardly mobile American youths would find such service a welcome brief diversion from the world of school or work. The added costs of this "New GI Bill" would be offset by reduced costs of attrition, by the elimination of current cash

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*The World War II veteran got up to $500 a year for tuition and $75 a month subsistence—enough in 1945–50 to cover most costs of even a Harvard education. Subsequent "GI bills" have been far less generous.
†In 1978, the Army's "selected reserve," which includes National Guard units slated for early deployment in case of war in Europe, was more than 20 percent under strength.
No other nation has made so strong an effort to use women in the military. Since 1973, the U.S. Defense Department has doubled the number of female soldiers, airmen, marines, and sailors—with 132,000 (or 6 percent of the total enlisted force) planned for this year. By 1984, the projected figure is 208,000, or 12 percent of all the services' enlisted personnel; 17 percent of the Air Force will be women.

Feminist agitation has had some effect, notably in opening up West Point, Annapolis, and the Air Force Academy to female cadets in 1976 and in enabling women to serve aboard Navy support vessels. But the major impetus has been the Pentagon's recognition of an unpleasant reality: Under the present all-volunteer system, not enough "able and available" American males can be recruited to fill the services' ranks, even with today's higher pay and reduced manpower goals.

Although barred from front-line combat units and warships, service women now fly helicopters, command Army posts, serve aboard Navy repair ships, drive Marine bulldozers, stand watch at Air Force Titan II missile sites, and train with the 82nd Airborne Division. Such assignments, small in number, make headlines. Surveys show that most enlisted women prefer—and get—"traditional" jobs in medical and administrative fields. Almost all women recruits are high school graduates; they rank well below male enlistees in drug abuse, alcoholism, and AWOL rates.

Last year, the Pentagon asked Congress to lift the ban on women serving in combat units. But debate persists within the military over how many women can be utilized without hurting operational readiness. The Army, in particular, with 57,000 enlisted women, many of them already in truck companies and other combat support units, has run into problems. Field commanders now must cope with a 15 percent pregnancy rate among enlisted women, unwed mothers, demands for Army-provided child care, and what one 1978 Army study called the "creeping advance of sex fraternization" between male officers and enlisted women. Such burdens have revived field officers' complaints that the Army risks becoming a "social welfare agency." Women are needed, according to Defense Secretary Harold Brown, but "the key issue is to maintain the combat effectiveness of the armed forces."

There are other grounds for encouraging such enlistments. The distinctive quality of the enlisted experience in modern American history has been the mixing of the social classes,
stereotyped in virtually every Hollywood movie about GIs at war. This began to diminish during the Vietnam conflict as the college-educated avoided service; it is rapidly disappearing in the all-volunteer Army.

To criticize a prosperous society that, in effect, excuses its privileged members from serving in the ranks is not to insist that the make-up of the enlisted force be perfectly "representative," an exact core sample of America's rich and not-so-rich, whites and nonwhites, Christians and Jews. The military should continue to be in the forefront of racial integration among both leaders and followers, as it has been since the early 1950s; that the military, as a profession or as a "step-up," attracts blacks is to its credit. But it is equally important that the participation of more middle-class youths in the enlisted ranks be considered a measure of our representative democracy and our dedication to equality of sacrifice. It is surprising that, given the extensive 1978 discussion of financial relief for families with children in college, no public figure has thought to tie such student aid to any service obligation, civilian or military, on the part of the youths who benefit.

Beyond the immediate problems of the all-volunteer force, there are nagging long-term questions. As it is now run, the all-volunteer force effectively excludes participation by most of those who will be America's future leaders, whether in government, the mass media, or, most notably, in the intellectual and academic communities. What effect will the evolution of a generation of political leaders who lack any firsthand experience have on future defense policy? Will military service gradually become viewed by the well-off as a solution for those with no other options?

In the final analysis, reliance on the market system is not the way to recruit or sustain an all-volunteer force, nor is it the way to strengthen the armed services for increasingly complex and demanding tasks on behalf of the larger society, in a time of world tensions and uncertainty.
Perhaps the best long view of the U.S. military is *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Macmillan, 1973, cloth; Ind. Univ., 1977, paper). Russell Weigley describes the military-political ups and downs of American history from the Battle of Bunker Hill to the battles in Vietnam. Some of Weigley's assertions are debatable, notably his thesis that, as its resources grew, the U.S. military usually came to favor an "annihilative" strategy against any foe. (In fact, the Joint Chiefs went along with a presidential "limited war" policy in Korea, as in Indochina.) Nowhere, he concludes, "does the use of combat offer much promise for the United States today."

Depicting *The Impact of War on American Life* (Holt, 1971), editor Keith L. Nelson serves up a piquant anthology of cartoons, polemics, and commentaries since 1900 dealing with pacifism, preparedness, and the military's influence—with a heavy focus on the Cold War era.

Good unofficial histories of the individual services (in contrast to good histories of U.S. wars) are rare. Weigley's scholarly *History of the United States Army* (Macmillan, 1967) is one of them. Most recent, and more popular in style, is J. Robert Moskin's *The U.S. Marine Corps Story* (McGraw-Hill, 1975), which describes not only the Marines' battles overseas—from the Bahamas expedition (1776) to Vietnam and the costly 1975 Mayaguez affair—but also their difficulties at home, notably with proposals after World War II and after Vietnam to abolish the Corps or reduce its size.

Two generals' biographies that illuminate the ethos of military life as well as the rigors of wartime command are Forrest C. Pogue's *George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880–1939* (Viking, 1963), which describes the early career and slow promotion of the imposing soldier who later shaped and led the U.S. Army in World War II, and William Manchester's breezy *American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1880–1964* (Little, Brown, 1978). Manchester depicts the imperious general's days at West Point, as well as later triumphs and failures.

Good generals depend on good troops. *The American Soldier: Vol. 1 Adjustment During Army Life; Vol. 2. Combat and its Aftermath* (Princeton, 1949, cloth; Military Aff. Aero, 1977, paper) is an ambitious effort by sociologist Samuel A. Stouffer, et al., to analyze extensive surveys of enlisted men before and during combat in World War II. The authors find the wartime GI a "civilian in uniform," highly resistant to the Old Army's caste system. Group esprit rather than ideology has motivated Americans in battle. *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War* (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1947; Peter Smith reprint, 1978) is combat historian S. L. A. Marshall's vivid exegesis of lessons learned from postbattle interviews in World War II. Among his findings: Americans fight better when they cheer and shout; only one out of four riflemen in close combat actually fired his weapon at the foe.
On a more abstract level, Samuel P. Huntington's *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations* (Harvard, 1957) traces the evolution of the modern officer corps since the early 19th century as a body of professionals with "expertise, responsibility, and corporateness." He sees necessary tensions between military values (duty, honor, country) and those of a liberal democratic society.

Far more detailed, and philosophically at odds with Huntington, is sociologist Morris Janowitz's pioneering study, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Free Press, 1960, cloth; rev. ed., 1971, paper). Janowitz traces the changing social origins of the U.S. officer corps (less Southern, less aristocratic); the increasing stresses on family life (with a high divorce rate in the Strategic Air Command); the new focus on "managerial" styles; the increasing collaboration between soldiers and civilian leaders after World War II. No longer, observes Janowitz, are the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps isolated from the larger society in peacetime; he favors more interaction.

During the late 1960s and early '70s, the military was blamed by academics and pundits for America's failures in Indochina and the heavy burdens of the Soviet-American arms race. In 1970, sociologist Charles Moskos, no supporter of the war, was moved to observe, "Anti-militarism has become the anti-Semitism of the intellectual community."

Indeed, the "warfare state," the "military-industrial complex," and the "selling of the Pentagon" were widely assailed in books and the news media. ROTC programs were eliminated at top universities, and West Point was flayed for being insufficiently humanistic.

A dispassionate analysis is Adam Yarmolinsky's *The Military Establishment: Its Impact on American Society* (Harper, 1970). Yarmolinsky, a former aide to Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and sometime Harvard law professor, provides a lucid Big Picture. He finds that the military, since 1940, has become more "civilianized" under the pressures of politics, technology, and involvement in foreign policy. Yet, a homogeneous "military-industrial complex" is a myth. Rival service chiefs, rival contractors, and Congressmen from affected localities vie for the defense budget dollar. Military contracts are vital to a few large but low-profit aerospace firms (e.g., Lockheed, General Dynamics) and regional shipyards, but they count for little at General Motors, AT&T, and the nation's other leading corporations.

Especially since the early 1960s, the power over the armed services held by Secretaries of Defense and their civilian aides has vastly increased (with mixed results). And, in the end, Yarmolinsky observes, "the military is at any time no more powerful than the President of the United States—the commander in chief of the armed forces—is prepared to allow it to be."

At presidential order, the United States has intervened militarily in many places besides Vietnam since World War II: Korea, Lebanon, the Taiwan Straits, Laos, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Cambodia. Have the generals always been the most eager to intervene?

No, says Richard K. Betts of Brookings as he examines the advisory role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and lesser military men since 1945 in *Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War*
Each service chief's views were shaped in part by his own service's organization and doctrine. But by and large, the military were no more eager to intervene in crises overseas than were the President's top civilian advisers. Sometimes they were less eager, as in the case of Laos in 1961. Once U.S. troops were in battle, however, the military tended to urge more forceful policies than did the civilians, as in Vietnam after 1965. For better or worse, "military advice," writes Betts, "has been most persuasive [to Presidents] as a veto of the use of force and least potent when it favored force."

Books on nuclear strategy, arms control, and national politico-military policy abound, often with recipes for better performance (see "Strategic Arms Control," Background Books, WQ, Autumn 1977). Many seem written with an eye on the day's headlines; the author's arguments and assumptions are soon made stale by events.

This weakness also afflicts most recent books on the draft, the all-volunteer force, and the post-Vietnam army. Unionizing the Armed Forces (Univ. of Pa., 1977, cloth & paper), edited by Ezra S. Krendel and Bernard Samoff, is a compendium of essays on what was once Topic A but seems to have faded. In Women and the Military (Brookings, 1977, cloth & paper), Martin Binkin and Shirley J. Bach, an Air Force officer, suggest that women could fill one-third of all Army enlisted positions and 94 percent of Air Force jobs but concede the need for more studies first. Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam Generation (Knopf, 1978) is a useful, partly anecdotal critique of the Vietnam draft, its inequities, and its evaders by Lawrence M. Bachir and William A. Strauss. The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force (Government Printing Office, 1970) lays out the original Nixon rationale for ending the draft; many of its assumptions have proved optimistic. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage assail Army careerism and bureaucracy in Crisis in Command (Hill and Wang, 1978) and contend that the all-volunteer force will not improve matters.

Sam C. Sarkesian's The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society (Nelson-Hall, 1974) tends to view the military in a broader context. Much remains the same, even after Vietnam. Anti-Pentagon polemics have abated. Yet American society has changed, he says, and the military profession must adapt to a new environment, without sacrificing its competence and esprit: "All the reorganizations, concerns for weapons technology, and changing strategic posture that may be necessary ... are meaningless if the [military profession] does not have solid support from the society at large."

editor's note: Advice on books for this essay came from Samuel F. Wells, Jr., Charles Moskos, David MacIsaac, and researchers at the Defense Department, the Army War College, and the Brookings Institution.
Local institutions run by local men became the hallmark of English colonization in America, writes Yale historian Morgan. But the Virginia settlers who early made it to the top as tobacco planters used their control of the colony’s assembly and the county courts to defraud and overwork the thousands of indentured servants lured to the New World from Britain. Before the 1670s, opposition to the laws passed by Virginia’s assembly did not come from the crown; it came from the discontented small farmers and freemen who wanted to dislodge the oligarchy that monopolized local offices, speculated in land, levied taxes, and restricted the franchise. Bacon’s Rebellion (1676), the most serious colonial conflict prior to the American Revolution, was the consequence. Later, slavery helped to calm the colony’s uneasy social order as planters turned to exploiting black slaves rather than other Englishmen; the assembly, responding to the small planter, reduced taxes and enlarged the franchise. Local politics was still intensely factional, but now rivals fought to control, not disband, the lower house. The Old South, says Morgan, was forged in Virginia, where slavery for blacks made democracy for white farmers possible.

—James N. Lang (78)
CURRENT BOOKS

the culmination of 30 years of strong scholarship. Craig is unsparing in his criticism of past failures on the part both of Germany's middle class and of intellectuals (in 1918, novelist Thomas Mann proclaimed, "I don't want politics. I want impartiality, order, and propriety"). He provides illuminating sketches of the historic principals—notably Bismarck—and fine insights into the workings of the German foreign ministry and diplomatic service. The "acute neuroticism" of the Germans, which Craig ascribes to fear of the intentions of others, deriving from lack of political education, still concerns many nations. The Germans themselves worry about this. Yet their ability to overcome their past rests on a final, curious irony: Even as Hitler bequeathed to them a memory of horror that was to reinforce the need to choose new paths, he also, with his demonic thoroughness, destroyed German society's traditional bases of resistance to liberalism, thereby restoring to (West) Germans the options that had once been open to them.

—William B. Bader ('77)

POPULAR CULTURE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE
by Peter Burke
$6.95 (paper only)
L of C 78-402
ISBN 0-06-131928-7

Britain's Peter Burke offers a thesis: that there was a distinct European popular culture in the period 1500-1800. This culture can be defined, he argues, using oblique rather than direct approaches to sources, and it can be seen to have changed subtly over time. In brief, there is such a thing as popular culture, and it has a history. Burke writes about such professional and amateur entertainers as the operateur or charlatan (the word was not always pejorative in the 16th and 17th centuries), whose amusing patter, designed to sell pills and potions, also helped to spread popular culture. He describes the world of Carnival, analyzes the composition of folk songs, folktales, and dances, and uncovers widely held attitudes voiced by the heroes, villains, and fools in dramas of the day. At first, the upper and middle classes of European society were participants in all this, despite attempts by both Catholic and Protestant clergy to reform popular culture. But, in

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time, buffoons became unfashionable (Charles I, who died in 1649, was the last king of England to have a court jester). And by the 18th century even popular proverbs were beginning to be shunned; Lord Chesterfield advised his son against their use as "proofs of having kept . . . low company."

—Rosemary O'Day

JUST AND UNJUST WARS: Ideological and national passions and myths combine to color judgment about war even in peacetime. During desperate days of battle, how much more unlikely is objectivity about the substantive merits of war's causes or conduct. Walzer, a professor of government at Harvard, takes as his starting point the fact that, however "inevitable" armed conflicts are claimed to be by ideologues, militarists, and politicians, however strong the tendency to accept warfare as outside our normal moral categories, we do apply moral judgments to war. He invites the reader to distinguish between the more and the less justifiable uses of force and gives his own evaluations of armed conflicts from all periods. Ancient Athens' destruction of Melos and Britain's bombing of Dresden in World War II cannot be justified, he holds; Israel's 1967 War and India's defense of Bangladesh are justifiable. Agincourt, the burning of Atlanta, and many other controversial episodes are a mix of the just and the unjust. Without concluding that Walzer is wholly right, one can admire his eloquent effort to face up to the difficulties of his subject.

—Geoffrey Best

Dominguez, an emigré political scientist at Harvard, describes how Cuba has been governed in the 20th century. The First Republic (1902–33) saw "the establishment of a multiplicity of sources . . . of authority and influence" while the country was engaged in a semicolonial relationship with the United States; the Second Republic (1933–58) saw rule through regulation and distribution of resources to favored groups and institutions under U.S. hegemony. Dominguez sees Cas-
tro’s Cuba, under Soviet hegemony, as one in which the impact of government in daily life has increased enormously: mass organizations are primarily tools that the regime uses to implement policy. The battle for control of the revolution and its future course is waged within the Partido Comunista Cubano. "The new citizen ideology" (egalitarian, with emphasis on cooperative values and behavior, selflessness, and discipline) is less effective than it might be, due to its "incoherence." Those of us who disagree with this important book’s approach to political theory—after all, it seems odd to describe an avowed Marxist-Leninist Revolution without a single reference to Marx or Lenin—are challenged to better its author’s ambitious analysis.

—Lourdes Casal

AMERICAN REALISM: A Pictorial Survey from the Early Eighteenth Century to the 1970s by Francois Mathey Skira/Rizzoli, 1978 192 pp. $50

Flax beaters, eel spearers, lacrosse players, rum runners, space travelers, fat tourists—in such subjects American artists for more than two centuries have struggled to identify the national spirit. Francois Mathey, curator of Musée des Arts Décoratifs, Paris, here presents an extended essay on the response of these artists to their fellow Americans and their environment, with a chronological sequence of paintings and photographs (70 in color, 100 black and white). Brief commentaries supply unusual information on particular works (the halos around the heads of the children in "Maryland Family," painted in 1820 by an anonymous artist, showed that they had died). Frank about his likes and dislikes, Mathey sees George Catlin as a meticulous investigator of Indian life, relating art to ethnography with sensitivity and skill, Thomas Hart Benton as a naive, bombastic populist. Encompassing individuals as diverse as Thomas Eakins, Albert Ryder, and Robert Rauschenberg under the rubric of realism poses some problems in definition: Is the realistic painter merely a pictorial reporter, a mechanical peeping Tom? Or is he also a shaper of a new reality, no matter how abstract his style, how clouded his vision?

—Archie Green
History

**THE DEATH OF WOMAN WANG**
by Jonathan Spence
Viking, 1978
186 pp. $10.95
L of C 77-29134

Woman Wang was an obscure peasant, murdered in 1672 in T’an-ch’eng County, Shantung Province, northeastern China. Historian Spence takes her fate as the focus and dénouement of his highly original rendering of that remote place and period. His account is based on a contemporary local history compiled by the county gentry, which describes ideal female behavior through the biographies of 56 honorable and virtuous T’an-ch’eng women. He enhances this with selections—including mention of the death of Wang—from a personal memoir by a magistrate-scholar with an eye for detail and an obsession with accuracy. Interwoven are some of the short stories of Pu Sung-ling, who happened to pass through T’an-ch’eng in 1670. From these diverse sources, Spence imaginatively reconstructs the tragedy of a woman with no recourse to magic, money, or family. He captures the sense of everyday life in this time of great upheaval, when the Ch’ing Dynasty was consolidating its success over the Ming. Taxes and other administrative matters are part of the record, but more important is the stream of catastrophes (famine, floods, the depredations of bandits) that overwhelm ordinary people in this stunningly fashioned miniature—a 17th-century Chinese murder mystery.

**GRACCHUS BABEUF:**
*The First Revolutionary Communist*
by R. B. Rose
Stanford, 1978
442 pp. $18.50
L of C 76-54099
ISBN 0-8047-0949-1

The French Revolution was in many ways a testing ground for the politics of the modern world. Important recent studies of the momentous events of this period (Robert R. Palmer’s *The Age of Democratic Revolution* and Jacques Godechot’s *France and the Atlantic Revolution of the Eighteenth Century, 1770–1779*) have been better at conveying the big picture than at sharpening the focus on
key participants. All the more welcome, then, is the appearance of this first comprehensive biography in any language of the remarkable François-Noël Babeuf, who looked back to the agrarian radicals of ancient Rome for his revolutionary name "Gracchus" and at the same time saw beyond the political and constitutional issues of his day. His so-called Conspiracy of Equals—the unsuccessful 1796 attempt to overthrow the Directory, for which he was tried and executed—anticipated 20th-century revolutionaries’ elitism in the name of communist ideals. The word "communism" was not in Babeuf’s vocabulary, however, and he is not represented as a proto-totalitarian. Avoiding the tendency of some historians to read into the past the preoccupations of the present, Rose, a professor at the University of Tasmania, portrays his subject as a touchingly loyal family man deeply involved in rural reform in his native Picardy before being sucked into the maelstrom of revolutionary Paris. This important book never quite comes to grips with the turbulent Pari- sian ambiance in which Babeuf’s conspiracy was initiated, but it provides a conscientious narrative of a leading figure’s movements.

THE PAX BRITANNICA TRILogy (3 vols.)
1. Heaven’s Command: An Imperial Progress;
2. Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire;
3. Farewell the Trumpets: An Imperial Retreat
by James Morris
Harcourt, 1968–78; 554, 544, and 576 pp., $11.50, $7.50, and $14.95 respectively
L of C 73-13965
68-24395
77-92542
0-15-171425-8
0-15-130404-1

“I have been concerned,” James (now Jan) Morris writes in Farewell the Trumpets, “not so much with what the British Empire meant, as what it felt like.” In the three volumes of this absorbing historical pageant, he successfully evokes the reality of imperial power—and of its loss—by a careful selection of places, people, and events. Heaven’s Command opens in 1837 with Victoria’s accession to the throne at a time when Britain had no pretensions to world dominion; it ends with an empire haphazardly gained. Pax Britannica concentrates on this empire at its dazzling climax, when the news seemed always good. (Plutocrat-imperialist Cecil Rhodes said it best: "To be born British was to win first prize in the lottery of life.") Farewell begins at the apogee of Victoria’s reign with the celebration of her Diamond Jubilee in 1897, when a quarter of the earth’s land surface and
nearly a quarter of its people were under her domain. Victoria died in 1901; the Boer War that "cracked the imperial spirit" had begun, and terrible events lay in the future. The book ends with the death of Winston Churchill in 1965. By that time, "the grand illusion had collapsed, and England was a European island once more," Morris notes. "Looking back at the great performance, wondering at the scale, the effrontery, the vulgarity, and the nobility of it all," the British "could scarcely recognize themselves in the actors or identify their smaller lives with that drama long ago."

PROTEST AT SELMA: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Voting Rights Act of 1965
by David J. Garrow
Yale, 1978, 359 pp. $15
ISBN 0-300-02247-6

Despite the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964, obstructionist local judges in the Black Belt counties of the Deep South long blocked federal attempts to end discriminatory practices against black voters. In Alabama's Dallas County, where blacks comprised half, or approximately 15,000 of the voting-age population, only 335 were registered to vote in 1964. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference, led by Martin Luther King, Jr., decided to concentrate on dramatizing a clear constitutional issue—the right to vote. Since 1963, a strong voter education effort had been carried on by SCLC organizers in the county. By early 1965, they felt ready to begin peaceful demonstrations in Selma, the county seat. On March 7, 1965, the most significant civil rights battle of the decade occurred. What black would-be voters faced was dramatically exposed that day in Selma when state troopers attacked and injured scores of peaceful demonstrators; "Bloody Sunday," televised nationwide, created unprecedented public support for civil rights. Garrow (a Duke graduate student) reconstructs the protest and shows how press and public reactions paved the way for the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which banned the tests and requirements that had thwarted black registration since 1957. After Selma, enforcement by federal registrars and poll watchers proved far more successful in securing voting rights than had earlier court procedures.
"Mars, the stupidest of the Gods," railed Erasmus. Judging from this survey of four centuries of effort to abolish him, the god of war may be also the most intractable. In the 16th century as in ours, war has been blamed on the vanities of the powerful, on the repression of peoples, on ignorance of one's true interest. In this book, the Oxford Professor of the History of War defines liberals as people profoundly dissatisfied with their world and confident of the power of reason to change it. But whatever these people hope for, he writes, they have to begin with the world they find; as threats multiplied and evolved, liberals have often gone to war for the sake of peace—occasionally, as in 1914, against one another. "At the root of the dilemma of liberal thinkers lies the habit of seeing war as a distinct and abstract entity about which one can generalize at large.... But 'war' is simply the generic term for the use of armed force by states or aspirants to statehood to achieve their political objectives." Howard shies away from what remains implicit in his argument: Liberals are torn between love of peace and love of justice; however great their desire for peace, in the crunch they discover causes they hold yet dearer. From this frequent incompatibility of cherished values, the pangs of the liberal conscience arise.

Contemporary Affairs

THE EMPTY POLLING BOOTH
by Arthur T. Hadley
Prentice-Hall, 1978
179 pp. $8.95
L of C 78-16966

The Case of the Missing American Voter has long intrigued the Holmeses and Watsons of political science and journalism. In the last presidential election, some 65 million members or 46 percent of an electorate of 150 million chose not to vote, thereby constituting themselves the largest enfranchised political group in America. Hadley, a former Newsweek political writer, eliminates many theories about the nonvoter, refuting popular assumptions that more often than not the "refrainer" is (a) a rural Southerner or a resident of a Northern city's slums; (b) black; (c) young; (d) cynical about life and government; (e)
poorer than the voter; (f) less educated than the voter; (g) prevented from voting by archaic regulations, fraud, difficulty of access to facilities, or threat of violence (the belief most fervently held in "the Boobus Americanus stereotype," according to Hadley). Citing statistics and delineating profiles of nonvoters gleaned from a poll that he and Robert Teeter conducted in 1976-77, the author proceeds to identify a decidedly different (often middle-class white-collar urban) composite refrainer. Since Thomas Jefferson's time, the belief has persisted that the country is best served when only a small group of educated and concerned citizens go to the polls. Hadley asks if we really want the nonvoters to vote (his own answer? a resounding "yes") and concludes with suggestions on how to get refrainers to exercise their rights. Among them: postal card registration; making "V-Day" a holiday in federal election years.

EGYPT'S UNCERTAIN REVOLUTION UNDER NASSER AND SADAT
by Raymond William Baker
Harvard, 1978, 300 pp. $16
L of C 78-18356
ISBN 0-674-2414-1

SHAHHAT: An Egyptian
by Richard Critchfield
$12.95 cloth, $6.95 paper
L of C 78-11945
ISBN 0-8156-2203-3
0-8156-0151-4 pbk

Egypt's modern leaders, in the view of Baker, a Williams College political scientist, have embraced "bureaucratic feudalism." Egyptians as a people have escaped "a situation of colonial dependency only by a new dependency on the cleverness of their authoritarian rulers." He finds both the late Gamal Abdul Nasser, who led the 1952 coup against the monarchy, and Anwar es-Sadat, who succeeded Nasser in 1970, fundamentally distrustful of the masses. Their failure to provide an ideology or working political institutions has left life in Egypt disrupted but not transformed.

The Aswan dam on the Nile has ended thousands of years of annual flooding in the villages of Upper Egypt where Shahhat, the impetuous young peasant vividly portrayed in Critchfield's book, pursues his life. Yet neither this nor various other forms of government intervention have substantially improved his lot, and new layers of seemingly irrational regulation have been imposed on him and his neighbors. Life to the sturdy Egyptian fellah has always seemed to lack order and reason, however, writes Critchfield,
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: A Study of Two Ethnic Communities in Israel
by Rita James Simon
$13.95 cloth, $4.95 paper
L of C 77-15090
ISBN 0-521-21938-8
0-521-29318-9 pbk

Ultra-orthodox Jews in Israel number approximately 55,000 and live mostly in the Mea Shearim section of Jerusalem. Militantly unassimilated, they cling to traditional dress styles, language (Yiddish), and religious rituals that they regard as inherently superior. They refuse military service. Urban Arabs remaining within the pre-1967 borders of Israel constitute one-third of the total 450,000 Israeli Arab population and are concentrated in five cities. They are eager to embrace education, employment, elections, radio and TV, and other aspects of the secular Israeli-Jewish society that continues to discriminate against them. This sympathetic, lucid monograph is based on interviews in both communities. Author Simon, editor of the American Sociological Review, concludes that the “big question” about the urban Israeli Arabs “is the extent to which their interests in the life styles of the larger Jewish society will be accepted or rejected by the gatekeepers and members of that society.”

Arts & Letters

THE FEDERAL PRESENCE: Architecture, Politics, and Symbols in United States Government Building
by Lois Craig and the Staff of the Federal Architecture Project
M.I.T., 1978, 595 pp. $37.50
L of C 78-13366
ISBN 0-262-03057-8

The very mention of “federal buildings” conjures up the worst in American architecture: the FBI’s brutalistic “copagon,” the Rayburn House Office Building, Alcatraz, or almost any local post office. Yet imperial bombast and bureaucratic tedium, in infinite combinations and variations, are not the whole story, as this rich book ably demonstrates. Its text, photographs, and drawings depict hundreds of famous and little-known projects (realized or otherwise). If at points the effect is of a visual grab bag, this very quality attests to the fickleness of public taste. Along with cookie-cutter constructions, there are brilliant designs by Thomas Jefferson, James Cukrenga a special correspondent for The Economist. “For did not hidden demons, blind fate, the solicitations of Satan, the hot fury of one’s own blood await every man in ambush at the crossroads? Why, then, change?”

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Renwick, H. H. Richardson, and Eero Saarinen, all commissioned by the federal government and preserved in the U.S. National Archives. There are misses and near-misses galore: the rejected design for the White House that included a throne room, for instance. But from George Washington's 1791 decision to create a national capital down to the scores of office buildings erected to house the Great Society bureaucrats of the 1960s, the U.S. Government has been one of the nation's most active—and, at times, most creative—patrons of architecture.

The not so "naive" painters of Yugoslavia command huge sums for their work these days. Happily, this collection of 120 excellent color reproductions, prepared especially for an American audience, presents a generous sampling at a bargain price. Not folk art, really, these paintings embrace personal statements about the world and visions of life close to nature that go far beyond Yugoslavian village lore. Tomašević places the stimulus for this art—fresh, direct, ingenuous, humane—in the context of the modernization and urbanization that affected Yugoslavia profoundly after World War II and the accompanying nostalgia for what was good about "the good old days." His case may be oversimplified, but it is presented with brio. Of 36 artists grouped by republic or region (regrettably, only one from Macedonia), 20 represent Croatia, where the world's first museum devoted solely to naive art opened in Zagreb in 1952. All draw upon fertile sources of inspiration, with talent and ingenuity. Josip Generalić's painting of an astronaut on another planet shows the explorer, despite his space suit, as a familiar rural character, barefoot and mustached, tending a yellow cow who munches on a clump of bright green grass growing near a crater. Martin Jonas portrays human figures as giants with enormous feet and hands and disproportionately small heads—surely the way they must have looked to him as a child sitting under a table in his parents' farm home.
Long before he died in 1809 at age 79, Franz Joseph Haydn had become an institution. His students and disciples (among them Mozart and Beethoven) adored him. So do audiences today, as musicologists writing for the *Haydn Yearbook* and members of the international Haydn Society will readily attest. Yet the short, pock-marked composer has proven too big for the chroniclers. The contents of important archives covering the quarter century he spent in the service of Prince Esterházy are only now being digested. And a comprehensive edition of his scores will not be completed until the year 2000. Under these circumstances, it requires more than an ordinary amount of nerve and energy to undertake an exhaustive biography of this gentlest of genuises. Landon has culled all the rich materials, both personal and musical. (Where did Haydn's favorite bassoonist obtain reeds? At "The Golden Bassoon" in Vienna, of course.) His *Haydn* is addictive, the well-told life of a great man. The secret of the author's success is his realization that the composer's art was inseparable from the demanding, often petty, world described in contemporary letters, reviews, and gossipy diaries. In Volume II, for example, we encounter Haydn struggling to obtain winter uniforms for his musicians, feuding with a neighbor, producing literally hundreds of pieces for no other purpose than to give pleasure to his patron, an amateur performer on the now extinct baryton. Could a grant from some forerunner of our National Endowments or cultural foundations have saved Haydn from all this, freeing him for the service of Art? Haydn himself seems not to have minded the grub work. Submitting some manuscripts to his publisher, he describes them as having been "neatly and correctly written and well constructed." One might think that he was speaking of the detailed account books he was obliged to keep, rather than five of his symphonies! Volume by volume, this *Haydn* demonstrates that craft is inseparable from art, that the sublime and the mundane are related like light and shadow, and that genius can be modest.
CURRENT BOOKS

THE BEST AMERICAN SHORT STORIES 1978
edited by Ted Solotaroff
with Shannon Ravenel
Houghton Mifflin, 1978
428 pp. $10.95
L of C 16-11387

This fine collection proves beyond any doubt
that the short story lives and flourishes in
North America today. It justifies once again
the faith maintained through some earlier,
leaner times and 35 preceding volumes by
Martha Foley, the series' long-time editor,
who died two years ago at the age of 80. To
choose the 22 stories reprinted here, Ravenel,
a former fiction editor at Houghton Mifflin,
goes through 500 issues of 123 U.S. and
Canadian magazines, from big (Esquire, the
Atlantic) to decidedly little (Ascent, published
by the English Department at the University
of Illinois). At that, editor Solotaroff notes,
she was able to peruse only about a quarter of
the stories appearing in 1977 in the roughly
500 periodicals that now publish short fic-
tion. The finalists are largely quite traditional
narratives—though their characters may be
as unexpectedly offbeat as Joyce Carol
Oates's conniving Russians in "The Transla-
tion," or as wildly down-home as Robert T.
Sorrells's fat, redneck tennis player in "The
Blacktop Champion of Icky Honey." Lynne
Sharon Schwartz's "Rough Strife," a Cana-
dian entry from the Ontario Review, is a ten-
der love story about a couple finally having a
child after they had given up hope. Under a
policy proposed by Solotaroff, the 1979 col-
collection will have a different editor; Ravenel
will continue to do the preliminary reading
for future volumes.

WEATHERING: Poems and
Translations
by Alastair Reid
Dutton, 1978, 125 pp. $7.95
L of C 78-51846
ISBN 0-525-23076-9

"I am awed by how things weather," writes
Alastair Reid in his title poem. "An oak mante-
tel in the house in Spain, fingered to a sheen/
the marks of hands leaned into the lintel, . . .
the watch / my father's wrist wore to a thin gold
sandwich. . . . Weathering is what I would like
to do well." This Scot, who served in the
Royal Navy in World War II, has earned his
living as a translator (principally of Latin
American writers), poet, reviewer, and re-
porter (for the New Yorker) from many parts
of the world. The poems he has chosen for this
slim volume cover a span of 25 years. In-
cluded here are 64 of his own and 24 trans-
lated from the work of José Emilio Pacheco,
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Pablo Neruda, and Jorge Luis Borges. A man with no permanent home address, Reid has a deep feeling for all that lasts—sea, ivy, leather bindings, crystals, “the language of the blunt-tongued Anglo-Saxons”—and for “the twilight setting” of goodbyes. Weather is everywhere in his haunting little book: sunlight “like a halo on hair and heather and hills,” snow, wind “cold like hate.” “For who is weather-wise/ enough to recognize which ills are the day’s, which his?” he asks. In “Translator to Poet” (1973), he speaks of Neruda’s books “stony on the shelf, I cannot read them for the thunderous silence, / the grief of Chile’s dying and your own, / death being the one definitive translation.”

Science & Technology

MURMURS OF EARTH: The Voyager Interstellar Record
by Carl Sagan et al.
Random, 1978, 273 pp. $15
L of C 77-5991

It has long been clear that man has a great urge to leave time capsules behind him. The principal author of this book has had a hand in assembling the capsules here described, as well as four earlier interstellar billets doux for NASA to deposit in space. Sagan and his colleagues detail the problems of arriving at a consensus on contents, designed to inform the cosmos at large about what Earthmen regarded as important in the latter part of the 20th century. The most recent opportunity arises from NASA’s Voyager I and II missions to the outer planets. The time capsules that these spacecraft carry constitute an extraordinary mélange of sound and images—both recorded on 16½ rpm phonograph discs. What, one cannot help but wonder, will some future cosmic junk collector make of diagrams of vertebrate evolution? Or a picture of a tree toad photographed in a backyard near Ithaca, N.Y., by a human whose own hand, with a dirty fingernail, appears in the print? Or the first two bars of the Beethoven cavatina from the String Quartet No. 13 in B flat, Opus 130? How will he (she?) respond to the Mandarin Chinese greeting: “Hope everyone’s well. We are thinking about you all. Please come to visit us when you have time”?

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COSMOS, EARTH, AND MAN: A Short History of the Universe
by Preston Cloud
Yale, 1978, 388 pp. $14.95
L of C 78-2666
ISBN 0-300-02146-1

Although it is written for the educated layman, Cloud’s book is likely to give some middle-aged readers a disturbing sense of academic backwardness. The distinguished University of Minnesota biogeologist (a new scientific caste he helped to create) weaves some familiar and many not-so-familiar elements into what he describes as a kind of “historical/predictive” novel about the earth, its ancestry, and its uncertain future. The last quarter century has produced an astonishing bounty of new discoveries—in plate tectonics, fossil finds, and sophisticated dating methods—about the cosmos, and about our own small planet and its history. Admitting that fresh knowledge comes so quickly that scholarly papers (or books like this) may soon be ridiculously out of date, Cloud draws on a lifetime of interdisciplinary expertise to retell the ever awesome story.

MIND AND MADNESS IN ANCIENT GREECE:
The Classical Roots of Modern Psychiatry
by Bennett Simon
Cornell, 1978
336 pp. $17.50
L of C 77-90911
ISBN 0-8014-0859-8

Early Greek poetry, philosophy, and medicine reveal three psychodynamic concerns that have survived to modern times: the structure of the mind; the relative importance for one’s mental life of external and internal forces; and the relationship between theory and practice in matters of psychological health. Both Plato and Freud posited a mental structure organized in parts having particular functions, with an attendant definition of conflict among them. But Simon, a Harvard professor of psychiatry, sees clear differences between ancient and modern mental stress. In classical Greece (Homer’s to Plato’s), a stable system of authority prevailed (even rules for rebellion were spelled out). Conflict arose out of individual opposition to these inhibiting forces and circumstances, not from within the personality. Homer is illustrative—his poetry has no term for “person” or “oneself.” Today, authoritarianism is a minor issue in the West, and madness (so to speak) far more personal. In losing our Greek choruses, we have lost security and have become “the multifaceted self of modern art, collage man, . . . the [human] counterpart of shifting institutions and shifting values.”
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PAPERBOUNDS


Ivan Turgenev, whom Henry James called "the novelist's novelist," was a 19th-century political dissident who chose to live much of his life in the West. Hence, many of his papers are preserved in France, England, and Germany, rather than in his native Russia. Britain's prolific critic and writer of fiction V. S. Pritchett (his Selected Stories were published in 1978) uses these materials to depict Turgenev's years abroad and particularly the bachelor author's passion for Spanish-born soprano Pauline Garcia-Viardot, which seized him in 1843 and lasted until his death in 1883. New information plus Pritchett's keen critical eye make this one of the best studies in any language of Turgenev's major novels (Rudin, Home of the Gentry, On the Eve, Fathers and Sons) and short stories (First Love is his most famous). More's the pity that Pritchett passes so lightly over the now largely forgotten Turgenev plays, which were unsurpassed on the Russian stage until Chekhov came along.


When this book was first published in 1948, the New York Times called it a "definitive history" of the celebrated 1920s' murder case. The description still applies to this cool study of the impact of the trial and execution of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, obscure Italian-born anarchists, for a $16,000 payroll robbery in Braintree, Mass., on April 15, 1920, in which two men died. The case was in the courts for six years during an era of U.S. history marked by a climate of anti-Red hysteria, chauvinism, and ethnic prejudice. The late Professor Morgan, a Harvard Law School authority on evidence, carefully examined the full legal record of the trial. He did not attempt to judge guilt or innocence, but he concludes that the conduct of the trial made the accused "victims of a tragic miscarriage of justice." The non-legal repercussions are discussed by social historian Joughin, who describes what happened in the United States and abroad. Anti-American demonstrations, possibly the first, occurred throughout Western Europe after Sacco and Vanzetti were electrocuted on August 23, 1927. Joughin also analyzes the enormous literature the case engendered: articles, poems, novels, and plays—among the latter, Maxwell Anderson's Winterset (1935).

CURING CHRONIC INFLATION. Edited by Arthur M. Okun and George L. Perry. Brookings, 1978. 310 pp. $4.95 (cloth, $11.95)

Brookings's Okun and Perry have organized the papers of their institution's 25th "Panel on Economic Activity" into a book on inflation that is not incomprehensible to the layman. Laurence S. Seidman of the University of Pennsylvania analyzes the probable effects of tax-based incomes policies (TIP), whose ultimate objective is to lower and control the rate of increase of prices; among various possible TIPs he favors the imposition of a penalty tax on employers who grant excessive wage increases. Florida State University's Abba P. Lerner takes a different tack: slowing inflation through the use of federal "wage-increase permits." Such permits would be fully tradable in a competitive market "like a share of IBM in the stock exchange," allowing an employer who wished to increase his adjusted wage bill by more than 3 percent annually to do so...
through acquiring permits from others who were reducing their wage bills. The problems that both businesses and the IRS would face in implementing any kind of TIP are reviewed by U.S. Treasury Department officials Larry L. Dildine and Emil M. Sunley. The administrative difficulties are large but not, they believe, insurmountable. However, they decline to evaluate the tradeoff between red tape and gains in moderating wage and price increases. Brookings' Robert W. Crandall reviews other ways in which the federal government could reduce inflation—by putting Social Security on a sounder basis, substituting direct for indirect taxes, changing both farm and foreign trade policies. Princeton University's Albert Rees notes the widespread skepticism concerning all of the proposed new anti-inflation policies. Neither he nor any other contributor offers much solace to citizens whose reaction to the economics of their daily lives is 'Stop the spiral—we want to get off.'

THE VOICES OF SILENCE. By André Malraux. Princeton/Bollingen, 1978. 661 pp. $9.95 (cloth, $40)

André Malraux (1901–76), a hero of the French Resistance in World War II, became France's Minister of Culture during the De Gaulle years. He was also a master of modern criticism, whose three-volume work, The Psychology of Art, appeared in English in 1949–50; later refashioned as Voices, it was first published in the United States in 1953. Malraux invented a new set of classifications for grouping his judgments and insights. Instead of writing about, say, Renaissance painting or Greek sculpture, he discusses the "museum without walls," the metamorphoses of Apollo, "the creative process," and the "aftermath of the absolute." These categories give him freedom to range widely; thus, describing the use of the horse as a motif on coins, he can write that, regarding the horse, "civilized and barbaric races had more in common than regarding Man." Malraux points out that the art museum did not exist until roughly 200 years ago. A large share of our heritage derives from peoples whose idea of art was quite other than ours, and even from peoples to whom the very idea of art meant nothing."

A NEST OF HOOKS. By Lon Otto. Univ. of Iowa, 1978. 141 pp. $4.95 (cloth, $8.95)

This volume, the ninth recipient of the Iowa School of Letters Award for Short Fiction, contains 28 stories ranging in length from a single brief paragraph ("The Rules") to 39 pages ("The Siege"). One is not surprised to learn that the collection's author, 30-year-old Lon Otto, wrote only poetry for a number of years; his closely focused stories show an artist's love for the rhythm and movement of language, for the telling small detail. Cataloging "a strangeness in the world that could only be borne in fiction," Otto shows men and women at the mercy of the contraptions with which they surround themselves. Bicycles, houses, cameras, submarines all take on a life of their own. Many of the stories in this good book concern fishing. In one of the best, the narrator imagines himself gone fishing with his long-deceased grandfather. The title: "I'm Sorry You're Dead."


In 1956, when this book was first published, its subject was still hush-hush in many circles, and it flopped commercially. Now, interracial marriage is accepted as a topic to be discussed, as the author does, with dignity, not shame. Murray, a former law professor who in 1977 became the first black female ordained an Episcopal priest, tells the story
of her maternal grandparents. Cornelia Smith, her grandmother, born into slavery, may have had no Negro blood; her mother, who was said to be three-quarters white and one-fourth Cherokee, was a slave maid raped by a 24-year-old bachelor member of her Chapel Hill, N.C., owner’s family. Robert Fitzgerald, her grandfather, a “free person of color” from Delaware, was one-quarter black; his mother was of Swedish and French descent, his father a half-Irish mulatto. Fitzgerald fought for the Union in the Civil War and later moved to North Carolina to work—until he went blind—for the Friends’ Freedmen’s Association as a teacher of ex-slaves. Murray’s new introduction to this book makes the point that over more than two centuries, “enough criss-crossing of racial lines and recirculation of genes within designated races has occurred to make the notion of racial purity a highly questionable biological concept for many future Americans.” Acceptance of the possibility of relatedness, she believes, may “help to ease the transition to a more humane society.”


Now that the Tutankhamun exhibit has reawakened Egyptophilia in the American imagination, the time has come to move beyond the boy pharaoh. Ramesses II, who came to the throne 48 years after Tut, in 1304 B.C., lived to a ripe 97 years of age. But he was not as fortunate in death as Tutankhamun, and his grave fell prey to robbers. In life, however, he had taken care of ensuring his permanence in history as Egypt’s most prolific builder of monuments. The present-day tourist, notes T. G. H. James, Keeper of the Department of Egyptian Antiquities at the British Museum, in a foreword to the book, “ceases, by the end of his visit, to be surprised at the architectural presence of this king.” MacQuitty’s excellent color photographs do justice to the most significant structures—at Abu Simbel, Karnak, Luxor, and Thebes. His brief text reminds us that the great obelisk in the Place de la Concorde, in the heart of Paris, also celebrates Ramesses II. A chronological table of the dynasties and principal kings of ancient Egypt is a useful extra.

THE FRONTIER IN LATIN AMERICAN HISTORY. By Alistair Hennessy. Univ. of New Mexico, 1978. 212 pp. $6.50 (cloth, $12.50)

This book’s point of departure is Frederick Jackson Turner’s thesis concerning the role of the frontier in American history and thought. British historian Hennessy finds that it does not apply in Latin America, where “there is no West; there is no Frontier; there are only frontiers.” The conquistadores who opened the continent and brought miscegenation, the Spanish and Portuguese crowns with their pursuit of authority and tribute, and the Catholic Church with its “half-feudalist, half-capitalist” colonizing strategies left a veritable typology of frontiers. Each has its own distinctive frontiersmen in the form of gauchos, miners, balladeers, muleteers. The comparative impact of the railways and river transport, European diseases, racial attitudes, the presence or absence of women also are part of the heritage that shaped Latin America differently from North America (and Australia and South Africa). Hennessy concludes that if, as Richard Hofstader argued, U.S. history is dominated by a sense of space rather than time, that of Latin America is dominated by “a complex interweaving of both space and time.”
On this ancient Chinese map, an unknown cartographer depicted his homeland as the "Middle Kingdom" and all other countries as small outlying islands: 1. China. 2. The Mountain of Man's Origin. 3. The Land of Superior Men. 4. The Land of Women. 5. Land Where It Is Hard To Live. 6. Pusang (America?) 7. Land of White People. 8. India.
“What’s a map for?” demanded Huckleberry Finn after his contention that Illinois was green and Indiana was pink met with Tom Sawyer’s scorn; “Ain’t it to learn you facts?” In ancient Greece, mapmakers sketched hypothetical continents to complement the lands they already knew. Their descendants, Jonathan Swift noted with amusement, plotted maps of Africa showing “elephants for want of towns.” With mankind reaching out into space, the future may be as fanciful as the past. Wilson Center Fellow Alan Henrikson charts the history of maps—and, by extension, our changing perceptions of the world.

by Alan K. Henrikson

Much as a child’s drawing of a neighborhood reflects his attitude toward the surroundings and his own place in them, so a society’s map of its geographical setting reveals, often in the same unconscious way, something of its sense of position in the world. The cartography of the physical world is a cartography of the mind.

The Chinese, for example, from ancient times have depicted their country as the “Middle Kingdom,” surrounded by assorted “barbarian” lands, which were separated from China and each other by concentric circles of ocean. To this day, the Chinese refer to their land as Chung-kuo, literally, the “Central Country.” Their opinion of foreigners as belonging to peripheral societies—lingers—recent diplomacy notwithstanding.

Unlike a photograph or a painting, a map represents its subject schematically. Because the areas it shows are too large to be seen in their entirety, and may include regions that have never been explored, some principle of extrapolation—from the known to the unknown—is needed. Lines are projected into the void, and the interstices are filled with figments of the imagination (or of scientific theory).

In the 6th century B.C., Anaximander of Miletus made a map describing the “whole circuit of the Earth, every sea and all rivers.” Of course, the “world” of the early Greeks was only the oikumenê, the known, inhabited world. The earth they pictured as a disc, resting upon water under the shield of the sky.

The Greeks initially divided the world into two—and, later, three—constituent parts: Europa, Asia, and Libya (Africa). Surrounding this continental triad was a narrow band of water, the “ocean stream” of Homer. The idea that the earth’s land masses were entirely surrounded by water was a lucky guess, considering that no Greek had yet circumnavigated the continents.

The depiction of the earth as a
spherical body complicated this primordial image. (Contrary to modern popular belief, few educated Europeans believed that the earth was disc-shaped, or flat, by the time Christopher Columbus began his journeys of exploration in 1492.) The theory of a round earth, beginning in the 5th century B.C., derived as much from philosophy as from physical evidence. To the Pythagoreans, the sphere was the most perfect geometric form. It was only appropriate, they concluded, that the home of man also be spherical.

Encompassing the round earth, they surmised, were ever-larger spheres—somewhat like the transparent skins of an onion—studded with the moon and planets. Finally, there was an all-inclusive globe, immovable and opaque, that carried the fixed stars and gave, by some divine principle, the motive power to the rest. The inner orbs rotated separately but in harmony—the famous “music of the spheres.”

Aristotle Notes the Sky

Empirical support for the notion of a spherical earth came from Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), after whom it may be doubted that the flat-earth theory ever again competed with the round-earth theory on an equal footing. Aristotle noted that, when the shadow of the earth crosses the moon during a partial eclipse, the edge of the shadow is curved. He also recognized that the height of stars over the northern horizon increases as one journeys toward it.

Any long-distance traveler could attest to this, just as any observant sailor could see that when a ship disappears over the horizon its hull drops out of sight first.

An Unfortunate Error

If the shape of the earth was more or less evident to the Greeks, its size was not. In one of the great calculations in history, Eratosthenes of Cyrene in the 3rd century B.C. figured out that the earth’s circumference was about 252,000 stadia (28,960 miles), a result fairly close to the actual circumference, at the Equator, of 24,901.55 miles.

The ancient Greek cartographers realized that the known world, the oikumene, was far too small to account for such an enormous sphere, yet the idea of a lopsided world offended their strong sense of symmetry. To fill out the earth’s empty space and restore its balance, they invented whole new continents.

On a globe designed by Crates (c. 150 B.C.), for example, the oikumene was juxtaposed with three new land masses. Diametrically opposite the oikumene lay a great southern land mass, the Antipodes. This appeared on maps for centuries as “Terra Australis Incognita” (Unknown Land to the South), a name that eventually rubbed off on Australia.

The other imaginary continents were Antoei and Perieoi. The latter
Ptolemy's 2nd-century "world" map, which presupposed a round earth, was actually only a section of the whole. Its graticule—system of lines representing parallels of latitude and meridians of longitude—foreshadowed the grid we use today. Based on the angle of the sun's rays upon the earth, Ptolemy also divided his map into latitudinal zones called "climata" (from the Greek klima, meaning slope).
was placed, by coincidence, roughly where America is located.

Unluckily, during the 1st century A.D., Eratosthenes' figure of 252,000 stadia was "corrected" by an unknown Greek scholar to 180,000 (20,690 miles). This major error became entrenched in the most influential geographic and cartographic work of antiquity, the eight-volume Geographike of Ptolemy (A.D. 90–168), Librarian of Alexandria.

**Ptolemy's World**

The Ptolemaic oikumene stretched from the "Fortunatae" (presumably the Canary Islands plus Madeira) to "Serica," literally "Silk Land" (China). Relying on the calculations of Poseidonius, Ptolemy was certain that the territories of Europe, Africa, and Asia spanned fully half the globe. In fact, from east to west, they cover less than three-eighths of the earth's circumference.

Moreover, Ptolemy heaped his own imaginings onto the miscalculations of Poseidonius. He drew the Indian Ocean as landlocked by a strip of "terra incognita," connecting Africa with eastern Asia. Coupled with rumors of a "torrid" zone to the south that no man could cross, the image of this fictitious land long discouraged Europeans from seeking a continuous sea route around Africa to the Orient.

From the late 5th to the mid-15th centuries A.D., the Greek tradition of cosmography, its rationalist ballast jettisoned, survived mainly in the assumption of a geocentric universe. Medieval world maps, with few exceptions, had little practical and no scientific value. Their human significance, however, was considerable.

Maps of the Middle Ages were intended to embody spiritual truths. Because the medieval map of the world maps was a product not of observation but of belief, artistry supplanted computation. Miniature drawings of cities, mountains, and other landmarks vividly conveyed a sense of place, to which the Greek concern for accurate representation of space was subordinated.

Jerusalem, in strict accord with Scripture, was normally placed at the center, the navel of the world's corpus. "This is Jerusalem," proclaimed the Book of Ezekiel: "I have set her in the midst of the nations, and countries are round about her."

Medieval cosmographers traced the inhabitants of the three continents back to the sons of Noah: Shem (Asia), Japheth (Europe), and Ham (Africa). Since it was believed that all peoples were descended from them, the idea of unknown populated regions of the earth was scarcely entertained. (When a new race of human beings was discovered in the New World, the predictable result was a theological crisis of the first order.)

Not until the 15th century, and the Renaissance, would Europe's attention again turn to the physical mysteries of this world—to the round earth's challenge to exploration.

Maps played a key role, and cartographic error stimulated exploration as much as cartographic truth. For example, under the spell of the mistaken small-world imagery of...
Ptolemy, and convinced that the late 13th-century travels of Marco Polo had extended beyond the oikumenë of the ancient Greeks, Columbus was certain that a "short," westward route to the so-called Far East existed. (By Ptolemaic longitudinal measurements, the distance westward from the Azores to Marco Polo's "Cipangu" [Japan] would have been roughly the same as the length of the Mediterranean, erroneously elongated in the classical view.)

Many contemporary cartographers, among them Martin Behaim of Nuremberg, who constructed the first detailed globe in 1492, unwittingly encouraged Atlantic exploration. They drew the untracked ocean to the West (a frightening prospect to sailors accustomed to the shelter of the Mediterranean) reassuringly populated with islands. When Columbus first sighted land in the Caribbean, he logically thought he had reached the outermost "Indies." Had Marco Polo's distance estimates and Ptolemy's grasp of the earth's circumference been correct, Columbus would indeed have arrived not at San Salvador (in the Bahamas) but in "Cipangu"!

**Room for America?**

It was only with the greatest difficulty that European visitors to the New World realized that the shores they had found belonged to an independent land mass. The first map to present the New World as a separate entity, the work of a German cartographer, Martin Waldseemüller, was not published until 1507. Even then, Europeans, to whom the idea of a "fourth part" of the world seemed an anomaly, were slow to adjust to the scale of the New World.

For one thing, there simply was not enough room for it on traditional map grids. Thus, Waldseemüller...
Martin Waldseemüller, a cartographer at the School of Saint-Dié in France, produced the first world map with the word "America" in 1507. A schematic rendering appears above. Waldseemüller named the new land after Amerigo Vespucci, impressed by the Florentine's claim to discovery of the mainland. Although Waldseemüller later abandoned the name, "America" gained final acceptance anyway—thanks largely to the cartography of Gerhardus Mercator, who in a 1538 map subdivided the New World into "North America" and "South America."

The new territory severely compressed, making it resemble a long, vertical island—a view of the New World now held, perhaps, only by some residents of Manhattan.

One solution to the problem of where to locate the New World was to place it in a separate "Western Hemisphere." In this way, the tightly integrated, tripartite image of the Old World could be kept intact and undisturbed, within an "Eastern Hemisphere." The very notion of opposing hemispheres, now deeply embedded in our thinking, is essentially an arbitrary one, originating in the struggle of Europeans to comprehend a world greater than they had believed possible.

For the colonists in America, it was perhaps not until the Revolution of 1776 that they fully saw their new wilderness habitat as a genuine continent, a constitutive part of the world. Previously conceived as a "satellite" of Europe, America became, in the view of Thomas Paine and other Revolutionary cosmographers, a "planet" like the other earth-planets, ready to assume its "separate and equal station," in the words of the Declaration of Independence, "among the powers of the earth."

**The Philadelphia Meridian**

American mapmakers began locating the Prime Meridian—hitherto drawn through Ferro (the westernmost island of the Canaries) or through one of the capital cities or astronomical observatories of...
Europe—in the New World, "Are we truly independent," an early American patriot asked, "when on leaving his own country every American is under the necessity of casting his 'mind's eye' across the Atlantic [to the Greenwich Meridian] and asking of England his relative position?"

Initially, a "Meridian of Philadelphia" was used, rivaled by Boston and New York meridians. Following its establishment as the federal capital in 1790, Washington, D.C., became the favored longitudinal line.

**Spread-Eagle Rhetoric**

A concrete symbol of this nascent American focus is the "Zero Milestone" monument, just south of the White House, from which all highway distances from Washington, D.C., are measured. Interestingly, when Pierre-Charles L'Enfant drew up the basic plan for the city, he sketched the 0° 0' line through "Congress House"—suggesting that, even cartographically, the executive and legislative branches have contended for primacy.

Westward expansion consolidated the American image of hemispheric equality and autonomy. By quick, giant steps—the acquisition of Louisiana (1803), Florida (1819), Oregon (1846), and California (1848)—the United States extended its domain across North America. Now the country "faced" the Pacific as well as the Atlantic, producing a fundamental change in national geographical perspective.

It is not surprising that around 1850 the United States began to appear at the center of American-made

![Map](Harvard Map Collection, Harvard College Library)

This 18th-century joined-hemisphere map satisfied both the European sense of self-importance and the American spirit of independence.

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world maps. Plans for a transcontinental railroad helped to revive Columbus's dream of a direct westward route to Cathay. "The European merchant, as well as the American," prophesied Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri in 1849, "will fly across our continent on a straight line to China. The rich commerce of Asia will flow through our centre." The center he had in mind was his hometown of St. Louis, which he hoped would become the emporium of future East-West trade. (It never did, of course, and was by-passed by Teng Hsiao-ping when he flew to Washington last winter.)

Pearl Harbor

Benton's (and other Americans') cartographic "self-centeredness" found few converts abroad. In 1884, an International Meridian Conference (ironically, held in Washington) formally adopted the line "passing through the center of the transit instrument at the Observatory of Greenwich" as the universal Prime Meridian.

The Spanish-American War in 1898, which left the United States with Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam, gave added credence to the spread-eagle rhetoric of America's boosters. But it did not immediately change Europeans' picture of the U.S. position in the world.

To the Old World, America was still remote—in some ways, perhaps more remote, because its physical center and national focus had shifted westward, toward the Pacific. "The United States has recently become an eastern power," declared British political geographer Sir Halford Mackinder in 1904, "affecting the European balance not directly, but through Russia."

World War I and, to an even greater degree, World War II produced a major change in world imagery and, concomitantly, in map selection and usage. In the United States, the First World War and President Wilson's universalist leadership greatly expanded American interest in the larger contours of the world. But the "primal event" of the revolution in American geographical thinking was the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

As any good map of the Pacific area will show, the distance between Japan and the Hawaiian Islands is approximately 3,500 miles. However, on the most frequently used world map at the time (drawn on the cylindrical Mercator projection), the distance across the Pacific was, at least conceptually, much greater.

Centered, by convention, on the Greenwich Meridian, standard Mercator-projection maps divided the Pacific Ocean into two parts roughly along the International Date Line. Hawaii appeared on the left, in the extreme "West," and Japan on the right, in the "Far East."

By all appearances, a Japanese attack on the United States could only come by crossing the entire width of the map. (The Japanese, it should be noted, used maps centered on Tokyo, which showed the Pacific whole.)

East Meets West

Most Americans had subconsciously assumed, with Kipling, that "East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet." Precisely because the relationship between the United States and Japan previously had been so indeterminate, it suddenly became as easy for Americans to overemphasize the nearness of the Japanese "peril" as it had been for them to exaggerate its remoteness.
"All maps lie flat; all maps lie," cartographers warn us. To gain three of the so-called cardinal virtues of a map—true shape, area, distance, and direction (acronym: "sadd")—is inescapably to lose the fourth. A globe is theoretically capable of preserving accuracy in all four respects, but most globes are in fact constructed of flat maps—tapered strips of paper called "gores," pasted to a sphere. More important, a globe fails to meet a primary objective of cartography: enabling us to see the world whole.

The cylindrical Mercator projection (top) is ideal for short distance navigation because compass directions appear as straight lines, and shapes of small areas are preserved. However, away from the line of tangency (e.g., the Equator), area and distance expand greatly.

Conic projections (middle), such as that devised by Ptolemy, provide especially effective mid-latitude maps of considerable east-west extent. The gnomonic azimuthal projection (bottom) shows all great-circle (i.e., shortest distance) routes as straight lines and is excellent for use in plotting long-range transportation systems. On many other maps, including those drawn on the Mercator projection, most great-circle routes appear as arcs.

"The time has come," declared a New York Times editorial in February 1943, "to discard [the Mercator projection] for something that represents continents and directions less deceptively." During the war, the avid interest of armchair generals called forth a spate of inexpensive but informative world atlases, many of them originating as supplements in newspapers and magazines. These were often conceived de novo by car-
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tographers and illustrators with visual imaginations of scope and power. The maps and charts they produced are documents of the first importance in the intellectual history of the war and of postwar diplomacy.

Foremost among these influential cartographers was Richard Edes Harrison, whose celebrated maps appeared in Fortune and, later, in Life. Harrison sought to encourage a "flexible" American view of the world. For the United States, to a greater extent than for any of the other major powers, the Second World War was a "global" effort—fought in all quadrants and dimensions. This new "world-wide arena," as President Franklin D. Roosevelt called it, required a fresh perspective on the globe. Harrison's North Pole-centered, azimuthal equidistant projection fit the bill.

Just as the Mercator projection had reflected the traditional (British) "seaman's view" and (German) "landsman's view," so the Harrison map illustrated the emerging (American) "airman's view."

A New Neighbor

Thanks to technological advances in aviation, the shortest and best routes between the New World and the Old now lay over the North Pole. The Mercator projection had stretched out the polar region beyond recognition. The azimuthal equidistant projection showed it in truer proportion.

One consequence of this mental shrinkage of the polar icecap was a heightened American appreciation of the geographical relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Formerly, the Soviet Union had appeared far across the map on the conventional Mercator projection—behind the buffers of the Atlantic and Europe. The new, Pole-centered maps made the virtual contiguity of the countries acutely evident. During World War II, this propinquity was comforting. Easy access seemed only advantageous, both economically and militarily, to both Allies.

A Regional Bias?

However, when a Cold War chill settled over U.S.-Soviet relations, the polar azimuthal projection seemed less reassuring. Indeed, it is not far-fetched to assume that Americans' heightened sense of proximity to the U.S.S.R. may have exacerbated the tensions. No longer, as Walter Lippmann pointed out, were American-Russian relations controlled by "the historic fact that each is for the other a potential friend in the rear of its potential enemies."

U.S. defense strategy shifted from an eastward, trans-Atlantic orientation to one where the Northern Ice Cap would become the probable zone of conflict. Our Distant Early Warning System—the celebrated DEW line—was arrayed across Canada. Henceforth, not doughboys but B-52s and Minutemen would be going over the top, toward targets only hours and, eventually, minutes away. (Ironically, the polar projections also inspired the United Nations emblem.)

To some new nations and old peoples, the Northern Hemisphere bias of these new world maps became particularly offensive. Granted, 74 percent of the earth's land masses lie north of the Equator. Yet the selection of the North Pole as the visual focus of the world only served as a reminder of the disproportionate military strength and industrial might poised in the northern zones.
Richard Edes Harrison's version of the Pole-centered azimuthal equidistant projection (1943) and the official emblem of the United Nations (1945). In the original U.N. design prepared by the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the vertical axis passed through the middle of North America. This annoyed many "Eurafrasians," at whose insistence it was changed to the Greenwich Meridian.

All of this has begun to change. The trend toward decolonization, the 1955 Bandung Conference of Asian and African nations (29 countries sent delegates, representing more than half the population of the world), and the 1973 Arab oil embargo—in short the rise of a Third World—have led some observers, including President Jimmy Carter in his May 22, 1977, speech at Notre Dame University, to conclude that we live in a "new world," one that is, if not Southern in emphasis, at least more evenly global.

German historian-cartographer Arno Peters has actually produced a map of this "new world." On most Mercator maps, the Equator is located well below the middle, resulting in a kind of global pituitary problem: North America and Eurasia are giant-sized, South America and Africa are dwarfed. Peters' map—a cylindrical, equal-area projection with two standard parallels (instead of one) to increase accuracy—somewhat rectifies this distortion of size.

The View from Outside

An even simpler way to put the Northern industrialized powers in their place is to leave them off the map altogether, as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
Arno Peters, a German historian, took issue with the conventional Mercator projection (top) in his 1973 "Orthogonal Map of the World" (bottom). With the Equator located squarely in the middle, Greenland no longer appears larger than South America. The reduction in size of the Soviet Union, Peters suggests, "makes it easy to see why the Russians are so nervous about the Chinese."

Map by Ron Clement. Courtesy of the Los Angeles Times.

(OPEC) has done on its official emblem (opposite page). What of future world maps? Perhaps the most significant changes in geographical perspective are being generated by the current revolution in space technology. Man's new viewpoint from outer space has made it possible for the first time in history to see what hitherto could only be deduced: that the earth is a vital, spherical whole—a living thing, a biosphere. This blue, brown, and white ball, suspended in inky darkness, is being mapped with new precision and penetration. Through remote satellite observation we can accurately measure the distances be-
tween the continents and discern large geological formations that may indicate hidden resources.

More important, through space reconnaissance—looking outward as well as inward—a celestial, or "high," frontier has been added. As the earth's "circle" is closed, and is cartographically "drawn and quartered," we have found a need to strike out imaginatively on its numberless tangents—thereby enlarging our world of exploration if not our actual oikumene.

The explosion of Earth's imaginative sphere is well under way. The images of the world given us by Apollo, Landsat, Skylab, and other "shallow" space vessels are already being broadened by comparison with images sent back by Pioneer and Voyager from the vicinities of Venus and Jupiter. In the future, we can expect vantage points from Uranus, Neptune, and perhaps other planets in "deep" space.

To the cartographic imagination this poses an extraordinary, though not wholly unprecedented, challenge. As our "global" world outlook gives way to a "galactic" one, some new scheme of spatial organization and visual representation may be needed.

The structure of a new environment is often not comprehensible until we have a map of it. Consciously or unconsciously, present-day cosmographers and cartographers may find themselves working in the tradition of the Pythagoreans and the Ptolemaists. Their layered diagrams of a geocentric cosmos may be the closest analogues we have to the expanding system, of which Earth is the center, now unfolding before us.

Old maps frame, if they do not make, new worlds.
REFLECTIONS

Letter from England

Five years ago, judging by the headlines and the TV commentaries, the future seemed bleak for Great Britain. Seemingly intransigent trade union leaders paralyzed both politics and industrial growth. Inflation was climbing. Racial tensions ran high as immigrants from the kingdom’s former African and Asian colonies arrived by the thousands to seek jobs and new lives. To many, the “scepter’d isle” suddenly seemed ungovernable. The obituaries have proved premature, however. Recently, North Sea oil and London’s no-nonsense economic policies have encouraged a certain optimism, despite last winter’s spate of strikes. No renaissance has occurred, writes British scholar Marcus Cunliffe, but the worst to come may not be so bad.

by Marcus Cunliffe

Twenty years ago on a sunny hilltop near Salzburg, I came across a clump of people in musical-comedy costume, together with a camera crew and a director in a big camel-hair coat. “We are making a romance,” he told me, “about the court of Franz Joseph. In Austria every film is about Vienna and the Emperor. We do not love anything since 1914.”

At the time, as an Englishman, I was condescendingly amused. We, with the Americans, had been the victors in 1918 and 1945. Indeed, unlike the Americans, we had been in both world wars from first to last. Our patriotism was a medley of gallant images and slogans: bulldog breed, Battle of Britain, Sink the Bismarck, Britain Can Take It. And up to some point in the late 1960s, we remained fairly proud of our past record and cautiously optimistic about the future.

Such pride and optimism were not without reason. There seemed to have been solid gains in Britain’s recent performance. The kingdom’s first postwar Labour government, under Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee (1945–51), had nationalized the Bank of England, civil aviation,
and the coal industry (all in 1946), electricity (1947), railways, canals, and gas (1948), and iron and steel (1949). Public ownership of the "commanding heights" of the economy, Labour leaders believed, would make planning more rational, less beholden to considerations of private gain. To be sure, in some cases state financing was the only alternative to industrial collapse. Meanwhile, William Beveridge's famous "white papers," which actually appeared before war's end, outlined Labour's comprehensive new schemes for national health care and social security, embodied in the National Insurance Act of 1946. Conservative governments, on the whole, later accepted these as irreversible.

In general, there was also bipartisan agreement on an overseas policy characterized by goodwill, magnanimity, and a hardheaded realization that the economic and political costs of the empire were no longer bearable. Starting with India and Pakistan, and, admittedly, not without some fuss, we dismantled the colonial system. Conscription was ended in 1955; fleet, air force, and army were cut and cut again.

(Today, the kingdom's overseas "presence," apart from the 55,000-man British Army of the Rhine, consists merely of token garrisons in Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Brunei, Belize, Cyprus, and Malta. Total armed forces: 340,000.)

The scale was being reduced. But
then, it was said, we were simply being sensible, living within our means, trying to make Britain a truly modern, democratic society. We were going to maintain full employment, expand our educational system, and achieve prosperity through technology. Entry into the European Common Market (it did not come until 1973) would guarantee us a share in the boom economies of Germany, Scandinavia, and France.

A Goodish Society?

After the mid-1960s, these modestly bright hopes began to fade. The main reason was that we could not generate enough money to pay for a British version of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society, or even for a Goodish Society. Public spending—on health, social services, all levels of education—increased, together with subsidies to keep various industries alive.

Taxes increased too. But the tax base was inadequate. Output grew too slowly. Technological miracles failed to materialize fast enough. Exports dwindled in relation to the gains registered by rival nations. The trade balance worsened as imports continued to grow.

The pound was kept artificially high, in part because of misplaced national pride. Devaluation, reluctantly accepted in 1967, helped exports by making them cheaper for foreign customers but raised the bill for imports. Alternating Labour and Tory governments strove to manage the economy—brake, accelerator, brake, accelerator—to the discomfort of the lurching passengers.

The onset of a world trade recession and the oil crisis of 1973 did further damage, not only to the economy but also to morale. The public's mood seemed to veer between irritable cynicism and amiable torpor.

Today? The most prominent British export may be the handsome BBC and ITV serials filmed for television—several involving royalty, most of them, like The Forsyte Saga and Upstairs, Downstairs, set in the era before 1914. There, life is opulent and secure, the weather sunny. Is this all that Britain can achieve?

Doomsday Gossip

It sometimes seems that way. Coverage in the American press tends to alternate between stories of imminent economic doom and brief gossip items about lascivious M.P.s or the royal family—as if the only hard news from Britain is bad news and the rest of no great consequence. Curiously, the British tend to focus on the same things. After all, in the news business, good news is no news. Thus, the papers in Britain are full of stories on "industrial action." Indus-

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Marcus Falkner Cunliffe, 57, is professor of American studies at the University of Sussex and a recent Wilson Center Fellow. Born in Rochdale, England, he was educated at Oriel College, Oxford, and Yale University and has taught at the University of Manchester, Harvard, the City University of New York, and the University of Michigan. His many books include The Literature of the United States (1954), The Nation Takes Shape (1959), American Presidents and the Presidency (1969), The Age of Expansion, 1848-1917 (1974), and Chattel Slavery and Wage Slavery: The Anglo-American Context, 1830-1860 (forthcoming).
trial action (or inaction) covers
everything from official strikes, of
the kind that closed down British
Ford and sidelined 57,000 workers
for several weeks late last year, to
unofficial wildcat strikes, work stop-
pages, overtime bans, and slow-
downs. More than 10 million man-
days were lost due to labor disputes
in 1977, triple the figure from the
preceding year.

**Sick Man of Europe**

Even those who prefer the sports
section to the financial pages cannot
help but be aware of the problem:
Newspaper press runs have periodi-
cally been curtailed owing to union
disruptions. The reader who does re-
ceive his paper may find blank
spaces where the photos and car-
toons would have been. In a sort of
management strike, intended as an
ultimatum to the unions, the London
*Times, Sunday Times*, and ancillary
supplements suspended publication
at the end of November. *The Times*
has never before failed to appear in a
history stretching back to 1785.

The symbolic shock of this is con-
siderable, akin to the discovery, a
few years back, that Rolls-Royce was
threatened with bankruptcy. One
reader expressed his dismay by re-
calling a bygone clue from the fa-
mous *Times* crossword puzzle. The
clue was: “Land of hope and ...”
(seven letters). The missing word was
“glory,” and the answer was thus
ICHABOD, the reference being to the
Book of Samuel, 4:21: “And she
named the child Ichabod, saying,
‘The glory is departed from Israel.’”

There are, of course, more substanc-
tive signs of departed glory.

In 1945, British industrial capacity
was intact. That of Japan and Ger-
many, and most of the liberated na-
tions of Europe, was shattered.

Today it is common to regard Britain
as the “sick man of Europe,” well
below the rest of northern Europe in
the tables that assess economic
health. In output per man-hour (a
meager 2 percent annual increase),
average hourly wage (about $4), and
per capita Gross National Product
(less than $6,000), Britain lags be-
hind Germany, the United States,
Japan, and France. Nearly 1.5 mil-
lion Britons are unemployed.

But even the most pessimistic ob-
server must concede that not all of
Britain’s vital signs are weak. Cer-
tainly comparisons with the rest of
Northern Europe are sometimes in-
vidious; at other times, however,
they are not unfavorable. For exam-
ple, the United Kingdom has more
telephones and television sets than
West Germany, and almost as many
passenger cars per 1,000 inhabitants.
British exports, at last, are on the
rise. And thanks to the tight wage
guidelines of Labourite Prime Minis-
ter James Callaghan and Chancellor
of the Exchequer Denis Healey, Brit-
ain’s inflation rate was brought
down from its 1975 peak of 25 per-
cent to under 10 percent in 1978.

**North Sea Oil**

Yet the good news can sometimes
be bad. The unexpected fillip from
North Sea oil and gas, which should
make Britain a net exporter of these
products by the end of the decade,
has poured vast sums into the treas-
ury; Britain now boasts a $7 billion
balance of payments surplus, in stark
contrast to the disastrous deficits of
recent years (more than $8 billion in
1974). However, it is now predicted
that North Sea reserves will last for
only a few more years, and the reve-
ues, we are told, are being squan-
dered on imports of consumer goods
to placate the British public.
Even at its projected peak in the mid-1980s, oil production will generate only some $8 billion annually—an amount, one observer wryly notes, that could easily be "gobbled up" in the bailouts of such troubled nationalized corporations as British Steel and British Rail.

The nation's long-term economic slide is obvious enough to tourist and resident alike. As late as the 1960s, the aircraft industry could still make a showing. The ill-conceived, supersonic Anglo-French Concorde may have been its last loud squawk by way of swansong. (Development costs will never be recovered.) Today the runways at Heathrow and Gatwick are dominated by planes of American manufacture. Try to buy a typewriter, a radio, a TV set, an electric kettle, a ballpoint pen: Where British versions exist at all, they are usually reckoned to be inferior in workmanship and design.

Endangered Jaguars

On the roads, one is aware of the high proportion of cars from Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and Sweden. Over half the automobiles sold in November 1978 were foreign imports. (Ten years before, 95 percent of all cars sold in Britain were British made.) As for the supposedly native product, two of the three big British car companies are American-owned (Ford and Chrysler), and many of the "British" Fords are partly manufactured across the Channel, in continental Europe. British Leyland, the other big auto corporation and the maker of Minis, Rovers, Triumphs, and Jaguars, is ailing despite—perhaps because of—being taken under the government's wing.

Productivity is appalling across the board, owing to a combination of low wages, poor management, and chronic "over-manning"—what in the United States would be called "featherbedding." Workers in British Ford plants produce a mere 40 percent of what German workers produce in similar plants. Japanese steelworkers produce 5 1/2 times more steel per hour than their British counterparts.

Wooing the Fringe

Some commentators conclude that Britain cannot hold its own in 20th-century industrial production. They forecast an abandonment of all but small-scale, specialized industrial activity, and perhaps mere assemblage under foreign management of parts manufactured elsewhere. That would leave Britain with older technologies (Scotch whisky, pottery, cloth) that are modest in scale, or those native industries (shipbuilding, steel) that are in any case inefficient and vulnerable to world trade recession. No one seems to take seriously the would-be jovial official claims that British industry is poised for even a modest leap forward.

Indeed, the political mood is depressing. If the media and opinion polls are to be believed, as they probably should be, the public has lost faith in the capacity of government to provide leadership or even to mediate successfully between the unions and other pressure groups.

The Labour and Conservative parties, divided internally and stuck in childish, adversarial squabbles over whose mistakes did more to wreck the economy, arouse little enthusiasm. The public appears bored and irritated by such parliamentary knockabout, and by the palpable failure of either party to resolve any of the key issues of the past dec-
ade—prices and incomes, industrial growth, Northern Ireland.

Since neither major party holds a commanding position, in any sense, recent governments have clung to office by wooing the small parliamentary groups on the geographical as well as the ideological fringe of British life. These groups—Scottish and Welsh Nationalists, Liberals, Northern Ireland Unionists and Social Democrats—have exacted a high price for their support.

When Scottish and Welsh Nationalists began to win seats a few years ago, their successes threw the two major parties, especially the Labourites, who had once been able to count on “safe” parliamentary seats in the industrial belts of Wales and Scotland, into panic. Afraid of losing these essential bases, and needing the Nationalist votes in Parliament, Labour hastened to promise a large measure of self-government for Scotland and Wales. The Tories, who had also lost some “pocket Boroughs” to the Nationalists, followed suit.

Ironically, the signs are that Celtic Nationalism—never as strong in Wales as in Scotland—has been on the wane in both regions since the early 1970s. Nevertheless, Westminster is already committed to a willingness to establish national parliaments for each “country.” Only the minority Nationalist militants have expressed a relish for “devolution” on such a scale, or for the inevitable introduction of new tiers of bureaucracy that devolution would entail.

An Ungovernable Isle?

In the past, the British congratulated themselves on the mysteriously smooth workings of their historic polity, which lacks, as every

“Gentlemen,” says a Japanese executive, “let me introduce Mr. Perks, from British Leyland, who has come to teach us how to reduce our output.”

British labor productivity ranks among the worst in Europe.
TROUBLED BRITAIN: ANOTHER VIEW

The United Kingdom has changed too much, too fast, Marcus Cunliffe contends. His University of Sussex colleague, Geoffrey Best, thinks otherwise: hidebound tradition and persistent class differences—that's the rub. Professor Best, a Wilson Center Fellow, offers his views below:

The British delight in emphasizing the relative stability that has been their country's for so long despite the world's first (and most traumatic) industrial revolution, the acquisition and sudden loss of a great empire, and a front-line place in two devastating world wars. Considering the beating Britain has taken over the past 100 years, one ought to be surprised, not that Britain has so many difficulties, but that they are not worse.

Fine. But there's a catch to all this. If ancient traditions have helped us weather the storm, they have also been a part of it. The "Mother of Parliaments" in Westminster, for example, is grotesquely inadequate, poorly organized, and clearly not up to the job of running the kingdom. Ideas for reform abound. Yet its mumbo-jumbo rituals and antiquated methods are as dear to many as the Tower of London.

Or take the "class" question. Almost impossible to see from the outside, reluctantly acknowledged on the inside, conflict between the working classes and the upper-crust "establishment" crisscrosses and complicates all other problems.

It is extraordinary that the first nation to witness an industrial revolution and the emergence of a Marxian "proletariat" has never had the social revolution Marx expected. Even now, when the political logjam encourages extremists on all sides, revolutionaries of the really violent sort are scarce. Chalk one up for our peacable traditions.

Schoolboy knows, a written constitution. Recently, however, the foundations have been felt to shift.

What is the United Kingdom? Where does sovereignty lie? If Scotland and Wales acquire separate parliaments, should there not also be one for England? If so, what would become of the present Parliament at Westminster? What of Northern Ireland, whose separate Stormont legislature was abolished in 1972? These are riddles that some say lack an answer. Indeed, it has become fashionable to argue that certain places are "ungovernable," and that Great Britain is one of them.

The gloomiest prophets predict that economic decline and governmental paralysis will lead to social collapse. They point to such early symptoms as racial tension (almost 2 million Asians, Africans, and West Indians live in Britain), the unabashedly racist activities of the neofascist National Front, the vandalism and violence of football crowds, and the rising crime rate in general. Tax evasion is up; church attendance is down.
Yet we do have a class war—a cold class war, so to speak, grinding away today as it has for centuries. It has never been completely submerged, even during such acute national emergencies as the two world wars. Oddly, this cold class war is rarely mentioned in the multi-volume histories of the English race. One hears not a word of it at the expensive private schools that, by a masterpiece of ruling-class camouflage, are called “public schools.” Here the British establishment continues to sequester its children, blind to the consequences.

Separate school systems for richer and poorer, or (not necessarily the same) for “them” and “us,” are not unknown elsewhere. But in Britain, the gulf symbolized by such institutions is profound. It is the factor beneath the surface in industrial disputes, political pettiness, and our all-too-common failures of national collective sense.

Over a century ago, a man giving evidence before a Royal Commission remarked: “There may be considerable kindness between classes, but there is little cordiality.” That was marvelously shrewd. The kindness shows in the respect most of us retain for each other as human beings, the live-and-let-live liberality of our social existence, our relatively bloodless politics. But there is little contact, liking, or trust between the two classes. People who prescribe for Britain a strong dose of Harvard Business School just show their own ignorance.

What is required is a sense of ourselves as one nation, not two. Each of our two classes is strong enough to thwart the other and pull down all into common ruin (peacefully, no doubt). For me, the question is whether the side that has lost some of its privileges (though still retaining much) will be sensible enough to realize that it can’t “win” against the side that, to put it at its crudest, is too stubborn to admit that it has anything to lose. Between 1940 and 1950, when wartime cohesion and Labour’s overwhelming postwar victory at the polls spurred hopes among all classes of a finer, future Britain, this compromise seemed possible. It may yet be possible.

All of these signs of decay—economic, governmental, social—are undeniably present. I do not know of anyone in Britain who faces the future with genuine confidence. What comfort then for ourselves or for those who wish us well?

To begin with, many of our troubles are not peculiar to Britain. Strikes are not merely the “British disease.” If London’s newspapers are in turmoil, so have been those of New York, St. Louis, and Washington. The United States, with its shaky currency, stagnant growth rate (barely higher than Britain’s), and loss of domestic and foreign markets to aggressive rivals, might likewise be suffering the problems of an “old” industrial system.

I do not anticipate a sensational economic recovery by Britain. We may well continue to get poorer in relation to our main competitors—we may even fare worse than they if there is a future world depression. But in some ways we stand to fare better because we have less far to fall. Moreover, medium- and small-size British industry (e.g., glass
manufacturing) is actually in excellent shape, and the great banking and insurance houses retain their old expertise. British agriculture is exceptionally efficient. In short, Britain can be poorer without being "sick."

As for government and politics, they are in a mess but not in a dire mess. Northern Ireland is a stuck record, and a historical nightmare. But one awakens from nightmares, and there is no good reason why the 6 counties of Ulster should not eventually be joined to the 26 counties of the Irish Republic. The United Kingdom would then be confined to one main island instead of one and one-fifth. Neatness is not everything, but it is something.

**Blunders and Bungles**

Social health is harder to measure than economic health. However, according to such indices as there are, Britain remains a comparatively stable and good-natured realm. England, Scotland, and Wales have all benefited in different ways from the 172-year-old union. The weight of economics and culture makes it unlikely that separatist nationalism will pull that union apart.

Admittedly, nonwhite immigration has been handled badly. The newcomers are having as hard a time as, say, minorities in post-1945 America. But similar routes to advancement lie open, and barriers are falling. Indeed, the first black football player for England in 1978; he is certain to be followed by others, to the horror but also the confounding of the idiotic National Front.

The British profess themselves well satisfied with the quality of life in their homeland, so the polls indicate, even if they are disgruntled by its politics. Few wish to emigrate. Most of them, despite inflation, are still better off than their parents, in social benefits, vacations, and possibly even tax fiddles. Those who have not fared better, such as myself, are the people most apt to write the critical articles.

Another positive index is the eagerness of foreigners to invest, to visit, and sometimes to settle here. Even Henry Ford II, who not long ago publicly despaired of his British investments, has decided to build a new $340 million manufacturing plant in Wales. Other American firms have taken similar steps.

Great Britain, alas in some respects, has shriveled to Little Britain. We do not win many international competitions, for sport or for industrial contracts. We are among the also-rans. But Britain is still in the running, and still likely to be in the field when others have fallen out or even fallen apart.

I now believe in a paradox. Some of our troubles arise not from an overdose of traditionalism but from the opposite: a whirl of innovation, sometimes for innovation's sake. We need to calm down, slow the pace of legislation, use our wits.

We have blundered and bungled. But, thank goodness, we have not managed to wreck what time and chance and our various ancestors have severally bequeathed.
The Old Plantation and the New Paternalism

Thomas Sowell's comparison between West Indian blacks and native black Americans ['"Three Black Histories," WQ, Winter 1979] is especially interesting in its implications for social policy.

To indicate just how and why, it is useful to examine the results of an experiment carried out in a reformatory some years ago by Melvin Seeman (see American Journal of Sociology, November 1963). Seeman gave instruction on legal issues to inmates and then tested their learning of what had been taught. Those who were in a position to affect the length of their term via use of the law learned the most. Those whose actions could not affect their futures felt a sense of powerlessness and did not learn much.

This study's implications for explaining the lack of success of many blacks in urban America are direct. Plantation life in America, during slavery and after, had one central property for a black: he was in a dependent status, subject to a paternalism that deprived him of authority over his destiny. Food staples and other items were disbursed by [his] owner; he had almost no contact with markets, where individual achievement leads to individual reward.

Such dependency is directly antithetical to the individualism necessary for self-sufficiency in urban society. [It] is a socialization in which learning in areas connected with responsibility for one's own destiny is useless and one in which -from Seeman's results—we would expect little learning to occur. It would lead naturally to the passivity and dependence stereotypically characteristic of a portion of American urban blacks.

What is most interesting about the West Indian comparison is that slavery there had a market component. Although slavery was harsher, individual blacks grew their own food and sold their surplus. Slavery there was not an experience of total dependence and powerlessness but contained some components of individual reward for individual effort. The striking difference that Sowell shows in urban success of West Indian immigrants and native blacks is exactly that which one would expect if Seeman's results are an important part of the explanation of differential success among blacks in urban America.

There is currently a policy struggle, partly ideologically-inspired, between those who argue for equality of opportunity and those who argue for equality of results. The policies of the former are for expanded opportunity and greater voice of the individual in [the] exercise of choice (e.g., voluntary rather than compulsory busing, housing allowances rather than public housing). The policies of the latter are for fixed quotas, whether in racial balance for schools or in jobs, and for provision of specified services, rather than money income.

If the implications of the West Indian and Seeman results are as I have suggested, they argue strongly in favor of equal-opportunity policies. The equal-results policies merely perpetuate the feudal regime of the plantation, with government replacing the owner, with benevolent paternalism replacing despotic paternalism. The fruits of such policies can be expected to be new generations as insensitive to and ill-equipped for the opportunities of urban life as their forebears who bore the marks of plantation slavery.

Professor James S. Coleman
Department of Sociology
University of Chicago

The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1979
American Tax Credits: Subsidies Abroad?

Re your statement [in the box entitled "The American Connection," WQ, Winter 1979] that, "In effect ... Saudi Arabia has been receiving a tax subsidy from the U.S. government" since 1950:

Saudi Arabia's action as a sovereign government imposing income taxes on companies engaged in business within its jurisdiction followed normal international practice. In fact, such action was subsequently followed by other producing countries.

Thus, from 1950 onward, when Aramco filed U.S. tax return, credit was taken for the income tax paid to Saudi Arabia. This was not a special arrangement. The U.S. Internal Revenue Code since 1918 has contained foreign tax credit provisions designed to prevent double taxation of foreign source income earned by American companies operating abroad.

Aramco's status was, in all material respects, identical to the U.S. oil companies and nonoil companies operating abroad. If Saudi Arabia received a subsidy, then every foreign government whose income taxes were deemed to be creditable for U.S. tax purposes and had entered into a tax treaty with the United States must also be considered to have received a similar subsidy.

James V. Knight
Vice President
Arabian American Oil Company

Re the Domino Effect

As it is now fashionable to compare the Saudis with the Iranians and worry about "the domino effect," I should like to offer a few observations on how Saudi Arabia is different.

Unlike the Iranians, some 99 percent of Saudi students in the United States return home when their academic work is completed. Unlike the Shah, who seldom saw anyone without an appointment, the king of Saudi Arabia sits in a public reception every Thursday morning to receive complaints or petitions from any one who chooses to attend. Many small matters troubling citizens are handled. Whatever the result, the petitioner has at least had the chance to be heard.

Unlike Iran, the religious establishment of Saudi Arabia is part and parcel of the government—from the ministry in charge of directing the pilgrimage to Mecca to the Minister of Education and the Minister of Justice.

Various people and governments have judged the Saudi regime to be "unstable" for 40 years. Yet it still survived. It survived the reign of King Saud, which was marked by great pressures from without and unbelievable incompetence, profligacy, inefficiency, and opposition from within. I am sure the Saudis are most anxious over the prospects in the Gulf, the character of the Iranian government, the extension of Soviet influence in neighboring countries, the threats to the Strait of Hormuz, the Soviet puppets of South Yemen, and their relationships to their northern Arab neighbors. However, I doubt that the possibility of internal strife, à la Iran, gives them much concern.

Tom Barger
Former Chairman of the Board
Arabian American Oil Company

The Embargoes Few Remember

The articles on Saudi Arabia provide timely and thoughtful insights on a country of vital importance to the United States.

William A. Rugh's article ["A Tale of Two Houses"] highlights the dynamic interrelationship of religion and government in Saudi Arabia ... something much overlooked by the West. He rightly maintains that the intimate alliance between spiritual and secular authority has generated stability and strength in Saudi Arabia, even in the face of its rapid economic and social transformation. The contrast with Iran is instructive. There the Shah, rather than seeking to ally himself with the religious establishment, alienated it.

There should have been, however, more stress on the room allowed for pragmatic adjustment to new circumstances under
"Wahhabi fundamentalism." For example, the statement that most Jews are still "unwelcome" calls for qualification if not refutation. In recent years, numerous Jewish-American government officials, journalists, and businessmen have been admitted to the country by contrast with earlier practice.

David E. Long's piece ["Saudi Oil Policy"] offers very useful insights into the way Saudis view their one major natural resource and its exploitation. Especially pertinent is his analysis of their desire and capacity to help keep OPEC strong. This goes far to counter frequent careless speculation on the possible collapse of that organization, whose position is currently enhanced by the cutoff of Iranian oil.

Some errors of fact should be noted. In Rugh's article, there are two misstatements in reference to the Islamic calendar. The year A.H. 1398 (A.Z. 1339) does not correspond to A.D. 1979, since A.H. 1399 began on December 1, 1978. Also, the pilgrimage to the holy cities occurs in the month of Dhul-Hijjah, not Ramadan, which is the month of fasting. Rugh indicates that oil was produced in Kuwait earlier than in Saudi Arabia. Despite its discovery in both countries in 1938, it was not commercially produced in Kuwait until 1946, while modest pre-World War II production occurred in Saudi Arabia.

Finally, Long states that the 1973 oil embargo was without precedent. In fact, King Faisal placed an embargo on Saudi oil to the U.S. after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war and, as Crown Prince, was instrumental in cutting off the flow of Saudi oil to the Bahrain refinery after the 1956 Israeli-British-French attack on Egypt. Few remembered this in 1973.

Malcolm C. Peck, Director of Programs
The Middle East Institute

College Views

The frontispiece for ["The Changing American Campus"] [WQ, Autumn 1978] shows the University of Missouri, circa 1875. The engraved details are rational. Trees are trees. Paths are paths. The wall separating the campus from the rest of the world is indeed a wall. The dimensions of the frame, however, exclude life in the world beyond the wall even in Missouri in 1875. The result is a caricature of reality.

Chester E. Finn, Jr.'s suspicion ["A Matter of Money"] that whatever ails us may "fade away" is typical of the malaise peculiar to his profession these days. The great political, intellectual, and scientific revolutions of this century may blow all of us up, but there isn't a chance that the lines they draw will fade away.

David Reisman ["Beyond the '60s"] reminds us that decline is relative. Compared to Einstein's, this theory of relativity is indeed a visionary confirmation of our history! For me, a university president "under siege" in the warfare between being a manager and a leader, Dr. Reisman prescribes vision and strength. The best cure for schizophrenia is not to get it in the first place. Prescriptions like that may send Western Civilization into acupuncture.

These essays pit "closed," "elite," "private," "small," and "liberal" against their apparent enemies: "open," "public," "urban." This formulation of the issues is politically charged, and any pretension of objectivity is phony. The authors are not neutral. They are nostalgic. [They] tend to misuse history, employing it less as a guide than as a substitute for the future.

We live in a time-warp—a period in which the density and quality of the accretion of knowledge and events are out of whack with the much longer and sustained flows of time we heretofore thought necessary for the accumulation of a "history." Navigation of the time-warp compels a different view of the relationships between history and the future. Our self-interests are committed within the terms of institutions that no longer can contain the dynamics of life in the warp. But few people in power now—tenured, titled, surviving, and/or on-the-make—are willing to deal with that.

William M. Birenbaum
President, Antioch University
Yellow Springs, Ohio
How Old Are Students?

An item of reported fact in Larry Van Dyne’s “The Latest Wave: Community Colleges” needs closer analysis. In describing the community college profile, he states that the average age of two-year college students is now about 30. Mr. Van Dyne cannot be faulted for repeating what both local and national community college leaders have perpetuated as absolute fact. But averages can be misleading.

The mean average of some comparative studies of community college campuses does show students to be around 27-plus year of age. Other measures of central tendency show the median average about 20, with the modal average about 19. Students under 20 take over 50 percent of academic units, with students under 25 taking about three-fourths. Therefore, the largest number of students in the community college setting are 19-year-olds who carry more academic units than anyone else.

These statistics have immense implications for planners, who may be establishing curriculum and instructional methods that may not be consistent with the basic clientele.

Clive L. Grafton
Vice Chairman
Department of Higher and Postsecondary Education
University of Southern California

Pregnancy and the Law

Bernice Madison states [in “The ‘Problem’ That Won’t Go Away,” WQ, Autumn 1978] that two recent Supreme Court decisions have entitiled more pregnant women to remain on the job as long as their physicians advise, receive normal disability benefits during their pregnancy leave, and be reinstated later in their old jobs. The two Supreme Court cases she cites do not affirm these three benefits.

Although Cleveland Board of Education et al. v. LaFleur et al. affirms that women may remain in their jobs as long as they are able, the decision does not require employers to give normal disability benefits. This situation, however, has been altered by a recent amendment to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Effective May 1, 1979, benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities will have to be made available as part of those plans that offer benefits for other temporary disabilities. If no such plan exists for a given employer, then none need be created to offer pregnancy-related benefits.

The amendment also relates to the matter of reinstatement. Generally speaking, whatever treatment an employer accords its employees in a given situation, the same must be accorded pregnant employees. No special restrictions applicable to pregnancy or childbirth alone are permitted. Since the matter of pregnancy-related rights is frequently misunderstood, I hope that you will take this opportunity to set the record straight.

Edward McCaffrey
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Soviet Mothers and Sons

To Bernice Madison’s penetrating report, one might add that the ambiguities with which Soviet women live verily procreate. The fortress of the Soviet family has been undermined, as anywhere else, by many forces, among them the changing mores.

A short poem by Natalya Astafyeva written in the transitional late 1950s can be seen in retrospect as a harbinger of the freedom, furtively granted to the citizens, for blending private and public values not quite the way the Bolshevik Amazons had wished: I am giving up my positions, I capitulate. I want to fall in love./. . . Why not? I see no wrong in that I am/Like all the others./. . . Let family worries engulf me! From Sunday to Saturday . . . /Let my fair baby boy/Press my breast with his tiny hand,/I do hope to be remembered someday/With a kind word for my love.

Another poem written some 17 years later, by Liudmila Tatianicheva, captures the perils of modernity: A woman,/Having abandoned her son,/Walks cheerfully un-
Breaking the Inflation Circle

Pessimism about inflation and the questionable potency of fiscal and monetary policies as weapons to combat it have moved the idea of a Tax-oriented Incomes Policy (TIP) into the limelight of the public arena [Laurence A. Seidman, "A Tax-Based Incomes Policy," WQ, Autumn 1978]. As the name suggests, TIP proposals use the tax system to provide incentives to firms for behaving in an anti-inflationary manner. In the “stick approach” on which Professor Sidney Weintraub and I have collaborated since 1971, inflation is restrained by imposing a tax penalty on employers granting excessive wage increases. An alternative form, the “carrot approach,” offers a bonus to employees and firms that limit wage increases. The real-wage insurance proposed by President Carter as part of his anti-inflation package is a version of this alternative form.

TIP deals with wages, not prices. However, since historically prices have followed wages closely, restraint on wages should be adequate. The penalty for excess wage increases, moreover, is paid by the employer, not the employee. By casting the tax penalty in the form of a surcharge on the corporate income tax, the danger that the added tax burden might be passed on to the consumer is minimized.

Regardless of the form it takes, TIP should not be viewed as an alternative to monetary and fiscal restraint. Only within an atmosphere of restraint could TIP provide the means to wind down the present high rates of inflation.

An appropriate combination of TIP and the standard tools of fiscal and monetary policy would offer great promise also for the long run. The result would be a reduction in the “nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment.” Whatever the level of unemployment consistent with reasonable price stability (or a constant rate of inflation), the restraints imposed by TIP would tend to make it somewhat lower.

TIP could be viewed as a form of wage guideline—preserving free labor market forces by allowing business and labor to arrive at their wage settlements subject only to the tax consequences of an excessively high settlement.

Thus, TIP offers a means of breaking into the vicious circle in which prices drive wages and wages drive prices. Because of the frustration in trying to wind down inflation with conventional anti-inflationary methods, it seems justified to enlist the tax system in the struggle.

Henry C. Wallich
Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Seeing India with Clear Eyes

The essays on India [WQ, Autumn 1978] by Edward A. O’Neill, B. G. Verghese, and Lawrence A. Veit offer refreshing perspectives and convincing arguments. [They] should help American readers see with clearer eyes than is often the case where India stands and where she may be heading in her international relations, politics, and economy.

Keeping India accurately and thoughtfully in mind has never been easy for Americans. O’Neill ["Unreal Expectations"] points out that our perceptions have often been distorted by lingering and fantastic stereotypes, by our dismay that India has not always shared our view of world affairs or bowed to the dictates of American foreign policy, and by our preoccupation with India’s poverty, which, as Veit ["A Frontier Economy"] writes, has sometimes prevented us from appreciating her remarkable accomplishments in the political task of...
"nation-building."

Part of the value of these essays is their frank recognition of the political and economic problems that India still faces—B. G. Verghese ("The Congress Party: Thirty Years of Power") suggests that with the 1977 elections the Indian political system entered a prolonged period of change and testing—and of the fact that U.S. and Indian interests do not and will not coincide completely. In my opinion, however, the writers’ distinctive contribution is their effort to view these realities against the wider background of just how much India has accomplished in the past quarter century, despite the several severe challenges they mention.

Robert F. Goosen
U.S. Ambassador to India
New Delhi, India

Those of us in the West who try to understand modern India [would] understand better if we were to listen less and watch more. To see the Harvard- or Oxford-trained Ph.D. tuck his degree under his arm and return to his village to marry the girl selected by his parents, from their caste, with the guidance of the stars, tells us far more about India than does his dissertation.

Lewis M. Simons
Washington Post correspondent, India, 1972-75

The Jury Is Still Out

B. G. Verghese’s discussion of Indian politics represents a tolerable mixture of facts and emotions. Although his analysis of the domestic political scene is generally to the point, his characterization of the Congress Party leadership under Mrs. Gandhi beginning in 1971 as manifesting “loss of direction, indeed, even of will,” betrays an emotional disillusionment with Mrs. Gandhi’s ideological direction.

The jury is still out on the question of whether Emergency rule represented an attempt to establish a dictatorship or transform India from an undisciplined “soft” state into a disciplined “hard” state. Verghese’s question, “Can the Desai government instill a new dynamism in India?” is well put. On the basis of recent goings on, it would seem that much will happen and little will change.

“Poverty is so acute that outsiders cannot understand how the political task of ‘nation-building’ could be more important than economic progress.” Lawrence A. Veit writes. Those who do not understand this are not likely to understand much about India.

Bājit Singh
Professor of Political Science
Michigan State University

Corrections

There is an interesting change in the poem by Robert Frost, “Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening,” in your profile of Nehru ("The Man Who Wouldn’t Be King," WQ, Autumn 1978)—a change I am reluctant to label a typo because of the interpretation one can attach to it. On the note pad found by Nehru’s bed after his death, the line, as printed on page 131, reads: “The woods are lonely, dark, and deep.” The word lovely in the original has become lonely.

In Frost’s original, the word lovely conveys the temptation of the observer to linger over the peaceful wooded scene. The word lovely would convey an entirely different attitude toward the woods and what they represent.

Stephen Harris
Production Editor, Social Education

It was indeed a typographical error. Nehru wrote out the lines correctly in English, his usual language for speaking, writing, and even dreaming.

Neither King Ibn Saud nor H. St. John Philby was present, as stated in William Rugh’s article ("A Tale of Two Houses," WQ, Winter 1979), when Karl Twitchell of Standard Oil delivered the gold sovereigns to Finance Minister Abdullah Sulayman three months after the concession was signed.
CURRENT FELLOWS

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In 1968 the Congress established the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars as an international institute for advanced study and the nation's official "living memorial" to the 28th President, "symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relation between the world of learning and the world of public affairs."

The Center opened in October 1970, and was placed in the Smithsonian Institution under its own presidentially appointed board of trustees. Its chairmen of the board have been Hubert H. Humphrey and, since 1972, William J. Baroody.

Open annual competitions have brought more than 250 Fellows to the Center since 1970. All Fellows carry out advanced research, write books, and join in seminars and dialogues with other scholars, public officials, members of Congress, newsmen, business and labor leaders. The Center is housed in the original Smithsonian "castle" on the Mall in the nation's capital. Financing comes from both private sources and an annual congressional appropriation. The Center—and The Wilson Quarterly—seek diversity of scholarly enterprise and of points of view.