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Spring 1988

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Buchman was often the center of controversy, and the organizations he founded—the Oxford Group and later Moral Re-Armament—underwent various investigations. Yet Buchman was twice nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, and following WWII he was decorated as a peacemaker by seven countries, including Germany, France, Japan, and the Philippines. Cardinal Franz Koenig called him "a turning-point in the history of the modern world through his ideas."


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Editor’s Comment

Two decades later, the year 1968 is being commemorated with a vengeance—by magazine editors, pundits, television producers, and pop historians, especially those who came of age during the late 1960s. Often cited in WQ essays, the events of that year for many Americans (and others) were traumatic. This year, they have become TV film-clip clichés: the Communists’ Tet offensive in Vietnam, LBJ’s decision not to seek reelection, the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy, urban riots, the “police riot” at the Democrats’ Chicago convention, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Richard Nixon’s narrow victory over Hubert Humphrey in November. By comparison, this U.S. election season has been almost tranquil.

Our editors have lately focused on another portentous year, when America was a very different country: 1948. In the Spring WQ, our contributors examined the surprising legacy of Harry Truman’s upset triumph over both the Republicans’ Thomas Dewey and the Democratic factions already breaking up the old New Deal coalition. In this issue (see p. 100) we look back at the first major confrontation of the Cold War—brought on by the 1948 Soviet blockade of West Berlin—and at what has happened to the lively, vulnerable city that was a chronic crisis point in East-West relations and is so no longer.

With this issue, the Wilson Center’s director and trustees welcome all WQ subscribers as charter members of the Wilson Center Associates, a new program designed to provide greater access to the Center’s scholarly output and to many opportunities offered by the Smithsonian Institution. For details, see p. 181.

THE WILSON QUARTERLY

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From Nativist Movements to the New Right in American History
by David H. Bennett

Bennett examines the forces shaping nativist and counter-subversive activity in America from colonial times to today's religious Right and political "hard right" movements. He concludes this important book by suggesting that the political extremism of the Right will remain a powerful force in American life. "Eminently fair-minded and judicious."—Richard Polenberg, Cornell University
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by Altina L. Waller

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by Sidney Stahl Weinberg

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by Allen Guttmann

Guttmann traces the development of modern sports in America from the sports rituals of pre-Columbian cultures to the juggernaut of contemporary intercollegiate and professional athletics. He demonstrates conclusively that sports are an integral part of American society and may be the best indicators we have of who we are as a people. 243 pp., $24.95 cloth, $10.95 paper
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The Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt
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All this is part of the Wilson Center's special mission as the nation's unusual "living memorial" to the 28th president of the United States.

Congress established the Center in 1968 as an international institute for advanced study, "symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relation between the world of learning and the world of public affairs." The Center opened in 1970 under its own presidentially appointed board of trustees, headed by former vice president Hubert H. Humphrey.

Chosen in open annual worldwide competitions, some 50 Fellows at the Center carry out advanced research, write books, and join in discussions with other scholars, public officials, journalists, business and labor leaders. The Wilson Center Associates program is designed to provide greater access to their scholarly output.

The Center is housed in the original Smithsonian "castle" on the Mall. Financing comes from both private sources and an annual congressional appropriation.

In all its activities, the Center seeks diversity of scholarly enterprise and points of view. Its company of Fellows has included such figures as Fernand Braudel, George Kennan, Gen. Andrew Goodpasture, Saburo Okita, Michael Howard, Mario Vargas Llosa, Shlomo Avineri, and Patricia Graham.
The Rhetorical Presidency
Jeffrey K. Tulis

Twentieth-century presidents speak directly to the people more often than did their nineteenth-century predecessors. Jeffrey Tulis contends that this commonly recognized shift to a "rhetorical presidency" is much more significant than previously supposed. He argues that popular leadership by presidents is not simply a logical constitutional development but a fundamental transformation of the constitutional order and of the entire political system.

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Constitutional Faith
Sanford Levinson

Sanford Levinson's book examines the "constitutional faith" that has, since 1788, been a central component of American "civil religion." By taking seriously the parallel between wholehearted acceptance of the Constitution and religious faith, he opens up a host of intriguing questions about what it means to be an American in the late twentieth century.

"...one of the most original books on the Constitution that I've read in a year saturated with the Constitution. I finally understand why the Constitution is to America what the Holy Scriptures are to Jews and Christians—what it is that makes an American." —Bill Moyers, Public Affairs Television

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A Forgotten Amendment

Over the years, most of the 10 amendments in the Bill of Rights have been extensively debated, in and out of the courts. Yet the Ninth Amendment, which states that rights not enumerated in the Constitution are "retained by the people," remains relatively untested. It has never been used to decide a Supreme Court case. Today some conservatives (e.g., Robert Bork) argue that its protections are irrelevant, that only rights listed in the Constitution are legally valid.

Barnett, a professor at the Chicago-Kent School of Law, disagrees. The Ninth Amendment, he believes, deserves "serious attention."

The amendment was designed by Virginia’s James Madison as a response to those opponents of a Bill of Rights who, like James Wilson of Pennsylvania, feared that citing all the freedoms that the Constitution should protect would, in effect, limit them to the ones mentioned. Madison drafted the amendment to balance Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which allows Congress to establish “necessary and proper” government powers not originally cited in the 1789 document. “The Framers,” Barnett notes, “recognized that it is impossible to specify in advance every right that a government might transgress.”

Barnett wants judges to recognize that the Framers held certain “philosophical presuppositions,” which the Ninth Amendment was meant to reflect. For example, the Constitution does not specifically recognize a right to private property, but that might well be an “unenumerated” right protected by the amendment.

Yet, says Barnett, the amendment does not give courts a “blank check” to create new rights. Judges should, when interpreting the Constitution, consider only the “background rights” assumed by the Framers, chiefly those protecting life, liberty, and property. They should also reject the argument that rights not enumerated in the Constitution are not protected by law; if they were not, why was the Ninth Amendment drafted? Properly invoked, writes Barnett, it can help ensure that the Constitution continues to act as “a constraint on the size and scope of government.”
Many contemporaries intensely disliked Martin Van Buren. "Thus only can I reach the throne," says Vice President Van Buren in this cartoon from the 1830s. "No, Matty," responds his weary boss, President Andrew Jackson, "by the Eternal, you'll sink me with you."


As George Bush continues his drive for the White House, he faces a barrier that has long seemed all but insurmountable: the "Van Buren jinx." The last sitting vice president to be elected chief executive was Martin Van Buren, who succeeded Andrew Jackson in 1836.

Sugiovanni, a Rutgers historian, dismisses the jinx as a product of "happenstance, historical accident, and outdated political custom."

Consider the 34 men who were vice presidents between Van Buren and Bush. Nine of them in fact became president when the incumbent resigned or died. Five vice presidents died in office, each time leaving the position open. (Not until 1967 did the 25th Amendment allow a president to fill a vice-presidential vacancy.) Seven were not renominated when their presidents ran for another term. Two fell out of contention when their presidents were not re-elected. One (Spiro Agnew, 1973) resigned.

Thus, only 10 of the 34 were "eligible" to seek the presidency. Four did not run. Among the six who did, early contenders were ill-
starred. In 1860, James Buchanan's vice president, John Breckinridge, was nominated by Southern Democrats in a party split that enabled Abraham Lincoln to lead his Republicans to victory. Charles Fairbanks was so disliked by his boss, Theodore Roosevelt, that in 1908 TR swung the G.O.P. nomination to his secretary of war, William Howard Taft.

The vice presidents' fortunes, Sirgiovanni argues, began to change during the 1950s. Dwight Eisenhower's vice president, Richard Nixon, transformed the office. Meeting with heads of state and serving as acting president twice when Ike was ill, Nixon helped turn his "dead end job" into a "free pass to the fast track" for the Oval Office. It was only by narrow margins that Nixon in 1960 and Hubert Humphrey in 1968 were denied the presidency. Sirgiovanni expects Bush—or one of his successors as vice president—to lay "the ghost of Martin Van Buren" to rest soon.

Preserving Diversity


How should government treat ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities?

Most of the world's liberal democratic states embrace "multiculturalism," policies designed to preserve and nourish such groups. But Gray, a fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, objects. These policies, he maintains, are "pernicious." They express "a racist conviction that minority cultures can never maintain themselves without paternalistic support."

English philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–73), the founder of modern liberalism, had only contempt for ethnic minorities. A Frenchman who thought himself a "Breton" or a "Basque," he wrote, was a "half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit."

Successive generations of liberals shared Mill's contempt for minorities, and, however inadvertently, expressed their disdain in the government programs they designed to assist them. Typically, attempts at "social-engineering" ended up harming rather than helping. (Example: urban renewal, which in many countries replaced poor but healthy communities with lifeless slums.) And subsidies aimed at preserving traditional ethnic culture, Gray believes, encourage the mistaken notion that minorities cannot flourish without state support, spawning "cultural apartheid."

Governments, Gray contends, should not try to conserve any minority through subsidy or regulation. A withdrawal from attempts to create special "tax-funded institutional reservations" (such as public housing projects) for minorities would encourage diversity. For example, allowing parents to select—or set up—their own schools through tuition vouchers would help offset the "cultural homogeneity" of public education.

The underlying issue, writes Gray, is what role the state should play in modern life. He votes for classical liberalism—that of *The Federalist Papers*, whose 18th-century authors believed that the state should exist not to promote any group or ideology, but to keep the peace and leave "practitioners of diverse traditions" free to thrive, or fail. Only a *limited* government can ensure that a diverse society "is more than an idle dream."
Tribal Rights

The 200,000-member Navajo tribe in Arizona owns 16 million acres. Its Tribal Council manages a $209 million budget. Yet the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), which oversees the nation’s 507 recognized tribes of Indians and Alaska natives, rules on such matters as cutting trees and the leasing of property on the reservation. Navajo police cannot investigate rapes and 17 other “major crimes”—these are under federal jurisdiction.

But the paternal relationship between Uncle Sam and the tribes, notes Sylvester, a Governing staffer, is “on the brink of change.”

The Reagan-appointed director of the 154-year-old BIA, Ross Swimmer, a former principal chief of the Cherokee Nation, wants to pare down his bureau ($1 billion budget, 13,500 employees). He would replace subsidized programs (e.g., the BIA schools on the nation’s 300 reservations) with grants to tribes—in line with the 1975 Indian Self-Determination Act, which allows them to manage existing federal services like public housing. The government, Swimmer believes, should keep only its “trust” role as guardian of the Indians’ land, minerals, and other resources.

Indeed, tribes have been increasingly sidestepping the BIA.

They learned to turn to the courts after 1974, when a federal district judge, ruling on the basis of an 1855 treaty, gave tribes in Washington rights to half the state’s catch of salmon and steelhead trout. With an $81 million award in a 1980 land-claim case, Maine’s Passamaquoddies and Penobscots bought a cement factory, a radio station, a blueberry farm—reducing their unemployment rate, once 60 percent, to below 10 percent.

Whether or not the BIA is ever cut down, or out (the National Congress of American Indians has called for Swimmer’s ouster), its role is diminishing. While Indian litigation has subsided, says Sylvester, that is because, more and more, tribes are “making [a] separate peace” with state and local governments—and still bypassing the BIA.

Lippmann’s Prophecy

In U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (1943), journalist Walter Lippmann (1889–1974) proposed a test for judging whether or not a country’s relations with other nations would receive the necessary domestic support: Measure its foreign commitments against its ability to project power. States whose obligations match their military capability (e.g., the United States between the Monroe Doctrine’s formulation in 1823 and the Spanish-American War of 1898) have successful foreign policies; those
whose commitments exceed their armed strength usually experience vigorous domestic opposition to any ambitious new foreign policy initiatives.

Since the 1960s, argues Huntington, director of Harvard’s Center for International Affairs, the United States has suffered from a “Lippmann gap”—its responsibilities extend beyond its military reach. For example, the Carter Doctrine of 1980, which committed Washington to keeping the Persian Gulf area free of the control of any outsider (i.e. the Soviet Union), brought “a tremendous expansion of demands on U.S. resources.”

The Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations sought to resolve the Lippmann gap through rapprochement with former adversaries. Examples: the Camp David accords of 1978, which completed Egypt’s transformation from Soviet client to U.S. partner, and the 1972 opening to China.

The Reagan administration replaced the conciliatory strategies of its predecessors with what Huntington regards as a more successful “compellent diplomacy.” This confronts adversaries who do not temper hostile positions with the certainty of a “highly unpleasant development” involving the expansion, or use, of U.S. military capability. Thus the deployment of new Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe hastened Moscow’s return to arms-control negotiations, resulting in the 1987 agreement to eliminate U.S. and Soviet ground-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe and elsewhere. And the 1986 air attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi “greatly reduced” Libyan-sponsored terrorism.

Huntington would continue some Reagan innovations. For example, at under $1 billion annually, Reagan Doctrine aid to anti-Communist “freedom fighters” (in Angola, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua) has proven a “cheap and easy way” to combat Soviet adventurism. But he worries that, in foreign policy, Reaganism has been a “simple moralism that views the world in terms of evils—the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons—whose influence” must be curbed. Thus, Reagan became “the only president who has actively tried to do away with” nuclear deterrence.

Reagan’s successor should seek the “realistic middle,” neither overextending commitments nor sharply reducing military strength. Only thus can the Lippmann gap be closed.

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**A War That Failed**


A centerpiece of the Reagan administration’s foreign and domestic policy is the “War on Drugs,” an effort to curb the transport, sale, and consumption of such illegal narcotics as heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. But Nadelmann, a Princeton political scientist, warns that the campaign is “exacerbating” the problem. In Latin America, the focus of his study, the beneficiaries of the U.S. “war” are dealers and revolutionaries.

Prohibiting the sale of drugs is like imposing a “huge tax” on them: it merely raises their price. High prices make the trade highly lucrative. By the hundreds of thousands, farmers have replaced or supplanted legal crops with coca and marijuana. Especially in the “main source” countries,
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, the processing and export of narcotics has been an "economic boon." In Bolivia's case, shipments of cocaine alone may pump $600 million a year into the economy, as much as sales of tin and other legitimate exports. By Nadelmann’s reckoning, the amount of foreign exchange that Latin Americans pocket from dealings in cocaine and marijuana is at least $2 billion, even before the drugs are refined and marketed overseas. (Marijuana that sells for $6–11 a pound in Colombia commands $550–990 a pound when it is resold in the United States.)

But the trade, Nadelmann notes, generates "tremendous corruption, lawlessness, and violence" in the source countries. In many of them it is the narcotraficantes (drug dealers) who have "ultimate power." They routinely bribe government officials (including cabinet ministers and supreme court judges) who support them, and assassinate anyone who opposes them. In Colombia, traffickers have killed a minister of justice, an attorney general, and a chief of the narcotics police. Colombia’s FARC and M-19 guerrilla organizations get income from drug trading; Peru’s Sendero Luminoso ("Shining Path") terrorists reap popular support through "attacks on U.S.-sponsored antidrug programs."

Nadelmann believes that legalization—and regulation—of the narcotics trade will eventually prove to be the most effective answer to the problems.
that drugs cause, in both source and destination countries. Latin American
governments, suffering greatly from the violent side effects of the illegal
drug traffic, may decide sooner than Washington that legalization is in their
best interests. If and when they do, argues Nadelmann, U.S. officials would
be well advised to “acknowledge those interests.”

**Ready to Fight?**

"Can a U.S. Army Corps Support Itself in War?" by Captain Douglas K. Zimmerman, U.S.

The U.S. Army, for more than a decade, has been trying to put more
active duty soldiers in combat units, fewer in rear-echelon supply and
maintenance outfits—"more tooth, less tail."

Captain Zimmerman, a systems analyst, argues that this policy—coupled
with low reserves of men and materiel and unrealistic Pentagon mobi-
lization plans—has made it unlikely that the 775,000-person Army can
sustain major combat operations overseas should war occur.

Ignored in Washington, Zimmerman says, such unpreparedness is
widespread. For example, the current estimate is that only 31 percent of
the nation’s stand-by munitions plants would not require extensive repairs
prior to activation. A minimum goal of a 30-day ammunition reserve for all
NATO forces, to be stockpiled in Europe by 1983, “slipped” by two years.

Roughly 70 percent of the service units now assigned to support the U.S.
Army’s Third Corps in war consist of part-time reservists, whose training,
equipment, and readiness for mobilization are below par.

At Fort Hood, Texas, Zimmerman reports, an Army study group ana-
lyzed the Third Corps’ ability to support combat operations with the logis-
tics units supposedly available in wartime. Units handling maintenance (of
weapons, vehicles, tanks), supplies, and casualties were all inadequate; only
the truck companies were equal to the task. The analysts concluded that
the corps could not carry out its mission.

**ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS**

**An End to Hierarchy?**

"The Coming of the New Organization" by Peter F. Drucker, in *Harvard Business Review*

The modern U.S. corporation evolved in two stages. Between 1895 and
1905, management emerged as a function separate from ownership.
Twenty years later, Pierre S. du Pont reorganized his family company in
Delaware on a military-style “command and control” model featuring de-
partments and hierarchical management. General Motors, under Alfred P.
Sloan, soon followed, and the present-day organizational standard was set.

Drucker, professor of management at the Claremont Graduate School,
believes that, before long, the hierarchical firm must yield to the “information-based organization,” if U.S. business is to remain competitive.

Industry’s increasing reliance on “knowledge workers” necessitates the change. Computers can generate so much data that top executives “risk being swamped” if authority is not pushed down to lower levels. The pushing will mean a paring of middle-managers who now “neither make decisions nor lead,” but function primarily as information “relays.”

The information-based firm will resemble the owner-managed corporations of the 19th century, with a difference. In those companies, expertise—about products, markets, and so forth—rested with the proprietors. In the future, it will rest with specialists who report to the boss. Companies, says Drucker, will be like an orchestra, where a conductor may direct 100 musicians without a “half-dozen division VP conductors.” Specialists will be organized for specific tasks, just as hospitals form teams—internists, radiologists, anesthesiologists, et al.—to treat a patient.

The new streamlined corporate structure will reduce management ranks by almost two-thirds, sharply curbing promotions from within. Career paths will increasingly lead from firm to firm, both for the would-be bosses and the specialists, who may seek to move to a larger or more prestigious employer even without a gain in rank. As Drucker notes, while “bassoonists presumably neither want nor expect to be anything but bassoonists,” they might aspire to play for a better orchestra.

**Stripping Genes**

Biotechnology may yet yield dozens of valuable new products and a thriving new U.S. industry. But a regulatory mess is dimming such prospects.

By law, the federal government oversees the testing of all genetically engineered products, whether or not they are ever marketed. In theory, notes Huber, a Manhattan Institute fellow, researchers have only to get an agency’s permission before beginning gene-altering experiments. In practice, the process is one of “ponderous disorder.” At least five federal agencies—led by the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Environmental Protection Agency—regulate biotechnology. The costly result: “high regulatory barriers very early in a product’s lifecycle.” Genentech was barred from testing an interferon vaccine for cows for a year while U.S. officials debated whether the product was a “veterinary biologic” under USDA’s purview or a “new animal drug” to be controlled by the FDA.

Increasingly, meanwhile, the courts are intervening. In a 1984 case, U.S. District Judge John Sirica cited the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to halt a University of California test of frost-inhibiting bacteria: No environmental-impact statement had been filed.

Conventional genetic engineering—crop breeding or animal husbandry—faces “few regulatory obstacles,” notes Huber. But such engineering in the laboratory stirs suspicions among public officials and envi-
environmentalists, even though a National Academy of Sciences panel found that genetically altered organisms "pose no unique ecological hazards."

Stringent regulation is forcing some scientists to do their work abroad. Philadelphia's Wistar Institute has tested a cow rabies vaccine in Argentina. Oregon State University researchers studied an antiviral animal vaccine in New Zealand. Some biotechnology companies, Huber reports, are considering partnerships with Japanese firms, so as to be able to experiment "without U.S. government oversight."

Huber calls for a reformed approval process in which a biotechnology firm would deal with "one division of [one] agency," and courts would resist "endless fine-tuning" of prior agency decisions. Otherwise, continuing regulatory unpredictability will surely "sink many undertakings regardless of their scientific and economic merits."

**Safety in the Skies**


In 1978, Congress stripped away the comfortable regulatory cocoon within which U.S. airlines had operated for 40 years. Decisions on "economic" matters (routes, fares, launching new carriers), long made by the Civil Aeronautics Board, were left to the executives in the industry.

Since then, some critics contend, airline safety has suffered. Facing intense competition, they argue, operators have slashed maintenance and hired less experienced, less expensive mechanics and pilots.

But Morrison, an economist at Northeastern University, and Winston, a Brookings fellow, find that deregulation "has not impaired air safety."

According to National Transportation Safety Board records, between 1965 and 1975, a period of strict regulation, there were 42 fatal crashes. Between 1976 and 1986, however, the number of such accidents dropped to 15—even though airline flights rose by eight percent and airplane passenger-miles increased by 52 percent over the previous decade.

Moreover, the pilots involved in the fatal 1976–86 crashes were, on average, older and more experienced than those in the 1965–75 accidents. This, the authors suggest, shows that "less-experienced pilots" are not "increasingly involved in accidents." Only one of the post-deregulation crashes was caused by improper maintenance.

The authors calculate that, as a result of deregulation, aviation insurance rates are 22 percent below what underwriters might be charging if regulation had continued. The insurers, whose profits come from successfully gauging risk, have judged that "the strength of market forces" has increased airline safety; they have cut premiums accordingly.

Stricter government-mandated safety policies, the authors believe, might decrease overall transportation safety, if resulting higher air fares persuade many travelers to drive instead of fly. Rather than re-regulate the airlines, the government should assign more air traffic controllers to busy airports, and press for "peak-load pricing systems" under which passengers would pay more to fly during congested periods.
Little Spenders

"Children as Consumers" by Horst H. Stipp, in American Demographics (Feb. 1988), 108 North Cayuga St., Ithaca, N.Y. 14850.

Advertisers are slowly discovering an untapped market: pre-teens.

Stipp, director of social research at NBC, reports that U.S. children “buy and influence” many more products than advertisers (and parents) suspect. According to James McNeal, author of Children as Consumers (1987), the average weekly allowance for four- to 12-year-olds is $3 a week, or $157 a year. Thus, the more than 20 million such youngsters have a combined disposable income of $4.7 billion a year.

A 1987 survey by the research firm of Yankelovich, Skelly, and White/Clancy, Shulman found that the chief income sources remain allowances from parents and birthday cash. But 10 percent of those aged nine to 11 are employed, working, on average, four hours a week for $8.

The pre-teens are thriftier than their elders, saving $500 million a year. As for spending, 58 percent purchase candy with their money; 30 percent get toys. Nearly one in four are magazine subscribers, more than one in five buy books, and one in 10 puts down cash for clothes, records, and fast food. The big spenders tend to come from single-parent or two-income households; moms and dads in traditional two-parent, one-breadwinner families are more tight-fisted.

The companies catering to pre-teens are becoming more specialized. A bank for children has opened in Denver; Los Angeles has a “children's

Levi Strauss is a major advertiser of apparel for children. Thirteen percent of six- to 11-year-olds buy their own clothes with their allowances. Another 53 percent choose what they wear but have their parents foot the bill.
Yellow Pages.” Among products recently created for the age group: Procter and Gamble’s Crest “Super Cool Gel” toothpaste, the “My First Sony” radio, General Electric’s “Kidcorder” cassette recorder.

Although some prime-time programs, such as The Cosby Show, are popular with children, the Saturday morning cartoon series still carry most of the television ads aimed at them; the candy, cereal, and toy purveyors are being joined by such newcomers as Heinz, which has discovered that pre-teens regard ketchup as “fun food.” By standing aloof from TV, says Stipp, other marketers of pre-teen favorites—peanut butter, records, watches—are still failing to profit from the social changes that have made U.S. children important independent consumers.

SOCIETY

Even More Divided


Twenty years ago, a presidential commission chaired by Illinois governor Otto Kerner warned that, among other things, the U.S. black population was dividing into a “small but steadily increasing Negro middle class” and a larger number of riot-prone “have-nots” who were “stagnating economically.” Zinsmeister, a demographer, finds a widening gap between the “two black nations.”

Black America has made many advances since the Kerner Report. The proportion of blacks above age 24 who have completed a high school education climbed from 30 percent in 1968 to 60 percent in 1987; the proportion who finished four years of college rose even more dramatically, from four percent to 11 percent. And black families with two parents who hold down jobs earn, on average, 85 percent as much as two-income white families, up from 73 percent in 1968. The earning power of young, married, black high school graduates is now on a par with that of comparable white couples.

Yet, while two-thirds of the nation’s 29 million blacks earn $10,000 or more annually, roughly eight million remain in the “underclass,” dependent on government payments and/or illegal activity for much of their income. These blacks are far more likely than their brethren to live in inner-city single-parent households, to bear illegitimate children, and to get in trouble with the police: 27 percent of the black inner-city males in the 16-24 age group surveyed by the National Bureau of Economic Research in 1986 admitted to being involved in crime, and 32 percent contended they could earn more from street crime than from honest work.

Ghetto violence is increasing; during the first four months of 1987 in Detroit, 102 blacks under age 16 suffered gunshot wounds, most in gang and drug wars. Half of the nation’s convicted felons, Zinsmeister observes,
“are young black males.”

However well intended, government policies such as affirmative action in hiring and noncompetitive “set-aside” contracts for minority businesses mostly benefit middle- and upper-class blacks. These citizens, Zinsmeister believes, could provide more effective help to the underclass than could an expansion of government welfare programs. Black Americans, he argues, “must ask themselves what they can do... for their brothers.”

An AIDS Analog

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, which has so far afflicted about one in 4,200 Americans, is not the first sexually transmitted disease to become a major national worry. During the late 1800s, about one in 10 citizens had syphilis. Its story, says Brandt, associate professor of social medicine at Harvard, offers an “important analog” to the AIDS drama.

Syphilis was feared both as a disease (often causing paralysis and death) and as an affront to Victorian values. Doctors exaggerated the ease with which such “vipers of venery” could be contracted. Calls arose for curbs on immigrants, who in fact did not show a high incidence of syphilis.

The early response was shaped by the Progressive-era “social hygiene movement.” It preached containment: sexual abstinence, police curbs on prostitution. Then, in 1909, came the hoped-for “magic bullet,” the arsenic-based drug Salvarsan. But only a fourth of syphilitics—outcasts, like AIDS patients—would complete the arduous injections.

World War I brought a new weapon: shame. Draftees with the disease (13 percent were afflicted with either syphilis or gonorrhea) were dishonorably discharged. On the home front, some 20,000 prostitutes were quarantined; 110 red-light districts (e.g., San Francisco’s Barbary Coast) were closed. Soldiers were given slogans (“A German bullet is cleaner than a whore”) but not condoms, which might encourage casual sex.

Persuaded that a “conspiracy of silence” about the disease aided its persistence, Surgeon General Thomas Parran wrote a 1937 best seller about syphilis, Shadow on the Land. Congress passed a 1938 law providing $15 million for education and blood tests. By that year, 26 states were requiring such tests for marriage-license applicants. Many people sought tests: Chicago’s “Wassermann Dragnet” drew up to 12,000 examinees a day. Yet, not until World War II—which brought penicillin (1943) and free condoms for G.I.’s—was syphilis curbed. From 72 per 100,000 people in 1943, the new-case incidence fell to four per 100,000 in 1956.

One moral of the story, says Brandt: Mandatory blood testing is no answer for AIDS. Such tests could raise both hysteria about the disease and a sizeable problem of misdiagnoses. (A fourth of syphilis tests yielded “false positive” results; many states have dropped premarital exam requirements.) Unless and until a magic AIDS bullet appears, Brandt believes the new “carnal scourge” is best fought with education.
In the West, studies of early transportation focus on watercraft and wheels. To McNeill, emeritus professor at the University of Chicago, this is “cultural myopia.” He gives a bow to a pack animal: the camel.

These beasts dominated transport in the Fertile Crescent between Egypt and Iraq for more than 1,000 years. Long before the time of Christ, camel caravans were shuttling textiles, metals, and other items among the cities of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. As late as 1869, when the Suez Canal opened, they remained the most effective means of moving goods between the Mediterranean’s eastern shore and India.

Although wheeled vehicles won favor after 1800 B.C., when military chariots appeared in Mesopotamia, by 300 A.D. the camel caravan’s superiority in long-haul work was established. A new “north Arabian saddle” raised the camel’s peak load to 500 lbs., making the typical string of 12 animals, tended by one or two men, more efficient than any wagon. Figures in the Emperor Diocletian’s Edict on Prices (301 A.D.) suggest that camels cost 20 percent less to maintain than horse- or donkey-drawn carts.

Whatever the terrain, the long-limbed animals could move 20 miles in a six-hour traveling day (the remaining 18 hours would be spent resting or foraging). Camels could go nine days without water, weeks without food.
PERIODICALS

They needed neither roads nor (at most rivers) bridges.

Islam accommodated the Fertile Crescent's "caravan world." In settled areas where grazing on land owned by others was considered theft, it was made an act of religious merit for people to subsidize "caravanserais" where camel drivers could tarry up to three days and get free shelter, food, and fodder. Asia Minor alone had 1,100 such "truck stops." One merchant's notes for a 79-day trip in 1581–82 showed his transport costs to be no more than three percent of the sale price of his goods; his expenses for customs and "protection" were higher.

Still vital even after 1300, when cargo transport by watercraft began to improve, caravans brought trade and Islam to remote areas—Arabia's "empty quarter," sub-Saharan Africa. Even so, the camel's limited capacity helped doom the Muslim heartland to slower economic growth than Europe or China enjoyed. Later, when the increased volume of trade between Europe and Asia required the movement of goods in bulk, the beast became obsolete as a mode of transport.

Since World War II, notes McNeill, aircraft and motor vehicles have "displace[d] camels even from their original homeland in Arabia."

The conventional wisdom among teachers is that television, with its fast-paced, image-packed shows, erodes children's attention spans—their ability to concentrate or to follow arguments in the classroom. But Barzun, emeritus professor at Columbia, argues that the reverse is true: In effect, TV merely echoes the fragmented curriculum in U.S. schools. There, "nearly everything done" over the past 50 years "has tended toward the discontinuous, the incoherent, the jiggly."

Educators, Barzun says, forget that many current classroom subjects cannot be taught. Teachable disciplines (such as history or mathematics) have at their core a "scheme of facts and rules" for students to master. But teachers of social studies take "real" subjects like economics or anthropology and pick from each a few bits and pieces without continuity or direction, thus distracting students from concentrated learning.

Moreover, too many educators favor "problem-solving" over analysis; they burden the schedule with such "non-subjects" as driver education and "family living." These are courses that focus on the students themselves, not the world around them, again retarding learning.

Barzun endorses the post-1960s "Back to Basics" movement, which calls for the return of the three R's and other traditional curricula. At present, he laments, "the school world is taking up another fad," courses in critical thinking. Supposed to enhance analytical abilities, this is yet another nonteachable topic. "Thinking" per se cannot be learned; students grasp it only as a consequence of studying difficult ideas. "Thinking is like piano-playing," Barzun contends. "It is shown, not taught."


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He calls on educators to heed philosopher William James (1842–1910). In *Talks To Teachers* (1899), James wrote that schoolwork must be “hard and unnatural” if students are to learn. He argued that the goal of a teacher was to find how to prod his pupils to “let loose the effort” to study. If teachers choose to *teach*, instead of entertain, they may be surprised by their students’ “miraculous” ability to listen—and to learn.

**PRESS & TELEVISION**

**Sunday Sermonette**


Now 20 years old, *60 Minutes* is the longest-running and most popular prime-time news program in U.S. television history. Why? Creator Don Hewitt’s prophecy that a documentary series that packaged reality “as well as Hollywood packages fiction” could not fail has been richly fulfilled.

Campbell, assistant professor of communications at the University of Michigan, analyzed 154 segments of the CBS series aired between 1968 and 1983. He concludes that Hewitt’s winning formula employs old-fashioned storytelling to dramatize a “mythology for middle America” that celebrates traditional virtues: fairness, simplicity, honesty, individualism.

The *60 Minutes* reporters play one of three archetypal roles:

- **Detective.** In investigative pieces, the reporter introduces a “crime” (political corruption, murder), then reconstructs the story, confronts witnesses, and unravels the mystery. Villains tend to be anonymous institutions (the government, big companies, unions); their facelessness may be underlined by their executives’ refusal to be interviewed. When villains are questioned, they are shown at close range. Their heads fill the screen and “sweat, facial twitches, and tears” stand out. Medium-range shots and trenchcoats mark the reporters as “individual loners” who always triumph.

- **Analyst.** In profiles (of politicians, actors, intellectuals), reporters again act as viewers’ surrogates, often posing “tough” questions. Example: Mike Wallace asks the Shah of Iran to comment on the CIA’s assessment of him as a “brilliant but dangerous megalomaniac.”

- **Tourist.** In segments that portray interesting places (Kuwait, rural America) and seek out “authentic” life and tradition-minded folk, reporters chastise villains (bureaucracy, modernity) by evoking myths from a lost, heroic age. (“This is one of those *Our Town* kind of stories,” intones Morley Safer, beginning a piece about a New Jersey village.)

Campbell finds that *60 Minutes* producers approach their audience (“Kiwanians, Rotarians, I understand them,” says Hewitt) with more sophistication than they display with their subjects. These get two-dimensional treatment at best. The series survives because it offers its Sunday evening audience “a center to go back to (or start out from) each week.”
Sixty years ago, most U.S. journalists preferred to report the “facts” without explanation. They focused on what, where, and when.

But that changed during the 1930s. Those years of swift change, propelled by the Depression and the New Deal, brought “interpretative” journalism—dealing with why and how—into fashion. *Time* (est. 1923) and *Newsweek* (1933) steadily gained circulation by promising extensive analysis of current topics. Newspapers expanded the space given to commentary, and syndicated columns, most notably those of Scripps-Howard’s Raymond Clapper and the *New York Times’s* Arthur Krock, gained prominence. By 1936, as many as 38 Washington correspondents were writing columns at least once a week.

To President Franklin D. Roosevelt, notes Winfield, associate professor of communications at Washington State University, straight reporting was greatly preferable to the new journalism. “It must be hell to have to interpret,” he remarked sardonically during a 1934 press conference. Editors, he argued, were losing the public’s confidence by giving columnists and commentators space. To get the new oracles on his side, FDR employed not only humor but also seductive offers of friendship.

Roosevelt, Winfield maintains, “socialized with journalists to an extent

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*Franklin Roosevelt with reporters (1939) during his family’s annual Fourth of July picnic at their Hyde Park, N.Y., estate. FDR courted newsmen at off-record sessions at “little White Houses” here and in Campobello, N.B.*
rarely matched" by any other president. He routinely invited them to official banquets, and faithfully attended such Washington press fixtures as the White House Correspondents’ Dinner and the annual Gridiron evening. Newsmen felt welcome to form clubs at which they could banter with Roosevelt and his aides: The “J. Russell Young School of Expression” was a yearly gathering, inspired by the Civilian Conservation Corps, where White House staffers and reporters met to plant trees, make daisy chains, and sing class songs.

To an “inside group” FDR dispensed special favors. One New York Times columnist, Anne O’Hare McCormick, was granted annual “background conversations” with the president that resulted in Pulitzer Prize-winning articles. For pundit Joseph Alsop (a second cousin of Eleanor Roosevelt), White House aides reviewed—and edited—three drafts of his 1940 foreign policy study, The American White Paper.

How successful were Roosevelt’s “private hospitalities” to the press? Arthur Krock, the New York Times’s Washington bureau chief, had it about right, Winfield believes. Roosevelt’s courting, Krock wrote, impelled many journalists to give FDR “the best of it when there is a best that can be given without violence to the facts.”

**RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY**

*Why Lewis Endures*  

Twenty-five years after his death, British essayist, novelist, critic, and Christian apologist C. S. Lewis (1898–1963) is more popular than ever. At two million a year, sales of his books in the United States and Britain are six times greater than when he was alive. Calendars, devotional readings, picture books, aprons, even coffee mugs celebrate his genius.

Nelson, a political scientist at Vanderbilt, thinks Lewis endures because he defended Christianity through “reason, logic, and certainty in an age when those qualities usually are regarded as enemies to religion.”

Lewis was the bookish son of a Belfast solicitor. Following World War I military service, he spent his life teaching English and literature, first at Oxford, later (after 1954) at Cambridge. Until he was 31, he was an atheist. But when he could not justify to himself or his students the idea of an “Absolute Mind” distinct from God, he became “an empirical Theist.” Two years later, after intense discussions with two colleagues, J. R. R. Tolkien and Hugo Dyson, he became a Christian.

But he scorned “Christianity-in-water.” He was orthodox. He thought liberal Christians were in error; they questioned the truth of the Gospels and did not believe in miracles. Yet Lewis, although he did not marry until his late 50s, was neither prig nor Puritan. While he taught that sex should
only be performed by married couples, he also stressed that "the sins of
the flesh" were far more venial than "the pleasures of power, of hatred." Unlike some fundamentalists, he emphasized that Christians could learn
from other religions, and Jesus could save "those who have not explicitly
accepted Him in this life."

Lewis's Christian apologetics were of two kinds. His essays, among them Mere Christianity (1952) and The Problem of Pain (1940), were a
systematic guide to Christian faith and practice. But his fiction, such as The
Screwtape Letters (1942) and The Chronicles of Narnia (1950–56), ex-
plored "the mythic aspects of Christianity."

Nelson believes that Christians, not atheists, were and are Lewis's
main audience. To evangelicals, his work says that "they can be Bible-
believing without being literalistic." To the average churchgoer, Lewis fills
a gap, lecturing on sin, the Trinity, and other topics now abandoned by
pastors who favor "social and political relevancy" over Christian doctrine.

The Literary Bible

"Responding to the Bible" by Fernanda
Eberstadt, in Commentary (Jan. 1988), 165
East 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

Most people interpret the Bible in one of two ways. To devout Christians
and Jews, it is simply God's word. To most scholars, subscribing to the
"historical-critical" school of interpretation, the sacred books are simply an
incoherent compendium of Near Eastern legends and histories related by
priests over several centuries.

In recent years, literary critics, aiming to revive public interest in the
Bible, have sought to treat it as "great literature." Contrary to the histori-
cal-critical approach, these scholars embrace the work as a whole. They
examine character development, narrative style, and imagery, and other-
wise study the Book not as primitive folklore, but with the respect due
"the creative masterpiece of a literary artist." This holistic approach, ar-
gues Eberstadt, a novelist and critic, raises issues few scholars have dared
to confront.

Viewing the Old and New Testaments as one is probably the literary
approach's greatest weakness: The two reflect not only different times and
cultures, but were written in different languages (Hebrew and Greek). And
there are theological differences, observes Eberstadt, that literary academ-
ics ignore. For example, in his New Testament Epistles, St. Paul treats the
laws that the Old Testament God gave to Moses for the Jewish people as a
"ministration of death, written and engraved in stones."

If the Bible is "best understood as a work of literature," asks
Eberstadt, "who better to grasp and convey its graces than a writer?" But
few can, she notes. In Congregation: Contemporary Writers Read the
Jewish Bible (1987), several storytellers (e.g., Cynthia Ozick, Mordecai
Richler) explore the work for literary merit, and, for the most part, find
they cannot "hear its melodies." Novelist James Atlas dismisses the some-
times harsh Old Testament God as a "petulant dictator" with little to say
to 20th-century man.
Oddly, the critics themselves, preoccupied with such arcania as “narratology” and “redactional heuristics,” tend to overlook whatever literary qualities are to be found in the Bible. Their work threatens to substitute one atomized view (the historical approach) for another “academic form of fragmentation.” Eberstadt concedes that the history, law, poetry, moral philosophy, and religious symbolism in the Bible represent a “vast and demanding subject for literary inquiry.” But so far, the Bible investigators have failed to explain how to read what “we somehow must understand if we are to understand ourselves.”

**Mold for Success**


During the early 1970s, a student at the Tokyo Institute of Technology erred in an attempt to synthesize a polymer called polyacetylene. He used 1,000 times more catalyst than he was supposed to.

The result was a new kind of plastic, a silvery film that looked like aluminum foil, stretched like Saran Wrap, and overturned an idea that had persisted since such synthetics were introduced during the 1930s: Plastics do not conduct electricity.

Since then, report Kaner and MacDiarmid, chemists at the University of California, Los Angeles, and the University of Pennsylvania, respectively, “conducting polymers” have been developed that transmit electricity as efficiently as copper. They could be used to make cheap, powerful batteries, highly efficient circuit boards, and artificial nerves.

Conducting polymers are created by “doping” polyacetylene and other compounds with an iodine solution. “Doping” allows electrons to flow freely, increasing the polymer’s ability to transmit electricity.

During the early 1980s, the authors created a prototype electric-car battery that was lighter than conventional nickel-cadmium or lead-acid batteries, and used no toxic materials. Last year, two Japanese firms, Bridgestone and Seiko Electronic Parts, began to market a rechargeable plastic-lithium battery that is more powerful than existing types and can store three times as much electricity.

A U.S. firm, Allied-Signal, is studying ways to use the new plastics in sensing devices—e.g., in a monitor that would tell consumers when the frozen food in supermarkets had been thawed during shipping. Medical applications might include replacements for damaged nerves, and in “internal drug-delivery systems” that doctors could implant in a patient and program to dispense a drug at regular intervals.

Additional uses for conducting polymers will appear, the authors believe, but only over time. As with conventional plastics after they were first developed a half-century ago, years of fine-tuning will be required to yield products that are “economically successful.”
Of Men and Apes


In Descent of Man (1871), Charles Darwin embraced a view, first proposed by his staunch defender, T. H. Huxley, that the closest relative to man on the evolutionary tree "is either the Chimpanzee or the Gorilla."

For a hundred years, many scientists questioned this closeness. Martin, an anthropologist at the State University of New York, Stony Brook, shows that in recent years researchers have come to agree with Darwin—for reasons he could have hardly imagined.

Darwin believed that "man's closest relatives" would naturally live on the same continent where humans first evolved—Africa. But he mistakenly assumed that the modern distribution of apes in the world also prevailed in prehistoric times. During the 1920s, British paleontologist Guy Pilgrim, studying fossils in India, concluded that the great apes (orangutans, gorillas, and chimpanzees) of Africa and Asia were more closely related to each other than any one of them was to man.
But Pilgrim, like all students of evolution in his day, believed that the best way to judge how closely species were related was to consider all their physical similarities. This view changed during the 1960s, when West Germany’s Willi Hennig argued that only similarities that linked species to a common ancestor—"shared derived" characteristics—mattered. Horses, zebras, and rhinoceros all belong to the order Perissodactyla because they have fewer than five toes. But one-toed horses and zebras are more closely related than either is to the three-toed rhino; therefore, horses and zebras may be a "clade," species with a common ancestor.

Who belongs in the same clade with humans? Men, great apes, and Old World monkeys (baboons, macaques) are in a clade because they have narrow noses, large brains, and 32 teeth. Men and great apes form a smaller clade because both have elbow joints and large premolar teeth. But two species of great apes, chimpanzees and gorillas, both have arms designed for "knuckle walking"—thick skin pads on the fingers and wrists that can "lock into position" somewhat like human knees. Because humans do not have these features, Martin concludes that the great apes form their own clade, making them "first cousins" to each other and "second cousins" to man. Thus, Martin says, Darwin guessed right: "Man must look to both the gorillas and the chimpanzees to uphold his family dignity."

Feminist Science?


In recent years, a growing number of feminist scholars have argued that science in the West is inherently biased against women. These feminists contend that women have been "systematically excluded" from science. Even the words scientists use—physicists who describe forces "acting on" objects, or biologists who describe the "competition" between animals to survive—are said to reveal rampant male supremacism. Male-dominated science, asserts philosopher Sandra Harding, author of The Science Question in Feminism (1986), produces "sexist, racist, homophobic, and classist projects."

Levin, a philosopher at Yeshiva University, believes that women who differentiate between "male" and "female" science are mistaken: "The whole idea of a 'masculine' theory or problem is extremely dubious."

Personal preferences do play a role in determining what research projects are initiated. But, Levin notes, the scientific method, with its emphasis on free discussion and replicable experiments, ensures that unprovable theories are swiftly discredited. If, as feminists charge, men are able to perceive only "hierarchical and uni-directional relationships," how did male scientists discover such examples of cooperation as symbiosis, catalysis, and biofeedback?

Feminists have failed to show how "female" science would differ from existing practice. Proposed language changes seem pointless: To say that nature is "bounteous" rather than "parsimonious," for example, simply substitutes a "caring" for a "dominating" word without providing new information. Moreover, some feminists, in their zeal to find hidden mascu-
line bias, fail to demonstrate why "male science" is faulty. Feminist theoretician Alison Jaggar, for instance, accuses Copernicus (1473–1543) of replacing "the female (earth-centered) universe with a male (sun-centered) universe," but cannot prove that the sun orbits the Earth.

Levin warns that feminist pressures could lead to unwarranted demands in universities for special women's science courses as well as less money for research deemed "masculinist." The feminist pursuit of arbitrary distinctions between men and women, she concludes, merely reinforces the old canard "that women's thinking is best confined to the practical while men should be off exploring the abstract and fundamental."

**Spawning Specialists**


Do different nations have different "styles" of conducting scientific research? Harwood, a historian at Britain's University of Manchester, believes that "national styles" emerged long ago. His case in point: a comparison of German and American geneticists.

Characteristically, Harwood says, they used the 1900 rediscovery of the papers of botanist Gregor Mendel (1822–1884) in different ways. Focusing on narrow technical issues, Americans, led by Columbia's Nobel laureate T. H. Morgan (1866–1945), extended Mendel's work by analyzing how chromosomes transmit genetic material. By contrast, such German geneticists as Alfred Kühn and Richard Goldschmidt aimed experiments primarily at broad theoretical questions, such as the role that evolution plays in the transfer of genetic material between generations.

American geneticists had more money and more "institutional niches" in which to work. U.S. universities, hungry for students, funds, and prestige, swiftly responded to demands for new departments and courses in specialties such as genetics. In addition, private foundations and the U.S. Department of Agriculture financed genetic research.

German universities had less room for specialists. The small number of professors who headed the typical faculty kept a tight rein over junior scholars, and actually liked to teach general introductory courses. (These increased the "capitation" fees that determined their pay.) To become a professor, a young German scholar had to have wide interests to qualify for a limited number of academic positions. Thus, junior geneticists, rather than pursuing uncharted ideas, tended to work "upon the classic problems of older disciplines" (such as evolution) that would enable them to become professors of botany or zoology.

Many German geneticists chose to immigrate to America or other nations rather than continue to teach in low-paid jobs. Geneticist Kurt Belar, for example, moved from the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute to Columbia University during the Depression, because Columbia doubled Belar's salary and offered a lighter teaching load.
The distinctions between German and American science faded after 1945, as postwar German universities adopted U.S.-style departments and reduced professors' power to hire and fire. German and American scientists became more alike in their interests.

**RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT**

*God Goes on Vacation*

When vacationing Americans go camping or mountaineering, or otherwise answer the call of the wild, they follow a trail first blazed by liberal New England Protestant ministers of the 19th century.

Before the 1850s, the "vacation" was an upper-class indulgence, for Southern planters and Northern merchants who could afford summer refuges such as Newport, Rhode Island, and New York's Saratoga Springs. Yet, observes Strauss, a Kalamazoo College historian, even when industrialization brought more free time, middle-class Americans had to reconcile such leisure with "the value placed on work" in a Protestant culture.

Help came. Invoking a benign rather than a judgmental Deity, preachers like Henry Ward Beecher assured urban, middle-class churchgoers that simple, restorative vacations in the countryside would improve their job performance and "not endanger salvation." Others, such as Edward Everett Hale, viewing cities as unhealthy, urged gymnastics and visits to parks as alternatives to less godly urban amusements. But it was William Henry Harrison Murray (1840-1904), minister of Boston's Park Street Congregational Church, who pioneered rigorous recreation in the wild.

An advocate of "muscular Christianity," Murray once shocked a congregation by showing up for services in hunting garb. For those in the unwholesome cities, he prescribed forays in the wilderness. Thus would weary lawyers and bankers—and "shrivel-skinned" clergymen—become "vigorous outdoorsmen like Moses and Jesus." The adventure stories he wrote argued that Christianity favored "piety of a broad-chested sort."

Murray's *Adventures in the Wilderness or Camp-life in the Adirondacks* (1869) appeared after the New York mountains were opened to rail travel. He offered guidance on where to stay and what to do, foreshadowing the "packaging" of travel. Indeed, the Adirondacks' summer population soared. The threat that "Murray's fools" (and lumbermen) posed to the environment spurred what became known as the conservation movement. New periodicals like *Forest and Stream* backed the creation, in 1885, of the Adirondack Forest Preserve, a precursor to U.S. national parks.

"Adirondack Murray" eventually drifted away from the pulpit; for a time he ran a ranch in Texas, then a restaurant in Montreal. Eventually, Strauss observes, his countrymen would forget all about the original "religious rationale" for occasionally roughing it in the wild.
RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

Cleaning Up Toxic Waste

"The Elusive Pursuit of Toxics Management"

During the past decade, government controls on the storage and disposal of toxic waste have greatly tightened. Each fresh discovery of an abandoned hazardous-materials dump brings more stringent regulation by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its state counterparts.

But "few if any" of their remedies have really worked, say Mazmanian, a professor at the Claremont Graduate School, and Morell, a vice-president of Exceltech, a California environmental engineering firm. Corporate resistance, combined with the EPA's weak enforcement powers, have led, understandably, to growing public frustration.

The first efforts to solve the toxic-waste problem were market-oriented, with industry bearing most of the costs. But impatient government regulators soon pressed for more draconian rules. These rules failed, however. Consider the fate of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1984. Rather than pay for newly mandated improvements to existing conventional landfill dumps (such as the installation of multi-layered liners), operators simply closed down more than a third of them. Meanwhile, the construction of waste treatment plants lagged, in part because of community resistance. Nearly all dangerous wastes continue to be sent to inadequate landfills, surface impoundments, and injection wells.

Nonetheless, economic incentives remain the best method of solving the fearsome toxic waste problem. The authors urge less reliance on "uniform rules promulgated by distant federal agencies" and more freedom for local initiatives. For instance, a "fee-and-rebate" system similar to the deposits paid on returnable bottles holds promise: A bill before the New Jersey legislature would increase the state corporate income tax from 9 to 9 1/2 percent—except for industries that gain state certification for compliance with toxic-waste disposal laws.

Corporations and environmentalists, add the authors, should begin to work with rather than against each other. Corporate managers should seek the advice of local environmentalists by appointing them to advisory boards to oversee plant operations. The latter, in turn, should temper their unrealistic demands for "zero-risk" factories.

ARTS & LETTERS

A Lost Art


The Hollywood directors of the 1930s and '40s perfected many film genres, notably the swashbuckling pirate adventures of Errol Flynn and the hard-boiled crime dramas (Little Caesar, High Sierra) that starred Edward G. Robinson or Humphrey Bogart.
But perhaps the most successful films of that era, in both their construction and the pleasure they still afford viewers, are the romantic comedies. Directed by Frank Capra, Preston Sturges, and Howard Hawks, and starring such actors as Carole Lombard, Katharine Hepburn, Myrna Loy, and Cary Grant, these films, says Garis, a Wellesley College English professor, constituted an “idiomatically American art.”

During the early 1930s, romantic comedy was dominated by the confections of expatriate German director Ernst Lubitsch (1892–1947). But with the Depression’s onset, audiences lost their taste for Lubitsch’s artificial romanticism. They sought comedies with a “real American feel.”

Frank Capra pointed the way with *It Happened One Night* (1934). This film, which paired a woman of “brilliantly inventive femininity” (Claudette Colbert) with a man laden with “rather square masculinity” (Clark Gable) in ludicrous, but plausible, fast-paced adventures, was the first “screwball” comedy. Although Capra soon abandoned screwball films for such didactic dramas as *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington* (1939), other directors continued to develop the genre.

Most important among them was Preston Sturges (1898–1959). A former screenwriter, Sturges shared Capra’s sentimentalism, but laced his films with foreboding, yet “peculiarly affecting and moving,” images. For example, in *The Lady Eve* (1941) Henry Fonda was cast as an amateur snake-expert who falls in love with a con artist, played by Barbara Stanwyck. Fonda scorns Stanwyck when he learns of her crimes, and she responds by “coldly torturing” him with feigned dark emotions. Sturges’s great achievement is to make the film as black as possible—and then allow
the couple to “escape into happiness” by processes as wondrous as Houdini’s escape from a straitjacket.

The reckless range of Sturges’s films, including *The Miracle of Morgan’s Creek* (1944) and *Unfaithfully Yours* (1948), exhausted the screwball comedy form. Sturges’s great works, Garis observes, “made his career the [genre’s] appropriate finale.” Later directors, such as Peter Bogdanovich in *What’s Up, Doc?* (1972) or Ted Kotcheff in *Switching Channels* (1988), attempted, but failed, to revive the genre.

**Parlor Ideologies**


In his fragmentary 1923 story “The Burrow,” Czech novelist Franz Kafka (1883–1924) described a half-human creature whose aim in life is to create a secure room. His snug burrow, says Kafka’s protagonist, encloses him “more peacefully and warmly than a bird is enclosed in its nest.”

Kafka’s story, writes Lears, a Rutgers University historian, is “a central text of modernist culture.” The notions Kafka expressed were shared by many people of his time, and helped shape interior design.

The American and European tastemakers who lived between 1850 and 1900 considered the interiors of homes to be the domain of women. French Second Empire designers, for example, conveyed a “demurely concealed” femininity through floral designs on wallpaper and “sensuous curves on canopied beds.” During the 1880s and ’90s, houses became more intimate and personal. “Semi-private” window seats and cubbyholes appeared; sitting rooms became crammed with bric-a-brac, particularly reproductions of ancient Egyptian and Turkish relics. The bourgeois home was a cozy, cluttered nest.

American feminists of the 1890s rebelled against cluttered design, which they thought heightened women’s hysteria and men’s neurasthenia. Led by author Charlotte Perkins Gilman and the editors of *House Beautiful*, they called for “absolutely sanitized” interiors free of “Victorian social artifice.” Technological advances, such as the introduction of large panes of glass, combined with the professionalization of interior decoration to speed a trend toward simplicity.

Early 20th-century European architects continued the rebellion against the untidy Victorian “closed box.” The Bauhaus Germans, Le Corbusier (1887–1965), and others strove for interiors that were “devoid of any references to the past or to the individuality of the occupant.” But American designers of the time did not propose living spaces as sterile as those their European counterparts advocated. Even the most starkly modern of the homes built by architect Frank Lloyd Wright (1867–1959), for example, used wood and stone instead of metal, and were equipped with homey hearths and dining rooms.

Wright’s reward: praise from commentators for “saving the family” from social chaos by preserving traditional designs.
Translating Homer

The Roman statesman Cato the Elder (234–149 B.C.) counseled young orators: *rem tene, verba sequentur*—"Keep a grip on the argument, and the words will follow." Jones, a senior lecturer in classics at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, England, agrees with Cato’s advice. Translators, he argues, should conserve each sentence in the original text.

A translation is a "historical statement," an interpretation shaped by both individual bias and contemporary fashion. When Alexander Pope (1688–1744) translated Homer's *Iliad* between 1713 and 1720, his heavily classicized poetry ("Gazing he spoke, and kindling at the view/His eager Arms around the Goddess threw") may have been well suited to the Miltonic ideals of 18th-century England, but it amounted to a reconceptualization more than a translation of Homer’s Greek.

"Let us abandon once and for all the chimaera of ‘the literal translation,’” urges Jones. Even "word-for-word" requires the translator to choose from among different shades of meaning from the original text. For example, one-third of the 27,000 lines of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are repetitions of the same phrases or passages. While "fixed, [Greek] hexametric ways of saying things" are necessary for accurate scansion (or poetic meter) of each verse in an epic poem, Jones views repetitions as "so much a part of the essence of Homer" that they must be retained.

Epithets such as “much-enduring Odysseus” are used in so many different contexts that it is hard to find an exact English equivalent. For example, the phrase *luto gounata kai philon etor* ("his knees and own heart were released") describes Homer’s characters when they are, variously, in great danger, receiving tragic news, or recognizing a relative.

Unlike other contemporary translators, Jones believes that English prose captures Homer’s "words and arguments" better than verse, which does more damage to Homer’s text. Translators, he concludes, should use "clear, strong, idiomatic English" that captures "something of the poetry of the original."

OTHER NATIONS

Sovs on the Dole

On October 9, 1930, Josef Stalin declared unemployment abolished in the Soviet Union. To this day, the Soviet Constitution makes work not only a right but an obligation. Even so, joblessness exists, and it is bound to increase regardless of how—and how far—Mikhail Gorbachev’s economic *perestroika* (“restructuring”) proceeds.
PERIODICALS

Soviet unemployment, according to *The Economist*, takes three forms. Some is “frictional”; at any time, two percent of all Soviet workers are moving to new jobs. Another one percent are “parasites,” those who lack formal employment—vagabonds, black marketeers, and dissidents. (Poet Joseph Brodsky, the 1987 Nobel laureate, was once classed as a parasite.)

But the biggest problem is “hidden unemployment.” There are uncounted millions of Soviets who have jobs but produce nothing, for many reasons: lack of supplies, broken machinery, sheer laziness, or the tendency of factory bosses to hoard labor. Managers who fire workers must find new posts for them. And “extra people come in handy for the ‘storming’ periods... when the rush is on to meet plan targets.”

But for the first time, layoffs are occurring. Between 1984 and 1985, 12,000 workers (10 percent of the staff) of the Byelorussian railway were fired and transferred to other jobs—their wages were allotted to the survivors as incentives to work harder. Similar cuts followed at 10 other railways and two subway lines. And unemployment benefits, officially nonexistent, are appearing; 3,200 bureaucrats fired from agricultural ministries in 1985 received three months’ pay.

More is yet to come. Last year, Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov told the Supreme Soviet that 13 percent of all state-run enterprises may close. By 1990, 60,000 employees of government ministries may be sacked. And an economist for Gosplan, the state planning committee, predicts that 13 to 19 million jobs may be eliminated by the century’s end, as workers are transferred from overmanned factories to the “rudimentary service industries.”

If Soviet managers are to be free to lay off workers, *The Economist* observes, the government must lift old barriers that discourage workers from moving to find new jobs. Abolishing the “internal passport” system, easing the housing shortage, and making part-time jobs more common will provide the mobile labor force needed for *perestroika* to succeed. Without these changes, workers may well prefer the “charming stability” of the old order, where, as the familiar Soviet joke puts it, “They pretend to pay us and we pretend to work.”

African Delusions


Why are many sub-Saharan African nations plagued by failing economies? The prime causes, maintains Eberstadt, a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, are government mismanagement and misdirected foreign aid programs.

Western efforts to aid these young nations, he argues, are based on “myths.” Among them:

- *Africa’s high population growth reflects increased birthrates.* Actually, says Eberstadt, the prime cause is falling death rates. Population control programs, such as those of the U.S. Agency for International Development, are doomed because they aim at lowering fertility—ignoring
American singer Harry Belafonte meets with children at a camp in famine-stricken Ethiopia during a June 1985 visit sponsored by USA for Africa.

The "population problem" that most concerns Africans. That, in a culture where large families are prized, is infertility.

- **Environmental forces (drought, desertification) cause economic chaos.** Not necessarily. Consider two bordering pairs of nations, Mozambique and Malawi, and the Ivory Coast and Ghana. According to U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates for the period from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s, agricultural production fell by more than 40 percent (on a per capita basis) in Mozambique and Ghana, but rose in Malawi and the Ivory Coast. Because these two pairs of nations have similar climates and "strikingly different" production rates, Eberstadt suggests that weather is not a "decisive factor" in causing African economies to fail.

- **Debt relief helps needy nations.** Indeed, in 1986 the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling on foreign donors to forgive $35-$55 billion in loans to African nations. Such generosity, Eberstadt believes, is both unnecessary and unwise. African governments have many surplus assets (such as nationalized industries) that could be sold to repay their loans. Moreover, he says, repudiating debts will not encourage African regimes to balance their budgets. "Is it a kindness," Eberstadt asks, to hold African rulers to "a lower standard of economic performance" than that required of commercial borrowers?

To restore their economies, Eberstadt proposes that African nations decrease their dependence on the largesse of foreign governments and make greater use of loans from private-sector banks. He cautions Western donors to "consider the moral and practical consequences" of foreign aid "before underwriting it on an even greater scale."
OTHER NATIONS

China's Elites


In the Soviet Union, the Communist Party exercises power through the nomenklatura (nomenclature), the patronage system under which the Politburo directly controls key positions in most political, governmental, social, and cultural organizations. However, all Communist states use such a system. In China, says Burns, a political scientist at the University of Hong Kong, the nomenklatura—there called zhiwu mingcheng biao—is "arguably the major instrument" of party control.

China's nomenklatura evolved during the early 1950s; by 1955, the Communist Party's Central Committee (CC) controlled all senior personnel appointments. Like everything else in China, the smooth-running nomenklatura machine was disrupted by Mao's Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, resulting in "highly irregular" appointments. Not until 1980, after four years spent rehabilitating the victims (and purging the leaders) of the Red Guards, was the nomenklatura system fully restored.

In 1984, the CC transferred control of two-thirds of the posts it used to fill to provincial party branches; they in turn handed many of their positions over to prefectural (county) party committees. This was done not to reduce the nomenklatura's size—still an estimated eight million positions—but to allow the CC to concentrate on filling important jobs.

Posts still controlled by the CC, Burns writes, include "the leadership of all important mass organizations," among them the trade unions, the industries, the top 10 universities, and such newspapers as China Daily and Renmin Ribao. Prominent exclusions: the armed forces and elected members of the CC, who control their own nomenklatura lists.

The more positions covered under nomenklatura, the higher-ranking the organization. The Academy of Sciences, for example, has "scores of positions" controlled by the CC, and is thus more prestigious than Peking University, where only the top two posts are nomenklatura jobs.

Like its counterparts elsewhere, notes Burns, China's nomenklatura "institutionalizes patronage." The continued monopoly by national and provincial central committees of the Communist Party on the granting of sinecures and official favors perpetuates the incumbent leadership's power.

Capitalist Corruption


India's businessmen face severe constraints—rules governing imports and exports, prices and production quotas, and even plant location. The result, notes Kochanek, a political scientist at Pennsylvania State University: the business leaders prefer to curry favor with New Delhi's politicians rather than compete in a free market. Thus, India has an economic system—known as the "permit-license-quota Raj"—that produces slow growth, massive corruption, and shortages of consumer goods.
The Congress Party politicians (led by Jawaharlal Nehru) who ruled India after independence from Britain in 1947 believed that centralized planning and curbs on corporations were the keys to economic development. Led by family-owned “business houses” (such as the Tatas of Bombay and the Birlas of Calcutta) descended from old trading firms, India’s industrialists accepted Nehru’s socialist restrictions rather than risk nationalization under a more radical regime. They chose to gain influence through massive campaign contributions and by providing jobs for the relatives of key politicians. As the costs of national election campaigns rose (from 25 million rupees in 1957 to between 300 and 660 million rupees 10 years later), politicians’ dependence on businessmen for funds grew.

The elections of 1967 gave the Congress Party its smallest majority since independence. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, angered by business donations to the opposition Jana Sangh and Swatantra parties, retaliated by banning all corporate campaign contributions. But Gandhi’s ministers threatened nationalization or punitive tax audits if businessmen failed to give illegal (or “black”) payoffs to the Congress Party. Although Gandhi’s government fell in 1977, her return to power (1980-1984) expanded the “permit-license-quota” system to state-owned corporations and to military contracts with foreign firms. Election costs continued to climb, reaching four billion rupees (about $307 million) in 1984-85, increasing politicians’ need for corporate aid.

Since he became prime minister in 1984, Indira’s son Rajiv Gandhi has legalized corporate campaign contributions. He has also tried to promote deregulation and tax reform. But bureaucrats resist any changes that may reduce their power. Moreover, many businesses “are happier in a closed, controlled, and noncompetitive environment” that allows inefficient factories to survive. The Indian economy, Kochar believes, “needs a drastic overhaul.” None is “anywhere in sight.”

**A Quiet Success**

What is the world’s fifth most populous country? Which nation is home to the most Muslims? The land whose per capita economic growth exceeded those of all other Southeast Asian countries except Singapore during 1965-85? The country is Indonesia—which, says Emmerson, a political scientist at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, remains unknown to most Americans.

After 200 years of Dutch rule and three years of wartime occupation by Japanese forces, Indonesia declared its independence in August 1945. Its first president, Sukarno, was a nationalist who shunned Western help, withdrew from international organizations, encouraged the world’s third largest Communist party, and aligned Jakarta with Mao’s China. But the succession struggle that erupted when the “president for life” fell ill in 1965 brought a military takeover and a new leader: General Suharto.

His supporters slew 100,000 Communists and set up a New Order, “an
authoritarian regime led by officers and technocrats.” The economy was spurred by Western investment, and, during the 1970s, by high oil and gas prices (Indonesia is OPEC’s only Asian member). Emmerson notes that Sukarno “delivered mainly speeches, Suharto delivers the goods.”

The end of the oil boom left Jakarta with an immense foreign debt ($42 billion in 1986). But the regime retains the favor of Western lenders; it has taken some austerity steps, and is grappling with endemic corruption. (A Swiss firm oversees customs at most ports.) While either Thailand or Malaysia is more apt to become “the second successfully industrializing Southeast Asian country” (after Singapore), says Emmerson, Indonesia has progressed by exporting oil, rubber, and coffee. In 1982, the World Bank raised its ranking from “low-income” to “middle-income.”

Indonesia’s next hurdle is political. Last March, Suharto easily won a new five-year term. Yet the durability of Indonesia’s “Unity in Diversity” is uncertain. The ruling party, GOLKAR (for Golongan Karya, or “Functional Groups”), is military-dominated, as is much of the bureaucracy. The regime is authoritarian—though, Emmerson argues, not necessarily unpopular, given the “habit of compliance” prevalent on Java, the island that is home to three-fifths of the 170 million Indonesians. But divisive forces do exist: regional independence movements (East Timor, Irian Jaya), militants among the 153 million Muslims, the rising expectations of the university-educated children of the growing middle class.

The country’s success or failure in achieving a peaceful political succession—perhaps in 1993, when Suharto will be 71—should determine just how “Indonesia will make its presence known” on the world scene.
“Abortion and Divorce in Western Law.”
Author: Mary Ann Glendon

Until two decades ago, most Western nations imposed tight restrictions on the termination of both marriages and pregnancies. Abortion was allowed only if the mother’s life was in danger; divorces were usually granted by the courts only on grounds of “marital offenses”—cruelty, adultery, or desertion.

Since then, curbs on abortion and divorce have been reduced. But U.S. courts, particularly with abortion, have been far more permissive than their European counterparts. Why have Americans and Europeans diverged in their handling of these basic family issues? Glendon, a Harvard Law School professor, argues that the answers are to be found not as much in law as in political philosophy.

Most Western nations began to relax abortion regulations during the 1960s. But with the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade, Glendon notes, the United States became the only Western nation to decide there is a “constitutional right to abortion.” Because Roe v. Wade established that abortion is constitutionally protected (until the fetus can live outside the womb, i.e. 24–28 weeks old), subsequent attempts by state legislatures to reimpose some restrictions (such as requiring a doctor’s consent) have regularly been struck down by the courts.

European courts and legislatures have approached the abortion issue not in the American fashion—as a problem of individual “rights” (of parents, and of unborn children)—but in terms of the state’s interest in protecting new human life. For example, in 1974 the West German Constitutional Court overturned a statute that allowed abortion until the fetus was 12 weeks old. The court ruled that “life developing in the womb” was constitutionally protected, and that the old law “did not sufficiently register disapproval of abortion in principle.” Even Sweden, which has Western Europe’s most liberal laws, mandates prior counseling if a fetus is more than 12 weeks old and requires government approval after the 18th week of pregnancy.

Laws regulating the termination of marriage have been liberalized in ways analogous to those regulating the termination of pregnancy. Nations such as England and France, which once allowed marriages to end only if a spouse was at fault (as in adultery), now permit the divorce of an “innocent” partner, requiring merely that the couple live apart for an extended period (in France, up to six years). Sweden, Canada, and 18 U.S. states have gone further: Divorces, which can be granted on “no-fault” grounds, may take effect with less than a year’s notice from either spouse.

Glendon observes that these steps have transformed the “legal definition of marriage” from “an enduring relationship” to a partnership “terminable at will.” The United States, by allowing judges near-absolute discretion in setting alimony and child-support payments, has generally favored husbands over wives: Men, typically having more money, can spend more for lawyers than their mates.

Glendon proposes rewriting U.S. abortion and divorce law in ways that would communicate “the right way to live.” States, rather than the Supreme Court, should be free to set their own abortion rules, which would probably be more restrictive than Roe v. Wade. The United States might imitate the Europeans by setting child-support and alimony payments according to fixed tables, rather than at a judge’s discretion. Only by such actions, Glendon maintains, can government convey messages of “social solidarity” that will help to curtail abortion and divorce.
"Corrective Capitalism: The Rise of America's Community Development Corporations."
Authors: Neal R. Peirce and Carol F. Steinbach

The "war on poverty" might well be won not by a massive effort from Washington, but through the steady, persistent effort of hundreds of locally-based community development corporations, or CDCs.

These organizations, report Peirce, a syndicated columnist, and Steinbach, an urban affairs journalist, act as "charity and capitalist and community organizer at the same time." They have proven a durable way both to rebuild depressed neighborhoods and to provide jobs for poor people.

A community development corporation is a nonprofit group whose purpose is to renew the neighborhood in which it is based by rehabilitating buildings, establishing new businesses, and creating jobs for residents. In 1966, senators Robert F. Kennedy (D.-N.Y.) and Jacob Javits (R.-N.Y.) sponsored a law creating a federal program to provide funds to CDCs, such as New York City's Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation and The Woodlawn Organization in Chicago. By 1980, federal programs gave CDCs $2.6 billion.

Reagan budget cuts (which reduced spending on CDCs to $1.1 billion in Fiscal Year 1987) forced these organizations to become more entrepreneurial. They largely replaced lost federal grants with money from foundations, corporations, churches, and city and state governments. Notable boosters: the Enterprise Foundation, created by developer James Rouse, and the Local Initiatives Support Corporation, a Ford Foundation spin-off that spent $23 million in 1987.

Today, the 3,000 to 5,000 CDCs are, with other nonprofit groups, the main source of new low-income housing. They have helped revive both blighted urban sites (Pittsburgh's north side, Chicago's West Garfield Park) and run-down rural areas (in eastern Kentucky and elsewhere). By expanding community control over development, they have also helped defuse opposition to "urban renewal." "One can't very well hurl his body into the path of an oncoming bulldozer," the authors note, "when he (or she) is the developer."

"American Mainline Religion: Its Changing Shape and Future."
Rutgers Univ. Press, 109 Church St., New Brunswick, N.J. 08901. 279 pp. $27.
Authors: Wade Clark Roof and William McKinney

The fracturing of American cultural and social life that took place during the 1960s affected many institutions, from colleges and universities to national political parties. But the organizations most scarred by the upheavals of those days may have been the nation's Protestant churches.

Roof, a sociologist at the University of Massachusetts, and McKinney, a professor of religion and society at the Hartford Seminary, see the 1960s as an era marked by "the collapse of the middle"—a broad transfer of power from centrist, "establishment" organizations to competing interest groups on the Left and the Right.

In religion, the effects have been marked. Protestant denominations in general have lost ground. (In 1952, 67 percent of Americans were Protestant; today, only 57 percent are.) Yet the tumult of the 1960s afflicting some more than others. The denominations that were once ascendant—the doctrinal liberals (Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and the United Church of Christ) and moderates (Methodists, Lutherans, Northern Baptists)—have lost
members and influence, both to more conservative denominations (Southern Baptists, the Churches of Christ, Seventh-Day Adventists) and to the swelling ranks of the unchurched.

Throughout most of America's history, the primary divisions among Protestant churches were by ethnic origin, geographical location, and class. Some of these distinctions still hold. Sixty-one percent of Lutherans still live in the Midwest, for example, and 69 percent are of German or Scandinavian origin. Old racial patterns persist. Eighty-five percent of black churchgoers worship in their own churches; the average black membership in a "white" denomination is between two and three percent, making churches "among the most segregated major institutions" in the United States. (The exceptions: Northern Baptists and Seventh-Day Adventists, 27 percent of whose communicants are black.)

Other demographic divisions are less sharp than they were in the past. For example, Episcopalians were once largely confined to New England. Today, however, 30 percent live in the South, while only 34 percent remain in the Northeast.

Switching churches (or the "circulation of the saints") has become more common. The members whom conservative denominations have gained tend to be young, less educated people with a strong interest in traditional values. Although moderate and liberal churches have lost ground, some

GROWTH PATTERNS FOR SELECTED DENOMINATIONS.

Note: In 1952-85, the percentage of all U.S. regular church/temple attendees who were Catholic rose from 25 to 28; the Jewish share fell from four to two percent.
the liberal losses have been offset by social climbers who seek to "trade up" to higher-status denominations (e.g., the Episcopal church) as their incomes rise.

The authors expect that the liberal and moderate churches will continue to lose "market share" as young people continue to choose either conservative Protestant rivals or nonaffiliation. Sixteen percent of Americans born around 1900, for example, were Methodists, but only 7.7 percent of people born between 1958–1965 are. Birthrates among liberal and moderate Protestants are far lower than they are among members of conservative denominations; the average conservative Protestant woman under age 45 has had two children; the average liberal churchgoer in that bracket has had 1.6. Forty-six percent of Episcopalians are now over age 50, up from 36 percent in 1957.

For all but the conservative Protestants, the authors conclude, demographics and "secular drift" have resulted in steadily declining influence, particularly in the liberals' case. Once-vibrant religious denominations, which established many of the nation's colleges and schools, hospitals and charities, and championed causes ranging from the temperance movement of the 1890s to the civil rights movement of the 1960s, "now seem distant entities."

"Auto Safety Regulations: Hazardous to Your Health?"
The Heartland Institute, 59 East Van Buren St., Ste. 810, Chicago, Ill. 60605. 28 pp. $4.50.
Authors: John Semmens and Dianne Kresich

Americans spend up to $15 billion each year on making roads and cars safer. But do these investments actually improve safety? Semmens, an economist with the Arizona Department of Transportation, and Kresich, a transportation analyst for the city of Mesa, Arizona, think not.

Since the passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in 1966, they argue, government planners have been obsessed with an "engineering model." It assumes that all safety problems can best be solved either by tougher requirements (such as mandatory seat belts) or by refining highway or car design.

This approach, the authors contend, creates as many safety problems as it solves.

U.S. highway fatalities have fallen—from 17.9 per 100 million vehicle miles in 1925 to 2.5 per 100 million in 1986. The authors point out that the death rate, by this miles-driven measure, has steadily declined by three percent a year for more than 60 years; thus the drop must be due not to regulatory steps, but to other factors, including increased driver competence. If more stringent regulation increases safety, they ask, why did the highway death rate rise in population terms from 19.1 per 100,000 people in 1925 to 19.3 in 1986?

Moreover, well-intentioned safety measures may yield "undesirable results." The more time police spend chasing speeders and flouters of seat-belt laws, the less time they have to pursue violent criminals. Mandatory seat-belt use may, by promoting the illusion of safety, inadvertently encourage reckless driving, thereby raising the odds that pedestrians and cyclists may be injured by cars. Britain passed a mandatory seat-belt law in 1983; by 1985, while deaths of drivers fell by 18 percent, deaths rose by eight percent among pedestrians and by 13 percent among cyclists.

The authors believe that what holds road deaths down is not so much the "engineering" away of hazards through regulation as the awareness of drivers of the perils they face. "Psychology," they believe, "may be more important than technology" in improving highway safety.
Since the 1960s, many American critics of U.S. defense policy have argued that the West European partners in the 39-year-old NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) alliance are not shouldering their "fair share" of its military burden.

The argument: Since the Europeans’ economies have fully recovered from the devastation of World War II, they can and should pay more of the cost of their own defense against possible Warsaw Pact attack. If they did, the United States’ military presence in Europe could be reduced. Spurred by such critics as Senator Mike Mansfield (D.-Mont.) during the 1960s and 70s, and Senator Sam Nunn (D.-Ga.) and Representative Patricia Schroeder (D.-Colo.) during the 1980s, Congress has passed several resolutions calling for reductions, notably among the 204,700 U.S. Army troops in West Germany.

Adams, director of the Defense Budget Project at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, and Munz, a consultant, find that the "burden-sharing" debate would remain murky even if the 15 NATO partners could agree on "what a 'fair' distribution of the defense load "would look like."

By any measure, the U.S. share is disproportionately large.

In 1986, the most recent year covered by the authors' study, the United States accounted for 40 percent of the NATO nations' total population and 54 percent of their combined gross domestic product (GDP). The U.S. share of the countries' total defense spending has been much higher—in 1986, nearly 69 percent. Though below the 74 percent reached in 1968 (when Vietnam War outlays peaked), that number, thanks to the Carter-Reagan defense buildup, is well above its 1976 low of 62 percent. On a per capita basis, U.S. defense spending rose from $758 that year to $1,120 in 1986.

Among other large NATO countries, Britain is the only one whose share of the alliance’s defense spending even equals its share of its GDP (both about seven percent in 1968). NATO’s Continental partners are more parsimonious. In 1986, for example, West Germany accounted for 10 percent of NATO’s population and 11.5 percent of its GDP—but only seven percent of its defense spending. The authors observe that other large nations (such as France and Italy) “have not greatly varied their level of GDP committed to defense since 1969.”

But precise judgments about who is, and is not, contributing a “fair share” are difficult to make. For example, many European nations use conscripts, who are paid less than men and women in the all-volunteer U.S. forces; this may account in part for their lower defense spending.

By some measures, moreover, the Europeans’ “burden-sharing” is considerable.

As of July 1986, those nations supplied precisely 76.5 percent of NATO’s main battle tanks, 83.3 percent of its combatant ships, and 92.3 percent of its heavy artillery. And some countries contribute more to the alliance’s strength in the field than their defense budgets would suggest.

On the U.S. Department of Defense’s “Division Equivalent Firepower” (DEF) scale, a measure of the effectiveness of unit weaponry, American forces get the top score (28.3) in NATO, but next (at 15.7) come the West Germans. Despite Bonn’s relatively low outlays, the German Panzer divisions, with their modern Leopard II tanks, are more combat-capable than any other West European ground forces. (The British Army's DEF score is only 8.1; the Dutch, at 2.6, bring up the rear.)

If comparative military contributions to NATO are hard to gauge, the value of political benefits—such as West Germany’s remaining a Western ally instead of becoming neutral—are impossible to quantify. No "bean counts," the authors conclude, will ever settle the question of what, exactly, a "fair" share of NATO’s burden is.
Led by Herman E. Sherman, the Young Tuxedo Brass Band parades in New Orleans, 1973. Marching bands—trailed by a “second line” of enthusiasts or, sometimes, funeral mourners—appeared in the Crescent City as early as the 1850s. During the next half century, they helped create the unique American sound of jazz.
American Music

This year, half a century after the guardians of Manhattan’s august Carnegie Hall first admitted Benny Goodman and his band to its stage, Congress declared jazz an “American treasure.” Scholars have been reappraising American music: popular song, jazz, and classical. Here, music critic Howard Husock recalls how Irving Berlin, Cole Porter, and dozens of other Tin Pan Alley songsters created a lively style of popular music that appealed to Americans of all ages, only to see the audience fragment after World War II. Terry Teachout chronicles the long quest of jazz musicians for cultural “respectability”; he describes some of the surprising effects. And music scholar K. Robert Schwarz traces the history of the nation’s classical composers, who have variously embraced “international” music or searched for a distinctively American sound.

POPULAR SONG

by Howard Husock

When Rudy Vallee exclaimed, “Heigh-Ho, Everybody!” through his trademark megaphone, his audience of young (mostly female) fans erupted in screams. The appearance of Vallee and his Connecticut Yankees at Keith’s 81st Street Theater in February 1929 had attracted hundreds of delirious teen-agers, as well as a contingent of New York’s Finest (on horseback) to contend with them. No popular singing star had ever created such tumult. It was, wrote one show business reporter, “an explosion in the theatrical world.”

The Rudy Vallee craze was America’s first taste of “youth music.” It would be 13 years before the nation saw anything like it again—when a gangly young “Frankie” Sinatra made legions of adolescent bobby-soxers shriek and swoon at New York’s Paramount Theatre—and another 14 years before Elvis Presley released his smash record, “Heartbreak Hotel,” establishing “youth music” as one of the enduring elements of American life.
Today, we take for granted popular music’s direct and exclusive appeal to the young. So much so that it is tempting to look at pop music, even before Elvis Presley, as a series of youth fads. But Rudy Vallee and Frank Sinatra were anomalies during the 60 years before the advent of Presley and rock-and-roll. Popular music before rock was dominated by Tin Pan Alley, whose diverse singers and songwriters, from George M. Cohan to Cole Porter, spoke to young, old, and middle-aged alike. And they usually spoke from an adult perspective. Whether describing the perils of “Makin’ Whoopee” or the emotional strains of “Stormy Weather,” Tin Pan Alley’s writers and performers were subtle and worldly wise, offering consolation to adults, guidance to the young. Moreover, songs such as “Brother Can You Spare a Dime?” and “God Bless America” expressed a shared national mood and culture.

Writing Songs to Order

Since the rise of rock, the mainstream of American popular music has been aimed narrowly at the young. Predictably, rock is more likely to celebrate youthful excess and alienation than to encourage thoughtful reflection. Even the names of rock groups—Megadeth, Agent Orange, the Dead Kennedys—celebrate the nihilistic underside of adolescence. The overwhelming dominance of rock in today’s popular music leaves the young with neither the steadying influence of a tale of personal experience nor the sense of belonging to a national culture, which pop music historically transmitted.

Commercial popular music itself is a relatively recent invention. America’s first “hit” song, writes Sigmund Spaeth in his History of Popular Music in America, probably was “Yankee Doodle.” This sprightly tune (author unknown) was on the American colonists’ lips before the Revolution; the Continental Army’s fife and drum corps played it at the surrender of General Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781. Most popular songs of the era promoted patriotic or political themes, with new words put to existing European tunes. Francis Scott Key, for example, wrote “The Star Spangled Banner” (1814) to the melody of “To Anacreon in Heaven,” an older English song.

The United States did not produce a bona fide hit composer until 1848, when Pittsburgh’s 22-year-old Stephen Foster published “Oh! Susanna.” The song was an immediate success, carried from coast to coast.

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by traveling minstrel shows and, later, by the California-bound Forty-Niners, who made it their anthem. In short order, Foster penned a string of phenomenally successful popular songs, including “De Camptown Races” (1850), “Swance River” (1851), and “My Old Kentucky Home” (1853). By 1857, he had pocketed some $10,000 in sheet music royalties—an astonishing amount for a songwriter at the time. Seven years later, however, Foster died in a Bowery hotel, having squandered his talents, the public’s affection, and virtually all of his financial assets. A chambermaid found 38 cents in his pocket.

As successful as Foster’s confections had been, most scholars agree that no truly national popular American music emerged until the end of the 19th century. Even in Foster’s heyday, church hymns and folk tunes made up the musical repertoire of most American households. The popular music business was tiny, with scattered songwriters and music publishers in San Francisco, Chicago, Detroit, New York, and other cities catering mostly to regional markets. Their chief products were one-
sentiment ditties—about “birds, stars, rippling streams, the perfume of the flowers, and thee-and-thou,” as one publisher summed it up. “Even the biggest song hits,” wrote historian Ronald L. Davis, “met with comparatively modest returns.”

All of that was changed in 1892 by the staggering success of a single tear-jerker, “After the Ball,” by Milwaukee’s Charles K. Harris.

The nation’s first certified million-seller, “After the Ball” alerted songwriters and music publishers to a vast new market for sheet music. Hitherto, they had survived by selling their wares—at 10 to 50 cents per copy—chiefly to professional entertainers in the traveling vaudeville shows (successors to minstrelsy), burlesques, and theatrical “extravaganzas.” Harris showed that there was big money to be made by selling sheet music directly to the growing middle class of industrializing America—and he understood that the songs had to appeal to women.

For many newly prosperous American families, having a piano in the front parlor was a mark of culture and sophistication. As Mother played the upright, the family would gather round of an evening to sing songs that, more likely than not, had caught her fancy at a traveling vaudeville show. (Once intended for “stag” audiences, vaudeville had been largely cleaned up by the 1890s.)

In a variety of ways, Harris set the style for the new popular music. A sign outside his office at 207 Grand Avenue in Milwaukee promised “songs written to order.” That impulse—to assess and cater to the popular taste—would drive Tin Pan Alley for years to come.

Harris even had a hand in creating the semimythical Tin Pan Alley itself. The profits from “After the Ball” (which ultimately sold some five million copies) allowed him to open his own music publishing house in turn-of-the-century New York, and he set up shop among the other flourishing publishers on West 28th Street—the clamorous thoroughfare, hard by the Broadway theaters and vaudeville shows, which the New York Herald’s Monroe Rosenfeld dubbed Tin Pan Alley.*

**Plugging ‘Ragtime Cowboy Joe’**

It was a street of low brownstones, grimy from coal smoke, with tailors and small shops occupying the ground floor storefronts, and the music publishers jammed into warrens of tiny cubicles on the floors above. Each publisher operated a kind of musical sweatshop, employing a staff of lyricists, composers, and arrangers to churn out songs in assembly-line fashion. In cramped audition rooms, demonstrators played the piano and sang the firm’s latest offerings for visiting singers and vaudeville performers (many of whom were unable to read music themselves). When all the windows were wide open on a humid Manhattan summer afternoon, the clamor on 28th Street was tremendous.

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*Tin Pan Alley became the generic term for the popular music industry from 1890 into the 1950s, even though Hollywood and the record industry had deprived 28th Street of most of its publishers by 1930.
The kings of Tin Pan Alley, recalls historian David Ewen, were the “pluggers.” This, too, partly reflects the influence of Charles Harris, who demonstrated the importance of the hard sell. In the days before the radio and phonograph, the pluggers’ job was to find a way, any way, to get his publisher’s song directly before the public. He might break into song while riding a horsecar, or at a baseball game, or while standing on the boardwalk in Atlantic City. Harry Cohen, later the head of Columbia Pictures, recalled that as a youthful pluggers in 1912 he sang “Ragtime Cowboy Joe” “50, 60 times a night,” to help make it a hit.

While it was as emphatic in its commercialism as the rock music industry is today, Tin Pan Alley avoided pandering to the public. Following the precedent established by “After the Ball,” popular songs not only told stories, they also imparted lessons.

Creating a National Repertoire

“After the Ball” is told from the point of view of a young girl who asks her bachelor uncle why he never married. The old man replies by telling how, as a youngster attending a ball, he had spied his beloved kissing another man. In a fury, he stalked out, vowing never to speak to the woman again. Years later, after her death, he learns that the other man was her long-lost brother. The chorus:

After the ball is over, after the break of morn
After the dancers’ leaving; After the stars are gone;
Many a heart is aching, If you could read them all;
Many the hopes that have vanished, after the ball.

“After the Ball” is a story of the consequences of youthful intemperance told, as a lesson, to a girl on her uncle’s knee. Like many popular ballads through the early 1900s, it transmitted the folk wisdom of the society to the young. In those days before television and the Walkman, moreover, the songs were often sung by entire families around the parlor piano, reinforcing the notion that these were values to be shared.

Among the many songs in this vein were Paul Dresser’s “The Convict and the Bird” (1888), about a criminal’s longing for freedom, and Harry Von Tilzer’s “Bird in a Gilded Cage” (1900), the sad story of a woman who married for money. These songs concerned what might be called the pathos of embracing the wrong moral values.

By no means were all, or even many, of Tin Pan Alley’s early creations somber or serious. Hundreds of forgettable songs were published every year on whatever subject seemed to strike the public fancy. Of the dozens of songs inspired by the bicycle craze of the 1890s, for example, only “Daisy Bell” (“A Bicycle Built for Two”) has survived.

But, in searching for songs that would sell, Tin Pan Alley also
turned out hundreds of songs keyed to current events and to the national mood. Without consciously seeking to do so, the songsmiths of Tin Pan Alley bound the nation together. "The Sidewalks of New York" (1894) and Paul Dresser's "On the Banks of the Wabash Far Away" (1897) were just two of the more popular numbers that familiarized listeners with American cultural geography. Tin Pan Alley ground out dozens of sentimental Irish ballads (including "My Wild Irish Rose") in response to the massive Irish immigration of the late 19th century—tunes that were aimed at a special interest market, but that surely also helped to remind native-born Americans of the humanity of the new immigrants.*

The years between the turn of the century and World War I brought vast changes to popular music—as it moved from vaudeville and the musical theater to the movies, and from live performance to radio and phonograph. In Tin Pan Alley, a new generation of songwriters took over, led by Irving Berlin, George Gershwin, Harold Arlen, and a handful of other great talents. They were mostly Jewish immigrants or sons of Jewish immigrants—who, consciously or not, helped create an inclusive national repertoire of songs. It is work that, in a stunning number of cases, is still familiar to Americans today.

Talking Up to the Audience

Tin Pan Alley's crystallization of national culture could not fail to yield songs unsurpassed in inspiring national pride: George M. Cohan's "You're a Grand Old Flag" (1906) and Irving Berlin's "God Bless America" (written in 1918 but not recorded until 1939, when Kate Smith made it famous). But commercial songwriters were seldom jingoistic. Berlin, for example, also wrote "Oh, How I Hate to Get Up in the Morning," a heartfelt gripe about life in the army.

Tin Pan Alley, in the person of lyricist E. Y. "Yip" Harburg, provided what might be viewed as bookend anthems of the Depression: the brooding, sardonic "Brother Can You Spare a Dime?" (1932) and the optimistic "Over the Rainbow" (1939).

Unlike many protest songs of the 1960s, "Brother Can You Spare a Dime?" made its case without indicting the entire society. The song is a capsule of the recent American past—a World War I doughboy "builds a dream" during the 1920s, only to find himself in a Depression breadline. His plight sums up the nation's plight. As always, Tin Pan Alley—in this case, Yip Harburg—talked up to its audience.

They used to tell me I was building a dream
And so I followed the mob

*However, Tin Pan Alley did not do well by blacks, producing an entire genre of "coon" songs (e.g., "All Coons Look Alike to Me"). It did welcome a few black songwriters, including Shelton Brooks, whose accomplishments include "The Darktown Strutters' Ball" (1917), and James Weldon Johnson, famed for "Lift Every Voice and Sing" (1900).
"Modern ballroom dancing may easily degenerate into... unruly behavior and not infrequently [into] sexual immorality," warned two English sociologists in 1951, several years before the birth of rock-and-roll.

For centuries, virtually every new style of music has spawned dance fads among the young—and alarm over "licentiousness" among adults. The Waltz, introduced to the royal courts of Europe during the late 18th century, outraged some aristocrats. In the United States, during the pre-World War I ragtime craze, polite society was scandalized by the Turkey Trot and Kangaroo Dip. But new steps were quickly transformed into "proper" ballroom numbers. Before long, even the Rockefellers and Hearsts were doing the Fox Trot at debutante balls and wedding receptions.

Youngsters maintained a monopoly on the latest dance fads, but the generations also mingled on the dance floor, doing the Two-Step, the Waltz, the Lindy. Teen-agers learned the accepted steps from their elders: Social dancing was not just a pleasure/ordeal but an introduction to the adult world. It taught the sexes about etiquette, and about each other. "Dancing is wonderful training for girls," quipped essayist Christopher Morley in 1939, "it's the first way [they] learn to guess what a man is going to do before he does it."

Then came rock and the 1960s. Recalling the Philly Dog, one of the first rock steps, author Don McDonagh observes that "its back-and-forth shuffling and snapping fingers... indicated a certain heedlessness for anyone outside the dancer's own world. The emphasis was shifting away from the socially approved couple to extreme preoccupation with the [self]."

Suddenly, dance floors were segregated by age. The conventions of social dancing withered. Until the disco craze of the 1970s, even the notion of established steps was endangered. "Did any of us really know how to do the Funky Chicken or the Frug?" asks novelist Jay McInerney, 33, author of Bright Lights, Big City (1984). Freedom from social dancing's restrictions has also deprived the young of its skills and shared pleasures. Now, when a turn on the floor is "unavoidable," McInerney says, he does an "all-purpose shuffle."
When there was earth to plow
Or guns to bear
I was always there
Right on the job
They used to tell me I was building a dream
With peace and glory ahead
Why should I be standing in line
Just waiting for bread?

The continuing impulse to mold a national culture was reflected, particularly before the Depression, by tributes to America's many locales that helped, albeit unintentionally, to unify the nation. Among the still-familiar examples are Mary Earl and Ballard MacDonald's "Beautiful Ohio" (1918), George Gershwin's "Swanee" (1919), Fred Fisher's "Chicago" (1922), Jerome Kern's "Ol' Man River" (1927), and Hoagy Carmichael's "Georgia on My Mind" (1930). There were plenty of more obscure tributes as well—to Tampa, to the Rio Grande, to "the girl in the heart of Maryland." In 1914, Irving Berlin, a quintessential New Yorker, even came up with "I Want to Go Back to Michigan."

Cole Porter's Scandal

Indeed, Berlin's songbook, more than most, reveals the Tin Pan Alley perspective. The Russian immigrant, who celebrates his 100th birthday this year, composed an ode to ethnic assimilation, "Yiddle on Your Fiddle" (1909), and also wrote classic songs that helped create common secular images for Christian holidays: "White Christmas" and "Easter Parade." (Less memorable was Berlin's attempt at a Thanksgiving hymn, "I Have so much To Be Thankful for.")

More than anything else, of course, the Tin Pan Alley composers produced songs about matters of the heart. Sentimental morality plays in the style of "After the Ball" fell out of fashion after the turn of the century, and Tin Pan Alley deserted the form without looking back. In many ways, however, the perspective and implicit lessons remained the same. Writing frequently in a more intimate, first-person vein, the leading love balladeers—Cole Porter, Richard Rodgers, George and Ira Gershwin, Jerome Kern, Johnny Mercer, Harold Arlen—infused their songs with adult themes and a poignant sense of personal experience.

The new frankness inevitably led to occasional scandals. Cole Porter's "Love for Sale" (1930), for example, was banned from the airwaves by most local radio stations, more for its title, apparently, than for its sobering message:

Let the poets pipe of love
In their childish way,
I know ev'ry type of love
Better far than they
If you want the thrill of love
I've been thru the mill of love,
Old love, new love,
Ev'ry love but true love.

Tin Pan Alley assumed that marriage and family were integral to “true love.” Romance was more than a matter of hormones. Not that its view of love and family was utopian. Consider the 1928 hit by Walter Donaldson and Gus Kahn, “Makin’ Whoopee”—which, in detailing the effects of an impetuous fling, reinforced the then-common belief that romance generally led to responsibility and its burdens.

Picture a little love nest
Out where the air is clean
Picture the same sweet love nest
See what a year can bring
He's washin' dishes, baby clothes
He's so ambitious, he even sews
But don't forget folks
That's what you get folks
When you make whoopee.

Because audiences expected an adult view of the world, Tin Pan Alley could deal with some of the harsher realities of life: the plight of the aging woman, hoping against hope for the arrival of “The Man I Love” (George and Ira Gershwin, 1924), or the affection that survives “Come Rain or Come Shine” (Harold Arlen and Johnny Mercer, 1946) for reasons that only adults, conscious of their own limitations and those of their partners, can understand. Singers as different in their appeal as Doris Day and Billie Holiday, or Bing Crosby and Billy Eckstine, performed the songs for an audience that spanned the generations, as well as the races and social classes.

Hound Dog

What killed Tin Pan Alley? The music publishers on West 28th Street began to disappear as early as the 1920s, when the rise of the phonograph diminished sheet music sales. Another blow came in 1927; Al Jolson's sensational appearance in The Jazz Singer, the first full-length talking picture, prompted Hollywood film executives to buy out many New York music publishers and to lure songwriters out West.

Still, the Tin Pan Alley style and sensibility survived, even if the place itself had vanished. Through the 1930s and '40s, film musicals and network radio shows such as “Make Believe Ballroom” carried Tin Pan Alley’s tunes to a national audience. Then, as historian James Morris
wrote, the rise of television during the 1950s gradually killed off many network radio broadcasts. Increasingly, "the radio waves were turned over to inexpensive and locally produced disc-jockey shows . . . Radio stations began to serve specialized audiences, playing only records by country musicians, or only rhythm and blues."

"Hillbilly" and "race" music, which had been growing and crosspollinating since the turn of the century, richly deserved a wider audience. But their arrival on the airwaves heralded the splintering of America's popular music culture. Now, rural white Southerners and blacks in the big cities each had their own music.

The energized hybrid of country and rhythm and blues, rock-and-roll, would be a rich new indigenous American art form. But the beat, the melodies (or lack of them), and the very message of rock music were pitched exclusively to another large specialized radio audience of the 1950s—the emerging baby boom generation.

The lyrics of the earliest rock songs did not explicitly cater to youthful sensibilities. Elvis Presley's "Hound Dog," for example, was originally a blues hit for Willie Mae Thornton, written as a woman's complaint about a freeloading man: "You ain't nothin' but a hound dog."

As a result of rock's sudden popularity, witty and inventive writers such as Chuck Berry and the prolific team of Jerry Lieber and Mike

*Rock in the USSR: Moscow's popular Mister Twister pays homage to Elvis Presley and the rock-and-roll of the 1950s. Along with movies and blue jeans, rock music is one of America's most successful cultural exports.*
Stoller, who once might have made careers in Tin Pan Alley, devoted themselves instead to writing music for teens. Lieber and Stoller’s 1957 hit “Yakety Yak,” performed by the Coasters, satirized parents who imposed restrictions on their offspring:

Take out the papers and the trash  
Or you don’t get no spending cash  
Just tell your hoodlum friends outside  
You ain’t got time to take a ride  
Yakety yak  
Don’t talk back.

For a time, mainstream America sought to embrace or at least contain rock. Ed Sullivan, whose Sunday night television variety show (1948–71) was in some ways the last vestige of the old-time vaudeville hall, with a faithful national audience of all ages, showcased Elvis Presley and the Beatles. But Sullivan’s producers felt compelled to show “Elvis the Pelvis” only from the waist up; rock-and-roll was not family music.

During the 1960s, virtually all popular music came to be defined as the province of the young. When Berry Gordy, Jr.’s Motown Records began to dominate pop music with a Tin Pan Alley-style stable of brilliant black singers and songwriters, Gordy felt constrained to market Motown as “the sound of Young America.” By 1969, when half a million youngsters gathered at Woodstock, New York, to smoke marijuana and celebrate peace and love (and, nominally, to protest the Vietnam War), the schism between the generations was deep. One of the acts at Woodstock was the Who, a British group known (and admired) for smashing its instruments on stage during major performances. “(Talkin’ About) My Generation,” their signature song, summed up the youth culture’s attitude toward adulthood: “Hope I die before I get old.”

Mock Hangings and Electrocutions

The rise of a popular music meant exclusively for the ears of the young had predictable results. Rock—lyrics, music, and performances alike—crystallized a generation’s ennui, but it also descended into adolescent fantasy, despondency, and self-indulgence. Romance, the great subject of Tin Pan Alley, was replaced by sex, the great preoccupation of teen-agers. The love songs of rock are—with some exceptions—about initial attraction far more than the complexities of what might follow. “Come on, baby, light my fire,” the Doors’ invitation in 1967, is a long way from Cole Porter’s “What is this thing called love?” (1929).

The challenge to adult authority that began in wiseacre innocence with “Yakety-Yak” during the 1950s took a turn toward overt rebellion during the early 1960s under the influence of Bob Dylan, the Beatles, and the Rolling Stones, among others, and finally veered into nihilism. By
REACTING TO ROCK

Rock-and-roll "is sung, played and written for the most part by cretinous goons and by means of its almost imbecilic reiteration and sly, lewd, in plain fact, dirty lyrics . . . [it] manages to be the martial music of every side-burned delinquent on the face of the earth."

Thus, in 1958, singer Frank Sinatra expressed the antipathy of many adults toward the raucous music that was pulling teen-aged fans away from the wholesome sounds of Pat Boone and Patti Page. At times during the 1950s, some parents did more than worry out loud. Authorities in New Haven, Connecticut, outlawed rock-and-roll dances; the Catholic Youth Organization urged teens to smash all the rock records they owned. One Columbia University psychiatrist likened the "prehistoric rhythmic trance" and wild gyrations induced by rock-and-roll to the medieval affliction St. Vitus Dance, where "as in drug addiction . . . a thousand years of civilization fall away in a moment."

Thirty years after Sinatra spoke out, the music that once scandalized parents has been assimilated to such an extent that it is used to advertise everything from Big Macs to Chevrolets. The early history of rock has been reduced to pop mythology: The young "taught a lesson" to an ignorant America.

During the same 30 years, however, the content of rock lyrics has changed dramatically. Rock idols, no longer confined by convention to innuendo and suggestion, now sing not only about sex but also about sexual perversion and violence. "Whips, chains, handcuffs and leather masks are being popularized in songs and as images in videos and on album covers," writes Tipper Gore, wife of Senator Albert Gore (D.-Tenn.). The most objectionable songs tend to be performed by "heavy metal" bands and other groups that appeal chiefly to the youngest (often pre-teen) listeners.

Gore became concerned over the content of these songs in 1985, when she discovered a song about a masturbating female "sex fiend" on a Prince album in her 11-year-old daughter's collection. Along with other prominent Washington wives, Gore organized the Parents Music Resource Center (PMRC). In a highly publicized Senate hearing in September 1985, Gore and her colleagues called on the record industry to put warning labels voluntarily on records containing sexually explicit lyrics. The FMRC also urged record companies to

the early 1970s, Detroit-born Alice Cooper (née Vincent Furnier) was delighting youthful fans with his boast, "I'm 18, I don't know what I want" (he was 25 at the time), accompanied by a stage show that featured mock hangings and electrocutions. Rolling Stone's history of rock music hailed Cooper's act as "the hippest rock rebellion yet."

By the end of the 1970s, this lone rock star's bizarre and troubling antics were being reproduced on a mass scale by the "punk" music movement and its offshoots, spearheaded by the likes of Sid Vicious and the Sex Pistols. Today, the teen-agers of Middle America routinely don punk regalia—black pants and shirts, chains and studs, hair dyed Halloween colors—to impress their peers at suburban shopping malls. Punk
print lyrics on album jackets to alert parents to the contents.

Most disturbing, according to Gore, are the dozens of songs that portray "sadomasochism, killing and raping as [a] . . . normal way to treat women." The popular group Judas Priest, for example, sings of forcing a girl at gunpoint to have oral sex. In Mötley Crüe's million-selling "Too Young to Fall in Love," the band sings, "Not a woman, but a whore/I can taste the hate./Well, now I'm killing you/Watch your face turning blue."

To Gore's surprise, she found herself denounced, as she put it, as "a prude, a censor, a music hater, even a book burner."

Civil libertarians and music industry executives, ignoring the fact that the PMRC had asked only for voluntary labeling, attacked the proposals as "a complete intrusion on artistic expression." Other critics have raised practical objections. One is the sheer size of the task of rating records: While about 300 movies are rated every year, the record industry pumps out some 25,000 new rock songs. Moreover, contends industry spokesman Stanley Gortikov, "lyrics are not like motion pictures. Standards, precise standards cannot be developed for language."

Nevertheless, in November 1985, the Recording Industry Association of America, representing most major U.S. record companies, agreed to a compromise. The companies would either put warning labels on albums containing "explicit" lyrics or print the words on the album jackets. But it was left to individual record companies to decide what is "explicit."

Since then, Gore writes, "some companies have complied in good faith, although others have not complied at all." Reluctant to concede failure, the PMRC is now concentrating on alerting parents and teachers to the dangers of media "sexploitation." The defenders of Mötley Crüe and Judas Priest, meanwhile, seem convinced that the next generation will regard them, like the defenders of Elvis Presley during the 1950s, as enlightened heroes.

music and its fashion "look," like virtually all the youth styles and fads (e.g., high-decibel "boom boxes") before and since, is also a calculated affront to adult sensibilities, or at least a flouting of convention. It is the musical equivalent of subway graffiti.

There are, of course, popular stars who have not embraced the juvenile preoccupations of rock. Ray Charles—one of the nation's premier popular singers, though not necessarily a "rock" artist—integrates virtually all strains of American music, from rhythm and blues to country, into his repertoire. In the patriotic Tin Pan Alley tradition, he has made "America the Beautiful" his signature tune. Aretha Franklin certainly rivals any of the great singers of the 1930s in sophistication and

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emotional depth. And the staying power of many Beatles songs (e.g., "Yesterday" and "In My Life") is due in part to the fact that the group was able at times to transcend purely youthful concerns. More recently, rock superstar Bruce Springsteen has established himself as a sophisticated story-telling songwriter.

A few other stars have also grown disenchanted with the adolescent posturing of rock. In recent years, longtime rocker Linda Ronstadt has recorded two collections of Tin Pan Alley standards, complete with orchestral backing. Buster Poindexter, the flamboyant former member of the New York Dolls, has taken to reviving standards as well. On a recent Tonight Show, Poindexter said he had tired of rock concerts that reminded him of "Hitler youth rallies."

Revivals, however, are not the same as a living musical culture. And even when rock songs are subtle and mature, they are not likely to have much impact on young listeners. The words are hard to understand; the youth fads and antics that surround rock do not encourage adult sentiments. For a possible successor to the Tin Pan Alley tradition, one has to look South, in the unlikely direction of Nashville’s Music Row.

Today, scores of talented young singers and songwriters hoping to capture the attention of publishers or record producers head for Nashville—to its ultramodern studios sprinkled among the fast food franchises on the outskirts of town, and to 16th Avenue in the old downtown, near the original Grand Ole Opry house and songwriter hangouts such as Tootsie’s Orchid Lounge.

Most “cosmopolitan” music fans in New York or Los Angeles would be loathe to admit it, but much of the nation’s most sophisticated popular music today is coming out of Nashville.

Country Grows Up

Of course, Nashville has been a major force in popular music for decades. During World War II, the music of Roy Acuff and his Smoky Mountain Boys (e.g., "The Great Speckle[d] Bird") became so popular among G.I.’s overseas that Japanese troops taunted them by shouting "to hell with Roy Acuff!" The mixing of men from North and South, East and West, in military units gave wider exposure to what had been a regional phenomenon. When they returned home, ex-G.I.’s all over the country began tuning in the Grand Ole Opry, the weekly live radio broadcast from Nashville’s WSM. The Opry sound had distinctly Southern roots in fiddle tunes and bluegrass, but it also had been keeping alive the sentimental ballad tradition of the 1890s.

By the 1950s, songs reflecting the exigencies of life—the truck driver who sacrifices his life to save a bus full of school children (Red Sovine’s "Phantom 309") or the convict who dreams of his small-town youth while he awaits execution (Porter Wagoner’s "Green Green Grass of Home")—had become virtually the exclusive province of Nashville.
Country goes mainstream:
On her weekly TV variety show, Dolly Parton welcomes country-western veteran Willie Nelson, who has revived "Blue Skies" and other Tin Pan Alley standards.

(Black gospel music, with a considerably narrower audience, also continued the story-telling tradition.)

Country-western music was an important element of the mix that became rock-and-roll. Elvis Presley and Jerry Lee Lewis had their roots in up-tempo country, or "rockabilly." But Nashville continued along its own evolutionary path after the 1950s: The Sun Belt's prosperity and the dispersion of Southerners to the North and West spread the Nashville sound, and the new audiences pushed it in more sophisticated musical and lyrical directions.

Like Tin Pan Alley, Nashville had to keep its ear to the ground. As its listeners left the farms for the tract housing of Houston, Atlanta, and Bakersfield, Nashville kept up—fashioning a music that spoke to the condition of more and more Americans. Instead of the "home out on a rural route" described in a heavy twang by Hank Williams, the "hillbilly Shakespeare," during the early 1950s, Nashville stalwarts such as George Jones and Tammy Wynette are now more likely to sing of life in a "Two-Story House" (by Wynette, Glenn Tubb, and David Lindsey):

She: "I have my story"
He: "I have mine, too"
Both: "How sad it is
We now live
In a two-story house."
Today, in commercial terms, country is not nearly as big as rock, annually claiming some $400 million in record sales compared to rock's $1.6 billion. But Nashville's appeal, like Tin Pan Alley's before it, is intergenerational. Country music concerts, whether at state fairs or in high school gyms, attract gray heads as well as grandchildren. A recent Country Music Foundation survey of the audience at a major country music festival, for instance, found that 19 percent were between 26 and 35 years old, and 18 percent were 56 and over.

A Fragmented Culture

Over the years, country has strengthened its claim to be our national music. Nashville now welcomes both black and Mexican-American stars—Charlie Pride is black, Freddy Fender is Hispanic. It is also, like Tin Pan Alley, a source of idealistic anthems (which are not always predictably right-of-center in their sentiments) about the nation as a whole. Waylon Jennings' recent hit "America," for example, praises the veteran who fought in Vietnam, but adds:

And the ones who could not fight  
In a war that didn't seem right  
You welcomed them home  
America, America.

Bruce Springsteen and a few other rock and "urban contemporary" (black) stars do occasionally come up with songs that have a sense of the trials and triumphs of daily life as lived by ordinary Americans. But only Nashville is doing so consistently. Its songs may not always match those of classic Tin Pan Alley in grace and subtlety, but the same sense of adult experience and maturity pervades what my local country-western radio station likes to call "songs about love and life, sung straight from the heart."

The reigning king and queen of country are singers Randy Travis and Reba McEntire: She is a former rodeo rider from Oklahoma, he, a onetime Nashville catfish cook.

In "Somebody Should Leave" (by Charles Rains and Harlan Howard) McEntire captures the pathos of a couple considering separation—but mindful of the consequences.

Somebody should leave  
But which one should it be  
You need the kids  
And they need me.

In "Forever and Ever, Amen," the biggest country hit of 1987, Travis pledges fidelity in marriage "as long as old men sit and talk about
the weather/As long as old women sit and talk about the old men.” The music video of the song even recalls the story line of “After the Ball,” with vignettes from what appears to be the wedding of Travis’s real-life sister, where young nieces and nephews beg their uncle for a song. The video, like the song, emphasizes kinship across the generations.

At times, country music has explicitly embraced the Tin Pan Alley tradition. The Country Music Association paid tribute to Irving Berlin during its televised annual awards ceremony two years ago; Willie Nelson has revived and reinterpreted “Stardust,” “Blue Skies,” and other standards. Accepting a Grammy award this year for writing (with Paul Overstreet) “Forever and Ever, Amen,” songwriter Don Schlitz said: “I grew up hearing about a place in New York . . . called Tin Pan Alley, and grew up listening to the music from Motown and the Brill Building, where a bunch of people went into rooms and banged out a song. And that tradition lives on in our hometown in Nashville, Tennessee. And I am very proud to be a part of it—one of those guys who goes into an office every day and writes a song.”

Yet Nashville’s appeal does have its limits, both of region and of class. “Sophisticated” listeners, who may still relish Gershwin and Porter, generally have little enthusiasm for country-western music. Nor is Nashville likely to get much of a hearing from teen-aged rock fans.

Nothing more aptly symbolizes the fragmentation of our popular musical culture than the headphone selections offered on commercial airline flights: Channel One for classics, Two for country, Three for rock, Four for jazz, and so on.

Today, Americans seem to share fewer and fewer tastes in national entertainment of any kind—from movies to television programs to radio. We have extraordinary electronic technology, but we lack songwriters like Irving Berlin, described more than half a century ago by his colleague Jerome Kern as an artist who “absorbs the vibrations emanating from the people, manners, and life of his time and, in turn, gives these impressions back to the world—simplified, glorified, clarified.”
JAZZ

by Terry Teachout

Trumpeter Harry James was uneasy as he warmed up backstage at New York's Carnegie Hall on the evening of January 16, 1938. "I feel like a whore in a church," he told a colleague. He had every reason to be nervous. Benny Goodman's swing band, with James on trumpet, was about to play a full-length concert—the first such performance ever given in America's most prestigious concert hall by a jazz group.

If anyone was prepared to bring jazz to Carnegie Hall, it was Benny Goodman. Known from coast to coast for his recordings and radio broadcasts, the King of Swing, the eighth of 12 children from a Chicago family of Russian immigrants, was also an accomplished classical clarinetist. (Three months after his Carnegie Hall debut, he recorded Mozart's Clarinet Quintet with the Budapest String Quartet.) Even so, Goodman was as nervous as Harry James that evening. At one point, he had even considered adding Beatrice Lillie, the English comedienne, to the program. "The stage shows we played in theaters," he explained, "always included comics."

As it turned out, Benny Goodman did not need any relief, comic or otherwise. A recording of the concert released in 1950 shows that the crowd was with the Goodman band from the moment it kicked off with "Don't Be That Way." After "Sometimes I'm Happy," the band swung into "One O'Clock Jump," the theme song of Count Basie. The famed Kansas City jazz pianist was waiting in the wings with four of his sidemen to join forces with Goodman, James, and drummer Gene Krupa for a 12-minute "jam session" on Fats Waller's "Honeysuckle Rose." Already on stage with the Goodman band were two saxophonists from Duke Ellington's orchestra. The whole history of jazz, it seemed, was being replayed before the audience that night.

For jazz, the road to Carnegie Hall had been a long one. At the time, most Americans saw jazz not as an art form but as dance music—with a scandalous black pedigree to boot. Whispered tales of alcoholism, drug abuse, and sexual promiscuity (some accurate, some scurrilous) followed jazz musicians, especially black ones. After F. Scott Fitzgerald published Tales of the Jazz Age in 1922, the word "jazz," at one time an obscure piece of ghetto slang with sexual overtones, became universally recognized as the emblem of "flaming youth."

A music grown up in such dubious circumstances, it then seemed, could hardly be respectable, and those who played it were not regarded in polite society as likely role models for the young. For Benny Goodman to have played jazz at Carnegie Hall—with a racially integrated group,
Onstage at Carnegie Hall in 1938, Benny Goodman plays clarinet; Lionel Hampton, vibraharp; and Gene Krupa, drums. The concert LP is still Number One on the list of all-time best-selling acoustic jazz recordings.

no less—was thus an extraordinary achievement.

"New Orleans is the cradle of jazz," pianist Jelly Roll Morton told Robert ("Believe It or Not") Ripley in 1938, "and I, myself, happened to be the creator in the year 1902." Though Morton was exaggerating his own role in its birth, jazz did emerge as a recognizable musical idiom in New Orleans around the turn of the century. "Pie man used to swing something on the bugle and the waffle man rang a big triangle," Louis Armstrong, born around 1900, later recalled. "The junk man had one of them long tin horns they celebrate with at Christmas—could play the blues and everything on it. There wasn't a person in New Orleans that didn't have rhythm."

Armstrong remembered going to the Funky Butt Hall on Perdido Street to hear jazz bands play when he was only about six years old. The music he heard was instrumental folk music played by and for a relatively small circle of New Orleans Negroes and black Creoles in and around Storyville, the city's red-light district. Early jazz appears to have been a hybrid musical idiom descended partly from ragtime,* partly from such earlier forms of Afro-American folk music as the blues, and partly from European hymnody and light classical music.

*Ragtime, exemplified by Scott Joplin's "Maple Leaf Rag," was a turn-of-the-century precursor to jazz, syncopated and often musically complex, which was fully written out rather than improvised.
What early jazzmen brought to this stylistic mishmash was "swing," a special kind of rhythmic excitement based on the opposition between the regular beat of the rhythm section—usually piano, guitar or banjo, bass, and drums—and the syncopated lines of the horn players who improvised over that beat. Like many things in music, it is easier to hear than to define. When a fan asked Armstrong to explain swing, he is supposed to have replied, "If you have to ask, you'll never know."

**Jazz Becomes a Lady**

Jazz was spread first by the riverboats that cruised up the Mississippi to Memphis, St. Louis, Chicago, and other inland ports, with New Orleans musicians employed to provide entertainment on board. Of equal importance was the invention of the phonograph, which became an effective medium after the turn of the century. In 1917, an all-white New Orleans group called the Original Dixieland Jass Band* made the first jazz recordings, sparking a nationwide dance craze (one of their first recorded tunes was "Dixieland Jass Band One-Step"), and introducing hundreds of American musicians to the new music. By 1920, writes historian James Lincoln Collier, jazz "was widely known and badly imitated throughout the United States."

From the beginning, jazz was a *popular* music, not an art music. The members of the Original Dixieland Jass Band always stressed their musical ignorance in interviews. ("I don't know how many pianists we tried," one ODJB member claimed, "before we found one who couldn't read music.") Yet, while jazz musicians were forced to work as commercial entertainers, some of them also thought of themselves as artists.

This dichotomy between the "entertainer" and the "artist" is central to the subsequent history of jazz. Every major artist in jazz has had to place himself, whether consciously or unconsciously, at some point between these two extremes. Few great jazz musicians have been altogether comfortable with the choice, and fewer still have fit neatly into either category.

The difficulty is exemplified by the careers of Louis Armstrong and Jelly Roll Morton. Millions of listeners around the world remember Armstrong as the gravel-voiced singer, with handkerchief in hand, of "Hello, Dolly" and other pop tunes. But he was also a musical genius of the first order, revolutionizing virtually every aspect of jazz. During the 1920s, with his Hot Five and Hot Seven bands, he established the solo as a

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primary form of jazz expression. His utterly natural sense of swing served as a model for many of his contemporaries and all of his juniors. "Through Louis Armstrong and his influence," composer and critic Gunther Schuller has written, "jazz became a truly twentieth-century language. And it no longer belonged to New Orleans, but to the world."

Armstrong's genius, however, was purely intuitive. A phenomenally gifted improviser on cornet and trumpet, Armstrong did not compose, showed little interest in classical music, and spent much of his career after the 1920s playing familiar tunes accompanied by mediocre big bands. He saw himself as an entertainer first. "You have to use a little showmanship," he said in 1965, "or they call you deadpan. If they ain't sick of it, I ain't."

Jelly Roll Morton (1885–1941), on the other hand, was a New Orleans jazz pianist and composer of considerable sophistication. Influenced by the multithematic musical structures of classic ragtime, Morton composed and recorded dozens of short pieces in the New Orleans jazz idiom (e.g., "Black Bottom Stomp," "Grandpa's Spells") that are the earliest successful examples of jazz as a self-conscious art music.

To most popular musicians during the 1920s, however, the epitome of musical sophistication was not the New Orleans jazz of Jelly Roll Morton but the quasi-symphonic "sweet" jazz of Paul Whiteman. Whiteman's big band performed at concerts as well as dances. Its audience was almost exclusively white and middle class. Some sense of the kind of music the band played can be gleaned from the fact that George Gershwin wrote *Rhapsody in Blue* at Whiteman's behest; the Whiteman band premiered the composition in 1924 at New York's Aeolian Hall. Duke Ellington later said, with a characteristic hint of irony, that Whiteman "made a lady out of jazz."

**Europe Applauds**

Not surprisingly, many white jazz musicians of the 1920s were attracted to classical music. They were challenged by its harmonic and structural complexity and, in many cases, comforted by its greater social acceptability. Whiteman's band offered the closest jazz equivalent to a symphony orchestra—Whiteman himself had been a violinist with the San Francisco and Denver symphonies. Though Whiteman's band was rhythmically "square," it was also, as Gunther Schuller notes, "overflowing with excellent musicians and virtuoso instrumentalists. Its arrangers...wrote complex, demanding scores that took everything these musicians could give."

Among the many talented musicians drawn into Whiteman's orbit was Iowa-born Bix Beiderbecke. In 1928, Beiderbecke fulfilled the height of the "artistic" jazzman's musical aspirations when he played the cornet solo on Whiteman's recording of Gershwin's *Concerto in F*.

He also set the pattern for most white jazzmen of the next quarter-
century. While the great innovators invariably would come from the ranks of black jazzmen, their white contemporaries (some of whom, like Beiderbecke, were also first-rate talents) would generally avoid the risks and rewards of radical innovation in favor of relatively conservative, "respectable" playing styles.

As big bands became "jazzier" after Louis Armstrong's short but pathbreaking stint with Fletcher Henderson's band during the 1920s, they began to attract the attention of black jazzmen who dreamed of their own brand of musical "respectability."

The most important of these musicians was Duke Ellington (1899-1974). Like Beiderbecke, Ellington was largely self-taught and a rather poor reader of music. His knowledge of classical music was sketchy at best. But Ellington, a man of exceptional sensitivity and imagination, was determined to turn the dance band into a medium for serious musical expression. As the leader of the house band at Harlem's storied Cotton Club during the late 1920s and early '30s, he began to write and record such now-famous original works as "Mood Indigo" and "Creole Rhapsody." The recordings attracted the attention of European commentators. In 1934, the influential British critic and composer Constant Lambert described the Cotton Club star as "the first jazz composer of distinction and the first Negro composer of distinction."

The Big Bands Go Bust

Ellington eventually went on tour in Europe, as did Louis Armstrong and several other important performers of the 1930s. They were stunned to find there a small but passionate community of jazz fans—and a comparative absence of the racial prejudice that burdened the black jazz musician's life in America, where black bands were not permitted in many white-owned nightclubs and concert halls. European acclaim convinced many American jazzmen that their work merited serious consideration as an art music.*

The first important step toward recognition in the United States came, ironically, with the resurgence of jazz as a truly popular music.

The initial jazz craze, which had started in 1917 and continued through the '20s, was stifled by the Great Depression. As the market for music of all kinds shrunk, radio and phonograph executives shied away from jazz in favor of blander, safer forms of popular music. By the mid-1930s, however, a new generation of young people, born during the post-World War I baby boom, had reached late adolescence and were looking for a music of their own. Benny Goodman, soon to be acclaimed the King of Swing, supplied it.

Swing was not really new: It was a slicker, more polished version of

*It also convinced a number of American jazzmen, mostly blacks, to remain in Europe as expatriate artists, as depicted in the film Round Midnight (1986). Several important American jazzmen still live in Europe, including trumpeter Art Farmer, who lives in Vienna, and saxophonist Steve Lacy, a Paris resident.
Gifted with musical talent and personal flair, Duke Ellington was widely honored at home and abroad. In 1958, he was presented to Queen Elizabeth II in Leeds, England. Ellington's celebrity helped increase public acceptance of jazz as "serious" music.

the big band style originally worked out by Fletcher Henderson during the 1920s. But Goodman popularized it, and thus set the tone for an entire era. For the first and only time in the history of jazz, in the words of jazz photographer William P. Gottlieb, "the most widely acclaimed music was the best music."

Even after his 1938 Carnegie Hall concert, Goodman continued to perform mostly on the radio and at dances, as did most of his contemporaries. Jazz remained a utilitarian dance music, and for every Benny Goodman, with his increasingly serious artistic ambitions, there were 10 Louis Armstrongs who were temperamentally incapable of seeing themselves as anything other than pure entertainers. But Goodman retained his interest in classical music, commissioning works from such composers as Béla Bartók, Paul Hindemith, and Aaron Copland, and studying with the classical clarinetist Reginald Kell.

Furthermore, Goodman's appearance at Carnegie Hall inspired other jazzmen to follow in his footsteps. Duke Ellington made his Carnegie Hall debut in 1943, performing Black, Brown, and Beige, the first of a long series of multimovement concert works on which he hoped to stake his claim to be a serious composer. Three years later, Woody Herman brought his famous Herd to Carnegie Hall to perform Igor Stravinsky's Ebony Concerto, which the Russian émigré had written especially for the Herman band. ("Their instrumental mastery," Stravinsky later said of Herman and his musicians, "was astonishing.")
Unfortunately, the musical advances of these bandleaders were wiped out by the collapse of the big band movement in 1946. The bands had begun to weaken during World War II, as many musicians went off to war and the costs of city-to-city touring rose sharply. The American Federation of Musicians made matters worse when it decided during 1942–43 to order its members to stop making records in an attempt to force a drastic restructuring of the system of royalty payments—in favor of the artists and at the expense of the record companies. Frank Sinatra, Peggy Lee, and other singers, stepping into the recording void left by the AFM strike, captured the nostalgic mood of wartime America with romantic ballads. The big band leader of the hour was Glenn Miller, who de-emphasized swing in favor of a sweeter, more commercial sound.

The final blow was delivered by the Depression-era baby bust. The birth rate in America had dropped to 21.3 per 1,000 in 1930. Sixteen years later, with their youthful core audiences shrinking, the big bands of Benny Goodman, Tommy Dorsey, Woody Herman, Count Basie, and Louis Armstrong went under.

A Bird Flies

With the sudden death of the big bands, jazz was reincarnated in the new “bebop” movement. Bebop flowered in popular night spots such as the Three Deuces and the Onyx on Manhattan’s legendary “Swing Street,” West 52nd Street. It stressed small groups and performances in nightclubs and brought a further increase in musical sophistication and artistic self-awareness. A brittle, fast-paced music, harmonically complex and melodically oblique, bebop was far more suitable for listening than for dancing. Jazz traditionalists, like much of the listening public, generally disdained the strange, new, seemingly disjointed music. “These young cats now,” said Armstrong, “they’re full of malice, and all they want to do is show you up and any old way will do as long as it’s different . . . people get tired of it because it’s really no good and you got no melody to remember and no beat to dance to.”

The key innovators in the movement, both black, again provided a vivid dramatization of the dichotomy between the “entertainer” and the “artist.” Trumpeter Dizzy Gillespie, for all his immense musical gifts, presented himself as an entertainer, clowning on stage and, later in his career, fronting a long succession of musically mediocre small groups. Most listeners remembered his stage antics and the trademark upturned bell of his trumpet rather than the flashing virtuosity of his solos.

From the beginning, Gillespie’s sometime partner, alto saxophonist Charlie “Bird” Parker, saw himself as an artist. A revolutionary musical innovator comparable in significance to Louis Armstrong, Parker fused the nervous electricity of bebop with the deeper emotional content of the blues to unforgettable effect. But, like Bix Beiderbecke before him, Parker eventually chafed at the constraints of small-group improvisation.
Parker was also interested in classical music, enjoyed playing with a string section, and longed to study composition. "Take me as you would a baby and teach me music," he once told composer Edgard Varèse. "I only write in one voice. I want to have structure. I want to write orchestral scores." But Parker, a heroin addict who seemed to do everything in excess, gradually destroyed himself, dying at age 34 in 1955.

**The 'New Thing'**

As before, the white jazzmen, with their better schooling and social advantages, made the first decisive moves of their generation toward musical respectability. Among them were baritone saxophonist Gerry Mulligan, a founder in 1949 of "cool" jazz, a bebop-derived style that stressed lyricism and subtlety. Another leader of the cool jazz movement was Lennie Tristano, a blind Chicago pianist who introduced completely unstructured, atonal improvisation to jazz with his 1949 recordings, "Intuition" and "Digression."

The hero of the new cool school was pianist Dave Brubeck, a student of French composer Darius Milhaud. Together with the alto saxophonist Paul Desmond, Brubeck founded a long-lived quartet that made use of such classical techniques as counterpoint, bitonality, and compound time signatures. But the Dave Brubeck Quartet was perhaps most notable for discovering jazz's most important audience of the coming decade: college students. Brubeck's long string of live on-campus recordings made him a national star, won him a place on the cover of *Time* (1954), and signaled the increasing dominance in jazz of the concert stage over the nightclub.

Back in New York, in 1952, four black beboppers who had played together in Dizzy Gillespie's short-lived big band started the Modern Jazz Quartet. The MJQ played off Milt Jackson's warm, expressive vibraharp against the elegant piano and attractive (if occasionally precious) compositions of John Lewis, a gifted blues player who was also strongly interested in classical music. Under Lewis's leadership, the MJQ performed in tuxedos, gave out printed programs and stuck to them, and even showed up on time for performances.

When not playing in clubs and at concerts, the group worked closely with Gunther Schuller, whose "third-stream" movement attempted to create a new fusion of jazz and classical music.

Not everyone was impressed by the Modern Jazz Quartet. Miles Davis, the dominant figure in jazz during the 1950s, rejected its fancy trappings outright, although he respected the musicianship of its members. "Polished Negroes," Davis said, leaving little doubt as to whom he was talking about, "are acting the way they think white people want them to act, so they can be accepted."

Although he had received some training at the Juilliard School of Music, Davis saw no need to pay homage to the ideals of classical music.
Jazz giants Charlie Parker (saxophone), Charles Mingus (bass), and Thelonious Monk (piano), in a rare appearance together in 1953. On drums is Roy Haynes. No comparable group of jazz innovators has appeared since this jazz “generation,” which also included Miles Davis and John Coltrane.

in order to establish his artistic credentials. He shunned rehearsals and avoided elaborate written arrangements, preferring to emphasize spontaneity. He also bucked a trend by playing whenever possible in clubs rather than concert halls: “Nobody can relax at concerts, the musicians or the people, either. You can’t do nothing but sit down, you can’t move around, you can’t have a drink. A musician has to be able to let loose everything in him to reach the people. If the musician can’t relax, how’s he going to make the people feel what he feels?”

Other innovators of the era included pianist Thelonious Monk and bassist Charles Mingus, the leading jazz composer of the 1950s and '60s (“Goodbye Pork Pie Hat,” “Pithecanthropus Erectus,” “Better Git It in Your Soul”). But Davis, an alumnus of the Charlie Parker Quintet and a founding father of cool jazz during the late 1940s, overcame a heroin habit and established himself as the dominant figure in 1950s jazz. One of the most intriguing, abrasive personalities in jazz, he was the first of its players to transcend the artist-entertainer dichotomy. Unlike Armstrong, he behaved in public as though he took himself seriously. “He was the first one,” Dizzy Gillespie said, “that came along in our business and figured he didn’t have to smile at everyone, didn’t have to tell no jokes or make no announcements, didn’t have to say thank you or even bow. He figured he could just let the music speak for him, and for itself.”

The result was a swinging, uncluttered music. Davis was willing to
try anything, moving fearlessly from bouncy show tunes, such as "The Surrey With the Fringe on Top" (from Oklahoma!), to sophisticated modal compositions, and he brought his public along with him at each stylistic turn.

By the early 1960s, one of Davis's protégés, tenor saxophonist John Coltrane, had taken the lead in developing the "new thing," a jazz idiom characterized by frenzied, turbulent collective improvisation and solos of unprecedented length. Sometimes brilliant, sometimes merely incomprehensible, Coltrane's style, which enthralled the jazz avant-garde long after Coltrane's untimely death in 1967, alienated much of what remained of jazz's popular audience.

Once again, the coup de grâce was provided by a demographic shift. As the first children of the post-World War II baby boom turned 16 in 1962, they ignored the increasingly inaccessible music of Coltrane and his contemporaries and turned instead to simpler, more immediately appealing sounds. Young whites tuned into rock-and-roll; young blacks to rhythm and blues and soul music.

Paying the Price

This rejection by younger listeners is the principal reason why an influential group of jazz musicians, led by Miles Davis, began during the late 1960s to incorporate elements of rock and soul into their music. The results were mixed. Some players, notably vibraharpist Gary Burton, were able to combine elements of jazz and rock in a genuinely creative way. Pianist Herbie Hancock and guitarist George Benson, among others, achieved great commercial success by merging jazz and black popular music during the 1970s, but their music became merely formulaic. Davis's attempts at "fusion," as the new brand of jazz was called, were more complex but generally less successful. After releasing a handful of provocative fusion recordings during the late 1960s, he ceased to be an important figure in jazz.

The abdication of Miles Davis left jazz without a major innovator to set new artistic directions for the next generation. As a result, jazz has entered a phase of eclecticism in which new players, instead of breaking fresh ground, pick and choose from a musical palette of the great players of the past.

Trumpeter Wynton Marsalis, the best-known of these younger musicians, is an exceptionally gifted technician whose style is almost completely derived from the playing of Miles Davis. Marsalis has also recorded several critically acclaimed albums of classical music. The World Saxophone Quartet, an avant-garde ensemble, has recorded a Duke Ellington album for Nonesuch, a classical music label. Tenor saxophonist Scott Hamilton and cornetist Warren Vaché pack nightclubs by playing an updated version of swing-era combo jazz.

This period has not been without its gains. While jazz was never, as
Grover Sales and other jazz critics claim, “America’s classical music,” it is now nonetheless generally recognized as a true art music.

The price of this status has, however, been high. As it became an exotic art music, jazz lost much of its popular audience. Commercial radio stations long ago stopped playing new jazz. The major record companies, which were still recording jazz 20 years ago, no longer have much time for it. While a Wynton Marsalis can still sell enough records to attract the attention of a major label such as CBS Records, most jazz artists, young and old alike, now record for small, independent firms—many of them based in Europe. Nor are recordings the only relevant measure of the shrinking market for jazz. Ask any middle-aged jazz musician how much work he gets today and how much work he got in, say, 1962, and you will hear a sad tale of slow and inexorable decline.

The crisis of expression in contemporary jazz is identical to that now being experienced by classical composers, who lost their audience by embracing avant-garde compositional techniques during the late 1950s and ’60s. Perhaps jazz may follow the example of such contemporary “minimalist” classical composers as Philip Glass and Steve Reich, whose music, whatever its aesthetic weaknesses, at least seems to have some potential for attracting a larger, younger, and more enthusiastic audience. “New age” music, with its simple, repetitive instrumental textures, may well turn out to be the minimalism of modern jazz.

Today, jazz has achieved “respectability.” It is played regularly in concert halls, analyzed by scholars, taught in universities, enshrined in archives, and celebrated in the Smithsonian and other museums. The typical young jazz musician now studies his art at Boston’s Berklee College of Music or some similar institution, carves out a fairly conventional middle-class existence by recording jingles or teaching high school band (playing jazz on the side), and dreams of getting a grant from the National Endowment for the Arts to start a big band, or perhaps an avant-garde combo.

It is difficult for many of today’s listeners not to feel nostalgia for a time when jazz was still fundamentally popular music, a vital part of American life. Now it is a branch of high culture. Yet, by its very nature, jazz is unsuitable for preservation by such state-supported artistic endeavors as the museum or the symphony orchestra. It is a way of life as much as a form of art, a unique musical idiom handed down from individual to individual. Now that the culture that sustained it has withered away, who knows whether the jazz tradition can be preserved?
After two years as a teacher in the United States during the 1890s, noted Czech composer Antonín Dvořák issued a surprising challenge to his hosts.

"Just as this nation has already surpassed so many others in marvelous inventions and feats of engineering and commerce," he said, "and has made an honorable place for itself in literature . . ., so it must assert itself in the other arts, and especially in the art of music."

In Dvořák's time, as today, American classical music was being tugged in two directions. Oddly enough, Dvořák, a foreigner, espoused the nationalist cause, joining those composers who have viewed America's native culture—our folk and ethnic music, ragtime and blues, and, later, jazz and rock—as a legitimate foundation for a distinctly American classical style. On the other side, the "internationalists," represented in Dvořák's day by composers such as John Knowles Paine, have dismissed the whole notion of a national style as chauvinistic. Implicitly assuming the inferiority of American culture, they have argued that American composers should learn mainstream European musical idioms.

Throughout American history, but particularly during the 20th century, the pendulum has swung back and forth between these two opposing views in almost every generation of composers and critics.

The tension between European and American styles emerged long before Dvořák's challenge. During the Revolutionary era, the sacred music of New England was dominated by the compositions of Boston-born William Billings (1746–1800). By the early 19th century, however, as the young nation absorbed a fresh influx of European immigrants, native New England church music was increasingly seen as crude and clumsy. New England clergymen began eliminating American compositions from hymn-books, replacing them with European works or imitations thereof. By the time Lowell Mason compiled the Boston Handel and Haydn Society Collection of Church Music (1821), hardly a trace remained of the native sacred repertoire.

Nor was the trend limited to church music. Louis Moreau Gottschalk (1829–69), a piano virtuoso and composer who was raised in the Old Quarter of New Orleans and educated in Paris, wrote brilliant solo piano compositions based on the Afro-Caribbean music he had heard as a child. Today, the vividness of his melodies and the snap of his rhythms seem a prescient attempt at American musical nationalism. Yet Gottschalk, despite tremendous success as a performer, was repeatedly stymied as a composer by the prevailing attitude among the educated urban...
classes in his homeland that European (and particularly German) music was superior to American.

By the mid-19th century, German musicians were everywhere in America, and native composers, if they wanted to be taken seriously, had to ape the German style. Some went to Germany to study composition; they returned to America sounding like Schumann, Brahms, or Wagner.

This was the unfriendly milieu that Charles Ives (1874–1954) encountered when he arrived at Yale to study with the noted composer Horatio Parker in 1894. Parker had little sympathy for either the young man's love of the American vernacular or his musical experiments. Yet to Ives, such tendencies came naturally. Raised in Danbury, Connecticut, he was the son of an all-purpose town music director of extraordinary eccentricity. George Ives, involved with band music, organ playing, and camp-meeting hymn singing, was reluctant to divorce classical music from popular music. And he was a relentless experimenter who used his son—and all the townsfolk of Danbury—as his test audience.

An Audience of None

"Father insisted on the use of the ears and the mind to think for themselves—in other words, not to be too dependent on customs and habits," Charles later recalled. Although the son seems to have exaggerated the father's originality, George's attempts to "stretch the ears" certainly took remarkable forms. Once, in a spatial experiment, he directed several bands to march around Danbury's town square in opposite directions, playing different tunes, an effect that Charles later recalled in his Three Places in New England (1912). In a tonal experiment, George had his son sing in one key while he sang in another. And always it was the spirit, conviction, and sincerity of a performance that counted far more than mere musical accuracy.

It is no wonder, then, that Charles Ives' compositions bore the imprint of his father's experiments. Yet the younger Ives realized that audiences were unlikely to appreciate his compositions any time soon. After graduating from Yale, he chose a career in life insurance (like his contemporary, poet Wallace Stevens) rather than music. "If he has a nice wife and children, how can [a composer] let the children starve on his dissonances?" Ives asked with typical Yankee practicality.

Thus Ives became a spare-time composer, writing in virtual isolation at night and on weekends at his homes in Manhattan and Connecticut. His few attempts to have his work performed provoked hostility and
AMERICAN MUSIC

European composers and performers dominated opera and classical music in America through the early 20th century. Here (circa 1916), Enrico Caruso, the Italian-born "superstar" of New York opera, sings the lead in Donizetti's popular L'Elisir d'Amore.

incredulity. "I seem to have worked in composition with more natural freedom when I knew that the music was not going to be played, at least publicly," he later rationalized.

By the mid-1920s, a variety of chronic health problems brought Ives' business life and musical career to a close. His music still earned him only ridicule. One reason was his assertion of the worth of all facets of American music—hymns, marches, ragtime, patriotic and popular songs—and thus his refusal to separate art from daily life. "You cannot set off art in the corner and hope for it to have vitality, reality, substance," he said. "It comes directly out of the...experience of life."

Ives believed that music should try to recreate life, with all its disorder intact. A song such as The Things Our Fathers Loved (1917) evokes this reality, and specifically Ives' own Danbury childhood, by means of quotations of hymns, marches, and popular songs, all juxtaposed with joyous disregard for traditional European notions of consonance and dissonance.

It was Ives' scorn for convention that led him to experiment with many revolutionary 20th-century techniques, sometimes before they were "discovered" in Europe. He equated dissonance with strength, and explored the implications of densely-textured music lacking a tonal center. Ives knew his compositions might sound "difficult," but felt that listeners ought to be challenged: "Beauty in music is too often confused
with something that lets the ears lie back in an easy chair. Many sounds that we are used to do not bother us, and for that reason we are inclined to call them beautiful.”

Ives might have been a model for younger American composers during the early 20th century—had any of them ever heard his music. Not until the 1930s did Ives begin to win attention. “There we were in the 1920s searching for a composer from the older generation with an ‘American sound,’ and here was Charles Ives composing this incredible music—totally unknown to us,” Aaron Copland later recalled.

**Music for ‘the Masses’**

So Copland, born in Brooklyn in 1900, had to look elsewhere for his models. Like many American composers—from Virgil Thomson in 1921 through Philip Glass in 1964—he went to Paris to study with Nadia Boulanger, a renowned teacher. Boulanger, who was convinced that American music was just about to find its own native voice, encouraged her young student to explore the sounds of home-grown music. When Copland returned to New York in 1924, he was “determined to write a work that would immediately be recognized as American in character.”

During the 1920s, the most natural way for an American composer to emphasize his nationalism was to turn to jazz. At the time, symphonic jazz was all the rage; in 1924, bandleader Paul Whiteman had introduced George Gershwin’s *Rhapsody in Blue*, a hugely successful attempt to synthesize jazz and concert music. Copland tried his own version of symphonic jazz in *Music for the Theatre* (1925) and *Piano Concerto* (1926).

But to Copland symphonic jazz was a dead end. “It was easy to be American in musical terms, but all American music could not possibly be confined to two dominant jazz moods—the blues and the snappy number,” Copland said. Where would he find a music upon which to base a richer American national style?

The answer came out of the great economic upheaval of the 1930s. The Depression years brought a turn toward conservativism in the arts and leftism in politics. Leftist sentiment encouraged composers to reach out to “the masses,” to speak a musical language that would appeal to the common people. And what better basis for such a language than American folk music? Suddenly, composers (like many artists and writers) became fascinated with historical and regional Americanism, and particularly with the rugged American West. Meanwhile, the growth of motion pictures, the phonograph, and radio assured composers a broader audience, provided that their music was simple, direct, and functional.

It was left to Virgil Thomson, born in 1896 in Kansas City but trained in Paris by Boulanger, to create the new style. Thomson wrote the scores for two documentary films, one of which, *The Plow That Broke the Plains* (1936), propagandized in favor of resettlement aid for Dust-bowl families. For his score, Thomson turned to the music of his
youth—Baptist hymns, blues, and, most importantly, folk and cowboy songs—and used them in a disarmingly unpretentious, tuneful manner.

Armed with this lesson, Copland embarked on his own attempt to reach a larger public by means of what he called "imposed simplicity." He later wrote:

During the mid '30s, I began to feel an increasing dissatisfaction with the relations of the music-loving public and the living composer. The conventional concert public continued apathetic or indifferent to anything but the established classics... Moreover, an entirely new public had grown up around the radio and phonograph. It made no sense to ignore them and to continue writing as if they did not exist.

Recognizing the split between composers and audiences that was then only just appearing, Copland, unlike many later composers, found a way to bridge it. Without compromising quality for the sake of popular appeal, he pared down and simplified his already lean musical vocabulary. To the rhythms of jazz he added a new ingredient—American folk music, reinterpreted in his own style. Thus the ballets *Billy the Kid* (1938) and *Rodeo* (1942) turn to cowboy songs, and *Appalachian Spring* (1944) includes the Shaker melody "Simple Gifts." During World War II, Copland responded to the nation's renewed patriotism with the heroic, brassy, *Fanfare for the Common Man* (1942), one of the best-known pieces of American music next to "The Star Spangled Banner."

**A ‘Prepared’ Piano**

Perhaps at no other time in American history were composer and public so united in their musical taste. But that bubble of solidarity was soon to burst, as American composers began to turn from nationalism to internationalism, from American models to European ones, a shift that was to have ominous consequences for both composers and the public. The most surprising development in music after World War II was the rapid adoption on both sides of the Atlantic of the 12-tone technique that Austria's Arnold Schoenberg had pioneered during the 1920s, and carried to the United States in 1933 when he fled the Nazis. The technique offered a new way of organizing the 12 pitches of the scale—a method that deliberately avoided any hint of tonal center (what we commonly call "key"). It is a cerebral, rational, compositional system, in many ways akin to mathematical permutation.

It was not until after World War II that the American composer Milton Babbitt realized that Schoenberg's 12-tone technique might be extended beyond pitch. If one could order the pitches of a composition in such a way as to both predetermine structure and void tonality, why not also order durations and dynamics? Thus Babbitt, trained as a mathema-
tician as well as a composer, began to use a series of durations (the lengths of notes) and a series of dynamics (the volume of notes) along with Schoenberg's series of pitches. Babbitt's extension of 12-tone technique became known, logically enough, as serialism.

Babbitt's approach led him to create staggeringly complex and rigidly organized compositions. "I believe in cerebral music—in the application of intellect to relevant matters," he declared proudly. "I never choose a note unless I know precisely why I want it there, and can give several reasons why I chose it and not another." Yet listeners were left utterly in the dark, for the mathematical permutations of serialism are inaudible on the musical surface. When confronted with the pointilistic sound of Babbitt's music—melodies fragmented into tiny, leaping, disjointed bursts—and its avoidance of both tonal center and regular pulse, listeners responded with dismay. And they became increasingly alienated from the American avant-garde.

Babbitt's reaction was to lash out at the "conservatism" of audiences, and to retreat, along with other composers who shared his predictions, into academia. With the development of the electronic sound synthesizer during the late 1950s, Babbitt, at Princeton, was finally able to realize his goal of totally-controlled music: Without having to worry about the limitations of human performance, he could obtain precise organization of complex rhythms, dynamics, and pitches.

The masters of 20th-century American classical music: Aaron Copland (left); Virgil Thomson (upper right); and Charles Ives (lower right).
One of the great ironies of American music history is that while Babbitt was extending serialism—a musical language that became the epitome of internationalism, at least among the avant-garde of the 1950s and '60s—another composer was moving in the opposite direction. Instead of trying to rigidly predetermine every aspect of music's structure, John Cage was attempting to reduce the composer's control over his creations. Cage can hardly be considered a nationalist, for he showed little interest in indigenous American music. Nor can he be considered an internationalist, for he had even less use for European models. Yet he is an internationalist of a different sort, a man strongly influenced by non-Western music and philosophy. And he belongs to a distinctly American lineage, that of the stubbornly independent innovator who, like Ives, follows his own path, oblivious to the dictates of fashion.

Born in Los Angeles in 1912, Cage grew up hearing as much non-Western music as Western. He became especially interested in the gamelan, an Indonesian orchestra of metal percussion instruments. By the 1930s, composing for percussion ensemble, Cage was attempting to recreate the gamelan aesthetic—not only its chiming sonority, but its distinctly non-Western static, nondirectional quality.

By 1938, Cage had succeeded in transforming the inside of a piano (by inserting screws, bits of rubber, and other objects) so that it sounded like a miniature gamelan. But Cage saw the “prepared piano” as only a first step in the absorption of non-Western aesthetics. He had become convinced, like Ives before him, of the need to blur the distinction between music and noise, between art and life. In 1937, he predicted that “the use of noise to make music will continue until we reach a musical product through the aid of electrical instruments, which will make available for musical purposes any and all sounds that can be heard.”

The Sounds of Silence

Thus Cage's Credo in Us (1942) combines home-made gamelan-like percussion with an electric buzzer and a radio. At precisely indicated points in the score, the radio is turned on to whatever happens to be broadcast (although the player is advised to “avoid news programs during national or international emergencies”)—a deliberate abdication of control by the composer.

Another step came in 1947, when Cage began attending lectures on Zen Buddhism. “The study of Zen led me to the enjoyment of things as they come, as they happen, rather than as they are possessed or kept or forced to be,” Cage said. “One may give up the desire to control sound, clear his mind of music, and set about discovering means to let the sounds be themselves, rather than vehicles for man-made theories or expressions of human sentiments.”

Giving up “the desire to control sound” became Cage's obsession during the 1950s. He began using chance methods to compose, choosing
pitches, durations, and timbres not by conscious decisions but by the results of the coin-tosses prescribed in the Chinese “Book of Changes,” the I Ching. Next, Cage sought to extend his “chance procedures” to the realm of performance. He realized that there is no such thing as “silence.” All the sounds around us are “music.” Thus, in Cage’s famous silent piece of 1952, 4’33”, the pianist sits at the keyboard and plays nothing at all. The listener is encouraged to focus on other sounds, especially those produced by the audience itself.

Cage thus took Ives’ refusal to distinguish between art and life to its ultimate extreme. He saw the composer’s role not as “an attempt to bring order out of chaos, nor to suggest improvements in creation, but simply to wake us up to the very life we’re living.”

Searching for Listeners

Cage could not have expected a warm reception from critics and his fellow composers, never mind the concert-going public. And he did not receive one. But his radical experiments served a valuable purpose, for they forced an entire generation of composers to open its ears. What could have been a better antidote to academia’s emphasis on stiflingly overintellectualized serial techniques?

Nevertheless, by the 1960s, composers and audiences had reached a peak of mutual estrangement. Composers, immersed either in academic serialism or the chaotic “happenings” of the experimentalists, dismissed the average listener as hopelessly naive.* Concertgoers, convinced that comprehensible music had died with Mahler and Sibelius, reacted with hostility to new works; conductors chose few new American compositions for performance. Meanwhile, rock and soul music siphoned off younger listeners. More and more, the classical music audience was white, older, upper-crust, and very conservative in its tastes.

However, a few younger composers were beginning to fill the musical vacuum by the late 1960s. Although they had little in common as far as musical style, they all shared a desire to reach out to audiences. Under the general umbrella of “new accessibility,” they began to attract the attention of once-alienated listeners. In Ancient Voices of Children (1970), for example, George Crumb did so by turning music into a theatrical ritual, filled with evocative masks, costumes, and sonorities.

If Dionysian expression rather than Apollonian rationalism was the hallmark of the “new accessibility,” no composer epitomized the trend more than David Del Tredici. “New Romanticism” might be a better term for Del Tredici’s music: Not only does he embrace Romanticism’s emotionalism, he returns to its tonality, its more consonant harmonic

*A notable exception was Leonard Bernstein. More than anyone else during the 1940s and 1950s, he managed to integrate native idioms with the classical tradition, notably in West Side Story (1957), a seamless amalgamation of Broadway, bebop, mambo, opera, and symphony. Bernstein has become our greatest conductor, but he was not able to live up to his early promise as a composer.
A scene from Akhnaten (1984), an opera by Philip Glass. Many critics argue that performances of such contemporary American works are all too rare.

language, and its singable melodic lines.

"For me," writes the Princeton-trained composer, "tonality is a daring discovery. I grew up in a climate in which, for a composer, only dissonance and atonality were acceptable." Yet Final Alice (1976), one of many Del Tredici scores inspired by Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland stories, reveals that the composer returns to Romanticism in a very personal, idiosyncratic way. Despite the virtuoso orchestration, consonant harmonies, and soaring soprano melodies, this is Romanticism transformed by a 20th-century composer—a Romanticism whose obsessive repetition and hyper-expressive climaxes are every bit as perverse as Wonderland itself.

Del Tredici's opulent orchestral scores certainly charmed audiences, but he could hardly win back the audience for new music by himself. That feat was left to a much more radical group of composers, who had roots firmly planted in the American vernacular.

By the late 1960s, at least four composers—La Monte Young, Terry Riley, Steve Reich, and Philip Glass—had emerged as pioneers of a new style called minimalism. The term itself, borrowed from the visual arts, is despised by the composers, but it does aptly describe the music—which zeroes in on small details of structure and then magnifies them by repetition to form the basis of an entire work.
The career of Steve Reich, now 51, reflects the predilections of the minimalists as a group. Born in New York City, Reich was fascinated by music with a steady pulse and tonal center—the bebop of Charlie Parker, the music of Africa and Asia, the propulsive rhythms of Stravinsky. Serialism left him cold. Nor was he interested in Cage’s experiments. Why, Reich wondered, was there such a gulf between the music he loved and the music his Juilliard instructors wanted him to write?

By the mid-1960s, Reich had decided to cast both serialism and Cage aside. Yet his interest in the drone-like modal jazz of saxophonist John Coltrane and the stasis of non-Western music meant that Reich would not simply work in the traditional Western mold. Ignoring Occidental notions of contrast, development, and climax, Reich’s music—compositions such as *Come Out* (1966) and *Piano Phase* (1967)—was directionless and static. Although it had steady pulse, clear tonal center, and jazzy syncopations, it created a meditative aura by means of ceaseless repetition and unchanging pitch, volume, and harmony.

**Selling Out?**

Reich’s early works scandalized the avant-garde. Serialists dismissed him as simple minded; Cage’s followers denounced him as fascistic. Yet younger listeners, long absent from the classical concert hall, flocked to Reich’s performances at lower-Manhattan lofts and art galleries. In 1970, Reich traveled to Ghana to learn West African percussion, revealing the fruits of his labors in his magnum opus, *Drumming* (1971). In 1976, after studying the Balinese gamelan, Reich wrote *Music for 18 Musicians*, reveling in lush, varied timbres and an expanded harmonic and melodic range. And *Music* demonstrated that, for the first time in recent memory, a contemporary composer had found an audience—for its recording sold more than 20,000 copies in the first year, and catapulted Reich to international prominence.

Philip Glass’s career parallels Reich’s in many respects. A native of Baltimore, educated at the University of Chicago and Juilliard, Glass, too, rebelled against academic serialism. During the mid-1960s, he studied with Nadia Boulanger in Paris. There, he met the Indian sitarist Ravi Shankar and, like Reich, became interested in non-Western music. But while Reich has favored abstract instrumental music, Glass has concentrated on dramatic music—opera, theater, film.

Today, Glass is the most important opera composer of his generation. His operatic trilogy—*Einstein on the Beach* (1976), *Satyagraha* (1980), and *Akhnaten* (1984)—has sold out opera houses around the globe. The trilogy, far from abstract, focuses on three figures representing different areas of human endeavor: Einstein, the scientist; Gandhi, the politician; and Akhnaten, the Egyptian pharaoh and religious monotheist. Even more important, however, is the shift in musical style the operas represent. For Glass’s recent operas, like Reich’s newer orches-
tral works, reveal a turn from the austerity of minimalism to an increas-
ingly rich, newly emotional, postminimalist aesthetic.

Reich and Glass have not abandoned their roots in American nation-
alism. Reich’s music continues to be imbued with jazz-inflected synco-
pated rhythms; Glass’s Songs From Liquid Days (1986) is set to texts
by rock stars David Byrne, Paul Simon, and Suzanne Vega. Nor have
Reich and Glass abandoned repetition. What they have done is to reach
out toward the symphonic and operatic mainstream, reinvigorating the
ossifying classical tradition. Today, Reich and Glass receive commissions
from orchestras and opera houses, and their works appear on programs
alongside those of Beethoven and Wagner.

In the same way that Cage helped liberate even composers who did
not emulate him, so Reich and Glass have freed a whole generation of
younger composers. Whether one is a devotee or a detractor of mini-
malism, one cannot deny its beneficial effects on American music—it
reabsorption of tonal center, steady pulse, and the American vernacular;
it appeal to a once-alienated younger public. The effects can be seen in
the career of John Adams, who, although once a disciple of both Reich
and Glass, has always showed a more intuitive, emotional spirit. His
opera Nixon in China (1987) played to packed houses during its pre-
mière run in Houston, and further performances and a recording will
reach thousands of listeners on two continents.

It is no accident that these successes recall the enviable achieve-
ments of American classical music during the 1930s and ’40s. Like
Thomson and Copland, the minimalists have reached out to audiences.

What Reich, Glass, and Adams offer is “nationalism” rather than
“internationalism,” an approach that embraces our culture instead of
thumbing its nose at it. And not only the minimalists have succeeded.
Following on the heels of David Del Tredici, a whole generation of “New
Romantics” has been composing accessible orchestral scores that are
finding their way onto concert programs. Stephen Paulus, Libby Larsen,
John Harbison, and Joseph Schwantner all display various facets of this
coloristic, expressive, often frankly populist symphonic style.

There is, of course, always the danger that composers will oversim-
ply for the sake of accessibility. Yet the finest composers of the younger
generation have been able to write for a broad public without compro-
mising standards. And the hazards they face seem preferable to those
created by the avant-garde of the 1950s and ’60s, which risked losing
forever the audience for living American composers. Both Dvořák and
Ives, I think, would be pleased.
Sifting through the relics of lost empires, archaeologists have unearthed pictures of Sumerian lyres and harps, scraps of Roman musical notation, even vivid descriptions of musical performances in ancient Greece. Yet, as scholar Gerald Abraham writes in *The Concise Oxford History of Music* (Oxford, 1985), the music of the ancients will never be heard again: "We cannot re-create these sounds, feel the emotional excitement, or even faintly imagine what [the music] really sounded like."

Only during the ninth to 12th centuries A.D. did a comprehensible Western system of musical structure and notation begin to take shape. (The Chinese system was by then centuries old.)

The single most important development in the history of European music, according to Joseph Machlis in *The Enjoyment of Music* (Norton, 5th ed., 1984), was the emergence between 850 and 1150 A.D. of polyphony—the use of two or more melodic lines. Polyphony required ever more precise forms of notation. Music, says Machlis, "took a long step from being an art of improvisation and oral tradition to one that was carefully planned and that could be preserved accurately." And that increased the importance of the individual composer.

Even so, the compositions of the immediately succeeding eras—the Gothic (1150–1450) and the Renaissance (1450–1600)—are known today chiefly by connoisseurs. The more familiar works, such as the concertos of Bach and Handel, date from the Baroque era (1600–1750) and later.


During the 19th century, however, educated Easterners embraced the music of Europe, while others created new forms of popular music. Only after World War I, Hitchcock says, did the "cultivated" and "vernacular" traditions begin to converge again.


From Irving Berlin's "Alexander's Ragtime Band" (1911) on, Tin Pan Alley eagerly absorbed and reinterpreted jazz influences. Isaac Goldberg's *Tin Pan Alley* (Ungar, 2nd ed., 1961), is an idiosyncratic (and occasionally misleading) insider's account of "the Alley," written in classic Broadway rococo style.

In his encyclopedic *All the Years of American Popular Music: A Comprehensive History* (Prentice-Hall, 1977), David Ewen notes the powerful influence of technology—the phonograph, juke box, and electric guitar.

In *Rock of Ages: The Rolling Stone History of Rock and Roll* (Summit, 1987), Ed Ward (along with Geoffrey Stokes and Ken Tucker) attributes the rise of rock in part to radio disc jockeys: "Here you were, an insignificant teen-ager... and here was this guy... playing weird records with sort of dirty lyrics, talking in your ear, like a
co-conspirator... It was your own secret society!"

Bill C. Malone's *Country Music, U.S.A.* (Univ. of Tex., 1985) is a no less affectionate chronicle of country and western music.

As Charles Hamm notes in *Music in the New World* (Norton, 1983), any survey is likely to leave out somebody's favorites—the compositions of John Philip Sousa or Pennsylvania's Moravians, Polish polkas or Cajun zydeco. None of them is any less a part of the wide, turbulent, ever-flowing stream of American music, "continually producing new and fascinating pieces and styles."

**DISCOGRAPHY**

**POPULAR MUSIC** This is too vast a field—from bluegrass and folk to blues and rock—to permit a simple list of suggested records. The Smithsonian's anthology of *American Popular Song* (R031) is a good introduction to the music of Tin Pan Alley. New World Records has issued hundreds of notable albums charting the history of popular music, including titles as various as *Come Josephine in My Flying Machine: Inventions and Topics in Popular Song, 1910–29* (NW233) and *Country Music: In the Modern Era, 1940s–1970s* (NW207).

**JAZZ**


**CLASSICAL**


**EDITOR'S NOTE:** Many of the book and record titles in this essay were suggested by Howard Husock, Terry Teachout, and K. Robert Schwarz.
IN DEFENSE OF THE VICTORIANS

The Victorian moral code has come under steady criticism during the 20th century. British intellectuals of the Edwardian era, among them Virginia Woolf and Lytton Strachey, dismissed their parents' ethics as hypocritical and prudish. More recently, some historians have charged that the Victorian ethos was little more than a weapon of "social control," a means by which the upper classes kept the lower orders in line. Historian Gertrude Himmelfarb finds such interpretations both condescending and wrong. The Victorians, she argues, placed their highest premium on values essential to the health of liberal societies—not social control but "self-control, self-help, self-reliance, self-discipline."

by Gertrude Himmelfarb

"Manners and Morals"—the expression is peculiarly, unmistakably Victorian. Not "manners" alone: Lord Chesterfield in the 18th century was fond of discoursing to his son on the supreme importance of manners—manners as distinct from (if necessary, in opposition to) morals. And not "morals" alone: Philosophers had always taken this as their special province, had, indeed, made it so elevated a subject that it had little to do with anything so mundane as manners.

It was the Victorians who combined these words so that they came trippingly off the tongue, as if they were one word. Manners were sanctified and moralized, so to speak, while morals were secularized and domesticated. When William Thackeray earlier in the century, or Anthony Trollope later, protested that manners were taking precedence over morals, that "the way we live now" (in the memorable title of one of Trollope's last novels) encouraged the cultivation of manners at the expense of morals, it was because they themselves attached so much importance not only to morals but to the continuum of manners and morals.
IN DEFENSE OF THE VICTORIANS

The concern of England’s upper classes for the welfare of the poor was often derided as hypocritical “slumming,” as this 1884 Punch cartoon suggests.

Margaret Thatcher has been reported as saying that she would be pleased to restore all Victorian values, with the exception of hypocrisy. If she did say that, she betrayed a serious misunderstanding of Victorian values. Hypocrisy, in the well-known phrase of La Rochefoucauld, is “the homage that vice pays to virtue.” It is also the homage that manners pay to morals. The Victorians thought it no small virtue to maintain the appearance, the manner, of good conduct even while violating some basic precept of morality.

This was, in fact, what the eminent Victorians did when they felt obliged to commit some transgression. They did not flout conventional morality; on the contrary, they tried to observe at least the manner of it. George Eliot, living with a man whom she could not marry because he could not legally be divorced from his wife, reproduced in their relationship all the forms of propriety. They lived together in a perfectly domestic, monogamous arrangement, quite as if they had been married. Indeed, she called herself, and insisted that others call her, “Mrs. Lewes,” and had the great satisfaction of hearing the real Mrs. Lewes involuntarily call her that. And when Mr. Lewes died, after 24 years of this pseudo-marriage (one can hardly call it an affair), she almost immediately took the occasion to enter a real, a legal marriage with John Cross—with all the appurtenances
thereof: a proper trousseau, a formal wedding in church, a honeymoon. All of which shocked her friends more than her earlier pseudo-marriage because this seemed to them a true misalliance; her new husband was 20 years her junior and much her intellectual inferior.

And so too with other notorious “irregularities,” as the Victorians delicately put it: extramarital relationships (such as that of John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor), or marital relationships which were unconsummated (the Carlyles and the Ruskins), or homosexual relationships (such as were presumed to exist in the Oxford Movement). Those caught up in an irregular situation of this kind tried, as far as they possibly could, to “regularize” it, to contain it within its conventional form, to domesticate it and normalize it. And when they could not do so (or even when they did), they agonized over it in diaries and letters—which they carefully preserved, and which is why we now know so much about these scandals.

So, at least, it was until the end of the century, when the moral certitudes began to falter. “For the Englishman,” Friedrich Nietzsche wrote in 1889, “morality is not yet a problem.” Not yet a problem, he thought, because the English still had the illusion that they could sustain morality in the absence of a religion; they did not realize how firmly rooted in Christianity their morality was. When Christianity lost its ascendancy, as Nietzsche thought it inevitably would, the English would discover how tenuous their morality was.

Nietzsche’s words were prophetic—not, to be sure, for the English as a whole. But then Nietzsche was not talking about the English as a whole—the masses, or “slave class,” as he called them, who mindlessly observed the manners and morals imposed upon them by the “priestly class.” He was talking about the priestly class itself, the intellectual aristocracy, many of whom were atheists and some of whom came to think of themselves as “free souls,” liberated from both religion and morality.

Nietzsche had no sooner made that pronouncement than public confirmation of it began to appear in the fin-de-siècle movement...
celebrated by such “esthetes” and “decadents,” as they proudly described themselves, as Oscar Wilde and Aubrey Beardsley. It is interesting that, from the beginning, the movement was known under that French label, as if to suggest how alien it was to England—rather like the “French flu” or the “French pox.” A character in a novel of the period remarks, in an execrable accent, “It’s fang-de-seeacle that does it, my dear, and education and reading French.”

The movement was well named; it did not survive the siècle. The Yellow Book expired in 1897, Beardsley died the following year, and Wilde died in exile (appropriately in France) in 1900. In his last and perhaps best play, The Importance of Being Earnest, Wilde delivered himself of one of those witticisms that was possibly truer than the author himself knew. “I hope,” a young woman says, “you have not been leading a double life, pretending to be wicked and really being good all the time. That would be hypocrisy.”

It was a nice accident of history that saw Queen Victoria die in January 1901, so that the end of the reign coincided with the start of the new century. The end of the reign and, for an influential group of intellectuals—the new priestly class—the end of Victorianism. The High Priests of Bloomsbury were not hypocritical in pretending to be more wicked than they were; their only hypocrisy, recent scholarship has shown, was in concealing from the public the wickedness they flaunted in private. After the death of Leslie Stephen (the Victorian paterfamilias of Bloomsbury), his children moved from respectable Kensington to what was to become the new Bohemia, Bloomsbury. “Everything was going to be new,” his daughter pronounced. “Everything was going to be different. Everything was on trial.” Later, Virginia Stephen (Virginia Woolf, as we now know her) assigned a different date to that new era. “In or about December 1910,” she pronounced with remarkable assurance, “human character changed.”

December 1910 was the date of the Post-Impressionist exhibit (organized by another member of the clan, Roger Fry) that so dramatically altered the artistic sensibilities of her generation. It was also, as Virginia Woolf saw it, the time when a new ethic was beginning to emerge to complement the new aesthetic. Just as art now appeared to be autonomous, dependent on no external reality but only on the vision and imagination of the artist, so the character of the artist (or of the writer, or of any other person with superior sensibility) was seen as autonomous, self-contained, not subject to the judgment of others nor bound by any sense of “obligation to others.”

The conventional idea, Virginia Woolf declared, of “living for others, not for ourselves,” was intended for “timid natures who dare not allow their souls free play.” Bloomsbury was made of sterner
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stuff. Later, one of its founding fathers described its basic tenet. “We repudiated entirely,” Maynard Keynes wrote, “customary morals, conventions and traditional wisdom. We were, that is to say, in the strict sense of the term, immoralists.”

“Everything was on trial,” Virginia Woolf had said. What was mainly on trial was Victorian morals and manners. Another member of Bloomsbury, its most flamboyant one, had the audacious idea of putting on trial some of the most eminent Victorians—and by implication Victorianism as such. *Eminent Victorians* was published in 1918. A half century earlier, that title could have been used and understood in all sincerity. When Lytton Strachey used it, no one could mistake its ironic intent.

Strachey made no secret of his purpose or his method. Ordinary history, he explained in his preface, “proceeded by the direct method of scrupulous narration.” The historian of the Victorian age had to adopt a “subtler strategy”:

> He will attack his subject in unexpected places; he will fall upon the flank, or the rear; he will shoot a sudden, revealing searchlight into obscure recesses, hitherto undivined. He will row out over that great ocean of material, and lower down into it, here and there, a little bucket, which will bring up into the light of day some characteristic specimen, from those far depths, to be examined with a careful curiosity.

Strachey concluded his preface with the familiar adage—“Je n’impose rien; je ne propose rien; j’expose.”

The eminent Victorians Strachey chose to expose were eminent in different fields. Cardinal Manning was an eminent ecclesiastic; Florence Nightingale an eminent social reformer; Dr. Thomas Arnold an eminent educator; General Gordon an eminent soldier and patriot. They were all eminences and, more to the point, heroes. Strachey’s intention was to belittle and disparage them—demystify them, we say today; deheroize would be more accurate. In each case what passed as heroism Strachey interpreted as megalomania, a ruthless drive for self-aggrandizement.

It is interesting that in seeking out the defects which would belie their heroism—in dipping his bucket into the depths of that murky sea—Strachey never came up with the two “dirty secrets” that a muck-raking biographer would look for today: money and sex. Drunkenness, yes, and vanity, and willfulness, and irrationality, and physical flaws. But not financial gain and not sexual misconduct. If there was anything sexually scandalous about them, Strachey intimated, it was either their celibacy, as in the case of Manning and Nightingale, or
their conspicuous normality, as in the case of Dr. Arnold, who fulfilled
his marital duties all too faithfully, as the existence of his 10 children
testified. (It is not surprising that there is no mention of Gordon’s
reputed homosexuality; that might have required Strachey to have
presented him in a more favorable light.)

Apart from their megalomania, the one flaw they had in common
was their weakness for religion. They were all religious to a fault.
Cardinal Manning might be forgiven for this; it was, after all, his job
to be religious, although he went beyond the call of duty by believing
what he preached. The others not only professed to believe when
they had no obligation to do so; they actually did believe. Strachey’s
wicked comment about Florence Nightingale is often quoted: “She
felt towards Him [God] as she might have felt towards a glorified
sanitary engineer: ... she seems hardly to distinguish between the
Deity and the Drains.” But Strachey was even more distressed by
her truly religious feelings, her “mysterious moods of mysticism,”
her “morbid longings” to find peace in God.

To “expose,” as Strachey saw it, the religious proclivities of
these eminent Victorians was to expose, and undermine, the very
foundations of their morality. It was also to expose them as frauds—
not in the sense that they were hypocritical about their religion; the
trouble was not that they were hypocritical but that they were true
believers. What was fraudulent, Strachey suggested, was their claim
(or the claim made on their behalf) that they were heroes. Heroes
could not be religious any more than a heroine such as Florence
Nightingale could be seen—as Strachey depicted her—putting a
dog’s wounded paw in a splint.

There were, in fact, no heroes in Strachey’s scheme of things,
because the heroic virtues were as suspect as all the other virtues.
And not only heroic virtues but also heroic attitudes—the manners
and morals, as it were, of heroism. For Strachey, religion, public
service, civic education, patriotism were absurd in themselves. But
they were even more absurd in the manner of their pursuit—in the
passionate, extravagant way heroes were wont to pursue them. And
they were more absurd still in the manner of their reception, the
respect accorded them by a credulous and deferential public.

Early in the Queen’s reign, another eminent Victorian (not sati-
rized by Strachey, but he could well have been) wrote the classic
defense of heroism. “Society,” Thomas Carlyle wrote, “is founded on
hero-worship ... [the] reverence and obedience due to men really
great and wise.” Like Nietzsche anticipating the time when morality
would have become “a problem” in England, so Carlyle anticipated
the time when the heroic virtues would become problematic. Indeed
he thought that time had already come. “Show our critics,” he wrote in 1840, “a great man, a Luther for example, they begin to what they call “account” for him; not to worship him, but to take the dimensions of him—and bring him out to be a little kind of man!” It is not clear which critics Carlyle had in mind—perhaps John Stuart Mill or Jeremy Bentham, those petitifogging, “dry-as-dust” rationalists. But it could easily have been Strachey. This is not to say that Carlyle saw no flaws in his heroes; on the contrary, he expected a hero's flaws, his vices, to be as large, as heroic, as his virtues. When the biographer of Sir Walter Scott was criticized for being indiscreet, for recounting episodes that made Scott appear (so the critics said) unheroic, Carlyle came to the biographer's defense. And he took the occasion to mock the conventional biography: “How delicate, decent, is the English biography, bless its mealy mouth.”

In deriding the mealy-mouthed biography, Carlyle did not mean to condone the Strachey type of biography which poor-months or bad-months its subjects, reducing the hero to a “little kind of man.” Still less would he have condoned the present fashionable genre of history that disdains any type of heroism or eminence, that reads history “from below,” as it is said, celebrating not individual heroes, not great men (or even great women) but rather le petit peuple, the “common men,” the “anonymous masses.”

One of the paradoxes of the new mode of history is that it professes to celebrate the common man while demeaning the virtues usually associated with the common man. If Strachey's Eminent Victorians is in disfavor today, it is not so much because it is unscholarly history as because it is “elitist” history. It disparages the manners and morals of eminent Victorians but says nothing about the manners and morals of ordinary Victorians. It is, Marxists would say, insufficiently “critical”; it demystifies the heroic virtues and not the bourgeois ones.

Such values as thrift, prudence, diligence, temperance, and self-reliance were indeed bourgeois ones. But they were also classical ones; they were hardly unfamiliar to the Greeks. And they were also religious ones; it was, after all, from the Jews and Christians that the Puritans derived them.

They were working-class values too: ones aspired to (not always successfully, but then all of us fall short of our aspirations) by the “respectable” Victorian laboring classes.

“Respectable”—there's another Victorian word that makes us uncomfortable, which we can scarcely utter without audible quotation marks. An influential school of historians now interprets the idea of respectability, and all the virtues connected with it, as instruments of
"social control"—the means by which the middle class, the ruling class, sought to dominate the working class: a subtle and covert way of conducting the class struggle.

Some early applications of the social-control thesis were plausible. The invention of the modern clock, it has been said, made possible habits such as promptness, regularity, and rationality, which were useful for the so-called work-discipline or time-discipline of an industrial, capitalist economy. Even here, however, the thesis has sometimes been stretched to the point where it seems as if the clock had been invented for that very purpose (this a couple of centuries before the emergence of industrialism and capitalism!); as if the rural economy knew no form of work-discipline; and as if nature did not have its own rhythms which can be no less compelling and oppressive.

But there is a more serious flaw at the heart of this social-control thesis. This is the assumption that the Puritan ethic was little more than a work ethic designed to "moralize" the new industrial proletariat and imbue the workers with middle-class values that would make them more productive members of society. Such alien values, so this argument runs, were imposed upon the workers by a middle class that enjoyed a cultural as well as an economic and political "hegemony," and were accepted by a working class led astray by "false consciousness," unable to recognize its own true, indigenous values and interests.

It is not clear what these indigenous values are supposed to have been—communal, presumably, rather than individualistic, and cooperative rather than competitive. One historian has said that it is only through the "distorting lens of middle-class aspirations to gentility" that the idea of self-help, for example, can be understood. But does this mean that this idea, the value of self-reliance and independence, was alien to Victorian workers, in which case are we to understand that dependency was congenial to them? And what of the other alien, middle-class values supposedly imposed on them? Is it to be assumed that workers were naturally indolent rather than industrious, or profligate rather than frugal, or drunk rather than sober? And if these middle-class values reflected the interests of capitalist society, does it mean that a socialist society would embrace a proletarian set of values—indolence, perhaps, or profligacy, or intemperance?

It must be remembered that the social-control thesis is advanced not by reactionary historians but by radical ones who are avowedly sympathetic to the working class, who, as one put it in an often quoted passage, want to rescue the poor and oppressed from the "enormous condescension of posterity."

One wonders, however, which is more condescending: to
attribute to the Victorian working class a radically different set of values from those professed by the rest of society, or to assume that most workers essentially shared these so-called middle-class values, and that if they sometimes failed to abide by them it was because of the difficult circumstances of life or the natural weaknesses of the human condition. Is it more condescending to describe these workers as the victims of “false consciousness” or to credit them with a true consciousness of their values and interests? False consciousness is a crucial part of the social-control thesis, because the radical historian has to account for the inconvenient fact that a great many workers seemed to view their own lives through that “distorting lens” of middle-class values. And it was not only the so-called labor aristocracy (as it is sometimes claimed) that suffered from this myopia; lesser skilled and unskilled workers did so as well, perhaps because they had most to lose if they lost their respectability.

These values, moreover, were consciously shared by the most radical British workers. The memoirs of those involved in Chartism, a working-class reform movement, provide poignant testimony to their efforts to remain hard-working, sober, frugal, clean, in short, respectable, despite all temptations to the contrary. There were groups within the movement—the Temperance Chartists and Education Chartists—who made this their main concern. Indeed the central tenet of Chartism, universal suffrage, was based on just this claim to respectability. The argument for political equality depended on the argument for natural equality, a common human nature—common values, aspirations, and capacities.

As for those middle-class British reformers—educators, political economists, and politicians who encouraged these values among the working classes—how condescending were they? Was it condescending on their part to credit the poor with the values that they prized so highly for themselves—and not only the values but the ability and will to fulfill these values? Were they patronizing the poor when they applied to them a single standard of values rather than the double standard that had prevailed so long—a double standard, incidentally, implicit in the social-control thesis? So far from keeping the working classes in a condition of inferiority, that single standard was an invitation to economic betterment, social advance, and, ultimately, political equality. It was also an attempt to bridge the “two nations” barrier dramatized by Benjamin Disraeli. A single standard of values was conducive to a single culture, a single society—and a single nation.

To the degree Victorians succeeded in “bourgeoisifying” the ethos, they also democratized it. That ethos was not, to be sure, an exalted or heroic one. Hard work, sobriety, frugality, foresight—
these were modest, mundane virtues, even lowly ones. But they were virtues within the capacity of everyone; they did not assume any special breeding, or status, or talent, or valor, or grace—or even money. They were common virtues within the reach of common people. They were, so to speak, democratic virtues.

They were also liberal virtues. By putting a premium on ordinary virtues attainable by ordinary people, the ethos located responsibility within each individual. It was no longer only the exceptional, the heroic individual who was the master of his fate; every individual could be his own master. So far from promoting social control, the ethos had the effect of promoting self-control. This was at the heart of Victorian morality: self-control, self-help, self-reliance, self-discipline. A liberal society, the Victorians believed, depended upon a moral citizenry. The stronger the voluntary exercise of morality on the part of each individual—the more internalized that morality—the weaker need be the external, coercive instruments of the state. For the Victorians, morality served as a substitute for law, just as law was a substitute for force.

And so, in a sense, manners were a substitute for morals. Or perhaps not quite a substitute; that puts it too strongly. The Victorians were no Utopians. They were acutely aware of the frailties of human nature, and thus of the need for whatever inducements or sanctions—social, religious, legal, ultimately physical—might be required to encourage virtue and discourage vice. A better image is that of the continuum. Manners were placed in a continuum with morals, as morals were with laws, and laws, as a last resort, with force. It was that great realist, and moralist, Machiavelli, who said, "For as laws are necessary that good manners may be preserved, so there is need of good manners that laws may be maintained." And it was another great realist and moralist, the mentor of so many eminent Victorians, Edmund Burke, who wrote:

Manners are of more importance than laws. Upon them, in a great measure, the laws depend. The law touches us but here and there, and now and then. Manners are what vex or soothe, corrupt or purify, exalt or debase, barbarise or refine us, by a constant, steady, uniform, insensible operation, like that of the air we breathe in. They give their whole form and colour to our lives. According to their quality, they aid morals, they supply them, or they totally destroy them.
A classic photo of the 1948-49 Berlin Airlift. "Just as a trickle of water can, if sufficiently prolonged, wear down the stoutest rock," wrote The New Yorker's E. J. Kahn in May 1949, "so the airlift, with its unostentatious but ceaseless trickle of flights, carved a hole in the Soviet blockade of [West] Berlin." A week later, Stalin ended his effort to starve the city into submission.
Berlin

During the summer of 1948, the future of West Berlin seemed to hang in the balance. On June 24, Josef Stalin finally shut off ground access to the city. Western officials wondered how ordinary West Berliners would react. An article in a local newspaper, the Telegraf, soon gave the answer: “What does the man in the street say? ‘This too will pass’... He turns up his coat collar, presses his hat farther down on his forehead, and tramps home... Nobody complains; everybody grits his teeth.” Here, Neil Spitzer tells how the Cold War split Berlin, and how West Berliners and the Western allies managed, in the face of Soviet pressures, to keep their half of the city free, democratic, and lively. And Josef Ernst describes life on both sides of the Berlin Wall today.

DIVIDING A CITY

by Neil Spitzer

In 1899, Walther Rathenau, industrialist and future statesman, returned to his native Berlin after having long worked elsewhere in Germany and abroad. Enjoying the company of the court aristocrats who flourished in Berlin under Kaiser Wilhelm II, Rathenau was struck by the city’s newly acquired splendor. With a population of 2.7 million, the capital of the young German Reich had become not only Europe’s third largest metropolis (after London and Paris) but also a symbol of economic and military might, of European culture and civilization.

“We had become both rich and powerful,” Rathenau wrote at the time, “and we wanted to show it to the world... The feverish life of a great city, hungry for realities, intent on technical success and so-called achievement, clamorous for festivals, prodigies, pageants, and such-like futilities... all this produced a sort of combination of Rome and Byzantium, Versailles and Potsdam.”

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Berlin’s heyday would be short-lived. Germany’s defeat in World War I sparked a revolution that brought down the Reich in 1918, giving way to the fragile Weimar Republic (1919–33). During the “Golden Twenties,” Berlin’s cultural life would be as creative and stimulating as its politics were ominous (Rathenau, then Germany’s foreign minister, would be assassinated by extremists in 1922). This was the Berlin, as historian Peter Gay has put it, of “Gropius’ buildings, Kandinsky’s abstractions, Grosz’s cartoons, and Marlene Dietrich’s legs.” But Adolf Hitler’s ascent to power would bring the Nazis and another ruinous World War.

Today, Berlin’s aura is characterized less by grandeur than by what the Germans call Wahnsinn, or “madness.” Split through its center by a concrete wall, Berlin, perhaps more than any other city in the world, expresses the absurd and tragic dimensions of human endeavor.

The isolation and division of Berlin is made all the more bizarre by the fact that no one deliberately planned it that way. For reasons of administrative convenience, representatives of the United States, Britain, France, and the USSR decided, during World War II, to occupy Berlin jointly after the Reich fell. But as the wartime alliance crumbled and the Cold War intensified, Berlin found itself at the epicenter of East-West conflict. The city became the focus of Stalin’s efforts to drive the West out of Central Europe, and of the Westerners’ determination to stand firm. Just as an Iron Curtain divided postwar Europe, along a line running “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic,” as Winston Churchill said in 1946, so too would it sunder Berlin.

I

THE BIG THREE

It might be said that the division of Berlin began in early 1943. By then, the Allies, having witnessed Germany’s failure to conquer the Soviet Union or to block the Anglo-American landings in North Africa, could begin to contemplate the fall of the Third Reich. In March of that year, Churchill’s foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, visited Washington to discuss with President Franklin D. Roosevelt what the great powers would do with Germany once the Nazis were defeated. It was crucial, remarked White House aide Harry Hopkins, to reach an understanding quickly “as to which armies would be where and what kind of administration [in Germany] should be developed.”

Several different notions circulated at the time. In September 1943,
George Grosz's oil painting, Cafe. With his caricatures of weary prostitutes, smug businessmen, and one-legged war veterans, Grosz produced the kind of art-as-social-criticism for which Berlin became famous during the 1920s. His work, said one French critic, represented "the most definitive catalogue of man's depravity in all history."

the U.S. State Department recommended against total Allied occupation of Germany. "Combined contingents," a State Department report suggested, should take over only the nation's "key strategic centers." One British plan would have dispersed the various occupation units in an "interlarded" fashion throughout the conquered territory—a plan that would have preserved Germany's territorial unity. The U.S. War Department, however, opposed the scheme because it would have created serious supply and communications problems.

In any case, Eden, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov met at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943, where they signed a protocol establishing an inter-Allied European Advisory Commission (EAC). The commission's assignment: to spell out how the Big Three would occupy Germany once the Reich fell.

The EAC first convened at London's elegant Lancaster House on January 14, 1944. Sir William Strang, the British delegate, submitted a proposal developed by the Attlee Committee (named after Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee). According to the plan, an Allied Control Council, based in Berlin, would run Germany as a single unit. But for administrative reasons, they would divide Germany into three different occupation zones, in the way that New York City is divided into boroughs.
Under this arrangement, the Soviet Union would control a large eastern zone, which accounted for 40 percent of the nation's prewar territory, and 36 percent of its population.

The British, under the Attlee proposal, would control northwestern Germany, which included the key North Sea ports of Bremen and Hamburg, and the Ruhr, Germany's prime industrial area. The plan, finally, awarded the United States a region covering the Saar and southern Germany. Berlin, of course, lay 110 miles within the proposed Soviet zone. But the Allies did not want any one nation to control Germany's historic capital. Thus, the three countries' garrisons would each occupy one of three sectors in a special "Berlin area."

The EAC delegates received the Attlee plan favorably. The "glum and serious" (in Stalin's words) Soviet representative, Fedor Tarasovich Gousev, accepted this scheme without major complaints. The U.S. delegate, former New Hampshire governor John G. Winant, also viewed the plan favorably, but his superiors back in Washington did not. Roosevelt had no objections to the proposed Soviet zone. But he insisted that U.S. forces occupy the northwest, not the southwest. The United States, he reckoned, would need the North Sea ports of Bremen and Hamburg to redeploy its troops to invade Japan. Moreover, the southwestern zone would not permit direct access to American occupation forces; to get there, U.S. supply trains would have to transit war-torn France.

A Conciliatory Approach

Neither Churchill nor Roosevelt would budge on the zonal dispute. Indeed, when the Allies first signed the protocol on the occupation of Germany and Berlin on September 12, 1944, they did so without designating which zones the United States or Britain would occupy. However, Roosevelt and Churchill, meeting in Quebec several weeks later, would settle the matter. Roosevelt agreed to let the British occupy the coveted northwest zone. In exchange, Churchill granted the Americans control of the North Sea ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, and guaranteed U.S. transit rights through the British zone. Even so, the British and the Americans quarreled over various definitions of "control."

Ironically, the U.S. and British negotiators in London paid little attention to the issue that would loom large during the Cold War: the right of the Western allies to travel through the Soviet zone of Germany, to and from the Western sectors of Berlin. At the time, Western access to Berlin did not appear to be a problem. According to U.S. negotiator Philip E. Mosely, the Soviet delegate, Gousev, had promised his interlocutors that "the presence of American and British forces in Berlin "of

*Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill formally approved their plans for the joint occupation of Germany at the Yalta Conference in February 1945—with one important change. They agreed that France would join in the occupation, and that its areas of occupation would be carved out of the Western zones of Germany and the Western sectors of Berlin.
course' carried with it all necessary facilities of access.”

In retrospect, U.S. and British policy-makers appear extraordinarily negligent in not having insisted upon specific transit rights to and from Berlin. But in 1944, the Western allies tended to assume the best about the Soviets. Indeed, the Soviet negotiators, observed Mosely, had taken a “moderate and conciliatory approach to the problem of how to deal with postwar Germany.” Besides, the whole arrangement was expected to be temporary. No one could imagine that the zonal boundaries would one day delineate the border between a (Communist) German Democratic Republic and a (democratic) Federal Republic of Germany. Roosevelt himself did not believe that American troops would stay in Europe much more than two years.

### Stopping at the Elbe

As Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, and their subordinates negotiated the future of Europe, the war raced toward its end. With the Germans struggling to defend their capital city, Stalin instructed the Red Army to stay put on the Oder River. Crossing the Rhine in the west, American troops, meanwhile, also had their eyes on Berlin. “From the day our invasion broke over the beaches of Normandy,” said General Walter Bedell Smith, the chief of staff to Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower, “the goal of every Allied soldier had been . . . to seal the defeat of Nazi Germany by seizing the capital of the Reich itself.”

But Eisenhower was not keen on taking Berlin first, even though the capital was within reach of the advancing Anglo-American forces. Such an assault, said General Omar Bradley, commander of the U.S. 12th Army Group, might cost 100,000 lives—“a pretty stiff price to pay,” he added, “for a prestige objective, especially when we’ve got to fall back [into the zones of occupation] and let the other fellow take over.” Hence, Eisenhower informed Stalin that he would direct his main thrust southward, toward Leipzig. That plan, Stalin replied, “entirely coincides with the plan of the Soviet High Command,” adding disingenuously that “Berlin has lost its former strategic importance.”

Churchill, however, was not pleased. “If [the Russians] take Berlin,” he cabled to Roosevelt on April 1, 1945, “will not their impression that they have been the overwhelming contributor to our common victory be unduly imprinted in their minds, and may this not lead them into a mood which will raise grave and formidable difficulties in the future? I therefore consider that from a political standpoint we should march as far east into Germany as possible, and that should Berlin be in our grasp we should certainly take it.”

Roosevelt and Eisenhower, however, could not be dissuaded. The Supreme Allied Commander ordered his Berlin-bound units to stop at the Elbe River, 53 miles from the city—which they did on April 11, 1945, the day before President Roosevelt died at Warm Springs, Geor-
Six days later, the Soviets launched their final offensive against Berlin. Deploying one million men in the attack, the Soviets demonstrated that, to them, Berlin had not "lost its former strategic importance." With the capital of his Reich under siege, Hitler and his mistress, Eva Braun, committed suicide in his Berlin bunker on April 30; the Germans surrendered on May 8, thus ending the fighting in Europe.

Allied bombing, and the desperate Battle for Berlin, in which some 100,000 Russians lost their lives, left Germany's capital prostrate. During the war, Berlin's population fell from 4.3 to 2.8 million; two-thirds of the city's surviving residents were women. Potsdamer Platz, Alexanderplatz, and other historic squares were littered with corpses lying atop heaps of rubble. One-fifth of all buildings were destroyed. There was no electricity, no gas, and one-third of the subway line was flooded. Food was scarce, forcing people to barter furs, carpets, and jewelry for potatoes, flour, and bacon.

"A more depressing sight than that of ruined buildings," wrote President Harry S. Truman, who saw Berlin during the Potsdam Conference of July 1945, "was the long, never-ending procession of old men, women, and children wandering aimlessly along the autobahn ... carrying, pushing, or pulling what was left of their belongings."

Ernst Reuter, West Berlin's anti-Communist mayor (1948-53), was an ex-party member; as a youth, he had even worked for the Bolsheviks in the USSR.
II

THE COLD WAR BEGINS

With Germany defeated, the Allies were in position to reconstruct Berlin. But how would this be done? How should a new city government and new political parties be established? How would labor unions be reorganized? Should there be free elections? What about a free press? The Allies, of course, had not settled such matters before the war’s end. The EAC had not addressed these questions; it had merely drafted an agreement outlining the Allied occupation.

Indeed, “The EAC agreements,” as political scientist Daniel J. Nelson has written, “were like a new house with no furniture in it.” “None of the Allies,” he observed, “seemed to have a clear idea of the kind of Europe which should result from Germany’s defeat.”

The Soviets, however, had thought more than a little about how to run Berlin. Even before the capitulation, Stalin had dispatched to Berlin a group of German Communists who had spent the war years in the Soviet Union. Walter Ulbricht led this “Committee for a Free Germany,” which was better known as the “Ulbricht Group.” “Our task,” Ulbricht explained, “will be to form the organs of self-government in Berlin. We will go into the various Berlin boroughs and select those anti-fascist elements [which support] the new German administration.”

Eager to get the city running as they saw fit, the Soviets tried to delay the entrance of U.S. and British forces. In June, the Soviets halted a Berlin-bound U.S. advance party 50 miles outside of the city; eventually, they would escort a trimmed-down entourage (about 200 men and 50 vehicles) through the metropolis.

“We went to Berlin in 1945,” observed Colonel Frank Howley, who commanded the advance party, “thinking of the Russians only as big, jolly, balalaika-playing fellows who drank prodigious quantities of vodka and liked to wrestle in the drawing room.” But Russian officers, he soon suspected, “had been briefed that we were their enemy, merely enjoying an armistice, and they regarded us as such.”

With the Americans and British absent from the city, the Soviets swiftly took control in Berlin. The Soviet Military Administration (SMAD) appointed a City Council to run day-to-day affairs. They set up a Communist-run police force, banking system, and trade union, as well as newspapers, radio stations, and a five-tier food rationing system; public officials could get as many as 2,485 calories a day—about twice as much as the elderly. Perhaps most important, the Soviets dismantled machinery from mills and factories and rounded up surviving livestock, all of which they shipped back to Mother Russia. By the time British and American forces entered Berlin in strength on July 4, 1945, they faced a
Communist-dominated city administration.

Soviet efforts to reshape Berlin in their own image, however, would not go unchallenged. When the Soviets tried to merge the Communist and Social Democratic parties into a majority Socialist Unity Party (SED), some Social Democrats rebelled and formed their own non-Communist Social Democratic Party (SPD). Berliners registered a powerful protest against the Soviet regime in the first postwar municipal elections, on October 20, 1946. The Social Democrats won 49 percent of the votes, the Christian Democrats 22 percent, and the Communists just 19.8 percent. On June 24, 1947, the Municipal Assembly elected an avowed anti-Communist, Ernst Reuter (SPD) as lord mayor of Greater Berlin. The Soviets, however, refused to let him take office.

Moscow managed to maintain the upper hand in its own sector of Berlin. The city's central government, or Magistrat, could not carry out its decisions in any sector without the approval of the local Allied commander. Karl Mautner, then serving as U.S. liaison officer to the Berlin City Government, recalled how the Soviets kept pressure on Berlin's non-Communist parties: “The CDU [Christian Democratic Union] chairman, Walther Schreiber, was no longer permitted to attend meetings at CDU headquarters in East Berlin because of his ‘anti-Soviet’ attitude... SPD meetings in the Soviet sector were banned or the scheduled meeting place suddenly became unavailable... Mrs. Ella Kay, [the elected] mayor of Prenzlauer Berg [in the Soviet sector] was dismissed on the grounds that she was ‘incapable of providing the people with firewood for the coming winter.’”

The Fulton Speech

By this time, the Western allies were no longer surprised. The Soviets were merely doing in Berlin what they were doing across the continent: implanting Communist regimes. Moscow would set up “People's Governments” in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. By March 5, 1946, when Winston Churchill made an appearance with President Truman at Fulton, Missouri, a clear pattern of Soviet behavior had already emerged. Now the leader of Britain's parliamentary opposition, Churchill said that:

A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory... From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Beyond that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere... this is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up.
From then on, Washington would become progressively less conciliatory in dealing with the Soviets. George F. Kennan, head of the State Department's Policy Planning staff, penned a now-famous article in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs that would reflect Washington's new view of Moscow. "It is clear," Kennan wrote, under the pseudonym "X," "that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."

III
THE BERLIN BLOCKADE

The Western allies would employ "containment" not only in Southern Europe* but also in the Western sectors of Berlin. Finding that they could no longer collaborate with the Soviets, representatives from the United States, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg met in London on February 23, 1948, to begin planning the eventual merger of the three Western zones of Germany into a Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and the introduction of a new currency there. At the March 20, 1948, Allied Control Council meeting in Berlin, Soviet delegate Vassily Sokolovsky demanded to know what had transpired at the London conference. When the allies refused to tell him, Sokolovsky stalked out.

The Russians retaliated by imposing a "mini-blockade" of West Berlin, interfering with truck and rail deliveries to and from the city. Undaunted, the Western allies introduced a new currency, the Deutschmark, into their three zones of Germany on June 20. The Soviets responded by imposing their own currency reform, valid for the Soviet zone of Germany and all four sectors of Berlin. The Western allies retaliated by introducing the new Deutschmark into their three sectors of the metropolis.

On June 23, Communist-led demonstrators, some carrying red banners, prevented the non-Communist City Assembly from convening on time at City Hall, in the Soviet sector. Inside, they crowded the City Hall chambers; outside, they broadcast speeches by Walter Ulbricht over a loudspeaker. Assemblymen demanded added police protection, but the police never arrived. A headline in the Communist newspaper, Neues Deutschland, would later complain: "Majority of the Magistrat, Against All Reason, Favors Double Currency and Customs Barriers in Berlin—

*Under the "Truman Doctrine," in 1947 the United States gave Greece and Turkey $400 million in military aid to offset Soviet pressures there.
THE 1948–49 AIRLIFT

When Josef Stalin first imposed a blockade of West Berlin on June 24, 1948, public officials in Washington, London, and Paris were not optimistic about maintaining a foothold in the city. After all, the Soviets, as U.S. Army Secretary Kenneth Royall put it, “have most of the trump cards.” Indeed, they controlled access by water, road, and rail to the old German capital. Nevertheless, the 6,500 British, American, and French garrison troops and their dependents would remain, Royall said, “until the Soviets make life unbearable for even a small group.”

What could the Western allies do? Various plans of action were proposed at the time. Royall suggested to General Lucius D. Clay, the military governor in the U.S. zone of Germany, that, for safety’s sake, he evacuate American dependents from Berlin; Royall also wanted Clay to slow the introduction of currency reform (which had precipitated the blockade) in the Western zones of Germany and the Western sectors of Berlin.

But Clay refused to consider either move. Given the U.S. monopoly on the atomic bomb, he believed that the Soviets would not maintain the blockade by force; he proposed that the allies put together a convoy of about 200 trucks, supported by a U.S. Army regiment, to run the blockade along the Helmstedt–Berlin autobahn. The group would be “directed to clear all obstacles and to avoid shooting unless resisted by force.”

The British, however, considered Clay’s plan reckless. “If you do that, it’ll be war,” warned Britain’s General Sir Brian Robertson. He urged that the allies supply Berlin by air. Clay, in turn, thought it “absolutely impossible” to feed 2.5 million West Berliners with an airlift. But officials back in Washington sided with Robertson. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, feared that Clay’s proposed foray might “shift the stage from one of local friction to that of major war.” The Chiefs saw what the Germans would later call a Luftbrücke, or “air bridge,” as a safe way to buy time.

Clay had no choice but to go along. “I may be the craziest man in the world,” he told Berlin’s Lord Mayor-elect Ernst Reuter, “but I’m going to try the experiment of feeding this city by air.” President Harry S. Truman approved the decision and vowed to keep West Berliners supplied, “even if it takes every Piper Cub in the United States.”

“Operation Vittles” began on June 26. The Royal Air Force, Clay figured, could provide only 150 planes. And the French, who were busy fighting Ho Chi Minh in faraway Indochina, could contribute ground personnel but no aircraft. The United States had only 102 transports in Europe. Thus, the allies initially would have to rely on several hundred relatively small planes, such as the two-engined Douglas C-47, to carry most of the cargo. These “Gooney Birds,” as they were known, lumbered along at 160 miles per hour, and carried just three tons each. Not surprisingly, the East Berlin Communist daily, Neues Deutschland declared: “The Allies are leaving.”

The Luftbrücke started slowly. But larger U.S. aircraft, such as the C-54
transport, soon joined in. Before long, allied planes, which together flew as many as 1,000 daily sorties, were bringing 8,000 to 9,000 tons of supplies (everything from bags of coal and flour to vitamin tablets and typewriter parts) into the city every 24 hours. Poor weather and occasional Soviet harassment sometimes made the one-hour, 40-minute flights hazardous. On "Black Friday," August 13, 1948, a ceiling of fog descended over the city's rooftops, causing three crash landings near Tempelhof Airport. From then on, pilots who broke their flight patterns or missed their landing approaches were instructed to circle back to western Germany.

The adequacy of the Luftbrücke relied, in the end, on ordinary West Berliners. Consider, for example, how they shared electricity—which was severely limited after the Soviets cut off all utilities running from East to West Berlin. Under a rationing scheme, which allotted energy supplies to vital industries first, West Berliners would receive one or two hours of electricity daily, usually at night. In practice, each family would leave a single switch turned on in the evening, and when a light bulb lit up, they would do whatever had to be done. For instance, the Schmidts might use their one hour of electricity to boil potatoes for several other households, the Webers to cook string beans.

In the end, the Berlin airlift was a clearcut British-American success, even though 65 men perished, most of them in accidents. Total U.S. expenditures: about $300 million. For the Communists, the blockade, which Stalin lifted on May 12, 1949, was a Cold War fiasco. The Soviet leader had prodded "the capitalist world with the tip of a bayonet," Nikita Khrushchev later observed, but the confrontation had been "badly thought out."
BERLIN

For Chaos, Hunger, and Unemployment.”

The first of the three major Cold War-Berlin crises began at 11 P.M. on June 23, when the East German (ADN) news agency’s teletype machine at the British sector newspaper, Der Tag, began to clatter: “Transport Division of the Soviet Military Administration, is compelled to halt all passenger and freight traffic to and from Berlin tomorrow at 0600 hours because of technical difficulties.” Moscow also cut off the flow of electric current, coal, food, and other supplies from the surrounding territory to West Berlin. The Berlin Blockade was on.

With this move, Stalin apparently believed he was delivering an ultimatum to the citizens of West Berlin: Either submit to Communist rule or starve. Moscow defended the blockade, saying that the Western powers, by setting up separate administrations in West Germany, had undermined not only the four-power control commission but also their right to participate in the administration of Berlin.

The Soviets did not imagine that the 2.5 million West Berliners would be able to survive a blockade. Few Westerners did either. The population would need some 4,000 tons of supplies daily to stay alive. But West Berlin, emplaced deep within Soviet-controlled territory, had become a Cold War symbol of the vigor of Western democracy, and a crucial place for the Western powers to make a stand. As General Lucius D. Clay, the military governor of the U.S. zone in Germany told Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall: “We have lost Czechoslovakia. Norway is threatened. We retreat from Berlin. When Berlin falls, western Germany will be next. If we mean . . . to hold Europe against Communism, we must not budge.”

A Worldwide Embarrassment

But rhetoric alone would not enable West Berliners to survive. After much debate, the Western allies decided to supply their sectors of the city by air—a measure, they believed, that could only last for about 30 days. But British and U.S. transports, leaving every few minutes from nine different airfields in their zones of Germany, delivered enough coal, food, and medical supplies to sustain the West Berliners indefinitely (see box, p. 110). The longer the “air bridge” worked, the less pressed were the Western allies to consider making concessions to the Soviets.

Recognizing that the blockade had failed to expel the Western allies from Berlin, and suffering considerable worldwide embarrassment, Stalin began looking for a way out of the stalemate. The Soviet leader quietly told Kingsbury Smith of the International News Service on January 31, 1949, that he could see “no obstacles to lifting transport [and trade] restrictions” if the Western allies agreed to postpone the formation of a West German state, and if the Council of Foreign Ministers met to consider the German problem as a whole.

Stalin’s conditions were not met, but after several months of secret
negotiations, Moscow agreed to lift the blockade on May 12, 1949. West Berliners, General Clay said, “had earned their right to freedom,” and, he added, thus “atoned for their failure to repudiate Hitler when such repudiation on their part might have stopped his rise to power.”

The airlift, however, did not solve the political impasse over Berlin. Soviet agents continued to disrupt the City Assembly at City Hall. Unable to conduct business, non-Communist members of the assembly repaired to the Technical University in the British sector on September 8. Their Communist colleagues stayed behind, claiming to run the entire city. On November 30, 1948, delegates from the Kulturbund, the Free German Trade Union Federation, and other Communist organizations met at the Admirals-Palast and drafted a new constitution that they said would be the sole legitimate basis for governing Berlin.

The Marienfelde Experience

Now Berlin had two de facto governments, each of which could make good its claims only in its half of the city. The Soviet and the Western sectors of Berlin would develop under opposing ideologies. East Berlin and West Berlin each became closely tied to (but officially separate from) the German Democratic Republic (East Germany, or the GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany, or the FRG), both of which were created in 1949.

East and West Berlin would not easily coexist. After a slow start (due to the blockade), West Berlin made stunning economic progress, thanks, in part, to Marshall Plan aid. The value of its exports rose from $3 million in 1950 to $30 million in 1954; by that year local industrial production had returned to about 70 percent of its prewar level. Once again, shoppers and tourists crowded West Berlin’s now-refurbished boulevard, the Kurfürstendamm. East Berlin, from which the Soviets had stripped much manufacturing equipment, lagged behind. For East Berlin’s workers, wages were low and hours were long. A pound of butter cost 10 marks (then, about $2.50), a pound of coffee, 75 marks ($18.75); new clothing was scarce.

For East Berlin officials, the presence of affluent, brightly-lit West Berlin made it difficult to generate popular zeal for the Communist New Age. West Berlin’s newspapers published photos of East Berliners shopping in West Berlin’s most fashionable stores. Savings-minded Westerners crossed into East Berlin, where they traded West German marks for cheap East German marks, and proceeded to clear the shelves in East Berlin’s Handelsorganisationen, or state stores.

Most humiliating to Walter Ulbricht’s regime was the unrelenting exodus of East German citizens—most of them young and well-educated—to the West, via West Berlin. During the 1950s, the trip was neither expensive nor dangerous. Residents of Leipzig or Potsdam left Ulbricht’s “Communist Workers’ Paradise” merely by taking a train to
East Berlin, then boarding a subway car to West Berlin. There, they would make their way to the Marienfelde Refugee Center, where they received food, temporary shelter, and, presumably, a schedule of airline flights from Tempelhof Airport to the destination of their choice in the Free World—often Hamburg, Frankfurt, Paris, or London.

The East German regime tried desperately to cut off the West-bound brain drain. They severed telephone communications between East and West Berlin, reduced the number of intracity crossing points, and constructed a 100-meter-wide “death strip” along the West German frontier. Still, by February 1953, some 30,000 East Germans, voting with their feet, were fleeing their homeland every month.

To increase factory output, the Ulbricht regime, on May 14, 1953, proposed a 10 percent increase in individual production quotas. For workers, theoretically the prime beneficiaries of communism, this was the last straw. On June 16, several thousand construction workers marched to the East German House of Ministries, where they demanded the government’s resignation and the holding of free elections.

Word of the protest spread rapidly. By the following morning, thousands of workers across the city had gone on strike. Demonstrators burned Communist Party banners along Unter den Linden (the city’s main boulevard), stormed local Communist Party headquarters, smashed

The East Berlin uprising of June 17, 1953: Soviet tanks were sent in not only to quash the revolt but also to deter West Berliners from joining the fray.
the windows of state grocery stores, and set fire to police stations. A
crowd of 50,000 demonstrators marched to the Brandenburg Gate and
tore down the Red flag flying above it. For a brief moment it appeared
that a popular revolt, the first in Eastern Europe since World War II,
would topple the Communist state.

Some Americans and West Germans wanted the new Eisenhower
administration to give the rebels a hand. But despite all of Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles’s earlier talk about “liberating” Eastern Eu-
rope from communism, Washington quickly decided not to intervene.
The United States, President Eisenhower declared, “planned no physical
intervention on the Soviet Union’s side of the Iron Curtain.”

Soviet tanks and troops quickly moved in. During the fighting, an
estimated 260 demonstrators lost their lives. East German courts sen-
tenced another 19 people to death. On June 18, West Berlin mayor
Ernst Reuter warned the Communists in a solemn radio broadcast that
“a people cannot be held in submission in the long run, with martial law
and bayonets and tanks.” The exodus to the West continued.

Throughout the 1950s, the impasse over Berlin proved a reason-
ably accurate barometer of the Cold War. At times, the crisis atmo-
sphere seemed to wane, only to wax again when East-West tensions rose
elsewhere. The next major Berlin confrontation would not occur until
1958, when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, perhaps emboldened by
Soviet accomplishments in space,* resolved to dislodge what he called “a
bone in Russia’s throat” once and for all.

IV

KHRUSHCHEV’S ULTIMATUM

The second Berlin crisis commenced on November 10, when Khru-
shchev told a visiting delegation from Poland that the right of the West-
ern powers to cross East German territory, to travel to and from West
Berlin, would have to be negotiated with the German Democratic Re-
public. The British, French, and Americans, Khrushchev said, had cre-
ated “a kind of state within a state,” in West Berlin, from which their
agents were conducting “subversive activity” against East Germany.
The Soviet leader went on: “The [West] German militarists are thinking
of swallowing up the German Democratic Republic, annexing Poland’s
western lands and staking claims on the territory of Czechoslovakia and
other Socialist countries.”

On November 27, Khrushchev issued a formal note to the Western
allies, which compared the Berlin situation to a “smoldering fuse that has

*The Soviet Union launched Sputnik I, the first artificial earth satellite, on October 4, 1957.
been connected to a powder keg.” He demanded that the Western allies evacuate Berlin, allowing the establishment of “an independent political unit—a free city, without any state.” Western failure to do so, the Soviet premier threatened, would simply result in the Soviets giving the East German government control over the access routes to Berlin. The Soviet leader added that the Kremlin would “make no changes in the present procedure for military traffic [between West Berlin and West Germany] for half a year.” Only “madmen,” Khrushchev concluded, “can go to the length of unleashing another world war over the preservation of privileges of occupiers in West Berlin.”

Whatever the actual intent of the Soviet note—its contents, when read in full, were highly ambiguous—President Eisenhower considered it an “ultimatum.” In its formal reply to the Soviets, Washington said that it “would not embark on discussion with the Soviet Union upon these questions under the menace [of an] ultimatum.” The U.S. press was a good deal more excited. The Soviet note, said the New York Times on November 29, “displays such contempt for truth and common intelligence and appeals so openly to brute force as to raise serious questions about the state of mind now ruling in the Kremlin.”

Over the next few months, Moscow would conduct a war of nerves as the “deadline” (May 27, 1959) to the six-month ultimatum approached. On Christmas Day 1958, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko warned the West that “any provocation in West Berlin,” could start “a big war, in the crucible of which millions upon millions of people would perish and which would bring devastation incomparably more serious than the last world war.” Perhaps sensing Western resolve, Khrushchev, on March 19, broke the stalemate by saying what the Western allies had been arguing all along: “I believe that the United States, Britain, and France do have lawful rights for their stay in Berlin. These rights ensue from the fact of German surrender as a result of our joint struggle against Nazi Germany.” The crisis faded.

The Three Essentials

As politicians in Washington, Paris, and London wondered if the world would survive the next Berlin crisis, West Berliners themselves enjoyed an ever-higher standard of living. “The last time I strolled down the Kurfürstendamm [in 1948], it had the vitality of a lump of putty,” wrote journalist John Gunther in 1960. “Hungry people stood in line for spoonfuls of naked corned beef out of a can; you could buy a girl for a cigarette. But today the fashionable area of Berlin has chic shops magnificently filled with merchandise from the ends of the earth.”

Thanks to Western affluence and freedom, East German emigration continued apace. In 1960, some 240,000 East German “visits” to the West were one-way trips—and about 80 percent of them were made through West Berlin. By now, both Khrushchev and Ulbricht were des-
East Germans at West Berlin’s Marienfelde Refugee Center, April 1961. More than half were under 25. The first words that an East German baby learned, went the joke, were “mama,” “papa,” and “Marienfelde.”

Sperately seeking ways to shut off the exodus. At a March 1961 Warsaw Pact meeting, Ulbricht proposed that his government seal off the “escape hatch” to the West by closing the border between East and West Berlin. But Khrushchev still favored his old “free city” plan, which he proposed to the new U.S. president, John F. Kennedy, at their Vienna summit meeting on June 4, 1961. Khrushchev insisted that a “peace treaty” be signed between the four allies and East Germany, making the Communist regime responsible for access to Berlin.

Kennedy rejected the Soviet proposal outright and declared that the Western allies would, if necessary, resort to military force to guarantee “three essentials”: continued allied presence in Berlin; unrestricted use of access routes to and from the city; and freedom for West Berliners to choose their own form of government. Khrushchev responded: “I want peace, but if you want war, then that is your problem.”

Kennedy’s West European allies encouraged him to hold the line with Moscow. “When Khrushchev summons you to change the status of Berlin, in other words, to hand the city over to him, stand fast!” French president Charles de Gaulle told Kennedy. “That is the most useful service you can render to the whole world, Russia included.” On July 25, Kennedy addressed Americans on television: “West Berlin,” the presi-
dent said, “has now become—as never before—the great testing place of Western courage and will.”

At this point, East Germans began to sense that something was about to happen. Since 1949, some 2.8 million of their compatriots—one in every six—had fled to the West. Those who had considered leaving reckoned that it was now or never. About 4,000 East Germans would flee during the last weekend of July. Surely, the Eastern Bloc could not sit idly by while the GDR, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted, was “hemorrhaging to death.”

THE WALL GOES UP

When the Warsaw Pact Council met August 3-5 in Moscow, Ulbricht pointed out to Khrushchev that Kennedy had limited his “three essentials” to the protection of West Berlin—thus signaling NATO’s intention of doing nothing as long as the East did not encroach on its rights. This time, the Warsaw Pact members saw little choice but to back Ulbricht’s plan to seal the escape hatch.

Shortly after midnight on August 13, 1961, East German soldiers, riding atop army trucks, streamed down Unter den Linden, Berlin’s majestic eight-lane boulevard. Peeling off at various points, the troops and workmen began erecting a 103-mile barrier, which ran through the center of Berlin and between West Berlin and East Germany. In Potsdamer Platz, where many East Berliners crossed into West Berlin every day, members of the People’s Police (Vopos) and border police (Grenpos) dug up cobbled stones to put up fenceposts, between which they strung barbed wire. The barrier ran down the middle of streets, through neighborhoods and school yards, along canals, following the border between the Soviet and the Western sectors of the city.

“The present situation regarding the traffic on the borders of West Berlin,” explained a Warsaw Pact communiqué, “is being used by FRG ruling quarters and intelligence agencies of the NATO countries for undermining the GDR’s economy...Through deceit, bribery, and blackmail, [Bonn] makes some unstable elements in the GDR leave for Western Germany. These deceived people are compelled to serve with the [West German Army], or are recruited to the intelligence agencies of different countries to be sent back to the GDR as spies and saboteurs.”

Berliners were outraged by the events that took place on the day they would later call Stacheldrahtsonntag, or “Barbed Wire Sunday.” By 11 a.m., some 2,000 people gathered on the Western side of the Brandenberp Gate, yelling “Put down your guns” and “Hang Ulbricht” (the East German leader) to the silent Vopos. Some East Berliners clambered over the Wall at weak spots; others swam to West Berlin.
across the Teltow Canal.

The East German move caught the CIA off guard and Western leaders on vacation. Charles de Gaulle was resting at his country home at Colombey-les-Deux-Églises. Britain’s prime minister, Harold Macmillan, was heading for a hunting holiday in northern England. And Kennedy was relaxing aboard his sailboat, The Marlin, off Hyannis Port, Massachusetts, when he was summoned by radio. Back on shore, Kennedy telephoned Secretary of State Dean Rusk in Washington.

Rusk told the president that neither the East Germans nor the Soviets had entered the Western sectors of Berlin. And they had not cut off access to West Berlin from West Germany. Indeed, this was an “internal security” measure, Rusk concluded, not “a play against Berlin.” How would Washington respond? U.S. troops in Berlin, the president knew, could not fire on the East German Vopos, tear down the new barrier, or otherwise intervene in the Soviet sector of Berlin without risking World War III. “Go to the ball game as you had planned,” Kennedy said to Rusk. “I am going sailing.”

Many West Berliners clamored for allied action against the East German regime. JFK dispatched a U.S. motorized column to West Berlin, but the Western leaders were simply not willing to risk a military confrontation by knocking down the barrier. Besides, had they done so, observed Howard Trivers, a U.S. diplomat, the East Germans could simply have “moved back 200 or 400 yards and commenced to rebuild the barbed-wire fence there.”

“Berliners raged and grieved,” British journalist Norman Gelb would later observe, “but what the Communists were doing to them and their city meant far less to the president than the awesome fact that he had been prepared for a war in which millions of people, including Americans, might have died, and suddenly it looked like it wasn’t going to happen—not yet.”

**Checkpoint Charlie**

President Kennedy assigned General Lucius Clay—who was beloved by Berliners as a hero of the 1948-49 airlift—to serve as his personal representative in Berlin. Shortly after arriving, the general found himself in a new confrontation. The showdown began when East German Vopos began demanding that U.S. officials show their passports when crossing into East Berlin in cars bearing American license plates. This represented a clear violation of Berlin’s four-power status: Under Allied protocols, Western officials had as much right to move freely about East Berlin as they did in West Berlin. If U.S. officials went along with these demands, they would be formally recognizing East German sovereignty over East Berlin.

Employing “get tough” tactics, General Clay, on October 25, stationed 10 U.S. M-48 Patton tanks and three armored personnel carriers...
John F. Kennedy in West Berlin on June 26, 1963. Overwhelmed by the warm reception, the president said to his speechwriter, Ted Sorensen: “We’ll never have another day like this as long as we live.”

on Friedrichstrasse at Checkpoint Charlie, the U.S. border crossing point at the new wall. Each time the East German Vopos stopped an official American vehicle, jeeps equipped with machine guns were sent in to escort the vehicle over the border, forcing the Vopos to step aside.

On October 27, the Soviets decided to meet intimidation with intimidation by positioning 10 tanks on their side of the checkpoint. With U.S. and Soviet tanks face to face, just 100 yards apart, millions of Americans wondered if the long-feared U.S.-Soviet clash over Berlin was finally at hand. But to Clay, the mere presence of Soviet armor in effect reaffirmed Western rights because it destroyed “the fiction that it was the East Germans who were responsible for trying to prevent Allied access to East Berlin.” After 16 hours, the Soviets broke the tension by withdrawing their tanks from Checkpoint Charlie, as did the Americans 30 minutes later.

The showdown at the checkpoint would mark the last time that Moscow and Washington would come close to an armed conflict in the old German capital. There are several reasons why. First, neither side seriously believed it was worth risking a war over Berlin. Second, the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962—perhaps the most dangerous crisis of the Cold War—forced leaders in Moscow and Washington to rethink the hazards of Soviet-American confrontation. Finally, with regard
to Berlin, the United States and its allies were willing to tolerate the status quo. West Berlin, after all, stood as a powerful symbol of the West’s determination to defend freedom, even where it was most vulnerable; and the Berlin Wall stood as concrete evidence that the Communist system was not only unworkable, but inhumane.

John F. Kennedy enjoyed one of the most spectacular moments of his presidency on June 26, 1963, when he addressed 150,000 cheering Berliners from a platform outside West Berlin’s City Hall:

There are many people in the world who really don’t understand—or say they don’t—what is the great issue between the free world and the Communist world. Let them come to Berlin. There are some who say that Communism is the wave of the future. Let them come to Berlin. And there are some who say in Europe and elsewhere, ‘we can work with the Communists.’ Let them come to Berlin...

All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin. And therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words ‘Ich bin ein Berliner.’

VI
A SIMPLE SOLUTION

The Berlin Wall would have many symbolic and many tangible (and paradoxical) effects on the city of Berlin, and on East-West relations.

The Wall upset the daily lives of many Berliners. Suddenly, 53,000 East Berliners who had been employed in West Berlin could not get to work. For them, travel became severely restricted, emigration nearly impossible. (Since 1961, only 5,000 East Germans and East Berliners have escaped illegally; at least 72 have died at the hands of the Vopos while trying.) The Wall also barred relatives who lived on opposite sides of the divide from visiting one another. For more than two years (from August 1961 to December 1963, when West Berliners were again allowed to visit East Berlin), the barricade separated parents from children, brother from brother.

But the Wall, ironically, also brought a certain calm. By ending the exodus of East Germans to the West, it made West Berlin less of an embarrassment to Ulbricht, and thus eased the threat of further Soviet attempts to drive the Western allies out of the city. It enabled Willy Brandt, West Germany’s chancellor (1969–74), to initiate Ospolitik—his policy of reconciliation with East Germany. In other words, “the Berlin Wall,” as Harvard’s Timothy W. Ryback has observed, provided “a simple solution to complex social, political and economic problems,” which explains why it “will remain in place for the foreseeable future.”
Finally, the Wall—or at least the political stability it helped produce—enabled the foreign ministers of France, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union to negotiate and sign the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin on June 3, 1972. The accord did not resolve the “Berlin problem”; it merely reaffirmed the wartime protocol. Under the agreement, the four powers pledged to “mutually respect their individual and joint rights and responsibilities, which remain unchanged.” The agreement reasserted the right of all four Allied victors to occupy Berlin jointly. It guaranteed access to West Berlin and the right of West Berliners to visit East Berlin.

The document stipulated that West Berlin could not become part of the Federal Republic of Germany, although “ties” between the two could be maintained. (The Bonn government keeps a liaison office in West Berlin, and represents the city in international forums. But West German politicians may not perform “constitutional or official acts” in West Berlin.) In a sense, the Quadripartite Agreement represented a victory for the West. The accord, at least on paper, killed the Soviet Union’s long-cherished goal of controlling all of Berlin. Today, West Berliners live in a bustling democratic enclave, albeit 110 miles inside a nation under Communist rule.

Yet, few Germans can be happy about what has happened to Berlin since World War II. Today, 43 years after V-E Day, a once-great metropolis remains occupied and divided with a wall running like a scar down its center and around the periphery of its Western sectors. The scar remains there in part because many of the key decisions regarding Germany’s future were made in 1944–45, before the Western allies fully understood what the Soviets had in mind for Eastern Europe.

Indeed, during World War II, Churchill reflected in 1953, many Westerners even feared that Josef Stalin would stop fighting Hitler once the Red Army regained the prewar frontiers. Little wonder, he wrote, that “the question of the Russian zone of occupation in Germany therefore did not bulk [large] in our thoughts.” With Western leaders trusting in Stalin’s goodwill, many of the more sophisticated plans for Germany’s future, Churchill said, “lay upon the shelves as the war crashed on.”
It is a leisurely Saturday afternoon in May, in West Berlin.

On Breitscheidplatz, the main square in the heart of the city, two dozen German women dressed in sports suits, all in late middle age, are stepping out, moving gingerly to the beat of a Bavarian march. With their ample midriffs pressing against their leotards, these members of an exercise club from Munich lift and twirl their batons toward the sky. Some 300 shoppers and passersby—senior citizens, middle-aged couples, many with their children—applaud approvingly as the group completes its routine.

Just 100 yards away, in the shadow of the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church, the multinational "Ku'damm Allstars" are stirring up a bigger ruckus with their drums and electric guitars. The group's audience, standing in a semicircle around the band, comprises a diverse lot: some are tourists, either from elsewhere in Europe or the United States; others are natives. Some are light skinned, others dark skinned. Nearly all of them are under age 30.

Suddenly, a long-tressed, bearded, jeans-clad young German ambles through the crowd, in front of the Allstars, seemingly oblivious to the music, or to the fact that he is strolling across center stage. The band's lead singer, a red-haired American from San Francisco, stops the music and gently seizes the trespasser. "Hey, I want everyone to take a look at this," he says to the onlookers, who know enough English to understand him. "This is what we used to call a 'hippie' in America. They were once big in Haight-Ashbury. But don't you know that this style went out in 1968?" Embarrassed, the German mutters "hands off" and walks away.

In some respects, the entire scene is West Berlin—that large (pop. two million), extraordinarily diverse, even bizarre city, undergoing drastic socioeconomic changes. Just as Greater Berlin is divided into East and West, so is West Berlin divided into two generations.

Many who belong to the older generation—the 42 percent of West Berliners who are 45 years of age and older—remember Adolf Hitler, the Gestapo, their Jewish neighbors being hauled away in the night, the Anglo-American bombing raids, the final apocalyptic Soviet assault. They remember Berlin when it was in ruins. They remember forays into the countryside to exchange prized family heirlooms for food. They also remember the stresses of the Cold War—the Berlin Blockade (1948–49), Nikita Khrushchev's "Ultimatum" (1958), and the building of the Berlin Wall (1961). They have aging friends and relatives in the East.

But the younger generation knows only today's divided Berlin, and
its members feel little in common with those who live drüben—"over there"—in drab East Berlin. Most of the young have either been born, or have arrived, in the city since the Wall was built. This generation includes ordinary office workers, ambitious government bureaucrats, thousands of students, blue-collar factory workers, and young homemakers. Finally, this population encompasses punks, hippies, freaks, and myriad other types of Aussteiger—literally, those who have "stepped out" of mainstream bourgeois society. West Berlin is one of the main centers, as political scientist Walter Laqueur has said, of the "German psychoscene and [of an] alternative subculture."

Fading Images

If the Berliner Szene, as the inhabitants call this subculture, seems to loom unduly large, that should not be so surprising. The metropolis has long been described as fast paced and sharp edged, like Paris or New York. "A Berliner has no time," as the writer Kurt Tucholsky (1890–1935) once observed. "He is always busy, making telephone calls, arranging dates." Shepard Stone, director of the Aspen Institute in Berlin, who left Dartmouth to study at the University of Berlin in 1929, has written that, as always, "the city remains slightly mad, open to experiments, some promising, some absurd." Today, West Berlin may be the only city in the world that employs a "rock commissioner" to award grants to bands with names such as Einstürzende Neubauten ("Collapsing Structures").

What strikes many visitors to West Berlin is how much it differs from Frankfurt, Munich, Hamburg, and other large cities in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Like those metropolises, West Berlin enjoyed its own Wirtschaftswunder, or "economic miracle," during the 1950s and '60s. Today, the Kurfürstendamm, the city's main thoroughfare, rivals Paris' Champs-Élysées in elegance and in the number of cafes and restaurants. Every day some 75,000 shoppers spend about $600,000 at Kaufhaus des Westen, the city's famed six-story department store. Patrons can shop for everything from leather luggage, to fresh lion's meat, to 1,500 kinds of cheese.

But perhaps because West Berliners have lived through so much, or perhaps because of the invigorating "Berlin air," the economic miracle changed the city less than it did the FRG. "Two countries," the Swedish writer Lars Gustafsson has argued, "could not be more different than the scarred, clever Berlin, with its lively sharp intellect, with its revolu-
The division of Berlin and West Berlin create peculiarly represents a
three-way face situation about who had been caught in the West,
where the eastern wall had defined a great deal of what had been
Eastern Berlin with the Americans for Berlin's Central
Bridge, the only bridge between East and West in the middle of
the bridge, the bridge of the city of the island of freedom.

The images of the city as an island of freedom (John F.
Kennedy)

And its enduring power.

And its enduring power.

And its enduring power.

And its enduring power.

And its enduring power.

And its enduring power.
quiet victory for Western diplomats and Western stamina. Over the last 20 years, the Soviets and the Western allies (the United States, Britain, and France) have not resolved their disputes over the status of Berlin, but they have agreed to disagree. In the Western view, all of Berlin remains, as it has been since the end of World War II, under four-power administration. The Soviets, however, consider East Berlin the capital of East Germany (the German Democratic Republic or GDR) and West Berlin a separate entity. The Quadripartite Agreement, which all four allies negotiated in 1971, and signed the following year, papered over these differences. “The situation which has developed in the area,” it says, in the vaguest possible terms, “…shall not be changed unilaterally.” The accord also guaranteed the allies, West Berliners, and West Germans free access to the city.

NATO’s Trip Wire

The task of Western diplomats working in West Berlin is to maintain the city’s fragile status—a mission that sometimes puts them at loggerheads with the local government. Last year, for example, East German leader Erich Honecker invited Eberhard Diepgen, West Berlin’s 47-year-old Christian Democratic mayor, to East Berlin to celebrate the city’s 750th anniversary. Diepgen’s eagerness to make the trip irked allied leaders, who saw in Honecker’s invitation a shrewd maneuver to get the mayor to recognize East Berlin as the capital of the GDR. “If we acknowledge that East Berlin has become just another part of East Germany,” said one U.S. official, “then what happens to our argument that West Berlin still has the same status as it did at the end of the war?”

In the end, the East German foreign ministry canceled the invitation. The government explained that, in criticizing the East German police, or Vopos, for the shooting of would-be escapees at the Wall, Diepgen had made “slanderous attacks” on the East German state.

The allies know that the 6,000 American, 3,000 British, and 2,700 French troops who are segregated in their barracks and training grounds could not long withstand a Warsaw Pact assault. At best, they could only serve as a “trip wire” for NATO retaliation. But they remain in the city to demonstrate the West’s willingness to support democratic governments—even one that is surrounded by a Communist regime. Some allied actions—for instance, the expropriation of suburban farmland for firing ranges or military housing—have not endeared the troops to the natives. In an effort to improve relations, the allies have agreed to a Rechtsbereinigung, or a “cleaning up,” of old laws that empowered the allies to prohibit the publication of newspapers, to require citizens to carry passports, to arrest Berliners for carrying pen knives, etc.

Some would like the allies to go further. “We want German courts and Germans laws,” said Renate Künast, a prominent member of the Alternative Liste Party. “And we want the Western military presence
reduced to a symbolic one. There’s no possibility of [the allies] defending Berlin anyway.” Those who have opposed the allied occupation have done so peacefully. It was, after all, Arab terrorists, not West Berliners, who bombed the “La Belle” disco in April 1986, killing an American G.I. and a Turkish woman, and injuring 230 others. Opinion polls have indicated that some 80 percent of the locals favor the allied occupation. When U.S. G.I.’s and West Berliners do mingle, at nightclubs such as “Go In” or “La Belle,” relations are usually cordial, and German-American scuffles are rare. West Berliners turn out in droves for the July 4 Allied Forces Day parade, air shows, and similar events.

Many of the younger folk, however, regard the parades, U.S. Army patrols along the Wall, and other military routines with a certain derision. At a youth hangout called the “Potsdamer Abkommen” (“Potsdam Agreement”), the condom dispenser at the back of the tavern is decorated with the U.S., British, and French flags—one for each brand. A sign above the machine reads: “Schutzmächte” (“protective powers”).

Few West Berliners of any age joke about West Berlin’s 254,000 foreign Gastarbeiter, or “guest workers,” whose presence has created many (predictable) difficulties. The Turks, who account for almost half of all foreigners living in the city, began arriving in the late 1960s. Today, in Kreuzberg and other Turkish ghettos, dark-eyed children play soccer in the streets to the exotic sound of Turkish music, which wafts out of nearby bars. On Friday afternoons, hundreds of Turkish men, their heads topped with white takkes, may be seen genuflecting toward Mecca on the lawns of the city’s 25 mosques.

The Magic Word

Most of West Berlin’s other immigrants—Greeks, Sri Lankans, Lebanese—have arrived more recently, and by highly unorthodox means. Indeed, many of these immigrants were delivered to West Berlin by the East German government. Here is how the operation worked: In the immigrants’ native lands, the East Germans advertised cheap flights to Berlin aboard Interflug airlines. Desperate for work, thousands of future Gastarbeiter bought tickets, and soon found themselves at Schönefeld Airport, just south of East Berlin.

From there, the Vopos put the immigrants on commuter trains bound for the Friedrichstrasse station in East Berlin. At Friedrichstrasse, the immigrants would board streetcars headed into West Berlin, where they would arrive two minutes later. Because the Western allies did not consider the Wall an international boundary, they could not require the “refugees” to clear customs. Once the immigrants said the magic word (“asylum”) they became candidates for permanent residency in West Berlin or the FRG.

Under Western pressure, the East Germans agreed to stop importing and re-exporting the refugees in 1987—but not before they had
WEST BERLIN: THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

Coming into West Berlin by jetliner, the window-seat passenger can see the Berlin Wall three times. Heading east, he first glimpses the barrier where it runs between East Germany and West Berlin. From an altitude of several thousand feet, the broad "death strip" looks as benign as a country road. The jetliner flies over the Wall for the second time (at a lower altitude) at a point where it slices through the middle of Greater Berlin. Turning back from the east, on its final approach to Tegel Airport, the plane crosses the "controlled border" again, with watchtowers now in clear view.

Some visitors may find it strange that the notorious barrier, which separates two different worlds on the ground, looks so unmenacing from the air. But West Berlin, sitting 110 miles inside East Germany, far from NATO forces (see back of fold-out map), is a peculiar place.

Consider the city's confusing legal status. Under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949), West Berlin is a Land, or state, of the FRG. But the Quadripartite Agreement of 1972 reaffirms the four World War II Allies' supreme control over the entire metropolis, West and East; the pact only permits "ties" between West Germany and West Berlin to be "maintained and developed."

What diplomats call "Berlin theology" is complicated. Though West Berlin is under allied occupation, the government in Bonn pays the expenses of the U.S., French, and British garrisons there. West Berlin sends 26 representatives to the West German Parliament, but they may not vote on legislation, or help choose the federal chancellor. The United States maintains an embassy in East Berlin, even though it does not recognize the city as part of—much less the capital of—East Germany.

The Soviets walked out of the four-power Allied Control Council in 1948, but they still cooperate with the Western allies in several ways. They helped guard Rudolf Hess, Adolph Hitler's old crony, at Spandau prison, until last year, when he committed suicide. And Soviet officers work with their British, American, and French counterparts at the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC). The BASC monitors the plane traffic in the 20-mile-wide air corridors that link West Berlin and West Germany.

"Since we're in the same room around the clock, our shift work becomes routine," said Air Force major Rick Fuller, deputy chief of the U.S. element at the BASC. "Remember, I get up in the morning and see this [Soviet] guy in his underwear across the room."

As residents of an alien enclave, West Berliners depend on East-West cooperation. Incoming shipments of coal, fuel oil, and other crucial raw materials must cross the GDR. And, since 1985, the city has received Siberian natural gas via a Soviet pipeline. Although Moscow is unlikely to tamper with the gas flow, the West Berliners are stocking a year's supply of gas underground—just in case.

Nowhere is Berlin's political geography more bizarre than in Steinstücken (pop. 200). A quiet hamlet of farmers and shopkeepers, it belongs to West Berlin, but sits a half mile inside of East Germany. Near the southwest corner of the city, the Wall takes a 90-degree turn to the east, runs out to Steinstücken, loops around the 85-acre village, and comes back again. Strolling to Steinstücken is an unsettling experience; pedestrians find themselves in a kind of roofless tunnel, hemmed in by 13-foot walls on each side of what was once a peaceful suburban lane.
The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) Talks (1973–)

In 1973, NATO and Warsaw Pact officials began meeting in Vienna to discuss curbs on conventional forces in Europe. The talks stalled for two reasons: negotiators could not agree on the number of present Warsaw Pact forces; and because any treaty requiring the withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet forces would have forced the Americans to pull back 3,000 miles (across the Atlantic), but the Soviets, only a few hundred miles (to Poland’s eastern border). In June 1985, however, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposed that the forces on each side be reduced by 25 percent—across an area stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. U.S. negotiators also hope to limit the number of tanks and other nonnuclear weapons—categories in which the Soviets have clear superiority over NATO.

The Stockholm Treaty (1986)

A surprise Soviet invasion of Western Europe has long been a NATO nightmare. In September 1986, diplomats from the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, and most nations in Europe, meeting in Stockholm, agreed to certain “confidence and security building measures.” The resulting treaty requires each of the 35 signatories to disclose information on all military exercises. It also invites other nations to send observers when a “stinger” (missile) movement involves more than 17,000 km, and permit more “challenge inspections” by its adversaries every year.
brought some 10,000 foreigners to the city. The immigrants’ life in West Berlin has resembled the life of new immigrants everywhere: Most have taken low-paying menial jobs, most have settled in low-rent ghettos, and nearly all have suffered from discrimination. Some of the city’s most common graffiti reads: Ausländer ‘raus!, or “Immigrants Out!”

The city government has responded to the plight of the city’s foreign nationals in ways that have been both stern and accommodating. The authorities have refused to give immigrants resident permits unless they agree to settle outside the overcrowded neighborhoods of Kreuzberg, Tiergarten, and Wedding. They have also declared that Turkish juveniles turning 18 who have lived in Berlin less than 10 years must be “repatriated to their native country.”

And the city has also waged a public relations campaign called Miteinander leben in Berlin, or “Living Together in Berlin,” which exhorts West Berliners to treat the newcomers with respect. One of the campaign’s posters, seen on billboards and in the subway, portrays 26-year-old “Anastasia”—a well-groomed Greek woman, dressed in Western clothes, who works in Berlin as a tax accountant. “The key to working together is mutual trust,” she is shown saying on the poster. “The same is true for living together.”

The Spirit of Tolerance

Over the last 20 years, West Berlin has also become an oasis for West Germany’s most free-spirited young people. Many flock to the city to study at the Free University of Berlin (enrollment: 95,000). While it is true that some young men come partly to avoid serving 15 months in the West German Bundeswehr (as residents of a city under allied occupation, they are ineligible for the draft), most counterculturists migrate to West Berlin for the same reason that many young Americans move to San Francisco: to enjoy the permissiveness that the city not only accommodates but also encourages. Despite its Nazi interlude, Berlin has long been known as a city with an open mind and a big heart. “All religions must be tolerated,” said Prussia’s Frederick the Great (1712–86), for “every man must get to heaven his own way.”

Young West Berliners have taken up Frederick’s edict with a vengeance. Whereas in the United States, hippies, punks, and other groups come and go, in West Berlin, the counterculturists never seem to fade. On the street, one sees as many hippies, with their long hair and tie-dyed T-shirts, as orange- and green-haired punks. There are other groups too. The radical Autonomous reject everything in life, especially the law. Their slogan: Legal, illegal—alles egal (“legal, illegal—who cares”). With powdered faces and jet-black hair, the Gruftis favor a macabre, Draculean look. They gather at the “Was Sonst?” (“What Else?”) bar on Orianienburger Strasse until sundown, when the gays move in.

Not surprisingly, the city’s counterculture has transformed Berlin
into one of Western Europe's more notorious drug havens. In 1978, a 15-year-old girl who called herself "Christiane F." wrote a book that described her life as a junkie-prostitute on the streets of West Berlin. The book, Die Kinder am Bahnhof Zoo ("The Children at the Zoo Station") was serialized by the weekly magazine Der Stern, and was later made into a popular movie. Christiane's story not only shocked many middle-class West Germans but also seemed to confirm what many had suspected: West Berlin was a city of crime and decadence.

Wessies and Half-Wits

Ironically, it is "the system" so scorned by the hippies and punks that makes possible their freewheeling existence. Unlike their American counterparts, students in West Berlin are under no pressure to complete their higher educations in a limited amount of time, or to find jobs thereafter that will enable them to pay off college loans. Fully subsidized by the state, the "Free University" is just that. Moreover, by enrolling as students, young West Berliners may receive health insurance ($42 a month), public transportation ticket books ($22 a month), and other services at low cost. Meanwhile, they pay the rent with Deutschemarks that they receive from indulgent parents or earn from part-time jobs. Thus the metropolis hosts thousands of Langzeitstudenten ("long-time students") who take eight, nine, or even 10 years to earn their degrees (if they get them at all).

If the counterculturists do not hold West Germans in high regard (referring to them, derisively, as Wessies), many West Germans voice little admiration for young West Berliners. "Smart Berliners move to West Germany," says my friend Thomas, a native West German, "and German half-wits come to Berlin."

What unites the young Aussteiger is their shared antipathy toward the West German state and toward Western authority in general. In his novel The Wall Jumper (1983), Peter Schneider, a screenwriter and longtime city resident, summed up the counterculture's perspective in his portrait of a rebellious young woman visiting East Berlin. In the Communist East, he wrote, "she has sympathetic listeners; she can catch her breath. But this is a delicate balance: Eastern tales of woe would upset her sense of having come from the worst of all possible worlds. The idea that she enjoys certain freedoms in the West—if only the freedom of movement—would weigh unbearably on her conscience. She can't afford to admit that she has any privileges, because she derives her identity from her status as a victim."

Within West Berlin's counterculture, the "Alternatives" have played the most constructive role. Alternatives run their own cooperatives and "collective" natural food restaurants, coffee shops, book and record stores, film and art exhibits, newspapers and magazines. During the summer they stage cabarets, rock concerts, and "dances 'til dawn"
West Berlin’s “Alternatives” boast their own schools, doctors, and day-care centers, so why not a biweekly entertainment magazine (circ. 60,000)? The Alternative “network,” observes British writer John Ardagh, is so extensive that one can “depend on it more or less completely,” except for having to “pay taxes and utility bills.”

at an Alternative circus tent called the “Tempodrom.” And, most importantly, they have founded their own political party, the “Alternative Liste,” which, in the last election, won 10.6 percent of the popular vote, and 15 of 144 seats in the West Berlin Parliament.

Politically, it is not easy to say what the Alternatives advocate—except, generally, a society that is less materialistic and more gentle with the environment. In 1980–81, Alternatives occupied several dozen homes that, in the middle of an acute housing shortage, had been purchased and left vacant by real estate speculators. Cried the squatters: Lieber instand besetzen als kaputt besitzen (“Better to occupy and renovate than to own and wreck”). They have also persuaded the city to stop salting the roads during the winter—a measure that helps prevent auto accidents, but harms nearby trees.

So far, the Alternatives’ daily newspaper, die tageszeitung (“the daily news”), which published its first issue on April 17, 1979, represents the counterculture’s most remarkable achievement. Owned by its 180 employees, many of whom are under 30, the “taz” (pronounced “tots”) operates without a managerial hierarchy. Indeed, all of the employees—including its correspondents in Moscow, Paris, London, Johannesburg, Rome, and Madrid—earn the same modest monthly salary (about $830). At morning staff conferences, which are held around a long table in the paper’s kitchen, no one is officially in charge.
The *taz* now reaches some 60,000 highly educated readers who seem to enjoy its editorial unpredictability. Before Ronald Reagan visited the city in June 1987, the editors argued that, in light of the U.S. president's willingness to negotiate with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the Alternatives had little reason to protest. Still, demonstrations, the *taz* conceded, would take place. “We in Berlin,” the paper concluded, “love traditions, and when Ronald Reagan comes, you demonstrate. Here in Berlin, we have a Pavlovian reflex.”

**Route 128 an der Spree**

West Berlin’s counterculture, and the welfare state that sustains it, could not flourish without a vigorous city economy. Before World War II, Berlin, then the site of many large chemical and manufacturing firms, was known as *Chicago an der Spree*. Not only did the war destroy about 70 percent of the city on both sides of the Spree River, over half of its plant and equipment wound up in Communist hands. After the war, business executives, unsure about Berlin’s political future, were reluctant to set up shop there. Even as the Cold War ebbed, the city’s up-and-coming entrepreneurs routinely moved their main headquarters to Frankfurt, Munich, and other cities in the FRG.

“You could see then that in 10, 20, or 30 years, the Russians wouldn’t need military force to take over West Berlin,” as Kurt Kasch, a member of the Deutsche Bank of Berlin’s board of directors, has observed. “The city would be exhausted internally.” Indeed, between 1960 and 1983, West Berlin lost about 150,000 jobs in manufacturing.

But in 1981, the local economy began to turn around. Elmar Pieroth, the city’s secretary of economics and labor, who wanted to make “earning money...fun in Berlin,” set up a public fund to invest in hi-tech firms. The city also converted the old brick AEG electrical plant into the *Grunderzentrum*—an industrial park for companies that produce various hi-tech products. Having already drawn over 300 hi-tech businesses (such as Siemens, Schering AG, IBM, and Nixdorf) to the city, officials are now optimistic about transforming West Berlin into a sort of *Route 128 an der Spree*. “Boston is a place with old industry that started to rebuild and modernize 25 years ago,” Pieroth observed recently. “Berlin is the oldest place of continental industry. We don’t have MIT and Harvard, but we have the Technical University, 180 research institutes and 37,000 people working in science.”

West Berlin’s economy would not be as robust as it is without the help of generous politicians (and taxpayers) in the FRG. Bonn gives the city about $7 billion a year in direct assistance; it provides another $4 billion in various subsidies to encourage companies and families to settle in the city. Corporate taxes, for example, are 22.5 percent lower in West Berlin than in the FRG. All employees receive annual government bonuses equal to eight percent of their gross incomes.
Such largesse explains, in part, why the average "Horst Janke" in West Berlin lives so comfortably. Let us imagine him: A resident of the southwest neighborhood of Neukölln, Herr Janke pays roughly 700 DM (about $420 per month) to rent an apartment large enough for himself, his wife Sabine, and their 2-year-old son, Dieter. Every workday morning, Horst awakes and quickly consumes breakfast (open-faced sandwiches with coffee) while reading BZ, the city's most popular tabloid. He eyes the customary photo of a bare-breasted Fräulein on page three and scans the soccer scores.

Like most West Berlin husbands, Horst leaves the family car, perhaps an Opel Kadett, at home for his wife. He hurries off through the rain (Berliners enjoy only about 40 days of clear, blue skies every year) to the nearest subway station. Along subway line Six, the train stops several times in West Berlin before passing (some 20 feet underneath the Berlin Wall) into East Berlin. The subway car trundles through the dimly lit Stadtmitte (center city) terminal without stopping. This is one of Berlin's old stations that the East Germans have boarded up. Under East Berlin, the train halts only at Friedrichstrasse. The doors slide open, and a few West Berliners, who will be spending the day in East Berlin, get off. Above, in the station, East German Grepos, or border police, see that no East Berliners board.

The subway train then wends its way back into West Berlin. Sev-
eral minutes later, Horst reaches his destination: the Borsig factory, where he works eight hours a day as a welder, building heavy machinery. His monthly pay after taxes: about $1,200. His wife works part time at a small restaurant. In the evenings, Horst and Sabine watch rented movies on their VCR; on weekends, they meet with friends at their favorite pub, “Joe am Ku’damm.” The Jankes and other West Berliners (and West Germans) can look forward to six weeks of paid vacation (guaranteed by law), which they often spend on the North Sea or on the beaches in Spain.

No matter how well the average West Berliner fares, he cannot entirely ignore the inconvenience (and oddity) of living in a city that is surrounded by a wall. The “anti-fascist bulwark,” as the East German regime calls it, is West Berlin’s premier tourist attraction—as it should be. The Wall, observes West Berlin scholar Helmut Wagner, “is the concrete expression of a situation which can only be upheld by means of bureaucratic and military force.”

The “Wall” is actually more akin to a Todesstreifen, or “death strip.” Its dimensions are impressive: 103 miles long, between 50 and 150 yards wide, with a 13-foot-high concrete wall running along either side. Armed guards, some atop watch towers, others on foot, keep an eye out for would-be escapees. The strip is equipped with barbed wire, vehicle traps, and flood lights. Always innovative, West Berliners have used what might have been a boring, blank stretch of concrete in many ways. The city’s artists have viewed the barrier as an ideal showcase, creating a new genre of “Wall Art.” And everyone else considers it a good place to scribble graffiti, which often appears in English: “Last Coke for 10,000 miles” and “Would the last person out [of East Berlin] please turn the lights off?”

The Living Museum

Americans who wish to pass through the Wall into East Berlin usually do so at Checkpoint Charlie. At the East German border station, they must purchase a day visa (five marks), and exchange 25 West German marks for 25 East German marks. The experience can be harrowing. Belongings may be inspected by an X-ray machine; personal mail is often read. And, perhaps most annoying, visitors will be blocked at each stage in the border-crossing process by a series of locked doors. Thus, they wait in the sometimes dark corridors until the Grepos buzz the doors open, allowing their guests to pass through.

In East Berlin, visitors find themselves in what some Western writers call a “living museum.” Not only are many of the old city’s most celebrated landmarks, such as the German State Opera, the National Library, and the Brandenburg Gate located here; people still live pretty much the way they did in the early 1960s. “Young girls still curtsy there,” as American journalist Priti J. Visilind has noted. “Streetcars
rattle and sing on boulevards of polished stone. Neon light is an infant art. Paper, not plastic, wraps the Bratwurst.”

Indeed, while Alexanderplatz and the immediate downtown area boasts a facade of Soviet-style modernity, the outlying districts, such as the working-class neighborhood of Prenzlauer Berg, still show the nicks and scars that they acquired during the war. The state seems omnipresent: the Vopos patrol the streets on foot, usually in pairs. The “International Book Store” on Alexanderplatz advertises works by Marx and Engels and sells Communist Party literature—available in German and Russian. There is little commotion or even traffic—just the occasional whine of East German-built Trabant cars. During the winter, the acrid fumes of burning coal hang in the air—and grow sufficiently dense to provoke “smog alerts” in West Berlin.

Still, East Berlin is the most exciting place available to East Germans to visit. Here, tourists find not only museums and a spectacular 1,200-foot-high television tower but also the country’s best restaurants, discos, and late-night bars. The Honecker regime, however, does not let good times get out of hand. When the British rock group Genesis performed a concert on the lawn of the Reichstag in West Berlin last June, 4,000 young East Berliners gathered near the Wall to enjoy the festivities from afar. East German Vopos, however, broke up the party, as the

West Berlin’s Kurfürstendamm. Says historian Gordon Craig: Berliners have tended to be “energetic, ebullient, colorful in their speech, quick at repartee, prone to sentimentality...[and] in time of trouble, courageous.”

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youths shouted “The Wall must go!” and (to show their support for glasnost) “Gorbachev! Gorbachev!”

For its part, the Communist government flatly denied that the imbroglio had even taken place. “There can be no talk at all of clashes between youths and police,” a spokesman said. “They exist only in the fantasy of Western correspondents who drive to and fro over the border with the aim of creating a sensation.”

West Berlin still presents thorny public relations problems for East Germany. On the one hand, the Communist authorities want to keep Western influence to a minimum. Thus, they publish city maps depicting the Western side of the metropolis as a white desert, marked “Westberlin.” And East German tour guides deliberately do not point out the Reichstag, which is clearly visible from the East. “At Friedrichstrasse, at the Brandenburg Gate, our Berlin ends,” wrote East Berlin journalist Horst von Tümpeling. “A different Berlin, one of yesterday, even of the day before yesterday begins there.”

On the other hand, the Honecker regime believes it cannot ignore the East Germans’ appetite for Western goods—and pop culture. To that end, it installed antennas in low-lying Dresden so that the residents there could watch Der Denver-Clan with Joan Collins and John Forsythe. East Germany has also allowed women over age 60 and men over age 65 to qualify for 30-day visas to West Berlin. (They use the time, of course, for shopping.) Most importantly, the regime now allows ordinary East Germans to apply for a visa allowing them to leave the GDR for good. The process may take as little as six months; since 1984, some 20,000 East Germans have emigrated to the West every year.

**The Romantic Fantasy**

From its dealings with the West, the East German government has managed to reap considerable financial rewards. As noted, it collects 25 Deutschmarks from every Westerner who enters East Berlin. The Bonn government also pays the Honecker regime to remove West Berlin’s garbage, to maintain the autobahn and the rail lines that run between West Berlin and West Germany, and periodically to dredge the Teltow Canal. The Bonn government gives the Communists a $5,000 “ransom” for every person they allow to emigrate to the West. Total annual payments from Bonn to East Berlin: about $7 billion.

In addition, the Communists earn hard currency from Western consumers. East German Intershops sell untaxed Western goods to anyone who can pay for them with Western currency. Located most prominently in East Berlin’s Friedrichstrasse subway station—where West Berliners may enter East Berlin—the Intershops offer savings on cigarettes, liquor, and electronic equipment of “up to 35 percent.”

With so much cross-border traffic and business going on, it is not surprising that public officials on both sides of the Wall occasionally
dream about unifying the two Berlins, and the two German states. Last year, Mayor Diepgen made a trip to Washington D.C. Speaking at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Diepgen said that both East and West Berlin would be celebrating the city's 750th anniversary “in the knowledge that it is all about one city” with “a common history” and a “common hope for the future.”

But I believe that this notion, that there exists one Germany and one Berlin, divided only by artificial political borders, is now a romantic fantasy. The two Berlins and the two Germanys, like North Korea and South Korea, have been moving in different directions for 40 years. East Germany and West Germany represent radically different and mutually incompatible societies. Several years ago, Erhard Krack, the mayor of East Berlin, was asked what would happen if the Berlin Wall were taken down. “Personally, I don’t think many of our citizens would go over to the West,” he said. “Our people have a good life.”

Krack was not just singing the East German national anthem. The young East Berliners whom I have encountered express a hankering for blue jeans and rock music, and they would like to be able to visit Paris or New York. But then, almost in the same breath, they say that unlike the West European governments, Honecker’s regime guarantees them a job, a steady income, and somewhere to live. There may be little freedom or opportunity or excitement in grey East Berlin, but neither are there many economic risks, at a time when about 10 percent of all West Berlin workers are unemployed and on the dole.

So what would happen if the East Germans, with permission from Moscow, took down the Wall? West Berlin novelist Peter Schneider has written that today East Berliners probably would not rush into the arms of West Berliners. Nor would the Westerners necessarily open their arms to greet them. Instead, he believes, and I suspect he’s right, that “there would be a hesitant standing still.”
Few major cities in the world have been more buffeted by politics in the 20th century than Berlin. Yet unlike other major West European capitals—Rome, Paris, London—old Berlin bloomed late as a cosmopolitan center. "Prior to 1871," as Gerhard Masur points out in *Imperial Berlin* (Basic, 1971), "the great powers of the world would not have considered the city worth the price of a bitter international struggle."

The city, writes Gordon A. Craig in *The Germans* (Penguin, 1983), was founded late in the 12th century as a tiny trading settlement on the banks of the Spree River. Enjoying relative peace and freedom under the margraves of Brandenburg, Craig observes, Berlin was a typical medieval market town, which boasted "a patriciate of great merchants and nobles, a Burgerturn of masters of trades and handicrafts, organized in guilds, a Jewish community, and a sizeable transient population."

In 1442, the state of Brandenburg fell under the control of the Hohenzollern dynasty, and Berlin served as the residence of the Kurfürsten, or "prince-elector" (who helped select the Holy Roman emperor). Although the Kurfürsten attracted bankers, court purveyors, and a new class of tradesmen to the city, Berlin, writes A. J. P. Taylor in *The Course of German History* (Putnam's, 1962), remained an "overgrown military camp," still "remote and obscure." But the Hohenzollerns would strengthen and expand the state of Brandenburg by annexing East Prussia, thus leading the way to the crowning of Frederick I, "King in Prussia," in 1701.

Under Frederick I, and especially under his grandson, Frederick the Great (1712–86), Berlin began to achieve a certain distinction. During the 18th century, Prussian monarchs enlarged the city by merging it with neighboring Kölln. They founded the Academy of Sciences, and built many of today's landmarks, including the Opera House (1743) and the Brandenburg Gate (1791)—the great ceremonial Doric gateway that stood as a symbol of Prussian strength and unity.

The 19th century severely tested the Prussian monarchy. Napoleon's armies occupied the capital for two years (1806–08). And the revolutionary turbulence that swept across Europe in 1848—brought on by unemployment and poor working conditions—reached Berlin too.

The fighting that took place on March 18, 1848, between workers and government troops, says Hajo Holborn in *History of Modern Germany, Vol. 3, 1840—1945* (Princeton, 1982), took the lives of 250 Berliners. The soldiers suppressed the revolt, but, as Holborn writes, the angry rioters afterward paraded the "March Dead" through the palace courtyard, while King Frederick William IV stood by, watching "the macabre show."

Meanwhile, Berlin, with the growth of its porcelain, textile, and iron industries, was developing into a factory city. By the time it became capital of the new, enlarged, unified German Reich—which Chancellor Otto von Bismarck formed after Prussia defeated France in 1871—Berlin boasted a cosmopolitan population of one million. The city, observes A. J. Ryder in *Twentieth Century Germany* (Columbia, 1973), represented "a study in contrasts... an industrial giant set among the sandy forests of Brandenburg, the radical capital of a highly conservative state, a centre of avant-garde artists in a metropolis characterized by ostentatious new wealth and the grey proletarian suburbs."

For Berliners, World War I meant not only the loss of loved ones but also the
rationing of food, the “turnip winter” of 1916–17, and, at war’s end, massive workers’ strikes and the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II. David Childs’ *Germany Since 1918* (St. Martin’s, 1980) recounts the city’s and the nation’s struggle to recover. Some two million Germans perished during the war.

Though often referred to as the “Golden Twenties,” the much-romanticized Weimar Republic (1919–33) was, as Otto Friedrich says in *Before the Deluge* (Fromm, 1986), a time of great suffering. Food was still scarce, joblessness high, and the rate of inflation soared. Friedrich cites novelist Klaus Mann’s description of the prostitutes who strolled “like fierce amazons” along the Kurfürstendamm. “One of them,” Mann wrote, “. . . whispered into my ear: ‘Want to be my slave? Costs only six billion and a cigarette. A bargain.’”

The era, however, was “golden” in a cultural sense. During these years, men such as filmmaker Fritz Lang, architect Walter Gropius, playwright Bertolt Brecht, and artist Wassily Kandinsky all flocked to Berlin. The renaissance they created, writes Peter Gay in *Weimar Culture* (Greenwood, 1981), represented a reaction to the apparent “disappearance of God, the threat of the machine, the incurable stupidity of the upper classes, and the helpless philistinism of the bourgeoisie.”

Adolf Hitler’s ascent to power in 1933 ended not only the Republic but also Berlin’s spirit of tolerance. The capital became the site of book burnings, Nazi torchlight parades through the Brandenburg Gate, and raids on synagogues and Jewish businesses (“Crystal Night,” November 9, 1938). Unfortunately, the best works in English on the Nazi period, such as Joachim C. Fest’s *Hitler* (Random, 1975); Karl Dietrich Bracher’s *German Dictatorship* (Holt, 1972); and Alan Bullock’s *Hitler* (Harper, 1971), say little about daily life in the city; they focus instead on the rise and fall of the Fuhrer’s regime, its horrors, and World War II.

As it happens, there is no shortage of vivid chronicles of the postwar division of Berlin and the three Cold War crises. These include Lucius D. Clay’s *Decision in Germany* (Greenwood, 1950); Philip Windsor’s *City On Leave* (Praeger, 1963); and Jean Edward Smith’s *Defense of Berlin* (Johns Hopkins, 1963). Two of the most illuminating accounts of the events leading to the building of the Communists’ “anti-fascist barricade” in the summer of 1961 are Curtis Cate’s *Ides of August* (Evans, 1979) and Honoré M. Catudal’s *Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis* (International Publications, 1980).

Today, visitors usually find West Berlin a bright, bustling place. But on a harsh winter’s day, the larger cityscape, with its ugly Wall and grey Eastern sector, still can remind one of the scene that Christopher Isherwood described in his *Berlin Stories* (Bentley, 1979). Berlin, he wrote in 1935, “is a skeleton which aches in the cold. . . . I feel in my bones the sharp ache of the frost in the girders of the overhead railway, in the ironwork of balconies, in bridges, in tramlines, lamp-standards, latrines . . . the city, which glowed so brightly and invitingly in the night sky above the plains, is cold and cruel and dead.”

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GEORGE C. MARSHALL: Statesman, 1945–59
by Forrest C. Pogue
Viking, 1987
603 pp. $29.95

THE MARSHALL PLAN: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–52
by Michael J. Hogan
Cambridge, 1987
482 pp. $34.50

Surely one reason for Americans’ persisting fascination with the end of World War II and the Cold War aftermath is a combination of the period’s intrinsic drama and our own moral satisfaction. But the visible erosion of a familiar political landscape, our sudden awareness that the dollar is no longer almighty, and the bleak recognition that there seem to be no giants in government these days may help explain it too. Both the institutional history of the Marshall Plan and the personal history of its namesake make useful reading under the circumstances.

Like George Catlett Marshall (1880–1959) himself, the fourth and final volume of historian Forrest Pogue’s biography is direct, dignified, substantial, well-informed, and demonstrably unpretentious. It takes the wartime Army chief of staff through his postwar career as secretary of state and secretary of defense. Like any book on war and peace, it deals with hopes, dreams, courage, cowardice, and tragedy. But above all, it addresses public virtues we now customarily, and perhaps correctly, call old-fashioned.

Focusing more on the career than on the life, Pogue tells how Marshall undertook a no-win mission to mediate between Nationalist and Communist Chinese immediately after World War II, then twice agreed to serve in an administration badly in need of any help he could give it. Only in 1951 did Harry Truman finally allow him to retire.

During his five years of postwar duty, Marshall did what he could to deal with Communist aggression and political instability in East Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. He also made the State Department safe for policy planning, gave his name and guidance to an unprecedented program for European recovery, and defended presidential control of the military against the partisans of General Douglas MacArthur.

An authentic specimen of that rare species, the true American conservative, he even recruited a liberal woman, Anna Rosenberg, as assistant secretary of defense for manpower, and loyally supported her against partisan political attacks from Capitol Hill. This was more, incidentally, than his onetime protégé, Dwight Eisenhower, did for him when Marshall was vilified by Senator Joseph McCarthy during the 1952 election campaign.

For all this, the author carefully avoids placing Marshall on a pedestal. Pogue does not even claim that his subject was a great secretary of state (1947–49), real achievements notwithstanding. Still less does he argue, from the record of a single year in office (1950–51) during the Korean
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War, that Marshall was a particularly remarkable secretary of defense. To judge from the documentary appendices, including the text of the famous Harvard University speech of 1947, Churchillian rhetoric was not the source of Marshall's greatness either, even though the speeches are perfectly good. Nor, for all his demonstrable skill, was Marshall unique or even vastly successful as a military or diplomatic strategist, tactical virtuoso, or political prophet.

Readers will also have to look elsewhere for funny stories, endearing anecdotes, and personalized drama, let alone revelations about what he smoked, how he spent the evening, or where he got his punch lines and one-liners. Regrettably, Pogue even skips the famous admonition intended to guide George Kennan as Marshall sent him to formulate what the rest of us remember as the Marshall Plan. "Avoid trivia," he said. Of all his utterances, this might be the worthiest of commemoration in bronze.

Yet whatever his limits as strategist, diplomat, wit, or aphorist, there seems to have been no question, even among the Republican furies who charged him with virtually every failing save bad breath, that Marshall was a great man. Making this credible to readers who never knew Marshall first-hand is probably Pogue's outstanding achievement. Marshall certainly seems to have avoided trivia himself. Pogue leaves no doubt that the general was a professional's professional, who understood the use and limits of military force as have few Americans before or since. He was also an administrator's administrator, who knew how to tell trees from forests, and an old Washington hand, whose experience went back to World War I.

But what seems above all to have distinguished Marshall was a character of such strength and integrity that contemporaries compared him without irony to George Washington. For the portrayal of these virtues alone, we have reason to be grateful to Pogue. Like the Iran-contra hearings or the latest AP poll of the people Americans most admire, his book may make us more conscious of how far, and to what level, our models and standards have fallen since Marshall's death in 1959.

Michael Hogan's story is inevitably less personal than Pogue's, but at least as worthy of our attention. Hogan too is concerned with character, personalities, and ideas (not to mention egos) of often heroic size. He is also fascinated with a U.S. foreign policy consensus that extended by 1947 from the leadership of the United Automobile Workers, to the Truman White House, to the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations.

Trained in the school of both Republican and Wilsonian Progressivism, and tempered by the Depression, the New Deal, and World War II, Ameri-
ca's postwar leaders believed with passionate, if questionable, consistency in the economic virtues of mass production, mass consumption, mixed economies, and free trade. As seldom before or after, they also believed in their own capacity to deny or repeal certain laws of historical gravity, most notably those pertaining to the tenacity of European nationalism.

But in the end, Hogan's book has more to do with governments than men, and more with bureaucracies than elected officials. It is ultimately a story of transatlantic exchange rates, currency reserves, import quotas, trade patterns, management styles, and budget lines, whose heroes, if any, are those inter- and intragovernmental agencies that now mean so little, but once meant so much.

It is the counterpoint between great hopes and historical inertia that makes his story both dauntingly complicated and disarmingly simple. At least by 1947, it was clear to a lot of Americans that an unprecedented U.S. aid effort was Europe's last best hope. But they were no less convinced that radical industrial modernization was necessary, and a federated Europe imperative, if U.S. aid were to work. By 1948, Congress had actually agreed to put up the money, and West European governments had agreed to take it on something like American terms.

By 1952, when the program ended, Western Europe's GNP had risen 32 percent over 1948, farm production was 11 percent above its prewar level, and postwar industrial production was up 40 percent. Intra-European trade had also grown dramatically, a democratic West Germany was anchored in Western Europe, and a supranational coal and steel community had risen from the ruins of the Ruhr.

But to the chagrin and frustration of planners in Washington, it was nonetheless clear that the Disunited States of Europe intended to stay that way. By 1952, the Korean War had also turned American policy irreversibly from butter to guns. Even the promised land of currency convertibility was still some years away, and West European union, let alone a reunified Europe, was far beyond the horizon. A "special relationship" with America permitted Britain to continue thinking of itself as a global power. Meanwhile, the Europeans themselves swung ambivalently between the common marketeers of Paris and the nominally free traders of London.

But for all the shortfalls between American dream and transatlantic reality, Hogan, a historian at Ohio State University, is as cold to those revisionist scholars who would demonize the Marshall Plan as he is to those who would trivialize it. As he sees it, the plan was neither Pax Americana "nor imperialism by other means," but a positive-sum game between mutually respectful and interdependent sovereign powers. As such, he concludes, it "must be judged as one of the most successful peacetime foreign policies launched by the United States in this century." Forty years later we still have reason to be grateful for all it accomplished.

—David Schoenbaum '84
It is said that the Vatican never changes its mind. In fact, the Rev. John Courtney Murray (1904–67), an American seminary professor, managed to change it. For the first two decades after World War II, he silently suffered the enmity of official Vatican theologians because of his “radical” theory of church and state. Freedom of religion was a natural right, he argued, not, as the Catholic Church had long insisted, an unmitigated evil. In 1965 his ideas provided American bishops with the arguments they needed to convince the second Vatican Council to approve its document on the liberty of religious conscience.

Murray was probably the best theologian the American Catholic Church produced before the arrival of David Tracy. Any comparison of the two, however, would show Murray to be more of an ecclesiastical thinker, more of a churchman. Tracy, by contrast, is a secular theologian, working in the manner of Murray’s three well-known contemporaries, Jewish theologian Paul Tillich and Protestants Reinhold and Richard Niebuhr. Indeed, Tracy is so thoroughly engaged with secular thought that one almost forgets he is a Catholic priest—at least until he addresses his own religious convictions, as he does in a very personal way at the end of this book.

Tracy’s aims and approach reflect the influence of his teacher, Canadian Jesuit Bernard Lonergan. In such books as Method in Theology (1972), Lonergan argued that the business of theology was to mediate between the church and the wider public culture, not, as the Vatican once held, between the bishop and his flock. Since the 1960s, a goodly number of Catholic theologians have followed Lonergan’s path, turning from “confessional” to “public” theology. But among them, Tracy stands out. Not only is his work distinctive in its range and quality (even though it is not yet equal to Lonergan’s in originality), but he himself has become something of a public figure. His appearance on the cover of a recent New York Times Magazine is only one sign of growing interest in his thought.

Tracy directly acknowledged his debts to his mentor in The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan (1970), but his subsequent books pay tribute to Lonergan in subtler ways. In Blessed Rage for Order (1979), for instance, he took up the task of justifying theology’s voice in the American university. (Tracy himself is a professor on the Committee on the Analysis of Ideas and Methods at the University of Chicago.) In The Analogical Imagination (1980), Tracy spelled out the role of theologian as interpreter of religious classics, a role analogous to that of the interpreter of literary classics. To perform his task correctly, Tracy explained, the theologian must immerse himself in the classics of political theory, history, literary criticism, and philosophy, as well as in those of other religious traditions. Tracy’s argument was, in effect, an elaboration of Max Weber’s assertion that an interpreter who understands only one classic understands none.
Tracy's *Plurality and Ambiguity* is uncharacteristically short, clear, and accessible to laymen. It is a book on how to interpret classics, why it is so important to read them, and why they are so difficult to interpret correctly. It is also a portrait of humanity painted under the spell of Plato and Aristotle (and Lonergan): To be human, Tracy argues, is to interpret "texts," and that is done in communities, through discourse. In conversation, Tracy writes, "we learn to give in to the movement required by questions worth exploring. The movement in conversation is questioning itself. Neither my present opinions on the question nor the text's original response to the question, but the question itself must control every conversation... It is not a confrontation. It is not a debate. It is not an exam. It is questioning itself. It is a willingness to follow the question wherever it may go. It is dialogue."

If to converse is to be human, the model for conversation is Plato's symposium, where opposing ideas are presented, questioned, and worked through. To bring this ideal into the present, Tracy takes his reader over some bumpy terrain: contemporary language theory. As rough going as some of this is, however, it is necessary to those who hope to participate in the contemporary symposium. After all, most intellectual discussion today focuses on the question of language—how it is used, how it works (or does not work) as a structure or system, whether it leads to meanings or only the illusion of such. Tracy ends up arguing that interpretation is possible, that meanings can be located amid the ambiguity of linguistic signs, and that meanings are not simply what the powerful deem them to be. "We can continue to give ourselves over to the great hope of Western reason," Tracy says. "But that hope is now a more modest one as a result of the discovery of the plurality of both language and knowledge and the ambiguities of all histories including the history of reason itself."

This optimism about the possibilities of communication is where Tracy's faith comes in. At the end of his book, he makes a direct plea for religion as a legitimate force for hope in spite of its ambiguities, and for theology as one of the many voices engaged in the conversation that makes up our culture: "As I suspect is obvious by now, my own hope is grounded in a Christian faith that revelations from God have occurred and that there are ways to authentic liberation." I find Tracy's plea in this last chapter both moving and persuasive, and its formulation gratifyingly personal.

—William M. Shea '87
NEW TITLES

**History**

**MIND-FORG'D MANACLES: A History of Madness in England from the Restoration to the Regency**
by Roy Porter
Harvard, 1987
412 pp. $38.50

"They said I was mad," wrote 17th-century poet Nathaniel Lee when confined to Bedlam, "and I said they were mad; damn them, they outvoted me." Porter, a historian at London's Wellcome Institute, delves into documents from the "long 18th century" (1660–1800) to uncover what madness was before the advent of psychiatry, how it was treated in a society almost devoid of mental institutions, and how attitudes toward it were changed by Enlightenment ideas.

According to the influential social theorist Michel Foucault (*Folie et Dérision*, 1961) 18th-century madmen throughout Europe were victims of the "great confinement"—mad and bad lumped together in a bourgeois plot to rid the streets of lowlife considered to be no better than animals. Not so in England, says Porter. Until the 1845 universalization of county asylums, there were few lockups and an array of treatments. Madness, from 1660 on, was seen first as possession by the devil, then as an imbalance of "humours," and, finally, in light of John Locke's empiricism, as a state of error that experience could correct. Locke's ideas provided not only a new idea of what madmen were but also the groundwork for psychiatry, the new science of the "moral management" of the mad. Those with the "English malady"—far from being trapped, as Foucault would have it, in the frozen category of "Unreason"—were thought only to suffer from misconceptions grounded on false consciousness. And so, like children, says Porter, they could be educated out of it.

**THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES**
by I. F. Stone
Little, Brown, 1988
282 pp. $18.95

With the same *chutzpah* that he displayed in his journalism, I. F. Stone asks the question that has vexed many a classical scholar: Why did the open, democratic society of Athens condemn Socrates (470–399 B.C.) to death for the offense of speaking his own mind?

Stone attempts not only to reconstruct the case for Athens in the famous trial of 399 B.C. but also to discredit Socrates at every turn. He marshals evidence from a vast array of hearsay—the conflicting accounts of Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, and Aristophanes. Socrates, one learns, justly earned
the label \textit{idiotes}—the derisive epithet ancient Athenians applied to those who took little part in the political life of the city. He was also a loudmouth who preferred the closed society of enemy Sparta, even though that stern city-state would never have tolerated his gadfly behavior.

Behind the official charges leveled against Socrates—impiety and corrupting the young—were what Stone calls the “three earthquakes”: the revolts of 411, 404, and 401, all of which briefly installed aristocratic dictatorships. These three reigns of terror made Athenians fearful of forever losing their democracy; yet Socrates did not abandon “his antidemocratic and antipolitical teachings.” The Athenians, moreover, did not forget that the most dangerous of the former dictators were Alcibiades and Critias, the philosopher’s prize pupils. “As a teacher of virtue,” Stone contends, “Socrates was a failure.”

As harsh as Stone’s verdict is, his most controversial claim is that Socrates could have avoided death: “Had Socrates invoked freedom of speech as a basic right of all Athenians—not just the privilege of a superior and self-selected few like himself—he would have struck a . . . responsive chord.” But to plea for acquittal on those grounds would have meant acknowledging the virtue of the \textit{polis}; for that, Socrates was too proud.

\textbf{THOSE TERRIBLE CARPETBAGGERS: A Reinterpretation}
by Richard Nelson Current
Oxford, 1988
475 pp. $24.95

Even as late as the publication of John F. Kennedy’s \textit{Profiles in Courage} (1956), carpetbaggers were depicted as the rascals of the post–Civil War Reconstruction. If Kennedy (and ghostwriter Theodore C. Sorensen) had looked more closely at the facts, they would have found that carpetbaggers were not all corrupt opportunists or profiteers; some, indeed, were eager to improve conditions in the stricken South; many others were simply engaged in the legitimate pursuit of gain.

Current, an emeritus professor at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro, is not the first to reconsider these much maligned men, but his readable, artfully constructed group portrait helps make the revisionist case more persuasive. Of his 10 subjects, one, Adelbert Ames, was a Maine-born career Army officer who became provisional governor of Mississippi shortly after the Reconstruction Act of 1867. Working hard to protect
the rights (and lives) of the newly enfranchised blacks, with little support from President Grant, he drew the wrath of reactionary white Mississippians. At the end of his corruption-free term in 1870, he was elected to the U.S. Senate. Equally admirable was Albion W. Tourgee, a Northern lawyer who settled in North Carolina and crusaded for full equality for blacks. His most notable achievement was the court brief he wrote for Louisiana octoroon Homer E. Plessy in *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896); although his arguments on the unconstitutionality of segregationist practices lost, they were later vindicated by the *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) decision.

Some carpetbaggers, such as Daniel H. Chamberlain, the South Carolina governor who became an antiblack pamphleteer, began as Radical Republicans but ended up disillusioned conservatives. Even so, few were rank scoundrels. Yet before Reconstruction ended in 1877, complained Arkansas carpetbag governor Powell Clayton, the “most fallacious stories” began to circulate—soon to be embedded in the works of such scholars as James Ford Rhodes and Woodrow Wilson.

**THE MASK OF COMMAND**

*What are the qualities that define leadership in war?* Keegan, defense correspondent for the *London Daily Telegraph*, explores the nature of military genius through the careers of four leading commanders: Alexander the Great (356–323 B.C.); the Duke of Wellington (1769–1852); Ulysses S. Grant (1822–1885); and, by way of contrast, Adolf Hitler (1889–1945).

Generals, Keegan argues, establish their authority by a process of “mystification”—distancing themselves from their armies to ensure that their troops follow the commander’s will. Alexander the Great earned the respect of his forces through his fearless courage, manifested by the eight wounds he acquired during pitched battles. Like Alexander, Wellington displayed the best qualities of his era by embodying the “gentlemanly ideal”—sober in dress and manner, reticent, and completely self-assured.

Technological advances and the growing size of the battlefield forced generals to distance themselves from the field. During the American Civil War, the improved range of sharpshooters’ rifles...
CURRENT BOOKS

(up to 1,000 yards) compelled commanders such as Grant to rely on telegrams rather than personal observation for their information. Yet Grant mastered the necessities of total war, while his modest style of “unheroic heroism” was, in Keegan’s view, perfectly suited “to the populism of the society he led to victory.”

The gulf between commanders and their forces in the field continued to grow. During World War II, Hitler commanded German armies as far away as 1,300 miles, even as he cultivated a “false heroic” style. His “mask” was based, Keegan explains, “on the concept of lonely suffering, on his internalizing of his soldiers’ risks and hardships...[and] ultimately on the ritual of suicide as the equivalent of death in the face of the enemy.”

Contemporary Affairs

THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: True Causes of Sickness and Well-being
by Leonard A. Sagan
Basic, 1987
233 pp. $19.95

During the past 150 years, the advanced industrial nations of the world have enjoyed a dramatic increase in their citizens’ average life expectancy. This has usually been attributed to advances in public sanitation, the discovery of “miracle” drugs and vaccines, and improved nutrition.

Sagan, a California epidemiologist, argues that these factors alone do not account for the change. Indeed, declining morbidity and mortality rates preceded the safeguarding of public water supplies, the routine delivery of babies in hospitals, and the introduction of antibiotics.

Then what else matters? Through adroit correlation of existing social, economic, and health data, Sagan points to such factors as class, family cohesiveness, education, and quality of work. Emotional health, solid self-esteem, creative and challenging jobs—these all contribute significantly to a healthy life. Sagan finds. Discussing the role of stress, he attacks head on the romantic notion that premodern societies are less taxing than modern ones; the day-to-day struggle to survive creates emotional distress that is ultimately reflected in a higher incidence of disease and lower life expectancy. But modern nations are not out of the woods: The pronounced slowing down of the growth of life expectancy in the United States can be directly correlated with such diverse phenom-
ena as rising illiteracy and the dissolution of the family through divorce.

Above all, Sagan's analysis suggests that high health expenditures do not alone achieve gains in life expectancy, and, after a point, produce diminishing returns. Despite Britain's national healthcare system, its lower classes still have higher mortality and morbidity rates than do its upper classes. And although America ranks second only to Sweden in per capita health outlays, it lags behind 18 other countries in average life expectancy.

ECONOMICS: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy
by James M. Buchanan
compiled by Robert D. Tollison
and Viktor J. Vanberg
Texas A & M, 1988
413 pp. $48.50

These 26 essays by the 1986 Nobel laureate in economics represent what the volume's editors call "a modern revival of [the] classical political economy" practiced by free-market advocate Adam Smith (1723–90). What Buchanan, a professor at George Mason University, admires most about Smith's approach is its modesty. Instead of trying to predict the outcome of the market process, Smith studied the relationships between the institution and the individual in the hope of finding how self-interest translated into public good.

Such modesty has been lost, says Buchanan. Economics is now a predictive "science," increasingly used by governments seeking to control and promote specific outcomes. Unfortunately, says Buchanan, neither economics nor politics can produce efficiency and justice. Unable to forecast individual choices, economists cannot aggregate individual choices into a "social welfare function." Governments, lacking the unanimous support to produce a truly "collective" choice, use temporary majorities to push through temporary policies.

Governmental hyperactivity in the United States has produced voluminous laws and regulations, which in turn spawn a growing number of interest groups seeking to manipulate government for personal or ideological gain. This unseemly scramble has served only to undercut respect for laws. And in a society with only a minimal "national community," respect for laws, institutions, and the rights of others is crucial.

Buchanan maintains that the restoration of the moral order requires the "rollback of governmental intrusions into the lives of citizens." Simple Reaganism? Perhaps. But it may be foolish to dismiss Buchanan with a partisan label. Foolish, also,
to ignore his suggestion for a modest role for economists: to predict not specific outcomes, but the effects various economic arrangements have upon the choices of individuals.

**Arts & Letters**

**ANTHILLS OF THE SAVANNAH**  
*by Chinua Achebe*  
*Doubleday, 1988  
216 pp. $16.95*

In his first novel, *Things Fall Apart* (1959), Nigerian author Achebe depicted a thinly fictionalized West African society gone rotten as a result of colonialism. In *Anthills*, however, Achebe suggests that laying the blame for present-day African ills on "capitalism and imperialism" is an evasion. A greater problem facing the Africans in Achebe's fictional Kangan is their failure to confront the question asked by the heroine, Beatrice Okoh, at the conclusion of the novel: "What must a people do to appease an embittered history?"

One thing they must do, Achebe implies, is to resist the "lies" and "madness" of their corrupted leaders. The Kangan head of state, identified only by his Christian name, Sam, is a charismatic military president who falls into the trap of the personality cult. His failure to become "President-for-Life" has embittered him. It has also brought him into conflict with two childhood friends, Chris Oriko, commissioner for information, and Ikem Osodi, poet and editor of the state-run newspaper. Both had earlier helped bring Sam to power but now refuse to lie for him. Yet even while they resist Sam, Chris and Ikem see their own friendship tragically founder.

This study of crumbling friendships allows Achebe to develop another imperative facing Africa's elite: the need to face conflicts between traditional and Westernized Africans. These conflicts also emerge in the book's most striking character, Chris's lover Beatrice. An educated, independent woman, she knows traditional Africans resent her advantages, just as she resents, and resists, their proverbial wisdom: "That's when you hear all kinds of nonsense talk from girls: Better to marry a rascal than grow a moustache in your father's compound...." Yet for the elite to turn their backs on tradition, Achebe knows, is to lose all contact with the "poor and dispossessed" whom they claim to lead.

Shortly before being murdered by state security
agents, Ikem tells a group of students that the writer’s role is to give “headaches,” not “prescriptions.” Facing complexity is always a headache, but the alternative, Achebe shows, is to accept the death of conscience.

**MANY MASKS: A Life of Frank Lloyd Wright**
by Brendan Gill
Putnam’s, 1987
544 pp. $24.95

America’s best-known and most imitated architect was also a liar, a philanderer, a self-promoter, an unscrupulous businessman—in short, a charlatan. Can genius excuse such failings? Biographer Gill, who met Wright during the last decade of his life (1867-1959), seems to suggest that it can.

Wright, one learns, reinvented his Wisconsin childhood, changed his name and birth date for his autobiography, and even glossed over the truth about his education (bad grades, no high school diploma, barely three terms of college at the University of Wisconsin, Madison). He habitually took all credit for buildings designed during his apprenticeship to Chicago architects Louis H. Sullivan and Dankmar Adler; and after he went on his own, tossing off house after newfangled house in the Chicago suburbs, he even took credit for his former firm’s design of the Seattle Opera House—which had never been built!

Wright’s houses and buildings (e.g., the majestically impractical S.C. Johnson Wax Co. in Racine, Wisconsin) stand in 36 states and reflect his eclectic borrowings—from Bauhaus to Tudor to Japanese pagoda. All make strong statements. Indeed, says Gill, Wright would have despised the current architectural fad for “contextualism.” His strange “Usonian” or “Prairie” houses bullied their neighborhoods with their “carports,” massive chimneys, and wide-eaved low roofs. Wright never acknowledged professional mistakes. When Dallas retailer Stanley Marcus complained that there were no bedrooms in his house, Wright replied, “In your climate you don’t need bedrooms.”

He rarely apologized for his personal life either, even though he wreaked havoc on his family and the various women who threw themselves under the train of his affection (including his first mistress, who died in 1914 in the fire that engulfed his Taliesin home in Spring Green, Wisconsin).

Gill has provided readers with an amusing glimpse behind Wright’s masks. But if finally we are less charmed by Wright than Gill seems to be, it may be because we never met the man.
The links between the various tongues of Europe and the languages of India are a mystery. After all, as Cambridge archaeologist Renfrew notes, "between Europe and Iran and India lies a great tract of land where very different languages are spoken." According to linguistic orthodoxy, Proto-Indo-European, ancestor of such modern languages as English and Hindi, was spoken by the seminomadic Kurgan people living around 4000 B.C. in the steppe region of southern Russia. Around 3500 B.C., these warlike nomads conquered the Danube valley and also began moving southward, ultimately conquering the Indus valley in what is now India; from the Danube, the proto-language, or *Ursprache*, was carried farther west by such tribes as the Germans and the Celts.

Renfrew comes up with a different scenario. Combining linguistic theories and archaeological evidence, he places the homeland of the first speakers of Proto-Indo-European in eastern Anatolia (modern Turkey) at roughly 7000 B.C. Neither bellicose nor rootless, Renfrew's *Ursprache*-speakers were peasant farmers whose moves proceeded at the pace of a few kilometers per generation. Advances in agricultural technology led to population growth, which in turn extended the frontiers of farming and Proto-Indo-European. The *Ursprache* may have diversified during the movement period or later.

Renfrew's hypothesis offers what the old one lacked: a plausible reason for the movement of the Proto-Indo-European speakers. Renfrew is confident, too, that the synthesis of linguistics and archaeology will yield more information about the origins of specific language groups and "about the time when the linguistic and conceptual abilities of fully modern man made their appearance."

If we observed the universe by looking at its reflection in a mirror, would we arrive at the same laws of physics? If so, the universe would be "reflection invariant." Similarly, does all physics have "rotational symmetry," or is there a preferred direction in the universe?

Following in the footsteps of Albert Einstein, contemporary physicists, including author Zee of the University of California, Santa Barbara, are
driven by a search for beauty in the universe. Indeed, the belief that nature at the fundamental level "is beautifully designed" guides physicists to "replace the multitude of phenomenological laws with a single fundamental law, so as to arrive at a unified description of Nature."

Even as long ago as the 17th century, Galileo recognized that two experimenters in constant motion with respect to each other—for example, one on a cart and the other standing still on the ground—should arrive at the same results in conducting their experiments. The symmetry of "relativistic invariance tells us," Zee says, "that it is impossible to decide whether we are at rest or moving steadily." Not so obvious or intuitive was Einstein's revelation that when the relative speed of two experimenters, one standing on a train platform, the other on a train, begins to approach the speed of light, space and time as observed by the two take on strange and new properties. According to the mathematics of the Special Theory of Relativity, the experimenter on the train would see that clocks on the platform seem to tick slowly, and objects would all seem to be compressed. But the observer on the platform would see the same effects on the train whizzing by. Although the general public has long been amazed by these "strange features," few people realized that only through his "profound appreciation of the power of symmetry" was Einstein able to arrive at his conclusions about "spacetime."

In 1956, physicists T. D. Lee and C. N. Yang found that the symmetry of reflection was violated during a certain subatomic process: It seems that an electron emitted in the decay of a particular nucleus is more likely to emerge in one direction than the other. Although shaken by this discovery, physicists continue to dream of "a unified description of Nature" in which the four forces of physics—the strong nuclear force, the weak nuclear force, electromagnetism, and gravity—are tied together in a "Grand Unification Theory."
Edward Teach, commonly called Blackbeard, was the best-known pirate captain of the Atlantic world during the early 18th century. Pursued by the Royal Navy, Teach was finally caught and executed in 1718.
Life Under the Jolly Roger

For centuries, as merchant ships plied the high seas, pirates lurked somewhere nearby to prey upon them. Usually murderous and cruel, such maritime brigands have seldom been completely lawless. Indeed, throughout history, and regardless of national origin, most freebooters have avoided anarchy; in some cases, they fashioned their own ethical codes as well as special notions of authority. Between 1716 and 1726, the brief heyday of Anglo-American piracy, thousands of men sailed under the Jolly Roger. Drawing upon 18th-century British archives, including the court records of sailors captured and tried for piracy, historian Marcus Rediker describes the unusual society of these “desperate Rogues” who not only dreamed of wealth and revenge but also claimed a certain fraternity and justice.

by Marcus Rediker

Writing to the Board of Trade in 1724, Governor Alexander Spotswood of Virginia lamented his lack of “some safe opportunity to get home” to London. He insisted that he would travel only in a well-armed man-of-war. “Your Lordships will easily conceive my Meaning when you reflect on the Vigorous part I’ve acted to suppress Pirates: and if those barbarous Wretches can be moved to cut off the Nose & Ears of a Master for but correcting his own Sailors, what inhuman treatment must I expect, should I fall within their power, who have been markt as the principle object of their vengeance, for cutting off their arch Pirate Thatch [Edward Teach, also known as Blackbeard], with all his grand Designs, & making so many of their Fraternity to swing in the open air of Virginia.”

Spotswood knew these pirates well. He had authorized the expedition that returned to Virginia claiming Blackbeard’s head as a trophy. He knew that pirates had a fondness for revenge, that they often punished captured ship captains for “correcting” their crews, and that a kind of “fraternity” prevailed among them. He had good reason to fear them.

Anglo-American pirates created a crisis for the Empire with their relentless attacks upon merchants’ property and international commerce.
between 1716 and 1726. Accordingly, these freebooters occupy a grand position in the long, grim history of robbery at sea. Their numbers, near 5,000, were extraordinary, and their plundering in the Atlantic and elsewhere was exceptional in both volume and value.

Piracy represented crime on a massive scale. It was a way of life voluntarily chosen, for the most part, by large numbers of men who directly challenged the harsh ways of the maritime society from which they excepted themselves. Beneath the Jolly Roger, "the banner of King Death," a new social world took shape once pirates had, as one of them put it, "the choice in themselves."

Going on the Account

From records that describe the activities of pirate ships, and from reports or projections of crew sizes, it appears that 1,800 to 2,400 Anglo-American pirates prowled the seas between 1716 and 1718, 1,500 to 2,000 between 1719 and 1722, and 1,000 to 1,500, declining to fewer than 200, between 1723 and 1726. In the only estimate we have from the other side of the law, a band of pirates in 1716 claimed that "30 Company of them," or roughly 2,400 men, pried the oceans of the globe. In all, some 4,500 to 5,500 men went, as they called it, "upon the account." The pirates' chief scourge, Britain's Royal Navy, employed an average of only 13,000 men in any given year between 1716 and 1726.

These sea robbers preyed upon the most lucrative trade and, like their predecessors, sought bases for their depredations in the Caribbean Sea and the Indian Ocean. The Bahama Islands, undefended and ungoverned by the crown, began in 1716 to attract pirates by the hundreds. By 1718 a torrent of complaints had moved George I to commission Governor Woodes Rogers to lead an expedition to bring the islands under control. Rogers's efforts largely succeeded, and the pirates dispersed to the unpeopled inlets of the Carolinas and to Africa. They had frequented African shores as early as 1691; by 1718, Madagascar served as both an entrepôt for booty and a place for temporary settlement. At the mouth of the Sierra Leone River on Africa's west coast, pirates stopped off for "whoring and drinking" and to unload goods.

Theaters of operations for pirates shifted, however, according to the deployments of the Royal Navy. Pirates favored the Caribbean's small, unsettled cays and shallow waters, which proved hard to negotiate for the men-of-war that gave chase. But generally, as one pirate noted, these

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The notorious women pirates Mary Read and Anne Bonny proved to be as bold as any of Calico Jack Rackam's crew. By "pleading their bellies" (pregnancy) at their trials in 1721, they both managed to dodge the gallows.

rovers were "dispers't into several parts of the World." Sea robbers sought and usually found bases near major trade routes, as distant as possible from the powers of the state.

Almost all the pirates had earlier labored as merchant seamen, Royal Navy sailors, or privateersmen.* The vast majority came from captured merchantmen as volunteers, for reasons suggested by Dr. Samuel Johnson's observation that "no man will be a sailor who has contrivance enough to get himself into a jail; for being in a ship is being in jail with the chance of being drowned... A man in jail has more room, better food, and commonly better company."

Dr. Johnson had a point. Service aboard ship did not differ essentially from incarceration in a jail. Life was harsh in both places. During the early 18th century, disease, accidents, and death were commonplace aboard ships; natural disasters threatened incessantly, rations were often meager, and discipline was brutal, even murderous on occasion. Peacetime wages were low; there were fraud and irregularities in the distribution of pay. British merchant seamen also had to face the constant risk of impressment by the Royal Navy, whose commanders sought recruits on land and sea.

*Privateers were privately owned armed vessels licensed by governments in time of war to capture the merchant ships of an enemy. Proceeds were distributed among king, investors, ship's officers, and seamen. Privateering was abolished by the Declaration of Paris in 1856.
Some pirates had served in the fleet, where conditions aboard ship were no less harsh. Food supplies often ran short, pay was low, mortality was high, discipline severe, and desertion consequently chronic. As one officer reported, the Royal Navy had trouble fighting pirates because the king’s ships were “so much disabled by sickness, death, and desertion of their seamen.”

Pirates who had served on privateering vessels knew well that such employment was far less onerous than that on merchant or naval ships. Food was usually more plentiful, the pay higher, and the work shifts generally shorter. Even so, owing to rigid discipline and other grievances, mutinies were not uncommon. During Woodes Rogers’s successful privateering expedition against the Spanish (1708–11), one Peter Clark was thrown into irons for wishing himself “aboard a Pirate” and saying that “he should be glad that an Enemy, who could over-power us, was a-long-side of us.”

Most men became pirates when their merchant vessels were captured. Colonel Benjamin Bennet wrote to the Council of Trade and Plantations in 1718, setting forth his worries about freebooters in the West Indies: “I fear they will soon multiply for so many are willing to joyn with them when taken.” The seizure of a merchant ship was usually followed by a moment of great drama. The pirate captain asked the assembled seamen of the captured vessel who among them would serve under the Jolly Roger, and frequently several stepped forward. Far fewer pirates began as mutineers who had collectively seized control of a merchant vessel. But piracy was not an option open to landlubbers, since sea robbers, Daniel Defoe observed, “entertain’d so contemptible a Notion of Landmen.”

Rank Hath No Privileges

Ages are known for 117 pirates active between 1716 and 1726. The range was 17 to 50 years, the mean 27.4, and the median 27; the 20-24 and 25-29 age categories had the highest concentrations, with 39 and 37 men, respectively. Three in five were 25 or older. The age distribution was almost identical to that of the British merchant service as a whole, suggesting that piracy held roughly equal attraction for sailors of all ages.

Though evidence is sketchy, most pirates seem not to have been bound to land and home by familial ties or obligations. Wives and children were rarely mentioned in the records of trials of pirates, and pirate vessels, to forestall desertion, often would “take no Married Man.” Almost without exception, pirates, like the larger body of seafaring men, came from the lowest social classes in Britain and its American colonies. They were, as a royal official observed, “desperate Rogues” who could see little hope in life ashore.

Yet contemporaries who claimed that pirates had “no regular command among them” mistook a different social order—different from the hierarchy aboard merchant, naval, and privateering vessels—for disorder. This arrangement was conceived by the pirates themselves. Their hall-
mark was a rough, improvised egalitarianism that placed authority in the
collective hands of the crew.

A striking uniformity of rules and customs prevailed aboard pirate
ships, each of which functioned under the terms of written “articles”—a
compact drawn up at the beginning of a voyage or upon election of a new
captain, and agreed to by the crew. Under these articles, crews allocated
authority, distributed plunder, and enforced discipline. In effect, these ar-
rangements made the captain the creature of his crew.

Favoring someone both bold of temper and skilled in navigation, the
sailors elected their captain. They gave him few privileges. He “or any
other Officer is allowed no more [food] than another man, nay, the Captain
cannot keep his Cabbin to himself.” William Snelgrave, a merchant captain
seized by pirates, noted with displeasure that the crew slept on the ship
wherever they pleased, “the Captain himself not being allowed a Bed.”

Distributing Plunder

The crew granted the captain unquestioned authority “in fighting,
chasing, or being chased,” but “in all other Matters whatsoever” he was
“governed by a Majority.” As the majority chose, so did it depose. Cap-
tains were ousted from their positions for cowardice, cruelty, or refusing
“to take and plunder English Vessels.” One captain incurred the class-
conscious wrath of his crew for being too “Gentlemen-like.” Occasionally,
a despotic captain was summarily executed. As pirate Francis Kennedy
explained, most sea robbers, “having suffered formerly from the ill-treat-
ment of their officers, provided carefully against any such evil” once they
arranged their own command.

To prevent the misuse of authority, pirates delegated countervailing
powers to the quartermaster, who was elected to represent and protect
“the Interest of the Crew.” The quartermaster, who was not considered
an officer in the merchant service, was elevated to a position of trust and
authority. His tasks were to adjudicate minor disputes, to distribute food
and money, and, in some instances, to lead the attacks on prize vessels. He
served as a “civil Magistrate” and dispensed necessaries “with an Equality
to them all,” carefully guarding against the galling and divisive use of
privilege and preferment that characterized the distribution of the necessi-
ties of life in other maritime occupations. This dual authority was a distinc-
tive feature of pirate vessels.

The decisions that had the greatest bearing on the welfare of the crew
were generally reserved to the council, the highest authority on the
pirate ship. Pirates drew upon an ancient custom, largely forgotten by the
18th century, under which the master consulted his entire crew in making
crucial decisions. The council determined such matters as where the best
prizes could be taken and how any dissension was to be resolved. Some
crews resorted frequently to the council, “carrying every thing by a major-
ity of votes”; others set up the council as a court. The decisions made by
this body were sacrosanct, and even the boldest captain dared not challenge a council’s mandate.

The distribution of plunder was regulated explicitly by the ship’s articles, which allocated booty according to skills and duties. Abolishing the wage relation, pirates turned to a share system to allocate their take. Captain and quartermaster each received from one and one-half to two shares; gunners, boatswains, mates, carpenters, and doctors, one and one-quarter to one and one-half; all others got one share each. The pay system represented a radical departure from the highly unequal allocation of pay in the merchant service, Royal Navy, or privateering. Indeed, the pirates devised perhaps one of the most egalitarian plans for the disposition of resources to be found anywhere in the early 18th century.

But not all booty was dispensed this way. A portion went into a “common fund” to provide for the men who sustained lasting injury. The loss of eyesight or any appendage merited special compensation. This rudimentary welfare system served to guard against debilities caused by accidents, to protect skills, to enhance recruitment, and to promote loyalty within the group.

The articles also regulated discipline aboard ship, though “discipline” is perhaps a misnomer for a system of rules that left large ranges of
behavior uncontrolled. Less arbitrary than that of the merchant service and less codified than that of the Royal Navy, discipline among pirates always depended on a collective sense of transgression. Many misdeeds were accorded "what Punishment the Captain and Majority of the Company shall think fit," and it is noteworthy that pirates did not often resort to the whip.

Three major methods of discipline were employed, all conditioned by the fact that pirate ships were crowded; an average crew numbered near 80 on a 250-ton vessel. The articles of Bartholomew Roberts's ship revealed one tactic for maintaining order: "No striking one another on board, but every Man's Quarrels to be ended on Shore at Sword and Pistol." By taking such conflicts off the ship (and symbolically off the sea), this practice was designed to promote harmony in the crowded quarters below decks.

### Regulating Conflict

The ideal of harmony was also enforced through the decision to make a crew member the "Governor of an Island." Men who were incorrigibly disruptive or who transgressed important rules were simply marooned. For defrauding his mates by taking more than a proper share of plunder, for malingering during battle, for keeping secrets from the crew, or for stealing, a pirate risked being deposited "where he was sure to encounter Hardships."

The ultimate sanction was execution. This penalty was imposed for bringing on board "a Boy or a Woman" or for meddling with a "prudent Woman" on a prize ship, but was most commonly invoked to punish a captain who abused his authority. Some crews attempted to avoid disciplinary problems by taking as a recruit "no Body against their Wills." By the same logic, they would keep no unwilling person.

Yet for all the efforts to limit authority and to maintain harmony, conflict could not always be contained. Occasionally upon election of a new captain, men who favored other leadership drew up new articles, took another ship, and sailed away from their former mates. But the very process by which new crews were established helped to ensure a social uniformity and, as we shall see, a sense of fraternity among pirates.

One important mechanism in this continuity can be seen by charting the connections among pirate crews. The diagram on the following page, arranged according to vessel captaincy, demonstrates that by splintering, by sailing in consorts, or by other associations, roughly 3,600 pirates—more than 70 percent of all those active between 1716 and 1726—fit into two main lines of genealogical descent.

Captain Benjamin Hornigold and the pirate rendezvous in the Bahamas stood at the origin of an intricate lineage that ended with the hanging of John Phillips's crew in June 1724. The second line, spawned in the chance meeting of the lately mutinous crews of George Lowther and Edward Low in 1722, culminated in the British government's capture, trial,
Connections among Anglo-American pirate crews, 1714-26. [Key to symbols—(---) direct descent; crew division because of dispute, overcrowding, or election of a new captain; (=) sailed in consort; (- - -) other connection: common crew members, contact without sailing together; (*) used the Bahama Islands as rendezvous.]

and executions of William Fly and his men in July 1726. It was primarily within and through this network that the social organization of the pirate ship took on its significance, transmitting and preserving customs and meanings and helping to structure and perpetuate the pirates' social world.

Pirates constructed their own world in defiance of the one they left behind, particularly the maritime system of authority. At a trial in Boston
in 1718, merchant captain Thomas Checkley told of the capture of his ship by pirates who "pretended" he said, "to be Robin Hoods Men." Historian Eric Hobsbawm has defined such "social banditry" as a universal and virtually unchanging phenomenon, an "endemic peasant protest against oppression and poverty: a cry for vengeance on the rich and the oppressors." Its goal is "a traditional world in which men are justly dealt with, not a new and perfect world"; Hobsbawm calls its advocates "revolutionary traditionalists." Pirates, of course, were not peasants, but they fit Hobsbawm's formulation in every other respect. Of special importance was their "cry for vengeance."

In his letter to the Board of Trade in 1724, Virginia's Governor Spotswood told no more than the simple truth when he expressed his fear of pirate reprisals, for the very names of pirate ships made the same threat. Edward Teach, whom Spotswood's men captured and killed, called his vessel Queen Anne's Revenge; other notorious craft were Stede Bonnet's Revenge and John Cole's New York Revenge's Revenge. The foremost target of vengeance was the merchant captain, a man "past all restraint," who often made life miserable for his crew. Spotswood noted how pirates avenged the captain's past "correcting" of his sailors.

Beasts of Prey

Upon seizing a merchantman, pirates often administered the "Distribution of Justice," "enquiring into the Manner of the Commander's Behaviour to their Men, and those, against whom Complaint was made" were "whipp'd and pickled." Many captured captains were "barbarously used," and some were summarily executed. The punishment of captains was not indiscriminate: A captain who had been "an honest Fellow that never abused any Sailors" was often rewarded by pirates. To pirates, revenge was simply justice; punishment was meted out to barbarous captains, as befitted the captains' crimes.

Freebooters who fell into the hands of the British government were treated severely. The official view of piracy was outlined in 1718 by Vice-Admiralty Judge Nicholas Trott in his charge to the jury in the trial of Stede Bonnet and 33 members of his crew at Charleston, South Carolina. Declaring that "the Sea was given by God for the use of Men, and is subject to Dominion and Property, as well as the Land," Trott observed of the accused that "the Law of Nations never granted to them a Power to change the Right of Property." Pirates on trial were denied benefits of clergy, were "called Hostis Humani Generis, with whom neither Faith nor Oath" were to be kept, and were regarded as "Brutes, and Beasts of Prey." Turning from the jury to the accused, Trott circumspectly surmised that "no further Good or Benefit can be expected from you but by the Example of your Deaths."

The insistence on obtaining this final benefit locked royal officials and pirates into a war of reciprocal terror. Just as the authorities offered boun-
ties for the capture of pirates, so did pirates “offer any price” for certain officials. The *American Weekly Mercury* reported that, in Virginia in 1720, one of six pirates facing the gallows “called for a Bottle of Wine, and taking a Glass of it, he Drank Damnation to the Governour and Confusion to the Colony, which the rest pledged.” Not to be outdone, Governor Spotswood thought it “necessary for the greater Terrour to hang up four of them in Chains.”

At the Charleston trial over which Trott presided, Richard Allen, attorney general of South Carolina, told the jury that “pirates prey upon all Mankind, their own Species and Fellow-Creatures without Distinction of Nations or Religions.” Allen was right in claiming that pirates did not respect nationality in their plunders, but he was wrong in claiming that they did not respect any of their “Fellow-Creatures.” Pirates did not prey on one another.

On the contrary, they showed a recurrent willingness to join forces at sea and in port. In April 1719, when Howell Davis sailed into the Sierra Leone River, the pirates captained by Thomas Cocklyn were wary until they saw on the approaching ship “her Black Flag”; then “immediately they were easy in their minds, and a little time after,” the crews “saluted one another with their Cannon.” Other crews exchanged similar greetings and, like Davis and Cocklyn who combined their forces, often invoked an unwritten code of hospitality to forge spontaneous alliances.

**Skull and Bones**

Without a doubt, one of the strongest indicators of solidarity was the absence of discord among different pirate crews. To some extent, this was even a transnational matter: French, Dutch, Spanish, and Anglo-American pirates usually cooperated peaceably, only occasionally getting into conflict. Anglo-American crews consistently refused to attack one another.

In no way was the pirate sense of fraternity, which Governor Spotswood and others noted, better shown than in the threats and acts of revenge taken by pirates. Theirs was truly a case of hanging together or being hanged separately. In April 1717, the pirate ship *Whidah* was wrecked near Boston. Most of its crew perished; the survivors were jailed. In July, Thomas Fox, a Boston ship captain, was taken by other pirates who “Questioned him whether anything was done to the Pyrates in Boston Goall,” promising “that if the Prisoners Suffered they would Kill every Body they took belonging to New England.” Shortly after this incident, Teach’s crew captured a merchant vessel and, “because she belonged to Boston, [Teach] alleging the People of Boston had hanged some of the Pirates, so burnt her.” Teach declared that all Boston ships deserved a similar fate.

In January 1724, Lieutenant Governor Charles Hope of Bermuda wrote to the Board of Trade that he found it difficult to procure trial evidence against pirates because residents “feared that this very execution
...would make our vessels fare the worse for it, when they happen'd to fall into pirate hands." The threats of revenge were sometimes effective.

Pirates also affirmed their unity symbolically. Certainly the best-known symbol of piracy is the flag, the Jolly Roger. Less known is the fact that the flag was very widely used. No fewer, and probably a great many more, than 2,500 men sailed under this banner alone. The Jolly Roger was described as a "black Ensign, in the Middle of which is a large white Skeleton with a Dart in one hand striking a bleeding Heart, and in the other an Hour Glass." Although there was considerable variation in particulars among these flags, there was also a general uniformity of chosen images. The flag's background was black, adorned with white representational figures. The most common symbol was the human skull, or "death's head," sometimes isolated but more frequently the most prominent feature of an entire skeleton. Other recurring items were a weapon—cutlass, sword, or dart—and an hour glass.

**Cleansing the Seas**

The flag was intended to terrify the pirate's prey, but its interlocking symbols—death, violence, limited time—simultaneously pointed to meaningful parts of the seaman's experience and eloquently bespoke the pirates' own consciousness of themselves as preyed upon in return.

The self-righteousness of many Anglo-American pirates was strongly linked to their vision of a world—traditional, mythical, or utopian—"in which men are justly dealt with," as described by Hobsbawn. Indeed, some authorities, including the British Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, feared that pirates might "set up a sort of Commonwealth" in uninhabited regions, since "no Power in those Parts of the World could have been able to dispute it with them."

But piracy never took national shape, and indeed, by 1726, it had been effectively suppressed by vigorous governmental action. Circumstantial factors such as the remobilization of the Royal Navy cannot account fully for its demise. The number of men in the fleet increased from 6,298 in 1725 to 16,872 in 1726 and again to 20,697 in 1727, which had some bearing on the declining number of sea robbers. Yet some 20,000 sailors had been in the navy in 1719 and 1720, years when pirates were numerous. Seafaring wages only occasionally rose above 30 shillings per month between 1713 and the mid-1730s. The conditions of life at sea did not change appreciably until Britain went to war with Spain in 1739.

The royal pardons offered to pirates in 1717 and 1718 failed to rid the sea of robbers. Since the pardons specified that only crimes committed at certain times and in particular regions would be forgiven, many pirates saw enormous latitude for official trickery and refused to surrender. The offer of amnesty having failed, royal officials intensified the naval campaign against piracy—with great and gruesome effect. Corpses dangled in chains in British ports around the world "as a Spectacle for the Warning of oth-
No fewer than 400, and probably 500 to 600, Anglo-American pirates were executed between 1716 and 1726. Parliament also passed laws that criminalized all contact with pirates. Anyone known to "truck, barter, exchange" with pirates, furnish them with stores, or even consult with them might be punished with death.

The campaign to cleanse the seas was supported by clergymen, royal officials, and publicists who variously sought, through sermons, proclamations, pamphlets, and the newspapers, to create an image of the pirate that would justify his extermination. Especially among seamen and dealers in stolen cargo, piracy had always depended in some measure on the rumors and tales of its successes. Not surprisingly, in 1722 and 1723, after a spate of well-publicized hangings and a burst of propaganda, the pirate population began to decline. By 1726, only a handful of the fraternity remained.

The Anglo-American pirates themselves unwittingly took a hand in their own destruction. From the outset, theirs had been a fragile existence. They produced nothing and had no secure place in the economic order. They had no nation, no home; they were widely dispersed; their community had virtually no geographic boundaries. Try as they might, they were unable to create reliable ways of replenishing their ranks or mobilizing their collective strength. These deficiencies made them, in the long run, relatively easy prey.

Although the heyday of the Anglo-American pirates soon passed, it remains a remarkable historical phenomenon. For a brief time, a sizeable number of desperate men lived beyond the church, beyond the family, and beyond disciplined labor. Using the sea to distance themselves from the powers of the state, they made a society in which poor men in canvas jackets and tarred breeches had "the choice in themselves."
FOLK MEDICINE IN MOSCOW

Russian Remedies

To a degree that astonishes Western visitors, the residents of the Soviet capital rely on folk medicine—a pervasive system of beliefs, superstitions, and amateur medical practices. For many reasons—shortages of commonly needed drugs, impurities or dilution of existing drugs, lack of information about modern medical techniques, enduring mistrust (founded and unfounded) of chemical preparations of all kinds—folk medicine plays an important role in the average Muscovite’s health care. Nancy Condee, a specialist on the Soviet Union, here describes some of the more popular nostrums that she and her husband, Volodya Padunov, encountered during a research stint in Moscow.

Folk cures vary enormously in Moscow, depending on which folk is ill. An Armenian student was shocked to learn that my husband, Volodya, was cooking chicken soup for me, his ailing wife. “Chicken soup! Have you lost your mind?” he shouted. “That’s all wrong. Melons! That’s what she needs for a cold.” And off he went to fetch the care package sent each week from Yerevan by his mother.

By far the most common material ingredients in Russian folk medicine are, not surprisingly, potatoes, garlic, onion, and vodka. A cold, for example, may be cured, or at least made more bearable, in a variety of ways:

- Dig up a potato with the earth still clinging to it. Boil it in its jacket and inhale the vapors.
- Drink pepper vodka. Better yet, one taxi driver joked, drink a mixture of vodka and water every hour: one glass of vodka to each drop of water.
- Buy pig fat and stick garlic cloves in it. Rub the chunk of fat all over your body before going to bed at night. When you wake up the cold will be gone. Try bagder grease with oil of mint as a variant.
- Heat a clove of garlic in warm water and stick it up your nose.
- If an earache accompanies the cold, place a sliver of roasted onion in the ailing ear.

One literary critic, a reformed drinker, had the simplest cure. “Just drink,” he advised me, waxing nostalgic for the good old days. “When I was younger and used to drink a great deal, I never suffered from anything. Now that I’ve stopped, I’m ill all the time.”

Vodka may be the best general pana-
RUSSIAN REMEDIES

But the most common Russian cure for a chest cold is mustard plasters (gor-chichniki). Ten of them may be bought for five kopeks (about seven cents) in any Moscow pharmacy. Slightly larger than playing cards, the dry plasters must be dipped briefly in warm water and then placed, mustard side out, along the back and side, avoiding the spine. Depending on the strength of the mustard, the patient's torso may be wrapped first in newspaper to protect the skin. The torso is then rewrapped in newspaper, flannel, a wide scarf, or whatever is at hand, and the patient must endure both the burning sensation and the unpleasant odor as long as possible, so as to produce maximum circulation of the blood in the affected area.

Avoiding the Kidneys

Increased circulation is also the primary purpose of banki, or cupping glasses, still widely used in Moscow. Small, thick jars with rounded bottoms about the size of shot glasses, banki are said to cure all severe respiratory problems. Any stick, such as a knitting needle, a pencil, or, best of all, a pair of scissors, is tightly wrapped in cotton wool and dipped in alcohol. The cotton swab is then lit, quickly swirled inside the jar so as to create a vacuum, and the jar is applied to the oiled torso, avoiding the kidneys, nipples, and the heart. This is easier said than done, and easier done than experienced, my friends tell me. If the cotton swab is inserted into the cupping glass too quickly, the vacuum will be too weak and the glass will fall off. If the swab is passed too slowly around the glass, the overheated jar will burn the patient's skin.

Properly administered banki, I am told, will adhere to the spot where the cold is located and will suck out the illness. After the treatment, the suction is carefully broken by inserting a finger under the glass. Even when correctly applied, banki will leave black-and-blue welts on the skin for up to a month.

In trying repeatedly to find someone who would apply banki to me, I discovered a curious and contradictory rule of modern medicine: As such treatments as banki become increasingly outmoded, the knowledge of their application becomes correspondingly limited to medical experts. While many friends and acquaintances have had banki applied to them, no one was confident enough to apply them to someone else. Find a nurse, I was told. Having found one, I met the next obstacle: I needed a sound medical reason to have banki applied. Curiosity would not suffice. In desperation, I offered up Volodya, then suffering from a severe chest cold, and the nurse finally agreed. Volodya, however, did not. Had he been feeling better, he explained, he would have tried it out. But with a cold and all, it was difficult to be enthusiastic about welts.

The Marvels of Mumiyo

Lest the reader suspect that I am making this up as I go along, I would like to stress here that there are all kinds of other Russian folk remedies that I have chosen not to include, remedies of which the average Muscovite is no longer even aware. These range from the quaint—bark leaf baths, for example—to the bizarre (earthworm salves, urine rubs,
RUSSIAN REMEDIES

bee-sting therapy, potato suppositories). However resistant Soviet city-dwellingers are to taking pills when a concoction of crushed daisies (for the skin), fennel tea (to help you sleep), or red bilberries (for rheumatism) will work just as well, they are now much harder to convince that malaria might be cured by wearing amber beads; that colds might best be treated by abstaining from all liquids for 24 hours; or that an epileptic seizure may be halted by stepping on the little finger of the epileptic as he or she is writhing on the floor.

No explanation of contemporary folk cures is complete, however, without a description of mumiyo. A black, congealed substance like tar, mumiyo is sold under the counter at farmers' markets and by other unofficial suppliers of folk remedies.

Mumiyo was originally discovered by hunters, who noticed that injured animals always returned to specific spots where they would lick an oozing resin from crevices in the rocks. Scraped from the rocks and boiled down into a hard, concentrated form, this resin was found by the hunters to have healing properties, and became used for a wide variety of ailments.* Whatever lengths hunters went to in their search for mumiyo—the many verst traveled over rough terrain to scrape the precious substance from the rocks, stalking wounded animals to their secret healing places; the return trips in the dead of night, when other hunters could not follow—their enthusiasm for the miracle substance seems mild in comparison.

*Mumiyo has been identified, variously, as bitumen (as in asphalt or tar) or as a coniferous oil or resin. Ancient Persians and Greeks, thinking that this substance was used for the preservation of human corpses in Egypt, mistakenly dubbed those preserved bodies “mummies.” In fact, the Egyptians used the substance only for the preservation of animal corpses.

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comparison with that of the Moscow intelligentsia. Theirs is a zeal that borders on religious.

*Mumiyo,* as it turns out, has all the necessary elements of a cult cure: It is found only in the remote wilds; it cures animals; it is rare. No one knows exactly what it is. And above all, it is ugly.

As a rule, the curiosity of the academy lags far behind that of the public. In the case of *mumiyo,* however, the opposite is true. The reader will be gratified to learn that the first scholarly *mumiyo* symposium took place in Dushanbe as early as 1965. Seven years later, at a medical conference in Patigorsk, Professor E. N. Kozlovskii presented a definitive set of guidelines for the use of *mumiyo.* For the treatment of diabetes, for example, he recommends the following 25-day regimen:

1. For the first 10 days, a tablespoon of *mumiyo* solution (17.5 grams of *mumiyo* dissolved in 500 grams of water) three times a day, 30 minutes before eating.
2. For the next 10 days, a tablespoon and a half of the solution three times a day before eating.
3. For the next five days, a tablespoon of the solution three times a day just before each meal.

If nausea results from the ingestion of the *mumiyo* solution, Professor Kozlovskii advises adding a half tablespoon of warm mineral water.

By 1976, *Mumiyo and Its Healing Properties,* the major work on *mumiyo,* appeared. According to its authors, Iu. Nuraliev and P. Denisenko, *mumiyo* is capable of curing chills, epilepsy, giddiness, and anemia. Their work contains many helpful charts and diagrams, cardiographs and scales, photographs of *mumiyo* chunks with little rulers under them, illustrations of the ecological sources of Asiatic *mumiyo,* tables documenting the influence of *mumiyo* on white mice, rabbits, and rats, whose ailments range from traumatic neuritis to infected paws.

Thanks to the work of these two scholars, links have been established between *mumiyo* and other miracle cures such as Indian *salodzhit,* Arabian *arakulshibol,* and even the well-known Mongolian remedy *brakshun.*

Most important, however, is the research by these two scholars demonstrating that *mumiyo* was recommended more than 2500 years ago by no less a figure than Aristotle. Among the ailments for which Aristotle thought to provide *mumiyo* cures were congenital deafness, nosebleeds, and hiccups, for which you coat your tongue with a mixture of *mumiyo* and honey.

During the last 10 years, *mumiyo*’s popularity has spread to virtually all sectors of Moscow society: cashiers, students, hairdressers, journalists, cleaning women, teachers, train station porters, shop clerks, taxi drivers, and Party officials. As its reputation grew, so did its curative powers. “You know us,” one Moscow State University student explained. “We are a people of extremes. If we find a cure for something, it works for everything.”

And so, apparently, it does. “Broken bones, colds, cancer, burns, ulcers,” enumerated one taxi driver, as we raced to a particular pharmacy in a vain search for leeches and *mumiyo,* “and, of course, old age. It can make you look younger.”

Back to Banki

As the interest in the cure reached epidemic proportions, counterfeit *mumiyo* began to be manufactured and sold around Moscow. Panic seized the *mumiyo* market, and with good reason. There is no fear as great as the fear that the snake-oil salesman is selling you imitation snake oil.

Hunters in the Pamirs have had more success stalking the elusive *mumiyo* than I have had in the farmers’ markets
of Moscow. Perhaps it is all for the best. Given the going rate of about eight rubles ($11.28) a gram, I could only afford to look at it.

One flower-seller, however, offered to sell me what she claimed to be an equally effective miracle cure, a hard brown object that resembles something left by an inattentive dog owner. This curious substance, propolis, is ostensibly made up of the residue that builds up on the inside walls of beehives and is scraped off by the beekeeper at the end of the summer.

Grated into a liter of vodka—that godsend to folk medicine—propolis cures a cough when taken internally, and heals a burn or an aching muscle when rubbed on the skin. The flower-seller was most willing to part with a 100-gram chunk for a mere 20 rubles ($28.20). She was less willing to part with it for 10 rubles, but finally agreed.

I brought the prized object that same evening to a nearby Moscow family, in hopes of further enlightenment on the use and benefits of propolis. As luck would have it, the family had another visitor, Ania, a banki expert. And so the events of the evening took an unexpected twist.

The female contingent gathered in the back room, armed with banki, cotton wool, and alcohol. I was asked to strip to the waist. Ania was indeed an expert; I felt at most a warm, tugging sensation as the banki took hold, sucking my skin up inside the glasses in harmless, mushroom-shaped globs. Once removed, however, the banki left my back spotted with enormous welts—perfectly round, bright red, the size of my palm—where the blood vessels had burst beneath the skin. My back looked as if I had yielded to the amorous ministrations of a very large octopus.

The evening was not over. To my horror, Ania insisted that I now apply banki to her, as a trial run in case my husband should fall ill and require banki. I replied, with a cheery insistence that bordered on hysteria, that my husband never really got ill. Everyone nodded politely, but my gambit failed. I was then led, step by step, through the administering of banki. I kept telling myself that, in case of severe mutilation, the propolis might fix things up. To my great surprise, I managed to apply the banki without permanently scarring my patient teacher.

Finally, when we had both rested, as is of course required after the application of banki, I was sent home, welts and all, to my husband and child. Having listened to the story of my initiation into the mysteries of banki, Volodya was oddly insistent that his cold was much better.
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**Fascism Lives?**

Charles F. Delzell in “Remembering Mussolini” (“Italy,” WQ, Spring 88) points out how widely the Duce was admired in the 1920s and ’30s.

What Delzell does not comment on is the power of the ideas that the Duce cobbled together and called “Fascism.” His nationalism and syndicalism go back to the 19th century, his corporativism to the medieval guilds, his ethical state to Plato.

These ideas also pop up in American presidential campaigns. Yet no one associates them with Mussolini or Fascism. Consider the following examples:

- In 1960, Jack Kennedy’s ringing “Ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country” became a classic of American political rhetoric. What nobody seems to remember is that this patriotic appeal, this call for sacrifice for the Fatherland, was the core of Fascism.

- In his 1984 presidential campaign, Gary Hart spoke of a national industrial policy, a coming together of labor and management in a common endeavor to revive an ailing industry like steel. At the time, everyone labeled him a bright young man with ideas. What nobody seemed to remember was that these ideas smacked of Mussolini’s corporativism—a scheme that united labor and capital in the various economic sectors into unions or lobbies. Their common economic interests, it was argued, would overcome their class antagonism.

- In 1987, Pat Robertson called for a new baby boom to create more workers and taxpayers. What few remember is that this notion of “the uterus as a national resource”—as one columnist put it—echoes Mussolini’s “battle of the births.”

As the current presidential campaign heats up, perhaps we need to remind ourselves that we are not immune to these “Fascist” ideas and that the fascist lurks in us all. We need to ask ourselves: What would it take to let a Mussolini loose in this country?

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**Democracy Italian Style**

The collapse of the 47th Italian government since the end of World War II prompted the London Times (March 15, 1988) to assert that “all the major parties in Italy now agree that the period of revolving-door governments must come to an end.”

A typical expression of Western alarm at Italy’s failure to conform to a stereotype of stable parliamentary government. The Times continued: “Radical political reform—modifying the proportional representational system, streamlining the chambers of parliament—requires strong and durable leadership.” Remarkably, in this instance the newspaper recommended a Socialist-Communist coalition administration; it was not advocating resort to a Mussolinian figure.

The problem with an analysis of this sort lies in its understanding, or its misunderstanding, of democracy.

Beyond question, Italy since 1945 has been a democracy, if only by contrast with what went before. Yet so often democracy is perceived in political terms alone. Joseph LaPalombara’s sketch of current Italian society (“Partitocrazia”) discloses the fallacy of this narrow view. Popular Italian attitudes toward the political process, whether liberal-oligarchical, fascist, or democratic, have always been skeptical—best summed up by the word *garbo*, defined by Luigi Barzini as “the careful circumspection with which one slowly changes political allegiance when things are on the verge of becoming dangerous.” A prescription for curbing political fervor.

So, while Italy’s political classes engage in the machinations of *partitocrazia*, Italian pluralism—the true essence of democracy—rests on myriad social conventions that seem to the outsider, in LaPalombara’s words, “illogical, devious, corrupt, and inefficient.” However, these conventions provide the oil of social civility, and, being mostly of organic growth, are of greater significance than formal and more artificial constitutional forms and practices. In this sense, Italy’s chaotic parliamentary system is merely a façade for real Italian democracy, which is a kind of subterranean phenomenon.
On the other hand, one should not dismiss all concern for Italy’s governmental instability. Those national characteristics that today make for a healthy social pluralism were not lacking between 1918 and 1922 when, as Delzell describes (in "Remembering Mussolini"), they succumbed in the trauma of post-war economic dislocation to the authoritarian blandishments of Mussolini.

Italy’s present democracy has survived unedifying rule by partitocrazia, and even the Red Brigades’ assault, in an environment of rising prosperity—fueled first by the Marshall Plan and since the 1950s by the Italians’ own efforts. What would happen were the tide of prosperity drastically reversed, perhaps in a more serious oil crisis than that of 1973? Is there a lesson to be drawn from the Fascist experience?

In the period 1918–1922, socioeconomic travail made the issue of ineffectual “revolving-door” parliamentary governments a very serious one indeed. Those pragmatic and civilized social habits that allow Italian democracy to flourish today operated to temper the worst excesses of the Fascist dictatorship (the Italian attitude to the anti-Semitic laws of 1938–1943 being a signal instance). But they did not serve to prevent the establishment of that political dictatorship in the first place.

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Women in Italy

Re your essays on Italy: Certainly, the recent history of Italian women is as complex as that of the nation generally.

For outsiders, Italian women, not to mention Italian sexual customs, are baffling: Do the "girlie" covers of Panorama and Expresso (Italy’s equivalent of Time magazine) indicate the prurience of a repressed Catholic society or the abandonment of the Swedish style? Do strong family ties perform a conservative function or a radicalizing one? How does one explain that Italian women were practically invisible in national politics until the early 1970s, and then, when mobilized around civil rights issues, caused the entire political system to be realigned? What has happened that in the late 1980s, when Italian Parliament has the largest percentage of women members of any large Western nation, notions of equal rights in the American sense are still given short-shrift?

Rather than clichés about Latin machismo, the Italian matriarch, or the enduring solidity of the family, we need systematic, historical insights. Two cases will illustrate this.

The First bears on the Fascist legacy. Mussolini made a repressive, antifemale sexual politics central to his regime. The Duce wanted women out of the workforce and back in the home to stanch liberal suffrage movements, to increase birthrates, and to lessen female competition with male workers. Yet his effort to shore up a male-dominated but mother-centered family ultimately backfired. Faced with a bad economy and Fascist warmongering, many Italians postponed marriage and cut back on having children.

After inciting Italian women to "defend the family like a fortress" against foreign enemies, the dictatorship found that families ended up looking out for themselves and for their neighbors, and being less and less responsive to the state. There was little Mussolini could do to stop hoarding, draft resistance, and the rampant complaints about inflation, laws discriminating against women workers, and shortages.

In sum, it is impossible to understand the widespread uncooperativeness during the war, and the Italian willingness to help Jews, draft dodgers, and partisans, without considering the home-front networks of family and community loyalties—consolidated in the ultimate chaotic years of the dictatorship and sustained by Italian women.

Likewise the sea change in the Italian political system in the 1970s must highlight the role of women. The Italian women’s movements of those years were huge and vital, if short winded. If they did not cause the enactment of divorce and abortion laws, they certainly prevented them from being overturned in the referenda of the mid-1970s.

These victories signaled changes in the roles of the major parties of the Left and Right. The Communist and Socialist Left could no longer claim to be sole interpreters of social protest; the old-style Christian Democratic political system, constructed in the late 1940s with the “Family Front,” and based on myriad ties between Parliament, patronage systems, and local society, was bro-
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Thus, neither Left nor Right could rely on their old-time subcultures; both have had to shape new appeals to reach out to their constituencies.

What is the role of Italian women in Italy’s current “success”? Women workers make up a major portion of the labor force in the ill-paid, unprotected, underground economy. The Italian family’s resilience and efficiency rely on women who work as well as manage households at extraordinary personal cost. The sophisticated, Armani-draped woman adds lustre to Italy’s image; there are Italian female executives, high-powered journalists, and even Nobel Prize winners. But the professions actually open to women are limited compared to opportunities in the United States.

The answer to the question “How modern will Italy really become?” depends on how the political system responds to women’s issues. The Left parties have barely started to respond: the Communists by electing numerous women deputies, the Socialists by recognizing prominent women by naming them to the ranks of Cavaliere del lavoro. But that is mere window-dressing; Italian society cannot truly be modern until the major parties, not just the huge pace-making public sector, do more than correct laws discriminating against women: They must also promote public customs and private behavior that recognize egalitarian and civilized attitudes toward Italy’s female citizens.

Victoria de Grazia
Professor of History
Rutgers University

Italian-Americans

Re the box on Italian-Americans [WQ, Spring ‘88, pp. 108-9]: While there is no question that Italians have “arrived” in the United States in terms of income and suburbanization, it is a mistake to read this progress back into the period of settlement, 1880-1930. In that period, the peasant values of southern Italy, the suspicion of any institution that transcended the family, and the failure to accept education as a path to upward mobility meant that Italians lagged a generation behind their Jewish counterparts.

Ted Perlmutter
Assistant Professor of Politics
New York University

Bigger than Britain

In referring to recent data by the government statistics office on the Italian economy—ranking it the fifth largest economy in the West and thus overtaking Britain—Joseph LaPalombara seems to ridicule the report (“The British dispute the Italians’ claim—‘rubbish’”—noting that they included dubious figures on the underground economy. Even so. . .”)

Such a quote, as well as the tone of the rest of the commentary, ends up reinforcing the image of Italy as a country not to be taken too seriously. Yet, in fact, it is the British response that ought to be ridiculed. In a special survey of the Italian economy, The Economist (February 27, 1988) concludes that even using the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) stringent estimates, Italy’s GDP is “still three percent bigger than Britain’s. . . and beats France by a whisker, making it the world’s fourth biggest capitalist economy.”

Primo Vannicelli
Professor and Director
International Relations Program
University of Massachusetts, Boston

In Henry Wallace’s Defense

I cannot dismiss Henry Wallace, presidential candidate of the Progressive Party, as Alonzo L. Hamby and Robert H. Ferrell do in “Truman vs. Dewey: The 1948 Election” [WQ, Spring ‘88]. I cannot write him off as a “mystic” or a “vegetarian.” I see him, above all, as an intellectual.

Viewing Wallace in that way, I have a strong interest in his experiences in 1948 and believe that their significance must be probed. What were the values embodied in his presidential campaign? Why did it cut him off from so many people, including millions who only a short time before had regarded him as Franklin D. Roosevelt’s logical successor? And what were the long-term consequences of his smashing defeat?

One consequence, I suggest, was acceptance of a style of analysis that these essays [Hamby’s “The Accidental Presidency” and Ferrell’s “The Last Hurrah”] reflect. It became the conventional wisdom among academics after 1948 to insist that only a certain political type should be encouraged to partici-
pate in the American system: the Truman type, not the Wallace type. And we were advised to tolerate the shortcomings of the first in the name of “realism.”

Richard S. Kirkendall
The Henry A. Wallace
Professor of History
Iowa State University

Remembering 1948

The essays by Hamby and Ferrell reconstructing the Truman-Dewey campaign cover all the main points concerning President Truman’s difficulties in his first three years in office and the vicissitudes of the campaign itself. As one who covered Truman’s whistle-stop campaign while a reporter for the old New York Herald Tribune, I naturally have unique memories that color my own reflections.

Truman’s detractors, hawkers of slurs about the “little man” and the bankrupt haberdasher, outsmarted themselves. The husky, square-shouldered, feisty man seen by thousands of Americans in towns and cities and on farms looked anything but diminutive and hapless. The role of laughable underdog universally assigned to him he played superbly to his own advantage, casting himself as the people’s champion against Wall Street, the real estate lobby, and the Republican friends of Big Business.

The president shrewdly based his campaign on attacks against the conservative, even reactionary, record of the Republican majority in Congress. The wonder is that Dewey, a former gang-busting district attorney, let Truman get away with it. After all, the 80th Congress passed the Marshall Plan and the Vandenberg Resolution, paving the way for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. My strongest recollection is how skillfully Truman wrapped himself in the mantle of the New Deal, and courted the members of the coalition that had elected Roosevelt four times. It held together just long enough to give the Democrats an astounding victory in 1948. Ironically, all the high spirits of the campaign were embodied in the one candidate believed to be the certain loser. That doubtless helped make him the winner.

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Intervention in Nicaragua

"Nicaragua" [WQ, New Year's '88] demurely dispatches some stereotypes of our "debate" on that Central American country. The familiar tableau of a passive Nicaragua capable of nothing but being victimized by the United States does not withstand the informed scrutiny of Richard L. Millett's essay on the country's history ("Patria Libre").

Referring to adventurers like William Walker, Millett notes gently that "Nicaragua's political factions would repeatedly seek foreign intervention rather than accept defeat at the hands of their local opponents." To Nicaraguans, this is Aesopian language signaling the colonial roots of Sandinista as well as contra proclivity to invite foreigners into Nicaraguan domestic disputes...

Clifford Krauss's essay on Nicaragua under the Sandinistas ["Democracia"] disturbs more recent and politically potent myths, and deserves respect for bucking the tide.

The Sandinistas did not wait to be "pushed" by the Reagan administration in the direction they wished to take. Within months they displaced their moderate colleagues: "A December 1979 cabinet shuffle completed the FSLN's take-over." Krauss thinks this Sandinista coup, and their rejection of Western and Latin American military aid in favor of Soviet Bloc aid, "dashed the hopes" of American liberals and European and Latin American Social Democrats "that power in Managua would pass to 'moderates.'" Yet such hopes were revived whenever a congressional vote on Nicaragua approached.

Even if Krauss, like Millett, prefers indirection, his contras are mostly a result of Sandinista economic, cultural, and political measures. They are principally poor peasants driven to rebellion by Sandinista economic and religious oppression.

Oddly, though Krauss is manifestly aware of Sandinista deception, he explains their signing of the Arias Plan, their subsequent concessions, preservation of diplomatic and commercial relations with the United States, and the "steady stream of American visitors" as a result of "ambivalence," rather than further illustrations of what the Sandinistas call "tactical flexibility for the sake of strategic intransigence."

The Sandinistas' primary "strategic relationship" is with Moscow. In writing about the subject occasionally, I try to make that clear—but with mixed success, judging from your "View from Moscow" box, which cites, among others, a piece I wrote four years ago.

I have never subscribed to the view that Moscow is uninterested in another client state in Latin America. "One Cuba is enough." What I wrote then was that Moscow was "cautiously but steadily" consolidating its hegemony in Nicaragua, moving within the circumference of its own economic problems and a reluctance to confront the U.S. near its own borders, thereby scuttling hopes for a new détente.

But prudence by no means signifies lack of interest. Sandinista tactical flexibility and deception neatly fit Soviet needs for a low-cost, low-profile policy of gradual consolidation and expansion. So, as I wrote in 1984, Moscow "encourages the Sandinistas to diversify their
trading partners and aid donors,” to preserve
a private sector, the trappings of pluralism,
and the rhetoric of nonalignment. Again tacti-
cal flexibility for the sake of a strategic
goal—a Soviet-aligned “socialist” Nicaragua.

Still, the Sandinistas sometimes grow nerv-
ous and try to extract a public commit-
ment—in the form, for example, of a squad-
ron of MiGs. Accordingly, there is a degree of
tension in this relationship, as there is be-
tween the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Robert S. Leiden
Visiting Scholar
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University

Word Snobbery

Joseph Epstein wrote in the Spring '88 issue
of WQ (p. 166): “But Dottie is one of those
people who seems to absorb whatever lan-
guage is in the air.”

My concern is this: Was it your copy edi-
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(or all three) who slipped up on his English
language here?

H. G. Grainger
Tyler, Tex.

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