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As a matter of policy, we ask Quarterly subscribers at renewal time to tell us what they think of our efforts to produce a useful national review of ideas and information. The response so far has been enlightening: Most of our first-year subscribers, judging by some 11,000 letters to date, either strongly endorse the Quarterly or don't like it at all. The favorable votes outweigh the anti's by five to one; roughly 40 percent of readers who renew their subscriptions ask for a two- or three-year extension.

After a year of existence, the Quarterly has subscribers in every state of the Union—in locales as varied as Nome, Alaska, Las Vegas, Nevada, and Scarsdale, New York. The magazine gets abroad, too—to Romania, the Soviet Union, and Zaire, among other places. In Washington, four copies now go to the White House, and scores of others go to congressmen, senior federal officials, newsmen, and foreign diplomats. Not as quickly as we would like, hard-pressed local public libraries are also receiving the Quarterly, often through gifts from individual readers.

How do people read the Quarterly? Some report that they snatch the latest issue out of the mailbox and settle down for a single read-through. Most readers, apparently, like to pick and choose, dipping into the magazine over a longer period of time. A much-traveled New York executive says the Quarterly is his “constant briefcase companion” for long airline flights. A graduate student in Los Angeles says he reads it over supper in Chinese restaurants.

In their letters, many readers share with us their concerns—over war and peace, energy and the economy, trends in education and family life, the need for greater understanding of the world’s past and present complexities. Their comments—and critiques—help the editors to avoid tunnel vision.

What about Quarterly readers who don’t renew? Some rebuke us for not being more “academic.” Others chide us for not being more “popular.” Yet, to our surprise, a good many non-renewers said they were dropping out, not because they disliked the magazine, but because of personal circumstances—a move overseas, a health problem, family pressures on reading time. And many wished us good luck and said they planned to come back. We hope they do.

Peter Braestrup
Who Voted for Lincoln?

Historians have long believed that Abraham Lincoln owed his election as President in 1860 to the votes of the foreign-born. Naturalized citizens—particularly German-Americans who had taken part in the middle-class uprisings of Europe in 1848—shared a hostility toward both slavery and the overwhelming influence of the South in Congress. They therefore voted in solid blocs for the Republican Party.

Kremm, an archivist at the Illinois State Archives, contends that it was religion, not nationality, that determined the voting behavior of the foreign-born electorate. Comparing 1860 election returns for Cleveland, Ohio, with contemporary demographic data, he notes that Lincoln won a city-wide 58 percent majority over the Democratic candidate, Senator Stephen A. Douglas. While Lincoln did poll a large number of “foreign” votes, this is not surprising, Kremm finds, since 70 percent of Cleveland’s electorate in 1860 was born outside the United States. Lincoln in fact won his biggest victory in the city’s second most “native American” sector, while he fared badly in Irish-American wards. And Douglas scored his victories in wards heavily populated by German immigrants.

Examining census and church records, Kremm finds that the most Democratic wards were also the most Catholic. Lincoln won his greatest majorities in areas where less than 35 percent of the voters were Catholic. The immigrant vote, argues Kremm, divided along distinct patterns: Catholic Democrats versus non-Catholic Republicans.

Ohio nativism, he concludes, was anti-Catholic, not anti-immigrant. Catholics were regarded with suspicion—as "wet nurses of despotism"—across ethnic and economic lines. In the end, the new Republican Party in Ohio was more an "anti-Catholic coalition" than an "anti-slavery-extension organization."
To many 17th-century New Englanders, William Phips (1651–95) epitomized what a good governor should not be. But preacher Cotton Mather found an overriding virtue in Phips’s checkered career: his “love for his country.”

Gura, a professor of English at the University of Colorado, finds the appeal to patriotism in Mather’s Life of Phips (1697) a fateful updating of the Puritans’ political vocabulary. Massachusetts’ old charter, which made church membership the prerequisite for political rights, had been revoked in 1683. The new charter based the franchise firmly on ownership of property. A new kind of public man was emerging—with Phips the outstanding example. This carpenter, treasure-hunter, and charismatic soldier (his forays against French Canada secured New England’s northern border) beguiled his way to a knighthood in 1687 and, on the recommendation of Mather’s father, to the governship of all New England in 1692. He died three years later in London, facing charges of bribery, piracy, and misconduct in high office.

Faced with this mixed record, Mather emphasized Phips’s courage, ambition, diligence in worldly affairs, and endearing manner with the lower classes. If these qualities had a “sinful” smell about them, they were nevertheless the virtues, Mather explained, of an incipient “political man.” Hence, the Life of Phips set a new standard in colonial politics; for the first time, public patriotism superseded personal piety as the chief measure of a good leader.

The decay of the nation’s Northern “core cities” has become the U.S. domestic problem, say Brookings government specialists Nathan and Dommel. But while the public tends to associate urban decline with city size, the authors believe other factors are more critical.

One cause is the balance—or lack of it—between a city and its suburbs. In a review of 55 of the nation’s largest cities, Nathan and Dommel find that 43 of them are economically worse off (in varying degrees) than their suburbs; 2 are about the same; 10 are better off. Almost all of these are in the South and West, and 4 have populations greater than 1 million.

The 14 worst off cities (including Newark, Gary, Baltimore, Cleveland, Detroit, and Hartford) are primarily in the northeast quadrant of the United States. Their rate of population loss doubled between 1970
and 1973, as compared to gains of up to 20 percent for the 10 healthiest cities. Growth in per capita income and tax base has declined. The nub of the problem: The boundaries of the unhealthiest cities have remained substantially unchanged for 60 to 100 years; unlike such new cities as Phoenix or Houston, older core urban areas have been unable to expand geographically to increase their "resource base."

Nathan and Dommel recommend increases in existing federal subsidies, such as welfare, to aid the central cities. But more important, they say, the ailing Northeast cities need structural relief. State, county, and suburban governments must realign their functions, if not their boundaries, to share the wealth with less affluent areas. One approach would create a two-tier system of government to preserve local autonomy while helping to coordinate financial policy. According to the authors, the governments of Los Angeles City and County and of Miami and Dade County "come close to the [two-tier] ideal" of individual community governments incorporated into larger, metropolitan area planning authorities.

Civil Liberties and the Burger Court

Lawyers, political scientists, and reporters discussing the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Warren Burger tend to adopt "angry and apocalyptic" tones. Many feel that Nixon and Ford appointees to the Burger Court have systematically dismantled the "edifice of civil liberties" erected by the Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren (1953–69).

Despite all the "hand-wringing," contends University of Massachusetts Provost Steamer, the contrast between the Burger and Warren Courts in regard to civil liberties is not all that sharp. The differences are "subtle shadings."

Criticized for curbing "access," the Burger Court, in fact, has simply tried to limit judicial review to cases involving real, not technical, questions of constitutional law. (The Court's docket is now four times as crowded as it was during the 1930s.) The 1966 Miranda ruling on the rights of accused persons still stands, albeit somewhat modified, despite the presence on the Court of two of the original dissenters from that decision, not to mention five "conservative" Republican appointees. Rulings expanding the use in court of evidence obtained from illegal searches and seizures are a break from the Warren years, but not from the rulings of earlier courts.

In Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection and due-process cases, the Burger Court has actually moved further than the Warren Court and created a "suborder of liberties" that have "no ascertainable reference points." Going beyond race, the Justices deal inconsistently with discrimination involving sex, age, and national origin, and with rights to travel and rights to marital privacy. Rulings in these cases rest on
the most "unrestrictive and indeterminate" clauses in the Constitution. In First Amendment free-speech and free-expression cases, particularly with regard to "prior restraint" (e.g., barring a newspaper in advance from publishing a story), the Burger Court has yet to stray significantly from the principles of the Warren Court.

In sum, Steamer concludes, the Court appears likely to "retain the best" of the Warren years (while eschewing some of the old pitfalls): a penchant for insubstantial cases and a blurred conception of the line between legislative and judicial functions.

**The Democrats' Two-Party System**

"The Democrats Have Their Own Two-Party System" by Everett Carl Ladd, in *Fortune* (Oct. 1977), 541 N. Fairbanks Ct., Chicago, Ill. 60611.

On election day 1976, the Democrats acquired a 149-seat margin over the Republicans in the House and held on to 68 percent of the seats in the 50 state legislatures. But on the same day, Democrat Jimmy Carter barely scraped by (with 50.1 percent of the vote) in the race for the White House.

Since World War II, the Democrats have won only four of eight presidential battles—three of them narrowly. The reason the otherwise predominant Democratic party repeatedly fails to walk off with the high-

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**Big-city white Catholics have begun to vote one way in presidential elections and another way in other elections, despite their heavy Democratic Party identification. For example, in 1972, 30 percent more white Catholics identified themselves as Democrats than as Republicans; the same lead held in congressional voting. However, the Republican presidential candidate received about 25 percent more white Catholic votes than the Democratic nominee.**
est office in the land, says Ladd, a political scientist at the University of Connecticut, is that there are not one but two types of liberalism in America today, and the Democrats, "to their joy and sorrow," embody both of them.

New Deal "bread and butter" liberalism, Ladd believes, is by now so ingrained that it wins votes from conservatives and liberals alike in congressional and state elections. But a "New Liberalism" has emerged in the past 20 years among a small but influential group of well-to-do, college-educated professionals who question the old economic and moral values. They reject equality of opportunity in favor of equality of result, writes Ladd, and take a libertarian stand on abortion, drugs, sexuality, and race.

New Liberals have a greater impact on the presidential race than on local contests. Because of their access to money and media, they help choose the Democratic nominee and shape his campaign. But because they are detached from the mainstream liberalism of the middle and lower classes, they taint the nominee's positions with unwanted controversy. New Liberalism, argues Ladd, was responsible for McGovern's nomination and defeat in 1972; it increased Carter's vulnerability in 1976. (Carter received 37 percent of the votes of self-styled conservatives; Democrats running for state legislatures in the same year received 54 percent of those votes.)

The Democratic Party will be torn by an ever widening breach between Old and New Liberals, Ladd predicts. Dissenting "policy intellectuals" see no place to go outside the Democratic camp; neither do the Old Democrats, under pressure from blue-collar workers who no longer see themselves as the principal beneficiaries of Democratic domestic spending programs.

The King's English


Students of politics are careful to note the influence of cultural change on government; but the operations of government may have an equally important impact on language and culture. A case in point, says Fisher, a professor of English at the University of Tennessee, is the re-emergence of Standard Written English as an official language in the 15th century.

Despite the upper-class preference for French after the 1066 Norman invasion, "English" was still spoken by ordinary folk in Britain. Until 1400, however, all official correspondence was written in French or Latin; schools did not abandon these languages as vehicles for classroom instruction until the 16th century; and Parliament's business was conducted in French until about 1360. In short, a spoken, colloquial English, with pronunciation and spelling varying by locale, existed alongside two highly structured administrative languages.
Then gradually, between 1420 and 1440, the royal Chancery began to write more of its documents in English, because citizens could no longer understand anything else; by 1460 local officials followed suit. Like other medieval English institutions, the Chancery had evolved from an arm of the royal household into an administrative secretariat led by a powerful Chancellor. All correspondence from King and Parliament, all petitions, proclamations, records, indentures, summonses, and writs, were written by the Chancery. And just as all Chancery clerks came to write in a distinctive "Chancery script," so too their words acquired linguistic uniformity when they began to write in English.

Thus, while a simplified, phonetic spelling was coming into vogue elsewhere in 15th-century England, the Chancery persisted in the archaic forms we retain to this day (such as *though* for *tho* and *right* for *rite*). But it replaced the old adverb construction *lich* (as in *openlich*) with a modern one (*openly*); changed the plural from *z* to *s*; dropped the *e* in words like *owe* and *whiche*; and adopted a past tense ending in *d* instead of *t* (as in *asket*).

Written English, concludes Fisher, grew up outside church and school, and in the absence of any other national model for writing the vernacular, the king's prolific chancery clerks set the style.

**Democratic Republicans**


According to many political scientists, leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives has been determined more by custom than by the clash of interests and ideologies. In this view, a representative, whether Republican or Democrat, reaches the top of the party hierarchy largely because he has come up the ladder: Service as majority whip leads to the majority leadership, which in turn is the springboard to the speakership.

Nelson, a political scientist at the University of Vermont, challenges this notion of an “institutionalized” House. In an analysis of House leadership contests from 1789 to the present, he concludes that Democrats and Republicans exhibit distinctly different selection patterns that reflect the two parties’ contrasting political philosophies and social composition.

The Democrats have had a higher proportion than Republicans of appointed leaders (such as deputy whips and committee chairmen), as well as of elected leaders who moved from post to post in an “ordered succession.” Appointed Democratic leaders have often been “removed from above” by the elected leaders (for example, by the speaker or majority leader). Elected leaders themselves, however, are subject only to infrequent, usually unsuccessful challenges from the party caucus. In short, House Democrats exhibit a hierarchically arranged, tightly con-
trolled succession process, which downplays internal conflict.

Republicans, on the other hand, display a more "egalitarian" system. They have relied more on the election of their leaders (even for minor posts, such as chairman of the Republican Conference), and, to a greater extent, are willing to challenge their dominant party colleagues in caucus. The elected G.O.P. leadership has never removed appointed leaders. The Republican tendency is "removal from below" by the rank-and-file (the most recent example: Gerald Ford's 1965 victory over incumbent Charles Halleck for the minority leadership).

Nelson speculates that the homogeneous, conservative composition of the House Republican membership has been conducive to more open leadership contests. The large, heterogeneous membership of the House Democrats, however, must cope with fiercely contending regional and ideological interests. Their highly regulated succession process seeks to avoid the internecine warfare that plagues the Party at large.

Reaping the
Farm Vote


Two decades ago, studies of U.S. voting trends portrayed American farmers as "isolated" and the least politically involved of the nation's major social groups. Farmers had few party links and were "psychologically uninvolved" with politics. Their voting shifts tended merely to reflect changing personal economic fortunes.

That may have been true in the 1950s, writes Lewis-Beck, a political scientist at the University of Iowa, but times have changed. Data for the 1952–72 period reveal that farmers have become one of the most politically active groups in the land. Analyzing their political behavior in terms of voting turnout, letters to public officials, and election campaign activity, he finds that with 83 percent of them voting and 42 percent writing letters, farmers stand second only to white-collar urban professionals in political participation. Moreover, although the farm population's average age is rising (and older Americans tend to be among the most politically active), it is the younger farmers who show the greatest activism, a result of their rising economic status and greater education. However, farmers' participation in actual campaign activity remains low—20 percent compared to 48 percent among professionals—reflecting their traditional lack of involvement in either political or farm organizations.

Farmers hardly represent a major voting bloc (9.5 million people or 4.5 percent of the population in 1973), but they have become a "strategic national interest group" in their role as food producers. While lack of organization will probably prevent U.S. farmers from tapping that potential to push their own interests, Lewis-Beck believes that the time may be ripe for mobilization of the farm vote by other interest groups.

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**Bombs at the Threshold**

Congress is currently debating development of a new, more sophisticated weapon, the enhanced-radiation, or "neutron," bomb. The principal difference between this nuclear weapon and others is its capacity to deal a lethal blow to enemy troops while greatly limiting damage to buildings and roads in the area of the blast.

The mechanics of the weapon are straightforward, writes Meittinen, professor of radiochemistry at the University of Helsinki. A nuclear explosion sets off two distinct reactions, fission and fusion. Traditional atomic weapons achieve a predominantly fission effect through blast and release of thermal radiation, which ignites and demolishes ships, tanks, buildings and other physical structures. Humans are killed either directly through intense heat or indirectly by the impact of hurling objects or collapsing buildings.

Fusion or neutron bombs, on the other hand, release most of their energy in the form of neutron and gamma radiation. A one kiloton explosion, for example, would incapacitate and eventually kill all human life within a half-mile radius; structural damage, however, would be limited to a fraction of this area.

Pentagon proponents of the neutron bomb stress its usefulness against battlefield targets and its operational versatility, especially in Europe. It would provide NATO forces with another option against Soviet attack where nuclear counterblows may have seemed undesirable in the past. Meittinen argues however, that this very versatility makes the neutron bomb's early use more likely, thereby lowering the "nuclear threshold."

Military concerns aside, he notes the slow, agonizing death that would be the fate of many victims of radiation poisoning and warns of the "incalculable consequences" of genetic damage to survivors of a neutron blast.

**Redrawing the Map**

The Carter administration's new Africa policy has been "justified for the wrong reasons and implemented amateurishly," contends Adelman, a former Pentagon official. Moral pronouncements and demands that South Africa grant its black majority full political rights on a "one man, one vote" basis are naive.

Black majority rule in South Africa cannot automatically be equated
with civil and political liberties, argues Adelman. Some 90 percent of the African countries have one-party governments or military dictatorships. Few have independent judiciaries or protect free speech. However, the Carter administration is apparently not prepared to make human rights the criterion for a consistent policy toward both black and white Africa. And rather than directly confront Soviet-sponsored arms build-ups, the United States has relied on Britain and France to cope with "the nasty business" of African national security (as in 1977, when France airlifted Moroccan troops to help defend Zaire).

The White House now lacks any coherent long-range plan for South Africa. But a step in the right direction, Adelman contends, would be to recognize that, given Pretoria's substantial military power, economic base, and resolve, the South African story will not end with whites being pushed into the sea. One solution may be wholesale readjustment of South Africa's borders, creating one "smaller white-dominated state" and a few "truly independent black ones," as opposed to South Africa's current "homelands" policy, which assigns 6 million blacks to poverty-ridden tribal areas, such as Transkei, where many of them have never been.

This approach would be "unappealing" to many Americans, accustomed to a multi-racial, multi-ethnic state. But it is nevertheless both feasible and just. South Africa has shown a willingness to cede territory if not power; but it is as determined to maintain a white-ruled state in a hostile environment "as Israel is to preserve its Jewish-ruled one." And for all their militant rhetoric, neighboring black-ruled nations are inclined to maintain economic ties with Pretoria; South Africa runs Mozambique's ports and rail system, while providing 80 percent of its foreign exchange, and Zaire sends three quarters of its copper out through South African ports.

The Inevitability of Surprise


The first paradox of surprise military attacks is that aggressor "signals" can never be trusted by the defense. While there may be no lack of "noise" from the enemy's camp, all of it is distorted. As a result, writes Handel, a foreign affairs analyst at Jerusalem's Hebrew University, there may be guidelines for deciphering enemy intentions and capabilities, but there is no foolproof way of preventing—or apprehending in advance—a surprise attack. This the Israelis learned to their cost in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

For the Israelis, the years after the 1967 Six Day War seemed prosperous and free of threats, leading them to assume that what was good for Israel must also be good for the Arabs. According to Western military logic, no nation will resort to war unless its chances of victory are
good. But in 1973, the Arabs were willing to risk military defeat to improve their international political position. Thus, paradox 2: The more risky the attack, the less risky it really may be.

During 1967–73, Washington and Moscow moved toward détente, leading Israel to believe that the Russians favored negotiation over aggression by their Arab allies. Meanwhile, Handel notes, Israel committed an intelligence error by imputing its own strategic theory to the enemy. It assumed that Egypt and Syria would contest Israel's air superiority with jet fighters rather than negate it by effective use of new Soviet ground-to-air missiles. Paradox 3: A quiet international environment is an ideal cover for war preparations. And 4: The better the intelligence service, the greater the risk of relying on its detailed but faulty findings.

The decision to initiate war, Handel concludes, is not always dictated by a capability to win. While analysis can certainly be improved, any nation's best protection against surprise attacks, he contends, is a system of deployment that assumes "no warning time at all."


U.S.-Soviet relations have cooled during the Carter administration, and the cause, to many critics, seems as obvious as the fact itself: President Carter's allegedly inexperienced, self-righteous diplomacy. Brown, director of the U.S.-Soviet relations program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, disagrees. The present difficulties, he argues, stem from widely held misconceptions about the nature of U.S.-Soviet interdependence.

Over the past decade, both Washington and Moscow have attempted to load the negotiating table with more than it could hold. On the agenda have been (1) stabilization of the political status quo in Europe, (2) a slowdown of the arms race, (3) expansion of the East-West trade, and (4) avoidance of a Soviet-American showdown in the Middle East. Not only are these questions complex in themselves, says Brown, but their final resolution is often beyond the power of both governments, even when acting in concert. In the Mideast, for example, both the United States and the U.S.S.R. are to a large degree at the mercy of local events.

A second reality is that material and nonmaterial interests can never really be separated. If, as some scholars maintain, the White House and the Kremlin share a "confluence of interest" in certain economic and strategic matters, a wide ideological chasm still exists between the two superpowers. Opposing world views, Brown believes, produce recurrent suspicions in both Washington and Moscow that détente really gives the other side an advantage. As a result, both governments are tempted to "score against each other in the persisting rivalry for global ascendency."

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The disease may turn out to be the cure, says Brown. U.S.–Soviet relations are cooling—and rightly so. Each side must lower its expectations by agreeing to disagree on certain issues. Only such an injection of realism can sustain genuine, if modest, progress.

_The Navy’s V/STOL Plan_


Without fanfare, the U.S. Navy decided in 1976 to move from reliance on conventional jet fighters taking off from big flat-tops like the _Forrestal_ and the _Nimitz_ to development of new “vertical or short take-off and landing” (V/STOL) jets capable of operating almost like helicopters from small carriers and other ships throughout the fleet.

However, writes Admiral Holloway, chief of naval operations, this revolutionary transition to a “pure” V/STOL force will take time. Meanwhile, the Navy’s 12-carrier force, America’s “margin of difference” over the growing Soviet fleet, must be maintained through the 1980s as new V/STOL aircraft replace the current generation of jet fighters.

Using V/STOL planes, like the Marines’ AV-8 Harrier, will reduce both complexity and cost. No longer will aircraft carriers need powerful catapults, large angled decks, arresting mechanisms, and overhangs. But the new jets are still two decades away from full deployment. Navy designers have yet to develop V/STOL fighters with the speed, range, payload, and all-weather flying capability to match today’s U.S. carrier aircraft.

_Stemming the Arms Drain_


Discussions of U.S. weapons sales to foreign governments—including the Carter administration’s recent proposed cutbacks in military aid—stress the role of these sales as a tool of foreign policy. But according to the General Accounting Office (GAO), they may be creating problems for U.S. defense policy as well.

Sales of U.S. military equipment to foreign buyers have jumped by more than 1,000 percent in 7 years: from $952 million in 1970 to over $10 billion today. The United States now dominates the world arms market, in part because it offers high-technology weaponry, in part because American industry needs foreign business to offset slackened U.S. weapons purchases since the end of the Vietnam War. More than half of all arms transactions now involve the United States. The chief
purchasers: Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, which account for about $4 billion of U.S. sales in 1976.

According to the GAO, increases in foreign military aid have "adversely" affected U.S. defense capabilities. Foreign sales agreements include provisions for future support (replacement and repair); undelivered future support orders now total $24 billion. This has led to production bottlenecks and competition between the Pentagon and foreign arms clients for essential parts. About half of all foreign support needs have yet to be calculated; inadequate attention has been paid to logistical back-up for systems with common components. (Sales of such systems affect not only the system being delivered but all similar systems already delivered.)

If lack of planning continues, GAO warns, the United States could find itself in the painful dilemma of being unable to fulfill foreign arms commitments without affecting U.S. readiness.

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ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

“A Slackened Pace for East-West Trade”


The experience of the past five years has changed U.S. thinking about East-West trade, writes Samuelson, a Journal staff writer. First, it is now clear that the Soviet Union and its allies see importing advanced Western technology not as a means of upgrading their armies, as was once feared, but as a way to solve chronic economic problems. Second, a long anticipated trade “bonanza” for U.S. industrial exporters, with a consequent muting of East-West ideological conflicts, will not materialize.

The Soviet economy has been burdened by heavy defense spending (11-13 percent of total output, compared to 5 percent in the United States); by the need to keep a quarter of the work force on the farm (less than 5 percent in the United States); and by periodic crop failures. Western analysts see a slowdown in Soviet economic growth and energy production by the mid-1980s, coupled with declines in productivity and available labor. Imports of Western technology (e.g., for the proposed West German steel complex at Kursk and U.S. truck plant on the Kama River) may help ease domestic shortfalls.

In recent years, however, East-West trade has slackened; The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe don’t have enough desirable goods to sell abroad. Communist trade deficits have reached staggering levels: In 1976, U.S. exports to the U.S.S.R., including grain, totaled $2.3 billion, while Soviet exports to the United States stood at a mere $220 million.
To sustain imports, the Soviets have allowed a rapid rise in their foreign debt, estimated at $14 billion in 1976, up from $1.9 billion in 1970. Total Soviet bloc debt now stands at $40 billion.

All told, the Eastern and Western economies have drifted together to a degree unimagined a decade ago (Soviet grain imports from the West and proposed Western purchases of Yakutsk natural gas are often cited), but two big "ifs" hang over the future. Some Washington observers think a debt crisis is possible as Eastern Europeans find themselves hard pressed to service debts already incurred. Second, if Western predictions of imminent Soviet production declines come true, Moscow's need for hard currency to pay for imported technology could increase sharply at a time when its sources of hard currency (such as natural gas sales) are drying up.

Job Security vs. Fringe Benefits

Although the United States considers itself the world leader in industrial management, leadership in labor relations may have passed to Western Europe, writes McIssac, a director of McKinsey & Company. He suggests that current trends here may make the European experience increasingly relevant to American companies.

At the heart of the European system—which McIssac terms a second Industrial Revolution—is the idea that workers have a right to stable employment; stability ranks as high as increased wages as a collective bargaining goal. This emphasis, he contends, has helped increase labor productivity in Germany, France, and Holland. In many European companies, labor has an "institutional" role in the corporate governing structure; indeed, the right to secure employment and stable income is approaching "political and legal parity" with the rights of investors.

Most U.S. labor unions are more concerned with real gains in wages and fringe benefits than with job security—defined by McIssac, as "uninterrupted, steady work with steady, uninterrupted wages." However, those American firms that have made job security a company policy, such as IBM, Kodak, and Delta Airlines, have recorded gains in morale and productivity.

The stark reality of the post–World War II job shortage, says McIssac, led to a "sober recognition" by European companies that profit was tied to political stability, which was tied to steady employment. For the next decade, the American labor force will grow faster than the number of jobs; it is thus in management's interest to heed workers' growing desire for "some form" of job security. Already some unions—the Steelworkers and the United Auto Workers—have indicated that they might be willing to exchange labor peace for steady employment guarantees. The 1977 Steelworkers contract, in fact, includes clauses protecting workers with 20 years of service from layoffs and shutdowns. It also includes an experimental "no strike" provision.
The Job Problem

Despite the creation of 28 million new civilian jobs in the U.S. between 1950 and 1976—a healthy 48 percent increase—the nation’s unemployment rate has doubled during the same period to about 7 percent. One big reason, writes Columbia economist Ginzberg, is the rapid rise in the number of job-seekers, especially women and young people. Of the overall growth in the U.S. labor force, from 62 million persons in 1950 to 95 million today, women account for no less than 60 percent.

The employment impact of the job shortage is aggravated by the low quality of most new jobs: Three out of four are classified as “poor” when measured by wages, fringe benefits, and working conditions. In this respect, the public sector has outperformed the private; two-thirds of the 9 million federal, state, and local government jobs created since 1950 were “good” compared to fewer than a third of the new jobs in the private sector.

Who took these “poor” jobs? By far the largest number—12 million—were married women with working husbands; 5.9 million more were single young men and women, many of them still in school. Overall, Ginzberg writes, the statistics support the view that white men have easier access to good jobs, with women and minorities trapped in bad ones, mostly in the retail trade and service industries.

Between 1950 and 1976, the number of “poor” jobs increased much more rapidly than the number of “good” jobs. Higher-paying jobs during the period grew by 28 percent (7.1 million); low-paying jobs nearly doubled.
Federal efforts to reduce unemployment, including President Carter's $10 billion federal job creation effort (a new departure in U.S. domestic policy), tend to ignore an estimated 17 million potential job-seekers not now counted among the 7 million officially unemployed: those in school or in poor health, those with responsibilities at home, or those discouraged by unsuccessful job-hunting. Providing a job for everyone, says Ginzberg, is too ambitious; neither the public nor private sector can absorb these 17 million "overhangers" of the labor market. His conclusion: Manpower and training measures "should be focused on the groups that are currently least equipped to find and hold jobs."

A Plague of Ills

"Before the Black Death" by A. R. Bridbury, in The Economic History Review (Aug. 1977), 1 Mundells St., Welwyn Garden City, Herts AL7 1EU England.

Economic historians have studied the economy of the late 13th and early 14th centuries for clues to the "momentous subversion of the accepted order" in England after the Black Death of 1348. During the 14th century, the expansion of late medieval society came abruptly to an end; in England, this was reflected in the decline of the large-estate system, a net loss of land under cultivation, and political turmoil following the death of King Edward III (1327–77).

Most scholarly explanations of the breakup of English society tend to link political turbulence with economic decline and the Black Death. Some historians maintain that the plague simply delivered a death-blow to an economy already under strain; others hold that the medieval economy could have withstood the Black Death had it not been weakened by the Hundred Years War—and, in particular, by the foreign adventures of Edward III.

But Bridbury, a scholar at the London School of Economics, believes that political collapse did not necessarily mirror basic economic woes. Taxation ledgers reveal a "varied and opulent" farming economy in England. In Lincolnshire alone nearly 4,000 men were required to assist the chief commissioners in collecting taxes when Parliament authorized a new levy in 1298. Farm records indicate a sizable sheep-raising industry. Moreover, says Bridbury, medieval wars were relatively inexpensive affairs, "portentiously splendid melodramas" with rarely more than 10,000 men under arms.

In addition, he writes, price levels for labor, rent, and produce remained high in the period before the Black Death; the peasant population continued to grow. When prices fell, as they did in 1333, Edward III's wars had not yet commenced. Even after the Black Death, the population of wage earners was not seriously depleted. There was no difficulty filling job vacancies.

Rather than disrupting the fabric of peasant society, Bridbury concludes, the economic troubles of the early 14th century disrupted the lives of the nobles and the commercial classes, on whom fell the main burden, finally, of financing Edward's wars.
President Carter's early pledge to reduce "the burden of over-regulation" on business contrasts with his administration's early record of "almost studied ambiguity" toward regulatory reform, contends Gergen, a former aide to President Gerald Ford. This uncertain approach, he believes, is incapable of dealing with federal regulatory growth that has developed a momentum of its own, propelled by statutes already on the books.

The White House has made some changes, Gergen concedes. It has formed a new division in the Office of Management and Budget to oversee regulation. It has supported bills to require periodic "sunset" reviews and eliminated some overlap and contradiction among federal regulatory agencies. Moreover, new guidelines now take into account the economic impact on businesses of proposed regulations.

Other Carter initiatives, however, encourage more regulation. The administration has proposed sweeping new controls over energy production, pricing, and consumption, over toxic chemicals, water quality, on-the-job safety, hospital costs, and the operation of oil tankers. (In the first six months of 1977, 34,000 pages of new regulations were published by the federal government, up 25 percent from the previous six months.) Carter has also appointed administrators with pro-regulation backgrounds to high-level positions in the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Energy Administration, and the Department of Transportation.

In sum, Carter has steered a "jagged course" on regulation, writes Gergen. He has been willing to favor more regulation rather than less when faced with strong political pressure. Unless there is a sharp change in strategy, Gergen predicts, regulatory "strangulation" of U.S. businesses will continue for some time to come.

Two centuries ago, economist Adam Smith (1723-90) first suggested that a decentralized economy guided by individual self-interest and supply and demand would allocate economic resources more efficiently than alternative, "controlled" systems.

The hardening of this view into dogma in the ensuing years, says Sen, an economist at the London School of Economics, occurred amid Victorian debate over Utilitarianism, which held that the interest of all is the interest of each. The Utilitarian program of seeking the greatest good for the greatest number was challenged by Victorian economists like...
Francis Edgeworth (1845–1920), who believed that, on the contrary, “general happiness” is to be achieved through each individual’s pursuit of his own happiness. Edgeworth promoted the idea that Homo oeconomicus is motivated solely by the selfish desire to increase “maximally” his own welfare; using this assumption, he was able to express economic principles in mathematics. This view—and the mathematical approach that followed from it—is “more or less intact” in contemporary economics and has been little questioned; nevertheless, claims Sen, it is mistaken.

Edgeworth’s economic model, which held that individual self-interest would lead to market equilibrium (the point at which no person’s welfare can be materially improved without worsening the welfare of another) led later mathematical economists to analyze consumer demand as a function of “rational choice.” This analysis supposes that there is a “single relation” between a person’s real preferences and actual decisions. Utility fails to be maximized only when a consumer’s preferences are inconsistent (and thus irrational).

In all this, Sen suggests, there is something profoundly disturbing: the virtual neglect by economists of the role that altruism has played in public policy and private conduct. To the extent that different varieties of “commitment” and “principle” influence personal economic decisions, he argues, so far has the classical notion of economic man as a blindly consistent egoist—as a rational fool—artificially limited the range of academic analysis.


The Soviet Union is grappling with social problems common to all industrial nations, but the only Soviet domestic issues heavily covered by Western newsmen are those raised by the dissident movement. Osnos, a former Moscow correspondent for the Washington Post, worries that “Americans hear so much about dissidents” that they can no longer see the Soviet scene in proper perspective.

Are the dissidents that important? Probably not. According to Osnos, this “small number of little-known private citizens” has helped to “highlight” Soviet repression as well as growing disaffection among ethnic minorities, liberal intellectuals, Marxist theorists, and religious groups. But it is a mistake, Osnos warns, to confuse the courage of a few with mass alienation.

Foreign correspondents and dissidents in Moscow are “mutually useful”: Reporters want to meet “real” Russians and get a good story of
conflict. Dissidents want to get their views to the West (and thence, via Western radio broadcasts, back home); they also believe they will be treated less harshly by Soviet authorities if they have a Western following. But Osnos contends that excessive reliance on the dissident point of view gives Americans a distorted picture, "as oversimplified in a way as Soviet reports about the United States."


The Civil War disrupted the white political monopoly in the South—but more in form than in substance, argues Logue, director of the University of Georgia's Communications Division. In a survey of post-bellum newspapers and magazines, he finds that Southern publishers used a "verbal bribe and a rhetorical threat" to intimidate newly enfranchised blacks. Their object: to persuade former slaves (suddenly a majority of the electorate in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina) to vote for conservative whites or not at all.

During Reconstruction, white Southerners felt threatened not only by Northern carpetbaggers but also by the growing number of blacks elected to Congress and the state legislatures. Newspapers like the *Mobile Daily Advertiser and Register* warned that "impressionable" blacks must be saved from "ravening" Northerners who would "poison the minds and monopolize the ears" of freedmen. The *New Orleans Picayune* promised that whites would help blacks become "useful, orderly, industrious, well-behaved, and productive"—if blacks would voluntarily forfeit their newly won political rights.

Behind the newspapers' cajolery lay an ill-disguised threat. If blacks failed to conform to white expectations, then "woe to your race," as

*Post-bellum Southern editors mocked pitiably black officials to amuse white readers. The Hon. Fortune Flanders (left) rails against a Northern carpetbagger: "He don't pay a tax even on de carpet bag he fotch down yeah to fill up wid de pickens ob de sixteen office he hole."*

From *XIX Century magazine*, Charleston, 1869.
orator Ben Hill wrote in the Atlanta Constitution. "Of course we mean no intimidation," declared an editorialist in the Mobile Daily Advertiser and Register. Blacks "are free—free to vote, free to starve." White editors advanced their views through "sensible negroes" who were tolerated as long as they preached black subservience. But even these "loyal" blacks reaped only ridicule (see illustration on facing page) from the press.

Reconstruction, Logue concludes, made it inevitable that whites would have to "talk to" Southern blacks. But "the voice of the press," one editor noted, could help keep blacks from talking back.

A Free Press and the Third World

Third World governments are increasingly embittered by Western news services—such as Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, and Agence France-Presse—that emphasize natural and manmade disasters in underdeveloped nations while ignoring local economic gains. And they view the flow of largely Western information into their countries (in the form of books, movies, newsmagazines, and wire service reports) as "cultural imperialism." Sussman, executive director of New York's Freedom House, warns that "an information revolution of historical proportions lies just ahead" as Third World nations seek drastic revisions in their information exchanges with the West.

The main arena for Third World complaints has been the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Government control of mass media and hostility to visiting Western newsmen has spread rapidly through Africa, Asia, and Latin America (often with UNESCO support). The UNESCO-backed Third World press pool, formed in 1976 and dominated by the Yugoslav news agency, Tanjug, reports 62 "nonaligned" nations now participating. Last March, Libya announced the formation, with UNESCO backing, of a far-flung Arab-African news agency with "anti-imperialist" political goals.

The Third World challenge, writes Sussman, involves a choice between government and nongovernment control of the news—an issue on which there can be no adequate compromise. For their part, ethnocentric Western media managers must begin to portray the complexity and diversity of the Third World (whose leaders they often describe simply as "pro-Moscow," "pro-West," or "pro-Peking"). At the same time, Third World leaders must realize that Western politicians and businessmen are not likely to assist regimes that obstruct access to the news. Moreover, Sussman believes, government news monopolies will not be popular; ordinary Third World citizens want to hear "competing voices," even if their rulers demur.

There should—and could—be room on television for all kinds of news programs, says Arlen, the New Yorker's TV critic, but that is not the way television seems to work. "There are trends," he notes, "and the trends point to dollars." The dollars right now point to more "soft" news broadcasts.

Soft news—the "informational entertainment" that has largely replaced "hard" news of critical world and national issues—dominates network broadcasts for two reasons: (1) the current success of CBS's magazine-format "Sixty Minutes," with its mixture of features and prosecutorial interviews; and (2) the popularity of "news consultants" who have boosted ratings by "personalizing" the newsroom. Network executives claim they have not lost perspective on what is and is not news. The fact remains, writes Arlen, that even a "dramatic early-morning rapprochement of the U.S. and Israel" can get lost in the "treacle jar" of human interest news—as it recently did.

The viewing public enjoys the latest news formula, with its flavorful vignettes of lions in Africa and the devouring of underwater grass by Maryland swans. But the same kind of slick coverage has been extended to world events.

Television is moving away from the traditions of print journalism and toward its own special strengths: portraiture, anecdote, and intimacy. That in itself is not bad. The flaw lies in television's one-dimensional style: "Everything" may be news, says Arlen, but everything is not news of the same kind.

Environmentalists, who pressed Congress for more stringent air pollution curbs in last year's amendments to the 1970 Clean Air Act, must pursue a flexible, reasoned approach to pollution control or risk sacrificing future progress, warns Penn State environmental specialist Brownstein.

In a Journal panel discussion, he contends that if the growth rate of the U.S. economy slows much further, tradeoffs between energy, eco-
nomics, and environment will become "absolute." Unyielding environmentalists could then face a "devastating confrontation" with other interests—as happened during last winter's energy shortage in Ohio and Pennsylvania, where environmental regulations were suspended to free industry and boost employment. "When push comes to shove," Brownstein writes, "environmental criteria run a distant second to economic and political concerns." One solution: the government should seek an overall level of environmental quality without dictating the specific methods (such as flue gas desulfurization) to reach it.

Cohen, an official at the Argonne National Laboratory, agrees. Since significant improvements in pollution control technology are extremely unlikely, a flexible approach to air pollution, he argues, should include such proven but little-used techniques as land-use and market controls, along with greater economic incentives. Land-use controls, for example, were used in the San Francisco Bay Area in 1976 to block construction of a Dow Chemical plant. Authorities can also encourage more efficient use of existing technology by inducing firms with effective emission control systems to reduce emissions by more than is required, while permitting other firms greater leeway. Finally, says Cohen, Congress should approve stronger economic incentives, such as penalties for delayed compliance.

Viruses and Pest Control


Farmers rely heavily on chemical sprays to protect field crops, orchards, and forests against harmful insects. But public concern over environmental damage, says Tinsley, a scientist at England's Natural Environment Research Council, has led to new interest in biological methods of insect control. Biological control will never supplant chemical control, Tinsley writes, but it could become an important complement. Why? Some insect species have already developed resistance to chemical insecticides; the price jump in petrochemicals is pushing insecticide costs ever higher; and toxic chemical residues have been found in fish and wildlife. Pathogenic viruses offer the greatest potential for biological pest control and can spread rapidly through insect populations. (In 1938, a virus accidentally introduced into Canada cleared the spruce sawfly from 31,300 square kilometers of forest.)

Release of pathogenic viruses involves a calculated risk. Scientists must make sure that toxic effects are limited to insects. However, insect pathologists have discovered at least one viral strain (baculoviruses) whose "host range" is, indeed, limited to invertebrates. Other viruses will infect butterflies and moths, for example, but not sawflies, bees, or wasps. Used properly, Tinsley maintains, viruses could be applied against many parasitic pests with little harm to beneficial insects.
**Mapping Coal with Sound**

The safety and cost of underground coal mining depend heavily on natural formations beneath the earth’s surface. Until recently, these have been difficult to determine in advance. Sand deposits within seams of coal, often the remains of ancient stream channels, have caused many of the roof cave-ins that trap and kill miners. Geologic faults in the earth’s strata pose similar problems.

By modifying the seismic mapping techniques used for many years by the oil industry for deep probes of 2,000 to 33,000 feet, the U.S. Bureau of Mines has developed a new technique for charting subsurface formations in the shallower, coal-bearing strata.

According to Lepper and Ruskey, Bureau scientists, the technique requires 8 to 24 sensors (or geophones) attached by cable to a special digital recording system. A small explosion is triggered. It sends seismic waves through the earth, which then bounce off coal deposits and other formations. The geophones detect the reflected signals, reproducing them on magnetic tape. With data from several geophone lines, a computer can generate a three-dimensional "picture" (see illustration) showing coal seams, channel and sand patterns, and other features of subsurface geology.

The technique now in use can produce pictures of coal deposits at a depth of 82 to 660 feet, with an accuracy of plus or minus 3 feet. Gaining such information costs the equivalent of perhaps 1 cent per ton of mined coal; the data not only can be used to improve mine safety but also to reveal the location of usable coal deposits and reserves.

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Seismic waves recorded by parallel lines of geophones (A, B, and C) can be used to create three-dimensional "pictures" of sand channels and other formations running underground through seams of coal.

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People Just Don't Care

"Are Consumers Concerned About Chemical Preservatives in Food?" by C. S. Martinson and J. McCullough, in *Food Technology* (Sept. 1977), 221 N. LaSalle St., Chicago, Ill. 60601.

Despite aggressive promotion of "natural" products by retailers and widespread revelations of potentially hazardous additives in packaged food, American consumers appear to be less worried by the use of chemical preservatives in their food than they were four years ago.

Using surveys of the Seattle area conducted in 1974 and 1976, Martinson, a University of Washington nutritionist, and McCullough, a University of Arizona marketing specialist, find that in 1974 a uniform 44 percent of consumers at all age and income levels expressed apprehension about preservatives. But by 1976 this concern had dropped sharply for most shoppers—to 25 percent among those over 55 and to 33 percent among those between 25 and 49. Least worried of all were those earning less than $8,000 or more than $15,000 a year. Only the 18–24 and 50–54 age groups sustained the same degree of concern they had shown two years before.

Both surveys showed a general lack of knowledge of what preservatives are. Oddly, higher education had no effect on consumption of TV dinners, instant breakfasts, or other convenience foods; and natural products such as granola were more likely to be used by people over 45.

The authors conclude that there appears to be either a general decrease of worry over preservatives or an "acceptance of their presence" by consumers. Their study also suggests a large increase in the number of shoppers who just don't care.

The Ghetto's Jobless Core


Federal job training assistance has been extended to hundreds of thousands of inner city youths, but these programs "hardly make a dent" in the ghetto's chronic unemployment. According to Vocational Foundation, Inc. (VFI), the situation has reached a "state of emergency." The most disturbing aspect is that ghetto unemployment seems to have acquired a life of its own, impervious to positive trends among blacks or young people generally.

Half of all black youths in the U.S. work force aged 16 to 19 are unemployed, twice the figure for whites of the same age. Lack of entry-level jobs has combined with large-scale collapse of the urban criminal
justice system to spawn a rapid rise in juvenile crime (which is declining nationwide). Many black youths unabashedly prefer crime to welfare, VFI reports. Young inner city blacks are 10 to 20 times more likely to be arrested for violent crimes; at the same time, fewer than 1 percent of those arrested actually go to prison.

Conventional government solutions will not work. Employers now consider education instead of race as the necessary "credential" for employment. The effect has been to bar black dropouts from many jobs. Unions have also restricted eligibility for apprenticeship. Insurance companies still penalize employers who hire the unskilled. Prison records handicap growing numbers of blacks.

VFI recommends revision of child labor laws that help to limit teenagers to poor jobs (as stock boys, messengers, mail clerks, and fast-food servers). The legal minimum wage must be lowered for teen-age workers. Insurance and tax rates must be made equitable. Only structural changes—and not the "same barren policies" of education, welfare reform, and periodic attempts at federal job creation—can save a new generation from the "vicious triangle" of joblessness, crime, and family breakdown.

IQ's Link to Juvenile Crime

For the past 50 years, academic criminologists have discounted evidence of a relationship between low IQ and delinquency; most textbooks, for example, either ignore the matter or question the correlation. Nevertheless, write Hirschi and Hindelang, sociologists at the State University of New York, the facts "strongly support" a relationship between IQ and criminal behavior.

According to the authors, virtually all recent research (conducted in locales as diverse as Philadelphia, London, and Davidson County, Tennessee) indicates a strong correlation between juvenile crime and low IQ, a link at least as strong as that with race or social class, both long recognized as important factors. However, the authors contend, the IQ factor is "threatening" to most criminologists, who consider emphasis on "individual differences" outmoded.

Early in the 20th century, they note, when criminology was dominated by physicians, a relationship between low IQ and delinquency was generally assumed. Then sociologists claimed criminology as a subfield. With this shift, Hirschi and Hindelang write, an "equivalent shift" in the underlying assumptions of criminological research was seen as necessary by many sociologists, who were already alarmed by the "moral" implications of IQ testing and by the growing interest in biological explanations of social behavior. Criminology's blind spot lies in its a priori assumptions, they believe, not in the evidence.
Many Americans believe that welfare has become a way of life for many of its recipients. But M.I.T. urbanologist Rein and Harvard sociologist Rainwater contend that the “welfare class” is, in fact, rather small.

Using data from the University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center, the authors followed the welfare history of women aged 18 to 54 (taken from a sample of 10,000 adults) for six years. They then made a 10-year projection (1968–77) of that history. Applying their findings to the 50 million American women in the relevant age range, they conclude that in any given year only about 1.5 percent, or 750,000, will become welfare recipients; over a decade, about 14 percent, or 7 million, will have had some welfare income.

Of these women, only 600,000 meet the authors’ criteria for chronic “welfare class” membership: on the dole for 9 out of the 10 years and dependent on welfare payments for at least 50 percent of their income during the period. However, while this welfare class constitutes less than a tenth of all women who go on welfare in any single year, its members consume up to 60 percent of all welfare dollars.

More common than chronic cases, the authors find, are transient welfare recipients—those in the midst of marital breakups or other family traumas, those in financial crises because of recurring unemployment, and those on welfare en route to other programs, such as workmen’s compensation. All in all, they conclude, the notion that welfare programs contain built-in “disincentives” to work and thereby encourage the rise of a welfare-dependent class has been “considerably exaggerated.”

For more than a century after the founding of Pennsylvania’s Lincoln University in 1854, black colleges and universities were the only avenue to higher education for most American blacks. Since the civil-rights legislation of the 1960s, however, blacks have gained increased access to predominantly white colleges (60 percent of all black college students are now enrolled in such institutions). Some observers argue that black colleges are now, at best, an anachronism; at worst, a segregationist dual system of education that should not be eligible for federal funds.

Lockett and Simpkins, officials at Lincoln University and Wayne State University, respectively, disagree. Black institutions, they contend, were and are “primary facilitators of integration.” Their chief
function is to prepare blacks for assimilation into the mainstream of American economic life. The nation's 118 financially weak black colleges and universities, most of them private, still educate 40 percent of all black college students; between 1965 and 1975, they granted fully half (200,000) of all diplomas awarded to blacks.

Graduates of black institutions, the authors note, are more likely to pursue advanced degrees and professional training than are their counterparts at white institutions. Moreover, while white institutions are accepting more blacks, they have been unable to retain and graduate them; only 40 percent of the blacks enrolled with whites as freshmen in 1971 were enrolled as seniors in 1974.

Black and white institutions can coexist in a society that respects diversity. More to the point, Lockett and Simpkins believe that if black Americans are ever to achieve parity with whites in their professional careers, what is needed is not the dismantling of black colleges but expansion of both black and white institutions.

Patient Rights and Electrotherapy

Electro-convulsive therapy (ECT), for 40 years an accepted treatment for such disorders as severe depression, suicidal tendencies, and acute insomnia, has sparked a growing ethical debate.

"Though it is neither a panacea nor a sadistic intrusion," writes Harvard psychiatrist Salzman, the nature of ECT (passing an electric current through the patient's brain) and its early history of abuse have given it an unsavory popular reputation. But the central ethical questions, he argues, concern a patient's right to receive ECT, to refuse it, and to understand it before he decides.

Citing case studies, Salzman finds ECT a safe and effective treatment. Patients have a right to receive it, he contends, particularly if they have responded well in the past or when medical, financial, or personal circumstances rule out other forms of treatment. Conversely, patients should be able to refuse treatment if they are capable of making an informed judgment. The protection of civil rights must override psychiatry's traditional "paternalism."

Complicated problems arise in defining "informed consent." Full knowledge of harmful side effects (possible memory loss and, rarely, death) could deter many patients from seeking a generally beneficial therapy. These dangers must also be weighed against the possible effects of withholding ECT, such as attempted suicide or medication in possibly toxic doses. Moreover, many mental patients are not capable of understanding the pertinent information.

Whenever possible, Salzman concludes, a patient should himself decide the nature of his treatment. Failing that, a court-appointed guardian, not a psychiatrist, should decide.
The Anglophile as Anglophobe

Like other Americans of his time (and later), historian-philosopher Henry Adams (1838–1918) left his native land to enhance his personal and intellectual development. One critical period of growth occurred during Adams’s seven-year sojourn in England (1861–68) as secretary to his father Charles, then Ambassador to Great Britain. The experience, writes Dusinberre, a historian at the University of Warwick, created a profound ambivalence: Adams had become an Anglophile in his tastes and an Anglophobe in his convictions.

The early years in Britain were not happy ones. Adams’s initial failure to gain acceptance into British upper-class society reinforced his own (and his family’s) staunch American republicanism. These feelings were deepened when Britain sympathized with the Confederacy and refused to aid the Northern cause during the Civil War. Snubs aside, writes Dusinberre, Adams’s English adventure allowed him to view American democracy from afar, with the fresh perspective he admired in his “model,” Alexis de Tocqueville.

Befriended in 1865 by Charles Milnes Gaskell, Adams’s unhappiness began to ebb with exposure to the “cultivated circle” of the Gaskell family. Gaskell, says Dusinberre, “embodied a tradition from which Adams needed to draw sustenance.” From this lifelong friend, Adams acquired his critical sense and the satirical writing style embodied in Democracy and The Education of Henry Adams.

A Neglected Side of Rubens

Art historians have generally neglected prints of the works of Flemish painter Peter Paul Rubens (1577–1640), in part because all but one of these engravings are the work of Rubens’s associates. Scholars have concentrated instead on the master’s “original” oils, drawings, and tapestries.

Yet in the 18th and early 19th centuries, before photography, these widely circulated prints were greatly admired for their effectiveness in suggesting the pictorial qualities of Rubens’s paintings. De Pauw-De Veen, an art historian at the University of Brussels, speculates that the prints demonstrate the artist’s grasp of the potential of engraving as
Engraver Lucas Vorsterman achieved the best rendering of the qualities in Rubens's paintings. In the Descent from the Cross, at left, he used a variety of graphic techniques to reflect the differing textures of skin, wood, cloth, hair, metal, paper, and sky.

well as his pioneering use of copper's reproductive possibilities.

Before Rubens, prints of paintings were simply graphic "translations" dominated by strong lines. Rubens, however, encouraged engravers to improve on traditional techniques. Most successful was Lucas Vorsterman (1595-1675), who used fine hatchings, cross-hatchings, and other subtle strokes, to suggest the texture of Rubens's colors, fabrics, and skin tones (as in The Descent from the Cross, above).

Rubens attached great importance to reproductions of his paintings. Prints made his work known to a wider audience, creating greater demand and higher prices. He apparently advanced his public relations in other ways as well—by printing portraits of influential officials and by distributing the prints of religious themes that make up the greatest part of his graphic production.

The Death of Moral Art


True moral artists must not only celebrate social justice and mirror their age; they must, as Tolstoy wrote, "sacrifice themselves in the service of man." Art instructs—or at least it ought to—but what passes for art today, claims novelist John Gardner, is the "cornball morality" of pornography and television, combined with cynical attacks on honesty, fidelity, patriotism, and courage.

It was not always so, Gardner writes. Dante, for example, at a time of
deep spiritual despair, searched his history and found in Beatrice a vision of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness. His *Divine Comedy* is an allegory of his search and an affirmation of the path he found. By contrast, Sartre, immersed in his celebrated “nausea,” found life meaningless and made meaningfulness his standard. Were Dante writing today, Gardner suggests, he would be considered “freakish.” Modern culture lionizes the artist for his angst, not his wisdom.

Contemporary novelists do little more than toy with moral standards, and when a Norman Mailer calls a Charles Manson “intellectually courageous,” the line between morality and escapist fiction begins to blur. “The brave pursuit of truth,” says Gardner, “changes utterly when truth becomes a matter of whim.” He finds E. L. Doctorow “meretricious” because the writer avoids involvement in his characters’ lives; Donald Barthelme may be an important and serious artist, but from his satire of despair no truths emerge. The doubting or sentimental artist who cannot offer positive models of virtue is a second-rate moralist.

Fiction should inspire but it should not lie. Moral art must speak of what is universal. And moral criticism, Gardner concludes, must be “a spur toward nobler action.”

### SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

**Black Tongue and the Pellagra Puzzle**

Pellagra, a malady caused by niacin deficiency, reached epidemic proportions among blacks and poor whites in the American South at the turn of the century. Though now nearly extinct, pellagra continues to puzzle scientists. Why did it appear so suddenly, and why had it not infected the pre-Civil War slave population? (The slave “hog-and-hominy” diet was almost perfectly pellagra-producing.) In fact, according to the authors, ante-bellum blacks did not escape the disease; its “protean” symptoms simply baffled 19th-century doctors.

First observed in 18th century Europe, pellagra usually strikes heavy consumers of Indian corn, which yields insufficient quantities of tryptophan, a niacin-producing amino acid. The staples of modern diets—milk, vegetables, and beef—all contain sufficient tryptophan, but these were not the staples of the slave diet. Most blacks are lactose intolerant (70–77 percent of U.S. blacks are unable to metabolize milk, compared to 5–19 percent of whites). Moreover, on Southern plantations, many vegetables were disdained as “fodder,” and beef was rarely used be-
cause it neither pickled nor smoked well.

In their search through ante-bellum medical records, the Kiples found a "Negro disease" with pellagra-like symptoms entering the medical lexicon as early as the mid-1840s. Reaching epidemic levels on plantations, this "new" disease struck blacks almost exclusively. Like canine pellagra, which had already been identified, it covered the tongue with a dark, inflamed coating and was called "black tongue." Its other symptoms (now referred to as the four D's of pellagra—diarrhea, dermatitis, dementia, and death) led doctors to mistake it for numerous other maladies, including diphtheria, malaria, dropsy, dysentery, and typhoid pneumonia, with unfortunate results for the suffering blacks. The Kiples' conclusion: Pellagra in the ante-bellum South was disguised "by an orgy of diagnostic blundering."

*Revolution in Microelectronics*  

"Microelectronics" by Robert N. Joyce;  

It all began 30 years ago with the development of the transistor, a small, low-power electric amplifier that replaced the large, power-hungry vacuum tube. Within the last decade, "microelectronics" has once again revolutionized the $80 billion electronics industry.

Microelectronics is the art of etching complex electronic circuits on tiny silicon chips. A circuit on a chip barely a quarter of an inch square (about the area of the cross section of a pea) can carry more electronic elements than the most complex piece of equipment that could be built in 1950. At the same time, the cost of producing these "integrated circuits" has gone down by 25 percent every year. Joyce, chairman of the Intel Corporation, credits this double breakthrough with most of the technological achievements of the last 10 years, from maps of Mars to the digital watch.

Some of the most far-reaching effects have come in the computer field. Computers need a large number of active circuits; a pocket calculator, for example, requires 100 times as many transistors as a television receiver. But a single chip can carry as many as 6,200 transistors and execute 770,000 instructions per second. Current microcomputers take up 1/30,000th the volume of the first electronic prototype; they are 20 times faster, far more reliable, and cost 1/10,000 as much.

Meanwhile, further miniaturization proceeds. As photoengraving methods reach their optical limits, electron beams and x rays are being substituted for visible light to reduce the dimensions of the "etchings" even further. Kay, a scientist at Xerox's Palo Alto Research Center, predicts the advent of small "personal computers" by the mid-1980s. These will be cheap, portable home devices able to reproduce graphic displays and manipulate the equivalent of several thousand pages of information. Moreover, he says, personal computers will use a simplified programming "language" a 6-year-old can understand.
A Soviet Nuclear Accident in 1958?

In 1976, Russian émigré Zhores Medvedev called attention to a Soviet nuclear disaster in the late 1950s caused by an explosion of nuclear waste stored in underground shelters. According to Medvedev, the blast contaminated thousands of square miles and caused several hundred deaths in the sparsely populated South Urals region of the U.S.S.R., where the first Soviet military reactors were built in the late 1940s.

Although Western scientists scoffed at his initial report, Medvedev, a biochemist at London's National Institute for Medical Research, now offers supporting evidence from Soviet sources. He describes the devastating effect (including chromosomal aberrations) of strontium 90 and cesium 137, radioactive isotopes with a half-life of about 30 years, on the natural habitat of the Urals region.

According to Medvedev, the South Ural region has become a laboratory for Soviet scientists; they have published more than 100 books and articles since 1958 on the effects there of nuclear pollution. Ural lakes have thick bottom silt deposits, which easily accumulate radioactive materials; one unidentified lake was found to contain 50 million curies (equivalent to the radiation from thousands of tons of radium). Clearly, Medvedev observes, such high levels of radioactivity were not created deliberately for experimental purposes.

Russian researchers, he writes, make clear when and where the explosion took place. Research in 1971 noted that the animal life under study had been nurtured in a radioactive environment for about 14 years, that is, since 1957 or 1958. In a censorship slip, one published scientific article identified the contaminated site as the Urals' Cheliabinsk area. Medvedev urges the West to place less emphasis on monitoring global fallout and more on analyzing such Soviet research journals as Genetika and Zoologicheskii Zhurnal "to ensure that such a tragedy does not happen again."

On the Trail of X-Ray "Bursters"

In 1975, Dutch and American scientists detected two brief x-ray outbursts in outer space apparently coming from "globular cluster" NGC 6624. Since then, writes M.I.T. physicist Lewin, a systematic search conducted by scientists around the world has identified more than 30 x-ray burst sources (see map on following page).

X-ray bursts result from giant explosions in the earth's galaxy, each lasting no more than a few minutes or even seconds but releasing as much energy as the sun does in several months. Some "bursters" explode regularly, at intervals of hours or days. None of the explanations...
Positions of bursters (black) and globular clusters (red). Open areas indicate bursters whose positions are known only approximately.

offered so far has proved entirely adequate, but scientists speculate that the mechanism may be similar to that governing “persistent” x-ray sources—systems in which a small but dense object (as little as 25 kilometers across) and a much larger star rotate around a common center. The small object, perhaps a neutron star or black hole, attracts gas from its larger companion; as the gas “falls,” it heats up. When the temperature reaches between 10 and 100 million degrees centigrade, x rays are emitted.

In x-ray bursters, this process may be interrupted by recurrent “choke”s that hold back the fall of gas, then suddenly release it, resulting in a blast of x rays. While the precise nature of the burst continues to elude scientists, 40 observatories in 17 countries joined last summer in a four-week “burst watch” that may yield important new data.

Beggar

Biology

For every academic discipline (such as molecular biology), there exists an “antidiscipline” (such as chemistry), which helps maintain a healthy tension. Where a discipline is concerned with the discovery and classification of new phenomena, an antidiscipline uses existing theory to search for fundamental laws. It is as an antidiscipline, suggests Harvard biologist Wilson (author of Sociobiology), that biology can revolutionize sociology, anthropology, and other social sciences—a proposition troubling to many scholars who feel that human behavior is almost exclusively determined by environment.

In anthropology, for example, the link between cultural and biologi-
cal evolution may add to an understanding of kinship, sexual and parental "bonding," xenophobia, and warfare. In psychoanalytic theory, sociobiology can try to reconstruct the evolutionary history of the structure Freud gave to the unconscious. Biology's antidisciplinary influence may even extend to economics, hitherto concerned with only a limited range of biological variables in a single species.

Wilson concedes that there are limits to the kind of "reductionist" model he presents. But if his premise is correct—that Homo sapiens, like other animals, can trace some of his behavior to genetics—then "the psychic unity of mankind has been reduced from a dogma to a testable hypothesis." Wilson predicts that once they have absorbed the emerging principles of biology, the social scientists will "go on to beggar them by comparison."

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**RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY**

**Pope Paul at 80**

"Paul VI at Eighty" by James V. Schall, S.J., in *Worldview* (Oct. 1977), P.O. Box 986, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11735.

Although the papacy has generally enjoyed high prestige in the 20th century, Pope Paul VI (elected in 1963) has received "an unaccountably bad press," especially from Roman Catholics. Critics have found him contradictory, insensitive, and lacking in leadership. His opposition to birth control has sparked controversy and doubt. But Schall, a political scientist at Gregorian University in Rome, believes that Paul, the most traveled Pope in history, has been widely misunderstood.

Paul VI's messages to the modern world, writes Schall, have emphasized the sanctity of the person and the inability of political ideology to provide relief for the human condition. In his Ostpolitik contacts with Eastern European Communist nations, he has consistently denied the value of violence and rapid, forced change as "deceitful" and "ineffective." And his most famous social document, *Populorum Progressio*, 1967, which dealt with bringing the poor of the world "into the mainstream of modern life," has come to seem more reasonable with each passing year. (In this context, Schall compares Paul to the late British economist E. F. Schumacher, author of *Small is Beautiful*.)

A just estimate of the Pope, Schall argues, requires scrutiny of the "encyclopedic" range of subjects he has covered in "addressing the problems of the world in a pertinent fashion." Paul's intelligence may be too "French" for the English-speaking world; his approach to Vatican II, abortion, and birth control may have left a legacy of bitterness among some Catholics; but a larger legacy remains intact: concern for the weak, the young, the sick, the isolated, and the deprived, "without letting the metaphysics of group or race or class or nature replace the irreplaceable individual."
The Roots of Anti-Semitism

American historians have had to face the task of reconciling widespread anti-Jewish prejudice during the late 19th and early 20th centuries with a society generally regarded as democratic and libertarian. But by stressing the "transitory" social and economic roots of prejudice, contends Dobkowski, professor of religion at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, scholars have ignored "religious, ideological, and popular attitudes that were more extensive and intense than has been previously recognized."

Analysts of the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era, says Dobkowski, fall into two camps: those who minimize the significance of anti-Semitism and those who seek its origins in populist rhetoric and the movement of immigrant Jews into the "gilded enclaves of patrician America." But Dobkowski believes the virulent anti-Semitism of the period had less to do with "agrarian protest" or "social clausrophobia" than with the "pervasive negative image of the Jew propagated by the popular culture."

In the literature, press, and theater of the time, he notes, Jews were almost exclusively represented as narrow-minded fanatics, arsonists, fraudulent pawnbrokers, and petty criminals; as unscrupulous capitalists, radical agitators, and unpatriotic foreigners. Shady Jewish merchants appeared regularly in Horatio Alger sagas; the New York Police Gazette in 1862 blithely stigmatized Jews as "receivers of stolen goods." Such stereotypes were typical, Dobkowski concludes; they reflected widely held "nativist attitudes toward the immigrants, the blacks, the Indians, and the Jews."

When the Kago Comes

"Everything will be all right when the Kago comes," the natives of the South Pacific often heard the white man say. "When the Kago [pidgin for cargo] comes, we shall have beer and whiskey and rice."

According to Merton, the noted poet and Trappist monk who composed this article shortly before his death in 1968, "cargo cults" have recurred in the Pacific over the past 75 years as a response to the artificial culture thrust upon the natives by Europeans. While the bizarre native rituals designed to make the Kago come may now seem remote, he writes, the rituals tell us as much about ourselves as about the natives.

To the islanders, the coming of Kago meant the coming of the millennium; through cargo cults, they sought to reconcile their ties to the powerful white man with their own deeply disturbed culture. In
Melanesia, one group of natives destroyed all their worldly goods—houses, crops, livestock—in order, Merton states, to erase all links with the past. Someday, they believed, the Kago would reward their act of faith. In a New Guinea cult, natives decorated their villages with flowers, copying the Europeans' habit of keeping freshly filled vases in their homes, in the hope that the Kago would come to them, too. (The Europeans responded by taking the natives' flowers away, thus confirming the cultists' view that the flowers indeed had some strange power.)

Primitive people, Merton contends, yearn for "moral reciprocity" with the white man, as illustrated by such ritual acts. And in their need to preserve a myth of their own superiority, Westerners provided nonwhites with the elements from which to build their own new myths. Is there much difference, he asks, between Kago cults and modern consumer advertising, which holds out the promise of the Good Life while suggesting that past satisfactions are now obsolete? In essence, the Kago myth is no more pathetic than the complaisant materialism of civilized man.

Real Problems or Verbal Problems?

The 1953 publication of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, two years after his death, was greeted with fanatical enthusiasm by a younger generation of philosophers in England and America who found in it the basis for "a whole new way of doing philosophy." Forty years after its informal introduction in private seminars at Cambridge, notes Tomlin, himself a Cambridge philosopher, Wittgenstein's "linguistic philosophy" remains a subject of controversy.

Wittgenstein's novel doctrines restricted the aims of philosophy. In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922), he had contended that only the propositions of the natural sciences were meaningful; the Tractatus gave rise to the logical positivist belief of the 1920s and 1930s that metaphysics had at last been expelled from the philosophical paradise. The Philosophical Investigations encouraged a later generation in the 1950s and 1960s to believe that the natural sciences had been expelled as well. Philosophy was now perceived as a "purely descriptive" exercise aimed at exposing the confusions of ordinary language that produce philosophical perplexity. Linguistic analysis, it was said, "leaves things as they are."

But things have been left as they are long enough, argues Tomlin, who laments its current dominance in academia as a "deviation." By abandoning "real problems for verbal problems," philosophy has ceased to display the speculative daring and social compassion that have been its noblest characteristics since the days of Plato. It is time for philosophers to recover their nerve lest a "linguistic mortmain" extinguish the light of philosophy.

For economic and strategic reasons, the major Arab nations on or near the Red Sea have long sought to influence events—and forestall leftist tendencies—in the volatile Horn of Africa. Since 1973, this has taken the form of increased military effort and development aid.

However, contends Steinbach, director of the German Orient Institute, recent clashes in the Horn, including the 1974 Ethiopian civil war and the 1977 Somali invasion of Ethiopia, bode ill for agreement among such disparate regimes as those of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Yemen.

The biggest question: the state of Ethiopian politics since the ouster of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974. The ruling Provisional Military Council (PMC) has provoked widespread opposition through unpopular socialist programs, including wholesale nationalization. The PMC's most dangerous foes however, are the several Ethiopian separatist movements—particularly the 50,000-man Eritrean Liberation Front, which hopes to achieve UN-mandated autonomy for its region.

Led by the oil-rich Saudis, the Arabs are trying to strengthen conservative, nonsocialist forces in the region (such as Oman and the Sudan) while excluding the United States and the U.S.S.R. from a major role in the area. Worries over Ethiopia's political orientation and its military ties to Israel (the Israelis have trained Ethiopian troops) have led the Arabs to support Eritrean autonomy, short of independence. The Arabs have failed to curb leftist Somalia's designs on Ethiopia's Ogaden region; they have attempted, with more success, to restrain socialist South Yemen in its border disputes with North Yemen.

Steinbach's conclusion: Even if the competing claims of Somalia, Ethiopia, the Eritrean rebels, and others can be resolved, prospects for a stable, "Arabized Peace zone" in the Horn of Africa are bleak.
Social Security in the Soviet State

The Soviet Union, like the United States, feels severe strains on its social security system. Pensioners total 45 million, more than double the 1960 figure; total benefits have risen 2,000 percent since 1950. Moreover, says Acharkan, director of research at Moscow's Institute of Labor, there is mounting evidence that Soviet retirement policies exacerbate the nation's labor shortage. (Russia's work force of 125 million is expected to grow at a rate of no more than 0.5 percent annually over the next decade.)

Under Soviet law, workers may retire as early as age 50. As Moscow tries to equalize retirement benefits (in the past 15 years, the minimum pension has increased by 50 percent, the maximum not at all), workers at the low end of the wage scale find early retirement more attractive. This is particularly true of farm laborers, who make up 25 percent of the total labor force. In the late 1950s, the proportion of rural workers who remained employed after the legal retirement age was twice that of urban workers; today, the reverse is true. One proposed solution to the labor crisis: encouraging more part-time work by aging pensioners and the disabled through economic incentives and, especially, improved working conditions.

Acharkan acknowledges that while Soviet social security funds are large, they are not limitless; with benefits ranging from 50 to 100 percent of wages, larger funds from general operating revenues must be devoted to sustaining the pension system. Worse, special benefits—for disability, dangerous working conditions, and length of service—are rising even faster than retirement pensions.

Editor's Note. In Acharkan's article, as in many Soviet commentaries, much hard data was missing. The figures on numbers of pensioners and work force expansion were supplied by the editors from current Western research.

Spain's Democracy

Less than two years after Franco's death, King Juan Carlos and Premier Adolfo Suárez have legalized political parties and trade unions, allowed freedom of speech and assembly, and held Spain's first freely contested parliamentary elections since 1936.

Last June, 18 million Spaniards went to the polls to elect the bicameral Cortes (a Senate and a Congress of Deputies). The victory of Suárez and his center-right Union of the Democrat Center was widely expected; a more leftist outcome would probably have been unacceptable.
to the military. But with a bare 35 percent of the vote, says Los Angeles Times correspondent Meisler, Suárez cannot claim to govern unilaterally. The Socialist Workers Party, led by young Felipe González, won nearly 30 percent of the vote and a role in what may become a competitive two-party system. Regional parties and extremist groups (including Francoists and communists) will have to watch from the wings.

But as Spain strives for representative government, the 300,000-man armed forces still openly exhibit Francoist tendencies. (The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces voiced its "general revulsion" over legalization of the Communist Party.) Catholic-trained civil servants, including the more than 100,000 Policía, are still in place. Politicians (and terrorists) in the country's two richest regions—Catalonia and the Basque provinces—continue to demand local autonomy. The economy is shaky. Annual inflation runs to 30 percent; almost a million Spaniards are out of work. These factors could slow or reverse the surprisingly robust democratic movement in Spain.

Meisler suggests one immediate reform: elimination of the army's traditional role in internal affairs by giving the military, instead, a "modern defense mission" under civilian control. This shift, he believes, would be encouraged by an invitation to Spain to join the NATO alliance.

Another View of Prague's Spring

"Czechoslovakia's Experiment in Humanizing Socialism: An Examination of Ideological and Tactical Implications" by Frank L. Kaplan, in East European Quarterly (Fall 1977), 1200 University Ave., Boulder, Colo. 80302.

Liberalization of Czech Communist Party rule under Alexander Dubcek in 1968—the so-called Prague Spring—brought an outpouring of public sentiment in support of the new regime. Opinion polls showed the Party gaining favor; newspapers, allowed to express themselves freely, called for revival of a multiparty system. This very success, writes Kaplan, professor of journalism at the University of Colorado, spelled disaster for Dubcek's experiment and precipitated invasion by Warsaw Pact forces in August 1968.

Initially, widespread economic failures under hard-line Premier Antonin Novotny gave impetus to the reform movement: In 1963, Czechoslovakia was the only industrialized nation to suffer declines in national output, national income, and real wages. That same year, Soviet-style Marxism came under attack at conferences of the Union of Czechoslovak Writers and the Union of Slovak Journalists. This wave of criticism culminated in rejection of Novotny's policies and adoption of Dubcek's "democratization" program in April 1968.

Despite Soviet accusations—and the urgings of some Czech journalists—the Dubcek regime had no intention of severing relations with Russia and its allies or of withdrawing from the 7-nation Warsaw Pact. To Moscow, the real issue, says Kaplan, was the revival of Czech
political autonomy that threatened the uneasy cohesion of the Soviet bloc. Czech intellectuals, bent on restoring civil liberties in the tradition of Slavic nationalist Tomáš Masaryk (1850–1937), called for democracy, not just democratization. The Soviets, misunderstanding the role of a free press, failed to distinguish individual opinions from government policy. Essentially, Kaplan contends, the tragic flaw of the Prague Spring lay in the naivité of the new Czech leaders, who believed they could allow partial democratization without unleashing democratic sentiments deeply embedded in Czech society.

*Ethnic Politics on the Eastern Front*


Asian specialists studying the fiercely independent ethnic minorities in the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China have paid little attention to the role these groups play in the Sino-Soviet dispute. According to Tillett, a Wake Forest University historian, ethnic and political boundaries seldom coincide along the contested Sino-Soviet border. This fact, he contends, could have a significant, if unpredictable effect on relations between the two communist giants.

No fewer than 10 ethnic minorities straddle the Sino-Soviet frontier—the longest (6,000 miles), most disputed, most heavily militarized border on earth. The Mongols (3 million) and the Uigurs and Kazakhs (between 4 and 5 million each) are most numerous, followed by the Tadzhik, Kirghiz, and others. Although these "unreliable" populations are relatively small, their strategic importance is not. (For example, minorities comprise only 6 percent of China's population but inhabit fully half of its territory.)
Neither Moscow nor Peking has resolved the minority question, says Tillett, though they have employed similar tactics: development of minority cadres, periodic purges of local leaders, and forced assimilation through resettlement. (Russian Kazakhs now constitute only 43 percent of the population of the Kazakh Republic; Chinese Mongols, less than 10 percent of Inner Mongolia’s inhabitants.) Recurrent ethnic nationalism may encourage the two communist rivals to use the nationalities to provoke border clashes under the guise of “liberation” and “ethnic unity.” Yet these ethnic groups could also have a “damping effect”: In the event of war, Russia and China would have to divert troops to control independence-minded minorities. Neither side, Tillett adds, has forgotten ethnic collaboration (by Ukrainians and Mongols, among others) with German and Japanese invaders during World War II.

Beirut’s Road to Recovery

The long-range economic setback suffered by Lebanon during its 1975–76 civil war can only be estimated, but the magnitude of the devastation is clear. Damage to factories, businesses, and other physical assets totaled at least $16 billion; national income dropped from $18 billion in 1974 to $7 billion in 1976; transportation, trade, and banking were severely disrupted. The challenge now facing Lebanese officials, writes Makdisi, an economist at the American University of Beirut, is to begin the social and economic reforms the country has needed since World War II.

From 1950 to 1974, Lebanon achieved remarkable economic expansion. Nonrestrictive foreign trade policies, a flexible exchange rate for the Lebanese pound, and political stability attracted foreign capital and fostered Beirut’s role as an international commercial and banking center.

But little attention was paid to income redistribution. (Less than 18 percent of the Lebanese earned more than the national average in the 1960s, compared to 35–40 percent in the United States, Denmark, and even Italy.) Only 8 percent of public investment from 1964 to 1971 went for such needs as inexpensive health care, low-cost housing, and education. Although increased attention to these concerns was evident in the government’s Six-Year Plan (1972–77), war broke out before its goals could be achieved.

A “special duality,” says Makdisi, has long marred Lebanon’s economic development: coexistence of a vigorous private sector and a lagging public sector. But he cautions that attempts to readjust the balance must preserve the “enterprising elements” on which Lebanon’s prosperity depends.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 345 E. 46th St., New York, N.Y. 10017. 164 pp. $3.75

Author: Brian Van Arkadie

Since Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the Jordan River after the Six Day War, economic changes have created an improved "new status quo" for the one million native Palestinian Arabs under Israeli control. But Van Arkadie, an economist at The Hague’s Institute of Social Studies, believes that economic uplift alone will not ameliorate the region’s underlying political problems.

The “gross national products” of Gaza and the West Bank have grown at a rate of 18 percent annually since 1967—faster than ever before. Higher wages have quadrupled per capita Palestinian income in 10 years; agricultural income has increased by 300 percent; labor-intensive industry, such as clothing manufacture in the Gaza Strip, has expanded.

But the long-term implications of Israeli rule remain clouded. Inflation has raised prices in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by 300 and 400 percent, respectively. While Palestinian employment has climbed 43 percent, most of these new jobs are for the unskilled and could evaporate in an Israeli recession. Political uncertainty discourages large-scale investment in the area. Moreover, the isolation of Gaza and the West Bank from world commerce (foreign trade, says Van Arkadie, remains hypothetical) forces reliance on imports from Israel, which are often more expensive due to high tariffs protecting the Jewish homeland’s industrial goods.

Van Arkadie’s conclusion: The territories are moving toward ties of economic normalization with Israel, but no simple verdict on the consequences is yet possible.


The Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. 61 pp. $2.95

Authors: Barry M. Blechman et al.

U.S. defense strategists have become acutely aware of a sustained improvement in the Soviet military arsenal, prompting Congress to authorize modest increases in total defense spending in each of the last three years. But the U.S.S.R.’s military buildup, these Brookings analysts warn, should not lead to exaggerations of Moscow’s offensive strength. Moreover, American weapons procurement programs must remain sensitive to the needs of strategic arms limitations negotiations.

Citing U.S. government reports, the study details a fivefold increase in the U.S.S.R.’s total strategic nuclear force since 1964. Moscow has demonstrated a satellite “kill” capability, boosted megatonnage from 1,102 in 1964 to nearly 5,000 today, increased its tactical air branch by 30 percent, and...
planned deployment of four new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and two new types of submarine-launched missiles.

The authors concede that fear of Soviet ascendency in the strategic field is well-founded. But they contend that the threat of a Soviet pre-emptive first strike is clearly far-fetched. The "theoretical" increase assigned to Soviet hard-target kill capabilities (ability to destroy U.S. land-based missiles in their silos) assumes split-second timing and coordination. It is doubtful, they add, that the Soviet Union would risk 50 to 100 million casualties on the basis of war-gaming and computer simulations.

American diplomacy must display resolve in dealing with the Soviet buildup while refraining from costly weapon programs that may hamper arms control negotiations. The proposed M-X ICBM, for example, which would move along a track in a "hardened" trench, will cost $34 billion for 300 deployed units. Such missile systems greatly complicate verification of arms control agreements. The authors believe that the higher-yield Mark 12A warhead for existing Minuteman missiles, combined with a continued silo-hardening program, would provide a less costly counterforce.

The general level of U.S. defense preparedness remains high. The authors note that deployment of the new, low-altitude cruise missile, which can be launched from ship or plane, effectively adds a fourth leg to the U.S. strategic triad of ICBMs, submarine-launched missiles, and attack bombers.

Editor's Note. An annual analysis of military strength and defense expenditures throughout the world is prepared by London's International Institute for Strategic Studies under the title The Military Balance. The 1977-78 edition ($7.50, paper) is available from Westview Press, 1898 Flatiron Court, Boulder, Colo. 80301.

"The Andean Pact: A Political Analysis"
Washington Papers, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1800 K St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. 72 pp. $3.00
Author: Roger W. Fontaine

Crippled by economic stagnation, lured by the elusive goal of Latin unity, South American nations have periodically tried to devise "common markets" to increase their leverage in world economic affairs. Most of these efforts, such as the Latin American Free Trade Association of 1960, have proved failures.

The 6-member Pacto Andino, the most ambitious attempt at economic integration to date, has shown some signs of success. Nevertheless, writes Fontaine, a Georgetown University Latin American specialist, factional squabbles and an inability to cope with economic emergencies threaten to make the Andean Pact a "hollow shell."

Organized in 1969 by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, the Andean Pact was intended to bring the "retarded but not hopelessly backward" economies of the Andes Mountain region into the 20th century. The goals of the Pact include trade liberalization between the countries, creation of a $100 million regional development bank, a common external tariff wall, and joint control over the terms of new foreign investment.

But for all its framers' good intentions, writes Fontaine, the Pact has been a disappointment. The common code prohibiting exploitative foreign investment has furthered the decline in foreign investment. In Chile, total U.S. investment dropped from $720 million in 1971 to $287 million in 1974; in Venezuela, from $2.8 to $1.8 billion during the same period. Regional industrial development has faltered, and the re-
A regional bank has allocated a mere $4.7 million for development projects. The most striking illustration of the market's troubles came in 1975, when industrialized Chile withdrew from the Pact to protest the foreign investment policies and high tariffs of its less developed partners. While Fontaine expects the union to last at least five more years, he warns that serious problems must still be overcome: Bolivia, Chile, and Peru are involved in a longstanding border dispute; and the rise in oil prices has encouraged nouveau riche Venezuela to seek dominance over the Pact.

"On Further Examination"
Report of the Advisory Panel on the Scholastic Aptitude Test Score Decline, College Entrance Examination Board, 888 Seventh Ave., New York, N.Y. 10019. 75 pp. $4.00.

Parents, educators, and high school students have been worried by the unexplained 14-year national decline in Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores. (SATs are used to help determine students' readiness for college.) Between 1963 and 1977, the average SAT score registered a 49-point drop (on a scale of 800) in the verbal, and a 32-point drop in the mathematical portion of the test. The College Board's investigation finds no single cause for the decline; major factors, however, include the "changing composition" of those taking the test and disruptive influences on society at large.

As opportunities for higher education increased in the mid-1960s more students (and therefore more students with lower test scores) were taking SATs and going on to college. The largest increases occurred among youths from poor families, among members of ethnic minorities (2 percent of those taking SATs in 1963 vs. 8 percent in 1972), and women (42 percent in 1960 vs. 47 percent in 1970). However, since 1970, according to the report, changes in educational policy and in society as a whole have had a greater impact on test scores. These changes include the proliferation of easy "elective" courses in high schools with less emphasis on basic skills, easier textbooks and lowered standards, indiscriminate television viewing, and the social turbulence of the past decade and a half.

"Women and the Military"
The Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. 134 pp. $7.95 (cloth); $2.95 (paper)
Authors: Martin Binkin and Shirley J. Bach

In 1976, women comprised 5 percent of U.S. military personnel (versus less than 2 percent in 1972), a proportion exceeding that of any other nation, including Israel. Whereas five years ago less than 35 percent of all military job categories were open to women, the figure today is 80 percent; and women recruits surpass their male counterparts in educational attainment. Nevertheless, argue Brookings analyst Binkin and Air Force Colonel Bach, discriminatory policies still keep the number of women in the services well below optimal levels.

To field an all-volunteer force of 2 million now requires 365,000 male recruits a year—or one out of every 11 qualified and available men between the ages of 17 and 22. Declines in the U.S. birthrate and, possibly, in unemployment will make this goal increas-
RESEARCH REPORTS

ingly hard to achieve. One solution—raising military pay and benefits—could add as much as $14 billion to the defense budget by 1982. A more desirable alternative, suggest Binkin and Bach, would be to expand the role of women in the services.

Yet unless current policies are changed, enlistment of women will soon peak at a level of about 7 percent. The ban on women's participation in combat units, the authors contend, remains unnecessarily broad. In 1948, for instance, Congress prohibited women from sea duty except on certain auxiliary vessels, such as hospital ships. Most such vessels are no longer used in today's fleet. Even work to which women have been traditionally assigned is reserved for men. Of 540,000 jobs for enlisted personnel in the professional, technical, and clerical categories, only 11 percent are filled by women (compared to 55 percent in the civilian sector).

Bach and Binkin propose policies that could bring the proportion of women up to 22 percent. For example, allowing Navy women to serve on support ships—replenishment and auxiliary vessels—would open up 40,000 jobs. Beyond this, the women-in-combat issue will have to be resolved. Congress is in the best position to address the question: It could begin by making legislative changes to permit women in potential combat assignments (in missile-launch squadrons, aircraft crews, and front-line units) on an experimental basis.

“Analysis of the Proposed National Energy Plan”

“Synthetic Liquid Fuels Development: Assessment of Critical Factors”

The Carter administration's National Energy Plan, announced last April, is sound in principle, but its oil, natural gas, and coal production targets represent the upper limits of U.S. capacity and are "not likely to be achieved."

According to the congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), domestic oil production could fall 1.5 million barrels a day (mb/d) short of the 10.6 mb/d goal; coal may lag by 200 million tons a year; nuclear power by as much as 15 percent. The reasons: restrictions on development of oil and natural gas deposits in the outer continental shelf, environmental curbs, and shortages of investment capital and manpower.

The Carter plan calls for coal production of 1.3 billion tons annually by 1985, double the current level. While U.S. coal reserves total more than 400 billion tons, much coal is inaccessible. Converting power plants from oil to coal is expensive, with pollution control equipment alone costing an average of $4 million per installation.

Mechanization of the coal industry has stagnated since 1969, when productivity peaked at 18 tons per miner per day. By 1976, production had dropped to 9 tons per miner per day. OTA also faults the administration's failure to consider synthetic coal-based liquid fuels as a replacement for petroleum. The estimated 200 million cars and trucks on U.S. roads in the year 2000 will consume the equivalent in oil of 6 mb/d.

However, in its separate analysis, the
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) finds that the development of domestic synthetic fuel faces "constraining factors" while lacking "strong economic incentives."

Syncrudes (crude oils produced from coal and shale) have long been technologically feasible. Nevertheless, they are not yet cost-competitive with natural crudes—even with expensive OPEC oil imports. Capital investment is enormous, and processing plants require large amounts of water. (ERDA fears that a syncrude industry might cause severe water shortages in Western agricultural regions.) Moreover, the agency warns, researchers have as yet been unable to "revegetate" spent shale residue, the chief by-product of syncrude manufacture.

"International Debt, the Banks, and U.S. Foreign Policy"


Author: Karin Lissakers

While most industrialized Western nations have so far been able to bear massive oil-induced trade deficits, many poor Asian, Latin, and African countries have had to go heavily into debt since 1973 to pay for higher-priced OPEC petroleum. The debt issue, writes congressional aide Lissakers, will dominate U.S. relations with the Third World until well into the 1980s.

The International Monetary Fund and other lenders have provided emergency assistance to less developed countries (LDCs), but the West's private commercial banks constitute the major source of balance of payments credit. The banks, most of them American, hold deposits from the oil-producing nations in excess of $100 billion. (The largest depositors are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates.) These "petrodollars" have been recycled as loans to developing nations to alleviate external trade imbalances and maintain domestic consumption levels.

But increased borrowing, coupled with failures to undertake energy austerity programs, is making it increasingly difficult for such countries as Brazil, Turkey, Zaire, and Mexico to repay their debts. (Brazil and Mexico together owe $39 billion to private banks; Turkey and Zaire are having trouble even meeting interest payments.) While precise figures are unavailable, LDCs may owe as much as $200 billion on oil purchases alone—half of it to commercial lenders. These countries are now spending an estimated 20 percent of export earnings just to service their debts. For Brazil and Mexico, the figure may be as high as 40 percent.

If one or more LDCs find it useful to default on Western loans, the result may be a domino effect, leading to worldwide financial panic. Unfortunately, Lissakers notes, there is no evidence that the industrialized nations themselves are prepared to reckon with the "underlying cause" of the present distress—excessive dependence on the OPEC cartel for energy.
"On my island, inspired by your example we shall shape our conscience and build Communism," says Fidel Castro in this poster harking back to (clockwise from upper left) Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, a leader of Cuba's 1868 war of independence; Antonio Maceo and Máximo Gómez, veterans of the 1868 and 1895 rebellions against Spain; José Martí, martyred leader of the 1895 revolt; and Camillo Cienfuegos and Ernesto Che Guevara, early Castro lieutenants in the Sierra Maestra.
Cuba

Last June, the United States and Cuba began the process of restoring formal diplomatic relations. Already American diplomats have been stationed in Havana, and Cuban diplomats in Washington. Such tentative steps toward “normalization” follow almost two decades of Cold War hostility. Washington still sees some outstanding issues: compensation for $1.8 billion in nationalized American property; Cuba’s ambitious nuclear power program; its widespread military intervention in Africa; and the fact that Fidel Castro has kept more political prisoners in jail for a longer time than any other Latin strongman. Yet Castro’s attempts to export his revolution to the rest of Latin America have failed. Cuba remains a one-party Communist state and a Soviet ally, but it has a history and character of its own. Here, historians Martin Sherwin and Peter Winn review past Cuban-American relations, while political scientist Richard R. Fagen examines Cuba’s special dependence on the Soviet Union.

THE U.S. AND CUBA

by Martin J. Sherwin and Peter Winn

“There are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation,” John Quincy Adams observed in 1823, drawing an analogy between the fate of an apple severed from a tree and the destiny of a beautiful island 90 miles off the coast of the newly acquired territory of Florida: “Forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain and incapable of self-support, [Cuba] can gravitate only toward the North American Union,
One hundred and thirty-five years later, however, something "unnatural" happened to Cuba, and for almost 20 years Americans have been trying to figure out what went wrong. How did an island liberated in 1898 by our army and adopted by our navy—a country so freighted with our economic interests and political influence that it could be described as "no more independent than Long Island"—defy the laws of gravity? Were our perceptions of Cuba mistaken?

The search for useful answers must begin with a hard look at the cultural, geographic, and economic assumptions that have guided American diplomacy since our Founding Fathers conceived of the "American system," a sphere-of-influence concept that envisioned a U.S.-dominated Hemisphere.

**Manifest Destiny**

Culturally, the United States is Anglo-Protestant and northern European, a society of immigrants at odds with the ethos of the Latin world. Our citizens may turn south for trade or relaxation, but for models and for measures of success they look across the North Atlantic. The good opinion of Latin Americans does not weigh heavily on them: Imitation is encouraged, envy expected, and disapproval permitted, but activities that conflict with the interests of the United States are not suffered gladly.

This attitude, which Abraham Lowenthal has termed our "hegemonic presumption,"* has guided U.S.–Latin American policy since the 19th century, when Manifest Destiny spread the fever of expansionism across the North American continent. Distinctions between our conquest of half of Mexico in 1848 and our acquisition of Cuba from Spain 50 years later are real, but they


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**Peter Winn, 35, is a fellow of the Research Institute on International Change at Columbia University. Born in New York City, he received his B.A. at Columbia University (1962) and Ph.D. at Cambridge University, England (1972). He has taught history at Princeton and is the author of Yarur, The Chilean Revolution from Below (forthcoming).**
are far less important than the underlying assumption that binds them to the Platt Amendment of 1901 and the Bay of Pigs: that the United States has the power, the right, and indeed the responsibility to define the economic and political order throughout the Hemisphere.

A Tranquil Caribbean

Geography, too, has helped mold American perceptions of Cuba, from the earliest days of the Republic through the present, when space age technology calls into question the importance of proximity in great power strategy. Poised at the gateway to the Caribbean, guarding the isthmian route to the...
Pacific, only 48 miles from Key West, Cuba has been viewed by Presidents from Jefferson to Nixon as an island whose destiny the United States must control. Even the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, as historian Ronald Steel noted in *Pax Americana* (1976), was essentially a Caribbean doctrine that affirmed the "vital interest" of the United States "in the tranquility of what it considered to be its inland sea."

American businessmen had reasons of their own for promoting a U.S. pre-eminence in Cuba. Even before the Spanish-American War, they had established a beachhead on the island. By 1897, exports to Cuba had reached $27 million and investments almost twice that amount. After the island came under U.S. protection in 1898, the dollar followed the flag, a condition which Cuba's first U.S.-appointed governor-general, Leonard Wood, equated with political stability. When "people ask me what we mean by a stable government in Cuba," Wood wrote to Secretary of War Elihu Root in 1900, "I tell them that when money can be borrowed at a reasonable rate of interest and when capital is willing to invest in the Island, a condition of stability will have been reached."*

In the years that followed, United States economic interests achieved virtual control of the Cuban economy. American investments rose to $1.2 billion in 1924, a year in which tiny Cuba was our fourth largest customer, buying 66 percent of its imports from the United States and sending us 83 percent of its exports (mostly sugar) in exchange. By 1928, Americans controlled three-quarters of Cuban sugar production, and "King Sugar," accounting for nearly 90 percent of Cuban exports, ruled the island's economy.

"Our Cuban Colony"

During the succeeding decades, American sugar holdings declined, reflecting the unstable fortunes of Cuba's bittersweet crop. Nevertheless, in 1956 Americans directly controlled 40 percent of Cuba's sugar production and consumed half of its sugar exports. The island still depended upon the United States for capital, technology, and tourism, as well as manufactures and markets. The development of Cuban industry had been impeded by treaty and restrictive U.S. legislation; Congress set the all-important Cuban sugar quota, and American investments accounted for 85 percent of all foreign investments on the

island.* Economically, on the eve of Castro’s Revolution, the island was still “our Cuban colony”, and politically, the United States ambassador, by his own testimony, was “the second most important man in Cuba; sometimes even more important than the [Cuban] president.” †

Despite the cultural biases, national security concerns, and economic interests that shaped U.S. policies toward Cuba, a minority of Americans sought to balance our interests against the legitimate aspirations of the Cuban people, although with limited success. In 1898, they persuaded Congress to accept the Teller Amendment, forbidding outright annexation of the island, only to see this measure neutralized in 1901 with the passage of the Platt Amendment, asserting the right of the United States to intervene in Cuba’s internal affairs.

Background to Revolution

Three military interventions and an equal number of American proconsuls punctuated Cuba’s history between 1901 and 1934, when President Franklin Roosevelt renounced the Platt Amendment.‡ Other forms of U.S. intervention, however, proved more benign. During the American occupation of 1899–1902, army doctors under Walter Reed virtually banished yellow fever from the island. Cuban finances were reorganized, trade boomed, and the Catholic Church was separated from the operations of the government.

But while American enterprise afforded Cuba a significant measure of prosperity, the island’s new affluence was unevenly distributed and dependent upon the volatile world sugar market. In the end, the Depression and the Machado dictatorship (1924–33) brought economic crisis and political unrest—and Sumner Welles as President Roosevelt’s emissary—to Cuba in 1933. Rejecting Machado’s successor as too radical, Welles or-

* The Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1934 barred import quotas or protective tariffs on a wide range of American manufactures and flooded the Cuban market with goods at prices with which local industries could not compete. Together with the Jones-Costigan Act of the same year, which established a generous quota for Cuban refined sugar, the trade treaty constituted what Earl Babst of the American Sugar Refining Company called “a step in the direction of a sound Colonial Policy.”

† Earl Smith, in Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act, Aug. 30, 1960, pt. 9, p. 700.

‡ Between 1898 and 1920, the United States landed troops 20 times on the soil of foreign nations. Three of these interventions involved Cuba, although the Platt Amendment was invoked as justification only in 1906. In addition, the tutelary missions of Charles Magoon (1907–09), Enoch Crowder (1920–22), and Sumner Welles (1933) represented active American political interference in Cuba’s internal affairs.
orchestrated negotiations in Cuba and decisions in Washington that led to the ouster of the reform-minded Ramon Grau San Martin in January 1934. Taking the hint, Cuban Army strong-
man Colonel Fulgencio Batista threw his support to Cuba's pro-American conservatives and reaped 25 years of power as a reward.

Batista brought tranquillity to Cuba, but through co-
option and coercion rather than reform. Strikes were broken, labor unions disciplined, and constitutional guarantees honored in the breach. Private property and foreign investment, however, were protected. Although a well-intentioned Foreign Policy Association study of 1935 focused sympathetically on the Problems of the New Cuba, in the eyes of most American policymakers and businessmen, the Cuban situation had been favorably re-
solved. By the 1950's, movies and tourism had replaced the old image of "our Cuban colony" with a new vision of "the en-
chanted island."

The Unseen Cuba

For most of its 6 million people, however, Batista's Cuba was a land of poverty, unemployment, sugar monoculture, and social injustice. Its politics were corrupt and repressive, and its relatively high levels of per capita income and social services were distributed unevenly. A 1951 World Bank report underscored these problems* and a few scholars and journalists de-
nounced Batista's frustration of democracy and denial of human rights, but this was a Cuba that most Americans neither saw nor wished to see.

The New Deal had responded to the growth of anti-Ameri-
canism south of the border with the Good Neighbor Policy, but viewed from Havana, benevolent changes in U.S. policy between 1898 and 1958 were more show than substance. With its empha-
sis on political stability and economic order, the clear priority of American policy in Cuba remained the protection of American interests—a commitment that placed the United States in oppo-
sition to fundamental reform. For six decades, this policy ap-
ppeared to be relatively successful, while acute economic, social,

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*International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report on Cuba, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951. This study found ample unused human and material resources available in Cuba and urged that the country take advantage of the current prosperity to diversify her economy, which concentration on sugar had prevented at a social cost of 25 percent unemployment, even in "normal" times. The report also recognized the social and political obstacles to economic growth, stressing in particular a malaise among the Cuban people, reflecting a lack of faith in the integrity of government and business and labor leaders, and doubts concerning the impartiality and consistency of law enforcement.
### CUBAN DOMESTIC EVENTS

**1952** *March* Colonel Fulgencio Batista ousts President Carlos Prio Socarrás in a military coup.

**1953** *July* Rebels led by Fidel Castro attack Moncado Barracks in Santiago de Cuba; about 100 students and soldiers killed.

**1956** *November* Revolutionary uprising led by Castro begins in Oriente Province.


**1960** *May* Pro-government unions seize major newspapers critical of Castro regime.

**1961** *May* In a May Day speech, Castro proclaims Cuba a socialist state. *June* Cuba nationalizes education.

**1963** *October* Most privately owned farms are nationalized.

**1964** *August* Cuba cuts back on foreign buying because of deteriorating economy.

**1966** *January* Government cuts rice ration by 50 percent.

**1969** *May* Bread rationing goes into effect in Havana; Castro calls for record 10 million-ton sugar harvest in 1970.


**1972** *February* Government announces 35 percent reduction in domestic sugar ration; Cuban dependence on Soviet aid reaches $750 million annually.

**1973** *January* Government cuts daily beef ration by 20 percent.

**1974** *June* Delegates to municipal assemblies are elected in first provincial elections in 15 years.

**1975** *June* Cuba announces a trade surplus of $500 million for 1974. *December* First Cuban Five-Year Plan calls for 6 percent annual growth rate; planners emphasize profitability and decentralized decision-making; Cuban Congress approves Constitution affirming Cuban socialism and calling for Cuban trade and diplomatic relations with all countries.

**1976** *February* Popular referendum approves new Constitution.
and political problems festered. In the end, the failure to carry out reforms from above led to revolution from below—a revolution with a distinctly anti-American cast.

**Revolution and Confrontation**

The initial American image of Fidel Castro was shaped by veteran *New York Times* correspondent Herbert Matthews in a series of articles in early 1957. Matthews had traced Castro and his guerrillas to the rugged Sierra Maestra in eastern Cuba, and his articles described the Cuban leader as an idealistic reformer intent on restoring the democratic Cuban Constitution of 1940. While some of his followers were probably Communists—including his brother Raul and Ernesto “Ché” Guevara—Castro himself, said Matthews, was not. He concluded that the guerrilla leader’s policies were likely to be conditioned by the way the United States treated him.

During 1958, as reports of guerrilla success and government repression surfaced in the American press, Washington’s support for Batista began to cool. The State Department, however, still sought a “safe” alternative, pinning its hopes first upon a Batista general, Eulogio Cantillo, and then, after the rebel victory, on the restraining influence of more moderate members of Castro’s political coalition, but with the flight of Batista and his closest collaborators to the Dominican Republic on the last day of 1958, power effectively devolved on Fidel Castro.

Although the United States recognized the new Cuban government, the underlying tensions between Washington and Havana surfaced early in 1959 when the Revolution took a radical road. The trial and execution of some 500 Batista military and police officers accused of “war crimes” (involving the deaths of an estimated 20,000 Cubans during the preceding decade) were widely criticized in Congress and the American media. The new land reform and utilities regulation measures were formally protested as prejudicial to American interests.

Increasingly, allegations of communist influence appeared in the U.S. press, and Matthew’s romantic image of Fidel Castro yielded to something more menacing. “The Revolution may be like a watermelon,” suggested the *Wall Street Journal* on June 24, 1959. “The more they slice it, the redder it gets.” These were but the first in a series of salvos fired across the Caribbean whose cumulative effect was to reverse the force of geopolitical gravity and send John Quincy Adams’ Cuban apple spinning off into the Soviet orbit.

In the months that followed, the United States embargoed
trade with Cuba, recalled its ambassador, and secretly began
training an exile invasion force, while Cuba nationalized Ameri-
can property, re-oriented its economy toward the Soviet Union,
and moved toward declaring itself the Hemisphere’s first
socialist state. In the face of a revolution whose character and
ideology had disappointed their expectations, the exodus of half
a million Cubans began, many of whom found a home in Miami
and support for their cause in Washington. By the close of 1960,
the United States and Cuba were trading accusations and steer-
ing a collision course.

Although the United States response to the Cuban Revolu-
tion was influenced by the assumptions and politics of the Cold
War, the intense emotion that it aroused in America revealed
still deeper roots. The U.S. reaction also reflected a sense of
failure and betrayal, as well as an awareness of the threat to our
self-image and Caribbean hegemony that the success of Castro’s
Revolution represented. Americans may have differed about
who was to blame, but they shared the rage of Prospero at the
treachery of a Cuban Caliban.

At bottom, however, the anti-American course of the Cuban
Revolution was the result neither of American error nor Cuban
perfidy but of a fundamental conflict between our hegemonic
presumption and Fidel Castro’s commitment to the structural
transformation of Cuba and its international relations. The
United States would itself take up the banners of land reform,
industrial development, and social justice during the years of
President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress. Castro’s pur-
suit of these goals in Cuba in 1959, however, clashed with pow-
erful American interests, as did his determination to lessen Cu-
ba’s dependence upon the United States. Either Castro would
have to compromise his vision of a New Cuba, as his nation’s
leaders had always done in the past, or a showdown with Wash-
ington was all but inevitable.

Surrogate Invaders

While politicians and pundits debated whether Fidel Castro
was a Communist and how Cuba’s leap into the arms of the
Russian bear could have been averted, successive U.S. adminis-
trations moved to deal with the new “red threat to the Hemi-
sphere,” as they had dealt with its Guatemalan predecessor in
1954—by sponsoring an invasion of exiles.

If the hegemonic presumption composed one part of the
equation that added up to the 1961 invasion at the Bay of Pigs,
the other was the projection onto Cubans of American values:
Castro was a Communist and a dictator; therefore the Cuban people would rebel against him, granted the opportunity. On the sands of Playa Giron, this presumption was revealed to be anachronistic and this projection ethnocentric. But the assumptions that shaped the invasion of Cuba were too deeply rooted for even the debacle of the Bay of Pigs to alter.

President Kennedy took responsibility for a misconceived strategy, but he continued to regard the new Cuba as a threat to the hemispheric system, a menace underscored by Castro's undisguised support for leftist guerrilla movements and the appearance of Russian vessels in Cuban ports. In Washington's eyes, the existence of a "red peril" only 90 miles from Miami justified a covert intervention that included economic sabotage, commando raids, and attempts to assassinate Castro. It required the recruitment and training of a clandestine force of Cuban exiles—a force that entered history at the Bay of Pigs and came home to roost at the Watergate.

Ironically, the potential Cuban threat to national—and hemispheric—security may have been largely a self-fulfilling American prophecy. The covert United States intervention in Cuba and open blockade of the island convinced Castro that another, more dangerous American invasion was in the offing and, by his own account, led the Cuban government to request the secret installation of Russian medium-range missiles on the island.

Sheathing the Dagger

Although the "missiles of October" (1962) had little effect upon the strategic balance of terror, their presence gave concrete shape to the deep-seated American fear of Cuba, "an island pointing like a dagger at the soft-underbelly of the nation." In the face of this concern, other considerations became secondary; the United States agreed not to invade Cuba in return for removal of the offending missiles.

Thereafter, American policy concentrated upon the containment of the Cuban Revolution, pressing for the island's ouster from hemispheric political and economic systems and training the Latin American military to prevent its repetition elsewhere. This priority of "no more Cubas" was to shape the Latin American policy of the United States for a decade—from Kennedy's Alliance for Progress to Kissinger's New Dialogue—and lead us to support first reform and then military dictatorships in half the continent, to send marines into the Dominican Republic (1965), and to intervene covertly in Chile (1970–73). As
President Lyndon Johnson remarked in justification of his massive Dominican intervention: "We don't propose to sit here in our rocking chair with our hands folded and let the Communists set up any government in the Western Hemisphere."

The New Cuba's Many Faces

The missile crisis, the most menacing event of the Cold War, froze a chilling image of Cuba for most Americans. Cuba was now a Russian satellite and America's enemy. It was a land of Spartan socialism, communist dictatorship, and regimented masses. Gone was the old image of Latin sensuality and spontaneity, of rum and rhumba.

Within this framework of general hostility, contradictory views of the "New Cuba" persisted. Some observers saw Castro as a Soviet satrap, replicating the structures and strictures of a neo-Stalinist state, responsive to the will and whim of the Kremlin. Others regarded the Cuban leader as unpredictably autonomous, a revolutionary Latin tail wagging the conservative Russian bear, a financial drain on Soviet gold and a competitor for Third World leadership.*

Only a minority of Americans viewed the Cuban Revolution with more favorable eyes, stressing its concern for social and economic equity. To them, Fidel Castro was a popular and charismatic leader, not a totalitarian tyrant, and his rule reflected both independence and innovation.† Whatever the merits of these various views, it was not until the mid-1970's that the prevailing American image of Cuba began to change, and with that change came a thaw in U.S.-Cuban relations.

On the Cuban side, the high costs of the symbolic 1970 sugar harvest and the failure of revolutionary movements elsewhere in Latin America led to a new pragmatism in economic and foreign policy and to a new stress on citizen participation in building

socialism. On the American side, détente with Russia and China and peace in Vietnam made continued confrontation with Cuba an anomaly, while Castro’s success in building diplomatic bridges to other Latin countries and eroding the U.S. economic blockade made a new Cuba policy advisable. Moreover, as the Communist monolith fractured into competing socialisms, pursuing distinct ideological paths and diverse national interests, the United States began to perceive opportunities to be seized where it had previously seen only enemies to be combatted.

Although Richard Nixon’s personal hostility to Castro’s Cuba (which he likened to one half of “a red sandwich,” the other half being Chile several thousand miles away) prevented him from extending détente to the enemy off Key Biscayne, his successor, Gerald Ford, began the process of improving relations. Ironically, Nixon, with his trip to Peking, paved the way for President Jimmy Carter’s inclusion of Cuba—along with China—among those areas of the world in which the United States should “aggressively challenge . . . the Soviet Union and others for influence.” Détente may not have begun close to home, but the logic of détente eventually found its way back to the Caribbean.

Recently, American interest in Castro’s Revolution has increased. Scholars and journalists, congressmen and businessmen have gone to Cuba and returned with more balanced impressions. Though it remains a country with economic problems, political restrictions, and Russian ties, it is also a land of rich resources, social reforms, and Latin culture. Moreover, in Fidel Castro Cuba has a popular and pragmatic leader who is ready for a rapprochement with the United States. Significantly, a Gallup poll taken last spring showed that a majority of Americans now favor negotiating our differences with Cuba and restoring diplomatic ties with Havana.*

As the Carter Administration takes steps to achieve both these goals, one phase in the long history of U.S.–Cuban relations draws to a close and a new one, with an opportunity to transcend the myths and mutual misperceptions of the past, begins. “The difficulty,” Lord Keynes observed, “lies not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones.”

* By a margin of more than 2 to 1 (59 percent to 25 percent), this poll showed that Americans are either “very strongly” or “fairly strongly” in favor of entering into negotiations (16 percent “didn’t know”). Public opinion, which had been firmly opposed to normalization of relations with Cuba in early 1971 (Harris survey: 21 percent in favor, 61 percent opposed, 18 percent didn’t know) began to shift after President Nixon’s trip to China in 1972. See William Watts and Jorge I. Dominguez, The United States and Cuba: Old Issues and New Directions, Washington: Potomac Associates, 1977.
One day last spring, while walking along the breakwater in the once fashionable western section of Havana, I spotted a pair of massive high-rise buildings facing the ocean on an isolated promontory. "What are they?" I asked my Cuban companion. "Those are the living quarters of Soviet and East European technicians and their families," he said.

What did he think, I asked, of Soviet "influence" on Cubans and the Cuban Revolution? "It doesn't exist," he replied. "We simply owe them our lives."

Given my friend's poetic bent, he can be forgiven a bit of hyperbole. But there is an essential truth, both in what he said and in the symbolism of the massive, isolated buildings overlooking the sea. In one sense, the Cuban Revolution does owe its "life" to Soviet support, and certainly the Soviet presence in Cuba is both substantial and special. But equally noteworthy is how Cuban, how un-Soviet, how independent Fidel Castro's regime has remained throughout this long and tangled relationship.

Cuban history offers some insights into this paradox. When Fulgencio Batista fled Cuba in the early hours of the morning on January 1, 1959, eight days before Castro's forces marched into Havana, few persons in the world—possibly including Fidel Castro and most of his followers—could have predicted that such a close relationship with the Soviet Union lay ahead. On the contrary, to Castro's 26th of July Movement and its supporters, victory essentially meant the defeat of a brutal dictatorship and the chance to complete the long process of national liberation and development that had begun in 1868 with the first major revolt against Spanish rule in Cuba.

National liberation, however, did mean basically changing Cuba's 20th-century relationship with the United States, a relationship firmly rooted in U.S. entry into the struggle in the closing days of the Cuban Wars of Independence, reaffirmed through multiple political and military interventions, and symbolized...
by the massive and humiliating (for nationalistic Cubans) U.S. economic presence on the island.

Although misperceived by most North Americans at the time, the fall of Batista and the public commitment of the new Cuban government to a program of profound economic and political changes necessarily implied direct conflict with U.S. economic, political, and strategic interests. Less fully understood—even by some early leaders of the Revolution—was that actually carrying out this program, especially those aspects that promised the eradication of poverty and the construction of a society in which all could realistically aspire to a decent life, implied the socialist transformation of Cuba’s dependent capitalist system.

Caribbean Cold War

The first crude and imperfect expressions of these historical realities were not long in coming. During 1959, as the revolutionary government moved toward urban and agrarian reform, the nationalization of some foreign properties, and the freeing of Cuba from U.S. control, cries of “betrayal,” “subversion,” and “communism” were heard both in Cuba and abroad.

Although causality should not be assumed, it is not entirely coincidental that in March 1960, one month after Cuba signed a $100 million loan and a sugar and trade agreement with the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower directed the CIA to begin organizing, training, and equipping the Cuban exiles who 13 months later came ashore at the Bay of Pigs.

In May 1960, Cuba and the Soviet Union formally established diplomatic relations, and Cuba informed the managers of U.S.-owned oil refineries that they would have to process Russian oil purchased under the recently signed Cuban-Soviet trade agreement. The refineries, acting under U.S. government directives, refused to receive the Soviet oil. A month later, they were seized by the Cuban government, and the Cold War was in full swing in the Caribbean. On July 9, three days after the United States reduced the Cuban sugar quota, Khrushchev

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promised to "defend Cuba with rockets" if the United States were to attack—a pledge that he subsequently said was only "symbolic."* 

As 1961 dawned, the United States severed diplomatic relations with Cuba, claiming intolerable provocations. Little more than a hundred days later, on April 15, came the aerial bombardment that preceded the invasion of the Bay of Pigs. In his funeral oration for those killed in these first attacks, Castro declared that the Cuban Revolution was socialist. All remaining doubts as to the totality of the rupture between the United States and Cuba were swept away as the U.S.-trained and supported exile invasion force landed at Playa Girón and Playa Larga. Also swept away in the crushing and inevitable defeat of the 1,500 invaders by the Cuban militia and Castro's still poorly equipped rebel army were various North American illusions about the unpopularity and incompetence of Fidel Castro and other leaders—although such illusions linger in some circles even to this day.

In the context of the Cold War, there was logic if not good sense in the installation of intermediate-range Soviet missiles in Cuba in the summer and autumn of 1962. Whoever actually initiated the process leading to their installation (historians still argue over the exact mix of Soviet and Cuban motives and initiatives), it seems clear that the decision was linked to the Bay of Pigs and the threat from the North.

The 1962 missile crisis was spawned in the Cold War and made specific by U.S. antagonisms toward the Cuban Revolution. It was resolved over the heads of the Cubans through direct U.S.–Soviet negotiations and ultimately resulted in important changes in the bilateral relations between all three primary actors. A U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba was formalized—and honored in the letter, if not the spirit, of the agreement. Cuban beliefs in the Soviet commitment to socialism in the Hemisphere were shaken when Moscow backed down and the United States and the Soviet Union—both sobered by the confrontation—began a slow reappraisal of some aspects of Cold War strategy and tactics.

The Soviet-Cuban relationship was conceived at the height

* The sugar quota stemmed from an agreement under which the United States agreed to buy a fixed quantity of sugar each year at predetermined prices from Cuba (and other countries). The 1960 quota for Cuba was roughly 3.1 million tons at 5 cents a pound, or about 2 cents above the world market price. The reduction in the sugar quota meant that Cuba had to seek guaranteed markets elsewhere—in this case, the Soviet Union, although Russia was self-sufficient in sugar. Precise causes and effects are impossible to identify, but it is clear that from 1960 on, Cuba sought closer relationships with the Soviet Union both as a substitute for lost U.S. markets, goods, and technology and as a shield against U.S. hostility.
of the Cold War and gestated in an atmosphere of U.S.–Cuban hostility. It also, however, had a life of its own. Its most essential component has, from the outset, been economic. From 1960, when the first agreements were negotiated, to the present, the Soviet Union has been the primary foreign backer of Cuban development.* In the light of inherited underdevelopment and deformations of the economy going back to colonial times, of prior dependence on the United States, of embargo, sabotage, and the threat of invasion, and of Cuban inexperience and errors and the comparatively modest resource base of the island, it is difficult to predict what would have happened had the Soviet Union not been so supportive. It is in this sense, even more perhaps than in the military sense, that my friend’s comment that “we simply owe them our lives” partakes of the truth.

The continuity of Soviet economic support is particularly impressive when the ups and downs of political relations between Havana and Moscow during the 1960s are taken into account. Haltingly after the missile crisis, but at a quicker pace after the January 1966 Tricontinental Congress in Havana, Cuba supported armed liberation movements around the world—particularly in Latin America—and thus came in conflict with Soviet policy.†

Soviet-Cuban Disagreements

By the beginning of 1967, the conflict was quite open, with Cuba supporting Latin American guerrilla groups, who in turn were under fire from Moscow-oriented communist parties in their own countries—parties that sought legitimacy and participation through electoral and other more conventional political tactics. The Cuban call to “take up arms against imperialism and its lackeys” was never more clearly voiced than by Ché Guevara and his small band of guerrillas in Bolivia. Operating without the backing of the relatively small but important Bolivian Communist Party, Guevara and his followers were finally hunted down and killed in October 1967 by a mixed team of U.S.-trained Bolivian rangers and CIA agents.

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*The most frequently cited figure on Soviet aid to Cuba during the first decade of the relationship is “more than $1 million a day” (approximately half a billion dollars a year). Precise figures are very hard to arrive at. Neither Cuba nor the Soviet Union has ever published comprehensive data. Levels of military grant aid are difficult to estimate, and Soviet purchases of Cuban goods, often under barter arrangements, sometimes involve price artificialities or subsidies.

†Throughout this period, the conditioning of the Cuban-Soviet relationship by the United States was always present, if only indirectly. In Cuban eyes, for example, Soviet failure to respond to U.S. intervention in Vietnam as forcefully as the Cubans thought Moscow should, reinforced and legitimized the policy positions that Cuba took in opposition to the U.S.S.R. elsewhere.
## CUBA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

1958 **March** U.S. bans all arms shipments to Fulgencio Batista's Cuba.

1959 **April** A victorious Fidel Castro visits Washington; sees Vice President Nixon but not President Eisenhower.

1960 **February** Cuba and U.S.S.R. sign sugar agreement. **May** U.S. ends all economic aid to Cuba. **June** U.S. and Britain reject Cuban demand that their oil companies refine Soviet crude oil; U.S. cuts Cuban sugar quota by 95 percent; Havana authorizes expropriation of all U.S. property. **July** Khrushchev threatens retaliation with rockets if U.S. intervenes militarily in Cuba. **September** U.S.S.R. grants first military aid to Cuba.

1961 **January** U.S. severs diplomatic relations with Cuba. **April** Bay of Pigs invasion. **August** U.S. and all Latin American countries except Cuba sign Alliance for Progress.


1964 **July** Organization of American States condemns Cuban "aggression and intervention" in Venezuela and votes to end all diplomatic and economic links with Cuba.

1966 **September** Ghana breaks diplomatic ties with Cuba, accusing it of interference in Ghana's internal affairs.

1967 **March** Castro attacks Soviet contacts with "oligarchy" governements in Latin America. **October** Ernesto Ché Guevara slain in Bolivia.

1968 **July** Castro supports Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia.

1972 **July** Cuba admitted to membership in Comecon, the Soviet trade bloc.

1973 **February** Cuba and U.S. sign antihijacking agreement.

1975 **July** OAS ends embargo against Cuba with U.S. support. **October** Castro sends troops to aid Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

1977 **March** Castro tours black Africa and visits Moscow; U.S. lifts ban on travel to Cuba. **September** U.S. and Cuba begin to normalize relations by reopening "diplomatic missions." **November** U.S. expresses concern over 27,000 Cuban troops and advisers in Africa.
To some extent, the death of Guevara marked the end of the most acerbic period of Soviet-Cuban disagreements on how to bring socialism into existence on a world scale. This was not fully apparent for more than a year—until Castro, with evident ambivalence, publicly supported the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August of 1968. Describing the Warsaw Pact invasion as a “drastic and painful measure . . . a bitter necessity,” he aligned Cuba with the Soviets at a particularly dark and difficult moment in Moscow’s relationship with both European and non-European communist parties.

Since 1968, Cuban and Soviet political positions have drawn closer together. In 1972, after an agonizing reappraisal of Cuban economic policies in the wake of the failed sugar harvest of 1970, Soviet-Cuban economic agreements were revised on terms very favorable to the Cubans. All payments on credits previously granted to Cuba were deferred until 1986, at which time both principal and interest payments will be stretched out over 25 years. New credits to cover anticipated balance-of-payments deficits were received. The Soviet Union almost doubled the price it was then paying for Cuba’s sugar, increased the price it was paying for Cuban nickel, and signed a new agreement on technical and economic collaboration.*

By the early 1970s, the Cubans had also clearly taken the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet split, and Cuban officials increasingly endorsed Soviet positions in international forums. In Algeria in 1973, when some Third World nations at the Fourth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Nations were vociferous in calling the U.S.S.R. (as well as the United States) imperialist, Castro responded:

How can the Soviet Union be labeled imperialist? Where are its monopoly corporations? Where is its participation in the multinational companies? What factories, what mines, what oil fields does it own in the underdeveloped world? What worker is exploited in any country of Asia, Africa, or Latin America by Soviet capital?

When a new Cuban Constitution was drafted in 1975, its preamble spoke of “Basing ourselves on proletarian internationalism,

* Estimates of total Cuban indebtedness to the Soviets at the time the new agreements were signed vary from $3 billion to $4 billion. For comparative purposes, it should be noted that in 1976 Mexico’s total public and private sector debt topped $25 billion, with at least half of the total owed to U.S. banks. Because Mexico’s total population is more than six times that of Cuba, the per capita indebtedness statistics are not too dissimilar for the two countries. Cuba, however, has much more favorable repayment terms.
on the fraternal friendship, help and cooperation of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and on the solidarity of the workers and the peoples of Latin America and of the world." It would be hard to imagine a closer identification of two nations than such constitutional enshrinement.

What else has the Soviet Union received in return for its aid to Cuba? In the early 1960s, opportunities to beard the U.S. lion in its den must have seemed immensely attractive in Moscow, and the strategic value of access to Cuba was certainly a large plus, as viewed through Soviet eyes. Equally, if not more, attractive was the opportunity to be in on the ground floor of Latin America's most radical social revolution. But just as the Cubans in the first days of the Revolution could not possibly have foreseen the problems they would eventually encounter in their relationships with the U.S.S.R., Soviet leaders could not have imagined how trying their Cuban ally would become a few short years after the first trade agreements were signed. Soviet leaders must have breathed a collective sigh of relief after Castro supported the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia; certainly since the early 1970s Cuba has been the most positive of allies, al-

<table>
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<th>CUBAN FOREIGN TRADE</th>
<th>(in millions of U.S. dollars)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total exports</td>
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<td>Communist countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Communist</td>
<td>776</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total imports</td>
<td>895</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Non-Communist</td>
<td>893</td>
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*Preliminary.

Cuban exports of sugar, nickel, tobacco, and fish rose steadily between 1970 and 1975, with sugar remaining the primary commodity. Trade with the communist world, especially the Soviet Union, has grown continuously since 1968. In 1974, however, there was a sharp increase in Cuba's trade with the noncommunist world, particularly Canada, Japan, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
though a somewhat costly one. Strategic factors are still important, at least marginally. But, perhaps most important of all from the Soviet perspective, is the fact that Cuba today is a basically successful and functioning example of socialism in the Western Hemisphere. The economy is much improved since the darkest days of the 1960s, the revolutionary government is stronger than ever, and even the archenemy to the North is now negotiating with it.

In the light of the economic bonds and close political ties between Cuba and the Soviet Union, what is to be made of my friend's claim that Soviet “influence” on Cubans and the Cuban Revolution doesn't exist? Viewed conventionally in an international relations context, the statement is false. To choose the most difficult, perhaps, and certainly the most controversial recent case, it is clear that the Soviet-Cuban relationship influenced the timing, manner, and scope of the Cuban presence in Angola since 1975. This is not to say that the Soviets “told” the Cubans what to do, or that the Cuban actions were some kind of crude repayment for past and present Soviet support. Rather, the way in which Cuba entered into the Angola equation would have been different without Soviet political and military support of the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and without U.S., Chinese, and West European support of other factions—not to mention the South African invasion. But almost certainly, given the Cuban leadership’s policy commitments, values, and past actions, the Cubans would have been on the scene, with or without the Soviets.*

The Minimal Soviet Presence

From a domestic standpoint, the Soviet influence is much less clear (and in all fairness to my Cuban friend, we were not talking about international politics when he made his statement). More superficially—although not unimportantly—he was referring to the fact that Cuban daily life and culture have been only minimally touched by the Soviet presence. Baseball and boxing are still the favorite sports in Cuba; English is still the preferred second language; and Cuban music, art, literature,

*In assessing the Cuban role in Angola, it should be recalled that Fidel Castro had offered to send troops to North Vietnam during the early 1960s—an offer that was refused by the North Vietnamese and that the Soviets probably opposed when it was made. Furthermore, the Cuban commitment to the MPLA was long-standing, dating from the mid-60s (actually predating the Soviet commitment), and the major costs of the Cuban presence in Angola, in both human and material terms, were borne by Cuba and its citizens, not by the Soviet Union. From personal contacts and other sources, it is my impression that, however costly, the Angola expedition, involving some 12,000 Cuban troops, was strongly supported by an overwhelming majority of Cubans.
CUBA'S ARMED FORCES

Total Population: 9,290,000
Military Service: 3 years
Total Armed Forces: 189,000
Estimated GNP 1970: $4.5 billion
Estimated defense expenditure, 1971: 290 million pesos
($290 million)
Cuban Army: 160,000 personnel
90,000 reserves, over 600 tanks
Cuban Navy: 9,000 personnel
1 escort patrol vessel, 18 submarine chasers, 5 Osa- and 18
Korar-class patrol boats with Styx surface to surface missiles,
24 motor torpedo boats, 29 armed patrol boats, 15 Mi-5
helicopters
Cuban Air Force: 20,000 personnel
210 combat aircraft, including 75 MiG-17s, 50 MiG-21s, 30
MiG-21MFs, 40 MiG-19s, 30 Mi-1 and 24 Mi-4 helicopters
Para-Military Forces: 10,000 State Security troops; 3,000 border
guards; 100,000 People's Militia


Deployment in Africa: Cuba's military involvement in Africa has
grown steadily since November, 1975, when Havana dispatched
3,000 troops to Angola. Two years later, Cuba had some 27,000
military personnel in 11 African countries (U.S. estimates).

and conversation, in general, show few if any traces of having
been in contact with Eastern Europe. Soviet technicians and
advisers are housed apart, and the Western visitor to Cuba is
reminded of their presence only when he or she is addressed as
"tovarisch" by kids in the street or when an Eastern European
deleagtion puts in an appearance at one of the hotels or restaur-
ants.* In fact, in contradistinction to the cultural and phys-
ical impact that the United States has had in most of Latin
America and much of East Asia, the "tracelessness" of the Soviet
relationship with Cuba is astounding.

There is also a deeper level at which my friend's comment
has meaning. At that level, the key question involves the au-
tonomy and appropriateness of Cuban development and the ex-
tent to which the special relationship with the Soviet Union has

*Estimates of the number of Soviet technicians and advisrs in Cuba at any given time in
the early 1970s range from 1,000 to about 3,000. The number of Cubans (mostly engineers
and techniciens) studying in the Soviet Union at any given moment during this same period
probably did not exceed 1,500.

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furthered, rather than distorted or restrained, needed economic and social change. The question is tricky, for no national development effort can be hermetically sealed against outside influences, and developmental goals can and do change.

The Cuban case, however, has been strikingly consistent. From 1953, when Castro made the famous speech in his own defense after the attack on the Moncada army barracks, to the present, the primary developmental goals and energies of the Revolution have consistently focused on improving the "quality of life" of the island's citizens. Although halting and uneven at times, overall achievements have been impressive and, as North Americans should understand by now, the incentive and commitment necessary for transformations of this magnitude do not come from without.

Thus, what ultimately gives substance to the claim that Soviet influence on the Cuban Revolution is of secondary importance is that Cuba's proudest achievements are rooted in the earliest moments of the revolutionary movement and have been fashioned from the sweat, creativity, and sacrifice of millions of Cubans. Of course, Soviet economic and technical support has been important in many ways, but the human resources, the key decisions, the style, the outcomes—and the errors—have been predominantly Cuban.

There is thus more than a kernel of truth in the claim that Cuban development has been—and continues to be—"uninfluenced" by the Soviets. It is something that visitors to the island sense, even those who are not particularly well disposed toward the Revolution. And it is this that continues to give hope to many who see in the Cuban experience much that is relevant to the future of the poorer countries—countries that in the main cannot expect and do not seek special relationships with the rich and powerful nations of the world, East or West.
The story starts with Columbus. But the explorer’s October 27, 1492 landing on Cuba (after he had blundered about for a couple of weeks in the Bahamas), did not cause a sudden, disrupting change of the sort that has characterized much of Cuban history.

Convinced that he had found Marco Polo’s fabled Asian island kingdom of Cipango (probably Japan), Columbus sent men inland seeking gold and “the Khan.” They found neither, and he sailed on, leaving no settlement behind.

Britain’s Hugh Thomas gives a backward glance to the first two and a half centuries of Spanish rule as he opens his prodigious, highly readable, 1,696-page CUBA: The Pursuit of Freedom (Harper, 1971).

Before Lord Albemarle sailed from England in 1762 to capture Havana, Thomas writes, the Spanish colony of Cuba had developed “with majestic slowness” into a prosperous possession. The countryside still had more acres left in virgin forests (cedar, mahogany, pines, royal palms) than were devoted to tobacco farms, sugar plantations, and cattle ranches. There were no good roads. Although the Catholic Church had reared a great cathedral in Santiago, the people of Havana still worshipped in parish churches among forts, the palaces of grandees, and unpaved back streets. Cuba serviced the great fleets that carried the wealth of mainland South America home to Spain. Havana, a commercial port with a permanent garrison of Spanish soldiers, had already acquired “that unique, easy-going, brilliant but semi-criminal character that has marked it ever since.”

Albemarle’s victory (he proclaimed himself captain-general and governor) brought the first significant change in the island’s social organization and economy. The Spanish regained control after a year, but during that year English merchants descended upon the island to open it up to world trade, and importation of African slaves on a major scale began. According to Thomas, the English brought in some 4,000 slaves in 11 months; Spanish planters followed their lead, importing so many more that within 30 years Cuba, unlike any Spanish possession on the mainland, had a black and mulatto majority in the population. Rapid expansion of the sugar industry, made possible by cheap labor, totally changed Cuban society.

It takes Thomas roughly 1,000 vivid pages to get through the two centuries following the British conquest. He covers economic, social, and cultural trends, the Spanish-American War, U.S. military occupation, the first Republic, subsequent dictatorships, and finally, Fidel Castro’s 1959 takeover. The remaining 400-odd pages provide a close analysis of developments under Castro up to 1970. No finer single source on Cuba or on Castro exists in English.

Detailed studies of modern pre-Castro Cuba include ARMY POLITICS IN CUBA, 1898–1958 (Univ. of Pittsburgh, 1976). The author, Louis A. Perez, argues that the turn-of-the-century U.S. intervention created a Cuban military apparatus designed to serve U.S. policy, not Cuban needs. This lackluster rogue army later served Batista, but it proved no match for Castro’s insurgents, despite their weaknesses as guerrilla fighters.

The title of a brief historical work by Luis E. Aguilar, CUBA, 1933: Prologue to Revolution (Cornell, 1972, cloth; Norton, 1974, paper), indicates its author’s
focus—the "ideals and frustrations" of the students, old revolutionaries, liberal professionals, and orthodox politicians who tried in 1933 to unseat dictator Gerardo Machado.


There is no consensus on Castro's Cuba among academic authors, and their scholarship is highly uneven in quality. The regime has its critics and its apologists (especially, one suspects, among those who want to be allowed to visit the island again). Bearing all this in mind, certain books can be recommended.

Among them is REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN CUBA, edited by Carmelo Mesa-Lago (Univ. of Pittsburgh, 1971, cloth & paper). It includes essays by leading Cuban exiles and U.S. specialists. The editor, himself the most objective of the émigré critics, concludes that Cuba's radical 1959–70 transformation was accomplished without excessive bloodshed or destruction of resources.

In a more recent book of his own, CUBA IN THE 1970s: Pragmatism and Institutionalization (Univ. of New Mexico, 1974, cloth & paper), Mesa-Lago assesses the island's current state. He sees Castro no longer enjoying "the capacity for maneuver that he had in the 1960s."


CUBA IN REVOLUTION, edited by Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdés (Doubleday/Anchor, 1972, paper) centers on internal political, economic, agricultural, labor, and cultural changes. A notable inclusion is the translation of a poem, "Out of the Game" by Heberto Padilla, written before he was imprisoned by the regime. Its message: The poet, get rid of him!... He does not play the game! Lacks enthusiasm!... Always finding something to object to!... Remove the party-poofer! the summer malcontent! He sings the "Guantanamera" through clenched teeth!... No one can make him smile; each time the spectacle begins.

Most telling when it takes Castro to task for repressing just such literary expression is a miscellany of largely new-left criticism edited by Ronald Radosh, THE NEW CUBA: Paradoxes and Potentials (Morrow, 1976, cloth & paper). Contributors include Martin Duberman, Frances Fitzgerald ("A Reporter at Large: Slightly Exaggerated Enthusiasms"), and Maurice Halperin, writing on culture and revolution. Editor Radosh concludes that "the apparent end of Cuba's isolation now makes it essential that we discard outdated arguments of opposition to Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution... It is here to stay."

Two former enthusiasts, Rene Dumont and K. S. Karol, have written more critically about the Castro regime. Dumont, a French socialist agronomist with much experience in Africa, was invited to Cuba by Castro, who later condemned the book that resulted: IS CUBA SOCIALIST? (Viking, 1974). Dumont looks back at Cuban predictions of economic performance and measures them against the cold facts of accomplishment. ("Revolution is not easy, you know," he quotes Castro as saying, apologetically, in 1969.)

Karol, a Polish-born Maoist living in Paris, is another European Marxist whom Castro welcomed and then turned upon. Whereas Dumont's criticism is on economic grounds, Karol's, in GUERRIL-
BACKGROUND BOOKS: CUBA

LAS IN POWER (Hill and Wang, 1970, cloth & paper), is political. Castro responded politically. The poet Heberto Padilla (above) was jailed because he allegedly passed information to Karol, and Castro made an effort to increase public participation in the one-party government, whose elitism Karol attacked.


A different kind of retrospective can be found in CUBA, CASTRO, AND THE UNITED STATES (Univ. of Pittsburgh, 1971) by the last American Ambassador to Cuba, Philip W. Bonsal, an angry victim of Washington’s early hostility to the 1959 Revolution. He argues that the close identity of interest between two major oil companies and the U.S. Treasury produced an aggressive, unannounced policy of attempting to undermine Castro—and he shows how it failed.

Last year saw the publication of two volumes in a projected three-volume series of interviews with present-day Cubans: FOUR MEN: Living the Revolution, An Oral History of Contemporary Cuba and FOUR WOMEN (with the same subtitle) by Oscar Lewis, Ruth M. Lewis, and Susan M. Rigdon (Univ. of Ill., 1977). The final volume, NEIGHBORS, will be published later this year.

In 1969, Oscar Lewis was professor of anthropology at the University of Illinois and widely recognized for his books, including The Children of Sanchez. Fidel Castro (who told him that Sanchez was “worth more than 50,000 political pamphlets”) invited him to interview Cubans on their views of the Revolution and other subjects. Lewis and his associates were given unprecedented freedom to travel and work. But the Cuban government halted the study. Officials said that their action was linked to Castro’s displeasure over the Dumont and Karol books and their concern that the researchers might be turning up “negative” or “conflictive” data. Lewis died soon thereafter; his wife and associate Rigdon edited the tapes.

One of the subjects in Four Men says, “I’m completely in love with the Revolution. In love, in love, in love! I’d do anything for it. Viva la Revolución!” All the men, raised in dire poverty, agree that their lives have been changed for the better economically. (“It was the Revolution that pulled me out of the swamp.”) To the women interviewed—a servant, a former counterrevolutionary/former nun, a psychologist whose family were early Castro supporters, and (at Castro’s suggestion) a one-time prostitute—the Revolution has brought more personal freedom.

A less upbeat sense of Castro’s Cuba emerges from a small (158-page) book BLACK MAN IN RED CUBA by John Clytus with Jane Rieker (Univ. of Miami, 1970). Clytus, a self-described “Negro-black-Afro-American-colored-revolutionary” went to Cuba in 1964, worked as a translator for Granma, the official Communist Party newspaper, and ended up three years later in jail after trying to “escape” across the border to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay. Clytus’s personal, somewhat overheated account of life under Castro is a corrective footnote to more glowing portraits of the new Cuban society: “Cuba taught me that a black under communism in a white-oriented society—any society where whites hold or have held power—would find himself persecute[d] . . . for even intimating that he had a love for black.”

EDITOR’S NOTE. Lewis H. Diuguid, an assistant foreign editor and former Latin American correspondent for the Washington Post, helped to select books for this list. Fellows and research associates at the Wilson Center also made suggestions.
COM

GROWTH OF MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES
The Founding Fathers saw no place for political parties in their vision of America. But, inevitably, competition for the presidency produced two political groupings that have survived occasional factionalism. Jeffersonian Republicans ultimately became Democrats preferring a strong chief executive. Federalists moved in the opposite direction as they became first Whigs, then Republicans. Leftists of a Communist or Socialist persuasion stood apart, pursuing self-defeating strategies of their own.
As the United States heads into its 1978 off-year elections for Congress and for state offices, the Democrats and Republicans seem as combative and vigorous as ever. On the national level, the two parties aren’t quite what they used to be. Campaign reform, federal subsidies, television, more independent voting have all affected the parties’ roles, especially in the election of Presidents. Yet, the United States’ loose-knit two-party system endures, accommodating diverse interests and ideologies. Here, political scientist Howard Penniman assesses our “dual system” of electoral politics; sociologist Seymour M. Lipset analyzes the Socialists’ political failure in America, even as a third party; and columnist David Broder notes a troubling gap between Presidents and their parties.

THE STATE OF THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

by Howard R. Penniman

Healthy two-party systems are in short supply in the world today. We may have seen an end to the time when a single party could win a majority of the seats in the British House of Commons and confidently form a government. The decline in the combined Labour and Conservative share of the popular vote in Britain (74.1 percent in 1974) may be part of a long-term trend aggravated by the rising strength of regional parties in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The Labour Party is in power today only because 13 Liberal Party members bolster a government that lacks a majority. Political parties in Canada and...
Australia have had comparable difficulty in consistently obtaining a majority of seats in their Parliaments.

If the two-party system is ailing elsewhere, the same cannot be said of the United States.

The Republicans and Democrats have not been polarized into two "ideologically pure conservative and liberal parties," as the New York Times suggested two days after the 1970 congressional elections. Nor has the two-party structure fragmented into ideological factions on the European model. But there is an uneasy feeling among politicians and academics alike that the American political party system is in a transition of some sort and that it may be headed in new and uncharted directions.

Insofar as third-party challenges are concerned, the Republicans and Democrats seem secure. Their grip on Congress has never been stronger. Since World War II, Democrats and Republicans have controlled a larger share of lower-house seats than have two parties in any other Western democracy. This phenomenon is all the more striking when one considers that, during these postwar years, civil rights turned into just the sort of regionally focused issue that often produced a third party in the past (as occurred during the 19th century when disgruntled farmers supported the Greenback and Populist Parties in the West). Protest presidential candidates like Strom Thurmond in 1948 and George Wallace in 1968 did emerge, but their effect on the two-party system was negligible.

Despite a growing tendency of American voters to identify themselves as Independents rather than as Democrats or Republicans, the dominance of the two major parties in the House is even stronger today than it was a hundred years ago. Although the membership of the House of Representatives was considerably smaller in the 19th century, 422 third-party candidates were elected to the House during the last 70 years of the century.* By contrast in the first 76 years of this century, all but


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108 representatives were elected as Democrats or Republicans.

Why have third-party congressmen virtually disappeared in recent years, while presidential electors are chosen to support third-party presidential candidates (e.g., Robert LaFollette in 1924, George Wallace in 1968) almost as frequently as in the past?*

The answer is that two quite different political systems have existed side by side in the United States for much of this century. One system operates for elections of candidates for all public offices except that of President, while the other system is reserved for election to the highest office alone. What has differentiated the two systems has been the development of direct state and local primaries as the means of nominating candidates for the U.S. Congress, state governorships, and lesser offices.

The Umbrella Effect

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the direct primary became the most widely accepted means of choosing party candidates for all offices except President. In the Southern states, primary elections were conducted in and by the Democratic Party. In Northern states, the shift to the direct primary as a nominating device by both parties was accomplished by state law.

Under the primary system, anyone who registered as a Democrat could vote in Democratic party primaries to select Democratic candidates, and anyone registered as a Republican could join in naming Republican candidates. There were no effective national, state, or local tests other than personal voter choice to determine who were Republicans and who were Democrats. In states where one major party was much larger than the other, candidates and voters, regardless of their political views, naturally gravitated to the larger party, since its nominees were almost certain to be elected in the fall. Virtually everyone was a Democrat in the Southern states, while most people called themselves Republican in a few Northern states, such as Vermont. This umbrella effect permitted ideological diversity and the formation of what, in essence, became a coalition of varied interests in each major party, rather than a centralized national party on the European model.

Between 1940 and 1970, for example, it was not uncommon for Southern Democratic voters to nominate white supremacy

*In the six presidential elections preceding the Civil War, 6.9 percent of all members of the Electoral College voted for third-party candidates. In the eight elections since 1948, an average of 12.9 electors per election (2.4 percent) have voted for third-party candidates.
candidates for the House of Representatives while Northern central city Democrats named black civil-rights candidates. Both the white supremacists and the black civil-rights supporters won in the general elections and served as Democrats together in Congress, each voting more or less as his constituents wanted him to vote on certain sensitive issues. At the same time, Southwestern Republican voters nominated conservative candidates and Northeastern Republicans named more liberal candidates. Both types won in the general elections and served together as Republicans in Congress; they, too, voted as their constituents expected. The same was true of the U.S. Senate, although senators, with their larger constituencies, tend to be more moderate in their voting patterns.

Since both Republican and Democratic nominees reflected
and records any overtly discriminatory actions in return to the key issue: slavery.

which were conducted in the wake that they stood to appeal to a broad range of voters

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positions, as in Britain, and that national party leaders should enforce such uniformity, consider the current system confusing and inefficient. But neither tradition nor the rules of the game encourage that sort of uniformity. Candidates are beholden to those responsible for their nomination, and today this means, first of all, the voters who bear the appropriate major-party label in the nominee’s state or district. Only these voters can decide whether the prospective candidate’s views are acceptable.

Undisciplined Dissidents

As every politician knows, a two-party system—and the stability it provides—can exist in this large heterogeneous country only because maverick officeholders and dissenters in both parties are virtually immune from reprisal by the national party leadership. To put it another way, when party discipline and the two-party system come into conflict in the United States, it is party discipline that loses and variety within the party that wins.

Presidential elections have had a quite different impact on the two-party system. Since only one man at a time can be President, he cannot reflect all views on divisive issues. When voters in one region are at odds with much of the rest of the country, they force major-party presidential candidates seeking a national majority into an especially difficult position. If both major-party candidates take roughly similar centrist positions on the critical issues—assuming, like Alabama’s George C. Wallace in 1968, that there “isn’t a dime’s worth of difference between them”—then regional dissidents may look elsewhere for a presidential candidate whose views are more acceptable. These voters are not looking for a new party; they are generally pleased with the votes of their representatives in the House and Senate on the divisive issues, but they want to be represented in the presidential race.

The future of such Independent candidacies remains uncertain. Recent legislation in the states has increased the number of presidential preference primaries from 16 in 1968 to 30 in 1976, and Congress has voted federal subsidies to authorized presidential candidates who seek nomination by either of the major parties. One possibility is that more candidates who are both impecunious and campaigning on a single narrow issue will tend to enter a major party’s primaries in order to gain the advantage of federal campaign subsidies. This is what anti-abortionist Ellen McCormack chose to do in 1976 when she ran as a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 18 states. On the other hand, candidates with few financial prob-
lems and wide national appeal, such as George Wallace, will be able to choose between a personal presidential campaign effort and the major-party route. They will pick whichever strategy will best advance their political careers, block an electoral college decision on a major-party presidential winner, or "send the major-party candidates a message."

Of these two types of candidates, we may expect the McCormack version to crop up more frequently. Crises divisive enough to give a national candidate the electoral strength of a George Wallace just do not surface every four years. (Wallace received 9,906,473 popular votes and 46 of the 538 electoral votes in 1968.) The single-issue McCormacks will seek the February to August media coverage they garner by entering major-party primaries. The Wallaces will make their decisions to go outside their own major party only after weighing the alternatives as election year approaches.

The prospect of federally subsidized national exposure in 30 presidential primaries may entice some candidates, who would otherwise defect, back to one of the major parties. But at the same time, these primaries may create other problems for the national parties. For example, in 1968 and 1972, voters in Democratic presidential primaries did not constitute an accurate sample of Democratic voters, much less a cross section of the general public.* Primaries elect nearly three-fourths of the delegates to national party conventions, yet their candidate choices, as in the notable case of George McGovern in 1972, may be unacceptable to many members of the party and to the broader electorate as well.

As I see it, the two major parties will remain heterogeneous and undisciplined and will continue to dominate congressional, state, and local elections. More presidential primaries and the possibility, as yet remote, of direct election of the President make the future role of major parties in selecting occupants of the White House much less predictable.

*According to Georgetown University political scientist James I. Lengle, in a paper delivered at the 1976 convention of the American Political Science Association in Chicago.
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MARX, ENGELS, AND AMERICA'S POLITICAL PARTIES

by Seymour Martin Lipset

The 1976 elections pointed up once again a singular fact about American politics: The United States is the only democratic industrialized nation in which not a single independent socialist or labor party representative holds elective office.

A study of the factors that have made this so offers some revealing insights into American society and the nature of our political parties.

Americans do not lack the opportunity to vote for socialists. On the ballot in various states in the 1976 elections were candidates of six different radical parties, ranging from the Socialist Labor Party, which has run presidential candidates since the late 19th century, to the Communist Party.* None of these parties, however, polled as many as 100,000 votes nationally out of a total of close to 80 million. Altogether, they received less than one-quarter of 1 percent of the ballots cast.

The 1976 tally of American voter support for socialism represents what is close to the lowest point in a century-long series of attempts by diverse political activists to build a socialist movement in the United States.

The most successful election effort was that of the Socialist Party. Before World War I, the Party counted among its 125,000 members the leaders of many trade unions, including the carpenters, mine workers, iron workers, and brewery workers. The Party had elected over 1,000 public officials (the mayors of Berkeley, Milwaukee, Schenectady, and a number of other cities), state legislators, and two congressmen (Victor Berger in Wisconsin, and Meyer London in New York). Its perennial presidential candidate and leader, Eugene V. Debs, captured about 6 percent of the vote in 1912.

*The others were the Socialist Party, a miniscule splinter of what was once a larger party of the same name; the U.S. Labor Party, an offshoot of a faction of the Students for a Democratic Society; the People's Party, a group calling themselves democratic socialists; and the Socialist Workers Party, a Trotskyist organization.

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Socialist Party strength declined after World War I, partly because of government reprisals for its antiwar agitation (Debs was jailed for almost three years for violating the Espionage Act) and partly because the Communists split the Party, pulling out many left-wing members to form an affiliate of Moscow's Third International. For several decades thereafter, the Socialists and Communists competed for the support of organized labor and the general public. The Great Depression of the 1930s produced gains for both groups. The Socialists under Norman Thomas's leadership won close to a million votes for President (2 percent) against Franklin D. Roosevelt and Herbert Hoover in 1932. The Communists were weaker electorally, but during the late 1930s, they acquired considerable strength among intellectuals and in the growing labor movement, particularly in the CIO.

Roosevelt's New Deal, however, made it impossible for either of these left-wing parties to build a permanent radical movement on the economic issues raised by the Depression. The Democrats supported a variety of planning and welfare measures designed to help the underprivileged and the unemployed and enacted legislation favorable to trade union growth, notably, the National Labor Relations Act. The Communist Party, following the international antifascist "popular front" policy laid down by Stalin, supported Roosevelt for re-election in 1936, as did many Socialists. Norman Thomas's presidential vote fell to well under 200,000 that year.

After World War II, neither the Communist nor the Socialist Party—nor any of the smaller splinter groups—was able to make much headway. The Communists rushed to join Henry Wallace's Progressive Party in 1948 and gained considerable organizational influence. Wallace received 1,150,000 votes, but in 1950 he resigned from the Party in protest against its pro-Soviet position on the Korean War.

The Socialist Party officially decided in the late '50s to

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stop fielding presidential candidates on the grounds that the electoral system—focusing on the Presidency rather than the election of members of Parliament—made success impossible. Instead, it began to cooperate with trade unions in working for progressive major-party candidates, generally Democrats. Once again factionalism plagued the Socialists. By the early 1970s the Party had split into three groups:

**Socialist Party U.S.A.** Frank P. Zeidler, former mayor of Milwaukee, is the present national chairman; Beatrice Hermann is vice chairman. The Party believes in running candidates for national office but after 1956 did not do so until 1976, when the Party got on the ballot in seven states with a slate consisting of Chairman Zeidler and J. Quinn Brisben, a Chicago schoolteacher.

**Social Democrats U.S.A.** Bayard Rustin is national chairman, Carl Gershman, executive director; noteworthy members include Sidney Hook, John P. Roche, and Paul R. Porter. The Party is anti-Communist. It is very close to the AFL-CIO and the Democratic Party and seeks to enhance the power of organized labor in American politics.

**Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee (DSOC).** Michael Harrington, a member of the Socialist Party national executive committee from 1960 to 1972, is chairman of the DSOC, which is identified with the dissidents of organized labor and with the leftist New Politics. Its members include Representative Ronald Dellums, Democrat from Berkeley; a number of elected state officials; and presidents of two large unions, Jerry Wurf of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, and William Winpisinger of the International Association of Machinists.


The Socialist Workers Party of the Trotskyists ran national candidates throughout the 1960s and, though hardly a
significant minor party, consistently outdid the Communists at the polls, winning 41,388 votes in 1968 and 66,677 in 1972. In 1976, candidates Peter Camejo and Willie Mae Reid received 91,314. The current national secretary of the Socialist Workers Party is Jack Barnes. Barry Shepard is national organizational secretary.

The continued weakness of socialism in the United States, so manifest in 1976, has been a major embarrassment to Marxist theory. The theory assumes that the cultural superstructure, including political behavior, is a function of the underlying economic and technological structure. Thus, the class conflicts inherent in capitalism as a social system should inevitably lead to a working-class majority that achieves political consciousness as a revolutionary socialist party. According to Marx, in his preface to Capital, it follows logically that "the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future."

In short, the most developed society—the United States—should have the most advanced set of class and political relationships. Indeed, until the Russian Revolution, a number of major Marxist theorists, adhering to the logic of historical materialism, believed that the United States would be the first country in which socialists would come to power.

American Exceptionalism

During the late 19th century, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels constantly looked for signs of class consciousness in the United States. Ironically, given the subsequent weakness of U.S. socialist and labor politics, Marx based his conviction—that the American working class would inevitably develop class-conscious politics dedicated to the abolition of capitalism—on his reading of "the first story of an organized political party of labor in the world's history."

Marx was referring to the Workingmen's Party, which won a good many votes in American cities in the late 1820s and early 1830s. Although the Party had disappeared by the mid-1830s, Marx and Engels, many decades later, were to remind deprecators of American radicalism that the Americans "have had, since 1829, their own social democratic school."

Yet, for close to a century and a half since the creation of the Workingmen's Party, the United States, almost alone among the industrial nations of the world, has frustrated all efforts to create a mass socialist or labor party—a fact that
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has provoked a sizable literature by radical writers here and abroad, as well as by scholars seeking to explain “American exceptionalism” (the curious term that emerged in debates on the matter in the Communist International during the 1920s).

Paradoxically, in explaining the failure of Americans to support socialism, many socialists, like Marx and Engels themselves, suggest that the United States has been too progressive, egalitarian, and democratic to generate the massive radical or revolutionary movements found in European countries. Their explanations fall into two categories, not necessarily exclusive: One emphasizes societal factors, the other focuses on factors internal to the political system.

The societal factors are:

1. The absence of a feudal tradition structuring politics along class lines.

2. The predominant liberal tradition, which serves as a surrogate for socialism (Americans look upon their society as sufficiently egalitarian and democratic and see no need for drastic changes).

3. The traditional emphasis on individualism and anti-statism, deriving from revolutionary values that imply support for decentralized radicalism, rather than for a strong collectivist state.

4. A steady rise in living standards, particularly of the working class, in conjunction with the considerable increase in the proportion of the gross national product received by less-privileged classes in modern times (U.S. workers have lived better than workers elsewhere since the Civil War).

5. The shift to large-scale economic organization that has accompanied growth in productivity, with the concomitant increase in middle-level positions and the resultant increase in upward mobility that followed the spread of educational opportunities.

6. Inhibition of the formation of class-consciousness by the individual American’s propensity for geographic movement and the resulting lack of stable community roots.

7. Factors traceable to a multiethnic, multiracial immigrant society, including: ethnic, religious, and racial tensions within the working class; resistance to socialist appeals by the Catholic Church, to which a very large proportion of the white working class has belonged since the late 19th century; and
continued immigration, which encourages upward mobility by native-born whites (immigrants until the 1930s—and blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and new immigrants since then—have filled the least well-paid jobs, enabling native-born whites to occupy the more privileged positions).

The political factors that have prevented the development of socialism in the United States on a large scale are:

- Universal suffrage (the U.S. “masses,” unlike those of most of Europe, attained universal suffrage prior to efforts to organize them into class-conscious parties).
- The constitutional and electoral system (the concentration of executive power and leadership in a President rather than in a Cabinet responsible to Parliament, together with the primary system of nomination, encourages a two-party coalition system in presidential elections and the formation of ideologically heterogeneous congressional parties).
- The flexibility of this coalition system, which makes it possible for the major parties to respond to pervasive discontent by stealing the thunder and adopting some of the policies of socialists.
- The emergence of movements rather than a third party in social crises (almost invariably, the response of the major parties to such movements reduces the potential base for institutionalized radical parties).*
- Periodic government attacks on syndicalist, socialist, and communist movements, which have broken the continuity of radical protest.

Efforts to demonstrate the validity of many interpretations of American exceptionalism are based on comparative studies. The most influential such study, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (1955) by political theorist Louis Hartz, is historical and sociological. It places the United States in a category

*To a large degree, this predilection for movements is related to the Protestant character of the country, the majority of whose inhabitants adhere to Protestant sects as distinct from churches (such as the established state churches of Europe). From this flows the Protestant sectarian phenomenon of conscientious objection to war, not to mention anti-Catholic and Nativist crusades and moralist drives relating to drinking, gambling, and sex. Of course, there have been persistent minor parties, which seek to promote a particular doctrine (the Socialist Party, the Prohibition Party), as well as transient third-party movements that arise in response to economic problems (the Populists of 1892, the Progressives of 1924). In addition, secessionist forces have attacked both major parties (Theodore Roosevelt’s Progressive Movement in 1912, the Dixiecrat or States’ Rights revolt of 1948). In 1968, the American Independence Party, led by George Wallace, secured 13 percent of the vote by appealing, in part, to a white racial “backlash.”*
What the downbreak of Russian Czarism would be for the great military monarchies of Europe—the snapping of their mainstay—that is for the bourgeoisie of the whole world the breaking out of class war in America. For America after all is the ideal of all bourgeoisie: a country rich, vast, expanding, with purely bourgeois institutions unleavened by feudal remnants of monarchical traditions, and without a permanent and hereditary proletariat. . . . And because there were not, as yet, classes with opposing interests, our—and your—bourgeois thought that America stood above class antagonisms and struggles. That delusion has at last broken down, the last Bourgeois Paradise on earth is fast changing into a Purgatorio.

_Friedrich Engels, Letters to Americans 1848–1895_

of overseas “fragment” societies formed in the Americas and Australasia by European settlers. The fragment concept is based on the fact that the groups that emigrated from European countries to settle abroad were only parts—or fragments—of the mother cultures.*

**The Anti-State**

These new societies developed very differently. They were not affected by many important European values and institutions, usually those associated with the privileged classes, the aristocracy, and the monarchy. Each immigrant group left behind in Europe an age-old source of conservative ideology in the form of its traditional class structure.

Some light on the relevance of this analysis may have been cast by British Socialist H. G. Wells 70 years ago in his book _The Future in America_. In discussing the weakness of socialism and class-consciousness in the United States, Wells noted that the country not only was without a strong socialist party, but it lacked a true national conservative or Tory party as well. The Democratic and Republican Parties both resemble the middle-class Liberal Party of England, which he called

*Hartz argued that it was impossible to build an ideological Left in the liberal fragment cultures because there was no hereditary aristocracy against which to rebel and because the philosophical bases on which an ideological Left might be founded were already institutionalized as part of the liberal and radical tradition of America.
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the party of industrialism and freedom. “There are no Tories to represent the feudal system,” he wrote, “and no Labor Party.... All Americans are, from the English point of view, Liberals of one sort or another.” Moreover, America was pure 18th century, and 18th-century liberalism was “essentially the rebellion of the modern industrial organization against the monarchical and aristocratic State—against hereditary privilege, against restrictions on bargains. ... Its spirit was essentially Anarchistic—the antithesis of Socialism. It was the anti-State.”

The argument that socialism is weak here because the United States is the purest example of a non-European, nonaristocratic society—a pure “bourgeois,” pure liberal, born-modern society—is, of course, not limited to the work of Louis Hartz and other contemporary analysts of U.S. and Canadian politics. One may find a variant of this thesis in the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and the Italian Communist Antonio Gramsci, all of whom considered the United States to be the product of the most modern, most purely bourgeois, and most democratic of world cultures. However, as the American socialist theoretician Michael Harrington has noted, they seemed to argue that one of the difficulties was that “America was too socialist for socialism.”

Friedrich Engels believed that socialism was weak in the United States “just because America is so purely bourgeois, so entirely without a feudal past and therefore proud of its purely bourgeois organization.”

Lenin also stressed the freedom and high status of workers in the United States. He described the country in 1908 as “in many respects the model and ideal of our bourgeois civilization ... (without rival in) the extent of political freedom and the cultural level of the masses of the population.”

The Bourgeoisie Triumphant

A year earlier, Lenin had pointed out that the weakness of socialism in America stemmed from “the absence of any big, nationwide democratic tasks facing the proletariat.” Political freedom in America had produced “the complete subjection of the proletariat to bourgeois policy; the sectarian isolation of the (socialist) groups ... not the slightest success of the Socialists among the working masses in the elections.” American socialism was weak precisely because it was dealing with “the most firmly established democratic systems, which con-
front the proletariat with purely socialist tasks.”

To reverse Lenin’s phrase, European socialism was much stronger because it could appeal to the workers for support, not only on purely socialist but also on democratic issues.

In the 1920s, Antonio Gramsci, one of the founders of the Italian Communist Party and perhaps the most important non-Russian theoretician of the communist movement, cited America’s unique origins and resultant value system as the source of its exceptional political and technological systems. Despite his Marxist credentials, Gramsci placed more emphasis on the role of America’s values—than on its “so-called natural wealth”—in producing a society that differed so much from that of Europe.

During the decade he spent in Mussolini’s prisons (1927–37), he produced a broad patchwork of writings that must be considered a major contribution to post-Leninist Marxist philosophy. A significant portion of these writings were subsequently translated into English and published as Prison Notebooks (1973) and Letters from Prison (1973). Essentially, Gramsci explained in Prison Notebooks, American society had been formed by

pioneers, protagonists of the political and religious struggles in England, defeated but not humiliated or laid low in their country of origin. They import in America . . . a certain stage of European historical evolution, which, when transplanted . . . into the virgin soil of America, continues to develop the forces implicit in its nature but with an incomparably more rapid rhythm than in Old Europe, where there exists a whole series of checks (moral, intellectual, political, economic, incorporated in specific sections of the population, relics of past regimes which refuse to die out).

According to Gramsci, America’s unique sociological background resulted in what he called Americanism—pure rationalism without any of the class values derived from feudalism. Americanism, he claimed, was not simply a way of life but an ideology. Americans, regardless of class, emphasized the rewards and virtues of hard work and the need to exploit the riches of nature.

Since 1929, other analysts,* like Gramsci, have put forth

*Among them, Hermann Keyserling, the conservative German aristocrat; Leon Samson, the American socialist intellectual; Sidney Hook, the socialist philosopher; Michael Harrington, former Socialist Party leader; and Carl Degler, American historian.
or accepted the argument that socialism as a political movement is weak in the United States because the ideological content of Americanism, apart from questions of property ownership, is highly similar to socialism, and Americans believe they already have most of what socialism promises.

Electoral Systems

The Canadian academic socialist Kenneth W. McNaught recently argued that explanations of the differences between the United States and Canada or Europe that are based solely on sociological and specific historical factors are incomplete. He would stress, instead, the political consequences of the American Constitution and its evolution.

The thesis that the Constitution has helped ensure the failure of third parties of any stripe in the United States is a very old one. It was the first item on a list of factors preventing the growth in America of a third, workers’ party, drawn up by Engels in 1893. The U.S. Constitution, he stated, “causes any vote for any candidate not put up by one of the two governing parties to appear to be lost. And the American . . . wants to influence his state; he does not throw his vote away.”

After more than half a century of disappointments at the polls, two recent leaders of the Socialist Party of the United States, the late Norman Thomas and Michael Harrington, also came to accept electoral factors as an explanation of the general failure of third parties.

In 1938, Thomas, recognizing the weakness of the Socialist Party, suggested that U.S. Socialists hurt their cause by running Independent candidates for President. By the ’50s and ’60s he had reluctantly come to the conclusion that his Party’s experience demonstrated the futility of third parties in America, a view that a majority of Socialist Party members eventually accepted.

The alternative strategy for American socialists and other radicals, given the electoral difficulties, has been to operate as a faction within one of the major coalition parties. The absence of any strong party discipline in Congress and the system of nominating candidates in state primaries clearly makes this possible.

This strategy was tried with considerable success by A. C. Townley, a leader of the Socialist Party in North Dakota. Believing that wheatbelt farmers were ready to accept socialist policies, Townley formed the Non-Partisan League in
PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA

1915. It called for a farmers’ alliance “to grapple with organized ‘big business’ greed.”

The League proposed government ownership and control of various enterprises. Townley and his colleagues decided to capture the region’s dominant, farmer-based Republican Party by entering a League slate of candidates in the primaries.

In 1916, in its first election contest, the League was instrumental in electing Lynn J. Frazier governor of North Dakota. They also backed the winning top state officials, all of whom ran on the G.O.P. ticket. After winning control of both houses of the state legislature in 1918, the League enacted a large part of its program into law, establishing a state bank, a home-building association to loan money at low rates of interest, a graduated state income tax that distinguished earned from unearned income, and a state hail insurance fund. They also passed a workmen’s compensation act that assessed employers for support and acts establishing an eight-hour day for working women and regulating working conditions in the coal mines.

Many Socialists thought that Townley had betrayed them by discarding the party label, but others openly supported him and looked on the Non-Partisan League as a bona fide socialist organization.

Socialism in The Dakotas

Later, by organizing the wheat farmers who shipped grain to Minneapolis and St. Paul, the League was able to enroll more than 200,000 members. In Minnesota, after losing in the Republican primary, Non-Partisan League candidates ran successfully as Independents and helped found the Farmer Labor Party, which elected many state officials, including governors and U.S. senators until it merged with the Democrats in 1944.

The Non-Partisan League never had the electoral success elsewhere that it had in North Dakota, but in South Dakota the Republican Party adopted much of the League’s program, setting up a state rural credit system, a state-owned coal mine, and a state cement plant, and promising that if state-owned flour mills and packing plants were successful in North Dakota, South Dakota would adopt them as well. An offshoot of the Non-Partisan League won power in Oklahoma in the early 1920s, electing a governor and many legislators on the Democratic ticket. It, too, had been established largely by former members of the Socialist Party.

The strategy of building a socialist faction to run a slate
of candidates in a Democratic or Republican primary was followed with some success in the 1930s on the West Coast. Upton Sinclair, who had been active in the Socialist Party since the turn of the century, had run as a Socialist for governor of California in 1932 and had received 50,000 votes. He decided to try his luck within the state's Democratic Party and formed the independent EPIC (End Poverty in California) movement, which ran a full slate in the Democratic primaries in 1934.

Sinclair won the Democratic nomination for governor, and EPIC candidates were nominated for both houses of the U.S. Congress and for the state legislature. In the ensuing general election, Sinclair received close to 900,000 votes but was defeated by the extremely well-financed Republican opposition. However, Sheridan Downey, the EPIC candidate for U.S. senator, was elected.

In nearby Oregon and Washington, groups calling themselves the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, the name used by Canadian socialists, entered the Democratic primaries and scored some successes; several Federation congressmen were elected as Democrats from the state of Washington. No comparable efforts, however, were organized elsewhere, and these movements gradually disintegrated with the coming of World War II.

During the late 1930s, the U.S. Communist Party, under orders from Moscow to cooperate with all left-of-center elements to build an antifascist "popular front," worked within the Democratic Party. Earl Browder, Communist leader at the time, has since pointed out that the Socialists did not believe that it was possible to participate as an organized group within the heterogeneous Democratic coalition and that they failed to learn any lessons "from the spectacular capture of the [California] Democratic Party primary in 1934 by Upton Sinclair's EPIC Movement."

Lessons of the Thirties

As a result, the Socialist Party, which had been stronger than the Communists while both were operating as conventional third parties, lost ground steadily. By the middle of the '30s, Browder wrote, "the positions of the two parties were reversed, the Communists had the upper hand in all circles that considered themselves left of the New Deal."

Michael Harrington, Thomas's successor (in 1968) as leader of the Socialist Party, in discussing the success of the
Communists in the 1930s and again during World War II, noted sadly that if the Socialists had only followed a similar policy, they might have built the largest and most successful socialist movement in American history.

The considerable strength the Communists obtained within the labor movement and the Democratic Party was, of course, destroyed by their great handicap—fealty to the international Communist line, whose changes were dictated by Moscow. In 1939, the Hitler-Stalin Pact isolated the U.S. Party, and it lost much of the support it had won from 1936 on, particularly among intellectuals. Again in 1948, renewed hard-line tactics dictated by the emerging Cold War broke the Party's links to the Democrats that had been revived during World War II and forced many adherents, especially labor leaders, to choose between a loss of their influence in unions and in the Democratic Party and their membership in, or ties to, the Communist Party.

Thus, American radicals have occasionally succeeded in building up socialist and communist influence within one of the two-party coalitions. These successes underscore the fact that one must examine the ideological forces within the Republican and Democratic parties for traces of the political tendencies that commonly exist as separate parties in other countries.

In recent years, a number of scholars have suggested that the welfare-state, pro-labor politics adopted by the Democratic Party since the 1930s constitutes a U.S. equivalent of the Social Democratic and Labour Parties of the British Commonwealth and those of Northern Europe. As historian David Shannon puts it:

The British and Scandinavian political arms of labor pay homage to socialism in the abstract, but they in fact have put their main emphasis on welfare state features such as unemployment insurance, old-age pensions, and national health plans. American labor, with only a few exceptions, has failed to pay homage to socialism in the abstract, but it has, in fact, put a major political emphasis on gaining welfare state objectives.*

In Labor in American Politics (1969), labor historian J. David Greenstone noted that "in their support of the

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Democrats as a mass, pro-welfare state party, American trade unions have forged a political coalition with important—although hardly complete—structural and behavioral similarities to the Socialist Party–trade union alliances of Western Europe.”

The turning point in the emergence of what Michael Harrington has described as America’s “invisible mass movement” was, of course, the alliance of the New Deal with Big Labor, which, as Richard Hofstadter wrote in Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (1967), “gave the New Deal a social democratic tinge that had never been present in American reform movements.”

Since the 1930s, the alliance between labor and the Democrats has grown; the national Democratic Party has become a supporter of state intervention and planning in economic affairs, and the AFL-CIO officially calls for federal policies resembling those advocated before World War I by the Socialist Party, policies which the AFL rejected at the time. In his book Socialism (1972), Harrington states that labor, through its political action committees had “created a social democratic party, with its own apparatus and program, within the Democratic Party.” Indeed, AFL-CIO President George Meany on several occasions has accepted the description of his organization’s political program as socialist.

Harrington is careful to distinguish between social democracy, which he perceives as “an independent, class-based political movement with a far-ranging program for the democratization of the economy and the society” and socialism, which involves the elimination of private capitalism. As he sees it, America now has a powerful social democracy comparable to those in other Western industrialized countries, but no effective socialist party or movement dedicated, even in theory, to the radical transformation of the economic order.

The key question then is not “Why does socialist ideology exist in Europe, but not in the United States?” but “Why does labor representation take on an explicitly class form in northern Europe and a populist, multiclass form in the United States?”

In one sense, the answer has been given: The United States does have a mass social democratic movement in the form of the liberal, trade union, welfare-state wing of the Democratic Party. This assumes that the constitutional and electoral systems inhibit the formation of viable third parties, while permitting factionalism within the major parties.
Yet it is clear that however grandly one describes the social democratic force in American politics, it is much weaker than the social democratic, labor, or communist parties of Europe and Australasia. In Canada, which sociologically is somewhat similar to the United States, we also find a relatively weak social democratic party (the New Democratic Party, known as the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation from 1932 to 1961). Both countries are also low on other indicators of class-consciousness and conflict. In every other Western democratic nation, except possibly France, the percentage of the nonagricultural labor force belonging to trade unions is much higher. The figures for Canada and the United States are about 28 and 24.5 percent; for Britain, 48 percent; for Germany, 38; for Denmark, 58; for Australia, 53; for Austria, Belgium, Israel, and Sweden, over 65 percent. The low rates for the Latin countries, particularly France and Italy (23 and 33 percent), appear to be the result of a quite different format of unionism, characterized by ideologically competitive union centers.

In both Canada and the United States, relatively egalitarian status structures, achievement-oriented value systems, affluence, the absence of a European aristocratic or feudal past, and a history of political democracy prior to industrialization have all operated to produce cohesive systems that remain unreceptive to proposals for major structural change. As M.I.T. political scientist Walter Dean Burnham has emphasized, "No feudalism, no socialism: with these four words one can summarize the basic sociocultural realities that underlie American electoral politics in the industrial era."*

The evidence indicates that H. G. Wells and Louis Hartz were correct in their evaluation of the impact of North America's unique history and culture on the prospects for socialism and class solidarity. The environment has simply not been supportive of ideological and class-oriented politics any less broad or more focused than those now offered by the two major coalition parties. Whether those two parties can retain the inner discipline and cohesiveness necessary for the performance of their traditional roles is another matter.

Four months after Inauguration Day, President Carter invited his party's congressional leadership to the White House for a breakfast-table briefing on the economic policies of the new administration. Charles L. Schultze, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, displayed charts showing that, with full cooperation from business, labor, and consumers, it might just be possible to generate enough economic growth to balance the federal budget by 1980, as the President had promised.

Bert Lance, as director of the Office of Management and Budget, followed with a sermon on the stiff discipline that would be required to meet that goal, pointing out that many past Democratic programs would have to be pared in the process. As the climax to the briefing, the President introduced Arthur Burns, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and living symbol of a cautious, conservative economic policy, and Burns gave his heartfelt blessing to the whole Carter approach.

That was just a little too much for House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill (D-Mass.) to swallow with his coffee and Danish. "Something has changed around here," O'Neill growled, "and I don't think it's me."

Indeed it had. The Democrats' jubilation over their first presidential victory since 1964 was quickly tempered by the realization that, as New York Times columnist Tom Wicker noted, they had nominated and elected the most conservative Democratic President since Grover Cleveland.

Part of their shock, of course, reflected little more than the belated recognition that the American public had grown weary of the liberal federal programs that were the meat and potatoes of the Democratic Party and had nurtured Tip O'Neill in the Irish wards of Cambridge and Boston. The ideas that had sustained most Democrats from the New Deal through the days of the Great Society had lost their allure, if
not their relevance. And no new ideas had replaced them.

The new President had grown up in an environment largely untouched by traditional Democratic ideals, even when they possessed vitality. An Annapolis graduate, a south Georgia farmer-businessman, he was as far removed from the Northern urban Democratic coalition of labor, ethnic, and racial blocs as could be imagined. He ran for President as a critic of Big Government—bureaucratic Washington, but he was more of an outsider than even his own rhetoric suggested.

Such a man could have emerged to lead the Democratic Party only after its presidential-selection process had undergone a thoroughgoing transformation. The new procedures allowed Mr. Carter to reap great advantage from the early support of a plurality of Democratic activists in primary elections in such relatively conservative states as Iowa, New Hampshire, and Florida. Traditional Democratic powerbrokers—leaders of organized labor, big city mayors, governors, and congressional leaders—were late and, in some cases, reluctant boarders of the Carter bandwagon.

Tax funds, available for the first time in significant amounts for a presidential campaign, provided sustenance for Carter's homebred campaign organization (of the $13.2 million he spent to win the nomination, $3.5 million was in matching federal funds); and the legislated limits on individual financial contributions prevented his chief rivals (Henry Jackson, Birch Bayh, Morris Udall, Jerry Brown, Frank Church, and Henry Jackson) from fully exploiting their potential advantage in soliciting large-scale individual or interest-group contributions.

The whole meaning and role of national political parties had changed in the quarter century since O'Neill was elected to Congress in 1952. Being a Democrat or a Republican means less today than it did then to almost everyone from the candidate down to the average voter.

The current decline of national political parties got under way just about the time Jimmy Carter left the Navy in 1953

and began the career that was to take him to the White House. After 1955, the symptoms could be found in the sorry record of unimplemented and underfunded government programs, of uncompleted reforms, of political careers ended abruptly in violence or frustration.

There has been general agreement on what a responsible two-party system means and what has caused it to erode over the past generation. As early as 1950, the American Political Science Association had catalogued a lengthy list of reforms to achieve "a more responsible two-party system." "An effective party-system," the Association's report stated, "requires first, that the parties are able to bring forth programs to which they commit themselves, and, second, that the parties possess sufficient internal cohesion to carry out these programs." The test of an effective party, in other words, would be its capacity to give the voters a credible pledge to pursue a plausible agenda and to achieve the consensus and discipline required to act on it, once the party was in office.

The American Superstate

The last time such a two-party system existed on any kind of a durable basis was the period of Democratic dominance from 1932 to 1952. Franklin D. Roosevelt had his difficulties with Democrats in Congress and suffered political setbacks along the way, but for a full generation, under Roosevelt's New Deal and Truman's Fair Deal, the Democrats mounted major attacks on America's social and economic ills and led the nation through World War II and the Korean crisis. In helping to establish the Atlantic Alliance and the United Nations, they also created the American superstate, with its enduring military and welfare bureaucracies that even today, a generation later, consume 90 percent of the federal budget. Moreover, they did this as Democrats, provoking from the Republican Party a challenge to almost every major policy decision, foreign and domestic. During that long period, despite each party's regional differences and factional splits, American voters were rarely in the dark about what was at stake in national elections.

To political scientists, the New Deal realignment, or Roosevelt Coalition, was the dominant force in the fifth major-party system since the birth of the Republic. Before 1932, four other critical elections inaugurated a new party system.

The first was the victory of Thomas Jefferson in 1800,
CARTER'S 1976 VOTE AS A PERCENTAGE OF VOTES CAST FOR TOP DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES FOR STATEWIDE OFFICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Carter's 1976 Vote</th>
<th>Top Democratic Candidate</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>101%</td>
<td>Louisiana 153%</td>
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<td>Alaska</td>
<td>129%</td>
<td>Maine 79%</td>
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<td>Arizona</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>Maryland 98%</td>
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<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>82%</td>
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<td>California</td>
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<td>Michigan 93%</td>
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<td>Colorado</td>
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<td>Mississippi 103%</td>
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<td>Delaware</td>
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<td>Missouri 102%</td>
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<td>Florida</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>Nebraska 74%</td>
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<td>Hawaii</td>
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<td>Nevada 72%</td>
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<td>Idaho</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>New Hampshire 102%</td>
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<td>Illinois</td>
<td>141%</td>
<td>New Jersey 86%</td>
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<td>Indiana</td>
<td>109%</td>
<td>New Mexico 114%</td>
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<td>Iowa</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>New York 99%</td>
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<td>137%</td>
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<td>Kentucky</td>
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<td>Ohio</td>
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<td>Oklahoma</td>
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<td>Pennsylvania</td>
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<td>Tennessee</td>
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<td>Texas</td>
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<td>Utah</td>
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<td>Vermont</td>
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<td>Washington</td>
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<td>West Virginia</td>
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<td>Wisconsin</td>
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<td>Wyoming</td>
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An analysis of voting data from the November 1976 election shows that in 27 of the 50 states President Carter drew fewer votes than the most popular Democratic candidate for statewide office.

which ended Federalist Party dominance of the young Republic. The second was the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828, a triumph for frontier democracy. The third was the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860, bringing the new Republican Party to power and precipitating the Civil War. The fourth was the election of Republican William McKinley in 1896, in which industrialism won a victory over the agrarian-populist forces that had captured the Democratic Party with the nomination of William Jennings Bryan. The fifth was the Depression-induced victory of Roosevelt and the New Deal Democrats.

Each of these realignments saw millions of voters shifting allegiance in response to what they perceived as new and vital issues and making the kind of emotional commitment to their new party that could be eroded only over a long period of time.

Because that process of erosion—and realignment—has occurred at fairly regular intervals, many scholars have formulated a cyclical or generational theory of party realignment. According to that theory, America should have had another critical presidential election in 1964 or 1968. Nothing like that happened. Instead, we have seen a series of random movements during the last two decades, in which near land-
slides for one party or the other (1956, 1964, 1972) alternated with near dead heats (1960, 1968, 1976), all the while granting the Democrats a comfortable congressional majority.

The old pattern began breaking up in 1952. The immediate catalyst was the personality of Dwight D. Eisenhower. As a war hero and a national figure, "above party," Eisenhower played a major role in breaking the habit of party-voting. He, more than any other individual, introduced ticket-splitting into American politics. An analysis of the 1952 election made by the University of Michigan Center for Political Studies found that "three out of five of those Democrats and Independents who voted for Mr. Eisenhower in 1952 were not willing to support the rest of the Republican slate."

The Broken Link

That lack of support was underlined two years later when the Republicans lost control of Congress despite Eisenhower's vigorous campaign efforts, thus inaugurating a long era of divided government. During 14 of the 22 years between 1954 and 1976, Republicans controlled the executive branch while Democrats reigned on Capitol Hill. No such lengthy period of divided party control can be found in America's previous history.

The 1952 election was notable for another reason. It marked the rise of Lyndon B. Johnson to leadership of the Senate Democrats. Johnson shared Eisenhower's belief that partisanship is the enemy, not the servant, of responsible and effective government. For eight critical years the two men managed to divorce party labels from pertinent issues and to practice what Johnson liked to call "consensus" government. It was during this period of Eisenhower-Johnson hegemony that the vital links that joined the public to government through the political party mechanism were broken. Once broken, the links were not repaired. John F. Kennedy, invoking the memory of Franklin Roosevelt, made a start at restoring party government but died before much had been achieved. None of the later Presidents cared much, or tried.

At the same time, other factors were influencing U.S. voting patterns. Four of these are important enough to be identified:

Television. In the last 20 years, television has established itself as the prime medium of political communication. The
most significant point to be made about television, as compared to printed media, is that it is personality dominated. It deals with political figures, not political institutions. It is first and foremost the President's instrument, but it is available to any politician with wit and flair, as George Wallace and Ronald Reagan have demonstrated.

Political parties as such have almost no role in television's portrayal of the political drama. Efforts by the opposition party to gain access to television to respond to presidential statements have been frustrated more often than not by the networks, the Federal Communications Commission, and the courts.

Television cameras focus on the parties only at convention time; then, they move in so massively that they almost overwhelm the convention, making it impossible for professional politicians to conduct the kind of negotiations that formerly characterized convention week. Under the gaze of the television cameras, party conventions have been largely transformed into carefully scripted theatrical productions for the ratification of decisions already made elsewhere. It is no accident that no convention has gone beyond one ballot in the selection of a President during the television era.

Education. As mass education has grown and spread, the behavior of voters has changed. In my own interviewing, I have found a significant difference between the political perceptions of those with at least a high school education and those who left school before eighth grade.

Educated voters are not content merely to vote the party ticket. They consider themselves capable of making sophisticated judgments on the individual worth of the candidates they have seen on their living-room screens. They tell you proudly, “I don’t vote for the party; I vote for the man” (or, if their consciousness has been raised, “for the person”). And they do. The percentage of ticket-splitting voters has risen significantly in the last quarter century.

Affluence. Prosperity has blurred the economic issues that once served to differentiate the two parties. The New Deal was essentially a class realignment, with important racial, religious, and ethnic elements. For the most part, Republicans represented the affluent classes and the Democrats the less well-off—except in the South, where it was many years before better-off whites were willing to ally themselves with the party of Lincoln.

Post–World War II prosperity and the industrialization of
## PERCENTAGE OF TICKET SPLITTERS

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<td>Pres./Gov.</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>24.8</td>
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<td>Pres./Sen.</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>25.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pres./Gov./Sen.</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>43.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>All of the above</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
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Source: Howard L. Reiter, assistant professor of Political Science, University of Connecticut, based on data from the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan.

The chart shows the growing trend of voters to support the Presidential candidate of one party and the Governor and/or Senate candidate of another. The highly partisan 1976 election slightly reversed the trend.

the South have taken many Americans far from their economic origins and thereby blurred old party allegiances. Overall, the country has become more inflation-conscious and conservative in the past decade—but not more Republican.

**Participation.** With education and affluence came an ideological demand—not confined to any single sector of the populace but led by the college-educated—for a greater direct voice in decisions that affect people's lives. The activism of the civil-rights movement (not to mention the peace movement, the environmental movement, the consumer movement, the equal-rights movement, the right-to-life movement, and all the opposition movements they have spawned) has carried over into the political parties, where it is expressed largely as a demand for participation, for "opening up the system." One result has been a great rush of rule-writing, designed to bring the informal processes of political brokering under prescribed and publicized codes, so that everybody, not just the insiders, can understand how the game is played.

Another result has been the sudden proliferation of state primary elections—from 16 in 1952 to 31 today—as a device for increasing public participation in the party's most important decision, the choice of its presidential nominee. Since 1952, the key to nomination has been performance in the primaries, and as a result, the role and influence of party cadre, the professionals, has steadily declined.
Most of these trends were evident at the time I wrote The Party's Over in 1971. The tone of that book was gloomy, for in the Washington of that day a policy stalemate between a President and a Congress of opposing parties was frustrating effective action on crises ranging from Vietnam to Detroit and Newark. That stalemate was duplicated in almost half the states, where divided governments were also struggling to cope.

I quoted—but did not sufficiently heed—the words of Stephen K. Bailey, the Syracuse University political scientist, who had written that "as long as we lack strong national parties operating as catalysts in the Congress, the executive branch, and the national government as a whole, and between the national government and state and local governments, power will continue to be dangerously diffused, or, perhaps what is worse, will whipsaw between diffusion and presidential dictatorship.”

I commented, "We have been through that dreadful cycle once . . . from diffusion of power under Eisenhower to the excessive concentration under Johnson . . . and with Nixon, we may be starting on a second run through that frustrating course." Obviously, I did not anticipate that shortly after The Party's Over was published, the Watergate scandals would reveal the covert, illegal steps Richard Nixon had taken, partly to relieve his frustration and gain the power he and his party had failed to win legitimately in the election of 1968.

**Ebbing Party Strength**

Unfortunately, there is little sign of a revival of the two-party system. Watergate decimated the Republicans on both national and state levels. When Nixon was forced to resign in August 1974, they lost the only card-carrying, life-long Republican President in two generations. They also lost most of their carefully cultivated reputation as the party of law and order and the party of America's "respectable people." In the 1974 Watergate-year election, they approached their all-time Depression low, losing 43 House seats, 4 Senate seats, and 5 governorships.

While the Republican party has been badly weakened, the Democrats have barely held their own. In Maine, public disillusionment with both parties was so great in 1974 that James Longley was able to become the first Independent governor in 38 years. Fundamentally, the Democrats have been losing strength as markedly as Republicans. In 1976,
HOW VOTERS IDENTIFY THEMSELVES


both parties were 8 points below their peak strength of the previous decade, measured by voters' self-identification. The Democrats had dropped from 53 to 45 percent; the Republicans, from 30 to 22 percent. It was the Independents who gained strength.

Institutional changes are also weakening the grip of the political parties. It is a remarkable irony that the single most important "reform" legislation stemming from Watergate, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, may severely damage both political parties. Its framers rejected the opportunity to strengthen the parties by making them the conduits for public subsidy of presidential candidates. Instead, it gave money directly to candidates ($67 million in 1976), while allocating only a few million to the parties for convention expenses ($2 million to the Democrats, $1.6 million to the Republicans), thus further widening the breach between presidential candidates and their parties.

At the same time that the share of the parties in financing candidates is being minimized, their role in the choice of nominees is being significantly reduced. The result of changes in the Democratic delegate-selection rules has been a proliferation of primaries. The Republicans, who have dabbled with minor rules reforms of their own, have been carried along in the Democrats' wake to a primary-dominated presidential-selection system. In 1976, more than 70 percent of the dele-
gates to both conventions were chosen in the primaries, not in state caucuses and conventions, where party cadres normally dominate the proceedings and often produce a sharper definition of what the party stands for.

Instead, we have what amounts to a national primary conducted state by state from late February to early June, with television amplifying the (generally inconclusive) results of early tests into giant waves of personal publicity that drown out almost any other consideration of qualifications for the office.

Only inside Congress has there been a bit of a counter-trend. Party caucuses, party leadership, and party discipline have been strengthened in the past decade, as first the Republicans and then the Democrats sought leverage with which to protect their legislative jurisdiction against the inroads of an unchecked President.

Advocates of responsible party government must welcome the reassertion of these party functions in the Congress, but they do so with bittersweet recognition that so long as the President remains largely outside the party system, this development is almost certain to result in greater conflict between the White House and the legislature. To many people, the greatest surprise of the early months of the Carter administration was the spectacle of frequent battles between the White House and the Democratic majorities in Congress. But those who understood that Carter truly was an outsider, the product of a selection process in which the party cadre, including many senior congressmen, had little voice, were not surprised.

Such analysts understand that the party system has now deteriorated to the point where it is possible for a President to face an "opposition" Congress organized and run by members of his own party.

In 1971, in The Party’s Over, I argued that the result of the decline of our parties was stalemate in government. With the advantage of hindsight, I would now amend that to read: Lacking a responsible party system, we can anticipate more stalemates—or more Watergates.
The American Revolution was made by a party, the Patriots [Whigs],” D. W. Brogan reminds us in his acerbic POLITICS IN AMERICA (Harper, 1954, cloth; 1969, cloth & paper). “It had its origin in party meetings, caucuses* . . . in ‘committees of correspondence’ linking the party members from state to state, and it had its governing body in the various Congresses of which the most famous, in 1776, published the Declaration of Independence. The Founding Fathers . . . knew a great deal about parties and party organization.”

Yet Thomas Jefferson, co-founder with James Madison of America’s first modern political party (the Republicans), paradoxically had no use for parties, as Richard Hofstadter points out in THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780–1840 (Univ. of Calif., 1969, cloth; 3rd ed., 1972, paper). Both Madison and Alexander Hamilton, founder of the rival Federalists, discussing parties in The Federalist (especially Papers 9 and 10) did so “only to arraign their bad effects.”

Were these Founders indulging themselves hypocritically in the antiparty cant popular in 18th-century America? Or were they from the start feeling their way toward the creation of a mechanism “by which men,” in Hofstadter’s words, “could put together what God, in the shape of the Constitution, had sundered”? His view is that without parties functioning as a part of the machinery of government, it is doubtful if the Constitution, devised in part as a barrier to party rule, could have been made to work.

William N. Chambers, in POLITICAL PARTIES IN A NEW NATION: The American Experience, 1776–1809 (Oxford, 1963, cloth & paper), discusses the role of the emerging two-party system in the election of 1801, when Jefferson succeeded his old Revolutionary friend, Federalist John Adams. This “first . . . grand, democratic, peaceful transfer of power in modern politics” was, Chambers writes, “an example of a procedure which many . . . nations have yet to experience, which many defeated factions or parties have found it difficult or intolerable to accept, but one which 1801 did much to ‘fix’ on the American scene.”

These complementary basic books on the shaping of the American two-party system vary widely in style and detail. Hofstadter soars imaginatively, while Chambers is more definitive. Both are good reminders of how the despised “factions” (a word used interchangeably with “parties” in the 18th century) began to grow into the durable, often disparaged, but widely respected U.S. political “system.”

V. O. Key, Jr.’s classic SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION (Knopf, 1949, cloth; Vintage, 1962, paper) is an examination of the causes and consequences of one-party politics in the once “Solid South,” based on the situation extant in the 1940s, but digging up old roots that go back to Civil War and Reconstruction days.

His monumental general textbook, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS (Crowell, 1942; 5th ed., 1964, cloth & paper), has been rated by leading political scientists as the most stimulating of all texts on the operation of the

*The word, according to Brogan, is one of Boston’s contributions to the vocabulary of politics. Supposedly, the Colonial city’s convivial Caucus Club took its name from the Greek kaukos (drinking vessel).
American two-party system.

Key regards the emergence of "episodic" third parties in American politics as essential to the system. They have a short life span because their issues are quickly adopted by at least one of the major parties; they get a large portion of the total vote; and they frequently are tied to important party realignments. Doctrinal third parties, such as the Socialists, generally have a long life but attract comparatively few voters—those purists more interested in issues than in power (i.e., winning elections).

Another analysis of third-party activity as it affects major parties comes from James L. Sundquist in Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States (Brookings, 1973, cloth & paper). Sundquist describes the turning-point elections of the 1850s, in which the two major parties, temporarily split by the Know-Nothings and others, re-established themselves; the 1890s, when the populist uprising in the frontier states polarized the Democratic Party and set the East against the West; and the 1930s, when the Great Depression caused Republicans and Democrats to move to opposite poles on economic and social policy.

Ray Allen Billington’s The Protestant Crusade: A Study of the Origins of American Nativism (Macmillan, 1938; Quadrangle, 1964, paper) remains the standard work on the early manifestation of the radical right in American politics. Billington holds that hatred of Catholics and “foreigners” was endemic for more than two centuries before it erupted in the Native American outburst of the 1840s and the Know-Nothingism of the 1850s. In Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860–1925 (Rutgers, 1955; Atheneum, 1963, cloth & paper), John Higham argues that whenever there is strong sectional or class cleavage or when war confronts an unprepared nation, men desperate for national unity rally against “the symbols of foreignness… appropriate to their predicament.”

The contributors to The Radical Right: The New American Right Expanded and Updated, edited by Daniel Bell (Doubleday, 1963, cloth & paper), originally published in 1955 shortly after the crest of the McCarthy era, are concerned with more recent responses to severe strains in American society. The later edition has essays added in the early '60s on the John Birch Society.

On the other side, The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case by Lee Benson (Princeton, 1961, cloth & paper) assesses the impact of the egalitarian movements—the Anti-Mason Party, Liberty Party, Barnburners, and Locofoocos—associated with what Benson considers to be the misnamed Age of Jackson. To him, it was not the Jacksonian Democrats who moved the country away from political elitism but these splinter groups challenging the already dug-in local parties. Joseph G. Rayback in Free Soil: The Election of 1848 (Univ. of Ky., 1970) analyzes the rise and impact of the small, leftist Free Soil party, which brought the slavery issue into both the Whig and Democratic 1848 presidential campaigns.

In The Socialist Party of America: A History (Macmillan, 1955; Quadrangle, 1967, paper), David Shannon argues that the Socialist Party’s failure was “due less to its errors than to basic traditions and conditions in American society which the Socialists could do little or nothing to change.” But he cites the SP’s faults, especially its failure to decide “whether it was a political party, a political pressure group, a revolutionary sect, or a political forum. It tried to play all these roles at the same time.”

The Roots of American Communism by Theodore Draper (Viking, 1957, cloth; 1963, paper) is the first vol-
For an overall summary of third-party effects and a strong statement of the value of new parties in American democracy, Daniel A. Mazmanian's study THIRD PARTIES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (Brookings, 1974, cloth & paper) is recommended.

Mazmanian's conclusion: "To restrict the free development of third parties . . . is to rely exclusively on the Democratic and Republican parties to represent the wants and needs of all Americans. The interests of the American people are too diverse for two parties to do this adequately all the time."

It is hard to find a contemporary American scholar or political journalist who is not critical of the state of the two major parties. Interestingly enough, however, when D. W. Brogan, the English author of Politics in America (above) wrote a new preface to the 1968 edition of his 1954 book, his admiration of the two-party system remained unchanged.

The two major parties, he wrote, are "the least integrated, the least national, of the numerous organizations that the Americans have invented for holding the country together." Yet they alone make it possible for "the formal political institutions" to work, preserving "in the days of supersonic flight . . ., the methods and the spirit of the politics of the rural America of the age of Lincoln, if not quite of Jefferson or Jackson."

EDITOR'S NOTE. Many of the above titles were suggested by Austin Ranney, former president of the American Political Science Association, currently resident scholar for public policy at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and member of the Democratic National Committee Commission on the Role and Future of Presidential Primaries. His books include CURING THE MISCHIEFS OF FACTION: Party Reform in America (Univ. of Calif., 1975). Additional recommendations were made by John Ellwood, special assistant to the director, the Congressional Budget Office. Ellwood is working on a book about the George Wallace movement.

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Many recent American novelists have experimented with typography that calls attention to their books’ own artificiality. Clockwise from top: the epigraph to Thomas Pynchon’s *V.* signals the mystery of the novel’s title. The “Frame-Tale” from John Barth’s *Lost in the Funhouse* forms a Mobius strip, an infinitely repeated story of once upon a time. The shortest chapter from Nabokov’s *Lolita* is both hymn and mockery of the narrator’s love for the heroine. In *V.*, again, Pynchon transforms World War II’s Kilroy into a monster. Finally, the tombstone from Kurt Vonnegut’s *Slaughterhouse-Five* expresses its author’s hopeful/cynical metaphysics.

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The American Novel

Since the time of Fitzgerald and Hemingway, there have been bold changes in American fiction—as shown by the collage of styles on the page opposite. We have seen new influences in the Southern novel and the Jewish novel, the Academic novel, even the nonfiction novel. Here four scholars discuss the American writers—from Saul Bellow to Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.—who have gained prominence since World War II. Earl Rovit describes what these writers have in common. Jerome Klinkowitz explores their uses of humor. Melvin J. Friedman scans the entire postwar period. Tony Tanner, an Englishman, examines the major themes peculiar to the American novel. And some surprises crop up in a Quarterly survey of professors' choices of the "most important" novels published since 1945.

THE AMERICAN NOVELIST: A SEMI-SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW

by Earl Rovit

Although the serious novel is still respectable, there is no doubt that the last half century has witnessed its slow decline from a position of cultural supremacy. Television, the movies, the demise of magazine fiction, and the new show-and-tell illiteracy have significantly reduced the prestige of the novel and rendered it less appealing to a large audience. Yet for all the countless pious discussions about the failing health or the impending death of the novel, the plight of its practitioners is usually ignored.

It is blithely assumed, I suppose, that as with the laborers displaced by the invention of the internal combustion engine, novelists will adapt their skills to a more receptive occupation or simply surrender, become recycled, or apply for welfare. This assumption, of course, is grandly inept. First, the peculiar combination of energy and talent that leads a writer to the novel is
not readily transferrable to related literary activities—and es-
entially not to the best-paying of them, the writing of screen-
plays. Second, the time lag between the writing of a novel and its distribution, coupled with the impossibility of predicting reader demand has historically defined the novelist's job as a full-time profession which is, paradoxically, a part-time oc-
cupation.

Only a very few novelists have ever been wholly self-sup-
porting—and then only after their careers were fully launched. Although novelists certainly produce novels with profits in mind, it is also true that they will write their novels when the chances of financial reward and public fame are so poor as to be virtually negligible.

The 1976 edition of A Directory of American Fiction Writers (with its 1977 Supplement) lists about 1,000 men and women apparently not ashamed to be identified in public as novelists or short story writers. I'm not at all sure what that figure signifies. By way of comparison, there are 10 times as many fiction writers as there are active U.S. senators. On the other hand, there are roughly one-third as many novelists as there are neurosurgeons. To put it another way, we have about one novelist for every 220,000 Americans. It is generally conceded that fewer than a hundred of these novelists are able to live on the income from their fiction.

The period of apprenticeship preceding the publication of a first novel can be quite extensive. More frequently than not, "first" novels are, in reality, the writers' second or third novels. The financial payoff, if any, is also likely to be meager, since publishers are reluctant to dispense large advances to writers who have yet to demonstrate their appeal to buyers of sizable subsidiary rights (book clubs, paperback reprints, television and movie options, and foreign rights). Accordingly, we find that colleges and universities have become the prime supporters of our novelists, treating them not as pets or conversation pieces, but as full-fledged members of their instructional staffs.

To be sure, the university is not the sole option for the

Earl Rovit, 50, is professor of English at the City College of New York. Born in Boston, he received his B.A. from the University of Michigan (1950) and his M.A. and Ph. D. from Boston University (1957). He has taught at Bates College, the University of Louisville, Wesleyan University, and several European universities. He is the author of Herald to Chaos: The Novels of Elizabeth Madox Roberts (1960), Ernest Hemingway (1963), Saul Bellow (1967), and three novels: The Player King (1965), A Far Cry (1967), and Crossings (1973).
novelist. A magazine like the New Yorker, a wealthy, indulgent spouse or patron here and there, the erratic largesse of philanthropic foundations, catch-as-catch-can free-lancing, journalism, advertising agencies, public relations firms, and the movie and television industries present other sources of support. But these have tended to be, in differing ways, less secure, less accessible, and more time-consuming in their demands than college English departments—especially during the academic boom years of the 1960s.

Before we examine the implications of this recent maternal bond between the university and the novelist, it might be sensible to take a small sampling of the Directory's 1,000 names—an elite group of 30 of our more successful novelists. My selection is admittedly subjective, but I think most critics would agree that at least 20 of the 30 represent our best novelists to have emerged in the post-World War II period.

| James Baldwin  | John Gardner  | Thomas Pynchon |
| John Barth     | William H. Gass | Ishmael Reed   |
| Donald Barthelme | John Hawkes  | Philip Roth    |
| Saul Bellow    | Joseph Heller  | J. D. Salinger |
| John Cheever   | Norman Mailer  | Jean Stafford  |
| Robert Coover  | Bernard Malamud | William Styron |
| J. P. Donleavy | Joyce Carol Oates | Peter Taylor |
| Stanley Elkin  | Walker Percy   | John Updike    |
| Ralph Ellison  | J. F. Powers   | Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. |
| William Gaddis | James Purdy    | Eudora Welty   |

Each has attracted a following of readers; each has been subjected to extensive literary-critical and cultural commentary. Their works have been reprinted in paperback, and, in many cases, movie and television options have been taken out on some of their books. They span about a generation and a half; the oldest of them (Eudora Welty) was born in 1909 and the youngest (Joyce Carol Oates) in 1938. Three are women, three are black, seven are Jewish, and there are possibly three Catholics and two homosexuals. Five of the writers are closely associated with the South; the rest are predominantly from the Northeast and Midwest. Except in a few instances, specific regional settings play minor roles in their fictional worlds.

As a group, they have received superior formal educations. Almost all of them have gained baccalaureate degrees (not necessarily majoring in literature) and many have done some postgraduate study. There are at least three who have earned Ph.D.s, and there is one M.D. (Walker Percy).
For the most part they have been warmly acclaimed. Seventeen of the 30 have been elected to the prestigious American Institute of Arts and Letters, one is a winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature, and more than half have won or been in contention for National Book Awards and Pulitzer Prizes. Their popular success, it is true, has differed enormously, ranging from the avalanches of attention that thundered down on Salinger for *Catcher in the Rye* and on Heller for *Catch-22* to the relative commercial neglect of James Purdy. Their prolificity has varied, but in general they have achieved a respectable productivity over the years.

It seems, however, that even this well-favored group has not escaped financial worries. Twenty-one of them teach or have taught on a full- or part-time basis. Nineteen of the 30 have applied for and received Guggenheim Fellowships, in some cases more than once. I count 8 who have enjoyed an association with the *New Yorker* and 12 who regularly augment their incomes by giving readings. Almost all of them (except Salinger and Pynchon) perform some kind of public role in society; they appear at workshops and writing conferences such as Breadloaf and Aspen, and most of them earn some money reviewing books and writing “think pieces.”

**A Chastening Experience**

The novelist is the long-distance runner among writers, and what he requires more than anything else is time—long stretches of concentrated, unimpeded time. Meeting classes, holding student conferences, grading papers, applying for grants, free-lancing, writing television scripts, editing, traveling the literary-lion circuit, etc., may, in some cases, be precisely the worst—and the most eagerly embraced—distractions that the novelist can suffer. In other cases, they may be sensible strategies for buying precious time. Even at its best, writing novels must be among the loneliest pursuits of man, and some responsible engagement with the social world is clearly necessary. But to determine the point at which the loss of momentum and concentration outweighs the gain of social sanity and perspective is a hazardous exercise in fine measurement.

For all of their differences, our novelists articulate a surprisingly homogeneous and moderate vision of the world. The regional, ethnic, racial, and sexual affiliations of these writers—and they seem to fall into the expected patterns of America’s professional middle class—are far less divisive than they might conceivably be. Whether the writers are experimenting outrage-
"Writing a novel is a terrible experience, during which the hair often falls out and the teeth decay. I'm always highly irritated by people who imply that writing fiction is an escape from reality. It is a plunge into reality and it's very shocking to the system. If the novelist is not sustained by a hope of money, then he must be sustained by a hope of salvation, or he simply won't survive the ordeal."

—Flannery O'Connor

ously with literary conventions and styles (Hawkes, Barthelme), exploiting extravagantly the idiosyncracies of their personalities or backgrounds (Mailer, Reed), or fashioning relatively traditional stories (Cheever, Updike), the appeal of their fiction is grounded less in the social constituency that the writers represent than in the vitality and competence of their performances. They are frequently acerbic in their criticism of American bourgeois principles and they are far from Pollyannaish in their outrage and despair at the grossness that they find at the core of contemporary life; but I am unable to find any significantly radical thrust in their analyses of our social framework.

It would be foolhardy to categorize the social philosophy of 30 unusually volatile individuals, but I might suggest that each of them, in a sense, knows that he has achieved a measure of success within the system. And, as novelists, as long-distance runners, each shares the chastening experience of going to the typewriter day after day in a mood of mingled patience and hope, for out of no other mood can a novel be pushed to completion. (Here it is not entirely irrelevant to note the much higher incidence of suicide and nervous breakdown among our contemporary poets, sprinters rather than long-distance runners, than among our novelists.) The way the novelist has learned to cope with his own novel-in-progress—what the Freidians describe as the principle of delayed gratification—may be the same approach that he is likely to choose in coping with the psychosocial conditions that enmesh his life.

It has been argued that this middle-class conservatism is a complacent compromise, a consequence of the academic umbrella that shelters our novelists' lives. From the cradle to the grave it is possible for an American novelist to be rarely out of earshot of the sound of chalk scraping a blackboard; and even
with the upheavals of the late '60s, the Vales of Academe are hardly the places where the main action is.

One might speculate on whether the novelists' conceptions of power are drawn from university politics—the cyclic tension of confrontation and accommodation among the student body, the faculty, and the administration. It is possible that the relative failure of the contemporary novel to delineate the real sources and interrelationships of power rests with the campus's lack of two essential elements— a working class that produces basic goods and services and a nexus of control above and beyond the campus with final responsibility and authority. Any social institution is likely to mirror the values and practices of its society, but the academic setting may be more artificial, cloistered, and stifling than, say, a hospital, corporation, or factory.

One mitigating factor may be the interesting statistic that 22 of our 27 male novelists have served in the military. In fact, several saw active combat in World War II or the Korean War. Clearly the military table of organization and chain of command offer a crisp sociopolitical introduction to power relationships that can easily—too easily—be applied to the civilian world. Think of Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead* (1948).

**The Human Predicament**

Since Emerson's time, American artists have been told that the vitality of literary expression rests on prior authentic experience ("Life is our dictionary"). I suspect that this imperative does nag intermittently at our novelists' consciences, but the mysteries of creativity are profound and murky. Some critics contend that the true sources of an artist's work can only be found in his adolescent and pre-adolescent experiences. Even if this theory overstates the case, no one can seriously believe that it is necessary to sail before the mast or become a soldier of fortune in order to feel in full the pain, the contumely, the bewilderment, and the joy that constitute the human predicament.

What, then, do our contemporary novelists share? And how do they differ from their predecessors? First, they are generally nonregional and urban in their perspectives. Born, most of them, after World War I, their experiences with village and rural life are largely of a secondhand or artificial nature. They are habituated to a culture of technological mobility, standardization, and rootless anomie to a degree that the Faulkner-Hemingway generation would scarcely recognize, and this is amply reflected in their work. At least 24 of these writers
characteristically use urban or suburban settings for their fiction.

Second, the superior success of the motion picture camera in presenting "live" narrative has compelled our novelists to focus intensively on the medium of their craft—on words rather than story line. They are more concerned with creating a verbal artifice than in competing vainly with the dramatic action of film and television.

And third, they have tended to avoid large-scale realistic portraits of social life, restricting themselves deliberately to what they can analyze minutely or suggest symbolically.

The novel form always exists in an irreconcilable tension between the forces of coherence and those of dissolution. We have every reason to suppose that yet another generation of writers, those who came to maturity during the explosive 1960s—with the civil-rights movement, student rebellion, the Woman's Movement, the Vietnam ordeal and its aftermath—will soon be adding a different series of rhythms and colors to contemporary American fiction.
A few years before he won the 1976 Nobel Prize for Literature, Saul Bellow was having a hard time of it as a guest at Northern Illinois University in De Kalb. The two English Department professors who were supposed to meet him for dinner hadn't shown up, so he stood by himself in the student union, watching a rerun of "Lost in Space" on the lounge TV while several hundred students milled around, wondering who he was. Two hours later, across town, a couple of graduate students thought they saw him at the Shamrock, finishing a beer and a radar-range sandwich and asking the bartender where University Hall might be.

We knew it was Bellow for sure when he stormed past the flustered professors, marched out on stage, and without a word of introduction opened a paperback of Henderson the Rain King (1959) and started reading.

"What made me take this trip to Africa?" he began, beet-red with anger but also weary with resignation. The combination made for a perfect voice. "... There is no quick explanation. Things got worse and worse and worse and pretty soon they were too complicated."

Within a few pages, Bellow had the audience in stitches and had begun laughing himself, although the story wasn't what you'd call funny. "When I came back from the war," he read to us, "it was with the thought of becoming a pig farmer, which maybe illustrates what I thought of life in general." Henderson, the character who fears that death will "annihilate" him, that "nothing will remain, and there will be nothing left but junk," plots a comic revenge on his family, on his Hudson River Valley estate, and on the world:

I took all the handsome old farm buildings, the carriage house with paneled stalls—in the old days a rich man's horses were handled like opera singers—and the fine old barn with the belvedere above the hayloft, a beautiful piece of architecture, and I filled them up with pigs, a pig kingdom, with pig houses on the lawn and in the
flower garden. The greenhouse, too—I let them root out the old bulbs. Statues from Florence and Salzburg were turned over. The place stank of swill and pigs and the mashes cooking, and dung. Furious, my neighbors got the health officer after me. I dared him to take me to law. "Hendersons have been on this property over two hundred years," I said to this man, a certain Dr. Bullock.

By my then wife, Frances, no word was said except, "Please keep them off the driveway."

"You'd better not hurt any of them," I said to her. "Those animals have become a part of me."

The comedy was in his voice—in Henderson's, and in Bellow's. "This is my most vocal novel," Bellow admitted during a break, after he'd cooled down and the audience had warmed up. "Because of distractions and disruptions I'd missed several deadlines in finishing the manuscript, and so my publisher sent out a stenographer to take down my dictation until the thing was done." From the clutter of drafts, notes, and fragments, Bellow had assembled this marvelous portrait of a man on the brink of despair fighting his way back to mental and moral stability by seeing how threats to them can be comically silly. As the hero of Herzog (1964) later tells himself, "For Christ's sake, don't cry, you idiot! Live or die, but don't poison everything!"

And so Bellow gives us the comedy of survival. Among his contemporaries, Philip Roth expresses it in a less overtly moral fashion, Bernard Malamud in more.

Roth shows us Neil Klugman fretting over life among the relatives. "Life was a throwing off for poor Aunt Gladys, her greatest joys were taking out the garbage, emptying her pantry, and making threadbare bundles for what she still referred to as the Poor Jews in Palestine," Neil admits early in Goodbye, Columbus (1959). "I only hope she dies with an empty refrigerator, otherwise she'll ruin eternity for everyone else, what with her Velveeta turning green, and her navel oranges growing fuzzy jackets down below."

Malamud sounds a deeper note of resignation as his grocer Morris Bober is felled by a robber's blow in The Assistant (1957). Running through his life of sadness as he hits the deck, Malamud concludes: "He fell without a cry. The end fitted the day. It was his luck, others had better." The music is either hilariously funny or comically bitter, but the instrument in each is the human voice, moving fiction closer toward its basic component, words.
The technique is not uniquely Jewish-American. In his own manner, John Updike presents characters just as sickened by the junk of life, yet able to find humor, style, and eventually meaning within it. In *Rabbit, Run* (1960) Updike's protagonist is sickened by his degrading job, drab apartment, and frumpy wife (who spends her afternoons with a bottle of bourbon and soap operas followed by "The Mickey Mouse Club") but responds comically to the same materials when he runs off with a girl friend. "They have gone bowling once and have seen four movies—*Gigi*; *Bell, Book and Candle*; *The Inn of the Sixth Happiness*; and *The Shaggy Dog*," Updike recounts. "He saw so many snippets from *The Shaggy Dog* on the Mickey Mouse Club that he was curious to see the whole thing. It was like looking through a photograph album with about half familiar faces. The scene where the rocket goes through the roof and Fred MacMurray runs out with the coffee pot he knew as well as his own face."

**The Materials at Hand**

Updike loves trivia, as do most readers, and starting with his earliest *New Yorker* poems he has been able to take small instances of contemporary silliness and elevate them, by his lyric style, into funny, telling truths about our lives. Even Bellow likes to prompt his readers into chuckles of recognition; his novel *Humboldt's Gift* (1975) is a perfect mix of popular and intellectual mores of the past three decades.

Bellow, Malamud, Roth, and Updike use orderly plots, recognizable situations, and carefully drawn characters. Their humor—and their hopes—come from their characters who, in the manner of fictive artists, create a more acceptable world from the materials at hand.

Writing about these materials in 1960, Philip Roth complained "that the American writer in the middle of the twentieth century has his hands full in trying to understand, describe, and then make credible much of American reality." The publicized atrocities of World War II, the frantic pace of life after the war,
and the commercialization of culture and politics in the '50s, Roth despaired, were "a kind of embarrassment" to an author's "meager imagination." A long line of American writers—Ben Franklin, Washington Irving, A. B. Longstreet, George Washington Harris, Mark Twain, William Faulkner—could draw their humor from situations easily contained by the human imagination. Life could still follow art, and the most improbable tall tale or cock-and-bull story had a way of coming true, or at least of catching the spirit of what everyone sensed was true. But how does one exaggerate the fact of 6 million killed in death camps? Or tell a tale any taller than that of one man free to push a single button and destroy the Earth? With such things on one's mind, the world looks different, and contemporary writers can only chuckle about the pettiness of it all and find refuge elsewhere.

The social disorientation that climaxed later in the 1960s found two novels adequate to it at the very start of the decade: Joseph Heller's Catch-22 (1961) and Ken Kesey's One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest (1962). Both culled their subject matter from previous decades—bomber raids over Italy during World War II and repression in mental hospitals—yet both moved beyond "the same old stories" toward new stylistic expressions.

"The Texan turned out to be good-natured, generous and likable," Yossarian says in the first chapter of Catch-22. "In three days no one could stand him." Heller tells of a colonel in the sick ward who "dwelt in a vortex of specialists" unable to diagnose his illness:

There was a urologist for his urine, a lymphologist for his lymph, an endocrinologist for his endocrines, a psychologist for his psyche, a dermatologist for his derma; there was a pathologist for his pathos, a cystologist for his cysts, and a bald and pedantic cetologist from the zoology department at Harvard who had been shanghaied ruthlessly into the Medical Corps by a faulty anode in an I.B.M. machine and spent his sessions with the dying colonel trying to discuss Moby Dick with him.

The fighting itself gets far less attention than the bureaucracy, malingering, and profiteering of the 256th Bomber Squadron; and even those actions are less important, and less comic, than the fractured, disconnected syntax that tries to connect them. The wackiness of this little part of World War II is expressed in the very sentences Heller writes—contradictory statements that march together in a lock-step order of solemn foolery. Toward the end of his career, Mark Twain raged over a God who creates death and destruction; Yossarian, in the face of
death and destruction far beyond Twain’s ken, keeps a sense of perspective and personal meaning only by exclaiming, “Good God, how much reverence can you have for a Supreme Being who finds it necessary to include such phenomena as phlegm and tooth decay in His divine system of creation?”

Exhaustion?

Kesey’s Randall Patrick McMurphy is another stylist of the absurd who walks into the sterile, closely played world of a 1950’s mental ward with the challenge, “Who’s the bull goose loony here?” His swagger and bravado are revolutionary acts meant to restore the inmates’ virile humanity. Looking back over his career, which has taken him from county jails to military stockades and prison workfarms, McMurphy shapes it into an all-American myth, expressed in properly vocal fashion: “I been a bull goose catskinner for every gyp logging operation in the Northwest and bull goose gambler all the way from Korea, was even bull goose pea weeder on that pea farm at Pendleton—so I figure if I’m bound to be a loony, then I’m bound to be a stomped down dadgum good one.”

McMurphy’s antics and the larger world around him are described by the book’s narrator, Chief “Broom” Bromden. He too has a special perception: of phone wires whistling in the walls, electric current roaring through conduits to the appliances surrounding him, fog machines deliberately obscuring the ward, and nuts-and-bolts technicians pulling spare parts in and out of the patients at will. The voice in which he tells his story is similarly charged. “I been silent so long now it’s gonna roar out of me like floodwaters and you think the guy telling this is ranting and raving my God; you think this is too horrible to have really happened, this is too awful to be the truth! But, please,” he begs, asking that we share his allegiance to imagination, “It’s the truth even if it didn’t happen.”

It is this imaginative truth that has made Heller’s and Kesey’s novels endure while other books of the Black Humor phase in American fiction have been forgotten. James Purdy, J. P. Donleavy, Terry Southern, and Bruce Jay Friedman, who at the start of the ‘60s seemed so promising with their irreverent, offbeat humor (Southern once wrote a story about a new toy for little girls, the “Cathy Curse” doll), never found an appropriate style for their silliness. Limited to content alone, their humor dissipated into the sick jokes of social realism.

Three other writers who first earned the Black Humor tag—John Hawkes, Thomas Pynchon, and John Barth—have es-
caped it by going just the opposite route, into almost pure style. Predictably, their best audiences are the college professors and academic critics who relish Hawkes's pastiche of existential poses, Pynchon's farcical, labyrinthine systems of plot and character, and Barth's comedy of self-exhaustion. Barth, in fact, has argued that in terms of creative writing everything has already been done, and that this exhaustion of literary modes by centuries of use leaves his own generation with no possibilities. Today's novelists, he says, can only burlesque and parody the earlier models. Hence, his comedy takes such forms as the epic journey of a sperm cell in search of an ovum, the rewriting of an 18th-century British novel in contemporary America, or the spectacle of Barth himself cavorting with Dunyazade, Scheherazade, and other mythic personages who hold more reality for him than characters he might otherwise create.

"It seems a country-headed thing to say," William H. Gass wrote in *Fiction and the Figures of Life* (1970), "that literature is language, that stories and the places and the people in them are merely made of words as chairs are made of smoothed sticks and sometimes of cloth and metal tubes." Gass and writers as various as Donald Barthelme, Richard Brautigan, Robert Coover, and Kurt Vonnegut seem to share a common delight in "the ease with which we . . . pass clamorous pages into soundless dreams. That novels should be made out of words, and merely words, is shocking, really," Gass concludes. "It's as though you had discovered that your wife were made of rubber: the bliss of all those years, the fears . . . from sponge."

**Imagine That**

Barthelme & Company, unlike Barth and Pynchon, don't want to misplace this new intelligence, and certainly don't want to spoil the fun. They realize that there is enough magic in words to sustain a story. Richard Brautigan's *Trout Fishing in America* (1967) uses simply expressed comparisons to create fiction, as when "the rain, like a mechanic, began in the late autumn" or the trout "wait there like airplane tickets for us to come."

Donald Barthelme's *Snow White* (1967) adapts the fairy tale to LBJ's America. There, a prince wandering in off-cue from the Rapunzel story, fails to respond to "Snow White's hair initiative," and the ruler conducts "the President's war on poetry." Language is action. Language can also be character, to the extent of getting up and walking away. "I wanted to make a far-reaching reevaluation," one of the dwarfs in *Snow White* complains. "I had in mind launching a three-pronged assault, but
the prongs wandered off seduced by fires and clowns." In Gass’s
Willie Masters’ Lonesome Wife (1968), footnotes finally chase the
text of his story off the page.

These writers create fiction that believes in its own reality,
beyond the parodies of Pynchon and Barth. In The Universal
Coover tells the story of a man who passes time by playing a
cardtable baseball game of his own invention. Gradually the
action in the novel drifts down to the artificial surface, where
athletes play out their careers, debate the principles of earthly
existence, and like death-of-God theologians ponder how there
can be any meaning to life at all, as they gaze blindly into a sun
emblazoned with the words “100 Watts.”

Words—just words—can create entirely new realities. The
funniest writer doing this is Kurt Vonnegut, and he makes fun of
himself in the process. It is Vonnegut who, in Slaughterhouse-
Five (1969), gave us the imaginative machinery to end war: Take
a war movie and run it backwards. Think of the imaginative
possibilities, he says. As with the engineer who first thought up
the heat pump, the technological hardware for it will follow.

Though the trauma of his own life dates from the World War
II firebombing of Dresden (where he was a prisoner of war),
Vonnegut’s style finds its roots in what he considers to have been
America’s time of hardest adversity: the Great Depression of the
1930’s, when the brilliant radio and film comedians mended
broken spirits with the relief of humor.

Sitting with me in the Mona Lisa restaurant in New York
City, sketching out his literary biography, Vonnegut is constitu-
tionally unable to let anything go by without a joke. “The fire-
bombing of Dresden,” he ponders—a subject he doesn’t like to
think about—“one hundred and sixty thousand people killed,
most of them civilians. The largest military massacre in Euro-
pean history. Think of that.” It didn’t end the war one second
earlier, didn’t save one American (or any other) life. The raid
served no purpose whatsoever, and it agonized Vonnegut so to
write about it that the only way he can face it now is with a grim
I made three dollars for every man, woman, and child killed.
Imagine that.”
TO "MAKE IT NEW":
THE AMERICAN NOVEL
SINCE 1945

by Melvin J. Friedman

Ever since T. S. Eliot made his famous statement in 1923 that "the novel ended with Flaubert and with James," novelists have frequently been put on the defensive. In 1957, literary critic and novelist Granville Hicks invited 10 American writers to contribute to a collection of essays entitled The Living Novel, with a view to asserting the continuing vitality and importance of their craft. To give a boost to their argument, Hicks declared in his Foreword: "There is no substitute now available for the novel, and those who talk about the death of the novel are talking about the death of the imagination."

Twenty years later, we find some of the same assertions being expressed. A 1977 article by novelist-critic Raymond Federman, entitled "Death of the Novel or Another Alternative," reflects the concern of Hicks and his colleagues, although on somewhat different grounds: "The novel is not dead, it is being assassinated by the big publishers who have turned their businesses into supermarket activities."

The critics' rhetoric of impending doom is still with us, but so are encouraging signs that the novel will survive. Of the 10 contributors to Hicks's 1957 collection, three have come to occupy something of the same position in their generation as Faulkner, Hemingway, and Fitzgerald occupied earlier: Saul Bellow, the late Flannery O'Connor, and Ralph Ellison. At least three others have continued to write vital fiction: Herbert Gold, Mark Harris, and Wright Morris. Not a bad record for a dying species! One can echo Mark Twain and say that reports of the death of the novel are greatly exaggerated.

But what constitutes a novel today? The writers in The Living Novel were committed to the ways of modernism—to tidily finished, neatly patterned, mythically ordered texts along the lines of Fitzgerald's The Great Gatsby or Hemingway's A Farewell to Arms. Another fictional persuasion has asserted itself in the
past decade or so, characterized by "disruption" and "self-conscious artistry"—by an extreme willingness to forsake the conventions of the traditional novel.* Postmodernism is the term most frequently used by academics to describe this new literary climate, which has brought with it an irreverence and uncertainty about even the function of print on the page.

Writing in the wake of new theories about consciousness and time by William James, Henri Bergson, and Sigmund Freud, the modernists produced an inward turning, personal fiction that accommodated the rough edges of the psyche and of "human time." The postmodernists seem to turn outward as they acknowledge the limits of a new technological world and its dehumanizing consequences.† Yet differences between modernism and postmodernism are always relative; it is impossible to say where one ends and the other begins, so much do they flow into each other.

**An Accurate Barometer**

One can perhaps illustrate this best by referring to the works of two contemporary novelists, John Hawkes and William Styron. Hawkes and Styron, both born in 1925, are as representative of the possibilities and concerns of the American fictional scene as any two writers of the last quarter century. Hawkes's first novel, *The Cannibal*, appeared in 1949, and Styron's *Lie Down in Darkness* followed two years later. Just as *Lie Down in Darkness* looks over its shoulder, sometimes uncomfortably, at Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury* and at Joyce's *Ulysses*, two of the great modernist novels, so *The Cannibal* looks ahead to the postmodern environment of John Barth, Donald Barthelme, William H. Gass, Robert Coover, Thomas Pynchon, and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.

Both first novels have in common a fascination with words and violence. The difference is that Styron in *Lie Down in Darkness* is something of an old-fashioned rhetorician, with his Faulknerian indulgences, and he deals with violence in comfortably mythical terms, while Hawkes seems to have broken down all classical distinctions between poetry and prose and forced his violence to retreat into the surreal and hallucinatory. Both Hawkes and Styron came out of creative writing programs; they

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*The Wilson Quarterly/Winter 1978*
moved in quite different directions yet converged interestingly along the way.

Saul Bellow and Norman Mailer, as several critics have recently observed, offer another intriguing pair of alternatives. One can say that Bellow, rather like Styron, continues to honor tradition, especially as conceived by the modernist writers of the 1920s and early 1930s. In contrast, Mailer, more erratic than Hawkes, has moved with ease from antiwar novelist, to spokesman for American existentialism, to nonfiction novelist, to popular culturist—becoming the most accurate literary barometer we have.

Bellow has created a body of work that places him squarely in the center of everything literary in this country. All of his fiction is enviably finished, even the excessively lean *Dangling Man* (1944) and the rather bloated *Humboldt's Gift* (1975). His admirably trim *Seize the Day* (1956), perhaps his most successful effort, belongs among America's best novellas, such as Melville's *Billy Budd* and Faulkner's *The Bear*.

Mailer's career, on the other hand, has been jagged and irregular. Like the phoenix, he keeps rising rejuvenated from his own ashes, assuming an unending variety of masks. His early novels, *The Naked and the Dead* (1948), *Barbary Shore* (1951), and *The Deer Park* (1955), are quite different from the quasi-journalistic *The Armies of the Night* (1968), *Of a Fire on the Moon* (1970), and *The Fight* (1975). The last three bear comparison with such recent hybrid works as E. L. Doctorow's *Ragtime* (1975), Alex Haley's *Roots* (1976), and Robert Coover's *The Public Burning* (1977), because all blur distinctions between history and myth, fact and fable.

**Contemporary "Conduct Book"**

At least three other novelists deserve mention in the front ranks of American fiction since World War II: Ralph Ellison; Vladimir Nabokov; and Flannery O'Connor, a Southern writer (see below). For various reasons, each is less central and repre-
## PROFESSORS’ CHOICE

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Points</th>
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<td>Invisible Man,* Ralph Ellison</td>
<td>1952</td>
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<td>102</td>
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<td>Catch-22,* Joseph Heller</td>
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<td>The Adventures of Augie March, Saul Bellow</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>The Sotweed Factor, John Barth</td>
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<td>V.,* Thomas Pynchon</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest,* Ken Kesey</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>The Assistant, Bernard Malamud</td>
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*Author’s first novel.
†Random House and Modern Library editions only; NAL/Signet paperback sales figures not available.
‡All printings through 1975, according to Publishers Weekly.
§All printings to October 1977, from publishers.
**All printings to October 1977, exclusive of original hardback publisher’s sales figures, which are no longer available.

Note. None of the above figures include book club sales.

Ellison has written just one novel, *Invisible Man* (1952). The story of a young black man’s responses to southern education, New York radicalism, and the inability of whites to see or know blacks except on their own terms, it brought to Afro-American fiction the major elements of continental literature and thought from Dostoyevsky and Kierkegaard down to the French existentialists. *Invisible Man* is the closest thing we have to a “conduct book” for our time. Still, it cannot quite stand up to the exten-
The Wilson Quarterly asked 44 professors of American literature to name the 10 “most important” novels (in order of preference) published in the United States since World War II. Twenty-six professors responded, nominating a total of 88 books by 54 authors. Among first choices, Invisible Man led with seven, followed by Lolita with four. Gravity’s Rainbow, The Catcher in the Rye, Herzog, and All the King’s Men each had two nominations for first place.

We assigned points to each title on the basis of 10 for a first preference, 9 for a second preference, and so on. A list of the nominees receiving the 20 highest point scores appears at left.

Eight authors accounted for 31 of all the novels recommended by the academics. John Barth, Saul Bellow, and Bernard Malamud were each represented by five works; William Faulkner and Norman Mailer each by four; and John Hawkes, Vladimir Nabokov, and Thomas Pynchon each by three. Although Invisible Man received more points than all of Bellow’s works combined (162 vs. 141), Bellow’s novels actually received the greatest number of nominations (23 vs. Ellison’s, and Mailer’s, 22), suggesting that Invisible Man’s overwhelming lead may have been helped by the fact that it is Ellison’s only published novel to date. Pynchon had 19 mentions, followed by Heller and Nabokov, each with 16.

The professors’ selections covered a span of 38 years, but half of their choices were published during an 11-year period, 1955–69. Two novels from 1977 were named: Robert Coover’s The Public Burning (3 points) and Joan Didion’s A Book of Common Prayer (1 point); one from 1976: John L’Heureux’s Jessica Fayer (3 points); but none from 1975.

Would the survey have produced different results had we phrased the question another way? One professor thought so: “You ask for the ‘most important’ novels. I take this to be distinct from the most popular (which are read and forgotten) and from the best (which are not always widely read and may lack any public import). In a list of ‘best’ novels I would [replace] Salinger, Vonnegut, and Heller with Hawkes, Barth, and Barthelme.”

In general, Nabokov’s vast output, written over a 50-year period, cannot honestly be considered as purely “American” fiction. Lolita (1955) and Pale (1957) are the exceptions. Most of his writing belongs in a Russian tradition that includes Pushkin, Gogol, and Goncharov.

There is always some difficulty with classifying American writers of the high order of those just discussed. Their fiction seems to resist neat cubbyholes. Lesser novelists, however, are
<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Cumulative sales</th>
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<td>1950</td>
<td>The Cardinal</td>
<td>Henry Morton Robinson</td>
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<td>From Here to Eternity</td>
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<td>The Silver Chalice</td>
<td>Thomas B. Costain</td>
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<td>The Robe</td>
<td>Lloyd C. Douglas</td>
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<td>Not as a Stranger</td>
<td>Morton Thompson</td>
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<td>Herman Wouk</td>
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<td>By Love Possessed</td>
<td>James Gould Cozzens</td>
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<td>The Arrangement</td>
<td>Ella Kazan</td>
<td>3,485,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Airport</td>
<td>Arthur Hailey</td>
<td>5,474,949*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Portnoy’s Complaint</td>
<td>Philip Roth</td>
<td>3,866,488*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Love Story</td>
<td>Erich Segal</td>
<td>9,905,627*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Wheels</td>
<td>Arthur Hailey</td>
<td>2,604,614*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>Jonathan Livingston Seagull</td>
<td>Richard Bach</td>
<td>9,055,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Centennial</td>
<td>James A. Michener</td>
<td>3,591,763*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Ragtime</td>
<td>E. L. Doctorow</td>
<td>2,855,667†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Trinity</td>
<td>Leon Uris</td>
<td>3,178,886†</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: None of the above figures include book club sales.

*All printings, through 1975, according to Publishers Weekly.
†All printings, to October, 1977, from publishers.
‡All printings, to October, 1977, exclusive of original hardback publisher’s sales, which are no longer available.

more readily grouped. Thus we can observe three kinds of novels written since World War II, distinguished as much (if not more) by subject matter as by technique: the Southern novel, the college or academic novel, and the Jewish American novel. (One might also think of the “Beat” novel with its many variations, given a certain respectability by Jack Kerouac’s On the Road, 1957, and Lawrence Ferlinghetti’s Her, 1960.)

Southern writing is predominantly rural in setting. From Faulkner through the latest novels of Reynolds Price (The Sur-
Since 1950, only one novel from the Top Twenty® selected by professors of literature for The Wilson Quarterly has led any of the annual best-seller lists compiled by Publishers Weekly, the voice of the book trade. (See facing page.) It is Portnoy's Complaint. Only five have placed on any of the annual lists of the Top Ten compiled by PW or its predecessor, The Bookman: The Naked and the Dead (1948), The Old Man and the Sea (1952), Lolita (1958 and 1959), Herzog (1964 and 1965), and Portnoy's Complaint (1969). Five appear on the list of all-time best sellers (defined as books that sold over 2 million copies) in 80 Years of Best Sellers, 1895-1975, edited by Alice Payne Hackett and James Henry Burke: Catch-22, The Catcher in the Rye, Portnoy's Complaint, Lolita, and The Naked and the Dead.

Of the 67 also-ran “Professors’ Choice” novels, only eight have placed on any annual best-seller list: The Wall, by John Hersey (1950), East of Eden by John Steinbeck (1952), Ten North Frederick by John O’Hara (1955), Ship of Fools by Katherine Anne Porter (1962), The Confessions of Nat Turner by William Styron (1967), The Fixer by Bernard Malamud (1966), In Cold Blood† by Truman Capote (1966), and Peyton Place by Grace Metalious (1956 and 1957). Deliverance by James Dickey (1970), In Cold Blood, and Peyton Place appear on the list of all-time best sellers. In the combined fiction and nonfiction category, Peyton Place was the no. 10 title, topping Roget’s Thesaurus and Webster’s New College Dictionary (but trailing Dr. Spock’s baby book, the all-time no. 1).


In 1976, the paperback Harlequin romances (e.g., Love in a Stranger’s Arms, The Honey Is Bitter) published in Toronto, sold 50 million copies in the United States. Written by 140 women authors according to a standard formula (no premarital sex, no violence, no politics, no unspoken gothic threats, and a wedding at the end), these romances accounted for an estimated 14 percent of total U.S. fiction sales.

*Actually 21 titles, with two books tied for 20th place.
†Listed by PW as nonfiction but considered fiction by the professor who nominated it.

face of Earth, 1975) and Madison Jones (A Cry of Absence, 1971), there is a very precise feeling for landscape and terrain. Carson McCullers of Georgia and Eudora Welty of Mississippi appeared almost simultaneously on the literary scene in the early 1940s. It became clear that the female sensibility was to be a major force in Southern letters when another Georgian, Flannery O’Connor, published her first novel, Wise Blood, in 1952. (Her second, and last, novel, The Violent Bear It Away, appeared in 1960.)

O’Connor is probably the best of the Southern writers after
Faulkner. Yet she falls short of being a major figure because of the sameness of her themes and techniques and the limitations of her vision and sensibility. She stands apart from most of her regional contemporaries by virtue of her Catholic background. Her characters may be Bible Belt fundamentalists, but they seem imbued with a Catholic sense of sin and redemption.

The most typical of the gifted Southern novelists in the period after Faulkner are probably the late Carson McCullers, Eudora Welty, Walker Percy, and Truman Capote. While the first two devoutly tilled the Southern literary soil through most of their careers, Percy and Capote have reached beyond their rather undaring fictional beginnings toward postmodern forms. Percy's *Love in the Ruins* (1971), for example, flirts with the conventions of science fiction as it reveals an uneasiness about current technology. Capote's *In Cold Blood* (1965), which the author called a "nonfiction novel," launched the new hybrid form that Mailer, Doctorow, Haley, and so many others have favored in the past decade. It is interesting to note, however, that even though the setting for *In Cold Blood* is western Kansas, Capote reminds us that "one is still within the Bible Belt borders." His own fictional beginnings in the rural South, first in *Other Voices, Other Rooms* (1948), then in *The Grass Harp* (1951), appear not to have been forgotten.

**Surprising Ambiguities**

College fiction thrived in the 1950s. One of the most successful and typical of the species is Robie Macauley's *The Disguises of Love* (1952). Set in an American university during the 1940s, the plot centers around a clandestine love affair between a strait-laced college professor and a co-ed. In technique, it bears a close and sympathetic relationship to the best modernist novels.

Similar concerns and techniques are evident in other academic fiction of the period—Mary McCarthy's *The Groves of Academe* (1952), Randall Jarrell's *Pictures from an Institution* (1954), and, in a far more serious vein, May Sarton's *Faithful Are the Wounds* (1955). The genre continued into the early 1960s, sometimes with a nod to the Angry Young Man motif imported from England, in such novels as John Barth's *The End of the Road* (1958), Mark Harris's *Wake Up, Stupid* (1959), and Bernard Malamud's *A New Life* (1961).

*The End of the Road* is the most intriguing and curious of these because Barth seems to acknowledge modernist practices and concerns while remaining steadfastly uneasy with them.
Each chapter is dutifully summarized before the chapter proper begins, but in the mocking, irreverent way that Pynchon later employed in V. and Vonnegut in Cat's Cradle (both of which appeared in 1963). The opening chapter, for example, bears the heading "In a Sense, I Am Jacob Horner," laying a foundation of surprising ambiguity for its first-person narration. In this story of a college teacher who has an affair with a colleague's wife, the furnishings may be familiar but the twists and turns they are subjected to are not.

A novel published four years after The End of the Road, Philip Roth's Letting Go, has much in common with it. Roth's Gabe Wallach, another self-conscious narrator, is a more aggressive Jacob Horner who settles uncomfortably into academic life and gets involved with a married couple. The major difference between the two is that Letting Go attends to the idiosyncrasies not only of university faculties and ill-suited love relationships, but of an urban Jewish way of life.

Roth's example may be partly responsible for a shifting of ground by older Jewish writers. The old-world values of Malamud's early novels and stories have given way to the preoccupations of dislocated modern urban Jews in Pictures of Fidelman (1969). Isaac Bashevis Singer, who has devoted the larger part of his writing to Polish ghetto subjects, set his latest novel, Enemies, A Love Story (1972), in New York City—with the Holocaust as backdrop.

The "Disruptionists"

Jewish subjects have proved intriguing to non-Jewish writers as well. John Updike entered the arena with Bech: A Book (1970), and Styron is working on a novel tentatively entitled Sophie's Choice, which has strong Jewish preoccupations. In fact, urban Jewish subjects now seem as irresistible as the dilemma of the American innocent abroad once did to such writers as Henry James, Mark Twain, and F. Scott Fitzgerald.

A word must be said about another group of novelists who do not fit any of the above categories. Their work is more usefully discussed in terms of technique and stylistic devices than ethnic or regional themes. Jerome Klinkowitz sees the 1967-68 publishing season as the first flowering of this group of "literary disruptionists," which includes Jerzy Kosinski, Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., William H. Gass, Ronald Sukenick, and Raymond Federman, among others.

At one end of the spectrum is Kosinski, who seems to be writing fairly conventional prose in The Painted Bird (1965) and
Steps (1968)—at least on the surface. His syntax is regular. His pages are visually orthodox enough to offer the printer no particular problems.

Sukenick and Federman, at the other extreme, completely alter the face and possibilities of fiction. Federman's two novels in English (he also writes in French), Double or Nothing (1971) and Take It or Leave It (1976), are typesetters' nightmares. Each page is a discrete visual entity and calls on the unflagging attention and dedication of the printer. Take It or Leave It is not even paginated. As Federman explains: "all sections in this tale are interchangeable therefore page numbers being useless they have been removed at the discretion of the author."

Gass falls somewhere in the middle. He can be as deceptively traditional as Kosinski, yet takes many experimental risks. His first novel, Omensetter's Luck (1966), belongs to a language-intoxicated tradition in American literature that started with Melville and includes Faulkner. A comparison between Omensetter's Luck and Faulkner's Light in August, which it occasionally resembles, reveals, however, the extent to which Gass has passed beyond modernist technique and into post-modernism.

The experiments of recent American fiction writers seem endless—always a healthy sign for a supposedly vanishing species. One has every reason to feel more comfortable about the fate of the American novel now than did the contributors to The Living Novel in 1957.
"What's your idea of who runs things?"

The words are from Saul Bellow's *The Victim* (1947), but the question is one that in many different forms runs through American fiction of the last 30 years.

One of the most important writers who has endeavored to give some sort of fictional outline and metaphorical definition to power and its modes of operation is Norman Mailer. This has taken him from actual political conventions and demonstrations to the technology of moon rockets, the significance of such star-victims of American culture as Marilyn Monroe, the operations of the CIA, the problem of *Why Are We in Vietnam?* (not the ostensible reasons but the deeper psychic ones), and on to more all-embracing metaphysical speculations where God and the Devil square up, as if for some great cosmic boxing match. Mailer has traveled far beyond realism to explore the violence and distorted aggressions he feels are at work in America, the plots and mysteries he feels are swirling in the air. In his *An American Dream* (1965) the protagonist Rojack, a World War II hero and former U.S. congressman, says he has come to believe in "spirits and demons, in devils, warlocks, omens, wizards and fiends, in incubi and succubi." Rojack has a vague sense of being involved in plots that defy definition:

I did not know if it was a hard precise mystery with a detailed solution, or a mystery fathered by the collision of larger mysteries, something so hopeless to determine as the edge of a cloud, or could it be, was it a mystery even worse, something between the two, some hopeless no-man's-land from which nothing could return but exhaustion?
These words could lead us on to many other writers, but perhaps the most obvious one is Thomas Pynchon.

Pynchon's brilliant, difficult, and highly erudite work organizes itself around two feelings. One is paranoia, defined as "nothing less than the onset, the leading edge, of the discovery that everything is connected." The other is what he calls antiparanoia, "a condition not many of us can bear for long." Instead of suspecting the existence of plots at work everywhere, the characters have to live with a sense that nothing is connected to anything, in a state of volitionless rambling, with no clues to follow.

"This is some kind of plot, right?" Slothrop sucking saliva from velvet pile.
"Everything is some kind of plot, man," Bodine laughing.
"And yes but, the arrows are pointing all different ways."*

With this oscillating sense of too little hidden meaning or too much, traditional concepts of society, character, and narrative plot dissolve.

Pynchon's fiction draws on skills and discourses not usually found in the novel—information theory, probability theory, geometry, and calculus, as well as an encyclopedic knowledge of esoteric areas of learning and history. The result is not only a completely revised sense of the self and modern society, but a new kind of reading experience that forces one to revise one's sense of what a text is and what it does.

It was Pynchon who first made serious use of the idea of entropy† in fiction, an idea that has become so common that even a comparatively traditional writer like John Updike, who sets out to explore what he calls "'middleness' or the quality of things at rest," has made fleeting use of it. With Pynchon, it is part of a serious vision of things—and people—running down. Both his writing and our reading of his texts are a constant

†In physics, the measurement of randomness, disorder, or chaos.
struggle between the deterioration of meaning and the counter-entropic creation of new ways of fictionalizing the world.

One result of this is an extreme dissolution of the individual. Although there is an excessive proliferation of names in Pynchon's work, there is a concomitant disappearance of selves. Just as he renames all of postwar Europe "the Zone," so individuals begin to blur as they try to work with, and live through, the new uncertain categories of the contemporary world. Even the hero—or central name—in Gravity's Rainbow, Slothrop, begins to "scatter" by the end. His "sense of Now" or "temporal bandwidth" gets narrower and narrower, and by the end there is a feeling that he is so lost and isolated and unconnected that he is vaporizing out of time altogether.

None of this is easy on the reader. Traditional novels tend to focus on what might be called the gradual assembling of a character, often starting from a near-zero identity—Tom Jones, David Copperfield, Jane Eyre, Stephen Dedalus. In Pynchon we are more likely to find a study of not just failure and loss, but the radical disassembling of character. His approaches to this process have produced perhaps the most important American fiction of our time—books that are as intricately assembled as anything since Joyce.

Saul Bellow would not be sympathetic to much of this. While his characters encounter many of the "new Uncertainties," and he has explored some aspects of "the disintegrating outline of the Self," he has in the latter part of his career written against those who overemphasize "the disintegrated assurances." Whatever miseries and doubts and bruisings they have to endure, his characters Augie March, Henderson, Herzog, Mr. Sammler, and Charlie Citrine are still very much themselves at the end of their stories—not scattered and dissolved, but wiser, if sometimes sadder individuals.

Bellow was one of the first postwar writers to challenge the agreed-on "reality pictures" of the modern world. Having done that, he must face the problem of discovering new explanations and integrations (a dilemma experienced by other American writers as well). Thus, in Mr. Sammler's Planet (1970):

Existence was not accountable to him. Indeed not. Nor would he ever put together the inorganic, organic, natural, bestial, human, and superhuman in any dependable arrangement but, however fascinating and original his genius, only idiosyncratically, a shaky scheme, mainly decorative or ingenious.
Yet note the ending of the book, set though it is (and not for the first time in Bellow's work) at a scene of death:

He was aware that he must meet, and he did meet—through all the confusion and degraded clowning of this life through which we are speeding—he did meet the terms of his contract. The terms which, in his inmost heart, each man knows. As I know mine. As all know. For that is the truth of it—that we all know, God, that we know, that we know, we know, we know.

I can think of few other contemporary American writers (Bernard Malamud would be one) who would conclude a book, which contains so much pessimism about the modern world, on a note of absolute assurance about some certain knowledge that we all share. As he has reiterated in many interviews and articles, Bellow still believes in the old values and truths and sees nothing very original in other contemporary fiction.

At the end of Humboldt's Gift (1975), once again set by a grave and heavy with the finality of death, we find Charlie and Menasha looking at some spring flowers. In their way, the flowers contest the dread misery of the city experience that the book transcribes. Refusing to blink at any of the miseries of modern life, indeed portraying them with considerable intensity, Bellow contrives to convey a flicker of optimism, of the ongoing possibilities of life, in his work. A quotation from Tocqueville comes to mind:

Nothing conceivable is so petty, so insipid, so crowded with paltry interests—in one word, so anti-poetic—as the life of a man in the United States. But among the thoughts which it suggests, there is always one that is full of poetry, and this is the hidden nerve which gives vigor to the whole frame.

Bellow is the contemporary American writer most interested in detecting and revealing in the texture of his work that "hidden nerve" without which his portrayals of American life would be grim indeed.

There are, of course, other seemingly neo-realist writers still working to project the American scene in a relatively undistorted way. Joseph Heller's latest book, Something Happened (1974), seems to have left behind the arresting absurdities of Catch-22 (1961) to concentrate on the straightforward miseries of growing old, or older, in contemporary America. The hero, Bob Slocum, is obsessed with omens of death—"I dream about
death and weave ornate fantasies about death endlessly and ironically.” Like some American writers he has that entropic sense that “the world is winding down.” But when we try to find out what exactly it was that “happened” we turn up only a vague and unspecific resentment against the aging process.

Somebody pushed me. Somebody must have set me off in this direction, and clusters of other hands must have touched themselves to the controls at various times, for I would not have picked this way for the world. He has never been found. Lost: one child, age unknown, goes by the name of me.

The book in fact represents an enormous anthology of the dreads, disquiets, desolations and isolations, fears and tremblings of contemporary America, just as it serves a bitter indictment of the success-ethics by which Slocum helplessly measures himself. “When I grow up I want to be a little boy”—shades of Huck Finn. But for all its vivid misery, Something Happened does not release, or force us into, new and energizing ways of construing reality. Instead the novel is similar to Bob Slocum’s bouts of insomnia, “those buffeting cataracts of fantasy, fury, reminiscence, and speculation—all of it inconsequential.” Heller can indeed portray the miseries of contemporary American life, but cannot find “the hidden nerve.”

Another American writer who feels obliged to stay close to the pains and pangs of ordinary people (though not without experimenting in prolific forms of realism) is Joyce Carol Oates. She seeks to give us a world “defantasized” and to that end she writes novels that, in one of her own phrases, project “The Nightmare of Naturalism.” Not that she is an old-fashioned Naturalist; she explores all kinds of current transformations and inchoate changes in contemporary personality and attempts to analyse what America is becoming. Wonderland (1971) is a good example of all her fictional concerns.

One of Oates’s most revealing remarks, about a novel by Harriet Arnow, indicates where her main interests lie:

Sunk helplessly in flesh, as in the turbulent uncontrollable mystery of the “economy,” the human being with spiritual yearnings becomes tragic when these yearnings are defeated or mocked or, as in The Dollmaker, by Harriet Arnow, brutally transformed into a part of the social machine. . . . It is a depressing work, like most extraordinary works. Its power lies in its insistence upon the barrenness of life.
There are plenty of assumptions in Oates’s work that many American writers would contest, as when she quotes approvingly the Wallace Stevens line “We keep coming back and coming back to the real.” Fair enough, many would say, but what exactly is “the real” these days, and where do you find it? Is it really given or does it have to be made or re-made? But at least she tries to present us with depictions of contemporary society, whereas Heller and Philip Roth (in *My Life as a Man*, 1974), narcissistically give us portraits only of their own suffering selves, with the rest of society negated and desocialized into a series of more or less irritating external phenomena.

**The Fractured Picture**

If Joyce Carol Oates seeks to give us a world defantasized, Donald Barthelme gives us the world enigmatized. It is a world deprived of narrative, with fading grammar and deteriorating syntax; a world where the vocabularies, terminologies, and discourses that proliferate in modern life contest each other in surreal conjunctions. When he writes about *City Life* (1970), we find that the city has become a quite different kind of fictional space from that of Theodore Dreiser, say, or Saul Bellow. Thus, in one city there are prizes for those who produce “the best pastiche of the emotions.” There is a prevalence of “white noise” and “white space,” both of which can be purchased. Every surface is smoothed down; everyone has the same fingerprints. Imprecise sentences lessen the strain of close tolerances, and inhabitants “go forward avoiding the final explanation... Creative misunderstanding is crucial.” And is precisely the state of mind that Barthelme’s innumerable stories seek to induce.

Rather than tease us with “creative misunderstanding,” John Hawkes seeks to impose on us a series of dreamlike or nightmarish landscapes composed as a series of darkly lyrical tableaux (because he too has renounced the authority of traditional plot and character). Some of his novels have an almost claustrophobic horror. For a really tight, darkly arresting and encapturing style, there is perhaps no other contemporary American writer to compare with him, and we may take the following as a definition of what Hawkes admires and searches after in fiction:

a quality of coldness, detachment, ruthless determination to face up to the enormities of ugliness and potential failure within ourselves and in the world around us, and to bring to this exposure a savage or saving comic
spirit and the saving beauties of language. The need is to maintain the truth of the fractured picture; to expose, ridicule, attack, but always to create and to throw into new light our potential for violence and absurdity as well as for graceful action.

Given the agitation, sense of malaise, and even outrage felt by some American writers at society (not to say the world) around them, it is surprising that they shun overt political writing. Yet dating back to the first American novelist, Brockden Brown,* the interests of American fiction have generally been more psychological than political, just as there has been more interest in Freud than in Marx in the United States.

Some of this may be due to the great sense of loneliness and lack of community that is felt by so many Americans and constantly referred to in, for example, Vonnegut's *Wampeters, Foma and Granfallos (Opinions)* (1974). The fact remains that the primary interest of American novelists seems to be in the private—often brilliant—manipulation of new forms of fiction, rather than in attempts to construct a more totalistic vision of society. The feeling is that if society seems to threaten and distract, in fiction one is free.

**Old Stories**

What we have instead of political writing is satire and a renewed interest in myth. Many writers would be happy to talk about constructing or reconstructing myths, while they shy away from the relation of politics to writing. John Barth, for instance, is not much interested in those writers who apply themselves to "reporting the secular news" (a phrase of John Locke), yet he is excited by the idea that his own work contains various mythic patterns.

"Myth" no longer refers to the kind of communal wisdom and narratives that are traditionally associated with the word. There is, to be sure, a highly developed awareness of the old stories among American writers, but the stories are transformed in all sorts of idiosyncratic ways. One particularly innovative writer is Robert Coover, who has made clear his interest in "mythic residue" and in the ways that very old narratives—including the Bible—can be made to yield new relevancies for our times. He uses myths not to reveal any hidden ideal order in

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*Charles Brockden Brown (1771-1810) is cited by The Dictionary of American Biography as the "first American who tried to live by his pen." His major novels include *Wieland* (1798), based on the life of a religious fanatic, and *Edgar Huntly* (1799).*
society but for the ironic possibilities that can emerge in the course of their systematic deformation, transformation, or hyperbolization. To use Coover's own words:

Our old faith—one might better say our old sense of constructs derived from myths, legends, philosophies, fairy stories, histories and other fictions which help to explain what happens to us from day to day, why our governments are the way they are, why our institutions have the character they have, why the world turns as it does—has lost its efficacy. . . . The world itself being a construct of fictions, I believe the fiction maker's function is to furnish better fictions with which we can reform our notions of things.

Thus, in such highly original works as The Origin of the Brunists (1966), The Universal Baseball Association, Inc., J. Henry Waugh, Prop. (1968), and Pricksongs and Descants (1969), Coover encodes a large number of not always detectable mythic and religious references, in a new series of fictions or "constructs" that probe deeply into modern problems and concerns.

There are many other writers I could have mentioned in this brief piece; for instance, William Gaddis, whose The Recognitions (1955) has certainly been an influence on younger writers; the brilliantly original James Purdy; William H. Gass, one of the great contemporary masters of words; the richly experimental Joseph McElroy; and Stanley Elkin, who writes the most extraordinary monologues but who remains one of the most underrated writers in the country. But I will conclude with a final observation from Tocqueville, which has perhaps more relevance today than when he wrote it in the 1830s.

Thus not only does democracy make every man forget his ancestors, but it hides his descendants and separates his contemporaries from him; it throws him back forever on himself alone and threatens in the end to confine him . . . within the solitude of his own heart.

Despite a certain amount of organized coming together of contemporary American writers, Tocqueville's words point to a deep truth: What is most amazing is the richness and variety of fictional forms that have been generated in privacy and solitude by the American novelists of the last 30 years.
In 1923, D. H. Lawrence rebuked his fellow intellectuals. "American art-speech contains an alien quality, which belongs to the American continent and to nowhere else," the British novelist-critic wrote. "But, of course, so long as we insist on reading the books as children's tales, we miss all that."

His *Studies in Classic American Literature* (Seltzer, 1923; Penguin, 1977, paper), which zigs and zags through the works of Fenimore Cooper (Lawrence's use of the name), Hawthorne, Melville, Poe, and others, created something of a sensation. Lawrence found psychological elements in *The Scarlet Letter* ("on the top . . . as nice as pie, goody-goody, and lovey-dovey"), in the Leatherstocking tales, in *Moby Dick*, in Edgar Allan Poe's *Ligeia* and *The Fall of the House of Usher*, which were to suggest to many later critics some previously unperceived connections between 19th-century American writing and the concerns of modern fiction.

His timeless reminder to critics—and ordinary readers: "It is hard to hear a new voice, as hard as it is to listen to an unknown language. We just don't listen. There is a new voice in the old American classics. The world has declined to hear it. . . . Why?—Out of fear. The world fears a new experience more than it fears anything . . . [more than] a new idea . . . . It can't pigeon-hole a real new experience."

Numerous scholars have by now examined the American novel, past and present, in terms of successive waves of fictional response to new experiences, beginning where Lawrence did, with the opening up of the American continent. Harvard's F. O. Matthiessen was the first to give academic respectability to Lawrence's intuitions. In *American Renaissance* (Oxford, 1941, cloth; 1968, paper), he describes the astonishing five-year burst of "new" writing that saw the appearance not only of Hawthorne's *The Scarlet Letter* (1850) and *The House of Seven Gables* (1851), Melville's *Moby Dick* (1851) and *Pierre* (1852), but also of Thoreau's *Walden* (1854), Whitman's *Leaves of Grass* (1855), and works by Thoreau's and Melville's novels, above, are the others—that Matthiessen examines most closely.


In *After the Lost Generation: A Critical Study of the Writers of Two*
Wars (McGraw-Hill, 1951; Books for Libraries Press, 1971), John W. Aldridge describes the '40s novelists and their ties to Hemingway, Fitzgerald, and Dos Passos. Many of his "new writers" have faded from the scene; others survived to produce best sellers (Gore Vidal, Irwin Shaw, Norman Mailer). As Aldridge saw them in 1951, the neo-Hemingways and others "whose small, confused, and misguided talents concern us now" lacked "the basic requirement of the healthy artist—a dogmatic belief in his supreme power as an individual and a complete contempt for everything which stands in the way of its exercise."

Hemingway's need to impose order on the chaos of life is discussed in a later work by Alfred Kazin, BRIGHT BOOK OF LIFE: American Novelists and Storytellers from Hemingway to Mailer (Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1973, cloth; Dell/Delta, 1974, paper). "Hemingway died of Faulkner as much as he died of Hemingway," Kazin writes. "In [his] last years it was Faulkner, coming up after having been ignored so long, who was to be a constant shock and bewilderment to Hemingway in the new age of ambiguity. Faulkner was another name for a world—for history—that could not be reduced to a style." Kazin sees Norman Mailer, like Truman Capote, as a novelist turning to reportage out of a sense of "ridded down by history" and wanting to do something about it.


In a foreword to this collage, Robert H. Walker notes the assertion in the first edition of the LHUS that "each generation should produce at least one literary history of the United States, for each generation must define the past in its own terms. Where," Walker goes on to ask, "as we slide toward the 1980s . . . is the new literary statement for that generation which has seemed so exceptionally committed to throwing out the past and trusting no one born before 1948?"

Indeed, no major new histories of American literature have been forthcoming. But since the 1950s the critics have been busy on narrower fronts—producing full-scale biographies of major figures that add to the understanding of their work; analyzing ethnic or regional groups of writers and those especially affected by upheavals as the Great Depression; linking the newest experimental novelists to the American past.


THE AMERICAN WRITER AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION, edited by Harvey Swados (Bobbs-Merrill, 1966, cloth & paper), is a solid critical anthology with
selections from James Agee, Erskine Caldwell, James T. Farrell, Nelson Algren, and others now forgotten. It reminds us of the politically radicalized fictional response in the 1930s and 1940s to hard times. BLACK FICTION, by Roger Rosenblatt (Harvard, 1974, cloth & paper) is a brief, sharply written study ("Hell, then, is where Native Son is located"). Rosenblatt covers not only Richard Wright and other major figures such as Ralph Ellison and James Baldwin, but also several relatively obscure black writers.

In A WORLD ELSEWHERE: The Place of Style in American Literature (Oxford, 1966, cloth & paper), Richard Poirier explores the formal stylistic achievements of the whole range of American literature and links many early works in surprising ways to later U.S. and European literary creations; he connects Walden, for instance, with its "fantasia of punning," to James Joyce's Finnegan's Wake.

And Leslie Fiedler in two books, LOVE AND DEATH IN THE AMERICAN NOVEL (Stein & Day, cloth, 1960; 1975, paper) and WAITING FOR THE END (Stein & Day, 1964, cloth; 1970, paper), sees the major works of American fiction, from the last century to our own, as a continuum with complex psychological, sexual, and political overtones. He suggests that "the new audience no longer hated literature per se, as had many of their parents and grandparents; they only feared madness and unrestraint (though they had read Freud), like their spiritual ancestors."

Among critical studies of the newest "new American novel," Robert Scholes' THE FABULATORS (Oxford, 1967) is notable for early attention to the so-called black humorists—who include, in Scholes' view, Pynchon and Vonnegut. Robert Martin Adams's AFTERJOYCE: Studies in Fiction After Ulysses (Oxford, 1977) is based on the thesis that contemporary fiction is the exhausted, final legacy of the Joyce school of writing. Adams has some witty points to make, but his study is less significant than Frank Kermode's incisive interpretation of what is now called "postmodern writing." In THE SENSE OF AN ENDING: Studies in the Theory of Fiction (Oxford, 1967, cloth; 1968, paper), Kermode examines, among other things, how European and American writers since World War II have dealt with the vision of apocalypse.

CITY OF WORDS: American Fiction, 1950-1970 (Harper, 1971, cloth & paper) by Tony Tanner (see page 144) is considered by many scholars the best work to date on contemporary American fiction—and one that explains its ties to the earlier national literary tradition. "Melville started Moby Dick with etymology," Tanner observes. "[Richard] Brautigan ends Trout Fishing in America (1967) with references to the history of language and some sport with words.... Both writers have a wondering sense of the ultimate elusiveness of the mysterious reality or spirit of America....[and of] the preserving and consoling fantasies and play which are possible in the City of Words, though both have that American wariness about accepting any fantasy.... as the true reality. Both operate from a sense of the radical disjunction between words and things.... I believe these to be the characteristic attributes of a large number of American writers."
CURRENT BOOKS

FELLOWS' CHOICE

Recent titles selected and reviewed by Fellows of the Wilson Center

GROWING OLD IN AMERICA
by David Hackett Fischer
Oxford, 1977
242 pp. $10.95
L of C 76-42645

RITES OF PASSAGE:
Adolescence in America
1790 to the Present
by Joseph Kett
Basic Books, 1977
327 pp. $16.50
L of C 76-43465
ISBN 0-465-07043-4

What went wrong in relations between generations in America? When did it happen? Those are the animating questions that inspired these two excellent books, one of them the first history of old age in any country, the other the first substantial history of youth in America. In David Fischer's view, the critical change in the status of the elderly occurred long ago, at the very beginning of the 19th century, when a spirit of social atomism loosened the ties of obligation between generations and elevated youth at the expense of age. To Joseph Kett, who provides a more finely grained (though less vivid) analysis, the nub of the problem has been the gradually increasing segregation of age groups since the mid-19th century. Society's confinement of teen-agers in educational institutions that shield them from the adult world has evidently resulted in good measure from the glorification of youthful innocence. Approaching our own time, the two books converge: Fischer notes recent improvements in the status of the elderly; Kett indicates that the isolation of adolescents from other age groups may be breaking down. An optimistic reader may conclude that the life cycle is becoming less coercive, and that our society is beginning to concede more dignity to the old and more maturity to the young.

—John Higham ('77)

DAY BY DAY
by Robert Lowell
Farrar, 1977, 138 pp. $8.95
L of C 77-6799
ISBN 0-374-13525-8

Lowell's first collection of new poems since 1973 was published only five days before his death last September 12. It includes some of his strongest poetry since Life Studies (1959). A triumphant exercise of those powers that made him the central poet of his generation in America (and winner of every important poetry award, including two Pulitzers), Day by Day is charged with his relentless intelli-
gence and the obsessive moral tension about human responsibility that never became despair only because he regarded despair as an evasion. Many of these poems are about his third marriage and his life in England. Others are addressed to friends and fellow writers aging or dead. "This Golden Summer," to his wife, is a love poem in which the age of the lovers does not daunt but reinforces their autumnal passion: We have plucked the illicit corn, / seen the Scriptural fragility of flowers. In "Our Afterlife (I)," he describes the energy and melancholy of this dying life: We are things thrown in the air / alive in flight . . . / our rust the color of the chameleon. Few poets end as strong as they began. Without the sentimentality he taught us to loathe, we can say that Lowell did.

— Frank D. McConnell

REAPING THE WHIRLWIND: A Christian Interpretation of History
by Langdon Gilkey
Seabury, 1976
446 pp. $19.95
L of C 76-29738

Difficult because it deals with highly abstract matters and sets up a dialogue with a great variety of theological schools, Langdon Gilkey's book is unquestionably important. It picks up and advances one of Christianity's central but most neglected themes: Providence. Theology's classical doctrines do not, in Gilkey's view, allow enough scope for human freedom and responsibility. Neither does "process theology," stemming from Alfred North Whitehead (Process and Reality, 1929), do justice to the Biblical faith. Gilkey holds that in creating free beings God imposes bounds on himself but within these bounds establishes, grounds, limits, judges, and rescues the present. The novel possibilities thus evoked in man help to shape the future. To nontheologians who lack the leisure to follow all the ins and outs of Gilkey's laborious argument, one can enthusiastically recommend the final chapter. It summarizes many of the findings of the book and could almost be read as an introduction to the whole. The opening chapters, on the promise and menace of our future, show how the religious dimension cannot be neglected in any serious effort to appraise the hopes and fears of our present technological civilization.

— Avery Dulles, S.J. (77)
CURRENT BOOKS

SOFT ENERGY PATHS: Toward a Durable Peace
by Amory B. Lovins
$15 cloth, $6.95 paper
L of C 77-4349
ISBN 0-88410-614-4
ISBN 0-88410-615-2 pbk

An oft-proposed solution to the world’s energy problem is to increase supplies to meet projected demands, primarily through rapid extension of high technologies for generation of electricity and production of hydrocarbon fuels. Lovins, a young American physicist now residing in Britain, summarizes the arguments for an alternative to this “hard” path. He advocates more efficient use of existing energy systems and supplies, with particular emphasis on careful matching of the scale and quality of delivered energy to consumers’ real needs (e.g., electricity to light, but not to heat, houses). Critics who have attacked his “soft” path thesis as softheaded point out that it is based on unproved assumptions and say that it would require unacceptable changes in U.S. lifestyles. But Lovins is no primitivist taking us back to an earlier, wood-burning rural America. His nonapocalyptic study, bolstered with supporting data, is probably the best guide we have to the feasibility—he would say the necessity—of something other than expanded high technology as a solution to energy needs.

—Charles F. Cooper (’77)

PERUVIAN DEMOCRACY UNDER ECONOMIC STRESS: An Account of the Belaunde Administration, 1963–1968
by Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski
Princeton, 1977
308 pp. $16.50
L of C 76-24296
ISBN 0-691-04213-6

What are the prospects for successful civilian rule, once the Peruvian military steps down from power in 1980, as promised? Kuczynski’s account of economic policymaking under Peru’s last popularly elected president, Fernando Belaunde, does not encourage optimism. A former manager of Peru’s Central Bank during the Belaunde administration, Kuczynski has written an insider’s chronicle of events leading to the military takeover and so-called Revolution of 1968. Weak political institutions, obstructionist opposition parties, vulnerable export-oriented economy, and rising demands on government from a restive population still characterize Peru; restoration of civilian rule could lead to a replay of the kinds of events he describes.

Webb, former research director of Peru’s Central Bank, writes for specialists but reaches conclusions that are of general interest. He argues that between 1963 and ’73, little progress was made toward a more equi-
table sharing of income; the patterns of government-fostered redistribution before and after the 1968 Revolution did not change much. Workers within the modern sector of the economy saw their living standard improve, but their incomes were already higher than those of subsistence farmers.

— Susan Kaufman Purcell ('77)

BLACK CULTURE AND BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS: Afro-American Folk Thought from Slavery to Freedom by Lawrence W. Levine
Oxford, 1977, 522 pp. $15.95
L of C 76-9223

Challenging the long-accepted academic view that slavery destroyed black culture, Levine holds that black oral tradition, folk heroes, legends and other lore, sacred and secular music, all flow together into a rich cultural stream. The idea of a historic black culture is not new; black intellectuals have been insisting on it for years. What is original and fresh is Levine's use of the techniques of the folklorist and anthropologist in the cause of writing a history of the minds of the mass of Afro-Americans rather than of the often-studied black elite. An important example of the newest of the "new history" of popular and mass culture, Levine's book extends even to black humor, including such variants as "playing the dozens"—a game of verbal taunts in which the winner is the one who keeps his cool.

— Thomas Cripps ('76)

DEFENDING AMERICA
by James Schlesinger et al.
Basic Books, 1977
255 pp. $13.95
L of C 76-43479

The most thorough critique of the Nixon-Kissinger policy of détente available today, this collection of essays from San Francisco's Institute for Contemporary Studies is unified by a common conservative philosophy and a prevailing pessimism. James Schlesinger, Theodore Draper, Walter Laqueur, Gregory Grossman, Albert Wohlstetter, and Leonard Schapiro are among the 13 contributors to sections on the political and economic implications of détente, on the current U.S. military posture, and on human rights. Robert Conquest bluntly concludes that "a stable [Soviet-U.S.] truce based on mutual distrust is preferable to delusions of friendship accompanied by and encouraging political and military initiatives by the Kremlin, which increase the dangers of both war and totalitarian victory."

— Samuel F. Wells, Jr. ('77)
CURRENT BOOKS

NEW TITLES

History

LAFAYETTE IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: Selected Letters and Papers
Cornell, 1977, 487 pp. $18.50
L.of C 76-50268

London, March 9, 1777

You will be astonished, my dear Papa, by what I am about to tell you; it has been more painful than I can say not to have consulted you... I have found a unique opportunity to distinguish myself, and to learn my profession. I am a general officer in the army of the United States of America.

Thus Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette, informed his father, the Duc d’Ayen, that he had joined up—with the American Revolution. Shortly afterward, Lafayette sailed aboard his own ship to Charleston, whence he traveled on to Brandywine, Valley Forge, privations, victory, and glory. The translation of this letter (with a reproduction of the blotted French original) is one of many items in a sizable correspondence—with his family, friends, brother officers, and the Continental Congress at Philadelphia—included in the first of six planned volumes funded by the National Historical Publications and Records Commission (WQ, Autumn 1976). Lafayette wrote letters as tirelessly as he soldiered.

STALAG: U.S.A.
by Judith M. Gansberg 372,000 German prisoners of war held in 44 camps in the United States during World War II. Because the POWs came under the terms of the Geneva Convention, their captors at first eschewed any interference in their political activities. However, in late 1943, reports of atrocities inside the camps prompted the War Department to begin segregating the ardent Nazis. In 1944, the Prisoners of War Special Projects Division was created to change the political attitudes of as many POWs as possible. This re-education program (top secret until May 1945) survived the persistent anti-Semitism of some prisoners, an uproar in the War Department over alleged Communist
proselytizing in the camps, and the disaffection of many instructors. (Harvard professor Howard Mumford Jones resigned in a huff over having to use texts "meant for adults of meager literacy.") At war's end, some prisoners were flown to Germany. Others went by ship to Le Havre and were held in France to work on rebuilding projects. So disorganized were the French in 1945, however, that what reconstruction was done was planned and accomplished by the POWs themselves—leading the newly democratized Germans to joke that the SS was again in control of Normandy.

The winner of a 1958 Pulitzer Prize for a biography of Woodrow Wilson describes the peak period of American diplomatic power, from the German request for an armistice in October 1918 until the opening of the Paris Peace Conference the following January. Walworth is now more critical of Wilson than he was 20 years ago. The President, he concludes, should have avoided dictating the form of the League of Nations and the location of postwar boundaries, used American food and economic power to aid European recovery rather than to advance U.S. short-term interests. Instead, says the author, Wilson misread the needs of the Allies, as he did the desires of his own people, and threw away "America's moment" in a spate of moralistic rhetoric that created fear of the United States rather than the trust essential for a stable peace.

Social reform, education, immigration, war, law, imperialism, slavery, Western development, and science are some of the subjects woven into this reference/history book. Handy, a Union Theological Seminary professor, chronicles the growth and decline of churches, ranging from Roman Catholic (Canada's largest, embracing 42.2 percent of the population) to Pennsylvania's tiny 18th-century celibate communal settlement at Ephrata, still noted for its contribution to church music. He shows how denominational differences shaped both U.S.-Canadian rela-
Angered by a 1774 statement of the first Continental Congress that decried Roman Catholicism for its "impiety, bigotry... and murder," the Bishop of Quebec refused to meet with emissaries Benjamin Franklin and John Carroll and effectively barred French-Canadian aid to the Americans in the Revolutionary War. Canada's religious duality of French Catholicism and British Protestantism (many Canadian Protestants were Tories who fled the American Revolution) contributed to a conservative tradition without counterpart in the United States.

The diary of upper-class, left-wing Labour Party leader Richard Crossman shows all too clearly how his colleagues in the government failed to deal with many of Britain's problems in the late 1960s. Official records remain closed, but Crossman chronicles Cabinet deliberations and sharply criticizes his party's leaders—especially Prime Minister Harold Wilson—for their ineptitude, irrelevance, and pettiness. He argues that Wilson's divided Cabinet erred in continuing the Tory policies of pushing "hopelessly ineffective" sanctions against Rhodesia, refusing to devalue the pound, and seeking entry into the Common Market. The determination to "keep Britain great" has been, he complains "the basic reason for all our economic troubles and our difficulties at home."

This is the second volume (revised) of a history of the Chinese Communist Party by a prominent French statesman, soldier, and professor (l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris), who has been closely involved with Chinese affairs for nearly 40 years. The first volume (Random, 1972) covers the years 1929-49. The two together are the "magnum opus" among histories of the C.C.P. Detailed, objective, factual, precise, well-documented, and balanced, Guillermaz's analysis fulfills his purpose: "to trace... the Party's behavior toward itself" and the way it has "developed the regime," basing
its choices on experience, on the state of affairs at home and abroad, and on "a compelling ideology dominated by the giant-like personality of Mao Tse-tung." The revision was done before Mao's death, but Guillermaz predicts that "with the old Party gone" and "with it the China of the early Communists," the "masts of the new China are already disappearing over the horizon. Another China is near . . . lit by the torch of revolution [but taking] its place among the realities [of the world] around it."

Contemporary Affairs

Raymond Vernon, director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs, writes that his new book "entails a risk on everybody's part": his, in aspiring to "an unattainable measure of objectivity"; the reader's, "in exposing himself to a presentation that could conceivably entrap." The risks are worth taking. Vernon's dispassionate view of immediate and possible future issues raised by the spread of multinational corporations is based on the heavy research done over the last 15 years at the Harvard Business School. The real problems, he argues, are that multinational enterprises have created tension and anxiety in all Third World "host" countries, whether rich (like Libya) or poor (like Mexico); that national security problems inherent in their corporate structures could become severe; that the multinational enterprise and the sovereign state, although not rival systems, can interact in ways that threaten both (the most obvious case in point being governments' use of companies as cover for intelligence agents operating overseas). Vernon reminds us that in times past nations have managed to "head off a threatening escalation in beggar-thy-neighbor" policies (e.g., tariff wars and competitive devaluations). Time for finding an acceptable code for multinational corporations has not yet run out, he says. In his view, the world needs such enterprises; the question is how can they be made to work better.
THE AMERICAN TOUCH IN MICRONESIA
by David Nevin
Norton, 1977
224 pp. $9.95
L. of C 76-58339
ISBN 0-393-05617-1

TIN ROOFS AND PALM TREES: A Report on the New South Seas
by Robert Trumbull
Univ. of Washington, 1977
302 pp. $17.95
L. of C 76-49164

WHITE HOUSE WATCH: The Ford Years
by John Osborne
Cartoons by Ranan Lurie
New Republic Books, 1977
482 pp. $11.95
L. of C 77-5321
ISBN 0-915220-26-1

Captain Cook (1728-79) wrote about them first. But little dependable up-to-date information on the island peoples of the Pacific and their problems has been available. These books fill the gap. Nevin, a former Life writer, focuses on the islands and atolls of Micronesia, occupied in turn by Spain, Germany, and Japan, and since 1947 administered as a UN Trust Territory by the United States. Informed by extensive interviews with both Micronesians and American officials, he attributes the corruption and unrest troubling these strategically important dots on the map to fumbling U.S. neocolonialism. Trumbull, who long covered the South Pacific for the New York Times, credits the United States with successful educational programs in Micronesia but wonders if the artificially unified "rusted Trust" has a political future. Trumbull's readable report ranges far beyond Micronesia. He covers nations as diverse as Papua New Guinea, which became independent in 1973, and the tiny island Republic of Nauru, "acre for acre and body for body" the world's richest nation, but already well on its way to having 80 percent of its land area strip-mined for phosphate.

After five volumes of The Nixon Watch, the wisest of White House reporters turns his attention to Gerald Ford. Osborne's portrait of the man who could grill his own breakfast muffins but garble a toast is remarkable. He gives us wry perception, revealing anecdotes, "background" interviews (on everything from arms control to Zimbabwe) and a rare tone (subjective but sober, critical but calm). Most of this material originally appeared weekly in Osborne's New Republic column and is arranged chronologically; the reader follows the Ford regency "live," from the Nixon Pardon, through convention victory, to election defeat. Osborne discerns real accomplishments during the Ford years, particularly in foreign policy. Ultimately, however, he echoes the former President's staff chiefs Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Cheney: "Good old Jerry was too damned good for his own good."
YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AFFAIRS 1977
edited by Richard F. Staar et al.
Hoover, 1977, 612 pp. $30
L of C 76-51879

The eleventh volume in a series, this edition surveys Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations throughout the world in 1976 and provides profiles of their activities in 93 countries. An 8-page essay on the United States gives details on the Communist Party USA, the Socialist Workers Party, and the Progressive Labor Party, together with some information on several Maoist sects, although not on the new Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) founded in June 1977 to attack revisionism and carry on Mao Tse-tung's thought. Other features include a long article on the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Europe, held in Berlin in 1976, and a valuable bibliography.

Arts & Letters

RUBENS IN ITALY
by Michael Jaffé
Cornell, 1977, 128 pp. $55
L of C 76-20065
ISBN 0-8014-1064-9

One day in 1600, Peter Paul Rubens, aged 23, left his native Flanders for Italy. Eight years later, in a desperate and fruitless attempt to reach his mother's deathbed, he returned home—and never went south of the Alps again. This account of Rubens' Italian years, by a Cambridge professor of art history, is an inspiring Painter's Progress—a tale of talent, helped by hard work, again and again assisted by luck. With impeccable scholarship and telling detail, Jaffé demonstrates in text and 346 well-chosen illustrations the impact of those early years on Rubens' later paintings. So convincing is the commentary that it makes one wonder how so many people, specialists or laymen, can continue to insist that this painter was only, or essentially, "Flemish"; he, whom many knew in his Italian Spring as Pier Paolo Rubens.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CHAUCER
by John Gardner
Knopf, 1977, 352 pp. $12.50
L of C 76-1915
ISBN 0-394-49317-6

Courtier, diplomat, squire, and poet Geoffrey Chaucer (1340?-1400) lived in the thick of English politics. His friends included patron and brother-in-law John of Gaunt (Duke of Lancaster and Steward of England in Richard II's early reign); his acquaintances, the enigmatic Black Prince (Edward) and the tragic Richard II himself. John Gardner (author of Nickel Mountain and many other
works of fiction and nonfiction) brings the novelist’s eye, the disciple’s devotion, and the medievalist’s hoary zest to a biography that may, he surmises, even be accurate: Records of the poet’s life are few and scholars quarrel over what facts remain, although Chaucer’s way of looking at things seems “clear as an English April day.” A royalist in evil times and a free-thinking Christian who read Boethius and cultivated a taste for the bawdy, Chaucer emerges as a man who would take matters seriously if he must but humorously if he could, serenely fathering English verse in his spare time.

WALLACE STEVENS: The Poems of Our Climate
The Poems of Our Climate
by Harold Bloom
Cornell, 1977
413 pp. $17.50
L of C 76-55482
ISBN: 0-8014-0840-7

Harold Bloom examines the work of one of the foremost American poets of the 20th century. He quarrels with the prevailing critical view that Stevens’ poetic self is engaged in exploring possible confirmations of selfhood in the face of the loss of traditional certainties. Instead, Bloom argues, Stevens’ return to the “First Idea,” urged in his “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction” (1942) is the poet’s central theme, conveying his will to repudiate the past, first by shedding inherited modes of perception, then by refashioning reality in a poem that affirms the authority and control of the poetic self. Central to this process is Stevens’ struggle to escape the influence of such strong precursors as Whitman and Emerson. Not an easy book to read, but not one for students of poetry to overlook.

THE BOOK OF MERLYN: The Unpublished Conclusion to The Once and Future King
by T. H. White
Univ. of Texas, 1977
137 pp. $9.95
L of C 77-3454

For reasons that Sylvia Warner Townsend’s introduction fails to make clear, this intended final chapter to Britisher T. S. White’s retelling of the Arthurian legends was dropped at the time The Once and Future King was first published (London, 1958). The Book of Merlyn was written in 1941, while White was living in Ireland and wrestling with pacifist scruples over joining England’s war for survival against the Nazis. Delivered to his editors just before he enlisted, the book is heavily didactic and, here and there, transparently autobiographical. But White’s original grand design is interesting: to take Ar-
thur, old, tired, sad, and sick of war and treachery, back underground for more instruction from the animals who, at the beginning of the story, helped the wizard Merlyn to school the young king-to-be. The furry tutors’ talk about fascism, communism, and capitalism is dreary, and Arthur’s experiences when he is magicked into an ant have no sparkle. But when he becomes a wild goose migrating in freedom with the plump Lylylok, whom he loves “more than Guenever, more than Lancelot,” that old White magic again casts its spell.

FIVE TEMPERAMENTS
Elizabeth Bishop, Robert Lowell, James Merrill, Adrienne Rich, John Ashbery
by David Kalstone
Oxford, 1977
212 pp. $10.95
L of C 76-42655

HOUSEBOAT DAYS
by John Ashbery
$7.95 cloth, $2.95 paper
Lof C 77-9978
ISBN 0-670-38035-0
ISBN 0-14-042202-1 pbk

David Kalstone, professor of English at Rutgers, here considers the uses of autobiography in the work of five contemporary poets, including the late Robert Lowell, who did as much as anyone to gain critical acceptance of the use of specific autobiographical detail in American poetry. Few of us do not know, by now, the minutiae of Lowell's life; the story is in the poems (see page 154). Kalstone explores how much of such autobiography poems “can bear and handle.” All five poets have found ways to build their lives into their work; Bishop in her later poems using “less geological, less historical, less vastly natural” time and space, more interior landscapes; Merrill recognizing a preference for the first-person present “with a veil drawn”; Rich by thinking, as she wrote in 1968, “how we can use what we have to invent what we need.” In his last chapter, Kalstone greatly helps the reader to understand John Ashbery, a daring, difficult writer whose work confronts “how little” poetry can do in the face of life’s complications.

“The past slips through your fingers, wishing you were there,” John Ashbery once reminded us. His latest volume, Houseboat Days, 39 poems written since the 1975 publication of Self Portrait in a Convex Mirror (which won a Pulitzer) continues exploration of the personal darkness that many American poets experience. “I cannot . . . pick up where I leave off . . . the truth becomes a hole, something one has always known . . . a randomness, a darkness of one’s own.”
CLOSE QUARTERS
by Larry Heinemann
Farrar, 1977, 336 pp. $10
L of C 77-2245
ISBN 0-374-12523-6

Vietnam veteran Heinemann’s first novel is one of the most humane books yet to appear on the experience of the American soldier in Vietnam. Its narrator, Philip Dozier, is assigned in 1967 to a unit of armored personnel carriers, or “tracks,” west of Saigon. A series of episodes dramatizes his initiation into the tedium, the intermittent danger, and the ambiguity of front-line fighting when the front lines are never clearly defined. The book conveys—in prose that is an authentic reflection of G.I. slang—the special anxiety, relieved only by dope or “smoke” and occasional mechanical sex, of the unenthusiastic young draftee. Like Hemingway in A Farewell to Arms, Heinemann convinces us of the authenticity of his war by limiting the narrator’s point of view to that of the individual in battle who understands neither the higher strategy nor the political causes that dictate his actions. The end of the novel—with Dozier’s visit to a friend’s stateside grave—is an understated elegy for much besides a single comrade lost in Southeast Asia.

Science & Technology

THE HIGH FRONTIER: Human Colonies in Space
by Gerard K. O’Neill
Morrow, 1977, 288 pp. $8.95
L of C 76-27860
ISBN 0-688-03133-1

Princeton physicist Gerard O’Neill combines persuasive technical explanation, succinct economic reasoning, science fiction, autobiography, and futurism to introduce us to man living in space. The high ratio of fact to page in his book may sometimes leave the reader puffing, but anybody who wants to learn how space colonies can be built and maintained will find the effort well rewarded. O’Neill’s vision of man’s future Out There is, however, socially and politically underdeveloped. A series of “letters home to earth” (this is where the science fiction comes in) raises more questions than it answers, and the scientist-author does not come to grips with the problem of making technically feasible projects politically affordable. According to O’Neill’s estimates, backed by NASA analyses, the costs of establishing a first habitable, industrial satellite-island in space run from a minimal $31.4 billion to a high of $185 billion. O’Neill asks not if we can, but if
we can afford not to spend the money. His arguments, of course, are that space offers living space, energy, resources, and a chance to escape earth's population pressures. If such arguments ultimately prevail, his book will stand as a major prophecy.

New Books by Fellows and Former Fellows


SCHOLARS' GUIDE TO WASHINGTON, D.C., FOR RUSSIAN/SOVIEt STUDIES. Edited by Steven A. Grant for the Kennan Institute of the Wilson Center. Smithsonian Press, 1977.
**PAPERBOUNDS**


This comprehensive text developed for use in medical courses at Harvard is also a unique sourcebook for lawyers, legislators dealing with health plans, and lay citizens. It opens with selections from the *Corpus Hippocraticum* (probably written by Pythagorean philosophers in the 5th to 4th centuries B.C.) and proceeds through well-edited articles on medical conduct and ethics; regulation, compulsion, and consumer protection in clinical medicine and public health; truth-telling in the physician-patient relationship; medical experimentation on human subjects; procreative decisions; suffering and dying; rights and priorities in the provision of medical care. The emphasis throughout is on human needs rather than on narrow professional concerns.


"Can a bug be beautiful?" A Western answer to this Zen question might be: Of course, if it's depicted by a Japanese artist. This large, elegant volume, printed and bound in Japan, was compiled by the late director of Washington's Freer Gallery. He briefly traces Japanese "nature" art from the emergence of Buddhist influence in the Heian Period (8th century A.D.), through the Kamakura, Muromachi, Momoyama, and Edo periods to the present. Among the 140 illustrations of paintings, drawings, calligraphy, ceramics, and lacquerware are a full-page color detail of wasps, a brushwork close-up of a tiger's eyebrow, an impudent cat of the late Edo Period—all pure delights. Concise notes with each item provide as much background as most readers will require. (For additional information, Noritake Tsuda's classic *Handbook of Japanese Art*, first published in 1941 by Charles Tuttle, is available as a paperbound reprint.)

**RED TAPE: Its Origins, Uses, and Abuses.** By Herbert Kaufman. Brookings, 1977. 100 pp. $2.95

"Writing about red tape turned out to mean writing about the whole governmental process," says Brookings president Bruce L. MacLaury, introducing this brief, bright study of a subject more satirized than examined. Kaufman finds that red tape represents procedural constraints of our own making. Can its onerous qualities and effects be minimized? Not easily, is his answer, and probably only through exercising more care in the writing of new regulations. Administrative regulations filled 15,000 pages in the *Federal Register* in 1946. The annual postwar page total dropped briefly (10,528 in 1956), rose in 1966 to nearly 17,000, passed 57,000 in 1976, and is expected to reach 100,000 in the 1980s. That's 100,000 pages, representing millions of yards of what was, in its beginnings under the British Empire, actual cloth tape, dyed scarlet, used to tie up official files.

**UHURU'S FIRE: African Literature East to South.** By Adrian Roscoe. Cambridge, 1977. 281 pp. $6.95 (cloth, $18.50)

The reader new to African prose, poetry, and drama may be surprised by the wide variety of themes and voices; the combination of strength and confusion felt
in the work of African writers who are part of a literary independence movement paralleling political change comes as less of a surprise. Introducing the work of contemporary authors in East, Central, and Southern Africa, Adrian Roscoe describes vernacular writing ("the outgrowth of an oral literature which has begun to die before the world knows much about it"). He discusses the change in the literature syllabus—from British to African—at the University of Nairobi in 1961, since followed in Malawi and Uganda. "As the voices of Wordsworth and Tennyson grow dim," he reports, "the voices of Okigbo and Soyinka grow loud." So do those of Kenya's Grace Ogot, with her strong tales based on Luo tribal stories, South Africa's Ezekiel Mphahlele, Uganda's Taban Lo Liyong, and dozens of other artists, established or emerging, whose work Roscoe perceptively analyzes.

## THE FACE OF BATTLE

**THE FACE OF BATTLE.** By John Keegan. Vintage, 1977. 360 pp. $2.95

John Keegan lectures at Sandhurst, England's West Point. He has never seen a battle. Neither had Stephen Crane, whose *The Red Badge of Courage* is probably America's best war novel. Keegan’s book, newly available in paper covers, is not as compelling as Crane’s classic, but it does distill, from historical records, what war is like to the men who bear the battle: English bowmen and pikemen at Agincourt (1415); gunners, cavalry, and massed infantry in the confusion of Waterloo (1815); participants in the unbelievable slaughter of the Somme (1916)—where the 1st Battalion, Newfoundland Regiment, in one afternoon lost 705 dead, wounded, or missing. (Newfoundland!) Looking at "the inhuman face of wars" in these three battles fought within a hundred-mile radius,

Keegan writes that "impersonality, coercion, deliberate cruelty, all deployed on a rising scale, make the fitness of man to sustain the stress of battle increasingly doubtful." One wonders.

## HOUSES AND TRAVELLERS

**HOUSES AND TRAVELLERS.** By W. S. Merwin. Atheneum, 1977. 214 pp. $6.95 (cloth, $10)

Better known as a poet and translator of poets than as a writer of prose, W. S. Merwin in the last few years has won new followers with his short short stories, fables, and parables, in the *New Yorker*. Thirty of the odd, haunting narratives collected here appeared first in that magazine, others in a variety of literary journals. Merwin writes (ostensibly) about people, many of them old and lost, about paths, cabins, grain elevators, lakes, nesting pigeons, about "The Devil's Pig," and even (in 69 words) about language we have lost but cannot forget—words we "shine the lantern of our sleep on . . . and there they are, trembling for the day of witness. They will be buried with us, and rise with the rest."

## THE ANATOMY OF MELANCHOLY:

**THE ANATOMY OF MELANCHOLY:** What it is, with all the kinds, causes, symptomes, prognostickes and severall cures of it. By Robert Burton. Vintage, 1977. 1,440 pp. $7.95

Robert Burton's years on earth (1577--1640) were greatly afflicted by the "black choler." ("I'll change my state with any wretch! Thou canst from gool or dunghill fetch! . . . Now desperate I hate my life. I Lend me a halter or a knife.) But he made a good thing out of melancholy. His learned, witty compendium on the subject, first published in London in 1621, went through five editions before his death at age 63 of natural causes. Not until now has it appeared in paper (at a cheering price).
China's Jesuit Century

Jesuit Matteo Ricci (left) and convert Hsu Kuang-chi in the early 1600s. One hundred years later, the work they began was in ruins.
In the long history of China's contacts with the West, only once has there been a major cultural accommodation: during the 17th century, when Jesuit scholars served as key advisers on diplomacy, science, and engineering to the imperial court at Peking. Mutual tolerance and respect brought cultural and material benefits to both East and West before Vatican insistence on theological orthodoxy led to a rift and to China's return to isolation. Father Joseph S. Sebes, who served in the Jesuits' China Mission in pre-Mao days (1940-47), visited China last year. His essay is drawn from original research undertaken during his tenure as a Wilson Center Fellow.

by Joseph S. Sebes, S.J.

On a crisp September morning in 1583, Matteo Ricci stood at the prow of a junk loaded with sheep and pigs and poultry. Portuguese Macao, its houses built low for protection against typhoons, slipped by astern as the vessel nosed its way up the Pearl River, and the young priest wondered whether he would be a fourth time rebuffed in his attempt to enter China, the Celestial Kingdom. By training he was a Jesuit and thus a man of learning; but he was also a man of God, and it is, in a sense, as a parable that his story has come down to us.

During the middle years of the 16th century, Portuguese Jesuits extended their missionary efforts to India and Ceylon, Malacca and the Moluccas, but the "brazen gates" of China refused to yield. Francis Xavier arrived in Japan in 1549 and established a Christian community that soon numbered 150,000, but his dream of bringing the gospel to the Chinese remained only a dream. He died on his way to China in 1552, the year in which Matteo Ricci was born in the Italian village of Macerata.

Stepping ashore at Chao-Ch'ing, Ricci could not know that through his own exertions China would finally emerge into its "Jesuit century." Rejecting the condescension of his fellow Europeans and recognizing in China a civilization more ancient, and in some respects more advanced, than his own, Ricci would accommodate the rites, customs, and philosophies of the Chinese within the structure of his own religious beliefs. By doing so, he would win the confidence, and sometimes the souls, of his Chinese hosts. But the welcome extended to this Western scholar in the East found no counterpart among theologians in Europe; short years after the Jesuits' most signal successes—including the Emperor's Edict of Toleration—his tactful, balanced approach succumbed to Papal condemnation. In the end, the West was to show itself incapable of accepting China as a cultural equal.

Mongol and Ming

Scholars who commonly describe China as historically a closed society often forget that under the Mongols (1280-1368) and before, the proud Middle Kingdom was relatively cosmopolitan. Some 2,000 foreign-trading firms had offices in the T'ang
capital of Ch’ang-an (near Sian), then the largest city in the world with a population of one million, and Chinese technicians supervised paper manufacture in cities as far away as Baghdad. European visitors—such as John of Montecorvino (1290) and of course Marco Polo (1271–95)—were frequent, and Chinese maritime expeditions crossed the Indian Ocean and “discovered” Africa well before Portugal’s Prince Henry sent his ships exploring down the continent’s west coast. There were even elements of religious diversity: The Jesuits were surprised to find a Jewish community in Kai-feng dating from the 12th century. Earlier, a group of Nestorian Christians had flourished in Ch’ang-an, where they acquired a reputation, according to one contemporary account, as “experts in eye diseases and diarrhea.”

China’s “Sinification”

Only when the new Ming dynasty finally wrested power from the Mongol overlords (1368) was there a period of consolidation; the result was the first self-imposed isolation in Chinese history. In many ways, the Ming reaction was similar to Chinese cultural withdrawal today. Indeed, the dynasty’s first emperor, Hung-wu, fancied himself a political philosopher and required each family in the kingdom to own the Ming ta kao, a digest of his thoughts and sayings, which for a time was the most widely read book on earth.

The years of Ming “Sinification” coincided with the European explorations of the East. The first Portuguese trade mission to China in 1514 met open hostility, as did Tomé Pires three years later when he presented himself as Lisbon’s ambassador to Peking (he was detained in the country until his death in 1520).

The Chinese generally regarded the Portuguese, often rightly, as little better than the Japanese pirates who periodically ravaged the kingdom’s coastline. As a result, the Portuguese found their reception in China markedly different from the hospitality accorded them elsewhere in the East.

In Japan, for example, Portuguese traders and missionaries first arrived during the Sengoku (country at war) period. They found an open society eager to obtain Western firearms (which the Japanese turned against the Koreans in 1592) and tolerant of Western religion. Francis Xavier’s limited evangelization of the country was hampered more by apathy than antipathy, and while he made some effort to win converts from among the new daimyo aristocracy, he concentrated on the lower classes. There

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seemed no need to seek protection in high places.

Nor was there much need for the Jesuits to accommodate culturally to the Japanese. The banners of the Shimabara rebels sported a Portuguese legend: _Louvado sea o Santissimo Sacramento_; and Western words were readily adopted: _Deusu_ for Deus, _Kirishtan_ for Christian—much as the Japanese, centuries later, adopted _beisuboro_ (for baseball) and _aisukurimu_ (for ice cream). Only after the _Sakoku_ (closed country) edict of 1639 did the Japanese, under the Tokugawa, retreat into an isol-
tion from which they would not emerge until the arrival of Admiral Matthew Perry in 1853 and the subsequent Meiji restoration of 1868.

Architects of Accommodation

China, in the 16th century, represented the opposite extreme: a closed society in a fantastical kingdom known to most Europeans only as a land of strange beasts and gunpowder, of paper money and printing. Aware of Western misconceptions and recent commercial and missionary setbacks, Alessandro Valignano used his appointment in 1573 as Superior of Jesuit missions in the Far East to devise a new approach. A man of rare gifts and vision, a doctor of civil law and aide to Pope Paul IV, he realized that cultural differences within the East could be quite as pronounced as those that divided, say, Flemings and Poles in the West. Moving between Japan and Macao, Portugal's peninsular bastion on the Chinese mainland, Valignano set about formulating the China policy Ricci would take with him to China.

Valignano believed that the Chinese would respond better to a show of respect than to self-righteousness. Intensely proud of their ancient culture and holding intellectual accomplishment in high esteem, the Chinese, he felt, would be impressed by Jesuit scholars who accommodated themselves to the Chinese way of life. Accordingly, he insisted that his missionaries "Sinicize" themselves by obtaining sound knowledge of the Chinese language and the Confucian classics—something no European missionaries had done before.

In the years preceding his departure for China, Ricci underwent intensive training in Chinese language, manners, and customs—so successfully that grammatical errors in his diary reveal a man more at home with Chinese than with his native tongue. When he arrived in Chao-ch'ing, he adopted a Chinese name (Li Ma-tou) and donned the robes of a Buddhist bonze to indicate that he was a man of God. (He later switched to Mandarin dress, when he realized that it conveyed higher status.)

Valignano's cultural-accommodation approach was marred by none of the paternalism common among his Western contemporaries. In essence, his message to his aides was: Become Chinese. Equally simple was his strategy: Work from the top down. As scholars, the Jesuits had a natural affinity with the literati and educated officials, whose influence would afford the missionaries a measure of protection.

The task facing Matteo Ricci, Valignano's first emissary, was a difficult one. The country itself was enormous and uncharted (the first reliable atlas of China would be produced by the Jesuits in 1717)—a land of perhaps 150 million inhabitants, dispersed over 3.5 million square miles and torn by conflicting strains of Confucianism. From the first, Ricci adapted himself to the Chinese way, performing the kowtow to officials (three kneelings and nine prostrations) and carefully stressing scholarship over religion to avoid conflicts with Chinese sensibilities.

Ricci had studied under Italy's cel-

*Ricci made it clear to the Chinese that in the sphere of ethical action and social and political life, Confucianism was a sound doctrine, which in all essentials agreed with Christianity. However, there were many superstitious elements in Confucianism as a result of Sung neo-Confucianist teachings. In its simplest terms, Ricci sought to restore the earlier, "pure" Confucianism, while condemning the adulterated later version, which, unfortunately, had been official doctrine for 600 years.
ebrated Christopher Clavius, called the Euclid of the 16th century, and was himself an accomplished mathematician, astronomer, and cartographer. To complement his skills, he had brought with him an assortment of scientific and astronomical devices as well as prisms, clocks, and other evidences of Western technology. Impressed by his devotion, tact, and ability and fascinated by his instruments (as the Chinese would be fascinated by my Polaroid camera 400 years later), the bureaucrats and literati of the southern provinces took kindly to Ricci and provided him with land for a house and church.

**Tongue and Brush**

Though still far from Peking, the administrative center in the north, Ricci had nevertheless secured a foothold, and as he established missions in the southern cities, he called for reinforcements to man them. Between the late Ming and early Ch'ing dynasties—that is, from around 1590 to 1680—more than 600 Jesuits would undertake the hazardous and often fatal passage from Europe to China. Only 100 actually made it. "All the rest," wrote one survivor, "had either been destroyed by shipwreck, illness, or murder, or captured by pirates or other robbers."

Meanwhile, Ricci made his way through the provinces toward Peking. It would take him 18 years.

With his preaching and scholarly writing—with "tongue and brush" as the Chinese put it—Ricci at every stop made the acquaintance of the local elites and spoke to them of science and philosophy, hoping these would lead to higher things. One Jesuit later noted that Ricci used the secular aspects of his training as a kind of oil "wherewith to grease the wheels of affairs that they might roll more softly."

And softly they rolled indeed. Hsu Kuang-chi, later to become Grand Secretary to the Emperor, was baptized in 1597. His power and learning proved invaluable to the Jesuit cause. Through Hsu's efforts, other influential Chinese—such as Li Chih-tao and Yang T'ing-yun, both of whom became presidents of the Supreme Court—embraced Christianity.

The key to Ricci's success lay in his learning and consummate tact. He refused to condemn ancestor worship, adopted a Chinese term, *T'ien-chu* (Lord of Heaven), for God, and adapted the liturgy to China. Aware that the Chinese, like the Europeans, mingled superstition with orthodoxy, he showed the same tolerance in this regard that Rome showed to Europeans. Moreover, in-

![天主](tian_zhushi.png)

T'ien-chu ([Lord of Heaven]), the Chinese Rites' term for God.
stead of contesting Confucian doctrine, Ricci used it as a complement to Christianity, stressing the common elements in both.

Ricci's insight into Chinese attitudes was apparently boundless. The first book translated from Latin into Chinese by the Jesuits was not the Bible or the Lives of the Saints but a compilation of selections from Cicero's *On Friendship*—friendship being one of the five basic Confucian relationships. And when Ricci was asked to draw a map of the world, he ensured his fame throughout China by informing the Chinese for the first time of the existence of many other civilized nations. Moreover, by placing China at the map's center, he reinforced (pandered to, some said) the Chinese conception of the Middle Kingdom as literally and figuratively the center of civilization.

The Forbidden City

Peking, as Ricci found it in 1601, was a city of 700,000 and the nerve center of empire, connected to the rest of China by the Chichou and Huit'ung canals and by a web of roads created by the Mongols. If the Jesuits wanted friends in high places, it was here among the mandarins and the concubines that they were to be sought. The techniques that had won Ricci friendship and respect in the provinces, along with several thousand converts, served him well in the Forbidden City.

The Wan-li Emperor was fascinated by Ricci's gifts and scientific instruments, which included a pearl-studded cross, a world atlas, several ringing clocks, and a clavichord. The Emperor's eunuchs, naturally enough, were unable to repair the clocks or play the clavichord, so Ricci was asked to remain in the imperial capital—as he had hoped. The tacit understanding from the beginning seems to have been that the Jesuits would serve as technical advisers to the Emperor; the Chinese, in turn, would tolerate the presence of Jesuit missionaries as long as the foreigners' services were deemed useful.

Converts during this time included 14 mandarins of the first class, a cross section of intellectuals of academic standing (10 Doctors, 11 Licentiates, and 300 Bachelors), 140 members of the imperial family, and 40 of the Emperor's eunuch advisers. When news of this astounding progress was reported in Europe, many Westerners entertained hopes of the conversion of the Emperor and spoke of a "Chinese Constantine." The Jesuits in China, however, did not take such talk seriously, for as one of them noted wryly, "In order to convert the Emperor to Catholicism, you must first find a loophole in the Catholic morality of sex that would allow him to keep his 200 concubines."

Meanwhile, Ricci continued to supervise missionary work in the provinces. More Jesuits entered China, sustaining missions in Soochow, Nanchang, and Nanking. By the time of Ricci's death in 1610, there were 13 European missionaries in China, several native Jesuit brothers, and some 50,000 Christians. Within 30 years, 31 missionaries were serving a congregation of nearly 150,000, with mission houses, colleges, schools, and churches scattered throughout China.

Master of Mysteries

For the remainder of the 17th century, Ricci's successors—Nicholas Longobardo, astronomer Adam Schall, and the all-purpose Fer-
Verbiest's observatory atop Peking's eastern wall (1687). The rest of the wall has since been razed, but this section remains.

dinand Verbiest—carried on his work, upholding the orthodoxy of the Chinese Rites—as Ricci's method of cultural accommodation came to be called—while continuing to serve China's Son of Heaven as technical advisers. In 1613, after a mistake by the imperial Board of Astronomy in forecasting an eclipse, the Jesuits under Schall were given the task of revising the Chinese calendar to bring it into conformity with the earth's orbit and rotation. As a result of the success of this project, the Jesuits were rewarded with key positions in the Calendrical and Astronomical Bureaus. Both Schall and Verbiest became official court astronomers. Schall was honored, in addition, with the presidency of the Board of Mathematics and the impressive title of Master of Universal Mysteries. These positions were of some importance, given the significance the Chinese attached to dates. Despite the turmoil of the ensuing centuries, the directorship of the Board of Astronomy would remain in the hands of a European priest until 1838. It was from this office that the
Jesuits exerted their considerable leverage on Chinese affairs. Interestingly, the section of the Peking wall that housed Schall's observatory is the only part of the wall that has not been torn down by the Communist government.

Other Jesuit activities included mapmaking, translating, and metal-casting. The works of Galileo and Euclid were rendered into Chinese, and Joannes Terrentius' Explanation of Wonder Instruments, a treatise on mechanical engineering, achieved a certain vogue. Later, the Jesuits were to survey the whole of China, producing, in 10 years, the Complete Atlas of the Empire, the first map of China to incorporate latitude and longitude. For the Ming dynasty, the Jesuits designed iron cannon to help stem the Manchu tide, overcoming religious scruples by taking the advice of convert Li Chih-tsaol:

If they propose to make warriors of you, make use of the title as the tailor does the needle, which is of no use to him but to pass his thread through; when the stuff is sewn and the garment finished, he leaves it, having no longer occasion for it.

The simile was an appealing one, and we find the Jesuits taking up their needles again, now in the service of the Manchus, who succeeded the Ming emperors in 1644. The Jesuits also served as doctors and ambassadors and wrote on every conceivable subject from algebra to zoology. Verbiest invented a boat and a car powered by steam and published 20 volumes on astronomy. The remarkable convert Hsu Kuang-chi wrote a Thesaurus on Agriculture in 60 volumes, most likely with the help of an enormously popular Western invention—eyeglasses.

Under the great Manchu ruler K'ang-hsi, the Jesuit century reached its pinnacle. A masterly, extraordinarily intelligent ruler from adolescence, with a shrewd insight into human behavior, K'ang-hsi would occupy the Dragon Throne for 60 years. He had been tutored by Verbiest, as his father had been tutored by Schall, and he trusted the Jesuits implicitly.

A Grateful Emperor

When the Yellow River overflowed its banks, it was to the Jesuits he turned when it came time to disburse the funds for flood relief, for K'ang-hsi was only too aware of corruption among his own officials. When he fell ill from malaria, he turned to the priests for quinine, the newly discovered drug known in China as Jesuit's bark. It was K'ang-hsi who commissioned the fathers to map his empire, and it was he who appointed Jesuit Ignaz Kogler to the Board of Rites, the first European to hold that key position.

For these and other services, K'ang-hsi was grateful. The work of the Jesuit missionaries culminated in 1692 with his famous Edict of Toleration, which at once removed Christianity from the list of "noxious religions" and accorded it "indigenous" status (as had been done with Buddhism many centuries before). The Jesuits profess "no disorderly or disturbing tenets," K'ang-hsi declared, "neither do they allure the people with treacherous doctrines nor provoke disturbances with strange theories." The Edict was followed in 1700 by the Emperor's "Declaration" approving the Jesuit interpretation of the Confucian classics, thereby ratifying the Jesuit position with regard to the Chinese Rites. If the Pope had shown as much tolerance as K'ang-hsi—indeed, if he had simply refrained from "provok-
The contribution of the Jesuits in China to European culture was no less spectacular. The missionaries determined, for example, that the Cathay of medieval times was the same as Renaissance China, ending several centuries of fruitless exploration for a land that did not exist. A Latin version of the works of Confucius was published in Paris, and in 1684 Jesuit Philippe Couplet presented to the Pope more than 400 newly translated Chinese works—along with a young Chinese scholar, Michael Shen Fu-tsong. "A little blinking fellow," as King James II of England remembered him, Shen later studied at Oxford and catalogued the Chinese manuscripts in the Bodleian Library.

As European interest in Chinese culture grew, so did the market for chinoiserie. Lacquered furniture and glazed porcelain became common in the drawing rooms of Western Europe. Oriental stone bridges and pagodas graced the gardens at Kew. More important, Chinese ethics and political philosophy exerted tremendous impact on such Western philosophers as Voltaire, Rousseau, and Leibnitz. To the Europeans, the Jesuits were the first Sinologists; to the Chinese, they were the first Occidentalists.

And yet, beneath these outward signs of amity and accord, an undercurrent of disquiet was running both in China and Europe. On the Chinese side, the conservative elite remained...
suspicious of the Jesuits and envious of their influence at court. Yang Kuang-hsien, who for a time replaced the Jesuit Adam Schall on the Board of Astronomy, was typical. In a treatise called *Pu-te-l* [I could not do otherwise], he stated that he "would rather have no good calendar than have foreigners in China," adding "it is exactly because of their excellent instruments and excellent weapons that they are a potential enemy."

Fearful of the literati, with whom the Jesuits were associated, and of such dissident sects as the White Lotus or Red Eyebrows, some conservative Chinese regarded Christianity as similarly subversive. Before K'ang-hsi's Edict of Toleration, persecutions of Catholic converts periodically swept through the provinces, and while they were usually brought to heel by the Emperor's swift intervention—the Jesuits had foreseen such eventualities—they sometimes reached into Peking itself.

At one point, the onetime imperial favorite, Adam Schall, together with some of his Chinese colleagues, was arrested and sentenced to undergo the *ling ch'ih*, a lingering death by slicing. The persecution abated only when, in 1665, on the day of Schall's scheduled execution, a violent earthquake shook Peking. It was interpreted as a sign of cosmic displeasure, and Schall was released. Not until the Tangshan earthquake of 1976 would tremors of such magnitude again shake the region (they were given a similar interpretation by many Chinese).

**The Rites Controversy**

Less understandable is the European reaction to what the Jesuits were accomplishing in China. Always slow to slough off imperialist designs, many in Europe accused the Jesuits of "selling out" Western superiority, while they attacked the priests for accepting high Chinese office—even when it was clear, as one scholar has noted, that the Jesuits enjoyed the honors but not the emoluments of such positions. With the arrival in China in 1632 of the Franciscan and Dominican mendicant friars, and with the transfer of Chinese missionary work to the authority of the Vicars Apostolic (the Pope's emissaries in China), the most violent phase of the European reaction against Ricci's work commenced.

To understand the ensuing "Chinese Rites" controversy, a brief explanation of the politics of theology is necessary.

**Christian Rivalries**

During the late 15th century, the competing claims of Portugal and Spain to the fruits of their global explorations threatened to spark a major European conflict. Pope Alexander VI successfully defused the issue in 1493 with his bull *Inter caetera*, which divided the newly discovered lands between the two nations, giving Spain most of the Americas (except Brazil), and Portugal most of the Far East (except the Philippines). The result, for a time, was a virtual Portuguese monopoly on trade and missionary activity in the East.

By the early 17th century, however, it had become clear to the Papacy that the herculean task of converting Cathay and the Indies to Christianity was beyond the resources of tiny Portugal. In 1622, the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith (*Propaganda Fide*) was established to coordinate the work of European missionaries abroad. Thus, in China, there appeared the
first challenge to Jesuit hegemony as missionaries from the Church's other orders arrived to spread the faith. The cracks would widen when the Vicars Apostolic of the Propaganda Fide took titular control over all missionary operations in China.

To the newly arrived mendicant friars, as well as to some Jansenist-influenced Propagandist Vicars, Ricci's accommodating approach to Chinese culture—the so-called Chinese Rites—appeared idolatrous and intolerable. The friars, unaware of Chinese feelings about bare feet, were horrified by paintings depicting Christ and the Apostles wearing shoes. They attacked traditional Chinese observances in honor of Confucius, ancestors, and the recently dead, and charged the Jesuits with failure to preach "Christ the crucified." (The Jesuits, mindful of Chinese aversion to violence, had stressed "Christ the glorified").

The critics didn't stop there. They condemned Jesuit adoption of Chinese dress and manners, refused to accept the Chinese name for God, and contended that Confucius was in hell. (Friar Domingo Navarrete proved this with a syllogism: All infidels are in hell. Confucius was an infidel. Therefore Confucius is in hell.) Finally, when the Jesuits refused to abandon their Chinese Rites, they were accused of disobedience, and after K'ang-hsi's Declaration approving the Rites, of having "appealed to Caesar" for rulings on matters better left to God.

The attitude of the newcomers threatened to undermine the work of a century, and the Jesuits fought back hard. They had studied China for many lifetimes, they argued, and looked upon the Chinese Rites as tokens of respect, not homage to false gods. Cultural accommodation, they added, had made it possible for intellectuals and high-ranking officials to embrace the faith, for among the upper classes Confucian observances were as much a matter of good citizenship as of religion. Abandoning the Rites, they concluded, would force such higher-ups—the backbone of the Chinese Church—from the faith. It should be noted that the Jesuits themselves drew the line on some of the Rites (certain burial practices, for example, were forbidden), but they never tried to force their positions on others. The Jesuit attitude was best expressed by a contemporary who wrote: "There is danger [to orthodoxy] in admitting the Rites, but a greater danger in suppressing them."

**An Uneasy Peace**

The infighting among the competing missionaries quickly grew more virulent, and when the friars in 1645 submitted the dispute to Rome, the Propaganda Fide issued a decree condemning the Rites. The Jesuits immediately appealed, and in 1651, after apprising the Propaganda of no less than 42 distortions in the friars' petition, won a decree permitting the Rites. No attempt was made to reconcile the contradictory pronouncements, and for a time an uneasy peace reigned. Unknown to the Jesuits, however, the friars and the Vicars Apostolic continued to press their case in Rome, to which end the Vicar of Fukien had engaged the crafty papal lobbyist Charmot.

The Jesuits were lulled by a false sense of security. When they finally defended themselves in several lengthy written arguments to the Vatican, among them, the famous Peking Xylograph, it was too late. For the Pope had decided in 1701 to send a legate to China to settle the matter.
REFLECTIONS: SEBES

The Pope was forced to uphold his legate.

Angered at the insult, K’ang-hsi expelled the Frenchman from China. "Reading this proclamation," he declared, "I have concluded that the Westerners are small indeed....It seems their religion is no different from other small, bigoted sects of Buddhism or Taoism." In the wake of the legate’s departure, the whole structure of accommodation between China and the West collapsed.

The Jesuit century had ended. Although the Jesuits would remain for many years in China as technicians, painters, architects, and musicians, they had lost both their capacity to act as protectors of provincial missions and their influence as a link between East and West. When the Edict of Toleration was effectively revoked in 1707, the missionaries in China again experienced severe persecution—now without imperial protection. And as the Jesuits suffered at the hands of the Chinese, they suffered too at the hands of the popes, who in 1715 and 1742 reiterated the ban on the Chinese Rites and in 1773 suppressed the Society of Jesus altogether. The sentiments of the last survivors may be gathered from the words of the French Jesuit Amiot, who, after surveying the ruin of his order and the destruction of the China mission, left this epitaph:

Go away traveler,
congratulate the dead,
condole the living, pray for all,
marvel, and be silent.
There have been five major periods of contact between China and the West in recorded history. Through Scythian and Persian intermediaries, Greeks and Romans carried on commerce with the Chinese, though the relationship never rose above bargaining over prices for Chinese silk. Later, in the 7th century A.D., dissident Christian groups settled in the Middle Kingdom, but this movement too came to an end as the Crescent of Islam divided East and West. During the Middle Ages, the nations of Europe sought to engage the Mongols in an alliance against the Moslem infidel. Embassies moved back and forth (Mongol missions appeared in Rome in 1248 and later in England), but fear of Mongol expansion eventually overcame the desire for joint action. Then in the 16th and 17th centuries, Catholic priests, led by the Jesuits, followed Portuguese traders to the East, and for more than a century maintained close links with the imperial court at Peking. Finally, beginning with the Opium Wars in 1839, European powers gained a foothold in China that lasted until a new period of official isolation began in 1949 with the victory of Mao Tse-tung.

Of these five contacts, only one—the "Jesuit century"—represented a serious Western attempt to engage the Chinese as equals. In the 16th century, the doors of self-imposed cultural isolation were opened a little by Ricci’s method of cultural accommodation, but it took a century and a decade more to throw them wide open. That this congenial exchange lasted, at its height, only a few short years enhances, rather than diminishes, its importance. The experience shows that, while mutual accommodation is possible, it is also very difficult.

The century of "unequal treaties" that ended in 1949 left China exploited, humiliated, unstudied—and groaning under an inferiority complex (how else can one explain, as Simon Leys has noted, the solemn mobilization of 800 million people to denounce a "puny charlatan" like filmmaker Antonio Antonioni?). Today, almost three decades later, foreign tourist groups and official visitors are permitted to "bring tribute" or take guided tours, but the immense and varied universe of China remains as mysterious and isolated as it was during the Ming dynasty.

Is there a possibility of reaching a new accommodation today? If so, how long will it take? I cannot answer these questions, but if there is any lesson to be learned from the Jesuit accomplishment of four centuries ago, it is that nothing will be achieved until Westerners accept the Chinese as cultural equals.
LETTERS

We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer's telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editors' requests for comment.

Sociobiology: Both Sides Are Right

The relevance of sociobiology to human affairs has been hotly debated [WQ, Summer 1977; also Letters, Autumn 1977]. The paradox is that both sides are perfectly correct.

Sociobiology cannot prove that there is one way of life which is “natural” to the human species. Sociobiology can indicate behavioral patterns that are “unnatural.” This seemingly trivial distinction suggests how the issue can be untangled.

Critics like Anthony Leeds and the Sociobiology Study Group are quite right to insist that human social behavior cannot be entirely “reduced” to biological “causes.” Since so much of our activity is shaped by cultural tradition and individual experience, it is obviously insufficient to claim that complex traits like altruism or socialization are narrowly caused by genes. But this means that no one cultural pattern is uniquely “natural”; instead, different ways of life are alternative strategies, more or less adapted to the environments in which they have emerged.

Sociobiologists like David Barash and Pierre van den Berghe also are quite right to insist that human social behavior cannot be divorced from modern biology. But sociobiology merely identifies the selective pressures that shape behavior. And even if the causes of a behavior are entirely cultural, its consequences for evolutionary adaptiveness can be measured.

Sociobiology can say that a cultural practice is “unnatural”—but not that there is one which is “natural.” For example, there is no single mixture of aggressive and cooperative behavior that is natural or normal for all human cultures (or, for that matter, all primates). But an attempt to eradicate all competitive behaviors—or all cooperative ones—is likely to have unfortunate functional consequences. Our species permits a broad range of experiments. But the more “unnatural” the functional pattern, the greater the tension it introduces—and the less likely that the pattern will persist.

It has been feared that the extension of sociobiology to human affairs is necessarily “conservative.” A more precise scientific approach indicates the reverse. This new field is likely to show why many existing patterns of large-scale bureaucracy are ill adapted to the broad constraints of primate social behavior.

Roger D. Masters, Department of Government, Dartmouth College

Questions for a “Triologue” on Japan’s Future


If Professor Reischauer is right (and I believe he is) in holding that the present configuration of Japan is the product of conditions and attitudes deeply rooted in Japanese history, what are we to make of the attitudinal changes Professor Thayer describes? How damaging, for example, are the growing privatism of Japanese life, the decline in the work ethic, the weakening of a sense of social and political responsibility to the democratic state?
Can international peace be preserved when the Japanese seem so little interested in anything beyond their own families? And what is to be made of Professor Azumi's findings? Are low morale in the workplace, impending labor unrest, and the probability of fundamental changes in labor-management relations likely to undermine Japan's prosperity? My guess is that there is too much contentment in Japan to expect any rapid shift. But I wonder what the three authors would say. I wish I could listen in on a conversation among them—might one call it a triilogue?—about the implications of their individual findings for Japan's future.

James William Morley, Professor of Government, Columbia University

Shooting Down Sweden: An International Sport

I would add three touches to WQ's portrait of Sweden [Autumn 1977]. First, the critics of Swedish social democracy are engaged in an international sport: Build up utopian expectations, then shatter them with a shotgun blast aimed at the failure of real governments to fulfill the critics' inflated expectations. Thus the massive "low-income study" of 1970 conclusively demonstrated that by Swedish cultural standards many people, especially among the unemployed in declining industries or communities, were poor. In fact, by international standards and by any careful measure, Sweden stands out in income equality. An OECD study found that, among 10 rich countries in the period 1967-73, Sweden tied the Netherlands for the most egalitarian income distribution.

The Swedes join in this sport; they oversell themselves on the international reputation market, thereby inviting critics to cut through the glossy publicity. Perhaps an uproar about the quality of life can break out only in a society that has satisfied the greater part of mass demands for dignified security and substantial equality.

Second, the structural base for the consensus, conservatism, and public acceptance of authority—noted by Steven Koblitz ["Symbolism and Reality"] as distinctive marks of Swedish history—is a kind of "democratic corporatism." And Sweden is not alone in this developing structure. Belgium, Austria, Norway, and, increasingly, West Germany all resemble Sweden in their structure for building consensus.

What counts is the capacity of strongly organized centralized economic interest groups, interacting under government auspices within a quasi-public framework, to produce bargains involving social policy, fiscal and monetary policy, and incomes policy. That structure for consensus may sometimes look shaky, but if we compare Denmark, the United States, and the United Kingdom, where channels for big-bloc bargaining are poorly developed, Sweden is, indeed, a model.

Third, a caveat about high culture. Like other countries, Sweden has curtailed its investment in the liberal arts core of higher education; it is here that we see the dearest conflict between equality and meritocracy. Thus, the test is not only whether Sweden will continue to manage its affairs better than other rich countries whose political economies are less centralized, but also whether its expanded institutions of higher learning will accommodate diversified excellence.

Harold L. Wilensky, Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley

Paradise or Perdition?

The problem with all attempts to portray Sweden as a model—of paradise or perdition—is that Swedish society is so utterly different from our own that we cannot expect to duplicate either its problems or its solutions.

This is not to say that we cannot learn from Sweden, particularly from essays as well informed and free of clichés as those published in The Wilson Quarterly. As social scientists we can learn that there are limits to Reason, that not all social problems are amenable to rational solutions.

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We can profit most from the realization that even if Reason doesn’t always work, it nevertheless works better than its rivals, and that Sweden will most likely cope with its present problems better than most.

Joseph B. Board
Department of Political Science
Union College, Schenectady, N.Y.

Sweden as Laggard:
A Heretical View

We might learn more both about Sweden and about common problems of industrial democracies if we stopped seeing Sweden as a harbinger—whether for good or ill—and looked on it more as a companion taking somewhat different policy routes through roughly similar terrain. We could then, for example, entertain the heretical idea that Sweden may in many ways be a laggard.

"Welfare" (public assistance) is still a local responsibility in Sweden, with geographically disparate benefit rates and financial burdens. Why has national welfare reform and negative income taxation been relatively ignored compared with the U.S. debate? Why has unemployment insurance only belatedly become a comprehensive national program?

What has caused access to secondary and higher education to lag far behind the United States? Why has it taken so long to frame an adequate response to the growing problem of ethnic and race relations surrounding immigrant labor?

What the Swedish experience can do is deepen our sensitivity to the implications of different choices about public policy—the way in which one thing seems to lead to another. Thus the Rehn/Meidner mobility policy of the 1950s and 1960s produced a reaction in the 1970s favoring less economically efficient policies that would increase job security and reverse out-migration from northern regions. Attempts to reduce income inequality through wage negotiations tended to compress wage and salary differentials and created more leeway for management to retain profits (this, rather than demands for worker participation, has precipitated much of the uncharacteristic strike activity since the late 1960s).

The result has been unparalleled efforts on the unions’ part to control the disposition of business profits. Day-care programs and other means of increasing labor force participation in the 1960s increased the social budget. Maintaining this commitment during the 1974-75 recession has been followed by more dependence on foreign creditors and more strenuous efforts to sell the exports of Sweden’s high-priced labor through devaluation, industrial rationalization, and so on. The result has been expanded wage demands to keep pace with prices and a strained social consensus.

What we learn from Sweden is that certain policy choices foreclose some choices and lead to still others. Not all the good things we desire are compatible. Sweden-watching can tell us something about how a country tries to cut back and scale down the tension among big social budgets, heavy taxes, expanding union demands, and dependence on uncertain international markets.

Hugh Heclo, Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

Managing a Decline?

Right now, Sweden is facing a more severe decline than at any time in the post-war decades of the export markets on which the country’s prosperity so vitally depends. It has more than once been a matter of surprise to me to observe how well the country has managed and how greatly it has continued to prosper on relatively slender resources and to survive one balance-of-payments crisis after another.

It may well be that at this stage "high-wage" Sweden will be forced to call a partial retreat for a few years from the continued rise in real income and from further expansion in welfare functions. This can be done in various indirect, inconspicuous, and hence politically more acceptable ways, among which the
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recent devaluation of the krona by 10 percent is an example.
Moreover, the demographic development of Sweden's population would seem
to create a strong barrier against further expansion of social welfare in the decades
ahead. By the mid-1980s the proportion of the population under age 20, most of
whom are not in the labor market, plus the population age 65 and over will be in
the ratio of roughly 3:5 to the working population aged 20-65 years. It is the lat-
ter who must support the former—largely
by taxes that already redistribute nearly
one-third of earned incomes as social
benefits.

Carl G. Uhr
Professor of Economics
University of California, Riverside

Understating Sweden's Plight

M. Donald Hancock ["The Swedish Welfare State: Prospects and Contradic-
tions"] and Steven Kelman ["The Uncer-
tain Future"] understate Sweden's cur-
rent plight. Hourly labor costs there are
now the highest in the world, in part be-
cause of the level of payroll taxes. This is
a serious matter for a country so depend-
ent on foreign trade. Real unemployment
is probably over 5 percent, taking into
account the participants in government-
sponsored employment projects. Corpo-
rate profits and savings have fallen dras-
tically and, with them, the rate of invest-
ment. Inflation has averaged 10 percent a
year since 1974 and shows no signs of
abating; indeed, the recent devaluation of
the krona provides still another inflation-
ary impulse. Sweden may be on the
British road to nationalization of indus-
try through the rescue of bankrupt firms.
This has already happened in shipbuild-
ing, and steel may be next.
The trade unions, both blue- and
white-collar, are still pushing both for
higher wages and for extension of the wel-
fare state. But given prevailing marginal
rates of income taxes and the rate of infla-
tion, money wages must rise by inordinate
amounts in order to yield even
modest increases in real disposable in-
come. The attempt to have the cake of
greater individual choice in income allo-
cation and to eat it in the form of more
public expenditures has created a di-
lemma that is essentially political in na-
ture, but consensus politics have not yet
been able to find a solution.

Walter Galenson, Professor of
Economics, Cornell University

A Reasonable Picture

On the whole I think that The Wilson Quarterly gives a reasonable picture of
Sweden today. It is of course difficult to
catch in a few essays what really is im-
portant—but I think the authors have
succeeded. Perhaps the present uncer-
tainty of what is going to happen to this
welfare state in the future could have
been stressed even more. The Social
Democrats—now in opposition—try their
best to unite the "wage earners" in fight-
ing the new government, which is charac-
terized as the government of the em-
ployers. Maybe Sweden will see a re-
newed class struggle in the near future.
However, I hope that the more optimistic
view underlying the essays will turn out
to be true!

Per Sundberg
University of Stockholm

The Swedish and the
American Dreams

Societies tend to have a core theme, a
"project," which they implicitly strive to
advance. The United States has long
stood as the chief symbol and carrier of
the capitalist project—a free society,
marshaling a giant industrial machinery
to provide ever more of its citizens with
ever more goods and services. Sweden is
often cited as the second most affluent so-
ciety and—because of its homogeneity
and absence of a large poor segment or
minorities—seen as even closer to a world
in which "everybody" has or soon will
have at least one TV set, a summer home,
a boat, and an auto.
In recent years the standard definition
of "the good life" has been challenged, not on economic grounds but within the counterculture, which sought a radical departure from the world of objects to satisfaction built on sensory stimulation via sex, drugs, mystical experiences, "nature"—all of which entail little consumption of material goods. The counterculture, which cut out both the production-work and the affluence-consumption ends of the industrial "project," soon crested, but it left in its wake a question shared, to varying degrees and in a more moderate form, by millions of Swedes and Americans: Is the good life one of hard work, robust competition?

Though not interested in adopting the hippie lifestyle of voluntary poverty, many Swedes and Americans nonetheless began to wonder whether they were not in danger of being ruled by their possessions and run ragged by their insatiable drive to buy more, and whether they could make do with less. Relatively few Swedes or Americans were attracted to "dropping out" of school or work, but many did find a more relaxed, less striving-and-stressful lifestyle appealing and became comparatively less interested in "success," in focusing their energies on "getting ahead," in rising up into the next higher social class.

In the long run, however, what is considered a good life, a good society, a desired future, may be shaped more by people's reactions to a new realization of a nation's limited capacities than by anything else. Under the impact of external pressures (first from OPEC), domestic shortages, and the growing recognition of the limited ability of government to solve social problems, we in the United States must choose in the near future what direction our main thrust will take: To resurrect the productive, hardworking, un-Swedenish early America? To reduce our material needs—private and public—via new definitions of the good life that are neither costly in resources nor work-intensive? Or to find merit in investing our resources in the pursuit of a human-services society?

Amitai Etzioni
Director, Center for Policy Research
Columbia University


I note one fundamental disagreement with the apparent characterization by Samuel F. Wells, Jr. ["America and the 'MAD' World"] of the Interim Agreement as the most important of the agreements signed in 1972. Most critics and supporters of SALT I agree, which is rare, that the ABM Treaty was clearly the more important of the agreements limiting strategic weapons.

The ABM Treaty, in formalizing the underlying fact that the offense dominates the defense in the strategic nuclear equation, rests on the basic agreement that the United States and the Soviet

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Union will not deploy defensive systems of any significance to defend themselves against the destruction of an actual attack. The fact that the ABM Treaty includes qualitative constraints provides some highly relevant precedents for constraints on modernization and technological development of offensive systems in a SALT II agreement.

None of the four WQ articles focus on nuclear weapons issues other than those encompassed to date in the SALT negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In my judgment, this view is too narrow. It avoids the larger issues of security in a world of increasing nationalism and access to advanced technology.

Since SALT I was concluded, five years have passed and technological innovations of some significance such as cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions generally (both nuclear and non-nuclear, strategic and tactical) have occurred. The Vladivostok Accord of 1974 has not led to a successor agreement, although the United States and the Soviet Union in October 1977 seem to be moving forward together in search of agreed constraints after the debacle of the March 1977 U.S. approach in Moscow.

The credibility of U.S. negotiators with their Soviet counterparts at all levels probably has been undercut by the earlier congressional rebuff of trade agreements between the two nations, by the fact that the Carter administration initially emphasized human rights and at the same time sought in March to repudiate the approach reached at Vladivostok and also by the long delay (Ford and Carter administrations) before the executive branch finally submitted the modest treaties already concluded (on peaceful nuclear explosions and limits on underground weapons tests) to the Senate for its consideration. And at present, the U.S. involvement of the Soviets in attempts to convene a Geneva Conference on the Middle East is linked U.S. and the Soviet Union. In my judgment, this view is too narrow. It avoids the larger issues of security in a world of increasing nationalism and access to advanced technology.

In light of all these factors, an important, if not critical, question relating to strategic arms control is whether the Carter administration can negotiate and agree with the Soviets on a SALT II replacement for the Interim Agreement that is likely to receive the necessary two-thirds approval of the Senate. Even if that is possible, concessions by Presidents to congressional critics in the form of additional testing or development of strategic weapons have been made in the past at the same time as apparent steps forward in the form of internationally agreed constraints. The role of Congress certainly deserves more attention than it received in the four articles in considering the political factors involving strategic nuclear arms.

John B. Rhinelander
Shaw, Pitman, Potts & Trowbridge
Washington, D.C.

Strategic Arms: What If the Novelty Wears Off?

There is one aspect of strategic arms control that may always be difficult to assess. How much have we been influenced, since 1945, by the sheer novelty of such enormous capacities for destruction? And what will happen if the novelty at last wears off?

It can be argued that much of the political impact of nuclear weapons has been due to their novelty, and that much of the tension of the Cold War was derived from the race to develop new weapons. Any new megatonnage “gap,” or other gap in favor of the Russians, is unlikely to have the psychological impact of the 1962 gap in favor of the United States. The tension about who would get jet bombers first, or H-bombs first, or intercontinental missiles first, is also now behind us, with the newer “races” unlikely to have matching interest. Such issues in future may seem more tedious than alarming or exciting.

It can similarly be expected that principles of military strategy and arms control are likely to remain more fixed. The Russians may never get around to admitting to a full understanding of deterrence; yet they have lost much of their ability to pretend to be stupid or incomprehending on the subject, an ability which earned
them some rewards in earlier years. Nor will arguments about the possible extent of nuclear umbrellas be as lively. We all know that the threat of escalation cannot really be used to shield Thailand; we all know that it can be used to shield West Germany.

This end of novelty may be largely to the good, producing less abstract academic theorizing about possible war scenarios. It could, however, be bad in one special sense. Confident of the balance of mutual assured destruction, we yet might some day blunder into nuclear war—not just a "war nobody wanted," but a "war nobody expected."

George H. Quester, Department of Government, Cornell University

The Needs of Middle-Income Americans

The period since 1964 has seen the proliferation of social programs that use income as the principal criterion for disbursing benefits not only to the poor but to millions of Americans who, by our poverty definition (and their neighbors'), have enough money to meet ordinary needs ["Money and the Pursuit of Spending in America," WQ, Autumn 1977].

In my view, our drift is hazardous. The shape of our income structure suggests that each liberalization of income-tested benefits has enlarged the numbers of the barely excluded—breeding envy, cheating, and disrespect for government if the exclusion formulas are viewed as irrational and unjust.

Are they so viewed? Should they be? We lack the knowledge to say. Three years ago, I spent three months organizing published Census Bureau and private survey data on the correlates of income level for Americans who are neither wealthy nor poor. To my knowledge, no other work with this objective has been done, other than market research for corporate clients. My "quick, dirty look" suggested to me that old-fashioned issues of need and desserts regain their force when social policy discriminates by simple income-based criteria among neighbors who share the insecurity of tight budgets but differ greatly in the value they attach to income maximization, in their access to unmeasured assets such as handyman skills and helpful kin, and in their prospects for higher income later on.

The relevant questions are investigable: To what extent is income in, say, the $7,000-$15,000 range determined by factors within the receiver's control? To what extent, in this range, is income a good measure of unmet needs? What are the unmet needs of "nonaffluent" Americans? Are modest earnings supplements an appropriate response to these needs? And so forth.

Instead of exploring these questions, scholars who once studied the poor now (I quote one of them) study "the nature, causes, and cure of opulence." Interpreting the vast middle range is left to the spouters of "Old Left" and "neoconservative" homilies. Yet people in this range do not compare their lot to the Rockefellers nearly so often as to one another's. Unless we learn much more about what most scholars seem to regard as trivial and uninteresting differences among "middle Americans," President Carter's objective of restoring faith in government will not be achieved.

Jane Newitt, Senior Professional Staff, Hudson Institute

Income Equality: An Ideal Not Shared by All

Each of the essays on money in The Wilson Quarterly has the apologetic attitude that is typical of almost all writing on the distribution of income in the United States. This is because equality is the predominant value among modern intellectuals. Yet, despite the criticism by intellectuals, most people appear to be satisfied with existing inequalities.

Why has the ideal of equality had so little impact on the citizenry in general or on public policy? It is probably because
people are interested primarily in themselves (despite the reluctance of social scientists to admit it) and unwilling to support egalitarian public programs over which they individually would have little control. In the type of society that we have, people compete for a higher share in the distribution of income. They appear to enjoy the contest and think the outcome fair enough. The process of income distribution is more important to them than the end result. A society in which income distribution is the result of a contest may well be more innovative and interesting than one in which income is allocated to persons in accordance with an agreed-upon conception of justice.

George Katona, former Research Coordinator, Survey Research Center
University of Michigan

Corrections

Robert J. Lampman, writing in The Wilson Quarterly [Autumn 1977], suggests that “inequality of opportunity ... is very difficult to measure.” I agree with him, rather than with Edward Pessen, whose essay ["Equality and Opportunity in America, 1800–1940"], seems to indicate that it is easy to measure—easy enough, at any rate, for one to be satisfied with only “a swift glance at the historical background” if one is interested in “how equality and opportunity have increased or diminished ... over the course of time.”

The task of measurement is certainly simplified if the analyst will accept pronouncements of travelers and politicians as equivalent in evidential value to statistics laboriously compiled from manuscript censuses and such sources. As the coauthor of “the most authoritative recent study” can tell you, the passage quoted from The American Occupational Structure is not from pp. 401-18 therein. It is, moreover, violently wrenching out of context and doesn’t mean at all what Pessen wants it to mean. It would take a lot of space to explain why that is so, but little enough to explain that my name is not Otis “S.” Duncan and that Peter M. Blau was the senior author of the incorrectly cited work.
Maybe a more leisurely "glance" at the historical record is needed.

Orit Dudley Duncan, Department of Sociology, University of Arizona

The editors of the Quarterly apologize to Professor Duncan for the incorrect use of his name, for citing him as senior editor of the work in question rather than Peter M. Blau, and for the incorrect page citation (it should have been p. 55).

I have enjoyed the Quarterly for over a year now. In general, the articles have been of a very high quality. However, in the Summer '77 issue the article entitled "The Greening of American Politics" by J. Clarence Davies III contained several inaccuracies.

Gifford Pinchot was never Secretary of Agriculture; he was the first Chief of the Forest Service. The Weeks Act of 1911 should be credited with extending the national forest system to the East; the Clarke-McNary Act of 1924 amended the Weeks Act by extending the authority to purchase lands beyond the headwaters of navigable streams. The date of the Multiple Use Act was June 12, 1960, when Lyndon B. Johnson was Majority Leader of the Senate, not 1964. Finally, the Fish and Wildlife Service was established in 1940.

John F. Shanklin, Conservation Consultant Washington, D.C.

Mr. Davies replies:

On the first point Mr. Shanklin is absolutely right and I am wrong. The error occurred because of my recollection of Pinchot's battles to keep the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture.

On the second point, I believe my footnote says that the forest preserve system was extended to the entire United States in 1911, an indirect reference to the Weeks Act. It goes on to say that the Clarke-McNary Act extended the system still further, certainly an accurate description of the authority to purchase lands beyond the headwaters of navigable streams.

Mr. Shanklin is also right about the last two points. The Multiple Use Act was passed in 1960, not 1964, and the Fish and Wildlife Service was established in 1940, not between 1933 and 1939. I apologize to all readers of the Quarterly for these errors.

J. Clarence Davies III
Executive Vice President, The Conservation Foundation, Washington, D.C.

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(signed) Peter Braestrup, Editor
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In 1968 the Congress established the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars as an international institute for advanced study and the nation’s official “living memorial” to the 28th President, “symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relation between the world of learning and the world of public affairs.”

The Center opened in October 1970, and was placed in the Smithsonian Institution under its own presidentially appointed board of trustees. Its chairman of the board have been Hubert H. Humphrey and, since 1972, William J. Baroody.

Open annual competitions have brought more than 200 Fellows to the Center since 1970. All Fellows carry out advanced research, write books, and join in seminars and dialogues with other scholars, public officials, members of Congress, newsmen, business and labor leaders. The Center is housed in the original Smithsonian “castle” on the Mall in the nation’s capital. Financing comes from both private sources and an annual congressional appropriation.