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because today's headlines in Central America cannot be understood if the Guatemalan process and its interruption through intervention in 1954 is not known and understood in this country."—CARLOS FUENTES

"There is an intriguing similarity to some of the phrase-making of the State Department in Central America today... Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Kinzer have produced an account that lives up to their book's subtitle, 'The Untold Story of the American Coup on Guatemala.' It is a tale of dirty tricks, the manipulation of public opinion, the smearing of the precious few journalists who managed to sense what was really going on, and of foreign policy that borrowed more from Doonesbury than diplomacy. It is a fast-paced and well-documented story... One can only wonder after reading this book if the Soviets and Cubans would have had the measure of success in Central America attributed to them by the State Department today had it not been for the unintended collaboration of Washington itself a quarter century ago.”—WARREN HOGE, New York Times Book Review.

BITTER FRUIT

The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala
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$16.95 at all booksellers
page  6  Editor's Comment
7 PERIODICALS
40 Research Reports

CANADA
44 Hanging Together
   by Kristin Shannon and Peter Regenstreif
60 An Orphaned Dominion
   by Robin Winks
74 Background Books

78 THE ENVIRONMENT: Olmsted’s Odyssey
   by Charles Capen McLaughlin

88 THE BRAIN
   by Richard M. Restak
90 Mapping the Hemispheres
98 The Archaeology of the Self
104 What Is "Understanding"?
114 Background Books

116 CURRENT BOOKS

REFLECTIONS
132 A Student in Moscow, 1966
   by Sheila Fitzpatrick

PERSPECTIVES
142 Assessing Lyndon Johnson
   by Robert A. Divine

151 Commentary
One of the WQ's aims is to survey the state of scholarly research on important matters. When such matters attract attention in the mass media, there is often a tendency to add up two plus two and shout "98!" This is the case, certainly, with much recent popular writing on new discoveries and/or theories of the brain—with various implications for education, IQ testing, and the differences between men and women. Our contributor, Richard Restak, we think, puts the new findings in perspective.

On the other hand, journalist Robert Caro's forthcoming massive biography of Lyndon Johnson seems to show up the relative poverty of scholarly research on the 36th President. The archives already opened at the LBJ Library in Austin have yet to be thoroughly mined; still awaiting declassification are many key documents, including the minutes of the secret “Tuesday lunch” sessions where LBJ made decisions on the Vietnam War. Historian Robert Divine examines the published work on LBJ and suggests that no one has yet come to grips with the man and his legacy.

As for Canada, our northern neighbor gets far less systematic attention from either newsmen or scholars than does Mexico, despite the country's major recent social and political changes, and its happy/unhappy proximity. Our contributors attempt to sketch the scene, as it looks to Canadians in the summer of 1982.

Starting with the next (Autumn) issue, we will publish the Quarterly every two months, except in summer. The object is to meet the expressed demands of our readers for timelier coverage of important periodicals and books and to increase our usefulness to a national audience.

The general internal format of the Quarterly will not change. Nor will our effort to provide a broader range of ideas and solid information. (Newcomers may get some notion of our past efforts from the “back issue” check list on the inside back cover.) As always, we welcome comments, corrections, and suggestions from our 100,000 readers.

Some folk have asked us whether, in publishing five times a year, we should change our name to, say, The Wilson Five. We prefer continuity. After all, the highly esteemed Congressional Quarterly now comes out every week.

Incidentally, current readers who extend their subscriptions will receive the extra issue at no extra cost. They keep the WQ alive and healthy, and we appreciate it.

Peter Braestrup
Eisenhower's Good Society


When Dwight Eisenhower (1890–1969) entered the White House in 1953, he brought with him a "fairly coherent social philosophy," writes Griffith, a University of Massachusetts historian.

Eisenhower began to express his views on government and economics publicly only after he left the Army in 1948 to become president of Columbia University. Deeply influenced by his military experience and strongly echoing the social theories of Herbert Hoover, he envisioned a prosperous, free society preserved from class conflict by self-discipline and voluntary cooperation among businessmen, workers, farmers, and others. A leader's task, he contended, was to inspire these groups to real sacrifice. Partisan politics, with its "appeal to all that is selfish in humankind," was the main obstacle.

As President, Eisenhower sought to govern by indirection. At his famous stag dinners with corporate leaders, he stressed cooperation. In office, he lifted Korean War wage-price controls. He tried to prevent government competition with business, wanted nuclear energy developed by private corporations, and favored natural gas deregulation. He named businessmen and industrialists to government advisory committees. During the 1954 recession, he privately (and successfully) urged bankers to cut interest rates.

But even when business leaders cooperated, as they did in helping the administration plan for public housing, highways, and use of natural resources, they did not necessarily rise above self-interest. Construction of public housing, for instance, declined sharply under Eisenhower, and critics charged that "far more poor people had been displaced through urban renewal than could be housed" in new public facilities. Eisenhower urged cooperation on labor, too. But when the White House intervened in labor disputes, it usually worked against "inflationary"
Black Americans' struggle for civil rights posed the sharpest challenge to Eisenhower's philosophy, Griffith says, and his response revealed an ethical blind spot. The President never endorsed the Supreme Court's landmark decision on school desegregation and privately thought it disruptive and unwise. When he reluctantly sent federal troops to Little Rock, Ark., in 1957 to secure compliance with court-ordered school desegregation, he justified the action, Griffith says, "in terms of defending civil order, not civil rights."

For the Good of the Party

"A 'Republican' View of Both Parties," by Josiah Lee Auspitz, in The Public Interest (Spring 1982), P.O. Box 542, Old Chelsea, N.Y. 10014.

America's two major political parties are busy reforming themselves—again. A committee of 60 Democrats headed by North Carolina Governor James B. Hunt has been working to change the way the party nominates presidential candidates and allocates convention delegates. Two Republican reform committees are also at work. But Auspitz, a project director for the Washington-based Sabre Foundation, worries that reformers on both sides will seize on "quick fixes," drifting still further away from the principles that underlie the concept of party in this country.

The prototypical American party was molded by Martin Van Buren, the New York Democratic "machine" politician elected to the White House in 1836. To the Founding Fathers, the "spirit of party" and the "mischief of faction" were identical. But Van Buren used party spirit—and discipline, buttressed by patronage—to overcome divisions, particularly between North and South. It was a time when, thanks to the lifting of property requirements, there were large numbers of new voters. National parties channeled growing demands for more citizen participation by instituting caucuses and conventions.

Auspitz believes that today's parties have strayed from these operating principles, neglecting their institutional well-being. "The Democratic Party," he writes, "needs to become more republican; the Republican Party needs to become more democratic."

In an attempt to escape the "smoke-filled room," Auspitz argues, Democrats have become locked into too much democracy—racial and sexual delegate quotas, numerous primaries, "mechanically bound delegates." The result: National conventions are mere rubber stamps, leaving little room for the convention-floor brokering that used to reconcile factional differences. The Republicans, meanwhile, have moved in the opposite direction. "Bonus" rules in force since 1916 (albeit modified in 1972) award extra delegates to states that voted for the party's last presidential candidate. Hence, sparsely populated Western states are disproportionately powerful; the Northeast is slighted. Again, factionalism is encouraged—as are third parties.
The 1980 presidential contest left many observers complaining that the major parties had lost their distinguishing features.

Yet Auspitz is skeptical of the current round of general reform proposals. Efforts to cut the "costs" of campaigns—by shortening the primary season and creating regional primaries—may favor established politicians too much. "Parties were once used to make sure that citizen pressures did not get out of hand," he concludes. "Now we may need them to make sure they are felt at all."

**Congressional Dropouts**

"Voluntary Retirement From the U.S. House: The Costs of Congressional Service" by John R. Hibbing, in Legislative Studies Quarterly (February 1982), Comparative Legislative Research Center, 304 Schaeffer Hall, Iowa City, Iowa 52242.

More U.S. Congressmen are voluntarily leaving office these days. Between 1962 and 1970, only 81 Representatives renounced public life completely; 153 left between 1972 and 1980. Hibbing, who teaches political science at the University of Nebraska at Lincoln, writes that the exodus may reflect a "malady" in our political system.

Hibbing interviewed 24 of the 31 Congressmen, young and old, who retired in 1978. One of the most common reasons they gave for leaving: "Raising a family and serving in Congress do not mix." One retiree recalled that while presenting an award at a soccer match in his district, "I realized that I should have been watching my own kid play soccer." A related cause was "the fishbowl factor": Congressmen are subjected to constant media scrutiny—hard on them, but harder on their families. "People seem to feel public officials should not be al-
POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

owed to have private lives," one retiree complained. The public holds officialdom in generally low regard, especially since Watergate, and that also takes away from job satisfaction. "Imagine living under a cloud of suspicion all the time," one ex-Representative remarked.

Many of the ex-politicians said that they enjoyed campaigning but found fund-raising "degrading." Moreover, congressional pay ($60,662) has not kept pace with private sector salaries. Lobbying, law, and other likely jobs for former Congressmen are now far more lucrative.

The job itself is less rewarding. It is harder to "do good" amid what seems to many to be a "legislative deadlock," fostered by time-consuming quorum calls and votes on meaningless issues (such as choosing the National Dance), by a new breed of Congressman intent on posturing for the media, and by a fragmented subcommittee system. The congressional reforms of the 1970s are partly to blame. Now that committee chairmanships are not awarded by seniority, there is less incentive to stay in office.

Older retirees (over age 60) were more likely to cite the diminished advantages of seniority or the desire to try something new "before it was too late" as the cause of their decisions; younger retirees more frequently cited the strains on family life. Hibbing concludes that since the percentage of older Congressmen is declining, the total number of voluntary retirements will drop off as well. But younger Congressmen will still face the same pressures and will probably quit at the same or higher rates as they have in the past.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Why NATO Is in Trouble

"The Dilemma of the West: A Transatlantic Parting of the Ways?" by Theodore Draper, in Encounter (March 1982), 59 St. Martin's Lane, London WC2N 4JS, United Kingdom.

The NATO alliance is in trouble, torn by dissension over proposals ranging from new trade sanctions against the Soviet Union to the deployment of new medium-range missiles in Western Europe. Draper, an author and former member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, N.J., writes that the tensions stem from fundamental shifts in the balance of power since the 1950s and from Washington's attempts to make the alliance into something that it is not.

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, when Western Europe, devastated by war, was nearly defenseless and the United States enjoyed a monopoly on atomic weapons. The NATO treaty provided for the mutual defense of Western Europe and carried the implicit promise of massive U.S. atomic retaliation for any Soviet attack on the region. The American "nuclear umbrella" left the Europeans relatively free to
pursue their own foreign policies and interests. But during the 1970s, with the relative decline of U.S. power, Washington called on the NATO nations for help in coping with crises outside Europe (e.g., the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). A break in the ranks was inevitable, Draper writes, because the alliance was never intended to serve such a purpose.

Meanwhile, something else had happened: America had lost its monopoly on atomic and nuclear weapons during the 1950s. French President Charles De Gaulle was the first to size up the implications. Believing that Europe could not depend on the United States to risk devastation for Europe's sake, he withdrew France from NATO's military organization in 1966 and set about building up French nuclear forces. The NATO plan to base U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe, though advanced by the Europeans themselves during the '70s, made Europe's predicament even more apparent: Theoretically, the United States could survive a nuclear war unscathed by limiting the conflict to an exchange of missiles in Europe and western Russia.

Should they choose to shed their "dependence" on America, the Europeans have three options, says Draper. They can follow the French "nuclear" path; eschew nuclear weapons but build up their conventional defenses to maintain an anti-Soviet deterrent; or allow "nuclear pacifism" to degenerate into full-fledged pacifism. Strong public opinion against nuclear weapons seems to rule out the first course in most countries, but Draper writes that Europe can follow the middle way "if only it has the will and fortitude to do so."

What can the United States do? Draper believes that pressure from Washington on the allies will do more harm than good. He writes: "Whatever the future relationship to the United States may prove to be, it should be decided by Europeans for the sake of Europe, without making the United States an alibi, a scapegoat, or a savior."

Proliferation for Peace?


The "proliferation" of nuclear weapons increases the chances of global catastrophe by making it more likely that some irresponsible ruler, some Idi Amin, will get his hands on one of the devices. So goes the usual argument in Washington. But Waltz, a political scientist at the University of California, Berkeley, disagrees. He contends that the slow spread of nuclear weapons may actually have a stabilizing effect.

The shift to a world dominated by two nuclear superpowers, each deterring the other, has kept the general peace since 1945—the longest such period in this century. Where the risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation once seemed greatest, along the Iron Curtain, there has been not a skirmish. Those who fear the spread of nuclear weapons, says Waltz,
believe "that tomorrow’s nuclear states are likely to do to one another what today’s nuclear states have not done."

Why does nuclear deterrence work so well? Primarily because it so vastly raises the stakes that any potential benefits of victory are outweighed by the possible costs. In a nuclear exchange, even the winner would be severely punished. A small deterrent force is sufficient, since an attacker can never be certain of destroying all of the defender’s nuclear weapons.

The danger of “irrationality” may be exaggerated. In the past, even “irrational” Third World rulers, notably Uganda’s Amin or Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi, have backed down when faced with the threat of superior conventional enemy force; there is no reason to think that, armed with “nukes,” they would be less pragmatic when faced with the sobering prospect of a nuclear exchange. “In the desperation of defeat, desperate measures may be taken,” Waltz concedes, “but the last thing anyone wants to do is make a nuclear nation feel desperate."

Weaker nuclear states, Waltz believes, are less likely than the global superpowers to “break the nuclear taboo”; because they have only vital local interests to defend, their nuclear deterrents become all the more credible to potential adversaries.

“Nuclear weapons, responsibly used, make wars hard to start,” Waltz argues, and there is no reason to think small nations will act less responsibly than big ones. The gradual spread of nuclear weapons gives their new owners time to adjust to them, and is “better than no spread and better than rapid spread.” Six or seven nations—the United States, Soviet Union, France, Britain, China, India, and probably Israel—now have nuclear weapons, and more than 40 have the ability to build them. The alternative for some Third World regimes (e.g., Pakistan) is a far more expensive conventional arms race.

"Silence Is Not Golden" by John Dugard, in Foreign Policy (Spring 1982), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

Just as South Africa started to ease enforcement of its harsh apartheid laws, the United States relaxed its pressure for reforms there.

The Carter administration, contends Dugard, a professor of law at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, deserves some credit for the South African government’s willingness during the late 1970s to ease racial discrimination and political repression. When black leader Steve Biko died under suspicious circumstances in a South African jail in 1977, the United States issued stern protests and sent official representatives to Biko’s funeral. That year, the Carter administration also denounced a South African decree aimed at suppressing dissident organizations and newspapers, and it supported a UN resolution calling for an embargo on selling arms to the country. South Africa’s ruling National Party made political hay out of Carter’s criticism. Accusing America of working against the interests of South African whites,
the National Party increased its parliamentary majority in 1977.

Yet, in response to American criticism, says Dugard, the government did ease its repression. Security-law enforcement was revised, and new rules for treatment of detainees were introduced. Biko's death was the last such fatality under security laws until 1982, when Neil Aggett, a white labor leader, died.

"Quiet diplomacy" may have been appropriate in the early days of the Reagan administration, when Pretoria still seemed committed to reform. And the strategy did succeed in resurrecting talks with South Africa on the UN plan for independence of its territory, Namibia. But quiet diplomacy, says Dugard, does nothing to help moderates within the National Party. It fails to prod South African businessmen toward job reforms. And it feeds black African suspicions about the U.S. stand on racism. In short, quiet diplomacy may spell "long-term disaster" for U.S. interests.

The Reagan administration should not push specific solutions to South Africa's internal problem, writes Dugard. But America should speak up clearly—and on occasion loudly—for an end to legalized racial discrimination. Rightly or wrongly, he warns, "the Reagan administration's quiet diplomacy is [already] widely construed as support for the status quo."

What Budget Deficit?

A federal budget deficit simply reflects the government's irresponsible penchant for spending more than it earns; right? Wrong, says Kopcke, an economist with the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The federal budget is not even a conventional budget. Its "bottom line" has little to do with the "basic" balance between receipts and expenditures.

Unlike budgets of businesses and many state governments, the federal budget is a "cash flow statement," which fails to distinguish between capital investments [e.g., buying an aircraft carrier] and operating expenses [e.g., running and maintaining the ship]. A well-managed business can borrow funds for expansion and improvements, just as a well-run family can borrow money to buy a house. Yet a cash flow statement for either could well show a deficit. U.S. nonfinancial corporations reported $136 billion in profits after taxes in 1980 and a surplus of $77 billion after dividends were paid. But because of $331 billion in new investments, a cash flow statement would have shown the corporations with a deficit of $104 billion.

If the federal budget were put on a "businesslike" basis, it, too, would often show a surplus in its "current" or "operating" budget. Thus, the fiscal 1980 "budget" (i.e., cash flow statement) has a $74 billion deficit (including $14 billion in outlays of off-budget agencies). But if that budget were divided into operating and capital budgets, the record would indicate a $33 billion surplus.

A cash flow statement, whether for government or business, has another blind spot, at least in times of inflation: Higher interest costs show up in the statement, but the similarly higher values of capital assets do not. Thus, that $74 billion federal deficit for fiscal 1980 was matched by a hidden $76 billion hike in the value of existing government capital. Finally, a federal budget deficit (or surplus), however defined, by itself says little about how government fiscal policy is working. Too much taxation, by slowing the growth of the tax base, may have been what caused the erosion of the federal budget surplus during the 1970s, not too much spending.

Evaluating the "propriety" of a federal budget deficit requires looking at the costs of investments versus their promised payoffs and at the tax burden versus spending programs' social benefits. "The same care used in business financial analysis," says Kopcke, "must be applied to the government's accounts before policies can be judged." No single number tells the story.
Mark Twain first used the phrase "robber barons" to describe the railroad moguls of 19th-century America. The name stuck because it captured the public's view of the new tycoons—more arrogant, greedy, unscrupulous than the businessmen of old. But, argues Ward, a historian at the University of Tennessee, it was not so much businessmen as business itself that had changed.

Railroads were America's first Big Business. The railroad men of the 1850s and succeeding decades broke precedent when they devised methods of management, finance, labor relations, and competition. Thus, when they talked shop, they invoked the only analogies that suited their power—the sovereign state and the military. "I, of all people," the Union Pacific’s Edward H. Harriman is supposed to have said, "know the problems of empire." Influenced by the sectional strife that preceded the Civil War, their rhetoric was sometimes extreme.

In their letters, they often described companies as armies with territory to conquer and flanks to defend from fierce competition. Terms such as "our domains," "entrenched position," and "colonize" often appeared. At times, there was "war." B&O vice president John King once sputtered about another line’s "unspeakable and unprovoked attack on our freight business." But there was also diplomacy (and even summit meetings, held on neutral ground such as Saratoga, N.Y.). Rail-

road leaders formed shifting alliances, sharing tracks to cut costs and match competitors' rate cuts; they even signed "treaties." In every year but one, the big lines managed to end their rate wars in time to transport the Western grain harvest at a profit.

In 1877, at the nadir of a long depression, the presidents of the powerful Eastern railroads formed the Trunk Line Association to moderate competition and arbitrate disputes. "Like leaders of great nation states," observes Ward, they had learned that they "stood to gain little from declaring war on their neighbors." The association marked the beginning of the end of fierce railroad competition in the East. And the colorful "Robber Barons" were soon succeeded by "a less obtrusive set of men more attuned to the paths of compromise and stability."


The "fiercest labor-management battles of the 1980s" probably will be over control of more than $650 billion in employee pension funds, according to Raskin, a former New York Times labor reporter. The reason: U.S. labor leaders accuse management of investing too many pension dollars in nonunion, antilabor, or foreign firms.

A 1979 study of pension funds whose assets totaled $147 billion indicated heavy investment in nonunion or mostly nonunion companies. More recently, American steelworkers learned that U.S. Steel and Bethlehem Steel retirement funds owned stock worth $133 million, in 10 banks that made substantial loans to Japanese steelmakers.

Some unions—notably in the fragmented construction and trucking industries—already have a say as to where pension dollars go. California building trades unions, for instance, have an equal voice with management. They have steered funds into low-interest mortgages that boost construction and union jobs. And a little noticed clause in the United Auto Workers' 1979 agreement with Chrysler gave the UAW a limited, advisory role in fund investments. But for 80 percent of the $450 billion in private pension funds, management calls the investment shots or entrusts large banks with the job.

In some big firms, including U.S. Steel and United Technologies, pension-fund assets now equal or exceed the total value of common stock. "A shift of a single percentage point up or down, in the earnings on retirement kitties of these dimensions," Raskin notes, "can make a significant difference in a giant corporation's net after taxes"—particularly since many corporate pension pools are underfunded.

Pension funds have a notoriously bad earnings record. One study shows an average total return of 230.9 percent over 19 years for retirement funds, versus 318.3 percent for mutual funds. Thus, some labor leaders are wary of adopting union goals, in preference to profitability,
as an investment guide. The AFL-CIO wants massive pension investments in the ailing steel and auto industries—but wants those investments guaranteed by the federal government.

Some unionists say it is possible to do good and still do well; they point to the Dreyfus Third Century Fund, a money market fund that weighs companies' environmental, consumer protection, and minority-hiring records, in addition to profits. In 1980–81, Dreyfus bettered the average stock-market performance by a wide margin.

**SOCIETY**

*Freudian Slips*


"A cure through love": Accustomed to the caricature of the aloof, intellectual "head shrinker," most English speakers would consider this definition of psychoanalysis far removed from Sigmund Freud's theories. Yet the words are Freud's own.

A physician, Freud (1856–1939) originally brought to psychoanalysis a scientific, medical perspective. But he gradually became a confirmed humanist, concerned not with minds so much as with souls. Unfortunately, his English translators (and their readers) never made the leap. So contends Bettelheim, a University of Chicago psychoanalyst.

In his essays, Freud used common German words and, often, metaphors to stir readers' emotions and let them feel what he meant as well as understand him intellectually. Indeed, contemporaries recognized him as a great stylist; novelist Herman Hesse praised Freud's "very high literary qualities." Freud could employ vivid, nontechnical prose because, in the Vienna of his day, psychology was viewed not as a natural science but as a branch of philosophy.

However, ambiguities acceptable in German psychological writing seem insubstantial when translated into English, in which "science" means only natural science. So thought Freud's translators. They regularly coined technical words, such as *parapraxis* for "faulty achievement" (describing "Freudian slips") and *cathexis* for "occupation" or "fixation." Instead of instilling a sympathetic understanding of humanity, and a basis for self-examination, says Bettelheim, the English translations encourage only a detached, "scientific" attitude toward others.

Where Freud used the familiar pronouns *es* (it) and *ich* (I) to name the unconscious and conscious aspects of the psyche, translators used cold Latin equivalents, *id* and *ego*. Worst of all, says Bettelheim, the translators substituted *mind* and *mental apparatus* for Freud's many references to *die Seele* (the soul). To Freud, an atheist, the soul was the powerful, intangible seat of both the intellect and the passions—in short, all that made humans human.
Since Freud knew English well, why did he not protest the English translations of his work? "Perhaps his low esteem for the materialism of American society," Bettelheim suggests, "had something to do with his indifference."


Since World War II, the Old Confederacy has undergone striking changes: In place of agricultural poverty, it has seen growth in industry and prosperity; in place of Democratic solidity, there have been Republican sweeps; in place of Jim Crow, there have been integration and black political power.

But, notes Roland, a University of Kentucky historian, Northerners and Southerners alike have been proclaiming the birth of a "new" South and writing epitaphs for an "old" one since shortly after the Civil War. And still the region remains a place apart—even in those aspects that recently have undergone the most change.

The new prosperity is real, but so is the South's persistent lag behind the rest of the country in wealth and income per capita. The South's economy is still a "colonial" one; major stockholders in the big corporations there are generally outsiders. In politics, the "liberal" Southern Congressmen of the early 1970s have become the conservative "Boll Weevils" of the early '80s. As for black political power, spectacular gains have been made, yet black office-seekers running outside black areas are usually defeated. And desegregated schools have often been, in effect, resegregated; Atlanta's public schools, once hailed for orderly desegregation, are now 90 percent black, thanks to "white flight."

The South has also held to its distinctive "Bible Belt" religion. Surveys show that Southerners are more likely than others to believe that "religion holds the answers to the great problems of the world." The Southern Baptist Convention, with over 12 million members, is the largest U.S. Protestant denomination.

Southern writers are set apart by their concern with "family, history, race, religion, and a sense of place." No one could say of a Southern writer what historian C. Vann Woodward said of Hemingway—that in his fiction a "hero with a grandfather is inconceivable." Finally, avoided by 19th- and early 20th-century European immigrants, the South is still more homogeneous than the rest of America.

Still, the gap between the South and the rest of the country has been narrowing. Thanks to Vietnam, Watergate, and other blows to innocence, all Americans have acquired some of the South's understanding of "the imperfectibility of man." And, too, the old "Southern-ness" is being steadily diluted by migration into and out of the region. Observes Georgia author Flannery O'Connor: Southerners "are being forced out, not only of our many sins but of our few virtues."

*The Wilson Quarterly/Summer 1982*
Law vs. Order


Communities, not just individuals, need police protection—and not just from crime. Rowdy teenagers, drunks, and panhandlers need commit no crime to make decent citizens fearful and put a neighborhood on the skids. Police should maintain public order, not just solve crimes. And until recent decades, they did. So argue Wilson and Kelling, a Harvard government professor and research fellow, respectively.

Police and social psychologists have long been familiar with the "broken-window" phenomenon: If one window in a building is left broken, it is taken as a sign that no one cares, and soon all the others are broken, too. In a neighborhood, argue the authors, "the unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken window." Disorder multiplies, and before long, in all likelihood, crime rises.

Time was when neighborhoods looked to police to help keep order—by keeping an eye on strangers and even by roughing up teenage hoodlums, if necessary. "'Rights' were something enjoyed by decent folk." But with increased mobility and the breakup of old neighborhoods, "decent folk" found it easier to flee than fight. Rising crime rates dur-

If police are not allowed to constrain rowdy youths on the streets, city dwellers feel insecure, regardless of the crime rate.

The Wilson Quarterly/Summer 1982
ing the 1960s and '70s led to a new emphasis on the policeman’s "crime-fighting" role. And with the stress on law enforcement came (thanks to publicized complaints and court decisions) legal restrictions that have increasingly handcuffed police. The result, say Wilson and Kelling, is that "the order-maintenance functions of the police are now governed by rules developed to control police relations with suspected criminals."

Law enforcement alone is no solution. "A gang can weaken or destroy a community," say the authors, "by standing about in a menacing fashion and speaking rudely to passersby without breaking the law." Police need to enforce community standards of "order"—but without becoming agents of neighborhood bigotry.

Citizens’ patrols can be useful. And putting more policemen on foot patrol instead of in cars seems to reassure neighbors and intimidate the disorderly. But when informal efforts fail, police need the "legal tools" to do the job. It was a mistake, say the authors, to "decriminalize" disreputable behavior that seemed harmless (e.g., vagrancy, public drunkenness). That has only taken away from police "the ultimate sanction" they can use to maintain neighborhood order.

Birth Control in the Middle Ages

"Birth-Control in the West in the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries" by P.P.A. Biller, in Past and Present (Feb. 1982), P.O. Box 28, Oxford OX2 7BN, United Kingdom.

When did birth control become widely practiced in western Europe? Most historians have said that contraceptive methods, which probably first found favor among prostitutes, were unknown or little used as late as 1500, the end of the medieval era. Not so, contends Biller, of the University of York: By then, the simplest method—coitus interruptus (withdrawal)—had been used extensively by married couples for almost two centuries.

Medieval theologians regarded procreation as the primary purpose of the sexual act; any other end was more or less sinful. And they wrote voluminously to this effect. Indeed, their attentions to the subject indicate contraceptive practices had aroused their concern as early as the 1200s "Si non caste tamen caute (If not chastely at least with care)," a maxim that appeared as early as 1049, was a commonplace by the 13th century. And Giles of Rome, in a work written in Paris before 1285, observed that prostitutes were "more sterile than other women."

By the early 14th century, judging from theologians’ complaints, the practice of coitus interruptus had become widespread among married folk. Peter de Palude, minister-general of the Dominican order, writing in Paris between 1310 and 1312, explicitly stated couples’ motive—"ne habeat plures filios (in order not to have more children)." In the Paradiso, poet Dante Alighieri, writing in north Italy between 1318 and 1321, lamented that Florentine homes had become "empty of family"
since couples had learned "what can be performed in the bedroom."

The population of western Europe had greatly expanded by the early 14th century. Resulting economic hardships may have spurred contraception's spread. As Peter de Palude wrote, the married man, through coitus interruptus, sought to avoid having children "quos nutrire non possit (whom he cannot feed)."

**PRESS & TELEVISION**

**Dusting Off Journalistic Virtues**


The virtues taught in journalism schools—fairness, detachment, skepticism—can be as damaging as censorship if they are exercised mechanically, contends Kirkhorn, a professor of journalism at the University of Kentucky.

Fairness must mean more than "the superficial balancing of unexamined opinions"; reporters and editors should be concerned with the larger matter of getting at, and publishing, the truth. Detachment must come only after involvement, observation, and understanding; it should not be a "premature distancing" in which a reporter moves just close enough to his subject to "scrape away a few pertinent facts." Skepticism, "an alertness to factual discord," is necessary, but full understanding of a subject requires imagination, too. Skepticism "will not embrace the life of a city or a farming town, it will not reveal the workings of a corporation or a terrorist cell, it will not explain to readers the value of... a discovery in cellular biology," says Kirkhorn. But imagination—"the constant search for connections"—will lead a reporter to the larger story.

American journalism rewards the merely skillful and those "who willingly accept the limitations on inquiry and understanding implied by the code of brevity, clarity, and directness of expression." But it neglects to nourish the imagination—without which there would not have been the great journalism exemplified by George Orwell in Homage to Catalonia (1938) or John Hersey in Hiroshima (1946) or Lillian Ross in Picture (1952).

Too often newspapers let sloth, fear of controversy, and ambitions for high circulation dictate their approach to news. A journalist who hopes to accomplish something more must play a waiting game—or he must take risks. To do the latter, says Kirkhorn, a reporter must have a "bedrock of identity," beyond concern for career. A serious journalist respects his audience. He speaks to his readers' responsibilities, not their imagined "needs" or frivolous "interests."
American reporters covering the civil war in Nicaragua during 1978–79 focused on the misdeeds of one side, the rightist government of strongman Anastasio Somoza Debayle. They saw the other side, the Sandinista National Liberation Front, through a “romantic haze.” So charges Christian, a Pulitzer Prize-winning Latin American correspondent for the Miami Herald, after scrutinizing 244 Washington Post stories, 239 New York Times stories, and 156 CBS broadcasts.

Intent on exposing the harsh rule of Somoza, says Christian, the American press failed to ask a fundamental question: What kind of government would succeed it? Reporters glossed over the Marxist ideology of key Sandinista commanders (in particular, Fidel Castro’s long-time friend, Tomas Borge, who now runs Nicaragua’s Interior Ministry and security police). Instead, they interviewed mainly anti-Somoza businessmen, labor leaders, politicians, and churchmen, who promised to work for a moderate government but were in no position to deliver one after Somoza’s fall. (Many of those moderates are now in...
exile.) And reporters failed to follow up on Somoza’s charges, subsequently confirmed, that rebels were getting arms first from Venezuela, then from Cuba.

It was not that the reporters were strangers to Nicaragua—most spoke Spanish, and some had worked in the tiny country before, says Christian. Nor were reporters intentionally misleading their readers. But they disliked Somoza, his blustery anti-communism, his corruption, and his brutal National Guard. And vivid stories about all these were close at hand. Stories about the rebels’ organization and ideology, on the other hand, were “complex to write and difficult to obtain,” observes Christian. U.S. reporters persuaded themselves that the Sandinista movement had been taken over by non-Marxist moderates (although, by and large, they were not the ones with the guns).

Most important, many American journalists were “on a guilt trip,” atoning for what they saw as the United States’ past mistakes in Nicaragua and its debacle in Vietnam. Jumping on the Sandinistas’ bandwagon, much of the press was all too willing to show how the United States, in backing Somoza, was wrong again.

Architect Bunker as Victim

“Stifle yourself, liberals!” That’s what real-life Archie Bunkers have reason to say in response to the famous, long-running TV series’ patronizing portrait of their situation.

From the first episode of All in the Family (now Archie Bunker’s Place) in 1971, controversy has swirled about the lovable bigot. Did televising Bunker’s racism, sexism, and other prejudices encourage viewers to come to grips with their own biases, or did it simply encourage bigotry? Archie’s creators and critics disagree. But what both ignore, contends Lasch, a University of Rochester historian, is that Archie Bunker has cause to be irritable. The white American working-class male has some legitimate grievances, because “the few gains that have been made in race relations, desegregation, and women’s rights” have usually come at his expense. In addition, Bunker has firm grounds for his dislike of liberals, who, by encouraging hedonism in the guise of “liberation,” seemingly have abandoned the sturdy, old-fashioned values he cherishes—marriage, family, hard work, responsibility.

The real-life Archie, says Lasch, “rightly regards himself as a forgotten man in a society increasingly dominated by the permissive, therapeutic morality of universal understanding. He sees himself, not without reason, as the victim of bureaucratic interference, welfracism, and sophisticated ridicule.”

Many viewers, as it turns out, identify with Archie without necessarily adopting all his opinions. But to members of the “new class” of young (under 35), affluent city-dwellers, the audience at which the
show has been aimed, Archie Bunker's world is the one they left behind—and on which they now want to look back and, for the most part, down. Having rejected the values of "middle America," the new class of liberals, says Lasch, "needs to repudiate its own roots, to exaggerate the distance it has traveled, and also to exaggerate the racism and bigotry of those lower down on the social scale. At the same time, it occasionally sheds a sentimental tear over the simpler life it thinks it has left behind."

Scholars View
Religious America

Over the past three decades, scholars have had difficulty deciding if America is becoming less—or more—religious. So writes Marty, a historian at the University of Chicago Divinity School.

During the 1950s and early ’60s, sociologists believed that industrial societies, in the long run, were bound to become increasingly secular. Many discounted the religious revival evident in public opinion polls as a superficial "search for identity" in religious institutions that were, at base, secular and modern. And the rest of "religious America" they regarded as marginal, "underclass" or ethnic.

Theologians in those years tended to agree. U.S. theologians developed theories of "secular theology," centered around such notions as "religionless Christianity" and "Christian atheism." Harvey Cox's celebration of The Secular City (1965) became a best seller.

Then, during the late ’60s, the secular tide in scholarship began to turn—as the adolescent children of journalists, professionals, and even sociologists embraced religious cults or the occult. Leaving The Secular City behind, theologian Cox wrote The Feast of Fools (1969), in which he celebrated the "magic, myth, mystery, and mysticism of religiousness."

By the ’70s, religion seemed to be everywhere. If the major traditional religious bodies were losing strength, the Fundamentalist, Pentecostal, and evangelical churches were thriving. With three successive American Presidents (Ford, Carter, Reagan) professing to be evangelical Christians, it is now secularity that seems marginal. How have scholars explained the change? Sociologist Robert N. Bellah has written about the diffusion of religion, arguing, Marty says, that religion has become "a private affair, its fate no longer tied to organizations."

Sociologist John Murray Cuddihy interprets evangelicalism as an "antidote" to growing cultural fragmentation. Among some scholars, broad definitions of religion have emerged that take in any way that people "transcend their mere biological nature."
"The new danger now," writes Marty, "is that the persistent secularity of American culture will be forgotten. The nation is as pluralistic as ever. In the university, the marketplace, or the legislature—America remains secular, with no single transcendant symbol to live by."

No Indifference in Poland

In an age when the Catholic Church faces growing indifference, especially in the world's urban and industrial precincts, the Polish Catholic Church stands out sharply. During the Solidarity sit-ins of 1980, for instance, one of the workers' demands was that Sunday mass be broadcast by government-run radio. Nowak, former director of Radio Free Europe's Polish Division, examines the Polish church's relations with its flock and with its government adversary.

Through the centuries, the Polish church has shared the Poles' sufferings—and so kept their allegiance. When the Poles rebelled against their tsarist occupiers in 1863, the Russians cut enrollments in Polish Catholic seminaries. During World War II, one out of every five priests and religious was executed by the Nazis or put in a concentration camp. Today, the number of priests is actually rising, and more than 93 percent of Poles are Catholic.

When the Communists came to power after World War II, the Polish church, led from 1948 to 1981 by Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, variously compromised, protested, and defied the state, in an effort to avoid the Communist takeover of church affairs that had occurred in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The regime first confiscated Catholic charities and put them in the hands of collaborationist "patriot priests." Then it began arresting "disloyal" priests. Wyszynski objected. But when the government insisted he sign an agreement not to oppose state policies such as collectivized agriculture, he signed. Finally, the regime went too far: In 1953, it claimed the right to make church appointments and met defiance. Wyszynski was arrested.

But Poland's Catholics ostracized the state's few collaborationist clerics. In August 1956, one million Poles on a religious pilgrimage demanded Wyszynski's release. Under pressure, the government freed the cardinal—a response that would make it very difficult to arrest him again. Thus strengthened, the church began to vigorously champion Poles' human rights—to study religion, to "live under more democratic conditions," to protest without fear.

Nowak thinks Pope John Paul II's 1979 visit to his native land marked a turning point. The millions who greeted him came away with "a marked sense of their own strength and their rulers' weakness." One year later, Solidarity was born. The church suddenly found itself in a mediating role between workers and state, a role that continues, even
RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

after Solidarity's suppression at the end of 1981.

But even as it speaks out against martial law, the Polish church, now led by Archbishop Jozef Glemp, strongly opposes all violence. Christ forgave his oppressors, Glemp observed in January 1982; "this is our Christian way, our difficult way."

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

The Future of Fusion

"Fusion Energy: Still an Elusive Target" by William Metz, in High Technology (Jan.-Feb. 1982), P.O. Box 2810, Boulder, Colo. 80322.

Despite talk of scientific "breakthroughs" and despite genuine progress, fusion power—energy produced by fusing nuclei of light atoms, such as hydrogen—is a long way from being a practical reality. Some difficult problems need to be solved first, says Metz, a Washington-based energy consultant.

Fusion, by contrast with fission, promises, in theory, to be a safe, clean, and inexhaustible source of energy. But scientists have been grappling for three decades with the physics involved in confining and heating two rarified gases (deuterium and tritium, both hydrogen isotopes) to temperatures hotter than the sun. "Inertial" and "magnetic" fusion have been the two main approaches.

In inertial fusion, a laser or particle beam is used to heat and compress a pellet of fuel until it detonates, the fuel's own inertia keeping it confined long enough for the reaction to take place. This process seems much less promising than it did during the 1960s and early '70s. But scientists at the University of California's Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, home of the 10-kilojoule "SHIVA" laser, have not given up hope and are planning a 300-kilojoule "NOVA" laser for the late '80s. Experts now predict, however, that a 1,000-kilojoule laser [1 kilojoule = 0.948 Btu] will be needed just to test the concept.

The currently favored approach is magnetic fusion, in which magnetic fields are used in complex configurations to keep the fuel confined. Significant advances have been made in recent years. In 1978, a small tokamak (a doughnut-shaped device invented by the Soviets) at Princeton University reached a temperature of 70 million degrees Celsius. This was still below the minimum 100 million degrees Celsius that would be needed for the reaction to produce more energy than it uses. A larger, $314-million Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor is now under construction at Princeton and is due to begin operating late this year. Other large tokamak projects are being built in Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan.

Researchers are sure that fusion's scientific feasibility will be demonstrated during this decade. But then comes the tough part: building a
A model of the Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor now under construction at Princeton. The $314 million reactor is designed to produce about 20 megawatts of fusion power.

Courtesy of the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory.

full-scale reactor. "Power engineers cringe," Metz notes, "at the thought of a [tokamak] reactor that switches its output from thousands of megawatts of thermal energy to zero many times a day; the thermal shock to reactor materials would be unprecedented." Moreover, in operation, the inner wall of a tokamak's reaction chamber would become highly radioactive and would often need to be replaced—using techniques that do not yet exist. Radioactive waste thus generated would require disposal. Accidents involving release of radioactivity would be possible.

"The environmental and safety advantages of fusion" over fission, concludes Metz, "are not automatic and will depend upon choices that have not yet been made."

Greek City
in Afghanistan

"An Ancient Greek City in Central Asia" by Paul Bernard, in Scientific American (Jan. 1982), P.O. Box 5969, New York, N.Y. 10017.

Scholars have long suspected that a Greek colonial state flourished in what is now Soviet Tadzhikistan and Afghanistan, in the second and third centuries B.C. But aside from some coins, no traces of the rumored "1,000 cities" of Hellenic Bactriana could be found. Now, in northwestern Afghanistan, close to the Soviet border, a French archaeological team reports it has unearthed the ruins of Ai Khanum, Bactriana's eastern capital under the Greeks.

The gymnasium, homes, and theater of this wealthy city reveal col-
onists who, more than 3,000 miles from home, remained deeply attached to their cultural heritage for 200 years, even after they quietly declared their independence circa 250 B.C. But the Greek settlers also acquired some habits from Eastern civilizations, as Bernard, leader of the French dig, explains.

Ai Khanum—perhaps founded by Alexander the Great (356-323 B.C.)—sits high above the juncture of two rivers, an ideal site for a military outpost. It is surrounded by a mud-brick wall 33 feet high and 20 to 27 feet thick. The city's grand palace, a complex of monumental administrative and residential buildings, covers more than 20 acres. There is nothing like it in Greece; the model for the plan was probably Persian, and the flat roofs are "characteristically Eastern." But columns in the classical styles—Doric, Ionic, Corinthian—abound. And the palace's occupants, true to Greek tradition, apparently read philosophy: A library yields fragments of a treatise of the Aristotelian school.

The city's 6,000-seat theater is essentially Greek. And carvings suggest that most plays were Greek. But in the middle of the audience section are three ostentatious seats of honor—virtually unheard of in the mother country.

In the arts, the colonists' tastes were "traditionally Greek, even to the point of perpetuating an outdated classical style," writes Bernard. Their sculptures are fine, but the "treatment is conventional." But, in religion, the settlers seem to have gone native. The official gods—those who appear on coins—are from the Greek pantheon; yet the city's three temples are Persian in design. And the relics they contain suggest rites more Oriental than Hellenic.

Less benign non-Hellenic forces also touched the city's inhabitants. About 145 B.C., northern nomads drove the Greeks out of Ai Khanum.

Machines that See


Can scientists create machines that duplicate human vision?

In a limited way, reports Hiatt, a University of Michigan science writer, they already have: Sensors can detect patterns of light and dark and relay the information to computers for interpretation. The auto industry employs such systems—"fleshed out" with steel arms and hands—as assembly-line workers to pick up parts on a conveyor and position them for later use. But these machines are easily overwhelmed: If parts arrive off-kilter, or if they are mixed up in a bin, the machines are stymied. A recent prototype, however, designed by researchers at the University of Rhode Island, tackles the "bin-of-parts" problem with remarkable 90 percent success.

But scientists are also working to move beyond such special-purpose visual processing to general-purpose computer vision—to machines
that really "see" (i.e., that can analyze and make complex decisions about unfamiliar objects).

One apparent requirement, regarded as a "key advance" toward computer vision, is "parallel" processing. Fifteen years ago, the goal was sequential data processing, "with each stage telling you what to look for next," as one computer scientist put it. By contrast, parallel processing starts with a network or grid containing a processor at each node. Writes Hiatt: "Elements in a grid trade off information, then pass a processed array of new information through further grids or layers of parallel processors . . . until a suitable level of representation or decision making is reached." Human vision probably works this way, but at speeds no machine can match. A rudimentary parallel processor is due to be completed at the University of Maryland later this year.

Meanwhile, at MIT, researchers are working on systems that will detect depth and make sense of motion. Their theory is that an object in motion is actually viewed by humans several times, quickly, which greatly enhances identification. (One possible application: traffic lights that adapt to the different time needs of a motorist or pedestrian when each appears in the line of sight.) "Human vision is the model we want to understand," as one scientist said, "because humans do it better than anything else."

*Science in Court?*

Scientific and technological controversies—from "right-to-die" cases to disputes over air pollution or nuclear power—increasingly fill the federal court calendars. Proposals have been made to help the beleaguered judges either by providing them with special advisers or training or by shifting some of their burden to a "science court." Such notions are misguided, say Jasanoff and Nelkin, a senior research associate and a sociologist, respectively, in Cornell's Program on Science, Technology and Society.

The basic issues involved in scientific and technological litigation are often not scientific at all, Jasanoff and Nelkin note, but may be moral or religious. Scientific advances raise questions of whether to permit *in vitro* fertilization or whether to prolong the life of a dying person, but science holds no answers.

In other cases, the fundamental issues are political. Balancing a nuclear power plant's risk to human health against its benefits to the community or the nation is essentially a matter of public policy. It is true that technical questions in such cases—e.g., what is a "safe" standard for human exposure to low-level radiation?—may not have undisputed answers. But the reason usually is that the evidence is inconclusive. Bringing in more experts would not make it less so.
Moreover, when a court reviews the decision of a federal regulatory agency, it need not determine the "right" answers to such questions, anyway—only "the substantive and procedural adequacy of the record" that supports the decision.

Giving the courts more expertise might help them somewhat to grapple with scientific and technological litigation, Jasanoff and Nelkin say. But it might also "divert attention from the public responsibility for major policy decisions and encourage the conversion of moral and political questions into technical debates among experts."


Roughly 200 million worn U.S. passenger-car tires end up in the throwaway bin each year. At a typical cost to dealers of $1 per tire, most of them are carted to already crowded landfills and buried. Often, the tires rise to the surface, where they pose fire hazards and provide homes for rats and mosquitoes. Is there a better way? Wolsky and Gaines, of the Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois, cite many uses for the discards, ranging from boiler fuel to paving roads. Once spurned as uneconomical, these applications deserve a second look in light of the energy price hikes of the 1970s.

It takes 47,000 Btulb of tire to produce a tire. The simplest way to use old tires is to burn them (getting 15,000 Btulb). Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. ran a furnace using unshredded tires for two years (in Jackson, Mich.) during the '70s. It met clean air standards for "coal-fired boilers." Then, the Michigan state government declared that the furnace was an "incinerator," subject to more stringent pollution regulations. The operation was shut down, but similar furnaces are in use abroad (notably in the United Kingdom).

Another option is to convert discarded tires into liquid fuel and chemical feedstock (recovering as much as 23,000 Btulb/lb.). A 700,000-tires-per-year conversion unit could gross $2.40 per tire (versus costs of $1.50 per tire), the authors calculate, but so far no U.S. company has built a commercial unit. A plant is being built in West Germany.

Old tires can also be recycled into new rubber products (for a fuel savings of 27,000 to 33,000 Btulb/lb.). But markets are limited, and the new steel-belted radials are hard to recycle. Tire manufacturers, in particular, are reluctant to use much reclaimed rubber because of the uncertain effect on tire quality.
By far the most promising application, say Wolsky and Gaines, is to take ground scrap or reclaimed rubber and mix it with asphalt. The result is a pavement that lasts up to three times longer than regular asphalt. This means big savings from decreased road maintenance—for a net energy savings of about 90,000 Btu/lb. This use could absorb all available discarded tires. However, the authors say, the method is unlikely to be widely adopted soon. The initial cost of reclaimed rubber is relatively high. And testing has just begun.

A Different ‘Energy Crisis’

The Soviet Union has begun to enter a special sort of ‘energy crisis’; it has the resources but lacks the modern technology to exploit them. With consumption increasing at home and in Eastern Europe, the long self-sufficient Soviets may soon have to get oil from the noncommunist world. China also has been plagued by backward technology (most of it supplied by the Soviets before the Sino-Soviet split); yet Chinese prospects for long-term energy independence are good.

The reason for the difference, says Meyerhoff, director of Associated Resource Consultants, lies not in disparities in natural resources but in China’s willingness to do business with Japan and the West.

Soviet coal production fell from 719 million metric tons in 1979 (when the United States produced 686) to 715 in 1980. By contrast, gas production has continued to increase—thanks to the huge gas pools of West Siberia. This gas is at such shallow depths as to be easily accessible using the nation’s outmoded drilling rigs. Soviet oil production began to stagnate during 1980 at just over 12 million barrels per day (the United States that year produced 10.2 million). Since the 1960s, more than half the Soviets’ oil has come from remote and inhospitable West Siberia, where the giant Samotlor field, discovered in 1965, is located. Production in the more convenient “old” fields has begun to decline. But many regions of the Soviet Union have yet to be tested; the land is “vastly underdrilled,” mainly because the Soviets’ technology is 12 to 35 years out of date. With Soviet equipment, it takes 90 to 400 days to drill an oil well 9,800 to 11,200 feet deep; in the United States, it takes only 34 to 45 days. A 16,400-foot Soviet well takes three to five years to drill, versus six months or less in the West.

While the Soviet Union, thanks to national pride and a lack of hard currency, has decided to “go it alone” in energy matters, China has openly turned to foreign loans and technology. As a result, the Chinese saw oil production soar in 1978 to more than two million barrels a day. And they have recently solicited bids from more than 40 oil companies (mostly American) for offshore exploration in the South China Sea.

If the West and Japan want to discourage Soviet military adventures...
and avoid strong Soviet competition for oil from OPEC, Mexico, and other noncommunist sources, Meyerhoff suggests, they should make it easier for the Soviets to get the advanced technology they need to solve their "energy crisis."

**The Paper Chase Slows Down**


America the Wasteful is the image, but the truth (or part of it) is that, relative to real GNP, the nation's consumption of such basic materials as steel, lumber, cement, and paper has been declining in recent years. (Chemicals have been an exception.)

A long-term shift to a service economy, new industry conservation practices, and the growth of many markets to "maturity" during the 1970s were key reasons for the decline, according to Ross and Purcell, of the Mellon Institute's Energy Productivity Center and the Technical Information Project, Washington, D.C., respectively. Citing the paper industry as an example, they show that economists' estimates of future industrial energy and raw material needs may be too gloomy.

Most macroeconomists, including those who produce the Federal Reserve Board's indices, estimate that domestic consumption of paper will rise at a faster rate than the GNP over the next two decades. But this prediction is based more on an economic than a physical measurement of materials used each year. Forecasters pay too little attention to basic pulp and paper production and too much to later, more labor-intensive "conversion" activities (such as coating, cutting, and packaging paper). The fact that less raw material and hence less energy now go into making each product is slighted. Moreover, these processed goods happen to be the industry's "strongest growth" items. Use of other paper products—including newsprint and packaging—has been declining relative to real GNP, thanks in part to competition from the electronic media and plastics. As a result, especially when anachronistic data from the cheap-energy era are thrown in, paper-consumption forecasts can be off by as much as two percent per year, a significant distortion when compounded over 20 years.

Such miscalculations, applied to other basic materials, say the authors, constitute "the single most important reason for very high estimates for the energy needs of industry at the turn of the century." The way to avoid error is to measure materials' consumption physically, by weight or volume. In the case of paper, the authors predict that domestic consumption, per real unit of GNP, will decline about one percent per year over the next two decades.
When Rip Van Winkle settled down for his long nap, he was the quintessential hen-pecked husband, and America was a tidy English colony. When he awoke 20 years later, on Election Day, Rip found his shrewish wife had died, and his peaceful, patriarchal village had been changed by America's independence into a confused and quarrelsome mob.

Rip's creator, Washington Irving (1783–1859), has seemed to many readers a divided author: glad that Rip had "got his neck out of the yoke of matrimony," yet distressed at the Americans who had "thrown off the yoke of Old England." But, argues Dawson, a doctoral student at the University of Missouri, Irving subtly portrayed Rip as a bit of a scoundrel and disapproved of his revolution, too.

Rip's ancestors, according to the tale's fictional historian, Diedrich Knickerbocker, were the same Van Winkles who "figured so gallantly in the chivalrous days of Peter Stuyvesant." Yet, in Irving's earlier History of New York from the Beginning of the World to the End of the Dutch Dynasty (published a decade before, in 1809), Knickerbocker labeled the Van Winkle family "potent suckers of eggs," "noted for running up scores at taverns." Moreover, Irving strongly implied that Knickerbocker's only source for Rip's tale was Rip himself, since the friends who had known him were gone when he returned. And Knicker-
bocker himself admitted that the old man was only "perfectly rational and consistent on every other point."

What sort of character was Rip? Irving’s numerous sexual images and puns suggest a rogue. Rip may have been a "great favourite among all the good wives of the village" because of his eagerness to attend to their "business." His pursuit of "his favourite sport of squirrel shooting" and his decision to rest in what Dawson describes as a "womb-like glen" were Irving’s way of saying that Rip ran off for a 20-year "frolick." But liberation’s consequences, Irving implied, were unhappy—as joyless as Hendrick Hudson’s bowling crew’s "melancholy party of pleasure." Cutting familial, communal, or national ties meant a loss of identity. "I can’t tell what’s my name, or who I am," cried a confused Rip, whose return may have been prompted partly by incapacity, his "gun" having grown rusty.

In "Rip Van Winkle," Dawson concludes, Irving was subtly trying to remind his readers of "the connection between liberty and libertine." Still, Rip’s life did end happily, as he settled back into the village without Dame Van Winkle. This, says Dawson, may reflect Irving’s growing affection for independent America, despite his fears.

Lost in the Dark

"The Great Dark," an unfinished manuscript by Mark Twain (1835–1910), has often been dismissed by critics as little more than the rantings of a despairing old man. But Wilson, a University of New Mexico doctoral student, contends that the moody tale reflects growing doubts about mankind’s possibilities, shared by other writers of the 19th century.

In the story, Henry Edwards and his daughters peer through a microscope at a drop of water; he shortly falls asleep and in a dream is transported with his family to a lost ship, sailing an uncharted ocean (the drop of water) under an always dark sky (most of the drop is outside the microscope’s "luminous circle"). He learns that his dream is reality and that his erstwhile reality was but a dream, and his Yankee curiosity turns to despair. The terrifying voyage continues; a giant squid attacks and then furiously stalks the ship. A mutiny threatens, and the captain pleads for reason and then for faith. Here the manuscript ends, but Twain’s notes take up the story: After various intrigues, Edwards’s infant son and the captain’s daughter are separated from their fathers and are aboard a second ship, which is hunted for 10 years and at last found in the region of the Great White Glare (the light shining from the microscope’s reflector through the slide). The children are long dead from the heat; those aboard the first ship also die from it. Edwards wakes up and is with his family again, as at the start.
When Mark Twain wrote this in 1898, he was 62 years old and sunk in gloom, his fortune gone and his beloved oldest daughter dead. But Wilson argues that Twain was not simply indulging his grief. Henry Edwards exemplifies the plight of 19th-century rational man lost in the irrational universe. Other similarly "lost" fictional characters include Arthur Pym in Edgar Allan Poe's Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym (1838) and Captain Ahab in Herman Melville's Moby Dick (1851)—all searchers after knowledge of the world.

In "The Great Dark," Mark Twain suggests the inability of reason to comprehend the universe. We humans, Henry Edwards somberly reflects, take great pride in our powerful "mental equipment," but, in lucid moments, "we see that intellectually we are no great things" and that "our best-built certainties are but sand-houses."

**Canvas Con Man**


Gilbert Stuart (1755–1828), the foremost American portrait painter of his day, was something of a con man. One of his victims, writes Meschutt, of the Frick Art Reference Library in New York, was Thomas Jefferson.

Jefferson sat for Stuart several times, the first in 1800 in Philadelphia when he was Vice President. He paid the artist $100 for an oil-on-canvas bust but never got it. In early 1805, Stuart wrote Jefferson that he was "not satisfied" with the painting, and Jefferson, then President, agreed to sit for him again, in Washington. Stuart did not tell Jefferson the real reason for his request: America’s new minister to Spain, James Bowdoin, had commissioned Stuart (who probably no longer had his 1800 Jefferson painting) to make a half-length portrait of the President. Stuart promised to send Jefferson the 1805 work after making an engraving of it.

But only after repeated attempts was Jefferson finally—in 1821—able to get what he took to be the 1805 portrait. Jefferson’s daughter, however, reportedly noticed that the paint was fresh when it arrived at Monticello. Historians since have had their doubts, too. The painting Jefferson received is on a mahogany or walnut panel, but Stuart did not begin using wooden panels regularly until 1807, when the Embargo Act cut off the supply of imported canvas. Moreover, the painting’s size (26 ¼ x 21 ¾ inches) and its impressionistic style link it not to Stuart’s Washington period but to his later years in Boston. The work Jefferson got was probably a late replica, hastily painted about 1821.

Stuart kept Jefferson’s $100, but, instead of giving him the 1805 portrait, Meschutt contends, he sold it to James Madison. (Selling a portrait to two different buyers was a bad habit of Stuart’s.) Later, the artist sent Jefferson the inferior version. Stylistically, Madison’s Jefferson is similar to portraits Stuart did of Madison and his wife in 1804;

*The Wilson Quarterly/Summer 1982*
the three works are roughly the same size (about 30 x 25 inches), and all are oil on canvas. Madison did not realize the painting had been first sold to Jefferson; Jefferson thought he had the original.

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**ARTS & LETTERS**

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**OTHER NATIONS**

*Argentina’s Ailments*

"The Argentine Pariah" by Charles Maechling, Jr., in *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1981/82), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

Argentina’s military leaders have promised a return to civilian rule in a few years, but the road back to constitutional government will be difficult, says Maechling, a Washington-based international lawyer. Three decades of "political chaos and economic mismanagement" and four years of urban terrorism and Army counterterror have brought chronic instability and conflict.

Early in this century, Argentina was the leader of Latin America. Today, it has skilled manpower and ample energy resources; its 28 million people enjoy the continent’s highest standard of living and literacy rate. But a drop in gross national product per capita has lowered Argentina’s world ranking from 15th to 37th. Inflation started to get out of control during the 1940s. The nation fell into “a banana republic cycle of domestic turmoil punctuated by military coups.”

A leader of one military junta, which took over in 1943, was Juan Perón. With his wife, Eva, he revolutionized Argentine politics by building a mass movement based on the grievances of the working class, the descamisados (shirtless ones). But Peronist social programs added immense fixed costs to an already shaky economy. Mounting inflation eroded savings and pensions, and, between 1955 and 1966, there were 448 strikes involving a total of more than four million workers.

By the early 1970s, labor-management strife had disrupted the economy. Marxist terrorists began an antigovernment campaign; the result was urban guerrilla warfare. A military coup in 1976 against the ineffectual regime of Perón’s second wife and widow, Isabel, had broad support, but the Army then launched a reign of counterterror; at least 6,000, and perhaps as many as 20,000, persons “disappeared.”

After the 1980 U.S. election, Argentina’s military rulers ended their repression and tried to destroy evidence of past atrocities. More civilian politicians were brought into the Cabinet; an end to the military regime was promised for 1984. But the Army, Maechling says, “faces the dilemma common to all military dictatorships—whether to hang on to power and perquisites at the risk of becoming the focus of the next wave of social and economic discontent or to relinquish them to the same forces that provoked the takeover in the first place.”

The “harsh, bloody and obscurantist regime” of Mao Zedong’s last years originated mainly in utopian notions. During the Great Leap Forward of the 1950s, Mao demanded unrealistically rapid economic development; during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, his aim was to transcend selfishness and create a new socialist man. So writes Schram, a professor of politics at the University of London. Yet, he adds, these were not the first, and should not be the last, grand visions in Chinese history.

Writing to a friend in the winter of 1920–21, Mao, then a junior member of the nascent Chinese Communist Party, portrayed the human race as divided into one billion “proletarians” and half as many “capitalists”—with the former on the verge of shattering their proverbial chains. And that was no more unrealistic than the early line taken by the party itself. At its First Congress in 1921, the party called for a purely working-class revolution—at a time when there were only a million and a half industrial workers in China.

Later in that decade, when the Kremlin played mentor to the Chinese party, Stalin vastly underestimated the peasantry’s potential; he imagined that the Chinese revolution need only triumph in a few cities, as happened in Russia when the Bolsheviks seized power in Moscow and Petrograd. Stalin’s dream turned into a nightmare with the unsuccessful Communist insurrection in Canton (Guangzhou) in December 1927. During the ensuing years, the strategy of Mao and his colleagues took
shape: Let the peasants, instead of the workers, act as the revolutionary vanguard, and proceed by "encircling the cities from the countryside."
The heretical vision worked. But Mao's "realistic utopianism" turned into fantasy with the Great Leap Forward, which produced not abundance but hunger.
Yet, Schram argues, any effective national movement must have a vision of what should be. And new goals are under discussion in China today: "democracy" (variously defined) and "modernization." What China needs, he says, is a "new, realistic utopia...to replace the failed utopias of the past."

Ethnic Tensions in Belgium

Ethnic conflicts that long have dominated Belgium's politics remain essentially unresolved, despite the latest plans to bring peace. Differences between Dutch-speaking and French-speaking Belgians have fragmented the major political parties, caused Cabinets to fall, and led to a partition of the state apparatus.

Ethnic tensions in Belgium revived after World War II, as Flemish politicians realized that they belonged to an ethnic majority that lacked the political power of the Francophone minority. They demanded a new deal and met opposition. Although the conflict has since involved mass demonstrations, it has been largely stirred and perpetuated by ethnic activists and rising politicians, says Covell, a political scientist at Simon Fraser University, British Columbia. Most ordinary Belgians, polls indicate, are more interested in economic issues.

During the early 1960s, the Parliament's old guard politicians tried to settle the conflict by passing a series of language laws. Dutch was made the official language of Flanders (pop.: 5,477,700), French the official language of Wallonia (3,117,200); Brussels (1,069,000), the largely French-speaking capital of the mostly Dutch-speaking nation, was left bilingual. Schooling in all three regions was affected.

The language laws, however, made things worse; efforts to implement them enabled ambitious ethnic politicians to keep fanning the flames. A 1968 dispute over expansion of the Francophone section of the University of Louvain split the nation's two largest parties, the Social-Christians and the Socialists, into Flemish and Walloon groupings.

Revisions of the constitution were made in 1969–70 in an effort to keep Belgian politics from polarizing further. Four linguistic regions and three autonomous cultural councils were established, and the division of Belgium into three economic regions (Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels) was vaguely outlined. It took another decade—during which ethnic conflict did not abate and six governments fell—for the politi-
cians to agree on the specifics of "regionalization." And they were able to do so only by excluding Brussels from the plan.

Today, the plan is being only gradually implemented, and most policymaking power still remains with the central government; hence, says Covell, although there is relative quiet for the moment, the "regionalization" debate—and ethnic discord—are likely to continue.

Did French Reds Resist Nazis?

Immediately after the fall of France in June 1940, did the French Communist Party (PCF) resist the Nazi occupiers—as party historians boast—or collaborate with them, as others have charged? Simmonds, a senior lecturer in European history at Cambridgeshire College of Arts and Technology, weighs the evidence.

On June 22, 1941, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union, France's Communists issued a clear, unwavering summons to arms; they waged a valiant guerrilla resistance against the Nazis thereafter. But their conduct before that date has been criticized.

After France declared war on Germany (September 3, 1939), French Communists served in their country's army, despite their party's praise of Stalin's separate peace with Hitler. But with the banning of the PCF by Prime Minister Edouard Daladier on September 26, 1939, the party's anti-war tone became more strident. Charges that the war was a capitalist-imperialist ploy, another opportunity for the rich to milk the poor, intensified when members perceived that Daladier was more interested in persecuting Communists than in prosecuting the war.

After the fall of France, the record is confusing. The party denounced Vichy, the government of the Third Republic, British imperialism, and London capitalists even as it called for fraternization with the ordinary German soldier ("within the framework of international working-class solidarity"). Party members, writes Simmonds, "like other Frenchmen, first sought someone to blame and only then began to think about the future." Some Communists did resist, especially in the provinces; but sometimes—as in a miners' strike in May 1941—they met criticism from PCF leaders. Meanwhile, the party clearly saw a chance to shed its outlaw status and rejoin the world of French politics. PCF leaders petitioned the Nazis to allow them to publish their journals, hoping that the 1939 German-Soviet pact would argue in their favor. They also called for a neutralist popular government to replace Vichy.

Despite Charles de Gaulle's radio broadcasts from London, there was little organized resistance in France during that early period, writes Simmonds. The Communists, he concludes, contested the German occupation then as much as any other group did. Their struggle to keep their party alive made possible their strong response after June 1941.
"The Science Race: Training and Utilization of Scientists and Engineers, US and USSR."

SRI International, 1161 North Kent St., Arlington, Va. 22209. 280 pp. $22.50. Authors: Catherine P. Ailes and Francis W. Rushing.

The Soviet Union's startling success in launching its Sputnik satellite in 1957 spurred the United States to invest heavily in education and research in the sciences. But American fears of technological inferiority gradually faded, especially after the Apollo landing on the moon in 1969, and the U.S. science effort slackened. Moscow, meanwhile, steadily continued its scientific advance and today threatens to open a real technology gap with the United States.

America still enjoys several advantages over the Soviets. It spends more on education (7.3 percent of GNP versus 5.3 percent in the Soviet Union in 1977), has more four-year college graduates (15.4 percent of the population versus 6.7 percent with equivalent degrees in the Soviet Union), and has a more educated population, on average.

But Ailes and Rushing, senior science policy analyst and senior economist, respectively, at SRI Interna-

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STATISTICS: U.S. BACHELOR’S DEGREES AND EQUIVALENT SOVIET DIPLOMAS AWARDED, BY SPECIALTY, IN 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specialty</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>USSR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical &amp; Life Sciences &amp; Mathematics</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td></td>
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Courtesy: Credit, Russak and Company, Inc.
tional, write that Soviet education is far more heavily oriented toward scientific and technical training.

The Soviet emphasis on science education begins early. Biology instruction commences in the fifth grade, physics in the sixth grade, and chemistry in the seventh. American students take up such courses later and for shorter periods of time—56 percent of all American students in grades nine through 12 took no science courses at all in 1973. Soviet science students at the college level also receive more intensive training. They spend from one-and-a-half to two times as many hours in class as their American peers do.

On the other hand, the United States has far more college students (10 million versus the Soviets' five million in 1978) and graduates about twice as many specialists in the physical and life sciences and mathematics. The Soviets, however, produce six times more engineers. At the graduate level, about 75 percent of Soviet students are enrolled in engineering or scientific fields, as compared to only 20 percent in the United States (down from 30 percent in 1960).

The result: Although in 1950 the two countries had equal numbers of engineers, by 1974 the Soviet Union had a threefold advantage. Meanwhile, the American lead in natural scientists dropped from 2:1 to 1.5:1.

The Soviets face several disadvantages in scientific competition. The training their scientists get is so narrowly specialized that it poorly equips them to master new knowledge or cope with technological advance. In addition, the Soviets misuse the talents of many of their scientists and engineers, thanks to bad planning and an inefficient system.

The United States, say the authors, does not suffer from those constraints. Its handicap is "the failure of the leadership... to grasp the necessity for a stated national policy for development of scientific and engineering manpower." Needed: school curricula revisions to strengthen mathematics and science instruction, more mathematics and science teachers, and more spending on scientific research.

"Marijuana and Health: Report of a Study by a Committee of the Institute of Medicine, Division of Health Sciences Policy."


"What little we know for certain about marijuana's effects on human health—and all that we have reason to suspect—justifies serious national concern."

That—despite some optimistic press accounts that have emphasized scientists' uncertainties—is the major conclusion reached by a committee of the National Academy of Science's Institute of Medicine after surveying the existing research on marijuana.

Marijuana's well-known short-term effects are themselves cause for alarm. Normal "social" doses of marijuana impair judgment, coordination, and motor skills; the drug may rival drinking as a hazard when an individual is driving.

But research also shows that, for hours after the initial "high," marijuana impairs short-term memory and causes a distorted sense of time. The drug makes coherent thought and learning difficult. These effects wear off, but they may represent lasting, if indirect, damage to those high school students who are intoxicated during...
school. (Close to 400,000 seniors use marijuana daily.)

Marijuana can cause unpleasant sensations, even among regular users; 33 percent of them, one study found, at times experienced "acute panic, paranoid reaction, hallucinations, and unpleasant distortions in body image." Extremely heavy users run the risk of "acute brain syndrome," in which clouded consciousness and disorientation may persist for days. Clinicians have long noted the "amotivational syndrome" in heavy users. Symptoms include apathy and a decline in school or work performance. Scientists do not know whether marijuana causes this condition or whether it merely satisfies and aggravates a pre-existing inclination. Nor can they say whether marijuana causes any permanent psychological changes.

Prolonged use of marijuana leads to inflammation of the lungs and airways, but when use ceases, the process is reversed. Marijuana smoke is similar in many ways to tobacco smoke—and so it is likely that, inhaled over a period of 20 years or more, it too causes cancer of the respiratory system.

Marijuana may reduce male fertility and alter levels of reproductive hormones in females; its active ingredients may pass from a pregnant woman to her fetus; it may affect chromosome segregation during cell division; it may suppress the body's immune system, which provides protection against infection. Not all those effects are known to be harmful. Indeed, whether they are, in fact, effects of marijuana is unclear from available evidence. But given the drug's widespread use and its effects that are documented, there seems to be reason for worry.

"Cuba in Africa."

Center for Latin American Studies, University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 4E04 Forbes Quadrangle, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15260. 230 pp. $5.95.
Editors: Carmelo Mesa-Lago and June S. Belkin.

During the late 1970s, Cuba, a small, Caribbean nation plagued by economic problems, dispatched upwards of 40,000 troops to fight in two African wars, in Angola and in Ethiopia. Why, and at what cost?

Mesa-Lago, director of the University of Pittsburgh's Center for Latin American Studies, along with Harvard's Jorge I. Dominguez and 11 other specialists on Cuba and Africa, offer some answers.

The view that Cuba acted as a "puppet" of the Soviet Union is, the specialists agree, an oversimplification. Fidel Castro's Cuba is heavily dependent on the Soviet Union but still has some discretion in foreign policy—at least in places of only marginal interest to the Soviets, such as Angola. In fact, Cuba may have drawn the Soviets more deeply into Angola than otherwise would have been the case; in Ethiopia, however, Moscow may have pushed for heavy Cuban involvement.

No clear consensus emerges, however, about the Cubans' motives. Did they hope primarily to advance the socialist cause, as one specialist insists? Or did they, as another argues, act out of self-interest, hoping to increase their influence in the Third World and their leverage with the Soviets?

During the 1970s, the perceived U.S. threat to Cuba's security diminished,
leaving the Castro regime freer to act with vigor abroad. But deployment of Cuban troops in Latin America would have risked confrontation with the United States and put the Soviets in a difficult position. Giving aid to "progressive" forces and governments in Africa was, in that sense, safer.

From the mid-'60s to the mid-'70s, Cuba provided arms and training to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), one of three rival nationalist factions. When South African troops intervened in October 1975, the desperate MPLA asked for Cuban soldiers—and got between 18,000 and 24,000 of them, transported, when necessary, by Soviet aircraft. By playing David to South Africa's Goliath, Cuba won increased prestige among African and "non-aligned" nations—and so became a more valuable Soviet ally. That gained Cuba more Soviet aid. And, in an MPLA-run Angola, Cuba secured a potential source of oil, should Soviet deliveries be reduced.

Unlike Angola, the Horn of Africa was strategically important to the Soviets. The coast of Eritrea, an Ethiopian "annexed colony," faces the southern strait of the Red Sea, part of the key waterway linking the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

During 1976–77, after the 1974 overthrow of its pro-Western emperor, Haile Selassie, Ethiopia shifted into the Soviet camp. This dismayed its neighbor, Somalia, whose "Marxist-Leninist" government had received Soviet and Cuban aid. Soviet-Cuban efforts to mediate the resulting Ethiopian-Somali conflict failed, and Soviet and Cuban aid to Ethiopia increased. During the early months of 1978, some 17,000 Cuban troops arrived, in Soviet transports. Soviet advisers played a key role in the successful campaign to drive the Somalis back over the Ethiopian border.

Cuba's services in Ethiopia reinforced its "privileged relationship" with the Soviets; by the end of 1978, Moscow was underwriting the Cuban economy at an annual rate of over $2.5 billion compared to the average rate of $550 million during the early '70s.

Yet Ethiopia was not the diplomatic "plus" for Cuba that Angola may have been. Siding with the repressive Ethiopian regime required Cuba to abandon not only Somalia but also the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, which Cuba had aided when it was fighting Haile Selassie. That revived suspicions among non-aligned nations about Cuba's motives.

Finally, the domestic costs of Cuba's overseas exploits have been high, quite aside from the (unknown) Cuban casualty figures. Between 1973 and 1978, Cuba's announced (and understated) military budget went from 400 million pesos to 784 million ($1 = 0.80 pesos). The adverse impact on the Cuban economy was "heavy and extensive," and probably not offset by Soviet aid. One additional cost was the postponement of "normalization" of U.S.-Cuban relations, with its attendant benefits, notably an end to the U.S. economic boycott of the Castro regime.

Roughly 19,000 Cuban soldiers are still in Angola; another 17,000 in Ethiopia.

The six contributors to this report who offer any predictions, Mesa-Lago notes, agree that Cuba's involvement in Africa during the 1980s "will be significantly smaller or less spectacular than it was in the 1970s."

The Wilson Quarterly/Summer 1982
43
A frequent Canadian theme: Man dwarfed by nature. This view of the forests of British Columbia was sketched in 1882 by the province's Governor-General, the Marquis of Lorne.

Public Archives of Canada.
Americans have many things in common: Washington's Birthday sales, summer reruns, FICA, the Goodyear blimp, to name only a few. Canadians, it is sometimes said, have in common only a map. Still, it is a very large map. And lately, it has been appearing in the news. Canada and Great Britain severed their last formal constitutional links in March 1982. Ottawa has taken steps to curb U.S. economic and cultural “imperialism.” Quebec separatists have edged closer to secession. Oil-rich Alberta is resisting Ottawa’s move to tighten up the world’s loosest federal system. Considering everything above the 49th parallel to be like everything below it, most Americans pay little attention to their neighbor “upstairs.” Yet Canada is a very different place, with very different preoccupations, and it lacks the luxury of being able to ignore its neighbor. Here, Kristin Shannon and Peter Regenstreif review the past decade’s tumult up north. Robin Winks looks at the Canadian character—if, he muses, there is such a thing.

HANGING TOGETHER

by Kristin Shannon and Peter Regenstreif

“Some countries have too much history,” Prime Minister Mackenzie King once said; “Canada has too much geography.”

The intense cold and forbidding landscape of northern Canada—thick forests, mountains, frozen tundra—have discouraged settlement ever since the first permanent colonists, led by Samuel Champlain, stepped ashore in New Brunswick in 1604. Even the Vikings, visiting Newfoundland some 600 years earlier, found ice-bound Greenland more congenial than “Vinland.” Today, three-fourths of Canada’s people live and work where it is warmest, within 100 miles of the U.S. border.

Human beings are rare in much of Canada. The nation is second only to the Soviet Union in land area, encompassing more than 3.8 million square miles, but, with only 24 million
people, its population density is less than that of arid Saudi Arabia. English poet Patrick Anderson once called Canada

America's attic, an empty room
a something possible, a chance, a dance
that is not danced.

Isolation, reinforced by ethnic differences, has bred distinct regional cultures in Canada. The country, it is often said, is a "mosaic," not a "melting pot." Descendants of the original French colonists dominate the province of Quebec. But Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island—these are bastions of the descendants of early English and Scottish settlers. Further west, Ukrainian and German communities dot the landscape. The result is strong local allegiances.

In 1907, Canadian nationalist Henri Bourassa lamented: "There is Ontario patriotism, Quebec patriotism, or Western patriotism, each based on the hope that it may swallow up the others, but there is no Canadian patriotism."

Optimists, especially provincial politicians, extol Canada's "unity without uniformity." But regional economic and cultural differences have, since the early 1970s, become increasingly troublesome. Canada's constitution leaves many responsibilities in the hands of its 10 provincial governments, and their leaders have been feuding bitterly with the national government in Ottawa and among themselves over the division of governmental powers. In French-speaking Quebec, a powerful movement has been pressing since the early '60s for independence of some sort from the rest of Canada.

Owing partly to these domestic difficulties, Canadians are becoming increasingly unhappy over the influence of their southern neighbor. In 1974, Parliament established a "takeover tribunal," the Foreign Investment Review Agency, whose approval is needed for new investments or purchases of Canadian corporations by foreigners (Americans, for the most part). In 1975, Parliament barred Canadian companies from taking tax deductions for advertising in media—print, television, radio—

Kristin Shannon, 35, is chairman of the board of Trans-Canada Social Policy Research Ltd., based in Montreal, and is the publisher and editor of Canadian Trend Report. Peter Regenstreif, 46, is professor of political science and Canadian studies at the University of Rochester. Born in Montreal, he received a B.A. from McGill University (1957) and a Ph.D. from Cornell (1963). He writes a newspaper column syndicated in Canada and is the author of The Diefenbaker Interlude: Parties and Voting in Canada (1965).
with less than 75 percent Canadian ownership and content. One result: "affirmative action" for Canadian rock musicians as top-40 radio stations scrambled to meet the new content rules.

To most Americans, all of this comes as something of a surprise. As recently as 1970, University of Minnesota historian William Kilbourn described Canada as the "peaceable kingdom." But a few years later, peace gave way to confrontation. American businessmen were astonished to find themselves suddenly regarded as representatives of "foreign" interests, as though they were Arab sheiks. American tuna boats were seized off Vancouver Island for fishing within the expansive 200-mile territorial limit claimed by Ottawa. Militant separatism, chronic political squabbling, and sporadic outbreaks of terrorism within Canada all added to the impression abroad that Canada was no longer the gray Good Neighbor it once seemed.

**Five Canadas or One?**

In truth, Canada is showing the strains partly imposed by sheer geography. In addition to the vast but nearly uninhabited Yukon and Northwest Territories (both governed directly by Ottawa), there are five distinct Canadas inside Canada:

¶ British Columbia, like the American Northwest, enjoys a relatively mild climate and is rich in natural resources—lumber, fish, copper, and zinc. Cut off from the rest of the country by the Canadian Rockies, and with a California-style ambience, the province tends to look south to the United States and across the Pacific to Japan and other Asian customers whose ships dock at the port of Vancouver, Canada's third largest city.

¶ The Prairie "breadbasket" provinces—Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba—produce more wheat each year than 10 South Dakotas, making Canada the world's No. 2 grain exporter. Germans, East Europeans, and Ukrainians (refugees from another breadbasket) and other relatively recent immigrants make up about one-quarter of the population here. Alberta, enjoying a Texas-style economic boom led by petroleum (the province contains 85 percent of Canada's proven oil and gas reserves), has been one of the chief obstacles to Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau's attempt to gather more power in Ottawa's hands.²

² Canada must still import about 25 percent of the oil it needs annually, but it also exports relatively small amounts of oil and gas to the United States. The Northwest Territories and the Yukon are thought to contain vast hydrocarbon deposits, and Alberta's virtually untapped Athabasca "tar sands" could yield between 650 billion and 1.3 trillion barrels of oil. (Saudi Arabia, by comparison, possesses proven reserves of 200 billion barrels.) Development of the "tar sands" has been slowed by high costs and technical problems; only one small processing plant is in operation.
Ontario, the most ethnically diverse province, is the nation's commercial and industrial heartland. It contains Ottawa, the placid capital, and Toronto, Canada's financial center and, with almost three million people, its biggest city and home of the world's tallest structure, the 1,821-foot-tall CN Tower. To the American Midwest, it sells autos, auto parts, and other manufactured goods, mostly produced by U.S.-owned companies.

To the east of Ontario lies the province of Quebec, the heart of Francophone Canada (80 percent of its citizens are of French descent). Quebec's economy is based on mining, forestry, and light manufacturing—e.g., clothing, furniture, and newsprint for U.S. newspapers. All of these industries are in decline because of the worldwide economic slump and brisk competition from the Third World, where labor is cheap. The bright spot: Quebec's flourishing hydroelectric industry, centered on James Bay, which will export electricity worth about $120 million annually to the United States during the 1980s, equivalent to 15 percent of New York City's electric bill.

On the rugged east coast lies a fifth Canada, the Atlantic

Who's in charge? Prime Minister Trudeau fiddles as provincial Premiers conduct. Quebec's Premier, René Lévesque, is front row, second from left.
provinces—New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island—dominated by the descendants of early British, particularly Scottish, settlers. Dependent chiefly upon fishing and forestry, the Atlantic provinces have long been Canada’s economic poorhouse. Brightening their prospects is the recent discovery of offshore fields of oil and gas near Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.

** Strikes, Separatism, and Taxes**

Despite diversification and an abundance of oil and gas, Canada’s $274 billion economy is in the doldrums. The lingering effects of the 1973–74 and 1979 OPEC price hikes, tight money, and high interest rates account for much of the problem. Unemployment reached 8.6 percent in 1981, inflation 12.5 percent, uncannily similar to the corresponding indices south of the border. The Canadian economy is (and always has been) heavily dependent upon exports, which amount to 25 percent of gross national product, and the United States is its chief customer. When the United States catches cold, Canada sneezes.*

Thanks in part to high tariffs that long shielded Canadian industry from foreign competition, Canada’s labor productivity is about 20 percent lower than that of the United States, adding to the price of Canadian products. Productivity growth has been hampered by strikes. Canada loses more working days (782 per 1,000 employees) due to strikes each year than any other country in the world except Italy. One reason: Canadian trade unions, particularly in Quebec, are highly politicized. In Canada, writes Toronto journalist F. S. Manor, “strikes [become] battles in a class war.”

In general, the West, paced by Alberta, has fared better than the East, deepening rifts between “have” and “have-not” provinces. Ottawa’s attempts to remedy some of the inequality via taxation—encroaching thereby on traditional provincial prerogatives—have stirred further animosity. A new Western separatist party won its first seat in the Alberta legislature in February 1982.

Underlying all of these controversies is one question: Must Canada remain a loose collection of 10 provinces, or can it become a genuine political community?

Canada’s form of government was laid out by Great Britain

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*The export problem has been eased somewhat by the decline of the Canadian dollar, which has been worth between 81¢ and 83¢ (U.S.) since 1979, down from about 90¢ in 1974. This makes Canadian exports cheaper. It also makes imports more expensive. The United States buys 73 percent of Canada’s exports and provides an equal proportion of its imports.
in the British North America (BNA) Act of 1867. This act gave Canada partial independence and today serves as its constitutional foundation. The act established a "Westminster" parliamentary system modeled after Britain's, with a popularly elected House of Commons and a largely ceremonial (and appointed) Senate, analogous to the House of Lords. At the same time, the BNA Act also established a federal system; it granted each province many more powers than the U.S. Constitution gives to the states. For instance, the provinces, each with its own legislature and laws, have responsibility for public health, education, and welfare—responsibilities that did not loom large in 1867. Yet the BNA Act also left all powers not specifically granted to the provinces in the hands of the federal government, leaving room for shifts in the balance of power.

**Dividing the Spoils**

During the Great Depression and, later, during World War II, Ottawa's power grew as Parliament tried to cope with new crises. Later, the absence of any immediate external threat and the widespread prosperity that began during the 1950s seemed to reduce the need for strong federal leadership. The provincial governments took on more functions in such areas as labor relations, economic policy, the environment. They built bureaucracies and local constituencies that undercut Ottawa. Today, polls show that more than half (56 percent) of Canada's people identify more closely with their province than with the country as a whole. Only Ontarians tend to look to Ottawa's leadership, and then only by a narrow margin.

By the end of the 1970s, the fault lines in the Canadian federal system were becoming increasingly apparent. With the help of the Supreme Court, Americans had sorted out most of their "states' rights" versus "federal powers" issues during the 19th century. By contrast, Canadian Trend Report studies showed that Canadian politicians in 1980 were hotly debating some 70 jurisdictional disputes.

Chief among these, as noted, was the question of taxes. The issue: Who would have the right to tax what? Ottawa, for instance, wanted to increase its levies on oil and gas production, mostly at the expense of the producing provinces. At stake were some $212 billion in total tax revenues expected by 1986, and

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*Canada became a constitutional monarchy under Great Britain, but the mother country retained crucial powers, especially in foreign affairs. These powers have been ceded to Canada in stages since the turn of the century. The last of them, the formal power to amend the Constitution, was ceded this year.*
the Constitution offered no clear guide to division of the spoils.

Some of the less monumental inter-provincial disputes illustrated the extent of the problem. Could Quebec bar Ontario's eggs from its markets? Could Ontario, in retaliation, restrict sales of Quebec's chickens in its markets? Such ques-
tions rarely arise in the United States, because the U.S. Constitution was designed in part to resolve just such ambiguities that had caused problems under the earlier Articles of Confederation. But, in Canada, each province has scores of rules that constrain the inter-provincial movement of people, goods, services, and capital.

The dilemma of modern Canada is reflected in the situation of its dominant political party, the Liberals. Headed for 15 years by Pierre Elliott Trudeau, the Liberals have held power in Ottawa for 74 of the last 86 years. They have been in charge since 1963 (except for an aberrant nine-month interlude in 1979–80). The Liberals, in other words, are the “natural” governing party of Canada. But, in recent years, Quebec separatism and the disputes over energy policy and the division of powers have worn away the “Liberal consensus” that long gave the country a sense of direction.

Phase One

Trudeau, an advocate of a more centralized regime, first became Prime Minister in 1968, propelled into office by “Trudeaumania,” a wave of enthusiasm for the Kennedyesque Justice Minister. Trudeau was not only young (he was then 48) but also, as Henry Kissinger described him, “elegant, brilliant, enigmatic, intellectual.” The Liberals suffered a defeat in the 1979 election thanks mostly to the country’s sagging economy, but Trudeau was returned to power the next year when Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Joe Clark’s government fell. (Clark’s proposal to sell off the government-owned oil company, PetroCan, and to impose an 18¢-per-gallon tax on gasoline caused a popular uproar and was rejected by Parliament.) But with only 44 percent of the votes, Trudeau and his party had no clear mandate.

By 1980, the Liberals’ strength—and that of their foes—had become highly regionalized. The Liberal Party held all but one of Quebec’s 75 seats in the House of Commons and 51 out of Ontario’s 95. But out in the rich, booming West, it reaped only two of 80 seats. There, the socialist New Democratic Party (NDP) and the Progressive Conservatives predominated. At the provincial level, the Liberals lost control of all 10 governments. The NDP, with its nationalistic program calling for greater federal intervention in the economy, was making inroads in tradi-

The Liberals did gain a majority in Parliament by coming out on top in winner-take-all contests. They hold 147 seats to the Progressive Conservatives’ 103, and the New Democratic Party’s 32.
Canada

CHURCH, HOCKEY, AND THE BLUE JAYS

An American visiting Canada notices several things immediately. Road signs give distances in kilometers. Gas is sold by the liter and is a few pennies cheaper than it is in the United States. Cross from Vermont into Quebec, and the road signs are in French, while the houses change colors: New England reds and whites on one side of the border; pastels on the other.

About 10,000 Americans emigrate to Canada every year. Their lives change in ways large and small. Of course, it is colder, and, as the U.S. State Department advises its personnel posted there, clothing is more expensive. To judge by the statistics, the new Canadian will learn to drink more hard liquor (2.19 gallons annually) and less beer (22.9 gallons) than before. The newcomer’s chances of taking a turn in a snowmobile will increase enormously—one of every eight Canadians uses one—and his chances of getting divorced will be cut almost in half. About 25 percent of all Canadian marriages end in divorce. He cannot expect to live longer, but his chances of being murdered will be only a quarter of what they are south of the border. If caught, his murderer will not face the death penalty, but he can be tried on evidence illegally obtained.

Apart from the weather, daily life is not extraordinarily different in much of Canada. Children pledge allegiance to the Queen (instead of the flag) every morning at school and may well recite a prayer, but they pass through 12 grades, as in the United States. They will get a day off in May to celebrate Victoria Day; Thanksgiving, which falls on the second Monday in October instead of the fourth Thursday in November, may seem a bit early. Only about a quarter of high school graduates will go on to college, half the U.S. proportion. On Sundays, most Canadians take their children to church, if only because there is not much else to do. Even the oil boom town of Calgary shuts down on the Christian Sabbath.

Neither is the workaday world much different. Bankers, bureaucrats, and tool and die makers are far more common than loggers. Income taxes (provincial and federal) are high, amounting roughly to what an average New York State resident would pay to Albany and Washington. But government benefits are usually more generous in Canada. All families with children are eligible for a monthly family allowance of $18.65 per child (1980). Everyone is covered by mandatory medical and hospitalization insurance: In some provinces, one need never pay a medical bill.

Hockey is the Canadian national sport, and the transplanted American would be well advised to cultivate a taste for curling and skiing. But he need not abandon the American national pastime: Canada has two professional baseball teams, the Toronto Blue Jays and the Montreal Expos. In French-speaking Montreal, of course, the fans sound a little different. When the Expos come up to bat, one prays for a circuit (home run) and curses every retrait (out).
Prosperity varies from province to province, but on average, Canadians do not lag far behind Americans. Canada’s economy moves in tandem with that of the United States, sharing its ups and downs, its air pollution, even its unemployment rates. “Living next to you is like sleeping with an elephant,” Pierre Trudeau once told President Nixon. Canadian industry has been especially hard-hit by chronic recession south of the border. The Canadian Science Council warned in 1979 that the country was moving “away from an industrialized economy back to one based on the export of raw materials”—timber, ores, grain, gas, and oil. The council charged that U.S.-based multinationals had deprived Canada of 200,000 skilled jobs by locating assembly plants in Canada while keeping research and management operations in the United States. Ottawa’s solution: a $1 billion program to aid domestic high-technology industries (e.g., aerospace, electronics, medical equipment) and new laws curbing foreign investment. Results are not yet in. Predictably, foreign investment has fallen off—a mixed blessing.

### ECONOMIC CONTRASTS

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tional Liberal urban strongholds in Ontario. It controlled the provincial government in Saskatchewan and was the official "opposition" (No. 2) party in Manitoba and British Columbia.

After the February 1980 election brought Trudeau back to power, Liberal strategists assessed the vote and decided they would have to move quickly to reassert their presence countrywide. Their plan: shift leftward (to head off the New Democrats) and establish a firmer constitutional basis for the stronger role that they needed Ottawa to play in order to enact Liberal policies. But before Trudeau and the Liberals could take any action at the federal level, they had to deal with the approaching referendum on the status of Quebec. A May 1980 vote was scheduled in the province. The issue: Should Quebec, for all practical purposes, secede from Canada? Countering secession became Trudeau's Phase One campaign. Trudeau, himself a Quebec native, told an audience: "It takes more courage to stay in Canada and fight it out, than to withdraw into our walls."

Surviving by Habit

Quebec's position within Canada has always been unique. Much of present-day Canada was French territory until 1759, during what Americans call the French and Indian War. In September of that year, a British army under General James Wolfe defeated an outnumbered French force under the Marquis de Montcalm on the Plains of Abraham, just above Quebec City. In a 1763 treaty, King Louis XV formally ceded much of New France to King George III except part of Newfoundland (later sold to Britain) and two tiny islands, St. Pierre and Miquelon, that today are departments of metropolitan France. But under the 1774 Quebec Act, London granted French-speaking, Catholic Quebec substantial political and religious autonomy.

Quebec remained relatively quiescent for nearly 200 years. That began to change when Canada, like the United States, experienced a boom in industrialization and urbanization during the 1950s and '60s. "Prosperity was creating not only industrial development but a new type of French Canadian," notes Quebec journalist Peter Desbarats, "educated, aggressive, and eager to play an active and complete role.... This was the beginning of what is now called 'the quiet revolution'—a revolution by French Canadians against the conservative Catholic ideals of a poor agricultural society and against dull acceptance of their position as a minority group."

Soon, the province's political leaders began rebuffing the English-Canadian and American investors who sought tax
breaks and low public outlays as the price of new investment. They initiated a pension plan and medical care programs, and pushed reforms in labor relations, the civil service, and government contracting. One of the leaders in this change was René Lévesque, Natural Resources Minister in Quebec’s Liberal government during the early 1960s. He came to personify the slogan Maîtres chez-nous (“Masters in our own House”) when he spearheaded the provincial government’s takeover of 11 privately owned hydroelectric companies in 1962.

The Quebec government began demanding—and getting—increased taxing powers from the federal government. But the pace of change was not fast enough for some in Quebec. In 1963, the radical Front de Libération de Québec began a wave of random bombings. In 1967, Lévesque himself left the Liberals to form what in 1969 would become the Parti Québécois (PQ), uniting most of the French separatists and nationalists under its banner. Lévesque advocated “sovereignty-association” for Quebec. As first conceived, this meant that the province would be politically independent of the rest of Canada, though tied to it by economic agreements like those that “unite” the member nations of the European Common Market.

The PQ won 21 percent of the vote in the 1970 provincial election, 30 percent in 1973. Opinion surveys indicated that Québécois sympathized with the party and trusted Lévesque, but many were reluctant to back the PQ because they feared a complete break with the rest of Canada. To assuage their fears, Lévesque, before the 1976 election, promised that, if he won, he would not try to change Quebec’s status within Canada before submitting the issue to a referendum. That was enough, and Lévesque swept to power. This was the situation confronting Trudeau.

The May 1980 referendum asked Quebec’s voters to authorize the provincial government to begin negotiating for “sovereignty-association.” It spurred a heated debate. Trudeau declared that a “Oui” vote would lead to a stalemate, and he promised that a “Non” vote would clear the way for a “renewed federalism” and new Constitution. On May 20, 1980, almost 60 percent of the voters said “Non.”

With the Quebec question at least temporarily shelved, the Liberals were free to move to Phase Two, the Constitution.

In a June 1980 conference, Trudeau laid before the 10 provincial Premiers a 12-item constitutional package that would strengthen Ottawa’s powers. In addition, Trudeau proposed to “patriate” the BNA Act: Britain would give up its last formal hold over Canada, the authority to approve amendments to the
In The Nine Nations of North America (1981), journalist Joel Garreau described life in Quebec, the "improbable" ninth "nation":

To love Quebec . . . is to love the Pontiac Firebird Trans Am with a 205-bhp, 301-cubic inch V8 and a flaming eagle painted on the hood. Québécois are the worst gas guzzlers left in the world, statistics show. Any street in Quebec is testimony to their affection for full-sized LTDs and vroom-vroom Corvettes. . . . It's a formidable combination in the 1980s to drive like a Frenchman in high-horsepower North American iron.

Their prides are different. Québécois make a very big deal over how terrific their women look, and, indeed, compared to some of the brown thrush understatements of which English Canadian women are capable, Québécoises can be very attractive. Women here are routinely referred to as "tres chic," and, in fact, the most striking statements are made by women whose heels are higher, make-up and perfume more pronounced, and fashions more Europe-conscious than others. . . . Even the politics and culture of good looks are different in Québec from those elsewhere.

They swear differently. And not just because it's in French. In order to get nasty, they don't modify with references to excrement or sex. They modify with words like "tabernacle," "sanctuary," "Chalice," and "host." If you really want to lean into a curse, you string them all together, until you get something like: "Lui, c'est un maudit, chrisse, 'osti, calisse de tabernac'." That'll get you a bar fight anyplace in the Gaspé.

They even think about their similarities with the rest of the continent in a different fashion. In making the point that, while Quebec was French, it was also a distinctly North American culture, one observer said, "Our culture is the way we do things; the way we eat. When we have breakfast, we eat cereal, we eat eggs, we eat bacon."

It’s tough to imagine another North American culture [bringing] attention to its singularity by the fact that it eats bacon and eggs.


Canadian Constitution. The most controversial of Trudeau’s changes was a proposed national Charter of Rights (similar to the U.S. Bill of Rights), particularly its guarantee of bilingualism throughout Canada. This would require that education and public business be conducted in both French and English.

Some of the Premiers from English-speaking provinces objected, but Lévesque protested loudest of all. Canada is officially bilingual even now, but Quebec, taking advantage of the porous Constitution, has been taking steps to curb the use of English in
its domain—for example, by prohibiting the language on commercial signs in the province. Under Quebec’s Bill 101, passed in 1977, only children with at least one parent who attended an English-language school are entitled to an education in English. All others must attend French-language schools.

British Columbia, Alberta, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia, meanwhile, objected to provisions of the Trudeau constitution that would strengthen Ottawa’s hand in setting oil and gas prices and taxes.

Throughout the bickering, Trudeau warned the Premiers that if no agreement were forthcoming, he would go over their heads and ask the Canadian and British Parliaments to pass his proposals. Ultimately, he did just that. But after the Canadian Parliament approved the package, Canada’s Supreme Court ruled that Trudeau was bound by tradition (though not law) to obtain provincial consent.

Trudeau went back to the conference table with the Premiers and emerged with a compromise: All of his proposals remained intact, but an escape clause was added allowing any province to exempt itself from the Charter of Rights for five years at a time. Nine of the Premiers agreed to the new formula. Lévesque dissented. Last December, the Canadian Parliament again endorsed the package and sent it to the British Parliament, which finally voted its approval on March 25, 1982.

In November 1980, only four months after unveiling his constitutional package, Trudeau launched Phase Three: a new National Energy Policy (NEP). Essentially, the NEP gave government a massive new role in the energy business. It imposed new excise taxes, reduced depletion allowances, and established a price below world levels for domestic oil consumed at home. It gave Ottawa a larger cut of the tax revenues and “encouraged” Canadian ownership through a Petroleum Incentives Program that gave tax advantages to domestic firms to increase their share of the energy business.

The Liberals saw their new energy policy as a chance to accomplish two things at once. First, by fostering economic nationalism (“Canadianization”), they took a step to the left—to steal the NDP’s thunder. Second, they garnered vastly increased tax revenues.

Canadian ownership is a particularly touchy issue. Canada has the highest level of foreign investment in the industrialized world. Non-Canadians own about 60 percent of Canadian indus-

Last year, the national government spent $373 million for printing documents in two languages and for bilingual education and related programs. This was a slightly larger share of the federal budget than NASA received in the United States.
try. Trudeau hopes to reduce foreign (mostly U.S.) ownership of oil and gas production from the current level of 79 percent to 50 percent within 10 years. (So far, it has been reduced by about five percentage points.) To show that the government was serious, its PetroCan bought the Canadian holdings of Belgium’s Petrofina corporation for $1.5 billion.

It would appear from the events of the last year or so that, in domestic politics, Canadians and Americans are heading in opposite directions: Canadians toward increased federal government involvement; Americans under the “New Federalism” toward a reduced role for the central government. But this is slightly misleading. Despite Ottawa’s heavy-handed intrusion into the energy field and Trudeau’s success in amending and patriating the Constitution, the future will probably see a lowered profile for government in general, and for the federal government in particular, and a greater emphasis on provincial values—this is what Canadians themselves seem to want.

It is becoming clear to Canadian politicians across the spectrum that direct intervention in the economy can be politically and economically costly. It is far easier to achieve improvements in the environment, occupational health and safety, the distribution of jobs and income, and other areas of social policy by regulating corporations than by owning them. This is probably the future direction of Canadian public policy, despite the often-heard contention that Canada’s natural drift has long been toward “socialism.”

It is far more difficult to say how the Quebec issue will evolve. René Lévesque was reelected last year and he has vowed to continue his fight. Early in 1982, he implicitly abandoned the idea of holding another referendum, saying instead that he will regard victory in the next provincial election, which must be held by 1986, as a mandate to pursue “sovereignty-association.” The outcome may well depend on how much freedom of action Quebec enjoys under the new Constitution.

Yet Canada will surely endure, if not as a “peaceable kingdom” then in fractious cohesion. As former Progressive Conservative Party head Robert Stanfield concluded five years ago: “I suppose there are times when we ask ourselves whether we deserve to survive as a country. But I believe we will survive somehow, if only from habit.”
AN ORPHANED DOMINION

by Robin Winks

Most Canadian intellectuals profess to find their country's history as dull as dishwater. But, in fact, it is a very interesting history, and one of its most intriguing aspects is the obsessive search by Canadians, especially Canadian intellectuals, for a "national identity."

Apparently, Canadians believe that all other nations have one and, hence, know exactly what they are all about. Canadians sense that they are somehow different. The editors of the Toronto-based news magazine, Maclean's, ran a contest some years ago asking readers to complete the sentence, "As Canadian as..." The winning entry: "As Canadian as possible under the circumstances."

Canadians have tended in the past to view their identity in negative terms—as "not being like the United States"—and through the nostalgic glow of their ties to the once powerful British Empire. They also believe that they are set apart from the rest of the world by their English-French "biculturalism." It is not a unique condition. Canadians share biculturalism, and bilingualism, with South Africa, Belgium, and, increasingly, the southwestern United States, as well as with less familiar countries such as Cameroun and the Sudan.

During the past two decades, English- and French-speaking Canadians have discovered that what they long believed to be true of themselves was a mixture of fact and fiction. But this has only increased the fervor of those who would define, capture, invent, or otherwise create a "Canadian identity." They have followed the nationalist's usual path: asserting the moral superiority of their society; making language a tool of self-awareness; increasing the power of the state.

In politics, Canadians have been preoccupied by three issues. The first is the "patriation" of their Constitution, recently granted by the British Parliament. At bottom, this was only a symbolic issue—no British Parliament would have refused to approve any reasonable (or even unreasonable) amendment Ottawa wished to make—but this last vestige of colonialism irked many Canadians.

The real problem is the second issue: Whither Quebec? René Lévesque and his Parti Québécois want to move the province
into a relationship with the rest of Canada that, with magnificent obscurity, they style “sovereignty-association.” No one is able to define precisely what this means. All agree, however, that it would bring far more independence to Quebec as a political entity.

The third issue is the taxing and pricing of oil and natural gas, which has pitted the west against Ottawa. The westerners are also angry over Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s concessions to Quebec, such as allowing the province to restrict the use of English.

None of this is really new. Canada has always run the risk of being, as Forbes magazine called it recently, “one nation divisible.” The Canadian flag ought not to display a maple leaf, some say, but a boxing glove. There have always been politicians and entrepreneurs in the United States who have thought that Canada, like the fruit of Shakespeare’s medlar tree, would become rotten before it became ripe and fall into the American Union. Yet somehow it never did.

Canadian intellectuals have always been ambivalent about their culture, often putting it down (though not wishing anyone

Quebec as it appeared around 1700. American attempts to take the city in 1775 are forgotten in the United States, not in Canada.
else to do so), and declaring what they are not: not American; not British; not French. But they are not so sure what they are. As one Canadian has remarked, Americans at least thought they knew what the purpose of the House Committee on Un-American Activities was, since they could generally agree on what it meant to be an American. But who could imagine a Royal Commission on Un-Canadian Activities?

The "Quiet Revolution"

History does set Canada apart in several obvious ways, even if these differences are not as pronounced as Canadian history textbooks tend to portray them.

There is, for example, the fact of Canada's dual culture. Many Canadians think this unfortunate, and yet in some ways the situation is a blessing. Despite the mystique about "two solitudes" in Canada, with neither culture speaking to the other, there is in fact a constant dialogue, often at the top of the lungs, that is unmatched in most other bicultural societies.

Many western Canadians refuse to learn French and decry the Liberal Party's efforts in Ottawa to turn Canada into a bilingual nation. French-speaking Canadians still learn English, mostly because it is rapidly becoming the world's lingua franca of trade and technology. They may be the only truly bilingual Canadians. Learning a second language seems a waste of time when the "other party" can already speak one's own first language, but one day English-speaking Canadians will realize that they will have to give way. If Paris was worth a mass (as the Protestant Prince Henri decided when he was offered the French throne in 1574 on condition that he convert to Catholicism), Canada is probably worth learning to speak French.

But language is not really the issue. The issue is mutual cultural respect. It is unfortunate that Canada chose to call itself a Dominion in 1867 (a title quietly dropped in recent years), with the Biblical connotation of having "dominion from sea to sea." Domination is what the debate has been all about: the centuries-old presumption by English-speaking Canadians that their culture was expansive, innovative, and most likely to develop a true Canadian identity, and that the "other culture" was

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conservative, priest-ridden, rural.

Goldwin Smith, a misguided British-born 19th-century historian, wrote that "French Canada is a relic of the historical past preserved by isolation, as Siberian mammoths are preserved in ice." So long as French-Canadians kept to themselves in their preserve of Quebec, the rest of Canada could go its own Anglophile way. But the Québécois did not wish their province to remain forever a cultural enclave, and with the "quiet revolution" that began in the 1950s they began to assert themselves.

Some of the separatists took up the language of Marxism because they meant it, some because they knew it would ring in Canadian ears like a fire bell, and some because they believed it would provide a fashionable vocabulary of protest. (Not all separatists claim to be Marxists, though.) But the issue was not language, and it was not Marx; it was whether two genuinely different cultures could coexist within a single state.

Long before, Lord John ("Radical Jack") Durham had said they could not, in his famous 1839 Report on the causes of and remedies for the rebellions of 1837 in Canada. The Americans seemed to confirm this judgment when the clash between their own cultures of North and South resulted in Civil War. But by the 1970s, in the context of post-Cold War international politics, Canadians had to ask themselves whether they could afford not to coexist within the bosom of a single state. The alternative was political fragmentation, loss of influence in the world, and possibly even piecemeal absorption by the United States.

**Waving the Flag**

Originally, it was Canada that threatened the United States, to use modern political terms for an older geography. The French had settled New France (largely, present-day Quebec), while the English had settled the eastern seaboard from Nova Scotia south to Georgia. By moving beyond those seaboard colonies, down the Mississippi River to Louisiana, the French had cut off British access to the far west. The British called this "the Gallic Peril." It was eliminated only toward the end of the Great War for Empire—a series of five wars beginning in 1689 and fought mostly in Europe, culminating in the Seven Years' War of 1753–60. By that time, there were some one million British colonists in North America and about 70,000 French.

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*The rebellions, led by William Lyon Mackenzie in English Canada and by Louis Joseph Papineau in French Canada, arose out of demands for greater local autonomy. They enjoyed scant public support and were quickly put down. Lord Durham, however, sympathized with the aims and recommended that Canada be granted more self-governing powers.*
CANADA

OTTAWA'S VIEW OF THE WORLD

"Ever since the Second World War, Canada has been cultivating the image of an international nice guy," Canada's External Affairs Minister, Flora MacDonald, declared in 1979. "We're friends to everyone, the honest brokers."

Inevitably, the United States looms large. The two nations are linked through NATO (1949) and by the 1958 North American Air Defense (NORAD) pact. Some 25,000 Canadian servicemen served alongside the Americans in Korea. After the Soviets' 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, Ottawa joined Washington in boycotting the Moscow Olympics and embargoing wheat shipments to Russia. Opinion polls indicate that 60 percent of the Canadian public favors such close ties to the United States. To Moscow, the country seems a pliant U.S. ally. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko once called Canada "the boring second fiddle in the American symphony."

Ottawa has tried, nevertheless, to keep a certain distance from the United States. As the British writer V. S. Pritchett observed, "The Canadian spirit is cautious, observant, and critical where the American is assertive; the foreign policies of the two nations are never likely to fit very conveniently." During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Ottawa refused to participate in an alert of the joint NORAD system, and in 1963, over Washington's objections, it arranged sizable grain deals with the Soviet Union and China. In 1968, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau cut Canada's 10,000-man NATO contingent, largely based in West Germany, by 50 percent. As a proportion of government outlays, only Luxembourg spends less on NATO than Canada does, though recently Ottawa has been modernizing its forces.

Citing a tradition of "international altruism"—the nation's 1981 foreign aid budget ($1.2 billion) is the world's fifth-largest—Canadians have often been more accommodating than Americans toward the Third World. In 1975, Trudeau backed demands for a New International Economic Order, urging "an acceptable distribution of the world's wealth." He caused an uproar at home (and in Washington) a year later by crying "Viva Castro!" during a speech in Cuba. Canada's ties with Caribbean nations are surprisingly strong, although most foreign aid still goes to Bangladesh, Pakistan, and other British Commonwealth countries, or, enhancing bicultural amity at home, to the French-speaking nations of West Africa. Canadian units have served in most United Nations peace-keeping forces, from Lebanon to Cyprus.

Yet world issues seldom stir much attention in Ottawa. The House of Commons did not once debate foreign policy between 1960 and 1977. And Trudeau himself has declared that Canada's "paramount interest" in foreign affairs was to "ensure the survival of Canada as a federal and bilingual state."
Most Canadians term the war's result the British Conquest. The French colonists and their descendants have used a different word for this political transition: the Cession. Behind the alternative word lies an alternative view of history. The British felt that they had conquered New France fairly in war. The French settlers were convinced that France could have defended its North American colony successfully but that Mother France had elected to abandon her children in exchange for gains in Europe and Asia.

The French-Canadians were a bit like the Afrikaans-speaking Boers of South Africa, who felt distant from a Holland that cared little for their needs and who saw themselves not as Europeans but as white Africans. The French-Canadians sought to protect their culture with the bulwarks granted to them by Britain under the 1774 Quebec Act: their own legal code, their religion, and their language. The British tried leniency to secure the loyalty of their new subjects, and it worked. According to an old cliché, the last hand to wave the British flag in North America should be that of a French-speaking Canadian.

Independence by Installment

The cliché had substance for a very long time, partly because the expanding United States, pursuing its “Manifest Destiny” before the Civil War, posed a threat to Canada, and especially to French-speaking Canadians. Were the British North American Provinces (as they were called) to be absorbed by the ravenous new Republic, the English-speaking Canadians would lose only their sovereignty and, perhaps, some of their property. The French-Canadians stood to lose their way of life. Thus, they had little choice but to remain loyal to the only available countervailing force: Great Britain. During the War of 1812, the Quebec Militia fought shoulder to shoulder with the redcoats, and as late as 1940, during the battle of Britain, the French-Canadian 22nd Regiment (the “Van Doos”) stood guard at Buckingham Palace.

Meanwhile, English-speaking Canada was also developing along lines different from those of the United States. After the success of the American Revolution, an influx of some 30,000 Loyalists from the new United States helped ensure that Canada would, at least initially, be anti-American, property-conscious, loyal to the Crown, oriented to the extent possible toward Britain (not toward Europe, of which Britain thought itself no part), and politically conservative.

Americans, with brash dogmatism, have always insisted
"Stay with the Leafs. We gotta get our 60% Canadian content."

Pierre Trudeau

"... you want to know what Canada is all about ... I'll tell you what it's all about ... it's YOU reading and listening to all these media people in Toronto telling you what Canada is all about ... THAT'S what it's all about ..."
"We have ways of making you talk French . . ."

Reprinted with permission—The Toronto Star
that they became independent on July 4, 1776. They could say that they became independent merely by declaring themselves to have become so, ignoring seven years of war and the 1783 treaty that truly conferred independence. Canadians looked on, a bit jealously, even as they themselves—French- and English-speaking alike—secured independence on the installment plan.

This is another cliché of Canadian history, though it is no less true for being one: that Canada is different from the United States because it acquired its independence through evolution rather than revolution.

Although Canadians celebrate July 1 as their national holiday (once called Dominion Day, now Canada Day) in honor of the promulgation of the British North America Act of 1867, Canada was in no significant sense independent then or for some time thereafter. Britain still held much of the land as Crown domain and could manipulate taxation. If Britain declared war, Canada was automatically at war as well (which is what happened at the outbreak of World War I in 1914). Surely one of the truest tests of independence is whether a people can decide for themselves whether to go to war.

Taking the High Road

The confederation created in 1867 united only four of the British North American Provinces. It was really not until 1948—when Newfoundland, which had remained a separate dominion under Britain, elected to join—that the present nation was totally formed. Canada was an independent nation well before the Constitution was patriated this year, but constitutionalists can make good cases for arguing that this status was not reached until (take your pick) 1911, 1919, 1927, 1931, even 1939. It is not important to know when Canada became independent; it is important to understand that no one really knows.

Of course, no one really knows when Britain or France or Germany actually became a nation. Canadians are not alone in having to settle for an evolutionary definition of identity. They would probably not make so much of the issue were it not for the fact that it helps them to feel quietly superior to the Americans, who had to resort to violence.

This, too, is part of the Canadian character: a tension between putting oneself down and putting everyone else down. By many objective criteria, Canada is superior to the United States. It has far lower crime and divorce rates; it spends substantially more per capita on education and health; its parks are cleaner,
its cities more pleasant, its highways better paved, its children better behaved. Canadians are particularly proud of their national health insurance plan, administered by the provinces (hospitalization insurance was established in 1961; medical insurance in 1965). There is far less venality in politics. Only two national Canadian politicians have ever been assassinated, and then not while in office.

But this is not enough for Canadians. They must also be seen as morally superior. Thus, evolution is better than revolution; Americans are ignorant of Canada but Canadians consider themselves quite well-informed about the United States (a half-truth); the Mounty always gets his man, while the American cop on the beat is a crook or an incompetent. The Canadian writer George Woodcock summed up his countrymen’s attitude in 1970, when he wrote of Canada’s “great potential role in the world, not as a leader so much as an exemplar, a country conditioned to politics as a process of cooling and reconciliation.”

There is no better symbol of this peculiar quest for moral superiority than a historic plaque on the banks of the Detroit River, where the industrial city of Windsor, Ontario, faces Detroit’s downtown Renaissance Center. The plaque is dedicated to the fugitive slaves “who found freedom under the lion’s paw” by making their way on the Underground Railroad to Canada during the 1850s. The plaque, like most Canadian monuments and history books, ignores the fact that the schools of Canada West (as Ontario was called) were segregated at the time, that chattel slavery was legal in Canada until 1833, and that patterns of racial prejudice in Canada were (and are) similar to those in the Northern United States.

“Vital Lies”

At the beginning of the 20th century, Canadians identified themselves as a linchpin or golden hinge in a “North Atlantic Triangle.” These constructions “explained” how Canada was a midpoint between Europe and North America; they implied that Canada followed the path of peace, was a mediator, a showcase to the world of how cultures (and therefore nations) could coexist. Such constructions were partly true, at different times, but no longer.

The new Canada differs from the historic, stolid Canada in important ways. Just as in the United States, where a portion of the population does not realize that the old America of the frontier is gone, there are Canadians who do not recognize that the old happy Canada is gone. History has become myth, or what
A CITY UPON A PLAIN

The English writer V. S. Pritchett, visiting Canada in 1964, described a Winnipeg that is little changed today. Canada’s fifth-largest city lies 150 miles north of Grand Forks, North Dakota:

In this hot, dusty growing city of half a million, one meets at last a real, well-rooted Canada. Winnipeg is not as polished as Toronto or anywhere near as sophisticated as Montreal, but it is as individual as all other Canadian cities and puts the fundamental Canadian case. The first things to catch the eyes are the onion domes of the Russian Orthodox churches of the Ukrainians. Here the non-British immigrant becomes important. The Ukrainians came here in 1900 from the richest wheat-bearing lands of Russia. . . . Up at Selkirk, on Lake Winnipeg, are the Scandinavians and Icelanders; in the city itself is a new Jewish population, as well as the German and Italian settlers who arrived in the last few years. The original population includes a very strong outpost of French-Canadians, the descendants of French marriages with Indians and of the men of the fur trade. . . .

Flying out of Winnipeg you get one more shock to the eye. First of all, the city spreads for miles as if it were printed on the land. The print moves out to the scrub and forest of the Shield, the enormous slab of pre-Cambrian rock that stretches to Hudson Bay. . . . The second shock is the sight of thousands of lakes, gay eyelets of blue looking out of the face of vegetation, and you realize how much of Canada is wild water. It is forest and lake all the way to the Great Lakes, and hardly a road anywhere. There must be trails of some sort, for occasionally there is the white speck of a settlement. The Great Lakes themselves are forest bound. One understands why this country was crossed by water first, not by land.

U.S. historian Hans Kohn called “vital lies,” essential parts of a nation’s sense of identity.

Three developments have destroyed the old truths: immigration, the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the new power of oil-rich nations. If Canadians are able to adapt to these conditions, the 21st century may yet be theirs, as they once insisted the 20th would be.

The most important problem remains the dual culture, now changed by postwar immigration. It was not Marxist rhetoric, or the Cold War, or the Catholic Church’s suicidal opposition to labor unions, strikes, and reforms in Quebec that shocked French-speaking Canadians into looking squarely at the question of cultural survival. It was the great wave of post-World War II immigration into Canada from virtually everywhere: Britain, Holland, Eastern Europe, Italy, Greece, the British West
Indies, Haiti. During the 19th century, the French had made up nearly one-third of the total population of Canada, and—in part through a conscious pursuit of a high birthrate (the “revenge of the cradles”)—they had maintained this ratio. In Parliament, the united votes of the West and Ontario were still required to overcome the opposition of Quebec’s legislators on matters the latter deemed threatening to French-Canadian survival.

**Savoring the Uncertainty**

Immigration changed all this. The French had expected that the new immigrants would distribute themselves in roughly equal numbers across the provinces. Quebec would maintain its relative power within the confederation. Québécois also assumed that many immigrants would arrive knowing French, the second language of many Europeans, and that many others would choose to assimilate into French-speaking rather than English-speaking Canada.

By 1960, it was evident this would not be the case. Immigrants—especially Eastern Europeans and the Dutch—preferred to maintain their own languages and customs to the extent that they could.† To the extent that they couldn’t, they generally chose to learn English, for two reasons. It was rapidly becoming the world’s second language, and since many immigrants came to Canada as a way station on the road to the United States, being able to speak it would improve their chances of making the next step. By 1971, two years after the formation of the Parti Québécois, and five years before the PQ won power, nearly a third of the Canadian population was neither French- nor English-speaking in origin. It was a vast new Canada that, as the French-Canadians had feared, would opt for the English rather than the French route if forced to choose.

Even moderate French Canadians, alerted to the danger by census statistics and school registration data, judged that the time had come to take steps to protect their culture. Such protection, they concluded, would best be afforded not by waving the British flag but by taking giant strides toward institutionalizing a separate identity. That was the impetus behind the growth of the Parti Québécois.

*"During the last two centuries," notes demographer Jacques Henripin, "world population has multiplied by three. European population by four. and French-Canadian population by 80." Since the 1950s, the growth rate has slowed to nearly zero.

†Today, immigration to Canada is down to about 100,000 annually, half the level of the early 1960s. Pakistanis, West Indians, Vietnamese refugees, and other nonwhites account for 40 percent of new arrivals.
Were René Lévesque never to hold another referendum, never to define “sovereignty-association,” he would have achieved what must have been his major goal: concessions—on language and local governance—significant in their own right, but also so angering to the remainder of Canada as to loosen the confederation and give Quebec even more room for maneuver.

At the same time, had the world not been polarized into two camps after World War II, things might have been different. Canada might have developed in another way; it might have accommodated Quebec more easily. But the end of the war “placed Canada directly between the United States and its late ally and inevitable rival, the Soviet Union,” observed Canadian historian W. J. Morton.

With its fate so closely tied by defense needs and geography to that of the United States, Canada was not entirely free to pursue its own path, either at home or abroad. Dependent on
U.S. investments, it could not evolve gradually toward socialism, as some Canadian intellectuals thought it would, and it could not be cavalier about forging stronger links to the Third World. Canada's U.S. ties prevented Ottawa from even thinking about making common cause with OPEC after 1973, for instance, and this restraint in profiting at the expense of the Yankees (and Canadians in the nonproducing provinces) was and is a key cause of the western provinces' threats to unravel the country.

It is an irony of Canadian history that so much of it has been influenced by the nations—first Great Britain, then the United States—that bought its exports. Canada's freedom of choice has been further restricted by the realities of the world markets for the succession of raw materials, from furs to codfish to timber to minerals, that the country sold abroad. In its next phase, the history of Canada may be determined as much by the course of OPEC and the world price of oil as from sharing a continent with and relying upon the United States. When oil prices go up, the Westerners will try to drive a harder bargain. When prices go down, the Canadian economy will suffer.

Canada's traditional common values—based on an Anglo-Saxon heritage and membership in a powerful empire—are slipping away. Nothing can readily take their place. In the years ahead, Canadians must have the courage to remain—perhaps even to truly become—pluralistic, respectful of, even drawing strength from, the fissiparous qualities of Canadian economic and political life. To remain the superior people Canadians consider themselves to be (and probably are), they must be willing to be unpredictable, taking joy from their ambiguities, finding tolerance in their duality, and content to have no single, embracing national identity.
A Canadian fantasy: The President of the United States, desperate for Canada's Arctic natural gas, announces the unilateral annexation of Canada. A 15,000-man U.S. occupation force airlifted to Canadian cities is rounded up on the ground by bands of outnumbered, outgunned, and outraged Canadian militiamen. ("Ah didn't know you Canadians had that much gumption, but ah sure know it now," a captured American general admits.) As U.S. armored columns race toward the Canadian border, the hotline rings in the Oval Office. Moscow vows nuclear war if Canada is invaded.

In Richard Rohmer's Exxoneration (McClelland, 1974, cloth; Paperjacks, 1977, paper), the United States loses not only its face but also one of its oil companies. Canadians found the potboiler cathartic enough to make it an instant best seller.

But belligerence, even in fantasy, is out of character for Canadians. The United States has always been "the great Canadian hang-up," concedes James Sloan Dickey, professor of public affairs at Dartmouth, in his comprehensive, though slightly dated, Canada and the American Presence (N.Y. Univ., 1975), yet "anti-Americanism need not be, and rarely is, malevolent or even unfriendly." Rather, it is Canada's way of emphasizing its individuality.

The United States is an overwhelming cultural presence. Half of all books purchased in Canada are published south of the border. While Canadian academics once lamented a "brain drain" to the United States, today 15 to 20 percent of Canada's university teachers are Americans. Small wonder that Canadians dwell on the qualities that set them apart.

One of these qualities, writes poet Margaret Atwood, is a preoccupation with simple Survival (House of Anansi, 1972, cloth & paper). Where the American frontier held out hope and excitement, she argues in this idiosyncratic reflection on Canadian literature, Canada's forbidding emptiness bred anxiety. "Our stories are likely to be tales not of those who made it but of those who made it back, from the awful experience—the North, the snowstorm, the sinking ship—that killed everyone else."

Canadians have been driven not by the pursuit of glory but by sheer necessity. In Canada and the Canadians (Faber & Faber, 1970; rev.ed., 1973, cloth; Macmillan, rev.ed., 1973, paper), journalist George Woodcock concludes that, partly as a result, the Canadian today "sees himself as unheroic, but as rational and decent and at times willing to endure and suffer for reason or decency."

Decency seems to mark Canadian political history. After putting down the 1837 rebellions against colonial rule without much bloodshed, the British Governor-General pardoned most of the rebels, exiled eight, and executed none.

This was Lord John Durham, whose 1839 Report on the Affairs of British North America, 3 vols. (Kelley reprint of 1912 ed., 1970), offers an image of the provinces during the early 19th century.
Durham’s Canada compared unfavorably with the United States. Its people were “poor, and apparently unenterprising, though hardy and industrious, separated from each other by tracts of intervening forest, without towns and markets, almost without roads, living in mean houses, drawing little more than a rude subsistence from ill-cultivated land.”

Lord Durham favored creation of a united, more independent Canadian nation in part to prevent American hegemony and guarantee the pro-British sympathies of at least one government in North America.

Independence offered other advantages. Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli considered Britain’s colonies “millstones around the Mother Country’s neck.” During the U.S. Civil War, cross-border strikes—by Confederate agitators attacking in one direction, fanatic Irish Fenians in the other—were frequent. Annexationist sentiment ran high in the Northern states. London deployed 15,000 troops in Canada for the duration of the conflict.

In 1864, John A. MacDonald of Canada’s Conservative Party, George Brown of the Reformers, and the French-Canadian Georges Etienne Cartier formed a “Great Coalition” to draw up a constitution. Historian Ramsay Cook describes the task of Canada’s three Founding Fathers in his graceful Canada: A Modern Study (Clarke, Irwin, 1963; rev. and enlarged ed., 1977, paper only).

MacDonald was elected the first Prime Minister of the new Confederation. His “National Policy” featured high tariffs to encourage domestic industry and government-financed construction of a transcontinental railroad to open up the West.

Nothing could insulate Canada from the worldwide economic slump that began in 1873. But the dark clouds lifted with the Klondike gold rush in the Yukon between 1896 and 1898, the last of the great North American gold strikes. As historian W. J. Morton notes in his scholarly The Kingdom of Canada (Bobbs-Merrill, 1963; McClelland, 1969, cloth & paper), the gold rush “drew into the Yukon, British Columbia, and the prairies many people who never saw the gold, and much capital that was merely attracted to the magnetic neighborhood.”

The gold rush set off the “Laurier Boom,” named for Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier (1896–1911). Mining and lumber companies prospered; new railroads crossed the continent. Between 1901 and 1911, the population of the wheat-farming prairie provinces tripled to 1.3 million. Then came World War I, which boosted demand for Canadian manufactured goods—uniforms, weapons, ships—and made light and heavy industry the leading sectors of the Canadian economy (as they are today).

Canada’s tradition of public ownership of business dates back to the first trans-Canada railroad. But not until the early 1960s did Canada begin erecting a liberal welfare state. As with Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, “Prosperity, the sense of security arising from the stability of postwar society, and the general reformist orientation of the media made this full measure of reform possible.” So write Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English in their comprehensive Canada since 1945 (Univ. of Toronto, 1981).

While many of the provinces had already fashioned social “safety nets” of their own, action on the federal level awaited the efforts of Lester B. Pearson, the Liberal Prime
Judging by what they read, Canadians and Americans have quite different things on their minds. The nonfiction best-seller lists from Maclean's and Time for the week of March 29, 1982, show that American book buyers seem to favor sex, self-help, and humor; the Canadian list tilts toward current events and history.

**Canada**

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<td>1</td>
<td>THE ACQUISITORS</td>
<td>Peter Newman: The second volume of a study of the Canadian business establishment.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>CONSEQUENCES</td>
<td>Margaret Trudeau: The Prime Minister's estranged wife tells all.</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>THE LORD GOD MADE THEM ALL</td>
<td>James Herriot: The life of a Yorkshire veterinarian.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>THE NEW CANADIAN REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT GUIDE</td>
<td>Henry Zimmer: How to get rich without really trying.</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>THE GAME OF OUR LIVES</td>
<td>Peter Gzowski: A year in the life of the National Hockey League's Edmonton Oilers.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>THE HOLY BLOOD AND THE HOLY GRAIL</td>
<td>Henry Lincoln, Michael Baigent, and Richard Bardmont: A theory that Christ had descendants who today form a secret society among the English aristocracy.</td>
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<td>FLAMES ACROSS THE BORDER</td>
<td>Pierre Berton: The Canadian-American conflict during the War of 1812.</td>
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<td>JANE FONDA'S WORKOUT BOOK</td>
<td>Jane Fonda: A physical and philosophical regimen for women.</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>I REMEMBER SUNNYSIDE</td>
<td>Mike Filey: A history of a Toronto amusement park and how people spent their leisure time in bygone days.</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>MEN OF PROPERTY</td>
<td>Susan Goldenberg: A profile of the top 10 land development corporations in Canada.</td>
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**United States**

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<td>A LIGHT IN THE ATTIC</td>
<td>Shel Silverstein: Humorous cartoons and verse.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>NOBODY'S PERFECT</td>
<td>Hendrie Weisinger and Norman Lobsenz: How to make friends and influence people.</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>HOW TO MAKE LOVE TO A MAN</td>
<td>Alexandra Penney.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>WEIGHT WATCHER'S 365-DAY MENU COOKBOOK</td>
<td>Weight Watcher's International.</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO GOOD PEOPLE</td>
<td>Harold Kushner: Words of solace from a Massachusetts rabbi.</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>WHAT EVERY WOMAN SHOULD KNOW ABOUT MEN</td>
<td>Joyce Brothers.</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>THE I LOVE NEW YORK DIET</td>
<td>Bess Myerson and Bill Adler.</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>THE INVISIBLE BANKERS</td>
<td>Andrew Tobias: An exposé of the insurance industry.</td>
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Minister elected in 1963. Within two years, national medical insurance and social security had been introduced, and Ottawa was embarked on ambitious job training and public works programs. By 1971, social spending accounted for 24 percent of the federal budget. Special beneficiaries: Indians and Eskimos.

Wrangling between the provinces and the federal government, not popular resistance or sniping by interest groups, was the chief obstacle to the new measures. Indeed, to judge from journalist Peter C. Newman’s encyclopedic group portrait of *The Canadian Establishment* (McClelland, 1975), even Canada’s business and financial elite are not all that interested in national politics per se.

Newman sets out to describe “the 1,000 or so men who really run Canada,” from oil-man John A. Armstrong to Hartland de Montarville Molson, patriarch of the beer-brewing clan. What he proves is that the rich, in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s phrase, are “very different from you and me,” no matter where they live. He cites the example of one mogul who paid $10,000 (Canadian) to have a fallen meteorite pulverized into gravel for his driveway. The Canadian Establishment is an exclusive club: Few non-WASPS gain admission. French-Canadians, Ukrainians, and other ethnic groups, Newman contends, have not gotten their fair share of wealth and status.

Peter Desbarats’ *René* (McClelland, 1976, cloth; Seal, 1977, paper) and Richard Gwyn’s *The Northern Magus: Pierre Trudeau and Canadians* (McClelland, 1980) are the best full-length biographies of Canada’s foremost political sparring partners.

Trudeau, scion of a wealthy French-English family, was educated at the University of Montreal, Harvard, the Sorbonne, and the London School of Economics. He taught law at his Montreal alma mater and edited *Cité Libre* magazine before entering politics in 1965. René Lévèque, son of a country lawyer, gained fame as a television news commentator. He was elected to the Quebec legislature in 1960.

During the late 1950s, the two men joined an informal discussion group of Quebec intellectuals and politicians. They often disagreed. But Gwyn writes of their long duel: “While each wanted passionately to win, neither, down deep, wanted to destroy the other.”

No matter what the outcome of the Quebec issue, Canadians will probably continue to agonize over their national future, wondering who they are and where they are headed.

In *The Canadian Imagination* (Harvard, 1977), a collection of essays on Canadian poetry, fiction, and theater, edited by David Staines, literary critic Northrop Frye suggests that what Canadians need to do is to stop viewing themselves as visitors to their own country. Frye recalls an anecdote about a city doctor traveling in the north with a native Eskimo guide. A blizzard closes in and the doctor panics. “We are lost,” he moans. “We are not lost,” replies his guide. “We are here.”

EDITOR’S NOTE: Many of the titles in this essay were recommended by Kathie Meizner, a librarian at Baltimore’s Enoch Pratt Free Library, who was formerly on the staff of the Canadian Embassy in Washington, D.C.
The Environment:

OLMSTED'S ODYSSEY

Frederick Law Olmsted began work on Manhattan's Central Park—the first of his creations—exactly 125 years ago. The anniversary finds a small group of Olmsted scholars still laboring on a project begun in 1972: editing the letters of a man who changed the way Americans perceived their cities, their suburbs, their wilderness. Two volumes have already appeared; a third is forthcoming; there are nine more volumes to go. Part aesthete, part engineer, part late-blooming reformer, Olmsted (1822-1903) designed a large share of urban America. His firm laid out some 1,000 parks in 200 cities. Here, Charles McLaughlin, editor of the Olmsted Papers, traces the man's life, his ideas, and his enduring achievement.

by Charles Capen McLaughlin

One of the curious things about creativity is how accidentally it can unfold and how its appearance can catch even the creator by surprise. In retrospect, it seems easy to match a person's talents to his accomplishments, but that is not always the way people living out their lives perceive it. Hence, the importance of a collection of letters. To read 60 years of a person's correspondence is to experience the twists and turns of his fate. Where Frederick Law Olmsted is concerned, we see how long he took to grow up, we see his impetuous risk-taking, his charm and irascibility, and ultimately his emergence as both a talented administrator and a far-seeing artist.

Olmsted sprouted early but blossomed late. After many false starts, and inspired by an earlier generation of garden and park designers (mostly in England, their work confined mostly to private estates), he established landscape architecture as a profession in America and gave it a public face. Visitors to Yosemite National Park, Boston's Franklin Park, Chicago's Jackson Park, the U.S. Capitol grounds, Niagara Falls, Stanford University, and scores of other places, big and small, all owe a debt to FLO (as Olmsted signed himself). They usually do not
know it. For there is an “always been there” quality about much of Olmsted's work; now, in their maturity, his landscapes often appear so “natural” that one thinks of them as something not put there by artifice but merely preserved by happenstance.

In a practical, old-fashioned sort of way, Olmsted became as much a social scientist as an artist. He had tried to gauge, as best he could, “the drift of human nature in America these last fifty years,” and he had rather clear ideas about what the next fifty years might bring and what he, as an individual, could do about it.

At a time when New York City stopped well below what is now “midtown Manhattan,” he foresaw the vast megalopolis that today includes portions of Connecticut and New Jersey. For cities generally, he realized that something had to be done not only to relieve the density at the center but to plan for orderly development of the surrounding suburbs. Though hardly a “man of the people,” Olmsted was a fervent democrat who believed that a park should be enjoyed equally by citizens of every class. He considered healthful the sheer aesthetic relief a park afforded from the city's “constantly repeated right angles, straight lines, and flat surfaces.”

Olmsted never wrote a Great Book about his parks or his landscape practice. His principles are nowhere codified. Those who would follow his footsteps must read his reports and acquaint themselves with his landscapes. But Olmsted did leave
behind tens of thousands of letters. Here, we can see him exercising his eye for detail and his talent for friendship. Here, we can watch Olmsted casually, even thoughtlessly, stumbling toward a destiny known only to us. As Olmsted conceded toward the end of his life, "I had no more idea of being a park-maker than of taking command of the Channel Fleet."

The Miseducation of Mr. Clodpole

Frederick Law Olmsted was born on April 26, 1822, to a prosperous Hartford merchant who, fortunately for him, would always remain prosperous. The entire Olmsted family enjoyed the outdoors, scenery, nature, but Fred especially so, and his letters betray the predilection. As a boy, he once wrote to his father about finding "a brook which winds about in gorges till it finds the most effective spot for display—when it jumps off and comes tumbling and smashing through the rocks, over the side of the mountain in the most astonishing manner."

Olmsted himself had trouble finding the most effective spot for display. He was to follow his brother John to Yale, but a severe case of sumac poisoning waylaid him at age 15, putting his education permanently off course. Eventually, Fred went off for an enjoyable three years to study civil engineering with Frederick Augustus Barton in Andover, Massachusetts, where he learned the rudiments of surveying and amused himself by drawing up plans for hypothetical towns and cities. The next stop, at his father's behest, was New York City, where Fred worked as a clerk in a dry goods-importing house. "Oh, how I long to be where I was a year ago," he wrote to his stepmother.

Olmsted returned to Hartford, slipped briefly into local "society," and made frequent jaunts to see his brother in New Haven. In 1843, he did what many lads did long before "finding oneself" became a cliche: He went to sea. Circumnavigating the globe, Olmsted was ill most of the time (acute seasickness, then typhus) and saw almost nothing of the Far East as a result. "My opportunities of observation and investigation," he wrote to his family, "are very similar to those enjoyed by Mr. Pickwick while a resident in his Majesty's Fleet Prison."

Fred returned home, at age 22, more partial to land than sea. He would, he now decided, become a "scientific farmer."

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one of the new breed. "I should think by the use of proper tools
and machinery," he wrote to his brother, "at least half of the
most disagreeable and hard labor of our old-fashioned farmers
might be dispensed with to advantage." He audited some pertinent
courses at Yale, then served a kind of apprenticeship at
model farms in Connecticut and New York. It was during this
period that he met Andrew Jackson Downing, whose Treatise on
the Theory and Practice of Landscape Gardening Adapted to North
America (1841) had established him as the leading American
authority in that small field.

Possibly none of this seemed as important to Olmsted at the
time as a woman named Elizabeth Baldwin ("Excellent
princess. She's a dove. Whew!"), the attractive daughter of a
former Governor of Connecticut. Fred could be insecure. He was
aware of his lack of formal schooling—his "miseducation," he
called it. He once referred to himself as "Mr. Clodpole." But
Lizzy Baldwin seemed to accept Fred for what he was, some-
times preferring his company to that of the Hartford toffs—"all
white-kid-dom creaking in their new boots," as Olmsted pic-
tured them. Miss Baldwin introduced Fred to the works of Ralph
Waldo Emerson, James Russell Lowell, and John Ruskin, teach-
ing him respect for his "constitutional tastes," he later wrote,
and giving him "a kind of scatter-brained pride." Lizzy, unfor-
tunately, broke off the relationship, such as it was.

A "Vagabondish" Life

To his brother, Olmsted poured out his feelings. He had just
finished Thomas Carlyle's Sartor Resartus, Fred wrote, and symp-
pathized greatly with the hero of the book, Teufelsdrokh. Like
Olmsted, Teufelsdrokh had suffered great uncertainty about his
role in life, had loved and lost a lady of high station, and had felt
himself to be a talented but poorly educated lover of nature.
Dutifully, Olmsted took Carlyle's injunction to heart: "Up! Up!
Whatsoever thy hand findesth to do, do it with thy whole might."

Olmsted threw himself into managing the two farms his
father purchased for him at Sachem's Head, Connecticut, and
Staten Island, New York. He shaped the grounds to please his
eye, planted groves and hedges, cabbages, and pears, learned
how to supervise hired labor and run a business. Everything
grew except Olmsted's income. His enthusiasm waning, Fred
abruptly sailed to Great Britain with his brother. As he wrote his
father in 1850: "The idea of settling down for life without having
seen England seemed to me cowardly and unreasonable."

He was captivated at once, not only by the "green, dripping,
glistening" countryside but by the formal parks at each country seat of the titled elite. The men (such as "Capability" Brown and Humphrey Repton) who imposed their vision on Nature were "artists" at work on "a picture so great that Nature will be employed upon it for generations." This God-like role appealed to Olmsted.

England of 1850, though, was also Charles Dickens’s England. Olmsted was shocked by the "dead mass of pure poverty" in city and countryside, and by the fact that few Englishmen "seemed to feel that anyone but God, with his laws of population and trade, was responsible for it." But a "public parks" movement was underway; urban space was being reclaimed by landscape. Fred was especially taken with the new town of Birkenhead, a suburb of Liverpool, in the midst of which Joseph Paxton had carved out a 120-acre park with groves, greensward, and lake. In democratic America, he wrote, "there was nothing to be thought as comparable to this People’s Garden."

Olmsted gathered his notes and letters from the trip into a book, *Walks and Talks of an American Farmer in England*, published in 1851. It caught the eye of Henry Raymond, editor of the *New York Times*, who hired Olmsted as the paper’s roving correspondent in the American South. Most of his dispatches were biting portrayals of a society based upon an institution—slavery—that Olmsted believed to be both economically ruinous and morally indefensible. But the Southern experience also led Olmsted to ponder anew the very different ills threatening
America's Northern cities: uncontrolled urban sprawl; a continuing influx of immigrants; over-crowding. Above all, perhaps, cities were losing their civility, which Olmsted thought of as "an all-embracing relationship based on the confidence, respect, and interest of each citizen in all and all in each."

Olmsted spent six years as a respected if not affluent writer and journalist. Finally, with $5,000 (from his father), he bought a partnership in the firm of Dix and Edwards, publisher of Putnam's Monthly, whose contributors included Herman Melville, Henry David Thoreau and Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. Olmsted felt that "this great country and cursedly little people" needed the uplift of a magazine like Putnam's. But Dix and Edwards and Putnam's failed ignominiously in 1857, leaving Olmsted unemployed, in debt, and deeply humiliated.

He was now 35 years old, and the parts of his life seemed to add up merely to the sum of those parts and nothing more. Yet Olmsted had acquired over the years—"without my knowledge, through living a somewhat vagabondish, somewhat poetical life"—a rather unique set of skills and interests. He was an engineer, a surveyor, a horticulturalist, a farmer. He enjoyed an instinctive rapport with "scenery" and had thought deeply about urban life. He was also a writer. This, oddly, proved decisive. As Olmsted later wrote, "If I had not been a 'literary man'... I certainly should not have stood a chance."

An entirely unexpected opportunity had arisen. The movement to build a great park for New York City, long championed...
THE ENVIRONMENT: OLMSTED

by poet-journalist William Cullen Bryant and landscape gardener Andrew Jackson Downing, had just succeeded; the New York legislature had appointed 11 commissioners to supervise the vast new project in the middle of Manhattan, with the $5 million cost to be borne by state and city. Olmsted happened to run into one of the commissioners, Charles Wyllys Elliott, an old friend. A superintendent was wanted, Elliott told him. Fred knew about land, and he knew about labor. Why not apply? Trading on his literary reputation, Olmsted won the support of many of the most admired men in New York and in the country: Bryant, for one, but also Asa Gray, August Belmont, Washington Irving, Albert Bierstadt. He got the job.

Greensward

With 1,000 workmen, Olmsted began the task of draining swamps, blasting away rock, pulling down the squatters’ shacks and slaughterhouses that cluttered the 770-acre plot. There was still no adequate design for the park, but an open competition was soon announced. Calvert Vaux, a charming and enthusiastic British-born architect and former partner of Andrew Jackson Downing, asked Olmsted to collaborate with him on a plan. Their joint proposal was entitled “Greensward” and in the spring of 1858 it was accepted by the commissioners.

The “Greensward” design for Central Park followed many of the English principles of park planning. The most important compositions were pastoral, where massed foliage framed vistas of meadow or mall. The intent was to soothe rather than excite. Footpaths, bridle paths, and carriage roads were separated from one another and never crossed except at over- and under-passes. The man out for a holiday stroll might want to see others in a gregarious mood as well as view the scenery. Accordingly, Olmsted and Vaux planned a mall sheltered by an arch of American elms and a terrace with a fountain overlooking Central Park Lake. The designers hoped that their mall, like public promenades they had seen in England and Europe, would be a “democratic” institution where visitors of all backgrounds and ages could mingle. Located in the middle of Manhattan, Central Park formed a two-and-one-half-mile-long, one-half-mile-wide barrier to east-west traffic, and the state’s commissioners had demanded roads to accommodate cross-town horse-drawn traffic. Olmsted and Vaux did not want this traffic streaming across the park in full view. Instead, they designed four transverse roads sunken below the landscape, screened by plantings, and crossed by park roadways and paths on wide bridges.
Opened section by section, Central Park proved to be an immediate popular success. Because New York, then as now, was a pacesetter, a cultural capital, other cities took note.

In landscape architecture, Olmsted had at last found a vocation and with a single stroke stepped to its forefront. Olmsted also had a family now. His brother had died of tuberculosis in 1857, a last letter imploring Fred: “Don’t let Mary suffer while you are alive.” In 1859, Fred married John’s widow and became a father of three. (He and Mary would produce two children of their own.) John’s death took much of the ebullience out of Olmsted and left him prone to overwork as a tonic: “Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy whole might.”

Fred spent the early part of the Civil War as executive secretary of the U.S. Sanitary Commission, set up to help tend the wounded and maintain the health of the Union Army. He mounted a well-run evacuation by sea of Union casualties from General George McClellan’s ill-fated Peninsula Campaign in July 1862 and was on hand, a year later, for the grim cleanup at Gettysburg. Local farmers had already scavenged the battlefield, he wrote, but “a great business is being done in disinterring bodies for embalming and shipment north.” Soon afterward, Olmsted arrived in California (on behalf of a consortium of New York businessmen) to manage Mariposa, a 45,000-acre estate flecked with gold mines.

Turning the Tide

In California, Olmsted’s landscaping practice began to grow, with little salesmanship on his part. His reputation had preceded him. He was commissioned to design a cemetery in Oakland and the new university campus at Berkeley, and was instrumental in preserving Yosemite as a scenic reservation. (Olmsted spent $2,000 out of his own pocket to have the valley mapped.) A park system Olmsted designed for San Francisco was rejected as too expensive. Among other things, he had proposed a sunken parkway that would also have served as a firebreak, dividing the city in half along what is now Van Ness Avenue (which is where the great fire of 1906 was checked by dynamiting houses).

When the Mariposa mines failed in 1865, Olmsted’s old Central Park collaborator, Calvert Vaux, lured him back east. As partners, they started work immediately on Brooklyn’s new Prospect Park, then took on projects in Newark, Philadelphia, and Hartford. At Riverside, near Chicago, they designed a suburban village, arranging houses and foliage, parks and pavilions.
along a riverbank to encourage, they hoped, “harmonious cooperation of men in a community.” Olmsted never concealed the civilizing intent of his work.

Both men considered a well-designed suburb to be “the best application of the arts of civilization to which mankind has yet attained.” Railway, telegraph, and telephone were rapidly making a new kind of city, where many people with jobs downtown could live on the town’s outskirts. Suburbs had to be planned, Olmsted argued, so as to reconcile “a measure of town convenience with a measure of rural village beauty.” Because the “outskirts” of 1870 would not be the outskirts of 1970, something also had to be done to keep the suburbs distinctive.

The chief enemy, as Olmsted saw it, was the grid layout. The grid street-plan adopted by New York in 1811, for example, swallowed everything in its path as the city grew: hills, valleys, streams. The uniform 200-foot-wide blocks made narrow tenement houses almost inevitable. Olmsted twice tried, unsuccessfully, to lay out undeveloped parts of upper Manhattan and the Bronx so that streets would follow the terrain and a suburban flavor would stand a chance of surviving. It was an era of corrupt city bosses and greedy developers; few in power would listen. Hence, Olmsted built his spacious suburbs farther out, where they are now—e.g., Tarrytown, New York, and Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts.

Olmsted and Vaux parted ways in 1872, their reputations established, their relations warm enough, despite some strain and jealousy, to permit occasional collaboration. Olmsted eventually took a son and stepson into the business and pressed on. He designed parks and gardens in Boston, Buffalo, Rochester; suburban subdivisions outside Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago; the grounds of Biltmore (the Vanderbilt estate in North Carolina); the 1893 Chicago World’s Fair. He landscaped hospitals, railroad stations, state capitols. He laid out the campus of Stanford University, ignoring the founder’s suggestion that it resemble a New England college. “If we are to look for types of buildings and arrangements suitable to the climate of California,” he wrote, “it will rather be in those founded by the wiser men of Syria, Greece, Italy, and Spain.”

Olmsted worked well into the 1890s, failing slowly, depending on his partner and stepson, John C. Olmsted, to make “any confusion in my mind as little conspicuous as possible.” In 1898, aged 77 and senile, FLO was committed to McLean’s Hospital outside Boston. He had designed the hospital grounds but didn’t appreciate the result. (“They didn’t carry out my plan, confound them!”) He died in 1903.
Not many years before entering McLean's, Olmsted had written to Elizabeth Baldwin, by then Mrs. William Dwight Whitney, impulsively resuming their correspondence after half a century. He wrote:

I need not conceal from you that I am sure that the result of what I have done is to be of much more consequence than any one else but myself supposes. As I travel I see traces of influences spreading from it that no one else would detect—which, if given any attention by others should be attributed to “fashion.” There are, scattered through the country, 17 large public parks, many more smaller ones, many more public or semi-public works, upon which, with sympathetic partners or pupils, I have been engaged....[T]hey are a hundred years ahead of any spontaneous public demand.... And they are having an educative effect perfectly manifest to me—a manifest civilizing effect.

Frederick Law Olmsted’s great work was done at a time when the landscape architect and the sanitary engineer combined forces to plan for American cities. He lived into the period when architects such as Daniel Burnham and Stanford White assumed the major role in planning. Moving away from Olmsted, they put greater emphasis on designing an unabashedly formal, monumental downtown, insisting that it was in all cases appropriate. Olmsted found himself swimming against the tide, vowsing that “I shall not sink before having seen it turn.”

He did sink before the tide turned, but he had influenced (and helped to train) a generation of landscape architects. Under John C. Olmsted’s and later Frederick, Jr.’s direction, Olmsted’s firm continued to thrive until 1954. More important, by deed rather than word, he had educated the public. In the years since Olmsted’s death, popular appreciation of the need for sensible urban and suburban planning, for open space, for vast, un molested wilderness parks, has not diminished. Quite the contrary. Against the chronic pressures of urban economics and short-range schemes, Olmsted’s views remain an important corrective influence; his ideas, like his landscapes, are living things and live on.
At the micromolecular level, there is no difference between a piece of fruit and a brain. What enables the latter and not the former to generate ideas? Why was it Newton who discovered gravity and not the apple?
The Brain

"To look into the heart is not enough," T. S. Eliot once wrote. "One must also look into the cerebral cortex." Last year, three American researchers—Roger Sperry of Cal Tech and Torsten Wiesel and David Hubel of Harvard—shared a Nobel Prize in medicine for doing just that. Brain research is both very new and very old. Contemporary specialists wrestle with problems that confounded the ancient Greeks, even as their findings alter the way we think (as individuals and as a society) about sexuality, childhood, education, senility, personality, and much else. While the advances of the past century in our understanding of the brain are real, so are the baffling vistas that every new advance brings into view. Here, in a three-part essay, neurologist Richard Restak reflects on what we know, don't know, and by all odds can not know about the brain.

by Richard M. Restak

To Aristotle, the brain was merely a cooling system for the blood as it left the heart. Assyrians favored the liver as the seat of the "soul." The Egyptians who embalmed the pharaohs carefully preserved most major organs in special jars—but not the brain, thinking it inconsequential.

Natural philosophers and physicians in ancient Greece eventually ascertained the true state of affairs—some centuries before the birth of Christ—but enlightenment gave rise to mysteries of a subtler sort. Granted that the brain is, after all, the center of conscious experience. Granted that it governs the way we perceive, think about, and react to the world; holds our memories in trust; sows, germinates, tends, reaps, harvests, and husbands our emotions; sustains our very sense of self. Given all that, how does the organ work?

The functioning of the brain has been variously likened to the workings of a telephone switchboard, a railway system, a computer. None of these models has proved entirely adequate. So far as we know, the brain is unlike any other structure in the
universe, and perhaps only the vast universe itself presents conceptual problems of equal complexity.

In terms of “hardware” alone, we are dealing with an organ composed of 10 to 15 billion highly differentiated yet profoundly interlocked brain cells. Beyond issues of structure lurk questions that transcend biology. “Know thyself,” Socrates advised. But can one, really?

The issues posed by “the brain” are as broad as life itself. What happens inside our heads when we write poetry, solve a puzzle, conduct business, fall in love? What made Rembrandt Rembrandt? Why are we sad or happy? How do we learn? Why do we forget? How do we remember? What is mental illness? What causes it? How “real” is “perception”? Driven by curiosity, altruism, or professional ambition (and what, incidentally, is the source of these drives?), hundreds of researchers in America and Europe are engrossed in such questions. Here and there, they are closing in on something that may approximate the truth. Here and there, they have run into a fog bank.

I MAPPING THE HEMISPHERES

The research conducted by Roger Sperry, Torsten Wiesel, and David Hubel that led to a Nobel Prize in 1981 involved the study of the two cerebral hemispheres. While their research was carried out during the past 25 years, the first investigations into the functioning of the hemispheres occurred nearly 25 centuries ago. The investigator was the Greek, Hippocrates (ca. 460-377 B.C.).

Hippocrates was the first to suggest that the brain was the organ of the mind. In his treatise On the Sacred Disease (epilepsy), he wrote: “Not only our pleasure, our joy, and our laughter, but also our sorrow, pain, grief, and tears arise from the brain, and the brain alone.” A meticulous observer, Hippocrates also noticed

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"Foster here is the left side of my brain, and Mr. Hoagland is the right side of my brain" was the caption of this 1977 New Yorker cartoon. The nature, degree, and implications of the differences between the two cerebral hemispheres remain a matter of debate.

that a sword wound to the right side of a soldier's head would affect only the left side of the body—and vice versa. From this, he concluded that "the brain of man is double." There matters rested for more than two millennia.

While the Romans, Arabs, and medieval Christians often mused on the locus and nature of "mind" and "soul," it was not until the 19th century that brain research came into its own.

In 1861, a young French physician named Paul Broca published an account of a patient in the Salpetrière who had suffered a stroke years earlier. Rather than rendering him completely mute, however, the stroke had allowed the patient to speak in short, laborious, telegraphic sentences (e.g., "I went restaurant food"), a condition Broca called aphasia. Examination of the patient's brain after death revealed a precise area of destruction in the left cerebral hemisphere that, Broca postulated, was responsible for speech.

Examination of other patients later corroborated Broca's assertion and initiated a lively interest (which continues) in correlating behavior with discrete parts of the brain. Thus, we can now "map" the brain in a rough sort of way, pinpointing which
portions are generally involved with vision, smell, movement, bodily sensation. One of the unintended consequences of the work of Broca and others was to lend impetus to the already popular "science" of phrenology, which, though misguided, did spur further interest in brain/behavior research.

Meanwhile, other researchers busied themselves with the larger implications of a human brain made up of two hemispheres. In 1844, an English physician, A. L. Wigen, published a little-noticed paper (The Duality of the Mind) describing the illness, death, and autopsy of a lifelong friend and patient. At the autopsy, Wigen discovered to his amazement that his friend, who had been neurologically normal in every respect, possessed only one cerebral hemisphere. "If only one cerebrum was required to have a mind," Wigen concluded, "the presence of two hemispheres [the normal state] makes possible and perhaps even inevitable the possession of two minds."

Wigen's speculations remained largely untested until the 1940s when brain researchers began cutting the corpus callosum (a tract of nerve fibers, also called the cerebral commissure, connecting the two hemispheres) to prevent seizure discharges from being relayed from one hemisphere to the other. The earliest researchers reported that the operation had no detectable effect on behavior. Clarification of the true situation awaited the Nobel Prize-winning efforts of Sperry and his colleagues. They

Phrenology was promoted by a Viennese physician, Joseph Gall (1768–1828), who believed that a person's mental faculties—intelligence, spirituality, "amative"ness”—could be deduced from the configuration of the skull. "Palpating" the skull was all the rage on both sides of the Atlantic.
demonstrated in "split-brain" subjects that each hemisphere is specialized for carrying out certain functions. Thus, in general, the right hemisphere is specialized for functions that deal with nonverbal processes (e.g., drawing, spatial awareness) while the left hemisphere is dominant for language.

While work with split-brain subjects has contributed immensely to our understanding of the hemispheres, the implications of that work have often been oversimplified. Some have claimed that Western society may be overly dependent on logical, linear, "left hemisphere" processes while Eastern thought is more "holistic" in its orientation. Some American educators have jumped on the bandwagon by suggesting that classroom techniques be modified to encourage freer expression of the "silent, non-dominant" right hemisphere.

When the Blind Can See

We should remember, however, that commissurotomy has been performed on very few people, all of whom have suffered unusual, chronic brain disease or disabling seizure disorders. Moreover, most authorities believe that hemisphere specialization can be altered profoundly by events early in life (e.g., birth trauma, infection). Thus, it is risky to leap from pathological cases to speculation about how the two hemispheres operate in presumably "normal" people.

Cooperation rather than competition between the two hemispheres seems to be the situation prevailing under most conditions. Both hemispheres, relying on different modes of information processing, operate in tandem to construct a continuous model of reality. Contradictions are resolved via interhemispheric connections—principally but not exclusively the corpus callosum. There are other important connecting links located deep beneath the cerebral hemispheres, where subcortical nerve cells serve as relay points enabling the two hemispheres to "talk" with each other. A significant degree of "processing," it appears, is carried out here long before nerve signals ever reach the cerebral cortex.

Take the phenomenon of "blind sight."

Penetrating injuries to the back of the head sustained by soldiers during World War I first revealed to researchers that the posterior parts of the brain, the occipital lobes, are involved in vision. Soldiers lost their sight in proportion to the amount of damaged "visual cortex." In the most devastating wounds, vision was lost altogether, an often cited "proof" that vision was "located" in the occipital lobes. But it turns out that things
aren't nearly that simple.

For example, if a flash of light or sudden movement occurs in front of a blind person and he is asked to point in the direction of the visual stimulus, he will respond correctly 85 percent of the time. This is possible because of the connections that still exist between the eyes and portions of the brain far below the cerebral hemispheres. In monkeys, these connections are so developed that, in the event of cerebral damage to the visual cortex, the animals may recover useful sight. The phenomenon of "blind sight" also shows that the brain's performance is not dependent on consciousness, for the blind person insists that he is unable to "see" any visual stimulus at all.

Synthesizing Perception

The visual cortex, it turns out, is the seat of conscious awareness. But often we perceive things unconsciously. Waking from a sound sleep to the noise of a ringing telephone is an example. The visual area of the brain, neurobiologists now think, is more concerned with the interpretation of visual stimuli rather than simply with "sight." Immediately adjacent to the area for visual reception in the cortex are the visual association areas, which correlate what we see with what we hear, taste, touch, and smell. The resulting "product" of this interlocking system is our perception of reality. I do not mean to imply that the "real world" is only a construction of our brain. That form of idealism died out with Bishop Berkeley. It does suggest, however, that we impose meaning upon our perceptions.

The cerebral cortex is responsible for the synthesis of sight and sound and touch into a coherent whole. Usually, this synthetic process occurs effortlessly, but, on occasion, the process breaks down. For example, a patient with visual agnosia may be incapable of recognizing an object or person by vision alone. Though not blind, he must touch the object or hear the person speak in order for recognition to occur.

It is sobering to think that the ability to "make sense" of our world is at the mercy of the slightest alteration in the amount of blood delivered to the brain. A person who has suffered a stroke may be incapable of understanding speech or written language. He may fail to recognize that his own arms and legs belong to him. Some of these lost functions may be recovered after a time, indicating that the brain has great recuperative powers and can "reassign" certain tasks (e.g., speech) to undamaged areas. But the degree of recovery is almost always incomplete.

Interestingly, if the injury occurs early enough, total "refit"
is possible. A child of eight or nine can suffer brain damage or even the complete loss of a cerebral hemisphere and yet go on to develop normally—as apparently happened with Dr. Wigen's patient. But by age 10 or 12, the prognosis will be similar to that for an adult: a largely irreversible loss of function. Why? Neurobiologists cannot say for sure. The brain's recuperative powers are thought to depend on an early "plasticity." As time goes on, specialization takes over and specific functions establish "squatter's rights" in one hemisphere and not the other.

Brain researchers are now trying to discover precisely why this occurs and whether the brain's early plasticity can ever be regained. There are some hopeful signs. For example, as Michael Gazzaniga, director of the Division of Cognitive Neurosciences at Cornell University, has shown, the right hemisphere is capable of primitive speech (on the level of a six- or eight-year-old child). It is possible, then, that drawing, speaking, writing, and other abilities exist "holistically" within the brain, at least potentially, and are not limited to specialized "centers" within one hemisphere or the other.

"No, I Can Never Say 'No'!"

The notion of "holistic" brain functioning can be traced back 120 years. During the 1860s, a dour and solitary English neurologist, John Hughlings Jackson, developed the novel theory that the central nervous system has a complex "vertical" organization with many functions somehow represented at different levels, starting with the lowest (and, biologically, most ancient) spinal cord level and proceeding up to the rarified realm of the cerebral cortex. Jackson's theory was based on his observation that a circumscribed injury never leads to a complete loss of function—even Broca's "aphasic" patient was able to speak, albeit clumsily.

As proof of a multilevel organization, Jackson cited a patient of his who could not voluntarily speak the word "no," but one day blurted out in frustration: "No, Doctor, I can never say 'no'!" A similar anomaly has been observed in stroke victims who, under the power of a strong emotion, can move a paralyzed limb. Such performances are possible, according to Jackson, because the brain is able to utilize alternative pathways that, under ordinary circumstances, are either totally unused or merely complementary to the main pathway. The difference is perhaps analogous to that between the Post Road and I-95.

Jackson's theory of alternative brain pathways met with disbelief in his own time, but many modern brain researchers
THE UNSOLICITED GIFT

There was once an illiterate shopkeeper in an Arab bazaar, called Ali, who, not being very good at doing sums, was always cheated by his customers—instead of cheating them, as it should be. So he prayed every night to Allah for the present of an abacus.... But some malicious djin forwarded his prayers to the wrong branch of the heavenly Mail Order Department, and so one morning, arriving at the bazaar, Ali found his stall transformed into a multi-storey, steel-framed building, housing the latest I.B.M. computer with instrument panels covering all the walls, with thousands of fluorescent oscillators, dials, magic eyes, et cetera; and an instruction book of several hundred pages—which, being illiterate, he could not read. However, after days of useless fiddling with this or that dial, he flew into a rage and started kicking a shiny, delicate panel. The shocks disturbed one of the machine’s millions of electronic circuits, and after a while Ali discovered to his delight that if he kicked that panel, say, three times and afterwards five times, one of the dials showed the figure eight! He thanked Allah for having sent him such a pretty abacus, and continued to use the machine to add up two and three—happily unaware that it was capable of deriving Einstein’s equations in a jiffy....

now find it fits both research findings and common sense observations. In their view, mental processes should be regarded as complex functions that are diffused throughout the brain and nervous system, not "localized" (à la Broca).

A creative tension persists today between the view that the brain can be understood by separating it into functional areas and the opposite orientation, which holds that mental life is a single, indivisible, "holistic" phenomenon, a function of the whole brain working in a unitary fashion. Some neuroscientists straddle the fence by postulating that the most basic brain functions (movement, sight) can be localized while symbolic activities (thought, the exercise of "will") cannot. Like the Missouri Compromise, this gallant effort does not quite do.

The exercise of "will," for instance, may be electrically distributed throughout the brain even when the resulting action is extremely localized in its final form. If a person in an experimental situation is instructed to move his finger at any time he wishes, the first recorded electrical event preceding the movement is a widespread "readiness potential" that can be recorded over a large area of both cerebral hemispheres. Only several milliseconds later can a distinct readiness potential be
Ali's children, then his grandchildren, inherited the machine and the secret of kicking that same panel; but it took hundreds of generations until they learned to use it even for the purpose of simple multiplication. We ourselves are Ali's descendants, and though we have discovered many other ways of putting the machine to work, we have still only learned to utilise a very small fraction of the potentials of its estimated hundred thousand million circuits. For the unsolicited gift is of course the human brain. As for the instruction book, it is lost—if it ever existed. Plato maintains that it did once—but that is hearsay.

The comparison is less far-fetched than it may seem. Evolution, whatever the driving force behind it, caters for the species' immediate adaptive needs; and the emergence of novelties in anatomical structure and function is by and large guided by these needs. It is entirely unprecedented that evolution should provide a species with an organ which it does not know how to use; a luxury organ, like Ali's computer, far exceeding its owner's immediate, primitive needs; an organ which will take the species millennia to learn to put to proper use—if it ever does.

—Arthur Koestler

recorded specifically from the "hand area" of the motor cortex.

Widely separated parts of the brain are required for carrying out the simplest of actions. Voluntary movement of the hands, for instance, is virtually impossible without the cerebellum, which designs movements that must be "pre-programmed" since they occur too fast and too "unthinkingly." Electrical recordings taken just before I put pen to paper might well register "readiness" in the sensory cortex, cerebellum, and motor control centers beneath the cortex, as well as in the limbic system, the "emotional area" of my brain.

The most convincing proof that the brain is organized along functional rather than strictly anatomical lines comes from stimulation studies of the exposed cerebral cortex. Because the brain does not contain pain fibers, a person undergoing a neurosurgical procedure can remain awake while parts of his cerebral cortex are stimulated with an electronic probe. From such "fishing expeditions," scientists have learned that the various parts of the body are represented on the cortex not according to size but in proportion to usefulness. The thumb and the tongue, for instance, occupy a huge area, while the small of the back and the chest wall have only tiny representations.
II THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE SELF

During the 1950s, neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield and his colleagues at the Montreal Neurological Institute made a startling discovery. They learned that past events in a patient's life could be mentally "brought to life" by an electrode applied to the temporal lobe—the "interpretive cortex" as Penfield called it. Although bodily movements could also be induced, these movements never proceeded beyond crude clutching or grasping motions. Electrodes could not elicit responses requiring fine motor control or coordination, because the stimulation never involved part of a willed act or "program" such as we use when carrying out a complex movement. Penfield's work was, in fact, one of the earliest indications that acts rather than separate muscle movements are programmed within the brain.

Penfield's patients frequently reported that, upon stimulation, everything around them seemed to have occurred before. One patient heard his mother speaking on the telephone. Another patient experienced the vivid hallucination of riding in a car around Fordham Square in the Bronx with his father.

Throughout, the patients remained fully aware that their strange mental experiences did not correspond to any events actually taking place in the operating theater, but were somehow the direct result of the surgeon's electrical probe. It was obvious to Penfield that "there is, beneath the electrode, a recording mechanism for memories of events. But the mechanism seems to have recorded much more than the simple event. When activated, it may reproduce the emotions which attended the original experience. . . ."

The temporal lobe is the center for the integration of experience. Here sight and sound and touch are synthesized into three-dimensional reality bounded in space and time. Disturbances within the temporal lobe, such as temporal lobe epilepsy, result in emotional distortions. Time and space may seem elongated or foreshortened. Anxiety may alternate with feelings of cosmic unity. The individual may express a sense of oneness with all of creative matter. Or he may cringe in fear, gripped by a terrible existential angst.

Fyodor Dostoyevsky, a temporal lobe epileptic, described in *The Idiot* the ecstasy that accompanied the onset of an epileptic attack. "[T]here was always one instant," he wrote, "just before the epileptic fit—when suddenly in the midst of sadness, spiritual darkness, and oppression, his brain seemed momentarily to catch fire and in an extraordinary rush all his vital forces
were at their highest tension.”

Our own sense of certainty, personal cohesion, and familiarity with our surroundings are dependent on the smooth functioning of the temporal lobe. The temporal lobe is an extension of the ancient limbic system, which in lower animals is concerned with smell. In higher mammals and man, the smell function has decreased in importance to be replaced by vision and hearing. Indeed, in humans, the *rhinencephalon*, once concerned with smell, has become associated with emotion.

Studies of ancient brain structures have been carried out at the Laboratory of Brain Evolution and Behavior of the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health in Poolesville, Maryland. The director, Dr. Paul MacLean, who originated the term limbic system, compares the human brain to an archaeological site. The outermost portion, the cerebral cortex, which is highly de-

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**THE HUMAN BRAIN**

Enclosed within a bony skull and three enveloping membranes, the human brain is nourished by the one and one-half pints of blood pumped through it each minute. Since the time of our hominid ancestors, the human brain has grown in size by 300 percent, more than any other part of the body.
developed in man, envelopes deeper layers that contain structures shared with our reptilian and mammalian forebears. MacLean believes that many of our mental processes are related to those that prevailed in ancient subhuman forms. For instance, human aggressiveness is a carry-over from a time when hominids often faced a simple choice: Kill or be killed. In modern society, by contrast, aggressiveness generally leads only to trouble. The tension between, say, talking peace and preparing for war can be understood, according to MacLean, as “schizo-physiology,” a split between the thinking portions of our brain (the cerebral cortex) and the feeling portions (the limbic system).* In epilepsy and certain forms of mental illness, especially schizophrenia, dysfunctions in the limbic system produce emotional reactions that are “irrational”—out of touch with reality. Brain researchers are now trying to develop drugs that will harmonize the limbic and cerebral structures.

Theories Old and New

The deeper brain scientists dig, the more they discover. Like archaeologists, they tag and catalogue new findings, testing old theories against fresh evidence. As a result, during the past several years, many long cherished concepts of brain function have been discarded. The implications for our ideas about memory, language, and mind may be profound.

Consider the “one neuron, one neurotransmitter” hypothesis, formulated during the 1930s. A neuron (brain cell) was thought to contain a single neurotransmitter that, upon stimulation, was released into the synaptic cleft, the tiny gap separating one nerve cell from another. At the time, only two transmitters were known and they were conveniently appropriated to explain “excitation” and “inhibition.” An inhibitory neurotransmitter prevented adjoining neurons from “firing”; an excitatory neurotransmitter activated adjoining neurons.

Despite its appeal, the “one neuron, one neurotransmitter” doctrine eventually came a cropper. For one thing, the menagerie of neurotransmitters has turned out to be very large. Only a few years ago, new neurotransmitters were being discovered every few months. Moreover, during the past few years, more than 20 peptide hormones (short-chain amino acids) have

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*A similar split between “thinking” and “feeling” may also be seen in today’s professed enthusiasm for avoiding firm commitment in male-female relations. This view denies the limbic underpinnings of sexual desire, possessiveness, and jealousy. Although a good argument could be made that human relationships might run more smoothly in the absence of these complicated emotions, it is unlikely that they will disappear if we simply ignore them.
been identified in the brain. The tasks performed by these peptides vary from place to place. Some of them are neurotransmitters. The much publicized enkephalins or endorphins (the body's own narcotic) control our perception of pain. Within the eye, other peptides process various kinds of visual information.

Scientists at the Karolinska Institute in Stockholm have demonstrated that some cells in the brain contain both peptides and "classical" neurotransmitters. They have also shown that pairs of neurotransmitters are located at individual synaptic junctions (where communication between cells takes place) implying that a nerve cell is capable of releasing one or both.

Brain cells, in short, do not behave quite like pinballs. Limiting our observations to whether a neuron "fires" is as satisfactory as trying to appreciate a Brahms symphony by assiduously determining from moment to moment whether a particular violin happens to be in play. Modulation, subtleties of response, and polyphonic interaction among many neurons are the key to understanding the action of single neurons.

The most exciting recent finding is that cells that have no direct connection with neurons employing peptides as neurotransmitters are nonetheless influenced when the nearby peptide synapses are activated. Presumably, the peptides diffuse from the synaptic area and activate receptors on the cell's surface. This means, essentially, that at least in some areas of the brain, information transfer can take place without the presence of synapses. This shatters notions of brain function as a linear process (a "digital" process in computer terminology).

The Question of Language

During the past few years, then, researchers have abandoned many entrenched beliefs about brain function. Freed from conceptual straitjackets, they have undertaken imaginative "I wonder what would happen if . . ." kinds of excursions into unknown territory. Thus, Dr. Floyd Bloom, director of the Arthur Vining Davis Center for Behavioral Neurobiology at the Salk Institute in San Diego, has investigated memory by injecting small amounts of vasopressin (a neuropeptide) into the brain ventricles of rats previously trained to jump onto a pole in order to avoid a painful electrical shock. Bloom found that these rats retained "memories" of their training for longer periods of time than did rats injected only with salt water. Bloom later performed experiments on people, with similar results. Neuropeptides, he believes, may signal "that the survival of the animal is challenged and that the animal had best be attentive.
ELECTRONIC "WINDOWS"

The first tool that provided a "window" into brain functioning was the electroencephalogram (EEG), developed 57 years ago by a German psychiatrist, Hans Berger. A shy, reclusive man, greatly interested in psychic phenomena, he rarely spoke publicly of his belief that the human brain generated spontaneous electrical signals that could be measured and interpreted. Not until 1934 were Berger's findings confirmed.

Among the newest and most exciting instruments of exploration are CAT and PET scanners. The CAT (computerized axial tomography) scanner combines conventional x rays with computer techniques to provide, in essence, a cross section of the brain or any other part of the body. Since its introduction in 1972, the CAT scan has revolutionized medicine by allowing neuroscientists to envision the subtle structural changes within the brain that accompany tumors and strokes. The newer PET (position emission tomography) scanner reveals activity within the brain—what is going on metabolically or chemically. For instance, an injection of glucose tagged with a radioactive "tracer" can be tracked through the brain to the site where it is metabolized.

BEAM (brain electrical activity mapping) uses computers to produce a color contour map of the electrical activity at the brain's surface. The computers can also be used in "evoked potentials" studies to average out the background "noise" that is present even when the brain is "idling." This enables neuroscientists to trace elementary sounds and flashes of light through multiple "way stations" within the brain. A single clicking sound, for example, can be broken down into eight different components starting with the ear and extending up to the auditory cortex. Abnormalities point to the location and, often, the nature of a disease.

The CAT scan shows abscess forming inside the skull of a teenager. The youth had been hit in the head with a baseball.

to its surroundings"—thereby enhancing memory. It is not too far-fetched to think that various neuropeptides will, one day, be assumed into the repertoire of pharmacology for humans.

An interest in behavior is shared by brain scientists of diverse persuasions and interests. Why do animals—and people—act the way they do? What brain events correspond with conscious experience? For instance, what is going on in my brain when, in a restaurant, I order a chocolate soufflé? How
does it differ from events that would accompany my choosing apple pie à la mode instead? Implicit in such questions is the assumption that there must exist correlations between my choices and the events going on in my brain. But what are they?

The answer immediately introduces two levels of discourse masquerading as only one. To choose a chocolate soufflé is an act of will. It requires the use of words in a language that will be meaningful to the waiter and involves innumerable variables that can never be reduced to an explanation at the level of a chemical slipping across a synapse. Why am I in the restaurant in the first place? What does my ordering of a highly caloric dessert imply about my attitude toward obesity?

To ask such questions is immediately to participate in a long-standing debate regarding the place of language in human motivation. To some researchers, human language is only a more sophisticated version of the kinds of communication seen in lower primates. Attempts to teach chimps to speak have, on occasion, been declared successful; yet, invariably, the “language” has been revealed as only a clever form of imitation or, in the words of Sir Edmund Leach, a series of “circus tricks.”

Nothing But, Nothing More

The debate over the uniqueness (if such it is) of human language and culture has great implications for brain research. And, if Sir Edmund is correct, then the social sciences—sociology, psychology, anthropology, and the rest—can never be based on the kinds of rules that govern the natural sciences; human attitudes, voting behavior, choices can never be predicted, or even explained with any precision. In other words, a detailed study of the brain is not ever going to shed much light on why I choose a chocolate soufflé over pie à la mode. As Leach put it, the capacity to make choices, which is linked to language, “represents a major discontinuity with the rest of nature.” Our biology may constrain our behavior, but it does not dictate it.

How, then, is the mind related to the brain? “Reductionism,” the simplest and currently the most popular view among nonbiologists, assumes that the mind is nothing more than the brain. As Carl Sagan wrote in *The Dragons of Eden*, “My fundamental premise about the brain is that its workings—what we sometimes call ‘mind’—are a consequence of its anatomy and physiology and nothing more.” Sagan’s “nothing more” is a first cousin of the “nothing but . . .” argument ridiculed a few years ago by Arthur Koestler: “Love is nothing but sublimated sexuality. The mind is nothing but the brain and so on.” Such
"nothing but" arguments reduce complex biological phenomena to principles everyone thinks he is familiar with. In neurobiology, the argument takes the form: "If we only knew enough about the brain, all of the mysteries concerning 'mind' would disappear."

Yet everything that we have learned about the brain over the years points away from any simplistic relationship between neurons and the expression of mind. Performance is not confined to any specific portion of the brain but is "spread out." The brain is thus highly localized yet exhibits confounding "nonspecificity." Brain researchers still have not resolved this conundrum, and perhaps never will.

III WHAT IS "UNDERSTANDING"?

Can the brain understand itself? There is no way for us to stand back and "objectively observe" the brain or even theorize about it, without encountering constraints that are inherent in our neuronal networks. To what extent can "reality" or "truth" be ascertained when the inquiring organ—the brain—itself exhibits significant perceptual biases that can never be altered?

In 1922, Werner Heinsenberg, a student of Danish physicist Niels Bohr, asked his mentor: "If the structure of the atom is as closed to descriptive accounts as you say, if we really lack a language for dealing with it, how can we ever hope to understand atoms?" Bohr's response could be applied to our attempt to "understand" the human brain: "I think we may yet be able to do so. But in the process we may have to learn what the word 'understanding' really means."

In recent years, physicists have joined forces with brain researchers. From this marriage of "hard" and "soft" science have come some impressive advances in our capacity to observe the brain. The advent of CAT scans has laid bare the structure of the human brain in ways that formerly were impossible without wielding saw and scalpel and actually "taking a look." PET and BEAM scans let us see the brain "in action."

But the marriage has sometimes been stormy, for physics, ever since the development of quantum mechanics, has been an extraordinarily "counterintuitive" discipline. Its principles are not readily grasped. It does not "make sense" in the same way that Newtonian physics did. As Heisenberg put it, "All the words or concepts we use to describe ordinary physical objects such as
position, velocity, color, size, and so on become indefinite and problematic if we try to [apply them to] elementary particles."

While many brain researchers continue to suggest models of the brain based upon the notion that its functioning must inevitably involve a process that can somehow be "pictured" (e.g., a telephone switchboard), others have lately been more daring. For instance, a physics-based theory of brain organization has been advanced relying on the principles of "holography," a technique invented by physicist Dennis Gabor in 1948.

A laser beam directed at a holographic plate at a precise angle will reconstitute (in space, and before one's eyes) a three-dimensional image of any object or scene previously encoded on the plate. If the hologram is a good one, the projected image—a game of chess, say—looks as if it is actually "there." The perspective will vary properly if one moves about the room. Some day, every museum will be able to display Michelangelo's Pietà.

The curious thing is that each portion of the holographic plate contains all the information necessary for reconstituting the image. One can snip off a corner or cut a hole through the middle but the plate still functions, although the quality of the image will progressively deteriorate the more one snips away.

Brain scientists, principally Stanford University's Karl Pribram, suggest that the brain, particularly the cerebral cortex, is the biological equivalent of a hologram. Such a theory is consistent with many of the findings of brain research cited earlier. Wilder Penfield's work with electrical stimulation in effect resulted in the release of a holographic memory complete down to the finest details. Rats have been shown to retain their ability to run mazes despite the excision of more than 50 percent of their cerebral cortex, with performance dropping off in proportion to the amount of brain removed rather than the specific area of removal—excepting, of course, those parts of the brain necessary for movement itself.*

Another example of the progress physics has made possible is the PET scan, which allows us to "see" biochemical processes within discrete areas of the brain. From a PET scan image taken earlier, a trained radiologist can tell whether you were reading and thinking, lifting a pair of barbells, or resting quietly as your brain was being scanned.

*There is a classic joke about a scientist who wanted to see what effect removal of an animal's legs would have on its performance. He removed one leg and said "Jump" and the animal jumped, albeit with some difficulty. He performed the same experiment after removing the animal's second and third legs. Again the animal jumped, with greater difficulty. But when all the legs were gone, the animal failed to respond. The scientist concluded that removal of all four legs had resulted in loss of will.
LIFTING THE CANOPY

All sensation and experience are derived from signals running to the brain down tiny nerve fibers. The brain does not receive light or sound but rather patterns of electrical signals that must be decoded. How do these signals travel?

Consider a reflex. Scientists once thought that a rather simple process was involved: Striking the knee sends an impulse from a sensory neuron into the spinal cord, from which a motor neuron fires a signal that finally results in the sudden jerking of the leg—a simple two-neuron process. And so, in fact, it is in sea anemones.

But in humans, the reflex involves nerve cells as far distant as the cerebral cortex. (That is why physicians must distract patients—to "get their minds off" what is happening.) Indeed, most of the neurons involved are neither sensory (originating in the skin) nor motor (connecting directly with the muscles). Almost all (99.9 percent) are intervening intermediate neurons. Some 3,000 to 5,000 of them may be affecting each motor neuron, even as they communicate with each other in intricate patterns. Tracking a signal from impulse to reflex thus becomes virtually impossible.

Imagine a billiard table over which a canopy has been spread that covers the center. All that is visible in this "thought experiment" is the rectangular outer edge, around which we can periodically see stray balls careening off the cushions or dropping into the pockets. Since the initial arrangement of the balls and the angle of deflection of the shots is hidden from view, it is impossible to determine which billiard ball is affecting which of its neighbors or how. That, roughly, is the position brain researchers are in.

Some scientists believe computers will one day "lift the canopy." That view is misleading. Kenneth Boulding, a former president of the Society for General Systems Research, has noted that 10 billion neurons each capable of only a single "on-off" response would yield $2^{10,000,000,000}$ (a number so large that it would take 90 years to write it out by hand one digit per second) different possible states. And neurons are capable of more than a single on-off response.
In the PET technique, a biologically active chemical compound is introduced into the brain labeled with a radioactive isotope that decays immediately by emitting a positron. Almost instantaneously, the particle combines with an electron within the brain. These are then mutually annihilated with the emission of two gamma rays. The gamma rays fly off in opposite directions and penetrate the surrounding brain tissue before exiting. The fugitive gamma rays are recorded by an array of detectors hooked up to computers that then reconstruct the original path of the rays. A "picture" of the brain tissue through which they passed results.

Notice that the PET scan technique is not based on a "model" of how the brain "works." Rather, principles of physics are applied to the brain and an image of brain function emerges. It is not even necessary that the organ under study be a brain. PET scanning is often used to detect abnormalities in heart muscle before the occurrence of a clinical heart attack.

**Puzzling Out the Program**

But, despite the breakthroughs wrought by technology, the essential questions remain unanswered. What is the underlying structural organization of the brain? How did it develop? What is its purpose?

The situation could be compared to that of a computer engineer who one day, while driving through California's "Silicon Valley," encounters a functioning computer set down by the side of the road. His training will enable him to identify the computer's components and hazard an educated guess about its capabilities (the "hardware" considerations). But unless the engineer is also privy to the program being employed (the "software"), he may never be able to figure out what the computer will produce at any given moment.

Brain scientists have learned much about the brain's "hardware" but remain as puzzled as ever about the "programs" that activate this 10 to 15 billion cell network.

One of the most intriguing riddles is whether the brain is capable of conceptualizing *all* possible facets of reality or is limited to only some of them. Because the brain is a biological structure, it must—unless it differs from all other known biological structures—function under certain constraints. No one argues this point at least when it comes to physical constraints. For instance, a fall in the oxygen saturation of blood directed to the brain eventually results in loss of consciousness. But when it comes to concepts, ideas, and symbolizations, the presence of
THE BRAIN

The constraints is vehemently debated.

"When someone maintains that brains cannot be expected to understand brains, the analogy is to the aphorism that a person cannot lift himself by his own bootstraps," writes Nobel laureate David Hubel. "The analogy is not compelling. For all practical purposes, neurobiologists are working on the hunch that they can understand the brain and, for the moment, they are doing well."

Few would deny brain researchers are "doing well." The crux of the argument, however, involves the extent to which further advances will in fact enhance our understanding of the mind-brain relationship rather than confuse us further. And what—to return to the original question—do we mean by "understanding" anyway?

Imagine a scientist who knows nothing about how a traffic signal operates. After observing the signal alternating from red to green with a few seconds of amber in between, the scientist may conclude that the signal operates according to a preselected cycle. After a few hours of studying its internal mechanism, he will probably be able to explain how it "works." At this point, most observers would agree with the scientist's confident assertion that he "understands" the traffic light.

A different observer, however, might point out that the traffic signal is only a mechanical operating device which serves as a symbol for "stop," "go," and "proceed with caution." Anyone who claims to "understand" the traffic light should be able to explain such things as, Why are people willing to behave in certain ways depending on the color of the signal? Suddenly, we are confronted with questions about human motivation and the symbolic structures of our minds. These are not so easy to answer. It is possible that some of them are unanswerable.

The Lessons of Ignorance

This is uncomfortable, disturbing, for we remain steeped in an affinity for mechanism, partly the result of our tool-making capacities and our prehensile thumb. It is natural, therefore, that many attempts to explain the brain should be based purely on neurochemistry and neurophysiology: Certain chemicals cause certain reactions that result in the brain performing in a certain way; the neuron fires, and the discharge is spread throughout parts of the neuronal network. The italicized words are the cumbersome, semantic luggage carried over rather clumsily from the 19th century, when God was considered to be a "glorified engineer." The reality may be far more complicated.
Many theorists are now speculating, for example, that even the biologist's distinction between "organic" and "inorganic" matter is a false one. Why not approach the study of the brain, and, by extension, the mind, via principles that rest on the bedrock of physics rather than biology? Taken a step further, is it not possible that biology, as a discipline, has been justified primarily by our own need to believe that we—along with other "living" organisms—are somehow special? Despite the theoretical nature of these inquiries, the implications of "yea" or "nay" are enormous.

In the case of "yea," one would argue that living and nonliving matter are essentially similar. This theory—along with the quantum physics on which it is based—is remarkable for its counterintuitiveness. We feel "in our bones" that living matter differs from nonliving matter. But so far no one has succeeded in defining the difference at a molecular or submolecular level. If there turns out to be no essential difference, then many of the "dualistic" conflicts that have troubled philosophers from Descartes to Karl Popper would disappear, to be replaced by a unified theory based on physics rather than biology.

As I see it, there would be something fundamentally dis-
THE INTELLIGENCE ENIGMA

In 1969, psychologist Arthur Jensen and his colleagues at the University of California, Berkeley, attributed the low average IQ among U.S. blacks (85, versus a national average of 100) to genetic traits. In angry rebuttal, most other educators pointed to the effect of cultural and environmental factors: poverty, broken homes, lack of intellectual stimulation. Studies cited by economist Thomas Sowell and others have shown that many white groups isolated from "mainstream" American culture (e.g., Jewish immigrants during the 1920s, Tennessee "hillbillies" during the '40s) likewise evidenced a low average IQ, comparable to that of blacks today.

One useful result of this rancorous debate was to prompt a new look at the make-up of intelligence tests themselves. A second was to focus attention on a basic question: What are such tests supposed to measure? What, in other words, is intelligence?

In fact, intelligence is a smorgasbord of widely varying abilities. Attempts to treat it as something "unitary" (beginning with the IQ scale devised by Alfred Binet and Theodore Simon in 1904 to help the French government distinguish between students who were "stupid" and those who were merely "lazy") are mistaken. Some people are astonishingly adept at mathematics but find it difficult to write a letter. Betty Edwards, author of Drawing on the Right Side of the Brain, estimates that the average university graduate draws on the level of a five-year-old. Consider the "idiot savant" who can perform prodigious feats of calculation or play championship chess, but may require permanent institutionalization because "common sense" matters are beyond him.

Tests of intelligence (e.g., the Iowa Test of Basic Skills, the Scholastic Aptitude Test, the National Merit Scholarship Exam) do
THE BRAIN

not—cannot—assess every manifestation of intelligence. How would one gauge the intelligence of a child who, with no prior training or instruction, can unscramble a Rubik's cube in 30 seconds? Intelligence tests are concerned instead with certain "developed" abilities in reading, writing, logic, mathematics. Within strict limits, according to a recent report from the National Academy of Sciences, intelligence tests are useful "predictors" of performance in school and on the job. But they cannot gauge "creativity" or "motivation," and make no claim to measuring "innate" ability.

Even under the best of circumstances, a bias may persist in tests, if only because males and females tend to have a different aptitude for certain tasks. Boys, for example, are favored in tests of math and spatial abilities. During the 1960s, the National Merit Scholarship exam was so skewed toward math, science, and tests of spatial relationships that boys outperformed girls by a wide margin. The exam has since been redesigned.

Intelligence tests may also penalize individuals for their behavior. The ability to sit still and manipulate a pencil does not come easily to "hyperactive" children (almost all of whom are males). It is virtually impossible to estimate the extent to which limited attention span, poor concentration, and impulsiveness may contribute to inferior IQ test results. At the other extreme, professional "coaching" can improve students' test scores significantly.

"Intelligence" is not a useless concept, but it is difficult to define. There is no good reason why intelligence testing, properly conducted and interpreted, should not continue; indeed, new brain-wave measuring techniques have yielded much insight not only into intelligence but also into various neurological complaints. What seems certain, however, is that the day when we can measure intelligence the way we monitor blood pressure is a long way off.

location of a specific subatomic particle at a given moment. It can't really be done. As a result, no neuroscientist can ever exert experimental control over the internal state of a human brain. In a sense, then, choice, whim, and free will are rooted in the very structure of the brain itself.

This is not to say, incidentally, that brain functioning is strictly "free form." On the contrary, randomness at the molecular level is offset by behavioral constraints. Within the human brain, certain biases exist from birth that structure experience along certain lines. The infant, for instance, is born with the capacity to differentiate color, discriminate background noise from pure tone, even recognize and prefer the human face over all competing visual stimuli. An infant only moments out of the womb will turn its head in the direction of a

The Wilson Quarterly/Summer 1982
111
voice (it prefers a female pitch), inquisitively searching for the
source of the sound. Where does such a newborn infant learn
such responses? Obviously, infant behavior is not learned at all.
Such findings are bringing about a reconsideration of the ideas
of Immanuel Kant, who held that all experience is organized
according to the categories of our thought. In other words, our
ways of thinking about space, time, and matter are predeter-
mined by the structure of our mind.

Our visual system, for example, is limited to only a small
segment of the electromagnetic spectrum—namely the radia-
tion of wavelength from about 380 to 760 millimicrons. (The
total range of wavelengths in the electromagnetic spectrum is
from 0.00005 millimicrons to several miles.) This narrow seg-
ment contains all the colors that can be seen by the human eye.
Thus, the very concept “color” depends on the neurological
mechanism operating between eye and brain. Even within the
visible spectrum we are not totally “free.” The eyes are more
sensitive to yellow-green than to violet, blue, or red.

These predispositions to perceive and behave in certain
ways form the basis for recent sociobiological theories regarding
individual as well as cultural development.

Brain researchers have also discovered lately that some of
our most cherished ideas about how we perceive “reality” are
wrong. Vision, for instance, is not based on the brain working as
a kind of slide projector that receives impressions “ready made”
for the eyes. Instead, the cells that gather information from the
light receptors in the retina respond best to a spot of light of a
particular size and in a particular point of the visual field. This
information is conveyed to receptor cells in the visual cortex
that are arranged according to columns that respond to varia-
tion in the angle and orientation of the lines in the visual field.
Reality is a two-way street: We impose “meaning” on the world
even as the world holds up cue cards.

Of even greater importance was the discovery that these
recognition patterns within the brain’s visual cortex required
outside stimulation in order to develop normally. In a child with
strabismus (crossed eyes), one of the eyes is usually suppressed
in favor of the “dominant” eye. If this imbalance is not cor-
corrected, vision is lost in the eye not in use. For this reason,
strabismus and cataracts are now operated on early in life. The
importance of environmental stimulation of brain function per-
sists throughout life and tells us much about ways to prevent
senility. Simply put, the brain (like a muscle) must be used in
order to maintain its optimal functioning. Everything else being
equal, it is the actively involved, mentally stimulated elderly
person who is least likely to develop senility.

We have learned much that is useful and much that is provocative about the brain during the past few decades, but it is too early to say how far we have advanced in mapping the *terra incognita* inside our skulls. Sir Charles Sherrington, a Nobel Prize–winning neurophysiologist, once referred to the brain as an “enchanted loom” that “weaves a dissolving pattern, always a meaningful pattern, though never an enduring one; a shifting harmony of subpatterns.” What is most obvious today is our inability to understand these subpatterns. How are they formed? What is the guiding principle by which billions of neurons can be “orchestrated” to produce a symphony or a sonnet, a poem or play, a PET scanner or paradigm, a Trianon or a trance? We do not, of course, know.

But our ignorance on this score may be beside the point. While brain researchers remain bedeviled by frustrated curiosity, their findings have greatly improved the quality of our lives. They have enabled us to detect and, increasingly, to cure a variety of brain disorders and offered new hope to the mentally ill. Brain science has revolutionized certain forms of therapy, particularly for victims of strokes, and vastly increased our understanding, still imperfect, of the psychology of learning, of affection, of aggression.

If the workings of the brain remain elusive, even that has its uses. It reminds us that human beings are a race apart, special in a way they continually try to define and explain, never succeeding, but still the only creatures on Earth to whom it has occurred to take the attempt.
BACKGROUND BOOKS

THE BRAIN

When Lord Byron bemoaned "the petrifactions of a plodding brain," he was unaware that his own brain was about twice the average size. This discovery, made after the poet's death in 1824, delighted those who believed intelligence to be a function of brain size. The idea seemed to make sense.

Unfortunately, writes biologist Steven Rose in *The Conscious Brain* (Knopf, 1973, cloth; Vintage, 1976, paper), most of the "sensible" ideas about the human brain have turned out to be wrong. In this case, Rose notes, "when a correction is made for body size, then the brains of all humans are closely matched in weight and structure, Einstein's or Lenin's with that of . . . a 'simpleton.'"

Rose's book is one of the best overall introductions to the subject. He traces man's concepts of the brain from the "hydraulic system" envisioned by René Descartes in the 17th century to our own preoccupation with the innards of computers. It is still impossible to explain, he writes, just how "two fistfuls of pink-gray tissue, wrinkled like a walnut, can store more information than all the libraries of the world."


More adventurous readers may wish to sample Gordon Rattray Taylor's *The Natural History of the Mind* (Dutton, 1979, cloth; Penguin, 1981, paper). Reading Taylor is like hearing one of the late John Coltrane's tenor saxophone solos: We are led up, down, around, and all over the place, but in the end one likes having made the effort.

One of the tragedies of brain research is that much of what we know is a consequence of injury or disease. As Howard Gardner observes in *The Shattered Mind* (Knopf, 1975, cloth; Vintage 1976, paper), what no doctor may do out of curiosity—"selectively destroy brain tissue"—is done every day by fate. The results are revealing, sometimes baffling. What is one to make of a person who can interpret "DIX" as the Roman numerals for "509" but is unable to pronounce the letters as a word—as "Dicks"?

"Holism" in the neurosciences—a conviction that the brain must be studied as an integrated whole, rather than as merely the sum of its "mechanical parts"—is eloquently defended by Russian neurophysiologist Aleksandr Romanovich Luria in *The Working Brain* (Basic, 1973, cloth & paper). He deftly covers rather esoteric subject matter in straightforward prose, without ever a trace of condescension.

Luria's brilliant and prolific disciple was Karl Pribram, whose *Languages of the Brain* (Prentice-Hall, 1971, cloth; Wadsworth, 1977, paper) is recognized as a modern classic. Pribram ponders neurological experiments that over the years have confounded brain researchers, developing along the way his notion of the brain as a hologram.

What is the relationship between mind and brain? "Consciousness and the Brain" (Plenum, 1976), edited by
BACKGROUND BOOKS: THE BRAIN

Gorden Globus, Grover Maxwell, and Irvin Savodnik, offers no definitive answers, although the speculative essays in this collection are eminently readable. The most valuable philosophical investigation of mind and brain is still Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind (Barnes & Noble, 1949, 1975).

Ryle's target was the old Cartesian notion of "duality"—a conception of mind and body as different in their very natures. Ryle so demolished this view that none dared again propose a dualistic theory of the brain until John C. Eccles came along.

Rarely does a Nobel laureate in medicine set out his ideas in a text intended for undergraduates, but Sir John did just that in The Understanding of the Brain (McGraw-Hill, 1973; 2nd ed., 1976, paper only). Eccles explains with precision and elegance how nerve cells communicate with one another, though his dualist convictions force him into some tricky intellectual acrobatics.

The recent enthusiasm for computer simulations of the human brain is effectively challenged in Computer Power and Human Reason (W. H. Freeman, 1976, cloth & paper). Author Joseph Weizenbaum concedes the apparent "plausibility" of viewing man as a "sophisticated machine" but adds that, scientifically, the notion is simplistic.

Morally, Weizenbaum contends, this notion constitutes a "slow-acting poison." "What," he asks, "could it mean to speak of risk, courage, trust, endurance, and overcoming when one speaks of machines?" And what would a "deterministic" concept of the brain do to our belief in "moral responsibility"?

The relevance of physics to the brain sciences may not be immediately apparent to the general reader. But physics has a great deal to tell us, and a good place to discover why is in Richard L. Gregory's Mind in Science: A History of Explanations in Psychology and Physics (Cambridge, 1981). In this lucid, colorful, and demanding book, Gregory, a neuropsychologist, ranges widely, from Babylonian myth to relativity theory, from the nature of light to the nurture of intelligence.

We live in two worlds, Gregory explains, a world that we see and perceive, and an underworld that we do not see but can also (with ingenuity) perceive: the everyday world of color, hardness, "reality" versus the lately discovered world of atoms and quantum mechanics. Do these worlds know each other? How?

"Brains," writes Gregory, "construct predictive hypotheses of aspects of the world which are generally useful for survival. [Most brain hypotheses] are largely at variance with the realities of physics. Our perceptual and conceptual hypotheses float free, even from things that seem most immediately sensed and known, to create and journey into realms of fantasy, myth, poetry, and illusion. Sometimes the fantasy traveler returns to bring gifts back to our world."

Some of these gifts of knowledge are unwelcome, unfriendly, disturbing; others are joyous, benign, enlightening. What, one wonders, would our reaction be if one gift someday turned out to be a knowledge of its own origin?
For the person who wishes to know something of Needham's work on the history of science in China but does not wish to read the 11 volumes of his monumental *Science and Civilisation in China* (plus the eight or nine additional volumes scheduled to come), this slender book of essays is probably the best substitute. Here, one finds the fruits of 43 years of study, grouped around the topics of gunpowder and firearms, macrobiotics (the making of elixirs of life), acupuncture and moxibustion (thermal nerve stimulation), and attitudes toward time and change. Some scholars have attributed China's failure to develop its own modern natural science to its strictly cyclical view of time. But Needham shows that linear, progressive, and even evolutionary concepts of time were at least as influential in Chinese civilization, and that, therefore, there were "no ideological barriers of this kind" to scientific progress.

Throughout, Needham points to contrasts between Chinese scientific traditions and Western European ones: In mathematics, the Chinese preferred algebraic approaches, not geometrical ones; in their philosophy of science, they were organic materialists, not mechanists or idealists; in their alchemical tradition, they sought elixirs of life, not the transformation of base metals into gold. And, in many of these areas, they made contributions to Western knowledge along little-noticed lines of transmission, often Arabic.

Needham, a historian of science at Cambridge, is not apologetic about his praise of Chinese scientific achievements. Indeed, he writes: "If sometimes we have written like barristers pleading a case, or sometimes over-emphasise the Chinese contributions, it has been consciously to redress a balance which in the past tilted over much too far on the other side." The cause of redress could not have found a more talented and energetic exponent.

—Loren Graham
KAFKA: A Biography
by Ronald Hayman
Oxford, 1981
349 pp. $19.95

Since he died in 1924, uncelebrated and convinced of his own literary and personal worthlessness, Franz Kafka has increasingly come to seem one of the indispensable voices of our time. His unsettling fables—most published posthumously—bear witness to the nameless anxieties, obsessive guilts, and numbing despairs that characterize the dark side of 20th-century life. W. H. Auden went so far as to suggest that Kafka represents his age as truly as Dante does the Middle Ages. How strange it is, then, that no one since Max Brod, in his 1937 memoir, has tried to trace the tortured, disastrous life that issued in his grim masterworks. It is the kind of absurd oversight that one might call "Kafkaesque."

For this, if for no other reason, Kafka: A Biography is an important book. Happily, there are a number of other reasons to admire it. Hayman, whose work includes a biography of the Marquis de Sade and a highly praised life of Nietzsche, is a clear, unpretentious writer. He is also, as his previous subjects suggest, something of a specialist in empathizing with odd, skewed lives.

Born in Prague in 1883, the only surviving son of a successful Jewish merchant, Kafka was a doubly displaced person: a Jew in a country with a long history of violent anti-Semitism, and a German-speaker in Czechoslovakia. His father had overcome the same difficulties to become a respected, assimilated Czech. His father was also, apparently, a Freudian nightmare of a bad parent, bullying and humiliating his son until the son had no recourse but to escape into literature, endlessly writing stories that replicate the original guilt, the inescapable sin of being—and of being cast off by the Creator.

"I know that God does not want me to write," Kafka lamented in a letter quoted by Hayman. In that melancholy sentence is encapsulated the deep sadness of the man's life: To write was the only way he knew to assuage his guilt, and to write was also to compound the very guilt he was trying to assuage. Not until 1915 could Kafka bring himself, at age 32, to leave his parents' house. He would return there frequently. He took a degree in law but because of poor health spent most of his life as a part-time, minor functionary in the National Workers' Insurance Institute (where he doubtless contributed to the sorts of bureaucratic absurdities that pervade his fiction). He traveled little. And always, he felt himself predestined to failure—not failure at a specific task or goal, but failure in a cosmic sense, failure altogether.

And yet he continued to write. It may have been the only thing he did that gave him any satisfaction. Hayman is clinical, cold, and absolutely compelling in his description of Kafka's bitter life. Kafka fell deeply in love with at least five women—the last, Dora Dymant, was a 19-year-old girl who accompanied him to the sanatorium where he suffered his last bout with tuberculosis. But Kafka was also incapable of committing himself to any of them. To do so, one suspects, would have been to admit that he was grown-up, capable of usurping the dreaded father's place.

The Wilson Quarterly/Summer 1982
Hayman's accounts of the love affairs are unrelenting in their presentation of this great writer as a pathetic, paralyzed human being. I think there is no other way to write a life of Franz Kafka. He was pathetic. Deeply sad and incapable of finding a way out of his sadness, he was nearly a "Man Without Qualities" (to quote another German writer, Robert Musil). Nothing much happened to him, and that may have been largely his choice, too. Yet his twins number in the millions in this world we have created for ourselves—men and women whose lives are spent shuttling from neurosis to depression and back again. They are, as Auden says, "children afraid of the night, who have never been happy or good."

The difference, of course, is that Kafka did write. He articulated, in a series of imperishable tales, the abyss into which many people stare wordlessly. And that was an act of heroism, an act that perhaps kept him sane. Hayman is inadequate on this central fact. Skillful in indicating the pathos of the life, intelligent in describing the brilliance of the stories, he nevertheless fails to show how the two come together. Perhaps no one could show us that, for it seems to have been a miracle. How could a little man with so many crippling neuroses have written The Metamorphosis? The Trial? The Castle? We know that Kafka himself wanted at least the last two works destroyed. Unpublished during his lifetime, and unfinished, they were to have been burned by his friend and literary executor, Max Brod, and to Brod's eternal credit, he betrayed his dead friend and had them published (another Kafkaesque twist).

Thus, Hayman gives no answer to the final riddle of Kafka, the question, "Whence came his courage?" But he does explore, more precisely than anyone before him, the wreckage of a life out of which such glories were constructed. It is impossible to read Kafka: A Biography without turning again to Kafka's own work and being awestruck at the effort that it must have cost. If Hayman does not explain that effort, it may be because he does not need to. The stories embody it, and the biography underscores how strongly they do.

—Frank McConnell (’78)
lingering from our past but cut off now from the contexts that were necessary to their meaning. (Those contexts were supplied, he thinks, by the Greek or Renaissance city-states or by medieval Christendom.) Others may see these fragments of understanding as pieces of a more coherent design, which requires for its completion the imagination and artfulness of our current philosophers. But MacIntyre denies that possibility.

He begins with the apprehension that "there seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture." But from the fact, hardly unique to our time, that people disagree over questions of right and wrong, MacIntyre draws the conclusion that there are no rational grounds for moral judgments—"no unassailable criteria" by which we may judge between competing moral claims. Moreover, all efforts, in philosophy, to supply that foundation have failed.

MacIntyre suggests that moral obligations could be drawn more persuasively in the past when human beings were not viewed as individuals abstracted from their webs of relations. When a man could be seen functionally as a member of a family, a citizen of a polity, a soldier or a cobbler, he could be connected to a *telos*, or a system of ends. If we know the proper ends of a polity or a family, we can speak more knowingly of a "good citizen" and a "good man."

To regain at least the coherence that attached to moral systems in the past, MacIntyre proposes a "corrected" version of Aristotle's understanding. He would place human beings in a political community that takes, as its principal concern, the moral condition of its members. But the morality of the community would not be derived from rational explanations; it would be drawn, rather, from a tradition of "narratives"—from works of literature (like Homer's epics) or from biographies of exemplary men and women. For MacIntyre, these narratives can connect individuals with their communities and make their obligations comprehensible.

This vision of moral order makes room for a variety of "virtues" or "excellences" that may not always be compatible with one another. And as MacIntyre seems to appreciate, that congenial pluralism can be preserved more easily if the whole design is somehow disconnected from what he calls Aristotle's "metaphysical biology"—or, to put it more plainly, Aristotle's understanding of "human nature."

For Aristotle, human nature was marked most distinctively by the capacity to grasp universals and to give reasons concerning matters of right and wrong. As Kant would later observe, the notion of "a rational creature as such" would itself become the source of moral judgments, for acceptance of this notion would signify an appreciation of the faculties, virtues, even the ways of life, that are higher or lower, better or worse. It would help establish, for example, that the capacity for moral understanding is higher than the capacity for brute physical force, and that creatures who can give and understand justifications do not deserve to be ruled in the way that one rules creatures who cannot understand reasons or knowingly tender their consent.

In other words, an awareness of human nature helped alert us to the standards of judgment that were already implicit in the logic of morals and in the very notion of a "moral being." Without these standards, we...
could not choose between “good” and “bad” narratives. We could not know, then, whether to commend to our children the personal “story” of Christ or of Hitler.

But MacIntyre denies that we can know human nature, and therefore he denies that there are any rights that arise from that nature. A belief in natural rights “is one with belief in witches and in unicorns.”

Yet the American republic was founded on the premise that there are indeed rights that arise from human nature—that, to quote the Declaration of Independence, this nature could be known to us with the force of a “self-evident” truth. Today, philosophers would speak, more precisely, of apodictic (or “necessary”) truths—truths that cannot be denied without falling, in turn, into contradiction. MacIntyre dismisses “self-evident” truths, but he says nothing about necessary truths. Had he dealt with this issue, he would have run into the obvious question of how a philosopher may deny the possibility of establishing, through reason, the truth of any moral proposition—and then seek to establish the truth of his own moral argument through nothing less than the artful marshaling of reasons.

MacIntyre intimates that he may address this problem in a later work, which will explain more fully the meaning of reason and rationality. But he may find it useful also to address an even more telling point: namely, that he presupposes throughout his book the very logic of morals—and the idea of human nature—which have furnished the core of the argument he has been seeking to resist. When he conveys his hope, in the end, for a “moral” life, he plainly understands a moral life to be concerned with more than emotive likes or dislikes. He assumes that moral propositions can speak about things that are universally right or wrong—for anyone, for everyone—quite regardless of personal tastes or the level of “disagreement.” He is convinced that certain virtues are good in themselves, that their goodness cannot depend merely on their usefulness in attaining other ends. And he assumes, as a matter of course, that “human beings can be held to account for that of which they are the authors.” From propositions no more astounding than these, men as varied as Rousseau, Kant, and Lincoln were able to extract the argument against slavery and the argument in principle for “government by consent” as the only legitimate form of government for human beings.

MacIntyre would presumably reach the same conclusions. But his own premise—that there are no rational grounds for moral judgments—must finally call into question the truth of any pronouncement he himself offers on any issue of moral consequence. At the same time, he runs the risk of confirming his readers in that moral skepticism that he counts among the maladies of our age: the conviction that our moral propositions represent nothing more than our emotive likes or dislikes, with no claim to being true or justified in any strict sense.

If that idea is warranted, there is no need for the discipline of moral philosophy that MacIntyre practices. And if it is not, MacIntyre could find no higher mission—and no service more suited to his large talents—than to use his arts of philosophy to rescue us from this modern superstition.

—Hadley Arkes (’77)
C H A R L E S 
RICHARD III
by Charles Ross
Univ. of Calif., 1982
265 pp. $24.50

Shakespeare labeled him "That foul defacer of God's handiwork." Seen thus by Tudor "propagandists," Richard III (1452–85) was a spiritual and physical cripple, driven by evil until justice, in the guise of Henry Tudor, brought him down at Bosworth Field. Richard's more recent defenders have been no less impassioned. Steering a middle course, Ross, professor of medieval history at the University of Bristol, measures Richard by the standards and political climate of the 15th century, a particularly ruthless period. As a child, Richard saw his father and brother (the future Edward IV) plunge the country into civil war to overthrow the Lancastrian monarch, Henry VI. Edward used any means available—disinheritance, betrayal—and when Edward died at an early age, leaving two young sons, Richard proved his mastery of the family lessons. Though he had no preconceived plan to usurp the throne, according to Ross, the divisions within the court provided an irresistible opportunity. There is still uncertainty as to whether Richard ordered the execution of his nephews; the important matter is that most Englishmen believed he had. Richard's overdependence on powerful northern landowners and his alienation of vital southern support figured largely in his downfall. But in Ross's view, Richard was neither the most nor the least immoral of men; merely a man of his times, when times were "sadly out of joint."

INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES, 1940–1965
by Morris J. MacGregor, Jr.

A handful of pragmatists who set to work shortly after World War II made the armed services the institutional vanguard of racial integration in the United States. Motivated less by high ideals than by concern for military efficiency, men such as General Idwal Edwards, chief of Air Force personnel, and

The Wilson Quarterly/Summer 1982 121
John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, argued, against upholders of “military tradition,” that segregation both during and after the war had left white units undermanned and black units burdened with more troops than they could absorb. The Air Force took the first progressive step, integrating months before Truman’s executive order of July 1948 called for equal opportunity in all services. But not until the Korean War, when blacks proved themselves in combat beside whites, was integration completed in the Army and Marine Corps. During the 1960s, reformers in Kennedy’s Defense Department joined with civil rights leaders to make the military an instrument of broad social uplift. Requiring the services to boycott civilian businesses that practiced segregation, the reformers were oddly negligent when it came to promotion practices that clearly favored whites within the services themselves. MacGregor, a historian at the Army’s Center of Military History, believes that more high-level attention to internal reform might have prevented the build-up of racial tensions that so troubled the services in the late ’60s and early ’70s.

Democracy, tyranny, slavery, and empire are terms frequently misused in describing ancient Greece. What did they mean to the inhabitants of Athens, Sparta, and the other city-states? In this collection of essays written over the past 30 years, Finley, a Cambridge classicist, reveals an enormous diversity within Greek institutions and some surprises: Sparta’s military victories ultimately destroyed its model military state by bringing “non-equals” into the army, providing opportunities for ambitious individuals, and puncturing xenophobia. Freedom reached its apogee in those city-states where chattel slavery flourished (in fact, slavery and democracy may have originated in Greece at the same place, Chios, at roughly the same time, the sixth century B.C.). Yet within various states there were often radically different notions of bondage. In Sparta, for example, “helots” belonged to the state, whereas, in
Athens, slaves belonged to individuals. Finley ranges from such topics as technical innovation (there was relatively little, despite advanced Greek science) to marriage practices in Homeric Greece and interstate relations within the Athenian “empire.” On themes that have drawn other classicists into pedantic praises or harsh revisionism, his unfailing “instinct for the concrete” delivers particulars that express the era.

Contemporary Affairs

Looking at American security policy since World War II, and at the assumptions of the men who shaped it, Gaddis, an Ohio University historian, discerns two rival approaches to Soviet containment—“symmetrical” and “asymmetrical.” The latter, first articulated by George Kennan in an influential article published in the late 1940s, prescribes a variety of means—diplomatic, political, economic, and military—to counter expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union. Stressing overall U.S. and Western strengths, Kennan believed it unwise to respond to every communist takeover (such as the one in China) as a threat to U.S. security. But his blueprint was revised almost immediately by Paul Nitze and other Truman advisers: Their symmetrical approach defined as vital any interest threatened by the Soviets or their allies; they proposed meeting any act of aggression with a direct show of force. Truman believed the country could bear the cost of direct military confrontations such as that in Korea. Eisenhower did not. Fearing the long-range economic burdens of large military expenditures, he reduced defense spending (as a share of the GNP) and chose a policy of brinksmanship (e.g., reliance on nuclear weapons) reinforced by a network of worldwide alliances and by negotiations with the Soviets. Rejecting Ike’s prudence, Kennedy and Johnson believed that America possessed the economic and military might to check any communist threat. Vietnam demonstrated
the ineffectiveness of their "crisis management" approach and, furthermore, through diversion of effort, cost America its nuclear edge. While Gaddis deals only briefly with more recent administrations, his main point is likely to hold: Shifts in U.S. policy respond less to Soviet moves than to turnover in the White House.


Over the past decade, farm output in most sub-Saharan nations has been on the decline. Bates, a political scientist at the California Institute of Technology, shows how government leaders, some trying to bolster nascent industries, others simply lining their pockets, have intervened in the agricultural markets, cutting peasant producers' income and prompting many to quit the land. Leaders of countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire, often working through state marketing boards (set up by colonial governments to stabilize food prices), have lowered food prices in order to provide cheap sustenance for city dwellers. At the same time, they have failed to provide small farmers with subsidies for seed, fertilizer, and farm machinery. Because domestic industries are protected from competition, farmers must pay higher prices for manufactured goods. As a result, many potentially self-sufficient African nations are now forced to import food. Peasant farmers are left with so little hope that those who remain on the land deal increasingly through black markets. Unless African leaders sacrifice short-term political advantages and personal financial gain for more balanced agricultural policies, warns Bates, they are apt to face steeper economic decline and political upheaval.


Equality, as the ideal behind public policies such as affirmative action and bilingual education, has become its own most consistent adversary. Seldom in policy debates do we find an argument for equality pitted against
one for inequality; more often, the problem is a "conflict of equalities." To show how the abstract principle becomes, in practice, a number of rival notions, and to help clear up the contradictions, Rae and four political science colleagues have laid down guidelines for evaluating programs intended to foster equality: Who are the individuals or groups contending for equality? What specific goods are being sought—money, jobs, the exercise of rights? Are policymakers attempting to distribute goods or the opportunity to earn them? And how well do the goods actually match up with the preferences of the beneficiaries? Failure to consider these and other questions thoughtfully often produces unintended results. Promoting equal opportunity will not guarantee equal success to all. And correcting inequalities resulting from sexism or racism may require preferential treatment, another form of inequality. The authors show that, although equality is almost everywhere prescribed, inequality almost everywhere survives.

Arts & Letters

MONET AT ARGENTEUIL
by Paul Hayes Tucker
Yale, 1982
224 pp. $29.95

A master of French impressionism, Claude Monet (1840–1926) has long been characterized as a painter who valued pleasing visual effect to the exclusion of content or ideas. Looking at the development of Monet’s art during the seven years he spent in the Parisian suburb of Argenteuil, Tucker, an art historian at the University of Massachusetts, refutes this view. When the 31-year-old Monet arrived in Argenteuil, he was an established artist, a married man, in many ways a typical French bourgeois. Like most of his class, he was struck by the rapid economic recovery his country was making in the aftermath of the costly Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), and a number of his pre-Argenteuil paintings favorably depicted images of progress—factories, trains. Yet, a dedicated landscape painter, he could not ignore the destruction visited upon his beloved Nature by the for-
ward march of progress. Site of a major ironworks, the quaint town of Argenteuil had begun to change long before Monet arrived. But, in his early paintings there, such as The Promenade along the Seine (1872), he succeeded in harmonizing rivers, fields, and trees with chimney stacks and railroad bridges. Soon, this balance proved too delicate, and he retreated to small corners of untouched nature and finally to the privacy of his own garden. When he did paint larger subjects again, as in Argenteuil—The Bank in Flower (1877), the natural and manmade worlds appeared in stark opposition. Though subtly expressed, Monet’s art was a judgment on his times.

Vladimir Nabokov (1899–1977), novelist, émigré, professor, lepidopterist, conducts a brilliant tour through the gallery of Russian literary “greats.” Judgmental and aphoristic (“Fancy is fertile only when futile”), he reveals as much about his own artistic crotchets as about the works of his compatriots. Leo Tolstoy, master manipulator of time in prose narrative, and Anton Chekhov, writer of “sad books for humorous people,” rank high in his pantheon. So does the comic genius, Nikolay Gogol: “His work, as all great literary achievements, is a phenomenon of language and not one of ideas.” Faring less well are Fyodor Dostoyevsky (basically a writer of “mystery stories” that stand up poorly on second reading, says Nabokov) and Maksim Gorky, from whose melodramatic fiction there was “but one step to so-called Soviet literature.”

Lives “as such” are unimportant, muses the author in her preface; the challenge in writing about them is “to let the unimportant remain unimportant.” Out of this severe aesthetic, Riding, the versatile American writer (poetry, essays, fiction), has fashioned stories that are icily detached in their observations of human foibles. A woman who cannot out-
grow the burden of her father's ideological obsessions ("Socialist Pleasures"), a man who affects idiosyncracies to appear "interesting" ("Schoolgirls"), a painter who burns out and has "nothing left but ideas" ("The Incurable Vices")—these are some of the characters who people the more "traditional" stories of this collection. In her more experimental pieces, Riding turns the story form inside out, commenting on the nature of the story itself. The narrator of "Reality as Port Huntlady" remarks on the silliness of her narrative and, by implication, all narratives: "Here we are telling ourselves a story about a place where people fancied themselves to be dealing with these few really important things, without knowing ourselves exactly what they are." Riding sometimes pushes her experiments too far—analysis can exhaust—but the austere cadences of her prose (reminiscent of Gertrude Stein at her best) pull one through these dry stretches.

**Science & Technology**

Beginning with his participation in the pioneering of classical genetics while still a graduate student at Columbia University, H. J. Muller (1890–1967) sought not only to establish the gene as the basic unit of life but also to defend Darwinism and eugenics. Toting fruit flies and theories across three continents, throwing himself into professional controversies, Muller helped map the mechanism of the individual gene, postulated genetic recombination and crossover, and voiced the first warnings against the mutagenic risks of radiation—a personal crusade derided both by the U.S. government and by doctors until after World War II. Most of Muller's scientific positions were vindicated by later advances (the Watson-Crick model of DNA, for instance). But as Carlson, a biologist at the State University of New York, points out, Muller's socialist convictions led to troubles and disillusionment. FBI reports of his radical activities drove him from a teaching position at the University of Texas in 1932. But
four years in Stalin’s Russia (1933–37) instructed him in the realities of totalitarianism, as he confronted the Lysenkoists, who worked from the specious theory that genes were directly influenced by environment. Muller finally received a professorship at Indiana University in 1944 and the Nobel Prize two years later—tardy recognitions of his groundbreaking research. Carlson’s chronicle is an even-handed, thorough biography, although the science receives more attention than the man.

A launch pad catastrophe, a secret cosmonaut town, a nearly fatal spacewalk, a woman in space—the history of the Soviet space program has all the elements of a good science fiction thriller. Only a few outsiders, however, have been able to reconstruct it, even partially. Oberg, a computer analyst at NASA and one of the West’s leading space “detectives,” sifts through the records—misleading Tass and Pravda news releases, official Soviet biographies, airbrushed cosmonaut photos, and the spadework of other Western observers—to present the most authoritative account to date. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev forced technicians in the early years to bolster his politics and propaganda with immediate, sensational launches. Though this policy brought triumphs (e.g., the world’s first manned space flight, in 1961, by Yuri Gagarin), it caused frequent disasters. The explosion of a balky rocket booster in 1960 killed many of the Soviet Union’s finest space technicians. Since Khrushchev’s ouster in 1964, a more rational, less hurried, approach has developed. Results have been dramatic, including record stints in Salyut space stations. At the center of Soviet success lies the story of Sergey Korolev, a survivor of Stalin’s “gulag” camps and Khrushchev’s chief rocket designer. While his ships made history, Korolev himself was kept under virtual “house arrest” until his death in 1966.
CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY. Edited by Virginia Tufte and Barbara Myerhoff. Yale, 1981. 403 pp. $6.95 (cloth, $25)

What have the decline of the urban café or changes in church seating arrangements to do with the current crisis of the family? More than we might think, according to historians Philippe Ariès and John Demos. Both find that the erosion of larger social institutions has burdened the Western family with so many responsibilities that it cannot help but appear to fail. Other contributors share the editors' concern with images of the family, images that both obscure and contribute to the so-called crisis. Silvia Manning's discussion of Charles Dickens's fiction shows how modern heirs to the Victorian vision of the family's "centrality, intensity, and complexity" still place too much faith in an idealized happy home. Reviewing a number of recent court cases, legal scholar Stephen Morse argues that "traditional family values" have come to conflict with "current conceptions of liberty and autonomy." No mere potpourri, this collection combines a variety of perspectives to show the modern family experiencing not so much a crisis as necessary adjustments to changing times.


Between the third and sixth centuries, Christians began to venerate their martyrs. British philosopher David Hume, writing in the 1750s, attributed the rise of the cult of the saints to popular superstition, a recrudescence of polytheism, the "vulgar" need to personalize and fragment the abstract God of Christianity. Hume's condescending view shaped the perceptions of succeeding generations of historians. Brown, a historian at the University of California, offers a fresh interpretation. Looking at the upper stratum of late Roman society, he notes that burial customs in pagan times were intensely private; indeed, their privacy was an expression of patrician family pride and autonomy. Early bishops, politically shrewd, invoked martyrs' relics, sacred sites, and saints' festivals in order to relocate burial customs within a more public, Church-dominated sphere. The idea of saints as personal protectors did derive in part from pagan ideas, but from the highest reaches of paganism: the belief in the "invisible companion," the genius or daimon, who presided over one's soul. More important, the "holy presence" associated with sacred relics and sites provided centers of faith and Church administration in the darkest corners of Syria and Gaul.

VOICES OF MODERN GREECE. Translated and edited by Edmund Keeley and Philip Sherard. Princeton, 1981. 203 pp. $5.95

Keeley and Sherard, who have been translating modern Greek poetry for over 30 years, have now assembled the best samples from their work—poems by C. P. Cavafy, Angelos Sikelianos, George Seferis, Odysseus Elytis, and Nikos Gatso. The great patriarch among these is Cavafy (1863–1933), whose spare, ironic poems span classical and modern themes. An elegiac mood prevails in the works of all these poets, a sense of loss perhaps best summed up in a line by poet-diplomat Seferis: Wherever I travel Greece wounds me.
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A Student in Moscow, 1966

Last year, despite the new chill between the two superpowers, at least 350 American scholars and students traveled to the Soviet Union to pursue their researches. Their presence is no longer a novelty. But 16 years ago, when Sovietologist Sheila Fitzpatrick, then a graduate student, arrived in Moscow, visiting Western scholars were rare, and the Soviets were unaccustomed to dealing with such inquisitive foreigners. Her first sojourn in Moscow produced some enlightening, often comical moments.

by Sheila Fitzpatrick

Moscow is a boring town for most of its foreign residents. Diplomats generally see only other diplomats; journalists can do little but collect press releases from official or, occasionally, dissident sources. The city’s eight million natives may not find it much more exciting.

For exchange students, it is different. They have all the privileges of foreigners, but, because they share dormitories with Russian students and speak the language, they can escape the insularity of life in a foreign ghetto. For most of them, the year in Moscow is a great adventure. I have returned many times since 1966 as a professor, but none of my visits has matched in intensity that first encounter as a graduate student.

No other group of outsiders—except, perhaps, retired KGB spies (e.g., Kim Philby, the British "mole"), foreign-born wives of Russians, and other stigmatized permanent residents—can mix so freely in Russian life as the students. The notorious perils and pitfalls of Moscow, though real up to a point, are not nearly as fearsome as they have been painted. The "closed society" opens up enough for the exchange students to make friends with Russians. The KGB presence, in the form of real and imagined bugging, tailing, and general snooping, adds an exotic touch without being a real threat. And the Soviet bureaucracy, obstructive as it is, can often be outwitted or worn down by persistence. Zhizn’-bor’ba—"life is struggle," as the Russians say. But it is a struggle that often pays off for the foreign students in knowledge and pleasure. And one’s fate is never really in jeopardy. The worst that usually happens to an exchange student (or a diplomat, or a journalist) is to be declared persona non grata after some frame-up or scandal, and sent home.
Moscow is a gray city, with long winters and vast, forbidding city squares, created in the monumentalist spirit of the Stalinist 1930s and '40s. The half dozen skyscrapers erected during Stalin’s last years, all in a nearly identical grandiose wedding-cake style, dominate the skyline, towering incongruously over small onion-domed churches and modest two-story wooden houses.

In the Moscow Metro, the city’s pride, old peasant women in white aprons sell ice cream and flowers. Some subway stations are done in palatial style, with chandeliers and murals. The Metro, a womb-like retreat from the fierce winter above, makes it possible for a foreigner to believe that the rigors of Moscow life can be survived.

I was an Australian doctoral student in Soviet history at Oxford when I first went to Moscow as an exchange student in 1966. The Soviets saw the purpose of such exchanges as promoting “friendship between our two peoples” (druzhba narodov). The phrase was repeated endlessly. But the Cold War was still icy enough during the late 1960s to make such sentiments sound insincere, even when they were not.

Mutual suspicion flourished, especially over the use of the exchange for
REFLECTIONS: MOSCOW

Espionage purposes. Each year, a few students ran into trouble for distributing “religious propaganda” (Bibles), smuggling icons, or selling foreign currency to Russians, and we were told horror stories about sexual entrapment (called provokatsiya), which the KGB purportedly employed to blackmail students. It was a new world for most of us. Probably even the spies in our group, if there were any, found it bizarre.

Most Western officials went along with the “peace and friendship” rhetoric, though without noticeable enthusiasm. The Americans also liked the idea of exposing the subject populations of communist countries to democratic values. The British, however, seemed too world-weary to press this view on their exchange students.

The officials who briefed us in London implied that we were setting off on an obstacle course rather than a culture-bearing mission. Not even rhetorical peace and friendship existed between Western and Soviet historians during the mid-’60s. In Soviet eyes, Western scholars who wrote about the post-1917 period were virtually all Cold Warriors and “bourgeois falsifiers.” Western historians were scarcely more flattering about their Soviet counterparts (“party hacks”) and viewed even the factual content of their publications with suspicion.

From my personal vantage point, relations seemed particularly bad. Because he had translated Doctor Zhivago into English, my Oxford adviser was ominously referred to in the Soviet press as “the not unknown Max Hayward.” (Actually, he was totally unknown to Soviet readers, apart from these sinister references.) My college, St. Anthony’s, was often described in the Soviet press as a nest of spies, and one of its Fellows claimed that the KGB had stolen his research notes—from a train in Switzerland, no less—and given them to a Soviet scholar. Such were the joys of Sovietology 16 years ago.

The subject of my doctoral dissertation was Anatoly Lunacharsky (1875–1933), an Old Bolshevik, a prolific writer on literary and other subjects before and after the October Revolution, and the first People’s Commissar of Enlightenment (meaning Minister of Education and Culture) in Soviet Russia.*

I chose Lunacharsky, sometimes described as “a Bolshevik among intellectuals, and an intellectual among Bolsheviks,” because of his position as an intermediary between the old Russian intelligentsia and the new Soviet regime during the 1920s. There was also something intriguing about a Bolshevik who disliked politics, wrote plays in his spare time, and was known for his exuberant good nature, tender-heartedness, and unsparing goodwill.

The other good thing about Lunacharsky was that he had published so much. The dissertation became my first book, published by Cambridge University Press as The Commissariat of Enlightenment in 1971. I was proud of that title, which (at least to me) conveys irony in English while being totally innocuous translated back into Russian. This strikes me as an apt example of the real spirit of the cultural exchanges in those years.

Sheila Fitzpatrick, 40, a Wilson Center Fellow, is professor of history at the University of Texas at Austin. Born in Melbourne, Australia, she received a B.A. from the University of Melbourne (1961) and a D. Phil. from Oxford (1969). She is the author of Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921–1934 (1979) and The Russian Revolution (forthcoming).

*The dissertation became my first book, published by Cambridge University Press as The Commissariat of Enlightenment in 1971. I was proud of that title, which (at least to me) conveys irony in English while being totally innocuous translated back into Russian. This strikes me as an apt example of the real spirit of the cultural exchanges in those years.
much on everything from religion to foreign affairs that I already had enough material for a thesis, even if Moscow proved to be a disaster.

I arrived in Moscow on a clear, chilly day in the autumn of 1966, having just acquired a husband (who was studying in Tokyo), a new passport (British), and a Soviet visa. I was in the mood for more great leaps forward.

Why, I thought, should I give my topic as "Lunacharsky as Literary Critic," when I was really interested in Lunacharsky as a political and governmental figure?

Why not request access to the Soviet archives, even if everyone said that would prove impossible?

For that matter, why not demand interviews with Lunacharsky's surviving colleagues and family members?

Why not, while I was at it, ask for the moon?

**Big Brother Blinks**

I laid out these ideas at the first meeting with my Soviet adviser, Professor Aleksandr Ivanovich Ovcharenko of the Philological School of Moscow State University. Making no objection and almost no comment, quizzical eyebrow slightly raised, Aleksandr Ivanovich began neatly rewriting my draft proposal (typewriters were scarce). He changed my title, removing some of the ambiguity I had cautiously inserted, and added the Central Party Archives, which are not always accessible even to Soviet historians, to my list of requested sources.

I was astonished by my good fortune, and later spent hours looking for a deeper meaning. This is a habit among foreigners in Russia, who tend to assume that everything that happens to them is known or even planned by higher authorities.

I soon found out that my adviser's approval was only the beginning of the battle. The proposal as a whole had to be processed by Moscow University's Inotdel, the department in charge of foreigners. Then each separate request had to be sent to the Ministry of Higher Education, which lackadaisically forwarded it to the institution concerned. The whole thing took months, and repeated refusals of archival requests (as in my case) were common. The trick was always to have something in reserve—an appeal to a higher official, a supplementary request, another office to be consulted—to prevent any refusal becoming final.

**Groping in the Dark**

The Central Party Archives were my top priority, not for such tantalizing but inaccessible documents as Politburo minutes or Stalin's personal papers but for the far less sensitive Lunacharsky collection. But my approaches through normal bureaucratic channels were foundering, and I could not call on my adviser, Professor Ovcharenko, for help. (He was in China as a member of the last Soviet-Chinese Friendship delegation, which, we later learned, was suffering grievous abuse at the hands of the young *Internationale*-singing Red Guards of China's Cultural Revolution, then at its peak.) I decided to break the rules and go in person to the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, where the archives were kept.

My arrival alarmed the militiaman on guard at the entrance, but he let me into the lobby, where I doggedly explained to a succession of worried secretaries that I was a foreigner and an official "guest of the Soviet Union" (which I was, more or less) and wanted to speak with the director.
They told me he was busy. I said I could wait. Finally, they summoned a deputy director, to whom I put my case.

As I was speaking, he unexpectedly interrupted. "Are you a Communist Party member?" he asked. I said: "Of course not, I'm a foreigner." That was tactlessly phrased, but, ignoring the implied insult to international communism, he was already stepping back a pace to deliver his exit line. "If you are not a member of the Party, how can we allow you to work in the Party Archives?" he boomed. I acknowledged defeat and left quietly.

This episode earned me a scolding from Moscow University's Inotdel. At the same time, however, Inotdel seemed to step up its own efforts to get me into the Central Soviet Government Archives. Oddly, nobody suggested that I should be a member of the Soviet government to qualify.

The permission finally came just before the New Year, three months after my original request.

It was a day of great triumph when I made my first appearance at a handsome, pre-Revolutionary building on Bolshaya Pirogovskaya, home of the government archives. Foreigners were restricted to their own reading room, one with big double windows, tall, old-fashioned cupboards for storing files, and an atmosphere of almost unnatural calm imparted by its custodian, the melancholy and taciturn Viktor Borisovich. I felt that I had walked onto a stage set for a Chekhov play.

I had never set foot in an archive before—any archive—though I tried to conceal this. But, in any case, nothing could have prepared me for my Soviet experience. I was told, for example, that I could order Xerox or microfilm copies, but not of a complete page of a file nor from any two
The procedure for ordering the files themselves was even stranger. When I first arrived, my consultant, a friendly woman with the gentle manners of the old intelligentsia, asked me what files I wished to see. Rather puzzled, I said that I would tell her when I had looked at a catalogue. She answered that there was no catalogue. I should tell her what I wanted to know, and she would look for the appropriate archival material.

"My" Commissariat and Yours

This was a real problem. Like everyone else, I was interested in the ostrye voprosy, "thorny issues" in Soviet history ranging from big questions like the forced collectivization of agriculture during the 1930s to smaller ones like Lunacharsky's resignation from the Commissariat of Enlightenment in 1929.

Among Soviet scholars, these were (and still are) extremely delicate matters. To present a list of such issues probably would have reduced my kind consultant to tears or, in a person of different temperament, provoked one of those sincere but infuriating lectures on Russia's suffering during the Second World War, which are supposed to shame foreigners into silence.

A better course, obviously, was to ask for material of the Commissariat of Enlightenment by category: orders, circulars, correspondence, and minutes. But that, too, had its difficulties for me. Having led a comparatively sheltered life, I had very little idea of how a government bureaucracy works, and thus, as I realized with rising panic, of what kinds of documents one was likely to generate.

I was lucky. My consultant, wracking her brains for something appropriate to my apparently nebulous interests, mentioned "protocols." I jumped at the suggestion, although I was not at all sure what protocols were.

They turned out to be summaries of the weekly meetings of the Commissariat's directorate. They started in 1918, when Lunacharsky and his fellow revolutionaries felt a sense of wonder and astonishment at being in power (like my own feelings, 50 years later, at being in the Soviet archives). They continued throughout the 1920s, during which time Lunacharsky & Co. learned some practical lessons about the workings of bureaucracy and government. So, at one remove, did I.

I took my research very personally at this stage of my career. Like most biographers, I became attached to my subject. Like most institutional historians, I also tended to take the side of "my" Commissariat in its conflicts with other Soviet institutions over policy and political turf.

But I had more than the normal reasons for personal involvement in that first year of serious research. I had found myself a foster family in Moscow.

Becoming a "Non-Person"

Before I went to the Soviet Union, I was not sure if it would be possible to make friends or scholarly contacts, given the nation's Stalinist heritage and its official suspicion of foreigners. But like many foreign students (except Africans, Asians, and Arabs, who are victims of prejudice), I quickly found out that it was easy to make friends in the Soviet Union. It was much easier, in fact, than for a foreigner to make friends in Britain or the United States, where the natives may be unsuspicious but are
probably also uninterested.

I also found out, to my surprise, that it was possible to do oral history in the Soviet Union, even if the subject was a controversial figure such as Lunacharsky.

During the 1930s, a whole galaxy of political and cultural leaders of the previous decade—men such as the Old Bolsheviks Nikolai Bukharin and Grigori Zinoviev, the poet Osip Mandelstam, and the theater director Vsevolod Meyerhold—fell victim to Stalin's terror and became "non-persons."* Their names could not be mentioned in print, their works could not be published, and their existing books were removed from library shelves. Others (including Lunacharsky) escaped this fate, but their reputations were tainted, and their works sank into obscurity.

Bolshevik Ghosts

But the situation was never as thoroughly Orwellian as it might have been. The Lenin Library in Moscow, for example, had its librarians ink out the names of "non-persons" such as Trotsky and Zinoviev in its books, but one could still read them, especially when the librarians used their watered-down purple ink rather than India ink.

In real life, moreover, discarded Soviet politicians and disgraced writers and scientists leave wives, children, and indeed whole family circles of relatives, disciples, and former aides and secretaries who are eager to restore their man's good name. In the case of the purge victims, the families had their chance after Khrushchev denounced Stalin's policies in his "Secret Speech" to the 20th Party Congress in 1956. In its wake, many who had died during the Great Purge of 1937–38 were "rehabilitated," and Old Bolsheviks such as Lunacharsky had their tarnished reputations restored to luster.

Avoiding Old Canards

Complicated human problems surrounded the rehabilitations. Was the widow of a victim entitled to reclaim all or part of the apartment she had been evicted from upon his arrest some 20 years before? There were also formalities to be observed. When the Lenin Library found that the ink covering the names of "non-persons" in its books could not be erased, it had librarians rewrite all the names in the margin.

The important thing for the families was to elicit more formal tokens of recognition of their man's accomplishment and merit, such as newspaper articles and memorial meetings on his birthday or publication of excerpts from his letters.

Some even succeeded in getting plaques installed outside their old apartments or elsewhere. The House of Government, a sinister gray monster diagonally across the Moscow River from the Kremlin, sprouted enough plaques to revive old memories of its ghastly depopulation in 1937–38.

Other families aimed higher, seeking permission to convert the family apartment into a museum celebrating its distinguished former inhabitant. But this was exceptionally difficult to engineer because Moscow had (and has) a severe housing shortage that the authorities were reluctant to exacerbate.

The best memorial of all was publication of a writer's neglected or previously unpublished novels or of a

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*Stalin's Great Purge of 1937–38 took a severe toll of the Soviet elite and Communist Party members. Hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, were arrested and sent to labor camps, where many perished.
politician's speeches and articles. The most enterprising families were soon gathering material for a Selected or, better still, a complete Collected Works. The publication of these collections, often in many volumes, required exhaustive archival and bibliographical work. Entirely new scholarly industries were generated in the process.

Lunacharsky's stock rose dramatically during the 1960s, when research for his eight-volume Works got underway. This was due in no small part to the efforts of his devoted and energetic daughter, Irina Anatolyevna Lunacharskaya. By the time I arrived in Moscow, there was already a generic name for people who, like me, studied Lunacharsky: We were lunacharskovedy.

It was not difficult for me to meet Irina Anatolyevna, then a woman in her 40s, since she herself wanted to meet and keep tabs on all the Lunacharsky scholars. The difficulty was not to be intimidated by her. She was small, beautiful, elegantly dressed, worldly, opinionated, and incredibly voluble. I was just small.

Her grand apartment on Gorky Street, which she had acquired when the Lunacharsky Museum Apartment was established, contained a remarkable collection of books, portraits, other lunacharskiana, old china, and imposing pieces of late Imperial furniture.

The telephone rang constantly. Irina Anatolyevna was and is a true virtuoso of the telephone. Charming, insistent, high-minded, shrewd, and admonitory by turns, her voice flows effortlessly and confidently to the final upward inflection, "Dogovorili?" (That's settled, then?). Then the receiver clunks down.

It is difficult at the best of times to

Anatoly Lunacharsky (right) and his brother-in-law and literary secretary, Igor Aleksandrovich Sats, in Lunacharsky's study in 1924.
hold one's own in conversation with Irina; on the telephone, it is simply impossible.

I grew very fond of Irina Anatolyevna, despite the problems that sometimes arose on the academic side of our relationship. The world of rehabilitative scholarship has its own rules and conventions, not all of which are easily accommodated by a Western scholar. It is unacceptable, for example, to revive old canards about Lunacharsky’s philosophical “heresies,” or to fail to emphasize how highly Lenin regarded him after 1917, or to cite quotations that might provide ammunition for his scholarly critics.

Like many Old Bolsheviks, Lunacharsky married twice and left two family circles, each with its own custodial interest in his legacy. To associate with both, I found, could be difficult. It was equally awkward to stray into the circles of other great men (Maksim Gorky, say) because of any hostility among the groups but because it suggested lack of loyalty to one’s own and even a kind of historical promiscuity.

Tears in the Archives

When I erred, Irina would scold me. She did this to other lunacharskovedy, but it had a very familial touch in my case. In my contacts with the Lunacharsky family in general, I was always struck by how little they treated me as a foreigner and how much they treated me as a child, someone in need of instruction and perhaps discipline, but also of love and protection.

Many of the other exchange students found the same attitude among their Soviet friends, and I even encountered it in the archives. Once, when I burst into tears of anger and frustration at being denied some of the archival material I wanted, a senior official reproached me. “Grown-ups don’t cry,” he said. But, after a moment of indecision, he picked up the phone. I got the material. (The same instinct, I suppose, leads careworn Soviet adults to give up their seats in buses to healthy 10-year-olds. Soviet children have a good life.)

No More Cloaks and Daggers

The protective attitude was most marked in the case of one of Irina Anatolyevna’s favorite relatives, her uncle Igor Aleksandrovich Sats, who had been Lunacharsky’s brother-in-law and also his literary secretary and confidant. When I first met him, Igor Aleksandrovich was one of the editors of the lively and often controversial literary journal, Novyi Mir. He had a sharp wit, great intelligence, and a dramatic Jewish face, sardonic, stubborn, melancholy, and gentle by turns.

Toward the end of that first year, I would sometimes go to Igor Aleksandrovich’s place and stay all day, listening to whatever he chose to talk about. Often it was Lunacharsky, but sometimes it was Liszt’s piano technique or the Smolensk Front in 1942. When I asked questions about people and events mentioned in the archives I was reading, he would give vivid thumbnail characterizations, sometimes unquotable.

This often happened when I was accompanying him on errands, picking up the family laundry and buying groceries. For me, he used to buy ryazhenka, a kind of yogurt that he said children particularly liked. This all seemed quite normal to him, for he attracted a lot of strays and was particularly fond of children and women. To me, it did not seem normal. I regarded Igor Aleksan-
drovich as a kind of miracle and wondered what I had done to deserve him. Later, I got used to the idea that he had adopted me, and I regarded him as a lately acquired parent. He died in 1980.

In the end, I did not write Lunacharsky's biography, disappointing Irina Anatoyevna. But I later wrote about the Soviet's own "Cultural Revolution"—no similarity to the events in China, Professor Ovcharenko unconvincingly assured me—that had driven Lunacharsky from the Commissariat of Enlightenment in 1929. (The book was Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–31, published in 1978.)

These days, as three visits since 1977 have shown me, foreign scholars in Moscow have a better deal. Working conditions have improved, and procedures have become more (if not totally) Western. There is a new social science research library, INION, which is a pleasure to work in.

Some things have not changed. For the last few years, I have had a running battle with the Lenin Library because of its unwillingness to produce Moscow telephone directories for the late 1930s. They suspect, quite rightly, that I might use the directories for the "dubious" purpose of estimating the number of purge victims. The archives may still be difficult to get into, but more Americans work there now, and there is less mutual incomprehension between archivists and foreigners. Relations between Western and Soviet scholars have warmed somewhat, partly because of the spectacular improvement in the quality of Soviet writing on Soviet history, and partly because the Soviets no longer automatically dismiss Western scholarship out of hand.

As a visiting professor, I have graduated from the Moscow University dormitories to the slightly seedy red plush of the Academy of Sciences Hotel, and my knowledge of life among exchange students today comes secondhand. But I gather that the old cloak-and-dagger excitement is less pervasive, and the foreign students seem to have stopped worrying that every proposition from a Russian may be a provokatsiya.

Of course, I think Moscow was more fun in the bad old days, before enlightened administrators started restoring historic churches properly, and before Muscovites began taking to the streets in droves of little Fiats, making their city look almost like any other European metropolis at rush hour. But that kind of reactionary nostalgia is to be expected from people who write memoirs.
Assessing Lyndon Johnson

Nearly a decade after Lyndon Johnson's death in 1973, the body of literature focusing on his political career and his tumultuous Presidency is surprisingly thin. Compared to work done on his predecessor, there is but a trickle on Johnson—nothing that would compare in influence, sales, or scope with books like Arthur Schlesinger's *A Thousand Days* or Theodore Sorenson's *Kennedy*. Many crucial LBJ archives (e.g., those covering deliberations on Vietnam) have yet to be opened. But some new studies are in progress—notably those by Robert Caro (author of the prizewinning *Power Broker*) and journalist Ronnie Dugger. Lyndon Baines Johnson remains one of America's most enigmatic Presidents. Here, historian Robert Divine looks at what there is, so far, of a "Johnson literature."

by Robert A. Divine

"You will never work for or with a more complicated man than Lyndon Johnson so long as you live," Robert McNamara told Joseph Califano in 1965. "I guarantee it." The critics' easy stereotypes—Johnson as a Texas wheeler-dealer, a mad bomber in Vietnam—fade when one begins to probe into the complexity of the man's character and career.

The equally misleading images of Johnson as the peerless Senate majority leader or as the progenitor of the Great Society also distort his curiously mixed political record. The man who first went to Congress with only 27 percent of the vote, the candidate who lost on his first try for the Senate, won the second by 87 votes seven days after the polls closed, and ran poorly against an unknown Republican college government teacher for his third term, the vice presidential candidate who barely held Texas for Kennedy and failed to halt Nixon's inroads into the South in 1960—all seem a far cry from the vaunted campaigner who surpassed Roosevelt's record 1936 landslide to defeat Barry Goldwater in 1964.

Far from being a figure with transparent motives and predictable behavior, Lyndon Johnson emerges from the existing literature as a complex and often inscrutable man whose contributions to America's
subsequent progress and problems have yet to be clearly evaluated.

The earliest books on Lyndon Johnson are the most one-sided. The first biography, written by an aide, Booth Mooney, in 1956 when Johnson began to develop presidential fever, is purely and simply a campaign document.

Mooney's *Lyndon Johnson Story*, updated in 1964, tells the credulous reader that Johnson won handily in his first race for Congress in 1937 and describes the 1948 Senate race as ending in “a melodramatic finish” without any reference to the crucial 202 late votes from Jim Wells County.

There is no mention of how Johnson built his personal fortune while serving the public, nor any explanation of his postwar abandonment of support for the pro-labor Taft-Hartley Act and the New Deal.

Mooney’s book can be excused as a campaign tract. There can be no such defense for the unabashed flattery that New York Timesman William S. White heaps on Johnson in *The Professional: Lyndon B. Johnson*. Writing soon after Johnson succeeded Kennedy, White, a long-time friend of LBJ, apparently wanted to reassure the people that the reins of government were in good hands.

Those who had followed Johnson’s Texas career must have been surprised to learn from White that there was “not an ounce of demagogy in him.”

Even scholars were not immune to the Johnson influence. Three historians at Southwest Texas State (LBJ’s alma mater), William C. Pool, Emmie Craddock, and David E. Conrad, collaborated on *Lyndon Baines Johnson: The Formative Years*. Though useful and reliable, with an especially informative chapter on Johnson’s college years, this volume
suffers from local chauvinism. Johnson's father is described as "an agrarian progressive" and his mother as "a tower of strength to her young children"; under their tutelage, LBJ grows to manhood infused with ideals based on the Constitution, the tenets of democracy, and political liberalism.

Johnson's political opponents quickly tried to set the record straight. Their books, though harsh and vengeful, are never dull.

"Drugstore Populist"

In 1964, J. Evetts Haley, a popular historian of Texas and far-right ideologue, wrote the classic account, *A Texan Looks at Lyndon: A Study in Illegitimate Power*. Haley tells his readers that Johnson is not a "typical Texan" but a product "of the strangely deranged times that have set the stage for his ambitious desires, his vanity and his evil genius."

He traces the origins of the Johnson fortune to his acquisition of Austin radio station KTBC and his subsequent manipulation of the Federal Communications Commission to achieve a television monopoly in central Texas. And he repeats the familiar Texas stories about Johnson's ties to Brown & Root, the Houston-based construction firm whose rise to wealth and power paralleled that of Lyndon Johnson.

Despite the intertemperance of his attack, Haley does raise a critical question that must be faced by Johnson's future biographers: Can he be viewed purely as a political manipulator or was there a set of beliefs that ran through his public life?

Robert Sherrill, a liberal writing during the Vietnam War in 1967, argues in *The Accidental President* that Johnson was totally without fixed principles. Disgusted at the thought of Johnson's being considered a liberal, Sherrill labels him "the Drugstore Populist."

In the most effective part of his book, Sherrill belittles Johnson's political reputation: "Johnson had climbed by successes so small that the cumulative grand success seems an accident, as indeed in more than one way it was." He points out how poorly Johnson did in all his campaigns except that of 1964.

The Political "Daddy"

By far the most sweeping critique of Johnson's career came in 1968 with Alfred Steinberg's 800-page biography, *Sam Johnson's Boy*, a curious mixture of fact and fancy. It is distorted by an adamant refusal to see Johnson as anything but a seeker after personal wealth and political power.

Steinberg's most original and striking contribution is the concept of the "political daddy." He analyzes Johnson's technique of finding a patron, an established politician who could adopt him as his protégé. Ac-
According to Steinberg, Johnson went through a series of such "daddies," ranging from the little known but influential Alvin Wirtz in Texas to such prominent national figures as Sam Rayburn and Franklin Roosevelt.

Carrying the Torch

Unlike many earlier critics, Steinberg does not ignore foreign and defense policy. He points out that LBJ was a child of the 1930s, obsessed with the fear of appeasement and the supposed lesson of Munich.

When Communist China intervened in the Korean War in 1950, Johnson blamed the Truman administration for the resulting American retreat. "For the common defense we have thrown up . . . chicken-wire, not a wall of armed might," Johnson told the Senate.

The escalation of the Vietnam War comes as no surprise to Steinberg: "Johnson's long-time militarism" flourished, destroying his "opportunity for greatness in the steaming jungles of far-off Asia."

A more sympathetic portrait of Lyndon Johnson emerges from the extensive memoir literature. In 1971, Johnson's own Vantage Point was billed as a personal perspective on his presidential years. In fact, it was written largely by six former White House aides, including Walt Rostow and Doris Kearns.

They did all the research and wrote the first drafts; Johnson then made the final revisions. At Johnson's insistence, the memoir focuses exclusively on public policy. The result is a bland and juiceless official history, without a trace of Johnson's flamboyant personality and earthy wisdom.

From the outset, Johnson is clearly intent on minimizing the theme of friction with the Kennedys. He insists that his focus on continuity at home and in Indochina in 1963 and 1964 was based on emotional commitment, not shrewd politics. "Rightly or wrongly," Johnson maintains, "I felt from the very first day in office that I had to carry on for President Kennedy."

The theme of continuity with John Kennedy, the idea that Johnson was simply carrying out the mandate of his popular predecessor, permeates the volume. The reason for this emphasis becomes clear as the book unfolds: Johnson is as obsessed with Vietnam in his memoir as he was in the White House. Even though only five of the 23 chapters deal with Vietnam, they account for more than one-third of the book.

Failure to take a stand in South Vietnam, Johnson explains, would have meant the loss of all Southeast Asia to communism, a fearsome domestic debate that would have divided the nation, the loss of confidence in America by our allies, and above all, the global advance of Russia and China into the resulting vacuum of power.

LBJ on RFK

The personal sentiments so notably absent in The Vantage Point come out clearly in Sam Houston Johnson's memoir, My Brother Lyndon.

The President's intense dislike of Robert Kennedy is apparent in Lyndon's statement to his brother in 1964, "I don't need that little runt to win." Sam Johnson, perhaps reflecting Lyndon's feelings, blames the Vietnam War on the advisers LBJ had inherited from Kennedy, especially McGeorge Bundy and Robert McNamara. Above all, Sam Johnson perceives LBJ's insecurity about his own educational attainments when in the company of polished Ivy

The Wilson Quarterly/Summer 1982

145
Though Sam clearly idolized his brother, the book has many glimpses of the dark side of LBJ—his ruthless bullying of overworked aides, his inability to apologize for his excesses. And the author gives an insight into the President’s monumental ego when he describes how LBJ began to organize his papers and clippings for posterity in 1957 by establishing a trained archivist in the Old Senate Office Building.

None of these unedifying but human qualities appears in Jack Valenti’s memoir, despite its title, *A Very Human President*. Like Valenti’s service as a presidential aide, the book is one long paean to the chief.

The most perceptive and eloquent of all the memoirs is Harry McPherson’s *Political Education*. McPherson was a young Texan who went directly from law school to work as a legislative aide to Johnson in 1956; 10 years later, he served as White House counsel and speech writer. McPherson admired Johnson, but he was always aware of the President’s limitations.

**Whales and Minnows**

The most revealing passages deal with Johnson’s handling of Congress. As majority leader, he introduced his young assistant to the facts of life in the Senate, showing him how to win the support of the “whales,” such as Senators Richard Russell (D-La.) and Robert Kerr (D-Okla.), and to avoid wasting time on the “minnows.” McPherson came to understand, as Steinberg never did, why Johnson took such a hawkish stand on national defense: It was the price the Democrats had to pay during the Cold War to get their social welfare measures through Congress.

Far more than William White, McPherson demonstrates that Johnson was “a master craftsman of politics.” After the landslide victory in 1964, McPherson was puzzled by Johnson’s haste in enacting the Great Society. “Doesn’t matter what kind of majority you come in with,” the President explained. “You’ve got just one year when they treat you right, and before they start worrying about themselves.”

**Coming on Strong**

McPherson believes that Johnson had a definite political ideology—he views LBJ as a Southern populist with a distaste for large industrial corporations and a genuine sympathy for the poor. But it is a mistake, he thinks, to label Johnson a Southerner. “His true province was not the South,” McPherson explains. “It was Washington.”

Two other memoirs, George E. Reedy’s *The Twilight of the Presidency* and Joseph A. Califano’s *A Presidential Nation*, were written as extended commentaries on the political system rather than as accounts of the authors’ years spent as Johnson aides. Yet both give indirect evidence about the character of the Johnson Presidency.

Reedy describes how Johnson “mistook the alert, taut, well-groomed young men around him [in the White House] for ‘American youth’ and could never comprehend the origins of the long-haired, slovenly attired youngsters who hooted at him so savagely when he traveled.”

Some of the best insights into Lyndon Johnson come from the journalists who observed him at first hand from the time he emerged as a national figure in the 1950s. Their accounts, however, tend to be rich in anecdotes but skimpy on analysis.
The most satisfying book by
newsmen on Johnson's involvement
in national politics is Lyndon B.
Johnson: The Exercise of Power, by
columnists Rowland Evans and
Robert Novak. Writing in 1966, they
survey his career in the Senate, as
Vice President, and during the first
two years of his Presidency.

They are at their best in depicting
his success as Senate majority
leader, which they attribute to two
factors—the Johnson "network" and
the Johnson "treatment."

The network was the group of
Senators, both Democratic and Re-
publican, liberal and conservative,
whom Johnson could call on when he
needed votes on the Senate floor. He
won the loyalty of some by giving
them the committee assignments
they desired, others received prize of-
fice assignments, still others got trips
abroad at the taxpayers' expense or
strategic campaign contributions.

The key to the whole system was
the "treatment." As described by
Evans and Novak, Johnson would
use the treatment whenever he had
the opportunity for direct, one-on-
one contact with a fellow Senator.
Sometimes, he relied on threats and
accusations, sometimes on flattery,
cajolery, even tears.

Playing by Ear

Above all, he used physical domi-
nation. "He moved in close, his face a
scant millimeter from his target, his
eyes widening and narrowing, his
eyebrows rising and falling. From his
pockets poured clippings, memos, statis-
tics. Mimicry, humor, and the
genius of analogy made the Treat-
ment an almost hypnotic experience
and rendered the target stunned and
helpless."

Two other journalists, Philip
Geyelin and Tom Wicker, are less
flattering but quite perceptive in de-
scribing Johnson's approach to for-
ign policy.

Geyelin gives the fullest account in
Lyndon B. Johnson and the World.
Writing in 1966, he describes
Johnson's foreign policy as President
with growing apprehension over the
Dominican Republic intervention
and the slow escalation of the Viet-
am War.

Yet he credits Johnson with con-
siderable expertise on defense mat-
ters and the ability to play power
politics. He was, Geyelin contends, in
large measure "a self-taught states-
man; he couldn't read the music, but
he had come a long way on his ability
to play by ear."

Personal Failings

In JFK and LBJ, Tom Wicker ar-
gues that Johnson, handicapped by
his Southern background, wheeler-
dealer reputation, and inexperience
in foreign policy, had little choice
but to implement the Vietnam policy
he had inherited from John Kennedy.
Kennedy might have escaped from
the Vietnam quagmire, but Johnson
could not.

Most of the other reporters' books
on Johnson fail to rise above rem-
iniscence. Volumes such as Jack
Bell's Johnson Treatment, Charles
Roberts's LBJ's Inner Circle, Frank
Cormier's LBJ: The Way He Was,
Hugh Sidey's Very Personal Presi-
dency, and Haynes Johnson and
Richard Harwood's Lyndon describe
in eye-opening detail Johnson's van-
ity, vulgarity, and pettiness as well
as his gusto and exuberance.

By far the best reporter's account
of the Johnson Presidency is No Hail,
No Farewell, by British journalist
Louis Heren. As a foreigner, Heren
views Johnson dispassionately, not-
ing both his coarse personal behavior
and his "superb" skills as a politician.

Heren gives Johnson full credit for the passage of the stalled Kennedy legislative program in 1964 and 1965. But he also criticizes Johnson for attempting to rule rather than govern after his massive reelection victory in 1964. "With private wheeling and dealing, the control of most outlets of official information, and the occasional dishonesties," Heren asserts, "Johnson also avoided the further check of public oversight."

Heren attributes LBJ’s ultimate downfall more to external events than to personal failings. "To a large extent he was a victim of circumstances beyond his control," The real tragedy, as Heren sees it, lay not in Johnson’s character but in the bankruptcy of the liberal tradition that he inherited from Franklin Roosevelt and John Kennedy.

"The old answers were often irrelevant," Heren claims, as the liberals proved to be "captives rather than heirs of the past." So the President who enacted long overdue civil-rights legislation and prevailed on Congress to pass aid-to-education measures ended as the bewildered victim of black violence and campus protests. And, in Vietnam, Johnson took the Cold War liberalism of his predecessors and carried it to its logical conclusion.

There were personal failings as well. The challenges Johnson faced were unprecedented—cultural revolution, a breakdown in law and order, massive racial unrest—but Heren feels that John Kennedy might have had the political sophistication, the appeal to youth, and the personal charisma to cope with the momentous upheavals of the mid-1960s.

Johnson’s political gifts worked
very well in the Senate but not in the White House, where he had to lead 200 million Americans, not just 99 Senators. "National leadership could not be exercised from a back room," Heren concludes.

Scholarly analysis of Lyndon Johnson's career is still meager. There have been a few pioneers, however. Eric Goldman and Doris Kearns stand out.

**Sam and Rebekah**

Goldman combined his skill as a political historian with his experience as a presidential assistant from 1964 to 1966 to write the most reliable available account of Johnson's Presidency. In *The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson*, Goldman describes the flowering of the Great Society in detail, perceiving it as the culmination of the reform movement that began with progressivism and continued with the New Deal.

In his search for an explanation of Johnson's failure as President, Goldman divides the blame between LBJ and the urban middle class. Lyndon Johnson, he claims, was his own worst enemy. Plagued by a deep-seated sense of personal insecurity, he tried desperately as President to win the respect and love of the people but succeeded only in bringing out his own worst qualities.

"Dubious whether people liked him," Goldman observes, "he pleaded, clawed, and maneuvered to have them love him."

Compounding the problem in the 1960s was what Goldman calls the emergence of "the Metroamericans"—the rising middle-class citizens of the cities and suburbs who prided themselves on their urbanity and sophistication. Influenced by a Northeastern-dominated media, Metroamericans compared Johnson to the Kennedy they had idolized and found him wanting.

Doris Kearns offers a very different explanation for Johnson's failure in *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream*. Like Goldman, she combines the insights of a trained scholar with personal experience gained from service as a White House aide and ghost-writer.

Adopting the techniques of psychohistory and benefiting from a close personal relationship with LBJ during the years of his retirement, Kearns analyzes the relationship between Johnson and his parents to explain the central contradiction of his life—the quest for power and the desire for service. The quest for power came from his father, Sam Johnson, who introduced Lyndon to the coarse but exciting world of politics during his brief stint in the Texas legislature. His mother, Rebekah, on the other hand, was a genteel woman who valued idealism and service.

Kearns claims that Rebekah withheld her love and affection from her son as a way to force him to give up his father's crude ways. As a result, "from the world of work and the conquest of ever-widening circles of men, Johnson hoped to obtain the steady love he had lacked as a child," Kearns writes.

**Digging Deeper**

The problem with Kearns's analysis of Lyndon Johnson is that it is too pat. In one fell psychological swoop, she accounts for all the contradictions in his political career.

Historians writing in the 1970s have shown greater interest in Johnson's political ideology than in his personal idiosyncrasies. Jim F. Heath stresses the theme of continuity with Kennedy in his book on the 1960s, *Decade of Disillusionment*.
Despite the obvious differences in style, the two Presidents, he contends, were very similar: Both were activists, both were in the progressive tradition in domestic policy, and both were ardent Cold Warriors. In particular, Heath sees Johnson as a genuine liberal who “saw the Great Society as going well beyond the work of his great hero, Franklin Roosevelt.”

A genuine consensus, to use LBJ’s favorite word, seems to be emerging out of the Johnson literature a decade after his passing.

The image of Johnson as a riverboat gambler, ruthless in his pursuit of power, a manipulator of men and events, is too strong for even his most ardent admirers to dismiss. But at the same time, historians have established a solid ideological base for his Great Society programs and demonstrated that he acted out of conviction as well as expediency.

The real test facing future historians is to explain why Johnson failed to meet the challenges of the 1960s—notably racial unrest, social upheaval, and the divisive Indochina conflict. Simply to say that he was limited by the progressive and internationalist traditions of his generation or by his own early experience is to deny him the capacity for growth and change, a quality he displayed in abundance throughout his career in Congress. No, scholars must dig deeper than that.

Until they do, we are faced with the continuing enigma of Lyndon Johnson, the brilliant tactician who led the nation into strategic disaster in Vietnam and disorder at home.

**AN LBJ BOOKLIST**

Jack Bell, *The Johnson Treatment* (Harper, 1965)
We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer's telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editors' requests for comment.

On Men and Women:

Time Out for Parents

Since I see no evidence that society intends to return to the asexual stage of our biological beginnings, I assume there will always be differences between men and women. But there are ways to lessen the disparities inherent in our female/maleness, especially as they affect women's ability to progress in the workplace.

Cullen Murphy's article ["A Survey of the Research," WQ, Winter 1982] points out that "female labor force participation slumps deeply between the ages of 25 and 35 as women bear and rear their children." Economist Lester Thurow believes, not surprisingly, that this is precisely the decade that counts, "when lawyers become partners, academics get tenure, blue-collar workers become supervisors or acquire new skills, and businessmen move onto a 'fast track.'" In other words, those who don't make it during that decade probably won't make it.

One change in the rules of the workplace would allow child-bearing women to stay on a par with their spouses—by alternating two-year periods of parenting responsibility. Under this plan, as Betty Friedan has suggested in The Second Stage, both industry and government would redesign their systems of upward mobility, rewarding, rather than punishing, women and men who take time out to assume equal shares of the parenting obligation. Ultimately, the goal would be to provide some form of income allowance for the primary caretaker, female or male.

Society as a whole would benefit, since children would experience equal exposure to the sexes, helping us move away from our all-too-enduring stereotypes. The rewards (and heartaches) of parenthood would be enjoyed and borne by both sexes. And the laws of the country, because they would be written by men and women, might finally draw the sexes together in support of similar goals.

Diane Rehm
Producer/Host
Kaleidoscope, WAMU-FM
Washington, D.C.

Quality, Not Quantity

I disagree with a statement made by Cullen Murphy: "Having both a mother and a father at home is still the best way for a child to grow up; single-parent households are, statistically, candidates for trouble and, collectively, a troublesome burden on the larger society."

It is not the presence of a mother and father that gives a child the best environment, but the presence of a loving adult or adults. Neither the number nor the biological relationship is relevant. I'll wager that the burden on the larger society of unhappy "nuclear" families exceeds that of happy "one-parent" families.

But since "quality" is difficult to measure, researchers often assume it is constant and manufacture statistics such as those alluded to by Murphy.

Lynn A. Austin
Washington, D.C.

Up from Feminism

As Cullen Murphy senses, public policy toward "women" has of late rested largely on fantasy. Men and women do differ enough to explain discrepancies in their "roles." Obviously, behavior is not wholly preprogrammed. But environmentalists who stress this merely obscure the real issue: the existence of some sig-
significant, innate, gender-specific traits.

Though speculative, sociobiology is as pertinent as endocrinology. Indeed, John Fleagle’s approach ["In the Beginning"] extends naturally to the psychological: Women today are “person-oriented” because this is a good thing to be when dealing with two-year-olds; thus, ancestral women with this trait were fitter to survive and pass on this trait than their liberated competitors.

A. E. Dick Howard ["The Sexes and the Law"] ignores the latest excuse for gender quotas (which are detested by anyone aware of the gross favoritism currently shown women, not just by businessmen and educators): They are needed to prevent discrimination against women.

In Labor Department jargon, women are no longer a "target" but a "protected" population. We may thus expect quotas to persist long after the last vestige of "past discrimination" has been compensated for. Thus does the agenda of feminism survive its intellectual demise: It becomes bureaucratized.

Michael Levin
Department of Philosophy
City College of New York
New York, N.Y.

Eternal Differences

The demand of the women’s liberation movement for a “gender-free” society washed aground on the rocks of the issues of the military draft and assignment to combat duty.

The military is the cutting edge of the peculiar ideology that emerged in the late 1960s proclaiming that there really isn’t any difference between males and females (except those private anatomical differences we need not discuss). In November 1979, the House Armed Services Committee was persuaded to hold four days of hearings on the demand by a few women’s liberationists to repeal the laws that exempt women from military combat. The committee quietly buried this proposal without a vote.

President Jimmy Carter offered himself as the sacrificial lamb on the altar of gender equality when, in his 1980 State of the Union speech, he called for draft registration of both women and men. His proposal was overwhelmingly rejected in both Houses of Congress. After the “gender-free” warriors moved their battleground to the courts, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the “sexist” male-only draft law by 6-to-3 in Rostker v. Goldberg in June 1981.

Except for the tiny fraction of one percent of career-age women who volunteer for military service and complete their terms of enlistment, American women still expect their men to protect and defend them. And American men will never stoop so low as to send their wives, sisters, sweethearts, and daughters out to fight enemy men.


Phyllis Schlafly
Alton, Ill.

Mrs. Schlafly is the founder of Stop ERA.

Contradictions

Descriptions of the 1973 Supreme Court abortion decision never fail to surprise me. A. E. Dick Howard writes only that the court permits abortions during the early stages of pregnancy. Roe v. Wade and its companion decision, Doe v. Bolton, prohibit states from outlawing abortion during the entire nine months of pregnancy.

Specifically, the Court drew two legal lines through pregnancy. After the first trimester, states may regulate abortion only in order to protect a woman’s health. By this ruling, states may require that second and third trimester abortions be performed in hospitals. The Court drew a second line at viability [in the words of the Court, the stage at which the fetus is capable of “meaningful life outside the mother’s womb”]. States may forbid abortions after viability except when the woman’s health may be jeopardized if she is denied an abortion. “Health” includes physical, psychological, and emotional well-being. (See Doe v. Bolton.) Therefore,
even the most restrictive state law must permit abortion right up until the moment of birth if a woman's emotional well-being would otherwise be adversely affected. This law amounts to no restrictions at all.

Two of the important precepts women have taught men are the efficacy of non-violence and the strength of commitment. If 1.5 million women a year sever the strongest bond in our culture, the bond between mother and child, how tenaciously will they remain committed to what may be the second strongest bond, that between a man and a woman?

Joe Sleve~ls
Cincinnati, Ohio

Prejudice at Work?

For virulent male bias, probably undetectable except by feminists of either sex, the WQ's articles on "Men and Women" are shameful.

The "Editor's Comment" gave me high hope, until I saw his criterion: All three authors were male.

"A Survey of the Research" one would think would include the economic realities of being female instead of being referenced to psychology and hormones. Most women wouldn't give a hoot about psychology and hormones if they enjoyed the same standard of living males enjoy. But not an economist visibly was quoted in the bunch! If males paid their child support, and obeyed equal opportunity laws, poverty would not be an issue for female-headed families.

The irritating part of the "research" article is that time after time it stopped short of "why." The answers would reveal prejudice at work. For example, if girls "lean toward teaching and clerical work, and boys indicate a taste for managerial and blue-collar jobs," why? Is it the conditioning and counseling of each, toward these choices? Can girls get jobs as easily in anything but clerical work and teaching? If not, aren't the girls being realists?

The "urge to bear children" attributed to women made me laugh. I suspect many women have no urge to bear children, but these women do not get ahead economically to the degree men with a similar lack of family responsibility do. And I saw nothing in the article about the male "urge to have a male heir"—though this certainly exists and has been responsible for much overpopulation.

The article states that males have a 290 percent higher suicide rate than females. This, of itself, would make me put females in charge of important organizations. Such emotional responses of males make them unsuitable.

Abigail Zilts
Syracuse, N.Y.

Ode to Our Forebears

Re John G. Fleagle's "In the Beginning":

According to the sage, revered Smithsonian Institution, Chimpanzees share the bulk of our Genetic constitution.

Though ninety-eight percent the same They live in cozy cages, And neither pay an income tax, Nor do they work for wages.

I hope the chimps appreciate What that small difference means— Just forced to share our genes!

Sarah F. Greenfield
Cocoa, Fla.

On Religion:

Jewish Persecution

I have no dispute in general with Nathan Glazer's article, "Jewish Loyalties" [WQ, Autumn 1981]. However, I take strong exception to the language contained in the third paragraph on page 134: "... because of a 2,000-year history in which persecution and disaster have been the norm."

Two thousand years is synonymous with Christianity. The phrase leaves little to conjecture: Jews have suffered persecution and disaster since the advent of

The Wilson Quarterly/Summer 1982

153
Christianity. A reasonable inference would be that prior to 2,000 years ago the Jews had it easy, living in a land of milk and honey. A person with only a cursory reading or understanding of the Old Testament knows that even before Christianity the Jews suffered persecution and disaster for thousands of years.

While I abhor anti-Semitic remarks, I equally abhor remarks that are anti-Christian. Sometimes I wish that our common father, Abraham, would come down and kick us both in the pants.

Joseph G. Balsamo
Suffern, N.Y.

Ethnicity and Faith

I was disappointed in Nathan Glazer's analysis of the concerns of contemporary American Jewry. He concentrated solely on the secular political and social issues and ignored the very significant religious aspect of American Jewish life.

Glazer notes that it is difficult to make a parallel between Jewish ethnicity and other American ethnic forms. He is right—but for the wrong reasons. Jewish ethnicity (which is as varied as the lands in which Jews live or have lived) has never long survived severance from the religious trunk onto which it is grafted.

The rich and flourishing Yiddish culture outlined by Irving Howe in World of Our Fathers has dwindled into a shrinking band of survivors and small groups of eager young academics in search of roots. Yiddish survives as a medium of communication only within the world of the very Orthodox. By the same token, the only appreciable remnant of the aristocratic Sephardic Jewish culture that dominated colonial Jewry is the Spanish Portuguese Synagogue in New York.

All of the social and political issues that Glazer mentions do indeed evoke concern and, of course, endless debate, discussion, and analysis. Yet the most profound changes in American Jewry have taken place on the religious level.

Anti-ethnic, classical Reform Judaism, which dominated in the 19th century, was overwhelmed by the tide of Eastern European immigrants, who imposed a more technically oriented Conservative Judaism as the religious norm. But in the last two decades, this kind of "soft" or "fuzzy" religiosity has been increasingly challenged by "harder" and more ideological forms of religious expression. Orthodoxy, long regarded as a dying immigrant phenomenon, has emerged as a dynamic and abrasive force, boldly challenging the very legitimacy of Reform and Conservative Judaism.

No survey of American Jewish concerns and interests that ignores what is taking place at the very heart of American Jewry can be either definitive or accurate.

Rabbi Gilbert Kollin
Los Angeles, Calif.

Other Matters:

A Plea for Joyce's Poetry

In "Words and the Man: The Art of James Joyce" [WQ, Winter 1982], Frank D. McConnell refers in passing to "two volumes of relatively forgettable poetry.... None of them matter, except to specialists." Yet the entire thrust of McConnell's insightful essay could be illustrated through these "forgettable" volumes.

In his poetry, Joyce reveals his love and tolerance for human passion. Any understanding of Ulysses would be deepened by reading Joyce's "Chamber Music." These poems are easily accessible and in many ways worthy of Yeats.

I agree with McConnell that in this year, the centennial of Joyce's birth, it is time to expand the readership of Ulysses and Finnegans Wake. Would it not be a shame to let slip poems that might be the key to seeing the passionately human side of these intellectual novels?

Neil Arditi
New York, N.Y.

Milton's Othello

Frank D. McConnell states in his opening paragraph: "With all the arrogance of
greatness, Othello could say to the night watch, "Not to know me argues thyself unknown." The quotation is not Othello's. See Paradise Lost [4:830], where Satan makes this remark, in essence to Ithuriel and Zephon.

"Greatness, Othello could say to the night watch, 'Not to know me argues thyself unknown.'" The quotation is not Othello's. See Paradise Lost [4:830], where Satan makes this remark, in essence to Ithuriel and Zephon.

Charles M. Raskin
Assistant Professor of English
Georgia College
Milledgeville, Ga.

Broadening the Creationist View

In "Charles Darwin and the Beagle" [WQ, Winter 1982], Michael Ruse states that the creationists argue that the Old Testament account of creation "should be the only one taught in the schools." The creationists have never argued such a position. In fact, the creationist's position is that both creationism and evolution should be given equal treatment in the schools.

Ruse would also have us believe that the creationists do not attempt to deal with all evidence as it may bear on creation and evolution. But this is not so. Creationist writings deal with other aspects of evolution and creation than the fossil record.

Garey B. Spradley
Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Houston
Houston, Tex.

Misplaced "Marxist"?


Why the phrase "a Marxist"? It seems as out of place as saying "a negro" if he were black. His politics, if you are correct, make no difference to readers who enjoy his writing.

Frank W. Peel
Hammond, Ind.

American Marxists, Gould included, identify themselves as such, having a special view of evolution, as they do of other matters. —Ed.

Who Said It?

Re "Indispensable Allies: The French at Yorktown" by Stanley J. Idzerda [WQ, Autumn 1981]: The famous words, "Lafayette, we are here," were not spoken (a) by General Pershing; (b) at the place or on the date the general first stepped on the soil of France in 1917.

General John J. Pershing and staff members first stepped on French soil at Boulogne, France, on the morning of June 17, 1917, after disembarking from an English Channel steamer that they had boarded in Great Britain. They were met
there by a welcoming party of high-ranking French military officers and members of the diplomatic corps. The general and his staff departed Boulogne, by train, for Paris soon after the preliminary welcome and arrived there late in the afternoon of the same day (June 17, 1917) to a tremendous reception.

It was not until July 4, 1917, however, when the French deemed that it would be appropriate to honor America's Independence Day with the Americans by an observance at the tomb of General Lafayette, that the words "Lafayette, we are here" were heard. They were spoken by Colonel C. E. Stanton, a member of General Pershing's staff, whom the general had designated to assume the oratorical duties of the day, after he (the general) had addressed a few extemporary words to the assembled dignitaries and French citizenry. General Pershing did take note of Colonel Stanton's words, nevertheless, and later observed (in his two-volume work, My Experiences in the World War, published in 1931) that the expression could only have emanated from inspiration and that he wished "the utterance could have been mine."

This commentary is submitted with deep and sincere respect for the splendid article by Idzerda, which shed much new light for me on America's "French Connection" in the Revolutionary War.

Maj. Theodore Baltes, Sr., USA (Ret.)
San Jose, Calif.

According to General Pershing himself, in his memoir, My Experiences in the World War, the General set foot on French soil on June 13, 1917, not June 17 as Maj. Baltes writes. Bartlett's Familiar Quotations, while attributing the famous words to Colonel Stanton, notes that an American uniformed correspondent named Naboth Hedin states that he heard Pershing pronounce the phrase ..., on June 14, his second day in Paris." The general himself cannot recall having uttered the words, but the fact that Colonel Stanton repeated them again on July 14, as Bartlett's reports, suggests that the American military was getting a great deal of mileage out of them.

Corrections

The scholarly and editorial standards of the WQ are so high that I am amazed to see a psalter, probably of French execution, identified in "Words and the Man: The Art of James Joyce" [WQ, Winter 1982] as from the Book of Kells, which contains only Gospels and is now widely recognizable as an outstanding example of Insular (Hiberno-Saxon?) art.

Of less intellectual moment is the caption in "Charles Darwin and the Beagle" [WQ, Winter 1981] where the ape is actually wearing formal evening attire, "white tie and tails" (lacking Fred Astaire's top hat), not a dinner jacket and black tie "tuxedo."

Ruth Dean
New York, N.Y.

The area of the Dominican Republic was incorrectly listed on page 126 of the Spring 1982 WQ as 5,683 square miles. The Dominican Republic actually covers 18,704 square miles.
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