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Micawber's theory

It has always appeared to us that the periodic furor about corporate profits might be resolved quite easily through application of the classic theory set forth by Mr. Micawber in *David Copperfield*: "Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen nineteen six, result happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds ought and six, result misery."

Even if the figures are elevated into the billions—as they might be in Mobil's case, and that of some other large corporations—Micawber's theory maintains an inexorable force: the person or organization (or the nation, but that's another matter) that cannot provide, over the long haul, for its own necessities will end in a condition of misery. The person in misery produces tears; the analog in a business is red ink.

The appalling size of the funds needed to escape misery in the energy business is a function of the appalling costs that a company such as Mobil must incur to find and produce energy. Going out with a shopping list has become a depressing experience for everyone. Consider what happens when we go out with ours.

Item: Bonus payments for the right to drill on 43 tracts offshore U.S.A. Cost: \$1.8 billion in 1979 (of which Mobil's share was \$580 million).

Item: One program to install 36 additional producing platforms offshore U.S.A. in the Gulf of Mexico @ \$10 million apiece. Duration: Five years. Mobil's share of cost: \$120 million.

Item: One catalytic cracking unit to enable greater gasoline yield from our refinery at Paulsboro, New Jersey. Cost: Over \$50 million.

Item: One oil producing platform for the deep waters of the Norwegian Continental Shelf. Cost: \$2 billion (of which Mobil's share is \$250 million).

Item: One program to develop reserves in the Arun gas field in Indonesia. Duration: 10 years. Mobil's share of cost: over \$400 million.

And so it goes. Last year, for example, Mobil Oil's total capital expenditures in our energy and chemical businesses hit \$3 billion—most of it spent in the United States. That adds up to a stupendous shopping list indeed, and is in fact equal to every dime in cash flow available for investment.

For—unlike Mr. Micawber—if we come out at the end of the year sixpence (or even \$2 billion) ahead, we don't put it into our pocket. We put it back in the business—into wildcat wells, into platforms, into refineries, into solar research, into ships, and shafts, and seismographs and all the other myriad costly items required to get more energy for our millions of customers.

Last year, for those customers, Mobil was able to supply oil and natural gas liquids at the rate of about 2.2 million barrels per day—an increase of 63,000 barrels per day in comparison to 1978. It cost a great deal to get all this energy, but just as certainly it met a great need. And thus, as Mr. Micawber would put it: "Result happiness."

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
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Excise.

With hundred rows of teeth, the shark exceeds,
And on all trades like Caffawar the feeds. *Marvell.*

PENNSION. *n. f.* [*penfion*, Fr.] An allowance made to any one without an equivalent. In England it is generally understood to mean pay given to a state hireling for treason to his country.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Editor's Comment

Good scholars look at old "facts" in new ways. To better analyze the state of California, for example, a group of scholars from Stanford, Berkeley, and other institutions has begun to examine the place as if it were a separate nation, an independent "post-industrial" society, with its own economy, architecture, culture, and politics. Some of their findings—and the wider implications—are reported in this issue of the *WQ*, along with a discussion of California's role as a bellwether for the rest of America.

Other analysts re-examine the output of a "growth industry" in the social sciences—the study of the American family. We first surveyed this controversial field in the Winter 1977 *WQ*. Since then, the upward trends have persisted in the statistics on divorce, illegitimate births, single-parent families, two-parent neglect of children. Still disputed are the causes—and the effects on children, schools, social uplift, politics. It is a murky business. This summer's White House Conference on Families will not change that. What has become clear is that family instability inflicts not only a financial trauma on the people immediately involved but also, in the aggregate, a growing burden on the larger community.

In his essay, "Fire in the Minds of Men," historian James Billington provides a fresh analysis of both old and new "facts" as he describes the development of today's revolutionary ideology from Rousseau to Lenin and Fidel Castro as a kind of secular faith—which may be dying.

Thus, this issue of *WQ* focuses on change—in ideas, human behavior, even technology. The long-term effects of such change are often only dimly understood. But our contributors offer some interesting conclusions.

Peter Braestrup

PERIODICALS

Reviews of articles from periodicals and specialized journals here and abroad

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POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

Party Paradox

"Institutional Development of Parties and the Thesis of Party Decline" by Cornelius P. Cotter and John F. Bibby, in *Political Science Quarterly* (Spring 1980), Ste. 500, 619 West 114 St., New York, N.Y. 10025.

Though the Democratic and Republican parties appeal to a lower percentage of voters than in the past, they have, on the national level, become increasingly sophisticated bureaucracies — putting a tighter rein on state and local parties and providing more services to community loyalists than ever before. So write Cotter and Bibby, political scientists at the University of Wisconsin.

As recently as 1920, the Democratic and Republican National Committees were ad hoc groups of politicians who simply gathered every four years to run the presidential campaigns. The RNC was the first to acquire a permanent staff, after the 1920 election, as Democrat Woodrow Wilson gained the White House. The Democrats followed suit in 1928, with one innovation. They hired a public relations man, Charles Michelson, who "trained his guns on the Hoover Administration" and, claim the authors, began the tradition of the out-party as perpetual critic of the in-party. In recent decades, the party chairmen have gained strength and independence — even from Presidents. Both national committees now secure financing apart from presidential campaign fund-raising operations.

In 1948, threatened with secession by the Southern arm of the party, the DNC faced the need for strict party conformity. Important show-downs came at the 1964 and 1968 Democratic conventions, when the national leadership sided with blacks to force the integration of Southern state delegations. In 1968, the McGovern-Fraser commission established a quota system for women and minority delegates.

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Meanwhile, the Republican National Committee has increased its influence through services to state and local parties. Under Chairman Bill Brock, the RNC provides state organizations with salaried managers, finance directors, and low-cost computer service. Even candidates for state legislatures can obtain funds from the RNC.

This new institutional strength has resulted in a paradox: increasingly disciplined parties, whose domination of electoral politics is reinforced by recent federal election laws, persuade a *decreasing* proportion of the voters to identify themselves as Democrats or Republicans.

When Do Voters Really Decide?

“Time of Decision and Media Use During the Ford-Carter Campaign” by Steven H. Chaffee and Sun Yuel Choe, in *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Spring 1980), Subscription Dept., Elsevier North Holland, Inc., 52 Vanderbilt Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.

Are autumn presidential campaigns a waste of time for voters and candidates? Since the 1940s, political scientists have believed that most voters make up their minds either before Labor Day, when campaigns traditionally begin, or during the last few days before the balloting.

Chaffee and Choe, researchers in journalism at the University of Wisconsin, polled a group of Wisconsin voters four times during the presidential race of autumn 1976: before and after the first Ford-Carter debate (September 23), after the second debate (October 23), and immediately following the November 2 election. They found an unexpectedly high 40 percent of respondents who made their choices during the *middle* weeks of the presidential campaign.

These “campaign deciders” (who split their votes between Ford and



Jeff MacNelly's 1978 cartoon depicts the traditional view of America's undecided voters.

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Carter) were considerably wealthier and better educated than last-minute deciders (who gave Carter a 60 percent majority) but somewhat below precampaign deciders (who went 59 to 41 percent for Ford) in social and economic status. Further, campaign deciders were more likely to be ideological neutrals than were precampaign deciders and last-minute deciders.

Campaign deciders base their choices on reports on TV and in the press, say Chafee and Choe. The amount of reading they did about politics in 1976 jumped between Labor Day and October, while the other groups' interest in political coverage tailed off considerably.

Diehard Democrats and Republicans fall in line behind their candidates soon after the nominating conventions, observe the authors. But once the party nominees are chosen, a large bloc of uncommitted Americans steep themselves in campaign coverage and base their choices on the candidates' views and performances.

Housing Test

"Housing Allowances: An Experiment That Worked" by Bernard J. Frieden, in *The Public Interest* (Spring 1980) Box 542, Old Chelsea, New York, N.Y. 10011.

Providing the poor with good quality housing has been a high priority of the federal government since the New Deal era. But a recent federal experiment suggests that low-income people are troubled most by high rents. So reports Frieden, a professor of urban studies at MIT.

Beginning in 1973, the Department of Housing and Urban Development offered cash payments averaging \$75 a month to poor tenants whose annual income came to less than \$7,000 (for a family of four). Recipients could spend the money as they pleased, provided they lived in or moved to housing that met sanitary and safety standards set by HUD.

The seven-year experiment involved more than 25,000 families in 12 metropolitan areas and cost \$160 million. As planned, the lowest income families received the greatest assistance. The average recipient family earned only \$4,000 (in 1976 dollars). The payments reduced the rent burden of poor families from between 34 and 53 percent of total income to between 17 and 30 percent.

However, less than half the families eligible for the new program applied. Reasons given included a reluctance to move from homes that failed federal inspections and an unwillingness to accept "handouts." Homeowning recipients used the allowances to make minor repairs, but only about 40 percent of the participating families moved to secure better housing. On the average, families spent only 20 percent of their additional income on rent.

"The poor do not give *quality* the high priority that program administrators do," says Frieden. In fact, just as the experiment began, an HUD poll revealed that 84 percent of poor families rated their homes "excellent" or "satisfactory."

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*Publicity vs.
Performance*

"Show Horses and Work Horses in the United States House of Representatives" by James L. Payne, in *Polity* (Spring 1980), Northwestern Political Science Association, Whitmore Hall, Amherst, Mass. 01003.

In Congress, there are "show horses" who neglect their legislative duties in their quest for publicity and "work horses" who quietly but effectively pass bills and attend committee meetings. That is the conclusion of Payne, a Texas A & M political scientist.

Taking 55 members of the House Banking and Public Works Committees who did not hold committee leadership positions, Payne compared the number of minutes each Representative spent at hearings in 1971-72 with the amount of news coverage he received during 1972 in five major newspapers across the country.

He found 10 members who garnered great publicity but attended few hearings (1,343 minutes worth, on the average). They included Manhattan Democrat Edward I. Koch, now mayor of New York City; former New York Democrat Bella Abzug; Henry Reuss (D-Wisconsin), who has chaired the Banking Committee since 1975; and Philip M. Crane of Illinois, a one-time candidate for the 1980 Republican presidential nomination. On the other hand, 17 congressional work horses logged an average of 4,060 minutes at hearings but were rarely mentioned in the press. Twenty-eight legislators ranked low in both respects.

Democrats, writes Payne, are more likely to be show horses and Republicans work horses. Show horses hold more extreme political views, as well. The eight Democratic show horses were more liberal than the four Democratic work horses (based on ratings by Americans for Democratic Action); the two Republican show horses were more conservative than the 13 Republican work horses.

Voters seem to like congressional publicity hounds. The typical show horse recorded 9.5 percent more votes in 1972 than he won in 1970, versus only a 2.5 percent gain for the typical work horse. The electorate was cruelest to Republican Fred M. Schwengel of Iowa. His district rewarded his record 7,314 minutes in committee hearings by voting him out of office.

*Partisan
Technologies*

"Do Artifacts Have Politics?" by Langdon Winner, in *Daedalus* (Winter 1980), American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 165 Allandale St., Jamaica Plain Station, Boston, Mass. 02130.

Nuclear power is inherently authoritarian; solar power is democratic. So argue some U.S. environmentalists, who contend that the production of plutonium waste may require suffocating security measures (wiretapping, informer networks) extending outside the nuclear power plant to prevent theft. They are not the first to suggest a link between

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politics and technology, asserts MIT political scientist Winner.

Even objects not intrinsically political can promote political ends. New York City planner Robert Moses, for example, ordered that 9-foot-high overpasses be constructed across new Long Island parkways in the 1920s and '30s. The low bridges closed the roads to the 12-foot-high buses of the day and put the beaches and parks of Long Island beyond the reach of New York City's poor. The classic case of manipulative engineering is Baron Georges-Eugène Haussman's reconstruction of mid-19th century Paris. At Emperor Louis Napoleon's behest, Haussman eliminated many of the narrow streets that had protected radicals battling police during the revolution of 1848.

Marxist theoretician Friedrich Engels maintained in 1872 that a strong central authority is needed to run modern factories—and, by extension, modern industrial states. Winner suggests that this may be true where nuclear power is concerned. "Soft energy" advocates, on the other hand, contend that solar energy is more compatible with democracy: It can be produced economically in small, independent cells, easily constructed from household materials.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

The Indecisive Monarch

"Carter and the Fall of the Shah: The Inside Story" by Michael A. Ledeen and William H. Lewis, in *The Washington Quarterly* (Spring 1980), Dept. WQ, Transaction Periodicals Consortium, P.O. Box 1262, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.

"After the Shah left Iran in January 1979, he remained convinced for several weeks that the American government had a grand strategy that was beyond his ken," write *Washington Quarterly* executive editor Ledeen and George Washington University political scientist Lewis. But the authors contend that while U.S. Presidents for years had showered the Shah with advice and aid, the Carter administration never developed a plan to deal with his protracted downfall.

Since the Kennedy era, Washington had viewed the Shah as "the linchpin of Iranian society" (as U.S. Embassy cables occasionally described him). But with an eye toward broadening his political base, aides to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson prodded the Shah to institute land reform, grant greater rights to women, and improve Iran's schools—sometimes designing these programs themselves. U.S. involvement in Iranian affairs deepened under Richard Nixon. From 1970 to 1973, tens of thousands of American civilian and military technicians poured into the country. Strong U.S. political support continued under Gerald Ford and then Jimmy Carter.

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The Shah's own stormy career, meanwhile, produced a split personality. Having returned from exile in 1953, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi came to see himself as a child of destiny. Yet, the Shah was an indecisive autocrat. Described as "neurotic, even pathological" by American diplomats, he leaned heavily on the United States for support and guidance. In late 1978, faced with incipient rebellion and debilitated by anticancer drugs, the Shah waffled between violent repression and conciliation. He turned to Washington for direction.

The Carter administration, say the authors, gave him conflicting signals. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski urged the Shah to maintain control at any cost. Cyrus Vance's State Department believed the Shah was doomed and opposed further repression. According to the authors, President Carter never reconciled this conflict.

After U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young referred to revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as a "saint," and Brzezinski mused publicly that radical Islamic forces in Iran might incite Muslims in the Soviet Union, the Shah concluded (erroneously) that Carter had secretly asked Khomeini to serve as America's new anti-Soviet surrogate in the Persian Gulf. In December 1978, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi made his decision to leave Iran.

Wonder Weapons?

"PGMs: No Panacea" by Daniel Goure and Gordon McCormick, in *Survival* (Jan.-Feb. 1980), The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 23 Tavistock St., London, WC2E 7NQ, England.

"What can be seen, can be hit and what can be hit, can be destroyed." So say some NATO officials, confident that precision-guided munitions (PGMs) will soon offset the Soviet bloc's growing conventional military superiority in Central Europe. Private defense consultants Goure and McCormick caution against relying too much on these highly accurate, sophisticated, hand-held weapons.

PGMs appeal to many Western defense officials as a cheap way to restore the military balance in Europe. But, the authors contend, PGM proponents have neglected an important change in Soviet military thinking. If the Soviets invade Western Europe, it will not be with a simple tank-led blitzkrieg, of the sort that could be vulnerable to the small, mobile, PGM-equipped squads envisioned by some NATO strategists. Since the 1960s, Soviet doctrine has increasingly stressed a "combined arms" approach. Warsaw Pact tank divisions are now supported by weapons and infantry numerous enough to destroy Western PGM units. The main improvements: self-propelled artillery, rocket launchers, surface-to-surface missiles, and PGMs of their own.

PGMs have technical limitations, too. Operators must be able to track their target continuously from launch to impact. During the 1973 Mideast War, the Israelis frustrated Arab troops armed with Soviet PGMs by spreading smokescreens and electronically jamming the new

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U.S. Army.

U.S. precision-guided munitions such as this TOW missile are designed to offset Soviet tank strength.

weapons. Further, most PGMs have ranges below 900 yards—well within the reach of Soviet tank guns. And many PGMs fire only two or three rounds per minute, rates too slow to stop waves of speeding tanks.

Relying too heavily on PGMs could lock NATO into a risky defense strategy that counts on stopping Soviet invaders swiftly just after they cross the Iron Curtain, the authors contend. Such a static defense is much less likely to deter attackers than the ability to wage a long conventional war—an expensive, politically touchy option NATO may not be able to avoid.

The Jolly Green Giants

"Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975" by Capt. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., in *Air University Review* (Jan.-Feb. 1980), Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Rescuing downed pilots in Indochina strained the U.S. Air Force's helicopter capabilities to the limit. But the "chopper" force—previously used to fly mercy missions in the United States and pluck astronauts from the sea—came through with flying colors.

From 1961 until 1964, the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service had to borrow scarce Army and Marine Corps helicopters, reports Tilford, an Air Force captain. These slow, lightly-armed choppers made easy targets for communist small-arms fire.

New equipment, introduced in late 1965, helped turn the tide. The long-range Sikorsky HH-3C/E ("Jolly Green Giant"), for example, car-

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ried combat aircrews able to fend off communist units while making pickups deep in enemy territory. Soon, improved enemy defenses, including more advanced Soviet anti-aircraft guns, forced a change in tactics. In 1966, helicopters began flying in teams of three, with a fighter-bomber escort. The effectiveness of the new Search and Rescue Task Forces jumped in 1967 with the arrival of Sikorsky HH-53Bs [the type used in the ill-fated attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran last April 24], capable of traveling 250 miles per hour.

In all, 3,883 of 5,646 downed U.S. airmen were rescued between 1961 and 1975. Rescue efforts, writes Tilford, were least effective over heavily-defended North Vietnam (176 crew pickups achieved) and most effective over South Vietnam and Laos. They fared well over dense jungle and poorly over exposed terrain. (Of the 15 helicopters used in the rescue of the Mayaguez crew off the Cambodian coast in May 1975, for example, eight were destroyed or badly damaged.) Thus, writes Tilford, tactics and equipment suited for rescues in Southeast Asia may not succeed in lightly-foliated Europe, or in the Middle East.

The Illusion of Power

"Talking Heads" by J. Robert Schaetzel and H. B. Malmgren, in *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1980), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

International summit meetings, which became increasingly popular among Prime Ministers and Presidents in the 1970s, create more problems than they solve, write Schaetzel, a former U.S. Ambassador to the European Economic Community, and Malmgren, former U.S. Deputy Trade Representative.

Since 1976, heads of state from West Germany, Japan, France, Italy, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States—the largest industrial democracies—have met annually to review international economic problems such as rising oil prices and sluggish growth. The nine members of the E.E.C. send their leaders to three summit conferences every year, and NATO, the Soviet bloc, and the so-called nonaligned countries of the Third World hold periodic summits, too.

These meetings boost the egos and images of government heads, providing stages "where leaders appear to take charge [and] move palsied institutions." They afford an opportunity to forge useful working relationships.

But the ability of summits to decisively affect events is often illusory. Even as the West's "Big Seven" met in Tokyo last year to discuss energy shortages, OPEC undermined their plans by hiking oil prices. Further, allies left out of summits can turn uncooperative. The Dutch have responded to their exclusion from Western economic summits by resisting NATO bids to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on their soil. And Western legislators frequently prevent summit agreements from being fully carried out—as President Carter learned when Congress defeated his early energy programs and slowed his efforts to cut U.S. oil imports.

Energy, trade, and international credit problems require "sustained

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Don Wright portrayed the July 1977 economic summit of the "Big Seven" Western powers—held in London—as all talk and no action.

attention and cooperative efforts" through truly international arrangements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the International Monetary Fund, write Schaezel and Malmgren. A handful of government heads, meeting intermittently, cannot hope to control world events.

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*Adam Smith's
Invisible Hand*

"The Selective Interpretation of Adam Smith" by Warren S. Gramm, in *Journal of Economic Issues* (Mar. 1980), Secretary-Treasurer, AFEE/JEI Fiscal Office, Dept. of Economics, University of Nebraska at Lincoln, Neb. 68588.

Generations of capitalist theorists have revered Adam Smith. But the 18th century British economist's reputation as a champion of cutthroat competition is undeserved, contends Gramm, a professor of economics at Washington State.

Smith's fame as a booster of the unrestrained pursuit of wealth began with his pronouncements in *The Wealth of Nations* (1776); the in-

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dividual, he stated, is "led by an invisible hand" of self-interest to promote the public good "more effectually than when he really intends to promote" it. But for all his apparent faith in the invisible hand, elsewhere in *Wealth of Nations*, Smith strongly qualified his support of private property, self-interest, and profit. He doubted that unorganized workers could bargain as equals with their employers. Smith's description of many merchants and manufacturers as deceivers and oppressors of the public showed that he saw dangers in unbridled economic power. He reserved his greatest scorn for monopolistic businessmen.

While Smith did not look to government to police capitalists, he did implicitly look to society. Smith's world was preindustrial. Giant corporations were unknown. The thousands of tiny businesses comprising the 18-century British economy and easy entry into the market, he believed, fostered "perfect competition." Small-town life also diluted competition's nastier side. Since merchants and their customers were neighbors, they were unlikely to cheat each other. Finally, the Protestant ethic discouraged accumulating wealth for its own sake and frowned on "conspicuous consumption."

In Smith's view, the free market did not create social harmony. Social harmony made the free market possible. But, Gramm writes, some modern free market advocates have ignored the passing of Smith's world. They have seized on a few isolated phrases from his work and turned a humanistic philosopher with a strong social conscience into an apologist for untrammelled corporate license.



Although Adam Smith never encouraged greed, by the early 19th century, the "fat capitalist" had worked his way into cartoonists' repertoires. Here, British banker Nathan Rothschild (1777-1836) is shown in a contemporary drawing.

Courtesy of the Austrian National Library.

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS***Reaching
Equilibrium***

"Trade Protection as an International Commodity: The Case of Steel" by Mary A. Yeager, in *The Journal of Economic History* (Mar. 1980), Eleutherian Mills Historical Library, P.O. Box 3630, Wilmington, Del. 19807.

Trade protection is commonly viewed as a crutch that governments occasionally hand to faltering domestic industries. Yeager, a UCLA historian, argues that tariffs and import quotas have supported the world's steel industries for so long that protection itself has become a key ingredient in steelmaking—as important as iron ore or coal.

American steel companies have relied heavily on protection since the 1870s. At first, the infant industry's leaders received tariff barriers from Republican Congresses in exchange for campaign contributions. Eventually, U.S. manufacturers grew strong enough to beat the foreign competition by dumping steel at cut-rate prices in Canadian and European markets. But during the 1920s, foreign challengers got their chance. Major new buyers (e.g., automobile manufacturers) sharply raised the "value" to steel producers of government-supplied protection, not just in the United States but throughout the industrialized world.

During the Depression of the 1930s, Western governments negotiated reciprocal tariff cuts designed to revitalize business. After World War II came the transformation of tariffs from aids to industry at home to crucial elements of foreign policy. To speed the free world's postwar economic recovery, the Truman administration gave the steelmakers of Western Europe and Japan easy entry into American steel markets in exchange for only modest tariff cuts abroad.

The flood of imports from revitalized foreign producers sent U.S. steelmakers reeling in the 1950s. During the last 20 years, the industry's management and labor have pressed Washington for a better deal in the world market. In Yeager's view, the U.S. import quotas forced on Japan and Western Europe in 1969, and the Trigger Mechanism introduced in 1977 (which sets a minimum price for foreign steel sold in the United States), have finally "standardized" protection worldwide.

***Red Tape
vs. Inflation***

"The Inflation in Your Future" by Robert L. Heilbroner, in *The New York Review of Books* (May 1, 1980), Subscription Service Dept., P.O. Box 940, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

The prime sources of inflation in the United States today are not OPEC oil prices, the burgeoning money supply, or slumping productivity, writes Heilbroner, an economist at the New School for Social Research. Instead, inflation stems from a century-long push by U.S. government officials, Big Business, and Big Labor for economic security.

A century ago, few Americans looked to government for protection

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from economic hardship. Far from expecting ever higher living standards, most 19th-century Americans worried about recurrent economic depressions. Since the Great Depression of the 1930s, however, federal social programs and fiscal policy have put "floors" under most economic activity. Social Security, unemployment compensation, parity payments to farmers, federally insured bank deposits, and public works programs provide "a degree of economic safety totally unknown in the era of pregovernmental capitalism," contends Heilbroner.

Just as important, the growth of Big Labor and modern corporations has neutralized much of the competitiveness that restrains prices. These institutions have turned into monolithic "bargaining blocs" able to keep both wages and prices artificially high.

Heilbroner rules out a return to the world of 1880—Americans will no longer tolerate the periodic blights of unemployment and business failures that previously checked inflationary pressures. He urges instead the matching of today's economic "floors" with inflation "ceilings." For example, all 1980 earnings that exceed 1979 earnings might be taxed away. This would reduce the demand for "cost of living" pay raises. Government agencies could be set up to determine exceptions—e.g., individual raises stemming from promotions or higher profits. Even acceptable salary gains, however, would escape taxation only if deposited into savings accounts or productively reinvested. Prices will stabilize, says Heilbroner, once incomes are limited.

Such a program, heavy with red tape, will never be enacted if inflation remains tolerable, Heilbroner concedes. But, he predicts, 50 percent inflation will make a new layer of bureaucracy seem a godsend.

SOCIETY

Ethnicity in America, 1790

"The Ethnic Origins of the American People, 1790" by Forrest McDonald and Ellen Shapiro McDonald, in *William and Mary Quarterly* (Apr. 1980), P.O. Box 220, Williamsburg, Va. 23185.

What was white America's ethnic makeup in 1790 when the first U.S. census was taken? A widely accepted 50-year-old study estimates that 60 percent of the white population of 3 million was of Anglo-Saxon (English) descent, 17.6 percent of Celtic (Scottish, Welsh, and Irish) stock, the rest being Germans, Dutch, French and Swedes.

But the McDonalds, historians at the University of Alabama, claim that genealogist Howard F. Baker and historian Marcus L. Hansen vastly undercounted America's Celtic population, particularly south of New York, in their famous 1931 study. Barker and Hansen, they find, ignored the centuries of wars, conquests, and intermarriages that in-

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jected Anglo-Saxon surnames into Celtic areas of the British Isles but left Celtic cultures intact.

According to the McDonalds' new estimate, which takes into account the ethnic traditions of immigrant Americans as well as "bloodlines," less than half the population south of Pennsylvania was Anglo-Saxon. (Unreliable figures from several states make accurate new nation-wide estimates impossible.)

Where Barker and Hansen classified 64.5 percent of Marylanders as Anglo-Saxon, the McDonalds' figure is 47.4 percent. North Carolina's percentage of Anglo-Saxons drops from 66 to 40.6, while the Celtic percentage rises from 26 to 52.6. In New England, Anglo-Saxons, as expected, comprised a high 77.6 percent of the population, according to the McDonalds.

The proportion of Celts increased within individual states as one moved inland. In North Carolina, for example, Celts made up roughly 40 percent of the inhabitants of most coastal counties but between 63 and 99 percent of the populations of western districts.

"When [Celts] appeared in sufficient numbers, they composed a disruptive element indeed," say the authors. The Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 broke out in western Pennsylvania's Washington County, where more than 75 percent of the population was Celtic. The authors speculate that most of the sectional disputes (East-West as well as North-South) that plagued the young United States were exacerbated, if not caused, by ethnic differences.

When Jews Marry Gentiles

"Processes and Outcomes in Marriages Between Jews and Non-Jews" by Egon Mayer, in *American Behavioral Scientist* (Apr. 1980), Sage Publications, 275 South Beverly Dr., Beverly Hills, Calif. 90212.

Do American Jews marry outside their faith to reject their parents or their religion? Is intermarriage always the first step down the road to assimilation into the larger society? Mayer, a Brooklyn College sociologist, says no.

He surveyed 446 mixed couples in eight American communities. In two-thirds of the marriages, the husband was Jewish. In most of the marriages, the Jewish spouses were better educated. However, whereas mixed marriages with Jewish wives tended to be unions of educational and occupational equals, Jewish husbands were significantly better educated and/or held more prestigious jobs than their non-Jewish wives. Eighty-one percent of the Jewish wives and 80 percent of their husbands held bachelors degrees, compared with 90 percent of the Jewish husbands and only 72 percent of their wives. Further, fully half the non-Jewish wives were housewives, students, retirees, or unemployed. Only 39 percent of the Jewish wives did not work outside the home.

As for the mothers and fathers, roughly three-fifths of the Jewish

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respondents' parents opposed intermarriage; fewer than one-third of the Gentile parents did. But Jewish parents rarely objected to their children dating non-Jews. Mayer argues that far from itching to flout parental wishes, Jewish "exogamists" rarely learn of any objections until relatively late in life.

Mixed couples tend to have more Jews than Gentiles as friends. Ten times more spouses convert to Judaism than leave the faith. And children of mixed marriages are more likely to be raised as Jews than as Christians. (Forty-two percent of Gentile wives, for example, expect their children to be Bar or Bat Mitzvahed, but only 18.7 percent expect them to be confirmed in church.)

When Jewish and non-Jewish values collide in mixed marriages, the Jewish values generally prevail, says Mayer. When the loss of religious identity that many devout Jews fear *does* occur in a mixed marriage, it probably stems "more from Jewish default than from the assimilating tug of the non-Jews they marry."

Class Differences

"U.S. and British Perceptions of Class" by
Reeve D. Vanneman, in *American Journal
of Sociology* (Jan. 1980), University of
Chicago Press, 5801 Ellis Ave., Chicago,
Ill. 60637.

With their egalitarian traditions, Americans have always seemed less "class-conscious" than Europeans. Yet a survey of 9,371 British and American voters analyzed by Vanneman, a University of Maryland sociologist, suggests that social class may be slightly more sharply defined by Americans than by Britons.

Sixty-eight percent of Americans surveyed in the 1960s and early '70s described themselves as aware of their class status, versus only about 59 percent of British respondents. Moreover, the criteria used by Britons and Americans to define classes were similar. The fact that an individual worked with his hands was 18 percent more likely to push him into the working class in most British minds and 16 percent more likely to do so in American minds. A college education increased the chances of being labeled middle class by 9 percent in the United States and 7 percent in Britain.

Why, then, is British society perceived as more rigidly class-conscious? Visible differences in makeup between the American and British political parties are one major factor, says Vanneman. Among employed British men and their wives, social class is four times more likely to determine party preference than it is among Americans. In Britain, Conservative and Liberal voters are invariably better educated and wealthier, and hold more prestigious jobs than do Labour Party voters. By contrast, in the 1972 U.S. presidential elections, Nixon and McGovern voters were, in terms of social class and income (if not numbers), nearly identical.

Vanneman writes that class distinctions are more clear-cut in Ameri-

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media spotlighting. For example, among women and the elderly, groups frequently victimized by crime, a doubling of crime coverage made crime twice as likely to be ranked as a major issue. Similarly, while families with members out of work were extremely sensitive to increased coverage of unemployment rates, opinion in families untouched by the problems held fairly constant.

Media coverage may affect people's notions of "what is important," to some degree. But the public's perceptions are more than a simple reflection of the front page.

Videopapers

"All the News That's Fit to Compute" by Bill Kelly, in *Washington Journalism Review* (Apr. 1980), 3122 M St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20007.

Electronic data systems carrying advertisements and entertainment listings are already eating into print newspaper circulation and advertising markets in Great Britain, Japan, France, and Canada. Major U.S. newspaper publishers like the New York Times Company and Dow Jones now offer corporate clients instant access to published articles stored in massive electronic memory banks.

Such "electronic newspapers" may make print newspapers obsolete—and sooner than we think, says Kelly, a Washington free-lance writer. The Knight-Ridder newspaper group has announced it will launch the first major American test of an electronic newspaper this summer. Through a system called Viewtron, 200 Miami-area families will be able to read news, weather and sports reports, consumer tips, and movie timetables on their television screens.

Through 1987, gross annual newspaper sales are expected to fall 17 percent from 1977 levels, Kelly writes. But while labor, ink, and newsprint costs are steadily rising, prices for electronic computer components will average a mere 1 percent of 1976 prices as early as 1981. Circuit density (a measure of efficiency) will increase 100-fold, and the cost of magnetic storage will drop by a factor of 1,000.

Some electronic newspapers will probably be broadcast by television stations to home sets. Decoders will turn the signals into televised pictures of news bulletins, providing fast-breaking news coverage. Two-way phone-line and cable TV services will also be available, offering substantially more information and permitting the viewer to choose programs from a larger computer data base.

For all their advantages, electronic newspapers face several obstacles. "You can't bring your television on the bus to work," notes Kelly. Further, some members of Congress fear that electronic newspapers will undermine the watchdog role of the press in American society. Huge corporations could use their technological prowess to dominate the infant industry. (Currently, AT&T is prohibited from offering data base services.) And the public may find it easier than ever to skip serious news entirely in favor of sports and entertainment features.

PRESS & TELEVISION

*TV and
the Elderly*

"How the Elderly Perceive Television Commercials" by Elliot S. Schreiber and Douglas A. Boyd, in *Journal of Communication* (Winter 1980), P.O. Box 13358, Philadelphia, Pa. 19101.

The elderly are not only a large (11 percent) and growing part of the U.S. population—but they watch more television than any other age group, according to the Nielsen ratings. Schreiber and Boyd, communications specialists at the University of Delaware, Newark, report that income, education, and age are good predictors of senior citizens' TV viewing habits.

The authors surveyed 442 persons, age 60 to 91, at senior citizens' centers and apartment houses for the elderly in and around Wilmington, Del. In general, they found that better-educated individuals who had held professional, clerical, and proprietary jobs watched fewer hours of television than their less-educated counterparts who had held lower-status jobs. However, the heaviest viewers in the study were those with between 7 and 12 years of schooling. Fifty-two percent of this group watched at least four hours of TV each day.

Male high-school graduates concentrated their viewing between 6:00 and 8:00 P.M., when evening news programs are broadcast. After 8:00 P.M., most of the men in front of the television set lacked high-school diplomas. One surprise: 47 percent of college-educated women admitted to problems in distinguishing commercials from regular programming, versus only 13 percent of women with 1–6 years of education.

"Younger elderly"—between 60 and 70 years old—were more apt to pick television as the most influential medium for advertising than were their seniors. Respondents over 70 stated that newspaper and magazine ads affected their buying habits more than TV commercials. Schreiber and Boyd suggest that this pattern stems from age differences in the 1950s, when TV first swept into America's homes.

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

*Confusion
over Confucius*

"A New Interpretation of Confucius" by Philip Ho Hwang, in *Philosophy East and West* (Jan. 1980), The University Press of Hawaii, 2840 Kolowalu St., Honolulu, Hawaii 96822.

A man of action, the Chinese philosopher Confucius (551–479 B.C.) discussed human conduct far more than human nature. [He saw the philosopher's task as that of identifying the specific duties that rulers and

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subjects had to perform to create a just society.] Yet most scholars are convinced that he thought of man as being naturally good. Their belief is based on the claims of Mencius, a 4th Century B.C. Chinese philosopher, and on debatable interpretations of Confucius's own ambiguous sayings, asserts Hwang, a professor of philosophy at Duksung Women's College in South Korea.

For thousands of years, Chinese philosophers took Mencius at his word when he proclaimed himself a true successor of the revered Confucius. But the two could scarcely have been more different. Confucius disdained worldly ambition and frequently incorporated the criticisms of others into his writings in the interests of discovering truth. Mencius, on the other hand, sought the limelight and stubbornly defended his ideas against all challenges. Mencius wrote voluminously about man's goodness. Confucius hardly mentioned human nature; the phrase appears only twice in the *Analects*, the most authentic available account of his life and sayings. One key passage, commonly translated as "Man is born with uprightness," may also be read as "Man is born *for* uprightness"—in Chinese, the preposition can have both meanings.

Though he maintained that his views conformed to Confucius's teachings, the ambitious Mencius was more concerned with luring disciples from his philosophical rivals. Playing to the Chinese people's deep respect for antiquity, Mencius wrapped himself in the master's mantle, pledging allegiance to Confucius as part of his campaign to become the pre-eminent philosopher of the day.

Mencius's focus on human nature may have been an "advance over Confucius" and a logical extension of his predecessor's teachings, observes Hwang. But the rhetorical homage that Mencius paid Confucius should not obscure his break with the master's thought.

Celibacy Retraced

"Clerical Continence in the Fourth Century: Three Papal Decretals" by Daniel Callam, C.S.B., in *Theological Studies* (March 1980), P.O. Box 64002, Baltimore, Md. 21264.

Celibacy for all priests is a relatively new development in Catholic history. The early Church regularly ordained married men, although bachelors and widowers were not allowed to marry once they entered the priesthood. Not until the 4th century did Pope Siricius (384-99) require that married, as well as unmarried, clerics lead lives of sexual abstinence (continence).

Theologians have long claimed that Siricius's decision flowed from a practical observation: Since priests were required to celebrate mass daily, and since custom forbade anyone who had sexual intercourse to participate in religious ceremonies the following day, sex was effectively off-limits, anyway.

But such arguments are faulty, contends Callam, a theologian at the

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University of Saskatchewan. First, daily mass was not a universal Church custom during the 4th century. Further, Church historians have underestimated Siricius's personal zeal for pure living. Siricius was deeply persuaded that while the Old Testament clearly illuminated the virtues of marriage, the New Testament preached virginity. He drew his scriptural support from the Epistles of St. Paul, who taught that the Christian mind should be focused on the Spirit rather than the flesh (Romans 8:8-9), that virgins should remain unmarried in order to remain fully committed to pleasing God (I Corinthians 7:32), and that married laity should periodically abstain from sex in order to devote themselves to prayer (I Corinthians 7:5).

Anticipating the eventual arrival of the Kingdom of God, when marriage would be no more, Siricius held that it was a priestly duty to prepare the laity on Earth by encouraging abstention from sex. Priests would have to "practice what they preached." Siricius only decreed continence. But Callam contends that his ruling paved the way for the requirement of universal clerical celibacy in the 12th century.



Chronologia Summorum Pontificum.

Pope Siricius's 4th-century ban on sex for the clergy paved the way for priestly celibacy.

Life or Death?

"Brain Death and Personal Identity" by Michael B. Green and Daniel Wikler, in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (Winter 1980), Princeton University Press, P.O. Box 231, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

When does a human being truly die? The question deeply divides legal and medical authorities today. Traditionally, death has meant the cessation of heart and lung functions, but irreversible loss of brain function now competes as a new criterion.

Green, a University of Texas philosopher, and Wikler, professor of medical ethics at the University of Wisconsin, favor the brain-death definition—but not for the biological and moral reasons that are commonly advanced.

Total brain function depends upon both the "upper" brain for mental capacities such as memory and thought and the "lower" brain for regulating breathing and other life processes. Biological arguments for brain death center around the lower brain: When the brain can no longer regulate basic body processes, biological death inevitably re-

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sults. But Green and Wikler argue that the lower brain is just "one among many organs, and, like other organs, could conceivably be replaced by an artificial aid which performed its function."

Most "moralist" philosophers who support a brain-death definition do so on a different basis. Human beings, they contend, distinguish the dead from the living not only by analyzing vital signs but by reassessing their obligations toward them. Upper-brain "death"—when a person "has no capacity for happiness, has no interests"—justifies such a reassessment. The flaw in this argument, note Green and Wikler, is that it maintains "not that the brain dead are dead, but that [they] need not be cared for."

By contrast, the authors advance a brain-death argument derived from ontology, the philosophy of "being." The key criterion of human life, they say, is identity, defined as the capacity for mental activity. When that capacity is lost, personhood is lost as well, and the individual ceases to be. This new argument does not end the moral debate between brain-death and heart-lung-death adherents, the authors admit. The body can still function after the upper brain has died. But clearly, they contend, when the body is stripped of the psychological traits comprising identity, "the person who entered the hospital has literally ceased to exist."

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Man's Purple Ancestors

"Cytochrome c and the Evolution of Energy Metabolism" by Richard E. Dickerson, in *Scientific American* (Mar. 1980), 415 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.

The faintness of the fossil traces left by 3-billion-year-old bacteria (the oldest known forms of life) long hampered the study of early metabolic evolution. But new processes such as x-ray crystallography now make it possible for scientists to examine an important chapter of this story—the development of respiration—by analyzing the building blocks of modern bacteria.

According to Dickerson, a chemist at the California Institute of Technology, learning the genetic make-up of a protein family called "Cytochrome c" opened the door.

All known life forms obtain and consume energy through fermentation (the chemical breakdown of high energy molecules), photosynthesis (the trapping of solar energy to make high-energy compounds), or respiration (the extraction of energy from molecules by combining them with free oxygen).

Different forms of Cytochrome c play a key role in the last two proc-

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esses. They serve as shuttles that channel free electrons from broken down or oxidized high-energy compounds into storable forms. Certain species of bacteria that photosynthesize and/or respire possess their own forms of Cytochrome c.

Comparing the distinctive genetic structures of these proteins strongly suggests that their differences have resulted from the same kinds of mutations that spurred evolution in higher life forms. From this, scientists reason that the processes of photosynthesis and respiration have a common origin.

All three processes evolved in response to changes in ancient Earth's environment. The common ancestors were the fermenting bacteria, capable of directly breaking down the high-energy compounds present in the primeval soils and seas they inhabited. They were followed by the first photosynthesizers—the earliest ancestors of modern plants. For hundreds of millions of years these proto-plants released enough oxygen to transform Earth's atmosphere. Some bacteria "learned" how to both photosynthesize and respire.

But some microbes known as purple bacteria only developed respiratory systems. In a low-oxygen environment they might have died out. Atmospheric changes eventually made the dual system redundant. The respirers thrived and probably evolved into mitochondria—the respiratory centers of modern cells. If so, writes Dickerson, a sobering thought occurs: "Human beings are [ultimately] the metabolic offspring of defective purple photosynthetic bacteria."

Early Views of Life in Space

"The Origins of the Extraterrestrial Life Debate and its Relation to the Scientific Revolution" by Steven J. Dick, in *Journal of the History of Ideas* (Jan.–Mar. 1980), Humanities Bldg., Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa. 19122.


The roots of modern speculation about life on other worlds go back to the revolutionary theory of Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543) that the Earth moves around the sun. If Earth was not the center of the universe, scientists and philosophers mused, then this planet—and the life it supports—were not necessarily unique.

As early as the 17th century, Copernican ideas locked astronomers and churchmen in battle over the possibility that "we are not alone," writes Dick, an astronomer at the U.S. Naval Observatory. Indeed, Johannes Kepler (1571–1630), imperial mathematician to the Holy Roman Empire, believed Copernican theory positively implied the existence of other inhabited planets. Dutch philosopher Christiaan Huygens (1629–95) agreed, arguing that it was "not improbable that the rest of the planets have their inhabitants too."

Armed with a faith in direct observation, these Copernicans trained their crude telescopes on Earth's neighbors. But observation turned up contradictory evidence. English astronomer John Wilkins (1614–72)

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In 1760, Sicilian artist Fillipo Morghen depicted the moon as a tropical paradise.



Library of Congress.

thought that the moon's darker surfaces were bodies of water. He reasoned that God would not have made a spotted moon if He intended it only to reflect sunlight toward the Earth. But Huygens' stargazing revealed that the moon's dark spots were pitted, and therefore could not be liquid. His observations of Venus, Mars, Mercury, and Jupiter were just as discouraging.

The notion of extraterrestrial life challenged Church doctrines. Could Adam's original sin, for example, be extended to moonmen, who also required salvation? There was speculation over the role of Jesus Christ as a kind of "planet-hopping Savior."

Worried religious leaders could not suppress the 17th-century search for alien life forms. According to Dick, discussion of extraterrestrial life by the likes of Kepler, Huygens, Wilkins, and, in the 18th century, by German philosopher Immanuel Kant completed the intellectual revolution begun by Copernicus. These thinkers helped to free scientists of their preoccupation with the "closed world" of Earth and roused their curiosity about the larger universe.

Nature's Undersea Laboratories


"Ocean's Hot Springs Stir Scientific Excitement" by Mitch Waldrop, in *Chemical and Engineering News* (Mar. 10, 1980), Membership and Subscription Services, ACS, P.O. Box 3337, Columbus, Ohio 43210.

The recent discovery of two underwater hot springs on the crest of the Pacific's mid-ocean ridge is forcing geochemists to rethink traditional theories about the oceans' chemical history, writes Waldrop, a *Chemical and Engineering News* correspondent.

A Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute expedition discovered the

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Heated by molten rock, millions of gallons of water per second shoot through vents in the ocean floor.



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first spring in February 1977 on the Galápagos Rift Zone midway between the Galápagos Islands and Ecuador. In April 1979, a second vent was located off the tip of Baja California. These finds "represent a totally new geochemical force," a system of hot springs riddling virtually the entire 30,000-mile length of the world's mid-ocean ridge system, according to Waldrop.

Scientists believe that the vents are formed by a percolating process. The ocean's cold bottom water seeps through porous rock along the ridge until it hits molten basalt rock, and the scalding water surges upward and chemically reacts with surrounding rock until it spews forth as a mineral- and gas-laden hot spring. Molten basalt that wells up with the water forms a new crust on the ocean bottom.

The temperatures of the spring water vary widely. The maximum temperature at Galápagos is around 62°F—hot only when compared to the frigid surrounding waters. But at Baja California, the water blasts out of rock chimneys at nearly 700°F. Ocean chemists believe that the Baja water goes directly from the hot basalt to the surrounding ocean, while the Galápagos water is cooled along the way by ordinary sea water that leaks into the spring through crevices in the surrounding ocean floor.

Scientists estimate that a million and a half gallons of water pour through the entire (mostly undiscovered) vent system per second, "enough to [recycle] the whole ocean in about 8 million years—500 times since the Earth began."

These figures flatly contradict the old model of the ocean as an immense, passive evaporation pan—formerly invoked to explain why sea water is salty. According to Waldrop, the discovery supports an alternative view that depicts the hot springs as natural "laboratories." They manufacture the chemicals needed to make salt water out of fresh water that continually flows into oceans from the world's rivers.

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY*Lest We Forget*

"Is Human Memory Obsolete?" by W. K. Estes, in *American Scientist* (Jan.-Feb. 1980), 345 Whitney Ave., New Haven, Conn. 06511.

Able to store millions of bits of data and retrieve them in microseconds, computers put human "short-term memory"—which handles new information and problem-solving—to shame. Technological advances are bound to make small computers as common as typewriters. Will humans soon be able to leave all short-term memory tasks to electronics?

No, says Estes, a Harvard psychologist. Granted, short-term human memories can store only the equivalent of half a dozen words or digits (e.g., a telephone number), while short-term computer (core) memories can store several million. And where human brains normally need between 0.5 and 1 second to accurately recall the simplest information, computers need only one-millionth of a second.

Such comparisons are misleading. Computer memories store information as discrete items in coded form. No connections are made. Electronic memory banks are thus little more than huge lists, or storerooms. Experiments indicate that human memory retains items in the form of pictures of events and their attributes, not as units. When a human brain memorizes a word, it also memorizes a large amount of rather vague information about the word's properties—sound, length, visual appearance, uses—rather than a simple coded symbol. Though a human's short-term memory capacity for storing discrete bits is small, no computer can match its ability to store and use this less precise data.

Human memory, writes Estes, sacrifices "high fidelity" for flexibility. The brain can continually reorganize information to cope with new but comprehensible experiences. Man's surroundings change constantly. No conceivable machine could guide him through life's frequent adventures.

*Quasar
Mysteries*

"Quasars Confirmed" by Stephen P. Maran, in *Natural History* (Feb. 1980), Membership Services, P.O. Box 6000, Des Moines, Iowa 50340.

The discovery of quasars in 1961 challenged both common sense and the cosmological theory of the universe's origin. If, as scientists' measurements indicated, these cosmic sources of radio waves were further from the Earth than most known galaxies, they had to be unimaginably powerful energy sources.

The cosmological theory holds that all objects in space are rushing away from one another, with the furthest receding the fastest. Spectrographic photographs that reveal the elements from which stars and galaxies are made allow astronomers to measure speed and distance. The faster an object travels, the more its elements' readings cluster at the red end of the light spectrum—a phenomenon called "red shift."

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Quasars' huge red shifts suggest that many are 1 billion light years away. But the notion of objects 1/30,000th the size of Earth's Milky Way Galaxy generating 1,000 times its total energy seemed impossible to many scientists.

Recent findings, however, by a University of Hawaii astronomer confirm the cosmological origin of quasars, reports Maran, a NASA staff scientist.

Astronomers had previously devised a theoretical "proof" of quasars' cosmological origins, pegged to the accepted belief that the red shift of galaxies resulted from the universe's expansion. If it could be determined that quasars characteristically occurred within the remotest, faintly visible groups of galaxies and displayed similar red shifts, then the common origin of these shifts would be undeniable.

Alan Stockton of the University of Hawaii was the first to systematically search the vicinity of large numbers of known quasars for evidence of these galaxy groups. Of the 27 quasars Stockton surveyed in the late 1970s, 17 were located near a total of 29 faint galaxies. When he measured the red shifts of 25 of these galaxies, he found that 13 corresponded to readings from the "nearby" quasars. Stockton calculated the odds against this being coincidence at 1.5 million to 1. In his view, the 12 galaxies that differ in speed from their local quasars are foreground objects much nearer to Earth than their photographs indicate.

Stockton's findings, says Maran, remind scientists how little they know of deep space by showing the universe to be filled with objects defying human comprehension.

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Get the Lead Out

"Lead in Albacore: Guide to Lead Pollution in Americans" by Dorothy M. Settle and Clair C. Patterson, in *Science* (Mar. 14, 1980), 1515 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.

Scientists have seriously misgauged the amount of poisonous industrial lead that has gotten into American and foreign diets, contend Settle and Patterson of the California Institute of Technology's Division of Geological Sciences. Reason: Researchers have consistently overestimated the normal ("naturally occurring") lead levels in the Earth's air and water.

The authors write that world lead production has risen from about 160 tons annually in 3000 B.C. (when smelting was developed) to 3 million tons today. Lead pollution is so pervasive now that even the seemingly low lead concentrations in the cleanest environments are

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demographer. The sharpest turnabout has occurred in the Third World, where population growth was considered out of control.

The globe's total population (up from 3.67 billion in 1970 to 4.16 billion in 1977) is still expanding by 70 million people annually. But between 1950 and 1970, the annual increase grew from 43 million to 73 million.

The "fertility transition" underway today in Latin America, Asia, and Africa is much more rapid than that of 18th- and 19th-century Europe. China's birthrate, for example, fell from 40 per thousand persons to 26 in less than 30 years (1950-77). Since 1970, birthrates have fallen even faster in the rest of the Third World.

The new figures show that the population growth-rate declines that demographers expected to occur in the 1980s began to appear as early as the late '60s. From 1960 to 1970, for example, Latin American birthrates fell from 41 to 39 per thousand. Asian birthrates (excluding China's) fell from 48 to 47 per thousand.

These statistics have mystified demographers. Fertility declines have occurred both in small, rapidly developing nations such as South Korea and Taiwan and in economically troubled lands such as India and Turkey. Nations where income distribution is highly unequal (Brazil and the Philippines) have cut birthrates as effectively as China and Sri Lanka, where wealth is rather evenly distributed.

In fact, Eberstadt argues, the main factor behind the transition seems unrelated to government family-planning programs: i.e., the growing tendency of women in poor countries to marry later and work during their peak childbearing years (the late teens and early twenties). What demographers forget, he concludes, "is that, in the final analysis, it is couples, not nations, that have children."

ARTS & LETTERS

Musical 'Martyrs'

"The Myth of the Unappreciated (Musical) Genius" by Hans Lenneberg, in *The Musical Quarterly* (Spring 1980), Circulation Office, 48-02 48th Ave., Woodside, N.Y. 11377.

Many music lovers believe that artistic genius and poverty go hand-in-hand. Yet, most great composers of the past enjoyed critical and economic success throughout their careers—despite the public's frequent lack of enthusiasm for their innovative works, claims Lenneberg, associate professor of music at the University of Chicago.

Major changes in the "sociology of music" denied popular success to Ludwig von Beethoven (1770-1827) and Franz Schubert (1797-1828).

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At the end of the 18th century, music was transformed from something played in cathedrals and aristocratic salons to a form of middle-class entertainment. Yet, at the same time, the great composers were writing music that could be performed only by fellow virtuosos. Beethoven's string quartets were simply too difficult for most amateur musicians, as were Schubert's songs. Both musicians, however, were acclaimed by experts as geniuses. Their works were widely performed by professional musicians.

The myths of the rejection of Wolfgang Mozart (1756–91) may be the most persistent, says Lenneberg. Despite mountains of contrary evidence, scholars still view the prolific Austrian prodigy as poor and unappreciated by Viennese society. His poverty, however, stemmed from spending "very large sums of money . . . as fast as he received them"—on an expensive apartment, a fancy wardrobe, and a hairdresser who visited him daily.

Even Igor Stravinsky (1882–1971), a recognized leader in avant-garde composition, was not as completely rejected as most scholars believe. Though his *Le Sacre du Printemps* drew angry jeers at its 1913 Paris debut, audiences and critics hailed it as a masterpiece only a few months later.

The mildest of criticism could fill these hypersensitive artists with despair, Lenneberg concedes. But the West's great composers did not go hungry. This fact may never be recognized. "The public," Lenneberg observes, "on all levels of sophistication, seems to have a deep need to confer martyrdom on its most cherished creators."

Jumbled Joyce

"The Computerized Ulysses" by Hugh Kenner, in *Harper's* (Apr. 1980), 1225
Portland Place, Boulder, Colo. 80323.

A flawless copy of James Joyce's *Ulysses* has never existed, according to Kenner, a Joyce scholar at Johns Hopkins. The text was corrupted even as it was written by the Irish expatriate in France and Switzerland.

Troubled by weak eyesight, Joyce was also afflicted by saboteurs, notably the prudish husband of one of his typists, who once burned a sexually explicit part of the manuscript, forcing Joyce to reconstruct it from messy earlier drafts. Moreover, Joyce wrote much of the work in proofs—his 40-page Molly Bloom soliloquy, notes Kenner, was "utterly uncommenced" when the bulk of the book was being set in type.

When the manuscript reached the print shop in Dijon, the tragicomedy of errors mushroomed. Joyce's handwritten corrections were puzzled out by French compositors who spoke no English. They rendered "Weekly Freeman" as "Wattly Jrceman" and "wife" as "urbe." Proofreaders multiplied such mistakes in later editions. For example: "Weight. Would he feel it if something was removed? Feel a gap." [Vintage ed., page 181] is a "corrected" version of "Weight would he feel it if something was removed," which is what was left after the

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printers in Dijon dropped 10 words from:

How on earth did he know that van was there? Must have felt it.
See things in their foreheads, perhaps. Kind of sense of volume.
Weight or size of it, something blacker than the dark. Wonder
would he feel it if something was removed. Feel a gap.

In 1961, Random House announced the publication of a reset, "scrupulously corrected" edition that seemed, to use narrator Leopold Bloom's own words, "a lasting boon for everyone concerned"—until critics noticed that in that very phrase, "boon" had strangely turned to "boom." Clearly, *Ulysses* could not be patched up simply by starting with the corrupt text and moving backward. Most editions of the novel are shot through with more than 6,000 typographical errors. In 1977, Hans Walter Gabler, the general editor of a planned "Critical Edition" of Joyce's works, turned to a computer in Munich for help.

Gabler fed the computer every known manuscript, author's change, and early edition of the novel. The computer compared these texts and provided a group of British and American Joyce scholars with a master list of all the conflicts. They in turn picked the "correct" version based on their knowledge of Joyce's evolving literary style. The result, predicts Kenner, will be an edition "as close to what James Joyce meant us to read as eyes will ever see." Scheduled publication date: 1983.



By Augustus John. Courtesy of Sir Caspar John.

James Joyce

Why Hamlet Procrastinated

"The Task of Hamlet" by Alexander Welsh, in *The Yale Review* (Summer 1980), 1902A Yale Station, New Haven, Conn. 06520.

The traditional view of Shakespeare's *Hamlet* assumes that revenge is a simple matter. Therefore, the Prince of Denmark's hesitation in avenging his father's murder is seen as the play's major interpretive mystery.

But according to Welsh, Professor of English at UCLA, Hamlet is not a procrastinator but a mourner. His actions reflect man's emotional need (re-enforced by social custom) to prolong grief.

Bereavement, not revenge, dominates the first four acts of the play. The ghost's watchword for Hamlet (which Hamlet repeats aloud as he copies it in his notebook) is not "Revenge" but "Remember me." Welsh emphasizes that proper remembrance takes time. In the case of natural

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death, the mourner can meet his obligations by spending a certain amount of time contemplating a loved one's demise. In fact, Hamlet's primary objection to his mother's behavior is her haste in remarrying: "The funeral baked meats/ Did coldly furnish forth the marriage tables."

In the case of murder, elemental justice demands revenge as well. Still, the conventions of mourning—and drama—require delay. Revenge must be slowly contemplated. The decision to strike cannot be hasty, for it symbolically brings the mourning period to an end.

Nevertheless, even the ghost who commanded it recognizes Hamlet's deed as "Murder most foul, as in the best it is." Taking a life in the name of love, writes Welsh, only underscores "the futility of revenge." Hamlet's retaliation fails. At the play's end, no happy ghost walks the stage pronouncing that its soul can finally rest. There is no satisfaction: Hamlet has not avenged his father's death. (He strikes at the murderer Claudius only after being fatally wounded.) Rather than bringing mourning to a close, the bloody outcome gives rise to new sorrow.

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*A Matter
of Revenge*

"Iran's Foreign Devils" by Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, in *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1980), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

By supporting the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and many Iranians have put nationalist sentiments ahead of true fealty to Islamic teachings. This reflects the Iranians' powerful xenophobic urge to avenge long years of alleged foreign domination, writes Mottahedeh, who teaches Islamic history at Princeton.

Islam's traditional protection of foreign traders and diplomats dates to medieval days, when Muslim rulers dealt with other nations from a position of equal, sometimes superior, might. But by the 19th century, Muslim power had ebbed.

The Russians were the first to abuse privileges granted by Iran (then Persia). The Treaty of Turkmanchai (1828) ratified a Russian border-war victory and gave the tsar's officials virtual veto power over Persian courts in cases involving Russian residents. Soon, other European nations were turning limited privileges into "devices for economic exploitation" and wresting blanket immunity from local laws—which insulted and humiliated many Muslims.

The deposed Shah's father, Reza Pahlavi, regained many of Iran's sovereign powers during the 1920s and won broad popular support. But his abdication in 1941 (forced by the Soviets and the British after he

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tilted toward Nazi Germany) and the 1953 CIA-orchestrated coup that restored his son to the throne made the Pahlavis seem no more than foreign puppets.

In 1962, as economic troubles sparked a surge of anti-Shah feeling, the United States pressed for diplomatic immunity from local laws for all American technical advisers in Iran. This infuriated many Iranians, including clerics. Among them was the Ayatollah Khomeini. Between jail terms for sedition, he denounced the Iranian parliament's approval of the Americans' immunity as a "crime," a "shameful vote . . . in contradiction to Islam."

Just before he was sent into exile in 1964, Khomeini predicted that the United States would try to expand these privileges; indeed, Washington soon secured diplomatic immunity for its advisers' dependents. By 1975, Mottahedeh writes, many Iranians believed that all 85,000 Americans assisting the Shah's army and economic development had "some standing that made them a community not fully subject to Iranian law."

Khomeini's anti-Americanism intensified in exile. Since the Shah's overthrow it has shaped Iran's treatment of U.S. citizens. In May 1979, all special American privileges were revoked by the Revolutionary Council. But U.S. diplomats still enjoyed immunity. Last October 28, Khomeini told Iranians, "All the problems of the Muslims stem from America." Seven days later, his militant followers stormed the embassy.

A Permanent Junta in Brazil?

"The Post-1964 Brazilian Regime: Outward Redemocratization and Inner Institutionalization" by Candido Mendes, in *Government and Opposition* (Winter 1980), London S.E.P.S., Houghton St., London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom.

The military regime that has ruled Brazil since 1964 is a junta with a difference, writes Mendes, a political scientist at Rio de Janeiro's Sociedade Brasileira de Instrução. Unlike their counterparts in Peru and Bolivia, the current President, General João Baptista Figueiredo, and his predecessors have sought to create a stable, permanent military state.

Off and on, the military has dominated Brazilian politics since defeating Paraguay in the War of the Triple Alliance (1865-70). The revolving-door civilian governments that ran Brazil for 75 years after the overthrow of Emperor Pedro II in 1889 ruled at the Army's pleasure. But not until 1964, when inflation reached 106 percent and middle-class rioters filled the streets, did the armed forces oust an elected President, João Goulart, and openly take over.

To assure continuity, General Humberto Castelo Branco, the Army's chief of staff, immediately granted Goulart's top bureaucrats a limited voice in decision-making. Civilians retained important powers even after Castelo Branco's successor, General Arturo de Costa e Silva, sus-

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pended the constitution and stiffened press censorship in 1968. Today, a mix of civilian economists and military officers manage Brazil's large state corporations; the profit-minded generals allow these concerns to run free of "political interference."

Moreover, Brazil's generals, says Mendes, have developed a set of "internal checks and balances" designed to prevent both destabilizing dissent within the Army and one-man rule. The Presidency, for example, rotates every six years among the country's leading generals. The post, writes Mendes, is seen as a "military mission"; at its end, "the incumbent [is] required to leave . . . as if he were being relieved of a routine assignment."

Rapid growth (nearly 10 percent annually during the 1970s) and a few social reforms have dampened most violent opposition to military rule. But despite occasional talk of "redemocratization," observes Mendes, Brazil's generals have no intention of stepping down. The restoration of the right of habeas corpus and the periodic easing of censorship are merely tactical moves aimed at enhancing the regime's staying power.

Soviet Crime

"The Geography of Soviet Criminality"
by Louise Shelley, in *American Sociological Review* (Feb. 1980), Dept. of Sociology,
University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill. 61801.

What is the crime capital of the Soviet Union? Surprisingly, it is not Moscow—nor Leningrad—but the much smaller port city of Vladivostok, in the Eastern Maritime region. According to Shelley, an American University sociologist, strict Soviet controls have not wiped out crime but shifted lawbreakers and crime-prone elements of the population to the USSR's small eastern and northern cities.

In the Soviet Union, criminal offenders living in big cities who are sentenced to prison terms of five or more years automatically lose their rights to reside there after release. The restriction is easily enforced; since 1932, all Soviet citizens have carried domestic passports that enable the authorities to regulate both travel and choice of residence. In effect, Soviet policy has removed experienced criminals from the largest cities and dumped them into the nation's newer, medium-sized towns.

The movements of law-abiding citizens also contribute to turning small cities into crime centers. Eight million Soviet citizens (roughly 5 percent of the Soviet population) move to new homes each year. The majority seek to escape the drudgery of life on collective farms. But Russia's larger cities are closed to most "outsiders." Thus, migrants are forced to opt for the small cities. (The period between 1959 and 1970 saw 73 Soviet cities attain populations of more than 100,000.) Many of the migrants are young males, the group most prone to crime in any society. Though generally better-educated, these young men from the villages often have trouble adjusting to city life and live in substandard

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housing. They frequently get into mischief—public drunkenness, burglaries, even murder.

Apparently, the key factor is not a city's size but the instability of its population. One cluster of Byelorussian towns grew by two-thirds in 10 years—and found that its crime rate grew even more quickly. The USSR's three largest cities (Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev), by contrast, enjoy crime rates far below those of the smaller Soviet cities. Thus, thanks to government policy, the geography of Soviet crime differs markedly from that of other industrialized countries.

Workers of the Persian Gulf

"Migration and Development: The Changing Perspective of the Poor Arab Countries" by J. S. Birks and C. A. Sinclair, in *Journal of International Affairs* (Fall-Winter 1979), Box 4, International Affairs Bldg., Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 10027

The spectacular economic development of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other thinly populated Persian Gulf countries depends not only on petroleum exports but on manpower imports. More than 4.5 million foreign workers labor on Gulf construction and industrial projects; they include almost 3 million Arabs from poverty-ridden Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and North and South Yemen.

The number of Arab migrant workers in the Gulf has increased roughly 10-fold since the 1973-74 OPEC oil-price hikes. The migration has proved to be a mixed blessing back home, write World Bank consultants Birks and Sinclair. Jobs in the oil kingdoms provide an alternative to local unemployment. The wages sent home by migrants supply needed foreign exchange. (In 1976, the \$397 million that Jordan's workers earned abroad offset fully 31.2 percent of the country's payments for imports.) But the new influx of cash has fueled inflation. And lucrative job opportunities in the Gulf take away not only skilled professionals but also farmers and herders. In Oman, acreage devoted to winter-wheat crops has fallen 75 percent due to labor shortages.

A sharp decline in the oil kingdoms' demand for Arab migrant workers has already begun. Saudi Arabia and the others are already turning to non-Arab workers—notably South Koreans, Filipinos, Indians, and Pakistanis. In 1970, Asian workers constituted 25.8 percent of the migrant labor force (83,900 workers) in small oil kingdoms such as Kuwait and Bahrain. By 1975, their share had jumped to 45.8 percent. Why? Asian workers pose no political threats to Persian Gulf regimes. They are easier to keep isolated and far less likely to settle permanently.

The authors predict that, in five years, Asians will comprise 55 percent of the Persian Gulf's much reduced 1.67 million-man migrant work force; Arabs will comprise only 40.5 percent. By 1985, in the poorer, labor-surplus Arab nations, continued low economic growth combined with resurging unemployment will bring new tensions, even as the financial benefits from migration decline.

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Why Slavery Expanded

"The Import of Firearms into West Africa in the Eighteenth Century" by W. A. Richards, in *Journal of African History* (Jan. 1980), Cambridge University Press, 32 East 57th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

Shipments of European firearms to native kingdoms revolutionized warfare in 17th- and 18th-century West Africa. They also fueled a great expansion of the slave trade, writes Richards, a historian at Britain's North Worcestershire College.

For several centuries, various West African rulers served as local "agents" for European slavers, selling the captives they took in wars and raids on their neighbors. Starting in the 1650s, they began to purchase large numbers of guns from the Europeans, particularly in Akwami, Denkyira, Dahomey, and Asante on West Africa's southern coast. By 1730, these and other "expansionist, militarized, slave-exporting states" were buying 180,000 firearms—mainly Dutch and British—each year. As early as 1698, their needs alone sustained the new English weapons industry.

The early primitive matchlock muskets gave Africans on the coast only a minor advantage over their spear-wielding neighbors. These guns functioned poorly in rainy, humid climates. But by the 1690s, technological progress had led to mass production in England of more



Courtesy of Kenneth M. Newman, The Old Print Shop, New York.

Armed with new British muskets, West African tribesmen met the New World's growing demand for slaves by selling captives taken in battle.

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advanced flintlocks; African slave raiders soon appreciated "the psychological impact of the musket in night and dawn raids, in causing panic by sudden volleys of gunfire." Moreover, flintlocks loaded with buckshot could fell foes—and potential slaves—without fatal injury, unlike earlier muskets capable of firing only the more lethal single ball.

These cheap weapons made slaving so profitable for West Africans that warfare became a way of life. Moreover, the insatiable demand of new Dutch and English plantations in the Americas for slave labor boosted the price of human exports. In some regions of West Africa, slave prices tripled between 1685 and 1803. Eventually, the commerce of West Africa was completely transformed. Wrote one Dutch official in 1705: "The natives no longer occupy themselves with the search for gold but rather make war on each other to furnish slaves."

Burma's Road Back?

"Burma 1979: Reversing the Trend" by William L. Scully and Frank N. Trager, in *Asian Survey* (Feb. 1980), University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif. 94720.

During the 1960s, Burma's socialist government isolated itself diplomatically, rejected all foreign aid, and ran the nation's once-prospering economy into the ground. President Ne Win's recent decision to welcome outside assistance, plus improved agricultural management, seem to be spurring a slow economic comeback, report Scully and Trager of New York University's Burma Research Project.

An International Monetary Fund report indicates that in recent years Burma (population: 31.5 million) has halted its agricultural decline. New government rice production incentives seem to be working. Though problems remain with poor yields, low prices, and careless milling (which damages the rice grains), the 1979 harvest totaled 10.3 million metric tons—1.3 million more than in 1976 and enough to give Burma a marketable surplus.

Another revived export is oil. Once the world's No. 14 petroleum producer (with pre-World War II exports of some 6 million barrels a year), Burma resumed foreign oil sales in 1977. Burma's state-owned oil corporation plans to export 1 million of the 12 million barrels expected from its offshore wells in 1980.

During 1979, the regime in Rangoon accepted sizable loans from several Western European countries, plus \$35 million in aid from the World Bank and \$49.6 million from the Asian Development Bank. But diplomatically, Burma is likely to continue to go its own independent way—as it showed last year by quitting the Non-Aligned Movement to protest the 98-nation group's apparent tilt toward Cuba and the Soviet Union. If Ne Win's one-man rule can keep political order in Burma (its secession-minded northern tribesmen and communist insurgents are currently lying low), the country's next decade will be marked by real economic improvement.

RESEARCH REPORTS

Reviews of new research by public agencies and private institutions

“Coal—Bridge to the Future.”

Report of the World Coal Study. Ballinger Publishing Co., 17 Dunster St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138. 247 pp. \$12.50

Author: Carroll L. Wilson et al.

A study involving researchers from 16 nations and headed by MIT economist Carroll L. Wilson indicates that the world economy can continue steady growth for the next 20 years — provided that annual global coal output reaches 11.2 billion metric tons, more than triple the 1977 level. This goal, says the authors, can be achieved handily.

If energy consumption matches population growth, the world will use the equivalent of nearly 190 million barrels of oil per day in the year 2000 — 50 percent more than in 1978.

The OPEC nations, which produce nearly half the world's oil and also control substantial reserves, have decided to limit their production to the present level of 30 million barrels per day. New exporters such as Mexico and China seem to be unwilling or unable to fill the gap.

Conservation can cut the West's annual energy consumption by only 25 percent by the year 2000, the authors estimate. Further nuclear power development and renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, and water power are expected to make only marginal contributions.

Coal already supplies 26 percent of world energy needs. Six hundred sixty billion metric tons of recoverable coal lie beneath some 80 countries. The United States (with 20 percent), the Soviet Union (with 16.6 percent), China (with 15 percent), and Australia (with 9.4 percent) are the best endowed. If the study's 11.2 billion metric ton target is met, cumulative coal production from 1977 to 2000

would use up a bare 16 percent of reserves. Soaring oil prices have increased coal's attractiveness. With imported oil prices now ranging from \$28 to \$37 per barrel, oil is more than twice as expensive to burn as coal.

The authors contend that the environmental hazards of coal are manageable. West Germany, for instance, has successfully and cheaply reclaimed land furrowed by strip mining. Sulfur dioxide and nitrogen emissions from burning coal—causing respiratory and other diseases—can be controlled by chemically reducing coal's sulfur content. And no proof yet exists that increased coal use will dangerously warm the Earth's atmosphere—although burning coal releases 25 percent more carbon dioxide than burning oil.

To reach the targets set forth in the study, the United States and Australia will have to supply half the 1 billion metric tons of coal exports the world will need in 20 years. (They produced 43 percent of the 200 million metric tons of coal traded internationally in 1977.) The total cost of opening new mines, building new coal ships, and improving railroads, harbors, and slurry pipelines could approach \$1 trillion—a small fraction of the \$38 trillion worth of new capital the Western democracies are expected to create by the end of the century.

Because new coal mines and transportation systems take 5 to 10 years to complete, the authors argue that the West must work fast: “Our most precious resource is time, which must be used as wisely as energy.”

land's losses are, relatively, about twice as high.) But Cincinnati's budget is currently balanced. Why? The authors cite the willingness of Cincinnatians to raise taxes (they upped the local income tax to 1.7 percent in 1970). Tax revenue has grown 8 percent annually since 1973.

Cincinnati's government is also streamlined. Elected "at large," the nine-member city council selects one of its members to be mayor. Less apt to be diverted by internal feuding, Cincinnati's leaders have created a solid partnership with the Hamilton County government and with the suburbs. The county, for example, contributes \$1 million each year to the

city for bridge repairs.

When Cincinnati's voters finally rejected a major tax increase, in 1976, the city government was prepared. Cincinnati's managers scaled down the city workforce and services, and shifted their spending priorities away from new construction and toward maintenance.

This change will enable Cincinnati's leaders to continue infrastructure repairs even if the city budget shrinks further. But Cleveland is likely to pay for its decision to delay needed maintenance. "It is analogous to a pay-as-you-go pension system," say the authors, "which is a bargain in the present but expensive in the future."

"Rising Infant Mortality in the U.S.S.R. in the 1970s."

International Population Reports, Series P-95, No. 74, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Subscriber Services Division, Data User Services, Washington, D.C. 20233. 95 pp.

Authors: Christopher Davis and Murray Feshbach

Infant deaths have been rising annually in the Soviet Union—from 22.9 per thousand live births in 1971 to 31.1 per thousand in 1976. This is the first sustained increase ever suffered by an industrialized nation, according to information pieced together by Davis, a Soviet health care specialist at the University of Birmingham, England, and Feshbach, a U.S. Census Bureau demographer and Wilson Center Fellow.

If Western reporting standards are used (the Soviets, for example, classify all infants who die by the seventh day after birth as miscarriages), the U.S.S.R.'s infant mortality rate is even higher, 35.6 per thousand for 1976—more than twice the U.S. rate of 15.1 per thousand.

The worst rates are found in backward, heavily Muslim Soviet Central Asia. Dushanbe, capital of the Tadzhik Republic, suffered 51.8 deaths per

thousand births in 1974. Infant deaths are rarest in the modernized Russian heartland. The city of Minsk boasted the lowest 1974 infant mortality rate—15.7 deaths per thousand.

Soviet health officials often attribute the statistical rise to more accurate census techniques. But Davis and Feshbach note that census-taking improvements made before 1970 failed to produce similar jumps.

Instead, the authors point to worsening environmental pollution, exceptionally virulent influenza epidemics between 1971 and 1976, and overcrowded, understaffed child-care facilities as the principal causes. Skimpy available evidence indicates that the main killers of Soviet infants are pneumonia and diet-related diseases such as rickets.

Pollution from past nuclear testing and industrial waste may exact an additional toll on the Soviets, note Davis

and Feshbach. One dissident report claims that the numbers of children born with genetic defects are growing by 5 to 6 percent annually. Currently estimated at 8 percent of the population, the proportion of retarded persons in the Soviet Union could reach an astronomical 15 percent by 1990.

"Another Revolution in U.S. Farming?"

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. 20250. 445 pp.
Authors: Lyle P. Schertz et al.

Dramatic changes in organization and management that are transforming American farms today may represent this country's third agricultural "revolution," says Schertz, an economist at the U.S. Agriculture Department. The first two revolutions were the introduction of horse-drawn mechanical equipment such as the McCormick reaper [in the early 19th century] and the introduction of the gasoline-powered tractor [in the 1890s].

For nearly 50 years, farms in the United States have been becoming fewer and larger. During the mid-1930s, the number of American farms peaked at nearly 7 million; by 1978, there were fewer than 2.7 million. But the total amount of U.S. land devoted to farming today has changed only slightly in 40 years (and now stands at 370 to 380 million acres).

Most farms (89 percent) today are owned by individuals, as has been the case historically. Another 9 percent are owned in partnership. Only 28,000 farms are owned by corporations, but these are larger and rack up bigger sales than the average farm. In 1974, family corporations (where persons related by blood or marriage control at least 51 percent of the stock) owned 1.3 percent of American farms, accounting for 7.8 percent of the farmland and 9.1 percent of farm product sales. Publicly held corporations, with only 0.06 percent of the farms, held 0.6 percent of the land and accounted for 3.4 percent of the sales.

More than one-fifth of all farming corporations in the mid-1970s were in

California, Florida, and Texas, with 10 percent located in California alone. Nationally, corporate farms dominate beef, poultry, and vegetable production, accounting for at least 28 percent of the sales of each commodity.

Numerous forces are responsible for these changes. During periods of inflation, land prices often rise faster than other prices, spurring business and wealthy individuals to invest in farmland. Sustained foreign demands for American agricultural products has removed restraints on acreage allotments, while increased grain and soybean exports (especially the large wheat sales to the Soviet Union during 1972-74) have sharply increased domestic farm incomes. Meanwhile, technological advances (e.g., four-wheel-drive tractors, electronically controlled harvesters, disease-controlling drugs) have lowered unit production costs.

The trend toward large farms is likely to continue until the end of the century, predict the authors, especially if inflation keeps rising. In the near future, increased energy costs for irrigation and transportation may reduce the profitability of big farms and shift much farming activity from the West to the North, where farms have always been smaller. Still, ownership of agricultural land by public corporations with ample funds to invest, is apt to increase in the long run. By the year 2000, the number of farms in the United States could drop to 1 million, with as few as 70,000 farms accounting for one-half of total farm sales.

"Public Attitudes and Information on the Nuclear Option."

Institute for Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, P.O. Box 117, Oak Ridge, Tenn. 37830.

Author: M. W. Firebaugh

After the March 1979 accident at Three Mile Island, near Harrisburg, Pa., more people judged nuclear power plants to be relatively safe than had thought so the previous autumn. This is just one surprising finding reported by Firebaugh, a University of Wisconsin physicist, in a study of public opinion on nuclear energy issues.

In a Harris poll taken in October 1978, 64 percent of the public described nuclear plants as either "very safe" (26 percent) or "somewhat safe" (38 percent). But the following April, after Three Mile Island, 21 percent of respondents to a similar poll rated nuclear plants as "very safe," and a hefty 46 percent as "somewhat safe"—a 67 percent total. Those who considered nuclear plants to be "not so safe" or "dangerous" increased by only 2 percentage points—from 28 to 30 percent of the sample.

The Three Mile Island accident polarized public views on nuclear power, contends Firebaugh. After an immediate nose dive, popular support for building more nuclear plants returned, by August 1979, to within two points of its preaccident level of 58 percent. Opposition to new construc-

tion, however, showed a sustained increase, from 30 percent in September 1978 to 40 percent in August 1979, as the proportion of undecided respondents declined from about 20 percent to 8 percent.

Public acceptance of nuclear power depends strongly on perceptions of cost, asserts Firebaugh. When told that nuclear energy would be 20 percent more expensive than other kinds of fuel, only 23 percent of Americans surveyed expressed support for building plants in their community. Informed that nuclear power would cost the same as other energy sources, 55 percent favored nearby plant construction, with nearly 80 percent in favor when nuclear power was described as 20 percent cheaper than alternatives.

One not-so-impartial pollster, Paul Slovic, has concluded that, in matters of nuclear safety, the public's views "are extraordinarily persistent in the face of contrary evidence." Nuclear issues are highly symbolic, writes Firebaugh. To many Americans, nuclear energy represents a noble effort to harness nature in line with growth and progress.



From Yesterday's California by Russell Leadabrand et al. Courtesy of E. A. Seemann Publishing, Inc.

This 1656 French map, like others of the period, depicted California as an island separated from the North American mainland by a "Red Sea."

California

Writing in 1889, Britain's James Bryce found California to be "the most striking state in the Union . . . capable of standing alone in the world." Lord Bryce was neither the first nor last commentator to accept the state on its own mythic terms. Indeed, scholars have lately begun to study California as if it *were* a separate country, one on which the neighboring United States has come to rely for sophisticated technology, specialty agriculture, political innovation, television programming, and the latest lifestyles. Just as Canadians self-consciously resist "cultural imperialism" from the south, so many Eastern Americans now profess alarm over creeping "Californianization" from the West. Here, historian James Rawls surveys the ups and downs of the California Dream in the popular imagination; sociologist Ted Bradshaw considers—and qualifies—the concept of California as the world's premier "postindustrial" society; and critic Sally Woodbridge traces the nationwide diffusion of California's unique residential architecture.



VISIONS AND REVISIONS

by James J. Rawls

One morning in 1962, commuters crossing San Francisco's Bay Bridge were greeted by a billboard emblazoned with the number 17,341,416, the projected population of New York State on January 1, 1963. Alongside this number was a running electronic tally of the estimated increase in California's population, then growing at a rate of one person every 54 seconds.

By New Year's Day, 1963, California had surged ahead to become, by official estimate, the most populous state in the

Union. Governor Edmund G. Brown, Sr., the father of the present governor, proclaimed a four-day celebration—"California First Days"—and called for "the biggest party the state has ever seen." In Truckee, an official delegation ceremoniously welcomed the latest carload of newcomers as they crossed the state line from Nevada. Jubilant pundits predicted a rosy future. The state's population, it was widely believed, would reach 22 million by 1970, 30 million by 1980, and by the turn of the century would be nearly equal to that of France.

The Best of Everything

California's population trends had been clear since the early 1950s. Indeed, in each decade of the 20th century, the state's population had grown at a rate three or four times that of the nation as a whole. Even before the territory was acquired by the United States, California had been highly regarded as a place to live, even if its Hispanic and Indian inhabitants, in the view of covetous visitors from the East, left something to be desired. A French traveler in the late 1830s, for example, found California, with its fertile valleys and Mediterranean climate, "ideally suited for raising animals, grains, and vines." But he lamented that it was "inhabited by a people for whom life's supreme happiness consists of horseback riding and sleeping."

In searching for the origins of what has come to be called the California Dream, one encounters the California Imperative: An extraordinary land deserved an extraordinary people. The corollary followed logically: Unworthy occupants could rightfully be expelled or barred. Both British and French visitors voiced the argument, but it was the Americans who adopted it, justifying their 1846-48 war with Mexico on the grounds that the United States had a "manifest destiny" to seize and develop California (and any other real estate north of the Rio Grande).

The Americans who began arriving soon after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which sealed the conquest, were confident that they could create in California a civilization on the shores of the Pacific that at last would equal the beauty and richness of the land itself. From the beginning, California was somehow

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A German caricature of a California gold miner, 1850. Few prospectors amassed fortunes; the entrepreneurs who provided the Forty-Niners with such staples as meat (Philip Armour) and blue jeans (Levi Strauss) fared better.

Courtesy of the Bancroft Library.

special, somehow more attractive than other “virgin” territories. There were fewer Indians than in the prairie states, and they were relatively docile. The farmland in Iowa was perhaps a bit richer than in California’s Central Valley, but Iowa had harsh winters. The climate in the Deep South was as warm as California’s, but it was also humid and fever-ridden. Unlike the Corn Belt states, California had a coastline and, in San Francisco, one of the world’s great harbors.

For a century and a quarter, this new California civilization grew and prospered. From around the country and the world, millions of would-be Californians arrived seeking something they had not been able to find at home. It was not, of course, always the same “something,” and whatever it was, the newcomers didn’t always find it. Yet, from the beginning, the *idea* of California among Americans has been even more alluring than the reality. If Texas was great, California was grand, and the few voices dissenting from this view of the state sounded, until the past decade, distinctly minor chords.

The *major* chords are familiar.

First, California has long been painted as America’s own New World, a land where almost anyone can realize his particu-

lar dream of economic success. One sees something of this in the early European and American views of the state, but it was the Gold Rush, beginning in 1848, that made the word "California" nearly synonymous with "opportunity"—to Europeans and Asians as well as Americans. Ironically, even at the height of the Gold Rush, the odds of a California miner making a big strike were slim. Yet people kept on coming, enticed by the railroad huckstering of the 1870s and '80s, the undeniable fertility of the vast Central Valley, the discovery of oil near Los Angeles in 1892, the glitter of Hollywood during the 1920s.

During the Great Depression, when 1.2 million Californians were out of work, California still beckoned to hundreds of thousands of migrants. Ma Joad, in John Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath* (1939), tells us that she had "seen the han'bills fellas pass out, an' how much work they is, an' high wages an' all." In fact, the Joads and other Dust Bowl refugees from Oklahoma and Arkansas found neither enough jobs nor high pay. Yet, the "han'bills"—in the form of newspaper ads and Chamber of Commerce brochures—continued to work their magic as a real economic boom began during the 1940s and '50s.

Tall, Dark, and Lissome

Climate is a second item. As early as 1840, author Richard Henry Dana had flatly asserted that "California is blessed with a climate of which there can be no better in the world." Kevin Starr, in his *Americans and the California Dream* (1973), called the state "an American Mediterranean." This image of the state as a land of perpetual sunshine—"It Never Rains in Southern California," as the song goes—obviously appeals to many Midwesterners and Easterners. One suspects that the annual New Year's Day telecast of the Rose Bowl Parade in Pasadena—with its views of enviable men and women sauntering in shirt sleeves under palm trees and blue skies—accounts for a large part of the yearly migration to California.

California's benign climate, it is said, also makes the state a particularly healthy place in which to live. During the 1870s, southern California welcomed thousands of invalids who believed, erroneously, that the region's warm, clean air would cure tuberculosis. For years, older Americans have flocked to California to soak their arthritic limbs in the soothing ultraviolet. So healthy was the state, declared Stanford University President David Starr Jordan around the turn of the century, that California college girls were more robust than college girls in Massachusetts. "They are taller," he said, "broader-shouldered,

thicker-chested (with 10 cubic inches more lung capacity), have larger biceps and calves, and a superiority of tested strength."

The imposing stature of California women suggests a fourth element of the California Dream: Romance. The association is even older than the territory. In Garci Rodríguez Ordóñez de Montalvo's romance, *Las Sergas de Esplandián*, published in Spain in 1510, the mythical island of California, which gave its name to the region discovered some two decades later, was peopled with passionate dark-skinned Amazons. Romantic California is the theme of numerous plays (e.g., William Saroyan's *Hello Out There*) and countless Hollywood films, from *San Francisco* to the *Bikini Beach* series where bronzed and nubile youths frolic to the music of Frankie Avalon. As a 1979 article in the *Los Angeles Times* put it: "Sex and California. The two seem to go together."

Finally, California has always been regarded as a tolerant state, a place where unconventional political movements, personal eccentricities, or unusual fads and fashions could bloom unmolested.* During the late 19th century, California nurtured an impressive variety of short-lived utopian communities—Altruria, Fountain Grove, Kaweah, Pisgah Grande—all intended to chart the putative future course of humanity. The idea of California as the harbinger of the American future—from campus turmoil and tax revolts to group therapy, community colleges, freeways, and shopping malls—has become a cliché. "What we want the whole country to be," Governor Edmund Brown proudly proclaimed in 1963, "California already is."

Nothing Left?

It is clear, in retrospect, that 1963 was the high-water mark of mythical California, a fact understandably lost upon most observers at the time. Yet, as New York State slipped away into the doldrums of second place, former governor (and then U.S. Chief Justice) Earl Warren warned his fellow Californians: "I would not celebrate with fireworks or dancing in the streets. Mere numbers do not mean happiness." Few paid any attention.

As Warren predicted, the remarkable economic expansion and population growth of the 1950s and '60s have not been an unalloyed boon. Smog hangs over scenic Yosemite Valley (not to mention Los Angeles), and California's alcoholism rate is second only to Nevada's. One-third of all U.S. heroin deaths occur in-

*The state's record of ethnic strife (with the Anglos pitted, seriatim, against Mexicans, Indians, Chinese, and Japanese) indicates that, when it came to rivalry for land, jobs, or status, tolerance tended to ebb.

CALIFORNIA: A CHRONOLOGY

- 1533 Fortún Jiménez of Spain discovers Baja (Lower) California.
- 1535 Conquistador Hernando Cortés visits Baja California in search of the mythical seven cities of gold.
- 1542 Looking for the Northwest Passage, Spanish navigator Juan Rodríguez Cabrillo is the first European to set foot in what is now the state of California. His expedition reaches what would later be the Oregon-California border.
- 1579 England's Sir Francis Drake anchors north of San Francisco Bay and claims the land for Queen Elizabeth.
- 1769 Father Junípero Serra establishes the mission of San Diego, the first of nine Spanish outposts he sets up in California.
- 1780 Non-Indian population: 600.
- 1781 Spanish governor Felipe de Neve founds Los Angeles.
- 1821 Mexico wins independence from Spain.
- 1846 On June 10, Americans in Sonoma, California, establish the "Bear Flag Republic." It lasts until July 9, when they hear news of war with Mexico and enlist in the U.S. Army.
- 1848 Gold is discovered at Sutter's Mill, northeast of Sacramento. Nine days later, Mexico signs the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, ceding to the United States all of present-day California.
- 1850 California becomes the 31st state.
- 1852 State population: 255,000.
- 1869 Central Pacific Railroad meets Union Pacific tracks at Promontory Point, Utah.
- 1871 Nativist mob murders 15 Chinese in Los Angeles.

side the state. In great rings around the state's cities, the geometry of tract housing has replaced that of green cropland and orchards. Increasingly, California is perceived elsewhere in America as offering less than expected, a victim of its own successes.

The mid-1960s in California were ushered in by the smoke of a burning Los Angeles. The six-day 1965 Watts riots—a field day for social critics and photojournalists—were undeniable proof that California had not fulfilled the expectations of all who had come. That Watts was only the first of the nation's black riots of the 1960s—Detroit, Newark, Washington soon followed—did

- 1906 San Francisco earthquake kills 452. Los Angeles's first motion picture studio is established.
- 1921 "California, Here I Come" is introduced by Al Jolson.
- 1940 State population: 6,907,387.
- 1942 Three months after Pearl Harbor, 93,000 Japanese Californians (two-thirds of them American citizens) are interned. They are released three years later, at the end of World War II.
- 1948 California becomes the nation's largest agricultural producer, surpassing Iowa.
- 1950 State population: 10,586,223.
- 1952 State law discouraging ownership of land by Orientals is ruled unconstitutional.
- 1964 Free Speech Movement disrupts Berkeley campus.
- 1965 Watts (Los Angeles) riots. 34 killed, over 1,000 injured.
- 1966 Black Panther Party is founded in Oakland by Bobby Seale and Huey Newton. Cesar Chavez forms United Farm Workers Organizing Committee.
- 1974 Los Angeles County experiences its first population drop in 123 years. 1974 population: 7,003,000.
- 1976 State legislature enacts a moratorium on the construction of nuclear power plants in California.
- 1978 Californians overwhelmingly approve Proposition 13, a constitutional amendment cutting property taxes by an average of 56 percent.
- 1979 State population: 22,694,000.
- 1980 Proposition 9, a proposal to halve the state income tax, is defeated by a 3 to 2 margin on June 3.

not seem to matter. One Watts rioter told a reporter: "Everywhere they say 'Go to California! California's the great pot o'gold at the end of the rainbow.' Well, now we're here in California, and there ain't no place else to go, and the only pot I seen's the kind they peddle at Sixtieth and Avalon."

The following year, novelist-essayist Joan Didion, writing in the *Saturday Evening Post*, described the desperate quest for the good life among the faded bungalows and tacky motels of the sun-drenched San Bernardino Valley. "Here is where . . . the divorce rate is double the national average and where one person in every 38 lives in a trailer. Here is the last stop for all those

who came from somewhere else, for all those who have drifted away from the cold and the past and the old ways."

Didion's portrayal of California (her essay was entitled "How Can I Tell Them There's Nothing Left?") was part of a new genre of critical literature—the minor chords now in concert—that emerged during the late 1960s and early '70s.* The national market for such books was just about saturated when the 1978 mass murder-suicide of the (California-based) People's Temple in Guyana—and the assassinations of San Francisco mayor George Moscone and councilman Harvey Milk a few weeks later—revived interest in California's alleged dementia.

In the latest outpouring of pop commentary, one finds all the old themes: opportunity, climate, health, romance, freedom. But they have been turned inside out, frisked for clues as to what went wrong.

The image of California as the land of opportunity, for example, has been cited by several observers as a *cause* of California's recent tragedies. The Gold Rush syndrome—high hopes, soon dashed—makes Californians especially susceptible, the argument goes, to the appeal of self-proclaimed messiahs.

Too Much Sun

Historian Henry Steele Commager, a New Englander, implicates the climate. California, he contends, has become "a society that worships open air and play rather than work." Television producer Norman Lear, a resident of the state, suggests that California's weather attracts "emotionally unwrapped people." And a 1979 article in the *New York Times* blames the sun for the "tradition of failure" among California's professional football teams: The sunshine, intoned the *Times*, makes life too easy and "restrains the competitive fury" necessary for victory on the gridiron.†

In these sour analyses, California is no longer seen as a land of health, but as a dark precinct of social pathology. One 1978 article in the *Sacramento Bee* reported that New Yorkers (oddly enough) commonly perceive Californians as having "a love affair with death." San Franciscans speak of the next earthquake even as they build more skyscrapers. But the allure of death is

*See, for example, Raymond Dasmann's *The Destruction of California* (1965), Richard Lillard's *Eden in Jeopardy* (1966), William Bronson's *How to Kill a Golden State* (1968), Curt Gentry's *The Last Days of the Late, Great State of California* (1968), Kenneth Lamott's *Anti-California* (1971), Michael Davie's *California: The Vanishing Dream* (1972), and Peter Schrag's *How the West was Lost* (1973).

†This generalization does not seem to apply to the Miami Dolphins, Super Bowl Champions in 1972 and 1973.

not limited to the northern part of the state. Witness the nonchalant remark of one writer in coastal southern California, where dry-season brush fires are a chronic hazard: "We live, of course, with the fear of fire any day. . . . This has a good deal to do with what attracts people here, that vicarious thrill of living in a place that may at any moment be destroyed."

California's image as a land of romance has been transformed into one of frolicking immorality. The television and newspaper coverage given to the all-embracing sexual proclivities of People's Temple leader Jim Jones and to Harvey Milk's self-proclaimed homosexuality spurred sizeable verbal barages. The arch-conservative *Manchester* (New Hampshire) *Union Leader*, for example, denounced San Francisco as "the Sodom of the United States." The *Union Leader's* sentiments may represent an extreme view, but they illustrate a general drift. As regards California's vaunted social freedom, the consensus elsewhere seems to be that the state has far too much of it—and the rest of America should take heed. (For what it's worth, even *Pravda* has chimed in, saying California is "an example of the moral and social bankruptcy of bourgeois society.")

The recurring critique of California—by insiders and outsiders—during the past 15 years has perhaps had a certain corrective effect, though in itself it is no more accurate than the notions it supplanted. The old California Dream and the new California Nightmare are both soaring abstractions, each tethered to Reality, but only to part of it.

In a sense, there is a "California" and there is a California, and neither Pangloss nor Jeremiah would find much of interest in the latter. As in Rhode Island or Indiana, the air may be a little dirtier than it was 15 years ago, the suburbs more crowded, the traffic a lot heavier, the scenery a bit more cluttered; but for most people, life proceeds no more remarkably than it does anywhere else. Perhaps the rest of America needs "California" as both a threat and a promise.



TRYING OUT THE FUTURE

by Ted K. Bradshaw

The most significant economic event in California history was not the Gold Rush or the coming of the railroad. It was World War II. In 1940, the federal government spent a mere \$728 million in California, much of it simply to relieve economic hardship caused by the lingering Great Depression. But after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, California became a vast staging area for the Pacific war zone, with San Diego and San Francisco as ports of embarkation. The climate proved ideal for testing airplanes and training troops. The state's fledgling aircraft and shipbuilding industries moved quickly to a war footing.

By the time the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, Washington had pumped \$35 *billion* into California. Its economy had suddenly become "modern." Federal outlays for defense-related construction and manufacturing accounted for about one-half of California's total personal income. The state's aviation industry, which claimed 60 percent of these wartime expenditures, emerged pre-eminent in the world. (Douglas, Lockheed, North American, Northrop, and Convair all located their main plants in California.) Moreover, millions of American servicemen had moved through California on their way to Australia, the central Pacific, and the Philippines; smitten, many returned to stay at war's end.

The momentum acquired during World War II was sustained in part by this postwar influx of manpower (California's population climbed from 7 to 15 million between 1940 and 1960), in part by U.S. rearmament during the Cold War and two more Pacific wars—Korea and Vietnam. Following the Soviet launching of Sputnik I in 1957, California also played a vital role in the quickening space race, as "aviation" became "aerospace." By 1963, 40 percent of the total U.S. space and defense work force was concentrated in five California industrial centers: Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Bernardino/Riverside, San Diego, and San Jose. If ever there was a military-industrial complex, it was here.

During the two decades following World War II, 6 out of every 10 jobs created in California could trace their paternity directly to Washington. Of the \$10 billion in research and devel-

opment (R&D) contracts let by the federal government in 1963, for example, 40 percent went to California manufacturers, universities, or private think tanks like the RAND (the name comes from "R an[d] D") Corporation. During the late 1960s, the University of California, the California Institute of Technology, and Stanford University together garnered 1 out of every 5 federal defense research contracts awarded to U.S. universities. For a time, research personnel at the University of California outnumbered teaching faculty.

Could the aerospace/defense boom last forever? By the mid-1960s, local businessmen and politicians had in fact begun to worry—properly so—that California had put all its eggs in a single basket. One client (Washington) was essentially buying and paying for one major family of California products (high-technology hardware). Journalist Christopher Rand, reporting from Los Angeles in 1966, sensed "a feeling of cutback" in the air. There is, he wrote, "from time to time, inevitably, talk about what would happen in the event of serious reductions in the defense and space programs. How to convert, and to what, in the face of such cutbacks, has been a big question, and some high-grade talent has been devoted to answering it."

Shifting Gears

Even before the domestic aerospace industry slumped during the early 1970s, California's most sophisticated industries had begun diversifying both their products and their markets. Aerospace companies sought a growing share of the international demand for commercial and military aircraft. Think tanks started looking at such issues as transportation and waste disposal. Electronics firms slowly weaned themselves from dependence on the Pentagon. There was, they all realized, a big civilian market out there. Today, the state's high technology exports, from Northrop "Freedom Fighter" jets to pocket calculators, find their way to a broad international market. California's flexibility has surprised the experts and defied the doomsayers.

The economic history of California during the past three decades is beginning to receive serious attention from scholars, who are intrigued by its implications for the United States as a whole. While the state is isolated from the rest of the nation geographically, and to some extent psychologically, by deserts, forests, and mountain ranges (the state's most permeable border seems to be with Mexico), many social scientists are attempting to isolate California analytically—viewing the state, for pur-

poses of comparison, as if it were an independent country. By doing so, they have thrown several features into sharp relief.

First, California, unlike New York or Illinois, has received since World War II a massive amount of economic "foreign aid" from Washington. No less important, most of it has gone into research and high technology industry, not into subsidies for municipal government or welfare. Washington helped underwrite California's postwar economic expansion as surely as it did Japan's or West Germany's. California, as a result, became the fastest growing industrial area in the world. Were the state a sovereign nation, its GNP today would rank eighth, behind Canada's but ahead of Italy's.

Breaking Away

Second, because California's rapid economic development occurred when it did—and not, say, 50 years earlier—California didn't really need to move heavily into steel, automaking, or textiles. It could "import" these items (duty-free) from the older industrial states. So California's entrepreneurs invested instead in what became the most sophisticated, fastest growing, and flexible sector of the U.S. economy—high technology.

What makes the California experience especially interesting is that the state has transformed itself from a sparsely populated frontier into the world's premier technological society in the space of a century, with most of the advance coming during the past 30 years.* California, it seems, has become a kind of giant laboratory where historic processes have been speeded up, as in time-lapse photography. In this sense, the state has been likened by several scholars to a crystal ball in which the rest of the industrialized world may glimpse the promise and the pitfalls of a "postindustrial" future.

The postindustrial thesis, commonly associated with Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell, holds that a major break with "traditional" industrial society is at hand, as fundamental as the Western world's 19th-century shift from an agrarian to an in-

*I use "most" advisedly. Even during the 19th century, California was at the forefront of several high-technology industries. Between 1850 and 1900, sales of sophisticated, California-manufactured mining equipment exceeded in value all the gold mined in the state during the same period.

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dustrial economy. "If the dominant figures of the past hundred years have been the entrepreneur, the businessman, and the industrial executive," Bell wrote in 1973, "the 'new men' are the scientists, the mathematicians, the economists, and the engineers of computer technology."*

The essential components of postindustrial society are these:

¶ An increasing reliance on high-technology manufacturing based on scientific knowledge rather than on mechanical trial-and-error or "Yankee ingenuity."

¶ Heightened productivity in industry and agriculture, freeing farm and factory workers for new jobs in an expanding "service sector."

¶ Increasing reliance on universities and other "knowledge industries" as generators of a valuable and replenishable kind of raw material: research.

¶ The application of "intellectual technologies" to government and policymaking.

Bell's characterization of postindustrial society is at times ambiguous; nowhere does he define matters with precision. But he unambiguously proclaims the United States to be the first such society.

Still, there is much variety. Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Ohio, for example, are traditional manufacturing states that have not reached the postindustrial threshold. Nebraska, New Mexico, and Wyoming lag even further behind. But when one looks at certain rough indicators—proportion of white collar employment, size of service sector, education of labor force, percentage of professionals and technicians, comprehensiveness of social welfare services, propensity of local governments to innovate—a handful of states appear at least to be on the road to a postindustrial future. California, New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Utah, and Alaska, for example, rank above the national average in all six indicators.

California does not come out No. 1 on any *single* indicator; cumulatively, however, it is the postindustrial state par excellence, ranking higher overall than any other state.

High technology: As noted above, it began with aircraft, and the aerospace industry remains of critical importance to California, which is currently home to 30 percent (21,000) of all U.S. aeronautical engineers. But aerospace, strictly defined, is not the fastest growing component in California's booming "high-tech" sector. These days, that distinction goes to electronics.

* See Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, New York: Basic, 1973.

The electronics industry has been well established in California since 1917, when Magnavox opened a small loudspeaker factory in Oakland. During the late 1930s and throughout the '40s, small firms began springing up around Stanford University. In 1938, for example, two young Stanford graduates, William R. Hewlett and David Packard, with the encouragement of the university's dean of engineering, founded Hewlett-Packard, which is now a leading electronics manufacturer.

The electronics business took off in the 1950s, stimulated by defense contracts and, just as important, by the development of transistors and, more recently, of microprocessors. Once the garden of the San Francisco Bay Area, Santa Clara County was transformed into "Silicon Valley"—the reference is to integrated circuits printed on silicon crystals—planted with companies like Intel and Memorex. The county boasts one of the most attractive job markets in the United States, and its per capita income (\$26,690 in 1979) is the highest in the state.

What is unique about such high-technology industries is that they are knowledge-intensive. Here, the cost of a product—a silicon "chip," a communications satellite, a ballistic missile guidance system—primarily reflects the cost of designing it, not the cost of producing it. The result is rapid price deflation after mass-market items like digital watches first hit the market—up to 20 to 30 percent per year.*

A second consequence of California's industrial concentration in high technology ventures is energy efficiency. As motorists, California's industrialists may be gas guzzlers, but as businessmen they produce more per unit of energy than does the nation as a whole. Data for 1972 show that California produced an average \$158 "value" (price minus materials cost) per thousand kilowatt hours of energy (equivalent) used for heat and manufacture, versus \$94 nationwide.

Services: To Daniel Bell, one hallmark of a postindustrial society is that more than half of all workers are employed in service industries. The United States reached that crossover point in 1956. California reached it in 1910. Today, more than 70 percent of employed Californians work in the service sector, from amusement parks and fast-food restaurants to banks, com-

*To a great extent, even agriculture in the state fits this high-technology pattern. California is the nation's No. 1 farm state, with sales approaching \$12 billion in 1979. Fertile land, irrigation, and a benevolent climate are not the only reasons. Just as important is the massive agricultural research effort that has pointed California farmers toward high-profit specialty crops—grapes, nuts, artichokes, etc. Winemaking in the state is now a science, not an art; there is no such thing as a "bad year" any more. The tomato-picking machine was developed by California scientists, who then bred a thick-skinned tomato that the machine wouldn't damage.

puterized data firms, law offices, and universities. Though technically "white collar," not all service jobs are glamorous or well-paying. The average salary for Californians working in service industries was \$16,905 in 1979, about \$2,000 less than their counterparts in manufacturing.

The growth of the service sector has not meant a shift away from manufacturing—the term "postindustrial" is misleading in this respect. In both California and the United States as a whole, manufacturing employment, as a percentage of the labor force, has actually been more or less constant since 1910, at about 30 percent. The shift has come at the expense of "primary" industries—mining, forestry, and, especially, agriculture.

A "Technocratic" Society?

The professions have been big gainers. Between 1960 and 1970, the overall California labor force grew by some 22 percent. Employment in the professions—medicine, law, education, accounting—grew more than three times as fast. The story is the same with the public sector. State and local governments today employ 1.4 million people—about one out of every seven employed Californians.

The knowledge industry: The keys to a high-technology, professional-service future are scientific research, mass university education, and professional retraining. I have already noted the central role of R&D in California's economy. R&D, one might say, is "human capital-intensive"; it depends on a first-rate educational system. California set a high standard with its 1960 Master Plan for Higher Education—a comprehensive blueprint that guided the state's university system as enrollment climbed to more than 1.3 million in the mid-1970s.* College is available to virtually any Californian who chooses to attend—in practice, 80 percent of the state's high school graduates.

Some 2.2 million Californians have college degrees; 32,000 have Ph.D.s in the science and engineering fields alone. Californians stay in school longer than do students in every state except, surprisingly, Utah. Degree programs aside, some 3.5 million Californians participate in some kind of part-time

*The Master Plan established a three-tiered higher education system and provided for the apportionment of graduating high-school seniors among them roughly according to class rank. Community colleges, offering an associate B.A. degree, make up the bottom tier. In the middle are the state colleges and universities, which may award the B.A. and M.A. degrees. The University of California, at the top, offers B.A.s, M.A.s, and Ph.D.s, and is the prime conductor of academic and scientific research. The system is not as rigid as it looks on paper. State colleges, for example, may award a Ph.D. in conjunction with the University of California. To give "late-starters" a second chance, students meeting certain requirements may "graduate" from a lower tier into the one above.

educational venture every year, be it for job training, self-improvement, or mere fun. Institutionally, California boasts 104 community colleges, 19 state universities, 9 branches of the flagship University of California system, and 84 private colleges and universities.

Government: Bell's final contention is that state and local governments will increasingly come to rely on a "new class" of technocrats familiar with such methods of "scientific" administration as Program Planning Budget Systems—PPBS, to initiate—and econometric modeling. California again appears to be a case in point, and not merely because a California engineer, William Henry Smyth, coined the word "technocracy" in 1919.

Going Solar

The state's county and city governments have more computers than do non-California governments, introduced them sooner, and, on average, employ 48 technicians per city or county to run them—double the national average. One-sixth of all "planners" working in the United States are employed by various public agencies in California. The state legislature (40 Senators, 80 Assemblymen), ranked as the "most professional" in the nation, relies on a highly trained, 2,000-member staff and a vast army of contract consultants, Washington-style.

California is also unique among large industrial states in allowing grass-roots "initiatives" to be placed on the ballot. Proposition 13, which cut local property taxes by more than half after its passage in 1978, is the best known of the nearly 160 initiatives placed before voters since Progressive Governor Hiram Johnson inaugurated the practice in 1911.*

In certain key respects, then, California seems to have fulfilled all the predictions about the postindustrial society to come. Bell's book, of course, is seven years old, and the future, as Frenchman Paul Valéry reminded us, is never what it used to be. Without looking too hard, one can find developments in California that anticipate a very different kind of future. The state is full of perplexing contradictions. As author Carey McWilliams observed in 1949, "in California, everything seems to be reversed, to occur out of the natural state of events, to be upside down or lopsided."

Thus, while California has the highest concentration of high technology in the world, it is the center of the ecology and anti-

*The latest California initiative to attract national attention was Proposition 9—labeled Jaws II by critics—which proposed to halve state income taxes. The initiative was handily defeated on June 3, 1980.

technology movements. California has some of the oldest and strongest environmental organizations in the country, the largest of them being the Sierra Club founded by naturalist John Muir in 1892. (More places in California are named after Muir than after any other person.)

The 1,330 organizations entered in the *California Environmental Directory* do more than spout slogans. A popular referendum in 1972, for example, created a Coastal Zone Commission to curb helter-skelter development of California's scenic shoreline. Restrictions on automobile emissions are so stringent—far stricter than federal standards—that auto manufacturers around the world must install extra pollution control equipment if they want a piece of the \$7.3 billion a year in California auto sales. And, by a 1976 act of the state legislature, new construction of nuclear power plants has been banned until satisfactory nuclear waste disposal methods are developed.

For reasons of both climate and inclination, California has also become *the* solar state, with 42 percent of total U.S. solar collector capacity. There were 30,000 solar installations in California in 1978—home water and swimming pool heaters, primarily—and an estimated 50,000 were added in 1979. California's 55 percent state income tax credit for solar home installations is the highest such credit in the country. Indeed, most of the "alternative energy" incentives embodied in Congress's National Energy Act of 1978 were already state law in California.

Bureaucracy and Magnetic Tape

The nature of state government in postindustrial California also seems to be evolving somewhat differently than anticipated. A decade ago, postindustrialists assumed that technocratic "rationality" was the wave of the future. Each government agency, it was thought, would have its own narrowly defined mission with its own staff of trained specialists: waste, overlap, and confusion would be eliminated. Problems would be attacked—and vanquished—one by one. Scientific administration, aided by technology, would be victorious.

In fact, as political scientist Kenneth Kraemer has pointed out, "there is little to suggest that advanced industrialism carries with it superior and effective technological resolution of society's problems." Kraemer found, for example, that despite a near-total reliance on computers in the daily operations of California governments, local bureaucrats report few cost savings. Nor has bureaucratic efficiency been notably enhanced.

CALIFORNIA'S AVANT-GARDE POLITICS

California has long been in the forefront of America's technological development. Because rapid change is an inherently turbulent process, argues Berkeley political scientist Todd La Porte, the state has produced a "politics of psychic reassurance" characterized by leaders who offer not solutions but "moods."

While its politicians, from Earl Warren to Jerry Brown, have captured the national limelight, California has quietly developed a solidly competent government, with a civil service, a state legislature, and a state supreme court all widely acknowledged to be among the best in the country. One possible reason: The special structure of the state's political system, established by Governor Hiram Johnson after he took office in 1910.

To break the Southern Pacific Railroad's strangle hold on the state government—the company at one time owned 10 percent of the state's land and nearly all of its legislators—Johnson and his fellow Progressives tried to separate politics from government. Local elections and offices were made nonpartisan; the introduction of direct primaries for state and local offices further weakened political parties. (Today, party affiliation becomes crucial to the state's politicians only when they have risen to national prominence and must work with non-Californians, whether in Congress or on the presidential campaign trail.) Most importantly, Californians were given three ways to override their elected representatives: the initiative (to enact laws); the referendum (to annul laws); and the recall (to remove elected officials from office).

The Progressives' reforms left a political vacuum. In the absence of party controls, primaries were wide-open affairs. Anybody could run—and did. In 1934, socialist author Upton Sinclair (*The Jungle*) campaigned on a program to End Poverty In California (EPIC) and captured the Democratic nomination for governor.

The strong Republican response changed America's politics. Led by Louis B. Mayer, head of the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer movie studio, California's Republicans threw \$10 million into an elaborate drive

In a sense, California has become too big and diverse for "scientific" government. The state's water system, for example, is stretched to the limit, owing to the simple fact that most of California's rain falls in the north while most of its people live in the south. But every new aqueduct into thirsty Los Angeles creates disgruntled farmers and angry environmentalists hundreds of miles away. California society, in short, is not a piece of machinery where one can simply isolate a defective part and replace it. It is more like a spider's web. Toying with any one

run by a new firm named Campaigns, Inc. After beating Sinclair, Clem Whitaker and Leone Baxter of Campaigns, Inc., went on to handle some 70 California campaigns, including Warren's first run for governor (1942) and the northern California end of Richard Nixon's 1960 presidential race. Their tactics became a model for imitators elsewhere.

In California, such campaign management firms filled the political void created by weak parties, by the frequent use of referendums and initiatives, and by immigration from other states. (The decisive margin in California's elections often lay with new voters, virtual strangers to the state.) Today dozens of political management organizations boost both candidates and ballot proposals. In 1978, Proposition 13 drew two firms, Butcher-Forde (supporting) and Winner/Wagner (opposing). Some political consultants specialize in collecting the signatures required to place a proposal before California's voters. "If you give me \$500,000," one professional told author Gladwin Hill, "I'll guarantee to get on the ballot a measure to execute the governor by Christmas."

But the prime task of campaign management, in a state without grassroots party organizations, is using the media. The 30-second television spot conveying not a philosophy but an "image" or an emotion—anger, say, or hope or nostalgia—holds a paramount place in election strategy. Somewhat more than most Americans, Californians seem to vote for those who do well on the tube: actors who act like politicians, such as former Governor Reagan and former Senator George Murphy, and politicians who look like actors, such as former Senator John Tunney.

The California campaign management firms, together with a galaxy of political exotics such as the John Birch Society and the Minutemen (on the extreme right) and the Black Panthers and Tom Hayden's nonviolent California Campaign for Economic Democracy (on the far left), create an illusion of political fervor. But the statistics suggest that, with their vigorous economy and able civil service, many Californians simply don't worry much about government. Though its people are unusually well-educated, the state's voter turnout ranked 34th in the nation in the 1976 presidential election.

strand—water, land, energy—disturbs all of the others.

In recent years, California has been moving toward creation of flexible new public agencies to manage overlap and complexity. These agencies (e.g., the Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, the Criminal Justice Planning Office) differ markedly from older ones (e.g., the Hospital for the Insane, the Board of Medical Examiners). They have no popular constituency but are designed primarily to work with other federal and state agencies, multinational corporations, nonprofit

interest groups, even foreign governments. They do not themselves provide a "service" but operate *between* government entities that do. And they have broad powers to coordinate what might otherwise turn out to be conflicting activities. In effect, these new agencies are an exercise in "preventive government."

Postindustrial theorists also assumed that a postindustrial society would tend toward homogeneity. Widespread affluence, media saturation, and the consumer ethic, they contended, would eventually lead to a convergence of attitudes and lifestyles.

The California experience suggests that the opposite may be the case. The diversity of California encompasses fundamentalist sects and mystical cults, self-awareness centers and philanthropic movements, the John Birch Society and the Symbionese Liberation Army. Similar movements are now found everywhere, of course, but in California they seem to emerge fully grown, *en masse*, and are accepted into the normal life of the state.

An Ethnic Salad

Numbers are hard to pin down, but an examination of several published lists of "alternative" and "fringe" organizations yields some suggestive information. For example, Mark Satin's *New Age Politics* (1978) contains a list of periodicals dealing with alternative approaches to social, political, and economic issues (e.g., *CoEvolution Quarterly*, *The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology*). One third of them are published in California. According to the *Spiritual Community Guide* (1978), some 42 percent of all "spiritual growth centers" (Kailas Shugendo and Brotherhood of the Sun, for example) are located in the state.

Some groups have coalesced for political reasons—for reasons of both common sense and sensibility. The homosexual community in San Francisco, estimated to include 20 percent of the city's voters, claims to have played a pivotal role in the 1979 election of Mayor Diane Feinstein. Other politically active groups include the disabled in Berkeley, the elderly throughout the state, and the ethnic communities of Chinese Americans, Mexican Americans, and others.

California is among the most ethnically diverse states in the Union: 16 percent of the state's population is Hispanic, another 8 percent is black, and 4 percent is Asian. Apart from Japanese, Chinese, and Filipinos, there are currently some 200,000 Koreans in the Los Angeles area alone, a 500 percent increase since 1976. About half of the 250,000 Indochinese refugees admitted to

the United States since 1975 reside in California. Former Lieutenant Governor Mervyn Dymally has predicted that, by 1990, the state's "minority" population will exceed 50 percent of the total, making California the nation's first "Third World" state. The prediction is highly questionable, but the trend is clear.*

What is notable about California's ethnic and racial minorities, as well as its "alternative lifestyle" groups, is that they are resisting "assimilation" and striving, with some success, to promote their own various cultures. No one has told them that, in the postindustrial era, they are supposed to hand over power to the technocrats.

Heading for the Hills

Postindustrialism is closely associated with urbanization, and California, not surprisingly, is the most urban state in the nation, with more than 90 percent of its citizens living in towns and cities. But even that is changing. Between 1970 and 1976, California's rural areas grew three times as fast as urban areas; during the same period, 47 cities in the Greater Los Angeles area (including L.A.) and 22 cities in the San Francisco Bay Area (including San Francisco) *lost* population. This is not just a matter of "suburbanization"; in fact, thousands of Californians are leapfrogging the suburbs to settle down in faraway and (for the moment) less congested mountain counties.

Postindustrialism itself is one factor: It enables many people who wish to live in small towns to do so. Electronics manufacturing, for example, can take place almost anywhere, since the products are usually lightweight and making them requires no rail connections and comparatively little water or electric power. Service industries like data-processing or banking may conduct much of their business by telephone, from any place. (I know of one anesthesiologist in Ukiah, 120 miles north of San Francisco, who maintains a toll-free "800" number and earns a living by dispensing specialized technical information to other doctors over the phone.) Government services—and em-

*Minority groups are not spread evenly throughout the state. One out of every four Los Angeles residents, for example, is Hispanic; 18 percent are black, and 6 percent are Asian. San Francisco has many fewer Hispanics (only 14 percent of the city's population), somewhat fewer blacks (13 percent), and far more Asians (16 percent). In economic terms, California's minority groups have fared no worse than minorities elsewhere, but their status relative to the overall high level of prosperity in the state makes their situation particularly distressing. A postindustrial society does not improve *everyone's* lot, just as it does not transform *every* sector of the economy; in a sense, it may even depend on a large underclass. The mechanization of agriculture, for example, has not eliminated the need for armies of Mexican farm workers, many of whom are now permanent residents of the state.

ployment—have expanded in all parts of California. With the expansion of the community colleges, higher education is within commuting distance of virtually everyone. In California, people no longer need to live in cities to have many of the economic or cultural advantages of urban living.

California is in a transition period between a dynamic present and several possible futures: among them, the postindustrial society of the theorists and the “small is beautiful” world of the dreamers. For the moment, however, the state appears to be in an eclectic sort of limbo, uncertain which way to go but still convinced that others will follow.

Anthropologists have identified a phenomenon called “the law of the retarding lead,” which holds that the most advanced countries have the greatest difficulty adapting to changing conditions. As their economies become established and sophisticated, as their social systems harden, as their citizens come to have an increasing stake in the status quo, developed regions lose the competitive advantage of flexibility. Progress, so to speak, seeks a vacuum.

The notion is pertinent to California, and not only because population and industry are shifting steadily—and innovatively—to the state’s less-developed rural areas. For a century, California as a whole has been in the avant-garde. Increasingly, it is less so. California’s rate of population growth is slowing. The population is becoming more “settled.” High-technology companies are not abandoning California, but they are *expanding* in such less-developed states as Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Vermont. In all of these places, the rate of in-migration is high and climbing, and R&D and electronics are among the big growth industries. Their per capita incomes are rising at an accelerating rate, faster than California’s. In 20 years, perhaps, they will face the dilemmas California confronts now.

Will California then still point the way?



THE CALIFORNIA HOUSE

by Sally B. Woodbridge

If Adam and Eve and their descendents had continued to occupy the Garden of Eden, what kinds of houses would they have built? How would they have designed their dwellings to take advantage of a lush natural setting where the climate was ever temperate and healthful, and where all time was leisure time?

These questions are not entirely fanciful. As portrayed by sincere apostles and hired evangelists, California Living had become, by the end of the 19th century, synonymous with the American vision of the Good Life. California's architects have aspired ever since to build the "ideal" home for the citizens of this new Eden. The architectural results have been widely imitated outside the state, even as the concept of the ideal California house continues to evolve.

The evangelism began, in a sense, with the rate war between the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific Railroads during the late 1880s. For a time, the cost of a ticket from Kansas City to Los Angeles fell to \$1. A new kind of settler came to the state. The gold-seekers of '49 had been young bachelors. The men and women who immigrated during the last decades of the 19th century were usually middle-aged and married—solid folk determined to live comfortably on a small plot "under their own vines and fig trees," as the railroad brochures had promised.

The humble remnants of Spanish colonial architecture, though well suited to the region's Mediterranean climate, did not much interest the "Pullman settlers" of the 1880s and '90s. Instead, they lived along the streetcar lines in wooden houses that mimicked Eastern styles. These homes were generally set on raised basements to prevent rot and were often surrounded by luxurious vegetation. The conventional wisdom of the time held that vapors from the earth were poisonous, so porches, piazzas, or verandahs were built to elevate the homeowner to a safe spectator position.

The influx of "Pullman settlers" brought rapid growth. As the inner suburbs of San Francisco (and later, Los Angeles) lost

their pastoral character, upper-middle-class families—who historically have been America's chief patrons of new residential architecture—fled to the virgin land on the far fringes of California's urban areas. Many of them built rather conventional homes, reflecting the Victorian penchant for gaudy ornament. But a bohemian minority was repelled by stylistic hodgepodge and machine-tooled filigree. They sought to create new settings that would in part reflect the highly popular aesthetic philosophies of Englishmen John Ruskin and William Morris, who emphasized aesthetic moderation, the worth of handicraft, "constructive" use of leisure time, and rejection of the unhealthy complexities of city life.

Hill-Dwelling Sophisticates


This notion of the Simple Life would one day be embodied in mass-produced "Bungalows." But for the moment it remained the ideal of the affluent. Their new "natural" houses owed much to a handful of local prototypes that perfectly expressed the ideals of what came to be known as the Craftsman Movement. Naturalist John Muir's Yosemite Valley cabin, built in 1869, was one of the pacesetters:

From the Yosemite Creek, near where it first gathers its beaten waters at the foot of the fall, I dug a small ditch and brought a stream into the cabin, entering at one end and flowing out the other with just current enough to allow it to sing and warble in low, sweet tones, delightful at night while I lay in bed. The floor was made of rough slabs, nicely joined and embedded in the ground. In the spring the common pteris ferns pushed up between the joints of the slabs, two of which, growing slender like climbing ferns on account of the subdued light, I trained on threads up the sides and over my window in front of my writing desk in an ornamental arch.

During the 1880s and '90s, clusters of "natural" houses were built in the Bay Area — on San Francisco's Russian Hill, in Berkeley, in Piedmont. Around 1895, architect Bernard Maybeck

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A "Queen Anne" home (c.1884) built in Santa Rosa by Joseph and Samuel Newsom. This "gingerbread" style sparked a drive for simplicity among a generation of young California architects.



From Picturesque California Homes by S. & J. C. Newsom. Published by Hennessey & Ingalls, Inc., 1978.

designed a house that was essentially a set of redwood-shingled pavilions strung along the edge of a slope north of the University of California campus at Berkeley (where he taught). Soon, more brown shingled houses by Maybeck sprang up near the first one. As the colony of hill-dwelling sophisticates grew, they formed a quasi-evangelical organization called the Hillside Club, whose ideal was succinctly stated in its 1906-07 yearbook: "Hillside architecture is landscape gardening around a few rooms for use in case of rain." (Ever determined to fuse indoor and outdoor living, it was Maybeck who developed the sliding glass door.)

Of the many houses erected in the spirit of the Hillside Club, none captured it so imaginatively as the Boynton family's "Temple of the Wings," in North Berkeley, designed by Maybeck but infused with the ideas of Florence Boynton, a friend and follower of dancer Isadora Duncan. In 1918, *Sunset Magazine* interviewed the Boyntons about life in the spare but elegant structure they had occupied for about four years. The "house" consisted of two round, temple-like pavilions, with roofs supported by a Corinthian colonnade. The flagstone floor was warmed by hot air circulating through hollow tiles underneath. In rainy weather, canvas awnings were unfurled between the columns; otherwise, the interiors were open to the elements.

Domestic drudgery and conventional dress had been

banished. The spirited Boynton women wore flowing garments like the ancient Greeks and wove garlands of flowers into their hair. Mr. Boynton, a successful San Francisco lawyer, wore a three-piece suit to the city; he donned robes in the privacy of the temple. He described their simple diet: raisins, dried figs, prunes, almonds, English walnuts, fresh fruits in season, cheese, honey, and milk. "We cook one article of food: we roast peanuts, a fifteen minutes' task daily." It was the Simple Life.


The Southern California counterpart of Berkeley's natural houses sprang up at the eastern edges of the Pasadena Arroyo among the orange and olive groves. Here, during the first decade or so of the 20th century, Charles and Henry Greene built California's first mansion-sized "Bungalows," roughly patterned on the East Indian dwellings of the same name. In a 1908 redwood-shingled Bungalow designed by Greene & Greene, long rounded beam ends protruding from under the roof eaves stretched like fingers to the outside world; dark hollows on the upper levels became cave-like sleeping porches. Skirting the ground level were verandahs and terraces embroidered with exotic plantings. The craftsmanship—elaborate wood joinery, stained glass, brick garden walls studded with granite river boulders—was expressionistic to the point of ostentation.

During the early years of this century, the California Bungalow—the state's first brand-name housing commodity—so captivated the nation that a far more modest, low-cost, shoebox version (in wood and stucco) spread eastward. Never mind that its flimsiness did not suit harsh Midwestern and Northeastern winters. It caught on anyway.




Courtesy of the American Institute of Architects.

Charles and Henry Greene.



From Five California Architects by Esther McCoy. Reprinted courtesy of the author.

Bernard Maybeck.



Above, Greene and Greene's mansion-sized Pasadena "Bungalow" (1908) for the David B. Gambles; below, their economy version for the average family.



© 1980 by Mary Mix Foley. From *The American House*. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.

Then came the automobile, with its promise of freedom and mobility. California's cities spread out, and new suburbs sprang up between the streetcar lines. During the surge of U.S. interest in European culture that followed World War I, the Bungalow yielded its popularity, in California as elsewhere, to a variety of cottage styles loosely based on European prototypes: the English Cotswold Cottage, the French Norman Farmhouse, and the tile-roofed Andalusian Hacienda—the latter a throwback to California's Spanish colonial heritage.*

A different kind of European style also crossed the Atlantic—Modernism, christened the "International Style" by American critics Henry-Russell Hitchcock and Philip Johnson. Modernism called for the same kind of moral commitment that the Craftsman Movement had espoused: the honest use of materials to serve basic needs, free of antiquarianism. For a variety of

*As noted above, the architecture of California's Spanish period was not highly prized during the first decades after statehood. But as urbanization progressed during the late 19th century, nostalgia for a pastoral, preindustrial past (that few of the state's residents could actually remember) suffused the Spanish colonial buildings with a new charm. The change in opinion is reflected in promotional literature. "An adobe house," wrote Charles Nordhoff in 1873, "no matter what is the wealth or condition of the Californian who lives in it, is simply a long range of rooms." By 1913, Herbert Croley could write that, "Rudimentary as these buildings were . . . they attain both by what they avoid and what they achieve, the essentials of good domestic architecture." Today, restored Spanish missions and old adobe homes are regarded in California as local shrines.


reasons, it was California that first embraced, and then popularized, the International Style.

To most Americans, it made no sense to apply words like "functional," "clean," and "honest" to a house; a man's home was still his castle and required stylistic trappings to prove it. In California, however, a growing respect for the solid architecture of the Spanish missions and Mexican *ranchos*, combined with the ideal of the Simple Life, had already spawned a natural, clean-lined, "proto-Modernism"; it was best exemplified in the San Diego and Los Angeles houses of the architect Irving Gill. Gill's cubist house for Mrs. Mary Banning was described in *Sunset Magazine* as being absolutely sincere and independent, "free from the distracting, feverish attempt to divert attention by means of excessive ornamentation."

The residential work of Irving Gill and the more exotic cubist houses that Frank Lloyd Wright built in Los Angeles during the early 1920s foreshadowed the machine-age style that Austrian-born architects Richard Neutra and R. N. Schindler would introduce during the '30s. Neutra and Schindler designed homes for members of Southern California's film and art worlds. Though stark and sometimes metallic, these International Style houses, like the earlier warm, redwood Craftsman houses, blended easily into their natural setting. Large expanses of plate glass helped to dissolve the barrier between indoors and out.


Northern California's most influential architect at this time was William W. Wurster, who regarded his professional role as that of the native son merging traditional aspects of California architecture with the European avant-garde. Beginning in the late 1920s, Wurster designed scores of houses that revolved around three features he called "the living porch," "the glazed gallery," and "the garden living room."

Wurster saw his clients' homelife as revolving around the



*A cubist beach house
(1926) in Newport Beach,
designed by Rudolph
Schindler.*

© 1980 by Mary Mix Foley. From *The American House*.
Reprinted by permission of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.



Americans from colder climes, noted Sunset in 1946, once “laughed when anyone mentioned the [California] ranch house. . . . But zone heating changed some ideas.” Ranch houses are now ubiquitous in America, even as high energy prices prompt second thoughts.

great outdoors rather than the hearth. In the September 1949 issue of *Architectural Forum*, he wrote:

The most predominant single desire for most people is for personally controlled out-of-door space, where the family can have a flower or vegetable garden at its door . . . where young children can make mud pies.

Most of the houses Wurster designed from the 1930s through the '50s drew on regional rural traditions. California's early architecture—the white-washed adobe of Monterey, for example—was sufficiently “elemental” to serve as the basis for a simple Modern Style. Clients who found the familiar historical details of European and American Colonial revival houses both

fussy and false, yet who had no taste for avant-garde Modernism, could be comfortable with an informal, vaguely rustic style that reflected the region's heritage.

At first, recognizably Modern houses were designed exclusively for sophisticated or at least affluent clients. The massive influx of migrants to California from all over the country after World War II changed that.

The postwar style-setters looked to the future, not the past. New technology for the home and a "progressive" attitude toward family relationships demanded (or so the architectural writers said) a new domestic setting. No publication was more successful than *Sunset Magazine* in selling California to prospective immigrants as the new frontier. *Sunset's* features encompassed everything from houses to plant boxes to barbecues, gardens, patios, and redwood decks. The annual *Sunset* design awards for the best houses for "Western Living" began during the early 1950s and continue to this day.

Eden for Everyman

The house that *Sunset* made synonymous with Western Living in the glowing postwar period was the California Ranch House, which resembled in its floor plan, if not its physical aspect, the old adobe Mexican *ranchos*. Like its predecessor, the Bungalow, the ranch house soon spread all over the United States. And like the Bungalow, it was difficult to characterize. The editors of the 1955 book, *Sunset Western Ranch Houses*, tried anyway:

Most of us describe any one-story house with a low, close-to-the-ground silhouette as a ranch house. When a long, wide porch is added to this form, almost everyone accepts the name. . . . Wide protected porches immediately suggest outdoor living—lazy summer afternoons, informal entertaining—but if those porches face the street and are, therefore, without privacy, you merely have a house that looks like a ranch house but does not function as one.

Prospective homeowners did not always worry about such distinctions. Wherever relatively cheap land remained on the fringes of urban areas, entrepreneurs built variations on the "indoor-outdoor" ranch house in vast tracts. Now young middle-class families could enjoy a house systematically zoned and labeled by the architect for appropriate use: outdoor living room, landscaped garden, boy's room, girl's room, patio, ter-

race, deck, swimming pool, barbecue, car-port, solarium, shop. It was not just "housing" but a "leisure center," a self-contained family spa, a "natural" retreat from the industrial age.

The California Ranch House became a symbol of the good life in the 1950s and early '60s, whether it was built in Orange County, California, or Shaker Heights, Ohio. In those prosperous days, when young couples were bringing up the largest generation in U.S. history, and most middle-class wives stayed home to mind the kids, there was perhaps a rationale for a house that promised a kind of mini-Eden. But life is different in the '80s. The housing market now includes vast numbers of single professionals and retired folk. Families are smaller, houses are more expensive, and many women aspire to careers outside the home. The idealized California Ranch House may no longer fit the times.

The latest California export—clustered, high-density residences in a park-like setting—is a response to shifts to smaller families, a harsher economy, and a threatened environment. The first of these prototype communities was the Sea Ranch condominium complex on the Mendocino County coast, designed by Moore/Lyndon/Turnbull/Whitaker in 1963.

The concept soon captivated architects and planners throughout California, who were increasingly aware of the costs of saturating the landscape with single-family tract homes. The idea, again, moved east. Today, clusters of wooden or stuccoed shed-roofed boxes dot the landscape from coast to coast, from the San Francisco Bay area's Foster City to Columbia, Maryland. In California, the ideal of the indoor-outdoor house lives on, although roof gardens, balconies, and hot tubs have succeeded terraces, patios, and pools.

And it is, after all, just that—an ideal. California Living, with its implicit assumption of leisured affluence in a lush natural setting, is as far from the daily experience of as many people in California as it is in New York.

But this vision has been a vision too long simply to founder on reality. Set in stone, glass, and redwood, it has taken tangible form and spread from California across America. Enter a man's house, Bernard Maybeck once wrote, and you will see his dreams.



BACKGROUND BOOKS

CALIFORNIA

Even by American standards, California's recorded history is relatively brief. It was not until 1769 that the first Spanish mission in California was founded—150 years after the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth, 250 years after Hernando Cortés invaded Mexico.

For a chronicle of California from the era of the Spanish friars and *soldados* to that of today's Governor Jerry Brown, there is Berkeley historian Walton Bean's reflective **California: An Interpretive History** (McGraw-Hill, 1968; 3rd ed., 1978). Bean measures California's "most controversial and persistent problems, such as racism, vigilantism, and the maltreatment of agricultural labor" against expansion, innovation, and economic growth under Spanish, Mexican, and U.S. control.

Entries range from abalone to Adolph Zukor (the Hungarian-born Hollywood film magnate) in James D. Hart's diverting guidebook, **A Companion to California** (Oxford, 1978). Hart's thumbnail sketches cover the state's agriculture, climate, geology, history, institutions, personalities, politics.

In 1510, Garci Rodríguez Ordóñez de Montalvo (about whom little else is known) wrote a melodramatic thriller—a Spanish best seller—that gave the future state its name. "Know ye that on the right hand of the Indies," he claimed, "there is an island called California, very near the Terrestrial Paradise."

Montalvo is one of 137 authors (including William Saroyan and Robinson Jeffers, as well as forgotten

miners and Indians) whose various diaries, verse, fiction, and critiques of California are excerpted in John and Laree Caughe's **California Heritage: An Anthology of History and Literature** (Ward Ritchie, 1962).

Montalvo's vision notwithstanding, the first Spaniards to set foot in "Terrestrial Paradise" found the land arid and mostly unfit for agriculture.

Led by Father Junípero Serra, a handful of Spanish missionaries and soldiers founded a Franciscan mission at San Diego in 1769—the first white settlement. Spreading the Christian faith among the Indians was only a peripheral concern to Spain, however.

Historian Charles Edward Chapman describes the Spanish move north into California from Mexico as the inevitable growth of an empire, in **The Founding of Spanish California: The Northwestward Expansion of New Spain, 1687–1783** (Macmillan, 1916; Octagon reprint, 1973). Spain feared—often on the basis of little or no real evidence—that Great Britain, France, or Russia might seize the region and threaten Spanish colonies to the South.

The result was an empire spread too thin. Franciscan friars taught the native Indians to farm and introduced irrigation methods that turned arid patches into oases. But the Spaniards and then the Mexicans—who took control from Spain in 1821—were mostly ranchers whose vast tracts were scattered along the coast and in the Central Valley.

In 1846, four years before California became the 31st state of the Union, its non-Indian population numbered fewer than 7,000—including some ambitious Americans.

Washington first attempted to gain control over California in 1829, when President Andrew Jackson sent an emissary to Mexico to negotiate the acquisition of what is now California, Texas, and New Mexico. According to historian Andrew F. Rolle, in **California: A History** (Crowell, 1963; AHM, 3rd. ed., 1978), U.S. offers of bribery offended Mexican officials, who refused to discuss the matter further.

The first wagon train of American pioneers bound for California set out from near Independence, Mo., in 1841. Five years later, as Zachary Taylor fought Santa Ana south of the border in the Mexican-American War, Kit Carson, John C. Frémont, and other Yankee immigrants successfully battled the Mexicans to gain California's freedom in the Bear Flag Revolt.

Dashing and opportunistic, Frémont later became one of California's first U.S. Senators (in 1850) and the state's first presidential candidate, running unsuccessfully on the Republican ticket in 1856. In **Frémont: Explorer for a Restless Nation** (Doubleday, 1977), author Ferol Egan observes that the intrepid Frémont came to symbolize for Easterners the larger-than-life Western hero. Frémont's impact on California's development was equally memorable. "From the ashes of his campfires have sprung cities," exclaimed his devoted wife, Jessie, daughter of Missouri's Senator Thomas Hart Benton.

In January 1848, James W. Marshall, a carpenter from New Jersey,

found gold nuggets in the American River at Sutter's Mill. The next year, 40,000 "Forty Niners" braved the five-month voyage around Cape Horn to San Francisco for a chance at a new start and instant wealth.

In **Americans and the California Dream, 1850-1915** (Oxford, 1973), historian Kevin Starr suggests that the Gold Rush irrevocably "linked California imaginatively with the most compelling of American myths, the pursuit of happiness." The discovery of gold put California up for grabs. During the ensuing 50 years, "a sudden and gorgeous drama," as Walt Whitman put it, was played out. This period of extraordinary expansion was marked by rampant speculation, the formation of powerful monopolies (especially in railroads), and cultivation of the land.

The Gold Rush hastened California's passage to statehood (1850), but Americans there remained isolated from the rest of the country—except for the Pony Express and, in 1861, the transcontinental telegraph. On an autumn evening in 1860, in a room above a Sacramento hardware store, merchants Collis P. Huntington, Leland Stanford, Mark Hopkins, and Charles Crocker—later to be called the "four associates"—met with construction engineer Theodore D. Judah. As Ward McAfee tells it in **California's Railroad Era, 1850-1911** (Golden West Books, 1973), the idea for the Central Pacific Railroad was born. The Central Pacific signed on as many as 10,000 Chinese coolies to build its railway, stretching from Sacramento to Promontory, Utah. Work was completed in 1869.

The four associates have been praised for their crucial role in California's economic growth and vilified for their ruthless business practices (for example, price fixing

CALIFORNIA IN LITERATURE

At the age of 19, Richard Henry Dana sailed from Massachusetts 'round the Horn to California as a common seaman in 1834. Four years later, he was among the first in a long line of "non-natives" to write about Californians and their environs. **Two Years Before the Mast** (1838) is his personal narrative of adventure along the California coast.

Bret Harte went west from Albany, N.Y., in 1854. His whimsical stories, among them "The Luck of Roaring Camp," romanticized the weathered miners, prostitutes, and gamblers of the rugged frontier.

A hard-boiled writing style marks the fiction of James M. Cain and Raymond Chandler. Cain's **The Postman Always Rings Twice** (1934) is a drifter's tale of adultery and murder, set along a rural highway in Southern California. Chandler's tough detective, Philip Marlowe, battled corrupt Los Angeles cops in such classics as **The Big Sleep** (1939).

Many established writers "hacked" for the movies. F. Scott Fitzgerald used his unhappy Hollywood experiences in his unfinished draft of **The Last Tycoon** (1941), as did Nathanael West in his eerie **The Day of the Locust** (1939).

Foreign authors who have penned their impressions of California include Britain's Aldous Huxley and Evelyn Waugh. Waugh's **The Loved One** (1948) gives a funny vision of love between two employees at Southern California's elaborate burial ground, Forest Lawn.

Nobel laureate John Steinbeck depicted the San Joaquin Valley in **The Grapes of Wrath** (1939) as a place of fruited abundance where, during the Depression, the children of migrant Okies starved. Fellow Californian Joan Didion writes essays (**The White Album**, 1979) and novels (**Play It As It Lays**, 1970) that probe the effects of celebrity, drugs, fads, and cars on Southern Californians—from bureaucrats to Black Panthers, to rock stars, to housewives.

In a lighter vein, novelist Cyra MacFadden's **The Serial: A Year in the Life of Marin County** (1977) satirizes the "mellow" lives of San Francisco's jogging, meditating, sexually self-conscious suburbanites. Her characters' chief worry, as one puts it, is "what it means to be *human*. You know—sex-role stereotyping, identity, meaningful human relationships. The whole gestalt."

and the control of docks to lessen competition). Notable among the biographies are David Lavender's **The Great Persuader** (Doubleday, 1970), a sympathetic portrait of Huntington (1821–1900), and Norman E. Tutorow's **Leland Stanford: Man of Many Careers** (Pacific Coast Publishers, 1971). Stanford (1824–93) founded the Republican Party in Cal-

ifornia, served as both governor and U.S. Senator, and financed and built the university named after his son. A melodramatic indictment of the Central Pacific—"that galloping monster, that terror of steel and steam"—is Frank Norris's muckraking novel, **The Octopus** (1901).

Today, agriculture is California's biggest business, with cash receipts

for 1979 totaling some \$11.8 billion. **Politics of Land** (Grossman, 1973, cloth; Penguin, 1973, paper), by Ralph Nader's Study Group on Land Use in California, focuses on how public and private land is allocated and used in the state. Competition for land is fierce. The authors note that the federal government has proprietary rights over 44 percent of California's 100 million acres; 25 corporate landowners hold more than 16 percent of the remaining privately owned land. Some 36 million acres, devoted to farming, produce 25 percent of the food (especially fruits and vegetables) that ends up on American dinner tables.

The precarious life of California's Hispanic migrant worker in the face of low wages and seasonal layoffs is described by novelist/naturalist Peter Matthiessen. His **Sal Si Puedes: Cesar Chavez and the New American Revolution** (Random, 1969, cloth; rev. ed., 1973; Dell, 1971, paper) paints a sympathetic portrait of the United Farm Workers' leader.

In 1887, Hollywood was a real estate development on the edge of Los Angeles. Movie-makers flocked there in the 1900s because of its sunny weather and its proximity to natural settings that could substitute for locales as different as the Sahara Desert and the French Riviera. British film historian Keven Brownlow has chronicled the history of California's early movie-making in several excellent books, among them **The War, The West, and the Wilderness** (Knopf, 1979).

Many of contemporary California's political debates have centered

around growth, land, and the environment. Because the Democrats and the G.O.P. are weak, local groups have arisen to fight the political battles. In a broad survey of recent **Power and Politics in California** (Wiley, 1980, paper), Cal Tech political scientists John H. Culver and John C. Syer note that the state's strong interest groups do not just pressure public officials but help to elect them in the first place.

One current battle has seen developers squaring off against environmentalists. During the early 1970s, there were 235 professional lobbyists in Sacramento representing "landed interests" (corporations, utilities, etc.) as opposed to 3 representing conservation groups. Although still outnumbered, the environmentalists have had their successes, notably in curbing the commercial development of coastal areas and in requiring "environmental impact reports" for all major construction projects. California's Environmental Quality Act is the most stringent state law of its kind in the country.

Political journalist Gladwin Hill takes a bemused look in **Dancing Bear: An Inside Look at California Politics** (World, 1968). A Democratic electoral majority, growing since 1932, he notes, did not prevent four successive Republican gubernatorial victories, from 1942 to 1954. (Nor did it bar Ronald Reagan from victory in 1966 and 1970.) California politics, concludes Hill, is marked by flexibility and pragmatism—"the frontier urge for experimentation, on the one hand, and the innate desire for security on the other."

EDITOR'S NOTE: *James J. Rawls and Ted K. Bradshaw suggested some of the titles mentioned in this essay.*

Revolution:

FIRE IN THE MINDS OF MEN

The chaotic aftermath of the 1979 overthrow of the pro-Western Shah of Iran is the latest revolution to preoccupy Americans. Yet, in one sense, the Ayatollah Khomeini's doctrine runs counter to world experience since the French Revolution of 1789. He preached a total return to Islam. He rejected the prevailing modern revolutionary vision of a manmade Utopia—a faith that has given the world Rousseau, Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and Fidel Castro. Here, historian James Billington takes a fresh look at how this powerful secular faith developed—and explains why it may be in decline.

by James H. Billington

Americans have great difficulty understanding the dominant world faith of our time: the belief in revolution.

The plain fact is that the militant revolutionaries we see in so many places are believers, no less committed and intense than the Christians or Muslims of an earlier era. What is new is the belief that a perfect secular order will emerge from the violent overthrow of traditional authority. This inherently implausible idea gave political dynamism to Europe during the 19th century and has become the major ideological export of the West to the world during the 20th.

This distinctly modern faith in revolution now shapes the official rhetoric of Moscow and Phnom Penh, Peking and Havana, and a host of Third World capitals. It was born and nourished during the turbulent period extending from the waning of the French Revolution in the late 18th century to the harsh beginnings of the Russian Revolution in the 20th.

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Flanked by angels of "liberty" and "equality," the revolutionary Christ is preaching "fraternity" to a world labeled "France" and crushing the vices of the old royalist regime underfoot.

Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

The arena was the Europe of the early industrial age; the main stage, the cramped editorial rooms of radical journals within great European cities. At the center stood the typical 19th-century European revolutionary: not a worker or peasant bent down by toil, but a thinker lifted up by ideas. He was part of a small intellectual elite whose story must be told "from above," much as it may displease those who believe that history in general (and revolutionary history in particular) is essentially made by socioeconomic pressures "from below."

This "elite" focus does not imply indifference to the mass

human suffering that marked this era of great social and economic turmoil in Europe. But, for better or worse, it was passionate intellectuals who created, developed, and, with the help of the printing press, propagated the revolutionary faith. It is important to understand the tradition of revolutionaries no less than the process of revolution.

Starting With Rousseau


The idea that making revolution could be a full-time vocation was alien to the practical-minded leaders of the American Revolution and to the bourgeois, moderate reformers such as Lafayette who initiated the French Revolution of 1789. However, the French revolutionary government went beyond republicanism to regicide early in 1793—and thence rapidly to terror, paralysis, and retreat. During the late 1790s, the realization grew among a small number of activists that the process of revolution would not in itself bring social harmony or social justice. A new species of man emerged in France to keep the dream alive at any personal cost: the professional revolutionary. He was a youthful intellectual who had little personal stake and even less vocational experience in the Old Regime. He became a full-time militant who argued that the French Revolution was incomplete. He believed in the need for a second and final revolution to realize the promise of a perfect secular society.

The revolutionary faith originated with Jean Jacques Rousseau, the father of romanticism, who wanted to replace inherited tradition with the primitive simplicities of nature. He idealized the unspoiled People as the source of authority for a radical reconstruction of society. His message particularly appealed to his fellow Swiss and to Germans resentful of the domination of French aristocratic culture. Rousseau-ism became revolutionary through the wild growth of occult fraternities and mystical higher Masonic orders, which spread back from Germany into France on the eve of the 1789 revolution and provided the first models for the secret, hierarchical organizations that

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sonal and dynamic machine—the driving force within the factory, which was transforming the hitherto static societies of Germany and Russia with such devastating effect in the late 19th century.

No less fateful than the schism between national and social revolutionaries was the conflict among social revolutionaries that began in the 1840s between Karl Marx and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. The former's focus on destroying the capitalist economic system clashed with the latter's war on the centralized bureaucratic state. Proudhon, a rough-hewn native of Besançon, advocated old-fashioned rural virtues and local autonomy against Marx's "materialist centralism." Marx, in turn, denounced Proudhon for his "petit bourgeois" indifference to industrial realities and to Marx's own intellectual authority. The conflict continued between the heirs of Marx (principally in



Vladimir Lenin's small Bolshevik Party played almost no role in destroying tsardom in February 1917 but was able to overthrow the fragile democratic provisional government by October.



Germany and Russia) and of Proudhon (among Latin and Slavic anarchists, syndicalists, and populists). But the increasing power of industrial organization and of intellectuals gave a growing advantage to the Marxists.

The word *intelligentsia* and the thirst for ideology migrated east from Poland to Russia (and from a national to a social revolutionary cause) through the Russian student radicals of the 1860s, who developed a new type of terrorism that was more impersonal, calculating, and dangerous than that of the heroically suicidal Poles. Later, Lenin drew both on this Russian penchant for disciplined violence and on German concepts of machine organization to create the Bolshevism that eventually brought the European revolutionary tradition out of the wilderness and into power in the October Revolution of 1917, amidst the devastation of World War I.

It is important to realize that the revolutionary faith developed in 19th-century Europe only within those societies that had not previously (a) legitimized ideological dissent by breaking with medieval forms of religious authority, and (b) modified monarchical power by accepting some form of organized political opposition. In northern Europe and North America, where these conditions were met by Protestantism and parliamentary traditions, the revolutionary faith attracted almost no indigenous adherents.

Thus, the revolutionary tradition can be seen as a form of political-ideological opposition that arose first against authoritarian Catholicism (in France, Italy, and Poland) and then

against other religiously based autocracies (in Lutheran Prussia, Orthodox Russia). The most dedicated and professional social revolutionaries—from Pierre-Sylvain Maréchal, author of the “Manifesto of Equals” in 1796, through Blanqui, Marx, and Marx’s anarchist rival, Mikhail Bakunin, to Lenin—came from such societies. And each tended to become that rarest of all forms of true believer: a militant atheist.

As they warred against the existing order, revolutionary movements tended to become more internationalist and visionary whenever women played a leading role, as with Flora Tristán, the French founder of the first international proletarian organization, the *Union ouvrière*, in the 1840s. They became more parochial and pragmatic whenever workers were in command, as in England during the 1890s where trade-union activism led to the reformist Labor Party rather than to a revolutionary movement.

The flame of revolutionary faith began its migrations during the 1770s, when some European thinkers followed the king of France’s cousin, Philip of Orleans, in transferring their lighted candles from Christian altars to Masonic lodges. The flame of occult alchemists, which had promised to turn dross into gold, soon reappeared at the center of occult new circles seeking to recreate a lost golden age of brotherhood and equality: Bavarian Illuminists conspiring against the Jesuits in the 1780s, French Philadelphians against Napoleon in 1805–12, Italian “charcoal burners” (Carbonari) against the Hapsburgs in 1812–20. Their campaigns all failed, but they left behind an aroused belief among bright young students throughout Europe in the possibility that a small “microcosm” of purified intellectuals might transform the “macrocosm” of the suffering world.

Operas and Guillotines

In the course of his attempt to overthrow Napoleon in 1812, General Claude-François de Malet was ridiculed for attempting “to use as a lever something which is only a match.” But Malet replied that “with a match one has no need of a lever; one does not lift up the world, one burns it.” Malet’s Italian ally, Luigi Angeloni, whose related conspiracy came closer to succeeding in Italy, subsequently noted after the fall of Napoleon that “the Italian flame” was spreading “the fire of freedom to the most frozen land of Petersburg.” There a group of idealistic officers who had served in the West staged an ill-fated uprising against Tsarist absolutism in December 1825.

The slogan of these first Russian revolutionaries (“From the

spark comes the flame!") had been originated by the first man to predict an egalitarian social revolution in the 18th century (Maréchal) and was to be revived by the first man to realize such a revolution in the 20th (Lenin, who used it as the epigram for his underground journal, *The Spark*).

A recurrent mythic model for revolutionaries—early romantics in Italy and France, the young Marx, the Russians of Lenin's time—was Prometheus, who stole fire from the gods for the use of mankind. The Promethean faith of revolutionaries resembled in many respects the general belief that science would lead men out of darkness into light.


But there was also a more visionary millennial assumption that, on the new day that was dawning, the sun would never set. Early during the French upheaval of 1789 was born what the cultural historian Jean Starobinski has called the "solar myth of revolution." This belief that the sun was rising on a new era in which darkness would vanish forever became implanted "at a level of consciousness that simultaneously interpreted something real and produced a new reality."

The new reality that modern professional revolutionaries sought was radically secular and stridently simple. The ideal was not the balanced complexity of the new American federation, with its separation of constitutional powers, but the occult simplicity of its great seal: an all-seeing eye atop a pyramid over the words *Novus Ordo Seclorum*. In search of primal, natural truths, revolutionaries looked back to pre-Christian antiquity—adopting pagan names like "Anaxagoras" and "Anacharsis," and, of course, "Spartacus." They idealized above all the semimythic Pythagoras as the model intellect-turned-revolutionary and the Pythagorean belief in prime numbers, geometric forms, and the higher harmonies of music.

Indeed, many of the same Strasbourg musicians who first played the revolutionary "Marseillaise" in 1792 had introduced Mozart's *Magic Flute* to French audiences in the same city only a few months earlier. The last solo words of that opera seemed to explain the fuller meaning of the *jour de gloire* that Claude-Joseph Rouget de Lisle's anthem had proclaimed:

The rays of the sun have vanquished the night,
The powers of darkness have yielded to light.

The first guillotine was made by a piano-maker named Schmidt from the same city of Strasbourg. His guillotine was first used at almost exactly the same time that Rouget de Lisle was compos-



This design for a "Temple of Equality" was drawn by Jean-Jacques Lequeu during the Reign of Terror in 1793 and illustrates the revolutionary passion for simple, often circular forms.

Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

ing the stirring but bloodthirsty words to his anthem, also in Strasbourg.

Philosopher-kings did not create the slogans and catchwords of revolution. *Communism*, the label Lenin finally adopted, was first used in print in 1785, not by the great Rousseau, but by a *Rousseau du ruisseau* (Rousseau of the gutter): an indulgent fetishist, author of fantasies, and nocturnal street-walker in prerevolutionary Paris, Restif de la Bretonne. Thus, the revolutionary label that now controls the destiny of more than 1 billion people in the contemporary world sprang from the erotic imagination of an obscure, eccentric French writer. Like other key words of the revolutionary tradition, it first appeared as the rough ideograph of a language in the making: a road sign pointing to the future.

From the beginning, revolutionaries were linguistic magicians. They used old words (*democracy, nation, revolution*, and



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Courtesy of Editions Jules Tallandier.

liberal) in new ways and invented altogether new words like *socialist* and *communist*. Their new vocabulary was so appealing that it was taken over for nonrevolutionary usage—as in the adoption of *republican* and *democrat* for competing political parties in postrevolutionary America, or in the conservative co-optation of *nation*, *liberal*, and even *radical* in late 19th-century Europe. Revolutionaries also originated other key phrases used by nonrevolutionary social theorists in our own century: *cybernetics*, *intelligentsia*. Even speculation about “the year 2000” began not with the futurology of the 1960s but with a dramatic work written in the 1780s by Restif, the figure who gave us *communism*.

The revolutionary faith was built more by ideological innovators than by political leaders. Professionalism and dedication was provided largely by intellectuals who lacked political experience but saw in revolution an object of faith and a source of vocation, a channel for sublimated emotion and sublime ambition. If traditional religion is to be described as “the opium of the people,” the new revolutionary faith might well be called the amphetamine of the intellectuals of the 19th and 20th centuries.

But such characterizations are neither fair to the believer nor helpful to the historian. The wellsprings of this faith are deep and have sustained men and women on the way to the scaffold of the executioner as well as to the platform of power. The youthful intellectuals who were the prophets and priests of this new secular religion were largely crying in the wilderness throughout the 19th century, struggling in Germany, in Poland, in Russia against overwhelming odds for revolutions that they saw coming mainly with the eyes of faith. It was not self-indulgent pity that caused one of the most militant of early revolutionaries—the Italian pioneer of guerrilla warfare, Carlo



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*Left to right:
feminist Flora
Tristán;
visionaries
Pierre-Sylvain
Maréchal and
Restif de la Bre-
tonne; rivals
Karl Marx and
Pierre-Joseph
Proudhon.*

Bianco—to compare his wandering life of exile to an eternal purgatory of “suffering without end and without hope”:

I no longer have a friend . . . no relatives, no old colleagues . . . no one writes me or thinks about me any more . . . I have become a foreigner in my own country, and I am a foreigner among foreigners. The earth itself refuses to adopt me.

At a deep and often subconscious level, the revolutionary faith was shaped by the Christian faith it attempted to replace. Most revolutionaries, from Louis de Saint-Just to Lenin, viewed history prophetically as a kind of unfolding morality play. The present was hell, and revolution a collective purgatory leading to a future earthly paradise. The French Revolution was the Incarnation of hope, but was betrayed by Judases within the revolutionary camp and crucified by the Pilates in power. The future revolution would be a kind of Second Coming in which the Just would be vindicated. History itself would provide the final judgment, and a new community beyond all kingdoms would come on earth as it never could in heaven.

A contemporary statement of this belief lies in the 1953 founding manifesto of Fidel Castro’s revolutionary movement, *History Will Absolve Me*. He represented his own original revolutionary assault on the Moncada Barracks as a kind of Incarnation. The subsequent torture and martyrdom of his virile fellow revolutionaries was the Passion and Crucifixion; and Castro’s trial by Batista was Christ before Pilate. The Cuban people were promised corporate Resurrection; and their revolutionary apostles, Pentecostal power. The coming revolution would fulfill all the Laws (the five “revolutionary laws” of the Moncada raiders)



Barricades in Vienna in 1848 marked a high point of Europe's romantic "revolution of the intellectuals."

Courtesy of Dietz Verlag, Berlin.

and the Prophets (Cuba's 19th-century rebel, José Martí).

Such total belief in secular salvation is uniquely modern: It is the sublime creation of the age of political religion ushered in by the American and French Revolutions. Previous political upheavals were in essence either spontaneous revolts or religious revivals. These events were often called revolutions, but then the word meant a re-revolution back to some idealized past. The American—and even more the French—Revolution proclaimed a totally new, essentially manmade order. When the French shunned the characteristic American references to the Creator, the modern revolutionary tradition received its distinct—and distinctly non-American—stamp of antireligious militancy. With the French Revolution, as critic Michel de Certeau observed, "a new era opens, that of beginnings without return."

The era is far from over. Indeed, the revolutionary faith

seemed to revive among some Western intellectuals during the 1960s. Revolutionary prophecy at that time was often shrill and rarely heeded. Most people in the West remained attached to either their material possessions or their spiritual heritage. However, within overdeveloped universities even more than underdeveloped economies, there was often a kind of fascination—compounded sometimes by fear and/or secret delight—with the perceived reappearance of a political species long thought to be nearing extinction.

Yet the perspective of history seemed strangely missing among the West's revolutionaries, antirevolutionaries, and voyeurs of the '60s and early '70s. Activists seemed largely uninterested in the substantial academic literature that had already accumulated by the mid-'60s, and new writing often seemed unusually narrow or polemically preoccupied with immediate issues. In America, there also seemed to be deeper cultural reasons for continued historical ignorance of the revolutionary tradition.

Narcotic Highs and Sexual Lows

There was, first of all, the voracious overuse of the word *revolutionary* in a generally nonrevolutionary society. The word was abused not only by advertisers to announce the most trivial innovations in taste and technology, but also by social commentators anxious to contend that a "revolution" was occurring in the politically conservative America of the early '70s. The new "revolutionaries" were variously identified as drifting but saintly flower children (by Charles Reich), as the technological innovators whom they rejected (by Jacques Revel), or as humanistic capitalists who presumably had little in common with either (by J. D. Rockefeller).*

Such confusion flowed in part from what various commentators have identified as the general modern tendency to attach a "magical, binding and unique meaning," "a positive light," to the word *revolution*—even as it is "emptied of all meaning" by constant use.

Beginning my research on this subject as a university-based historian during the late '60s, I was repeatedly struck in the depths of libraries by the precedents for almost everything that

*It was only marginally more absurd for a bizarre drifter who called himself Rasputin in 1975 to characterize his sexually indulgent, communal cult of affluent youth near Washington, D.C., as "revolutionary"—and to invent the verb *to revolute*. Said he: "Let the people do what they want . . . keep them revolting. Revolution, constantly changing, going on to the next thing. . . ."

was daily being hailed as a novelty from the rooftops outside.

I came to know figures like Thomas (Ismail) Urbain, a Black Muslim of the 1830s unknown to those of today. He adopted Islam and Algerian nationalism a century before the same pattern was followed by Frantz Fanon, another black revolutionary from the same West Indies. Flora Tristán anticipated today's radical feminism by invading the all-male House of Lords in London of the late 1830s and removing her disguise as a male Turk to dramatize her cause. The struggle between the old and the new Left in America during the 1960s was in many ways another *reprise* on the Marx-Proudhon conflict of the 1840s.

An End to Politics as Religion?

The concept of a revolution along generational lines was already fully developed in *Gerontocracy* (1828) by the Swiss revolutionary James Fazy. Germany had produced even earlier the prototypical "modern" student counterculture: rakish dress, long hair, narcotic highs, and sexual lows. Out of this radical subculture came strident calls for a "propaganda of the deed" long before the theatrical violence of today's terrorists. The anti-traditional musical theater of the early 19th century inspired real revolution in a way that rock festivals of the recent past only vowed to do.

Since revolutionaries are intense people at war with accepted social conventions, they have become favorite subjects in America for psychological explanations. Aside from the recognized difficulties of retroactive psychoanalysis, the fact is that most of the important early revolutionaries seem surprisingly free of unusual personal characteristics. One of the best studies of the emotional side of the original French revolutionaries points out that "the future revolutionaries were almost all docile pupils of Jesuits and Oratorians." Like most other French children of their time, they were fond of their mothers, of their native regions, and of mildly sentimental, apolitical literature. The revolutionaries' use of violence was often reluctant and it was invariably seen by them as the violence-to-end-all-violence.

The fascinating fact is that, during the 19th century, most revolutionaries sought the simple, almost banal aims of modern secular man: material satisfaction and rational simplicity. What was unique was their intensity and commitment. This faith and dedication made the revolutionary trailblazers bigger than life—and deeply controversial. Their progress represented, for some, humanity emerging on wings from its cocoon; for others, a malignancy attacking civilization itself.

Most communists and many Third World leaders still profess to believe in salvation-through-revolution; in America, others fear that this idea still has the power to dazzle intellectuals in the West, who as Peter Berger puts it, lack "the experience of living in a society where that myth has been politically elevated to the status of official doctrine." Yet others see this secular faith fading away as a "post-industrial society" moves "beyond ideology" into a "technetronic" era. Others suggest that belief in revolution was only a political flash fire of the European industrial era that is burning itself out on the periphery of the Third World. The reality may be that the industrial West has itself moved from an expansive age of energy into a lingering twilight of entropy.

I am inclined to think that the end may be approaching for political religions—particularly for that religion which saw in revolution the sunrise of a perfect society. Political authority throughout the world is now largely based on the authority of some kind of revolution. But most of that authority has now lost its initial luster, and the practical problems of people everywhere are proving ever more untouched by the arrogant simplicity of the revolutionary faith. Simply to survive, humanity may have to find ways of evolving beyond revolution and even beyond politics.

Therefore, I wonder if the secular revolutionary creed, which arose in Judeo-Christian culture, may not ultimately prove to be only a stage in the continuing metamorphosis of older forms of faith. Perhaps the belief in secular revolution, which has legitimized so much authoritarianism and oppression in the 20th century, may prefigure some rediscovery of religious evolution to revalidate democracy during the 21st.



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Family Tree by Norman Rockwell, 1959. The smiling Baby-Boom youngster at the top has an even chance of getting divorced during his lifetime. If his views reflect those of the 1,529 Americans polled by the Gallup organization in March 1980, he holds the family in high esteem but believes family life has deteriorated markedly during the past 15 years.

The American Family

When *WQ* took its first look at studies of “the changing family” three years ago, the editors contrasted the “upheaval” in family patterns with the “trickle” of scholarly research exploring the phenomenon. The trickle has since become a torrent; the upheaval, in the eyes of many, a full-blown crisis. The high incidence of divorce and out-of-wedlock pregnancies, the growing number of one-parent families, the costly pathology of family instability—all of these persist as America moves into the 1980s, and the experts don’t really know why. Meanwhile, political discussion has become increasingly shrill, as if views on “the family” were a litmus test for assigning people among competing ideologies. Is a little “benign neglect” by activists in order? Here, psychologist Arlene Skolnick looks at the family in American history; sociologist Graham Spanier provides an overview of the latest academic research into family matters; and specialists Mary Jo Bane, Lee Rainwater, and Martin Rein examine the evolving government-family “partnership.”



THE PARADOX OF PERFECTION

by Arlene Skolnick

The American Family, as even readers of *Popular Mechanics* must know by now, is in what Sean O’Casey would have called “a terrible state of chassis.” Yet, there are certain ironies about the much-publicized crisis that give one pause.

True, the statistics seem alarming. The U.S. divorce rate, though it has reached something of a plateau in recent years, remains the highest in American history. The number of births out-of-wedlock among all races and ethnic groups continues to climb. The plight of many elderly Americans subsisting on low fixed incomes is well known.

What puzzles me is an ambiguity, not in the facts, but in what we are asked to make of them. A series of opinion polls conducted in 1978 by Yankelovich, Skelley, and White, for example, found that 38 percent of those surveyed had recently witnessed one or more "destructive activities" (e.g., a divorce, a separation, a custody battle) within their own families or those of their parents or siblings. At the same time, 92 percent of the respondents said the family was highly important to them as a "personal value."

Can the family be at once a cherished "value" and a troubled institution? I am inclined to think, in fact, that they go hand in hand. A recent "Talk of the Town" report in *The New Yorker* illustrates what I mean:

A few months ago word was heard from Billy Gray, who used to play brother Bud in "Father Knows Best," the 1950s television show about the nice Anderson family who lived in the white frame house on a side street in some mythical Springfield—the house at which the father arrived each night swinging open the front door and singing out "Margaret, I'm home!" Gray said he felt "ashamed" that he had ever had anything to do with the show. It was all "totally false," he said, and had caused many Americans to feel inadequate, because they thought that was the way life was supposed to be and that their own lives failed to measure up.

As Susan Sontag has noted in *On Photography*, mass-produced images have "extraordinary powers to determine our demands upon reality." The family is especially vulnerable to confusion between truth and illusion. What, after all, is "normal"? All of us have a backstairs view of our own families, but we know The Family, in the aggregate, only vicariously.

Like politics or athletics, the family has become a media event. Television offers nightly portrayals of lump-in-the-throat family "normalcy" ("The Waltons," "Little House on the Prairie") and, nowadays, even humorous "deviance" ("One Day at a Time," "The Odd Couple"). Family advisers sally forth in syndicated newspaper columns to uphold standards, mend rela-

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Teenage Parents Always Have Homework!



Premarital pregnancies were frequent in colonial America, but today's unwed mothers are younger and less likely to give up their children or marry for appearance's sake. Day-care centers for students' children are being established in U.S. urban high schools, including those in Washington, D.C.

Courtesy of Creative Media Group.

tionships, suggest counseling, and otherwise lead their readers back to the True Path. For commercial purposes, advertisers spend millions of dollars to create stirring vignettes of glamorous-but-ordinary families, the kind of family most 11-year-olds wish they had.

All Americans do not, of course, live in such a family, but most share an intuitive sense of what the "ideal" family should be—reflected in the precepts of religion, the conventions of etiquette, and the assumptions of law. And, characteristically, Americans tend to project the ideal back into the past, the time when virtues of all sorts are thought to have flourished.

We do not come off well by comparison with that golden age, nor could we, for it is as elusive and mythical as Brigadoon. If Billy Gray shames too easily, he has a valid point: While Americans view the family as the proper context for their own lives—9 out of 10 people live in one—they have no realistic context in which to view the family. Family history, until recently, was as neglected in academe as it still is in the press. This summer's White House Conference on Families is "policy-oriented," which means present-minded. The familiar, depressing charts of "leading family indicators"—marriage, divorce, illegitimacy—in newspapers and newsmagazines rarely survey the trends before World War II. The discussion, in short, lacks ballast.

Let us go back to before the American Revolution.

Perhaps what distinguishes the modern family most from its colonial counterpart is its newfound privacy. Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, well over 90 percent of the American population lived in small rural communities. Unusual behavior rarely went unnoticed, and neighbors often intervened directly in a family's affairs, to help or to chastise.

The most dramatic example was the rural "charivari," prevalent in both Europe and the United States until the early 19th century. The purpose of these noisy gatherings was to censure community members for familial transgressions—unusual sexual behavior, marriages between persons of grossly discrepant ages, or "household disorder," to name but a few. As historian Edward Shorter describes it in *The Making of the Modern Family*:

Sometimes the demonstration would consist of masked individuals circling somebody's house at night, screaming, beating on pans, and blowing cow horns on other occasions, the offender would be seized and marched through the streets, seated perhaps backwards on a donkey or forced to wear a placard describing his sins.

The state itself had no qualms about intruding into a family's affairs by statute, if necessary. Consider 17th-century New England's "stubborn child" laws that, though never actually enforced, sanctioned the death penalty for chronic disobedience to one's parents.

If the boundaries between home and society seem blurred during the colonial era, it is because they were. People were neither very emotional nor very self-conscious about family life, and, as historian John Demos points out, family and community were "joined in a relation of profound reciprocity." In his *Of Domesticall Duties*, William Gouge, a 17th-century Puritan preacher, called the family "a little community." The home, like the larger community, was as much an economic as a social unit; all members of the family worked, be it on the farm, or in a shop, or in the home.

There was not much to idealize. Love was not considered the basis for marriage but one possible result of it. According to historian Carl Degler, it was easier to obtain a divorce in colonial New England than anywhere else in the Western world, and the divorce rate climbed steadily throughout the 18th century, though it remained low by contemporary standards. Romantic images to the contrary, it was rare for more than two genera-

tions (parents and children) to share a household, for the simple reason that very few people lived beyond the age of 60. It is ironic that our nostalgia for the extended family—including grandparents and grandchildren—comes at a time when, thanks to improvements in health care, its existence is less threatened than ever before.

Infant mortality was high in colonial days, though not as high as we are accustomed to believe, since food was plentiful and epidemics, owing to generally low population density, were few. In the mid-1700s, the average age of marriage was about 24 for men, 21 for women—not much different from what it is now. Households, on average, were larger, but not startlingly so: A typical household in 1790 included about 5.6 members, versus about 3.5 today. Illegitimacy was widespread. Premarital pregnancies reached a high in 18th-century America (10 percent of all first births) that was not equalled until the 1950s.

Form Follows Function

In simple demographic terms, then, the differences between the American family in colonial times and today are not all that stark; the similarities are sometimes striking.

The chief contrast is psychological. While Western societies have always idealized the family to some degree, the *most vivid* literary portrayals of family life before the 19th century were negative or, at best, ambivalent. In what might be called the “high tragic” tradition—including Sophocles, Shakespeare, and the Bible, as well as fairy tales and novels—the family was portrayed as a high-voltage emotional setting, laden with dark passions, sibling rivalries, and violence. There was also the “low comic” tradition—the world of hen-pecked husbands and tyrannical mothers-in-law.

It is unlikely that our 18th-century ancestors ever left the Book of Genesis or *Tom Jones* with the feeling that their own family lives were seriously flawed.

By the time of the Civil War, however, American attitudes toward the family had changed profoundly. The early decades of the 19th century marked the beginnings of America’s gradual transformation into an urban, industrial society. In 1820, less than 8 percent of the U.S. population lived in cities; by 1860, the urban concentration approached 20 percent, and by 1900 that proportion had doubled.

Structurally, the American family did not immediately undergo a comparable transformation. Despite the large families of many immigrants and farmers, the size of the *average*

family declined—slowly but steadily—as it had been doing since the 17th century. Infant mortality remained about the same, and may even have increased somewhat, owing to poor sanitation in crowded cities. Legal divorces were easier to obtain than they had been in colonial times. Indeed, the rise in the divorce rate was a matter of some concern during the 19th century, though death, not divorce, was the prime cause of one-parent families, as it was up to 1965.

Functionally, however, America's industrial revolution had a lasting effect on the family. No longer was the household typically a group of interdependent workers. Now, men went to offices and factories and became breadwinners; wives stayed home to mind the hearth; children went off to the new public schools. The home was set apart from the dog-eat-dog arena of economic life; it came to be viewed as a utopian retreat or, in historian Christopher Lasch's phrase, a "haven in a heartless world." Marriage was now valued primarily for its emotional attractions. Above all, the family became something to worry about.

The earliest and most saccharine "sentimental model" of the family appeared in the new mass media that proliferated during the second quarter of the 19th century. Novels, tracts, newspaper articles, and ladies' magazines—there were variations for each class of society—elaborated a "Cult of True



New York Public Library.
Courtesy American Heritage Publishing Co.

With the idealization of family life in the 19th century came an appreciation of "childhood" as a distinct—and fragile—stage of development, paving the way for the mass marketing of "how to" childrearing manuals.

Womanhood" in which piety, submissiveness, and domesticity dominated the pantheon of desirable feminine qualities. This quotation from *The Ladies Book* (1830) is typical:

See, she sits, she walks, she speaks, she looks—
unutterable things! Inspiration springs up in her very
paths—it follows her footsteps. A halo of glory encircles
her, and illuminates her whole orbit. With her, man not
only feels safe, but actually renovated.

In the late 1800s, science came into the picture. The "professionalization" of the housewife took two different forms. One involved motherhood and childrearing, according to the latest scientific understanding of children's special physical and emotional needs. (It is no accident that the publishing of children's books became a major industry during this period.) The other was the domestic science movement—"home economics," basically—which focused on the woman as full-time homemaker, applying "scientific" and "industrial" rationality to shopping, making meals, and housework.

The new ideal of the family prompted a cultural split that has endured, one that Tocqueville had glimpsed (and rather liked) in 1835. Society was divided more sharply into man's sphere and woman's sphere. Toughness, competition, and practicality were the masculine values that ruled the outside world. The softer values—affection, tranquility, piety—were worshiped in the home and the church. In contrast to the colonial view, the ideology of the "modern" family implied a critique of everything beyond the front door.

What is striking as one looks at the writings of the 19th-century "experts"—the physicians, clergymen, phrenologists, and "scribbling ladies"—is how little their essential message differs from that of the sociologists, psychiatrists, pediatricians, and women's magazine writers of the 20th century, particularly since World War II.

Instead of men's and women's spheres, of course, sociologists speak of "instrumental" and "expressive" roles. The notion of the family as a retreat from the harsh realities of the outside world crops up as "functional differentiation." And, like the 19th-century utopians who believed society could be regenerated through the perfection of family life, 20th-century social scientists have looked at the failed family as the source of most American social problems.

None of those who promoted the sentimental model of the family—neither the popular writers nor the academics—

considered the paradox of perfectionism: the ironic possibility that it would lead to trouble. Yet it has. The image of the perfect, happy family makes ordinary families seem like failures. Small problems loom as big problems if the "normal" family is thought to be one where there are no real problems at all.

One sees this phenomenon at work on the generation of Americans born and reared during the late 19th century, the first generation reared on the mother's milk of sentimental imagery. Between 1900 and 1920, the U.S. divorce rate doubled, from four to eight divorces annually per 1,000 married couples. The jump—comparable to the 100 percent increase in the divorce rate between 1960 and 1980—is not attributable to changes in divorce laws, which were not greatly liberalized. Rather, it would appear that, as historian Thomas O'Neill believes, Americans were simply more willing to dissolve marriages that did not conform to their ideal of domestic bliss—and perhaps try again.

A "Fun" Morality

If anything, family standards became even more demanding as the 20th century progressed. The new fields of psychology and sociology opened up whole new definitions of familial perfection. "Feelings"—fun, love, warmth, good orgasm—acquired heightened popular significance as the invisible glue of successful families.

Psychologist Martha Wolfenstein, in an analysis of several decades of government-sponsored infant care manuals, has documented the emergence of a "fun morality." In former days, being a good parent meant carrying out certain tasks with punctilio; if your child was clean and reasonably obedient, you had no cause to probe his psyche. Now, we are told, parents must commune with their own feelings and those of their children—an edict which has seeped into the ethos of education as well. The distinction is rather like that between religions of deed and religions of faith. It is one thing to make your child brush his teeth; it is quite another to transform the whole process into a joyous "learning experience."

The task of 20th-century parents has been further complicated by the advice offered them. The experts disagree with each other and often contradict themselves. The kindly Dr. Benjamin Spock, for example, is full of contradictions. In a detailed analysis of *Baby and Child Care*, historian Michael Zuckerman observes that Spock tells mothers to relax ("trust yourself") yet warns them that they have an "ominous power" to destroy their

children's innocence and make them discontented "for years" or even "forever."

As we enter the 1980s, both family images and family realities are in a state of transition. After a century and a half, the web of attitudes and nostrums comprising the "sentimental model" is beginning to unravel. Since the mid-1960s, there has been a youth rebellion of sorts, a new "sexual revolution," a revival of feminism, and the emergence of the two-worker family. The huge postwar Baby-Boom generation is pairing off, accounting in part for the upsurge in the divorce rate (half of all divorces occur within seven years of a first marriage). Media images of the family have become more "realistic," reflecting new patterns of family life that are emerging (and old patterns that are re-emerging).

Among social scientists, "realism" is becoming something of an ideal in itself. For some of them, realism translates as pluralism: All forms of the family, by virtue of the fact that they happen to exist, are equally acceptable—from communes and cohabitation to one-parent households, homosexual marriages, and, come to think of it, the nuclear family. What was once labeled "deviant" is now merely "variant." In some college texts, "the family" has been replaced by "family systems." Yet, this new approach does not seem to have squelched perfectionist standards. Indeed, a palpable strain of perfectionism runs through the pop literature on "alternative" family lifestyles.

For the majority of scholars, realism means a more down-to-earth view of the American household. Rather than seeing the family as a haven of peace and tranquility, they have begun to recognize that even "normal" families are less than ideal, that intimate relations of any sort inevitably involve antagonism as well as love. Conflict and change are inherent in social life. If the family is now in a state of flux, such is the nature of resilient institutions; if it is beset by problems, so is life. The family will survive.



OUTSIDERS LOOKING IN

by Graham B. Spanier

As with all of the social sciences, the study of marriage and the family began long before it was distilled into an academic specialty. Socrates mused about the family, and Plato, in what was perhaps man's first venture into "family policy," argued that the family would have to disappear as the price for establishing his *Republic*. Plutarch, Chaucer, Milton, Marx, and Freud each spoke his piece on the subject.

It was not until the 1920s, however, that, thanks largely to the pioneering efforts of men like Ernest Burgess and his colleagues at the University of Chicago, family research emerged as a serious academic endeavor. Even then, it was generally conducted by sociologists who saw "the family" as merely one specialization among several that they had, the way some realtors also handle insurance or some lawyers do tax returns.

Much has changed. Today, virtually every U.S. college and university has family specialists on its faculty. There are dozens of scholarly journals and newsletters devoted to the family—from *Demography* to the *Journal of Marriage and the Family*. Professional associations of family researchers such as the National Council on Family Relations have a collective membership in the tens of thousands.

The stigma is gone, but the enterprise is not yet a truly "hard" science, nor, given the subject, will it ever be. In matters ranging from divorce to premarital pregnancy to homosexuality, establishing the facts of the case and relating cause to effect remain a murky business. Scholarly hypotheses sometimes set sail, drift, founder, and sink, possibly to be salvaged and refitted years later. Words like "inconclusive" and "ambiguous" pepper the more serious authors' concluding comments in journal essays. It is a frustrating profession.

For all their uncertainty, the best family researchers can offer some insights into *what* is happening, if not always into *why* it is happening or what it all means for America as a whole.

Let us begin with unwed cohabitation (or "living together," née, "living in sin"), a development fostered, so it is said, by the cultural revolution of the 1960s. Data from the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey point to a steady increase in the

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"Mummy, when will I be old enough to get divorced?" was the caption on this cartoon by William Hamilton. For women, the average age of first divorce is now 27.



Reprinted from The Anti-Social Register, by William Hamilton. Published by Chronicle Books, 1974.

number of persons living together. The figure more than doubled between 1970 and 1978, to more than 1.1 million couples. Between 1977 and 1978 alone, there was a 19 percent increase.

Such living arrangements are popularly thought to be a lasting alternative to marriage, one more bit of evidence that the nuclear family is in a state of decay. In fact, cohabitation is rarely permanent. About two-fifths of those who now live together are never-married young adults, most of whom will eventually marry someone—if not necessarily the person they currently live with. Another 55 percent are divorced individuals, most of whom will eventually remarry. A few are elderly. Of all never-married persons living together outside of marriage, about 85 percent are under age 35, 8 percent are between 35 and 54 years of age, and 7 percent are 55 or older.*

Paul Glick of the Census Bureau and I have recently published data showing that cohabiting couples generally live in large suburbs or cities. They have, on average, relatively low incomes and experience high unemployment, although the women among them are more likely to be employed than are married women. Couples living together who are young and have never been married also tend to be better educated than either their married or previously married counterparts. Blacks

*Corresponding percentages differ for persons living together who have been previously married. Approximately 38 percent of such individuals are under age 35, 30 percent are aged 35 to 54, and 32 percent are 55 or older.

account for a disproportionate share of the number of couples living together, but the vast majority of all cohabiting couples are, in fact, white.

What most of these people have in common—perhaps the only thing—is that they have chosen this lifestyle as a temporary convenience, one made possible by effective birth-control techniques and perpetuated to a great extent both by changing mores and, especially among the young, by an increase in the number of career-minded women. “Living together” rarely constitutes an *ideological* rejection of marriage. Indeed, one of the greatest problems for such couples comes when one of them is ready to marry and the other is not.

Marriage is still the norm in our society, and, I suspect, it will remain so. In 1979 alone, more than 4.5 million persons got married; 9 out of 10 Americans eventually march down the aisle. Today's young adults seem to be as committed to the idea of marriage as were previous generations, but there is one difference: They are not in as much of a hurry. The median age at first marriage is now 24 for men and about 22 for women—an increase of nearly two full years each since the 1950s. Among women aged 25 to 29, one in five has never been married, versus one out of ten in 1960.

Why the delay? Demographer Kingsley Davis has cited, among other reasons, the lackluster state of the U.S. economy. Some young couples, he suggests, lack the financial security to launch a family, as happened during the Depression when the average age of first marriage was roughly as high as it is today. Unfortunately, the role of economics is one variable that family researchers have trouble documenting. Even when common sense points to it as a factor, it is difficult to “disaggregate” economics from other underlying variables, such as race, class, and education.

More persuasive explanations of the rising age of first marriage center around changing social values. Most men and women are now sexually experienced before the conclusion of adolescence; they don't need to get married simply to enjoy sex. Effective contraception, if employed, virtually eliminates the

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chance of an unwanted pregnancy, a fear (or reality) which in the past encouraged (or forced) some early marriages. For some youths, living together may make marriage seem less urgent, at least for a while. Moreover, a higher average age of marriage has historically been associated with higher educational levels, and the U.S. population, in particular the young population, is more educated than ever before. Finally, as I have already noted, the increasing number of ambitious young women looking first to their careers may also help shift the average age of marriage upwards.*

Divorce

Despite the impression often left by the media, the proportion of teen-age marriages has *declined* over the past decade. Those who do marry in their teens, however, are most likely to get divorced. Women who marry at ages 14 to 17 are twice as likely to get divorced as women who marry at ages 18 or 19, who in turn are one and one-half times as likely to get divorced as women who marry in their early twenties, for whom divorce rates are high to begin with. Men who marry in their teens are about twice as likely to get divorced as men who marry in their twenties. Interrupted education, poor job prospects, lack of money, basic immaturity, parental opposition, early (if not premarital) pregnancy—the factors behind the failure rate are clear to everyone except, perhaps, the teen-agers involved.

Teen-age married couples may be especially divorce-prone, but divorce, of course, is not just a teen-age phenomenon. There are now more than 1 million divorces in America each year, involving more than 2 million adults and 1 million children. (There are some 48 million married couples in the United States.) While the upsurge in divorce during the past two decades is finally slowing—the rate had more than doubled since 1960 from about 9 to more than 20 divorces annually per 1,000 married couples—there is nothing to suggest that the rate will actually decline. At best it will level off.

Divorce hits all social groups, but not equally. Divorce rates are considerably higher for blacks than for whites. Although divorce can strike couples of any age and circumstance, those who get a divorce tend to do so relatively early in their marriages. (Paradoxically, many couples who remain married say

*Some of the delay is also accounted for by a demographic wrinkle called the "marriage squeeze." On average, women marry men a few years older than themselves. When the first wave of Baby-Boom women (those born after 1945) hit marrying age in the late 1960s, the pool of older, "eligible" bachelors (men born *before* the Baby Boom) was relatively small.

that their happiest years were those statistically vulnerable early ones.) Generally speaking, the lower the educational level, the higher the divorce rate.

What weight to assign various economic factors—e.g., job stability, income level, welfare availability—is still a matter of dispute. Consider the controversial proposition that “welfare breaks up marriages”—a seemingly plausible hypothesis given that welfare benefits for an intact family are lower than they are for a female-headed family. Dozens of researchers have tested this notion. They have variously found that: the proposition is true; is false; is true for blacks but not whites; is true for whites but not blacks. Some contend that welfare has no effect on divorce rates but *does* delay remarriage; others suggest that some ineffable “third variable” may account for going on welfare *and* getting divorced.*

Who Stays Married?

What is the profile of the couple *least* likely to divorce? The wife would have married in her late twenties and would have a B.A. degree, but no more. (Women with graduate degrees have a disproportionately high divorce rate, perhaps owing to a greater sense of economic security and social independence.) The husband would also have a B.A. and would likewise have married in his late twenties. Both would be white and upper-middle-class, and would eventually become the parents of two boys or a boy and a girl (not two girls), with the eldest child born a couple of years after the wedding. Their chances of divorce would be lessened further if they lived in the countryside, were of the same religion, and went to church regularly.

Whatever the roots of marital success or failure, if one assumes that the divorce rate will remain relatively constant over the next couple of decades, then between one-third and two-fifths of all *first* marriages formed during the late 1970s are destined to end in divorce. Considering the whole potential cycle of divorce, remarriage, and redi-*vi*orce, it is probable that between 40 and 50 percent of *all* marriages formed by today’s young adults will not remain intact.

If there is a silver lining, it is that approximately half of those who get divorced do so relatively early in their marriages, often before they have children. The spouses, moreover, are rejecting an *unsuccessful relationship*; they are usually not rejecting the *idea of marriage or family per se*. Many of them, in fact,

*For a concise overview of the debate, see “The Effects of Welfare on Marital Stability and Remarriage” by Stephen J. Bahr, in *Journal of Marriage and the Family* (August 1979).

look forward to a "traditional" family life the next time around. The data on remarriage speak volumes. Approximately 25 percent of divorced persons remarry within a year following termination of a first marriage; 50 percent do so within three years; 80 percent of them do so ultimately. Samuel Johnson once called second marriages "the triumph of hope over experience." It would appear that many Americans are more hopeful about the family than some of the experts.

In any event, divorce may not be the worst of evils, at least for the adults involved. We do not have much hard data on the subject, but a reading of Brontë's *Jane Eyre* or James's *Ambassadors* recalls the tragedy of some 19th-century marriages that obdurately remained intact. There is no evidence that the quality of U.S. marriages has declined (or improved) during the past century—only that Americans have become more willing and able to seek a divorce if a marriage fails to meet expectations.

... And the Children?

Much of our basic uneasiness about family instability stems from legitimate concern about what happens to the children—and, as a result, to society as a whole. Three in five divorcing couples have at least one child under 18 years of age. During the late 1970s, an average of two children were involved in every divorce in which there were any children at all under age 18. The impact of family disruption on children cannot be ignored, even when the divorce is amicable, and the custodial arrangement problem-free. Psychologist Mavis E. Hetherington has catalogued the problems that children sometimes experience following divorce: psychological stress, promiscuity, drug abuse, suicidal tendencies, guilt. Divorce may be especially hard on an only child.

Yet, Hetherington and others argue that it is far better for a child to grow up in a loving home with one parent than in a domestic battleground with two. Moreover, children are remarkably resilient, often evincing an uncanny ability to roll with the punches. Although no one suggests that divorce is actually *good* for children, just how much impact marital instability has on a child's emotional development and on his development as a young adult is one of those issues that divides scholars. But no one denies that a financial trauma attends most divorce actions, since divorced mothers who retain custody of their children usually experience economic hardship.

The number of households with children maintained by a man or (usually) a woman with no spouse present increased

THE BLACK FAMILY'S SPECIAL PLIGHT

Early in 1965, Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan issued his controversial report on *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*. Looking at three warning signs—nearly a quarter of urban black marriages were dissolved; nearly a quarter of black families were headed by females; nearly a quarter of black births were illegitimate—he concluded that “the Negro family in the urban ghettos is crumbling.”

That general prediction has proven correct: During the past 15 years, those three rates have almost doubled (see charts on p. 128).

The black family was not always in such bad shape. Although Moynihan argued that the horrors of American slavery had broken the black family, historian Herbert Gutman has since found in the black family of the late 19th and early 20th centuries a stability comparable to that of white families. In New York City in 1925, for example, two parents were present in 85 percent of all black homes.

What went wrong, and when? Theories vary. There are no conclusive answers. Gutman blames the great 1940–70 exodus from the rural South to the cities, and high urban unemployment. But this popular “urbanization thesis” has yet to be tested by a sociological comparison of the effects of migration on poor whites and blacks.

Researchers such as the Urban League’s Robert Hill point to continuing economic pressures as the prime villain. In 1969, black households had a median income of \$6,063, or 61 percent of the median white income. Nine years later the figure for black families was \$10,879, or 59 percent of white income.

Yet, when economic factors are held constant, black families are still less stable than white families. Of all white households living on

from 3.2 to 5.7 million during the 1970s, thanks both to divorce and to the escalating number of births outside of marriage, particularly to women in their teens.* Black women are three times as likely as white women to head up a single-parent household. Households maintained by a married couple declined slightly

*Some 600,000 children are born to U.S. teen-agers every year, and more than 40 percent of them are illegitimate. Blacks are far more likely than whites to have a premarital pregnancy, but whites are more likely than blacks to have an abortion or rush into marriage as a result. (Approximately 75 percent of white children and 94 percent of black children born out of wedlock are kept by their mothers.) One Urban Institute study, *Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancy and Childbearing*, has found that “mothers whose first child was born out of wedlock are more likely to receive welfare” than their married counterparts. On the other hand, the authors note that there is no evidence to support the frequent charge that the availability of welfare encourages premarital teen-age pregnancies. Nor does the availability of “family planning services”—i.e., contraceptive advice—foster promiscuity. Not surprisingly, the use of contraception does correlate with a lower incidence of teen-age pregnancy.

less than \$5,000 a year in 1977, one-third were headed by a single parent. For blacks, the rate was two-thirds. And even among middle-class blacks, single-parent families occurred at triple the rate for whites (13.7 percent versus 4.6 percent).

Black family breakups, argue some sociologists, are caused by persistent racism. Yet, by most measures, blacks have made gains in access to voting, education, jobs, and government aid since 1965—even as the black family's stability has worsened.

Contrasting the general socioeconomic success of black West Indian immigrants with the continuing "underclass" status of many native-born blacks, UCLA's Thomas Sowell concludes that racism *alone* cannot explain the disparities between blacks and whites. He suggests that a culture of "regimented dependence," inherited from Southern slavery and reinforced by the welfare state, is to blame. But that, again, is more of a guess than an answer. So is the "culture of poverty" explanation, which does little more than slap a label on the depressing statistics.

To call the black family "pathological," some critics say, is to impose "white values." Evidence of cultural differences does exist. A wide-ranging "kinship system" would explain why 15 percent of all black children are taken in by siblings, aunts, uncles, or grandparents; but the "extended black family" is probably more an adaptation to difficulty than an inherent strength.

Serious public discussion of the black family's special plight—and the implications for general black advancement—has not been widespread since the Moynihan report. Involving both race and family, the topic is a touchy one. Yet, as several scholars have noted, the statistics clearly indicate that the black family's future is too important a matter to be left to polemicists.

during the 1970s, to 72 percent of all households.

There is no lack of statistics about America's children that give cause for alarm, quite apart from the effects of divorce. Poverty and malnutrition afflict millions of children. So do abuse and neglect: It has been estimated that between 1.4 and 1.9 million American children are victims of one or the other annually. New York State last year spent \$42 million investigating some 52,000 reports of maltreatment of children—85 percent of them neglect cases. The two biggest apparent causes of simple neglect: the rising number of single-parent families, and the increasing entry of mothers into the labor force.

The fact of the matter is that the upbringing of children is often a secondary consideration, even in many intact families. A 1978 Yankelovich poll found that 51 percent of the parents sur-

PARENTS' COSTS OF REARING A CHILD, 1961-78

(estimates for a middle-class child raised in a city in the North Central states)

Age	Food	Clothing	Housing	Medical	Education ^a	Other ^{**}	Total
1-5	\$1,442	\$545	\$2,861	\$389	—	\$2,391	\$7,628
6	306	155	463	75	35	433	1,467
7	380	163	482	79	37	450	1,591
8	399	173	513	85	38	469	1,677
9	420	180	550	90	40	490	1,770
10	504	186	575	96	42	513	1,916
11	525	190	598	99	43	523	1,978
12	631	284	647	103	44	573	2,282
13	794	305	722	112	47	629	2,609
14	860	319	800	126	51	687	2,843
15	883	330	849	138	53	742	2,995
16	1,037	478	941	151	56	866	3,529
17	1,143	495	1,005	164	70	948	3,825
Total	9,324	3,803	11,006	1,707	556	9,714	\$36,110

^aincludes fees, books, and supplies^{**}includes transportation, recreation, reading, and other miscellaneous expenses

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture.

This chart assumes both that the child has no more than four siblings and that he attends public schools.

Three major expenses are not depicted above. One, the cost of having a baby in the hospital, estimated to have been \$1,050 in 1961. Two, the follow-up cost of a college education: In 1979, when this child would have matriculated, one year at a state university cost \$5,000. Three, the potential income a woman forfeits by bearing and rearing a child. The average "lost opportunity" cost of a *first* child is normally about equal to the direct maintenance cost, in this case, \$36,110.

Taxpayers today shoulder much of the burden of rearing some American children. The offspring of teen-agers, for example, often become recipients of government aid. Researchers at SRI International, a California "think tank," estimate that each of the 442,000 first children born to teen-agers in 1979 alone will during his first 20 years of life require an average of \$18,710 extra in public welfare and health expenditures. This adds up to a total tax-supported outlay of \$8.3 billion, just for this "Class of '79."

veyed felt it was all right to send their children to day-care centers in order to give themselves more leisure time. Other polls of the 1970s suggest that many married couples today have a stronger commitment to each other or to their careers than to their children. To what extent such new attitudes may have contributed to the schools' growing problems of drug abuse, indiscipline, and classroom inattention since 1965 remains a matter of conjecture.

What "threats" do the much publicized "alternative" lifestyles pose to the future of the family? It is hard to argue that any alternative arrangement is likely to replace the family as we know it. Such alternatives have always existed, but they have never attracted large numbers of people. (Witness, in the United States, the early communes of the Shakers, Hutterites, Moravians, and the Oneida Community.) Most contemporary communes are short-lived, unless they have a strong ideological basis—or economic base. Even then they are often unstable.

There is certainly greater tolerance of alternatives today than ever before, particularly in the press and, I must add, among family scholars. Most of us have relatives and acquaintances who have never been married, or who are separated, divorced, or remarried, or who are living together outside of marriage. Without too wide a search, one can turn up group marriages, homosexual couples, and single-parent adoptions. Yet those variations that are by far the most common (remarriage, for example) actually build upon the structure and function of the family as we usually define it. The more unusual arrangements remain exceedingly rare.

Blue-Chip Stocks

What topics are likely to command the greatest interest among researchers in the decade to come? Another way of asking the question is: What are the most pressing family problems, and what research is most likely to be funded?

Family violence: This is a matter we still know little about. During the past few years, researchers such as sociologist Murray Straus and his colleagues Richard Gelles and Suzanne Steinmetz have attended to such questions as: What kind of person is most likely to abuse his spouse or child? What kind of child is most likely to become a victim? Do abused children become child abusers in turn? Should violent families be broken up? In 1974, Congress created the National Center for Child Abuse and Neglect, with an appropriation in 1978 of \$19 million. And in December of 1979, the House passed a bill authoriz-

ing \$65 million over a two-year period to aid victims of domestic violence. (The Senate is expected to support the bill.) During the 1980s, we can expect some major studies of family violence.

The *quality of marital relationships* has long been the "blue chip" stock in family studies. This will continue. Some of the important questions: What factors make for a happy marriage? Is *when* one marries more important than *whom* one marries? What is the relationship between marital quality and marital/extramarital sexual behavior? What kinds of marital and family therapies work best?

Room for Humility

The *reciprocal influences between parents and children* will stir one of the up-and-coming theoretical debates. Researchers have generally paid more attention to the impact of parents on children than vice versa. Penn State sociologist Richard Lerner and his colleagues have begun examining the other side of the coin; they are likely to be joined by a growing number of developmental psychologists and family sociologists.

Divorce and all its ramifications are the greatest "institutional" problems facing the American family and its relation to the larger society. This is already a major focus of research—and of chronic debate among radical feminists, "pro-family" advocates, and others. The U.S. National Institute of Mental Health recently issued a request for proposals for projects that would examine the effects of divorce on children. The Institute was willing, the announcement said, to provide \$1 million to fund perhaps seven projects. No less than 136 proposals came in. Related topics such as *remarriage* and *stepparenthood*, which have not been studied extensively, will also get the spotlight.

Reproduction and *fertility* have been growth areas for research during the past two decades. Adolescent sexuality increased dramatically during the 1970s. So did adolescent contraceptive use, but not as fast as sexual activity. No one knows exactly why, but there is plenty of speculative research. The consequences are clear: adolescent pregnancy, abortion, and/or parenthood. These and other issues are being studied in a continuing survey of young American women conducted by Melvin Zelnik and John Kantner at Johns Hopkins University. Another study, the comprehensive National Survey of Family Growth, created in HEW (now the Department of Health and Human Services), is looking into the fertility of American women throughout their reproductive years. We don't know much about the social determinants and consequences of pregnancy or

the impact that number and spacing of children has on a family. The National Institute of Child Health and Human Development is supporting inquiries in all of these areas.

We can also expect to see a growing body of research pertaining to *dual earner families* and the increase in the proportion of *working wives and mothers* in the labor force. Psychologist Lois Hoffman and others have begun work on government-sponsored projects to investigate a variety of issues: What is the relationship between fertility and employment? Do children, in fact, suffer when both parents work? Is a working wife more prone to divorce?

Finally, there has been an explosion of interest in *family demography*, in statistical trends affecting the family—marriage, divorce, remarriage, family economics, and household living arrangements as they vary by race, income, locale, age. One reason is that Congress relies increasingly on just this kind of information when it formulates legislation; bureaucrats use it to draft regulations and “target” financial assistance to the needy; scholars depend on it to identify areas of interest and put narrowly focused research into context. Paul Glick, senior demographer at the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the founding father of family demography, will preside as researchers this summer begin to pick over the results of the 1980 Census.

In short, aside from the highly useful Census “facts,” we can look forward to a bumper crop of research on the causes and effects of family trends during the next few years. How comprehensive—or useful—these analyses will be is another question. Scholars may already be producing more studies than anyone could ever hope to assimilate: A healthy portion of all scholarly articles published on the family every year are actually comprehensive reviews of existing research to help the experts stay abreast of the latest developments.

Moreover, insofar as serious family research may be helpful to Washington policymakers—and much of it is not—there is a considerable lag between academic discoveries and political action. Legislation rarely reflects the *latest* findings. Even if it did, how long would those findings remain valid?

There is, in sum, much room for humility as we continue to explore the dynamics of the American family.



FILLING THE CRACKS


by Mary Jo Bane,
Lee Rainwater, and Martin Rein

On a summer day four years ago, presidential candidate Jimmy Carter promised a strongly "pro-family" White House. "There can be no more urgent priority," he told New Hampshire voters, "than to see that every decision our government takes is designed to honor and support and strengthen the American family." One way Carter proposed to strengthen the family was by requiring all plans for new federal programs—from housing to tax reform—to contain "family impact statements" similar to the "environmental impact statements" demanded by the Environmental Protection Agency.

Little has come of that campaign pledge, largely because no one knows how precisely to measure the effects on families of *current* federal programs, let alone those that do not yet exist. Moreover, the idea of a family "EPA," with all the bureaucracy it would entail, did not sit well with many politicians or their constituents. Still, Carter had a point. Since the 1930s, the federal government—and state and local agencies—have increasingly shouldered such "traditional" family responsibilities as child support, child care, child nutrition, and housing and financial support for the elderly.

Government aid to families in the United States has not gone as far as it has in France or Canada, where the state provides an allowance to parents (originally designed to encourage higher birth rates) for each child in the household. Washington has not sought to match the Soviet Union's much publicized state day-care centers, which enroll 41 percent of Soviet preschoolers. Still absent from the U.S. scene is any counterpart to Sweden's ubiquitous network of social workers who monitor family nutrition, child abuse, and the wants of the elderly. Nor does Washington imitate Scandinavian laws subsidizing "paternity" leaves for fathers of the newborn.

But, by chance or intention, Congress has created a myriad of programs that affect American families as never before. Two years ago, George Washington University's Family Impact Seminar reviewed 1,044 programs listed in the *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance* for fiscal year 1976. It found 268 pro-



From Harper's Weekly, 1868. Reprinted by permission.

"How it would be if some ladies had their own way" was the title of this 1868 Harper's Weekly cartoon. Now that women increasingly have their own way, Washington has had to assume new responsibility for child care.

grams, costing \$180.6 billion and administered by 17 different federal agencies, that had at least "potential" impact on families. Of these, 63 (together worth \$66.0 billion) affected families directly; they ranged from sweeping programs costing billions of dollars (e.g., \$6.9 billion for food stamps) to less costly, but more precisely targeted efforts: \$12 million for family health centers, \$15 million for child welfare research.*

By focusing solely on federal financial assistance, the Seminar excluded numerous other government actions that impinge on American families. The federal income tax code, for example, contains not only deductions for dependents but also what is often called the "marriage penalty." As Isabel Sawhill, then director of the National Commission on Manpower Policy, noted in 1975, "If a man earning \$10,000 a year marries a woman who also earns \$10,000, they will pay an extra \$340 in taxes." Regulatory agency decisions, such as the controversial Federal Trade Commission's proposed 1978 guidelines for television advertising aimed at children, presumably affect families. So, more clearly, do decisions by state courts to grant divorces, place children in foster homes, or commit people to mental hospitals. To the dismay of conservatives, Washington's spending on social insurance and public assistance—e.g., the National School Lunch Program, Medicare, Social Security—has risen

*Toward an Inventory of Federal Programs with Direct Impact on Families, Washington, D.C.: George Washington University Institute for Educational Leadership, 1978.

dramatically since Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society of the 1960s. Total federal, state, and local government social welfare expenditures climbed seven-fold between 1960 and 1977, from \$52 billion to \$362 billion. As a percentage of GNP, these expenditures nearly doubled from 10.5 to 19.7 percent.

While some contend that the government, with its vast outlays for social programs, is usurping family functions, it is more likely that Washington is stepping into a vacuum. American society, after all, is changing. Not every family today can provide the wide range of services performed by families in historian Peter Laslett's long-ago "world we have lost."

Federal aid to families did not emerge, like Minerva, fully grown from the Great Society. Indeed, Washington began giving substantial support to American families as early as 1935, when the Social Security Act was passed. Since then, government benefits for senior citizens have grown dramatically. Of the \$500 billion in the federal budget for fiscal year 1979, over \$150 billion was spent in various ways to help senior citizens.

As the American population becomes proportionately older, federal outlays for the elderly are almost certain to increase. In 1976, 10.7 percent of the U.S. population was at least 65 years old; by the year 2000, the Census Bureau estimates, the figure will be between 11.3 and 12.9 percent, and will continue to grow as the post-World War II Baby-Boom generation ages.

Social Security provided about one-third of the income of Americans over 65 years old in 1976. Forty percent of their income, however, came from their own earnings or that of others in their household. And it is clear that when assets and pensions are added in, over half the income of the elderly comes from private sources. Our own surveys by the MIT/Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies indicate that financial contributions from children are rare and, when they do occur, very small.

Seldom do the elderly share a household with their children. In 1979, only 8.6 percent of men and 20.3 percent of

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A MATTER OF POLITICS

"Family," says presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, is the first of "five short words" forming the heart of his campaign message. (The others: "work, neighborhood, freedom, peace.") Meanwhile, long-time feminist Betty Friedan (*The Feminine Mystique*) announces in the *New York Times Magazine* that the women's liberation movement must advance to "a new frontier: the family." Obviously, the family can no longer be taken for granted as a Fourth of July cliché. It is now a "buzzword," variously interpreted and linked to some of the most emotionally charged issues in current American politics, notably abortion, busing, welfare, classroom prayer, day care, the Equal Rights Amendment, and the rights of homosexuals.

Born of a 1976 Jimmy Carter campaign pledge, this summer's White House Conference on Families and its preliminaries have provided a battleground for groups active on those issues on both Left and Right. A number of "New Right" groups—among them, the National Christian Action Coalition, Family America, and FLAG (Family, Life, America, God)—saw an unholy alliance shaping up among government bureaucrats, social workers, and groups ranging from the National Organization for Women to the National Gay Task Force. So, in August 1979, they formed the "Pro-Family Coalition." Its leader, Connaught Marshner, dismissed as ingenuous the White House claim that the Conference would make the government more sensitive to the family. Rather, she contended, its true purpose was to create "the illusion of a national consensus" on family issues, along moderate-liberal lines.

The battle was joined in late 1979, when state conferences were held to select delegates for the three national meetings scheduled for this summer. In Virginia, last November, the New Right captured 22 of 24 seats. Soon thereafter they swept up all 8 of Oklahoma's delegates. When the governors of Indiana and Alabama withdrew their states from the Conference (Alabama's Forrest H. James said it conflicted with "traditional Judeo-Christian values"), President Carter's aides began to worry about a big Left-Right brawl on TV just before the Democratic national convention. White House control of the Conference perceptibly tightened. Late last spring, the "pro-family" forces estimated that they ultimately won fewer than 30 percent of the slots for the national meetings in Baltimore, Minneapolis, and Los Angeles.

The White House was not, however, happy about the unexpected family feud. "We wish the whole thing would go away," one staffer told the *Wall Street Journal*. "It's been a nightmare." But many on the New Right think the uproar is just beginning. One of them is *Conservative Digest* columnist Paul Weyrich, who predicts that "the family will be to the decade of the 1980s . . . what the Vietnam war was to the 1960s."

A LEGAL MAZE

The American family has been legally regulated at least since 1636, when Puritan authorities ruled that all single persons in the Massachusetts Bay Colony had to live with families. Nearly 350 years later, a maze of federal, state, and local laws—and courts—exist to regulate conflicts between individuals within a household while safeguarding a family's right to privacy.

As early as 1888, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of marriage, which it described as "having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution." But it was not until 1978, in *Zablocki v. Redhail*, that the Court declared that Americans have a fundamental right to marry.

The right to have children has been recognized by the Court since 1942. In 1965, this principle was broadened to include the right *not* to have children when the Court invalidated a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married couples. And in 1973, in *Roe v. Wade*—the decision that declared unconstitutional a Texas law prohibiting nontherapeutic abortions—the Court concluded that the right to procreate was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."

Federal and state courts have largely given parents free rein in raising their children. Education, religion, and moral upbringing are all viewed as domains into which government should not tread. Last December, a Michigan district court judge ruled that a mother who had withheld her children from a public school for religious reasons was entitled to instruct them at home even though she had no state certification as a teacher.

Parental authority is not unlimited, however. Parents cannot keep their "mature minor" children from having abortions or using contraceptives. States are increasingly concerned with child abuse and neglect. Wisconsin, for example, provides that persons who report parents for possible child abuse may not be sued even if their "good faith" reports prove to be unwarranted.

Divorce and child custody—traditionally the major concerns of family law—have been undergoing major transformations as legislatures and courts try to purge laws of sexual bias. Only Illinois, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota still require proof that one spouse is at fault for a divorce to be granted. Most state legislatures allow judges to divide property between divorcing spouses, but laws are increasingly being changed to help ensure "equitable," if not "equal," distribution. Forty states have enacted laws that, in some way, preclude gender as a basis for awarding child custody.

More changes may come as legal authorities conclude that the general courtroom is the wrong place for settling household disputes. One expert's suggestion: creation of separate family courts staffed by specialists.

of their children aged 3 to 13. Even among families with mothers who worked full-time, more than 40 percent of 3-to-5-year-olds and over 50 percent of 6-to-13-year-olds were cared for by their parents, usually the mother.

Parents are helped by a wide variety of paid and unpaid caretakers, including both relatives and friends. Most of these are informal baby-sitting arrangements: Fewer than 10 percent of preschoolers are in formal day-care centers (not including nursery schools) either full- or part-time. Indeed, some surveys have indicated that even when free, organized day care was available to working women, they preferred to make their own informal arrangements.

What Next?

The 1980s may bring a greater shift toward outside arrangements for the care of children. If high divorce rates persist, this trend obviously could be reinforced. In any event, women in their twenties increasingly enter the labor force. By 1990, 70 to 80 percent of women in their twenties through forties may work outside the home. They seem to be showing a greater commitment to their careers, and less to personal childrearing. These women are marrying late, postponing childbirth, and planning to have very small families.

But a shift toward outside-the-home child care, if it happens, does not necessarily mean that family values will be undermined. We don't know what such a shift will do. Sheila B. Kamerman and Alfred J. Kahn, of the Columbia University School of Social Work, argue:

It has yet to be shown that family values have been eroded anywhere by child-care arrangements, whether in nursery schools, centers, or in family-day-care homes. And the parents themselves, insofar as we have information, are overwhelmingly positive about group programs.*

The federal government spent more than \$2.2 billion on a variety of child-care programs in fiscal year 1977, including \$448 million on Head Start, \$500 million on tax credits for work-related child-care expenses, and \$809 million in grants to help states provide day-care centers for children from low- and moderate-income families. Only a small percentage of American

*"The Day-Care Debate: A Wider View" by Kamerman and Kahn, in *The Public Interest* (Winter 1979), p. 81. A more critical analysis is "Parental Evaluation of Child Care Alternatives" by Laura Lein, in *The Urban and Social Change Review* (Winter 1979).

children were served by these programs.

Thus, a national day-care program for preschoolers, long advocated by congressional liberals, would be extremely expensive, but there is a possibility of some trade-offs. If "welfare mothers" now receiving AFDC payments could put their children in public day-care centers, they might be able to work full-time, thus reducing their need for food stamps and other subsidies. But again, estimates vary, and the debate continues.

Government income supplements for one-parent families will almost certainly continue, of course, as will income guarantees for the elderly. Responsibilities for caring for the oldest and youngest members of our society—particularly the poor—will continue to be shared. Civilization means, in part, that people are not allowed to starve or live in dire need. The United States, through financial assistance programs, has dedicated itself to collectively filling in the cracks when individual responsibility—or capability—fails.

It is certainly possible for government to do more to *enhance* the family's ability to survive. It could provide more income security for poor *two*-parent families with children. Tax laws could be rewritten to remove "marriage penalties." The school day could be lengthened to eight hours, as it is in many countries, to keep children productively occupied while parents are at work. Adoptions could be subsidized to help foster parents make their foster children into full family members. And welfare laws could be revised. Despite two decades of attempted reform, 26 states—including Alaska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Virginia—still deny welfare to mothers with young children unless the father has left home; "in effect," says Sidney Johnson, director of the Family Impact Seminar, "families are encouraged *not* to stay together."

Recent history has shown that government—through Social Security, AFDC, food stamps—can take over the task, at least in part, of financial support for the elderly and for needy children without destroying family ties and responsibilities. Government and families have formed a partnership to care for American society's neediest members. The challenge for the future is to make that partnership work.



BACKGROUND BOOKS

THE AMERICAN FAMILY

Ever since Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels called for its abolition in *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), the family has been the subject (sometimes, the target) of scholars, reformers, and ideologues.

In *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* (1884; International, 1972, paper), Engels contends that the family evolved from communal group marriages in prehistoric times to the competitive (read capitalist) male-headed households of the 19th century.

French historian Phillipe Ariès emphasizes personal rather than economic relations in his influential *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life* (Knopf, 1962, cloth; Vintage, 1965, paper). Drawing on such clues as 16th-century aristocrats' family portraits and 17th-century middle-class clothing, he finds that the concept of "childhood" is a relatively recent one.

In the medieval world, children worked and played with adults. The introduction of day schools in the 15th century took children out of apprenticeships and returned them to the home. There they became the hub of new self-contained households consisting solely of two generations—the parents and their offspring. These "nuclear" families were, by the 18th century, commonplace among the bourgeoisie of northern Europe. Change came later to the lower classes.

The exploitation of child labor during the Industrial Revolution was, suggests Ariès, an anachronistic continuation of medieval practice.

Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Carl Degler picks up the story in the mid-18th century, where Ariès leaves off, and brings it to this side of the Atlantic in *At Odds: Women and the Family in America from the Revolution to the Present* (Oxford, 1980).

Caught up in the ferment of the colonial Revolution, and emboldened by the responsibilities they shouldered while their husbands were away at war, American women began to demand a greater voice. During the 19th century, their efforts took the form of "social feminism" (e.g., the Women's Christian Temperance Union); in the 20th century, militant females first launched the women's suffrage movement and then the recent women's liberation movement, with its calls for absolute equality of the sexes.

This evolution has not, however, weakened the family, Degler argues. With both parents relieved of the need to provide the services now offered by teachers, bakers, doctors, and tailors, the family, he says, is able to concentrate on what it can do best—fostering affection between husband and wife and raising children in an atmosphere of love.

Not all scholars are so optimistic. In *All Our Children: The American Family Under Pressure* (Harcourt, 1977, cloth; Harvest, 1978, paper), MIT psychologist Kenneth Keniston and the Carnegie Council on Children survey the troubles that undercut some contemporary American families. Extreme poverty increases by two-thirds the odds of a baby dying during its first year; the aver-

age American child spends more time watching television than he does with either his parents or teachers; one in 20 teenagers has a "drinking problem." Keniston proposes strong government programs to remedy unemployment, redistribute wealth, and expand family health and legal services.

Some social critics see Keniston's solutions as part of the problem. University of Rochester historian Christopher Lasch is one. He maintains, in **Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged** (Basic, 1977, cloth; paper, 1979), that the state and the "helping professions" have usurped families' authority. Psychiatrists tell mothers how to care for babies; educators raise and train children, and social workers advise on just about everything else. The result, says Lasch, is parents unable to direct their own lives or those of their children.

French sociologist Jacques Donzelot provides a variation on Lasch's theme in **The Policing of Families** (Pantheon, 1980, cloth & paper). After the post-medieval family withdrew its children into the home, he relates, modern society followed it in off the street. The result: a compromise. The family was charged, via legislation concerning everything from child labor to unsanitary housing, with civic duties (e.g., to raise healthy, obedient citizens), and society was made familial (providing centers for schooling and health care).

Not all family problems are mediated (or complicated) by legislation. Boring work and low pay for breadwinners place heavy strains on today's blue-collar family, reports Berkeley sociologist Lillian Breslow Rubin. Her **Worlds of Pain: Life in the Working-Class Family** (Basic,

1976, cloth; 1977, paper) summarizes interviews with 50 white San Francisco-area working-class families and with 25 middle-class families. Many working-class parents who married as teenagers age quickly; "when I was young" is a refrain repeatedly heard from mothers and fathers in their twenties.

Equally direct is **Trying Out the Dream: A Year in the Life of an American Family** (Lippincott, 1975). Sympathetic but unsentimental, author Paul Wilkes finds that the "Neumeyers," a statistically average suburban family, do not conform to the widely-held "Ozzie and Harriet" image of wholesome tranquility. The parents deplore their offspring's freedom and use of marijuana; the children feel like strangers in their own home; and everybody fights at Christmas.

Journalist Susan Sheehan crisply portrays the life of **A Welfare Mother** (Houghton, 1976, cloth; New American Library, 1977, paper) as "a series of accidents, both happy and unhappy." Despite the crime and squalor surrounding her, this promiscuous Puerto Rican mother seems to Sheehan as content as a suburban housewife. More than 700 letters, reports, and forms fill her New York City Department of Social Services file; she sometimes finds complying with welfare regulations as arduous as a full-time job.

Legal regulations are a manifestation of "the persisting tension between family and public values," maintains one Harvard professor of education. In **Here to Stay: American Families in the Twentieth Century** (Basic, 1976, cloth; 1978, paper), Mary Jo Bane discusses how society's interests (e.g., the prevention of child abuse) come into conflict with family privacy.

Pointing to the debates over day care, abortion, and divorce reform, Bane contends that the chief family-related issue facing Americans is reconciling women's liberation with family stability. It will be best resolved, she suggests, if the government sticks to enforcing women's rights in the marketplace and leaves the resulting shifts in family roles (such as "provider" and "head of family") to be worked out privately.

Europeans see the family somewhat differently. In **Family Policy: Government and Families in Fourteen Countries** (Columbia, 1978, cloth & paper), editors Sheila Kamerman and Alfred Kahn of Columbia University's School of Social Work report that distrust of government invasion of family privacy is not much of a problem in Scandinavia or in Germany and France: Since child subsidy programs are usually applied universally, there is no need for governments to monitor eligibility or ferret out fraud.

The last decade has brought noteworthy changes in Eastern European views on the family. Until the liberalization of the early 1970s, Polish authorities assumed that the family—like all of society's burdens—would eventually disappear in the socialist world. Now communist academics and bureaucrats have come to believe that the family is here to stay, and that its problems must be dealt with: Nurseries are

being expanded; working mothers are now given maternity and child-care leave.

European families who immigrated to the United States underwent a gradual assimilation spanning several generations. Their story is told in **Ethnic Families in America: Patterns and Variations** (Elsevier, 1976, cloth & paper), edited by Charles Mindel and Robert Habenstein. One of the most obvious changes among immigrants has been in family size. In 1910, for example, when all white American women had families averaging 3.4 children, Polish-American mothers averaged 5.9. Two generations later the Polish-American average was 2.8, a figure close to the national mean.

Thus third- and fourth-generation ethnic families come to resemble the American norm: "Small, mobile, and independent," writes Rudy Ray Seward. In **The American Family: A Demographic History**, (Sage, 1978, cloth & paper), the North Texas State University sociologist looks at U.S. census records and finds the American family a remarkably sturdy institution. Despite all the cries of crisis in the family, Seward concludes that, in terms of size and organization, the American family of 1970 was not much different from the American family of 100 years earlier. This year's census will tell us whether the same can be said of America's families in 1980.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Some of the titles in this essay were suggested by Arlene Skolnick and Wilson Center Fellow Laura Nader.

CURRENT BOOKS

FELLOWS' CHOICE

Recent titles selected and reviewed by Fellows of the Wilson Center

**THE PAPERS OF DWIGHT
DAVID EISENHOWER**

(Vols. 6-9)

6. Occupation, 1945

edited by Alfred Chandler, Jr.
and Louis Galambos

7-9. The Chief of Staff

edited by Louis Galambos

Johns Hopkins, 1978

2517 pp. \$85 (4-vol. set)

The War Years, volumes 1-5 of Dwight Eisenhower's collected papers, confirmed Thomas Hardy's view that war makes "rattling good history." This second well-edited set, alas, finds Ike mired in the postwar tedium of occupation duty in defeated Germany, followed by 26 months of daily frustration as chief of staff in Washington, presiding over the dismantling of the recently victorious U.S. Army. No longer is Ike choosing commanders or deciding Allied strategy. Now he is preoccupied with policies for training troops awaiting discharge and for disposing of surplus property (including 91 Miami Beach hotels). Eisenhower put it succinctly in a letter to his son: The Pentagon "was a sorry place to light after having commanded a theater of war." On the larger issues, Ike's days as chief of staff bore bitter fruit. His hopes for complete unification of the U.S. military services were dashed by the 1947 National Security Act, which created a kind of federation under the titular leadership of the Secretary of Defense. The new Joint Chiefs of Staff arrangement failed to eliminate interservice feuds. And his program for universal military training was rejected by Congress. For all the disappointments associated with this period of Eisenhower's career, one aspect of his personality remained undiminished—he was "Old Army" to the core. Ike was meticulous in his personal correspondence and careful to duly note important events—birthdays, promotions, awards—in the lives of his colleagues and friends. Although it is true of his writing that the higher the level of abstraction, the less he shines, at the personal level, and in dealing with day-to-day problems, he was superb.

—David MacIsaac ('79)

**SOVIET INTERVENTION
IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA,
1968: Anatomy of a Decision**
by Jiri Valenta
Johns Hopkins, 1979
208 pp. \$12

When communist Czechoslovakia embarked upon democratic reforms for several turbulent months during the "Prague Spring" of 1968, most Soviet leaders, to a greater or lesser degree, clearly saw their country's own security in jeopardy. After examining the Soviet press and interviewing former Czech officials, Valenta, a Czech political scientist now teaching in America, has sought to reconstruct the lengthy Kremlin debate that ended in a decision to invade Czechoslovakia in August 1968. On the domestic front, bureaucrats, such as P. E. Shelest, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, worried that "deviate" ideas in Eastern Europe would encourage nationalist movements in the USSR's non-Russian republics; the KGB feared that the Czech example would galvanize Soviet dissidents. Within the military, at least one Soviet general pointed to the Czech Army's low morale as a threat to discipline among Warsaw Pact forces. On the other side, Soviet foreign-affairs specialists argued that an invasion would jeopardize accommodation between Communists and Socialists in Western Europe. And China, they warned, would be driven closer to America. The result, reports Valenta: a "bureaucratic tug-of-war ending in shaky compromises and trade-offs between various elements in the Politburo." Valenta's story is as complex as it is intriguing; it should not be missed by those who seek a better understanding of Soviet purposes in world affairs.

—Franklyn J. C. Griffiths ('79)

**HERBERT HOOVER: The
Great War and Its After-
math, 1914–23**
edited by Lawrence E.
Gelfand
Univ. of Iowa, 1979
242 pp. \$17.95

Many Americans still remember Herbert Hoover only as the "Great Depression President" of 1929–33. Yet, earlier, before he acquired his reputation as a bumbling reactionary, his contemporaries considered Hoover one of the ablest and most progressive public men of the century—as this collection of eight essays reminds us. The former mining engineer's accomplishments as head of the Commission for the Relief of Belgium (1914–

18), as U.S. Food Administrator (1917-19), and as director-general of the American Relief Administration in Europe (1919-20) made him the best-known American, next to Woodrow Wilson, to emerge from World War I. Democrats and Republicans alike courted him as a presidential candidate in 1920. The most incisive reassessments of Hoover in this volume focus on his social and economic perceptions. Writes historian Carl Parrini: "Hoover's political economy proved to be a failure not because he did not understand the social system of Western Europe and North America, but because he expected the elites within the system to act in a socially responsible way, eschewing short-run profit and seeking the long-run stabilization of the system." Hoover's belief in voluntarism and in limits to government intervention in domestic affairs won him enormous respect during and immediately after World War I. Ironically, as he applied his once-successful, once-popular ideas to the Depression crisis, he failed as President.

—Joan Hoff Wilson ('80)

THE NATURAL MAN OBSERVED: A Study of Catlin's Indian Gallery
by William H. Truettner
Smithsonian, 1979
323 pp. \$40

**GEORGE CATLIN:
Episodes from Life Among
the Indians and
Last Rambles**
edited by Marvin C. Ross
Univ. of Okla., 1959; reissue,
1979; 354 pp. \$25

In 1830, George Catlin, a 34-year-old Connecticut artist who had encountered only modest success as a portrait painter, went west. For six years, he journeyed among the tribes of the upper Missouri region. He captured on canvas a whole culture—tribal chiefs and their families, Indian games, dances, and religious rituals. Truettner, a curator at the National Collection of Fine Arts, provides an illustrated account of Catlin's travels and artistic accomplishment, set against a 19th-century backdrop of growing interest in natural history. Having produced 607 works, Catlin exhibited his "Indian Gallery" in Northeastern cities in 1837 and, in 1840, in England, where it was a success. In 1841, he published *Letters and Notes*, a two-volume potpourri of drawings and rambling text that remains a basic source on Plains Indian culture. After Catlin, observes Truettner, "no self-respecting artist could paint Indian life



Courtesy of The American Museum of Natural History.

without venturing forth from his eastern studio."

For years, Catlin borrowed against the potential value of his paintings with the expectation that the U.S. government would purchase them. It did not. In 1852, he was jailed for bad debts. His canvases were rescued by a Philadelphia locomotive manufacturer. Out of jail, his wife and son dead, Catlin traveled to South America. He painted Indians from Tierra del Fuego to the coast of Alaska. By 1857, he had assembled another collection of 600 works and had published two children's books about his experiences. Art historian Ross has gathered many sketches and paintings from this second phase of Catlin's life and presents whimsical selections from his writings. Catlin died in 1872 convinced that his life was a failure.

—Richard Bartlett ('80)

**A SHORT HISTORY OF
MODERN GREECE**

by Richard Clogg
Cambridge, 1979
241 pp. \$26 cloth,
\$8.95 paper

At a time when the West seems to be losing power and influence, the Greek experience illustrates the persistence of both national identity and the democratic ideal. Having shed military rule in 1974 and joined the Common Market in 1978, Greece is today a partner of Western Europe. Such has not always been the case, as British historian Clogg relates in this brisk history. After the Ottoman Turks put an end to the 1,000-year Byzantine Empire in 1453, the conquered Greeks were, for nearly 400 years, subjected to often harsh Islamic laws and virtually cut off from Europe. Only with the weakening of the Ottoman Empire in central Europe during the 18th century did Greeks resume trade with the West. The growing numbers of middle-class merchants proved extremely patriotic; they supplied funds for community schools and libraries and support for a nationalist revival and, eventually, an independence movement. During the early 1800s, the Greeks, inspired partly by the French Revolution, rebelled, gaining their freedom from Turkey in 1821. The new state embraced only some 750,000 of the more than 2 million

Greeks under Ottoman rule. Through the 19th century and until World War II, the driving ideology in Greek politics was the "Great Idea"—the goal, never completely realized, of bringing under one nation all the territories inhabited by Greeks. Through revolutions, Nazi occupation, civil war (1946–49), domestic repression, and clashes with Turkey over Cyprus, the Greeks have remained a stubborn people who refuse to settle for less than their ancient heritage of *demokratia* and freedom.

—Vlad Georgescu ('80)

VIABLE DEMOCRACY

by Michael Margolis

Penguin, 1979

211 pp. \$3.95 (paper only)

The Good Citizen is rational, public-spirited, and well informed, according to traditional democratic theory. Even if all citizens matched this image (and studies abound to show they do not), many scholars argue that the work of managing the economy and protecting the environment has now become so complex that only specialists are competent to make the right choices. Margolis, a University of Pittsburgh political scientist, disagrees. He believes that a democracy where leaders and citizens continuously consult is still possible if reforms are made. Among other things, he proposes a network of computers (placed in private homes and linked to cable television) to provide citizens with instant, detailed information—supplied by the government and large corporate bureaucracies—on all subjects relating to public policy. Users would pay the costs. Toll-free public access in libraries would allow the less affluent to participate. Citizens then could make inquiries, offer opinions, and exchange data. (Margolis does not suggest that the system be used for "daily plebiscites" or "instant democracy," but simply to "provide equal opportunity for every citizen to gather information and express himself.") Margolis does not envisage a utopian transformation of U.S. politics via technology. He does, however, introduce some provocative ideas for making government more accessible.

—Peter Singer ('79)

NEW TITLES

History

FIN DE SIÈCLE VIENNA:
Politics and Culture
 by Carl E. Schorske
 Knopf, 1980
 378 pp. \$15.95

No sooner did Vienna's well-to-do professionals, academics, and merchants come into power in Austria's new parliament in the late 1860s than they lost all hope of enjoying the rewards. An entrenched Hapsburg nobility ridiculed their liberal republicanism and rebuffed their advances into high society. After the legislators broadened the franchise, lower-class Slavic nationalists, Pan-German anti-Semites, and Christian Socialists mixed parliamentary maneuvers with mass demonstrations and street brawls to paralyze the government. "The Viennese upper middle class," observes Princeton historian Schorske, "reigned though it could not rule." Out of that predicament, however, came an incredible explosion in the arts. As an escape—and, perhaps, to assert their dominance in the intellectual arena, if nowhere else—the city's *haute bourgeoisie* cultivated a passionate interest in the support of art. They took comfort in Freud's oedipal and sexual explanations of behavior. Freud, posits Schorske, provided "an a-historical theory of man and society that could make bearable a political world spun out of orbit and beyond control." Gustav Klimt's sexually explicit paintings mirrored Freud's dream theories; Otto Wagner broke with his spiritual fathers to design modernistic buildings; Arnold Schönberg's atonal music fled the diatonic scale. Even as Vienna's social fabric unraveled, its artists leaped ahead into the 20th century.

CHINA AND THE WEST:
Society and Culture,
1815–1937
 by Jerome Ch'en
 Ind. Univ., 1980
 488 pp. \$22.50

Starting with Marco Polo, Westerners viewed the Chinese as dishonest, and the Chinese saw Europeans as barbarous. The situation changed—somewhat—in the period 1815–1937. This era of increased trade and travel between the Chinese and the British, French, and Americans, asserts York University histo-

From *China and the West*.

rian Ch'en, was marked by "a Western chorus denigrating China and a Chinese chorus lauding the West." Military defeats (suffered at the hands of the British, French, and Japanese) and exposure to the Western debate over the evolutionary nature of societies (via the first Mandarin translations of Herbert Spencer, John Stuart Mill, and Thomas Huxley) prompted China's leaders to question the viability of their own rule. Manchu lords and, after 1911, Sun Yat-sen and his successor, Chiang Kai-shek, yearned to emulate the aggressive and powerful West. Both the old Manchus and the republicans failed. Their unyielding loyalty to patriarchal Confucianism, with its emphasis on harmony and order, simply protected "the status quo," contends Ch'en. Meanwhile, the spectacle of the Western world coming apart during World War I disillusioned many Chinese intellectuals. In a 1923 Peking National University popularity poll, Lenin received 227 votes; Woodrow Wilson, 51. Chiang futilely experimented with Western-style reforms, mainly, the centralization of governmental power. At the same time, Chinese communists organized and trained for guerrilla action, and war with Japan loomed ahead.

LEOPOLD II OF THE BELGIANS:
King of Colonialism
 by Barbara Emerson
 St. Martin's, 1980
 324 pp. \$25

"To be a great person," Leopold II once remarked, "is not necessarily the same as being a good person." Historian Emerson's colorful biography depicts the Belgian king, who began his reign in 1865 at age 30, as shrewd and audacious—but too big for his homeland. An artful diplomat, Leopold kept his country from being annexed by powerful neighbors, notably France's Napoleon III, who regarded Belgium as a "ripe pear." At home he built up the Army and beautified Belgium's cities. But his real ambitions lay overseas. Leopold sought to buy or rent a score of Asian colonies—from Borneo to Formosa to Indochina—before deciding "to find out discreetly whether there is anything doing in Africa." With the help of American journalist-explorer H. M. Stanley, he established the

Congo Free State in 1885 as his personal fiefdom (the Belgian government *per se* was not involved) and precipitated the European "Scramble for Africa." Spurred by the 1888 invention of the pneumatic tire, Leopold exploited the rubber-rich, million-square-mile Congo as his private plantation, employing what amounted to slave labor. His reputation was deservedly (and permanently) blackened after Roger Casement, England's consul in the Congo, published a report describing Leopold's atrocities. The embarrassed Belgian parliament finally wrested jurisdiction over the hapless colony from the king in 1908. Leopold died, bitter and reviled, a year later.

Contemporary Affairs

TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA

by Duncan Wilson
Cambridge, 1980
269 pp. \$24.95

"We are developing socialism in our country in somewhat different forms," Josip Broz Tito informed Stalin in 1948 when Yugoslavia and Moscow parted ways. Since then, Yugoslavia's ethnically diverse federation of six republics and two autonomous provinces has adopted some decidedly noncommunist policies: limited private enterprise, open borders, nominal nonalignment in world affairs. Wilson—British ambassador to Yugoslavia (1964–68) and to Russia (1968–71)—faithfully details the internal party debates (there have been three constitutions since 1953) and regional rivalries in a country some inhabitants have called "Progressive Wonderland." Tito—strong, pragmatic, and clever—generally stayed above the fray, intervening in governmental reorganizations only when they were well along their way, or when he felt they had become too liberal. And after Tito? The USSR will be cautious, avoiding direct intervention without abandoning its long-standing aim of returning Yugoslavia to the Soviet camp, says Wilson. Domestic economic policies may eventually cause Yugoslavia more trouble. As the industrial North (Croatia and Slovenia) has prospered from

increased trade with Western Europe, the poorer South (Bosnia and Macedonia) has intensified its demands for central control of the economy. Any attempt by Belgrade to wield a Soviet-style "firm hand" in economic affairs could well bring a resurgence of virulent ethnic feuds and the weakening of an untested central leadership.

**MONEY ON THE MOVE:
The Modern International
Capital Market**

by M. S. Mendelsohn
McGraw-Hill, 1980
291 pp. \$16.50

During the late 1970s, about half the loans going to finance international trade imbalances were supplied by the world's 40 to 50 major private banks. Such countries as Italy, Poland, Mexico, and Brazil depended on the international capital market for 50 to 100 percent of the foreign funds needed to offset their chronic deficits. Mendelsohn, a British financial journalist, has penned a highly readable account of the workings of the Eurocurrency market. It informs the layman as it interests the specialist. He begins with the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement (which created a system of set exchange rates anchored to a fixed gold price); traces the growth, during the '60s and '70s, of an alternative unregulated banking system that permits a country (and/or its businesses) to borrow from its own banks the currencies of other countries; then neatly cuts through the complexities of Eurobonds and Eurocredits, now the main components of the Eurocurrency system. Careful always to give both sides of a controversy, Mendelsohn maintains that the current international banking system—in contrast to the less flexible economic policies of governments—contributes only marginally to world financial instability.

**STRANGERS AND
PILGRIMS: The Last Italian
Migration**

by Ann Cornelisen
Holt, 1980
304 pp. \$12.95

Some 600,000 Italian *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers) lead relatively prosperous lives in West Germany. As Common Market citizens, they cannot be arbitrarily displaced from their new homes. Hired as construction workers and factory hands, they pay taxes and are eligible for health care and unem-

ployment insurance. They do not easily assimilate into German society; but neither is there much room for them in the shriveled peasant economy of southern Italy, where most of them originate. Journalist Cornelisen, author of *Women of the Shadows* (1976), spent a year interviewing peasant emigrants from the poverty-ridden town of Torregreca. In Offenback, West Germany, she found Anna, a department-store clerk, and Franco, a mason, basking in their material comforts—"indirect lighting, velvet upholstery"—but lonely. There is no close-knit Italian community in Offenback (nor in most German cities). And the German government's position is plain: Germany is "not a country of immigration." Citizenship is kept "carefully out of reach"; there is little attempt to bridge the language gap. Most of Cornelisen's subjects talk of returning to their birthplace as well-to-do gentry. Although he has lived in Germany since 1965, Gaetano, who is not yet 50 and who still speaks little German, is one such dreamer. "No man," he says, "wants to die a stranger among strangers." But Torregreca's population has decreased by half over the last decade. Gaetano may go home, but he will not find much to keep him there.

**LIFE CHANCES:
Approaches to Social and
Political Theory**
by Ralf Dahrendorf
Univ. of Chicago, 1980
173 pp. \$15

"The case for inequality"—or, as Dahrendorf, director of the London School of Economics, sees it, for liberty—is argued in this difficult but lively philosophical treatise. "Hope springs from differences rather than sameness, and liberty from inequality rather than equality," Dahrendorf reflects. Progress is born of each individual's drive to improve his position in life. Existing inequalities—a boss with a higher salary, a neighbor with a bigger house—show it can be done. As Western governments shift their sights from equality of opportunity to equality of results, they will cease to be a force for change and betterment in the lives of their citizens. Dahrendorf would promote "differentiation rather than integration in education, tax relief rather than further relief of income differentials,

success in industry rather than subsidies for those in trouble, incentives for individual mobility, geographical and otherwise."

Arts & Letters

**THE LETTERS OF
GUSTAV FLAUBERT**

edited by Francis
Steegmüller
Harvard, 1980
250 pp. \$12.50

"May I die like a dog rather than hurry by a single sentence that isn't ripe!" Not only sentences obsessed French novelist Gustav Flaubert (1821-80). Words were his passion. The author of *Madame Bovary* did not believe in synonyms; he would anguish for hours searching for "*le seul mot juste*," the only right word. Most of the letters collected in this first of two volumes are opinionated discourses on art and writing. The majority were addressed to Louise Colet, a minor poet and Flaubert's ever-nagging Parisian mistress. He steadfastly refused to marry the woman, preferring instead to live in the country and write. His goal: prose as "rhythmic as verse, precise as the language of the sciences, undulant, deep-voiced as a cello, tipped with flame." Flaubert is often described by critics as the father of the modern realistic novel. "An author in his book must be like God in his universe, present everywhere and visible nowhere," he proclaimed. Yet, he professed to being "a rabid old Romantic," who found literature's "most beautiful works . . . motionless as cliffs, stormy as the ocean, leafy, green and murmurous as forests, forlorn as the desert, blue as the sky." He corresponded at night; by day, he was himself creating just such works of literature.

**PART OF NATURE, PART
OF US: Modern American
Poets**

by Helen Vendler
Harvard, 1980
376 pp. \$15

Wallace Stevens said of the poet: *As part of nature he is part of us. / His rarities are ours: may they be fit, / And reconcile us to ourselves in those / True reconcilings, dark, pacific words.* In some 30 crisp essays that originally appeared in publications ranging from the *Southern Review* and *Parnassus* to the *New York Times* and the *New Yorker*, Vendler, a Harvard pro-

fessor of English, is concerned with modern poets' "naturalness." "To anyone brought up on Shakespeare, Keats, and Tennyson," she writes, "the accommodation to the modern . . . must be sometimes painful pleasure." Eschewing esoteric theories of aesthetics, she searches for—and values most highly—the true voice that describes life's ordinary experiences in the works of poets as disparate as W. H. Auden and Marianne Moore, Allen Ginsberg and Elizabeth Bishop. Vendler can be wholehearted in her praise (A. R. Ammons' "conversations with mountains are the friendliest and most colloquial conversations with the inanimate since Herbert talked to his shooting stars") and wittily scathing in her condemnations. Her least charitable remarks are reserved for E. E. Cummings, for his "great and aborted talent" and "devaluation of intellect," and W. S. Merwin: "one has a relentless social-worker urge to ask him to eat something, anything, to cure him of his anemia."

ADULTERY IN THE NOVEL: Contract and Transgression

by Tony Tanner
Johns Hopkins, 1980
383 pp. \$18.50



Woman Taken into Adultery by William Blake. Courtesy of the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston.

Marriage occupies center stage in most 18th- and 19th-century European novels about the middle class. But adultery, suggests Tanner, a British literary scholar, gets the limelight. Concentrating on Jean Jacques Rousseau's *Julie, or the New Eloise*, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's *Elective Affinities*, and Gustav Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*—but ranging widely over Western literature to the present, Tanner considers this obsession with infidelity. Marriage reconciles the designs of love with those of economics, he muses; as such, it is the "all-subsuming, all-organizing contract . . . the structure that maintains the Structure" in modern middle-class society. In the novel, adultery became a device to test the limitations of decorum and of institutions such as marriage, the family, and the state. And, as authors came to view life as mired in arbitrary "contracts" that could be "transgressed," they began to ask whether society could be based on something other than marriage and novels constructed from something

other than 19th-century narrative conventions. Portrayals of the breakdown of marriage portended the collapse of fictional realism, observes Tanner, and led to works of extreme "physicality" (D. H. Lawrence), excessive word play (Joyce), and "mere solipsism" (Proust).

Science & Technology

THE PURPOSIVE BRAIN

by Ragnar Granit
MIT, 1980
244 pp. \$12.50



Rat



Tree shrew



Man

From The Purposive Brain.

"Why" the human brain works as it does is as relevant a question as "how," to Granit, a 1967 Nobel laureate in physiology. Granit combines philosophy of science with an up-to-date technical explanation of eyesight and human motor control, and of the mastery of the two by the brain. Along the way, he reviews the debate over such issues as the purpose of a reflex and how and why the brain's right and left halves differ. (Most scientists agree that the brain's left hemisphere controls language communication; the right perceives and comprehends but cannot express itself verbally. Yet, one researcher found that an isolated right hemisphere retains the ability to compose music.) Granit carefully underlines the limitations of all scientific theories that claim to identify Nature's ends. "There is no explanation," he notes, for "the talent that made possible the creation of [Beethoven's] Ninth Symphony." Moreover, some subjectivity is inevitable, even in the laboratory. The wall of ignorance that so often blocks scientific advance, Granit emphasizes, is erected, in large part, by "the head that beats against it."

THE COLDER THE BETTER

by David Wilson
Atheneum, 1980
272 pp. \$9.95

Rocket fuel, the superconductive magnets that are used in atomic particle accelerators, and even some instant coffees (of the freeze-dried variety) would not exist but for cold. Wilson, a British science writer, details the erratic history of low-temperature technology. Cryobiology—the study of low temperatures' effects on biological systems—was the

first area of research but was slow to develop. Greek physicians of classical times noted that cold could both damage and preserve living things. For centuries, the major obstacle to sustained research was a practical one—how to produce cold. Then, during the 19th century, scientists discovered the means to liquefy gases by compression; as a gas liquefies, it absorbs heat from the surrounding environment and cools it. Gas liquefaction gave us refrigeration and air conditioning, among other things. As Wilson notes, it takes about 20 to 30 years to move a new discovery from the laboratory into commerce and industry. In sight are laser beams for cooling and freeze-dried bacteria for use in medicines and fertilizers.

**THE FRUITED PLAIN:
The Story of American
Agriculture**
by Walter Ebeling
Univ. of Calif., 1980
433 pp. \$22.50

The Great Plains are ours only by right of conquest—of Indians, droughts, wild creatures (plant “one for the squirrel, one for the crow, one for the cutworm, and one to grow”). Advancing westward, American settlers cut away the forests, depleted local soils, and then moved on. This practice culminated in the 1930s with the 150,000-square-mile Dust Bowl: Strong winds piled sand in dunes as high as 30 feet, and five-mile-high clouds of black dust were carried as far as the Atlantic coast. Ebeling enlivens an encyclopedic survey of agricultural technology and economics with historical anecdotes. It was common, for example, to call a planter with half-a-dozen slaves a “Colonel” in ante-bellum Kentucky, “where the corn is full of kernels and the colonels full of corn.” During the 20th century, advanced technology (hybridization, fertilizers, pest-management) and mechanization brought about an “agricultural miracle.” U.S. corn yields remained at 22 to 26 bushels per acre for 140 years up to the 1930s; by the late '60s, 80 bushels per acre were common. Scientists are now attempting to improve nitrogen fixation (the conversion of atmospheric nitrogen into organic compounds by plants) and to produce hardier, disease-resistant plants through genetic engineering.

PAPERBOUNDS

CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE. By Charles E. Silberman. Vintage reprint, 1980. 745 pp. \$4.95

This year, three Americans out of 100 are likely to be victims of violent crimes; one household in 10 will be burglarized. Afraid? Two of 5 people—in large cities, one out of two—fear going out alone at night. In this far-ranging and well-documented study, writer Silberman surveys America's prisons, police, courts, and juvenile justice systems. He paints a bleak picture: "No approach to rehabilitation seems to work." Yet, he argues, tougher punishment is not the answer. "When people feel that the criminal justice system is too harsh, they become reluctant to cooperate with the police and courts." Among Silberman's suggestions: Police departments should build stronger ties to their communities by, for example, reinstating foot patrols. Juvenile courts should stop handling truancy and runaway cases; they should exercise jurisdiction only when a child's actions would be considered criminal if committed by an adult. Silberman backs up his proposals with case studies of programs that have worked and, he argues, can be made to work again.

BERTOLT BRECHT: Poems, 1913–1956. Edited by John Willett and Ralph Manheim. Methuen, 1980. 627 pp. \$12.50 (cloth, \$25)

Bertolt Brecht is more renowned for his plays — *The Threepenny Opera*, *Mother Courage*, *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* — than for his poetry. Brecht (1898–1956) wanted it that way. Two-thirds of the 500 poems in this collection were not published in any form during his lifetime. Nevertheless, W. H. Auden (and many

later literary critics) thought him a better poet than a playwright. Brecht's poetry is expansive; he wrote lyrical poems, unrhymed political verse, ballads, love poems, sonnets, and children's verse. All share a simplicity of style and an unswerving identification with the common man (. . . *the compassion of the oppressed for the oppressed is indispensable/It is the world's one hope*). A long-time foe of the Nazis, Brecht fled war-torn Europe for California in 1941; he returned to East Germany in 1947 and embraced communism. Western officials labeled him the "communist poet laureate." Yet, Brecht never let go of his essential humanity — or his sense of humor. When East German workers rioted in 1953, he deflated outraged party officials in verse: *Would it not be easier . . . for the government/To dissolve the people/and elect another?*

IN PATAGONIA. By Bruce Chatwin. Summit reprint, 1980. 205 pp. \$4.95

In 1865, a band of Welsh coal miners "combed the earth for a stretch of open country uncontaminated by Englishmen." They settled in Patagonia, where their independent-minded descendants live today. At the southern tip of Argentina and Chile, Patagonia's Cape Horn was, before construction of the Panama Canal, a landmark for sea voyagers. Today, the region's southern desert remains wild, rugged, sparsely populated. Chatwin, a British travel writer, whose grandmother's cousin lost a ship in the Horn's Strait of Magellan, roamed this desolate landscape, interviewing the miners and herdsman, the descendants of runaway criminals, revolutionaries, and sailors lured by the place's "absolute remoteness." Charles Darwin traveled to

Patagonia in 1832 and came away four years later with an idea, "for the mere sight of the [Tierra del] Fuegians helped trigger off the theory that Man had evolved from an ape-like species." In 97 observant sketches, Chatwin depicts daily life—then and now—at the "uttermost part of the earth."

SOCIOBIOLOGY: The Abridged Edition. By Edward O. Wilson. Harvard, 1980. 366 pp. \$9.95 (cloth, \$18.50)

The debate over the biological roots of animal and human social behavior heated up in 1975 with the publication of *Sociobiology* by Harvard biologist Wilson. This abridged version for the layman eliminates the technical expositions and data summaries but retains all the basic propositions. Specific (but as yet undiscovered) genes, Wilson contends, predispose humans variously toward altruism, guilt, even homosexuality. Natural selection not only determines the color of our eyes but also, to an extent, the way we care for our children, and explains why we will sometimes give up our own lives so that others might live. The old maxim that "the chicken is only an egg's way of making another egg has been mod-

ernized: the organism is only DNAs way of making more DNA," Wilson declares. He systematically traces the social behavior of ants and bees, birds, dolphins, elephants, bears, lions, and finally man. Wilson's theories have drawn sharp criticism, notably from philosophers and political scientists who oppose any reduction of the social sciences and humanities to branches of biology. Sociobiology, they argue, ignores, or worse yet, disparages the age-old concept of free will.

MY LIFE. By George Sand. Harper reprint, 1980. 246 pp. \$3.95

George Sand, the Frenchwoman who shocked her peers by renouncing her comfortable marriage and country estate for the writer's garret, penned her autobiography to set the record straight—at a time (1854–55) when much of her career lay still before her. Sand was born Aurore Dupin in 1804, "the last year of the Republic and the first of the Empire." As a child, she witnessed the turmoil wrought by the French Revolution from her aristocratic grandmother's country home and, later, from a convent school in Paris. At 18, she married; but feeling that "my small fortune, my freedom to do nothing, my supposed right to command a certain number of human beings . . . went against my tastes, my logic, my talents," she fled. Back in Paris, at age 26, she wore men's clothes, joined the literary avant-garde, and began work on the first of some 80 Romantic novels (among them, *Lélia*, *The Haunted Pool*, *The Master Bell-Ringers*) until her death in 1876. In clean, energetic prose, Sand describes the artists' enclave of Paris—the self-satisfaction and childishness of her friend Balzac, the affectations of Stendhal, the genius and torment of her lover, Frédéric Chopin. Sand chose not to be the central figure of her autobiography, weaving instead a rich tapestry of people and events in post-Revolutionary France.



By Sarah Landrs. From *Sociobiology*. Used by permission of Harvard University Press.

“May We Not Perish”: The Incas and Spain

Three great Indian civilizations dominate the early history of Latin America—the Mayas of Central America (1500 B.C.–A.D. 1200), the Aztecs of central Mexico (A.D. 1200–1519), and the Inca empire that spread from central Peru around 1200 to most of western South America before its demise at the hands of the invading Spanish *conquistadores* in 1532. Numerous contemporary European accounts of the conquest of the Incas exist. But there is only one from the pen of a pure-blooded Inca. In a massive “letter” to the Spanish monarch, probably written between 1583 and 1613, an elderly Inca nobleman, Don Felipe Huamán Poma de Ayala, chronicled the rise and fall of his people’s civilization. He proposed a plan for its revival. Here, Sara Castro-Klarén, a specialist in Latin American culture, tells the tale of this bitter, but hopeful, Christian convert.

by Sara Castro-Klarén

In 1908, a German librarian discovered an extraordinary document while leafing through manuscripts at the Royal Copenhagen Library.

How *El Primer Nueva Crónica y Buen Gobierno* (The First New Chronicle and Good Government) came to rest in Denmark, no one knows. The 1,400-page history/memorandum had been written over a 30-year period, to Kings Philip II and III of Spain by an elderly Inca Indian. In it, he gave posterity a unique, flavorful portrait of Inca society before and after the Spanish

conquest. He also dared to chastize his Spanish overlords and to seek a bargain—cleverly, proudly—for the autonomy of his fellow South American Indians.

Perhaps Don Felipe Huamán Poma de Ayala had entrusted his richly illustrated letter to friendly Jesuits for safe passage to Spain, and the missionaries, deciding that it was too impudent for a king’s eyes, hid it safely away.

In any event, the German librarian had stumbled on a 17th-century treasure—“the most remarkable



Don Felipe Huamán Poma de Ayala never got his audience with Philip III of Spain. But in his illustrative drawings, the Inca nobleman clearly envisioned an encounter with His Majesty.

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The Royal Library of Copenhagen.

production of native genius that has come down to our time," according to British historian Sir Clements Markham.

Huamán Poma's epistle marked the first written native history* of pre-

*Prior to the early 16th-century arrival of the Spaniards, the Incas had not conceived of a written language. Oral traditions were strong, however. The Indians had a separate caste for historians, and limited messages could be recorded on *quipus*, knotted loops of string that were also used for mathematical calculation.

Inca and Inca civilization. But it was more than this. The letter chronicled, step by step, the disappearance of a culture and the threat to an entire race under the impact of European conquest.

The Inca dynasty was founded in the mountain city of Cuzco, in what is now Peru, around A.D. 1200, the era of the Europeans' great Crusades in the eastern Mediterranean. By the time Francisco Pizarro of Spain began his

first expedition to South America in 1524, the Inca empire extended for 3,000 miles from what is now the southern edge of Colombia to central Chile.

Scattered in thatched-roof villages often having no more than four houses, the Inca population (about 10 million) subsisted mainly by farming. Maize, potatoes, and cassava were grown on terraces, carved from the mountainsides and irrigated by an elaborate system of aqueducts. Extensive reserves of food were maintained as a hedge against crop failure or as rations for Inca soldiers.

Plague, War, Conquest

A strict caste system governed the division of labor. Every six months, a census was taken throughout the empire dividing the citizens into 10 age groups. Each group had its own assigned tasks for boys and girls, men and women. Even the handicapped worked; the Indians' remarkable coil pottery was largely their responsibility.

The Incas also had a fairly stable political regime. Heading the government was the king. Ranking immediately beneath him was the royal house—relatives who aided him in governing. Advising them was the Council of the Realm, noblemen from the various regions of the empire who often represented tribes that the Incas had conquered. The *varayoc* (or mayors) were appointed to rule over individual towns or provinces.

As luck would have it, however, the *conquistadores*, led by Pizarro and Diego de Almagro, arrived in the

Andes in 1532, just as the Inca nation was fighting a bitter civil war over succession to the throne. "These struggles," related Huamán Poma, "cost the country a great deal."

Between 1525 and 1527, he wrote, the Incas had been stricken by a fierce "plague" (possibly the smallpox that raged through vulnerable Indian populations ahead of the Spanish, who brought the disease with them to the Caribbean). The reigning monarch, Huayna Capac, had died of it.

Inca law could not dictate in this case which of Huayna Capac's sons would succeed him, since he had split the empire between two of them. One son, Huascar, had been installed in the capital city of Cuzco; according to Inca law, he was the legitimate heir since he had been born of a union between Huayna Capac and Huayna Capac's own sister. However, ruling the northern portion of the empire was a second son, Atahualpa, a favorite sired through Huayna Capac's marriage to a princess of the Kingdom of Quito, a tribe conquered by the Incas. Neither Huascar nor Atahualpa was satisfied with half a kingdom, so each fought for sole control.

By the time Pizarro's forces reached Inca territory in 1532 from what is now Colombia, Huascar's forces had been defeated; Atahualpa was on his way south to Cuzco to claim the throne. As Huamán Poma told it, Pizarro, with fewer than 200 *conquistadores*, encountered the new king and his army of perhaps 80,000 men at Cajamarca, 500 miles south

Sara Castro-Klarén, 37, is professor of Latin American literature at Dartmouth College. Born in Sabandia, Peru, she received her B.A. (1962), M.A. (1965), and Ph.D. (1968) from the University of California, Los Angeles. She was a Fellow at the Wilson Center in 1977-78 and is the author of El Mundo Magico de Jose Maria Arguedas (1973).

school. Martín studied under a Christian friar, and it was probably he who taught his half-brother to read and write.

As an adult, Huamán Poma seems to have spent considerable time with the conquerors, although he felt that his noble birth made him vastly superior to the greedy Spanish "rabble." He apparently worked for a while in the Spanish itinerant courts as a public defender of poor Indians. In that job, he must have made a pest of himself. The presiding Spanish *corregidor* (royal administrator) banished him from his native village of Chinchaycocha around 1580.

One obsession—"May God grant that we shall not perish forever"—permeated the *Nueva Crónica*. The style of the epistle to Philip II and Philip III was an incongruous mixture of Spanish pulpit rhetoric and the salty dialect of any 16th-century Castilian commoner:

Our Indians ought not to be thought of as a backward people who yielded easily to superior force. Just imagine, Your Majesty, being an Indian in your own country and being loaded up as if you were a horse, or driven along with a succession of blows from a stick. Imagine being called a dirty dog or a pig or a goat. . . . What would you and your Spanish compatriots do in these circumstances? My own belief is that you would eat your tormentors alive and thoroughly enjoy the experience.

Only too aware of censorship and the Inquisition, Huamán Poma worried about possible criticism: "What I have written . . . is not malicious," he maintained, "but intended for the improvement of bad Christians."

As he shrewdly noted, the *conquistadores* had taken Peru for God as well as for Spain. With either naive sincerity or great cunning, one can-

not tell, Huamán Poma turned the tables on the Spanish by portraying *them* as the bad Christians. The Spanish colonists, he noted, lived off the labors of others and could not be controlled by their own monarch in faraway Madrid. The Indians, by contrast, were capable of hard work and had created a highly organized society, two of the highest human values.

Catholic missionaries to the New World took the brunt of Huamán Poma's criticism. A convert to Christianity himself, he admired the Jesuits for their asceticism, but he clearly had no use for the arrogant Mercedarians or Dominicans who behaved "as if they had forgotten that Our Lord was poor and humble and the friend of sinners."

Who Will Lead?

The Church, Huamán Poma argued, would be better served if the Spanish priests restricted their efforts to saving other Spaniards. The Indians could produce their own priests, theologians, and religious artists—all just as capable of serving Christ as the Spanish clerics. After all, as pagans, the Incas had achieved a civilization distinguished for its social order, economic plenty, and technological ingenuity. As Christians, he said, they could only do better.

Huamán Poma was certain that God intended each race to reign in its land of origin:

The first [Indians] were brought by God to this country. They were descended from those who survived the Flood in Noah's Ark. . . . Spaniards do not have a right to come into these lands, for the Inca was the legitimate owner and king.

Whatever Huamán Poma *wanted*, he knew in his heart that the Euro-

THE SPANISH COLONISTS: A NATIVE'S VIEW

In the eyes of Don Felipe Huamán Poma de Ayala, there were "more thieves in Peru than even in Castile." He carefully listed what he saw as the crimes of each type of Spaniard in the New World:

Royal administrators:

The so-called *corregidores* or royal administrators . . . collect Indians into groups and send them to forced labour without wages, while they themselves receive the payment for the work. During their term of office, the royal administrators make all sorts of contracts and deals, embezzle public funds and even lay their hands on the royal fifth [a 20 percent tax on anything bought or sold in the colonies].

Deputies:

The purpose in life of deputies is to imitate their masters, the royal administrators, and find similar opportunities for robbery and oppression. They usually have some 20 or 30 Indians at their beck and call, whom they find fault with for the slightest thing, including even scratching their buttocks.

Innkeepers:

The innkeepers . . . sometimes employ as many as 20 Indians, who receive no pay whatever. It is quite usual for them to keep half a dozen whores on the premises, under the pretence that they are the wives of the Indian servants. In reality, of course, they are hired out to travellers who spend the night there.

Priests:

The priesthood began with Jesus Christ and his Apostles, but their successors in the various religious orders established in Peru do not follow this holy example. On the contrary, they show an unholy greed for worldly wealth and the sins of the flesh and a good example would be set to everyone if they were punished by the Holy Inquisition.

From Letter to a King: A Peruvian Chief's Account of Life Under the Incas and Under Spanish Rule by Huamán Poma. © 1978 by the translator, Christopher Dilke. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, E. P. Dutton and George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

peans and their black slaves from Africa were in the Andes to stay. And so he promised that the Incas would remain the devoted subjects of the Spanish king.

However, the colonialists, who by 1628 numbered over 14,000 in the area that is now Peru, should be limited, he said, to living in the cities that they had established (Lima,

Bogotá, Puerto Viejo). Social contacts between Indians and Europeans should be forbidden. Traditional Indian communities (Cuzco, Huánuco, Potosí) should be reserved for natives. (Any "newcomers" who disagreed, he noted, could "easily escape from their predicament by leaving Peru.")

And what would be the role of an

Supervisors of mines:

At the mercury mines of Huancavelica the Indian workers are punished and ill-treated to such an extent that they die like flies and our whole race is threatened with extermination. Even the chiefs are tortured by being suspended by their feet. . . . The managers and supervisors, who are either Spaniards or half-castes, have virtually absolute power. There is no reason for them to fear justice, since they are never brought before the courts.

Tramps and vagabonds:

A large number of Spanish tramps and vagabonds are continually on the move along our highways and in and out of our inns and villages. Their refrain is always "Give me a servant" or "Give me a present." . . . Every day of their lives they eat about twelve pesos' worth of food and ride off without paying, but still give themselves the airs of gentlemen.



The Royal Library of Copenhagen.



The Royal Library of Copenhagen.

Corregidor engaged in a bribe (left); priest kicking an Indian (right)

Indian state in the Spanish empire? Who would assure the Spanish king that the Indians would mine more gold and silver for his coffers, produce crop surpluses for export to Spain, and obey newfound Christian moral doctrines? Huamán Poma considered these questions.

He advised the king that heading the new native regime in the Andes

should be men like Huamán Poma himself: the old and wise survivors of Indian nobility. Men of his age, he wrote, no longer harbored a desire for personal pleasure or the acquisition of power, nor did they burn with the lusts of younger men. God forbid the follies and the experimental desires of youth!

Under this government of vener-

able chiefs, the old Inca social order would be restored. Local Indian authorities would once again decide which women would be lifelong virgins and which would marry. Once married, women would devote their lives to serving their husbands and producing offspring.

Children over five years old would go back to collecting firewood, sweeping the family homes, and gathering seeds, eggs, and greens. As they grew older, they would hunt for small birds and rodents and learn to work the feathers and skins into the bountiful clothing the Spaniards so greatly admired. Later on, they would look after the herds of llama and wanakus.

All boys and girls would learn to read and write Spanish. But great potters and weavers would once again be the pride of their villages. With proper care, the land would produce bountiful crops of maize and potatoes, as it had in the old days.

Work would fill Indians' lives from the cradle to the grave. Theft and pilfering would vanish. There would be peace and order.

Huamán Poma was offering Spain's king a new Inca society: a blend of a few helpful features from European civilization (writing and Christianity) with ancient tribal values, an Inca state loyal to the Spanish throne. His pleas had an ethnocentric purpose—to preserve the Indian race and its culture from a growing population of *mestizos*.

Huamán Poma never disguised his distaste for *mestizos* (despite the half-brother he held dear). In his most generous statement, he conceded that "they are capable of turning into good Christians and obedient citizens," but he quickly added that "many of them are simply hangers-on of the Spaniards, always



The Royal Library of Copenhagen.

Huamán Poma hoped to save the traditional Inca family structure, with one change—Christianity.

ready to commit some act of treachery with the aid of a knife or dagger, a noose . . . , or a stone."

He likened the spread of *mestizos* to "the mixture of *vicuña* and *taruga*, two kinds of Peruvian sheep, which produces an offspring resembling neither the mother nor the father."

Only the *zambos* (black-Indian half-breeds) came in for equal loathing. Huamán Poma preferred the pure black man and even felt pity for the Negro—so long as he stayed in the city with his Spanish master. A little education and Christianity, he wrote, made a black man worth two *mestizos*.

Huamán Poma feared *mestizos* because their spread threatened the traditional bonds within Indian families. Among other things, *mestizos*, like the Spaniards, had no

communal work obligations and were allowed to use Indians as unpaid forced labor.

To make matters worse, Indian women increasingly ran off to Lima and Bogotá, the new Spanish-built cities, for the wealth they could gain as concubines. Wailed Huamán Poma: "The Indians are disappearing because they have no women."

The women may have had less baneful motives for their behavior than mere greed, however. As Huamán Poma recorded, life for a woman under Inca law meant endless toil and complete submission to male authority:

The principal chiefs shall be entitled to 50 women each for service in their households and for the procreation of children. Lesser chiefs, according to their rank, shall be entitled to 30, 20, 15, 10 or only a few women. Indians of humble position . . . shall be entitled to two women each.

If Spanish men and Indian women continued to mate, the royal colonies would suffer economic disaster, Huamán Poma informed the king. There would be no pure-blooded natives left to do the king's labor. *Mestizos* were lazy; they would not mine gold or silver.

In all likelihood, Huamán Poma's letter never reached the king. Even if it had, Philip III would probably have ignored its pleas. He had enough trouble controlling his distant countrymen in the New World without proposing economic and

political autonomy for the Indians.

Eventually, of course, freedom from Spanish rule returned to the New World. Colombia became independent in 1819; Peru in 1824; Bolivia in 1825. But power did not go to the descendants of the great pre-Colombian civilization. Instead, political control stayed in the hands of whites and *mestizos*, where it still remains.

Arguments over the status of Indians persist in Latin America to this day. The Peruvian population of nearly 17 million people is 46 percent Indian, 43 percent *mestizo*, and 11 percent Caucasian. Similar ratios exist in Ecuador and Bolivia. In Chile and Colombia, a majority of the population is *mestizo*; only 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively, are full-blooded Indians.

The Indians tell a story that Atahualpa's head, severed from his body since 1534, remains alive, buried some place near Cuzco. The head has been growing a new body for the last 450 years, and, when it is complete, says the legend, the Inca realm will be restored.

But Huamán Poma, writing his letter to the king, knew that he was fighting the currents of history; he realized from his own long years of reflection that the destructive aftermath of the Spanish conquest—*mestizos*, serfdom, imperial bureaucracy, repression—could not be altered by a king, much less by a pleading, powerless old man.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Readers may be interested in consulting British historian Christopher Dilke's abridged English translation of Huamán Poma's manuscript (Letter to a King: A Peruvian Chief's Account of Life Under the Incas and Under Spanish Rule, New York: Dutton, 1978). Some of the quotations in this essay are taken from Dilke's work; other translations of passages not found in Letter to a King are the author's.

H. G. Wells: Utopia and Doomsday

Novelist, short-story writer, historian, twice-defeated Socialist candidate for England's Parliament, H. G. Wells (1866–1946) said he would “rather be called a journalist than an artist.” All of his work, fiction as well as nonfiction, has a sense of journalistic immediacy about it. Best known for his science fiction (*The War of the Worlds*, *The Time Machine*), Wells was a prophet who saw both war and technological progress in advance. Here Frank D. McConnell argues for Wells's admission to Anglo-American literature's Hall of Fame. The one-time doyen of that establishment—novelist Henry James—found the eclectic Wells a bit disconcerting but “a very remarkable performer indeed [who] makes even dear old Dickens turn . . . in his grave.”

by Frank D. McConnell

“I grieved to think how brief the dream of the human intellect had been. It had committed suicide.”


Herbert George Wells made that melancholy observation in his first novel, *The Time Machine* (1895). He spent the rest of his life—and 200 books—trying to erase it.

He never succeeded; nor did the world succeed in entirely escaping the truth of what he said—Wells died in 1946, a year almost to the day after Hiroshima.

Historian Ernest Barker recalls meeting a sick, aging Wells in 1939. Wells had lost the audience that, dur-

ing the 1920s and early '30s, made him the most celebrated and influential English intellectual of his time. Europe was plummeting, again, into war—a war he had warned against for two decades. Barker asked Wells how he was: “Poorly, Barker, poorly,” said Wells. “I am composing my epitaph.” And what would that be? asked Barker. “Quite short, just this—God damn you all: I told you so.”

It ought to be his epitaph, catching as it does so much of Wells's arrogance, bitter humor, passion for man's survival—and sadness.



By Frank Paul for *Amazing Stories*, 1928.

Artist's 1928 conception of Wells's city of the future. The middle space is stationary; on either side, conveyor belts speed pedestrians up to 50 miles per hour.

From *The Time Machine* to his bleak last book, *Mind at the End of Its Tether* (1945), Wells journeyed from despair to despair. His books served as his public struggles against that despondency. Science fiction and realistic fiction, history, economic and political analysis—all offered Wells potential ways out of the trap, as he saw it, that evolutionary history had laid for man. His fellow novelist George Orwell doubted that any intelligent Englishman or American educated between the wars could have escaped Wells's influence.

Conspiracy of Silence

There is little doubt that Orwell was right, but it takes an effort to remember *how* right. For one of the most remarkable things about Wells's notable career is its eclipse.

Wells's great early science-fiction novels—*The Time Machine*, *The Island of Doctor Moreau* (1896), *The Invisible Man* (1897), *The War of the Worlds* (1898), and *The First Men in the Moon*, (1901)—remain in print. They are taught, with growing frequency, in colleges, although usually banished to that academic ghetto—the science-fiction class.

The rest of Wells seems to have vanished without a trace. Who today is aware that Wells's imprint on his time was equal to or greater than that of D. H. Lawrence, Virginia Woolf, C. S. Lewis, or W. H. Auden? And yet it was—despite the recent conspiracy of silence.

Conspiracy, of course, is a harsh word. Yet, it is not unjustified. One of

the reasons for Wells's continuing relevance also partially explains why he has not been—and probably cannot be—canonized by the literary establishment. His work represents a serious challenge to the principles of specialization and scholarly disinterest upon which academic culture is founded and thrives.

"I hammer at my ideas," Wells insisted in *The Fate of Homo Sapiens* (1939)—with little respect for those to whom the "intellectual life" means the contemplation of compartmentalized intricacies. Ideas mattered, and mattered passionately, to him because he believed they were the only things that might save the human race from extinction. But the comfortable niches in which we store our ideas—"science," "aesthetics," "economics," "sociology"—had to go.

Forging a New World

If the world did not make sense *altogether*, it could not long continue to make sense at all.

Science and socialism, argued Wells, would unite the world. But Wells's socialism was highly idiosyncratic. He enthusiastically joined the famed Fabian Society (dominated during the early 1900s by George Bernard Shaw and Beatrice and Sidney Webb) and later noisily broke away when he could not take command of the group.

Socialism for Wells, write his biographers Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie, "was essentially a state of mind rather than a set of practical

Frank D. McConnell, 38, is professor of English at Northwestern University and a former Wilson Center Fellow (1977–78). Born in Louisville, Ky., he received a B.A. from the University of Notre Dame (1964) and a Ph.D. from Yale (1968). Among his books are *Four Postwar American Novelists: Bellow, Mailer, Barth, and Pynchon* (1977) and *Storytelling and Mythmaking: Images from Film and Literature* (1979).

*In 1901, the 35-year-old Wells was already a successful author, having published *The Time Machine*, *The War of the Worlds*, and *The Invisible Man*.*



Courtesy of New English Library.

policies." He came to see the Fabians as a "bureaucratic regime of small-minded experts," as critic Van Wyck Brooks put it. All forms of socialism were, for Wells, only partial steps toward the formation of a new World State.

Wells's semimystical utopia incorporated socialist programs (public ownership of energy sources and land; financial aid for the unemployed, the ill, and the aged) but was a benevolent dictatorship where "voluntary noblemen" would exercise a firm hand (controlling human procreation, for example). These scientifically trained new samurai—mechanics, engineers, doctors, teachers, writers—would rule mankind through a loose and informal worldwide cooperative organization unlike any previously existing government.

Wells was a "global thinker," who, for better or worse, took all contemporary knowledge for his province. It

was for this that he was most often attacked, even during the days of his greatest fame. He does indeed display much of the eccentricity and intolerance associated with the self-educated genius. But he also displays all the humanizing passion of that breed.

There is a moment in *Kipps* (1905) that catches Wells's special tone. Near the end of that wonderfully comic novel, the working-class hero, Artie Kipps, and his wife, Ann, have earned a comfortable degree of wealth and a house in a neighborhood far above their station. They quarrel over their inability to behave properly among their upper-class neighbors. It is terribly funny, until the narrator suddenly interrupts himself:

The stupid little tragedies of these clipped and limited lives! . . . See what I can see! Above them, brooding over them, I tell you there is a monster, a lumpish

ALL FOR ONE, ONE FOR ALL

In Wells's last great fictional prophecy—The Shape of Things To Come (1933)—a League of Nations official has been able to read a history textbook written 150 years in the future. He learns that a devastating world conflict will break out in 1939—over a dispute between Germany and Poland. After the war, the airmen responsible for the destruction become the elite that saves mankind and restores order to the world. All men come to share a unifying purpose:

The body of mankind is now one single organism of nearly two thousand five hundred million persons, and the individual differences of every one of these persons is like an exploring tentacle thrust out to test and learn, to savour life in its fullness and bring in new experiences for the common stock. We are all members of one body. Only in the dimmest analogy has anything of this sort happened in the universe as we knew it before. Our sense of our individual difference makes our realisation of our common being more acute. We work, we think, we explore, we dispute, we take risks and suffer—for there seems no end to the difficult and dangerous adventures individual men and women may attempt; and more and more plain does it become . . . that it is not our little selves, but Man the Undying who achieves these things through us.

monster, like some great, clumsy griffin thing, like the Crystal Palace labyrinthodon . . . like pride, like indolence, like all that is darkening and heavy and obstructive in life. It is matter and darkness, it is the anti-soul, it is the ruling power of this land, Stupidity. My Kippses live in its shadow.

This interruption is an aesthetic flaw, if you conceive of the novel as a disinterested, wholly pure narrative. The narrator is preaching here, and preaching at the top of his lungs—"See what I can see!" It is also a moment, however, in which we hear Wells's characteristic voice demanding that we understand the middle-class comedy of *Kipps* in its widest significance, and insisting that that significance be taken seriously.

Kipps, by the way, was one of

Wells's last books to appear before the onset of his quarrel with novelist Henry James. That feud, in its way, determined much of the 20th-century debate over the function and purpose of art. James (who admired *Kipps* for its "rawness") insisted that a novel should be an utterance like a lyric poem. Wells increasingly insisted that fiction should serve the purpose of mass education and social transformation. The only hope for mankind's survival, believed Wells, was knowledge; education was the road to that knowledge.

It was once assumed, by the mandarins of the London literary establishment, that James had won the quarrel. Recent experiments in fiction by Thomas Pynchon, Kurt Vonnegut, and Robert Coover call that


decision into question.

Wells—in his urgency and prophetic fervor, in his insistence on taking the whole range of knowledge as his domain, and, particularly, in his utopianism—may be not only the characteristic writer of the early 20th century but (as he would have hoped) the characteristic writer of the century's end. Against the monster "Stupidity" that he describes in *Kipps*, he struggled his whole life. Even at his most "realistic," he was a science-fiction writer. His two central beliefs lie at the heart of science fiction: Man is under

universal sentence of death, but he has it within his power to cheat that cosmic doom.

His own life story seemed to portray this drama. Destined to be an intellectual bull, Wells was born in 1866, literally, in a china shop—a business his parents, a housekeeper and a professional cricketer, failed at. His mother's fondest wish for him had been that he might become a draper's assistant. At 14, he did—only to fail rapidly and totally. (He couldn't keep accounts straight.)

After a few years, he was again apprenticed to a draper. (He later said



By Peter Edwards for H. G. Wells's *The Time Machine*. Everyman Paperback, 1964.

*Uncharacteristically, Wells rewrote *The Time Machine* six times before he published it in 1895. The above antiquated montage was designed by artist Peter Edwards for the 1964 Everyman paperback edition of the book.*

that his mother's belief in God was equalled only by her faith in drapers.) He also served as an apprentice to a druggist and, finally, to a grammar school teacher. His record of failure continued.

Free Love

Wells broke the habit—temporarily—when he won a national competition for a scholarship to the Normal School of Science (now the Royal College of Science) in 1883. It was a turning point. There he met Charles Darwin's staunch defender, biologist T. H. Huxley. Wells never forgot Huxley's lessons, but after three years he left without a degree.

In 1891, he married his cousin Isabell and was soon bored and unhappy. (A man of voracious sexual appetite, Wells openly advocated free love. It is likely that he never found a partner who met his expectations.) He was also very ill, with a lung ailment diagnosed as tubercular and terminal. Yet he insisted on controlling his life. He began to write witty sketches on the implications of modern science for man's self-image for London newspapers. In 1892, he was teaching biology at William Briggs's Tutorial College. Two years later he ran off with one of his students, Amy Catherine Robbins. He married her in 1895. She was probably the woman who understood him best—and forgave him most.

A sickly young man with little means of support and two families is not likely to be either happy or productive. Nevertheless, in 1895, Wells published *The Time Machine* to great acclaim.

During the next decade, he produced enough work to consolidate his position as one of the most popular writers of the age. From World War I until his death in 1946, he pub-

lished at an astonishing rate. Through periods of depression and numerous disruptive and passionate love affairs (including a famous liaison with Rebecca West), he continued to write "for dear life."

It is worth noting that seven years before Wells's birth two books appeared that shaped the course of his intellectual life. The more immediately successful of the two was *Self-Help* by Samuel Smiles. Smiles, a Victorian clergyman and a dedicated "social worker," ardently contended that man's will and self-control could overcome any obstacle.

The other book was *The Origin of Species*. It took away everything Smiles's book seemed to promise. Man, in Charles Darwin's scheme, was not a specially created, specially gifted architect of his own salvation or damnation. He was, rather, the random side-effect of a blind, reasonless, and awesomely long process of evolution.

"Heads—Merely Heads"

It is not too much to say that a great deal of 20th-century intellectual debate has centered around the tensions between the visions of Smiles and Darwin. Are we condemned to be the playthings of forces over which we have no real control? Or are we the agents of a consciousness and a *purpose* beyond the mere physical dimensions of our world?

The plethora of recent American best sellers on self-help psychology, along with the equally large number of popular books on biological determinism, shows how persistent the debate remains.

Wells gave full expression to these ideas. His most deeply held convictions were Darwinian in origin. For all its splendid accomplishments, he believed, society was on the verge of

On Halloween 1938, actor Orson Welles broadcast, on radio, news of a Martian invasion after the fashion of The War of the Worlds. Americans believed the hoax and were terrified; Wells was furious. Here, a Marvel Comics rendering.



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overspecializing itself into extinction. This was Wells's point in *The War of the Worlds*. Those soulless Martian invaders are future versions of ourselves who have become "heads—merely heads," and who are pathetically prey to so simple a threat as the common cold.

If Wells was moved to Darwinian despair, it was precisely through expressing it that he exemplified, in his own life, Samuel Smiles's (and, later Horatio Alger's) success fable. Through sheer will and application, he lifted himself from the bleakest of backgrounds to international fame.

Wells's career suggests a triumph of mind that his central ideas denied. Could man, through common sense, avert disaster? Wells had, and he always thought of himself as a "very

ordinary brain." The prognosis for the human race was not good, but it was not altogether fatal. At least, he thought, not if the rest of mankind could be persuaded to act as H. G. Wells had.

Isaac Asimov, who ought to know, has written that science fiction is best understood as "ordinary," novelistic fiction, with one crucial difference: Its hero is no individual but the human race itself.

This is an accurate description of Wells's work—not only his science fiction but also his realistic novels and most of his historical and sociological writing. Wells was a very heroic man, and a very vain one. His permanent and preeminent concern was the fate of mankind, and his reference point for the fate of the

human race was, always, himself.

These two outlooks are present in Wells's writings from the beginning.

In *The Time Machine*, the Time Traveller relates his tale of universal despair to an anonymous narrator. At the end of the book, after the Traveller has embarked again on his journey into time, the narrator reflects upon his curious friend. He "thought but cheerlessly of the Advancement of Mankind," observes the narrator, "and saw in the growing pile of civilization only a foolish heaping that must inevitably fall back upon and destroy its makers in the end." Here speaks the Darwinist, the calm and dispassionate analyst of the human condition against the absolute background of scientific truth. Yet, this voice does not have the last word. "If that is so," says the narrator, "it remains for us to live as though it were not so."

"Living as though it were not so" is, indeed, the theme of most of Wells's writing after *The Time Machine*. The despairing, time-traveling hero and the willfully optimistic narrator continued their debate in his books for the next 50 years.

Optimism or Despair

To be sure, Wells gave an increasingly ample role to the hopeful narrator. By World War I, Wells's scientific romances had taken a distinctly positive turn. He was now writing utopian fiction. In it, he imagined that following the cataclysmic war to which mankind was surely doomed, a new golden age of rational organization and scientific progress would emerge.

This vision, too, was the projection of his own massive will to survive, his insistence that turmoil and disaster *must* be redeemable. It is the implicit argument of his massive survey

of civilization, *The Outline of History* (1920), and also of his last great exercise in social prophecy, *The Shape of Things To Come* (1933).

Wells, however, was never a "utopian" in the pure sense of the word. He never, even at his most strenuously assertive, fully trusted his own optimism. The voice of the time traveler, with its message of a great darkness at the end of all striving, was never entirely stilled.

It was once fashionable to attack Wells for his optimism—to denigrate his boyish insistence that, if only the world could be handed over to the engineers and the scientists, they would produce a clean, sane, chromium and glass civilization.

This optimistic side of his vision is expressed most unabashedly in his one screenplay, *Things To Come* (1936). The Marxist critic of the 1930s, Christopher Caudwell, accused Wells of being irresponsibly



Courtesy of G. P. Wells, London.

Caricature of Wells drawn in the 1920s by his son G.P.

A READER'S GUIDE TO H. G. WELLS

The best place to begin reading—or re-reading—H. G. Wells is where he himself began: *The Time Machine* (1895). It is arguably his best book, and certainly one of the great short novels in the English language. It is also a dress rehearsal of the themes of determinism and free will, technology and its negative effects on the human spirit, that remain crucial to his later work. His other major “scientific romances”—*The Island of Doctor Moreau* (1896), *The Invisible Man* (1897), *The War of the Worlds* (1898), and *The First Men in the Moon* (1901)—develop these themes for later science fiction.

Of Wells's so-called realistic novels much less remains in print than should be the case. *Kipps* (1905) survives, of course, and may well be one of the great English comic novels. In the currently out-of-print *Ann Veronica* (1909) and in *The History of Mister Polly* (1910) and *Tono-Bungay* (1909), Wells extended the hardheaded vision of the social conditions determining—and strangling—his world. The realist and the scientific romancer come together (at least in the early Wells) in *The Food of the Gods* (1904) and *In the Days of the Comet* (1906). Here Wells the visionary and Wells the acute chronicler of his own times and class find a common voice (that of the utopian planner) that remained with him for most of his career.

The Outline of History (1920) is opinionated, flawed, and brilliant. In it, Wells refocused and reinterpreted the world's history to show its rhythmical nature. For Wells, nations rise and fall just as species dominate and decline. A nation rises due to the presence of a creative ruling elite. Bureaucrats then take over and change a “community of will” into one of “faith and obedience” that exploits the masses. As this degeneration sets in, society falls prey to “barbarians.” *The Shape of Things To Come* (1933), his last and most ambitious utopian novel is a companion-piece to the *Outline*, a projection of the latter's arguments into the future.

Experiment in Autobiography (1934) is by no means great. But its voluble, often anecdotal reminiscences shed light on Well's early years, particularly on his sense of the writer's craft. The opening pages of *The Fate of Homo Sapiens* (1939), on the other hand, constitute the most satisfying self-portrait Wells ever drew. Finally, Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie's *H. G. Wells: A Biography* (Simon & Schuster, 1973; cloth; Touchstone, 1974, paper) is indispensable.

“spiritual” in his hopes for the future. C. S. Lewis, at almost the same time, accused Wells of being overly “materialistic.” But Wells's optimism was held, throughout his career, in a creative and humanizing

tension with a deep pessimism and melancholy. The man who whistles loudest in the dark is likely to be the one who feels the darkness most. It is *this* Wells, the Wells of the dark places, who matters—or should

matter—more and more for us.

We may be closer to the self-destruction Wells warned of in 1895 than we have ever been before. Critics have remarked how much recent American fiction—Saul Bellow in *Mr. Sammler's Planet*, Thomas Pynchon in *Gravity's Rainbow*, John Barth in *Letters*—makes serious use of themes and techniques once thought to be the province of pulp science fiction. Recent "explainers" of the human condition—from Robert Ardrey and Arthur Koestler to Carl Sagan—insist that we cannot fully understand or control our own fate until we begin to see it in the context of evolutionary history.

These writers are not Wells's "disciples." Wells was too idiosyncratic a thinker to have any real disciples. He would not have wanted any, anyway. As a *reactor*, a highly intelligent, extraordinarily sensitive, middle-class man who courageously confronted the central problems of his age, Wells has gained something more important than followers. He has found brothers.

All of Wells's writing is science fiction. It is (as the claim is often made by science-fiction writers) important because it is prophetic. "Prophetic," not in the sense of accurate technological forecasting but as poet William Blake was. Wells understood how men come to feel in a

world in which they are capable of unprecedented self-aggrandizement (we *can*, technologically, do almost anything we want) and total humiliation (we might kill ourselves doing it). In surveying such a world, he managed to be infinite in hope, yet sober in expectation.

Wells is cantankerous enough not to be readily admitted into the polite world of literary history. Scholars, however, have begun to examine his importance for the history of 20th-century thought and writing, and especially his relevance to the way we think and live today. Nevertheless, Wells is still best read and understood by those "ordinary brains" who were always his audience. Rediscovering Wells is not a matter of stumbling upon an interesting literary curio but rather of recognizing a powerful, immensely kind, and good-humored voice.

Perhaps Wells described himself best in *When the Sleeper Wakes* (1897). There, his revolutionary hero, Graham, is about to address the nations of the Earth and rid them of their slavery:

He found the thing in his mind too vague for words. He paused momentarily, and broke into vague exhortations, and then a rush of speech came to him. Much that he said was but the humanitarian commonplace of a vanished age, but the conviction of his voice touched it to vitality.

COMMENTARY

We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer's telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editor's requests for comment.

From Yoga to Black Coffee

There is a theme running through health commentary this year that troubles me. Cary Kimble ["In Pursuit of Well-Being," *WQ*, Spring 1980] airs a commonly heard sentiment when he argues that "to improve today's general level of health . . . start living properly rather than just urging Washington to spend more." This line of reasoning has two serious drawbacks. It distracts our attention from the business at hand, and worse, it often amounts to thinly veiled backsliding.

We never have had a "health" care system in America, but we do have an illness-care system consuming \$30 million an hour. The pressing problem for us as physicians, administrators, and policy makers is how to get the most "bang" out of our 30 million bucks. Of course, personal and public health are important, but the money is going into illness. Prudence would seem to suggest continuing and increased federal support for analyzing and tuning up the illness-care system.

Backsliding is a danger if we follow along with a change in our objective function from attacking illness to elevating health. Jogging is a better answer than biomedical research if improved health is our goal. Surely, it follows, we should fund better answers like jogging and defund worse answers like research . . . but fund *jogging*? No! Nevertheless, defunding fits the national mood. Everyone

seems to be switching from white wine, yoga, and National Health Insurance to black coffee, Bourbon, and Proposition 13. We run the serious risk of forgetting how important it is that government provide us with public goods of improving quality at a price we can afford.

Allan Chamberlain
Medical Student
University of Cincinnati

Distorting Statehood for Puerto Rico

The articles on Puerto Rico [*WQ*, Spring 1980] do not provide a balanced perspective. Two of the authors, Jorge Heine ["A People Apart"] and Jaime Santiago ["One Step Forward"], are both against statehood; they repeat well-known fallacies to describe the pro-statehood position. Their common argument is that statehood proponents are interested in increasing the island's dependency on federal transfer payments. Mr. Santiago gives a blatant distortion of Governor Carlos Romero Barceló's position by stating that the Governor believes that the sure way to achieve statehood is "by gradually eliminating industrial tax exemption and increasing Puerto Rico's dependence on federal welfare funds."

In Governor Romero Barceló's message to the Eighth Legislative Assembly in January 1980, he summarized his official policy for Puerto Rican development.

The key elements are (a) the diversification of the economy; (b) the efficient use of our natural resources; (c) the integration of our economic development into the vast and powerful economy of the 50 states of the Union; (d) the reaffirmation of economic development based on private initiative and capital with minimum government intervention; (e) the use of capital from the mainland and foreign countries, together with the formation of Puerto Rican capital for development; (f) the application of federal minimum

wages; (g) the reaffirmation of industrial incentives policies, conditioned upon the number of jobs generated by industry; and (h) the substitution of imports to the fullest extent possible.

Those of us who support statehood believe that progress toward economic self-sufficiency is a major factor in our strategy.

We also believe that our people cannot continue to give up political dignity and equality as American citizens for the sake of economic expediency—that would be inhuman and unfair.

Baltasar Corrada
Resident Commissioner for Puerto Rico
Washington, D.C.

Don't Forget Congress

A neglected aspect of the Puerto Rican dilemma is that each of the three "status" alternatives— independence, enhanced commonwealth, and statehood—presents a nearly insuperable obstacle to U.S. congressional approval.

The trouble with independence is that few voters in Puerto Rico have ever been in favor of it. Congress is unlikely to agree to any change in Puerto Rico's political status that lacks the support of a substantial majority of the electorate; but Puerto Ricans have consistently shunned pro-independence propositions, parties, and candidates at the polls. In the 1976 election, for example, the two pro-independence gubernatorial candidates received only 6.4 percent of the total vote. In the 1972 election, they received 5.5 percent, and in 1968, only 3.5 percent.

Today, most Puerto Ricans seem to regard commonwealth status, unchanged since its adoption in 1952, as inadequate. Conceivably, however, a large majority might support a commonwealth whose control over the island's affairs was enhanced along the lines of the "New Thesis" announced last July by former Governor Rafael Hernández Colón and now supported by the Popular Democratic Party. The difficulty with the New Thesis is that Congress can't understand what its advocates are talking about. Their demands for more autonomy for

Puerto Rico strike many Senators and Representatives as plainly incompatible with the U.S. Constitution.

A strong majority of Puerto Rican voters in favor of statehood could present Congress with an altogether different set of problems. How would Congress react, for example, if, in protest, intransigent supporters of independence were to resort to acts of violence that would take the lives of hundreds of U.S. citizens in the island and on the mainland? Or if there were a danger that granting statehood would convert Puerto Rico into another Quebec? Or if Latin America were united in fervent opposition to the incorporation of Puerto Rico into the Union? Such scenarios might easily become congressional realities by the mid-1980s.

Henry Wells
Professor of Political Science
University of Pennsylvania

Decalogue Revisited: Take the "Nine" Years

Author Sybil Schwartz ["Surviving the '80s: Decalogue Comes of Age," *WQ*, Winter 1980] has it all wrong. Decalogue, forsooth. What is a decade between friends? Let her leave the decalogue to Moses. Take care of the units, and the tens will take care of themselves.

It is the last, not the penultimate, digit that matters. Take the nine years. In 1809, *annus mirabilis*, were born Lincoln, Gladstone, Mendelssohn, Tennyson, Poe, Darwin, and, for good measure, Braille, Edward Fitzgerald, and Gogol. That was a vintage year to be sure. But, 10 years later, 1819 gave birth to both Victoria and Albert, progenitors of a whole generation, or almost an era. Or track back. Goethe, 1749; Schiller, 1759; and in 1769 another vintage: Napoleon, Wellington, and Castlereagh, with Thomas Lawrence who painted them all. Regrettably, Adolf Hitler was born in 1889.

But perhaps Sybil Schwartz is less concerned with birthdays. Then let her look at this century: the Versailles Treaty in 1919, the Wall Street crash in 1929, the Second World War in 1939. More deaths

than births, perhaps. But seminal years, nevertheless.

The Duke of Edinburgh once told the British public to pull its collective finger out. My advice to Miss Schwartz is similar. *Dedigitate*. Say '99' and wait for it.

*Sir John Barnes
Sussex, England*

Correction

As several readers have pointed out, a typographical error appeared in "Health in America" [*WQ*, Spring 1980]. In the chart, "The Top Ten Killers," on page 73, cancer is shown to cause 70.6 percent of all 1978 deaths rather than 20.6 percent—the correct figure. To repeat:

1978	Per 100,000 population	As % of all deaths
Heart Disease	333.9	37.8
Cancer	181.6	20.6
Strokes	79.1	9.0
Accidents	49.5	5.6
Pneumonia & Influenza	26.7	3.0
Diabetes Mellitus	15.0	1.7
Cirrhosis of the Liver	13.7	1.6
Arteriosclerosis	13.4	1.5
Suicides	12.6	1.4
Certain Conditions of Infants	10.1	1.1

Source: U.S. Public Health Service.

Secondly, the correct source of the "Percent of Popular Vote" chart on page 129 ["Puerto Rico," *WQ*, Spring 1980] is the Puerto Rican Economic Development Administration, not the Health Care Financing Administration.

Politics and Foreign Policy

Re Stephen Hess's "Does Foreign Policy Really Matter?" [*WQ*, Winter 1980]:

Whatever the facts may be about past elections, the 1980 presidential contest will surely go to the man who sees most clearly and explains most effectively the brute fact that domestic economic policy no longer stops at the water's edge—if it ever did.

Trade follows the flag, as it always has, and the reduced clout of the United States in guaranteeing the security of our trading partners has set off a global struggle for access to the raw economic resources of the earth—in particular, the oil of Iran and the Arabian peninsula and the scarce nonfuel minerals of Africa. The Soviet Union is trying to win this struggle by political intimidation, revolutionary overthrow of unfriendly governments, or use of outright military force, directly (in Afghanistan) or indirectly (through Cuban proxies in Angola and Ethiopia).

The result of this disorderly and conflict-ridden world situation is rapidly rising costs and double-digit inflation in the United States. In this decade, there is no way to solve the energy problem except to insure the security of the oil-producing states of the Mideast. There is no way to do that except by a firmer American foreign policy and a much stronger American military presence in the Arabian Sea-Persian Gulf region.

In the 1980s, international policies and domestic policies must fit together like the intricate interlocking pieces of a Chinese puzzle. Any candidate for President of the United States who does not perceive the inseparable connection between our energy supply, our inflation, our jobs, our worried and refractory allies, and our dwindling military strength *vis-à-vis* opposing Soviet forces does not deserve to be President.

*Ray S. Cline
The Center for Strategic
and International Studies,
Georgetown University*

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
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