JFK'S MISSILE CRISIS, 1962
by Robert A. Pollard
WHY ECONOMISTS DISAGREE
CHILDREN IN AMERICA
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THE WILSON QUARTERLY
AUTUMN 1982

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Let's not phase out incentive

Funny how quickly some people forget the significant little details of history. Since the phasing out and later termination of price controls on crude oil and petroleum products, we have seen an upsurge in U.S. drilling activity and a moderation in petroleum prices. A recent New York Times editorial says Jimmy Carter should get the lion's share of the credit because of his "brave and dramatic" policy determination to let crude oil controls expire gradually over 30 months.

Well now, as Al Smith said: "Let's look at the record." Decontrol, as advanced by former President Carter, was not the decontrol program as agreed to by Congress and accelerated by President Reagan. What Mr. Carter first asked for was a "crude oil equalization tax" in exchange for letting U.S. oil prices rise to the levels charged by foreign producers. Under this plan, the U.S. Treasury would have collected all increases generated by higher oil prices. When the Senate would have none of that, he returned with his "windfall profits tax" as the price for allowing domestic oil to reach world levels. This would have given the federal and state governments about 89 percent of the price increases.

The major defect of both these plans was the establishment of a confiscatory tax on oil not yet discovered—a clear disincentive to search for new, secure domestic oil. Congress—wisely—rejected this approach by passing legislation with a much lower tax on undiscovered oil and in 1981 lowered that tax further. By these actions, Congress recognized the vital role incentives play in attracting new investment to the search for petroleum reserves.

It may not be critically important who now gets the political credit for the spurt of drilling activity and increased production that accompanied decontrol. But the record should show that it was Ronald Reagan who acted boldly and decisively to complete the decontrol process. What is also important is an understanding by the public that decontrol with incentives produced the healthy production spurt. Decontrol in which government would have derived nearly all the benefit, as proposed by President Carter, would have been simply an onerous additional tax burden, a windfall for the government but little or no help in the job of finding and producing more energy.

The "windfall profits tax," may we remind, never had anything to do with profits. It is an excise tax levied on production and based approximately on the difference between an arbitrary base price and the market price being paid for foreign oil. When the tax was being debated, Mobil argued that, if there had to be such a levy in order to achieve gradual decontrol, it should, at least, not be imposed on oil yet to be found. Nobody could know in advance the cost of finding and producing undiscovered oil, we said.

As it turned out, the "windfall profits tax" enacted in 1980 came closer to the principle we advocated. Old oil carried a 70-percent impost on the difference between an arbitrary base price and world price. On newly discovered oil, the tax rate was a lower 30 percent.

Even that extra margin provided the explorationists with incentive. And explore they have. From barely 10,400 wells drilled in 1979, the figure jumped to more than 15,300 in 1981. Industry sources estimate that domestic crude oil production is 700,000 barrels a day higher than it would have been if price controls had not been phased out and then ended.

Last summer, amid general recognition that incentives did indeed produce results, Congress changed the "windfall profits tax" on newly found oil to reduce it by 2 1/2 percent each year until it reaches 15 percent in 1986. As the nation recovers from recession and economic growth increases the demand for oil, we're sure the marketplace—with incentive for producers to produce—will continue to work its magic.

This should, incidentally, be an important lesson to remember if the Administration and Congress decide to accelerate the deregulation of natural gas. Any new tax on deregulated gas production must allow the needed economic incentive to bring on stream new gas supplies. The alternative, as always, is shortage, and America has had enough of that.

Mobil

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Editor's Comment

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Editor’s Comment

Starting with this issue, we will publish the Wilson Quarterly every two months, except in summer. The object is to meet the requests of our readers for more frequent coverage of important periodicals and books and to increase our usefulness to a growing national audience.

The general internal format of the WQ will not change. Nor will our effort to provide a broader range of ideas and information. A new feature is a sampling of key papers presented at Wilson Center seminars by noted scholars and specialists.

In this issue, our lead “cluster” of essays deals with the latest research on children and child-rearing in America. The findings reflect changes, for good or bad, in the larger society during the past two decades, even as the products of the great post-1945 Baby Boom begin raising offspring of their own. To a considerable degree, the role of children has been ignored in the debates of recent years—over women’s rights, the welfare state, and the plight of poor blacks and other minorities. Our contributors add fresh perspectives.

Our focus in the next WQ, a special issue, will be on the U.S. news media, particularly “print versus video,” and their rapid evolution since World War II. To a surprising extent, the future of American big-city newspapers depends on the performance of other institutions—the schools, the courts—as well as on the vagaries of public taste and the national economy. The WQ special issue will appear in November.
PERIODICALS

Reviews of articles from periodicals and specialized journals here and abroad

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POLITICS & GOVERNMENT


The secession crisis of 1861 forced Abraham Lincoln to choose whether to seize unconstitutional powers or to stand helpless as the union collapsed. He took the former course, raising troops and monies and suspending habeas corpus without congressional approval. But he was concerned by the dilemma: “Is there in all republics this inherent and fatal weakness? Must a government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?”

American presidential initiatives of the last 15 years—Lyndon Johnson’s use of the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution to broaden U.S. military commitments in Vietnam, Richard Nixon’s wiretaps of telephone calls by reporters and White House staffers to trace leaks—have raised anew the question of the need for limits to executive power. Engeman, a Loyola University political scientist, sees presidential prerogative as a dangerous necessity—which is balanced in our Constitution by the power of Congress to impeach.

Few Americans today would fault the actions of Lincoln. He seized on unconstitutional means to preserve the Constitution itself. But the choice is not always so clear. The assumption of unconstitutional powers must be reserved for extraordinary crisis, but what is to stop a President from treating an ordinary problem as extraordinary? Because it is impossible to specify in advance the circumstances that would justify extra-constitutional action, the only solution is extreme penalties for abuse. John Locke (1632–1704) believed that the only check on executive power was the willingness of the people to rebel. The Federalist Papers of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay propose a more orderly solution—regular popular elections. But, as Engeman notes, “much mischief can be done in a four-year term.”

The final constitutional safeguard against the abuse of presidential power is the Constitution itself, which must be interpreted by judges and the Supreme Court. The choice is not always so clear. The assumption of unconstitutional powers must be reserved for extraordinary crisis, but what is to stop a President from treating an ordinary problem as extraordinary? Because it is impossible to specify in advance the circumstances that would justify extra-constitutional action, the only solution is extreme penalties for abuse. John Locke (1632–1704) believed that the only check on executive power was the willingness of the people to rebel. The Federalist Papers of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay propose a more orderly solution—regular popular elections. But, as Engeman notes, “much mischief can be done in a four-year term.”
power is impeachment—the mirror image of presidential prerogative. Impeachment, says Engeman, is "the very tool which, abused to the slightest degree, would destroy separation of powers and enthrone legislative supremacy." Like presidential prerogative, impeachment puts the Constitution itself at risk by sanctioning a usually forbidden concentration of power. But balanced against each other, these two perilous powers secure America's future as a republic.

Whom Does Congress Serve?

Do members of Congress believe their primary responsibility is to their home district or to the nation as a whole? In January 1977, the U.S. Commission on Administrative Review polled 154 veteran members of the House of Representatives to see where their loyalties lay. Cavanagh, a Brookings Institution political scientist, examines the results.

Forty-seven percent of the Congressmen polled claimed to put the nation first; 25 percent, their district. (The rest said both were equally important.) The more experienced legislators expressed a stronger sense of responsibility to the nation: Of those serving six or more terms, for instance, 54 percent said their first duty was to country, compared to 38 percent of those in their second term. Party affiliation made virtually no difference.

These answers, says Cavanagh, could simply have reflected an "idealized self-image." But they were largely borne out in more specific questioning. Of those legislators who put their constituents first, 82 percent spent "a great deal of time" in their districts (compared to 54 percent of their nationally oriented colleagues). For the district-oriented, the top priorities in Washington were helping constituents cut government red tape (48 percent versus 25 percent) and winning federal grants and projects for the district (38 percent versus 14 percent). By contrast, 50 percent of the nationally oriented Congressmen spent most of their time working on legislation in committees.

All the lawmakers said they were more likely to heed district opinion on pocketbook matters—highways and public works, military spending in the district, social programs (housing, health, education, welfare). But on foreign and defense policy, abortion, civil rights, and fiscal policy, the Congressmen were more likely to make up their own minds. Often, several Congressmen noted, they have no choice. Because most issues get little publicity, constituents have no opinion; on many complex matters, they defer to the expert in Washington. Even on issues eliciting strong reactions—e.g., abortion or gun control—lawmakers usually have to decide for themselves, observes Cavanagh, because of the "cacophony of conflicting voices which cancel each other out."
"Thank You,
Mr. Ex-President"

"Harry S. Truman and the Multifarious Ex-Presidency" by James Giglio, in Presidential Studies Quarterly (Spring 1982), Center for the Study of the Presidency, 208 East 75th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

"No former President more extended the authority and privileges of the ex-Presidency than President Truman," observes Giglio, a Southwest Missouri State University historian. From 1953 until old age hobbled him in 1964, Harry Truman's experiences illustrate the nature—and limits—of the influence attending the "office of the ex-Presidency."

As President, Truman invited ex-President Herbert Hoover to chair several federal commissions. He expected Dwight Eisenhower to extend a similar courtesy to him, but bitter exchanges between the two men during the 1952 election campaign prevented this. Nevertheless, in times of foreign policy crisis, Truman threw his support behind Ike, defending, for instance, his decision to help Taiwan fortify the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, in 1958.

At the 1956 Democratic convention, ex-President Truman championed Governor Averell Harriman for President. But Truman found out his power was not what it had been when he occupied the White House. He swayed not a single delegate. The convention overwhelmingly endorsed Adlai Stevenson.

John F. Kennedy invited Truman to be his first guest in the White House, out of appreciation for the ex-President's campaign help. But there is little evidence that Truman had any impact on Kennedy's policies. Truman was philosophical: "Well, at least [Kennedy] listens," he once sighed. By contrast, Lyndon Johnson, an old friend, banked on Truman's help to overcome political opposition to his Vietnam policy, and gratefully acknowledged Truman's support.

Truman's relations with Congress were more fruitful. He was invited to testify on subjects ranging from presidential disability to immigration to highways. And he helped push through the 1958 Former Presidents Act, which provided a $25,000 annual allowance, a staff stipend,
office space, and free mailing privileges to former Chief Executives. By refusing to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1953, Truman also established precedent for the “ex-executive privilege” later invoked by Richard Nixon.

Truman threw most of his energies into party politics, and here the limits of his influence are most evident. He worked hard for his party’s presidential candidates—Stevenson, in 1956, and Kennedy in 1960. But before their nominations, he tried in vain to rally support for his favorites—Averell Harriman and Stuart Symington.

Like other ex-Presidents—Theodore Roosevelt, Herbert Hoover, Gerald Ford—Truman expected to retain more power than he did. But, says Giglio, his loyalty to old associates (e.g. Harriman and Symington) and to old policies—notably his “gradualist” approach to race relations—diminished the role he had hoped to play.

Republicans Heading South

"Republicans Flow South" by Robert H. Freymeyer, in American Demographics, (June 1982) P.O. Box 68, Ithaca, N.Y. 14850.

In the 1980 presidential election, Ronald Reagan won 13 of 16 Southern states. Some political analysts cite a national swing to the right or a general weakening of old party ties as the cause of this Republican sweep. Freymeyer, a sociologist at Gettysburg College, offers another explanation: More than four million Northerners have migrated to the once solidly Democratic South in the past decade, and a disproportionate number of them have been Republicans.

According to poll data, only seven percent of the South’s voters in the presidential election of 1952 were migrants from the North. By 1976, the figure had climbed to 25 percent. Of these migrants, 37 percent are Republicans (compared to 27 percent of native Southerners), and only 42 percent are Democrats (versus 60 percent of the natives). Not surprisingly, Florida, a retirees’ haven, has seen the biggest influx. Three-fourths of all Republicans there are migrants. In the 1968 presidential election, claims Freymeyer, migrants handed the state to Richard Nixon. Forty-three percent of Florida voters were transplanted Northerners, of whom 63 percent voted for Nixon. Only 22 percent of the migrants voted for the Democrat Hubert Humphrey, and native Southerner George Wallace won only 15 percent of their vote.

What changes can be expected as a result of this new Republican voice in the South? Freymeyer predicts a continued growth in Republican influence. In 1980, for example, six Southern states sent Republicans to the U.S. Senate. In four of those states (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina), Republicans replaced Democrats. On the local level, Freymeyer sees future improvements in Southern schools, since only 21 percent of migrant Republicans say they have confidence in the Southern educational system, compared with 42 percent of native Democrats and 62 percent of native Republicans.

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Migrant Republicans should have an even greater impact than their numbers indicate, says Freymeyer. They tend to be more active citizens than do native Southerners, who have the lowest voter turnout rate in the country. "Like the carpetbaggers after the Civil War," he observes, Northerners today are "heading South [and] bringing the Republican party with them."


Calculating how many weapons were needed to maintain nuclear deterrence was a simple matter when the United States enjoyed a clear military edge over the Soviet Union. But today, writes Lebow, professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins, the issue is far more murky. And U.S. military planners may be overstating our needs.

A key consideration is the U.S. "residual" force—how many missiles and bombers would survive a Soviet first strike. The two chief sources of estimates on this question, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, disagree. The CIA’s estimates are optimistic, the DIA’s are pessimistic. More important, Lebow contends, both agencies err by equating deterrence only with raw numbers of missiles and bombers. Ignored are crucial but hard to measure factors such as psychology, political will, and economic structure.

Both CIA and DIA fear that the prospect of facing a weak U.S. residual force might tempt Moscow to launch a preemptive first strike. As these agencies see it, the Kremlin assumes that Washington would not try to retaliate with a surviving U.S. force that could not eliminate the Soviets’ capability to launch a second strike. But Lebow notes a lesson from the past: In wartime, "honor, anger, or national self-respect" may overcome pragmatic considerations. Given their own World War II history, Russians, more than most people, realize that even a devastated, "weak" America would fight back.

Moreover, U.S. military analysts forget that war is waged for political reasons, not merely because one side enjoys a military advantage. And for Moscow, the political "bottom line" is survival. A war-ravaged Soviet Union would probably confront domestic unrest among its ethnic minorities—Caucasians, Muslims—and rebellion in its Eastern European satellites. Moreover, the Soviet economy, deprived of central direction, would be seriously disrupted. Soviet industry is especially vulnerable because it is concentrated close to key railroads. Destroying
the Trans-Siberian Railway, for instance, would cut off the only land link between European Russia and the east. The vaunted Soviet civil defense measures do not compensate for such risks.

Both sides understate the human costs of nuclear war, Lebow says; "Awareness of these costs may—and should—constitute a more potent deterrent than any degree of relative nuclear advantage."


A U.S. battalion was advancing cautiously down an open road into a valley when suddenly North Korean machine gunners opened fire. The U.S. troops dove for cover; tanks were brought up to pound the nearby hillside, then air strikes were launched. No attempt was made to protect civilians in the area. Finally, a platoon of soldiers moved out through the scrub to try to outflank the enemy. Was the commander right to use such heavy firepower to protect the lives of his soldiers?

In both Korea and Vietnam, U.S. commanders, trying to get at a hidden foe while keeping U.S. casualties to a minimum, often ordered massive bombardments—despite the increased risk to civilians. Dubik, an Army captain, weighs the morality of the tactic.

Citizens who become soldiers lose their rights to life and liberty, argued Michael Walzer, a political scientist at Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study, in his widely cited 1977 book, Just and Unjust Wars. Soldiers' lives should not be wasted, but commanders should take "due care" to minimize the hazard to civilians. "And if saving civilian lives means risking soldiers' lives," he wrote, "the risk must be accepted." Thus, in the Korean war incident, the patrol should have been sent out first—before any bombardments.

Dubik agrees that soldiers must accept increased risk. But they do not lose their natural right to life, which the state should still protect. Hence, a military commander, as the state's agent, must not only take "due care" regarding civilians, he must also see that his soldiers are exposed to no more than "due risk."

The right course for the Korean war commander, in Dubik's view, lay between the extremes of massive bombardment to protect passive troops, on the one hand, and no fire support at all for maneuvering soldiers. When troops move out to try to outflank the enemy, a commander becomes "quite justified" in backing them up with enough fire to suppress enemy machine guns. "Soldiers would enhance their own security at the expense of some civilians in this situation," Dubik writes; "however, civilians would be afforded due care and soldiers exposed only to due risk." And that is the balance that a military commander must strike.
Despite President Carter's personal commitment to human rights, his administration was surprisingly cautious in denying arms transfers to regimes considered to be repressive. Cohen, a Georgetown University law professor, contends that executive branch "bureaucratic warfare" during the Carter years kept military aid flowing to foreign governments guilty of flagrant human-rights transgressions.

In 1974, Congress enacted legislation (inserting Section 502B into the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act) recommending that the President deny, except in "extraordinary circumstances," American arms sales and military aid to regimes that showed a "consistent pattern" of "gross" abuse of human rights, including torture and "prolonged detention without charges." Until 1978, the statute remained merely advisory. During the Ford administration, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger simply ignored it. When Carter took office in 1977, the view at the top changed; Congress made Section 502B mandatory. But career foreign service officers, bent on maintaining cordial relations with foreign governments, failed to cooperate. They frequently played down human rights abuses in their assigned countries, and exaggerated improvements, says Cohen. (Countries that "squeaked through" under such conditions include Morocco, Taiwan, and Thailand, Cohen suggests.)

Despite President Carter's personal commitment to human rights, his administration kept military aid flowing to regimes deemed repressive.
FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Moreover, though the Carter administration banned new weapons sales to eight nations on the basis of Section 502B—Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay—it did so quietly, to keep its options open. The State Department even refused congressional requests for lists of countries guilty of "gross abuse." Spare weapons parts and military support equipment (e.g., trucks, radar) usually were not included in the bans. In 1978, for example, the United States sold Argentina nearly $120 million in spare parts and support. "Extraordinary circumstances" continued to necessitate frequent aid to five other regimes judged repressive (Indonesia, Iran, the Philippines, South Korea, Zaire).

"Human rights," President Carter said in December 1978, "is the soul of our foreign policy." That may have been the President's policy, says Cohen, but to career State Department officials, loyalty to "client" countries and U.S. allies came first.

Moscow's Friends Backed the Bomb

"Hiroshima and the American Left: August 1945" by Paul P. Boller, Jr., in International Social Science Review (Winter 1982), 1717 Ames St., Winfield, Kans. 67156.

Did America drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 mainly to defeat Japan or to daunt its future rival, the Soviet Union?

Since the publication of Gar Alperovitz's revisionist Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, in 1965, the conventional wisdom among American radical intellectuals has been that the bombings were unnecessary and immoral, staged chiefly to intimidate the Soviets. But Boller, a Texas Christian University historian, writes that this argument ignores one important fact: In 1945, those U.S. intellectuals who were most sympathetic to Moscow were also among the most enthusiastic supporters of the decision to use the bombs.

On August 8, 1945, two days after the devastation of Hiroshima, for example, a columnist for the American communist Daily Worker wrote, "So let us not greet our atomic device with a shudder, but with the elation and admiration which the genius of man deserves." Among intellectual journals then generally sympathetic to the Soviet Union—The Nation, The New Republic, and PM—the reaction was equally triumphant. The editor of The Nation wrote that "$2,000,000,000... was never better spent."

But anticommunist liberals, writing in such periodicals as Common Sense, The Progressive, and Christianity and Crisis were disturbed. Theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, for instance, criticized left-wing supporters of the bombings for harboring "the foolish hope that if we can completely destroy we will also be able to build a more ideal social structure out of these complete ruins." American socialists, led by Norman Thomas, echoed these liberals' anticomunsm and their qualms about the bombings. The American Trotskyists of the Socialist
Workers Party, hostile to both Stalinist Russia and capitalist America, reviled the bombings as the work of "Wall Street Militarists."

If Washington's purpose really was to intimidate the Soviets, Boller concludes, it is strange that Moscow's friends in the United States did not get the message.

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**ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS**

Who's Turning Out the Lights?


Since the late 19th century, regulated utility companies have helped foster American economic growth with abundant, relatively cheap electricity. However, because the industry is starving for new capital, those happy days may soon be over.

Until the early 1970s, the low costs of capital and fuel allowed the industry to expand rapidly, holding down expenses through economies of scale. But Navarro, a Harvard researcher, writes that the oil price hikes and inflation of the 1970s reversed the equation. Expansion today only boosts costs. And state regulators, under political pressure to keep consumers' monthly utility bills down, are reluctant to grant compensatory rate increases. The result: depressed bond ratings and lower stock values, raising the cost of capital still further.

During the 1980s, the demand for electricity is expected to grow by three percent annually; new coal or nuclear plants will be needed—at a cost of some $300 billion. It will take another $50 billion to replace or convert uneconomical oil- and gas-fired plants. But if capital costs for investment remain high, output will probably grow by only one to two percent annually during the decade. As overall supplies tighten, selective "brownouts" are likely, particularly in the Pacific Northwest and Colorado. The effects could include factory relocations abroad, slower adoption of new energy-intensive technologies (e.g., word-processing equipment), and a more sluggish economy.

Consumers will pay a "petroleum penalty" for the industry's troubles. More than half the new coal- and nuclear-fueled power plants scheduled for completion by 1988 have been delayed by an average of 20 months, mostly because of the capital squeeze; and two-thirds of "coal-convertible" plants still use oil. (In the Northeast alone, a $1.3 billion conversion investment could save consumers $5.2 billion.)

Navarro urges state regulators and Washington to come to the rescue. Utilities must be allowed a fair return on investment. And a speedup of federal plant-licensing procedures will be necessary to insure adequate electricity for the future.
Why Unions Need to Change

American unions have claimed a shrinking share of the labor force since the 1960s, thanks largely to the rapid growth of new, hard-to-organize service industries. (Only 20 percent of U.S. workers were union members in 1980 versus 34 percent in 1955.) But now, writes MIT economist Michael J. Piore, unions are in trouble even in their old power base, the mass-production industries.

After the 1930s, unions guaranteed their influence within industry by an implicit agreement with management. With union leaders' assent, business adopted the "scientific management" theories of Frederick Taylor (1856-1915), an American engineer who called for narrow specialization and strict job definitions on the shop floor. In the unions' view, this made it easier to bargain over working conditions and wages for each kind of job. But the unions' focus on spelling out responsibilities probably also enhanced productivity. Hence, managers did not resist, and sometimes even encouraged, unionization.

But basic economic changes have rendered "Taylorism" obsolete. Domestic markets alone no longer sustain the mass-production industries. Today, corporations must sell their goods around the world, facing increased foreign competition in smaller, fragmented markets. These conditions require swift market adjustments and product changes—in short, flexible job assignments.

Thus, business is abandoning Taylorism. But unions are resisting.
Piore notes that high wages are no longer managers’ principal objection to unions. Indeed, many are willing to pay even more to avoid unionization and the attendant rigid job categories.

American labor unions, Piore believes, must adapt to survive. Otherwise, corporations seeking to expand and revitalize their mass production operations will be forced to relocate their plants overseas. And if, as seems more likely, small domestic markets become critical, flexibility on the shop floor will still be essential.

Explaining
Budget Battles


Fashioning the federal budget may seem like an arcane technical process. But budgeting, writes Berkeley political scientist Wildavsky, reflects the underlying social order: “When we experience basic changes in budgeting . . . we know that society is not what it was or will be.”

From the founding of the Republic to the 1960s, Wildavsky contends, three major groups in American society joined in an evolving consensus favoring small, balanced budgets and a low level of public debt. “Social hierarchs,” such as Alexander Hamilton, favored a strong central government; “market men” sought government aid for “internal improvements”—canals, roads, harbors—and Jeffersonian republicans feared big government would perpetuate inequality. Generous internal improvements gave the first two groups some of what they wanted, and the size of government (and the budget) was kept down to satisfy the Jeffersonians. The balance was “not only between revenue and expenditure, but between social orders.”

After the Civil War, quickly liquidating the public debt no longer seemed crucial. Abraham Lincoln had averred that citizens “cannot be much oppressed by a debt which they owe themselves.” In fact, because of a five percent annual economic growth rate, federal outlays shrank relative to the economy between 1870 and 1902. But by 1920, deficits were appearing frequently. The progressives’ goal of spending wisely took priority over balancing budgets.

The Budget Act of 1921, which gave President Harding budgetary authority through a new Bureau of the Budget, “ushered out the era of small government in the United States.” Within 11 years, federal spending had risen nearly 40 percent, to 7.3 percent of GNP. And the acceptance of Keynesian economics and the welfare state after the Great Depression shaped a completely new consensus.

By the 1960s, the permanently unbalanced budget, with spending adjusted to insure full employment, was firmly established. The egalitarian heirs of Jefferson were now convinced that government redistribution of income was necessary to achieve equality; Hamilton’s
ideological descendants saw a need to buy off restive minorities and preserve social peace; market men got greater subsidies for business.

Today's budget battles reflect the struggle to forge a new social compact. Wildavsky believes the new consensus will call for budget balance. The question: Will it be balanced at a high level of taxes and spending, as in the European social democracies, or at a lower level, as the market men demand?

**America's Lag**


America's vaunted technological and economic superiority may be in jeopardy, thanks to shortsighted corporate leadership, excessive labor-management strife, and an overgrowth of litigation. These surface defects, says Lewis, a Senior Fellow at the Wharton School of Business, suggest underlying U.S. character flaws: too much conflict, too little trust.

The United States leads in corporate R & D as a percentage of industrial output, at 1.91 percent; the West German figure is 1.64 percent; Japan's is 1.29 percent. But partly in response to high inflation, the Americans concentrate on products for the immediate future, while leading foreign companies look decades ahead. The executives of Japan's consumer electronics firms envisioned selling video recorders 15 years before they could market them.

Similar shortsightedness plagues U.S. investment strategies. For example, the stockholders' thirst for profit forces General Motors to seek pay-back on investment within five years. Technological improvements are thus confined to tinkering with old auto plants. GM uses its factories for 39 years; its Japanese competitors build new ones every 14 years.

Even more harmful is the adversarial approach in American labor-management relations. A 1981 General Accounting Office survey found that daily productivity in 20 comparable Wyoming coal mines ranged from 58 to 242 tons of coal per worker. Why? Bosses of the more productive mines encouraged worker involvement in decision-making. IBM and Kodak have proved that Japan has no monopoly on "open" businesses. But why are there so few in the United States?

U.S. regulatory agencies and corporations prefer to litigate rather than cooperate—with predictable results. Ordered to reduce coke oven pollution, U.S. steel firms often cut plant efficiency to comply. Their Japanese competitors, given technical guidance by government regulators, increase efficiency by using waste heat from emissions to power their plants.

It is not in the cards for a heterogeneous America, founded on individual rights and distrustful of authority, to become "another Japan," says Lewis. But increased cooperation, American-style, is a must.
Scandal is nothing new to U.S. college football. At the turn of the century, students, who then ran the sport, paid players' tuitions out of game receipts and winked at excessive violence on the field. Smith, a professor of physical education at Pennsylvania State University, tells how football nearly died of its excesses, then was saved.

The 1905 season was the climax. A Wesleyan football player jumped on the back of a downed Columbia runner and sparked a melee that required police intervention. In October, President Theodore Roosevelt (Harvard, '80), convinced that the sport built character, summoned representatives of the "Big Three"—Harvard, Yale, and Princeton—to the White House for some admonitory jawboning. But trouble continued. Roosevelt was outraged when a Yale tackler smashed a Harvard punt receiver in the face—a case of injury added to insult as Yale (again) shut out the Crimson. A Union College player was killed in a pile-up during a game with New York University. Columbia decided to ban football; other colleges—among them NYU, Northwestern, California, and Stanford—did the same. Would the rest follow suit? As the nation's most prestigious college, Harvard held the decisive vote.
In early November 1905, Harvard football coach Bill Reid—whose $7,000 salary exceeded by 40 percent that of any professor on the faculty—got word that the trustees had secretly decided to abolish the sport. Reid and four allies hatched a plan to save their game—by openly condemning its brutality and recommending that it be “radically changed.” Harvard’s president, Charles W. Eliot, was skeptical.

But Reid persisted, trying to persuade other college coaches to agree to Harvard-proposed rules changes. He predicted that without reforms, Harvard would abolish the sport and that other colleges would inevitably follow. It would mean, Reid warned, that football would be replaced: “This will mean English rugby.” It was too terrible a prospect. Reid won, and football, under new rules, survived.

"Ethnicity—North, South, West" by Nathan Glazer, in Commentary (May 1982), 165 East 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

Since the mid-1960s, new waves of immigrants—Latin Americans, Asians, and Africans—have come to America. In language, religion, or culture, they differ measurably from the European immigrants who preceded them. And they have been treated differently: through laws to help them keep their old languages and through government boosts to an increasing number of ethnic groups deemed “deprived.” Such special handling is a “sure recipe for conflict.” So argues Glazer, a Harvard sociologist.

European immigrants came to this country in massive numbers during the 19th and early 20th centuries. The influx halted during the 1920s, then resumed, much reduced, during the ’50s and ’60s. For those immigrants—Irish, Germans, Italians, Jews, Poles, Ukrainians—the open, competitive system worked: They, or their sons and daughters, eventually obtained a fair measure of economic or political success. But this system did not seem to work so well after World War II for Hispanics or Southern blacks who migrated north. For example, European immigrants had used politics to advance themselves, but despite the Voting Rights Act of 1965, blacks in Northern cities continued to vote in very low numbers. In response, Washington backed ever more extensive efforts to assure equality by conferring special benefits on blacks, Hispanics, and other “deprived” ethnic groups.

But as America’s ethnic groups multiply, says Glazer, it becomes more difficult to decide who really deserves special treatment. The 1.5 million Asians who immigrated to the United States during the ’70s (up from 362,000 during the ’60s) included Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Koreans, Asian Indians, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians, and Pacific Islanders. Many Asian Indians were educated professionals; many Koreans, able small businessmen; many Vietnamese, adept students. Do they deserve equal, or any, government assistance? Do they deserve it in the same measure as urban blacks or Hispanics? "A com-
petition over who is more discriminated against, and who more worthy of federal or other protection," says Glazer, "may well develop." The consequences for society could be disastrous.

The answer, he suggests, is to return to the long-abandoned vision of the American "melting pot." Assimilation as an ideal worked for the old immigrants; it may yet work for the new ones.

"Past Court Cases and Future School Discipline" by Henry S. Lufler, Jr., in *Education and Urban Society* (Feb. 1982), Sage Publications, 275 South Beverly Dr., Beverly Hills, Calif. 90212.

During the 1970s, the Supreme Court considered fewer than 10 cases involving the rights of public school students. Its rulings, which generally expanded student rights, are having an impact on the schools—often in indirect and unintended ways, according to Lufler, assistant dean at the University of Wisconsin's School of Education.

In 1969, the Justices ruled in *Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District* that wearing an antiwar armband was insufficient grounds for suspension unless school officials could prove that the student's display would disrupt classes. The Court leashed school administrators again in 1975. *Goss v. Lopez* established that students were entitled to a hearing by an administrator before being suspended for even a few days. And in *Wood v. Strickland*, the Court added that school officials could be held personally liable if they knew or "reasonably should have known" that they were depriving students of their rights.

These cases were based on a Court interpretation of government services (such as welfare payments) as property rights, not discretionary benefits. Due process, ruled the Justices, was required before entitlements could be withdrawn. But the Justices appear reluctant to expand students' rights much beyond *Tinker, Goss*, and *Wood*, maintains Lufler. Due process requires only that students be told why they are being suspended and that they be given a chance to tell their side of the story. In 1977, the Court ruled in *Ingraham v. Wright* that hearings are not required before corporal punishment could be carried out.

Now, legal uncertainties (How much due process is required for suspensions longer than 10 days? Can grades be lowered as punishment for truancy?) plague school administrators and school boards fearful of lawsuits. A 1977 survey reveals that both teachers and students believe the courts have provided greater protection for students than is really the case. Under such misapprehensions, teachers today hesitate to discipline their students, who, not surprisingly, feel freer to misbehave.

It's up to educators to inform themselves about the Court rulings, says Lufler. Otherwise, "the gloomiest prophecies about the negative impact of courts on schools" will come true.
As depicted by much of the press, Jerry Falwell commands the loyalties of two million members of the Moral Majority and reaches 25 million more people through his TV program, Old Time Gospel Hour. His followers are on the move in a "political holy war without precedent."

Such media alarms have been sounded often since Falwell’s meteoric rise to fame in the election-year summer of 1980. They are wildly exaggerated, says Rosenberg, publications director at the Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies. The Moral Majority’s real membership is 400,000, and Falwell’s weekly TV audience is about 1.4 million. In audience, Falwell ranks sixth among religious broadcasters — just behind Jimmy Swaggert. If the Moral Majority has power be-

Jim Morin’s 1981 cartoon reflects newsman’s low opinion of Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority. But the press has exaggerated the group’s influence.
yond its numbers, that power has been bestowed on it by the press and political liberals.

Exaggerating Falwell’s power serves liberals by supplying a scapegoat for their 1980 election losses and by lending a sense of urgency to their appeals for funds. The American Civil Liberties Union recently raised $100,000 in one month after it ran a newspaper advertisement playing on fears that the Moral Majority would succeed in re-establishing school prayer. But why have newsmen played along?

For one thing, Falwell & Co. know how to grab headlines and 20-second TV news clips with outrageous quips (“We’re becoming a society with a chicken in every pot and a baby in every trash can”). More fundamentally, most New York and Washington reporters are liberals—“the very people Falwell blames for driving America into a moral tailspin.” A 1981 survey of 200 influential journalists found that 86 percent seldom or never go to church. Hence, newsmen fear Falwell’s intolerance and anti-intellectual attitudes, even as they fail to understand his appeal and its limits. Yet, Rosenberg notes, the media furor has probably helped Falwell: “What’s described as powerful often ends up being powerful.”

Largely ignored by the press amid all the noise, says Rosenberg, has been “the human side”—the legitimate concerns of Americans worried about the moral decay in national life.

No News Like Washington News

The way the big-league U.S. press and television reporters tell it, 40 percent of what matters in America takes place in Washington, D.C. The nation’s capital dominates the news now as never before. Of all the news items broadcast by CBS-TV, for instance, almost two-fifths originate in Washington; of all the domestic wordage sent out to American newspapers by the major wire services, AP and UPI, nearly 40 percent is Washington news. So reports Bonafede, chief political correspondent for the National Journal.

The federal government’s growth spurt since 1965 partly explains the Washington news explosion. But since “news” to some extent is whatever editors and reporters say it is, the growth of the Washington press/TV corps itself is a factor. Forty years ago, when Franklin D. Roosevelt was President, he met the press by chatting with a handful of reporters gathered around his desk. Now, presidential press conferences draw 200 reporters, TV cameramen, and others. According to Bonafede, there are some 10,000 journalists of all varieties, and 2,989 news organizations, ranging from the Los Angeles Times to the Bergen County, N.J., Record; in town. ABC’s TV news operation is headquartered in Washington, not New York, and has a staff of 450. The New York Times’s Washington bureau had 32 reporters in 1979; now it has

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40. The Washington Post’s news staff has jumped from 350 in 1966 to about 500 today.

TV, radio, and daily newspapers can’t take care of all the Washington news. That’s where the specialized “newsletter industry” comes in. Some 2,500 different newsletters, both commercial and nonprofit, are now published in the capital. Uncle Sam is largely responsible. “Every time there was a new federal program, there would be two, four or six newsletters,” explains Fred Goss, president of the Newsletter Association of America. President Reagan’s determination to cut Big Government has ended the newsletter boom, Bonafede says, but 16,000 subscribers still each pay $600 a year for Tax Management and 1,800 fork out $800 for The Energy Daily.

Big Government is now matched by Big Media. But the question again is: Is bigger better?

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

America’s Liberal Theologians

“The Politics of American Theology Faculty” by Everett Carll Ladd and G. Donald Ferree, Jr., in This World (Summer 1982), Institute for Educational Affairs, 210 E. 86th St., Sixth Floor, N.Y., N.Y. 10028.

How do Americans’ religious values affect their political views? Scholars debate whether deep religious faith tends to make a person politically conservative (e.g., anti-abortion) or liberal (e.g., pro-nuclear disarmament). Now, a new survey of America’s Christian theologians compounds the riddle. These religious leaders, at least, are more liberal than most Americans on many political issues but conservative on questions of personal morality. So report Ladd and Ferree, director and associate director, respectively, of the Roper Center.

The Roper Center polled 1,112 professors in Christian seminaries and schools of religion in late 1981 and early 1982. Theologians, they found, are far more likely than other Americans to call themselves political liberals. Fifty percent of the theologians claimed to be liberal; 22 percent, moderate; and 27 percent, conservative. (For Americans overall, the figures are 21 percent liberal, 33 percent moderate, and 47 percent conservative, according to a 1981 Roper poll.) The political gap was especially evident on issues of welfare and defense spending. Only 29 percent of theologians, but 55 percent of the general public, thought welfare spending was too high. By contrast, 74 percent of the theologians objected to Washington’s defense outlays; just 29 percent of the general public agreed. The theologians were closer to other Americans on so-called social issues. Seventy percent deemed abortion immoral in cases where a married woman simply wanted no more children; 65 percent of all Americans concurred. When asked whether such abor-
tions should be illegal, 56 percent of the faculties said yes, as did 53 percent of the public.

The theologians overwhelmingly agreed that religious values should affect governmental decision-making, though they doubted that Christianity mandates specific political prescriptions. Three-fourths thought that religion's influence in the United States was "too low," but only 32 percent supported establishing a period of voluntary, silent prayer in public schools.

Denominational affiliation significantly influenced the theologians' responses. Abortions were most likely to be considered moral or "morally neutral" by American Baptists (63 percent) and Methodists (54 percent). The strongest opponents of current U.S. military spending were Episcopalians (92 percent) and Catholics (89 percent). On a few issues, the theologians were almost unanimous. Ninety-five percent believed that church property used for nonreligious purposes should be taxable. And 99 percent said they would oppose a constitutional amendment declaring Christianity the official national religion.

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According to most historians of American religion, the early colonists may have arrived on these shores filled with religious zeal, but their sons and daughters soon lapsed into indifference. Not so, say Bonomi and Eisenstadt, historians at New York University. They contend that early American church life was remarkably stable.

The traditional view is logical enough: Many colonies had no officially established church; formally educated ministers were rare. Early in the century, Anglican priests lamented the colonists' "indifference, carelessness,[and] unconcernedness" toward worship. But where many historians see apathy toward religion, Bonomi and Eisenstadt see a different religious culture.

Church membership figures for the 1700s seem low, but they are misleading. Anglicans, to cite one difficulty, required a bishop's presence to confirm new members, and no bishop ever visited the colonies.

A better indicator is church attendance. In 1724, 56 percent of potential white adult Virginians (excluding Quakers, Catholics, and other "dissenters") were in an Anglican church each Sunday. In South Carolina, it was 61 percent. Churches in the North were stronger. In all 13 colonies, adherence to eight major denominations dropped only slightly—from 80 percent of whites in 1700 to 74.7 percent in 1740 to 69 percent in 1765.

Many churches grew so quickly that their buildings were almost al-
ways too small. A South Carolina minister wrote in 1724 that his congregants "were forced to stand without the door, and others hang at the windows." Churches were usually the first institutions created on the frontier. Presbyterianism in the South grew from a few scattered churches early in the century to 45 in 1750. Immigrant Lutheran congregations mushroomed by 160 percent between 1740 and 1776.

Ordinary colonists simply had less narrow views of Christian doctrine than their pastors had, the authors conclude. Thus, the "indifference" clergymen decried was simply a lack of concern for denominational differences. When Charles Woodmason, an Anglican priest in rural South Carolina in the 1760s, denounced the region's "infidels and Atheists," he meant that they were not Anglicans. Thriving Presbyterian, Baptist, and independent churches had formed, he noted unhappily, in every "Hole and Corner where they could raise Congregations."

President Reagan's recent proclamation of a National Day of Prayer may seem to reflect the current surge of religious fundamentalism. But, writes Menendez, research director for Americans United for Separation of Church and State, the President was simply obeying the law—a law with a 200-year history behind it.

During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress assigned a number of national days of "public humiliation, fasting and prayer." The peace following Pennsylvania's Whiskey Rebellion in 1795 prompted George Washington to create an official day of thanksgiving. In 1808, Thomas Jefferson declined to comply with this tradition, citing the Constitution's proscription against the "intermeddling" of religious and civic affairs. Refusing petitions from religious leaders for a national prayer day, Jefferson observed that "every religious society has a right to determine for itself the times for [fasting and prayer]."

Jefferson's successor waffled. Though a staunch proponent of the separation of church and state, James Madison felt an allegiance to the presidential tradition and assigned several days "on which all who thought proper might unite in consecrating it to religious purposes, according to their faith and forms."

In 1832, Andrew Jackson drew reproach from Congress for refusing to declare a public day of fasting and prayer in response to a cholera epidemic. After bitter debate, Congress passed a resolution over Jackson's objection, recommending "fervent supplications to Almighty God that He will avert the Asiatic scourge."

Abraham Lincoln, a religious man but no churchgoer, was moved by the crisis of Civil War to declare nine separate days of penitence and prayer during his 49-month administration. To Lincoln, the "awful
calamity of Civil War" was "a punishment inflicted upon us for our presumptuous sins."

Not all Presidents have felt so urgently the need for prayer. In 1953, notes Menendez, Dwight Eisenhower declared July 4 a National Day of Prayer, then spent the day "fishing, golfing and playing bridge."

Whether they like it or not, Presidents must now mix politics with religion at least one day a year. In 1952, Harry Truman signed into law a resolution mandating that the President "proclaim a suitable day each year, other than a Sunday, as a National Day of Prayer."

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**SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY**

*Is the Sun Shrinking?*


Scientists have agreed in recent years that the sun is not a placid place. It pulsates, erupts in storms, and is developing holes in its outer atmosphere. The sun, writes Johnson, a Colorado science writer, is an "unpredictable, middle-aged star." Some astronomers now think that it may also be a shrinking star, and that contention has sparked a fierce scientific controversy.

It began in 1979, when, after culling the records of London’s Greenwich Observatory dating back to 1750, John A. Eddy of Colorado’s High Altitude Observatory reached the startling conclusion that the sun might be shrinking at the rate of two "arc seconds" annually (one and a half meters per hour). Eddy knew his estimate was exaggerated—at that rate, the sun would disappear in 100,000 years. But the archives of the Naval Observatory in Washington, D.C. seemed to confirm it.

Critics, led by John H. Parkinson of London’s University College, scoffed at Eddy’s evidence. The Greenwich and Washington astronomers had measured the time it took for the sun to cross a fixed point in the sky: The quicker the transit, the smaller the sun. Unreliable instruments, subjective judgments, and the effects of air pollution all could have thrown off their data.

Meanwhile, Irwin Shapiro of MIT took another approach to the problem. Drawing on records of the time it took the planet Mercury to cross the sun in 24 cases since the 17th century, he put the sun’s shrinkage at 0.15 arc seconds per century—an insignificant amount, possibly overstated by flaws in the data.

Other scientists tried to resolve the dispute by scrutinizing records on the duration of total solar eclipses—when the moon passes between the sun and Earth—during the past two centuries. Using observations gathered by Edmund Halley in England in 1715 and by legions of *Scientific American* subscribers in 1925, and comparing them to more recent
findings, NASA’s Sabatino Sofia and two colleagues put the sun’s diminution at a slight 0.34 arc seconds altogether between 1715 and 1979. Parkinson contends that the sun has not shrunk at all; Eddy and other scientists still argue that it has, if only by a small amount. Even slight changes in the future, they argue, could affect the Earth’s climate. Meanwhile, astrophysicists and astronomers continue to delve into dusty archives in an attempt to resolve the question.

Darwin’s Finches


Newton is struck by an apple, Galileo drops weights from the Tower of Pisa—and theories are born. Thus do legends dramatize the painstaking discoveries of great scientists. But surely the legend of “Darwin’s finches” is true? Not so, according to Sulloway, a professor of psychology and social relations at Harvard. The finches of the Galápagos Islands are said to have inspired his theory of evolution, but Darwin never even mentioned them in his landmark Origin of the Species (1859).

Charles Darwin (1809–82) visited the Pacific archipelago—16 principal islands about 600 miles west of Ecuador—in 1835, aboard H.M.S. Beagle. During his five-week stay, he gathered geological specimens from as many of the islands as he could. But he gathered zoological specimens haphazardly. Of the nine finch species (there are 13 “Darwin’s finches”) that he did collect, he correctly identified only six as finches. And these he thought were very distantly related—too different to arouse thoughts of evolution.

Darwin did notice that mockingbirds varied slightly from island to island. And he was intrigued to learn “that from the form of the body, shape of scales & general size, the Spaniards can at once pronounce, from which Island any Tortoise may have been brought.” (Still, he was not intrigued enough to stop his shipmates from eating the tortoises brought aboard the Beagle.) While still at sea, nine months after leaving the islands, the significance of these facts began to dawn on him; he wrote in his notes that they might “undermine the stability of Species.”

Returning to England in 1836, Darwin turned over his collections to specialists. Ornithologist John Gould correctly identified Darwin’s finch specimens as closely related species. This revelation—plus others’ findings about his fossil and plant collections—helped to confirm Darwin’s thinking. Only then did Darwin pay close attention to the finches. But while on the islands he had recorded very little about them. He tried to deduce the island of origin for his specimens by going through the collections of his shipmates and servant, but he was wrong half the time. Moreover, he could not prove the impact of natural selection on the finches because he had failed to notice any differences in the birds’ diets.
Male-female pairs representing three of 13 species of "Darwin's finches" found in the Galápagos Islands. The birds are said to have inspired Darwin's theory of evolution—but he never even mentioned them in his Origin of the Species.

and behaviors. Thus, the finches never made it into Origin.

Whence the legend? By the middle of the 20th century, it was clear to scientists that the finches presented a 'textbook example' of Darwin's theories. Darwin's elaborate reconstructions of specimen locations—which later scholars took to be field notes—falsely implied that Darwin himself had recognized this from the start.

Why Dieting Doesn't Work

"Do Diets Really Work?" by William Bennett and Joel Gurin, in Science 82 (Mar. 1982), P.O. Box 10790, Des Moines, Iowa 50340.

It often seems as if almost every adult in weight-conscious America is on a diet. According to Bennett and Gurin, director of the writing program at MIT and managing editor of American Health, respectively, such self-control may all be in vain.

Overeating, the authors argue, is not the chief cause of corpulence. Research conducted at fast-food outlets shows that the fat and the skinny eat about the same amounts. Genetic predisposition is the chief determinant of body weight. Each individual, the authors say, has a natural "setpoint"—a kind of fat thermostat—that keeps body weight near a fixed level. Glycerol and other substances released by adipose cells signal how much fat the cells contain: When the substances reach a low level, the brain responds by slowing body metabolism to conserve energy. Too high a level triggers the opposite reaction.

Setpoint theory helps to explain why dieters often gain back weight they have lost. In a 1944 experiment, 36 volunteers placed on an austere 1,750-calorie diet lost a quarter of their weight within six months. They
were apathetic and lethargic even when allowed to eat again, returning
to normal only when they regained their former weights. A 1964 exper-
iment showed the effects of overeating: The subjects found it hard to
gain weight and maintained their new corpulence only by consuming
an extra 2,000 calories per day, far more than was theoretically neces-
sary. Evidence suggests that a metabolic speed-up is triggered after two
weeks of overeating or by a cumulative 20,000-calorie surplus.

The body also regulates eating. In an experiment run by University of
Pennsylvania psychologist Theresa Spiegel, volunteers subsisted on a
milkshake-style beverage dispensed from a reservoir they could not see.
They soon began drinking just enough to get about 3,000 calories
daily—the normal amount. Then, the calorie content was secretly cut in
half. After two days, the volunteers adjusted by roughly doubling their
intake, keeping their calorie counts steady.

If setpoint theory is correct, neither conscious decisions nor deep
psychological forces have much to do with an individual's weight. The
only way to slim down is to tamper with the setpoint, and that, the
authors say, can only be done by smoking, taking amphetamines or
other diet drugs, or increasing physical exercise.

Keeping Secrets

"Secrecy and Openness in Science: Ethical Considerations" by Sissela Bok, in
Science, Technology, & Human Values (Winter 1982), 70 Memorial Dr., Cam-
bridge, Mass. 02139.

Modern scientists have traditionally viewed anything less than com-
plete openness about research methods and results with suspicion.
Now their attitude is changing, writes Bok, a Harvard Medical School
lecturer. The burgeoning scientist population, increased specialization,
competition for funding, and the rising importance of science in both
corporate strategies and national security may actually work against
the speedy advancement and diffusion of scientific knowledge.

Most scientists recognize the drawbacks of secrecy: "It fosters need-
less duplication of efforts, postpones the discovery of errors, and leaves
the mediocre without criticism and peer review." On the other hand,
the drive to be ahead of other scientists with a discovery can fuel inno-
vation. And researchers are so specialized now that they cannot "shift
gears" easily if they discover another scientist on the trail. In the 1960s,
biochemist James Watson and biologist Francis Crick selectively re-
leased information about their work on the structure of DNA to keep
competitors off their scent. By the same token, word that an experiment
is going poorly can lead to a researcher's loss of financial support.

Corporations increasingly require secrecy when they contract with
university scientists. Without denying all grounds for "trade secrecy,"
Bok points out the dangers: concealment of promising lines of research
that may benefit society and the cover-up of product deficiencies.

But the most fractious issue facing scientists today may be the U.S.
military's attempts to control the dissemination of new mathematical coding systems that are virtually impossible to break. Vice Admiral Bobby Inman, then director of the National Security Agency (NSA), argued in 1980 that sharing such research could hinder U.S. intelligence gathering. In a two-year test, some cryptographers are submitting papers to the NSA for prepublication review. But many others have refused NSA offers of financial aid, fearing censorship or classification of their discoveries.

Keeping new cryptographic knowledge secure may not even be possible, Bok concludes. Voluntary controls will work only if researchers worldwide agree to them. And enough information has already been published to enable interested parties to discover for themselves the essential principles behind "unbreakable" codes.

RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

Acid Rain Ignored

"Acid Precipitation in Historical Perspective" by Ellis B. Cowling, in Environmental Science & Technology (Feb. 1982), 1155 16th Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

In 1962, U.S. author-biologist Rachel Carson stirred widespread surprise and public concern when she warned in Silent Spring of the "poison rain" that pollutes our lakes and streams, reduces fish populations, and sickens vegetation. Yet, notes Cowling, chairman of the National Atmospheric Deposition Program, scientists, mostly Europeans, studied "acid rain" and its links to industrial emissions for centuries, and they were virtually ignored.

That industrial emissions affect humans and plants was perceived as early as 1661–62, when English country gentleman John Evelyn and statistician John Graunt recommended building taller industrial chimneys to spread "smoke" to "distant parts." The term acid rain was coined in 1872 by Robert Angus Smith, a British chemist. He described how coal combustion altered the chemistry of rain and how contaminated precipitation harmed plants, textiles, and metals in industrial regions of England, Scotland, and Germany. Nine years later, geologist Waldemar Brøgger undertook a study of smudsig snefeld (dirty snowfall) in his native Norway. He pinpointed its cause: smoke from a manufacturing area in Britain.

Nevertheless, research on pollution proceeded piecemeal as specialists on the world's water systems, agriculture, and air tackled the question independently. In the late 1940s, German chemist Christian Junge and Swedish scientists Carl Gustav Rossby and Erik Eriksson pioneered in the new field of "atmospheric chemistry." And beginning in the 1950s, Eville Gerham, a Canadian ecologist, reported on acid rain's damage to aquatic ecosystems. He noted, too, that bronchitis in
humans increased as rain became more acidic. A junior colleague of Rossby and Eriksson, soil scientist Svante Odén, combined all of these findings, and more, in 1967 and 1968. Somewhat flamboyantly, Odén described for the Swedish press a foul "chemical war" among the nations of Europe, in which pollutants of a single country could travel over 1,200 miles in the atmosphere. His reports finally aroused scores of European and North American scientists and politicians.

As of late 1981, 93 stations across the United States and 50 in Canada had been set up to monitor precipitation. The findings so far: Two-thirds of the two countries' land area regularly receive acid rain.


Environmentalists often blame businessmen—and the capitalist system itself—for air and water pollution. The entrepreneurs make their profits, and the public pays the "costs," they argue. However, Smith, a Washington consultant, contends that much pollution and other environmental abuse in the United States has been fostered by government failure to appreciate the advantages of private ownership.

Environmental pollution, Smith notes, seems to be worse in communist countries than in the West. A 1981 study found the populace of the heavily industrial Katowice region of Poland suffering 47 percent more respiratory disease than other Poles. The Soviets, meanwhile, have so polluted and overexploited their waterways that rivers leading to the major inland seas, the Caspian and the Aral, are now "little more than open sewers." And the Chinese under Mao Zedong let pollution, waterworks, and landfill projects ravage the freshwater fish population; fish has almost disappeared from the Chinese diet. State regulation of natural resources, Smith concludes, does not necessarily eliminate environmental abuse.

The problem with public ownership, says Smith, is that it fails to hold out an incentive to any individual to protect a natural resource. In America, backpackers, hunters, wildlife lovers, campers, cattlemen, and others all press public managers to allocate resources in often conflicting ways. Hence, the government sometimes permits the overharvesting of trees in national forests, excessive grazing on leased Western lands, and congestion of national parks. Private property owners, by contrast, can carefully tend their forests and grazing lands.

The federal government owns or manages one-third of America's 2.27 billion acres of land; when state and local government lands are added, about 40 percent of the country is in the public domain. Smith calls for putting some of the most abused wildlife refuges and parks under the control of the Audubon Society and other suitable private owners. Such an experiment would raise difficult questions about procedure and fairness. But America's resources, he writes, are worth the effort.
"Rudyard Kipling and the Establishment: A Humanistic Dilemma" by Harold Orel, in *The South Atlantic Quarterly* (Spring 1982), Duke University Press, P.O. Box 6697, College Station, Durham, N.C. 27708.

More than 200 Kiplingisms pepper the third edition of the *Oxford Dictionary of Quotations* ("the white man's burden"; "I've taken my fun where I found it"; "A woman is only a woman, but a good cigar is a smoke"). And Rudyard Kipling's fiction—*The Light That Failed*, *Captains Courageous*, *Kim*, and much more—still sells briskly in America, Britain, even the Soviet Union. Why, then, asks Orel, a professor of English at the University of Kansas, is Kipling's reputation as a serious writer so tarnished?

Kipling (1865–1936) was the first Englishman to win the Nobel Prize for literature, in 1907. Yet generations of scholars, claims Orel, have chosen to evaluate the man's art on the basis of his controversial political pronouncements. T. S. Eliot joked that no one need worry about defending Kipling against "the charge of excessive lucidity." Oscar Wilde, Henry James, Malcolm Cowley, and Lionel Trilling alike damned him with scathing reviews. But, Orel argues, Kipling's convictions have been too harshly judged. Kipling did once contend that war was a panacea, but he held to the idea for only two or three years in the early 1890s. Nevertheless, critics portray him as a chronic warmonger.
Too often, critics have confused the opinions of Kipling’s characters with his own. In 1942, George Orwell wrote, for example, “It is no use claiming . . . that when Kipling describes a British soldier beating a ‘nigger’ with a cleaning rod in order to get money out of him, he is acting merely as a reporter . . . Kipling is a jingo imperialist, he is morally insensitive and aesthetically disgusting.” But, born in Bombay and trained as a journalist in India, Kipling far more than his foes had witnessed firsthand the workings of empire at its outposts. His imperialist views were tempered by a firm belief that expansion without a proper sense of responsibility toward the governed was foolhardy. In his “The Ballad of East and West,” he salutes strong men whatever their race.

Kipling was no saint: “He was never a democrat, he detested female suffragism, he despised the very concept of mass education,” notes Orel. But his efforts to probe grief, the horrors of war, and the “irrationality of human existence” through fiction deserve the serious consideration of scholars.

Godless Art

American intellectual thought before the Civil War revolved around God and a perceived divine order: Nature was God’s handiwork; man was subordinate. The young Republic’s art reflected this emphasis, until Charles Darwin and French impressionism together prompted a major change in artistic theory and style. So writes Novak, a Barnard College art historian.

Between 1825 and 1865, Americans developed a native art form, luminism. It drew on their experience in a New World, with its force, energy, and seemingly certain promise of renewal. Art showed “God-in-Nature,” not man’s interpretation of nature. Artists such as Fitz Hugh Lane painted smooth, linear surfaces; an individualistic stroke was taboo, since it presumptuously indicated the artist’s ego.

The emergence in the late 1860s of impressionism in Europe helped to change all this. Where luminist art had striven for a transcendent “spiritual illumination,” impressionism was secular and personal. Luminists had used minute modulations in tone to create landscapes that shone with divine light. French impressionist works also have a sunny, optimistic glow. But the viewer of paintings by such impressionists as Claude Monet is always conscious of the paint itself and of the artist’s use of “broken color” to create light.

Meanwhile, the evolutionary theory in Darwin’s Origin of the Species (1859) challenged Americans’ certainty about divine control of a stable world. American artists began to rely on their impressions and to experiment with style; God and nature lost some of their prominence in paintings.

The new American impressionist art produced by John Singer Sar-
gent, William Merritt Chase, Mary Cassatt, and others corresponded to
tensions in U.S. society at the time, argues Novak. Industrialization
and new technology were changing the landscape. Nature required
curatorship; the Yellowstone (1872) and Yosemite (1890) national parks
were established. U.S. artists no longer merely copied nature, but
neither did they “fracture” it with the extreme broken strokes of their
French mentors. They used their new, assertive styles to “solidify” na-
ture on their canvasses and to preserve it.

Violence
and Laughter

“A crippled Laughter: Toward an Understanding of Flannery O’Connor” by Clara
Claiborne Park, in The American Scholar
(Spring 1982), 1811 Q St. N.W., Washing-
ton, D.C. 20009.

A self-righteous atheist flirts with a Bible salesman, who returns her
interest by stealing her artificial leg. An old woman feels an instant of
pity for the madman who has just murdered her family; he responds by
shooting her in the chest. “Most people think of [my] stories as hard,
hopeless, brutal,” wrote author Flannery O’Connor, a prolific writer
despite her own long struggle with a crippling, incurable disease. “I
read them over and over and laugh and laugh.”

Few readers have drawn much cheer from the grotesqueness and
violence of O’Connor’s fiction. O’Connor, as a result, felt compelled to
write countless letters and essays trying to explain herself—explana-
tions that her stories should have made unnecessary, argues Park, pro-
fessor of English at Williams College. Why did her fiction fail? Part of
the problem lay in her devotion to both Catholicism and literary
modernism. Adhering to a contemporary literary style, she crafted her
fiction with understatement and objectivity, letting the stories speak
for themselves through subtle, nearly opaque symbolism. But, argues
Park, the aesthetic rules “elicited from Joyce and James were not
adequate to carry a burden of conviction more like Dostoevski’s.”

Violence and suffering, in O’Connor’s view, were necessary to com-
municate her Christian vision to an unbelieving audience. “To the hard
of hearing you shout,” she wrote, “and for the almost blind you draw
large and startling figures.”

In her private life, as her letters reveal, O’Connor had learned how
suffering could teach Christian love, humility—even good humor. Yet
in her fiction she could “take her ugly characters up to the moment of
grace” through violence, but no further. Her stories end without the
clear affirmation of Christianity that she sought to inspire. The reason,
says Park, lay in O’Connor’s private fear of sentimentality—of pity.
“Within pity,” she observed, “lay self-pity, everywhere in ambush.”

Toward the end of her life, O’Connor seemed ready to make room in
her art for compassion. “I have got to the point now,” she wrote,
“where I keep thinking more and more about the presentation of love
and charity.” She died, says Park, too soon to accomplish it.
During most of the 1960s and '70s, Afghanistan seemed a perfect "good neighbor" to the Soviet Union: officially non-aligned, yet grateful for Soviet aid and apparently deferential to Moscow's wishes in every important matter. Why was that not enough to preserve Afghanistan's independence? Rubinstein, a University of Pennsylvania political scientist, examines what happened.

Former Prime Minister Muhammad Daoud Khan inadvertently triggered Afghanistan's troubles by taking part in a 1973 leftist military coup that deposed his brother-in-law, King Muhammad Zahir Shah, and returned Daoud to power. Gone with the King, says Rubinstein, was the only institution that held the country's rural tribes together. The Soviets did not engineer the coup, but they probably knew it was imminent—and they chose not to tell King Zahir.

As President, Daoud loudly asserted Afghanistan's claims to Pakistani territory—despite Moscow's coolness to the idea. And he gave only lip service to the Soviets' proposed Asian "collective security" plan involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.

Later during the mid-1970s, the autocratic Daoud faced increasing economic and political difficulties at home. He invoked his "royal and tribal heritage" and replaced leftists in his regime with friends and relatives. To lessen his country's dependence on the Soviet Union, Daoud revived the traditional Afghan foreign policy of bi-terafi ("with-
out sides"). He sought improved relations with Pakistan. He also agreed
to take $2 billion in credits from the anti-communist Shah of Iran and
got financial commitments from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as well.

The prospect, however faint, of a Teheran-Kabul-Islamabad coalition
of Muslims began to worry the Soviets. Daoud seemed unreliable. His
April 1977 visit to Moscow to sign a treaty providing for more Soviet
aid was marked by "frankness" rather than cordiality. One year later,
leftist Afghan military officers, encouraged by the Soviets, seized power
in Kabul. They slew Daoud and replaced him with a communist, Nur
Muhammad Taraki, who soon stirred tribesmen's ire with his Marxist
"modernization" efforts. [In 1979, Taraki was succeeded by another
communist, Hafizullah Amin, who proved too independent for Moscow.
Late in 1979, the Soviets intervened in force and replaced him.] Ambi-
tious but inept, Daoud had started his country on the road to disaster.

Asia's Fat
'Little Dragons'

Since the late 1970s, American intellectuals and journalists have en-
gaged in a round of "Pacific optimism." Business Week, for example,
saw Japan and the other non-communist nations of East Asia as "the
stars of the developing world." Milton and Rose Friedman, in their
best-selling Free to Choose (1980), lauded Japan, Malaysia, and the four
"little dragons" (South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan) as
models of democracy and free-market prosperity.

Emmerson, a University of Wisconsin political scientist, suggests
that Americans' "Pacific optimism" may be a kind of psychological
compensation for the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Moreover, he adds, the
Friedmans and other analysts who go on to attribute the Asian success
story to laissez-faire economics and democracy are seriously mistaken.

The six nations cited by the Friedmans are prosperous, averaging a
$3,000 income per capita as compared with $253 in China and $204 in
India. But a comparison of all 26 Asian nations, communist and non-
communist, shows no link between prosperity and limited government.
The poorest countries devoted 19.2 percent of GNP to government
spending, the next poorest 24.8 percent, and the richest 22.6 percent.
"The virtues of the private sector," Emmerson observes, "are most ap-
parent once a nation [lifts] itself out of dire poverty."

How do these 26 governments spend their money? The poorest coun-
tries spend more on the military (up to 19.3 percent of expenditures)
than do the richest (13.7 percent). Outlays for education, however, pro-
gress from 11.8 percent of the budget among the poorest nations to 16
percent among the wealthiest. But Emmerson argues that the armies in
less-developed nations serve to train manpower and build infra-

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structure—here, military outlays are a form of social spending.

A country-by-country analysis also contradicts the laissez-faire argument. Singapore, one of the world’s best economic performers, is neither democratic nor non-interventionist. The government built more public housing per citizen than any other non-communist regime and ordered several steep general wage hikes during the late 1970s.

The "magic of the marketplace" is respected by Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. But in each case, government waves the magician’s wand. And a host of other special factors—political stability, cultural traits, geography—have contributed to their success.


As elsewhere in the West, the feminist movement came alive in Italy during the late 1960s, an offshoot of the "New Left." Championing a single issue—abortion—it reached its peak during the mid-1970s, then faded from the political scene. Ergas, a law instructor at the University of Macerata, traces the movement’s rise and fall.

Student rebellions rocked nearly every university in Italy during 1968. Young women caught up in the New Left tumult got an education in anti-establishment thought and in militant politics—so much so that they became frustrated by the "sexism" within New Left organizations and formed their own groups. In 1974, the feminists embraced legalized abortion as their chief cause. Women’s groups, including a small Radical Party faction, began transporting as many as several hundred women a month to abortion clinics abroad and, illegally, in Italy.

The principal political parties shunned the small feminist movement. The Christian Democrats, proclaiming themselves moderates and maneuvering for votes on the right, condemned feminist ideas as destructive of traditional family values. The Communists, hoping to ally themselves with the Christian Democrats and fearful that feminists’ ideas might provoke divisions within their own ranks, stayed clear of the movement. Then, in early 1975, Italy’s Constitutional Court found the existing anti-abortion law unconstitutional. The controversy that ensued focused politicians’ attention on the movement—particularly after 50,000 pro-abortionists marched in Rome that December.

But the feminists, still in thrall to their New Left vision, spurned the established political parties. They insisted, for instance, that members of such parties not proclaim their affiliations at the Rome demonstration. (In 1978, Parliament enacted a compromise abortion law. It did not go far enough to satisfy the feminists, but it was liberal enough to make their abortion services unnecessary.)
In parliamentary elections in June 1976, the Communists, still cultivating their “establishment” image, put up many female candidates, but almost none were radical feminists. The strategy worked. The Communists carried an unprecedented 34 percent of the votes; the Christian Democrats got 38 percent. For the feminists, it was a serious blow. Their shrinking movement turned from politics to concentrate on “women and the visual arts” and similar cultural matters.

Black Africa’s Elusive Riches

The Resources of Tropical Africa” by Andrew M. Kamarck, in Daedalus (Spring 1982), 1172 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, Mass. 02134.

Explorers, imperialists, and, more recently, black nationalists have all entertained hopes of finding untold wealth in sub-Saharan Africa. Kamarck, associate Fellow at Harvard’s Institute for International Development, writes that very little is actually known about the region’s resources. Enormous barriers—geographic, climatic, technical, political—still stand in the way of exploration and exploitation.

Africa possesses only a small portion of the world’s proven mineral reserves. Most of its output—gold in South Africa and Ghana, diamonds in South Africa and Zaire, cobalt and copper in Zaire and Zambia, iron ore in Liberia and Mauritania, manganese in Ghana and Zaire—comes from the temperate southern part of the continent or from areas where minerals are exceptionally easy to mine and transport. Elsewhere, the lack of transportation and of technology adapted to tropical conditions discourages exploitation. Gabon, for example, has a deposit of nearly one billion tons of rich iron ore located only 400 miles from its coast. A railroad through the intervening swamps is being built, but it will cost billions of dollars if and when it is completed.

Since 1960, African political instability has been the key problem confronting developers. Mineral exploration in Africa has declined drastically, with Canadian and American companies now spending about 80 percent of their exploration budgets in North America and Australia. Thus, while Guinea, Ghana, and Cameroun contain the world’s largest reserves of bauxite, an essential ingredient in aluminum, developers have turned to Australia, where production since 1960 has grown from 70,000 to 28 million tons.

Only in oil production has there been much progress since the 1960s. The reason: Oil company receipts are so huge that losses due to political instability are more easily absorbed. Nigeria is black Africa’s major producer (exports amounted to some $30 billion in 1980), followed by Gabon, Angola, the Congo Republic, and Cameroun. Yet fewer than 100 new wells are drilled each year in Africa, compared with nearly 30,000 in the United States.

Exaggerating the continent’s potential or blaming its poverty on Western exploitation, Kamarck concludes, merely diverts attention from basic problems that must be confronted if Africa is to prosper.
**RESEARCH REPORTS**

*Reviews of new research by public agencies and private institutions*

**“Plant Closings: Public or Private Choices?”**

Cato Institute, 224 Second St., S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003. 164 pp. $5.00
Editor: Richard B. McKenzie.

In recent years, Congress and more than 20 states have contemplated "plant closing" laws to discourage migration of industries from the "Frostbelt" to the "Sunbelt." The reason: During the 1970s, manufacturing jobs declined in the Northeast and East North Central states by about nine percent. But, say McKenzie, a Clemson University economist, and nine other specialists, plant relocations actually played a minor role.

Between 1969 and 1975, for instance, the number of manufacturing firms in New England declined, for various reasons, by 5.7 percent—but the 2.1 percent lost through relocation were more than made up by the 2.5 percent gained through relocation.

The real culprit is not plant relocations or even the high rate of plant closings, but a low rate of plant openings. Some 38.9 percent of all U.S. firms in existence at the end of 1969 went under during the next six years. The rate of plant closings, in fact, differs little by region. The rate of plant openings, however, is much higher in the Sunbelt—where, between 1969 and 1975, 112 new plants began hiring for every 100 that closed. In the Frostbelt, only 70 percent of closed plants were replaced.

The South attracts new businesses with its conservative political climate, lower taxes, weak labor unions, less restrictive environmental laws, and a lower cost of living.

Plant closings and relocations cause hardships, the authors agree, but restrictive laws (requiring firms, for example, to compensate workers and local governments) are no remedy. If enacted in the North, such laws would only give businesses another reason not to open plants there. And a national plant-closing law would only increase production costs for U.S. firms, raising their incentive to locate new facilities abroad.

Finally, say the authors, it is misleading to focus only on manufacturing jobs in the Frostbelt. Though the region lost some one million manufacturing jobs during the '70s, total nonagricultural employment—mostly in the service sector—grew by 4.5 million jobs.

**“Middletown Families: Fifty Years of Change and Continuity.”**

University of Minnesota Press, 2037 University Avenue S.E., Minneapolis, Minn. 55414. 436 pp. $16.95.
Authors: Theodore Caplow et al.

For a year and a half during the 1920s, sociologists Robert and Helen Lynd lived among and studied the citizens of Muncie, Indiana. The result was *Middletown* (1929), hailed as the first anthropological look at "the average American community." What the Lynds found out about Middletown’s families was worrisome. Four of every 10 marriages (43 percent) failed. Par-
Sociologists Robert and Helen Lynd moved to Muncie, Indiana in 1924. They reported on their interviews and research, conducted over a year and a half in this city of "middle America," in their classic, *Middletown* (1929).

Muncie today has doubled in population, to 80,000. It has also prospered. Its managers and blue collar workers now enjoy comparable affluence, paying off mortgages on "neat subdivision houses" complete with trash compactors and electric garage doors.

The divorce rate today is 51 per 100 marriages (versus 49 per 100 nationally). But those Muncie couples that stay together are more content than their parents and grandparents were. Couples today enjoy each other's company: They watch TV, dine out, and attend concerts and sporting events together. Ninety-five percent consider their marriages "happy."

The "generation gap" the Lynds found in 1925 remains, but Caplow and his team note that it "never manages to change the relationship between parents and children." The one thing today's youngsters want most from their parents is time together—the same thing they wanted in 1925. Forty percent of the teenagers, the same as in 1925, argue with their parents about evening curfews. On the other hand, children and parents spend more time together now than they did 50 years ago.

Both Middletown's children and
adults firmly believe family relationships are worse now than they have been in the past. But what Caplow and his colleagues tell us is that almost every change in Middletown’s families since 1925 has been for the better.

“Alternative Methods for Valuing Selected In-Kind Transfer Benefits and Measuring Their Effect on Poverty.”


Author: Timothy M. Smeeding.

Although Lyndon Johnson declared a “war on poverty” in 1964, poverty has not been eradicated. Is the way the federal government defines poverty partly to blame?

In 1965, federal “in-kind” (noncash) benefits—food stamps, school lunches, public housing, Medicaid, Medicare—totaled $2.2 billion. By 1980, they had jumped more than 12-fold, to $27.8 billion (in constant 1965 dollars). Yet the percentage of Americans living below the poverty line declined by only one-third: from 17.3 percent in 1965 to 11.1 percent in 1979, according to the Census Bureau. The government’s statistics, however, are based on a definition of income that ignores in-kind benefits.

A 1977 Congressional Budget Office report claimed that the number of poor people in the United States would drop, statistically, from 25 million to nine million if the government included in-kind benefits in its income calculations. In 1980, the Senate Appropriations Committee directed the Secretary of Commerce to test the theory. Smeeding, an American Statistical Association Fellow at the Census Bureau, responded with this study. But he produces more questions than answers.

Researchers cannot agree on a single measure of the value of in-kind benefits to recipients. Simply counting in-kind benefits at their market value (MV) reduces the number of poor Americans in 1979 to 6.4 percent of the population. Measuring their “cash equivalent” value (CE)—i.e., for how much cash the recipient would trade them—leaves 8.2 percent below the poverty line. A third way, the “poverty budget share” (PBS) method, limits the value of food, housing, and medical benefits to the proportions spent on these items by people near the poverty line in 1960-61, when in-kind benefits were minimal. This approach finds 8.9 percent of the populace in poverty.

Medical care represents the lion’s share of federal in-kind benefits—in 1980, $54.5 billion out of a total $72.5 billion (in 1980 dollars). But should medical benefits be counted as “income”? Does getting hospital care transform a poor American into a wealthy one? If medical benefits are excluded from poverty computations, the percentage of poor Americans becomes 9.4 (MV), 9.5 (CE), or 9.8 (PBS).

At present, the official formula for defining poverty overlooks not only in-kind benefits to the poor but also private and public in-kind benefits to other income groups (employer-funded health insurance and pensions, mortgage interest tax breaks, etc.). Since the definition of poverty now hinges in part on how the average U.S. family allocates its income, Smeeding reasons, “invisible” in-kind income must be taken into account for poor and nonpoor alike.
"Progressivism: A Modern Reassessment."


Michael J. Lacey, moderator.

Among historians, interest in the American Progressives of the early 1900s has waned. One reason, suggests McCormick, a Rutgers historian, may be a disillusionment among scholars with liberal reform movements in general—from the Progressives' efforts to minister to (i.e., mold in their own image) poor immigrants to later excesses of the Great Society.

In a seminar at the Wilson Center, McCormick assessed the welter of early 20th-century reform efforts affecting public health, criminal justice, election practices, worker safety, housing, education, and liquor sales. He also reflected on the dissatisfaction that liberal reformers seem inevitably to generate, even among their sympathizers.

Between 1904 and 1906, many Americans were stunned by muckraking journalists' revelations of massive corruption in business and politics—local, state, and national. They responded with an outpouring of reformist sentiment that reached every corner of public life. It was, says McCormick, "the first (perhaps the only) reform movement to be experienced by the whole American nation."

Uniting the diverse crusaders were anger at big business (combined with an acceptance of industrialization) and faith in "social engineering," whether undertaken by volunteer associations or by government. They also shared a faith in economics, sociology, and psychology and an evangelical drive "to purge the world of sin."

Yet, reforms rarely accomplished their intended goals. In an effort to weaken political party machines, for instance, activists pushed through state laws replacing nominating conventions with direct primary elections. But low voter interest in the primaries in effect returned control of candidate selection to party bosses. Administrative agencies were set up to regulate industry—between 1905 and 1907, 15 state railroad commissions were established. But businessmen soon discovered it was even easier to draft regulatory policy in the offices of key administrators than in legislative halls.

The Progressives' faith in scientific methods should have been tempered, notes McCormick, by examining one element inherent in those methods—the availability of hard data by which to measure progress. The numbers documented "just how far short of success their programs sometimes fell."

Whatever their motives—an honest desire to make society more just, a craving for the power to impose "right forms of behavior on the masses"—the Progressives failed to judge their programs by the standards they themselves had set. Like the architects of the Great Society some 50 years later, they had promised more than their experiments could deliver. Then they "covered up," declaring America's social difficulties "solved through expertise and government."

Yet, if the Progressives often failed to find solutions, they had put their
fingers on the problem confronting America in the 20th century. And this, concludes McCormick, was perhaps their greatest accomplishment—to recognize that America was no longer as homogeneous as it had once been, "that diverse cultural and occupational groups had conflicting interests and that the responsibility for mitigating . . . those differences lay with the whole society, usually the government."

"The Limits of Reform in China."
Conference sponsored by the Wilson Center's East Asia Program, May 3, 1982.
Ronald A. Morse, moderator.

Five years after Beijing's pragmatic new leadership embarked on its "Four Modernizations"—in agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology—the obstacles to change in China are becoming apparent, according to the six papers presented at this Wilson Center conference. Among them are China's massive bureaucracy, the regime's reluctance to give up Soviet-style central planning, and fears among the citizenry after the Cultural Revolution.

Party deputy chairman Deng Xiaoping has rehabilitated 2.9 million cadres (bureaucrats)—all victims of purges since 1957—to provide political support for the shift from revolution to economic development. The Chinese bureaucracy now numbers 18 million civil servants—one cadre for every 50 people. Most have little to do. In the summer of 1981, 40 percent of Beijing's 600,000 state cadres were on vacation simultaneously without affecting normal operations. And only half the cadres have more than a middle-school education, leaving them poorly equipped to lead a technological revolution.

In agriculture, reformers are trying to dismantle the commune system and to emphasize the profit motive and family farming. Middle-level bureaucrats, whose power would wane, and wealthier communes are resisting. At the same time, "overexuberance" among China's 100 million abjectly poor peasants is arousing second thoughts in Beijing. Since late 1981, according to University of Michigan political scientist David Zweig, peasants have taken over public orchards and farms and stripped collective factories of machinery for private use without official permission.

In industry, replacing production quotas with the profit yardstick in some 40 percent of state-owned firms has made little difference. Beijing still fixes prices and wages and allocates capital, supplies, and workers among factories. Bureaucrats thus have little incentive to change inefficient habits of administration. In any case, there are few Chinese who can show them how. Only 20,000 students attend finance and accounting colleges—so few that it will take 76 years to provide one graduate for every state-owned firm.

Chinese scientists and intellectuals, meanwhile, have been restored to high status and called upon to help revitalize the nation. But they are reluctant to initiate change lest they suffer for it—as they did during the Cultural Revolution—when the political winds shift.

Beijing recently revived the Confucian edict, "Seek truth from facts." But as Wesleyan University's Vera Schwarz observes, "Neither the government nor the intellectuals seem certain as to which truths may be glimpsed from what kinds of facts."
Elevated to political pre-eminence by the 1978–79 Revolution, the Iranian clergy may continue to run their nation after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini dies. But opposition to a theocracy from top-ranking clergymen and disillusioned laymen could result in a major power struggle. Eighteen journalists, economists, historians, and political scientists—all specialists on Iranian affairs—met to discuss Iran’s prospects at a Wilson Center conference. The conference was coordinated by Nikki Keddie, a Wilson Center Guest Scholar and UCLA historian.

Iran’s republican government is headed by the Faqih (now Khomeini), the nation’s highest legal authority, supreme over executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Though the 1979 constitution provides that Khomeini be replaced as Faqih by a Leadership Council composed of three to five men, Khomeini has indicated his interest in a single successor. But his choice, a former student and long-time friend, Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, may be passed over.

Unlike Khomeini, Montazeri is not an ayatollah ozma (grand ayatollah). Of the six current ayatollah ozma, Khomeini alone favors clerical control of politics. No ayatollah—the term refers to 100 or so religious and legal scholars at the top of the Islamic hierarchy—is considered infallible. Surviving ayatollahs could easily repudiate Khomeini after he dies.

Khomeini’s clerical support comes not from the ayatollahs, but from 50,000 to 80,000 mallas (preachers) and tulla (seminary students). Most Iranians disdain the mallas as greedy hypocrites and reserve their respect for the ayatollahs. The mallas could lose their political influence if leading ayatollahs challenge their views openly.

If the mallas are to retain power, they will have to solve other problems, as well. They are already divided among themselves, and Khomeini’s death may drive them into open strife. Moreover, many lower- and middle-class Iranians believe that the Revolution has not brought the promised justice and prosperity. Left-wing secular groups will try to exploit this dissatisfaction. Meanwhile, various exile factions, monarchist and "republican leftist," seek to overthrow the regime. Recalling the country’s volatile 20th-century history—from the constitutional revolution of 1905–11 to the national movement led by Mohammad Mosaddeq during the 1950s—one conference speaker noted, “It is not to be imagined that the current phase of Iranian history is any more permanent than earlier ones.”
Parents thought R. F. Outcault's Hogan's Alley comic strip (detail above), America's first, encouraged children to misbehave. As an antidote, many sought out the new genre of "how-to" manuals. Psychologist L. Emmett Holt, Jr. offered a cure for thumbsucking in his popular Care and Feeding of Children (1893): "Confine the elbows by small pasteboard splints."
Americans have always been "child-oriented." The Puritan colonists assigned a "tithing man" to every 10 families to monitor children's behavior. Many years later, Mark Twain celebrated a different notion of childhood in *Huckleberry Finn* and *Tom Sawyer*. Our treatment of children has always reflected not only what U.S. society is but what adults hope it can become. Today, parents and politicians alike keep watch on the statistics—juvenile crime, illiteracy, teen-age pregnancy, drug abuse, alcoholism—and increasingly dislike what they see. Are the kids really in bad shape? Were they better off in the past? Here, historian Philippe Aries reflects on the origins of our idea of "childhood"; psychologist Valerie Polakow Suransky analyzes the influence, sometimes malign, of scholarly theories about child development; and editor Cullen Murphy summarizes the latest research on the lives children now lead and the America they live in.

**THE SENTIMENTAL REVOLUTION**

*by Philippe Ariès*

In the freshness of discovery, the historian invariably (and fortunately) has difficulty detaching himself from the jumble of impressions that drew him into his adventurous quest in the first place. The passage of time diminishes the excitement but brings in return a compensation: a better view of the forest. Today, in the wake of contemporary debates about children, the family, youth—and about my own book, *Centuries of Childhood* (1962)—I see more clearly the broad ideas underlying my work.

I maintained in my book that traditional Western society before the year 1700 concerned itself little with the child, even less with the adolescent. "Childhood" was that period when the child could not yet provide for himself. Once the child reached the age of seven to nine years, he found himself among adults, participating in their work and in their games. Education, the transmission of values and of knowledge, was supplied and
supervised not by the family but rather by the system of apprenticeship. The child quickly withdrew from his parents into a larger group and learned by helping adults do what had to be done—even if it meant going to war, as the paintings of Titian and Caravaggio attest.

A superficial sentimentalization of infancy was reserved for the first few years when the child was a curious, monkey-like creature capable of providing amusement. But if it died, as often happened, only a few might mourn it; the general rule was that one paid the matter little attention. Another infant would soon come along. “I have lost two or three children in their infancy,” writes Michel de Montaigne in his 16th-century Essays. "not without regret but without great sorrow."

Obligatory Affection

The manifest duties of the traditional family were the conservation of holdings, the communal practice of a trade, mutual aid in a world where an isolated man (and even more an isolated woman) could not survive, and, in crises, the protection of honor and of lives. The family had no emotional role, yet love was not always absent. On the contrary, it was often recognizable, created, and supported by the communal life. But (and this is what is important) the feeling between the married couple, and between parents and children, was not a necessary part of family life. The sharing of emotions and social communication were provided outside the family by a close communal environment composed of neighbors, friends, masters and servants, children and old people, and men and women, a large social medium in which individual families were diluted.

Toward the end of the 17th century, things began to change. Formal education was substituted for apprenticeship. Children no longer mixed with adults to learn about life but were separated and kept apart in a kind of quarantine—the school. Thus began a long process of shutting up children (like the insane or the poor or prostitutes) that continues into our own time.

This sequestering of children, for the best of reasons, of course, is one face of the great moral changes wrought by

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Catholic and Protestant reformers of the Church, the law, and the state. But it would not have been possible without the sentimental complicity of parents. Families became places of obligatory affection between married couples, and between couples and their children. The family’s concern was no longer simply training children in terms of proper behavior and honor. Parents began to interest themselves generally in the schoolwork of their children and to follow them with a solicitude unheard of earlier. In the last decade of the 17th century, playwright Jean Racine wrote to his son, Louis, about his teachers as would a father of today. Masters of boarding schools, beleaguered by too frequent family visits, had to devise ways to temper parents’, especially mothers’, eagerness to see their children.

The family thus began to organize itself around the child, who emerged from his former anonymity. Absent from his family, General Marie-Antoine Bouët de Martange, in the twilight of the ancien régime, wrote anxiously to his wife inquiring about his children’s health. One could no longer lose a child without great pain. Now it became advisable to limit the number of children in order better to care for them. Not surprisingly, one result of this scholarly and sentimental revolution was a voluntary reduction of births, observable since the 18th century. And
revolution it was: From regarding young children as so trivial that a father in Moliere’s Hypochondriac is said to have only one child because a second is too young to count, society has come to see children as the center of a family’s life. This was the cycle my book traced.

A book has its own life; it quickly escapes its author to belong to an independent public. Centuries of Childhood soon found itself in the hands of psychologists and sociologists, especially in the United States, who applied it to their studies of the difficulties encountered by contemporary maturing children, and in the hands of historians, who accepted its broad outlines while noting signs of change earlier than the end of the 17th century, where I had placed it. Debate about my book was surprising—at one point I found myself identified as an American sociologist—and absorbing, and it pushed both myself and others into new ideas.

Some Fresh Thinking

If I were to conceive my book anew today, I would hold to the general lines of my argument. But I would also take account of new data, particularly in four areas. First, I would draw attention to the persistence into the 17th century of tolerated infanticide. It was not an openly accepted practice, as it had been in ancient Rome; technically, indeed, it was a severely punishable crime. Infanticide was nevertheless practiced in secret, perhaps fairly frequently, often disguised as an accident: Children would die of suffocation, as a matter of course, in the beds of their parents when they slept. The life of a child was considered with the same degree of ambiguity as is the fetus today, with the difference that infanticide was buried in silence while abortion is openly avowed.

By the end of the 17th century, though, attitudes toward infanticide were beginning to change. Pressure was placed on parents by bishops who prohibited—with a vehemence that gives one pause—the practice of having children sleep in the beds of their parents. The pressure seems to have worked: Historian Jean Louis Flandrin has shown that the decline in infant mortality during the 19th century cannot be explained by medical or hygienic reasons; people had simply stopped letting or helping their children die.

A similar revolution occurs in a second area I would propose for further exploration—the history of baptism. Toward the middle of the Middle Ages, adults appear to have been in no great hurry to have their children baptized, often forgetting to
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Are children children or are they adults?

In the Supreme Court’s opinion, children “are possessed of fundamental rights which the state must respect.” But which rights are fundamental? And is discrimination on the basis of age necessarily unfair?

Americans have not made up their minds on the matter of children’s rights. In 1967, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court (In re Gault) ruled that juveniles charged with delinquency were entitled to adult rights of due process—right to counsel, right to appeal, and so on. Yet juvenile offenders are still considered special. Thus, in Arizona, upon reaching 18 a person may have his juvenile court and police records destroyed (even if the crime involved was murder). Other states have such “wipe the slate clean” provisions.

The Supreme Court has ruled that children in school have the same First Amendment rights as adults. They can also undergo an abortion without their parents’ consent. Children as young as 12 can even “divorce” their parents altogether—becoming formally “emancipated” by a court if they are able to support themselves.

And youngsters can take their elders to court. In 1972, a 15-year-old Minnesota girl unwilling to accompany her parents on a two-year around-the-world cruise won a judge’s permission to spend the time with an aunt instead. Lawyers representing deformed or retarded infants have sued physicians for “wrongful life”—with mixed success—arguing that death would have been preferable. Most of the legal changes affecting children have not, of course, been sought by children themselves, but by adult Americans with certain ideas of what is in a child’s best interest.

In many highly controversial matters, children have not been freed from parental or special legal constraints. Thus, the Supreme Court has refused to grant the right to a jury trial to minors. In 1979, the court affirmed the constitutionality of a Georgia statute allowing parents to commit a child against his will to a mental institution. Last year, the court upheld a Utah law requiring notification of a minor’s parents before performing an abortion, while proposed guidelines from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services would require parental notification when minors receive prescription contraceptives from federally-funded clinics. During the past decade, meanwhile, alarmed by highway deaths caused by youthful drunk drivers, 17 state legislatures have voted to raise the local drinking age.

For better or worse, American children enjoy more “adult rights” today than they did 20 years ago—and often more adult responsibilities as well. But until their elders resolve their ambivalence, a peculiar combination of rights and responsibilities can be expected. In most states, a girl of 16, for example, who has a legal right to an abortion must also have her parents’ consent for a throat culture.
do so in “serious cases” where the child’s life was in danger. The medieval clergy, worried about the condition of the soul, increased the number of churches and parishes—in part to permit priests to reach more quickly the bedside of a woman who had just delivered. Pressure was placed on families to administer baptism as soon as possible after birth. Thus it came about that early baptism of the newly born child became the rule. It was even the (unauthorized) practice of midwives to baptize in the uterus fetuses thought not likely to survive.

Private Spaces

A third area of interest, related to the second, involves the representation on funerary monuments of the blessed soul as an infant, usually idealized and naked, as can be seen in many medieval French portrayals of the Last Judgment, where the souls of the righteous march into Abraham’s bosom. The souls of the chosen were believed to enjoy the same enviable innocence as the baptized infant—at a time when, as noted, the infant himself was seldom given serious attention. Interestingly, the soul ceased to be represented as an infant in the 17th century, from which time a child on a funerary monument was simply a child. Funerary portraits of children, until then a rarity, became far more common.

The fourth avenue for further exploration is domestic architecture. I originally located at the end of the 17th century the retreat of the family from the collective life of the village square into the interior of a house more suited to intimacy. Historian Richard A. Goldthwaite has found an analogue in 15th-century Florence, where the 13th- and 14th-century palaces—huge, open, a jumble of family, renters, clients, shopkeepers—gave way to palaces whose appearance makes possible the deduction of an interior designed to provide small patrician families with a private world, a mix of intimacy and vastness. It is natural that in such a private space, a new sentiment should develop among members of the family, and more particularly between mother and child: the feeling for the family. “This culture,” says Goldthwaite, “is centered on women and children, with renewed interest in the education of children and a remarkable rise in the status of women.”

The case is far from closed. The history of mental habits is, whether one admits it or not, a comparative and regressive history. We depart necessarily from what we know of man’s behavior today, as though it were a model with which to compare the facts of the past; we move on then to consider the new
model, constructed with the aid of facts from the past, like a second source, and redescend toward the present, modifying the naive image we had of it at the beginning. The history of the idea of the family has just begun; it is just now beginning to stimulate research. Let us hope that the scholarly energy devoted to the search is expended wisely, opening new areas of inquiry rather than burying itself under an endless sifting of old ideas.

A TYRANNY OF EXPERTS

by Valerie Polakow Suransky

We take it for granted today that childhood is a distinct and even delicate stage of life, though it was not always viewed that way. As Philippe Ariès contends, what we call childhood is largely an invention that has gradually taken shape since the 17th century. Childhood is an idea as much as it is a developmental decree of nature. And our treatment of children has varied with our ideas about it.

Today, we view children as having such unique status that we have largely cordoned them off from the rest of life. We now separate children from the world of work, strictly divide work and play, and exclude (or "shelter") children from many aspects of everyday existence. The young have their own institutions: day care centers, nursery schools, elementary schools. They are studied by childhood specialists; no group, indeed, has been so overanalyzed. Theories abound explaining children's psychosexual and cognitive development, their early education, their learning and motivation, their creativity, their capacity for moral reasoning. Anxious parents look to "experts" for guidance on everything from the dos and don'ts of toilet training to encouraging "creative play." "Becoming at home in the world," may be, as educational philosopher Donald Vandenberg be-
believes, a young child's chief project, but it has not been made any easier by the legions of social scientists who vie for theoretical ascendency and prescriptive power over parents and teachers. The cult of expertise is now entrenched everywhere—from hospital maternity wards to schools.

Most of today's "experts" view childhood from above: Looking at children in the abstract, they develop theories that are detached from the actual worlds children inhabit.

A Fight is a Fight is "Aggression"

Who are the new "childhood scientists"? They are, variously, the intellectual descendants of Vienna's Sigmund Freud, or of the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget, or of Harvard behaviorist B. F. Skinner, or of lesser lights. On the subject of childhood, we hear from neo-Freudians, Freudian-behaviorists, cognitive developmentalists, neo-Piagetians, stage theorists, and many others.

Psychoanalysis, like other worldviews, embodies a particular vision of social reality, which the experiences of children are made to fit. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Freud for the first time gave aggression a status equal to libido as a basic human drive. "Civilization," writes British psychoanalyst W. H. Gillespie, commenting on this shift of emphasis in Freud's work, "depended on the taming of aggression, rather than the sublimation of sexuality." The new emphasis led many psychoanalysts to a preoccupation with children's manifestations of the aggressive drive.

The more sensible analysts, such as Anna Freud, advocate direct, sensitive observation of children as a necessary prerequisite for understanding their inner world. In a 1972 essay, she cautioned her colleagues against "preconceived ideas which handicap an investigation," pointing out that analysts' conception of the aggressive drive is still overshadowed by the much better developed theory of the sex drives, leading many to put clinical findings into the framework of the latter.

The psychoanalytic perspective on aggression has shaped our cultural assumptions about childhood. Aggression among...
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children, for example, is simply considered part of everyday life in other cultures, including lower-class subcultures in this country, and not necessarily the result of "ego resistance" or the "direct discharge of aggressive fantasies," as some middle-class analysts would have it.

As Harvard psychiatrist Robert Coles once remarked, "Children are not allowed simply to play anymore, to develop an occasional grudge, or even to just happen to get into a fight." Simple, natural aggressive acts in school or at home are seized upon and analyzed out of all proportion to their context. As a result, the chief socialization function of the schools becomes the channeling of so-called disruptive impulses into socially benign activities—play, schoolwork, gardening.

Imagining Reality

Social learning theorists, such as psychologists Albert Bandura of Stanford and the University of Waterloo's Richard Walters, view socialization primarily as a process whereby children are made to conform to established social norms and rules. Concerned more with how children behave in groups than with children as individuals, the social learning theorists focus on how children learn social roles from "role models" and on the parts patterns of reinforcement and reward play in the development of socially acceptable and socially deviant behavior.

The social learning theorists believe that imaginary models are often more effective than real—but "inconsistent"—parents and teachers. For the very young, television's Mister Rogers' Neighborhood is probably one of the best examples of a consistent "pro-social" model. Mild-mannered and middle-aged, Mr. Rogers is often too good to be true. He carefully wipes his feet before entering a home, is unfailingly polite, and gently encourages a "let's talk about it" approach. Mr. Rogers' neighborhood is small, perfect, and unreal—as unreal as the laboratory experiments in which social learning theorists develop strategies to shape the learning processes of captive children.

Behaviorism is the most pragmatic and functional of the modern psychological ideologies. Developed during the 1920s by Columbia's John Watson and Edward Thorndike of the University of Chicago, and later by B. F. Skinner, behaviorism is the most distinctively American contribution to psychology. The behaviorists based their theories on laboratory experiments with animals. Learning quickly became one of their chief concerns. They found, for example, that rats could be taught to run a maze with the proper rewards and punishments—a bit of
cheese, a small electric shock. Why not teach children in much the same way?

Studying behavior—what could be seen, observed, measured—was enough in the behaviorists’ view. That which could not be observed and measured was assumed to be insignificant. The child was regarded as little more than an extension of the animal, without a will of its own, or an active consciousness. Learning and other “behaviors” were triggered by simple stimuli. Watson described language as “mere motor sounds in the larynx.” The entire “science of behavior” was founded on the measurable manifestations of human action: feeling behavior; imagination behavior; learning behavior; linguistic behavior. All were believed to be linked in rigid stimulus-response associative chains. The trick, in the behaviorists’ view, was to provide children with the right set of stimuli and reinforcements. To assess the results, one needed only to test: Can the rat run the maze; can the child read the book?
The distinctions between knowing and saying, being and acting, competence and performance were overlooked in an orgy of experimentation and testing that began around the turn of the century and has continued largely unabated to the present.

Prepackaged Hypotheses

The current popularity of "child management" programs and the curriculum standards that pervade the schools reflect (and reinforce) the widespread and uncritical acceptance of behavioral engineering: Often this operates under the guise of egalitarian decision-making, such as we find in Thomas Gordon's Parent Effectiveness Training (P.E.T.) and Teacher Effectiveness Training (T.E.T.), both expounded in best-selling books during the 1970s. P.E.T. and T.E.T. are typical recipes for instant interpersonal success, involving such strategies as "active listening" and "no-lose methods" for resolving conflicts among children. But behaviorism has enjoyed its greatest success in institutions with helpless populations—juvenile detention centers, homes for the autistic and retarded—where the image of the child is most debased.

Stage theorists constitute the fourth major school of thinking on childhood. Jean Piaget (1896–1980) in his work observing children (including his own) in real-life settings contributed many valuable insights into the unique world of childhood. He recognized that young children do see the world differently from adults and think about their experiences accordingly. Piaget's invariant stage theory—that children progress through four fixed stages of mental and physical development, from "sensory motor" to "preoperational" to "concrete operational" to "formal operational"—is, as some critics have pointed out, culture-bound and rigidly hierarchical. But his work is important because he allowed his subjects, the children, to define their world, and it is their perceptions of reality that informed his epistemology of children's cognition.

Unfortunately, it is the rigid, measurable facets of Piaget's theory that have most attracted educators and psychologists, particularly in the United States. The "experts" have retailed these ideas as prepackaged hypotheses about cognitive developmental stages, moral development, moral reasoning, and even moral education. Piaget's "invariant" stages actually overlap a great deal, but this has not stopped teachers and administrators from using Piaget's scheme in school curricula. Thus, children are often given Piaget's "conservation" test to determine what stage they are in: Water is poured from one of two
FEMINISTS AND CHILD-REARING

In America, feminists' ideas about childhood range from the extreme to the temperate. Ironically, the radical feminists complement today's academic "experts." The latter portray childhood in splendid isolation; on occasion, the former have advocated its complete extinction. Shulamit Firestone's manifesto in The Dialectic of Sex (1970), for example, is simple and startling: "Down with childhood."

Firestone contends that childhood is an invention of the postfeudal bourgeoisie. Taking a page from Friedrich Engels, she claims that the capitalist division of labor made husbands the "owners" within the family, wives the "means of production," and children the "laborers." The dawning of the "age of childhood" merely reinforced the "tyranny of woman's reproductive biology." Firestone's solution: "cybernetic socialism," ultimately leading to the artificial reproduction of children and the dissolution of the nuclear family. "As long as we use natural childbirth methods," she warns, "the household can never be a totally liberating social force."

Few feminists go as far as Firestone, but many come close. In Sexual Politics (1970), Kate Millet proposes that childhood be "taken over" entirely by efficient professionals. Germaine Greer suggests a rather more exotic solution in The Female Eunuch (1971): the founding of a baby farm in Italy where children would be housed and visited from time to time by their mothers and fathers, taking time off from their busy schedules in North America to jet into Calabria. The "oppressive" role of child-rearing would be delegated to a "local family" where, no doubt, the old sexual division of labor would be reproduced not among the Greer elite but in the peasant family.

American educators, typically, always asked Piaget how they could accelerate children's progress through the four stages. The Swiss psychologist, no advocate of "hurrying along" children, ruefully called this "the American question."

Harvard's Lawrence Kohlberg has applied Piaget's stage model to children's capacity for moral reasoning. He seems to have the last expert word at present on the matter of moral education. He has constructed an elaborate hierarchy of moral stages, from the premoral orientation of "punishment and obedience" followed by "naive instrumental hedonism" to the sixth and highest stage, "morality of individual principles of..."
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employed to run the farm.

In recent years, a number of feminists have taken a more sensible perspective. Sociologist Alice Rossi, writing in Daedalus in 1977, criticized the new wave of antichild feminism as a mirror image of male patterns of oppression: encouraging narcissistic self-fulfillment, the pursuit of personal ambition and profit, and distant parent-child relationships. The feminists’ “parenting script,” she argues, is “modelled on what has been a male pattern of relating to children, in which men turn their fathering on and off to suit themselves or their appointments for business or sexual pleasure.”

In The Reproduction of Mothering (1978), sociologist Nancy Chodorow asks how the role of woman-as-mother, with primary responsibility for child-rearing, is transmitted from generation to generation. Rebutting arguments that “mothering” is biologically determined or learned through role training in childhood, she examines the social organization of “parenting” from a psychoanalytic perspective. She concludes that children absorb sex roles and thus later re-create their parents’ family structure and sexual division of labor.

Chodorow’s theory is original and provocative, but ultimately unsatisfying. Like most theories concerning childhood, it is abstract. The experiences and perspectives of real children are missing, and the complex relationship between parents and their children is not fully captured.

What feminists must realize is that their struggle for the transformation of the family and the elimination of sexual inequality will be successful only when children are not allowed to become its victims.

—V.P.S.

conscience.” In some schools, special “moral education” courses have been set up to guide children to “higher” states of moral development through group discussions of hypothetical moral conundrums led by so-called specialists in moral education.

The authority from which Kohlberg claims to have derived this universal scheme is a battery of tests posing hypothetical dilemmas that he presented to children of all ages during the 1960s. But the questions Kohlberg asked (e.g., should a husband steal a drug to save his dying wife?) are unrelated to anything children are likely to have faced. Moreover, the “objective” cognitive-developmental standards used to categorize children’s judgments merely reflect prevailing upper-middle-class views, often bearing no relation to the different cultural and class backgrounds and upbringing of his subjects or to the issue at stake: How do children react in real life to difficult situations and make ethical judgments?
It is the children in Robert Coles’s five-volume *Children of Crisis* who really show us the nature of childhood thinking. The Rubys of the deep South, the Peters of the migrant camps, and even the Larrys of the very wealthy reveal the true moral sensibilities of the child. These children are not inferior to, or in a lower stage of moral “development” than, many adults. Their sense of morality is born of concrete involvement in the world, of confronting true-to-life situations, not abstract dilemmas posed by social scientists. Ruby, a black girl who was among the first to integrate a New Orleans elementary school during the early 1960s, drew pictures of black people with missing limbs, but often colored them in with only a little dark crayon. “I try to give the colored as even a chance as I can,” she explained, “even if that’s not the way it will end up being.”

“Do we really need,” Coles asks, “a so-called ‘expert’ parading his years of ‘research’ with various American children of different sorts—to tell us what has been appreciated over and over again by parents and grandparents and older brothers and sisters and school teachers and Scout leaders and athletic coaches and ministers and doctors and nurses—by anyone who has occasion to have a talk or two with a child?” If the children of old were seen but not heard, today’s children are studied but neither seen nor heard. Their consciousness is typologized, stages of development are imposed upon them, and grant proposals are funded in their name.

The idea of childhood has been transformed and reconstituted in every historical era. Today, having circumscribed the lives of children in schools where their experiences, intellects, and states of being are constantly measured, quantified, and evaluated, and having founded a burgeoning industry devoted to promoting their “growth,” we may have elevated the idea of childhood to its highest status ever. But we have also stripped this unique phase of life of its special character.
KIDS TODAY

by Cullen Murphy

Why is there air? "To make basketballs," answered comedian Bill Cosby.

Why are there children?
One reason, of course, is that children provide jobs. Jobs for more than 1.3 million elementary school teachers, for 13 million stay-at-home mothers, for the makers of the 1.3 million infant and toddler car seats sold in the United States in 1980; jobs, too, for many of the 2,768 psychologists who received their Ph.D.s that same year. The very existence of children, moreover, implies that the economy is in for a long run.

Children keep democracy fit. Without kids there would be no PTA. Local town meetings would be reduced to acrimonious disputes over solid waste disposal. Congress would be little concerned about family subsidies, and utterly unconcerned about abortion, day care, and prayer in the schools. Children help to lure adults into political activity.

Children also challenge their parents to think about the future, and hence about values and standards. Children represent what society is going to become. While moral relativism makes for lively reading in the pages of Us or Esquire, the notions of right and wrong acquire a certain importance when adults contemplate their own offspring.

Thus, unintentionally perhaps, children do America a lot of good. Against all of this, however, is the fact that children are an immense burden on everyone, arriving in this world at odd hours, consuming precious resources. To their parents, they are a relentless inconvenience and a perpetual source of worry. They cause taxes to rise to pay for schools and welfare. They force many mothers into the work force just to help the family make ends meet and at the same time place obstacles in the path of mothers who wish to work, or must. They complicate divorce and they complicate remarriage. Even in the best of circumstances, they get sick, irritate friends, repeat their parents' errors, flunk school tests. They force adults, both as individuals and as members of a community, to make painful choices concerning time and money.

Because children mean so much to society, for better or worse, their elders long ago set up a kind of Distant Early Warn-
ing system—a DEW line monitoring the approach of serious trouble. Centuries ago, such surveillance was conducted in Europe by the community as a whole. Children, though not collectively produced, were a collective obligation. In the United States, the nuclear family—two parents—soon took over many of the functions once performed by relatives or by neighbors. That, too, has been changing. As historian John Demos writes: "Broadly speaking, the history of the family in America has been one of contraction and withdrawal; its central theme is the gradual surrender to other institutions of functions that once lay very much within the realm of family responsibility."

**More Babies, Less Boom**

Today we pay not only doctors, teachers, psychiatrists, and lawyers to help ease children into maturity, but also psychologists and sociologists to keep tabs on the trouble spots: education, sex, drugs, television, poverty, broken families. Under the rubrics "children," "childhood," and so on, there are some 42,000 titles in the Library of Congress catalog. Scores of scholarly journals are devoted to these and related subjects. Last year, Washington disbursed upwards of $400 million for research pertaining to early childhood.

The research effort is vast, yet there is actually very little one can say for sure about children in the United States and the prospects they face over the next few years. One certainty is that there will be a lot more young children around during the next decade than there were during the one just past. Another is that it will cost parents far more to raise them than it ever did before. Precisely what that money buys in terms of a final "product" remains a matter of dispute. There are a few indications that older children, growing up after the recess period of the late 1960s and early '70s, are beginning to behave a bit more sensibly. Cigarette-smoking is down dramatically, for example, and drug use has diminished.* The teen birthrate has declined slightly to about 52 per 1,000 girls. For reasons that are becoming clearer, however, a substantial minority of America's chil-

*According to *Student Drug Use in America* (1982), a seven-year study sponsored by the U.S. Public Health Service, the use of barbiturates, LSD, heroin, and other narcotics seems to have leveled off among American junior high and high school students, while both the number of daily marijuana users and the overall number of "anytime" users have declined. Prior to junior high, children's experiences are largely confined to alcohol (sampled by nine percent of sixth graders), cigarettes (2.9 percent), and marijuana (2.2 percent).

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Children will face a disproportionate share of problems.

About 3.6 million babies were born in 1980, a half-million more than in 1975, prompting *Time* and other publications to herald a new baby boom. Such reports, unlike 91 percent of the newborns, are premature. What we are seeing merely reflects the fact that more women, women born during the true baby boom after World War II, have passed into the prime childbearing ages. The U.S. fertility rate per se has remained more or less steady at about 67 births annually per 1,000 women, and projections indicate that the total number of children an American woman will bear in her lifetime is now estimated at fewer than 2.2. Admittedly, women from age 30 to 34 recorded a 16 percent fertility gain between 1975 and 1979—but many of these babies were first births. Few of the late-starters will be producing baseball teams or even basketball teams.

Increasing numbers of men and women, moreover, are choosing to remain childless. While fewer than 10 percent of women born during the Depression never bore children, that percentage is projected to rise to 20 for women born in 1950 and to 30 for women born only four years later. The trend is most pronounced among affluent, urban, college-educated whites.
One is reminded of the inhabitants of Edwin A. Abbott’s fanciful *Flatland* (1884) who, the higher they rose in socioeconomic status, the less fertile they became, with the top-drawer elite unable to reproduce at all.

The notion of “child-free living,” once pursued primarily by the elderly, is now reflected in the living arrangements of younger households. Indeed, one-quarter of all rental units in the United States do not allow children, resulting in a shortage of space in many cities—New Orleans, Miami, Dallas, and Los Angeles are among the worst off—even for small families. Fewer than 10 states prohibit age-restrictive housing; court challenges elsewhere have rarely been successful.

**Suggested Retail Price**

Economists, professionally focused on a *homo oeconomicus* capable only of making rational choices in his own interest, must find it hard to explain why the species reproduces itself at all. The Health Insurance Institute estimates that the cost of having a baby, not including drugs and maternity clothes, averages between $2,170 and $2,220. According to the Department of Agriculture, a child born to middle-class, urban parents in the North Central region in 1979 will have cost them some $134,414 (reckoning eight percent annual inflation) by the time he reaches 18, assuming a “moderate cost level” and attendance at public schools. This figure would include the $54.16 that the average parent spent on Christmas presents for each child and the 51¢ that the average eight- to 10-year-old got every week as allowance during the mid-1970s.* Obviously, these numbers vary from country to city, class to class, family to family. Children are no more homogenous than Americans generally.

The Department of Agriculture originally began compiling its cost estimates to “provide budgetary guidance for individual families.” In reality, the chief users of such projections are judges, lawyers, and social workers as they variously set the level for child support payments, sue for damages arising in medical malpractice cases, or calculate the monthly stipend for foster parents. The uses to which *The Cost of Raising a Child* is put suggest a darker side of childhood in America today.

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*According to *The Child*, a study conducted by the Connecticut-based Gene Reilly Group, the average eight- to 10-year-old had a weekly disposable income (allowance plus earnings from odd jobs) of $1.29 during the mid-1970s, and 60 percent of children this age had already opened up a savings account. Of the money that children spent, most of it went for fast food and candy, but the amount varied by age and sex. Teenagers, for example, started buying more clothing and shoes, while boys of every age spent proportionately more than girls on toys, games, comic books, movies, and other forms of entertainment.
Increasing numbers of children are growing up with one parent in the home or with none—with consequences that are predictable for such youngsters as a group, though not as individuals. While economists quarrel over how to define "poverty"—should noncash government benefits be counted as part of a family's income?—too many children grow up in it. The public school system in many places is in disarray, especially in the older cities, where the exodus of middle-class whites and blacks to the suburbs has further tipped the scales against the children who remain. For many children, even in the more affluent suburbs, initiation into the worlds of drugs, sex, and crime comes before introduction to nouns and predicates.

These problems are real and merit the serious attention they have drawn in the media, academe, and government. It is sometimes easy to forget, however, that the average American child today stands a far better chance than did his parents or grandparents of, first, growing up, and second, doing so with a minimum of trauma. In three areas specifically, despite lingering ills, the vast majority of children in the United States are so much better off than their forebears that we have come to take the new conditions for granted.

**Improving the Breed**

*Health:* The massive drop in infant mortality—from about 150 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1900 to fewer than 14 in 1980—reflects the great strides medicine has made. Polio, rubella, tetanus, diphtheria, cholera, typhus, and whooping cough have been virtually eliminated. Even measles, common as recently as 1960, has been reduced by 99 percent since then to a scant 3,000 cases a year in the United States. Meanwhile, advances in neonatology have given premature infants weighing between 2.2 and 3.2 pounds as good a shot at survival (80 to 85 percent) as a full-term baby had in 1900.

The evolving roster of the top-10 child-killers tells the story. Before World War I, infectious ailments accounted for almost all deaths of children under four. Today, negligence, not illness, takes about one-half of these lives—accidents of one kind or another, especially automobile accidents (which in 1978 contributed to 1,287 deaths of children under age four). Homicide holds the No. 6 rank for children generally, No. 3 for blacks.

*So rare are the once lethal childhood diseases, and so immunized is the "herd," that many parents, lulled by ignorance or a false sense of security, overlook routine vaccinations. In September 1981, 77,600 students in New York City's public schools were denied admittance to their classes, amid public furor, until properly immunized.*

*The Wilson Quarterly/Autumn 1982*
CHILDREN AND THEIR PARENTS

BIRTH RATES BY AGE OF MOTHER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE OF MOTHER</th>
<th>First child</th>
<th>Second child</th>
<th>Third child</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 15</td>
<td>10,203</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>26,926</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>58,005</td>
<td>5,606</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>90,423</td>
<td>15,355</td>
<td>1,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>185,557</td>
<td>22,630</td>
<td>2,185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BIRTHS TO MOTHERS UNDER AGE 18, 1978

THE CHILDREN OF DIVORCE


The Wilson Quarterly/Autumn 1982

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At any given moment, one-fifth of America's children are living with one parent or with neither. Youngsters who do not grow up in two-parent households are more likely to need welfare, subsist below the poverty level, and be arrested at least once during their lifetimes.
Employment: Alexander Hamilton urged exploitation of child labor in 1791, arguing that children would "otherwise be idle, and in many cases, a burthen on the community." By 1880, 1.1 million youngsters from age 10 to 15 were gainfully employed, one out of six children in that age group. By 1900, the proportion was one in five. More than two-thirds of working children were employed in agriculture. The next largest category was textiles. "The golf links lie so near the mill/That almost every day/The laboring children can look out/And watch the men at play"—this popular quatrain by Sarah Norcliffe Cleghorn was published in 1915 as child labor in the United States reached its zenith.

Massachusetts passed the first child labor law in 1836, but not until after Reconstruction did a reform movement begin lobbying, state by state, to limit the number of hours children could work and to keep the very young out of the workplace altogether. Compulsory education laws were enacted over stiff opposition, even from educators. (Texas school superintendent Oscar H. Cooper opposed such measures in 1890, arguing that they undermined the "American idea" of "a minimum of law, thoroughly enforced, and a maximum of freedom."). Ultimately, in 1938, the U.S. Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act, which prohibited employment of minors in hazardous work—operating guillotine shears, for example, or priming rim-fire cartridges—and set down regulations regarding hours and pay according to the employee's age and job.

Currently all 50 states have child labor laws, many of them more stringent than federal statutes. Despite recurrent violations—some 13,825 miners were discovered working illegally in 2,493 establishments in 1981, and untold thousands of children, many of them illegal Hispanic aliens, are employed as migrant farm laborers—for the most part, child labor is no longer a burning issue.

Education: Only about one-quarter of the grandparents of children born in 1955 completed high school; half of their parents did so. Today, some 86 percent of all children will get diplomas and a majority of graduates will attend college at least for a while. Admittedly, more time spent in class is not necessar-

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*Indeed, some economists contend that the laws are now too strict and impede students who wish to work part-time. Handicap though the law may be, some one million 14- and 15-year-olds still manage to work at some job after school or during the summer in any given year. Female participation in the labor force is fast approaching that of young males. Surprisingly, the 14- and 15-year-olds who are still attending school are almost as likely to be in the labor force as the two percent of this age group that has, for whatever reason, dropped out.
### ALL-TIME BEST SELLERS FOR CHILDREN AND PARENTS

#### Children's Books

- **GREEN EGGS AND HAM**, by Dr. Seuss (1960).
- **THE WONDERFUL WIZARD OF OZ**, by L. Frank Baum (1900).
- **THE LITTLE PRINCE**, by Antoine de Saint-Exupéry (1943).
- **GERMEIER'S BIBLE STORY BOOK**, by Elsie E. Egermeier (1923).
- **THE LITTLE ENGINE THAT COULD**, by Watty Piper (1926).

*Five other books by Dr. Seuss and one other by Laura Ingalls Wilder would appear in a strict listing of the top 10, but have been omitted to broaden the list's scope.*

#### Parents' Books

- **INFANT CARE**, U.S. Children's Bureau (1914).
- **BABY AND CHILD CARE**, by Dr. Benjamin Spock (1946).
- **PRENATAL CARE**, U.S. Children's Bureau (1913).
- **YOUR CHILD FROM 1 to 6**, U.S. Children's Bureau (1918).
- **BETTER HOMES AND GARDENS BABY BOOK**, (1943).
- **YOUR CHILD FROM 6 TO 12**, U.S. Children's Bureau (1949).


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Family time better spent. The National Assessment of Educational Progress has registered a decline during the 1970s of some reading and math skills. Discipline and daily attendance is a problem in many schools—New York City’s, for example, where the number of truants daily ranges from 58,000 to 108,000.

That the educational system has its troubles is no longer
news. Still, the fact that public education is both universally available and a subject of universal concern suggests the importance that has, only recently in our national history, been attached to the schools. The average schoolchild in 1982, unlike that of 50 years ago, is likely to receive at least an adequate education—if the youngster remains in class. More girls than boys stay the course.

**A Two-Way Street**

Governments, like gamblers and students of particle physics, thrive on averages, but averages mask disparities. Consider the 3.5 million babies born in 1979. The “average” infant weighed about seven and a half pounds at birth, but 34 percent of new babies weighed more than eight pounds and 15 percent weighed less than six. The average baby was “normal,” but many were not. Of those 3.5 million newborns, for example, as many as three percent had some kind of noticeable congenital deformity. One out of 700 to 750 white children (and one out of 1,000 to 1,300 black children) was born with a cleft lip and/or cleft palate. Fetal Alcohol Syndrome affected at least 5,000 babies and about 2,000 were born addicted to opiates.

The average child was born to a married couple, but 17 percent were born to unwed mothers, and between 32 and 46 percent (projections vary) will grow up in a one-parent household at some point before the age of 18. Most unwed mothers these days—more than nine out of 10—keep their children, but thousands of newborns are still put up for adoption. Currently 120,000 children are available for adoption in the United States; one-third of them are black, and many are by no means babies any longer. “There is a family for every child,” may be the motto of modern adoption services but in fact, the children most in demand are white, healthy, and newborn. For these, the waiting list exceeds seven years.

The range of variation in children, physically and socially, is enormous. Recognizing this, doctors and psychologists over the past several decades have noticeably shifted their perspective on early childhood—away from an emphasis on what the environment does to an “average” child and toward the qualities each infant as a unique individual brings to his environment. Dr. J. P. Crozer Griffith, in 1895, considered a newborn to be “little more intelligent than a vegetable,” but even fetuses, it turns out, have remarkable powers of discernment. They are acutely sensitive to light and darkness, and can differentiate some sounds, primarily voices. Infants are responsive to stimuli.
immediately after birth and can make choices, preferring some sights (patterns rather than plain surfaces) and sounds (a female voice rather than a male's) to others. Certain personality traits, such as shyness, show up early and may be inherited. John Locke to the contrary, the child's mind is no simple tabula rasa.

The nature/nurture question is obviously complex, and one wonders how the Lord will deal with the matter when he apportions blame on Judgment Day. Calvinists and behaviorists aside, though, most specialists happily concede that the interaction between genetics and circumstance, between a new individual and the enveloping world its caretakers provide, is a two-way street. What remains elusive is the pattern of traffic.

120,000 Commercials

Some environmental correlations are simply too strong to ignore, even if they cannot serve as "predictors" in individual cases. Birth order, for example, appears to make a difference, as parents have long suspected. "Being an only child is a disease in itself," wrote psychologist G. Stanley Hall around the turn of the century. But recent studies indicate that "onlies," and first-born children generally, are in fact over-represented in graduate schools and the professions and tend to be especially intelligent, ambitious, and creative. (Of the first 16 astronauts, 14 were onlies or first-borns.) "Middle" children and the "baby" of the family likewise often display distinctive traits.

Between birth and the beginning of school at around age five, the average American child will learn about 6,000 words, although the first reading primers the child uses in school will contain only between 78 and 104 words. (As psychologist Bruno Bettelheim has pointed out, the techniques employed so successfully by parents in teaching children to speak seem to be "forgotten or ignored in many of our schools when we begin teaching our children to read.") Six-year-old children will also have watched 6,000 hours of television and as many as 120,000 commercials.

A link between television and children's behavior and learning skills probably exists, but no one has quite defined what it is. There is a positive correlation for young children, for example, between low IQ and high levels of TV viewing, but it is impossible to say whether cause and effect is involved or, if so, which way it runs. Programs such as Sesame Street apparently can teach the alphabet, but educators are otherwise divided on TV's effectiveness as a learning tool. Some ramifications are clear. According to the latest report on television from the National
CHILDREN: EDUCATION, JOBS, AND CRIME

Percent of group entering 5th grade

SCHOOL RETENTION RATES, BY GRADE

(Percent completing 12th grade, by high school class)

1980
1974
1962
1952
1942
1932

5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th


NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of correct responses</th>
<th>Reading</th>
<th>% of correct responses</th>
<th>Math &amp; Science</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(national average)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75%</td>
<td></td>
<td>55%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>9 year-olds</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>9 year-olds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>17 year-olds</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>17 year-olds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>9 year-olds</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>9 year-olds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>17 year-olds</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>17 year-olds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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HOW 15-YEAR-OLDS WERE EMPLOYED, SPRING 1980 (both sexes)

Average weekly hours:
- Males: 14.8
- Females: 10.5

JUVENILE ARREST TRENDS (Persons under 18)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFENSE</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>Percent change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CRIMES AGAINST PEOPLE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder and nonnegligent</td>
<td>51,761</td>
<td>66,452</td>
<td>+ 28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manslaughter</td>
<td>1,207</td>
<td>1,237</td>
<td>+ 2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forceible rape</td>
<td>2,652</td>
<td>3,093</td>
<td>+ 16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>27,499</td>
<td>34,829</td>
<td>+ 26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated assault</td>
<td>20,403</td>
<td>27,293</td>
<td>+ 33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>127,335</td>
<td>145,377</td>
<td>+ 14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny-theft</td>
<td>279,067</td>
<td>295,667</td>
<td>+ 5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicle theft</td>
<td>54,050</td>
<td>41,152</td>
<td>- 23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>4,884</td>
<td>5,205</td>
<td>+ 6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The number of agencies reporting arrests to the FBI varies from year to year. The figures above—which are intended to depict trends rather than the absolute number of arrests—are drawn from the 3,806 agencies that reported in both 1971 and 1980.
Institute of Mental Health, "the evidence accumulated during the 1970s seems overwhelming" that TV violence does prompt aggressive behavior in children. For what it is worth, kids prefer adult comedies and dramas to cartoons and are under few illusions about what the intent of commercials is.

The Impact of Divorce

Frequent moves, especially over long distances, affect school performance for the worse. A newborn in the United States can expect to move 12.9 times in his lifetime, and the average 16-year-old has already had three different homes. At first glance, the statistics show that children who are highly mobile are the least likely to have fallen behind the average achievement level for their age group. This is because the bulk of the moves made in any year involve intact families where the fathers have relatively high educational attainment—giving their children a head start to begin with. If these variables are "controlled," then the impact of moving becomes negative: It increases the likelihood that a child will fall behind in class. The more important lesson to be drawn, however, concerns the powerful influence of family stability and parents' education.

Findings about the effect of divorce on children are surprisingly consistent. About one million divorces are granted every year, involving more than one million children under age 18. Young children tend not to see divorce as a relief from family stress. Their school performance falls off, and relations with their peers suffer; many become fodder for the psychologists. In general, the children of divorce can expect lower lifetime income, less education, and a higher rate of marital instability than children brought up in stable families. In mitigating the emotional damage done by divorce, incidentally, the most important single factor seems to be continued close contact between a child and his missing parent (usually the father)."

"Happy families are all alike," began Leo Tolstoy in Anna Karenina, "every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." Yet, if only because it is pathology rather than bliss that attracts the lion's share of the research effort, it is among children with problems that one finds familiar patterns.

Some 11.4 million children under age 18 live in families whose income is below the poverty level—$8,414 for a nonfarm family of four in 1980, according to the U.S. government. Most of

these children have one thing in common: They are not living with both parents. In Illinois, for example, 89 percent of all children receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) payments live with their mothers only or with neither parent. Virtually the entire increase in the number of children in poverty in that state between 1969 and 1975 occurred among female-headed households. The reasons are obvious. Single-parent families must subsist on one income. The arrival of children, furthermore, usually curtails a young woman's education and limits her employment opportunities.

There is little any American government can do to eliminate divorce, abandonment, or out-of-wedlock births, which suggests that there is little that any agency can do, in the final analysis, to eliminate poverty. At most, the government—and private agencies—can treat the more painful symptoms.

A Misleading Debate

More than half of the 25 million U.S. wives with children are in the labor force (versus 20 percent in 1950), and about 7.5 million children under the age of six have mothers who work. What is to be done with all these kids? Must Washington subsidize a massive expansion of community day-care facilities?

In and out of Congress, the issue of day care somehow manages to stir ideologues of every stripe. The far Right condemns day care as a malevolent federal intrusion into family life—“the boldest and most far-reaching scheme ever advanced for the Sovietization of American youth,” in the words of columnist James J. Kilpatrick. Other conservatives are willing to swallow day care if it gets the “brood mares”—Sen. Russell Long’s memorable term for welfare mothers—into the workforce. Feminists see day-care centers both as a tool for eventually ridding the society of sexism—assuming they can get hold of the kids at a tender enough age—and as a means to allow more women to find jobs. The problem here is that when one question is asked (Do we need day care?), a second question is really implied (What kind of society do we want?).

The most respected writers on the subject—people such as Harvard’s Mary Jo Bane—take a moderate view of government-subsidized day care. In the 1980s, as Bane notes, the responsibility for child care should rest where it has for more than half a century: with parents and schools, “supplemented by a

*A recent study published in the Urban Institute—Teenage Child-Bearing and Welfare (1982), by Kristin A. Moore and Martha R. Burt—estimates that each year a woman delays having her first child reduces her chance of being on welfare at age 27 by two percentage points.
"CHILD POLICY" AT HOME AND ABROAD

During the 1979–80 school year, state and local governments in the United States spent $87.4 billion on elementary and secondary education for 47 million youngsters; Washington provided $9.5 billion more. At the federal level alone there are more than 260 programs that variously affect children, administered by 20 agencies. Even so, the United States has no true “national policy” for children or families. While there exists a U.S. Administration for Children, Youth and Families, most of the major federal efforts—Aid to Families with Dependent Children and the School Lunch Program, for instance—fall outside its jurisdiction.

Federal programs are a hodgepodge in part because Americans, putting a high value on family autonomy, seem to have wanted it that way. “All children are dependent,” wrote Grace Abbott, director of the U.S. Children’s Bureau, in 1938, “but only a relatively small number are dependent on the state.” This is still true. With few exceptions (e.g., public schools), government, local or federal, has acted only to help families in trouble—to succor abused children, to support poor single mothers and their offspring, to give disadvantaged children a “Head Start.”

By contrast, most European countries do have an explicit overall family assistance plan. Typically, these policies were originally designed to encourage couples to have more children and thus reverse a declining birthrate. More recently, family policy has had to tackle new problems: Should women enter the labor force? Will working women still have enough children? Who will care for them while their mothers are on the job?

Every industrialized country except the United States provides a yearly allowance, usually between five and 10 percent of the median wage, to all families with children. Many nations try to ensure that children and expectant mothers are in good health. In France, for instance, maternity benefits (currently about $840 per birth) are withheld from mothers who do not seek proper medical care. Most European governments ensure job security for as long as three years for new mothers who take a leave from work. Many require employers to allow days off to care for sick children.

rich and diverse array of extended family, community, and market arrangements.” Government has a role to play—but not necessarily a very big one.

Today, of all American pre-schoolers with working mothers, 29 percent are taken care of in their own home by a relative or by hired help, 47 percent are taken care of in someone else’s home (usually by a non-relative), and 19 percent are taken care of by the father or mother (at work, or at home when the return

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All family policy is not alike. Columbia's Sheila Kamerman and Alfred J. Kahn have identified four different "models" illustrated by four European nations:

Hungary's policy of encouraging mothers to stay at home to care for their young children was originally designed to relieve a labor glut. But its popularity and the high cost to government of supplying day care explain why it has lasted through more recent labor shortages. After a 20-week paid maternity leave, Hungarian women are entitled to a yearly child-care allowance, amounting to about half the average woman's salary, for up to three years, if they stay out of the workforce. Czechoslovakia and West Germany have adopted policies with a similar intent.

The emphasis in labor-short East Germany, on the other hand, is on placing young children in day-care centers, mostly to enable women to return quickly to work. Government-run centers care for more than 50 percent of children aged three or under. After their 26 weeks of paid maternity leave, women may elect to take an additional year, but without pay.

The French government helps mothers who return to work (via subsidized child care) as well as those who stay at home (via special stipends for lower- and middle-income families). About one-third of French children under the age of four receive some kind of out-of-home care.

In the interest of equality between the sexes, Swedish policy (copied in many respects by Finland and Denmark) encourages both parents to share child care. Paid "parental leave," with the expense shared by state and employer, is available to both the mother and the father.

As the Europeans have discovered, a national policy on children is no simple matter. The French, for instance, have a "neutral policy" in part because they cannot make up their minds which is more important, increasing the birthrate or helping women enter the labor force. In most countries, cash bonuses for mothers have not been successful in raising the birth rate. And in Sweden, despite the egalitarian rhetoric, most mothers still assume primary responsibility for child care. Only about 12 percent of eligible fathers actually took leave from work in 1979 to help raise their newborn offspring.

of one parent enables the other to depart for a job.

Only 15 percent are sequestered in a child-care institution of some kind. These institutions are not all day-care centers. They include Head Start programs, for example, as well as nursery schools. Of day-care centers per se, only seven percent are operated by government agencies; private entrepreneurs, churches, employers, and community groups run the rest. White-collar families in the suburbs are disproportionate con-
sumers of day care. As psychologist Suzanne H. Woolsey has noted, "A policy-maker or academic who lives in Bethesda or Cambridge, with parents in Fort Lauderdale and a sister in Berkeley, is not predisposed to think of relatives caring for his or her children. It is easy to forget that for those who live in South Boston or Harlem, a child's grandmother or aunt is more likely to be a few blocks away."

As noted above, the largest child-care program of all—public schools—is already in place, overseen by state and local governments. Community efforts are augmented by scores of federal programs (e.g., for the handicapped, to combat drug abuse), not to mention hot lunches and/or breakfasts for 23 million children every day, which cost $2.5 billion in 1981. In September 1982, roughly 2.7 million five- and six-year-olds will enter first grade in public schools, another 350,000 in private schools. Six out of 10 private grammar schools are Catholic, and their student bodies, despite a median annual tuition of $400, are disproportionately black and Hispanic.

To some degree, the first three or four years of grammar school are a period of categorizing, pigeonholing, even weeding out—tasks conducted by teachers, psychologists, and social workers while the basic job of imparting the skills of reading, writing, and arithmetic proceeds (or does not proceed). Children are given ear tests, eye tests, IQ tests, tests of physical coordination, psychological tests. By the time the average American child leaves high school he will typically have taken a dozen full-length, two- to six-hour batteries of intelligence tests alone and had at least an equal number of physical examinations. If the child is not average—if he has a physical or mental disability—the figure could be two or three times as high.

About two percent of school-age children, mostly boys, will be adjudged "hyperactive" and possibly sedated or put on special diets. As many as 1.5 percent may be mentally retarded to some degree (although only 100,000 mentally retarded children are currently institutionalized). At least two percent will have some speech impediment, 0.1 percent may be deaf or hard of hearing.

Other handicaps today are of a different order. Unable to speak English well, 295,000 schoolchildren are being taught in

*Mental illness among children is not so rare as may be supposed. Some 50,000 chronically mentally ill youngsters are institutionalized in any given year, and an estimated 12 percent of all children suffer from some sort of "clinical maladjustment," ranging from schizophrenia to depression to minor behavioral disorders. The United States has as many licensed child psychiatrists (3,300) as it has neurosurgeons. Suicide is the eighth leading cause of death for children from age five to 14.
one of 80 other languages (Spanish being used in at least two-thirds of these cases). The federal government alone contributed $99 million toward bilingual education in fiscal year 1981, although the long-term impact of such efforts, in terms of both learning and the nation's social cohesion, remains a matter of dispute. Nearly one million students, identified as "gifted," have also had their educations modified thanks to special efforts by state governments. (Forty-three states and the District of Columbia reported spending $148.5 million on education for the gifted last year.)

The vast majority of American schoolchildren, not marked for special treatment of any kind, will get on with the job of learning their lessons. Well before junior high, millions of youngsters will have achieved computer "literacy"; yet the deterioration in children's test scores on various standardized exams—including the much publicized 55-point drop in SAT verbal scores between 1963 and 1980, and a parallel 35-point drop in math—suggests that overall, children are not learning as much or as well as they did two decades ago. On the other hand, the long-term decline seems to have slowed lately and, in some places, even to have reversed. In Washington, D.C., elementary school children have finally reached national norms in reading and math; for the first time in 10 years, New York City scores have actually edged above the national average.

Educators and politicians have apparently taken to heart the angry criticism leveled by parents. By 1981, 17 states had adopted competency-based certification for prospective teachers. Two-thirds of the states now have "minimum competency" standards for public school students—and in 17 states, high school seniors must meet the standard before getting their diplomas. Many school districts have ended the practice of "social promotions" (i.e., automatically advancing students through the grades even if they are unable to handle the work).
None of these measures, of course, will help children who do not stay in school. Dropout rates are high. In 1979, some 25 percent of black males and 22 percent of black females had not graduated from high school by age 20. (The figures for whites are 17.7 and 14.3 percent respectively.) Why children leave school one can guess though not prove, the data being sparse and fragmentary. Disciplinary problems, family turmoil, boredom, pregnancy—these are probably the chief causes, in that order. Few youths drop out confident that they are ready to make a go of it in the real world.

A Subsidized Matriarchy?

Indeed, the real world may already have taken its toll. Crime, for example, is a fact of life in the schools. Every month American children spend in secondary school, they can expect to experience, as a group, 2.4 million thefts, almost 300,000 assaults, and more than 100,000 robberies. Criminal behavior starts early—usually in school—and it peaks quickly. More 17- to 20-year-old males are arrested for virtually every class of crime (including homicide) than males of any other age. But the record of children under 10 (55,000 arrests in 1980) is itself sobering, and it gets seven times worse by age 14. In 1981, 2.3 million juveniles were taken in by the police, if not necessarily charged. Of the more than one million youths referred to juvenile court in 1977, fewer than half were living with both parents.

No one really knows precisely how many girls end their educational careers on account of pregnancy, but more than a half-million teenagers bore children in 1981, and 65 percent of those new mothers were unmarried at the time of conception. Pregnancy, like crime, becomes more of a problem as children get older, but it is something to be reckoned with from the beginning of junior high, when six percent of young females are already sexually active. Contraceptive use among this age group, while rising, remains sporadic. Although, as noted above, the teen birthrate has dropped somewhat, 52 births for every 1,000 females under 20 remains extraordinarily high by comparison with rates in other industrialized countries.

The costs and correlatives of teenage pregnancy are well known. In one study, some 82 percent of the girls who had their first child before their 15th birthday had mothers who were also teen parents. Teen mothers will have larger-than-average families. Their educations will be curtailed, their income stunted, and they are prime candidates for the welfare rolls. Of the $9.4 billion paid out in AFDC benefits last year, half went to
women who gave birth to their first child as a teenager. There is no evidence that young girls are getting pregnant deliberately in order to collect welfare and move out of the house—but the availability of welfare may influence the teen mother to bear the infant (instead of having an abortion), to keep the child (as almost all of them do), and to reject marriage to the father. It may be, as urban affairs columnist Neil Pierce has observed, that especially among poor blacks, we have developed a "self-perpetuating, government-supported matriarchy."

America’s children survive many things—chicken pox, firecrackers, TV commercials—but what they have the most trouble surviving with anything like “acceptable” casualties is growing up without two parents. The absence of one of those individuals often puts a household into chronic difficulty and, in extreme cases, may trigger a kind of chain reaction. During the 1976 presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter had a standard stump speech on families. He would rattle off data about one unfortunate group of children after another—the unwed mothers, the juvenile delinquents, the runaways, the drug users, the illiterates, the illegitimate. The point he never made—the truly important point—was the extent to which all of these statistics overlap, the tendency for individuals who fall into any one of these categories also to fall into many of the others.

Making Adjustments

The stresses on children that attend, precede, or ensue from family instability feed on one another. While the majority of children who experience family disruptions learn to cope, in enclaves where broken families predominate—in some urban slums, in public housing projects, in isolated rural pockets—the odds are heavily against many children breaking out of the “underclass” cycle of disorganization, poverty, and dependence. It is not clear that any policy of government “intervention” acceptable in a democratic state can end this localized crisis of the family, which seems to be worsening.

Most American children, fortunately, have not fared so poorly. Childhood experiences during the past 30 years, and increasingly during the past 10, reflect the profound changes the society has undergone since World War II. The fact of the baby boom itself made the United States a child-centered (and then youth-centered, and ultimately, when the baby boom kids became adults, self-centered) nation. Deficiencies in children’s health, education, standard of living were deemed intolerable—and remediable. Meanwhile, the nation’s population was
CHILDREN

becoming more urbanized, more mobile. By the mid-1960s, women were entering the work force in record numbers. All the while, the children were still in the process of growing up. Some trade-offs had to be made.

John Demos has noted the trend within the American family toward "contraction and withdrawal." Without consciously setting out to do so, American adults have spent the past decade and more trying to adjust the way society works—giving themselves a bit more freedom (to move, to play, to work, to divorce) while devising alternative arrangements for bringing up the kids. Needless to say, this has placed an added burden on the schools. It has required new day-care arrangements. It has contributed to the growth of the fast-food industry. It has meant less time for parents with their kids, more time for kids with each other.

Whether this continuing adjustment of U.S. society is good or bad (or permanent) is hard to say. Some affluent parents have certainly substituted money for attention or affection. About 20,000 "latch-key" children from age three to six are left unattended every day while their parents are off working. On the other hand, mothers' entering the labor force has saved many families financially, particularly in times of stagflation and recession. There are pluses and minuses. The essential points are that society's adjustment is by no means complete, and that most children seem to have been weathering the transition, albeit not always unscathed.

It will be interesting to see what becomes of the children of the baby boom children—the "echo." They are being and will be raised by the first generation of Americans to have tasted the sexual revolution, the first to have experimented freely with drugs, the first to have been brought up by parents who were beginning to question "traditional" sexual roles. No previous generation of American parents suffered so from divorce as children, or enjoyed such material well-being. All of this will leave a mark on their own offspring, though what kind of mark may not be evident for years.
"To raise children is an uncertain thing," wrote Greek philosopher Democritus in the late fifth century B.C. "Success is attained only after a life of battle and disquietude. Their loss is followed by a sorrow which remains above all others."

Such ambivalence was characteristic of the ancients, observes Barbara Kaye Greenleaf in her popular survey, Children Through the Ages (McGraw-Hill, 1978). The Egyptians worshipped two gods who protected children: Maskonit, who appeared at the moment of birth, and Rainit, who insured that the infant was properly nursed.

Yet, infanticide was common in such cultures. The Phoenicians, Moabites, and Ammonites engaged in child sacrifice. And the Roman philosopher Seneca defended the practice of mutilating abandoned children and making them beggars. "This one is without arms, that one has had its shoulders pulled down out of shape in order that his grotesqueries may excite laughter. . . . Have not these children been done a service inasmuch as their parents had cast them out?"

Indeed, psychohistorian Lloyd de Mause declares, "The history of childhood is a nightmare from which we have only recently begun to awaken." In The History of Childhood (New York: Psychohistory Press, 1974, cloth; Harper, 1975, paper), de Mause chides Philippe Ariès and other historians for understating the extent to which children were "killed, abandoned, beaten, terrorized, and sexually abused" in the past.

Sending children to wet nurses, often for as long as five years, de Mause writes, was a common form of "institutionalized abandonment." In 1780, the police chief of Paris estimated that of the 21,000 children born each year in his city, 17,000 were sent into the country to be wet-nursed.

Things have always been a little different in the New World. The first Puritan settlers, worried about the spiritual salvation of their young, "were at once more severe with their children than members of other communions, and more concerned with each individual child," writes Mary Cable in her sprightly Little Darlings: A History of Child Rearing in America (Scribner's, 1975).

About half of all children in 17th-century America died before they reached the age of 10. With life so short, Puritan parents put a premium on "early piety." Cotton Mather wrote a primer containing "some examples of children, in whom the Fear of God was remarkably budding before they died."

Parents have never lacked for "experts" to advise them on the upbringing of their children. As Daniel Beekman demonstrates in detail in The Mechanical Baby: A Popular History of the Theory & Practice of Child Raising (Lawrence Hill, 1977), every epoch produces its Dr. Spock.

The philosophers Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) and John Locke (1632-1704), himself a bachelor, both propounded influential theories. Rousseau opposed swaddling, Locke opposed regular feeding, and both advocated icy baths to inure
children to nature's rigors.

The U.S. public school system began to take shape before the Civil War. Schools of the day, writes David B. Tyack in *The One Best System* (Harvard, 1974, cloth & paper) were disorganized and unimpressive. Only two percent of all 17-year-olds attended high school in 1870.

During the 1840s and '50s, school reformers promoted moral uplift. But as urbanization and industrialization accelerated, and the need to absorb new immigrants became more pressing, their aims shifted. "Efficiency, rationality, continuity, precision, impartiality" became watchwords.

The reformers thus set about bringing city school systems under central control, improving the status of teachers, and setting up the graded class system. According to Tyack, this quest for the "one best system" is largely responsible for many of today's educational troubles—bureaucratization, inferior education for the poor, political feuds over the schools.

School reform was often linked to an attack on child labor. In 1900, nearly two million children were at work—in factories, farms, as street-corner bootblacks—and not in school. By 1930, the number was down to fewer than 700,000, thanks largely to the state-by-state efforts of labor leaders, reform groups, and politicians. Yet, as Katherine Lumpkin and Dorothy Douglas write in their impassioned *Child Workers in America* (McBride, 1937), in some states, old practices died hard. In Mississippi, 25 percent of the white children between ages 10 and 15 and about one-third of the black children held jobs in 1930.

Fourteen-year-old Henry Dickinson, for example, rose at three every morning to work in a cotton mill for a $5 weekly wage. "Does it make Henry any less a child because he is a wage earner at 14?" Lumpkin and Douglas ask. "It does . . . by the time he has been there a few weeks."

Case studies furnish the core of psychiatrist Robert Coles's oft-cited five-volume series, *Children of Crisis* (Atlantic–Little, Brown, 1964–80, cloth & paper). Coles lived among Southern black sharecroppers, Eskimos, Chicanos, privileged white suburbanites, and other groups, trying to understand how children learn attitudes about social class, status, and the political system.

Coles ponders the cases of a banker's son who takes an alarming (to his parents) interest in television episodes of *The Adventures of Robin Hood* and a migrant worker's daughter who develops an equally alarming hostility to farmers and sheriffs. Eventually, the boy's guilt about being wealthy fades and he takes to watching *Gilligan's Island*; the girl resigns herself to her fate.

How does this happen? Parents play a role, Coles says, but "in the topsy-turvy world of child psychiatry it is hard to come up with consistent or unqualified answers."

The whys and wherefores may be unclear, but to many of today's reformers, the "what to do" is not. Two representative studies—*Toward a National Policy for Children and Families* (National Academy, 1976) and Kenneth Kenniston's *All Our Children: The American Family Under Pressure* (Harcourt, 1977, cloth; 1978, paper)—press the case for massive federal intervention.

Nearly five million children under age six live in some degree of poverty; 20 million children of all ages receive inadequate medical care. "Many of the difficulties faced by
families," write the authors of the National Academy of Sciences report, "are intricately linked with larger societal concerns: inequality, poverty, the decline of cities, poor housing, unemployment, inadequate health care, lack of transportation, the deterioration of the environment, inadequate education." The solution: national guaranteed annual income, day-care programs, and expanded health and welfare services.

But political scientist Gilbert Y. Steiner offers a cogent counterargument in The Futility of Family Policy (Brookings, 1981, cloth & paper). Big government proposals are too all-embracing, ill-defined, and contradictory, he writes. "Families would dissolve notwithstanding all these and myriad other exemplary public achievements, and [other] families hold together under conditions of war, economic depression, slum living, environmental pollution, and educational jungles."

Most of America's childhood "experts," however, are concerned not with political issues but with the development of individual children. A good overview of this enormous field is Carmichael's Handbook of Child Psychology (Wiley, 1954; rev. ed., 1970), edited by Paul H. Mussen.

Psychologist Urie Brofenbrenner provides a fascinating perspective on American child-rearing practices in his classic Two Worlds of Childhood: U.S. and U.S.S.R. (Sage, 1970). Everyone in the Soviet Union takes an extraordinary interest in children—even strangers. "Children in the park are expected to keep in the immediate vicinity of the accompanying adult, and when our youngsters...would run about the paths, even within our view, kindly citizens of all ages would bring them back by the hand."

The Soviets overemphasize conformity and the primacy of the group over the individual, he concludes, but Americans can learn from their practices. "What is called for is greater involvement of parents, and other adults, in the lives of children, and—conversely—greater involvement of children in responsibility on behalf of their own family, community, and society at large."

Another perspective on childhood is offered by psychologist Bruno Bettelheim in his exploration of The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales (Knopf, 1976, cloth; Vintage, 1976, paper). "Each fairy tale," he writes, "is a magic mirror which reflects some aspects of our inner world, and of the step required by our evolution from immaturity to maturity."

In "Hansel and Gretel," for example, the children are twice abandoned by their poverty-stricken parents and are accepted back only after outwitting the witch in the forest (who embodies deep psychological conflicts within the children) and returning home with pearls and precious stones (which represent psychic remuneration). It is a parable, Bettelheim concludes, about the rewards of growing up—and the impossibility of holding on to childhood forever.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Related titles may be found in WQ's Background Books essays on Men and Women (Winter '82) and the American Family (Winter '77 and Summer '80).
Economics:

WHY ECONOMISTS DISAGREE

Only a few years ago, the United States seemed destined to enjoy endless good times. The 1950s were marred by two brief recessions, but unemployment averaged only 4.5 percent, inflation two percent. By 1965, the pace of annual economic growth had nearly doubled, climbing to 6.5 percent, and unemployment and inflation remained near their old levels. It seemed that Washington’s economic sages had hit upon a magic formula to ensure growing prosperity for all. But within a decade, chronic stagflation had set in, exacerbated by the 1973–74 oil price “shocks,” defying all predictions and cures. The high interest rates and severe recession of 1981–82 now stir new quarrels among economists. Here, James W. Dean tells what went wrong and what happened to the magic—if there ever really was any.

by James W. Dean

Economists have always disagreed among themselves, but until recently, no one much noticed.

Of course, history records exceptions. A dramatic example was the presidential campaign of 1896, when Democrat William Jennings Bryan immortalized the evils of tight money tied to a gold standard with the phrase “Cross of Gold.” Today, ringing references to economic theory again fill the air, and last year the President even created a Gold Commission to contemplate resurrection of the Cross.

No presidential campaign since 1896 brought questions of economic theory so directly to public attention as did the 1980 Carter-Reagan contest. And the debate continues. When before has so academic a scandal as Doubting David Stockman’s public confession about “supply-side” theory caused such a political uproar? When before did local newspapers lampoon the Federal Reserve? When before was the New Yorker inspired to run regular cartoon coverage of Keynesians and monetarists sparring
over family breakfast or in corner bars?

As an economist, I can no longer enjoy cocktail parties without being harassed by jazz dancers and interior decorators seeking a shepherd through the murky world of economic theory, of whose very existence they were, until recently, mercifully ignorant. What guidance can one offer the principled and sincere young dancer who contemplates, soon after the second television episode of *Free to Choose*, lifelong commitment to monetarism and Milton Friedman? And will her commitment falter after she reads Harvard's John Kenneth Galbraith, who is wittier but a Keynesian? Or when she discovers anti-monetarist letters to the *New York Times* by James Tobin of Yale, who is, like Friedman, a Nobel Laureate?

**Welcome in Washington**

Can there be truly serious theoretical disputes between *Nobel Laureates* in economic science? Or is the argument merely empirical? Or perhaps political?

Of course, it is all three. Empirical disagreements—arguments over facts and figures—are to be expected in any social science, where controlled experiments with indisputable outcomes are impossible. And political disagreements are predictable whenever policy choices must be made. It is harder to explain why economists today, more than 200 years after Adam Smith codified the principles of economics in *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), should find themselves in such deep disarray over theory.

The truth is that the postwar era up to the late 1960s was a time of unusual consensus among economists. With the exception of a few eccentrics from the University of Chicago and the Austrian school, economists considered themselves "neo-Keynesians." Confined to academia, none of this would have mattered very much. But after World War II, politicians vowed not to repeat the Great Depression, and they expanded the New Deal practice of bringing economists to Washington to serve as advisers. Of course, almost all these economists agreed that government could keep the economy healthy and foster steady growth by using neo-Keynesian "fiscal fine-tuning" techniques—continually adjusting government spending and taxes to keep aggregate demand steady, avoiding both inflation and recession.

This notion suited Congress and the White House. With the Employment Act of 1946, the federal government committed itself, at least on paper, to fiscal fine-tuning methods to contain
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The jobless rate. Economists gained new prominence. The White House had acquired its first full-time economic adviser in 1939; seven years later, it added a three-member Council of Economic Advisers to counsel the President. Congress established its Joint Economic Committee in 1946 and added the Congressional Budget Office in 1974. By then, the number of economists on the government payroll had reached 4,300.

The New High Priests

The consensus that reigned among economists first took shape during the late 1940s, aided by the invention of electronic computers and the publication of Paul Samuelson's best-selling textbook, Economics, in 1948. Samuelson introduced the "neo-classical synthesis," which seemed to reconcile the thought of the neoclassical followers of Adam Smith with the economics of England's John Maynard Keynes. Smith believed that an economy, if left to itself, would be guided by an "invisible hand" toward a natural and widely beneficial equilibrium; Keynes, writing during the Depression, contended in his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) that markets could seriously malfunction, leaving workers without jobs, consumers without income, and businesses without sales. As codified by Samuelson's textbook, neo-Keynesian conventional wisdom emphasized that markets could be relied upon to function much as neoclassical theory promised, as long as aggregate demand (i.e., spending by individuals, business, and government) was sustained. Unemployment, curse of the Depression years, could be reduced to some "hard-core" rate—for example, three percent—by stimulating the economy, chiefly through government spending or tax cuts.

Samuelson's textbook ended, at least temporarily, the great theoretical debate among economists. They turned to their new computers to engineer the application of neo-Keynesianism or to toy with elaborate mathematical models of the economy.

In 1958, a new twist—or rather, curve—was added to the economist's grab bag by Professor A. W. Phillips, a New Zealander then at the London School of Economics. According to

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the "Phillips curve," there is an inevitable tradeoff between inflation and employment: To get less of one, economies must suffer more of the other. For some reason, economists, unlike the rest of us, invariably welcome such Calvinistic reminders that the good things in life (low inflation) can only be obtained at great sacrifice and pain (unemployment). The Phillips curve quickly became a centerpiece of neo-Keynesian doctrine.

The aura of consensus was fostered by a period of benign prosperity. By the mid-1960s, not only had America reached a level of affluence unprecedented in human history, but also boom-and-bust business cycles seemed to be licked. Economists proclaimed themselves high priests of social engineering. Their success, and their methods, seemed beyond dispute. "It is possible to see at last," City University of New York economist Robert Lekachman wrote in 1966, "that Keynesian economics is not conservative, liberal, or radical. The techniques of economic stimulation and stabilization are simply neutral administrative tools." A few moral souls—Barbara Ward, Gunnar Myrdal, John Kenneth Galbraith—preached against the evils of income inequality, but by and large, the community of economists was
congenial, though something of a bore.

This is not to say there were no dissenters. In 1956, Milton Friedman, a prominent neoclassicist at the University of Chicago, published "The Quantity Theory of Money—A Restatement." The "Restatement" elegantly revived pre-Keynesian theory, laying the groundwork for a counterrevolution. Friedman challenged, head-on, Keynes's argument that if more money were put into circulation it might simply be hoarded, not spent. Instead, Friedman argued that "money matters." Like any other good, it decreases in value when plentiful and increases in value when scarce. Pumping too much money into the economy would spur inflation; reining in the money supply too rapidly would cause unemployment and recession.*

Then, in his 1959 Program for Monetary Stability, Friedman offered a prescription for government policy: the fixed monetary growth rule. The Federal Reserve Board, Friedman argued, should increase the money supply by a fixed rate of three to five percent annually to promote stable economic growth. His underlying idea harked back to Adam Smith: The private sector is self-stabilizing. Economic instability results primarily from government's fiscal, monetary, and regulatory actions. Keynes had suggested just the opposite.

**JFK's Gamble**

From Chicago and elsewhere poured reams of supporting evidence, forcing most economists to agree by the late 1960s that money is considerably more important than the Keynesians had first claimed. In 1968, the conservative Swiss-American economist Karl Brunner christened Friedman's Chicago-school economics "monetarism."

Meanwhile, back in the real world of 1968, postwar history seemed to have confirmed the success of neo-Keynesian fiscal fine-tuning. Granted, the 1950s had been prosperous without benefit of explicit Keynesian policies: President Dwight D. Eisenhower was a fiscal conservative who believed in balanced budgets. But that was the decade when America supplied a gradually reviving Western Europe with its exports, helping to sustain aggregate demand at home. Moreover, despite Ike's reluctance to fine-tune the economy, automatic stabilizers such as unemployment insurance (which buoyed demand when the economy turned sluggish) and progressive tax rates (which

*In his 1963 magnum opus, *A Monetary History of the United States*, co-authored with Anna Schwartz, Friedman argued that the Depression of the 1930s could have been avoided had the Federal Reserve Board pumped out enough money in time.
skimmed off excessive demand when it picked up) were already in place, along with federal public works programs.

John F. Kennedy was the first President to try deliberate neo-Keynesian policies. "In the early 1960s," Paul Samuelson later observed, "the United States government, for the first time in its history, explicitly tried to add to a recession deficit in the interests of higher employment and growth." Federal fiscal policy, particularly the famous $10 billion tax cut planned by Kennedy and enacted in 1964 under Johnson, was probably responsible for the sustained real growth (an average of 5.2 percent annually) and low unemployment of the Kennedy-Johnson years.

"Policy Nihilism"

Toward the end of the 1960s, however, things began to come unglued. Fearful of losing his Great Society social programs, Lyndon Johnson shied from putting the issue of financing the Vietnam War before Congress; he avoided raising taxes and refused to sell new Treasury bonds on the open market for fear of pushing up interest rates. Instead, he pressured the Federal Reserve to create new money to buy the bonds. The monetarists' warnings seemed to be confirmed: Inflation went from 1.7 percent in 1965 to 5.4 percent in 1969. In 1968, Johnson tried to combat inflation with a standard Keynesian tax tool—a 10 percent income-tax surcharge to lessen demand—and failed. Still worse, unemployment was rising too, contrary to the predictions of the Phillips curve. Events had outstripped theory. The neo-Keynesian orthodoxy was beginning to falter.

In a well-timed presidential address to the American Economics Association in 1967, Friedman unveiled a "new" Phillips curve (developed almost simultaneously by Edmund Phelps). There is, he contended, a "natural" rate of unemployment, unrelated to the rate of inflation. Furthermore, aggregate demand could be trimmed only by reducing monetary growth. Less money, therefore, would eliminate inflation without, in the long run, raising unemployment; more money would generate inflation without any long-run payoff in reduced unemployment.

Though the "new" Phillips curve did not necessarily imply that unemployment and inflation would rise simultaneously—giving us stagflation—it did seem to help explain it. Since employment in the long run was determined by supply alone, the swelling numbers of new workers during the late 1960s and '70s—the housewives and the maturing children of the Baby Boom entering the work force—had probably raised "natural" unemployment. Government policies—minimum wage laws
and unemployment insurance—that interfered with the natural workings of the market boosted the jobless rate higher, and "misguided" Keynesian pump-priming attempts to maintain unemployment at the old, lower rates simply added to inflation without permanently increasing the number of jobs.

What was so startling about Friedman's argument was that it denied the efficacy of the Keynesians' most basic policy prescription—stimulating demand to reduce unemployment. In his view, no form of demand stimulus could keep unemployment below its "natural" rate. Government could do little about unemployment and was best advised simply to provide stable monetary growth and to leave markets to function for themselves. An age of "policy nihilism" had begun.

Within 10 years, policy nihilism—passive government economic policy—was being seized upon by politicians, not all of them conservatives but all eager to avoid responsibility for stagflation. By the spring of 1978, even the Labour Prime Minister of Britain, James Callaghan, could be heard disclaiming his government's responsibility for unemployment.

At the August 1978 American Economic Association meetings, I asked 15 prominent economists whether unemployment, then at 5.9 percent (almost three points above the old "hardcore" rate) was at, above, or below its "natural" rate. A majority answered "at or below," implying that demand should be either left alone or geared down to avoid boosting inflation.

Economists from the depleted liberal ranks argue that their

At left, the unemployment-inflation tradeoff as seen by Keynesians (the Phillips Curve) and monetarists (the "new" Phillips Curve). Economists do not know where the two actually intersect. According to the Laffer Curve, either a high or low tax rate can yield the same revenue.
conservative colleagues, in their preoccupation with the natural rate of unemployment, have performed a serious social disservice. The "naturally" unemployed, they argue, are really victims of "structural" unemployment—a mismatch between job openings and the skills and aptitudes of job seekers. Their conservative counterparts prefer to think of unemployment as an extended but voluntary "search" for work.

At the bottom of this controversy is a philosophical question: What constitutes free choice? If the "naturally" unemployed were willing to change occupations or their location, or work for wages close to what they receive in welfare benefits or unemployment insurance, many could find jobs. But is such unemployment truly "voluntary"?

How to Work Wonders

The conservatives also argue that many of the "naturally" unemployed are mere youngsters who will find jobs once they grow up; others are wives who bring home "second" incomes. The implication is that we need not be deeply concerned about the fate of either group. But do youths or wives seek work with less zeal or compulsion than do their elders or their spouses?

There is little question that economists (with some notable exceptions) swung markedly to the right during the past decade. A generation of economists under 40—christened by Newsweek in 1978 "the new economists"—have explicitly rejected the Keynesian canons that stirred them during the 1960s. "We were good Keynesians once," declared University of Minnesota economist Thomas Sargent, "but we had to change our minds." Many in the older generation have also moved to the right. Most of the 15 doyens I interviewed in 1978 said they had retreated from fiscal activism, crediting their latter-day wisdom to a combination of old age, unhappy events inconsistent with Keynesian theory, and even the immutable advance of logic.

While the revised thinking on the tradeoff between unemployment and inflation is its most obvious manifestation, the intellectual retreat from neo-Keynesianism is far more fundamental. At the 1978 American Economic Association meetings, the prestigious Ely Lecture was delivered by Cornell's Alfred Kahn, who as chairman of the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board had just dramatically deregulated the airlines. Kahn—something of a performer—was roundly applauded. To those I interviewed afterward, the lesson was clear: Sweeping deregulation throughout the U.S. economy would work wonders.

These days, economists' new love affair with "noninterven-
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"Economism" springs less from ideological commitment than from pragmatism. There is a growing recognition among economists that government often just cannot deliver on its promises, or can do so only by incurring unconscionable costs. For example, Murray Weidenbaum, now chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, estimated in 1977 that it costs business $100 billion annually to comply with federal regulations—far more than the value of any benefits that might conceivably be reaped. Harvard’s Martin Feldstein argued that the prospect of receiving Social Security benefits reduces incentives for younger families to save, thereby shrinking the pool of funds available for investment. And University of Southern California economist Arthur Laffer has become famous for his controversial “Laffer curve,” which expresses the notion that rising tax rates discourage production by individuals and firms to such an extent that Washington has less to tax and reaps less revenue.

Thus, the 1970s saw the birth of “supply-side” economics. The supply-side credo is plain: Cut taxes and deregulate business to stimulate work effort, saving, investment, and productivity. The idea is to promote a greater supply of output, in contrast to the more indirect Keynesian strategy of stimulating demand to induce an expansion of output.

Out of the Closet

High taxes are not a necessary consequence of Keynesian theory, but in practice Keynesian economists often favor stimulating the economy by increasing government spending rather than cutting taxes. Also, the Keynesian “fine-tuning” mentality may have fostered a greater willingness in Congress and the White House to intervene in the economy. Keynesians thus got a good deal of the blame for what had gone wrong.

Supply-side economists found a home in Ronald Reagan’s White House. Reagan, like Moses before him, held out to his people a Promised Land. It was to be a Promised Land of Low Taxes and Rapid Economic Growth. It was also to be a Promised Land Without Inflation so that monetarists, too, found a happy home with Reagan. But domestic disputes were inevitable. The monetarists advocated tight money. The supply-siders hoped for a quick stimulus; the more fervent and naive even expected tax revenues to rise, Laffer-like, soon after tax rates were cut.

But tax cuts coupled with tight money have produced precisely the opposite effect. Tax revenue has fallen below projections, and so has the growth of GNP. The federal deficit has ballooned, and so, consequently, has Washington’s need to sell
bonds. With monetarists at the Federal Reserve keeping credit tight in order to fight inflation, interest rates can only skyrocket. As a result, business and consumer demand have been throttled. We are witnessing today the bizarre spectacle of demand-side restriction exacerbated by the attempt at supply-side stimulus. By fueling high interest rates, the most pro-business administration since Herbert Hoover’s is crowding out private investment (albeit unintentionally) in favor of public spending.

Eventually—and this is the only point at which supply-side and monetarist policies can converge—a recession (or depression) will break not only current inflation (as it is beginning to do) but also expectations of future inflation (which it has not yet done). This will bring interest rates down, as lenders stop demanding high returns as insurance against future inflation. Then, investment may recover, and with it the economy.

Meanwhile, the rift between supply-siders and monetarists widened. President Reagan, in his monetarist incarnation, castigated Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker for failing to dam the country’s river of credit. But Representative Jack Kemp (R.-N.Y.), the consummate supply-side politician, called on Volcker to resign because his money policy was too restrictive. Thus, Congressman Kemp was exposed as a closet Keynesian. Suddenly, he wanted to stimulate not supply, but demand, by loosening the reigns on monetary policy. Keynes’ message was that supply does not, in the short run, create its own demand. “In the long run,” he wrote, “we’re all dead.”

That snippet from Keynes has been repeated so many times that it now seems trite, but it is a major clue to why economists disagree. Differences over short- and long-run perspectives are behind a surprising range of controversies among economists, cutting across issues of theory, “facts,” and politics.

**Guessing Games**

The supply-side controversy, for example, was opened by Keynes 50 years ago when he questioned the validity in the short run of Say’s Law. This proposition—first articulated by the French economist Jean-Baptiste Say in 1826—states that supply creates its own demand. An excess supply of goods or workers, for example, can never develop since prices and wages will always fall until they are all purchased or everyone gets a job.

Keynes observed that prices, and especially wages, do not fall rapidly in the short run, just because aggregate demand falls and unemployment rises. Similarly, as Congressman Kemp has divined, lowering taxes to stimulate the supply of goods and
services does no good unless the Federal Reserve fuels demand. Short- versus long-run issues underlie the Keynesian-monetarist controversy, as well. Keynesians such as James Tobin favor the employment and output gains that come from stimulating demand, whereas monetarists such as Milton Friedman are convinced that such gains are only temporary and that stimulation only causes inflation in the long run.

Why such disagreement over the relative importance of the short and long runs? Increasingly over the last decade, economists have formulated theory in terms of expectations. The "new" Phillips curve, for example, suggests that high unemployment in the wake of monetary restriction is a result of workers' expectations that the respite in inflation is only temporary. They keep their wage demands high and employers, faced with lower revenues but steady costs, cut payrolls.

God, Khomeini, and the U.S. Economy

The stoic monetarist response calls for continued tight money—and thus continued high unemployment—to break inflationary expectations. It hinges on the faith that inflationary expectations can be broken before the economy, and perhaps society itself, cracks under the weight of the unemployed. Such cherubic faith was neatly parodied last fall by Bob Rae, then a member of the Canadian Parliament, who rewrote a passage from Peter Pan: "If we all get together and really believe that inflation will come down, that jobs will be created tomorrow, if we close our eyes and wish ever so fervently, then it will happen."

If inflationary expectations could be broken, the supply-siders' dream might come true, too. Interest rates would decline; investment would rise. It was faith that inflationary expectations would come down quickly that fostered an alliance between monetarists and supply-siders during President Reagan's first few months in office. And when it became clear that this would not happen quickly, the supply-siders called for a new Cross of Gold (gold standard) to do the job. The monetarists demurred, convinced that a steady tight money policy alone would eventually break inflationary expectations.

Why did economists seem so successful until the 1970s, and why have they seemed so unsuccessful since? Much of the answer has to do with the predictability of expectations.

Throughout the 1950s and '60s, the macroeconomic facts of life—inflation, unemployment, the growth of GNP—were remarkably stable. Economists did not need to be soothsayers. They could confidently create computer models of the economy.
and base their projections of the future on extrapolations of what happened in the past. The long run could be expected to be more or less an extended version of the short run. Similarly, the effects of economic policies did not hinge nearly so much upon public expectations, since these stayed within a narrow range.

This benign world broke down with the Vietnam War deficits of the late 1960s. These not only overstimulated an economy already running near full capacity, but, because they were financed with new money, fueled inflation as well. Lyndon Johnson’s 1968 tax surcharge failed to reduce inflation over the short run because the public (correctly) expected it to be a one-shot treatment, not a permanent curb on demand, and therefore kept buying (and pulling up prices) as before.

Johnson and Nixon kept the money supply and inflation at unprecedented levels well into the 1970s. A second layer of inflation was added with the drastic food, commodity, and oil price increases of 1973–74. By the mid-‘70s, expectations that inflation would persist at high levels were deeply entrenched, reflected in wage demands and long-term interest rates.

What it will take to change these expectations is anybody’s guess. In building computer models of the economy, economists must predict such things as how rapidly prices will change and how much business will invest. These predictions, in turn, depend on educated guesses about how rapidly people adjust their expectations to new conditions (e.g., will bankers ease long-term interest rates when inflation seems to decline?) and how optimistic (or pessimistic) businessmen are about future demand. Again, millions of individuals’ expectations play a key role. Yet our ability to predict how these expectations will change is wretchedly inadequate.

What economists can do is provide orderly models of a relatively unchanging economy. As long as acts of God and the politicians are infrequent and relatively unimportant, such models can be used to test the effects of various policies and even to make rough predictions for the near future. But in a world reeling from the acts of Lyndon Johnson, Sheik Yamani, and the Ayatollah Khomeini, even this modest role becomes impossible. Economists find themselves reduced to diviners of the public psyche. Little wonder they disagree.
Framed by one of the 162 statues atop Bernini's graceful colonnade, Pope John Paul II greets pilgrims in St. Peter's Square from the window of his study in the Apostolic Palace. The labyrinthine palace, with its 10,000 rooms and hallways, is the center of official life inside Vatican City-State.
The Vatican

Pope John Paul II is in the public eye as leader of the Roman Catholic Church. He also happens to be sovereign of the Vatican City-State. Like Britain and Japan, the Vatican has a geography, a population, a language, and a national anthem ("Inno Pontifico," by Gounod). In some ways, its domestic problems are those of many a larger nation: Worldwide stagflation, for example, has drained the Vatican’s exchequer. Domestic political and administrative reforms, long overdue, have not always worked out as planned. What set the Vatican apart, of course, are its tiny size and its religious mission. Here, theologian Francis Xavier Murphy describes the Vatican as a functioning mini-state; and political scientist Dennis Dunn analyzes its special foreign policy, which goes well beyond papal visits to Asia, Africa, and communist Poland.

CITY OF GOD

by Francis Xavier Murphy

It is the smallest independent state on earth. Its ruler, last of the absolute monarchs by divine right, is also its only permanent citizen. It boasts no natural resources. It must import all of its energy, labor, food, and building materials. It lacks a Times Square, on moral grounds, but it has its own Wall Street and Fleet Street, its own license plates, currency, postage stamps, and passports; it could charter its own airline and has run a merchant marine under its own flag. There is no government older—an unbroken train of succession trails back 1,900 years—and no other state occupies a position so anomalous in the international regime, perpetually inviolable and neutral.

As the realm of the pope, the Vatican City-State’s global influence and international presence are greatly disproportionate to its size. The sums it allots to “foreign aid” of various kinds take up about half of its annual budget. Active in diplomacy, the Holy See has been at least as effective as the United Nations in focusing attention on the wretched of the earth. “We want to be
the voice of the voiceless,” Pope John Paul II said in Mexico in 1979, his words carried around the world by the powerful Vatican transmitter at Santa Maria di Galeria. John Paul, born Karol Wojtyla, had been elected to the papacy only months earlier. The first Polish pontiff brought a new and much publicized dimension to the Vatican’s foreign policy as Poland stumbled toward political and economic disarray in the shadow of the USSR.

The “Roman Question”

Rarely reflected in the headlines in recent years has been the Vatican its inhabitants know, a tiny state that shares the problems of a larger world. Inflation is high, energy costly, and labor disgruntled. As happens whenever all businesses are state-owned, complaints about red tape are frequent. Air pollution is a problem. So are sporadic crimes of violence, perpetrated by hammer-wielding vandals or would-be assassins. Though not burdened by a large defense establishment (there was once a Pentagone, but this referred to a clique of five powerful cardinals), the Vatican today is unable to make ends meet. In more ways than one, the Holy See has entered the modern world.

The Vatican City-State’s 108.7 acres lie across the brown Tiber from Rome’s centro storico, atop a gentle rise that served as a cemetery in the days of the caesars. The link between this plot of land and the papacy was forged around A.D. 67 when Peter, the Judean fisherman and first bishop of Rome, was martyred in the nearby Circus of Nero. According to tradition, Peter was buried in a primitive grave underneath what is now the main altar of St. Peter’s Basilica; archaeological evidence, though not definitive, suggests that tradition has something to recommend it. Whatever the truth, the Emperor Constantine (306–37) took the sanctity of the site for granted when he erected the first basilica there, centering its axis on the presumed Petrine remains. The present structure, designed by Bramante, Raphael, Michelangelo, and others, was begun in 1506.

How the malarial Vatican hills became The Vatican is rather an intricate story. By the second century A.D. the bishop of Rome had already achieved a certain pre-eminence within the church in both doctrinal and disciplinary matters. (Irenaeus of Lyons

speak of Rome's *potentior principalitas*—its "more important origin.") By the fourth century, the pope was master of much property in Italy and beyond, his rights protected by Constantine and later Christian emperors. As imperial government collapsed, the task of maintaining order on the Italian peninsula increasingly fell to the Roman pontiff.

The papacy at first pressed no formal claim to a temporal state—"My kingdom is not of this earth," Christ had said—but papal rule of an autonomous territory in central Italy gradually became a fact of life, then a matter of principle. From the breakup of the Carolingian Empire in the ninth century to the reunification of Italy in the 19th, the bishop of Rome enjoyed sovereignty over a protean state whose size, borders, population, wealth, and stability seemed to vary from pope to pope. Although the territory was ruled from Rome, not until 1377 did the Holy Father move his residence from the Lateran palace across the river to the Vatican complex. It was to the Vatican that Pope Pius IX withdrew in 1870 when the new Kingdom of Italy suppressed and annexed what remained of the Papal States. Ironically, by relieving the papacy of its temporal responsibilities, the *risorgimento* unwittingly started that institution on the path to the international prestige it enjoys today.

Beginning with Pope Leo IV (847–55), the Vatican had been fortified against invaders. In protest against the usurpation, Pius
IX and his successors refused to pass beyond these 50-foot high, turret-studded walls, declaring themselves virtual prisoners. This adamant stand won the popes worldwide sympathy at a time when the papacy itself had reached a low ebb in public esteem. The impasse over the “Roman Question” continued until February 11, 1929, when the Basilica of St. Peter’s and the in-walled cluster of palaces, gardens, chapels, and museums on its flanks were recognized in the Lateran Treaty as the independent enclave of Lo Stato della Città del Vaticano.

A Jurisprudential Quirk

Despite the loss of territory, the Holy See as the supreme directive organ of the Catholic Church had continued to exchange diplomats with many nations, claiming sovereignty to be “inherent in its very nature.” In the Lateran Treaty, the Holy Father was acknowledged as Supreme Pastor of the Holy See and, in this capacity, ruler of an independent Vatican City-State. The Holy See, not the Vatican, possesses sovereign status in the international order. Though a jurisprudential quirk, this distinction, unique in international practice, has been maintained ever since. While the Vatican City-State as a geopolitical entity (official language: Italian) participates in the European Space Conference and conforms to the Berne Copyright Convention, it is the Holy See (official language: Latin) that is represented at UNESCO, that is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that exchanges emissaries with more than 100 nations.* Recently Britain, willing finally to forget the unpleasantness over Henry VIII’s divorce, re-established full diplomatic relations with the Holy See after a 448-year lapse.

There are two main roads into the Vatican City-State. One passes through a gate leading to the Arch of Bells on the south side of the basilica and is used primarily by cardinals, diplomats, and heads of state. The other is the Gate of St. Anna to the north of the basilica, which is used by workers, residents, or visitors on business. Most tourists approach the Vatican through the Piazza of St. Peter’s, bracketed by Bernini’s majestic colonnade.

Traffic control and internal security within the Vatican are

*One nation that has been rebuffed thus far is Israel. The Vatican’s pretext is an ancient principle that precludes recognition until national boundaries are stabilized. In fact, the Holy See is displeased about the status of Jerusalem, which it would like to have declared an “open” city. The United States does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with the Holy See or the Vatican. However, every President since Franklin D. Roosevelt has dispatched a personal representative to the pope as head of the Catholic Church. The current envoy is William Wilson, a California stockbroker and realtor, a Catholic convert, and a friend of President Reagan. The Vatican’s man in Washington is Archbishop Pio Laghi.
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provided by a corps of 133 Swiss Guards, whose red, yellow, and blue Renaissance uniforms are believed to have been designed by Michelangelo. (All Swiss Guards are veterans of the Swiss Army, under 25, at least 5'8½" in height, Catholic, and, except for the commandant and sergeant major, single.) Their surveillance is supplemented by a platoon of well-trained secret servicemen. As part of his effort to trim the papacy's atavistic trappings, Pope Paul VI eliminated many of the more ostentatious displays of personnel: the uniformed Zouaves and gendarmes, the lay functionaries in ruffs and garters, the papal musicians. Also given notice were the "black" Roman aristocracy—relatives of former popes who had retained inherited titles as princes, counts, and other species of papal royalty.

The city within the walls is artfully landscaped, dotted with fountains and formal quadrangles, and laced with cool, cypress-lined walks. Within its borders, one will find a radio station (the first facility was set up by Guglielmo Marconi in 1931), a daily newspaper (L'Osservatore Romano), a railroad station, post office, pensione, clinic, pharmacy, clothing store, supermarket, victualer, gas station, publishing house, firehouse, and coffee bar—all owned by the Holy See. There is also a small mosaic factory. A $1.6-million bomb shelter is being built. "God helps those who help themselves," observes the Right Reverend Alfonso Stickler, the Vatican's librarian, who is overseeing the construction.

Running a Government

There are several tennis courts on the grounds, numerous audience halls, thousands of offices, and enough apartment buildings and messhalls to shelter and feed the Swiss Guards and the 900 prelates and laymen whose jobs entitle them to reside within the papal enclave. About 1,600 lay workers are employed in Vatican offices, shops, and services. Almost all of them live outside, in Rome. The Vatican issues passports to its diplomats, but emissaries and high-level staff (and sometimes their families, if they are laymen) receive citizenship only for the duration of their service. Currently, 729 persons are citizens of the city-state. No taxes are collected.

The business of the Vatican is the business of the Holy See, whose business in turn is that of the Roman Catholic Church. It is a sprawling enterprise. Worldwide, its religious personnel alone include some 404,000 priests, 950,000 nuns, 2,447 bishops, and 532 cardinals and archbishops. They are scattered among hundreds of thousands of churches in 1,803 dioceses in 162 countries. No accurate count exists of the numbers of schools,
 colleges, hospitals, clinics, leprosariums, orphanages, halfway houses, and nursing homes run by the church. These efforts, together with the abbeys, convents, rectories, seminaries, retreat houses, and other properties, provide employment for upwards of five million laymen, food and shelter for another 13 million, and spiritual care for 724 million. The Holy See does not pay for all of this—church finances are highly decentralized. But it has the final say in church administration.

The pope is the supreme executive, legislative, and judicial authority within the Vatican. Under his aegis, day-to-day administration is the task of the Roman curia—an entrenched bureaucracy of cardinals, prelates, priests, professors, nuns, and laymen that has at one time or another exasperated every pontiff. (When asked once how many people worked in the curia, Pope John XXIII replied, “About half.”) The organs of government are called congregations or secretariats. These function like cabinet offices. The decisions of the congregations and secretariats are rendered in letters, rescripts, admonitions, and other legal forms, many of them procedures with which the Emperor Hadrian would have been familiar.

Italy's Fascist leader, Benito Mussolini, and Cardinal Pietro Gasparri, Vatican Secretary of State, sign the 1929 Lateran Treaty, ending a 59-year conflict between Italy and the Holy See.
Immediately beneath the pope is his Secretary of State, currently Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, 66, son of a Piacenza tailor. A nimble Vatican diplomat and architect of the city-state’s Ostpolitik, Casaroli handled papal relations with the nations of Eastern Europe for two decades, successfully arranging for a restoration of the Catholic hierarchy in those lands. He looks frail but is not, and as Peter Nichols of the *Times of London* has discerned, is “so precise that he chooses his words like a bird pecking the appropriately flavored seed.” Within his competence are two other offices: the Council of Public Affairs, primarily concerned with foreign policy, and the so-called sostituto to the Secretary of State, who acts as the pope’s executive officer, conducting his day-to-day business.*

**Paying the Bills**

The current sostituto, Eduardo Martinez Somalo, is a Spaniard, a shock to many curial officials. They believe that only an Italian prelate can handle that office, since it requires an intimate knowledge of Italian politics. While Pope John XXIII once allowed that “Italy should be no more important to the Vatican than the Philippines,” simple proximity along with certain provisions of the 1929 Concordat—plus the fact that the pope is both bishop of Rome and primate of Italy—long dictated otherwise. Now that a Pole occupies Peter’s throne, however, the ideal of a disimpegno or “pulling out” of Italian political affairs is being pursued by the Vatican with considerable though by no means total success (see box).

Cardinal Casaroli may be the chief of staff, but the byzantine bureaucracy below him is hydra-headed, made up mainly of priests and prelates recruited on the raccomandazione of curial officials in league with diplomatic and episcopal intimates around the globe. There are nine congregations (the first was set up in 1542) dealing with everything from Catholic schools to relations between Rome and the various Eastern Rites. In addition, there are three newly created secretariats, overseeing a broad range of ecumenical activities. Special commissions—

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*In the past, there has been rivalry between the sostituto, with his direct and frequent access to the pope, and the Secretary of State. This was particularly so when Archbishop Giovanni Benelli was sostituto under Pope Paul VI and seemed subtly to upstage the French-born Secretary of State, Cardinal Jean Villot. Credence was lent to this gossip when suddenly, in 1977, the octogenarian pontiff moved Benelli out of the Vatican, appointing him archbishop of Florence and raising him to the cardinalate. Critics were reminded of a similar situation in 1954 when Monsignor Giovanni Battista Montini, the man who would become Paul VI, was suddenly removed from his Vatican post by Pius XII and made archbishop of Milan without the traditional cardinal’s hat, a highly embarrassing situation.*
THE VATICAN AND ITALY

On September 20, 1870, Italian troops marched through the Porta Pia to defeat the armies of Pope Pius IX and capture Rome. It was the climax of a 10-year campaign to suppress the Papal States. Italy was united at last as a secular state under King Victor Emmanuel II. But the pope remained—and has been ever since—a force to be reckoned with in peninsular politics.

Initially, the Vatican refused to recognize the new Italian state and forbade Catholics to vote or hold public office. Not until 1929 did the two parties make their peace. The accords that year between Pope Pius XI and Fascist Party leader Benito Mussolini settled the Vatican’s legal status (in the Lateran Treaty) and included a Concordat that established Catholicism as Italy’s state religion, prohibited civil marriage and divorce, and mandated religious instruction in public schools. According to Pope Pius, the treaty gave “God back to Italy and Italy back to God.” According to Il Duce, “We have not resurrected the [pope’s] Temporal Power, we have buried it.”

For the Vatican, the achievement indeed proved double-edged. Conciliation enhanced Mussolini’s prestige and led to an overwhelming Fascist victory in the March 1929 plebiscite. Brutal attacks by Mussolini’s supporters on members of Italy’s Catholic Action followed; the national lay organization was emasculated as a potential source of opposition. Pope Pius XI condemned aspects of Fascism in a 1931 encyclical (Non Abbiamo Bisogno—“I Have No Need”), but the document was suppressed in Italy, and all political activity by the clergy was banned. Church and state papered over the differences, but tempers flared again during the late 1930s when the Holy See criticized government-sanctioned anti-Semitism.

A new era began with the fall of Mussolini and the end of World War II. In a 1946 referendum, Italian voters abolished the monarchy and created a republic. (The Concordat was incorporated into the

e.g., on family life, the liturgy, communications—are innumerable. There is a judicial branch comprising the Apostolic Signatura (a kind of Supreme Court), the Sacred Penitentiary (responsible for indulgences and excommunications and for resolving cases of conscience submitted secretly), and the Sacred Roman Rota (dealing with divorce, annulment, and the like). These tribunals were all in existence by the 14th century.*

No pontiff has ever succeeded in getting all of the curial

*The Vatican has a court to handle petty crimes and has, on a handful of occasions during the past five decades, imprisoned offenders for short periods of time. Under the Lateran Treaty, the Holy See is bound to extradite to Italy all persons accused of serious criminal offenses. Mehmet Ali Agca, the Turk who attempted to assassinate Pope John Paul II in St. Peter’s Square, was tried, convicted, and jailed in Italy.
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new constitution.) The Vatican promptly allied itself with the Christian Democratic Party (CDP) and helped to defeat the Communists in the 1948 parliamentary elections. (The CDP won 305 seats out of 574 in a contest involving eight parties.) In 1949, Pius XII excommunicated all Communists and ordered Catholics not to support the Reds. Encouraged by the Vatican, Christian Democrats pursued an anti-Communist strategy at home throughout the 1950s.

Under the leadership of Pope John XXIII, elected pope in 1958, the Vatican deliberately sought to reduce its meddling in Italian politics. In his 1963 encyclical, Pacem in Terris, John drew a distinction between communism as a political system and as an atheistic political ideology—implying that voters in good conscience could support the former. In adopting a new Pastoral Constitution in 1965, the Second Vatican Council explicitly endorsed the idea of ecclesiastical withdrawal from local politics—not only in Italy but in Ireland, Spain, and elsewhere—in order to play a more purely spiritual role throughout the world. When John Paul II was inaugurated in 1978, he refused to be crowned with the tiara (symbol of temporal power), accepting instead the pallium, a white woolen band embroidered with crosses, symbolizing the metropolitan authority of a bishop. The Holy See, meanwhile, acquiesced in Italian parliamentary moves during the late 1970s disestablishing the Catholic Church.

For all the Vatican’s good intentions, there has been some backsliding. Parliamentary legislation permitting divorce (1970) and abortion (1978) was endorsed by Italians in national referendums (in 1974 and 1981) that deeply engaged Paul VI and John Paul II. Both spoke out—to no avail. Some politicians contended that the church had gone back to its old ways. But a commentator in Rome’s daily La Repubblica probably summed up the situation best a week before the 1981 vote: “Neither the Church nor the society is the same, nor is it the same curia or the same Christian Democratic Party, and the pope is neither an Italian nor a Christian Democrat.”

offices and factions under his thumb, and some popes have complained of being a “prisoner of the Vatican”. The bureaucracy has, after all, evolved over hundreds of years. Its character is partly imperial, partly feudal, partly modern, and partly rational. No one disputes the pope’s ultimate authority. Everyone knows, however, that frequently the curia represents a powerful barrier to the exercise of his free will.

Pope Paul VI’s ambitious attempt to overhaul the Vatican bureaucracy in 1965–67, for example, met with only mixed success. To some extent, he “internationalized” the curia, reducing the number of Italians. Most key appointees were given fixed terms of office. Certain kinks in the line of authority were rem-
edied. Yet some operations seemed impervious to change. Thus, Paul reorganized the much-criticized Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office—the Vatican’s doctrinal watchdog—into a Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and abolished its Inquisition and Index of Forbidden Books. The congregation was directed to encourage theological inquiry rather than impede doctrinal evolution by censoring the church’s most advanced thinkers. Unhappily, its prefect, the prosecutorial Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani, proved hard to dislodge. Ottaviani eventually retired, but many who shared his views continued in their jobs. The recent cases of Hans Küng (stripped of his title as a Catholic theologian), Edward Schillebeeckx (called to Rome to defend his writings), and Jacques Pohier (whose *Quand je dis Dieu* was actually condemned in 1979) suggest that the congregation is still capable of waging a minor campaign of terror.

Pope Paul instituted a number of financial reforms. But he was unable to rationalize fully the Vatican’s domestic “economy,” and the situation is still highly confused. While the Holy See is essentially a spiritual organization, it cannot subsist on the love of God alone. Its worldwide activities cost money: about $200 million a year. Accused of hoarding enormous riches and severely criticized for their failure to publish an annual financial report (they have never done so), Vatican officials take some satisfaction in reminding critics of Pope Pius IX’s reaction at the close of Vatican Council I in 1870, where papal infallibility had been proclaimed. Asked how it felt to be infallible, the pontiff replied: “I do not know if I am fallible or infallible, but I do know I am in fallimento [bankrupt].”

Despite an inestimable deposit of treasures—from prehistoric artifacts and Roman sculptures to Renaissance frescoes—the Vatican since shortly after Vatican Council II has been continually on the verge of bankruptcy. The ceiling of the Sistine
Chapel may be priceless, but it is not a liquid asset. Papal generosity after World War II in helping to resettle refugees and rebuild devastated areas of Europe was unstinting. So has been the Holy See’s response to more recent catastrophes: earthquakes, famines, droughts, the devastations wrought by war and revolution. The expansion of the Holy See’s far-flung missionary and relief efforts has proven a great drain, as have the extensive papal travels of recent years.

The Vatican’s overhead alone is exorbitant—a fact illustrated dramatically by the recent threat to strike by lay workers within the City State: the policemen and firemen; construction crews and repairmen (the sanpietrini); gardeners in the Vatican and at the experimental farms at the papal summer residence at Castel Gandolfo; postmen; telephone operators; ushers; typographers. (Average salary at the Vatican for lay workers is $7,000 per annum, indexed to inflation.) The Holy See also supports some 35 curial cardinals plus an estimated 3,000 other officials and clerics, including papal emissaries and their staffs in more than a hundred countries.

Some Vatican agencies, it should be noted, do run in the black. The Governoratorato or Governor’s Office, under the guidance of Marchese Don Giulio Sacchetti, oversees the buildings and grounds of both the Vatican City-State and its extraterritorial possessions in Italy. Thanks to the sale of stamps and coins, fees from the museums, and revenue from other enterprises such as the polyglot press, real estate investments, art and tapestry repair workshops, and the Vatican commissary, it reportedly turns a small profit. The same seems to be the case with the Fabbrica of St. Peter, run by a cardinal and four architects, charged with the upkeep of the Basilica of St. Peter’s.

The principal source of Vatican income is the financial settlement made in the Lateran Treaty of 1929 when the Italian government turned over to the pope the equivalent of $70 mil-
lion in cash and another $100 million in government bonds as compensation for papal territories lost in 1870. Under the watchful eye of a highly respected banker, Bernardino Nogara, this nest egg was invested wisely with the help of New York's Chase National Bank (now Chase Manhattan) and National City Bank (now Citibank), London's Hambros Bank and N. M. Rothschild & Sons, and France's Lazard Frères, and Credit Suisse. No one knows how much money the Vatican actually has now, not even the pope. Estimates placing the amount at several billions are considered absurd by European financiers, who generally cite figures of about $500 million (equivalent to about one-third of Harvard's endowment).

A second source of income is the generosity of Catholics all over the world who make contributions in special collections—most notably "Peter's Pence." (This was originated by Britain's King Canute in the ninth century as an annual giving of one penny from each household; it was revived during the middle of the 19th century by devout English and French Catholics.) On visits to the Holy See, cardinals and bishops from affluent nations typically make special donations. Well-to-do laymen often pick up part of the tab for such extravagances as the new papal Hall of Audiences, built by architect Pier Luigi Nervi for Pope Paul VI.

**A Day in the Life**

The Vatican's money is handled by a labyrinth of institutions. The bulk of the portfolio is managed by the Administration of the Patrimony of the Holy See, headed by an experienced diplomat and economist, Cardinal Giuseppe Caprio. Peter's Pence is paid directly into the Secretariat of State. The Vatican also has its own bank, the Istituto per le Opere di Religione. With assets of at least $100 million and no debts, the Istituto is under the general supervision of five cardinals and an executive director, the 60-year-old Archbishop Paul Marcinkus, an avid golfer from Cicero, Illinois, who doubles as the pope's advance man on his worldwide travels. It handles the funds of various congregations and religious orders and serves as the local bank for the curia and for Vatican employees.

Pope Paul attempted to exert some control over Vatican finances by appointing the former apostolic delegate in Washington, Cardinal Egidio Vagnozzi, as a sort of overall comptroller and, until his death in December 1980, chief of a new Prefecture of Economic Affairs. The Vagnozzi are well-known businessmen—the family runs the largest confectionery in
Rome—but even the cardinal was soon quoted as saying that it would take a "combined effort of the CIA, KGB, Interpol, and the Holy Spirit" to make heads or tails of the ledger books. Pope John Paul II has since appointed a commission of 15 cardinals, including John Kroll of Philadelphia, to tackle the Holy See's annual deficit, estimated at about $30 million in 1980.*

If the administration of the city-state was all the pope had to worry about, the Vatican might well be a smoothly functioning operation, a mini-Switzerland on half a square kilometer. But he has many other tasks—writing, greeting, praying, thinking, preaching—and perforce must delegate much administrative responsibility. Even then, there is never enough time.

By nature and habit, John Paul II is an early riser, up by 5:30 A.M. He spends an hour or so in private meditation, usually says Mass for his household, then eats a hearty breakfast, frequently with guests. From then on, the day is not his: briefing after meeting after reception after audience. The appointment log is as varied as that of the President of the United States—one minute Andrei Gromyko, the next a choir of retarded children. In between, there are a worldwide bureaucracy to run, encyclicals (pastoral letters) to write. Sundays and Holy Days are devoted mainly to visiting parishes or participating in the great traditional religious festivals at one of Rome's basilicas. John Paul makes a point of finding time to exercise—taking brisk walks in the Vatican grounds or a swim at Castel Gandolfo, where he had a swimming pool installed, remarking that it was cheaper than holding another conclave to elect a successor.

"Popes come and go . . ."

The tenor of the papacy in each age depends upon the person of the pope and his idiosyncrasies. While his rule is monarchical, it is not despotic. He has no coercive force to impose his will but must rely on the compliance of bishops and theologians and ultimately on the faith of the Catholic people. Down through the ages, the saying Roma locuta, causa finita—"Rome has spoken, the case is closed"—has been honored in the breach.

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*Vatican officials have denied suffering great losses in the scandalous Michele Sindona affair. During the late 1960s, Pope Paul VI tapped the Sicilian-born Sindona, considered a financial wizard, to diversify the Vatican portfolio. Instead, Sindona shunted it into a tax shelter in Luxembourg, then used the money to help finance the Italian Banca Unione and the Swiss Finabank. Luckily, the Vatican began to bail out before the crack-up that started with the failure of the Long Island-based Franklin National Bank in 1974. Cardinal Caprio maintains that Vatican losses were on paper, but no one really knows. More recently, in July 1982, the Vatican bank came under fire for its links with the scandal-ridden Banco Ambrosiano. John Paul II has appointed three lay bankers from the United States, Italy, and Switzerland to investigate the matter.
Most recently, Pope Paul VI's condemnation of artificial contraception was challenged from within the Catholic hierarchy, and Catholic family practice largely ignores the papal ban.

Predictions that Paul's decision would destroy papal authority have proven premature—as, I expect, will similar forecasts stemming from John Paul II's intransigence on such issues as women in the priesthood, clerical celibacy, and divorce and remarriage. The papacy has survived greater perils—persecution, schism, reformation, revolution. Its principal enemy is stagnation, a state, fortunately, that the Vatican's immersion in the secular world has rarely permitted for long. Instead, a resilient sort of traditionalism has prevailed, at once preserving the church's essential teachings and forcing popes and papacy to confront the changing realities of the world outside the walls.

Though ecclesiastical in mission, the church has always adapted to the political structures of secular society. Early Christianity sloughed off the synagogical legalisms of its origins as the papacy gradually acquired the forms and juridical usages of imperial Rome. The pope became a feudal suzerain in the Middle Ages and, during the Renaissance and Enlightenment, an absolute monarch by divine right. Today, the church's government is undergoing a subtle change in the direction of democracy—a change John Paul II seems reluctant to acknowledge. In 1967, Pope Paul VI instituted a series of triennial synods of bishops in Rome, designed to solicit the views of the church's worldwide leadership on such problems as heresy, missionary methods, and family life. At this point, however, the synods are consultative only, and it is still the pope and curia who prepare a "final report" and publish the results.

Nevertheless the papacy, like the church itself, is subject to evolutionary forces. The more strenuously its leaders oppose change, the more likely that change is about to occur. At Vatican II, this phenomenon was unwittingly acknowledged by the former archbishop of Lyons, Cardinal Pierre Gerlier, who complained: "The church is so much in love with tradition that it is continually creating new ones."

And the Vatican? "Popes come and go, but we go on forever" is the centuries-old, if unofficial, motto of the Roman curia. The sentiment is echoed by the city-state's inhabitants. "Thou art the rock," said Christ to Peter, establishing the authority of the papacy. But also founded on a rock is the Vatican City-State, this tiny trapezoid of papal turf symbolizing the City of God where, within the shadow of eternity, one man's word is law.
GLOBAL REACH

by Dennis J. Dunn

John Paul II, the pope from Poland, broke with precedent and shunned the imperial tiara at his consecration in 1978, but like each of his 263 predecessors he still wears two hats. As pastor of the Holy See, he guides the spiritual life of six million Oceanians, 50 million Africans, 55 million Asians, 151 million North Americans, 199 million Latin Americans, and 263 million Europeans. Because his vast flock, a sixth of mankind, is dispersed across national boundaries—and because they are impoverished and oppressed in many places, or bled white by war and revolution, or divided on moral questions that may also be dividing courts and legislatures—the pope must play the role of statesman and politician as well.

In essence, observed French Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé in 1904, "every act of a pope is political." He cannot escape politics, and politicians cannot escape him—often not even physically, given the present pontiff’s penchant for travel. (He has visited 25 countries on five continents since 1979.) Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos sat by helplessly in his white guayabera as John Paul chided him for his unimpressive record on human rights. Well-to-do Brazilians winced as he rebuked them for living high amid so many poor. In Ireland, among its sympathizers, John Paul denounced the outlawed Irish Republican Army for its terrorist tactics in Ulster. He did not visit Spain, but his opposition to pending legislation that would allow abortion contributed to the downfall of Adolfo Suarez’s government in 1981. He did visit Poland, and though he could not prevent the imposition of martial law, John Paul’s public statements and behind-the-scenes maneuvering probably prevented a bloodbath there, and the church remains intact.

The pope's only weapon is his moral authority—any political fallout is a by-product of its use—and its importance should be neither overestimated nor underestimated. "Deal with the pope as if he had 200,000 men at his command," Napoleon instructed his envoy in Rome, but of course the pope does not now and did not then command an army of 200,000. The pope does have some Swiss Guards, but the last time they saw action was in 1527, when 147 Guardsmen died defending Pope Clement VII during the Sack of Rome by the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles.
V. (The last battle fought by papal troops of any kind was in 1870.) If Attila the Hun should again suddenly descend on Rome as he did in 452, the pope could only meet the threat with words, as Pope Leo I did, but Leo's voice was persuasive then and John Paul II's can be persuasive now. As head of the largest and (for all its quirks) best-organized church in the world, the pope can move men's minds and hearts.

This ineffable quality is the great equalizer in the Holy See's day-to-day dealings with hostile ideologies and puissant nations. It is the tool with which the pope may sometimes affect, as peacemaker, mediator, or teacher, the course of international events. Stalin's sarcastic query—"How many divisions has the pope?"—revealed more about that former seminarian's base of power than the Roman pontiff's. The Holy See did not need an army to persuade Stalin's successors to allow it to begin rebuilding its hierarchy in the heavily Catholic Baltic States. It was not because the pope lacks divisions that the Kremlin permitted Eastern European regimes to work out a *modus vivendi* with the church and sent Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to confer with the pope in 1965, 1966, 1970, 1974, 1975, and 1979.

**Doing No Harm**

The Vatican today is enmeshed in what foreign policy journals call the "geopolitical order." Some 95 states have *de jure* relations with the Holy See (including Iran and Cuba, Yugoslavia and England), while at least 26 others send a semi-official representative to the papal court. Every week, monarchs, heads of state, diplomats, and religious leaders of every stripe affix their signatures to the leather-bound guest book in the pope's poorly ventilated Renaissance study. Like the United Nations, Vatican City-State has become a kind of free-trade zone for unpublicized exchanges between diplomats, and for "back-channel" messages between governments.

Because the Holy See has a reputation for discretion, and because it lacks a conventional "national interest," it has often been cast in the role of mediator. Brazilians today speak

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THE VATICAN

Papal authority, January 1077: When Henry IV, the Holy Roman Emperor, sought Pope Gregory VII's forgiveness for illicitly investing bishops, Gregory made him wait three days in the snow before lifting excommunication.

Portuguese thanks to Pope Alexander VI, who arranged for the division of Latin America between Spain and Portugal in 1494. Pope Leo XIII resolved the Carolina Islands dispute between Spain and Germany in 1886. The very notion of "third-party" arbitration in international law owes much to papal precedents.

John Paul's record has been mixed. His efforts in 1980 to secure the release of 52 American hostages in Iran prompted only a barrage of insults from the Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1981, however, Vatican envoy Antonio Samore's shuttle diplomacy staved off open warfare between Chile and Argentina over disputed sovereignty of three islands in the Beagle Channel. John Paul's attempt that year to end the fast of IRA hunger-striker Bobby Sands—the pope's legate visited the prisoner and then conferred with British authorities in Northern Ireland—came to naught, just as Argentina and Britain were unmoved in April 1982 when the pope sought a peaceful solution to the Falkland Islands crisis. But in May, the Holy See's nuncio, or ambas-
sador, in Honduras negotiated a settlement between four leftist jet hijackers and the Honduran government. Add up the pluses and minuses as you will. One may in any event applaud the Vatican's effort and note that the Hippocratic dictum was observed: "At least, do no harm."

The Holy See was the world's first international organization—St. Ignatius of Antioch, after all, declared the church to be "catholic," meaning universal, in A.D. 110—and Rome has not, during the postwar period, ignored the proliferation of multilateral agencies and conferences. Quite the contrary. It is represented on all of the major UN bodies, sends a permanent observer to both the Common Market and the Organization of American States, and is party to international agreements ranging from the Geneva Conventions to the Outer Space Treaty. While it is unlikely that the Vatican will ever take prisoners of war or send a man to the moon, other nations obviously will do so, and the Holy See's signature is avidly sought as a measure of moral support.

Such accords may sometimes be used for more devious ends, of course. In February 1971, Monsignor Agostino Casaroli, now the Vatican's Secretary of State, arrived in Moscow to deliver the Holy See's signed copy of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. While the trip, technically, was unnecessary, it served as an excuse to get the first papal diplomat onto Russian soil since 1924. When the Soviets received Casaroli—as they had to—they heard less about plutonium than about the plight of the USSR's four million Roman Catholics.

 Foreign Aid

In some international agreements, the Vatican has had a keen—and direct—interest. It acceded to the various telephone, telegraph, and postal conventions, for example, simply in order to function. But usually the stakes are higher. Invited to participate in the 1975 Helsinki Conference on European Security and Cooperation, the Holy See played the key role in drafting the "freedom of religion" provisions. As signed, these go well beyond the published laws (let alone the practice) of most of the communist signatories, most notably the Soviet Union. By tacking these provisions onto an agreement the Kremlin desperately wanted (ratifying the present European territorial borders and providing for trade and technological exchanges), the Vatican, at least on paper, extended Soviet law.

Like other states, the Vatican has varied interests abroad. Its Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples oversees the
activities of some 50,000 missionaries around the world—men and women deeply involved every day in economic development quite aside from their avowedly religious mission. The Vatican's purely humanitarian efforts (providing food, clothing, medicine, and shelter for the needy) are loosely coordinated by the pontifical council, Cor Unum (One Heart). All of this amounts, in effect, to a vast foreign aid program, one that the U.S. State Department has described as too massive, complex, and diverse "to quantify." The sum of money spent every year is staggering and undoubtedly surpasses, if military assistance is excluded, the foreign aid outlays of the Soviet Union or of many an industrialized country in the West.* And the Catholic aid apparatus is unusually efficient: Many Western governments have found it expedient to channel some of their Third World relief and development funds through agencies operating under the Vatican's foreign aid umbrella. Two-thirds of the $350 million annual budget of the U.S. Catholic Relief Services, for example, is provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Defining Objectives

Because the worldwide activities of the pope and the Holy See are so diverse—and therefore reported unsystematically (though regularly) in the secular press—it is sometimes easy to miss the forest for the trees. In fact, the Vatican's basic foreign policy aims are simply stated. The first is survival—chiefly by maintaining its hierarchy (and hence the capacity to consecrate bishops, and thereby ordain priests, and thus administer the sacraments) in working order, or by rebuilding it where it has fallen into disrepair. More on this in a moment.

A second aim is keeping the peace, peace being a good thing in itself and the ideal environment for the conduct of the church's business. The third objective, inseparable from the others, might loosely be defined as "doing good": exercising moral leadership, alleviating poverty and suffering, pressing the case for human rights. Again, all of this is both desirable in itself and helpful to the church's cause.

*Tracking down the source of every Vatican aid dollar is impossible. Much of the church's foreign assistance comes directly out of the Vatican treasury, but most of it is raised by individual charitable groups and religious orders in the wealthier Western nations. (The West Germans, thanks to incentives in their tax code, are the biggest contributors per capita.) Some of these funds may be handled by the Vatican bank and by the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples (whose finances are separate from the Holy See's), but in many cases Rome does not even see the money. While the Vatican in a sense "charters" the myriad organizations responsible for missionary and humanitarian work, these organizations typically are jealous of their autonomy.
These objectives follow logically from the Holy See’s conception of its very purpose: the pastoral mission of saving souls. Pope Paul VI, a few months before his death, told the graduates of the Pontifical Diplomatic Academy in 1978 that “a diplomat of the Holy See is first and foremost a priest.” John Paul II made the same point at the 1979 Latin American bishops conference in Puebla, Mexico, emphasizing that the church has no business linking its mission to “ideological systems,” and must “stay free with regard to the competing systems, in order to opt only for man.”

This, at least, is the position taken by the modern papacy. Before the loss of the pope’s own kingdom in 1870, however, it would have taken the tortuous reasonings of a Jesuit to argue convincingly that the pope was primarily a pastor. Beginning with the Donation of Pepin in 756—when Charlemagne’s father ceded what became the Papal States to the Holy See—the Bishop of Rome behaved like what he was: a temporal ruler on an unruly continent. Pope Gregory VII humbled the German emperor Henry IV at Canossa in 1077, at least temporarily, and by the beginning of the 13th century, Pope Innocent III controlled the destinies of entire peoples. Innocent referred to the papacy as the sun and the Holy Roman Emperor as the moon and pointedly reminded audiences whence the moon obtained its light.

The sun set as the 14th century dawned. When Pope Boniface VIII in 1303 reiterated Innocent’s claim to control both the temporal and spiritual realms by telling the envoy of the
French king, Philip IV, that “we hold both the swords,” Philip’s man replied: “True, Holy Father, but where your swords are but a theory, ours are a reality.” Spiritually and politically, the papacy faltered, beset by scandal, schism, and war. Dante numbered popes among the damned in his *Inferno* and Erasmus poked fun at their follies. A bastard son (Cesare Borgia) of one pope proved to be the model for *The Prince* by Niccolò Machiavelli. Even so, the Vatican remained an influential factor in international affairs as the jurists in the papal chancery helped develop the foundations of modern diplomacy: the concept of sovereignty, the sanctity of treaties, the notion of diplomatic privilege, the rules of war.

**Waiting for Volume Two**

Stunned by the 16th-century Protestant Reformation, the papacy mounted an aggressive campaign to reclaim its spiritual and temporal authority. The popes became embroiled in the wars of religion and mercantilism raging throughout Europe. Papal diplomacy aimed to keep the Vatican’s political position in Italy secure by playing off the major powers one against the other. Sometimes it failed, as when Charles V sacked Rome. Sometimes it succeeded, as when Pius VII regained the Papal States, following Napoleon’s defeat, at the Congress of Vienna.

The incorporation of those territories into the Kingdom of Italy in 1870 left the Vatican bewildered. The Holy See sought to recoup initially by backing grass-roots Catholic political parties throughout Europe—with some success. But after World War I, shaken by the carnage and destruction wrought by Christian governments, the Vatican despaired of temporal meddling. Sir Odo Russell, the British legate to the Holy See, commented in 1927 that “Pius XI wishes to withdraw the church as far as possible from politics, so that Catholics may unite on a religious and moral basis.” Challenged by new secular “theologies” (fascism, nazism, communism), the pope feared, perhaps rightly, that unequivocal opposition would merely invite retaliation—hence the formal accords with Mussolini (1929) and Hitler (1933), designed to insulate Roman Catholics from overt abuse and, ultimately, to retard the advance of communism, which Rome regarded as the greater long-term evil. Pius XI’s successor, Pius XII, emphatically denounced Hitler’s anti-Semitism before the outbreak of World War II. But during the war itself, fearing retribution against Catholics in Nazi-controlled countries, he failed to speak out against the Holocaust, which he knew about and abhorred.
After V-E Day, its fascist nemeses buried, the Vatican aligned itself wholeheartedly with the West. It supported the Marshall Plan, lobbied for the NATO alliance, and quietly aided the Christian Democratic parties throughout Western Europe—in West Germany, Belgium, Austria, and especially Italy. Though few but its hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries may remember, the Vatican Migration Office also helped reunite wartime refugees and prisoners with their families. Implacably opposed to Marxism, Pius XII refused to negotiate with the new Soviet-backed regimes, which had engulfed Eastern Europe and eviscerated the church hierarchy. "If you desire peace, prepare for war" was the pope's message to free nations.

Angelo Roncalli—aged 78 when he succeeded Pius in 1958 as John XXIII—ushered in the papacy's modern era. By convening the Second Vatican Council and writing such encyclicals as *Mater et Magistra* ("Mother and Teacher"), he encouraged a more expansive definition of the Holy See's pastoral mission, one with heavy political and moral overtones. This did not mean a return to the pre-1870 preoccupation with territory and political power. The church recognized, instead, that man could not live by grace alone. Vatican II, in effect, revived the church's...
"social gospel." John Paul II defined it unequivocally in 1979: "We must declare by name every social injustice, every discrimination and every violence committed against man's body, against his spirit, his conscience, and his convictions."

The Vatican does not always react swiftly to events. In 1848, a cardinal approached Pope Pius IX with the first volume of Karl Marx's Das Kapital and warned that the book would change the world. The pope, unalarmed, decided to wait and see what Marx said in volume two. It was both ironic and unexpected, then, when Pope John XXIII, a decade before “détente” became a household word in the United States, initiated the Holy See's rapprochement with the Soviet bloc, entrusting the task to Agostino Casaroli. Fond of quoting a remark of John's—"There are enemies of the church but the church has no enemies"—Casaroli's ultimate aim was to persuade communist regimes to allow complete freedom of religion. But he was willing to take small steps, working out partial agreements that gave his church—the Catholic Church—room enough at least to administer the sacraments. Salus animarum, after all, is the suprema lex: The salvation of souls is the highest law.

Healing the Breach

There was one other item on Casaroli's agenda: laying the groundwork for reunification of the Russian Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches. The breach had occurred in 1054, and Rome has long been trying to heal it. Tsars and party secretaries alike have shamelessly exploited this desire. Ivan IV, for example, dangled the prospect of reunification before Pope Gregory XIII when he begged the Holy See to halt Stephen Batory's Polish army as it advanced toward Muscovy in 1582. Gregory lived up to his side of the bargain; Ivan did not. During the tragic 1921-22 Russian famine, the Soviets promised to open their doors to Catholic missionaries if the Holy See organized a relief effort. The Vatican did, but the Kremlin reneged.

On balance, however, the Vatican's Ostpolitik must be considered a success. The church hierarchy has been largely re-established in Hungary and the heavily Catholic former Baltic States. It is fully restored in East Germany and Yugoslavia. Poland—93 percent Catholic—is the Holy See's strongest re-doubt. But there have been some failures, too. In Romania, Bulgaria, and the non-Baltic regions of the USSR, the episcopal structure is weak to nonexistent. Albania, which indulged in a Neronian persecution of the church, and summarily executed or imprisoned all bishops and priests, remains a kind of black hole.

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Much farther east, the situation in China is both confusing and complex. Premier Chou En-Lai had offered in 1951 to allow the small church in China (Catholics currently make up less than one percent of the country's population) to maintain ties with the Vatican providing that the local church and the Holy See unequivocally supported the Revolution—and that Rome cut all ties to "American imperialism." When both the Chinese church and the Vatican flinched at these demands, the government purged priests and bishops loyal to the Holy See and, like Henry VIII, set up its own agency, the National Association of Patriotic Catholics, to run the church. The pope in 1981 named Msgr. Dominic Tang Yiming archbishop of Canton, ostensibly with Beijing's approval, but the Chinese church reacted to this "thaw" with charges of Vatican meddling.

A Matter of Principle

In pursuit of Ostpolitik there have also been some noisome compromises. In Czechoslovakia, where more bishoprics are unfilled than filled, the Vatican has consecrated three "peace priests" (clerics who collaborated with the communists) as bishops. In 1974, at the insistence of the Hungarian government, Pope Paul VI removed Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty, a pillar of anticommunism in Europe, from his archepiscopal see of Esztergom. (The cardinal had lived in "exile" inside the American embassy in Budapest for 15 years, unable to leave.) The Vatican has also abandoned its earlier defense of the persecuted Ukrainian Uniate Church in order, typically, to promote more harmonious ties with the Russian Orthodox Church and to vitiate the Kremlin's innate suspicion of Rome. (The Ukrainian Uniate Church was organized in 1596. It was a new rite which permitted Orthodox believers to accept union with Rome but keep their own liturgy and practices. In 1946 this church was forcibly "reunited" with the Russian Orthodox Church, but an underground church continues to this day.)

Looking at the past two decades from the Holy See's perspective, one must conclude that, on balance, matters have gone well. The scope of its humanitarian and missionary efforts is broad. The Holy See's hierarchy is intact in most countries and is being restored in the remainder, with very few exceptions. The Vatican's diplomatic machinery seems to have operated with the unhurried efficiency for which it was designed.

The greatest difficulty for the Holy See in foreign affairs has come, not surprisingly, in those areas where principle and practice seem to be irreconcilable, where morality and politics col-
lide. All governments face this dilemma, but none have so much at stake as the Holy See.

It is not as if popes have been reluctant to state, in general terms, their emphatic support for human rights and the dignity of labor, for freedom of conscience, for self-determination, for the right of every individual to enjoy food, shelter, medical care, and for religious liberty. They have done so tirelessly. And yet in specific situations, and for purely pragmatic reasons, the Holy See has sometimes pulled its punches.

The financial support the Vatican receives from Western capitalist nations, for example, has unquestionably tempered papal criticism of social injustices and moral lethargy in the developed countries. In Latin America, the Holy See has condemned the violent and ideologically tinged aspects of “liberation theology.” But it has not indicated what course priests and prelates should pursue instead, nor, for fear of inviting a backlash, has it publicly condemned repressive Latin regimes. In Africa, similarly, the tendency has been to not rock the boat. And then there have been the diplomatic compromises, some of them noted above.

One cannot help but sympathize with the Holy See’s predicament. The Vatican’s foreign policy goals are worthwhile, but they are not always compatible. And when they clash, the Holy See must calculate where its true interests lie. Fundamentally, its interests are those of the church, and on some matters the church should not compromise.

“We cannot apply moral criteria to politics,” George F. Kennan has written, yet if that were true the Holy See would be irrelevant, and clearly it is not. Moral authority is its only weapon. Its standards are different, its time frame unique, its motives not those of Whitehall or the Quai d’Orsay. Do not judge us by your usual yardstick, Pope Paul VI cautioned foreign correspondents at the Vatican in 1973, for the Holy See’s “decisions are based upon the Gospel and her own living tradition, not on the world’s spirit nor on public opinion.” Though honored in the breach even by Paul, the formulation is apt. It may not be easy to play both politician and pastor, but such is the pope’s role, and when the jobs conflict, he must stand for principle.
Winston Churchill once described the Soviet Union as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." Add to that an anachronism within an anomaly, and we have the Vatican in a nutshell.

To comprehend its legal status is to embark on a "title search" through 2,000 years of jurisprudence and diplomacy. The city-state—the last classical polis—has few citizens, yet the word foreigner finds no place in its official vocabulary. No person is unwelcome, no passport must be shown to gain entry.

"Jurists find gaps, ambiguities, and even apparent contradictions in the structure of this miniature precision clock," writes one of the contributors to *The Vatican and Christian Rome* (Westfield, N.J.: Eastview, 1979), "while the ordinary person only notices a slight tendency of minor cogs to lose time."

Not everything is up to date in Vatican City, as this handsomely illustrated volume lovingly makes plain. In 43 chapters—topics range from the Secret Vatican Archives to the Vatican Museums—written by eminent clerics, art historians, and journalists, the book surveys the city-state's history and organization.

The volume does have one real flaw: Bearing the Vatican's own *imprimatur*, it is, not surprisingly, short on analysis and self-criticism. A good antidote is Peter Nichols's *The Polities of the Vatican* (Praeger, 1968).

Nichols, a British journalist long based in Rome, provides memorable sketches of Popes John XXIII and Paul VI. When John (born Angelo Roncalli) worried at night about his immense responsibilities, Nichols writes, he used to comfort himself with the thought: "But who governs the Church? You, or the Holy Spirit? Very well then, go to sleep Angelo."

Any gaps in the chronicle of the Holy See as an institution can be filled in from *The Papacy* (Kenosha, Wis.: Prow/Franciscan Marytown, 1981), a handsomely illustrated volume edited by Christopher Hollis.

The Vatican is not a glass house, and monitoring its financial maneuverings requires dogged legwork. Corrado Pallenberg's *The Vatican Finances* (Humanities, 1971) is a thorough but dated history of papal wealth from the age of Constantine through Pope Paul VI's curial reform.

Pallenberg notes that in 1964, when Vatican diplomat Agostino Casaroli hammered out an agreement with communist Hungary providing for restoration of the church hierarchy, Casaroli brought back to Rome in addition a Hungarian order for urinals to be manufactured by Ceramica Pozzi, a Vatican-controlled company.

*The Finances of the Church* (Seabury, 1978, cloth & paper), edited by William Bassett and Peter Huizing, is more solid, more recent, more searching, and less fun. As they review the Vatican's financial picture, department by department, function by function, the authors emphasize key trends in the Holy See's economic strategy during the 1970s.

The Vatican, they write, has faced the ethical dilemmas of its investment policy, selling off its interest in
companies producing armaments and even birth-control pills. Ventures deemed "inappropriate" include construction of vacation resorts and luxury apartment houses and hotels. (The Holy See once owned a 15 percent interest in General Immobiliare, builder of Washington's Watergate complex.

The Holy See, Peter Nichols makes plain in The Pope's Divisions (Holt, 1981), has rarely been aloof from "world affairs." But in foreign policy, the Vatican customarily "thinks in centuries," a habit of mind formed by long experience. There was, for example, a direct link between the crowning of Charlemagne by the pope on Christmas Day, 800, and the veto by the Austro-Hungarian Emperor of Cardinal Rampolla's election to the papacy in 1903. In his overview of the Vatican as a temporal actor, Nichols keeps one eye on long-term trends and the Holy See's "grand design," the other on short-term tactics and controversies.

The most successful papal gambit of recent years—the "opening" to Communist Europe—is chronicled in Eastern Politics of the Vatican 1917–1979 (Ohio Univ., 1981, cloth & paper) by Hansjakob Stehle. Stehle ranges from the present back to the first diplomatic overtures to Bolshevik Russia by Achille Ratti (later Pope Pius XI) and Eugenio Pacelli (later Pius XII). He highlights the Holy See's vacillation between principle and opportunism as it sought a modus vivendi with communism. As a practitioner of realpolitik, for good or ill, the Vatican has come a long way from its rigidly principled antipathy toward the reunification of Italy in 1870. The story of that diplomatic disaster is told by S. William Halperin in Italy and the Vatican at War (Univ. of Chicago, 1939; Greenwood reprint, 1968).

The Holy See's aims, powers, and style evolve not only from century to century but also from reign to reign. Peter Hebblethwaite describes the process in The Year of Three Popes (Collins, 1979). As a "window" onto the papacy, Hebblethwaite chooses the events of 1978: the death of aging Paul VI, who presided over the Second Vatican Council; the election of Albino Luciano as Pope John Paul I, and then his sudden death 33 days later; and the surprise selection of Karol Wojtyla, a Pole, as the new pontiff, John Paul II.

In the actions of these three men, Hebblethwaite finds evidence of a gradual shift from an "imperial papacy" to a more collegial "Petrine ministry." That conclusion is echoed by Patrick Granfield in The Papacy in Transition (Doubleday, 1980).

Whatever the situation a century hence, it is a good bet that the Vatican will still be annually publishing its compact Annuario Pontifico (International Publishers), a staff directory of the Holy See, complete with addresses, phone numbers, and capsule biographies. Among its 2,000 pages is a section giving the official Latin name of every diocese and archdiocese on earth. Those who perceive the Vatican as obstinate and inflexible should note that Saigon is now called Hochiminhpolitan.
CURRENT BOOKS

FELLOWS’ CHOICE

Recent titles selected and reviewed by Fellows of the Wilson Center

INDIAN SUMMER: Lutyens, Baker and Imperial Delhi
by Robert Grant Irving
Yale, 1982
406 pp. $39.95

The Imperial Durbar held in the northern outskirts of Delhi in 1911 marked the apogee of the British Raj. At the conclusion of this royal assembly, King George V revealed the best-kept secret in the history of India: The capital was to be transferred from Calcutta to the more central and historically rich site of Delhi. Scene of 14 successive imperial capitals during the preceding 3,000 years, Delhi was then mere ruins and slums on an inhospitable malarial plain.

Irving, associate Fellow at Yale’s Berkeley College, describes the planning and building of the new city (not completed until 1931) in fascinating detail. At the heart of the undertaking were its two principal architects, Sir Herbert Baker, a wealthy and established designer with buildings throughout the British empire, and Sir Edwin Landseer Lutyens. Virtually self-educated, Lutyens was, like Baker, a fierce traditionalist. But he had also kept up with the “art and science of town planning” and gave as much attention to the problems of hygiene and traffic flow as to the “classic purity” of line in his buildings.

Both architects strove to create a sense of imperial grandeur with their imposing neoclassical structures. Unfortunately, by the time the city was completed, architectural pomp was out of favor, replaced by a starker, more functional style. But the layout of Delhi has stood up well in comparison with other modern “planned” capitals, such as Canberra and Brasilia.

Among the architects’ inspirations were Hausmann’s Paris and L’Enfant’s plan for Washington. What emerged was a complex of grand diagonal avenues punctuated by hexagonal rond-points, with liberal space reserved for trees, grass, and water. Unlike L’Enfant, Baker and Lutyens incorporated residential streets, bungalows with spacious gardens, maharajahs’ palaces, and workmen’s apartments into their plans, mingling public ostentation and domestic privacy.

Plans, photographs, and sketches show Delhi’s major buildings and the recurrent visual allusions to Indian mythology in murals and statuary. Unhappily, though, most of the illustrations are devoid of any human presence. They thus give little idea of the uses to which New Delhi and its many distinct localities are put today.

—George Morrison Carstairs
A generation of revisionist scholars has demonstrated that economic and social stability was the main objective of the intellectual, corporate, and political leaders of the Progressive Era. The most significant reforms—including banking and currency reforms, new scientific management techniques, and social welfare measures—helped advance, not restrain, the consolidation of 20th-century corporate capitalism.

But if historians understand a good deal about what motivated enlightened capitalists and politicians to support the emerging economic order, they understand far less about what prompted large numbers of upper-, "new middle-," and working-class Americans to do so. Lears, a University of Missouri historian, offers an ingenious explanation of how an assortment of essentially upper-class "antimodernist" intellectuals paved the way for social and economic changes they originally set out to resist.

In the ranks of the antimodernists, Lears includes such familiar figures as psychologist William James, critic Van Wyck Brooks, art historian Charles Eliot Norton, and author Henry Adams, along with some 60 lesser-known journalists, ministers, and academics. Earlier interpretations have treated these men and women as escapist dilettantes or as declining gentry unable to accept the challenge of new wealth. Lears suggests a more ironic process: Essentially private efforts to relieve anxiety and frustration produced by the erosion of Protestant and liberal values inspired these privileged intellectuals to search for "authentic experience"—for spiritual, moral, and even physical regeneration. This search had the unintended public consequence of shoring up the new corporate-industrial order by ennobling the individual quest for self-fulfillment—a quest that has become a central and necessary element of 20th-century consumer culture.

During the 1870s, according to Lears, American Victorians were essentially united in an optimistic faith in progress, recently reinvigorated by philosopher Herbert Spencer's evolutionary positivism and supported by increasing material comfort. But the generation that came of age in the '80s faced the first realities of modernization: bureaucracy, the monotony of industrial routine, an overwhelming concern for profits. Even sons and daughters of the most powerful old-line Eastern families felt they had little control over the direction of their lives. Life seemed overcivilized, lacking in vitality, and emotionally empty. The psychological strain revealed itself in a virtual epidemic of "neurasthenia" (a term coined at the time) and other debilitating neuroses.

Yearning for release, a sizable number of the Gilded Age's "best and brightest" turned, like earlier European Romantics, to the past. Some, such as Charles Eliot Norton, following the English Arts and Crafts movement, tried to recover a sense of community and meaningful work by re-creating the hard but satisfying life of medieval artisans. Others, including historian Brooks Adams, glorified the martial values of medieval
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society. Still others turned to Oriental mysticism, to cults of femininity (as Henry Adams did, with his idealization of the Virgin Mary), or to Anglo-Catholic ceremony and ritual.

Yet this quest for regeneration was ambivalent. Rebellion went only so far. In most cases, the antimodernists remained committed to the world of their fathers, with its rationality and stern ethic of achievement. The more practical elements of the Arts and Crafts movement were incorporated into vocational education (which managers hoped would be an effective means of class control), even as the movement inspired a do-it-yourself craze that captivated desk-bound businessmen. Nostalgic militarism provided intellectual justification for imperialism; not surprisingly, Teddy Roosevelt found much to praise in Brooks Adams' *The Law of Civilization and Decay* (1895).

Thus adapted, these new passions eased the transition from a producer ethic of hard work and self-denial to the "therapeutic ethic" of individual growth, self-fulfillment, and gratification through intense experience. They helped revitalize and transform American culture, accommodating it to the needs of an advanced, consumer-oriented industrial society.

In addition to showing that the "therapeutic ethic" antedates the 1960s, Lears's argument has historiographical significance. His use of Freud's theories of repression and ambivalence and of Antonio Gramsci's concept of "cultural hegemony" (i.e., that the dominant class controls the lower classes through manipulation of cultural symbols) explains much about the motives of his subjects.

The book's flaws stem from overgeneralization. These privileged intellectuals were not the first or even the most important antimodernists. That honor should be reserved for 19th-century agrarian and working-class radicals and for authentic (mostly Southern) regionalists who clung to communal, anti-commercial values. Their persistence into the 20th century suggests the limits of ruling-class hegemony as an explanatory device.

Lears's argument cannot be extended even to most segments of the new middle class. A service ethic, faith in scientific objectivity, and marketable expertise eased many of the new class of professionals into the 20th century without paralyzing ambivalence. Middle-class managers and specialists who modernized education and social welfare had more to do with mediating and spreading corporatist values (above all, the promotion of social harmony through conservative reforms aimed at improving the "standard of living") than did elite journalists and literati.

Finally, Lears underestimates the importance of his subjects' retreat from political involvement. His subjects are less noteworthy for what they did than for what they failed to do—and more culpable. In the end, many were guilty of escapism, for failing to use their considerable influence to shape responsible political and economic institutions.

Despite these disagreements, this is a courageous, sensitive, closely argued, and important book that advances the discussion of the dynamics of modernization to a new level.

—Mary O. Furer

*The Wilson Quarterly/Autumn 1982*
THE GERMANS
by Gordon A. Craig
Putnam's, 1982
350 pp. $15.95

Recent tensions between Washington and Bonn, one of our most important European allies, give new urgency to an old question: Who are these Germans? In his latest book, Craig, professor emeritus at Stanford, provides personal and scholarly answers that extend his Germany 1866–1945 (1978) in both directions. To put the problem in perspective he has chosen two lines of inquiry: "Is there any real connection between today's Germany and the one that I visited in 1935 or, for that matter, all the other Germanies that lie in the past—those of William II and Bismarck and Frederick II and Luther?" And perhaps more importantly: "How healthy is German democracy?"

Casting his net widely, he examines "a religious heritage that has always been ambivalent," torn between obedience and rebellion in both the Catholic and Protestant traditions. He describes the German respect for hard work and its financial rewards, tempered by a suspicion of money. And he detects a native distrust of change and nonconformity and of those who represent either, including students, women, and Jews. Disturbed by the modern German's "neurotic sensitivity to signs of economic trouble" as well as by "the increasing use of violence in domestic controversy," notable in the rise of terrorism on the extreme Left and Right in the 1970s, he is nevertheless optimistic about the future of West German democracy.

Craig acquired his reputation first as a military historian. But his literary erudition is vast, and his interpretations of cultural questions, such as "The Awful German Language," are provocative. He enlivens his discussion of the early days of the Federal Republic with quick sketches of its leading figures: Berlin's feisty mayor, Ernst Reuter (who led West German resistance to the Soviet blockade of 1948), the paternal but staunchly democratic Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and Germany's economics wizard Ludwig Erhard (architect of the "socially responsive free market economy"). His chapters analyzing postwar literature, appraising the West German Army, and evoking the city of Berlin combine personal affinity and critical intelligence.

Unfortunately, there are significant numbers of Germans who do not appear in this volume. One searches in vain for a sympathetic portrait of the German working man, the farmer, the burgher, or the bureaucrat. And Hitler's grisly Third Reich is largely passed over, apparently out of distaste, leaving us with little sense of the immediate background of the Federal Republic.

The reader will learn more about Germans of the past than about their modern-day heirs from this book. But it is well worth making the acquaintance of those whom Craig so ably and vividly presents.

—Konrad Jarausch ('80)

Jews, Christians, Muslims—the "three peoples of the Book"—share a common heritage. All three embrace the original Covenant with God; the latter venerate the Hebrew scriptures, though they have acquired their own distinctiveness through new revelation. Similarities beyond monotheism (e.g., dietary restrictions) have led some scholars to consider early Christianity a Jewish reform movement and Muhammad a Hebrew fundamentalist. Neither rejecting nor endorsing such notions, Peters, a professor of Near Eastern studies at New York University, contrasts the three groups' approaches to scripture, theology, law, community, and mysticism as they successively developed between the sixth century B.C. and the 11th century A.D. Attempting to make faith "rational," all three borrowed from Greek thought. And all were enriched by esoteric sects (Cabalism, Gnosticism, Sufism) that emphasized private revelation. In a more worldly vein, Peters notes that taxation, "which fell under secular jurisdiction in the Christian Roman Empire and was imposed upon Jewish communities from without, was part of the preserve of religious law in Islam." Not least among Peters' accomplishments is his explanation of how three "sharers of a common sacred history," under pressure of different circumstances (e.g., Christianity's adaptation to the Roman Empire, Islam's struggle with tribal rivalries), grew to be so distant from one another.


In 1314, a commission of cardinals found Jacques de Molay, last Master of the Order of the Temple of Solomon, guilty of sodomy, heresy, and idolatry and burned him at the stake. Ever since, the Knights Templar have been portrayed by historians as either saints or miscreants. Howarth, a historian and Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, ar-
gues that they were mainly victims. The order was established around 1118 in Jerusalem. Its founders were Hugh de Payens, a middle-rank nobleman, and other French knights dedicated to defending the recently reconquered Holy Land. Their aspiration: "to unite the contrary virtues of monk and warrior." The knights, whose ranks soon swelled to include Germans, Italians, and Britons, quickly gained recognition, financial support, and special privileges (mainly tax exemptions) from the Church. Before long, they owned land throughout Europe and in Outremer, the Holy Land. For over 180 years, the knights valiantly defended Jerusalem against Muslim armies. But a death blow came from fellow Christians, the secular princes who envied their wealth and prestige. Caught up in the political struggle between the papacy and the King of France, the order was finally dissolved by Pope Clement V in 1312. Howarth's lively history underscores a paradox of medieval Christendom—its martial piety.

ORDEAL BY FIRE:
The Civil War
and Reconstruction
by James M. McPherson
Knopf, 1982
694 pp. $29.95

The bloodiest of American wars and the last to be fought on native soil, the Civil War changed the way Americans viewed themselves. "Union" became "nation"; the "United States" a singular noun. And the federal government emerged as a more powerful instrument: It issued money (before the war, state-chartered banks had), conscripted men directly when states failed to meet quotas, and confiscated property. The 13th Amendment abolishing slavery "established a precedent by which the next six restricted state powers or expanded those of the national government." The appellation "first modern war" is perhaps a misnomer, since "every war is more modern than the previous one," argues McPherson, a professor of history at Princeton. But his descriptions of Northern industry—exemplified by railroads, rifle technology, and mass production—highlight the modernity of the war's machinery, if not of its tactics (which remained essentially
those of the Napoleonic wars). So, by their presence, do the photographs of politicians, soldiers, and battlefields that punctuate the text. McPherson's narrative concludes with the "unmourned death" of Reconstruction—that failed attempt to remake the South in the image of the North.

Contemporary Affairs


Current discussions of strategies—many of them inspired by Japan—for reinvigorating the ailing U.S. economy make this study both timely and helpful. Japan is the "best example of a state-guided market system currently available," observes Johnson, a Berkeley political scientist. But his analysis of Tokyo's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and related agencies does not ignore the costs (big bureaucracies, subordination of individuals to corporate goals) involved in creating a "development state" as opposed to the "regulatory state" devised by Americans. Tokyo's formation of an "economic general staff" during the 1930s to manage a wartime economy spawned a powerful bureaucratic elite. These civil servants, responsive to industrial interests (in part because many planned to shift to the private sector), forged a private-public development policy that survived well into the postwar 1940s, after which Big Business acquired a greater share of power. "Administrative guidance" principles gave discretionary power to the bureaucracy in guiding the economy, without destroying either democracy or domestic competition. The changes produced by MITI during its golden age (1952-61) included revitalized trading companies, banking reforms, and the creation of new industries (steel, automobile). All spurred Japan's advances of the 1960s. Entrance onto the world stage and an expanding economic machine lessened the need for MITI's "invisible hand." But since the "oil shock" of 1974, MITI has regained some of its earlier prestige through its influence over energy and resource policies.
BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE
edited by Irving Howe
Schocken, 1982
288 pp. $17.95 cloth, $8.95 paper

The "welfare state"—not only its mild U.S. version but also its systemic Western European forms—arouses public expectations that cannot be fulfilled, reduces political participation, and, in its extravagance, fuels inflation. Are these the grumblings of the resurgent American Right? Hardly. Howe, co-editor of the liberal journal, Dissent, cites these failings in this surprising collection of leftist critiques of social welfare programs (including everything from progressive taxation to public education to subsidies for failing corporations). The welfare state does provide for the barest needs of the underprivileged, most contributors concede. But economist Robert Heilbroner calls the concept a buttress of capitalism, a means of defusing discontent at the bottom of society and salving consciences at the top. Others, including political scientist Philip Green and Swedish sociologist Ulf Himmelstrand, argue that in practice, too, welfare states are flawed: In Britain, corporate executives earn up to 20 times the incomes of their low-level employees; in Sweden, 94 percent of the means of production remains privately owned. The central concern of the authors is how economies—and society in general—should be controlled. Heilbroner opts for an authoritarian order to ensure central economic planning and "a collective moral goal." Vigorously disagreeing, sociologist Lewis Coser and the late historian Henry Patcher favor decentralized economies governed by local workers' councils. Will the ideal socialist state be democratic or authoritarian?—that remains the unresolved question.

SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS
by Albert O. Hirschman
$14.50 cloth, $5.95 paper

Why do individuals—and whole societies—lurch from a preoccupation with private pursuits into immersion in public issues and then withdraw again? This puzzling cycle has been seen in the United States and other Western nations during the past three centuries. After instituting a "Republic of Virtue" in France, Robespierre voiced dismay at how quickly his fellow revolutionaries developed an appetite...
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for chètives marchandises—shoddy consumer goods. Hirschman, an economist at Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study, offers some fresh explanations. Beginning in the 18th century, Western societies challenged the Renaissance ideal of power-seeking as the public virtue and instead identified the public interest with the private pursuit of wealth. But the Western "consumer-citizen" has been repeatedly disappointed by the goods and services his recent affluence has enabled him to buy; while providing comfort, they fail to provide enough psychic "pleasure." He may then seek the very different satisfactions of the public arena. There, as Hirschman writes, he may escape, at least temporarily, our "imperious bottom-line mentality." When large numbers of people undergo parallel experiences (a rising middle class, for example), their disappointment with private consumption—their sheer boredom—may lead to political activism. Alas, says Hirschman, politics also entails disappointments. Progress may be too slow and results unexpected. Among its virtues, Hirschman's essay helps to explain why America's children of affluence for a time embraced wide-ranging social change and then beat such a hasty retreat toward the world promised by Ronald Reagan.

Arts & Letters

THE BARBARIANS ARE COMING
by J. M. Coetzee
Penguin, 1982
156 pp. $3.95

This is a fable of moral awakening, a story set in a nameless Empire at a time that could be any time. Its protagonist, the aging Magistrate of a frontier town, has unquestioningly served his state for decades. But when interrogation experts of the Empire's Third Bureau arrive to root out information about a rumored barbarian uprising and senselessly torture innocent natives, the scales begin to fall from the Magistrate's eyes; "I know somewhat too much; and from this knowledge, once one has been infected, there seems to be no recovering." Coetzee, a South African novelist, sets this Kafkian theme of one in-
individual's resistance to an inhuman order in a severe yet beautiful landscape—a small agrarian community situated precariously between a brackish lake and an encroaching desert. He also manages, while guarding the universality of his hero, to endow him with real flesh (sagging), nerves (unsteady), interests (amateur archaeology), and appetites (for young women). The guardians of the Empire are obsessed by historical time—the intermittent rise and decline of their domain. Their fears drive them to cruelty. But if the Magistrate suffers punishment and humiliation for his protest, he earns precious wisdom: an awareness of a more fundamental temporal order, tied to nature and felt by those who live close to it. Coetzee stands with his fellow South African writers Nadine Gordimer and Alan Paton in his vision of a truth that endures beneath the disorder of states.

The instigators of the French Revolution and the artists of the period—Wolfgang Mozart, William Blake, Francisco de Goya, Jacques-Louis David, and others—drew upon a common set of Enlightenment ideas. Starobinski, a professor of French literature at the University of Geneva, shows how these ideas emerged and were transformed in the arts and in the events of the revolution. Artists and revolutionaries alike tried to replace the oppressive frivolity of the ancien régime with reason, justice, and order. The earlier baroque and rococo artists agitated the senses with endless ornamentation. This was an art for the aristocratic libertine, whose fate was a weariness of entertainments and a knowledge of the emptiness that lay beyond. The new artists announced the dawn of a brilliant light that would banish the darkness of oppression. The sun was a recurring image. Artists such as David expressed the triumph of reason by replacing the “chaos” of colors with “rational” lines and forms. They slavishly imitated the styles and subjects of the Roman Republic, where man’s condition as a free and equal citizen seemed closer to...
what nature intended. Architects designed the "geometrical city." Each building was to be a monument of public utility, radiating the simple grandeur of geometry. But as the "Terror" became the third act of the revolution, so too darkness and irrationality reappeared in art. Goya's *Pradera of San Isidro* (1787) typifies the change. It depicts a crowd of people enjoying themselves—"a multicolored murmur." The chance encounters it portrays foreshadow the "essential instability" that marks the artist's later paintings.


Nothing could be less fashionable amid the "new traditionalism" of the 1980s than a spirited defense of "modernism." But this is precisely what Berman offers, invoking artists and thinkers (Goethe, Marx) whom he believes have responded most creatively to the social and economic changes of the last two centuries. These are not the modernists of more recent decades—Samuel Beckett or other high priests of despair and alienation. They are, rather, the innovators who preached survival and adaptation—making oneself "at home in the maelstrom." Goethe's *Faust* is exemplary: The epitome of the modern "developer," Faust translates his drive for power and self-aggrandizement into a sprawling corporate empire. Berman does not overlook Faust's tragedy—the human costs of development (which include Faust's own obsolescence)—but he admires Faust as one who never retreats to the "little world" of his origins. He lauds Marx, Baudelaire, and the great St. Petersburg writers, from Gogol in the mid-19th century to Biely in the early 20th, for showing a similar courage. Berman, a political scientist at the City University of New York, approaches literature, philosophy, urban planning, the arts, and architecture with strong biases—reviling, for example, such modernists as Le Corbusier and Robert Moses for designing the life out of cities. His impassioned criticism is engaging even when most outrageous.

Between the Smithsonian Institution's founding in 1846 and the death in 1902 of John Wesley Powell, one of its most celebrated scientist-administrators, the nation's museum was the driving force in the development of American anthropology. As they studied American Indian languages, beliefs, social organization, and technologies, James Mooney, W. J. McGee, Matilda Stevenson, and other old-fashioned generalists, soldier-intellectuals, and missionaries sought above all to confirm their beliefs in the sacred unity of an evolving Nature. Their ideas often had practical consequences, notably for the effort by educators and missionaries to draw Indians into the rest of American society. In this first thorough study of American anthropology, Hinsley, a Colgate historian, concludes that Powell's Bureau of American Ethnology was a response to the times—the product of booming material progress, spiritual malaise, and unquestioning trust in evolutionary ideas. There has been a loss as well as a gain in the transition to 20th-century expertise. The old anthropology was addressed to the whole American nation, not only to a "well-defined academic peer group." It was inspired by moral and religious commitments, bent on constructing a unified science of humanity that would itself help bring about the future "generalized race." It was also an "exercise in self-study," seeking to explain and justify the "wide disparities in human conditions, past, present, and future."

THE OXFORD COMPANION TO ANIMAL BEHAVIOR edited by David McFarland Oxford, 1982 657 pp. $29.95

Do animals suffer from boredom, use language, live longer in or out of captivity? Are carnivorous species more or less prone to cannibalism than other species? And what is the evolutionary significance of animal hypnosis? Providing answers to these and hundreds of other related mysteries, ethology—the study of animal behavior—has been par-
ticularly successful during the past four decades. McFarland, an ethologist at Oxford University, has assembled more than 200 articles on topics ranging from aggression to wildlife management, from Darwinism to mating systems (over 90 percent of the birds in the world are monogamous). The Companion's 69 specialist-contributors do not ignore rival theories and point out, wherever relevant, significant parallels or differences between animal and human behavior.

"That plants and animals are analogous we may be convinced if we only consider the manner whereby they receive their nourishment," wrote Antoine de Jussieu in 1721. In an age before biology was a clearly defined scientific pursuit, explains Delaporte, a historian of science at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 18th-century natural philosophers remained within the intellectual framework of their time; they took animal physiology as the starting point for the study of the plant kingdom. In defining what was essential to plants (their "vegetality"), investigators first examined functions they found to be common to both animals and plants: nutrition, reproduction, and movement. Delaporte works in the tradition of Michel Foucault, a modern French historian who traces the organization of man's knowledge at different periods. He shows how natural philosophers, following frequently erroneous rules and assumptions, often arrived at essentially correct conclusions about the nature of plants (describing pollination, for example). Only at the end of the 18th century did naturalists begin to think about plants in terms of structure rather than function. The discovery of the plant cell by Konrad Sprengel and others in turn led to a reversal of the earlier animal studies, as the focus shifted to physiology and the animal cell.
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PIG EARTH. By John Berger. Pantheon, 1982, 213 pp. $5.95

"The world has left the earth behind it." Not quite yet, in fact, but the likely extinction of peasant society makes this collection of essays, poems, and stories written between 1974 and 1978 (while Berger and his family were living in a French village) a work of urgent anthropology. It is also a striking artistic effort, capturing in tone and style the villagers' own portrayal of themselves and their world—"mordant, frank, sometimes exaggerated, seldom idealised." This volume is the first part of a projected trilogy, Into Their Labours, by the versatile British art critic and novelist.

SOME TIME IN THE SUN. By Tom Dardis. Penguin, 1981. 297 pp. $5.95

Hollywood has never helped a writer, or so runs the cliche. But Dardis, editor, professor, and short story writer, claims that time in Hollywood was not ill-spent for F. Scott Fitzgerald, William Faulkner, Nathanael West, Aldous Huxley, and James Agee. Fitzgerald's own assessment was that film work may have meant the sacrifice of his talent "in pieces," but it did not cause its destruction—as the uncompleted novel The Last Tycoon illustrates. At the very least, scriptwriting kept him away from the bottle (most of the time) and solvent. Hollywood earned Faulkner more money than he thought existed "in the entire state of Mississippi," buying him stretches of precious time back home for serious writing. (He may well have been one of the fastest studio writers, at 35 pages of script a day.) West's work at low-budget studios yielded rich ore—material for his novel, Day of the Locust (1939). For Agee, Hollywood represented no compromise: The novelistic detail of his scripts and the literary excellence of his film criticism demonstrate his respect for the medium.


In this major work on the revolutionary temperament, Walzer, a political scientist at Princeton's Institute for Advanced Studies, considers the role of Puritanism during Britain's tumultuous transitional period between 1530 and 1660. England then, like much of Europe, was in the throes of transformation, political, economic, and religious; the ideas of earlier thinkers such as Martin Luther and Niccolo Machiavelli had called into question all the old hierarchies and privileges but offered few certainties. Reacting to the disorder of the times, and despising the hedonism of aristocratic Cavalier society, many gentlemen and merchants found in Calvinist doctrine the promise of a new form of order: self-mastery. Once "re-made," the Puritan saints, the Cromwells and the Miltons, proceeded to shape society "in the image of their own salvation." If they killed kings, they did so to install a new state, self-governing, austere, and virtuous. Walzer's comprehensive analysis shows how these first radicals prefigured later generations of essentially intolerant zealots—Jacobins, Bolsheviks, and Maoists.
REFLECTIONS

Crèvecœur’s New World

Polish émigre poet Czeslaw Milosz recently observed that the popular myth of America, like all such myths, “is kept alive by what it chooses not to say; it selects only the attractive elements from a complex reality.” The same could be said of the work of J. Hector St. John de Crèvecœur (1735–1813). His *Letters from an American Farmer* created a minor sensation when it first appeared in Europe, and passages from this book are still cited in our college texts. His panegyrics to the New World have been transformed into elements of our national self-image. But Crèvecœur was not free from contradictions—an aristocratic Frenchman who claimed, during his years in America, to be nothing more than a simple rustic. Here historian Bruce Mazlish describes the *Letters* and its author.

by Bruce Mazlish

Exactly 200 years ago, just as the 13 colonies were emerging victorious from their War of Independence, *Letters from an American Farmer* appeared in print. Published first in London and followed quickly by editions in Dublin, Belfast, Leipzig, Berlin, and Paris, the book was addressed to “a friend in England.” It described the customs, manners, work habits, and “modes of thinking” of Nantucket fishermen, backwoods frontiersmen, and Carolina slaveholders, as well as the people in the New World whom the author knew best — the small farmers and freeholders of New York and Pennsylvania.

The volume, 12 letters, or chapters, in all, was widely read in Europe, serving, as one scholar recently put it, “as a report on the application of the liberal and humane doctrines of the Enlightenment to a functioning society.” But the book’s persistence as a minor classic in Europe and the United States may be largely credited to Letter III with its lavish (and highly quotable) description of the American as “a new man, who acts upon new principles.” Such phrases as “melting pot” and “new man,” derived from the *Letters*, have become part of the American mythology.

Only more recently have scholars
begun to recognize the Letters's considerable merit as social commentary—as acute in many ways as Alexis de Tocqueville's better known Democracy in America (1835 and 1840). Yet the special significance of Letters derives in part from the ambiguities that troubled the author himself.

The title page named him as J. Hector St. John and further identified him simply as "A Farmer in Pennsylvania."

The larger story is a bit more complicated: Born in France, baptized Michel-Guillaume-Jean de Crèvecoeur, the author had immigrated, by way of Britain and Canada, to the northern English colonies in 1759. Curiously, he made no mention of his mixed heritage or uncertain identity, though it is precisely these elements that give the Letters its special interest. For Crèvecoeur was not simply describing a nation of "other" people, as Tocqueville later did; he was also attempting to make sense of himself—as an American.

What life had Crèvecoeur led before he became an "American farmer"? He was born in 1735, in Caen, Normandy; his father was a member of the lesser nobility. Sent to a Jesuit college for schooling, Crèvecoeur later remembered being treated harshly and living in a "dark and chilly garret."

At age 19, he was shipped off to England, possibly because of a quarrel with his father, to live with relatives. There he proceeded to learn English and fall in love with the daughter of a Salisbury businessman. The death of his fiancée prompted him to sail for Canada in 1755, where he enlisted as a cadet in the French militia.

Endowed with mathematical abil-
ities, he served as a surveyor and cartographer, growing acquainted with both the North American landscape and its inhabitants. Three years later, he secured a commission as a second lieutenant in the regular French Army. In the last battle of Quebec, September 1759, trying to help save New France from the British, he was wounded.

A Hyphenated People

And at this point, a mystery clouds Crevecoeur’s life. One month later, in October, he was forced by fellow officers to resign from his regiment. We have no idea of the reason. Had Crevecoeur, cited earlier for bravery, somehow disgraced himself in the Quebec battle or after it? In any case, he sold his commission, and, boarding a Royal Navy ship, arrived in New York City on December 16, 1759. Crevecoeur, the Frenchman, now adopted the name J. Hector St. John, and a new American was born.

Americans, almost uniquely, are a hyphenated people. To a remarkable degree, we are still German-Americans, or Italian-Americans or what have you, dragging our other-than-American past behind us. Crevecoeur was more than ordinarily divided.

First of all, as a Franco-American (and appropriately he named his first daughter America-Francés), he was never sure which half dominated. Though he spoke of himself sometimes as “a good Frenchman and a good American,” on most occasions he either emphasized his New York colonial citizenship (obtained in 1765–66) or reverted to his natal claim. Though he wrote in the Letters, “the American ought therefore to love this country much better than that wherein either he or his forefathers were born,” he became a French consul in 1783, an action sufficient to make the American statesman Gouverneur Morris feel he had abrogated his American citizenship. About this time, moreover, Crevecoeur wrote to the Duke de La Rochefoucault, calling himself “a Frenchman.”

Going Native

Besides a confused national identity, Crevecoeur wrestled with a provincial one: Never fully settling on any one claim, he kept calling himself, variously, a Pennsylvanian or a New Yorker (he had his farm in that colony), or a Vermonter. (Ethan Allen, in 1787, arranged for Crevecoeur and his three children to be declared naturalized citizens of the Green Mountain state; St. Johnsbury, Vermont, was named after Crevecoeur.)

To complicate matters further, he even flirted with an Indian identity. In Letter XII, the last of the collection, Crevecoeur fantasized about leaving his farm in New York, menaced as it was by the Indians under British command, and fleeing to a friendly tribe of Indians, among whom he and his entire family would take up life as full tribal members. In his Voyage (1801), a book that he published after the Letters, he stated on the title page that the author was

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“un membre adoptif de la nation Onéïda” (an adopted member of the Oneida nation); his Indian name was Cahio-Harra.

Opium in Nantucket

But the ambivalent qualities that emerged in Crèvecoeur’s life and work have usually been neglected. His praises of the “American” are cited by students of American literature who have read no more than the lyric passages from Letter III, so often reprinted in anthologies.

“He is an American,” Crévecoeur wrote, “who, leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners, receives new ones from the new mode of life he has embraced, the new government he obeys, and the new rank he holds. . . . Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men, whose labours and posterity will one day cause great changes in the world.”

Thus, few readers know that his troubled view of the frontiersman (whose life, he believed, led to moral degeneration) antecedent and influenced James Fenimore Cooper’s “Leatherstocking” portrayals or that his description of the whalers in Nantucket, including their opium-using housewives, is a worthy prelude to that given in Herman Melville’s Moby Dick.

Crèvecoeur’s private ambivalence aside, his experiences were, for an American, typically broad and varied. After his arrival in the colonies, he traveled, worked (as a surveyor or farmer), and lived in different parts of Pennsylvania and New York. Then, in 1769, he married a Yonkers woman, Mehitable Tippet, and settled down on a farm in Orange County, New York about 35 miles northwest of Manhattan.

During the 1770s, Crèvecoeur led the life of a prosperous American farmer, writing most (if not all) of his Letters, as well as occasional articles critical of British taxation. Yet when the war broke out, Crèvecoeur sided with the Tories and soon felt himself forced to flee, along with his oldest son but without his wife and two other children, to New York City, then to England, and ultimately, in 1781, to his native France.

Cultural Baggage

It was probably Crèvecoeur’s private allegiance to his own class, the aristocracy, and his fear of the unruly rabble that drove him, albeit with reluctance and mixed feelings, to the Loyalist side during the War of Independence. Yet, in his Letters, Crèvecoeur went to great lengths to stress his own simple, rustic qualities. He insisted that he was “neither a philosopher, politician, divine, nor naturalist, but a simple farmer.”

In fact, he was a relatively sophisticated student of French Enlightenment thought, and something of all of the above. In one area, religion, he was misled by the anti-clericalism of the Enlightenment into predicting that the children of Americans would “grow up less zealous and more indifferent in matters of religion than their parents. The foolish vanity, or rather the fury of making Proselytes, is unknown here.”

Crèvecoeur dedicated the Letters to the Abbé de Raynal (a minor Enlightenment thinker), whose own work on North America, Histoire Philosophique (1770), helped inspire a favorable view of the New World.

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* He returned to America as a French consul in 1783, only to learn that his wife had died the year before; he finally retired to France in 1790.
The cultural baggage Crèvecoeur brought with him also included, significantly, an admiration of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Here, too, we have a highly ambivalent figure, partly of the Enlightenment and partly opposed to it. In any case, Crèvecoeur echoed many attitudes found in the writings of the "Citizen of Geneva": a tendency to romanticize nature, an eager willingness to shed tears, and a stress on the virtues of sincerity and the language and feelings of the heart.

Firsthand experience delivered Crèvecoeur from any idolization of the "noble savage." Nevertheless, he, too, recognized and mythologized some of the good qualities of the Indians, even as he noted their lack of strict morals and self-discipline.

Crèvecoeur, a cultivated European, wished, like Rousseau, to shed his overcivilized veneer in order to become a new man. Although he wanted to know what that new man would be like as an American, he also posed a larger question: What might any new man be? More to the point, what should he be?

Into the Melting Pot

Behind the philosophical question was Crèvecoeur's own unrelenting quest for an identity. Like a religious convert, he sought to become a new man, for that was the only way Crèvecoeur believed he could become a fully human being. We sense the personal note when he writes of how the newcomer to America "begins to feel the effect of a sort of re-education; hitherto he had not lived, but simply vegetated; he now feels himself a new man, because he is treated as such." A few pages later, he repeats, "for the first time in his life [he] counts for something; for hitherto he has been a cypher."

Crèvecoeur was willing to take on a new life in any setting, French or American, as long as it promised to answer the question, what is this man? What gives Crèvecoeur, and his writing, a historical as well as a personal dimension is that in the course of seeking his definition he offered one to all others who would wish to find theirs by calling themselves Americans, however mixed their cultural origins.

The new American was one who had left Europe and its old authority relations. He was an immigrant. He became an American, dipping himself in a melting pot and emerging with his "past" behind him.

A Mixed Vision

On many points, Crèvecouer defined America's virtues as the obverse of Europe's ancient vices: "the severity of taxes, the injustice of laws, the tyranny of the rich, and the oppressive avarice of the church," these are all absent for the American. He is a "free" man—"possessing freedom of action, freedom of thoughts"—free of the weight of European institutions. His new home is "the general asylum of the world," welcoming to its shores the poor and oppressed of the old continent.

Crèvecoeur claimed to be interested only in the man of the present and the future. He mocked those who were absorbed in viewing ruins and who went to Italy for that purpose; how much more interesting was a civilization emerging, how satisfying the observation of "the humble rudiments and embryos of societies." In America, one could contemplate "the very beginnings and out-lines of human society, which can be traced no where now but in this part of the world."

Nevertheless, here, too, Crèvecoeur
was ambivalent. In his youth he had been interested in artifacts of the past—old worm-eaten furniture, tapestries, and portraits. And, in Letter XII, he wrote of an America that was itself in ruins as a result of the Revolutionary War. He was compulsively interested in the ruins, rather than in the glowing future.

Before that, however, in the first three letters, he offered an idyllic picture of America, free from the ancient curses of Europe. "Here," he lyricized, "we have had no war to desolate our fields [ignoring the convulsions starting in 1776!]; our religion does not oppress the cultivators: we are strangers to those feudal institutions which have enslaved so many."

Unburdened by these negative influences, America enjoys a number of benefits and blessings: "Here nature opens her broad lap to receive the perpetual accession of new comers, and to supply them with food"; "We are a people of cultivators, scattered over an immense territory . . . united by the silken bonds of mild government, without dreading their power, because they are equitable. We are all animated with the spirit of an industry which is unfettered and unrestrained because each person works for himself"; and "Here man is free as he ought to be." Rousseau could ask for little more.

This is the Crévecoeur who figures in the anthologies. It is the Crévecoeur who was writing for Europeans, not Americans, trying to impress them with the wisdom of the choice he and others were making in settling in the New World. It is the Crévecoeur who was reacting to Constantin-François Volney (the French author of a famous work on ruins), who had just written a widely cited book belittling America and its inhabitants, native and colonial. It is also the Crévecoeur who was challenging the view of Georges-Louis

Crévecoeur hailed the simple rural life: "The father thus plowing with his child, and to feed his family, is inferior only to the emperor of China ploughing as an example to his kingdom."

VENERATE THE PLOUGH

Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
Buffon and other Frenchmen who saw American flora and fauna as degenerative species, weaker than their European counterparts. Crevecoeur described the way in which the "plentitude" of both geographic and social space transformed Europeans into Americans: The European "no sooner breathes our air than he forms schemes, and embarks on designs he would never have thought of in his own country."

**Frontier Mongrels**

Crevecoeur offered an "environmental" explanation of the American and his goodness. "Men are like plants," he announced in Montesquieu-like tones, "the goodness and flavor of the fruit proceeds from the peculiar soil and exposition in which they grow. We are nothing but what we derive from the air we breathe, the climate we inhabit, the government we obey, the system of religion we profess, and the nature of our employment." Nurture, then, is more important than nature in the case of man.

As a good 18th-century advocate of the primacy of agriculture (one thinks both of the "Physiocrats," who believed land was the source of all wealth, and of Jefferson), Crevecoeur often tended to emphasize the shaping force of the land. He was, after all, a farmer, and he appears to have said that tilling the soil produces healthy results in men. At other times, he seems to have put the stress on government, as when he claimed that barren Nantucket "seems to have been inhabited merely to prove what mankind can do when happily governed."

Essentially, however, Crevecoeur's praise was reserved for the cultivated and the "middle way." His utterly unromantic view of the frontiersman, or "back settlers" makes this clear. "The chase," he tells us, "renders them ferocious, gloomy, and unsociable." Their mode of life produces "a strange sort of lawless profligacy." Their children "grow up a mongrel breed, half civilized, half savage." Such "degeneracy" hardly accords with Frederick Jackson Turner's picture of the frontier as the regenerative source for American democracy.

Crévecoeur preferred another setting: Between the struggle with the sea and the hazards of the frontier lies the stable state of agriculture. It is the happy man, he wrote, who can "inhabit the middle settlements, by far the most numerous," where "the simple cultivation of the earth purifies them."

**America in Ruins**

Alas, Crévecoeur's optimism disconcertingly declines as we move further into the Letters. His metaphor for man changes from plant to animal. Though he began by treating man the animal as possessed by instinct, which is good, he ended by focusing on the bad side of the passions. Man, Crévecoeur came to see, is quarrelsome, cruel, and power-hungry. He is, in short, potentially bestial; and, on the frontier, he relapses into barbarism.

A dark shadow falls over the later letters, in which Crévecoeur penned a description of Charlestown, South Carolina, its aristocrats given over to foolish pleasures and supported by an exploitative slave system. The end of Letter IX presents a harrowing scene: Crévecoeur comes across a Negro slave, hanging from a tree in a cage, birds pecking out his eyes and insects eating his rotting flesh. His crime: killing the overseer of the plantation. As Crévecoeur's host ex-
plains to him, "The laws of self-preservation rendered such executions necessary."

Increasingly, as the *Letters* progressed, Crévecoeur went back and forth between shocking instances of cruelty and suffering in man and nature in America — there is an extraordinary account of two snakes battling one another — and depictions of occasional "benignity" (as in the portrait of the botanist, John Bartram).

All falls apart by Letter XII. War had come to Crévecoeur's idyllic farm. He and his family were threatened by British-led Indians and had to flee. The Revolutionary War for Crévecoeur, as we know, did not open the way for the pursuit of happiness but instead ended his bucolic contentment. "America," for our "American Farmer," was now in ruins.

Crévecoeur's only salvation was an imaginative retreat. He would take his family and escape to some "good" Indians, where they would be sheltered from the storm. He was aware that in becoming "A Frontier Man" — the title of his letter — he ran the risk of degenerating into bestiality. But he imagined that he would, in fact, help civilize the Indians and prevent his children from adopting their ways. The severe divisions within Crévecoeur are striking in this final fantasy. We witness a terrible transformation, as the American dream becomes a nightmare. In the end, Crévecoeur was overwhelmed by a riven sense of identity and the loss of a stable world.

Ironically, Crévecoeur's claim to be describing the reality of America and Americans has generally been taken by critics at face value. The claim, in fact, is valid, but not precisely in the way he asserted.

Crévecoeur's intent was, at least in part, philosophical; and the English publishers were right when they saw through his project for a third book, to be titled *Journey through Northern Pennsylvania and the State of New York*. Writes Julia Post Mitchell, an early biographer: "When they learned that this was not an actual journey, in reality undertaken by the author, but rather a philosophical description of America, their interest cooled, and the plan had to be abandoned."

The importance of Crévecoeur's *Letters* lay in its message to Americans and to those outside who wished to know about this strange new world. His was an "actual journey," but it was also a *mythical* one through a largely psychological landscape. In writing his account of this journey, Crévecoeur helped create the myth of what it was to be an American, and that myth, in turn, helped shape reality. He also suggested the ambivalences, as well as the darker aspects, of the American character.

In his own ambivalence and in his painful search for identity, Crévecoeur was one prototype of the new "American," especially the American writer. He mirrored and prophesied for us the polarities — what Erik Erikson calls the "counterpointing of opposite potentialities" — that still partly define us as a nation 200 years after *Letters* was first published.
The Cuban Missile Crisis: Legacies and Lessons

Twenty years ago this autumn, halfway through the 1962 football season, Americans learned from their President, John F. Kennedy, that Nikita Khrushchev had secretly placed nuclear missiles in Castro's Cuba and that an unprecedented U.S. showdown with Moscow was at hand. Did this mean World War III? The stock market dropped sharply. Here and there, housewives stampeded the supermarkets to stock up on canned goods. A handful of protesters, including socialist Norman Thomas, urged the White House to yield. But most Americans, including Congress and the media, backed JFK's imposition of a naval blockade—and the 13-day crisis ended with a Soviet retreat. Historian Robert Pollard examines the October 1962 drama and today's scholarly debate over its causes and consequences.

by Robert A. Pollard

At 7:00 P.M. on Monday, October 22, 1962, President John F. Kennedy addressed the nation on television. His face was grim. His subject was Cuba.

"Within the past week," Kennedy said, "unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere."

From the bases, once completed, the Russians could fire medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) as far north as Washington and as far south as the Panama Canal. Kennedy noted that construction was also proceeding on air bases and on missile sites for intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), which could strike targets more than 2,000 miles away.

While home-based Soviet nuclear weapons had long posed a grave threat to U.S. national security, the President explained, the missiles in Cuba were different. This "secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles" in the Caribbean, close to U.S. shores, was "a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which
PERSPECTIVES: MISSILE CRISIS

cannot be accepted by this country, if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.

Kennedy said that he had ordered a "strict quarantine" by the U.S. Navy to intercept shipments of offensive military materiel to Cuba. He invited Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev "to move the world back from the abyss of destruction" by withdrawing the missiles from Cuba and entering into negotiations for the control of nuclear weapons.

The Bay of Pigs

The President acknowledged the risks inherent in his decision. "No one can foresee precisely what course it will take or what costs or casualties will be incurred," he warned. "But the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing."

One of the epochal confrontations of the atomic age had begun. Millions of Americans wondered if a nuclear holocaust was at hand. Although the crisis was ultimately resolved without war, it raised numerous questions: Why did Khrushchev place the missiles in Cuba? Was their significance primarily military or political? Was Kennedy's response appropriate? Indeed, was this crisis necessary? Did the United States really win a Cold War "victory," as some pundits claimed at the time? What impact did the confrontation have on Soviet-American relations? On the arms race?

With the benefit of hindsight, some of these matters become clearer. But even after 20 years, certain elements remain a mystery.

The prelude to the crisis lay in the hostility between the United States and Cuba following Fidel Castro's seizure of power from Fulgencio Batista in January 1959. The Castro regime's expropriation of American-owned properties and increasingly close ties with the Soviet Union prompted the Eisenhower Administration to impose a partial trade embargo and, later, to sever diplomatic ties.

Meanwhile, during the 1960 presidential campaign, the Democratic nominee, John F. Kennedy, charged that the Republican administration had allowed the Communists to gain a foothold just 90 miles from the Florida coast while offering "virtually no support" to anti-Castro groups.

In fact, CIA training of Cuban exiles in Florida and Guatemala was already well under way when Kennedy won the 1960 election; and Kennedy, as President, approved plans to deploy a 1,200-man exile force for an attempted overthrow of Castro. The landing at the Bay of Pigs in late April 1961 resulted in a humiliating U.S. defeat and a further shift by Cuba into the Soviet orbit. The Soviets rewarded Castro with large shipments of tanks and artillery accompanied by several thousand technicians and military advisers during the summer of 1962.

Seeing the Ponies

The Russians at first succeeded in concealing their deployment of offensive missiles.

Then, on August 31, 1962, Senator Kenneth Keating (R-N.Y.) declared that he had evidence of missile silo construction in Cuba. High-flying American U-2 photo-reconnaissance planes had already established that the Soviets were installing defensive surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in Cuba, but U.S. intelligence found no solid evidence of any missiles which might threaten the U.S. The President and his advisers were also ap-
PERSPECTIVES: MISSILE CRISIS

parently deceived by repeated pledges from Khrushchev and his emissaries that the Soviets would avoid any aggressive action in Cuba. On September 4, the White House released a statement that the only missiles in Cuba were defensive in nature. But, with congressional elections approaching, Keating and other GOP spokesmen continued to hammer away at the Democrats on the Cuban issue.

In response, Kennedy told a press conference on September 13 that recent Soviet arms transfers to Cuba did not constitute a serious threat to any other part of this hemisphere. The United States would only react if Cuba became an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union. In the meantime, he said, U.S. surveillance would continue.

This did not soothe his Republican critics, who now included Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona and Richard Nixon, a candidate for governor in California. And on October 10, Keating claimed on the Senate floor that construction had begun on six IRBM sites and that the Administration was deceiving the American people. By his own account, Keating had earlier relied on leaks from the U.S. intelligence community, but he never disclosed the source for his allegations on October 10.

At the time, American intelligence apparently had still not discovered the missile sites. Heavy cloud cover and fear of the new SAMs had inhibited reconnaissance by the U-2s in early October. Kennedy’s top intelligence advisers, moreover, doubted that the Soviets would install offensive missiles before their protective SAM network was ready. On October 14, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, appearing on ABC’s “Issues and Answers,” denied the existence of Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba just as a U-2 was taking pictures of them for the first time.

Finally, on October 15, CIA analysts identified bases under construction for MRBMs and IRBMs. This revelation surprised and angered Kennedy, but he took the news calmly. How should the United States respond? Kennedy appointed an Executive Committee (ExCom) of the White House National Security Council on October 16 to advise him during what was now looming as a full-fledged world crisis.

During the next 13 days, the two superpowers were to come closer to war than at any time since the Berlin “aerial” crisis in 1948.

While the ExCom deliberated, the President maintained the appearance of business as usual. One morning, for example, Kennedy took

An Oval Office portrait by Bernard Fuchs of John Fitzgerald Kennedy, who led the United States through Cold War crises over Laos, Berlin, and, finally, the nuclear missiles sent by Nikita Khrushchev to Cuba in late 1962.

astronaut Walter Schirra and his family out to see daughter Caroline's ponies, and then met with a White House Panel on Mental Retardation. During the course of the crisis, the President flew to Connecticut, Ohio, and Illinois for campaign appearances and issued statements on run-of-the-mill legislation, including a bill curbing indecent publications in the District of Columbia (which he vetoed). The ExCom members, too, took precautions, arriving at different White House gates at different times to avoid attention. When a few newsmen, notably the New York Times's James Reston, began to sense what was happening, the White House managed to persuade them to remain silent.

The ExCom considered several possible U.S. reactions: to do nothing; to rely on diplomacy alone; to implement a blockade; to launch a preemptive air strike; or to invade the island.

The first two options were soon dismissed. The ExCom regarded the presence of the missiles as a serious threat; the Soviets were likely to rebuff diplomatic overtures until the missiles were operational. Few of the advisers, on the other hand, favored an invasion as a first move.
The two main options were an air strike or a blockade, with most ExCom members initially leaning toward the former. A "surgical" air strike against the Soviet missiles would be quick and decisive, its proponents argued. But further inquiry indicated that Soviet casualties on the ground might be high and the results uncertain. A Soviet commander at one of the missile sites, it was thought, might even be tempted to launch a missile on his own in the event of an American attack.

Gromyko Complains

To eliminate all the missiles, a costly amphibious invasion by U.S. troops would have to accompany any air strikes, possibly provoking Soviet counter-moves against West Berlin or Turkey. An air strike, moreover, would be "a Pearl Harbor in reverse," in Robert Kennedy's words. "My brother," he told the group, "is not going to be the Tojo of the 1960s."

By Thursday, October 18, discussion shifted to a partial naval blockade designed to halt the flow of Soviet offensive weapons to Cuba. A blockade would probably avoid a military clash while confronting the Soviets on the high seas, an area of comparative U.S. advantage. Yet this approach, as Dean Acheson noted, would not remove the missiles already in Cuba, and, during the blockade, the Soviets could prepare more and more of them for launching.

While his aides conferred, President Kennedy held a long-scheduled White House meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. The Soviets, by most U.S. estimates, were hoping to spring their surprise immediately after the U.S. November elections. Maintaining the deception that there were no missiles in Cuba, Gromyko complained of American designs against Castro. Kennedy repeated his September warning against offensive missiles without revealing what he knew.

The key session of the ExCom occurred on Saturday, October 20. Rusk and McNamara secured President Kennedy's assent to a blockade rather than an air strike. Kennedy informed congressional leaders of his decision just two hours before his broadcast to the nation on Monday, October 22.

The climax came on the morning of Wednesday, October 24, as the U.S. "quarantine" took effect. Led by the cruiser Newport News, a U.S. naval task force of 19 warships formed a picket line in the Atlantic, 500 miles from Cuba, to intercept approximately 25 incoming Russian ships. The big carriers Enterprise and Independence took position near Cuba. Some 45 ships, 240 aircraft, and 30,000 men were directly engaged in the blockade. In addition, 25,000 Marines aboard Navy ships and more than 100,000 Army troops in Florida were ready for an invasion of Cuba.*

Eyeball to Eyeball

Shortly after 10 A.M. Washington time, the Navy reported to the President and his advisers that two Russian ships, the Gagarin and the Komiles, were approaching the American ships with a submarine escort. McNamara told the group that the prearranged plan was for helicopters from the carrier Essex to signal the submarine by sonar to identify itself; if this failed, they would use depth charges to make the Soviet vessel surface.

*The Soviets had put 22,000 personnel in Cuba, 10,000 of whom were guarding the missiles, as much against the Cubans as the Americans.
"I felt we were on the edge of a precipice with no way off," Robert Kennedy later wrote. "President Kennedy had initiated the course of events, but he no longer had control over them."

Then at 10:25 word came that the two Soviet ships had "stopped dead in the water." "We're eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked," Dean Rusk said, as a palpable sense of relief swept through the room. Later, the other Soviet ships reversed course.

The success of the blockade, of course, did not ensure the withdrawal of the missiles already in Cuba. Intelligence revealed that work on the missile sites was continuing, as was the assembly of Soviet Ilyushin-28 bombers.

**Jupiters in Turkey**

Kennedy and Khrushchev had exchanged messages up to this point almost daily, but to no avail. In a letter received October 23, for instance, the Soviet Premier had flatly refused to recognize the blockade, which he characterized as "outright banditry, or, if you like, the folly of degenerate imperialism."

Yet, Khrushchev provided a way out on October 26. In return for an end to the American blockade and a pledge not to invade Cuba, Khrushchev offered to withdraw or to destroy all launching pads and offensive weapons on the island. The Premier's tone was emotional. If they could not resolve the crisis, Khrushchev wrote Kennedy, "what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly what terrible forces our countries dispose."

A second message arrived at 10:17 A.M. on October 27, just as the ExCom met to consider the first one. In less compromising language, Khrushchev demanded the withdrawal of 15 U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey in addition to the previous conditions.

Kennedy faced a dilemma: He knew the obsolete Jupiters were no longer useful to NATO defense.* But he could not accept the Soviet demand without seeming to legitimize the Soviet missiles in Cuba. The Joint Chiefs, joining the ExCom at midday, argued that the blockade had failed to force a Soviet pullout, and that the time had come for an air strike followed by a full-scale invasion of Cuba. Then word came that a SAM had shot down a U-2, killing Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr., one of the two Air Force pilots who had first discovered the missiles in Cuba. Several senior officials spoke in favor of an attack to destroy all the SAM sites as well, but Kennedy rejected this option.

**Khrushchev's Retreat**

At this point, Robert Kennedy suggested that the President should ignore the second letter and reply to the first. While President Kennedy was sending a message to Khrushchev accepting the conditions of the October 26 message, his brother informed Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that "if they did not remove those bases, we would remove them." The Attorney General also told the Russian that the missiles in Turkey would be removed in due course, but not in exchange for the missiles in Cuba. (The last Jupiter left Turkey in April 1963.)

Khrushchev accepted the U.S. conditions on October 28. Kennedy publicly welcomed Khrushchev's

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*Kennedy had earlier directed that the missiles be removed, but the State Department had not yet implemented his order.
"statesmanlike decision" on the same day. Over the next few weeks, Castro, angered by his exclusion from the Soviet-American deal, delayed implementation of the agreement by blocking UN inspection. But U-2 surveillance and observations at sea revealed that the Soviets had destroyed all missile sites and removed 42 MRBMs. (The IRBMs apparently were never delivered.) On November 20, the Soviets agreed to remove their bombers as well. The crisis had ended.

The public response in America was a combination of profound relief and patriotic celebration. Most contemporary observers applauded the President's courage and skill in forcing Khrushchev to retreat from a dangerous and aggressive venture. The President won strong bipartisan congressional support and a public approval rating, as determined by polls, of almost 80 percent, as well as the backing of America's major allies.

Goldwater's View

In the Saturday Evening Post, Joseph Alsop and Charles Bartlett credited Kennedy with acting firmly but with restraint. Kennedy had chosen a plan of action which allowed the Russians time for maneuver and minimized the possibility of military conflict. In contrast with his mishandling of the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy "never lost his nerve" in this crisis. Similarly, Walter Lippmann wrote that "the United States, which had overall nuclear superiority and conventional superiority around Cuba, was careful to avoid the ultimate catastrophic mistake of nuclear diplomacy, which would be to surround the adversary and leave him no way to retreat."

Time hailed a U.S. victory. But others chided Kennedy for not acting more boldly to eradicate the Communist presence in the Caribbean. Republicans charged that Kennedy had long ignored their warnings and then timed his response to affect the impending congressional elections. Senator Goldwater contended that Kennedy's implicit pledge never to invade Cuba had "locked Castro and communism into Latin America and thrown away the key to their removal."

A Link to Berlin?

In March 1963, Fidel Castro told a visiting newsmen that certain aspects of the missile crisis remained a "mystery" which could take historians "20 or 30 years" to unravel. Even after 20 years, scholars debate three main issues: What were the Soviet's motives? Did the United States overreact? What has been the crisis's long-term effect?

President Kennedy speculated during the crisis that the Soviets had several objectives: to strengthen their position in the communist world (and possibly draw Russia and China closer together), to protect Cuba, to gain leverage on the Berlin issue, to close their missile gap with the United States, and "to deal the United States a tremendous political blow." During a television interview in December 1962, Kennedy argued that while the Russians probably never intended to fire the missiles, their presence in Cuba "would have politically changed the balance of power. It would have appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality."

The Soviet press at the time claimed that the missiles were designed primarily to protect Cuba against a U.S. invasion. But if this were the case, a considerably smaller
arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, or even conventional arms and Soviet troops, would have sufficed. Castro himself said after the crisis that he had not wanted nuclear missiles in Cuba, and that Khrushchev had to talk him into it.*

In his 1971 memoirs, Khrushchev claimed that besides saving Cuba for Castro, the missiles “would have equalized what the West likes to call ‘the balance of power.’” The United States had surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases, “and now they would learn just what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing at you; we’d be doing nothing more than giving them a little of their own medicine.”

No Bargaining Chips

Scholars disagree on the military significance of the missiles, but a majority believe that the Soviet MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba would have roughly doubled the number of Soviet missiles capable of striking American cities. (The Soviets had perhaps 75 home-based, intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs] versus 450 to 500 U.S. ICBMs before the crisis.) Roger Hilsman, the State Department’s director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research during the crisis, adds that missiles based in Cuba could have seriously eroded the U.S. ability to strike back after a Soviet nuclear attack.

*If the Cubans had controlled the missiles, the outcome might have been quite different, for Castro was prepared to go to nuclear war rather than submit to Kennedy’s conditions. In a 1975 interview, Castro told Senator George McGovern: “I would have taken a harder line than Khrushchev. I was furious when he compromised. But Khrushchev was older and wiser. I realize in retrospect that he reached the proper settlement with Kennedy. If my position had prevailed, there might have been a terrible war. I was wrong.”

The missiles in Cuba, however, were highly vulnerable, and they probably represented only a “quick fix” to Soviet nuclear inferiority. In 1962, the Soviets had assembly lines producing the MRBMs and IRBMs in large quantities, but their ICBM technology lagged far behind.

If the Kremlin hoped only to force withdrawal of the 15 American Jupiters, the planned Soviet deployment in Cuba was again disproportionately large—at least 42 MRBMs and 24 to 32 IRBMs. As Harvard’s Graham Allison concludes, Khrushchev in the end probably “seized on a Cuba-Turkey bargain as the best hope in a bad situation.”

As most U.S. scholars see it, the Soviets were not using the Cuban missile deployment as a “bargaining chip” to force the Allies out of West Berlin. The Soviets probably never would have traded their huge investment in Cuba for Berlin, and they must have known that any serious confrontation over West Berlin would have risked a nuclear war.

Anxiety over Beijing

But Harvard’s Sovietologist Adam Ulam places Khrushchev’s gamble in the context of both the Berlin problem and the growing Sino-Soviet rift. The Kremlin hoped that “a dazzling Soviet success in the international arena, a demonstration of continuing Soviet dynamism in foreign policy, might persuade the Chinese comrades to trust their nuclear defense to the Russians” and to forgo development of nuclear weapons. Likewise, Ulam writes, the Soviets may have wished to swap the missiles in Cuba for a peace treaty on Germany that would have denied nuclear weapons to West Germany. Anxiety over Beijing’s bid for leadership of Third World revolutionary movements
may also explain Khrushchev's big effort on behalf of Castro.

If the Soviet missiles in Cuba did not tilt the real balance of military power, why did Kennedy bring the world to the brink of a nuclear exchange? During the crisis, President Kennedy estimated the chances of war breaking out at "somewhere between one out of three and even." Since the United States eventually removed its missiles from Turkey and pledged not to invade Cuba, some writers have asked, why did Kennedy confront Khrushchev with a choice between humiliation or possible annihilation?

A Needless Test?

Critics such as Ronald Steel, Barton Bernstein, and I. F. Stone have concluded that Kennedy shunned quiet diplomatic approaches and risked nuclear war largely in order to bolster his own image at home and abroad. After the Bay of Pigs, Cuba was Kennedy's political "Achilles heel," and his prestige could not survive another show of weakness. In Khrushchev's place, faced with nuclear confrontation or retreat, Steel argues, Kennedy probably would not have backed down: "Kennedy had politics in mind during the missile crisis. . . . One of the hallmarks of the New Frontier was a nagging sense of insecurity that manifested itself in an inflated rhetoric . . . and self-assumed tests of will, such as Cuba and Vietnam."

Kennedy's defenders, including Hilsman, Theodore Sorensen, and Arthur Schlesinger, note that several members of the ExCom and other advisers urged much stronger action than that which the President adopted. Kennedy vetoed an air strike or invasion, did not retaliate following the downing of the Air Force U-2, and offered an informal compromise on the Jupiter missiles which helped to settle the crisis.

Given the Russians' earlier duplicity—what Robert Kennedy later characterized as "one gigantic fabric of lies"—it is not surprising that the U.S. President did not pursue a diplomatic solution through time-consuming traditional channels. Finally, Kennedy and his advisers never seriously considered the first use of nuclear weapons; they did not try to go to the brink.

All in all, Kennedy's decisions during the crisis were judicious. The President could not foresee all the consequences, good or ill, of his actions. Nonetheless, Kennedy kept his options open and always offered Khrushchev an outcome short of total defeat. Later, Kennedy discouraged celebration over the Soviet Premier's retreat, and cautioned newsmen against exaggerating its importance.

Never Again

What were the consequences of the crisis? Commentators as diverse as Hilsman and Steel agree that the 1962 showdown set the stage for a more cooperative relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Among other things, the superpowers established a direct "hotline" between the Kremlin and the White House and signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963.

Probably the most intriguing question about the 1962 crisis is whether or not it gave impetus to the massive Soviet arms build-up in subsequent years. Recalling Khrushchev's humiliation, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov later warned, "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again." By the end of the 1960s, the Soviets were
approaching parity in strategic nuclear weaponry with the United States, and the Soviet fleet, if not yet a match for the U.S. Navy, achieved "blue-water" status for the first time during the '70s. The Kremlin, however, may already have been committed to large-scale rearmament by 1960, in which case the Cuban missile crisis and the subsequent ouster of Khrushchev in 1964 had little fundamental impact.

Misperceptions

Few scholars today would echo Hilsman's description of Kennedy's October 1962 success as "a foreign policy victory of historical proportions" for the United States. According to Steel, ever the critic, the crisis involved a near-fatal failure of diplomacy and intelligence. Acheson similarly attributes the favorable outcome more to "plain dumb luck" than to skillful management, and Allison demonstrates that Kennedy and Khrushchev did not always exercise full control over their respective bureaucracies. Some Kennedy partisans, Robert Kennedy among them, were appalled by the unwillingness of certain advisers, notably Acheson and the Joint Chiefs, to contemplate the likely consequences of direct military action against Cuba.

The significance of the missile crisis was not nearly as unambiguous as some contemporaries believed, largely because the conditions — geography, timing, relative strength — surrounding it were unique. The "lessons" in the uses of U.S. strategic superiority, for instance, became largely irrelevant once the Soviets achieved a rough equivalence with the United States in nuclear weapons.

Clearly, each side misread the other's intentions at the beginning. The Americans underestimated Khrushchev's willingness to gamble while the Soviets underestimated Kennedy's willingness to fight. The crisis further demonstrated that intelligence services can fail, that statesmen can lie, and, once again, that seemingly rational men can engage in reckless adventurism.

A still common misperception is that the crisis resulted in a tacit Soviet-American accord on the status of Cuba, bringing a certain stability to the Caribbean region. In fact, the United States never formally pledged not to invade Cuba because Castro did not allow UN inspection of the Soviet bases. And the Khrushchev-Kennedy messages did not clearly define the "offensive" weapons which the Soviets were prohibited from stationing in Cuba. Not until August 1970, as Sovietologist Raymond Garthoff notes, did Washington and Moscow reaffirm their understanding on this issue, such as it was. The vagueness of the Soviet-American accords underlay the controversies surrounding the Soviet shipment of MIG-23s to Cuba in 1978 and Washington's belated discovery in 1979 of a Soviet "combat brigade" on the island.

Sobering Up

The abrupt withdrawal of the nuclear missiles, however galling to Castro, did not undermine Cuban security; the Cubans continued to receive substantial military and economic aid from the Soviet Union. Most importantly, Castro gained an informal but credible guarantee against a Yankee invasion. Still, the cost to Cuba of the continuing U.S. refusal to restore normal economic and diplomatic ties has been very high. Over the long term, no one
“won” very much from the 1962 missile crisis.

The crisis was salutary in one respect. Contemporary observers perhaps exaggerated how close the superpowers came to a holocaust. But the experience was sufficiently sobering so that Soviet and American leaders have never since engaged in anything akin to nuclear brinkmanship. Improved communications and other safeguards have also lessened the possibility that a U.S. President will ever again face a nuclear showdown without prompt access to his Soviet counterpart.

President Kennedy himself came away deeply impressed with the need to reduce Cold War tensions. His address at American University on June 10, 1963, drew what is perhaps the most enduring moral for Soviets and Americans alike:

“Total war makes no sense in an age when great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all of the allied air forces in the Second World War. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn.”

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**FURTHER READING**

**Books**


Henry M. Pachter, *Collision Course: The Cuban Missile Crisis and Coexistence* (Praeger, 1963)


**Articles**


“The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?” by Barton J. Berstein, in *Political Science Quarterly* (Spring 1980); “The Week We Almost Went to War” by Barton J. Berstein, in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (February 1976)

“American Reaction to Soviet Aircraft in Cuba, 1962 and 1978” by Raymond L. Garthoff, in *Political Science Quarterly* (Fall 1980)

“Controlling the Risks in Cuba” by Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, in *Adelphi Papers* (1965)
COMMENTARY

Economic Growth in the Caribbean Basin

There is very much about Abraham Lowenthal's "The Caribbean" [WQ, Spring 1982] that I heartily endorse, but I emphatically reject the notion that missiles and technology have eliminated the strategic significance of our nearest neighbors and our most important sea lanes. Surely we cannot define our strategic interest only in terms of a nuclear response. Economic interdependence has rendered the sea lanes more, not less vital. And the nature of our long struggle makes intolerable that we become surrounded by a ring of Marxist nations whose autonomic response is incessant, mindless hostility to us and all we value.

Mr. Lowenthal wrote his article before President Reagan announced his Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). I trust that he would characterize the CBI as developmental since it includes almost every recommendation he makes. However, Mr. Lowenthal suggests that we provide greater access to our market, but that we not provide preferences or depart from overall U.S. trade policy of Most Favored Nation (MFN). We thought long and hard before opting for preferences.

On the one hand, we could make MFN cuts on, or add to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) products currently exported. Such measures would have been helpful, but might reinforce dependence in economies that export a limited number of basic items. On the other hand, the most promising non-traditional exports are largely potential in the region. U.S. labor and industry would feel threatened and would strongly oppose such MFN cuts.

We were gradually led to the conclusion that we must open all our markets, boldly and preferentially. Such a policy was the only way to provide the kind of incentive that would lead Basin countries to adopt reforms necessary to enjoy healthy and more diversified growth.

Implicit in Mr. Lowenthal's comment is the fear that preferences will raise the area's dependence upon the United States. The result should be the opposite. The development of open, more diversified and competitive economies is necessary to take full advantage of the opportunities we are offering and will lead to a greater integration into the world economy and less dependence on basic commodity exports or upon any one market.

Thomas O. Enders
Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs

Too Many Stereotypes

As a native-born Trinidadian, I must take exception to the Thomas Sowell quote [in "The Caribbean"] asserting that the "greater successes of West Indians in the United States" is due to their having had in the Caribbean "the kind of incentives and experience common in a market economy." If West Indians in this country do better than American blacks, it is because discrimination based on color has for generations not been nearly so invidious in the Caribbean as it continues to be even today in the United States. Furthermore, American whites who harbor prejudices against fellow Americans who are black have historically seen Africans and West Indians as somehow "different" and so less deserving of discriminatory treatment—so long as they were educated and "middle class."

That the differential treatment does not extend to the impoverished is evident in our treatment of Haitian refugees, as contrasted with the more favorable treatment accorded white refugees.

Mervyn M. Dymally
U.S. Representative (D-Calif.)
The Harsher Realities

Abraham Lowenthal has provided a lucid and thoughtful but not entirely persuasive view of the Caribbean. The happy liberal solutions he suggests never mention the starker Caribbean realities of internal disorder and frequent chaos, subversion, foreign intervention, economic decline, and national fragmentation or even disintegration. How one can implement progressive, coherent, social reform in the midst of such harsh realities merits some attention.

Moreover, the solutions Mr. Lowenthal advocates seem divorced from the newer realities of U.S. domestic politics. A doubling of foreign aid, tariff cuts that cost U.S. jobs, the channeling of aid funds through multilateral agencies that would give as much or more to communist Cuba and revolutionary Nicaragua as to democratic Costa Rica, and the acceptance of more revolutionary regimes in the Caribbean do not appear to be in accord with the sentiments of U.S. voters.

Mr. Lowenthal seeks to provide guidance for the 1980s, but his prescriptions rely heavily on the tired developmentalist formulas of the 1960s.

Howard J. Wiarda
Director, Center for Hemispheric Studies
American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research

Buying Power—Then and Now

As a sometime scholar, I was appalled by the assumptions and implications in a footnote to Alan Brinkley’s article on the New Deal [WQ, Spring 1982], which states: “More than 70 percent of American families during the 1920s continued to earn less than $2,500 a year, then considered the minimum for a “decent” standard of living.”

You see, I was born in 1914. I was there. People earning $2,500 had, not a “decent” standard of living, but were rich. You didn’t need that much money to live comfortably, by the standards of the day. You could send your family away for the summer, buy your wife a fur coat, have sleep-in help on a smaller income. School teachers, who earned about $2,000, routinely spent their summers in Europe.

Mr. Brinkley says these families couldn’t afford “to buy the consumer goods—automobiles, refrigerators, radios—that American industry was so bountifully producing.” In the 1920s just about everybody we knew (schoolmates, relatives, neighbors, friends) had radios. This was not so, in rural areas—not because they couldn’t afford it, but because they still had no electricity.

Refrigerators were as novel in the ’20s as home computers are today. Would Mr. Brinkley consider a family with a current income in six figures poor because they don’t have a home computer? The icebox functioned. Until you moved into a new home or apartment, you lived with an icebox.

Mr. Brinkley is looking at statistics and drawing conclusions from his own era. If he’d like a better idea of the standard of living then, he’d be wise to look at the statistics on sales of pianos and sheet music, and of phonographs (hand-wound) and records. These were the luxuries people aspired to—and bought.

Thelma J. Ocko
New York, N.Y.

Correction

In your review of The Graves of Academe [WQ, Spring 1982] you refer to “Max Wundt, professor of psychology at the University of Leipzig.” I wonder whether you do not mean “Wilhelm Wundt”? I know that Max Wundt wrote a book about Plato and another about Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister. Wilhelm Wundt pioneered in experimental psychology and founded the first institute for it at the University of Leipzig.

Ernst Rose
Leesburg, Fla.

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MISSING SOMETHING?

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