Let's make the Fairness Doctrine work

Ridley Scott, the acclaimed British film director, has made a chillingly effective television commercial called The Deficit Trials. But even though it was made for television, don't look for it on the networks.

Set in the year 2017, the film depicts a gloomy courtroom filled with ragged young spectators. A boy prosecutor confronts an elderly man confined in a glowing cone. "By 1986, for example, the national debt had reached two trillion dollars," the boy intones. " Didn't that frighten you?" As the accused squirms, a voice-over pronounces somberly: "No one really knows what another generation of unchecked federal deficits will bring." The accused man finally asks, "Are you ever going to forgive us?"

This minimovie is actually a 60-second commercial by W.R. Grace & Co. NBC and CBS refused to air it and ABC agreed to show it, but only after midnight. CBS and NBC did broadcast portions of the spot as part of their news programs, although refusing to run it as a paid commercial.

According to a Grace spokesman, the networks refused to run the commercial because it was controversial. That judgment left Grace just as confused as it leaves us; last year, NBC and ABC accepted another Grace commercial on the deficit. It showed two bureaucrats delivering an invoice of $50,000 to a newborn infant, as its share of the government debt. We fail to see where it is any less controversial than The Deficit Trials.

Still, there's consistency even in the networks' inconsistency, and to us, the Grace controversy is just another rerun. During the energy crises years of the '70s, news about energy was breaking fast, and inaccuracy was rife. While newspapers were willing to sell us space to comment on what was happening, the networks' response was: "It is not our policy to sell time for controversial issues of public importance."

Then, as now, the networks say that under the Fairness Doctrine, they must "afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance." This sounds like an invitation for a broad public debate, until the networks add their zinger: Only their news departments have the wisdom to define issues of public importance, and these issues will be covered only as they see fit. So much for the legislative policy that broadcasters are trustees of the airwaves, which ultimately belong to the public.

Actually, we eventually got our energy messages out to the public, usually in print, and Grace is also being heard. Its problem with the networks has been reported in the press, and Grace has paid to have the Scott ad shown by cable networks, independent stations and in Washington, D.C., movie theaters. But network television, which reaches into virtually every living room in the nation, and is the main source of news for most people, continues to limit the availability of differing points of view.

So we're calling—again—for the networks to get off their rhetoric and give the Fairness Doctrine a chance. Let responsible opinions on issues of public importance be aired, unedited, in prime time. When that happens, the networks finally will be allowing the Fairness Doctrine to live up to its name.

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Editor’s Comment

Ever since the Wilson Quarterly began life a decade ago, its editors have been struck by certain flaws in the vast apparatus of American scholarship: great gaps in the research on many subjects, notably foreign countries (see “Finland,” pp. 76–77), rapidly changing fashions in the study of U.S. foreign policy and domestic issues, and, here and there, what amounts to self-censorship in the face of academic taboos.

No subject, not even the black family [see WQ, Summer ’80] has been studied more gingerly in academe than the condition of American women. Barnard historian Rosalind Rosenberg found out why when she testified as an expert witness in a 1985 sex discrimination case. She said that women, historically, chose jobs not only for the salary but for other reasons, including the importance of balancing family duties with work. She was widely accused of betraying the feminist cause. A committee of female historians passed a resolution saying that “as feminist scholars, we have a responsibility not to allow our scholarship to be used against the interests of women struggling for equity . . .”

In our contributors’ essays on American feminism (pp. 88–141), such pressures are noted. What bodes ill for future U.S. efforts to ameliorate existing inequities and undue burdens on women are continuing demands on academic researchers to conform to a party line: All differences between men and women in behavior and condition stem, one way or the other, from sexism. Common sense suggests that such matters are more complex and that honest inquiry may shed some light on the complexities.

THE WILSON QUARTERLY

Published in January, March, May, September, and November by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution Building, Washington, D.C. 20560. Indexed biennially. Subscriptions: one year, $19; two years, $32; three years, $45. Foreign subscriptions: one year, $25.50; two years, $46; three years, $62.50. Foreign subscriptions by mail: one year, $34; two years, $56; three years, $84. Lifetime subscription (domestic only): $115. Single copies mailed upon request: $3. Back issues: $2.50, including postage and handling; outside U.S. and possessions, $7.00. Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and additional mailing offices. Editorial offices: Smithsonian Institution, 600 Maryland Ave. S.W., Suite 430, Washington, D.C. 20560. All unsolicited manuscripts should be accompanied by a self-addressed stamped envelope. Send changes of address and all subscription correspondence with Wilson Quarterly mailing label to Subscriber Service, The Wilson Quarterly, P.O. Box 56161, Boulder, Colo. 80322-0161. (Subscriber hot line: 303-449-9609 or 212-887-0770.) Postmaster: Send form 3579s to P.O. Box 56161, Boulder, Colo. 80322.


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Ronald Reagan’s popularity remains high. Early in 1986, surveys showed roughly two-thirds of the electorate supporting the president—the highest rating so far accorded to any 20th-century U.S. chief executive during the first quarter of his second term.

Such poll data seem to suggest that most Americans agree with the president’s conservative agenda.

But Lipset, a political scientist at the Hoover Institution, does not think so. Consider some examples. Answers to identical New York Times/CBS poll questions in 1980, 1981, and 1986 have shown that popular support for federal antipoverty programs has risen from 30 percent to 39 percent under Reagan. The same pollsters also found a rising percentage of Americans favoring strict federal regulations to protect the environment: 66 percent in 1986 versus 45 percent in 1981.

A comparison of surveys taken by the Washington Post/ABC in 1981 and 1986 showed that public support of increased military spending has dropped from 72 percent to a mere 22 percent. Regarding the right of women to have an abortion, approval has risen from 40 percent in 1981 to 54 percent today. Moreover, 54 percent of Americans now think it is “a bad idea for the United States to try to help overthrow pro-Communist governments, opposed to 41 percent who said it was a good idea.”

What, then, accounts for Reagan’s 1984 landslide and his current popularity? Lipset cites the economy’s strong performance, Reagan’s considerable political talents, and the perceived “failures” of his four presidential predecessors. Faced with a U.S. electorate that is increasingly “volatile”—and defined more by race, economic status, and gender than by party affiliation—conservative Republicans will be hard-pressed to retain political power in the Great Communicator’s absence.
Criticisms of its cost and inefficiency have made the USPS a target of cartoonists. Partly to blame is volume: In 1985, the USPS handled 140 billion items, or 40 percent of the world's postal traffic.

**Sorting Out The Mail System**

"Neither snow, nor rain, nor heat, nor gloom of night stays these couriers from the swift completion of their appointed rounds." So goes the official motto of the U.S. Postal Service (USPS).

Like many Americans, Representative Green (D.-N.Y.) frets that the USPS is not as "swift" as it ought to be, despite the efficiencies that followed the Postal Service's transformation from a cabinet department to an independent agency in 1970. Although the cost of mailing a one-ounce first class letter has risen much faster than the rate of inflation, service has slipped. The 1978 lament of then-postmaster general William Bolger, that the mail worked better 50 years ago, still holds true, Green believes.

The USPS today promises first class delivery overnight inside city limits, within two days for adjacent areas, and generally within three days for deliveries beyond 600 miles. In New York City, for instance, the service claims "overnight" delivery of 95 percent of first class intracity mail, meaning that the pieces travel from the sending to the receiving post office within 24 hours. But in Green's own test mailings of several hundred letters in the city, where he represents a Manhattan congressional district, only 33 percent moved from the postal dropoff point to the addressee's mailbox (a more significant measure) within a day.

Green blames USPS inefficiency on the post office's continuing status (dating from 1775) as a protected monopoly. With a few minor exceptions, private firms are legally prohibited from delivering first class mail, which accounts for 52 percent of the pieces handled yearly and 62 percent of the USPS's income. The absence of competition has greatly benefited the
service's 746,000 employees—the nation's largest nonmilitary work force. Wages account for 83 percent of the service's $27.7 billion operating budget. From 1971 to 1982, mail carrier salaries increased by 123 percent, compared with 70 percent for other government employees at the same level; a 1982 General Accounting Office study found that even USPS custodians earned more than double the hourly wages of their private enterprise counterparts. Only in recent months has the Postal Service begun to turn a profit, after record losses of $251 million in 1985; prospects for improved service do not seem bright.

Privatization is Green's solution—specifically, allowing private firms to compete in those areas where the USPS fails to meet even its own standards. He believes that extensive subcontracting could improve service and cut costs considerably. Of course, tinkering with protected monopolies is a risky business, Green acknowledges, citing the mixed results of the 1984 breakup of Ma Bell.

Unpackable Justice

"Packing the Supreme Court" by David M. O'Brien, in The Virginia Quarterly Review (Spring 1986), One West Range, Charlottesville, Va. 22903.

As of mid-1986, President Reagan had named 329 judges to various lower federal benches, appointed two Supreme Court justices (Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia), and promoted their colleague William Rehnquist to chief justice.

The numbers and conservative cast of such appointments have led many legal scholars to accuse the president of "packing" the judiciary. O'Brien, who teaches government at the University of Virginia, politely demurs. "The myth occasionally circulates that appointments should be made strictly on merit," he writes. "But the reality is that every appointment is political."

Court packing, notes O'Brien, began with George Washington and was employed by such venerated successors as John Adams, Andrew Jackson, and Abraham Lincoln. The term was coined during the 13-year tenure of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Packing became an issue when Roosevelt, angered by the Court's invalidation of much early New Deal legislation, proposed (unsuccessfully) that it be increased to 15 members, which would have given him an instant majority.

Rebuffed, FDR appointed justices sympathetic to his Big Government economic program, even if, like Alabama's Senator Hugo Black, they once had been affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan. When Roosevelt, under pressure to diversify the Court in 1939, appointed Attorney General Frank Murphy, a Michigan Catholic, his move was still "politically opportune," says O'Brien. It enabled him to promote his friend, Assistant Attorney General Robert Jackson, to Murphy's former post, and then, in 1941, to put him on the Court as well.

Still, attempts to shape the Court politically have often failed. New issues arise, and justices frequently change their outlook. For a period
after Harry Blackmun's arrival in 1970, O'Brien reports, he voted almost 90 percent of the time with Warren Burger, an old friend and fellow Nixon appointee. Now Blackmun concurs most of the time with William Brennan, the most liberal justice.

Reagan's critics, O'Brien suggests, might also recall that after Theodore Roosevelt appointed Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1902, Holmes voted against Roosevelt's antitrust policies, prompting the president to say that he "could carve out of a banana a judge with more backbone than that!" FDR was incensed that Felix Frankfurter "turned out in many areas to be a rank conservative." Harry S Truman (the only Democrat to name a Republican to the court) was driven to near-apoplexy by Tom Clark, one of his Democratic appointees. Clark sided with a 1952 majority ruling that Truman's nationalization of steel mills to head off a strike during the Korean War was unconstitutional.

"Packing the Supreme Court simply can't be done," Truman lamented. "I've tried and it won't work."

That 1787 Anachronism


One of the most misunderstood and harshly criticized aspects of the U.S. Constitution is its provision for selecting a president and vice president. Since the Constitution was ratified in 1789, Congress has debated nearly 700 proposals to amend or abolish the nation's system of indirect elections via an electoral college, most recently in 1979.

Such progressive historians as Charles Beard have viewed the electoral college as proof of the Founding Fathers' underlying distrust of democracy and direct popular elections. Other scholars have seen the college as a clumsy, last-minute compromise to allow the delegates at the 1787 constitutional convention to finish their business. Slonim, a historian at Hebrew University, Jerusalem, argues that the American method of indirect election, whereby "electors" are pledged to a national ticket, was, in fact, a deft and necessary creation that reconciled the political desires of both large and small states.

At Philadelphia in 1787, delegates from very populous states favored direct elections, in which their many votes would have great impact; those from smaller states sought to bolster their influence by having presidents elected by Congress. Led by George Mason of Virginia and Roger Sherman of Connecticut, proponents of election by legislature argued that, while the citizenry had the right to pick the chief executive, in a country of great distances and poor communications voters might be unable to make an informed choice. Champions of popular elections, notably Gouverneur Morris of New Jersey, feared an executive beholden to a legislature for reelection, citing the dangers of "corruption, plotting, or cabal."

The electoral college, a product of weeks of discussion, struck the right
balance. It enabled small states to retain their voting clout by granting to them electoral votes equivalent in number to their congressional delegations. And, in the event that no presidential candidate won a majority outright, the decision would fall to the House, where the advantage would go to the most populous states.

Though it was a "Rube Goldberg" device, Slonim says, the college did succeed in reconciling the nationalists and the federalists among the convention delegates. Doubts about the result would emerge later, as when Benjamin Harrison was named president in 1888, even though Grover Cleveland had received a larger popular vote. Nonetheless, during the late 18th century, Alexander Hamilton could say of the compromise solution that "if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent."

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Human Rights

"The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights" by Tamar Jacoby, in Foreign Affairs (Summer 1986), 58 East 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

One of Ronald Reagan's first steps as president was to begin dismantling the Carter administration's human rights policy.

Jimmy Carter's focus on human rights as a diplomatic goal, Reagan felt, diverted attention from the East-West struggle and conflicted with U.S. economic and strategic interests. "International terrorism," declared Reagan's first secretary of state, Alexander Haig, in 1981, "will take the place of human rights in our concern." Congress was urged to, among other things, reinstate military aid to dictatorships in Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Uruguay—all known for their human rights abuses.

Yet, since the fall last February of presidents Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines and Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti, says Jacoby, a New York Times editor, a change in thinking has become clear—"a 150- if not a 180-degree change." In mid-March, the president asserted to Congress that it was U.S. policy to "oppose tyranny in whatever form, whether of the Left or the Right."

To explain this turnaround, Jacoby points to unexpectedly strong interest in human rights among the public and Congress—not to mention the White House's own observation that the human rights issue is a powerful diplomatic tool. Early in 1982, guided by then-assistant secretary for human rights Elliot Abrams, the White House hesitantly announced its intention to pursue a "two-track" human rights policy: to promote democracy abroad and to condemn the abuses of friends as well as foes. (This decision followed a surge in the number of reported human rights violations in Haiti, South Korea, and El Salvador.) By mid-1983, the State Department was openly criticizing the Duarte regime in San Salvador—but tactfully, so as not to destabilize this ally.

Since 1984, the White House has been trying to figure out the most

In many ways, maintains Jacoby, the White House has had trouble making up its mind about matters of human rights, particularly about their place in the hierarchy of “geopolitical concerns.” Nonetheless, the administration has come a long way during the past five years. Behind that recent progress, Jacoby concludes, is the discovery that “human rights and strategic interests turn out to be consistent far more often than many Americans expect.”

Brothers in Arms


Once a racial tinderbox, the U.S. armed forces now boast a degree of integration unmatched in civilian society.

So says Moskos, a sociologist at Northwestern. In his opinion, “there is no question that on the whole the military has served blacks well, just as blacks have served the military well.”

During the 1960s, few blacks attended the elite U.S. service academies. This year, 41 black men and women graduated from Annapolis, 80 from West Point, and 70 from the Air Force Academy.
Progress in military race relations did not come smoothly. President Harry S. Truman abolished segregation in the services by executive order in 1948. Throughout the 1950s, integration proceeded apace, especially during the Korean War, when blacks and whites fought in the same Army combat units for the first time. Then came the civil rights movement of the 1960s and the Vietnam War, which heightened racial tensions among troops and highlighted remaining anomalies, notably a paucity of commissioned blacks. (As late as 1972, only one in 25 Army officers was black, compared with one in 10 today.) Seeing the need for intervention from the top, Washington prescribed basic training courses in race relations and black history; “race-relations skills” became part of each officer’s official evaluation. The effectiveness of such measures is still unclear. Yet, says Moskos, “all of this helped to set a tone.”

When the draft ended in 1973, the prospect of steady employment brought many poor black (and white) volunteers into the armed forces. At that time blacks accounted for 17 percent of the Army. Today they comprise 30 percent of that service, 13 percent of the Navy, 17 percent of the Air Force, and 20 percent of the Marine Corps. Overall, some 400,000 blacks serve in an active-duty force of roughly 2.1 million. A 1982 Brookings Institution study showed that 42 percent of all qualified black youths join the military, as compared to 14 percent of their white counterparts. At least partly reflecting high motivation, black recruits are more likely to stay the course: Only one in four black males (versus one in three whites) is discharged for some reason before completing a first enlistment. The dropout rate among black women is even lower.

Besides a decent wage (an Army buck private’s annual base pay is now $7,668), what draws blacks to the armed forces is the variety of opportunities open to them. They “occupy more management positions in the military than they do in business, education, journalism, government, or any other significant sector of American society,” the author reports. Why? Moskos credits the nature of military life, where “orders, once given, must be followed, whatever a soldier’s private feelings or misgivings.”

Of course, America’s military is no interracial utopia. Tensions and latent prejudice persist. However, in the face of hostility to the military among liberal black politicians, observes Moskos, the Pentagon has not only achieved an impressive degree of colorblindness, it has also given many poor blacks opportunities for social mobility without the “stigma of a government social program.”

Is Egypt Being Gyped?

Egypt ranks high among the recipients of U.S. assistance. As of 1984, Washington had dispensed $10.7 billion in loans and grants to Cairo since 1975, following then-president Anwar Sadat’s ending of two decades of dependence on the Soviet Union.

Yet Egypt remains a financial disaster. Its 1982–83 trade deficit with the United States and the 10 European Common Market nations came to $4.7 billion. Egypt imports almost half of its food, up from seven percent in 1961. And its total foreign debt in 1982 was estimated at $20 billion, with the United States (to which it owes roughly $8 billion) being its single largest creditor.

Such dismal statistics, observes Weinbaum, a political scientist at the University of Illinois, have cast doubt on the effectiveness of U.S. aid. Critics claim, for example, that subsidized wheat distributed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) reduces the incentives to Egyptian farmers to harvest their own grains. AID projects also tend to siphon off Egypt's top talent, as well as to favor the use of American-made (rather than locally manufactured) machinery and materials. Such facts have led to charges that the United States—by creating "production disincentives" and cultivating dependency—is guilty of exploiting Egypt for its own economic ends.

Weinbaum rejects that notion, calling Egypt's current reliance on aid "an unavoidable price for growth." Sadat, facing "immediate economic and political crises" during the 1970s, decided that Egypt's "most promising course" lay in ties to the Western market economy. But the country's present sources of income—oil, worker remittances, Suez Canal tolls, tourism, and cotton exports—are vulnerable to swings in that economy. Only foreign aid can enable Egypt to meet domestic demand and to invest in its infrastructure. Furthermore, Weinbaum attributes Egypt's declining wheat production to an exodus of rural workers and to poor soil conditions. At current yields, Egypt would have to devote all of its arable land to wheat to become self-sufficient. U.S. grain allows Egyptian farmers to earn more money raising livestock or growing export crops.

Weinbaum does agree that, at times, "foreign aid has not assured Egypt the most effective use of its natural resources." But here at least, the United States may be as much exploitee as exploiter. Washington can ill afford to let one of its few Arab allies collapse economically. U.S. aid helps to assure that Egypt will remain relatively stable. In turn, unhappily for Washington, Sadat's successors realize that U.S. assistance will keep coming—thus postponing, in Weinbaum's view, the tough internal reforms necessary for real economic progress.

Shooting Down ASATs


As political support for the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or "Star Wars," has grown in Washington, so has concern over the proper boundaries to draw in "militarized" space.

If missile-attacking satellites are to become part of the U.S. defense system, should Washington pursue with Moscow an antisatellite (ASAT) arms control treaty banning attacks on satellites?
Above, an artist's rendering of a U.S. Air Force ASAT device tested on September 13, 1985. Launched from an F-15 fighter plane, the ASAT steers toward its satellite target (background) and destroys it on impact.

Yes, says Carter, a Harvard public policy specialist, but with reservations. While he believes that skepticism over controlling attacks on satellites is in order, he also thinks that some “limited and complex” ASAT proposals could benefit the United States without jeopardizing any American defensive measures.

Chief among the objections to a broad ASAT treaty, according to Carter, are that attacks on satellites are “too easy” (and violations are too difficult to prove); some satellites do not deserve sanctuary (i.e., Soviet reconnaissance satellites that track U.S. warships and could direct air attacks against them); and ASAT restraints might hamper future “Star Wars” research.

Carter, however, argues that such objections properly apply only to satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO)—distances less than 3,125 miles above the Earth. Such Soviet LEO satellites perform missions “threatening” to the United States, whether directing tactical battlefield operations, ballistic missile defenses, electronic intelligence, or photoreconnaissance.

By contrast, satellites in high Earth orbits (above 6,250 miles) pose little direct military threat. Of the roughly 200 Soviet and U.S. satellites now in geosynchronous orbit (22,300 miles), for example, most are used for communications, navigation, and early warning of missile launches.
FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

A total ban on attacks on all satellites is technologically and politically infeasible, asserts Carter. Instead, he supports what he sees as a sensible, limited ASAT treaty: a ban on all "direct intercepts" of satellites flying above 1,875 miles and on "directed energy weapons" targeted above 625 miles. Such an accord, Carter adds, would protect most "benign" satellites; it would not in any way constrain the development or operation of SDI antimissile "battle stations"; as LEO vehicles they would, in effect, "be associated with the air, sea, and land as fair game for military activity, and . . . would have to fend for themselves like all of the other instruments of terrestrial warfare."

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

Oil Slick Ahead

“After the Fall: The Politics of Oil” by Edward L. Morse, in Foreign Affairs (Spring 1986), 58 East 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

As oil prices plummeted, from a record high of $40 per barrel in 1980-81 to less than $12 per barrel this past winter, American motorists—and Washington economists—celebrated the good news.

But Morse, managing director of the Petroleum Finance Company, sees trouble not far down the road.

For nearly a century the oil market has experienced major price fluctuations, cycling from boom to bust and back again roughly every 20 years. (Oil gluts during the early 1930s, late '40s, and late '60s were always followed by dry spells and price hikes.) The present glut, Morse maintains, originated with a marketing miscalculation by Saudi Arabia.

During the summer of 1985, the Saudis moved to boost their share of the world oil market by raising production and cutting crude oil prices. (Saudi oil income had fallen from its peak of $113 billion in 1981 to $28 billion in 1985.) But the Saudi ploy did not work. The world's thirst for oil did not increase. Instead market prices fell by as much as $15 per barrel in January and February 1986. Today, world demand for oil from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is at its lowest level since the oil embargo of 1973—roughly 15 million barrels a day. Morse predicts that oil prices will continue to drop through the early '90s, bottoming out (in 1986 dollars) at somewhere between $8 and $10 per barrel.

Although the price drop sounds good to most Americans, it could have severe repercussions. If debtor nations that depend on oil exports to pay off their debts (e.g., Mexico and Nigeria) falter, America could see a wave of bank failures. Morse also expects U.S. domestic oil production, exploration, and reserves to decline rapidly (production perhaps by as much as 10 percent annually until 1990). Such a decline would leave the United States, once again, vulnerable to OPEC.

Import tariffs and price floors might protect the nation from an oil price collapse, but they would do little to stabilize the international oil industry. Morse would prefer a "rationalization" of the oil market. That would entail
mergers between oil producers and oil refiners as well as "asset swaps" between multinational oil companies and oil-exporting nations. The world petroleum industry would thin out, too, enabling the big U.S. oil companies to plan more effectively for the future.


Stories about "vacations" funded by unemployment insurance (UI) benefits are as common as those about welfare-financed Cadillacs. But are they true?

Yes, suggest Burgess, Kingston, and St. Louis, all economic researchers at Arizona State University. Many UI recipients have no intention of getting a job until their weekly checks run out, and the $15-billion-a-year national UI system is riddled with errors in benefit payments.

Using a specially devised UI Random Audit program, the U.S. Department of Labor investigated the UI systems in Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, New Jersey, and Washington between April 1981 and March 1982. The results were not encouraging.

The auditors found that, on average, the five state UI offices made payment errors (defined as the percentage of weeks paid with either an overpayment or an underpayment) in roughly 26 percent of the cases. Louisiana did relatively well: It erred in only 12.1 percent of its payments. New Jersey did the worst: It made mistakes more than half the time (overpaying on 38.2 percent of its weekly checks, underpaying on 13.9 percent of them).

For these five states alone, the authors estimate, the combined overpayments add up to nearly $400 million—indicating that the nation's 53 UI districts could be wasting billions of tax dollars.

To stay on the dole, some dishonest UI recipients took jobs that they failed to report, quit jobs without cause, or turned down offers of employment. Most commonly, cheaters would falsely claim that they were job-hunting as required under UI rules, while they enjoyed subsidized leisure. Such "work-search" fraud accounts for at least half of all misspent UI dollars, estimate the authors. In the case of Kansas and New Jersey, "phantom job searches" accounted for 70 percent of UI overpayments.

Because verifying job search claims is time-consuming and expensive, the authors offer some other suggestions to minimize UI fraud. The U.S. Department of Labor, which allocates all UI administrative funds, could provide financial incentives to state UI bureaus to curb errors. The state bureaus could make it harder for the jobless to qualify for UI benefits, barring those applicants with a history of shirking work. Each state could force local UI recipients to document more of their work-search claims.

If conventional tactics fail, the states might consider investigating a small number of randomly selected individual claims and publicizing the results in an effort to root out, and deter, cheaters.

As masterpiece paintings command ever-higher sums at Manhattan auctions, art investment has come to look like a sure-fire way to show off and make a profit.

But Baumol, a Princeton economist, argues that big price tags do not necessarily mean big profits from paintings.

Drawing mainly on Gerald Reitlinger’s three-volume compilation of art sales data (*The Economics of Taste: The Rise and Fall of the Picture Market, 1760–1960* [1961]), Baumol examined 640 sales of paintings by famous artists, spanning the period 1652 to 1961. After adjusting for inflation, he found that even the works by the “best-known” painters of each age brought home an average annual rate of return of 0.55 percent—a remarkably low figure. By contrast, the safest of British government securities (not known as money earners) have historically averaged a 2.5 percent annual rate of return.

While it is true that a few purchases turned handsome profits, more than 40 percent of the sampled art investments lost money; roughly 60 percent turned out to be financial opportunity losses for the buyers, relative to other things that they could have done with their money. And, though many art dealers insist that only “professionals” really understand

*In April 1985, Christie’s (London) auctioned Andrea Mantegna’s Adoration of the Magi (circa 1500) for a record-high $10,449,000.*
the art market, Baumol says that even insider's knowledge is not enough. Tastes change constantly. The art world is so "fickle," he asserts, that the Dow Jones Index is predictable by comparison. Paintings by Jan Vermeer (1632–1675) "virtually disappeared from sight for several centuries" before they were resurrected; today they are considered priceless. El Greco (1541–1614) was another modern rediscovery. Works by J. M. W. Turner (1775–1851), the great Romantic painter, became "an embarrassment to [London's] Tate gallery" earlier this century. Yet today Turner's paintings are "among the most valued items in the museum's collection."

Not that Baumol has anything against the buying and selling of great works of art, or the satisfaction of owning a masterpiece. He simply suggests that gambling on art solely to make a profit is not a good way to "beat the game financially."

**Japan, Inc.**

"Theory F" by Joel Kotkin and Yoriko Kishimoto, in *Inc.* (April 1986), 38 Commercial Wharf, Boston, Mass. 02110.

Japan's rapid rise as a world-class industrial giant during the past decade has left many American businessmen scrambling to uncover the Japanese secret of success.

In 1981, a University of California management professor, William J. Ouchi, put forth one explanation. His book *Theory Z* attributed much of Japan's prosperity to its family-style corporations, which offer lifetime employment and good benefits to employees. Presumably, such benevolence helps to instill pride, loyalty, and selflessness among Japanese workers.

Yet Kotkin and Kishimoto, an Inc. editor and Japanese business consultant, respectively, argue that Japan's recent economic strains reveal that the Theory Z style of management has a dark side, too.

During the 1960s and '70s, when Japan's economy enjoyed double-digit growth rates, there was virtually nowhere to go in a Japanese corporation except up. Jobs were plentiful; professional mobility was assured. Since the early 1980s, however, competition from South Korea, Taiwan, and China has intensified. Japan's annual economic growth rates have fallen to roughly five percent. Average corporate operating profits now hover around 1.9 percent (half the figure of a decade ago).

Meanwhile, new college graduates are flooding the market for corporate management posts; competition for promotion is fierce. As late as 1983, two-thirds of the college-educated employees of Japan's largest corporations had attained the rank of division manager by age 54. Those days are over. By the year 2000, according to Japan's Social Development Research Institute, only 17 percent of college-educated employees will share the same status.

The result of Japan's economic slowdown, say the authors, is frustration and apathy. A recent survey of Japanese employees under the age of 40 found that nearly one in five felt little commitment to his work, "an attitude that may be commonplace in Western cultures but is shocking in Japan." And, since Japanese businessmen regard an individual's mid-career move to another company as a sign of professional failure, many middle-

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aged managers feel stuck.

The operation of today’s Japanese corporations is best explained by a new model, says Michael L. Jablow, an American businessman in Tokyo. He calls it Theory F: now it is “fear that moves those managers. There is no tolerance for failure. The penalty for failure is out, finished.”

**SOCIETY**

**Gaining Ground**


Of late, Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty has become a target for conservative reformers. The notion that federal efforts to help the poor have undermined their desire to earn a living rapidly gained currency in Washington through Charles Murray’s widely quoted *Losing Ground* (1984) [see WQ, Autumn ’84].

Ellwood and Summers, who teach government and economics, respectively, at Harvard, take issue with Murray. “Despite the haphazard evolution of these [federal] policies and their seeming lack of coherence, they function reasonably well,” the authors contend.

Although the poverty rate for Americans under 65 declined dramatically between 1959 and 1969, it stopped improving just as the massive social welfare programs of President Johnson’s Great Society took hold. Murray and like-minded critics have pointed to that fact in questioning the Great Society’s usefulness. The authors, however, cite a different coincidence. Noting the parallel courses of the U.S. median family income ($26,433 in 1984) and the poverty rate (14.4 percent in 1984), they argue that the health of the national economy, not Washington’s antipoverty effort, has been the key factor in determining the level of U.S. poverty.

Despite the charge that aid to the poor has “ballooned,” during the 1970s Congress raised the annual expenditures for each nonelderly poor person by only $93, after adjusting for inflation. Furthermore, since “in-kind” benefits (food stamps, housing assistance, Medicare) are not counted as income, “they cannot reduce statistically measured poverty.”

Yet such in-kind benefits have done much to help the poor, the authors maintain. Life expectancy rates rose faster during the 1970s than they did during the 1950s and ’60s. The rate of nonwhite infant mortality dropped twice as much as did the rate for whites.

While the number of single-parent households has risen greatly, the authors also find “no obvious relationship between the percentage of children not living in two-parent families and AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Children] benefit levels.” As for dependency on handouts: Of those single mothers who do receive AFDC, “at least 50 percent leave within two years, 85 percent leave within eight. Most women who ever use AFDC do not seem to get trapped by it.”
All told, Ellwood and Summers believe that “categorical” welfare, for
the disadvantaged, the disabled, and single mothers, is useful and effective,
for the poor, and for the nation. They even favor raising AFDC subsidies,
since real AFDC benefit levels fell nearly 30 percent between 1970 and
1980 in most states.

*Missing Kids*

“The Children’s Crusade” by Neil Spitzer, in
*The Atlantic* (June 1986), 8 Arlington St., Bos-
to, Mass. 02116.

In October 1981, Senator Paula Hawkins (R.-Fla.) convened the first con-
gressional hearing on missing children. “We simply do not know how many
children disappear from their families each year,” she said. “The estimates
are as high as 1.8 million children per year.”

Then the media blitz began: made-for-TV movies, fingerprinting cam-
paigns, posters. Staring out from grocery bags and milk cartons, the faces
of missing American youths awakened the nation to a new “crisis.”

Yet, observes Spitzer, a *Wilson Quarterly* associate editor, statistical
evidence of such a “crisis” is dubious.

Hawkins’s 1981 estimate—the most publicized number—actually en-
compasses three broad categories of missing kids: runaway and homeless
youths; minors kidnapped by noncustodial parents; and children abducted
by strangers.

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services puts the number

\[1-800-222-1464\]

In Michigan: (517) 764-6070

During the past 18 months, pictures of 130 missing chil-
dren have appeared on
roughly six billion milk car-
tons and 15 billion grocery
bags, according to the Na-
tional Child Safety Council,
which started the program
of homeless and runaway youths at roughly 1,155,000, most of whom are at least 13 years of age, leave home voluntarily, and return home within a month. According to a 1983 University of Rhode Island study, children snatched by a parent (usually in a postdivorce quarrel over custody) account for 626,000 abductions each year. Only a small number of children are kidnapped each year by strangers. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) annually investigates fewer than 100 such cases. Although some specialists believe the FBI figure is too low, the discrepancy of tens of thousands between the FBI estimate and popular guesstimates, says Spitzer, deserves more scrutiny.

Spitzer lauds such organizations as the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, founded in 1984, for alerting the nation to the problem of abductions. But he warns that publicizing exaggerated figures only confuses the issue.

As a step toward reducing the number of future abductions, Spitzer supports the recent recommendations of the U.S. Department of Justice: classifying abductions by noncustodial adults as felonies (rather than misdemeanors) and repealing state and local laws that hinder police from detaining runaway and homeless children.

Family Values


His report stirred a major controversy. Moynihan argued that years of slavery and oppression had undermined the authority of fathers in black families, and that the subsequent breakup of those families threatened black economic progress. Moynihan was widely accused of racism.

As it turns out, observes Loury, a Harvard political economist, Moynihan was partly wrong: The collapse of the black family structure is a post–World War II phenomenon. As late as 1925, 85 percent of black families living in Harlem, New York City, were intact; teen-aged mothers raising children alone were virtually unknown. Yet, Moynihan’s “hunch” that the crumbling of black families would wreak havoc on the black community was correct. Of the black children born in Harlem in 1984, 79 percent had unmarried mothers.

Today many Washington policymakers are quick to blame poverty and federal welfare programs for the prevalence of unwed black mothers. Loury disagrees. Such factors may have exacerbated the breakdown of black families, but they are not the root causes. Instead Loury points to a crisis of “values” within the poor black community. The notion of a traditional family, where two parents (at least one of whom is employed) raise their own children, has fallen from grace in the ghetto. Ever fewer black youths aspire to such a conventional style of living.

To Loury, the disintegration of black family life is not just a trend but
PERIODICALS

SOCIETY

a crisis—and a difficult one to solve. To help stem the tide of out-of-wedlock births, Loury maintains that Washington should look upon family cohesion, and traditional morality, not as matters of "taste" or "preference," but rather as values "central to our collective lives...as a political community." To promote moral indifference, he argues, is to condone parental negligence.

"The black community has paid an enormous price for delaying by two decades a concerted effort to grapple with the problem which Moynihan identified in 1965," Loury concludes. "Surely the nation as a whole will suffer grievously if we refrain from any effort to shape our citizens' values on these matters today."

PRESS & TELEVISION

Luce's America


Most Americans today remember the weekly Life magazine (1936-72) as the 20th century's great picture album. Few would consider it a "philosophically rooted tool for 'nation building.'" Yet it was, contends Carlson, executive vice president of the Rockford Institute. The son of a Presbyterian missionary in China, Henry Robinson Luce (1898-1967), who founded the Time, Inc. empire in 1923, imbued Life and its sister publications (Time, Fortune, Sports Illustrated) with a mission: to "shore up" Western civilization.

Luce was much influenced by the Catholic theologian John Courtney Murray, who urged the nation's elite to promote a "basic consensus" of informed opinion. Rather than just cover the news, Life under Luce strove not only to "reflect and defend values," argues Carlson, but to reinvigorate respect for religion and freedom among Americans.

Religious morality, Luce believed, was "fundamental" to liberty, for only people with a heartfelt sense of ethics, "who considered themselves accountable to an authority higher than government," could be depended on to govern themselves. Luce looked to Christianity to "provide the liberal tradition with moral coherence."

Initially, notes Carlson, commercial success occupied Luce's mind. But the onset of World War II changed him. Luce grew "restless and more philosophical." In a 1940 essay, "The American Century," Luce characterized the country as purposeless and confused. As inheritors of such principles as justice, truth, and charity, Americans were duty-bound to spread them throughout the world. Prosperity, too, Luce saw as a gift with a curse: It would make America great only if it did not make its citizens selfish and lazy.

In 1942, Luce added an editorial page to Life, specifically to promote a sense of moral purpose. In 1947, Life engaged in a campaign called the
Henry Luce (left), founder of Time, Inc., chatting with reporters in New York after lunch with president-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953.

New America, a picture display celebrating rising birth rates, an expanding middle class, and a spiritual reawakening—America at "the dawn of its greatness." Special issues on Christianity (1955) and The American Woman (1957) reaffirmed the traditional roles of God and motherhood.

But the Luce vision began to fade as early as 1958. Life was besieged by what Carlson calls "a moral crisis." Edward K. Thompson, Life's editor (1961–67), would not toe Luce's line. Luce's advocacy of the Cold War and religious revivalism lost popular support during the 1960s.

"In his last years," Carlson writes, Luce tried to "push the American people further than they could go."

**Dubious Victories**

"Two Trials" by Renata Adler, in The New Yorker (June 16 & 23, 1986), 25 West 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

Last year, two libel trials—General William C. Westmoreland versus CBS and Israel's Defense Minister Ariel Sharon versus Time—resulted in victories for the defendants, and, so other newsmen claimed, for freedom of the press under the First Amendment.

Adler, a Yale Law School graduate and New Yorker writer, does not share her colleagues' joy. Both trials, she found after lengthy investigation, involved "legal and journalistic shams."

No other Western nation puts so heavy a burden on libel plaintiffs, she
notes. Since the “strange and historic” decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), “public officials” must prove not only falsehood but “malice” on the part of offending journalists.

Both Time and CBS were guilty, in Adler’s opinion, of unusually sloppy, even dishonest, journalism—and of arrogance and deceit in refusing to admit it. Time (Feb. 21, 1983) reported that Sharon had spoken of the “need” for Lebanese Phalangists to “take revenge” on the eve of the massacre at Sabra and Shatila; no source was cited nor solid confirmation sought by Time before it went to press.


In reality, Adler notes, CBS’s conspiracy story was totally wrong, as former LBJ aides told CBS before and after the broadcast. But CBS cared not. As for malice, producer George Crile told reporter Mike Wallace as the show developed: “Now all you have to do is break General Westmoreland and we have the whole thing aced.”

Yet, after many dubious twists-and-tums in court, the defending lawyers could claim a “win.” In the Sharon trial, the jury found Time guilty of falsehood, but not of malice. In Westmoreland’s trial, his inept chief counsel caved in, settling unnecessarily for an ambiguous “joint statement” before the case even went to the jury.

CBS, Time, and their aggressive lawyers, says Adler, may have litigated in good faith, but “facts have a value and a fragility of their own.”

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY


The 18th-century European Enlightenment—or Age of Reason—encompassed a revolution in man’s conception of his place in nature.

Whereas scientists and theologians had once envisioned man near the top of a descending order of beings (starting with God), Enlightenment thinkers began to view life from the ground up: an ascending order of creatures, progressing from the most primitive to the most perfect. This new perspective on nature, contends Rigotti, a historian at Georg-August-Universität in Göttingen, West Germany, brought with it great implications for society as well.

G. W. Leibniz (1646–1716), a mathematician and philosopher, first set such ideas in motion with his “monadology,” a theory that saw nature as the “successive unfolding of a predetermined order.” Building on Leibniz’s
thought, Louis Bourguet (1678–1742), a geologist, classified fossils and crystals along a “scale,” starting the Great Chain of Being in the “mineral kingdom.” The biologist Charles Bonnet (1720–1793) sought to rank members of the animal kingdom in terms of their deviation from “perfection.” Bonnet’s universe, Rigotti notes, is “systematic: everything contained in it is arranged, related, linked, chained together.” Gaps in nature did not exist; man simply could not see all the necessary links.

Then came J. B. Robinet (1735–1820), a naturalist-philosopher. His version of a “hierarchic order of society” included a “perfect parallelism between natural species and social ranks.” Moreover, Robinet felt that society had to maintain an equilibrium between “good and evil.” It was important for the “happiness of society that its humble components remained in the condition in which they were born.” Efforts at social uplift, for example, were “a great disservice” to everyone.

Such rational visions of society and nature soon drifted into the literary arena. Voltaire (1694–1778) even went so far as to lambaste the Leibnizian notion that this is “the best of all possible worlds” in his plays and fiction (e.g., *Candide*). To Voltaire, the concept of an “unbroken chain of being,” says Rigotti, “seemed designed to impress and please public imagination—to suggest how society ought to be, rather than accurately describe how the world, in fact, is.

Ultimately, the Enlightenment’s “inversion” of the chain of being set the stage for Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution (1859), which then prompted debate over how (and whether) society, like nature, would “progress”—a debate that continues today.

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**Comet of Bethlehem**


The New Testament account of the Magi’s trek from the East, guided by a great star, to see the infant Jesus (Matt. 2:1–12), is, says Phipps, who teaches religion at Davis and Elkins College in West Virginia, a “source of wonder and inspiration.”

Yet the recent passing of Halley’s comet, Phipps adds, has rekindled many scientists’ interest in possible connections between the Magi’s “guiding light” and the well-known comet, visible roughly every 76 years.

Modern astronomers have calculated that Halley’s comet appeared in A.D. 66, a fact that accords with records kept by ancient Chinese and Jewish scribes. Historical documents also indicate that, during that same year, the Magi journeyed from Persia to Rome—for political reasons. The Roman historians Suetonius, Pliny, and Dio Cassius report that Tiridates, king of the Magi, sought permission from the Emperor Nero to rule over a nation in his Asian homeland. (Nero named him king of Armenia.)

Phipps notes that the story of Christmas was not officially inscribed into Matthew until several years after A.D. 66, by a “Christian story-teller who lived some decades after Jesus.” Moreover, some phrasing in Mat-
threw sounds remarkably like the accounts of the Roman historians. Another odd twist: Origen, an early Christian scholar, wrote shortly after Halley’s comet appeared in A.D. 218 that “the star which appeared in the East [is] to be classed with the comets which occasionally occur.”

Adding up these and other findings, Phipps argues that the author embellished the verses in Matthew with tales of events that took place after the birth (in fact, after the death) of Christ.

“The writer who blended strands [of folklore] into the variegated infant Jesus story was not concerned with historical literalism,” contends Phipps. “It is unlikely that he expected his readers to believe that a star actually guided the Magi the few miles between Jerusalem and Bethlehem and ‘came to rest over the place where the child was.’”

Though the tale was as popular during the first century as it is today, Phipps believes, it probably “belonged as much to the realm of fantasy then as the tale of Santa coming down the chimney does now.”

**Reasons to Believe**

“Blaise Pascal and the Intellectuals” by Christopher Faille, in *This World* (Spring 1986), 1112

16th St. N.W., Ste. 1500, Washington, D.C. 20036.

In his time, France’s Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) was a phenomenon: a mathematician, physicist, philosopher, and humble recluse who worked through the church to help the poor.

As a scientist, Pascal was responsible for first postulating the existence of vacuums in nature, developing theories of probability, and formulating the physical laws governing pressure.

Yet Faille, an intellectual historian, observes that despite Pascal’s scientific achievements, he did not believe that the meaning, or value, of human existence lay in reason alone. Instead Pascal placed his faith in his intuitions and in a belief that knowledge and appreciation—of life, of society, of God—had to originate in the soul, not the mind. “The heart has its reasons which reason does not know.” Such views put Pascal at odds with his great rationalist contemporary and compatriot, the mathematician and philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650), who contended that mind was the essence of being.

Pascal underwent a religious conversion in 1654, and shortly thereafter entered a Jansenist convent at Port-Royal. There he composed his most famous philosophical texts, *Les Provinciales* (1657) and *Pensees* (published posthumously in 1670). In *Les Provinciales*, he attacked what he saw as the laxity of Jesuit moral teachings. He promoted the cause of the austere Jansenists, who believed that religious salvation occurs only by predestination. *Pensees*, among other things, put forth Pascal’s famous “wager.” Rejecting Descartes’ notion that God’s existence is susceptible to rigorous logical demonstration, Pascal argued that a belief in God costs nothing if God does not exist, and is worth everything if God does exist.

Was Pascal an “irrationalist”? No, says Faille. The French thinker “did not condemn the use of reason—he only put it in its place, rebuked the pride of intellectuals.”
The fastest animal on earth, the cheetah, is now in a race against extinction. Centuries ago, the feline predator—light, long-limbed, and able to overtake fleeing prey at 70 miles per hour—roamed Africa, the Middle East, and India in great numbers. Today, barely 20,000 remain, scattered among a few remote regions of Africa.

In 1981, O'Brien, Wildt, and Bush—a National Cancer Institute geneticist, a physiologist at Washington's National Zoo, and the Zoo's chief veterinarian, respectively—collaborated with South African zoologists to investigate why cheetahs were declining in number. They learned, to their dismay, that the species (*Acinonyx jubatus*) suffered from excessive inbreeding, a phenomenon rarely found outside of captivity. The gene pool is virtually uniform, shorn of the variations necessary to generate healthy offspring. Hence, cheetahs now are not as fit as their ancestors. Their infant mortality rates run as high as 70 percent. Though still able to pursue and kill, they defend their catches rather timidly, losing half of their food to more aggressive lions, leopards, and hyenas.

In captivity, cheetahs do not flourish, a reality that has so far foiled scientists' attempts to reinvigorate the dwindling species. (In 16th-century India, Akbar the Great, a Punjabi ruler, even gave his pet cheetahs the run of the palace garden in an unsuccessful attempt to get them to mate.) Only 10 to 15 percent breed in captivity, and 30 percent of their offspring die within six months. Puzzled by the cheetahs' troubles, the zoologists sampled the male animals' semen. They found weak and malformed sperm cells, a common result of inbreeding.

How did this happen? Most likely, the authors contend, a natural calamity (perhaps 10,000 years ago) killed all but a few cheetahs, who became the ancestors of today's species. Such a population "bottleneck" would explain the extreme genetic uniformity.

Although the cheetah's future is grim, say the authors, it is not hopeless. Other species have survived such population bottlenecks (the northern elephant seal, for instance). Further research may show that cheetahs from eastern Africa have enough genetic differences from those in southern Africa to warrant a controlled breeding program; bringing them together might help to diversify the species.
Saving Teeth


Long known for their readiness to use the drill, dentists have discovered a less painful way to fight tooth decay and strengthen weak teeth: mouthwashes that "remineralize" decayed tooth enamel.

Normally, mineral-rich saliva from glands in the mouth protects teeth from acids secreted by plaque-forming bacteria. But when the bacteria's acids dissolve tooth minerals faster than the body can replenish them, the tooth becomes spongy and porous. Eventually a cavity forms.

Dentists now want to enhance the body's own ability to restore porous tooth enamel, writes Raloff, a reporter for Science News. Their technique: using mouth rinses that act as "super" salivas. Such dental potions are rich in calcium, phosphate, and fluoride. The calcium and phosphate rebuild the tooth's crystals—known as hydroxy apatite—while fluoride serves as a catalyst, speeding up the process.

The key to designing a superior remineralizing solution, says Leon Silverstone, director of the University of Colorado's Oral Sciences Research Center, lies in tailoring its chemistry so that it deposits new apatite crystals in the right places. Repairing surface decay is easier than rebuilding the porous enamel below. Recently, dental researchers at the University of Rochester have found that adding strontium and tartrate to the super rinses helps to transport the minerals deep into the enamel. At the Tufts School of Dental Medicine, tooth decay patients were treated with a sodium fluoride gel and a super rinse saturated with six times the concentration of calcium and phosphate normally present in saliva. The researchers were able not only to slow tooth decay but also to spur remineralization in 77 percent of the dental lesions suffered by a total of 94 persons with "rampant" tooth decay.

Wider availability of remineralizing chemicals will soon lead to over-the-counter versions of these mouthwashes. When that happens, trips to the dentist may become less fearsome and less frequent.

Seeing Atoms


The invention of the electron microscope in 1931 enabled scientists to see, with great clarity, objects they had never seen before—such as the components of human cells.

Now physicists can picture the outlines of atoms.

At the International Business Machines Research Laboratory in Zurich, four physicists have built a scanning tunneling microscope (STM) that can detect the presence of atoms on the surfaces of some solids. Gerhardt Binnig, Heinrich Rohrer, Christoph G. Gerber, and Edmund Weibel finished the first prototype in 1981. Their invention, writes Baum, a reporter for Chemical & Engineering News, promises advances in fields as diverse...
as solid state physics and biochemistry.

Ordinary microscopes magnify an image by using lenses to bend light, which either passes through or is reflected back by the specimen under scrutiny. An electron microscope employs the same principle—except that it uses a beam of electrons instead of light to create a magnified image. The new STMs utilize a different method altogether: A small probe passes closely over a specimen, senses the contour of the atoms on its surface, and sends the information to a computer, which generates a picture.

Early versions of the STM (as with electron microscopes) could only view objects in a vacuum, a condition that greatly limited their use. The specimen under observation also had to be able to conduct electricity. Background vibrations created other problems: even very low sound waves could throw the microscope out of kilter.

Binnig and his colleagues have since overcome many of those difficulties. Now STMs can analyze samples under water and in dilute salt solutions, thus allowing scientists to study "active" biological materials. Perhaps, researchers speculate, they will soon be able to view large biological molecules, such as deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), in their native habitats, the fluids of cells. Such developments may someday allow biologists to study the essential chemistry of life, just as it occurs in nature.

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Missing Monsoons

"Waiting for Rain" by Peter J. Lamb, in The Sciences (May/June 1986), 2 East 63rd St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

On the vast African grasslands, stretching from Gambia to Ethiopia, millions of farmers harvest millet, sorghum, and groundnuts. Lacking irrigation systems, they patiently wait for the summer monsoons, which bring 80 percent of the region's annual rainfall, to water their crops.

Yet, since the late 1950s, each monsoon season has brought less rain than the last. Severe droughts in 1972, '83, and '84 led to the deaths of one million Africans and left roughly 150 million on the verge of starvation. The droughts persist, with no end in sight.

According to Lamb, a University of Illinois meteorologist, such droughts are not freak occurrences. Meteorologists have observed large-scale changes in the region's climate that may be responsible for the prolonged dry weather.

From 1945 to the early 1970s, average annual air temperatures above Northern Hemispheric lands dropped by roughly one-half degree Fahrenheit. (On a global scale, that is significant; by contrast, during the previous 100 years the average temperature fluctuated less than two degrees.) Perhaps due to pollution or volcanic ash in the upper atmosphere (blocking out sunlight), the temperature change may have redirected upper atmospheric air currents, thinning out the monsoons.

Other meteorologists note the southward encroachment of the Sahara.
More sand and less vegetation reflect more light and heat, a condition that tends to inhibit cloud formation. Still other forecasters point to changes in the surface water temperature of the tropical areas of the Atlantic Ocean (where the monsoons originate). Satellite and water sample measurements show that the zone of warmest tropical waters, which fuels the monsoons, has shifted 200 miles south of where it was during the 1960s. The monsoons appear to have drifted south, too.

While U.S. meteorologists cannot redirect the monsoons, they may be able to predict the severity of future African droughts. Currently they are working on a statistical model—based on sea surface temperatures, wind speed and direction, atmospheric pressure, and other variables—to forecast each spring the sub-Sahara's summer rainfall.

What good would that do? Such forecasts, says Lamb, could forewarn African farmers and Western relief agencies, which could then pool aid and head off a catastrophe.

**Exporting Hazards**

In 1977, the U.S. Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC) banned the domestic sale of children's sleepwear treated with Tris, a flame retardant; studies had shown that Tris caused cancer. American garment distributors—their warehouses filled with unsalable clothing—cut their losses by exporting 2.4 million pairs of the fireproofed pajamas.

Under public pressure, the CPSC later halted such exports. Yet the Asian and South American importers were not notified about the risks of Tris; no pajamas were recalled.

In Third World nations, such oversights are all too common. Many poor countries rush to import Western products but fail to warn, or safeguard, their citizens against the associated hazards. That U.S. companies can still sell abroad items deemed unsafe at home has not helped, argues Shaikh, a scientist at the Health Effects Institute in Cambridge, Mass.

Roughly one-third of all U.S. pesticides (including DDT and Phosvel) now sold overseas cannot be marketed domestically because of health and safety reasons. The same is true of prescription drugs: Pharmaceuticals whose strength and purity have been changed, whose shelf life has expired, and whose labels are misleading can be sold in foreign markets without any special warnings.

Aware of the dangers involved, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution in 1979 urging member governments to exchange information about hazardous products. The U.S. Congress approved a “notification” system that requires the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, and the CPSC to inform foreign countries about the regulatory status of American products. The Carter administration planned to strengthen U.S. export safety guidelines; Reagan officials subsequently shelved those plans.
Shaikh would like the United States to take a more aggressive stance on export safety, notably by backing the UN Environment Program's proposal to compile a worldwide list of all hazardous export products. Without U.S. backing, he argues, any UN export safety effort will surely stall.

**ARTS & LETTERS**

*Big Glass Boxes*  

At the 1968 opening ceremony of the New National Gallery in Berlin—a austere, glass-faced pavilion perched on a windowless stone base—the museum’s director quipped: “Where shall I hang the pictures?”  
“That’s your problem,” replied the gallery’s designer.

*Miss van der Rohe’s twin towers at 860 Lake Shore Drive in Chicago caused a stir when they rose on the Windy City’s lakefront in 1951. Today they are just two glass buildings among many in the nation’s metropolitan areas.*
The designer was Ludwig Mies van der Rohe (1886–1969), the Bauhaus architect whose vision of "logical structure" brought steel-and-glass skyscrapers to America. Known mainly in the United States as the architect of New York's Seagram Building (built in 1958) and Chicago's Federal Center (1964), Mies fostered a "marriage" of art and technology during the 1920s and '30s. His concept of "skin and bones construction" helped builders of high-rises to cut construction costs. Mies's minimalist philosophy: "Less is more."

Today, in the year of Mies's centenary, glass-box buildings dominate skylines from San Francisco to Sydney. Though his style endures, so do his critics. Rykwert, who teaches architecture at Columbia University, is one of them. He argues that "Mies was totally oblivious to the social context of his buildings." Obsessed with construction details and the overall harmony of his buildings' forms, he often disregarded the function his structures were to serve. He approached design problems as if they were "moves in a game of checkers," the author says. Mies's buildings, while appealing to the eye of the passerby, were often uncomfortable and impractical on the inside. Although other architects strove to mimic Mies's style, many of his disciples lacked his touch, his fine sense of proportion and detail. They could only create clumsy imitations. As a result, many big U.S. cities now suffer from what Rykwert calls the "Sixth-Avenue Syndrome"—after midtown Manhattan's ranks of towering glass boxes.

Guarding against such an outbreak, the City of London recently scuttled plans for the Mansion House Square project, a 290-foot tower and plaza designed by Mies just before his death. Rykwert praises the move. In building the project, the developer, Peter Palumbo, would have had to demolish 21 fine Victorian edifices, just to make room for what His Royal Highness Prince Charles called "another giant glass stump."

Lifeless Fiction


Experience provides the raw material of good fiction. It is no accident that many major American novelists had, at some point in their lives, vocations other than writing. Mark Twain and Herman Melville piloted ships. John Steinbeck worked as a farm hand. Ernest Hemingway drove an ambulance during World War I.

But what has happened since World War II? wonders Lemann, national correspondent for the Atlantic. Writers of fiction in America, he argues, have become a wimpish lot, choosing to hole up as teachers in university writing programs rather than to brave the workaday world. Consequently, their "range of experience has become narrower over the years"; what emerges from their work is a disengaged and predominantly negative view of American life.

A case in point, Lemann contends, is Don DeLillo's White Noise, winner of the 1985 American Book Award for fiction. The story of a college town overshadowed by an ambient toxic cloud, White Noise fails to ven-
ture beyond the academic cloister. In fact, states Lemann, DeLillo’s novel is less a work of good storytelling than is Anthony Lukas’s *Common Ground*, which won the 1985 American Book Award for nonfiction (and a 1986 Pulitzer Prize). A vivid chronicle of school busing in 1970’s Boston, *Common Ground* captures the lives of flesh-and-blood American citizens enmeshed in a public debacle. By contrast, *White Noise* merely furthers the view popular among the nation’s literati that “American life is unreal and sterile for the middle class and degrading for the working class.”

One reason for such rejection, Lemann suggests, is that even best-selling American novelists do not receive the attention they once did. Forced to compete with television and other media, all but the most popular novels sell fewer and fewer copies each year. As Lemann observes, “a writer who thinks most people aren’t listening might use his writing as a way to return the compliment.”


“It’s about time that everyone who writes—especially genuine literary artists—admitted that in this world you can’t figure anything out.”

Only 28 years old when he wrote this, Anton Chekhov (1860–1904), the Russian physician-turned-writer, had already retired as a moral crusader. The playwright (*The Cherry Orchard*, *The Seagull*) and short-story writer (*Ward Number Six*, *Ariadne*) decided to use his fiction to record, rather than judge, the human condition. Calling himself an “impartial witness,” Chekhov strove to clarify and to illuminate moral dilemmas, but not to try to solve them.

Epstein, editor of the *American Scholar*, has high praise for Chekhov’s work, admiring, among other things, his astute, intuitive grasp of ordinary folk. Yet, at the same time, Epstein sees Chekhov’s moral neutrality as a weakness. Lacking a political or ethical stance, his fiction often stalls. The point of the story is missing. “Chekhov’s stories are not about good and evil; they have no heroes,” observes Epstein. “With only rare exceptions is there anything resembling intrinsic drama.”

Chekhov himself was aware of this flaw. In a letter to Dmitry Grigorovich, also a writer, Chekhov admitted that his basic principles changed “every month.” And, since all good writers move “toward something definite and beckon [the reader] to follow,” his stories would sag. He could only describe “life as it is and stop dead right there.”

In a story, for instance, titled “My Life” (which was not about Chekhov’s life), he reflects momentarily on a Russian village: “I could not understand what these 60,000 people lived for, what they read the gospel for, why they prayed, why they read books and magazines.” Refusing to cast the townspeople in a good or bad light, he instead presented them just as they were.

“Unfocused” as it was, Chekhov’s style did have some unique advantages, Epstein concedes. He became a “master of moods. Verisimilitude
came naturally to him. Whatever Chekhov writes, one feels, is true.” Thus Chekhov’s failure to achieve gripping drama enabled him to excel at something else: capturing in his characters their “condition of soul.”

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Détente in Ulster?


On November 15, 1985, prime ministers Margaret Thatcher of Britain and Garret FitzGerald of Ireland signed the so-called Anglo-Irish agreement, a pact officially recognizing Dublin as a partner, alongside London, in the governance of Northern Ireland, or Ulster.

Granting the Irish Free State a voice in the administration of Northern Ireland’s police force, courts, and prisons, the agreement marked a major turnaround in Thatcher’s stance toward the troubled northern province. Only a year earlier, Thatcher had steadfastly refused to negotiate with Irish nationalists.

What brought about this political concession? Shannon, a Boston University historian, believes that Thatcher’s “hard-line” approach toward the Catholic Ulster nationalists—condemning the extremist Irish Republican Army (IRA), ignoring the moderate Social Democratic and Labour Party, and spurning the Catholic bishops—ultimately backfired. Her 1981 decision to allow Bobby Sands and nine other militant members of the IRA to die in hunger strikes was, in Shannon’s opinion, a “major strategic error.” The hunger strikes roused Catholic sentiments and a corresponding backlash among Northern Irish Protestants, who favor continued British rule.

By 1983, tension in the north had become so ugly that the four nationalist parties, representing three-quarters of the island’s population, held a New Ireland Forum to find a solution. After a year’s deliberation, they proposed three possible models for a unified Ireland: a single state headed by Dublin; a federation of the two Irish provinces; or joint governance of northern Ireland by London and Dublin. Thatcher rejected all three. The result: Moderate Irish Catholic nationalist parties began losing support to the IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein. Trapped in a political stalemate, and alarmed by the IRA’s popular resurgence, Thatcher reluctantly endorsed the Anglo-Irish agreement.

Had Thatcher been more willing to negotiate with moderate nationalists early on, contends Shannon, the IRA might not have gained support. Thatcher also might not have found herself in the position of seeming to abandon her Protestant unionist constituents.

With the Intergovernmental Conference in place, Shannon argues, perhaps Northern Irish Catholics will feel less disenfranchised. Maybe they will now turn from IRA extremism and support reconciliation between the island’s northern and southern communities.
Kenya's bumper maize crop of 1985 (2.5 million metric tons) allowed Nairobi to export the hybrid grain to Tanzania and other East African countries.

_A Green Kenya_  

Plagued by drought, famine, and political turmoil, the nations of sub-Saharan Africa have dashed the hopes of many Western economists in recent years. All except Kenya, that is. Thanks to a strong agrarian economy, writes Lofchie, a political scientist at the University of California, Los Angeles, Kenya is "an African success story."

Over the last decade, Kenya's agricultural sector has enjoyed an average annual growth rate of three percent. Not only is the East African country self-sufficient in food production, but exports of coffee, tea, and other commodities now generate approximately $700 million in annual revenues. These foreign exchange earnings, in turn, have enabled Kenya's nonagricultural industries to avoid the crippling shortages of imported capital goods, spare parts, and raw materials that have afflicted most other African nations.

Lofchie traces Kenya's agricultural prosperity to the restrained, free-market policies pursued under presidents Jomo Kenyatta (1964–78) and Daniel arap Moi (1978 to present). After independence from Great Britain in 1963, Kenyatta largely resisted popular pressure to break up the effi-
cient European-owned farms in the “white highlands” of Kenya’s central province. Instead, he and Moi emphasized “privatizing” the four-fifths of Kenya’s arable land owned by Africans, converting it from communal or group ownership to private plots. By refusing to subsidize urban consumers with artificially low food prices, Nairobi has provided its farmers with a powerful incentive to increase their output. Export-crop production has nearly doubled since the late 1970s.

The present boom in world coffee prices, owing largely to a drought in Brazil, bodes well for Kenya’s economic future. But difficulties loom ahead. While the country’s overall gross domestic product has risen steadily, so has its population—up from less than 11 million in 1969 to over 20 million today. With that increase has come a growing incidence of rural land shortages, urban unemployment, and crime.

“Unless Kenya can reduce the rate of its population increase,” asserts Lofchie, “economic growth may not bring any improvement in the material conditions of life for most Kenyans.”

**Rocking Costa Rica**

Caught in the struggle between Nicaragua’s Sandinista government and the U.S.-backed anti-Communist contras is a neutral bystander: Costa Rica. Lately the Reagan administration has been pressuring President Oscar Arias to firm up his stand against Managua’s Marxist regime. Reding, a World Policy Institute Fellow, believes that Washington’s pressure may do more harm than good.

Among Central American nations, Costa Rica is a model of stability. Despite a gross national product per capita of $1,600, the country’s 2.5 million citizens today enjoy a relatively comfortable standard of living. Their life expectancy is comparable to that found in the United States; access to higher education is equivalent to that of France or Norway.

Unlike Nicaragua and nearby El Salvador, Costa Rica has never experienced an armed Communist uprising. Having participated in almost every legislature since 1931, “Costa Rica’s Communists have become some of the most passionate defenders of their country’s humane traditions,” Reding says. Rather than promote revolution, they want to expand the nation’s welfare state. Spared the threat of domestic strife, Costa Rica abolished its standing army in 1949 and nationalized most industries, ranging from electric power to health insurance.

Costa Rica’s left-wing factions (including some pro-Sandinistas) have few friends in Washington, which supplies Costa Rica with almost $200 million in annual economic aid. (Only war-torn El Salvador receives a greater share of U.S. aid to Central America.) By funding propaganda against Costa Rica’s Communist-dominated labor unions, the White House hopes to erode the Communists’ political support. The United States has also sought to revive Costa Rica’s military, sending $10 million in “security assistance” in 1985. Where police once patrolled San José unarmed, they
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now carry M-16s, wear combat fatigues, and drive jeeps. Attempts by presidents Luis Alberto Monge Alvarez (1982–86) and Arias to avoid direct conflict with the Sandinistas have not gone over well with the Reagan administration either.

Reding worries that Costa Rican democracy may suffer in the long run from the Reagan administration’s attempt to use Costa Rica in the struggle against the Sandinistas. In trying to change Costa Rica’s antimilitarism, Washington may instead tip its own ally off balance.

Pakistan’s Progress

Third World countries that make a successful transition from military to civilian rule are rare. Pakistan, contends Richter, a political scientist at Kansas State University, is becoming a member of that select club.

On December 30, 1985, President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq lifted martial law and restored civil rights to Pakistani citizens. The move came as something of a surprise. Only eight and a half years earlier, in July 1977, General Zia had taken power in a bloodless coup, promising to hold elections within 90 days. They did not take place. Instead Zia banned political parties, imposed censorship, and invalidated parts of Pakistan’s 1973 constitution—not a good omen in a country ruled by 21 generals during 38 years of independence.

Yet by August 1983 the situation in Islamabad had changed. Zia announced a plan to turn over political power to the nation’s 90 million civilians through nonpartisan elections to the National Assembly (parliament) and to the provincial assemblies before March 1985. He kept his promise: On February 25, 1985, more than 50 percent of the population voted in elections that Richter calls “relatively clean and fair.”

The transition to civilian rule has paid off—so far. Last year Pakistan’s economy grew by 8.5 percent, an improvement over the average rate of six percent annual growth since 1977. Pakistan is about to cross the threshold from “poor” to “middle-income,” according to the World Bank. Zia’s emphasis on foreign investment, an export-based economy, and privatization of nationalized industries has pleased Western diplomats. Foreign aid has been plentiful: The Aid-Pakistan consortium sponsored by the World Bank pledged $2.1 billion for this fiscal year; a $3.2 billion five-year aid package from the United States is also forthcoming.

Moreover, Zia has made substantial headway, observes Richter, in improving relations with India—more so than any other regime since Pakistan came into existence in 1947. Despite Delhi’s objections to Zia’s “Islamization” of Pakistan’s laws, his 1981 proposal of a “no-war pact” prompted India to issue a counterproposal that has led to a joint Indo-Pakistani commission.

Richter predicts Pakistan’s shift to political “normalcy” will gain momentum—a welcome departure from the nation’s topsy-turvy history of internal strife and violence.
"American Professors: A National Resource Imperiled."


Authors: Howard R. Bowen and Jack H. Schuster

American colleges and universities are caught between a rock and a hard place. Not only must they contend with a shrinking demographic pool of students, but according to Bowen and Schuster, professors of economics and public policy, respectively, at Claremont Graduate School, "fewer and fewer highly talented young students are opting for academic careers."

The authors note that while the number of Americans with Ph.D.s has steadily risen (to 750,000 in 1985), so too has the percentage of those employed in professions other than teaching (43 percent in 1985). And among the best and the brightest, the rejection of academe in favor of law and business is becoming more pronounced. A survey of "highest achievers" (the top five percent of graduating seniors at elite research universities) showed a drop in Ph.D. candidates in this group from 44 percent in 1966 to 21 percent in 1976. Furthermore, while 35 percent of Rhodes Scholars chose teaching careers in 1964, only 18 percent did so in 1977.

The authors attribute the ivory tower's lost luster to several factors. Despite the rapid rise in students' tuition, faculty salaries have declined in real terms by 15 percent since 1970. The quality of academic life has also suffered, as hard-pressed institutions have cut back on building maintenance, clerical staff, and research facilities. Tenured posts are harder to come by; competition has increased and institutions have become more willing to hire less expensive—and usually less qualified—part-time instructors (up from 22 percent of all faculty in 1970 to 32 percent in 1982).

To attract talent to academe, the authors make a number of (predictable) suggestions. These include raising salaries, improving working conditions, and offering more job security through tenure.

"The American Millstone: An Examination of the Nation's Permanent Underclass."


In 1985, amid revived debate over U.S. antipoverty programs, the Chicago Tribune deployed a biracial team of 24 reporters to focus on the predicament of North Lawndale, a nearly all-black neighborhood on Chicago's West Side.

The Tribune produced an unsentimental, comprehensive 31-part profile of North Lawndale and its dominant, demoralized "underclass," now published as a book. The journalists combined sharp-edged interviews and vivid local "human interest" stories with city, state, and national data. They also included the views of a host of specialists, including Greg J. Duncan, of the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research, and William Julius Wilson, a noted sociologist at the University of Chicago and author of The Declining Significance of Race (1978).

North Lawndale, the Tribune staffers discovered, was a bleak "laboratory" for their research. Within this crime-ridden "land of broken glass" there were 99 liquor stores and 48 state lottery agencies, several major public housing projects, and...
storefront churches that had names like "Instant Deliverance."

Every kind of economic or demographic statistic suggests that the neighborhood is deep in trouble: Half of North Lawndale's 61,654 residents are on welfare; three of every five potential workers are unemployed; 41 percent of all families are headed by single women; seven out of 10 births are illegitimate; the homicide rate is six times the national average.

Despite numerous federal programs, North Lawndale's prospects, the authors note, have become grimmer over the last 20 years. Busing, racial unrest, and rising crime rates spurred most middle-class whites and blacks to move their families—and their businesses—out of the neighborhood. Ironically, the Tribune points out, the easing of Chicago's racial segregation has hurt rather than helped the ghetto: It has enabled blue-collar black families to move out of places like North Lawndale and into better neighborhoods. Left behind are the violent, the shiftless, the drug-addicted, the welfare-dependent. Most (but not all) seem immune to outside efforts at social uplift. Local schoolteachers, policemen, parole officers, welfare officials, and the editors of the Tribune are not optimistic.

The newspaper urges more early childhood education, a carrot-and-stick approach in welfare administration, job training, and strong leadership, hitherto lacking, from area churchmen and public officials, presumably including Chicago's Mayor Harold Washington. "What's needed," says the Tribune, "are politicians who will be forthright in acknowledging the problem in all of its painful dimensions; who will admit that not every member of the underclass can be reached, but [that] for many the chain can be broken."

"Crisis in the Budget Process: Exercising Political Choice."

American Enterprise Institute, 1150 17th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. 88 pp. $4.95.

Authors: Trent Lott, Norman Ornstein, Leon Panetta, Rudolph Penner, Allen Schick, David Stockman

Pointing to massive annual federal budget deficits—$212 billion in 1985—many social commentators have charged that the federal budget process does not work. But the six specialists on government spending who contributed to this report agreed that the process is fine: Congress, they say, lacks only the political courage to make ends meet.

The Congressional Budget Act of 1974, explains University of Maryland professor Allen Schick, was designed to help Congress impose discipline on the budget-making process. Rather than accepting or rejecting White House spending bills, one by one, Congress, under this measure, would design its own master budget—according to which it would raise and spend federal monies. The law also established the House and Senate Budget Committees, and the Congressional Budget Office, which has a 218-member staff today.

The specialists do suggest some minor revisions in the budget process. Congressmen Leon Panetta (D.-Calif.) and Trent Lott (D.-Miss.) argue that the budget should be drawn up every two years—not annually. But all agreed with Panetta that "political will... is the bottom line."

David Stockman, former director of the Office of Management and Budget, traces the origins of today's cumulative $1.67 trillion federal deficit back to the early 1970s, when "favorable fiscal trends" allowed Congress to expand federal programs without raising taxes.

One "trend," he says, was the "collapse of national interest and defense spending" as the United States withdrew from Vietnam. Pulling out of Indochina, he estimates, saved Washington some $200 billion (in 1985 dollars) every year. Galloping
inflation rates also helped the government save or collect money. Through tax "bracket creep," the Internal Revenue Service collected an increasingly higher percentage of Americans' incomes; inflation also decreased the "real" interest on U.S. Treasury bills, with which Washington finances the debt. 

In sum, says Stockman, "the budgeting game of the 1970s delivered a $300 billion jackpot (5.5 percent of the gross national product [GNP]) of new domestic benefits to domestic constituencies without explicitly raising taxes." Members of Congress happily went about authorizing high defense expenditures, or new subsidies for nutrition and student aid, without considering the long-term consequences. Between 1962 and 1980, for example, the annual cost of Social Security alone increased from 2.6 to 4.5 percent of total GNP.

"Current fiscal disorder," Stockman concludes, "results from powerful, long-term, macroeconomic policy and political trends that have thoroughly overwhelmed the budget process."

“World’s Fairs: How They Are Faring.”
Editorial Research Reports, 1414 22nd St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. 17 pp. $5.50.
Author: Robert K. Landers

"World’s Fairs [have] had their day, and [will] be seen no more."
So wrote Century magazine in 1885. One hundred years and dozens of expositions later, today’s pundits are no more optimistic about the future of world’s fairs.

The skeptics have their reasons. Recent fairs, says Landers, a Congressional Quarterly editor, have drained private and public coffers. In May 1984, Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards exclaimed, “Laissez les bon temps roule!” (Let the good times roll), as he kicked off his state’s world exposition. Due to poor attendance, the fair left the state with a $120 million debt. Two years earlier, Knoxville’s Energy Expo ‘82 had been no more successful. The fair drove the city’s largest bank, United American, into insolvency.

Why have world’s fairs gone broke? The expositions, critics hold, fail to attract huge crowds because they no longer serve as "timekeepers of progress." World’s fairs, observes New Orleans business leader Harry Greenberger, used to be on "the leading edge of the newest technology.” Indeed, Philadelphia’s Centennial Exhibition in 1876 gave visitors their first look at the typewriter, sewing machine, and telephone. “Now,” Greenberger says, “we see [new technologies] on television.” Still, some previous world’s fairs have returned something of value to the cities that sponsored them. Many fairs have helped rebuild decaying downtowns. Seattle held its Century 21 Exposition in 1962. Today, the city uses the exposition’s U.S. pavilion as a sports arena; the auditorium functions as an opera house. Spokane’s Expo ‘74 transformed the city’s waterfront—long a wasteland of railroad yards and deserted factories—into today’s Riverfront Park.

This year’s world’s fair, Expo ’86, now under way in Vancouver, British Columbia, seems to be faring better than most. Fair organizers expect some 16 million visitors by the time the fair ends on October 13. Still, Expo ’86 will not pay for itself. The federal government in Ottawa is picking up part of the $1 billion cost—including $100 million for Canada’s pavilion alone.

Whatever the costs, world’s fairs are more than likely to continue, say their aficionados. “There’s nothing like rubbing shoulders and talking, and seeing what others are doing, and showing off,” observes Alfred Heller, editor of World’s Fair magazine. “I just can’t imagine the world not having them.”

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Landscapes loom large in Finnish life and art. Before painting Kaukola Ridge at Sunset (1889), Albert Edelfelt wrote in a letter to his mother: "I must see wilder terrain...summer light, and real Finnish Finns. Tar boats, wilderness [and] rapids...are beginning to take hold of me."
Finland

Finland, as Finnish diplomat Max Jakobson observed, emerges “only occasionally and for brief moments above the horizon of international news media.” Yet Finland, with no more people (4.9 million) than the state of Wisconsin, maintains a unique position on the world scene: a prosperous Western democracy living next door to the Soviet Union. To Americans, says Jakobson, this looks like an Indian rope trick: “a clever thing to do, but not quite believable.” Here, Keith W. Olson surveys the Finns’ turbulent history as innocent bystanders repeatedly caught between the great powers. Pekka Kalevi Hamalainen explains how, after the ordeals of World War II, the Soviets and the Finns finally learned, more or less, to get along.

BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

by Keith W. Olson

In the early morning of November 30, 1939, the roar of Soviet bombers startled the rural folk living among the birch forests and fields of eastern Finland. From the Karelian Isthmus in the south to Petsamo in the north, 600,000 Soviet troops pushed across the 800-mile border. Joseph Stalin’s advisers believed that Finland would fall in just 12 days. But they failed to reckon with the deep snows, the minus-40-degree temperatures, and the determination of 300,000 Finnish troops fighting for their country’s survival.

Though ill-equipped and outnumbered, the hastily mobilized Finns defended themselves brilliantly. Sheltered in 20-man dugouts beneath the snow, the sotilaat held fast to the Mannerheim Line, an 88-mile fortified strip that ran across the Karelian Isthmus from the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ladoga. Soviet armored columns fell prey to Finland’s “invisible wall”—white-clad, forest-wise ski troops, armed with submachine guns, backed up by artillery. Moving through forests of birch and spruce, the Finns repeatedly caught the Soviets by surprise. Small towns and villages such as Summa, Kolla, Tolvajärvi,
and Suomussalmi would become, as a Finnish colonel later recalled, “Finland’s small Stalingrads.”

Stalin’s 46 divisions eventually wore down the Finns. For a time, Great Britain and France, already at war with Hitler’s Germany, contemplated sending 100,000 troops as a rescue force to Finland via Norway and Sweden; wanting to remain neutral, both Oslo and Stockholm refused to allow the Allied forces to cross.* The Russians finally captured Viipuri, Finland’s second largest city, on March 5, 1940. By the time President Kyosti Kallio sued for peace, some 25,000 Finns had perished, and 450,000 had been driven from their homes. From the front, Life’s Carl Mydans reported: “The symbol of Finland has become the blackened stalk of a chimney standing without its house.”

**Sod and Birchbark**

As a result of peace negotiations in Moscow, the Soviets pushed Finland’s eastern border 70 miles westward, to 90 miles from Leningrad. They also won key ports on the Gulf of Finland, such as Uuraa and Koivisto, and the valuable sawmills of Karelia. But few Russians rejoiced over the victory. Nikita Khrushchev exaggerated the numbers—but not the enormity of the suffering—when he wrote, in his memoirs, that the Winter War had cost the Soviets one million men. Said one Russian general at the time, “We have won enough ground to bury our dead.”

Finland had lost the war, but gained the respect of the world. On January 20, 1940, five months before he became prime minister of his own embattled country, Britain’s first sea lord, Winston S. Churchill, observed, “Finland alone—in danger of death, superb, sublime Finland—shows what free men can do.”

Churchill may have been impressed—but could not have been surprised—by Finland’s determination. Nestled between the Gulf of Bothnia and the Gulf of Finland on the Baltic Sea, Finland had always offered what the Russians wanted: a military buffer against the West, and an opening to the Baltic. Thanks to this geography, the two neighbors had fought over the same territory many times. In victory or in defeat, the Finns had always stood their ground with tenacity; somehow they had managed to hang on to their language, their cul-

*The Finnish resistance won popular admiration in the West; in New York City, all but one of Broadway’s playwrights pledged one night’s box-office receipts to Finnish war relief. The holdout was Lillian (The Little Foxes) Hellman, who, like some other American leftists, sided with Moscow.

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Finland’s chronicle begins relatively late in the history of the West. The Finns’ forebears first started to migrate into Finland from the south shore of the Gulf of Finland—today’s Estonia—around 2,000 years ago. They settled in three different groups: the Suomalaiset* along the southwestern coast; the Hiilialaiset in the western lake district; and the Karjalaiset, or Karelians, along the western shore of Lake Ladoga. As the new settlements grew, the indigenous Lapps migrated northward, above the Arctic Circle.

During the short summers and long winters, the typical talonpoika, or pioneer-farmer, eked out a meager subsistence. To clear the wooded terrain, he felled trees in the autumn, and burned them the following spring. A birchbark roof, weighted with sod for insulation, covered his one-room log cabin. The small plots he tilled produced barley, oats, and rye. He raised a few horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, and goats. During the spring and autumn, the talonpoika ventured into the woods to hunt and fish. He trapped lynx, marten, and fox, and sold or bartered their furs along the coast. Small Finnish trading vessels, hugging the jagged coastline, carried the goods to

*Finns today call themselves Suomalaiset and their country Suomi after this region.
FINLAND

Tallinn, Gdansk, and other ports along the Baltic coast.

Since the 12th century, Finland has stood between East and West. Legend has it that King Erik and Bishop Henry of Uppsala led the first major Christian crusade to Finland around 1155. (Henry, later martyred by an ax-wielding peasant named Lalli, became the Church of Finland's patron saint.) Church officials in Rome made the first written reference to Finland in 1172, while compiling a list of Swedish provinces. But Finland did not yet belong to the Swedish crown; it was still missionary territory, beyond Stockholm's reach. In 1216, Pope Innocent III authorized the Swedish king to bring Finland within his realm. The bishops of Turku ruled Finland as an autonomous ecclesiastical state and dispatched missionaries to spread Christianity across the peninsula. By 1540, the Church of Finland watched over more than 100 churches, adorned with statues of their saints—Olav, Lawrence, Anna, and Martin of Tours.

**Sweden's Österland**

Western Christianity, however, did not go unchallenged. In 1227, missionaries under Novgorod's Duke Jaroslav ventured westward, forcing the Karelians to be baptized into the Eastern Church. Russian and Swedish forces clashed for decades before the two sides negotiated, for the first time, Sweden's (and Finland's) eastern border. The Treaty of Nöteborg (1323) delineated not only Swedish and Russian spheres of influence but also the boundaries of western and eastern Christianity, of Rome and Constantinople.

For the next 500 years, Finland would be Sweden's österland, her eastern territory. The arrangement was benign. Finns enjoyed all the privileges of Swedish citizens, including the right to help elect the Swedish king and to be represented in the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament. Finns joined the Swedes in their repeated military expeditions on the Continent; some 25 percent of all Swedish troops were Finns, who became known, like the Scots and the Swiss, for their qualities as warriors. Prayed the trembling Catholic followers of the Hapsburgs in the 17th century: “From the horrible Finns, dear Lord, deliver us.”

Thus, for a half-millennium, the fates of Sweden and Finland were bound together. Swedish kings, by design or accident, shaped Finland's future. One of them, Gustav I Vasa, acceded to the throne in 1523. Vasa tried to govern Sweden-Finland as his private estate. He broke relations with Rome in 1524, transferred church lands to the crown, abolished the Mass, and banned the use of Latin in church services. Vasa even decreed that each church give the crown one of its bells—which, of course, could be bought back by the congregation at a suitable price.

Inadvertently, Vasa's eccentricities made Sweden-Finland fertile
Nearly the size of California, Finland (130,119 square miles) is Europe's fifth largest country. Only 200,000 Finns live above the Arctic Circle, where, in winter, the sun does not appear at all for seven straight weeks.
ground for the spread of another faith—Lutheranism. Foremost among the many Swedes and Finns who had fallen under Martin Luther’s teachings at Wittenberg was Mikael Agricola, the bishop of Turku. By translating various religious writings into the vernacular—including the New Testament—Agricola brought the gospel of Christ to the common man. A well-known jingle testified to the popularity of Agricola’s ABC primer and his rukouskirja, or Book of Prayers: Kun ABCKirja ensin on / Siittä alku opista uskon (When the ABC book came into being / The people began to learn the faith).

Despite the efforts of Vasa and his grandson, Gustavus Adolphus (1594–1632), to give Sweden a centralized regime, Swedish kings allowed Finnish culture to flourish. Clergymen delivered their sermons in Finnish. Courts normally permitted the use of Finnish in oral proceedings. The Swedish army included separate Finnish-speaking regiments. A Finnish Diet, established in 1617, helped the King govern the Finnish-speaking provinces.

All in all, the link to Sweden proved extraordinarily fortunate for Finland. From the Swedes, Finns acquired a preference for democratic and constitutional government, for humanistic values, and for free speech and religion. In large part, this legacy explains why Finns identify with the West rather than the East today. “The Finlander,” wrote the ethnologist James Latham in 1856, was “united with the Swede rather than subjected to him . . . his civilization is that of western Europe rather than eastern Europe.”

‘The Great Wrath’

Finland might well have remained attached to the Swedish crown. But time and again, geography would cast Finland in the role of Europe’s innocent bystander, brought willy-nilly into political and military contests by the Continent’s great powers.

Between 1700 and 1721, Peter the Great fought and defeated Sweden’s King Charles XII in the Great Northern War. Peter sought, as he put it, “a cushion” upon which his newly established imperial capital, St. Petersburg (now Leningrad), “might be secure.” As Sweden’s eastern frontier, Finland suffered the most during the war. Nearly one-quarter of Finland’s 400,000 inhabitants perished in the last eight years of fighting, later known as “The Great Wrath.” Helsinki, Lappeenranta, Porvoo, and Pietarsaari were burnt to the ground. During the conflict, one Swedish official observed, “All the thrusts received by Sweden from her worst enemy have gone right through Finland’s heart.”

In the 19th century, Finland again became entangled in the great power maneuverings on the Continent. The peace that Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I made on a raft in the middle of the Niemen River at Tilsit also brought war to faraway Finland. Under the Treaty
of Tilsit (1807), Russia was obliged to bring her nominal ally Sweden into Napoleon's naval blockade against England. But Sweden's King Gustavus IV Adolphus refused to go along, forcing the tsar to declare war on Sweden.

On February 21, 1808, Russian troops struck across the Karelian Isthmus. With his troops underequipped and outnumbered, the Finnish commander-in-chief, W. M. Klingspor, ordered his men to retreat. Poet Johan Ludvig Runeberg immortalized the heartwrenching march northward through the snow:

He scans the frozen contour of Siikajoki's plain,
As desolate as a corpse before interment,
But sadder is the thought of the army in his train,
That fled from Russian war-cries of triumph and disdain.

After 13 months of resistance, the Swedes sued for peace. Under the terms of the armistice, Gustavus surrendered his Finnish territories to the tsar. As soon as the fighting ended, Alexander I convened the Finnish Diet at the village of Porvoo, 30 miles east of Helsinki. There, on March 25, 1809, the Diet pledged loyalty to the tsar, the "Grand Duke of Finland." In turn, Alexander accepted Finland into his empire as a self-governing constitutional state. Thus, 19th-century Finns would fare better than their Polish counterparts, who suffered under both Russian and Prussian oppression. On April 4, 1809, Alexander promised "to confirm and secure to them the maintenance of their religion and fundamental laws." The Diet managed to do what Finns had done before and would do again: preserve Finland's culture and identity in the aftermath of defeat.

Fennomania

In retrospect, Finns might well have greeted Russia's victory with a sigh of relief. It was ironic that as a satrapy of Imperial Russia, Finland's traditional nemesis, the country would enjoy its longest period of uninterrupted peace. Passports read: "Finnish Citizen, Russian Subject." Although the tsar's personal representative, the governor-general, sat in Helsinki, Finns would experience little interference from St. Petersburg. Russian military conscription stopped at the border (though many Finns volunteered for the Imperial Army). As one governor-general, F. L. Heiden, remarked, it would be futile to force Finnish youth, "accustomed to eating salted herring, to eat buckwheat porridge."

Indeed, many Finns did not like the "taste" of Russian nationality, the tsar's restrained attitude notwithstanding. Finnish journalist and nationalist Adolf Ivar Arwidsson complained of feeling like a "squatter in a rotten province governed by stupid asses and sly..."
THE YKSINKERTAINEN FINNISH LANGUAGE

In French, the word is téléphone; in Italian, it is telefono; in Russian, telefon; but in Finnish it is puhelin. Indeed, most Finnish words look and sound strange to many Europeans. That fact has helped Finns to preserve their own national identity, despite centuries of Swedish and Russian rule.

Finnish stands well apart from English, French, Spanish, German, and other Western tongues because it belongs to the Finno-Ugric—not to the Indo-European—family of languages. The Finns’ ancestors, anthropologists believe, began to disperse from their homeland in the southern Ural mountains around 3000 B.C. The Uralians divided into two groups; some eventually settled in present-day Hungary, while others migrated to Estonia and Finland. With some practice, modern Finns and Estonians can understand each other; Hungarians and Finns cannot.

Just how different is Finnish? Imagine an American student in Helsinki, learning a language with no gender, no articles, few prepositions, 15 cases, and words that seem to stretch halfway across the page. Even “simple” is not: yksinkertainen. The Finnish language relies heavily on a bewildering array of prefixes, suffixes, and infixes (particles within a word). Thus, pöydä means “table” and pöydällä means “on the table.” One noun with several particles can express what would need a whole phrase in English. “Let’s have a look” equals katsotaanpa in Finnish. And thanks to the oddities of the Finnish transliteration, our student would even find imported words such as pankki (bank) impossible to recognize.

Nor does mastery of Finnish pronunciation come easily. The sole difference between saying tapaamme (we meet) and tapamme (we kill), for example.
As a literary language, Finnish is young, and has matured slowly. Finnish was not an official language until Tsar Alexander II so declared it in 1863. And the University of Helsinki—where classes had long been taught exclusively in Swedish—did not become bilingual until 1923.

The task of fashioning everyday Finnish into a literary form fell to assorted scholars and amateur linguists. The physician and future University of Helsinki professor Elias Lönnrot (1802–84) was one of them. While practicing medicine in the Karelian village of Kajaani, Lönnrot transcribed thousands of verses from Karelian cantos, or runes. From these he constructed a single long, connected oral poem, which he called the Kalevala (1835). Here was an epic work, many thought, an expression of the genius of ordinary Finns. As it turned out, Lönnrot had written many of the verses himself. “I myself began to conjure,” he later admitted. “I myself began to sing.”

In any case, the 12,000-line Kalevala, with its vivid descriptions of Finnish landscapes, nature, customs, and folk life, spurred a sense of pride—the quintessence, it seemed, of Finnish culture and nationhood:

O thou lovely little village, / Fairest spot in all the country! / Grass below, and cornfields over, / In the midst between the village. / Fair the shore below the village, / By the shore is gleaming water, / Where the ducks delight in swimming, / And the water-fowl are sporting.

Not surprisingly, the Kalevala played a central role in Finland’s national awakening, and inspired the paintings and frescoes of Akseli Gallén-Kallela (1865–1931) and the pastoral moods of Jean Sibelius’s Finlandia (1899) and other musical compositions.

As a Grand Duchy of Russia, Finland moved forward on all fronts. Geographically, the country expanded when, in 1812, Alexander I restored to Finland territories that had been lost to Russia after the Great Northern War. At the same time, public education became much more available. Between 1875 and 1917, the number of public school students soared from 15,000 to over 200,000. Thousands of boys and girls, once busy only with domestic chores, found themselves reading Finnish literary classics, such as Elias Lönnrot’s Kalevala, a compilation of Karelian poems and songs, and Johan Runeberg’s patriotic Tales of Ensign Stål (1848).

Under the tsars, the Finns would enjoy material progress. Lacking large deposits of coal and iron ore, 19th-century Finns, it seemed, would be forever dependent on fishing, farming, and fur trading. In 1850, 90 percent of all Finns still tilled the soil. But industrialization in Western Europe soon spurred demand for Finland’s wide range of timber products—pit props for coal mines, plywood for crating and packaging, poles for telegraph companies. Lumber-hauling paddle steamers snaked through Finland’s 3,000-mile web of interconnect-
ing canals and lakes. Steam-powered ferries took lumber and dairy products from Finland's southwest coast to Stockholm. Icebreakers, first launched from Finnboda wharf at Stockholm in 1890, kept the ports in the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland open all year round. By the turn of the century, dozens of steamships, many operating out of Helsinki and Hanko, hauled textiles from Tampere and Turku and glassware from Nuutajarvi to other European metropoles, such as Hamburg and Stettin.

The belated Finnish economic boom may have been too much of a good thing. Seeing advantages in bringing a prosperous Finland more directly under the empire's control, Tsar Nicholas II set out to Russify the peninsula. His February Manifesto of 1899 essentially ended the lawmaking powers of the Finnish Diet. Finland's ruling elite—mostly Swedish-speaking liberals—were shocked and angered. Within 10 days, some 523,000 Finns (half of the country's adult population) signed a petition protesting the Manifesto, which a delegation of Finnish luminaries presented to the tsar in St. Petersburg. Nicholas paid no attention.

Courting the Kaiser

The tsar's resistance deepened the crisis. Increasingly, events in Helsinki paralleled those in St. Petersburg. The burgeoning working class nudged the new Social Democratic Party further and further to the Left, while Russian political exiles in Finland propagated the ideologies of Karl Kautsky and Karl Marx. Students and intellectuals joined in forming secret societies, such as the Kagal, which exhorted young male Finns to resist passively the newly expanded Russian military conscription. Less than half of all Finns summoned for duty showed up to serve. In 1904, one member of the Finnish Activists, Eugen Schauman, assassinated the governor-general, Nikolay I. Bobrikov, in his office in Helsinki. Suddenly, Finland—so quiet, remote, passive, and parochial—began to look like anywhere else.

By the time World War I began in 1914, Finnish nationalists were courting Russia's enemies, notably Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany, as logical allies in their own struggle to liberate Finland. Some 2,000 young Finns received military training at Hamburg's Feldmeister School. As members of the 27th Royal Prussian Jaeger Battalion, they eventually fought alongside German troops, against the Russians near the Gulf of Riga. Finnish novelist Joel Lehtonen wrote that the atmosphere in Helsinki before World War I was "like the period before a thunderstorm, stifling, suffocating, making one restless, almost as if longing for some sort of explosion."

The first thunderclap sounded on March 15, 1917, when Tsar Nicholas II abdicated; his regime was later replaced by Aleksandr Kerensky's provisional government. In Finland, the end of Russia's
1,000-year-old monarchy raised more questions than it answered. Who now would inherit the power of the absent tsar?

In Petrograd, the Kerensky government refused to let the semi-autonomous Finnish parliament, or Eduskunta, the new unicameral assembly that had replaced the old Diet in 1906, establish home rule. But when Lenin's Bolsheviks toppled the Kerensky regime on November 7, 1917, most Finns were ready to insist that their country should be sovereign. On December 6, 1917, the Eduskunta, led by a coalition of nonsocialist parties, proclaimed Finland independent with "the legislature the repository of supreme power."

Finnish socialists, however, were not going to let power slip into bourgeois hands so easily. Buoyed by Lenin's triumph in Petrograd, they were eager for their own Bolshevik revolution in Helsinki. Social Democratic Party leaders sanctioned the formation of Red Guard units, and, on November 13, had proclaimed a nationwide strike. The Eduskunta responded by setting up its own police force—the Civic, or White, Guards—to expel the 40,000-man Russian garrison from Finland and restore order. Suddenly, Finns—normally unified in the face of a Russian threat—found themselves both divided and mired in a nasty civil war.

Fighting broke out on January 19, 1918, when the Whites at-
tempted to break up Red Guard gunrunning between Petrograd and Viipuri. On the same day, Gen. Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim traveled incognito, as the merchant “Gustaf Malmberg,” to the city of Vaasa on the Gulf of Bothnia. From there he would command the White troops—a “farmer’s army” of 70,000, mostly small landholders and country lads. Nine days later, the Red Guards—now some 100,000 strong—occupied the government offices in Helsinki, forcing chief executive Pehr Svinhufvud and other White leaders to join Mannerheim in Vaasa. Mannerheim’s counterrevolutionary forces, buttressed by 12,000 German troops and the Finnish Jaegers, eventually managed to re-establish order and take control of Red strongholds in the south. On May 16, 1918, the victorious White forces paraded through the streets of Helsinki.

Finally, Finland belonged to itself. But the price had been high. Cruelties on both sides left deep psychological wounds. Some 21,000 Finns had died in the civil strife. More than 8,000 Reds were executed in the war’s aftermath; nearly 10 times as many were herded through prison camps during the summer of 1918. Many died of disease and starvation. Others fled to Sweden, the Soviet Union, or the United States. Those who returned to their towns and villages did so bearing the onus of having sided with those who had tried to overthrow the government.

Now a sovereign nation, Finland, for the first time in its history, would conduct its own foreign affairs. The privilege, of course, brought commensurate burdens. During the 1920s and ’30s, Finnish presidents found themselves in roughly the same position as the early Swedish kings: maintaining a guarded, uneasy relationship with the big eastern neighbor. Not even the 1939–40 Winter War would reconcile, as Finnish diplomat Max Jakobson has put it, “Finnish will to independence with the great power ambitions of Russia.”

**Hitler’s Co-Belligerent**

Indeed, just weeks after the Winter War ended, Finland found itself afflicted once more by geography, caught between two great powers. On April 9, 1940, Nazi troops invaded Denmark and Norway, and quickly occupied Oslo, Bergen, and Narvik, the tiny port from which the Nazis exported Swedish iron and Finnish nickel to Germany. The Finns later allowed German troops and materiel to transit through Finland, to and from northern Norway. In July, the Soviets won *their* concessions: transit rights for military supplies on Finnish railroads from the Soviet border to the Soviets’ Hanko naval base on the southern coast.

Clearly, each totalitarian power had designs on Finland. From November 10 to 12, the Soviet and German foreign ministers, Vyacheslav Molotov and Joachim von Ribbentrop, met in Berlin to
Field Marshal Carl Gustaf Mannerheim (1867-1951), Swedish-born aristocrat, is shown here at his wartime command post at Mikkeli in 1942.

discuss the future of Finland. Russia's interest in applying "a settlement on the same scale as in Bessarabia to Finland" collided with Hitler's desire to secure supplies of Finnish nickel needed for his war effort. By June 1941, the Germans had deployed five divisions in Finnish Lapland, with the approval of Helsinki.

On June 22, 1941, Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa, attacking Russia all along its western border. On June 25, the Red Air Force bombed Kerimaki, Turku, Porvoo, and other Finnish cities. Two days later, Finland's 400,000-man army counterattacked; some 60,000 German troops joined in the advance in northern Finland. Hitler wasted no time in bragging that his Wehrmacht was fighting "side by side with their Finnish comrades."

But the Finns did not quite see it that way. Their military effort was a "continuation of the Winter War"; Germany and Finland, as "co-belligerents" (not allies), shared nothing more than a common enemy. Hitler demanded that the Finns join in the Wehrmacht siege of Leningrad, and in a planned attack on the Murmansk-to-Moscow railway, along which came boots, blankets, and other supplies for the Red Army, carried by Allied convoys to Murmansk. In both campaigns, the Finns refused to participate. Finland's leading Social Democratic daily, the Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, claimed that co-bellig-
erency with Germany would not “limit Finland’s freedom of action; it does not change our relations with other countries; it does not tie us to any foreign ideology.”

Nevertheless, Great Britain and the United States could not dismiss the reality that Finland was fighting alongside the Germans, against an ally. And Finnish operations, contrary to their claims, were not entirely defensive. By August 1941, Finnish troops had crossed the pre-Winter War frontiers into Soviet territory. On December 6, 1941, Finnish Independence Day, Churchill declared war on Finland. Allied suspicions seemed confirmed when Finland’s President Risto Ryti wrote to Hitler on June 26, 1944 that he would not “make peace with the Soviet Union except in agreement with the German Reich.” Four days later, U.S. officials lowered the American embassy’s flag in Helsinki; the U.S. ambassador went home. “Most Americans,” according to an editorial in the New Republic, were “badly troubled in their minds about Finland.”

As the Third Reich crumbled, Finland’s Continuation War ended in much the same fashion as the Winter War: The Soviets captured the Karelian Isthmus (in June 1944) and forced Finland to sign an armistice. This time, Finland would have to surrender not only much of the Karelian frontier zone but also its valuable nickel mines near the far northern city of Petsamo. The Finns were forced to lease the Porkkala Peninsula—which lay just 18 miles west of Helsinki—to the Soviets for 50 years.

The peace settlement also stipulated that the Finns expel 200,000 German troops remaining in Lapland—which they did, between September 1944 and March 1945. As the Germans retreated under Finnish harassment into Norway, they left behind a wasteland, destroying buildings, bridges, and telephone poles.

Thus, Finland was the only nation involved in World War II to fight both Germany and the Soviet Union. It was also the only European nation bordering on the Soviet Union to remain a Western-style democracy after Hitler’s demise.

Why the Soviet Union never simply took over Finland—as it did the Baltic republics and parts of Poland and Romania to the south—remains a matter of scholarly debate. Stalin may have judged such a step too costly in terms of possible Western reactions in 1944—45. Or perhaps the Soviets’ study of Finnish history imparted a lesson, which has not been forgotten by the Kremlin today. “The Russians have learnt,” as British historian Paul Winterton observed, “that the Finns are an indigestible people, but [the Russians] also know that they do not have to swallow Finland in order to get what they require.”
THE FINNISH SOLUTION

by Pekkä Kalevi Hamalainen

In Helsinki, the summer sun rises at about 4 A.M., and sets after 10 P.M. The pitkä paiviä, or long days, compensate for the short, gloomy days of November and December. Summer tourists find the Finns savoring the season: families, couples, and groups of students from the University of Helsinki throng the Esplanade, a broad park that stretches five blocks from Mannerheimintie, the city's main boulevard, to South Harbor. Some stroll through the landscaped common; others sit and talk near a bronze statue of Johan Ludvig Runeberg, Finland's national poet.

Two blocks away, patrons browse through the Academic Book Store. With 12 miles of shelves and a white marble interior, it is one of Europe's largest and most luxurious book outlets. Meanwhile, down at Market Square, at South Harbor, farmers hawk fresh fruits and vegetables under orange canvas tents. Out on the water, red-hulled ferries shuttle tourists and their cars to and from Stockholm, Travemünde in West Germany, and other Baltic ports.

Nearby, at the Kappeli, a popular outdoor restaurant, patrons sip coffee, "long drinks" (gin and tonics), or one of Finland's beers—Lahden A, Lapin Kulta, Karjala. A small passenger ferry from South Harbor takes couples to Suomenlinna, an 18th-century island-fortress in South Harbor, to dine at Walhalla, an open-air terrace restaurant. Entrées might include roasted breast of ptarmigan (an arctic grouse) and grilled smoked eel.

Like Geneva or Bonn, Helsinki is an efficient business center, where bureaucrats and executives drive to their offices in Volvos, Saabs, and Toyotas; almost everyone else uses the punctual commuter transit system.* The city's architecture is handsome but unprepossessing; no International-style glass high-rises dominate the skyline. "I found it a sensible, always honest city," wrote one American reporter from Helsinki, "perhaps even chaste among the shopworn capitals of Europe."

With so much of the good life to offer, it is little wonder that Helsinki has become a civilized refuge for Western diplomats, journalists, and students who dwell in the bleak austerity of Moscow and Leningrad. Westerners in the Soviet Union travel to Helsinki on weekends, often by plane from Moscow, or by train from Leningrad.

*Japanese automakers hold the largest single share (38 percent) of the Finnish market for imported automobiles; the Russians rank only fourth, despite a television ad campaign and large roadside billboards for the Soviet-made Lada.
They come to shop for Arabia china, Ettalia glassware, Marimekko fabrics. Stockmann—Helsinki’s fashionable five-floor department store—maintains a 15-member export staff to handle some $2 million in annual sales to Westerners and high-level Soviet party officials in the Soviet Union alone. When Soviet Premier Yuri V. Andropov died on February 10, 1984, Stockmann delivered a funeral wreath to the U.S. embassy in Moscow within 24 hours.

Prosperity is by no means limited to Helsinki (pop. 484,000) and its tidy suburbs. Indeed, while many Americans consider affluent Sweden the model of Scandinavian society, it would be difficult to argue that Finns are significantly worse off. Although their wages are lower than those in other Nordic lands, Finns enjoy the world’s ninth highest gross national product (GNP) per capita ($10,740)—ranking well behind the United States ($14,110) and Sweden ($12,470), but slightly ahead of France ($10,500) and Japan ($10,120). Partly because Helsinki discourages “guest workers”—fewer than 20,000 foreigners live in Finland—unemployment hovers around a modest six percent; inflation is less than three percent.

Prayer in the Schools

Like Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, Finland supports a generous welfare state. The government provides a wide array of benefits for the unemployed, the sick, the disabled, and the retired. National health insurance pays 80 percent of all medical expenses—including the cost of contraceptives and abortions. The state also subsidizes university education and the nation’s amateur sporting clubs, newspapers, orchestras, and theater companies; it even picks up the tab for political party functions.

Yet Finland’s social welfare system has not grown as large as others in Europe. Government spending in Finland accounts for just 36.2 percent of the country’s gross domestic product—compared to 59.8 percent in Sweden and 58 percent in Denmark (and 36.9 percent in the United States). Helsinki has nationalized a sizable slice of the economy. About 14 percent of all employees work for state-owned companies—compared with 16 percent in France and seven percent in Sweden. But most government firms, such as Finnair (the airline), Imatran Voirna (the power utility), and Alko (the state alcohol business), operate as profit-making corporations.

An egalitarian tradition, a common culture, and a small homoge-

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neous population have given Finns a highly civilized society. Street-cars, buses, and public parks are neat and well-kept. Graffiti are unknown, even in the tough industrial cities of Tampere and Turku. Finns can brag—though they seldom do—that they have the *lowest* rate of infant mortality in the world. Virtually all adults are functionally literate, thanks to the demanding school system and a public consensus on high standards of education. Known as voracious readers, Finns borrow some 72.3 million books—about 15 per person—from the nation’s network of 1,600 public libraries and 200 bookmobiles every year.

Above all, Finns have more of what middle-class urban Americans seem to miss most: free time. Although widely regarded as diligent workers, most employees in Helsinki leave the office after no more than a seven-hour day. By law, all working Finns are entitled to five weeks of vacation. Many spend three weeks in the summer at the lake or seaside, one week in the autumn hunting moose or fox, and one week cross-country skiing in the winter. Thus, at first glance, Finns would seem to have it all—a sentiment expressed not long ago by Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa before a group of Finnish bankers. “Can you please name a country,” Sorsa asked, “where market forces operate so freely as to frighten some firms, where there is no international terrorism, and never has been, where [Lutheran] prayer in the schools has been part of daily life for decades?”

Yet Finland is no paradise. Like their Icelandic counterparts, many Finnish academics and scientists feel isolated from the wider world by language and geography. The country is too small to support the level of scientific and technological research that is taken for granted in countries like Sweden or West Germany.

**Good-bye to Cohabitation**

Two years ago, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, asked leading Scandinavian intellectuals for frank appraisals of their respective countries.* These anonymous “Nordic Voices,” as published in *Daedalus*, included the comments of 10 Finns. All of them held forth in English. They pondered certain ailments in Finnish society: drunk driving, the relatively high rate of homicide, and the burgeoning government. “Finland’s bureaucracy is smaller than Sweden’s,” said one of the interviewees, “but it’s beginning to seem excessive.”

Nearly all the Finns compared themselves to the self-assured Swedes, who think, as one commentator put it, that “they know how to solve all the problems.” Indeed, Finns retain an uneasy blend of

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*Finns are not traditionally known for loquacity. One story has it that a Finn and a Swede went to a Helsinki bar and ordered beer. Raising his glass, the Swede said: “Skål.” Replied the Finn: “Did we come here to drink or to talk?”*
Finnland

Envy and disdain toward their rich western neighbor and former colonizer. “Swedes have the influence of a monarchy and a landed aristocracy to live down,” said one Finn. “But Finland was always dominated by farmers. It’s an egalitarian state, with no tradition of wealth.” Said another interviewee: “[As exporters] Finns operate on a world scale. Sweden imagines that it does, but its real influence is—or was—in Scandinavia. . . . The Swedish ambassador arrives imagining that he is our big brother.”

Whatever Finns say about the Swedes, they are proud to be Finnish themselves. “People are all very patriotic. No one makes much of the class struggle,” said one. “The call is to think of ourselves as a nation, and not as a separate interest group.” Others noted the Finnish respect for authority (“We are used to the law. We obey it.”) and family values (“We are home-centered. We [have] already passed through the phase of unmarried cohabitation.”).

What strikes outsiders (including the Soviets) most about the Finns is their *sisu*—a word which expresses, all at once, toughness, resilience, fierceness, and inner moral strength. “They love to pit themselves against the elements and endure the worst that winter can offer,” observes a former *Time* correspondent, Donald S. Connery. “They bake like lobsters in the sauna and then plunge naked through a hole in the surface of a frozen lake.”

First and foremost, Finns regard themselves as Westerners, despite the fact that their country lies farther east than Poland and

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Czechoslovakia, and that it belonged to Imperial Russia for more than a century (1809–1917). As Swedish citizens for some 500 years, until 1809, Finns grew accustomed to constitutional government, a free press, and Western Christianity. More than 300,000 Swedish-speaking Finns live in Finland today—most along the southern and western coasts and in the Aland Archipelago, a string of islands that stretches out into the Gulf of Bothnia. Like the Swedes, more than 90 percent of all Finns adhere to the Lutheran faith (though only four percent attend services on a regular basis); only 1.3 percent belong to the Eastern Church. “The rugged individuality of Martin Luther’s movement,” former president Urho Kekkonen once said, “seemed as if made to order for the way of life that was growing up here amidst the dark forests.”

Like most other Western European nations, Finland is a democratic republic, complete with a popularly-elected president, a prime minister, and a 200-seat parliament, or Eduskunta, in Helsinki. Power is diffused. The Eduskunta includes representatives from nine different parties. In fact, no single party has ever won a majority of seats in parliament since the founding of the republic in 1919. Consequently, Finnish prime ministers have been forced to assemble shaky, sometimes minority, coalition governments representing various segments of Finnish society. The Social Democrats draw their support from the southern industrial working class; the Center Party is most popular among farmers in the rural north; the conservative National Coalition
THE FINNS IN AMERICA

Finns, by reputation, are stolid and pragmatic. Yet the 360,000 Finns who immigrated to the United States between 1860 and 1920 ranked among America’s most politically radical newcomers.

The first Finns in the New World arrived as Swedish subjects. In 1638, Stockholm sent its more undesirable Finns—lawbreakers and draft dodgers—to help settle New Sweden, on the west bank of the Delaware River. But Finnish immigration did not begin in earnest until the 1860s. The Quincy (copper) Mining Company of Hancock, Michigan, recruited impoverished Finns who were fishing, mining, and farming in the northern reaches of Norway. Word quickly spread to Vaasa, Turku, and Helsinki that jobs for unskilled laborers were waiting in the mines and forests of the United States.

The Finns favored rural towns, especially in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Michigan’s Upper Peninsula, though many settled elsewhere. Finns loaded iron ore in Conneaut, Ohio; netted Chinook salmon along the Columbia River near Astoria, Oregon; manufactured textiles in Worcester, Massachusetts. The young women labored as domestics. “The Finnish servant,” reported the Nation in 1918, “is one of the most sought for and best paid on account of her nature, intelligence, and efficiency.”

Like the Danes and the Swedes, the Finns were organizers. In Calumet, Michigan, they founded an Apostolic-Lutheran Church, the Finnish Mutual Aid Society, the weekly newspaper Amerikan Suomalainen (Finnish-American), a saloon, and nine public saunas. Throughout the Midwest, the Finns turned warehouses, cheese factories, and boarding houses into consumer cooperatives. In 1917, representatives of 65 Finnish co-ops set up the Cooperative Central Exchange (CCE) in Superior, Wisconsin. The CCE marketed its own Red Star brand of products, emblazoned with the Russian Revolution’s hammer and sickle.

The cooperatives spurred the burgeoning Finnish socialist movement. Newspapers like Raivaaja (Pioneer) of Fitchburg, Massachusetts, and Toveri (Comrade) of Astoria, Oregon, spread the word. By 1913, the Finnish Socialist Party includes much of the country’s white-collar, upper-middle class; and the communist People’s Democratic League comprises a dwindling population of aging laborers. With so many parties representing contrasting social and economic interests, it is not surprising that Finnish post-war governments have lasted, on average, only about one year. The present “center-left” cabinet—made up chiefly of Social Democratic and Center Party ministers—has proved more durable than most. First formed in May 1983, the four-party coalition is expected to endure until the parliamentary elections of March 1987.*

But the recurring debates over budgets and the jockeying of party

*Since 1966, the Social Democratic Party has held more seats in parliament than any other party. Fifty-seven Social Democrats now sit in the Eduskunta. Other parties represented include the People’s Democratic League (27), the National Coalition Party (44), the Center Party (38), the Swedish People’s Party (11), the Christian League (3), the Rural Party (17), the environmentalist Greens (2), and the ultrarightist Constitutionists (1).
Finnish-Americans, as a group, are probably more conservative and more Republican than the nation at large. Only a few predominantly Finnish communities remain in the United States, some of them in the South. The 15,000 Finnish-Americans who live in Lake Worth and Lantana, Florida, run one Finnish newspaper, *Amerikan Uutiset* (America's News, circ. 3,000), 17 motels, three churches, and a Kentät Haali, or "social hall," used for Finnish dances and dinners—but no drinking or betting.

Finnish-Americans, notes Timo Poropudas, editor of the Superior, Wisconsin, newsweekly *Työnties Ettepin* (Working Man Forward), "think of themselves as quiet, stubborn, hard-working and honest—and most of them are."

politicians tend to mask an underlying Finnish consensus on the welfare state, on policy toward the Soviet Union, and on cultural and psychological adherence to the West.

Finland's Western orientation is most pronounced among the younger generation, which avidly follows British and American pop culture. Nearly all (96 percent) Finnish high school students pick English as the first of the two foreign languages they must study. Less than one percent choose the language of the neighboring superpower. Finns, young and old, regularly watch the "Cosby Show," "Dynasty," and other American programs on the state-run TV network. Nearly half of the movies shown in Finland every year are American products, *Rocky IV, Out of Africa,* and *White Nights*—often dubbed in Finnish with Swedish subtitles—have numbered among the recent box office hits. One American movie star has at-
tracted his own following in Finland; some of the teenagers who loiter in downtown Helsinki call themselves *diinarit*—disciples of Hollywood’s James Dean.

That the Finns enjoy an open, free society may not surprise most Americans. But in 1945, just after World War II, the odds seemed good that Finland, under pressure from Moscow, would be drawn behind the Iron Curtain. “We shall no doubt hope that Finland will be left some degree of at least cultural and commercial independence,” said British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in August 1944, “[but] Russian influence will in any event be predominant in Finland, and we shall not be able . . . to contest that influence.”

**Watching from Porkkala**

Like Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, Finland found itself in dire straits after the war. Some 85,000 men had died in five years of combat against the Russians; another 425,000 Finns were uprooted when the Soviets annexed the Karelian territories along Finland’s eastern border. In addition, the Soviets demanded huge reparations, the actual amount of which cannot be determined: The indemnity was paid not in currency but in 199 categories of goods. Russian orders included, for example, 5,500 freight cars, 500 steam locomotives, and four papermills—all of which had to be built according to rigorous specifications and timetables. Keeping watch was the Soviet garrison of the Porkkala naval base, near Helsinki, which the Soviets had “leased” from the Finns for 50 years.

The Soviet Union might have tried to impose its will on the Finns. It did so everywhere else in Eastern Europe where the Red Army had stood victorious. But Finland survived. The Soviets had learned to respect the Finns’ toughness, their *sisu*, in five years of combat. They could not occupy Finland without another war, and, possibly, a showdown with the West. For their part, the Finns had learned that they could not depend on the Americans, the British, or anyone else for help; they had to bury the hatchet and get along with the Soviets. Even so, survival was not easy.

Thus, in 1946, as reconstruction began, Juho Paasikivi, Finland’s 76-year-old president, argued that Finland “must not direct itself against the Soviet Union.” Nor should the country, he believed, compromise its sovereignty, or allow the Soviets to meddle in Finland’s internal affairs. “The composition of the [Finnish] government,” he said, “…is not the business of the Communist Party or the Soviet newspapers, radio, or in general of the Soviet Union.”

This middle way, between conflict and co-optation, was dubbed by Finnish journalists and politicians the “Paasikivi Line,” and still steers Finnish foreign policy today.

The Paasikivi Line meant being both flexible and tough. As
prime minister, Paasikivi, in 1944, kept the Soviets happy by legalizing the Finnish Communist Party, which had been outlawed since 1930. When he became president in 1946, Paasikivi appointed Mauno Pekkala, a Communist, as prime minister. Various “war criminals,” including former president Rysto Ryti, were brought to trial. (Ryti was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in jail; he served only half that long, and was later restored to a position of honor.) Paasikivi, however, was no lackey of the Kremlin. In the face of Soviet pressure, for example, he stood by Social Democrat Karl August Fagerholm’s first government (1948–50), which had eliminated Communists from the cabinet.

Holding the Line also meant making painful choices. After the war, Finland quietly received some $120 million in U.S. aid through the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank. But Helsinki felt it had to refuse more American dollars that would have been available under the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction (named after U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall). On July 10, 1947, Finland’s parliamentary Foreign Relations Committee declared that “the Mar-

Famous Finns: architect Alvar Aalto (1898-1976), whose designs resemble those of Frank Lloyd Wright; composer Jean Sibelius (1865-1957); and Paavo Nurmi, the “Flying Finn,” winner of six gold medals in three Olympics (1920, '24, and '28).
shall Plan [has] become the source of serious differences of opinion among the Big Powers. ... Desiring to remain outside the areas of conflict in Big Power politics, [Finland] regrets that it does not find it possible to participate.”

Finland’s rejection of Marshall Plan aid pleased the Kremlin. But pressure from the East did not cease. In 1948, Finns watched Soviet moves elsewhere in Europe and wondered what would happen to them. On February 4, 1948, Stalin signed a mutual defense pact with Romania, formally bringing that country within the Soviet orbit. Hungary agreed to a similar accord two weeks later. On February 20, 1948, Czech Communists, with Stalin’s backing, toppled their country’s democratic government. And three days after that, Stalin sent a letter to President Paasikivi, urging “a mutual assistance pact” between Finland and the USSR. With Finnish Communists arguing that “the road of Czechoslovakia” was the road for them, many Finns feared a Communist coup.

A coup did seem possible. In 1948, the People’s Democratic League was one of the strongest parties in Finland. It held six of 18 cabinet posts, including the powerful Ministry of the Interior, which controlled the Valpo, a state police force. President Paasikivi warned Finnish Communists, privately, against any reckless moves. “We are not Czechs,” he said. “Such events may not take place in Finland, and will not take place, before I am shot.”

Whether or not Finnish Communists actually planned a coup remains a matter of debate; in any case, nothing materialized. Instead, Stalin settled for a treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance that Finnish Prime Minister Mauno Pekkala and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov signed in Moscow on April 6, 1948. The treaty, said Molotov, stood “as a convincing example of the lack of aggressiveness in Soviet foreign policy.”

**Pravda Protests**

Indeed, the Soviets, for the most part, allowed Paasikivi to dictate the terms of the accord. If “Germany, or any state allied with [her],” should invade Finland—or the Soviet Union, through Finland—the treaty said, Helsinki was obliged to repel the attack. If necessary, the Soviet Union would aid Finland, but only by “mutual agreement.” Both sides pledged that they would respect the “sovereignty and integrity of the other.” The treaty stipulated that neither power could “conclude any alliance or join any coalition” directed against the other.

Thus the Soviets did not seek directly to control Finland. What they wanted more than anything was to prevent a recurrence of what had happened in World War II: an enemy attack against the Soviet Union from Finnish soil. Finland’s role, as Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev would later emphasize, was to "preserve the Baltic Sea as a perpetual zone of peace."

In any case, the treaty made Western leaders apprehensive, partly because it had been initiated by the Soviets, partly because it was signed right after the Czech coup. The Cold War was entering its harshest phase. "The tragic death of the Czechoslovak Republic has caused a shock throughout the civilized world," observed U.S. President Harry S Truman. "[The] pressure is now directed toward Finland, in a threat to the whole Scandinavian peninsula."

Truman's fears notwithstanding, Finland escaped the fate of other regimes in Eastern Europe. Yet the country's geography and peculiar circumstances—a Western democracy bordering on a Communist superpower—placed its leaders in a recurring predicament: How could Helsinki develop fruitful economic and political relations with Washington, London, Stockholm, and Bonn without the Kremlin taking offense?

The answer to that question has never been simple. Finland has approached Western organizations tentatively, only after checking with Moscow. Finland, for example, was eager to join the low-key Nordic Council, which was organized for nonmilitary purposes by Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway in 1952. But anything re-
A Scandinavian alliance has always made Moscow uneasy. "The history of Finland's independence," Pravda warned at the time, "is full of examples of how the 'idea of the North' is used in aggressive policy against the Soviet Union."

Finland did not become a member of the Council until 1955, two years after Stalin died. Relations between Moscow and Helsinki improved dramatically under Khrushchev. In 1955, the Soviets gave up the Porkkala naval base. The Finns, in return, agreed to a 20-year extension of the 1948 mutual assistance treaty. Finland has never joined the European Economic Community (Common Market). After weighing Soviet objections, Helsinki signed a free-trade agreement with the Common Market in 1973. Not by coincidence, Finland entered into a similar arrangement with the Soviet-run Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Thus Moscow is willing to allow Finland to remain in the capitalist world, as long as its leaders take heed of Soviet security interests.

Not surprisingly, Finnish voters have elected to high office only those leaders who could guarantee good relations with Moscow. When President Paasikivi’s term expired in 1956, Finland chose the 56-year-old Agrarian candidate, Urho Kekkonen, to replace him. As New York Times reporter Werner Wiskari put it, Kekkonen was "a proud man with an imperious bearing, as though always aware that the mantle of the presidency was on his shoulders." While not personally popular, the hearty, athletic Kekkonen was well known in Helsinki and Moscow as a stout supporter of the Paasikivi Line. "The superior force of the Soviet Union is absolute and continuing," he had once said. "Honest recognition of this will be the condition and touchstone of our national existence."

Meeting with Khrushchev

Kekkonen’s often chummy ties to Soviet leaders helped to smooth Finno-Soviet relations during his 25 years in office. At tense moments, Kekkonen and Khrushchev, for example, would talk over matters while hunting elk in Siberia or while baking in the Finnish president’s sauna.

Kekkonen, critics have said, often went too far to please the Russians—e.g., during the Night Frost Crisis of 1958. In nationwide elections held that year, Finnish Communists won a plurality in the Eduskunta. But when Social Democratic Prime Minister Karl August Fagerholm formed his third government, he left out the Communists and included Conservative ministers instead. Moscow responded to Finland’s new "rightist" government by withdrawing its ambassador from Helsinki, suspending credits it had just extended to Finland, and ending negotiations on a joint Finno-Soviet canal. The new regime in Helsinki, Khrushchev charged, would "first and foremost serve the
circles in the West [interested in] drawing Finland into their military-political maneuvers.” Under Soviet pressure, and with Kekkonen’s approval, five Agrarian ministers quit the three-month-old Fagerholm government, causing it to collapse.

The Kremlin pressured Helsinki again during the Note Crisis of 1961. This episode grew out of Soviet suspicions about West German military activity in the Baltic region, which had steadily increased since Bonn joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1955. When West German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss—in the midst of the Berlin Wall Crisis—traveled to Denmark and Norway to discuss setting up a joint American-German-Nordic sea command within NATO, the Soviets took action. On October 30, 1961, the Kremlin presented the Finnish government with a long note, railing against the “Bonn military junta,” and warning against “West German militarist and revanchist penetration into North Europe.” The communiqué concluded by proposing consultations with Finland “about measures to secure the defense of the borders of both countries” against a possible West German attack.

Meeting with Khrushchev in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk, Kekkonen convinced the Soviet leader to withdraw his request for “consultations.” Still, Soviet pressure made an impact in Helsinki.

South Harbor farmer’s market in Helsinki. Sweden’s King Gustav I Vasa founded the city in 1550 as a rival to Estonia’s Baltic port at Tallinn.
Aware of the Soviet need for reassurances that neither Finland’s leadership nor her policies would change anytime soon, presidential candidate Olavi Honka, backed by a coalition of five Finnish parties, called off his challenge to Kekkonen. The move surely found favor in Moscow. As Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko saw it, the Honka Front represented a “certain political grouping” bent on preventing “the continuation of the present foreign policy course.”

Critics of Finland’s foreign policy have accused the government and press of self-censorship to avoid offending the Soviet Union. Finnish newspaper editors do not avoid covering sensitive issues. But in the name of “politeness,” they have played down articles on controversial topics—such as human rights in the Soviet Union—by, say, burying them on an inside page. The Finnish State Film Censorship Board can ban a movie that “may be considered a slur on a foreign power.” The board prohibited the film *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* (1971). The book by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn on which the film was based, however, was sold in Finnish bookstores.

**No Pawns, Please**

As a rule, the Finnish government avoids criticizing *either* Washington or Moscow.

Unlike Sweden’s late prime minister, Olof Palme, President Kekkonen did not condemn U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. Nor did politicians in Helsinki join Western European condemnation of the U.S. air strike last April against Libya.

In similar fashion, when Soviet troops occupied Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Finland’s foreign minister, Ahti Karjalainen, said only that he hoped that “all external restraints will be removed as soon as possible in accordance with the wishes of the people of Czechoslovakia.” Finland also quietly abstained from the 1980 United Nations vote calling for total withdrawal of “foreign troops” from Afghanistan. And most recently, when a radioactive cloud from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant drifted west across Finnish territory last April, Helsinki let Stockholm do the complaining in public. “In situations like this, we are not the first to criticize,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Jouni Lilja told a crowd of journalists. “We try to take a constructive approach.”

From such episodes has come the American and Western European notion of Finlandization—the compliant submission by a small nation to the wishes of a more powerful neighbor. Many Finns, of course, angrily reject the term. “Uttering the word in a Helsinki living room,” observes writer Joyce Lasky Shub, “is like dropping Koo Stark’s name at Buckingham Palace.”

Finland’s former United Nations ambassador, Max Jakobson, is probably the best-known defender of his country’s prudence. Big
Skiing presidents: Urho Kekkonen (left), whose critics called Finland "Kekkoslovakia" during his presidency (1956–81), and the incumbent, Social Democrat Mauno Koivisto (1982–).powers like the United States, he complains, tend to treat small ones as "objects of policy... pawns to be gained or lost in the conflicts between the great powers." Finland, he believes, acts in its own best interest toward the Soviet Union, preferring to assert "the supremacy of national egotism over the claims of ideological solidarity."

Given the realities, one could say that Finland and the Soviet Union now maintain a fairly balanced relationship. There is give-and-take. The Soviets have, on many occasions, made concessions. In 1971, Soviet Ambassador Aleksei S. Belyakov tried to settle a dispute among Finnish Communists. Outraged by such meddling in Finland's domestic politics, Kekkonen demanded—and obtained—the ambassador's recall. In 1976, Kekkonen rejected a Soviet proposal that the two nations celebrate their upcoming 70th anniversary together. And in 1978, Kekkonen also said No to a proposal from
Dmitri F. Ustinov, the Soviet minister of defense, to conduct joint maneuvers involving Soviet and Finnish armed forces.*

Whatever American pundits may think about the politics of Finno-Soviet relationship, one thing is clear: The Finno-Soviet relationship has satisfactorily served Finland’s economic interests, enabling the country to trade heavily with both East and West. Finland receives most of its oil and natural gas through a barter arrangement with the Soviet Union. Soviet oil helped Finland weather the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 that rocked other European nations and the United States. In turn, the Finns send more of their exports (28 percent) to the Soviet Union than to any other country.

But that relationship does not stop Finland from shipping more than half of its exports to Common Market countries. And, significantly, Finland no longer exports only timber products, such as wood, paper, and pulp. While such goods made up 75 percent of the country’s exports in 1960, they account for only 35 percent today. The Finnish firm Oy Wärtsilä manufactures half of the world’s icebreakers, as well as ferries and cruise ships (including the liner used in the American TV series “Love Boat”). Nokia ranks as Scandinavia’s largest producer of personal computers and color television sets. Rauma-Repola Oy is the world’s leader in forest-harvesting equipment.

Up from the Docks

Like other Scandinavian nations, Finland must now decide how to provide a welfare state without crippling the private enterprises that pay for it. In Finland, despite a popular consensus on larger matters, labor and management are often at odds. Workers have been accustomed to good times. Employers are worried about price competition in export markets. This year, the slowing economy has been riven by strikes. *Sisu* does not make for easy compromises. Stalled negotiations between the Finnish Employers Confederation and the Central Trade Union Confederation nearly shut down all manufacturing last March. Eventually, management awarded the workers modest salary increases and a gradual shortening of the work week, from 40 to 37.5 hours by 1990. One month later, 40,000 civil servants walked off their jobs, crippling the nation’s air, rail, and postal services for seven weeks.

Still, Finland has come a long way both politically and economically since its “years of danger” immediately after the war. Finns last worried about their country’s survival in October 1981, when President Kekkonen became ill, and could no longer govern. It was a

*Under the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty with the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France, Finnish active-duty forces are limited to 41,900 troops. Every Finnish male must serve—8 months for enlisted men, 11 months for officers and special units. The nation can mobilize 700,000 trained reserves within four to five days. Finland spends less than any other Nordic nation on defense: about two percent of its GNP.
moment many Finns had feared. "After Kekkonen comes the deluge," wrote Mauri Sirro, a columnist for the Communist Party organ, Kansan Uutiset (People's News), shortly before Kekkonen's health failed. "Then all the dikes will burst."

But nothing of the sort happened. There was no Soviet influence in the ensuing election. In fact, the Kremlin's apparent favorite, Center Party candidate Ahti Karjalainen, never even won nomination. Instead, Finns elected, on January 17, 1982, a Social Democrat, Mauno Koivisto, by an overwhelming margin. With his quick, dry wit, the tall, rugged-looking Koivisto has become by far the most popular Finnish president since the war. Unlike Kekkonen—who won his first election by just one electoral vote, and was continually re-elected with Soviet support—Koivisto was clearly the people's choice. Wrote one Finnish commentator: "The Russians didn't choose him, the boys in the back room of the electoral college didn't choose him, the party bosses didn't choose him, and Kekkonen didn't choose him."

Koivisto—who grew up in a modest working-class home, and made his way from working on the docks in Turku to a Ph.D. in sociology—has become a symbol of national dignity and self-reliance. This is important in Finland, where the words and deeds of the president do much to set the tone of national life. On his first official visit to the Soviet Union, in March 1982, the new president took the leaders of all major parties with him—including those leaders earlier deemed "unacceptable" to the Kremlin. Koivisto thus quietly made it clear: He would not be pushed around.

Still, Koivisto remains keenly aware of Finland's past ordeals. He realizes that, quite aside from whatever else fate may bring, Helsinki must get along with Moscow. Otherwise, the Finns and their good society cannot survive. "For Finland," Koivisto said last year, "it has been a natural principle in a divided world to deal with all sides, to be open in all directions, to show others the confidence that we hope others will show us."
“Much of the information about Finland available to foreigners is second-hand and second-rate,” wrote a senior Finnish diplomat two years ago in Foreign Affairs. “As a result,” he continued, “Finland is forever at the mercy of the itinerant columnist who, after lunch and cocktails in Helsinki, is ready to pronounce himself upon the fate of the Finnish people.”

An English-speaking reader hungering for serious information on contemporary Finnish society soon finds himself on short rations. To be sure, there are respectable books on Finlandization and contemporary Finno-Soviet affairs. These include Roy Allison’s outstanding Finland’s Relations with the Soviet Union, 1944–84 (Macmillan, 1985) and Max Jakobson’s concise Finnish Neutrality (Praeger, 1968). In addition, Jaakko Nousiainen’s The Finnish Political System (Harvard, 1971) serves as a basic guidebook to the nation’s constitution, interest groups, and political parties.

But there is little new published scholarship, in English, on Finnish history. No major works exist that describe key aspects of everyday Finnish life: the state of the family; the quality of education; new trends in art and cultural life; or, all in all, what it means to be a Finn.

W. R. Mead’s Finland (Praeger, 1968) is a highly readable, if slightly outdated, introduction to the subject. Mead’s chronicle starts 12,000 years ago, when the great Quaternary Ice Sheet began to melt and retreat northward, leaving behind a flat landmass flanked by the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia, and dotted with some 55,000 lakes. Finland, Mead says, “resembles a drowned landscape in the process of emerging from sea, lake, and swamp.” Pine, fir, and birch forests, carpeted with “cushions of green, gold, and milky grey” mosses, cover almost two-thirds of Finland’s land area.

Other more comprehensive chronicles include John H. Wuorinen’s A History of Finland (Columbia, 1965) and Eino Jutikkala’s and Kauko Pirinen’s A History of Finland (Praeger, 1974). Jutikkala and Pirinen, both at the University of Helsinki, sweep through Finnish history—from the Ice Age to the end of World War II—in fewer than 300 pages. Swedish influence over Finland, they point out, began as early as the ninth century, when the Vikings, roving eastward, traded with Finnish trappers living along the peninsula’s southwest coast. “The growing demand for furs,” they write, “caused the Finns to extend their wilderness treks into remote Lapland and as far as the Arctic coast.”

Such surveys aside, there are several excellent works that concentrate on specific periods in Finnish history. Juhani Paasivirta’s scholarly Finland and Europe (Minnesota, 1982) is probably the best book on the period when Finland was a Grand Duchy of Imperial Russia. Anthony F. Upton’s The Finnish Revolution (Minnesota, 1981) chronicles the “catastrophic” civil war that followed Finland’s declaration of independence on December 6, 1917.

David Kirby’s Finland in the 20th Century (Minnesota, 1980) traces Finland’s transformation from a “remote and backward agrarian region” to a “modern, streamlined European state.” He observes that Finns became more wary of the Russians after they separated from the tsar. “Russophobia,” Kirby writes, “which had not been a very noticeable feature of Finnish political or cultural life [under the tsar] became virtually synonymous with patriotism during the early 1920s and 1930s.”
Several writers and scholars have focused on what may be the most dramatic saga in Finnish history: the 1939–40 Winter War. Allen F. Chew’s *The White Death* (Michigan, 1971) is probably the best military analysis of Finland’s 100-day stand against the Russians. Jukka Nevakivi’s *The Appeal That Was Never Made* (McQuillan’s, 1976), demonstrates how Helsinki tried to isolate the Finno-Soviet conflict from the Allies and World War II, then in its early stages. And Väinö Tanner’s *The Winter War* (Stanford, 1957) takes the reader behind the scenes. The author, then Finland’s foreign minister, recounts late-night negotiations with Josef Stalin, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, and Finland’s envoy, Juho Paasikivi.

Anthony F. Upton’s analytical *Finland in Crisis, 1940–41* (Faber, 1964) begins where Tanner’s narrative (and the Winter War) ends—with the Treaty of Moscow, on March 12, 1940. Upton criticizes Finland’s venerable commander-in-chief, Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, for stumbling into a de facto alliance with Hitler in the 1941–44 Continuation War. “Gripped by passivity and a desire to procrastinate,” the Finnish regime, Upton says, “had not issued a clear declaration of its position either to its own people, or to foreign powers.”

Like Runeberg, many 20th-century Finnish poets, including the 26 writers whose work appears in *Salt of Pleasure* (New Rivers, 1983), have drawn inspiration from the Finnish countryside. Eino Leino (1878–1926) saw in the unyielding climate and the harsh necessities of rural Finnish life the sources of the strength that many outsiders today see in the Finnish character. *Salt of Pleasure* includes some of Leino’s work, including this verse from “Drifter’s Song”:

We love the thunder of our streams,
Our torrents’ headlong bound,
Our gloomy forests’ mournful themes,
Our starry nights, our summer’s beams...

Life’s frost took my flower.
All that remained was work
days unending,
my heartache a winter’s night.
Organize, dim-witted wretches,
or heaven’s lightning will strike.
Happy-go-lucky man and woman,
who will eat bread next fall?

EDITOR’S NOTE: Keith Olson and Tönu Parming, a specialist on Finland at the U.S. Department of State, suggested many of the titles in this essay. Of related interest are WQ’s Background Books essays on Sweden (Autumn ’77) and Norway (Spring ’84).
IN PRAISE OF THOMAS AQUINAS

Reconciling faith and reason in his massive Summa Theologica (1265–73), Thomas Aquinas ranks as one of the great thinkers of the eve of the Renaissance, the conservative revolutionary who changed in 40 years the whole intellectual outlook of the Christian world. He pressed for "rational investigation," "discernment of exceptional conditions," and "prudence." Italy’s Umberto Eco, semiotics scholar and author of the popular novel The Name of the Rose (1983), offers a lively assessment of the man who now "is back in fashion, as saint and philosopher."

by Umberto Eco

The worst thing that happened to Thomas Aquinas in the course of his career was not his death, on March 7, 1274, in Fossanova, when he was barely 49, and, fat as he was, the monks were unable to carry his body down the stairs.

Nor was it what happened three years after his death, when the Archbishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier, published a list of heretical propositions, including 20 by Thomas, the angelic doctor himself, son of the lordly family of Aquino. For history soon dealt with this repressive act and in Thomas's favor; he received justice, even after his death, winning his battle while Etienne Tempier ended up, with Guillaume de Saint-Amour, Tommaso's other enemy, in the unfortunately eternal ranks of the great reactionaries.

No, the disaster that ruined the life of Tommaso d'Aquino befell him posthumously in 1323, two years after the death of Dante and was perhaps also, to some degree, attributable to the poet: in other words, when John XXII decided to turn Tommaso into Saint Thomas Aquinas. These are nasty mishaps, like receiving the Nobel Prize, being admitted to the Académie de France, winning an Oscar. You become like the Mona Lisa: a cliché. It's the moment when the big arsonist is appointed Fire Chief.

Now Thomas is back in fashion, as saint and philosopher. We try
to understand what Thomas would do today, with the faith, culture, and intellectual energy he had in his own day. But love sometimes clouds the spirit: To say that Thomas was great, that he was a revolutionary, it is necessary to understand in what sense he was one. For, though no one can say he was a reactionary, he is still a man who raised a construction so solid that no subsequent revolutionary has been able to shake it from within—and the most that could be done to it, from Descartes to Hegel to Marx and to Teilhard de Chardin, was to speak of it “from outside.”

Especially since it is hard to understand how scandal could come from this person, so unromantic, fat, and slow, who at school took notes in silence, looked as if he weren’t understanding anything, and was teased by his companions. And, in the monastery, as he sat at the table on his double stool (they had to saw off the central arm to make enough room for him) the playful monks shouted to him that outside there was an ass flying and he ran to see, while the others split their sides (mendicant friars, as is well known, had simple tastes); and then Thomas (who was no fool) said that to him a flying ass had seemed more likely than a monk who would tell a falsehood, and the other friars were insulted.

But then this student that his companions called the dumb ox became a professor, worshiped by his students, and one day he went out
walking on the hills with his disciples and looked at Paris from above, and they asked him if he would like to be the master of such a beautiful city, and he said that he would much prefer to have the text of the Homilies of Saint John Chrysostom; but then when an ideological enemy stepped on his foot he became furious and in that Latin of his that seems laconic because you can understand it all and the verbs are exactly where an Italian expects them, he exploded in insults and sarcasm.

Was he good-natured, was he an angel? Was he sexless?

When his brothers wanted to prevent him from becoming a Dominican (because in those days the cadet son of a good family became a Benedictine, which was something proper, and not a mendicant, which would be like entering a serve-the-people commune), they captured him as he was on his way to Paris and shut him up in the family castle; then, to get the crazy notions out of his head and turn him into a respectable abbé, they sent a naked girl, ready and willing, into his room. And Thomas grabbed a firebrand and started running after her, clearly meaning to burn her buttocks. No sex, then? Who can say? Because the thing upset him so much that afterwards, as we are told by Bernard Gui, “Women, unless it were absolutely necessary, he avoided as if they were serpents.”

In any case this man was a fighter. Sturdy, lucid, he conceived an ambitious plan, carried it out, and won. What then was the field of battle, what was at stake, what were the advantages he achieved?

When Thomas was born (in 1225), the Italian communes had won the battle of Legnano against the Holy Roman Empire 50 years earlier. Ten years before his birth England received the Magna Charta. In France the reign of Philippe Auguste had just ended. The empire was dying. Within five years the seafaring and trading cities of the north would join to form the Hanseatic League. The Florentine economy was expanding, about to issue the gold florin; Leonardo Fibonacci of Pisa had already invented double-entry bookkeeping; the flourishing medical school of Salerno and the law school of Bologna were a century old. The Crusades were in an advanced state; in other words, contacts with the East were in full development. Further, the Arabs in Spain were fascinating the Western world with their...
tific and philosophical discoveries. Technology was making great strides: There were new ways of shoeing horses, driving mills, steering ships, yoking oxen for bearing burdens and plowing. National monarchies in the north, and free communes in the south.

In short, this was not the Middle Ages, at least not in the popular sense of the term. Polemically, we might say that if it weren't for what Thomas was about to do, it would already be the Renaissance. But Thomas actually had to do what he was going to do if things were then to proceed as they did.

Europe was trying to create for itself a culture that would reflect a political and economic plurality, dominated, true, by the paternal control of the church, which nobody called into question, but also open to a new sense of nature, of concrete reality, of human individuality. Organizational and productive processes were being rationalized: It was necessary to find the techniques of reason.

When Thomas was born, the techniques of reason had been operative for a century. In Paris, at the Faculty of Arts, they still taught music, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, but also dialectic, logic, and rhetoric, and in a new way. Pierre Abelard, a century before, had been there; for private reasons he was deprived of reproductive organs, but his head lost none of its vigor.*

The new method was to compare the opinions of the various traditional authorities, and decide, according to logical procedures based on a secular grammar of ideas. Linguistics, semantics were being employed; scholars asked themselves what a given word meant and in what sense it was used. Aristotle's writings on logic were the study manuals, but not all of them had been translated and interpreted; few knew Greek, except for the Arabs, who were far ahead of the Europeans both in philosophy and in science.

But already a century before, the school of Chartres, rediscovering the mathematical texts of Plato, had constructed an image of the natural world based on geometrical laws, on measurable processes. This was not yet the experimental method of Roger Bacon, but it was theoretic construction, an attempt to explain the universe through natural bases, even if Nature was seen as a divine agent. The English theologian Robert Grosseteste (1175–1253) developed a metaphysics of luminous energy that suggests partly Bergson and partly Einstein: The study of optics was born. In short, the problem of the perception of physical objects was broached, a line was drawn between hallucination and sight.

This is no small matter. The universe of the early Middle Ages was a universe of hallucination, the world was a symbolic forest peo-

*For secretly marrying his student, Héloïse, Abelard (1079–1144) suffered castration at the hands of her uncle's henchmen. He went on to think great thoughts in the abbey of Saint-Denis.
pled with mysterious presences; things were seen as if in the continuous story of a divinity who spent his time reading and devising the Weekly Puzzle Magazine. This universe of hallucination, by Thomas's time, had not disappeared under the blows of the universe of reason: On the contrary, the latter was still the product of intellectual elites and was frowned upon.

Because, to tell the truth, the universe of terrestrial things was frowned upon. Saint Francis talked to the birds, but the philosophical foundation of theology was neo-Platonic. Which means: Far, far away there is God, in whose unattainable totality the principles of things, ideas, stir; the universe is the effect of a benevolent distraction of this very distant One, who seems to trickle slowly downward, abandoning traces of his perfection in the sticky clumps of matter that he excretes, like traces of sugar in the urine. In this muck that represents the more negligible margin of the One, we can find, almost always through a brilliant puzzle-solution, the imprint of gems of comprehensibility, but comprehensibility lies elsewhere, and if all goes well, along comes the mystic, with his nervous, stripped-down intuition, who penetrates with an almost drugged eye into the garçonnière of the One, where the sole and true party is going on.

Plato and Aristotle had said all that was needed to understand the problems of the soul, but the nature of a flower or of the maze of guts the Salerno doctors were exploring in the belly of a sick man, and the reason why the fresh air of a spring evening was good for you: Here things became obscure. So it was better to know the flowers in the illuminated texts of the visionaries, ignore the fact that guts exist, and consider spring evenings a dangerous temptation. Thus European culture was divided: If they understood the heavens, they didn't understand the earth.

If somebody then wanted to understand the earth and not take an interest in heaven, he was in big trouble. The Red Brigades of the period were roaming around: heretical sects that, on the one hand, wanted to renew the world, set up impossible republics, and on the other hand, practiced sodomy, pillage, and other horrors. Reports of their activities might or might not be true, but in any case it was best to kill the lot of them.

At this point the European men of reason learned from the Arabs that there was an ancient master (a Greek) who could supply a key to join these scattered limbs of culture: Aristotle. Aristotle knew how to talk about God, but he also classified animals and stones, and concerned himself with the movement of the stars. He knew logic, studied psychology, talked about physics, classified political systems.

But, above all, Aristotle offered the keys (and in this sense
Thomas was to make the fullest use of him) to overturning the relationship between the essence of things (that is, to the extent that things can be understood and said, even when those things are not here, before our eyes) and the matter of which things are made.

We can leave God out of it: He is living happily on his own and has provided the world with excellent physical laws so that it can go ahead by itself. And we needn't waste time trying to recover the trace of essences in that sort of mystic cascade of theirs whereby, losing the best along the way, they come and get all muddled up in matter. The mechanism of things is here, before our eyes; things are the principle of their movement. A man, a flower, a stone are organisms that have grown up obeying an internal law that moved them: The essence is the principle of their growth and their organization. It is a something already there, ready to explode, that moves matter from inside, and makes it grow and reveal itself: This is why we can understand it. A stone is a portion of matter that has assumed form: Together, from this marriage, an individual substance has been born.

The secret of being, as Thomas was to gloss with a bold intellectual leap, is the concrete act of existing. Existing, happening are not accidents that occur to ideas, which for themselves would be better off in the warm uterus of the distant divinity. First, thank heaven, things exist concretely, and then we understand them.

Naturally two points have to be clarified.

First of all, according to the Aristotelian tradition, understanding things does not mean studying them experimentally: You had only to understand that things count, theory took care of the rest. Not much, if you like, but still a huge step forward from the hallucinated world of the previous centuries.

In the second place, if Aristotle had to be christianized, more space had to be given to God who was a bit too much off to one side. Things grow thanks to the inner force of the life principle that moves them, but it must also be admitted that if God takes all this great movement to heart, he is capable of thinking the stone as it becomes stone by itself, and if he were to decide to cut off the electricity (which Thomas called "participation") there would be a cosmic black-out. So the essence of the stone is in the stone, and it is grasped by our mind, which is capable of thinking it; but it existed already in the mind of God, which is full of love and spends its days not doing its fingernails but supplying energy to the universe.

This was the game to be played; otherwise Aristotle wouldn't enter Christian culture, and if Aristotle remained outside, nature and reason remained outside, too.

It was a difficult game because the Aristotelians that Thomas
found had preceded him, when he began to work, had taken another path, which might even be more pleasing to us, and which an interpreter fond of historical short-circuits might even define as materialistic. But it was a very slightly dialectical materialism; indeed, it was an astrological materialism, and it rather upset everybody, from the keepers of the Koran to those of the Gospel.

The man responsible, a century earlier, had been Averroes, Muslim by culture, Berber by race, Spanish by nationality, and Arab by language.* Averroes knew Aristotle better than anybody and had understood what Aristotelian science led to: God is not a manipulator who sticks his nose into everything at random; he established nature in its mechanical order and in its mathematical laws, regulated by the iron determination of the stars. And since God is eternal, the world in its order is eternal also. Philosophy studies this order; nature, in other words. Men are able to understand it because in all men one principle of intelligence acts; otherwise each would see things in his own way and there would be no reciprocal understanding.

At this point the materialistic conclusion was inevitable: The world is eternal, regulated by a predictable determinism, and if a sole intellect lives in all men, the individual immortal soul does not exist. If the Koran says something different, the philosopher must philosophically believe what his science shows him and then, without creating too many problems for himself, believe the opposite, which is the command of faith. There are two truths and one must not disturb the other.

Averroes carried to lucid conclusions what was implicit in rigorous Aristotelianism, and this was the reason for his success in Paris among the masters at the Faculty of Arts, in particular with the theologian Sigier of Brabant, whom Dante puts in Paradise with Saint Thomas, even if it is Thomas's fault that Sigier's scholarly career collapsed and he was relegated to the footnotes in popular handbooks of philosophy.

The game of cultural politics that Thomas tried to play was a double game: on the one hand, to make Aristotle accepted by the theological learning of the time; and on the other, to detach him from the use the followers of Averroes were putting him to. But in doing this, Thomas encountered a handicap: He belonged to the mendicant orders, who had the misfortune of having put the Italian "mystic"-theologian Joachim of Fiore (1130–1201) in circulation along with another band of apocalyptic heretics who represented a grave danger for the established order, for the church and for the state. So the reactionary masters of Paris's Faculty of Theology, with the fearsome Guillaume de Saint-Amour at their head, could easily say that

*Averroes, or ibn-Rashid (1126–98), was a Spanish-born Arab philosopher and physician.
AQUINAS

mendicant friars were all Joachimite heretics, and wanted to teach Aristotle, the master of the Averroes-inspired atheistic materialists.

But Thomas, on the contrary, was neither a heretic nor a revolutionary. He has been called a “concordian.” For him it was a matter of reconciling the new science with the science of revelation, changing everything so that nothing would change.

In this plan he showed an extraordinary amount of good sense and (master of theological refinements) a great adherence to natural reality and earthly equilibrium.

Mind you, Thomas did not aristotelianize Christianity; he christianized Aristotle. He never thought that with reason everything could be understood, but that everything is understood through faith; he wanted to say only that faith was not in conflict with reason, and that therefore it was possible to enjoy the luxury of reason, emerging from the universe of hallucination.

And so it is clear why in the architecture of his works the main chapters speak only of God, angels, the soul, virtues, eternal life; but, within these chapters, everything finds a place that is, more than rational, “reasonable.”

Within Thomas’s theological architecture you understand why man knows things, why his body is made in a certain way, why he has to examine facts and opinions to make a decision, and resolve contradictions without concealing them, trying to reconcile them openly. With this Thomas gave the church once more a doctrine that, among other things, without taking away a fraction of its power, left the communities free to decide whether to be monarchist or republican. The doctrine distinguishes, for example, among the various types and rights in property, going so far as to say that the right to property does exist, but for possession, not use. Or, in other words, I have the right to possess a building, but if there are people living in hovels, reason demands that I grant the use to those who do not possess the equivalent (I remain owner of the building, but the others must live there even if this offends my egoism). And so on. These are all solutions based on equilibrium and on that virtue that he called “prudence,” whose job was to “retain the memory of gained experience, to have an exact sense of ends, prompt attention to situations, rational and progressive investigation, circumspection of opportunities, precaution in complexities, and discernment of exceptional conditions.”

It works, because this mystic who was so eager to lose himself in the beatific contemplation of God to whom the human soul aspires “by nature” was also alert, in a human way, to natural values and respected rational discourse.

It must be remembered that, before him, when the text of an
ancient author was studied, the commentator or the copyist, when he came upon something that clashed with revealed religion, either scratched out the "erroneous" sentences or marked them with a question mark, to alert the reader, or else they shifted the words to the margin. But what did Thomas do, instead? He aligned the divergent opinions, clarified the meaning of each, questioned everything, even the revealed datum, enumerated the possible objections, and essayed the final mediation. Everything had to be done in public, just as, in his day, the *disputatio* was public: The tribunal of reason was in operation.

Then, if you read Thomas closely, in every case the datum of faith came to prevail over everything else and led to the untangling of the question; in other words, God and revealed truth preceded and guided the movement of secular reason. This has been made clear by the most acute and affectionate Thomas scholars, including, more recently, Etienne Gilson. Nobody has ever said that Thomas was Galileo. Thomas simply gave the church a doctrinal system that put her in agreement with the natural world.

And he won, at lightning speed. The dates are explicit. Before him it was asserted that "the spirit of Christ does not reign where the spirit of Aristotle lives"; in 1210 the Greek philosopher's books of natural history were still forbidden, and the ban continued through the following decades, as Thomas had these texts translated by his collaborators and commented on them. But in 1255 all of Aristotle was allowed. After the death of Thomas, as we mentioned, there was an attempt at reaction, but finally Catholic doctrine was aligned along Aristotelian positions. The dominion and spiritual authority of Benedetto Croce (1866–1952) over 50 years of Italian culture was as nothing compared to the authority Thomas displayed by changing in 40 years the whole cultural policy of the Christian world.

Hence Thomism. That is to say, Thomas gave Catholic thought such a complete frame that, since then, Catholic thought can no longer shift anything. At most, with the scholastic Counter-Reformation, it developed Thomas, gave us a Jesuit Thomism, a Dominican Thomism, even a Franciscan Thomism, where the shades of other 13th- and 14th-century theologians—Bonaventure, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham—stir. But Thomas cannot be touched. Thomas's constructive eagerness for a new system becomes, in the Thomistic tradition, the conservative vigilance of an untouchable system. Where Thomas swept away everything in order to build anew, scholastic Thomism tries to touch nothing and performs wonders of pseudo-Thomistic tightrope walking to make the new fit into the frame of Thomas's system. The tension and eagerness for knowledge that the
fat Thomas possessed to the maximum degree shift then into heretical movements and into the Protestant Reformation. Thomas’s frame is left, but not the intellectual effort it cost to make a frame that, then, was truly “different.”

Naturally it was his fault: He is the one who offered the church a method of conciliation of the tensions and a nonconflictual absorption of everything that could not be avoided. He is the one who taught how to distinguish contradictions in order to mediate them harmoniously. Once the trick was clear, they thought that Thomas’s lesson was this: Where yes and no are opposed, create a “nes.” But Thomas did this at a time when saying “nes” signified not stopping, but taking a step forward, and exposing the cards on the table.

So it is surely licit to ask what Thomas Aquinas would do if he were alive today; but we have to answer that, in any case, he would not write another Summa Theologica. He would come to terms with Marxism, with the physics of relativity, with formal logic, with existentialism and phenomenology. He would comment not on Aristotle, but on Marx and Freud. Then he would change his method of argumentation, which would become a bit less harmonious and conciliatory. And finally he would realize that one cannot and must not work out a definitive, concluded system, like a piece of architecture, but a sort of mobile system, a loose-leaf Summa, because in his encyclopedia of the sciences the notion of historical temporariness would have entered. I can’t say whether he would still be a Christian. But let’s say he would be. I know for sure that he would take part in celebrations of his work only to remind us that it is not a question of deciding how still to use what he thought, but to think new things. Or at least to learn from him how you can think cleanly, like a man of your own time. After which I wouldn’t want to be in his shoes.
"The best convention ever held anywhere," said Carrie Chapman Catt of the National American Woman Suffrage Association's "Golden Jubilee" at the St. Louis Statler Hotel in March 1919. In June, the U.S. Senate finally approved a suffrage amendment. By August 1920, the amendment had been ratified by 36 states.
Feminism in America 1848–1986

In no other Western nation have organized women tried so hard so often to transform society. American feminists have sought not only to end inequities in voting, employment, property rights, and education, but also to reform men and, on occasion, to move both sexes toward a kind of “gender-blind” regime—goals few European feminists have ever contemplated.

Today, after both successes and unexpected failures, America’s Third Wave of feminist agitation, the “women’s movement” of the 1970s, has subsided. Twenty years after Betty Friedan and others founded the National Organization for Women, their chief goal, the ratification of an Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, is moribund. Only in academe, and in local campaigns for state ERAs or “comparable worth,” do the old feminist visions still seem alive and well.

The chronicle of political feminism since 1848 is one of recurring difficulties. Unlike U.S. civil rights leaders, for example, feminists have repeatedly run into resistance from their own putative constituents. They have differed sharply on tactics and ideology. Their greatest impact usually has been social rather than political, coinciding with other major shifts in American life.

As historian Fernand Braudel once noted, human societies are inherently conservative. Feminism intrudes upon the very core—home, family, relations between the sexes. Hence, so often what militant feminists hailed as a New Age soon turned out to be a period of adjustment, even of reaction. So it has been after the Third Wave, with its much-publicized changes in women’s expectations, opportunities, and burdens. Much remains unchanged.

On the following pages, our contributors variously recount feminism’s early frustrations, analyze the struggle for suffrage, explain the rise and fall of the Third Wave, describe what is known (and not known) about its effects, and survey “women’s studies,” the new feminist beachhead in academe.
On July 19, 1848, in the village of Seneca Falls, New York, some 300 people crowded into a small Methodist chapel, drawn by an announcement in the daily Seneca County Courier. The notice proclaimed something unheard of—a two-day “Woman’s Rights Convention.” Despite a request that men stay away until the second day, about 40 curious males showed up at the start.

The organizers of the convention—Lucretia Mott, a 55-year-old Quaker activist from Philadelphia, and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 32, the wife of a local lawyer-politician—would be remembered later as the founders of the American women’s rights movement. But on that day in 1848, they lacked the temerity to preside over their own meeting and instead persuaded Mott’s husband, James, a merchant, to serve as chairman. Not until Stanton rose to speak did anyone get a sense of what was to come.

“I should feel exceedingly diffident...having never before spoken in public,” she told the audience, “...did I not feel that the time had come for the question of woman’s wrongs to be laid before the public, did I not believe that woman herself must do this work; for woman alone can understand the height, the depth, the length and the breadth of her degradation.”

Stanton went on to read aloud the “Declaration of Rights and Sentiments” that she and several fellow organizers had drafted for the convention. A clever rewording of Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, its title borrowed from the 1833 covenant of William Lloyd Garrison’s American Anti-Slavery Society, the broadside provoked 18 straight hours of debate among those present—farmers, local merchants, housewives, mill workers, abolitionists and sundry other reformers.

“We hold these truths to be self-evident,” Stanton said, “that all men and women are created equal.” Thus, Stanton positioned her declaration squarely within the American political tradition. But she underscored the radical roots of that tradition: “The history of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of man toward woman, having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over her. To prove this, let the facts be submitted to a candid world.”

The facts Elizabeth Cady Stanton presented that day in Seneca Falls illustrated the social and legal liabilities attached to being a woman during the first 60 years of the republic.
As she pointed out, the status of the majority of American women at midcentury was vividly characterized by the common-law term "civil death." A throwback to British Colonial days (indeed to the Norman Conquest), civil death made married women, in effect, private property. Legally, they could not sign contracts, keep earnings, or control property. Divorces were granted only in cases of nonsupport, desertion, or adultery; even then, fathers retained child custody. Single women had legal status, for they were expected to pay property taxes. But without the right to vote they incurred the very injury that provoked the American Revolution: taxation without representation.

Stanton's Declaration of Sentiments also deplored women's "social and religious degradation." Man, Stanton charged, had "deprived woman of a thorough education, all colleges being closed against her." He "monopolized nearly all the profitable employments" and held women to a moral code by which his "delinquencies" were "deemed of little account." He "usurped the prerogative of Jehovah himself" and made women "willing to lead a dependent...life."

*In 1848, New York had passed the Married Woman's Property Act, the nation's first reform of civil death. It gave certain real estate and personal property rights to wives.

†Oberlin College (Ohio), founded in 1833 to train missionaries, was coeducational; Mount Holyoke (Massachusetts), founded for women in 1837, received collegiate status in 1883.
In its demand for suffrage—women's "inalienable right to the elective franchise"—the declaration must have appeared almost as revolutionary as another social tract of 1848, the Communist Manifesto. To the Seneca Falls group, this demand for the vote seemed so excessive that only the black abolitionist Frederick Douglass would take the floor in Stanton's support. Lucretia Mott warned her friend not to make their movement appear "ridiculous." Stanton's father, a New York State Supreme Court judge, was reportedly outraged. Her husband, Henry, ever the politician, quietly left town.

**Home Rule**

After two days of impassioned rhetoric, only one-third of Seneca Falls' conferees were persuaded to sign the declaration. Some later retracted their signatures. An editorial in the Philadelphia Public Ledger and Daily Transcript plainly showed what fears Stanton had aroused: "A woman is nobody. A wife is everything. A pretty girl is equal to ten thousand men, and a mother is, next to God, all powerful.... The ladies of Philadelphia... are resolved to maintain their rights as Wives, Belles, Virgins, and Mothers, and not as Women."

Was not protection preferable to the risks inherent in equality? It was a question that would surface repeatedly for over a century.

Other American women had spoken out before Seneca Falls—the essays of Judith Sargent Murray, daughter of a Massachusetts sea captain, argued for equal rights 10 years before Mary Wollstonecraft's 1792 *A Vindication of the Rights of Women* appeared in England. By 1848, literate Americans of both sexes had pondered the "Woman Question," most of them apparently concluding, along with Thomas Jefferson, that "the tender breasts of ladies were not formed for political convulsion." But the Seneca Falls meeting became a mid-19th-century media event; the nation's newspapers, newly linked by telegraph, gave it plenty of play. Stanton saw that bad publicity ("the most shocking and unnatural incident ever recorded in the history of womanity," pronounced a typical newspaper editorial) was better than no publicity. "There is no danger of the Woman Question dying for want of notice," she wrote.

It was an era of national expansion, radical hopes, and conservative fears. Sutter's Creek in California yielded gold, President James K. Polk's generals won the Mexican War, and a new antislavery

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political party was formed—the Free-Soilers—all in 1848. Mid-century America abounded with middle-class reformers, usually led by clergymen, variously upset by urban dislocation in the industrializing North, slavery in the South, and immorality out West.

In upstate New York, where Stanton was raised, the opening of the Erie Canal in 1825 brought thousands of settlers and entrepreneurs. After them came Evangelical Protestant revivalists, with so many hellfire sermons that the area became known as “the burned-over district.” Preachers set up tents to warn against money-grubbing, declaring that “all men may be saved if they will” and taking public confessions from largely female audiences. While at Emma Willard’s Troy Female Seminary, the young Stanton went to hear the Rev. Charles Grandison Finney, a tall, charismatic ex-lawyer who claimed to have seen Christ in Rochester, New York. She became ill from all the emotional intensity, and thereafter distrusted religion.

As Stanton learned early, American middle-class society was organized around the popular notion of “separate spheres” for men and women. “Everything I liked and enjoyed,” she wrote of her childhood, “was messy and injurious;...and...everything I disliked was just the thing.” According to Sarah Hale—editor of the widely read *Godey’s Lady’s Book* and a kind of 19th-century Emily Post—“ladies” kept to “the chaste, disinterested circle of the fireside,” where “purer, more excellent, more spiritual values” than “the contagion of moneymaking” prevailed. How much Stanton enjoyed such advice may be surmised by her depiction of home life in Seneca Falls: “How rebellious it makes me feel when I see Henry going about where and how he pleases,” she wrote to a friend, while “I have been compelled...to be...a household drudge.”

**Sexual Politics**

This was not quite the whole picture. Even household drudges could get out of the kitchen for a good cause—and there were plenty of those in the Northern states, from helping unwed mothers to hiding fugitive slaves. Indeed, social uplift became the main outlet for the talents of educated women such as Stanton. Inadvertently, reform organizations became a training ground for future women’s rights leaders. Despite Stanton’s contempt for the *spheres* (“A man has quite enough to do,” she replied to one critic, “without being taxed to find out also where every woman belongs”), the custom of creating separate male and female groups within these organizations had a polarizing effect that led many women to seek greater equality.

The first social reform groups—“benevolence societies” such as the American Bible Society and the Home Missionary Society—bloomed in the early 1800s, and they tended to be highly conservative. Women raised money for missionaries laboring in the unruly
West. They visited the poor, cared for orphans and widows, established schools, asylums, and workshops.

Over time, social reform took on a distinct coloration, the first sign of what Kate Millet would call “sexual politics.” Uplift groups, such as the social purity and temperance movements, which campaigned against male carnality and drunkenness, signaled a widening rift between men and women over the state of the nation’s manners and morals. By 1840, the American Female Moral Reform Society had over 500 auxiliaries and a weekly journal read by 20,000 subscribers. Its members battled prostitution by spying on prominent clients of brothels. In Utica, New York, “visiting committees” went into poor sections of town to solicit tales of men’s sexual abuses at home. Meanwhile, temperance workers went on tour with stories of wife beating, child molesting, gambling, and other incarnations of “Demon Rum.” Later in the century, it was common for temperance women to invade saloons in large “praying bands.”

Most important to feminists were the antislavery organizations. In 1840, just before the convention at Seneca Falls, abolitionists split into factions, partly over whether women should speak out in “promiscuous” (mixed) company. The “political” wing, headed by several New Yorkers, among them Henry Stanton, favored gradual abolition and a no-talking policy for women. The radicals, led by William Lloyd
Garrison, wanted an immediate end to slavery and had no qualms about letting women say so, giving many future feminists their first taste of political agitation.

It has been said that women abolitionists became feminists when they perceived the analogy between slavery and the plight of woman-kind. But Stanton and Mott became feminists when they saw how women were treated by certain male abolitionists. They met in 1840, at the first international antislavery convention in London. Mott had been dispatched by the Philadelphia Female Anti-Slavery Society; Stanton was simply accompanying her new husband. Forced, despite the objections of Garrison and Wendell Phillips, to keep silent in a curtained-off section of the hall, the two women vowed to retaliate when they returned to the United States.

**National Strides**

They envisioned the meeting at Seneca Falls as the first in a series of public forums on women's rights. Until the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, conventions did take place almost every year. But the women's movement never attracted much of a popular following among women compared to temperance, abolition, and moral uplift. Its ideas were both too radical and too bourgeois, the product of upper-middle-class experience. Though they spoke of self-reliance, feminist leaders did not form their own independent organization for nearly two decades. And by relying on women in temperance and abolitionist groups to publicize their activities and provide a grassroots structure, the feminists antagonized conservative reformers and may have discouraged would-be supporters. Moreover, by focusing on property rights, marriage reform, and suffrage, they failed to arouse much support from one of their natural constituencies, a fast-growing group of women workers with grievances of their own.

By 1850, women—often unmarried, first generation teen-agers or farmers' daughters—constituted nearly 25 percent of the country's expanding manufacturing work force. Even in the textile mills around Lowell, Massachusetts (touted for model industrial conditions), women worked 13-hour shifts in overcrowded rooms. Many got sick from the fumes of kerosene lamps. They sometimes slept six to a room, two to a bed, in nearby boarding houses. Theirs was a separate sphere in one sense: women's pay, less than one-half that of male workers, ranged from $1 to $3 per week; much of it went for room and board.

Some of these women staged strikes and made sporadic attempts to form labor organizations during the 1830s and '40s. Sarah Bagley, one of the nation's first trade unionists, founded the Female Labor Reform Association in New England. But such efforts eventually foundered for lack of funds, time, and support from men's labor...
organizations. Only after the Civil War would women's rights leaders take up the factory workers' cause.

In 1850, feminists from seven states met in Worcester, Massachusetts. Some were already prominent among social reformers: Mott, Lucy Stone, and Angelina Grimké, who left her Southern plantation to work against slavery; Paulina Wright Davis, a wealthy one-time moral reformer; Ernestine Rose, a Polish Jew active in the early temperance movement; Antoinette Brown, the first female Protestant minister. The leaders of this unusually large meeting—about 1,000 people came—set the agenda for subsequent conventions. They initiated petition campaigns in eight states for women's suffrage and established committees to report on women's educational, legal, and professional status.

Then as later, the press approached the Woman Question with hostility or scorn: "What do women want?" ran an editorial in the New York Herald. "They want... to be lawyers, doctors... generals in the field. How funny it would sound... that Lucy Stone, pleading a cause... gave birth to a fine bouncing boy in court!" Other editors wrote of "petticoat rebellions" or "hen conventions" arranged by "love-starved spinsters."

Stanton stayed in Seneca Falls until the last of her seven children reached adolescence—surrounded, as she wrote to Wendell Phillips, "by small craft which I am struggling to tug up life's stream." Even so, her exceptional eloquence guaranteed her a central role during the early years of the movement; she wrote impassioned letters that were read aloud at each feminist convention. She was further encouraged when, through Amelia Bloomer, a neighbor who published The Lily, a monthly temperance newspaper, she met Susan B. Anthony, a Quaker temperance activist. In contrast to the high-spirited, talkative Stanton, Anthony was sober and introspective, yet the two became lifelong friends.

Choosing Sides

This alliance proved essential to the women's movement. With Anthony's coaching, Stanton's ideas developed into powerful speeches and essays. Whereas all of the other feminist leaders had husbands and children to worry about, Anthony, unwed, could give all of her time to promoting the cause. Stanton fondly recalled how her friend would turn up with a briefcase full of slanderous diatribes by male politicians against women. "Whenever I saw that stately Quaker girl coming across my lawn," she wrote, "I knew that some happy convocation of the sons of Adam was to be set by the ears. She supplied the facts... I the philosophy."

In 1852, the New York State Men's Temperance Society invited women's groups to attend their annual meeting. However, they
forbade the women to speak. Anthony, Mott, and other outraged
delegates formed a rival New York State Women’s Temperance Soci-
ey, electing Stanton president. But Stanton’s radical ideas—espe-
cially her insistence that women be permitted to divorce drunken
husbands—dismayed conservatives. Even Bloomer took sides against
Stanton. She was not re-elected.

Anthony quit the temperance group out of loyalty to her friend.
It was the beginning of both women’s commitment to direct political
agitation. Stanton outlined their goals: the full rewards of citizenship,
including the right to vote; property and marriage reforms for
wives—especially the right to dissolve unhappy marriages in divorce.
(All were controversial, yet suffrage proved hardest to attain.)

Anthony organized a plan of action. She enlisted 60 women, one
from every county in New York State, to be “captains” of a petition
campaign. In six weeks she had signatures from over 10,000
women—5,931 for married women’s rights; 4,164 for woman suf-
frage. But it was grueling work. Often women slammed their doors
against the canvassers, Anthony reported, saying they had husbands,
thank God, to look after their interests.

A Slave’s Appeal

The petition campaign culminated in the Albany women’s rights
convention of 1854, timed by Anthony to take place while the New
York legislature was in session. As she had hoped, the legislature
allowed Stanton to present the petitions to the Joint Judiciary Com-
mittee. But the response to her plea came in a committee report
asserting that since “the ladies always have the best place and choic-
est titbit at the table...the warmest place in the winter and the
coolest place in the summer...if there is any inequity or oppression
in the case, the gentlemen are the sufferers.”

On Christmas Day 1854, Anthony set out alone to bring back
more petition signatures, with $50 loaned by Wendell Phillips. During
one of the coldest winters in New York’s history, she traveled by
train, sleigh, and often on foot, carrying a carpetbag full of tracts by
Stanton. Often hungry and exhausted, she stayed in unheated hotels
and passed the hat to cover her expenses. By May, she had can-
vassed 54 of New York’s 60 counties.

This effort, and repeated efforts over the next five years, failed
to stir Albany’s male politicians. Not until 1860, when Stanton rea-
pered before the Judiciary Committee with a speech entitled “A
Slave’s Appeal,” would legislators finally listen, though not to pleas
for suffrage or changes in divorce law. They amended the existing
Married Women’s Property Act to include child custody, control over
earnings, and property rights for widows.*

*Fourteen other states passed bills from 1848 to 1860 giving women limited property rights.
However, marriage reform was not the most pressing issue in America by that time—not even to Stanton and Anthony. The country was on the verge of civil war over questions of slavery and states' rights, and these life-or-death issues consumed the attention of the reformers from whom feminists drew their support. Stanton and other leaders identified their aims with those of the abolitionists. At rallies sponsored by William Lloyd Garrison's American Anti-Slavery Society, women speakers argued that suffrage was a "natural right" both of white females and of the oppressed black race.

In 1857, the year the Supreme Court declared slavery permissible in the Dred Scott decision, Anthony started working as a paid organizer for Garrison. Stanton, whose husband allied himself with the conservative abolitionists, earlier had shared his fear that demanding an immediate end to slavery would provoke an unnecessary war. But by 1857 she had gone over to the radicals' cause, and in early 1861 she left home to join Anthony for a series of antislavery rallies in western New York. For suggesting that the newly elected president, Abraham Lincoln, commit himself to ending slavery, the two women often faced mobs throwing eggs and stones.

When the Civil War erupted in April 1861, all talk of women's rights abruptly stopped. Over Anthony's objections, Stanton and other feminists decided to devote themselves to supporting the war effort. They reasoned that a grateful government in Washington would reward their wartime loyalty with the right to vote. As Stanton later wrote, "It was a blunder." While she and others knitted socks and cared for the wounded, the New York legislature gutted its own 1860 marriage reform bill, banning joint child custody and revoking widows' property rights. Stanton and Anthony's wartime petition drive for universal enfranchisement would be seen by Congress as evidence of national support for black male suffrage only. The politics of postwar Reconstruction would divide the feminist movement over questions unrelated to women's rights. In the war's aftermath, feminists would have to start from scratch in many areas. But at least in a perverse way, the long, bloody conflict had advanced their cause: It showed how important civil rights could be.
THE FIGHT FOR SUFFRAGE

by William L. O'Neill

"Don't forget to be a good boy," wrote a mother in rural Tennessee to her 24-year-old son Harry Burn, the youngest representative in the Tennessee legislature, "and help Mrs. Catt put 'Rat' in Ratification."

Burn's vote meant everything, because the legislature was otherwise evenly divided. If he voted in favor of the Nineteenth Amendment, Tennessee would become the final state needed for ratification. If he voted against it, the amendment would probably fail, for the remaining states were Southern and fiercely opposed to it.

But Harry Burn was a good boy. Seventy-two years after women held their first equal rights convention, he called out the decisive "aye" that enfranchised 26 million American females of voting age on August 26, 1920. When antisuffragists accused Burn of taking a bribe, he replied: "I know that a mother's advice is always safest for her boy to follow."

Motherhood, not sisterhood, had won the day for women's rights.

This did not bother Carrie Chapman Catt, the pragmatic leader of the National American Woman Suffrage Association; she had brilliantly lobbied for the Nineteenth Amendment in Washington and many state capitals, including Nashville. The irony might have disturbed Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who died in 1902. While other feminists, including her friend Susan B. Anthony, had focused narrowly on the ballot—and employed conservative arguments to get it—Stanton had stuck to the feminists' original premise that true equality for women required radical changes all across the board.

But by 1920 the movement Stanton had launched at Seneca Falls, New York, was falling apart. Some feminists were interested chiefly in social reforms.* Others were preoccupied with equal rights at the expense of everything else, expressing themselves by touring the country in black-and-white striped prison uniforms to remind Americans that they had been, as Doris Stevens of the National Women's Party would write, *Jailed for Freedom.*

What all feminists had in common in 1920 was the fact that it had taken them 72 years to win the vote. This long delay resulted from vigorous opposition to equal suffrage, but also, in some mea-

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*During the 1920s, the League of Women Voters lobbied for food and drug legislation, prohibition of child labor, birth control, antilynching bills, compulsory school attendance, mothers' pensions, government efficiency, and the repression of vice.
sure, from the failings of suffragists themselves. If suffragism is to be fully understood we must go beyond 1920, when the years of struggle and glory ended, to see the movement whole.

Women’s rights became synonymous with woman suffrage after the Civil War, when feminists found themselves at odds both with the Republican majority in Congress and their long-time male abolitionist colleagues. As President Wendell Phillips of the American Anti-Slavery Society (now committed to enfranchising black men) put it, “This hour belongs to the Negro.” To which Stanton replied, “Do you believe the African race is composed entirely of males?”

Black Males Only

In May 1866, while Congress was debating the Fourteenth Amendment, Stanton, Anthony, and Lucy Stone formed the Equal Rights Association (ERA) to press for “universal,” or, as it was later called, “equal” suffrage. Phillips, unwilling to alienate Republicans, did not join the ERA. One month later, feminist fears were realized when Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment. It enfranchised black men at the expense of women; the Constitution now specified for the first time that the basis of representation was to be “male.”

Though the abolitionist Standard assured women that they would get the vote when their sex as a whole became “sufficiently alive” to the need for it, Stanton’s group declined to wait. They resolved to fight for woman suffrage state by state. Their first major effort took place in Kansas, where, in March 1867, the legislature submitted two referendums for voter approval, one enfranchising blacks, the other women. Equal Rights Association leaders committed themselves to working for both.

Kansas Republicans campaigned openly against woman suffrage, encouraged by a New York constitutional convention that had just denied women the vote. The Democrats were led by an unscrupulous stock speculator and railroad promoter, George Train. They, too, opposed woman suffrage but hoped to defeat black enfranchisement by supporting the ERA. No matter; as one feminist remarked, “the hypocrisy of the Democrats serves us a better purpose in the current emergency than does the treachery of the Republicans.”

During the last two months of campaigning, Stanton and Anthony accompanied Train as he stumped the state advocating the

*From Section 2 (the “apportionment of representatives”): “The basis of representation...shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 21 years of age...”

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Singing hymns and wielding a hatchet, Carry Nation, the 6-foot, 175-pound temperance leader from Kansas, was a menace to saloons in the 1890s.

vote for women but not for blacks. The electorate was called upon, he said, to choose either "Beauty, Virtue, and Intelligence" or "Muscle, Color, and Ignorance." Unimpressed, some 44,000 white male voters rejected both propositions in November by a margin of 3 to 1.

The Kansas debacle broke up the Equal Rights Association, destroying feminist unity. Republican feminists, headed by Stone and concentrated in New England, had been horrified when Stanton and Anthony tied women's rights to the Democratic Party. In May 1869, after an ERA convention dissolved acrimoniously, Stanton's group formed the New York-based National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA). In November, the New Englanders created a rival body which they named the American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA). It called for the enfranchisement of blacks and women in that order, opposed advocating what Stone called "side issues" (like the marriage reforms dear to Stanton's heart), and included as members male Republicans and former abolitionists.* Henry Ward Beecher, a famous New York minister, became its first president.

The NWSA shared Stanton's and Anthony's well-founded belief that once blacks were enfranchised (as happened in 1870), the ques-

*Stanton thought divorce should be granted on simple grounds of incompatibility.
tion of universal suffrage would die for a generation. Even though it read the future accurately, the NWSA was no more successful than its New England counterpart; both groups were ahead of the times and failed to recruit more than a few thousand members.

Stanton and Anthony accepted money from Train to start their own paper, entitled, ominously, Revolution. Besides promoting Train's dubious business schemes, they advocated numerous unpopular causes from marriage reform to trade unionism. Worse still, Stanton and Anthony became linked to a messy scandal that would have damaging consequences for the feminist movement.

The affair turned on a bizarre divorcée named Victoria Woodhull and her unmarried sister, Tennessee Claflin, members of a large and larcenous Midwestern clan. Utterly lacking in morals and common sense, the sisters were richly endowed with good looks and charm. Backed by Cornelius Vanderbilt—railroad tycoon, stock manipulator, a fellow spiritualist, and perhaps Tennessee's lover—they became Wall Street's first "lady brokers" and the publishers of Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly. The paper was even more radical than Revolution and twice as peculiar; its crank causes ranged from a sort of Marxism to the healing properties of various elixirs.

Appealing to Bigotry

These oddities notwithstanding, Woodhull was a person of formidable drive and ambition. In 1871, she became the first woman to testify before Congress, lecturing the House Judiciary Committee on woman suffrage. This endeared her to feminists, Stanton especially, who called her "a grand, brave woman." The press adored Woodhull; she publicized universal suffrage as no one before her, even running for president of the United States in 1872 on her own Equal Rights Party ticket. But, for all her gifts, Woodhull was a time bomb waiting to go off. Reckless in speech and habit, she one day publicly declared her right "to love whomever I may" and "to change that love every day if I please."

At this, the press turned on her savagely, and so did the public. In short order, Woodhull was broke, homeless, and ostracized by society. For revenge, she struck out at the Reverend Henry Ward Beecher, one of her foremost critics, revealing that he was carrying on an affair with the wife of a prominent liberal journalist. Beecher prevailed because the Establishment rallied around him. Woodhull and Claflin fell into obscurity.

Feminism survived. But the cause was damaged even so. To conservatives, the Woodhull fiasco was final proof that feminists meant to destroy the family. The NWSA all but drowned in a flood of bad publicity. Stanton excepted, most women in the NWSA now decided that Lucy Stone was right. If women were to win the vote,
Feminists would have to give up their other preoccupations—marriage reform above all.

They did so, and soon nothing separated the NWSA and AWSA except personal animosities. In 1890, they finally merged to form the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA).

By then both groups were not only equally conservative but also equally opportunistic. The feminist tactic, acquired in Kansas, of exploiting racial and ethnic prejudices whatever the moral cost, had become so entrenched that suffragists no longer identified with blacks and other minorities.

This can be seen in a resolution the NAWSA passed during its first year. Woman suffrage was desirable because “in every state there are more white women who can read and write than all negro voters; more American women who can read and write than all foreign voters; so that the enfranchisement of such women would settle the vexed question of rule by illiteracy, whether of home-grown or foreign-born production.”

Appeals to popular bigotry failed. But, around the turn of the century, suffragists began to tap a more promising source of support: Moral reformers, previously hostile to feminism, had started to agree that if their largely female constituencies could vote, politicians would become more responsive. These reformers, both men and women, gradually moved to combine woman suffrage with other reforms, a linkage that has often been called “social feminism.”

Cheers in Wyoming

One of social feminism’s first and most important practitioners was the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU). Under Frances Willard, previously the first dean of women at Northwestern University, the WCTU grew in size (from 27,000 members in 1879 to 168,000 by 1898) and in scope. It attacked, among other evils, prostitution, child labor, and dangerous factory conditions, finally taking up the cause of woman suffrage.

Willard shrewdly used the term “Home Protection ballot” to describe woman suffrage, directly countering conservative fears that the vote for women would destroy family unity. She said the vote would enable women “to make the whole world homelike,” and predicted that women voters “would come into government and purify it, into politics and cleanse its Stygian pool.”

Such rhetorical claims about the moral superiority of women were common among social feminists. Even equalitarian suffragists could not always resist taking the moral high ground, though as a rule they tried to minimize gender differences.

The suffragists’ cause also benefited from America’s economic growth, which created more jobs than could be filled by male immi-
FEMINISM

The migration from Europe, huge though it was. By 1910, 7,640,000 women were employed—20 percent of the total labor force. Though most were servants or manual workers, nearly two million held white-collar jobs as clerks, librarians, secretaries, and teachers. With the advent of universal public education, girls entered school in numbers roughly equal to boys. But they stayed longer, in order to develop the literacy skills needed for "woman's work."

Women also made great gains in higher education. In 1870, when one percent of college-age youths attended college, only 21 percent of them were women. By 1910, when about five percent of college-age Americans matriculated, 40 percent were women. In U.S. high schools, girls outnumbered boys. The more education women received, the more likely they were to join the largely middle-class suffragists.

Despite this trend, combined with a better-educated public's growing interest in social questions, woman suffrage took time to catch on. In the 1890s, a few thinly populated Western states enfranchised women—Wyoming (1890), Colorado (1893), Utah (1896), and Idaho (1896)—but not another state joined them until 1910.

Apathy was one cause of slow progress, the numerous and varied opponents of woman suffrage another. Suffrage was attacked by...
conservative Southern Democrats, who were sexist as well as racist, and by the gigantic liquor industry, whose leaders were certain that women would vote for prohibition, given a chance. It was even opposed by middle-class women known as "antis"; in 1911, individual state groups organized into the National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage, founded in New York by Mrs. Arthur M. Dodge.

The lean years ended in 1910 when the state of Washington, dominated by Progressive politicians sympathetic to social-feminist demands, gave women the vote. Two years later, presidential candidate Theodore Roosevelt made woman suffrage a plank in his Progressive Party's platform. Meanwhile, thanks to a young Quaker named Alice Paul, woman suffrage was making headline news.

**Safety First**

Paul, a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania, had returned to America after years of experience in the radical English suffragette movement.* Using the Englishwoman's direct-action techniques, she put the publicity stunt to work in Washington, D.C. In 1913, on the day before Woodrow Wilson's inauguration, Paul inspired some 5,000 suffragists to march near the White House. A riot broke out when enraged spectators physically assaulted the marchers. This much-publicized event aroused great sympathy for the women and public outcry against Washington's chief of police, who was fired. More important, it lit a fire under the suffragists' cause.

The NAWSA gained more from this incident than did Alice Paul, who could not get along with its moderate leaders and formed her own organization. Her National Woman's Party (NWP) won the press's avid attention with such tactics as organizing hunger strikes, burning President Wilson's speeches, and lying down in Pennsylvania Avenue to stop traffic. But most women preferred the more conventional NAWSA, which grew prodigiously. And most male politicians, who had never before cared for the NAWSA, saw new virtues in it as the safe alternative to Paul and her militants. In 1915, when the NAWSA elected a new president, Carrie Chapman Catt, she was finally in a position to exploit these advantages.

Catt had made her reputation in New York. There she had created an efficient political machine that narrowly lost a state suffrage referendum in 1915, and was favored to win the next one, as indeed it did, two years later. A canny strategist and dynamic leader with no interest in theory, Catt once observed that she did not know whether the vote was "a right, a duty, or a privilege, but whatever it is, women want it."

World War I gave suffragists a golden opportunity that they were quick to seize. Despite the long-standing pacifism of most femi-

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*British women won the vote in 1918.
nists, the majority stood behind Congress and President Wilson when the United States declared war against Germany on April 6, 1917. As the social-feminist General Federation of Women’s Clubs explained in its house organ, “We should love to talk it over with the war-makers, but they would not understand...so we give our men gladly, unselfishly, proudly, patriotically.”

**Stalling in the Senate**

That was not entirely accurate. Catt did pledge the NAWSA’s support, but she pressed for equal suffrage as a war measure. Her gambit was accurately described by anti leader Dodge as “Patriotism—at a Price.” The Wilson administration established a Woman’s Committee of the Council of National Defense and appointed a former NAWSA president, Anna Howard Shaw, to chair it. Women by the millions also filled factory and other jobs left vacant when men entered the armed forces. It could thus be said—and Catt said it—that women had earned the right to vote through patriotic service.

This formula enabled male politicians to change sides on woman suffrage without seeming to have been pressured. Many, including Republican presidential hopeful Warren G. Harding, did change sides. And after Congress enacted Prohibition as a war measure the antisuffragist liquor lobby faded away. Accordingly, in January 1918, Woodrow Wilson asked Congress to approve a constitutional amendment enfranchising women. The House of Representatives quickly complied. The Senate, with Southern Democrats stubbornly opposed, stalled for 16 months. The senators did not give in until June 1919. Republicans, who had always been more sympathetic to woman suffrage, provided the most votes.*

Two-thirds of the state legislatures now had to be won over. Antisuffragists, hoping to delay, if not prevent, ratification until after the 1920 elections, launched a campaign linking woman suffrage to anarchism and the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. Suffragists united to march and petition in record numbers. Even so, had Harry Burn of Tennessee not come through for his mother, the amendment would undoubtedly have died in the remaining Southern states.

Republicans earned their reward in 1920 when a majority of women voters cast their ballots for candidate Harding. But much of what suffragists thought would happen after they won the vote never did. Before 1920, social-feminist reformers were always complaining that they lacked political weight. Hence they needed voting women behind them to make legislators enact reforms. But this was a dubious argument, since prudent politicians—unable to measure women’s influence—tended to take reform issues seriously well before 1920. In fact, during the Progressive era (1900–14), social feminists played

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*Thirty Democrats voted for, 22 against; 32 Republicans voted for, 21 against.
"The greatest thing for any woman to be is a wife and a mother," wrote Theodore Roosevelt. And a voter, said suffragists. Teddy capitulated.

a key role in persuading Congress to abolish child labor and enact laws protecting consumers and women workers.

However, once women began casting votes, their political clout appeared to decline. Women did not go to the polls in equal numbers with men. And, contrary to suffragist predictions, they voted much like men. There was no ideological "gender gap."

As time went on and politicians stopped treating women as a political bloc, women, to a remarkable degree, stopped acting like one. During its last years the NAWSA had perhaps a million members; the League of Women Voters, organized by Catt in 1920 to replace it, started out with one-tenth as many. Few women ran for office in any given year, fewer still were elected, and even this contingent could not be counted on to support social-feminist programs.

The vote was probably the least of many factors that diminished social feminists' power during the politically conservative Roaring Twenties. Liberal male reformers also lost ground in Congress and the state legislatures. But having expected so much from suffrage, feminists were all the more discouraged. And feminism was all the more discredited.

Efforts to fashion new goals produced further feminist disunity.
The major split opened up in 1923, at a meeting in Seneca Falls. The militant NWP announced that its first priority would be to fight for an equal rights amendment, since laws and ordinances everywhere still discriminated against women.* However, social feminists feared that such an amendment would void the whole structure of legislation protecting working women, built up with great effort over a long period of time.

Equitarian feminists did not care. They argued that the real function of protective law was to keep women from taking desirable jobs. This was why the American Federation of Labor supported protection for women, they said, while opposing it for men.

**Enlisting Gloria Swanson**

Although both sides had a point, neither would compromise. The NWP aggressively pursued its goal, disrupting two conferences sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor's Women's Bureau. Florence Kelley of the National Consumers' League, a legendary social feminist, called the NWP "insane." The Women's Bureau's Mary Anderson described it as "a kind of hysterical feminism with a slogan for a program." Even so, the NWP was supported by many celebrities, among them actress Gloria Swanson, aviator Amelia Earhart, Mrs. William Randolph Hearst, and poet Edna St. Vincent Millay.

Antifeminism did not disappear after women won the vote. Instead, virulent attacks upon social feminists became commonplace, adding to the confusion. In 1921 Congress passed the Sheppard-Towner Act, the first federally financed health care program for mothers, a hard-won victory for social feminists. But a strong counterattack led by organized medicine and red-baiting "Woman Patriots" (most of them former antis) smeared "Bolshevist" organizations like the League of Women Voters, the YWCA, and the Women's Bureau. Sheppard-Towner was allowed to expire in 1929.

By then, according to an article in Harper's Monthly, young women were either bored by feminism or actively disliked those who "antagonize men with their constant clamor about maiden names, equal rights" and such. A psychologist found that young women equated feminism with being lonely and unmarried. The pleasure-loving flapper infuriated older activists. "It is sickening to see so many of the newly freed abusing that freedom in mere imitation of masculine weakness and vice," wrote feminist intellectual and pacifist Charlotte Perkins Gilman. Her generation had expected that equality would bring men to the moral level of women, not the opposite, as seemed to be happening.

The Great Depression struck just when feminism was weakest.

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*During the 1930s, the NWP compiled a list of 1,000 state laws that discriminated against women. For example, 17 states denied women equal rights in the sale of real estate.
Apparently overshadowed by the economic crisis, NWP militants could no longer command the attention of the press or politicians, despite growing support from business and professional women. Thanks to Eleanor Roosevelt, social-feminist programs prospered under the New Deal, and more than 50 women received important federal posts, including the first female cabinet member, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins. Yet Mrs. Roosevelt and her allies in the League of Women Voters denied any link to the women’s movement. “We are not feminists primarily,” a League officer explained in 1933, repudiating her organization’s heritage.

As the Depression wore on, more women were forced to find employment than ever before. The number of working women rose from 10.8 million in 1930 to 12.1 million in 1940. But the vast majority of men and women, when polled, did not think women should work, especially not wives, accused (falsely, as a rule) of taking jobs away from men to earn “pin money.” The very notion of equal rights sank from view, leaving to women only what Betty Friedan would later call the “feminine mystique.” In 1940, novelist Pearl Buck surveyed the American scene and concluded that women’s influence was “almost totally lacking” in the centers of national life.

Why did the women’s movement fade away? The crux of the problem was that feminist leaders viewed themselves in contradictory ways. Militant feminists demanded equality with men, and, in the NWP and other organizations, worked more or less intelligently to that end. But the militants were out of step with feminists as a whole. Most agreed with Florence Kelley that “the cry Equality, Equality, where nature has created inequality is... stupid and deadly.” Social feminists believed that because women were vulnerable, they needed protection, yet, as they were also morally superior, women merited special rights and opportunities.

Ironically, because feminist leaders made suffrage a substitute for feminist theory and ascribed to it benefits it manifestly lacked, gaining the vote helped put an end to feminism. Many women were inadvertently persuaded by suffragist propaganda that by winning the vote they had won equality, making feminism redundant. Unity around the banner of suffrage concealed differences among organized women that could neither be hidden nor reconciled after 1920. But that became clear only after the fact, too late for feminists to change. Years later, when a new generation of women took up the fight for equality, the same problem would be waiting for them.
THE THIRD WAVE

by Rita Kramer

On the afternoon of March 22, 1972, a packed gallery in the United States Senate erupted in applause, cheers, and cowboy yells as the roll call vote revealed that, 49 years after it had first been proposed, the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) had been approved by a lopsided margin of 84 to 8. Within a half-hour, Hawaii's state legislature became the first in the Union to ratify the amendment.

"There seems little question now," the Washington Evening Star observed after the Senate vote, "that [feminists] will have their Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution."

Public opinion polls earlier had revealed a rapid shift in popular sentiment: An overwhelming majority of Americans now seemed to favor the measure. "Equality of rights under the law," the amendment stated, "shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."

From the White House, a conservative Republican president, Richard M. Nixon, offered his unqualified endorsement. Representative Martha Griffiths (D.-Mich.), who had engineered the ERA's passage in the House of Representatives the year before, confidently predicted ratification "in less than two years."

In the spring of 1972, the ERA did not seem like a particularly radical measure either to Washington politicians or to media folk. It was still a time of rapid change. The impact of Lyndon Johnson's 1964-68 surge of Great Society legislation was still being felt; the 1964 Civil Rights Act, banning sexism as well as racism in hiring and promotions, was being enforced; the federal government was pushing affirmative action quotas for women and minorities; spokesmen for every aggrieved group, from Hispanics to Native Americans to homosexuals, seemed to be seeking, and often gaining, redress.

Indeed, during 1967-72, perhaps the most rapid, and certainly the most pervasive, changes in American attitudes, opportunities, and customs had involved both women and men. Unlike black civil rights leaders after Brown v. Board of Education (1954), feminists did not have to overcome "massive resistance" as they sought to eliminate scores of barriers to women in education, employment, and behavior long sanctioned by custom or (less often) by statute.

Spurred by new laws and regulations, these changes had occurred without any ERAs, and often without much argument. For example, after one day of picketing by feminist protesters in 1967, New York Times advertising executives ended their practice of seg-
While feminists view the housewife as a captive of domesticity, to the New Yorker’s James Thurber in 1943 she appeared all-powerful in her domain. 

regating help wanted ads by sex. Under federal mandates, corporations doing business with the government had to show “progress” in the hiring and promotion of women. Yale opened its doors to women in 1969; San Diego State College created the first “women’s studies” program in 1970, and dozens of other colleges did the same (providing what amounted to ready-made pulpits for feminism). In 1970, Alaska, Hawaii, and New York liberalized their abortion laws; the Episcopal Church allowed women to be ordained as deacons; the U.S. Department of Justice filed its first sex discrimination suits against private employers. In 1971, Congress passed the Comprehensive Child Development Bill, a federally subsidized day care program, only to have it vetoed by President Nixon.

The 1972 Equal Rights Amendment was seemingly nothing more than a constitutional buttress to changes already under way.* But, after its initial successes, the ERA never made it through the state-by-state ratification process.

Today, despite a long, devoted campaign on its behalf, the ERA is dead. The various prospects, which its feminist champions once

*Two states, Wyoming and Utah, had added ERAs to their state constitutions many years earlier; nine states adopted ERAs during 1971 and 1972. Today, 16 state constitutions contain ERAs.
offered, of a "gender-blind society" seem to have lost whatever allure they may have had. And, in ideological-political terms, feminism is, once again, in deep disarray.

In retrospect, the eventual schism between feminist political "spokespersons" and the immensely varied population they claimed to represent seems to have been foreordained by the politics of feminists themselves. When the movement re-awakened during the 1960s, four decades after woman suffrage was won, feminism was not aimed at a single tangible goal such as winning the vote. Rather, its advocates harked back to Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who had sought to challenge women's own notions of their role in society, indeed, America's very notions of the good society. It was a tall order.

The Feminine Mystique

During the 1950s, after the insecurities of the Great Depression and the stresses of World War II, the popular norm was suburban domesticity. Although divorcées were entitled to alimony, they bore a certain stigma (except among the very poor and the wealthy); "career women" were rare outside teaching or nursing; husbands, white-collar or blue-collar, were expected to bring home the bacon. Most young college-educated women worked, but only until they married Mr. Right, if he could be found. The wives of farmers, shopkeepers, and clergymen were often partners in the enterprise; working wives in poor households had no choice. Middle- and upper-class wives governed family social life, and supplied vital energy and talent to church and civic groups (e.g., the League of Women Voters) and political campaigns, but left the limelight to men.

In women's magazines, in church sermons, in commencement speeches at Smith or Vassar, in all but a few women's organizations, the old ideal of mutually supporting "separate spheres" for husbands and wives was widely, if tacitly, accepted as best for the marriage, the home, the children, and the larger community.

"The ideal American woman today," anthropologist Margaret Mead observed in a special Life issue on women midway through the 1950s, "is a woman who can afford to have the number of children she and her husband want, who has as well-equipped a house as she needs, a car at her disposal to drive her children to parties and herself to volunteer or paid work, and a cooperative, successful husband engaged in challenging work."

Rita Kramer, 57, has written extensively on family issues. She is an active member of the U.S. Department of Education's Elementary Education Study Group. Born in Detroit, she received a B.A. from the University of Chicago (1948). Her books include Maria Montessori, A Biography (1976), Giving Birth: Child Bearing in America Today (1978), and In Defense of the Family: Raising Children in America Today (1983).
Yet, amid unprecedented national affluence, the ideal American woman was to discover that she was not happy. The news came from a Smith-educated mother of three, wife of a Madison Avenue adman, and freelance writer named Betty Friedan.

One April morning in 1959, Friedan wrote, she was chatting over coffee with five mothers in a well-to-do New York suburb when one of the women began talking “in a tone of quiet desperation” about “the problem.” “Suddenly,” Friedan recalled, “they realized they all shared the same problem, the problem that has no name. They began, hesitantly, to talk about it.”

“The problem,” which Friedan raised in coffee klatches with friends, neighbors, and housewives whom she interviewed across the country, was boredom and a sense of “emptiness.” Friedan named the problem in the title of her book, *The Feminine Mystique* (1963). Hailed by one reviewer as “the most important book of the 20th century,” it became a best seller.

The novelty of *The Feminine Mystique* was that Friedan portrayed the laments of her middle-class subjects not as individual frustrations, but as angst common to all women in America. Justified or not, this thesis touched a nerve. It was to evolve into the leitmotif of 1960s feminism: The personal is political.
“Our culture,” Friedan contended, “does not permit women to accept or gratify their basic need to grow and fulfill their potentialities as human beings.” Society was to blame. The privileged housewives she had interviewed had been tricked, Friedan argued, by a conspiracy of “popularizers [of Freudian theory], sociologists, educators, ad-agency manipulators, magazine writers, child experts, marriage counselors, ministers, [and] cocktail party authorities” into accepting the “mystique” that domesticity was the key to feminine fulfillment.

In reality, Friedan charged in an often-quoted phrase, the suburban home with its husband and children was nothing but a “comfortable concentration camp.”

_The Feminine Mystique_ is usually cited as the spark that re-ignited the feminist movement in America. That may or may not be true. But the grievances it articulated were those of white, North-eastern, college-educated women. And their special visions of true sexual equality would thereafter dominate most feminist political thought and action.

Events might have taken a different turn without two assists that the federal government inadvertently provided to Friedan and the nation’s small corps of active feminists.

In 1961, when Friedan was still writing her book, Esther Peterson, soon to be an assistant secretary of labor in the new Kennedy administration, had an idea. A social feminist of the Eleanor Roosevelt school who viewed the ERA as a “headache,” Peterson was worried by the persistent high-level lobbying for the amendment by the tiny National Woman’s Party (NWP) and the elite Federation of Business and Professional Women’s Clubs. Why not appoint a presidential Commission on the Status of Women, she wrote, “to substitute constructive recommendations for the present troublesome and futile agitation” for the ERA?

**Equality, Now!**

President Kennedy agreed. In 1963, his Commission’s Equal Pay Act, the first federal statute requiring “equal pay for equal work,” breezed through Congress; it addressed a tangible injustice done to women. Kennedy also established two permanent government committees; state commissions on the status of women sprang up to complement them. A seedbed for feminism was now in place. Betty Friedan joined the New York commission.

Ironically, the most important piece of legislation that now affects the lives of American women also came _before_ feminism became politically visible and vocal.

After Kennedy’s assassination, Congress approved the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act. Almost by accident, the lawmakers included
women under Title VII of the act, which banned discrimination in employment and pay on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Representative Howard W. “Judge” Smith (D.-Va.) had deliberately inserted “sex” into the language of Title VII hoping to torpedo the act. But Title VII passed anyway, without much debate. Now federal law required not only equal pay for equal work, but equal access to jobs from which women, by custom, were usually excluded—carpenter, investment banker, sports reporter, corporation lawyer, fire fighter."

Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society kindled the hopes of the feminists, but, as in the years after the Civil War, many liberals believed that “this hour belongs to the Negro.” So did the press and the television networks. Women’s rights were eclipsed by a nationwide focus on the drama of Martin Luther King’s struggle to make white America live up to its own fresh promises to blacks. In 1966, at a Washington assembly of the states’ new women’s commissions, Friedan complained that Washington was dragging its feet. Over lunch, she and 27 other activists (including two men) formed the National Organization for Women (NOW). It was the first significant feminist organization to appear since the NWP was formed in 1913.

Portents

Initially, Friedan and her colleagues pressed Johnson to strengthen the new Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), a federal agency created to help enforce the 1964 Civil Rights Act. They asked him to prod the EEOC’s male commissioners “to combat sex discrimination as vigorously as they seek to combat racial discrimination.” In a letter to the White House, they called on LBJ for a “comprehensive effort” to “include women in your Great Society program for the underprivileged and excluded.”

The phrasing was no accident. Echoing the liberal rhetoric of the day, the founders of NOW saw women as a kind of “oppressed majority.” Although few white women suffered the kinds of indignities and injuries that blacks did—indeed, feminists often complained that men put women “on a pedestal”—NOW’s founders perceived their cause as a heroic counterpart to the black civil rights movement. “Sexism,” variously defined, was akin to racism. NOW, they said, would be “an NAACP [National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo-

*In 1964, state and federal laws still sanctioned many forms of discrimination. Some co-educational state colleges, for example, imposed informal quotas on their admissions of women; women’s opportunities in interscholastic sports (and their access to athletic scholarships) were limited. Credit cards and home mortgages were largely unavailable to single women, and, in some states, laws also limited single women’s access as well as single men’s) to contraceptives. Because women, on average, live longer than men, their monthly pensions during retirement were often smaller than men’s. Since 1964, new laws and court decisions have remedied many such inequities. But others remain. A divorced woman who spent many of her married years as a homemaker, for example, will find that her monthly Social Security check is worth only half as much as her ex-husband’s.
Feminist leaders gather for a 1972 meeting of the National Women's Political Caucus. From left: Gloria Steinem, representatives Bella Abzug (standing) and Shirley Chisholm, and Betty Friedan.

ple] of women's rights."

Lyndon Johnson accepted their argument. In his now-famous Executive Order 11375, issued in 1967, he included women along with blacks and other minorities among the groups to be favored under federal affirmative action programs.

NOW, still a tiny organization of only 1,000 women and men, soon broadened its agenda—the first of several such expansions. Its 1967 Bill of Rights called for maternity leave for working mothers, tax deductions for child care, federally supported day care facilities, and equal education and job training opportunities for men and women. Two further demands, passage of the ERA and the repeal of all state anti-abortion laws, were added after a brief but jarring debate. The debate was a portent of future difficulties.

NOW's embrace of the ERA temporarily cost it the support of

*Even radical black and Hispanic women have never flocked to the feminist cause. "In class and color," writes Barbara Deckard, "movement women looked too much like 'Miss Ann,' the employer and oppressor of the black woman domestic." The white militants were far more interested in sexual equality than were many black and Hispanic women, who stressed special protection in the marketplace (e.g., day care). And many feared that white women would compete with blacks for jobs, especially under affirmative action quotas. Aileen Hernandez, the black woman who succeeded Betty Friedan as NOW's president in 1970, noted that "some black sisters are not sure that the feminist movement will meet their current needs," which another black woman defined as "for black men to get ahead."

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female labor union officials who saw absolute equality as a threat to hard-won workplace protections for women. Its tentative endorsement of “reproductive freedom” alienated a number of mainstream feminists, who broke away to form the Women’s Equity Action League (WEAL). A veteran radical, NWP leader Alice Paul, now almost 90, was dismayed by the link to abortion. “As far as I can see,” Paul said, “the ERA has nothing whatsoever to do with abortion.” The issue got little attention in the media.

However, as the 1960s ended, NOW was joined by dozens of new groups, such as the National Abortion Rights League, Federally Employed Women, and COYOTE (Cut Out Your Old Tired Ethics), a union of prostitutes. Even the conservative Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) created a National Women’s Resource Center “to expand society’s limiting concept of women” and to “raise women’s awareness of their restricted options.”

Off Our Backs

On the Left, meanwhile, militants led by the likes of Robin Morgan (who had once played the little sister in the sentimental 1950s TV series “I Remember Mama”) and Ti-Grace Atkinson quit NOW to organize more radical groups such as the New York Radical Women (later called the Feminists), and WITCH (Women’s International Terrorist Conspiracy from Hell).

These young urban activists, far more visible on TV and in the national press than they were numerous, had a different agenda and style from the older, legalistic reformers of NOW. Most had entered politics through the student New Left. While NOW welcomed like-minded men to its ranks, the militants were separatists—lesbians, Marxists, socialists, utopians. Beginning during the late 1960s, they formed women’s health collectives, communes, businesses, and banks, and started magazines—some of them literary, like Aphra, some of them angry, like Off Our Backs and Up from Under. In the summer of 1969, the Feminists agreed that no more than a third of their members would consist of women who lived with men.

To the radicals, “founding mother” Betty Friedan’s plea for the removal of barriers that kept women at home and out of the “man’s world” seemed bourgeois and conservative. They insisted on nothing less than a “cultural revolution” that would “restructure society” and “abolish gender roles,” freeing women from “the tyranny of their reproductive biology.” Shulamith Firestone announced that pregnancy was “a temporary deformation of the woman’s body for the sake of the species.”

“Ultimately,” wrote Boston militant Roxanne Dunbar, “we want to destroy the three pillars of class and caste society—the family, private property, and the state.”
Such sentiments aside, the radicals contributed two elements that were to have a considerable effect on the women’s movement. The first was a “women-are-not-just-equal-but-superior” ideological strand, oddly reminiscent of the 19th-century suffragists, which would eventually color much feminist rhetoric.

The radicals’ second contribution was “consciousness-raising,” often combining a form of agit-prop with growing American middle-class penchants for group therapy, “self-awareness,” and the “human potential” movement.

First on college campuses and then in the suburbs, small groups of women gathered not so much to voice general discontents, Friedan-style, as to discuss their unhappy experiences with men: husbands, ex-husbands, fathers, boyfriends, employers, doctors, bankers, lawyers. Individual problems soon appeared to be “common problems,” as feminist writer Jo Freeman put it, “with social causes and political solutions.”

“Three months of this sort of thing,” Firestone declared, “is enough to make a feminist of any woman.”

Joining the Crusade

Imitating the anti-Vietnam War protesters, both radical and mainstream feminists learned how to attract the attention of the news media. NOW and other liberal groups picketed the EEOC and buttonholed newspaper editors. On August 26, 1970, the 50th anniversary of woman suffrage, 50,000 women marched past a thicket of TV cameras on Fifth Avenue during NOW’s Women’s Strike for Equality. “Don’t Cook Dinner—Starve A Rat Today!” one placard urged. Radical feminists occupied the Philadelphia offices of the Ladies’ Home Journal in 1970, browbeating the editors into publishing a special supplement on women’s liberation. Kate Millet, the so-called Mao Zedong of the movement, earned a spot on the cover of Time with the publication of Sexual Politics (1970), her furious indictment of patriarchal society.

In 1971, five Manhattan professional women created Ms. magazine, giving feminists an important voice all their own, and journalist Gloria Steinem became its chief editor. (By 1973, the circulation of Ms. had climbed to 200,000.) With television always eager for confrontation stories, the radicals staged attention-grabbing “happenings.” WITCH “covens” ceremoniously hexed the New York Stock Exchange (the Dow Jones Index dipped) and the New York Radical Women crowned a sheep Miss America outside the Atlantic City hotel where the pageant was being held.

Diverse as they were, all of the splinter groups and sects of the feminist movement—radicals, lesbians, legalists, liberals, moderates—were loosely held together by the urgency they attached to
winning ratification of the ERA, and, to a lesser degree, repeal of state laws regulating abortion. Indeed, many long-time foes of the ERA—the League of Women Voters, the American Association of University Women, the AFL-CIO—reversed their positions on the amendment once Congress approved it. Even WEAL, despite its break with NOW over abortion, eagerly joined NOW as a junior partner in the ERA crusade.

None of the groups could agree on exactly what the ERA would mean—that would have to be worked out, case by case, in the courts. Recalling Carrie Chapman Catt’s attitude toward suffrage, they only knew that they wanted it.

But ERA faced a peculiar liability: To many sympathetic Americans of both sexes its value now seemed mostly symbolic. During the tumultuous years after the 1964 Civil Rights Act, most obvious barriers to sexual equality seemed to start to fall almost as quickly as they could be named. Feminists issued stern summonses to the “struggle for women’s rights,” but, helped by the media, they won a receptive audience and secured their initial demands in a remarkably short time. And there was no overt male “backlash.”

The white males who ran America’s institutions had wives and sisters and daughters; male politicians had little to lose and much to gain by placating women (who voted). And as time went on, public opinion polls showed that men generally favored the ERA and abortion-law reform by wider margins than women did. By 1973, every item in NOW’s six-year-old Bill of Rights had been at least partially satisfied, and feminists had become part of the national political scene, notably in the faction-torn Democratic Party.

**Nominating McGovern**

The news media had almost completely ignored NOW’s creation in 1966, but it was front-page news in 1971 when a group of New York Democrats, including Betty Friedan, Gloria Steinem, and U.S. representatives Bella Abzug and Shirley Chisholm, formed the National Women’s Political Caucus (NWPC). Now feminists were in partisan politics. Their goal was to organize support for candidates in favor of “women’s” demands—broadly defined as an end to the Vietnam War, repeal of anti-abortion laws, passage of the ERA, tax law reform, and an end to various forms of discrimination.

That very year, Rep. Martha Griffiths managed to extract the ERA from the House Judiciary Committee, where it had been bottled up for 19 years by the chairman, 82-year-old Representative Emmanuel Celler, a Brooklyn Democrat. (Celler described the ERA as a “blunderbuss amendment” that ignored the fact that there is “as much difference between a male and a female as between a horse chestnut and a chestnut horse.”) Celler subsequently lost his congres-
Running sprints at Yale. Under the federal Education Amendments of 1972, schools and universities are required to spend as much (per capita) on women's athletic programs and scholarships as on men's.

sional seat to Elizabeth Holtzman, an ardent young Democratic feminist and antirwar militant.*

In early 1972, passed by the House, the ERA swept through the Senate. At the Democratic Party Convention in Miami that summer, a "democratization" of party rules enabled women to take nearly 40 percent of the seats. Presidential candidate and senator George McGovern (D.-S.D.), who had engineered the rules changes, would pay a price for his own egalitarianism.

"If you let Barnum & Bailey interpret a plot by Stendhal," Gloria Steinem later wrote, "it might come out to be something like the 1972 Democratic Convention." Introduced to the Woman's Caucus by a feminist supporter with the words, "We are all here because of him," McGovern joked that "the credit for that has to go to Adam"—prompting a chorus of jeers and hisses. "George the pig!" cried one backbencher.

On the convention floor, Shirley Chisholm challenged McGovern for the nomination; to oppose McGovern's anointed running mate,

*In the early 1970s unprecedented numbers of women began to appear on the ballots of both major parties. Texas sent a black woman, Democrat Barbara Jordan, to Congress in 1972. In 1974, Connecticut elected a woman governor, Ella Grasso. Yet nomination did not mean election. Twenty-five women now hold seats in the U.S. Senate and House, only seven more than in 1955. For all the Democratic Party's feminist rhetoric, a majority of the congressional women (including both senators) are Republicans. Among female voters, however, Democrats outnumber Republicans by about 5 to 4.
Senator Thomas Eagleton of Missouri, activist women pushed a former Texas state legislator named Frances "Sissy" Farenthold. On the convention floor, they clamored for a "reproductive freedom" plank in the party platform and cheered the homosexuals and lesbians who demanded the party's endorsement of gay rights. As the TV cameras rolled, Bella Abzug, her trademark hat bobbing, assailed actress Shirley MacLaine for opposing the "pro-choice" plank: "A sister never goes against a sister!" she boomed.

For all that, Abzug and the NWPC succeeded in winning the Democratic Party's endorsement not only of the ERA but of government-funded day care. They also helped to nominate George McGovern—and, by their eccentricities, aired on national television, probably helped Richard Nixon to defeat him.

**Miss, Mrs., or Ms.?**

The political events in Miami were an augury of things to come. By 1972, even the mainstream feminists of NOW were shifting Left, away from the preoccupations and politics of most American women, working or not. Midge Decter, author of *The New Chastity and Other Arguments against Women's Liberation* (1972), observed that the movement "does not belong to the history of feminism but to the history of radicalism."

During the early 1970s, for example, NOW denounced women's traditional volunteer work in hospitals and social welfare agencies as the equivalent of housework—or "***work," as feminists called it. NOW sought the legalization of prostitution and took up the cudgels for the rights of lesbians—the victims, NOW declared, of "double oppression."

Such radical sentiment had begun to alarm some of the pioneers. In 1972, for example, Friedan felt compelled to take Abzug and Steinem to task for "female sexism" in the pages of *McCall's*. She scored Steinem in particular for denouncing marriage as a form of prostitution and for asserting, as Friedan put it, that "no woman would ever want to go to bed with a man if she didn't need to sell her body for bread or a mink coat."

Still, judging by the number of women who copied the "Gloria Steinem look"—streaked hair and oversize aviator glasses—feminism had its chic aspects. And, among other cultural phenomena, the women's movement imposed a new etiquette on middle-class American males, at least outside the chivalrous South. If it was sometimes awkward for a man to decide whether to address a woman ("lady" having been banned from the approved lexicon) as Miss or Mrs. or Ms., or chairperson, or whether to hold a restaurant door open for his dinner companion, it was, as George McGovern had learned, no laughing matter.
‘COMPARABLE WORTH’

When Eleanor Holmes Norton took over the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under President Jimmy Carter in 1977, she called the concept of comparable worth a “magic opportunity” for sexual equality.

Indeed, with the demise of the Equal Rights Amendment, comparable worth is emerging as the “feminist battle of the 1980s.”

What feminists—and their union allies—seek is the expansion of U.S. civil rights laws to require that not only men and women holding the same jobs but those holding dissimilar jobs of comparable worth get the same pay. Thus (female) clerk-typists might earn the same as (male) warehouse workers, (female) librarians the same as firemen.

The political push comes from a simple, much-publicized statistic: The average working woman makes only 64 percent of the average man’s income.

Groups such as the National Organization for Women and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) contend that the pay gap mostly stems not from the marketplace and women’s job choices and aspirations but from discrimination. Neither the 1963 Equal Pay Act nor the 1964 Civil Rights Act has ended the disparity.

No one argues that no gaps (and no discrimination) exist. But economists contend that the 64 percent figure is too simple. Debate over the other earnings data continues.

Massive job studies are the key to comparable worth. However, fixing a specific job’s “worth”—usually by giving points for various elements such as “effort,” education required, working conditions, skills—is inherently subjective. Business economists say it ignores costs, complexity, the give-and-take of union labor contracts, and the ever-changing job market. Conceded one evaluator, Alvin O. Bellak: “Could we prove to a legal certainty that job X is inherently, absolutely, unequivocally worth as much [in pay] as job Y? The answer is no.”

In 1983, the AFSCME sued the state of Washington, noting that the state had ignored a study showing that its women employees were paid 20 percent less than men in “comparable” jobs. A U.S. district court judge in Seattle sided with the union, ordering the state to pay $1 billion in restitution. But the state was upheld on appeal last year. Said the 9th Circuit Court: “Neither law nor logic deems the free market a suspect enterprise.” Now the U.S. Supreme Court may deal with the issue.

President Reagan opposes comparable worth; Congress has yet to approve it. But, pressured by feminists and unions, state governments have ordered job studies (24 states) or revised pay scales (12 states) for their employees with comparable worth in mind. Worried but still untouched is the private sector, which fears any federal wage-setting. Even so, a few companies (e.g. Textronix, BankAmerica) have begun to re-examine, and sometimes end, certain disparities in pay, under some variation of comparable worth.
Helping the feminist cause was the sheer presence of more and more women (38 percent of the work force in 1970) in professional schools, secretarial pools, and newsrooms as the U.S. economy grew. And, often to the bewilderment of their parents and menfolk, younger women were breaking the old rules and exploiting new opportunities: In increasing numbers, they were going to college, taking nontraditional jobs, delaying marriage, living with men outside marriage, getting divorced, seeking careers. By 1974, 40 percent of all women between the ages of 20 and 24 remained unmarried, up from the 1960 level of 29 percent. Women accounted for 45 percent of the nation’s 6.8 million college students. Women also comprised 20 percent of the enrollment of U.S. medical and law schools, and half of the enrollment of graduate schools. Visible and vocal, these young women were in no mood to accept “separate spheres” or old constraints on future possibilities.

In 1973, with ratification of the ERA seemingly assured, the militant feminists scored what they saw as a triumph. The Supreme Court struck down 46 state laws restricting access to abortion in its Roe v. Wade decision. NOW, never before a leader of “prochoice” forces, hailed the ruling for removing control over abortion from a “celibate [Roman Catholic] male religious hierarchy...male-dominated legislatures and a male-dominated medical profession...opposed to the full recognition of women as persons.” Nobody guessed it at the time, but that profeminist decision by seven of the nine male Justices of the Supreme Court marked the apogee of post-World War II political feminism in the United States. The reaction to it helped kill the ERA.

**West Point’s First Women**

Like so many other reforms urged by feminists, Roe was imposed from above. But this time reform stirred deep opposition. Phyllis Schlafly, a conservative political organizer from Illinois who headed STOP-ERA, had been fighting the amendment without great success. “Every change [that ERA] requires,” she warned, “will deprive women of a right, benefit, or exemption that they now enjoy.” And within months of the Court’s decision, a powerful grassroots Right to Life movement, strong among Catholics and Protestant fundamentalists and composed mostly of women, sprang up in every state. They sought not only to roll back Roe, but to defeat the ERA.

But it was not only the Right to Lifers who were beginning to question the feminist agenda. Already, the initial burst of enthusiasm for the ERA had been exhausted. In January 1973, 10 months after Congress gave a green light, the executive director of the National Women’s Political Caucus conceded, “The momentum for passage of the amendment has sort of worn out.”
The urban career women leading NOW, and their allies in academia and elsewhere, may have been dead certain of the need for full sexual equality, a kind of America the Androgynous, but many other women were beginning to have second thoughts. America had gone far on the road to equality, and the ERA’s intimations of full equality, never carefully considered, were beginning to look worrisome.

In 1975, the women’s movement was dealt its first series of political setbacks. In New York and New Jersey, voters declined to add ERAs to their state constitutions. A national one-day strike by housewives, organized by NOW to dramatize the value of housework, fizzled. (Nevertheless, as the campaign for the ERA entered its desperation phase, NOW’s claimed membership climbed from 40,000 in 1974 to some 200,000 during the early 1980s, before dropping to 130,000 in 1985.) The next year, Congress cut off Medicaid payments for abortion, thus ending all controversial government funding of the procedure.

During the presidential election of 1976, feminists backed Jimmy Carter. He appointed two women to Cabinet posts—but did not put ERA and abortion high on his agenda. In 1978, after women’s groups lobbied Congress for an extension of the ERA deadline, unprecedented in the history of the amendment process, they won with only a slim majority of votes. (The amendment was then three states short of the 38 needed for ratification, and it had been two years since the last state, Indiana, had given its approval.) Not a single additional state legislature thereafter could be persuaded to vote Yes. The ERA’s demise was soon to follow.

As the ERA debate went on, women continued to find they could demand and gain “access”—Congress forbade sex discrimination in schools and universities that receive federal aid in 1972, a federal court ordered the American Telephone and Telegraph Company to hire women for traditionally male jobs in 1973, and West Point admitted its first female cadets in 1976. But, it was one thing for women voluntarily to try new roles, quite another to force them to do so in the name of egalitarian doctrines.

The Return of the Flappers

For years, Schlafly had warned that, if conscription were resumed, the “ERA will require mothers to be drafted on exactly the same basis” as fathers and sent into combat. It had seemed an abstract issue, since the draft had come to an end in January 1973. Many feminists seemed to assume, like their ideological forebears, that the threat of war would vanish once women held their fair share of political power.

But after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, President Carter asked Congress to resume draft registration—and, in a bow
to the feminists, requested that women as well as men be required to carry draft cards. In the debate that followed, NOW's leadership and other equal-rights feminists were forced by the logic of their position to endorse Carter's proposal.

But the nation was not ready to face the prospect of conscripting young women and possibly sending them to suffer mutilation or death in battle. Without noticeable objections from the White House, Congress rejected the registration of women—but not of men—by an overwhelming margin.* Said Schlafly: "I think this decision put the nail in the coffin of ERA."

The ERA was officially laid to rest on June 30, 1982. As a final jolt to feminist political hopes, President Ronald Reagan confounded predictions that a "gender gap" in voting patterns would cost him reelection in 1984. He defeated Walter Mondale and his female running mate, Representative Geraldine Ferraro (D.-N.Y.), by a landslide; he received a majority of women's votes.

"No Fault" Is No Good

But President Reagan, a foe of the ERA, had also named Sandra Day O'Connor to the U.S. Supreme Court, another first for women. O'Connor's appointment illustrated, again, that while the women's movement was losing battles on the political and ideological front, doors were still opening to women in the world of work. There was steady, if highly uneven, progress. At home, wives made their own difficult adjustments to the dual tasks of child-rearing and working, largely without relying on feminist dogma. In 1982, a young feminist noted with dismay in the New York Times Magazine that the upwardly mobile career women she had interviewed, like the flappers of the 1920s, ungratefully viewed feminists as "bored," "unhappy," "bitter" women. Even Betty Friedan's daughter—before being converted in medical school—told her, "I'm not a feminist, I'm a person; it's not necessary to fight for women anymore."

Although many inequities remained, the feminists' evolving vision of a gender-blind society steadily found fewer sympathizers. Some of its key features were no longer matters of abstract theory, but unpleasant realities. New opportunities brought new burdens. The political had become personal.

Most notable among those questioning whether women could really "have it all" was Betty Friedan, the pioneer. In 1981, she came out with her revisionist Second Stage, suggesting that it was time to transcend "the male model [sic] of equity" and "come to new terms with family and with work."

*In 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court had upheld a Massachusetts law granting veterans preference in government hiring, rejecting feminist claims that the law, although nominally gender-blind, unfairly favored men since most war veterans were male.
The feminine mystique, Friedan wrote, had been superceded “by a feminist mystique which denied that core of women’s personhood that is fulfilled through love, nurture, home.” Like Dickens’s Miss Havisham, Betty Friedan seemed to be asking herself, “What have I done?”

She was not alone. Susan Brownmiller, who, in Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape (1975), had interpreted the relationship between men and women throughout Western history as a kind of organized rape, now accused her sisters of ignoring “profound biological and psychological differences” between the sexes. Andrea Dworkin, a long-time militant, declared that “sexual liberation only made life harder for women.”

In Sexual Suicide (1973), drawing considerable fire, antifeminist author George F. Gilder had warned that women’s “liberation” would relieve “men of the responsibility as head of the family. That makes it easier for a man to walk out.”

In fact, the U.S. divorce rate nearly doubled during the 1970s. Moreover, as a result of new egalitarian, feminist-backed “no-fault” divorce laws, divorcees were getting shortchanged. According to Stanford’s Lenore Weitzman, a man’s standard of living now rose by 42 percent after a divorce, while that of his ex-wife (and, usually, their children) fell by 73 percent.

Anti-ERA activist Phyllis Schlafly demanded to know “how much [federal] money was spent and how it was spent” at the 1977 National Conference of Women in Houston, led by Democratic congresswoman Bella Abzug. Schlafly staged her own conference across town.
The traditional family, long condemned by feminists as a patriarchal trap, took on a new luster. Beginning during the 1960s, poverty had become an affliction concentrated among single mothers and their children, who accounted for more than one-third of the poor by 1984. Two-parent families fared better all around.

The workaday world, where women held 45 percent of the jobs by 1984, proved to be less exciting than advertised. Helen Gurley Brown, editor of Cosmopolitan and high priestess to the young working urbanite, maintained that "a job gives a single woman something to be" in a "far more colorful world than the one of PTA, Dr. Spock and the jammed clothes dryer." But Representative Barbara Mikulski (D.-Md.) told an interviewer, "If your husband is a factory worker or a tugboat operator, you don't want his job."

And, in fact, while the working women who were getting all the attention in Cosmopolitan and newer women's magazines like Self (circ. 1 million) and Working Woman (circ. 770,000) were donning sober business suits and taking "assertiveness training" classes, the vast majority of women (like men) held less-than-glamorous jobs. Only about seven percent of employed women had entered careers by 1984 in law, medicine, and other "fast-track" professions. A 60-hour work week, young single professionals complained to Newsweek, did not leave much time for some fundamentals: finding a suitable husband and raising children.

The feminists, increasingly dogmatic and in disarray, were not sympathetic. In 1984, for example, NOW filed a legal brief against a California woman who was suing her employer for maternity leave. NOW's position: Without equal time off for fathers, such leaves would be a dangerous form of "special protection," which would give employers an incentive to discriminate.

The Old Questions

Liberalized abortion, though still supported by a majority of women and men in public opinion polls, may have freed men far more than it did women. Feminists for Life, a newly formed group, noted that women suffer the trauma of abortion, while men are relieved of responsibility. "If a woman gets pregnant," remarked a former editor of the leftish magazine Mother Jones, "the man who 20 years ago might have married her may today feel that he is gallant if he splits the cost of the abortion."

Just who, many women wondered, had been liberated?

The decline in the fortunes of the women's movement after 1973 were partly due to changes in the American political and social climate. Many militant feminists' sentiments simply did not wear well in a nation frayed by a decade of inflation and recession, rising crime, oil crises, and overseas defeats (e.g., the fall of South Vietnam, the
Feminism

Iran hostage crisis). Enough was enough.

But feminists also had themselves to blame. Like the suffragists before them, the feminists of the 1960s and '70s had united behind a banner, the ERA cause, that obscured the profound differences among them. It enabled them to avoid the difficult, perhaps impossible, task of hammering out a detailed agenda on which all could agree. As the centripetal force of the ERA waned, the old divisive questions returned: Are women morally superior to men or are they equals? Are they equal but different? Should the traditional family be strengthened or destroyed?

A New Agenda?

Moreover, as the years went by, feminist celebrities took sides in peripheral controversies (e.g., El Salvador, gay rights, the draft) that cost the ERA movement much public support. By the mid-1980s, so many matters had been defined as "women's issues" that it was impossible to speak of a single, broad-based women's movement. How many women who favored the ERA also supported a nuclear freeze, self-help gynecology, and laws against "marriage rape"?

Such incoherence made itself felt. So did the feminists' shallow political strategy. For all their success in prodding the nation toward the goals announced by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the women of Seneca Falls more than 100 years before, the feminists of NOW and their allies had sought many reforms "from above"—through the courts, the media, federal regulations, and by lobbying in Washington. They never could build or sustain a cohesive grassroots political structure. Their Supreme Court victory in Roe v. Wade, for example, spurred working-class and religious women to mobilize alongside Phyllis Schlafly against the feminist cause. Other women simply withdrew, deciding that they did not like militant feminism's tendency to polarize the sexes, encourage narcissism, and deprecate individual obligations to others.

Eventually, outside academe, the popular feminist "notion of an already extant universal class—women as such—collapsed," noted scholar Jean Bethke Elshtain. "Not only were women [like men] divided along racial, ethnic, religious, class, regional, and political lines, but feminists, too, were fragmented into many parts."

Today, while few of women's tangible gains seem to be threatened, Americans' second thoughts about the movement's political ideology bar further advance for the moment.

Feminists themselves do not agree on which way to lead. After a bitter contest over the presidency of NOW in 1985, the membership elected "ERA First" advocate Eleanor Smeal over a rival who favored an emphasis on other issues. Meanwhile, a highly acclaimed new book in the social-feminist tradition, Sylvia Ann Hewlett's A
Lesser Life: The Myth of Women’s Liberation in America (1986), may augur a revival of a long-dormant branch of feminism. While excoriating the “chic, liberal women of NOW” for their obsession with the ERA, Hewlett also argues that U.S. society should make life easier for working mothers. She favors “maternity leave, child care, flextime, and specially tailored career ladders.”

This approach—a kind of “bread-and-butter” feminism—is much like that taken by organized women in Western Europe since the early 1960s. Sweden is perhaps the archetype. Swedish feminists, unlike their American sisters, did not focus on a campaign for “equal rights.” They sought special benefits and protections for women under the law and in the marketplace. Nor did they form a Swedish equivalent of NOW; they worked within the existing political parties, the churches, the labor unions.

The results have been a steadily increasing share for women of Sweden’s already generous social welfare benefits. In connection with childbirth, both parents can share up to a year’s leave at 90 percent pay; state-financed day care accommodates 40 percent of all children under age six. Eighty percent of Swedish women have jobs. But, for a variety of reasons, utopia has yet to arrive. Mothers still do most of the housework and child-rearing; 45 percent of working women work part time (versus seven percent of men). Concentrated in “pink-collar” occupations, women earn 62 percent of what men do.

What new proposals will appeal to young women in America during the late 1980s is unclear. In everyday life, all across the nation, the tide of cultural change and reform of the laws has slowed but not ebbed. Unless the economy staggers, today’s young college-educated single women can assume that there are a wide range of job opportunities (if not always lucrative careers) in their futures. They enjoy unprecedented personal autonomy and financial independence. Their material aspirations are often high. What they apparently find more difficult to count on are those private things that their mothers and Betty Friedan once took for granted—husbands, homes, and children. Those items, essential to a healthy society, are not at the top of any feminist agenda.

E.R.A.

YES!
MEASURING THE EFFECTS

by Steven Lagerfeld

For scholars, sorting out the causes and effects of the past two decades of America’s social and sexual rearrangements is like eating a bowl of overcooked spaghetti with chopsticks. Every factor is somehow intertwined with others: Tug on the feminist strand, and along comes a tangle of others—sexual liberation, the growth of the economy’s “service sector,” affluence, the Pill, the expansion of college enrollment, recession, the rise of the “Me Generation,” the reactions of men. There is, in short, no single “X factor” that researchers can point to and say, “That is the impact of Betty Friedan!”

As in research on minorities, the politicization of much scholarship concerning the sexes has had a “chilling” effect on certain lines of inquiry, obscuring matters still more. Rosalind Rosenberg, a Barnard College historian, discovered just how powerful academic taboos can be when she testified for the defense in a sex discrimination suit against Sears, Roebuck and Company last year. If Sears did not have many women in certain jobs, she said, it was probably because few women wanted those jobs. Historically, she said, “men and women have had different interests, goals, and aspirations regarding work.”

Among others, a committee of her sister scholars at the Organization of American Historians swiftly rebuked her: “As feminist scholars, we have a responsibility not to allow our scholarship to be used against the interests of women struggling for equity in our society.”

The most indisputable (and obvious) change in women’s lot in recent years is the migration of women, particularly married women, from the home to the workplace. The female “labor force participation rate” has been on the rise since 1890, when only 18.2 percent of working-age women were employed or looking for a job. By 1950, the rate stood at 29 percent; by 1986, it had jumped to 55 percent. Why?

Most of the much-publicized increase since 1950 is a product of decisions by married women with children.

Some of these new working mothers were doubtless drawn to factories, offices, and classrooms by feminist-inspired visions of personal fulfillment and equality with their husbands, but nobody can say how many. “We are busily unmaking one of the proudest social achievements in the 19th century,” notes analyst Peter Drucker, “which was to take married women out of the work force so they could devote themselves to family and children.”

There are several banal explanations. One is that, on average,
two-paycheck families earn more ($35,740 annually) than those with a male breadwinner alone ($25,640). Moreover, Washington, through its income tax policies, has given mothers a reason to work. Between 1960 and 1984, the average tax rate on childless married persons changed very little, while that on couples with two children jumped by 43 percent. The chief cause: Inflation slashed the real value of standard deductions for dependents.

Oddly, America's economic growth may have contributed more to the influx of women into the work force than did economic hardship. Two Rand Corporation economists, James P. Smith and Michael P. Ward, have attempted to measure the importance of rising real wages in drawing women away from home since World War II. Their conclusion: Nearly 60 percent of the influx is due to better pay.

Looking at the 1960–80 period, a second pair of economists, William R. Johnson and Jonathan Skinner, found another force pushing wives to work: the increased risk of divorce, causing many married women to take precautions to ensure their future economic security.* Such fears, they say, explain 12 percent of the increase in the female labor force participation rate between 1960 and 1980.

By and large, however, married women seem to put their families first when they do go to work. About one-third of working mothers in intact families hold part-time jobs, according to the U.S. Department of Labor. Even those mothers who work full time make adjustments, shifting to less demanding jobs, and taking and quitting jobs with far more frequency than do their husbands. Only about one-quarter of all married mothers work full time, year round.

*As a result of today's high divorce rate, some 40 percent of all white children can now expect to live in a single-parent household at some point by the time they turn 16.
These choices, as well as discrimination, are reflected in employment patterns. In *Women's Work, Men's Work—Sex Segregation on the Job* (1986), a U.S. National Research Council panel reports that only a modest decline in workplace separation between the sexes occurred during the feminist 1970s. And most of the change that did occur was not revolutionary: Women entered in growing numbers those fields that were already “integrated”—e.g., payroll accounting, factory assembly. *In numerical terms,* women were not flooding male-dominated fields.

Despite the continuing, if softened, division of the sexes by job in the nation's factories, offices, and retail establishments, the male-female “pay gap” narrowed by four percentage points between 1979 and 1983: In 1983, full-time female workers earned 64 percent as much annually as their male counterparts did. (Since women are less likely to be employed year-round, *hourly* earnings might be a better gauge. Thus measured, the figure increases to 72 percent.)

**How Much Discrimination?**

Why is there a pay gap at all? No one denies that discrimination is part of the answer. But researchers do not agree on how strong an influence it is. Francine Blau, a University of Illinois economist, argues that more than half the gap is due to discrimination. “Human capital” theorists, such as June O’Neill of the Urban Institute, trace most of the differential to female patterns of schooling and employment. In general, O’Neill notes, working women (especially older women) have taken less career-oriented schooling than men. Once in the work force, they take time off to bear and raise children, change jobs more frequently than men do, and often seek jobs with “amenities such as short hours, long vacations... or a [convenient] location, [which] are paid for through lower wages.”

O’Neill argues that such factors account for most of the wage gap. Another human capital theorist, Solomon W. Polachek, says that they may explain virtually all of it. Economists of all schools seem to agree that the concentration of women in lower-paying fields—by choice and/or because of the traditional “socialization” of women and discrimination—is the key explanation for the wage gap.

In any event, O’Neill and Blau both expect male-female earnings to equalize perceptibly as younger women, better prepared for the work world, enter the job market.

How much wages will equalize is a matter of conjecture, for motherhood clearly is a major factor in determining how much women earn. Between the ages of 20 and 24, when most working women are still childless, women earn 89 percent as much as men.

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According to O’Neill. During the chief childbearing years (ages 25 to 34), the wage gap begins to grow. One group of women does enjoy wage parity with men of comparable age, education, and experience: those women who have never married or borne children.

Male-female differences persist on the “fast track”—law, medicine, business. “No matter what sphere of work women are hired for or select,” sociologist Cynthia F. Epstein writes, “like sediment in a wine bottle they seem to settle to the bottom.”

The reasons why are the subject of heated debate. Women have been entering business and professional schools in increasing numbers since 1960. Here is where the first crucial career decisions are made: One argument is that women tend to make different choices. In medicine, for example, many women elect to enter lower-paying specialties such as pediatrics, psychiatry, and gynecology/obstetrics. The pattern recurs in business. In a study of 18 women and 113 men who graduated from Stanford’s Graduate School of Business in 1974, Francine E. Gordon and Myra Strober found that the peak salaries the women aimed for were only 70 percent as high as those the men expected. And the female MBAs tended to train for occupations that pay less: While only three percent of the men took jobs in government, nearly 20 percent of the women did.*

Strober’s findings seem to be contradicted, in part, by Mary Anne Devanna’s study of 90 men and women who earned MBAs from Columbia’s Graduate School of Business between 1969 and 1972. The women started with virtually the same expectations, salaries, and professed commitment to their careers as the men did, yet within 10 years they were earning less. Devanna concluded that unspecified “societal and organizational phenomena” were to blame.

**Dropping Out**

Abundant anecdotal evidence suggests that men in the executive suite do treat women differently. *Fortune* reported in 1984 that many senior male managers are reluctant to brace their female juniors with sharp but constructive criticism. Some male executives also exclude women colleagues from their after-hours socializing, and assume that many of their female subordinates will eventually give it all up for their families.

In study after study, motherhood does emerge as the stumbling block for women on the fast track. Whatever their expectations when they set out on their careers, many women seem to change them when they bear children. A 1982 survey of 300 successful career women by Korn/Ferry International, an executive recruiting firm, found that 48 percent were unmarried and 61 percent (versus 14

*Of course, women may find such jobs attractive because sex discrimination is more rigorously policed in government. Nobody knows.
WOMEN IN THE U.S. LABOR FORCE 1960-1984

Nearly half of the nation's 114 million workers in 1984 were women, up from one-third in 1960. Labor force participation rates increased most for women with children under six, 52 percent of whom now work.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE RATES, 1960-1983

Women who work tend to marry later and get divorced more than those who do not. In recent years, the high U.S. divorce rate has leveled off even as women's employment has increased.

FAMILY STATUS OF POOR PEOPLE, 1960-1984

Of the nation's 33.7 million poor in 1984, 35 percent lived in female-headed households. Without the sharp increase in the number of such families, overall U.S. poverty would have dropped significantly between 1960 and 1984.
During the past 15 years, some 17 million women have entered the labor force, the vast majority taking "traditional" jobs. Of those women who work full time, most have no children under 18; of those mothers employed full time, about one-third are the sole support of their children.

WOMEN WHO WORK FULL TIME
(Total: 34 million)

Have women "displaced" men in colleges and professional schools? Yes and no. Overall, enrollments of women and men have grown rapidly. But at some elite institutions, e.g., the Harvard Business School, women have increased their numbers at the expense of men.
percent of all women their age) were childless. Nearly half of the 71 women in Harvard Law School's Class of '74 were still childless after 10 years, according to Jill Abramson and Barbara Franklin, authors of Where They Are Now (1986).

Abramson and Franklin provide some of the few available insights into the attrition rates of women on the fast track. Sixteen of the 38 mothers in the Class of '74 lowered their sights or abandoned their law careers entirely to devote themselves to their children. Of the 49 women who followed the well-worn male path from Harvard to the big-league law firms on Wall Street and elsewhere, 24 remained after 10 years, 16 as partners. Many of the women encountered discrimination of some kind—inferior assignments, paternalistic attitudes, clients who preferred male lawyers—but none cited it as a reason for falling behind their classmates or dropping out.

What about women in blue-collar nontraditional jobs? In the civilian work force, the changes are too recent or the numbers too small to provide answers. In 1985, only some 6,000 women were employed as auto mechanics and 2,000 as telephone "linepersons." But the U.S. military's experience provides some clues as to how working-class women behave in a nontraditional milieu.

**Pregnant Soldiers**

No other nation has moved so far so fast to integrate women into the military. Today, after a decade of rapid change, 10 percent of the nation's 1.7 million service people, all volunteers, are female, including 10 percent of the officers; eight women are generals or admirals. Women are barred by statute or policy from combat, but not from battle zones. During the brief 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada, 114 Army women (including a helicopter pilot, military police, clerks, and prisoner interrogators) joined 5,000 male troops on the island; they got high marks from most senior Army officers.

Even so, the Pentagon's busy researchers have discovered, military enlisted women are different. More likely to have completed high school, and better disciplined than their male peers, first-term Army enlisted women nevertheless suffer greater attrition (roughly 45 percent versus 34 percent). If they stay on, they have shorter service careers. Army women on maneuvers, reports sociologist Charles Moskos, work just as hard as their male comrades, but they are more likely than men to view the Army as "a way station to a better civilian life," including college.

Contrary to the hopes of feminists and Pentagon civilian officials, enlisted women have gravitated toward "traditional" female work (administrative, clerical, medical). Their attrition rates went up, or they sought transfers, when they were assigned to serve as truck drivers or aircraft refuelers, or in other "male" jobs.
Half of all enlisted women are married. Roughly seven to nine percent of enlisted women, married or unmarried, get pregnant (no longer cause for automatic discharge from the service) in the course of a year. To unit commanders in the field, pregnant soldiers—and young single mothers—are a chronic “readiness headache.” Such women cannot easily pull extra duty, or rapidly deploy overseas.

All in all, however, enlisted women have fared well during the past decade. Those who have stayed in the military have been promoted as fast as, or faster than, men.

**Back to the Spaghetti**

Whether feminist pressures or attitudes per se have caused or simply abetted changes in women’s roles in the workplace and the military may never be known for certain. The same is true for the changes that have swept the lives of women, men, and children at home as women have gone off to work.

One thing has not changed. Even in two-income families, mothers still take primary responsibility for child-rearing and keeping house. Several surveys show that husbands do less than one-quarter of the cooking, cleaning, and diapering around the house in an average week, and that they have increased the time they spend on such chores by only about six percent during the past 20 years. Undoubtedly, many men are unwilling to do “women’s work.” But, if the evidence of women’s magazines and other popular sources is to be believed, wives often do not want husbands to play too large a role in the home. “If the children ever turned first to Daddy in time of need,” Shirley Sloan Fader wrote recently in *Working Woman*, many mothers would be “devastated.”

Whatever her sentiments, the working mother’s continuing responsibilities at home mean that she is doing two jobs at once. And chances are that she is not doing either job as well as she would wish. Feminists cite this tension when they urge Washington and private employers to expand day care subsidies and programs. Contrary to the predictions of many child psychologists, most of today’s academic research on how children (at least those over one year old) fare in day care, emotionally and intellectually, is reassuring. Indeed, the bottom line, according to Sylvia Ann Hewlett, is psychologist Claire Etaugh’s finding that “satisfied mothers—working or not—have the best-adjusted children,” even if the children are in day care.*

Of course, many children are in day care because their mothers are divorced and *must* work. The causes of divorce are complex. But most scholars seem to agree that the wife’s employment may be a

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*Data on child care are scarce, but, by one estimate, less than 10 percent of children under age three with working mothers are enrolled in formal day care programs. The rest are tended by relatives, nannies, or neighborhood women offering “family day care”; many mothers prefer this.
factor. Largely for lack of adequate data (a chronic hurdle in such determinations), the issue remains unresolved. According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, for example, eight percent of all women over 18 were divorcées in 1984, yet 16 percent of those with incomes of $25,000 or more, and 23 percent of those with incomes of $50,000 or more, were divorced. But nobody knows how many of these women enjoyed high incomes before they got divorced.

As Peter Uhlenberg and David Eggebeen note in Public Interest (Winter 1986), the increase in divorce and the absence of working mothers from the home, combined with fathers' reluctance or inability to fill in for their wives, add up to this: America's parents are giving less time and attention to their children.

The effects can be seen in a paradox of the 1960–80 period: While nearly every statistical predictor of adolescents' well-being (education outlays, family income, available social services) improved, other indicators revealed disturbing trends. Children's academic achievement dropped while delinquency, drug abuse, teen suicide, and illegitimate birth rates all soared among whites and minorities.

Uhlenberg and Eggebeen assign much of the blame to "an erosion of the bond between parent and child—one characterized by parental commitment and willingness to sacrifice self-interest."

To ask why American parents may have drifted toward egocentricity is to return to our bowl of overcooked spaghetti. There is much that researchers have yet to untangle, and much they never will untangle, about the effects of feminism as such. For all the antifamily rhetoric of the 1970s militants, it seems premature to single out feminism, as some do, as the chief cause of today's family difficulties. What we do know is that as women went to work during the 1970s—whether in search of equality and fulfillment, out of necessity, or lured by rising wages—they did not discard responsibility. Young college-educated single women took jobs or pursued careers, much as their male peers did, while most married women struggled to strike new compromises between work and family when children came along. As the results of these practical, often painful trade-offs of everyday life emerge, they may show the larger society how better to respond to the various cultural shifts that the latest wave of American feminism has helped to bring to the nation.
BACKGROUND BOOKS

FEMINISM IN AMERICA

Feminist movements may come and go, but it appears that feminist scholarship is here to stay.

From its inception as an interdisciplinary course at San Diego State University in 1970, "women's studies," currently taught in more than 523 college and university programs, has gained a prominent place on the academic menu.

Signs of what women's studies advocates call "mainstreaming" are evident everywhere: Princeton recently became the first in the Ivy League to establish a tenured chair in women's studies; the Organization of American Historians is now publishing four "teaching packets" intended to fuse women's history with college survey courses on Western civilization and U.S. history.

With one foot in feminism and one in academe, women's studies hopscotches between politics and scholarship. Its practitioners are guided not by a common perspective but by a highly divisive question: What does it mean to be female-historically, biologically, and culturally? Add feminist goals and it is no wonder that meetings of the National Women's Studies Association often take on the tenor of a United Nations emergency session.

Much of the controversy in and around women's studies harkens back to the early feminists' nature/nurture quandary—are women by nature the same as men (only nurtured to be different) or are they something akin to a separate species? Among university administrators, this delicate question often underlies the lingering debate over whether the study of women truly requires, to borrow from Virginia Woolf, a field "of one's own."

Among scientists, the question has launched extensive inquiries into gender, such as Anne Fausto Sterling's Myths of Gender (Basic, 1986). Sterling claims that our past and present biological assumptions about men and women are highly speculative and often based on "cultural conceptions" that affect behavior and in turn can determine "the way our bodies grow"; even the 10 percent difference in height between the sexes may be culturally induced.

Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Harvard, 1982, cloth; 1983, paper) is more concerned with how the differences between men and women, whether biological or cultural (both, says Gilligan), are often turned against women. Gilligan disputes theories developed by Freud, Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, and other thinkers, who concluded that women are morally deficient. She argues that because "masculinity is defined through separation [from the mother], while femininity is defined through attachment [to the mother]," the standard psychological literature, written by men, rewards men for a separatist morality based on abstract principles such as justice and equality; it penalizes women for a morality based on an ethic of "interdependence" and care.

In feminist historical scholarship, the nature/nurture problem often shows up as a subtle narrative bias: Women, clearly similar to men, were bamboozled into feeling different, herded into housework and procreation, and largely denied the satisfactions of outside work. Mary Ryan's Womanhood in America (New Viewpoints, 1975, cloth; Franklin Watts, 1983, paper), for example, examines the "gender system" that "sentenced" women to "inferiority."

A variant describes how women, clearly different from men—and possibly superior—gladly formed a distinct feminine culture that revolved around domestic life. As Gerda Lerner somewhat inelegantly puts it in the preface to her Female Experience: An American
Documentary (Bobbs-Merrill, 1977, cloth & paper): “The history of women is the history of their on-going functioning on their own terms in a male-defined world. . . . They rebelled against and defied societal indoctrination, developed their own definition of community, and built their own female culture.”

After what appears to have been a prudent silence during the militantly feminist 1970s, many scholars are now trying to revise or amplify the highly critical positions several noted historians staked out back in the 1960s as they turned their attention to feminism for the first time.


“Moral and intellectual bankruptcy” was their verdict on the often racist and opportunistic 19th-century feminists, a charge taken up by William Leach in True Love and Perfect Union (Basic, 1980, cloth; 1983, paper). Leach argues persuasively that the feminists were not so much bankrupt as “vexed” by a “confusion” between their ties to the reigning American individualism on the one hand and their communitarian yearning for “perfect union” on the other.

“The 19th-century feminists,” he concluded, “would have been wise to abandon individualism” and embrace “the humane and democratic character of their cooperative vision.”


The author discovered that, starting in New England, increasing numbers of white middle- and upper-middle-class daughters, despite the dominant “cult of motherhood,” took to heart Louisa May Alcott’s remark that “liberty” was “a better husband than love.” In 1850, the percentage of “spinsters” in Massachusetts was twice that in the nation’s population at large; this same “cult of blessed singleness” emerged later in the South and the West.

Several new books have pulled together the increasingly specialized feminist scholarship of the last two decades. Nancy Woloch’s eminently fair-minded and readable Woman and the American Experience (Knopf, 1984, cloth & paper) portrays many groups of women that are now a focus of interest in women’s studies: pioneers, plantation wives, laborers, prostitutes, maids, missionaries—and with white middle-class housewives—from Colonial times to the present.

Jacqueline Jones’s Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow: Black Women, Work, and the Family from Slavery to the Present (Basic, 1985, cloth; Vintage, 1986, paper) assimilates a wealth of research on black women, resisting “oppression” rhetoric to record these women’s efforts to preserve fragile family ties.

Much new scholarship has revived women’s contributions to past scholarship, starting with Rosalind Rosenberg’s Beyond Separate Spheres: The Intellectual Roots of Modern Feminism (Yale, 1982, cloth & paper). Rosenberg surveyed the iconoclastic work of forgotten social scientists Marion Talbot, Jessie Taft, and Elsie Parsons. These women’s “insistence that the vast majority of observable sex differences could be traced to cultural conditioning,” in violation of “Victorian science’s bedrock belief in the primacy of biology,” paved the way for today’s stress on social determinants, says Rosenberg, al-
though male mentors received much of the credit.

Feminist scholars have also generated great interest in primary sources. The indisputable heavyweight: the six-volume History of Woman Suffrage (Little & Ives, 1881–1922; Arno, 1969). This 6,000-page labor of love was begun by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan Anthony (who "hated every minute" of it) and completed by Matilda Gage and Ida Harper. It provides our only comprehensive portrait of the woman suffrage movement, drawn from the clippings, letters, speeches, journals, and legislative reports of the time, which Susan Anthony had the foresight to preserve.

An important Civil War document resurfaced when literary critic Edmund Wilson came upon the diary of a high-ranking Confederate official's wife while doing research in South Carolina in 1962. He thought it "a masterpiece." The diary was published in a recent unexpurgated edition, edited by C. Vann Woodward, as The Private Mary Chestnut (Oxford, 1984). "There is no slave after all like a wife," wrote Chestnut—rather disingenuously, for she was at the center of events in Virginia and South Carolina throughout the war.

Among many rich primary source anthologies compiled by women's studies scholars are Nancy Cott's Roots of Bitterness: Documents of the Social History of American Women (Dutton, 1972, cloth & paper), a collection of diaries, letters, and published works from Colonial to present-day America, and Judith Anderson's Outspoken Women: Speeches by American Women Reformers (Kendall-Hunt, 1984, cloth & paper).

The speeches range from Anne Hutchinson's 1637 testimony during the Salem witch trials to Mary McLeod Bethune's 1933 address, "A Century of Progress of Negro Women.

It is difficult to predict how women's studies will evolve as a new generation of less politically minded scholars gradually supplants the fervent feminists now at the helm. Will the pioneers' hopes for women's studies be realized—or will their vision someday seem as quaint as the early suffragists' dreams of social transformation?

Consider the suffragist echo in a recent Ford Foundation report by Catharine Stimson, a founder of the leading women's studies quarterly, Signs, and chairman of the National Council for Research on Women: "In the United States, women's studies, like the contemporary reconstruction of gender relations, is under way. . . . It may not yet have achieved a full public understanding of its purpose . . . but its direction is clear—toward nothing less than a new architecture of consciousness and culture."

—Ann J. Loftin

EDITOR'S NOTE: Ann J. Loftin is an associate editor of the Wilson Quarterly. Some of the titles in this essay were suggested by Rutgers's William L. O'Neill and by Esther Stineman and Susan Searing, authors of the forthcoming Women's Studies: A Recommended Core Bibliography, 1980–1985 (1986). For related titles, see WQ Background Books essays on The War on Poverty (Autumn '84), Blacks in America (Spring '84), Men and Women (Winter '82), Children in America (Autumn '82), and The Changing Family (Winter '77).
MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY
From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
edited by Peter Paret with Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert
Princeton, 1986
941 pp. $45

"The need to understand war is, if possible, even greater now than it was in 1943." So observes editor Peter Paret, a Stanford professor of international relations, in his introduction to this newly expanded version of the classic 1943 history of strategic thought edited by Edward Mead Earle.

Only three chapters are reprinted from Earle's original; four have been revised; the remaining 22 essays are new. But the changes are amply justified by fresh historical research. The revised version, moreover, retains Earle's laudable goal—to underline both the importance of war in history and the utility, as Paret puts it, of "integrating the history of military thought and policy with general history."

The essays deal with individual military theorists (Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan) and practitioners (Napoleon, Frederick the Great) and with broad trends in economic and political organization and military technology. Felix Gilbert pursues both lines of inquiry in his opening essay on Machiavelli. In the Art of War (1519-20), the Italian thinker rather grudgingly adapted ancient Roman principles of warfare (which emphasized the use of infantry) to the 16th century's primitive artillery. Even so, Machiavelli's pronouncements on the organization of professional armies, the need for strict discipline, and the desirability of "short and sharp" wars still ring true today.

For three centuries in Europe, small standing armies, adept at maneuver as well as at fortification and siegework, were the forces involved in relatively limited conflicts (with the exception of the Thirty Years' War, 1618-48). The French Revolution of 1789 changed things. The shift "from the dynastic to the national form of state," as Yale's R. R. Palmer calls it, made unprecedented human and material resources available for military operations. Universal conscription and wars with unlimited aims—e.g., the overthrow of an adversary's system of government—were a logical extension of 19th-century European nationalism and intolerant revolutionary ideologies.

Napoleon, not surprisingly, stands out as the single most influential figure in 19th-century strategy. Exploiting the popular fervor that came with the French Revolution, the brilliant Corsican, as national leader and battlefield commander, fascinated later theorists, notably Switzerland's Antoine-Henri Jomini and Prussia's Carl von Clausewitz. They proposed strategic principles (e.g., superior mass, deep penetrations, and rapid maneuvers and concentrations of force) that became standard fare at European, Russian, and American military academies.

The protracted carnage of World War I—with over 35 million casual-
ties on both sides—brought about a temporary devaluation of strategy. Military specialists in the United States concluded that efforts to orchestrate military power for political ends had been overtaken by a brutal contest of physical resources—"a mere mechanical trial of the abilities of rival coalitions to generate armies and materiel," in Russell Weigley's words. Armored mobility and air power each gained champions, France's Charles de Gaulle among the former, Italy's Guilio Douhet among the latter. But World War II illustrated the perils of forecasting. Douhet, for example, failing to foresee the development of radar, underestimated the prospects for effective air defense when he predicted in 1921 that massive long-range bombing attacks against "enemy centers of population, government and industry" would make surface forces irrelevant.

Gradually, a leitmotif emerges in this dense, capacious volume: Statesmen must link military planning to political objectives. Clausewitz, of course, had no monopoly on the wisdom embodied in his dictum that "War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means." But successful applications of this wisdom, as the book suggests, have been rare. Hitler, to use an extreme example, subordinated military advice to his megalomania, with, as Gordon Craig puts it, "no realistic assessment of capabilities and costs"—and with disastrous consequences for his country and the world. Franklin D. Roosevelt, to take a far more reasonable case, knew that most Americans distrusted concepts such as "balance of power" and "spheres of influence." Eager to obtain Stalin's cooperation in building a new international system at the end of World War II, he refused to join in disputes over East European political borders or between rival Polish governments in 1944-45. The results were grim for East Europeans. In Craig's view, Roosevelt's behavior "suggests that the legitimate political concerns of the most responsible of war leaders can be contradictory and self-defeating."

To what extent can even the most skillful strategists use the laws of war to reduce the effect of unpredictable factors? That question provides the volume's second theme. The path blazed by Machiavelli—who saw war as "determined by rational laws"—was pursued in the 17th and 18th centuries by theorists who attempted, as R. R. Palmer writes, "to enlarge the field of human planning and to reduce the field of chance." Jomini went further in trying to reduce warfare to what John Shy describes as a simple array of "formulaic statements and prescriptive injunctions." Clausewitz acknowledged the role of "friction," which includes individual errors, accidents, and bad weather, but held, according to Paret, that "to a degree at least, intelligence and determination can overcome friction...."

This second theme acquires particular salience in our nuclear age. Lawrence Freedman of King's College, London, takes a close look at various Western views of strategic deterrence. He concludes that the "threat that leaves something to chance," which stresses mutual vulnerability to nuclear annihilation, allows relatively little scope for traditional strategic planning. Despite North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) plans for gradual nuclear escalation, if necessary, in wartime (plans intended to per-
suade the Kremlin to withdraw from NATO territory), the West in prac-
tice depends heavily upon the threats of “mutual assured destruction” to
deter a Soviet attack.

Does this mean that strategy is now irrelevant?

Craig and Gilbert allude in the final chapter to the possibility that we
live “in an age without useful precedents.” Perhaps. But as Field Marshal
Michael Carver of Britain reminds us in a useful historical survey, there
has been ample room for strategy in conventional wars since Hiroshima.

Omnibus volumes like this are bound to have shortcomings. This one
might have devoted more attention to the role of deception in war. Hitler’s
sundry nonaggression pacts and the Allied exploitation of German and
Japanese communications are only two 20th-century instances of this ef-
fective strategic weapon. As Thomas Hobbes pointed out in Leviathan
(1651): “Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues.” Another
flaw is the Eurocentric view that reduces 19th-century American and Rus-

FRANKLIN OF
PHILADELPHIA
by Esmond Wright
Harvard, 1986
404 pp. $25

In the social wisdom Americans have passed
down since the early 19th century, Benjamin
Franklin (1706–90) has been the archetype
of the robust, successful individual. When-
ever we have wanted to name the quintes-
tessential American, we have chosen not
George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, or
Abraham Lincoln, but Benjamin Franklin. To
us he is the self-made man, imbued with
common sense, forthright, resourceful,
witty, and self-satisfied. As this last quality would suggest, proclaiming that
Franklin is the representative American has involved some discomfiting
concessions. We are not completely at ease with the image of Franklin as
unintellectual, unspiritual, uninterested in the arts, and uncommonly de-
voted to his own reputation.

A major achievement of Esmond Wright in this rich and satisfying new
study is his demonstration that certain qualities—both positive and nega-
tive—that we have unthinkingly associated with Franklin as American indi-
vidualist stem in fact from the working procedures of an enormously social
man. We are unlikely to know a “private” Franklin. If our printer, invent-
or, politician, and consummate diplomat spent much time with second
thoughts, or entertained intellectual and spiritual doubts, he kept these
matters to himself. Virtually his every utterance was public. He wrote
even his autobiography (1771–88) as a piece of didactic literature. As Wright comments early on, “always at the root [of Franklin’s persona] was a conviction that the individual is only truly himself in a gregarious, not in a solitary, setting.” Thus a life of Franklin is a life of a man in society—in Boston (until age 17), in Colonial Philadelphia, in London and Paris, and, finally, in the new United States of America.

Wright, an Englishman who had a long career as director of the Institute of United States Studies at the University of London, has given us a Franklin who was, above all, engaged. Every manifestation of Franklin’s genius—as scientist and inventor, as founder of institutions for the public good in Philadelphia, as politician determined to break the power of the largely absentee landholders of Pennsylvania during the 1750s, as courtier hopeful of preserving the unity of the British Empire and, finally, after 1776, as diplomat winning France’s help for the new American nation—demonstrates that it was action with others that was the mainspring of his being.

Wright’s sprinkling of Franklin’s Poor Richard maxims throughout the text reminds us each time of how shallow a picture they give us of Franklin if seen only as separated from a lifetime of interaction with others. The common historical viewpoint has portrayed Franklin’s experiments in electricity, for example, as inspired by curiosity but carried out as a private eccentricity. Wright, by contrast, shows us that Franklin pursued his scientific work with the desire to pull together communities of interest across the Colonies, across the Atlantic, and across the European continent.

In meticulous detail, Wright demonstrates the progress of Franklin’s ideas about America’s relationship to Britain, from his earliest involvement with the defense of the American frontier in the 1750s to his happy optimism in the 1780s about the future of the newly independent nation. Using Franklin’s arguments, Wright traces the intricacies of Franklin’s long allegiance to the British monarch and his hopes for an imperial parliament. “He insisted that America was a part of England, or at least as much part of it as Scotland; and at least until 1768 he was as ready to settle permanently in London as he had been to move to and settle in Philadelphia.” The arrogance of England’s Parliament forced him to his final conviction that America had to be independent—and not only independent but a republic, whose citizens had “natural” rights rather than “the rights of Englishmen.” The book unfolds with an efficient sweep, as Wright organizes details into larger patterns. His style is graceful, his language precise.

Near the end of the book, Wright pauses to ask what Franklin means to us in the 20th century. To many, he is the father of all who are independent in spirit. Wright’s impressive biography persuades us, however, that even more important, Franklin is the model of social man—the politician, the negotiator, and the conciliator.

—Elizabeth Johns ’86
To many Jews, the heart of Europe is a poisoned place. The soil of what was once the Third Reich, and of what are now the two Germanies and Austria, nourished the leaders who devised the Final Solution to the Jewish problem, the bureaucrats who organized it, the industrialists who devised the technologies for it, the troops who carried it out, the population that applauded it or tolerated it or preferred not to know of it, and the culture, traditions, and values that, if not promoting it, did not stand in its way. To those Jews, especially the ones who lost all or almost all of their relatives to the Nazis’ focused carnage, that soil is forever contaminated, a kind of radioactive wasteland that is incompatible with Jewish life.

Small wonder, then, that many of the Jews who have returned to live on that soil have in fact developed strange and distorted lives. And small wonder, too, that, to other Jews in other places, the discovery that some of their brethren do live on that soil, and seem to live on it willingly, is a mystery, a shock, even an abomination.

Nor is it an abomination solely to them. To many of the approximately 35,000 Jews now living in Germany and Austria—perhaps one-twentieth of the number that lived in those countries in 1933—it is an abomination as well, not to mention a shock and a mystery. They, too, recognize the anomalies of their existence, both historical and contemporary. And it is those anomalies that are repeatedly revealed in Peter Sichrovsky’s Strangers in Their Own Land.

The book consists of 14 first-person accounts by Jews in West Germany and Austria, the first 13 derived from Sichrovsky’s interviews with those Jews, and the last Sichrovsky’s own story. All of the accounts describe the lives of Jews born after World War II. Most of them are the children of Jews who escaped the Third Reich before 1939, or who, remarkably, managed to hide, or who, almost as remarkably, survived the concentration camps to which the Nazis had sent them.

Some of those parents returned to Germany or Austria because it was the only place they had ever called home. Some returned as an act of vengeance, to live among the murderers as constant reminders of German or Austrian guilt. But the parents’ return imposed dilemmas and ironies on the children that rendered their lives damaged and, finally, grotesque.

For some of these children, early childhood in Germany or Austria was almost normal. “But I got used to everything, went to school here like all the others, and never had any problems about my Jewishness,” says Tuvi, a policeman whose parents moved back to Germany from Israel when he was six. For others, it was marked by frequent encounters with anti-Semitism. Ultimately, the lives of many of the young Jews presented in this book were characterized by several common themes.

One such theme was the recognition, at some point, that they were living among the killers of their families or among the children of those...
killers. Another theme was rage at the unwillingness of Germans, and especially Austrians, to take responsibility for their country's past. "I am not broad-minded enough to accept your father's role in the mass execution of women and children," says Robert, a Viennese doctor, to his non-Jewish wife. Yet another was the striving, at some point, especially in early adulthood, to become more German or Austrian and less Jewish—to "get out of history," as one, a woman journalist, put it. They tried joining the Left, say, or a peace group, or a feminist group. They then discovered, in those groups, among the young Germans or Austrians born after the war, a refusal, similar to that of their parents, to recognize the horror of the past, or a tendency to trivialize it, or to present themselves and other Germans or Austrians as victims of it just as surely as were the Jews.

Still another theme was that of escape. Many of these young Jews feared that, at some point, the Germans would rise up once again to kill them. This fear was followed by the worry that, like so many of their relatives under Hitler, they would fail to heed the warning signs and stay until it was too late.

But perhaps the most common theme that emerges from the accounts of these Jews, some of them as young as 14 or 15, is the inward turn they ultimately took. Recognizing their environment as foreign, they withdrew from it, rediscovered their identities as Jews, and burrowed into those identities, often to the surprise and distress of their parents. For some, in fact, it became Judaism itself that was the only truth they could grasp and the only belief that could save them.

Why, if life is so painful for these people, and the soil on which they find themselves so contaminated, do they stay? Some leave, and some of them return. Perhaps, for them as for some of their parents, Germany or Austria is home. For some, rage at things German is matched by an attachment to them—an irony contained in the comment of Anna, the child of a German mother and an Austrian father, who was sent to Germany by her parents "so I could learn the language of the poets and thinkers and murderers." When she left Israel, where her parents now live, her father said to her, "You are going to a country where they speak the language of Herzl and Hitler...."

The ambivalence toward the language and the place is constructed of ties that bind no less than of hatreds that repel. Caught in that conflict, these Jews build walls around themselves. They feel attacked as Jews even when they are not. They are overwhelmed by doubt, rage, and the ever-crowding images of death.

"Almost every conversation with my wife, my parents, or my friends ends with the question of whether to remain or to leave," Fritz, a successful lawyer in Berlin, tells us. "And the head always wins out over the heart. I am here today and will still be here tomorrow. But if I stay here I am sure to die of heart failure, because no heart can stand this sort of humiliation forever."

—Walter Reich '83
Aron’s warnings against the lures of Marxism have been echoed so frequently over the past two decades that it is hard to appreciate how brave and solitary his stand once was. Yet the distinguished French sociologist (1905–83), who began his public career as a supporter of Socialist Léon Blum during the 1930s, became virtually a party of one in France during the immediate postwar years. Colleagues and former schoolmates from the prestigious Ecole Normale Supérieure denounced him as a “reactionary” and a traitor: powerful words, coming from the likes of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

Why did he provoke such rage? This sampler of his work—12 essays in all—suggests the answer. It also provides readers with a sense of Aron’s intellectual pedigree.

A key essay goes to the heart of Aron’s lifelong interest—the “intelligibility of history.” Unlike most of his peers in Paris, he refused to discard the “bourgeois” notion of free will or the Enlightenment faith in the power of reason to pursue “truth.” He thus found the Marxist premise of historical inevitability untenable.

Where Marx invoked determinism, the great 19th-century French commentator Alexis de Tocqueville saw probability at work. In an essay strongly sympathetic to the latter, Aron relates how Tocqueville “foresaw our era as egalitarian, but left open the choice between servitude and liberty.” Elsewhere, in a lucid exposition of Max Weber’s work, Aron acknowledges the debt he owes to the German father of sociology, even as he indicates where he departs from Weber’s pessimistic conclusions about the relativity of human values. Between two or more codes of behavior, men, Aron believed, could and should be able to choose the better.

Pantaloons-clad piano legs, bowdlerized editions of Shakespeare, and other such pruderies have long been thought of as the stuff of Victorian morality. But Himmelfarb, a New York University historian, finds the Victorian “moral imagination” far more substantial and complex. To be sure, 19th-century
middle- and upper-class Britons strove to uphold what Edmund Burke called "the decent drapery of life." In her title essay, Himmelfarb describes how five eminent couples (including the Carlyles and the Dickenses) undid the drapery only to restitch it as tightly and honestly as they could. The novelist George Eliot, for instance, insisted on being called "Mrs. Lewes" while living with her married lover. Even when thwarted by convention, Eliot typically tried to respect it—to temper it without destroying it.

Not so in later generations, as Himmelfarb shows in an essay about the Bloomsbury group, which flourished in London during the early years of the 20th century. Artists and thinkers in that gifted circle, Virginia Woolf, Clive Bell, and John Maynard Keynes, among others, rejected their elders' commitment to a service-oriented "religion of humanity." In the philosophy of their contemporary, G. E. Moore, the "Bloomsberries" found lofty justification for their aestheticism and other more self-centered pursuits.

Himmelfarb notes other, earlier stresses running through the oak of Victorian morality—Jeremy Bentham's stark utopianism (with its schemes for model prisons, poorhouses, and a highly centralized government); William Godwin's rosier vision of a perfect society; and the Fabian socialism of Sidney and Beatrice Webb. But even as it faded in the 20th century, the old moral code had a lingering effect on those who had challenged it: Beatrice Webb praised Soviet leaders (circa 1932) for being—of all things—morally upright, indeed, "model Puritans."

Finley is the E. F. Hutton of classical studies: When he talks, his profession listens. Here the Cambridge historian speaks directly to his peers about the problems of their craft—the skimpiness of evidence, the unreliability of sources, the uncertainty about what the few surviving artifacts and statistics mean.

Thanks largely to the "new archaeology," artifacts now enjoy high status among classical historians. Remnants of Roman pottery, they maintain, speak more objectively than, say, Roman documents about such things as economic arrangements. Finley finds this faith naive, and in a
tightly woven essay argues that material evidence, like literary evidence, relies on "the conceptual framework from which the historian works."

Numbers, too, can be highly deceptive, despite efforts by demographic and economic historians to make them seem definitive. One such scholar's attempt to establish the relative price of slaves in fourth-century B.C. and second-century A.D. Rome was based partly on a sum mentioned in a Roman satirical poem. Flimsy stuff—yet, says Finley, nonspecialists awed by numbers accept such figures "on the auctoritas of the original author."

Finley points out some puzzling gaps in the study of ancient history. The bellicosity of Greeks and Romans is legend. (Between the Persian Wars in 499–478 B.C. and its defeat by Philip of Macedonia in 338 B.C., Athens was at war on the average more than two out of every three years.) Yet, apart from rehashing the views of contemporary chroniclers such as Thucydides, scholars have barely looked into the causes of ancient wars. Mysteriously, Finley observes, historians continue to ignore such matters as the "profits of war and their distribution."

If Finley's larger point is that the historian's answers can only be tentative, he also convincingly demonstrates the crucial importance of asking the right questions.

Contemporary Affairs

THE VANISHED IMAM:
Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon
by Fouad Ajami
Cornell, 1986
243 pp. $17.95

In 1943, the year of Lebanon's independence, the Shia minority (about 20 percent of the nation's one million inhabitants) enjoyed the dubious reputation of being their nation's "hewers of wood and drawers of water." The lot of this dispirited minority, inhabitants mostly of the south, had not improved much by 1959, the year of the arrival of a young and charismatic Iranian cleric named Musa al Sadr.

Within a decade, his name was known throughout Lebanon and, indeed, the wider Islamic world. His "genius," according to author Ajami, a Middle East specialist at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, was his ability to forge a progressive, Shia-based social movement that appealed to people of vastly different back-
grounds and interests. It was also, Ajami notes, "this chameleonlike quality in him that made his critics doubt his sincerity."

Preaching the compatibility of Islam with reason, science, and social justice, Musa al Sadr found followers among Sunni Muslims and Maronite Christians as well as among his own Shia constituency. In a faction-ridden Lebanon, with an increasingly weak central government and a growing number of Palestinian refugees, Musa al Sadr not only bolstered the pride and confidence of his fellow Shia but offered to other groups the hope of compromise and cooperation. His role was not without its contradictions, however: The cleric who fasted for the cause of peace in 1975 was also responsible for organizing the nucleus of the Shia militia, Amal, in the same year.

A man of such influence in a volatile land inevitably made enemies; many Palestinians and Arab leftists despised him. In August 1978, while on a trip to Libya, the imam mysteriously vanished. A cry went up among Musa al Sadr's supporters, but Libya's President Muammar al-Qaddafi declared himself innocent of foul play.

Ajami's book merits the label tour de force. Depicting the life of an unusual man, it illuminates the larger tragedy of a region where hope for peaceful solutions to old and vexing problems grows weaker every day.

BEYOND ENTITLEMENT:
The Social Obligations of Citizenship
by Lawrence M. Mead
Free Press, 1986
318 pp. $19.95

Just about every side lately has had its say in the revived U.S. debate over the causes and aggravations of poverty, from New York Democrat Daniel Moynihan to conservative Thomas Sowell to socialist Michael Harrington. Mead, a New York University professor of politics, thinks that all sides have missed the central issue, or at least given it short shrift: "The main problem with the welfare state is its permissiveness not its size."

Mead argues that government should require the poor to earn their benefits by fulfilling certain fundamental obligations of citizenship. These include a demonstrable effort to hold a job, to finish school, to obey the law.

So sensible is Mead's proposal that by far the more interesting part of his book is his discussion of the philosophical and practical barriers to its adoption. America's tradition of "Lockean" liberal-
ism, with its aversion to any form of governmental coercion of individuals, presents one such obstacle. And the long-established political practice of interest group brokering has seen to it that government "does not make demands on people; they make demands on it."

Formidable obstacles. But given the current shortage of "self-evident" truths, it would be a pity if Mead’s ideas were ignored.

Arts & Letters

**ARCTIC DREAMS:**
*Imagination and Desire in a Northern Landscape*
by Barry Lopez
Scribner’s, 1986
464 pp. $22.95

The 16th-century navigator Jacques Cartier described the Arctic as "the land God gave to Cain." Lopez, author of the highly acclaimed *Of Wolves and Men* (1979), has far kinder words for the region. Having spent four years there with scientific researchers and Eskimos, he understands its attraction for both.

Braving an environment in which 32 degrees Fahrenheit is considered warm and a "night" lasts months, Eskimos speak a language that changes radically with the seasons. Thus, says Lopez, "terms for the many varieties of snow emerge in winter, while those for whaling come into use in the spring." (Indeed, the Inuktitut language is so closely tied to experience that, as religious rituals, hunting practices, and other old ways die, young Eskimos no longer understand large chunks of their elders’ speech.)

The polar bear is another hardy resident of long standing, and scientists have learned a great deal about its survival skills. Although its thick white hair loses 90 percent of its insulating power when wet (a far worse performance than, say, the beaver’s), scientists have found that its exterior "guard hairs" are hollow and conduct the sun’s heat to the bear’s black skin.

Above all, Lopez’s book evokes the terrible beauty of the frigid north. The aurora borealis, solar and lunar rings, halos, coronas, and a variety of mirages give the Arctic heavens a chimerical aspect. So convincing, for instance, are the fata morgana—mirages resembling extensive mountain ranges or urban skylines—that seasoned explorers in earlier centuries "set down mountains and islands on their charts where there was nothing but empty sky."
A CONCRETE ATLANTIS: U.S. Industrial Building and European Modern Architecture
by Reyner Banham
MIT, 1986
266 pp. $25

"For a period at the end of the 1970s," observes author Banham, "one could look out over downtown Providence, R.I., from the raised platforms of the train station and see the façade of a new multi-story hotel visually superimposed on that of an old 1920s multi-story factory behind it—and the two façades were almost identical cellular grids of concrete structural members."

It was no coincidence, argues Banham. The great European masters of the modernist International style of architecture, including Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Walter Gropius, and Le Corbusier, found direct inspiration in the work of now-forgotten Americans—mostly engineers—who designed industrial buildings at the turn of this century. Pioneers of concrete construction, men such as Ernest Ransome and Lockwood Greene put up "daylight" factories (with ranks of regularly spaced windows) and grain elevators whose use of materials and simplicity of design provided European architects during the 1920s and '30s with a "language of forms" that they in turn applied to nonindustrial buildings. "Let us listen to the counsels of American engineers," declared Le Corbusier. "But let us beware of American architects!"

The ultimate irony is obvious: American architects of the 1960s and '70s, inspired by the International style, created city hotels and office buildings resembling structures that had all but vanished from an older urban industrial landscape.

THE DANCE OF THE INTELLECT:
Studies in the poetry of the Pound tradition
by Marjorie Perloff
Cambridge, 1986
243 pp. $24.95

Critics who lament the death of poetry in our age are mistaken, says Perloff, a professor of literature at the University of Southern California. To be sure, a certain type of poem—the Romantic lyric characterized by the agonized voice of its wounded poet-speaker—has reached the end of the line. But, Perloff argues, the verbal intensity and resourcefulness of poetry have simply passed on to nonlyric forms, including encyclopedic and collage poems, prose and performance poems.

Perhaps the last supreme master of the lyric mode was Wallace Stevens (1879–1955), who cleaved to the symbolist faith that "poetry as an imaginative thing consists of more than lies on the surface." Stevens found a devoted following.

But Perloff credits Ezra Pound (1885–1972) with heralding the shift to a harder, more objec-
tive, and certainly more experimental sort of poetry. Pound's insistence that "the cherry tree is all that it does" was only part of his larger goal: to "MAKE IT NEW."

Elsewhere, Perloff looks at how the Pound tradition took form (partly inspired by "documentary collages" of the fin de siècle French sculptor Henri Gaudier-Brzeska) and then filtered through the work of other artists, including some, such as novelist James Joyce, playwright and prosateur Samuel Beckett, and composer John Cage, who are not strictly considered poets.

Beckett's "associative monologues" may baffle or repel many readers: "Absence supreme good and yet. Illumination then go again and one return no more trace. On earth's face. Of what was never...." But however strange they may occasionally seem, Perloff makes a good case that they are as genuinely poetic as John Keats's "Ode on a Grecian Urn."

**Science & Technology**

FEMALES OF THE SPECIES: Sex and Survival in the Animal Kingdom
by Bettyann Kevles
Harvard, 1986
270 pp. $20

In the opinion of Charles Darwin (1809–82) and many of his successors, females of the species stood lower on the evolutionary ladder than males. Viewed as passive and "coy," females seemed to play a secondary role in the all-crucial struggle for survival. Kevles, a science journalist, draws from a wide range of recent animal studies to present a new understanding of the "fairer" sex's role.

Kevles notes patterns and peculiarities throughout the animal kingdom. A female balloon fly and a female stickleback fish typically appear to be put off by eager male suitors. Their reluctance, however, stems not from abhorrence of sex but from the desire to choose the best possible father for their offspring. Female elephant seals actually provoke males to combat in order to identify strong mates. And high-ranking female baboons band together to attack a low-ranking female just as she shows signs of fertility.

The passive, stay-at-nest image of females crumbles before the fact that, in many species, the male is the primary caretaker of offspring. Male Antarctic King penguins have a special fold of skin on their feet for incubating eggs during the entire 50-day gestation period. Some mothers seem alto-
In pre–World War II America, there was nothing extraordinary about “information.” Historian Roszak, author of *The Making of a Counter Culture* (1969), recounts its evolution into a more esoteric concept. Thanks to the work of Bell Laboratories scientist Claude Shannon and other technical wizards, it now may mean “whatever can be coded for transmission through a channel that connects a source with a receiver, regardless of semantic content.”

Whatever that means, information is also a burgeoning industry, aggressively promoted by computer companies, artificial intelligence specialists, and futurologists of the Alvin Toffler–John Naisbitt school. All variously promise that information technology will brighten our economic future, improve our schools, make our houses “talk,” and even one day do our thinking for us.

Roszak finds the popular middlebrow faith in such overblown promises not only comic but potentially harmful. Exaggerated confidence in a high-tech service economy future, for example, feeds suburban Americans’ indifference to the fate of older industries, even agriculture. Educators are convinced that students should be “computer literate,” and hard-pressed American universities spent $1.3 billion in 1984 to achieve that dubious end. Such “literacy” is at best ephemeral, Roszak notes, when “user friendliness” increases with each generation of machines. Something is amiss in academe (and elsewhere) when a college president declares that “the great university of the future will be that with a great computer system.”

That “something” is a radical confusion of information with ideas, of data processing with the process of thinking—and is the real target of Roszak’s feisty polemic.

"Ireland," say the authors, "is Britain's oldest problem. Britain is Ireland's." And the six Protestant-dominated counties of Northern Ireland have been the nub of the problem ever since 1920, when the British gave freedom to the Catholic south and kept Ulster as part of the United Kingdom. Hadden and Boyle, law lecturers who shared many years at Queen's University, Belfast, come, respectively, from Protestant loyalist and Catholic nationalist backgrounds. They argue that the best alternative to despair in their common land is a new Anglo-Irish treaty recognizing the rights of both Northern Irish communities. They also urge cooperative intervention by the governments of Britain and Ireland. Outlining the history of the Ulster mess and exposing flaws in the many "simple" solutions (e.g., reuniting Ulster with Ireland or making it into an independent nation), they propose the creation of joint Anglo-Irish agencies to administer economic aid and to monitor civil rights. Needed, too, they believe, are north-south cooperation in security affairs and police and judiciary reforms. An initiative signed between Britain and Ireland on November 15, 1985, has already put many of the authors' proposals to the test.

RELIGION AND THE DECLINE OF MAGIC. By Keith Thomas. Scribner's, 1986. 716 pp. $18.95

"A cunning-man, or a cunning-woman, as they are termed, is to be found near every town," wrote the English poet Robert Southey in 1807. These practitioners of occult arts were the ineradicable heirs of a magic-oriented culture that flourished in England during the 16th and 17th centuries. Magic, of course, had been no stranger to England before 1500. But, as Oxford historian Thomas explains, it had competed with medieval Catholicism's "vast reservoir of magical powers"—saints, relics, special prayers. To these, as well as to astrologers and witches, people turned when faced with illness, drought, or bad fortune. The Protestant Reformation brought an end to ecclesiastical magic in England. Puritan divines denounced it as necromancy, irrelevant to the individual's pursuit of salvation. Thus the centuries immediately after the Reformation were a transitional period when, Thomas says, "a variety of magical agencies continued to offer their services to those for whom the Protestant notion of self-help was too arduous." Thomas's masterful book closely surveys those magical practices and also explains their demise—a development due less to the practical benefits of science, medicine, and technology than to people's growing readiness to accept uncertainty, "which has been defined as an essential characteristic of the scientific attitude."


The recent writings of Thomas Kuhn, Karl Popper, and other philosophers have made almost commonplace the notion that great scientific upheavals result more from imaginative or intuitive leaps than from new empirical discoveries. But the French chemist-philosopher Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) was preaching this gospel as early as the 1920s, having quickly inferred the broader implications of Albert Einstein's physics. Among the six essays collected here, one explains how Bachelard generalized Einstein's work on space, time, and perception into a theory about the relativity of all scientific endeavors. Refuting the myth of pure objectivity in science, Bachelard brought an end to the three-century-old legacy of René Descartes: the idea that the individual reflecting mind is completely separate from the material world that it ponders.
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Spy Stories: The Life and Fiction Of John le Carré

During the years following World War II, a certain popular-thriller glamor attached to the image of Western secret agents. Cold War heroes, they countered the Red menace in Greece, Berlin, Guatemala, and elsewhere. That espionage could be a dubious, often amoral game seldom occurred to the readers of Ian Fleming’s James Bond stories. But in 1964, well before accounts of treason and double agents became common media fare, John le Carré’s chilling *Spy Who Came in from the Cold* suddenly shattered many illusions. Le Carré’s complex moral vision has given his “spy stories” something extra. Here, critic Tom Maddox suggests that le Carré has created significant literature about our times, most recently in his best-selling tale, *A Perfect Spy*.

by Tom Maddox

This is the century of spies. Yet, though they are said to be almost everywhere, we seldom see them, except on television, giving press conferences, or being led, in manacles, from car to courtroom. Knowing that most of the successful ones work in shadows, we wonder who they are and what they do.

So we take pleasure in stories about them, even if our pleasure is often contaminated by the sentiment that spy stories are inherently unworthy of serious attention. Reviewing *A Perfect Spy*, John le Carré’s latest novel, Anthony Burgess offered a standard put-down of the genre, if not of the author himself: “Le Carré’s talents cry out to be employed in the creation of a real novel.” Burgess went on to lament “the myth that the only literature the British can produce on a world scale is sub-art about spies.”

One can hear in these remarks more than the waspishness of a novelist reviewing a colleague who has had better sales and received higher critical praise. Here is the voice of High Culture, schooled in the rigors of modernism, unwilling to believe that the spy novel could ever be literature.

Many years ago, Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges made an astute observation about the detective story:
"The literature of our time is exhausted by interjections and opinions, incoherencies and confidences; the detective story represents order and the obligation to invest." In our day, nearly 45 years later, Western literature is even more filled with interjections and incoherencies, to say nothing of its other ills.

The result is that a vast public—educated, sophisticated—waits eagerly for a writer who can order and invent and still provide the excellences of literature.

Le Carré is just such a writer. And reading his novels has become one of the characteristic literary pleasures of the late 20th century, just as reading the fiction of Charles Dickens was one of the characteristic pleasures of the 19th. Like Dickens, le Carré has invested a popular literary form with the full strength of his personal obsessions. Like Dickens, he has transformed a popular form into high art. Such transformations are mysterious and difficult to explain, but they are marked by certain outward and visible signs. In le Carré's case, they are the literary tradition he inherited, the personal history he brought to it, and the 26-year arc of his fiction.

Any brief survey of le Carré's relation to his predecessors is bound to be unsatisfying. The field is enormous, and literary history, which is in bad enough condition with regard to the certified works of great literature, is in absolutely awful shape with regard to popular genres.

Nevertheless, to refuse to place le Carré in a tradition is worse yet, for then one ignores the fact that his work depends vitally on the existence of the pop-
ular genre. As le Carré has said, "When I brought back, but did not invent, the realistic spy story, it was misinterpreted as a great new wave." Admitting necessary limitations, then, let us quickly examine a small sample of the massive outpouring of modern spy novels.

Rummaging through the 20th century's spy stories, one can understand Burgess's contempt for "sub-art about spies." Inane popular fantasies are the norm, spun by writers as various as E. Phillips Oppenheim (The Spymanmaster, The Secret) and John Buchan (Mr. Standfast, The Thirty-Nine Steps) in the early part of this century, and, more recently, by Ian Fleming (Dr. No, Goldfinger). Moreover, during the greater part of the spy novel's existence, a literary Gresham's Law has appeared to operate: The bad has usually driven out the good. President John F. Kennedy singled out Ian Fleming for his golden touch, not the more serious practitioner of the genre, Graham Greene.

Depicting the Pest

This has not completely discouraged serious writers. As early as 1907, Joseph Conrad wrote The Secret Agent, a novel that stands out among the clutter like a Palladian villa among suburban tract homes. In that acute psychological story, Conrad depicted the secret agent as agent provocateur, his nature as unideological, opportunistic, amoral. The force behind this essentially passive creature was provided by the nihilistic madness of people such as "the incorruptible Professor," who is set loose at the novel's end:

He had no future. He disdained it. He was a force. His thoughts caressed the images of ruin and destruction. He walked trail, insignificant, shabby, miserable—and terrible in the simplicity of his idea calling madness and despair to the regeneration of the world. Nobody looked at him. He passed on unsuspected and deadly, like a pest in the street full of men.

With striking prescience, Conrad portrayed the "pest" we have come unwillingly to know more fully as the political terrorist.

Waiting for Cornwall

However, for serious writers any excursion into spy fiction during the dawn of this century could only be a vacation jaunt—a walk on the literary wild side. Spy stories remained peopled by clean-limbed young lads of enormous pluck and daring and their antagonists, brutal Germans with shaved heads and dueling scars or Orientals of inhuman subtlety and cunning, with no respect at all for human life. For spy fiction to begin to come of age, it had to wait for two distinguished British writers, Eric Ambler and Graham Greene.

In both men's narratives we enter more realistic worlds where despair is as common as heroism, and confusion, weariness, cowardice, and deceit abound. But even though Ambler brought a degree of psychological realism to spy fiction in such novels as A Coffin for Dimitrious (1937) and Journey into Fear (1940), he began (and remains) too close to purely popular fantasy to become a novelist of le Carré's importance. His novels are usually well-crafted, but they are essentially thriller-picaresque tales of innocents abroad in a conspiracy-filled world.

Greene certainly deserves examination on his own terms, whether we read his early "entertainments" such as The Confidential Agent (1939) or his later novels such as the The Quiet American.
(1955). But I cannot give such an assessment here. So I will just express my belief that, for a number of reasons, the simplest being his lack of total commitment to the form, Greene never became the quintessential spy novelist. Yet, after Greene (and, to a lesser degree, Ambler), the ground had been prepared. The spy novel was waiting for another Briton, le Carré, or, to introduce him under his proper name, David Cornwell.

If, in a heartless mood, one were to design a life for a writer of spy fiction, one might create Cornwell's. His rogue father, Ronnie Cornwell—a con man with vast social ambitions and few, if any, scruples—taught him the intricacies of deception and impersonation, and in the process gave him the terrible gift of being a permanent outsider. Experiencing public schools—both as pupil and master—revealed to Cornwell the intimate ways of the English upper (or aspiring) classes in all their baroque eccentricity and almost insane snobbery. The British secret intelligence service recruited him and schooled him not only in the inherent complexities of spying but also in the vicious, self-destructive, and often pointless infighting so characteristic of bureaucracies.

Serving the Queen

Cornwell's early life had the mobile and elusive quality of a "legend," a term that appears so many times in Smiley's People (1980), signifying a fictitious biography created for an agent. As part of the "legend"—that part which implied upper-class origins and prosperity—Cornwell and his brother were placed in public schools, where they were to acquire the manners, morals, and accent of the ruling classes. As a result of this extended exposure, Cornwell has always considered himself a deceiver, a parvenu, "advancing into British society with an undefended back."

Ultimately all this proved too much for Cornwell. "I was not educated at all," he said in an interview in 1977. "We were ruled by the rod and by the athletes; we lived a cultureless existence in beautiful buildings and we were heirs to preposterous prejudices." At age 17 he fled Sherborne School and spent a year at the University of Berne in Switzerland. There he became fluent in German, developed a lasting interest in German literature, and probably received his first espionage assignment from British intelligence—this last point seeming especially plausible in light of the experiences of A Perfect Spy's central character, Magnus Pym.

After Berne, Cornwell was drafted into the Army and assigned to the intelligence corps in Austria in 1952. His job was to interview refugees who had come across from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but he may also have been engaged in espionage work, perhaps running agents in the Soviet-occupied zone of Austria.

Enter George Smiley

Service completed, Cornwell returned to England and Oxford, where he graduated in 1956 with a first in modern languages and a young wife, Ann Sharp. Teaching at Eton for the next two years, he found the experience stifling, but it provided him with invaluable background material for A Murder of Quality (1962) and, presumably, for the episodes set at Thursgood's School in Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy (1974).

Then came the Foreign Service years (1960–64), with postings in Bonn and Hamburg. Although his official titles were, respectively, second secretary and consul, Cornwell was almost certainly working for the secret intelligence service. But even espionage seemed not to engage his full attention or energies. Feeling "completely alienated," he turned to writing and in accordance with Foreign Office rules published his books under a pen name—John le Carré, or "John the Square."
Richard Burton (right) as Alec Leamas in the 1965 movie adaptation of The Spy Who Came in from the Cold.

His two early novels, Call for the Dead (1961) and A Murder of Quality, were exercises in English murder mystery as much as spy thrillers. They are enjoyable in their own right, but their chief interest is that in them the character George Smiley appears for the first time with a great deal of his biography already intact. He has even been abandoned by his aristocratic, beautiful, oft-straying wife, the Lady Ann, who over the years will prove to be the source of much of Smiley's pain.

Smiley appears at this stage as a reincarnation of the genius detective—pudgy and diffident, he is perhaps related to Father Brown, the priest-detective hero of G. K. Chesterton's novels. Smiley loves “academic excursions into the mystery of human behavior, disciplined by the practical application of his own deductions.” This is Smiley all right, but an early Smiley whose detachment has not yet been tempered by personal and professional fires.

Although they garnered respectable reviews, neither of the first novels was uncommonly successful. The Spy Who Came in from the Cold was a different story. It made le Carré a rich man—so rich that he could retire from the Foreign Service. More important, it announced that the most extraordinary career in the history of the spy novel was well and truly under way.

Unlike the later books, Spy has a single-minded intensity about it. We are thrown into British agent Alec Leamas's
mind and suffer his trials from beginning to end. Absent are the digressions into other characters’ histories that make le Carré’s later novels seem like variations upon a form. There is none of the movement “forward and back” that retards the later narratives and provides even their most frantic moments with a curiously leisurely pace.

Rather, Spy is filled with revelations within revelations, coincidences, decisions, violent consequences. It has a thriller plot finely machined.

**On the Berlin Wall**

With the plot providing narrative drive, le Carré attacks moral considerations head on. Fiedler, the relatively decent East German espionage agent whom Leamas is sent across the Iron Curtain to entrap, is concerned with means and ends. He questions Leamas, asking if the British secret service would kill him. Leamas answers, “It depends. It depends on the need...” Fiedler replies, “That is a great relief,” and concludes, “We’re all the same, you know, that’s the joke.”

Liz Gold, the naive English Communist who falls in love with Leamas, is forced to consider Leamas’s principle that “you believed in things because you needed to; what you believed in had no value of its own, no function.” And Leamas himself has a vision that gives ultimate moral structure to the plot. Driving to meet with an agent, Leamas nearly crashes into a family car traveling down the West German Autobahn:

As he passed the car he saw out of the corner of his eye four children in the back, waving and laughing, and the stupid, frightened face of their father at the wheel. He drove on, cursing, and suddenly it happened; suddenly his hands were shaking feverishly, his face was burning hot, his heart was palpitating wildly. He managed to pull off the road into a lay-by, scrambled out of the car and stood, breathing heavily, staring at the hurtling stream of giant lorries.

He had a vision of the little car caught among them, pounded and smashed, until there was nothing left, nothing but the frenetic whine of klaxons and the blue lights flashing; and the bodies of the children, torn, like the murdered refugees on the road across the dunes.

Action and theme come together when Leamas discovers his final betrayal and makes his final commitment: He finds that, to the various secret services, all people, their own agents included, are counters in a vast international game. Therefore, sacrifice and loyalty should be reserved for those we love. At the novel’s end, he climbs down from the top of the Berlin Wall to where Liz lies huddled, shot dead by the East Germans (possibly with the connivance of the English), and takes his stand beside her:

Finally they shot him, two or three shots. He stood glaring around him like a blinded bull in the arena. As he fell, Leamas saw a small car smashed between great lorries, and the children waving cheerfully through the windows.

This is the definitive hard-boiled spy novel, set in a dark landscape of betrayal and subsequent disillusionment, where moral commitments come from the far side of despair.

Yet (and oddly, considering that this book made le Carré’s fame and fortune), Spy remains somewhat a sport among his books. This superb novel was not for le Carré the beginning of something but the end: Having dispensed with the hard-boiled spy story, he could go on to find his own voice. This proved difficult; his next three novels seem to be digressions, false starts.

*The Looking Glass War* (1965) is a particularly depressing little exercise. Even more than Spy, it seems to have been imported whole from “Greeland,” Graham Greene’s spiritual moonscape where virtually nothing lives. Instead of Leamas betrayed, we
have Fred Leiser as agent and dupe, and the culpability this time lies entirely on the British side. What amounts to a wretched interdepartmental quarrel takes his life. Though Smiley makes an appearance in this narrative, his influence on events is even more tangential than in Spy, and the entire “Circus”—as the British secret service and its headquarters are called—appears ready to collapse from viciousness, treachery, and exhaustion.

Viewed against this bleak predecessor, A Small Town in Germany (1968) represents something like a recovery of nerve. Alan Turner, the investigator who goes to Bonn to trace the disappearance of a British embassy second secretary, is humane, dedicated, honest—a younger cousin of Smiley’s, so to speak—and he pursues his research with much the same patience and understanding that will characterize Smiley’s researches into the identity of Gerald, the mole in Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy.

A Romantic Failure

Unfortunately, the plot has a counterfactual absurdity at its core: le Carré’s assumption that “an amorphous Movement of popular resentments, popular protest and occasional violence has come into being.” Published in 1968, the book floats in an odd social vacuum, given the topsy-turvy politics of the decade, and in fact makes little or no political sense. le Carré’s “Movement,” which provides the various conspiracies crucial to the plot, is not quite of the Right or the Left, neither Baader-Meinhof nor neo-Nazi. The West Germany of Small Town undoubtedly rings true in a multitude of small details—le Carré is always notoriously careful in such matters—but in the larger sense it never exists at all. As a result, the novel floats right off into fantasy; for the only time in le Carré’s career as a novelist, his grasp on milieu is unfrm.

After this interesting failure comes the least-read, most-vilified le Carré novel, The Naive & Sentimental Lover (1971). It is also his only work of nongenre fiction. The consensus (with which I agree) is that the book is virtually unreadable, a total failure. Whether the consensus is mistaken this first time around, as it is so often, I will leave to others to discuss.

One wonders how le Carré felt about his writing at this point. Though both The Looking Glass War and A Small Town in Germany have their partisans, neither book has ever seemed remotely as important as Spy, and, as I have said, le Carré’s subsequent foray into the nonspy novel caused general discontent. In retrospect, it seems as though le Carré had placed himself in a rather tight corner.

Smiley’s Circus

Not too tight, however, for a resourceful writer to escape from. Between the years 1974 and 1980, he published the three books of The Quest for Karla trilogy—individually, and in sequence, triumphs. le Carré returns in these books to a Circus that has grown more complex and interesting, and to Smiley, who will gather around him “his” people, each of whom, like a character in a medieval mystery or miracle play, will step forward and have his say.

With plot, character, theme, he must proceed always by indirection: This appears to be the lesson that le Carré learned. Show first; explain later. When Lacon, political adviser to the Circus, gives Smiley his commission—to find the mole Gerald—he says, “You’ll take the job, clean the stables? Go backwards, go forwards, do whatever is necessary? It’s your generation, after all. Your legacy.” For the next three novels Smiley patiently does exactly this, and the narratives move crabwise along with him. In Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, he sifts through the files, accumulating knowledge both from what the records say and
what they should say but don't. In *The Honourable Schoolboy* (1977), the process is described as, and goes by the name of, "back-bearing".

By minutely charting Haydon's path of destruction... by exhaustively recording his selection of files; by reassembling... the intelligence culled in good faith by Circus outstations, and balancing it, in every detail, against the Intelligence distributed by Haydon to the Circus's customers in the Whitehall marketplace, it would be possible to take back-bearings... and establish Haydon's, and therefore Karla's, point of departure.

This is espionage as scholarship and psychohistory, perhaps even as a way of making order out of the ruins of a chaotic, catastrophic past. The Circus's history (Bill Haydon, the mole, infecting it with treachery from near the center), like David Cornwell's, demands to be reconstructed from within. Where there should have been love and loyalty, there was treachery. Patiently the scene is reconstructed; the crucial question—"Why (don't you love me, have you betrayed me)?"—can never be answered. One can, perhaps must, make up stories about Bill Haydon (and Ronnie Cornwell, le Carré's father). But one can never explain their actions, which ultimately wear the shroud of inscrutable fate.

However, out of the process of trying to solve these oedipal riddles, new questions will emerge, new victories will be laid on top of old defeats, new joys on top of old sorrows. This appears to be le Carré's wisdom: personally, as he seeks to cure his own wounds; professionally, as he establishes the novelistic style and method of his maturity. Smiley, whom he has created, teaches him to proceed by patience and indirectness.
Thus the three novels open obliquely, in each case beginning with a retarded narrative, as if to say, "Patience, patience. This is important, and as the story unfolds, you will see." In *Tinker, Tailor*, we begin in the rain at Thursgood's School with Jim Prideaux, the agent who has been farmed out after being betrayed by Haydon; in *The Honourable Schoolboy*, we listen in on old Craw, Luke, and the Dwarf, foreign correspondents at their club in Hong Kong; in *Smiley's People*, we begin with Maria Ostrakova, an aging Russian expatriate, and a KGB thug in Paris.

Each of these episodes is crucial in varying degrees to the story that will follow, each is rendered with loving, obsessive attention to personality and place, and each is sounded in the string-quartet prose that we now associate with le Carré: expressive, unostentatious, rhythmic, controlled.

**Hand-held Lights**

Jim Prideaux's story can serve for them all. Near the beginning of *Tinker, Tailor*, he wrings the neck of a trapped owl, just as, near the end, he will wring the neck of Bill Haydon, the mole, the betrayer. The first of these actions is of enormous emblematic importance—signifying Prideaux's willingness and ability to perform the unpleasant but necessary act of violence. The second act provides symbolic justice—Prideaux, the betrayed friend, serves as the arm of all whom Haydon betrayed. However, *we actually witness neither act.* We see Prideaux through the eyes of his student, Bill Roach—the fat, asthmatic, friendless child of rich, divorced parents. ("Coming from a broken home, Roach was also a natural watcher," we are told, a piece of bitter wisdom from le Carré's past.) Through Roach we measure Prideaux's character and receive a partial reflection of the extent of his pain. The greater demands of plot are held in abeyance as this smaller and more immediate story unfolds.

Commenting upon *The Little Drummer Girl* (1983), *Newsweek*'s reviewer remarked of le Carré that "he writes romances—stories which subordinate every element they contain to the tyrannous demand of plot." Not exactly. Plot *ultimately* will rule, yes, but one can deliberately deflect its force and, having promised the reader to tell one story sooner or later, proceed to tell any number of others.

Allow me my own minor digression. During the late 1960s I saw Jean-Louis Barrault and his Parisian company perform a trendy multimedia show called *Rabelais*. The arena stage permitted one to watch Barrault when he was not acting. He was always busy: directing, or manipulating hand-held lights, or somehow urging his actors on by the mere force of his presence from where he kneeled, almost lost among the audience. Whatever he did, without upstaging his company or making a show of his influence, he was the controlling hand behind the drama.

Now the obvious point: As Barrault was to his troupe, so is Smiley to these novels. As each character's story is shown or told, Smiley hovers closely by, sometimes listening, sometimes proceeding with his work of understanding "forward and back," almost always interpreting for us the meaning of these lives.

**Entropy Conquers All**

Smiley embodies a humanity that is consistently at odds with his profession. The secret service wishes to dispense with that humanity, the consensus on high being that humane virtues have outlasted whatever limited usefulness they might have had. So Smiley comes and goes, comes and goes: Before *Call for the Dead* is completed, Smiley has resigned; in *Spy Leamas* is told that Smiley "isn't with us anymore" (though this may or may not be yet another deception inflicted on Leamas); and Smiley is
called from retirement first to hunt down the traitor within in *Tinker, Tailor* and once again to tidy things up after General Vladimir, an Estonian agent, has been killed in *Smiley’s People*.

Here, characteristically, he pursues a course very different from that expected of him—rather than burying Vladimir as quietly and deeply as possible, Smiley seeks to understand his death and, in the process, is led back to his primal antagonist, Karla, a high-ranking Soviet agent in Moscow Center. To put the matter shortly, the secret service needs Smiley, at least from time to time, but does not want him.

And what does Smiley feel about these things? When he is thrown out, apparently for the final time, at the end of *The Honourable Schoolboy*, he writes to Ann:

Today all I know is that I have learned to interpret the whole of life in terms of conspiracy. That is the sword I have lived by, and as I look round me now I see it is the sword I shall die by as well. These people terrify me, but I am one of them. If they stab me in the back, then at least that is the judgment of my peers.

This letter, said by one of his friends, Peter Guillam, to be “from Smiley’s blue period,” expresses very clearly the paradox of Smiley as intelligence officer: No matter what his degree of power or knowledge at any moment, Smiley is always the outsider.

Amid all the pain and human waste, Smiley searches again and again for things of lasting value. Ann, his unfaithful wife, floats in and out of his life, more out than in, and the Circus itself can hardly take Smiley’s full allegiance—it is the repository of too much inhumanity, not to mention simple careerism and its elaborate accompanying sophistries. So Smiley is left with his people:

His thoughts, as often when he was afraid, concerned people. He had no theories or judgements in particular. He simply wondered how everyone would be affected, and he felt responsible... It worried him that he felt so bankrupt; that whatever intellectual or philosophical precepts he clung to broke down entirely now that he was faced with the human situation.

*Smiley’s People* takes this theme from *Tinker, Tailor*, calls it the primacy of ties that bind, and makes it a central, painful text.

And it is painful. The first turn of the screw concerns Smiley’s inability (and, by implication, any good man’s) to maintain these ties. Vladimir dies almost forgotten, and, long before his death, is reduced to miserable circumstances. Connie Sachs has to be resurrected by Smiley from physical and mental decay not once but twice. And Smiley’s responsibility for Jerry Westerby’s death in *The Honourable Schoolboy* remains ambiguous. Guillam responds with anger every time Westerby’s name comes up, and the narrative itself worries back and forth the degree of Smiley’s culpability, if any. Among the uncertainties remains an unpalatable truth: With respect to our loves, friendships, and deepest loyalties, entropy conquers.

**Life in No-Man’s Land**

The next, more excruciating turn of the screw concerns the extent to which we become what we fight. Smiley is finally able to entrap the Russian master spy Karla precisely because of Karla’s concern for his daughter (who is receiving psychiatric care in Switzerland), a fact that introduces several unpleasant ironies. In *Tinker, Tailor*, Guillam conjectures to Smiley, “So Karla is fireproof... He can’t be bought and he can’t be beaten?” Smiley’s reply is, “Karla is not fireproof, because he’s a fanatic. And one day, if I have anything to do with it, that lack of moderation will be his downfall.” Yet in *Smiley’s People*, Karla’s weakness, then his downfall, are not caused by lack of moderation but “by nothing more sinister than excessive
Magnus Pym, central character of A Perfect Spy (1986), is a rising British intelligence official—and a traitor who spies for the Czechs. London assigns him to Washington, where he charms American officials and slips U.S. secrets to Axel, his Czech handler. Magnus describes his experience to his son:

No country was ever easier to spy on, Tom, no nation so open-hearted with its secrets, so quick to air them, share them, confide them, or consign them too early to the junk heap of planned American obsolescence. I am too young to know whether there was a time when Americans were able to restrain their admirable passion to communicate, but I doubt it. Certainly the path has been downhill since 1945, for it was quickly apparent that information which 10 years ago would have cost Axel’s service thousands of dollars in precious hard currency could by the mid-’70s be had for a few coppers from the Washington Post. We could have resented this sometimes, if we had been smaller natures, for there are few things more vexing in the spy world than landing a great scoop for Prague and London one week, only to read the same material in Aviation Weekly the next. But we did not complain. In the great fruit garden of American technology, there were pickings enough for everyone and none of us need ever want for anything again.

Cameos, Tom, little tiles for your mosaic are all I need to give you now. See the two friends romping under a darkening sky, catching the last rays of the sunlight before the game is over. See them thieving like children, knowing the police are round the corner. Pym did not take to America in a night, not in a month, for all the splendid fireworks of the Fourth. His love of the place grew with Axel’s. Without Axel he might never have seen the light. Pym set out, believe it or not, determined to disapprove of everything he saw. He found no holding point, no stern judgment to revolt against. These vulgar pleasure-seeking people, so frank and clamorous, were too uninhibited for his shielded and involuted life. They loved their prosperity too obviously, were too flexible and mobile, too little the slaves of place, origin and class. They had no sense of that hush which all Pym’s life had been the background music of his inhibition. In committee, it was true, they reverted soon enough to type, and became the warring princelings of the European countries they had left behind. They could run you up a cabal that would make mediaeval Venice blush. They could be Dutch and stubborn, Scandinavian and gloomy, Balkan and murderous and tribal. But when they mixed with one another they were American and loquacious and disarming, and Pym was hard put to find a centre to betray.

love, a weakness with which Smiley himself, from his own tangled life, was eminently familiar.” So Smiley waits for Karla at the end and thinks:

The very evil he had fought against seemed to reach out and possess him and claim him despite his striving, calling him traitor also; mocking him, yet at the same time applauding his betrayal. On Karla has descended the curse of Smiley’s compassion; on Smiley the curse of Karla’s fanaticism. I have destroyed him with the weapons I abhorred, and they are his. We have crossed each other’s frontiers, we are the no-men of this no-man’s-land.
Guillam’s final remark—“George, you won”—though Smiley assents to it—thus has an unintended cutting edge. Smiley has achieved a costly personal triumph, but even at this price the final victory cannot erase the major defeats that went before—most especially, the irreparable damage Bill Haydon’s treachery inflicted on the Circus. Also, we know that instead of Smiley there will be perfidious and opportunistic careerists at the helm: Control, Alleline, Enderby. Smiley remains, as always, outside. On this somber chord ends the trilogy.

From the Karla trilogy to The Little Drummer Girl we travel not only in space but in time—not only from England to the Middle East but from the Cold War’s yesterday to terrorism’s now. This is not a journey we might have expected from John le Carré.

Exorcising Ronnie’s Ghost

In many ways the strangest of le Carré’s novels, Drummer Girl seems to me, like A Small Town in Germany, to be built on sand. This time around, however, the political milieu is excruciatingly accurate—whether one is listening to the Israelis or the Palestinians, their voices ring true. Our problems come with one major suspension of disbelief (the heroine Charlie’s “conversion” to Israeli purposes) and a recurring conceit—“the Theater of the Real.” Le Carré, master hypnotist that he is, makes us swallow these artifices whole, at least while we are reading.

The narrative of indirection has thus been superceded, if only for the moment. Violence moves back onstage, and it carries the characters forward. Their emotions are not reconstructed after the event, through analysis, but are presented as they happen in bright neon colors. These standard thriller resources do not serve the purpose of mere titillation, however: They are not there to elicit the pop novel reader’s “I couldn’t put it down” response.

Le Carré uses them to further what seems to me Drummer Girl’s reason for existing: to communicate the horrible suffering that characterizes this endlessly inhuman Mideast war; and to educate blind Western admirers of Israel to the inhumanity of Israel’s own excesses. In short, this narrative impolitely rubs our noses in appalling realities.

As these events recede into history—and one can only hope that these apparently eternal conflicts will recede—then the true virtues and vices of Drummer Girl can emerge. At this point, the Theater of the Real seems tiresome, Charlie’s malleability a mere authorial device. When we reach the historical moment when the term PLO requires footnotes, then these artifices will be seen clearly.

We come full circle to A Perfect Spy, le Carré/Cornwell’s exorcism of his father’s ghost after a quarter century of fiction-writing. Magnus Pym, the British traitor and “perfect spy” of the title, gives us a narrative within the narrative, a vivid telling of his childhood for the benefit of his son Tom and his colleague Jack Brotherhood. Pym’s story is obviously drawn from Cornwell’s memories.

Farewell to Truth

Impersonation is one theme. Rick Pym, the father and confidence man, is the master of seeming—all that he says or does is calculated to produce an effect or gain an advantage. Magnus, the son, is the unwitting pupil, his life bent around Rick’s lies and treacheries. Spying in its most literal sense is the other theme. To know anything of the truth, Magnus must search through letters, records, bills, and legal papers; he must assume that all stated facts about his father’s life are lies. Thus Magnus, schooled in imposture and prying, becomes a “perfect” spy.

By definition, of course, the perfect spy can have no ultimate loyalties. To do so would be to remove the final mask and to accept the exposed surface as
truth. The perfect spy's inauthenticity is total; he cannot terminate deceit and say, "Here, between these two points I will be myself and tell the truth."

As Smiley feared he had become what he fought, so Magnus Pym and John le Carré/David Cornwell fear becoming Rick Pym/Ronnie Cornwell. One can understand the fear: Cornwell has presumably walked with it since he became aware of the almost incredible falsity that was the basis of his father's life.

As several reviewers have noted, *A Perfect Spy* is not a thriller, not in conventional terms; it is not what you expect. More than that, it is in some ways an anticlimax. Having struggled all these years to come to terms with his father, le Carré does so with such total control and exposes himself with such total candor that one can only follow along and nod in assent—yes, it must have been really horrible.

As reader or critic, however, one absolutely must allow le Carré this book. It is as technically polished as any of his strongest novels, precise in its evocation of place (London, Vienna, Washington, boarding school), memorable in its creation of people and scenes. For all the implied criticism that it does not provide adequate suspense, it is highly enjoyable: Rick Pym is a rather astounding con man, Magnus Pym is a suitably inauthentic spy—not a Hollow Man exactly, but one convinced despite the evidence that hollow is all he can be. Also, though the long-term popularity of the book seems to me uncertain, its importance for le Carré (and aficionados of his work) is assured: Here is the shape of le Carré/Cornwell's dread. It has been brought out in the open and mastered.

The consequences of laying Ronnie Cornwell's ghost to rest are unpredictable. As critic Roland Barthes says:

If there is no longer a Father, why tell stories? Doesn't every narrative lead back to Oedipus? Isn't storytelling always a way of searching for one's origin, speaking of one's conflicts with the Law, entering into the dialectic of tenderness and hatred?

All next books are wagers. Le Carré himself has said that when an author finishes a book, "He has been to the end of his talent. It is a frightening view."

Like le Carré, we must simply wait to see what happens next, trusting that David Cornwell's bitter experiences will continue to provide material for John le Carré's novels. Though we know that real-life spying is usually vulgar and tiresome, as in the recent Walker family case, we are willing to let le Carré make it all more interesting than it is—with his Circus, lamplighters, marthas, scalphunters, and wranglers; with Smiley, Peter Guillam, Connie Sachs, the Lady Ann. They are not the elements of escapist fantasies but of imaginative fiction. They are pieces of reality transformed by John le Carré and made eloquent as literature about our time.
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COMMENTARY

We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer's telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editors' requests for comment.

Literacy Lesson from the 'People of the Book'

You couldn't have said a truer word in "The Struggle for Literacy" [WQ, Spring '86] when you stated, "Americans have something to learn from the...successes of others." In the essay "The Reading Revolution," Steven Lagerfeld discusses literacy on the international scene from a historical point of view. Nowhere, but nowhere, does he ever even mention the "People of the Book"—the Hebrews, whose culture mandates education at an early age and in which, from the earliest times, Jewish children could not only read and translate Hebrew, but learned the local language as well.

Jacob Siegel, M.D.
Houston, Texas

Instilling Habits

In "Keeping Up in America" [WQ, Spring '86], David Harman notes that many young people who are taught the techniques of reading and writing often lapse back into illiteracy when left on their own.

The success we have had at Reading Is Fundamental, Inc. (RIF) in transforming non-readers into readers makes me optimistic that Americans could reverse these trends.

At RIF, the book is the centerpiece of a program that serves young people aged three through high school. Through our grassroots network of 3,161 local projects and more than 90,000 volunteers, RIF reached more than 2.1 million young people last year with seven million books.

Comments from parents and educators reveal that those who participate in the RIF program read more, develop more positive attitudes toward school, and check out more books from libraries. School officials add that reading scores are inching up as a result. RIF has capitalized on this by offering parent workshops and guidance publications on how to encourage reading in the home.

Mr. Harman rightly notes that illiteracy tends to be passed from generation to generation. But Americans could break through that cycle if we could but instill a love for reading in one generation of young people who, in turn, would have books in their homes and pass the habit and skill of reading on to their own children.

Ruth Graves, President
Reading Is Fundamental, Inc.

On Hollywood

Congratulations on "The Movies in America" in your Summer '86 issue. I would like to suggest a few additional considerations.

As to the content of modern films, please remember that the commercial motion picture once enjoyed a virtual monopoly on audio-visual technology and drew upon a thriving legitimate theater and published literature for its A-budget films. In the television and video era, films cannot compete with the immediacy and topicality of commercial and public television. Both the stage and literature have disintegrated into arcane subject matter (which makes for "art" films) and overwritten historical and/or sex novels (which become miniseries on television). The feature film, more than ever before, must rely heavily on original-screenplay escapism to draw large audiences.

It is a source of occasional irritation that films are badgered for recycling themselves, when in reality all art forms can be accused of self-imitation. There are rip-offs, clones, remakes, and sequels galore in music, drama, literature, sculpture, dance, architecture, etc.

On the other hand, there is a valid reason for much of this: Human emotions and conflicts do not change (including the hubris of each passing generation), and therefore the artistic expressions of these human attributes will resurface with varying cosmetic details.

A few minor quibbles: Foreign revenues
COMMENTARY

for American films represent one-third or less of total receipts (no longer 50 percent, the pre–World War II ratio); the summer box office season is close to 40 percent of a year’s business (not 50 percent); and theater concession sales represent a 30–35 percent add-on to box office receipts (i.e., if ticket sales are $20,000, then popcorn and candy receipts will be $6–7,000).

A. D. Murphy, Director
The Peter Stark Motion Picture Producing Program
University of Southern California

New Zealand: Remember the ‘A’ in ANZUS

In “Trouble in Paradise” [WQ, Spring ‘86], Roderic Alley suggests that, as a consequence of the ANZUS imbroglio over U.S. nuclear vessel visits to New Zealand ports, the Labour government of David Lange is embarking on a more regionally oriented, “self-reliant” security policy. He adds, rather sanguinely, that the prospects for self-reliance are less possible for New Zealand than for Australia.

This is a reminder that Australia is the largest power in the South Pacific region. A coherent, cohesive regional security system designed to ensure that the South Pacific does not become a “cockpit of superpower confrontations” may be an (if not the) alternative for a post-ANZUS New Zealand. But to make this option viable will require the active support of Australia. And herein lies the rub for Wellington.

Canberra, while maintaining something more than a fig leaf of neutrality in the dispute between its two ANZUS allies, has sided nevertheless with Washington on the crucial issues. More pertinently, the government of Prime Minister Robert Hawke has signaled clearly that it would opt for a new bilateral defence pact with the United States in the unlikely event this was necessary, rather than for some form of independent regional security. Thus the result of an attempt to pursue regional “self-reliance” against Australian wishes would almost certainly prove dysfunctional. The upshot would be a divided, less secure region, as the Pacific Island states align themselves with either Australia or New Zealand. This scenario should trouble Washington and Canberra as much as Wellington since a continuation of the ANZUS row may well back all three parties into unacceptable corners.

Dr. R. A. Herr
Department of Political Science
University of Tasmania

Legitimate Indian Leaders

I read the cluster of articles on “The American Indian” [WQ, New Year’s ’86] with great interest and admiration. In general I find the accounts accurate and persuasive. I am less satisfied with Stephen Cornell’s “The New
Indian Politics” because it is almost without reference to the principal actors: the tribal governments that exist in a “government-to-government” relationship with federal and state governments. Cornell perpetuates the fashionable view that tribal governments are largely “puppets” manipulated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and that the true cause of Indian progress in recent years has been extratribal Indian organizations, such as the American Indian Movement. Indian-white relations, in this view, are seen in terms of a “resistance model” that attributes progress to confrontational demands and militant action. In fact, the old “assimilation model” was shattered not by militant Indians but by the work of John Collier and the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, often in the face of Indian opposition.

Those who view Indian politics from a resistance model denigrate the real and growing authority of the official representatives of Indian tribes and nations. By attacking and even ridiculing the Indian political leaders who possess actual tribal authority and representative character, commentators like Cornell seriously undermine Indian sovereignty and the rights that Indian tribes have obtained through treaties, acts of Congress, and Supreme Court decisions. Indians have had reason in the past to worry about their self-proclaimed white “friends”; today they have continued reason to be suspicious.

Wilcomb E. Washburn, Director
Office of American Studies
Smithsonian Institution

A Dubious ‘Trail of Tears’

Patricia Limerick’s article “Here to Stay” [WQ, New Year’s ’86] has repeated the standard piece about the Cherokee forced exodus west in 1838–39. Considered conventional historical wisdom, the piece says that the Cherokees were given scant supplies by the United States and that 4,000 out of 18,000 died on a “Trail of Tears.”

Twenty-plus years of research in original documents, both U.S. and Cherokee, have convinced me that the story is simply untrue. The Cherokees supplied themselves from U.S. funds agreed upon in advance by Cherokee leaders. No military force accompanied the main groups west.
As for the alleged number of deaths, Cherokee Nation records themselves show that large contingents arrived in Indian territory with more Indians than were counted upon leaving the eastern Cherokee homelands. The groups picked up stragglers on the way. The 4,000-death estimate was by a distraught missionary mourning the loss of an infant before the movement started. Detailed reports elsewhere do not support it.

The phrase "Trail of Tears" first appeared in 1908, 70 years after the episode. An Oklahoma historian reported it out of the mouth of a Choctaw Indian to a Baptist preacher describing a road in what is now Oklahoma. Historians grabbed onto it like a slogan. The Cherokees never used it.

W. R. Higginbotham
Fort Worth, Texas

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