Including Historic Presidential Memoirs You Can Own...

A TIME TO HEAL

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF


gerald R. Ford

The Easton Press

Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter will personally sign your editions of their memoirs for you – by hand!
For the first time in America’s history, a magnificent library of leather-bound books pays tribute to each of our Presidents. Here are the best Presidential biographies… the most significant Presidential writings… the gripping personal memoirs… assembled in the finest library of the American Presidency ever created. 

In recognition of its historic significance, former Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter will personally hand-sign their memoirs for each subscriber. Thus, the same signatures that made history happen… will now create historic documents for you and your family to treasure forever.

An acquisition of lasting importance.

Imagine how much these historic volumes – and the Presidential signatures – will mean in years to come… in a very real sense you will own a piece of American history.

Every volume in The Library of the Presidents is a major work by a renowned writer – books like Stephen Ambrose’s definitive Eisenhower… Carl Sandburg’s Pulitzer Prize winning Lincoln… Douglas Southall Freeman’s Pulitzer Prize biography of George Washington. And, of course, the personally signed memoirs of Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter.

Magnificent leather-bound volumes.

Each sumptuous volume will be fully bound in genuine leather… with real 22kt gold on the spine… embellished with deeply inlaid cover designs… printed on acid-neutral paper – a masterpiece of the bookbinder’s art.

Send no money now.

To reserve your historic Library of the Presidents, simply return the Reservation Application. Available exclusively from The Easton Press.

Here is your chance to hold history in your hands… and for your family to treasure it for generations.

The Easton Press

© 1989 MBI

RESERVATION APPLICATION

The Easton Press
47 Richards Avenue
Norwalk, Conn. 06857
We will bill you.

Send no money now.

Please enroll my subscription to The Library of the Presidents and send me the first volume. Further volumes will be sent at the rate of one per month at $35.50 each. This price is guaranteed for the next two years. I may return any book within 30 days for a refund and either party may cancel this agreement at any time.

*Plus $2.95 per book for shipping and handling.

☐ As a convenience, enclosed is $38.45** (payable to The Easton Press) for my first volume.

☐ Credit Card Option – charge each volume when shipped to my:

☐ MasterCard ☐ VISA ☐ American Express

Credit Card No. ☐ Please print clearly
Exp. Date

Name ____________________________

Address ____________________________

City ____________________________ State ______ Zip ______

Signature ____________________________

(All applications subject to acceptance)

**Conn. residents pay $41.53 to include sales tax.

Tenn. residents pay $41.43 to include sales tax.

029-1215
A lifetime of emotions wrapped up in one word: Cancer

Let's keep our heads. It is tremendously important that everyone know what cancer is. And what it is not. Cancer is not one disease. Some cancers may be prevented by good health habits. Some are easy to control; others may be severe or life-threatening. Different cancers are subject to different treatments. Most important of all, it is imperative to know that cancer need NOT be fatal.

Here is the latest news about cancer:
One of the leading scientific journals, Nature, recently said, "1983 may be the year in which carcinogenesis is finally understood."

Some of the best informed scientists in the world say that we may see substantial control and cure of cancers before this century is over. By the year 2000, the incidence of total cancers should be markedly decreased by prevention and cure. This is believed because of the rapid advances in the past several years, and what we can surely anticipate in the years just ahead.

The attack on the problem of cancer is vast, here and the world over. Scientists in universities, pharmaceutical organizations and government health agencies are coordinating activities that are supported by huge budgets and by an immense technology. A tremendous body of experience has been amassed for many different cancers.

Too much fear can be dangerous.
Early diagnosis is essential to arrest and to overcome many cancers. But early diagnosis is often hindered by fear. And fear is worse when one does not know the facts. Here are simple all-important facts: Cancer is NOT the commonest cause of death. Many cancers are curable.

Too often fear delays treatment. The best way to overcome fear is to get all the facts. More often than not, your fear that you have cancer will prove to be wrong. But it is still absolutely essential that you get a medical examination and that your doctor (not you, nor your family, nor your friends) make a diagnosis.

Fear that someone in your family has cancer should also be promptly addressed. Here again, seek the advice of your physician. There are also many qualified professionals and special organizations that provide information on cancer in virtually every major community in the United States.

Remember, knowledge is the best cure for UNFOUNDED fears.

Hope is the key to the future.
Hope is what the latest facts and figures on cancer are all about.
Hope resides in early diagnosis.
Hope resides in early treatment.
Hope resides in current research.

We now know that cancer can be diagnosed and treated with an array of new technology and knowledge. You are not alone in preventing or treating cancer. You need and have a support system. We call it...

Partners in Healthcare:
You are the most important partner.
Only you can take the first step. And at the first warning sign—a lump, unusual bleeding from any part of the body, a sore that does not heal, an obvious change in a wart or mole, a nagging cough or hoarseness, a change in bowel habits—DO NOT WAIT. CONSULT YOUR PHYSICIAN AT ONCE.

Your doctor interprets the warning signs, orders your tests and makes the diagnosis.
The chances are that your physician will find something other than cancer. But it is essential that, whatever tests are needed, they be done quickly for an early diagnosis.

All those who discover, develop and distribute medicines complete the partnership.
Pharmaceutical companies in the past few years have developed many good drugs for cancers. We at Pfizer are fulfilling our role as one of your partners in healthcare by mobilizing our doctors, chemists, technicians, a huge range of facilities and modern instrumentation to do our share in the search for the cause and the ultimate cure of cancer and other diseases.

For a copy of the pamphlet The Hopeful Side of Cancer, write to the American Cancer Society, G.P.O. Box 1400, Dept. 12, New York, N.Y. 10116.
For reprints of this Healthcare Series, please write: Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, Post Office Box 3852, Grand Central Station, New York, N.Y. 10163.
**THE WILSON QUARTERLY**

Published by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Section</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Editor's Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>PERIODICALS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Research Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>THE ISLAMIC WORLD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 39   | State and Society Under Islam  
  *by Bernard Lewis* |
| 54   | The Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979–1989  
  *by Shaul Bakhsh* |
| 63   | Varieties of Muslim Experience  
  *by Mahnaz Ispahani* |
| 73   | Background Books |
| 76   | JOHN DEWEY  
  Philosopher in the Schoolroom  
  *by John Patrick Diggins* |
| 86   | TOWARD A HISTORY OF READING  
  *by Robert Darnton* |
| 104  | CURRENT BOOKS |
| 120  | BEIJING JOURNAL  
  Memory, Commemoration, and the  
  Plight of China’s Intellectuals  
  *by Vera Schwarcz* |
| 130  | REFLECTIONS  
  P. T. Barnum and the American Museum  
  *by A. H. Saxon* |
| 143  | Commentary |

Cover: Imam Zaynal-Ahdin Visits the Ka'ba (1549–50). An explanation of the painting appears on page 38.
"I offer you hunger, thirst, forced marches...and death."—Garibaldi

We offer you

3 books for $1 each, Plus a 4th at the low Member’s price. And you can desert at any time

—History Book Club

1677. $29.95/$22.95
1701. $24.95/$18.95
1883. $35/$24.95
8615. $22.95/$19.50

No risk. No strings. No pressure to reenlist.
MORE HISTORY—MORE SAVINGS

No matter what area of history you enjoy reading about most, you'll find that History Book Club offers some of the finest selections being published today. And no book club we know of offers greater savings—as much as 30% off publishers' list prices.

You can save even more by taking advantage of our Introductory Offer. Select any three books on these two pages for $1 each when you take a fourth book at the low Member's price—plus shipping and handling. Thereafter, you're not obligated to order any more books. You may cancel membership at any time by notifying History Book Club. We may cancel your membership if you elect not to buy at least one book in any six-month period.

How the Club works: You'll be able to choose from 150 to 200 books featured each month. History Book Club always offers its members well-made, long-lasting editions.

You'll receive our Review along with a dated Reply Form 14 times a year (about every 4 weeks), plus up to 4 more offers of special selections. If you want the "Editors' Choice" do nothing—the book will come automatically. If you want another book, or no books at all, return the Reply Form by the date specified. A shipping and handling charge is added to each shipment.

Your HBC Guarantee: If you receive an unwanted "Editors' Choice" because you had less than 10 days to decide, simply return it and pay nothing.

History Book Club®
Camp Hill, PA 17012-8805

Please enroll me in History Book Club according to the no-risk, no-commitment terms outlined in the accompanying ad. Send me the four books whose numbers I have listed below. Bill me $1 each for the 3 choices on the left, and the fourth at the low Member's price—plus shipping and handling.

H192-10-0

Name ____________________________
Address ____________________________ Apt. # ________
City __________________ State ________ Zip ________

All orders subject to approval. Prices generally higher in Canada.

© 1989 History Book Club, Inc.
The end of the Cold War already has Western strategists fretting about the shape of things to come. Declaring the "end of history," Francis Fukuyama, in one of the more talked about articles of the season [see p. 12], predicts boring times ahead. The future he envisions holds little more than tedious bureaucratic-legal negotiations among states and trading blocs, and the gradual but ineluctable spread of Western democracy, free enterprise, and individual rights to former communist bastions and the Third World. Perhaps. But such a vision begs a large question: What about the resurgence of ethnic, national, and religious sentiments that already played such a dramatic role in the politics of this decade, in locales as diverse as Iran, Peru, Ethiopia, and now the Soviet Union. In this issue, we look at the world of Islam, which today includes almost one billion people, or roughly one fifth of the globe's population. Surveying the relations of state, society, and religion from the early Arab caliphates to the contemporary Islamic Republic of Iran, our contributors explore the powerful and sometimes conflicting forces that have helped to create what one analyst calls the Muslim "crescent of crisis."
PERIODICALS

Reviews of articles from periodicals and specialized journals here and abroad

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT  7
FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE  9
ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS  12
SOCIETY  16
PRESS & TELEVISION  18

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY  20
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY  22
RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT  24
ARTS & LETTERS  26
OTHER NATIONS  29

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

Washington
The Philosopher

“His character has been exalted at the expense of his intellect,” the historian and politician Henry Cabot Lodge said of George Washington in 1889, “and his goodness has been so much insisted upon...that we are in danger of forgetting that he had a great mind as well as high moral worth.”

Yet forget we have, declares Loss, a University of Chicago political scientist. The fault is partly Washington’s. Unlike such contemporaries as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, he left only scattered written reflections on politics. Most scholars still do not take his ideas seriously.

Loss believes that the outlines of a philosophy can be found in Washington’s writings. Borrowing from the ancient Greek philosophers, Washington adopted the idea that a virtuous citizenry is essential to good government. “Can it be,” he asked in his Farewell Address of 1798, “that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with its virtue?” Thus he disagreed with republican thinkers of his own time, including Immanuel Kant, who held that the problem of government could be resolved “even for a race of devils” by the proper design of political institutions.

But Washington parted with Aristotle and other ancients who held that democracy inevitably becomes the rule of ignorance. “Although we are yet in our cradle, as a nation, I think the efforts of the human mind with us are sufficient to refute” such doctrines, he wrote in 1798.

Among Washington’s greatest goals was the establishment of a national university to promote learning and virtue among potential statesmen. “Knowledge,” he declared in his first annual address to Congress in 1790, “is in every country the surest basis of public happiness.” In this emphasis on moral education he differed with both the Federalist, where Madison wrote that “the extent and proper structure of the Union” was the “Republican remedy for the diseases most incident to Republican Government,” and Jefferson, who noted in 1813 that “I had more confidence than he had in the natural integrity and discretion of the people.”

Washington, says Loss, “paradoxically relied on a classical solution for the perpetuation of modern republican institutions.” It may have been a flawed philosophy, but a philosophy it was.

Who Counts?


We are, to paraphrase Richard Nixon, all the statistics now. “We have slipped into living with statistics as we have with television or computers,” writes Woolf, a historian at the University of Essex, with consequences that are not entirely benign.

Modern statistics was pioneered during the 17th century by British insurance firms...
and Sweden's Lutheran Church. The former created actuarial tables to assess risks; the latter gathered data on literacy.

At first, statistics followed separate paths in different nations. As Sir John Sinclair, author of an 18th-century statistical survey of Scotland, wrote, “By Statistical is meant in Germany [and France] an inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining the political strength of a country, or questions respecting matters of State; whereas [in English-speaking nations it] is an inquiry into the state of a country, for the purposes of ascertaining the quantum of happiness.”

Until the mid-19th century, most statistical studies were based on quasi-medical models of society. Human societies were to be studied like the plant world and other subjects of natural history; if only the statistician could gather enough data, a proper category could be found for everything. Of course, the reality was that most researchers began with notions of what the categories were—e.g., race or region of origin. Countless studies were launched to quantify fertility, crime, school attendance, and the like. In the census of 1840, Americans were subjected to 80 columns of questions on disease, insanity, and the economy, “all correlated to region, race, and gender.”

In post-Revolutionary France and during the unification of Italy during the 1860s, politically-inspired statisticians feverishly gathered data to document the progress—indeed, the very existence—of the nation. Statistics were also to serve, as Italy’s Giacinto Scelsi put it, as “the compass of statesmen” in crafting government policy.

By the end of the century, Scelsi’s notion—along with the belief that statistics are “value neutral”—had won broad acceptance in the West. But Woolf believes that those who take the measure of nations today, like the 19th-century statisticians who put much store in measurements of the human cranium; harbor many unacknowledged biases. And the statisticians today enjoy much greater power to shape perceptions of society.
Let Them Eat Cake!

In Washington, it is called the “quiet crisis.” Low pay is demoralizing the federal work force and draining it of talent, warn such “inside-the-Beltway” luminaries as Paul Volcker, the former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. Volcker now stumps for a big federal pay raise as head of a group called the National Commission on the Public Service.

Culler, a former official of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, finds it all a little hard to believe. If the three million civilian federal workers are so miserable, why do only 5.2 percent of them quit their jobs annually, as opposed to 10.9 percent of their private sector counterparts?

Culler suspects that Volcker and his allies (including former President Gerald Ford) are really most concerned about the upper-echelon bureaucrats who earn salaries of $50,000 or more. But even among technical specialists who could easily find more lucrative work in the private sector

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Swords Unsheathed

Even as the world cheers the progress of Soviet-American arms control, dangerous new weapons of mass destruction are spreading to the volatile Middle East.

Iraq used chemical weapons during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, and the two sides fired conventionally-armed ballistic missiles at each other. Iraq is also working on an atomic bomb and is stockpiling biological weapons (bacteria, toxins, viruses). Libya is building a chemical weapons plant, and Syria has obtained Soviet-made SS-21 missiles. Israel almost certainly possesses nuclear weapons.

More alarming than the quantity of arms, writes Steinberg, a researcher at Israel’s Hebrew University, is the ignorance of Middle Eastern leaders about their dangers. Over the years, the two superpowers have reduced the threat of war through deterrence—by, among other things, placing weapons in submarines and hardened silos to ensure that any surprise attack would be met by a deadly second strike. But few deterrents exist in the Middle East.

Geography and the new missiles heighten the temptation to strike first. Syria’s capital, Damascus, is a mere 100 kilometers from Israel’s Golan Heights.

It is too late to put the genie back in the
bottle, Steinberg says. Despite many non-proliferation pacts, advanced weapons have reached the Middle East from both the Soviet Union and the West. Washington failed even to apply sanctions against Iraq after it used chemical weapons.

Instead, Steinberg believes that the two superpowers must now educate Middle Eastern leaders about the dangers of the weapons they have acquired. At the 1987 Soviet-American Glassboro summit conference, a seminar persuaded both sides not to deploy massive anti-ballistic-missile defenses. The United States should organize such meetings for top political and military leaders in the Middle East today. Both superpowers could act as intermediaries—for example, urging Saudi Arabia to keep its Chinese-made missiles unarmed, unfueled, and open to satellite surveillance to allay Israeli fears of a surprise attack. Satellite data should be made available to all, Steinberg adds. In short, he says, the Middle East must learn the lessons of the Cold War.

Words and War

From the American soldiers who fought during World War II we have inherited "snafu" ("situation normal, all f---- up") and many other words with unprintable definitions. Why this burst of sly verbal insubordination, asks Paul Fussell in The Atlantic (August 1989)?

It was not just the danger and fear, the boredom and uncertainty and loneliness and deprivation. It was the conviction that optimistic publicity and euphemism had rendered their experience so falsely that it would never be readily communicable . . . . They knew that despite the advertising and publicity, where it counted their arms and equipment were worse than the Germans'. They knew that their automatic rifles (First World War vintage) were slower and clumsier, and they knew that the Germans had a much better light machine gun. They knew despite official assertions to the contrary, that the Germans had real smokeless powder for their small arms and that they did not. They knew that their own tanks, both Americans and British, were ridiculously underarmed and underarmored, so that they would inevitably be destroyed in an open encounter with an equal number of German panzers . . . . And they knew that the single greatest weapon of the war, the atomic bomb excepted, was the German 88-mm flat-trajectory gun, which brought down thousands of bombers and tens of thousands of soldiers. The Allies had nothing as good, despite the fact that one of them had designated itself the world's greatest industrial power.

Clausewitz Redux


In the nation's military academies and journals, officers drop the name of Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) as frequently as journalists and scholars speak of Tocqueville. "The latest version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, is practically oozing Clausewitzian terminology," notes Cannon, a major in the U.S. Army.

The Prussian-born strategist has been in vogue in the United States before, but never so dramatically as he has since the end of the Vietnam War. Clausewitz, like many of today's American officers, lived through a time of drastic change in the nature of war. When he joined Frederick the Great's Prussian army at about age 12, wars were limited in scope. By the time he became director of the Berlin War College in 1818, he had seen the emergence of "total war" in the campaigns of Napoleon, an experience that forced him to rethink the art of warfare. The result was On War, published after his death.

To Clausewitz we owe indirectly the dictum that "war is politics by other means." Much influenced by Hegelian philosophy, Clausewitz learned to think of war in somewhat dialectical terms. He viewed
war as a tendency toward pure primordial violence, constrained by politics and chance events.

He also developed concepts that help soldiers understand (and anticipate) the day-to-day vagaries of war. His notion of friction, writes Cannon, was "an elegantly stated predecessor of Murphy's Law," which held that countless minor incidents inevitably lower the level of military performance. A related concept is the "culminating point," the notion that a combat unit's effectiveness falls rapidly after reaching its peak.

Secret Friends

In 1966, a huffy President Charles de Gaulle led France out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's integrated military command, and evicted NATO headquarters and troops from French soil.

The causes of the rupture were many and complex, but among the most significant was U.S. opposition to the development of a French nuclear force. Yet seven years later, according to Ullman, a Princeton political scientist, top officials in Paris and Washington were secretly cooperating to bolster France's nuclear force de frappe and to coordinate French defense plans with NATO's. Until now, virtually no one except a few top U.S. and French (and probably Soviet) officials knew about it.

The secrecy was enforced by the desire of de Gaulle's successors after 1969—Pompidou, Giscard, and Mitterand—to maintain the illusion that they were sticking to the Gaullist "go-it-alone" defense policy, of which the "home-grown" force de frappe was the proudest symbol. And until 1985, a variety of U.S. laws barred the sharing of information about the physics of nuclear weapons with any allies except, in effect, Britain.

Beginning during the Nixon administration (1969-74), U.S. nuclear specialists skirted these laws by resorting to "negative guidance." Their French counterparts, seeking to determine which of, say, six ways of miniaturizing warheads was best, were invited to play a game of "20 questions" to get the answer. Other information—e.g., about missile technology—could be legally passed along, although some was withheld.

Has it all been worth it? Ullman credits the secret cooperation with the growing warmth of high-level Franco-American relations. NATO's coordination of nuclear targeting with the French has reduced the risk of instant armageddon in case of war. More important has been the coordination of conventional forces—where NATO is weakest—since President François Mitterand took office in 1981. While France has not formally rejoined the NATO command structure, it has agreed in case of war to reinforce NATO troops in West Germany and to provide bases for U.S. forces.

But there are minuses. French plans to expand the force de frappe to 1,000 warheads could greatly complicate the arms reduction efforts of the two superpowers. More important, Ullman says, "France's allies are entitled to wonder about the solidity and durability of military linkages with a government that does not have the confidence to acknowledge their full extent to its own public."
After the Cold War

The Cold War is over!

On that startling assertion, many of the people who make their living by thinking and writing about strategy now seem to agree. And yet the latest postmortems and prospectuses in the nation’s leading periodicals have hardly been full of skyrockets and glee.

Conservatives, who might have been expected to erupt in delirious celebration, seem almost gloomy. For dizzying claims of victory and somber afterthoughts none exceed those of Francis Fukuyama, deputy director of the U.S. State Department’s policy planning staff. Writing in the National Interest (Summer 1989), Fukuyama declares the end not only of the Cold War but of history itself.

By “history” Fukuyama does not mean the sort of stuff historians usually write about but history as the philosopher G. W. F. Hegel conceived of it: a struggle through which Reason is realized in this world. We have, Fukuyama believes, reached “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”

Conservatives, who might have been expected to erupt in delirious celebration, seem almost gloomy. For dizzying claims of victory and somber afterthoughts none exceed those of Francis Fukuyama, deputy director of the U.S. State Department’s policy planning staff. Writing in the National Interest (Summer 1989), Fukuyama declares the end not only of the Cold War but of history itself.

By “history” Fukuyama does not mean the sort of stuff historians usually write about but history as the philosopher G. W. F. Hegel conceived of it: a struggle through which Reason is realized in this world. We have, Fukuyama believes, reached “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”

Fukuyama glumly predicts, will give way to an obsession with grubby consumerism and “the endless solving of technical problems.”

Fukuyama and Walden comprise what might be called “the enemy is now us” camp. But other thinkers have had no difficulty imagining other forces and “isms” to replace communism as the West’s nemesis.

“At enormous cost to the Russian people,” argues historian Hugh Ragsdale in the Virginia Quarterly Review (Summer 1989), Moscow maintains “a semi-civilized order over two parts of the world almost infinitely disorderly. The first is the Balkans and Eastern Europe, the area that gave us World War I and World War II. The second is the Soviet side of the [Muslim] ‘crescent of crisis.’”

The preservation of order in these areas, he contends, “is more vital than the progress of human rights.”

William S. Lind, a noted advocate of military reform and head of the Center for Cultural Conservatism, goes even further. Writing in Policy Review (Summer 1989), he argues that a Russia freed of communism—the Russia of Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, and Solzhenitsyn—“could resume her rightful place as part of the West, an ally in the defense of Western culture and civilization.”

Lind sees militant Islam and “nativist-fascism” (e.g., Peru’s Shining Path guerrillas) as emerging threats to the West.

Plenty of other writers, of course, are quite content to stick with the old enemy. Patrick Glynn of the American Enterprise Institute warns in Commentary (Aug. 1989) that false optimism about the end of the Cold War “is destined to make the world a more dangerous place.”

Burton Yale Pines of the Heritage Foundation argues that the Soviets’ current weakness provides the opportunity to deliver a knockout blow: the separation of Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union. The New Republic’s (Dec. 13, 1988) Charles Krauthammer likewise refuses to claim victory yet, but is willing to contemplate a post–Cold War world.

Most likely, he thinks, is the development of a “multipolar” world with five centers of power: the Soviet Union, China, Europe, the United States, and Japan. He sees an opportunity for something grander: “a unipolar system centered on an integrated West of Western Europe, North America, Japan, and with some of the newly industrialized states perhaps joining as well.”

To what end? Perhaps to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons in the Third World and to launch a global environmental crusade. Perhaps the evolution of a grand confederation of capitalist democracies—a higher form of political organization—could be an end unto itself.

"Multipolarity" is the concept—some would say buzzword—that all of the people who write for the policy journals must reckon with, whether they believe the Cold War is over or not. From the hawkish Jeane Kirkpatrick to Yale's Paul Kennedy, author of The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (1987) and a leading advocate of greatly reduced U.S. commitments abroad, many agree that the global dominance of the two superpowers is waning.

As West Germany's Karl Kaiser writes in the Adelphi Papers (No. 237), a multipolar world would mean more emphasis on economic competition and less on military competition. East-West antagonism would continue on a reduced scale, but new dangers would appear. More local wars among Third World nations armed with weapons of mass destruction are almost certain; protectionist regional economic blocs involving the larger powers are a troubling possibility.

What is the United States to do?

No grand strategy comparable to the containment doctrine [see p. 104] that has guided the United States since the 1940s has emerged. Instead, several rather vague and frequently overlapping scenarios have been talked about.

In Foreign Policy (Winter 1988–89), William G. Hyland, the editor of Foreign Affairs, argues that multipolarity offers the United States the opportunity to reduce its military burdens while remaining, paradoxically, "the only true global power."

Going a step further than "retrenchment" in the SAIS Review (Summer–Fall 1989), Alan Tonelson, though skeptical of multipolarity as a useful concept, contends that a multipolar world "would make possible—and in many ways desirable—a U.S. return to something like its traditional detachment from international politics." Tonelson, who is writing a book on foreign policy for the Twentieth Century Fund, favors an inch-by-inch reassessment of U.S. interests and commitments around the globe.

Still others see within reach, at last, the prospect of a harmonious world order where international organizations such as the United Nations play a much larger role. An example is Walter Russell Mead's two-part essay in World Policy Journal (Spring and Summer 1989). This left-wing "unipolarity," as the editors of the New Republic (Sept. 18–25, 1989) point out, is essentially a spiffed-up version of old-fashioned "one-worldism," and a complement to Krauthammer's newfangled conservative "one-worldism."

Not much considered, they add, are several less pleasant scenarios, such as complete international disorder—a world increasingly torn by nationalist, religious, and protectionist passions.

The perspective that seems to prevail within the foreign policy establishment is summarized by Zbigniew Brzezinski in Foreign Affairs (Spring 1988). But "America's New Geostrategy," as he describes it, sounds much like the old, despite the former U.S. National Security Adviser's bows to "consensual leadership," especially with the Japanese, and "a more cooperative world system." In the future, he says, "no alternative to a leading American world role is likely to develop, and America's partners will continue to want the United States to play that role."

Brzezinski may be right, but he is not alone in sounding as though he has wrapped new jargon around old positions. As Tonelson points out, all the talk of multipolar "systems" has so far encouraged strategic thinkers to beg essential questions. If the containment of communism is no longer to be the chief purpose of U.S. foreign policy, what larger purposes, if any, are to replace it? As Francis Fukuyama's post–Cold War funk suggests, the United States tends to turn churlish toward the larger world when lacking a near-messianic mission. Ally-bashing already seems to engage the American imagination far more than does the prospect of "consensual leadership." Whether or not the Cold War is over, the U.S. will need stronger intellectual leadership for the future.
The High Costs Of Cable TV

If you have cable television in your home, chances are that your local government has granted a franchise monopoly to a cable company. Chances are also good that it made a big mistake, argues Barnes, an editor at the Detroit News.

Since cable television's growth began during the 1970s, some 5,000 U.S. municipalities have granted franchises. Cable, like telephone service, is usually considered a "natural" monopoly. The reason: Wiring a city is deemed too costly and disruptive to permit competition.

But in 1984 a Congress bent on deregulation barred local governments from regulating prices charged for cable service. Nationwide, prices jumped by 32 percent between 1984 and 1988—up to $33 per month in some areas. Cable has become a $14.5 billion industry. Now, Congress is thinking about reversing itself.

That would be a mistake, says Barnes. The answer is more competition, not less.

There is nothing "natural" about cable monopolies. The residents of Huntsville, Alabama, groused about their 12-channel, $10.45 per month service until the city fathers allowed competition in 1986. The new company offered 50 channels for $8.95. Allentown, Pennsylvania, and suburbs of Phoenix, San Diego, and Washington, D.C., are other communities that have found that competition works.

The argument that ghetto communities will be bypassed is a canard, says Barnes. In Sacramento, poor Oak Park was among the first to be wired. The poor (unfortunately) are good customers: They watch more television than others, and their urban neighborhoods are cheaper to wire.

Local monopolies have fostered waste and corruption. Economist Thomas Hazlett estimates that the "bells and whistles" offered by companies seeking monopolies—dozens of channels, "local access" stations—add 20 to 30 percent to customers' bills. And more than one local official has found himself before the bar for accepting bribes or favors from cash-rich monopoly seekers. Rather than deregulate cable, Barnes concludes, Congress should ban local monopolies.

Learning From The Girl Scouts

Forget the Japanese. Business executives who want to know how to run a big organization ought to ask the Girls Scouts.

Such voluntary organizations, says Drucker, a professor of management at the Claremont Graduate School, "are becoming America's management leaders." They range from tiny local church groups to the 1.2 million-member Salvation Army. Overseeing more than 80 million volunteers who give an average of five hours each week, they have discovered three keys to good management:

1) A clear sense of their mission and its requirements. Nonprofits, says Drucker, "are more money conscious than business enterprises are" simply because money is very scarce. But they do not mistake money for mission. Knowing what they are trying to accomplish, they can set strategy and organize more effectively.

2) Their boards of directors actively supervise operations. "In every single business failure of a large company in the last few decades," Drucker observes, "the board was the last to realize that things were going wrong."

3) They have learned how to motivate people. According to Drucker: "Nonprofits used to say, 'We don't pay volunteers so
we can't demand much.' Now they say, 'Because we don't pay, we have to demand even more.'” The nonprofits also invest much time and energy in training and nurturing volunteers.

When he asks executives why they do volunteer work, Drucker notes, many respond that their jobs lack challenges, and that in their corporations “there is no mission, there is only expediency.”

Selling Soap


During the 1920s, soap suddenly became hard to sell. Paved streets, automobiles, electricity, and gas stoves were eliminating much of the filth and muck that had permeated American life. To make matters worse, the expanding cosmetics industry was making it hard to peddle Camay, Lux, and other soaps as beauty products.

To meet the crisis, the soap producers created a trade association and, in 1927, an offshoot called the Cleanliness Institute, hailed by the New York Times as a “new public welfare organization.” Its stated goal: to make Americans even cleaner. “Slovenly folk who have been going on the theory that they can take a bath or leave it,” the Times cheered, “are to be brought to their senses.”

The creation of such trade associations was common during the 1920s, says Vinikas, a University of Arkansas historian. As consumer goods proliferated during the affluent decade, manufacturers learned that they were competing at least as much with other industries for the consumer’s dollar as among themselves. And many had already tried cooperative efforts at Washington’s behest during World War I. But the effort of the soap industry—which had pioneered mass advertising as early as the 1860s—was the slickest of them all.

The Institute poured out newspaper and magazine advertisements—250 million in 1928—pamphlets and posters, warning all Americans of a new cleanliness crisis. One Institute spokesman even assailed the handshake as a “pernicious” custom. In 92 percent of all deaths from communicable diseases, the Institute warned, the disease enters the body through the mouth or nose “and it is the human hand in many instances, that carries it.”

Children were the main targets of the crusade. An ominous-sounding Institute survey showed that only 31 percent of America’s schools provided hot and cold water, soap, and towels. The washing of hands (not to mention washing behind the ears) was rarely required. The Institute embarked on an all-out effort to persuade parents and teachers to clean up the kids. Thousands of textbooks, posters, and pamphlets were sent to schools. A model “cleanliness curriculum” laid out what kinds of bathing and grooming should be...
expected at every grade level.

To what effect? The exact results remain an industry secret, reports Vinikas. But it is probably fair to say that after 1927, Americans were cleaner and the soap industry greener than ever before.

SOCIETY

Prisons Without Walls

America's jails are bursting at the seams. Nine hundred thousand criminals were behind bars in 1987, up by a third since 1983. The number on parole or probation grew even faster, reaching 2.6 million. The price tag for federal, state, and local corrections has soared to some $25 billion annually; state corrections budgets are growing faster than is spending on education.

Most of that money buys only failure, says DiIulio, a Princeton political scientist. One study shows that 70 percent of young adults paroled from prison are arrested for new crimes within six years. Not surprising since parole officers must handle up to 300 cases each, often with little more than a monthly phone call. Lax supervision hits urban ghettos hardest: Ten percent of the nation's black men are in prison or on parole or probation.

But there are promising alternatives to conventional incarceration, parole, and probation. For example, 20 states and localities have experimented with intensive supervision programs (ISPs). Offenders live in strictly governed centers and are required to work, attend classes, perform community service, and submit to drug tests. Of 2,300 criminals studied in a Georgia ISP, 25 percent were later rearrested, compared to 40 percent of the state's jailed prisoners. Moreover, ISP costs Georgia taxpayers $6,000 per prisoner annually (most of which is recouped through tax and other payments by the prisoners); a Georgia prison bed costs $14,000.

Not all programs have been so successful. In New York City, a less intensively supervised system of community service sentences produced recidivism rates no better than the city's jails. Yet the program costs only $920 annually per prisoner.

Even if "prisons without walls" can be made to work on a large scale, says DiIulio, the only place for most violent or chronic offenders is behind bars. Hundreds of new jails and prisons will be needed by the end of the century; These, too, must be reformed. A system of "small unit management" pioneered by the federal Bureau of Prisons may be the answer. It has reduced prison crime and increased prisoner participation in training and education classes.

But state and local governments deal with the vast majority of the nation's criminals. DiIulio believes that if experimentation and professional management are to make any headway against the nation's crime and corrections crisis, Washington will have to take a much more active role in showing how it can be done.

The End of Black Progress?

A half-century of remarkable black economic progress in the United States is in jeopardy. Today, older black men are getting ahead, while younger black men are losing ground.

In 1940, according to Smith and Welch,
of the RAND Corporation and UCLA, respectively, employed black men earned $4,956 annually (in 1987 dollars), while white men made $11,441. By 1980, blacks' earnings had quadrupled to $20,480, outpacing the gains of white men, who made $28,212. Then, young black men began falling behind their white peers.

Almost all of the black gains during the 1940–1980 period resulted from two factors, according to Smith and Welch: economic growth (which accounted for 45 percent of the gain) and black migration from southern farms to cities, mostly in the North. Migration created better job opportunities, but more importantly it boosted the amount and quality of black schooling. In 1940, the typical black worker entered the labor force with only a sixth-grade education from an inferior country school in the South. By 1980, the same worker possessed a high-school diploma; his white counterpart had only one additional year of schooling.

Surprisingly, blacks made the greatest strides during the 1940s; the 1960s were the second most important decade. Since 1970, the real incomes of both whites and blacks have grown little. Yet, black males narrowed the wage gap until 1982, when they earned 68.9 percent of what white men did. (Affirmative action had very little effect, say the authors.) By 1986, the ratio fell to 68.2 percent.

This small drop is less disturbing than another trend. During the 1982–86 period, older black males actually continued to narrow the wage gap with their white peers—the black middle class expanded. But the gap widened among men under age 35.

In 1980, for example, employed black men aged 20 to 24 earned 76 percent as much as young white men; by 1986, they earned only 69.1 percent as much. (Moreover, fewer black men are working. In 1970, 17 percent of all 24-year-old black men were unemployed, out of the work force, or in jail; in 1980, the latest figures available, 28 percent were.)

The decline in the relative earnings of young black men may be the result of changes in the labor market, such as a reduction in the number of high-paying jobs for unskilled workers. Such changes may be temporary. But the growing wage gap could be a reflection of the deterioration of the inner-city schools that helped earlier generations of blacks get their first foot on the ladder of American success. And if history tells us anything, say Smith and Welch, it is that blacks have no hope of improving their status without both economic growth and decent schools.

Train to Nowhere

Save the cities! Slow suburban flight! Clean the air! These were among the goals Congress had in 1961, when it began subsidizing local bus and subway systems. Twenty-eight years and nearly $40 billion later, mass transit is off the track.

Even as bus and subway service has expanded by 50 percent, reports Wachs, an urban planner at UCLA, ridership has stagnated. Americans now take 8.3 billion trips annually on mass transit, an improvement over the nadir of the late 1970s, but still the same number as 1965. Moreover, these trips account for only 2.6 percent of all local travel, down from 3.6 percent during the late 1960s. Mass transit has continued to lose out to the automobile.

Meanwhile, costs have soared. Between 1965 and 1983, operating outlays per vehicle-mile rose by 419 percent, more than twice as fast as inflation. The reason? Chiefly, the growing number and declining efficiency of mass transit employees. Labor costs account for 70 percent of mass transit’s operating budget. Today, a Los Angeles bus driver who works for the city’s public transit system makes $49,777 in wages and benefits; his unionized counterpart in the private sector makes $34,426. More competition between public and pri-
vate mass transit would keep costs down. Wachs argues that Washington should stop trying to woo suburbanites away from their cars. Federal subsidy formulas have encouraged construction of costly but dubious rail systems, notably in Baltimore, Atlanta, Buffalo, and Miami. Maintenance, as well as efforts to prevent the growing bus and subway crime that scares urban riders away, has been neglected. Better to give cities and states lump sums of transit aid for them to use however they see fit.

The local preference for flat fares is also perverse. They make poor inner-city travelers subsidize affluent suburban commuters. In Los Angeles, a suburbanite traveling 20 miles pays only about 10 percent of the cost of his trip; but transit operators make a 120 percent profit on the passenger who goes only one mile. (Nationwide, fares cover only 37 percent of mass transit operating costs.) Public mass transit will never make money. And without harsh measures such as heavy taxes on autos it will never halt the suburban exodus. But Wachs believes that it could, if properly managed, at least provide safe, convenient service for the city residents who need it most.

---

**Acts of the Rich**

Every age has its characteristic vice. It was pornography during the 1970s, notes novelist Tom Wolfe in *Advertising Age* (June 12, 1989). Now we have "plutography."

You'll notice that in my business, journalism, the great successes, the great success stories of the 1970s, were the pornographic glossies like Playboy and Penthouse.

But now those magazines have started the grim slide to financial oblivion. They're losing advertisers. And what has taken their place in the pantheon of journalism? Why, the plutographic magazines. I'm speaking of magazines like Architectural Digest, HG (formerly House & Garden), Town & Country, Art & Antiques, Connoisseur. Now these are magazines that purport to tell us about architecture, interior design, the provenance of antiques, the history of art.

But you know and I know that the rogue stimulation we feel as we turn through those marvelous pages is due to the fact that we are being shown most graphically and intimately depictions of acts of the rich!

---

**PRESS & TELEVISION**

**What's A Picture Worth?**

Americans do not always believe what they hear, but they usually believe what they see. In books, newspapers, and magazines, photographs are unquestioningly regarded as records of fact—even by the nation’s courts. Modern technology, however, may be putting an end to all that.

According to Lasica, an editor at the *Sacramento Bee*, editors and others using new digital photographic systems can alter photos in virtually any manner. "Photographs that lie" are becoming a "journalistic nightmare."

Consider some of Lasica's examples: *National Geographic* slightly shifted one of the Great Pyramids at Giza in a photo to fit on the cover of a 1982 issue; *Rolling Stone* removed a pistol and holster from a photo of *Miami Vice* star Don Johnson that appeared on a 1985 cover; in a health story, *New Jersey's Asbury Park Press* created a photo of a cow munching on a salad. (Readers wrote in to ask how the cow was persuaded to eat it.) Imagine what a super-
market tabloid might do. *Time, Newsweek, USA Today, and the New York Times* are among the many newspapers and magazines that use the digital technology. Publishers are buying the computerized systems not for their photo-altering capabilities but for their cheaper, faster, higher quality photo reproductions. Many publications (now including *National Geographic*) ban any sort of tampering at all. But as the tools of the trade evolve, Lasica fears, so will the rules of the game.

The digital technology reduces images to computer code, then reconstitutes them on an electronic monitor, where they can be shrunk, enlarged, or otherwise altered. In some systems, film has been entirely eliminated. The camera records computer-coded images directly on a microchip. Since there is no photographic "proof," there is no way to know if the image has been tampered with.

Eventually, this technology will also be used to doctor video images. As one specialist put it, "In 10 years we will be able to bring Clark Gable back and put him in a new show." Wonderful. But what if a terrorist group fabricates a news bulletin about an impending nuclear attack—delivered, say, by a synthetic Dan Rather?

Defenders of the technology argue that machines are not unethical; people are. True enough, says Lasica. But the fine line between what is ethical and what is not is already beginning to blur.

**Racial Hypocrisy**

On the night of July 17, 1988, 23-year-old Danny Gilmore and two friends were driving in his pickup truck through Cleveland's East Side slum, searching for the expressway home to Warren, Ohio. A young black man on a moped pulled away from the curb without looking and hit the truck. No injuries. But a crowd of 30 to 50 young black men gathered and soon a fight broke out. Gilmore's two friends, both black, escaped. Gilmore, who was white, did not. He was beaten and run over by his own truck. He died early the next morning in a Cleveland hospital.

A year earlier, the murder of a young black man by white youths in Howard Beach, New York, provoked great soul-searching in the national news media about racial hatred in America, recalls Joy, a freelance writer. Gilmore's case "occasioned a great silence."

Why?

The *Cleveland Plain Dealer* (circ.: 478,000) did not even report Gilmore's killing until two days later, when an arrest was made. And then it buried the story in the back of the paper. A reader would have had to read to the end of the brief report to discover that Gilmore was white and his assailants were black. Later coverage of arrests and trials was equally skimpy. "The *Plain Dealer*'s editors have consistently deleted any references to the matter of race," writes Joy, even though Eric Stringfellow, a black reporter covering the case, is said to have protested. Local TV news broadcasters followed the *Plain Dealer*'s lead.

Print and broadcast editors alike simply deny that there was a racial component to the murder. They also say, as a *Plain Dealer* editor put it, "You have to be very, very careful" in a racially tense community. Yet, Joy notes, the *Plain Dealer* has not shrunk from putting white assaults on blacks on page one. He does not doubt that a double standard is at work. In Cleveland and elsewhere, news organizations that have increased hiring and coverage of minorities in laudable efforts to compensate for past neglect, Joy says, have also turned a blind eye to unpleasant facts.

Ironically, black residents of the East Side slum where Gilmore was murdered have not. They identified the killers and testified against them. "These people had their priorities straight," Joy writes. Cleveland's journalists did not.
Kindness That Kills

A century or more ago, the handicapped, the deformed, and the mentally ill were commonly teased and ridiculed on city streets. Some, such as the 19th-century Elephant Man, David Merrick, were displayed in freak shows. Criminals were paraded before angry crowds and pelted with curses and stones; murderers were executed in public.

It is a triumph of modern humanitarianism that such spectacles would be unthinkable today, notes Lasch, a University of Rochester historian. Yet, he finds something ominous in this compassion.

The truth is, he says, that we are less able to bear the presence of unfortunates than were our ancestors. With the rise of science and technology since the 18th century, we have come to believe that "adversity can be brought under human control." Where it persists, it must be camouflaged or hidden. Thus, the mentally ill were confined to asylums beginning during the 18th century; the ritual humiliation of criminals largely ceased during the 19th century; and now the handicapped are welcomed into society, so long as they abide by the unwritten social code that "requires abnormal people to maintain the pretense of normality and thus to remain as unobtrusive as possible."

Behind the emergence of modern humanitarianism, Lasch finds a growing belief that pain plays "no useful or necessary part in normal life; a tendency to define normal life precisely as the absence of suffering; even a willingness to insist that suffering has no right to exist."

It becomes hard to resist "the implacable logic that would relieve trouble and pain by relieving those who suffer—or who lack even the capacity to suffer—of the burden of life itself." Already, says Lasch, the "quality of life" is being substituted for the sanctity of life as a standard by advocates of abortion for "unfit" fetuses and euthanasia for the elderly and ill.

Inevitably, the quest for freedom from all of nature's hardships will lead to genetic engineering and ever-increasing dependence on technology. The irony, says Lasch, is that engineering the good life ultimately "will eliminate freaks only by turning us all into freaks."

Preaching By Other Means

"The gospel of Christ," Mark Twain observed in 1871, "came filtered down to 19th-century Americans through stage plays and through the despised novel and Christmas story, rather than from the drowsy pulpit."

Twain's proposition is rarely taken seriously by scholars, says Moore, a Cornell historian. After all, the nation's prominent 19th-century ministers grew red in the face denouncing the popular newspapers, magazines, novels, and theater that increasingly competed with them for the public's attention.

Yet, in many cases, clergymen helped create and shape these popular diversions. Evangelical Protestants founded the highly theatrical camp meetings and revivals, "arguably the first, large-scale, popular entertainment in the United States," according to Moore. Methodists pioneered the popular newspaper with the Christian Advocate and Journal, which claimed the largest circulation in the world (25,000) in 1829.

But the archetype of the pop culture preacher was Mason Locke ("Parson")
Weems (1759–1825), an itinerant bookseller and Episcopal minister. In addition to a successful biography of George Washington, Weems penned *The Drunkard's Looking Glass* (1812) and other popular novels. He kept readers turning the pages with lurid images of sin and its wages. Thereafter, “moral sensationalism” permeated popular culture. It reigned in magazines such as the *National Police Gazette* and scores of novels like *Quaker City, or the Monks of Monk Hall* (1844), by George Lippard, who was noted for titillating readers with images of torn nightgowns and heaving female breasts. Lippard was trained but never ordained as a Methodist minister.

Of course, says Moore, the spicy tales often undermined the high-minded messages. But the clergymen did establish that moral seriousness, even if given only lip service, was a prerequisite to success in the marketplace. “Religion was expected to censor the public realm and to be part of everyone’s value system.” Moore believes that the commercialization of religious values helped keep religion strong in America. And it confused later scholars, who have wrongly concluded that Americans who indulged in popular entertainment thought they were abandoning religion in favor of a secular culture.

An illustration from Parson Weems’s gruesome *God’s Revenge Against Gambling* (1811),
Why Sex Makes Sense

To scientists, it has never been very obvious why so many species, from yeasts to humans, engage in sexual reproduction.

After all, it consumes a great deal of time and energy. It isn't any fun for most species (such as the yeasts). And it is downright dangerous for the males in certain species. Sporting flashy coloration may melt female hearts, but it also attracts predators.

The textbook answer to the riddle, writes Michod, a biologist at the University of Arizona, is that sexual union creates genetic variation, which enhances a species' ability to adapt to its environment. But the problem is that sex washes out variations as easily as it creates them. Chances are that, say, a bird born with feathers that provide better camouflage than is typical of its species will produce offspring with standard-issue coloring. Anyway, asexual species (including bacteria, sponges, and some lizards) seem to be just as adaptable in the short term as sexual ones.

Only recently, says Michod, has it become clear that sexual reproduction offers unique advantages in the "repair and maintenance" of genes.

All living cells contain pairs of chromosomes, one from each of the organism's parents. Each chromosome in turn contains many genes, which govern individual traits. And the genes are constantly undergoing damage and repair.

Organisms that reproduce sexually have a special advantage in this process. The cells that create eggs or sperm undergo a process called meiosis. Each cell's chromosomes line up and exchange genes, then divide. The result: two egg (or sperm) cells, each with only one set of chromosomes. When egg and sperm are united, a full complement of chromosomes is again created.

The War Against AIDS

Even a medical miracle would not eliminate Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), warns MIT's Kenneth Keniston. In the second of two special issues of Daedalus (Summer 1989) devoted to AIDS, he observes that our rhetoric about the disease hinders efforts to cope with it:

The metaphor most used to understand AIDS is that of war. We speak of our battle with AIDS and vow to fight it. A war, as author Susan Sontag notes, involves an enemy, soldiers on both sides, weapons, a struggle to win. As she does not note, it also suggests an outcome: the idea that the war will end in victory or defeat. Thus, the war metaphor, with its unstated hope that there will be a victory for our side, also prepares us poorly for the long-term consequences of AIDS. Wars eventually end. They do not get steadily worse or continue indefinitely. They are followed by a time of peace. We do not view them as something we must live with forever. But as I have suggested, this is unlikely to be the case with AIDS.

If in most of us, optimists, the war metaphor promotes fantasies of complete victory, in pessimists it encourages the equally problematic image of unconditional defeat. ... This dark view, too, fails the test of plausibility: it assumes that no intervention or combination of interventions—medical, behavioral, social—will make a difference. ... By predicting total and inevitable defeat, it disarms us for the efforts necessary in the long run.
ply of chromosomes in each new organism, so that mutant genes that survive in one parent are often suppressed by dominant genes from the other. Asexual organisms, by contrast, perform a kind of incest. That is why sex and all that goes with it makes sense to scientists, if not to others.

Chaos


Chaos has crept into science. A century after "chaos theory" was first hinted at by the French mathematician Henri Poincaré (1854–1912), scientists are debating whether it heralds a revolution even more fundamental than quantum mechanics and Einstein's theory of relativity, or whether it is merely a small step forward for science.

Chaos theory is hard to explain, notes Pool, a Science staff writer. It suggests that systems described by mathematical equations—the motion of heavenly bodies, for example—sometimes "act in such a complicated way you cannot predict exactly what they will do in the future. The best you can do is make probabilistic statements about them."

Like quantum mechanics, chaos theory has no single author. Many scientists have developed and applied it in different fields. MIT astronomer Jack Wisdom, for example, has shown that Pluto's orbit around the sun is chaotic. The research of Ary Goldberger, a Harvard cardiologist, suggests that healthy human hearts have chaotic fluctuations in their pattern of beating; ailing hearts have more regular beats.

Nearly 30 years ago, MIT's Edward Lorenz sparked the "chaos revolt" among scientists when he demonstrated the existence of chaotic behavior in atmospheric air flows. As a result, meteorologists accept the idea that weather forecasts more than a couple of weeks into the future are now impossible. But some insist that chaos theory will eventually help them overcome that limit.

Such arguments are the nub of the debate over chaos theory. Is it chiefly a new tool that will help penetrate the mysteries of the universe? Or does it show that some questions never will be answered, that we will have to drop our 200-year-old vision of a clock-like Newtonian universe? An answer may be decades away.

The Green Hour


Artists and writers in every age seem to discover a new chemical shortcut to the Muse—marijuana, LSD, cocaine, and, perennially, alcohol. In 19th-century France, the drug of choice was absinthe.

Absinthe owed its popularity to French soldiers who fought in the Algerian wars of the 1840s. While in North Africa, they began to add extracts of the wormwood herb (Artemisia absinthium) to their wine, believing that it warded off fevers. It didn't, although according to Arnold, a biochemist at the University of Kansas Medical Center, wormwood did have a few medical uses, such as the treatment of roundworms, detailed by the ancient Egyptians, Greeks, and others.

In France, the veterans' newly acquired taste for the bitter herb (one ounce diluted in 524 gallons of water can still be tasted) was satisfied by absinthe. The pale green liqueur "was said to evoke new views, different experiences and unique feelings." One of wormwood's ingredients is thujone, a chemical that can cause intoxication and hallucinations—as well as convulsions and permanent damage to the nervous system. (Thujone was later used in research into convulsive therapy for schizophrenics.) By the 1850s, the French
recognized a disease they called *absinthism*, though they were not aware that thujone was the toxic agent.

Nevertheless, absinthe increased in popularity throughout the 19th century, mostly in France, but in other nations as well. During the 1870s, *l'heure verte* (the green hour) became a daily event in Parisian cafes. It was surrounded by a pleasant ritual: With an absinthe spoon, the drinker held a sugar cube over a small quantity of the liqueur and poured water over the cube to dilute the drink's bitter taste. Like most of the drugs that came after it, absinthe was said to be an aphrodisiac. As the poet Ernest Dowson put it, “absinthe makes the tart grow fonder.” The liqueur was immortalized in paintings such as Edouard Manet's *The Absinthe Drinker* and championed by the poets Charles Baudelaire and Arthur Rimbaud. The psychosis that drove Vincent van Gogh to suicide in 1890 was probably exacerbated by absinthe, says Arnold.

The French quadrupled their consumption of the drink between 1875 and 1913, despite government efforts to curb it. Finally, in 1913, France followed the example of other nations and banned absinthe. Thereafter the French made do with drinks such as Pernod and Ricard, which have absinthe's bitter taste but not its bitter consequences.

**RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT**

**Do Computers Kill?**

Almost one out of every 15 white-collar workers in this country uses a computer or word processor with a video-display terminal (VDT). Few of these users know that “they are being exposed to potentially harmful magnetic fields emitted by their machines.”

So writes Brodeur, in the last of a three-article series on the hazards of various kinds of electromagnetic radiation.

Complaints about eye problems caused by VDTs began cropping up during the 1970s among the first heavy users of computers—telephone-company operators and newspaper employees. In 1980, matters took an even more serious turn when it was learned that four of seven pregnant women in the classified advertising department of the *Toronto Star* gave birth to children with birth defects. In May 1981, more reports of birth defects and miscarriages prompted a Congressional panel to hold hearings. Government and industry specialists reassured the Congressmen. VDTs emit several kinds of radiation—including x-rays—all harmless. In the radio spec-
trum, they said, VDTs radiate in the very low frequency (VLF) range, not known to have any biological effects. The controversy died down.

But clusters of birth defects kept occurring. In October 1982, a Czech emigre biophysicist in Canada, Karel Marha, revealed that VDT’s also emit extra low frequency (ELF) radiation, and noted that the East Bloc countries had strict standards for VDT emissions. In Madrid, Dr. José M. R. Delgado found that chicken embryos exposed to pulses of ELF radiation—similar to those emitted by VDTs—suffered abnormalities. The experts who testified before Congress in 1981 had lacked equipment capable of detecting ELF emissions. The U.S. and Canadian press reported none of this.

And so it went. Every new study pointing to hazards was dismissed by other experts—or in the case of important research sponsored by IBM in 1984, Brodeur contends, was misrepresented by corporate spokesmen. The Reagan administration delayed a government research effort. Newspaper publishers and editors, whose employees were among the most often affected, imposed a virtual “blackout” on VDT stories.

That began to change last year, when Kaiser Permanente released a study showing that pregnant women who worked with VDTs for more than 20 hours per week were 80 percent more likely to suffer miscarriages than other women. But many in business and government continue to deny that a problem exists, Brodeur says, fearful of the costs and disruptions of remedial efforts.

He believes that a crash program of research is needed to determine if VDTs damage fetuses, eyes, or possibly cause cancer. Preventive measures need to be taken before the findings are in. Not to act now, he says, would make users of the nation’s 30 million VDTs “test animals in a long-term biological experiment.”

Ozonomania

Last year’s global environmental menace was the “greenhouse effect.” This year’s is the “hole” in Planet Earth’s ozone layer, which screens out the sun’s ultraviolet rays. But it is a little premature to stock up on sun block yet, suggests Singer, an environmental scientist at the University of Virginia.

The “hole” in the planet’s stratospheric ozone layer was discovered over Antarctica by British scientists in 1985. Alarms were sounded, international conferences held, and in 1987 the world’s industrial nations agreed under the Montreal Protocol to begin reducing production of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). These are the industrial chemicals—used in refrigerators and air conditioners, in plastic foam-blowing, and in electronic cleaning equipment—that are said to be responsible for the missing ozone.

“The case against CFCs is based on a theory of ozone depletion, plausible but quite incomplete,” says Singer. In March 1988, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) released amid much fanfare a study of ozone trends over 17 years. It reported that ozone was disappearing even faster than theory predicted. “This could mean that the theory is wrong, or the trend is spurious, or both,” observes Singer. But NASA cited it only as a cause for greater alarm about CFCs.

In fact, says Singer, the ozone hole may have other causes. It may, for example, be a temporary phenomenon related to cycles of solar activity.

Moreover, he argues, the evidence linking increased exposure to the sun’s ultraviolet rays to human illness is suspect. One scientist frightened a Congressional committee in 1987 by reporting that malignant melanoma (skin cancer) had increased by 100 percent since 1975. True enough. But the scientist neglected to point out, among other things, that skin cancer has been in-

Ozonomania

“My Adventures in the Ozone Layer” by S. Fred Singer, in National Review (June 30, 1989), P.O. Box 96639, Washington, D.C. 20077-7471.
creasing sharply since 1935, long before the ozone hole appeared.

Singer is suspicious of the motives of the scientists, government bureaucrats, and diplomats who are fanning the ozone panic. The scientists get more research grants and public attention; the bureaucrats get more power; the diplomats get more diplomacy. "For all involved there is of course travel to pleasant places, good hotels, international fellowship, and more." Until we better understand the science behind ozone depletion, Singer concludes, some controls on CFC production are prudent. But a complete ban would be costly and premature.

**ARTS & LETTERS**

**Gauguin’s Myth**

Paul Gauguin’s life (1848-1903) “is the stuff of which potent cultural fantasies are created. And indeed have been.”

The tale is now well-known, writes Solomon-Godeau, an art historian. In 1886, the 38-year-old former stockbroker cast off his bourgeois existence, deserting his wife and five children in Copenhagen to paint full time in Paris. After a sojourn in Brittany, where he developed his style of primitive symbolic painting, he sailed for Tahiti and the islands of French Polynesia in 1891. During the next 10 years, he painted the pictures that made his myth and reputation after he died—images of a sensual Eden, “nature’s plenitude reflected in the desirability and compliance of ‘savage women.’”

It was all a fraud, says Solomon-Godeau. By the time Gauguin arrived in Tahiti in 1891, “the pre-European culture had been effectively destroyed.” Christian missionaries had been at work for a century—European diseases had killed off two-thirds of the population—and most of the “natives” attended church at least once a day. Gauguin never bothered to learn their language anyway, and most of his paintings’ Tahitian titles were “either colonial pidgin or grammatically incorrect.” Even the brightly colored clothing that (occasionally) draped Gauguin’s subjects was of European design and manufacture.

Gauguin’s own existence, which he portrayed as effortless and idyllic in his autobiography, *Noa Noa* (1900), was in fact wretched. He “subsisted on macaroni and tinned beef and the charity of Tahitian villagers and resident Europeans.” Often, his teenaged Tahitian mistresses (one was only 13) were his meal tickets.

As for his vaunted style, Solomon-Godeau claims that it was pirated from

*Going Native* by Abigail Solomon-Godeau, in *Art in America* (July 1989), 542 Pacific Ave., Marion, Ohio 43306.

*Paul Gauguin’s Parau na te Varua ino (Words of the Devil) (1892).*
other painters. He “drew far more from art than from life.” Gauguin, wrote his one-time friend, the painter Camille Pis
sarro, “is always poaching on someone’s land; nowadays, he’s pillaging the savages of Oceania.”

Who Creates?

According to contemporary etiquette, one of the highest compliments a person can pay another is to call him “creative.”

Creativity is “incessantly invoked, praised, urged, demanded, hoped for, declared achieved, or found lacking,” observes Barzun, a professor emeritus at Columbia. Political campaigns are criticized for “lacking in creativity,” successful businessmen praised for possessing it, indeed whole groups—professionals, advertising writers—are said to be endowed with this miraculous quality. We take courses in “creative writing,” even though such instruction necessarily involves imitation. In fact, creativity now means little more than “release from compulsion and regulation,” usually in one’s work.

Barzun defines true creative genius as the ability to make something entirely new out of little or nothing. Ironically, our diminution of creativity is the result of our worship of artists and scientists, who have now surpassed even soldiers and statesmen as objects of public esteem. Creativity is now regarded as everybody’s birthright, “as if artistic ability were universal and only stunted or repressed in those who do not become artists.”

True creativity defies explanation, says Barzun. Some writers have linked it to madness, citing the cases of Zola, Wagner, Ibsen, and others. But George Bernard Shaw pointed out that works of genius show the world some new and profound truth about man or society; their creators are thus “masters of reality.”

Shaw also believed that genius is pure inspiration—“Great art is either easy or impossible,” he said—but Barzun notes that Flaubert labored like a coal miner over his stories and novels. In recent years, psychologists have sought the answer in the “creative process”—as if any insight into the genius of Balzac could be obtained by scrutinizing the many drafts of his novels.

Creativity is rare and mysterious, Barzun insists. By trivializing it we have “glutted the market with innumerable objects and performances arbitrarily called art, thereby making it even more arduous for true creation to find a public.” At the same time, there are fewer and fewer true creations to be found. What passes for art today—like Marcel Duchamp’s mustachioed Mona Lisa—is at best imitation and at worst destruction of the glories of the past.

New Light on Impressionism

Impressionism had come to seem like painting’s answer to Muzak. Now it has suddenly become controversial again, at least among art scholars.

For the last 50 years, reports Flam, an art historian at Brooklyn College, scholars have generally agreed that who and what the impressionists were could be easily defined. They painted spontaneously, directly from nature, and employed a certain technique that broke down color into its chromatic components. Most of them showed their pictures at eight major exhibitions between 1874 and ’86. It was easy to draw up a list of the leading impressionists: Claude Monet, Pierre Auguste Renoir, Camille Pissarro, and Alfred Sisley.

These certainties are now dissolving like colors on an impressionist canvas. For example, John House’s Monet: Nature Into
Art (1986) showed that Monet composed and painted his pictures very deliberately. And Monet, Renoir, and other impressionists shifted styles far more frequently than has been supposed.

But the essence of the new scholarship is the shift in emphasis by T. J. Clark, Robert L. Herbert, and others “from concern with formal qualities to subject matter and its social context,” writes Flam. These scholars have argued that the impressionists were united less by the way they wielded their brushes than by their attitudes towards modern life and their themes—generally, spectacle and urban leisure. Thus, several artists traditionally placed on the periphery of impressionism (Mary Cassatt, Edgar Degas, Edouard Manet, and Berthe Morisot) have been drawn into its center—even though Degas for one loathed the very word impressionism. “No art was ever less spontaneous than mine,” he declared.

In Cézanne and the End of Impressionism (1984), Richard Schiff showed that the divide between the “mindlessness” of the impressionists and the symbolism of such post-impressionists as Paul Cézanne, Vincent van Gogh, and Georges Seurat has been overstated. The impressionists were more than naive nature painters. Their notion of the quick and spontaneous rendering, though often honored only in the breach, “was an assertion of individual freedom,” notes Flam. Their emphasis on the flux and relativity of experience challenged settled 19th-century notions of hierarchy and order. That is why they were considered shocking in 19th-century Paris and still stir interest among scholars today.

Critics at War

In 1987, the literary world was stunned by the revelation that the dean of deconstructionist criticism in America, Yale’s Paul de Man (1919–1983), had published anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi articles during the German occupation of his native Belgium in World War II.

As is their wont, de Man’s fellow literary critics have reacted by issuing a new round of scholarly polemics and interpretations. These, along with de Man’s oeuvre, are reviewed by Donoghue, who teaches at New York University.

After the war, de Man embarked on a career of scholarship in Switzerland and the United States, drawing upon the ideas of philosopher Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida, the founder of the deconstructionist movement. De Man insisted that every text or symbol is susceptible to a multitude of interpretations, each of them equally valid—or vacuous. The author’s intent counted for nothing. His was a particularly ascetic and controversial brand of deconstructionism. It seemed to deny that literature could simply be enjoyed and to assert that only a rigorous form of theoretical reductio ad absurdum was possible.

Some of deconstructionism’s harshest critics have seized on de Man’s pro-Nazi past to try to discredit all of deconstructionism. Other writers have argued that de Man created his theory in an attempt to escape his long-concealed past. By reducing all language and texts to meaninglessness, critics like Tzvetan Todorov have reasoned, de Man was able to explain away, at least to himself, his early writings as insignificant and merely part of the vast morass of deceit and falsehood that is language.

Donoghue, however, views de Man’s deconstructionism as a repudiation of the beliefs that “made a mess of his early life in Belgium.” He believes that the young de Man was “radically divided... over the relation of thought to action.” When the one ideology which seemed to him to embody the unification of thought and deed, German fascism, proved to be an awful delusion, de Man’s youthful faith in the unity of meaning and experience was shattered. As a result, Donoghue says, he spent the rest of his life in cynical and self-flagellating dis-
paragement of any "system of relationships" that implied universal truth.

Is deconstructionism discredited? De Man did not invent it, says Donoghue (who himself is no fan of the movement), and it did not die with him or his reputation.

OTHER NATIONS

Save the Wall?

"Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!" President Ronald Reagan exclaimed in 1987 as he stood before the Berlin Wall. He was repeating a demand that virtually every Western leader has made—implicitly, a call for the reunification of the two Germany's—during the 28 years of the wall’s existence.

What if Gorbachev did it?

Reagan, his successor, and America’s allies in Western Europe would be "terror-stricken," predicts Schneider, a West Berlin novelist. "Who really wants to see the two German states—each the leading economic power in its half of Europe—join forces to become an economic superpower? Who wants to see 80 million Germans gathered under one roof again in the heart of Europe?"

More surprising, Schneider believes that the West Berliners and the West Germans, for whom reunification has been a Holy Grail, would be even more dismayed. As a West German diplomat in East Berlin once told him: "It sometimes seems to me as though the wall is the only thing that still connects the two Germany's."

The relaxation of East-West tensions is already making West Germans rethink their devotion to German reunification. Bonn has long guaranteed the 17 million East Germans and millions of ethnic Germans in Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and the Soviet Union the right to resettle in West Germany. Until recently, it was merely a theoretical promise. But last year 200,000 ethnic Germans showed up on the doorstep of West Germany—one of Europe’s most densely populated countries (one burdened, moreover, with an unemployment rate near eight percent). These “foreigners,” heavily dependent on government aid, have contributed to the xenophobia that propelled far-Right parties to surprising successes in local elections in Frankfurt and West Berlin last spring.

Schneider likens the two Germany's to twins separated at birth. "Inevitably, our twins, raised so differently, have developed ambivalent feelings toward each other.

European Salad

Delirium about a "united Europe" has apparently set in as the 12-nation European Economic Community nears its goal of creating a single market by 1992.

In The American Spectator (April 1989), Mark Lilla anticipates the challenges of tossing a European salad:

Just as Europe was never really "Americanized," but simply produced a half dozen home-grown perversions of an imagined American culture, so too it will never be "Europeanized." Young Parisian lawyers can be expected to hunt down jobs in Brussels after '92; Spaniards might start buying more British lamb; and soldiers from Hamburg and Marseilles could even find themselves sitting in the same tank. But the idea of a transnational European culture arising from these exchanges is only put forward seriously by those who have a special interest in believing it, like government arts administrators and Esperantists. If a century of economic integration has not succeeded in making Milanese and Sicilian into Italiani, it is not about to turn Basques and Bavarians into "Europeans."
over 40 years—enmity even.” Their differences can only be mitigated by democratic reforms in the East, not “some utopian
reunification.” The wall, says Schneider, merely “preserves the illusion that the wall is the only thing dividing the Germans.”

El Salvador’s War

Guerrilla war broke out in El Salvador nine years ago, and LeMoyne, a New York Times reporter who has covered the country since 1982, doubts that it will end for at least another decade.

Five reasonably fair elections during the 1980s have improved but not transformed the political landscape. “A tiny urban elite and dominating caste of army officers essentially rule, but do not effectively govern, an illiterate, disease-ridden and frustrated majority of peasants and urban slum-dwellers,” writes LeMoyne. Last March, Alfredo Cristiani, a moderate member of the rightist Nationalist Republican Alliance party (ARENA), won the presidency; he faces the daunting task of reining in right-wing death squads and the 56,000-man army while pursuing economic reforms in a land where unemployment is 50 percent. Human rights abuses are beginning to increase again. Yet, LeMoyne says that Cristiani may surprise some of ARENA’s critics.

The five rebel groups in the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), in LeMoyne’s opinion, make up “the best trained, best-organized and most committed Marxist-Leninist rebel movement ever seen in Latin America.” They have 3,000 to 4,000 fighters, perhaps 50,000 committed supporters, and the sympathy of up to 10 percent of the five million Salvadorans. Little pretense remains that they are not

Getting out the vote in March 1989. “I’m here to protect you,” says the soldier’s pamphlet. But apathy and fear of guerrilla attacks kept half the voters home.
supplied by Cuba and Nicaragua. The rebels have inflicted some $2 billion in damage, nearly canceling out the $3.3 billion in aid (not counting covert grants) provided by Washington during the 1980s. Captured rebel documents show that the FMLN is bent on military victory. It regards participation in peace talks only as war by other means.

U.S.-provided arms and aerial gunships have helped the army force the guerrillas to operate in groups of five to 20 men, rather than company- and battalion-size units, but they remain effective. Combat "regularly occurs within 10 miles of the capital," reports LeMoyne. During the last year, the FMLN has murdered a number of local officials and mayors and issued many death threats—"the first time the rebels have appeared to be as abusive to civilians as the army has." Apparently, the FMLN fears the successes of a new U.S. Agency for International Development program aimed at helping villages directly.

In the long run, LeMoyne says, the odds may be against the rebels. Unlike their predecessors in Nicaragua and Cuba, they cannot conceal their doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist ideology to win broad public support. But unless the Salvadoran government and army can be persuaded to further reform themselves, LeMoyne suggests, it will not matter much for the people of El Salvador which side wins.

Ethiopia’s Cloud-Cuckooland

"The Tragedy of Ethiopia’s Intellectuals” by Forrest D. Colburn, in The Antioch Review (Summer 1989), P.O. Box 148, Yellow Springs, Ohio 45387.

Jubilation swept the campus of Ethiopia’s Addis Ababa University in 1974 when army officers put 81-year-old Emperor Haile Sellassie in a Volkswagen and literally drove him from power. Ethiopian intellectuals abroad, writes Colburn, who teaches at Princeton, hurried home to help with “the construction of socialism.”

During the 1960s and ’70s, the American-backed university had been an intellectual headquarters for the African Left. Many of its best students were sent to the United States and Western Europe. They returned radicalized, adding to the ferment at the campus of 18,000, where the political debates on the steps of the language building never seemed to end.

Fifteen years later, the eucalyptus-shaded main campus slumbers. There are no demonstrations, no debates, no newspapers—no signs of interest at all, Colburn says, in learning or in the daunting problems of this east African state. It is the poorest nation in the world (per capita annual income is $110), it lost a million people to famine in 1986, and has been slowly bled by a long civil war in Eritrea.

In the aftermath of the gentle “revolution” of 1974, the intellectuals fell to sometimes bloody quarreling among themselves and with Major Mengistu Haile-Mariam’s military junta (the Derg). Though committed to the intellectuals’ Ethiopian Socialism—nationalization of industry, collectivization of agriculture—the military was not committed to sharing power. In 1977, it killed hundreds of students and others during the Red Terror.

But Ethiopia’s woes have not bred disillusionment with socialism. "Ethiopia's own experience is dismissed by its intellectuals as an anomaly, one that does not pose many questions for socialist theory," according to Colburn. Many blame the military for the nation’s problems—"we have too many revolutionary slogans and not enough revolutionary deeds," says one professor—yet are embarrassed by their early support for it. Students who can select neither their majors nor their careers feel they have little control over their own destinies, much less the nation’s. And, of course, there is the fear of repression.

Colburn sympathizes with but cannot forgive the abdication of the intellectuals. "If the best and the brightest of Ethiopia are not actively involved in searching for solutions . . . the dismal statistics of malnutrition, disease, environmental disaster, and war are even gloomier."
POTOMAC FEVER*

"Be wary as you plunge into this book... You will, in short, be in grave danger of catching a virulent, if historical, case of the dread fever."
WILLIAM McFEELY

WITNESS TO THE YOUNG REPUBLIC
A Title of the Month Club selection
Benjamin Franklin
Introduction, Donald H. Cole and John J. McCusker

One of the great diaries by a Washington insider personally acquainted with twelve presidents brings to life four tumultuous decades in the nation's capital.

"A shrewd, lively, and most entertaining trip through American life from J. Q. Adams and Jackson to Lincoln and Grant."
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.

"Another marvelous diary of equal value [to] those of Mary Boykin Chesnut, John B. Jones, George Templeton Strong, and Gideon Welles."
JAMES McPHERSON

A Book-of-the-Month Club selection. $39.95

UNIVERSITY PRESS OF New England
Hanover, NH 03755 • 800-421-1561

---

Bargain Books, Publisher's Overstocks

Over 3,500 Titles at up to 80% Off in our Free Catalog

If you love books, you'll really love the low prices in our Bargain Book Catalog. It's free for the asking!

Each issue features over 3,500 books including about 600 new arrivals every month. Choose from recent reprints, overstocks, remainders and imports, from all major publishers. We offer you the biggest selection at the best prices — more bargains than you're likely to find in any bookstore or other catalog.

You could have paid $20, $30, $40 or more for newly-published titles. Just a few months later they can show up in our pages—at only $2.95, $3.95, $4.95!

Books you missed—

Book you never knew existed

Subject areas include Biography, History, Fiction, Art, Literature, Politics, Health, Movies, Nature, Cooking and Gardening and much more... Everything from yesterday's best sellers to titles you never knew existed — most at savings of 50% to 80%!

Fast shipment, fully guaranteed.

We normally ship within 48 hours, and we'll refund your money on any book you return.

Send me your FREE Catalog of Bargain Books

Name

Address

City

State

Zip

HAMILTON
Box 15-187, Falls Village, CT 06031
Dvork, Symphony No. 9
From The New World
Cleveland Orch./Dohnanyi.
London 15666

Vivaldi, Concerto
"Amoroso"
The English Concert/Pinnock.
Arch 25417

Haydn: The Deccas Masters.
Vol. 2 Lullaby.(W.Bing Crosby)
Summertime, more. MCA 00850

Zimmerman: Chopin, The 4
Ballades, Plus Barcarolle &
Fantasia in F Minor. DG 15332

Beethoven, Symphony No. 9
Stamats. London Classical
Players led by Roger Norrington.
Angel 00467

Van Cliburn: Liszt & Grieg.
Piano Concertos The
Philadelphia Orch./Conway.
RCA 00606

Berlioz, Symphonie Fantastique
The Philadelphia Orchestra/Muti.
Angel 54244

The Digital Fox Organist Virgil
Friedman, Synthesizers.
DG 15516

Rachmaninov, Piano
Concerto No. 2; more RCA 00015

Zimek, Janigro, Strauss, Don Quixote;
Perman: French Violin
Concerto. London 25397

Bereski, Janigro, many more.
BMG 15153

Andreas Segovia Plays
Rodrigo: Fuerza & Teresa
Favolas para un Gentilhombre;
Cash Money Spain, more. NCA
53979

Rhapsody In Electric Blue
J. R. Baker, synthesizers.
BMG 03487

Mozart, Overtures Magic Flute,
Marriage Of Figaro, more.
Mannertt conducts. Angel 34267

Digital Juke Box Boston Pops.
Williams. Girl From Ipanema,
more. Philips 25509

Musorgsky, Pictures At An
Exhibition; more Munich
Sym. /Ottow. London 25314

---

The International Preview Society
P.O. Box 91412 - Indianapolis, IN 46291

YES! Please accept my membership in the International Preview Society and send me, for 10 days, FREE examination, the 3 CDs I have indicated below, under the terms of this offer. I may return them after 10 days and owe nothing, or keep them and pay only $1 (shipping/handling added to each shipment). I understand that I'm not obligated to buy anything...ever!

Write Selection Numbers Here:

---

This remarkable $1 CD offer is being made to introduce you to an outstanding classical music membership—with no obligation to buy anything. Whenever you wish, simply by writing to us. Or, remain a member and take advantage of future money-saving bargains.

Substantial savings with our bonus plan.

For every regular purchase you do make, you'll receive bonus certificates good for discounts, up to 50% off. (Shipping/handling added to each shipment.)

3 Compact Discs for just $1!
Begin your membership now by choosing any 3 CDs shown here for just $1 plus shipping and handling. Send no money now. We want you to judge for yourself, judge whether you decide to become a member. If not delighted, return your 3 CDs at the end of 10 days without obligation.

---

Dvorak, Symphony No. 9 (From The New World)
Cleveland Orch./Dohnanyi.
London 15666

Vivaldi, Concerto "Amoroso"
The English Concert/Pinnock.
Arch 25417

Haydn: The Deccas Masters.
Vol. 2 Lullaby (W.Bing Crosby)
Summertime, more. MCA 00850

Zimmerman: Chopin, The 4
Ballades, Plus Barcarolle &
Fantasia in F Minor. DG 15332

Beethoven, Symphony No. 9
Stamats. London Classical
Players led by Roger Norrington.
Angel 00467

Van Cliburn: Liszt & Grieg.
Piano Concertos The
Philadelphia Orch./Conway.
RCA 00606

Berlioz, Symphonie Fantastique
The Philadelphia Orchestra/Muti.
Angel 54244

The Digital Fox Organist Virgil
Friedman, Synthesizers.
DG 15516

Rachmaninov, Piano
Concerto No. 2; more RCA 00015

Zimek, Janigro, Strauss, Don Quixote;
Perman: French Violin
Concerto. London 25397

Bereski, Janigro, many more.
BMG 15153

Andreas Segovia Plays
Rodrigo: Fuerza & Teresa
Favolas para un Gentilhombre;
Cash Money Spain, more. NCA
53979

Rhapsody In Electric Blue
J. R. Baker, synthesizers.
BMG 03487

Mozart, Overtures Magic Flute,
Marriage Of Figaro, more.
Mannertt conducts. Angel 34267

Digital Juke Box Boston Pops.
Williams. Girl From Ipanema,
more. Philips 25509

Musorgsky, Pictures At An
Exhibition; more Munich
Sym./Ottow. London 25314

---

The International Preview Society
P.O. Box 91412 - Indianapolis, IN 46291

YES! Please accept my membership in the International Preview Society and send me, for 10 days, FREE examination, the 3 CDs I have indicated below, under the terms of this offer. I may return them after 10 days and owe nothing, or keep them and pay only $1 (shipping/handling added to each shipment). I understand that I'm not obligated to buy anything...ever!

Write Selection Numbers Here:

---

This remarkable $1 CD offer is being made to introduce you to an outstanding classical music membership—with no obligation to buy anything. Whenever you wish, simply by writing to us. Or, remain a member and take advantage of future money-saving bargains.

Substantial savings with our bonus plan.

For every regular purchase you do make, you'll receive bonus certificates good for discounts, up to 50% off. (Shipping/handling added to each shipment.)

3 Compact Discs for just $1!
Begin your membership now by choosing any 3 CDs shown here for just $1 plus shipping and handling. Send no money now. We want you to judge for yourself, judge whether you decide to become a member. If not delighted, return your 3 CDs at the end of 10 days without obligation.
“Deregulation, Privatization, and Air Travel Safety.”
The Heartland Institute, 634 S. Wabash Rd., Chicago, Ill. 60605. 27 pp. $4.50.
Authors: John Semmens and Dianne Kresich

Has airline travel become unsafe at any price?
Since Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, airline travel has nearly doubled, reaching some 325 billion passenger miles annually. Dozens of new airlines have been created and fares have dropped.

But every fiery airline crash brings fresh charges that safety has suffered. In fact, say Semmens and Kresich, both economists at the Laissez Faire Institute in Arizona, airline safety was improving before deregulation and has continued to get better.

Despite dramatic increases in air traffic, the accident rate has continued to fall by 6 percent per year. Researchers at MIT calculate that “the average person would have to take a flight every day for the next 29,000 years before being involved in a fatal crash.”

True, the authors say, reports of “near collisions” have jumped recently (up 26 percent between 1986 and 1987). But the vast majority of these incidents involve private aircraft, which have not been affected by deregulation. The key to further improvements in air safety, the authors insist, is building more airports—no major new ones have opened since 1973—and separating commercial from general aviation. What stands in the way? The Federal Aviation Administration’s remaining regulations and the red tape of the local governments that build and operate airports.

“Religious Change In America.”
Author: Andrew M. Greeley

“When the Social Science Research Council invited me to prepare this book,” writes Andrew Greeley, “its letter assumed that one of the major tasks of a study of religious indicators over the past half-century would be to document the ‘secularization’ of the American population.”

This study by the University of Arizona sociologist (and Catholic priest and popular novelist) is bound to disappoint the Council. Surveying public opinion data stretching back as far as 1940, Greeley found some changes where none would be expected (a decline in church attendance among Catholics) and little change where much would be expected (no upsurge in Protestant fundamentalist sentiment). But in matters of personal faith, America remains a nation of believers—so much so that many self-proclaimed “nonbelievers” (five percent of the population) regularly pray to, well, something.

Three quarters of Catholics and Protestants (smaller groups could not be accurately surveyed) believe in the divinity of Christ and in an afterlife, the same as during the 1940s. More strongly than even the Irish (not to mention Italians, Germans, and Swedes), Americans believe that “God is important in their lives.”

Catholics account for about 25 percent of the U.S. population, Protestants 65 percent, Jews two percent. The proportion claiming “no affiliation” grew from two percent in 1963 to seven percent in 1980, where it has remained. Greeley expects that number to decline again as the baby-boom generation ages.

Church attendance—40 percent of the population says that it has attended church during the past seven days—is the same as it was in 1939. Yet attendance was once even higher: It peaked at 49 percent in 1958.

What happened? Most of the post-1958 decline occurred among Catholics, Greeley finds, and most of that happened after 1969, when Pope Paul VI issued the famous encyclical, Humanae Vitae, which forbade Catholics to use most forms of birth control. By 1975, the decline had halted. The net effect: not mass defections from the Church but less regular attendance.

Among Protestants, Greeley says, there has been a great game of denominational “musical chairs.” As everybody knows, the “mainline” churches, especially the Methodists and Presbyterians, have lost many members to other denominations, which now claim the loyalty of up to 60
percent of the nation’s Protestants. About one-third of the movers switch when they marry, and others seem to leave because of the involvement of the mainline churches in liberal social and political causes. But only about half of them embrace a literal interpretation of the Bible. Despite the prominence of fundamentalist TV preachers, Greeley believes that most of theseswitchers prefer to leave politics of all kinds behind when they leave the mainline.

Catholics remain more avid church-goers than Protestants. Less than a third of 20-year-old Catholics or Protestants attend church every week; by the time they reach their early forties, 51 percent of the Catholics and 34 percent of the Protestants are no longer staying home to read the Sunday newspaper.

When the collection plate comes around, however, Protestants are more generous than Catholics. During the early 1960s, members of each group gave about $140 annually. By 1984, Protestants were giving $580, Catholics only $320, failing even to match increases in inflation. That costs the Catholic Church in America some $6 billion annually.

This occurred despite a remarkable change in the relative socioeconomic status of the two groups. By the early 1960s, white, non-Hispanic Catholics had achieved virtual parity with comparable Protestants in terms of education and income. Today, they are ahead. During 1980-84, for example, Italian-American Catholics earned an average of $30,321 annually, while Presbyterians earned $27,513. Why haven’t Catholics shared their new wealth with the Church? Greeley blames disaffection with Rome’s teachings on birth control and sex. Indeed, surveys show that Catholics now have more liberal attitudes on matters sexual and social than Protestants do.

With apologies to the Social Science Research Council, Greeley thinks that little has changed beneath the surface. Christians, he says, have “shown remarkable skill in drawing from their faith what they want and need regardless of current organizational and theological fashions among their elites.”

"U.S. Army Guard & Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks."
Authors: Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufman

It is not very fashionable these days to talk about preparations for war. Yet as reliance on the 44-year-old formula of nuclear deterrence in Europe diminishes, the importance of conventional forces increases.

Surveying the capabilities of the U.S. Army, Binkin and Kaufman, both Brookings analysts, are dismayed. Since 1970, and especially since the end of the draft in 1973, Army planners have been relying increasingly on reserve forces—the National Guard and the Army Reserve—that are in fact quite unreliable.

The regular Army (772,000 troops today versus 973,000 in 1964) is now structured so that it can barely fight without reserves. Traditionally, reserves have been used largely as reinforcements. If war broke out in Europe, according to the Congressional Budget Office, reserves would be called upon to provide 42 percent of the Army’s manpower (300,000 men and women) on the European front during the critical first month of fighting.

The federal Army Reserve (602,000 troops) would supply most of the help during the first month, chiefly through combat support services such as supplies, engineering, and maintenance. From the Army National Guard (459,000 members nominally under the control of state governors) would come mostly combat units.

"If history is any guide," the authors write, "the contemporary Army’s unprecedented dependence on the reserves is a risky venture.” Troops called up on several occasions since World War II—during the Korean War, the 1961 Berlin Crisis, and the Vietnam War—have been badly underprepared. Mobilizing the Army reserves has always had significant political repercussions at home and abroad: During the Vietnam War, President Lyndon B. Johnson delayed using the Army Reserve until 1968 (and then summoned only 20,000 troops) because he feared the erosion of domestic political support for the war. And the reservists themselves, with strong political support in Congress and elsewhere in Washington, have often resisted or shaped the character of mobilization.

Such political constraints
were eased only slightly in 1976 when Congress gave the president the power to activate up to 50,000 reservists (since raised to 200,000) without declaring a state of national emergency. Likewise, reserve performance has been improved but remains disappointing. About a third of the units counted on during the first month of war would not be ready; reserve units lack about 30 percent ($17 billion worth) of their authorized equipment.

Reality and rhetoric must both be adjusted, the authors conclude. The reserves need more training and more equipment, and the regular Army must rely on them less.

“The Diverted Dream: Community Colleges and the Promise of Educational Opportunity in America, 1900–1985.”

Authors: Steven Brint and Jerome Karabel

There is no greater testament to this nation’s worship of equality of opportunity than its two-year community colleges. These uniquely American institutions, which now enroll some four million students, including half of the nation’s college freshmen, were born nearly a century ago in response to growing public demand for access to higher education and thus to the American Dream. The age of the self-made man was ending; anybody who wanted to get ahead in the new era of corporate capitalism needed a college education. The community college seemed the perfect solution.

But during the past two decades, write Brint and Karabel, sociologists at Yale and Berkeley, respectively, the nation’s community colleges have been quietly transformed into vocational schools. No longer serving as stepping stones to four-year institutions, they now largely prepare students for work that will limit their opportunities for advancement in American society.

Actually, the authors say, the community college was born illegitimate. The first such institution, Joliet Junior College, was created in 1901 at the behest of William Rainey Harper, president of the University of Chicago. Like many other U.S. university administrators of his day, Harper worried that the growing democratization of higher education would distract top universities from advanced research and graduate training. He even offered students at Chicago an associate’s degree with the hope, he wrote in 1902, that some would “give up college work at the end of the sophomore year.” But he and others saw the independent two-year “junior” college as an even better diversion.

By 1928, there were 248 of them, both publicly and privately run, enrolling some 45,000 students. But “administrators found that to legitimate their institutions, they had to emulate the first two years of a traditional college education,” the authors write. In the popular mind, the two-year schools were “democracy’s colleges,” giving their graduates the chance to move up to more prestigious four-year institutions, and ultimately, to high-paying white-collar and professional jobs. Thus they were called “junior” colleges for the first 70 years of their existence.

Yet at no time since 1901 have more than about one-third of junior-college graduates actually transferred to four-year schools.

Tensions between goals and realities gave rise during the 1920s to a quest among junior-college administrators for a new mission, spearheaded by men like Leonard V. Koos, a professor of education at the University of Minnesota and a popular lecturer at meetings of the American Association of Junior Colleges. According to the authors, Koos and his allies argued that junior colleges “could ‘democratically’ guide less capable students toward their place in society without subjecting them to the ‘ruthless’ but socially necessary elimination awaiting them at the university.” They urged the junior colleges to transform themselves into “terminal” vocational schools for the “semiprofessions,” educating future nurses, insurance agents, shipping department heads, forest rangers, and cafeteria managers.

Junior-college administrators liked the idea. There was only one catch: Students did not. By 1940, 150,000 students were enrolled in junior colleges (10 percent of all undergraduates), but barely a third of them agreed to sign up for the highly-touted “terminal” courses in vocational education.

After World War II the drumbeat for vocational education grew louder, as Wash-
Potomac Fever?

The U.S. House of Representatives, which the Founding Fathers expected to be the government’s most sensitive barometer of public opinion, has instead become something like a faculty of tenured politicians. Last year, despite protests of low pay, 94 percent of its members ran for reelection; 98 percent of those 409 incumbents were returned to office. In a report for the Congressional Research Service, Analyzing Reelection Rates of House Incumbents: 1790–1988, David C. Huckabee finds what is unusual is not the high success rate among incumbents but the percentage of veteran Congressmen seeking another tour of duty in Washington.

Incumbents who have sought reelection apparently have always been relatively successful. More specifically, the proportion of incumbents running for reelection who were returned to office has rarely dropped below 70 percent (only seven times, 1842, 1854, 1862, 1874, 1890, 1894, 1932) and often has exceeded 80 percent (73 out of 100). Incumbent return rates exceeding 90 percent were experienced in the early Congresses (every election from 1790–1810) and since 1968 (except for the post-Watergate 1974 election). Resignations, deaths, and retirements apparently account for much of the difference in return rates for the entire House between the 19th and 20th centuries.

What does appear to have changed over time is the percentage of incumbents seeking reelection. For most of the 19th century, this percentage was in the 60–70 percent range. With the trend towards careerism that emerged in the late 19th century and accelerated in the 20th century, this percentage rose to the 85–95 percent range.

In Washington, big business, foundations, and the higher education establishment joined the crusade. The peculiar mixed agenda of opportunity and elitism remained in place. As Clark Kerr, the architect of the University of California system’s explosive growth during the 1960s, later wrote: “I considered the vast expansion of the community colleges to be the first line of defense for the University of California as an institution of international academic renown.”

Yet junior-college students persisted in seeing themselves as being bound for bigger and better things, and enrollment grew ever larger.

The “great transformation,” Brint and Karabel write, did not occur until the recession-plagued 1970s. Persuaded by exaggerated news media reports that a bachelor’s degree was no longer a ticket to the good life, many junior college students began opting for vocational courses. It was at about this time, the authors add, that the term community college—emphasizing local ties—came into wide use.

Administrators capitalized on the new trend by offering even more vocational courses and aggressively recruiting part-time, adult, and other “marginal” students. Enrollment jumped from 1.6 million students in 1970 to more than 4.5 million at the end of the decade. By then, about 62 percent of the students were enrolled in occupational fields, and only about 15 percent moved on to four-year schools.

Only recently have the costs of the “great transformation” become clear, the authors write. Several studies show that community college graduates wind up, as one might expect, in lower-status and lower-paying jobs than their better-educated peers. But many even fail to find any jobs at all in their chosen fields. Since 1983, total enrollment has dipped, and criticism of some of the community colleges’ marketing excesses—courses in personal awareness and the like—have grown.

Today, the community college faces another crisis of identity, the authors warn. They concede that these institutions must continue to serve what education professionals call a “cooling-out” function: encouraging some students to lower their sights. America generates more ambition for upward mobility than it can possibly satisfy. Yet at the same time, Brint and Karabel believe that community colleges must return to the older ideal of academically oriented democratic education, perhaps preparing only some students to move up the educational ladder, but preparing all of them to be better citizens.
The Islamic World

The West pays attention to the Islamic world when there is a crisis—when hostages are taken, or a bloody jihad is waged, or an ayatollah pronounces a death sentence upon a "blasphemous" novelist. Few Westerners recognize that beneath such headline events lie ancient, tangled conflicts that go to the heart of Islamic faith and civilization, often threatening to divide it.

One such conflict—between worldly and spiritual authority—finds apt expression in the 16th-century Persian painting featured on this page. It depicts an early Muslim caliph, Hisham, who, on his pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca, tried unsuccessfully to touch the shrine of the Ka'ba. The caliph looks on as the crowd parts to allow a holy man, the Imam 'Ali Zaynul-Abidin, to approach and kiss the shrine. The painting implies that the imam is morally and spiritually superior to the caliph—and that this makes him, in principle if not in fact, the rightful leader of the Muslim people.

While the image is a partisan one, reflecting the Shiite view about ultimate authority in this world [see box, p. 60], the painting circles a number of related questions faced by all Muslims throughout their 1400-year-old history: Who is the rightful ruler of an Islamic state? What constitutes a proper state and society under Islam? And, indeed, is there one and only one correct conception of state, society, and leadership under Islam? The questions are far from academic. To many of the one billion Muslims living today, they are often matters of life or death.

Our contributors here offer three approaches to the ongoing Islamic debate. Bernard Lewis considers the evolution of civic and social arrangements in Muslim polities from the time of Muhammad to the present. Some Islamic leaders who today claim to be recreating the community as it was under Muhammad and the early caliphs are, Lewis argues, inventing something quite new. Shaul Bakhash looks at the first 10 years of the Islamic Republic of Iran to show how a fundamentalist theocracy has fared in coping with the problems of everyday governance. Finally, Mahnaz Ispahani, who recently returned from a tour of several Muslim nations, surveys the variety of contemporary Muslim cultures and states. This diversity, she finds, allows many liberal and moderate Muslims to challenge the fundamentalists' notion of a single, orthodox Muslim state without abandoning the vision of unified community of believers.

Each of the articles is opened by a calligraphic rendering of the first line of the Qur'an, "In the Name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate."
Christendom and Islam are in many ways sister civilizations, both drawing on the shared heritage of Jewish revelation and prophesy and Greek philosophy and science, and both nourished by the immemorial traditions of Middle Eastern antiquity. For most of their joint history, they have been locked in combat, in an endless series of attacks and counter-attacks, jihads and crusades, conquests and reconquests. But even in struggle and polemic they reveal their essential kinship and the common features which link them to each other and set them apart from the remoter civilizations of Asia.

As well as resemblances, there are, of course, profound disparities between the two, and these go beyond the obvious differences in dogma and worship. Nowhere are these differences more profound—and more obvious—than in the attitudes of these two religions, and of their authorized exponents, to the relations among government, religion, and society. The founder of Christianity bade his followers “render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things which are God’s”—and for centuries Christianity grew and developed as a religion of the downtrodden, until Caesar himself became a Christian and inaugurated a series of changes by which the new faith captured the Roman Empire and—some would add—was captured by it.

The founder of Islam was his own Constantine and founded his own empire. He did not therefore create—or need to create—a church. The dichotomy of regnum and sacerdotium, so crucial in the history of Western Christendom, had no equivalent in Islam. During Muhammad’s lifetime, the Muslims became at once a political and a religious community, with the Prophet as head of state. As such, he governed a place and a people, dispensed justice, collected taxes, commanded armies, waged war, and made peace. For the first generation of Muslims, whose adventures are the sacred
and salvation history of Islam, there was no protracted testing by persecution, no tradition of resistance to a hostile state power. On the contrary, the state that ruled them was that of Islam, and God's approval of their cause was made clear to them in the form of victory and empire in this world.

In pagan Rome, Caesar was God. For Christians, there is a choice between God and Caesar, and endless generations of Christians have been ensnared in that choice. In Islam, there was no such choice. In the universal Islamic polity as conceived by Muslims, there is no Caesar, but only God, who is the sole sovereign and the sole source of law. Muhammad was his Prophet, who during his lifetime both taught and ruled on God's behalf. When Muhammad died in A.D. 632, his spiritual and prophetic mission, to bring God's book to man, was completed. What remained was the religious mission of spreading God's revelation until finally all the world accepted it. This was to be achieved by extending the authority and thus also the membership of the community which embraced the true faith and upheld God's law.

To provide the necessary cohesion and leadership for this task, a deputy or successor of the Prophet was required. The Arabic word khalifa, the title by which that successor came to be known, combines the two meanings. This was the title adopted by the Prophet's father-in-law and first successor, 'Abü Bakr, whose accession to the leadership of the Islamic community marked the foundation of the great historic institution of the caliphate.

Under the caliphs, the community of Medina, where the Prophet had held sway, grew in a century into a vast empire, and Islam became a world religion. In the experience of the first Muslims, as preserved and recorded for later generations, religious belief and political power were indissolubly associated: The first sanctified the second; the second sustained the first. The late Ayatollah Khomeini once remarked that "Islam is politics or it is nothing." Not all Muslims would go that far, but most would agree that God is concerned with politics, and this belief is confirmed and sustained by the Shari'a, the Holy Law, which deals extensively with the acquisition and exercise of power, the nature of authority, the duties of ruler and subject—in a word, with what we in the West would call constitutional law and political philosophy.

In the Islamic state, as ideally conceived and as it indeed existed from medieval through to Ottoman times almost into the 19th century, there could be no conflict between Pope and Emperor; in classical Middle Eastern Islam, the two mighty powers which these two represented were one and the same, and the caliph was the embodiment of both. As a building, a place of public worship, the Muslim equivalent of the church is the mosque; as an institution, a corporate body with its own hierarchy and laws, there is no church in Islam. For the same reason, there is no priesthood in the true sense of the term, and therefore no prelates or hierarchy, no councils or synods, to define orthodoxy and thus condemn heterodoxy. The ulema, the professional men of religion in the Islamic world, may perhaps be called a clergy in the sociological but certainly not in the theological sense.

Bernard Lewis is professor of Near Eastern Studies (emeritus) at Princeton University and the director of the Annenberg Research Institute in Philadelphia. Born in London, England, he received his A.B. (1936) and Ph.D. (1939) from London University. His books include The Assassins (1967) and The Muslim Discovery of Europe (1982). This essay was presented in August 1989 at a conference on "Europe and Civil Society" at Castle Gandolfo in Italy under the auspices of the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen of Vienna, Austria. Copyright © 1989 by Bernard Lewis.
sense. They receive no ordination, have no parishes, perform no sacraments. There is no priestly mediation between the worshiper and his God, and in early Islam there was no constituted ecclesiastical authority of any kind.

The primary function of the ulema—from a word meaning knowledge—is to uphold and interpret the Holy Law. From late medieval times, something like a parish clergy emerged, ministering to the needs of ordinary people in cities and villages, but these were usually separate from and mistrusted by the ulema, and owed much more to mystical than to dogmatic Islam. In the later Islamic monarchies, in Turkey and Iran, a kind of ecclesiastical hierarchy appeared, but this had no roots in the classical Muslim tradition, and members of these hierarchies never claimed and still less exercised the powers of Christian prelates.

If one may speak of a clergy only in a limited sociological sense in the Islamic world, there is no sense at all in which one can speak of a laity. The very notion of something that is separate or even separable from religious authority, expressed in Christian languages by such terms as lay, temporal, or secular, is totally alien to Islamic thought and practice. It was not until relatively modern times that equivalents for these terms were used in Arabic. They were borrowed from the usage of Arabic-speaking Christians.

Yet, from the days of the Prophet, the Islamic society had a dual character. On the one hand it was a polity—a chieftaincy which successively became a state and an empire. At the same time, it was a religious community, founded by a Prophet and ruled by his deputies who were also his successors.

Christ was crucified, Moses died without entering the Promised Land, and the beliefs and attitudes of their religious followers are still profoundly influenced by the memory of these facts. Muhammad triumphed during his lifetime and died a conqueror and a sovereign. The resulting Muslim attitudes can only have been confirmed by the subsequent history of their religion.

In the West, barbarian but teachable in-

Islamic civilization, as it spread, accommodated and absorbed other cultures. In this 16th-century Mughal painting, Alexander the Great, wearing an Islamic turban, is shown being lowered into the sea in a glass jar.
vaders came to an existing state and religion, the Roman empire and the Christian church. The invaders recognized both and tried to serve their own aims and needs within the existing structures of Roman polity and Christian religion, both using the Latin language. The Muslim Arab invaders who conquered the Middle East and North Africa brought their own faith, with their own scriptures in their own language; they created their own polity, with a new set of laws, a new imperial language, and a new imperial structure, with the caliph as supreme head. This state was defined by Islam, and full membership belonged, alone, to those who professed the dominant faith.

Calligraphic emblem of Suleyman I.

The career of the Prophet Muhammad, in this as in all else the model which all good Muslims seek to emulate, falls into two parts. In the first, during his years in his birthplace Mecca (622–622), he was an opponent of the reigning pagan oligarchy. In the second, after his migration from Mecca to Medina (622–632), he was the head of a state. These two phases in the Prophet’s career, the one of resistance, the other of rule, are both reflected in the Qur’an, where, in different chapters, the believers are enjoined to obey God’s representative and to disobey Pharaoh, the paradigm of the unjust and tyrannical ruler. These two aspects of the Prophet’s life and work inspired two traditions in Islam, the one authoritarian and quietist, the other radical and activist. Both are amply reflected, on the one hand in the development of the tradition, on the other, in the unfolding of events. It was not always easy to determine who was God’s representative and who was Pharaoh; many books were written, and many battles fought, in the attempt. Both traditions can be seen very clearly in the polemics and struggles of our own times.

Between the extremes of quietism and radicalism, there is a pervasive, widely expressed attitude of reserve, even of mistrust, of government. An example is the sharp difference, in medieval times, of popular attitudes towards the qadi, a judge, and the mufti, a jurisconsult in the Holy Law. The qadi, who was appointed by the ruler, is presented in literature and folklore as a venal, even a ridiculous figure; the mufti, established by the recognition of his colleagues and the general population, enjoyed esteem and respect. A recurring theme in biographies of pious men—of which we have hundreds of thousands—is that the hero was offered a government appointment, and refused. The offer establishes his learning and reputation, the refusal his integrity.

Under the Ottoman sultans there was an important change. The qadi gained greatly in power and authority, and even the mufti was integrated into the public chain of authority. But the old attitude of mistrust of government persisted, and is frequently expressed in proverbs, folk tales, and even high literature.

For more than a thousand years, Islam provided the only universally acceptable set of rules and principles for the regulation of public and social life. Even during the period of maximum European influence, in the countries ruled or dominated by European imperial powers as well as in those that remained independent, Islamic politi-
cal notions and attitudes remained a profound and pervasive influence.

In recent years there have been many signs that these notions and attitudes may be returning, albeit in much modified forms, to their previous dominance. There are therefore good reasons to devote a serious study to these ideas, and in particular to how they deal with the relations among government, religion, and society.

The term "civil society" has become very popular in recent years, and is used in a number of different—sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting—senses. It may therefore be useful to examine Islamic perceptions of civility, according to various definitions of that term.

Perhaps the primary meaning of civil, in the Middle East today, is as the converse of military; it is in this sense that civility must begin, before any other is conceivable. This has a special relevance in a place and at a time when the professional officer corps is often both the source and the instrument of power. Understood this way, Islamic society, at the time of its inception and in its early formative years, was unequivocally civil. The Prophet and the early caliphs that followed employed no professional soldiers but relied for military duties on a kind of armed, mostly voluntary militia.

It is not until the second century of the Islamic era (A.D. eighth century) that one can speak, with certitude, of a professional army. The caliph, who in early though not in later times occasionally commanded his armies, was nevertheless a civilian. So too was the wazir, who, under the caliph's authority, was in charge of all branches of the government, both civil and military. The wazir's emblem of office was an inkpot, which was carried before him on ceremonial public occasions. During the later Middle Ages, internal upheavals and external invasions brought about changes which resulted in the militarization of most Islamic regimes. This has persisted to modern times. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, there was an interlude of civilian, more or less constitutional government, mostly on Western models. During the 1950s and after, these civilian regimes, for the most part, came to an end and were replaced by authoritarian governments under ultimate military control.

This is, however, by no means universal. In some countries, including, for example, Saudi Arabia and Morocco, traditional monarchies still maintain a traditional civil order; in others, such as Turkey and, later, Egypt and Pakistan, the military themselves have prepared the way for a return to...
The Prophet Muhammad (570–632) lived only 1400 years ago. Of all the founders of major world religions, he is the closest to us in time. Yet historians have struggled to piece together a complete and accurate biography of the man who Muslims believe is the last prophet in the succession of Abraham. Scarce primary sources include the Qur'an and the Hadith, traditional accounts of Muhammad's words and deeds. Early biographies (8th–9th centuries)—the Sirah (Life) by Ibn Ishaq, the Maghazi (Expeditions) by Al-Waqidi, and the writings of Ibn Sa'd—also remain valuable to scholars.

Muhammad, the son of a respected Quraysh family, was orphaned at six and raised, successively, by his grandfather and uncle. He himself went on to become a successful caravan merchant, and at 25 he married his employer, Khadijah, a wealthy widow (and the first of several wives). Financially secure, Muhammad turned to other, higher matters, and sometime in his late thirties he began to meditate in a hill cave outside of town. Around 610, the faithful believe, he had a vision of the archangel Gabriel, who pronounced Muhammad the "Messenger of God." To his friends and relatives and later to the entire community, Muhammad began to relate messages that he claimed came directly from God.

The central tenet of Muhammad's teachings posed a threat to the polytheistic creed of most of his fellow Arabs: He declared that there was civilian legality. On the whole, the prospects for civilianization at the present time seem to be reasonably good.

In the more generally accepted interpretation of the term civil society, civil is opposed not to religious or to military but to government as such. So construed, the civil society is one in which the springs of organization, initiative, and action come from within the society rather than from above, from the holders of authority, the wielders of power. Islamic precept, as presented by the jurists and theologians, and Islamic practice, as reflected by the historians, offer a variety of sometimes contradictory precedents.

The tradition of private charity, for example, is old and deeply rooted in Islam, and is given legal expression in the institution of waqf. A waqf is a pious endowment in mortmain, consisting of some income-producing property, the proceeds of which are dedicated to a pious purpose—the upkeep of a place of worship, a school, a bathhouse, a soup kitchen, a water fountain, and the like. The donor might be a ruler or government official; he might equally be, and very often was, a private person. Women, who in Islamic law had the right to own and dispose of property, figure prominently among founders of waqfs, sometimes reaching almost half the number: This is perhaps the only area in the traditional Muslim society in which they approach equality with men. By means of the institution of waqf, many services, which in other systems are the principal or sole responsibility of the state, are provided by private initiative. One of the major changes brought by modernizing autocrats in the 19th century was to bring the waqfs under state control. (Several present-day Muslim states, including Egypt, have departments or ministries of waqfs.)

Islamic law, unlike Roman law and its derivatives, does not recognize corporate
only one good and all-powerful God. He also preached about the coming of a Day of Judgment and the existence of Heaven (the Garden) and Hell (the Fire). Islam literally means submission, and Muhammad's faith called on Muslims (those who submit) to acknowledge God's might and majesty and to accept Muhammad as the final prophet.

Muhammad's preaching was, above all, religious, but it also contained a social message that was troubling to some of Mecca's wealthier merchants. By A.D. 616, many of the Quraysh leaders had grown alarmed by the Prophet's success, and Muhammad began coming under verbal and then physical attack. By this time, too, the Prophet's reputation had begun to spread beyond Mecca. During the summer of 620, six pilgrims from Yathrib, an oasis town 250 miles north of Mecca, came to hear the Prophet preach. Impressed, they begged him to return with them to arbitrate among the rival tribes in their own community. In 622, Muhammad and some 70 of his followers moved to Yathrib; the Hijra (migration) marks year one of the Islamic calendar.

Established in Yathrib (which the Muslims renamed al-Madina, the city), Muhammad and his followers soon came into conflict with the pagan oligarchy in Mecca. War broke out and Muhammad's forces, though greatly outnumbered, outfought their foes. Each victory seemed proof of Allah's will, and the Islamic ranks swelled to some 10,000 fighting men. In 630, Muhammad triumphantly returned to Mecca at the head of his army; the city surrendered and many of its inhabitants converted to Islam. Muhammad now ruled as the most powerful political and religious leader in Arabia.

The Prophet, however, had little time to savor his triumph. He died a natural death in 632. Thereafter, a line of caliphs (successors), beginning with Muhammad's faithful lieutenant and father-in-law, 'Abu Bakr, spread the power and faith of Islam. Within little more than a century, Islam had expanded north as far as the Atlas Mountains, east across Persia and central Asia to the borders of India and China, and west across North Africa and into Spain.
French Revolutions.
In time, these ideas were almost universally accepted in Western Christendom. Though few nations, other than France and the United States, accepted a formal constitutional separation of religion and the state, most of them in fact accepted secular principles. This virtually ended the earlier situation which Danish scholar Vilhelm Gronbech spoke of as "a religion which is the soul of society, the obverse of the practical, a living and real religion, the practical relationship of the people to God, soul and eternity, that manifests itself in worship and works as a life-giving power in politics and economics, in crafts and commerce, in ethics as in law. In this sense," he concludes, "the modern state has no religion."

Despite the personal devoutness of great and growing numbers of people, Gronbech is right—the Western democratic state has no religion, and most, even among the devout, see this as a merit, not a defect. They are encouraged in this belief by the example of some states in Central and Eastern Europe, yesterday and today, where the principle of unity and direction was retained but with a shift of stress—religion replaced by ideology, and the church by the single ruling party, with its own hierarchy, synods, inquisition, dogmas, and heresies. In such countries, it was not the state that withered away but the civil society.

In the Islamic world, the dethronement of religion as the organizing principle of society was not attempted until much later and resulted entirely from European influences. It was never really completed and is perhaps now being reversed. Certainly in Iran, organized religion has returned to something like the status which it enjoyed in the medieval world, both Christian and Islamic. Indeed, in some ways—notably in the power of the priesthood and the emergence of a political prelacy—the Iranian theocracy is closer to the Christian than to the classical Islamic model.

During the 14 centuries of Islamic history, there have been many changes. In particular, the long association, sometimes in coexistence, but more often in confrontation, with Christendom, led to the acceptance, in the later Islamic monarchies in Iran and Turkey and their successor states, of patterns of religious organization that might suggest a probably unconscious imitation of Christian ecclesiastical usage. Certainly there is nothing in the classical Islamic past that resembles the more recent offices of the chief mufti of the Ottoman empire or the grand ayatollah of Iran.

These Western influences became more powerful and more important after the French Revolution—the first great movement of ideas in Christendom which was not Christian but was even, in a sense, anti-Christian, and could therefore be considered by Muslim observers with relative detachment. Such earlier movements of ideas in Europe as the Renaissance, the Reformation, or the Enlightenment had no impact whatsoever on the Muslim world, and are virtually unnoticed in contemporary Muslim philosophical and even historical writings. The initial response to the French Revolution was much the same, and the first Muslim comments dismiss it as an internal affair of Christendom, of no interest or concern to Muslims and, more important, offering them no threat.

It was on this last point that they were soon obliged to change their minds. The dissemination of French revolutionary ideas in the Islamic world was not left to chance but was actively promoted by successive French regimes, both by force of arms, and, much more effectively, by translation and publication. The penetration of Western ideas into the Islamic world was greatly accelerated when, from the early 19th century, Muslim students in increasing
numbers were sent to institutions of higher education in France, Italy, and Britain, and later also in other countries. Many of these, on their return home, became carriers of infectious new ideas.

The revolutionaries in France had summarized their ideology in a formula of classical terseness—liberty, equality, fraternity. Some time was to pass before they, and ultimately their disciples elsewhere, came to realize that the first two were mutually exclusive and the third meaningless. Of far greater effect, in the impact of Western ideas on Islam, were two related notions—neither of them originating with the French Revolution, but both of them classically formulated and actively disseminated by its leaders: namely, secularism and nationalism. The one sought to displace religion as the ultimate basis of identity, loyalty, and authority in society; the other provided an alternative.

In the new dispensation, God was to be doubly replaced, both as the source of authority and as the object of worship, by the Nation. Secularism as such had no appeal to Muslims, but an ideology of change and progress, free—as it seemed then—from any taint of a rival religion, offered attractions to 19th-century Muslims who were increasingly aware of the relatively backward and impoverished state of their own society, as contrasted with the wealth and power of Europe. Liberalism and patriotism seemed to be part of the same progressive ideology and were eagerly adopted by young Muslim intellectuals, seeking arguments to criticize and methods to change their own societies. The West European civic patriotism proved to have limited relevance or appeal, but the ethnic nationalism of Central and Eastern Europe had greater relevance to Middle Eastern conditions, and evoked a much more powerful response. According to the old view, the Muslims are one community, subdivided into such nations as the Turks, the Arabs, the Persians, etc. But according to the new, the Arabs are a nation, subdivided into Muslims and Christians, to which some were, for a while, willing to add Jews.

For a time the idea of the secular nation, defined by country, language, culture, and descent, was dominant among the more or
Accepted as the word of God by Muslims, the Qur'an, the holy book of Islam, remains the fundamental source of Islamic doctrine, law, thinking, and teaching. It says to its followers, "You are the best nation ever brought forth to men, bidding to honour, and forbidding dishonour, and believing in God" (III, 106).*

During Muhammad's life, observes historian Marshall Hodgson in *The Venture of Islam* (1974), it "served at once as the inspiration of Muslim life and the commentary on what was done under that inspiration; its message transcended any particular circumstances yet at the same time served as a running guide to the community experiences, often down to seemingly petty details." The Qur'an (literally "recitations") touches on everything from manners—"O believers, do not enter houses other than your houses until you first ask leave and salute the people thereof..." (XXIV, 27)—to the largest questions of spiritual import: "O believers, fear God as He should be feared, and see you do not die, save in surrender" (III, 97).

Scholars distinguish between two main parts of the Qur'an, the whole of which consists of 114 *Suras* (chapters) of varying numbers of *Ayahs* (verses). The early *Suras*, revealed to Muhammad while at Mecca, focus upon ethical and spiritual teachings: "Then he whose deeds weigh heavy in the Balance shall inherit a pleasing life, but he whose deeds weigh light in the Balance shall plunge in the womb of the Pit" (CI, 6). *Suras* revealed later at Medina, however, concern social legislation and the politico-moral principles for constituting and ordering the community. Verses such as "God has promised those of you who believe and do righteous deeds that He will surely make you successors in the land..." (XXIV, 54) point to a concern with the rightful rule.

According to tradition, Muhammad received the verses of the Qur'an at irregular intervals from around A.D. 610 to 632. Many of Muhammad's devout followers memorized the Qur'an, and for a time no comprehensive written collection of the *Suras* existed. After the Prophet's death, and especially after the battle of Yamamah (633), where many who knew the words by heart fell in combat, fear of losing the record of God's word spurred meticulous collection efforts. Several versions resulted. But a desire for consistency led the third caliph, 'Uthmân (ruled 644–656), to order its consolidation, producing the authoritative 'Uthmânic recension now used. 'Uthmân then had all other copies destroyed.

'Uthmân's version, compiled by a handful of learned Muslims, arranges the chapters approximately according to length (except for the opening chapter, longest first). Yet Qur'anic specialists have assembled a rough chronology and identified a handful of recurring themes. The essential message is that there is only one God, Allah, who will judge men by their earthly deeds on the Last Day. Men, therefore, should endeavor to worship God and to act generously in dealings with others.

As Islam became established during the centuries after Muhammad's death, theological and legal questions inevitably arose. What was the correct way for Muslims to pray, to live, to do business, to govern? To deal with such questions, a succession of distinguished theologians and jurists employed three methods: study of the Qur'an; consideration of the precepts and practices of the Prophet, as handed down by tradition; the use of independent reason to apply the first two to problems that arose. (Sunnis, the majority of Muslims, believed that independent reason ceased to be a valid method after the ninth century; Shiites believe that it still is.) The Qur'an remains the ultimate authority to all Muslims, but pious believers have frequently differed over points of interpretation. For example, the Shiites argue that passages on divorce allow temporary marriages for a fixed dower; the Sunnis, however, find no Qur'anic support for such temporary arrangements.

*Qur'anic quotations are from *The Koran Interpreted*, translated by A. J. Arberry (© George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955).
less Westernized minority of political activists. Beginning with the decline and fall of the old Westernized elites in the mid-20th century, and the entry into political life of more authentically popular elements, the ideal of the secular nation came under challenge and in some areas has been decisively defeated.

Nowadays, for the first time in many years, even nationalism itself is under attack and has been denounced by some Muslim writers as divisive and un-Islamic. When Arab nationalists complain that the religious fundamentalists are creating divisions between Muslim and Christian Arabs, the latter respond that the secular nationalists are creating divisions between Arabs and other Muslims and that theirs is the larger and greater offense.

The attack on secularism—seen as an attempt to undermine and supplant the Islamic way of life—has been gathering force and is now a major element in the writings of religious fundamentalists and other similar groups. For these, all the modernizing leaders—Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, the Shah in Iran, Faruq, Nasser, and Sadat alike in Egypt, the Ba'thist rulers of Syria and Iraq, and their equivalents elsewhere—are tarred with the same brush. They are all apostates who have renounced Islam and are trying to impose neo-pagan doctrines and institutions on the Muslim world. Of all the Muslim states, only one, the Turkish republic, has formally declared itself a secular state and legislated, in its constitution, the separation of religion and government. Indonesia, by far the largest Islamic state, includes belief in one God among the basic constitutional principles but does not formally establish Islam. Virtually all the others either proclaim Islam as the state religion or lay down that the laws of the state shall be based on, or inspired by, the holy law of Islam. In fact, many of them had adopted secular legislation, mostly inspired by European models, over a wide range of civil and criminal matters, and it is these laws that are now under strong attack.

This is of particular concern to the two groups which had, in law at least, benefited most from the reforms, namely women and non-Muslims. Hence the phenomenon, paradoxical in Western but not in Muslim eyes, that such conventionally liberal causes as equal rights for women have hitherto been espoused and enforced only by autocratic rulers like Kemal Atatürk in Turkey and Mohamed Reza Shah in Iran. For the latter, this was indeed one of the main grievances of the revolutionaries who overthrew him. It has been remedied under their rule.

Until the recent impact of Western secularist ideas, the idea of a non-religious society as something desirable or even permissible was totally alien to Islam. Other religious dispensations, namely Christianity and Judaism, were tolerable because they were earlier and superseded versions of God’s revelation, of which Islam itself was the final and perfect version, and therefore lived by a form—albeit incomplete and perhaps debased—of God’s law. Those who lacked even this measure of religious guidance were pagans and idolaters, and their society was evil. Any Muslim who sought to join them or imitate them was an apostate.

Some medieval Muslim jurists, confronting a new problem posed by the Christian reconquest, asked whether it was lawful for Muslims to live under non-Muslim rule, and found different answers. According to one view, they might stay, provided that the non-Muslim government allowed them to observe the Muslim religion in all its aspects and to live a full Muslim life; according to another school, no such thing was possible, and Muslims whose homeland was conquered by a non-Muslim ruler were obliged to migrate, as the Prophet did
The harem, no pleasure-den, was simply where women and children lived in a Muslim house.

from pagan Mecca to Medina, and seek a haven in Muslim lands, until in God's good time they were able to return and restore the rule of Islam.

One of the tests of civility is surely tolerance—a willingness to coexist with those who hold and practice other beliefs. John Locke, and most other Westerners, believed that the best way to ensure this was to sever or at least to weaken the bonds between religion and state power. In the past, Muslims never professed any such belief. They did however see a certain form of tolerance as an obligation of the dominant Islamic religion. "There is no compulsion in religion" runs a much quoted verse in the Qur'an, and this was generally interpreted by Muslim jurists and rulers to authorize a limited measure of tolerance for certain specified other religious beliefs, though of course without questioning or compromising the primacy of Islam and the supremacy of the Muslims.

Does this mean that the classical Islamic state was a theocracy? In the sense that Britain today is a monarchy, the answer is certainly yes. That is to say that, in the Muslim conception, God is the true sovereign of the community, the ultimate source of authority, the sole source of legislation. In the first extant Muslim account of the British House of Commons, written by a visitor who went to England at the end of the 18th century, the writer expresses his astonishment at the fate of a people who, unlike the Muslims, did not have a divinely revealed law and were therefore reduced to the pitiable expedient of enacting their own laws. But in the sense of a state ruled by the church or by priests, Islam was not and indeed could not be a theocracy. Classical Islam had no priesthood, no prelates who might rule or even decisively influence those who did. The caliph, who was head of a governing institution that was state and church in one, was himself neither a jurist nor a theologian but a practitioner of the arts of politics and sometimes of war. There are no popes in Islamic history and no political cardinals like Wolsey or Richelieu or Alberoni. The office of ayatollah is a creation of the 19th century; the rule of Khomeini an innovation of the 20th.

In most tests of tolerance, Islam, both in theory and in practice, compares unfavorably with the Western democracies as they have developed during the last two or three centuries, but very favorably with most other Christian and post-Christian societies and regimes. There is nothing in Islamic history to compare with the emancipation, acceptance, and integration of other-believers and non-believers in the West. But equally, there is nothing in Islamic history to compare with the Spanish expulsion of
Jews and Muslims, the Inquisition, the autos-da-fé, the wars of religion, not to speak of more recent crimes of commission and acquiescence. There were occasional persecutions, but they were rare and atypical, and usually of brief duration, related to local and specific circumstances.

Within certain limits and subject to certain restrictions, Islamic governments were willing to tolerate the practice, though not the dissemination, of other revealed, monotheistic religions. They were able to pass an even severer test by tolerating divergent forms of their own. Even polytheists, though condemned by the strict letter of the law to a choice between conversion and enslavement, were in fact tolerated, as Islamic rule spread to most of India. Only the total unbeliever—the agnostic or atheist—was beyond the pale of tolerance, and even this exclusion was usually enforced only when the offense became public and scandalous. The same standard was applied to the tolerance of deviant forms of Islam.

In modern times, Islamic tolerance has been somewhat diminished. After the second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, Islam was a retreating force in the world, and Muslims began to feel threatened by the rise and expansion of the great Christian empires of Eastern and Western Europe. The old easy-going tolerance, resting on an assumption not only of superior religion but also of superior power, was becoming difficult for Muslims to maintain. The threat which Christendom now seemed to be offering to Islam was no longer merely military and political; it was beginning to shake the very structure of Muslim society. Western rulers, and, to a far greater extent, their enthusiastic Muslim disciples and imitators, brought in a whole series of reforms, almost all of them of Western origin or inspiration. These reforms increasingly affected the way Muslims lived in their countries, their cities and villages, and finally in their own homes.

These changes were rightly seen as being of Western origin or inspiration; the non-Muslim minorities, mostly Christian but also Jewish, were often seen, sometimes also rightly, as agents or instruments of these changes. The old pluralistic order, multi-denominational and polyethnic, was breaking down, and the tacit social contract on which it was based was violated on both sides. The Christian minorities, inspired by Western ideas of self-determination, were no longer prepared to accept the tolerated but inferior status accorded to them by the old order, and made new demands—sometimes for equal rights within the nation, sometimes for separate nationhood, sometimes for both at the same time. Muslim majorities, feeling threatened, became unwilling to accord even the traditional measure of tolerance.

By a sad paradox, in some of the semi-secularized nation-states of modern times, the non-Muslim minorities, while enjoying complete equality on paper, in fact have fewer opportunities and face greater dangers than under the old Islamic yet pluralistic order. The present regime in Iran, with its ruling clerics, its executions for blasphemy, its consecrated assassins, represents a new departure in Islamic history. In the present mood, a triumph of militant Islam would be unlikely to bring a return to traditional Islamic tolerance—and even that would no longer be acceptable to minority elements schooled on modern ideas of human, civil, and political rights. The emergence of some form of civil society would therefore seem to offer the best hope for decent coexistence based on mutual respect.
A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

7570: Muhammad born in Mecca.

7610: Muhammad receives first revelation.

613: Muhammad begins preaching notion of single God and other revelations to fellow Meccans.

622: The Hijra. Muhammad and his followers move to Yathrib (Medina).

630: Muhammad captures Mecca.

632: Muhammad dies and is succeeded in Medina by 'Abū Bakr (ruled 632–634).

634: ‘Umar (634–644), former lieutenant of Muhammad, succeeds ‘Abū Bakr as caliph and organizes an Arab empire.

644: ‘Uthmān (644–656), an Umayyad, becomes caliph and continues expansion.

656: First fitna (civil war). ‘Uthmān’s murder. The attempt of Muhammad’s companion ‘Ali to assume the caliphate sparks a five-year civil war.

661: ‘Ali murdered. Umayyad dynasty (661–750) established in Damascus. A pious opposition to Umayyad rule develops, however, and support increases for the claims of the ‘Alids (descendants of Muhammad through ‘Ah). The ‘Alids establish the Fatimid dynasty in Egypt (held to 1171); found Cairo.

1369: Timur (Tamerlane), from Transoxania, conquers most of Islamic world, from Delhi in India to Damascus and Anatolia.

1501: Isma'il defeats Turkmen confederation that rules Persia and proclaims himself Shah, founding the Safavid dynasty and establishing Shiism as religion of the realm.

1517: Ottomans take over Syria and Egypt.

1520: Suleyman becomes sultan of the Ottoman Empire.

1526: Suleyman’s troops defeat Hungary at Battle of Mohács.

1551: Ottomans establish suzerainty over North Africa except Morocco.
1556: Russia conquers and annexes Astrakhan.

1744: House of Sa’ud, a petty emirate in central Arabia, makes alliance with ‘Abd al-Wahhab, a strict fundamentalist leader. Viewing the Ottoman religious establishment as impious, the militant sect gains control of Medina and Mecca and raids religious centers in Iraq, laying the foundation for today’s Saudi Arabian state.

1783: Russia annexes Crimea.

1798: French forces under General Napoleon Bonaparte invade and occupy Egypt.

1801: Allied British and Ottoman forces expel the French, allowing an Ottoman officer, Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha to rule Egypt as viceroy.

1803: British East India Company places Indian Mughal emperor under their “protection.”

1839: The Tanzimat (1839-76), a series of educational and legal reforms, is begun by Sultan Abdülmecid (1839-61) to preserve Ottoman state through modernization.

1868: Khanates of Kokand and Bokhara become Russian protectorates.

1881: Tunisia made a French protectorate.

1882: British occupy Egypt.

1907: Anglo-Russian convention establishes exclusive Anglo-Russian spheres of influence in Iran, Afghanistan, and Tibet.

1908: Young Turk Revolution in Ottoman Empire leads to the transfer of real power from the sultan to parliament.

1914: Ottoman Empire enters World War I allied to Germany.

1917: Balfour Declaration—Britain promises to support establishment of a national home for Jewish people in Palestine.

1918: Arab world partitioned among the European powers following World War I.

1919: Mustafa Kemal, later known as Atatürk (father of the Turks), organizes Turkish resistance to postwar European occupation and partitioning of the Ottoman Empire.

1921: Persian cavalry officer Reza Khan takes control of military in Iran.

1923: Turkish National Assembly declares Turkey a republic and names Atatürk first president.

1925: Reza Khan deposes last Qajar Shah and adopts the title for himself.

1941: Anglo-Russian forces invade Iran, force Reza (Khan) Shah to abdicate to his son, Mohammad Reza Shah.

1947: Pakistan emerges an independent state after the partition of British India.

1948: U.N. partitions Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states. State of Israel is created. Arab neighbors invade but are defeated.

1949: Dutch recognize Indonesian independence.

1951: Libya becomes independent.

1952: Officers led by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser topple Egyptian monarchy.

1954: Anglo-Egyptian Treaty—British troops agree to evacuate Suez Canal zone.

1956: Nasser nationalizes canal zone; Israel, Britain, and France attack Egypt, but U.S. and USSR pressure them into withdrawing.


1962: Algeria wins independence.

1979: Shah of Iran deposed; Ayatollah Khomeini comes to power.

1979: Soviet troops invade Afghanistan.

1980: Iran-Iraq War begins.

1988: Iran-Iraq War ends.


Ever since they made a revolution and seized power 10 years ago, Iran's clerical leaders have considered themselves to be engaged in a unique experiment to create an exemplary Islamic state, based on Islamic law and superior to both capitalism and communism. "We should be a model to the world," Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, former speaker of Iran's Majles, or parliament, said two years ago. "We should be able to present Islam as an alternate model for human society." According to the Chief Justice, Abdol-Karim Musavi-Ardabili, the establishment of a true Islamic state has not been attempted for 14 centuries, not since the Prophet established his exemplary community in seventh-century Arabia.

Other Muslim states today also espouse the concept of Islamicization. But the Iranian experiment is unique. In Egypt, secular leaders may pay lip service to Islamic law, but they run a basically secular state. In the Pakistan of Zia ul-Haq (1977–1988), the soldiers ruled, although Zia banned alcohol, reimposed canonical Islamic punishments, and introduced non-interest banking to win the support of the religious leaders. In Iran, however, it is the clerics who rule. A cleric is the faqih, the supreme leader. Clerics dominate the chief offices of the state, the security agencies, and the judiciary. They and their followers determine and enforce the norms of social morality, of dress, and of female modesty. The clerics are responsible for state ideology. They make the laws, and on the basis of Islamic criteria, senior Islamic jurists judge their acceptability. The very legitimacy of the state is said to derive from the authority vested in the clerics and the vice-regency they enjoy, as heirs to the mantle of the

*Rafsanjani was elected president of Iran on July 28, 1989, eight weeks after Ayatollah Khomeini's death on June 3.
The Islamic World

Prophet. During his lifetime, Ayatollah Khomeini was said to derive his authority as the faqih from this divine mandate.

But the Islamic Republic was also born out of revolution. And it is this combination of religion and revolution, by now so inextricably woven together as to be indistinguishable, that explains the character of the Islamic Republic and of the Islam which its leaders articulate. The interweaving of religion and revolution is reflected in the very names the revolutionaries have chosen to give to the institutions of the revolution: the Foundation of the Disinherited and the Martyrs' Foundation, the revolutionary committees, the Revolutionary Guards, and—a kind of morals police—the Mobile Units of God's Vengeance. It is reflected also in the new names given the great squares and main avenues of Tehran during the post-revolution frenzy of renaming: Freedom Square, Revolution Avenue, and the Square of the Imam of the Age.

Both religious and revolutionary zeal explain the puritanical impulse of the revolution, the social conformity demanded of Iranians in public. In winter, in the ski resorts north of Tehran, men and women must ski on different slopes. Practically speaking, women can no longer swim on the Caspian coast, the playground of the middle class under the Shah. Women may not even appear in bathing suits in their own homes if they can be seen by neighbors. One wealthy Tehran homeowner has shut down his private pool, feeling it unfair for himself and his son to swim when his wife and daughter cannot do so. Women cannot appear unveiled in public. An excessive show of hair or lipstick or a dress too tight around the hips may earn a woman a reprimand or bar her from entry into a store or government office. In periods when the puritanical impulse is running high, a woman even risks arrest and sentencing to a specified number of lashes. Male members of Iran's soccer teams must wear shorts that cover their knees. It required several rulings from Khomeini himself last year to permit light music to be played on the radio, Western entertainment programs and films to be shown on television, and chess to be accepted as a religiously permissible pastime.

For apolitical members of the middle class, the worst of the revolutionary fervor is over. People no longer expect revolutionary committee members unexpectedly to enter homes to search for liquor and playing cards or to round up guests if men and women are mixing at a party in ways considered immodest. Upper-middle-class women wear make-up, more daring clothes, and people drink in the privacy of their own homes. But a lingering fear of the knock on the door remains. A chasm has opened between public and private life. A popular saying in Tehran has it that under the Shah, Iranians prayed in private and drank in public; under the Islamic Repub-
lie, they pray in public and drink in private. France's revolutionaries sent the enemies of the revolution to the guillotine. Iran's revolutionaries have sent thousands before the firing squad for similar counter-revolutionary crimes and "crimes against the people." But the revolutionary courts in Iran have also charged their victims with crimes that revive a dimly-remembered Qur'anic vocabulary. Hundreds were executed for "making war against God" and "spreading corruption on earth"; hundreds more on charges of blasphemy or for being *taghutis*, worshipers of Mammon. Still others were sentenced for sharing in "the crimes of Lot," like inhabitants of a present-day Sodom and Gomorrah.

In the Islamic Republic, as was the case in Paris during the French Revolution, the year is now punctuated by a seemingly endless chain of public festivals (or mourning days) that celebrate and mark religious and revolutionary events and, most often, a combination of both. Iran of the Islamic Republic mourns the martyrdom of Imam Husayn, who died on the plains of Karbala' in the seventh century, on one day; it celebrates the takeover of the American embassy in Tehran and shouts "death to America" on another. On Fridays, the Muslim sabbath, tens of thousands attend Friday prayers in open spaces in cities across the country. The mass Friday prayer meetings are a combination of family outing, communal get-together, and political and religious rally. The government uses the Friday sermons to expound and elaborate on government policy and religious practice, although it is often difficult to tell where one ends and the other begins. The same themes are treated in Friday sermons throughout the country. In Tehran, the sermon is delivered by one of the leading clerics of the regime. Dressed in clerical robes and turban, he delivers the sermon while resting one hand on the barrel of a rifle—a symbol, as he is meant to be, of piety and power, authority deriving from divine sanction and the barrel of a gun.

Like much else, history, too, has been turned upside down. If under the Shah official history was a celebration of monarchy, in the Iran of the ayatollahs the object of celebration is the sacred history of religious resistance to the Shah's supposedly autocratic, impious, and excessively Western-inspired rule. The Shah in 1971 celebrated 2,500 years of monarchy and depicted himself as the latest in a line of illustrious Iranian kings. In the new history books of the Islamic Republic, the kings are denigrated, while turbaned religious teachers, mystics, Islamic jurists, and martyrs for the faith are proclaimed heroes. Under the Shah, Women's Day celebrated the abolition of the veil in 1936. Today, the veil is back with a vengeance, and Women's Day coincides with the birthday of the Prophet's daughter, Fatima, depicted as the symbol of both female modesty and revolutionary commitment.

Some criminal laws of the Islamic Republic apply specifically and only to those who held office under the Shah after June 5, 1962, the day on which Khomeini was first arrested—as if the only modern history that really matters began when the Islamic forces girded themselves to overthrow the Shah's secular state.

The Shah's technocrats discussed public policy in the language of development economics. Today, public discourse and debate...
is usually framed in the vocabulary of Islam. In debating a tax law some years ago, the Majles (about half of whose 270 members were then mullahs) argued whether a tax imposed by the Imam Ali on horses and mules in the seventh century constituted a precedent for income taxes. In 1986, Mehdi Bazargan, Khomeini’s first prime minister, now in the opposition, urged Khomeini in an open letter to make peace with Iraq. He based his argument on the example of peace treaties signed by the Prophet 13 centuries ago; Khomeini, in turn, rejected his suggestion by citing the example of the unrelenting struggle of the Old Testament Prophets against idolatry and unbelief.

Like the French and Russian revolutions, the Iranian Revolution had from the beginning an international dimension, but this too bore an Islamic imprint. In the first year of the revolution, Mohammad Montazeri, one of the younger, militant clerical leaders, and his numerous gun-toting followers insisted on leaving Iran and entering other Islamic countries without passports or visas: Islam, Montazeri said, has no borders. Iran did not initiate the bitter eight-year-old war with Iraq. But once the Iraqis invaded in September 1980, and especially after the tide turned in Iran’s favor two years later, the war, too, was treated as a religious war, of Islam against unbelief. The teenage volunteers of the paramilitary forces—known as the Mobilization of the Disinherited—wore bandanas emblazoned with dedications to the Imam of the Age, whose coming will inaugurate the reign of Truth and Justice. The Iranian offensives were given names that resonated with the great moments of Islamic and Shiite history: Badr, Karbala’, Muharram, Dawn of the New Age.

Iran’s aim, Khomeini said, was to see an Islamic state established at Baghdad—and beyond. The war also became a crusade to restore Muslim rule to the Holy Land. “The road to Jerusalem lies through Baghdad,” was one of the slogans of Iran’s revolutionary armies. The war reinforced the belief that the tide of Iran’s Islamic revolution would sweep the Middle East and the rest of the Islamic world. “Our revolution is not tied to Iran,” Khomeini remarked last year.

During the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, up to one million Iranian women took one month of military training to ready themselves as reserves. Here, a chador-clad “bassidji sister” takes aim.

“The Iranian people’s revolution was the starting point for the great revolution of the Islamic world.”

Iran’s leaders have maintained that Iran will “export” its revolution only by means of example and ideology and not by means of force. In fact, the clerics have not been above sponsoring clandestine opposition groups in other Muslim states and encouraging bombing, assassination, and hostage-taking as a means of extending the reach of the Islamic Republic. But even the export of ideology and Islamic propaganda have exacerbated Iran’s strained relations with
other Muslim states. Khomeini each year encouraged the 150,000 Iranians who made the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca to join in demonstrations to “disavow the unbelievers.” This great gathering of Muslims, he insisted, had a political as well as a religious purpose—to unite Muslims against the “world-devouring” great powers and the autocratic, un-Islamic rulers of Islamic states. He and his lieutenants had no reservations about publicly denouncing other heads of state. It was, they held, an Islamic duty to denounce the wrongdoer.

Iran’s leaders have claimed not only a universal significance for their revolution but also leadership of all Muslims for Khomeini himself. “Today, the Imam [Khomeini] has regency over 50 million Muslims,” Ayatollah Ali Meshgini said last year: “Tomorrow, God willing, he will rule over one billion Muslims.” It was as spiritual leader of the Muslim world, and defender of the interests of the worldwide Islamic community, that Khomeini in February 1989 pronounced a death sentence upon Salman Rushdie, whose book, The Satanic Verses, contained material deemed insulting to Muslims. Rafsanjani made an official visit to the Soviet Union in June, shortly after the Ayatollah’s death, where he addressed Muslim audiences in the Caucasus.

He reported on his return that even Soviet Muslims wept when he mentioned Khomeini’s name.

But ultimately, as Iran’s leaders themselves emphasize, the most powerful message of the Islamic revolution will derive from the exemplary model of the Islamic Republic itself. The eyes of the entire Muslim world, Chief Justice Musavi-Ardabili has said, are on Iran. “Failure for the Islamic Republic,” according to the former president Ali Khamenei, “means failure for Islam.” Iran’s clerics measure their success in part by the degree to which they have succeeded in asserting Iran’s independence, standing up to the great powers, and reaffirming Iran’s Islamic identity in the face of a threatening and alien Western culture. But they also made a revolution in the name of social justice, equality, and prosperity, and their superior ability to manage the economy.

The Iranian revolution was a reaction to excessive signs of Westernization under the Shah. But it was also a reaction among upwardly mobile young men and women to what they rightly or wrongly perceived as inequities not only of wealth and privilege but also of access to jobs, housing, and education.

The revolution did result in a transformation of the ruling classes. The old ruling elite of court and government under the Shah was decimated by execution, purge, forced retirement, and self-imposed exile. The great industrialists and businessmen lost their factories and banks; today they are mostly abroad. In the bazaar, new men with access to the ruling clerics and the valuable import and investment permits that only the government can issue have edged out the old merchant families. Even within the clerical community, middle-rank clerics, hungry for power and ready to espouse a revolutionary agenda, have
edged out the old clerical families and dominate the new regime. Many young men have made their way up through the revolutionary organizations and by way of revolutionary activity to positions of great prominence. Mohammad Ali Raja'i was a street peddler and school teacher before he became prime minister of the Islamic Republic. Another unknown, a member of "the students of the Imam's line" who occupied the American embassy and took American hostages in 1979, became a deputy foreign minister. Khamenei, now Khomeini's successor as supreme leader, was a middling cleric in the provincial capital of Mashhad before the revolution. In the army, senior military command is often in the hands of officers who were lieutenants under the Shah.

The revolution, however, promised material rewards to the masses, not only to members of a new ruling elite and their allies. These promises are embedded in the constitution. They are echoed in revolutionary rhetoric. Members of parliament, Friday prayer leaders, and government officials routinely castigate businessmen as "capitalists," "leeches," and "bloodsuckers." They speak of the working class and of the downtrodden as the true and deserving children of the revolution. On the eve of the 1988 parliamentary elections, Khomeini urged voters to elect deputies devoted to "the Islam of the barefoot people, the Islam of the deprived and the meek," and to reject candidates favoring "capitalist Islam, the Islam of the arrogant... in other words, American-style Islam."

But war, revolutionary turmoil, mismanagement, a swollen and cumbersome state sector, the flight of talent and capital, and plunging oil revenues have played havoc with the economy. Huge cranes still hover; as they did when the Shah was overthrown 10 years ago, over uncompleted apartment and office blocks. The revolutionaries believed they would create a new economy, free of the Western imports, machinery, and technology that the Shah relied on. In fact, they have promoted the same projects—steel, gas, petrochemicals, consumer durables, copper, automobile assembly—as did the Shah.

The choice, then as now, has been dictated by Iranian strengths and realities rather than by servility to the West, as the revolutionaries believed. Even in areas where Iran should excel, progress has been meager. As in other Third World revolutions, the Iranian revolution has created, through expropriation and nationalization, a huge, cumbersome, and inefficient state sector in industry and in other areas of the economy. Productivity is generally down. The government subsidizes basic commodities, but meat, butter, sugar, and tea are all rationed. And even rationed goods are not always available. Middle-class families supplement their needs on the open black market, where supplies exist but are much more expensive. The arrival of a fresh supply of chickens is likely to send housewives and husbands scurrying to the neighborhood grocery. Inflation has been high, unemployment widespread, and housing shortages severe.

Moreover, there has been very little agreement among the senior jurists on the issues of social justice, the role of private business in the economy, and the degree to which, under Islamic law, the state can tamper with private property in order to ensure the more equal distribution of wealth. Over the past three years, the Majles has passed a series of laws touching on these issues. All were struck down by the 12-member Council of Guardians, a body of senior jurists empowered to veto legislation it considers in violation of the constitution or Islamic law. The Council struck down laws that would have permitted the distribution of arable land, the na-
The greatest rift within the Muslim faith originated during the seventh century and remains open to this day. Historian Stephen Humphreys here offers a brief account of the schism:

After the Prophet's death in 632, the majority of the Muslim community in Medina chose as their leader one of Muhammad's oldest companions, 'Abî Bakr. He took a title which emphasized his political functions—Deputy of the Messenger of God ("caliph"). 'Abî Bakr, however, did not claim supreme authority to interpret revelation. God had vouchsafed guidance and salvation to the community of believers as a whole. As the community's plenipotentiary agent, the caliph, Bakr believed, must try to ensure sound faith and conduct among Muslims. But he was in no way to be a final arbiter of religious truth. This point of view (much elaborated during later centuries) became the kernel of Sunni Islam.

A minority, however, rejected both the election of 'Abî Bakr and the frame of mind which underlay it. This group held that Muhammad's closest kinsman by blood and marriage, his cousin and son-in-law 'Ali, had the only rightful claim to leadership over the Muslim community. They also asserted that Muhammad had designated 'Ali as his successor and that 'Ali had religious priority as the first male convert to Islam. Among the partisans of 'Ali (shi'at 'Ali) two ideas quickly took root. First, religious and political authority must be united in one man. Second, leadership must be invested in the descendants of 'Ali himself. In the Shiite view, the essence of leadership was religious authority, and their preferred title for the head of the community, "imam," underlined this point.

Though 'Ali's adherents resented the caliphate of 'Abî Bakr and his first two successors ('Umar and 'Uthmân), they provisionally accepted their rule. But when acute political and social tensions within the community led to revolt (656) and then to the death of 'Uthmân, some of the rebels proclaimed 'Ali as the new...
caliph. ‘Ali, however, never secured his claim to the office. Instead, a bitter but inconclusive struggle with ‘Uthman’s clan (the Umayyad) ended with ‘Ali’s murder in 661 by a third-party extremist. The majority of Muslims now accepted the Umayyads as the heads of the community, albeit with some misgivings. ‘Ali’s partisans refused to accept the situation and undertook a century of struggle to regain the caliphate for his descendants.

In 750, a Shiite-inspired revolt overthrew the Umayyad dynasty, but the new caliphs, though kinsmen of the Prophet, were not descendants of ‘Ali. Once established, they adopted the majoritarian (Sunni) point of view. Toward the end of the eighth century, many elements within the Shiite movement turned away from political activism toward pietism. In these circles the doctrine grew that the imam held supreme religious authority even if he could not wield political power as caliph. Moreover, the imam’s teaching was now held to be divinely guided and thus infallible. By 873, the 12th imam disappeared from human view; his followers (the “Twelvers”) believed that he would ultimately return to institute a reign of justice, but until that time the proper stance was one of watchful waiting and outward submission to the powers that be.

Around 1500 a radical Shiite sect, the Safavids, seized power in Iran. Once in power, the Safavids aligned themselves with the hitherto quiescent Twelver movement and made it the official religion of Iran—a status which it holds to the present day. During the intervening centuries, the Twelver Shiite clergy have often kept their distance from the regime in Iran, but they did not actively oppose monarchy. Only in the late 19th century did certain Iranian religious leaders openly call for limits on royal power, and only during the 1960s and 1970s, largely under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, did they begin to demand the abolition of the monarchy and to assert that the clergy should take a leading political role.

Some 85 to 90 percent of Muslims in the world today regard themselves as Sunnis. The largest Shiite community is that of Iran, but large communities are also found in Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan.

The advocates of a broad interpretation of Islamic law attempted to resolve this impasse by appealing to Khomeini himself, and by seeking from him rulings on matters of property, social justice, and state authority that would allow them to overcome the objections of the Guardianship Council. Occasionally, Khomeini issued such rulings. For example, he declared that the state could collect income taxes in addition to...
the canonically prescribed levies. In a ruling of January last year, he claimed unusually broad authority for the Islamic state. Such a state, he asserted, could suspend agreements or even the primary requirements of Islamic law, if the interests of the Islamic community required it. The broad constructionists latched on to these rulings to claim for Khomeini the right to unquestioned authority as the *faqih*, or supreme jurist. In the absence of the Hidden Imam (see box, p. 60), Khamenei said last year, the rule of the *faqih* is God's rule. "When the supreme jurist issues an order based on the interests of Islam and the society, that order is an order from God, a religious edict." It must, therefore, be carried out.

Khomeini, however, was generally reluctant to issue rulings on specific items of legislation on which the senior clerics and the leadership had been divided. He preferred to propose mechanisms for resolving differences and to leave the difficult decisions to his own quarreling lieutenants. Last year, for example, he appointed a special committee composed of senior jurists of the Council of Guardians and the three branches of government to mediate differences between the Council and the Majles. Earlier, he had suggested that a two-thirds majority vote in the Majles would suffice to establish the necessity for laws appearing to contravene Islamic dictates. But these mechanisms did not resolve parliament's difficulties with the Council of Guardians over matters of property and Islamic law. Khomeini himself subsequently retreated somewhat from his extreme formulation regarding the virtually unlimited authority of the Islamic state.

As late as Khomeini's death on June 3, 1989, many items of controversial legislation were still pending. The major doctrinal issues regarding the application of Islamic law to questions of property and social justice remained unresolved. Khomeini, however, had articulated a fairly clear position on these issues, even if, in the end, he proved unable to win consensus among the senior clerics behind his view. He believed that the preservation and continuity of the Islamic community itself overrode all other considerations, that Islamic law could be applied to the problem of governing modern societies, and that jurists must find in the law solutions to modern-day problems. Shortly before he died, in "a fatherly reminder" to the jurists of the Council of Guardians, Khomeini wrote that the problems of today's world could not be resolved by the hairsplitting theological and legal disputes of the religious seminaries. It was incumbent on the jurists, he said, to show that Islam could resolve complex social, political, and economic problems and administer the affairs of this world. A similar plea was expressed earlier by Chief Justice Musavi-Ardabili, when he argued for "a dynamic and living" jurisprudence that would change with the times.

During the first decade of the revolution, Iran's clerics and leaders argued the seemingly arcane points of Islamic law regarding raisins and hoarding, freedom of contract, and maternity rights. They pursued such matters with energy and conviction because they believed that larger questions of social justice, property rights, and state authority were at stake. Their conflicts over Islamic law are a reminder that, in the Iranian case, revolution and religion go hand in hand. The revolution is constantly being shaped and defined by the Islamic movement that helped to bring it about. Islam—variously defined—remains the ultimate source of legitimacy.
In the glorious days of the Ottoman Empire, it was the exclusive prerogative of the sultan to build a mosque with more than two minarets. But when the Caliph Sultan Ahmed (ruled 1603-17) ordered the Blue Mosque built in Istanbul with six minarets, he was told that the sacred Haram-e-Sharif in Mecca must boast more minarets than any other mosque in the Muslim world, and it had six. Sultan Ahmed promptly commanded that a seventh minaret be added to the mosque in Mecca so that he might fulfill his fantasy in Istanbul. His will was done. The Blue Mosque was built with six minarets within the astonishingly brief span of five years.

Except in the speeches of fundamentalist mythmakers and rabblerousers, the power to exercise such supreme dominion over the entire community of believers, the umma, has long since departed from the Muslim world. Today no aspirant to Muslim power—no ayatollah, no moneyed Arab monarch—can rightly claim the Ottomans' imperial reach.

The Islamic world—including the some 40 nations in which Muslims constitute the majority of the population—is a rich assortment of peoples and cultures. It is united, in fact, only by the prevalence of poverty. Beyond the borders of the desert oil kingdoms, Muslim societies are poor and developing, confined by their lack of political, economic, and military resources. They face the ample, simultaneous difficulties of modernization: sprawling, densely populated cities immobilized by traffic; unceasing migration from the countryside; restless, disease-ridden slums filled with second-generation rural migrants. Visible everywhere is the constancy of construction and the constancy of decay.

The many disorientations of development have provided fertile ground for Mus-
lim fundamentalists, and certainly, during the decade of Khomeini, it was they who came to people the world’s imagination. Yet if we scan Islam’s numerous geographical redoubts we are quickly assured of the diversity of Muslim pasts and patrimonies. Modernists, reformers, secular nationalists, and fundamentalists are everywhere arguing about the proper balance between miracle and reason, between universalism and local culture, between the community and the state in the Muslim world.

Muslim spokesmen of earlier eras of tumult, of the 19th and early 20th centuries, were also preoccupied by these questions. Yet, by and large, they presented a face of Islam far different from that presented by more recent militant fundamentalists. These early spokesmen—including the South Asian educator, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817–98), and the philosopher-poet, Sir Mohammad Iqbal (1876–1938)—were Muslim modernists who argued for reconstructions of Islam’s universal principles, and for the faith’s association with humanism, rationality, doubt, historical reckoning, and scientific advance. It was their successors—Muslim modernists and secular nationalists—who led the fight against Western colonialism. Yet the modernists’ notions of rebellion and their blueprints of economic and social progress were inspired by Western teachers. From Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–70) in Egypt to Mohammed Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) in Pakistan to Sukarno (1901–70) in Indonesia, Muslim nationalists turned what they had learned from the West against their colonizers, or their various Muslim monarchs, and fashioned new societies in their own images.

Secularists took power in Sunni Muslim societies as disparate as Tunisia and Indonesia. But their inheritance is perhaps nowhere more vivid than in modern Turkey. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, known as Atatürk (1881–1938), was a Turkish soldier and secular nationalist who followed the example of earlier Muslim modernists, the Young Ottomans, who had been active during the 1860s and 1870s. On the bones of the Ottoman Empire he set about building a modern Turkish Republic. In 1919, abandoning Istanbul, the city of the caliphs, he made Ankara the capital and turned it firmly toward the West. In 1922, through a resolution of Turkey’s Grand National Assembly, he terminated the Ottoman sultanate; in 1924, the Assembly, on Atatürk’s recommendation, abolished the caliphate and banished the Ottomans. Atatürk based his case before the Assembly on the need “to cleanse and elevate the Islamic faith, by rescuing it from the position of a political instrument, to which it has been accustomed for years.” His dream was fully realized in 1937, when secularism was enshrined as the central tenet of the constitution.

Thousands of miles away and a decade later, in the multi-cultural society of Indonesia, a rural-born engineer named Sukarno led a secular crusade to free his country from Japanese and Dutch imperialists. In 1949, he finally succeeded. Sukarno, too, frequently stressed the need to separate public state from private faith. Today, Indonesia, with 174 million people, only 12 percent of whom publicly profess other faiths, is the largest Muslim country in the world.

In Shiite Iran, however, the quarrel be-

The Mosque of Sultan Ahmed in Istanbul—also known as the Blue Mosque—was built between 1606 and 1611, a remarkable feat of construction even by today's standards.

tween monarchs, modernists, secularists, and revolutionary ulema (clergy) over Islam's role in politics has had a different resolution. The frail Qajar Shahs of the 19th century were succeeded by modernizing monarchs, the Pahlavis. (Echoing the emphasis placed on the pre-Islamic past by many secular leaders of Muslim states, they adopted a name that invoked pre-Islamic memories.) These Shahs tried to strengthen the state's institutions as well as to encroach on the establishments of religion. But some of Iran's Shiite ulema resisted, and partly because they continued to control powerful and independent religious organizations, they were ultimately able to wrest control from the Pahlavi state. Their victory was sealed by Khomeini's revolutionary rise to power in 1979.

By preaching his fiery brand of religious transnationalism, by insisting that "neither East nor West" was his ruler, the Ayatollah transformed Shiite Islam's message into an anti-Western crusade. More than 7,000 people were executed for the glory of the Islamic Revolution, while another half a million Iranians, many of them young men, died in a remorseless eight-year war with Iraq. Nevertheless, Khomeini's message was taken up by radical Islamic movements throughout the world. The example of his revolution encouraged a violent circus of religious zealots, inflammatory mullahs, and transnational terrorists who brandished bombs and held hostages in the name of their Islam.

Radical religious peoples, Shiite and Sunni, placed their stamp on recent Islamic and global politics. They stormed the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. They assassinated Egypt's presi-
dent Anwar Sadat in 1981. They have been participants in the battle over Beirut since 1975. They provoked bloody riots in Algeria in 1988. They recently instigated deadly rioting in India and Pakistan, purportedly to protest the publication of Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*. And in Indonesia, on the islands of Sumbawa and Sumatra, radical Muslim preachers have begun to deliver incendiary sermons.

In Western societies, the turbaned sweep of Khomeini's theocracy revived the dread chimera of a Muslim monolith, nearly one billion strong. The irony is that most Westerners share this image with the fundamentalists. The former fear it; the latter revel in it. To Westerners, it poses the constant threat of terror; to fundamentalists, it is the harbinger of triumph for the umma. This Islamic monolith, however, is mythical. The map of Islam is colored by many cultural particularities. Or, as an eminent Turkish art historian once said to me, there is "no Islam in general."

The diversity of Islam is captured—to take the most pleasing example—by its aesthetics, of which architecture, along with calligraphy, has always been a principal expression. The familiar forms of Islamic design—the dome, the minaret, the calligraphic inscription—are everywhere inflected by radical regional variations. As there is no single Islamic culture, so there is no single Islamic architecture. Urban designs and buildings which fulfill Islamic functions—the palace, the mosque, and the bazaar—are adapted to local materials, customs, climates, levels of knowledge and technology. The mosque, of course, is omnipresent, but even its manifestations are myriad. While Istanbul's skyline is filled with the undulations of Ottoman domes, on Indonesia's islands curved domes vie with an angular geometry more responsive to monsoon rains, revealing an Islamic architecture at enviable ease with complexity.

The Indonesian mosque may be represented by the national Istiqal mosque in Jakarta: Modern, domed and daunting, it was designed (in the spirit of Indonesian tolerance) by a Protestant. But in parts of Java, to complicate matters, there is not a domed mosque in sight. There, mosques conform to the traditional wood "pendopo" style: pavilions with pitched brick or corrugated iron roofs.

In Bangladesh, meanwhile, another major Muslim society of over 100 million people, the fusion of cultures, and of colonialism and modernity—of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, of British rule and American effort—are visible in its sacred and profane structures. Decaying temples and stupas coexist with old mosques built in brick, the common medium of Muslim Bengal. One such mosque, more than 250 years old, today looks out upon the "Raj Video Store" in Old Dhaka. Here, in the world's largest delta, it is the terrible omnipresence of water and of poverty which determines the scale and nature of Islamic construction and decay. Only a few tall 15th-century Sultanate mosques and a few grand 17th-century Mughal forts survive. And even their fragile remains fall prey to the "brick hunters," poor scavengers among the ruins of cultures who dismantle the remnants, stone by stone, to build new shelters.

In such extraordinary diversity, the fundamentalists see a danger: a faith diluted, an umma divided. To them, geography, ethnicity, and nationalism are pernicious obstacles to Islamic unity. Liberal Muslim politicians and thinkers also value the universality of Islamic principles; they, too, venerate revelation, prophecy, and text. And they have worked to unite the umma through such organizations as the Islamic Conference and the Islamic Development Bank. Yet they are not undone by Is-
Islam's diversity. In it, they find a faith enduring. They accept that, unlike religion, cultures and politics have geography.

But wherever he lives, the modern Muslim—and even more so the secular Muslim—stands on precarious ground between fundamentalism and assimilation. While aware of the various intrusions of the West upon his society, the modern Muslim does not see the solution to the difficulties of development in the abandonment of all Western political ideals. He (or she) considers education, pluralism, and democracy as necessary conditions for social progress and is disturbed by encroachments of Islam upon the state. The modernist does not argue, however, that progress depends upon the absence or abandonment of Islam. Instead, he insists, it requires that Islamic history be read dispassionately.

Mohammed Arkoun, an Algerian professor of Islamic history at the Sorbonne, argues that while Muslims need not engage in debates about modernity solely on Western terms, they must abandon their "theological" and "mythical" approaches to history. The failures of Islam must be studied as readily as are their successes. In Karachi, Pakistan, Dr. Akhtar Hamid Khan, a venerated champion of community development, has sharply criticized Muslim myth-makers for aspiring to the wrong goals: Some Muslim leaders, he has said, are still looking for their own Holy Roman Empire. And in Jakarta, Abdur Rahman Wahid, the leader of the 40-million-strong Nahdatul Ulema ("The Awakening of the Ulema"), the largest, rural-based Muslim organization in Indonesia, has openly defended intellectual freedom and the separation of Islam from the state.

In Indonesia, orthodox Islam is strongest in the coastal areas of Kalimantan, Sumatra, and Sulawesi. Yet Java, where the
majority of Indonesians live, is almost recklessly syncretic, its popular traditions enriched by the histories of Buddhism, Hinduism, Kebatinan, local mysticism, and a late-spreading Islam. The island is home to the incomparable Borobudur, the early medieval Hindu-Buddhist shrine to meditation. From its towering gray terraces, hundreds of stone Buddhas gaze calmly across the world. Many Indonesians comfortably carry names which assert the glory of the Mahabharata, an ancient Hindu epic, while delivering their daily prayers to Allah. In Jogjakarta, the cultural capital of Java, the Muslim sultan, Hamengku Buwono X, communes with the area’s most powerful spirit, the Goddess of the Southern Seas. She is said to meditate in one of the sultan’s royal mosques. The ceremonial columns of his keraton, or palace, are colored in the gold of Buddhism, the red of Hinduism, the enscripted black of Islam, and the green of Java. Culture, in Indonesia, conspires to reinforce the state’s efforts to separate itself from the faith.

The powerful Indonesian state enforces Panca Sila, or the five principles—belief in one God, humanitarianism, national unity, social justice, and “democracy through deliberation.” After a fateful encounter with communists in 1965 (in which more than half a million people were killed—many by ardent Muslims—and the Partai Komunis Indonesia was banned), the state has required all its citizens to profess a religion, but any public deviation from the secular ideology of Panca Sila is considered a crime. President Suharto’s New Order government promotes Islamic rituals and funds Muslim schools and mosques, but it prohibits their politicization.

In Turkey, as in Indonesia, it is the military which defends the separation of Islam from politics. Aware of their religious and secular legacies, their Islamic and European heritages, Turks today are also wrestling with questions about the role of Islam in modernity. In the cities, a preoccupation with Europe is still evident. Turkey’s leaders seek a place not merely in Europe’s defense but also in its economic and political systems. On the issue of publication of The Satanic Verses, that most recent yardstick for measuring Muslim adherence to Western standards of rights, Turkey took an ambiguous stand. Although the chief of religious affairs suggested that it would be “preferable” not to publish the book in Turkey, the book was not officially banned. As one Turkish architect put the matter, “How can an aspirant to the European Community ban a book?”

Still, rural Anatolian Turks and Islamic groups are resisting Atatürk’s legacy. To many of them, this is a post-secular era, and Atatürk is yesterday’s man. Over the years, (although the state has kept Islam under its
control), Atatürk’s inheritance has been significantly diluted, in order better to integrate it with the Islam of Turkey’s masses. As an Ankara professional recently said to me, Atatürk has become “an empty fetish.” That may be hyperbole. But Atatürk’s revolution is certainly being challenged. Consider the delicate question of dress. Atatürk forbade the wearing of traditional garb such as the fez and prohibited the turban and other religious clothing outside religious buildings or ceremonies. Turks were quite literally ordered into Western attire. Recently, though, Turkish leaders have become embroiled in a tense controversy with religious radicals (backed by Iran) over whether university women should be permitted to wear turbans, or religious headcoverings, to class. After much national discussion this year, the Turkish courts paid tribute to the resilience of secularism by ruling that such headdress was in violation of the constitution. Echoes of the controversy still linger.

During the 1980s, Islamic fundamentalism also encroached upon the Pakistani state. The contemporary struggle over this society’s Islamic identity goes back to the inchoate conditions of the nation’s founding. The adherents of the mass movement for a separate Muslim homeland during the 1940s were drawn to the idea of leading a Muslim life in a state ruled by Muslims. Yet, the champions of this territorial nationalism were, and could only be, modern or secular Muslims. The founder of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, a Western-educated lawyer, believed in political pluralism, social progress, and the separation of the faith from the state. Shortly after the birth of Pakistan, Land of the Pure, Jinnah made a powerful declaration: “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan…. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State.”

Nevertheless, since 1947, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan’s political history has been riven by battles between Islamic form and Islamic content. To date, neither Pakistan’s politicians nor its ulema have been able to agree upon the definition of an Islamic state. Successive Pakistani constitutions have insisted on the state’s fidelity to Islam, while Pakistani leaders have followed an assortment of interpretations and policies. In May 1959, General Ayub Khan, a military modernizer who ruled Pakistan between 1958 and 1969, said, “The miracle of Islam was that it destroyed idolatry, and the tragedy of Muslims has been that they rendered religion into the form of an idol.” Ayub passed the most progressive family laws in the nation’s history in 1961. They included restrictions on polygamy and child marriage, and they eliminated talaq (divorce solely through repudiation).

Similarly, in his constitution of 1973, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a civilian who ruled Pakistan between 1971 and 1977, declared Islamic Socialism to be his party’s credo. He also prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex. Yet even Bhutto entered into a contest of Islamic one-upmanship with the influential, right-wing religious party, the Jamaat-i-Islami. Bhutto declared the Ahmadis, a controversial Muslim sect, to be non-Muslims. He also prohibited liquor and gambling.

It was not until the age of ayatollahs, however, that a middle-class soldier, General Zia ul-Haq, deftly brought both state and society under the purview of conservative Islam. Reversing the practices of their Turkish and Indonesian counterparts, Pakistan’s soldiers, under Zia, imposed the Shari’a (Islamic law) on the state. Through Islamicization, Zia sought to
Benazir Bhutto listens to the national anthem shortly before being sworn in as Pakistan's prime minister on December 2, 1988. She is the first woman to be elected leader of a Muslim nation.

The map of Islam is more complicated still. It is populated by yet another figure: the fundamentalist-modernizer. Saudi Arabia and the small, dry Arab sheikdoms of the Gulf are, in one sense, divided societies. Saudi monarchs aim to absorb Western technology and expertise and to adopt administrative laws essential to modernization. Meanwhile, in accordance with the puritanical, aggressive reading of Islam given by the 18th-century founder of their Islamic school, Ibn Abdul Wahhab, the Saudi leaders enforce a rigid and punitive social system. (Slavery was not banned until 1962; and to this day no non-Muslim house of worship may be built on Saudi soil.) Yet this closed, “Men Only” society, where women are immobile and unseen, is rapidly modernizing its economy, thanks to Allah’s munificence—oil—and the efforts of outsiders—foreign labor and foreign expertise. Can such a process of compartmentalized change continue, either peacefully or successfully?

The Saudi monarchs, so reliant on Western military prowess, seek, as do their Iranian rivals, to promote their brand of Islam throughout the Muslim world. Saudi Arabia enjoys special influence in poor, economically dependent states like Pakistan and Bangladesh. There the Saudis are commonly said to sponsor their ideological compatriots, religious parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami, which press first for the establishment of Islamic states and eventually for a reunion of the umma. Like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Sunni

unify the nation’s disparate peoples. He asserted the sovereignty of the laws of God over merely secular laws and barred political parties as antithetical to Islam. Significantly, he tried to retire Pakistan’s women from public life. But Zia’s Islamicizing efforts did not produce greater national cohesion. Instead, they aggravated schisms among Muslim sects and created painful uncertainty for women.

Everywhere, while fundamentalists such as Zia seek first to unify nations around Islam and then to rebuild the entire Muslim umma, the history-minded Muslim modernists and secularists see such Islamicizing efforts as causes of violence and national failure. Pakistan’s bloody war of secession in 1971 (which led to the amputation of East Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh) stands as proof that Islam failed to hold together the only modern state that was founded on its behalf.
fundamentalist Jamaatis are activist and anti-modernist. Today, Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi warriors may even be spied on the troubled battlegrounds of Afghanistan, killing, and taking no prisoners, for their faith.

The first concern to such fundamentalists, of course, is legislation pertaining to the family, specifically to women. And here again, they work to undo the accomplishments of the early Muslim modernists, many of whom actively helped to improve the status of Muslim women. Atatürk's secularism went important steps further. Polygamy was abolished in 1924; equality between the sexes in education, employment, and family law was established; and by 1934 Turkish women had the right to vote. During the 1950s and 1960s, most non-Gulf Arab Muslim states passed humane family laws which, among other things, restricted polygamy and the rights of men in divorce.

Yet, today, in order to curtail the role of women in Muslim societies, fundamentalists readily exploit local and traditional notions of honor. Above all, they exploit the attitude that control over women is the source of honor for men. Saudi Arabia's women are entirely banished from the public (that is, the male) realm. And in the urban slums of Pakistan, women leave their homes only in "distress" or to fulfill some urgent economic need. In their rural communities, Pakistani men imprison women through an ancient tactic: reverence. Poor peasant women, who must work unveiled in the fields, are viewed by feudal men as entirely without honor. "Feudals," however, and aspirants to their status—who are always in search of honor—cover their women with veils and surround them with four walls.

The social, economic, and political particularities of the Muslim world sometimes thwart the fundamentalists' best efforts to keep women enclosed. In Bangladesh, it is the overwhelming fact of poverty that breaks Islamic strictures unmodified by history. In the cities, Bengali women with their wretched limbs exposed sit under charred umbrellas in the noontday sun, spending day after long day crushing bricks to earn a living.

In Pakistan, General Zia passed Islamic laws injurious to women, including the Offense of Zia (Adultery) Act of 1979, which blurred distinctions between adultery and rape and prescribed flogging for the "crime." And while he built 7,500 mosque schools, he made no efforts to increase education for women. Yet only a few months after the General's sudden death in August 1988, Pakistan's people, in a unique historical act, elected a young woman, Benazir Bhutto, to become the first woman to lead a Muslim nation in modern Islamic history.

South Asian cultures have been sympathetic to the daughters and wives of their political aristocracies: Srimavo Bandaranaike governed Sri Lanka (1960-1965, 1970-1977) after the death of her husband; Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter, ruled India with a powerful hand (1967-1977, 1980-1984). In voting Benazir Bhutto into office, Pakistanis overrode the admonitions of the fundamentalist Jamaat and its allies that, under the laws of Islam, a woman cannot legitimately govern a Muslim state. When I asked her how she might explain her rise to power, Benazir Bhutto pointed to the fact that in Pakistan "while there may be tremendous exploitation of women on one level, on another level there is tremendous respect for women. Heaven lies at the foot of the mother, and sisters are to be venerated, protected...."

Meanwhile, Indonesia's syncretic culture allows its young Muslim women, with their heads properly wrapped in Islamic fashion, to convey themselves about town on motorbikes. Inside the mosques of Java, women pray—an uncommon sight in the
THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Gulf Arab states, or even in Pakistan. In Turkey, an unlikely quarrel between generations of women has erupted. There, women brought up during the heyday of Atatürk’s reforms protest against their own daughters (or granddaughters) who seek increasingly public demonstrations of Islamic ritual. Recently, the middle-aged mother of a Turkish friend of mine, a devout Muslim resident of Istanbul who prays daily and dislikes demonstrations, marched in protest against the wearing of turbans by her daughter’s generation. Across the Islamic world, such conflicts between the claims of religion and those of culture, secular politics, and economics abound.

Still, it is important to remember that we are living in a time when fundamentalists increasingly define the terms of the Islamic debate. Benazir Bhutto’s opposition clamors for the full institution of Zia’s legacy: Islamic laws. She is hampered in argument by her sex. Her head and body covered, she has not yet dared to alter the direction of Pakistan’s social policies or to right the juridical wrongs inflicted upon women by General Zia ul-Haq’s Islamicizing regime.

Today Muslims in every corner of the world are quarreling about readings of history. In Turkey, for instance, the debate over historical interpretation between Muslim fundamentalists and Muslim secularists has emerged in contests for the control over monuments and their meaning. In which civilization’s image, for example, should one know the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul? Born of Justinian’s vision and will in the sixth century, this church once spoke of the magnificent capacities of the Byzantines. Its massive dome was inimitable for 500 years, the obsession of generations of Ottoman master builders. (Ottoman efforts to match this great dome may be seen in the mosque of Süleyman the Magnificent.) When he took Constantinople in 1453, Mehmet II transformed the Hagia Sophia into a central mosque of the Ottoman Empire. (It is said that he prayed there the night after he took the city—an act at once astute and symbolic.) Centuries later, on his secularizing crusade, Atatürk banished the Ottoman sultan and ordered the mosque stripped of its earlier religious symbolism: In modern Turkey it is a museum. But today Islamic fundamentalists are agitating for its restoration to a functioning national mosque. Muslims, like all peoples with great memories, are finding that history starts as many debates as it resolves.
The Islamic World

As recently as 15 years ago, no serious student of social and political change in the Middle East, North Africa, or South and Southeast Asia paid much attention to Islam. It was obviously the religion professed by the overwhelming majority of the populations in many nations of these regions, and no doubt it had once provided the framework of ideas and sentiments through which Muslims interpreted their own actions and institutions. But that was history. As an ideology in the modern world, Islam could hardly compete with such juggernauts as nationalism and Marxism.

By 1980 scholarly fashions had changed beyond recognition. Every commentator on these regions was now compelled to come to grips with Islam as a powerful, indeed transforming, political force. Perhaps the pendulum has even swung a bit too far. Islam has certainly held its own against competing ideologies in these areas, but except in Iran (and for wholly different reasons, in Saudi Arabia) it has not yet driven its rivals from the field. But Islam undeniably holds a privileged place in nations as geographically and culturally distinct as Morocco and Indonesia; eras of crisis always evoke a deeply felt need to reconstitute society and government on an authentically Islamic foundation—to strive to re-enact in the present generation what the Prophet and his companions so gloriously achieved 14 centuries ago.

The most ambitious effort to convey the interpenetration of Islam and society is by the late University of Chicago historian M. G. S. Hodgson in The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization (3 vols., Univ. of Chicago, 1974). Hodgson's style is dense and prolix, and his chapters on economic life and social structure are seriously outdated. Even so, his grasp of the complex impact of Islam is unique, as is his own involvement with his subject. I. M. Lapidus, in A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge, 1988), offers an intelligent, clear, and wide-ranging synthesis of current scholarship. Like Hodgson, the University of California historian tries to deal with the whole world of Islam, from West Africa to Southeast Asia. But his focus on broad structures and processes leads to a somewhat impersonal presentation. One gains a much less vivid sense than with Hodgson of what was at stake for these people.

Both Hodgson and Lapidus write narrative history on a vast scale. In his concise but formidably erudite essay, The Political Language of Islam (Univ. of Chicago, 1988), Bernard Lewis explicates the social and political vocabulary—much though not all of it firmly rooted in revelation—used by Muslims throughout their history. When, as here, individual terms such as "umma" (the community of believers) and "sultan" (used in earlier periods as "government" and in later times as "authority") become the focus of discussion, they tend to take on a life of their own, as if concepts and attitudes were caused rather than symbolized by words. But altogether Lewis is both perceptive and challenging.

Since Islam was from the beginning not only a system of belief but a framework for political and social action, a knowledge of origins is essential. F. M. Donner, in The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton, 1981), shows how a tribal society in Arabia became the core of a world empire: "The formulation of the umma, the concept of an overriding higher authority, and the strong tendency toward centralization of that authority provided powerful ideological underpinning for the rise of state institutions hitherto unknown in the region."

Donner's interpretation has found wide acceptance, but its assumptions have been sharply attacked by some, most notably by the Danish Islamicist Patricia Crone. In God's Caliph (Cambridge, 1986), she and Martin Hinds propose a radical revision of established views about the relationship between religion and state in the early caliphate. Their view—that for almost two centuries the caliph claimed a nearly inspired authority to define Islamic doctrine—is extremely controversial, but it cannot be ignored.

During the long period between 900 and 1300, Muslims increasingly felt that religion and state had become divorced; the claims of most rulers to be God-fearing were dismissed.
as rank hypocrisy. Even so, the profound hope that political life might somehow be redeemed was not lost. Our modern understanding of these issues is based on a series of articles which the Scottish-born scholar H. A. R. Gibb devoted to Sunni political theory. Although some of these date back half a century, they have retained much of their value; a number of them are collected in Gibb’s *Studies on the Civilization of Islam* (Routledge, 1962).

The political tradition of medieval Iran, rooted partly in ancient notions of kingship and partly in Islamic constitutional thought, is discussed by A. K. S. Lambton, professor of Persian at the University of London, in *Theory and Practice in Medieval Persian Government* (Variorum, 1980). Perhaps the best introduction to Perso-Islamic thought, however, is an 11th-century treatise by the vizier Nizam al-Mulk, *The Book of Government, or Rules for Kings* (trans. by Hubert Darke, Routledge, 1978)—a powerful and uncompromising statement of royal absolutism, in which Islam’s proper role is reduced to legitimizing and reinforcing submission to kingly authority.

It can be argued that the Ottoman Empire was the most deeply Islamicized of Islamic regimes, the one which strove most earnestly to harmonize royal autocracy and Islamic law. By far the best analysis of the institutional and ideological foundations of this durable polity is Turkish historian Halil Inalcik’s *Ottoman Empire: the Classical Age, 1300–1600* (Weidenfeld 1973).

Its chief rival, the Safavid kingdom in Iran, originated as a millenarian Shiite movement. As the Safavids consolidated their power after 1500, however, they turned to a more moderate version of Shiism (the Ithna ’ashari or “Twelver” branch) and established it as the official religion of Iran. Shiite political thought was long the stepchild of Islamic studies, but the tumultuous events of 1978–79 in Iran demonstrated its relevance. A good introduction to the subject can be found in two collections of articles: S. A. Arjomand’s *Authority and Political Culture in Shiism* (State University of New York, 1988); and Nikki R. Keddie’s *Religion and Politics in Iran* (Yale, 1983). Both volumes discuss medieval and Safavid Shiism, but inevitably they focus on contemporary ideas. These not only inspired a political revolution but also reflect a profound ideological ferment within Shiism itself.

Although the Ottoman government appealed to Islamic principles and loyalties down to the very end, specifically Islamic concepts played a declining role (though they were certainly never absent) among the intellectual elite of the empire from the 1820s on. The classic account of this transformation is Bernard Lewis’s *Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford, 1961), which brings the story down to 1950. Lewis has been criticized on several grounds—notably his narrowly Istanbul-centered view of political and ideological change and his identification of progress with secularization—but his work remains indispensable. For the Arab provinces (and eventual successor states) of the Ottoman Empire, we have Albert Hourani’s *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939* (Oxford, 1962; Cambridge, 1983, with a new preface), a superb overview whose elegant style complements its massive erudition and precision of thought. Perhaps Hourani’s analysis assigns too marginal a role to Islam, but we must recall that until very recently the secularizers
and Europeanists seemed to have the upper hand. Like Lewis's Emergence, it is a book of enduring value.

Disillusionment with European ideologies of whatever stamp and a renewed search for Islamic authenticity are signaled in The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967 (Cambridge, 1981) by Fouad Ajami of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Ajami does not subscribe to the Islamic movement, but he understands its appeal and its roots in political, social, and economic frustration. The Islamic critique of contemporary society in Egypt and Syria is astutely analyzed in Emmanuel Sivan's Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics (Yale, 1985). Sivan, an Israeli scholar, correctly locates the radical impulse in the fear that Islam is in danger of extinction before the onslaught of modernity. The political struggle of Egypt's Islamic groups, culminating in the assassination of Sadat, is vividly portrayed in French political scientist Gilles Kepel's Muslim Extremism in Egypt: the Prophet and Pharaoh (California, 1985). It is worth recalling that in spite of intense socio-economic frustration and deep popular commitment to Islam, Egypt has not (so far at least) had an Islamic revolution. Kepel shows us that Egypt's fundamentalists failed to understand that the Egyptian masses "had not radically broken with the values of the Egyptian nation as such, values of which Islam is the most important, but not the sole, component."

The collapse of the Iranian monarchy in 1978–79 astonished Iranians no less than everyone else, and the success of the clergy in seizing and retaining power made fools of many wise men. Shiite doctrine and ideology are surveyed in the volumes by Arjomand and Keddie mentioned above. The best political analysis of the establishment of the Islamic Republic is Shaul Bakhsh's, The Reign of the Ayatollahs (Basic, 1984), though one might fault his focus in the middle chapters on the hapless President Bani-Sadr rather than the leaders of the Islamic Republican Party.

A bold attempt to portray the frame of mind of the Iranian clergy is Harvard historian R. P. Mottahedeh's The Mantle of the Prophet (Simon and Schuster, 1985). The author uses the biography (slightly fictionalized) of a Shiite mullah to explore the cultural and intellectual roots of modern Iran. Mottahedeh writes with a novelist's touch. At one point, for example, he recreates an episode from his mullah's childhood: "These 20 or so words in Arabic [from the Qur'an] seemed to enter Ali almost at once, but when he recited them back to his father two days later, for the Arabic word samad, 'Eternal,' he said shamad, the Persian word for 'mosquito netting.' 'Dear son, if you have to speak Persian instead of Arabic in your prayers, at least compare God to something more substantial like namad [felt], which is a little stronger and more solid than mosquito netting.'" Mottahedeh's narrative is a bit dizzying in places, but on balance his is the one book on contemporary Iran that must be read.

Finally, we should call attention to the recent book by Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism: a Critique of Development Ideologies (Univ. of Chicago, 1988). Binder is demanding of his readers, but he squarely addresses a crucial question: What are the prospects for the creation of a liberal political order in the Middle East, and what role (positive or negative) may Islam play in this process?

—R. Stephen Humphreys
Professor of Middle Eastern
and Islamic History
University of Wisconsin-Madison
During the past decade, critics and educational specialists have come up with scores of reasons for the decline of America's public schools. High on the list of culprits stands the philosopher John Dewey (1859–1952). Conservatives, now as before, fault him for undermining the teacher's authority and slighting traditional subjects. Many liberals, too, have lamented his influence. They find his faith in science and “doing” disturbingly attuned to the American materialist ethos. Here, historian John Diggins locates Dewey in his times and among his fellow pragmatist philosophers to identify a major American thinker—one whose ideas continue to shape beliefs about the ends and means of education.

by John Patrick Diggins

It is either celebrated or conceded that John Dewey is the most influential American philosopher of the 20th century. No other philosopher in this century, Richard Rorty has observed, so freed philosophy from its age-old metaphysical concerns and made it apply directly to so many areas of daily activity.

Dewey’s activism, along with his towering reputation, has also made him the country’s most controversial thinker and educator. While his disciples hail him for placing philosophy on a scientific foundation and saving America's children from boredom, his detractors criticize him for severing philosophy from morality and undermining all authority in the classroom.

The man who would transform the fields of philosophy and education looked like neither an abstract thinker nor a rebellious teacher. With erect, almost stiff posture, matted-down light hair, plain spectacles, drooping mustache, and starched collar, Dewey looked more like a Victorian businessman from the Midwest than a theoretician of metaphysics and a political activist. But in habit if not in appearance, he was the proverbial absent-minded professor. According to Max Eastman, who was his teaching assistant at Columbia University in the pre-World War I years, Dewey on one occasion left the campus and was walking with a colleague when a young lad rushed up to him and asked for a nickel. Dewey gave the boy the coin and, walking away, wondered aloud what the world was coming to that children could go begging in the streets. “John,” replied the colleague, “that was your son!”

Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont, in 1859, the year that Charles Darwin’s *Origin of Species* was published. Like
many other Victorians, Dewey in his youth was torn between the claims of science and religion. His mother, a devout Congregationalist, was forever asking Dewey and his two brothers, even in the presence of others, if they were “right with Jesus.” The energetic Lucina Dewey, who taught her sons their daily prayers and took them to Sunday services, created a strenuous and demanding religious environment. Dewey never questioned the teachings of Burlington’s White Street Congregational Church. He did wonder, however, about the “routine performances” of prayer and sermon even while becoming a Sunday-school teacher himself. Not until his junior year at the University of Vermont (1877–78) did he experience what might be called a spiritual crisis or turning point. Taking a course in physiology with a text written by the English scientist Thomas Henry Huxley (Elements of Physiology), Dewey encountered Darwin’s disciple, then struggling to liberate the theory of evolution from the “impregnable rock” of Holy Scripture. Suddenly awakened by the scientific account of man’s brain and body, Dewey also became interested in the work of the 19th-century positivists Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer. Soon he found himself in a world altogether different from the one he had learned about during his Sunday-school years.

The rapture of scientific knowledge did not turn Dewey into a village agnostic. He was far from convinced that material reality is all there is and all one needs to know. He retained his older religious moralism regarding character and will, even though he could hardly dispute Huxley’s account of material forces shaping behavior. The terrible tension between science and religion, between new knowledge about scientific reality and an older faith, remained deeply embedded in the psyche of the mild, shy, self-conscious youth. In the early 1880s, while teaching high-school in Oil City, Pennsylvania, and while struggling with the conflicting authorities of religion and science, he had his one experience with the awful unknown. As he sat reading one evening, the gnawing doubt again arose whether he really meant business when he prayed. It was not, he later recollected, “a very dramatic mystic experience.” There was no vision, not even a definable emotion—just a supremely blissful feeling that his worries were over.

Dewey somehow managed to conclude that all his anxieties about spirit and matter were an illusion. What is here is here; the supernatural and transcendent are part of the immediate given, and the finite and natural world can be known and trusted. Freed of the pains of spiritual disquietude, Dewey exclaimed: “I’ve never
had any doubts since then, nor any beliefs." Despite his professions of tranquility, the memory of old-fashioned religious authority continued to weigh upon him. In an autobiographical sketch written when he was 60, Dewey referred to an "inward laceration" inflicted upon him by the conflict between scientific truth and revealed dogma. He had once been overwhelmed, he recalled, by the "sense of divisions and separations that were, I supposed, borne upon me as a consequence of a heritage of New England culture, divisions by way of isolation of self from the world, of soul from body, of nature from God." The chasm between empirical science and moral philosophy became an obsession; he would later remark that he devoted his entire intellectual life to its solution.

While teaching high school, Dewey took private tutorials in philosophy from his old college professor, H. A. P. Torrey. In September of 1882, with the encouragement of Torrey and W. T. Harris, editor of the prestigious *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, Dewey entered the graduate program at Johns Hopkins. The fellowship committee at Johns Hopkins, which was founded just six years before Dewey enrolled, deserves no credit for discernment. Both Dewey and Thorstein Veblen were refused aid when they applied for admission. But Dewey borrowed $500 from an aunt to launch his career as a professional philosopher.

Teaching philosophy at the University of Michigan a few years later, Dewey and a colleague, George Herbert Mead, began to feel that their discipline should be less speculative and more involved with the practical aspects of daily life.

When Dewey became the chairman of the philosophy department at the University of Chicago in 1894, he began to see some of the uglier realities of urban life with his own eyes. He participated in the tenement reform projects of Jane Addams and Hull House and came to know the world of immigrant workers, union organizers, and social activists. He also founded the exciting laboratory experiment known as "the Dewey School," where he and his assistants worked out psychological and pedagogical hypotheses to be tested under controlled classroom conditions. But Dewey's off-campus involvements led to conflict with the university administration, and in 1904 he left Chicago for Columbia University, where he remained until his retirement in 1930.

Even after retiring, Dewey continued to involve himself in public affairs as well as scholarship. Traveling abroad, he reported for the *New Republic* and other magazines on conditions in China, Turkey, Mexico, and the Soviet Union. In 1937 he earned the wrath of the American Communists by agreeing to head the commission to hold a "counter-trial" on Leon Trotsky; the publication of the commission's findings, *Not Guilty* (1938), cleared Trotsky of the accusations that were leveled during Stalin's purge trials. In 1940, Dewey defended Bertrand Russell, a leading critic of his own philosophy, when the English philosopher had been denied permission to teach at the City College of New York because of his views on free love. Although Dewey opposed America's entry into the Second World War, and thereby lost some standing in intellectual circles, he remained active during the post-war years.

Right to its end, Dewey's life reads like an endorsement of his forge-ahead pragmatism. In 1927 his beloved wife of 40 years, Harriet Alice Chipman Dewey, with whom he had had six children, died. In 1946, at the age of 87, he remarried a 42-year-old woman, Roberta Lowitz Grant, and shortly afterwards they adopted two young Belgian war-orphans and became an affectionately closely-knit family. When he died in 1952, at the age of 92, he was still at work on scholarly articles in philosophy.

Pragmatism, the school of thought that Dewey espoused, is America's one original
contribution to the world of philosophy. During the late 19th century, Charles Sanders Peirce both named and defined it. William James, a more accessible writer than Dewey, did much to popularize the new philosophy throughout the country and in Europe. But it was Dewey who carried the philosophy well into the 20th century. And it was Dewey who applied it to various aspects of modern thought and life.

Pragmatism is essential to understanding the late 19th century because it represents one of the most successful attempts to resolve a major intellectual crisis of the era. The crisis involved the collapse of accepted theories of truth. Most philosophers, though debating various fine points, had agreed that truth was either what corresponded to or what cohered with the order of objectively existing reality.

These theories of truth became untenable after Darwin. Reality no longer seemed orderly; the human mind no longer capable of representing it. Dewey's accomplishment was to find a solution to the crisis of faith caused by Darwinism. He did so by tempering the English naturalist's ideas with those of the German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831). From Darwin, Dewey learned that man was not distinct from nature but part of the evolutionary process. Employing this Darwinian view of man, Dewey worked out a new pragmatic theory of truth that described the human mind as interacting with the contingencies of an unstable, ever-evolving nature. From Hegel, Dewey took the notion that reality is contradictory and that conflicts are fruitful collisions yielding higher syntheses.

Dewey's synthesis of Hegel and Darwinism allowed him to argue that thought comes into existence neither to cohere nor to correspond with reality. Instead, he concluded, thought seeks to change reality, and truth is that which is brought into existence. It is what happens to an idea or hypothesis when it is acted upon, tested, and verified. In a word, truth is made, and its meaning lies in its consequences and its value in its usefulness. Truth as utility: Nothing could sound more American.

Dewey's redefinition of truth as experimental and activist was bound to irritate many of his fellow philosophers. Arthur O. Lovejoy, George Santayana, and Bertrand Russell all believed that pragmatism simply confused truth with the process of its verification.

Equally vulnerable was Dewey's ethical theory, which purported to make morality a scientific proposition. Dewey believed that all judgments could be submitted to a community of scientific inquirers who, by using reflective intelligence, would enable society to move from fact to value, from "is" to "ought." But the chasm between science and morality that he sought to bridge since his days as a teacher remained as wide as ever to many intellectuals unpersuaded by pragmatic formulations.

The publication of three major treatises during the 1920s brought Dewey international recognition. Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), Experience and Nature (1925), and The Quest for Certainty (1929) all applied his "experimental methods of science" to ever-widening areas of thought and daily practice—logic, psychology, education, social philosophy, fine arts, religion, and politics as well as to the analysis of current events. Practitioners beyond the academy found the philosopher's ideas useful. During the 1920s, the famous art collector Albert C. Barnes set up the Barnes Foundation to apply Dewey's ideas to the study of painting. In the realm of law, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., applied pragmatism's gauge of utility to legal interpretation. Holmes found Dewey's philosophy "profound and illuminating." Dewey's language was a different matter. Writing to Harold J. Laski, the British Labour Party leader, Holmes complained that Dewey's prose was so dense that it read as though God had set out to explain the world to man and had become inarticulate.

Yet, for all his wide-ranging vigor, Dewey today would be remembered only by professional philosophers were it not for his ideas about education. In no other sphere of American culture did he enjoy more influence. For almost the entire first half of the 20th century, his ideas prevailed in many public and private schools, transforming older formal systems of instruction, reshaping the outlook of students and teachers alike. Even critics who found pragmatism a deficient intellectual diet or
JOHN DEWEY

rejected Dewey's liberal politics conceded that he rescued learning from the drudgery of the starched-collared pedagogue. "John Dewey," wrote Max Eastman, the controversial editor of The Masses, "may best be described as the man who saved our children from dying of boredom, as we almost did in school."

One indication of the importance, or at least the volatility, of Dewey's educational ideas is that they have been as roundly condemned by reactionaries and conservatives as by moderates and liberals. Few pedagogical theorists have had the honor of being denounced by a president of the United States, indeed by so mild a president as Dwight D. Eisenhower. In a 1959 issue of Life magazine, 1ke warned the American people: "Educators, parents, and students must be continually stirred by the defects in our educational system. They must be induced to abandon that educational path that, rather blindly, they have been following as a result of John Dewey's teachings."

Despite criticisms such as this, educators for half a century followed the ideas that Dewey made popular in such books as The School and Society (1899) and The Child and the Curriculum (1902). At the time these books appeared, academic scholars gave very little thought to the problems of teaching. Elementary-level teaching in particular seemed far removed from the luminous importance of "higher learning." But to Dewey, the early educational years were crucial: They were the time when social values were passed on to the young. In its classrooms, auditoriums, and playing fields, Dewey held, a society's habits and beliefs either lived or died.

Conservatives have always insisted that education must transmit conventional knowledge and values from the past. Dewey himself believed in the "ethical responsibility of the school." But he remained convinced throughout his life that "virtue" could not be taught. In Moral Principles in Education (1909), Dewey emphasized that education had no business teaching students "knowledge of what the right is." The teacher should rather develop in the students "the power of trained judgment" to enable them on their own to discriminate among "relative values" and "relevant ends."

Dewey deplored any formal instruction that degenerated into empty routine or smacked of indoctrination. What must be avoided at all costs, Dewey argued, are a priori procedures that may frustrate the student's potential for self-directed activity. Dewey opposed "traditional" teaching and offered a better possibility, "progressive education":

To imposition from above is opposed expression and cultivation of individuality; to external discipline is opposed freedom; to learning from texts and teachers, learning through experience; to acquisition of isolated skills and techniques by drill is opposed acquisition of them as means of attaining ends which make direct vital appeal; to preparation for a more or less remote future is opposed making the most of the opportunities of present life; to static aims and materials is opposed acquaintance with a changing world.

In short, learning by doing rather than by drill would lead the student to—and here Dewey indulged his penchant for the language of biology—"development," "formation," "integration," "unification," "continuity," "progression," and especially "growth."

Describing progressive education, Dewey in effect rewrote the very definition of a teacher and a student. A teacher must not pose as an "authority." Dewey so mistrusted the word that he usually sandwiched it between quotation marks. As an authority, the teacher would only suppress the curiosity of the pupils. The good teacher, in Dewey's thinking, was an interpreter or guide whose skills were at the service of the students' emotional and intellectual energies.

Similarly, Dewey argued, students were only alienated by a curriculum of abstract subjects and pre-digested textbooks. Dewey believed a set curriculum isolated the school from society. Learning, he said, must begin with "problematic situations" that students know first-hand. Active involvement of students, starting with a pragmatic inquiry into their immediate problems, guaranteed that any subject taught would be "relevant." Dewey held that
learning which was an exercise in knowing rather than doing, or knowledge for the sake of cultural appreciation rather than social application, only deepened the already established class divisions in society.

Dewey's ideas have steadily permeated the mainstream, even when their source goes unacknowledged. This year a Newsweek cover story reported that educators now accept the Deweyite principle that "young children learn best through active, hands-on teaching methods." Dewey's theories were once the staple of experimental education. But now, according to Newsweek, "the entire early-childhood profession has amassed itself in union behind these principles"—principles which Dewey would heartily have endorsed.

Predictably however, conservatives, now as earlier, have blamed Dewey for the "permissiveness" of his so-called progressive education, charging that it created bedlam in the classrooms. During the 1950s especially, when Russia's successful Sputnik program seemed to indict American education back on Earth, critics like Admiral Hyman Rickover blamed Dewey's influence for the failure of American schooling.

Diane Ravitch, who teaches at Dewey's old school, Teachers College at Columbia University, elaborates upon this criticism in The Troubled Crusade: American Education, 1945–1980 (1983). A failing of many progressive educators who followed Dewey, Ravitch argues, was their assumption that a child's character was naturally rational and disciplined; they failed to recognize how such qualities result from education itself. Although Ravitch faults the educational goals of Deweyite progressives for being more political than intellectual, she also realizes that this political bias has been the basis for Dewey's lasting influence. Because the American public, in this century, has expected education to solve complex social problems of democracy (such as poverty and in-

In fact, however, Dewey himself grew disenchanted with the steady decline of all forms of discipline in the classroom. In 1929, in the essay "Individuality and Freedom," he qualified the student's right to follow his own "desires" and instead endorsed a more forceful role for the teacher: There is "no spontaneous germination in mental life," he wrote. "If he [the student] does not get the suggestion from the teacher, he gets it from somebody or something in the home or the street." Despite such reservations, Dewey continued to view the student as a younger "responsible citizen," just as the school was a miniature version of society. And it is this belief in the civic and social role of school that is perhaps Dewey's most durable legacy to Amer-

Downgrading the three R's: Dewey's Laboratory School (started in 1896) combined thinking with doing—reflecting Dewey's pragmatic philosophy that ideas are "tools" for solving problems.
ican education.

From the 1940s through the '60s, the Supreme Court largely subscribed to Dewey's view of students-as-citizens. It guaranteed the right of free speech to students in such decisions as Tinker v. Des Moines (1969). More recently, in cases like Bethel School District v. Fraser (1986) and Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988), the Supreme Court reversed precedents and limited students' right of speech, especially speech considered lewd or indecent. Years ago Dewey anticipated, and in a sense rebutted, the Supreme Court's logic on these matters, saying that it was "useless to bemoan the departure of the good old days of children's modesty, reverence, and implicit obedience, if we expect merely by bemoaning and exhortation to bring them back."

Dewey might have questioned the Supreme Court's recent concern over students' use of sexual language, when sexual innuendo permeates television shows watched by the whole family.

Ironically, while conservatives charged Dewey with nurturing anarchy in the schoolroom, radicals have often accused him of exactly the opposite: of promoting conformity. The charge dates from the 1920s, when Greenwich Village rebels, the "Lost Generation" intellectuals, saw pragmatism as a philosophy that chimed only too well with America's business ethos of practicality and profit. Dewey's faith in science and his "problem-solving" curriculum left no place, they charged, for the subtler qualities that emanate from art and literature—esthetic insight, moral vision, irony, tragedy, beauty, and sublimity. Pragmatism seemed as success-oriented as capitalism, and both, according to such cultural critics as Van Wyck Brooks and Lewis Mumford, exalted the practical at the expense of the spiritual.

During the 1960s, New Left radicals such as Christopher Lasch continued this line of criticism. In The New Radicalism in America (1965), Lasch claimed that Dewey confused advocacy of social change with "education for citizenship": "The very act of defining the purpose of school in these terms forced Dewey back into the concept of education he wished particularly to avoid, the idea of education as a form of indoctrination in the values of the grown-up world." Perhaps Lasch was unfair, but then Dewey had left himself open to criticism by failing to define any specific "ends" to which education should aspire. Without a philosophy of ends, he could not state on what basis values, his or anyone else's, should be accepted or chosen. Even the value of democracy was taken for granted by Dewey, just as all value was attributed to experience itself.

Controversy, hot dispute, and denunciation, however, are not what doom a philosopher's writings. What is far more injurious to any writer's reputation is to be half-forgotten—largely accepted but largely unread. To some extent, this has been Dewey's later fate. Dewey's writings about education, always more important for their ideas than for any literary felicity, have been assimilated into the mainstream debates about American education. Dewey, of course, insisted that changes in education should promote changes in society, that democracy in the school should create citizens for a Democracy. But with American culture Dewey had always been partly at odds: For all his celebrity, he remained a kind of outsider. The American dream of "possessive individualism," based on property, opportunity, acquisition, and competition, Dewey considered more as a curse. In later works like The Public and its Problems (1927) and Individualism, Old and New (1930) Dewey tried to claim that America's true political legacy, rooted in the small self-governing communities of an earlier age, was actually communal and cooperative rather than individualistic and competitive. Dewey's nostalgic thesis would have astounded the American Founders, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Karl Marx, all of whom had seen America as a society in which property was synonymous with the "pursuit of happiness."

In 1933, the year Franklin Delano Roosevelt assumed the presidency, Dewey's reputation began to lose its luster. Dewey's opposition to the New Deal hardly sat well with many liberals convinced that FDR's domestic programs had saved America from political and economic disaster. But Dewey thought that FDR had not gone far enough: He had only remedied the worst excesses of a faulty capitalist system. Rather
than remaining prisoner to an antiquated capitalist ethos, Dewey wrote, Roosevelt should have applied the collective intelligence of science to national planning. Such arguments, not surprisingly, offended many of Dewey's former enthusiasts.

Worse was to come. Dewey's reputation slipped further when he opposed America's intervention in World War II. Chastened by his earlier advocacy of America's entry into the First World War, Dewey remained an isolationist throughout the 1930s. When war broke out in 1939, he offered Americans six words of advice: "No matter what happens, stay out." On the evening of December 7, 1941, he delivered a scheduled address at New York's Cooper Union. Referring to the attack on Pearl Harbor, Dewey said to the audience, "I have nothing, had nothing, and have nothing now to say about the war." "I have nothing to say"—it was an unconvincing postscript for a man who could never resist speaking out, whose bibliography of published titles runs over 125 pages.

In the Nation and the New Republic, in articles titled "The Irresponsibles" and "The Corruption of Liberalism," Archibald MacLeish, Lewis Mumford, and others faulted Dewey for failure to support the American war effort. They claimed that "pragmatic liberalism" had failed to prepare America for a world increasingly totalitarian. Pragmatism's faith in scientific technology, they argued, was blind to the reality of evil, to the necessity of moral values. Pragmatism, in short, was of no use.

Is it safe to say, then, that Dewey is passe? Not really. In fact, we seem to be amid a small-scale Dewey revival, led by such philosophers and creative interpreters of Dewey as Richard Rorty, Richard Bernstein, Sheldon Wolin, and Cornell West. Transcendental conceptions of philosophy have long been out of fashion. And more recently, many practicing philosophers have come to see analytical philosophy as a dead end. In what amounts to a philosophical interregnum, numerous thinkers are willing to follow Dewey onto the terrain of pragmatism and to take up his concern for social theory, cultural criticism, and reformist thought.

In the current Dewey revival, what were once considered his defects are again being seen as virtues. It is true that as late as 1987, Allan Bloom, in The Closing of the American Mind, was still blaming Dewey for having no dedication to absolute values and leaving America adrift in ethical relativism. But that is exactly the point, Sydney Hook responded in the American Scholar: What Dewey has given us, Hook argued, was not relativism but "relationism," a way to understand ideas in relation to the circumstance in which they arise and function. In a fresh reappraisal of pragmatism, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (1989), Princeton professor of religion Cornel West called Dewey "the greatest of the American pragmatists" precisely because he took the Emersonian preoccupation with personality and power and fused it "with the great discovery of 19th-century Europe": an historical consciousness that comprehends human existence always in terms of changes in society.

Dewey thus provides a guide for living (and thinking) in a time when no absolute principles are held to be true and practicable everywhere, when even noble values can seem in conflict with one another. As early as the turn of the century, Dewey showed how one could cope with the world even while being uncertain of it. In philosophy as in education, Dewey insisted, human purpose is not to grasp an immutable reality but to control an environment of change and contingency.

Richard Rorty has said that no modern philosopher in Europe or America has come up with a more convincing resolution to the epistemological crisis of the late 19th century. Rorty links Dewey with the grand names of Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Despite their obvious differences, Rorty shows, they are the three philosophers who developed ways to deal with a world without the certainty of philosophical foundations. Dewey updates and furthers what the Italian critic Giovanni Papini called pragmatism right after its birth in the late 19th century: a philosophy for getting along without philosophy.
Granta is ten years old this month! To celebrate, we're publishing an extra long issue—the merry miscellany pictured above. In bookshops this issue of Granta costs $7.95, if it has not sold out already. But you can have it free, gratis, for nothing and for certain. All we ask is that you subscribe to Granta at a 44 per cent saving from the cover price. You get an entire year of Granta for only $21.95. Plus, we give you the ‘Birthday Special’... FREE.

All you do is send in the coupon.

Please enter my subscription to Granta at $21.95 for one year, four issues. And, if I enclose payment with my order, I'll also receive the ‘Birthday Special’—a further $7.95 value—FREE:

Name
Address
City/State/Zip

( ) $_________enclosed. Send the ‘Birthday Special'. ( ) Cheque ( ) Visa ( ) Amex ( ) MC
Card No._________ Exp. Date_________ Signature_________

( ) I will pay later. Please bill me.

Return to Granta, US Offices, 250 West 57th St, Suite 1316, NY, NY 10107 (Canadian orders please add $4, other foreign orders please add $8 for postage.)
Audio-Forum® offers the best in self-instructional foreign language courses using audio cassettes—featuring those used to train U.S. State Dept. personnel in Spanish, French, Portuguese, Hebrew, Polish, German, Chinese, Arabic and more. Learn a foreign language on your own! Free Catalog.

To get your copy:

Call toll-free 1-800-243-1234

or fill out and send this ad to—

Audio-Forum, Room C1604,
On-The-Green, Guilford, CT 06437 (203) 453-9794

Name

Address

Apt. #

City/State/Zip

I am particularly interested in (check choices):

☐ Russian  ☐ Greek  ☐ Danish  ☐ Finnish  ☐ Japanese  ☐ Spanish
☐ German  ☐ Korean  ☐ Mandarin  ☐ Swedish  ☐ Hausa  ☐ French
☐ Hungarian  ☐ Italian  ☐ Dutch  ☐ Other ___________________________
Toward a History Of Reading

Reading is reading is reading, as Gertrude Stein might have said. Medieval monks reading the Bible aloud, a subway commuter scanning the *New York Daily News*, Mao Zedong perusing *Marx's Capital*—all, it may seem, are engaged in the same activity. But is it the same? Robert Darnton thinks not. Reading has a history, he argues. Here he examines the act of reading in Europe and America as it has changed over four centuries. How people read can be more revealing than what they read. By showing how readers variously approached the written word, Darnton opens a new window on the ways our ancestors thought about themselves and made sense of their world.

by Robert Darnton

In *The Art of Love*, the Roman poet Ovid offers advice on how to read a love letter: "If your lover should make overtures by means of some words inscribed on tablets delivered to you by a clever servant, meditate on them carefully, weigh his phrases, and try to divine whether his love is only feigned or whether his prayers really come sincerely in love." It is extraordinary. This poet of the first century B.C. might be one of us. He speaks to a problem that could arise in any age, that appears to exist outside of time. In reading about reading in *The Art of Love*, we seem to hear a voice that speaks directly to us across a distance of 2000 years.

But as we listen further, the voice sounds stranger. Ovid goes on to prescribe techniques for communicating with a lover behind a husband’s back:

It is consonant with morality and the law that an upright woman should fear her husband and be surrounded by a strict guard.... But should you have as many guardians as Argus has eyes, you can dupe them all if your will is firm enough. For example, can anyone stop your servant and accomplice from carrying your notes in her bodice or between her foot and the sole of her sandal? Let us suppose that your guardian can see through all these ruses. Then have your confidante offer her back in place of the tablets and let her body become a living letter.

The lover is expected to strip the servant girl and read her body—not exactly the kind of communication that we associate with letter-writing today.

Despite its air of beguiling contemporaneity, *The Art of Love* catapults us into a world we can barely imagine. To get the message, we must know something about
Roman mythology, writing techniques, and domestic life. We must be able to picture ourselves as the wife of a Roman patrician and to appreciate the contrast between formal morality and the ways of a world given over to sophistication and cynicism at a time when the Sermon on the Mount was in a barbarian tongue far beyond the Romans' range of hearing.

To read Ovid is to confront the mystery of reading itself. Both familiar and foreign, it is an activity that we share with our ancestors yet one that never can be the same as what they experienced. We may enjoy the illusion of stepping outside of time in order to make contact with authors who lived centuries ago. But even if their texts have come down to us unchanged—a virtual impossibility, considering the evolution of layout and of books as physical objects—our relation to those texts cannot be the same as that of readers in the past. Reading has a history. But how can we recover it?

We could begin by searching the record for readers. The Italian historian Carlo Ginzburg found one, a humble miller from 16th-century Friuli, in the papers of the Inquisition. Probing for heresy, the inquisitor asked his victim about his reading. Menocchio replied with a string of titles and elaborate comments on each of them. He had read a great number of Biblical stories, chronicles, and travel books of the kind that existed in many patrician libraries. By comparing the texts and the commentary, Ginzburg discovered that Menocchio did not simply receive messages transmitted down through the social order. He read aggressively, transforming the contents of the material at his disposition into a radically non-Christian view of the world. Whether that view can be traced to an ancient popular tradition, as Ginzburg claims, is a matter of debate. But Ginzburg certainly demonstrated the possibility of studying reading as an activity among the common people four centuries ago.

I ran across a solidly middle-class reader in my own research on 18th-century France. He was a merchant from La Rochelle named Jean Ranson and an impassioned Rousseauist. Ranson did not merely read Rousseau and weep: He incorporated Rousseau's ideas into the fabric of his life as he set up business, fell in love, married, and raised his children. Reading and living run parallel as leitmotifs in a rich series of letters that Ranson wrote between 1774 and 1785. These letters show how Rousseauism became absorbed in the way of life of the provincial bourgeoisie under the Old Regime. Rousseau had received a flood of letters from readers like Ranson after the publication of The New Eloise (1761). It was, I believe, the first tidal wave of fan mail in the history of literature, although the novelist Richardson had already produced some impressive ripples in England. The mail reveals that readers responded as Ranson did everywhere in France and, furthermore, that their responses conformed to those Rousseau had called for in the two prefaces to his novel. He had instructed his readers how to read him. He had assigned them roles and provided them with a strategy for taking in his novel. The new way of reading worked so well that The New Eloise became the greatest best-seller of the cen-
HISTORY OF READING

The century, the most important single source of romantic sensibility. That sensibility is now extinct. No modern reader can weep his way through the six volumes of *The New Eloise* as his predecessors did two centuries ago. But in his day, Rousseau captivated a generation of readers by revolutionizing reading itself.

The examples of Menocchio and Ranson suggest that reading and living, constructing texts and making sense of life, were much more closely related in the early modern period than they are today. But before jumping to conclusions, we need to work through more archives, comparing readers' accounts of their experience with the protocols of reading in their books and, when possible, with their behavior. It was believed that Goethe's *Sorrows of Young Werther* (1774) touched off a wave of suicides in Germany. Is not the Wertherfieber ripe for fresh examination? The pre-Raphaelites in England provide similar instances of life imitating art, a theme that can be traced from *Don Quixote* to *Madame Bovary* and *Miss Lonelyhearts*. In each case the fiction could be fleshed out and compared with documents—actual suicide notes, diaries, and letters to the editor. The correspondence of authors and the papers of publishers are ideal sources of information about real readers. There are dozens of letters from readers in the published correspondence of Voltaire and Rousseau, and hundreds in the unpublished papers of Balzac and Zola.

In short, it should be possible to develop a history as well as a theory of reader response. Possible, but not easy.

The documents rarely show readers at work, fashioning meaning from texts, and the documents are texts themselves, which also require interpretation. Few of them are rich enough to provide even indirect access to the cognitive and affective elements of reading, and a few exceptional
cases may not be enough for one to reconstruct the inner dimensions of that experience. But historians of the book have already turned up a great deal of information about the external history of reading. Having studied it as a social phenomenon, they can answer many of the “who,” the “what,” the “where,” and the “when” questions, which can be of great help in attacking the more difficult “whys” and “hows.”

II

Studies of who read what at different times fall into two main types: the macro- and the microanalytical. Macroanalysis has flourished above all in France, where it has traced the evolution of reading habits from the 16th century to the present. One can follow in these studies many intriguing phenomena: the decline of Latin, the rise of the novel, the general fascination with the immediate world of nature and the remote worlds of exotic countries that spread throughout the educated public between the time of Descartes and Bougainville.

By the late 19th century, borrowing patterns in German, English, and American libraries had fallen into a strikingly similar pattern: 70 to 80 percent of the books came from the category of light fiction (mostly novels); 10 percent came from history, biography, and travel; and less than one percent came from religion. In little more than 200 years, the world of reading had been transformed. The rise of the novel had balanced a decline in religious literature, and in almost every case the turning point could be located in the second half of the 18th century, especially the 1770s, the years of the Wertherfieber. The Sorrows of Young Werther produced an even more spectacular response in Germany than The New Eloise had done in France or Pamela in England. All three novels marked the triumph of a new literary sensitivity, and the last sentences of Werther seemed to announce the advent of a new reading public along with the death of a traditional Christian culture: “Artisans bore him. No minister accompanied him.”

Thus for all their variety and occasional contradictions, the macroanalytical studies suggest some general conclusions, something akin to what Max Weber described as the “demystification of the world.” That may seem too cosmic for comfort. Those who prefer precision may turn to microanalysis, although it usually goes to the opposite extreme—excessive detail. We have hundreds of lists of books in libraries from the Middle Ages to the present, and most of us would agree that a catalogue of a private library can serve as a profile of a reader. To scan the catalogue of the library in Monticello is to inspect the furnishings of Jefferson’s mind. And the study of private libraries has the advantage of linking the “what” with the “who” of reading.

The French have taken the lead in this area, too. Daniel Mornet’s essay of 1910, “Les bibliothèques privées” (“The Private Libraries”) demonstrated that the study of library catalogues could produce conclusions that challenged some of the commonplaces of literary history. After tabulating titles from 500 18th-century catalogues, he found only one copy of the book that was to be the Bible of the French Revolution, Rousseau’s Social Contract (1762). The libraries provided no basis for connecting certain kinds of literature (the work of the philosophes, for example) with certain classes of readers (the bourgeoisie).

Seventy years later, we now have statistics on the libraries of noblemen, magistrates, priests, academicians, burghers, artisans, and even some domestic servants. Parisians were readers: Before
1789, Paris had 500 primary schools, one for every 1,000 inhabitants, all more or less free. But for artisans, reading did not take the form of the books that show up in inventories. It involved chapbooks, broadsides, posters, personal letters, and the signs on the streets. Parisians read their way through the city and through their lives, but their ways of reading did not leave enough archival evidence for the historian to follow closely on their heels.

Subscription lists and the records of lending libraries offer an opportunity to make connections between literary genres and social classes. The most remarkable are the registers of borrowings from the ducal library of Wolfenbüttel, which extend from 1666 to 1928. They show a significant "democratization" of reading in the 1760s: The number of books borrowed doubled; the borrowers came from lower social strata; and the reading matter became lighter, shifting from learned tomes to sentimental novels (imitations of Robinson Crusoe went over especially well). Curiously, the registers of the Bibliothèque du Roi in Paris show that it had the same number of users at this time—about 50 a year, including one Denis Diderot. The Parisians could not take the books home, but they enjoyed the hospitality of a more leisurely age. Although the librarian opened his doors to them only two mornings a week, he gave them a meal before he turned them out. Conditions are different in the Bibliothèque Nationale today. Librarians have had to accept a basic law of economics: There is no such thing as a free lunch.

The microanalysts have come up with many other discoveries—so many, in fact, that they face the same problem as the macroquantifiers: how to put it all together? The disparity of the documentation—auction catalogues, notarial records, subscription lists, library registers—does not make the task easier.

So far only one book historian has been hardy enough to propose a general model. Rolf Engelsing has argued that a "reading revolution" (Leserevolution) took place at the end of the 18th century. From the Middle Ages until sometime after 1750, according to Engelsing, men read "intensively." They had only a few books—the Bible, an almanac, a devotional work or two—and they read them over and over again, usually aloud and in groups, so that a narrow range of traditional literature became deeply impressed on their consciousness. By 1800 people were reading "extensively." They read all kinds of material, especially periodicals and newspapers, and read things only once before racing on to the next item. Engelsing does not produce much evidence for his hypothesis: Most of his research concerns only a small sampling of burghers in Bremen. But it has an attractive before-and-after simplicity, and it provides a handy formula for contrasting modes of reading very
early and very late in European history. Its main drawback, as I see it, is its unilinear character.

Reading did not evolve in one direction, toward extensiveness. It assumed many different forms among different social groups during different eras. Men and women have read in order to save their souls, to improve their manners, to repair their machinery, to seduce their sweethearts, to learn about current events, and simply to have fun. In many cases, especially among the publics of Richardson, Rousseau, and Goethe, the reading became more intensive, not less. But the late 18th century does seem to represent a turning point, a time when more reading matter became available to a wider readership that in the 19th century would grow to giant proportions with the development of machine-made paper, steam-powered presses, linotype, and, in the Western world, nearly universal literacy. All these changes opened up new possibilities, not by decreasing intensity but by increasing variety.

I must therefore confess to some skepticism about the “reading revolution.” Yet an American historian of the book, David Hall, has described a transformation in the reading habits of New Englanders between 1600 and 1850 in almost exactly the same terms as those used by Engelsing. Before 1800, New Englanders read a small corpus of venerable “steady sellers”—the Bible, almanacs, the New England Primer, Philip Doddridge’s Rise and Progress of Religion, Richard Baxter’s Call to the Unconverted—and read them over and over again, aloud, in groups, and with exceptional intensity. After 1800 they were swamped with new kinds of books—novels, newspapers, fresh and sunny varieties of children’s literature—and they read through them ravenously, discarding one thing as soon as they could find another. Although Hall and Engelsing had never heard of one another, they discovered a similar pattern in two quite different areas of the Western world. Perhaps a fundamental shift in reading took place at the end of the 18th century. It may not have been a revolution, but it marked the end of an Old Regime—the reign of Thomas à Kempis, Johann Arndt, and John Bunyan.

The “where” of reading is more important than one might think, because by plac-
ing the reader in his setting one might find hints about the nature of his experience. In the University of Leiden there hangs a print of the university library, dated 1610. It shows the books, heavy folio volumes, chained on high shelves jutting out from the walls in a sequence determined by the rubrics of classical bibliography: Jurisconsulti, Medici, Historici, and so on. Students are scattered about the room, reading the books on counters built at shoulder level below the shelves. They read standing up, protected against the cold by thick cloaks and hats, one foot perched on a rail to ease the pressure on their bodies. Reading can not have been comfortable in the age of classical humanism.

In pictures done a century and a half later, "La Lecture" and "La Liseuse" by Fragonard, for example, readers recline in chaises longues or well padded armchairs with their legs propped on footstools. They are often women, wearing loose-fitting gowns known at the time as liseuses. They usually hold a dainty duodecimo volume in their fingers and have a far-away look in their eyes. From Fragonard to Monet, who also painted a "Liseuse," reading moves from the boudoir to the outdoors. The reader backpacks books to fields and mountain tops, where, like Rousseau and Heine, he can commune with nature.

The human element in the setting must have affected the understanding of the texts. No doubt Jean-Baptiste Greuze (1725–1805) sentimentalized the collective character of reading in his painting of A Father of the Family Reads the Bible to his Children. Restif de la Bretonne (1734–1806) probably did the same in the family Bible readings described in The Life of My Father (1779): "I could only remember with emotion the interest with which this reading was heard; how it conveyed to everybody in our numerous family a tone of good-heartedness and brotherhood (in the family I include the servants). My father always started with these words: 'Let us gather my children; it is the Holy Spirit that is going to speak.'" But for all their sentimentality, such descriptions proceed from a common assumption: For the common people in early modern Europe, reading was a social activity. It took place in workshops, barns, and taverns. It was almost always oral but not necessarily edifying. Thus it was for the peasant in the country inn described, with some rose tinting around the edges, by Christian Schubart in 1786:

And when the evening breaks in,
I just drink my cup of wine;
Then the Schoolmaster reads to me
From the newspaper what news there is.

The most important institution of popular reading under the Old Regime was a fireside gathering known as the veillée in France and the Spinnstube in Germany. While children played, women sewed, and men repaired tools, one of the company who could decipher a text would regale them with the adventures of Les quatre fils Aymon, Till Eulenspiegel, or some other favorite from the standard repertory of the cheap, popular chapbooks. Some of these primitive paperbacks indicated that they were meant to be taken in through the ears by beginning with phrases such as, "What you are about to hear . . ." During the 19th century groups of artisans, especially cigar makers and tailors, took turns reading or hired a reader to keep themselves entertained while they worked. Even today many people get their news by being read to by a telecaster. Television may be less of a break with the past than is generally assumed. In any case, for most people throughout most of history, books had audiences rather than readers. They were better heard than seen.

Reading was a more private experience for the minority of educated persons who
could afford to buy books. But many joined reading clubs, *cabinets littéraires*, or *Lesegesellschaften*, where they could read almost anything they wanted, in a sociable atmosphere, for a small monthly payment. Françoise Parent-Lardeur has traced the proliferation of these clubs in Paris under the Restoration, but they went back well into the 18th century. Provincial booksellers often turned their stock into a library and charged dues for the right to frequent it. Good light, some comfortable chairs, a few pictures on the wall, and subscriptions to a half-dozen newspapers were enough to make a club out of almost any bookshop. Thus the *cabinet littéraire* advertised by P. J. Bernard, a minor bookseller in Lunéville: “A commodious establishment, large, well illuminated and heated, which will be open every day, from nine o’clock in the morning until noon and from one until 10, will offer starting now to booklovers 2,000 volumes which will increase by 400 volumes annually.” By November 1779, the club had 200 members, mostly officers from the local *gendarmérie*. For the modest sum of three livres a year, they had access to 5,000 books, 13 journals, and special rooms set aside for conversation and writing.

German reading clubs provided the social foundation for a distinct variety of bourgeois culture in the 18th century. They sprang up at an astounding rate, especially in the northern cities. Perhaps one of every 500 adult Germans belonged to a *Lesegesellschaft* by 1800. All of these reading clubs had a basic supply of periodicals supplemented by uneven runs of books, usually on fairly weighty subjects like history and politics. They seem to have been a more serious version of the coffee house, itself an important institution for reading, which spread through Germany from the late 17th century. By 1760, Vienna had at least 60 coffee houses. They provided newspapers, journals, and endless occasions for political discussions, just as they had done in London and Amsterdam for over a century.

III

Thus we already know a good deal about the institutional bases of reading. We have some answers to the “who,” “what,” “where,” and “when” questions. But the “whys” and “hows” elude us. We have not yet devised a strategy for understanding the inner process by which readers made sense of words. We do not even understand the way we read ourselves, despite the efforts of psychologists and neurologists to trace eye movements and to map the hemispheres of the brain.

Is the cognitive process different for Chinese, who read pictographs, and for Westerners, who scan lines? For Israelis, who read words without vowels moving from right to left, and for blind people, who transmit stimuli through their fingers? For Southeast Asians, whose languages lack tenses and who order reality spatially, and for American Indians, whose languages have been put into writing only recently by alien scholars? For the holy man in the presence of the Word and for the consumer studying labels in a supermarket?

The differences seem endless, for reading is not simply a skill but a way of making meaning, which must vary from culture to culture. We could not expect to find a formula that could account for all those variations. But it should be possible to develop a way to study the changes in reading within our own culture. I would like to suggest five approaches to the problem.

First, I think it should be possible to learn more about the ideals and assumptions underlying reading in the past. We could study contemporary depictions of reading in fiction, autobiographies, polemi-
HISTORY OF READING

...cal writings, letters, paintings, and prints in order to uncover some notions of what people thought took place when they read. Consider, for example, the great debate about the craze for reading in late 18th-century Germany. Those who deplored the reading mania did not simply condemn its effects on morals and politics. They feared it would damage public health. In a tract of 1795, J. G. Heinzmann listed the physical consequences of excessive reading: "susceptibility to colds, headaches, weakening of the eyes, heat rashes, gout, arthritis, hemorrhoids, asthma, apoplexy, pulmonary disease, indigestion, blocking of the bowels, nervous disorder, migraines, epilepsy, hypochondria, and melancholy."

On the positive side of the debate, Johann Adam Bergk, author of The Art of Reading Books (1799), accepted the premises of his opponents but disagreed with their conclusions. He took it as established that one should never read immediately after eating or while standing up. But by correct disposition of the body, one could make reading a force for good. The "art of reading" involved washing the face with cold water and taking walks in fresh air as well as concentration and meditation. No one challenged the notion that there was a physical element in reading, because no one drew a clear distinction between the physical and the moral world. Eighteenth-century readers attempted to "digest" books, to absorb them in their whole being, body and soul. The physicality of the process sometimes shows on the pages. The books in Samuel Johnson's library, now owned by Mrs. Donald F. Hyde, are bent and battered, as if Johnson had wrestled his way through them.

Throughout most of Western history, and especially in the 16th and 17th centuries, reading was seen above all as a spiritual exercise. But how was it performed? One could look for guidance in the manuals of Jesuits and the hermeneutical treatises of Protestants. Family Bible readings took place on both sides of the great religious divide. And as the example of Restif de la Bretonne indicates, the Bible was approached with awe, even among some Catholic peasants. Of course Boccaccio, Castiglione, Cervantes, and Rabelais had developed other uses of literacy for the elite. But for most people, reading remained a sacred activity. It put you in the presence of the Word and unlocked holy mysteries. As a working hypothesis, it seems valid to assert that the farther back in time you go the farther away you move from instrumental reading. Not only does the "how-to" book become rarer and the religious book more common, reading itself is different. In the age of Luther and Loyola, it provided access to absolute truth.

On a more mundane level, assumptions about reading could be traced through advertisements and prospectuses for books. Thus some typical remarks from an 18th-century prospectus taken at random from the rich collection in the Newberry Library in Chicago: A bookseller is offering a quarto edition of the Commentary on the Customs of the Residents of Angoumois, an excellent work, he insists, for its typography as much as its content—"The text of the Commentary is printed in grosromain type; the summaries that precede the commentaries are printed in cicerō; and the commentaries are printed in Saint-Augustin. The whole work is made from very beautiful paper manufactured in Angoulême."

No publisher would dream of mentioning paper and type in advertising a law book today. During the 18th century advertisers assumed that their clients cared about the physical quality of books. Buyers and sellers alike shared a typographical consciousness that is now nearly extinct.
The reports of censors also can be revealing, at least in the case of books from early modern France, where censorship was highly developed if not enormously effective. A typical travel book, *New Voyage to the American Islands* (Paris, 1722) by J.-B. Labat, contains four "approbations" printed out in full next to the imprimatur. One censor explains that the manuscript piqued his curiosity: "It is difficult to begin reading it without feeling that mild but avid curiosity that impels us to read further." Another recommends it for its "simple and concise style" and also for its utility: "Nothing in my opinion is so useful to travellers, to the inhabitants of that country, to tradesmen, and to those who study natural history." And a third simply found it a good read: "I had great pleasure in reading it. It contains a multitude of curious things."

Censors did not simply hound out heretics and revolutionaries, as we tend to assume in looking back at the Inquisition and the Enlightenment. They gave the royal stamp of approval to a work, and in doing so they provided clues as to how it might be read. Their values constituted an official standard against which ordinary readings might be measured.

But how did ordinary readers read? My second suggestion for attacking that problem concerns the ways reading was learned. In 17th-century England, a great deal of learning took place outside the schoolroom, in workshops and fields where laborers taught themselves and one another. Inside the school, English children learned to read before they learned to write instead of acquiring the two skills together at the beginning of their education as they do today. They often joined the work force before the age of seven, when instruction in writing began. So literacy estimates based on the ability to write may be much too low, and the reading public may have included a great many people who could not sign their names.

But "reading" for such people probably meant something quite different from what it means today. In early modern France the three R's were learned in sequence—first reading, then writing, then arithmetic—just as in England and, it seems, all other countries in the West. The most common primers from the Old Regime—ABCs like the *Croix de Jésus* and the *Croix de par Dieu*—begin as modern manuals do, with the alphabet. But the letters had different sounds. The pupil pronounced a flat vowel before each consonant, so that *p* came out as "eh-p" rather than "pé" as it is today. When said aloud, the letters did not link together phonetically in combinations that could be recognized by the ear as syllables of a word. Thus *p-a-t* in *pater* sounded like "ehp-ah-eh." But the phonetic fuzziness did not really matter, because the letters were meant as a visual stimulus to trigger the memory of a text that had already been learned by heart—and the text was always in Latin. The whole system was built on the premise that French children should not begin to read in French. They passed directly from the alphabet to simple syllables and then to the *Pater Noster, Ave Maria, Credo*, and *Benedicite*. Having learned to recognize these common prayers, they worked through liturgical responses printed in standard chapbooks. At this point many of them left school. They had acquired enough mastery of the printed word to fulfill the functions expected of them by the Church—that is, to participate in its rituals. But they had never read a text in a language they could understand.

Some children—we don’t know how many; perhaps a minority in the 17th century and a majority in the 18th—remained in school long enough to learn to read in French. Even then, however, reading was often a matter of recognizing something al-
ready known rather than a process of acquiring new knowledge. Nearly all of the schools were run by the Church, and nearly all of the schoolbooks were religious, usually catechisms and pious textbooks like *The Parish School* by Jacques de Baten-cour. In the early 18th century the Brothers of Christian Schools began to provide the same text to several pupils and to teach them as a group—a first step toward standardized instruction, which was to become the rule a hundred years later. At the same time, a few tutors in aristocratic households began to teach reading directly in French. They developed phonetic techniques and audio-visual aids like the pictorial flash cards of the abbé Berthaud and the *bureau typographique* of Louis Dumas. By 1789 their example had spread to some progressive primary schools.

But most children still learned to read by standing before the master and reciting passages from whatever text they could get their hands on while their classmates struggled with a motley collection of booklets on the back benches. Some of these “schoolbooks” would reappear in the evening at the *veillée*, because they were popular “bestsellers” retelling old tales of chivalry. So reading around the fireside had something in common with reading in the classroom: It was a recital of a text that everyone already knew. Instead of opening up limitless vistas of new ideas, it probably remained within a closed circuit, exactly where the post-Tridentine Church wanted to keep it. “Probably,” however, is the governing word in that proposition. We can only guess at the nature of early modern pedagogy by reading the few primers and the still fewer memoirs that have survived from that era. We don’t know what really happened in the classroom. The peasant reader-listeners may have construed their catechism as well as their adventure stories in ways that escape us.

If the experience of the great mass of readers lies beyond the range of historical research, historians should be able to capture something of what reading meant for the few persons who left a record of it. A third approach could begin with the best known autobiographical accounts—those of Saint Augustine, Saint Theresa of Avila, Montaigne, Rousseau, and Stendhal, for example—and move on to less familiar sources.

J.-M. Goulemot has used the autobiography of Jamerey-Duval to show how a peasant could read and write his way up through the ranks of the Old Regime, and Daniel Roche discovered an 18th-century glazier, Jacques-Louis Ménétra, who read his way around a typical tour de France.
Although he did not carry many books in the sack slung over his back, Ménétre constantly exchanged letters with fellow travelers and sweethearts. He squandered a few sous on broadsides at public executions and even composed doggerel verse for the ceremonies and farces that he staged with the other workers. When he told the story of his life, he organized his narrative in picaresque fashion, combining oral tradition (folk tales and the stylized bragadocio of male bull sessions) with genres of popular literature (such as the novelettes of chivalry). Unlike other plebian authors—Restif, Mercier, Rousseau, Diderot, and Marmontel—Ménétre never won a place in the Republic of Letters. But he showed that letters had a place in the culture of the common man.

That place may have been marginal, but margins themselves provide clues to the experience of ordinary readers. During the 16th century marginal notes appeared in print in the form of glosses, which steered the reader through humanist texts. In the 18th century the gloss gave way to the footnote. How did the reader follow the play between text and para-text at the bottom or side of the page? The historian Edward Gibbon created ironic distance by masterful deployment of footnotes. A careful study of annotated 18th-century copies of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire might reveal the way such distance was perceived by Gibbon’s contemporaries. John Adams covered his books with scribbling. By following him through his copy of Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, one can see how radical Enlightenment philosophy looked to a retired revolutionary in the sober climate of Quincy, Massachusetts. Thus Rousseau, in the first English edition:

There was no kind of moral relation between men in this state [the state of nature]; they could not be either good or bad, and had neither vices nor virtues. It is proper, therefore, to suspend judgment about their situation... until we have examined whether there are more virtues or vices among civilized men...)

And Adams, in the margin:

Wonders upon wonders. Paradox upon paradox. What astonishing sagacity had Mr. Rousseau! Yet this eloquent coxcomb has with his affectation of singularity made men discontented with superstition and tyranny.

Scholars have charted the currents of literary history by trying to reread great books as great writers have read them, using the annotations in collectors’ items such as Diderot’s copy of the Encyclopédie and Melville’s copy of Emerson’s essays.

But the inquiry needn’t be limited to great books or to books at all. Peter Burke is currently studying the graffiti of Renaissance Italy. When scribbled on the door of an enemy, they often functioned as ritual insults, which defined the lines of social conflict dividing neighborhoods and clans. When attached to the famous statue of Pasquino in Rome, this public scribbling set the tone of a rich and intensely political street culture. A history of reading might be able to advance by great leaps from the Pasquinade and the commedia dell’arte to Molière, from Molière to Rousseau, and from Rousseau to Robespierre.

M y fourth suggestion concerns literary theory. It can, I agree, look daunting, especially to the outsider. It comes wrapped in imposing labels—structuralism, deconstruction, hermeneutics, semiotics, phenomenology—and it goes as rapidly as it comes, for the trends displace one another with bewildering speed. Through them all, however, runs a concern that could lead to some collaboration between literary critics and historians of the book—the concern for reading. Whether they unearth deep structures or tear down systems of signs, critics have in-
creasingly treated literature as an activity rather than an established body of texts. They insist that a book’s meaning is not fixed on its pages; it is construed by its readers. So reader response has become the key point around which literary analysis turns.

In Germany, this approach has led to a revival of literary history as “reader response aesthetics” under the leadership of Hans Robert Jauss and Wolfgang Iser. In France, it has taken a philosophical turn in the work of Roland Barthes, Paul Ricoeur, Tzvetan Todorov, and Georges Poulet. In the United States, it is still in the melting-pot stage. Wayne Booth, Paul de Man, Jonathan Culler, Geoffrey Hartman, J. Hillis Miller, and Stanley Fish have supplied ingredients for a general theory, but no consensus has emerged from their debates. Nonetheless, all this critical activity points toward a new textology, and all the critics share a way of working when they interpret specific texts.

Consider, for example, Walter Ong’s analysis of the first sentences in *A Farewell to Arms*:

> In the late summer of that year we lived in a house in a village that looked across the river and the plain to the mountains. In the bed of the river there were pebbles and boulders, dry and white in the sun, and the water was clear and swiftly moving and blue in the channels.

What year? What river? Ong asks. Hemingway does not say. By unorthodox use of the definite article—the river instead of “a river”—and sparse deployment of adjectives, he implies that the reader does not need a detailed description of the scene. A reminder will be enough, because the reader is deemed to have been there already. He is addressed as if he were a confidant and fellow traveler, who merely needs to be reminded in order to recollect the hard glint of the sun, the coarse taste of the wine, and the stench of the dead in World War I Italy. Should the reader object—and one can imagine many responses such as, “I am a sixty-year-old grandmother and I don’t know anything about rivers in Italy”—he won’t be able to “get” the book. But if he accepts the role imposed on him by the rhetoric, his fictionalized self can swell to the dimensions of the Hemingway hero; and he can go through the narrative as the author’s companion in arms.

Earlier rhetoric usually operated in the opposite manner. It assumed that the reader knew nothing about the story and needed to be oriented by rich descriptive passages or introductory observations. Thus the opening of *Pride and Prejudice*:

> It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife.

However little known the feelings or views of such a man may be on his first entering a neighborhood, this truth is so well fixed in the minds of the surrounding families that he is considered as the right-
ful property of some one or other of their daughters.

"My dear Mr. Bennet," said his lady to him one day, "have you heard that Netherfield Park is let at last?"

This kind of narrative moves from the general to the particular. It places the indefinite article first, and helps the reader get his bearing by degrees. But it always keeps him at a distance, because he is presumed to enter the story as an outsider and to be reading for instruction, amusement, or some high moral purpose. As in the case of the Hemingway novel, he must play his role for the rhetoric to work; but the role is completely different.

Writers have devised many other ways to initiate readers into stories. A vast distance separates Melville's "Call me Ishmael" from Milton's prayer for help to "justify the ways of God to men." But every narrative presupposes a reader, and every reading begins from a protocol inscribed within the text. The text may undercut itself, and the reader may work against the grain or wring new meaning from familiar words: hence the endless possibilities of interpretation proposed by the deconstructionists and the original readings that have shaped cultural history—Rousseau's reading of Molière's Le Misanthrope, for example, or Kierkegaard's reading of Genesis 22. But whatever one makes of it, reading has re-emerged as the central fact of literature.

If so, the time is ripe for making a juncture between literary theory and the history of books. The theory can reveal the range in potential responses to a text—that is, to the rhetorical constraints that direct reading without determining it. The history can show what readings actually took place—that is, within the limits of an imperfect body of evidence. By paying heed to history, the literary critics may avoid the danger of anachronism.

By taking account of rhetoric, the historians may find clues to behavior that would otherwise be baffling, such as the passions aroused from Clarissa to The New Eloise and from Werther to René. I would therefore argue for a dual strategy, which would combine textual analysis with empirical research. In this way it should be possible to compare the implicit readers of the texts with the actual readers of the past and thus to develop a history as well as a theory of reader response.

Such a history could be reinforced by a fifth mode of analysis, one based on analytical bibliography. By studying books as physical objects, bibliographers have demonstrated that the typographical disposition of a text can to a considerable extent determine its meaning and the way it was read. In a remarkable study of Congreve, D. F. McKenzie has shown that the bawdy, neo-Elizabethan playwright known to us from the quarto editions of the late 17th century underwent a typographical rebirth in his old age and emerged as the stately, neo-classical author of the three-volume octavo Works published in 1710. Individual words rarely changed from one edition to another, but a transformation in the design of the books gave the plays a new flavor. By adding scene divisions, grouping characters, relocating lines, and bringing out liaisons des scènes, Congreve fit his old texts into the new classical model derived from the French stage. To go from the quarto to the octavo volumes is to move from Elizabethan to Georgian England.

Roger Chartier has found similar but more sociological implications in the metamorphoses of a Spanish classic, Study of the Life of Buscón by Francisco de Quevedo. The novel was originally intended for a sophisticated public, both in Spain where it was first published in 1626 and in France where it came out in an elegant translation in 1633. But in the mid-17th century the Oudot and Garnier houses
of Troyes began to publish a series of cheap paperback editions, which made *Buscón* a staple of a variety of popular literature known as the *bibliothèque bleue* for 200 years. The popular publishers did not hesitate to tinker with the text, but they concentrated primarily on book design, what Chartier calls the "mise en livre." They broke the story into simple units, shortening sentences, subdividing paragraphs, and multiplying the number of chapters.

The new typographical structure implied a new kind of reading and a new public: humble people, who lacked the facility and the time to take in lengthy stretches of narrative. The short episodes were autonomous. They did not need to be linked by complex sub-themes and character development, because they provided just enough material to fill a *veillée*. So the book itself became a collection of fragments rather than a continuous story, and it could be put together by each reader-listener in his own way. Just how this "appropriation" took place is a mystery, because Chartier limits his analysis to the book as a physical object. But he shows how typography opens onto sociology, how the implicit reader of the author became the implicit reader of the publisher, moving down the social ladder of the Old Regime and into the world that would be recognized in the 19th century as "le grand public."

A few adventurous bibliographers and book historians have begun to speculate about long-term trends in the evolution of the book. They argue that readers respond more directly to the physical organization of texts than to their surrounding social environment. So it may be possible to learn something about the remote history of reading by practicing a kind of textual archeology. If we cannot know precisely how the Romans read Ovid, we can assume that like most Roman inscriptions, the verse contained no punctuation, paragraphing, or spaces between words. The units of sound and meaning probably were closer to the rhythms of speech than to the typographical units—the letters, words, and lines—of the printed page.

The page as a book unit dates only from the third or fourth century A.D. Before then, one unrolled a book to read it. When gathered pages (the *codex*) replaced the scroll (volumen), readers could move backwards and forwards through books. Texts became divided into segments that could be marked off and indexed. Yet long after books acquired their modern form, reading continued to be an oral experience, performed in public. At some point, perhaps in monasteries in the seventh century and certainly in the universities of the 13th century, men began to read silently and alone. The shift to silent reading might have involved a greater adjustment than the shift to the printed text, for it made reading an individual, interior experience.

Printing made a difference, of course, but it probably was less revolutionary than is commonly believed. Some books had title pages, tables of contents, indexes, pagination, and publishers who produced multiple copies from scriptoria for a large reading public before the invention of movable type. For the first half century of its existence, the printed book continued to be an imitation of the manuscript book. No doubt it was read by the same public in the same way. But after 1500 the printed book, pamphlet, broadside, map, and poster reached new kinds of readers and stimulated new kinds of reading. Increasingly standardized in its design, cheaper in its price, and widespread in its distribution, the new book transformed the world. It did not simply supply more information. It provided a mode of understanding, a basic metaphor of making sense of life.
So it was that during the 16th century men took possession of the Word. During the 17th century they began to decode the "book of nature." And in the 18th century they learned to read themselves. With the help of books, Locke and Condillac studied the mind as a tabula rasa, and Franklin formulated an epitaph for himself:

The Body of  
B. Franklin, Printer,  
Like the cover of an old Book,  
Its Contents torn out,  
And stript of its Lettering & Gilding  
Lies here, Food for Worms.  
But the Work shall not be lost;  
For it will, as he believ'd,  
Appear once more  
In a new and more elegant Edition  
Corrected and improved  
By the Author.

I don't want to make too much of the metaphor, since Franklin has already flogged it to death, but rather to return to a point so simple that it may escape our notice. Reading has a history. It was not always and everywhere the same. We may think of it as a straightforward process of lifting information from a page; but if we considered it further, we would agree that information must be sifted, sorted, and interpreted. Interpretive schemes belong to cultural configurations, which have varied enormously over time. As our ancestors lived in different mental worlds, they must have read differently, and the history of reading could be as complex as the history of thinking. Although readers and texts have varied according to social and technological circumstances, the history of reading should not be reduced to a chronology of those variations. It should go beyond them to confront the relational element at the heart of the matter: How did changing readerships construe shifting texts?

The question sounds abstruse, but a great deal hangs on it. Think how often reading has changed the course of history—Luther's reading of Paul, Marx's reading of Hegel, Mao's reading of Marx. Those points stand out in a deeper process—man's unending effort to find meaning in the world around him and within himself. If we could understand how he has read, we could come closer to understanding how he made sense of life; and in that way, the historical way, we might even satisfy some of our own craving for meaning.
Reinventing the future will involve setting goals and finding solutions for major worldwide problems of the environment, the North-South gap, arms control and East-West relations, and ethics. These are the issues that Christian Science Monitor columnist, Rushworth Kidder addresses in this timely and important book.

Each of the four "issue chapters" summarizes a problem, outlines specific goals, and lists the steps that can be taken to achieve those goals. The text itself skillfully blends reports of general principles and discussions with the viewpoints and contributions of individuals.

240 pp. $17.95
Diplomacy’s Wise Man?

SKETCHES FROM A LIFE. By George F. Kennan. Pantheon. 364 pp. $22.95


KENNAN AND THE ART OF FOREIGN POLICY. By Anders Stephanson. Harvard. 380 pp. $35

George Kennan, diplomat, historian, essayist, and diarist, is the putative philosopher-king of American diplomacy. More conspicuous than Clark Clifford, more cerebral than Paul Nitze, more compelling than Dean Rusk, he has outlived and outwritten all the rest. His prodigious meditations on foreign policy quicken with the intensity of their author’s personal experience and his awareness that the arc of his life describes nearly the entire history of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in 1904, educated at Princeton, and trained in Berlin as one of the fledgling Russianists of the Foreign Service, Kennan helped to open the first U.S. embassy in Moscow in 1934. He has observed and commented upon the behavior and culture of the Soviet Union ever since, first as a professional diplomat in the 1930s, 1944-46 and 1952, and subsequently on visits as a distinguished academician. Yet Kennan’s role in the evolving U.S.-Soviet relationship has defied easy assessment. An anecdote from Sketches from a Life dramatizes the paradox of Kennan’s career.

In December 1987, a typically self-conscious Kennan found himself in Washington (“not my Washington, of course…”) to attend a reception for General Secretary Gorbachev at the Soviet embassy. “Remembering my wife’s admonishments not to stand uncomfortably in the back-ground as I normally do on such occasions but to insist on meeting the guest of honor and adding my particular set of banalities to the others he was condemned to endure,” Kennan moved nearer to the crowd around Gorbachev.

At this point “the latter, whom I was meeting for the first time, appeared to recognize me, and amazed me by throwing out his arms and treating me to what has now become the standard statesman’s embrace. Then, still holding on to my elbows, he looked me seriously in the eye and said: ‘Mr. Kennan, we in our country believe that a man may be the friend of another country and remain, at the same time, a loyal and devoted citizen of his own; and that is the way we view you.’”

Kennan was stunned. Sixty years of Sovietology swam before his eyes. For Kennan it was a valediction, fitting yet melancholic. “If you cannot have this sort of recognition from your own government to ring down your involvement in such a relationship, it is nice to have it at least from the one-time adversary.”

The anecdote, like many others in the richly evocative Sketches, captures the ironies of George Kennan’s career. He spent decades serving the U.S. government, yet considered himself an outsider; he was known as a political realist, yet his sensibilities were those of a detached writer; for 50 years he penned prescriptions for a 20th-century democracy, yet he himself subscribed to virtues more suitable to an 18th-century aristocracy.

Since Kennan is today better known than most U.S. secretaries of state, it comes as some surprise to realize how brief was the period of his influence. It was largely confined to the period 1946-47, when he wrote three official or semi-official papers: the clarion call “Long Telegram” of February 22, 1946, from Mos-
cow; the “Mr. X” article on “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” published in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs; and the masterly report of May 25, 1947, on “Certain Aspects of the European Recovery Program from the United States’ Standpoint,” which unified State Department thinking on what became the Marshall Plan.

The “Mr. X” article in particular lingers in the collective memory of students of American foreign policy. The article spun an alluring and prophetic vision of “either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.” But the article’s influence rested on its famous prescription for “long-term, patient, but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansionist tendencies... by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy.”

It seemed that a new doctrine for U.S. foreign policy had been formulated, in terms more comprehensive than anything since the Monroe Doctrine (1823). Just as Winston Churchill’s famous phrase, the “iron curtain,” became forever associated with both him and the Cold War, so the Cold War concept of “containment” attached itself unshakably to the name of George Kennan. Henry Kissinger later observed that “Kennan came as close to authoring the diplomatic doctrine of his era as any diplomat in our history.”

Although the containment article had been published anonymously, its author was unmasked within weeks. Recognition came with a vengeance. Kennan, like many another sudden celebrity, soon felt trapped by the source of his fame. He saw his meaning distorted and his message misread. At the time, several critics, notably Walter Lippmann, excoriated containment as a “strategic monstrosity,” reactive, almost pathologically indiscriminate, and unduly militarized.

The galling truth was that Kennan sympathized with the thrust of Lippmann’s criticism. In between Kennan’s drafting the “Mr. X” article in the winter of 1946-47 and its publication the following July, President Truman announced his “blank check” doctrine. According to the doctrine, America had the right to intervene anywhere in the world where it perceived a communist threat. In 1950, the United States did precisely that, sending U.S. troops to fight in the Korean conflict. Kennan’s qualms about these developments caused him to change, in Anders Stephanson’s words, “from wanting to contain the gushing Soviet flood to wanting to contain the ensuing American one.” But Kennan’s clarification of his position was slow in coming and was not widely known till he published his two-volume Memoirs in 1967 and 1972.

The outline of Kennan’s career as sketched above appears in both of the studies reviewed here. The first, by David Mayers, a professor of political science at Boston University, is the more straightforward book—a conventional, scholarly mix of political and intellectual biography, detailed, decent, and, it must be said, dull.

Despite his soporific approach, Mayers effectively shows that Kennan’s genteel drift to the margins of American public life had already begun by 1948. Kennan had
no stomach for bureaucracy. His short-term analyses were often unrealistic. (Throughout 1948 he argued against a commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, yet in the same year he was perfectly willing to contemplate direct U.S. intervention in the Italian electoral process.) Kennan increasingly found himself out of temper with the times, the “court jester” of the State Department, as he described himself. In 1952, as ambassador to the Soviet Union, the American who above all others could lay claim to a sympathetic understanding of that country and its people was declared persona non grata; he had compared conditions in Moscow with those of his internment under the Nazis 10 year earlier. In 1953, clearly incompatible with the newly installed secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, he resigned and retreated to the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. There, with only short intermissions, he has remained, writing his polished books, articles, and pronouncements on foreign policy and Western civilization.

It is Kennan’s realism, both as a diplomat and as a writer-analyst, that Mayers in conclusion praises: “Kennan,” he writes, “has crusaded against the crusading and moralistic spirit of American foreign policy, has insisted on some version of the national interest as primary, and has uncompromisingly affirmed the superiority of diplomacy over the rigidity of military thinking on the one hand and naive internationalism on the other.”

By contrast with Mayers, Anders Stephanson, a historian at Rutgers, has written a vigorous intellectual study, not exactly a biography, nor yet a history, but something akin to a sustained argument in historical perspective, a critical examination of the very thing that makes Kennan so interesting—his thinking. To understand so unusual a political creature as Kennan, Stephanson blends the theoretical stratagems of political science, ethics, and even aesthetics. For the original Kennan he comes up with an original label: “organicist conservative.” By this label, Stephanson distinguishes Kennan from American conservatives who place excessive faith in individualism, competition, and material values, all of which Kennan views with a skeptical eye. Kennan’s organicist conservatism is at odds with America’s blatantly “inorganic” mobility and mass-produced culture. Although Kennan’s vision of traditional values, elitism, and benevolent hierarchy did not force him to leave the country, as similar visions did Henry James and T. S. Eliot, it has made him, as he described himself in Sketches, an “expatriate in time,” in his own “internal migration.”

Stephanson’s study shows how Kennan’s outsider status has served him well. “It is [his] very marginality that has allowed him to see things outside the common purview and to argue, rightly or wrongly, what no one in a ‘responsible’ political position could.” Kennan’s elegant self-contradictions—the “internal expatriate” involved in public affairs, the 18th-century elitist working for a 20th-century democracy—made him “not always a great diplomat,” Stephanson argues. But he quickly adds that Kennan “was a great analyst and policy-maker, one of the very few this country has produced in foreign affairs, perhaps the finest since John Quincy Adams.”

The final irony of Kennan’s long, distinguished career is being played out even now. Kennan’s renown, which began with his authoring the Cold War doctrine of containment, has concluded with applause for his declaring that doctrine at an end. On April 4, 1989, 42 years after publishing his anonymous “Mr. X” article, the 85-year-old Kennan testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the future of Soviet-American relations. “Whatever reasons there may once have been for regarding the Soviet Union primarily as a possible, if not probable, military opponent,” he declared, “the time for that sort of thing has clearly passed.” As the session ended, the entire committee, a body not usually given to sentimental excess, rose in standing ovation.

—Alex Danchev, ’89
Black Models, White Myths


Most images of black people in Western art have been painted, drawn, modelled, or carved by white hands. Does this division between artist and subject matter—between, as Hugh Honour says, “black models and white myths”—present a problem for the art historian? Traditional art historians would answer no. Art, scholars once assumed, exists in its own realm of imaginative experience, abiding by its own rules of stylistic development, beauty, and iconography.

In recent years, however, this faith in art as existing in a world apart has been challenged by such art historians as Leo Steinberg, Michael Baxandall, and T. J. Clark. They bring the study of society, economics, gender, and other power relations to bear upon the practice of art criticism. Hugh Honour, an English art historian, did not formerly belong among these innovators. Indeed, his Neo-Classicism (1968), The New Golden Land (1975), and Romanticism (1979) fit squarely into the “old school.”

But Honour has changed. Perhaps the study of blacks in Western art mandates a bold, new departure. In any case, this study, commissioned by the Menil Foundation, raises social implications that go far beyond polite museum talk. Images of blacks, Honour writes, “are no mere historical documents. They have a continuing relevance as the products of a white society whose opinions and acts have blighted and continue to blight the lives of millions of human beings . . . . No paintings or sculptures could more clearly demonstrate the role of the arts in maintaining an established order with its ranks, marginalizations, and exclusions.”

By redefining art as “socially constructed,” Honour in effect makes three points: Works of art are not the fabrication of some disinterested ideal of beauty; they do not hold a mirror of verisimilitude to a “pre-existing reality”; and finally, they are assertions of social power.

To make his case, Honour takes the reader on a chronological journey around both sides of the North Atlantic world. It begins in the late 18th century, when abolitionism became a force to be reckoned with. The goal of abolitionists in Britain and America was, of course, to make blacks into free subjects. But their efforts had an unintended consequence: They made blacks into the subjects of art.

Before abolitionists drew attention to the slavery question, blacks were an exotic marginalia in Western art. Yet in the American and European paintings and sculptures that began to portray them, blacks rarely appeared as the “free subjects” of the abolitionist vision. Indeed, artistic attempts to disassociate black people from demeaning circumstances often ended up
creating subtler forms of denigration or condescension. Honour analyzes how the abolitionist medallion, *Am I not a Man and a Brother?* (1787), was effective precisely because it presented the black man on bended knees, a servile position that reassured whites ambivalent about abolitionism. Art that was free of racial stereotypes—like the *Shaw Memorial* (1897), Augustus Saint-Gauden's heroic monument to black Civil War soldiers which now stands in the Boston Commons—often had difficulty in finding a suitable site or offended white audiences.

The Civil War and the emancipation of American slaves marked a turning point: Despite the persistence of slavery in other parts of the world (including the former Portuguese colony, Brazil), abolitionism ceased to be a popular cause in Europe. Emancipation had, it appears, also emancipated the white social conscience. What followed, Honour notes, was a remarkable increase in erotic depictions of female slaves, which suggests that black female figures "appealed, and may always have appealed, to libidinous as much as philanthropic instincts."

Honour concludes his study of the social role of images with late 19th-century colonialism, a system of domination which received ample justification in works produced by artists throughout the Western world. Although some artists painted African blacks as naked and savage, an art less blatantly racist—such as John Mossman's bronze relief for the *Livingstone Monument* (1877) or Francois Biard's *Proclamation of the Liberation of Blacks in the Colonies* (1849)—portrayed colonialization as a process that benefited the native people.

But the closer Honour draws to our own period, and to the works of modernism, the less he seems to believe that social construction is fundamental to art. Interpreting the work of Manet, Matisse, and Picasso, he fails to challenge the now-dated notion that in modern art the subject is secondary and incidental to the artist's style and individuality of expression—and, indeed, free from ideology. To claim, as Honour does, that even in the late 19th century, when colonialism was alive and flourishing, European artists regarded blacks "simply as subjects for works of art with or without symbolic overtones" defies the logic of his earlier argument.

Consider one of the most famous early modernist paintings, Edouard Manet's *Olympia* (1863). The fragile hauteur of the naked, reclining prostitute who dominates that work is made all the more poignant by the presence of the black serving woman who stands behind her, tendering a bouquet of flowers. The servant's blackness is not merely a contrast with the pallor of the prostitute's flesh; it is also a reminder of the buying and selling of people, an activity that has continued even after the abolition of slavery. Honour does not ignore the social undercurrent of *Olympia*, but he relegates it to secondary significance. He lets aesthetics crowd out ethics.

Honour's lapse is indicative of the "growing pains" of a discipline coming to terms with ideas that most literary critics have long accepted—namely, that words construct "realities" which serve those who use them. Except for the modern period, Honour reveals a parallel truth about image-making, about its relationship to social power and audiences' tendency (including our own, if we are careless) to view the image, once made, merely as illustration. In our culture where we are bombarded by images—of race, gender, and ethnicity—an awareness of what art does is as urgently needed as ever.

—Elizabeth Johns, '86
NEW TITLES

History

THE DIARIO OF CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS'S FIRST VOYAGE TO AMERICA 1492–1493. Abstracted by Fray Bartolome de las Casas, trans. by Oliver Dunn and James E. Kelley, Jr. Univ. of Okla. 504 pp. $57.50

SPAIN AND ITS WORLD 1500–1700. By J. H. Elliott. Yale. 295 pp. $27.50

We have grown accustomed to commemorating centennials and even bicentennials. But a cinquecentennial is something of a rarity—nearly as rare as discovering a nuevo mundo was in 1492. Among the profusion of books and exhibitions scheduled for 1992, this beautiful edition of Columbus's log of his 1492–93 journey has arrived early. Here is the ultimate travel adventure: Through its archaic prose, we witness again the frustration, the endless days without sight of land, Columbus's lies to his men about the distances, the insubordination of one of the captains, and the Spaniards' curiosity about the people they met.

To place Columbus's diary in its historical context, however, we need to turn to the collection of essays by the preeminent historian of early modern Spain, J. H. Elliott, now of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. Elliott argues that the discovery of the New World undermined the Christian scholastic worldview as effectively as Galileo or Copernicus or even Protestantism had. The existence of unknown peoples on the Earth, Elliott notes, compelled Europeans to re-examine the old verities, including the very nature of man.

Although Elliott's essays range widely—from the mental world of Hernán Cortés to the nature of 17th-century revolutions—his preoccupation is with Spain's startling decline within a century after Columbus's discovery of the New World. It is this theme of decline that first attracted Elliott to Spanish history: As a student in England after World War II, he suspected "that the collective predicament of the last great imperial generation of Spaniards... was not entirely dissimilar to the collective predicament of my own generation."

Elliott's explanation for Spain's decline is perhaps not unfamiliar: moral degeneration, the decay of rural communities, the concentration of wealth in the hands of the profligate few, competition from foreigners, and the loss of military vigor. More surprising is Elliott's depiction of how "economic decline and cultural achievement [walked] hand in hand." As the Spanish political empire outwardly decayed, Spain turned inward and flourished artistically, creating a "golden age" still visible in the paintings of Murillo and Velasquez. There may be a certain advantage to living in dreams of past glory, as is shown by the most famous, if fictional, citizen of early 17th-century Spain: Don Quixote de la Mancha.


Rome is located not only on the Italian peninsula; it is also a city in the American imagina-
tion. Vance, a professor of English at Boston University, wants to understand how that Eternal City of the imagination, America’s Rome, was built. He is, in effect, writing two histories simultaneously, recording changes both “in America’s own idea of itself” and “in Rome as the place against which that idea could be measured.” Rome thus becomes a kind of litmus test, indicating, by their varying responses to it, Americans’ changing values.

No Americans ever came to Rome without first having visited it in their reading and their schooling. The writers, artists, diplomats, and churchmen whom Vance shadows through their Roman holiday all were testing their preconceived images, their “American Rome,” against the brute experience of the city. The confrontation invariably created something new. As Thornton Wilder has Julius Caesar say in The Ides of March (1948), “Rome can exist only in so far as I have shaped it to my idea.”

Vance’s method of dividing each American’s impressions of Rome into separate categories like classical, “papal,” and contemporary is unfortunately impressionistic and inconclusive. Yet Vance comes up with surprises. So many well-known Americans have admired Rome—the Founding Fathers, for its ancient republican virtues; literary expatriates, for its traditions—that it may be assumed that Rome always made a beau ideal for Americans abroad. Hardly. Throughout the 19th century, American visitors bemoaned the corrupting influence of the city: Mark Twain thought the Colosseum vile, and Henry James caricatured the Pope as a “flaccid old woman waving his ridiculous fingers over the prostrate multitude.” Only with Edith Wharton’s Italian Backgrounds (1905), encouraging Americans to reconsider “objects at which the guidebook tourist has been taught to look askance,” did Rome begin to enjoy a steadily good press. Yet because one American’s impressions inevitably contradicted another’s, Vance ends up describing most Roman artifacts as having opposing meanings for Americans. The Colosseum, for example, has evoked for some Americans, like the political cartoonist Thomas Nast, our own imperial destiny, but to others, such as Henry Adams, it has whispered prophecies of our imperial doom.

LAND WITHOUT GHOSTS: Chinese Impressions of America From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present. Trans. and Edited by R. David Arkush and Leo O. Lee. Univ. of Calif. 309 pp. $25

We Americans are all too familiar with the innumerable, often unflattering accounts that European visitors have written of the United States, from Mrs. Trollope in the 1830s to Gunnar Myrdal during the 1940s. But what have visitors coming from the other direction, from China, thought of us? Travel writing has been a major literary genre in China since antiquity. But “we are amazingly uninformed” about what this genre says about America, historian John King Fairbanks has observed. Now Arkush, a historian at the University of Iowa, and Lee, director of East Asian studies at the University of Chicago, have assembled 150 years of Chinese observations of America.

Americans once considered China exotic, which is exactly how 19th-century Chinese thought of America, a wonderland at once amazing and frightening. The young interpreter Zhang Deyi, visiting America in 1868, was astounded at everything from the way “barbarian [American] speech sounds like jiujiudongdong” to how Americans “go to bed and when they get up there is the ritual of touching lips.” By the turn of the century, however, the Chinese were studying America as a model for modernization. The young reformer Liang Qichao in 1903 contrasted American organization to Chinese haphazardness: “Westerners walk together like a formation of geese; Chinese are like scattered ducks.”

Chinese observations of America are at times so different from Europeans’ that it almost seems they were reporting about different countries. After the French Revolution, European travelers, finding no feudal or aristocratic traditions here, hailed America as a classless society. Coming from China, where an aristoc-
racy of talent had replaced hereditary officeholders a thousand years before, visitors saw the immobility and inequality of American society. Liang Qichao astonished his Chinese readers by reporting that 70 percent of America’s wealth was in the hands of one-fourth of one percent of the population. Suffering racial slights themselves, the Chinese were sensitive to racism directed against Afro-Americans. When the anthropologist Fei Xiiaotong translated Margaret Mead’s book on the American character, And Keep Your Powder Dry: An Anthropologist Looks at America (1942), he took Mead to task for not considering American blacks. On his own initiative he wrote and added a chapter on that theme.

Yet on one American characteristic Chinese and Europeans agreed, even though they approached it from sharply different angles of vision. While Tocqueville noted Americans’ obsession with the future, driven by “visions of what will be,” the Chinese were fascinated by the past, or rather its absence, in the American consciousness. In 1943, Fei Xiiaotong commented that America was “a world without ghosts . . . In a world without ghosts, life is free and easy. American eyes can gaze straight ahead . . . I do not envy their lives.” It is not for a new perspective on his own country, however, that an American reader will turn to this book. Explaining Chinese stereotypes, these impressions help to illuminate Chinese-American relationships, past and present.

Contemporary Affairs

MORE LIKE US: Making America Great Again. By James Fallows. Houghton Mifflin. 245 pp. $18.95


"Japan is strong because of its groups; America, because of its individuals." With this simple comparison, Fallows, an Atlantic Monthly editor, parts company with American business theorists who breathlessly promote Japan, Inc., as an economic model. Japan is a strong economy, Fallows allows, but only at the expense of the individual Japanese: Consumers pay far more for native-grown Japanese rice than banned imported rice would cost; only 37 percent of Japanese houses have sewer service; if a Japanese quits his company job he is unlikely to be hired elsewhere. Celebrating America’s individualism and social mobility, Fallows suggests that, instead of emulating the Japanese, we should stress our unique virtues and become "more like us."

Japan’s own “uniqueness” has never been made more clear than in The Enigma of Japanese Power. Americans tend to view Japan as a nation roughly like their own, with a responsible central government overseeing a capitalist free-market economy. In fact, argues Van Wolferen, a Dutch journalist who has lived in Japan for nearly 25 years, responsible government is as much a fiction in Japan as a free-market economy is. "No one in Japan," he says, "is given the unambiguous right to rule. No one person or group of people is ever really accountable for what Japan does." Instead of a government in control, the Japanese economy is divided up, or "Balkanized," into sectors. Each sector (e.g., finance, agriculture) regulates itself to prevent real competition. The heads of the various sectors share the same world-view, having all been educated at Tokyo University. But they have no common authority, no decision-making body, above them. Among the self-governing sectors the buck never stops passing: Japan is a series of administrators without a true government, or, as Van Wolferen calls it in his subtitle, "a stateless nation." Consequently, the nominal government, with little real power, can sign anti-protectionist treaties with foreign trading partners and profess concern about East-West trading imbalances. But the treaties and the concern leave unaffected the huge industrial conglomerates that continue flooding the world markets with cheap exports while charging exorbitant prices for foreign goods at home. So much would be required to turn Japan into a genuine, modern constitutionalist state—the creation of independent political parties, an inde-
dependent judiciary, and individual political awareness—that it would certainly threaten the present constellation of administrators who mistake their survival for the survival of Japan. To convert Japanese subjects into genuine citizens, Van Wolfere concludes "would require realignments of power akin to those of a genuine revolution."

Although The Enigma of Japanese Power has caused an uproar in Japan, Van Wolfere is not condemning a society which has almost no street crime, no homeless, 100 percent literacy, and—to be sure—huge trade surpluses. But, as Fallows observed, "Japanese-American relationships have a fragile, walking-on-eggs quality, which makes people think it's dangerous to talk frankly in public."


Beyond the daily drone of Washington's debates over defense and foreign policy, there are a few hopeful signs that the crippling post-Vietnam schism within the nation's foreign policy establishment may slowly be healing itself. Barbarian Sentiments is one of them. In the lucid prose one would expect of a regular contributor to the New Yorker, Pfaff takes his readers on a tour of the globe, at every stop pointing out how badly Americans have misunderstood the forces at work (especially nationalism) in the nations where they have become involved since 1945.

Pfaff's assessments are bold and refreshing. The strength of West Germany's peace movement, for example, he ascribes to Germany's age-old failure to achieve a satisfactory political and cultural identity for itself. As a result, he observes, "Germany has consistently looked for justification in causes larger than mere national aggrandizement." But he is also capable of gross misjudgments (dismissing communist ideology as a cause of the Khmer Rouge's genocide in Cambodia in 1975–79).

The world, Pfaff argues, is a much more complicated place than most Americans have appreciated, the problems of nations more intractable. He decries the naive American optimism that has given birth to "an activist foreign policy which presumes that nations and international society can be changed into something more acceptable to Americans." Curiously, however, he seems to think that only conservatives have been guilty of this naïveté; liberals prone to it are exonerated simply by omission. And Pfaff seems convinced that the impersonal forces of nationalism and history run so deep that neither men nor ideas can greatly alter the fate of nations. At times, Pfaff seems to collapse into a kind of "neoisolationism" or to embrace the politics of resignation.

What is most encouraging about the emergence of thinkers like Pfaff is the assumptions they share (without acknowledging it) with others across the political spectrum. If liberals follow Pfaff's lead, they soon will find themselves competing with conservatives over who has the more "realistic" view of the world and of American interests rather than the most morally unimpeachable one. Such realism would be a very good thing for the United States—and possibly for the world.

THE POLITICS OF EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION. By Richard Stuart Olson with Bruno Podesta and Joanne M. Nigg. Princeton. 187 pp. $19.95

By June 28, 1981, all outbound flights from Lima, Peru, were booked; Peru's first census in many years was postponed; property values had dropped drastically; those who could afford it had left town. An unknown U.S. government physicist, Dr. Brian Brady of the U.S. Bureau of Mines, had driven the entire population of Lima to panic by predicting, almost to the day, a disastrous earthquake that would level that country's capital.

Olson, an Arizona State University political scientist, poses a vexing question: When scientists make a prediction, what are the politicians to do? The question was, in this case, further complicated by the fact that Brady had invented a method of prediction that contradicted all the accepted ones. Traditionally, earthquake predictions are, at best, carefully hedged approximations, based on past earthquake patterns in a particular area. But Brady claimed that, given enough seismic, geophysical, and microphysical data, he had a math-
The OFDA had always operated after a disaster happened. But if Brady were right, the agency would become a headline-grabbing hero that had averted, or at least mitigated, a catastrophe. The more the OFDA championed Brady's prediction, the more the U.S. Geological Survey—the traditional home of earth scientists—denounced it. The stakes were high. If Brady's prediction proved correct, most established earth scientists would become semi-obsolete creatures, and, indeed, the Survey might well lose its funding for earthquake studies. Despite the Survey's opposition, however, the OFDA was awarded nine million dollars for seismic and precautionary studies in Peru. The U.S. government did not want to risk the charge of being careless about the lives of five and a half million people in a country with a history of natural catastrophes.

June 28, 1981: When the long-dreaded day arrived, the earthquake did not happen. But the issues the prediction raised are far from dead; similar situations will certainly recur elsewhere. The moral that the seismological community took from this controversy, however, is not encouraging. According to Olson, earth scientists no longer publish their predictions and are reluctant to talk with anybody from the media: "By its very existence, the controversy has...[convinced] scientists to stay quiet and announce predictions only after the fact."

").

Arts & Letters


Until his death this past September, Robert Penn Warren was not only the grand old man of American letters; he was the chief exhibit that a "man of letters" was still possible. During his lifetime (1905–89), he wrote admired poems, novels, short stories, criticism, and essays—more than 50 books in all. In addition to being the only person to receive a Pulitzer Prize for both fiction (in 1947 for All the King's Men) and poetry (twice, in 1958 and 1979), he became in 1986 America's first Poet Laureate.

During the 1940s, Warren was a founding practitioner of the "New Criticism," of which these essays are excellent examples. Before New Criticism, the work of critics was often a casual affair, based on subjective impressions or inferences about the author's intention drawn from biographical clues. For the New Critics, as Warren demonstrated, the "evidence is [in] the poem itself" while "the criterion is that of internal consistency."

These 13 essays deal with familiar figures—Coleridge, Hawthorne, Melville, Twain, Conrad, Hemingway, Faulkner—but Warren seldom confined himself to well-worn paths. Melville's poetry catches his eye, not Moby Dick. In a surprising essay about John Greenleaf Whittier, Warren asks, "What does the past mean to an American?" This question reverberates throughout Warren's poetry and fiction as well as his essays. (It may also explain why Warren's novels have fallen out of favor: Rooted in history and community, they do not suit a largely individualistic, present-minded reading public.)
Of Faulkner, Warren notes how the great Mississippian dug into his native soil but at the same time created his own myths. By contrast, Warren took the legends that filled the slow, murmured porch talk of his Kentucky boyhood and forced them to reveal what it means to live in a particular time and place with a particular history. The observation that Warren made about Nathaniel Hawthorne could serve as an epitaph to his own career: “What [he] found in the past was not the quaint charm of distance but the living issues of moral and psychological definition.”

**THE COMPLETE FICTION OF BRUNO SCHULZ:** The Street of Crocodiles and Sanatorium Under the Sign of the Hourglass. By Bruno Schulz. Trans. by Celina Wienieowska. Walker and Company. 311 pp. $22.95


With novels of fable and myth now in vogue, it is little wonder that the star of Polish writer Bruno Schulz (1892-1942) is on the rise. I. B. Singer—one of a long rollcall of writers now praising Schulz’s originality—compares him to both Franz Kafka and Marcel Proust, saying that Schulz “succeeded in reaching depths that neither of them reached.” Such acclaim would have terrified the modest Schulz. Like Emily Dickinson (in the delicacy of her perceptions, his nearest American counterpart), he knew that his creativity depended on the protective coloring of a quiet, hermit-like background.

In Schulz’s case, that background was the provincial Polish town of Drohobycz, which he made famous in *The Street of Crocodiles* (now re-issued in a hardback edition, accompanied by Schulz’s lesser fiction).

_Street_ is both example and product of Schulz’s wish to “mature into childhood.” (By childhood, he meant that time when we see is still permeated by our imagination.) Drohobycz, in Schulz’s “child’s vision,” appears as delightful as a town balanced on a highwire, populated with improbable dreamers who hatch rare bird’s eggs in attics, treat tailors dummies courteously, and where boys tossing pennies turn into oracles.

When the Polish novelist Witold Gombrowicz claimed that Schulz’s Drohobycz would mean nothing to the proverbial middle-class doctor’s wife, Schulz replied that the spiritual world can be undermined by depression, doubt, the attack of a malicious critic, but not by a fictitious doctor’s wife. Schulz’s defense of his art, as well as a sense of his life, is woven through *Letters and Drawings of Bruno Schulz*. His daily life—teaching arts and crafts in a boys’ school while living at home with his Jewish parents—appears as ordinary as his fiction was singular. The only dramatic event of his life was his death, from a Gestapo officer’s bullet in 1942. But his letters and drawings, like his fiction, show how he bore a quotidian existence that he compared to a room without an exit. “I have only to imagine a door…. There is no such room so walled-up that it will not open with such a trusty door, if you have but the strength to insinuate it.”

**Science & Technology**

**THE DYNAMICS OF PROGRESS:** Time, Method, and Measure. By Samuel L. Macey. Univ. of Ga. 288 pp. $35

**EMPIRES OF TIME:** Calendars, Clocks, and Cultures. By Anthony Aveni. Basic Books. 352 pp. $24.95

St. Augustine once said of time: “If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain it to him who asks me, I do not know.” Do we have a better understanding of time today? Macey and Aveni provide quite different answers.

Macey, an English professor at the University of Victoria, views the way we measure time as part of a much broader effort by man to control his universe. Standardizing languages, weights and measures, production and distribution led man to the brink of the Industrial Revolution. But it took a realization that production could be measured against time for in-
dustrialists such as England's James Watt in the 19th century and America's Henry Ford in the early 20th to transform the workplace. Indeed, Macey shows, technological advances throughout history both demanded and created increasingly exact measures of time and distance. Before trains, people could not travel fast or far enough in a single day to be concerned with variances in "local" time; telegraphs also brought confusion to long-distance communications. In response, the International Meridian Conference of 1884 was convened to divide the globe into 24 equal time zones, to give people communicating across vast distances a common time reference. As much as anything, Macey says, this decision marks "the beginning of our global village."

Macey views man's endless quest to quantify as both measure and means of his advancement. But Aveni, an astronomer and anthropologist at Colgate University, wonders how man got so out of step with the rhythms of nature. "With the development of technology," he says, "we have removed our reckoning of time from nature's realm." Since 1967, for instance, what we know as a "second" has become defined by the vibrations of cesium 133 atoms, a measurement so precise it can be subdivided into one billion trillion parts. And from the pendulum clock, patented by Christiaan Huygens in 1657, we have now come to the hydrogen laser, a device for measuring time accurate to one second in 50 million years. But tying time to the cesium atom means severing our connections to the Earth's rotation. Does a better clock make man happier or more productive?

To find an answer, Aveni studies various non-Western cultures. The Nuer tribe on the upper Nile, for instance, never developed a linear notion of time: They experience events more in relation to natural cycles (e.g., seasons are wet or dry). Anthropologist E. E. Evans-Pritchard said of the Nuer, "I do not think that they ever experience the same feeling of fighting against time" as those in the West.

The Western quest for an orderly worldview, evident even in our creation myths, has during this century run head-on into the scientific discovery that the universe is constantly changing, possibly ever-expanding. "We find ourselves in the role of bystanders, not participants," Aveni says, in our efforts to understand cosmic time. Without "a change of philosophy," he suggests, "that gets us back in the picture as active participants," it seems "cosmic determinism is sure to defeat us."


"Biotechnology" conjures up images of scientific wizards working with organisms too small for the eye to see, using methods too grand for the imagination to grasp. Unfortunately, it's only when scientists become—or become allied with—marketeers and investors that the real biotechnologists emerge.

"Biotechnology—the very word was invented on Wall Street," writes Teitelman, a senior editor at Financial World and a columnist for Oncology Times. He shows how Isaac and David Blech, two brash young Wall Street dealmakers, decided in 1980 to capitalize on the public's growing faith that molecular biologists could cure cancer. They created Genetic Systems, lured research scientists away from colleges, and promoted a few minor discoveries as major advances toward the cure of cancer. The result: The company's stock skyrocketed, and the original investors made millions when Bristol-Myers bought out the company in 1985. (And we are still a long way from a cure.) Biotech companies such as Genetic Systems routinely feature "advisory boards, mice, consultants, forecasts, and laboratory miracles," says Teitelman. But the real miracles—the cures—have yet to be produced.

It is not the business but the social side of biotechnology—the opportunities for abusing biotechnological information—that concerns Nelkin, a sociologist at New York University, and Tancredi, director of the University of Texas's Health Law Program. Diagnostic testing,
once confined to the medical system and clinical situations, is now employed by insurance companies and by schools, in the workplace and in the courts. Tancredi and Nelson acknowledge the benefits of genetic testing (e.g., sparing parents the agony of “bearing a child with an untreatable disease”). Yet they worry that a new discriminatory apparatus is being introduced into American life with little awareness of, or debate about, its consequences. They doubt the value of using biotechnology to diagnose maladies that have no cure: Such a diagnosis cannot help a person, but it can cause him anxiety, will likely increase his insurance premium, and may cost him his job. Schools have recommended sedation for children whose tests indicated hyperactivity. But which is the greater good, the authors ask, society’s need for a quiet classroom or the child’s right to individuality? Too often, they contend, “the new diagnostics are providing theoretical models that explain complex human behavior in simple biological terms.” And increased diagnostic testing, Tancredi and Nelson argue, runs “the risk of expanding the number of people who simply do not fit. . . . We risk increasing the number of people defined as unemployable, untrainable, or uninsurable. We risk creating a biologic underclass.”

SEEING VOICES: A Journey into the World of the Deaf. By Oliver Sacks. Univ. of Calif. 171 pp. $15.95

In his best-selling The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat (1986), neurologist Oliver Sacks intrigued readers by showing how patients dismissed as “retarded” or “idiots” actually created comprehensible worlds; these realms, however, operated on principles very different from those governing “normal” reality. Now Sacks has undertaken a new journey of understanding, this time into the universe of the deaf.

Sacks’s involvement with the deaf began when he stopped viewing them in purely medical terms, as “diseased ears” or “otologically impaired.” Instead, he started thinking of them “not as deaf but as Deaf, as members of a linguistic community.” These revelations forced Sacks to reconsider the relation of speech to thought: “Is our humanity partly dependent on language? What happens to us if we fail to acquire any language?” The answer can be saddening: Deaf people who do not learn sign language can only indicate a visible object and are thus condemned to a narrow existence in the present, without the shadow of reflection. They cannot generalize or think abstractly; they cannot even ask a question. Sacks compares them to Adam at the beginning of creation, before he learned to name the creatures.

Seeing Voices is an argument for, and indeed a hymn to, American Sign Language (or “Sign”). Pronouncing words and reading lips are painfully difficult for deaf people to learn. By contrast, Sacks shows, Sign comes to a deaf person naturally and even becomes his “inner speech.” Not all workers with the deaf, however, share Sacks’s enthusiasm. Sign has been criticized as a makeshift language that segregates the deaf from society; 30 years ago, even the deaf accepted that it was a crude gestural substitute for speech. But Sacks rejects all such criticism of Sign. Employing his knowledge of neurology, Sacks demonstrates that Sign uses the same parts and functions of the brain that other linguistic grammars do: “Sign is a language and is treated as such by the brain, even though it is visual rather than auditory.” Sign, Sacks concludes, “is biologically and unsilenceably the voice of the deaf.”
NEW FROM LIBERTY FUND
THE FABLE OF THE BEES
OR PRIVATE VICES, PUBLICK BENEFITS
By Bernard Mandeville
With a Commentary Critical, Historical and Explanatory
By F. B. Kaye

"Mandeville is able to offer possibly the first systematically derived account of politics and social order based on 'interests,' both rational and irrational. In so doing, he elevated the individual and offered a new view of morality that contained the seeds for our contemporary understanding of human freedom and the good society." —Roger Michener, Princeton University

Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733) had a profound impact on economics, ethics, and social philosophy through The Fable of the Bees, one of the most significant English works of the eighteenth-century. F.B. Kaye's beautiful edition and masterful commentary is again available for the first time in years.

Volume II - 481 + v pages. Preface and index.
Hardcover $15.00 each or $30.00 the set 0-86597-072-6
Paperback $ 7.50 each or $15.00 the set 0-86597-075-0
LibertyClassics, 1989

Prepayment is required on all orders not for resale. We pay book rate postage on prepaid orders. Please allow approximately 4 weeks for delivery. All orders from outside the United States must be prepaid in U.S. dollars. To order, or for a copy of our NEW 1989 catalogue, write:
Liberty Fund, Inc., Department AA11, 7440 N. Shadeland Avenue, Indianapolis, IN 46250

Please send me: The Fable of the Bees
Liberty Fund edition, 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Hardcover set</th>
<th>$30.00</th>
<th>Hardcover each</th>
<th>$15.00</th>
<th>Paperback set</th>
<th>$15.00</th>
<th>Paperback each</th>
<th>$ 7.50</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indiana residents add 5% sales tax</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We pay book rate postage. Please allow approximately 4 weeks for delivery. All orders must be prepaid in U.S. dollars.

☐ Enclosed is my check or money order made payable to Liberty Fund, Inc.
☐ Please send me a copy of your NEW 1989 catalogue.

Name ____________________________
Address __________________________
City/State/Zip ______________________

Mail to: Liberty Fund, Inc.
7440 North Shadeland Ave.
Department AA11
Indianapolis, IN 46250
Knowledge Is Power
The Diffusion of Information in Early America, 1700-1865
RICHARD D. BROWN, University of Connecticut

"Information is an elemental dimension of society, yet one that has remained almost untouched by the historical imagination. Knowledge Is Power—a pathbreaking study of patterns of information use and distribution in early America—shows beyond doubt that historians must look afresh at this crucial axis of social life. A provocative and insightful synthesis."—Dan Schiller, UCLA

October 1989 384 pp.; 15 halftones and 4 maps $39.95

The Insecure Alliance
Energy Crises and Western Politics Since 1944
ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN, Brandeis University

"Kapstein's book is an excellent study of the crucial role of energy and energy politics in the evolution and stability of the Western political and military alliance."—Robert Gilpin, Princeton University

October 1989 288 pp.; 2 linecuts, 3 maps $35.00

States of Siege
U.S. Prison Riots, 1971-1986
BERT USEEM and PETER KIMBALL, both of the University of Illinois, Chicago

"The book offers a thorough review of available data on a set of recent prison riots and also builds on a great deal of original data gathered from interviews at several of the prisons. I found it all quite engrossing."—Richard E. Ratcliff, Syracuse University

1989 292 pp.; 8 photos, 5 blueprints $29.95

Prices and publication dates are subject to change and good only in the U.S.
To order, send check or money order to: Department IMAG
To order by phone using major credit cards, please call (212) 679-7300 ext. 7106

Oxford University Press
200 Madison Avenue • New York, N.Y. 10016

MATTERS THAT MATTER

Now back in print!
Are Quanta Real?
A Galilean Dialogue
By J. M. Jauch with a new Foreword by Douglas R. Hofstadter
"... thought-provoking and delightful. I believe that anyone interested in nature’s deepest secrets would find great stimulation in this charmingly written little gem of a book."—Douglas Hofstadter, author of Godel, Escher, Bach
cloth $22.50 paper $7.95

Philosophers in Exile
The Correspondence of Alfred Schulz and Aron Gurwitsch, 1939-1939
Edited by Richard Grathoff
Translated by J. Claude Evans
Foreword by Maurice Natanson
one of the great intellectual correspondences of this century
—Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
... the best introduction there is today to phenomenological philosophy and sociology
—Fred Kersten, Husserl Studies
$39.95

Guide to Research and Scholarship in Hungary
Volumes II and III
Edited by Marton Tolnai and Peter Vas-Zollan
Comprehensive and up-to-date information about Hungarian academic research and Hungarian institutes, archives, and libraries. Published in association with the International Research and Exchanges Board and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
$75.00

People or Monsters?
And Other Stories and Reportage from China after Mao
By Liu Binyan
Edited by Perry Link
Introduction by Leo Ou-fan Lee
An outstanding example of “reportage,” or fictionalized social analysis, the title piece of this collection was an immediate sensation when it was published in China in 1979. The courageous honesty of “People or Monsters?” infuses all the pieces here.
cloth $39.95 paper $7.95

At bookstores, or direct from

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Dept. AOAR • 10th & Morton Sts., Bloomington, IN 47405 • 812-855-6804
The Greenwich Workshop invites you to enter the Land of the Dragon through the world of limited edition fine art prints. Available only through your authorized Greenwich Workshop dealer. Please call or write for the name of your nearest dealer and a free full color brochure.

THE GREENWICH WORKSHOP, INC.
30 Lindeman Drive
Trumbull, CT 06611
(203) 371-6568
Toll-free, outside CT (800) 243-4246

THE GREENWICH WORKSHOP LTD.
3781 Victoria Park Avenue, Unit 6
Scarborough, Ontario, CAN M1W 3K5
(416) 490-8342
Toll-free, in CAN (800) 263-4001
BEIJING JOURNAL

Memory, Commemoration, and the Plight of China’s Intellectuals

by Vera Schwarcz

"The great events, they are not our loudest but our stillest hours. Not around the inventors of new noises, but around the inventors of new values does the world revolve. It revolves inaudibly."
—Friedrich Nietzsche

T
oday, China is in grave danger of losing its past. Like a snail robbed of its shell, it has nothing to pull back into, little to carry forward with certainty. The mass movement for democracy in the spring of 1989 already did not happen. The government claims it was nothing but “counter-revolutionary turmoil” instigated by a handful of “hooligans.” The students and ordinary citizens killed in Beijing may not be mourned publicly. Remembrance of the dead—long the anchor of personal and familial identity in China—is crushed under the weight of officially mandated amnesia. Instead of personal memory, for the moment, China is going through a season of loud, official commemorations: first, in the spring of this year, the 70th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement of 1919; and now, this October, the 40th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic. Can commemoration replace memory?

The use and abuse of the past has long been a problem in China and particularly for China’s intellectuals. But the urgency of the problem revealed itself only gradually during the celebrations, discussions, and demonstrations that I witnessed or took part in during April and May of this year. I had gone to China to attend two conferences dealing with the 70th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement of 1919. One took place at the Sleeping Buddha Temple on the outskirts of Beijing from April 30 to May 3. The second took place in downtown Beijing from May 5 to May 8 and was sponsored by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. At both, China scholars from the mainland, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and the United States gathered to celebrate an earlier student-led movement for democracy. But for a few days in early May, it seemed as though the present had overtaken the past. It seemed as if public commemoration of the event of 1919 would have to be expanded to accommodate the dreams of a new generation of Chinese intellectuals.

During the May Fourth Movement of 1919, students and teachers of Beijing University had taken to the streets to protest China’s mistreatment at the Versailles Peace Conference. They started out by expressing anger over the warlord government’s acceptance of a treaty that threatened China’s national integrity. (The treaty,
"Looking at History from My Space," a painting by Chen Yi Fei, poses a delicate question: Can the individual in China form his own view of the past?

for one, would have given Chinese territories formerly held by Germany to Japan. But soon the movement turned into a full-blown protest against the traditional values that underlay corrupt warlord politics. The intellectuals' vision of an alternative "new culture" was summed up by the two slogans: "science" and "democracy." "Mr. Science" (Cai xiansheng) and "Mr. Democracy" (De xiansheng), as they were personified, would deliver the people of China from Confucian autocracy, bureaucratic politics, arranged marriages, and the burden of formulaic learning—or so the brave young voices of 1919 believed.

In the spring of 1989, a new generation of Chinese students took to the streets of Beijing, again marching under the banner of "science" and "democracy." The specific cause of this protest was corruption inside the Communist Party, and for a brief time it seemed as though these idealistic students might change old habits of mind. The 70th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement gave them a dramatic opportunity to project themselves as heirs to the struggle for national enlightenment and progress. Like their predecessors in 1919, they made speeches, distributed pamphlets, carried flags. And like their predecessors, they believed that they were fulfilling, even going beyond, the anciently defined obligations of the scholarly class.

It was Mencius (370–289 B.C.), the disciple of Confucius, who first codified the intellectuals' duty to society: "Those who work with their minds are meant to rule; those who work with their brawn are meant to be ruled." Mencius also said that "those who know are the first to awake; the enlightened awake the others." In the spring of 1989, even more so than in 1919, the intellectuals seemed to heed more closely the second of Mencius's pronouncements and to spurn the elitist message of the first. Whether they had truly shed the elitism of their class is difficult to say, but the students made every effort to reach out to workers and other non-intellectuals. And in response, the ordinary citizens of Beijing joined ranks with the intellectuals, creating crowds of up to a million people a day.

In May 1989, in other words, it was briefly possible to ignore the centuries-old social isolation of the intellectuals. It was also possible to overlook ominous parallels between unfolding events and another, more recent mass movement, the Cultural Revolution of 1966–69. To be sure, the latter had been instigated by one man, the Great Helmsman himself, Mao Zedong. But it too had been driven by the
energy and idealism of millions of young people on the streets of Beijing, and by its end—a terrible parallel to contemplate—youthful idealism had been replaced by a struggle for power among the old men of the Party.

The leaders and supporters of the pro-democracy movement ignored such troubling parallels. They saw no sign of the dark hand of the past on what they were trying to accomplish. But it was there, as somber and ominous as the solitary black flag raised on Tiananmen Square on May 13 to announce the beginning of the hunger strike.

It was there even earlier—in the conference halls where older intellectuals gathered for scholarly conferences on the May Fourth Movement. These scholars were keenly aware of the burden of the past. They had seen its effect on their own lives. They had spent decades analyzing the unfinished legacy of the May Fourth Movement. And yet even these seasoned academicians got caught up in the passions of the student movement. On May 4, 1989, most of them were in or around Tiananmen Square, wondering if the hopes of an earlier generation of idealists would finally be fulfilled.

History has been used and abused throughout 20th-century China. It has been used in particular to explain the century’s repeated convulsions, including the republican revolution of 1911, the “new culture” revolution of 1919, Mao’s long struggle against the Guomindang and the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, and the Cultural Revolution of 1966–69. “Revolution” is, in fact, a new phenomenon in Chinese political culture, but it is still given an old name—geming (loosely translated as “lost Mandate”). Geming signified the loss of the Mandate of Heaven, a devastating loss of moral authority and legitimacy that always preceded the demise of one dynasty and the accession of another.

But while this term more rightly fits the traditional pattern of Chinese history, with its long “cycles” of dynastic rise and fall, geming has never been more frequently used than during the modern period. China has seen so many cataclysmic geming during this century that one might imagine the Chinese had grown weary—and wary—of dramatic change, and of the language used to describe it. One might imagine that the Chinese were ready for the language and experience of reform.

But the leaders of the student movement of 1989 seemed incapable of escaping the old language. Although they began by calling for gradual reform, they ended up (partly because of the Party’s intransigence) resorting to the old metaphor of lost mandate. They ended up calling themselves “revolutionaries”; similarly, to discredit the students, their enemies in the Party ended up calling them “counter-revolutionaries.” It was as if no other word but geming were available to China’s political activists. History had to be historic, had to fit in age-old categories, or else it was of no use at all in this year of momentous commemorations.

Throughout the spring of this year, the 70th anniversary of May Fourth fueled talk of a new, “more revolutionary May Fourth.” In 1919, 3,000 students had marched the short distance from the old, downtown campus of Beijing University to Tiananmen Square. On May 4, 1989, hundreds of thousands of students marched for eight hours from the outskirts of the city where Beijing University and other institutions of higher learning are now located. The momentous scale of the 1989 demonstrations put a great burden on the symbolism of commemorations. May Fourth had to accommodate not only the intellectuals’ aspirations for science and democracy, not only the students’ grievances about lack of freedom of the press and bureaucratic corruption, but also the hopes of millions of ordinary citizens aroused by activists in Tiananmen Square.


WQ AUTUMN 1989

122
The anniversary of the event of 1919 became identified with the unfulfilled promise of China’s “liberation” in 1949.

On May 12, 1989, this conflated vision of historic commemoration was explicitly proclaimed at a “democracy salon” held on the campus of Beijing University. This “salon” (translated into Chinese as shalong, “sand dragon”) was the 17th in a series of student-sponsored discussions about political reform. At this one, 500 undergraduates crowded around a grassy patch in front of a statue of Cervantes. They came to hear Bao Zongxin, a respected historian of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911). But Bao did not speak about the past. Instead, he stirred up the crowd with his impassioned rhetoric: “You, your movement, has finally made China stand up! On October 1, 1949, Mao proclaimed in Tiananmen Square that China has stood up. But that was propaganda. You have made those words real.”

“Liberation” became an intoxicating slogan in the spring of 1989. The language of political revolution is always heady stuff. But the price of such intoxication is truth—in this case, the unsavory realities of the past. The political atrocities that had surrounded the revolution of 1949 and the naive cultural radicalism of the student movement of 1919 were forgotten, as yet another mass movement engulfed China’s capital. Especially after millions took to the streets in support of students who had called for a hunger strike in Tiananmen Square, there was little room left in Chinese public life for the ambiguities of historical memory.

Placard images of the past were imported directly into the present—with inspiring messages tacked on whenever possible. Official government newspapers such as the People’s Daily commemorated the 70th anniversary of May Fourth with bombastic editorials about the “praiseworthy patriotism” of the students of 1919. Decoded, the message to the present generation was simple: Be loyal to the Party, dedicate yourself to the nation’s modernization program, forget about Western ideas that only aggravate the economic crisis at hand. Students responded with a fervent defense of the right to critical thinking. They insisted that the contemporary economic crisis be blamed on the Party’s own corruption. They, too, asserted that the past leads inevitably to the present, as they marched under banners reading “Seventy Years Already!” and “We have waited too long for Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy!”

In the heat of the confrontation between the government and the students, the 70-year-old May Fourth Movement had been transformed into a set of convenient slogans, despite the warnings of a few middle-aged scholars who knew that such uses of the past have a way of blurring the realities of the present. At the Sleeping Buddha Temple conference, especially, there was a noticeable effort to take a longer view of the problem of Chinese intellectuals.

Several participants sought to place the events of 1919 in a context that was quite different from that of 1989. Chen Fangzheng (from the Chinese University of Hong Kong), for example, reminded his compatriots that the original May Fourth Movement had been the product of an extreme sort of political crisis. China in the late 1910s was in danger of disintegration at the hands of rapacious warlords and aggressive imperialists. China was facing no such crisis in 1989, he warned, and to make it seem as though it were might bring on undesirable consequences.

At the conference sponsored by the Chinese Academy of Social Science, Chen Fangzheng went one step further. He told his fellow intellectuals that they were a transitional force, a group brought into existence by the social turmoil of 20th-century China. Those who called themselves “zhishi fenzi” (“intellectuals,” or literally, “knowledgeable elements”), Chen argued, have a temporary mission: to voice criticism while other social groups find and express their own voice. Later, when others can speak for themselves, when the educated need no longer to be daiyan ren—carriers of the word for the wordless masses—then intellectuals will be superfluous. They will have no special calling in a truly modern society.

But during the buoyant days of May 1989 Chinese intellectuals were not prepared to hear about their demise. Too much of what was going on in the streets
of Beijing promised them a greater role in Chinese politics. They had every reason to hope for more public visibility as their activities drew increasing coverage from newly emancipated newspapers and television stations.

Such optimism found realistic expression in remarks made by the eminent philosopher, Li Zehou. At both conferences, Li argued that the May Fourth promise of democracy could be fulfilled provided that it was grounded in philosophical reason and in political institutions. His new slogan—"minzhu yao kexuehua" (democracy must be more scientific)—reordered and reinvigorated the old May Fourth ideals. At the same time, Li called attention to the insufficient legal foundation for democracy in China, to the absence of any constitutional guarantees for dissent.

But Li Zehou's effort to talk about the process of democratization, about its institutional prerequisites, was cut short by contemporary events. The pro-democracy movement in the streets of Beijing developed faster than middle-aged intellectuals in conference halls could fathom. Students on the streets fanned hopes even as they brought on a mood of crisis. With the beginning of the hunger strike on May 13, the movement drew closer to the brink: It was now a time of desperation and ultimatums. Wang Dan, the student leader from Beijing University, wrote in the pages of the Washington Post about the need to "fight to the end" for science and democracy. Students were preparing to die. They started to write last wills and testaments, just as older intellectuals were beginning to talk about legal guarantees for dissent.

With the declaration of martial law on May 20th, 1989, history appeared to have come full circle. The future of China's youth now appeared as unpromising as it had been for May Fourth activists—who, while seeing no more than 60 of their number jailed, drew upon themselves the ire of conservative Confucian authorities in the military and in the universities. Old warnings, old pleas were heard again on the streets of Beijing. But the battle now was not against Confucian dogma; it was against the armed force of the People's Liberation Army. However "revolutionary" the meaning of May Fourth might have been, it was impotent against the tanks that invaded Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989.

By then the historical symbol of May Fourth had been exhausted. In the dark of the night, young and middle-aged intellectuals alike saw that the real power of historic commemorations was tragically limited. They stood on the verge of a precipice described 40 years earlier by the literary scholar Lo Changpei. On the eve of "liberation" in 1949, he too had tried to grapple with the lessons of the events of 1919: "The old tune of May Fourth cannot be replayed," Lo wrote. "Without May Fourth, we would not have the present. If we continue to grasp forever at the spirit of May Fourth, we will have no future."

The literary critic Lo Changpei did not live to see the 70th anniversary of May Fourth. He did not have a chance to comment on the fate of Chinese intellectuals 40 years after the founding of the People's Republic. But his younger colleagues did. In early May of 1989, they gathered to assess their past and their future in relation to the "old tune" of May Fourth. The most explicit statement of their concern was inscribed on the banner that hung above the conference at the Sleeping Buddha Temple: "May Fourth and The Problem of Chinese Intellectuals."

Those speaking beneath the banner were all survivors. They were victims of various criticism campaigns directed against China's educated elite from the 1950s onward. Some of the participants of the 1989 conference had been labeled as "rightists" in 1957, after Mao found their expression of critical thought intolerable during the short-lived Hundred Flowers Movement. Many more had suffered when intellectuals were labeled members of the "stinking ninth" during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–69. The "crime" of this group (deemed more odious than landlords, capitalists, or Guomindang sympathizers) was simply their possession of higher education. Having made a living with their minds, intellectuals were excommunicated from the sacred community of peasants and workers.

Thrown out of jobs, publicly humiliated, incarcerated in "cow pens" (as hold-
ing cells for intellectuals were known during the Cultural Revolution), these scholars had paid dearly for Mencius's ancient claim that those who labor with their minds are intended to rule over those who labor with their brawn. Mao had willfully, cruelly reversed the traditional Chinese veneration of the educated. By the time of his death in 1976, intellectuals had lost almost all of their former social standing and much of their self-confidence as well.

Rehabilitation began slowly, and it came, predictably, from the top: Deng Xiaoping, a survivor himself, declared at the 1978 National Science Conference that "the overwhelming majority of the intellectuals were indeed part of the working class. Those who engage in physical labor and those who engage in mental labor are all laborers in a socialist society." Once renamed as workers (gongzuo), intellectuals could hope for better housing and better pay. But their social calling—especially their right to comment critically upon urgent political issues facing China in the age of reform—remained suspect in the eyes of Communist Party rulers.

In April 1986, a new face appeared on new 50-yuan notes issued by the China People's Bank. It showed an intellectual with gray hair and tie alongside a worker and a peasant. The intellectual had replaced the soldier in the previous trinity. This was a symbolic step forward in the public rehabilitation of intellectuals. It was also a symbolic concession to the Confucian world-view that held the educated elite to be the foundation of Chinese society—along with peasants, and to a lesser extent artisans. Soldiers, according to tradition, were at the bottom of the social hierarchy.

And yet the rehabilitation of Chinese intellectuals did not go far beyond symbolism. Less than a year after the intellectual appeared on a bank note, China was once again in the throes of an anti-intellectual campaign. The attack mounted in early 1987 was nominally against "bourgeois liberalism," but its targets were the same critical thinkers whom Mao had sought to silence in 1957 and then again during the Cultural Revolution. The 1987 campaign followed closely on the heels of an earlier attempt to intimidate intellectuals during the 1983 campaign against "spiritual pollution." Over and over again, intellectuals were labelled criminals for their interest in ideas from abroad—ideas about democracy, science, and freedom of speech.

And still, the commitment to critical thought endures. The intellectual-survivors who gathered to commemorate the event of 1919 asked themselves: What had gone wrong? To their credit, they did not simply blame Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping for the short-sighted policies of the Chinese Communist Party. Rather, they took this as an opportunity to examine those aspects of the Chinese intellectual's own tradition that had kept its modern heirs from finding and expressing an autonomous voice in public life.

In seminar rooms, in hallways beyond the reach of microphones and public lectures, intellectuals dissected the ancient burden of political responsibility. Politics, in one form or another, has consumed the life of Chinese scholars from the time of Confucius onward. The fate of European scholars was quite different. Over the centuries, they had been able to think and work in spheres clearly distinct from the political—first the sphere of religion and then of science. By contrast, the Chinese wenren (literally men of the word) have
always been drawn directly into the political realm and subjected to the whims of rulers who controlled both words and swords. In the midst of May Fourth commemorations, conversation drifted back to intellectual ancestors who first muted their voice for the sake of official position—or, less selfishly, for the sake of national salvation. It was impossible to ignore the example set by so many scholar-bureaucrats who, from the Han dynasty (200 B.C.-A.D. 220) onward, kowtowed to state orthodoxy and reaped great material benefits. But historical evidence also shows that for centuries many Chinese intellectuals had served as the moral conscience of society. Long before modern events such as the May Fourth Movement of 1919, members of the educated elite had sought to distinguish between rule by force (zhitong) and rule by ethical ideals (daotong). But for centuries as well, they had been powerless to close the gulf between the two.

Now, with a new generation of students out on the streets, the question became more urgent: Can intellectuals find and maintain a critical voice in the midst of political corruption? Will they be able to further the values espoused by the May Fourth movement and thereby edge China closer to science and democracy? In both conferences commemorating the event of 1919, the answer was far from certain. In both settings, participants noted that the idea of enlightenment had been repeatedly overpowered by the exigencies of national salvation. If intellectuals had been willing to forgo—or had been forced to abandon—their own ideas about political and cultural reform before 1949, what was to ensure the success of the current student movement?

The answer that came from Tiananmen Square on June 4 was forcefully clear: nothing. Without institutionalized pluralism, without legally sanctioned dissent, the current generation of students stood as naked in the face of arbitrary political authority as did the Chinese scholars who were buried in 212 B.C. by China's first emperor, Qin Shihuangdi.

Unlike the ancient scholars, however, the contemporary generation of Chinese students received massive popular support. Before the tanks rolled on June 4, 1989, ordinary citizens had given students food, water, and even money. Millions demonstrated in the streets, day after day, in support of hunger strikers in Tiananmen Square. They even tried to shield the demonstrators with their bodies during the first few days of martial law.

But, in the end, something overcame the students' idealism as well as the citizens' best intentions. It was not only the force of guns. The politics of the crowd helped crush the student movement. Well before the shooting of June 4, one could anticipate the tragic outcome. Although students clamored for "dialogue" with the government, they became increasingly reluctant to discuss matters openly among themselves. Authoritarian tendencies emerged in the way some student leaders
dealt with fellow activists. Even the old labels of the Cultural Revolution, “renegade” and “traitor,” were hurled back and forth between students who disagreed.

The echoes of the Cultural Revolution were clearly audible on the streets of Beijing. The government, of course, repeatedly invoked the comparison in order to fuel popular fear of chaos. But that was not the real danger. The real danger was that the students would let their idealism get the better of them, as had their predecessors during the Cultural Revolution; the danger was that in the course of crowd politics the tactics and slogans would become more simplistic. And sure enough, even as early as the May Fourth commemorations, the simplistic sloganeering could be heard: fateful echoes of 1966–69. But few people seemed alarmed.

In the conference halls, too, commemoration sometimes displaced historical memory. At one point during our discussion at the Social Science Academy conference, I asked: “What is the connection between the May Fourth Movement, the current student protest, and the Cultural Revolution?” My question was met with silence. Many of these middle-aged intellectuals had been victimized as members of the “stinking ninth” not more than 20 years before. A few minutes later, an old gentleman from Shanghai leaned over and whispered to me: “Maybe there is a link after all. Maybe it is to be found in the way that both democracy and intellectuals have been ridiculed for so long. Remember the cultural conservative Gu Hongming, who was so outspoken in the late 1910s? He wore a long pigtail down his back, wrote good English, and mocked May Fourth activists by calling the proponents of democracy ‘demo-crazy.’ That is what Mao thought about intellectuals as well—crazy and dispensable. Maybe our fate is no different today.”

Discouraging as his words were, this gentleman from Shanghai helped me appreciate the difficulties faced by Chinese intellectuals who try to stretch the limits of historical memory. He also helped me appreciate those papers presented at the conference that managed to accommodate large chunks of materials from a more genuinely remembered past. Unlike some scholars who merely served up officially acceptable versions of May Fourth, the authors of these papers wrestled with the full complexity of that earlier protest. In remembering 1919, they managed to give it a second chance, a second life as it were. They made it possible for their colleagues to envision a version of May Fourth that breaks through the constraints of official party historiography.

One essayist, for example, dealt with his own mother, Zhang Ruoming, a prominent woman student of the May Fourth era who became a major scholar of French literature. Zhang Ruoming has been more or less forgotten in Chinese public memory—except for her briefly noted political association with Zhou Enlai, the man who became premier of the People’s Republic after 1949. Little else was known about Zhang Ruoming until her son began to recollect his mother’s scholarly life. On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of May Fourth, it became possible to write about Zhang Ruoming’s cosmopolitanism in a way that went beyond the canons of party history.

The subject and the documents brought to life details overlooked in official versions of May Fourth. The bulk of the essay about Zhang Ruoming focused on her study of the French writer André Gide rather than on her role in the demonstrations of 1919 or even on her short career as a Chinese communist in France during the 1920s. It detailed her effort to interpret Gide’s work around the central theme of “narcissism”—something that Zhang Ruoming wrote about with distinct appreciation. Her appreciation, in turn, brought an admiring response from Gide himself. In 1931 he wrote to her saying, “It seemed to me in traversing your pages that I have regained consciousness of my existence. I do not think I have ever felt so well understood.”

Zhang Ruoming might have said the same thing about this essay written by her son for the May Fourth commemoration. For here was a recollection that did not dwell on the prescribed historical subjects—his mother’s communism or her obsessive loyalty to the Party during the 1957 campaign against “rightist” intellec-
tuals, or even her despair-driven suicide a year later. Instead, the essayist had used the 70th anniversary of May Fourth to add to his contemporaries' understanding of a uniquely cosmopolitan generation of Chinese intellectuals.

So commemoration did not fully displace historical memory in 1989. Rather, it offered Chinese intellectuals an opportunity to tell parts of their own story in their own terms. Even as a momentous new student movement arose in Beijing, even as the passions of the thronging crowds in Tiananmen Square were engulfing the intellectuals' agenda, recollection received its due. Far from the noise of the streets, the muted voice of memory kept the master teacher's 80th birthday. But such personal occasions still have to be cloaked in public significance. So the disciples fastened upon the 56th anniversary of Zhang Dainian's teaching career at Qinghua University. The large red banner over the head table proclaimed the oddly unremarkable number "56," in contrast to the recognizably momentous "70" that had graced commemorations of May Fourth. The banner and the rows of empty chairs were not the only things that distinguished this gathering from commemorations of the events of 1919. The mood had radically changed in the past three weeks. Now the student movement on the streets had been crushed. Tanks had not yet rolled onto Tiananmen Square, but an ultimatum had been given. Fear of persecution and arrest was thick among the intellectuals gathered to pay homage to Zhang Dainian.

Behind the head table hung scrolls traditionally used to honor master teachers. Classical couplets recalled the integrity of Zhang Dainian's scholarly career. A large painting portrayed an aged crane standing tall and proud on the wrinkled-bark of a large pine tree. The bird and the pine, too, were traditional symbols of an outstanding intellectual of high moral character. These symbols were further elaborated during speeches that paid tribute to Zhang Dainian's work in classical philosophy. Several former students got up in turn to talk about the enduring influence of Zhang Dainian on their own lives. One described the lasting impression he had of Zhang's "wei ren"—his way of being fully human in a world that often denied the intellectual's humanity. This "moral achievement," his student argued, was more important than all of Zhang Dainian's considerable scholarly accomplishments. Another student emphasized his teacher's "zi zai"—his inner peace maintained through fidelity to classical moral ideals. All the speakers alluded to the suffering Zhang Dainian un-


history alive.

Nowhere was this more apparent to me than on May 20, when I attended a ceremony commemorating the 56th anniversary of an eminent philosopher's scholarly career. It was held on the day after martial law was declared in Beijing. A large lecture hall on the Qinghua University campus had been set up to accommodate hundreds of guests. It looked cavernously empty, since only about 40 intellectuals had managed to get there. At the center of the ceremony stood Zhang Dainian, the renowned scholar of classical Chinese thought.

Everyone knew that the ceremony had been planned by former students to mark
derwent after being labeled a “rightist” in 1957. All praised his ability to survive, to remain productive, to be truthful to himself under conditions that repeatedly thwarted and threatened his self-esteem.

On this day, when martial law reigned in Beijing, there was little doubt that Zhang Dainian’s students were also speaking about themselves. Praising their teacher’s endurance, they were also trying to encourage one another to outlast yet another crackdown. None of this was explicit, of course. The symbols and the rituals of recollection sufficed for the moment. This was an intensely personal occasion. The odd setting of a 56th anniversary along with martial law made it all the more poignant.

Zhang Dainian’s own speech was subtle as well as truthful. Moved by his student’s tributes, he responded with simple, modest words: “I have done nothing special over these 56 years. I just went on living and somehow managed to reach 80—something auspicious just in itself. Throughout my life I have tried to bring together Marxism and Chinese philosophy, but I have not done it yet . . . . After 1979 [the year of Zhang’s rehabilitation] I regained my courage and my energy. I tried to think more independently after I turned 70. But it has been too little, too late. Most of my life I have spent obeying and so did not accomplish enough. Still, I expect to go on with my work.”

As a foreign observer, I was deeply moved by the tenacity of the bond between these intellectuals and their work. On one of the bleakest days of their shared history, they managed to come together and to hearten one another by paying tribute to the moral fortitude of one of their aged mentors. If Zhang Dainian could endure and still make significant contributions to China’s understanding of “truth,” “beauty,” “morality,” and “tradition” (all major themes reflected in the titles of his recent books), others, too, might outlive the present nightmare. The key to Zhang’s survival with integrity lay in his commitment to the past. It was this commitment that he had passed down to his students through his teaching and, now, through his words to those gathered on May 20th, 1989. In the very midst of what Nietzsche might have decried as loud, noisy history, Zhang Dainian and his disciples managed to recover an hour of stillness. Even as martial law was enforced outside of the gates of Qinghua University, inside intellectuals reminded themselves that the world revolves not around the inventors of new noises, but around the inventors of new values—or, as it was apparent now, around the guardians of values.
REFLECTIONS

P. T. Barnum and the American Museum

He called himself the "Prince of Humbugs." Today, most people remember him for his circus and for a cynical remark ("There's a sucker born every minute") that in fact he never made. It is less well known that P. T. Barnum (1810–91) first made his mark as the proprietor of the American Museum in New York City. There, from 1841 to 1868, he combined freak shows and serious scientific exhibits, entertainment and edification, to produce "rational" amusement for a remarkably diverse audience. Recreating this chapter in the great showman's life, biographer A. H. Saxon describes Barnum's role in shaping an important part of 19th-century American popular culture.

by A. H. Saxon

Could a present-day Manhattanite somehow be transported back to the mid-19th century, he would find little to surprise him in the New York City of that time. Although its teeming boardinghouses and tenements, hotels, pleasure haunts, and thriving businesses were still located mainly in the area from the Battery to just north of City Hall, the inexorable march "uptown" was well under way, with well-to-do citizens erecting their opulent mansions as far north as Union Square at 14th Street, while some visionaries were already predicting the day when every inch of the island would be built upon.

Fueled by ambitious natives pouring in from the countryside and by a never-ending stream of immigrants, the city's population, from 60,000 inhabitants at the turn of the century, had been more than doubling every 20 years and by 1850 stood at slightly over half a million. The "Empire City," as some insisted on calling her, already had the reputation of being a cosmopolis—of being, owing to the large number of foreigners in her midst, the least "American" of American cities.

Commerce was the great engine that drove the city. American entrepreneurship had at last come of age, and huge fortunes were being made overnight by former petty tradesmen, farmers, and ship captains. The manners of these parvenus or "shoddyites"—with their ludicrous aping of foreign customs, conspicuous consumption, and putting on of what they considered to be aristocratic airs—were amusingly satirized at New York's Park Theatre.
in Anna Cora Mowatt’s *Fashion* of 1845.

But those in more modest circumstances and the industrious poor who jammed into the city were no less engaged in running after riches. And behind the kaleidoscopic whirl of life in Gotham was a darker, less salubrious aspect: In the back slums of Broadway and the city’s notorious “Five Points” district, crime, drunkenness, and prostitution flourished amidst appalling scenes of misery and squalor.

In the spring of 1841 Phineas Taylor Barnum, aged 30 and “about as poor as I should ever wish to be,” as he later wrote in his autobiography, was himself an eager participant in this hurried scene.

If we are to believe every word of his autobiography, it was not his first scrape with poverty. Born in 1810 in the rural village of Bethel, Connecticut, Barnum later harped upon the “deprivations” of his youth, complaining that he never had any educational “advantages.” In fact, he had been no worse off than most of his boyhood companions. At both the Bethel common-school and the private academy in neighboring Danbury, he had received a thorough grounding in mathematics, composition, and the classics of English literature.

Barnum’s father, Philo, a tailor, innkeeper, and livery stable owner, died insolvent when his son was 16. But the custom of the “widow’s dower” allowed Mrs. Irena Barnum and her five children to keep their house and even a modest amount of personal property. The oldest of her five children, the future showman, enjoyed the further “advantage” of being the pet of one of the village’s wealthiest citizens, his maternal grandfather Phineas Taylor, after whom young “Taylor”—as he was usually called by his friends and family—was named.

From his family, and his grandfather in particular—or so he liked to think—Barnum inherited a lifelong love of practical jokes. Phineas Taylor would “go farther, wait longer, work harder and contrive deeper, to carry out a practical joke, than for anything else under heaven,” Barnum wrote admiringly in his autobiography, whose original 1855 edition describes many such exploits in hilarious detail. Young “Taylor” was himself often the accomplice in, and sometimes the butt of, his grandfather’s elaborate pranks; and to the end of his life he could never resist the opportunity to cause other people temporary embarrassment.

*Vanity Fair* ob[131]
The prankster was never an idler, however. By the time he was in his teens, with the encouragement of his doting grandfather, Barnum was successfully engaged in various business enterprises. After serving as a clerk in a country store, he opened two such establishments of his own in Bethel. At 19, too, he married a “fair, rosy-cheeked, buxom-looking girl” named Charity Hallett, who had traveled up from the coastal town of Fairfield to work for a local tailor.

Business and marriage did not consume all of Barnum’s energy. He took an early and keen interest in public affairs, and when letters he wrote attacking religious interference in politics were rejected by the editor of a Danbury newspaper, he established a weekly paper of his own—the first in the history of Bethel—which he defiantly named The Herald of Freedom. The fledgling editor’s heated opinions and outspokenness landed him in court on several occasions. At the conclusion of one such trial for libel, brought on by his accusing a local dignitary of being a “canting hypocrite” and a “usurer,” he was sentenced to 60 days in the Danbury jail.

Eventually, the attractions of tiny Bethel began to pall. So in the fall of 1834, without any firm idea of what he might do there, he moved to New York City. After several months of unemployment and some rather desultory attempts to reestablish himself as a businessman, he “fell” into the profession of showman when he began taking around the country the exhibition known as “Joice Heth.”

This extraordinary attraction was in fact a blind, decrepit, hymn-singing slave woman, whom Barnum advertised as being 161 years old and as having once been the “nurse” of the revered George Washington. When Joice died early in the following year (at which time an autopsy revealed she could not have been much above 80), he continued to tour with several other entertainers, including an Italian juggler whom Barnum rechristened “Signor Vivalla” and a young blackface dancer named “Master Diamond.”

The showman later confessed that this nomadic period in his life had been fraught with dangers to his moral well-being. “When I consider the kinds of company into which I was thrown, the associations with which I was connected, and the strong temptations to wrong-doing and bad habits which lay in my path,” he wrote, “I am astonished as well as grateful that I was not utterly ruined.”

Meanwhile, his long-suffering wife Charity, who had remained behind in Bethel or New York while her husband was off on his tours, had given birth to the first two of their four daughters. The showman faced mounting pressure to settle down and establish himself in some “respectable” line of business. From time to time—nearly always disastrously—he tried his hand at some “mercantile” enterprise. But his great opportunity came toward the end of 1841, when he learned the collections at New York’s soporific American Museum were up for sale.

Barnum later wrote that he repeatedly visited the Museum as a “thoughtful looker-on” and that he soon became convinced that “only energy, tact, and liberality were needed, to give it life and to put it on a profitable footing.” The trouble was, his ill-fated business speculations had nearly exhausted his capital. He therefore wrote to Francis Olmsted, a wealthy merchant who owned the building in which the Museum was housed, and persuaded him to purchase the collections in his own name, allowing Barnum, while leasing the building, to pay for them in installments.

The nucleus of the Museum’s collections had been assembled toward the end of the previous century by the Tammany Society and was originally exhibited in City Hall. Since 1795, however, the collections had been owned and managed by a.

succession of private individuals, the latest of whom, the taxidermist and natural-history enthusiast John Scudder, had died in 1821. Thanks to squabbling among his children and to other turns of fortune (including the financial panic of 1837), the asking price for the collections, which might have been $25,000 a decade earlier, was now only $15,000. Barnum managed to bargain that figure down to $12,000.

Proprietary museums have largely disappeared from the American scene, and few people today would look upon them as likely business opportunities. But in the mid-19th century, before the great public museums and zoological gardens got under way, nearly every city of any size boasted at least one such establishment, and often these were the principal, most popular cultural institutions of their day.

The theater, still held in low regard by many respectable citizens, reached its nadir in 1849 with the bloody Astor Place Riot, the climax in the long rivalry between the brawny American actor Edwin Forrest and the English tragedian William Charles Macready. Opera and ballet, then barely under way in America, were tainted by their theatrical associations. Circuses, which sometimes performed in theaters or buildings of their own when not on the road, were fairly common by this time. But here, too, shady practices and loose behavior on the part of employees—not to mention the coarse jests and indelicate references that figured in many clowns' repertoires—frequently outraged the moral element in communities.

Menageries were more acceptable, since they were patently "educational" and their denizens were commonly referred to in scriptural terms ("the Great Behemoth of Holy Writ," etc.). Exotic animals, brought to these shores and sold by enterprising ship captains, had been exhibited in America since the colonial period. Taken about the countryside individually or in small groups, they were a profitable investment for those who bought them.

Pleasure gardens such as William Niblo's in lower Manhattan, to which the novelist Henry James recalled being taken as a boy, were obviously respectable. Here, on a fine summer's evening, a family party or group of friends might take refreshments served in one of the elegantly decorated boxes or "bowers" that surrounded the garden, stroll along its illuminated pathways, and enjoy the light entertainment presented in the adjacent "saloon" or garden itself.

Waxworks, too, were deemed innocuous family entertainment, provided they did not dwell too luridly on female anatomy or the horrors of the French Revolution. Music of the nonoperatic variety, performed in numerous "concert halls," was eminently respectable; so were "ethiopian" entertainments or minstrel shows, whose greatest period of popularity, however, was to come in the second half of the 19th century.

An appreciation for the fine arts was noticeably on the increase, although here, too, there were as yet no great public institutions to bring together such works. At a time when photography was in its infancy, Americans' curiosity about the Old World and their own nation's remote fastnesses was satisfied by a number of spectacular pictorial entertainments—panoramas, dioramas, etc.—whose huge paintings, often

*Giantess Anna Swan, a leading museum draw.*
viewed under shifting lighting conditions, with three-dimensional objects in the foreground, special sound effects, and musical accompaniment, were exhibited in specially constructed buildings.

One might as well add that lovers of the arts also had at least one "adult" outlet around this time: tableaux vivants of the "model artists" variety, whose generous display of undraped female charms pointed the way to another cultural development. But striptease and the raucous "girly-show" phase of burlesque were still some years in the future, as was the cleaner, full-fledged vaudeville show.

Americans were hardly starved for amusement at mid-century, and when one adds to the above the numerous other entertainments then available to them—"legerdemain" or magic shows, puppets, balloon ascensions, annual expositions of arts and industries, county fairs, lectures and other visitations sponsored by local lyceum societies, itinerating freaks, and such prodigies as Joice Heth that Barnum and his fellow showmen took around the country—one sees to what extent the old Puritans' influence over such godless goings-on had by now declined.

But of all these entertainments, museums were undoubtedly the most inclusive and least objectionable, combining as they did, rather incongruously, elements of nearly all the above, while at the same time stressing their dedication to "rational" amusement.

Such had been the announced policy of America's first great museum, that of the painter, inventor, and naturalist Charles Willson Peale, whose Philadelphia establishment, from the 1780s on, featured wax figures and a notable collection of the founder's own paintings. It also offered lectures, scientific demonstrations, musical evenings, magic-lantern shows, and a scenic spectacle with changeable effects, which Peale eventually advertised as "moving pictures." As at the present-day Smithsonian Institution, almost everything having to do with man and nature was cheerfully accommodated, from a chip of the coronation chair in Westminster Abbey to the tattooed head of a New Zealand chieftain and a living cow with five legs and two tails.

Peale sometimes expressed impatience with sports of nature and weird acquisitions, but their inclusion in earlier "cabinets of curiosities" was a well-established practice by the time he founded his Philadelphia museum, and neither he nor later museum proprietors dared disappoint their patrons.

The American Museum continued the tradition of catering to such expectations—not without a frequently humorous note—and under Barnum's direction exhibited such quaint objects as the preserved hand and arm of the pirate Tom Trouble, a hat made out of broom splints by a lunatic, and (a traditional Connecticut specialty) a wooden nutmeg.

But the bulk of the Museum's collections was decidedly of a more legitimate nature and possessed, as Barnum often boasted, considerable scientific and cultural value, even if scholarly visitors did complain about the inadequate labeling and lack of systematic display they sometimes found in their favorite areas. For the American Museum aspired to be—and probably was under Barnum's management—the largest and most comprehensive establishment of its kind in America.

Unfortunately, no complete catalogue of its eclectic holdings was ever compiled, and the various guidebooks that were published give but a faint indication of the extent of its contents. Still, some idea of the "million wonders" Barnum was himself trumpeting in 1864, when the Museum was at its most congested, may be gleaned from a guidebook published around that time. There was, to begin with, the usual profusion of skeletons and stuffed animals. A collection of wax figures—some, like the one of Queen Victoria, notoriously bad—was on display, as were paintings, statues, and daguerreotypes of Barnum and his famous dwarf Tom Thumb. Elsewhere were Roman, Oriental, and American Indian artifacts; trick mirrors, optical instruments, and a large magnet; collections of insects and butterflies, minerals and crystals, shells and corals, and horns. A separate room was devoted to 194 "cosmoramas," in effect peepshows, through whose apertures visitors raptly gazed at famous scenes and
buildings around the world.

All this was but the beginning, however. Continuing another tradition established by Peale, the American Museum had its menagerie of living animals. They were so numerous and at times so large, in fact, that one cannot help wondering how Barnum found space to fit them all in, let alone get them to the Museum's upper stories, where most of them were kept. Besides the usual lions, tigers, bears, ostriches, and primates, the museum boasted the first hippopotamus seen in America, a rhinoceros, the delicate giraffe or "camelopard" as it was still sometimes called, and the entire "California Menagerie" of the legendary "Grizzly" Adams.

Entirely new at Barnum's establishment was the first public aquarium in America. The idea for this project had come to the showman while he was on a trip to England, where he had seen a similar display at London's Regent's Park zoo. Procuring glass tanks and two able assistants from the same institution, in 1857 he inaugurated an elegant exhibit of "Ocean and River Gardens" at the American Museum. By the early 1860s a large collection of native and exotic fishes was on display, as were sharks, porpoises, and "sea flowers" or anemones. To keep his "Aquarial Gardens" supplied, he regularly fitted out sailing expeditions to the tropics that returned laden with angel, porcupine, and peacock fish, and a variety of other brilliantly colored specimens. (The young Albert S. Bickmore, who had studied with Harvard's famed Louis Agassiz and was later to found the American Museum of Natural History, was on board the vessel that visited Bermuda in 1862.)

Even more remarkable was the expedition Barnum himself made to the mouth of the St. Lawrence River in 1861 to supervise the capture of beluga whales. Transported to New York in a special railway car, the first two of these beautiful creatures were exhibited in a brick and cement tank in the Museum's basement. When they died after a short time, Barnum promptly set about procuring additional specimens, which were now housed on the second floor in a plate-glass tank measuring 24 feet on each side. To supply them and his other exhibits with fresh salt water, pipes were laid from the Museum to New York Bay, and a steam engine was set up at dockside to pump the water. The showman also exhibited his white whales in Boston, and when rumors began circulating that they were only porpoises, Professor Agassiz himself showed up to vouch for their authenticity.

Although Barnum sometimes spoke disparagingly about his knowledge of natural history and told his friends that he didn't know a clam from a codfish, he had the reputation of being a great zoologist among his contemporaries, many of whom addressed queries to him and sent him specimens to identify. Many of his animals, like his beluga whales and his genuine white elephant of later circus fame, were of the greatest rarity or the first of their kind to be exhibited in America. Others, like the four giraffes he bragged about in an 1873 letter to Spencer F. Baird, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, were difficult to transport under the best of circumstances. When these animals died, they were quickly replaced and their hides and skeletons given to scientific institutions, which often entered into fierce competition for them.

For half a century Barnum was actively involved with and made important contributions to the study of natural history. Yet today, predictably, he is remembered almost exclusively for such patent frauds as his Little Woolly Horse and the notorious Fejee Mermaid—those "skyrockets" or "advertisements," as Barnum liked to explain, by which he attracted attention to the bona fide objects he had to offer. At times even he was genuinely puzzled and in danger of being taken advantage of.

In the 1880s, in the midst of a spate of sightings of sea serpents and lake monsters (including the perennial "Champ" of Lake Champlain fame), he issued a standing offer of $20,000 to anyone who could capture a specimen and deliver it to him "in a fit state for stuffing and mounting." There seemed to be no reasonable doubt about the creatures' existence, he stated in his announcement, so many "intelligent and respectable" people had reported seeing them. The reward went unclaimed, needless to say, although several such monsters...
The Lucasi family of albinos.

were manufactured around this time. In the early 1880s, too, the showman entered correspondence with one J. D. Willman of Vancouver, British Columbia, who had the notion he might succeed in capturing a living mammoth.

And indeed, why should there not have been great woolly mammoths shaking the earth of the Canadian wilderness? Had not Charles Willson Peale, who at the turn of the century excavated the first nearly complete skeleton of a “mammoth”—more accurately, mastodon—for years cherished the belief that this “Great Incognitum” still lived?

The idea that species might become extinct, that breaks could occur in the “Great Chain of Being” linking God to the lowliest of his creations, had only recently gained acceptance in the scientific community, and was still vigorously opposed by many outside it. For that matter, were not new species like Gorilla gorilla, whose existence had been reported but generally doubted until the explorer Paul du Chaillu showed up in London with his specimens in 1861, being discovered all the time?

Even more unsettling than the notion of species becoming extinct, to many of Barnum’s contemporaries, was the idea that they might be subject to a process of gradual change. It was left to Alfred Wallace and Charles Darwin to formulate the theory of natural selection. But even before the publication of the latter’s controversial Origin of Species in 1859, sufficient evidence had accumulated to convince many scientists that evolution occurred, although its mechanism was then but dimly perceived. The immense geologic record of the earth itself was at last being read, and soon the race would commence for fossil remains far more ancient and unsettling than Peale’s mastodon.

To those with an interest in natural history—and this included nearly everyone in 19th-century Europe and America—it was an exciting, if confusing, age. Barnum, who supplied as best he could legitimate examples of the subject, was not above exploiting his patrons’ ignorance and credulity from time to time. This he certainly did with the Fejee Mermaid and Little Woolly Horse, not to mention a tantalizing procession of unicorns, frogs with human hands, phoenixes, and similar curiosities manufactured for him by the ingenious Japanese, who even then seem to have had a good idea of what would appeal to the American market.

Equally challenging to spectators were his exhibits in the “missing-link” and “descent-of-man” categories. There may have been some excuse, in the 1840s, for touting “Mlle. Fanny,” his celebrated orangutan, as “the connecting link between man and brute.” But the succession of “What Is Its?” he exhibited from the same period onward were out-and-out frauds. The most famous of these was the cone-headed Negro William Henry Johnson, known to generations of Americans as “Zip,” who continued at his strange vocation until his death in 1926, when he was variously reported as being anywhere from 63 to 84 years old. “Is it man? Is it monkey? Or is it both?” queries one bill dating from 1861, describing “Zip” or one of his predecessors.

In a pamphlet published the previous year, the speech of this curiosity’s “keeper” is even given. He had been captured, according to this account, by a party of adventurers in quest of a gorilla and had only recently been taught to walk upon his feet. After pointing out a number of interesting physical traits—“the ears are set
back about an inch too far for humanity,” etc.—the speaker concluded with the announcement that he had been examined “by some of the most scientific men we have, and pronounced by them to be a connecting link between the wild African native and the brute creation.”

It was no accident that the advent of this particular “What Is It?” coincided so closely with the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species, whose original English edition had sold out on the first day of issue the previous November. The diarist George Templeton Strong, who was then, like many of his contemporaries, immersed in reading and privately arguing with the work, stopped by the Museum on two consecutive days in early March 1860 to view the “What Is It?” On his first visit he thought the keeper’s story “probably bosh” and the “What Is It?” itself “clearly an idiotic negro dwarf.” But its anatomical details, he conceded, were “fearfully simian, and he’s a great fact for Darwin.”

Aside from exhibits that can most charitably be termed “ethnographic,” there was always a floating population of human abnormalities or freaks to be seen at the American Museum, generally on a platform in one of the saloons, but, in the case of more choice specimens like General Tom Thumb, sometimes on the stage of the Lecture Room. There was a formidable assortment of giants and giantesses (their heights nearly always exaggerated, of course), including Barnum’s sensational “Nova Scotia Giantess,” Anna Swan, who in time married the irascible Captain Martin Bates, another giant, and went off to an Ohio farm in the hope of settling down to a “normal” life.

At the opposite end of the spectrum were Isaac Sprague, the 50-pound “Living Skeleton,” and the “Living Phantom,” R. O. Wickware, “whose body is so thin that it is almost transparent, whose limbs, like walking canes, are only about an inch thick, and yet who enjoys a hearty meal, and can wrestle successfully with men of robust constitution and powerful physical development.”

There was always a pleasing variety of little people—“dwarfs,” as Barnum and his contemporaries usually referred to them, but which spectators today, since they were perfectly proportioned, would more likely term “midgets.” And what more interesting entertainer could one wish for than the armless wonder S. K. G. Nellis, who played the accordion and the cello with his toes and could also expertly manage a bow and arrow, hitting a quarter held up by any visitor intrepid enough to hazard the experiment?

Equally interesting were those individuals possessing abnormal pigmentation or none at all. The albino family of Rudolph Lucasie—husband, wife, and son, whose marmoreal likenesses are immortalized in a Currier and Ives print—was the best-known example. At one time Barnum also featured two Negro girls, “Pure White, with White Wool and Pink Eyes,” alongside their black mother and baby sister.

Freaks and ethnographic curiosities were by no means the only living hominids to be seen at the American Museum. The halls and saloons were populated by a variety of industrious individuals, for the most part concessionaires, who offered their wares and services at small additional charge. There were Bohemian glassblowers and phrenologists like Professor Livingston, who was advertised to examine his customers and produce correct charts of them in less than 10 minutes. During the first few years of Barnum’s management visitors might purchase multiple silhouettes of themselves made by an individual using an outlining apparatus known as the physiognotrace; in later years daguerreotypists and photographers took over this function. Further entertainment might be had in a rifle and pistol gallery in the Museum’s basement, while those in need of nourishment could refresh themselves in an oyster saloon.

Finally, there was the Lecture Room. By Barnum’s own admission a “narrow, ill-contrived and uncomfortable” place when he took over the Museum, this feature had been common to all museums since the days of Peale. And originally such rooms had been just that: places in which lectures and scientific demonstrations were given. As time went on, however, their educational goals were subverted by less rigorous entertainment—magic-lantern shows, exhibitions of juggling, ventril-
oquism and legerdemain, dancing and musical numbers, comic skits, etc.—until their programs were barely distinguishable from those of variety halls.

From this, once their auditoriums and stage facilities had been suitably improved, it was only a short step to full-scale dramatic entertainments, rivaling or even excelling those of neighboring theaters—but always under their earlier designation of "lecture room" or "hall," thereby ensuring the continuing approbation of spectators who would never dare think of entering a "theatre" but who had no qualms whatever about taking themselves and their families to such entertainments as Barnum and his contemporary, Moses Kimball, proprietor of the Boston Museum, presented on their stages.

So much has been made in the past of this subterfuge, of the supposed hypocrisy of Barnum, Kimball, and their fellow museum proprietors, that one tends to overlook the genuine service they rendered to the American stage. During the first half of the 19th century theaters were hardly the decorous places to which we are accustomed today. Spectators, particularly those in the upper galleries, were given to demonstrating their disapproval of actors and playwrights in no uncertain terms; drunkenness was rife in the front of the house and, to a somewhat lesser extent, on the other side of the footlights as well; prostitutes openly solicited in corridors and boxes. Unless he were hopelessly addicted to the drama or determined to see some great itinerating "star," a respectable person thought twice about going to the theater. He thought even harder before exposing his wife or sweetheart to these conditions. Children were almost never taken there.

But all this was gradually to change during the second half of the century, thanks largely to the determined efforts of Barnum and a handful of other managers. They made theater into something it had rarely been before: a place of family entertainment, where men and women, adults and children, could intermingle safe in the knowledge that no indecencies would assault their senses either onstage or off. In addition to such sterling temperance and abolitionist dramas as The Drunkard, Ten Nights in A Barroom, and Uncle Tom's Cabin (the last in an adaptation even Mrs. Stowe had difficulty following), the Lecture Room regularly regaled its audiences with domestic and romantic melodramas and with plays based on biblical subjects.

From Barnum's acquisition of the American Museum at the end of 1841 until its destruction by fire 23 and a half years later, nearly 38 million admission tickets were sold; close to a million additional tickets were dispensed at his second museum uptown during the two and a half years it was in existence. Many of these were bought by repeat customers, of course, but the record is nevertheless remarkable, especially when one considers that the total population of the United States in 1865 was only around 35 million. Indeed, calculations reveal that the first American Museum, during its years under Barnum's management, actually sold more tickets in proportion to the population than did Disneyland during its first 23 and a half years in operation.

Nor did the American Museum ever cater to any particular "class" of spectator. Barnum once claimed, rather unconvincingly, that he had "often grieved that the taste of the million was not elevated." With no financial support for his museum other than what he took in at the door, he had been "obliged to popularize it," and while he had indeed offered his visitors a "million" bona fide curiosities, "millions of persons were only induced to see them because, at the same time, they could see..."
whales, giants, dwarfs, Albinoes, dog shows, et cetera." It was all an undigested hodgepodge, of course, and in later years the showman was sometimes apologetic about the Museum's lack of system and some of the methods he had employed to lure its patrons.

Yet among these same customers, rubbing elbows with farmers fresh in from the countryside, tradesmen, apprentices and laborers, and "respectable" citizens with their families in tow, were famous scientists like Louis Agassiz and Joseph Henry of the Smithsonian Institution, authors like Walt Whitman and Henry David Thoreau, eminent statesmen, religious leaders, and ambassadors from abroad, and even, in 1860, the visiting Prince of Wales.

In an age when public-supported cultural institutions were still the exception rather than the general rule, Barnum's museum filled a definite need in American society. And, if it did not always strive to elevate their taste, at least it offered its visitors wholesome entertainment. From sunrise until 10 P.M., seven days a week, its untold wonders summoned the democratic multitude. It was one of the greatest, most universally popular institutions of its day. And all this—museum, menagerie, lecture room and freaks—for what was even then the bargain price of 25 cents.

Barnum's first American Museum burned to the ground on July 13, 1865. Unruffled, the showman immediately set to work to assemble a new collection and less than two months later opened his second American Museum farther up Broadway, between Spring and Prince streets. When this second American Museum burned during the night of March 2-3, 1868, he decided to take his friend Horace Greeley's advice to "go a-fishing" and announced his "retirement" from museum management. But his interest in the business did not die. Besides offering advice and lending his support to newer institutions like the Smithsonian, the American Museum of Natural History, and eventually even the Smithsonian's national zoo, he paid for and endowed the Barnum Museum of Natural History, which continues to this day as a center for the study of the biological sciences on the campus of Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts.

As the century drew to its close, the old showman had sense enough to realize that proprietary museums of the type he had owned had nearly run their course. The great public institutions were at last coming into their own, and they were infinitely better organized, more specialized and "scientific," than his museums had ever been. If these successors were not half so entertaining—if they contained no fat ladies, "What Is It?" or wooden nutmegs—why, such "curiosities" could still be accommodated in the museum or "side-show" department of a traveling circus.

And so they were, beginning in 1871, when "P. T. Barnum's Museum, Menagerie, and Circus" (the ordering of the words was deliberate) first took to the road. The showman's connection with what came to be called "The Greatest Show on Earth" is a story in itself, and even there—despite his advanced age, the sniping of fierce rivals, and the perverse delight of latter-day critics in pointing out what he did not do in this field—his contributions were considerable.

As indeed they were in nearly every entertainment he touched. Aside from his acknowledged mastery of publicity, his almost intuitive grasp of human nature, and his skill in exploiting public opinion, Barnum, for over half a century, not only expanded but in large part defined the notion of popular entertainment in America. Like Walt Disney's in a later day, his view of such entertainments was that they should be eminently wholesome, family-oriented, "educational" and occasionally even didactic, but above all amusing. By the 1880s, when he had achieved almost mythic status, the showman's more notorious frauds and hoaxes had long been forgiven, and the "Prince of Humbugs" had been metamorphosed into "The Children's Friend" and "The World's Greatest Showman." In posters advertising his circus around this time, he was sometimes proclaimed "The Sun of the Amusement World." For one who let light into so many lives, that title will serve as well as any.
Magnifying Reading Glasses

Send for your FREE Catalog today. Our 16-page catalog features 40 styles of magnifiers priced from $9.98, plus many other helpful vision aids and useful products, such as our new magnified sunglasses and fisherman glasses. In addition, our catalog provides a guide to lens strengths (diopter) to aid in your selection.

NAME

ADDRESS

CITY STATE ZIP

PRECISION OPTICAL Dept. 254H
Lincoln & 8th St., Rochelle, IL 61068

NEW IN PAPERBACK

ON WAR
Carl von Clausewitz
Edited and translated by
Michael Howard and Peter Paret
With introductory essays by
Peter Paret, Michael Howard,
and Bernard Brodie
With a commentary by Bernard Brodie

"On War is undoubtedly one of the most useful books ever written. . . Now that we have the new publication from Princeton, translated with elegant clarity by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, all excuses for not reading Clausewitz are removed."
—The New Republic

AT YOUR BOOKSTORE OR:
Princeton University Press
41 WILLIAM ST • PRINCETON, NJ 08540 • (609) 452-0600
ORDERS 800-777-4726

WHAT IN THE NAME OF LENIN IS GOING ON IN GORBACHEV’S RUSSIA?

For the only on-the-scene, independent answers to that question, read the bimonthly, English-language edition of GLASNOST. With each issue containing the most important articles from the three previous numbers of the Russian edition, our journal looks at everything from “The Goals and Limits of the Gorbachev Reforms” to “The End of ‘The Good Life’ for Galina Brezhneva.” Other subjects include “The Ecological War on the Peoples of the Caucasus,” “The Destruction of the Last Court Archives from the 1930s-1950s,” “The 15th Moscow Film Festival,” “Public and Political Clubs in the U.S.S.R.,” “Inventors and Perestroika” and, of course, the most current appeals and open letters to Soviet leaders. Glasnost, then, may not contain the latest in “Gorbymania”; but it will try to tell you all about Gorbachev’s most recent mania.

GLASNOST — Subscribe Now!
Authors...

LOOKING FOR A PUBLISHER?

Learn how to have your book published.

You are invited to send for a free illustrated guidebook which explains how your book can be published, promoted and marketed. Whether your subject is fiction, non-fiction, poetry, scientific, scholarly, specialized (even controversial), this handsome 40-page guidebook will show you how to arrange for prompt publication. Unpublished authors, especially, will find this booklet valuable and informative. For your free copy, or more information, fill in and mail the coupon to Vantage Press, Inc., Dept. RD-6 516 W. 34th St., New York, N.Y. 10001.

To the Author in Search of a Publisher

FREE! Valuable 40 Page Guidebook

VANTAGE PRESS, Inc. Dept. RD-6 516 West 34th Street, New York, N.Y. 10001

Please send me a free copy of your guidebook called "To the Author in Search of a Publisher".

NAME ___________________________ ___________________________ ___________________________ ___________________________

ADDRESS

CITY ___________________________ STATE ___________________________ ZIP

OKLAHOMA

CHEYENNES AND HORSE SOLDIERS
The 1857 Expedition and the Battle of Solomon's Fork
By William Y. Chalfant
Foreword by Robert M. Utley
Illustrated by Roy Grinnell
"For sheer drama, the clash between cavalry and Cheyennes on Solomon's Fork can hardly be surpassed in the history of Indian conflict."—Robert M. Utley. $24.95

SHAMROCK AND SWORD
Saint Patrick's Battalion in the U.S.-Mexican War
By Robert Ryal Miller
A fascinating true story about war, intrigue, defection to the enemy, and brutal military justice. "Miller tells the story with vivid detail."—David J. Weber. $24.95

ROWDY JOE LOWE
Gambler with a Gun
By Joseph G. Rosa and Waldo E. Koop
This exciting book is a view into the smoke-filled saloons, brothels, and gambling "hells" of the frontier West. $19.95

SAGEBRUSH SOLDIER
Private William Earl Smith's View of the Sioux War of 1876
By Sherry L. Smith
"Here is history with the hide on—a rare first-hand account by an articulate enlisted man of the bloody Powder River Expedition."—Paul Andrew Hutton. $18.95

University of Oklahoma Press

Write for FREE catalog. From your bookseller or

University of Oklahoma Press

Dept. MAE—1005 Asp Ave. Norman, Ok 73019-0446
Add $1.50 post/hand. We accept Visa/MasterCard.
### A China Past
By T. G. Li
- 330 pages
- 0-8191-7377-0
- $32.50 cloth

### Balancing National Security Objectives in an Uncertain World
_The Aspen Strategy Group_
- 242 pages
- 0-8191-7489-0
- $18.75 paper
- 0-8191-7488-2
- $31.50 cloth

### Soviet Human Rights Policy and Perestroika
By Roberto Toscano
- 48 pages
- 0-8191-7408-4
- $8.50 paper

### The Argentine Economy: Policy Reform for Development
By Eduardo Conesa
- 144 pages
- 0-8191-7410-6
- $13.50 paper
- 0-8191-7409-2
- $27.50 cloth

### The Unknown War: The Miskito Nation, Nicaragua, and the United States
_Focus on Issues, No. 8_
By Bernard Nientzschmann
- 120 pages
- 0-932088-42-2
- $11.75 paper
- 0-932088-41-4
- $26.25 cloth

### A Strategy for Victory Without War
Edited by Herbert I. London
- 126 pages
- 0-8191-7438-6
- $12.95 paper
- 0-8191-7437-8
- $26.50 cloth

---

**Available exclusively from America's leading publisher and distributor of public policy books**

**UNIVERSITY PRESS OF AMERICA, INC.**

4720 Boston Way • Lanham, Maryland 20706

(301) 459-3366
Science's Blind Eye

Walker Percy ["The Divided Creature," WQ, Summer '89] sheds light on the so-called mind-body problem inherited from the work of Descartes and on Charles Sanders Peirce's solution to it. The problem—how the brain, a physical entity with properties that are open to scientific scrutiny, can interact with the non-material mind or consciousness—is generally ignored in contemporary social science. In explaining mind in terms of neurological function, psychology, for example, is blind to the category mistake it is making: the explanation of one sort of thing, thought, in terms appropriate to another, brain activity. By turning to language, a phenomenon that comprises both physical sounds as well as meanings which are nonphysical, Peirce bypasses this dualism by getting outside it.

Percy also discovers parallels between Peirce's thought and that of recent existential philosophers. Both Peirce and many existentialists believe that the presuppositions of the social sciences must be made explicit in order to bring out difficulties and incoherencies in their conception of the human being. There are further affinities that Percy does not mention. Both Heidegger and Peirce assess Cartesian philosophy as a wrong turn in the history of thought, are attracted to the work of Duns Scotus and, despite their admiration for the logic of the Middle Ages, remain wary of medieval nominalism. These shared predilections and beliefs make up the background against which the critique of the human sciences is articulated.

Still, resemblances should not be overstated. In the end Peirce remains optimistic about developing scientific models for understanding human beings if these models are sufficiently reflexive whereas Heidegger, Buber, and Marcel see the aims and objects of the sciences as different in kind from the thoughts, hopes, and dreams of actual men and women.

Edith Wyschoegrod  
Professor of Philosophy  
Queens College

Is Anyone Listening?

Walker Percy is a voice. That's good news and bad news. The good news is that the human spirit still speaks in such tones. The bad news is that our era may no longer have the capacity to listen. Speaking to an incapable or unwilling listener is like trying to toss a cannonball into an egg cup. But Percy has his ways. He's a tricky man, admired for "making up stories" that are full of good humor, beauty and transforming power, but ultimately designed to tempt listeners into thinking.

In "The Divided Creature," Percy has no tricks; his voice is pure and resonant. Will we then stop listening? Possibly. It could be said that Percy is not an expert social scientist, and since this is not a novel, he can be ignored as uninformed. It will be easy for some to reject out of hand (instead of fairly testing) the Peirce-Percy Conjecture, the hypothesis that no genuinely triadic relation can be reduced to collections composed exclusively of dyadic relations. This Conjecture has far-reaching consequences for social science.

"And just what are those consequences?" says a poker-faced social scientist. One that is deeply important has to do with explanation. It would be quite easy to make a case that many social scientists do not regard any attempt at explanation to have been successful unless the explaining material is composed of dyadic relations. These are typically causal dyadic relations, often between quanta of matter. But the central phenomena in social life are triadic relations: Percy has enumerated several. Therefore, if the Peirce-Percy Conjecture is correct, the most commonly preferred explanatory strategy in social science today is defunct, at least to the extent that explanations are actually sought for the central phenomena.

"So Percy has something better?" the social scientist asks. Maybe. The question is whether the social scientist is sufficiently courageous to put Percy's proposals to a fair test. If he isn't, we may question why he and so many other social scientists are obsessed with reducing phenomena to dyadic relations, typically causal patterns. Is it possible that such an obsession arises from a conviction that the aim of social science is control, of a rather mechanistic variety? But if the Peirce-Percy Conjecture is correct, understanding, not control, would be the aim of social science—a development that we would all applaud.

Kenneth Laine Ketner  
Charles Sanders Peirce Professor of Philosophy  
Texas Tech University

WQ AUTUMN 1989

143
Huh?

Perhaps someone will be kind enough to answer these questions concerning Todd Gitlin’s article ["The Postmodern Predicament," WQ, Summer '89]:

Are sociology students taught to talk and write this way today? Did Dr. Gitlin write the article as an example of postmodern style? Did he feel better when he finished? What did he say?

As the author says, "There is anxiety at work, and at play, here."

Sid Lasky
Dallas, Texas

Legacy of Ambiguity

The articles by Keith Baker and Maurice Cranston ["1789," WQ, Summer '89] demonstrate yet again what Michel Morineau recently called the "ambiguities" of the French Revolution. Baker stresses the revolutionary nature of the democratization of politics, while Cranston sees a Tocquevillian stability in French society.

Both authors rightly stress the importance of popular political participation, and the difficulties that Rousseau's ideas on direct democracy have received this photograph in the context of France, 1789, enshrined the corporate will of the venal officers, so that the Revolutionaries could not possibly reject the corporate state and side with Montesquieu. The Declaration of the Rights of Man created a new France, based on the collective will of (male) individuals.

Cranston sets out the ambiguity of the Revolution in his quotation from Simón Bolívar: The conflict between “permanency and liberty” and “equality and order.” Order stands, as Barnave and the defenders of the Constitution of 1791 remind us, for the protection of property. Baker and Cranston show us that we must accept the ambiguity of the Revolution’s elusive synthesis: the Revolution reconstructed society around the most fundamental value of the Old Regime, order, and around that value's Old Regimen antithesis, equality.

James B. Collins
Assoc. Professor of History
Georgetown University

Correction

The photograph that appeared on page 80 of the Summer '89 WQ, identified as a picture of Charles Sanders Peirce, was in fact a picture of Joseph Lovering, a professor of mathematics and natural philosophy at Harvard University (1938–83). We received this photograph from the Harvard archives, which had mislabeled it as Peirce. We regret the error. At right is a photograph of Dr. Peirce taken about 1909 (five years before his death) at Arisbe, Peirce’s home in Milford, Pa.
Significant social issues for today

**BROKEN ALLIANCE**
*The Turbulent Times between Blacks and Jews in America*
By Jonathan Kaufman. With a new Epilogue by the Author. "Whether you are black, Jewish, or simply an American who truly cares about us all, this book will make you angry...and sometimes rejoice...Jon Kaufman's work will lead you to a richer understanding that the making of citizens—equal citizens—led America deeper into its very soul."—Henry Hampton, Executive Producer/Creator, Eyes on the Prize. Winner of the Present Tense Award, Outstanding Current Affairs Book.
© MENTOR 0-451-62737-7 $4.95

**LIVING HUNGRY IN AMERICA**
Dr. J. Larry Brown and H.F. Pizer. "Powerful...like few books on hunger and poverty, this work lets the poor speak for themselves."—San Francisco Chronicle. Follow the year-long investigation that took physicians and community health officials across the country to document the return of widespread hunger in America, land of plenty. "A harrowing book the Reagan administration tried to brush off."—UPI
© MENTOR 0-451-62708-3 $4.95

**MAGGIE'S AMERICAN DREAM**
*The Life and Times of a Black Family*
By James P. Comer, M.D. Foreword by Charlayne Hunter-Gault. Told through Maggie's own words and those of her son, an award-winning child psychologist, this is the story of how one woman, born poor and black, realized her American dream of opportunity and education for her five children. "This book encapsulates the black South-to-North movement, from the days of segregation to days of flickering hope. Highly recommended."—Library Journal
© PLUME 0-452-26318-1 $8.95 November

**ROE V. WADE**
*The Untold Story of the Landmark Decision That Made Abortion Legal*
By Marian Faux. One of the century's most important legal decisions is fully chronicled in this book, which follows the actual case reviewed by the Supreme Court—from the client and her lawyers to their strategy, from the original state court decision to the grounds for its appeal, from the arguments in the case to the Supreme Court's final ruling. "A solid work of cultural and legal history."—The New York Times
© MENTOR 0-451-62719-9 $4.95

**HIDDEN FROM HISTORY**
*Reclaiming the Gay and Lesbian Past*
Edited by Martin Bauml Duberman, Martha Vicinus, and George Chauncey, Jr. A unique collection of essays by the leading researchers in the field, Hidden from History explores homosexuality in many cultures and in different eras—from late Imperial China and Renaissance Italy to Victorian America and Nazi Germany to the 1980's—and establishes the first overview of the field of gender study and sexuality for future historical and social research.
© NAL BOOKS 0-453-00692-2 $24.95 November

**FASTING GIRLS**
*The History of Anorexia Nervosa*
By Joan Jacobs Brumberg. "Brumberg traces the linkages between body and mind across time and space in this fascinating study of the role of eating disorders in the psychological lives of young women across the ages. The work is an outstanding example of the new scholarship that weaves social history with developmental science to enhance our understanding of both individual and society."—Urie Bronfenbrenner, Cornell University
© PLUME 0-452-26327-1 $9.95 October

Prices subject to change. Write to the NAL Education Department at the address below for a free Psychology & Social Sciences catalog.
Smooth sailing to 84 countries around the world.

It may surprise you that Lufthansa, the airline of Germany, also flies to Australia, India, Japan, Tanzania, Yemen, anywhere business takes you.

But what shouldn't surprise you is that, no matter how unusual your destination, you can always expect our usual commitment to getting you there without the slightest turbulence.

People expect the world of us: Lufthansa
German Airlines

Lufthansa is a participant in the mileage programs of United, Delta, USAir and Continental Eastern. See your Travel Agent for details.