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Travels With le Carre

Few recent novels have so tantalized readers with the question “How was it written?” as John le Carré’s new spy thriller, “The Honourable Schoolboy,” which recalls the best of Graham Greene in its descriptions of Southeast Asia (Newsweek, Sept. 26). Perhaps more than any other writer, the Hong Kong press corps, which figures so vividly in the book, it was Washington Post reporter H.D.S. Greenway who helped le Carré with his extraordinary firsthand research. From Jerusalem, where he is now the Post’s correspondent, Greenway recalls the experience:

He said he had come east of Suez to get his “knees brown,” a self-mocking reference to the days when old Far East hands wore shorts in the tropics. But when John le Carré showed up suddenly in Hong Kong, everyone assumed that he was about to turn his attention from the spy story, we decided to have a go at the intrigues, treacheries and wildly colorful eccentricities of the East. That was the winter of 1974, and what has now emerged as his latest novel was then only an embryo. The book would still be about the English intelligence community and the now familiar character of George Smiley, he said, but much of the action might be projected against the background of the Far East—perhaps to include a journalist who gets in over his head in matters beyond his control.

A friend in Singapore had passed David Cornwell—le Carré’s real name—on to me because I had been working as a reporter out of Hong Kong and Southeast Asia for a number of years and might be able to show him around a bit. He impressed me as a large, rather shy man with enormous eyebrows that gave him a quizzical air. He was soft-spoken, impeccably polite, and it was only later that the zany side to his personality emerged. A master raconteur and mimic, he turned out to be like a cooler Scaramouche, “born with the gift of laughter and the sense that the world was mad.”

Ledger: These are highly desirable qualities if you are going to spend any time trying to work in Southeast Asia. So, after a look at Hong Kong and Macao, we decided that Cornwell would join me in a swing through Thailand, Laos and Cambodia as my photographer. Just to complicate his “cover,” he insisted that his credit line be Janet Leigh-Carr, and one of his photographs of a burned-out town in northeastern Thailand appeared in The Washington Post, duly credited to Ms. Leigh-Carr.

Cornwell always traveled with a great bookkeeper’s ledger, which he carried under his arm to jot down every mood and anecdote that caught his imagination. Like all good reporters, he realized that first impressions are often the most powerful. Once, in Cambodia, we took a drive to the front to have a look at that surrealistic war and found ourselves on a back road, in a re-speed, where no sane man should have been. I was sweating with fear that we would be ambushed or, worse, captured by the Khmer Rouge, but all the time Cornwell sat calmly writing in his ledger. The incident later emerged in the book, not just the way it was, but with the drama heightened to show the pointlessness and, in the end, the hopelessness of all that was happening in Cambodia.

Opium: Cornwell strove for credibility rather than total accuracy, but he did a thorough job of research. He took flights on Cambodian airplanes that most of the press corps thought more dangerous than Russian roulette, and he choked on the obligatory pipes of opium in one of Vientiane’s more sordid dens.

There was one occasion when reportorial integrity gave way to the option of a good night’s sleep, however. We took the night train down from Nong Khai on the Laotian border to Bangkok, and the old wooden second-class carriages, with saffron-robed monks squatting on their seats eating sticky rice out of lotus leaves, are as colorful as any in the Far East. First class offered a modern sleeping car with beds and air conditioning. After some struggling with his conscience, Cornwell said: “Let’s go first class and let George Smiley go second. He can tell us about it in the morning.”

When we arrived in Bangkok, there was a pile of photographs reporting the succès of his book “Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy.” Cornwell promptly checked into the Somerset Maugham suite of the Oriental Hotel and ordered up bottles of champagne. I have a vague recollection of a serious discussion on ballistics and the exact trajectory necessary to bombard the German stewards in the swimming pool from our second-story window with corks from well-shaken bottles of Mumm’s 69.

Epitaph: In later years, I was able to go over the various manuscripts of “The Honourable Schoolboy” with Cornwell and his wife, Jane, a literary editor. What struck me was how the characters in the book grew as the work of creating a novel took over from the reportorial ledger. It also struck me that Jerry Westerby, the honorable schoolboy of the book, is Conrad’s Lord Jim brought up to date and turned inside out. Whereas Jim tried to atone for having broken faith with a rigid code of conduct, Westerby realizes in the end that the code expected of him has all along been immoral and cruel. “Unforgiven and excessively romantic . . .” Conrad wrote of Jim. “He goes away from a living woman to celebrate his pitiless wedding with a shadowy ideal of conduct.” There could hardly be a better epitaph for le Carré’s schoolboy.

As for le Carré/Cornwell, no sooner had his novel been set in print than I received a telephone call in my new post in the Middle East saying that ace photographer Janet Leigh-Carr was coming to accompany me on a swing through Beirut, Damascus and across the Allenby Bridge to Jerusalem. A new ledger is filling up and I suspect George Smiley is going to have his hands just as full the next time around.
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Editor's Comment

Scholars, like lawyers or bettors at the Kentucky Derby, do not always agree on the meaning of the available evidence. Nowhere is disagreement more vigorous than in the current scholarly debate over “Sociobiology,” the new study of animal (and human) social behavior in terms of biology and Darwinian theories of evolution. The debate is complicated. It touches on ethics, philosophy, and the social sciences, not to mention political ideology. For nonspecialists, following the argument may involve some extra effort, but we found it a stimulating exercise. Our presentation of several differing viewpoints will doubtless elicit others.

Our lead essays on contemporary Japan, we believe, contradict some fashionable stereotypes, notably the image of the Japanese citizen as unchanging in both attitude and behavior on the job. In our brief essays on the Environment, we seek to supply both historical perspective and a kind of current report card on the unprecedented American cleanup effort which began in 1970. Dispassionate, full-dress scholarly analysis of this phenomenon has yet to emerge.

The Quarterly occasionally reviews distinguished first novels in the Current Books section, also noting useful works of fiction in “Background Books” on foreign nations. In this issue, we publish some new fiction—excerpts from Reiner Kunze’s The Wonderful Years. Like several Washington specialists in Communist affairs, we find that Kunze’s sharp, understated vignettes of daily life in his native East Germany illuminate a political culture foreign to the American experience with a special clarity that few scholars or journalists can hope to match.

Equally refreshing to us has been the diversity of reactions from distinguished specialists and lay readers alike to earlier Quarterly essays on the Supreme Court, Southern Africa, and television’s election coverage. We have incorporated the most interesting comments—some of them bright mini-essays—in an expanded Letters section. More will follow in the Autumn issue.

Peter Braestrup
POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

The Scholar in Politics

"Preparations for a Politic Life: Sir Thomas More's Entry into the King's Service" by Jerry Mermel, in The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies (Spring 1977), 6697 College Station, Durham, N.C. 27708.

After Henry VIII acceded to the English throne in 1509, the Dutch humanist Erasmus remarked on the number of scholars that had enlisted in royal service. The King, he observed, had created "not a court but a temple of the Muses."

For 16th-century men of letters, the decision to enter politics turned on a resolution of the age-old argument over the merits of the contemplative vs. the active life, writes Mermel, a former professor of literature at Touro College. Thus, "while many Tudor literati were attracted to the classical ideal of the eloquent scholar-statesman," they also worried about the "disappointments and compromises that might attend the quest for power or influence" in government. Some like Erasmus, chose to keep their distance from civic matters and to influence kings and courtiers through their writings. Others, like Thomas More, chose to combine an education in the classics with the study of law in preparation for "a politic life."

More began his political career in 1504, when, at the age of 26, he served as a burgess in Parliament. His tenure in this position was short, due to his opposition to Henry VII's request for additional funds. However, he later wrote five fulsome epigrams to honor Henry VIII's coronation, "each filled with eloquent compliments"; shortly thereafter, he was commissioned by the new King to carry out an inquest in Middlesex. After holding several municipal and diplomatic positions, More began work on the first volume of his Utopia in 1515.

The stern argument against government employment in Utopia and More's reluctance to confide his ambitions to Erasmus (who regarded royal service as a form of slavery) suggest that More was still plagued
by doubts concerning the mixing of scholarship with politics. The inconclusive nature of *Utopia*’s dialogue on court service, however, provided a hint of More’s later leap into royal affairs. By February 1516, Ammonius could write to Erasmus that More “now haunts the smoky chambers of the Palace.” The decision was not easy, says Mermel, “but it was one for which [More] had long been readying himself.”

**Reorganization and Civil Service**


President Carter has vowed to reorganize and consolidate federal executive agencies. He has also pledged that reorganization will not involve firing or demoting any government employees. While Congress has given the President authority to enact wholesale reforms, there is some question, says *National Journal* reporter Havemann, whether Carter can deliver on either promise, let alone both.

One major problem, he notes, is simply getting a grip on the 2.8 million civilian workers who make up what is called, usually derisively, the federal bureaucracy. While Zachary Taylor, under the old patronage “spoils” system, could replace a third of all federal employees in one year (1849–50), passage of the Pendleton Act in 1883 brought an end to such abuses. The bill, establishing the Civil Service Commission, was intended to bring the needs of department managers and the rights of workers into balance. Havemann quotes critics, among them Carter aide Jules Sugerman, who contend that the pendulum has swung too far. “We’ve erected a pretty firm wall against effective managerial action,” Sugerman complains. It is now virtually impossible to fire employees for poor performance; built-in seniority rules make it difficult for federal managers to reorganize their own staffs; and Civil Service permission is required for even the most routine personnel measures.

The Carter administration can fill only about 2,200 jobs—mostly high-level policy positions—without having to deal with the Civil Service. The remaining “career” Civil Service jobs, from grades GS-1 up through GS-18 are subject to labyrinthine regulations. Even the Civil Service Commission admits that, as a result, hiring delays are excessive. For grades GS-9 through GS-12, the time required to fill a vacancy is three months; GS-13 through GS-15, six months; GS-16 through GS-18, more than a year. Even more difficult is firing, which can take from 6 to 18 months or even longer, depending on how tenaciously an employee manipulates appeal procedures.

Havemann’s conclusion: Even if the administration’s reorganization proposals are acceptable to congressional committees, upper-level bureaucrats, and special interest groups, they could well be impeded by the “harsh reality” of the Civil Service system.
Doves’ Debate

"Fighting Among the Doves" by James Finn, in Worldview (Apr. 1977), 170 E. 64th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

Among American former antiwar activists, as Worldview editor Finn reports, bitter controversy has broken out over evidence of totalitarian repression in South Vietnam. In Manhattan, one faction (including Finn) sent a public “Appeal” to Hanoi, December 29, protesting the Communists’ detention of many leading non-Communist foes of the wartime Saigon regime. They urged Hanoi to “honor the concern for human rights which you have expressed [to visiting] peace activists.” The Appeal’s 120 signers included singer Joan Baez, writer Daniel Ellsberg, historian Staughton Lynd, poet Allen Ginsberg.

A paid counterstatement later appeared in the New York Times. Its signers included Princeton law professor Richard Falk, pacifist David Dellinger, and Richard Barnet of Washington’s Institute for Policy Studies. South Vietnam, they asserted, was a special case; the “present suffering” there was “largely a consequence of the war itself,” for which the United States bears a “continuing responsibility.”

Assessing the doves’ continuing debate, Finn quotes from French journalist Jean Lacouture: “It is better for someone trying to preserve intact his admiration for a revolution not to know its victims.”

American Jews as Voters


Why do American Jews consistently vote as political liberals, regardless of party alignment, class status, and economic interest? Many analysts cite traditional Jewish cultural values—charity, reverence for learning, and a concern for “life-in-this-world”—as an explanation. Halpern, professor of Judaic studies at Brandeis, believes otherwise. Jewish liberalism, he argues, is a political development largely influenced by Western European immigrants whose descendants constitute a minority of the Jewish population.

The traditional Jewish political attitude, he says, is one of conservatism and detachment, conditioned by a historic awareness that safety from persecution depended on the protection of the ruling authorities. Among Eastern European Jews (from Russia, Rumania, and parts of Austria-Hungary), from whom the majority of American Jews are descended, this noninvolvement was reinforced by language barriers and cultural insulation; among Western European Jews, by ghetto life in France and Germany and the constant fear of expulsion.

Inspired by the ideals of the French Revolution (and its subsequent Napoleonic extension into the Low Countries, Italy, and Germany), the Western European Jews became the forerunners of today’s liberals. They adopted the language, manners, and fervent patriotism of their
adopted countries and re-oriented their own institutions so as to support non-Jewish causes. Defense of the universal interest, they argued, was defense of their own interests. Eastern Europeans, with no hope of emancipation, had no such alternative.

The constitutional ideals of the young American Republic favored the growth of this Western-style liberalism, first transplanted here by Jewish immigrants from Bavaria and southern Germany in the 1820s and '30s. Massive immigration of Eastern European Jews began in the 1880s. At first, these immigrants were absorbed by Democratic political machines; later waves brought socialists and anarchists who, along with a lively Yiddish press and the trade union movement, stimulated independent Jewish voting and a high level of political participation. A generalized liberalism was the result.

How long this phenomenon will last is unknown. The Holocaust and the founding of Israel have rekindled Jewish traditions of self-interest. Many American Jews have also begun to question "conventional liberal assumptions" concerning the Jewish-Gentile relationship. "In the last resort," Halpern observes, "Jews are isolated and will not be effectively aided by others."

Social Security's Generation Gap

"Facing the Social Security Crisis" by Martin Feldstein, in The Public Interest (Spring 1977), National Affairs, 10 E. 53rd St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

Concern for the financial health of Social Security has prompted the White House, under both Ford and Carter administrations, to propose emergency legislation to shore up the sagging system. Social Security now carries an unfunded liability of $4 trillion. Current trust funds are equivalent to only 8 months' worth of benefits, compared to 15 in 1970. The depletion rate is accelerating.

But unlike private pension programs, says Harvard economist Feldstein, Social Security's actuarial soundness has a friend in government coercion. Although bankrupt by conventional standards, there is no economic reason why Social Security need ever fail because "the government's power to tax is its power to meet the obligations" to future beneficiaries. The key issue, therefore, is not the administration's short-term structural tinkering but whether taxpayers are prepared to support the Social Security system.

Maintaining political support, contends Feldstein, will become increasingly difficult. The rate of return on Social Security—the excess of benefits over lifetime Social Security taxes—will fall sharply in the near future, both in real terms and relative to return on private investment. In part, this is due to the "demographic swing" from baby boom to baby slump. Where there are now 30 retirees per 100 workers, 40 years from now there will be 45. Simply to maintain the existing ratio of benefits to previous earnings, the tax will have to be increased by at least 50 percent. (There is no possibility, however,
that the Social Security tax, which has increased 500 percent in the past 25 years, can continue to rise to provide ever greater benefits.)

In short, says Feldstein, "we are asking the next generation to pay an increased rate of tax to support us as retirees even as the whole social security program becomes less of a 'good deal' for them than it has been for us."

Feldstein proposes several measures—notably, increasing tax rates within three years—to deal with the system's more immediate problems. Since an unfair shift of the tax burden runs the risk that the next generation will simply refuse to pay, he also proposes that the current taxpayer generation, in effect, pay in advance. A 2 percent surcharge on Social Security taxes, says Feldstein, would produce about $15 billion a year, enough to meet the needs of the demographic old-age bulge that lies ahead.

Does Sex Make a Difference?


When a woman runs against a man in a political contest, is her sex a help or a hindrance? Conventional wisdom is divided on the subject. Some analysts say women candidates gain public recognition more easily; others argue that women "mobilize" the votes of other women; still others believe qualified women are often victims of a sexist backlash. On one point, all agree: A candidate's sex interests voters.

But in a study of 1,099 contested races for seats in the U.S. House of Representatives (in 1970, 1972, and 1974), Darcy and Schramm, political scientists at George Washington University, conclude that voters are ultimately indifferent to a candidate's sex. When variables of party and incumbency are taken into account, sex alone was found to have no effect on outcomes in the 87 races in which women participated. Regardless of sex, Democrats were likely to get more votes than Republicans, and incumbents more than challengers. Two-thirds of the women were Democrats.

In each of the elections studied, there was no evidence that a candidate's sex contributed to greater public recognition; women shared obscurity with the men. Voting turnout of women in races involving women candidates was not significantly higher, and those few voters who would favor or oppose women candidates simply on account of their sex were "balanced neatly" by voters with opposing tendencies. But if sex is not an issue, why are there only 18 women in the 435-member House?

The answer, suggest the authors, lies in the nominating process. Women were nominated in less than 10 percent of the contests studied, and women of both parties tended to be nominated from
the "few, atypical, largely Democratic urban districts." Democratic women there can rely on such extra-party organizations as the Women's Political Caucus to support their nominations. Urban areas are also likely to have a larger pool of activist women as potential candidates. And the largest bloc of voters tends to be made up of "candidate-oblivious" Democrats who vote the party line instinctively.

As for Republican women, they tend to be nominated in the same kinds of districts, where chances of Republican victory are small. In such situations, ticket balancing—"introducing population subgroups not typically represented on the party ticket"—is irresistible. The result: Republican women are largely "throwaway" candidates.

**An Idea Whose Time Is Past**

"The Case Against a Federal Department of Education" by Gerald E. Sroufe, in *Phi Delta Kappan* (Apr. 1977), 8th and Union, Bloomington, Ind. 47401.

During the 1976 campaign, Jimmy Carter advocated creation of a federal, Cabinet-level Department of Education. The idea is not new. Cabinet rank for education, supporters contend, is necessary to "achieve rationality" in U.S. education policy by making it more amenable to "long-term planning, consolidation, and efficiency."

But creating a distinct education department, says Sroufe, director of instruction at Nova University, faces several obstacles—among them, high cost and the existing federal education bureaucracy. Reorganization is never quick, he notes. It took two years and two Presidents (Eisenhower and Kennedy) to restructure the Public Health Service, and four years and two Presidents (Kennedy and Johnson) to create the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Enormous amounts of presidential influence and energy must be brought to bear—to the detriment of other efforts. FDR spent seven years and exerted much influence enacting even a few administrative reform proposals; some were not adopted until the 1950s.

Proponents of a new department, the writer argues, also ignore the political realities that would make a Department of Education merely a symbolic affair. To lament the lack of a European-style ministry of education is to overlook the obvious: American education is peculiarly decentralized. Most responsibility rests with state and local governments. Special interest groups, e.g. vocational teachers, college presidents, inner city administrators, will fight to keep their programs from being consolidated or eliminated; numerous congressional committees dealing with education will still exert tremendous power, unimpressed by a Secretary of Education. And, within the department itself, unless more money and new policies accompany reorganization, each agency will single-mindedly respond to its narrow constituencies, as before. Let the idea rest in peace, Sroufe suggests, while Presidents and educators attend to more pressing matters.
The Rise of the 'Safe' District

There has been a marked decline in competition for seats in the U.S. House of Representatives since the mid-1950s. Some observers claim that the so-called "marginal" districts have vanished due to redistricting; others suggest that incumbents edge out challengers because of their increased ability to communicate with constituents. But Ferejohn, a political scientist at the California Institute of Technology, argues instead that voter behavior has changed.

Rejecting the redistricting argument, Ferejohn shows that similar declines in competition have taken place in unredistricted congressional districts. In a review of non-Southern states, for example, he finds that the number of "competitive" seats (winner received less than 60 percent of the vote) in redistricted districts dropped from 51 in 1962 to 40 in 1966; during the same period, competitive seats in unredistricted districts dropped from 51 to 28.

Ferejohn suggests that there has been a decline in the electorate's "party identifiers"—citizens whose votes are determined by a candidate's party affiliation. Many party identifiers "are behaving more like Independents." However, "issue voting" has not markedly increased. Instead, it appears that "incumbency voting" has replaced party voting as a kind of "shorthand cue" in the voting booth. (Such voter rules of thumb are common in "low-information" congressional elections.) One effect is to reduce the number of competitive seats.

The Social Costs of Urban Renewal

Between 1950 and 1974, 76 percent of federal grants for urban renewal projects were for construction. By the end of this 25-year program, roughly half of the 2,102 construction projects had been completed; more housing units had been demolished than constructed, and seven states had received more than half of the $10 billion in total federal assistance. What has been the lasting effect?

One of the major goals of the 1949 National Housing Act (the major urban renewal legislation), says Jaffee, professor of business at Indiana University, was "a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family." But he reports that under urban renewal low-income families were forced out of central city slums and thus had to compete for a reduced supply of low-cost housing elsewhere. Few could afford to return to the "redeveloped" neighborhoods.
However, urban renewal did increase the market value of urban land. In renewal areas, the tax base increased by an estimated average of 213 percent after completion of the federally aided projects—apartments, office buildings, and shopping malls, for instance. Land was frequently bought up by local urban renewal agencies for more than its market value, benefiting downtown real estate owners in and near renewal areas. Jaffee questions the use of such federal outlays for correcting "inefficiencies" in the urban land market, especially when the benefits accrue only to the local economy. He also criticizes excessive use of federal funds for construction of government-owned buildings. Of the total land value of all urban renewal projects completed by the end of 1973, only 47 percent represented taxable property.

The Politics of Wealth

For the past 150 years, the myth of the "self-made man" has proclaimed America a land of plenty, where every ambitious and hard-working person could achieve material success.

Historical realism, however, suggests that this has not been the case, says CUNY historian Pessen. In fact, the growth of political democracy in the United States has done little to better prevailing conditions of "gross social and economic inequality."

During the latter half of the 19th century maldistribution of wealth (real or personal property) was such that more than 50 percent of the people in 10 major U.S. cities owned no wealth whatever; the richest 10 percent owned about 80 percent of the wealth. By 1920, America's wealthiest 1 percent still owned about 35 percent of the wealth when measured by families, and approximately 31 percent when measured by individuals. By 1966, one-half of 1 percent of all "consumer units" held 22 percent of the wealth.

The fact that great inequities persisted despite the broadening of suffrage raises a number of unanswered questions. Was the politicians' failure to change things due to an indifferent or powerless electorate? Were elected officials unconcerned, elitist, or lacking in power?

The American masses, says Pessen, appear never to have sought a political solution to the problem of economic inequality. Their elected leaders behaved politically as if they themselves were well off, whether they were or not. The evidence does not point to development of a "ruling class" that monopolized political power. What it does suggest is that, for as yet unexplained reasons, political power has not been used by the shifting groups and interests that have possessed it "to tamper with the social and economic order and the pervasive inequalities that characterize that order."

Giving Tito His Due

"Yugoslavia's 'Old' Communism: Europe's Fiddler on the Roof" by Laurence Silberman, in Foreign Policy (Spring 1977), National Affairs, Inc., 345 East 46th St., New York, N.Y. 10017.

Since Marshal Tito's 1948 break with Stalin, Yugoslavia has enjoyed a special relationship with the United States based on American desire to ensure the country's continued freedom from Soviet domination. But Washington's aid has never been reciprocated. Indeed, argues Silberman, former ambassador to Belgrade, Yugoslavia's "non-aligned" diplomacy has been "increasingly hostile to the United States."

The Yugoslavs, for example, supported the UN's 1975 resolution equating Zionism with racism and have called for the "decolonization" of Puerto Rico. Yugoslavia has permitted Soviet naval repairs in its Adriatic ports and did not object to Soviet planes overflying its territory to supply Arab armies in 1973 and the Soviet-backed insurgents in Angola in 1976. Yugoslavia has also abused its access to restricted U.S. civilian technology of strategic significance by passing it on to unauthorized Communist states; it has mistreated "unfriendly" American reporters and has charged that anti-Yugoslav activities undertaken by American-based émigrés have been coordinated by the U.S. government.

A realistic U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia, says Silberman, must recognize the Tito regime as an ideological adversary. The United States, he suggests, must be firm with the Yugoslavs, even as Washington supports Belgrade's non-aligned status. "In fact," Silberman concludes, "it may well be that the less support Yugoslavia gets from the United States the more they feel obliged to resist Soviet pressure" to maintain their relative autonomy.

IRBMs, MIRVs, SALT, and the USSR

"The SS-20 and the Eurostrategic Balance" by Richard Burt, in The World Today (Feb. 1977), Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London NW10 0DD.

Analysts of American-Soviet détente have noted recent Soviet attempts to develop a new class of long-range ICBMs. What has been overlooked, says Burt, assistant director of London's International Institute for Strategic Studies, is Soviet stress on shorter-range "Eurostrategic weapons"—missiles which do not directly threaten the continental United States but could be deployed against Western Europe. Notable among these is Moscow's new intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM) known as the SS-20.

Although the SS-20 is classified by the Russians as a “tactical” weapon (a short-range, small-warhead system designed for use on or near the battlefield), the traditional distinction here between “tactical” and “strategic” is obsolete. The SS-20 is highly mobile and fitted with multiple, independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Burt suggests a more useful distinction—one between “super-power” weapons and “regional strategic” arms. The former would include ICBMs, long-range bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The “Eurostrategic” regional forces, however, are more disparate and include NATO and Warsaw Pact strike aircraft, Soviet medium-range bombers, French and Soviet IRBMs, and British and French submarine-borne missiles. Here, the U.S.S.R. already possesses a clear advantage. Deployment of the SS-20, Burt asserts, “will further distort the already lopsided Eurostrategic balance.”

The SS-20 presents a unique problem for SALT negotiators. The Carter administration could “sour” relations with the U.S.S.R. by insisting on inclusion of the missile in a new strategic arms limitation agreement despite Soviet claims that it is not a “strategic” weapon. On the other hand, avoiding the issue could weaken NATO. If the latter course is followed, Burt warns, European allies, particularly Britain and France, would be compelled to develop larger and more independent strategic capabilities, which would create a more complex arms control problem.

The SALT negotiations, observes Burt, are not designed to grapple with such multilateral, alliance-wide issues, nor are the talks on “mutual and balanced force reductions” (MBFR). He concludes that the West must recognize the significance of the SS-20 and insist to the Soviets that Russian attempts to establish “nuclear hegemony” in Europe are illegitimate, will jeopardize SALT agreement with the United States, and could trigger the expansion of Western European nuclear weapons programs.

U.S. Arms for Peking?


In a widely discussed 1975 paper, Rand analyst Michael Pillsbury raised the possibility of future U.S.-China military ties. Since then, the Chinese have purchased (usually embargoed) British technology to produce Spey jet-fighter engines. The United States has agreed to sell Cyber computers, which have potential military applications, to Peking. But if such Sino-American ties now seem a somewhat more plausible option for Washington, there are considerable differences of opinion
on the subject in Moscow, Tokyo, and Peking.

The Japanese, says Pillsbury, gain from the Sino-Soviet conflict, and will therefore "strongly resist" pressure to take sides. Japan's survival depends on maintaining working relations with all the major trading nations and military powers. (Japan has no significant military capability of its own.) Moreover, the matter of China policy remains "the most divisive issue in Japanese politics."

Although some analysts see U.S. military aid to Peking as triggering a Soviet attack on China, Pillsbury argues that Moscow, despite its paranoia and uncertainty, is constrained by several factors. The Soviets believe that ideological conflicts remain deep enough to preclude any active Chinese-American military cooperation against the U.S.S.R. The Kremlin can also, if necessary, apply considerable pressure against Western nations—Britain, France, Germany—to cut off China's other sources of military equipment. Finally, primitively equipped Chinese forces would have to be upgraded by a factor of 10 even to approach parity with the Soviet Union.

As for the Chinese, conflicting allegorical tales in several influential journals suggest that the U.S. aid issue is a sensitive one in Peking. But in any U.S. deal, says Pillsbury, the Chinese will want to avoid both the appearance of military weakness and the presence of large numbers of foreign technicians. Protracted negotiations will also reflect the mildly schizophrenic nature of Chinese politics. However, Pillsbury thinks the Chinese have taken a "cautious step" toward closer military relations with the West, apparently believing that only "joint pressure applied by Western Europe, Japan, China, and the United States" can contain Soviet expansion.

*The Oil Crisis of the 1980s*

"Oil, the Super-Powers, and the Middle East" by Ian Smart, in *International Affairs* (Jan. 1977), Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London NW10 0DD; "U.S.-Saudi Relations and the Oil Crises of the 1980s" by Dankwart A. Rustow, in *Foreign Affairs* (Apr. 1977), 428 East Preston Ct., Baltimore, Md. 21202.

The industrialized world was able to absorb the first demonstration of the "oil weapon"—the 1973 Arab embargo—without severe political or economic damage. But a more conclusive demonstration may yet come. According to some current projections, by the early 1980s OPEC exporters will control critical reserves, which, if withheld, could provoke a global crisis. The results for the West would be economic hardship and severe restraints on foreign policy.

The 1973 embargo and price increases threatened but did not upset world stability, argues Smart, deputy director of Chatham House. Reductions in Mideast exports to the United States, from 1.2
The major variable in OPEC exports is Saudi production. By 1985, it could range from a low of 6.3 million barrels per day (the 1973 embargo level, capable of supporting Saudi domestic programs) to a maximum of 15 if capacity is substantially increased. The estimates below are in millions of barrels per day.

<table>
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<th>Assumption</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Total OPEC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low production</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-low</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
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The other side of the equation is the oil import needs of the industrialized nations, as estimated below by OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). The United States and other OECD countries would be in a safe position only if they adopted an "accelerated policy" of conservation and development of new energy sources. Estimates are in millions of barrels per day.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumption</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Total OECD</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>Imports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High growth</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium growth</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accelerated policy</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The United States will find itself in a precarious position twice: once in 1978–79, before oil starts flowing fully from Alaska; again in the mid-1980s, when domestic demand surpasses Alaskan production.


db/d (million barrels per day) in the fall of 1973 to a trickle by early 1974, amounted to only 7 percent of U.S. consumption. OPEC price increases, from $1.73 per barrel for "marker" crude in January 1973 to $10.46 two years later, were more than offset in the United States, Germany, and Japan by expanded trade with the Middle East. The most significant political result, concludes Smart, was the transfer of power and influence in Mideast affairs from the Arab states bordering Israel to the oil-exporting nations of the Persian Gulf and North Africa.

The key to any future crisis will be Saudi Arabia, largest of the OPEC producers. Because of their vast oil reserves, notes Rustow, a CUNY political scientist, the Saudis effectively control the rate of exploration and production as well as the price of OPEC oil. They thus have the leverage to initiate another, more devastating embargo.
or price increase. Price hikes could run as high as 50 percent. One result: staggering payment burdens on consumer nations. Another: political leverage, direct or indirect, on the United States and Israel.

The likelihood of such a confrontation will be determined by the energy policies of the world's largest consumer, importer, and waster of energy—the United States. Americans will depend on OPEC for 60 to 70 percent of its imports by the mid-1980s. (OPEC imports rose from 1.4 mb/d in 1973 to 2.6 mb/d in the first half of 1976.) Only an "accelerated policy" (see table) of conservation and development of domestic sources by the United States, says Rustow, can reduce total import needs of consuming nations to a level safely short of critical dependence.

The Lessons of Confrontation

Since the tense 1962 Cuban missile crisis, potentially serious Soviet-American confrontations have occurred only in the Mideast, where American-supported Israelis and Soviet-supported Arabs went to war in 1967 and 1973. The two great powers were repeatedly surprised or manipulated by their respective Mideast allies; since the 1973 Yom Kippur war, Moscow and Washington have become more sophisticated about their real interests in the area.

So writes Whetten, a University of Southern California specialist in Soviet affairs, in a 42-page analysis of shifting post-1956 relationships involving the Big Two, Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The breakthrough came with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's 1973-74 overtures to Egypt and the Arabs, resulting in a "triangular" Mideast relationship, long prevented by "Israeli intransigence." Moreover, Washington seems to have learned that "cosponsorship" in Mideast peacekeeping efforts is a more reliable method of insuring Soviet restraint than "ostracism."

The Soviets did not seem "excessively embittered" by their declining influence in the Arab world after 1973; they can "afford to wait" for favorable developments, while guaranteeing their Mideast clients' military parity and negotiating equality with Israel. Moscow also seems confident of assuring herself a great-power role in shaping a Mideast settlement.

Egypt under Anwar el-Sadat has been "the quickest to apply the lessons of previous experience"—using both war and diplomacy to push for a favorable settlement. After the 1973 war, Sadat sponsored the new U.S. role ("the Soviet Union could deliver arms but only the Americans could deliver Israel"), shook off Soviet influence, and negotiated a Sinai disengagement pact with the Israelis. Sadat's ultimate goal—the restoration of Egypt's 1967 borders—has yet to be
achieved. But in the interim he has gained greater security, foreign investment, and economic relief.

Israel, Whetten contends, "has probably learned the least" after nearly 30 years of intermittent war. She remains "unable to convert her military strength into diplomatic initiative" and is increasingly dependent on the United States. Her "siege mentality" must change; "living on the margin of Middle Eastern life is too risky" until Israel defines more precisely the nature and terms of accommodation with her surrounding Arab neighbors.

The Target
May Be China

Although the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 banned space-based nuclear weaponry, both the United States and the Soviet Union have continued to develop sophisticated military "support" systems for outer space. These systems are used primarily for arms-control verification, early warning, communications, and reconnaissance; they do not involve armaments. However, the prospect of this "strategic nervous system" being paralyzed, or its component satellites "blinded," bothers both Washington and Moscow. Western analysts are worried by periodic Soviet testing of an interceptor satellite apparently designed for use against U.S. satellites.

Although Khrushchev boasted in 1961 that Russian missiles could "hit a fly in outer space," notes Freedman, a Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, only recently has the Kremlin shown real ability to destroy a satellite. Beginning in 1967, Soviet satellites demonstrated the capacity to perform complicated rendezvous and docking maneuvers. In 1968, after being launched into an elliptical orbit, the 2.5-metric-ton Kosmos 249 swooped in on Kosmos 248, then exploded. The experiment was repeated two weeks later and again in 1970. After a five-year hiatus coinciding with the SALT talks, testing of the interceptor program was resumed in 1976.

But Freedman notes some oddities in the Soviet program. Interception would take six hours—more than ample warning for the United States—and the Soviet satellites have not demonstrated the ability to intercept maneuvering targets. Moreover, the Soviet interceptions all took place at a relatively low, 500-kilometer altitude, whereas the U.S. tendency is to place satellites into 36,000-kilometer geosynchronous orbits. There is sufficient duplication in the U.S. satellite system to make its paralysis unlikely.

One possible explanation: The Soviet satellite program is aimed at China, not the United States. China's early efforts to develop a satellite surveillance capability have thus far been primitive, and the system is well within the range of the Russian interceptors.

When Europe Lay Fallow


As in Millet’s paintings and Proust’s Combray, the “immemorial village” stands at the heart of the European pastoral vision. Historians, notably Marc Bloch and Roger Dion, have argued that these “timeless” communities strewn across Western Europe originated as Roman villas—rural estates worked by slaves—and have been continuously inhabited ever since. As a result, scholars have tended to concentrate instead on the “rise of the cities” as a key to rapid medieval economic growth, an expansion unparalleled until the 19th century.

But Cheyette, an Amherst historian, contends that, like the Industrial Revolution, the commercial revolution of the Middle Ages “reposed upon a rebirth of agriculture.” While urban areas never ceased to exist after the fall of Rome in the fifth century, the countryside, from the Mediterranean to the British fens, was “slowly emptied of its population.” In place of the Roman villas but not necessarily on their sites, a new pattern of “nucleated” villages appeared.

Cheyette notes that, in aerial photographs of southern France, field patterns reveal barely discernible but incontestable evidence of the Roman land-allocation grid (710 meters square, known as “centurial”). Superimposed everywhere upon the centurial grid are the later “spider’s web or cartwheel patterns” of field division, which have been the rule for at least a millennium. Roman villa foundations are often found in what are now open fields. Other archeological evidence indicates that many rural settlements were successively abandoned between the third and sixth centuries. Wherever one turns, says Cheyette, a discontinuity is apparent, the result of “a rhythm of repeated blows and partial recoveries.”

References to walled villages first appear in documents of the 10th century but do not indicate sudden rural rearrangement. The first rural parishes were organized earlier—in the eighth century. These parishes, with their cemeteries, dues, tithes, and boundaries, “presuppose a structured territory.” Cheyette speculates that a mixture of church evangelization, colonization, and simple population growth from 700 to 900 A.D. led to the pattern that exists to this day. The extent of the expansion may be gleaned from the fact that only 250 of the 2,000 villages in the Picardy region of France were founded after the 10th century. So integral was this new form of peasant life to the medieval economy, says Cheyette, that it was not abandoned “even when the plague clear-cut the countryside.”
PERIODICALS

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

Dusting Off the Sherman Act


Despite Watergate revelations of widespread "questionable" corporate payments abroad, most business leaders lack an "animated" conviction that these practices, ranging from "consultants' fees" to political contributions to outright bribes, should be stopped. (By September 1976, over 200 firms had admitted to such payments.) According to McManis, visiting professor of law at Vanderbilt, the response of federal oversight bodies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has been inadequate and inconclusive. He proposes a hitherto ignored approach: Antitrust laws already on the books could put a potent legal weapon in the hands of those most willing and able to attack questionable payments.

Recent proposals by former President Ford's Task Force on Questionable Payments Abroad, by the SEC, and by several congressional committees fail to address a central issue. Payments designed to influence the business practices of foreign governments are, in fact, anticompetitive practices.

Existing antitrust laws, McManis observes, provide a solid legal basis for attacking such payments. The Sherman Act (1890) prohibits conspiracy in restraint of trade; the Clayton Act (1914) prohibits payment of brokerage fees to persons under direct or indirect control of another party in a transaction; and the Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) declares unfair methods of competition unlawful.

Liable under this approach would be corporations, subsidiaries, and individual officers and directors. Legal action could be initiated by the Justice Department, Federal Trade Commission, or SEC, by business competitors or parties threatened with economic injury, by shareholders, and even by foreign governments. The ensuing lawsuits, says McManis, would remind negligent corporate executives that questionable overseas payments are not "victimless wrongs" and threaten both U.S. foreign policy and their companies' own long-term business interests.

The Limits to No-Growth


To reduce pollution and avoid depletion of nonrenewable natural resources, some economists have proposed limiting the U.S. economy's rate of growth. Although implicit limits are already set by the rate of productivity (evidenced by an annual increase of per capita GNP over the past 30 years of only 1.8 percent), most slow-growth proponents...
would set the limits below those that now exist.

One way to analyze the consequences of deliberately imposed limitations, says M.I.T. economist Thurow, is to consider the implications of zero economic growth (ZEG). Examining actual periods of zero or negative economic growth in recent U.S. history (the recessions of 1949, 1954, 1957–58, 1960–61, 1969–70, 1974–75), Thurow concludes that ZEG would indeed reduce use of nonrenewable resources but would also cause higher unemployment and greater economic inequality. Furthermore, he argues, "pollution does not decrease when the U.S. economy stops growing."

Without "substantial changes" in the way the economy is operated, he contends, ZEG unemployment rates would rise about 5 percentage points a year. Since the structure of unemployment, measured by percentages of various groups affected, will remain the same, the result would be severe inequities for the young and the black. (Within two years of ZEG, black unemployment would rise to 28 percent, that of young people to 40 percent.)

Moreover, if ZEG is not to bring a falling standard of living, zero population growth will have to be achieved. That means immediate reduction in the average number of children per family from 2.1 to 1.2.

One measure to prevent the rising inequalities that attend ZEG, Thurow suggests, would be some form of "work rationing." However, such a plan would result in a clash between private incentives and social objectives. Such tension could be avoided only if there were some way to eliminate the human desire for more goods and services. A technique for accomplishing this, Thurow concludes drily, "is as yet, however, unknown."

Poor Returns on Stable Pricing


Fluctuations in the price, and thus the export earnings, of raw materials in the world market have caused severe difficulties for the 98 commodity-producing nations designated by the World Bank as "less developed" countries (LDCs). For more than two decades, these nations have pressed for international remedies. But without clear formulation of economic objectives, conclude Brook and Grilli in this World Bank study, the most widely discussed policy option—international commodity price stabilization—would not automatically benefit commodity producers.

The authors identify three possible objectives: stabilizing export revenues, maximizing export revenues, or minimizing import expenditures. In each case, the source of the price fluctuation for a particular commodity is the determining factor in benefits derived. Wheat, tea, wool, rubber, and most metals, for example, tend to be more sensitive
to demand, while the prices of rice, sugar, coffee, cocoa, cotton, and jute vary with supply.

In an analysis of 17 commodities critical to the economies of developing countries, the authors conclude that, as exporters, the LDCs would benefit from price stabilization only for coffee and cocoa; as importers, only for wheat. Moreover, while exports of coffee are of general importance from Brazil to Uganda, cocoa has only regional significance as an export commodity for West Africa. Benefits would in any case be modest. Coffee and cocoa accounted for only 17 percent of the LDCs' export earnings in 1973, the last year for which data are available, and wheat for only 15 percent of total imports. (It is uncertain whether stabilized prices for jute, cotton, and sugar would have a positive or negative effect on export earnings.)

Stabilized prices for their exported minerals and metals would not help less developed countries at all, but the consuming industrialized nations instead. For these commodities, as well as for rubber and sisal, compensatory financing to cover fluctuations would have a more beneficial effect on the LDCs.

An Abnormal Housing Rebound

A revival of housing construction has been in progress for two years, but the current surge differs significantly from earlier "boom" cycles, says the Bulletin.

While previous postwar upswings in building preceded overall economic recoveries by more than six months, housing starts this time began their climb only one month before the economy hit its low point in the first quarter of 1975. Residential construction's 3.5 percent share of GNP remains below the levels attained in previous recoveries.

Other anomalies abound. For example, mortgage lending continues to finance the housing boom, but savings and loan associations account for an abnormally high two-thirds of direct residential mortgage debt. More noteworthy is the expanding role of mortgage-backed securities issued or guaranteed by the federal government. These liquid, bond-type securities account for a fifth of the mortgage debt increase.

To an unusual degree, single-family housing starts dominate the current rebound, despite the fact that the cost of owning a home is rising faster than average family income. Investors have not gone heavily into multifamily projects. Potential cost overruns, materials shortages, strikes, adverse weather, and shifts in consumer demand make construction loans for multifamily dwellings (apartments, condominiums) high-risk investments. At the same time, there has been an unprecedented demand for multifamily housing. Approximately 85 percent of all such units completed during the third quarter of 1976 had been rented before year's end.
During the 17th century, the refracting telescope developed rapidly from Lippershey's all-purpose spyglass (1608) into a sophisticated astronomical instrument. In large measure this was due to the Huygenian eyepiece, named for Christian Huygens, the Dutch astronomer, physicist, and lensmaker, who is credited with its invention.

But Huygens, writes van Hendel, a Rice University historian, "did not invent the eyepiece ex nihilo." As early as 1644, a Capuchin monk, Schyrle of Rheita, used a modified telescope with additional lenses in his studies of Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars. A 1649 letter from Augsburg optician Johann Weisel also refers to what is clearly a compound eyepiece. Huygens studied a Weisel eyepiece in Antwerp in 1652.

Recurrent modifications in telescope construction during the period brought increased magnification, expansion of field of view, and alleviation of spherical and chromatic aberration (the former caused by lens shape, the latter by the lens's tendency to bend different wavelengths of light at different angles). Magnification increases with the ratio of the objective focus (AD, below) to the focus of the eye lens (CE). Telescopes thus grew longer to increase focal length. However, the greater the magnification, the smaller the field of view. Although the Keplerian telescope (1611, two convex lenses) yielded a larger field of view and a clearer, if inverted, image than the Galilean (1609, convex and concave), similar restrictions of field soon became apparent. Van Hendel speculates that it was the long telescope, necessitating addition of a field lens (B) to increase the scope, which led to development of the compound eyepiece.

But until he visited England, Huygens had worked primarily with...
smaller (12- to 23-foot) instruments. Not until 1661, when observing the transit of Mercury across the sun with Sir Paul Neile’s 35-foot telescope, was he impressed with the need for the field lens. In subsequent experiments of his own, Huygens improved the eyepiece, adopting the plano-convex lens (one side flat) for field and eye lenses, turning the flat side of each toward the eye, as Weisel had done 15 years before. Building on the work of his predecessors, by October of 1662 he had determined elements of the special relationship between field and eye lens, thus eliminating aspects of transverse chromatic aberration.

Is It Safe? Does It Work?

"Vaccines and Social Responsibility: Here Are Some Answers, What Are the Questions?" by H. V. Wyatt, in The Monist (Jan. 1977), Box 402, La Salle, Ill. 61301.

In 1972, a U.S. court ordered the federal government to pay damages to a woman paralyzed by poliomyelitis as a result of "immunization" with Sabin oral vaccine in 1963. The court found the former Division of Biologics Standards of the National Institutes of Health negligent in releasing vaccine that had been determined—through tests on monkeys—to exceed the legal safety limit. Yet, the same vaccine has virtually eradicated polio in the United States. Introduction of new vaccines necessarily involves issues of safety versus efficacy. What balance should be struck between the two?

Scientists working on the polio vaccine program faced a moral dilemma, writes Wyatt, a microbiologist at the University of Bradford, England. If the Sabin vaccine were not used, polio would infect thousands and kill many; if it were introduced, almost all of these cases would be prevented. The vaccine itself, however, could cause some scattered injury. This latter consideration was overlooked in light of the "balance of good." Moreover, the vaccine had been widely tested in humans, and researchers were convinced the vaccine was safe, "regardless of what other doubts might be raised by animal or tissue culture experiments."

Clear bioethical decisions, says Wyatt, are plagued by a variety of uncertainties, including test results that differ in people and animals. Between 1957 and 1964, for example, tests on guinea pigs indicated that the Swedish polio vaccine had increased in potency by only 50 percent, although tests of the same vaccine on humans revealed an increased potency of 300 percent.

Wyatt warns that "overscrupulous fear" of the possible consequences to recipients may "prevent proper testing of new vaccines" for such diseases as malaria and syphilis. Adverse reactions to whooping cough vaccination, for example, recently stirred up controversy in Britain, despite the fact that deaths from the disease have been reduced from over 1,000 to about 10 annually.
Early European explorers in subequatorial Africa were surprised to find that their porters spoke a language—Bantu, meaning "the people"—understood throughout most of the region. Bantu dialects are today spoken by 130 million people.

During the late 19th century, scholars theorized that these dialects were derived from some common ancestral tongue in the relatively recent past. In a review of the archaeological and linguistic evidence, Phillipson, assistant director of the British Institute in Nairobi, suggests that the dialects were introduced to the area over a period of 3,000 years by migration from northern Sudanic regions (the Sudanic belt lies between the Sahara and the equatorial forest).

From the probable Bantu linguistic homeland in present-day Cameroon (A on map), the area where greatest diversity among neighboring dialects is found, Neolithic Bantu-speakers migrated eastward (2000 B.C.) around the equatorial forest to the Great Lakes region of Uganda (B). An early eastern stream of migrants moved south in the 4th century A.D. as far as present-day South Africa, while other groups possessing Early Iron Age technology pushed westward to central Zambia (C), where they met and reinforced a pre-metallurgical Bantu-
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speaking migration moving southward along the Atlantic into the western highlands. By the 11th century A.D., this westward stream gave rise to a major Bantu center in southeastern Zaire (D), from which evolved the modern dialects spread widely through the eastern highlands.

Phillipson finds circumstantial but persuasive evidence that this linguistic dispersion correlates with the existing archeological record of the spread of Iron Age culture. The Sudanic belt is the probable homeland for both the ancestral Bantu language and early metal-working cultures. (The best-known iron-working centers were adjacent to the Sudanic belt, at Nok in Nigeria and Meroë in Nubia.) Today's known Bantu-speaking areas correspond broadly to evidence of Early Iron Age culture found in pottery at 350 different archeological sites.

SOCIETY

The Persistence of Segregation


According to many recent studies, the social legislation of the 1960s has led to both absolute and relative improvements in the status of U.S. minorities. Increases in income between 1960 and 1970 were proportionately greater for nonwhites than whites (60 vs. 39 percent). In several key socioeconomic categories—occupation, political participation, education—blacks show significant upward shifts.

Nevertheless, according to the writers, who are researchers at the Universities of Massachusetts and Virginia, a "pervasive web of discrimination" apparently continues to bar blacks from housing in many communities.

Comparing mean "segregation indexes" for all 237 "standard metropolitan statistical areas" (SMSAs) existing in 1970 with those for the 137 areas so designated in 1960, the authors confirmed a decline in residential segregation of 8 percent for SMSAs generally, and of 9 percent for central cities. However, this decline has apparently resulted from the designation by the Census Bureau of 100 "new" SMSAs (cities which became SMSAs since 1960) with already low segregation indexes.

Among the "original" 137 SMSAs there was virtually no change between 1960 and 1970 in the level of residential segregation. In fact, 7 of the 10 most segregated cities in 1960 (Chicago, Cleveland, Milwaukee, Los Angeles, Gary, Dayton, Oklahoma City) remained among the most segregated in 1970.
Contrary Views of Crime

Baffled by the steadily rising U.S. crime rate, many Americans have begun to heed the "new classicist" criminologists, who hold that "deterrence" is a workable approach to reducing crime.

Two of these "new classicists," Wilson, a Harvard professor of government, and van den Haag, an NYU social philosopher, contend that the liberal, "social scientific" approach is bankrupt; that the "root causes" of crime are too complex and controversial to serve as a basis for countermeasures; that crime stems from individual human weakness, not deficiencies in society; and that criminal justice agencies, especially the courts, should promptly remove convicted offenders from society. Above all, these two writers believe that the threat of punishment will influence criminal behavior. The United States has more crime than Britain, Japan, or Italy. "Is it coincidence," asks van den Haag, "that the severity of our punishment is lower?"

A contrary view comes from Curtis, director of the National Alternative Inner City Futures Project, who argues that "retributive justice" (punishment) should not be stressed at the expense of "distributive justice" (general political and social reform). Social and economic barriers, he says have greater influence on spawning crime than do innate personal qualities. He criticizes the federal belief that more money, men, and crime-fighting equipment will do the job. CUNY historian Silver worries that the new classicists ignore the potential danger of rigid "deterrence" used as a tool of oppression. Innocent citizens, he observes, could become victims of such harsh prescriptions as mandatory prison sentences and reduced discretionary powers for parole boards.

Detecting Ovulation

Catholic welfare groups, among others, have become interested in a possible new alternative to the birth control pill, the IUD, and other contraceptive devices, reports Harvard staff writer Marcus.

Dr. Harold J. Kosarsky, clinical instructor in obstetrics and gynecology at Harvard Medical School, working with M.I.T. biomedical engineer Louis E. Kopito, has developed an "Ovutimer," capable of pinpointing the ovulation period—the fertile time—in a woman's men-
The key is an accurate measure of the viscosity (resistance of flow) of cervical mucus, which decreases for four days prior to ovulation and then increases. Kosasky has accurately predicted ovulation—or the lack of it—in over 2,200 tests on 100 women.

The Ovutimer's simple consumer version will utilize a weighted stand about the size of a cigarette pack. The woman samples her mucus on a probe covered by a grooved plastic plate. She places the plate against another plate mounted on the stand. If the two plates stick together when the stand is turned over, the mucus is safely thick and impenetrable by sperm. A normal woman would need to test herself four times a month; once she has detected her own ovulation, she can look forward to three weeks of protection. The device will be tested by 2,000 American women and could be available next year.

Black's, Immigrants, and IQ Tests

Controversial UCLA psychologist Arthur Jensen asserted in 1969 that (1) the average IQ of blacks is 15 points below that of fully-assimilated minorities; (2) black performance on tests is lowest when dealing with abstract material; (3) 80 percent of human intelligence is fixed forever at conception; and (4) the struggle to promote equal opportunity through education is therefore doomed to failure.

But Sowell, an economist at the Center for Advanced Study at Stanford, finds current patterns of black IQs “encouraging.” Analyzing U.S. Army mental tests and some 70,000 elementary school transcripts, he finds that during World War I the IQs of European and Asian immigrants were nearly identical to black IQs today. Acculturation, education, and upward mobility closed the gap. Sowell concludes that, thanks to social changes of the past two decades, these factors are now beginning to influence the IQs of disadvantaged minority groups.

Soon after their arrival in America, Jews, Poles, Italians, Chinese, and Japanese had lower than average IQs (in the 80s and occasionally 70s), observes Sowell. But during the past 50 years, the average IQ of Polish- and Italian-Americans has gone up 20 to 25 points—a total exceeding the current gap between blacks and whites. Virtually all immigrant groups now have IQs at or above the national average.

As for Jensen's view that blacks have more difficulty on tests dealing with abstract material (i.e., material not dependent on “cultural information”), Sowell explains that similar results were found for white children in isolated mountain communities, for rural working-class children in England, and for Chinese-Americans during their early years in this country. Chinese-Americans now do best on abstract portions of standardized tests and figure prominently among the nation's Nobel Prize-winning scientists and mathematicians.
The decade-old debate over proposals for massive federal aid for new child-care centers has produced more heat than light from those ideological "pied pipers" who variously see such centers as the answer to "oppression of women, a thoroughly unworkable welfare system, emotional disturbance, and school failure."

So argues Woolsey, associate director for Human and Community Affairs at the White House's Office of Management and Budget. Analyzing child-care data, she finds that most working mothers employ—and prefer to employ—relatives or friends to take care of their young children. Much-touted high-quality day-care centers are costly to operate—up to $5,000 annually per child—and surveys show no urgent demand by parents for more of them. (In 1976, various federal child-care subsidies totaled roughly $1.5 billion, excluding tax breaks for working parents' child-care expenses.) Even experimental free centers for welfare mothers got "few takers"; the same was true of centers set up for employees by corporations. Moreover, day-care centers are not crucial to a mother's ability to work outside the home. What matters is "the existence of a job"; children get taken care of somehow. Indeed, one 1973 South Carolina study showed that low-income women managed to keep their jobs even after their day-care centers shut down.

Although they sometimes prove useful, Woolsey concludes, formal federally funded child-care centers constitute a "secondary issue." In the debate, parochial upper-middle-class advocates (and their foes) have diverted attention from the real wants and needs of black, Puerto Rican, and blue-collar white parents, not to mention their children.

Despite growing dismay among some ethnic groups over "forced Americanization," the "melting pot" ideology remains deeply entrenched in American institutions and the minds of the public. Engrained in the philosophy of the public school, and justified by the "evolutionary" social models of such theorists as Weber and Durkheim, assimilationist assumptions left many scholars with little interest in the interplay of ethnic groups.

But while U.S. ethnic groups may be "legally invisible," says Swierenga, a Kent State University historian, a growing school of social scientists suggests that the political and social cleavages in this
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country have been primarily along ethnic and religious, rather than
economic or "class," lines.

Beginning in the early 1960s, research by such "new pluralists" as
Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Nathan Glazer at Harvard, Lee Benson
at Iowa, and Andrew Greeley at the University of Chicago, has indi-
cated that the main points about the melting pot are: that it did not
happen; that ethnic groups have always comprised a series of sub-
societies; that this persistent diversity is necessary and healthy; that
ethnic diversity continues to play a vital part in party politics. Even
the fourth and fifth generations of some mid-19th century immigrants
—Dutch, German, and Scandinavian—have yet to be fully assimilated.

Some major historical studies in the field are already underway.
(The federal Ethnic Heritage Studies Program, begun in 1972, pro-
vides some of the research funds.) The Philadelphia Social History
Project has been compiling data on the social characteristics of local
blacks, Germans, and Irish between 1850 and 1880. Swierenga himself
is studying the impact of migration on 17,500 America-bound 19th-
century Dutch families. Nevertheless, he concludes, the new ethnic
consciousness "has clearly caught [most] sociologists and social his-
torians off guard."

RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

The District Heat
Alternative

"Prospects for District Heating in the
United States" by J. Karkheck, J.
Powell, and E. Beardsworth, in Science
(Mar. 11, 1977), 1515 Massachusetts Ave.,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.

The use of waste heat (50°-100°C) from electric plants and other
sources for space and water heating could be an efficient energy
alternative for colder, urbanized areas of the United States. (Space
and water heat now account for about 19 percent of U.S. energy
needs.) Such "district heating" has been used with success in almost
all European countries, report the authors, members of the Fusion
Technology Group at Brookhaven National Laboratory. With this
system, Denmark serves 32 percent of its people and Sweden 25 per-
cent. The authors believe the district heating approach could provide
more than half of the U.S. population with "cost-competitive" heat
and hot water, reduce American reliance on foreign fuel, and promote
the principle of "total energy use."

Other technologies, the authors contend, do not match district
heating in terms of cost or efficiency. Coal gasification consumes a
"finite resource." Solar heating must rely on conventional back-up
systems. And nuclear power creates more waste heat. After the sub-
stantial initial capital investment, the authors add, annual expendi-
The difficulties facing district heating on a national scale—it involves laying a grid of buried transmission and distribution pipes—are enormous. (The European systems were mostly installed during post-World War II reconstruction and urban expansion.) The authors recommend a central role for the federal government and estimate the total cost at $180 billion, paid for by annual reductions of $13 billion in the cost of imported oil. Finally, to ease the transition, a variety of tax incentives should be made available for cooperating utilities and individual consumers.

Disposing Safely of Nuclear Waste


In a light-water reactor, enriched (3.3 percent) uranium is exposed to neutrons. Many of the products of these reactions (isotopes of strontium, cesium, and plutonium, for example) are high-level radioactive waste and pose a potential health problem. Several solutions have been proposed. Most involve burial of atomic waste deep in the earth. But critics of nuclear power contend that such disposal is unsafe, since the dangerous nuclear material could easily enter the environment. What exactly are the risks in burying nuclear waste?

In a complicated computer study, Cohen, a University of Pittsburgh physicist, traces the decay history of a year's worth of nuclear waste (about 4,000 canisters, each 10 cubic feet in size) over a period of a million years. He takes hundreds of variables into account—rate of decay, levels of toxicity, possible leakage, geological stability, volcanic action, inadvertent human intrusion, even the possibility of a meteor hitting the disposal site. He concludes that atomic waste deeply buried (to at least 600 meters) could cause 0.4 deaths from cancer per million years. If a cure for cancer is found, the figure becomes 0.04.

Cohen notes that buried waste is most dangerous during the first 500 years, after which toxicity will have decreased by several orders of magnitude. Ground water is the most likely pathway to the environment, but waste could be put in deep salt formations (one site in New Mexico is being considered) that have been dry for 250 million years. That aside, ground water travels very slowly, and, at a depth of 600 meters, radioactive water would probably have to travel at least 100 km to reach the surface. Moreover, water would first have to corrode the glass and steel nuclear waste containers, not to mention the rock or salt in which they are embedded. The process could take a million years, and radioactive leaks are easily discovered.

Cohen's conclusion: The chances of leakage, of leakage reaching the earth's surface, and of leakage being inhaled or ingested, are remote.
RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

Walking on Two Legs

"Intermediate Energy Technology in China" by Vaclav Smil, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Feb. 1977), 1020 E. 58th St., Chicago, Ill. 60637.

Specialists have increasingly questioned the usefulness of capital-intensive Western technology for developing nations. In China, an intermediate approach ("walking on two legs") has characterized the austere Chinese economy since the 1950s. While large mines, refineries, and power stations support the nation's heavy urban industry, the countryside now depends heavily on the production of fuel and electricity by small communal enterprises.

Haphazard experiments began during Mao's Great Leap Forward (1957-59), but only since the end of the turbulent Cultural Revolution (1969), says Smil, a geographer at the University of Manitoba, has systematic planning begun.

Three forms of energy have been adapted to decentralized production: coal, hydroelectricity, and "biogas." Official statistics show that almost one-third of China's coal now comes from small community mines, mostly south of the Yangtze River where the cost of northern coal is prohibitive. Almost all of China's 60,000 small dams and hydroelectric stations are in the same region.

Biogas is produced by fermentation of animal dung, night soil, vegetation, garbage, and waste water. Organic materials are broken down by acid-producing bacteria; the acids in turn yield methane, carbon dioxide, and traces of other gases. A typical 10-cubic-foot insulated "digester" can supply a farm family of five with enough fuel for cooking and lighting, as well as fertilizer for crops. Almost 3 million peasant families are producing biogas in Szechwan alone.

PRESS & TELEVISION

The Big Get Bigger


In 1930, newspaper chains controlled 43 percent of America's daily newspaper circulation; in 1960, 46 percent. But today, notes Bagdikian, a veteran newspaper analyst, the chains control 71 percent of daily circulation. Most of the remaining independent dailies have circulations under 10,000—not very tempting to the potential investor.

In 1976, the top 25 newspaper chains alone accounted for more than half of all daily circulation, up from 38 percent in 1960. The largest
chain, Gannett, began the year with 50 dailies and ended with 73; Thomson grew from 51 to 57. Now that most of the independent dailies have been acquired, the bigger chains have begun to buy up the smaller chains. Last year, the 30-paper Newhouse organization purchased the eight Booth papers for an estimated $305 million, the largest newspaper deal in history.

Why this furious acquisition pace? Because virtually all (more than 97 percent) of the nation’s 1,500 daily newspapers have no local competition. Investors are attracted by the stable, high annual profits (up to 25 percent of sales). But, particularly when controlled by large conglomerates, Bagdikian warns, the newspaper may become little more than just another manufactured product. Worse, objective reporting may become the casualty of conflicts of interest. The New York Times Company, for instance, recently was threatened with the loss of 260 pages of trade advertising in one of its properties, the journal Modern Medicine, after the appearance of articles on medical incompetence in another property, the daily Times. (The company sold Modern Medicine shortly thereafter.)

Bagdikian proposes two steps to insulate news operations from “business side” intervention. First, disclosure of newspapers’ owners and their holdings should be required by the Postal Service. Second, as is the practice on several European newspapers, notably Paris’s Le Monde, editorial staffs should be given the right to choose the editor in chief, to send a delegate to board meetings, and to participate in the budget process. Such staff autonomy runs counter to U.S. traditions, Bagdikian concludes, but it is preferable to control by “empire builders concerned with business in other places.”

Making Reality Seem Worse

The Violence Index, measuring the prevalence, rate, and character of violent behavior on television, registered an unprecedented jump in 1976. All three networks increased their scores, with NBC still the highest, followed by ABC and CBS. The most dramatic increases occurred in the “family hour” (8–9 p.m. EST) and children’s daytime programming, thereby boosting the cumulative index to the highest level since Gerbner and the Communications Research Team at Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School of Communications first began keeping records in 1967.

The researchers’ analysis, based on a broad sample of fall 1976 TV programming, shows that 9 out 10 TV shows contained violence, up from 78 percent in 1975. “Frequency” also rose, from 8 to 9.5 violent
actions per hour. On average, there were 1.06 victims for every violent person; women, the young, the poor, the nonwhite, and the “good” suffered the most.

One consequence, argue the Annenberg researchers, is a tendency among TV audiences to overestimate actual levels of violent crime in the United States. They found that most adult heavy viewers surveyed believe that 25 percent of all crimes are violent (real life: 10 percent; TV: 77 percent), that they have a 10 percent chance of being involved in a violent situation (real life: 0.41 percent; TV: 64 percent), and that most fatal crimes occur between strangers (real life: 16 percent; TV: 58 percent).

Pravda’s View of Watergate

“Watergate and Détente: A Content Analysis of Five Communist Newspapers” by Leon Hurwitz, in Studies in Comparative Communism (Autumn 1976), School of Politics and International Relations, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Calif. 90007.

Three Communist newspapers in the West—New York’s Daily World, Paris’s l’Humanité, and Rome’s l’Unità—provided “reasonably accurate and complete” accounts of the Watergate affair in 1974. Indeed, their coverage compared favorably with that of local non-Communist newspapers during the three weeks preceding Nixon’s resignation and the week following the Ford pardon. But the two “official” Soviet dailies, Izvestiia and Pravda, either ignored the story or ran accounts that were “incomplete, misleading, or both.”

One inhibition on the behavior of the Soviet press, writes Hurwitz, a Cleveland State University political scientist, was the then blooming “détente” policy (and its political imperatives). Reports critical of the Kremlin’s American partner in détente were to be avoided. Pravda persistently referred to the “so-called Watergate affair,” commenting that “certain circles” in the United States wanted to use Watergate to “dampen” relations with Moscow. Both newspapers refrained from printing criticism of Nixon. At the time, Hurwitz recalls, the Soviets were trying to weaken support for the Jackson Amendment in Congress. Moscow’s implicit suggestion: If the U.S.S.R. did not take sides in an American domestic controversy, the United States should behave in like fashion regarding Soviet treatment of dissident intellectuals and Jewish émigrés.

But the basic Soviet attitude, suggests Hurwitz, stems from the deeper meaning of Watergate as a victory for constitutionality, the rule of law, and the importance of the individual vis-à-vis the state. Such themes do not match Soviet notions of “state security” and jurisprudence. “Extended commentary and moralizing [on Watergate] by Pravda and Izvestiia,” Hurwitz comments, might well “have led their readers to question Soviet political behavior.”
Black Africa’s American Heritage

The fascination of some leading black American writers with their African heritage has long been acknowledged. In poet Langston Hughes’ words, “If you want me you must search for me / Beneath the palms of Africa.” But scholars tend to overlook the influence of America’s black authors on the literature of blacks in Africa, writes Asein, a professor of English at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

During the 1930s and ’40s, South African writers such as Peter Abrahams (Dark Testament, 1942) and Ezekiel Mphahlele (Man Must Live, 1947), beset by white supremacy in their own country, discovered both techniques and purpose for their fiction in the pan-Negro consciousness of W. E. B. DuBois, the rage of Richard Wright, and the revolutionary rhetoric of Claude McKay. “The agony [of Wright’s “Big Boy Leaves Home”] told me how to use the short story—as a way of dealing with my anger and indignation,” Mphahlele wrote in 1947. Mphahlele’s early writing had focused on “private concerns.” His later works echoed American blacks’ interpretation of racial problems by taking a “wide-angle view” of South African society as the determining factor in the lives of his characters.

Today, with many South and West African writers (among them, Keorapetse Kgositsile, Joseph Okpaku, and Mphahlele) emigrating to the United States, America’s influence on African literature is entering a new phase: Recent work by these Africans reveals a willingness to experiment with new settings, American fictional characters, and the “overtly combative” tradition of American black radical politics.

The Making of a Myth

On May Day, 1627, Thomas Morton erected an 80-foot maypole and declared a day of festivity. He welcomed “all comers, red or white, to a barrel of beer, a case of spirits . . . and dancing to drums” in celebration of spring and the re-christening of his fur-trading community near what is now Quincy, Massachusetts. Morton dubbed his settlement Ma-re (pronounced “merry”) Mount—a “compound title
of almost unlimited suggestibility”—perhaps to aggravate his nearest competitors, the Puritans.

Shortly thereafter, Plymouth’s William Bradford, disturbed by the “beastly practises of madd Bacchinalians,” dispatched Miles Standish to secure Morton’s arrest; Morton was charged with selling firearms to the Indians and shipped to England. In a subsequent Puritan expedition, John Endicott felled the infamous maypole.

The passing of Merry Mount has been described by so many American writers that it has become a myth, asserts McWilliams, professor of English at the University of Illinois. All have found in this brief episode a “mirror” of the values and assumptions of their own times. In his 1720 historical account, for example, Cotton Mather attacked Morton venomously, betraying his fear that a new “counterculture” might again threaten the peace.

Farther removed from the event but still in the shadow of the founding fathers, Nathaniel Hawthorne took an ambiguous approach to the Merry Mount conflict before concluding that Morton symbolized the “English past,” and the Puritans the “American future.” During the 1920s William Carlos Williams decried Puritanism as the source of modern America’s troubles and condemned the Puritans for their “repressed sexual envy.” During the 1960s, Robert Lowell’s drama The Old Glory stressed racial hostility between Puritans and Indians.

McWilliams suggests that the “meaning of the conflict” at Merry Mount has always been ripe for reshaping “because its historical facts had been conveniently obscured” from the beginning. Only two eyewitness accounts exist of the episode, Morton’s New English Canaan and Bradford’s Of Plymouth Plantation.

The Artist as Stricken Child

Of Michelangelo’s many unfinished works, the Pietà in Florence is the only one that the sculptor mutilated before abandoning it. He destroyed Christ’s left leg and damaged both arms before friends persuaded him to stop. Significantly, says Liebert, the group of figures was intended to adorn Michelangelo’s tomb, and the face of Nicodemus resembles Michelangelo’s own features. Why did Michelangelo try to wreck this particular creation in such a way? And why did the destruction occur when it did?

Liebert, a Columbia University psychiatrist, rejects several explanations—such as that the marble was flawed or the sculptor a hopeless perfectionist—to focus on Michelangelo’s own explanation: He destroyed the Pietà because his steward Urbino, his “beloved servant and companion,” was nagging him to finish it. At the time (late 1555), Urbino lay dying. The prospect of imminent loss preoccupied Michel-
Michelangelo, then 80 years old. “Nothing but unending wretchedness remains for me,” he wrote after Urbino’s death.

Irritation and blame directed at a dying loved one are typical responses to feelings of abandonment, but for Michelangelo, Liebert argues, the experience was especially traumatic. After 26 years of service, Urbino had probably become a surrogate for Michelangelo’s mother, who died when he was six. (As a result, Michelangelo avoided relationships with women throughout his life.) Enraged at a second loss of maternal affection, Liebert contends, he found an outlet in mutilation of the Pieta, a symbol not only of his own death and the approach of Urbino’s but also of “loving fusion” between mother and son. Nevertheless, the theme continued to obsess Michelangelo, and he was working on yet another Pieta when he died 10 years later.

Back to Big Movies


Emerging from the slump of 1969/70 (when Paramount, for example, went $60 million into debt on four films), Hollywood has enjoyed its greatest financial successes during the past three years. With the return of the blockbuster movie—Jaws ($118 million in rentals alone), The Godfather ($85 million), The Exorcist ($82 million)—the industry, its admirers claim, has once again found a mass audience.

But those who hail the return of the truly “popular” movie, writes Paul, film professor at Haverford, overlook the fact that historically the movie industry has employed a variety of genres to create and
sustain mass appeal. By contrast, Hollywood’s heavy reliance in the 1970s on the big-budget, multicharacter action film presages “disaster for the art form and, in the long run, for the industry itself.”

Relying on “bankable” stars, sophisticated marketing techniques, and ever-rising film budgets (up to $15 or $20 million), producers are looking for the safe “pre-sold product.” With recent movies now a cornerstone of network TV programming, new films must possess some “unique”—and expensive—quality to lure customers away from their television sets. As a result, fewer movies are being made and distributed. (Universal opened Jaws in 500 theatres for a 12-week run; during this period it launched no other films.) This strategy has had some short-term success: The top 79 films in 1975 grossed $700 million, but of these, 15 accounted for 57 percent of the total “take.”

With fewer movies, however, opportunities for young filmmakers are reduced. Moreover, while a successful blockbuster may give some directors—Stanley Kubrick, Robert Altman—the financial security to pursue their own interests, just as often it will have the opposite effect. Faced with artistic independence or a percentage of the box office, how many top directors, asks Paul, will “give up the chance to tie into one of the $50 million-plus grossers?”

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**RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY**

*Nietzsche’s Notion of Shame*

Blushing, wrote Darwin, “is the most peculiar and human of expressions.” But the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), obsessed with the emergence of a new type of human being, proved ultimately more concerned with that mother of the blush—shame.

Nietzsche’s interpretation of shame was dynamic and often contradictory, writes Schneider, professor of religion at Meadville-Lombard Theological School. He did not mean “shyness” or “guilt” and had no patience for those “shamed” by their instincts. True shame he associated with the mysterious, the masked, the valuable. It occurred when man perceived himself as merely a “tool of manifestations of will infinitely greater than he is permitted to consider himself”—as when creating and procreating, or in the presence of nature, art, or truth. In the end, what was of value was “like a woman. She should not be violated.” The “noble” man or artist should embody the “pathos of distance,” where keeping one’s distance betokens respect.

By contrast, the ignoble and mediocre man craved the explicit and lacked a “delicate reverence.” Thus, Nietzsche detested scientific
inquiry because it “cheapened” the spirit by its familiarity, says Schneider. In fact, he likened science to peeping under a woman’s skin. In Christianity—which confuses shame with inhibition and the holy with the unnatural—Nietzsche confronted his values in reverse. In particular, he despised the positive value Christianity put on shamelessness, especially the shameless presumption of helping others. “Pity offends the sense of shame,” he wrote in Thus Spake Zarathustra.

Perhaps only in art was the proper balance struck, Nietzsche suggested, because the artist was alternately bolder and more reticent than the “common” man. As his stormy relationship with Wagner evolved, he became fascinated by the comparison of music and words. Urging artists to exploit their experiences “shamelessly” and to avoid the “dangers” of modesty, he nevertheless saw shame at the heart of art. On the one hand, he found writers and poets shamed by the intrinsic limits of their medium; on the other hand, shame kindles respect for “appearances”—forms, tones, folds—in music, painting, and sculpture. To stop at the surface, to preserve the veil, Nietzsche believed, was to acknowledge the “indecency” of uncovering everything.

‘New Religions’ of Japan

In response to the disorientation occasioned by defeat in World War II, hundreds of religious denominations and sects have flourished in Japan since 1945. While most sects can be classified as Buddhist, Christian, or Shinto, much of the nation’s religious vitality revolves around the “New Religions,” a term reserved for some 125 movements that have emerged since the late Tokugawa and early Meiji (1800-1870) periods.

The New Religions emphasize a theological conservatism adapted to modern social organizations, writes Solomon, Iowa State professor of philosophy. They thus present the Japanese with an attractive middle course: “the blend of traditional with modern values in a creative manner.”

These New Religions include Soka Gakkai, Rissho Kosei-kai, and PL (Perfect Liberty) Kyodan, which, among them, have more than 20 million members. They place reaffirmation of traditional values (loyalty, nationalism, aestheticism) at the center of their beliefs. However, the creative synthesis of traditional and modern is often expressed in unusual and striking ways. PL Kyodan’s emphasis on individual illness as an indication of sin, for example, has prompted the organization to maintain a Bureau of Computerized Mission. The Bureau keeps track of the illnesses of its 1.5 million members and
attempts to establish "mental structures" for various conditions.

The most remarkable re-formulation of religious values in a modern context involves Soka Gakkai. Not content to be a passive element in a technocratic society, it has formed a political wing, the Komeito, or "Clean Government" party. More remarkable still has been its success. Highly organized among the working classes, and serving as an ombudsman for the disadvantaged, Komeito is now the third largest party in the Japanese Parliament. There are 30 Komeito members in the House of Representatives, 24 in the House of Councilors (Senate), and more than 3,000 local Komeito officeholders nationwide. For the New Religions, observes Solomon, the sacred belongs "at the core as well as the circumference of an industrial society."

Roman Catholics and Anglicans

A theological "study document" drafted in Venice by the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission has been widely understood as signifying the impending union of the Anglican and Roman Catholic communities under the primacy of the Pope. Despite "widespread misrepresentation" in the press, Ryan, a Jesuit and commission member, believes that the so-called Venice Statement could provide the basis for a "much-needed dialogue" on questions in which divergence between the two churches seems to be increasing.

When the document was released last January, press reports indicated variously that: (1) the statement was an "official document" of both the Anglican and Roman Catholic Churches; (2) Anglicans were prepared to accept the Pope as universal primate; and (3) the Archbishop of Canterbury would become a patriarch in the manner of the Eastern rite of the Catholic Church. Time headlined its account "Power to the Pope." The Times of London reported that commission members "found a convergence of belief to their surprise."

Actually, says Ryan, the assembled theologians found the Times article surprising. Although they reached agreement on Church authority, the "authority" is Christ's. The theologians developed no new structure to resolve the major differences between the Roman Church and the 23 autonomous Anglican Churches in Britain, the United States, and elsewhere; instead, the commission stressed the model of koinonia—communion of men with God and one another. Universal primacy is discussed in the Venice Statement in connection with the episcopate, or oversight function of bishops in promoting koinonia. But the Statement says only that in "any future union," a much weakened, collegial authority "should be held by the See of Rome." Although the Venice Statement makes clear that both communions share elements of a common tradition, on issues, Ryan writes, they "appear to be moving further apart."
PERIODICALS

OTHER NATIONS

**Moscow's Brand of Mercy**


More than 180 general amnesties for criminals have been declared by the Soviet Union since the first was proclaimed at the Sixth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in 1918. Only nine have come since Stalin's death in 1953. How many people have been affected by these actions is not known, but it seems clear that amnesties play an important role in Soviet penal policy. Yet, observes Zile, a University of Wisconsin political scientist, no precise definition of amnesty appears anywhere in Soviet law.

Apart from Moscow's insistence that amnesty is merely “an expression of socialist humanism,” Zile notes, the sketchy available facts will support almost any interpretation. Some amnesties seem to be public-relations moves. To celebrate International Women's Year, for example, the Kremlin freed large numbers of female convicts. But novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn claimed (in *Gulag Archipelago*) that, in at least one instance, amnesty served as a device to flush out potential dissidents: Cossacks responding to an amnesty offer were first given land, then arrested. Finally, Peter Maggs of the University of Illinois says that Soviet amnesties are simply granted “when prisoner detention facilities become overcrowded.”

Ordinary criminals are the main beneficiaries. “Politics” were excluded from both the amnesty of 1967, celebrating the October Revolution's 50th anniversary, and the two amnesties of 1975. “Soviet amnesty policy,” Zile suggests, “distributes the rations of mercy in ways designed to condition human beings in the unquestioning acceptance of the established order.”

**A Bitter Pill**


Faced with dwindling food supplies, endemic disease, and an “unacceptably high” birthrate, the government of Bangladesh embarked on a major population control effort shortly after the nation achieved independence from Pakistan in 1972.

With funds from the United States, the United Nations, and others, economic incentives have been devised to encourage family planning.
Thousands of sterilizations have been performed and contraceptives have been provided for those who want them. The United States alone has given Bangladesh over 50 million cycles of oral contraceptives since 1972. During one week in 1975, volunteers distributed birth control pills and condoms in two-thirds of the nation's 65,000 villages.

However, argues correspondent Iain Guest, the intensity of the drive has not been matched by its results. Bangladesh has yet to recover from a civil war and two coups in five years. Bureaucratic fragmentation has crippled distribution services; funds are held up by administrative rivalry; allegations of fraud and incompetence are widespread. Lacking instruction, most women haven't used the birth control pills that they received. Those who are using them are misusing them. And because women become more fertile immediately after ceasing to take estrogen, those unable to get pills every month are likely to conceive in the interim.

Worse yet, the government has ignored the connection between family planning and health care. Thirty percent of Bangladeshi children die before the age of five, notes Guest; since working children are economically vital to rural families, parents who undergo sterilization, as urged by officials, in effect "act against their own best interests." Moreover, if the children of a sterilized woman die, her husband may simply take a new, fertile wife. According to Guest, Bangladeshi officials now fear that the birth control program may actually have increased the country's annual population growth rate by half a percent since 1974.

Three Reports on the New Vietnam

"Gulag Vietnam?" by Allen E. Goodman, in Freedom at Issue (Mar.-Apr. 1977), 20 W. 40th St., New York, N.Y. 10018;
"They Are Us, Were We Vietnamese" by Theodore Jacqueney, in Worldview (Apr. 1977), 170 E. 64th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

Two years after Hanoi's tanks rolled into Saigon, its durable Politburo is still wrestling with the grave problems of postwar recovery and the "social transformation" of the conquered South.

Roughly $1 billion in foreign aid, half of it from the Soviet Union, buttressed the thin $2.6 billion national budget of the unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam last year; with 43 million inhabitants, Vietnam is now the world's third largest Communist nation. Turley, Southern Illinois political scientist, cites official plans: a "redistribution" of 4 million people out of urban areas by 1980; use of army technicians on economic projects; a stress on light industry in the North and farming...
in the South. To help cover its foreign trade deficit, Hanoi tapped the International Monetary Fund last January for the first time.

Goodman, a former Clark University professor and now a senior CIA researcher, echoes Turley's finding that Hanoi profoundly distrusts the "bourgeois" Southerners; Northern cadres run the South's cities and provinces; Northern-style "collectivization" of Delta agriculture and Saigon commerce has yet to occur. Roughly one-third of the South's working-age population, by virtue of prior ties, however modest, to the old regime, appears slated for "re-education" and subsequent "parole" under continued surveillance.

Some 200,000 people, says Goodman, are already in re-education camps, with sentences ranging from 3 to 30 years. All in all, "the people of Southern Vietnam face a disruption as profound as that caused by the war itself."

Jacqueney, a former U.S. aid official turned antiwar protestor, reports that there is now clear evidence (notably from new refugees) that the 1975-76 consolidation of the South was accompanied by "massive detentions" and grim "Gulag-like conditions" in re-education camps, even as favored Western visitors were shown "selected camps" near Saigon. Among those imprisoned since 1975 are some of the old Saigon regime's chief noncommunist foes, notably Tran Ngoc Chau, Bui Tung Huan, Tran Van Tuyen. Others have died of maltreatment. Thich Tri Quang, famed wartime leader of a pacifist Buddhist faction, is under house surveillance; his followers have protested Communist persecution with a dozen self-immolations.

**France’s Quiet Shift in Foreign Policy**

“French Foreign Policy: The Domestic Debate” by Marie Claude Smouts, in *International Affairs* (Jan. 1977), Oxford Univ. Press, Press Road, Neasden, London NW10 0DD.

Since taking office in 1971, French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing has quietly shifted away from the foreign policy of his immediate predecessors. French business has been encouraged to establish closer ties with the United States; France has moved closer to NATO in deed if not in word; and development of a costly nuclear deterrent—supreme Gaullist symbol of French independence—has been slowed.

Oddly, this shift has elicited no great debate, says Smouts, a researcher at Paris’s Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. Why? The French press and public are inclined to regard foreign affairs as "the king's secret"; they are also currently preoccupied with domestic economic problems. But the President himself, elected by a bare 50.1 percent of the voters, has been reluctant to publicize foreign policy initiatives lest he provoke internal dispute that would fragment his fragile center-right alliance in parliament and give the Socialist-Communist left a political advantage. Though uneasy at several of Giscard’s moves, the Gaullist UDR, the largest single bloc in the gov-

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neering alliance, has muted its criticism for the same reason. No discussion of foreign policy, write Smouts, "can be isolated from the internal political struggle."

One issue, however, may generate serious foreign policy debate: the proposed direct election of delegates to the European Parliament, which would coincide with the 1978 French presidential election. Giscard, Smouts suggests, may be tempted to use this issue to destroy the dominance of the UDR and divide the left by rallying the citizenry around the "truly Giscardian theme" of European unity. However, since the proposition is a volatile one (President Georges Pompidou failed in a similar attempt in 1972), it is likely that both Giscard and his opponents will continue to discuss foreign policy in a muted, intermittent fashion.

New Politics
in Latin America

A curious feature of recent Latin American politics has been the closeness of presidential elections. In contests taking place around 1970, the two principal contenders were separated by a median gap of less than 5 percentage points. The comparable figure for 1950 was more than 15 percent.

Needler, a University of New Mexico political scientist, argues that slim margins indicate growing Latin political awareness. His analysis of half the countries holding presidential elections between 1962 and 1972 (El Salvador, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, and Uruguay) suggests that a common pattern may partly account for the change. As parties become established and it becomes possible to calculate relative strengths, a "minimum winning coalition" strategy can be developed by the "outs."

Thus, in Costa Rica, Francisco Orlich won in 1962 with 49 percent of the vote against a divided opposition but lost in 1966 with the same percentage when his foes put forward a single opposition candidate. Salvador Allende, the Marxist, lost in Chile in 1964 with 39 percent of the vote but won in 1970 with 36 percent. Overall, Needler contends, Latin American elections have become more competitive and "less simply a device to ratify continued possession of power by those who already hold it."

The consequences, however, have been discouraging. Narrow victories carry little conviction, impair legitimacy, and underline the strength of the opposition. Close contests were followed by political disturbances in Uruguay and Colombia, by attempts to bar inauguration of the election winner in El Salvador and Chile, and by a military takeover in Peru.
“Nuclear Power Issues and Choices”

Although the nation’s oil and natural gas supplies will be seriously depleted before the year 2000, a “mix” of coal-burning generators and uranium-powered nuclear plants (light-water reactors) could easily provide sufficient amounts of electricity for the United States.

Consequently—the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group writes—the United States should place only a low priority on development of the controversial “breeder” reactor and suspend plans for commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium produced by light-water reactors. Work on solar, fusion, and geothermal energy should continue, although none of these may be an economic alternative to coal or conventional nuclear power “until well into the next century.” (The report’s analysis has been reflected in President Carter’s energy proposals to Congress.)

Proponents of the breeder reactor, which produces more plutonium fuel than it consumes, argue that the nation’s supply of uranium fuel for the light-water reactor is in short supply. But the present report’s authors contend that such estimates are unduly pessimistic. The need for a plutonium-based energy policy, they add, will be further diminished by increased use of coal. (U.S. coal reserves: 400 billion tons; annual consumption: 600 million tons.) Furthermore, reliance on plutonium, a weapons-grade fuel, exacerbates the threat of nuclear proliferation, which the authors label “the most serious risk associated with nuclear power.”

To minimize the dangers of proliferation, they urge the United States to (1) demonstrate that plutonium waste disposal is a safe alternative to recycling; (2) pressure foreign nuclear suppliers to curb exports of “sensitive” nuclear technology; and (3) guarantee supplies of uranium fuel for foreign reactors to deter breeder commercialization programs.

“Achieving America’s Goals: National Service or the All-Volunteer Armed Force?”

After more than three decades of reliance on the military draft, taking the advice of a study commission headed by former Defense Secretary Thomas S. Gates, Jr., the Pentagon returned to an all-volunteer armed force (AVF) in early 1973. The transition worked smoothly. The active Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force are now being
manned at close to desired strength (2.1 million), and personnel quality has generally been satisfactory.

This successful start-up, however, came during a time of growing population in the prime military-age group (17–21), high unemployment in that same group, and pay increases for enlisted men greatly exceeding those in the private sector. The Army, in particular, doubts that the AVF concept can be sustained.

In analyzing AVF for the Senate committee, King, a professor of business at the University of Pittsburgh, finds that many of the Gates Commission’s assumptions were over-optimistic or simply erroneous. Enlisted personnel turnover is now running 50 percent higher than expected, at an added annual cost of $1 billion. Military manpower needs have not been reduced, as anticipated, by increased efficiency; in fact, the military payroll now accounts for 54 percent of the defense budget vs. 43 percent in 1964. The educational level of enlistees is down; attrition in the Army alone is up to 20 percent for first-year recruits. Minority representation is disproportionately large and getting more so. (The Army is 24 percent black, although blacks make up only 11 percent of the U.S. population.) Without draft-spurred enlistments, the reserve forces suffer in both quantity and quality of manpower.

One remedy, King concludes, would be a program of National Service. Such a system could encourage, and possibly require, all American men and women at a certain age either to work for civilian service agencies or enter the armed forces, perhaps with a pay incentive for military service. National Service could reduce annual increases in the cost per recruit (now running from $5,500 to $12,000), ensure sufficient manpower, and create a more equitable mix in the barracks.

“Perspectives on Technical Information for Environmental Protection”
A Report to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency from the Commission on Natural Resources and the Steering Committee for Analytical Studies, National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C. 20418.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established in 1970 to coordinate fragmented pollution control programs involving air, water, solid waste, pesticides, and radiation. Congress gave the agency no new authority; EPA was simply required to carry out existing laws. Anti-pollution laws enacted by Congress since 1970 continue to be narrowly focused, are not always "internally consistent,” and often conflict with earlier legislation. The result, contends the National Research Council, has been "inefficient, confusing, and sometimes counter-productive" EPA regulatory practice.

A study of sewage treatment illustrates the complexities that can arise. The 1971 Water Quality Standards Act requires treatment of wastewater; the treatment produces a noxious substance called sludge. The 1972 Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act prohibits ocean-dumping of this sludge; and the 1970 Clean Air Act restricts the use of sludge incinerators. The result: Sludge is dumped on land, which has yet to be accorded protection.
The National Research Council recommends that EPA propose new legislation to Congress to restore "coherence" to the regulatory process. It further suggests that the agency no longer rely entirely on regulatory standards and timetables: It should instead ask Congress for the additional power to use "economic incentives" when the goal is abatement of aggregate amounts of pollution and when specific levels of toxicity are not involved. In principle, EPA could simply set a regulatory charge and leave the choice of responses to industries, townships, and families. "Those with low abatement costs will find it cheaper to abate than to pay," the study concludes; "those with high abatement costs will find it cheaper to pay than abate."

"U.S. Foreign Economic Policy Issues: The United Kingdom, France, and West Germany"

Britain's chronic trade deficit, aggravated by the fourfold increase in OPEC oil prices since 1972, could be largely relieved by development of oil and gas deposits in the North Sea.

According to London's figures, the United Kingdom, which now imports 1.7 million barrels of oil daily, could be self-sufficient in energy by the end of the decade. North Sea oil is flowing in greater volume than expected; estimates of reserves have been raised. By 1980, Britain could be exporting a projected surplus of 1.3 barrels per day.

Even so, observe the authors of this Senate staff report, the long-term policy implications of successful North Sea exploitation remain hard to predict. Critics have charged that Britain may already have "mortgaged" its future revenues by borrowing against them now. Moreover, other members of the Common Market, seeking alternatives to Middle East oil, are wondering how Britain will distribute its anticipated oil surplus, expected to enrich the British Treasury with annual revenues of up to $4 billion (roughly equivalent to its current oil deficit). France, which imports all of its oil, has complained bitterly about Britain's failure to devise an oil export policy vis-à-vis its European partners. Like West Germany, France fears Britain may eventually adopt the Norwegian position—a policy of slow, controlled production—which many Europeans would regard as a breach of faith.

There is concern as well among Western industrialized nations over the impact of North Sea oil on OPEC prices. While some believe the availability of British oil could be used to force down OPEC prices, others predict that, instead, OPEC will find a new ally in London. Development cost of North Sea oil is $4 to $5 per barrel, compared to 16 cents for Saudi Arabian oil. Thus, only the inflated OPEC oil price—$13 per barrel—makes North Sea development economically rational.
The four main islands and the nearly 4,000 smaller islands of the Japanese archipelago total 143,818 square miles (equal in area to Montana) and extend northeast-southwest for almost 2,000 miles. Latest estimates put the population at 114 million. One-fifth of these people live in Tokyo and seven other major cities—Osaka, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, Kobe, Kita-Kyushu, and Sapporo.
Japan

Despite its 15 centuries of recorded history, Japan remains more of a mystery to Americans than many of our less important trading partners and allies. The United States and Japan have each left deep marks on the other, yet there is a tendency in this country to see the Japanese people as all of a kind, unchanging, inscrutable, diligent, uncomplaining. The realities are different. Historian (and former U.S. Ambassador) Edwin O. Reischauer examines the origins of Japan's much-publicized postwar economic "miracle." Historian Nathaniel B. Thayer, using new research findings, traces changes in traditional Japanese values. And sociologist Koya Azumi describes the "Westernization" of labor and management attitudes in the workplace. Our Background Books cover other aspects of the Japanese experience, past and present.

THE POSTWAR "MIRACLE"

by Edwin O. Reischauer

In 1945 Japan lay in ruins, a defeated, helpless pariah among nations—its cities destroyed, its industry at a standstill, its people exhausted, confused, and demoralized. Yet in only one generation the country has risen like the proverbial phoenix to become, next to the colossi of the United States and the Soviet Union, the greatest economic power in the world, with a remarkably free and stable society, an efficiently functioning democratic system of government, and a vibrant cultural life.

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This triumphant metamorphosis so strains belief that it has been called a miracle; the miracle seems even greater if one compares contemporary Japan to the country not at its postwar nadir but when it was bent on the creation of the world's greatest empire. Now it is the least militarized of all the great powers, passionate in its hope for world peace and proud of a constitution that forswears all resort to war. The regimented, indoctrinated Japanese of World War II have been replaced by a people dedicated to the defense of a long list of constitutional human rights. The robot-like soldiers, who selflessly accepted death in the name of their Emperor, have been succeeded by a generation that is skeptical of all authority and vigorously resists any arbitrary exercise of power.

How did the Japan of the war years transform itself into the Japan of 1977, a change so complete as to appear unreal or at best shallowly rooted? The magic wand of a General MacArthur is not enough to explain such a change. A look back at the history of the country, however, reveals a continuity that makes the transformation more understandable. Contrary to what most observers imagine, present conditions and attitudes are deeply anchored in history, and their roots, though nurtured by the American occupation, are to be found in the past experiences of the people themselves.

Japan's postwar economic "miracle" is, of course, no miracle at all but rather the continuation of an accelerating rate of economic growth that can be traced back to the 1880s. When Japan was opened to the West in the mid-19th century, it was an institutionally complex nation with an advanced, nationally united economy, a plentiful supply of entrepreneurial talents, high rates of literacy, a disciplined work force, and a strong work ethic. It trailed the West in technology but, as it acquired technology step by step, the economic gap began to close. The relatively slow growth of the 1920s—throughout the world as well as in Japan—helped to account for the political crises of the 1930s, and in the 1940s economic productivity plummeted in the wake of wartime.

destruction. After the war, economic growth accelerated once again. It was particularly fast in the 1950s and '60s, as the Japanese restored their ravaged cities and adopted the technological advances from which they had been cut off by the war.

As they gained experience with modern industrial production, they began to apply their traditional organizing skills to new economic problems. Foremost among these skills were the ability of a diverse people to identify themselves with group interests and the ability of diverse groups to achieve decision through consensus. The first skill can be seen in the lifetime employment of Japanese in large industries (both management and labor), in the loyalty of both groups to the firm, and in the low incidence of disruptive strikes, despite vigorous annual bargaining over wages and perquisites. The second skill is illustrated by the sense of partnership between government and private business, an easy interchange of views between the two, and the willingness of sharply competitive businesses to accept governmental guidance.

The Third Way

The entire pattern of the relationship between labor and management and between business and government in Japan is so at variance with the corresponding pattern in the United States and other Western nations as to constitute a third system of economic integration, halfway between that of the West and the planned economies of the Communist world. In many ways it is the most successful of the three. What is more to the point is that the system clearly derives from deeply ingrained attitudes and historical experience. Although it did not become full-blown until after the war, the Japanese system had begun to assume its present shape in the 1920s. Japan's astounding economic virtuosity therefore is no sudden flash in the pan but an established characteristic firmly based on historical antecedents. It should endure well into the future.

The transformation of the Japanese from old-fashioned imperialists and fanatic militarists to ardent believers in world peace may seem less convincing than the carry-over to postwar days of earlier economic skills, yet here, too, is a continuity of attitudes that is not at first apparent. Modern Japan became a heavily militarized state in the 19th century, not because of its feudal traditions, which had in fact produced a thoroughly bureaucratized and completely peaceful society, but because of the military menace posed by the technologically advanced West. A strong army and navy was created to meet this threat, and in the process
Japan became a player in the Western game of imperialism. Industrialization was the next step, both to ensure military strength and to stem the influx of Western machine-made products. Because a narrow geographical base made the country increasingly dependent on foreign raw materials as well as on markets to pay for them, imperialism, which started as a search for strategic security, evolved into a search for economic security.

In the aftermath of World War I, Japan was still making up for its late start on the road to imperialism at a time when most other great powers were content with the vast territories they already possessed. By and large, the Western world considered imperialism out of date. In any case, a spreading spirit of nationalism was making it more costly. This was especially true in China, the only available area for Japanese expansion. At the beginning of the 1920s, the Japanese were faced with the question: Should they continue on their imperialist course or rely on international trade in a peaceful world to supply their economic needs? The decision was in favor of peaceful trade; the country started to cut down its military strength and pull in its imperialist horns.

The 1920s, however, proved to be a period of stagnation in international trade that ended in worldwide depression and left the door open for the army and other advocates of the old imperialism to seize control of Japan's foreign policy and force the nation back on a course of military expansion. This led to the catastrophe of World War II. The lesson was not wasted on the Japanese. Since the war, they have rejected both militarism and imperialism with revulsion and embraced the concept of peaceful world trade as the only path to a viable future.

**The Roots of Democracy**

Postwar conditions turned this emotional about-face into a firm, rational conviction. Rampant nationalism throughout the world made the old imperialism entirely impractical. Moreover, Japan's erstwhile military strength had been outmoded by nuclear weapons, and its narrow, crowded terrain made it impossible for the country to mount a credible nuclear deterrent. Furthermore, a greatly increased dependence on worldwide resources and markets ruled out the possibility of armed defense of its vital national interests, which now included worldwide resources, markets, and lanes of commerce. The prewar roots of the stand in favor of world peace have thus been made firm and permanent by postwar realities. This is no longer an area of political controversy in Japan.
What about democracy? Here, too, the roots go deep. The men who reorganized and modernized Japanese society in the second half of the 19th century had no interest in democracy as such, but they built into their system a small role for locally elected assemblies and a national parliament (the Diet). This was done in part to please Westerners, from whom the Japanese were trying to win acceptance as equals, but also as a technique to ensure wide support for the government and to provide a safety valve for popular discontent. In reality, a small group of nation builders, constituting a sort of oligarchy, ruled Japan in the Emperor’s name. They assumed that their power could be passed on to their successors, but, in fact, the oligarchs had no clear successors. Once they themselves had faded from the scene, there was no equivalent body of men to control the various groups of political elites that had grown up in the meantime.

**Discredited Militarism**

Of these elite groups, the Diet and the parties that controlled it proved the strongest and by the 1920s had come to occupy a dominant position in Japanese politics. Japan seemed well on the way to becoming a parliamentary democracy, but the Diet lacked effective control over the other branches of government, particularly the military. During the 1930s, the military seized power from the Diet, largely over the foreign policy issue. The disasters of World War II, however, discredited not only militarism but all authoritarian rule.

To the postwar Japanese, the obvious alternative to military or civil dictatorship was parliamentary democracy, and they enthusiastically supported the postwar constitution, which embodied this form of government. They had already had considerable experience with democracy—with elected local bodies in the 1880s, a national parliament in 1890, and party supremacy in politics in the 1920s—and were able to function successfully as a democracy from the beginning. Much controversy remains over the imperfections of the present system, but all political parties and virtually all citizens are firm supporters of parliamentary democracy in preference to any other conceivable form of government.

One question persists: Does Japan have the sort of society that can maintain such a system? The answer is an emphatic Yes. For centuries, the Japanese have been accustomed to living under a stable political system that functions according to a known body of laws and precedents. No people are greater
sticklers for legality and precedent. Building on relatively high pre-modern literacy rates, the Japanese achieved full literacy by the early 20th century. Today, with nine-tenths of the young people completing the 12 years of rigorous formal education that leads to graduation from senior high school, and with about a third of these going on to higher education, the Japanese may well be the best educated people in the world. Economic success has made the people relatively affluent, and wartime destruction and postwar policies have resulted in a fairly equitable distribution of the wealth, with less of a gap between rich and poor than in almost any other country outside the Communist world.

The Japanese have developed an extremely egalitarian society in other ways. The strict class distinctions of the 19th-century feudal system were virtually wiped out within two or three generations, largely through a nationwide, egalitarian educational system. By the 1890s, positions of leadership were attained not by birth or inheritance but by academic achievement and the passing of examinations, first for government posts, later for key positions in business as well. The Japanese today come as close as any large and complex nation to being a classless society. There is almost no sense of class but, if pressed, almost all Japanese admit to being "middle class."

Finally, despite their strong self-identification as members of groups, the Japanese have developed a pronounced sense of their rights as individuals—a concept that goes back to the "freedom and people's rights movement" that flourished in the 1870s. The postwar constitution enumerates individual human rights in great detail. In short, few societies are better prepared than Japan's to maintain a system of parliamentary democracy.

Japan's militaristic frenzy as it embarked on World War II and its agony at the end of the war make what has happened since then appear almost too miraculous to be fully credible. Nor is it any more credible to attribute the transformation to American intervention. If, instead, one looks at the development of Japan over a longer period of time and then considers the situation in which the Japanese now find themselves, the great change becomes quite understandable. Japan's present affluence, its devotion to world peace, its firmly based democracy, the stability of its politics, and the vigor and health of its society are no fleeting accidents of history.
A NEW SOCIAL PORTRAIT OF THE JAPANESE

by Nathaniel B. Thayer

The postwar resurgence of Japan is one of the most amazing events in modern history. At the end of the war, the Japanese people faced the devastation of a costly struggle, the uncertainties of foreign occupation, and a hostile international environment. Today, 32 years later, Japan has regained its sovereignty and has become a valued ally of the United States and a major supportive force in the international system.

How have the past three decades of momentous economic and political change affected the psychology of the Japanese people? To find the answers, researchers for the Institute of Mathematical Statistics in Tokyo conducted a series of surveys at five-year intervals from 1953 to 1973. The results often contradicted the image of Japan presented in Western news media.

In aesthetics, they found that traditional Japanese concepts have grown stronger, despite an apparent predilection for American movies, McDonald's hamburgers, and blue jeans. During each survey, they showed 3,000 to 4,000 Japanese citizens a photograph of a Western garden and a photograph of a Japanese garden and asked, "Which garden is better?" In 1953, 79 percent said the Japanese garden was better; by 1973, the percentage had risen to 90 percent.

On the other hand, some ideas about the family showed a trend away from traditional values. In 1953, 73 percent of the husbands and wives queried said they would adopt a child to carry on the family line if they had no progeny (conforming to prewar practice). In 1973, fewer than half said they would adopt a child for
this purpose (36 percent), although 17 percent said that they might, depending on circumstances (Chart 1).

Religious values have changed scarcely at all. In the four surveys made from 1958 to 1973, researchers asked Japanese citizens whether or not religious faith was important. Each time, roughly 70 percent said Yes; however, another question showed a decided slip in the number of Japanese formally affiliated with an established church.

Ideas about nature, however, have seesawed. “To be happy,” the questioners asked, “should man adapt to nature, use nature, or conquer nature?” Japanese who, during the 1960s, had discarded the traditional concept that man should adapt to nature returned to that belief in the 1970s (Chart 2).

Do the answers to these and thousands of other survey queries produce a coherent picture of the Japanese people today? That is the question that five researchers attached to the government television and radio network NHK asked themselves. As a first step, they gathered 1,500 national public opinion surveys conducted after World War II by the nation's leading newspapers, government ministries, and research organizations. For two years, they studied the responses to 20,000 questions and in November 1975 published their findings in Sen'ō Seron Shi [History of public Opinion in the Postwar Era].

The results provide a mosaic of a complex society undergoing significant change, yet sustaining cultural coherence. In the following analysis, I have borrowed liberally from the findings of the NHK researchers and from other material found in the first three volumes of Nihonjin Kenkyū [Study of the Japanese People] published in Tokyo, 1974-76, by the Society for the Study of the Japanese People, a research organization established in 1972 to analyze contemporary Japanese characteristics and culture.

In prewar Japan, the state and society took precedence over the individual. In postwar Japan, the situation has been reversed. Can the individual be called upon to sacrifice his freedom for the welfare of the state? An increasing number of Japanese reject

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1. IF YOU HAD NO PROGENY, WOULD YOU ADOPT A CHILD TO CARRY ON THE FAMILY LINE?

2. TO BE HAPPY, SHOULD YOU ADAPT TO NATURE, USE NATURE, OR CONQUER NATURE?
this suggestion each time it is made by pollsters. More and more Japanese subscribe to the proposition that the welfare of the nation depends on the happiness of the individual. When asked in 1974, "Do you want to do something for your country?" only 9 percent answered Yes, whereas 48 percent said they would rather get something from the country.

The growing importance of the individual is reflected in the national craze over health. "What do you value most? What concerns you most? What is necessary for a full life?" To all these queries, the Japanese gave a single reply: good health.

To a fourth survey question, "What do you worry about most?" the answers were, in order of importance, inflation, accidents, pollution, and sickness—the last three of which are bodily concerns. Better than 80 percent of the Japanese over age 60 said that their greatest desire was to live a long time.

The lack of concern over civic responsibilities shows up in the choice of a lifestyle. Every five years, Japanese citizens were asked which of these six lifestyles they preferred:

1. To live according to one's tastes without thinking about fame or fortune (the tasteful life).
2. To live from day to day without worrying (the happy-go-lucky life).
3. To work diligently and become a man of wealth (the monied life).
4. To live as correctly and cleanly as possible, abjuring the improper things of the world (the clean life).
5. To live selflessly, devoting oneself to the betterment of society (the selfless life).
6. To study seriously and become famous (the famous life).

The table on page 65 shows that the number of Japanese who want to live "tastefully," without thinking about fame or fortune, almost doubled in 20 years. Those who want to live happy-go-lucky lives have more than doubled, whereas those who want to lead correct, clean lives decreased from 29 to 11 percent, and the number wanting to dedicate their lives to society—never more than 10 percent—was down to half of that at the end of 20 years.

Closely related to questions of lifestyle are questions of family. The evidence suggests that the family is replacing the nation as the focus of Japanese loyalty, though nationalism still exists. First, the family takes precedence even over personal health in inquiries into values. Second, 70 percent of the Japanese queried say that they continue to revere their ancestors, an
WHICH LIFESTYLE DO YOU PREFER?

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<th>Year</th>
<th>The Tasteful Life</th>
<th>The Happy-Go-Lucky Life</th>
<th>The Monied Life</th>
<th>The Clean Life</th>
<th>The Selfless Life</th>
<th>The Famous Life</th>
<th>All Others</th>
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<td>1953</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
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<td>1958</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>30</td>
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answer that I interpret as an expression of family rather than religious, interest. Third, although they are not willing to adopt a child, most husbands and wives want their family to continue from generation to generation. Most Japanese still adhere to the tradition that the family estate should not be divided at death but should be handed down intact to a designated heir; fewer Japanese now insist, however, that this heir be the eldest son. Fourth, 70 percent of the Japanese say they will be satisfied with their lives if their families can live in peace and harmony.

**Should Husbands Help?**

How exclusive is this concern of a Japanese with his family? One survey posed the question "If you and your family are more or less secure, are you willing to concern yourself with other people in the world?" Only 7 percent answered Yes.

Japanese opinions about many other family matters have changed. Before the war, most parents believed they should arrange their children's marriages. Nowadays, most young people insist on selecting their own mates. Before the war, three generations lived under a single roof. Now many parents and more young
couples choose to live by themselves. In the prewar home, the husband worked and the wife managed the household. Nowadays, many younger wives work or want to work (the issue comes to a head after the first child is born). In the prewar family, the husband decreed and the wife obeyed. Now most couples agree to talk over household purchases and the children's upbringing.

"Should husbands help in the kitchen?" In 1952 a majority said No. In 1973 a majority said Yes. Family planning has become an integral part of Japanese life: 95 percent know about birth control; 61 percent use birth control devices. Before the war, a large family was considered desirable. Nowadays, 80 percent of Japanese couples prefer two or three children born less than three years apart.

Not everything about the family has changed. For example, most Japanese still believe in filial piety, and about half of all Japanese endorse the practice of staging elaborate weddings and funerals if the family can afford it—in spite of newspaper campaigns against such practices.

A majority of both sexes still believe that men are superior to women in reasoning and organizing ability. A majority of both sexes still believe that men lead the "harder" life and that a woman cannot support herself solely through her own labors, although the size of this majority is decreasing.

**Wifely Discontent**

Some Japanese women express "economic dissatisfaction," but most prefer the role of wife and mother to that of worker outside the home. Most wives do not register discontent so long as their real family lives are not too different from their ideal. In 1973, 80 percent of the women said that they were satisfied with their lives, and 70 percent found their lives meaningful. On five occasions from 1950 to 1973, Japanese women were asked, "Would you want to be reborn as a man or woman?" In 1950, only 16 percent wanted to stay female. In 1973, it was 51 percent.

So long as Japanese concern is directed toward the family and the fulfillment of private desires, the Japanese woman will probably be content, since she is a central figure in the family. But should Japanese concerns come to be directed toward public and international problems at the expense of the family, her discontent may grow rapidly, since she is presently excluded from these fields.

Japanese thinking about government and politics is changing, too. The trend is toward greater insistence on personal rights,
dissatisfaction with government in general, and reluctance to participate in politics.

In 1946, the American occupation authorities rewrote the Japanese constitution, articulating many new rights for the people. At first, the Japanese either paid little attention to these rights or opposed them, believing that they were unnecessary and not in accord with Japanese values. But in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Japanese began to change their opinion, coming to believe that the state should serve the people rather than the people serve the state.

If a Messiah Comes

In 1958 and 1975, surveys queried citizens on whether they had opinions about civic matters. The respondents fell into three categories: those who had no views; those who had views and articulated them; those who had views but talked to nobody about them. The largest category was citizens who had no views. In 1958, they totaled 61 percent, but by 1975 they had declined to 39 percent. Citizens who had views and articulated them remained at a constant 22 percent. Citizens who had views but remained mute were 17 percent of the total in 1958 and 29 percent in 1975 (10 percent in 1975 did not respond). In 17 years, people had become more interested in civic affairs, but their interest had not advanced very far in the direction of the talking, much less action, stage.

Other evidence buttresses the impression that the Japanese are increasingly unwilling to personally participate in politics. "How can we achieve the ideal society?" one survey asked. The two most popular answers, as revealed by two different polls, were to vote for politicians who would try to achieve such a society (43 percent) and to wait for good politicians to appear (26 percent). If a political messiah should come, would he be welcome? Twice, surveys asked for confirmation or denial of this statement: "When a superior politician appears, the nation benefits if its affairs are turned over to him rather than have the people decide those affairs themselves." In 1953, the respondents split evenly; 20 years later, only a slender majority (51 percent) opposed this sentiment.

So much for political leadership. What about political institutions? Twice a year, Japanese citizens have been asked, "Does the Diet [the national legislature] reflect public opinion?" In 1954, a third of the people said it didn't; 20 years later, the percentage had almost doubled (61 percent). "Does local govern-
ment reflect public opinion?" In 1952, a small percentage (16 percent) answered No; by 1975, the percentage had quadrupled (48 percent.) The Japanese, apparently, are dissatisfied with government at all levels.

Dissatisfaction with politics became most evident during the 1970s. In 1971, respondents who said politics were advancing in a discouraging direction totaled 47 percent; by 1973, even before the Lockheed scandals, this percentage had climbed to 70 percent. During the early '70s, Japan was struck by the oil crisis, double-digit inflation, and the full effects of pollution, developments to which the government responded, but not quickly or effectively. Perhaps these factors accelerated a growing disenchantment with politics, but the Japanese had undergone more serious crises in earlier years without losing faith in government. In 1971, people who were optimistic about political trends totaled 70 percent; by 1973, this percentage had shrunk to 40 percent. In yearly surveys between 1974 and 1976, only 20 percent of the populace was willing to express even partial satisfaction with politics.

Why? Responses to statements made in scattered surveys conducted by the NHK television and radio network over a nine-year period between 1965 and 1974 suggest an answer: The populace is estranged from government, and the estrangement is growing. In 1966, 40 percent of survey respondents agreed with the statement "Politics are decided by powers that the common people cannot control." By 1969, the percentage was 56 percent. Also in 1969, 53 percent agreed that "Political and economic policies are determined by persons the common people cannot touch." And in 1974, 78 percent conceded that "A small group wields power and moves society."

**Estrangement from Government**

The Japanese citizen, then, wants to expand his personal freedom. He has political opinions but is reluctant to voice them, much less act on them. He awaits the coming of a national leader but worries about granting this leader sufficient power to govern. He has little faith in either the national or local government. He feels estranged. In the 1970s, this estrangement has contributed to widespread expressions of dissatisfaction with politics. One may hope that this dissatisfaction is a prelude to a greater popular involvement, but as of now the Japanese citizen appears to be politically passive.

How strongly do the Japanese identify with their nation?
How does Japanese nationalism differ today from the days before the war? Measuring Japanese nationalism is a tricky business. During the late 1940s and 1950s, the Japanese regarded nationalism as one of the causes of the disastrous Pacific War, and no one had anything good to say about it. In the '60s, this revulsion became less vocal. After the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, the Japanese realized that nationalism was not inextricably associated with war and began to evaluate it more rationally. Rather than use the prewar words for nationalism with their unfortunate connotations, the Japanese invented new words or borrowed English words to describe their feelings. They still do, and answers to questions regarding the subject will differ, depending on the Japanese word for nationalism used in the question.

**Flag and Anthem**

The two great symbols of nationalism in any country are the flag and the national anthem. In Japan, neither flag nor anthem creates a semantic problem. In surveys made in 1961 and 1975, sentiment has been the same, first and last. About 60 percent of the populace feel love and respect for the flag and anthem; less than 1 percent feel antipathy.

Beyond the flag and the anthem, a symbol of nationalism unique to Japan is the Emperor Hirohito whose family has reigned since the 6th century, when history was indistinguishable from myth. Japan's 1889 constitution decreed that the Emperor was a “sacred and inviolable” sovereign, holding “the supreme rights of rule.” During the 1945–52 occupation, the Americans changed the Emperor's status by having him declare himself to be a human being. The new 1946 constitution downgraded him from a sacred sovereign to a symbol of the state and of the unity of the people, declaring further that he shall not have powers related to government. Sovereignty now resided with the people.

As early as 1946, public opinion polls asked, “Should we or should we not have an Emperor?” Various versions of that question were asked six times from 1946 to 1965, and the answers were always the same. Although the feeling was held more strongly by older than by younger respondents, over 80 percent wanted to keep the Emperor. Initially, sentiment existed to restore his powers, but by the mid-1960s that sentiment was expressed by no more than 10 percent. Roughly 80 percent supported the clauses in the constitution that made the Emperor the symbol rather than the sovereign of the state.

“Do the people still regard the Emperor as godlike?” Accord-
ing to a 1950 survey, 81 percent considered him to be a "normal human being." "What emotions do the people hold towards the Emperor?" Throughout the 1960s, two-thirds of the people said they felt affection and respect; one-third felt nothing; less than 3 percent felt antipathy. At the beginning of the 1970s, the ratio changed. The affection-and-respect group shrank to 50 percent, and the no-feeling group grew to 40 percent, the antipathetic group remaining constant.

"What role do the people see the Emperor as performing?" A 1974 survey confirms a 1967 survey in which a few people still saw the Emperor as occupying the center of the political system, and a few people said he had no function. The rest of the respondents split fairly evenly, one group claiming that his role was no more than ceremonial and the other group asserting that he provided spiritual support to the people.

Does Japan Need an Army?

In brief, the Japanese want to keep the Emperor but see his role as ancillary and symbolic. No one wants to change his status, but more and more people are thinking less and less about him.

Another significant national symbol is represented by the armed forces. Pollsters have plumbed Japanese attitudes toward militarism most thoroughly. On at least 20 occasions since 1950, they have asked, "Does Japan need armed forces to protect the nation?" The answer has been remarkably consistent. Some Japanese refuse to comment, but about 30 percent say Japan does not need armed forces, and 60 percent say that it does. In another 12 surveys, 70 percent of the respondents were supportive of the need, possibly because the questioner replaced the words "armed forces" with "self-defense forces." The rub comes when the Japanese are asked what the armed forces do. In two surveys 10 years apart, less than 5 percent of the respondents replied that the armed forces defended the country. About 80 percent said they best served as a disaster relief force. "Should the armed forces be strengthened or weakened?" Throughout the 1950s and '60s, the Japanese were mildly in favor of strengthening the armed forces; in the 1970s the trend is toward their reduction.*

The Pacific War was the first war in which the Japanese had ever met defeat, and that defeat set off waves of self-doubt and feelings of cultural inadequacy when they compared themselves to other nationalities. A 1963 survey asked, "Are the Japanese

*The Fourth Defense Build-Up Program (1972-76) called for total expenditures equivalent to about US$15.3 billion, or less than 1 percent of Japan's GNP.
people superior to or inferior to Western peoples?” More Japanese than not answered Inferior. But that was the last year when the Japanese gave themselves the short end of the stick. By 1973, 39 percent of the Japanese considered themselves superior, 18 percent thought themselves equal, and only 9 percent considered themselves inferior.

In 1973, the Japanese were asked to rate themselves on levels of scientific technology, artistic achievement, economic strength, standard of living, and richness of emotional life. In science, art, and economics, they rated themselves extremely—or quite—high. In living standards and emotional life, they weren’t sure if they were quite high or quite low. Clearly, however, the Japanese had recovered their self-esteem.

Since 1960, the news service JIJI has asked 2,000 Japanese every month which countries they like or dislike the most. The United States was the most-liked country until 1966, when disenchantment with American action in Vietnam sent its popularity to a new low and gave the lead to Switzerland, a country about which other surveys have shown the Japanese know very little. The Soviet Union has consistently been the most disliked nation, though in recent years it has been getting strong competition from the two Koreas. Since 1975, the Japanese have disliked South Korea more than North Korea. There is a noteworthy tendency for more and more Japanese respondents to say that they like or dislike no country. In the ’70s, their percentage climbed above the halfway mark.

A Renaissance of Pride

Over the past decade, the Japanese people have become greatly concerned with the destruction of the environment and the spread of pollution. Most analysts see this concern as a reaction against a postwar high-growth economic policy that has damaged or polluted the nation’s air, land, and waters. Concern with pollution and the environment has grown apace with the renaissance of pride in country, suggesting that this reawakened love of the land is a manifestation of the new nationalism.

The pattern of Japanese perceptions, then, is like a set of rings enclosed in concentric circles. The outermost ring represents the international community. Color it pale blue; like the sky, the Japanese know it exists but they don’t pay it too much attention. The second ring is the nation itself. Color it any of the earth colors; unlike prewar nationalism, which was fueled by a resentment against the outside world, today’s sentiment seems to focus

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on the land itself. The third ring comprises the government. Color it a somber shade; the Japanese are most pessimistic about it. The fourth ring comprises the family. If white is the most intense of colors, then color this ring white; the family is the quintessence of each citizen's loyalty, energy, and attention. Within the innermost circle—right smack in the center—is the individual. Color him grey-pink, the color of the Ueno cherry blossoms undulating in a March breeze, or orange-brown, the color of the wood in the Kiyomizu temple at sunset, or black-green, the color of the Matsu-shima pines in a misting rain. The Japanese citizen's views of his obligations, rights, and outlook are singular, derived totally from his culture. In Japan, the age of the individual is at hand.

JAPAN'S CHANGING WORLD OF WORK

by Koya Azumi

Three themes usually dominate discussions of Japan at work: the homogeneity of the Japanese people; the diligence, loyalty, dedication, and high morale of Japanese workers; and the paternalism of management. I submit that these stereotypes are false, or at least seriously outdated. The Japanese are, in fact, highly heterogeneous. Worker loyalty in Japan is a product of economic self-interest, not sentiment. And morale is often lower than it is among comparable workers in the United States and Europe.

It is indeed true that the Japanese are homogeneous in terms of race, language, and culture, especially in contrast to Americans. Overemphasis, however, can lead to a unitary image, which is unwarranted and misleading, particularly in matters where race, language, and culture have little relevance. It is better, I believe, to keep in mind that an industrialized society is necessarily hetero-
JAPAN

geneous; that Japan, as it industrialized, became increasingly heterogeneous; and that the forces that brought this about are likely to make the society more susceptible to rapid change.

The working-age population of Japan (15 years of age and older) is estimated at 86 million out of a total population of about 114 million. The active labor force—those employed or seeking jobs—totals 54 million. The distribution of this labor force shows a steadily declining percentage of those engaged in forestry and agriculture (9 percent compared to about 4 percent in the United States), typical of other industrialized countries. The remainder of the work force is engaged in various, primarily urban, occupations, including 14 million (26 percent) in manufacturing, 10 million (20 percent) in wholesale and retail sales, and 8 million (15 percent) in service jobs. Among those in the labor force, some 9 million (18 percent) are self-employed. The percentage of people in professional and technical occupations stands at about 6 percent, considerably below the more than 9 percent found in most Western industrialized economies.

This broad spectrum of workers, which includes a far higher proportion of university graduates in the under-45 age group than is the case, for example, in West Germany, represents a broad range of personal tastes, values, political views, and lifestyles.

It is clearly dangerous to make generalizations about the Japanese worker. While the Japanese people as a whole may have a greater sense of commitment to work than the people of other societies, there are broad variations in the degree to which this commitment is felt throughout the population. Perceptions of work and degrees of job satisfaction in Japan depend to a great extent (as they do in any society) on one's place in the social structure.

Surveys indicate that workers on the lowest socioeconomic levels and women generally are least content. White-collar workers are happier than those in blue-collar jobs. Older workers are more satisfied than young workers.

The Orient Express

Not surprisingly, job satisfaction is also related, in part, to the type of industry and the nature of one's job. Workers in processing industries, such as oil refining, are more satisfied than assembly-line workers. Apart from the boredom of many repetitious assembly-line tasks, the important factors appear to be autonomy and control. The Japanese worker has no desire to become a robot. Job satisfaction drops when the pace and
nature of work is dictated by a machine and the worker loses a sense of control.

The Japanese people certainly appear to be hard-working. The Japanese work ethic—even more than the old "Protestant ethic" in the United States—views hard work as both a virtue and a moral responsibility. One can even find slogans posted by workers in Japanese factories proclaiming, "Work is religion."

Japanese working abroad take their work ethic with them. Employees hired in New York City by Japan-based firms tend to work normal hours. But those sent out from Tokyo follow the custom of the home office, frequently working until 8 or 9 in the evening, and riding to their homes in the northern suburbs on a late train dubbed "The Orient Express." Leisure time on weekends is frequently spent in some work-related activity, such as playing golf with a customer. By American standards, these workers neglect their families.

High-Speed Work

When a United Auto Workers official, Douglas Fraser, visited Japan in the early 1970s, he is reported to have said that "in some plants Japanese workers put together cars at [high] speeds that would not be tolerated by American workers." Are the Japanese really that diligent? The evidence is contradictory, at best. Personal observation leads me to believe that there is greater variation in work speeds within a country, than between one country and another. Workers in some shoe manufacturing plants I have visited in Massachusetts seem to produce at greater speeds than their counterparts in Japan, perhaps because they are paid at piecework rates.

A Japanese government youth survey in 1972 suggests that Japanese youth, compared to youth in other countries, are more work-oriented than people-oriented, but their values appear to be in a state of flux.

Are Japanese workers loyal? Many Japanese companies are
known for ritualistic activities designed to foster among workers a sense of loyalty and identity with the firm. In some companies, the atmosphere is not unlike that of a revival meeting. In Matsushita Electric Company factories, where Panasonic electrical appliances are manufactured, it is customary to hold a daily assembly at which workers sing the company song and listen to speeches. Sometimes company officials will discuss practical matters, such as production plans, and occasionally a worker representative will deliver what amounts to an exhortation or testimonial.

However, when Konosuke Matsushita, the founder of the company, paid a rare visit to one of his plants and a delegation of workers, mostly young girls, was sent to the train station to see him off, the delegation was totally distracted by the sight of a popular television star. The TV celebrity proved far more important to them than the head of the highly paternalistic company that provides its employees with housing, recreational facilities, medical care, and a company store. Worker loyalty is less than absolute.

A Relatively Unhappy Lot

Japanese workers fall roughly into three broad groups: those with job tenure, amounting to lifetime employment; temporary employees; and day laborers. More than 90 percent of wage earners have job tenure; the remainder are temporary workers hired and laid off according to business conditions. Studies by Robert M. Marsh and Hiroshi Mannari suggest that the tenured Japanese worker tends to spend his entire working career with one firm, not because he feels morally bound to do so, but because his status enhancement needs are better met by staying.* These findings are at odds with an earlier thesis proposed by another American specialist, James C. Abegglen, who argues that the traditional Japanese sense of loyalty best explains both the systems of “lifetime employment” and a wage system that is based largely on seniority rather than performance.†

Other evidence also indicates that the Japanese are a relatively unhappy lot. Kunio Odaka, who has done much empirical research on industrial workers, found in the first half of the 1960s that Japanese worker morale was considerably lower than


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AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF 'JOB SATISFACTION'
(Figures indicate % of 'Satisfied' Respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jobs</th>
<th>U.S.A</th>
<th>W. Germany</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skilled-manual</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiskilled-manual</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working class</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled-manual</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


that of industrial workers in the United States, West Germany, Sweden, and Norway.⁹

Odaka discovered that only 40 percent of rank and file workers in five Japanese companies were satisfied with their jobs. Only in West Germany, where a mere 21 percent of semiskilled manual workers and 47 percent of skilled manual workers express satisfaction with their jobs, is there comparable disaffection. In the United States, the corresponding figures were 76 and 84 percent, in Sweden 69 and 72 percent, in Norway 83 and 88 percent.

In a more recent study, my colleagues and I found that only 39 percent of the 600 workers we surveyed extensively in Japan felt that their work suited them well, compared to 70 percent in Britain and 83 percent in Sweden. The study design provided control over such factors as plant size and product manufactured, and the same instruments were used to measure various facets of organization and personnel.

We found that attitudes toward work in Japan are clearly related to the structure of the employing organization, especially its hierarchy of authority. A sense of alienation is greatest where management and administration are highly centralized, and where the worker feels isolated from management. The

pervasiveness of rules (against smoking or eating on the job, for example) and a feeling that orders are not be questioned also contribute to low morale. This suggests that many Japanese organizations provide little autonomy for the worker and frequently create an atmosphere in which the worker feels that he is being watched closely—and that he is not trusted.

Japanese companies are aware of this problem and conduct surveys of their own to test worker attitudes. Corrective measures include instituting provisions for greater lateral mobility as well as efforts to let workers develop multiple skills. These are not intended to upgrade a worker's job but rather to allow him to be shifted to a variety of dull, repetitive tasks, instead of remaining with just one.

Arranging Marriages

It is also usual for the Matsushita organization, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Hitachi, and others to keep work units small so that workers develop a stronger sense of cohesion and loyalty to each other. The effect is such that it is not uncommon for workers to remain at the factory on their own time to discuss mutual problems, such as quality control. By the same token, sanctions against workers misconduct are more likely to come from fellow workers than from management.

The paternalism of Japanese management has been very real. It is manifested in generous fringe benefits (e.g., health care, paid vacations, housing allowances, free transportation to and from work), in the diffuse social relations between management and worker (a boss may even arrange a marriage for an employee), in the guarantee of lifetime employment, and in a reward system that includes both pay and promotion based on seniority and education rather than productivity and performance.

The no-firing policy is widespread but not universal among employees with presumed job tenure. Generally, the employer expects to retain the tenured employee and the employee expects to stay with the firm for the duration of his work career—that is, from his entry into the labor force after he leaves school until the compulsory retirement age, which has commonly been set at 55. This policy is by no means closely followed by all economic organizations. But it is sufficiently common to mean that management frequently cannot reduce its work force in response to technological innovations and market fluctuations.

Bosses consider it bad business, bad form, and bad public relations to fire employees, especially when large-scale layoffs are
publicized in the press. They prefer to reduce payrolls through early retirement or attrition. Even when a work force must be drastically reduced—as was the case in the aftermath of the 1971 disruption of U.S.-Japanese trade brought about by the surprise devaluation of the dollar, still referred to as the “Nixon shock”—companies usually make elaborate efforts to avoid firings.

Corporations could maintain the tradition of lifetime employment were it not for the economically irrational reward system, which awards both promotions and salary increases to tenured workers without regard for responsibility or productivity. Such practices can be continued only in an expanding economy. In the 1950s and 1960s, these conditions were largely met and Japan enjoyed a persistent better than 10 percent annual rate of economic growth. The prospect now, and an optimistic one at that, is for a relatively stable growth rate of 5 or 6 percent a year.

Japan’s Aging Population

Moreover, Japan has undergone substantial demographic changes. The decline in the birthrate in the 1950s, as well as an overall improvement in health conditions resulting in lowered mortality for all ages (Japan is now competing with Sweden for the world’s lowest infant mortality rate), have made the population increasingly older. At the same time, the overall level of educational attainment of youth has risen, thereby increasing the number of college graduates and reducing the number of new workers fresh out of middle and high school, who filled labor’s ranks in the boom years.

In addition to these factors, workers are demanding ever higher wages and bonuses, a shortened work week (from 6 to 5 days), shorter hours (down from 48.3 hours per week in 1960 to 43.5 hours per week in 1975 for manufacturing workers), and a higher compulsory retirement age (already raised to 57 or 58 in some industries because of labor shortages). In short, the conditions under which both lifetime employment and a reward system based on seniority and educational attainment can be maintained without threat to the survival of the firm cannot be expected to prevail much longer.

The problem of the aging, and therefore more senior, worker is readily apparent. In 1970, about one-third of the male labor force in manufacturing was under 30. Older workers (over 45) constituted slightly more than 20 percent. The percentage of older workers is expected to rise to about 37 percent by 1985, meaning higher payrolls when wages are pegged to seniority.
A similar difficulty faces those firms that persist in granting promotions based on education and seniority. Currently, only about 4 percent of Japanese men aged 50-54 are university graduates, but this proportion is expected to rise to nearly 15 percent by 1985. In 1974, in establishments with more than a thousand employees 64 percent of university graduates aged 50-54 occupied high administrative posts. No comparable proportion of university graduates aged 50-54 can be expected to occupy high administrative posts in 1985 without rendering a firm so top-heavy with expensive managers as to risk bankruptcy.

Japanese management is well aware of this problem, and some changes are occurring in the reward system to make wages more dependent on performance. Hiring practices are changing as the demand for professional personnel and experienced workers...
forces employers to recruit from rival companies. Union wage demands are being met by management, but productivity continues to rise as well. And in a recent survey of 300 major firms on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, conducted by the Japanese news magazine *Nikkei Business*, well over half the firms not only agreed that lifetime employment practices should be replaced but predicted that they *would* be replaced.

This does not mean that drastic changes are coming overnight. Nothing changes very rapidly in Japan. But the evidence indicates that the customs and mores of the Japanese workplace will increasingly come to resemble those of the United States and other Western industrialized nations. This is likely to keep Japanese exports competitive, while the Japanese worker experiences less paternalism, more job mobility, more individualism, and greater labor unrest.
The complexity of Japan is not easy to encompass in a single broad volume. Of the writers who have tried such surveys and histories, Edwin O. Reischauer (page 56) must be mentioned, both for *JAPAN: Story of a Nation* (Knopf, 1970, rev. 1974) and his new book *THE JAPANESE* (Harvard, 1977). Frank Gibney, former *Time* and *Newsweek* correspondent in Tokyo, is another. His readable general account of contemporary Japanese society, *JAPAN: The Fragile Superpower* (Norton, 1975), is particularly good on the business world (one chapter is entitled "How To Succeed in Business by Trying").

John Whitney Hall, in *JAPAN: From Prehistory to Modern Times* (Delacorte, 1970, cloth; Delta, 1971, paper), provides brisk coverage in 395 pages of the island culture and involvements with foreigners from pre-ceramic times (100,000 to 200,000 years ago) through the late 1960s. Hall, a Yale medieval historian, tends to favor his period, but since the feudal age in Japan was important and colorful, his emphasis is not misplaced.

Sir George Sansom's *JAPAN: A Short Cultural History* (London: Cresset, 1931; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1943, rev. 1962) remains unsurpassed in its field, although it was first written nearly 50 years ago. It is a showcase for the kind of imaginative writing admired and practiced by this former British diplomat (later director of Columbia's East Asian Institute). A reviewer in the *Western Political Quarterly* called three more extensive studies by Sir George, *A HISTORY OF JAPAN TO 1334*, *A HISTORY OF JAPAN 1334-1615*, and *A HISTORY OF JAPAN 1615-1687* (Stanford, 1958-63, cloth & paper), "a great, perhaps the greatest, contribution of Western scholarship to the study of the societies of East Asia."

The three Sansom volumes are not concerned with post-17th-century developments. These are well-covered, however, in W. G. Beasley's thorough *THE MODERN HISTORY OF JAPAN* (Praeger, 1970, rev. 1974, cloth & paper).

Two questions that have fascinated all scholars on Japan are: "How was Japan able to become a world power within the short span of a century?" and "Are there any lessons in the Japanese modernizing experience that might assist in the development of other nations?" In 1958, a group of scholars met at the University of Michigan to determine ways to explore further the answers to these and similar questions. The result was a series of seminars over the next six years and a book of essays edited by James Morley, entitled *DILEMMAS OF GROWTH IN PREWAR JAPAN* (Princeton, 1974). The special strength of this collection is that its authors refuse to see development as solely an economic problem; they examine sociocultural forces as well.

Only one scholar has written credibly about the American occupation, which followed the Pacific War. He is Kazuo Kawai, and his book is *JAPAN'S AMERICAN INTERLUDE* (Univ. of Chicago, 1960). The author has lived in both Japan and the United States and shows great ability in interpreting the former to the latter. A bibliographic study by Robert Ward and Frank Shulman, *THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF*
JAPAN: 1945-1952 (American Library Association, 1974), inventories more than 3,000 books, articles, and documents. The authors only hint at the scope and complexity of the American occupiers' endeavors to remold Japanese society; they make clear the immense amount of investigation that scholars must do before we have even a rudimentary grasp of these crucial years.

Two ways of examining the Japanese body politic are from afar with binoculars or close-up with a stethoscope. Nobutaka Ike views from afar. His JAPANESE POLITICS: Patron-Client Democracy (Knopf, 1972, paper) is a broad sweep in a thin volume designed for the college classroom. But the book is more analytical than descriptive and the analysis is sophisticated. Ike examines various models of democracy. In the Japanese model, he says, the voter trades ballots for specific benefits. Issues and ideology are relatively unimportant. Demands for broadly conceived public policy are negligible. The system is prevented from degenerating into a scramble for pork-barrel benefits by a bureaucracy that has a long tradition of commitment to national goals. Because the bureaucracy is pluralistic rather than monolithic, policy competition is present.

Gerald Curtis wields the stethoscope. For him, "the electoral process is the heart of modern democracies, and the way in which it beats says a great deal about the health of the larger political system." For nine months, Curtis lived in the home (and dogged the footsteps) of Bunsei Sato, a conservative candidate for the lower house of the Diet, and followed him on the hustings. Sato was successful and so was Curtis, who provides a vivid description of a Japanese election campaign. His book, ELECTION CAMPAIGNING JAPANESE STYLE (Columbia, 1971), was translated into Japanese and became a best seller.

The obverse to the domestic side of the political coin is foreign policy. During the past quarter-century most Americans have agreed on the origins of the Pacific War: A small, willful group of military officers first gained control of the Japanese government and then set out to seize East Asia, a pursuit that left the United States no option prior to Pearl Harbor but to react (with oil embargoes, etc.) in its own interests. In 1969, Japanese and American scholars met at Lake Kawaguchi in Japan to see if this explanation was sufficient. Their papers are in PEARL HARBOR AS HISTORY: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941, edited by Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (Columbia, 1973). The book runs on for 800 pages; new data, insights, and interpretations abound. The scholars did not agree on everything but they did conclude that blame lay with both sides and among a broad range of people as well as institutions, including Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the Japanese imperial staff.

For many years, we have been without a solid book on relations between Japan and the United States. That gap was filled in 1975, when Charles Neu published THE TROUBLED ENCOUNTER: The United States and Japan (Wiley, cloth & paper). He attempts to explain the dynamics of policymaking in Tokyo and Washington as well as to analyze the contrasting cultural and intellectual contexts. Neu emphasizes the period from 1890 to 1941. He concludes, "With few exceptions, policy makers in Washington and [U.S.] ambassadors in Tokyo had not been able to move beyond the [narrow] assumptions of their own culture."

I. M. Destler, Priscilla Clapp, Hideo Sato, and Haruhiko Fukui are interested in the politics of U.S.-Japanese
relations since 1945. In their book MANAGING AN ALLIANCE: The Politics of U.S.–Japanese Relations (Brookings, 1976, cloth & paper), they concentrate on three negotiations—the revision of the bilateral security treaty in 1960, the reversion of administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan in 1969, and the dispute over quotas for Japanese textile exports to the United States in 1971. In their final chapter they write, “We have found that [senior] U.S. officials recurrently take actions or make statements that damage or complicate U.S.–Japanese relations because their minds and interests are elsewhere.” In short, these writers reach the same conclusion for the postwar period that Charles Neu reached for the prewar period.

Over the past five years, we have been steadily bombarded with books on the Japanese economy. In early 1976, editors Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky delivered the economists’ blockbuster, ASIA’S NEW GIANT: How the Japanese Economy Works (Brookings, cloth & paper), a solid 943-page analysis of the Japanese economy of the past 20 years (see WQ, Autumn 1976, page 134).

Scholars from other disciplines have also offered information and analysis. One is sociologist Robert Cole, who worked in the factories he writes about in JAPANESE BLUE COLLAR: The Changing Tradition (Univ. of Calif., 1971, cloth & paper). Cole demolishes the notion that the Japanese worker is submissive and loyal and points out that the Japanese worker supports the “Marxist” trade unions because their chiefs are the only ones who have the “ideology” to stand up to management.

Another sociologist, R. P. Dore, argues in BRITISH FACTORY—JAPANESE FACTORY: The Origins of National Diversity in Employment Relations (Univ. of Calif., 1973, cloth & paper) that Japan has leapfrogged over the other industrial democracies to produce a form of industrial organization more humane and advanced than those of the Western democracies.

Yet another view is offered by anthropologist Thomas Rohlen in FOR HARMONY AND STRENGTH: Japanese White-Collar Organization in Anthropological Perspective (Univ. of Calif., 1974). Rohlen’s subject is the social structure, culture, and ideology of a medium-size bank in a small Japanese city. In Rohlen’s bank, profits are never mentioned publicly; management accepts responsibility for an employee’s misconduct even outside the bank; and the president invites the parents of new workers to their “initiation” ceremony and promises the parents, often tearfully, that he will take over the task of educating and caring for their children. Rohlen concludes that the bank “is not regarded . . . as primarily a legal entity or a complex money-making machine, but more as a community of people organized to secure their common livelihood.”

EDITOR’S NOTE. Japan specialist Nathaniel B. Thayer (page 62) provided the above bibliography and many of the annotations. George Packard, deputy director of the Wilson Center, served as consultant. Mr. Packard was special assistant to Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan, 1963–65, and is the author of PROTEST IN TOKYO: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960 (Princeton, 1968).
Total 25-Year Pollution Control and Abatement Expenditures: $120 Billion

Private spending includes capital investment and operating and maintenance costs of pollution control equipment, as well as added individual costs of auto emission control devices. State and local spending includes all expenditures generated by state and local governments for air and water pollution control and solid waste treatment. Grants to states and municipalities are included in federal spending. (Pre-1975 outlays are in current dollars, 1975–85 projections are in 1975 dollars.)

The Environment

From colonial times to the present, Americans have variously viewed their natural surroundings with greed, ignorance, and Thoreau-like sensitivity. The early Western trappers who learned to live with nature, for example, were followed by buffalo hunters who wasted more than they took. But the record shows an abiding, if somewhat erratic, public concern for the well-being of the American environment. Since 1970, the country has been engaged in an unprecedented effort to clean up its air and water, as the chart indicates. And of late, there has been a revival of the turn-of-the-century notion that natural resources are not limitless. Here, conservationist J. Clarence Davies III sketches the historical antecedents of the present environmental movement, and former EPA administrator Russell Train focuses on recent problems and progress.

THE GREENING OF AMERICAN POLITICS

by J. Clarence Davies III

The origins of organized environmental politics in the United States go back at least as far as the period just after the Civil War, but isolated events, foreshadowing later environmental concerns, go back much further. As early as 1647, the Massachusetts Bay Colony passed regula-
tions for preventing the pollution of Boston Harbor, and in 1710
the Colony forbade the creation of any "disturbance or incum-
brance . . . on or across any river that would operate to stop or
obstruct the natural passage of fish . . . without the approbation
and allowance first had and obtained from the general sessions of
the peace." In 1832, the Hot Springs in Arkansas were set aside
by Congress as a national park. Then in 1864, George P. Marsh's
*Man and Nature*, revised 10 years later as *The Earth as Modified
by Human Action*, laid much of the philosophical groundwork
for the modern conservation movement. Appalled by the over-
grazing of meadows and the ruthless cutting of forests in his
native Vermont, Marsh observed:

The ravages committed by man subvert the relations and
destroy the balance which nature had established. . . .
The earth is fast becoming an unfit home for its noblest
inhabitant, and another era of equal human crime and
human improvidence . . . would reduce it to such a condi-
tion of impoverished productiveness, of shattered sur-
face, of climatic excess, as to threaten the depravation,
barbarism, and perhaps even extinction of the species.

The massive industrialization of America that took place in
the decades following the Civil War created conditions that made
it impossible to ignore environmental degradation. Cities were
covered with a pall of smoke from factories, coal-heated homes,
and steam locomotives; rivers became sewers; the threat of
waterborne epidemics was constant. The heavy demands of a
rapidly growing population resulted in devastation of the country-
side by mining and timber cutting.

In the context of man's assault on land, air, and water, the
political foundations were laid for the flowering of environmen-
tal concern that was to occur at the turn of the century. In 1873,
the first major national organization devoted to conservation
matters was founded; John Wesley Powell, an ex-army officer—the

J. Clarence Davies III, 39, is executive vice president of the Conserva-
tion Foundation in Washington, D.C. Born in New York City, he
graduated from Dartmouth (1959) and took his Ph.D. in government
at Columbia (1965). He served on the staff of the White House Council
on Environmental Quality (1970–73) and was a Fellow at Resources
for the Future, Inc. (1973–76) before joining the Conservation Founda-
tion. He is the co-author, with Barbara S. Davies, of *The Politics of
Pollution* (1970, rev. 1975). His article is drawn from a forthcoming
book-length study, *Setting the National Agenda.*
first American to examine the close relationship between land use and water supply in the arid West—and others concerned about forest preservation and land use formed the American Association for the Advancement of Science.*

**Parks for the People**

During the same period, the passage of several innovative conservation laws showed that environmental matters were already on Washington's agenda. In 1872, Congress established Yellowstone as the first major national park "for the benefit and enjoyment of the people." In 1875, Congress passed a buffalo protection bill, the first measure ever passed by Congress to protect a species of wildlife (President Grant vetoed it because the buffalo hunters were proving more effective than the army in beating back the Plains Indians). In 1891, the first national forest legislation was enacted. It authorized the President to establish forest reserves on federally owned land in the Western states for the purpose of conserving timber and water and to prevent floods.

When Theodore Roosevelt became President in 1901, conservation matters were given high priority. In his second State of the Union Message, he declared that "the forest and water problems are perhaps the most vital internal questions of the United States." During the first years of his Presidency, the landmark Reclamation Act was passed and the first national wildlife refuge created. Roosevelt appointed a Public Lands Commission, which supported federal ownership—not sale—of the public lands; he established an Inland Waterways Commission, which recommended that plans for river and harbor improvements take pollution control into account; and he named Gifford Pinchot, the foremost proponent of scientific forestry and coiner of the term "conservation," as his Secretary of Agriculture.

Throughout Roosevelt's administration (1901-09), conservation proposals came primarily from scientists within the federal government. As historian Samuel Hays wrote in 1959, "Conservation neither arose from a broad popular outcry, nor centered its fire primarily on the private corporation. . . . It is from the vantage point of applied science, rather than of democratic pro-

*Followed by the American Forestry Association (1875); the nucleus of the Audubon Society (1883); Teddy Roosevelt's Boone and Crockett Club, devoted to fighting the slaughter of big game (1888); the Sierra Club (1892); and the American League for Civic Improvement and the Society for the Preservation of Historical and Scenic Spots, both devoted to beautification and preservation (1900).
test, that one must understand the historic role of the conserva-
tion movement."* The movement was an elite, intellectual affair, based on the gospel of scientific efficiency.

In 1908, William Howard Taft was elected President, and Roosevelt's vigorous conservation efforts began to encounter strong opposition from Congress, from the new President, and from key federal agencies; any restriction on the further development and exploitation of American resources was resented as improper interference with the "invisible hand of the market." Roosevelt, Pinchot, and the other conservation leaders applied the strategy of "enlarging the arena of conflict." Through speeches, conferences, and the press, they turned to the public for support. The public responded with massive enthusiasm for conservation, and thus a movement that had been largely limited to federal scientists and planners found a broad base of support in the public at large.

To a marked degree, the change from an intellectual to a popular base changed the ideology of the conservation movement. Its more dogmatic supporters in 1908 and 1909 tended to look upon all commercial development as crass materialism. They viewed conservation, in Hays' words, "as an attempt to save resources from use rather than to use them wisely." Thus, what began as an effort to improve economic efficiency became tinged with the enthusiasm of a religious crusade to save America from its materialistic enemies.

Within a few years, the conservation coalition that TR had unleashed splintered apart. Its vague evangelistic ideology and tenuous unity could not sustain the political pressures involved in taking a position on particular projects or in initiating legislation. After 1910, the movement fractured into a variety of narrowly focused groups, and the first stage of the American conservation movement came to an end.

Between 1910 and 1933, conservation was no longer a popular cause, but the movement did not die out altogether. For example, the Oil Pollution Act of 1924 was the first major federal statute to be directed explicitly at the pollution problem. The Act authorized the Secretary of the Army to prescribe regulations for the discharge of oil from vessels "in such quantities, under such conditions, and at such times and places as in his opinion will

not be deleterious to health or sea food."**

On the organizational front, the major governmental addition was the creation in 1916 of the National Park Service, a result of long and dedicated efforts by John Muir, Frederick Law Olmsted, and other preservationists. (Prior to this time, each of the national park superintendents reported directly to the Secretary of the Interior, who generally paid little heed.) A wide range of private conservation-oriented organizations came into being. In 1919, the National Parks Association was formed. The Izaak Walton League was founded in 1922, followed in 1928 by the Federation of Sewage Works Associations, later to become the Water Pollution Control Federation. The gains made under TR were consolidated during the 1920s. Neither the White House nor the general public showed much interest in conservation, and defense of the earlier legacy was left to Congress.

In 1933, with the coming of the New Deal, conservation was again caught up in a broader movement with popular roots, tied to a general policy of federal intervention. Franklin Roosevelt, like TR, took a personal interest in the subject and in fact learned much from the same teacher, Gifford Pinchot. Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in discussing the origins of what was to become the New Deal, observed that "the central theme in Roosevelt's emerging philosophy was the conservation of natural resources." An interesting insight is contained in a 1937 presidential memorandum to Aubrey Williams, acting administrator of the Works Progress Administration. FDR wrote from Hyde Park:

> I realize that sewer projects are useful but I think we should adhere strictly to my memorandum of August twenty-first, directing that no future WPA projects shall be approved for improving, repairing or adding to sewers which dump [directly] into any creek or river. The only modification, or, to be more accurate, interpretation, of this order would be in a case where the sewer project has nothing to do with the ultimate disposal of sewage.

> ... In order to be absolutely on the safe side in these cases, I wish you would submit to me any projects which seem to come within the above interpretation.

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*Congress also extended the forest preserve system to the entire United States (1911), The Public Health Service Act was amended to authorize surveys and investigations of water pollution (1912), and the 1913 Annual Report of the Public Health Service recommended federal control over pollution of interstate waters. A law was enacted providing for the establishment of migratory bird refuges (1913). In 1920, the Federal Water Power Act and the Mineral Leasing Act established national policy in two areas vital to conservation interests. These were followed in 1924 by the Clarke-McNary Act, which extended the national forest system still further.*

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With White House support, major progress was made on many fronts between 1933 and 1939. The Civilian Conservation Corps, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Soil Conservation Service, and the Fish and Wildlife Service were established. Congress passed, and FDR signed, the first Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, the Taylor Grazing Act, the Historic Sites Act, and the Pittman-Robertson Act providing federal funds for state wildlife projects. Twice Congress approved a federal water pollution control bill, but in 1938 it was vetoed by Roosevelt because of a dispute over budget procedures; in 1940 the House and Senate were unable to reconcile their versions of the bill. The Public Works Administration and its successor agencies built $325 million worth of sewage treatment projects across the nation. In 1935, the WPA organized an air pollution survey of New York City, and the following year the Public Health Service began a similar survey in 14 major cities.

**The Killer Smogs**

New Deal conservation efforts were cut short by World War II. But the immediate postwar years were marked by increased scientific and public concern over air and water pollution, which was to become the leading concern during the subsequent, or third, stage of the environmental movement. In 1947, California passed the first modern air pollution legislation to deal with the smog problem in Los Angeles (although it was not discovered until the early 1950s that the automobile was the chief cause of the problem). An air pollution episode in Donora, Pennsylvania, the following year, which killed 20 people and made several thousand sick, brought an outcry that led eventually to passage of the first federal air pollution law in 1955. The law gave the Public Health Service authority to do research on air pollution and to conduct demonstrations and training. The first federal statute designed to deal with the overall water pollution problem was signed in 1948 and strengthened in 1956. It provided for federal subsidies to build local sewage-treatment plants and allowed limited federal moves to control pollution in interstate waters.

The postwar years also brought a new environmental threat—radiation. Radioactive fallout from the testing of Soviet and American nuclear weapons became a major concern of the general public in the early 1950s. Headlines such as “Strontium-90 in Babies’ Milk” stirred the scientific community into political action. Just as scientists formed the nucleus of Teddy Roosevelt’s conservation movement, so scientists, aroused by the nuclear
hazard, played a major role in the new conservation. Barry Commoner, referring to the impact on scientists of the fallout controversy in 1953 and 1954, wrote, "For many of us, the meaning of the environment and its importance to human life was suddenly brought to light." Another ecologist, Grahame J. C. Smith, noted, "Radioactive material was the first pollutant to be properly monitored and the first to show clearly the worldwide distribution and effects of a pollutant released at one point. It was this pollutant that alerted us to the dangers inherent in our treatment of the Earth."

Nuclear fallout dramatized the impact of man's environmentally disruptive actions on man. The controversy over pesticides, in particular DDT, dramatized their effects on nonhuman life. Research findings during the late 1950s showed that pesticide residues were pervasive in the environment and that their effects on wildlife could be extremely damaging. Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas observed in 1961, "There is growing fear that due to DDT and other pesticides we will witness in a few years a greater extermination of animal life than man has known in all his previous centuries on earth." A year later, Rachel Carson's Silent Spring vividly conveyed the same message to a wide audience and helped to trigger a continuing series of governmental curbs on pesticides.

Renewing the Conservation Ethic

With John F. Kennedy's election in 1960, conservation problems again received extensive federal attention. In 1961, Kennedy sent to Congress a special message on natural resources, followed by a special message on conservation in 1962. In May 1962, the White House held a National Conference on Conservation. The emphasis in these efforts was on traditional conservation matters, such as proper development of water and timber resources, the public lands, electric power, and recreation. Pollution control was not yet a major issue in Washington.

Lyndon Johnson was even more committed to the conservation cause than Kennedy. As in other policy areas, Johnson in his first year in office pushed through Congress many of the conservation measures advocated by his predecessor: the Multiple Use Act of 1964, the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act, and the law establishing a National Wilderness Preservation System. Typically, Johnson went much further. Each year after 1964, he sent to Congress new broad proposals. Lady Bird Johnson supplemented her husband's efforts by publicizing a cam-
Public attention to air and water pollution peaked in 1970, the year of Earth Day and the Nixon administration's major environmental initiatives, and has since subsided to a moderately high level.

The Congress generally supported the President's efforts; a group of Democrats, notably Senators Edmund Muskie and Henry Jackson, began to assume greater prominence as independent advocates in the media and in Congress itself. In 1965, the Water Pollution Control Act was strengthened, and the Clean Air Act was extended to cover automobile emissions. Congress passed the Highway Beautification Act and the Federal Water Project Recreation Act. In 1966, the Clean Water Restoration Act was signed by Mr. Johnson—who, optimistically, promised to clean up the Potomac in 10 years—and an air pollution scare in New York City spurred further strengthening of the Clean Air Act. The movement for wilderness preservation reached its peak in the so-called "conservation Congress" of 1968, which created the North Cascades and Redwoods National Parks, halted plans to dam the Grand Canyon, and established a Wild and Scenic Rivers System and a National Trails System.

These actions in Washington were accompanied by a massive increase in public concern with environmental matters. The membership of the Sierra Club almost tripled to 90,000 between 1965 and 1969, and other private environmental groups registered

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**INDEX OF PUBLIC ATTENTION TO AIR AND WATER POLLUTION, 1963–73***

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*Mr. Davies' index, which roughly measures the degree to which a problem rates as a political "issue," is derived from the sum of five weighted components: (1) the number of articles and editorials in the New York Times dealing with the issue; (2) mention of the issue in the Republican and Democratic Party platforms; (3) passage of relevant major legislation by state legislatures; (4) mention of the issue in the annual policy statement of five major interest groups (e.g., the AFL-CIO); and (5) mention of the issue in the annual policy statements of four major environmental groups (e.g., the Sierra Club).
large gains in membership. Press coverage also increased. The number of environment-oriented articles in major periodicals increased from 68 in the 1957-59 period to 226 in the 1967-69 period. The number of articles in the New York Times concerned with the effects of pollution rose from 101 in 1960 to 492 in 1969. National opinion polls revealed that 35 percent of the citizens in 1965 considered water pollution a "very serious" or "somewhat serious" problem. By 1968, this figure had jumped to 58 percent. The comparable poll figures for air pollution were 28 percent in 1965 and 55 percent in 1968.

In 1968, media interest in environmental problems flagged, and some observers thought that the great boom was over. Richard Cooley and Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith, two specialists on environmental politics, wrote in 1969:

"There is some indication that the close of the Ninetieth Congress late in 1968 may mark the end of this remarkable period in the history of conservation politics. . . . Some members of Congress, as well as of the new Republican administration, have suggested that we are reaching the end of a long wave of significant and highly visible progress, and that the widely hailed "environmental crisis" has, in a certain sense, passed the peak of critical national interest and public concern.

In fact, 1968 marked the transition from the "old" to the "new" conservation, from the New Deal stage to the '70s stage of the movement. The new conservation stressed protection of the environment, primarily through pollution control, with industry as a prime target, as contrasted with the narrower traditional emphasis on wilderness preservation, erosion control, and recreation.

As during the Teddy Roosevelt period, the change in emphasis also changed the nature of environmental politics. One scholar had this to say about the "old" conservation: "Virtually every major conservation success in our country's history, from the National Park System to the Tennessee Valley Authority to the Soil Conservation Service, has deep roots in what is commonly referred to as pork barrel politics." The old conservation issues were "distributive" issues; they involved the government in subsidizing some segment of American society. The new conservation placed far more emphasis on government regulation, on government control of the behavior of certain groups, in this case, industrial polluters and developers."
AN INDUSTRY VIEW

Robert O. Anderson, chairman of the board and chief executive officer, Atlantic Richfield Company, writing in the magazine Catalyst for Environmental Quality, October 17, 1973:

So we have two problems which, to some, would appear to be in conflict: energy and environment. While technology has been pointed to as the culprit, actually it is our only hope for solving the environmental problem. I agree with the scientist . . . who said, "Technology and ecology are by no means at war; it is merely that they have suddenly discovered each other."

We cannot go back in time to a less productive society, so we must find new ways to use energy and still maintain an acceptable environment. We can do this only if all segments of society work together toward that common goal. The adversary confrontation approach to restructuring public policy will not work, for the situations created by this approach only threaten to sacrifice the welfare and even the well-being of our citizens . . .

The task ahead of us, as a nation, is to make public choices in a more informed and rational way. This implies trade-offs, compromises and the ability to come to balanced values. It is important that we know where we are going, but it is just as important that we pay attention to the selection of the paths by which we will get there.

The newer environmental demands, particularly in the area of pollution control, had considerable popular appeal, especially to the American middle class. During the autumn of 1969, a number of developments coincided to produce an explosion of environmental interest in 1970. Although doctrinally opposed to "excessive" federal regulation, the Nixon administration decided to place major emphasis on environmental issues—in part, to steal the Democrats' thunder. Senator Muskie, a potential challenger to Nixon in the 1972 election, was preparing amendments to the Clean Air Act; Senator Jackson was shepherding his National Environmental Policy Act through Congress. Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin and a group of student leaders were making preparations for a nationwide celebration of Earth Day, to be held in April 1970.

On January 1, 1970, Mr. Nixon signaled his administration's new commitment to environmental improvement with the strong statement that accompanied his signing of the National Environ-
A few days later he devoted almost one-third of his State of the Union Message to the environment, stating that environmental quality "may well become the major concern of the American people in the decade of the seventies." On February 10, he sent to Congress a special message containing a number of recommendations, including the strengthening of the acts for air and water pollution control. On April 22, Earth Day was celebrated across the nation with an outpouring of public concern. In Washington, D.C., 50,000 people turned out, some to march on the Interior Department, others symbolically to protest beach pollution by throwing oil on the sidewalks. The full tide of environmental law-making crested in 1970-73. The Council on Environmental Quality and the Environmental Protection Agency were created, thus firmly institutionalizing advocacy within the government. In the private sector, yet another wave of environmental organizations came into being; existing environmental groups increased in membership and sophistication, and certain national associations that had previously ignored environmental problems began to devote considerable attention to them. Dramatic changes were made in the laws governing air and water pollution control, pesticides, and occupational health. New issues competed for attention—land use, noise, recycling, growth. The media devoted twice as much time and space to environmental problems as they had prior to 1970.

Declining Political Momentum

However, by 1973, the high cost of environmental improvement became increasingly apparent. Industry opposition to pollution controls stiffened, and the public became increasingly concerned about inflation. The Nixon administration showed less interest in new environmental outlays. Finally, during the Arab oil embargo in the winter of 1973-74, "energy" usurped "environment" as a top federal concern. With the Watergate scandals full-blown in 1974, Mr. Nixon, for the first time in five years, failed to send an environmental message to Capitol Hill. Environmentalists in Congress during 1974 and 1975 spent as much time opposing the weakening of environmental laws as strengthening them. New proposals covering land use, which a year or two earlier had seemed likely to become law, languished and died.

Despite the decline in political momentum, two new laws, passed in late 1976, closed the remaining gaps in the federal government's authority to regulate pollution. The Resources Conservation and Recovery Act established a regulatory framework...
for land disposal of pollutants comparable to the regulations dealing with air and water pollution. The Toxic Substances Control Act encompassed literally all substances with the exception of those specifically regulated by other acts, such as pesticides, drugs, and nuclear wastes. The regulatory powers given to the government were equally broad, ranging from labeling to the outright ban of certain chemicals.

Despite high unemployment and "energy" problems, public concern and media attention continue to be greater than what they were prior to 1970. Environmental organizations in and outside the government have persisted in their efforts to see that the complex, sometimes controversial antipollution laws enacted in 1970 and 1972 are implemented. Many new issues have appeared with an environmental "connection"; the primary public worry—over the future availability of fuel, food, and other resources—is reminiscent of the first Roosevelt era. In some ways the movement has come full circle, and conservation is once more the top priority of the environmentalists.

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THE BEGINNING OF WISDOM

by Russell E. Train

Little more than seven years have passed since zealous young people were burying automobiles to celebrate the first Earth Day. A great deal has happened since then. But how much has really been achieved?

Is our environment better than it was? Are toxic wastes and dirty air any less of a hazard than they were in 1970? There are no simple answers. The beginning of wisdom about environmental problems is an appreciation of their complexity. In fact, we are discovering environmental hazards today—fluorocarbons, heavy metals, asbestos fibers—that were scarcely considered hazards a few years ago.
Certainly we are now far better prepared to cope with pollution and other environmental degradations, at least in our own country. The essential institutional framework for protecting ourselves and our children is in place at the federal level. The Council on Environmental Quality is a focal point for White House policy-making, while the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), created in December 1970, is the strongest experimental-research, standard-setting, and enforcement institution of its kind in the world.

EPA has strongly influenced Japan, Canada, Britain, West Germany, Sweden, and other countries where political leaders have decided to centralize environmental management. All of our own state governments have established agencies to deal with pollution. Some, like California's large, well-staffed Air Resources Board, enforce standards more stringent than those of the federal government; others are still ill-equipped to enforce any standards.

Since 1970, the National Environmental Policy Act has required federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement, spelling out all possible adverse environmental consequences, for every major federally funded project—dams, highways, airports, public buildings. This landmark reform, almost revolutionary in its implications, means that federal agencies, for the first time in history, must engage in truly comprehensive decision-making, taking into account a broad range of social and economic factors seldom considered in the past.

The Council on Environmental Quality monitors the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process. Thousands of these documents are filed each year routinely. All too often, this procedure, in which experts compile mountains of excessively detailed data, has become a burden. Copies must be available to all interested parties, and it is this public disclosure requirement that provides the operative force behind the EIS process by offering environmental action groups and others an opportunity to scrutinize and challenge controversial projects.

Of course, the EIS process can be abused. It is time-consuming. It has been used to block or delay badly needed low-income housing projects as well as highways of questionable value. Federal employees in Washington, D.C., have even invoked it to avoid moving their offices to an undesirable part of the city.

The Council on Environmental Quality has also served the nation as a drafter and initiator of legislative proposals. In addition, the Council has prompted the issuance of executive orders from the White House, such as President Nixon's order
banning the use of poisoned bait to kill coyotes on public land—the poisons were killing other species, including the endangered bald eagle.

The performance of the Environmental Protection Agency is less easy to assess but, given its problems, I believe its record is remarkable. Its statutory mandates have been extraordinarily sweeping and complex, and they continue to multiply. Unfortunately, EPA’s resources have always lagged behind its responsibilities as legislated by Congress. The Ford administration submitted a request to Capitol Hill for $802.7 million for fiscal year 1978, only 4 percent ($28.7 million) above the previous year’s appropriation, despite EPA’s sharply increased responsibilities under the Toxic Substances Control Act and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. As EPA administrator, I had recommended an increase of $350 million, including funds to increase the agency’s staff from 9,680 to 12,350. So far, President Carter has proposed a small increase of funds and 600 additional positions.

EPA has almost doubled in size since it was established in 1970 with 5,000 personnel but has had trouble in building up the technical resources it requires. It must try to provide design assistance to more than 8,000 municipalities involved in sewage-treatment construction programs. The agency desperately needs toxicologists to help with the re-registering of some 35,000 pesticide compounds. But industry needs these specialists too (and pays them better) in order to carry out the testing required by the new toxic substances legislation and by the growing number of requirements of the Food and Drug Administration and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

Since 1970, Americans have come to expect prompt solutions to pollution problems. Overall, we have made some notable progress, particularly in dealing with air and water pollution. Air quality has been significantly improved in urban areas. Nearly 40 percent fewer people were exposed to unhealthy levels of particulates in 1975 than in 1970. Sulfur oxide levels in urban areas have declined an average of 30 percent since 1970. Some 92 percent of

*Russell Errol Train, 57, former administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1973-77) and chairman of the President’s Council on Environmental Quality (1970-73), received his A.B. from Princeton (1941) and L.L.B. from Columbia (1948) and served as Judge of the U.S. Tax Court from 1957 to 1965. He has been active in a number of conservation organizations—as president of the African Wildlife Leadership Fund (1959-69), vice president of the World Wildlife Fund (1959-69), and president of the Conservation Foundation (1965-69).*
major stationary sources of air pollution (e.g., power plants and factories) are in compliance with state regulations or adhering to compliance schedules. Auto pollution levels are down, including hydrocarbons in California, a major source of smog in that state.

The Price of Cleanliness

Nonetheless, we have a long way to go. Sulfur oxide levels threaten to rise again because of shifts from oil to coal. Air quality standards have been achieved in only a minority of the nation's 247 air quality regions. It would appear that many of the goals originally set for 1975 may not be reached for another decade.

With its construction grants for treatment of municipal waste, EPA is now administering the largest public works program in the country. Despite delays, some $16 billion of federal funds have been obligated to the program, but it will take at least 10 more years and billions of dollars more before satisfactory "secondary treatment" is achieved nationwide. Industry, generally, is well ahead of municipalities in achieving the 1977 targets. However, industry is now mounting a major attack on the "best available technology" (BAT) standards mandated for 1983, claiming that they are both unnecessary and too costly. They are neither. The 1983 requirements should be maintained, especially for toxic effluents.

Although it is impossible to assess the condition of all the nation's waterways at any one time, the best available data show a decline in levels of bacteria and oxygen-absorbing waste but a rise in nitrogen and phosphate contaminants (particularly from agricultural runoff), which encourage algae and other undesirable vegetation. Fish have returned to portions of such major rivers as the Willamette, Detroit, Monongahela, Savannah, Buffalo, and Arkansas. Particularly satisfying has been the reduction in the flow of contaminating phosphorus that had been accelerating the eutrophication of the Great Lakes. Further reductions are needed and new concerns have arisen in the Great Lakes region with the contamination of fish by toxic chemicals, such as PCBs.*

Passage of the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, establishing new purity standards for all states, was a major achievement, but we still know far too little about the potential hazards of toxic

*Polychlorinated biphenyls. These exceptionally stable industrial compounds, when lost through vaporization, leaks, or spills, prove more persistent in the environment than DDT. Dangerously high PCB levels have been found in fish, waterfowl, water supplies, cattle, and even in mothers' milk.
substances in drinking water. New Orleans, for example, draws its water from the Mississippi, which contains minute amounts of carcinogens and other chemical contaminants, some in the parts-per-trillion category. We have inadequate knowledge of the effect on human health of long-term exposure to low levels of such contaminants.

Looking back on the past six or seven years, it is easy to conclude that key environmental legislation was usually too ambitious and too complex for easy and effective administration. Unrealistic deadlines were set. Standards were mandated that could not be met in the time allowed. Vast programs, such as the one for construction of municipal sewage treatment plants, were initiated but not funded. As frustrating as these circumstances often were to those charged with carrying out the legislation, I would not have had it any other way. To have asked only for what was clearly and easily achievable would have brought little progress. By demanding what often seemed impossible, we have, in fact, made remarkable headway.

Divergence in Congress

The fact that the legislation was written by congressional committees with sometimes opposing philosophies has not made EPA's job any easier. Water quality legislation is a case in point: The Senate, in a move spearheaded by Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D-Maine), has stood for stringent regulation, while the House has sought more flexibility.

On occasion, divergent congressional approaches to specific issues in the water pollution legislation, such as user charges, are both reflected in the final statute, leaving it to EPA to find a way to implement the law. In 1976 and again this year, congressional consideration of the extent of EPA authority over dredge-and-fill operations in the nation's wetlands reflected a desire by the House to reduce that power, whereas the Senate has tried to sustain it.

Citizens groups, particularly public-interest law firms, have played an immensely important and valuable role, especially by holding EPA's bureaucratic feet to the fire through court action (or threat of court action) in order to force prompt implementation of new statutes. These groups have not hesitated to bring suit when deadlines for pollution control measures were not met by EPA. I imagine that I was the most sued man in government, taking into account legal actions brought by both public-interest
law firms and by industry. In this regard, one must bear in mind that for every environmental group that believes EPA is moving too slowly or too leniently in a given case, there is a business or farm group, or some other organization, that finds the agency acting too rapidly or too strictly.

Much environmental legislative activity in the 1975–76 Congress was essentially defensive in character. Thus, the extension of EPA's authority to regulate pesticides turned into a fight to prevent Congress from giving the Secretary of Agriculture veto power over the exercise of that authority. The fight was won in the House by an uncomfortably close margin.

Struggles of this kind were perhaps an inevitable consequence of moving from the conceptual to the implementation stage of the environmental effort. Practicing what you preach is often painful. Sewage treatment plans cost taxpayers dollars. Sulfur oxide controls instituted by public utilities often mean higher electricity bills. Pesticide regulation restricts the freedom of the farmer. EPA control over development of valuable wetlands means that some developers, as well as other private property owners, may no longer exploit their land without restriction. The ban on the use of poisons to kill coyotes antagonizes ranchers who claim livestock losses. Mandatory auto-emission control devices added to the cost of cars and created some engine performance problems, at least initially.

**Matching Costs with Benefits**

In 1970, environmental issues were often viewed simplistically and emotionally; Utopia seemed easy to attain. We have become more sophisticated since then; the energy crisis and economic troubles have led to closer scrutiny of the costs and benefits of environmental proposals. The days of uncritical congressional acceptance of environmental controls are gone.

The continued success of the environmental effort in the United States will depend on three things: first, our ability and willingness to find ways of keeping costs, inequities, and inefficiencies to a minimum and of encouraging constructive reconciliation of environmental, social, and economic goals; second, the effective redirection of the environmental effort to ensure a steady shift from the control of pollution to its prevention; third, the strength of the general public's commitment to environmental protection.

Several items remain on the agenda of needed legislation, as
I see it. We need strip mining legislation. We need to enact a bill giving permanent legal status to EPA and providing a more coherent framework for the agency's policies and programs. We should give serious consideration to the creation of a Cabinet-level Department of the Environment, which would include EPA's present authorities and programs as well as appropriate elements now located elsewhere in the federal government, such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and portions of the Geological Survey, the National Park Service, and perhaps the Coast Guard.

**Painful Preventive Medicine**

As a society, we must learn to assess every decision, every action in advance to determine the adverse environmental impacts that might result. This means recognizing that manmade environmental hazards are a serious threat to human life and health and that we must practice preventive medicine with respect to the environment. It means recognizing that lasting environmental progress comes not from add-on controls but from basic changes in industrial and automotive processes. Mass conversion to coal, for example, will require billions of dollars for new technology to remove sulfur. But in the longer run, we need clean, renewable sources of energy, such as solar energy.

The greatest successes of EPA so far have come from applying technology to specific sources of emissions and effluents, such as particulate and sulfur oxides from factory smokestacks and liquid industrial waste. Still to be introduced—and far more difficult—are pollution control measures that involve real changes in American lifestyles and land-use patterns, such as urban transportation control plans that affect the ways we use our private autos.

Our reliance on regulatory approaches to pollution has brought positive results, but regulation often carries with it a rigidity of application that can prove counterproductive, particularly as we reach high levels of control. We now need greater flexibility in administration as well as new approaches involving the use of economic charges as a supplement to regulation.

Noncompliance charges for motor vehicle emissions, for sulfur oxide emissions from power plants, and for some point sources* of water pollution are attractive possibilities as regu-

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*Point sources are specific sewer outlets, discharge pipes, and the like, in contrast to generalized sources of pollution such as agricultural runoff.
KEY ENVIRONMENTAL COURT CASES

The 2nd Circuit Court held that factors other than economic interest could be the basis for being an “aggrieved” person, thus giving environmental groups legal standing to sue in defense of scenic, historical, and recreational values affected by power development.

Zabel v. Tabb (July 1970)
The 5th Circuit Court held that the Army Corps of Engineers was not limited in the issuance of dredge-and-fill permits to considerations of navigation, flood control, and hydroelectric potential but could deny such permits on environmental and ecological grounds.

Sierra Club v. Morton (April 1972)
The U.S. Supreme Court held that, once a citizen or group established its direct stake in an environmental decision, the plaintiff could assert the interest of the general public as well. The decision reaffirmed that injury is not limited to economic values but extends to aesthetic and recreational values as well.

Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus (Nov. 1972)
The Circuit Court in Washington, D.C., held that EPA acted in violation of the Clean Air Act in approving state plans that permitted significant deterioration of existing air quality.

U.S. v. SCRAP (June 1973)
The U.S. Supreme Court held in class-action environmental suits that, if the alleged harm will affect a small group of people, the plaintiff must be able to prove that he will be one of those affected; but, if the harm affects all citizens, then any citizen may bring suit.

Scientists’ Institute for Public Information v. AEC (June 1973)
The Circuit Court in Washington, D.C., held that the National Environmental Policy Act (1969) required the preparation of an environmental impact statement, even at the research stage of a federally funded project.

Kleppe v. Sierra Club (July 1976)
In what was viewed as a defeat for environmentalists, the U.S. Supreme Court held that since there was no federal plan or program for regional coal development (in the northern Great Plains), no immediate preparation of a regional environmental impact statement was required from the Department of Interior.

E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Train (Feb. 1977)
The U.S. Supreme Court held that EPA has the authority to establish uniform 1977 and 1983 effluent limits for classes or categories of existing point sources of water pollution, provided that allowances are made for variations in industrial plants.
latory supplements. Other promising economic approaches could involve a mandatory deposit on throwaway beverage containers and taxes on packaging to create an incentive to reduce this country's growing mountain of solid waste at the source.

Our society places a premium on adversary approaches to problem solving. Citizen action must remain strong. But I also believe that we must curb extreme advocacy and ideological polarization. Businessmen must develop a less paranoid attitude toward environmental protection, and environmental activists must become more sensitive to the real-life concerns of others, particularly when it comes to jobs, economic well-being, and adequate profits.

White House leadership is vital as the conflicts over environmental policy sharpen in the years ahead and regulatory actions really begin to affect commuters, farmers, workers, and small businessmen. Growing population and increased competition for scarce resources are going to produce both greater harmful stress on the environment and more political conflict over environmental programs. Yet, if we are to succeed in maintaining environments that both sustain and enrich human life, we will need—above and beyond all regulatory systems, technologies, ideologies, institutions, and mechanisms—a new ethical awareness of our relationship with our environment and other forms of life.
A sizable literature is available on various aspects of the environment: ecology, nature, conservation, preservation, pollution and its control, economic growth, endangered animal species, the seas, the wilderness, parks, forests. Offshoot subjects—environmental law, ethics, economics, and politics—are treated in scores of specialized works.

But dispassionate full-length studies are rare, as are scholarly critiques of the leading environmentalists' contemporary assumptions and proposals concerning energy, land use, and agricultural methods.

Of the "basic" books, most ardent environmentalists would place Aldo Leopold's *A Sand County Almanac* (Oxford, 1949, cloth and paper; Sierra Club/Ballantine, 1970, paper) at the top of the list. For two decades this book had a small but devoted following; the environmental awakening of the late 1960s brought hundreds of thousands of readers to *Almanac*.

Leopold, who takes the reader through each month of the year at his Wisconsin farm, has been called a 20th-century Thoreau because of his fine descriptive prose. But it is his philosophy, expressed in such essays as "The Land Ethic," that has guided his disciples.

"A land ethic," he writes, "changes the role of *Homo sapiens* from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members and also respect for the community as such." Leopold defines conservation as "a state of harmony between men and land. . . . The land is one organism. Its parts, like our own parts, compete with each other and co-operate with each other. The competitions are as much a part of the inner workings as the co-operations. You can regulate . . . but not abolish them."

The first environmental best seller was Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* (Houghton Mifflin, 1962, cloth; Fawcett, rev. 1973, paper). A biologist already widely admired for her 1961 book *The Sea Around Us*, Miss Carson challenged the agricultural pesticide industry when no other writer was either competent or willing to do so and documented the harm that DDT and other popular pesticides were doing to the soil, water, wildlife, and, potentially, to humans as the poisons passed up through the food chain.

"The chemicals to which life is asked to make its adjustment," she wrote, "are no longer merely the calcium and silica and copper and all the rest of the minerals washed out of the rocks and carried in rivers to the sea; they are the synthetic creations of man's inventive mind, brewed in his laboratories, [with] no counterparts in nature."

What happened as a result of Miss Carson's impassioned plea for biological instead of chemical control of harmful insects? In *Since Silent Spring* (Houghton Mifflin, 1970, cloth; Fawcett, 1970, paper), Frank Graham, Jr. describes the Velsicol Chemical Corporation's unsuccessful campaign to get the publishers to withhold Miss Carson's book, the controversy it created, and the partial ban on DDT that followed.

*Man and Nature* (Scribner's, 1864, cloth; Harvard, 1965, paper) by George Perkins Marsh is the granddaddy of ecological books. It appeared in many languages besides English and in an
1874 revision entitled THE EARTH AS MODIFIED BY HUMAN ACTION: A New Edition of Man and Nature. Marsh, a Vermont lawyer, congressman, and U.S. ambassador in Europe, recorded in graphic language man’s depredations against nature: “Vast forests have disappeared from mountain spurs and ridges; rivers famous in history and song have shrunk to humble brooklets; . . . the estuaries, and the consequently diminished velocity of the streams which flow into them, have converted thousands of leagues of shallow sea and fertile lowland into unproductive miasmatic morasses.”

In NATURE AND THE AMERICAN: Three Centuries of Changing Attitudes (Univ. of Calif., 1957, cloth; Univ. of Nebr., 1972, paper), Hans Huth traces the rise of the U.S. conservation movement. He provides abundant detail on the Theodore Roosevelt era and the development of the great Western parks —Yosemite, Yellowstone, and the Grand Canyon. The standard historical study of this period is CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: The Progressive Conservation Movement by Samuel P. Hays (Harvard, Historical Monograph Series, 1959, cloth; Athe neum, 1969, paper). Hays highlights social and political tensions that plagued the movement.

MAN’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions by John Passmore (Scribner’s, 1974) examines changing attitudes toward nature in terms of pollution, conservation, preservation, population. Passmore, an Australian professor of philosophy, goes back to Biblical sources and the ancient Greeks; he punches holes in a number of theories held by ecologists as well as by the ecologists’ critics.

“There is certainly a risk that we shall be utterly discouraged by the implications of Barry Commoner’s first ecological law,” he writes. To say, as Commoner does, that “‘everything is connected to everything else’ makes it appear that to act at all is the height of imprudence. . . . It is just not true that everything I do has effects on everything else. Rather . . . the unintended consequences of our actions are often surprisingly remote in time and place from those actions.”

Which brings us to Barry Commoner’s THE CLOSING CIRCLE: Nature, Man, and Technology (Knopf, 1971, cloth; Bantam, 1972, paper). Advocate-biologist Commoner gives examples of technological and social actions that have broken nature’s cycle and produced an environmental crisis which, in his view, endangers mankind’s survival.

Less polemical analyses of environmental problems and possible remedies are available in a number of superior textbooks, including Raymond F. Dasmann’s well-written classic, ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION (Wiley, 1959, rev. 1972, cloth & paper), and the more pedantic but useful SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Harper, 1972, paper), edited by William R. Burch, Jr., Neil H. Cheek, Jr., and Lee Taylor.

Three newly published books by former federal officials offer glimpses into the making of environmental policy. One is CLEANING UP AMERICA: An Insider’s View of the Environmental Protection Agency by John Quarles, Jr. (Houghton Mifflin, 1976). In it, the former EPA deputy administrator describes his frustration with the federal bureaucracy and his gloom over the prospect of diminished public support for environmental action. John C. Whitaker’s STRIKING A BALANCE: Environment and Natural Resources Policy in the Nixon-Ford Years (American
Enterprise Institute, 1976, paper) presents background on major environmental policy decisions as seen by the author, a Nixon White House aide and later Under Secretary of the Interior. Whitaker blames most mistakes and delays on what he calls the “iron triangle” of vested interests embracing lobbyists, congressional committees, and middle-level federal bureaucrats.

**THE NEW AMERICAN DREAM MACHINE: Toward a Simpler Lifestyle in an Environmental Age** by Robert L. Sansom (Doubleday/Anchor, 1976) views the complexities from lower down the federal totem pole. Sansom, EPA assistant administrator for Air and Water Programs (1972–74), analyzes energy, pollution, transportation, and land-use problems facing the nation. All, he contends, are linked to Americans’ profligate way of life.


Books on specific subjects range from West Virginian Harry Caudill’s eloquent case against strip mining, **MY LAND IS DYING** (Dutton, 1973, cloth & paper), to novelist and nature interpreter Freeman Tilden’s introspective **THE NATIONAL PARKS** (Knopf, 1968, cloth; 1971, paper). Ian L. McHarg’s **DESIGN WITH NATURE** (National History Press, 1969, cloth & paper) is aimed at urban planners. In McHarg’s view, existing soils, terrain, and groundwater show us how to use land; human settlements work best when designed in harmony with nature’s patterns.

Lewis Mumford’s two-volume **The Pentagon of Power** makes excellent reading for environmentalists. In the second volume, **THE MYTH OF THE MACHINE** (Harcourt, 1964, 1970 cloth; 1974, paper), Mumford examines the historical basis for man’s “overwhelming commitment to his technology” with its miscarriages of production that lead to pollution and waste.

Inspiration and hope for the future come from several writers, among them René Dubos. **A GOD WITHIN** (Scribner’s, 1972, cloth; 1975, paper) is Dubos’ eloquent plea for a “creative stewardship” of the earth. Reminding his readers of the Biblical injunction that man was put in the Garden of Eden “to dress it and to keep it,” he calls this passage from Genesis (2:15) “an early warning that we are responsible for our environment.”

—Lois Decker O’Neill, Associate Editor (Books)
Sociobiology

New scientific theories, especially when they touch on the mysteries of human behavior, seldom go unchallenged. Such has been the case since Harvard biologist Edward O. Wilson's Sociobiology: The New Synthesis was published in late 1975. Wilson sought a biological explanation for animal (and human) social behavior through a fresh application of Darwin's theories of evolution and natural selection. His book was "news" in both specialized journals and major newspapers. This "synthesis" brought heated reactions from other academics—in part, over what some critics perceived as its ethical, racial, and cultural implications. Last November, the American Anthropological Association devoted several sessions at its annual meeting to sociobiology, and the discussion shows no signs of abating. Here, zoologist David P. Barash discusses sociobiology's significance; sociologist Pierre L. van den Berghe explores its ethical aspects; and anthropologist Anthony Leeds offers a sharp but detailed critique of both Wilson and his more extreme detractors.

THE NEW SYNTHESIS

by David P. Barash

More than 100 years after The Origin of the Species was first published, students of behavior are finally coming to grips with Darwin's message. It's about time. The behavioral sciences in general—and social science in particular—have long suffered from an inferiority complex relative to the "harder" sciences, notably chemistry and physics. Even a cursory reading of the classic texts in these areas, such as Linus Pauling's General Chemistry and Richard Feynman's Lectures on Physics, explains why. The physical sciences unfold with an almost irresistible intellectual mo-
mentum as basic assumptions are checked against the data, hypotheses are generated, and these in turn are checked against more data, thereby generating more hypotheses. The result is a coherent explanation of how the world is put together, one that not only interprets our findings but also provides further insights.

In contrast to the masterful structures of these disciplines, behavioral science is a ramshackle affair indeed, a rickety Tower of Babel with as many viewpoints as there are practitioners and virtually no unifying intellectual underpinnings. But all this is changing with the recognition that biology—and behavior as a branch of biology—possesses an underlying unity. This unifying principle is evolution by natural selection, and it lies at the very core of the synthesis that is sociobiology. In fact, sociobiology is nothing more or less than the application of evolutionary biology to animal social behavior, a notion as old as Darwin but with implications that are only now being explored.

Experience Versus Evolution

Most scientific revolutions generate controversy and resistance as well as enthusiasm. Until the rise of sociobiology as a discipline, experience was considered to be pre-eminent in influencing behavior. Social scientists in particular have been wedded to the notion that behavior derives from learning and early experience—or from social traditions and cultural norms in the case of human social behavior as studied by anthropologists and sociologists. To some extent, therefore, the suggestion that evolution influences behavior is bound to be controversial. But the issue lies deeper. The infusion of evolutionary concepts into the study of behavior implies that behavior is subject to the same laws as anatomy and physiology. Despite the furor occasioned by evolution in the 19th century, we never fully appreciated Darwin's message. Granting that humans and all other living things share a common ancestry, we were still content to ignore the implications of evolution for behavior. In so doing, we may have gratified our need for being "special," but at the cost of forgoing an objective, critical examination of ourselves and our fellow creatures.

Although Darwin is its intellectual grandfather, sociobiology is very new, the product of a flurry of activity during the past 15 years. And although the controversy surrounding it derives largely from its application to human behavior, sociobiology itself derives almost entirely from studies of nonhuman animals.

In 1962, the Scottish ecologist V. C. Wynne-Edwards shook
the world of biology with his book *Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour*, in which he suggested that virtually all social behavior—including dominance hierarchies, securing of territories, flocking in birds, herding in mammals, even the nocturnal dances of fireflies—is a means of regulating animal numbers and preventing populations from eating themselves into oblivion. It had long been recognized that socially subordinate individuals often fail to breed and that overpopulation is rare in nature. Wynne-Edwards suggested that social congregations serve to inform individuals of the local population density, so that individuals could avoid overpopulation by regulating their own breeding accordingly.

It was an appealing notion, but Wynne-Edwards recognized that it required altruistic reproductive restraint by the participating individuals counter to the expectations of Darwinian theory, which assumes that individuals will always behave so as to maximize their reproduction. He attempted to justify his suggestion by postulating "group selection"—in which individuals might evolve who reduced their personal reproductive success, providing such "altruistic" behavior contributed to the reproductive success of the groups to which they belonged. Biologists were quick to respond, pointing out that in virtually all such cases, selection operating upon individuals within their own groups would over-ride selection acting among groups.

Natural selection is quintessentially selfish. Traits spread in a population when individuals possessing these traits produce more successful offspring than individuals with other traits. If some individuals within a group benefited the group by restricting their breeding, they would be at the mercy of selfish individuals within the same group who reproduced indiscriminately, even if this meant the extinction of the group. Observations of free-living animals strongly support this view. Reproductive restraint has repeatedly been shown to reflect each animal's attempts to maximize its own reproduction, including certain cases where this is accomplished by temporarily failing to breed.

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current trend among evolutionary biologists is to regard group selection as theoretically feasible, but the requirements for its occurrence are so extreme that it is very improbable. Indeed, it has yet to be demonstrated in nature.

Why is the issue worth mentioning? Because, in responding to the challenge of group selection, biologists have been forced to examine natural selection as it operates upon individuals rather than groups or species. Out of this has come a new appreciation of the power of evolution. A cornerstone of this new thinking was unveiled in 1966 with the publication of George C. Williams’ influential book *Adaptation and Natural Selection: A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought.*

**Altruistic Workers**

Another cornerstone of modern sociobiology had been in existence since 1964, when W. D. Hamilton’s article “The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour” appeared. This British geneticist was particularly concerned with explaining a long-standing puzzle in the biology of the social insects—bees, wasps, and ants—but his findings had enormous significance for all social behavior, including our own. Hamilton addressed himself to the perplexing fact that among honeybees, for example, workers are sterile; they labor altruistically for the success of the queen while not breeding themselves. A case of group selection? Perhaps. But Hamilton pointed out that these insects exhibit a peculiar genetic system: Males are “haploid” (they develop from unfertilized eggs and therefore possess only half as many chromosomes as their “diploid” sisters). As a result, a female worker shares three-quarters of her genes with her sisters, whereas she would share only one-half with her offspring if she were to breed. Hence, a female worker does more to foster her own genotype by staying home and caring for sisters than if she were to leave the hive and attempt to rear a family of her own. Altruism? Again, perhaps, but an altruism that is ultimately selfish in that it promotes each individual’s genes, albeit at the cost of producing offspring directly.

By focusing on genes, Hamilton emphasized that even parental behavior is only a special case of concern for others in proportion as those others share the parents’ genes. Hence the term
"kin selection." For most vertebrates, parents share one-half of their genes with each offspring, one-quarter of their genes with nieces and nephews, and one-eighth with cousins. Kin selection provides a coherent theory for the biology of nepotism, since the "closeness" of relatives depends on the proportion of the genes they share. At the same time, kin selection provides a more acceptable explanation of the evolution of altruistic behavior than group selection.

An animal can be said to behave altruistically if its actions increase the reproductive success (fitness) of another, while decreasing the personal fitness of the performer. In the cases presented thus far, altruism was evidenced by reproductive restraint, but in many cases the relevant behavior may be much more subtle, even though it ultimately results in reduced reproduction. Thus, individuals may share food, provision someone else's offspring, and defend others from predators or warn them when predators approach.

Take this example: Prairie dogs give a warning bark when a coyote appears in the prairie-dog town. In doing so, the alarm-giver is altruistic in that his action increases the chances of survival, and hence reproduction, of the prairie dogs warned by the alarm, but his own chances of reproducing successfully are reduced, since his bark draws the predator's attention to himself. However, if a sufficient number of the alarm-caller's relatives are saved as a result, genes for alarm-calling could spread in the population, even though individual alarm-callers are at a personal reproductive disadvantage.

**Cost-Benefit Analysis**

In discussions of the sociobiology of altruism, no assumptions need be made concerning consciousness or personal motivation. Altruism is defined solely by the consequences of a particular act for fitness, so it is acceptable to speak of altruistic turkeys, honeybees, or even viruses. Kin selection theory states that, in general, the occurrence of altruistic behavior increases with the "closeness" of the beneficiary (the more genes shared by common ancestry, the more likely is altruistic behavior). Similarly, altruism is more likely when the cost to the altruist, measured as a decline in its personal fitness, is low and the recipient's benefit is great. By manipulating these factors, we can derive various predictions for the occurrence of altruism as determined by kin selection.

Findings so far are consistent with this theory. Thus, in the
only vertebrate species known that practices "simultaneous polyandry" (several males sharing the same female), the males tend to be brothers so that each male, if not a father, is at least an uncle through his "altruistic" tolerance of his sib. In several bird species, young adults often help older pairs provision their offspring; significantly, this altruistic "helping at the nest" is invariably done by close relatives of the pair being aided. Most often, they are offspring from a previous brood. Their altruism promotes their own genotype, since it helps to rear siblings with whom the helpers share genes. Studies of Japanese macaque monkeys reveal that they are likely to share food with others in direct proportion to the closeness of the relationship. The list of such kin-selection cases is long and growing, providing sociobiologists with a valuable "handle" on social interactions between individuals—non-human animals for certain and quite possibly the human species as well.

Adaptive Social Behavior

A major insight of sociobiology is the recognition that behavior, even complex social behavior, has evolved just as teeth, feathers, and bone have evolved. If so, then social behavior should be adaptive. It should somehow be attuned to particular environments so as to maximize the reproductive success of individuals showing that behavior. By the 1960s, patterns began to emerge from the numerous long-term field studies of animal social behavior. These patterns differed for each animal group studied, but the underlying truth was clear: The complex social systems of free-living animals revealed the unmistakable imprint of natural selection.

An example from my own work on marmots should suffice. Woodchucks are marmots common in the eastern United States, where they occupy low-elevation fields. These animals are solitary and aggressive. The Olympic marmot, by contrast, lives above
Sociobiology

The systematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior.

Adaptation

In evolutionary biology, any structure, physiological process, or behavioral pattern that makes an organism more fit to survive and to reproduce in comparison with other members of the same species. Also, the evolutionary process leading to the formation of such a trait.

Altruism

Self-destructive behavior performed for the benefit of others.

Chromosome

A complex, often rodlike structure found in the nucleus of a cell, bearing part of the basic genetic units (genes) of the cell.

Darwinism

The theory of evolution by natural selection, as originally propounded by Charles Darwin. The modern version of this theory still recognizes natural selection as the central process, and for this reason is often called Neo-Darwinism.

DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid)

The basic hereditary material of all kinds of organisms. In higher organisms, including animals, the great bulk of DNA is located within the chromosomes.

Ethology

The study of whole patterns of animal behavior in natural environments, stressing the analysis of adaptation and the evolution of the patterns.

Evolution

Any gradual change. Organic evolution, often referred to as evolution for short, is any genetic change in organisms from generation to generation or, more strictly, a change in gene frequencies within populations from generation to generation.

The timelineline in the Olympic Mountains of Washington. In this severe environment, Olympic marmots are socially tolerant, living in large colonies. Members of a third species, the yellow-bellied marmot, inhabit environments of intermediate severity in the Rockies and Sierras, and their social system is appropriately intermediate; they live in colonies, to be sure, but these are loosely organized, and the few interactions between residents tend to be rather aggressive. Furthermore, another high-mountain dweller, the hoary marmot of the northern Rockies and Cascades,
Genetic fitness The contribution to the next generation of one genotype in a population relative to the contributions of other genotypes. By definition, this process of natural selection leads to the prevalence of the genotypes with the highest fitness.

Genotype The genetic constitution of an individual organism, designated with reference either to a single trait or to a set of traits.

Kin selection The selection of genes due to one or more individuals favoring or disfavoring the survival and reproduction of relatives (other than offspring) who possess the same genes by common descent. One of the extreme forms of group selection.

Natural selection The differential contribution of offspring to the next generation by individuals of different genetic types but belonging to the same population. This is the basic mechanism proposed by Charles Darwin and is generally regarded today as the main guiding force in evolution.

Parental investment Any behavior toward offspring that increases the chances of the offspring's survival at the cost of the parent's ability to invest in other offspring.

Phenotype The observable properties of an organism as they have developed under the combined influences of the genetic constitution of the individual and the effects of environmental factors.

Reproductive success The number of surviving offspring of an individual.

Selfishness In the strict usage of sociobiology, behavior that benefits the individual in terms of genetic fitness at the expense of the genetic fitness of other members of the same species.


lives in a social system that closely resembles that of its high-elevation cousin, the Olympic marmot.

To complete the correlation between environments and social systems for this group, I found that some yellow-bellied marmots (the intermediate-elevation, intermediately aggressive species) also live in high-elevation situations and display the social system shown by Olympic and hoary marmots. Of course, it is one thing to document a correlation and quite another to determine its cause. In this case, there are other correlations: Animals at
higher elevations grow more slowly than at low elevations, become sexually mature later, and reproduce less often. It appears that such animals have evolved social systems whose tolerance varies with the necessity for young animals to remain within the colony and thus enhance their own chances of survival and, eventually, reproduction.

With their attention newly focused upon natural selection, behavioral biologists developed a whole new range of theory relating evolution to social behavior. For example, a model was developed showing how female choice is largely responsible for the evolution of mating systems in birds and mammals, the choice in each case attuned to the maximizing of evolutionary fitness. Thus, some red-winged blackbird males typically mate with several females, leaving some males with no females at all. Given that females profit from male assistance in rearing offspring, it seems that females would prefer to mate with a bachelor and thus receive his undivided attention, rather than share their mate with other females. It was shown, however, that females prefer harem membership to cozy monogamy, so long as the harem-master offers enough benefits to compensate for the loss of his undivided attention. This occurs especially when territories offered by males differ in such matters as food supply and protection from predators, which maximize their reproduction and that of their relatives. The niceties of domesticity take second place to the selfish realities of evolution.

**Reciprocal Altruism**

Males, or any individuals that defend a territory, have also been shown to be sensitive to economic considerations of cost and benefit. Territories are maintained when they are objects of competition and contain resources that can be economically defended. A model has been proposed for the evolution of "reciprocal altruism," a system in which altruistic tendencies can be selected, even in the absence of genetic relatedness. The point here is that the beneficiaries have an opportunity to reciprocate, thereby repaying the original altruist; again, as with all sociobiologic considerations, "payment" is measured ultimately in units of evolutionary fitness.

The evolution of reciprocity is sensitive to the appearance of "cheaters," individuals who receive help from others but refuse to reciprocate when the opportunity arises. Cheating tendencies would spread in such a population, since cheaters would gain fitness at the expense of the altruists. On the other hand, this
should result in selection on the basis of ability to discriminate cheaters from non-cheaters—especially important for our own species, given our extraordinary concern with character and past behavior.

Sociobiologic theory has also dealt with the ubiquitous phenomenon of male-female differences in behavior, especially reproductive behavior. Among animals, males are nearly always the sexual aggressors, playing relatively fast and loose, whereas females tend to be coy and discriminating. Harvard biologist Robert Trivers (responsible for the concept of reciprocal altruism, discussed above) has made an enormous contribution with his elaboration of the idea of “parental investment,” defined as any investment directed toward offspring that enhances their chances of survival and reproduction and is made at the cost of the parent’s ability to invest in subsequent offspring and other kin. Females generally invest more than males: Eggs “cost” more than sperm. Furthermore, reproducing females among mammals must undergo pregnancy and lactation. Small wonder males are the aggressive adversaries and females the careful comparison shoppers.

**Game Theory**

The implications of parental investment theory go even further. Thus, individuals of the sex investing less—usually the males—can be expected to compete among themselves for access to individuals of the sex investing more. This explains the occurrence of large, brightly colored, aggressive males in most birds and mammals. The exact opposite is found in those rare species in which the males invest more than do females. In such cases, the females are appropriately large, brightly colored, and aggressive. Moreover, male-female differences in parenting behavior are related to differences in confidence of the genetic relatedness to the offspring. Females are always related to the young they produce; males have no such assurance. Significantly, male involvement in care of the young in most animals is greatest when male confidence in paternity is most assured.

Sociobiologists have applied the mathematics of game theory to aggressive encounters between animals, arguing that stable strategies of behavior should evolve when fixed costs and benefits are associated with different behaviors. For example, there is a cost associated with fighting (risk of injury and time expended) but also a possible benefit (access to food, female, nest site, or whatever). When appropriate values are given to these
considerations, the results help explain why animals often stop short of killing, or even injuring, defeated opponents. Such animals adopt the behavioral strategy that maximizes their evolutionary fitness, consistent with the other findings described above.

With all these exciting theories and supporting data in the air, it remained for Harvard zoologist E. O. Wilson to bring it all together in a masterful, encyclopedic synthesis in 1975. *Sociobiology existed before Wilson's book, but it has not been the same since. He gave it a name, gathered the materials in one convenient place, and received a great deal of acclaim—and no small amount of criticism and abuse.

**Genetic Influence, Not Determinism**

Sociobiologists do not claim that behavior is somehow "controlled" by genes, ignoring the roles of experience and culture. Genes are merely blueprints, patterns for eventual products that may be susceptible to a great deal of modification along the way. Genes influence behavior only to the extent that they code for a range of possible behaviors. In a case like the blink reflex, the range may be narrow and not particularly subject to learning. In other cases, such as the development of personality, the range may be extremely broad. Critics who accuse sociobiology of genetic determinism unfairly oversimplify the issue, since the claim for evolution's relevance to behavior rests on genetic influence, not determinism.

The question of the place of free will in sociobiology is an especially fascinating one. Merely proposing that human behavior is "determined," or even influenced, by previous experience does not leave us with any more control over our destiny than we had before. I suggest that one is possessed of maximum free will when behaving in accord with one's inclinations; specifying the source of these inclinations does not help to answer the question of free will, although it may help us to understand ourselves. Sociobiology may not explain why we voted for one presidential candidate over another, but it may have a lot to say about why we choose leaders at all. It offers potential insight into the deep structure of human behavior, although this is not to deny the role of experience and culture in producing the final product.

We cannot doubt that the behavior of *Homo sapiens* is the farthest removed from genetic influence of all animals. However,

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this does not mean that we are not susceptible to such influence, and our particular self-interest demands that we use whatever tools we possess to better understand our own nature. Indeed, if biology seems arrogant in claiming insight into human behavior, what of the greater arrogance of a social science that claims no help is needed?

Imagine you have been seriously nearsighted all your life but haven't been aware of it until you are fitted for eyeglasses. Things seen only dimly, if at all, are suddenly clear. Blurry images make sense, and vague relationships have a sharp, new meaning. Sociobiologists have undergone the same kind of an exciting experience in recent years, thanks to the conceptual clarity provided by the application of evolutionary biology to animal social behavior. Since fitness—the key to sociobiology—is so dependent on reproductive success, we might expect reproductive behaviors to be especially sensitive to natural selection, and, indeed, sociobiologic studies of reproductive behavior have been particularly rewarding.

Courtship serves the important function of permitting an individual to assess the characteristics of a prospective mate and to reject those less suitable. Accordingly, predatory birds practice acrobatic, aerial courtships, and most monogamous species insist on prolonged pre-copulatory engagement periods. Among gulls, mated pairs that fail to rear offspring one year are significantly more likely to seek a new mate the following year than are pairs that were reproductively successful. (Isn't this equivalent to divorce?) Male hummingbirds permit females to feed on their territories only when the females permit the males to copulate with them. (Equivalent to prostitution?) A male mountain bluebird who discovers a strange male near his mate will aggressively attack the stranger and will attack his own female as well, provided this occurs at the time copulation normally occurs in nature. (Male response to adultery?)
Rape is common among many ducks: Unmated males are especially likely to be rapists, and males whose females are being raped often try to intervene; if too late, they often rape the female themselves. Apparently, the males' best (fittest) strategy in such cases is to introduce their sperm as quickly as possible, to compete with the sperm of the rapists. Male lions and langur monkeys who take over a harem of females are apt to kill the infants, thereby eliminating individuals with whom they share no genes and inducing the females to become sexually receptive again, so they can produce their own offspring as quickly as possible—an unpleasant procedure, but, if it results in an increase in gene frequency, animals can be counted on to do it.

A real difficulty in studying human sociobiology is that we are so complex and the ethical restraints on genetic experimentation are so real that it may be virtually impossible to disentangle biological from cultural elements. A productive approach to overcoming this difficulty might be to combine anthropology with evolutionary biology in order to search out the cross-cultural universals in human behavior—the pan-human cake that underlies the diverse cultural icing. With adroit use of the Central Theorem of fitness maximization, it might then be possible to make real and valid predictions in regard to human behavior.
Sociobiology applies natural selection theory to behavior. It asserts that the behavior of an animal, like its anatomy, is the product of a process of biological evolution through natural selection. Any behavioral phenotype is the result of the interaction between genotype and environmental conditions (which include other members of the same species and, in the case of man, his material and symbolic culture). For man, culture is indeed a whole new evolutionary ball game; cultural evolution is far more rapid than Darwinian, genetic evolution. However, human culture does not stand apart from biological evolution; it grew out of it and remains inextricably intertwined with it.

One would think that the above statements are by now uncontroversial, at least since the Scopes trial of 1925. Yet, sociobiology has been attacked as a pernicious, racist, reactionary doctrine, much as the proponents of Darwinism at the time of the Scopes trial were accused of being communists, anarchists, and revolutionaries. The New Left of “Science for the People” has joined hands with backwoods fundamentalism in denying the relevance of natural selection for the evolution of human social behavior. No sociobiologist that I know denies the importance of culture in humans—or of “tradition” in many higher vertebrates—but many people, especially social scientists, still deny the relevance of Darwinian evolution to the social behavior of man.

What is at stake is not the uniqueness of man. Every species is unique in some of its aspects, otherwise it would not be a separate species. Nor is it arguable that humans possess a set of capabilities (such as symbolic language, rational choice, conspiratorial behavior, productive and destructive technology, environmental control) that make their evolution, in some important respects, different from that of other species. What sociobiologists refuse to accept is the dogma shared by many
social scientists that human behavior is infinitely plastic and subject to no genetic constraints.

What, if any, are the ethical implications of sociobiology? Certainly, no ethical conclusions logically follow from a sociobiological view of human behavior. Sociobiology is not a moral philosophy. It contains no teleology. It does not assume that evolution—or survival, or reproduction, or anything else—is good, or even that it serves any purpose. Sociobiology and the theory of natural selection that underlies it help to explain why organisms change over time.

**Sociobiology as Ideology**

Strictly speaking, natural selection is not a theory but a tautology: reproductive success is merely the definition of adaptation. Thus, natural selection is the simplest and most general description of how living things change, in both their morphology and their behavior. The specific mechanisms through which this happens (sexual selection and reproduction, meiosis, mutation, recombination through chromosomal crossovers) are still only superficially understood. In any case, one is no more justified in ascribing an intrinsic morality, ideology, or teleology to sociobiology than to astronomy or biochemistry.

The critics of sociobiology come principally from self-styled leftist circles who fear that sociobiology will become an ideology of racism and conservatism, as a strain of Social Darwinism did in the late 19th century. Others fear the specter of eugenics and genetic engineering. It is possible, for instance, that significant genetic differences may be found in behavioral traits between human groups and, if found, highly probable that they may serve to justify many human prejudices. The fact that males and females of our species, and of other sexually reproducing species as well, behave differently, in part because of genetic and biochemical differences, has spawned a multitude of ideologies and moralities.

Sociobiology is hardly to blame. We can just as well expect sociobiology to have a liberating, liberalizing, even revolutionizing influence. By stressing how fundamentally alike humans are beneath their cultural differences, for instance, sociobiology could be a powerful antidote to racism. Or by using our knowledge of the causes of sex differences, we could engineer the reduction of sexual dimorphism in humans and strike a blow for androgyny. The possibilities are endless. Because of our recent experiences with racism and genocide, we are especially sensitive to critics from the left, but in the 19th century religious fundamentalists saw Darwinism as a threateningly radical ideology. Our use of knowledge bears only accidental resemblance to the content of scientific theories. Perhaps the safest conclusion is that knowledge is commonly used for self-serving purposes and that, since it is often most effectively used by those in power, it generally serves conservative ends.

It is true that scientists, whether of the left or the right, have ideological biases like the rest of mankind, and these privately held values inevitably intrude on, and bias, scientific inquiry. It is also true that in social science, the borderline between would-be scientific theory and ideology is frequently fuzzy, and therefore the practice of questioning one's motives and values is a sound corrective to the intrusion of values in scientific inquiry.

Sociobiologists cover approximately the same political spectrum as academics in other disciplines, with a center of gravity that is clearly left of center on the American political scene. Some of the people whom critics of sociobiology have sought to identify with sociobiology are entirely outside the current of sociobiological thinking. Arthur Jensen, for instance, makes meaningless statements (e.g., on proportions of IQ variance attributable to heredity rather than the environment) to which few if any sociobiologists or population geneticists, aware of the complexity of the relationship between phenotype and genotype in intelligence, would subscribe.

Could there not be a sociobiological basis to some of our moral and ethical precepts? Some evidence suggests that, within broad limits, moral injunctions are congruent with evolutionary strategies of fitness maximization. Consider the double standard of sexual morality found in a wide variety of cultures. To put it briefly: To the extent that females of practically all sexually reproducing species produce far fewer, bigger, and therefore more valuable, gametes than males, they can be expected to be more selective than males in the choice of mating partners and
to appreciate quality rather than quantity of offspring. The argument applies even more to mammals, where the number of offspring is limited, where gestation is long, and where lactation further increases maternal, as opposed to paternal, investment in the young. It is not only human females who play coy—and are left holding the babies.

Our own society in the last couple of decades seems to be moving toward a sexual morality that rejects the double standard. My argument is clearly not that we have a gene for the double standard and that our behavior in this respect is so rigidly programmed that our culture cannot modify it. Rather, I suggest that the double standard of sexual morality in humans is a cultural codification of differential reproductive strategies of males and females. So far as we know, moral standards are unique to humans, but differential parental investment of males and females in offspring is general to sexually reproducing species, including our own. Our recent technology of contraception, in effect, dissociates sexual and reproductive behavior. The risk of conception, even with an unfit partner, is reduced dramatically for females, and, lo and behold, sexual morality changes.

**Culture and Genes**

This example is instructive because it suggests that the linkages between culture and genes are anything but simple or mechanically deterministic. We certainly have the capability to alter drastically the course of our evolution, culturally and even genetically. This is not to say that our behavior ceases completely to be biologically predisposed. It will be interesting to see whether the technology of contraception will have a feedback effect on the physiology of sexual arousal. Assuming that slower female arousal was an adaptive response to greater female cost of reproduction, the new culturally created conditions should over a few generations reduce sexual differences in speed of arousal. Culture not only acts on genes, but genes act on culture. It works both ways.

A second illustration of a possible sociobiological basis for ethics is far broader in scope. It concerns the complex set of social norms that underlies social existence itself and is present in varying degrees in all human societies. At a minimum, moral rules enjoin us to honor our father and mother and cherish our children, but almost invariably morality extends beyond the nuclear family to kin groups (lineages, clans) and to still larger groups ("racial," ethnic, linguistic, religious, national). A few
ethical systems have encompassed, at least in theory, our entire species: Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism go so far as to extend moral precepts to all living things. Generally, however, the more sweeping the scope of moral precepts, the less well they work in practice. When morality is extended beyond the nuclear or extended family, it frequently uses the idiom of kinship: Members of a race or of a religious sect are “brothers” and “sisters” to each other; the emperor is the “father” of his subjects; it is for the “fatherland” or the “mother country” that we allow ourselves to be slaughtered in time of war; and so on.

**Enlightened Self-Interest**

Insofar as these moralities are effective in eliciting “altruistic” behavior—beneficial to “alter” at some cost to “ego”—they parallel in their effects what sociobiologists call “kin selection,” “inclusive fitness,” and, rather misleadingly, “altruism.” Altruism is a misnomer because it refers in fact to the ultimate form of genetic selfishness. Kin-selection theory says in effect that our altruism is proportional to the number of genes we share with the beneficiaries of our altruism. By increasing the reproductive fitness of those who share some of our genes, we indirectly, and to the extent that we are related, enhance our own fitness or, more precisely, that of our genes.

There is no need to postulate any genes for altruism. All the theory says is that those genes carried in organisms that contribute to their own fitness and to that of related organisms will, by definition, increase their representation in the gene pool of the next generation—as compared to the competing alleles of the same genes in organisms that, say, cannibalize their siblings or favor strangers over their own children. The more distant the relationship—and, hence, the lower the probability of shared genes—the weaker are the fitness benefits of altruism and the less effective its operation. General philanthropy cuts little ice; charity, we all know, begins at home. A man can be expected to help his children, his siblings, his parents, and in a pinch his cousins, uncles, aunts, nephews, and nieces. To a more limited extent, he will extend his altruism to other members of his tribe, “race,” or religion, whom he vaguely considers to be distant kin.

The moral precepts of most human societies are, in general, what biological kin selection would lead us to expect. Of course, human altruism cannot be reduced to a blind, unconscious drive for genetic fitness. Man is capable not only of blind, genetic
selfishness but also of enlightened selfishness. We consciously do others good turns on the expectation of being repaid, because we are able to distinguish the cheaters from those who play the game our way. Again, we find that cooperative behavior in man is a complex blend of genetic predispositions and cultural arrangements.

Inevitably, the charge will be made that sociobiology is the same old ethic of enlightened self-interest in a new garb. It will do little good to disclaim any advocacy of selfishness, for many people are simply incapable of dissociating a description of reality from advocacy. The fact remains that the social behavior of an organism is such that consciously, or more often unconsciously, it will act so as to increase its fitness. That is what it has been selected to do. The seeming exceptions to that rule turn out on closer analysis to be easily explainable in terms of inclusive fitness through kin selection or "reciprocal altruism"—for which read "enlightened self-interest over a sequence of interactions."

Sociobiology is not a new ethic, but it can, perhaps, throw some light on the study of ethics. If social scientists want to achieve a well-rounded understanding of human behavior, they will have to abandon the dogma that man is purely a product of his upbringing and his culture. The most lowly organism is the result of both its ontogeny and its phylogeny. This is also true of man. Ethics are, so far as we know, a human monopoly and a cultural development, but they do not exist in a biological vacuum.

We are not disembodied spirits. We are a very special kind of self-conscious animal, but an animal all the same. And we run the risk of making asses of ourselves if we should forget that at some very fundamental level we are mortal conglomerations of billions of cells that evolved as carnal envelopes for the transmission of potentially immortal genes.
SOCIOBIOLOGY,
ANTI-SOCIOBIOLOGY,
AND HUMAN NATURE

by Anthony Leeds

The acclaim that greeted Edward O. Wilson's *Sociobiology* as a breakthrough in various domains of biological and social sciences has had its match in critical attacks on the author's failure to understand human cultural and social organizations as well as attacks on some basic misconceptions in biology itself. In this essay, I address only the question of "human nature," specifically Wilson's sociocultural misconceptions about human nature, which is also a central, unresolved problem for his critics.

The key issue with which both sides must deal is this: Innumerable human sociocultural universals clearly indicate a biological basis. At the same time all specifics of these universals are highly varied in form and content (e.g., all aspects of culture and social organization), exchangeable among distant populations (e.g., the diffusion of Western-style haircuts around the world), and rapidly responsive to changes in situation (e.g., rapid social reorganization after a crisis such as the Irish famine of 1845-48).

That these specifics cannot be genetically determined is clear. All human sociocultural behavior is based upon postulation, on the taking for granted, on assumption, that something exists, is real, or necessary, without proof. What is postulated has no genetic foundation whatever. Moreover, a uniquely human reflexivity permits man to observe himself as object—to detach himself from his physical, biological, or cultural self—with profound consequences. A quite different model of the relationship between the genetic foundation of the species and its behavior is needed for human beings than the models afforded by any other species. The model for humans must deal with
genetic structures generating broad, formless universals, within which nongenetic generators of behavior define form, content, and meaning.

The biological sciences are far from dealing with such a problem. Despite Wilson's 500 pages of data and argumentation about various animals purporting to show the evolution of characteristics such as altruism and self-interest (based on the conceptual work of Robert Trivers), the behavior of even the most highly organized social animals and insects does not provide a satisfactory model for the behavior of postulating and reflexive humans.

**Wilson's Human Nature and Epistemology**

Wilson's book presents a theory of human nature that can be set forth fairly simply despite elements of contradiction within the text and in the author's own post-publication statements.* In his text, Wilson conceives human nature to be biologically based; Hence the subject matters of the social sciences and humanities—human societies and cultures—constitute essentially biological phenomena. The ultimate reduction of the social sciences and humanities to branches of the biological sciences appears to be the object of Wilson's polemic; his title indicates the road.

Wilson's conception takes many shapes. It includes the postulation of genes for this or that supposed single attribute of human behavior, such as guilt, homosexuality, spite, gullibility, etc. (and postulation it is, since no "homosexual gene" or "gullibility gene" has been identified). Numberless passages indicate that human nature is based in specific genes, produced

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* *"Variation in the rules among human cultures, however slight, might provide clues to underlying genetic differences, particularly when it is correlated with variations in behavioral traits known to be heritable" (Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, p. 550). The entire section of which this passage is an example attempts to geneticize human behavior. Yet Wilson, in an interview published Nov. 9, 1975, told the New York Times, "I see maybe 10 percent of human behavior as genetic and 90 percent as environmental." The two positions are incompatible.*

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through a Darwinian natural and sexual selection. This notion is one for the geneticists and biochemists to argue, but it does seem palpably contrary to what is known of the biochemical make-up and the genes.

A key aspect of Wilson's conception of human nature, which sets the arguments of the entire book, appears on the opening page:

Camus said that the only serious philosophical question is suicide. That is wrong even in the strict sense intended. The biologist, who is concerned with questions of physiology and evolutionary history, realizes that self-knowledge is constrained and shaped by the emotional control centers in the hypothalamus and limbic system of the brain. These centers flood our consciousness with all the emotions—hate, love, guilt, fear, and others—that are consulted by ethical philosophers who wish to intuit the standards of good and evil. What, we are then compelled to ask, made the hypothalamus and limbic system? They evolved by natural selection. That simple biological statement must be pursued to explain ethics and ethical philosophers, if not epistemology* and epistemologists, at all depths. Self-existence, or the suicide that terminates it, is not the central question of philosophy. The hypothalamic-limbic complex automatically denies such logical reduction by countering it with feelings of guilt and altruism.

Here we have a traditional Western mind/body dualism, sanctified by apparently scientific backing. Wilson's dualism counterposes, on one side, reason, rationality, mind, intellect and, on the other, unreason, irrationality, body, emotions. The emotions are irruptive, violent, bestial: They "constrain our knowledge," "flood our consciousness," and prevent "logical reduction." Emotions located in an archaic system in the evolution of animal species—"the hypothalamic-limbic complex"—destroy the order of the world. Suicide is an irrational, not a moral-philosophical act. Because the limbic system appears relatively early in the evolution of higher animals, Wilson assumes that this "system" is bestial in character, a major a priori that provides the structure for his whole argument.

Knowledge and knowing, for Wilson, come not from emotions but from "reason," exemplified entirely by predicative discourse, as in language and mathematics. Wilson either does not

* Or theory of the nature of knowledge.
know or simply avoids mentioning epistemologies that deny this entire mode of thought, such as that of Lancelot Law Whyte, a physicist and biologist (not listed in Wilson's immense bibliography or index), who turns the entire conception upside down. In *The Universe of Experience: A World View Beyond Science and Religion* (Harper, 1974), Whyte sees all primary knowledge as coming from the unconscious and emotional life.

**SSG's Human Nature and Epistemology**

Shortly after Wilson's book appeared, an outcry against its conception of human nature arose. The earliest and still one of the main antagonists was the Boston-based Sociobiology Study Group (hereinafter SSG or “antagonists”), which published the first broadside against *Sociobiology* in the *New York Review of Books* on November 13, 1975. I have been a member of the SSG* since shortly after its inception and was also a signatory to a second article, “Sociobiology—Another Biological Determinism,” published in *BioScience* in March 1976. In essence, the SSG asserted that Wilson's whole conception of human nature was limited to our time and place in the universe—ours, as a capitalist, competitive, invidiously alienated people in a United States that is now the central world power. I think this criticism is substantially true, but not basic.

The SSG also asserted that a scientific basis for attributing genetic foundations to human sociocultural characteristics was entirely absent. No specific genes for specific attributes have been isolated (nor could they be, since genes do not work that way). The similarities of human genetic structures are far greater among human populations than the enormous diversity of sociocultural manifestations, which can change drastically at very rapid rates in a given population and be diffused from population to population—or can even be taught to older generations.

Some broad relationship between genetically structured species characteristics of *Homo sapiens* and specifiable sociocultural domains cannot be avoided, however. The relationship is clearly not Wilson's simple-minded genetic determinism, but it is also not his antagonists' environmentalism. This point is absolutely central to understanding and moving beyond the

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*Members included microbiologist Jon Beckwith, biologist Richard Lewontin, zoologist Steven Gould, biologist Ruth Hubbard, microbiologist Hiroshi Inouye, all of Harvard; psychologist Steven Chorover of M.I.T.; and psychiatrist Herb Schreier of Massachusetts General Hospital.*
controversy involving Wilson, other sociobiologists, and their antagonists.

The SSG's form of argument is called environmentalism. By some it is called (rightly in my view) “extreme environmentalism,” because it regards humans as essentially beings of cultural norms and the institutions derived from them. Environmentalism ascribes the characteristics of (human) behavior to environmental conditions and situations; its extreme version denies that any significant human behavior has biological foundations. In SSG's initial attack in the New York Review of Books, this statement was included (over my strong objection): “We suspect that human biological universals are to be discovered more in the generalities of eating, excreting, and sleeping than in [highly selected human habits].”* These functions are shared with, among other animals, the dog, viper, goose, and ass, with which I prefer not to be identified.

The SSG, then, found itself in a very peculiar position. It had, in fact, stated that the only attributes common to humans—regarding which Homo sapiens might be said to have a human nature—were essentially identical to those of other animals, the "bestial" ones.

At the same time, these antagonists of Wilson claimed that all those things that make Homo sapiens distinctively human—culture, institutions, “rationality” as contained and expressed in science and language—were denied the status of human nature on the grounds of the relativism of sociocultural variability. In so doing, the SSG denied the goals and activities of the social and humanistic sciences searching for universals—particularly anthropology, which looks not only for sociocultural universals but also for their basis in Homo sapiens' biological species characteristics. The SSG's gross evasion of specifically human universals (discussed below) and failure to deal with the disciplines that study them strike me as thoroughly anti-intellectual and nihilistic. In effect, the SSG adopted the same basic epistemology as Wilson's—one that separates mind and body and opposes cultural rationalities to "bestialities.” It thereby denies a large body of contemporary thought offering alternative epistemologies. In the present controversy between Wilson and one group of his critics (the SSG), the antithesis echoes the thesis.

In what follows, I present several problems that now one, now the other, party to the controversy—and sometimes both, given their philosophical and substantive positions—cannot treat. These problems come in part out of various sorts of inquiry in

Excerpt from a letter to the editors of the New York Review of Books, November 13, 1975, from a group of students and professors in the Boston area, sharply critical of Edward O. Wilson's Sociobiology:

What Wilson's book illustrates to us is the enormous difficulty in separating out not only the effects of environment (e.g., cultural transmission) but also the personal and social class prejudices of the researcher. Wilson joins the long parade of biological determinists whose work has served to buttress the institutions of their society by exonerating them from responsibility for social problems.

anthropology, although they are not restricted to that discipline, in part out of my own work and experience. Each area is one in which major research should and could be carried out.

The first problem is that of human universals. Historically, the idea of universals was not phrased in terms of a set of elements, but appeared in such concepts as the universality or catholicity of the Church, along with its explanatory theology. A later idea is that of the "psychic unity of mankind," which has permeated anthropology explicitly, and other disciplines implicitly, for at least a century. It asserts that all human populations are characterized by the same attributes and functions of mind. Thus, the basic perceptual and cognitive processes are identical. In effect, we can all understand each other fully; cultural and language differences are only local and secondary. In principle, total translatability within our species is possible, while interspecies translatabilities scarcely exist. Our concepts of most, or all, major human sociocultural processes are built on this idea.

More recent inquiry has been more analytic and less concerned about the species as such than about behavioral domains. Linguists are concerned with "language universals"—structural properties such as negation, predication, and question formation, found in all languages.

Many disciplines are concerned with the universal occurrence of metaphor—visual, aural, and especially, linguistic. In a sense, all language is metaphor, since all words are, at best, arbitrarily encoded allusions to selected attributes only (a strictly human phenomenon involving postulation) and not to the totalities of
situations experienced. In a narrower, more usual sense of metaphor, images from varieties of settings and times and in various distortions are juxtaposed in the single expressive form, a possibility uniquely afforded by the abstracted and arbitrarily referential, postuational, extra-somatic human symbol. (Only for humans does the tyger burn bright in the forest of the night.)

Other scholars in various disciplines concern themselves with roles. All humans operate in society only through roles—arbitrary, relativistic, and situational concatenations of nonsomatic rights, duties, obligations, and prerogatives, without known parallel among other species. All humans potentially can, and do, change roles by choice, and the same role can be filled by genetically quite different individuals. This includes the 'father' role, universal among humans and including the recognition of paternity, biological or not—a normative status unknown to animals. No human kinship role is necessarily a biological one. This fact should present insurmountable difficulties for sociobiologists. Given the sociological characteristics of roles, transfers and exchanges—the foundations of economic and political systems among humans—are entailed normatively, not biologically.

When Postulation Ceases

All human beings exist in a universe whose structures and meanings are "known" to them only through postulation. The capacity or "drive" to postulate may be biologically-genetically based, but what is postulated and what is known have no known genetic bases at all. When postulation ceases, meaning ceases, too—including Wilson's meaning and that of the SSG's sciences and epistemologies. Finally, postulation is intimately connected with human reflexivity, which is discussed below. The reader will think of many other human universals which cannot be discussed here—music, art, humor, suicide.

This brief review suffices to establish the nature of the problems of universals for the sociobiologists and their antagonists. Logically, since many of these universals appear to be strictly human and occur in all human societies, these species characteristics must be dealt with by Wilson's antagonists as "human nature." Such universals are no mere arbitrary abstract categories but descriptively established domains of common human experience. The proof of commonality lies in the fact that, in principle, anyone can, with time and effort, learn culturally different forms, as any anthropologist, or, say, art historian, knows.
That is, universal translatability from culture to culture exists within domains and, in certain senses, from domain to domain within a culture (as symbols of prestige can be translated into power).

The fact of the universality of the various experiential domains requires an explanation of terms of inherent, and ultimately genetic, human capacities, as Noam Chomsky has argued in the case of language. That there should be such species characteristics seems to me wholly unobjectionable on genetic grounds. I cannot understand why some of the geneticists of the SSG reject it. The problem is to formulate the characteristics of this unique kind of genetic foundation and to specify how it constrains and shapes human behavior, not to reject it out of hand.

Rule-Breaking and Reflexivity

Wilson's disregard for the fact that human sociocultural features can be created, diffused, lost, or translated into each other is clearly seen in his book's distressing Chapter 27 on human beings.* The tendency of cultural expressions of human universals to vary immensely from population to population, to move around among them, to appear and disappear cannot be coped with at all in terms of Wilson's simplified genetic causality. Clearly what genetic determination there is does not apply to any particular expression but constrains all-possible-expressions. This aspect the sociobiologists—Trivers and Wilson in particular—treat inadequately or not at all. In fact, Wilson beat a drastic retreat in his claims for a sociobiology that would account for human behavior and subsume the social sciences by saying that perhaps only 10 percent of human behavior is genetically determined, as he did to the New York Times in the interview noted earlier. (What a sad social science it would be that explained only one-tenth of its material.)

All "normal" humans know that they can break rules. Rule-breaking, an important fact related to the points raised above against Wilson, is one any child can tell you about. Specific rules are widespread, sometimes virtually universal, among cultures.

* "The transition from purely phenomenological to fundamental theory in sociology must await a full, neuronal explanation of the human brain. Only when the machinery can be torn down on paper at the level of the cell and put together again will the properties of emotion and ethical judgment come clear. Simulations can then be employed to estimate the full range of behavioral responses and the precision of their homeostatic controls. Stress will be evaluated in terms of the neurophysiological perturbations and their relaxation times. Cognition will be translated into circuitry.” (Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, p. 575.)

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in time and space. But exceptions may also be widespread. If these "rules" have a genetic component, it is the case that recognition of any pattern, rule, or norm allows humans, upon reflection, to break or modify them and change behaviors. Reflexivity, recognition, and rule-breaking of this sort are all strikingly human.

Clearly, the relation between "the rules," their genetic foundations, and rule-breaking must be dealt with by both the sociobiologists and their antagonists in a comprehensive theory. Sociobiologists must cope with the fact that "rules" are, for humans, at best, "tendencies" that can be dealt with only statistically and can always be broken. The antagonists must deal with the fact of the statistical tendency toward "rulefulness" as a human-species characteristic. The strongest possible environmental position the anti-sociobiologists can take, I believe, is that departure from the biologically based human "rule" tendencies is a slow process of cultural evolutionary cumulation, itself an uncertain tendency.

Reflexivity, which allows persons to look at their acts, their bodies, or parts thereof, or their psychocultural self-configurations as external objects, is almost certainly a unique human characteristic and conceivably a genetically-based capacity. Together with postulation, it permits rule-breaking, including breaking the human rule of postulation itself. It is through reflexivity and the breakdown of postulation that humans arrive at suicide—a uniquely human phenomenon, probably known in all societies but practiced in ways suggesting no significant genetic patterning. Since suicide involves postulation and meaning problems, it remains, despite Wilson, a philosophical, not a biological problem.

**Emotions and Epistemology**

Lancelot Whyte, cited above, has argued that fundamental knowledge comes from the inner intuitive world and is merely given justification and communicable order in language. I concur fully and hold that Wilson's epistemology is wholly untenable and very narrowly culture-bound. These contrary positions will not be resolved here, but it is worth sketching the issues.

In any reasonable theory, human or animal emotions are very complex processes, involving sensory inputs, cognitive assessments and evaluations of both. Key, here, is that the emotions are always directed at, and are about, externalities—including, as Edmund Jacobson points out in *Biology and Emo-
tions (Thomas, 1967), reactions about other parts of the body from some other sensory locus in the body. In short, the emotions are object-oriented, assessing objects and their states of being, contexts, and dispositions: The emotions are the sources of basic knowledge. Language and all logical forms derived from it merely translate this knowledge into our major form of communication by abstracting and decontextualizing (with much loss of objective information). One consequence of this view is that most of the central core of the "subjective"/"objective" distinction falls to pieces. "Rationality" and "irrationality" display themselves equally in the worlds of scientists' postulations ("the ether," "phlogiston," "ant slavery") and in all human beings' object-oriented, emotional sorting out of meanings through sensory scanning of the external world.

Among human beings, however, the emotions take on a special character, which Wilson, from the perspective of nonhuman animals, seems thoroughly unaware of and, given his paradigm, cannot deal with. All known humans, at least for the last 40,000 years or more, have lived in cultural environments. I mean this in two fundamental senses.

First, all human beings shape their environments (as do innumerable animals and even many plants). But human beings use cultural means, especially technology, in terms of cultural, normative conceptions, formulated as goals and ends. The degree of shaping varies, of course, with the effectiveness of the technology and probably with the scope of the conceptions. But shaping, in some degree or other, takes place in some culturally, that is, not biologically, determined way.

Second, all humans define their environment conceptually (postulation, again). All human action is directed only at objects so defined and given value. In effect, whatever is undefined conceptually does not exist, although, as external analysts, we may say that these cultural nonexistents in fact affect the culture-carriers. All culture-carriers live exclusively in culturally conceptualized environments—including that very Nature that the Enlightenment and the French sage Claude Lévi-Strauss set against Culture. For example, the concept that there is a "struggle" between "Man" and "Nature" is a relatively recent Western cultural artifact, implying an ontology and epistemology of the sort Wilson accepts as "natural": "rational" Man vs. "bestial" Nature. By his very acceptance of it as "natural," it becomes ideology, as well as being philosophically naive.

Thus, from an individual developmental point of view, human beings' chief mode of knowing—the emotions—are neces-
sarily shaped from birth by externalities which, in a double sense, are cultural or culturized and also encoded in language, itself a cultural form and the basic respitory of "reason." The very form and content of human emotions are therefore necessarily cultural, not bestial, and encompass all the logics, rationales, and rationalities that Wilson denies them, including even "reason" itself. The human beast, Wilson included, lives in an almost (but not quite) tautological world: the means of knowing are shaped by what the means of knowing permit us to create, in an almost closed circle. This view of the nature of human knowing is at sharpest variance both with Wilson's conceptions of human nature and with his epistemology. Since the book is built on these two conceptions, much of the logical structure and interpretation would collapse if they were untenable. Particularly, his views on the genetic basis of human behavior become still more ambiguous or entirely untenable.

**Human Sexual Dimorphism**

Wilson's antagonists have accused him of "sexism" in his sociobiology: the pervasive reading into animal and human life of the particular cultural norms of relations between the sexes in American life. Although I think the assertion true, the SSG itself fails to deal with systematic cross-societal expressions of sexual differences discussed here as sexual dimorphism. However, the "rules" of sexual dimorphism can be and are broken, a fact the sociobiologists must cope with.

The general proposition is as follows. Under primitive techno-social conditions, there is a sharply marked tendency for statistically relatively standard cross-societal forms of the division of labor to occur, though ecological bases vary the content. This patterning of the division of labor is based, hypothetically, on systemic aspects of the sexual differences between male and female humans: If, *a priori*, one denies that such differences have significant effect, one tends not to look for their existence. But if one asks if it is possible that they have significant sociological consequences, two interesting observations begin to emerge from a systematic pursuit of the question.

One is that the characteristics involved are consistently patterned: Distribution differences by sex are demonstrable and the directions of differences tend to fit each other—pattern for males, pattern for females. The other is that, with one exception, they never require sexual exclusivity, although the distribution is heavily lopsided. The implication of the second point is
that the effects of these dimorphisms sociologically appear as tendencies, not as absolutes: Though men and women can both do the same work and sometimes do, the division of labor is significantly differentiated by sex. The absence of exclusivity is demonstrably related to choice, i.e., to reflexivity and "rule"-breaking.

The exception, of course, is the pregnancy-childbirth-lactation sequence. This exclusively female set of attributes is accompanied by statistically significant dimorphisms of body build, especially the pelvic area and leg articulations, gait, and possibly other motor behaviors, such as squatting. Not clearly related to reproduction are other accompanying statistically significant dimorphisms in leg-bone proportions, foot structure, etc. All these clearly suggest differential male/female behavior, in part linked to reproductive functions selected for in the primate evolutionary process leading to Homo sapiens. "Man the Hunter" and "Woman the Gatherer" (and Baby-Producer) have a major genetico-biological basis, which it is, in my view, folly to deny as long as one recognizes that the behavior observed is a variable statistical distribution, not a biologically absolute requirement (as is the queen bee's performance, for example). Women can hunt and men can gather; both do. But in the divisions of labor observed, they tend statistically not to. In my language, the rule, though it can be broken, tends to be observed. The cross-societal data leave no doubt about this. This argument can be extended by considering endless arrays of distributions.

Sexual Divisions of Labor

The important thing to note is that, though aspects of dimorphism are found for other animals, especially the higher primates, their human occurrence must be dealt with as part of human nature and their implications even for contemporary human life assessed. Clearly, the evolution of extra-somatic technology loosens the biological hold. Clearly, the "principle" of rule-breaking means that any of these tendencies can be disregarded—and increasingly tend to be. Yet all societies display sexual divisions of labor. On the whole, this pattern is still evident in our society.

The problem of human sexual dimorphism requires major research. It means that the sociobiologists must review their entire approach to the relations between the sexes, especially where humans are concerned, and particularly their highly invidious, individualistic conception of genetic competition be-
tween the sexes. The anti-sociobiologists must deal with the possibility of systemic, rule-breaking distributions of male and female characteristics seen in relation to sociocultural evolution. The characteristics discussed occur in all human populations and may be seen as species characteristics (some overlapping with other animals) hence, as aspects of human nature, rooted in biology.

The polar positions of the sociobiologists and the anti-sociobiologists lead to stalemate. In basic ways, both sides are locked into the same rules of the game. The result is that crucial questions are not posed because crucial aspects of human beings are not examined, namely: the virtually universal appearance of specific attributes, most of them uniquely human, in all kinds of domains; the great variability of form and content in which these universals appear; the detachability, diffusability, learnability, and loseability of these forms and content; and mankind's peculiar capacity to break practically any "rule," including, perhaps, even those epistemological rules rooted in the biology of his sensory equipment. In a generic sense, the variability within the species' universals, the spatial and temporal unfixedness of the universals, and the rule-breaking are core aspects of human nature.

Both camps avoid consideration of those central capacities of human beings—postulation and reflexivity. Their statements indicate their scientific and philosophical inability to treat the nonbiological, purely human dilemma. Those who have agonized at the sheer edge of convention, where ambiguous culture and its postulational underpinnings erode and reflexive, rational, emotional assessment of self in a universe empty of intrinsic meaning follows, will find that Wilson's *Sociobiology*, for all its monumental amassing of data, has little to say. They will find truth, if little comfort, in Camus' view that the only serious philosophical problem is suicide.
It all began with Charles R. Darwin in the year 1859.

Whether "sociobiology" is seen as science or pseudoscience, "a new synthesis" or a false step in the study of man's social behavior, the basic book is, of course, the great British naturalist's *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* or, *The Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life* (Harvard, 1975, 1st ed. reprint, paper).

In it, Darwin pays particular attention to the social insects (ants, bees, etc.), which had evolved complex systems of caste specialization; even sterile members performed specialized tasks. How could animals that failed to reproduce be part of the evolutionary process? Confronted by this question, Darwin, like many of his scientific descendants, seizes upon the only course open to him. His answer: Such neuters exist because they confer an advantage, not on individuals, but on the societies in which they live.

In a later (1872) study, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (Univ. of Chicago, 1965, cloth & paper), Darwin attempts to show how the facial expressions and "body language" observed in human beings have evolved from more rudimentary forms of expression in man's primate ancestors. From this early effort to treat behavior as a biological feature akin to muscles and feathers, much analysis was to flow. That man's behavior as well as his body is influenced by natural selection was a revolutionary notion in biology and anthropology. In many ways, it still is.

Post-Darwin intellectual developments and counterdevelopments produced many important 19th-century books. Of these, the works of Herbert Spencer, another precursor of sociobiology, must be mentioned. Both *Social Statics: or, The Conditions Essential to Human Happiness Specified, and the First of Them Developed* (Appleton, 1866; Kelley, 1969) and the three-volume *Principles of Sociology* (Appleton, 1880–96; Greenwood, 1975) raise the question whether it is meaningful to ask of Spencer (as it is of Marx) whether he was, as often suggested, a "Social Darwinist."

If Social Darwinism is understood as providing theoretical support for the full-blown competition of man against man, group against group in a bloody war for survival, then the term does not correctly describe Spencer's beliefs. To him, the optimal social organization exists only when the requirements of man's biological nature and those of society are brought into harmony; immorality and evil arise from the discrepancies that exist between biological propensities and social arrangements.

Although Spencer left a legacy to philosophers and social scientists alike, he is today largely unread. Closer to his own time, academic arguments raged round his theories as they do now over sociobiology. Richard Hofstadter in his *Social Darwinism and American Thought* (Univ. of Pa., 1944, cloth; Braziller, 1959, rev., cloth & paper) recounts the excesses to which a firm belief in scientific ethics led some Americans. Racism, sexism, imperialism, and xenophobia were allowed to infuse politics in the name of Darwinistic or...
Social Darwinistic ideas about nature and behavior. Opposition (as cited in Popular Science, April 1894) was known as "Spencer-smashing."

Historian Gertrude Himmelfarb in DARWIN AND THE DARWINIAN REVOLUTION (Doubleday, 1959; cloth; Peter Smith, 1967, cloth; Norton, 1968, paper) gives a comprehensive survey of the effects of speculation about man, human evolution, and human behavior on the intellectual world of the late 19th century. Philosopher Maurice Mandelbaum in HISTORY, MAN, AND REASON: A Study in Nineteenth Century Thought (Johns Hopkins, 1971; cloth; 1974, paper) demonstrates how fears of the inexorability of social evolutionism and the biological limitations contained in hereditarianism were ameliorated by a belief in the inevitable progressiveness of biological, social, and intellectual evolution. Self-betterment and self-improvement loomed as the saving graces of ethical and political systems built on the scientific understanding of human nature and behavior.

One interesting reaction that came hard on the heels of Darwin's and Spencer's attempts to provide evolutionary explanations for social behavior in animals and man was that of Russian geographer and social theorist Peter Kropotkin. In his recently reprinted 1902 classic, MUTUAL AID: A Factor of Evolution (New York Univ., 1972), Kropotkin goes to great lengths to show that as many species of animals and races of man have found cooperation a suitable strategy for survival as competition. Contra Darwin, he concludes, Nature's imperative is "Don't compete—competition is always injurious to the species."

Perhaps the first truly "sociobiological" approach to understanding animal behavior appears in American ecologist Warder C. Allee's ANIMAL AGGREGATIONS: A Study in General Sociology (Univ. of Chicago, 1931) and his later work, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF ANIMALS (Norton, 1938). Both books are out of print. Allee's lack of access to mathematical models, genetic findings, or detailed field studies meant that his pioneering attempts to analyze the precipitating conditions for the appearance of certain social behaviors were never fully realized, hence have gone unappreciated.

Allee in the United States tried to direct attention to social behavior viewed from an ecological and demographic perspective. Meanwhile, Konrad Lorenz and Nikolaas (Niko) Tinbergen in Europe were trying to redirect biologists to Darwin's original insight that behavior could be treated like any other organic property and studied by means of comparative genealogies and evolutionary analyses. Lorenz's work on birds had convinced him that much observed behavior in animals had its locus or cause in genetic sources. In his popular book, ON AGGRESSION (Harcourt, 1966; cloth; 1974, paper), he summarizes a lifetime in behavioral biology and extends his findings to human beings.

Lorenz emphasizes the importance of genetic factors in triggering such complex behaviors as aggression, sex, dominance, territoriality, love, friendship, and warfare. Not only can much human behavior be understood as outgrowths of our genetic programming but, in his view, our culture and society are at the mercy of our innate (and unpleasant) biological natures. Unlike Spencer, Lorenz sees a world in which killings, violence, selfishness, and competition are unavoidable since no amount of political engineering or socialization can modify our natures.

Tinbergen, in his scholarly THE STUDY OF INSTINCT (Folcroft, 1951,
BACKGROUND BOOKS: SOCIOBIOLOGY

cloth; Oxford, 1969, cloth & paper) and later, popular book, CURIOUS NATURALISTS (Basic Books, 1958, cloth; Natural History Library, 1968, paper), also urges the re-acceptance by biologists and social scientists of behavior as a legitimate object of evolutionary inquiry. He decries the tendency among psychologists and ethologists to confine the study of animal and even human behavior to the laboratory and the artificial experiment ("I believe strongly in the importance of natural or unplanned experiments"). Tinbergen's concern with field observations had a marked effect on the development of sociobiological thinking about the evolution and function of social behavior in animals.

Other books published in the 1960s helped to lay the groundwork for today's sociobiology. In ANIMAL DISPERSION IN RELATION TO SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR (Hafner, 1962), Vero C. Wynne-Edwards follows the tradition of Allee and theorizes that animals evolve social behavior and organization as an adaptive group response to the threat of overpopulation and the overexploitation of resources. George C. Williams in his lucidly written ADAPTATION AND NATURAL SELECTION: A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought (Princeton, 1966, cloth & paper) shows how social behavior can be seen as primarily advantageous, not to a species or group, but to individual genetic perpetuation. Unlike some of his peers, however, Williams stresses that, to prove adaptation, one "must demonstrate a functional design" and "concentrate first on the individual and seek an understanding of the adaptive aspects of its behavior."

Cyril D. Darlington in GENETICS AND MAN (Macmillan, 1964, cloth; Schocken, 1969, paper) argues that human behavior not only is subject to the influences of genetics and the environment but is merely the sum of these interactions. Belief in free will, in human responsibility for action, in choice, and in rationality—all are totally mistaken. "Our instincts may revolt at this conclusion," he writes, "but that is no evidence of its falsehood."

SOCIAL LIFE OF EARLY MAN, edited by Sherwood Larned Washburn (Aldine, 1961), and PRIMATE BEHAVIOR: Field Studies of Monkeys and Apes, edited by Irven DeVore (Holt, 1965), are two influential collections of papers from this period.

More spectacular books about human and animal behavior came from a group of writers that includes Ashley Montagu, Desmond Morris, Robert Ardrey, Robin Fox, and Lionel Tiger. Many scholars were shocked by the popularization of ethology in books by science writers. But other practicing scientists hopped on the best-seller bandwagon.

Fox and Tiger, collaborators on THE IMPERIAL ANIMAL (Holt, 1971, cloth; Dell, 1972, paper), hold that most of our fights, politics, family arrangements, attitudes toward women and children, and assignment of roles in society are merely external reflections of our "biogram," or natural genetic programming. Tiger's own book, MEN IN GROUPS (Random, 1969, cloth; 1970, paper), was much criticized by feminists; the author protested that it was intended to be the opposite of sexist. Surprisingly, a new book by Robert Ardrey, THE HUNTING HYPOTHESIS: A Personal Conclusion Concerning the Evolutionary Nature of Man (Atheneum, 1976) seems to have escaped such attacks, despite a bitingly funny chapter entitled "The Sexual Adventure" ("the evolving human female . . . dreamed it up," the author claims). Ardrey's several earlier books, all with long, Darwin-style subtitles (as above), include THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE (Atheneum,
With the appearance of E. O. Wilson's massive *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* (Harvard, 1975), social behavior gained renewed prominence as a challenge to those evolutionary conceptions which rooted change in the advantages conferred by certain types of behavior on individual organisms. (see pages 114–15.)

Wilson's clarion call for the scientizing of human behavior is echoed by others, among them Pierre van den Berghe (see page 122) in his *Man and Society: A Biosocial View* (Elsevier, 1975, cloth & paper). Richard Dawkins, in his readable *The Selfish Gene* (Oxford, 1976), argues that the sort of explanations represented by the work of sociobiologists necessarily revolutionizes the view we have of our own behavior and of ourselves in the world. Dawkins, who acknowledges his debt to Tinbergen, sees human beings as "survival machines—robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes." The contributors to *Biology and Politics: Recent Explorations* (Humanities, 1976, paper only), edited by Albert Somit, generally agree that political theory and practical politics can only truly be understood in light of the findings of sociobiology and evolutionary biology.

There are many dissenters. In a collection of papers presented at a Smithsonian conference in 1969, published as *Man and Beast: Comparative Social Behavior*, edited by J. F. Eisenberg and Wilton S. Dillon (Smithsonian Institution Press, 1971), philosopher Susanne K. Langer objects to overemphasis on animal behavior in analyzing human actions and customs. "Facts, opinions, and conceptions of causal relationship (often imaginary) have become the basis of human life," she states.

Social scientist Marshall Sahlins in *The Use and Abuse of Biology: An Anthropological Critique of Sociobiology* (Univ. of Mich., 1976, cloth & paper) vigorously enters the lists against the sociobiologists. In his view, far less of human social behavior is determined by biology and genes than the sociobiologists would like us to believe. Sahlins also asks whether Wilson and his supporters may not be repeating historical errors and allowing political and other biases to color the kinds of things sought and found to be "scientifically" true about human nature and behavior.

Another scholar and writer on primate behavior, anthropologist Vernon Reynolds, in *The Biology of Human Action* (Freeman, 1976, cloth & paper) writes in mind-stretching detail about emotions and "man's inner dimension." He rejects the idea of biological predispositions as unprovable and comes down instead on the side of biological limitations. We act on perceptions, culturally organized. For these perceptions (as well as the limits on them) to be better understood, he believes, the academic world needs to see a rapprochement between the biological and social sciences, not a synthesis.

**EDITOR'S NOTE:** Arthur Caplan, who teaches medical ethics at Columbia University's College of Physicians and Surgeons and is at present a postdoctoral fellow at the Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences, Hastings Center, Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y., suggested many of the books discussed above and commented on some. Two Wilson Center Fellows, John Purcell and Joaquin Romero-Maura, both social scientists who have read widely in biology and ethology, offered other selections and observations.
CURRENT BOOKS

FELLOWS' CHOICE

Recent titles selected and reviewed by Fellows of the Wilson Center

THE SECULARIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN MIND IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
by Owen Chadwick
Cambridge, 1975
286 pp. $18.95
L of C 75-16870
ISBN 0-521-20892-0

Focusing on Britain, France, and Germany between 1860 and 1900, Cambridge's Regius Professor of Modern History disputes the conventional wisdom that urbanization and scientific discovery undermined 19th-century religious commitments. Paradoxically, secularization reflected the vitality of religion in European life. In the burgeoning cities, working-class people were mildly hostile toward churches, but not toward religion. Many churchmen as well as anticlericalists approved the decline in the churches' political influence. Socialist leaders encountered distaste for atheism: Rosa Luxemburg ultimately mounted an attack on churches precisely for being irreligious. Sober thinkers of the day discerned no inherent conflict between science and religion. In France, Ernest Renan's biography of a humanized, secularized Jesus attracted sustained readership. Overall, Chadwick perceives 19th-century secularization not as a movement against religion but as a quest for a Christianity that fulfilled the promise of personal freedom. "Liberty to attack religion rose less from the decline of religion than from the love of liberty."

—F. Gregory Campbell ('77)

THE BOLSHEVIKS COME TO POWER:
The Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd
by Alexander Rabinowitch
Norton, 1976, 393 pp. $14.95
L of C 76-20756
ISBN 0-393-05586-8

Five crucial months in the history of the Russian Revolution are portrayed here with a wealth of new data. The Bolsheviks, lifting themselves up from a seemingly fatal slump in their fortunes in July 1917, moved to their successful bid for power in October (Julian calendar). Quite a number of preconceptions are dispelled in this work by Rabinowitch, director of Indiana University's
Russian and East European Institute. We see the Bolsheviks in action—debating, hesitating, deeply disagreeing on policies, fiercely contesting Lenin’s ideas—a far cry from the monolithic avant-garde some writers still believe the Party to have been. We see a Party whose growing mass following in Petrograd often pushed it to precipitate action, despite efforts to rein in its followers while still radicalizing them.

—Moshe Lewin

DEVELOPING THE ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics
by Edmund Beard
Columbia, 1976, 273 pp. $15
L of C 76-16037
ISBN 0-231-04012-1

Concepts of bureaucratic politics developed by Graham Allison, Morton H. Halperin, John D. Steinbruner, and others are applied in this monograph to explain what did not happen in ballistic missile development before and during the critical years 1946-54. Why did the U.S. Air Force resist the ICBM? Beard’s answer: a combination of technological conservatism and organizational identification with the manned bomber. Not until pushed by innovation in American nuclear weapons and Soviet bombers, reinforced by explicit directives from the Eisenhower administration, did senior Air Force officers begin to recognize the revolutionary potential of ballistic missiles. Beard calls for high-quality weapons evaluation procedures that will have both independence and political authority, but he does not specify what form these would take.

—Samuel F. Wells, Jr.

ISHI IN TWO WORLDS: A Biography of the Last Wild Indian in North America
by Theodora Kroeber
Univ. of Calif., 1976
262 pp. $14.95
L of C 75-36501
ISBN 0-520-03152-0

Ishi, last known survivor of the Yahi Indian tribe, was found starving on a ranch near Oroville, California in 1911. His story is told by the wife of one of the Berkeley anthropologists who befriended him and gave him a home for the remaining four years and seven months of his life. Ishi learned enough English to be able to teach his teachers something of the language and customs of his vanished tribe. This account of how he
CURRENT BOOKS

endured the transition from Stone Age culture to the 20th century was first published in 1961. It is now reprinted with many illustrations, including striking photographs of Ishi swimming free and naked and then stiffly posed in the heavy, white man’s clothes of the period. Also shown are the northern California hills and forests where he and his people fished, hunted, and roamed at will until encroaching white civilization destroyed their inheritance.

—Walter C. Clemens, Jr.

PRECARIOUS SECURITY
by General Maxwell D. Taylor
Norton, 1976, 143 pp. $7.95
L of C 76-5798

General Taylor (former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and onetime U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam) provides an informed, well-reasoned analysis of our security needs for the years ahead. He evaluates U.S. nuclear and conventional armed forces. He makes organizational and procedural proposals for strengthening the civil side of security in response to international and domestic challenges that military power cannot meet (e.g., problems of population, supply of oil and other resources, the North-South confrontation, post-Vietnam stresses within American society). Some readers will differ with General Taylor on specific proposals—notably, his advocacy of a “minimum” or “finite” deterrent strategic force. His formulations could leave the United States with a strategic nuclear force perceptibly inferior to that of the Russians and, in consequence, expose Washington and its allies to pressure tactics from without while encumbering Americans with a psychology of inferiority from within. Other readers may place a higher premium on NATO; they will contest Taylor’s apparent readiness to reduce U.S. European commitments in ways that could have a severe impact on the solidarity that constitutes NATO’s greatest strength.

—General Andrew J. Goodpaster (’76)
NEW TITLES

KARL KRAUS AND THE SOUL-DOCTORS: A Pioneer Critic and His Criticism of Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis
by Thomas Szasz
La. State Univ., 1976
180 pp. $9.95
L of C 76-17004
ISBN 0-8071-0196-6

Between the two world wars, Vienna was the intellectual capital of the world; Karl Kraus, a crusader for purity of language and precise thinking, was Vienna's foremost literary critic. Admired by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein and despised by Freud, he got what he called “the silent treatment” from newspaper editors and the literary cliques that he criticized. His importance is increasingly recognized, and Szasz's book is an effort to make him known to the American public in his role as a foe of psychoanalysis. Kraus's corrosive criticism of Freud and his disciples is often outrageous. (“On the seventh day, God rests. That's the day the psychoanalyst picks to demonstrate that there is no God.”) The “soul-doctors,” he believed, had “greatly enlarged the frontiers of irresponsibility.”

THE FABIANS
by Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie
Simon & Schuster, 1977
446 pp. $12.95
L of C 76-41350

George Bernard Shaw, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, H. G. Wells, and many lesser-known (but just as talkative) Fabians fill this objective, anecdotal book. The most influential group to emerge out of the proliferation of London's socialist sects during the 1880s, they took their name from pseudohistory—"a dubious political reference to a Roman general [Fabius]" who defeated Hannibal by tactics "supposedly both cautious and forthright." But the Fabian Society was serious, survived for 60 years, and had a profound effect on English life. Its members believed in an "ascetic obligation" to serve the poor and "raise them from the lower depths." Dedicated to the spread of socialist opinions through education and influence, the Society established the London School of Economics, founded the New Statesman, and saw its ideas become official Labour Party policy. In 1945, Clement Atlee took office as Britain's first "Fabian Prime Minister."
University of Pennsylvania political scientist Alvin Z. Rubinstein dissects Russian-Egyptian relations from the 1967 June war to the 1973 October war. He compares joint communiqus to the original Russian and Egyptian drafts and probes such diplomatic nuances as delegation exchange (envoys greeted on arrival or bade farewell by a lower-ranking official to indicate the host country's displeasure). His conclusion: Despite their advisory role, the Russians rarely enjoyed significant influence on Egyptian policymaking. Their superpower status in the region after their re-arming of Egypt (1968) came as a result of the invitation to bilateral talks on the Middle East extended to Moscow by Washington. Rubinstein's case study strongly implies that a Big Power, lacking direct military presence, cannot hope to control Third World "client" regimes.

When the "Sons of the Founders" entered Harvard, Yale, and other colleges serving the Republic at the turn of the 18th century, they brought with them strong nationalist feelings and a tendency to dissent learned at the knees of their Revolutionary fathers. Their broad support (except at William and Mary) of a strong federal government disappointed some of their elders, especially Thomas Jefferson. Their questioning of campus authority led college administrators, in the formative years 1798–1815, to turn away from the "free-thinking" disciplines (sciences, the study of politics) and to restore emphasis on traditional, "illiberal" education (Latin, Greek, theology).

Despite Golo Mann's thorough illumination of every shred of evidence, much remains of the enigma that shrouded Albrecht Wenzel von Wallenstein in his lifetime (1583-1634). What does emerge vividly is an image of Europe torn by religious wars. This mammoth biography of the religious skeptic and
self-made Prince of the Holy Roman Empire, who served Ferdinand II as generalissimo until the Emperor deposed him, is an impressive scholarly achievement. It is also a good read. Showing us 17th-century court life and the battlefields of the Thirty Years' War as they would appear to a contemporary, Mann enables us to appreciate the sheer outlandishness of Wallenstein. In his inevitable isolation as he fought and connived for political stability, he seems a complex and uncannily modern figure.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, British, French, and Dutch imperialist enterprise established a string of uniform, hospitable "treaty ports" from India to Japan. In this bold interpretive account of the years 1850-1950, historian Murphey analyzes the impact of this system on the Asians. Reactions varied markedly with the local setting. In the smaller and insular states, the imperialist "capitals" (Singapore, Djakarta) generated new economic structures and national identification with the foreign enclaves. India, commercially underdeveloped, linguistically divided, and long torn by warfare under the alien Mughal regimes, succumbed to sweeping "Westernization." Only the Chinese, with a large, thriving, autonomous rural economy and a strong cultural identity, reacted vigorously against, rather than adapted to, the ways of the outsiders in the treaty ports.

Schandler, now a Library of Congress senior researcher, wrote the brief section of the original "Pentagon Papers" covering the 1968 U.S. policy crisis that followed Hanoi's surprise Tet attacks against South Vietnam's cities. Using fresh documentation, he has drawn a calm revisionist portrait of Lyndon Johnson and the administration "hawks" and "doves," who variously sought to exploit the shock of Tet to force changes in U.S. war strategy. Schandler shows that, contrary to most accounts, no sudden LBJ turnaround...
ensued. The President's climactic March 31, 1968, speech, announcing a partial halt of U.S. bombing, was largely an effort to buy more time at home for existing policy. But Hanoi surprised LBJ by accepting his public offer to talk peace; thereafter, new Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, a disillusioned ex-hawk, adroitly moved in to limit U.S. commitments to the war.

MODERN ECONOMIC THOUGHT
edited by Sidney Weintraub
Univ. of Pa., 1977
584 pp. $25
L of C 76-20140
ISBN 0-8122-7712-0

Up-to-date coverage of the historical development and principal theoretical positions of "modern" economics, edited by an economist known for his broad erudition. Thirty contributors discuss the ideas put forth by nearly everyone of significance in the field, beginning with the "neoclassical synthesis" of Britain's Alfred Marshall (who reigned from Victoria's day to the end of World War I). The inventive theorists who followed were numerous and lively but overshadowed by John Maynard Keynes, the Englishman whose thinking helped shape Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal policies. The concluding chapter on radical economists covers Marxist analyses of capitalism, done by Europeans and by Americans Victor Perlo, Paul Sweezy, Paul Baran, Eugene Genovese, Samuel Bowles, and others. This hefty textbook can serve interested laymen as well as students; only occasionally does it demand special background.

SECRETS, SPIES, AND SCHOLARS: Blueprint of the Essential CIA
by Ray S. Cline
Acropolis, 1976, 294 pp. $10
L of C 76-39650
ISBN 0-87491-046-3

A former deputy director of the CIA tells how the United States developed what was in his view "during the 1950s and 1960s the best intelligence system in the world." Accepting the need for "small-scale, selective, covert political action," Cline proposes separating clandestine operations from research and analysis. He would make all segments of the intelligence community accountable to the President and to the appropriate congressional committees. This didactic memoir adds a useful perspective on many of the recent intelligence exposés.
THE NATIONAL GALLERY OF ART
by John Walker
$45 cloth, $22.50 paper
(paperback edition available only through the Gallery)
L of C 75-10716
ISBN 0-8109-0336-9

Just as the National Gallery of Art prepares to open its new East Building, Director Emeritus John Walker has published a sumptuously illustrated book (1,028 color plates, 93 black and white) devoted to the collections and their housing. From the cover, showing Rogier van der Weyden’s serene 15th-century Portrait of a Lady, to the final section of rare master drawings, this is an elegant volume. The Gallery’s full range of Western masterpieces is here: a 12th-century Limoges reliquary, the stainless steel sculpture of David Smith, a Byzantine madonna, the Impressionists, the great Italians. Walker’s highly personal, often opinionated text contains fascinating material on donors and individual works and his memories of paintings and people.

TUTANKHAMUN: His Tomb and Its Treasures
by I. E. S. Edwards
Metropolitan Museum & Knopf, 1976. Unpaged. $35
L of C 76-49330
ISBN 0-394-4170-6

Death, gold, an ancient tomb, its modern discovery. These themes drew huge crowds to the “Treasures of Tutankhamun” exhibit in Washington last winter. Those who missed the show or cannot see it on tour over the next two years in Chicago, New Orleans, Los Angeles, Seattle, or New York, can feel its spell through these books. The most splendid is Tutankhamun: His Tomb and Its Treasures. With the aid of Edwards’ concise text, its dramatic black-and-white photos shot by Harry Burton as the tomb was opened in 1922 and recent color pictures taken at the Cairo Museum lead the reader to the objects in the order of their discovery. Treasures of Tutankhamun, the paperback exhibition catalogue, includes many of the same photos, plus informative articles by E. F. Wente and Tom Buckley. Wonderful Things (also in paper), abridged and adapted from Howard Carter’s classic three-volume work (1923-33), is illustrated entirely with Burton’s photographs. Letters, cables, and newscuttings enliven its text.
Photographers employed by the Farm Security Administration during the Depression and early years of World War II included the well-known Dorothea Lange, Walker Evans, Ben Shahn, and eight others. Under Roy Stryker’s direction, they took photos throughout most of the United States and Puerto Rico, concentrating largely on the rural poor. The Library of Congress has 200,000 of their pictures. Some have been reproduced so often that Miss Lange once termed them “documentary cookie cutters.” The value of this new collection lies in the remarkable quality of the reproduction, the inclusion of work by all eleven members of the group, and a text based on interviews by O’Neal that presents the individual perspectives of the photographers.

First volume of a major literary biography, this meticulous study of the young Dostoevsky should not put off the general reader. Thoughtful interpretations of Poor Folk, The Double, and Netochka Nezvanova enrich our understanding of Dostoevsky’s own life; details of his personal world help us comprehend the books. Thus, Dostoevsky’s father more closely resembles the capriciously severe Varvara in Poor Folk than the gluttonous, wrathful père of Brothers Karamazov; when his serfs murdered the elder Dostoevsky in 1839, the son’s legacy was not a supposed epileptic fit (later seized upon by Freud) but a lasting, deep-seated hatred of serfdom itself. Ten years later, as this volume ends, the great writer is more apparent in the radical intellectual of 28 than we had thought, or he had told us.

This posthumous collection represents only part of the large fund of material that Berryman left behind him. It includes 45 previously unpublished “dream songs,” some short poems written just before the poet’s suicide in 1972, and fragments of longer works. Among the latter is the beginning of a pro-
Asked if she believes in fairies, Oxonian Katherine Briggs, author of "The Anatomy of Puck" and many other books, won't clap her hands. In the foreword to this encyclopedia/anthology, she declares herself "an agnostic." Readers of Shakespeare and Spenser, Bruno Bettelheim's "The Uses of Enchantment," or Sylvia Townsend Warner's New Yorker stories, who consult Briggs for historical information or literary reference, are apt to find themselves, hours later, entrapped by this book's "glamour." (Defined by Briggs as originally a Scottish word in undoubted use in the 18th century. It "signified a mesmerism or enchantment cast over the senses, so that things were perceived or not as the enchanter wished. Gipsies, witches, and above all fairies had this power." )

Religion

In this stimulating work, Huston Smith, an eminent student of world religions, defends the traditional wisdom of the ancient faiths. He sees them as a necessary complement and correction to the reigning scientism of the West, whose assumptions he challenges (or,
as in the case of Darwinian evolutionism, rejects). Smith's own religiosity can be described as a harmonious mixture of elements from Platonism, Hinduism, Sufism, Zen, classical Christianity, and Jung; among Christian theologians, Dionysius the Areopagite (sometimes called Pseudo-Dionysius), 1st-century author of The Divine Names and the Mystical Theology, seems to have a special attraction for him.

Science & Technology

FORCES OF NATURE
edited by Sir Vivian Fuchs
Holt, 1977, 303 pp. $25
L of C 76-3973
ISBN 0-03-17591-7

MISSION TO EARTH:
Landsat Views the World
by Nicholas M. Short et al.
NASA, GPO, 1976
462 pp. $14
L of C 76-60816

British geologist Sir Vivian Fuchs has assembled a generally well-illustrated survey of nature's more powerful earth and atmospheric forces (volcanoes, avalanches, tornadoes, lightning) doing their damaging worst. The emphasis, in photos, drawings, and literate essays by noted scientists, is on catastrophic or periodic fluctuations in nature's behavior—and the impact of these episodes on what we have come to consider man's environment. Forces of Nature is written in popular style but reflects controversies and recent advances in various fields. Essays on the origin and place of life in the physical environment and on the latest advances in global environmental studies from satellites are commendably handled.

What today's earth is like as seen from space, replete with the traces left by glaciers, drought, changing river courses—and by building, polluting man—can be studied in the lavish collection of Landsat satellite pictures made available by NASA and the U.S. Government Printing Office. Mission to Earth must be the book bargain of the year. Its 400 plates, almost all in color, are admirably reproduced. Introductory material and appendixes explain the application to which these startlingly detailed images have already lent themselves (in agricultural crop classification, forestry, desert control, land use, mapping, identification of water pollution sources, geology). Landsat's sensors cover a range greater than that of the human eye; its "scenes" measure 115 miles square.
Those shown in this book depict the United States extensively and offer other interesting views of the rest of the world. A bonus is that almost any area (Monterey Bay; the Afar Depression in Ethiopia; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania) looks in the "false color" of the plates like the most powerful abstract art.

Essays by specialists of many nationalities comprise nearly two-thirds of this reference work. They review the state of the art and 1976 developments in science and science policy in the United States, the Soviet Union, the European countries, the "scientifically advanced smaller nations" (Australia, Canada, Israel, and South Africa), the "potentially powerful nations" (Brazil, the People's Republic of China, India, Japan), and in UN programs. Emphasis is on legislation and facts (in 1971, out of the 65 nuclear power stations operating worldwide, 6 were in the Soviet Union, 1 at Rheinsberg in East Germany; another 10 were under construction and 6 more on order in the Comecon nations). The Almanac also includes a directory of major scientific organizations and personnel, plus significant documents.

New Books by Fellows and Former Fellows


CURRENT BOOKS


With the Renaissance there began a trend of political theorizing based on looking at man "as he really is." New concepts evolved to replace traditional advocacy of the repression of passions for the sake of political and social order. One, systematized by Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733), was to harness these human feelings. Another, proposed first by Francis Bacon (1561–1626), was "to set affection against affection and to master one by another." This Baconian notion of countervailing passions grew into the doctrine that transformed greed into economic interest; Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations (1776) represents its culmination. Harvard political economist Hirschman illuminates this evolution with brevity and clarity. "Both critics and defenders of capitalism," he concludes, "could improve upon their arguments through knowledge of [its] intellectual history."

THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY. By Alicia H. Munnell. Brookings, 1977. 184 pp. $3.95 (cloth, $9.95)

A quote suggests why this book is of relevance to most Americans: "Social security covers over 90% of the working population and pays more than $83 billion annually. Current members of the system have been promised future benefits exceeding $4 trillion." Against a background of absurdly overlapping or arbitrarily preclusive programs, Alicia Munnell provides the reader with a painstaking, down-to-earth survey of problems arising from flaws of coordination, the gross inequities that result from careless legislation, negative feedbacks on savings. Her cool look at the statistics is a far cry from the sterile all-or-nothing terms in which Social Security is often debated.


Critical theory is concerned with the study of how social conditions determine our knowledge. This anthology presents a good summary of the main positions in this "branch" of sociology, better understood as a phenomenon of German intellectual history. It includes an excellent selection of texts by Hegel, Marx, Wilhelm Dilthey, and the writers of the Frankfurt School—Adorno, Habermas, Benjamin, Marcuse, Max Horkheimer.


Sanche de Gramont, journalist and author, recaptures an age of adventurous exploration when brave and foolish Europeans endured unspeakable hardship to find West Africa's Niger River and trace its capricious 2,600-mile course to the sea. Those, like Mungo Park and Richard Lander, who did not succumb at once to murder, misfortune, or disease returned home to England and France. There they inspired new expeditions funded in the name of abolitionist conviction or the imperial mission. Reading this intriguing history, one can only marvel at the suicidal zeal of these men.

The Wilson Quarterly/Summer 1977
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Wilson, a professor of government at Harvard and a member of many task forces and commissions on law enforcement, shares his thinking about crime and about the human nature of criminals. Most of his recommendations deal with what he calls “predatory crime for gain” (robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft). He does not discuss “white-collar” criminals or, except for heroin addiction, “victimless” crimes. All of what he has to say is based on his conviction that “wicked people exist. Nothing avails except to set them apart from innocent people. And many people, neither wicked nor innocent, but. . . calculating of their opportunities, ponder our reaction to wickedness as a cue to what they might profitably do.”

THE ACADEMIC REVOLUTION. By Christopher Jencks and David Riesman. Univ. of Chicago, 1977. 580 pp. $7.95

In a foreword written for the latest edition of this 1968 book, Martin Trow comments on the concern its authors show for “the tension between specialized knowledge and liberal education.” He notes their belief that “the best undergraduate education can be found where that tension has not been resolved.” Jencks and Riesman feared that the balance was tipping too far toward specialization at the expense of liberal studies. A decade later, Trow asks, would they fear for the fate of both specialized and liberal studies amid the surge of vocational and pre-professional courses “that make claims to neither ‘breadth’ nor ‘depth’?” Other questions will occur to new readers; much has happened to make sections of the book seem dated and almost innocent. It remains, however, an outstanding analysis of American higher education.


Designed as a text for an undergraduate course at Stanford University, this first comprehensive study of contemporary international arms control should prove useful to scholars in many fields—and to worried citizens. The principal focus of the book is on strategic nuclear arms. But it also covers conventional arms and nuclear proliferation and has important sections on the historical, economic, and legal dimensions of arms limitations.


Sixty-nine original works and two translations (of Rilke and Dante). This reprint is worth the price if only for one seven-line poem entitled “Origin.” In it, Nemerov, former poetry consultant for the Library of Congress and master of many short, structured forms of poetic discourse, writes about how language began. Who had the credit of it? he asks. Gods, men, devils, elves? / . . . "We got together one day," they said/ "And talked it over among ourselves."
The Quiet Dissident: 
East Germany’s Reiner Kunze

Signed by the Soviet Union, the United States, and 33 other nations, the 1975 Helsinki human rights agreement has brought no great surge of individual freedom to Communist Europe. Those dissident East European and Russian intellectuals who urged compliance with the Helsinki accords have suffered official reprisals. We present a profile of East Germany’s Reiner Kunze, followed by excerpts from The Wonderful Years, a collection of his ironic, intimate sketches of everyday life. This book, officially banned in the East, has become both a literary success and a best seller in West Germany. Long a target of Communist Party pressure, Kunze in April finally applied for, and got, permission to emigrate to the West.

A Literary Profile by David Binder

In this wordiest of worlds he appears to be almost a stranger, a kind of dropout: a writer who does not write much, a poet whose collected works would take less time to declaim than a standard Communist Party Congress speech by the Secretary-General. His is the economy of precision. He does not waste words. This is surely part of his appeal— we hang on his words because they are so few and so clear, the words of Reiner Kunze.

The other part of this East German writer’s appeal, and probably the stronger, is his devotion to recording the human condition, the condition of the spirit in the micro-cosm/macrocosm he created on the banks of the White Elster River in southern Thuringia. It would explain why his collection of semi-fictional vignettes, Die wunderbaren Jahre (published in the United States as The Wonderful Years), became a best seller in West Germany on the other side of the barbed wire, and why Kunze’s two and one-half room apartment in the town of Greiz became the bourne of young pilgrims in his native East Germany. (He was, he told an interviewer in 1976, something of a “pastor for the heathen.”) There are clear antecedents for his popular essays—Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther
(1774) and, more recently, a variation on the Goethe story by Kunze’s East German contemporary Ulrich Plenzdorf entitled The New Sorrows of Young W (1973).

On November 17, 1976, when poet Wolfgang Biermann was deprived of citizenship in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) while on tour in West Germany and charged with “hostile behavior” constituting “flagrant violation of citizen duties,” Reiner Kunze was among the hundreds of GDR artists and writers who protested Biermann’s expulsion. He was thought to be particularly vulnerable because Biermann had described Kunze, the other unperson of East German letters, as “my friend though not my comrade.”

However, on February 3, 1977, Kunze arrived in Vienna for a poetry reading, having received a visa to travel to the West and return to the East. Asked to comment on the Biermann expulsion, he responded: “Unless it is absolutely necessary—I shall always do it if it is necessary—but unless it is necessary, absolutely necessary, I would like to return to the essential, that is to avoid these publicity utterances.” As for his own treatment, he said, “Possibly it expresses the fact that there has been another small advance toward internal sovereignty.”

In contrast to Biermann, who proclaims himself a Communist and a proletarian, Kunze is avowedly, passionately unpolitical. He objected to being compared to Solzhenitsyn, saying: “First, I believe that my feeling for proportion is still intact. Second, I had the great fortune not to have to go through what Solzhenitsyn went through. Germany wasn’t Russia. The GDR is not the Soviet Union. Third, Solzhenitsyn is concerned with political agitation. I absolutely abhor that.”

It is apparent that he accepts at least one precept of Lenin, to “learn, learn, and once again, learn!” The students who camped in his apartment in search of guidance often heard him counsel, “Learn, learn as much as possible—make yourselves inexpedible.” Unwordy, but not wordless.

Kunze, the son of a miner, was born in 1933 in Oelsnitz on the Elster River—in that pre-eminently German corner of Germany, where the tribes held out against the blessings of Christianity and hierarchy longer than elsewhere, where the Peasant Wars began, where Bach and Luther were at home, where weaving and papermaking were native arts, and where democrats and despots, Nazis and Communists flourished side by side.

The boy was supposed to become a shoemaker, and there is something of that careful craft in his verse—his words fit his ideas snugly. A German would say they “sit” well. His first poems, written while he was a university philosophy student, were apparently in the Party mold, but he became disillusioned and embittered by constant indoctrination during his four-year term as a teaching assistant. Shortly before completing a doctoral degree, he dropped out to become an ordinary mechanic-truckdriver. He made the acquaintance of his future wife, a Czech dental physician who had written asking for one of his poems, through correspondence (his proposal and Elisabeth’s acceptance are in two of their 400 letters). After moving to Czechoslovakia, he worked at translating Czech poems into German and published some of his own in Czech. The couple
moved to East Germany in 1962. Shortly after the armies of five Warsaw Pact countries, which included East Germany, invaded Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968, Kunze quit the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany. In his hagiography, Karl Marx was replaced by Albert Camus. The shadow of the Party fell on the Kunzes and on their daughter Marcela, who was forced to leave high school a year before she would have been graduated.

There were periodic campaigns against Kunze. But when pressed to emigrate, he refused and protested to Communist Party President Erich Honecker, who intervened, as he had intervened in the 1960s on behalf of Wolfgang Biermann.

Persecution was not total. Kunze was permitted to publish two volumes of poetry in West Germany—Sensible Wege (Sensitive Paths) in 1969 and Zimmerlautstärke (roughly, Room Temperature) in 1972. In 1973 the East German publishing house Philipp Reclam, Jr. printed a 15,000-copy edition of his Letter with a Blue Seal—a selection of his poetry, which sold out immediately despite the fact there had been no press reviews and only one public reading. That same year he was awarded the literary prize of the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts. His children’s book Leopold the Lion won another prize in West Germany, although it remains unpublished in East Germany. Kunze has now been translated into 10 languages. Was he being “rehabilitated?” He was permitted to lecture at four universities in Britain in 1975, and last year he spoke in Rotterdam, West Berlin, and Munich.

On April 7, this year, Kunze asked to be “dismissed” from GDR citizenship, as the law allows. On Easter Sunday, he was told that he and his family could leave. His explanation for his departure: “I had no more reserves. The constant stress wiped me out. The doctors said if it went on like that, they couldn’t help me.” On April 12, the Kunzes drove across the German-German frontier to the West.

The contents of Kunze’s works shimmer with political intensity. In The Wondrous Years (a rendering of the title I prefer to the “Wonderful” of the translation by Joachim Neugroschel), he depicts “peace children” playing with war toys, a young man made politically suspect by the mere possession of a Bible, and an adolescent girl and others chafing under the dulling conformity and discipline of everyday life in a socialist society. This is social realism—the opposite of Socialist Realism. The difference shows plainly in all of the vignettes and anecdotes from the book excerpted below. It is a view of East German life that prompted one of his peers to describe him as “an enemy of the state” and “totally malicious.” Kunze rejoins, “I am not an enemy of the Republic; I am an enemy of lies.”

David Binder, 46, has been a correspondent of the New York Times since 1961. Born in London, he studied German history and literature at Harvard (B.A., 1953) and at Cologne University. His Times career has included reporting from both East and West Germany and covering the State Department in Washington. He is the author of The Other German: Willy Brandt’s Life and Times (1976).
Excerpts from

THE WONDERFUL YEARS

by Reiner Kunze

PEACE CHILDREN

Seven-Year-Old

He holds a pistol in each hand, he has a toy tommy gun hanging on his chest.

"How does your mother feel about these weapons?"

"She bought them for me."

"And why?"

"Because of the bad people."

"And who is good?"

"Lenin."

"Lenin? Who is he?"

He thinks hard, but does not know what to answer.

"You don't know who Lenin is?"

"The captain."

Eleven-Year-Old

"I've been elected to the group council," says the boy, skewering cubes of ham onto his fork.

The man who ordered the meal for him is silent.

"I'm responsible for Socialist defense training," says the boy.

"For what?"

"For Socialist defense training."

DEFENDING AN IMPOSSIBLE METAPHOR

Fifteen

He sucks macaroni off his lower lip.

"And what do you have to do?"

"I prepare maneuvers and stuff like that."

She wears a skirt. It beggars description, for even one word would be too long. Her scarf, however, is like a double train: casually slung around the neck, it drops full-width over her shin and calf. (She'd love to have a scarf which at least three grandmothers have knitted on for two and a half years—a kind of woolen Niagara Falls. I think she'd claim that a scarf like that perfectly matches her philosophy of life. But who could have known two and a half years ago that such scarves would be in, today?) Along with the scarf, she wears sneakers, on which all her friends, boys and girls, have signed their names. She is 15 and doesn't care beans what ancient people think—that's anyone over 30.

Could any of them understand her, even if he tried hard? I'm over 30.

When she listens to music, the door panels vibrate even two rooms away. I know this volume means greater pleasure for her. Partial satisfaction of her need to protest. Supersonic blocking of unpleasant logical conclusions. Trance. Nevertheless, I always catch myself short-circuiting. I suddenly feel an urge to ask her to please turn down the radio. How, then, could I understand her—with my nervous system?

An even greater handicap is my tendency to try and ground all-too-lofty thoughts.

The dust snows on the furniture in her room. It surges underneath her bed. Scattered all over are hairpins, a pocket mirror, remnants of wet-look leather, loose-leaf binders, apple cores, a plastic bag that says "The fragrance of the big wide world," heaps of half-read books (Hesse, Karl May, Hölderlin), jeans with legs turned inside out, sweaters pulled half and three-quarters inside out, panty hose, nylons, and used handkerchiefs. (The foothills of this mountainous landscape branch right into the bathroom and the kitchen.) I know: she doesn't want to abandon herself to the trivia of life. She fears any cramping of the view, of the mind. She fears any deadening of the soul through repetition! Furthermore, she weighs activities against one another according to the displeasure they might involve and regards it as an expression of personal freedom to ignore the greater displeasures. But not only do I secretly clean her room every now and then to protect her mother from heart spasms—I also have to resist the temptation to move these trivia into her field of vision and contribute to the development of internal obligations.

Once I gave in to this temptation, she's horrified of spiders. So I said: "There were two nests of spiders under your bed."

Her lilac-shadowed eyelids vanished behind popping eyeballs, and she started shrieking: "Eeeh! Yechh! Ugh!" so that her English teacher, had she been present, would have fainted at this wealth of glottal stops. "And why do they have to build their nests under my bed?"

"No one ever bothers them there." I didn't want to hint any harder, and she is intelligent.

By evening, she had regained her inner equilibrium. Lying in bed, she had an almost supercilious air. Her slippers were on the piano. "I'm keeping them up there from now on," she said. "So the spiders can't crawl in."

Wire

She regrets that her vision is not impaired. If her vision were impaired, she could wear wire-rimmed glasses. The parents of a student who wore wire-rimmed glasses to school were warned: wire-rimmed glasses are an imperialistic fad, decadence. To prove it, the teacher presented illustrations from a Western magazine showing long-haired males wearing wire-rimmed glasses. The morning she could go to school in wire-rimmed glasses would be a day she'd be glad to go. Her great-grandfather had worn wire-rimmed glasses. He was a miner. Her grandfather had worn wire-rimmed glasses. He was a miner. To prove it, she would display the photos.
Image of Man

Scene of dialogue: Expanded high school in G.

Time: Two hundred thirty years after the demise of Friedrich Wilhelm I, King of Prussia.

Teacher: You always come to school in such dingy sweaters.

Pupil (female): I beg your pardon, but you're insulting my mother.

Teacher: I don't mean that your sweaters aren't washed. But you wear such dark colors.

Pupil: I'm blond.

Teacher: I want the students in my class to wear optimistic colors. Besides, your long hair looks untidy.

Pupil: I comb it several times a day.

Teacher: But the part down the middle isn't straight.

Order

The girls and boys who sat down on the corner bench in the empty railroad station were coming from a jazz concert. Their conversation quickly faded. Each in turn put his head on his neighbor’s shoulder. The first train was at 4:46 A.M.

Two transport policemen, with a German shepherd on a leash, appeared in the entrance, headed toward the bench, and tugged on the sleeves of the sleepers. “Either sit up straight or leave the station. Order must be maintained!”

“What do you mean, order?” asked one of the boys after straightening up. “Can’t you see? We all know where our heads are at.”

“If you don’t button your lip, you’ll get thrown out on the spot. Understand?” The policemen walked on.

The young people leaned the other way. Ten minutes later, the patrol came back and ordered them out of the station.

Outside, it was drizzling. The hand on the big clock whipped to one like a rubber truncheon.

Element

1

In the apprentice dormitory, Michael put the Bible on his bookshelf. Not because he’s religious, but because he finally wanted to read it. The teacher, however, pointed out to him that a Bible has no business being on the bookshelf of a Socialist dormitory. Michael refused to take the Bible off the shelf. What apprentice dormitory is not Socialist, he asked. Given that in a Socialist state every apprentice dormitory is Socialist, and given that it is not one of the duties of the Church to train certified chemical technicians, ergo, he concluded, if the teacher was right, then no one who insisted on being allowed to put the Bible on his bookshelf in a dormitory in a Socialist state could ever become a certified chemical technician. This logic, delivered behind the shield of the medal that had been awarded to Michael at the end of 10th grade (A+ average), quickly brought him under the principal’s eyes. The Bible vanished, and Michael continued to think logically. The civics teacher, however, began classifying him as one of those elements not foreseen
in Mendeleev's periodic table, called "unstable."

One evening Michael was summoned to the factory security office. A man in plainclothes produced a statement in which an "I" agreed not to set foot in the capital [East Berlin] during the World Youth and Student Festival, and asked him to sign it. Why? asked Michael. The man looked at him as though he hadn't heard the question. He would be on vacation during the World Festival, said Michael, and under his bed he had brand-new mountaineering boots, which he certainly hadn't gotten to climb the TV tower on Berlin's Alexanderplatz. He wouldn't even be in the country during the World Festival.—Well, then he could sign, said the man, reaching across the table and moving the ballpoint pen that lay by the paper to the middle of the page.—But why? asked Michael. The statement, he said, sounded like an admission of guilt. He was not aware of any guilt. At worst, he had once nearly hitched a ride in a VW beetle with a West Berlin license plate. The security organs had inquired about him at school. But that, he said, was no reason for him to sign an agreement not to go to Berlin during the World Festival.—What was or was not a reason for him was not the issue here, said the man. The only issue here was his signature.—But they would have to provide grounds, said Michael.—Having to do something here, said the man, was solely due to the fact that in this state the workers and peasants wielded the power. It was therefore advisable not to make any trouble.—Michael began to fear they might not let him hitch to the High Tatra. He stifled a remark that he took the last words as a threat and signed.

Two days before the start of his vacation, his I.D. card was confiscated, and he was handed a provisional pass that did not entitle him to leave the German Democratic Republic and bore the invisible words: unstable element.

With the topographical image of the High Tatra in his head and mountaineering boots on his feet, Michael set out for the Baltic Sea. Since it wouldn't have made sense to hitch from Z, he took the train to K. At the station platform at K, when he stepped down with a guitar on his shoulder, a patrol asked for his papers. "Aha," said one of the transit policemen upon seeing the pass and ordered him to come along. He was handed over to two city policemen, who brought him to the People's Police District Station.

"Unpack everything!"
He unpacked.
"Pack up!"
He packed up.
"Sign here!"
For a second time, he signed a statement in which an "I" agreed not to enter the capital during the World Festival. Around 12 P.M., they released him.

In the morning (Michael had just stationed himself at the roadside to thumb a lift), a squad car halted unbidden. "Your papers, please."
A short time later, Michael was back in the People's Police District Station.

"Unpack everything!"
He unpacked.
"Pack up!"
This time he was taken to a com-
A small rally of guitars for the Festival was off limits: they had been caught with a Biermann number, or with the slogan SEIZE THE TIME. His name was called.

"Where to?"

"A Swiss band needs a guitarist," said the policeman sarcastically. He took him back to Z. Michael faced the music at the People's Police District Station.

"So you wanted to go to Berlin."

"I wanted to go to the Baltic."

The policeman ripped off Michael's headband. "If you lie again, I'll give you a solid feeling of the power of workers and peasants!"

Michael was photographed (with headband, without headband) and released.

To avoid any further suspicion that he wanted to go to Berlin, he decided to hitch east first and then down the Oder River to the coast. In F, a driver offered to take him unmistakably far beyond the latitude of Berlin the next day. "7:30 A.M. at the station."

At 7:30 A.M., the square in front of the station was blue with shirts and flags: people were gathering for the trip to the World Festival in Berlin. A marshal with an armband asked Michael whether he belonged to a 50-man group. "Do I look like I do?"

The marshal came back with two station policemen.

"Your papers!"

Michael refused to go along. He explained. He pleaded. They grabbed his arms. Railroad station cell. Interrogation. The policemen advised him to buy an express ticket and go back. He protested. He had the right to spend his vacation wherever his pass allowed him to.

He didn't have to go all the way back to Z, said the policemen, just to D. But if he caused any problems, he would force them to notify the People's Police District Station, and then he wouldn't be let off so easily. Two guards and a dog escorted him to the ticket window and to the train.

"If you get out before D, you'll be taken into custody!"

At every station, there was a guard with a dog. In D, two policemen were waiting for him, they ordered him to buy a ticket for Z immediately and go to the train. He gave up. On the platform in Z, he waited for the policemen to come up to him. After comparing his photo with his face, they gave him back the pass. "You can go."

"Where to?" asked Michael.

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**Literature Class**

She was beside herself. The teacher had called Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn scoundrels. "Can you imagine?" she said. And then again: "Just imagine!" You could see what the Nobel Prize was worth by the fact that scoundrels like Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn had gotten it, the teacher had said. She had pretended to be sick and left the classroom. "You can't just sit there," she said.

I said, "But a book by Pasternak was published here."

"Which one?"

"*Initials of Passion.*"

"When?"

I took the volume of poems from the bookcase and opened to the title page.

"1969? Here? Scoundrels are published in our country?" She grabbed
her forehead with both hands. "And
to think I didn't know!"
She was crushed.

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At Least

A party, probably lasting till morn-
ing so that it wouldn't be worth
coming home to sleep? In the middle
of the school week? I advised her
against it. "The next day you'll bare-
ly get through classes, which will
only hurt you," I said. "Besides, one
of the teachers could make an issue
of it."

"No skin off my back," she said.

At the next alert, gun
and ammo on the cot. Camouflage
uniform. In the afternoon, Red
Meeting. Every day, loading and un-
loading. . . . First scuttlebutt: Czech
movie troupe wanted to make film
with the help of West German Army,
which West German Army used as
pretext to march into Czechoslo-
vakia. Disturbances in Prague. . . .
Oficially confirmed at Red Meeting.
Policy: Since we have to reckon with
West German Army's refusal to

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CAFÉ SLAVIA

But Heroes
(Motto of M, motorized artilleryman)

First alert, late July.* Three days,
then over. All leaves canceled. Ex-
planation: Black Lion NATO ma-
neuver. . . . At the next alert, gun
and ammo on the cot. Camouflage
uniform. In the afternoon, Red
Meeting. Every day, loading and un-
loading. . . . First scuttlebutt: Czech
movie troupe wanted to make film
with the help of West German Army,
which West German Army used as
pretext to march into Czechoslo-
vakia. Disturbances in Prague. . . .
Oficially confirmed at Red Meeting.
Policy: Since we have to reckon with
West German Army's refusal to

*When East German and other Warsaw Pact
armies mobilized in response to the "liberali-
zation" of the Czech regime, summer, 1968.
stop at our border, we may be forced to attack. . . . Our radio—big super-heterodyne—is jammed. All we can get is GDR stations. Dial sealed with adhesive tape. Higher alert phase.

8/19: Early alert. No more Red Meetings.

8/20, 0330: Fall in with battle gear. Military gas masks passed out and Jumbo—nickname for antinuclear tarpaulin. Some guys had had target practice only eight times. Another advance—a quickie—except for officers and staff sergeant. Then: Forward! Without being told the destination. And without rest. In P, tank regiment on trailers. Morning

21st: Reconnaissance on the car.

Printed handout: Czechoslovakia asks the Warsaw Pact for help. Fulfillment of obligations. First test. Reminder of oath of allegiance. Stress on seriousness of oath. Anyone taking it is under military jurisdiction. Severest punishment because of martial law. First indication that martial law was declared. We crapped in our pants! Terrified for our bare lives. Every step, every word could mean death. For instance, when plastered. No morale. . . .

Raw weather. Clothes clammy, dirty. The discharge candidates saw black: it was already mid-September! . . .


* Daily newspaper published by the East German Socialist Unity Party.


Gradually—through truckdrivers—things trickle in from outside: abortive attempts at contacting Czechs. Big awakening: "I thought they called us?!" Now it was clear why the Soviets were in Prague, and not us. We would have stirred up memories. . . . Squadron demoralized. Every other word is "home." For "Hi!"—"When are we going home?" Some officers almost chummy. Especially when a soldier on duty had a heated vehicle at night. . . . Finally it was announced that Dubcek had been thrown out. He hadn't shown the necessary severity towards the class enemy. . . . From now on, every time something went wrong, there was only one pet phrase: Dubcek's final revenge!—If you cut yourself on a can-opener: Dubcek's final revenge!—"Third Company—peel potatoes": Dubcek's final revenge! One question more pointed than the other. No one afraid any more. The men would have shot only to protect their own lives. I grew up more in this time than in years! . . . Finally: alcohol. Official prohibition. Now a big bottle of beer every day. Hard stuff on the sly. If you had the bread. There was always someone.


Note

I am grateful to my wife for her selflessness.
I am grateful to Marcela that she never denied her father even during the years when she had to find herself.
I am grateful to our friends for their sympathy and their help.
LETTERS

Presidential Procedures: 
Ends or Means?

In “Jimmy Carter's Theory of Governing” [WQ, Winter 1977] Jack Knott and Aaron Wildavsky succeed in setting up a straw man to knock down. They interpret Carter’s behavior as a commitment to procedures rather than goals. They perceive government long-range planning, openness, and reorganization as instruments rather than policies. However, these procedures perceived as economy, responsiveness, and effectiveness of government become ends rather than means.

In concentrating on Carter’s “instrumental-cum-technological view of public policymaking,” they have ignored the man’s philosophical and intellectual attributes. In seeing him as little more than a scientific planner and hyperenergetic efficiency expert, they do not recognize that his instrumental approach is only a method used to obtain goals based on ethical, moral, and philosophical precepts.

C. G. Alexandrides
Professor of Management
Georgia State University, Atlanta

Other Opinions on the Supreme Court

Reading the thoughtful article by A. E. Dick Howard, “From Warren to Burger: Activism and Restraint” [WQ, Spring 1977] confirms the wise observation of Alfred North Whitehead: “There are no whole truths; all truths are half-truths. It is trying to treat them as whole truths that plays the devil.” So much current writing talks about “the Warren Court” and “the Burger Court” as though they were black and white. Often what is involved is simply the preconceptions of the speaker.

Perhaps the most significant observation which Howard makes is that the Burger Court is a “less interventionist Court,” whose judges “limit themselves to doing what they are competent and have a warrant to do.” Howard quotes the observation of Governor Charles Evans Hughes, when he said “We are under a Constitution but the Constitution is what the judges say it is.” The immediately following sentence of the Governor is often overlooked but might well have been added here: his conclusion was: “Let us keep the courts for the questions they were intended to consider.”

In listing the Presidents who had opportunity to change the face of the Court, Howard, for some reason, omits President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had, and utilized, the greatest opportunity of all, naming eight Justices to the Court: Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Byrnes, Jackson, and Rutledge, in addition to designating Stone as Chief Justice.

It would be hard to underestimate the influence of Black and Douglas in producing what has come to be known as the Warren Court, and Frankfurter and Jackson made their own important contributions to the Warren era. These and many others of the great figures of the Court have exemplified its “inner integrity” and essential continuity. The Court’s doctrine may ebb and flow, but who outside the Court can say what is the “truth” in the important issues which come before it?

Erwin N. Griswold, Washington, D.C.

Professor Howard wisely avoids the usual pro or con as he describes the change from the Warren to the Burger Supreme Court. He is right that the landmarks of the Warren years, the decisions on legislative apportionment and race and criminal procedure, have been left “fundamentally intact” but that the new Court has nibbled away at the
edges of constitutional doctrine so that the Fourth Amendment, for example, "appears to be quite a different amendment now."

However, I think he takes professed attitudes too much at face value when he says the present Justices (or a majority of them) "are more apt to defer to the legislative process than their predecessors and to leave the solving of social problems to the political process.

The Justices do claim to be following such a path. But they do not hesitate to overturn the legislative process when they disagree with its values.

The most remarkable example is a decision that Professor Howard himself cites, National League of Cities v. Usery (1976), declaring unconstitutional the application of federal wage-hour standards to state and local government workers. Justice Rehnquist's opinion strikes down a congressional commerce statute for the first time since 1937 without paying the slightest deference to legislative pre-eminence in "the solving of social problems"; indeed, it is almost a casual opinion, scarcely mentioning any provision of the Constitution. I conclude that the talk of deference is just talk when the Justices are hostile to a legislative purpose.

The Burger Court's other noteworthy departure from historical trends has been its determined effort to close the doors of the federal courts to those claiming violation of their constitutional rights. In case after case, a majority has found reasons for denying the right to a federal hearing. The reasons sound "technical," but the result turns constitutional litigation into a game something like the old song about "my darling daughter," namely: "Yes, you may go down to swim, but don't go near the water."

Anthony Lewis

By recounting the history of the Court, Alpheus Thomas Mason ["Free Government's Balance Wheel," WQ, Spring 1977] shows us how judicial decisions are the selection of alternatives. One is left to wonder: Who guards the guardians?

I take issue with Mr. Mason on one point: It is certainly not only the Court on which the Founders relied for a "peaceful resolution of controversies." A. E. Dick Howard's article indicates the problems encountered when one Court (the Warren Court) fails to learn from the Founders.

It is to the Burger Court, whose technique, according to Mr. Howard, has been "to distinguish, to limit, to confine," that we must turn to acquire an adequate understanding of what the Supreme Court should be doing. First, the Burger Court is sensitive to the argument that fundamental rights and duties cannot always be defined concretely and exactly. Second, in its deference to legislative judgment, the Court has recognized that its particular function is not, in Justice Powell's words, to stand "as the sole bulwark against unwisdom or excesses of the moment." (James Madison, in Federalist Paper No. 63, says, in similar words, that this is the function of the Senate.) Third, by encouraging federalism, the Court is beating back the view of national government as apportioner of goods and services. Finally, the Burger Court, by placing faith in the political process, recognizes the necessary trust that is fundamental to the system. Mr. Howard's article is sensitive to the subtleties of this new Court and proves that it is not quite as Neanderthal as some would have it.

Patricia E. Curry
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

"In this quarter century how much the whole character of the job has changed!" So Judge Learned Hand greeted the seeds of the new judicial activism in 1946. How might the salty Hand, an apostle of judicial self-restraint, have appraised the harvest of modern activism on the Supreme Court? The process has profoundly affected the functions, organization, and policy impact of fed-
eral courts in the American polity.

Organizationally, judicial activism has contributed to a law explosion that strains effective administration of justice. Between 1960 and 1975, the number of cases filed in U.S. Courts of Appeals leapt 327 percent, a rate of growth three times faster than in either federal trial courts or the Supreme Court and seven times faster than increases in the number of circuit judges to decide them. In response, federal courts are resorting to mass-production techniques, raising fears for the quality and cohesion of federal adjudication. A major issue confronts policymakers: Can federal courts deliver on a mass scale services formerly reserved for elites?

Politically, judicial activism magnifies judicial risks, but lacking powers of purse or sword, federal judges are seldom eager to fill political vacuums, nor notably successful when they do. Reapportionment, for example, fell short of Earl Warren's lofty goals of increasing legislative responsiveness and decreasing popular reliance on courts. The Supreme Court's effects on crime in American society, for all the fuss over criminal procedure, is basically marginal. More blacks now attend segregated schools in the North than in 1954—or in the South—thanks in part to a Burger Court retreat, which Professor Howard understimates.

Perhaps Hugo L. Black had the last word from the Senate floor in 1973: The Constitution is what the judges say it is—"the last time they say it."

J. Woodford Howard, Jr.
Thomas P. Stan Professor of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University

Updike's Ort

An appreciative nod to John Updike... not so much for his reasoned defense of the written word as for his splendid vignette on his father ("Updike's Father as Reader," WQ, Spring 1977). It's seldom that such a tiny piece, a literary ort,* can bring the subject almost literally to life.

James F. Egari, Gaithersburg, Md.

* A scrap or leaving of food after the meal is completed.
Heat and Light on Southern Africa

The brief overview of conditions and prospects in Southern Africa [WQ, Spring 1977] is noteworthy for its timeliness and quality of authorship. For it is difficult to even approach objectivity when confronting the emotionally charged (some would say miasmic) atmosphere of race relations and change.

From my perspective, it is no longer useful to fixate on issues of “who arrived where and when” in Southern Africa, Lewis Gann’s implicit rationale. His seductive yet unconvincing article (“The White Experience in South Africa”) is helpful in summarizing oft-repeated themes (Eurocentric half-truths that, in themselves, reveal the larger picture) employed by one “pro-white” camp of Africanist scholars. But it does little to advance our thinking vis-à-vis the reality of South Africa.

For example, Gann compares Transkei per capita incomes with those in states such as Togo, Rwanda, and Mali. Might not a comparison between South African (white and “nonwhite”) incomes and those of similarly wealthy states be more illustrative?

Gwendolen Carter [in “The Black Experience in South Africa”] more fairly presents the sad tale of “creeping racialism” from a legalistic perspective. There is some evidence that some South African white politicians have too realized the destructiveness of their stance; one Nationalist leader’s recent claim that his party was “stupid” on “petty apartheid” issues stands as proof.

Despite Colin Legum’s authority, his five-point plan for peaceful change (“Looking to the Future”) is lamentably too little, too late. Arms embargoes just don’t work, especially when a state is nearly self-sufficient in weapons capabilities. “Joint approaches” by the West are usually weakened by compromises and delay. Capital investment prohibitions are ideologically as well as practically infeasible for the United States and the other nations cited by Legum. However, his insistence on Western involvement in a nonmilitary, overt manner is to be welcomed, for the West has a proper role to play; it is worth remembering that South Africa is as much a Western as an African dilemma.

Perhaps time will move slowly enough that we will see the Nationalists and others in South Africa grow in their thinking. Perhaps time will produce a more enlightened U.S.-African policy of constructive involvement.

But one fears that, perhaps, we have had our last chance.

Jeffrey A. James, Washington, D.C.

Professor Gann doesn’t see the South African white women in the garment industry who joined black co-workers in a fight for trade union rights, or the Afrikaner lawyer, son of a former Judge President of the Republic, who joined the liberation movement and spent nine years in prison, or the young white soldier, forced into exile because he exposed the atrocities perpetrated by the South African military in Angola and Namibia. What of the whites caught by tear gas in Cape Town last September 1 who later phoned the newspapers to complain, not about the protesters, but about police viciousness?

Where in Gann’s picture are the white policeman who arrested Father Dominic Scholten, secretary-general of the Southern African Roman Catholic Bishops’ Conference, for distributing an illegal publication? What white experiences have led Archbishop Burnett, head of the Anglican Church in South Africa, to say in February that “the society we have created for ourselves is morally indefensible. . . . Banning people and what they say cannot produce a society which is worth living in”?

Professor Gann never even mentions the fundamental component of the white experience—apartheid, “the space of the white man’s being . . . the distance needed to convince himself of his
denial of the other’s humanity.” This is how Breyten Breytenbach, one of the leading Afrikaans poets and artists, expresses the white experience. Breytenbach, who has received his country’s highest literary award, the Hertzog Prize, is today being held in solitary confinement in a psychiatric wing of a Pretoria prison, where he has been for over a year.

Blinders, like those worn by Professor Gann, do us all harm.

Helen Hopps, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.

Many articles on South Africa convey the impression that throughout its history only the black peoples have suffered while whites have always occupied a privileged position. Dr. Gann, unlike Professor Carter, correctly makes it clear that the whites themselves have in their 300 years of history been through war, travail, and hardship to establish and develop their country. They will not, as all of your three authors acknowledge, readily yield what they have achieved. This is why the proposals made by Mr. Legum are more likely to lead to confrontation than a negotiated settlement and offer little prospect in the light of historical experience of achieving results of social equality, economic progress, or minority rights.

It is because there is no single, definable majority that the South African government has adopted a policy of separate development, which provides for the accession of each national group to full, territorial sovereignty, provided it does not infringe on the sovereignty of the other national groups.

Separate development is not the static policy it is alleged to be, but evolves constantly in relation to changing internal and external circumstances, taking into account the rising wages and standards of living of the black peoples, advances in education, and their own changing needs as they emerge from a pastoral to a modern economy.

South Africa’s first concern, as any other civilized state’s, is with human rights and values, dignities, and freedom; the high standard already achieved in various spheres of life by its black nations fully substantiates this claim.

Jeremy B. Shearar, Chargé d’Affaires a.i. Embassy of South Africa, Washington, D.C.

Absent in all the contributions to the Wilson Quarterly’s discussion of Southern Africa is a dispassionate perspective on the sociology of revolution and its probable relevance for South Africa. That is a very serious omission.

South Africa’s social system today, whatever its origin, is a device for racial exploitation that is capitalist in essence. In view of the odiousness of its purpose, the brutality of its means, and the extravagance of its upkeep, it is so riddled with contradictions that it simply cannot last. Other oppressive social orders that were dedicated to human exploitation and whose rulers evinced as much determination as those of South Africa lie in ruins. I do not believe South Africa is immune from revolutionary change.

South Africa is like no other previous country where a revolution has taken place. If white supremacy in South Africa was its own justification, one could probably say there is no hope except for a suicidal and destructive conflict. However, white supremacy is based on very material and crass economic interests. Even if the die-hard racists are willing to fight to the last man and woman, are those who have financial stakes in apartheid South Africa willing to support white supremacy to their last dollar? Are the Africans destined forever to be willing victims of exploitation?

The Afrikaners are a determined people who have struggled against all odds, but their determination is not suicidal. The African movement is weak, but its weakness is not congenital.

Bernard Magubane
Associate Professor, Department of Sociology
State University of New York at Binghamton

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During this period of fairly rapid change in the South African subcontinent, the most valuable information is to be found not in books but in periodical literature and in special publications linked to such institutions as the Johnson Foundation in Racine, Wisconsin, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., and David Rockefeller's Trilateral Commission. Periodicals include: *African Magazine* (London); *Africa News: A Weekly Digest on African Affairs* (Durham, North Carolina); *Southern Africa News* (Washington, D.C.); *Southern Africa Magazine* (New York); the bimonthly *Journal of Southern African Studies* (London: Oxford Univ. Press); *The Journal of Southern African Affairs*, published quarterly for the Southern African Research Association by the University of Maryland's Afro-American Studies Program; *A Current Bibliography on African Affairs*, published quarterly by our African Bibliographic Center; and the published transcripts of the Habari telephone information-news service on African affairs, also produced by our African Bibliographic Center.


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Yes, we [at NBC] covered a horserace in the 15 weeks beginning in late February when the New Hampshire primary was held. We perceived that to be our responsibility. Professor Patterson apparently does not agree.

We felt that responsibility keenly during early 1976 because the campaign reforms that Watergate had inspired encouraged an unprecedented number of candidates to enter the Democratic primaries. Our polls showed that the recognition factor of most of the candidates was very low. We attempted to meet the need for more public knowledge by broadcasting profiles of each candidate and through other kinds of stories. We found little difference in the way each candidate approached the major issues. This is, of course, characteristic of primary campaigns.

TV News and Politics: *Who Wins the Horserace?*

The issue of the role of the media in the election process ["TV News and Politics," *WQ*, Spring 1977] is one that concerns many people today. In evaluating the amount of network time devoted to three areas of the presidential campaign—the horserace, the substance, the rest—Thomas E. Patterson ["The 1976 Horserace"] included under "substance" the candidates' policies, the candidates' characteristics and background, and party platforms. He concluded that there is too little coverage in these areas and too much in more unimportant areas of the campaign. Roan Conrad's response that "news is not a reporter's perception or explanation of what happens" and that "network television news is really not in the business of making assessments" seems at best misunderstood. No one is asking for more perceptions, explanations, or assessments. We've got too much of that already. But a greater devotion on the part of the media to issues, platforms, and policies as stated by the candidate would, I believe, strengthen our election process. Most candidates are not in the habit of strongly addressing the issues. The public's level of concern is generally not high. But the news media, particularly in television, could be a leading force toward a reversal of these attitudes by pushing the candidates toward the issues and reporting their positions, by giving the valuable air time and exposure to candidates who did state their policy positions, and by failing to give extensive coverage to those candidates who did not.

Kurt R. Krauss, Bellefontaine, Ohio

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On the Republican side, the two candidates differed only—it seemed to us—on who could be elected. Ronald Reagan changed that strategy after losing the early primaries and in North Carolina differed for the first time with President Ford on what might be termed a matter of substance—the Panama Canal. Our polling found that this rather exotic issue was having an effect on Republican primary voters. We immediately launched people on planes for Panama and did several pieces on the Canal, the U.S. negotiations with the Panamanians, and the history of American involvement in the Canal.

In the polling we did on primary day in key states, we continued to look for issues that motivated voters. Distrust of Washington was the key issue that Carter voters cited when we asked why they had voted for him. Hardly surprising, but was that an issue?

In the general election the percentage of “substance” stories increases on the Patterson scale. Of course. That is when for the first time clear issues begin to emerge. A platform has been written (and read on live television) and the candidates begin to run on it. But a winning candidate knows that in the United States the politics of consensus, not the politics of ideology, is what wins elections. So the candidates attempt to straddle the middle of the road and avoid sharply drawn issues whenever they can.

The network news programs do not exist in a vacuum. They are part of a news division’s total coverage effort. For us at NBC that meant that if a story was to be thoroughly covered on the “Today” program, chances are that the same story would not appear on the NBC Nightly News. The same was particularly true later in the campaign when a series of 30-minute programs once a week were broadcast, summarizing the events of the week and exploring some of the matters raised by the candidates on the stump. The daily news programs would shy away from stories being covered for the special. On election eve NBC mounted a one-hour prime time program—much of it devoted to the differences on issues between the presidential candidates. These sorts of programs were not included in Professor Patterson’s sample. But they were part of the coverage of the campaign of 1976 by NBC News.

In sum: we make a distinction between the primary campaigns and the general election campaign. Patterson does not. We do not see our daily news broadcast as more than one element (albeit the key element) in the total coverage plan of the network news division: Patterson’s methods ignore the rest of our effort.

Our perceptions are different, Professor.

Ed Fouhy, Director of News
NBC News, Washington, D.C.

I certainly agree that “issues” and “substance” are important in the reporting of a presidential election.

But what is so wrong about reporting a good horserace? In what was by far the most exciting presidential election since 1960, Johnny Apple [of the New York Times] and Jules Witcover and Dave Broder [of the Washington Post] and dozens of other political reporters wrote about the horserace constantly, for months. The news magazines were filled with stories about it. Should television have ignored it?

Academics who write about the business I am in never fail to impress me with their total ignorance of the subject. They don’t know what we do, or how, or why we do it.

Douglas Kiker, NBC News,
Washington, D.C.

Roan Conrad’s reactions [“TV News and the 1976 Election: A Dialogue”] perfectly typify the lack of understanding that the networks have of [academic] criticisms. Conrad assumes that dealing
We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer’s telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication.

with the issues requires “assessments,” whereas, in fact, it implies simply reporting the stands that the candidates themselves repeatedly take. Robert Chandler of CBS points out that these may be repetitious. Candidates often give the “standard speech,” but networks seldom run even that in its entirety. They are willing to poll the public to determine their opinions about the issues. I think few candidates would fail to respond to being polled themselves about a particular position. But, as Mr. Conrad says, the networks are more concerned with “people getting caught short” and “people making big mistakes.” Is an act of violence or a slip of the tongue really as important as a candidate’s fundamental stands?

Challenging Conquest

Robert Conquest’s reflections (“Some Notes on Political ‘Science,’” WQ, Spring 1977) on the delusions of political science are a remarkable blend of practical wisdom and theoretical nonsense. Nearly every fact he brings to bear on the subject is pertinent. By the methods of contemporary “scientific” political science one cannot successfully tell wolves from basset hounds. The billions of dollars spent according to the prescriptions of “scientific” social scientists have improved only the economic position of these adepts of arcane “models” and theories.

But Mr. Conquest seems to believe that “generalization” is worthless because political events may not be accurately predicted. He is correct only if the function of science (for that is what he means by generalization) is to predict. But this is not what science is about. In Aristotle’s time as in our own, people sought to predict and control phenomena. If they did so on the basis of experience, they were called technicians; if otherwise, magicians. Prediction and control are the hallmarks of technology, not of science. How many difficulties we have had because we have confused the two!

Angelo M. Codevilla
Department of French and Italian
Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.

CORRECTIONS

The second paragraph of “The Comparative Survey of Freedom” in the periodicals section (WQ, Spring 1977) contains two decimal points that should have been commas. It reads in part: “his associates categorize 789.9 million people (19.6 percent) as ‘free,’ 1,766 million (43.9 percent) as ‘not free,’ and 1,464 million (36.4 percent) as ‘partly free.’” The 43.9 percent reference should be 1,766 million and the 36.4 percent reference should be 1,464 million.

We are indebted to Robert Laird of Houston, Texas, for first spotting this error.

Robert M. Lewis, St. Louis, Mo., notes an error in “Portrait of a President” (WQ, Winter 1977): “Every fourth even-numbered year, on a Tuesday between the second and eighth of November, a President is elected.” It is not every fourth even-numbered year, as that would give a President an eight-year term. It is every fourth year, or every second even-numbered year.
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The Center opened in October 1970, and was placed in the Smithsonian Institution under its own presidentially appointed board of trustees. Its chairmen of the board have been Hubert H. Humphrey and, since 1972, William J. Baroody.

Open annual competitions have brought more than 200 Fellows to the Center since 1970. All Fellows carry out advanced research, write books, and join in seminars and dialogues with other scholars, public officials, members of Congress, newsmen, business and labor leaders. The Center is housed in the original Smithsonian "castle" on the Mall in the nation's capital. Financing comes from both private sources and an annual congressional appropriation.