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For all the lamentations over the sad state of literacy in America, a lot of books are being published and sold—some $5 billion worth last year, according to Publishers Weekly. Into the marketplace went 26,439 new titles, ranging in subject matter from sociology and economics (4,425) to fiction (1,936) to technology (1,294) and travel (278). The university presses alone issued 2,580 new books, mostly scholarly works, covering such topics as *Kinship in Bali* and *The Politics of Unreason*.

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From the beginning, we have followed some rules. We see no point in devoting precious space to the clever evisceration of books that are just plain junk. We stay away from books too parochial for any but the hobbyist or the academic specialist. We avoid the handful of good books that get heavy attention (along with the bad) in the mass media—you already know about them. Our purpose is to be useful, to seek out the 35 or 40 good Current Books for each WQ issue that are “important” in terms of fresh ideas or new information and that might otherwise be missed. Judging by our readers’ letters, we manage to alert a sizable number of people to a wide variety of such books, and to the ideas they contain.

In charge of all this since 1976 has been Associate Editor Lois Decker O’Neill, who came to the WQ with a solid reputation as book critic and book editor; she leaves us this summer for Ireland to write a biography of Maud Gonne, the flamboyant actress-revolutionary and friend of William Butler Yeats. Succeeding her is Robert R. Harris, a director of the National Book Critics Circle and a former editor at *Library Journal* and *Bookviews*. Like Mrs. O’Neill, Mr. Harris can draw on a rich array of talent: the ever-changing company of Fellows here at the Wilson Center who advise on selection and write reviews. To keep peace in the family, the WQ lists, but does not review, the scores of books that Fellows and former Fellows publish each year.

*Peter Braestrup*
**PERIODICALS**

*Reviews of articles from periodicals and specialized journals here and abroad*

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**POLITICS & GOVERNMENT**

*Debunking Voter 'Apathy'*

"The Empty Voting Booth: Fact or Fiction" by Ronald C. Moe, in *Commonsense* (Winter 1979), Republican National Committee, 10 First St. S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003.

The American electorate has been accused of "apathy and alienation" because the percentage of "eligible" voters who turned out on election day allegedly fell from 63.4 percent in 1960 to 53.3 percent in 1976.

This is a "bum rap," says Moe, a research specialist at the Library of Congress. The 53.3 percent figure is grossly inaccurate because it is computed by dividing the number of persons who cast a ballot for President by the total number of persons who are of voting age (18 and older) on election day.

A correct analysis of American voting statistics must first distinguish between two categories of people: the "eligible voter" who has registered to vote in a given state and is physically and legally able to vote, and the "potential voter" who is counted by the Census Bureau as part of the voting age population, irrespective of status or citizenship.

Most states have permanent voter registration; a registrant is "eligible" as long as he continues to vote in general elections. As a result, local lists of eligible voters include large numbers of persons who have died or moved to another state since the last general election. If one assumes, reasonably, that three percent of the population over 18 dies or moves in a given year, the "eligible" total in a state with a biennial purge of the voting rolls may be off by at least 6 percent even before the voting begins.

Voter participation figures are further distorted by the Census Bureau's "potential voter" total. It includes people who do not register because they are either aliens, in-transit, incarcerated, in the military, or infirm due to age.

*The Wilson Quarterly/Summer 1979* 13
And, the "total voter turnout" and the "total vote for President" are not identical. There is always a significant number of persons who come to the polls and sign the register on election day but either do not vote for one of the presidential candidates or have their ballots disqualified for some reason. Yet they are classified as apathetic "non-voters."

If the total of "eligible" registered voters is adjusted to reflect a 6 percent mortality/mobility factor, and if signing the election register is considered evidence of having voted, then a reasonable estimate of voter participation in 1976 is much higher than 53.3 percent. For example, there were 9,980,488 registered voters in California in November 1976. Of this number, 7,867,043 (or 78.8 percent) voted for one of the presidential candidates. But 8,137,202 voters turned up at the polls and signed their names. The actual voting participation rate, therefore, was 81.5 percent.

But this 81.5 percent figure is still misleading because it includes as eligible voters all those who may have died or moved to another state during the previous two years. When adjusted for the 6 percent mortality/mobility factor, California's "real" 1976 voter participation figure is 87.5 percent. Using the same formulation, the "real" 1976 voter turnout for New York State is 87 percent; for Hawaii it is 91.1 percent; and, for Connecticut it is 90 percent.

The "real" national average is about 88 percent, Moe concludes, and this is hardly a sign of apathy or alienation.

**Vietnam and the Polls**

"American Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam" by William L. Lunch and Peter W. Sperlich, in *Western Political Quarterly* (Mar. 1979), University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112.

Under close analysis, U.S. public opinion polls taken during the Vietnam War undermine some conventional assumptions. For example, throughout the conflict young people (under 35) were more supportive of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and more opposed to U.S. withdrawal, than were people over 35. Ironically, general support for escalation of the U.S. effort peaked in 1967 at the very moment when a majority of Americans also began to feel that involvement in the war had been a "mistake."

Public awareness of the U.S. role in Indochina was virtually nil from 1955 to 1965, say political scientists Lunch, of the University of San Francisco, and Sperlich, of Berkeley. As late as 1964, with 20,000 U.S. military advisers in Vietnam and future U.S. policy a Johnson-Goldwater campaign issue, two-thirds of the American people said they paid little or no attention to developments in South Vietnam. Popular uneasiness over the war began to grow in 1967, but support for outright American withdrawal never exceeded 20 percent from late 1964 until after the November 1968 elections. Thereafter, such sentiment began an erratic climb to the point where a pullout was the Vietnam policy preferred by a majority of Americans in 1970.
While young white males were the most consistent backers of escalation, American men of all ages were more hawkish than women. Over time, by a factor of three, blacks and other minorities opposed the war far more than whites did; older, black women were the most predictable opponents, especially if they were poor. By 1968, 80 percent of Jewish respondents to opinion polls thought the war was a "mistake," compared to 64 percent of Protestants, and 56 percent of Catholics.

By 1970, Americans of higher socioeconomic status were joining those in lower income groups in supporting withdrawal while middle-class Americans clung to a hawkish war policy. Vietnam's political legacy may be that those at the bottom of society are now more distrustful of government than ever, while the educated and affluent have become more critical of foreign policy initiatives, making presidential leadership in times of international crisis increasingly difficult.

**Carter’s Retreat from Populism**

President Jimmy Carter has committed himself to a dual role: pacesetter in foreign affairs and "consensus politician" on domestic issues. So argues Burns, a professor of government at Williams College and biographer of John F. Kennedy.

Carter’s Middle East peace initiatives, the 1978 fight for ratification of the Panama Canal treaty, recognition of the People’s Republic of China, and his determination to push through a new SALT agreement show his desire to shape world events. The President has even been willing to risk a constitutional crisis by observing the terms of a SALT II
treaty signed with the Soviets but rejected by the U.S. Senate.

After interviewing Carter last December, Burns contends that the President is also ready to act as a "manager and compromiser of domestic politics and policy." Carter's retreat from earlier populist rhetoric at home is due to the assertiveness of a post-Watergate Congress, the Democratic Party's decline as a cohesive force, and damage to the President's "moral" image—a result of his passionless speech delivery, compromises in his human rights campaign, and the lingering taint of the Bert Lance affair.

Carter, with his self-assurance and passion for detail, may be "supremely fit" for the role of political power broker, but Burns wonders how this may affect his chances of reelection in 1980. The public perception of Jimmy Carter may become more blurred than ever. In moving to the right on some "spending" issues, he may alienate many Democrats and pull Massachusetts Senator Edward F. Kennedy into the presidential race, supported by a heterogeneous coalition of liberals, blacks, women, and union members.

Even so, Burns still thinks that Carter holds the high cards. He has learned his presidential lessons and now has a smoothly functioning administration. He is widening his popular following by meeting with hundreds of community and business leaders at the White House each week. But looking past 1980 and possible reelection, Burns is skeptical of the ability of Carter—more "activist broker" than "transforming leader"—to overcome the present "disarray" of the American system with its uncontrollable bureaucracy, fragmented Congress, and disintegrating political parties. Barring some major shift of party coalitions, Burns concludes, the reelection of Jimmy Carter will mean "government as usual." No dramatic failures, but no mastery of the nation's fundamental social and economic problems.

**Tapping the Volunteers**

"The Cities: Unsolved Problems and Unused Talents" by George Gallup, in *The Antioch Review* (Spring 1979), P.O. Box 148, Yellow Springs, Ohio 45387.

A great untapped resource—a massive army of American citizens—is ready to work as unpaid volunteers to improve the quality of life in their cities and neighborhoods, writes Gallup, pioneer pollster and chairman of the American Institute of Public Opinion.

Based on a nationwide survey conducted in November, 1978, Gallup says that seven out of every 10 adults living in urban America would be willing to work an average of nine hours per month, serving on committees, working on neighborhood uplift projects, or helping the elderly and the handicapped.

The survey findings reveal that 57 percent of urban residents—as many as 70 to 73 percent of college-educated, high-income residents—are ready to serve on city advisory committees without pay. The matters that interest them most involve schools and education, the plight of
POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

senior citizens, parks, sports and recreational facilities, and developing programs for youth.

The proportion of city dwellers willing to serve on neighborhood committees dealing with peculiarly local problems averages 64 percent and ranges as high as 75 to 79 percent among the better educated. Some 18 percent of those polled were willing to work as teachers' aides or in neighborhood child care centers; 14 percent were willing to help pick up trash and litter; 23 percent to work with handicapped residents; and 15 percent to work in neighborhood health centers.

The survey shows that citizens are ready to work with their hands as well as their minds, writes Gallup; they are only waiting to be asked:

"Volunteerism is important not so much as a low-cost option for providing urban services (although there is a potential saving here), but as an effective way to improve the social fabric of our cities."

Liberal or Opportunist?

"Opening a Curtain: The Metamorphosis of Lyndon B. Johnson" by Joe B. Frantz, in Journal of Southern History (Feb. 1979), Bennett H. Wall, History Dept., Tulane University, New Orleans, La. 70118.

Was Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas just another southern conservative who posed as a progressive to win the votes of blacks and northern liberals? Not at all, says Frantz, historian at the University of Texas at Austin. From his earliest years in politics, Johnson showed progressive—even liberal tendencies.

The efforts embodied in LBJ’s “Great Society” programs sprang from his genuine concern for the problems of ordinary folk.

Frantz bases his judgment, in part, on a study of some 1,200 taped interviews with friends and foes of the 36th President. When he served as Texas state director of the National Youth Administration, Johnson won the praise of black leaders, such as Mary McLeod Bethune. As a young legislative aide in Washington in 1933, he led the overthrow of the conservatives who controlled the organization of congressional secretaries on Capitol Hill and persuaded his boss, Rep. Richard M. Kleberg, Sr., to support several pieces of New Deal legislation, including Franklin Roosevelt’s proposals for an Agricultural Adjustment Administration to help poor farmers.

There was also a less liberal side to Johnson. As a Congressman, he infuriated organized labor by voting for the restrictive Taft-Hartley Act in 1946, telling his brother, Sam Houston Johnson, “It isn’t what labor says it is. It’s a good law, and I’m voting for it.” He placated Texas oil and gas interests by leading the attack against Leland Olds, an advocate of public power who was nominated to head the Federal Power Commission in 1949. But these, says Frantz, were not radical concessions for a man in the political hurly-burly.

With the security of his position as Senate majority leader, Johnson
could be true to his liberal instincts and win passage of two civil rights acts (in 1957 and 1960) and the extension of social welfare programs. And as a new President in 1963, he shrewdly realized that the death of John F. Kennedy would make the nation more receptive to legislation that helped the disadvantaged, securing congressional approval for welfare reform and other anti-poverty legislation.

"Big and sometimes gauche," Johnson was "almost always a compassionate man," says Frantz. He was essentially a progressive throughout his political career—a man who changed with changing circumstances and who used the power he gained to lead the country with genuine concern for minorities and the poor.

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**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**

*Wary but Willing*  
"The American Mood: A Foreign Policy of Self-Interest" by John Rielly, in *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1979), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

While wary of direct involvement in the affairs of other countries, Americans are concerned that the United States' global influence is waning and that the country may be losing the military capability to defend itself, writes Rielly, president of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

He reports on a November 1978 Gallup poll of 1,546 Americans from all walks of life and on a second survey in November 1978 and January 1979 of 366 "leaders" selected from Congress, the federal government, international business, labor, the media, academia, and other groups. Rielly notes that public support for more defense spending is higher

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<td>Too much</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>52%</td>
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<td>About right</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
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<td>Too little</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
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*Sentiment for an activist U.S. role in the world was tested by asking: "Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?"*

*The Wilson Quarterly/Summer 1979*
BEING AN ACTIVE PART

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Better if we take an active part</th>
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<td>1947</td>
<td>68%</td>
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<td>1956</td>
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than at any time since the early 1960s; in 1978, 32 percent said we were spending "too little" on defense, versus 21 percent in 1960 and 8 percent in 1969.

Public support for foreign economic aid programs has dropped from 52 to 46 percent between 1974 and 1978. Military aid continues to be unpopular, although public support increased somewhat from 22 percent to 29 percent between 1974 and 1978.

A clear majority of the public (56 percent) and 39 percent of the leaders believe that the United States is falling behind the Soviet Union in military strength. "Public euphoria about detente has evaporated," says Rielly, "but there remains solid support for specific aspects of that policy." Both the public and the leaders favor limiting nuclear weapons, undertaking joint U.S.-Soviet projects to solve energy problems, and even banning all nuclear weapons.

An overwhelming majority (92 percent) of opinion leaders favor the commitment of American troops if the Soviets invade Western Europe; the public is less enthusiastic (54 percent) but more so than in 1974 when the favorable response was only 39 percent. There is growing support (59 percent), in both the public and the leadership groups surveyed, for active efforts by the CIA inside other countries to strengthen elements that serve the interests of the United States and to weaken those forces that work against U.S. interests.

There is less interest in news from abroad. And a declining percentage of both the public and the opinion leaders favor an "active" U.S. role in world affairs—59 percent, compared with 66 percent in 1974 and 68 percent in 1947, a peak year.

Unconditional Surrender

"The Origin of the Formula 'Unconditional Surrender' in World War II" by Michael Balfour, in Armed Forces and Society (Winter 1979), Social Science Building, University of Chicago, 1126 East 59th St., Chicago, Ill. 60637.

Perhaps the most controversial political decision of World War II was the Allies' policy of demanding the "unconditional surrender" of Germany, Italy, and Japan, announced by President Franklin D. Roosevelt at Casablanca on January 24, 1943. Although FDR tried to suggest that...
the announcement was unpremeditated, it had been recommended by a State Department advisory committee on postwar problems in May 1942 and approved by the U.S. military chiefs in December 1942.

Roosevelt and Churchill agreed not to compromise on the "unconditional surrender" formula for sound reasons, says Balfour, professor emeritus of history at the University of East Anglia, England. Official opinion was sharply divided within both Britain and the United States over whether a "hard" or "soft" policy toward Germany might influence the German people to turn against Hitler and sue for peace. The "unconditional surrender" formula avoided, or at least postponed, the "invidious task" of deciding what the terms of a hard or soft policy should be—the sort of debate Hitler hoped might provoke a serious split among the wartime allies.

Balfour contends that "unconditional surrender" was never exploited by Hitler's regime to bolster the German will to fight on. Although Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels is quoted as having called the formula "an epoch-making asininity of the first order," he preferred to bolster German resistance by invoking more lurid images of what an allied victory might bring (e.g., the castration of the entire male population).

There never was any realistic alternative to an "unconditional surrender" policy after 1941, when Winston Churchill's position as Britain's wartime leader was secure, says Balfour. The Russians were committed to the destruction of Germany, Churchill to the ending of Prussian militarism, and Roosevelt to a lasting peace based on a fundamental change in the German people and their concept of nationalism.

**The Case for the Helicopter**


With its prime focus on the NATO battlefield, the U.S. Army appears to have lost confidence in armed and troop-carrying helicopters, believing that the choppers are too vulnerable to Soviet ground fire, writes Gen. Howze, retired director of Army aviation.

A helicopter can certainly be shot down, he says, but when skillfully employed with tanks, infantry, artillery, and other helicopters, its vulnerability shrinks to an acceptable level and its effectiveness vastly increases.

In part, Howze bases his conclusions on field trials conducted in West Germany in 1972. The exercises pitted an "aggressor" armored force, supported by Soviet-type, mobile antiaircraft weapons, against a "friendly" force consisting of one U.S. M60 tank and either two scout helicopters and one armed (Cobra) helicopter or no scouts and two Cobras.

Sixty trials were run in which hits by ground and air weapons were recorded. Red smoke bombs lashed to ground vehicles and aircraft
were activated by laser beams triggered by the weapons "shooting" at them. Anti-armor helicopters, firing rockets, succeeded in destroying approximately 18 enemy tracked vehicles for each armed helicopter lost. When scout helicopter losses are included, approximately 13 enemy tanks or anti-aircraft vehicles were "killed" for each helicopter lost.

The rolling European terrain helped pilots who used nap-of-the-earth flight techniques to conceal their presence; the overcast skies and haze often made it difficult for the "aggressors" to see attacking helicopters until it was too late. With properly trained pilots, Howze concludes, "antiarmor helicopters employing hovering fire at standoff ranges are extremely effective in destroying attacking enemy armor."

The Manipulation of Russian Desire


The Carter administration's apparent reliance on tactical "linkage" to affect Soviet behavior (e.g., curtailing trade to induce Moscow to ease its harassment of dissidents) is not working, writes Sonnenfeldt, a former Kissinger aide now at the Brookings Institution.

The tactical, or narrow, approach, has several shortcomings. First, Carter administration officials have made clear that key elements in the U.S.-USSR relationship, such as SALT, are outside "linkage." Secondly, the current use of "linkage" inevitably harms significant American interest groups, such as bankers or farmers, who have a commercial stake in U.S.-Soviet relations. Lastly, there is little evidence that the Carter approach has forced any major Soviet concessions.

The strategic practice of broad linkage, however, begun by the Nixon administration in 1969, had produced by 1972 a "network of understandings, commitments, and processes" that provided the Soviets with incentives—some actual and some potential—for restrained conduct. The summit meeting in Moscow in May 1972, resulting in final approval of the SALT I agreement, was followed in July by a three-year arrangement covering the sale of U.S. grain to the USSR. By June, 1973, when Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev visited the United States, a total of nine agreements had been reached covering various forms of bilateral cooperation in scientific and other fields.

The Nixon approach, which was reinforced by a readiness to defend U.S. interests (e.g., the Nixon administration issued stern warnings in 1970 when the Russians tried to establish a submarine base in Cuba), faltered in the wake of Watergate and lost momentum during the Ford administration. The result was that the Soviets did not hesitate to back Angolan rebels in 1975-76, for example, because they knew they faced no substantial military risks on the ground, nor any painful reduction in contacts with the United States. Hence, strategic "linkage" was
never adequately tested.

The principal U.S.-Soviet issues are interrelated, says Sonnenfeldt. A new SALT agreement, for example, unaccompanied by broader restraints and improvements in political relations, is unlikely to have significant impact on East-West competition in strategic arms because avenues for new advances in strategic weaponry will remain available.

The problem of how to restrain Soviet power can best be overcome by a return to the broad, strategic linkage of the Nixon era, Sonnenfeldt argues. The Soviets want, and need, cooperation with the West. The United States should manipulate that desire in order to temper Moscow's antagonism and make clear our willingness to counter Soviet aggression.

Moving Ahead on MBFR

"European Security: Three Proposals" by David Linebaugh, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May 1979), 1020-24
East 58th St., Chicago, Ill. 60637.

Even as Moscow and Washington have been working out a complex SALT II agreement, another set of East-West negotiations has been underway in Vienna since 1973. These talks involve "mutual and balanced force reductions" in Europe by NATO and the Moscow-led Warsaw Pact nations. No overall agreement is expected soon in Vienna, writes Linebaugh, former deputy director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He argues for some interim steps:

¶ Token reductions and a freeze. Russia would withdraw one 11,000-man division from East Germany; America would withdraw two Army brigades (about 7,000 men) but not their equipment. Both sides would impose ceilings on their total military manpower in Central Europe. The purpose, says Linebaugh, would be chiefly political—"to prime the pump in Vienna MBFR negotiations, and to alter perceptions about the trend of events in Europe."

¶ "Stabilizing measures" to reduce the danger of surprise attack. Limiting any forces involved in major training exercises to 60,000 men, and temporary increases in total force levels in Central Europe to 25,000, would make it more difficult for the Russians to concentrate forces under cover of war games (as they did prior to their 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia).

Both sides are on the threshold of a nuclear arms race in Central Europe. Moscow is deploying in Western Russia an intermediate-range mobile missile, the SS-20, as well as new aircraft, including the Backfire bomber. Since 1976, the United States has stationed substantial numbers of "nuclear-capable" aircraft in Europe and may add long-range cruise missiles and a mobile ballistic missile.

For the moment, a de facto parity exists. Russia has deployed about 100 SS-20s; the British and French have about 120 missiles on their submarines. A moratorium on further deployment of the Soviet SS-20 and U.S. cruise missiles, says Linebaugh, would give the Vienna negotiators a chance to get ahead of weapons deployment.
The Benefits of Joblessness

From 1921 to 1938, the unemployment rate in Britain averaged 14 percent and never dropped below 9.5 percent (compared with an average of 2 percent during the first quarter century after World War II). Why did the high rate persist?

London’s efforts to control inflation by raising interest rates brought a sharp fall in prices and wages and pushed unemployment to 16 percent in 1921, but the joblessness continued even after prices and wages recovered. "By all appearances there was chronic unemployment in the midst of plenty," say economists Benjamin, of the University of Washington, and Kochin, of the Hoover Institution at Stanford.

Some economists blamed the overvaluation of the pound and the inability of Britain’s economy to absorb workers displaced from export industry jobs. But these factors should not have had a long-lasting effect. Other economists cited union obstinacy in fighting wage reductions. Yet in 1920-21, when union membership was at its interwar peak, wages fell by 23 percent.

The persistent unemployment between the two World Wars, say Benjamin and Kochin, can easily be explained by a single, long-overlooked factor—a British unemployment insurance system of unprecedented generosity.

Centrally administered unemployment compensation in Britain originated in 1913; it initially covered less than 15 percent of the work force and provided benefits amounting to about one-fourth of average weekly wages. By 1920, however, almost three-fourths of all workers were covered and benefits were raised to nearly 40 percent of average wages. By 1930, benefits exceeded half of average weekly wages, and claimants no longer even had to prove they were looking for work.

Benjamin and Kochin argue that once jobless benefits exceeded about 25 percent of average weekly wages, each full percentage point increase in the ratio of benefits to wages caused a rise in the unem-
ploymen rate of about one-quarter of one percentage point. While the
dole relieved extreme suffering caused largely by the government's
monetary mismanagement in 1920 and again in 1931–32, it reduced
Britain's annual production of goods and services by 2 to 3 percent.
Worse, the self-inflicted disease of insurance-induced unemployment
was misdiagnosed and treated by London with "the deadly medicines
of inflation and protectionism" that only compounded the problem.

America's New Mandarins

College graduates produced by the post–World War II boom in U.S.
higher education now command one in four jobs in the American labor
force, including nearly all the top professional and managerial
positions, says Ginzberg, an economist at Columbia University's Grad-
uate School of Business.

Salaried managers, as opposed to entrepreneurs and self-employed
professionals, dominate a changing economy. Their importance has
grown with the creation of new industries based on computers, the
transformation of family-owned corporations into multinational con-
glomerates, and the rapid expansion of nonprofit and governmental
activities.

Forty percent of workers in "professional, technical and kindred"
occupations (a Labor Department category that almost doubled in size
from 7 million to 13.7 million between 1958 and 1977) render their
services to organizations—business, nonprofit, and governmental. The
lower growth rate of the "managers and administrators" category (a 42
percent increase in the same 1958–77 period, from 6.8 million to 9.7
million) masks a major shift: the number of self-employed managers
(principally small businessmen) declined by 51 percent, while the
number of salaried managers jumped by 110 percent.

The full significance of these changes is not yet clear, says Ginzberg;
he notes that many of these college-educated professionals have been
trained to think critically. They do not automatically accept the values
and goals of the organizations they join. Because of their numbers and
expertise, they are in a position to inhibit the decision-making of senior
executives in organizations where, now, "nothing can happen" without
the participation or, at least, the acquiescence of middle management
and professional staff.

Though the growth of professionalization appears to be slowing,
Ginzberg concludes, "It remains to be seen whether the demands of the
new American mandarins for a stronger voice in corporate decision-
making can be met without subversion of the risk-taking, profit-
seeking, efficiency criteria on which the country's business system has
long rested."

"The Professionalization of the U.S. Labor Force" by Eli Ginzberg, in Scien-
tific American (Mar. 1979), 415 Madison
Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.
The Dirt-Rich Farmer

In classical economic theory, land prices are supposed to reflect farming's current and anticipated costs and returns. But the new boom in farmland prices, says Breimyer, a University of Missouri agricultural economist, "has inverted the normal economics of agriculture."

The appreciation of physical assets (e.g., land, equipment) in agriculture has far outstripped current income. Between January 1, 1971 and January 1, 1979, the value of such assets rose from $300 billion to $750 billion. Farm mortgage debt rose too, and in 1979 stood at $72 billion, compared to about $30 billion in 1971. The resulting gain of about $410 billion in equity in physical assets exceeded the $200 billion farmers earned from farming in 1971-79 by more than two to one.

This reversal of returns threatens the existing pattern of U.S. family farming, Breimyer warns. The big capital gains on land, which are fed by inflation and the poor performance of the stock market, will eventually create a separate landholding class in agriculture. The land boom has benefited some established farmers—those who bought acreage before inflation began and can capitalize their gains into larger holdings—but it has also attracted foreign investors and nonfarmers seeking tax shelters. Crowded out are families of modest means.

Farmers have won investment credit allowances for machinery, depreciation allowances in orchards (except citrus) and some livestock, and other concessions that generally make farming attractive as a tax haven. Inheritance laws have also been liberalized, ostensibly to help preserve the family farm. But these tax breaks are regressive; they benefit wealthy investors the most.

"Continued inflation in farmland prices coupled with present tax laws," says Breimyer, "will irrevocably lodge landholding with scions of old established farm families ... and high-tax-bracket nonfarmers."

Our Stable Crime Rate

Contrary to popular view, crime in the United States has not increased appreciably in the last few decades. It has remained remarkably stable, although reported crime has risen sharply, writes Doleschal, of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency.
The FBI's annual nationwide compilation of crime statistics, the Uniform Crime Reports, shows that the number of serious crimes committed during 1957 totaled 835 per 100,000 people. In 1967, the rate had risen to 2,989, and in 1977, the rate exceeded 5,200 per 100,000 people.

When the U.S. Census Bureau began conducting victimization surveys in 1973, it discovered that most crimes are never reported to the police and that actual crime rates were four times what the FBI reported. The Census Bureau data also showed that the actual rate for robberies resulting in injury, for example, was 2.3 per 1,000 persons aged 12 and over in 1973, 2.3 in 1974, 2.1 in 1975, and 2.1 in 1976. The rate for robbery of commercial enterprises, regarded as the most reliable indicator of the extent of criminal activity, was 38.8 in 1973, 38.8 in 1974, 39.4 in 1975, and 38.5 in 1976.

The national homicide rate (the number of people murdered each year per 100,000 population) has fluctuated between 5 and 10 for many years, says Doleschal. "As if set by a thermostat, the rate declines when it reaches or exceeds 10 and starts rising when it falls below 5."

The census data, Doleschal concludes, supports the contention of some criminologists that society tends to foster a stable level of crime (and punishment) in order to reinforce group values and social cohesion and to define the boundaries of acceptable behavior.

White Flight

"White Flight & Political Retreat" by Ernest Erber, in Dissent (Winter 1979), 505 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.

In 1966, University of Chicago sociologist James S. Coleman conducted a massive federally-funded study of segregation's adverse effects on the education of minority children. His report, Equality of Educational Opportunity, became the authoritative basis for 12 years of court-ordered school desegregation. Then, in 1975, Coleman shocked supporters of integration and delighted its foes when he announced he had changed his position; he had come to see the white exodus from large city school systems as a disaster caused by forced integration.

The implication of Coleman's change of mind—that less integration is the remedy for shrinking white enrollment in big city schools—has no validity, argues Erber, an urban and regional planner with the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing. There is no correlation between increases in minority enrollment and a drop in white student enrollment. For example, statistics show that, from 1968 to 1976, New York City, with one of the largest percentage increases of minority enrollment (14.3 percent) of any major city, had one of the smallest percentages of white loss (29.8 percent). Conversely, San Antonio lost more than half of its white students during that period, while its minority enrollment was also dropping (by 2.8 percent).

Erber argues that white families are not fleeing away from big city integrated schools but toward such social and economic benefits as new
jobs and better housing. From 1970 to 1975, for example, more than
twice as many households without children moved out of Chicago as
households with children. At the same time, thousands of black families
also moved to the suburbs.

Even if maintenance of racially segregated schools would influence
some white families to stay in the big cities, Erber concludes, this is no
justification for ending school desegregation. The Supreme Court has
ruled that segregation is wrong and should not be tolerated. The cause
of equality would be best served not by halting desegregation but by
including suburban schools in metropolitan integration orders.

How to Pay for
Social Security

"Aging U.S. Population Poses Threat to
Retirement Systems" by Harrison H.
Donnelly, and "Financing Squeeze Forces
New Assessment of Social Security" by
Christopher R. Conte, in Congressional
Quarterly (Mar. 17, 1979), 1414 22nd St.

In 1900, there were 3.1 million persons in the United States over the age
of 65; in 1975, there were 22.4 million. This represents a jump from 4
percent of the total population to 10 percent. As large as this increase
has been, it will be dwarfed by what happens when the post-1945 'baby
boom' generation turns 65.

If America's current low birth rate continues, says CQ reporter Don-
nelly, no less than 22 percent of the U.S. population will be over 65 by
the year 2030. This 'graying of America' threatens the viability of the
Social Security system; the number of Americans receiving social secu-
ritv benefits is increasing faster than the number of younger people
paying taxes to support the system.

The simplest remedy, writes CQ reporter Conte, is to raise the Social
Security tax rate. Congress has done this repeatedly, most recently in
1978 and 1979. But in terms of impact on taxpayers, the 1978 increase
was relatively small, and the 1979 increase was offset by a general tax
cut. In 1981, however, the Social Security tax rate is scheduled to jump
from 6.13 percent to 6.65 percent of covered wages—up $52 for some-
one earning $10,000, or up $388 for someone earning over $29,700.
PERIODICALS

SOCIETY

Such a boost is likely to be politically unpopular, says Conte, and Congress is already looking for ways to avoid or soften the blow. One obvious alternative would be to cut Social Security benefits, now tied to the cost-of-living; specific proposals range from raising the retirement age to reducing the benefits for disabled workers. A second controversial approach would be to extend coverage to the estimated 6 million federal and state employees not now covered, thus increasing the number of persons contributing to the system.

A more radical solution, Conte suggests, would be to revise the financing system by drawing funds from general tax revenues or by imposing a form of national sales tax. Whether any of these alternatives is more acceptable than the scheduled 1981 rate increase is a political issue that may ultimately be settled by the 1980 elections.

Condemned by Tranquilizers

"Ought a Defendant Be Drugged to Stand Trial?" by Glenn C. Graber and Frank H. March, in Hastings Center Report (Feb. 1979), 360 Broadway, Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y. 10706

Is it proper to bring a defendant to trial when his mental competence can only be assured with the help of tranquilizers?

William Earl Stacy was accused of fatally shooting a Knoxville bus station ticket agent in 1976 while in a wild and agitated state, say philosophers Graber of the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and Marsh, of Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Va. At Central State Psychiatric Hospital in Nashville, where he was transferred after his arrest, Stacy was diagnosed as a schizophrenic. While under treatment with antipsychotic medication, his condition improved to the point that the attending psychiatrist, Dr. Adolph F. Siegmann, judged that he was able to understand the nature of the legal proceedings against him and to consult with counsel and participate in his own defense. Without the medication, Dr. Siegmann testified, Stacy would not satisfy these legal criteria for competence to stand trial.

The appellate court of Tennessee ruled that Stacy should be tried in a state of "synthetic competence." Graber and Marsh contend that Stacy was being treated without his consent with the sole motive of making him competent to stand trial. The attending psychiatrist, moreover, was a state employee, like the prosecutor, and faced an acute ethical dilemma in having to choose between two modes of therapy—psychotherapy, with greater promise of long-term benefits to the patient but less likelihood of assuring his competence to stand trial, and antipsychotic drugs that guaranteed immediate competence to stand trial but less promise of long-term benefit.

There is another Catch-22 element in the case. If the jury could have seen the defendant without medication, his plea of innocence by reason of insanity might have succeeded.

Stacy's plea of insanity was disallowed, and he was found guilty.
Uninformed Voters


Question: "In what year did Columbus discover America?" Answer: "1942." A comically absurd reply? Not according to the results of a 1978 Gallup Poll, writes Peirce, a syndicated columnist.

A "citizenship test" administered in 1978 by the Gallup organization to one thousand 17- and 18-year-old Americans nationwide showed an ignorance of history, geography, and politics alarming among young people coming of voting age. Eighty-one percent of those polled did not know that party conventions make the final choice of presidential nominees; 41 percent were unaware that China is the most populous nation in the world; and only 18 percent understood the meaning of "detente."

The Gallup findings confirm the results of the National Assessment of Educational Progress, which show a steady decline since the early 1970s in knowledge of the U.S. governmental system among 17-year-olds. In 1976, the National Assessment revealed that only 50 percent of the young people surveyed knew that each state has two U.S. Senators, that the number of Representatives is based on population, and that the President cannot appoint members of Congress. Moreover, one-third of the 17-year-olds did not believe that newspapers and magazines should be allowed to publish articles critical of government officials.

The civic and political "illiteracy" of these potential voters, says Peirce, must be blamed on the country's schools and school teachers. Social studies are given low priority, and enrollment in civics courses is declining. The result can be seen in the answers of young people taking the Gallup citizenship test. Question: "Who was the Democratic candidate for President in 1972?" Answer: "Richard Ford."

Press & Television


The future of the black press in America is in doubt. The number of black newspapers is declining—from 208 in 1973 to 165 in 1979. Overall circulation is also falling—from a weekly total of 4,099,541 in 1973 to 2,901,162 in 1979. The two largest papers are Harlem's The Amsterdam News (92,760 daily) and Chicago's Daily Defender (34,000 daily).

Black newspapers must overcome a host of problems if they are to avoid fading away like America's foreign language press, writes La
Brie, a former research fellow at Harvard. Since the mid-1950s, when the white-owned news media discovered “minority affairs,” the black press has been forced into competition with the establishment media for talented black journalists. Production costs are rising.

The most serious problem, however, has been the failure of black publishers to show advertisers that their papers can reach black consumers, a market with $70 billion in disposable income. Only 15 percent of overall black newspaper circulation has been certified as “audited” by independent bodies such as the Audit Bureau of Circulation or Verified Audit of Circulations. Without some assurance that newspapers are actually received, potential advertisers cannot be sure that the black press is an effective advertising medium.

Few black newspapers print hard-hitting editorials or publish nationally-syndicated columnists; news copy is often poorly written or lacks depth in reporting. Most black publishers rate society news as most important to their readers, followed by sports and then news carried on the front page. Many blacks who have worked on black newspapers quit in frustration because so little revenue is reinvested in the business.

Not all black newspapers are poor news products, La Brie concludes; but many are, and their number is growing.

‘Televisionic’ Journalism

Tom Wolfe, author of The Pump House Gang, The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test, and other books associated with the “New Journalism,” has been both praised as a master stylist and dismissed (by critic Dwight Macdonald) as a “demagogic parajournalist.” What most analyses overlook, writes Kallan, a professor of communications at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, is that Wolfe and other New Journalists are attempting to compete for attention with popular television personalities via the printed page.

Wolfe’s style is uniquely suited to a TV-oriented audience that has learned to expect, and crave, excitement. He uses a variety of devices to achieve not only excitement but immediacy and credibility as well. It is “televisionic” journalism.

The third-person point of view is the stylistic device most associated with New Journalism. Scenes are presented to the reader through the eyes of a particular character who is presumed to be present, experiencing and reacting to what transpires. Scene by scene construction, using the present tense, conveys a sense of witnessing something that is happening now. The realism is heightened by extensive dialogue and the use of symbols—gestures, habits, manners, customs, styles of furniture,
and dress that provide instantly recognizable descriptive clues: "The grape workers were all in work clothes, Levi's chinos, Sears balloon-seat twills, K-Mart sports shirts, and so forth."

Wolfe's similes speak to a plebeian mentality; they are casual, colloquial, and comprehensible. "She had an incredible drunk smile that spread out soft and gooey like a can of Sherwin-Williams paint covering the world."

Wolfe has spawned scores of imitators in newspapers and magazines. New Journalism is more than a passing fancy, says Kallan. It persists as a general movement toward greater reportorial freedom and more innovative and subjective reporting; it testifies to the pervasiveness of television's influence.

**Surrogate Reality**


Criticism of television has grown to the point where some writers (e.g., Jerry Mander, author of *Four Arguments for the Elimination of Television*, 1978) have suggested that reform is futile and that there is nothing left to do but abolish the medium. But television need not be "insidious," writes Monaco, editor of *Media Culture*; it should be possible to reorder the priorities of the medium so that it conveys information rather than merely drama.

The remarkable power of television to dramatize its images and sounds—and the commercial exploitation of that power—has inflated viewers' need for drama, Monaco says. Many viewers watch more drama in one weekend than people in previous historical periods saw in a lifetime. The average American TV set is turned on for six hours a day. When work time and sleep are excluded, viewers spend more time experiencing television than reality. Hence, it is only natural that "reality is often disappointing."

Furthermore, the vast distribution system of television conveys images in a remarkably uniform dramatic style, integrating such disparate categories as news, sports, comedy, and commercials into a homogeneous flow of bits and pieces that inhibits the presentation of detailed information or intricate plots. Programming concentrates on character and personality—hence the popularity of talk shows ("the ultimate form of television") and the celebrity of newscasters. "We watch television to be with people . . . so the ultimate function of TV becomes surrogation," says Monaco. "To a large extent, it replaces experience."

There is no reason why television cannot be altered so that people value it for the information, rather than the drama, it conveys. However, Monaco concludes, television is not going to change until society does. It is the critic's task to help Americans to develop an adversary relationship with the medium.
**RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY**

**The New Radicals**

"Revs and Revolution: Church Trends and Theological Fashions" by David Martin, in *Encounter* (Jan. 1979), 59 St. Martin's Lane, London WC2N 4JS.

In recent years, says Martin, a sociologist at the London School of Economics, the World Council of Churches has criticized despotic rule in Brazil, South Korea, and other countries and called for an end to racism and poverty in the Third World. It has allied itself with what it calls "the party of humanity."

The Council, an ecumenical body made up of some 250 Protestant and Eastern Orthodox churches, has done this at some potential risk both to liberty and to the practice of Christianity. On the more radical fringes of Protestantism in the West, says Martin, political rhetoric has replaced confessional healing as the churchman's primary function.

The new radical celebrates self-expression and nonconformity. But, paradoxically, Martin notes, in repudiating the established order, the Left-liberal cleric often succumbs to a new kind of conformity and quickly embraces some new Commandments, the greatest of which is: "Thou shalt espouse self-expression but not individualism, applaud community but not consensus." Individualism is rejected because it suggests the Protestant ethic of thrift, initiative, and self-discipline. Self-expression is best achieved through group encounter sessions rather than through personal effort.

The zealotry of the political cleric springs from the political atmosphere of the 1960s. The radicals offer "spiritual psychology and encounter ideology tuned to Christian instruments," says Martin. They overflow with political rhetoric but offer little in the way of serious political analysis. Moreover, they don't bother to assess the kind of society that is to be achieved by political action or the costs to be assumed or values sacrificed in the process.

**Variations on an Islamic Theme**


Islam plays a vital role in Arab politics, but it is not monolithic; Islam has never meant the same thing to all Muslims. There are, however, three basic orientations of religious thought and behavior within Islam, says Humphreys, a research associate at the University of Chicago's Center for Middle Eastern Studies. They are: Fundamentalism, Modernism, and Secularism.
Fundamentalists reaffirm the literal truth of the Koran and its commandments (including the prohibition of intoxicants and usury); they revere the structure of ritual, moral standards, and law (called the shari'a) created by the lawyers and theologians of medieval Islam. Politically, Fundamentalism prescribes that the ruling elite be Muslim, that Muslim law be state law, and that Islam be the basis for international solidarity. Saudi Arabia comes closest to meeting the Fundamentalist criteria (although it abandoned some of the archaic commercial regulations of the shari'a in 1931).

The Modernists also revere the Koran and the shari'a but emphasize those aspects that harmonize best with the 20th century and Western ideas. Religious leaders are esteemed but seen as sometimes “out of touch.” Egypt is a typically Modernist-oriented state although not a “pure or consistent adherent.” Islam is the state religion, but the state exercises supervision and control of the Muslim religious establishment.

Secularists regard religion as a purely personal matter, without political consequence. Secularists may draw on the shari'a in matters of family law where popular custom dictates, but they recognize no rationale for law beyond contemporary utility. They grant no specific political role to religious spokesmen or leaders. Syria, which has no official state religion, is a “bold and frustrated” example of the Secularist approach.

Social Justice and the Church

Religion and politics are so tightly meshed in Latin America today that they cannot be separated. For centuries, the Catholic Church tended to reinforce the status quo, says Levine, a political scientist at the University of Michigan. But for more than a decade, religious conviction has served Latins “as a source of motivation for radical action and as an institutional shield for dissent from authoritarian rule.”

In the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council and the subsequent 1968 conference of Latin American bishops in Medellin, Colombia, leaders of the Church began to accept the notion of change and to
promote social justice. Lesser churchmen focused attention on the poor and the need to overcome the misery of poverty, not only through individual charity but also through political action.

Controversial Christian-Marxist alliances were formed all over Latin America during the early 1970s, especially in Colombia, Chile, and Peru. Leftist pressures led to what has come to be known as "Liberation Theology," a distinctively Latin American concept that holds that religious and political liberation go together. Such spokesmen for Liberation Theology as the Peruvian priest Gustavo Gutiérrez argue that the problem for religion is not atheism or indifference but the need to transform the social and political structure of a dehumanizing society. As radical Catholic clergymen and lay allies adopted more open political commitments, writes Levine, their activism was matched by ultra-conservative Societies for the Defense of Tradition, Family, and Property (TFP), most notably in Brazil and Chile. TFP members combine very traditional forms of Catholic religious practice (e.g., the Latin mass) with a strong commitment to reactionary social, economic, and political positions. They uphold the sanctity of private property and see themselves as part of a general counterrevolutionary offensive.

Caught in the middle, the Latin American bishops are trying to hold the Church and the Catholic community together while retaining maximum possible autonomy from governments and political groups alike. They have resisted attempts by both Left and Right to harness the moral authority of Catholicism to a particular image of the ideal social and political order.

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

The Earliest Englishman


For more than 40 years, Piltdown man was believed to be Darwin's "missing link" between apes and humans. Not until 1953 was its discovery shown to be one of the great hoaxes in the history of science. The true mystery of Piltdown, says Gould, a Harvard biologist and science historian, is why it took so long to expose the fraud.

The skull fragments, jaw, and teeth of Piltdown were first "discovered" near Piltdown Common, Sussex, in 1912 by Charles Dawson (1846–1916), an amateur archeologist, in collaboration with the British Museum's Arthur Smith Woodward and the French Jesuit, Father Teilhard de Chardin. The association of a human-like cranium with an apish jaw troubled many observers, but none suspected fraud. Britain's
most respected paleontologists, including Smith Woodward, Arthur Keith, and Grafton Elliot Smith, staked their reputations on the authenticity of *Eoanthropus*, the "dawn man."

Finally, in 1953, after applying a fluorine test to the presumably 500,000-year-old fragments, Kenneth P. Oakley discovered that the skull and jaw were artificially stained and the teeth filed to simulate human wear. The cranium, he proved, belonged to a modern human; the jaw was an orangutan's.

The Piltdown hoax, Gould speculates, was most likely not a malicious forgery but a prank concocted by Dawson and Teilhard de Chardin, then a "fun-loving young student." Dawson wanted to expose the gullibility of pompous British professional paleontologists; Teilhard wanted to remind the English that they lacked France's rich lode of human fossils.

Why did the hoax escape earlier detection? One reason, Gould suggests, was professional rivalry that encouraged British scientists to accept Piltdown as the predecessor of Europe's Neanderthal man, first discovered near Dusseldorf, Germany, in 1856. Another was cultural chauvinism. Piltdown, with his highly developed brain, could be claimed as the earliest Englishman, the progenitor of the white race. The Chinese and other races would have to make do with Peking man discovered in 1927, who had a brain only two-thirds as large.

The Piltdown hoax, says Gould, shows science "as a human activity, motivated by hope, cultural prejudice, and the pursuit of glory."

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Is 'Technology' a Sexist Word?

American women have traditionally functioned as passive consumers of science and technology—not as producers. And technological progress has occurred with little concern for the special impact it may have on women's lives.

This peculiar estrangement of women from technology, says Cowan, an historian at the State University of New York, Stony Brook, has existed for decades. Standard histories of technology, for example,
make no reference to the baby bottle, a significant cultural artifact and one of the more controversial Western exports to underdeveloped countries. Much has been written about the impact of the bicycle, but almost nothing about the baby carriage or the historical development of cribs, playpens, and other paraphernalia of modern child rearing.

"We do not usually think of women as bearers of technological change," says Cowan, "nor do we think of the home as a technological locale (in part because women reside there)."

The domestic household has resisted industrialization, in part because Americans have long idealized the household as a place where men could retreat from the pressures of the technological order. Occasional reformers, most of them women (Catherine Beecher, Lillian Gilbreth), have advocated communal canneries, laundries, kitchens, and nursery schools, but such notions have been branded socialistic and therefore un-American. Many important labor-saving devices—the automatic washing machine, vacuum cleaner, and refrigerator, for example—were first developed (by men) for commercial and not home use. Today, Cowan asserts, some household appliances (e.g., microwave ovens) are acquired less to increase efficiency than to demonstrate family status.

In America, the land of practicality and Yankee ingenuity, the engineering profession is regarded as inappropriate for women. This may help to explain why the recent upsurge in "antiscience" and "antitechnology" attitudes has coincided with an upsurge in women's political activism.

Accentuating the Positive

"Technology: Hope or Catastrophe?" by Harvey Brooks, in Technology in Society (Spring 1979), Pergamon Press, Maxwell House, Fairview Park, Elmsford, N.Y. 10523

Are science and technology going to save the world or destroy it? Even nonradical scientists have begun to fear that the unintended negative effects of advanced technology may outweigh the positive effects, according to Brooks, former Dean of Engineering and Applied Physics at Harvard.

He cites some concerns: the development of fluorocarbons and nitrogen fertilizers that may be dissipating the stratospheric ozone layer that protects humans from harmful solar radiation; the specialization of knowledge that threatens democratic decision-making; and medical advances that have given rise to uncontrolled population growth.

Some scientists have jumped aboard the small-is-beautiful "appropriate technology" bandwagon, proposing that technology be used in a more restricted way by small, largely self-sufficient communities. Others, such as biologist Garrett Hardin of the University of California, Santa Barbara, have proposed a "lifeboat ethic" that permits some part of humanity, perhaps the desperately poor of the underdeveloped
world, to perish so that others may live in affluence, without competition, and without overloading the ecosystem.

Most of the pessimists see a rigidly finite world. Brooks argues that the earth's resource base is constantly changing and expanding with new knowledge and technology. Resources are not consumed; they are transformed in the process of serving mankind and can be recovered at a price. In this sense, says Brooks, "the pie is expandable, given sufficient time, technical wisdom and foresight, and the political will to defer current consumption for investment in future supply."

Optimism about the future, he concludes, requires some assurance of controlled population growth, a sustainable energy supply (solar, the breeder reactor, or fusion), a world trading system that benefits all countries, and continued technological progress aimed at producing more goods and services more efficiently.


Noting that commercial ocean vessels today account for almost 8 percent of total oil consumption in the non-communist world, Bergeson, a marine engineer, suggests that sail power could ultimately fill 50 to 75 percent of ocean transport requirements.

Commercial sailing ships were brought to a high state of development in the early 1900s before low-cost fossil fuels made steamers and diesel motor ships more economical. The German square-rigged ship,

As a square-rigger, the Preussen carried 53 sails. Only 11 sails are required with the modern schooner rig shown here.
Preussen, built in 1902, carried 8,000 long tons of cargo at a maximum sustained sea speed of 17 knots and an average voyage speed of 7.5 knots. The vessel's 60,000 square feet of sail, carried on five masts, were safely handled by only 41 men using a hand-powered winch system. The seven-masted schooner, Thomas W. Lawson, also built in 1902, at Quincy, Mass., carried 8,000 to 11,000 deadweight tons and represented the ultimate design in the development of the fore-and-aft rigged commercial schooner.

Bergeson believes that new antifouling bottom coatings, synthetic fabric sails, fore-and-aft rigging that permits "motor-sailing" in light winds, and the use of modern hull forms, including catamarans, can greatly improve the performance of large sailing ships. Carrying only limited amounts of fuel, the ships would have engines available to use in emergencies as well as to avoid severe storms and escape calms.

Unguided Missiles and Other Debris

The U.S. Air Force's North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) monitors the status of all objects launched into space. As of April 1, 1978, a total of 10,791 satellites, rockets, and various pieces of nonfunctional debris had been placed in orbit, of which 6,191 had fallen out of orbit and either burned up in the atmosphere or returned to earth.

One of the tasks of the NORAD Space Defense Center, says Doyle, a deputy director of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), is to predict which objects are likely to survive re-entry. It is an imprecise science, at best.

When America's new Space Shuttle makes its maiden flight early in 1980, for example, it will jettison a large external fuel tank at about the time it reaches an altitude of 60 nautical miles. The release is timed so that whatever pieces of the tank survive the intense heat of re-entry will fall into the Indian Ocean west of Australia. Because of such uncertain factors as the aerodynamics of the tumbling tank, however, NORAD can only suggest that the debris has a 97 percent chance of falling into a strip of ocean 1,700 miles long and 50 miles wide.

Given this degree of uncertainty about an object of known size, weight, and shape, says Doyle, it is impossible to know where and when pieces of a space satellite will come down when it malfunctions and then skips, hops, and dives through the atmosphere shattering into segments of varying size and weight. On the morning of January 19, 1978, when radioactive chunks of the Soviet Union's Cosmos 954 landed in Northwest Canada, the Russians were predicting that it would return to earth near the Aleutian Islands, and NORAD predicted a splashdown near Hawaii.
Gas from Sugar

After World War II, Brazil, with the world’s fifth largest land area and sixth largest population, came to depend almost entirely on the internal combustion engine and a massive road network to help develop its economy and tie together its vast territory. No other major nation now relies so heavily on trucks and cars.

The sharp 1973-74 increases in the price of imported oil hit Brazil hard. A cumulative trade surplus of $4.7 billion, earned between 1945 and 1973, was wiped out by a $10.3 billion deficit over the next three years, leaving an overall negative trade balance of $5.6 billion for the 1945-76 period. To meet this economic challenge, writes Gall, a consultant to the American Universities Field Staff, Brazil is turning to alternate fuel supplies based on photosynthesis.

Brazil’s vast sugar plantations have been producing alcohol as a by-product for 50 years. In 1974, production totaled 740 million liters (195 million gallons). The government’s goal is to produce 5 billion liters annually by 1980, permitting the use of alcohol as a fuel in a 20 percent mixture with gasoline, as well as a raw material for the chemical industry. This effort will require 234 new distilleries and 1.5 million hectares (3.7 million acres) of new sugar cane plantings.

Pilot plants have been established in several parts of the country where experiments are under way for making alcohol from wood, manioc, and the babacu, a wild palm that thrives in Brazil’s northeast. Besides saving scarce foreign exchange, says Gall, conversion to alcohol as a major fuel source can provide rural jobs, reduce urban air pollution (alcohol burns more cleanly than gasoline), and put low-fertility croplands into useful production.

Salvage Rites

On March 16, 1978, the supertanker Amoco Cadiz ran aground and sank in heavy seas off the town of Portsall on the Brittany coast, spilling 220,000 tons of high-grade Iranian-Saudi crude oil into the sea. It may hold the record for the most catastrophic grounding for years to come, says Clark, director of the Conservation Foundation’s Coastal Resources Program.
The lethal effects of the oil spill on birds and aquatic life were enormous. Some 20,000 cormorants, guillemots, auk, and rare Atlantic puffins were killed. In one coastal bay, 9,000 tons of Breton oysters were destroyed or officially condemned as unfit for market. All told, more than 100 miles of shoreline were affected.

More than one-fourth of the oil cargo penetrated two or three feet into the bottom sediments of coastal bays and estuaries beyond reach of bacterial decomposition. "The bottom-dwelling part of the food chain may be crippled and unable to sustain an abundance of fish and other life in these bays for many years to come," says Clark.

Was the disaster preventable? The Liberian-registered Amoco Cadiz was "an economy-model tanker" with no back-up steering system to take over when the rudder mechanism failed only eight miles off the French coast. Even so, its Italian captain vacillated for six hours before officially accepting assistance. A French salvage tug was alongside in less than three hours and could have prevented the grounding, but the captains and owners of the tanker and salvage tug bickered endlessly over the question of salvage rights. Later, a towing cable parted in the stormy night, and the supership went aground.

International rules on crew training and safety need to be tightened, says Clark. But the solution to the foul-ups that produced the Amoco Cadiz disaster is to replace traditional salvage operators with "an effective international rescue program."

Cleaning Up Carbon Dioxide

Mounting concern that the burning of fossil fuels may lead to increased concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and catastrophic climatic changes is often cited as grounds for greater reliance on nuclear energy.

There is reason to believe, however, says Gribben, a researcher at the University of Sussex, that the destruction of the earth's biomass, especially its forests, is adding as much carbon dioxide to the atmosphere as the combustion of fossil fuels. The carbon dioxide is released when wood is burned as fuel, as is common in much of the Third World, and when vegetation dies and decomposes.

Moreover, the destruction of forests reduces the amount of carbon dioxide that is removed from the atmosphere by the natural process of photosynthesis. Reforestation and properly managed timberlands can increase the normal transformation of carbon dioxide into oxygen and also provide firewood to augment fossil fuels for central power plants and home heating.

Gribben believes that carbon dioxide should be regarded as a pollutant, or waste, to be treated like the wastes from nuclear power
stations. Processes already exist by which carbon dioxide can be "scrubbed" from the waste gases emitted by power stations and blast furnaces. Ultimately, new ways will be found to convert the carbon dioxide into solid compounds that can be stored in abandoned coal mines or injected into offshore waters (e.g., the Straits of Gibraltar) where the prevailing currents will carry them to the ocean depths.

The increased technological sophistication required to deal with carbon dioxide as a pollutant, he says, will raise fuel costs. But these costs should properly be compared to the costs of developing nuclear power and dealing with spent nuclear fuel.

"The Energy Stalemate"

The announced energy goal of the last three American Presidents has been to reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil. Yet oil imports have been increasing, says Yergin, an energy consultant, and will continue to increase. Imports are likely to average more than 9 million barrels a day in 1979, or almost 50 percent of U.S. consumption.

Dependence on foreign oil puts a strain on the U.S. dollar and risks creating a seller's market with higher prices and the danger of supply cutoffs for either technical or political reasons. Competition for oil has already caused tensions among Western industrial nations and suspicions that the United States is seeking to pre-empt Saudi Arabia's oil production and boost U.S. imports in order to hoard domestic oil reserves. (U.S. imports of OPEC oil grew by 70 percent between 1973 and 1977, while those of most other major Western industrial countries declined or remained stable.)

Why has there been no effective American response to the oil crisis? Primarily, says Yergin, because of the enormous stakes involved: "To frame an energy policy is to allocate large benefits and large costs and

U.S. OIL IMPORTS

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should benefit from OPEC's arbitrary price increases? These increases, in effect, have boosted the value of known U.S. oil and gas reserves by an estimated $800 billion.

Careful analysis, says Yergin, shows that, regardless of financial incentives, domestic oil and natural gas production can only be sustained, not increased; that President Carter's goal of annually producing 1.2 billion tons of coal by 1985 cannot be met; and that the de facto moratorium on major nuclear power development is likely to continue.

On the other hand, conservation and decentralized solar energy have yet to be really tested. (Solar energy could possibly supply up to a quarter of America's energy needs by the year 2000.)

U.S. energy policy continues to be held in stalemate by contending special interest groups—including both consumers and producers. This means ever-increasing imports of foreign oil—perhaps until the international energy distribution system can no longer stand the strain.

What Price Safety?


Should the federal government be compelled to analyze the precise costs and benefits of its new regulations intended to reduce exposure to cancer-causing agents and other hazards? Must the government set a monetary value on human life?

Such questions have become crucial, says National Journal correspondent Kirschten, since Federal Appeals Court Judge Charles Clark demanded to know in October 1978 how many cases of cancer would be avoided if managers of U.S. refineries and petrochemical plants spent the $500 million required to meet federal standards on benzene emissions. Judge Clark set aside the proposed new benzene standard after an industry witness alleged that the controls might avert two cases of leukemia every six years at a cost of $300 million per life saved, and federal officials declined to make any estimate.

Different decisions came down in three other recent cases—dealing with asbestos dust, vinyl chloride, and coke-oven emissions. Federal appeals courts ruled that the Labor Department Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) does not have to justify workplace standards by quantifying expected health gains; OSHA need only prove that industry is capable of reducing the hazards to workers.

The U.S. Supreme Court must ultimately decide whether precise risk-benefit analyses are necessary. Yet, says Kirschten, many specialists contend that insufficient technical knowledge renders most such analyses meaningless. Some reputable scientists believe that humans have natural defense systems that protect them from low-level exposure to many toxic substances so long as a certain "threshold level" is
not exceeded. But there is no proof that such a threshold exists; long-term exposure to cancer-causing agents, like benzene, may have a cumulative effect.

**ARTS & LETTERS**

*High Adventure for Lower Classes*

There was a preoccupation with juvenile delinquency in Victorian England, and a species of popular literature known as the "penny dreadful" was often blamed for criminal behavior in the young.

Heroes of the "penny dreadful" periodicals, writes Dunae, a University of British Columbia historian, were usually young boys who quarreled with their employers or schoolmasters and then ran off to live adventurous lives as pirates and highwaymen. The stories were condemned by clergymen, journalists, and magistrates because they "glorified physical aggression" and encouraged disrespect for authority among working-class youth.

Middle-class apprehensions grew as the spread of mass literacy in England produced scores of these magazines aimed at adolescent boys in the 1870s. Hundreds of thousands of the penny periodicals were sold weekly under such titles as *Bad Boys' Paper, Boy's Standard,* and *Boy's World, Boys of England,* published from 1866 to 1899, featured the adventures of Jack Harkaway, who, says Dunae, "waylaid travelers at gunpoint, led insurrections in the schoolhouse," and formed questionable attachments to attractive older women.

There were some attempts by social reformers to launch more wholesome competing journals but most of these appealed to the parents of middle-class children rather than to working-class juveniles. A series of "penny healthfuls" published in 1895 offered poetry, prose, and fairy tales especially edited for young readers.
More successful was Boy's Own Paper, a periodical founded by the Religious Tract Society, which in the 1890s had the highest circulation of any boys' periodical in Britain. By then, British imperialism was in full flower, and there was a general admiration for all things military and muscular. Even the young heroes of the respectable periodicals were fighting—not against teachers and policemen but against savage tribesmen and other enemies of Queen Victoria.

It is doubtful that the penny dreadful inspired social misconduct; it may even have had a cathartic effect, says Dunae. Indeed, most evidence indicates that juvenile crime in Britain declined in the last quarter of the 19th century.

“A Monument to Pride or to Love?”

India's Taj Mahal, the beautiful, white marble mausoleum built near Agra by the Mughal emperor Shah Jahan (1592-1666) for his wife Mumtaz Mahal, has long been regarded as a symbol of marital devotion. Official accounts depicted Shah Jahan as grief-stricken when Mumtaz Mahal died suddenly in 1631, at the age of 38, a few hours after giving birth to their 14th child.

Although she was the second of Shah Jahan's three legal wives, writes Begley, art historian at the University of Iowa, Mumtaz Mahal was clearly his favorite. She was the mother of all his living children (except for one daughter by his first wife) and his constant companion during the 19 years of their marriage. In the early 19th century, Persian historians wrote that Shah Jahan was so faithful to Mumtaz Mahal that he remained celibate for the 35 remaining years of his life.

Contemporary accounts by European visitors, however, portray Shah Jahan as arrogant, petty, and ruthless. Sir Thomas Roe, the first British ambassador to the Mughal Court, found the emperor obsessed with power and the emblems of power; French and Italian travelers reported that the Shah carried on an incestuous relationship with his eldest daughter and ultimately died of a urinary dis-
order brought on by overdoses of aphrodisiacs.

In 1914, the German philosopher Hermann Keyserling expressed his doubts about the romantic origins of the Taj Mahal, wondering if it was not intended to symbolize the emperor's own achievements rather than serve as a funeral monument to his wife. Begley agrees. The architectural plan of the immense complex and the choice of Koranic passages inscribed on the mausoleum and its gateway suggest that the Taj was conceived as a vast allegory of Paradise and the Day of Resurrection, when the dead shall arise and proceed to the place of judgement beneath the Divine Throne.

The Taj Mahal, Begley concludes, seems "less a romantic symbol of devotion than a vainglorious, yet profound attempt to define God in Shah Jahan's own terms, perhaps even to rival him."

**Rewriting Marx**

The radical graduate students of the 1960s have become the radical young professors of the 1970s. For the first time in American history, says Cole, a former college English teacher, a "sizable" community of Marxists and radicals is teaching in the nation's universities. They have spawned a number of new radical and Marxist journals. Among them: Politics and Society, The Insurgent Sociologist, Human Factor, Radical Teacher, Radical History Review, Praxis, Radical Philosophy, KAPITALISTATE, and Marxist Perspectives.

Mostly produced by academics and often edited collectively, these publications cover almost every field of research in the humanities and social sciences. Ironically, writes Cole, they are flourishing at a moment when radical student political activity has largely withered and died.

Occasionally these journals publish some useful research, as when Radical America delved into the early history of the homosexual movement in America. But, unfortunately, they are often as guilty of obscurantism, dullness, and devotion to jargon as the nonradical, non-Marxist publications their editors hope to supplant. The theoretical articles, Cole contends, are "heavily-handed and needlessly abstract; worst of all, they add little that is new to the storehouse of Marxist thought."

Their failure is partially explained by the academic training of most of the authors. A more fundamental problem lies in Marxism itself. Marxism is not just another commodity in the marketplace of ideas, Cole observes. Its purpose is not simply to interpret the world but to help change it. The great interpreters of Marxist thought—from Lenin to Mao Tse-tung—have all been leaders of mass working-class movements. Marxists often criticized the powerful U.S. social movements of the 1960s (e.g., the struggles for racial equality and welfare rights) for their lack of theory. But these new journals, Cole concludes, "are the expression of a theory without a movement."

*The Wilson Quarterly/Summer 1979*
OTHER NATIONS


What really caused the downfall of the Shah of Iran? The obvious factors—economic difficulties, social injustice, political repression—all existed, but they don’t explain very much, says Laqueur, of Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies. The same conditions can be found in most Third World countries. In Algeria, for example, a third of the workforce is unemployed, despite the oil revenues, and political opposition is harshly suppressed.

“The impression was created in the Western media that Iran was a more brutal dictatorship than others, whereas it was in fact only less effective,” says Laqueur. The Shah labored under many handicaps. He had been on the throne too long (almost 40 years); he lacked the charisma and demagogic skills to be a successful modern-style dictator, like Cuba’s Fidel Castro.

The strongly religious character of the demonstrations against the Shah came as a surprise. Even so, Laqueur argues, the conservative, urban merchant class constitutes a political force in Iran that equals in importance the Islamic clergy and is more powerful than the Left—which played only a modest role in the Shah’s downfall. The Iranian economy now faces a difficult period of retrenchment and adjustment that will be eased, in part, by oil royalties. Political tranquility will take longer and will come with the rise of a new autocracy, not democracy.

Iran is unlikely to become a Soviet satellite like Afghanistan, says Laqueur, but there is danger that the Iranian turmoil, and the process of apparent disintegration in Pakistan and Turkey, will spread to other Asian and African countries, which have now come to question the power and will of the United States to help them.

"Why They Won’t Speak Our Language in Asia" by Selig S. Harrison, in Asia (Mar.-Apr. 1979), P.O. Box 379, Fort Lee, N.J. 07024.

White House Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski once predicted that Asia would succumb sooner or later to the homogenizing impact of a "technocratic era" in which cultural differences virtually disappeared.

Just the opposite seems to be occurring, says Harrison, a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "Cultural divisions are hardening rather than dissolving." This is especially apparent in the sensitive sphere of linguistic policy, where indigenous languages are being pushed at the expense of English.
Unlike Japan, which laid the foundations for modernization in the last century by establishing a broad base of literacy in a standardized Japanese language, the major non-communist countries of South and Southeast Asia are multilingual. Most must choose not only between one indigenous language and English, the language of a former colonial ruler, but also between national and local (or regional) languages.

From Pakistan to Malaysia, the enormous numbers of new students and teachers in these countries make it difficult to use English as a national medium of instruction; for one thing, there are not enough qualified instructors. In Malaysia, the switch from English to the national language, Bahasa Malaysia—a standardized version of Malay—has now been completed in most elementary and secondary schools. Even in the Philippines, where English has deep roots, Tagalog is now spoken by more than half the population and is overtaking English as the lingua franca.

The shift to native languages is part of a larger effort by Asian politicians and intellectuals to reaffirm indigenous cultural identities. Noting that “the line between nativism and xenophobia is a narrow one,” Harrison warns: “We are not headed toward one world but toward a world deeply divided by a color line that coincides all too closely with economic inequities and cultural differences.”

Mobilizing the Muslim Masses

The unequal distribution of manpower in the Soviet Union could result in a slowing of industrial growth, localized unemployment, and social unrest during the next few decades if Soviet leaders fail to shift surplus labor from Central Asia to the industrial centers of European Russia. “Burgeoning rural Muslim populations” of Kazakhstan and Central Asia now provide the major increases in Soviet manpower, writes Rywkin, a professor of Russian studies at City College of New York.

Between 1958 and 1975, gross “European” reproduction rates in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.), the Ukraine, and Byelorussia dropped from a range of 1.14 to 1.36 (1 = a roughly static population) to only .98 for the R.S.F.S.R., 1.0 for the Ukraine, and 1.08 for Byelorussia. In contrast, the birthrate for the Muslim majority in Soviet Central Asia continued to rise. In 1975, the population of the R.S.F.S.R. grew at a rate of 5.9 per 1,000, while that of heavily Muslim Uzbekistan increased by 27.3 per 1,000.

Yet rural Muslims show little inclination to move to labor-short industrial areas; it is primarily non-Muslims who are migrating out of the Muslim regions. If Muslim migration does not occur, Rywkin warns, the Soviet government will need to either rapidly increase overall labor

OTHER NATIONS

productivity to meet production goals or move new industries to rural Muslim regions to utilize untrained manpower.

The result in any case will be an increase in the political and economic importance of the Muslim minority. In Soviet Central Asia, "there is a growing feeling of Muslim identity, of linguistic solidarity" that goes beyond religious practice. To win the cooperation of Muslim workers, Soviet leaders may be forced to accommodate a vigorous new ethnic pride that resists integration within the new "Soviet Nation."

The Muslim populations of Kazakhstan and the rest of Soviet Central Asia are growing faster than the Slavic peoples of Western Russia.

West African Miracle?


The Ivory Coast Republic’s economic growth, apparent political stability, and internationally respected President, Houphouet Boigny, have created what is often called the "Ivorian miracle."

But Africa Report correspondent Rondos argues that the Ivory Coast may be headed for trouble because of the very factors that helped produce its 8 percent annual growth rate: heavy reliance on foreign capital, markets, and labor since independence from France in 1960.

More than 45 percent of Ivorian capital investment has come from abroad, mostly from France. Public investment is substantial, but there is little domestic private investment, indicating the absence of a dynamic entrepreneurial class among the 6.5 million Ivorians. Coffee, cocoa, and timber account for the bulk of total exports (75 percent in 1977), leaving the Ivory Coast vulnerable to adverse weather conditions and commodity price fluctuations. Timber makes up 20 percent of exports and employs 20 percent of all industrial workers. Between 1966 and 1974, however, more than 13 million acres of forest were destroyed, 80 percent of it by planters clearing land for coffee and cocoa plantations. Only 50,000 acres have been reforested.
In 1970, more than a million foreign workers, mostly from Upper Volta, were employed in the Ivory Coast, accounting for almost half the agricultural labor force. A drop in coffee and cocoa production due to a 1978 drought led to an exodus of these laborers, who are now reluctant to return without assured work contracts. Meanwhile, some 50,000 French nationals (compared with 12,000 at independence) continue to hold key positions in industry and government.

Economic and political power is closely held by a small elite of wealthy Ivorian planters and government officials in Abidjan, says Rondos. There is no meaningful public participation in the nation's ruling Parti Democratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), and there have been signs of restlessness among students and younger party members.

The View from Seoul

In October, 1978, two events occurred which underscored South Korea's complex security dilemma, says Han, professor of international relations at the University of Korea. First, Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo and Chinese Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-ping issued a joint assessment that no "war tension" currently existed on the Korean peninsula. A few days later, the United Nations Command in Seoul announced the discovery of a third North Korean invasion tunnel under the demilitarized zone.

Provocative acts, such as the construction of "invasion tunnels" and the build-up of North Korea's "offensive capabilities," last year showed that President Carter's 1977 plan to withdraw U.S. ground forces from South Korea by 1982 was "ill-advised and premature," writes Han. President Carter subsequently revised the withdrawal schedule, augmented U.S. air power in South Korea, and secured congressional approval for a major South Korean military improvement program.

On the international, domestic, and economic fronts, South Korea made satisfactory progress last year, Han reports. Relations with the United States "began to return to normalcy" despite the Koreagate scandal. South Korea made headway in its efforts to establish official relationships with communist countries, particularly the Soviet Union.

Despite government financial scandals, President Park Chung-hee won re-election over a divided opposition party, and South Korea continued to enjoy an extraordinarily high rate of economic growth (15.5 percent according to preliminary estimates). Foreign exchange earnings soared due to exports and overseas construction contracts. While accommodation grows between China and the United States and Japan, the threat from the North remains paramount for South Korea, says Han. The government reasons that "only an insurmountable superiority in economic and military power" will force North Korea's Kim Il-sung to abandon plans for a forceable takeover of the South.

RESEARCH REPORTS

"Resource Trends and Population Policy: A Time for Reassessment"

Worldwatch Institute, 1776 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
55 pp. $2.00.
Author: Lester R. Brown

The world's population now stands at 4.2 billion and is increasing by some 70 million per year. Official U.N. population projections, widely used for planning purposes throughout the world, show population expanding to some 12 billion before eventually stabilizing about 100 years from now.

These projections assume that the basic energy, food, and other natural resources required to support human life are going to be available in the future as they have been in the past.

This is unrealistic, says Brown, president of Worldwatch Institute. In recent years, as world population moved toward the 4 billion mark, human needs began to outstrip the productive capacity of the earth's basic biological systems—fisheries, forests, grasslands, and croplands.

For example, the total world fish catch increased along with population until the latter reached 3.6 billion in 1970. Despite new investment in fishing fleets, the annual catch has remained around 70 million metric tons.

Similar trends have occurred elsewhere. Per capita production of mutton peaked in 1972 at 1.92 kilograms per person, and per capita wool production peaked at 0.87 kilograms in 1959. Worldwide, per capita timber production peaked in the mid-70s. Since 1971, per capita production of the wheat, rice, corn, and other cereals that supply well over half our food energy has leveled off.

In the past, substitution of petroleum and petroleum products has partially offset shortages of croplands and commodities of biological origin.

PEAK YEARS: WORLD PRODUCTION OF KEY COMMODITIES, Per Capita

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Wood</th>
<th>Fish</th>
<th>Beef</th>
<th>Mutton</th>
<th>Wool</th>
<th>Cereals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>9.43</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>10.59</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>10.80</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>10.75</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>11.81</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows the years in which world per capita production of key commodities peaked; thereafter, future production gains failed to keep pace with world population growth. (1 cubic meter = 35.314 cubic feet; 1 kilogram = 2.679 Troy pounds)

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Kerosene substituted for firewood. Synthetics replaced natural fibers. Now, the growth in oil production has slowed, and prices have risen sharply. There is no longer cheap oil to help boost the earth’s population-sustaining capacity.

World population growth must be halted at about 6 billion, says Brown. Stabilizing at a lower level would be exceedingly difficult, given the great momentum of population growth inherent in the large numbers of young people coming into their reproductive years. Yet, Barbados, China, Costa Rica, Indonesia, and Singapore have shown it can be done.

There are five areas in which governments can act to slow population growth: providing family planning services, improving social conditions (such as nutrition and literacy), reshaping economic and social policies (such as those governing the number of children for whom tax deductions can be claimed), improving the status of women (through education and jobs), and encouraging people to understand how population size affects the quality of their daily lives.

“Collective Bargaining And Employee Participation in Western Europe, North America and Japan”


Authors: Benjamin C. Roberts, Hideaki Okamoto, and George C. Lodge.

Collective bargaining between trade unions and industrial management in Western Europe, North America, and Japan should be supplanted by cooperation involving greater employee participation in management. So say the authors of this report by the Trilateral Task Force on Industrial Relations.

As a simple power contest, collective bargaining does not cover enough issues of importance to the welfare of employees, such as adjustments to new technology. Labor-management bargaining also pushes up labor costs and, thus, inflation, even during periods of slack demand. A more cooperative approach could promote a healthier industrial climate.

Western Europe has gone the furthest in involving employees in management, through “works councils.” West Germany’s “co-determination” policy provides for one-half of the directors of most companies to be elected by the employees. In Sweden, unions are seeking to obtain control of some equity capital funds.

Japanese firms have developed a network of consultative committees, but their boards of directors include no employee representatives. However, some firms have introduced “shadow boards” of lower-level managers and employees. Most Japanese government, business, and union leaders agree that this consultative process should be extended.

The United States is one country where industrial relations have generally not moved beyond adversarial collective bargaining. A typical labor contract, however, is more comprehensive and detailed in the United States than in other industrial countries. Moreover, a number of U.S. firms have set up special labor-management committees to deal with such issues as worker productivity. These committees may evolve into more comprehensive forms of cooperative industrial relations.

Employee participation in management is not universally accepted.
even in countries where it is most pervasive; nor is it a panacea for "stagnation." There is substantial evidence, however, that increased employee participation improves worker morale and reduces labor conflicts.

"World Abortion Trends"

Abortion, once the most common method of birth control in much of the world, now ranks third behind voluntary sterilization and the pill. Nevertheless, experts estimate that one in four pregnancies worldwide is terminated by induced abortion—about 40 million annually.

About half of these abortions occur illegally; they represent a leading cause of death among women of childbearing age. In Latin America, the Middle East, and other areas where family planning services are scarce, the medical complications of illegal abortions are reaching "epidemic di-

ABORTION WORLDWIDE

About one in four pregnancies worldwide is now terminated by induced abortion. The map shows the incidence of abortion—both legal and illegal—per 1,000 live births.


The Wilson Quarterly/Summer 1979
mensions," the report says. In 1969, Chilean government officials estimated that illegal abortions caused 35 percent of all maternal deaths and that 6 percent of Chile's annual health care budget was spent for treatment of abortion-related cases.

In most of the world, the incidence of abortions is expected to grow because of a preference for smaller families, the lack of family planning services, and an increase in the number of women of childbearing age.

Already, more than half of all pregnancies in Italy, Portugal, and Uruguay, where abortion is illegal, and in Austria, Japan, and the Soviet Union, where it is legal, are believed to end in abortion. Restrictive abortion laws are ineffective deterrents; of the 10 countries (including Belgium, Burma) that prohibit abortion under any circumstances, seven report one abortion for every five live births.

Over the last century, abortion—legal and illegal—has been a major factor in the fertility declines experienced by industrialized countries. Since present contraceptive methods are neither totally effective nor universally available, some reliance on abortion will probably be necessary to achieve the two-children per family average needed for world population stabilization. "Only universal use of a perfect contraceptive would largely eliminate the need for abortion services," the report concludes.

"Changes in the Future Use and Characteristics of the Automobile Transportation System"

Unless chronic, worldwide oil shortages intervene, the private automobile will remain the principal form of personal transportation in this country for the next 20 years, says Congress' Office of Technology Assessment (OTA). Because of increases in population, urbanization, and income, this means that by the year 2000, there will be 36 percent more licensed drivers and 56 percent more cars on the road than in 1975. Total automobile travel will rise by 75 percent, to 1.8 trillion vehicle miles annually.

Despite increased auto use, new highway construction will taper off and travel times will increase, particularly in urban areas, where average speeds will be 10 to 15 percent slower and drivers will find serious congestion 2 or 3 times as often as today.

The OTA study finds little cause for optimism. Potential improvements in public transportation, ride-sharing schemes, and transportation management systems that give priority to high-occupancy vehicles (e.g., buses and vans) can bring less than a 5 percent reduction in the number of vehicle miles traveled annually.

Sooner or later there will be a shift from petroleum to alternative energy sources for the automobile—possibly liquid fuels made from coal, tar sands, or oil shale; alcohol fuels; electricity; or longer term options such as fuel cells. In the meantime, federal efforts to force Detroit to build smaller, more efficient cars will result in a slight reduction of petroleum requirements for automobiles (excluding trucks and buses) from the present 5.2 million barrels per day to 4.8 million barrels per day by 1985.

Auto emission controls required by the 1970 Clean Air Act will gradually
reduce motor vehicle air pollution as older cars without control devices are replaced by newer models. But about half the U.S. population will still be exposed to hazardous concentrations of dirty air caused in large measure by private automobiles.

Among the study’s other findings:
Currently the average driver spends between $1,300 and $1,800 a year to own and operate a car. Except for the lowest income groups, “expenditures for automobile transportation have replaced food as the second largest item in the household budget.”

A fivefold increase in federal support for mass transit would have little overall effect on auto use.

“Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program: Report to the Congress, December 31, 1978”

A total of 170,698 refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have resettled in the United States as of November 1, 1978 (46,637 of them in California), according to this latest report to the Congress by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

More than $617 million has been appropriated by Congress since 1975 for the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program. The program is slated to be phased out by 1981. But 20,113 more escapees arrived during the fiscal year which ended last September 30. "An increasing number of refugees from the countries of Indochina can be expected during the next few years," the report says.

Most of the refugees (75 percent) are from Vietnam; 20 percent are Laotian, and 5 percent are Cambodian. On the whole, they are adjusting well—learning English, acquiring job skills, and achieving self-sufficiency. Approximately 130,000 refugees were eligible in 1978 to adjust their immigration status from parolee to permanent resident alien by virtue of having lived in the United States for two years. Of these, 116,680 applied, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service completed action on 104,904, denying 186 and approving the rest. Many of the refugees will be eligible for full U.S. citizenship in another year and a half.

Employment data show that 94.9 percent of the refugees 16 years of age and older who were in the labor force (working or looking for work) had found employment. This compares with 94.5 percent among all Americans. Since the first survey was taken in July 1975, the employment rate of Vietnamese refugees has risen from 68.2 percent among men to the present level of 95.2 percent, and from 50.9 percent among women to the present 94.3 percent.

Between August 1, 1977, and August 1, 1978, at a time when 16,165 new refugees arrived, the percentage of the total refugee population receiving cash assistance dropped slightly, from 34.8 percent to 33.1 percent—well below the peak level of 36 percent reached in May 1977. The most recent sample survey conducted in November–December 1978 showed that only 11 percent of all refugee households were dependent solely on federal cash assistance. Many of the other refugee households requiring such help were receiving only limited aid to supplement low wages.
There are “signs of serious deterioration” in most U.S. universities and colleges that are likely to worsen in the 1980s and '90s as these institutions compete for students, reports the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education.

Academic dishonesty among students is apparently on the rise: 8.8 percent of undergraduates in 1976 reported some form of cheating was necessary to get the grades they wanted, up 1.3 percent since 1969. (In universities that emphasize research, the figure jumped from 5.4 to 9.8 percent.) Even larger percentages of students admit to spontaneous cheating on papers or exams during their college years—42 percent at Amherst College, for example, and 30 percent at Johns Hopkins.

Theft and mutilation of library books and journals is considered a serious problem at 80 percent of the universities studied—as are abuses of public financial aid programs. Thirteen percent of the Federal Guaranteed Student Loans and 17 percent of National Direct Student Loans are in default and more than 20,000 recipients have filed for bankruptcy to discharge their loans.

Some faculty and administrative practices bear watching. “Grade inflation” is rampant; between 1969 and 1976 the proportion of students with A and B averages rose from 35 to 59 percent while those with averages of C or lower dropped from 25 to 13 percent. Academic credit is readily given for insufficient or inadequate work. Off-campus and out-of-state programs are proliferating, granting degrees based on questionable standards, or simply serving as “diploma mills.” Some institutions are using misleading advertising to attract students.

All this, the report notes, may signal “a general loss of self-confidence and of a sense of mutual trust, and a general decline in integrity of conduct on campus.”
This poster promoted the first U.S. professional baseball team, the Cincinnati Red Stockings, organized in 1869 by Harry Wright (center). Many Americans were scandalized by the players' high salaries—$800 to $1,400 per season. Others ridiculed the uniforms. "Harry," fans yelled, "you've got whiskers like a man and pants like a boy." Yet the Red Stockings went undefeated in 65 games their first season.
Sports in America

East Germany's state-run Turn und Sportbund churns out Olympic medalists with Teutonic efficiency, but for sheer popular interest, the United States is the world's sporting nation par excellence. Sales of athletic equipment have reached the $15 billion mark, as millions of Americans devote their leisure to tennis, boating, golf, jogging, and other endeavors. Millions more flock to see highly paid professionals at play or watch sports contests on TV. Yet, athletically speaking, the United States has been a late bloomer, lagging a century ago far behind England and Germany. The growth of sports, and how it reflects American aspirations, has increasingly begun to intrigue American scholars, even as some ignore the warning of marathon champion Frank Shorter: "It ruins the whole thing to take it so seriously." Here, editor Cullen Murphy looks at the rise of sports after the Civil War; sociologists David Altheide and Robert Snow gauge the impact of television; and philosopher Michael Novak speculates on what sports tell us about ourselves.

THE OPEN FRONTIER

by Cullen Murphy

Devotees of sports hail a "Golden Age" almost as often as book publishers herald a "major literary event." Still, the present era is as good a contender for the title as any. Endorsements by sports stars can mean money in the bank for shaving cream manufacturers or the margin of victory for ambitious politicians. Professional athletes are themselves amply represented in Washington by, among others, Senator Bill Bradley (D-N.J.), late of the New York Knicks, and Representative Jack Kemp.
(R.-N.Y.), a 13-year National Football League veteran and, according to the New York Daily News, “almost certainly the only member of Congress whose district picked him up on waivers.”

There are now more professional football teams (28), baseball teams (26), basketball teams (22), and hockey teams (21) than ever before, and Americans spent $2 billion last year on tickets to athletic contests, using up enough oil in the process to keep New York City running for a year. Attendance at all sporting events is up (to 255 million); so is individual participation in such exertions as jogging (96 million), swimming (85 million), bicycling (66 million), and tennis (41 million).

For their part, many scholars now consider sports a legitimate field of study—if only as a circuitous means of studying something else. Physician Benjamin Rush (1745–1813) once sought to placate critics of school sports, remarking that “the common amusements of boys have no connection with their future occupation.” Now, latter-day savants spend their working lives manipulating lambda scores and Gini coefficients as they plot the influence of childhood sports on, say, juvenile delinquency or upward mobility. Their research—“Athletic Dressing Room Slogans as Folklore”, “Machiavellianism Among College and High School Coaches”—is seldom conclusive.

Sedentary Pleasures

On another front, the nation’s pollsters report a high incidence of “no opinion” on such topics as welfare reform, SALT II, and the electoral college; yet virtually everyone has a considered position on athletics.

Some Americans are the spiritual heirs of Theodore Roosevelt, champion of “the strenuous life,” frenetic hunter, horseman, and footballer. (“You must remember,” a friend of his once remarked, “the President is about six.”) Yet, one should not exaggerate the size of this ruddy, energetic, sport-for-all-seasons contingent. According to a 1978–79 Yankelovich survey conducted for the General Mills American Family Report, only 36 percent of adult Americans subject themselves to regular exercise.

The General Mills report describes the remaining 64 percent as “sedentaries.” For some, this is undoubtedly an ideological

Cullen Murphy, 26, is associate editor (essays) of The Wilson Quarterly. Born in New Rochelle, N.Y., he holds a B.A. in history from Amherst College (1974) and writes frequently for publications here and abroad, including Le Monde and Harper’s.
posture: Ever since William Bradford, the governor of Plymouth Colony, outlawed "stoole-ball" in 1621, a skeptical minority has looked down on sports as vulgar, narcissistic, or at best a frivolous use of time. The editor of the *American Spectator* is among them. For the past year he has kept a log of unfortunates who have died while jogging "as an omen to all who would don malodorous apparel and join in this madness."

The lion's share of the inactive file, however, is probably composed of fans. The *New Yorker's* portly humorist Robert Benchley was typical of the breed. "Cavalier though he may have been about his own 'exercise,'" his son Nathaniel recalled, "he was nevertheless quite interested in other people's." Football and horseracing were his first loves. To keep himself in shape, Benchley had a sofa, which he called his "track," and took several turns around it every day, though he insisted that jai alai was really his most demanding sport because the stairs at the Hippodrome were so steep. Benchley’s spiritual heirs, who burn off calories by frequently adjusting the TV set on sports-saturated Saturday afternoons, are everywhere.

Whatever the import of such varying attitudes toward sports—and no doubt someone will make the case that they are culturally as significant as race, sex, religion, political party, or class—their roots extend far back in U.S. history.

Early Puritan settlers in New England did not conceive of man as created for a life of fun. In the more tolerant South, Virginia's squires pursued such aristocratic pastimes as horse-racing, though "formal" athletic activities were few.
Americans throughout the colonies managed to eke out what fun they could, but up through the first half-century after Independence, organized sports played on a regular basis did not exist in the United States. Charles Dickens, who toured the new Republic toward the end of this period, claimed to have witnessed no organized recreation except spitting, "and that is done in silent fellowship, round the stove, when the meal is done."

Then, during the 1840s and '50s, U.S. opinion-makers worried that the United States was getting "flabby"—a leitmotif in American letters ever since. Transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson inveighed against the "invalid habits of this country" and Oliver Wendell Holmes, in the first issue of the Atlantic Monthly, affirmed that such a "paste-complexioned" youth as the United States' had "never before sprang from the loins of Anglo-Saxon lineage."

Leisure and Affluence

Middle-class Americans took heed. Ice-skating, ocean-bathing, and boxing acquired scores of converts. Baseball, which had been played in some form since the earliest colonial days, in 1842 boasted its first real team—the genteel, amateur New York Knickerbockers. Footracing became increasingly popular, and $1,000 prizes were not uncommon. Men of the cloth, hoping to capitalize on America's new cult of Hygeia, began preaching "muscular Christianity," defined as the duty to "fear God and run a mile in four minutes and a half."

The two decades after the Civil War launched something of a silly season in the United States as fad after imported fad swept the nation: bicycling, croquet, tennis, archery, golf, roller-skating. The diversion of young and old alike to "bicycling" (Americans debated for years over just how to pronounce the word) reportedly cut piano sales in half, and Scientific American observed in 1885 that the roller-skating craze had pushed up the price of boxwood, then used for skate wheels, from $28 to $120 per ton.

The now familiar team sports grew quickly, attracting tens of thousands of spectators. Baseball, which had developed a more or less standard set of rules before the war, came into its own in 1869 as the Cincinnati Red Stockings, the nation's first

"See, for example, "Echoes of the Jazz Age," by F. Scott Fitzgerald: "Americans were getting soft. There were signs everywhere: We still won the Olympic games, but with champions whose names had few vowels in them—teams composed, like the Fighting Irish combination of Notre Dame, of fresh overseas blood." (Ironically, F. Scott Fitzgerald has fewer vowels than Frank A. Pierkarski, the University of Pennsylvania guard who became the first All American with a "foreign" name in 1904.)"
In 1850, only 15 percent of the U.S. population lived in cities; by 1880, the percentage had doubled, and the actual number had quadrupled to 14 million.
The rise of sport in the United States is, in part, also the story of the growth of newspapers. Perceptive editors in the 1890s began adding sports pages to their publications for the same reason that, a few years earlier, they had started to run comic strips: to attract the general reader (who, by 1900, had on average only five years of schooling). As Frederick W. Cozzens and Florence Scovil Stumpf point out in Sports in American Life (1953), the tail soon began to wag the dog.

When William Randolph Hearst bought the New York Journal in 1895, he began to outdo his rivals in the matter of reporting sports news, and what emerged was the modern newspaper sports section. Where rival newspapers were printing from three to seven columns of sports news daily, the Journal doubled, trebled, and quadrupled the space and also began special Sunday issues of twelve pages. During the years 1896 and 1987, Hearst began the practice of signing up sports champions to write for his paper: Hobart on tennis, Bald on bicycling, Batchelder on wheeling, and Hefflefinger, the Yale hero, on football. Experts on his staff included Ralph Paine of Yale on rowing, Charles Dryden on baseball, and Paul Armstrong on boxing. It might be said that Hearst invented the present-day sports page makeup, since today the innovations of 1896 have become commonplace. . . . Hardly any major paper—be it ever so conservative or intellectual—goes to press without a sports page. . . .

There are uncounted examples which could be cited to show how a sports-hungry reading public has prompted invention and innovation in the processes of gathering and disseminating the news. It was in the year 1899 that the first story covered by wireless, a sports event, appeared. The inventor, Marconi, had been experimenting for four years, and had arrived in the United States with his equipment packed in two trunks and eager to have his new wireless tested. The Associated Press hired Marconi and his equipment to report on the international yacht race involving Sir Thomas Lipton’s Shamrock and the American Columbia. . . . By 1913, telegraph lines could be strung direct to the scene of most sports events, regardless of locale, and reports written by a sports editor and his small staff could go direct to newspaper offices.

The first time a complete newspaper page was transmitted by Associated Press Wirephoto from one city to another was on New Year’s Eve, 1936, when the Dallas Morning News printed a special Rose Bowl Souvenir Edition on the presses of the Los Angeles Times. During the Tournament of Roses Parade, and before the game between Southern Methodist University of Dallas and Stanford University, 15,000 copies of the paper were run off.
timore, Chicago—and railroad entrepreneurs promoted sporting events as a way of boosting their own ticket sales. For that very reason, the Boston, Concord, and Montreal Railroad in 1852 arranged the first intercollegiate crew regatta between Harvard and Yale on New Hampshire's Lake Winnipesaukee. (Harvard won.) The railroads helped make possible the creation of baseball's intercity National League in 1876. To lure passengers, streetcar companies built parks and stadiums on the outskirts of towns; the owners of resort hotels financed racetracks—like Monmouth Park in New Jersey—to attract paying guests.

In many ways, large and small, the growth of sports mirrored growing U.S. affluence, a phenomenon glimpsed by Mark Twain when he described baseball as the "outward expression of the drive and push and rush and struggle of the raging, tearing, booming 19th century." And the growth continued. By 1910, Americans were spending $73 million on sports, not counting capital investment; by the 1920s, even factory workers had enough free time to attend ball games. Boating was once the preserve of the wealthy; today, 34 million Americans spend their off-hours on the water. If any generalization is valid about American sports, it is that activities first patronized exclusively by the well-to-do—from bicycling to tennis—eventually trickled down to Everyman."

It is primarily the social aspect of sports that has captivated scholars. The spread of public schooling, the rise of literacy, and the growth of mass-circulation newspapers (whose readership had climbed to 15 million by 1900, from 3.5 million three decades before) fast pushed sports into the realm of popular culture. With their informal, partisan prose, sportswriters emerged in the 1890s to assume a place they have yet to relinquish. When the Chicago White Stockings trounced the Pittsburgh Pirates on May 4, 1891, sportswriter Leonard Dana Washburn's story began:

You can write home that Grandpa won yesterday.

And say in the postscript that [pitcher] Willie Hutchinson did it. The sweet child stood out in the middle of the big diamond of pompadour grass and slammed balls down the path that looked like the biscuits of a bride.

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*The New Deal's Works Progress Administration (WPA) went so far as to build municipal polo grounds. By 1937, the WPA had constructed 1,500 athletic fields, 440 swimming pools, 3,500 tennis courts, 123 golf courses, and 28 miles of ski trails. (See Foster Rhea Dulles, America Learns to Play, New York: Appleton-Century, 1940.)*
Frederic Remington, famed artist of the old West, played football at Yale in 1879. A decade later, he returned to sketch the players in action.

From Harper's Weekly.

Washburn went on to note that Mr. Staley, who pitched for Pittsburgh, "did not have enough speed to pass a streetcar going in the opposite direction."

Early apologists once made the case for athletics by stressing its healthful benefits, just as afficionados of horse flesh claimed they were primarily interested in "improving the breed." But by the turn of the century, sports was popular simply because it was fun.

And yet Americans were aware—self-consciously aware, as they still are—that sports fulfilled important social functions. Frederick Jackson Turner delivered his famous paper, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," in 1893. The western frontier, with its promise of new opportunity and escape since the landing at Plymouth Rock, had been "closed" scarcely a decade earlier. At a time when the United States was undergoing rapid industrialization, sports provided a new safety valve, a new frontier. For recent immigrants, and eventually for women and blacks as well, athletics became a route to public accomplishment and self-esteem. "Who shall say," wrote a prescient historian, Frederic L. Paxson, in 1917, "that the quickened pulse, the healthy glow, the honest self-respect of honest sport have not served in part to steady and inspire a new Americanism for a new century?"
THE TELEVISION EFFECT

by David L. Altheide and Robert P. Snow

On May 17, 1939, when there were barely 400 working television sets in the United States, station W2XBS of New York produced the first live telecast of a sporting contest—the Columbia-Princeton baseball contest for fourth place in the Ivy League. The quality of broadcast was poor; a New York Times reviewer wrote, "The players were best described by observers as appearing 'like white flies' running across the screen." The sportscaster, Bill Stern, didn’t know when to keep his mouth shut. A director hollered into Stern's earplug: "Shut up! If they can see it, don’t say it." A new era in sports had begun.

Forty years later, the most popular shows on television are sports events. When asked to list their favorite TV programs in a 1979 Washington Post national survey, 17 percent of the 1,693 respondents mentioned at least one sports show—a much greater response than any single dramatic or comedy series received. One-quarter of the average man's television-viewing time is spent watching sports; for women, the figure is 15 percent.

To many people, sports are simply competitive play, with no broader significance; in short, fun and escapism. For others, sports dramatize the human condition. But in today’s professional sports, thanks to the ever-increasing influence of TV, neither interpretation holds. Sports and television, after all, seek somewhat different goals.

The logic of television is shaped by economics, as a sports contest is not. Since television must sell commercial time to be profitable, its managers’ goal is to deliver the maximum number of viewers to advertisers. Sports events serve this goal admirably, but they must fit TV’s normal entertainment criteria. Some of these criteria are inherent in sports—color, action, excitement, the appeal to a sense of idealized justice. TV exaggerates them. During lulls in action, viewers’ attention is riveted on such sideline attractions as cheerleaders (e.g., the jiggling Dallas Cowgirls) or zany crowd behavior. (An ABC Monday Night Football camera once caught a spectator making an obscene finger gesture at the camera; sportscaster “Dandy
Don” Meredith explained to his partner, “Howard [Cosell], he means we’re Number One.” While true sports fans are happy just to see the contest, instant replays and sportscasters’ emotive commentary “hype” the drama for the less committed.

No one symbolizes the rise of the star sportscaster more than Howard Cosell, once described by a jealous critic as “the only man in the world who changed his name [from Cohen] and put on a toupee in order to tell it like it is.” James Michener describes a Miami Dolphins—Pittsburgh Steelers football game he attended where one fan, who had a radio tuned to pick up television audio, became a center of attention:

What’s [Cosell] saying now?” people begged. “What did he say about that pass?” What Howard Cosell said about a play was much more important than the play itself... It was as if only the presence of Cosell lent verity.”

Television’s marriage to sports has made Cosell a millionaire. Its economic logic also means big money for professional sports that can attract national audiences:

ABC, CBS, and NBC together spent approximately $160 million to broadcast National Football League games during the 1978–79 season. Baseball will get $54 million for the 1979 season for network and local broadcasters. The 22 teams of the National Basketball Association currently divide more than $40 million each year. And the Professional Golfers Association will receive $30 million from its contract with NBC and CBS to broadcast tournaments from 1979 to 1981. More than half that money will be reimbursed to corporations that sponsor tournaments on the PGA tour, with the remainder retained by the PGA tour for administrative costs and capital development.

Media revenue is a crucial source of income for the owners of professional sports teams. As Roone Arledge, ABC-TV sports and news chief, observed several years ago, “So many sports


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Robert P. Snow, 42, is assistant professor of sociology at Arizona State University. He received his B.A. (1960), M.A. (1963), and Ph.D. (1967) from the University of Minnesota and collaborated with David L. Altheide on Media Logic (1979).
"I'm afraid we're kind of tied up. Eddie and Paul are watching Game of the Week, then the Tulsa Open, Aussie Tennis, and the Big Fight reruns. Karen's signed in for Wide World of Sports, Celebrity Bowling, Gymnastics from Poland, and the Roller Derby. I'm watching the Innsbruck slalom trials, African Safari, free falls and gliding."

organizations have built their entire budgets around network TV that if we ever withdrew the money, the whole structure would collapse."

Consider, for example, the short-lived World Football League. Promoter Eddie Einhorn, whose independent TVS network had the league's television franchise during its opening (1974) season, was able to sell the games to 110 television stations around the country, including the top 36 markets. But after league scandals (such as manipulation of attendance figures), the audience ratings for league telecasts dropped drastically, and Einhorn decided not to renew his contract. Without TV revenue, the league's second season was its final season. Delivering an unkind epitaph, Eddie Einhorn declared:

In the final analysis, the league had mediocrity written all over it. It had $250- or $500-a-game players written all over it. I think the lack of a national television package definitely hurt their credibility, too. If a league's not good enough to have a national TV game of the week,
a guy doesn't want to go. It's bush, and he's not going to pay money to see it.

In the Big Leagues, the TV factor is no less important. And the rules of most games have been changed to suit the TV requirements for faster action. Offense is emphasized over defense. For example, professional baseball now has the "designated hitter" to bat in the American League as a substitute for the weak-hitting pitchers. Adding to the action are a larger strike zone to encourage more hitting, a livelier regulation ball (with a bigger rubber center and more tightly sewn cover), and umpires who are trained to keep games moving at a faster pace.

The Bowl Boom

Football began promoting the field goal for the last-minute victory and the longer kickoff for the exciting runback. New rules encouraged more passing (defenders may make contact with receivers within five yards of the scrimmage line but are restricted beyond that point; offensive linemen are allowed to use open hands and extended arms to shield the quarterback).

Basketball reinstated the exciting "slam dunk" and instituted the "24-second rule" to increase the offensive pace of the game. Teams in the NBA must attempt a shot within 24 seconds of receiving the ball.

Tennis adopted the sudden death playoff to court the media, and, to brighten the color TV screen, players no longer dressed only in white.

Golf also developed the sudden death playoff, as well as its par scoring system. Long ago, it allowed noisy TV cameras to disturb golfers' concentration. When TV began to cover sports, one irate golf champion vowed, "I'll never accept a grinding camera on the course when I'm playing." A television executive prophetically responded, "When we start to offer big money, he'll learn to."

Sometimes, major changes have been made on the spot to adapt sports events to commercial TV's programming requirements. In one case, the Miz-Lou Television Network had contracted to produce a closely-timed three-hour "package" of the December 19, 1975, Blue-Gray College All-Star football game for syndication to TV stations around the country. When, at the beginning of the game, it looked as if the contest might last too long, TV officials ordered that the first period be 12 minutes.

*In golf, tied players renew play at the 16th hole and play until one player wins a hole outright. In tennis, sudden death means that, after a 6-set tie, a tie-breaking set is played.
long rather than 15. When the game moved more quickly than
they had expected, the third quarter was ordered stretched out.
And when that tactic proved inadequate, additional minutes
were added to the final quarter. In the last 31 seconds, after the
game technically should have been over, the Blues scored a
touchdown to win, 14 to 13. Bill Moseley, an official of the
Blue-Gray Committee, later publicly apologized to the Grays for
allowing TV to steal their victory.

To assuage TV’s need, seasons are longer. More games are
scheduled during the prime time evening hours (e.g., Monday
Night Football); and during overlaps of different sports’ seasons,
schedules are adjusted to avoid conflict. The United States Golf
Association split what used to be 36-hole Saturday marathons
into 18-hole contests on Saturday and Sunday. College post-
season football championship games were spread out (from De-
cember 22 to January 1 in the 1978–79 season), rather than all
being played on New Year’s Day. Football “bowl” games have
multiplied like rabbits: There were 5 major bowl contests in
1940; the 1978–79 season saw 12.

Superstar Economics

In 1974, ABC offered to broadcast the Notre Dame–Georgia
football game if its date were shifted from Saturday, November
9, to Monday, September 9, as a season opener. Both schools
quickly agreed to the change. Some adverse criticism followed,
but Bear Bryant, the University of Alabama coach, commented,
“We think TV exposure is so important to our program and so
important to this university that we will schedule ourselves to
fit the medium. I’ll play at midnight if that’s what TV wants.”

Television has also changed the style of athletes. Some vet-
eran golfers, for example, have reputations as frightful grouches
on the greensward, but as soon as they come on camera, they
become all sweetness and light. A few athletes find the opposite
technique equally pleasing to the media—at least one boxer and
one tennis player come to mind as accomplished actors using
on-camera nastiness to pique the attention of audiences.

TV officials believe that, for prime time, an “ideal norms”
format, emphasizing honesty, hard work, team spirit, and fair
play, is best. The commissioners of the various professional
leagues have sought to reduce the amount of visible violence on
the playing field, notably by imposing cash fines on erring play-
ers. While brute force has always been part of most contact
sports, it embarrasses the networks when witnessed close-up by
millions during family viewing time. Ex-gridiron star Frank Gif-
For the past three years, the office of Lawrence F. O'Brien, U.S. Basketball Commissioner, has been compiling a profile of a hypothetical professional basketball team. Sources of revenue and major expenditures for such a team are shown below. According to the Commissioner's office, the figures are quite close to the average for U.S. professional basketball teams. Figures for expenses exceed 100 percent because the typical team in the National Basketball Association operates at a loss.

**REVENUES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gate receipts</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV, radio, playoffs, concessions</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXPENSES (as percent of revenue)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Player salaries, pensions, etc.</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative and miscellaneous expenses</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arena costs</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertising, marketing, public relations</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coach, trainers, scouts, etc. salaries</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team travel</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League assessment</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>107%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ford, who fostered his share of mayhem during his playing days, is now heard to intone as a commentator on Monday Night Football: "Violence has no place in this game." On the other hand, TV would lose many viewers and, as a result, advertising dollars, if all harum-scarum were eliminated.

Player salaries have also been affected by television. Management has been using TV revenue to stay in the black for over a decade; in some cases, a team can play to an empty house and still make money. Now players have decided that they have not
been getting their fair share of the dollars. Multi-year contracts in excess of $100,000 a year are no longer uncommon for individuals. A few players even have multi-year million-dollar contracts.²

Inevitably, superstar economics have developed, with players both employing business agents to negotiate contracts and increasingly playing out their contracts to become free agents.³ To earn big money is to prove that one is a superstar; to earn less is to be second-class. The top players are now both highly skilled athletes and wealthy entrepreneurs who, like Hollywood actors, sell their services to the highest bidder.

Selling the Sizzle

For their part, the sportswriters have largely adopted the management perspective, saying: “It’s just a job, and why shouldn’t players get paid a lot of money,” or “The owners still have a lot of money,” or “The only problem is that some players aren’t worth what they are getting.”

Each of these statements makes sense in the context of worker-employer wage negotiations. They still seem alien to amateur players and numerous fans who cannot understand how anyone could possibly put a dollar value on athletic endeavor. Strikes have become relatively common in professional sports: the 13-day strike by the Major League Baseball Players Association in 1972 that caused a 10-day delay in the season’s opening and the cancellation of 86 games; the 1979 baseball umpires strike; the brief 1979 walkout by some athletes in the North American Soccer League who wanted to form a players union, but who were forced back to work when a judge threatened to deport striking foreign athletes.

All in all, professional sport has become more a matter of TV entertainment than a straight competitive contest. And yet, the push to produce a winner—and a top-rated TV attraction—at any cost has actually undermined, to some extent, sound business logic. Many owners of teams spend more money on players than the teams are making as profit; the “bottom line”

²First baseman Pete Rose switched from the Cincinnati Reds to the Philadelphia Phillies in December 1978 for a contract averaging $745,000 a year (with part of his salary paid by a Philadelphia television station). Pittsburgh Pirates right fielder Dave Parker has a complicated contract that, after allowing for inflation, should net him an average of $1 million to $1.5 million a year. California Angels first baseman Rod Carew’s five-year contract gives him a $900,000 a year average.

³In baseball, a player must announce a year in advance that he intends to become a free agent in order to have his name placed in a draft. Other major league teams may then bid for his services.
may, in the short run, show a loss. And the current willingness of a few team owners to make huge investments to capture the top players has given sports a certain oligopolistic flavor. As the Los Angeles Times commented after the 1977 World Series:

The world championship New York Yankees weren't built. They were just a complicated business merger. A $3 million pitcher here, a $2.9 million outfielder there, a $1 million shortstop on top, and presto! Instant World Champions. . . . The pennant will be decided in a countinghouse in November, not a playing field in October.

Yet, ironically, in some cases, the guarantee of TV revenue may actually lower owners' incentive to win, especially if they know they cannot spend enough to produce a championship team. Asked in May 1979 if he thought this was true in the National Football League, George Allen, former coach of the Los Angeles Rams and Washington Redskins, replied, "I think that's right. Nobody is losing money; everybody is making it, even if his team is in last place. You don't have to win to make money. Look at the [San Francisco] 49ers—they won two games."

In short, professional sports have become like many another industry—operating in accordance with the dictates of its special marketplace. To mask the internal cynicism, massive public relations efforts are made to promote the notion that nothing has really changed, to maintain the image that professional sports still embody the magic, altruism, uncertainty, rivalry, and super-human capacity for heroism.

We are repeatedly told by team publicists that players perform out of personal pride and team loyalty. Along with this ideal, we see professional athletes engaging in charity drives and coaching at youth training camps. National Basketball Association stars appear in commercials for YMCA basketball leagues. Reggie Jackson, the notoriously temperamental New York Yankee slugger, once stated, "Being a pro athlete is one of the most difficult things in the world. Realistically, it's not realistic."

For his part, Toronto Blue Jays baseball club president Peter Bavasi noted that his organization was involved in selling "the illusion of baseball." He added:

I grew up in the time when . . . the only acceptable way to promote a baseball team was to win the World Series. We don't have that luxury [in Toronto], so we must sell the sights, sounds, smells, and tastes of baseball . . . the sizzle instead of the steak.
But there is more to image-making than baseball game “bat nights” and “guaranteed win nights” (fans who attend home games of a normally unlucky team are guaranteed tickets to another game if the team loses). Team owners make major financial investments such as million-dollar player contacts, in part so that they seem dedicated to preserving interteam competition; those owners who do not are berated by the local sportswriters and fans for “not caring.”

Amateurs Profit

Largely because of television, the real values of professional sports have become the standard for amateurs as well. At the college level, it is helpful to have winning teams to bolster institutional prestige and alumni loyalty. Fund-raisers for Yale, for example, contend that a victory over Harvard by the university’s football team spurs an extra $500,000 in Old Blue alumni contributions over the following year.

For some universities, sports are big business, attracting tuition-paying students, alumni dollars, and lucrative television contracts. For example, the College of William and Mary, a 6,000-student school in Williamsburg, Virginia, with a high academic reputation, wants to expand its present 15,000-seat football stadium to accommodate 30,000 spectators, despite substantial opposition from students, faculty, and the local community. Supporting the proposal, which bears an estimated price tag of $4.8 million, are alumni and the school’s official governing board. The enlarged stadium, it is said, would enable William and Mary to again host its traditional opponents, including Navy and the University of Virginia, who demand higher revenues from ticket sales than the college can now provide. Such games, in turn, would attract remunerative TV coverage.

Perhaps sports may again be played less for fortune than for fun. Unhappily, the more predictable outcome is a wider gap between the traditional ethos of sports on the one hand and the commercial realities on the other. If so, collective self-delusion will reach a new level, and the sports dramas provided by television in pursuit of top audience ratings will assure us that the fiction we are watching is real.
A HOLY TRINITY

by Michael Novak

"I find more genuine religion at the baseball match than I do at my father's church on Fifth Avenue," Ernest Howard Crosby, the 19th-century New York social reformer, is said to have remarked. This observation may also apply, for some, to football and basketball, the other two American sports that are public liturgies as well as games.

For certain sports are rather like religions—not like Christianity, Judaism, Islam, or any of the world's other great faiths, but forms of secular religion nevertheless. The elements of religion are visible in them: dramatic re-enactments of struggles representing life and death, involving moral understanding and development, evoking awe for powers not wholly in an individual's control, and employing public liturgical figures who stand in for the people as a whole.

I concentrate on baseball, football, and basketball—a holy trinity—because I love them most and because these three sports, invented in the United States, have captured in symbolic form elements of American life (urban and rural, rich and poor, white and nonwhite, highly educated and hardly educated) as other games have not. Tennis and jogging may have more direct participants, but when it comes to public participation in a visible liturgy, these three sports appeal across regions and classes as no others do.

The combination of baseball, football, and basketball represents a unique expression of the American consciousness; in no other countries have these three sports together seized the national imagination. Many nations play basketball with enthusiasm, if not finesse; since men's basketball became a regular feature at the Summer Olympics in 1936, the United States has won the gold medal every time but once. It lost to the Soviet Union in a controversial game in 1972.
1891, it had already spread to 11 nations (among them France, India, and Japan). A few—Japan, Canada, and some Latin American countries—play baseball. Only Canada loves anything similar to American football.

Not all Americans love these sports, of course. Some find all three profoundly boring. A theologian once asked me how I could possibly dignify football with theology; she called it "Neanderthal," found baseball "tedious beyond belief," and described basketball as "silly tall men in short pants." For such nonbelievers, the only hope is prayer and fasting.

Some Americans are excited by one of these games but not by the others. This should not be surprising, since each differs in mythic substance and narrative form. These variations evoke important diversities in the American character.

Consider the matter of time. Baseball is clockless. Barring an act of God, a baseball game lasts as long as it takes to go through nine innings of six outs each (even more innings, if after nine a tie score exists). The longest major league game occurred May 31, 1964, when the San Francisco Giants and the New York Mets played 23 innings for 7 hours and 23 minutes. (San Francisco won, 8 to 6).

By contrast, a clock (frequently halted) limits football to 60 minutes. Each actual play on the field lasts an average of four seconds, with approximately 140 plays in a game. Thus, the real action may require as little as seven minutes. Like chess, football is a game of sets, formation, deliberation.

In professional basketball, play is limited to 48 minutes (unless a tie score forces a game into overtime) and in college basketball to 40 minutes, but virtually every second contains hectic action. Unlike football, basketball teams cannot "run down the clock" by spending time in huddles or on the line of scrimmage.

Each of these games involves its players in quite different social bonds. In baseball, the individual is always the center of attention. Each member of the team is chosen as the focus of attention. Each member of the team is chosen as the focus of attention.
action by the tiny white ball. The central drama is a duel of
direct intimidation between the pitcher and the batter. The
most painful accusation in baseball is to "choke," to buckle
under pressure.

Separation of Powers

Baseball dramatizes the myth of the lonely individual; foot-
ball, the myth of the collective. Whereas the batter goes to the
plate in total solitude, a football player is (so to speak) part of a
committee. A hitter hits alone, but a passer can do no better
than his blockers and receivers permit. Football is a game of
social liberation ("running for daylight"). It is not an acquisitive
game; the winner is not the team that acquires the most
yardage—yardage is won only to be surrendered—but the team
that breaks through for the most points.

Basketball is as corporate as football, but it gives far more
latitude to the soloist. The individual can rarely go his own way
in football; in basketball, the individual's style gives the game
more than half its pleasure. Basketball is like jazz: separate
virtuoso instrumentalists improvise along a common melodic
line.

A third area of difference is each game's relationship to the
law. In virtually every single play, baseball requires tremendous
dependence upon the force of law. It is a game of exquisite
checks and balances and in some ways exemplifies republican
government. The offensive players step to the plate one by one
like solitary executives battling a hostile nine-member congress.
The umpires provide an independent judiciary. Distances, the
weights of ball and bat, the height of the pitcher's mound, and
other elements are exquisitely calculated, statistically, to keep
the game in balance.

Football is another story. Given its number of players and
the rapidity of its collective action (during blazing seconds of
actual movement), it is impossible to police completely. Its in-
herent violence is tempered by rules, regulations, traditions, ex-

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prise Institute, was until recently the Cadden-Wilson distinguished profes-
sor of religion at Syracuse University. Born in Johnstown, Pa., he received
his A.B. from Stonehill College (1956), his B.T. from Gregorian University
in Rome (1958), and an M.A. from Harvard (1965). His books include
Belief and Unbelief (1965), The Experience of Nothingness (1970), As-
cent of the Mountain, Flight of the Dove (1971), The Rise of the Unmelt-
able Ethics (1972), Choosing Our King (1974), and The Joy of Sports
(1976). He is currently working on a study of democratic capitalism.
Sports may be America's civic religion, but attendance at sporting events still lags behind churchgoing. An exception: horse-racing, perhaps because it holds out to its faithful the promise of an earthly reward.

Expectations, and specified equipment; still, there can be no doubt that football is essentially a celebration of physical and psychological aggression, something like war without death.

Although designed to be a noncontact sport, basketball is also exceedingly physical. Like football, it cannot be completely policed. Fakery and deception are essential to it; on virtually every play, there is a violation of the game's clearly stated laws. Thus, basketball demands, in a sense, a constant violation of the law in order to achieve perfection of the law. Legally, one should never touch anyone else, but to play the game properly, one must be in frequent, powerful, restrained, but well-executed physical contact. The referees control the game in roughly the same way that police control highway traffic: they make no attempt to stop every speeder, but they do make symbolic arrests in order to preserve the general rule of law.

San Jose State College psychologists Bruce C. Ogilvie and Thomas Tutko once reported finding no empirical evidence that
Unfortunately, critics of sports misunderstand an important point concerning the relationship of sports to moral understanding and development: the kind of virtues celebrated in our sports have more to do with helping us to understand the basic human situation than with offering us practical guides to moral behavior.

**Risk and Ridicule**

Sports form our character at a level deeper in some ways than the merely ethical. They show us what it is to be an individual confronted with one’s own terrors and what it is to show persistence and courage. They establish one of the most fundamental meanings of the community—not the community of eye-to-eye encounter, full of sensitivity and communication, but the sort that occurs in teamwork under great stress and provocation.

This type of community is characterized not so much by tender feelings toward one another, although these may indeed be both present and quite powerful, as by the ability to accomplish together a common task, picking up one another at the point of weakness of each, gaining strength from one another, adapting almost unconsciously to one another’s needs and requirements, and coming to recognize and achieve effortlessly the “click” of disparate individuals acting together as one. This is a rare and precious experience. There are many other meanings of community, but this is a basic one. It is a meaning crucial in pluralistic societies, in which cooperation rather than tender love is absolutely necessary. It is not entirely an accident that in later life many former athletes look back on this experience of community as one of the most profound of their lives, in the light of which they judge all other meanings.

Everyone fails at something at some point during life; likewise, no athlete wins all the time. Teaching oneself how to lose, how to learn from errors, how not to make excuses, and how to rise to struggle again on another day are ordinary lessons in sports. Most athletes fail more than half the time. (In baseball, a batter who hits successfully even one-third of the time is a star.) Each athlete discovers in himself stark limitations and finds himself inferior to others in many skills.

Teams, as well as individual athletes, serve as a symbol of the inevitability of defeat as well as victory. In baseball, for

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example, major league teams rarely win 100 of 162 games in a season. Yet almost all win at least a third of the time. In the last 10 seasons (1969–78), major league teams have had records of .667 or better only three times, of .333 or worse only twice.

Moreover, our major sports are played under the eyes of connoisseurs, and ridicule for failure is quite open and unabashed. One of the most important experiences in sports is the experience of public failure—to which is added, sometimes in good humor and sometimes meanly, an element of humiliation. Since every exercise of freedom involves risk, there is in sports an excellent preparation for trying things publicly, even at the risk of public failure, and for accepting with grace both failure and defeat.

To learn such things is not quite the same as acquiring moral virtue. Yet it is no small thing to learn how to be reconciled to one's own human assets and liabilities. The benefits? A certain insight into the human situation, the uses of craft, and the limits of will—into "character" in that sense, rather than as it is spoken of by Sunday School teachers. Athletes, like artists, may achieve a species of excellence and create work of considerable beauty while not excelling in the moral virtues. Often, indeed, like the rest of us, they are moral mediocrities. Babe Ruth was a hero on the baseball field but a drunken, gluttonous buffoon off the field.

The virtues taught by sports, like the virtues involved in artistic excellence, are in this sense nonmoral. To learn how to think clearly under the pressure of impending defeat and humiliation is an important human gain. The conditions of an athletic contest are appropriate conditions under which to learn such skills, which pertain to the survival, even to the possible improvement, of the human race. They have a certain existential, if not directly moral, weight.

Sports also function as a religion by providing a source of emotional release. They are fun largely because they are an aside, separate for most spectators from the "game of life." Of our three national sports, football especially fulfills this function. In a culture like ours that praises sentimental virtues and represses destructive ones, some way must be found to channel aggressive tendencies. Football is one such channel. Partisan Review editor William Phillips once wrote:

Football is not only the most popular sport, it is the most intellectual one. It is in fact the intellectuals' secret vice. Not politics, not sex, not pornography, but football, and not college football, but the real thing. Pro
SOCCER AND HOCKEY

If baseball, football, and basketball are America's national sports, what are the athletic "faiths" of other countries? Soccer, of course, is supreme throughout much of the world, particularly Europe and the Third World; ice hockey is popular in northern countries. In his book, The Joy of Sports, Michael Novak discusses the cultural significance of these two sports:

What kind of show does the public want? And why? In different cultures, people find different skills exciting. There is nothing inherently spectacular in catching a ball or swinging a bat (or in running, tackling, shooting a ball in a basket). Jugglers in Hungary show greater skills....

If we ask why hockey still has not caught on in [much of] the United States, contrasting symbolic values come to light. . . . The game is played on ice. Its symbolic matrix lies in the lands of snows, blizzards, and dark freezing nights. Hockey is a Slavic sport, Eastern European, Scandinavian, Canadian. One gets suggestions of an Ice Age once again smothering the planet. One senses the sheer celebration of hot blood holding out against the cold, of the vitality of the warm human body, of exuberant speed rejoicing in its own heat, of violence and even the sight of red blood on white ice as a sign of animal endurance. There are stories about young hockey players saving as trophies the stitches pulled from their own healed wounds. "Twelve more stitches, dad!" the teenager boasts, entering home after a bloody game. Against the possibility of freezing, against the omnipresent threat to human survival, hockey celebrates the heat and passion of survival. . . .

The images surrounding soccer are those of Africa, Brazil, Pakistan, and India: green fields, leisure, space, effortless running and grace, freedom, an almost total absence of violence or force, an almost total commitment to fluid form, to kinesis, to the patterns in motion of a unit of runners. Running and passing are the steady pleasures of the game; the sudden appearance of the great players just as they are needed, flashing in from out of nowhere to execute a perfect kick, suggests the intelligence and instinct of anticipation. Soccer is freedom and flow, and it weaves its graceful tension back and forth, up and down the field, resolving it only infrequently with sudden charges upon the goal and the slashing, spinning projection of the ball, by head or foot, into the large net.

Hockey is swift, soccer graceful. Hockey is physical, brutal, violent; soccer evasive, flowing, quietly impassioned. The net in hockey is small and narrow, and the puck whizzes toward it almost as swiftly and invisibly as a bullet; the net in soccer is larger than a mother's arms, ample, and the slower flight of the large, black-white ball leaves a visual image almost as permanent as the trail of a jet.
football is the opium of the intellectuals. . . . Much of its popularity is due to the fact that it makes respectable the most primitive feelings about violence, patriotism, manhood.

Neither football nor other sports will purge the male spirit of violence, but they do give that spirit shape, form, and beauty. A respect for fate is taught by the three American sports. Each of our national games is, in a powerful way, decided by fate. The way the ball bounces decides many a baseball or basketball game. And, in baseball, victory or defeat is never certain until the last out. William Saroyan once expressed this valuable feature of the game:

With a score of 6 to 0, two outs, two strikes, nobody on, only an average batter at bat, bottom of the ninth, it is still possible, and sometimes necessary, to believe that something can still happen—for the simple reason that it has happened before and very probably will again. And when it does, won't that be the day?

The football was deliberately designed not to be round, to be unpredictable in its bounces. Many astute football coaches have well understood that close games are decided by the breaks; they train their teams, accordingly, to press hard for the breaks—a fumble by the other side, a pass interception—and then suddenly to exploit such graces from the gods.

The Flight of the Dove

As for basketball, on any given night, almost any team, “getting hot,” can defeat almost any other, and even in the closest and most evenly matched contests, the contingencies and tricks of fate of the last few seconds often decide the outcome. The player who makes 80 percent of his free throws over a season either does or does not make his one critical free throw drop. Often the last shot of the game, surely as much by luck as by skill, decides the outcome. (A whimsical proposal for the National Basketball Association: why not give each team 100 points and then play for only one minute? Without loss of excitement, it would save a great deal of wear and tear).

We are supposed to be a puritan, pragmatic, calculating people. Yet it is astonishing how inwardly satisfied we are by liturgical images of luck and fortune. Indeed, the importance of

*Of 902 regular 1977-78 season games in the National Basketball Association, 119 (13 percent) were decided by one or two points.
SPORTS IN THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION

Sports appeal to people on the same level as do novels and plays—the level of imagination, the stage on which agents in conflict decide, act, and meet their destiny. For this reason, the most illuminating route to an understanding of sports lies through the fields and valleys of our historical and literary imagination.

The first European settlers stood in awe of the cunning and craft of the American Indian—the "noble savage," "athlete of the wilderness." They learned to track in the forest, delighted in marksmanship, and tested themselves in feats of agility and endurance.

Nature and humanity were viewed as part of one whole; man did not walk on the earth so much as in it—listening to nature, adapting to its limits and laws. An image developed of a wholly natural man who by superior sensitivity lived up to the potentialities of nature. The first U.S. fictional hero, Natty Bumppo, the central character in the "Leatherstocking Tales" of James Fenimore Cooper (1789-1851), achieved this new ideal, living by a code of wisdom, agility, and stunning athletic prowess, in which he found a deep and quiet satisfaction of spirit.

Nature, in the American imagination, was not always beneficent: "Dan'l Boone kilt a b'ar," but the b'ar might just as well have killed Daniel Boone. As a result, the new athletes acquired a special reverence for the ability to accomplish perfect physical feats with frequency and grace. To do so yielded a sense of immortality.

The vision of living in unity with nature while performing perfect luck may be the most fundamental assumption in the American view of the world. We believe in equal opportunity, yet experience teaches us there is no equality of results. We believe in hard work, yet we can see quite vividly that individual rewards are not directly equivalent to hard work but are decisively affected by a little luck here and there. By freedom and by equality, we seem to have in mind a kind of lottery in which luck might strike anyone at any time, regardless of social class or position. Not mere, random good luck, of course, but a luck for which one has trained and prepared oneself—luck, nonetheless.

Our greatest athletes have a knack for "coming through" at the most critical moments. They are graced. Fortune blows out their sails. They have prepared themselves, they have trained, they have worked hard, but at the last moment it is the flight of the dove that bears them aloft, not the patient climbing of the mountain. This, at least, is what our games seem to celebrate. It
acts lives on, to a large degree, in our major sports. The green ex-
panse of baseball and football fields is reminiscent of nature unclut-
tered by urban encroachment. There, heroes of craft and cunning
struggle against the elements, against others, and against their own
natures, seeking in themselves “rhythms” and mysterious potencies
(being “up” for the game), craving opportunities to perform flawless,
perfect acts.

—M.N.

happens to fit, as well, what our scholars have to tell us about
the actual evolution of equality of opportunity in the United
States.” Nothing seems to correlate with results as much as luck
or chance.

America loves the underdog. Our national ethos is based
upon the lucky discovery of an untried New World, full of won-
der, upsetting the Old Orders of the ages.

Finally, sports involve the mysticism of numbers. Ameri-
cans take an eerie delight in numbers, as if numbers were the
inner structure of reality itself. Baseball especially reflects this
oddly pragmatic, down-to-earth mysticism, delighting in the
ancient mystic numbers, three and four: three strikes, four balls,

"Economic success seems to depend on varieties of luck and on-the-job competence that
are only moderately related to family background, schooling, or scores on standardized
tests.”—Christopher Jencks et al., Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and
three outs, four bases, 360 feet (a perfect circle) to “home.”
Every aspect of the game is quantified: runs, hits, errors, hitting percentages, home runs, stolen bases, earned run averages. Counting makes it real.

Individual athletes are the priests of sports, and like the priest, its ritual victims. In a sense, athletes are heroes of a spiritual order. They are not necessarily handsome, physically well-formed, godlike—Babe Ruth had the shape of a pear on spindles. But they do overcome overwhelming odds (Jackie Robinson stealing home, making incredible catches; George Blanda winning magical, last-second games for the Oakland Raiders while in his mid-forties). Sometimes they represent causes larger than themselves (black Hank Aaron breaking white Babe Ruth’s career home run record, Billie Jean King beating Bobby Riggs at tennis). Sometimes they simply perform perfect and beautiful acts again and again (Reggie Jackson hitting three home runs in one World Series game, pitcher Mark “the Bird” Fidrych bringing life to the otherwise hapless Detroit Tigers). But this is on the field. When their careers in the public liturgy are ended, they are often burnt-out cases, ritual victims—dropped from public sight.

Sports are not all-important, and they obviously are not a full religion. But they do help fulfill important secular religious needs. It is a little sad that many intelligent persons, not least some employed at universities, are blind to the powerful realities of the sports in their very midst. It is a shame to overlook this field of fundamental experience, from which many Americans have learned so much about harsh, humanistic virtue. To overlook it, indeed, is to squander a precious national resource. Without the games we have—baseball, football, basketball, and all the rest—we would be far poorer than we are. Their loveliness, though limited, deserves to be sung.
Eighty years ago, American economist Thorstein Veblen solemnly argued that play, or sports, had become one of the four "occupations" of the leisure class. The other three: government, warfare, and religion.

Yet, during the republic's earlier days, sports—especially those that encouraged betting—were regarded as frivolous, or worse.

The splendidly illustrated 200 Years of Sport in America: A Pageant of a Nation at Play (Mc-Graw-Hill, 1976), Wells Twombly quotes John Quincy Adams on the National Course, which opened with fanfare outside Washington in 1802: "Many scores of American legislators went on foot from the Capitol...and they found not only grog but 'sharks' [bookmakers] at the races."

If horse racing began as a gentleman's sport, it was soon democratized, although the rich still own most of the horses. Wagers on the Kentucky Derby alone now exceed $3 million each year.

Later, the well-to-do spent many of their dollars on big racing sailboats. America won the Royal Yacht Squadron Cup in 1851 in a race around the Isle of Wight. The Civil War intervened, and the first race took place in 1870 in New York harbor.

Some of yachting's flavor can be sampled in The Sea Chest: A Yachtsman's Reader (Norton, 1947; reprint, 1975). Editor Critchell Rimington's selections range from the humorous (James Thurber's sailing experiences, which gave him a new appreciation for the "simple, boomless bicycle") to the instructive
(Gardner Emmon's essay on determining the strength of wind at sea). Now "yachting" has become "sailing," a small-boat sport open to tens of thousands of Americans.

Professional boxing has traditionally served as a route to fame for the less privileged. Tom Molineux (1784-1818) was raised a Virginia slave, yet he became America's most celebrated boxer of the time. In 1810, he fought the English champion, Tom Cribb, in London for the world championship; it was the first battle for a world crown between a black and a white. The event was held outdoors in a chilling rain and heavy wind, and a badly battered Molineux had to be carried from the ring—at the end of the 33rd round. A description of that fight, and of many subsequent bouts, can be found in A Pictorial History of Boxing (Citadel, 1959; rev. ed., 1975) by Nat Fleischer and Sam Andre. The book also contains an extensive collection of black-and-white photographs (dating from the mid-19th century) and drawings.

The time when some sort of ball game was not played in America is unknown. In a readable history, Four Centuries of Sport in America, 1490-1890 (Derrydale Press, 1931; Arno reprint, 1968), Herbert Manchester points out that the pre-Columbian Aztecs enjoyed a form of football/soccer. North American Indians originated lacrosse. Tennis, devised by Major Walter Wingfield in England in 1873, arrived in the United States in 1875. Manchester says that the lawns of the few existing U.S. cricket clubs were easily adapted for tennis, much to the chagrin of a few old Anglophiles. The upstart sport soon became firmly established.

A book that captures the grace and rigor of tennis is John McPhee's Levels of the Game (Farrar, 1969). McPhee writes an elegant chronicle of the complex rivalry that developed during a single tennis match—the 1968 United States Open's semifinal at Forest Hills, N.Y., where Arthur Ashe defeated his Davis Cup teammate Clark Graebner.

Imported from Scotland, golf was played in Charleston, S.C., as early as 1790; the Savannah (Georgia) Golf Club held meetings until 1819. However, golf didn't really catch on in the United States until the late 1870s. Herbert Warren Wind, in The Story of American Golf: Its Champions and Its Championships (Knopf, 3rd ed., rev. 1975), sums up the sport's chief appeal: one does not have to be a "young, fast, beautifully coordinated athlete to play it acceptably."

A few other specialized books are worth noting. The New Yorker's Roger Angell is probably the most evocative baseball writer now working. He combines a journalistic attention to detail with relaxed reflection in The Summer Game (Viking, 1972, cloth; Popular Library, 1973, paper) and Five Seasons: A Baseball Companion (Simon & Schuster, 1977, cloth; Popular Library, 1978, paper). Anyone who thinks that baseball is just a matter of swatting a ball around with a stick might want to read Leonard Koppett's All About Baseball (Times Books, rev. ed., 1974). Koppett's main interests lie in the subtle psycho-intricacies of the game (e.g., the many functions of a manager and the importance of statistics to fans).

The NFL's Official Encyclopedic History of Professional Football (Macmillan, 1963), edited by Tom Bennett and others, provides a vivid overview of the world of pro football through a mixture of brief team histories, capsule biographies, accounts
of key games, club standings, rosters, rules, and play diagrams. Sportswriter Larry Merchant's The National Football Lottery (Holt, 1973, cloth; Dell, 1974, paper) is an offbeat, anecdotal examination of the vast amount of (mostly illegal) betting on pro football.

In The City Game (Harper's Magazine Press, 1970, cloth; Pocket Books, 1971, paper), journalist Pete Axthelm writes about basketball as it is played from the asphalt playgrounds of the inner city to the 50,000-seat palaces that host the pros. Focusing on New York City's Harlem and Bedford Stuyvesant, he interviews neighborhood 'stars' who excel in basketball but who never make it to the big time.

The most perceptive basketball memoir is Bill Bradley's Life on the Run: A Career in Basketball (Times Books, 1976, cloth; Bantam, 1977, paper). Bradley's career, however, is far from typical. A star for both Princeton University and the New York Knicks, he was also a Rhodes scholar. He is now the junior U.S. Senator from New Jersey.

For the generalist, a one-volume reference guide, providing histories and records for more than 50 sports from angling to yachting, is Frank G. Menke's The Encyclopedia of Sports (A. S. Barnes, 6th rev. ed., 1978).

Two of the best anthologies of sport are John T. Talamini and Charles H. Page's Sport and Society: An Anthology (Little, Brown, 1973, paper) and Henry B. Chapin's Sports in Literature (McKay, 1976, paper). Sport and Society contains essays ranging from Lewis Mumford's critique of mass sports (too much regimented spectacle) to a reflection on self-trial by English physician (and first four-minute miler) Roger Bannister. Sports in Literature includes (mostly) fiction by such fans as Irwin Shaw, John Updike, Ring Lardner, and James Thurber.

The dean of American sportswriters, Walter Wellesley ("Red") Smith of the New York Times, has collected his favorite sports accounts in Press Box (Norton, 1976). His 18 choices include W. C. Heinz (on football), Stan Fischler (hockey), and Edward J. Neil (bobsledding). Smith's favorites also include the Big Dramas, such as Boston Red Sox star Ted Williams' last game (he hit a home run in his last time at bat) and the knockout of Nazi Germany's Max Schmeling by Joe Louis in 1938. They reveal the powerful emotional impact a sports event can have on even its most sophisticated observers.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Some of the books mentioned in this essay were suggested by David Altheide and sports commentator Heywood Hale Broun.
Nuclear Energy:

SALVAGING THE ATOMIC AGE

"Before Three Mile Island, I was comfortable with the record of nuclear energy," writes Alvin M. Weinberg, one of the pioneers of atomic power. Yet long before the accident in Pennsylvania last March, Weinberg was worried about the siting, design, management, and operation of the 70 commercial U.S. nuclear power plants that today provide more than 10 percent of the nation's electricity. Short on oil and coal, some countries, notably France and South Korea, are "going nuclear" in a big way. Other countries, such as West Germany and the United States, are increasingly disturbed by the possibility of large-scale radioactive contamination. Weinberg believes that solar energy and other "clean" approaches should be pushed; but none of them, he argues, can fully substitute for the "nuclear enterprise." Here he reviews the history of atomic power and suggests what must be done to ensure its future.

by Alvin M. Weinberg

A 1-million-kilowatt, pressurized-water nuclear reactor—the type widely used in the United States today—contains 15 billion curies of radioactivity. This is about equal to the natural radioactivity that accompanies decay of the four billion tons of uranium dissolved in all the oceans. Nothing except time can turn this radioactivity off. The radioactivity in a reactor decays only slowly after the reactor is shut down: it contributes about 200,000 kilowatts of heat while the reactor is running, and, depending upon how long the reactor has been running before shutdown, it is still generating 8,500 kilowatts a week later. Unless a large chain reactor is cooled even after the reaction has
ceased, the fuel will melt. If it melts, radioactivity will escape from the fuel and may enter the environment.

From the beginning, all of us at Arthur Compton’s wartime Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago, where the first chain reaction was established in 1942, sensed that man had crossed a threshold when he learned how to create radioactivity at will—and on an enormous scale.

Until then, radioactivity was measured in micro- or milli-curies; one gram of radium, costing $50,000, was equal to one curie. (The maximum permissible dose of radium in a human being is one ten-millionth of a gram.) Enrico Fermi, the developer of the chain reactor, and our scientific leader, on occasion would remind us of this. It was not only the Bomb that changed things, he said, it was also the creation of unimaginably large amounts of radioactivity.

The simplest way to ensure that no member of the public was hurt by the release of radioactivity from a malfunctioning nuclear reactor was to put the reactor in a remote place. To be sure, the first chain reaction, on December 2, 1942, took place on
57th Street and Ellis Avenue in the heart of Chicago's South Side. This tiny venture into large scale radioactivity gave General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, and Arthur Compton plenty of anxiety, but every day counted during the war. To have awaited the completion of the site at Argonne Forest Preserve outside the city would have taken too much time.

But we took it for granted that the large (250,000 kilowatt) plutonium-producing reactors then being planned, as well as a much smaller pilot plant reactor, would be remotely sited—the latter at Oak Ridge in the hills of eastern Tennessee (“site X”), the former on the huge Hanford Reservation in eastern Washington (“site W”). Most of the other reactors built by the Atomic Energy Commission between 1946 and 1974 were confined to these and several other sites: Savannah River, South Carolina; Idaho Falls, Idaho; and Los Alamos, New Mexico.

All of these places were, at the time, far from population centers; and as the supporting towns, such as Richland, Wash., and Oak Ridge, Tenn., developed, they were sprinkled with specialists who had daily experience in the handling of large-scale radioactivity and knew how much was dangerous and how much was but a tiny addition to the earth’s all-pervasive natural background radiation.

Had all U.S. power reactors been as secluded as the original Hanford or Idaho Falls or Savannah River reactors, the nuclear enterprise might have avoided many of the problems it has now encountered. We might have had by this time perhaps 25 remote sites, each eventually having as many as 10 or 20 reactors (Hanford at one point had 9 large reactors), each surrounded by a

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Alvin M. Weinberg, 64, is founder and director of the Institute for Energy Analysis at the Oak Ridge Associated Universities. Born in Chicago, he received his S.B., S.M., and Ph.D. (in physics, 1939) from the University of Chicago. He was one of the first members of the university’s wartime Metallurgical Laboratory, where he served from 1942 to 1945. He has been at Oak Ridge since 1945, first as director of the physics division (1947–48), then as director of research (1948–55), later as director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (1955–73). He holds or shares patents for the original Hanford plutonium-producing reactor, the original homogenous reactor, the first light-water reactor, the first heavy-water reactor, and the original liquid-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor. Dr. Weinberg, who served on the President’s Science Advisory Committee under Eisenhower and Kennedy, is a former Guest Scholar at the Wilson Center. His books include The Physical Theory of Neutron Chain Reactors (1958, with Eugene P. Wigner), and Reflections on Big Science (1967).
The first nuclear chain reaction was established in 1942 in a squash court under the University of Chicago’s Stagg Field. Two years later, physicists Enrico Fermi and Leo Szilard applied for a patent on the first nuclear reactor (left). The patent for the two-story-high structure was issued in 1955.

large unpopulated zone, and each ringed at a distance by villages inhabited by people who worked at the plants and for whom the safe handling of radioactivity was a fact of life.

Had the nuclear energy enterprise remained a government monopoly, as originally prescribed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, then the siting and generation of nuclear electricity might have evolved along such lines. Power generation would be in the hands of the Atomic Energy Commission, or a successor agency, and the electricity so generated would be distributed by private and public utilities.

But, in retrospect, this could never have happened. The utilities, perhaps stung by the consequences of their foot-dragging on rural electrification in the 1930s, were anxious to forestall the development of a government-operated nuclear version of the New Deal’s Tennessee Valley Authority. And this was not a phantom threat: in the early 1950s, Tennessee’s Senator Albert Gore was calling (in vain, as it turned out) for federal construction of six large power reactors in the United States. But the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 put nuclear energy into the private sector: Congress allowed utilities to own and operate nuclear power plants, and indeed, encouraged the pri-
vate sector to design and develop reactors. Today 41 utilities operate some 70 large nuclear power plants.

Producing electricity in remote sites is also awkward. Utility planners build conventional coal and oil generating plants near cooling water and close to “load centers” (i.e., population centers) to reduce the cost of transmission lines. A conventional plant’s impact on the environment has, until very recently, been regarded as a secondary matter. As for fossil fuel plants’ possible danger to the public, for a long time this was not an issue, even though their emissions may cause or exacerbate lung disease. It was all but inevitable, therefore, that nuclear generating plants would by and large be sited as conventional plants had been.

**Barriers Within Barriers**

Thus, during the early 1960s, Consolidated Edison, which traditionally had put its conventional plants close to New York City, proposed building an underground nuclear plant in the borough of Queens; the proposal was withdrawn only when it became clear that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission would never license a plant in such a densely populated area.

How could nuclear engineers reconcile the intrinsic danger represented by 15 billion curies in the core of an operating reactor with the necessity of placing the reactor fairly close to population centers?

Several strategies evolved. First, reactors were not allowed too close to populated areas. The AEC (and now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) required “exclusion” zones and close-in “controlled” zones around reactors. No one can live in an exclusion zone, which usually extends about one-half mile from the reactor site; the utility controls access to the controlled zone. Of the 90 or so nuclear sites now in operation or being built, only 13 have more than 25,000 people living within a five-mile radius, and only 10 have more than 100,000 within a ten-mile radius. To this extent, the original approach to nuclear safety has prevailed, although only a handful of commercial power plants are sited as remotely as are Hanford and Savannah River.

But this isolation was clearly not enough. Elaborate engineering devices were developed to place barriers between the environment and those 15 billion curies inside the reactor. The AEC used to speak of three approaches to safety: extremely careful design, to minimize the likelihood of a mishap in the first place; various systems, such as shut-off rods and sensors, to abort a mishap before it gets out of control; and back-up devices, such as the emergency core cooling system, to cool the reactor.
and prevent a meltdown should the regular system fail.

In addition, there are now at least three physical barriers at each reactor between the radioactivity and the world outside: metallic zirconium enveloping the fuel pellets in which the radioactivity is largely generated; the thick steel pressure vessel, along with the pipes that carry the primary cooling water at a pressure of about one ton per square inch; and the now-famous concrete-encased steel dome designed to withstand a pressure of 50 pounds per square inch without leaking. In the event of a core meltdown, should any one of these barriers remain unbreached, little radioactivity would reach the public.

How well had these systems worked before the accident at Three Mile Island, in March, 1979? Pretty much as planned, in American reactors. There were several major accidents, however, as well as many minor incidents:

- In 1961 a serious nuclear excursion, apparently initiated by deliberate removal of a control rod, killed three operators in a small experimental reactor in Idaho Falls, Idaho; some radioactivity escaped because this reactor, being located so far from people, had no containment shell.
- A loose piece of metal blocked the coolant and caused a partial meltdown at the Fermi fast breeder reactor plant outside Detroit in 1966; both primary system and containment held.
- At Browns Ferry, Alabama, in 1975, a fire disabled much of the emergency core cooling system, but enough remained to prevent a core meltdown; no radioactivity leaked to the atmosphere.

Outside the United States, the record, at least in the early days, was not as good. The worst incident was Britain's Windscale fire in 1957. A plutonium-producing reactor made of graphite caught fire; since the reactor was not surrounded by a containment vessel, some 20,000 curies of radioactive iodine were released, several thousand times as much as was released to the outside in the Three Mile Island accident (10–15 curies).

A properly operating reactor is generally a benign source of energy. It emits no carbon dioxide or sulfur dioxide or particulates. Its radioactive emissions during routine operation are rather less than those from a coal plant of the same output. The main hazard comes from the 200 tons of uranium that is mined to keep it fueled each year. The mine tailings—leftover material after uranium ore is processed—contain about 1,000 curies, but they are usually stored in remote places and much of the

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* A 1-million-kilowatt coal plant burns 2.5 million tons of coal per year. This coal may have some 10 tons of uranium in it, and this represents about 50 curies of radioactivity in the coal ash and in gases released in the air near the coal plant.
radioactivity decays before it is dispersed. Covering the tailings with a foot of earth would reduce even these emissions.

Unlike many critics, I would put disposal of toxic radioactive wastes in the category of lesser problems. This is largely because the high level, potentially dangerous wastes occupy so little space (two cubic meters per reactor per year) and because, after about 1,000 years, the wastes are no more hazardous than the original uranium from which the wastes were formed. (This uranium is part of nature, and it seems unreasonable to require the sequestered wastes to be less hazardous than the original uranium.) To sequester wastes for 1,000 years simply does not
strike me as being beyond reason. After all, cave paintings by Cro-Magnon man have survived for 12,000 years. In Oklo, Gabon, there are ancient underground natural chain reactors that operated for 500,000 years: Many of the fission products and essentially all of the plutonium created in these remarkable phenomena have remained in place, unattended, for almost 2 billion years! Despite the great public concern and political passion generated over nuclear wastes, I view them as a nuisance for which there are many solutions.

Nor do I consider nuclear proliferation, the issue on which so much discussion hinges today, the principal problem of nu-
clear energy. Most, if not all, of the world's atomic bombs have come from reactors built expressly to make bombs, not from power reactors. Should a country want to make bombs badly enough, it can do so without troubling to build or buy a commercial power reactor. Indeed, I believe nuclear power is rather peripheral to the proliferation issue; our attempts to devise technical fixes for that problem tend to be "allusive and sentimental" (to quote Robert Oppenheimer) rather than "substantive and functional." We can not prevent Pakistan or South Africa from making bombs if they are intent on so doing and if their leaders place the manufacture of bombs above other national aims.

The Probability Paradox

The 15 billion curies in an operating reactor, and the possibility of its release, has long struck me as the primary issue, the one on which nuclear energy will stand or fall. Since a serious reactor malfunction is a matter of probability, the issue becomes more and more important as more reactors are built. To illustrate: If the probability of a serious malfunction, in which significant amounts of radioactivity are released, is, say, 1 in 20,000 per reactor per year, then when there are 100 reactors operating, one might expect one such accident every 200 years; but if there are eventually throughout the world 10,000 reactors—as could happen were nuclear energy to become the world's primary energy source—then, unless the probability of an accident for each reactor is reduced, one could expect one such accident every two years.

I do not believe the public in the United States or elsewhere would retain much confidence in an energy system that caused even relatively modest radioactive contamination every two years. Nor does it make much difference where accidents happen: TV converts an accident anywhere into an accident everywhere. For nuclear energy to grow in usefulness, the accident probability per reactor will simply have to diminish; the public will have to be prepared to cope with the radiation risk such infrequent accidents might entail; and the media will have to deal with nuclear malfunctions in the same way it deals with other industrial accidents that have comparable impact on health.

Bo Lindstrom, the Swedish aeronautical engineer, pointed out some 20 years ago that air travel faced exactly this dilemma. He argued that if air travel continued to expand, and the accident rate per passenger mile held constant, then by around the
"Relax Rosalynn... The Nuclear Regulatory Commission said it was safe to go into that plant..." Bill Schorr's cartoon appeared shortly after President Carter and the First Lady toured Three Mile Island.

year 2000 there would be several serious accidents every day around the world. For the individual passenger, air travel would remain as good a risk in 2000 as it was in 1960. But, he argued, the public's confidence in air travel would collapse. Air transport has, of course, become much safer, per passenger mile, than it was at the time Lindstrom made his observations; and, I suppose, the public and the media have become somewhat inured to occasional air crashes. Both changes were necessary for air transport to survive.

What are the actual probabilities of malfunction in reactors? Before the Three Mile Island accident, all of us in the nuclear enterprise were fairly comfortable with the estimates made by Norman C. Rasmussen of M.I.T. in his famous 1975 study on the probabilities and consequences of a reactor accident.* He estimated that for a light-water reactor the probability of a core meltdown that would release at least a few thousand curies of radioactivity was 1 in 20,000 per reactor per year.

Most of these incidents would not cause physical damage to the public. A few would, and a very few, estimated at one in a billion reactor years, might be a major catastrophe—3,300 immediate radiation deaths, 45,000 extra cancers, $17 billion in property damage.

**Gripping Dramas**

Rasmussen himself has set the uncertainty in his estimate of probability at about 10 either way (although the report puts the uncertainty at half this), his estimate of consequences perhaps at three. That is, the probability of an accident causing significant property damage might be as high as one in 2,000 per reactor per year; the probability of the very worst accident 1 in 100 million reactor years. A recent NRC review of the Rasmussen report led by University of California physicist Harold W. Lewis has set even greater uncertainties on the probabilities, although it generally praised Rasmussen’s methodology.

Before Three Mile Island, I was comfortable with the record of nuclear energy. The non-communist world’s light-water reactors had amassed 500 reactor years without a meltdown; if one added the U.S. nuclear navy’s record, one could roughly triple this—no meltdowns in about 1,500 reactor years. Rasmussen’s upper limit of meltdown, about 1 in 2,000 reactor years, was close to being vindicated.

Though I write this before all the returns are in, I believe it is fair to say that Three Mile Island suggests that the probability of accidents that release a few thousand curies may have been underestimated, not so much because of possible engineering deficiencies, but because of human error. Closure of two valves, thus incapacitating the auxiliary feedwater system, followed by various other malfunctions and operator errors, was not, as far as I can deduce, contemplated in the Rasmussen study.

Yet containment for the most part held. The iodine released was perhaps a dozen curies; the maximum total whole body exposure to any member of the public was probably less than what we used to accept every day as the allowable dose in the early days of the atomic energy project. No member of the public has suffered bodily harm from Three Mile Island.

Chauncey Starr, vice chairman of the Electric Power Research Institute (the research arm of the utilities), has estimated that an incident like Three Mile Island has a 50-50 chance of occurring every 400 reactor years. Can nuclear energy survive if such incidents have a 50 percent chance of happening that of-
THE CHAIN REACTION

Uranium-235 undergoes fission when it is bombarded with neutrons. For nuclear energy to be possible, the same agent, the neutron, which splits the $^{235}\text{U}$ nucleus and releases energy, must itself be released during fission. In this way, a "chain" reaction can be propagated: A single $^{235}\text{U}$ nucleus splits and in splitting gives off roughly two neutrons; this in turn causes two other $^{235}\text{U}$ nuclei to split, four neutrons are given off; and so on.

In most reactors of current design, the $^{235}\text{U}$ is diluted with $^{238}\text{U}$, just as it is in nature. Uranium-238 usually does not undergo fission but competes for neutrons with the $^{235}\text{U}$. To establish a chain reaction in such a mixture, it is necessary to slow or "moderate" the neutrons. This is accomplished by mixing the uranium with a substance (e.g., water) containing "light" elements, such as hydrogen. The neutrons lose energy in colliding with protons, much as a billiard ball loses energy when it strikes another, stationary ball.

The $^{238}\text{U}$, though it does not directly engage in the chain reaction, does absorb some of the neutrons given off in fission. Upon absorbing a neutron, $^{238}\text{U}$ is converted to plutonium-239. This isotope can support a chain reaction; $^{239}\text{Pu}$ was used as the bomb material at Alamogordo and at Nagasaki.

Nuclear fission is the heart of the nuclear-fuel cycle: the unshaded area shows the other existing elements. Shaded areas show how fuel cycle would expand to accommodate fuel reprocessing and breeder reactors. Fear of nuclear proliferation prompted the Carter administration in 1977 to halt U.S. commercial fuel reprocessing and slow commercial breeder development.
ten? I do not think it can. It is not that people will actually be hurt; it is that people will be scared out of their wits. The drama of the hydrogen bubble in the pressure vessel at Three Mile Island has rarely been matched on TV. And with 200 reactors operating in the United States alone by the 1990s, one might expect a new, gripping TV serial once every few years.

**Six Suggestions**

Can the nuclear enterprise be redesigned so as to make it acceptable? Can the probability of an incident like Three Mile Island be significantly reduced? And is it likely that the public's (and the media's) reaction to future Three Mile Islands will be more commensurate with the actual damage rather than with their perception of the potential hazard?

In my view, all of this is possible. Indeed, Three Mile Island could be the salvation of nuclear energy. Before the incident, the possibility of a core meltdown was, by and large, the private knowledge of the nuclear and the antinuclear communities. Today, every newspaper reader and TV viewer knows about cooling systems and their malfunction. Best of all, the managers of the electric utilities that operate nuclear plants are now acutely aware that the responsibility entailed in operating a nuclear power plant is far greater than that entailed in operating a fossil-fuel plant.

But "consciousness raising" is not enough. I believe an acceptable nuclear future should have six characteristics: increased physical isolation of reactors, further technical improvements, separation of generation and distribution, professionalization of the nuclear cadre, heightened security, and public education about the hazards of radiation.

**Physical isolation.** It is unfortunately too late to return to the original siting policy that confined nuclear activities to very remote places. But we can achieve a good deal by confining the enterprise, forever, to those existing nuclear sites that have few people near them. About 80 nuclear sites (operating or being built) currently meet that criterion. Evacuation in an emergency would be relatively easy. More important, everyone living within five miles could be educated about radiation, and each household might be equipped with a radiation detector, much like smoke detectors.

Moreover, the size of the future population within five miles ought to be restricted. This could be accomplished if the area (75 square miles) around each site were properly zoned. If we eventually had 100 isolated nuclear sites in all, this would amount to...
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THE FEDERAL ROLE

At the end of World War II, the United States had a $2 billion atomic industry on its hands, with major laboratories, research reactors, and hundreds of scientists and other personnel. The question in Washington: What to do with it all?

One group, led by General Leslie Groves, head of the wartime Manhattan Project, sought to keep the atom under military supervision. Another, led by Connecticut's freshman Democratic Senator, Brien McMahon, pushed for civilian control. The latter prevailed with passage of the McMahon Act in 1946, which created the five-member Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Congress charged the Commission (chaired by David E. Lilienthal, former head of the Tennessee Valley Authority) with both weapons development and research into possible peaceful applications of the atom.

Initially, the AEC's budget was modest. In 1952, for example, Congress gave the agency $753 million, of which only $67 million was for nuclear reactor development. More than $400 million was devoted to weapons and the manufacture of fissionable materials.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, passed by a Republican Congress in the wake of President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech to the United Nations, was designed to turn nuclear energy over to private industry. It allowed electric utility companies to own and operate nuclear power plants (though none were yet in existence) subject to AEC licensing. The act prohibited the government from selling nuclear-generated electricity, but did not set out any master plan for siting and development of private power reactors. The utilities were given further incentives under the 1957 Price-Anderson Act, whereby the federal government itself insured nuclear utilities against damage claims. The first U.S. power reactor began operating that year in Shippingport, Pennsylvania. With massive government subsidies, the commercial nuclear industry began to thrive.

In 1974, the AEC was reorganized. Its watchdog functions passed to the new Nuclear Regulatory Commission, while its research arm became the Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA). ERDA was absorbed by President Carter's new Department of Energy (DOE) in 1977.

The current (fiscal year 1979) DOE budget is $10.7 billion. As in the old AEC, a substantial portion of this total—about $2.5 billion—goes for defense-related activities. Research on nuclear power claims $1.1 billion. Other energy research categories: solar, $559 million; fusion, $356 million; coal, oil, and gas, $759 million. The department also spends $485 million annually on nuclear waste management. Most of this waste is generated by weapons programs, not by electric utilities.
committing 7,500 square miles to the enterprise in perpetuity. Only a small part of this area, perhaps 200 square miles, would be exclusively reserved for nuclear operations; the rest could be devoted to farming.

Since the number of sites is limited, the generating capacity of each will increase as the nuclear enterprise grows. Eventually each site may have as many as 10 reactors, compared to an average of less than 2 per site now. Such clustering ought to bring in its wake other improvements. Large sites are likely to have more able people in charge than are small sites. There will develop an organizational memory: Small mishaps on Unit 2 five years ago are not likely to be repeated on Unit 4 today. I speak of this from my experience at Oak Ridge, a large, powerful, nuclear center which has always had the logistical strength and organizational memory to contain the damage when accidents have happened.

A Question of Nerve

The sites, like dams, also ought to be invested with an imputation of permanence. If one concedes that the sites are permanent, then one can simply leave the voluminous low-level radioactive wastes (as well as the old reactors) in place until their radioactivity has largely decayed. After 100 years or so, the bulk of the low-level wastes, as well as the old reactors, will be fairly innocuous. Dismantling old reactors after that should be relatively easy. During the decay period, the old reactor buildings might be used to store the other nuclear wastes. In an active, self-contained nuclear complex, maintenance should pose little difficulty.

Technical improvements. As Three Mile Island has shown, the nuclear establishment is still learning. Is it learning fast enough? Will improved back-up systems reduce the probability of failure faster than the number of reactors grows? Surely Three Mile Island will lead to corrections of certain faults in existing pressurized-water reactors. It will also lead to even tougher government regulations. This combination of tougher regulation and improved technology will certainly lessen the likelihood of future Three Mile Islands.

Beyond this is a more fundamental question: Are there types of reactors inherently safer than the common pressurized-water reactor (PWR)? After all, the PWR was conceived as a compact reactor capable of being stuffed into a submarine; its evolution into the mainstay of huge central nuclear power plants on land is still a source of wonder to its original
Nuclear power currently provides only about 4 percent of total U.S. energy needs, far less than coal, natural gas, or oil. The nuclear share of U.S. electric generating capacity, however, is more than 10 percent, and rising. Americans today use twice as much total energy as they did in 1950.

designers. The British, without quite saying so, suggest that their large graphite reactors cooled with gas are less prone to mishaps than is the PWR. *

The Russians continue to build large graphite, water-cooled reactors, as well as reactors like that at Three Mile Island; the Canadians use heavy-water systems. I was a long-time proponent of a completely different reactor type that used fuel that was already in the liquid state, the molten-salt reactor. Is it impossible to return to Square One and try to design a reactor that is more resistant to the so-called China Syndrome? Does the technical community have the nerve, and do the other actors (utilities, government, manufacturers) have the money and the will to design and commercialize a completely new system? Perhaps when the furor over Three Mile Island subsides, we will embark on this uncertain, but possibly rewarding, new path.

*Three reactors other than PWRs are used commercially: gas-cooled-graphite, in which the uranium rods are embedded in a huge block of graphite and are cooled by flowing gas; water-cooled-graphite, in which water is used as coolant; and heavy-water, in which the graphite is replaced by a tank of heavy water—i.e., water in which the ordinary hydrogen is replaced by heavy hydrogen (deuterium).
Generation and Distribution. The nuclear system requires a powerful organization if it is to be operated properly. We have in this country about 200 electricity-generating utility companies. Nuclear electricity does not lend itself very well to such fragmentation, nor to small operators. A 1-million-kilowatt power plant often represents a large fraction of the total output of a smaller utility. Twenty-seven of the 41 “nuclear” utilities have but a single reactor. It seems to me that such small nuclear utilities are less likely to maintain the organizational strength and memory necessary to operate a nuclear reactor properly than is an organization that owns and operates many reactors.

If the siting policy that I espouse becomes a reality, it seems natural that the large, clustered sites will be operated by powerful organizations whose main job is operating nuclear facilities. Presumably, most of the sites would serve more than a single utility. Thus, one could envisage the gradual separation of generation from distribution of nuclear electricity, the former being in the hands of powerful organizations—public or private—that do nothing but generate nuclear electricity. Such nuclear generating entities would have the technical capacity to supervise every element of the design and construction of their plants. They would be much less at the mercy of the reactor and equipment suppliers than they now are.

Clearing the Brain

It is a delicate, and not very clear, question as to whether the operating consortia should be public or private, whether one would get better (and safer) operation from private organizations policed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or from a public Nuclear Energy Authority. There is an inherent tension between safe as possible and cheap as possible. The conflict manifests itself when a pilot decides to cancel a flight because the weather is bad, even though this costs his company money. Many would argue that a public operator is more likely to weigh his decisions on the side of safety. But public authorities seem to me to be harder to regulate than private ones.

After Three Mile Island, every nuclear utility, not to mention reactor manufacturer, must realize that its very existence may depend on avoiding incidents of this sort. This must be powerful medicine for clearing one’s brain of a possible confusion as to which comes first, safety or continuity of electricity supply.

Professionalization of the nuclear cadre. The pilot of a transatlantic Boeing 747 is paid about $100,000 per year, perhaps 50
percent of what the president of his airline gets. The superintendent of a nuclear plant gets $40,000 per year, about 20 percent of what his president gets. The pilot and the operator bear a heavier burden of direct responsibility for people's lives than do their respective bosses. In the case of the pilots, this is more or less acknowledged in their pay; in the case of a plant superintendent, it is not. Why?

I believe the answer is to be found again in the mistaken belief among utility executives that a nuclear plant was just another generating station. The pay scales, indeed, the whole conception of training and expertise, tended to be strongly influenced by this perception. Moreover, a utility manager found it awkward to pay operators of one kind of plant much more than he paid operators of another.

But the responsibility borne by the nuclear operator is so great that he and his staff must be regarded—and trained—as an elite. They must constitute a cadre with tradition, competence, and confidence. Is it possible to get people of such quality for jobs that are essentially very boring? This is the same problem faced, say, by the pilots on the Eastern Airline shuttle between Washington and New York or by the anesthesiologist during a routine operation. We deal with this ennui with money, with status in the community, with shorter work schedules. This is the very least we can do with nuclear operators.

That is why I have so strongly urged cluster siting and separate generating entities: Both would be more conducive to creation of the professionalized corps necessary to keep the nuclear enterprise out of trouble. At a nuclear center, there will be many people to choose from when vacancies arise. There will be a general ambience of expertise. And an independent generating entity can pay its employees salaries that are not bound by the locked-in traditions of coal-fired utilities.

Heavy security. The nuclear enterprise will always demand far greater security than the fossil-fueled enterprise. Terrorists and saboteurs can merely incapacitate a fossil plant; in nuclear plants, they can, albeit with some difficulty, produce serious accidents. This is another reason why cluster siting is important. It is easier to guard 10 reactors on a single site than 10 reactors on separate sites.

Public education about radiation. None of the above measures will ensure the survival of nuclear energy unless the public and the media come to accept the risk of radiation as no different from the risk of other noxious substances that are products of our technology, particularly agents such as mercury or
CALVERT CLIFFS, A TYPICAL PLANT

The idea behind nuclear power—creating heat to boil water to make steam to drive turbines—is simple. But operating a commercial reactor is a complicated business. The Calvert Cliffs plant, comprising two pressurized-water reactors in Maryland on the Chesapeake Bay, is typical. Owned by the Baltimore Gas & Electric Company, it began operating in 1975; construction costs totaled $766 million. A profile:

**Designer:** Combustion Engineering, Inc.

**Builder:** Bechtel Power Corp.

**Personnel:** Over 200, including chief engineer, section engineers, nuclear plant operators, secretaries, guards.

**Capacity:** About 1,620 megawatts. Electricity produced in 1978 was the equivalent of 16 million barrels of oil.

**Site:** The plant itself covers 126 acres of a 1,135 acre tract. A high wire fence surrounds the entire property. Housing begins beyond the perimeter; 150,000 people live within 30 miles of the reactor.

**Security:** Number of guards not disclosed.

**Environmental effects:** As a coolant, the plant uses 2.4 million gallons of water from the Chesapeake Bay every minute; the water is returned to the bay 10 degrees warmer. According to a company statement: "The plant has no significant effect on the environment." According to a Nuclear Regulatory Commission statement: "Emphasis [at Calvert Cliffs] is upon commercial operation; attitude toward safety is that meeting N.R.C. requirements literally is sufficient."

**Service Area:** Calvert Cliffs serves 800,000 residential, industrial, and commercial customers in Baltimore and eight nearby counties.

(A) Water intake basin; (B) pump house; (C) administration building; (D) turbine room; (E) control room; (F) reactor containment buildings, constructed to withstand earthquakes, tornadoes, and the direct impact of a 747 jetliner; (G) water tanks; (H) plant switchyard; (I) first security clearance checkpoint.
polychlorinated biphenyls that persist and sometimes (as at Seveso, Italy) interdict land.

Why, after all, did Three Mile Island create such extreme concern, especially since not one member of the public has been harmed by it or, for that matter, by the operation of any other commercial nuclear reactor? Why was Three Mile Island the biggest story of the year when the collapse of the Grand Teton Dam in 1976, or even the collision of the jumbo jets in Tenerife in 1977, vanished from the front pages in a few days?

**Invisible Hazard**

I see several reasons for this seeming double standard. The potential for a disaster was there, though exactly how close we came will have to await the outcome of the current investigations. Since its dimensions could not be gauged and the whole situation was so completely novel, the crisis provided the classic ingredients of high media drama. The fear of possible radiation-induced death goes deep. Radiation is mysterious: It cannot be sensed, you can't see it, yet it can kill you.

The estimate of the hazard of radiation is clouded by bitter scientific dispute. In particular, there is the strongest kind of disagreement among scientists as to the effect of very low levels of radiation, even levels as low as our natural radiation background. Most of the estimated delayed cancer deaths associated with so-called hypothetical accidents are supposed to be caused by exposures well below the occupational limits. If one assumes that any extra radiation, however small, causes cancer, then if millions of people are exposed, some extra cancers will result. But if, as I believe, low-level radiation is nowhere near as dangerous as, for example, television newsmen seem to think, then the public's (and, perhaps more important, the media's) reaction to the possibility of such irradiation may be far more restrained.6

The whole question of low-level radiation is so critical to public acceptance of nuclear energy that I consider this a leading, if not the leading, scientific issue underlying the nuclear controversy. Unfortunately, since the effects (if any) are so rarely seen because the exposures are so small, the issue may be beyond the ability of science to decipher. Fortunately, we do have a standard—natural background radiation—with which to

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6 The controversy over low-level radiation is examined in *The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiations*, the report of the Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations, National Academy of Sciences (1979). The committee divided sharply on the issue, a dissenting report is appended.
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compare additional exposures. At Three Mile Island, the total dose to the population was about 1 percent of natural background—a level where no effects can be seen.

Unless changes are made that restore the public confidence, the Nuclear Age will come to a halt as the present reactors run their course. And we shall have to revert to the energy strategies that were available before fission was discovered. What are the alternatives to fission? Aside from conservation, which has its limits, there are only four: geothermal, fusion, fossil, and the various forms of solar energy.

The potential of geothermal energy—from natural steam or hot dry rocks—is relatively small; if we are to contemplate a world that has many more people, and that uses, say, three times as much energy as we now use, geothermal can hardly help.

Pricing a Moratorium

As for fusion, despite the optimism that prevails among scientists working in the field, it seems to me that the possibility still remains just that—a possibility. The fuel, deuterium and tritium (isotopes of hydrogen), is all but inexhaustible, yet the engineering remains formidable. Moreover, fusion is not devoid of radioactivity. To be sure, there is 100 times less in a fusion reactor than in a fission reactor. But, as Three Mile Island suggests, if fusion is to be acceptable, it too will require a public that understands the relative hazards of radioactivity. Thus, my view about fusion is agnostic—let’s work on it, but let’s not count on it.

Fossil fuel is, of course, what we shall turn to in increasing amounts whether or not we have fission. But if we had a moratorium on new fission plants beginning in 1985, we might, in the United States, have to burn about a billion tons more of coal by the year 2000 than if we had no such moratorium. And as for oil, the political pressures might become quite intolerable should our need for the world’s oil increase drastically.

Nor is fossil fuel a benign source of energy. Even a properly operating coal plant emits noxious fumes. The dangers from burning fossil fuels are undramatic—deaths from coal mine accidents, black lung disease among miners, bronchial troubles downwind of a coal-burning plant. By contrast, the dangers of a nuclear plant are localized and dramatic, even though, as Three Mile Island has shown, a nuclear plant can suffer an extraordi-


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nary amount of damage without anyone being hurt. Fossil fuels also pose a large-scale worldwide threat comparable to that of proliferation. I refer to the accumulation of carbon dioxide (CO₂) in the atmosphere. Most climatologists (though not all) believe that doubling the CO₂ may increase the average surface temperature of the earth by about 2°C, and would diminish the equatorial-polar temperature gradient, which drives the wind system, by about 10°C.

Not all the ensuing changes need be bad. But the doubling of CO₂ in the atmosphere, which could happen by, say, the year 2050, represents an unprecedented climatological experiment by man. It might cause the seas to rise, turn deserts into grasslands, grasslands into deserts. If this is a real possibility, then would continued burning of fossil fuels be a responsible course, even if fossil fuels were inexhaustible (which they aren’t)?

Which leaves us with solar energy, including hydro, wind, waves, biomass, and ocean thermal gradients as well as direct solar. Solar energy is immense, environmentally benign, the darling of the people (no one is against solar energy). But it is also intermittent and, insofar as one can tell, expensive. If what we contemplate is an all-solar world, not one in which small household solar water heaters are backed up by electricity from the local utility, then we must come to terms with the intermittency of solar energy. Either we adjust our lives to a sun that does not always shine, or else we arrange for storage—perhaps with auxiliary engines operated on alcohol, or electric batteries, or perhaps by hydrogen-generated photoelectrically. Overcoming intermittency seems to be very expensive, though how expensive I cannot say. What seems clear is that an all-solar society is almost surely a low-energy society, and one in which energy will be a good deal costlier than it is now.

The Faustian Bargain

To my mind, the only alternative (or perhaps adjunct) to a solar society is the one based on fission—at least if one concedes that fossil fuels are limited, or that the CO₂ danger must be taken seriously, or that fusion will forever evade us. But such a fission future might involve several thousand U.S. reactors, and one must then come to terms with the problem I alluded to earlier: Even though the probability per reactor of a serious accident is small, when the system becomes large the number of accidents may become too frequent for the public to tolerate.

Thus, if a solar society can be made to work, by all means let us work hard to achieve it. I favor pushing solar technology as
More than 200 nuclear power reactors are operating throughout the world, most of them in the eastern United States and Western Europe. Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, Britain, and France produce more of their electricity—up to 22 percent—from nuclear power than does the United States.

The governments of Brazil, France, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, among others, are firmly committed to nuclear energy because they feel they have no alternative. Governments in such countries as West Germany, Britain, Belgium, and Sweden face growing opposition.

hard as we can. But let us not mislead ourselves. Solar cannot take over very much of the load for a long time, if ever; and a solar society will not be the utopia many advocates perceive it to be, even if some very major improvements in energy storage and photoelectric conversion are achieved.

But suppose we do not achieve these technological breakthroughs, can we put a price on solar energy at which we would prefer it over nuclear because nuclear is handicapped by its radioactivity? There are many who would abolish nuclear in favor of solar whatever the cost. This I cannot view as a rational response. But neither can I say how much extra one should pay for solar to avoid the disadvantages of nuclear. And it is not impossible that the price one must pay for an acceptable nuclear system—with its better technology, higher-paid personnel, and tighter security—conceivably could price nuclear out of the market.

About eight years have passed since I first referred to nuclear energy as a Faustian Bargain. I have since been corrected both by nuclear advocates (who prefer Prometheus to Faust) and by scholars (who say that Goethe's Faust didn't really make a bargain at all). Nevertheless, what I meant was clear: nuclear energy, that miraculous and quite unsuspected source of energy, demands an unprecedented degree of expertise, attention to detail, and social stability. In return, man has, in the breeder reactor, an inexhaustible energy source."

Three Mile Island has undoubtedly turned many away from nuclear energy, has reinforced their belief that nuclear energy is simply too hazardous. Three Mile Island for me has a rather different significance. I have often said that Goethe's Faust was redeemed:

"Who e'er aspiring, struggles on,
For him there is salvation."

and that man, in his striving, will finally master this complex and unforgiving technology.

My antimuclear colleagues retort that this is foolish technological optimism—that man is imperfect, and that anything that

*A breeder, which creates more nuclear fuel than it consumes, requires only 1/60th as much uranium as do present-day "burner" (e.g., pressurized-water) reactors. Unless we are badly underestimating our uranium reserves, Phase I, the age of burners, will necessarily be transitory. Phase II will rely on breeders. The Carter administration supports development of an advanced, sodium-cooled breeder, but it is strongly opposed to completion of the Clinch River Breeder, a sodium-cooled pilot plant that was to be built in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. As of this writing, Congress continues to fund the project despite administration attempts to kill it.

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can go wrong will go wrong. But man is also ingenious, and the history of the two worst American reactor accidents—Browns Ferry and Three Mile Island—demonstrates this. In both cases, the accident was precipitated, or at least exacerbated, by human error: a lighted candle at Browns Ferry, closed valves at Three Mile Island. In both cases, the operators used their ingenuity to contain a nasty situation. And in neither case was anyone harmed by excess radioactivity. It is their cynical denial of human ingenuity and uncompromising acceptance of human fallibility that is the main weakness of the more strident nuclear opponents.

I am not an uncritical advocate of nuclear energy. I believe the enterprise needs fixing if it is to survive. Nor can the nuclear enterprise wait too long before its managers demonstrate to the public that they recognize this fact. I hope those of us who believe that nuclear energy cannot be lightly cast aside will do more than simply restate our faith in the technology. We must come up with positive and convincing initiatives that prove to the public that the lessons of Three Mile Island have been learned. To do less will commit us to energy options whose inherent difficulties, though not as dramatic as those of nuclear energy, could in the long run be even more serious.
Because the choices are more difficult and energy technology is far more intricate than in the past, few writers have yet mastered the complexities of the energy problem in its broadest sense. The most interesting books have been the product of group efforts or have focused on special aspects of the energy debate.

One early attempt to take a comprehensive look at America's energy options following the Arab oil embargo of 1973 turned out to be the most controversial. A Time to Choose: America's Energy Future (Ballinger, 1974, cloth and paper) is the final report of the Ford Foundation's three-year, $4 million Energy Policy Project designed "to explore the range of energy choices open to the United States and to identify policies that match the choices."

The study was supervised by S. David Freeman, now chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and a distinguished, if disparate, panel of advisers. It presents three very different "scenarios" for U.S. energy growth up to the year 2000 and discusses the economic and social implications of each.

A "Zero Energy Growth" option, involving substantial conservation and strong federal curbs on demand, is the one favored by Freeman and the study staff. It is also the option described as ideologically motivated and shoddily contrived by critics of the Ford report, including Herman Kahn, of the Hudson Institute, and U.C.L.A. economist Armen A. Alchian, in No Time to Confuse (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1975, cloth and paper).

The Ford Foundation report, says Alchian, is "inexcusably ignorant of economics."

The controversy persists. In 1977, two of the advisers to the Ford study were still arguing its validity. In A Debate on a Time to Choose (Ballinger, 1977), William Tavoulareas, president of Mobil Oil Corporation, attacks the staff report as "a blatant effort" to substitute pervasive government controls for free market forces, while Dr. Carl Kaysen, an M.I.T. economist, defends the report: "Its technical analyses and its principal message [stressing conservation] . . . look better and better as history and comparable analyses accumulate."

Somewhat more readable is Future Strategies for Energy Development: A Question of Scale (Oak Ridge, Tenn.: Institute for Energy Analysis, 1977, paper only), the proceedings of a 1976 energy conference sponsored by the Oak Ridge Associated Universities. Ten essays address the question: Will energy continue to be supplied by large, centralized systems that consume massive quantities of primary fuels (coal, oil, uranium) and distribute energy by long-distance networks? Or will there be a shift to a decentralized energy economy in which energy sources are shaped to local needs, distribution distances are shorter, and the fuels (such as solar power) are renewable?

One of the essayists is an articulate member of the small-is-beautiful faction, physicist Amory B. Lovins. He lays out his "Hard Path/Soft Path" approach. Artificially cheap energy
has produced distribution systems that are out of kilter. Lovins argues. What we need, he says, are small scale, limited distribution, decentralized, labor-intensive energy technologies, such as solar heating.

Lovins is challenged by West German physicists Wolf Haefele and Wolfgang Sassin. They argue that worldwide population growth and urbanization must inevitably lead to higher per capita energy consumption that can only be satisfied by large centralized energy supply systems, relying on a combination of fossil fuels, breeder reactors, and solar power.

The Nuclear Power Controversy (Prentice-Hall, 1976, cloth and paper), a short book of essays, was produced by Columbia University's American Assembly. Included are a straightforward discussion by several specialists of various aspects of nuclear energy systems—safety, regulation, proliferation, etc.—and a final, somewhat emotional attack by chemist George B. Kistiakowsky, who argues, "I find that the technology is not ready for a massive expansion of nuclear power and that our society is not ready to live with it."

A gloomy examination of the nuclear proliferation issue by the congressional Office of Technology Assessment, entitled Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards (Praeger; 1977), offers useful information on the close link between the spread of commercial nuclear reactors and the spread of the capacity to produce nuclear weapons.

This treatment includes nine appendixes, largely prepared by outside contractors, which cover, unevenly, such specific issues as the terrorist threat, the international nuclear industry, and safeguards administered by international institutions. The glossary and bibliography are excellent.

Nuclear weapons are relatively easy to make, and the requisite fissionable material is being produced in relatively large quantities in nuclear power plants. Law professor Mason Willrich and physicist Theodore B. Taylor in Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards (Ballinger, 1974, cloth and paper) argue for more effective defenses than currently exist. They recommend a system of safeguards for each step of the nuclear fuel cycle and the creation of a federal security service to protect nuclear weapons materials.

Participants in a seminar on nuclear energy held in Gatlinburg, Tenn., in December 1976 ranged from ardent antinuclear spokesmen to passionate nuclear advocates, from college professors to utility executives. They were brought together by the Oak Ridge Associated Universities in hopes of producing some useful ideas that might help resolve, or at least moderate, the "great debate" on nuclear energy.

The results of that effort can be found in An Acceptable Future Nuclear Energy System (Information Service Division, Institute for Energy Analysis, P.O. Box 117, Oak Ridge, Tenn. 37830, 1977, paper only). The proceedings opened and closed without consensus, but the discussion ranges widely.

The question of using plutonium—as a more efficient successor to uranium—in the nuclear fuel cycle is at the center of current debate. A Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group, sponsored by the Ford Foundation and administered by the Mitre Corporation, concludes in Nuclear Power Issues and Choices (Ballinger, 1977) that "there is no compelling reason at this time to introduce..."
plutonium or to anticipate its introduction in this century.” While nuclear power will continue to provide a significant portion of the world’s electricity, the plutonium decision can be safely deferred while other safe, nonnuclear energy alternatives are explored.

Theological considerations are explored in Facing Up to Nuclear Power (Westminster, 1976, paper only), published under the auspices of the World Council of Churches. The volume includes the text of the 1975 “Ecumenical Hearing on Nuclear Energy” held at Sigtuna, Sweden, and a broad range of views on the “Faustian bargain” between nuclear scientists and society. Third World contributors argue, among other things, that the less developed countries can never meet their future energy needs without nuclear power.

One would not expect the Sierra Club and Sheldon Novick, editor of Environment magazine, to produce a pro-nuclear book. But The Electric War: The Fight Over Nuclear Power (Sierra Club/Scribner’s, 1976) is not an unrelenting antinuclear diatribe.

Novick chronicles nuclear progress since Hiroshima and notes a wide spectrum of views and interests to illuminate the points of controversy. The utility industry occupies center stage as Novick’s villain, but he concedes that nuclear power is now a fact of life in the United States.

On the other hand, Unacceptable Risk: The Nuclear Power Controversy (Bantam, 1976, paper only) is a passionate antinuclear tract given to predictions of approaching ruin. McKinley C. Olsen, the author, relies heavily on the testimony of four disaffected nuclear engineers. One of them, Gregory E. Minor, from General Electric’s nuclear energy division, says, “We cannot design to cover the human error, and I am convinced the safety of nuclear reactors hangs on the human error.”

A mirror image of Unacceptable Risk in the popular mode is Critical Mass: Nuclear Power, the Alternative to Energy Famine (Nashville: Aurora, 1977). Author Jacque Srouji, an American journalist and onetime critic of nuclear power, executed an abrupt U-turn after spending a year investigating more closely the validity of information on which she based her earlier stories. She concludes that “the confusion in the public mind in interpreting what might happen in the most unfavorable combination of circumstances with what actually will happen has been one of the major sources of difficulty in discussing the issues of nuclear energy” (italics hers).

It is a difficulty that, unfortunately, none of these books, including hers, entirely overcomes.

EDITOR’S NOTE. Help in selecting these titles came from former Wilson Center Fellow Chester L. Cooper, onetime White House official and now an energy specialist.
The Spanish Conquest in 1521 did not eradicate Mexico’s Indian heritage. Today, a bronze statue of the defeated Aztec emperor, Cuauhtémoc (“Fall- ing Eagle”), adorns the center of Mexico City. There are several well-known paintings of the victorious Spaniard, Hernán Cortés. The most popular (above) is by muralist Diego Rivera, who depicts the great Conquistador as a cross-eyed, syphilitic hunchback.
Mexico lost one-half of its national territory to the United States in the 19th century; two years ago, vast new oil and gas deposits were discovered under the land Mexico was allowed to keep. Now Washington hopes Mexico can supply as much as 10 percent (1 million barrels per day) of U.S. petroleum imports, while Mexican leaders hope steady oil revenues will help them buy time to put their own house in order. Two-thirds of Mexico's 68 million people live in poverty; each year, hundreds of thousands of them look for work north of the Rio Grande. Inflation, corruption, and political repression worry the nation's otherwise comfortable middle class. Some Mexican officials—and foreign diplomats—suggest privately that Mexico could become "another Iran." Here, journalist Marlise Simons looks at daily life in modern Mexico; historian Peter Smith examines Mexico's progress since the 1910 Revolution; and political scientist Richard Fagen ponders the present state of U.S.-Mexican relations.

THE PEOPLE NEXT DOOR

by Marlise Simons

"I can think of no people in the West who are as strange to Americans as the Mexicans are," John Womack, a visiting Harvard historian, commented recently. "They are as different from us as the Vietnamese or the Japanese. But in the case of Mexico, Americans don't know about the difference."

The United States has Sinologists and Kremlinologists aplenty, but, until lately, the "Mexicanist" in the U.S. government has been a rare bird. American newspaper readers know more about Moscow's political machinations than about Mexico City's; more about Mao Tse-tung's revolution in 1945 than about Mexico's in 1910.

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the economic ladder. Middle-class Mexicans aspire to American-style homes and imported sports cars, and a U.S. tourist would feel at home among the crowded billboards and gaudy neon signs advertising Pizza Hut and Kentucky Fried Chicken. Three and one-half million cars and trucks clog the nation's modern roads; 5 million television sets provide reruns of "Kojak" and "The Bionic Woman."

A Mestizo Nation

Yet as Octavio Paz, Mexican poet and essayist, has written, the country's "occidentalism" is essentially a mask. "The impression we create," he observed, "is much like that created by Orientals. They too—the Chinese, the Hindus, the Arabs—are hermetic and indecipherable. They too carry about with them, in rags, a still-living past."

The Mexicans are mestizos, a mixed race, and the Indian part of the mix has ultimately proved stronger than the Spanish. Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Guatemala all have proportionately larger Indian populations than Mexico, but they are ruled by white Hispanic elites. In Mexico, less than 5 percent of the population is pure European; 70 percent is mestizo. The Spanish conquistadores were able to impose their language (90 percent of Mexico's 68 million people speak Spanish), their religion (96 percent of the population is Catholic), and their legal system on Indian Mexico. But the country's Indian character prevailed; that was Montezuma's true revenge.

It is no coincidence, then, that Argentinians and Chileans in Mexico contend that they are not really in Latin America at all, while Indonesians and Pakistanis say they feel somehow right at home. Mexico in turn looks down on its southern neighbors. Long ruled by civilians, the Mexicans feel superior to the military juntas and crude dictatorships of Central and South America.

Marlise Simons, 38, has reported on Mexico and Central America for the Washington Post and Newsweek since 1971 and is a correspondent for De Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant in The Netherlands. A Dutch citizen, she is a graduate of Amsterdam University (1961). From 1965 to 1971 she was a reporter for the Times of London based in New York. She received the Latin American Studies Association's award for "distinguished reporting" for her coverage of the 1973 coup in Chile.

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BREAKFAST AT SANBORNS

Perhaps no one has depicted daily life in Mexico as aptly as novelist Carlos Fuentes (The Death of Artemio Cruz, Terra Nostra). Mexico’s one-time ambassador to France and a former Wilson Center Fellow, The following is from his latest book, The Hydra Head, a novel of political intrigue.

Felix Maldonado attended a political breakfast every morning. A pretext for exchanging impressions, ordering world affairs, plotting intrigue, conspiring, and organizing cabals. Small early-morning fraternities that serve, above all, as a source of information that would otherwise remain unknown. . . . He said to himself that no one would ever understand the articles and editorials if he was not a devoted regular at the hundreds of political breakfasts celebrated daily in chains of American-style quick-food restaurants—Sanborns, Wimpy’s, Dennys, Vips. . . . But how odd it was to find himself in the Sanborns on Madero. . . . Like the nation, he mused, this city had both developed and underdeveloped areas. Frankly, he didn’t care for the latter. The old center was a special case. If you kept your eyes above the swarming crowds, you didn’t have to focus on all the misery and poverty but could, instead, enjoy the beauty of certain facades and roof lines. The Templo de la Profesión, for example, was very beautiful, as well as the Convento de San Francisco and the Palacio de Iturbide, all of red volcanic stone, with their baroque facades of pale marble. Felix reflected that this was a city designed for gentlemen and slaves, whether Aztec or Spaniard, never for the indecisive muddle of people who’d recently abandoned the peasant’s white shirt and pants and the worker’s blue denim to dress so badly, imitating middle-class styles but, at best, only half successfully. The Indians, so handsome in the lands of their origin, so slim and spotless and secret, in the city became ugly, filthy, and bloated by carbonated drinks. . . .

Translated by Margaret Sayers Pedess. Translation Copyright © 1978 by Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, Inc.
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Because Mexico identifies so little with Latin America, its people tend to look North. Indeed, Mexicans seem obsessed by the United States. The Mexican press devotes sizeable amounts of front-page space to its powerful neighbor, although U.S. newspapers rarely return the compliment. The Mexicans, who see 3 million well-heeled yanqui tourists every year, not to mention imported U.S. movies and television shows, perceive Americans as garishly dressed, uncultured, spiritually poor. Mexicans seem to disdain what they envy, dislike the things that fascinate them most.

The affluent may ski in Colorado, shop in Dallas, and send their children to study science and economics at Harvard or
M.I.T. But excluding a small clique of traveled authors, academics, and diplomats—people like Carlos Fuentes and Octavio Paz—Mexico's thinkers, writers, painters, and editors do not speak English and look on Americans with suspicion or scorn. English is taught in Mexican high schools with less success than Spanish in U.S. schools. "I refuse to speak the language of the empire," says historian Gastón García Cantu, "It's easier not to be contaminated that way."

While the "gringo" possesses the wealth the Mexican covets, Americans are too abrupt and forthright in their manner to please people who take pains to avoid giving offense. The Anglo-Saxon virtues of punctuality, honesty, and brevity are of dubious value to Mexicans. Social intercourse requires the Oriental ritual that permits a display of personal dignity and mutual respect. A visitor to a banker, businessman, or government official may find the conversation beginning with his health, his wife, his children, his holiday—and only then learn that his loan has been denied, his equipment order canceled, his permit revoked.

**Reliving Defeat**

Rigorous as Mexico's social rituals seem, they are also precarious. Someone not worthy of attention may be icily ignored by bureaucrats, courts, or anyone with a favor to give or a service to perform. With regard to individual rights, the Mexican police, ogres to those citizens without influence, display a haughty disregard in keeping with Mexico's long authoritarian tradition. Charges that police commonly abduct and extort, make random arrests, keep people incommunicado, and beat or torture common criminals and political prisoners alike appear daily in the newspapers. There is little government reaction. There is a standard rationale for police abuse, which a high government official once explained to me: "Mexicans are not used to telling the truth. Our culture does not demand that. If police only asked questions, they would never get anywhere."

Few countries are as haunted by their history as this southern stretch of North America. Mexicans spend their lives, the Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges once noted, "contemplating the past." They morbidly relive their past defeats, diplomatic and military. The press (Mexico City alone has 21 daily newspapers) regularly interviews the few living veterans of the 1910

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*Mexico has about a dozen different police forces, including federal police, traffic police, and secret police. Each has earned a distinctive, often rude, nickname. Traffic cops, for example, are called *chalecos*, from *morder*, "to bite," i.e., to bribe.*
Mexico, three times the size of Texas and rich in natural resources, is facing a Malthusian challenge, despite the Green Revolution in agriculture. The country's population, now 68 million, is growing by between 3.2 and 3.6 percent annually (5.0 percent in cities, 2.0 percent in the countryside). Some 63 percent of all Mexicans live in urban areas. Because of Mexico's rugged terrain—massive mountain ranges run parallel to each coast and meet south of Mexico City—good farm land is scarce. Arable land per capita is about one acre, half the U.S. figure.

Revolution, the participants in past political scandals, the aging eyewitnesses to fraud, treason, and civil war.

Mexican politicians, intellectuals, and plain people still pick at the scabs of history, still struggle to assimilate the impact of the Spanish Conquest in 1521, which crushed Mexico's ancient culture. The European concept of the Old World and the New World does not exist in a land that, before the Conquest, had cities like Tenochtitlán, Cholula, and Texcoco, more popu-
lous and magnificent than those of Spain itself. Columbus Day, as such, is not celebrated in Mexico. Not long ago, a wreath was placed at the Columbus statue on Mexico City's bustling, modern Reforma Avenue, but the message read: "1492, the first meeting of two sister races." In other words: "We were here first."

Despite their fierce chauvinism, Mexicans would be hard pressed to describe a "typical" countryman. There are so many Mexicos. Middle class wives shop in stores supplied with a cornucopia of familiar American brand names: Kellogg's, Del Monte, Colgate. Yet the mountain people of Nayarit still pray in a cave for a sick person's wandering soul, and the somber, introverted inhabitants of the central deserts and highlands seem to have little in common with the cheerful, easygoing Caribbean folk of Veracruz.

Hospitality and Contemplation

Foreigners have long marveled at Mexico's cultural variety. But it was not until after the Revolution that the country's artists and scholars, then its government, turned their attention to the Indian heritage pervading Mexico's society, its geometric and stylized art, its familiar foods, its etiquette, its architecture. (There are 20,000 potential archeological sites in Mexico, though only a handful have been excavated.) The Indian heritage is present in the honors rendered to a guest, in the fiestas and sense of ritual, in the contempt for death, and, above all, in the Mexican penchant for contemplation, which Americans commonly misinterpret as passivity.

But the Indians are admired only in the abstract; real Indians are widely disdained. Although many scholars and social workers have dedicated their lives to improving the Indians' lot, it is not an easy task. The Indians have stoutly refused to meet 20th-century Mexico halfway, even spurning routine vaccinations for TB, typhoid, and measles in favor of home-grown cures. For their part, "modern" Mexicans take a patronizing attitude toward the Indians, when they are not overtly hostile. The government devotes much benevolent rhetoric and much money to the "Indian problem"; yet calling someone an "indio," meaning dirty, stupid, and lazy, is a serious insult.

Six million Mexican Indians, almost 10 percent of the country's population, speak no Spanish. They comprise 73 different ethnic groups. Humiliated and driven to the inhospitable southern highlands by whites and mestizos (the mountains of Oaxaca and Chiapas harbor the largest Indian communities in the
Americas), the Indians turned inward, preserving much of their tribal, linguistic, and religious cohesion.

Mexico is a foreign country to them. They still wear traditional clothing with highly symbolic designs—although transistor radios in their shoulderbags are no longer unusual. Yet Tzeltals, Tepehuanos, and Tarascos, to name but a few, barely know of one another’s existence, and if they met, they could not communicate. Officially, 58 Indian languages are still spoken in Mexico, but there are so many offshoots that some 150 languages and dialects are mutually unintelligible. The fast high-pitched tonal languages heard in the Indian markets reminds one of the Orient, even though scholars have yet to uncover any certain links with Asian tongues.

To some extent, the travail of these Indian peoples is that of all of rural Mexico. In the southern state of Chiapas alone, where the wealthy own most of the arable land, 2.3 percent of the population produces 52 percent of the marketable agricultural goods, primarily coffee and cotton. The landed gentry live in feudal style on their haciendas; many own private planes, have bodyguards, and maintain luxurious homes in the nearest town. Their property is usually secure; they have given bribes to the local army captain, or, more openly, have invited his troops to graze horses on their land. The rest of the rural population lives off subsistence farming. One-third of Chiapas’ workforce, mostly highland Indians, move down to the coast every December, where parents and children alike pick coffee and cotton for three harsh months.

An Urban Monster

Mexico has about 80,000 rural communities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, and they rank low on the government’s list of priorities. Planners argue that it takes too much money to bring water, electricity, and roads to such small communities. Yet the result of neglect appears to be even more costly. In search of work, education, or some vague hope of self-improvement, millions of peasants have moved to Mexico’s great urban centers: Guadalajara, Monterrey, Mexico City.

Greater Mexico City is an urban monster with some 14 million people packed into an area about half the size of New York City. One of the world’s oldest capitals, it has long ceased to be manageable. Situated in a high valley (7,400 feet above sea level) once the site of a magnificent lake, it is now chronically short of water. Except for the beautiful Spanish colonial center, studded with skyscrapers, the city has a low, drab, and
The United States and Mexico are divided by 2,000 years of history as well as 2,000 miles of border. In The Labyrinth of Solitude (1950), Octavio Paz, the Mexican writer, philosopher, and former ambassador to India, describes the contrasts in the two national characters:

The North Americans are credulous, and we are believers; they love fairy tales and detective stories, and we love myths and legends. The Mexican tells lies because he delights in fantasy, or because he is desperate, or because he wants to rise above the sordid facts of his life; the North American does not tell lies, but he substitutes social truth for the real truth, which is always disagreeable. We get drunk in order to confess; they get drunk in order to forget. They are optimists, and we are nihilists—except that our nihilism is not intellectual but instinctive, and therefore irrefutable. We are suspicious, and they are trusting. We are sorrowful and sarcastic, and they are happy and full of jokes. North Americans want to understand, and we want to contemplate. They are activists, and we are quietists; we enjoy our wounds, and they enjoy their inventions. They believe in hygiene, health, work, and contentment, but perhaps they have never experienced true joy, which is an intoxication, a whirlwind. In the hubbub of a fiesta night, our voices explode into brilliant lights, and life and death mingle together, while their vitality becomes a fixed smile that denies old age and death but that changes life to motionless stone.

What is the origin of such contradictory attitudes? It seems to me that North Americans consider the world to be something that can be perfected, and that we consider it to be something that can be redeemed. Like their Puritan ancestors, we believe that sin and death constitute the ultimate basis of human nature, but with the difference that the Puritan identifies purity with health. Therefore he believes in the purifying effects of asceticism, and the consequences are his cult of work for work’s sake, his serious approach to life, and his conviction that the body does not exist or at least cannot lose—or find—itself in another body. Every contact is a contamination. Foreign races, ideas, customs, and bodies carry within themselves the germs of perdition and impurity. Social hygiene complements that of the soul and the body. Mexicans, however, both ancient and modern, believe in communion and fiestas: there is no health without contact. Tlazolteotl, the Aztec goddess of filth and fecundity, of earthly and human moods, was also the goddess of steam baths, sexual love, and confession. And we have not changed very much, for Catholicism is also communion.
seemingly endless skyline. Public transport is inadequate; as a result, nearly 2 million private cars create permanent traffic jams, and add to the heavy industrial pollution that on most days blocks out the view of the two snowcapped volcanoes some 15 miles away. It is not unusual for a worker to take two hours to get from his suburb or slum to his job. Not surprisingly, the Chilangos, as the city’s inhabitants are known, get pushy and irritable at rush hour.

Parachutists

Mexico City boasts the country’s largest slum, Nezahualcoyotl, named after the 15th-century poet-king who once ruled the area. “Neza,” as Mexicans usually call it, has 2.6 million inhabitants. Newcomers move in with relatives at the rate of 6,000 per month. The men start hunting for odd jobs. If they are lucky, their children may go to elementary or even high school and their grandchildren may join the lower-middle or even the middle class.

Along with its unpaved streets and dilapidated housing, Neza has schools, clinics, and moviehouses, unlike many of the Federal District’s 3,500 “illegal” neighborhoods. The “illegals” result from landgrabs staged by families of “parachutists”—people who invade vacant lots, after nightfall, with cardboard, wood, and corrugated iron. By daybreak they have built their shacks; it is a challenge to move them out. Eventually they start pressuring City Hall for water, electricity, and other municipal services.

At the other end of the scale are the country’s numerous millionaires and industrial barons. Mexico’s wealthy are able to live in comfortable isolation, largely untroubled by social deterioration or by the Catholic consciences that most profess to have. Their concerns appear to be monitoring the investment climate, the availability of servants, and frequent trips abroad.

Industrialists have been pampered with protective tariff barriers, low taxes, controlled wages, and heavily subsidized gas, oil, and electricity. The leaders of the business community have easy access to the President and his ministers, and the government’s important economic decisions are usually not made without consulting key businessmen. When this consul-

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*Many Mexican politicians have substantial business investments of their own, but it is rare for businessmen to become openly involved in politics. In the United States top corporation executives are routinely appointed to Cabinet positions (W. Michael Blumenthal of Bendix, for example, as Treasury Secretary); such a “revolving door” has no counterpart in Mexico.*
tation failed to occur during the final years of the Echeverría regime (1970-76), it drove businessmen to virtual mutiny. They organized strikes, took $4 billion out of the country, and precipitated the collapse of the peso in 1976.

Business magnates are not the only ones who can withhold support to great effect. Mexico's leaders realize that dangers lie in the rising expectations, inflated by the prospect of oil revenues, of the urban middle class. "This is where a major political threat lies in Mexico," a senior official in the labor ministry commented. "The middle classes are fed up with high prices, taxes, and political controls. They don't feel represented by the government."

In Gobernación (Ministry of Government), Mexico's political nerve center and the agency charged with stifling domestic dissent, there is keen awareness that a larger share of the pie must be given to the middle classes to keep social peace. The widespread 1968 protest movements, which culminated with the killing of some 300 people (students, housewives, workers) by the army during a political meeting in Mexico City, derived their strength from the disgruntled bourgeoisie, not from the poor or disadvantaged.

Gobernación also fears the increasingly militant labor unions, made up of miners, oil workers, bus drivers and others. Since the 1930s, organized labor, centered around the giant Confederación de Trabajadores de México, has been a bulwark of successive regimes; labor leaders often hold both union and
government positions. But in the last few years, a number of "independent" unions have tried, with limited success, to break away from their alliance with government, now that alternatives, such as the new leftist parties and the old (but only recently legalized) Communist Party, are available.

To channel discontent into the political arena, the government has devised reforms to assure opposition parties of one-fourth of the seats in Mexico's rubber-stamp Congress. The much-cited oil bonanza is buying vital time, not only for the nation's economy, but, above all, for the political system, which, though unabashedly authoritarian, has shown surprising pragmatism by remaining flexible. It has survived so long because it managed to adjust to pressures whenever necessary.

Part of the key to this flexibility lies in the special prestige of the Office of the President. A Mexican President has powers that far exceed those of the man in the White House; he is revered like an 18th-century monarch. When El Señor Presidente visits a rural town, people paint their homes, scrub the streets, and try to bring him their private petitions. Within this highly centralized, paternalistic system, the President's role is to balance the interest groups: business; labor; peasants; foreign investors; the bureaucracy; the military. All of these groups lobby top officials directly, by-passing the virtually powerless Congress.

An Electoral Machine

Business leaders stayed home last March, for example, when the official Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), which controls Congress, celebrated its 50th anniversary; they know that the party is used by power but never exercises it. The PRI is a political-administrative machine, a self-perpetuating job agency, a political playing field. It is an electoral machine without parallel in Latin America.

Undeniably, the PRI's blatant corruption, its stuffing and stealing of ballot boxes, has undermined its effectiveness. Most Mexicans have "corruption stories," which range from crossing a bureaucrat's palm to get a liquor license to paying a kickback to senior officials in return for a juicy government pipeline contract. A post office worker may buy his "window" for $200 and it can cost up to $4,000 in bribes to the PEMEX (Petróleos Mexicanos) union to get a lucrative job in the state-run oil industry. Officials also appoint friends and relatives to cushy or nonexistent advisory positions. Such appointees are known as "aviators" because they only land in the office to collect their paychecks.
THE CHURCH

The Church in Mexico occupies a delicate political position. Alexander Wilde, a research associate in the Wilson Center's Latin American Program, comments:

During Pope John Paul II's January 1979 visit, Mexico briefly seemed to be what in fact it is: the second largest (after Brazil) Roman Catholic nation in the world. The massive popular turnout for the Pontiff was an embarrassment to the regime, which has been officially anti-clerical for more than 50 years; by and large, the Church in Mexico has been greatly circumscribed.

Catholicism arrived with the conquistadores, and within a dozen years gave Mexico one of its enduring symbols: the miraculous Virgin of Guadalupe. Under her banner, the priest Hidalgo rallied Indian armies against the Spanish in 1810, while the Church hierarchy remained loyal to Spain. Since Independence, anti-clericalism has been a recurrent theme in politics. The Church lost its extensive landholdings following Juárez's Reforma of the 1850s. After the 1910 Revolution, the Calles government turned strongly against the Church. For more than three years during the 1920s—the period captured vividly in novelist Graham Greene's The Power and the Glory—Catholic schools were closed, no Masses were said, and peasant armies of cristeros sought, unsuccessfully, to defend the rights of the Church.

Since the cristero revolt, the Church has generally accepted a restricted, traditional role. A pre-Vatican II mentality persists, disturbed but not transformed by such figures as the "Red Bishop" of Cuernavaca, Sergio Méndez Arceo (called Méndez Ateo—"the atheist"—by his detractors). Liberation Theology, nurtured by military repression elsewhere in Latin America, finds few adherents in a country saturated with the regime's own revolutionary rhetoric. While attendance at Sunday Mass is low, the Church remains a cultural redoubt, educating a conservative elite (one-quarter of the country's high school students), and fostering popular piety, with its magical and Indian elements, among the rural poor.

Because of such widespread venality, and the state's heavy role in the economy, the fastest way to the top, to money and power, lies not in private enterprise but in politics. To be sure, Mexico's government has many idealistic teachers, nurses, doctors, engineers, and agronomists, but the pervasive aura of corruption blinds many Mexicans to the regime's better side. Tax evasion, Mexico's national sport, is invariably justified with the rhetorical question: Why pay money that disappears into politicians pockets?
The task confronting Mexico is to find a dignified route out of underdevelopment. In theory, Mexico's economic planners reject both what they see as the stifling inefficiencies of Eastern European socialism and the crass, callous path of Western capitalism. But the latter remains the likely route, for in fact, it has already been chosen. Despite their populist rhetoric, most Mexican leaders believe that seeking economic efficiency is the only practical path to social justice; as they see it, state-supported capitalism will create new wealth that will eventually trickle down to the bottom of society. So far, however, the effect of Mexico's economic advance has been to funnel great wealth to a minority, while, according to the government's own figures, only one-third of Mexico's 67 million people can afford adequate diets and some 40 percent suffer from outright malnutrition.

Even if the flow of oil dollars does raise the standard of living for many Mexicans, pessimists fear the quality of life will deteriorate. "I am very worried about the official tendency to think only about expanding the consumer market," says Rodolfo Stavenhagen, a leading Mexico City anthropologist. "It is not necessary that we lose our culture, that we break down family life, lose our artisans, our very identity in the name of progress." Already Mexican pottery is making way for plastic jars, its fresh food for canned vegetables, its fruit for soda pop and junk food. Uncontrolled industrialization has made Mexico City the most polluted metropolis in the world.

In Mexico, these days, a prominent local writer told me recently, "The bankers, the businessmen, the oil engineers, are close to euphoria. But they know little about our society. The specialists who pay close attention to our agriculture, education, employment, nutrition—they are all deep pessimists. Things are bad now and the population will double in a few decades. I try not to think in apocalyptic terms. At best, we may become a cheap imitation of the industrialized West today—and at that, long after the West has abandoned the consumer values Mexican politicians are now fighting for."
THE WOUNDS OF HISTORY

by Peter H. Smith

The Plaza of the Three Cultures in the district of Tlatelolco, Mexico City, is the site of the final victory of the Spanish over the Aztecs. A nearby plaque reads: "On August 15, 1521, heroically defended by [Emperor] Cuauhtémoc, Tlatelolco fell to the power of Hernán Cortés. This was neither a victory nor a defeat, but the painful birth of the mestizo people that is today's Mexico."

Like any country's mythology, Mexico's contains an element of truth. The birth of her mestizo people, part Spanish, mostly Indian, actually took three centuries. But it was indeed a painful process.

Mexico after the Conquest experienced rebellion, Inquisition, and near anarchy, leavened by interludes of colonial torpor or ruthlessly enforced tranquility. The 300 years of colonialism following the Conquest saw clear winners and losers. It was the white population—the peninsulares (Spaniards born in Spain) and criollos (Spaniards born in Mexico)—that composed the cream of society. They controlled the colonial government, the military, the Church, and such nascent industries as textiles, mining, and ceramics. Almost all of the country's arable land was in their hands, divided into mammoth estates or haciendas, comprising, on the average, perhaps 50,000 acres and worked by hundreds of peones (essentially sharecroppers). The rest of the future mestizo nation subsisted at the sufferance of the white social elite, in semifeudal fashion.

Ambitious criollos provided the impetus for the 1810 breakaway from a weakening Spain. During the turmoil that followed, criollo landowners remained on their rural haciendas, protecting and increasing their own holdings, while military caudillos (bosses) and rising middle-class leaders struggled among themselves for control of a faltering central government. Indeed, until the rise to power of General Porfirio Díaz in 1876, "politics" had less effect on the general direction of Mexican society than did old social and economic patterns held over from

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colonial times. (There were more than 50 separate governments between 1821 and 1876.)

To be sure, the *peninsulares* were gone, and certain activities of the Catholic Church had been legally curbed—an angry reaction to the Church’s colonial role. Yet in many other respects, Mexico in the 19th century was much like Mexico in the 17th century: a predominantly agricultural society, highly stratified, with wealth concentrated in the hands of a relatively few *criollos* and upwardly mobile mestizos.

**Pax Porfiriana**

In a sense, the reign of Porfirio Diaz (the *Porfiriato*) marks the beginning of what the plaque at Tlatelolco calls “today’s Mexico.” For 35 years, from 1876 to 1911, Diaz proved to be a master politician. He never proclaimed himself dictator; he simply had the constitution amended, time and again, so that he could be reelected to the Presidency.* He built up the army, and, to maintain order in the countryside, established the feared *guardias rurales*. Key decisions came to be made in Mexico City—a harbinger of today’s highly centralized government. Systematic repression was viewed by Diaz as a major ingredient of stability. “We were harsh,” he explained near the end of his regime. “Sometimes we were harsh to the point of cruelty. But it was necessary then to the life and progress of the nation.”

Diaz found support among foreign investors, mainly British and American, whose capital supplied the stimulus for economic progress. (New York’s Guggenheim family, for example, had invested $12 million in Mexican mining and exploration by the turn of the century.) As a result, Mexico developed rapidly. After unsuccessful efforts to construct railroads with public funds, Diaz gave the concessions to foreign entrepreneurs in late 1880. By 1910, the amount of track had grown from 750 to 12,000 miles. The volume of foreign trade increased nine-fold between 1877 and 1910. Besides silver and gold, Mexico started exporting copper and zinc, fiber, and food while the United States became the country’s leading partner in trade, supplanting Great Britain. Manufacturing grew, with notable advances

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*Mexico has had four constitutions. The Constitution of 1824, modeled on the U.S. Constitution, provided for a federal republic, separation of powers, and a bicameral legislature. This was superseded by the Constitution of 1836, imposed by the dictator Santa Anna, which essentially replaced civilian officials with military governors. The liberal Constitution of 1857 abolished slavery and ecclesiastical courts, created a unicameral legislature, and included an American-style Bill of Rights. The Constitution of 1917, still the law of the land, went even further. It limited the President to one term, and, under Article 27, provided for large-scale land reform. Article 123 established an 8-hour workday and a minimum wage, and legalized strikes and labor unions. There were numerous anti-clerical provisions.*

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in textiles, iron, cement, and consumer goods. By 1895, the national government showed a budget surplus (an unthinkable achievement in earlier generations) and the Diaz regime maintained a balanced budget for the remainder of its tenure. In 1910, as the centennial of independence approached, Diaz proudly proclaimed that “order and progress” had become reality in Mexico.

Unleashing the Tiger

But these advances came at a tremendous social cost. While the Porfirian circle accumulated wealth and aped the ways of European (especially French) aristocracy, Mexico’s common people, both urban workers and rural campesinos, suffered increasing hardship. Despite the growth of the economy, real wages—never high to begin with—underwent a sharp decline. (According to some estimates, real per capita income fell by more than half between 1820 and 1900.) Small farmers, wage laborers, and peones on the haciendas—some 85 percent of the population—were all worse off economically than their great-grandparents had been. Few peasants owned land.

While Mexico’s exporters were sending oil, ores, and other products abroad, the domestic production of corn, beans, and other staples barely kept pace with population growth. Infant mortality was staggering; as of 1900, about 28.5 percent of all baby boys died within the first year of life. In that same year, more than three-quarters of Mexico’s 15 million citizens were illiterate.

Yet when what has come to be known as the Mexican Revolution began in 1910, its leadership emerged not from the oppressed strata of society but from its upper reaches. Francisco Madero, the so-called apostle of Mexican democracy, came from one of the country’s wealthiest families, with extensive interests in cattle and mining. Educated in Paris and at the University of

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A wealthy lady during the Porfiriato, savagely portrayed by printmaker José Guadalupe Posada (1852–1913). At the turn of the century, Mexico's Francophile upper classes danced the cancan and celebrated Bastille Day.

California, Madero developed a strong belief in the virtues of political democracy and of the free-enterprise system as well.

Dismayed by the excesses and rigidities of the Díaz regime, Madero began writing a book called La Sucesión Presidencial in 1908. Its message was plain—Mexico was ready for liberal democracy—and its formula was simple: The 80-year-old Díaz himself could run again for President in 1910, but he should pick his vice-presidential candidate, and putative successor, from outside his immediate entourage.

When Díaz failed to heed the message, Madero entered the 1910 campaign as the candidate of the new Anti-Reelectionist Party. When Díaz was declared the winner, Madero, jailed with 5,000 of his supporters, refused to recognize the outcome and called for armed resistance. The movement rapidly swelled; his troops in the north took Ciudad Juárez (across the border from El Paso, Texas), and, in a surprising show of weakness, Díaz capitulated.

"Madero has unleashed a tiger," Díaz told an aide as he fled into exile in 1911, "Now let us see if he can control it." Madero
couldn't. Hitherto united in common hatred of the Díaz regime, rebellious factions soon began to champion their separate causes: employment, or political freedoms, or land reform. During the next decade, the Revolution turned into virtual civil war; millions of Mexicans died. Madero, the ardent democrat, was assassinated in 1913 (with the approval of U.S. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson); Emiliano Zapata, chief of the southern insurgents and zealous advocate of land reform, was murdered in 1919; Pancho Villa, leader of the ragged rebels in the north, was assassinated in 1923. The country did not attain a measure of calm until 1924, with the election of Plutarco Elías Calles, a tough post-Revolutionary leader, and the first Mexican President to assume power peaceably in 40 years.

Friend of the Peasants

At Calles' behest, and in the face of a crisis brought on by the assassination of his successor-elect, leaders of the nation's political factions and power groups in 1929 founded an official unity party, the Partido Nacional Revolucionario. When Lázaro Cárdenas, the former governor of Michoacán, became President in 1935, he reorganized the party, renaming it the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana and building it around four separate functional groups, each with its own representatives on the party's executive committee: peasants, labor, the military, and, as a kind of residual category, the “popular” or middle-class sector. By the time the party was reorganized once again in 1946—this time as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the name it retains to this day—the military had lost its status as a formal participant.4

Cárdenas' single six-year term (señorio) as President marked the consolidation of political stability in modern Mexico. Henceforward, ideological and policy disputes over the course of the “institutionalized” Revolution would be decided within the official party; power would pass from one chief executive to the next, on schedule and with little fuss. Despite the activity of several small opposition parties, the 10-million-member PRI continues to garner about 90 percent of the popular vote in national elections.

Revolutionary rhetoric remains a hallmark of Mexican politics, but Cárdenas was the first Mexican executive to make the military's political role in Mexico has steadily ebbed. One consequence: The armed forces' share of government expenditures declined from 53 percent in 1921 to 19 percent in 1941 to a mere 5.5 percent in 1961. The figure today: 2.9 percent ($557 million). This supports a modestly equipped force of 322,000 men, including 250,000 draftees.
MEXICO

THE TRANSITION

The presidential succession every six years is the paramount event in Mexican politics. It involves the transfer of the nation’s highest office from one person to another, but it signifies far more than that.

The outgoing President selects his own successor after consulting with leaders of various power groups—the unions, big business, and others—known in Mexico as “public opinion.” This means that the President cannot impose a truly unpopular candidate. It also means that, among those who are deemed to be acceptable, the President makes the final choice. As Alfonso Corona del Rosal, an experienced and powerful politico, once said, it is the outgoing President who “selects his successor, supports him, and sets him on his course.”

Still, the succession can bring new directions in policy (within the generous limits prescribed by revolutionary rhetoric), even fairly sharp departures from the recent past.

Almost always, presidential transfer means a realignment in the distribution of power and prestige throughout the country, a rearrangement in the relative standing of cliques: those who are close to the new President move up near the top, those who are not move either out or to the bottom.

The succession sets the rhythm of political life, marking time according to sesentos, the six-year limits of incumbencies. Ever since Madero’s vain 1910 challenge against Diaz, it has been taken as a measure of the nation’s political health. A peaceful transfer of power means that the system is working, that “no-reelection” is in force, that the government is complying with the heritage and obligations of the Revolution.

—P. H. S.

rhetoric approach reality. By 1940, Cárdenas had redistributed some 50 million acres of land, more than twice as much as all of his predecessors combined. For the most part, these lands were divided into ejidos, or government-regulated cooperative farms. Populist to the core, he sometimes visited peasant villages to sign over the land in person.* He supported the consolidation of some 3,000 Mexican labor unions into the powerful, million-member Confederación de Trabajadores de México and sanctioned hundreds of strikes in support of higher wages. And in 1938, he expropriated the holdings of foreign oil companies,

mostly American, replacing them with the state-run corporation Petróleos Mexicanos, or PEMEX.

The resolution of Mexico’s chronic political crises and the achievement of key social reforms were preconditions for economic development. World War II provided the takeoff. Shortages in the United States and Europe spurred Mexico to reduce its reliance on manufactured imports, as well as to step up exports of such minerals as zinc, mercury, cadmium, and copper. U.S. Export-Import Bank loans flowed into Mexico; foreign investors were welcomed back (with the stipulation that they acquire no more than 49 percent of any company’s stock). The textile, brewing, cement, and iron industries expanded quickly.

The Mexican 'Miracle'

Cárdenas had dreamed of a nation of agricultural cooperatives and small industry, but Mexico during the war years inadvertently embraced something bigger. At first glance, the results seemed promising. Between 1940 and 1960, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) jumped from 21.7 billion pesos to 74.3 billion pesos, an average annual increase of 6.4 percent, impressive by any standard. During the 1960s, as Mexico maintained this rate of growth, the country’s performance came to be known as the “Mexican miracle.” Foreign economists expressed their admiration at the coexistence of economic growth and political stability in at least one part of the developing world. "Mexico has started an industrial revolution designed to go far and to transform the economic and social life of the country," wrote one U.S. economist in 1950. "There will be no turning back."

All Mexicans have not shared equally in the benefits of economic growth. Indeed, the picture in the postwar years is one of growing inequalities. As the “Mexican miracle” progressed, the share of total income garnered by the poorest tenth of the population dropped from 2.4 percent in 1950 to 2.0 percent in 1969; during that same period, the richest tenth of Mexico’s population increased its share from 49 to 51 percent. In other words, half the national income went to 10 percent of the families.

*Sanford Mosk, *Industrial Revolution in Mexico* (University of California Press, 1950). The “Mexican miracle” was helped along by a surge in foreign investment. From a total amount of $1.5 billion (1970 dollars) in 1911, direct foreign investment slipped to less than half a billion dollars in 1940—partly because of the turmoil of the Revolution, partly because of Cárdenas’s expropriation of oil companies in 1938, and partly because of the Depression. By 1970, however, the figure had soared to 3.8 billion dollars, 80 percent of which came from the United States. In sharp contrast to previous eras, when mining, communication, and transportation were the dominant activities for foreigners, most of this investment was in basic industries: chemicals, petrochemicals, rubber, machinery, industrial equipment.

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In less tangible matters, the record is also mixed. Take the education system. In Mexico, a central goal has been to expand educational opportunity in order to increase social mobility, augment the nation's supply of trained talent, and create a more just society. In this, the Mexicans have been moderately successful. In 1910, just before the onset of the Revolution, only 24 percent of the elementary-school-age population was attending school. By 1930, the figure had gone up to 42 percent, and by 1970, to over 80 percent. Census figures suggest that "illiteracy" declined from 76.9 percent in 1910 to 28.3 percent in 1970; other estimates, using a more exacting definition, show less than 40 percent of the population over nine years of age to be "functionally literate."

Yet restricted access to the upper levels of the Mexican educational system (secondary, preparatory, and university) has helped perpetuate class barriers. In 1926, 3,860 students were enrolled in the secondary or high school track, probably no more than 4 or 5 percent of the relevant school-age population. In 1970, the proportion had risen to no more than 20 percent.

**Licensed Democracy**

The preparatory track, through which students pass on to university, has been even more exclusive; in particular, the Escuela Nacional Preparatoria in Mexico City, modeled on the French lycée, has remained the bastion of the national elite. A university education has been traditionally reserved for only a small fraction of the population. According to my best estimate, about 1.7 percent of the literate adult male population had attended a university in 1900; by 1960, four decades after the Revolution, the figure had risen to only 2.7 percent. Mexico's national university system has recently expanded; its 124 campuses now enroll some 470,000 students, about 9 percent of the eligible population. Yet instruction is often poor, and it will be at least a generation before the social effects of expanded higher education are felt.

Scholars and politicians will argue for decades to come over the relative costs and benefits of the Mexican "miracle," but most would agree that it began losing its luster in the late 1960s. That the postwar industrial bonanza had benefited primarily the upper and middle classes, not the bulk of farmers and wage earners, was by then abundantly clear. That Mexico's "licensed democracy" was a one-party monopoly, part oligarchy, part dictatorship, was equally evident. With the election of Gustavo Diaz Ordaz as President in 1964, dissatisfaction with the state of
affairs in Mexico began to crystalize.

Díaz Ordaz was a hardliner whose selection by the PRI as its candidate, after the sexenio of charismatic Adolfo López Mateos, proved unpopular. Once in office, the new President clumsily sought to weaken PAN, the already small conservative opposition party. Soon afterwards, he sparked public outrage by annulring the election of several PAN gubernatorial candidates.

**Massacre at Tlatelolco**

In 1966, anti-government strikes broke out at the National University of Mexico (UNAM) and spread quickly to other campuses. It took federal troops to restore order. The students protested again two years later, as the government was sprucing up Mexico City for the Olympics. The climax came on October 2, 1968, at Tlatelolco—The Plaza of the Three Cultures. Once again the army moved in to quell a small demonstration. By the time it withdrew, some 300 persons were dead. In the wake of the Tlatelolco massacre, leftist guerilla activity in Mexico City and elsewhere stepped up sharply. The Díaz Ordaz regime had registered solid gains in education and urban renewal; the economy remained healthy. But the mood in Mexico was one of malaise as the 1970 elections approached. Díaz Ordaz and other top leaders chose the Secretary of the Interior, Luis Echeverría, as the next President.

When Echeverría took the presidential oath on December 1, 1970, he looked like the supreme embodiment of Mexico's political elite. He had obeyed all the rules of the game. Born in Mexico City in 1922, he had studied at UNAM, taken a degree in law, and, like so many of his political colleagues, taught courses there as well. He married into a prominent political family from the state of Jalisco and promptly entered the PRI.

Echeverría was the first constitutional President since 1924 who had never held a single elective position. He had become, over the years, a master of subtle bureaucratic maneuvering. Once in office, Echeverría revealed the power of his personality. Impatient and energetic, he took to his work with passion, exhorting his countrymen to labor with "creative anguish." He went everywhere, saw everyone, gave speeches, made pronouncements, talked and talked some more, apparently seeing himself as a latter-day Cárdenas.

In the international arena, Echeverría sought to take Mexico away from the shadow of the United States and establish Mexico as a leader of the Third World countries, with himself as major spokesman. He traveled widely, visited China in 1973,
and instructed the Mexican ambassador to support the United Nations' 1975 anti-Israeli denunciation of Zionism as a form of "racism." Greatly overestimating his own prestige, Echeverría also presented himself in vain as a candidate for the secretary-generalship of the U.N. near the conclusion of his presidential term.

At home, Echeverría pursued an activist, growth-oriented economic policy. In keeping with his tercermundista (Third World) pronouncements, Mexico passed new laws to regulate—but by no means eliminate—multinational corporations. The role of the state, already large, expanded sharply with the government supplying well over 50 percent of total capital investment. Government revenue grew from around 8 percent of gross domestic product in 1970 to roughly 12.5 percent in 1975. Massive outlays went for housing, schooling, and social programs. Agricultural credit increased. Mexico doubled its capacity to produce crude oil, electricity, iron, and steel. The GDP, Echeverría proudly pointed out, was growing at an annual average rate of 5.6 percent.
The expansion of state activity brought problems of its own. Domestic industry, for example, was caught in a squeeze between multinational corporations and the Mexican state. Only the strongest local firms could survive, and the government bought out many of the weaker ones. The number of state-owned corporations swelled from 86 to 740 during Echeverria's regime. The federal deficit increased sixfold, contributing to an inflationary spiral as prices rose by about 22 percent a year. While inflation priced Mexican exports out of foreign markets, the cost of imported oil quadrupled. (Major new domestic oil deposits were not discovered until 1977.) Mexico's balance of payments deficit tripled between 1973 and 1975, placing great, ultimately overbearing, pressure on the value of the peso.

Asking Forgiveness

A sense that something was very wrong started to spread among Mexicans by the summer of 1976. Indeed, Echeverria's regime nearly fell apart in its final months. In early August, an unidentified terrorist organization attacked a car that was carrying Margarita López Portillo, a sister of José López Portillo, the President-Elect. She was unhurt, but one of her bodyguards was killed; three others were wounded, and the leader of the gang was shot to death.

Later that month, after months of official denials, the government decided to “float” the peso, letting it find its new level—which the Bank of Mexico pegged at 19.90 to the dollar, a 37 percent drop in value from the longstanding rate of 12.50. The government again floated the peso on October 26, and the exchange rate quickly fell to 26.50 to the dollar. For those who had viewed the currency's strength as a manifestation of “the Mexican miracle” and cause for national pride, this was bitter medicine indeed.

In November 1976, events in northern Mexico created further tension. Around the middle of the month, landless peasants seized several hundred thousand acres from some 800 landowners in the states of Sonora, Sinaloa, and Durango. On November 20, Echeverría, not about to give up power till the final minute (his term expired on December 1), suddenly expropriated nearly 250,000 acres of rich, privately owned land in Sonora for new, collective ejidos. Outraged landowners protested, and in Sinaloa, 28,000 of them announced a stoppage in the fields. A week later, in a fitting finale to the Echeverría regime, explosions rocked commercial buildings in Mexico City.

José López Portillo, a lawyer, professor, and Echeverría's
treasury secretary and lifelong friend, finally assumed the Presidency on December 1. In a conciliatory inaugural address, he offered an olive branch to the alienated private sector and begged for “pardon” from the poor and dispossessed. “The solution,” he had proclaimed throughout the campaign, “lies in our cooperation.”

Striving to return the country to normal, López Portillo distributed high-level offices to representatives of a broad spectrum of Mexican society: labor leaders, peasant spokesmen, seasoned politicians, educated técnicos—even some private businessmen, a rarity in Mexican politics. He offered amnesty to political prisoners (no one knows how many) and seemed sincerely interested in cleaning up elections, ousting old-time bosses, and democratizing—to an extent—the political process. Political change has been real, though limited.

Other changes may prove more difficult to achieve. It will be unclear for years to come whether Mexico’s recent oil discoveries can help resolve the country’s chronic social tensions. The gap between rich and poor is steadily increasing, as it has been for many years. The population continues to grow at an astounding rate, perhaps by as much as 3.6 percent annually. Already over half of Mexico’s population is under 15 years of age, a burden that will place Mexican society under severe stress within a decade.

López Portillo and his colleagues are conscious of these trends and seem genuinely anxious, if only out of self-interest, to get them under control. Prospects for the immediate future are mildly encouraging. The real test, however, will not come in the short term but in the long term. If leadership fails, Mexico’s mestizo people may be in for still more years of pain.
AN INESCAPABLE RELATIONSHIP

By Richard R. Fagen

It is a gorgeous prospect, this annexation of all Mexico. It were more desirable that she should come to us voluntarily; but as we shall have no peace until she be annexed, let it come, even though force be necessary, at first, to bring her. Like the Sabine virgins, she will soon learn to love her ravishers.

New York Herald, October 8, 1847

Fortunately for Mexico, not all of her national territory was annexed by the United States in the wake of the war that Ulysses S. Grant would describe as “the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation.” Nor are there any indications that the not-so-virgin Mexican nation (it had previously experienced the passions of the Spanish and the French) learned to love her northern ravishers. To the contrary, as a country repeatedly humiliated by the United States (U.S. troops entered the country again in 1914) and dependent on the United States economically, Mexico has developed a political culture heavily flavored by anti-Americanism—or at least strong scepticism regarding U.S. motives and actions.

Thus it was not surprising when President Carter landed in Mexico City on St. Valentine’s Day 1979 for an official three-day visit that his reception was less than ecstatic. Not only did President José López Portillo publicly criticize Carter in a toast (the Mexican President felt that his country was “neither on the list of U.S. priorities nor on that of U.S. respect”), but crowds were sparse and the hand-carried signs and painted walls bore hostile messages. “Carter is coming to exchange oil for peanuts,” read one.

True, Carter’s trip came shortly after that of Pope John Paul II—not an easy act to follow. And recent U.S. actions had angered President López Portillo and inflamed Mexican public
MEXICO

After capturing Mexico City on September 13, 1847, U.S. troops under General Winfield Scott paraded before the city's 16th-century cathedral. Anti-Americanism has flavored Mexico's politics since the war.

opinion. But the chilly reception derived from deeper feelings: the Mexicans were once again declaring their independence from the United States, emphasizing their sovereignty, demanding that they be taken seriously.

Early in the respective presidencies of Carter and López Portillo, the basic agenda of U.S.-Mexican issues was clear. The key to Washington's renewed interest in Mexico was the recently announced reserves of Mexican oil and gas. As of January 1979, Mexico had proven reserves (72 percent oil, 28 percent gas) equivalent to 40 billion barrels, probable reserves of an additional 44.6 billion barrels, and potential reserves of up to 200 billion barrels. Mexico had suddenly moved into roughly the same category as Iran and Kuwait, possibly rivaling even oil-rich Saudi Arabia. To the United States, which must import almost 50 percent of its oil (9 million barrels a day), much of it from the increasingly troubled Middle East, this was welcome news. Mexico is not now a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and is unlikely to join, since it enjoys all the

In August 1977, the Carter administration proposed to stem illegal migration from Mexico into the United States by adding 2,000 men to the U.S. Border Patrol and cracking down on American employers who hired illegal aliens. (Under the "Texas proviso" of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, employment of illegal aliens does not constitute the illegal act of "harboring.") In December of the same year, the administration vetoed a proposed purchase of Mexican natural gas, although a letter of intent had previously been signed between the Mexican government and six U.S. companies.

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advantages of membership, such as high prices, but none of the
disadvantages, such as U.S. hostility.

It was also welcome news in Mexico City. With rising petro-
leum revenues, Mexico could begin to address its long-standing
development problems—chronic poverty, backward agriculture, uneven industrial growth. Yet enthusiasm was soon
tempered by caution. In other nations—Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Venezuela, to a degree Great Britain—new oil had spawned new
problems: inflation, swollen import bills, increased consump-
tion of luxuries, an emphasis on capital-intensive industry at the
expense of labor-intensive manufacturing and agriculture.

The Illegals

Thus, by the time of Carter's February visit, Mexico had
unveiled a "go slow, plan carefully" scenario for petroleum de-
velopment. Total production would rise from 1.4 to approxi-
mately 2.3 million barrels a day by the end of 1980, with that
rate frozen until 1982. Less than half of this output would be for
export, with as little as 60 percent of that made available to the
United States. López Portillo made it clear that oil development
would not be determined by "distortions of bilateral covetous-
ness." The decision was not entirely welcome in Washington.

Even more vexing was the question of northward migration.
Although exact statistics are not available, at any given moment
perhaps as many as 6 million Mexicans are living and working
illegally in the United States; hundreds of thousands of Mexi-
cans cross the border illegally every year, and hundreds of
thousands return. Given the complexity of these flows and the
interests at stake, it is not surprising that no U.S. policy consen-
sus has emerged. Indeed, as David Aaron of the National
Security Council noted recently, every industry, interest group,
federal agency, and executive department in the United States
seems to have its own Mexico policy.

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ican Relations (1979, editor and contributor). Research and travel related
to this essay have been supported, in part, by the Rockefeller Foundation.
Historically, relations between Mexico and the United States have not been as between equals. Yet being the United States' neighbor has its advantages, as Mexico's new Foreign Minister, Jorge Castañeda, points out:

Mexico is not an ordinary developing country: the Mexican dictator Porfirio Díaz, who knew about these things, was distressed that his nation was so far from God, so close to the United States.

Yet because it is so close to the United States, Mexico is one of the very few countries in the world that can afford the luxury of not being burdened by the cost of armaments and a heavy military establishment. Being a neighbor of the greatest military power in the world, it would be totally senseless to acquire arms other than those needed for internal security.

To appreciate the enormous savings this represents, one could compare our situation with that of powers that live next to a comparable rival, so that the symmetry in power forces them to outbid each other in armaments. Some of the unfortunate pairs are Brazil and Argentina, Chile and Peru. Each of these countries spends as much as five times more per capita than Mexico in armaments.

Second, proximity means a clear economic advantage. Being near to the largest and richest market in the world should give us a natural competitive edge for exports. Oil and gas are typical examples.

Finally, whether you [Americans] like it or not (and you don’t like it) and whether we like it or not (and we don’t like it either, though for opposite reasons), vicinity allows us to solve partially the problem of unemployment in Mexico. About 800,000 Mexicans manage to cross the border annually. This figure is roughly equivalent to the yearly increase of the Mexican labor force.

Segments of organized labor, led by the AFL-CIO, see the migrants as “taking jobs from American workers.” Bureaucrats, politicians, and anxious taxpayers often perceive them as freeloaders using public services (health care, Social Security, schooling) without paying taxes. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service views illegal aliens essentially as criminals. Some view them as an actual or potential threat (“the browning of America”) to the social integrity of the nation. Former CIA Director William Colby, noting that Mexico’s population could double (to 130 million) by the year 2000, has cited the potential consequence of a massive overflow across the border as “a greater threat to U.S. security than the Soviet Union.”

Much of the above is arguable, some is patently false, but all of it has in common an “immigrants-as-problem” perspective. That perception is not universal. A recent New York Times/CBS
News poll found, for example, that 56 percent of Americans surveyed felt that illegal aliens generally hold jobs that Americans do not want. Thousands of U.S. businesses, from huge agricultural enterprises to motel chains to humble diners employing a single dishwasher, depend on immigrant labor to do what natives won't do—at least not for the wages offered. From this perspective, illegal aliens are in fact the solution to a continuing U.S. need for a low-cost, semiskilled, nonunionized, and elastic labor supply.9

A $3 Billion Bonanza

Official Mexican positions on the immigration issue are dictated by the critical role that migrants play in both economics and politics south of the border. The migration northward annually drains off hundreds of thousands of persons who would otherwise swell the ranks of the underemployed and unemployed—variously estimated to run as high as 35 percent of those actively seeking work in Mexico. Annual remittances back to Mexico from workers employed in the United States may total as much as $3 billion dollars, a crucial if not always acknowledged component of Mexico's balance of payments and a sum that probably exceeds Mexican income from all tourist-related activities.

Rapid or forced repatriation of large numbers of Mexicans living and working in the United States—or even a much more closely patrolled border without repatriation—would severely strain Mexico's political system. In this context, it is not surprising that President López Portillo has repeatedly said, "It is not a crime to look for work, and I refuse to consider it as such."

Beyond oil and immigration, the United States and Mexico have long been at odds over trade, tariffs, access of Mexican goods to U.S. markets, and the conditions under which American capital, technology, and corporations can enter the Mexican economy. The United States is by far Mexico's largest trading partner. It buys 70 percent of all Mexican exports and provides more than 60 percent of all Mexican imports. Trade between the two nations totaled $9 billion in 1978, with the balance currently favorable to the United States by about $1 billion. In

9How long illegal aliens will remain outside the U.S. labor movement is an open question. Most labor leaders feel threatened by them; President Carter's 1977 border crackdown in fact fulfilled a campaign pledge to organized labor. Yet the International Ladies Garment Workers Union is actively organizing migrant Mexicans. So is the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers Union. Even César Chávez and his United Farmworkers have moderated their initial hostility toward illegal aliens.
The stormy history of U.S.-Mexican relations began in 1822, with President James Monroe’s formal recognition of America’s newly independent neighbor to the south.

Peace did not last long. During the late 1820s, Mexico grew alarmed as thousands of Americans settled in its territory of Texas. After a cruel local conflict (including the siege of the Alamo in 1836), Texas emerged as the independent Lone Star Republic; it was annexed by Congress in 1845. American designs on California and New Mexico led to a congressional declaration of war in 1846. The United States capped a military victory with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, which cost Mexico a third of its territory.

Thirty-five years of relative domestic stability in Mexico (1876–1911) under President Porfirio Diaz encouraged heavy foreign (primarily American) investment in Mexican mining and oil. During the decade of civil strife that followed Diaz’s exile, however, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson moved to protect democracy, not business. American troops occupied Veracruz in 1914 to undercut dictator Victoriano Huerta. Less ideistically, two years later, in response to rebel Pancho Villa’s raids into Texas and New Mexico, General John J. (“Black Jack”) Pershing led an unsuccessful punitive expedition across the border.

U.S. policy in the 1920s and ’30s focused on promoting U.S. investment. The most serious upset came in 1938 when Mexico expropriated all foreign oil holdings. Ties improved after Mexico joined the United States in declaring war on Nazi Germany during World War II. In 1942, the Mexican government allowed farm workers (braceros) to harvest crops in the labor-short United States. By the time the bracero program ended in 1963, up to 450,000 Mexicans were coming across the border each year. In the postwar period, Washington’s policy toward Mexico was largely one of benign neglect—until the Mexicans found large oil and gas deposits two years ago.

U.S. reaction to President Lázaro Cárdenas’ expropriation of the holdings of 17 American, Dutch, and British oil companies in 1938 was less than jubilant. In this contemporary Philadelphia Inquirer cartoon, the stolen chicken is labeled “American Property.”
addition, American banks hold $11.5 billion in loans and credits to Mexico.

As Mexico increases petroleum exports, the imbalance in favor of the United States will diminish, and loans will be easier to repay. But Mexico also intends to export larger amounts of manufactured products and foodstuffs. In an increasingly protectionist and economically beleaguered United States, there will be strong local and regional pressures to exclude or at least sharply limit the inflow of such goods. Oil will enter easily; steel, consumer goods, beef, and tomatoes will not. It is not a situation designed to please Mexican planners, politicians, and exporters.

The Borderlands

When the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo formally ended the U.S. war with Mexico on February 2, 1848, the United States received title to Texas, the territory that is now California, Nevada, and Utah, most of what became Arizona and New Mexico, and part of Colorado. Mexico was paid $15 million to compensate for this loss of about half her national territory and much of her dignity. Five years later, for $10 million, the Mexican tyrant Santa Anna, short on cash, sold an additional 45,000 square miles of what is now southern Arizona and New Mexico to the United States. This so-called Gadsden Purchase was the final adjustment in the line of demarcation between the two countries.

The border—marked in some places by a fence, in other places by the shifting Rio Grande, in still other places by numbered concrete obelisks along the surveyor's lines drawn for the Gadsden Purchase—at once divides and unites. When goods, capital, people, and ideas cross that line in opposite directions, they are subject to different laws, interpretations, and rules of the game. In some ways, however, the border is little more than a juridical concept.

The term "borderlands" is a more apt description of this 2,000 mile frontier zone where cultures, languages, and local economies intermingle. Parts of south Texas are almost indistinguishable from areas in northern Mexico. Some 82 million people travel back and forth legally across the border every year; tens of thousands commute from homes in one country to jobs in the other. One of the most striking features of the borderlands is its necklace of twin cities, stretching from Brownsville (Texas) and Matamoros (Mexico) on the Gulf Coast, to San Diego and Tijuana on the Pacific Ocean. Such tandem urban clusters...
An urban archipelago adorns the 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexican border. With per capita incomes twice as high as the national average, Mexico's border states lure jobless workers from the impoverished south. Millions eventually reach the United States. One out of every seven families in California, Texas, and Arizona is Hispanic; in New Mexico, one out of three.

(Laredo–Nuevo Laredo, El Paso–Ciudad Juárez, Nogales–Nogales) share both telephone service and major industries. Mexican factories assemble parts for U.S. companies that are only a few miles away. The currencies of both Mexico and the United States are de facto legal tender. Air and water pollution flow north and south.

The symbiosis of the two economies takes many forms in addition to two-way shopping, the Border Industrialization Program, and the flight of Mexican capital into the U.S. whenever there is a "scare" south of the border. For example, there has recently been serious discussion of locating a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in sparsely populated Baja California if objections from environmentalists and others make it impossible to build the terminal in California. The LNG would then be regasified and pumped north through pipelines—with Mexico assuming the risks associated with plant safety.

*The Border Industrialization Program was established by the Mexican government in 1965 after negotiations with the U.S. government. Under the program, Mexico waives duties on raw material imports and restrictions on foreign capital anywhere within a 12.5 mile strip along the U.S.-Mexican border (now extended farther into Mexico) on condition that 100 percent of the finished products are exported out of Mexico. In turn, only the "value added" is taxed when the products re-enter the United States. Maquiladores, as such factories are known, employ about 80,000 people—10 percent of the labor force in the nine major Mexican cities where the plants are located.

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In sum, the borderlands suggest more dramatically than perhaps any other area in North America certain features of our times, with their wealth and poverty, cultural mixing, racial tensions, fierce nationalism, and increasingly interdependent economies. The U.S.-Mexican border is also the longest frontier in the world between a highly developed and a less developed country. Relations between the United States and Mexico thus constitute a de facto special case and warrant special attention.

The major problems of U.S.-Mexican relations are structurally determined and will be with us for the foreseeable future. Points of contention between the two nations are profoundly affected by events and socioeconomic forces that initially seem to have little to do with foreign policy. This is particularly the case in the United States where, for example, changes in agriculture can affect everything from the demand for immigrant labor to protectionist sentiments vis-à-vis Mexican imports. Washington policymakers should not be under any delusion that such issues can ever be “resolved” in the same sense that the Panama Canal Treaties (may) have resolved the outstanding problem in U.S.-Panamanian relations.

Much that is ultimately of crucial importance for U.S.-Mexican relations does not and will not pass directly through the political process on either side of the border—whether the problem is ostensibly in the “foreign” or “domestic” domain. Too much is out of the reach of national decision-makers in this relationship. Too much depends on forces set in motion by the independent decisions of millions and millions of men and women: to seek work, to travel, to spend, to have children, to invest, to care or not to care about cultures, values, lives, and futures near or distant from their own. There is an aura of wishful thinking attached to the notion that two Presidents (and their assorted bureaucrats and advisers) can sit down and solve the major issues perturbing U.S.-Mexican relations.

In this context, Presidents and their entourages, separately or in concert, can only help set the stage, limit damage, and—if they are wise—encourage the widest possible participation in debate and decision-making. Long after they and their advisers have come and gone, the problems will remain.
The civilization of the Aztecs, which reached its zenith in the period from 1420 to 1530, was a strange combination of high culture and violence. Compulsory education, medical knowledge on a par with Europe's, and a sense of noblesse oblige coexisted with human sacrifice and ritual cannibalism. The society was puritanical in some respects; there were daily religious observances, and the death penalty was often imposed for lying or theft. But Aztec leaders were not monastic. Emperor Montezuma II (1480–1520) had 1000 wives and concubines, of whom as many as 150 were pregnant at the same time.

In The Course of Mexican History (Oxford, 1979), Michael C. Meyer and William L. Sherman begin their chronicle with prehistoric times. They note that it was not until A.D. 1100 that the Aztecs first appeared on the scene when they left the Caribbean island of Aztlán off the coast of the present state of Nayarit. As the authors see it, the Aztecs were committed to a policy of war and the enslavement of less powerful neighbors even as they developed an orderly society, great cities, and remarkable art. In 1502, the Aztec capital city of Tenochtitlán (Mexico City)—which boasted elaborate palaces, gardens, canals, and even a zoo—had a population of some 80,000. At that time, only four European cities had populations of 100,000 or more.

Led by Hernando Cortés, Spanish conquistadores invaded Mexico in 1519. Cortés and his men, mostly of humble origin, preached Christianity, hunted for gold, and converted or killed the natives. The Aztec civilization succumbed in less than a decade, the crucial blow coming when Cortés, with a force of 900 men, captured Tenochtitlán in 1521.

Bernal Diaz del Castillo (1498–1593) was a foot soldier who rose to serve as an aide to Cortés and later became a government official in New Spain. In True History of the Conquest of Mexico (Octagon reprint, 1970), he chronicles his comrades' exploits and shares their belief in their divine mission.

In addition to providing Mexico with Catholicism and an enduring cultural tradition, the Spaniards implanted a philosophy of government aptly summed up by Antonio de Mendoza, first viceroy of New Spain: "Do little and do it slowly."

Anthropologist Eric R. Wolf writes in Sons of the Shaking Earth (Univ. of Chicago, 1959, cloth and paper) that, during the ensuing 300 years of Spanish rule, Mexico developed a rigid class system based mainly on racial distinctions brought about by frequent intermarriage among the Indians, the Spaniards, and Africans brought to Mexico as slaves.

In The Mexican Political System (Houghton Mifflin 1966; 2nd ed., 1976, cloth and paper), L. Vincent Padgett contends that Mexico's 20-year struggle for independence (won in 1821) was, in reality, a civil war, with the upper-class conservatives (criollos) at first siding with Spanish authorities against the peasants (Indians and mestizos). Padgett de-
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scribes the conflict in terms of key personalities, and he divides them into heroes (Fathers Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla and Jose Maria Morelos, peasant leaders) and villains (Colonel Agustin de Iturbide; General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna).

Santa Anna (1794-1876) served as President of independent Mexico 11 times, fought the Yankees, and once had his amputated leg paraded through the streets of the capital. He was so cruel and corrupt that many scholars consider him a forerunner of the worst of the modern-day Latin dictators.

One contemporary observer, however, was favorably impressed. Madame "Fanny" Calderon de la Barca was of Scottish and New England origin. As the wife of the Spanish envoy, she traveled extensively throughout Mexico during the middle of the 19th century. In Life in Mexico (1843; AMS Press reprint, 1976), she tells us that Santa Anna was "a gentlemanly, good-looking, quietly-dressed, rather melancholy-looking person," and she adds, "it was only now and then that the expression of his eyes was startling, especially when he spoke of his leg... He speaks of it frequently."

Most Americans have no trouble recalling Santa Anna’s successful siege of the Alamo (1836), but the ensuing Mexican-American War (1846-48) is less vivid. In Many Mexicos (Univ. of Calif., 1941; 4th rev. ed., 1966, cloth and paper), Lesley Byrd Simpson notes that at the start of the fighting, Mexico had 20,000 enlisted men in its army—and 24,000 officers.

The war left Mexico resentful and humiliated but did little to unite its people. In A Concise History of Mexico: From Hidalgo to Cardenas, 1805-1940 (Cambridge, 1977, cloth and paper), Jan Bazant describes recurring class conflict throughout the 19th and 20th centuries: "the struggle for land on the part of those who do not possess it... the striving for land and status on the part of merchants and politicians; and the striving on the part of land-owning families to preserve their position."

Soon after the war, the presidency (1855-72) of Benito Juarez, an Oaxaca Indian dubbed by posterity "the father of the nation," was disrupted by civil strife (1857-60) over new laws separating church and state. Juarez attempted to redistribute the land by taking it away from the Church and making it available to the poor, to establish freedom of religion, to improve educational opportunities.

The inevitable upper-class reaction came with the regime of Porfirio Diaz (1830-1915). The reaction to the Porfiriato was a peasant revolution; during its violent phase (1910-20), some 1 million people lost their lives.

John Womack, Jr.’s Zapata and the Mexican Revolution (Knopf, 1969, cloth; Vintage, 1970, paper) is readable and exhaustive. Eschewing social and political analysis, Womack recounts how the poor cheered Emiliano Zapata (1880-1919), a peasant leader who helped Pancho Villa seize Mexico City in 1914. Zapata’s Plan of Ayala, which demanded “land and liberty” for the poor, became one of the staples of Mexico’s modern revolutionary tradition (and rhetoric). However, Zapata and Villa never succeeded in organizing their followers and exploiting success, and both men were eventually assassinated.

A more analytical companion to Womack’s book is anthropologist Paul Friedrich’s Agrarian Revolt in a Mexican Village (Prentice-Hall,
Two valuable studies of Mexico’s politics and economy since the Revolution are Pablo González Casanova’s *Democracy in Mexico* (Oxford, 1970, cloth; 1972, paper) and Clark N. Reynolds’ *The Mexican Economy: Twentieth Century Structure and Growth* (Yale, 1970).

Reynolds suggests that the government’s distribution of land to the peasants since the 1920s has brought a measure of social justice and rising economic productivity. The outcome has been balanced growth in the rural and urban sectors. He sees this balance as bringing about a widening of national markets, fairer income distribution, and one of the highest rates of capital formation in the Western hemisphere.

Highly respected Mexican historian González Casanova’s *Democracy in Mexico* (Oxford, 1970, cloth; 1972, paper) is a left-of-center critique that faults the Revolution, even in its reform phase (1920–40), for not realizing democratic ideals.

The books of anthropologist Oscar Lewis are based on extensive interviews with scores of Mexicans, mostly the poor and the powerless. Among them are *Life in a Mexican Village, Five Families, and The Children of Sánchez*. Perhaps his best work is *Pedro Martínez: A Mexican Peasant and His Family* (Random, 1964, cloth; Vintage, 1964, paper), which shows rural society as seen through the experiences of one man, his wife, and oldest son in a small highland village 60 miles south of Mexico City. Suspicious of foreigners, shrewd, but idealistic, Martínez fought alongside Zapata in the Revolution. His endless struggle to survive wears him down, yet he remains his own man. At age 42, he shocked his neighbors by converting to Seventh Day Adventism.

The contradictory Mexican psyche has been explored by many of Mexico’s contemporary creative writers. Two representative anthologies are *Anthology of Mexican Poetry* (Ind. Univ., 1958, cloth and paper), compiled by Octavio Paz and translated by Samuel Beckett, and *The Muse in Mexico: A Mid-Century Miscellany* (Univ. of Texas, 1959), edited by Thomas Mabry Cranfill.

Novelist-critic Carlos Fuentes probes Mexican life in the 20th century in *The Death of Artemio Cruz* (Farrar, 1964, cloth; Noonday, 1964, paper). Among other things, he sensitively describes the plight of Mexico’s Indians, demonstrates the destructive results of macho behavior, and evokes the Mexican peasant’s passion for the land.

Octavio Paz has written a critical yet affectionate analysis of Mexican culture in *The Labyrinth of Solitude: Life and Thought in Mexico* (Grove, 1961, cloth; 1962, paper). Better than anyone else writing today, Paz tells what it means to be Mexican: “We oscillate between intimacy and withdrawal, between a shout and a silence, between a fiesta and a wake, without ever truly surrendering ourselves. Our indifference hides life behind a death mask; our wild shout rips off this mask and shoots into the sky, where it swells, explodes, and falls back in silence and defeat. Either way, the Mexican shuts himself off from the world: from life and from death.”

**EDITOR’S NOTE:** Suggestions for this essay came from Richard Fagen and from Alexander W. Wilde, a Research Associate with the Wilson Center’s Latin American Program.
THE WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA: Feminism, Nihilism and Bolshevism 1860–1930
by Richard Stites
$37.50 cloth, $12.50 paper
L of C 77-72137
ISBN 0-691-05254-9
0-691-10015-6 pbk

WOMEN UNDER COMMUNISM
by Barbara Wolfe Jancar
Johns Hopkins, 1978
301 pp. $16
L of C 77-16575

Almost 11 years in the making, Stites's history interprets the women's movement in Soviet Russia in the light of prerevolutionary advances and retreats. His book goes into such questions as why Tolstoy and Dostoevsky attacked women nihilists (illustrations include portraits of turn-of-the-century bomb-throwing "heroines of terror") and why Lenin's wife rejected personal liberation in favor of liberation from capitalism. Legislation passed in the early revolutionary period (1917–20) gave women civic, legal, and political rights. The years 1920–30 saw "released" urban women consolidating these gains by educating their rural proletarian sisters in "the first genuine social women's liberation in history." After 1930, under industrialization, a government headed by males focused on drawing females into the labor force. Stites's contribution to the sparse serious literature on women around the world is a major achievement, enhancing knowledge of woman's place in Russia, while throwing light on the West's efforts to deal with its own "woman question."

Jancar's study is concerned with equality of the sexes not only in the Soviet Union but also in communist Eastern Europe, China, and Cuba. Some of her data are not quite accurate (e.g., family allowances in the Soviet Union are paid on the birth of the fourth rather than the third child), and some might have been drawn from better Communist and Western sources. But her brief chapter summaries save the reader from getting bogged down in detail. She divides Communist leadership's responses to the needs of women into an early postrevolutionary phase, when the objective is to break up the old social order, and a later phase in which the regime's concern is to stay in power and promote economic develop-
ment. Overall, Jancar's conclusions are not too different from Stites's: in Communist countries, women's greatest advances have been made in the economic and educational spheres, but political parity still eludes them. Men have always manipulated women to serve a patriarchal establishment, and in Communist countries they still do.

—Bernice Madison (78)

EDUCATION BY CHOICE: The Case for Family Control
by John E. Coons and Stephen D. Sugarman
Univ. of Calif., 1978
263 pp. $10.95
L of C 77-20318
ISBN 0-520-03613-1

Few would deny that the best interest of the child should be the guiding principle of public education. Yet curricula imposed from afar and allocations of students to schools simply to fill racial quotas are among many factors that make it difficult, if not impossible, to design programs that fit the needs of children as individuals. And while schools fail the child, they also exclude parents from an important civic function: involvement in determining school policy. Law professors Coons and Sugarman make a strong case for the educational voucher (or "family scholarship") that permits a broad choice among schools and courses of study as a reasonable alternative to our present-day system, monopolized by "professionals."

—Robert B. Hawkins, Jr. (76)

LEADERSHIP
by James MacGregor Burns
Harper, 1978
542 pp. $15
L of C 76-5117
ISBN 0-06-010586-7

In 10 books written over 22 years, James MacGregor Burns has dug into the New Deal and war years of Franklin D. Roosevelt, written campaign biographies of John F. and Edward M. Kennedy, analyzed the conditions of American political deadlock, and exhorted citizens to face up to the wisdom of "uncommon sense." This book synthesizes both his own earlier studies and a vast amount of contemporary social science research on leadership. Inevitably, a work of such scope contains disappointments. To historians, somebody once observed, Burns is a brilliant political scientist; to political scientists, an exceptional historian. No doubt many political scientists will object to Leadership's analytical imprecision and philosophical tenor,
while many historians will fault its author for being overconcerned with definitions at the expense of original historical research. But Burn's goal is to construct a unified theory of how men and women lead. Ranging across eras and cultures, he distinguishes two kinds of leadership: transactional (involving the exchange of material and nonmaterial goods between the leader and the led) and transformational (in which leaders "shape, alter, and elevate the motives, values, and goals of followers"). Burns argues that "Great Person" theories underestimate the role of followers. Moreover, a good leader—whether a brilliant transformational figure like Mao Tse-tung or a transactional genius like the current Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Thomas P. ("Tip") O'Neill, Jr.—also knows how to be a good follower.

—Jeff Fishel (79)

SUPPLYING WAR: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton
by Martin van Creveld
Cambridge, 1977
284 pp. $14.95
L of C 77-5550

Logistics (the branch of military science having to do with procuring, maintaining, and transporting materiel, personnel, and facilities) conditions the conduct of war. But it has received little attention from scholars, less from popular historians. Old assumptions prevail. If we have read anything at all about armies, we know that in the 18th century they depended on fixed supply depots (the "magazine system"). We know that Napoleon's troops were the first who actually "lived off the land." We know that the Germans, moving and supplying their troops by rail to fight Austria in 1866 and France in 1870, ushered in a new military era. Historian van Creveld sets out to demolish these hallowed clichés. He demonstrates that all armies, down to and including Germany's during the invasion of Belgium in 1914, lived off the land: only in World War II, with the massive use of the motor truck, could a moving army be supplied from its base. The author of this highly controversial book has made a normally tedious subject exciting. It will be a pity if only military buffs read it.

—Walter M. Pintner (78)
THE WATERSHED OF TWO ERAS: Europe in 1900
by Jan Romein
Wesleyan, 1978
823 pp. $25
L of C 77-14641
ISBN 0-8195-5026-4

Romein's masterpiece, published posthumously in Holland in 1967 and now for the first time translated from the Dutch original, is at once the most comprehensive and interesting of all such efforts. A notably undogmatic Marxist, who preferred to seek change in "an infinite series of micro-processes," Romein delves into the music, business practices, literature, politics, and religious ideals of the major European nations. He presents a civilization coming apart at the core, its statesmen losing confidence in themselves, its artists fleeing into an idealized "art nouveau" world—well before "the guns of August" opened World War I. Whatever the causes, and for Romein they are countless, Europe by 1900 had been forced to yield place to more recently developed societies like our own, which were benefiting from what he describes as the "privileges of backwardness." Many attitudes that Romein exhumes in this work echo ironically today: Some Englishmen were complaining of the incursions of American corporations back in the 1890s; other Europeans were ascribing America's overall success to a practical educational system and attention to the training of women.

A SEASON OF YOUTH: The American Revolution and the Historical Imagination
by Michael Kammen
Knopf, 1978, 405 pp. $15
L of C 78-54948

How and why did the American Revolutionary era (rather than the Puritan experience or westward expansion) come to dominate Americans' sense of tradition? From the beginning, Kammen argues, the special mix of rebellion and cautious constitutionalism enabled Americans to evoke and interpret the events from the 1760s to 1789 to suit their own ends. Even the nation's first Fourth of
July commemoration was an occasion of political and social division; anti-Federalists celebrated with readings of the Declaration of Independence; Federalists, in separate ceremonies, with prayer. Banjo clocks, popular verse, "second-rate romances and third-rate novels," famous and forgettable paintings are all given attention by this Cornell historian, who finds the American people as determined to cast off the "burden of the past" as they are "to define a national character." In the first half of the 19th century, the image of George Washington as distinguished lawmaker was pre-eminent in the patriotic arts. Later, with the rise of sectionalism and then jingoism, Washington the civilian came to be overshadowed by militaristic statues and paintings of the General on Horseback. The late 20th century has seen another change. Novels about our rebellious past written in the 1970s, Kammen notes, have been "mainly psychological studies . . . more interested in what it feels like to fight—fear, hunger, pain, exhaustion—" than in the Revolution itself.

American radicalism, writes David DeLeon, a specialist in U.S. intellectual and religious history, is distinguished by a suspicion of centralized discipline that verges on open hostility. "Our radicals have concentrated on emancipation, on breaking the prisons of authority," he writes. Abolitionists rather than institution-builders, they have been "too occupied with changing the world and not enough with understanding it." DeLeon traces the "subterranean anarchist currents" in liberalism and libertarianism (both of the right and the left) from Thoreau and Emerson, through Henry George, Benjamin R. Tucker, Eugene Debs, and the Wobblies, to the free market anarcho-capitalists and commune-oriented anarcho-communists of today. The bourgeois New Left he sees as typically anarchic "in its spontaneous, non-theoretical radicalism." Anarchist criticism will remain an integral element of American culture as long as the United States is a liberal, middle-class society, DeLeon contends.
but he does not believe that our homegrown radicalism will ever seriously challenge traditional capitalism or even socialism.

THE IRONY OF VIETNAM: Did Lyndon Baines Johnson, as his critics claim, use the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident as a pretext for later massive U.S. intervention in South Vietnam? No, say the authors. Gelb, who directed the famed "Pentagon Papers" history of U.S.-Vietnamese relations, and Betts, a Brookings historian, provide an eye-opening analysis of Vietnam decision-making in Washington, 1945-68. Like John F. Kennedy, LBJ tried to pay only the "minimum necessary price" of averting a takeover of the South by Hanoi. As the price went up, he glumly kept paying it, until over 500,000 Americans were in Vietnam and the American people decided that the minimum was getting too high. LBJ followed public opinion, the authors contend, citing poll results; as it shifted, he shifted. The U.S. democratic policymaking system "worked"; the Kennedy-Johnson Vietnam strategy did not. Throughout *Irony*, Gelb and Betts jar many an assumption long cherished by either hawks or doves.

MASTER MARINER: Capt. James Cook and the Peoples of the Pacific
by Daniel Conner and Lorraine Miller
Univ. of Wash., 1979
176 pp. $16.95
L. of C. 78-2989
ISBN 0-295-95621-6

In a time of press gangs, floggings, and scurvy on the high seas, Captain James Cook (1728-79) was a saintly mariner. Moreover, he was as loath to mistreat or insult a "savage" as he was to see his fellow seamen suffer injury or disease. In his Nootka Sound journal, kept in the course of the search for the Northwest Passage on his third voyage (1778), the good Captain describes a chief "who had some time before attached himself to me" to whom he made "a small present." In return, the Indian gave him a beaver skin. "This occasioned me to make some addition to my present," writes Cook, "on which he gave me the Beaver skin Cloak he had on, that I knew he set a value upon. And as I was desirous he should be no sufferer by his friendship and generosity to me, I made him a present of a New Broad Sword with a brass hilt which
made him happy as a prince." The genius, character, and decency of this gifted navigator, surveyor, and hydrographer is clearly apparent in Conner’s and Miller’s illustrated account of his early career and the extended Pacific voyages that ended with his death in a fray with Hawaiian islanders. Drawing on Cook’s own journals and those of officers who sailed with him, the authors capture the spirit of adventure and intellectual curiosity that pervaded these epic journeys.

Contemporary Affairs

WHOSE NEWS?
Politics, the Press, and the Third World
by Rosemary Righter
Times Books, 1978
272 pp. $12.50
L of C 78-1443
ISBN 0-8129-0797-3

Last November’s UNESCO general conference in Paris illustrated that the international flow of news has become a major source of friction between developing and industrialized nations. This book, written before but released after that conference, provides a welcome spark of objectivity in the generally heated debate over Western domination of international media. Granted, the Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, and Agence France Presse provide over 90 percent of international news to the world, says Righter, who reports for the Sunday Times of London. But Third World leaders are wrong when they charge excess “nationalism” by Western news agencies; of AP’s 559 journalists outside the United States, 478 are non-American. Criticism of developing nations does not indicate an anti-Third World stance; Western journalists criticize their own governments as well. Claims of “cultural imperialism” are often based on absurd conspiracy theories. And the frustration of Third World leaders stems not from the fact “that power, as they see it, is concentrated in a few hands, but that they are the wrong hands.” Righter finds some complaints deserving of attention, however. A “Western perspective” can distort what a journalist writes; Western media do neglect issues that have been solved for industrialized nations but not for developing ones; Western news agencies often do concentrate their coverage in areas that are most apt to buy their services. Righter argues...
that if Western media want to retain access to the Third World, "they must provide clearer evidence that they are seriously interested in what is going on there."

**BIRDS OF PASSAGE:** "Overstayed" (and undocumented) foreign workers make up the bulk of the migrant labor force in the United States today. This clandestine group, writes M.I.T. economist Piore, is estimated at anywhere from 2 to 12 million. In northern Europe, where foreign workers are largely legal, they accounted for some 9 percent of the labor force in West Germany, 11 percent in France, and over 25 percent in Switzerland by 1975. Professor Piore contends that a substantial migration of workers does little good, in lasting ways, for either the host or the home country. The migrants' departure does not significantly relieve population pressure or rural poverty at home, nor does their presence in industrialized societies sit well with the native labor force—union or nonunion. Piore sees the current influx of Spanish-speaking workers from Latin America and the Caribbean islands to the United States as only the latest step in a generally unsavory historic progression that brought cheap labor here from Europe in the 19th century and blacks from the South to Northern cities. He criticizes U.S. immigration policy, which does not recognize the existence of "illegals," and faults Americans for their unwillingness to accept responsibility for their ambivalence about migrants.

**Arts & Letters**

**DELIRIOUS NEW YORK:** The Dutch author of this subversive book has seen New York City close up and, wonder of wonders, loves it. Koolhaas does not long for the organic, the Sierra Club "natural," the environmentally sound. On the contrary, he relishes New York's systematic artificiality and identifies its arrogance toward nature as being of its very essence. Rather than moralize about this, the author describes and—
through a wondrous selection of illustrations that range from postcards to Hugh Ferriss's visionary architectural drawings—displays the rich and literally revolutionary conceptions to which the city's distinctive civilization gave rise between 1890 and 1940. Koolhaas's New York is a zany, surrealistic Coney Island that spawned other Coney Islands as diverse as Rockefeller Center and the Downtown Athletic Club. "The Metropolis," he observes, "strives to reach a mythical point where the world is completely fabricated by man so that it absolutely coincides with his desires." All this may be past history today, as New York seeks to weather its next financial crisis, but it explains why modern architecture and all that it represents was popular in New York to a degree that would have been unthinkable in the less Promethean capitals of Europe.

FINLEY PETER DUNNE
AND MR. DOOLEY: The Chicago Years
by Charles Fanning
Univ. of Ky., 1978
296 pp. $14.50

Generations of American political writers have shamelessly dished up morsels of "Mister Dooley" wisdom culled from the syndicated newspaper columns that Finley Peter Dunne wrote after leaving Chicago for New York City in 1900. Generally overlooked are the more compassionate, more true to life, and even funnier observations of the fictitious saloon-keeper Martin Dooley during the early years when his creator was an ambitious, young editorial writer for the Chicago Evening Post. Dunne came from a respectable middle-class Irish family. He traveled in social circles far removed from the poverty of Chicago's South Side, where Martin Dooley held forth. Author Charles Fanning traces the oddly schizophrenic split between Dunne's upbeat editorials and Dooley's caustic comments on Chicago's political corruption, the rhetorical excesses of Irish-American nationalism, and the culture of the working class. Whether talking of sports—"Downtown it's football; out here it's the Irish killin' each other"—aldermanic politics, or the powerlessness of the poor, Dooley's utterances reflected Dunne's feel for dour realism and his unbounded love of language. As a recorder of
CURRENT BOOKS

RUDYARD KIPLING
by Lord Birkenhead
Random, 1978, 430 pp. $15

Rudyard Kipling was a callow and already arrogant 16-year-old when he began his journalistic career in India in 1882. The talented fledgling roamed the stews and caravan serais of Lahore until dawn, insulted his elders at their clubs, fell in love with what he observed of the Army, and absorbed all he saw, heard, and felt for later use in his stories and verse. By the time he returned to England, at age 24, he was already an established literary figure for whom success after success was to follow. Lord Birkenhead tells us more of the private man than of the literary lion: his restless world wanderings; his bitter battles with a brother-in-law in Vermont; his hobnobbing with admirals, field marshals, financiers, royalty; his prejudices and hates; the family tragedies that befell him. There is little indication in any of this of the great warmth and perception that distinguish *Kim*, the *Jungle Books*, and others of his works. Birkenhead tries to be sympathetic, but the jingoistic, ultra-Tory Kipling (who once wrote an article so scathingly critical of the Liberal Party that the *Times* refused to print it) keeps getting in the way. This biography—the most readable of three published since 1975, including Angus Wilson’s—was commissioned 30 years ago by Mrs. Elsie Bambridge, Kipling’s only surviving child. When she saw the manuscript, she refused, without explanation, to allow its publication. Both Lord Birkenhead and Mrs. Bambridge died a few years ago, and the book has now at last seen print.

THE MYTHMAKERS
by V. S. Pritchett
Random, 1979
190 pp. $8.95
ISBN 0-394-50472-0

V. S. Pritchett is an elegant and prolific writer of fiction (his *Selected Stories* were published in 1978), autobiography (*Midnight Oil*, 1971), biography, travel accounts, and criticism. In this collection, the first of a projected two volumes of literary essays, he presents concise appraisals of 19th- and 20th-century authors—Solzhenitsyn, Chekhov,
Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Kafka, Zola, Stendhal, García Marquez, Borges, and others. Integrating the lives and works of his subjects, Pritchett accomplishes in a few pages what it takes lesser critics whole books to do. He makes convincing connections. For example, the later Borges, "a learned pillager of metaphysical arguments ... who has made Chesterton rhapsodic [and] put blood in the diagrams of Euclid," passes the test of the artist: "Can he make his idea walk, can he place it in a street, a room, can he 'plant' the aftermath of the 'moment of truth'?" And Pritchett shows how fiction is made to work. He writes of Stendhal: his "sense of human beings living not yet transfixed, for an affecting moment, by their future, gives the doctrine of self-invention an ironical perspective."

**Science & Technology**

**THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MUSIC**
by John Booth Davies
Stanford, 1978
240 pp. $13.95
L of C 77-92339
ISBN 0-8047-0980-7

What happens when we listen to music? British psychologist and jazz musician Davies defines the psychological study of music (classical, pop, jazz, folk) as "psychophysics." He reviews what is known about how people hear music, how musical abilities and aptitudes may be measured and tested, the place of rhythm in various musical cultures, the fit between the personalities of musicians and their instruments, and the relative merits of different kinds of music. The very fact that "the physical properties of sound fail to define the subjective response" makes music possible, he writes. Studies indicate that we "chunk" together what we hear to form larger units that convey meaning and feeling. Because "people make tunes" as they organize tonal sequences into meaningful patterns, we can speak of "tune" deafness but not of tone deafness. There is much else in this complex, subtle book. Discussing theories of consonance/dissonance, for example, Davies warns that "the phenomenon is synonymous with the way the person feels, either positively or negatively, towards this chord or that chord."
ON ALMOST ANY WIND:
The Saga of the Oceanographic Research Vessel Atlantis
by Susan Schlee
Cornell, 1978, 301 pp. $15
L of C 78-58038

Recently NASA announced that a space shuttle to be launched in the 1980s will be christened Atlantis in honor of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution’s exploratory sailing vessel. For 35 years, the 142-foot, 460-ton auxiliary ketch, launched in Copenhagen in 1931, served not only oceanography but also biology, geology, physics (and, on occasion, naval intelligence). Susan Schlee’s account of the first Atlantis’s million and a half miles of voyages is drawn from ship’s logs, expedition notes, recollections, and scientific folklore. The cast of characters reads like a Who’s Who of American oceanographers (supported in their explorations of the deep by a gang of boisterous crewmen). Neatly counterpoised with tales of nautical adventure (and misadventure) is useful information on the institutional and political background of Woods Hole. There is not a lot of scientific detail, but light is shed on some of the earliest stirrings of Big Science in America as Schlee enumerates pre–World War II findings—about Gulf Stream currents, temperature layers, the propagation of sound in the ocean—and later discoveries involving sediments and the geological structure of the ocean bottom. All, in her telling, gain a special human meaning.

THE SHORTER SCIENCE AND CIVILIZATION IN CHINA: 1
by Colin A. Ronan and Joseph Needham
Cambridge, 1978
326 pp. $19.95
L of C 77-82513
ISBN 0-521-21821-7

This abridgement of volumes I and II (more will follow) of Joseph Needham’s monumental 1954 text compares the early development of scientific thought in China to its counterpart in the West. Beginning with archaeological evidence of the development of coiled clay pots in the Yangshao culture (c. 2500 B.C.), Ronan and Needham move on to the concept of opposite forces (Yin and Yang) and ideas about nature, logic, and magic that evolved in China during the middle ages. They show that a copious literature (known to few before the 20th century) substantiates China’s involvement in the diffusion of knowledge. Information about early Chinese astronomy, hydraulic machinery, the evaluation of pi (π) was passed in a continuous stream westward for 2,000 years before Europe’s scientific revolution.

Poet and critic Robert Pinsky’s “traveler’s essay” on the terrain of contemporary poetry sets out to discover “what part the poetry of the past... seems to play in the mind of one who is about to read or write a poem.” He traces the growth of ideas espoused by such “modernist” poets as Williams, Crane, Eliot, and Stevens into a tradition that lives in poetry today. Defining “contemporary” to include work written since the late 1950s, the author analyzes the relationship of modernist (and Romantic) notions to techniques and references in the work of John Berryman, Robert Lowell, Sylvia Plath, and Theodore Roethke and in some poems by younger and less established writers. Pinsky argues convincingly against the notion that contemporary poetry exists in a vacuum. His book is a valuable refutation of Archibald MacLeish’s statement that a poem “should not mean, but be.” It demonstrates that contemporary poems indeed can, and often do, “mean.”

UNDERGROUND TO PALESTINE. By I. F. Stone. Pantheon, 1978. 272 pp. $3.95

In 1946, “Izzy” Stone, creator of the one-man newsletter I. F. Stone’s Weekly and the weekly newsletter PM, was the first journalist to accompany Jewish survivors of the Holocaust across war-devastated Europe to Palestine. At the time, his emotion-charged reports, published in the New York daily PM and in book form in English and Hebrew, had an important impact on the struggle to establish Israel. Appearing again after many years out of print, they have lost none of their power. But now they come with an equally powerful 31 pages entitled “Reflections and Meditations Thirty Years After.” Here Stone notes that as a “dissident on the Middle East” today he has found getting a hearing on anything that departs from “the standard Israeli line about as easy as selling a thoughtful exposition of atheism to the Osservatore Romano in Vatican City.” He attacks what he has long seen as a “twofold scale of moral judgment, defining the same action as right for oneself but wrong in the neighbor.” Stone reviews the little-known history of the “Other Zionism,” preached by Judah Magnes, founder of the Hebrew University, and others who believed that “the right of the Jewish peoples to a national home in Palestine does not invalidate the rights of the rest of the land’s inhabitants.” As concerned for the Arab refugees of the 1970s as he was for the Jewish refugees of the 1940s, Stone declares that “the two peoples must live together, either in the same Palestinian state or side by side in two Palestinian states.”


The Federal Theatre Project (FTP) was established, along with the Federal Music Project and the Federal Writers’ Project, as part of the white-collar division of the U.S. Works Progress Administration (WPA) in the dark Depression year 1935. Quickly becoming the most visible and controversial of these programs that provided work for unemployed artists and technicians, the FTP also was the first to die. In 1939, funds for its continued support were eliminated by the U.S. Congress in a compromise that President
Franklin D. Roosevelt accepted rather than lose his whole relief program. Congressional testimony disclosed that opposition to the FTP was based in part on its very success, under Director Hallie Flanagan, as a national theater operating in competition with free enterprise. Also involved were Congressmen's fears concerning the radical associations of some FTP artists, which surfaced in several exchanges, including this one: Dies Committee Member Joseph Starnes. "You are quoting from this Marlowe. Is he a Communist?" Mrs. Flanagan. "I was quoting from Christopher Marlowe . . . the greatest dramatist immediately preceding Shakespeare." Within a month, the Federal Theatre had been disbanded and the records of its existence packed away in boxes. These files, including scripts, production notebooks, costume sketches, posters, and newspaper clippings, were stored for many years in an abandoned airplane hangar in Maryland. There they were found and opened by O'Connor and Brown. The book's informative text and 250 illustrations (48 in color) make it a must, both for theater lovers and for students of the Depression era in America. The FTP's backers and participants included Eleanor Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins, Orson Welles, and Arthur Miller.

**DA VINCI'S BICYCLE: Ten Stories.** By Guy Davenport. Johns Hopkins, 1979. 192 pp. $4.95 (cloth, $12.95)

The first publication of fiction in the 100-year history of the Johns Hopkins University Press, these 10 "assemblages" (a term that English professor Davenport prefers to "stories") take fragments of odd fact as their jumping-off point and combine them with the "necessary fiction" of imagination. Davenport amalgamates such material as the life of Gertrude Stein, Samuel Beckett talking about James Joyce, the habits of wasps, and the possibilities implicit in flying machines. In "The Richard Nixon Freischutz Rag," he interweaves a scene of Leonardo da Vinci inventing the bicycle with an imagined conversation between Nixon and Mao Tse-tung. The collection demonstrates its author's joy in the tiny incident evocative of much more. Ranging across literary and philosophical history, he vividly illustrates his notion that man is a forager, created to understand the world.


The Library of Congress has published an explanatory text and five microfiche reproductions of 303 photographs taken by the Wright brothers between 1898 and 1911. The microfiche cards can be used with a viewer or examined under a magnifying glass. Thus, without having to pay a visit to the collection of glass negatives in the Library's Prints and Photographs Division, aviation buffs and others can now see the historic pictures snapped by John T. Daniels of the Kill Devil Life Saving Station during the first powered aircraft ascension of December 17, 1903.

They can also browse through amazingly clear thumbnail-size prints of photographs that Orville and Wilbur took of one another, their family, and friends, as well as their bicycle shop, kites and gliders (wrecked and flying), and 10 informal studies of Orville's St. Bernard dog, Scipio. A bargain.
THE FOLLIES. By Daniel Mark Epstein. Viking/Overlook, 1979. 48 pp. $3.45

Daniel Mark Epstein, 1978 recipient of the American Academy of Arts and Letters Prix de Rome, is a poet of the penny arcade. His people are lost souls—carnival hucksters, tattoo artists, beggars. His poems, whether lengthy narratives or short, pithy verses such as "The Man Without Legs," who "knows pity from the inside out," are full to bursting with concrete detail. Like Walt Whitman, Epstein usually locates his poetry in a specifically American landscape or cityscape. Thus, an eccentric inventor's visit to heaven in a machine of his own devising (it also takes him to hell) includes a celestial version of Baltimore's Lexington Market where his appetite "revived with all the ardor of his soul. He hadn't eaten in a day and heaven, like the best resort hotels must proscribe hunger past a dwindled satiety."

THE CHALLENGE OF DAYCARE. By Sally Provence, Audrey Naylor, and June Patterson. Yale reprint, 1979. 311 pp. $7.95

In the United States today, women make up 50.1 percent of the work force. Of these women, many are working mothers, who know, to their sorrow, that high-quality daycare for young children is hard to find. The authors of this book, respectively a professor of pediatrics at Yale's Child Study Center, an assistant clinical professor of social work at the Center, and an associate professor of child development at Connecticut College, have some good news to report. They describe how Yale, since 1967, has developed a practical full-time program for children of varied backgrounds. Daycare, they say, is here to stay; it can be excellent. Challenge covers organization and administration (e.g., how to draw clear lines of responsibility and authority), staffing, working with parents, and the day-to-day problems and pleasures of nurturing and teaching infants and toddlers.


Best remembered for The Good Soldier (1927), his novel of World War I, Ford Madox Ford also wrote criticism and other nonfiction. Little of it survived beyond his death in 1939. Provence, first published in 1935, is an old-fashioned travel book, the kind to which Lawrence Durrell gave the generic title Spirit of Place. Turning its pages, one almost smells the fields of lavender in bloom and recalls the medieval troubadours of Provence and the earlier Roman rulers whose monuments glorify the sun-bleached landscape of this region of France. The reader shares in the English author's small adventures—not least, the savoring of an authentic bouillabaisse (despite Ford's flat statement that "Provence has no regional dishes, and the true Provencal has neither the gift, nor the patience, nor yet the materials that are necessary for the serious cook"). Reprinted by the Ecco Press as one of its "Neglected Books of the 20th Century," this volume, with its undated air of delight enhanced by the original edition's insouciant line drawings, may be 1979's only affordable trip to Avignon.


This engraving, copied from a daguerreotype, appeared as the frontispiece of the first edition of Leaves of Grass in 1855. Whitman's eccentricities jarred many critics, but his poetry prompted Ralph Waldo Emerson to exclaim: "I rubbed my eyes... to see if this sunbeam were no illusion."
Vladimir Nabokov once described biography as "psycho-plagiarism." George Eliot called it "a disease of English literature," and W. H. Auden said it is "always superfluous" and "usually in bad taste." Yet, biography's most ardent champions—those who traffic in it—face special challenges. Justin Kaplan, winner of a 1967 Pulitzer Prize for _Mister Clemens and Mark Twain: A Biography_, is now working on a book about Walt Whitman. He ponders the questions that haunt a literary biographer: How much of Whitman's life is reflected in his poems? What are other, truer clues? How much detail must be unearthed to understand both the man and his writing? Kaplan discusses Whitman's complicated early life to show how the poet transformed his fascination with "phrenology" and his celebration of sex into a uniquely American poetic vision.

_by Justin Kaplan_

A few weeks before his 36th birthday, Walter Whitman, former printer, schoolteacher, housebuilder, and newspaper editor, now the author, proprietor, and publisher of a literary work in press, registered a copyright with the clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

When it went on sale in July 1855, his book was as arresting in format and detail as in its contents: the most brilliant and original poetry yet written on the continent, at once the fulfillment of American literary romanticism and the beginnings of American literary modernism.

The reader's eye was caught first by the unidentified frontispiece portrait of a bearded man dressed like a common seaman or laborer. The title page offered no clues to the author's identity. It displayed only the words "Leaves of Grass," a small decorative rule, and the legend, "Brooklyn, New York: 1855." The copyright page was more informative, but the Walter Whitman named in the statutory boilerplate was conceivably the author's publisher or assignee or even, as some readers might have concluded, a conservator appointed in cases of mental instability.

Ten pages of prose eccentrically punctuated with strings of periods were followed by 83 pages of verse, at first glance clusters of prose sentences printed like Bible verses; the 12 poems were untitled except for the insistent head caption for each, "Leaves of Grass." Only in a passage on page 29 did the reader finally
come upon a connection between the bearded loafer of the frontispiece, the anonymous author, and the copyright holder:

Walt Whitman, an American, one of the roughs, a kosmos. Disorderly, fleshy and sensual ... eating drinking and breeding. No sentimentalist ... No stander above men or women or apart from them ... no more modest than immodest.

In an era of triple-barred literary eminences who uttered their names in Jovian trochees and dactyls—William Cullen Bryant, John Greenleaf Whittier, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, James Russell Lowell—the poet of Leaves of Grass chose to follow the populist examples of Andy Jackson, Kit Carson, and Davy Crockett.

The name Walt Whitman put its bearer on a more familiar footing, which he frequently expressed in sexual imagery, with his “soul.” “I cannot understand the mystery,” Whitman said in an early prose fragment, “but I am always conscious of myself as two—as my soul and I: and I reckon it is the same with all men and women.”

Whitman’s egocentricity was not only profound but also so sweeping that he projects himself into every corner of existence. As Tolstoy remarked about Lincoln, he “wanted to see himself in the world—not the world in himself.” The “I” speaking in Whitman’s poems ceases to be specific and personal and becomes generic, archetypal. If Leaves of Grass has to have a subtitle, it might well be Gertrude Stein’s Everybody’s Autobiography.

The inner life of a creative person “is as much a work of fiction—of guiding narrative structures—as novels and poems,” Phyllis Rose says in her study of Virginia Woolf, Women of Letters; “the task of literary biography is to explore this fiction,” this “personal mythology.” This may be what Yeats had in mind when he said, “There is some one Myth for every man, which, if we but knew it, would make us understand all that he did and thought.”

As Whitman entered his thirties, a familiar time for radical redefinitions of the self, he became a sort of Kit Carson, and Davy Crockett.

Enter Spurzheim

During the 1840s, America had welcomed as a messiah Johnn Kaspar Spurzheim, one of the founders of phrenology, the science of the mind. He was teaching a course in brain anatomy at the Harvard Medical School when he died. His sudden departure was memorialized by the Massachusetts Medical Association as “a calamity to mankind.” His body went to Mount Auburn Cemetery and his brain went to Harvard, but his happy spirit marched on for more than 30 years.

Justin Kaplan, 53, is currently a visiting lecturer at Harvard University. Born in New York City, he received a B.S. from Harvard in 1944. In addition to winning a Pulitzer Prize, his Mister Clemens and Mark Twain: A Biography won a National Book Award in 1967. His other books include Lincoln Steffens: A Biography (1974) and Mark Twain and His World (1974). This essay is drawn from his contribution to Telling Lives: The Biographer’s Art (New Republic Books, 1979).
"FAINT CLEWS AND INDIReCTIONS"

When I read the book, the biography famous,
And is this then (said I) what the author calls a man's life?
And so will some one when I am dead and gone write my life?
(As if any man really knew aught of my life,
Why even I myself I often think know little or nothing of my real life,
Only a few hints, a few diffused faint clews and indirections
I seek for my own use to trace out here.)

—from Walt Whitman's Leaves of Grass

Often the biographer has to suspend historical hindsight in order to
deal imaginatively and empathetically with what Sir Thomas Browne
called Pseudodoxia Epidemica, or Vulgar Errors, bits, pieces, and even
entire structures of belief that now appear downright silly but at one
time served a purpose: they supplied the underpinnings of personal
mythologies. For the biographer, who is concerned with rendering an-
other person's texture and density of experience in another era, the sup-
porting belief is of immense interest, whatever its present validity.

Reading the Bumps

According to Spurzheim, the faculties of the mind had specific locali-
ties in the folds and fissures of the brain. The size of these localities
varied with the strength or weakness of individual faculties in individual
brains, but since the skull, as described, was a bony fabric that fitted
the brain like the skin of a pumpkin, it was possible to measure individual
facilities from the outside. The examination and classification of living
skulls—"bump reading"—was a form of palpation, the classic diag-
nostic procedure applied this time not to livers, uteri, and prostates but
to personality, temperament, and ability.

The corollary of Spurzheim's elegant propositions was electrifying: if
you found out what you were, you could then become what you wanted
to be by "depressing" faculties that were too prominent and "elevating"
those that were too small. It seemed that the human race had found a way
of purging itself of crime, insanity, and bafflement and was about to
grow upward toward perfection. For Americans in particular, already
fired with self-reliance and democratic mission, Spurzheim's teach-
ings were like drinks on the house.

"One of the choice places of New
York to me then," Whitman said of
the five or six years before the emer-
gence of Leaves of Grass, "was the
'Phrenological Cabinet' of Fowler &
Wells, Nassau Street near Beek-
man....I went there often, and once
for myself had a very elaborate and
leisurely examination and 'chart of
bumps.' I have it yet," he added; he
should also have added that on three
separate occasions he published it as
a pedigree or charter for his poetry.

Dangerous Indolence

"This man has a grand physical
constitution, and power to live to a
good old age," according to the
Fowler & Wells reading of Whit-
man's bumps. "He is undoubtedly
descended from the soundest and
hardiest stock. . . . Leading traits of character appear to be Friendship, Sympathy, Sublimity, and Self-Esteem; and markedly among his combinations, the dangerous faults of Indolence, a tendency to the pleasure of Voluptuousness and Alimentativeness, and a certain reckless swing of animal will.

At this stage in his career, reassured by phrenology, Whitman could see himself as a perfected man and also a new type of poet: robust, sensual, joyous, a universal sharer, lover, companion, and teacher.

The 30-year-old who had his bumps read on Nassau Street was soon to describe himself, in aesthetic terms, as a “tall, large, rough-looking man, in a journeyman carpenter’s uniform. Coarse, sanguine transparent, indistinct light blue, and with that sleepy look that comes when the lid rests half way down over the pupil; careless, lounging gait.” His companions—drivers, mechanics, laborers, deckhands—epitomized “simple humanity.”

In the cabinet of Fowler & Wells, Walter Whitman had entered a wonderland of parabolic funhouse mirrors. He saw reflected in them the lineaments of “Walt Whitman, an American,” “a man cohered out of tumult and chaos.” Wrongheaded in theory and application, phrenology nonetheless contributed to Whitman a structure of belief, a way of reasoning out glorious conclusions about the man and poet he became, and led him to the exuberant vision of himself in his poems:

I am the poet of the Body and I am the poet of the Soul.
The pleasures of heaven are with me and the pains of hell are with me.
The first I graft and increase upon myself, the latter I translate into a new tongue.

In the building of a new self, Spurzheim’s pseudoscience served Whitman like the scaffoldings around the speculative houses he once put up in Brooklyn. In time, he dismantled his phrenological staging and uprights and the new self stood unaided, but he never forgot its origins. “I know what [Oliver Wendell] Holmes said about phrenology,” Whitman joked toward the end of his life, “—that you might as easily tell how much money is in a safe feeling the knob on the door as tell how much brain a man has by feeling the bumps on his head: and I guess most of my friends distrust it—but you see I am very old fashioned—I probably have not got by the phrenology stage yet.”

Forty Ounces of Blood

Then there was Whitman and sex. In 1855, when he presented himself coatless and barenecked like “one of the roughs” in the Leaves of Grass frontispiece, men of fashion dressed from head to toe like black tubes. Women of fashion resembled tea cozies, jam pots, and other gently rounded objects of manufacture—their breasts, buttocks, and legs were hidden under nearly 100 yards of gown, petticoat, and underclothing.

In the name of health and public order, the body had been officially banished from polite society and its external shape and structure denied. Popular theorists of the day, in particular Sylvester Graham (eponym of the delicious cracker), argued that one act of sexual intercourse was for a man the equivalent of losing 40 ounces of blood—a fifth of his entire supply; this appalling statistic served as a warning that sexual overindulgence—meaning more than once a month—could cause tuberculosis, convulsions, and even imbecilism. Sex withered the thinking
Before he published Leaves of Grass, Whitman often visited Fowler & Wells's popular "Cabinet" for a reading of the bumps on his head.
TELLING ALL

Barbara W. Tuchman, author of Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–1945 (1971) and A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century (1978), suggests that, in contrast to Kaplan, many biographers today relinquish all judgments to the reader:

Biography has lately been overtaken by a school that has abandoned the selective in favor of the all-inclusive. I think this development is part of the anti-excellence spirit of our time that insists on the equality of everything and is thus reduced to the theory that all facts are of equal value and that the biographer or historian should not presume to exercise judgment. To that I can only say, if he cannot exercise judgment, he should not be in the business. A portraitist does not achieve a likeness by giving sleeve buttons and shoelaces equal value to mouth and eyes.

Today in biography, we are presented with the subject’s life reconstructed day by day from birth to death, including every new dress or pair of pants, every juvenile poem, every journey, every letter, every loan, every accepted or rejected invitation, every telephone message, every drink at every bar. The result is one of those thousand-page heavies in which all the hard work has been left to the reader who can hardly be blamed if he finds the task unrewarding.

organs of men, just as thinking withered the reproductive organs of women. Sex was a major disorder, even a catastrophe—it was a wonder the human race had lasted as long as it had.

Whitman thought otherwise. No other poet of his century wrote about the body with such explicitness and joy, anatomizing it at rest and cataloguing its parts, celebrating it in the act of love:

Without shame the man I like knows and avows the deliciousness of his sex. Without shame the woman I like knows and avows hers.

No other poet of his century paid such a continuing high price for his boldness: ostracism, ostentatious neglect, censorship, legal action, expulsion, banning in Boston. Emerson and others had urged him to tone down Leaves of Grass, and he had re-fused, arguing that his poetry was organic and integral, that “the dirtiest book in all the world is the expurgated book, and besides, sex was the root of roots, the life beneath the life.”

Now, a curiosity about the sex lives of other people is a perfectly natural thing. And yet having followed Whitman to a point where he stands so admirably opposed to the sexual standards of Victorian America, we find ourselves in a quandary.

Despite his declared standards of candor, not to mention those of our era of total disclosure dictated by an as-yet unwritten Freedom of Sexual Information Act, we know practically nothing about what Whitman “did,” even though, as he tells us, he chronically “aches with amorous love.”

In contrast to Whitman, whose
aches reminded D. H. Lawrence of a steam engine. It is tempting for us to believe Ralph Waldo Emerson had the sex drive of a day-old corpse. But Emerson had four acknowledged children. This means that we are able to make four more inferences about his intimate conduct than we can about the publicly excitable but ultimately covert Whitman.

Realizing the importance of such inferences, when he was 71 years old Whitman made an astounding claim in a letter to the English critic John Addington Symonds: "The writings and roundings of Leaves of Grass has been to me the reason-for-being, & life comfort. My life, youth, manhood, mid-age, time South, &c: have all been jolly, bodily, and probably open to criticism—Tho' always unmarried I have had six children—two are dead—One living southern grandchild, fine boy, who writes to me occasionally."

The consensus among the members of Whitman's inner circle was that this newly revealed chapter of his life was pure moonwhine, the children and grandchild (none of whom have ever surfaced) being the "delusion"—panicky, defensive, pathetic, senile, or self-aggrandizing—of a sick man who "was not exactly himself at times toward the last," as one of his friends said. But the main point is that Whitman did have fatherhood fantasies all his life and that he wrote this letter out of exasperation, after having been chivied relentlessly by Symonds and other homosexual admirers in England to acknowledge the meaning of a number of his poems celebrating what the phrenologists called "adhesiveness," or manly love, or the love of comrades.

**Second Thoughts**

"Perhaps I don't know what it all means—perhaps never did know," Whitman once said about the poems of Leaves of Grass, displaying a mixture of naivete and disingenuousness. "Maybe I do not know all my meanings." He described himself in one newspaper interview as "an old bachelor who never had a love af-

![Whitman once described himself as 'an old bachelor who never had a love affair': on another occasion, he said he had six children.](image)
fair” and then, having had second thoughts, angrily repudiated the interview. Constantly enriching the already scumbled surface of his history, he hinted at affairs with women in New York, Washington, and New Orleans, but he also acknowledged that the most intense relationships of his life were always with younger men, variously and anomalously lumped together as brothers, sons, comrades, lovers.

**Understanding Miracles**

On the documentary level, the problem of accounting for Whitman’s sexuality is magnified by his practice of laundering, editing, and revising his archives, altering the sequence of a cycle of love poems in order to obscure their narrative connection with each other, doctoring his notebooks by tearing out pages, or by changing “him” to “her” and a man’s initials to a number code. During his last years, Whitman contributed a substantial share to those pyres of paper and columns of smoke marking the trail of 19th-century authors who dreaded what biographers might find after they were dead and gone.

One can’t blame these fugitives—they knew that even the best-disposed biographies have to have an adversary or inquisitorial aspect if they are to arrive at any kind of truth. What is at stake here is not just invasion of privacy but the biographer’s obligation to give Whitman himself the freedom he never had to pursue his recognition that love, of whatever sort it may be, was the root of roots in his life and poetry.

“I rubbed my eyes a little, to see if this sunbeam were no illusion,” Emerson said after he read *Leaves of Grass* for the first time. It is the work, of course, that remains the paramount mystery or, in Whitman’s word, “miracle.” One does not try to explain a miracle but only to describe, with as much precision, credibility, and passion as possible, the moments and years preceding and following the miracle.

Thus, the irreducible reality of a literary life may not be the naked self at all but the sum of a writer’s public verbal acts and ecstasies with language. And as a corollary to this, the drama of literary biography may have less to do with stalking the naked self to its burrow than with the tensions between the familiar, shared life of human beings—making it, making out, making a go of it, making waves, making a name—and a vision so singular it deserves to be regarded with awe.
Why the Russians Sold Alaska

“We may make a treaty with Russia but we cannot make a treaty with the North Wind or the Snow King,” complained the New York Tribune when the United States bought Alaska two years after the Civil War. The $7.2 million purchase proved, of course, to be a bonanza for the United States. The Russian side of the story is less well known. Late this summer, for the first time, Soviet, American, and Canadian scholars plan to meet in Sitka to discuss Alaska under the Tsars—in a conference that the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute has helped to organize. Among the participants will be historian James R. Gibson, who here describes both the 1867 land deal and the growth and decline of "Russian America."

by James R. Gibson

After dinner on Friday, March 29, 1867, Russia’s portly envoy to Washington, Edouard de Stoeckl, walked the few blocks from his quarters to the home of Secretary of State William Henry Seward. Interrupting a family card game, he informed Seward that His Majesty, Tsar Alexander II, had cabled his agreement to one of the biggest real estate sales in history. For 2¢ an acre the United States had acquired Russian Alaska—586,000 square miles, an area twice the size of Texas.

The 40th Congress was scheduled to adjourn at noon the following day. Seward, whom Henry Adams had once described as a "slouching slender figure" with "a head like a wise macaw... offhand manner... and perpetual cigar," was in a hurry. When Stoeckl suggested that they meet next morning to draw up the formal papers, the American asked, "Why wait until tomorrow, Mr. Stoeckl?"

The surprised Russian diplomat agreed to muster his legation and
When the 27-page treaty was actually signed, at four o'clock on Saturday morning, only a few Americans—President Andrew Johnson and his Cabinet—had any idea that a purchase of Alaska was being considered. Preoccupied with Congress' virulent attacks on his Southern Reconstruction policies, Johnson relied heavily on his Secretary of State in foreign affairs. As Seward told Stoeckl during negotiations, "the President was not inclined to the transaction," but he nonetheless went along with Seward's plan. Only Massachusetts' Senator Charles Sumner, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was immediately informed by Seward of the successful negotiations. It was the first he knew of the intended purchase. The secrecy surrounding the talks reflected both Seward's ego (Stoeckl believed the Secretary wanted total credit for the purchase) and the deteriorating relations between Congress and the administration.

When Johnson submitted the treaty for ratification on March 30, the response in the American press and on the Senate floor was immediate and harsh. Senator William Pitt Fessenden of Maine called the purchase "Seward's Farm," adding, "no country should be so prodded to live there." The New York World announced, "Russia has sold us a sucked orange."

Held over in executive session, the Senate reluctantly gave its approval on April 9. But the recalcitrant House of Representatives did not appropriate the $7.2 million purchase price (roughly 11 million rubles) until more than a year later.

**One Arm of a Pincer**

Why the United States bought Alaska and why Russia sold it are quite different questions. Historians have little trouble pinning down the American side of the story. In his three-hour pro-ratification speech to the Senate, Charles Sumner evoked the United States' desires to expand its commerce in the Far East ("further north, the harbors are abundant, and they are all nearer to the great marts of Japan and China"), to extend republican institutions ("by it we dismiss one more monarch from the continent"), to pre-empt any British purchase, and to cement U.S.-Russian friendship.

Above all, there was Secretary of State Seward's ambition to aggrandize his country and perhaps gain badly needed popular support for President Johnson. An ardent expansionist, Seward saw Alaska as one

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James R. Gibson, 44, is a professor in the Geography Department of York University, Downsview, Ontario. He was born in Chilliwack, British Columbia, and was graduated from the University of British Columbia in 1957. He received an M.A. from the University of Oregon (1959) and an M.S. (1962) and a Ph.D. (1967) from the University of Wisconsin. His books include Feeding the Russian Fur Trade: Provisionment of the Okhotsk Seaboard and the Kamchatka Peninsula (1639-1856) (1969) and Imperial Russia in Frontier America: The Changing Geography of Supply of Russian America, 1784-1867 (1976).
By 1867, Russia’s Pacific empire was more impressive on the map than in reality. The Russian colonists in Alaska numbered fewer than a thousand. Their satellite settlement at Ft. Ross in California had already been sold off.

The North Pacific, 1867

By 1867, Russia’s Pacific empire was more impressive on the map than in reality. The Russian colonists in Alaska numbered fewer than a thousand. Their satellite settlement at Ft. Ross in California had already been sold off.

The Russian side of the story is more complicated—affected by Tsarist disappointments and ambitions, financial ups-and-downs, and the changing balance of power in both Europe and Asia. To understand it all, one must go back 300 years before that impromptu predawn ceremony in Seward’s gas-lit office.

During the last half of the 16th century, the Tsars were barred from expansion across Europe by the Western powers and from access to the Mediterranean by Turkey. There

* Seward had made clear his vision as early as 1860. In a speech in St. Paul, Minnesota, he predicted U.S. dominion over all of North America, with island outposts in both oceans. There would be 60 states (already there were 33), and St. Paul would be the capital. All this, he said, would come to pass by 1960.

was only one way to go—east, across the Siberian wilderness, where backward and scattered natives offered only token resistance, while China and Japan remained isolationist. It was a period of exploration and exploitation by rough-and-ready promyshlenniki—Russia’s counterpart to America’s buckskin-clad frontiersmen. Siberian sable pelts brought good prices in Moscow and Western Europe.

The first Russian explorers reached the shore of the Okhotsk Sea between the Siberian mainland and the peninsula of Kamchatka, in 1639. Eight years later, a trading post was established, but little more. Only 20 huts and fewer than 100 Russians comprised the port of Okhotsk a century later.

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From Kamchatka, Vitus Bering, a Dane serving in the Tsarist navy, set
out with a crew of 77 men on the first leg of an imperial mission to explore the coast of North America in 1741.

Bering spotted the mainland of Alaska on July 16, 1741. But he never made it back to Russia to describe his find. In November, his ship, the St. Peter, homeward bound, was wrecked on the rocky shore of an uninhabited, treeless island in the Komandorskie chain, one hundred miles off Siberia. More than half the crew, including the 60-year-old Bering, fell victim to scurvy and the rigors of winter. The exhausted survivors finally reached the Siberian mainland in a make-shift boat in later summer of 1742; with them they brought Alaskan sea otter pelts five feet long and two feet wide.

That was all the encouragement the Russian promyshleniki needed. Following the same pattern they had established in Siberia—decimate the fur-bearing animals, then move east—Russian hunters advanced in hastily built ships from Kamchatka to the Komandorskie to the mist-shrouded Aleutians, then on to Kodiak Island and the Alaskan mainland. They slaughtered hundreds of Aleut natives as well as Alaskan sea otters.

**Russians in California**

The first permanent Russian colony in Alaska may not have been established until 1784, when Gregory Ivanovich Shelikhov, a Siberian merchant, found two partners and embarked from Okhotsk with 185 promyshleniki and his wife Natalia (the first white woman in Alaska). They settled on Kodiak Island at Three Saints Bay. For years Shelikhov sought legal standing for his colony in the Tsarist court, without success.

Finally in 1799, five years after Shelikhov's death, Tsar Paul I granted a royal charter to the Russian-American Company, an amalgam of Shelikhov's and other private ventures. The Tsar gave the company monopoly rights to Alaskan resources and trade as well as sole responsibility for the territory's management. Shelikhov's foreman Alexander Baranov, was named the company's first resident manager and Alaska's first governor.

Aided by Russian naval forces and Aleut hunters, Baranov defeated the Tlingit Indians of Sitka, an island off the coast of Alaska's temperate panhandle, and moved the colony's headquarters there in 1808.

A British seaman described Sitka (Baranov christened it New Archangel, but the name never took) when he visited it some six years later:

> There are blockhouses, and a town of about sixty houses, a church, ship-yard, etc., and about 100 Russians, chiefly convicts from Siberia. [The Russians] employ a great number of Kodiak and Oonalaska Indians to hunt the sea-otter and man their ships. . . . They have also several hostages from the tribe about the Sound. . . . [The Russians] live very comfortably, marrying the Kodiak and Oonalaska women, who are very industrious and make good wives. . . . The whole of the population of this establishment does not exceed 1,000 souls.1

Unhappy over the high cost of supply from Siberia, and wary of relying on American or British traders, Baranov decided that Russian America needed its own agricultural colony on the North American coast. The location he picked was 65 miles north of San Francisco in Spanish California. The Spaniards were dismayed by the prospect of a Russian outpost on their shores but lacked

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the force to prevent it.

The Russians constructed their new settlement high on an ocean-side cliff, allowing themselves little room to farm. It hardly mattered, because the 95 Russian fur-traders and 80 Aleuts dispatched there in 1812 knew little about farming. Fort Ross (after Ros, an old form of Russia) barely fed itself.

The Ups and Downs

Inevitably, as the Russian-American Company entered into increasing competition with foreign rivals, notably the Hudson's Bay Company of Britain, it came under greater state control. By 1819, following Baranov's retirement, a naval officer served as governor of Russian America, and the Tsar himself held shares, along with private stockholders. The company was, in the words of one officer, the government's "most loyal, reliable, and conscientious agent."

The heyday of the company's maritime fur trade was the period of its first charter (1799–1819), when sea otters and fur seals were still plentiful. Thereafter, fewer pelts, higher wages, and stiffer competition from British posts on the coast combined to lower profits. Fur exports from Russian America totaled 1,550,000 skins during the period of the first charter and only 900,000 during the second (1820–40).

By the mid-1850s, the company was paying as much attention to fishing, lumbering, ice cutting, coal mining (all for export to the growing markets of California and Hawaii), whaling, and the China tea trade (from Shanghai into Russia) as it was to its fur trade.

By then, even the fur business showed signs of recovery. Thanks to strict conservation measures begun in the early 1830s, the sea otter, fur seal, and fox populations along the Alaskan coast were making a comeback.

This is not to say that Russian America in the 1850s was enjoying a boom, especially by comparison with the rest of the Pacific coast of North America (the California Gold Rush had begun in 1848). Nevertheless, Alaska still showed a profit. The Russian population remained small but stable (around 600), and the Aleut population increased slightly.

It was not until the middle 1860s that serious financial difficulties

This native Aleut woman was sketched around 1816. Her hair is tied in traditional Aleut fashion, but her dress is Russian and she wears a crucifix.

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Sitka, circa 1860. The steeple at left marks the native Orthodox church; the onion-shaped steeple at center belongs to the Russian Orthodox church. A stockade separated the native Tlingits from the Russian part of town. The large building on the hill at right is the Governor’s House.

arose in Alaska, and these were generated artificially.

When the company’s third charter expired at the end of 1861, Tsar Alexander II seemed reluctant to approve a fourth. Instead, he sent two inspectors to tour the colony. Upon their return to St. Petersburg, the imperial agents submitted their findings to a review committee composed of civil servants, stockholders, and scientists.

Bankrupt

In 1864, the committee issued a lengthy verdict. Noting that the colony had not been fully developed in the hands of the Russian-American Company, the committee recommended that the Alaska franchise be renewed for another 20 years but that the company’s monopoly be limited to the fur trade (no longer the company’s main source of income).

A general meeting of stockholders—the company’s last—rejected the new terms, and the company’s future remained in limbo. The company was unable to pay dividends in 1862 and 1863, and the value of its shares plummeted.

By 1866, the company was receiving direct and indirect subsidies from the Tsarist government to the tune of $132,000 (200,000 rubles) annually, which represented more than a quarter of the company’s income. The firm was $666,000 in debt, most of it owed to the imperial treasury. Unquestionably, the Russian-American Company was on the verge of bankruptcy.

Why did the Tsar balk at the prospect of a fourth charter? The reasons had less to do with Alaska’s financial status than with its strategic and political prospects.

In terms of security, the territory was vulnerable. Its settlements had always been undermanned and undersupplied; the colonists sometimes had difficulty keeping resentful natives at bay. Tlingit Indians attacked Sitka as late as 1855.

Even more troublesome were American “filibusters”—freewheel-
ing Yankee traders from as far away as Boston who aggressively and often clandestinely trafficked with Russians and Indians alike throughout the colony. Offering provisions, firearms, and spirits in exchange for Alaskan furs, these exemplars of the American entrepreneurial spirit had little respect for Tsarist authority. Nor did they get much in the way of reproaches from faraway Washington. In 1860, Stoeckl reported the official U.S. position to St. Petersburg: "It is up to us to take the necessary precautions against these marauders. . . . The United States cannot undertake surveillance of our shores."

The Tsar’s government could do little but complain. Its Navy was not strong enough to patrol effectively all of the offshore waters of its far-flung empire.

The political outlook was even dimmer. As far as the Tsar was concerned, Alaska was no longer serving its chief purpose, namely, to further Russian imperialist expansion.

The 1840s saw the United States acquire the lower Columbia River region (present-day Washington, Oregon, and Idaho) in 1846 and upper California in 1848; British settlement created the crown colonies of Vancouver Island in 1849 and British Columbia in 1858.

Clearly, no further opportunities remained for Russia in this area; indeed, it seemed that Russia would be fortunate to retain Alaska.

Scattered, small gold deposits had been discovered in Alaska by the Russians. Once the word got out, the Tsar’s adviser’s feared, it might spark an uncontrollable California-style gold rush, flood the territory with Americans, and bring an abrupt, embarrassing end to the Russian-American Company’s rule.

**Gold Trouble**

Russian officials were well aware that the Fraser River gold strike of 1858 had compelled the British government to take over the Hudson’s Bay Company’s control of British Columbia. Within weeks of the Fraser strike, as many as 5,000 American goldseekers had flocked to the region, threatening even to wrest the colony from Britain.

Ambassador Stoeckl warned Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov of Russian America’s precarious position vis-a-vis U.S. adventurers in 1867: “In their eyes this continent is their patrimony. It was they who little by little overran Texas, which later became a state of the union. New Mexico and some other parts of the south have been acquired in the same way.”

In the eyes of the Tsar, the Crimean War (1853–56) and events in Asia underlined the indefensibility of Russian America and sealed its fate.

In the fall of 1853, Russian skirmishes with the Turks in the Balkans escalated, and France and Britain were poised to enter on the side of the Turks. St. Petersburg realized that Russia’s possessions on both sides of the North Pacific, especially on the more distant eastern side, lay hopelessly exposed. Sitka, for instance, was there for the taking: a few soldiers stood guard in a wooden stockade designed as a defense against Indians, not against superior British and French sea power.

The Crimean War never spread to North America, but the Russians had seen the light.

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*Russia had long since given up hope of expanding its feeble beachhead at Fort Ross. The Russian-American Company sold the enclave to John Sutter, of later Gold Rush fame, for $30,000 in 1841, nine years before California became the 31st state.*
Moreover, Russia’s humiliating defeat by the British and French in the Crimean conflict called for a shift in strategy. Ended was Russia’s dominant role in southeastern Europe, where the Tsars had long sought to control navigation between the Black and Mediterranean Seas. With U.S. expansion in North America apparently irresistible, that left Russia’s frontier across the waist of Asia as the only arena of promising imperialist opportunities.

**Looking Toward Amuria**

The area Russia most coveted was the Amur River Valley in northeastern China. Russian hunters had first heard of the grain harvests and furs of the Amur Valley in the mid-17th century. The Amur River represented an easy access route from the heart of Siberia to the untapped markets of the Orient.

Towards the end of the 18th century, Russia had tried to annex “Amuria” but had been repulsed by China’s powerful Manchu emperors. By the middle of the 19th century, Manchu power had waned in the face of foreign (mainly British) intervention and internal turmoil, and China lay open to easy exploitation.

Russia was determined to share in the spoils.

To avoid alarming French and British rivals, Russian expansion in the Far East was directed through the Russian-American Company. In effect, the company masqueraded as a private concern to camouflage state aims. Beginning in 1851, under the forceful direction of Governor-General Nicholas Muravyov of Eastern Siberia, the company helped to explore and settle the Amur Valley.

Here, in what later became known as the Maritime Territory, lay, in the opinion of Russian statesmen, the empire’s Pacific future. Grand Duke Constantine, the Tsar’s younger brother and head of the Naval Ministry, agreed. In early 1867, he said of Russian America: “It is urgent to abandon it by ceding it to the United States and to render all of the Government’s solicitude to our Amurian possessions, which form an integral part of the empire and which by all accounts offer more resources than the northerly shores of our American possession.”

As Charles Sumner later told the U.S. Senate during the debate on ratification of the Alaska purchase, Russia “wished to strip herself of all outlying possessions as Napoleon had stripped himself of Louisiana [in 1803] in order to gather her strength for her struggle with England for the control of Asia.” All that was needed was a buyer for the company’s territory. The two most obvious customers were the United States and Great Britain. Although Britain would probably have paid as much or more than the United States, the latter was the politically logical choice.

For one thing, Russia and the United States were on friendly terms. Despite the American free-booters in the North Pacific, there had been little serious friction between the two countries. As Tsar Alexander II put it in 1866, “the Russian and American peoples have no injuries to forget or to remember.”

*The oft-heard argument that Russia sold Alaska to replenish its treasury after the Crimean War is erroneous. In 1866, Baron Osten-Saken, an official in the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry, pointed out in a memorandum on the proposed sale of Alaska that “even a few tens of millions of rubles will hardly be of any state importance in an empire which has about half a billion of annual income and expenditure and more than one and a half billion of debts.”*
Moreover, they shared a common antipathy toward Britain. Indeed, the United States had sympathized with Russia during the Crimean War. U.S.-British relations deteriorated further during the American Civil War (1861–65), when Britain remained "suspiciously neutral" and continued to trade with the rebellious Southern states. And Britain had long made clear its hostility to American expansion in the Pacific Northwest.

Russia needed a close ally to help press for a revision of the Treaty of Paris (1856), which had sealed its ignominious defeat in the Crimea by stripping it of part of Bessarabia, depriving it of its claim to protection of the Orthodox Christians of Turkey, and neutralizing the Black Sea. The United States was seen as that ally. Furthermore, cession of Alaska to the United States would undermine British power in North America and might even provoke a clash between Britain and the United States.

To sell Russia's only overseas colony to Washington, then, was primarily a political/strategic decision, not an economic one. The official decision to sell began to be formulated as early as 1857, when Grand Duke Constantine, Russia's most ardent proponent of cession, first proposed the idea to Foreign Minister Gorchakov.

That year, Ambassador Stoeckl was instructed to discreetly sound out American officials on the subject. President James Buchanan seemed to favor a deal, but then Russia de-
cided "to postpone this matter until a more favorable time." Foreign Min-
ister Gorchakov feared that a quick sale to America would overly inflame Britain so soon after the Crimean War.

A time more favorable for the Russians was the close of 1861, when the company's third charter expired. The Civil War intervened, and Washington was gravely preoccupied with the preservation of the Union."

Finally, after the Civil War, in 1866, Stoeckl was called home and instructed to arrange the sale of Alaska to the United States. Probably in order to save face, the Tsarist government insisted that the negotiations be conducted in such a way as to make it appear that the United States had taken the initiative.

Seward gladly complied. That way, he could confine the discussion to a few administration officials during negotiations, and then present Congress with a fait accompli.

On March 14, 1867, he offered Stoeckl $5 million for Russia's North American territory. (Unbeknownst to Seward, Russia had already settled upon this sum as its minimum acceptable price.) Stoeckl said nothing. "And we might even go to $5,500,000, but no more," Seward continued. The Secretary of State had betrayed his eagerness by upping his own bid. A shrewd negotiator, Stoeckl held out for the final figure of $7.2 million. From start to finish, the discussions lasted less than three weeks.

On October 18, 1867, a company of U.S. soldiers and Russia's tiny Alaskan garrison gathered at Sitka for the official transfer of power. As cannons saluted, the Russian imperial flag came down; the U.S. Stars and Stripes went up. Later that fall, perhaps to commemorate this occasion of Russian-American friendship, two Sitka cross-streets were named Russia and America.

Seward's vision of a United States stretching from the Equator to the North Pole never came to pass. And any hopes he had of boosting Andrew Johnson's popularity through the Alaskan purchase were unfounded. Still, in 1870, when asked by a friend to name his greatest accomplish-
ment, Seward, former New York Governor, Senator, and Secretary of State, replied defiantly: "The pur-
chase of Alaska! But it will take the people a generation to find that out."

As for the Russians, they withdrew from the Western Hemisphere to consolidate their new position in Asia at the expense of the Chinese. The shift had one far-reaching and long-lasting consequence—namely, China's hostility toward Russia.

Any regrets they may have had over selling their North American property the Russians kept to themselves. In January 1974, as Americans lamented the low prices paid by the Soviet Union for U.S. wheat, Vladimir S. Alkimov, a Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, had this reply: "Look at Alaska, which we sold you for $7 million back in 1867. That was cheap, too, but you don't hear us complaining."

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*The Civil War worried Russia. Stoeckl warned Gorchakov that "the disintegration of the United States as a power is a deplorable event. The American confederation has been a counterweight to English might... an element in the worldwide balance of power."*
COMMENTARY

The Pentagon’s civilian and military leadership have backed away from politically sensitive solutions. Only pallid steps have been taken, such as experimenting on a very limited scale with direct enlistments into the IRR, which now draws its strength only from people who have finished their active duty hitches and who have some military obligation time remaining. This problem will not be solved by bonuses or other enticements. Ultimately, the draft may be the only answer.

Fred Hoffman
Military Correspondent, the Associated Press
Washington, D.C.

Forgetting the Humanist

As A. E. Dick Howard points out in “The Road from ’Brown’” [WQ, Spring 1979], there is a reliance by judges on social science data today. Meanwhile, the voice of the humanist is unfortunately almost inaudible. Surely it is a great irony that a subject natural to historians, ethicists, and philosophers has been taken up by social scientists and made to appear primarily, if not exclusively, a matter of numbers and statistics.

The Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education may itself be regarded as contributing to this state of affairs. The decision, unquestionably the right one, appeared to turn on findings supplied by social scientists. Yet it is highly doubtful that if pressed on the evidence (if shown data indicating that segregation did not generate “a feeling of inferiority”) the Court would have decided otherwise than it did. The Court knew that segregation by race was fundamentally wrong, yet it failed to adduce the clearest reason: that racial segregation contradicts the language of the Declaration of Independence—that “all men are created equal.”

What continues to be missing 25 years after Brown, not merely in the courts but also in the culture at large, is moral, philosophical, and historical thinking in the new debates over such conflicts regarding equality as apparent in Bakke and now Weber. If on Brown’s 50th anniversary, we would be closer to writing that “finis” Howard speaks of, we will need the perspectives of history, philosophy, and ethics to better comprehend the facts of the American experience on race and what it means for all men to be equal.

Terry Enslow, Editorial Page Editor
The Greensboro (N.C.) Record

A Nation of Bedouins?

Is the society of Saudi Arabia basically Bedouin? ["Saudi Arabia," WQ, Winter 1979] The Western stereotype of the Arab wearing sandals and riding a camel would suggest that the answer is yes. History and the current scene, however, clearly demonstrate that the answer is no.

Long before the advent of Islam in the 7th Christian century, towns flourished on the Arabian Peninsula in oases and as way stations on caravan routes. The Prophet Muhammad was himself a citizen of Mecca, a mercantile center. Islam came out of a town, not out of the desert.

The members of the House of Saud were townsmen who had settled in Diriya about three centuries before Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab transferred the headquarters of his reform movement there in 1744. The reformer himself was a townman, and the most ardent and vigorous supporters of his movement in the early days were from the town of Najd. The Bedouin tribes in general were too mercurial and inconstant for full reliance to be placed on them.

The late King Ibn Saud liked to say, “I am a Bedouin," but he was not. Born and raised in the town of Riyadh, he had spent time with Bedouins in the desert and learned their ways, but that did not make him truly one of them.

Today King Khalid and all the ministers, provincial governors, and religious leaders are townsmen, just as their antecedents were for centuries. Many are keenly appreciative of the attractive virtues of their ancient Bedouin heritage and many resort to the nearby deserts for recreation, but this does not qualify them as genuine Bedouins. Though accurate
statistics are not available, it is clear that townsmen in the kingdom far outnumber the Bedouins, many of whom are now settling down and giving up their old nomadic roaming.

George Rentz, Visiting Scholar
School of Advanced International Studies
The Johns Hopkins University

The Technical Side of Oil Production

Despite the emergence of Saudi Arabia as a key element in the world energy calculus, perceptive and accurate descriptions of the Saudi petroleum situation are generally lacking.

David Long's article ("Saudi Oil Policy," WQ, Winter 1979) provides some useful insights into the development and manifestation of Saudi oil policy but is marred by some flaws that prove distracting to readers with some knowledge of the subject. The most significant of these are encountered in his discussion of the Ghawar [oil] field.

Long refers to problems that if unsolved could lead to a permanent loss of recoverable reserves. For example, he states that "salt has begun to encroach on some of the oil reservoirs, and there has been a drop in the natural pressure which forces oil to the surface." These two points have an element of truth, but taken out of context they lead to an erroneous conclusion.

With regard to encroaching salt, Ghawar is basically a water-driven field. As oil is withdrawn from the interstices of the reservoir rock, salt water moves in behind it. There is nothing evil about this; that's just the way God made water-driven fields, which are very common oil-producing formations. This situation (it shouldn't be called a problem since it can be anticipated and dealt with) is normally handled in two ways. Wells are drilled toward the interior of the field away from the encroaching water, or de-salting units are installed to reduce the salt content of the crude oil to an acceptable level. The wells referred to by Mr. Long have been shut in, not to combat salt encroachment, as he suggests, but because wet oil handling facilities are not yet in place.

As for the second point, reservoir pressure declines are normal as crude oil is produced. Aramco, like most other oil producers, utilizes gas and water injection to maintain reservoir pressures at technically sound levels. Current reservoir pressure is generally at a very acceptable level, and there is every indication that the recovery of oil in place will be excellent.

The behavior of the Ghawar field is not the critical factor in projecting Saudi Arabia's future production capacity. More important factors are the amount of known reserves and the length of time over which the Saudis wish to recover these reserves.

Long's article in its policy conclusions is basically sound. However, the article would have been considerably improved by omission of the technical discussion.

James V. Knight, Vice President
Arabian American Oil Company

David Long replies:

I address two aspects of Mr. Knight's comments, one semantic and the other more substantive. The semantic point concerns my use of the word "problem" in discussing salt encroachment and water injection. I agree with him that there is nothing evil about those developments. I still consider them problems, however, in that they do require policy attention.

The substantive point concerns his view that the article would have been considerably improved by omission of technical discussion. I disagree. Technical constraints on oil production are as important in the determination of Saudi oil policy as economic and political considerations.
CURRENT FELLOWS

MICHAEL L. BENEDICT, Associate Professor of History, Ohio State University

GEOFFREY F. A. BEST, Professor of History, School of European Studies, University of Sussex

DANIEL R. BOTKIN, Associate Scientist, Ecosystems Center, Marine Biological Laboratory, Woods Hole

LOURDES CASAL, Assistant Professor of Psychology, Rutgers University

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