The New Deal Reconsidered
Troubles in the Caribbean
by Abraham Lowenthal
Nathaniel Hawthorne
Mathematics, 1982
Czech Tales
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SPRING 1982
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This year, Americans have been marking in various ways the 100th anniversary of Franklin D. Roosevelt's birth. Perhaps the best intimate portrait of the man comes in retired columnist Joseph Alsop's *FDR: A Centenary Remembrance*. "Even more than the feeling that there were [then] giants in the land," he writes, "I now feel nostalgia for the absolute confidence in the American future which was the necessary foundation of [FDR's] total absence of doubt... Somehow his mind formed the minds of the overwhelming majority of other Americans who watched him in action in those years of hope."

The birthday celebration coincides with the 50th anniversary of FDR's first campaign for the Presidency, which led, as the Great Depression deepened, to the New Deal. This spring, the New Deal has been the subject of renewed discussions among historians and old New Dealers in meetings at the Wilson Center and other scholarly institutions.

Many questions still stir debate. Did the New Deal, as some critics claim, miss an opportunity to make America a more egalitarian society? Were New Deal policies as popular as the President who shaped them? Even as Roosevelt gave unions, farmers, and minorities a stronger voice in U.S. politics, did he not help create a new set of powerful lobbies in Washington that plagued his successors?

In this issue of WQ, our contributors raise these questions and others as they examine three aspects of the New Deal: its ideological antecedents, Roosevelt's economic policies, and his impact on his successors in the White House.

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SPRING 1982

page  1 Editor's Comment

11 PERIODICALS

44 Research Reports

THE NEW DEAL

50 Prelude
  by Alan Brinkley

62 The New Deal Reconsidered
  by Bradford A. Lee

77 The Legacy of FDR
  by William E. Leuchtenburg

Background Books

98 MATHEMATICS: Monsters and Manifolds
  by Rick Norwood

112 THE CARIBBEAN
  by Abraham F. Lowenthal

142 Background Books

146 CURRENT BOOKS

REFLECTIONS

162 Hawthorne's Divided Genius
  by James R. Mellow

PERSPECTIVES

174 The Comic Tales of Jaroslav Hasek

184 Commentary
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Who is chiefly responsible for American foreign policy: The Executive? The Congress? Or are they equal partners?

The issue has bedeviled the Republic since its founding, writes Tower, a Republican Senator from Texas, but the first significant congressional challenge to a President's conduct of foreign affairs was the Senate's rejection of Woodrow Wilson's Versailles Treaty in 1920. For two decades thereafter, the legislature flexed its muscle. Franklin Roosevelt regained the upper hand after Pearl Harbor. His successors managed Cold War diplomacy with "bipartisan support"—often meaning, in effect, acquiescence on the Hill. But, Tower observes, congressional disenchantment with the Vietnam War altered the balance once again.

Since 1970, Congress has enacted more than 150 measures to restrict the President's authority in such areas as troop deployment, arms sales, foreign aid, and intelligence gathering. Some prohibitions were confined to specific locales: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Angola. Many have been sweeping. The Nelson-Bingham Amendments (beginning in 1974), for example, gave Congress a veto over most arms sales. The bitter and protracted public disputes that ensued between the White House and Capitol Hill—over arms for Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia—raised allies' doubts as to U.S. reliability, Tower contends.

How, ideally, should foreign policy be conducted? The Constitution, writes Tower, provides "no unambiguous guidance." The document
merely names the President as Commander in Chief and gives the Senate power to declare war and ratify treaties. Yet, Tower notes, a presumption of presidential prerogative has existed since the days of John Jay (writing in *Federalist 64*) and Chief Justice John Marshall. "The President," Marshall stated in 1806, "is the sole organ of the nation's external relations." Congress lacks the necessary staff, information, and instinct for diplomacy. Its 535 members are buffeted continually by parochial political concerns. In 1981, Tower recalls, House Whip Dan Rostenkowski (D-III.) admitted to voting against the sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia not on the proposal's merits but because of the political sentiment in his home district.

Domestic policy may benefit from horse-trading, but diplomacy should be made of sterner stuff. Foreign policy is a chess game, Tower concludes dryly, and "chess is not a team sport."

**Suburban Victories**


Since its famous 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, the Supreme Court has dealt sternly with communities that practice racial discrimination. But Johnston, professor of geography at the University of Sheffield (United Kingdom), argues that the Court has failed to attack laws that allow suburban communities to exclude the poor and, sometimes, even the middle class.

Because suburban communities can incorporate as separate municipalities, they can escape paying the costs of education and other services elsewhere in the area. They are also free to practice "exclusionary zoning," which allows them to set housing standards (minimum lot sizes, limitations on the construction of apartments) so high that all but the affluent are priced out of the market. Thus, the 279 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas identified by the Census Bureau in 1977 contained 6,444 separate municipalities, and over half of these had fewer than 2,500 residents. There were 5,220 independent school districts within the 279 metropolitan areas, only 1,213 of which operated 10 or more schools.

In *San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez* (1973), the Court ruled that states did not have to equalize the amount spent per pupil in different school districts. The Court has also refused to restrict suburban zoning powers. In *Warth v. Seldin* (1975), it held that a Rochester, N.Y., suburb could not be sued for zoning rules that effectively excluded the poor, because it was "the economics of the housing market, not respondents' assertedly illegal acts," that were at issue.

Johnston notes that individual states have applied some remedies. About half have programs that aim (with mixed success) to equalize...
spending per pupil in their school districts. A few, notably New Jersey, have limited exclusionary zoning power. But state legislatures, in general, are not likely to be aggressive in enacting such changes. The reason: As a result of the Supreme Court’s “one man, one vote” decisions during the 1960s, requiring that seats be apportioned according to population, suburban representatives are now in the majority in many of these legislatures.

Rush to Judgment

“The Abuse of Science in Public Policy”  

The Food and Drug Administration’s attempts to ban nitrites and saccharin, its successful campaigns against cyclamates and herbicide 2,4,5-T, and the 1980 evacuation (on orders from President Jimmy Carter) of 710 families living near a chemical dump in the Love Canal section of Niagara Falls, N.Y.—all have one thing in common. In each case, writes Havender, a biochemist at the University of California,

In all, 82 chemicals were found seeping from the ground near the Love Canal in Niagara Falls, N.Y. Reports of chronic illness, birth defects, and misshapen chromosomes prompted Washington to declare it a federal emergency area, evacuating families in 1978 and 1980. Yet, from the beginning, scientists questioned their colleagues’ data.
Berkeley, the federal government intervened on the basis of "tentative and uncorroborated" scientific findings that failed to stand up to subsequent scrutiny.

A "guilty until proven innocent" mode of regulation, Havender contends, is the product of a naive faith in science that reached its peak among U.S. academics during the 1960s, filtering "upwards" to bureaucrats, politicians, and the press. The result: some misguided prophylactic legislation, often backed up by overly fastidious regulation, in such areas as job safety, toxic waste, air and water pollution.

Thus, the Delaney Amendment (1958) banned any food additive found to cause cancer in any animal in a single study, despite scientists' own ingrained wariness and their emphasis on duplicatable results. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, overwhelmed by its responsibility for evaluating thousands of new chemicals, has drawn up "generic" guidelines that provide answers in advance to thorny questions (for example, should benign as well as malignant tumors be counted in determining carcinogens?) over which scientists heatedly disagree.

The costs of the present system, Havender argues, include the money spent by Washington in making, litigating, and enforcing its decisions; reduced productivity in industry; unemployment. Moreover, excessive regulation has hurt both science and the taxpayer: The heavy expense of developing a new drug (or pesticide) can now be recouped only if the new chemical solves a widespread problem markedly better than anything else does. Small advances and treatments for rare diseases do not pay for themselves and are apt to come less frequently.

It is time to shift the burden of proof, Havender concludes, away from claims built on "gossamer and opportunism" and "back toward proving harm."

The 'Movement' Reconsidered

The so-called "Movement" of the 1960s, a heterogeneous mixture of Left politics and youth "counterculture," failed to live up to the high hopes of its various spokesmen and academic sympathizers. Social inequities were not eliminated, and the core of American values—individualism, competition, the work ethic—survived, shaken but intact. Yet, according to Cleck, a social scientist at the University of California, the legacy of the Movement is "powerful, complex, largely salutary—and probably enduring."

The Old Left began dying in the '40s, a victim of right-wing harassment and ideological exhaustion. Yet even during the prosperity and tranquility of the Eisenhower-Kennedy years, a breed of young college-educated radicals was in the making, inspired as much by beat-
Periodicals

Politics & Government

Nik attitudes and styles as by early struggles to end racial segregation in the South. Mostly children of affluence, these unlikely rebels saw links between their personal troubles (a nagging sense of meaninglessness, disenchantment with materialism) and larger public issues. Indeed, it was this merger of private and public concerns that gave the youthful Movement its vitality and broad appeal, even before the Vietnam draft loomed up as a focus for campus protest.

Why did such a lively social phenomenon fade by 1973? Certainly its many spokesmen lacked a clear, consistent ideology. Its strongest original elements—the white Students for a Democratic Society and the black Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee—were eclipsed as the Movement expanded. The fusion of communitarian visions and "revolutionary" politics, which seemed to unite Maoists and hippies, white radicals and Black Panthers, was fragile; the violence of extremists (such as the Weathermen) and external events (the "winding down" of the war) led to the Movement's decline.

The irony, writes Cleck, was that the initial ideological fuzziness of the Movement enabled it to gather wide campus support. But as anti-war protest mounted, self-styled "New Left" leaders spouting Marxist rhetoric alienated more moderate "fellow travellers."

The Movement's anti-establishment spirit lives on, most obviously in some liberal single-issue advocacy groups—environmentalists, pacifists, feminists. But a continuing search among adults for individual self-fulfillment, accompanied by a distrust of doctrinaire politics, may be the more lasting legacy.

Foreign Policy & Defense

'MAD' Was Not so Bad


Until 1980, American nuclear strategy stressed "massive retaliation" against Soviet cities in the event of a Soviet attack on this country or its European allies. The prospect of "mutual assured destruction" (MAD), it was believed, would make starting a nuclear conflict unthinkable for either side. But, in July 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed Presidential Directive 59, adopting a "countervailing" strategy that called for a graduated U.S. nuclear response to Soviet aggression; its principal targets are Soviet missile silos. Beres, a professor at Purdue, writes that this directive, which still represents U.S. policy, "can only hasten the
eventuality of a desolated planet.”

Moscow has nothing to gain by launching the limited nuclear attack anticipated by U.S. strategists, Beres argues. Moreover, even a limited strike would leave some 18 million Americans dead, so the Soviets have no reason to believe Washington would restrain itself in case of such an attack. Finally, the Soviets themselves reject the notion of a limited nuclear war—they would not play by the rules.

Indeed, the American strategy is likely to be a temptation to the Soviets. “Used in retaliation,” Beres notes, “counterforce-targeted warheads would only hit empty silos.” The Soviets suspect that the United States has really targeted their silos in preparation to strike first; thus, they have grounds for launching their own missiles early in a crisis. On the U.S. side, the new strategy “contributes to the dangerous notion that nuclear war might somehow be endured or even ‘won.’” Beres notes that Moscow targets American silos and continues to improve its ability to knock out U.S. bombers and submarines. But that, he says, is no reason for Washington to follow suit.

To avoid nuclear war, Beres believes, the two superpowers should return to “minimum deterrence.” They should begin negotiations on a new SALT accord and adopt a comprehensive test ban. The United States should build up its conventional forces to raise the threshold at which a nuclear response seems necessary.

Finally, America must unilaterally pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for a nonnuclear attack. Only then, Beres writes, “can the United States hope for a reduction in Soviet conventional and theater nuclear forces and for a reciprocal abandonment of the first-use option by the Soviet Union.”

Curbing the Arms Trade


In 1977, President Jimmy Carter, alarmed at the growth of the international arms trade (then approaching $20 billion annually), imposed an $8.6 billion ceiling on U.S. sales of conventional arms to the Third World and attempted to negotiate a multinational agreement limiting the trade. The effort failed, but it provided some valuable lessons.

The Soviet-American Conventional Arms Transfer talks (CAFT) opened in December 1977. (France, West Germany, and Britain had insisted upon a Washington-Moscow agreement before they would discuss their own sales.) Salomon, assistant dean at Carnegie-Mellon University, and Louscher and Hammond, professors at the universities of Akron and Pittsburgh, respectively, observe that Carter’s unilateral
restraint gave the Soviets little incentive to negotiate. The Carter administration, meanwhile, gradually came to realize that the comprehensive, region-by-region agreement that it had envisioned would require it to cut back on military aid to valued allies, such as the Shah's strife-torn Iran, without requiring an equal sacrifice from Moscow. When, in December 1978, the American negotiators tried to limit the regions under discussion to black Africa and Latin America, the Soviets broke off the talks.

With better planning and a focus on types of weapons rather than regions, the authors say, the imbroglio might have been avoided. But Washington's biggest mistake, they maintain, was failing to get an agreement from its European allies before talking to the Soviets. It is not the volume of arms to the Third World that threatens Western interests; it is the competition among Western states to make sales.

The competition stems from the Europeans' need to sell arms to pay for oil imports and from America's domination of the NATO market—it sells 10 times as much to its NATO allies as it buys from them. To support its domestic arms industry, France exports 55 to 60 percent of the weapons it produces; Britain exports 35 percent. One result: The allies build less sophisticated weapons for the export market and then buy them for their own armed forces. This also hampers efforts to standardize NATO equipment. Some Western nations, particularly France, feel compelled to peddle arms even to countries that are unfriendly to the West. Our Third World allies pay high prices for arms from inefficient Western manufacturers and receive a hodgepodge of weapons that often are not compatible.
Future conventional arms limitation efforts should focus first on solving the problems within the NATO alliance and coordinating Western overseas arms sales policies, the authors argue. Only then will it make sense to talk to Moscow about limiting its sales of conventional arms.

"Machines, Men, and Warfare"

In the spring of 1943, Axis troops were dug into high ground near the North African city of Tunis. The American commander watched as a heavy artillery barrage smothered the enemy's emplacements, then turned to a war correspondent and said: "I'm letting the American taxpayer take this hill." Citing this incident, historian Allan Nevins later wrote that U.S. technological prowess in World War II had brought "not only speedier victory but victory purchased with fewer (American) lives."

Faith in a "technical solution" to the horrors of the battlefield now underlies much popular and professional thinking about U.S. military preparedness, writes Lieutenant Colonel Baucom, deputy director of research at the Airpower Research Institute. It helps to explain the Pentagon's increasing reliance on sophisticated matériel (e.g., precision-guided munitions, satellite telecommunications). Unfortunately, Baucom concludes, it also "diverges dangerously from the realities of modern war."

U.S. military men were once slow to adopt new technology. World War II changed that. Nazi Germany's Blitzkrieg, Japan's lightning air attack on Pearl Harbor, and the intensive Allied investment in military research and development that eventually turned the tide—all demonstrated the importance of technology in warfare.

But the lesson was learned too well. Many Americans came to believe that "we won World War II because of highly reliable M-4 tanks" and "overwhelming numbers of superb B-17s, B-24s, P-47s, and P-51s," not because of the brave who manned them. The increased prominence of technology did correlate with relatively low American casualties in the two World Wars (fewer than one percent of the U.S. population killed or wounded in each) but the U.S. experience was atypical. The United States entered both wars late and fought them abroad.

Thinking of war as a "great, big engineering project" is bad strategy and bad psychology: It undercuts the real importance of the "good, well-trained soldier" and obscures the inevitability of "human sacrifice." Vietnam was widely described as the technologically most advanced conflict in history. At the same time, Americans deemed "unacceptable" the loss of 55,000 lives over 10 years. Is this, Baucom asks, more than a coincidence?
As any executive realizes, it is difficult, if not impossible, to cut back on costs one does not know about. That, write Leonard and Rhyne, of Harvard and the Congressional Budget Office, respectively, is just the problem with the "shadow budget"—financial commitments made by the U.S. government but not listed in the federal budget.

A key part of the "shadow budget" is government credit. Most Americans are aware of the Chrysler Corporation's federal loan guarantee and of the federal guarantee of New York City's debt. But few realize that federal credit in 1980 exceeded $100 billion—much of this not recorded in the federal budget. "Off-budget" federal credit takes four forms: direct loans (such as the $1.2 billion extended by the Rural Electrification Program), loan guarantees (including those offered by the Export-Import Bank), lending by government-sponsored enterprises (e.g., the privately owned but federally chartered Federal National Mortgage Association), and tax exemptions for interest paid on state and municipal bonds.

Federal credit in fiscal 1980 was more than six times what it was in 1971. Much of this "credit explosion" can be traced to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, when Congress carefully kept loan guarantees "uncontrolled" and neglected to prohibit off-budget loans.

In 1970, all direct federal loans appeared on the federal budget. Since then, on-budget loans have held steady, but off-budget lending and other types of federal credit not accounted for in the federal budget have mushroomed.

Adapted from: The Public Interest (Fall 1981).
Congress probably wanted to favor government loans over grants, say the authors, while at the same time keeping a back door open for unpunlized federal expenses. But it is likely, too, that Congress failed to grasp what the true costs of federal credit are. The federal budget is designed to record direct spending, not the extension of credit and such variables as interest rates, the risk of default, and, in the case of loan guarantees, eventual expiration.

Yet in the private sector, such calculations are routine. And therein, contend the authors, lies a possible solution. Instead of, say, directly providing loan guarantees, the government should buy loan guarantees from private loan-insurance companies. The purchase price would give legislators—and voters—unambiguous information about the true costs of federal credit, which, though subtle, are “extraordinarily high” and have an impact on the economy.

What Happened to Consumerism?

The middle-class consumer movement, so active during the 1960s and most of the ’70s, seems lately to be out of the news, pre-empted by such matters as defense, the economy, and events abroad. According to Bloom and Greyser, business professors at the University of Maryland and Harvard, respectively, the picture is more complicated: While some large, national consumer groups are beset by declining memberships, many local organizations are thriving. The “brand” of consumerism they offer accounts for the difference.

Early consumer organizations, led by well-known activists such as Ralph Nader and Betty Furness, pushed protective federal legislation. Feathers in their caps included the federal Truth in Packaging (1966), Truth in Lending (1968), and Consumer Product Safety (1972) acts. But, by the late ’70s, the public was beginning to have second thoughts about some of these efforts. Many did not want to be protected by mandatory automobile air bags and seatbelt interlock systems; many more looked askance at such consumerist causes as the Fight to Advance the Nation’s Sports (FANS), launched by Nader. Consumer groups’ tendency to paint business as a villain worked against them. And business began to fight back, with advocacy advertising as well as new consumer assistance offices. In 1978, Congress rejected a proposal to create a federal consumer protection agency, despite intensive consumer lobbying.

Yet such setbacks do not signal consumerism’s demise. A series of five opinion surveys taken between 1971 and 1979 show “no drastic shifts in consumer attitudes.” And a 1979 Union Carbide study indicates that most Americans favor “stricter health and safety regulations and [are]
concerned about the power of corporations.” If Americans seem to be giving up on the national organizations, many are turning to their local counterparts—to groups that stress personal services. These organizations’ offerings range from the “redress assistance” of local media “action lines” to the information pools and bargains of buyer co-ops.

In sum, say the authors, the American public is shifting from its past role as “cheering spectators” to participation on the community level.

Don’t Blame the Japanese


In 1976 and 1977, American steelmakers complained strongly about the “predatory dumping” of Japanese steel on the American market. Capitalizing on lower labor costs and friendly government subsidies, the Japanese were out to wreck the American steel industry by undercutting American prices—or so the charge went. Kawahito, a professor of economics at Middle Tennessee State University, argues that the competitive advantage of Japanese steel results not from unfair trade practices but from the Japanese ability to produce cheaper steel.

The story of how the Japanese acquired that ability is a miniaturized version of Japan’s struggle for postwar economic recovery. In 1956, before the United States became a net importer of steel, producing a ton of the metal cost the Japanese $8 more than it did the Americans. By 1960, the Japanese had reversed the situation and could make a ton for $32 less. By 1976, their cost advantage was $120.

The Japanese government was not responsible for the turnaround. (Indeed, Tokyo has actually hurt steelmakers with its pampering of farmers and support for the faltering coal-mining industry.) Japanese steelmakers became competitive by constantly monitoring technological innovations around the world and then adopting them. They were helped also by the declining relative costs of buying and delivering raw materials. This was not simple luck: During the 1950s and ’60s, Japanese steelmakers helped lower those costs by finding and exploiting overseas iron mines, joining in designing new bulk carriers, and constructing new steelworks along their seacoasts. And, true enough, low labor costs provided an additional boost: In 1976, the Japanese hourly labor cost was $5.25, less than half the U.S. figure of $12.14.

The U.S. steel industry is in for harder times, says Kawahito. Over the next few years, the newly industrializing nations, paying much the same prices for resources as the United States does, but far lower ones for labor, will rapidly expand their steelmaking capacity. American steelmakers will simply not be able to match their prices. Thus, he concludes, the best policy in the United States would be not to mount a
futile attempt at full-scale "revitalization" of steel but to plan for an "orderly contraction," scrapping outmoded plants while upgrading those that now are most competitive.

### SOCIETY

**Sports Fans in History**


Mindlessly partisan, doltishly passive, prone to abusiveness, drink, and riot—such has been the image of the sports fan for hundreds of years. Tertullian, the second-century Church Father, railed against the excesses of the Circus-goer. More recently, neo-Marxists have condemned Western spectator sports as a dehumanizing sop to worker discontent. Guttmann, a professor of American Studies at Amherst, looks at sports aficionados in history.

In the classical Greek city-state, participation in games was an expression of citizenship; and, as the skimpy seating in early stadia suggests, many of those who came to observe also came to play. Though the atmosphere was probably not "quietly literary," the games were still sedate enough to allow for the recitation of poetry. This began to change even before Roman influences contaminated the games, as professional athletes came to dominate Greek sports festivals. By the second century A.D., spectators had acquired a nasty reputation: "When

Set in countryside, 12th-century tournaments were mortal battles waged by unruly parties of knights. By the 16th century, weapons had been blunted and stands erected for the ladies.


The Wilson Quarterly: Spring 1982
they enter the stadium," wrote one Alexandrian, "it is as though they had found a cache of drugs."

Roman games differed in that slaves played and citizens watched. Clever politicians quickly learned to use chariot races and gladiatorial contests to curry popular favor; the Emperor Trajan, for instance, thrilled his subjects by pitting 10,000 beasts against the same number of gladiators. Often, though, the games were overshadowed by fierce feuding, drinking, courting, and rioting in the stands. Fans in Justinian's Constantinople burned down their wooden coliseum four times between 491 and 532 A.D.

Medieval spectators were far less unruly, perhaps because of the smaller scale of events and the narrower social gap between players and viewers. Tournaments of knights, beginning as wild and rough "mimic wars" in the 12th century, made few allowances for audiences. But as the melees were "tamed" into sport, stands and pavilions sprouted to accommodate lords and ladies, who themselves played a role in the pageantry. Lesser folk were usually well behaved.

Sports with few rules seem to inspire spectator violence, writes Guttman. As games become regulated, the mayhem in the stands subsides, too—so long as the spectators, like those at medieval tournaments, feel they are "tomorrow's participants." But when sports become so professionalized that the fans lack the experience—and the hope—of gaining the limelight, the rooters in the stands respond "less to the fine points ... and more to the thrills ... of physical violence."

Reading
Is Boring?

"Why Children Don't Like to Read" by Bruno Bettelheim and Karen Zelan, in The Atlantic Monthly (Nov. 1981), P.O. Box 2547, Boulder, Colo. 80322.

Recent research has suggested that a student's success or failure during the rest of his education is pretty well set by the end of the third grade. Falling SAT scores and the declining literacy in U.S. high school and college classrooms must be traced in large part to the poor quality of early schooling. Bettelheim, a psychoanalyst at the University of Chicago, and Zelan, a child psychologist in Houston, blame the elementary textbooks that are used to teach reading.

Reading primers have deteriorated steadily. In the 1920s, primers contained, on average, 645 new words; many today contain fewer than 200. Yet most first-graders already know 4,000 words without benefit of book-learning. Books that consist of words chosen because they are short or easy—-one widely circulating primer, for instance, uses "store man" in place of "salesman"—leave children feeling vaguely suspicious.

Publishers are not wholly to blame: School boards and superintendents, not children, buy textbooks. Consider one publisher's experience with an Illinois school system: His volume contained a story in which children bring home a balloon only to have a cat pounce on it and burst.
Outraged cat-lovers had the book withdrawn. The fruits of such education by consensus—"Nan had a pad. Nan had a tan pad. Dad ran. Dad ran to the pad."—are hardly the stuff of epics. Bored, children "read them with less facility," said the authors. "Publishers, in response, make the books even simpler."

Other attempts to spice up textbooks have, in fact, worked against reading. Some publishers have doubled the space devoted to illustrations, making the printed text even less appealing by comparison. Others emphasize play; in one well-known series, school does not even come up until the end of the second-grade reader, in a chapter entitled "Too Much Is Too Much of Anything."

The average European first-grader can read far more words than can his American counterpart. A look at one Swiss primer series suggests why. The books are filled with difficult words, familiar rhymes, poems and stories by famous German authors (past and present); often they deal with the critical events in a child's life—sickness or the birth of a sibling. In short, they do more than teach the cold mechanics of reading; they hint at the treasure to be found in the printed word.

**Teenage Suicide**


Within the past 10 years, the suicide rate of American teenagers has nearly doubled. Suicide is now the third leading cause of death among U.S. adolescents. Smith, an associate professor of education at SUNY-Buffalo, outlines current research on the problem.

In 1978, for boys age 15 to 24, the United States had the fifth highest suicide rate among the Western industrial nations—20 per 100,000—behind Switzerland, Austria, Canada, and Germany (in order of severity). Suicide is generally considered a white phenomenon. But there is a key difference between blacks and whites. Whereas white suicide tends to increase in later years (after age 45), blacks commit most suicides earlier in life (20 to 35). Blacks who survive a deprived youth, some researchers speculate, make compromises with life just as whites are beginning to feel its frustrations. Suicide among young U.S. blacks (15 to 24) is increasing, just as it is among young whites, but the rate for black youths remains substantially lower.

Regardless of race, however, adolescent males commit suicide at a rate four times higher than females. Smith suggests that society is more tolerant of female emotion and female failure.

Warning signs of suicide are generally clear: severe depression, excessive fear or uncertainty, social isolation. But causes cannot be so easily singled out. Most theories stem from the writings of Emile Durkheim, founder of the French school of sociology, and Sigmund Freud, founder of psychoanalysis. According to "Durkheim's Law," the likeli-
hood of suicide varies inversely with an individual’s degree of integration into state, church, or family. Individuals who have lost a loved one are especially prone. Freud, on the other hand, saw suicide as internalized revenge for perceived parental disfavor, “symbolic patricide.”

Among the writers cited by Smith, novelist Scott Spencer (Endless Love, 1979) believes society has lost its commitment to children. Today’s youth must compete with the “narcissistic lifestyles” of adults. Children sense they can no longer be “afforded” and, claims Spencer, in a final act of obedience, oblige their parents by killing themselves.

*Sociology*

In March 1981, actress Carol Burnett won a highly publicized $1.6 million libel suit against the weekly National Enquirer. Just five weeks earlier, a jury awarded a former Miss Wyoming, Kimerli Jayne Pring, $26.5 million in her libel suit against Penthouse magazine. (Both awards were later reduced by appeals courts.) Such cases draw headlines, but the fact is that very few libel suits against the media are successful.

Franklin, a Stanford law professor, looked at 291 libel suits (101 trial cases and 190 appeals) lodged against the media during 1977–80. Plaintiffs, he found, not only lost 75 percent of the time at the trial stage; they also lost 75 percent of their appeals. The media fared much better, securing reversals in half of their appeals. Juries were more likely than judges to find for the plaintiff. But only eight jury decisions favoring plaintiffs survived the higher courts. And only one jury case resulted in a final settlement as high as $75,000.

Who sues the media? Businessmen accounted for 19 percent of all suits, followed by professionals and government employees, both at 12 percent. Elected officials accounted for only eight percent of all cases, but they enjoyed an 18 percent success rate on appeals, the highest by far—perhaps, says Franklin, because they are more likely “to calculate the political and social implications of an unsuccessful suit.” Allegations of crime, moral failing, or incompetence were at issue in 80 percent of all cases. Against professionals and corporations, incompetence was the most frequent media charge; against politicians, it was crime. (With an elected official, notes Franklin, “a charge of incompetence is likely to be considered a political opinion.”)

Newspapers were sued far more often than any other branch of the
media. They were defendants in 62 percent of the cases; magazines accounted for 14 percent; TV stations or networks only 12 percent. Television and radio did not lose a single case—possibly, suggests Franklin, because of their "less detailed reporting."

Cases like Carol Burnett's and Miss Wyoming's may bring more big money settlements, Franklin concludes, but suing the media will probably remain an unrewarding exercise for most.

France’s Limited Free Press


Had French laws concerning the press been applied in the United States, the Watergate story, the Pentagon Papers, critical accounts of the Vietnam War, and most reports about Senator Edward Kennedy’s Chappaquiddick accident might never have appeared. So writes Eisendrath, communications professor at the University of Michigan.

There are 46 “exempted subjects” about which the French press is, by law, forbidden to report, on penalty of criminal prosecution, fines, prison terms, or seizure of the publication. These include any story that hurts military “effectiveness or morale,” “attacks the credit of the nation,” or “outrages public morals.” In 1980, the Palais de Justice slapped the editor of France’s leading newspaper, Le Monde, with a criminal summons. The reason? Le Monde had "cast discredit” on the courts by questioning the handling of charges that President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing had received diamonds from the Central African Republic’s former Emperor, Jean-Bedel Bokassa. “Offending” or “outraging” the President in type is illegal—and the truth, writes Eisendrath, “is no defense.” A story need only detract from “the respect due to the office and its incumbent.”

An “outraged” Charles de Gaulle sued journalists 350 times. Giscard never did so, but the law is still in effect. Similar statutes protect notables ranging from diplomats and mayors to university professors. When he took office in 1981, the current President, François Mitterand, pardoned all pending “misdemeanors of the press.” Obstacles to reporting on some topics are subtle, composed of “legal minefields” rather than blatant prohibitions. For example, unlike the United States, where “you can’t libel the dead,” France allows heirs of an injured party to sue. Damage to one’s “peace of mind” can be a sufficient claim. Such policies are perhaps considered justified by the $500 million in government subsidies that help sustain French publications. Funds are distributed without regard to a paper’s ideology.

America’s founders fashioned the First Amendment after an earlier French model. Yet, unlike the Americans, who held to the absolute principle of a free press, the French, says Eisendrath, used to monarchical discretion, chose to measure the role of a free press, case by case.
Looking for the Good Society

The early Greek philosophers openly debated what a society's goals should be. But since the time of Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), social theorists have repeatedly professed to pure objectivity. Their claims are misleading, contends Bellah, a Berkeley sociologist.

Machiavelli claimed he described how the world was, not how it should be. Yet beneath the seeming amorality of The Prince and the Discourses was an implied goal—the unification and independence of his native Italy. Machiavelli believed that the desire for strength and freedom from powers outside one's own nation was a "natural" human virtue. Another "objective" observer, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), maintained that the state should guarantee individual security and restrain man's innate "restlesse desire of Power after power"—this despite his contention that there is no point in discussing "the good society" since good is only a word for what one desires.

Hobbes was an early "social scientist," trying to apply the methods of biology and physics to the study of human behavior. Yet, even in the
natural sciences, as physicists are quick to point out, an experimenter has some effect on the system he examines. With social scientists clearly inside the subject they study, distance is impossible, says Bellah. Failure to recognize this produces incomplete theory. Thus, German economist Max Weber (1864–1920) claimed to pose scientific truths empty of "sacred values." Yet Weber's works betray a constant tension between his desire for brotherly love and his conviction that the quest for power impels human behavior.

Fortunately, says Bellah, some social scientists today are beginning to admit their ethical aims. In The Last Half-Century (1978), Chicago sociologist Morris Janowitz proposes a goal for his colleagues—helping individuals develop the self-control necessary for the survival of democracy. And German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, in Knowledge and Human Interests (1968), returns to the Aristotelian dilemma of what constitutes a "good society." It is this matter that "belongs at the head of our agenda," writes Bellah, "something social science for a long time has not wished to believe."

How Near Is God?


During the 1960s, "God is dead" became a major, and controversial, precept for many Christian theologians. Two decades later, leading Western and Third World theologians are proclaiming, a la Mark Twain, that such rumors were very much exaggerated. These scholars—e.g., Edward Schillebeeckx, Hans Küng, Karl Rahner—argue, however, that images of God must change substantially to fit shifting human needs. So writes Carr, a University of Chicago theologian.

For starters, Christians need to change their prime orientation from the past to the future. God, writes Schillebeeckx, is "the 'One who is to come'... who is our future." Faith is the trust that God is beginning to "change the course of history for the better." Theologians Schubert Ogden and David Tracy add that views of God as unchanging should be replaced by concepts of a dynamic force that not only affects but is affected by human struggles. The Creation event is a continuing process; "Creation out of nothing," says Langdon Gilkey, refers to God as the source of everything—from the universe's beginning to the end.

Redefining God has major political and economic implications. Feminist theologians such as Mary Daly and Naomi Goldenberg argue that traditional references to God as "He" and "Father" help legitimize oppressive patriarchal societies. In Latin America, liberation theologians such as Juan Segundo and Gustavo Gutierrez propose a partisan God, on the side of the powerless. Claims Gutierrez: "To know God is to do justice," not just through individual charity but by participating in liberation struggles. In more affluent Western Europe, Johannes Metz
African Gods and African gods

When North African Muslims first ventured into black West Africa around A.D. 1000, they were appalled that the natives seemed to worship many gods. About 500 years later, Christian explorers were similarly dismayed. Only in this century have anthropologists recognized the region’s long tradition of belief in a single Supreme Being, reports Ryan, who teaches religion at the University of Ghana.

Reverence for ancestral and animist spirits is common in West Africa. The Yoruba of southwestern Nigeria, for example, honor oriṣa—generally, the spirits of clan members’ earliest paternal ancestors. Each oriṣa created or now rules its own domain in nature (rivers, rocks, diseases)—at the bidding of the God, Olodumare. The indolent Olodumare is considered absolutely transcendent over the oriṣa as well as over humanity; he has no descendants and is honored with virtually no direct ritual worship. By contrast, the Akan tribes of southern Ghana worship a more activist Supreme God, Onyame, who created the world single-handedly. But they too venerate lesser, transcendent spirits, from whom they are descended.

Some Westerners have likened these spiritual hierarchies to the Semitic imagery of God and the angels, but Ryan finds this comparison simplistic. Unlike Jews and Christians, West Africans pray to the lesser spirits, largely because they believe that the Supreme Being pulled back from the affairs of the world after Creation, leaving his deputies in charge. (Akans hold that an old woman pounding mashed yams kept striking Onyame, symbolized by a nearby sky, until he withdrew from human reach.)

The West Africans probably have believed in one supreme God longer than Jews, Christians, and Muslims have, Ryan concludes. The Yoruba and Akans have always given one God prominence over lesser spirits. By contrast, some Biblical scholars cite Psalm 82 (which states that “God presides in the divine council, in the midst of the gods adjudi-

Remembered today for slumping world economies and higher oil prices, the 1970s were nonetheless boom years for dinosaur hunters, reports Olshevsky, a freelance science writer. During the decade, some 20 percent of the 300-odd known dinosaur genera were discovered. As a result, paleontologists are revising their views of the "terrible lizards" who ruled the Earth before suddenly vanishing 64 million years ago.

The title of "largest known land animal" has passed to *Ultrasaurus*, an 80-foot-long, 80-ton herbivore. *Ultrasaurus* was found in 1979 in the Morrison Formation that underlies much of the Western United States; its 40-foot neck would have allowed it to peek into a fifth-story window. And, in 1976, two Princeton paleontologists working in Montana came across what may have been a "dinosaur nursery." Inside a seven-foot-wide elliptic nest, they found cracked egg shells and the three-foot-long skeletons of 11 baby dinosaurs. An adult’s skull was uncovered 120 yards away. The young were too large to be hatchlings, and wear marks on their teeth indicate that they had been feeding on plants somehow procured beyond the nest. Later finds of similarly "supervised" adolescent populations have prompted scientists to dub this new species *Maiasaura* ("good mother lizard").

Meanwhile, in the Gobi Desert, scientists have dug up ancestors of North American dinosaurs. "No one knows exactly when or where the first dinosaurs appeared," notes Olshevsky, who puts the "rise of the reptiles" at the early Mesozoic era (ca. 225 to 180 million years ago). The Earth’s land area was then one supercontinent—Pangaea—which began to break up between 160 and 100 million years ago, isolating dinosaur herds and causing them to differentiate. Yet few early North American dinosaurs left descendants. Paleontologists now think that sometime during the Cretaceous period (135 to 75 million years ago), a "Mongol horde" of Asian dinosaurs invaded North America via the Bering Land Bridge and wiped out the natives.

Why did dinosaurs vanish? Paleontologists now think that dinosaur diversity gradually declined during the Cretaceous period. They question most catastrophe scenarios—e.g., that a meteor collision raised sun-blocking dust clouds, killing off the herbivores’ food. Yet, at some point, the pace of extinction dramatically quickened, for reasons dinosaur hunters cannot yet explain.
Einstein Was Right

An object 15,000 light-years from Earth has provided "the first strong evidence" for Albert Einstein's theory of gravity, a central component of his general theory of relativity. So report Weisberg and Taylor, physicists at Princeton, and Fowler, a physicist at Atmospheric and Environmental Research, Inc. of Cambridge, Mass.

Einstein (1879–1955) held not only that matter and energy are equivalent and that space and time are integrated; he also stated that gravity could occur as waves emanating at a finite speed from an accelerating mass, rather than as the pulling force that objects instantaneously exert on their neighbors, as Isaac Newton postulated in the 17th century. Yet gravity is too weak an agent for such waves to be directly observed by modern scientific instruments. (Einstein questioned whether the waves would ever be detected.) And most known stars and planets move too slowly to provide meaningful readings. In 1974, however, Taylor and one of his students found a perfect laboratory: a pulsar in the constellation Aquila.

Like the 329 other pulsars found since 1967, PSR 1913+16 is a tiny

Einstein predicted that an accelerating orbiting body would give off gravitational waves, which would cause its orbit to shrink. Above is pulsar PSR 1913+16's orbit every 50 million years from now. The pulsar will coalesce with its companion in 300 million years.
(12 to 19 miles in diameter) star made up of neutrons so densely packed that it outweighs the sun. Thought to be remnants of supernova explosions, pulsars emit directional radio beams that sweep the sky as they spin on their axes up to 30 times per second. Unlike most pulsars, however, PSR 1913+16 is a system containing two objects orbiting each other: a pulsar and a silent companion, probably another neutron star. Their orbital speeds (up to 250 miles per second) seem enough to produce powerful gravitational waves. Moreover, PSR 1913+16 is like an enormous clock: The arrival of its pulses at Earth varies precisely with its orbital position. By measuring the intervals, astronomers can discern the orbits and gauge the two bodies' gravitational effects with great accuracy.

Relativity predicts that gravitational waves thrown off as the two stars whirl in space should reduce the total amount of energy in the system. The authors reasoned that this loss would slow PSR 1913+16's orbital speed and gradually shrink both the size of its orbit and the time it takes to circle its companion. Indeed, after six years, the deviation was more than one second—almost precisely the rate predicted by relativity theory. The authors calculate that the pulsar's orbit shrinks 11.5 feet per year. Their experiment constitutes new evidence supporting relativity theory. But they may have gained practical benefits as well—by using Einstein's insights to map objects beyond the range of the strongest telescopes.


Linguists agree that present-day human speech serves many purposes, often simultaneously: to express emotion; to demand or deny; to keep the "channel of communication open"; to please the ear. Most linguists attribute to our early ancestors' speech only one function: relaying concrete information, using words as symbols. However, according to researcher Richman, humans had speech before they had words.

Richman bases his conclusion on sounds made by gelada monkeys, found in Western Africa. The geladas are the second most vocal of Old World primates (after man). They keep up a near constant chorus, inhaling and exhaling, varying long and short tones, and changing their pitch. Often two or more monkeys alternate cries in long, complex rhythmic sequences; soon other geladas pick up the pattern and chime in. According to Richman, these geladas are engaged in "contact-calling"—signaling their presence to establish, in effect, a "continuous index of...social solidarity." The predictability of a caller's rhythm and sound (his "syntax") is crucial, for that enables all members of the group to participate.

Intricate choral singing by present-day hunter-gatherer societies
PERIODICALS

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

(notably, African bushmen and Pygmies) suggests that humans created similar vocal ensembles for the same purpose even before they developed words. The complexity of their rhythmic syntaxes, made ever more complex by the need to keep everyone’s interest up, says Richman, produced modern language’s multifaceted structure. Without it, human speech might have followed another course: the continuous gradings of voice and meaning found among most primates.

In the wild, such grading has certain advantages. It allows primates to shift quickly among social functions: from threatening to soliciting to submitting. But the range is limited. Choral music, on the other hand, cultivated an appreciation of “discrete oppositions”—“upbeats versus downbeats, iambic versus trochee rhythms, tonic versus dominant tones,” which, when words were finally developed, gave human language its sophistication.

RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

Wind Farms and Windmills

Along with the Colt revolver, windmills played a big part in taming the arid American West. Some six million wind-powered water pumps dotted the American landscape at the end of the 19th century—before rural electrification cut short the windmill’s golden age. Now, windpower may be enlisted again, in the wake of oil price increases and predictions of energy shortages. Flavin, a researcher at Worldwatch Institute, surveys the current technology.

It takes an average wind speed of 12 miles per hour to generate electricity. Although a quarter of the continental United States could theoretically support wind turbines, the Solar Energy Research Institute estimates that 3.8 million rural homes and 370,000 farms are particularly good candidates for private generators. For them, a small three- to five-kilowatt generator should suffice (cost: $5,000–$20,000). The investment is eventually recovered, but battery storage can boost the cost per kilowatt-hour to roughly three times the rate charged by utilities for oil-generated electricity. The most sophisticated small turbines permit households to use a utility’s electricity on calm days and send wind-generated electricity back through the utility lines as “payment” when use is down or winds are high.

But wind is not just a “backyard” resource. Currently, Alcoa, Boeing, General Electric, Lockheed, and Westinghouse are working with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to develop centralized
wind-power systems ("wind farms"). The Bendix Corporation and Hamilton Standard have developed 3,000-kilowatt wind turbines. And in the breezy Columbia River Valley in the Pacific Northwest stand three 2,500-kilowatt turbines. Built under U.S. Energy Department supervision for 14 mph average winds, each consists of two narrow blades almost as long as a jumbo jet’s wings. Their electricity is cost-competitive with electricity from more conventional sources.

California has witnessed the "most ambitious wind-farm development effort in the world so far," reports Flavin. He gives three reasons: windy mountain passes, tax incentives for investors, and state-run resource assessments. Southern California Edison expects to have wind turbines producing 120,000 kilowatts by 1990. Meanwhile, Canada, Denmark, Great Britain, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Sweden, and West Germany are supporting similar research. "Few countries are completely windless," writes Flavin, "something that cannot be said for coal, oil, or uranium."

Safe Water: An Elusive Goal

Besides food and energy shortages, many Third World countries have little safe water for even the most fundamental needs—drinking, washing, cooking, sanitation. The UN General Assembly has called for "clean water for all by 1990." Biswas, vice president of the International Water Resources Association, takes stock of the cultural, economic, and political obstacles.

Estimates of water scarcity vary, but the general picture is grim. A 1975 UN World Health Organization (WHO) survey found that, on average, 77 percent of the urban populations of 71 developing countries had some water piped to them through house connections or communal standpipes, but among rural folk only 22 percent had access to potable water. Service varies by country. While Egypt reported in 1977 that over 93 percent of its total population was supplied with safe water, Gabon could claim only one percent. Kenya is more typical: There, 97 percent of city dwellers had access to potable water compared with two percent of rural dwellers.

Why is clean water chiefly a rural problem? For one thing, although developing countries are predominantly rural, the people who run governments and man the bureaucracies tend to be city folk. Moreover, investment in public works of any kind seems less economical in thinly populated farm areas.

Assistance from national and international agencies has, often as not, been misguided. WHO, for instance, has set standards for water quality, but they are too ambitious, more appropriate for European cities than tropical countryside. Contributions for equipment have generally not been matched by money for maintenance and trained personnel.
percent of the "foreign aid" tube wells in South India and Bangladesh were inoperative in 1976. And acting alone rather than in consultation, donor nations have sometimes introduced new complications: To relieve a 1972 drought in Ethiopia, several Western nations separately sent water pumps that could not take the same spare parts.

The World Bank figures that universal access to safe water will cost $300 billion (in 1978 dollars)—a gross underestimate, says Biswas, but still 10 times the actual investment during the 1970s. Such funding is possible only if developing countries make water a top priority.

Who Pays For Clean Air?


How much does clean air cost? A Business Roundtable study estimates that compliance with the Clean Air Act of 1970 alone could cost the nation $400 billion (in 1980 dollars), by 1987. For the past several years, industry has been calling for modified air quality standards and for the abolition of needlessly complex rules. On the other side, environmentalists have urged even stricter regulations to deal with an array of "newly perceived" environmental threats, including acid rain and fine particulates.

Resistance from both political parties has forced the Reagan administration to back away from its early attempt to subject air quality standards to cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, writes Mosher, a National Journal reporter, clean air has become "as risky a target for budget cuts as social security benefits." Action taken on the Clean Air Act (now up for review) should indicate whether the administration is interested in improving or in simply abolishing regulations.

Even if the administration is serious about reform, it will have difficulty sorting out the conflicting data. An EPA study covering 1970–86 put the total cost of the Clean Air Act at $291.6 billion (in 1977 dollars)—an estimate far below the Business Roundtable's. Productivity growth has declined steadily since the act was passed (from three percent in 1965 to about one percent in 1978), and one University of Wisconsin economist attributes eight to 12 percent of the slowdown to environmental regulations. Edward Denison of the Bureau of Economic Analysis maintains, however, that the adverse economic effect of environmental controls on productivity growth was only 0.08 percent by 1978.

One clear beneficiary of clean air regulations is the air pollution control industry; its approximately 1,000 companies reaped some $2.4 billion worth of sales in 1981. But Mosher agrees with John Schork, chairman of Research-Cottrell Corp., one such firm, that it has become "impossible for businessmen to predict what environmental standards they will be forced to live with, and so plans to build new plants have
been delayed or scrapped.” Without clarification and some relaxation of standards, Mosher concludes, the economy will suffer.

ARTS & LETTERS

The Novel as Victim


Writer's block, book reviews, and negotiations with publishers—these matters have long concerned novelists. But, until recently, serious American authors, following the lead of Henry James and T. S. Eliot, kept them separate from their work. Now, however, writers like William Styron, Philip Roth, Bernard Malamud, and John Irving are relying on such details from their own lives for the meat of their novels. Dickstein, professor of English at Queens College (N.Y.), objects. These novelists have a kinship with the “confessional” writers of the late 1950s and '60s—e.g., poets Robert Lowell and Allen Ginsberg and novelists Norman Mailer and Saul Bellow. The latter two sought to free the novel from formalism and give it more immediacy and intimacy. Unfortunately, says Dickstein, Styron’s Sophie’s Choice, Roth's The Ghost Writer, Malamud’s Dubin’s Lives (all published in 1979), and Irving’s The World according to Garp (1978) reduce such innovations to “lazy convention.”

By closely modeling his protagonist on himself, an author limits his “perspective” to highly subjective retrospection; he loses the ability to make balanced judgments about his characters. Thus, his hero becomes a “confessional victim”—sinned against but rarely sinning. In Ghost Writer, an associate lamely characterizes Nathan Zuckerman (really, Roth), an aspiring Jewish novelist, as having “the most compelling voice I’ve encountered in years.” Other characters are likely to lose definition, becoming mere satellites of the protagonist.

Styron, Roth, and Malamud have tried to counter their self-absorption by filling their stories with great events and historic personages (the Holocaust, Anne Frank, D. H. Lawrence, respectively). But because such subjects are mere settings or props for their personae, their efforts amount to a “kidnapping” of history, writes Dickstein.

James Joyce mined his own life as a writer to explore the nature of art and the creative process. All novelists are forced to work from a limited stock of personal feelings and experiences. But they must add keen observation of how others live, Dickstein argues. Styron & Co. never even tell us what it is like to hold down a job, or reveal very much about the broader society that their characters inhabit.
Every February 14, candy and flower shops prosper as Valentine’s Day sweethearts celebrate a love feast usually traced by historians to pagan Roman traditions. But the shopkeepers should thank English poet Geoffrey Chaucer (1340?-1400) instead, asserts Oruch, a University of Kansas English professor.

Modern academics believe that St. Valentine was a churchman who cured a crippled child through prayer, inspired conversions, and was beheaded by Roman authorities circa February 14, around the year 270. Eighteenth-century scholars postulated that, some two centuries after Valentine’s death, Roman churchmen decided to Christianize a February pagan mating festival called the Lupercalia. They allegedly replaced the custom of pairing lovers by lottery with a contest involving saints’ names and transformed the rite into a festival marking Valentine’s death. A 20th-century version of this tale holds that a fifth-century pope, Gelasius, replaced the Lupercalia with a festival celebrating the Purification of the Virgin Mary, and that Valentine thus became associated with fertility. Oruch dismisses both theories. The Lupercalia, he argues, never involved the pairing of lovers. And Gelasius sought to abolish the festival, not Christianize it. While Valentine was venerated throughout Europe by the 14th century, Oruch has found no sign of the saint in any European love poem.

The first linking of St. Valentine with romance occurs in Chaucer’s “Parlement of Foules.” In the poem, Nature convenes the birds on “seynt Valentynes day” and commands them to choose mates. Twentieth-century lovers might view this celebration of spring in
mid-February as premature, but the date suited Chaucer's poetic purposes. Some calendars of his era marked spring's debut on February 7, and several English birds do mate in mid-February. Moreover, during February, winter is still a threat, and summer barely a hope and memory; the fickle climate mirrors love's inconstancy.

Thanks to Chaucer and his literary followers, St. Valentine was on his way to becoming the "Christian Cupid" by the end of the 14th century.

W. A. Mozart, Democrat

The world's most sinful composer is how Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard once described Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (1756–91). Yet in such comic operas as Don Giovanni and Cosi fan Tutte, Mozart never exactly glorified evil, notes Ballantine, who teaches music at the University of Natal in South Africa. Rather, he vested it with verve and humanity in a show of sympathy with the revolutionary notions then sweeping 18th-century Europe.

Mozart frequently depicted social class and convention as masks, which he ultimately exposed. Thus, in The Abduction from the Seraglio (1782), he debunks the power of tyrants by emphasizing their inability to rule human emotions. In The Marriage of Figaro (1786), a web of charades and disguises reveals a world where pretense is the norm and where apparent untruth contains hints of truth. When Figaro, a mere valet, proclaims his love to the Countess (whom he recognizes as his wife in disguise), the music—direct and only superficially insincere—suggests that in other circumstances he could love the Countess.

Mozart, writes Ballantine, believed that "without the darker sides of human experience, the brighter are not possible." Nowhere is this view clearer than in Don Giovanni (1787). A murderer and a seducer, Giovanni is nonetheless the most dynamic character in the opera, and his escapades subvert the social order. He sings in a populist buffo style. He is creative, a great improviser under stress. And, by stirring peasant and rich man alike to frantic action, he exposes their common humanity.

Mozart forgave human imperfection. Such pardon could be personal, as when Elvira excuses Giovanni for duping her, or political—as when Selim wins the admiration of his subjects by setting his prisoners free, in The Abduction. Self-pardon is equally important—in Cosi (1790), Fiordiligi acknowledges her infidelity and forgives it.

Reconciliation on a grander scale—the end of religious and nationalistic prejudices, an emphasis on universal brotherhood—were major goals of Enlightenment thinkers. By using his art to subtly undermine the ancien régime, Ballantine concludes, Mozart "aligned himself with the progressive social tendencies of his day."
Mass culture, from network television to potboiler novels, has thrown the American Left into a quandary. It seems to reflect popular tastes and therefore to qualify as "democratic" and praiseworthy. Yet even the most populist thinkers regard much of it as aesthetically dreadful, intellectually stultifying, and politically retrograde.

Lasch, a University of Rochester historian, argues that Marxists and liberal sociologists share a view of popular culture that reveals a great blind spot in their political thinking—they equate progress and modernity with "uprootedness."

Like their 18th-century predecessors, they hold that the emergence of a truly classless or democratic society hinges on a weakening of allegiances to family, race, religion, and land. They generally explain popular culture's shortcomings with tortured rationalizations. Some, such as critic Dwight Macdonald, dismiss even the possibility of high-quality mass culture. "The great cultures of the past have all been elite affairs," and always will be, Macdonald maintains. Others, including sociologist Herbert Gans, suggest that taste is relative and citizens are entitled to lowbrow culture if it relieves their boredom.

The Left today is quick to argue that modern industrialism and the "mass market" have resulted in shoddy goods and a freedom of choice that is limited to "the freedom to choose more or less indistinguishable commodities." At the same time, leftist ideologues fail to appreciate that culture, as it has become something for general consumption, has come under the same influences; the consumer of culture is no more "sovereign" in front of the TV than in the shopping plaza.

In both politics and art, progress has always been fortified by a sense of past and place, Lasch contends. The assimilating forces of which mass culture is a part do not destroy the "need for roots." But they may push people toward substitutes—e.g., "aggressive nationalism"—that are often the antitheses of everything true democrats believe in.

Since the 1973 overthrow of Salvador Allende's Marxist regime, Chile has been variously criticized by Western liberals for its repressive military junta, its economic "market fascism," and, more recently, the occasional exiling of leftist foes.
Yet, writes Sigmund, a Princeton professor of politics, there is now another side to the story, including the "faint outlines" of a future libertarian political system. Since taking power, General Augusto Pinochet's regime has gone through several phases:

- In 1973–77, wholesale police repression, designed to emasculate the Left and, later, the Center, easing with the dissolution of the notorious DINA secret police and public discussion of past "excesses."
- In 1975–78, rigorous implementation of a free enterprise economic policy, influenced by Milton Friedman's "Chicago-school" theories, leading first to a wracking depression, then to strong economic growth and a sharp decline in the inflation rate (700 percent in 1973, six percent in early 1981).
- In 1978–81, "structural reforms" of the economy, notably ending much state control and many direct services. Under threat of an American AFL-CIO boycott of Chilean exports, for instance, the Pinochet regime allowed unions to organize at the plant level and to strike for up to 60 days. Public housing projects were superseded by subsidized low-interest home loans to the needy. By early 1981, social security was revamped, allowing employees to invest in private pension funds; national health services were replaced by vouchers that gave patients a choice of physicians.

The latest stage—establishing a new political system—seems more difficult. Adopted by a two-thirds vote in 1980, the new constitution in effect gives Pinochet control until 1989 and permits a military-dominated council to review all government actions. Pinochet wants to establish a new political creed for Chilenos—but it is not European-style fascism, for there is no mass Nazi-style party and, of late, no bar to press criticism of the regime.

After several decades of Pinochet & Co., Sigmund writes, the Chile of the future is likely to be "consumer-oriented, materialist, and modernized—and much less susceptible to the clarion calls of the Catholic or Marxist reformers and radicals."

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**Israel in Africa**


A shocking, abject surrender to Arab oil blackmail—many Israelis would so describe the decision of 29 black African states to sever diplomatic relations with Jerusalem between 1967 and 1973. Yet Nadelmann, a Harvard political scientist, contends that Israeli-African relations were troubled from the start.

Seeking Third World friends, Israel established diplomatic relations with 33 of the 35 sub-Saharan African states and signed economic cooperation pacts with 20 of them from 1958 to 1972. Total Israeli aid never topped much more than $10 million annually. But drawing on
Africa’s Muslims had long denounced Israel, but Israel’s 1967 seizure of Egypt’s Sinai set off the steep decline in Israeli-black African ties.

their own “nation-building” experience, some 3,000 Israeli experts provided educational, medical, agricultural, and military training to Africans from 1958 to 1971. Black leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania reciprocated by resisting African Arabs’ demands for anti-Israel declarations.

However, Israeli-African ties suffered from the disappointments that often afflict foreign aid donors and recipients. The importance of Israeli assistance declined during the late 1960s as help from the West, the communist world, and, to a much lesser extent, the Arab nations poured into black Africa. And large Muslim populations in nations such as Nigeria and Tanzania continually inhibited pro-Israel leaders. Further, while critical of apartheid, Israel angered many Africans by expanding trade with South Africa (though Western and even clandestine black African commerce with Johannesburg dwarfed Israel’s).

The Six-Day War of 1967 marked a turning point; Israel had seized a chunk of Africa—the Sinai. African sympathies began to shift. When
Israeli troops advanced west of the Suez Canal in October 1973, 20 African states severed relations. And when oil prices soared during the early 1970s, Arab aid to Africa increased.

Nonetheless, Arab assistance remains far smaller than African outlays for oil. And apparent Arab indifference to apartheid rankles most black Africans. In fact, unofficial ties with Israel have mushroomed in recent years. The number of Israeli advisers, for instance, is at a record high. (Most are “private” consultants.) Politicians in Kenya, Nigeria, Zambia, and Ghana have urged a renewal of formal ties.

But a breakthrough requires at least one of three conditions, suggests Nadelmann: determined backstage diplomacy by Israel, a cooling of the partnership with South Africa that has blossomed since 1973 (Prime Minister Menachem Begin heads the Israel–South Africa Friendship League), or progress in the Camp David talks that draws more Arab nations into the Mideast peace process.

**Beijing’s Move toward Islam**

Seeking Third World allies against Soviet expansionism, especially in Asia, Chinese communist leaders have during the past four years increasingly muted their official atheism to woo the Islamic states. Harris, a political analyst in the State Department, observes that Beijing’s new foreign policy experiment has not been easy going, even as it has irritated the Russians.

China, writes Harris, has tried to persuade Islamic leaders “that its sizeable Muslim population qualifies it for a special relationship” with Islamic countries—a distinction the Soviets themselves claimed with some success under Khrushchev and before their 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Last year, Hsinhua, China’s official news agency, fastened upon the Third Islamic Summit at Taif, Saudi Arabia, as an occasion to warn that Moscow is the “mortal enemy of the Islamic movement.” Meanwhile, Beijing has eased internal bans on Muslim worship and sent its own Muslim delegations to tour Islamic nations. Ten Chinese minority groups are officially recognized as Muslim, notably the widely dispersed Hui (seven million strong) and the Uighurs (3.5 million), who live near the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their members have been allowed to make the haj (pilgrimage) to Mecca since 1976.

As they seek to promote Muslim unity against the Soviets, the Chinese (like others) find it difficult to deal with Islam as a bloc. The conservative Saudis remember past Chinese support for domestic radicals—as do the Indonesians and Malaysians. Beijing’s long support for Egypt’s Anwar Sadat stirred resentment among other Arabs after Camp David; Beijing feels it must endorse the Palestine Liberation Organization as the “Arab cause” but regards the PLO as undisciplined...
and unpredictable. South Yemen and Syria have close Soviet ties.

Moreover, even as Radio Beijing gloats over Moscow’s difficulties with its Muslim minorities, China faces domestic repercussions from the worldwide resurgence of Muslim fundamentalism. In 1974, 1,700 people died in a Muslim uprising in Yunnan. Yet to revive old curbs on Muslim activities would now severely embarrass Beijing. “Past efforts by non-Islamic states to use Islam as a political tool have never had a happy ending,” Harris notes. “Islam is a two-edged sword.”

**Greek Ire**


Last October, Greece alarmed its Western allies by electing a socialist Prime Minister who had harshly criticized Greek membership in NATO and in the European Economic Community. But Andreas Papandreou’s victory turned mainly on domestic issues, writes Larrabee, a Fellow at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.

Foreign policy was a frequent topic during the campaign, notes Larrabee. Most Greeks believe that NATO members have sided with Turkey, their arch-enemy (and NATO partner), in long-simmering conflicts over Cyprus, Aegean air space, and the continental shelf below. (In protest, Athens withdrew from the alliance’s military command from 1974 to 1980.) Many Greeks also resent Washington’s arms sales to the right-wing military junta that ruled the nation from 1967 to 1974.

But, according to Larrabee, popular desires focus on more jobs, better transportation, housing, and schools, and a less corrupt and sluggish bureaucracy. In 1974, even many leftists supported conservative Constantine Karamanlis for Prime Minister, seeing his New Democracy Party as the best hope of preventing another coup. Karamanlis laid a solid foundation for democracy, chiefly by purging the Army of politically restive officers. He also dramatically reduced inflation (which hit 30 percent under the junta), virtually eliminated unemployment, and extended compulsory education from six to nine years.

Yet too much investment capital languished in the tourism and luxury real estate sectors. Agriculture stagnated, and the city-country income gap widened. Economic growth plunged from 6.4 percent to 1.6 percent between 1978 and 1980, and inflation rebounded to 25 percent. Finally, as Greek memories of the junta faded, pressure to oust the centrists mounted. In 1980, the weary Karamanlis quit his post for the less demanding (but potentially powerful) Presidency.

The new Prime Minister has promised major improvements in Greek life, and Larrabee predicts that he will initially focus on domestic affairs. Yet even if Papandreou seeks major foreign policy changes, two big obstacles loom: a conservative Army, and the pro-Western Karamanlis, who as President, has the power to dissolve Parliament, veto legislation, and declare a state of emergency.
"Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics."

612 pp. $32.95 cloth, $15.95 paper. 
Editor: Richard K. Betts

The small, slow, 1500-mile range cruise missile has emerged as the major current U.S. military innovation—a descendant of the crude German V-1 buzz bombs used against England during World War II. It was first pushed by Pentagon civilians as a strategic weapon, relatively cheap and hence available in quantity. Yet the full implications for future arms control talks, NATO doctrine, and U.S. nuclear strategy have yet to be widely debated.

So say the authors of this detailed Brookings study. Twenty specialist-contributors cover just about everything: cruise missile history and technology; potential military uses and weapons “trade-offs”; the complex diplomatic and domestic political context; the reactions of the Soviets.

Of the six U.S. cruise missile systems under development, only Boeing’s air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) is intended for strategic missions against the Soviet Union. By year’s end, the first B-52 long-range bombers will be armed with a dozen ALCMs apiece; by 1985, most of the aging B-52 force will be equipped to fire ALCMs with nuclear warheads against Soviet targets from outside the ring of Soviet air defenses. Not surprisingly, the cruise missile figured in the 1979 Soviet-American SALT II arms control agreement (unratified by the U.S. Senate).

Most recently, the planned U.S. NATO deployment in 1983 of 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM), initially sought by Washington’s allies as a counter to new Soviet SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe, has helped stir up an anti-nuke furor in West Germany, protests in Moscow, and misgivings elsewhere. In Congress, controversy surrounds the Navy’s decision to reactivate two battleships, partly to serve as big platforms for sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM).

Other Pentagon discussions center on arming attack submarines with cruise missiles, rather than torpedoes, and on using ground-launched cruise missiles with conventional nonnuclear warheads as a substitute for manned fighter-bombers in attacks against heavily defended fixed targets on the NATO front.

This first generation of small cruise missiles, especially the proposed non-nuclear versions, should make everybody think twice, suggests Betts, the study’s editor.

Guidance systems are far from perfect. The conventional (nonnuclear) version of the cruise missile cannot now deliver enough explosive “punch” to knock out a big bridge or an airfield. Yet how much can such weapons be improved without making them too costly to produce in large quantities? And how can the Soviets be sure that a
U.S. CRUISE MISSILES UNDER DEVELOPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missile</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Warhead</th>
<th>Carrier</th>
<th>Range (nautical miles)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALCM</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>B-52</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLCM</td>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>Truck</td>
<td>1,300-1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLAM-N</td>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>Submarine or surface ship</td>
<td>1,300-1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLAM-C</td>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td>Submarine or surface ship</td>
<td>700</td>
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<tr>
<td>TASM</td>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td>Submarine or surface ship</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRASM</td>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td>Tactical fighter</td>
<td>300</td>
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</tbody>
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Note: The strategic missile (ALCM) is in production; the tactical nuclear missiles are in the engineering phase; the tactical conventional missiles are in an accelerated engineering phase. All will be capable of subsonic speed. All but the ALCM are variants of General Dynamics' Tomahawk, whether ground-launched (GLCM), Tomahawk land-attack (TLAM), Tomahawk anti-ship (TASM), or medium-range air-to-surface (MRASM). Nuclear warheads weigh a few hundred pounds; conventional warheads weigh about 1,000 pounds.

Source: Cruise Missiles, Brookings, 1981.

U.S. conventional cruise missile is really nonnuclear?
It would be ironic, Betts concludes, if someday ground-launched nonnuclear cruise missiles, deployed only to bolster NATO defenses against ever-superior Soviet conventional ground forces, ended up wrecking all prospects of Soviet-American agreement on nuclear arms control.

"Teenage Childbearing and Welfare: Policy Perspectives on Sexual Activity, Pregnancy, and Public Dependency."

Authors: Kristin A. Moore and Martha R. Burt

Teenagers give birth to nearly half of the nation's out-of-wedlock babies. And these young mothers end up accounting for the majority of welfare benefits. Over half of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1975 went to women who as teens bore their first children. The AFDC, Medicaid, and Food Stamp expenditures to their households totaled $8.6 billion that year.

The rise in births to teenage mothers has had an important impact on the federal budget as well as on the persistence of poverty in America. Moore and Burt, senior research associates at the Urban Institute, examine recent increases in early childbearing and offer possible "economic" solutions. Sexual activity among youths has become widespread. Among unmarried 19-year-olds in 1979, 65 percent of white females (about one and one-half times the 1971 rate), 89 percent of
black females, 77 percent of white males, and 80 percent of black males had had sexual intercourse. Pregnancy, surprisingly, has not reached "epidemic" proportions as yet. According to one estimate, some nine percent of women aged 15 to 19 were pregnant in 1979—only a two percent increase over the 1971 rate.

Contraceptives have kept the numbers down; inconsistent use allows the problem to persist. In 1979, 63 percent of "never-using" teen girls became pregnant, compared to 14 percent of "always-users" and 30 percent of "irregular users." Awareness of contraceptives is nearly universal. Even so, a quarter of sexually experienced teenagers have never used any method of birth control. The reasons: ignorance, embarrassment, cost, and medical, moral, and social objections.

How unmarried teenage mothers resolve pregnancy varies strikingly according to race. Abortion and out-of-wedlock births are more common among black teens; marriage and adoption are chosen more frequently by whites. Eighty-three percent of black and 29 percent of white teenage mothers in 1978 were unmarried. (The white rate, nevertheless, was an all-time high.)

Once on welfare, teen mothers find it hard to escape: They complete less schooling (only half of the women aged 18 or younger at first birth graduate from high school by age 29); they tend to have larger families over time; and their job prospects are slim.

Blame for teenage pregnancy has been directed at the media and advertising for glamorizing easy morals, at the declining role of religion in the lives of the young, and even at efforts to mitigate the problem—sex education, family planning clinics. No evidence to date supports or disproves the hypothesis that these services—and the existence of AFDC—encourage early sexual activity or early pregnancy, say the authors.

Their availability, however, may affect the resolution of a pregnancy. Out-of-wedlock motherhood and legalized abortion have replaced "shotgun" marriage as primary choices. And welfare policies may encourage an unwed mother not only to keep her child but also to avoid marrying the father. In about half the 50 states, only single mothers can receive AFDC and Medicaid.

"There are no easy or good solutions once a teenager becomes pregnant," conclude the authors. Clearly, the Reagan administration does not intend to increase the availability of abortion. Other options—better medical care and nutrition, adoption information and support, financial, educational, and occupational assistance for mothers who keep their children—require added federal spending. The best measures—more sex education and contraceptives—are those that prevent unwanted pregnancies in the first place.

"On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context."

Author: Harry G. Summers, Jr.

As they prepared reluctantly to intervene in South Vietnam in 1965, both President Lyndon Johnson and his civilian and senior military associates shared this view: "They [erroneously] equated mobilizing national will with total war, and they believed total war unthinkable in a nuclear age."
Such fears and misconceptions about the nature of war, fostered in part by academic "limited war" theorists and the perceived "lessons" of Korea, helped lead to U.S. failure in Vietnam. No less to blame was the willingness of the U.S. military to leave the development of strategic ideas to civilians who had no experience of the brutality, uncertainty, and moral requirements of warfare.

Such is the thesis of this wide-ranging analysis by Colonel Summers, a combat veteran and a senior strategist at the Army War College. In essence, he asks both civilians and military men to rethink the "lessons" of Vietnam for future U.S. conflicts in terms of the enduring maxims of On War by Carl von Clausewitz.

Washington's reluctance to arouse the "national will" and tie the American people to the war effort led step-by-step to fatal disarray. LBJ dispatched troops to Southeast Asia without a declaration of war. The failure to ask Congress for a declaration of war led to White House decisions not to mobilize the reserves. The refusal to mobilize the reserves discouraged U.S. military leaders from pushing for decisive strategies aimed at halting Hanoi's aggression and led instead to protracted campaigns against its "symptoms"—the communist insurgency in the South.

One reason, says Summers, for Johnson's refusal to ask for a declaration of war in 1965 may have been his belief that Congress would not approve it. Such a rebuff would have put an immediate halt to U.S. efforts in South Vietnam—"a preferable result, given the final outcome."

"Across the Border: Rural Development in Mexico and Recent Migration to the United States."

Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Calif. 94720. 198 pp. $12.
Authors: Harry E. Cross and James A. Sandos

Over seven million persons of Mexican descent, by one estimate, lived in the United States in 1978. Many were legal residents. But between 2.6 and 5.2 million Mexicans during the mid-1970s were here illegally.

By law, only 20,000 Mexicans a year have been allowed to enter since 1977. But the net total of arrivals (subtracting those aliens who return home) has been about 135,000 a year.

Mexicans have been migrating north throughout most of this century, and, for economic reasons, are expected to continue to do so for years. So report Cross, of the Battelle Human Affairs Research Center in Washington, D.C., and Sandos, a University of Redlands historian.

Between 1900 and 1930, one and one-half million people—one-tenth of Mexico's population—came to the United States. Most of this movement occurred after 1913, as rural peasants fled Mexico's Revolution (1913-20) and the Cristero rebellion (1926-29). The Depression reduced the attraction of the United States during the 1930s, although world economic troubles and President Lázaro Cárdenas's ill-fated agrarian reforms caused severe unemployment in rural Mexico.

The rural uplift efforts begun by President Atila Camacho in 1940 modernized much of Mexican agriculture, increasing maize production by over 500 percent by 1970 and quadrupling wheat harvests.
But this disproportionately benefited wealthy landowners. The poor ejidatarios (communal farmers), already largely limited to subsistence farming, were soon in dire straits. In real terms, the rural minimum wage declined by six percent between 1940 and 1960. In 1950, 54 percent of all Mexican farms earned less than $80 annually—well below the subsistence level.

Mexico City’s response to rural unrest was the bracero program, which sent at least two million Mexicans to the United States on temporary visas between 1942 and 1964 under an agreement with Washington. Almost 55 percent of the government’s permits were given to residents of the north central states, which accounted for only 25 percent of Mexico’s rural population, but were once the stronghold of the most powerful dissident movement, the Sinarquistas.

Washington terminated the bracero program at the end of 1964, after Americans complained of substandard working conditions for Mexicans and a loss of jobs for U.S. citizens. But more than 500,000 Mexicans still crossed the border legally during the next 10 years alone. With economic disparities between the United States and Mexico constantly growing, massive illegal immigration began during the late 1960s. Fewer than 15 percent of the legal immigrants since 1960 have become naturalized citizens. Meanwhile, it is estimated that between 10 and 20 percent of jobs held by Mexican aliens might otherwise have gone to U.S. citizens.

Mexico’s birth rate has declined dramatically in the last decade, but most of the potential migrants during the next 20 years have already been born. The authors urge oil-rich Mexico to distribute income more equitably and to increase jobs for low-income people. The United States should establish a five-year program to admit Mexicans, without quotas, under renewable, one-year work visas. And the U.S. Border Patrol should be strengthened sufficiently to discourage further illegal migration.

"Women, Work, and Wages: Equal Pay for Jobs of Equal Value."

Editors: Donald J. Treiman and Heidi I. Hartmann

"Equal pay for work of equal value" is a new feminist battle cry, superseding the oft-heard "equal pay for equal work."

The earlier slogan—whose words were made fact by the Equal Pay Act of 1963—had the advantage of precision, and cases of discrimination were relatively easy to detect. The second slogan was designed to end current differentials in pay between those occupations dominated by women (e.g., nursing) and those dominated by men (e.g., carpentry). But the National Research Council’s Committee on Occupational Classification and Analysis reports that an "equal value" approach makes the detection of cases of "discrimination" far more difficult.

By what yardstick are the respective values of dissimilar jobs to be gauged? Neoclassical economic theory insists that the only valid measure of a job's relative worth is the wage it is assigned in an unfettered, competitive labor market. The committee, how-
Mean Earnings of Year-Round Full-Time Civilian Workers 18 Years Old and Over, 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All races</td>
<td>$17,547</td>
<td>$9,939</td>
<td>97.7%</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>17,959</td>
<td>9,992</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>12,898</td>
<td>9,388</td>
<td>71.8%</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish origin*</td>
<td>13,002</td>
<td>8,654</td>
<td>72.4%</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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* Persons of Spanish origin may be of any race.


Why jobs in the American economy are so segregated by sex is not entirely clear, the committee acknowledges. The choices women themselves make play a part, but so, too, the committee assumes, does discrimination, in the form of denial to women of access to better-paying jobs and of underpayment for work done by women. A 1974 study of Washington State government jobs showed that pay rates for jobs held mainly by women averaged about 80 percent of the pay rates for jobs of "comparable value" held mainly by men.

Although no absolute standard of job worth exists, many companies do, to varying degrees, explicitly estimate the relative values of jobs within the firm. Such "job evaluation plans" are not necessarily untainted themselves, but "under certain circumstances," they could be used to unearth and reduce wage discrimination against females. The committee, however, does not urge that every firm adopt a job evaluation plan. Why? The committee's answer: "At present, we know of no method that would guarantee a 'fair' pay system."
Franklin Roosevelt's confidence, expressed in such famous pronouncements as "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself" may have done as much as his policies to lift America's morale during the Depression; it also helped him win election to unprecedented four terms as President.
The New Deal

"At the heart of the New Deal was not a philosophy but a temperament," wrote historian Richard Hofstadter. Whatever it was, it survived Franklin Delano Roosevelt, held the Democratic Party together for half a century, and inspired the champions of a growing welfare state. This year is both the centennial of Roosevelt's birth and the 50th anniversary of his election to the Presidency; scholars are meeting at the Wilson Center and other institutions to reassess Roosevelt, the New Deal, and related topics. FDR's record in office remains a matter of dispute. What did he promise? What did he accomplish? Where did he fail? These are timely questions as Americans, led by a conservative President, once again ponder the role they want government to play in their lives. Here, Alan Brinkley looks at the various American reform traditions that influenced FDR as he fashioned, willy-nilly, the New Deal; Bradford Lee supplies a "report card" on the Roosevelt administration's economic policies; and William Leuchtenburg examines FDR's lingering impact on the men who succeeded him in the White House.

PRELUDE

by Alan Brinkley

A century of political tradition was shattered in July 1932. Until Franklin Delano Roosevelt stood before his party's delegates that year in Chicago, no Democratic nominee had ever addressed a national convention. By custom, the candidate had remained at home for the duration, feigning surprise and delight when party officials called upon him several weeks later to "notify" him of his victory. Roosevelt had no patience with such niceties. He flew to Chicago, walked into the sweltering conven-
tion hall on his braced, paralyzed legs, and electrified the party with a fiery, combative speech—or, as he termed it, a “call to arms . . . to win in this crusade to restore America to its own people.”

It was not an ordinary beginning for a presidential campaign, but then it was not an ordinary time. America was in the third summer of the worst economic crisis in its history. An estimated 25 percent of the work force was unemployed, and the rate was much higher in industrial cities. Akron reported 60 percent unemployment; Toledo, 80 percent. The agricultural economy had also collapsed, with farm prices down by more than half since 1929. As if nature itself were conspiring to add to the crisis, large areas of the nation’s Midwestern farm belt had been turned into a “Dust Bowl” by severe drought. And in the White House sat a man who had fallen into such disrepute that the squalid shantytowns springing up on the edges of desperate cities now bore his name: “Hoovervilles.” So it was a receptive audience—both in Chicago and in the nation at large—that heard Franklin Roosevelt conclude his acceptance speech with a ringing promise: “I pledge you, I pledge myself, to a new deal for the American people.”

No one, however, knew precisely what he meant. And to many, listening to the candidate’s genial evasiveness over the course of the campaign, it seemed as if he meant nothing at all. Newspaper columnist Walter Lippmann described him as “a highly impressionable person, without a firm grasp of public affairs and without very strong convictions.”

**Disorder and Instability**

Yet those who dismissed Roosevelt as a man without convictions judged too quickly. It is true that the New Deal was the child of no single ideology. Indeed, few moments in American history reveal as many competing, even conflicting philosophies shaping public policy simultaneously. But the basic debate within the Roosevelt administration—over the proper role of the federal government in the economy—mirrored an argument that had been in progress for decades. Roosevelt’s advisers, and Roosevelt himself, had long been involved in that debate. They

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may have had no clear answers to the nation’s problems, but the questions they would ask—the framework within which they would work—were already defined.

The federal government had, of course, been intruding itself into the American economy since the earliest days of the Republic. It had, for instance, influenced industry and commerce through its tariff policies and helped to finance the building of roads, canals, and railroads. But these early government excursions into the economy had been generally limited and indirect. The real origins of modern federal expansion lay in the rapid industrial growth of the late 1800s and the simultaneously nervous and optimistic response to it at the beginning of the 20th century.

Within the space of a few decades, the United States found itself transformed from a predominantly agrarian society into the greatest industrial power in the world. And it found itself, too, with a host of new problems: giant corporations with threatening power; a marketplace infected with corruption and brutality; an economy plagued by disorder and instability. The problems were national in scope; they required national solutions.

The young Winston Churchill, in a 1909 essay widely read by American reformers, wrote that industrial society had entered “a new time” in which “strange methods, huge forces, larger combinations—a Titanic world—have sprung up around
us... We will go forward into a way of life... more consciously national than any we have ever known.”

In this optimistic spirit, Americans moved forward in the first years of the new century into what became known as the Progressive Era. During this time, many of the men who were to create the New Deal received their political educations, and the nation began to embrace a political vision that would enchant it for decades to come.

The New Freedom

At the heart of the progressive vision was a belief in system, in process. If institutions could be constructed along rational, scientific lines, if the economy could operate on the basis of enlightened procedures and through carefully designed structures, then the disorder of modern industrial life could be eliminated. No longer could the economy be entrusted to the untrained, inefficient, self-serving “robber barons” who had emerged during the late 19th century—men whom the influential social scientist Thorstein Veblen contemptuously dismissed as mainstays of the “leisure class.” Instead, Veblen and many other progressives believed, the nation required a new species of managers, imbued with the “discipline of the machine” to transform the economy into a smoothly functioning mechanism.

Implicit in this vision was an acceptance of large-scale organization as the basic feature of the modern economy and a belief in the need for centralized coordination and control. “The essential condition of efficiency,” wrote the progressive theorist Herbert Croly, “is always concentration of responsibility.” But the advocates of centralized planning disagreed among themselves as to who would do the planning.

Some insisted that the power to regulate must remain in the hands of private institutions, each segment of the economy working to stabilize itself. To others, however, this private reordering of the economy seemed plainly insufficient. Giant corporations and trade associations could reduce disorder in some markets, but what of other, less powerful segments of society: farmers, workers, consumers? What institution would regulate the economy for the good of society as a whole? That institution, these reformers agreed, had to be the federal government.

The acknowledged leader of the progressive drive for active federal regulation and planning was Theodore Roosevelt. He earned that reputation less through his accomplishments as President (from 1901 to 1909) than through his celebrated Progressive (“Bull Moose”) Party campaign to regain the White
House in 1912, when he articulated the ambitious economic program he called the New Nationalism. "We should," he declared, "enter upon a course of supervision, control, and regulation of those great corporations—a regulation which we should not fear, if necessary, to bring to the point of control of monopoly prices."

Other progressive reformers challenged the New Nationalism. Roosevelt accepted economic concentration as inevitable and sought to curb its evils; his opponents urged an assault upon economic concentration itself. Their vision of reform centered on a concerted government effort to eliminate what the legal scholar (and, after 1916, Supreme Court Justice) Louis D. Brandeis called the "curse of bigness." Corporations were too large, too powerful, and too unwieldy. The state, Brandeis and his followers believed, should act to eliminate monopoly and restore an economy of smaller, genuinely competitive units.

Woodrow Wilson took up this theme with his call for a "New Freedom" during the 1912 campaign. Theodore Roosevelt's approach, he warned, would create a dangerous "all-conquering combination between money and government." The promise of economic decentralization had great popular appeal, and it helped Wilson to triumph over Roosevelt and William Howard Taft (the Republican incumbent) in the 1912 contest. Never, however, did it have more than a secondary impact upon public policy. Wilson himself did virtually nothing to decentralize the economy. Instead, he created an array of Roosevelt-like regulatory institutions: the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Reserve Board, and others.

The Planners' Triumph

And although the New Freedom continued to attract reformers in later years (including such influential future New Deal figures as Harvard's Felix Frankfurter), the New Nationalism always proved the stronger influence. Franklin Roosevelt, though he served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Wilson, felt a far closer sense of identification by the 1930s with his distant cousin (and uncle by marriage), Theodore. He surrounded himself with advisers who viewed themselves as modern-day champions of the New Nationalism. His powerful "Brains Trust"—Raymond Moley, Rexford Tugwell, Adolf Berle, and other academics—were without exception men who, as Moley later wrote, had rejected the "traditional Wilson-Brandeis philosophy that if America could once more
become a nation of small proprietors, of corner grocers and smithies under spreading chestnut trees, we should have solved the problems of American life.”

Out of the political battles of the Progressive Era, in other words, emerged not only the outlines of a debate but a clear indication of the relative strength of the opposing sides. The advocates of restoring competition would never dominate. The first impulse of policymakers dealing with the economy would be to impose centralized administration on it. The most important argument, therefore, would be between those who advocated private, corporate planning and those who believed in strong federal direction.

The New Era

Many politicians drew on America’s experience in World War I, when, suddenly, the proper organization of the economy was no longer a theoretical question but a matter of national urgency. The American war effort depended as much upon the country’s industries, farms, and transportation systems as upon its military. In meeting its new needs, Washington gave little more than lip service to the ideal of decentralization.

Beginning in March 1918—after less centralized planning efforts had dissolved into bureaucratic chaos—a single agency, the War Industries Board (WIB), emerged as the undisputed center of the nation’s mobilization effort. Under the leadership of corporate financier Bernard Baruch, the WIB served as a clearing house for virtually all industrial decisions: allocating scarce raw materials among competing industries, setting production quotas, overseeing prices. “Of the effects of the war on America,” wrote the popular historian Mark Sullivan a few years later, “by far the most fundamental was our submission to autocracy in government. . . . The prohibition of individual liberty in the interest of the state could hardly be more complete.”

In fact, Baruch was never the economic “dictator” that Sullivan and others described; nor was the wartime bureaucracy as efficient and successful as its advocates liked to claim. But the ultimate significance of the World War I experiment lay in the public’s later perception of it. In popular mythology, America’s military triumph was the result of fruitful cooperation between private interests and public authorities.

This vision of an organized, cooperative economy became the basis for a bold economic experiment in the 1920s: the federal government’s attempt to create an American version of the “corporate” state. Despite the popular image of the ’20s as a
Harvard's Louis Brandeis (left) was a leading figure among the early progressive "trust busters"; Bernard Baruch (right), a Wall Street financier, was a champion of cooperative business-government planning after World War I. Both remained influential during the New Deal.

decade of political torpor, contemporaries were often dazzled by the pace of innovation and change. America, Herbert Hoover exuberantly proclaimed early in the decade, was "a nation of progressives." The nation had entered a "New Era" in which the industrial economy had finally achieved the stability Americans had long sought.

The reasons for the enthusiasm were clear. The United States during the '20s was in the midst of the greatest economic boom in its history. Manufacturing output rose more than 60 percent during the decade. Income per capita increased from $522 to $716. The gross national product grew by an average of five percent per year, amid low unemployment and negligible inflation.

To be sure, the Presidents of the '20s never viewed themselves as active agents of economic reform. Warren G. Harding stumbled genially but ineptly through his three years in office...
never fully able, as he put it, “to grasp that I am President.” Calvin Coolidge, his successor, spent his few waking hours doing as little as possible, convinced that the smaller Washington’s role in the economy, the healthier the nation would be. But elsewhere in the Republican government were men eagerly working to build the framework for what they called an “associative” state. Foremost among them was Herbert Hoover, the popular Secretary of Commerce through the Harding and Coolidge years.

Hoover had been educated as an engineer and trained—both in private industry and in his work as Food Administrator during World War I—as a bureaucrat. He brought to public life the technocratic assumptions of the Progressive Era. Efficiency and organization, he believed, were the keys to a modern society. Government and business could cooperate to restructure the industrial economy according to scientific principles.

The Commerce Department, a struggling, underfunded office when Hoover took command of it in 1921, grew under his leadership to one of the largest and most active departments in Washington. Hoover arranged countless conferences to expose corporate executives to scientific principles of organization, personally helped establish new trade associations, and persuaded businessmen to dampen labor discontent by bestowing new benefits upon workers through what some called a system of “welfare capitalism.”

**Black Friday**

“There is reason to doubt,” wrote The New Republic’s columnist, TRB, in 1925, “whether in the whole history of the American government a Cabinet officer has engaged in such wide diversity of activities or covered quite so much ground.”

But Hoover’s prominence was not merely the product of his influence; it signaled the triumph of the “associative” ideal. Some, including Calvin Coolidge, considered Hoover uncomfortably liberal. Others—labor and farm leaders and their supporters in Congress—viewed him as too conservative and called for an even more forceful federal role in the economy. But these were clearly minority voices. Nobody could effectively challenge the Republican leadership in the face of rapid economic growth. And, as if to ratify the philosophy of voluntary, centralized cooperation, the American people unhesitatingly elected Herbert Hoover President of the United States in 1928. Less than a year later, the New Era economy collapsed.

It began unexpectedly, with a sudden and sickening stock
market crash in October 1929. And as the economy began to slide slowly into the Depression, the inherent structural weaknesses of the New Era economy began to reveal themselves. There was the excessive dependence upon a few large industries, notably auto manufacturing and construction. Both had already begun to decline before 1929. There was the weakness of the banking and credit system, which began to collapse quickly at the first signs of economic trouble. There was the rickety system of international debt. Above all, there was the inadequate distribution of purchasing power within the United States itself. The American economy had become the most productive in the world, but the American people could not afford to buy its products.* The result of all this was a long deflationary spiral that dragged the nation into crisis.

A Vain Appeal

Herbert Hoover responded in classic progressive fashion: He promoted structural economic change and encouraged still greater organization and cooperation. In the process, he became the most forceful and intrusive President in American history to that point. Yet his efforts were painfully inadequate.

His attempts to persuade businessmen to maintain prices and wages voluntarily and to join new trade associations and other cooperative ventures foundered as individual companies scrambled to keep themselves afloat. The most innovative of his policies, the creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) in 1932, had only a limited impact. Not only was the $1.5 billion the RFC offered banks, railroads, and industries in long-term, low-interest loans inadequate, but the agency had no authority to require recipients to cooperate in any coherent program of recovery.

Hoover's commitment to voluntarism also shaped his approach to another major problem: the explosion of poverty and unemployment. He restricted his efforts to trying to coordinate the efforts of local and private relief agencies already in existence, most of which were collapsing under the unprecedented strain. Washington offered no direct financial assistance.

Hoover's economic programs failed in part because they lacked adequate funding and influence. They failed, too, because they were based upon a false premise. Faced with an economic

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* More than 70 percent of American families during the 1920s continued to earn less than $2,500 a year, then considered the minimum for a "decent" standard of living. Not all of them were truly poor. But neither could they afford to buy the consumer goods—automobiles, refrigerators, radios—that American industry was so bountifully producing.
crisis that required innovative fiscal policies to increase purchasing power and thus stimulate demand, Hoover, like virtually every other public figure of the day, responded with the old nostrum of structural change. The solution to the Depression, Hoover believed, lay in rescuing the great institutions of business and finance and in helping them to maintain and increase prices. More than that, it lay in the creation of a harmonious, cooperative economy. It was a misguided vision. Yet it resolutely refused to die; not even the political demise of Herbert Hoover weakened its grasp upon the nation’s imagination.

Franklin Roosevelt arrived in Washington in March 1933 confident and energetic, bringing with him a crowd of new policymakers and administrators determined to transform American government. He also brought a legacy of reform impulses stretching back over 30 years, which would do much to shape, and ultimately to limit, the New Deal.

**Limits and Possibilities**

It was not really one legacy, but many. As a result, there would be a bewildering variety of reforms and experiments operating simultaneously throughout the New Deal. The New Dealers took up posts in various arms of the bureaucracy, pursued their individual and often conflicting aims, and hoped that some good would emerge from the chaos. Many critics were dismayed by the apparent aimlessness of government policy. But among many old progressives and new liberals, there was exhilaration. The narrow, technocratic progressivism of Herbert Hoover had given way to a more expansive, optimistic, and experimental spirit where limits were less important than possibilities.

But all was not possible. While the past provided Franklin Roosevelt with many avenues of reform, it barred others. It prevented any serious challenge to the system of free enterprise, it discouraged moves to adopt the Keynesian demand-stimulating policies that might have produced recovery, and it inhibited any effort to establish a permanent, coherent federal welfare system.

What the past did mandate, and what became the closest thing to a philosophical core for the New Deal, was an expanded effort to construct a rationally organized economy. The New Dealers did not repudiate the New Era vision of harmonious cooperation in the economy, only the narrow means by which the Republicans had attempted to produce it. The federal government, they agreed, must be invested with far more power to compel recalcitrant companies and interest groups to cooperate
on behalf of the common good.

How this conviction would translate into concrete public policy was not clear early in 1933. But that the new administration would be guided, and restrained, by the assumptions of the past was evident from the most important speech of the 1932 Democratic campaign, Roosevelt’s one attempt to offer a consistent vision of New Deal reform.

Addressing the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco on September 23, 1932, the future President spoke warmly of the Democratic Party’s Jeffersonian heritage and of his own commitment to individualism. But the problems of a modern, complex economy, Roosevelt explained, required important modifications of such traditions: “Our task now is not discovery or exploitation of natural resources, or necessarily producing more goods. It is the soberer, less dramatic business of administering resources and plants already in hand, of seeking to reestablish foreign markets for our surplus production, of meeting the problem of underconsumption, of adapting existing economic organizations to the service of the people. The day of the enlightened administration has come.”

It was hardly a revolutionary vision. Other Americans—from the progressive reformers of the first years of the century, to the economic managers of World War I, to the advocates of voluntary cooperation in the 1920s—had been saying much the same thing. Roosevelt proposed only to enlarge the boundaries of their vision, to expand the ideal of “enlightened administration” to encompass new groups of people and larger tasks.

FDR’s administration was no more able to make itself the agent of coordinated economic growth than were the administrations of the previous 30 years. The decades-old dream of a cooperative state crumbled in the face of harsh political and economic realities. Yet out of the eclectic array of programs and policies that survived emerged a new tradition: “New Deal liberalism,” destined to inspire, for good and ill, the next generation of American reformers.
"This nation asks for action, and action now," Franklin D. Roosevelt declared at his March 1933 inauguration. Eight months earlier, at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, he had confidently promised the American people a "New Deal" to fight the Great Depression, and his "Brains Trust" advisers had been hard at work on a program ever since.

In the famous First Hundred Days of FDR's Presidency, he sent 15 major legislative proposals to Congress: the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which awarded subsidies to farmers who limited their crops; the National Industrial Recovery Act, which permitted industries to form cartels to limit output and fix prices; and 13 other major laws—some of them passed after only token debate.

Over the next five years, these would be followed by several major relief measures (including the $5 billion Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, the most expensive peacetime government program anywhere up to then), the establishment of the Social Security system in 1935, the Securities Exchange Act, and a host of other bills. The new government agencies created by Roosevelt strained the resources of the alphabet—AAA, CAB, CCC, CWA, FCA, FCC, FDIC, FERA, FHA, FSA, HOLC, NLRB, NRA, NYA, PWA, REA, SEC, TVA, WPA.

The results may have been mixed, but the impact was unmistakable. Even a cursory inspection of the New Deal shows that it reshaped American institutions and gave material sustenance to millions of people who had been thrown out of jobs and into various states of misery by the Depression. The greatest lift probably came from FDR himself. Of his predecessor in the White House, one observer remarked, "If you put a rose in Hoover's hand, it would wilt." Roosevelt, by contrast, radiated confidence. "Never was there such a change in the transfer of a government," New York Times columnist Arthur Krock exclaimed a week after the inauguration. "The President is the boss, the dynamo, the works."

Did any conscious grand design for American society underlie Roosevelt's policies? Pretty clearly, the answer is "No."
Civilian Conservation Corps workers in the field. The CCC was the inspiration for the Job Corps in President Johnson's War on Poverty.

Helen West Heller, for the WPA

Roosevelt's advisers were perpetually at odds among themselves. Raymond Moley hoped to revive industry by allowing companies, in effect, to form cartels; his Columbia University colleague, Rexford G. Tugwell, advocated centralized government planning; and Felix Frankfurter, like Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, wanted to break up big corporations and restore a bygone economy of small businesses. FDR flirted with all of these ideas, often at the same time.

Yet, for a historian simply to paint a picture of blooming, buzzing confusion would be to obscure three broad aims that Roosevelt and his advisers did share.

Apart from keeping their countrymen alive, their first goal was to bring the economy out of the Depression. Their second objective was to make the distribution of wealth and especially income more equal—or, as they were wont to say, more “balanced.” The major cause of the Depression, in Roosevelt's view, was the relatively small amount of purchasing power in the hands of farmers and workers; the cure was redistribution of income. Finally, the New Dealers hoped to realign the groupings in American politics to keep the Democratic Party in power.

To what extent did Roosevelt succeed in his principal aim,

The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1982

63
the restoration of prosperity? The conventional wisdom has it that only mobilization for war at the end of the 1930s pulled the American economy out of the Depression. And, in fact, the Gross National Product did not surpass its 1929 level until 1941. But there were some remarkable ups and downs along the way.

While almost all the major industrial countries (except France) enjoyed a fairly steady recovery after mid-1932, interrupted only by a mild setback in 1937–38, the American economy (measured by GNP) took a wild roller coaster ride. It plunged between the 1932 election and the 1933 inauguration and recovered briefly. It fell again in the autumn of 1933. Then, from late 1934 to mid-1937, the American economy grew by an average of about 15 percent annually (in current prices)—a rate never equalled in peacetime before or since. Soon, however, the country was wracked by an industrial decline even steeper than that in the initial post-1929 crash. Between Labor Day 1937 and New Year’s Day 1938, two million people were abruptly thrown out of work. The economy began to recover once more a year later, as a surge of defense spending rolled the country toward a wartime boom.

Coincidence and Calamity

"Roosevelt’s depression" of 1937, as the Republicans called it, was the result of two mistakes. Never comfortable with deficit spending—he had attacked Herbert Hoover for heading "the greatest spending administration in peace times in all our history"—FDR cut back Washington’s outlays on relief and public works in a great show of budget balancing in 1936, an election year. The other mistake was committed by the independent Federal Reserve Board, which took it upon itself in 1936 and 1937 to shrink the volume of credit outstanding in the banking system. The two decisions, though arrived at separately, coincided to produce calamitous effects.

And, unfortunately for Roosevelt’s reputation as an economic policymaker, he cannot take much credit for the boom of the mid-1930s. The major economic stimulus seems to have been an extraordinary annual increase of more than 13 percent

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(on average) in the money supply between 1934 and 1936, due not to any calculated policy but to an influx of gold from politically unstable Europe.*

Federal fiscal policy did little to spur the economic expansion of the mid-1930s. Roosevelt's deficits were unprecedented in peacetime, reaching $3.6 billion during his first full year in office. But raw deficit figures are not a good indicator of how much the economy is being stimulated. Economists today measure the effect of a fiscal policy by calculating the size of the hypothetical surplus that it would produce if the economy were at its full-employment level. The higher the hypothetical surplus, the lower the stimulus. By this standard, Roosevelt's budgets throughout the '30s provided little stimulus in any year except 1936—and then only because Congress passed a $2 billion bonus payment for war veterans over his veto. Indeed, Herbert Hoover's fiscal policy in 1930 and 1931 had about the same effect as any two consecutive New Deal budgets.

It was not until 1938 that Roosevelt finally accepted the principles of Keynesian fiscal policy. Up until then, he had viewed deficits as a necessary evil, tolerable only because Washington had to finance programs to keep people working or, in some cases, eating. When John Maynard Keynes himself had tried to tutor FDR in his theories in 1934, the President was unimpressed. Keynes, he remarked, "left a whole rigamarole of figures. He must be a mathematician rather than a political economist."

Only Four Stripteases

From the start, Roosevelt put his faith instead in "structural" measures that would directly raise prices and wages. If farmers got more money for their crops and workers got more for their labor, they would buy more goods; if there were increased demand and higher prices, businessmen would earn greater profits. This was the rationale behind the two main elements of the New Deal economic program—the Agricultural Adjustment Act, administered by the AAA, and the National Industrial Recovery Act, run by the NRA. "The aim of this whole effort," Roosevelt declared, "is to restore our rich domestic market by raising its vast consuming capacity."

Under the NRA, 765 codes were drawn up to regulate output, fix prices, reduce working hours, and increase wages in various industries. The NRA’s famous blue eagle symbol was

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*The dollar was then a gold-backed currency. The Federal Reserve Board passively allowed the increase in gold reserves to be translated into an expansion of credit in the economy.
seen everywhere as the most obscure industries were urged to adopt special codes. New York's burlesque houses even agreed in a code to allow no more than four stripteases per show. The eagles disappeared abruptly after the Supreme Court declared the act unconstitutional in 1935 on the ground that Congress had delegated too much of its authority to the agency. The AAA was just as far-reaching. In 1933 alone, cotton farmers collected $100 million for taking 10 million acres out of production.

The AAA and NRA did indeed improve the lot of many farmers, workers, and businessmen. But, especially in the case of the NRA, the effect on the economy as a whole was not so positive.

Soaking the Rich?

Any economic stimulus will work itself out in a certain combination of increases in prices and increases in output, or quantities of goods and services produced (national income = prices \times quantities). The NRA, AAA, and other government programs, such as those encouraging collective bargaining agreements, ensured that the economic stimulus provided by an expanding money supply would express itself more in terms of higher prices and less in terms of increased output. Thus, wholesale prices rose by 45 percent between 1933 and 1937—a perverse development at a time when millions of people were out of work and so many factories were operating at reduced capacity.

Higher output would have produced more jobs. In 1936, after two years of recovery, one out of six workers (about 17 percent of the labor force) remained unemployed. By diverting so much of the economy's upward thrust into higher prices, New Deal policymakers inadvertently prolonged the agony of joblessness for millions.

This brings us to the second question: How much did the distribution of income and wealth change during the New Deal?

Between the onset of the Depression in 1929 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, there was a shift toward greater equality of incomes in America for the first time in well over a century. The share of total national income received by families in the bottom two-fifths of the scale rose from 12.5 percent to 15.7 percent; the share of income for the top fifth fell 13 points to 41.6 percent. There was a trend toward greater equality of wealth as well: The share of the national wealth held by the richest one percent of adults fell from 38 percent in 1929 to 22 percent in 1949. The two key questions are: To what extent did these changes take place in 1933–38, the heyday of the New Deal?
THE NEW DEAL

THE MAJOR NEW DEAL AGENCIES

To cope with the Depression and implement New Deal programs, Congress set up scores of new federal entities. Notable among them:

- **Agricultural Adjustment Administration** (1933-42) Raised farm prices by subsidizing reduced crop production.

- **Civil Works Administration** (1933-34) Hired jobless workers, from carpenters to artists, to practice their crafts. Peak enrollment: four million.

- **Civilian Conservation Corps** (1933-42) Employed a total of three million relief recipients to reforest public land and improve national parks under Army supervision.

- **Farm Security Administration** (1937-46) Granted low-interest loans for farm improvements and for land purchases by tenant farmers. Set up model camps for migrant laborers. Spending totaled $1 billion by 1941.

- **Federal Emergency Relief Administration** (1933-37) Financed state-run employment projects. Grants totaled $3 billion.

- **Home Owners Loan Corporation** (1933-51) Refinanced mortgages for home owners in distress. Took over more than one million loans by 1936.

- **National Recovery Administration** (1933-35) Directed government-business cooperation in cutting production and raising prices and wages.

- **Public Works Administration** (1933-39) Provided jobs on major projects (highways and public buildings) for the unemployed. Spent some $6 billion.

- **Works Progress Administration** (1935-43) Spent $11 billion to employ the jobless on small projects, from digging ditches to painting murals in government buildings.

Surviving New Deal agencies include: the Civil Aeronautics Board (formerly Authority); Commodity Credit Corporation; Export-Import Bank; Farm Credit Administration; Federal Communications Commission; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; Federal Housing Administration; Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation; National Labor Relations Board; Rural Electrification Administration; Securities and Exchange Commission; Social Security Administration (formerly Board); Tennessee Valley Authority.
FEDERAL SPENDING DURING THE DEPRESSION

Federal deficits were relatively small during the 1930s and did little to stimulate the economy. Yet by some measures America’s 130 million people were better off by 1940, despite nagging poverty and unemployment.

SOCIAL INDICATORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1980</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marriage rate (per 1,000 pop.)</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Birth rate (per 1,000 pop.)</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
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<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicide rate (per 100,000 pop.)</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>14.9</td>
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<td>Homicide rate (per 100,000 pop.)</td>
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<td>9.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
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<td>Radios (% of households with)</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>81.1</td>
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<td>Telephones (% of households with service)</td>
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<td>40.9</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>96.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annual meat consumption (lbs. per capita)</td>
<td>124.3</td>
<td>121.7</td>
<td>124.2</td>
<td>134.1</td>
<td>120.9</td>
<td>118.6</td>
<td>134.1</td>
<td>157.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>College degrees (per 1,000 persons 23 yrs. old)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>238</td>
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Deal, and to what extent were shifts within that period due to New Deal policies?

In the case of wealth, the answers are simple: The New Deal had no effect. Spurred on by the growing popularity of the flamboyant Louisiana “Kingfish,” Senator Huey Long, and his Share the Wealth movement, Roosevelt pushed stiffer taxes on gifts and estates through Congress in 1935. (William Randolph Hearst, the newspaper mogul, ordered his editors to call Roosevelt’s policies the “Raw Deal” from then on.) Yet the share of wealth held by the richest one percent of the population actually rose from 30 to 33 percent between 1933 and 1939.

The answers are more complicated in the case of income, but one point is quite clear: About two-thirds of the shift toward more equality came in just three years, 1941–44. As in other countries during the 20th century, war was the great equalizer.

The rest of the shift took place sometime between 1929 and 1941. Since there are adequate income statistics for only one intervening point—1935—it is difficult to pin down when much of this more modest change occurred. One can make an educated guess that the steep economic decline in 1929–32 hit those at the upper and lower ends of the income ladder much harder than those in the middle and that the net overall effect was a small increase in inequality of earnings. If so, we can infer that there must have been a significant, though hardly spectacular, increase in income equality after that. But we cannot assume that New Deal policies were responsible for the shift. Other factors, such as the recovery itself and normal changes within the economy, also contributed.

**Benefits for Big Business**

What, then, can we say about the role of federal policy? Higher taxes after 1935 did take a bite out of large incomes. But it is easy to overstate what can be achieved by “soaking the rich.” Wesleyan University economist Stanley Lebergott has pointed out that if Washington had taxed away all personal income over $20,000 in 1970 and distributed it to those below the poverty line, each family would have received just $350. And Roosevelt never contemplated so confiscatory a tax (though he once remarked during World War II that no one needed an after-tax income over $25,000). In fact, the overall tax structure did not become much more progressive during the 1930s.

Roosevelt was rather more adventurous when it came to spending. But the sums expended on public works and relief were never enough (even allowing for a generous "multiplier")
"And if Roosevelt is not reelected, perhaps even a villa in Newport, my dearest sweet" was the caption of this 1936 cartoon.

Effect) to support more than a fraction of the vast numbers of jobless and destitute at anything but a minimum level. Harry Hopkins’s Works Progress Administration, established in 1935 with a budget of $1.4 billion, provided work for only three million of the estimated 10 million unemployed—at wages as low as $19 per month. This was by far the most ambitious New Deal relief effort. Such programs did not, therefore, have much effect on income distribution.

Indeed, it is not at all clear that the government’s money went to those whose absolute need was greatest. The states in the richest region of the country, the West, got 75 percent more federal relief and public works money per capita than those of the poorest region, the South. Anyone with a modicum of cynicism will (rightly) sense politics at work: The “Solid South” fared badly because the Democrats were sure of its electoral support. The Western states did well because their political loyalties were up for grabs.

Still, for all their limitations, the taxing and spending policies of the New Deal did at least slightly narrow the gap between those at the very top and those at the very bottom. Other policies, however, pushed the people in between further apart. The AAA’s crop-restriction and subsidy program, for in-
stance, helped big farmers more than smaller ones. On large farms, with hired labor and large amounts of machinery, fuel, and fertilizer, costs could be cut in many ways when the payments for curtailing acreage began. But smaller farmers who relied on the labor of their families had few extraneous costs to cut. The subsidies were worth comparatively less to them. *

Large-scale operations and influential producers in industry also enjoyed an advantage under the shortlived National Recovery Administration. Big business was generally able to control the formulation and administration of the NRA codes that fixed prices and output; they showed no great concern for the interests of the "little guy."

Contradictions

Even among workers, there was a tendency for the most vulnerable to be left behind. The NRA pushed employers to pay higher wages, and unskilled workers gained even more than their skilled counterparts. Thus, the most dramatic dividing line was not between the skilled and the unskilled, but between those with jobs and those without them.

After the Supreme Court put the NRA out of business in 1935, labor got a new boost from Washington. The landmark National Labor Relations Act of 1935 gave labor unions even more help in their efforts to organize workers (by guaranteeing secret ballots in representation elections, for instance) and allowed them to press wage demands more successfully than before. But, again, higher wages, like higher prices, meant fewer jobs would be created for the unemployed.

The unavoidable conclusion about New Deal economic policy is that, so far as both recovery and redistribution are concerned, FDR's "structural" measures offset much of whatever uplift effect his fiscal policy may have had. There was some progress during the New Deal, but government's contribution to it was scant.

All this, of course, is much clearer in hindsight than it was back then. When one looks over at the political side of the picture, it appears that a distinct majority of the American people at the time seemed quite satisfied with the New Deal—and wanted to play on. Or did they?

Roosevelt's victory in the 1932 election with more than 57

*There was another problem in the South, where there were many sharecroppers who customarily received from the landlord only a share of the crop they grew on his land. The sharecroppers were entitled to a corresponding portion of the AAA payments. But the program was implemented at the local level by farmer committees dominated by landlords, and, especially in cotton-growing areas, the sharecroppers did not get their due.
percent of the vote, and his even more spectacular triumph four years later with more than 60 percent, were the critical points in a massive electoral realignment. He put together a political coalition that has dominated American politics ever since, although the 1980 elections may have changed that. The realignment in the 1930s was the product of two phenomena. One was a switch-over among some Republicans to Roosevelt; the other was a surge of new participants into the electorate.

Prominent among the converts were blacks, who had been attached to the GOP, the party of Lincoln, since the Civil War. (A 1938 Fortune survey showed that 84.7 percent of the blacks polled supported Roosevelt.) But large numbers of white
middle-class progressives and farmers switched as well. (Later, they tended to gravitate back toward the Republican fold.) The new voters included most of the young and many women; they came above all from enclaves of Poles, Italians, and other recent immigrants in the big Northern cities. The upshot was an incongruous coalition whose staunchest elements were "minorities" of all sorts and white Southerners with racist and nativist views.

It is easier to identify who voted for Roosevelt than to be sure precisely why they did so. The farmers and middle-class "swing" voters were probably spurred the Republican Party for its mishandling of the Depression—they had a kind of Hoover hangover. Southerners no doubt continued to vote for...
the Democratic Party largely because it was part of their tradition. The ethnic groups were mobilizing to preserve the relief and public-works jobs that they gained under the New Deal.

Yet the bond between New Deal programs and the general public was never as strong and far-reaching as many people have since assumed. It was during the 1930s that "scientific" public opinion surveys made their debut. The first Gallup poll, taken in September 1935, revealed that 60 percent of a national cross-section thought government expenditures for relief and recovery were "too great" while only nine percent deemed them "too little." In December 1935, 59 percent opposed the AAA; in September 1936, 56 percent were against reviving the NRA.

The message was clear. Roosevelt was much more popular than were his programs. By the end of the 1930s, even his personal popularity was in doubt. In 1938, a bitter Hugh Johnson, whom Roosevelt had fired from his job as head of the NRA, wrote, "The old Roosevelt magic has lost its kick. . . . His Falstaffian army can no longer be kept together and led by a melodious whinny and a winning smile." The Gallup polls suggest that only the war made it possible for FDR to run and win in 1940 and, again, in 1944 (garnering 54.7 and 53.4 percent of the popular vote, respectively).

Sheepskins from Harvard

The lack of widespread ideological support for the New Deal was soon reflected—indeed magnified—in Congress. In 1937, Roosevelt's congressional coalition crumbled, and a bloc of conservative Democrats—mostly from the South—joined with the Republicans to oppose almost all further New Deal legislation. This happened despite the fact that Roosevelt himself had carried every state but two in the 1936 election. (His advisers joked, "As Maine goes, so goes Vermont."). It would be more than a quarter of a century before another reform-minded Democratic President, Lyndon B. Johnson, could overcome that stalemate on Capitol Hill.

The basic animus of these conservative Democrats was directed against the rapid growth of the federal government under Roosevelt. They were also repelled by the growing power of the new bureaucratic breed who were intellectuals first and party operators second. One Congressman complained in mid-1937 that "unless an applicant can murder the broad 'a' and present a Harvard sheepskin he is definitely out."

Another development that stymied FDR during the late 1930s was the growth in the power of interest groups. Since the
late 19th century, they had made their voices heard in Washington on more and more issues. They had won many “pork barrel” concessions, but seldom triumphed on matters of principle. Big Business, for instance, had failed to get from the Republican administrations of the 1920s what it most wanted—a drastic relaxation of the antitrust laws.

A New Power Structure

Roosevelt himself promoted the growth of interest groups after 1933, partly in hopes of defusing criticism of the increasingly powerful bureaucracy he presided over and partly to line up support for the New Deal. The Roosevelt administration worked with the American Farm Bureau Federation, for instance, in designing and running the AAA. The result: The Farm Bureau’s membership increased by 150 percent between 1933 and 1937. Union membership soared under the NRA, and even more under the National Labor Relations Act. The NRA not only allowed Big Business most of what it had wanted but also encouraged the growth of more powerful trade associations.*

But the strategy backfired. Business, disillusioned with the NRA and outraged by New Deal fiscal policy, soon turned against Roosevelt, as the Farm Bureau did later on. Part of the labor movement, led by the fiery John L. Lewis of the new Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), broke with FDR in the late 1930s. Thus, while the creation of a new power structure in Washington was probably Roosevelt’s most lasting achievement, he himself ended up being immobilized by it—one reason why he put so few major New Deal measures before Congress after 1935. Future occupants of the White House would face the same array of powerful interests in and out of Congress.

To a historian born after Roosevelt’s death and writing almost half a century after his first term in office, the New Deal lacks the epic quality that it has for many who lived through it. But my purpose is not to rewrite the New Deal as a tragedy of missed opportunities. In countries with pluralistic political systems and market economies—and not just in those countries—it is difficult for any government to bring about sudden but endur-
ing transformations in the structure of society.

The independent movements, decisions, and mentalities of millions of people are, in other words, more than a match for the flow of paper from the top. Even to begin to alter the existing distribution of income, the democratic state must reach deep into the pockets of taxpayers far down the middle tax brackets—and, for its efforts, it is likely to get its hand bitten. To revitalize an economy from above is no easy matter either. The U.S. government’s share of GNP in the 1930s was still so small that even relatively large increases in spending would not have had decisive results. It may be possible to concentrate political power early in a President’s term, but in a political system whose constitutional underpinnings encourage fragmentation, a reaction is inevitable. No President of the United States has been able to get his own way for long.

This is not to endorse the new conventional wisdom that governments can do nothing constructive. It is simply to say that in complex, advanced societies such as the United States, governments are most effective when they pursue sharply defined ends through consistent, carefully designed means. FDR could have achieved far more with more thought and less action. So, no doubt, could have his heirs of the Johnson years. And those who would repudiate the spirit of the New Deal today are prone to the same incoherence of means, the same inattention to unintended consequences, and the same unrealistic inflation of hopes. As any historian knows, however, it is much easier to see this in retrospect than from the eye of the storm.
THE NEW DEAL

THE LEGACY OF FDR

by William E. Leuchtenburg

During his long Presidency, Franklin Delano Roosevelt so dominated the political culture that historians have called the period “the age of Roosevelt.” In the years since his death, he has continued to cast a giant shadow, especially on the White House. He has had the greatest influence, understandably, on the first three Democrats to succeed him—Harry S Truman, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson. But he has left his mark, too, on Republicans and upon those more remote from the heyday of the New Deal, not excepting the present incumbent.

Each of FDR’s successors has, in different ways, had to cope with the question of how to comport himself with respect to the Roosevelt tradition. Much of America’s political history since 1945 is a reflection of their responses.

On April 12, 1945, as World War II neared its end, Vice President Harry Truman was presiding over a dull Senate debate on a water treaty. When it ended, shortly before sunset, he made his way to the office of the Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn. No sooner had he arrived than the Vice President was told to call the White House. The President’s press secretary wanted him to come down right away, quickly and quietly. When he got there, Mrs. Roosevelt came up to him, put her arm on his shoulder, and said softly, “Harry, the President is dead.” Franklin D. Roosevelt had died that afternoon in Warm Springs, Georgia. After a moment of shock, Truman recovered himself enough to ask Mrs. Roosevelt: “Is there anything I can do for you?” She replied: “Is there anything we can do for you? For you are the one in trouble now.”

That was an odd remark to make to someone who had just ascended to the highest office in the land, but Truman saw immediately that he was indeed “in trouble.” So totally had Roosevelt embodied everyone’s notion of who “the President” was that it seemed incomprehensible that anyone else could hold the office. Many Americans could not remember when there had been anyone but Roosevelt in the White House, and they had assumed without thinking about it that he would be there forever. During the 1944 campaign, according to one story, a man said to a loyal Democrat who had just become father of a
baby boy, “Maybe he’ll grow up to be President.” “Why?” the man replied, “What’s the matter with Roosevelt?”

Truman himself found it difficult to assume his role as Roosevelt’s successor. Five months after he took office, he was still writing Eleanor Roosevelt, “I never think of anyone as the President, but Mr. Roosevelt.” Truman’s deference to Eleanor Roosevelt went well beyond personal solicitude. He began his Presidency, according to one account, by regularly phoning his predecessor’s widow to find out “what he would have done about this or that great problem.” The President “consulted Mrs. Roosevelt as he might have consulted a medium.”

Roosevelt’s “Fifth Term”?

Many of those who had been close to Roosevelt doubted that Truman had a proper appreciation of liberal values or the capacity to translate those values into action. The head of the Tennessee Valley Authority wrote in his journal his response to the news of FDR’s death: “Complete unbelief. That was first. Then a sick, hopeless feeling. Then consternation at the thought of that Throttlebottom, Truman. ‘The country and the world doesn’t deserve to be left this way, with Truman at the head of the country at such a time.’” Some New Dealers decided to abandon the new administration, while others were forced out. By the time of the 1946 midterm elections, little more than a year after V-J Day, not one member of the Roosevelt Cabinet of April 1945 remained.

During the 1946 elections, Truman’s stock fell so low that the Democratic national chairman told the President to stay out of sight, and the party turned to recordings of Roosevelt’s voice instead. In one radio commercial, a discussion of the meat shortage, a voice announced, “Here’s what President Roosevelt had to say about it,” although the shortage had developed after Roosevelt was in the grave. Worse yet, the Democratic Party’s congressional candidates, running for the first time in 16 years without Roosevelt in the White House, lost their majority in both House and Senate. Truman was blamed, not altogether fairly, for lacking FDR’s magic touch.

William E. Leuchtenburg, 59, who will be a Wilson Center Guest Scholar this year, is De Witt Clinton professor of history at Columbia University. Born in New York City, he received a B.A. from Cornell University (1943) and an M.A. (1944) and Ph.D. (1951) from Columbia. He is the author of The Perils of Prosperity, 1914–32 (1958) and Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (1963). This essay is adapted from In the Shadow of FDR, a work in progress.
The end of World War II brought a burst of prosperity, not the new depression that many had predicted. New Deal-style programs, however, were not dismantled but expanded.

As Truman entered the 1948 presidential campaign, he found that much of the contest centered not on what new steps the country should take, but on who was the real heir to Franklin Roosevelt: Truman, or his predecessor in the Vice Presidency, Henry Wallace, who ran as the third-party Progressive candidate. One journalist commented, “Nothing quite like this has happened since the turbulent debate over Lenin’s will.”

To offset Wallace’s appeal to liberals, Truman deliberately based his campaign on an appeal to memories of Roosevelt and the New Deal. “Think of the gains you’ve obtained in the last 16 years—higher wages, Social Security, unemployment compensation, federal loans to save your homes and a thousand other things,” he said. Like Roosevelt after 1932, he campaigned less against his current Republican rival than against Herbert Hoover. Though the odds against him seemed insurmountable, Truman confounded the experts by coming home a winner. (The Democrats also returned to power in the Senate and House.)

Yet even his upset triumph did not get Truman out from under Roosevelt’s shadow. True, people paid tribute to his grit. But all Truman had done, they said, was to scrape by on the basis of the political coalition that Roosevelt had put together.
One of Winston Churchill's American correspondents held a similar view. The victory, Churchill was told, was the result of the "continuation of the policies which had been in effect for the last 16 years." The author of the letter: Harry Truman.

The aftermath was even more troubling for Truman. He had, all along, viewed his role as being that of a caretaker President filling out Roosevelt's fourth term. But now he thought he had been elected in his own right, and everything would be different. It was not to be.

In 1949, Truman tried to establish his own identity by offering a program under a different rubric, the "Fair Deal," with some proposals—such as national health insurance, federal aid to education, and civil rights legislation—that moved a step beyond the Roosevelt agenda. (All of these proposals went down to defeat in Congress.) However, critics regarded the Fair Deal as little more than a warmed-over New Deal; one called Truman's tenure after 1948 "Roosevelt's Fifth Term."

As a consequence, Truman, who had thought of himself as FDR's faithful servant, took a more questioning look at the Roosevelt heritage, particularly in one respect. Long before his term was scheduled to expire, Truman decided not to run for re-election because he disapproved of his predecessor's example in breaking the two-term tradition.

In an April 1950 memorandum, Truman stated: "There is a lure in power. It can get into a man's blood just as gambling and lust for money have been known to do. . . . When we forget the examples of such men as Washington, Jefferson, and Andrew Jackson, all of whom could have had a continuation in the office, then we will start down the road to dictatorship and ruin. I know I could be elected again and continue to break the old precedent as it was broken by F.D.R. It should not be done."

Frustrations

To Truman, who had a keen interest in his place in history, it could not help but seem unfair that he was being perceived only as FDR's stand-in. To be sure, Truman inherited a great many things from Franklin Roosevelt: a broad view of the prerogatives of the chief executive, a legacy of New Deal statutes and agencies, a legislative agenda, a matrix of foreign policy commitments and institutions, a corps of seasoned administrators with ties to academe, and a successful electoral coalition. Yet Truman made his own distinctive contributions—in domestic affairs, a greater emphasis on civil rights, notably in desegregating the military; in foreign policy, the Marshall Plan, the
Berlin airlift, and the intervention to rescue South Korea from communist invasion. But he never managed to walk out from under the giant shadow cast by FDR.

Ten days after Franklin Roosevelt was inaugurated in March 1933, a prominent financier wrote to him: “I just stopped off at Providence to see my oldest daughter at the Sacred Heart Convent. The Mother Superior of the Convent, a real saintly woman, said the nuns were praying for you and then made a remarkable statement for a religious woman to make, ‘That since your inauguration peace seemed to come on the earth; in fact it seemed like another resurrection.’” The man who sent Roosevelt this report was Joseph P. Kennedy.

Family Feud

Five years later, a former Secretary of State met with Joe Kennedy and found that he had a very different attitude toward Roosevelt. Henry Stimson noted in his diary: “Speaking of the effect of [the New Deal] upon himself, Kennedy said that a few years ago he thought he had made money enough to provide for his children. He now saw it likely to be all gone and he lay awake nights over it.”

These two episodes indicate the parameters of the attitudes toward Roosevelt that John Kennedy absorbed as a young man. They may help to explain his failure to share the admiration of other Democrats of his generation for Roosevelt and the detachment with which he viewed the New Deal.

To be sure, the young Jack Kennedy could not escape an awareness of Franklin Roosevelt. He was 15 when Roosevelt came to power, 16 when his father became chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission and hence was linked to FDR in any newspaper Jack was likely to read. Furthermore, Joe Kennedy ran a remarkable dinner table. “I can hardly remember a mealtime,” Robert Kennedy later said, “when the conversation was not dominated by what Franklin D. Roosevelt was doing or what was happening around the world.”

Still, it is striking how little impact Roosevelt appears to have had on Jack Kennedy in his youth. Much of the time he was at school, away from his father and cut off from the events of the Great Depression. “Please send me the Literary Digest,” he wrote from the Canterbury School in the fall of 1930, “because I did not know about the Market Slump until a long time after, or a paper. Please send me some golf balls.” More important, he displayed surprisingly little interest in national affairs as his schooling continued and no enthusiasm for FDR.
AFTER THE NEW DEAL AND WORLD WAR II

THE GOVERNMENT SPENDING "MIX"

PERCENTAGE OF THE U.S. POPULATION IN POVERTY

NEW TRENDS IN FEDERAL SPENDING

Source: Office of Management and Budget; U.S. Council of Economic Advisers; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census and Bureau of Economic Analysis.

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The signals Jack Kennedy received became even more confusing after December 1937 when Roosevelt appointed his father Ambassador to Great Britain. On the one hand, Jack, who was then in his third year at Harvard, understood that Roosevelt had bestowed a singular honor on an Irish Catholic of rude origins. On the other hand, Jack’s father, as Ambassador, took an attitude toward foreign affairs markedly different from FDR’s. The President became increasingly disturbed at reports that his envoy was saying that the Nazis could not be defeated, that the Jews were running America, and that Roosevelt would go down to defeat in 1940. At the 1940 Democratic convention, Jack’s older brother, Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., then being groomed for a political career, voted to deny Roosevelt nomination for a third term. The elder Kennedy resigned his post at the Court of St. James’s the same year.

Less Profile, More Courage

Worse was still to come. During the war, Joe Kennedy, Jr., the apple of his father’s eye, was killed, and Joe Kennedy never forgave Roosevelt for it. In 1945, when the nation was plunged into grief by the death of Roosevelt, Joe Kennedy wrote to his daughter, “There is . . . no doubt that it was a great thing for the country.”

In 1946, Jack Kennedy was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. As a Congressman from a Boston waterfront district, however, he showed a curious lack of zeal to identify himself as a Roosevelt liberal. To be sure, he often voted with New Deal Democrats, but not always and with little ardor. He never joined any of the leading liberal organizations, did not seem to feel much empathy for the poor, and voted to slash funds for that archetypal New Deal project, the Tennessee Valley Authority. Furthermore, he more than once traced his country’s difficulties in foreign affairs to “a sick Roosevelt” at the 1945 Yalta Conference with Stalin and Churchill.

If Kennedy expressed disdain (in private) for Roosevelt liberals during the 1950s, they returned it in kind. As Burton Hersh, Ted Kennedy’s biographer, wrote: “The tendency among the . . . twilight-burnished New Deal liberals of the period . . . was to see this standard-bearer of a second generation bid for

*The New Deal*

*Government spending (state, local, and federal) grew from 22 percent of GNP during the late 1940s to 40 percent in 1980. Postwar federal domestic outlays rose most rapidly under a Republican President, Richard Nixon. Economic growth and government programs, meanwhile, dramatically reduced poverty.*

The Wilson Quarterly: Spring 1982

83
political power as callow and opportunistic, able to summon up a little too self-consciously . . . a moderately recherché text from Burke or Stendhal or Dante or Duff Cooper."

He had one particularly sharp critic, Eleanor Roosevelt, the keeper of the liberal flame. When Kennedy went after the Democratic vice presidential nomination in 1956, Mrs. Roosevelt embarrassed him in public by asking him why he had not spoken out against Senator Joseph McCarthy. Kennedy had made himself particularly vulnerable on this question by writing a book with the title Profiles in Courage. This opened him to the gibe that he should have shown less profile and more courage. Kennedy, for his part, demonstrated little interest in assuaging the doubts of the Roosevelt liberals.

But in 1960 a change came. When he sought the Democratic presidential nomination that year, a pollster told Kennedy that it was essential to identify himself with FDR and liberal ideals if he hoped to win the critical state of West Virginia, where pic-
tures of Roosevelt could be found in almost every coal miner's home. Kennedy took this advice. He even imported Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. to campaign for him. In one speech, FDR Jr. declared, "My daddy and Jack Kennedy's daddy were just like that!" as he raised two fingers tightly together, a notion that astonished those with long memories. In addition, at Joe Kennedy's suggestion, thousands of letters with FDR Jr.'s signature were mailed to West Virginia voters bearing the postmark of Hyde Park, New York, the ancestral Roosevelt home. Kennedy was victorious in the West Virginia primary and that put him well on his way to winning the presidential nomination.

Eleanor as Den Mother

John Kennedy had now crossed a divide. For the first time in his life, he was identifying himself with Franklin Roosevelt. Some liberals were quick to take him at his word, but one person remained unconvinced: Eleanor Roosevelt. In a last-ditch attempt to deny Kennedy the nomination in favor of Adlai Stevenson, she flew to the Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles. "It seems absurd," she said with a twist of the knife, "to accept anyone as second best until you have done all you can do to get the best." After Kennedy won the nomination, she left the convention in tears.

As President, Kennedy satisfied some of the skeptics by showing an abiding interest in the style of Franklin Roosevelt. So many of the people who joined Kennedy's White House staff had intellectual backgrounds reminiscent of the New Deal bureaucrats that one Republican, eyeing a cadre of presidential assistants on Capitol Hill, said, "All they need now is Eleanor Roosevelt to be den mother." Kennedy took pains to seek Mrs. Roosevelt's counsel. The political scientist Lawrence Fuchs of Brandeis has observed that as early as the spring of 1961, "the relationship between the President and the Lady was blooming." By the end of Kennedy's first year in office, one could no longer discern even a smoldering ember of the old Kennedy-Roosevelt family animosity.

At a policy level, too, Kennedy drew upon the Roosevelt tradition, at least in part because there was no other source for a Democratic President to turn to for ideas. In the realm of domestic affairs, he reinstituted a modest food stamp plan that had originated in the New Deal, put through a watered-down $900 million Public Works Acceleration Act that derived from the Public Works Administration, modeled both his farm support and conservation programs in part on the legislation of the
1930s, and sketched out plans for an assault on poverty that drew upon FDR’s relief operations. No less revealing was the lineage of his foreign policy. He instructed his advisers to come up with a catch phrase like FDR’s “Good Neighbor” policy (“Alliance for Progress” was the answer), and he appropriated Roosevelt’s term, quarantine, for his strategy during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. On the eve of taking office, he said: “In the final analysis, our foreign policy, our relations with other countries, will be most affected by what we do here in the United States. It was Franklin Roosevelt’s compassionate actions here at home that built his great reputation abroad. What we are speaks much louder than what we say.”

Yet, for all he owed to Roosevelt’s style, for all of his efforts to cultivate the Roosevelt family, for all of his indebtedness to particular ideas of the earlier period, neither Kennedy nor the men around him thought that the Roosevelt legacy was really pertinent to the 1960s. On one occasion, holding up a memo from a White House aide, he said to a caller, “Look at that, will you? Seven single-spaced pages. And what a lot of blankety-blank. I dearly love this man. He has a fine mind and some fine ideas, but in this case. . . .” He paused, then said with a trace of a smile, “He is proposing that I conduct myself as Franklin Roosevelt did in 1933, but this fellow can’t get through his head that first, I’m not FDR and this is 1963, not 1933. . . . Roosevelt faced one central problem, the Depression, and he could take more liberties with domestic matters than I could possibly enjoy today. Also, in 1933, there were no nuclear bombs or missiles or jet aircraft or Cold War.”

Escaping History

No sooner had Kennedy died than historians and publicists felt compelled to assign him a place in history, and once more the comparison to Roosevelt seemed inevitable. Some regretted the fact that Kennedy’s premature death denied him the chance to roll up the achievements of an FDR. It was, wrote Arthur Schlesinger, the sympathetic biographer of both men, as if Roosevelt had been killed at the end of 1935. However, other writers, recognizing how much Roosevelt had accomplished by 1935, emphasized how thin Kennedy’s record was.

But while historic assessment was going on, something more important was happening: Kennedy was becoming part not of history but of myth. As Theodore White has written: “More than any other President since Lincoln, John F. Kennedy has become myth. The greatest President in the stretch between
them was, of course, Franklin D. Roosevelt; but it was difficult to make myth of Franklin Roosevelt, the country squire, the friendly judge, the approachable politician, the father figure. . . . Kennedy was cut off at the promise, not after the performance, and so it was left to television and his widow, Jacqueline, to frame the man as legend.

Had Kennedy lived, he could not have escaped comparison to Roosevelt, and he might well have been judged never to have measured up to him. But by becoming part of myth rather than history, Kennedy was at last outside the shadow cast by FDR.

The Greatest of Them All?

A short time after Harry Truman left Speaker Rayburn’s office on the afternoon of April 12, 1945, a young Texas Congressman showed up. He had first come to Congress in the spring of 1937 in a special election at a crucial moment for President Roosevelt. Only 29 years old, he had run as an outright supporter of FDR’s controversial plan to “pack” the recalcitrant Supreme Court with New Deal supporters.

Opponents of Roosevelt’s scheme, including most of the press, said that the country was against it, while the President claimed that the people were with him. When the young outsider was victorious, his triumph was hailed as a vote of confidence for Roosevelt. The President himself, then on a fishing vacation in the Gulf of Mexico, arranged to have him at the Galveston pier when his yacht docked and invited him to ride with him on the northbound train from Houston. The new Congressman’s name: Lyndon Baines Johnson. Roosevelt offered Johnson some fatherly advice and gave him the telephone number of one of his closest aides.

Washington quickly reached the conclusion that Johnson was FDR’s pet Congressman. Roosevelt was once heard to remark, “That’s the kind of man I could have been if I hadn’t had a Harvard education.” The President understood that on most issues he had Johnson’s vote in his pocket, and Johnson in turn had easy access to the White House. When Johnson learned the news of Roosevelt’s death in Speaker Rayburn’s office, he was grief-stricken. “He was like a daddy to me, always. He was the one person I ever knew—anywhere—who was never afraid.”

When in November 1963, Johnson succeeded to the Presidency, he declared openly that Franklin Roosevelt was his model. Johnson surrounded himself with advisers who had been luminaries of the New Deal—Abe Fortas, Jim Rowe, Tommy Corcoran (the man whose telephone number FDR had given him

The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1982

87
"We stand at the edge of the greatest era in the life of any nation," President Lyndon Baines Johnson declared in 1964. "For the first time in world history, we have the abundance and the ability to free every man from hopeless want... [T]his generation has man's first chance to create a Great Society."

During the next two years, under LBJ's prodding, Congress established no less than 21 new health programs, 17 others for assisting education, 15 for economic development, 12 for urban aid, and four for manpower training. The initial cost when all was in place: $11 billion in 1966, only 10 percent of the federal budget, which was then just beginning to feel the impact of the Vietnam War.

Some of the Great Society measures were simple (albeit generous) extensions of federal transfer payments, conceived during the New Deal, to the needy. Thus, the number of recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (first set up under FDR) rose from 3.5 million in 1962 to five million in 1967 (and to 10.8 million in 1980). Created in 1965, federal health insurance for the aged (Medicare) and for the poor (Medicaid) represented steps toward universal coverage that had been on the Democrats' agenda since FDR's day. Together, they cost $64 billion in 1980.

In various minor ways, Washington had long been involved in local public education. But under LBJ's Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Congress authorized no less than $1 billion to fund "compensatory" classes for "disadvantaged" children. The Head Start program (first appropriation: $96 million) was designed to provide special instruction, nutrition, and guidance for some 200,000 disadvantaged preschoolers. And in 1965, Congress passed the Higher Education Act, providing (among other things) loans and

26 years before (1956), Ben Cohen—and he borrowed freely from the New Deal experience. Roosevelt's Civilian Conservation Corps served as the inspiration for the Job Corps of Johnson's War on Poverty, and the National Youth Administration of the 1930s became the basis for the Youth Corps of the '60s.

President Johnson's chief assistant, Bill Moyers, once told me: "Johnson's relation to FDR was like that of Plato to Socrates. He was Roosevelt's pupil. Roosevelt may not have known

The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1982
88
grants to low-income college students.

Social engineering began with LBJ's ambitious 1964 Economic Opportunity Act — creating the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). One new program was the Job Corps, which brought 30,000 poor teenagers each year to live in 95 special camps where, it was hoped, they would learn both a trade and good work habits. The short-lived Model Cities program — "the Johnson administration's great adventure in structural tinkering," according to legal scholar Lance Liebman — was supposed to renovate slums and reinforce local social services in a carefully targeted drive to break the "cycle of poverty" in 150 cities.

Much Great Society legislation was aimed at ending racial discrimination. Through such measures as the 1964 Civil Rights Act (which banned discrimination in voting, employment, and public facilities), and the 1965 Voting Rights Act (which outlawed "Jim Crow" restrictions on blacks' right to vote), Congress tried to bring blacks and other minority groups into the American mainstream.

Some endeavors went further. Through creation of OEO's nationwide Legal Services Program, Congress gave minorities a powerful advocate in local courts. The OEO's Community Action Program was designed to enlist the "maximum feasible participation" of the poor in administering local antipoverty efforts. Such federal efforts soon sparked opposition from jealous local elected officials. Apathy, confusion, and red tape plagued urban uplift. Legal services lawyers were accused of radicalism and worse.

Community Action, OEO, and Model Cities no longer exist, even as civil rights laws remain in force. The future of the Legal Services Program (now Corporation) is uncertain. Medicare, Medicaid, student aid: These are the major Great Society innovations that will probably survive in some form for generations. Their intent was clear; their goals were attainable. They involved direct financial help to the needy. These measures, ironically, were closest in spirit to the main thrust of the New Deal that Lyndon Johnson had hoped to leave in the shade.

this, but Johnson was always studying him. The influence of Roosevelt on Johnson is like the mark a prehistoric river leaves in a cavern. If you go to some place like the Luray Caverns, you may not see the old river but you sense its presence everywhere.

Johnson, though, wanted a great deal more than to be FDR's follower. He had gargantuan ambitions. He would not be content to go down in the history books merely as a successful
President in the Roosevelt tradition. He wanted instead to be "the greatest of them all, the whole bunch of them." And to be the greatest President in history, he would need not merely to match Roosevelt's performance but to exceed it. Indeed, on Election Night 1964, a reporter, expecting him to be jubilant over his landslide victory over Senator Barry Goldwater, was startled to find him peevish instead. He had no doubt that he had beaten Goldwater, but he was still not sure that his percentage of the vote was greater than FDR's in 1936. (It was; Johnson won 61.1 percent of the popular vote versus FDR's 60.8 percent.) Johnson was not running against Goldwater. He was running against Roosevelt.

When I spoke to President Johnson at the White House in the fall of 1965, he made clear to me exactly how he measured himself against Roosevelt. He said: "He did get things done. There was regulation of business, but that was unimportant.

Representative Lyndon Johnson joins FDR in Galveston in May 1937. Johnson's district was a top federal aid recipient during the New Deal.
Social Security and the Wagner Act (the National Labor Relations Act) were all that really amounted to much, and none of it compares to my education act."

If Johnson's claims were excessive, it was because Roosevelt was such a hard act to follow. Roosevelt did so many things for the first time that he pre-empted a huge amount of territory. Johnson could rightly claim that "the fabulous 89th Congress" had enacted a bevy of laws that went beyond the New Deal—not only federal aid to education but also Medicare, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and even a program to create "vest pocket" parks in cities. And Johnson's Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), established in 1964 by the previous Congress, went well beyond the New Deal in attempting to enlist the "maximum feasible participation" of the poor in federal efforts to eradicate poverty.

Yet the OEO, budgeted at only $237 million in 1965, was a small part of Johnson's program. Much of what he did was merely a gloss on the legislation of the Roosevelt years. Commentators had no doubt about the pedigree. One called the Johnson program a "Second New Deal," while another wrote flatly, "The Great Society is an attempt to codify the New Deal's vision of a good society."

Stumbling over Vietnam

Johnson was unwilling merely to remain in Roosevelt's shadow not only because of his vaulting ambitions but also because, in one crucial aspect, Johnson thought of FDR as a bad example. He had seen a President win an overwhelming victory at the polls in 1936 and then have his expectations explode only a few months later when the Court-packing bill went down to defeat. Never again would the prospects for New Deal reform be so promising. Johnson, too, had just won a landslide victory. But over lunch in 1964 Johnson told reporters that he meant to avoid Roosevelt's error. One of those present that day, Tom Wicker, later wrote: "Lyndon Johnson would not . . . carelessly throw away the fruits of his great victory for some unattainable goal, as Roosevelt had done in trying to pack the Supreme Court. But he did. . . . Like Roosevelt before him, he . . . scaled the heights only—in the blindness of his pride—to stumble and fall."

The stumble and fall came in foreign affairs, where, at least as much as in domestic policy, Franklin Roosevelt served as his model. Johnson was certain that in pressing the war in Vietnam he was doing only what Roosevelt would have done. (It is by no means clear that this is so—Roosevelt, in fact, had been sym-
pathetic to the anti-colonialists in Indochina.) Not only did Johnson analogize the communist challenge in Southeast Asia to that posed by Hitler at Munich, but he even proposed to establish a TVA in the Mekong Basin. By carrying the ideas of the Roosevelt years far beyond FDR's achievement, he anticipated that he would be rewarded with glory that would put Roosevelt in his shadow.

However, by early 1968, Johnson had come to realize that he had reached the end of the road. The outcry and domestic disorder over Vietnam led Johnson to recognize that he had not escaped FDR's difficulties of 1937 after all. Roosevelt survived the Court-packing crisis, but for Johnson it was all over.

As he contemplated the painful decision not to seek re-election, the most vivid memory of the Roosevelt years returned to him. "He recalled coming in as a Congressman and seeing FDR immobilized domestically over the Supreme Court issue," Walt Rostow has reported. "He felt that he could beat Nixon but wouldn't be able to accomplish anything in his second term. He had too many 'tin cans' tied to him."

Fading Away?

Even after he left office, he continued to claim that history would vindicate him, but not even a man of Lyndon Johnson's enormous ego could any longer believe that history would say that he had placed Roosevelt in his penumbra.

To some, it seemed that Johnson had come to grief because he had tried to apply FDR's ideas when they had ceased to be germane. The historian Eric Goldman, who served on Johnson's White House staff, has written: "America had been rampaging between the 1930s and the 1960s. The alterations were so swift and so deep that the country was changing right out from under President Lyndon Johnson. [Johnson] was about as contemporary as padded shoulders, a night at the radio, and Clark Gable."

Implicit in such an analysis are two assumptions: that Johnson's last year spelled the end of the Roosevelt tradition and that the Roosevelt legacy is no longer usable.

But both of these contentions are open to challenge.

Every four years, the pundits say that the Roosevelt coalition is finished, and every four years the Democratic voting configuration, though modified, bears a striking resemblance to what it was under FDR. When Jimmy Carter launched his presidential campaign in 1976, he did so not in the traditional place—Detroit's Cadillac Square—but in Warm Springs, Georgia; when he chose to address the country on the energy crisis,
he deliberately chose the format of the fireside chat.

Even Republican Presidents have bowed to the Roosevelt tradition. Eisenhower, though he did not wish to emulate Roosevelt, strengthened many New Deal programs, such as Social Security, and dismantled none. Richard Nixon borrowed from Roosevelt’s experience with price controls, while allowing, however grudgingly, rapid growth in the social spending that had begun in the 1930s and increased during the ’60s. During the 1980 campaign, Ronald Reagan, who had voted for Roosevelt four times, quoted from FDR so extensively that the New York Times entitled its lead editorial on the Republican convention “Franklin Delano Reagan.”

Still, the legacy of FDR appears to be waning. Nixon, Carter, and Reagan all have acknowledged the influence of Roosevelt, but largely as a matter of ritual. Carter, the technocrat from Georgia, failed to inspire the elements of the FDR coalition in his party in good part because he was so far removed from the Roosevelt tradition in spirit and substance. Reagan may quote at length from Roosevelt, but at the same time he seeks to dismember New Deal–style programs. He has even suggested that the New Deal was modeled on Italian fascism. And some see evidence in the 1980 election that we have entered a new age in which the shadow of FDR will disappear.

That is not a conclusion one should embrace too quickly. The 1980 outcome gives little evidence of being a radical realignment like that of 1932, and the Republican success may prove to be short-lived. Though there is a widely felt sense that liberal Democrats must rethink their premises, the leaders of the party—Fritz Mondale and Ted Kennedy—are both Roosevelt legatees. No one will any longer live in FDR’s shadow, as Harry Truman, John Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson did, but it may be a considerable time before Roosevelt’s presence is not felt at all.
The term "New Deal" is convenient shorthand for various things: an era, a series of programs, a philosophy, a cluster of personalities, a collage of national memories and myths. If it is difficult to analyze the New Deal, it is even harder to fathom the complicated man who brought it to pass. The more one learns, the more one yearns to know.

Thus, it has taken four volumes—The Apprenticeship, The Ordeal, The Triumph, and Launching the New Deal, (Little, Brown, 1952, 1954, 1956, & 1973, respectively)—for historian Frank Freidel, in what is doubtless the definitive biography, to move from Roosevelt's childhood to the end of his First Hundred Days in office.

Roosevelt's patrician character was formed early. When young Franklin's mother reprimanded him for being high-handed with his playmates, Freidel writes, Roosevelt replied, "Mummie, if I didn't give the orders, nothing would happen."

As a young man, Roosevelt was strongly influenced by his distant cousin, Theodore, a vigorous leader who told Franklin during one of his infrequent visits to the White House that "men of good background and education owed their country public service."

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once remarked that FDR had a "second-rate intellect but a first-rate temperament." James MacGregor Burns reaches the same conclusion in his highly readable, two-volume biography, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (Harcourt, 1956, cloth; 1963, paper) and Roosevelt: Soldier of Freedom (Harcourt, 1970, cloth; 1973, paper). Burns describes the 32nd President as a man of "no fixed convictions about methods and policies" whose chief tenet was "improvise."

Even so, writes historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Roosevelt never wavered in his efforts to create a society "as good as human ingenuity can devise and fit for the children of God."

Schlesinger's three-volume The Age of Roosevelt—The Crisis of the Old Order (Houghton, 1957, cloth & paper); The Coming of the New Deal (Houghton, 1959, cloth & paper); The Politics of Upheaval (Houghton, 1960, cloth; 1967, paper)—is the most comprehensive history of domestic affairs during Roosevelt's first term. It suffers, however, from Schlesinger's chronic tendency to view himself as one of FDR's intellectual apostles.

FDR steals less of the show (and gets a mixed review) in William E. Leuchtenburg's Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (Harper, 1963, cloth; 1975, paper). Leuchtenburg considers the achievements of the New Deal a "halfway revolution." He concludes nevertheless that, despite its failure to solve many inherited problems, and its propensity for creating new ones, the New Deal probably changed America for the better.

Above all, Leuchtenburg argues, Roosevelt proved that democratic governments were disposed to respond, and could respond with at least partial effectiveness, to traumatic economic and social crises. This was no small accomplishment.
"at a time when democracy was under attack elsewhere in the world"—notably in Germany and Italy.

As a key member of the "Brains Trust" that advised President Roosevelt, Raymond Moley was in the thick of things from the start. But as he makes clear in After Seven Years (Harper, 1939; Da Capo, 1972), he soon became disillusioned with the "unskillful combinations of Gothic, Byzantine, and Le Corbusier" that comprised the social architecture of the New Deal.

Moley had at first deemed Roosevelt's freedom from dogma a virtue, but the "autointoxication of the intelligence" that lured FDR into contradictory policies ultimately drove him away. Moley felt that the New Deal sputtered ingloriously to a halt because Roosevelt tried to accomplish too much too quickly.

Roosevelt's quixotic nature was the despair of all who worked closely with him—and an endless source of fascination. "I cannot come to grips with him," complained the irascible Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, no easy person to get along with himself. The almost daily entries in Ickes's three-volume Secret Diary (Simon & Schuster, 1953–54; Da Capo, 1974) provide a sometimes narrow but always penetrating view of the political struggles, great and small, within the administration.

The man who may have understood Roosevelt's freedom from dogma best was Harry Hopkins, the "minister of relief" who presided over the Works Progress Administration and Federal Emergency Relief Administration. During the war years, he served as Roosevelt's personal emissary to Churchill, Stalin, and other heads of state. His career is exhaustively chronicled in Robert E. Sherwood's Roosevelt and Hopkins (Grosset, 1950).

During the 1930s, Hopkins employed journalist Lorena Hickock as his confidential "eyes and ears" in the field to keep him apprised of the progress of New Deal relief programs. Her vivid dispatches have been collected in One Third of a Nation (Univ. of Ill., 1981), edited by Richard Lowitt and Maurine Beasley.

In June 1934, Hickock prepared an optimistic report on the Tennessee Valley Authority, then employing some 10,000 men:

Thousands of them are residents of the valley, working five and a half hours a day, five days a week, for a really LIVING wage. Houses are going up for them to live in... And in their leisure time they are studying—farming, trades, the arts of living, preparing themselves for the fuller lives they are to lead in that Promised Land. You are probably saying, "Oh, come down to earth!" But that's the way the Tennessee Valley affects one these days.

Roosevelt's critics were numerous. On one flank were the disillusioned progressives—among them, journalist Walter Lippman and California's Senator Hiram Johnson—who make up the cast of Otis L. Graham, Jr.'s An Encore for Reform (Oxford, 1967). Most of them supported the New Deal at the outset but broke with FDR for carrying his reforms too far.

On the populist side, FDR's chief foe was Huey P. Long, the Louisiana Senator assassinated in 1935. A one-time Roosevelt supporter, Long was embittered by the President's reluctance to embrace more sweeping reforms, such as a drastic redistribution of wealth.

In the end, argues T. Harry Williams in Huey Long (Knopf, 1969, cloth; Random, 1981, paper), the
"Kingfish" was corrupted by his own quest for ever more power to accomplish ever more good. But Williams believes that the Senator's goals and the President's were remarkably similar, differing only in degree.

New Left historian Howard Zinn echoes many of Huey Long's complaints in his introduction to New Deal Thought (Bobbs-Merrill, 1966, paper only), a useful collection of speeches and essays from the 1930s by New Dealers and their critics on both the Left and the Right.

Zinn finds much to praise in the free-wheeling intellectual debate of the New Deal years. But he faults Roosevelt for failing to bring lasting help to the "permanent army of the unemployed; the poverty-ridden people blocked from public view by the huge prosperous and fervently consuming middle class."

In A New Deal for Blacks (Oxford, 1978, cloth; 1981, paper), Harvey Sitkoff agrees—up to a point. While FDR did not attempt to end racial discrimination, he did extend the benefits of such New Deal programs as the WPA to blacks. Ultimately, Sitkoff contends, the New Deal's most important contributions lay in creating a tradition of reform and in making explicit as never before "the federal government's recognition of and responsibility for the plight of Afro-Americans."

A New Deal experiment more notable for its aspirations than its achievements was the "back to the land" movement, promoted by several federal agencies. In Tomorrow a New World: The New Deal Community Program (Cornell, 1959), Paul K. Conkin writes that the movement reflected both a tradition of agrarian romanticism and the utopian thinking of social theorists. Approximately 100 newly created communities, mostly in the South and Southwest, brought "more tangible enduring achievements" than most other relief expenditures of the time, Conkin concludes, even though no more than 10,000 families were involved. One forgotten legacy of the programs: the impetus they gave to latter-day urban planning.

Another of Roosevelt's reforms, more Machiavellian than utopian, was his oft-forgotten reorganization of the executive branch. In 1939, at FDR's prompting, Congress authorized the creation of an Executive Office of the President, placing the Bureau of the Budget, the National Resources Planning Board, and a host of other agencies more firmly within the President's grasp.

As Barry D. Karl argues in Executive Reorganization and Reform in the New Deal (Harvard, 1963), the reform did not alter the balance of power among the three branches of government, but it did allow future Presidents to control potential in-house critics and, paradoxically, to isolate themselves.

While the White House was consolidating its power within Washington, the federal government was extending its authority over the states. James T. Patterson argues in The New Deal and the States (Princeton, 1969) that the ebbing of the states' power was due more to their inability to meet a crisis of national proportions than to any conscious decisions in Washington.

Harry Truman inherited the New Deal's legacy of federal activism but not the Depression-era sense of crisis that legitimized it. His challenge, during a period of both prosperity and inflation, was to translate the "emergency" measures of the 1930s into an enduring liberal program.

In Beyond the New Deal (Colum-
Alonzo L. Hamby maintains that Truman succeeded in this task. By combining Keynesian economics and "Fair Deal" social programs at home and adopting a firm anti-communist stance abroad, Truman established a postwar liberal consensus that helped keep the Democratic Party at the "vital center" of American politics.

But America's liberal reformers had to wait almost 20 years after Franklin Roosevelt's death to see anything comparable to the New Deal. Some of the thrill returned in 1964 when Lyndon Johnson embarked on the ambitious program of economic and social renewal he called the Great Society even as he intervened militarily in Vietnam. The most comprehensive assessment is *The Great Society* (Basic, 1974, cloth & paper), edited by Eli Ginzberg and Robert M. Solow. Its contributors focus on LBJ's initiatives in specific areas—health, education, welfare, income redistribution, housing and urban renewal, manpower training, black poverty. "The record of the Great Society," the editors conclude, "is one of successes mixed with failures . . . as any sensible person should have expected."

Some programs, such as Medicare and remedial education, worked fairly well. The "War on Poverty" initiatives—e.g., the Community Action Program, the Model Cities program—did not: "The promises were extreme; the specific remedial actions were untried and untested; the finances were grossly inadequate; the political structure was . . . vulnerable."

What of the New Deal that LBJ hoped to outshine?

A generation is still alive that remembers Roosevelt and holds him in high esteem; younger generations have grown up taking his achievements for granted. Franklin Roosevelt's programmatic legacy—Social Security, welfare, unemployment insurance, broad regulation of business—remains largely intact, and despite the new conservatism in Washington, no politician dares renounce it.

Among scholars, the debate continues over whether the promise of the New Deal was really fulfilled. Some believe that FDR ignored or overlooked opportunities for reform and failed to deliver the fruits of the New Deal to all Americans. It is a useful debate, and I think Roosevelt, were he alive today, might be pleased to learn that he is still the subject of controversy.

—Linda J. Lear

EDITOR'S NOTE: Ms. Lear, adjunct associate professor of history at George Washington University, is working on a biography of Harold Ickes.
Izaak Walton once likened mathematics to fishing: Both are solitary pursuits that "can never be fully learnt." Yet mathematics has a loathsome reputation. It frightens many people and may bore the rest. In its highest reaches, it seems to defy common sense. There are 17,000 mathematicians in the United States today, almost all of them employed by universities or by flourishing "high-tech" corporations. Their ranks include brilliant theorists, yeoman problem-solvers, colorful eccentrics, classroom drones. The discipline has progressed by leaps and bounds since 1900; the past decade has been especially fruitful. But few Americans understand the achievements of modern mathematics or its contributions to the workings of an industrial society. The federal government is more appreciative; Washington plans to create two national mathematical "institutes," one at the University of Minnesota, the other at the University of California, Berkeley. Here, mathematician Rick Norwood explains some of the advances of recent years—and describes the unsolved problems that his colleagues seek to answer.

by Rick Norwood

All mathematics is divided into three parts. Roughly, these parts are the study of number systems, called algebra; the study of geometrical spaces, called topology; and the study of functions, called analysis. There are also a few islands—number theory and set theory, for example—and two vast continents that have broken off from the mainland and are drifting out to sea: computer science and statistics.

Most mathematicians identify with one or more of
these disciplines, and it is almost impossible to keep up with any but the most important results outside one's own area, a song of woe heard in other lands than mathematics.

The total amount of mathematics written in this century probably exceeds the total of all previous centuries taken together. In 1980, more than 64,000 pages of new mathematics were published. Not everyone in the field today (perhaps not anyone) is a Newton or a Gauss, but much of the mathematics now being done meets extremely high standards of originality and excellence. Much has been discovered that is startling and beautiful.

Most people think of mathematics as a dry, cobwebbed science, written by Euclid on tablets of stone and passed down through the ages from teacher to student until all are bent under the load—as the domain of hoary eccentrics at one extreme, and of fearful schoolmasters at the other. It has long been the butt of jokes. "I have hardly ever met a mathematician capable of reasoning," Plato once said. To see mathematics exhibit grace and elegance, then, is as surprising as the sight, in Shōgun, of the warrior Toranaga dancing on the battlements. Nevertheless, it dances.

Topology is my own field. To me, the fascination of multidimensional geometric shapes is unending. One can easily visualize only the simplest of these things—the curious Klein bottle, for instance; the sphere; the doughnut-shaped torus. The rest one can never really "see"; they can be manipulated only in one's head. Or one can try (as I have tried) to convey their properties by employing seven colors of chalk while simultaneously using bodily gestures to simulate motion. I'll save topology for last. First, a brief word about computer science and statistics.

Statistics is the science that nearly got saccharin banned in 1977 on the basis of a study of 630 cancer patients by the National Cancer Institute of Canada. It is also the science used in the 1979 U.S. National Cancer Institute study of more than 3,000 patients that won saccharin a reprieve. When properly applied (e.g., by a life insurance company), statistics is as "true" and as useful as any other mathematics.

Computer science, meanwhile, has moved into our living rooms and seems there to stay. Already, computers build Toyotas and play games with us. Tomorrow, they may do housework. The day after tomorrow, they may tell us that they don't do windows.
Computers have revolutionized commerce, communications, government; they are an indispensable tool in engineering and in all of the physical sciences.

While mathematics gave birth to computer science and statistics (in the case of the former, electrical engineering was the father), both have largely packed up and moved out, perhaps because of mathematicians' schoolmarmish insistence on right answers.

The problems with statistics are obvious. Given the real-world constraints of time, money, or a client's needs, there is a tendency to cut corners. Much of the statistical data published these days is quite misleading. Computer scientists, for their part, are primarily interested in programs that will be reasonably reliable. But no program is perfect, and a good mathematician can usually come up with some "input" that will overload a computer's memory. I can sometimes befuddle my own pocket calculator by asking it to perform certain chores that could quite easily be worked out with pencil and paper.

Does it sound as if I take a dim view of mathematics' glamorous offspring? I don't, really. I am impressed by the power of modern statistics and staggered by the advances in computers. If anything, I am a little envious. I wish simply to note a difference. Applied mathematics asks, "How can we accomplish such-and-such in a practical and efficient way?" Pure mathematics asks, "What is? What different kinds of mathematical objects can exist?"

Take "group theory."

Algebra, as I have mentioned, is a study of number systems. The algebra one learns in high school is an important example, but it bears the same relation to what a mathematician means by algebra as the study of lions bears to zoology. Mathematicians classify number systems according to their properties, just as zoologists classify animals. A warm-blooded animal that suckles its young is a mammal. A set with one operation that is associative and has identity and inverses is a group. (An example of an operation would be addition or multiplication.) The associative law is 

\[(a+b)+c = a+(b+c).\]

In other words, when adding...
three or more numbers, you can drop the parentheses without being ambiguous. The law of identity is that \( 0 + a = a + 0 = a \). The law of inverses is that \( a + (-a) = (-a) + a = 0 \).

The whole numbers form a group, but so do matrices, polynomials, and functions. Quite a lot of things can play the role of numbers in abstract algebra, just as, in a court of law, the Interior Department, the Sierra Club, and Exxon may all be considered, legally, to be "individuals." If you find this troublesome, refer to Whitehead (below).

"Now, it cannot be too clearly understood that, in science, technical terms are names arbitrarily assigned, like Christian names to children. There can be no question of the names being right or wrong. They may be judicious or injudicious. . . . The essential principle involved was quite clearly enunciated in Wonderland to Alice by Humpty Dumpty, when he told her, apropos of his use of words, 'I pay them extra and make them mean what I like.'"

—Alfred North Whitehead,
*An Introduction to Mathematics* (1911)

Groups occur in all branches of mathematics, and in theoretical physics as well, notably in the study of crystals and quarks. Many important mathematical problems come down to a question about the groups involved. For example, in the theory of "knots" (a branch of topology), we know that for every knot there is a group. If we can show that the group in question is the group of whole numbers, then we know that the "knot" can be pulled and stretched into a circle; that the "knot" was really untied to begin with.

For 150 years, since the days of Augustin-Louis Cauchy and Évariste Galois, mathematicians have been trying to answer these questions: "What different types of groups can there be? What are they like? How can we tell one from another?" This is called the classification problem.¹

Let us concentrate on the finite groups, groups with a finite number of elements. The smallest finite group consists only of the number 0 and the operation \(+\). It is a group with only one number; in math terminology, a group of order one. Once you know that \( 0 + 0 = 0 \), you know everything you need to know about this group.

The next smallest group has order two. One way

¹The term "group theory" itself can be traced back to a letter written in 1832 by Galois. The letter was composed on the eve of the duel in which the 20-year-old Galois was killed. For more information about Cauchy, Galois, and other prominent figures, see Eric Temple Bell's classic *Men of Mathematics* (Simon & Schuster, 1937).
Thus far, I have called the group operation "addition" and written it "+", and I will continue to do so, but I could just as well have called it "multiplication" or anything else. What's in a name? The rows, by any other name, would add as sweet.

2This to describe it is by using the numbers T (for True) and F (for False). When we "add" two numbers, we are asking for the truth value of the statement, "These numbers are the same." So $T + T = T$, $F + F = T$, but $T + F = F$ and so does $F + T$. The identity in this case is $T$, because $T$ added to any number gives that number as an answer. Each number is also its own inverse, because a number added to itself gives the identity $T$. Another way of looking at the group of order two is by substituting "even" for $T$ and "odd" for $F$. You might think this was a second group of order two, but mathematicians do not look at it that way. To a mathematician, the group of $T$ and $F$ is "isomorphic" to the group of even and odd, because the addition rules are the same for both groups. So we say that there is only one group of order two.

There is also only one group of order three (i.e., with three elements), but there are two different groups of order four, and from then on there are often many groups of a given order.

By a technique known as the composition series, finite groups — groups with a finite number of elements — can always be broken up into smaller groups called simple groups, somewhat as a whole number like 15 can be broken into its prime factors, 3 and 5. Thus, mathematicians have been chiefly concerned with classifying the finite simple groups. And in 1980, the process of classification was completed.

The easiest examples of finite simple groups are the cyclic groups of prime order (e.g., a group of order three, since 3 is a prime, divisible only by itself and 1), and the so-called alternating groups of order 60 or more. These are groups one would study in an undergraduate course in abstract algebra. There are infinitely many of them, but they are completely classified and well understood.

Next, if you pursued abstract algebra at the graduate level, you would encounter finite simple groups of the Lie type, named for Norwegian mathematician Marius Sophus Lie (pronounced Lee). These are not easy to understand. Even so, finite simple groups of the Lie type are also completely classified.

Finite simple groups that are not of prime order, or alternating, or Lie, are called sporadic. They are the sports, the strange ones. They were the last type of finite simple group to be classified. We now know that there are exactly 26 of them.

Some of them have pet names like Monster and Baby Monster; these two, in fact, were the last to be
discovered. The order of Monster is 808,017,424,794,
512,875,886,459,904,961,710,757,005,754,368,000,000,
000. In other words, it has that many elements. Its
discovery by Bernd Fischer of the University of
Bielefeld in West Germany was one of the most impor-
tant achievements in pure math in recent years.

Why have I led you over such murky terrain? To
repeat: Groups are building blocks, like the elements
of the periodic table. Some elements—hydrogen, say
—are rather basic; we know pretty well what they can
be used for, and we use them all the time. Other ele-
ments—lawrencium, for example, with its half-life of
eight seconds—remain exotic. There is really no "use"
for lawrencium. I expect it will likewise be a while
before Monster gets much of a workout. But one never
knows, for groups underlie many things: particle
physics, chemistry, and, as Martin Gardner has
pointed out, the theory behind any magic trick involv-
ing ropes and twisted handkerchiefs.

It would be a mistake to conclude that mathema-
ticians necessarily care whether a new discovery has
some practical application. Mathematicians do what
they do because it is beautiful, interesting, challeng-
ing. What flares the nostrils is the prospect of a chase.
A problem beckons: "Come, Watson. The game is
afoot." Still, there are always surprises. Attempts by
practical men to separate the pure from the applied
are artificial concessions to the finiteness of human
thought and time.

Number theory, for example, has always been
considered the purest of pure math. It is the study of
whole numbers, prime numbers in particular. Yet one
of the most practical applications of mathematics in
recent years came out of number theory: public key
cryptography. The first method of public key cryptog-
raphy was discovered by Whitfield Diffie and Martin
Hellman of Stanford in 1976, but the system I am
about to describe is the work of Ronald Rivest, Adi
Shamir, and Leonard Adleman, all of MIT.

To understand public key cryptography, you must
understand the word *modulo*, a concept introduced by
Karl Friedrich Gauss in 1801 in his classic *Dis-
quitiones arithmeticae*. The integers modulo five (to
give an example) are obtained by setting 5 equal to 0,
so that you count 1,2,3,4,0, 1,2,3,4,0, and so on. Any-
thing that is cyclic can be measured in modulo num-
bers. We tell time modulo 12. Numerous card tricks
can be worked modulo 13. Because both the Earth and
the moon follow a cyclic pattern, one can use modulo

Karl Friedrich Gauss
(1777–1855)

Let us go back to modulo five. You can add and multiply modulo five (or any other number) provided you go back to zero every time you reach five. The easiest way to cast out fives is to divide by 5 and take the remainder. Thus, \(4 + 3 = 2\) (the remainder when you divide 7 by 5) and \(4 \times 4 = 1\) (the remainder when you divide 16 by 5). This arithmetic may seem strange, but it obeys many of the laws of ordinary arithmetic.\(^3\)

What does this have to do with cryptography? Well, you can see how easy it is, given a number, to find out what it equals modulo five. But what about going the other way? If I tell you what my number equals modulo five, you have no way of guessing what my original number is. I tell you my number is 3 modulo five. What is it? It might be 8. It might be 63. It might even be 3. A kind of one-way trap door has been set in place. This is the basis of public key cryptography, a tamper-free system whose applications range from ensuring the privacy of electronic mail to running a network of agents behind the Iron Curtain.

In practice, public key cryptography works modulo some very large number (one of 200 digits, say) that is the product of two very large prime numbers. To put a message into code, you first transform the message into a number (any schoolboy method for accomplishing this will do) and then raise that number to a power that anyone can know, modulo some very large number that is also open to anyone. Thus, anybody can encipher a message. But, once a number has been reduced modulo some other number, there is no way of getting the original number back.

Now the cyclic nature of modulo numbers comes

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1. Call the year \(Y\). Subtract 1900 from \(Y\) and call the difference \(N\).
2. Divide \(N\) by 19. Call the remainder \(A\).
3. Divide \((7A - 1)\) by 19. Ignore the remainder and call the quotient \(B\).
4. Divide \((11A - 4 - B)\) by 20. Call the remainder \(M\).
5. Divide \(N\) by 4. Ignore the remainder and call the quotient \(C\).
6. Divide \((N - C + 31 - M)\) by 7. Call the remainder \(W\).
7. The date of Easter is \(25 - M - W\). If the result is positive, the month is April.
   * If it is negative, the month is March (interpreting 0 as March 31, -1 as March 30, -2 as March 29 and so on to -9 for March 22.

From "Mathematical Games" by Martin Gardner.
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into play. There is another number, a secret number. When you raise the enciphered message to this secret power, it comes around to the original message.

Let's do an actual example. (So that we don't need a computer, I will use unrealistically small numbers.) The first step is to pick any two prime numbers. We pick 3 and 11. Multiply these numbers to get 33. We will work modulo 33. Subtract one from each prime to get 2 and 10. Multiply 2 times 10 to get 20. We calculate our public number and our secret number modulo 20 (since the standard abbreviation for modulo is mod, we say "mod 20"). First, list all the numbers that divide 20. Your list should read: 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 20. For your public number, pick any number between 1 and 20 that is not divisible by any number on this list (except 1, of course). We pick 7. For your secret number, use your computer to find a number that, when multiplied by 7 and reduced mod 20, gives 1. The mathematics of modulo arithmetic guarantees that there will always be such a number, and in this case it is not hard to find. The number 3 will do the job, because $7 \times 3 = 21$ and $21 \mod 20 = 1$. So, our secret number is 3, and we are ready to go.

Send your operatives in the field the public number, 7, and tell them all to work mod 33. Keep the number 3 so secret that not even you know it. The way to do this is to have your computer calculate it, with instructions to tell no one; but instruct it to raise any number entered to this secret power and then reduce mod 33.

Now, your operative is ready to send you a message. Because we are working with such small numbers, it must be a very short message. Suppose he decides to send the letter B. The easiest way to change letters to numbers is to let $A = 1$, $B = 2$, $C = 3$, and so on. So, he changes B to 2, raises it to the seventh power (7 is the public number, remember) and reduces mod 33. Two to the seventh power is 128. To reduce 128 mod 33 you divide 128 by 33 and take the remainder, which is 29. Your operative then sends you the number 29.

Back at the home office, you get the number. You feed 29 into your computer, which raises it to the secret power, 3, and reduces mod 33. That is, multiply 29 times 29 times 29, then divide by 33 and take the remainder. Do it and see what you get.\(^4\)

With small numbers such as these, it is really very easy to find the secret number. Just factor 33 into $3 \times 11$, then find the secret number the same way we

\(^4\)You should get 2, which yields the original message: B.

The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1982

105
found it to begin with. The key to the success of this cipher lies in the fact that it is hard to factor large numbers. Mathematicians have been trying to find ways to do so for more than 100 years. It would take the fastest computer now in existence about 76 years to factor a 200-digit number.

Most mathematicians believe that the problem of factoring very large numbers will not be solved in the near future, but the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) is taking no chances. The NSA has asked American mathematicians working in the area of cryptography to submit all new results to government experts in Washington prior to publication. Some mathematicians find this reasonable. Others feel it is an unwarranted intrusion into their lives and work. For arguments pro and con, see Notices of the American Mathematical Society (Oct. 1981). The debate may be academic. The NSA is powerless to prevent mathematicians in other countries from conducting research in cryptography and publishing their results in, say, the Saskatchewan Journal of Number Theory.

Let's turn now to analysis.

Analysis is the study of functions. A function is any rule that assigns a fixed output to any given input. The squaring function is a familiar example. Input 3, output 9. Input 5, output 25. Other well-known functions are the sine function and the exponential function. Calculus, discovered independently in the 17th century by both Isaac Newton and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, is the greatest achievement of analysis.

To understand the most significant recent result in analysis, we need to look at the Riemann zeta function, named for the German mathematician Bernhard Riemann. The Riemann zeta function has applications in algebra and algebraic geometry as well as analysis. It is used to estimate the number of primes in a given range (say, between 10 and 10 million), which is important in the theory of public key cryptography.

We begin with the number $i$, the elusive square root of $-1$. It was called imaginary (in "real life," you can't square anything and get a negative number), and its existence was denied until it proved too useful to ignore. Leibniz once called imaginary numbers "a wonderful flight of God's Spirit; they are almost an amphibian between being and not being." If we utilize these amphibians as in the graph on the facing page, then any number in the field—say, $3 + 2i$, or $-2 - 2i$, or even $-2 + 0i$—is known as a complex number. In trigonometry, we learn how to do arithmetic with
complex numbers.

The input of the Riemann zeta function is a complex number. So is the output. How is the Riemann function defined? To define a function, we need to know what to do with the input. The squaring function turns 3 (for example) into 9. The reciprocal function turns 3 into \( \frac{1}{3} \), 4 into \( \frac{1}{4} \). If these simple functions are like light bulbs (input: electricity; output: light), then the Riemann zeta function is a whole factory (input: raw materials; output: finished product).

The Riemann zeta function inputs a complex number, \( z \), then takes the series

\[
1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + \ldots
\]

(\( \ldots \)) means: go on forever, takes its reciprocal term-by-term to get

\[
1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{3} + \ldots
\]

and then raises the whole thing, again term-by-term, to the \( z \) power. The sum of this infinite series is the output of the Riemann zeta function, and for any \( z \) which begins with a number greater than 1 (e.g., \( 3 + 2i \)), the series converges. This means that it adds up to a finite number. (The series

\[
1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{5} + \ldots
\]

also converges: It adds up to 2. While some people may wonder how one can actually add up an infinite number of terms—Will we ever really reach 2?—Isaac Newton discovered a method: calculus.)

Now, whenever you have a function, a natural question to ask is, “Where is the output zero?” This is what most of high school algebra was about. Where are the zeroes of \( x^2 + 2x - 3 \)? Answer: \( x = -3 \), or \( x = 1 \). Where are the zeroes of the Riemann zeta function? To date, 3.5 million zeroes have been found by computer, not counting the zeroes (considered trivial) that lie along the horizontal axis. So far, all of the 3.5 million

\[3^2\]

For \( z \)'s that begin with a number less than or equal to 1, we must extend the zeta function by a process known as analytic continuation. Once this is done, then for every complex number except \( 1 + 0i \), the Riemann zeta function converges.
non-trivial zeroes lie on a vertical line through the point $\frac{1}{2} + 0i$. The question is: Do all of the zeroes in fact lie on this line? Riemann hypothesized that they did, but so far no one has been able to prove it.

When mathematicians cannot answer a question, they try to find a different question, one they can answer. If the Riemann hypothesis is too tough to crack, perhaps the problem can be solved for some important series other than $1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{3} + \ldots$. It turns out that it can. The French mathematician Pierre Deligne has proved the Riemann hypothesis for a particular zeta function studied by André Weil of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. And it has been proved, ironically, for a harder form than Riemann's original.

This is common in mathematics. Consider the Four-Color theorem, which asserts that no more than four colors are needed to color any map (such as the one below left) so that no two regions that touch are the same color. The conjecture was proved for maps drawn on all of the hard surfaces (e.g., the torus, the projective plane) long before it was proved in the "easy" case: maps on a flat surface. The breakthrough came in 1977 with the help of a computer (the computer just did the calculations), and the proof is too long for a human being to read.

The Four-Color problem, along with the proofs of the Smith conjecture (a recent result in the unusual theory of knots) and the Complements conjecture, are some of the latest achievements in the field of topology. Here is another one, brand new, not even published yet.

To understand it, the first thing you must know is what is meant by the term manifold. The Euclidean spaces (e.g., the line, the plane, three-dimensional space) are all examples of manifolds, as are such non-Euclidean spaces as the torus and sphere. The Euclidean spaces can be given Cartesian coordinates, as on a graph, but these spaces do not stop with dimension three. Four coordinates represent a point in four dimensions, five coordinates a point in five-dimensional Euclidean space, and so on.

When we talk about a dimension, we simply mean a direction at right angles to each of our previous directions. One dimension is length, two dimensions length and breadth, three dimensions length, breadth, and height. Typically, mathematicians understand spaces of five or more dimensions better than they understand dimensions three and four. (The fourth dimension is not time, by the way, although Einstein-
ian space-time is an example of a space that has four
dimensions.)

A one-dimensional manifold is a curve. A two-
dimensional manifold is a surface. We might call a
three-dimensional manifold a three-space, and a
four-dimensional manifold a hyper-space. It is often
easier to picture a manifold by putting it in a Eucli-
dean space of higher dimension. A sphere, for ex-
ample, is simply a surface: a two-manifold. But try to
picture a sphere without picturing it in three-
dimensional space. Mathematically, that three-
dimensional space is unnecessary, but conceptually it
is essential.  

The question then arises: What is the smallest
dimensional Euclidean space in which you can put a
given manifold? In 1944, Hassler Whitney came up
with a preliminary answer. He proved that any
$n$-dimensional manifold ($n$-manifold, for short) can be
put at least into $2n - 1$ dimensional Euclidean space.
So, we can always put a three-manifold into five-
space. One- and two-manifolds are well understood,
but there is a profusion of three-manifolds, and they
are extremely hard to get a grip on. Seeing how they
fit into Euclidean space is a big help.

When we put one space into another, we do not
want to tear it or crease it. For example, we can flatten
a sphere, but not without a sharp crease at the edge, so
we cannot put a sphere into a plane. There are two
legitimate ways of putting one space into another:
immersion and embedding. An immersion allows the
space to intersect itself, an embedding does not. A fig-
ure eight is an immersion of a circle in the plane: It
intersects itself. The letter $O$ is an embedding of a
circle in the plane. To the right is a picture of a Klein
bottle; it is an immersion because we construct it by
passing the neck of the bottle through the bottle's side.

The new theorem, proved by Ralph Cohen of
Stanford, and conveyed to me by Don Davis of Lehigh,
shows that any $n$-manifold can be immersed in Eucli-
dean space whose dimension is $2n$ minus the number
of 1's in a binary expansion of $n$. The binary system is
a way of expressing any number in terms of 1's and
0's, and the transformation of an ordinary number
into binary form is easily accomplished (see box on
next page). Thus, any five-manifold can be immersed
in Euclidean eight-space because five in binary form
has two ones in it.

A topological question that remains unsolved is
the dimension of the smallest Euclidean space in
To change an ordinary number into a binary number, divide the number by 2 and write down the remainder. Keep dividing by two and writing the remainder. When your quotient is 0, stop. The remainders, written in reverse order, form the binary expansion. The binary expansion of 41 is achieved by:

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<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 0 0 1 1

Thus, 41 in binary form is 101001.

which every n-manifold can be embedded. The conjecture is that every n-manifold can be embedded in Euclidean space of dimension $2n$, minus the number of 1’s in the binary expansion of $n$, plus 1. But this is just a conjecture.

During the past decade, many famous problems have fallen, but many more—like the embedding conjecture above—remain unsolved. One of the most obdurate conundrums of mathematics is the problem known as Fermat’s last theorem, which involves solutions to the equation $x^n + y^n = z^n$, where $x, y, z, n$ are whole numbers. One easy solution is $3^2 + 4^2 = 5^2$, a familiar configuration to anyone who remembers the Pythagorean theorem. Indeed, solutions are a dime a dozen if $n = 1$ or $n = 2$. Fermat’s last theorem states that the equation has no solutions that are whole numbers if $n$ is 3 or larger. The trouble is proving it.

Pierre de Fermat was a French jurist who lived in Toulouse and corresponded about mathematics—his hobby—with Descartes, Pascal, Leibniz, and Newton. He originated the conjecture that bears his name and in 1637 wrote in the margin of a book: “I have discovered a truly remarkable proof which this margin is too small to contain.” However, he never wrote down the proof, even though he lived for 28 more years. Perhaps, he did not have a proof after all. After another 300 years, the theorem still has not been proved.

Some dents, of course, have been made. The Swiss Leonhard Euler proved it for $n = 3$ in 1770, Adrien-Marie Legendre of France proved it for $n = 5$ in 1823, and the German number theorist Ernst Eduard Kummer proved it for almost all prime numbers in 1847. Modern computers have since proved it for any
between 3 and 30,000. But such computer searches give no insight into a general solution to the problem. We may never know whether Fermat's last theorem is correct, but the efforts to prove or disprove it over the centuries have led to much useful and ingenious mathematics—a reward in itself.

The most important unsolved problem in mathematics may be the Poincaré conjecture, posed by the brilliant French astronomer-mathematician Jules-Henri Poincaré. To understand it, one must return to the topological spaces called manifolds.

A manifold is termed "simply connected" if any loop of thread on its surface can be pulled in—by someone holding both ends of the loop firmly—while at the same time remaining in continuous contact with the manifold. A sphere is simply connected; try it with a piece of thread and a rubber ball. A torus is not simply connected. A loop of thread around it will lose contact with the surface as it is pulled in and passes over the hole; if the thread goes through the hole to begin with, one cannot pull it in at all. The Poincaré conjecture states that the only simply connected three-manifold is the three-dimensional sphere.

A version of the Poincaré conjecture has been proved for dimensions five and above (i.e., the only simply connected five-manifold is the five-dimensional sphere). The four-dimensional case has just been proved by Michael Freedman of the University of California, San Diego. (Another important new result.) The three-dimensional case remains unsolved.

But there are distant rumblings. Mathematician talks to mathematician. While nothing has yet appeared in print, the word is, to everyone's surprise, that the Poincaré conjecture may be false.

So it goes, new mathematics from old, curving back, folding and unfolding, old ideas in new guises, new theorems illuminating old problems. Doing mathematics is like wandering through a new countryside. We see a beautiful valley below us, but the way down is too steep, and so we take another path, which leads us far afield, until, by a sudden and unexpected turning, we find ourselves walking in the valley, admiring the trees and flowers.
Sunday afternoon in the islands. "Cameos of brightness I collect," wrote Trinidadian poet Ian McDonald, "Cane emerald in the ripening sun,/A small church filled with white dresses... Red bougainvillea on a sunlit wall."
The Caribbean

Americans are used to worrying about inflation, about the Soviet Union, about war and peace. Few worry about the Caribbean, except, periodically, about Fidel Castro's Cuba. Indeed, to many, the Caribbean is an exotic archipelago where American tourists flee from worldly cares. Yet there are 15 sovereign nations and 17 dependent territories in the region. None of them are rich; few of them are politically stable. Most of them are small island societies, still deeply marked by long centuries of slavery and colonial rule. Millions of the Caribbean's people have migrated, legally or illegally, to the United States, and this controversial influx continues. Currently, the region is the focus of a series of conferences sponsored by the Wilson Center's Latin American Program. Here, the program's secretary, Abraham Lowenthal, surveys the contemporary Caribbean scene, identifies the sore spots, and summarizes the current Washington debate over future U.S. policy.

by Abraham F. Lowenthal

A legend in Trinidad has it that God created the islands of the Caribbean by shaking loose from his fingers a fistful of earth and letting it fall into the waters below. Geologists are less fanciful. Of the many thousands of islands in the 1.5-million-square-mile Caribbean Sea, almost all are the summits of partially submerged volcanoes strung like vertebrae in a gentle arc from Florida to Venezuela. The vegetation is lush, the soil fertile enough in places for a few crops, the rainfall abundant—30 inches a year in the driest locales, up to 200 inches where mile-high mountains capture Atlantic storms. The mean temperature is 80°F, the extremes moderated by prevailing trade winds.

During winter, the climate is perhaps the most hospitable on Earth. Some 10 million tourists visit the region every year, to swim and sail, to ramble through old fortresses or white-washed hilltop towns, to eat lobster, enjoy steel bands, watch cricket,
bask in the sun. Outsiders, mostly from the United States, spent at least $3 billion in the Caribbean during the 1980 “season,” sustaining many local economies for the rest of the year.

Even visitors, however, may come away with the feeling that the area is, in Aimé Césaire’s words, “a mock paradise.” It is easy to avoid the slums of Kingston, Port-au-Prince, or San Juan, but it is difficult to pretend they are not there. The pages of Caribbean newspapers are peppered with reports of bad economic news, fractious political squabbling, and violent “incidents” on one island or another.

Back in the Headlines

On the international front, meanwhile, recent events in the Caribbean have prompted a fresh spate of worries, words, and actions in Washington. These events include the sudden takeover of the island republic of Grenada in 1979 by a group openly allied with Cuba and supportive of the Soviet Union; Jamaica’s eight-year drift toward socialism, bankruptcy, and violence, and then its sudden political reversal; the gaining of independence by several Caribbean mini-states and pressure for independence by others; the continuing influx of Caribbean immigrants into the United States, including new waves of “boat people” from Fidel Castro’s Cuba and Jean-Claude Duvalier’s Haiti; and the potential “ripple effect” of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary violence in Nicaragua and El Salvador. All of this has occurred within a changing international environment—heightened tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, intensified superpower rivalry in the developing world—that lends an added importance to circumstances on America’s “third border.”

President Jimmy Carter, impelled by a concern for both human rights and the development of Third World nations, determined at the outset of his administration that the Caribbean and its problems merited high-level attention (as did those of sub-Saharan Africa). Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young, and Mrs. Carter all visited the region.

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Under Secretary of State Philip Habib led an important mission there in 1979. The number of U.S. government officials assigned to the region was expanded. The State Department, for the first time, appointed a Deputy Assistant Secretary specifically charged with overseeing U.S.-Caribbean relations.

Later, in the wake of Washington's "discovery" in mid-1979 that a 2,800-man Soviet combat brigade was stationed in Castro's Cuba, a Caribbean Contingency Joint Task Force was established. The U.S. Navy staged a series of naval maneuvers and Marine amphibious exercises (including a well-publicized "assault" near the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba), and American warships made 125 calls to 29 Caribbean ports during 1980 alone. The Voice of America established a powerful new transmitter in Antigua, capable of beaming medium-wave broadcasts to the entire region.

In all, the Carter Administration nearly doubled U.S. economic assistance to the Caribbean, from $96 million in 1977 to $184 million in 1981. Washington also took the lead in 1977 in establishing the Caribbean Group for Economic Cooperation and Development—a consortium of 31 aid-giving and aid-receiving governments and 16 financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund. (The group has channeled more than $300 million to the Caribbean since 1978.) To supplement all this activity, the Carter administration helped to launch, with considerable fanfare, a "private sector entity," Caribbean/Central American Action, supported by 51 U.S. corporations and staffed in part by Foreign Service personnel on leave, to work on improving U.S. ties with these regions.

President Reagan has demonstrated as much if not more interest in U.S.-Caribbean relations. His first official foreign visitor was Jamaica's new Prime Minister, Edward Seaga; even

*The task force, headquartered at Key West, Florida, consists of a modest staff of 75, with representatives from all four services. Its mission: to monitor developments in the Caribbean, conduct training exercises, and devise contingency plans for the use of U.S. forces. It is one component of the U.S. Forces Caribbean Command.
in the new administration’s austere 1982 budget, foreign aid to the Caribbean surpassed $200 million. The President has held lengthy discussions about the region with President José López Portillo of Mexico, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau of Canada, and other world leaders, and allowed suggestions of a “mini-Marshall Plan” for the Caribbean to filter into the press (although the idea was eventually scrubbed).

The current revival of interest in the Caribbean is not unprecedented. ("Our Caribbean Policy Again Under Scrutiny" read one New York Times headline—in 1931.) Time and again, Washington has found itself responding to events in “America’s Mediterranean,” occasionally sending troops there. This was the case from the late 19th century, notably during the Spanish-American War, until the 1930s, and then once again during the 1960s when the U.S. government was preoccupied with Cuba (the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962), British Guiana (the CIA-sponsored campaign to destabilize the pre-independence government of Cheddi Jagan in 1964), and the Dominican Republic (where 23,000 U.S. troops intervened in 1965 to prevent what President Lyndon Johnson feared would be a “second Cuba”).

But, more often, the U.S. government has tended to take the Caribbean for granted. This it did from the late 1960s until the mid-1970s, as three Presidents dealt with a war in Vietnam, two wars in the Mideast, détente with the Soviet Union, and the “opening” to China. During such periods of neglect, Washington rarely questions long-standing “rules-of-thumb” about the region. When a perceived “crisis” develops, therefore, Washington often sees the Caribbean in terms of old verities; officials hastily formulate policies that ignore the region’s dynamics and any changes that may have occurred in the Caribbean since the previous crisis.

The resurgence of official U.S. attention provides an opportunity for a new look: How is the Caribbean evolving? What are the real U.S. interests in the region, and how are they changing? What are the different ways in which U.S. aims might be promoted, and the likely risks and benefits of each? To what extent is it feasible or desirable to fashion special policies toward the Caribbean? What kind of approach might work?
I

THE PENCIL OF GOD

The Caribbean now comprises no less than 32 political entities with a population totalling some 30 million people.* Fifteen of these entities are now independent countries, twelve having achieved independence since 1960. The natives in several British territories (including Montserrat, Anguilla, and St. Kitts-Nevis) are actively seeking independence. Residents of other “dependent” islands (France’s Guadeloupe and Martinique, for example) seem happy with the status quo. Puerto Rico’s future, perennially under discussion, is less clear than ever, after the nearly equal vote registered in the 1980 gubernatorial election by the pro-statehood and pro-commonwealth forces—with the independentistas getting less than six percent of the vote.

The Caribbean territories are remarkably diverse, yet they are also surprisingly alike in important ways. As historian Franklin Knight has noted, the people of the region “have more in common than the Texan and the New Yorker, or the Mayan Indian and the cosmopolite of Mexico City.”

To begin with, most of the territories are tiny. Two-thirds of the islands of the Caribbean could fit together into the King Ranch in Texas, or inside the Everglades. Cuba is by far the largest island, 745 miles long, but even Cuba is smaller in area than the state of Ohio. Trinidad is smaller than Rhode Island; Grenada is not much larger than the District of Columbia.

None of the territories is ethnically or culturally homogeneous. Five different racial groups (black, white, Oriental, native Indian, and East Indian) and their numerous subgroups and combinations mingle with varying degrees of integration and hostility. A certain color and shade consciousness persists. Numerous languages and dialects are spoken within the region, including Dutch, Spanish, French, and English and their derivatives, plus the Creole mixtures with African and Indian tongues. The result is at once a linguist’s feast and nightmare. In Bar-

*Analysts differ about how to define the Caribbean. For the purposes of formulating U.S. policy, it is helpful to conceive of the Caribbean region as that set of territories, in or bordered by the Caribbean Sea, concerning which the United States has historically felt a special security interest, arising primarily from their proximity and their perceived vulnerability to external penetration. All the Caribbean islands, together with Belize on the Central American isthmus and Guyana, Surinam, and French Guiana on the South American mainland, would fit this definition of the region. While there has been much fashionable talk of late about the larger “Caribbean Basin,” the experiences of Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and most Central American nations differ in significant ways from those of the Caribbean territories I deal with in this essay.
bados, Antigua, and elsewhere, many archaic English words are still in use, augmented by local inventions—birds’seed (for "very fast"), for example, or don’t careish ("indifferent").

Caribbean religious sects include mixtures of the borrowed and invented, the traditional and the ultramodern. Thus, a blending of West African religions with French or Spanish Catholicism produced voodoo in Haiti and Santeria and Nairiguismo in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic. In the English and Dutch Caribbean, there are Moravians, Anglicans, Catholics, and Pentecostals; in Trinidad and Guyana, large communities of Muslims and Hindus flourish. Rastafarians, "black Israelites," wear their long hair in braided "dread-
locks” and look to Ethiopia as the Promised Land. Originating in Jamaica, they have since spread their message to other islands and even to New York and Washington.

The economic organization of the Caribbean runs the gamut from the tax havens of the Bahamas, reportedly the largest single Eurocurrency market outside London, to Cuba’s brand of socialism (where free market transactions are beginning to be permitted again), with all manner of hybrids in between.

In the Dominican Republic, because dictator Rafael Trujillo’s vast personal fiefdom passed to government ownership after his assassination in 1961, a big share of the economy is now in the public sector; the government tries through generous incen-
tives to encourage private investment, domestic and foreign. Jamaica and Guyana, whose leaders chose to build various forms of socialist-oriented “mixed” economies, are now concerned about how to re-attract and stimulate private investment. Grenada, whose principal exports are bananas and nutmeg and whose main economic potential lies in tourism, is apparently opting for Cuban-style “socialism” in a mini-state where no form of economic organization can much alter the obvious constraints on growth: scant resources, a small island, a tiny population.

In Mocking Splendor

Economic productivity ranges from the abysmal showing by Haiti—“the land of unlimited possibilities,” whose chief local growth industry may be the smuggling of refugees to the United States (at up to $1,500 a head)—to the uneven but impressive performances of Martinique and Guadeloupe, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados. The region includes four out of six of the countries with the lowest GNP per capita in the Western Hemisphere (Haiti, Dominica, Grenada, and Guyana). But it also boasts eight territories with GNP per capita among the highest (Martinique, Trinidad and Tobago, the Netherlands Antilles, Guadeloupe, Puerto Rico, Surinam, the Bahamas, and Barbados). Trinidad and Tobago has been lucky. It is the only Caribbean nation to have struck oil and today produces 200,000 barrels per day.

Although per capita incomes in the region are high by Third World standards, bitter poverty is still widespread. Two-thirds of Haiti’s rural population were reported in 1978 to have annual incomes below $40; 50 percent of Haiti’s children under five suffer from protein-calorie malnutrition, with 17 percent classified as severely undernourished. Seventy-five percent of preschool children in the Dominican Republic suffer from malnutrition, four percent severely. One-third of Jamaica’s people have annual incomes under $200, barely enough to cover a tourist’s stay for a single night at one of Montego Bay’s fancy hotels. In the slums of West Kingston, writes Trinidadian V. S. Naipaul, “hovels of board and cardboard and canvas and tin lie choked together on damp rubbish dumps behind which the sun sets in mocking splendour.”

The poverty of the region is highlighted, and its psychological effects aggravated, by the juxtaposition—through migration, tourism, the media—with American affluence. Between 60 and 80 percent of the programs shown on Caribbean television are...
U.S. imports—*Sesame Street*, *Peyton Place*, *Marcus Welby*. At the Mallard's Beach-Hyatt in Jamaica, a Canadian Club on the rocks costs $4.75, about three times the hourly wage of a local security guard. Shop windows taunt the poor with duty-free items they cannot afford but which tourists perceive as bargains. Poet Derek Walcott of Barbados has written how

> my small-islander’s simplicities  
> can’t better our new empire’s civilized  
> exchange of cameras, watches, perfumes, brandies  
> for the good life, so cheaply underpriced  
> that only the crime rate is on the rise.

Overall, the island economies are in deep trouble. Caribbean shares of world production of sugar and of bauxite are falling, and even absolute levels are declining in many cases. (This is true of sugar in Barbados, Guadeloupe, Guyana, Haiti,
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Puerto Rico, and of bauxite in Guyana, Surinam, and the Dominican Republic.) The region's share of world tourism revenues is also dropping.

At the same time, higher prices for oil and other imports burden economies in the Caribbean as elsewhere in the Third World. Jamaica has had seven consecutive years of negative growth. Cuba's economic growth, even by Castro's own account, is not much more impressive. The Dominican Republic's significant progress counters regional trends, but the Dominicans have been hard hit by the price of oil. In 1973, the Dominican Republic earned almost twice as much from sugar exports as it spent on oil imports; by 1979, oil imports cost about $75 million more than the country's total income from sugar.

The Caribbean islands share other painful characteristics. They are densely populated and heavily dependent on exporting a few primary products. They are extremely susceptible to international market fluctuations and the vagaries of disease and weather. The epidemic of dengue fever in Cuba last summer (infecting 100,000 people) and the erratic path of Hurricane David in 1978 (sparing Barbados at the last moment and devastating Dominica instead) vividly illustrate this point.

Running Out of Steam

Most islands have few known resources beyond the sun and sea, and this fact will never change; "the pencil of God has no eraser," is an old Haitian proverb. Those places with a broader resource base—Jamaica, for example, with its bauxite (used in aluminum) and the Dominican Republic with its nickel and gold—have seldom been able to exploit these assets fully. Christopher Columbus's assessment of the Arawak Indians on Hispaniola in 1492 remains valid when applied to Caribbeans today: "They very willingly traded everything they had. But they seemed to me a people very short of everything."

All of the islands have limited domestic markets, insubstantial local savings, and inadequate financing capacity. Agriculture is weak and declining through most of the region. "King Sugar" is now, at best, a princely pretender, its dominance undercut during the 20th century by large cane growers in Louisiana and Brazil and by the thriving European sugar-beet industry. Most of the islands have deliberately sought to diversify their economies, moving toward manufacturing

*Only Trinidad and Tobago is self-sufficient in oil, but many other nations—Surinam, Cuba, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic—are exploring. Because Caribbean countries are small, even modest discoveries could be of major importance.
DEPENDENCE AS A STATE OF MIND

Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago until his sudden death in 1981, pondered the “Caribbean character” in From Columbus to Castro (1970). Much has changed during the past decade, but Williams’ essential point remains valid:

Dependence on the outside world in the Caribbean... is not only economic. It is also cultural, institutional, intellectual, and psychological. Political forms and social institutions, even in the politically independent countries, were imitated rather than created, borrowed rather than relevant, reflecting the forms existing in the particular metropolitan country from which they were derived. There is still no serious indigenous intellectual life. The ideological formulations for the most part still reflect the concepts and vocabulary of nineteenth-century Europe and, more sinister, of the now almost defunct Cold War. Authentic and relevant indigenous formulations are either ignored or equated with “subversion.” Legal systems, educational structures, and administrative institutions reflect past practices which are now being hastily abandoned in the metropolitan countries where they originated.

Even though both in the Commonwealth Caribbean countries and in the French Departments literature of world standard and universal validity has been produced, and even though in Trinidad and Tobago the steel band and calypso have emerged, nevertheless artistic, community, and individual values are not for the most part authentic but, to borrow the language of the economist, possess a high import content, the vehicles of import being the educational system, the mass media, the films, and the tourists. V. S. Naipaul’s description of West Indians as “mimic men” is harsh, but true.

Finally, psychological dependence strongly reinforces the other forms of dependence. For, in the last analysis, dependence is a state of mind. A too-long history of colonialism seems to have crippled Caribbean self-confidence and Caribbean self-reliance, and a vicious circle has been set up: psychological dependence leads to an ever-growing economic and cultural dependence on the outside world.

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(Puerto Rico, for example), textiles (Barbados), petroleum refining (Aruba and Curaçao), financial services (the Cayman Islands), mining (many places), and tourism (everywhere). As they did elsewhere, people moved off the farm and into the towns. The result: Food production per capita—of pineapples, bananas, beans—has fallen during the past 15 years in Jamaica, Guyana, Haiti, and Trinidad and Tobago. The region as a whole now imports more than $1 billion worth of food annually, costing the equivalent of at least 10 percent of total exports.

The Wilson Quarterly | Spring 1982
123
While agriculture is declining, so is the push toward industrialization. The region-wide burst of industrialization-by-invitation begun during the 1960s has run out of steam. Most of the islands have found that it is easier to "take off" than stay aloft. Constrained by small size, they cannot generate enough power, in the form of capital, local markets, and so on, to sustain altitude. And capital must generally be imported, with much of the profits—from the making of watches or socks, the retreading of tires, the refining of oil—therefore exported. Few Caribbean islands show any growth since the mid-1970s in the share of GNP accounted for by manufacturing. Industrial stagnation, combined with a rural exodus and populations that are growing by two and three percent a year (versus 0.7 percent in the United States), have produced unemployment rates exceeding 30 percent in some countries—according to official statistics.

All of the Caribbean countries—including Haiti, which has been independent since 1804—bear the mark of centuries of colonial rule and of plantation societies. Ninety percent of the region’s population are descendants of the four million slaves imported from West Africa, beginning in 1506. The history of the Caribbean has always been largely shaped, and even written, from outside. A few outstanding Caribbean intellectuals—V. S. Naipaul, Frantz Fanon, Aimé Césaire, C.L.R. James, Eric Williams, Juan Bosch, William Demas, and Arthur Lewis among them—have projected the Caribbean condition onto a much broader canvas. Their work, and the common experiences of Caribbean peoples, have reinforced the outsider’s notion of this as a region. As Demas, president of the Caribbean Development Bank, has written, "The [Caribbean] countries have a common historical legacy: the sugar plantation, slavery, indentured labor, monocultural economies producing what they did not consume and consuming what they did not produce . . . and perhaps the longest period of external political dependence in any part of the Third World.”

Mini-States, Mini-Rivals

Most Caribbean societies are still not well-integrated internally. Many, indeed, are more fragmented socially and politically now than they were a generation ago. The Dominican Republic’s civil war in 1965; Trinidad’s 1970 Black Power uprising; Bermuda’s 1977 race riots; the 1980 general strike in Martinique; Jamaica’s recurrent urban violence—all exemplify this trend. Cuba is not immune. Recall the 10,800 Cubans who
sought asylum within the garden walls of the Peruvian embassy in Havana in April 1980, and the subsequent sealift that brought 125,000 Cuban refugees into the United States.

The Caribbean islands are even less well-integrated “horizontally”—with one another, that is. Although a sense of regional identity is slowly emerging—enhanced by the creation of certain regional institutions, such as the University of the West Indies—local efforts to forge a “common market” have come to naught. The West Indies Federation of 10 territories established in 1958 lasted only until 1961; it could not survive inter-island rivalries, especially between Jamaica and Trinidad. The eastern Caribbean, the last portion of the Americas to shed colonial rule, is shattering into mini-states so small as to raise the possibility that one or another could be taken over by international criminal elements, such as those involved in the narcotics trade.* Interchange between the British Commonwealth Caribbean countries and the Spanish-, Dutch-, and French-speaking countries is still minimal.

“Doctor Politics”

Politically, the Caribbean territories face contradictory currents. All but four of the 15 independent countries are formal democracies. “Nowhere else in the world,” Jamaica’s Edward Seaga has said, “does a conglomeration of parliamentary democracies exist as it does in the Caribbean.” But democracy is not always deeply rooted. For every Barbados, there is a potential Grenada or Surinam. Grenada’s Prime Minister, the eccentric Sir Eric Gairy, was ousted in a 1979 coup while he was in New York to address the United Nations General Assembly on the subject of flying saucers. In 1980, 16 Surinamese Army sergeants occupied several public buildings in a bid for higher pay—and accidentally toppled the government. “We only wanted a union,” one of them said, “but ended up with a country.”

While Grenada and Surinam have joined Haiti and Cuba as the Caribbean’s only nondemocratic sovereign states, an extended period of deceptive political “stability” elsewhere may be coming to an end. Many long-standing practitioners of “doctor politics”—Lloyd Best’s unimprovable phrase to describe the

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*In 1980, the FBI arrested 10 men in New Orleans who were allegedly planning to overthrow the government of Dominica (population: 77,000) using mercenaries drawn from the ranks of the Ku Klux Klan. The plot was reportedly bankrolled by a Texas millionaire (who hoped to establish a free port in Dominica), supposedly with the blessing of a former Dominican Prime Minister.
role of Caribbean scholar-statesmen such as Eric Williams (Trinidad and Tobago), Juan Bosch (Dominican Republic), and Luis Muñoz Marín (Puerto Rico)—are either dead or out of power. Their passing has ushered in an era of uncertainty.

Jamaica, once considered highly developed politically, verged on chaos as the 1980 election approached; some 600 per-


The Wilson Quarterly: Spring 1982
The elections were marked by pre-election violence. In the Dominican Republic, the first peaceful transition from one elected President to another came in 1978 only after the Carter administration "jawboned" the local military and thereby made sure the ballots were fairly counted. Even Barbadians, who "consider that they and their institutions are perfect," as one 19th-century

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The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1982
127
British governor put it, are nervous about the influence of leftist activists on small neighboring islands. Haiti, long ruled by "Papa Doc" Duvalier, is now ruled by his son "Baby Doc"; no one knows when or how this dynasty will end. And in Cuba, where Fidel Castro, 53, has directed a highly authoritarian regime for 22 years, overt dissidence is increasingly evident.

Indeed, polarization seems to be the prevailing political trend. Grenada's leftist coup and the quasi-leftist coup in Surinam have been matched by a rightward swing (albeit through elections) in the politics of Dominica, St. Vincent, St. Kitts-Nevis, and Antigua, and especially by the decisive election in 1980 of Edward Seaga as Prime Minister in Jamaica after eight years of Michael M. Manley's "democratic socialism." The prospects for some sort of 'pan-Caribbean' consensus grow dim as the islands' politicians move in diverging directions.

Artificial Economies

On the world scene, most of the Caribbean countries are satellites in search of an orbit, or perhaps of multiple orbits, in the sense of regular and predictable relationships with Big Powers. The United States acts increasingly as the principal métropole; France and Britain have been slowly withdrawing from the area. Mexico and Venezuela have shown some interest in expanding their relations with the Caribbean, an interest that reached its most concrete expression in mid-1980 with a Venezuelan-Mexican commitment to sell oil to nine Caribbean and Central American states on extremely favorable terms. The Soviet Union's close relationship with Cuba makes the Kremlin a Caribbean actor, although direct Soviet influence has so far been slim outside of Cuba itself, where Moscow underwrites the island economy with some $3.4 billion annually and equips Havana's military.*

Cuba's situation is not the most extreme case of dependence on a foreign power, contrary to popular belief. Almost all of the island states have special trade and aid agreements with various powers. Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana, for example, are juridically part of metropolitan France; their citizens participate in French elections and send voting delegates to the National Assembly in Paris. These three territories (combined population: 702,000) receive some $570 per capita a year from

*"Cuba has the best air force in the Caribbean and a modern "gunboat navy." The Soviets have supplied the island with MiG-23 "Floggers" and missile attack boats. Russian pilots reportedly help patrol Cuban skies to free Cubans for duty in Angola, Ethiopia, and elsewhere in Africa."
France, making their economies, in William Demas's words, "the most highly artificial in an area in which there is considerable artificiality." The residents of the Netherlands Antilles receive about $200 per capita, courtesy of The Hague. The U.S. subsidy to Puerto Rico, in the form of transfer payments, amounts to more in per capita terms than the USSR's subsidy to Cuba. In all, the Caribbean islands benefit from more foreign aid per capita than any other group of countries in the world.

The volume of trade with the United States—$12 billion in 1980—reflects one characteristic shared by most of the Caribbean: a high degree of dependence on the U.S. mainland. Not counting Puerto Rico, the United States has more than $4.7 billion in direct private investment in the Caribbean. Some 75 percent of the bauxite that the United States imports (more than half of our total consumption) comes from the Caribbean, as does about $4.5 billion worth of refined petroleum products.

The most significant ties between the United States and the Caribbean involve people. As I have noted, Caribbean economies depend heavily on tourism and cater primarily to U.S. travelers. Thousands of young Americans attend "last chance" medical schools in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Dominica. U.S.-based criminal syndicates find in the Caribbean congenial bases for narcotics and gambling operations, more lucrative than the rum and slave traffic of old. And American culture and technology—high and low—pervades the islands, at all levels and in all classes, from top-40 music and college T-shirts to Ford Mustangs and illegal arms shipments.

Island-Hopping

The most dramatic link of all is the stream of Caribbean migrants to the United States. Migration has long been a fact of life in the region, beginning with the arrival of the Indians from the South American rain forest and augmented, after 1492, by an influx of Europeans, of slaves, and, during the late 19th century, of indentured laborers from India, China, and Java. Up until the 1930s, however, Caribbean migration was essentially migration into the Caribbean or within the Caribbean. Today, the primary trend is migration out of the Caribbean.

Since World War II, some 4.5 million Caribbeans have left the islands and entered the United States. (Many others have gravitated toward France, Britain, the Netherlands, and Venezuela.) Puerto Rico has exported 40 percent of its total population to the mainland since 1945, primarily to New York, Chicago, and other Northern cities. More than one million Cu-
By all want economic growth, more capacity, full employment, and good goods. Caribbean is where the economic, political, and social upheaval beneath these populations has been. Understanding the contemporary issues is a central role of "U.S. Caribbean Relations.

Caribbean and the United States is today the most significant. The flow of people, goods, and capital between the two countries is significant. The United States, with its large economy, provides significant exports to the Caribbean. However, the Caribbean is also a significant source of imports for the United States. The Caribbean has been a significant destination for US investments, providing significant returns for US companies. The United States is also a significant source of tourism to the Caribbean, providing significant returns for the region.

While the Caribbean faces significant challenges, it is also a region of significant opportunity. The United States, with its large economy, provides significant exports to the Caribbean. However, the Caribbean is also a significant source of imports for the United States. The Caribbean has been a significant destination for US investments, providing significant returns for US companies. The United States is also a significant source of tourism to the Caribbean, providing significant returns for the region.

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Creative Imagination, by Shirley Mckean. A street scene in Jamaica.
political participation, enhanced national autonomy, and more self-respect. These goals are not necessarily compatible. Cuba has achieved full employment at the cost of underemployment and severe limits on political freedom. Martinique is prosperous in large part because it is not autonomous. Barbados has grown "birds speed," but not equitably.

The truth is, no single development strategy in the Caribbean has really worked. As Lloyd Best summed up the postwar experience: "We hoped for economic transformation by borrowing capital, by borrowing management, by borrowing technology, by borrowing this and borrowing that, and by kowtowing before every manner of alien expert we could find." Yet sustained progress has been elusive, and high expectations have turned, here and there, to frustration and violence.

II
DEFINING U.S. INTERESTS

What is at stake for the United States in the Caribbean? What are U.S. interests? How are they changing?

Most discussions of U.S. interests in the Caribbean emphasize our military security and economic ties. The security interest has usually been seen in terms of keeping hostile political and military influences away from this country's "soft underbelly." That was the aim of both the Monroe Doctrine (1823) and the so-called Roosevelt Corollary of 1904. (Theodore Roosevelt stated then that the United States, in the face of "wrongdoing" in Latin America, would act, "however reluctantly," as an "international police force").

U.S. military installations dot the region, from the Roosevelt Roads naval base in Puerto Rico to Guantánamo Bay in Cuba. The Caribbean provides access to the Panama Canal, long considered vital to U.S. commerce and defense. The sea lanes on which much U.S. trade depends (including one-half of our imported oil) pass through or near the Caribbean. The economic interest, as traditionally conceived, turns on protecting American commerce in the region, as well as U.S. access to various local strategic minerals and raw materials. For all these reasons, it has long seemed crucial that, if nothing else, the United States maintain what Secretary of State Cordell Hull once called "orderly and stable governments" in the Caribbean.

Many U.S. diplomats and scholars continue to think in these terms. They cite the presence of Soviet fleets in the Caribbean.
Beginning in the early 20th century, a stream of black immigrants moved to New York's Harlem from Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad, and other parts of the British West Indies. West Indians today make up only about one percent of the U.S. black population—but they have long been overrepresented among black professionals, businessmen, and public figures. In Ethnic America, economist Thomas Sowell explains why:

While not racially distinct from American Negroes, West Indians have had a different cultural background. During the era of slavery, the British West Indies, like the North American colonies, received a mixture of Negroes representing many African tribes. In general, the most bitterly criticized features of slavery—callous overwork, sexual exploitation, Negro fragmentation, and self-denigration of blackness—were worse in the West Indies than in the United States. However, several other features of West Indian slavery may help explain the greater success of West Indians in the United States. For example, unlike slaves in the United States, West Indian slaves were assigned land and time to raise their own food. They sold surplus food in the market to buy amenities for themselves. In short, they had the kind of incentives and experience common in a market economy but denied American slaves for two centuries. Moreover, West Indian slaves were emancipated a generation earlier than blacks in the United States.

Significant numbers of black West Indians began to arrive in the United States—principally in New York City—in the 20th century. About 30,000 arrived in the first decade of the century, more than twice as many in the second decade, and about 40,000 during the 1920s. The occupational level of the early West Indian immigrants was not very different from that of the Southern black migrants who arrived in the urban Northeast at about the same time.

The real contrast was in their behavior patterns. West Indians were much more frugal, hard-working, and entrepreneurial. Their children worked harder and outperformed native black children in school. As early as 1901, West Indians owned 20 percent of all black businesses in Manhattan, although they were only 10 percent of the black population there. American Negroes called them "black Jews."

As of 1969, West Indian incomes were 28 percent higher than the incomes of other blacks in New York City and 52 percent higher nationally. Second-generation West Indians had higher incomes than whites. While native blacks had an unemployment rate above the national average, West Indian blacks had an unemployment rate below the national average. As of 1970, the highest ranking blacks in New York's Police Department were all West Indians, as were all black federal judges in the city.
(since 1969, 21 Soviet naval deployments, varying in size from two to five ships, have visited the Caribbean); the possible construction of a submarine base capable of handling Soviet vessels at Cienfuegos on the southern coast of Cuba; and the KGB’s electronic intelligence-gathering installations, also based in Cuba. In addition, they say, U.S. commercial interests in the Caribbean are being threatened by political instability.

Ray Cline, former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and now on the staff of Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, has urged the White House to “reproclaim” the Monroe Doctrine. To support their views, Cline and others have drawn on the writings of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Halford John Mackinder, leading geopolitical theorists of the 19th century.

A Contrary Opinion

Other observers, mostly in academe, ask whether the Caribbean is really still so important to the United States.

Changing technology—jet aircraft, long-range missiles—have reduced both the military significance of the Caribbean and the feasibility of excluding foreign influence. U.S. naval bases and other outposts in the region are no longer vital; U.S. power can easily be brought to bear from the mainland. Indeed, most of the remaining U.S. military installations in the Caribbean are currently due for phase-out by the mid-1980s, primarily for budget reasons. The Panama Canal, although still useful, is no longer essential in the old sense. A shrinking share of U.S. trade passes through the canal; many of the world’s new oil supertankers are too big to negotiate it, as are almost all of the aircraft carriers around which U.S. fleets are organized.

In practical terms, the United States can no longer exert the total control over this region it once enjoyed. From 1898 to 1969, no hostile naval force (aside from German submarines during World War II) entered Caribbean waters. But, as noted, Soviet surface ships and submarines have been visiting regularly to “show the flag.” The primary means for protecting U.S. strategic interests now lies in great-power agreements, exemplified by the apparent U.S.–USSR “understandings” of 1962, 1970, and 1979, which, seriatim, are said to have banned from Cuba land-based nuclear missiles, Soviet submarines carrying nuclear missiles, and further deployments of Soviet combat troops.

In economic terms, too, the relative significance of the Caribbean for the United States has waned. Before World War II, the region accounted for more than 11 percent of direct U.S.
foreign investment and an even higher share of overseas trade. By 1978, U.S. investment in the Caribbean (excluding Puerto Rico) amounted to only 2.5 percent of direct U.S. foreign investment, and considerably less if the $2 billion in “paper” investment in the Bahamas is excluded. The share of U.S. petroleum imports coming from or passing through the Caribbean, though still significant, has been declining in recent years, as imports from the Middle East, Nigeria, and Mexico have risen. Today, the United States depends on no commodity imported from the Caribbean. Bauxite, the principal strategic import, is available from many other countries.

Yet there are other reasons why Washington should keep its eye on the Caribbean.

First, the sovereign Caribbean nations constitute a significant bloc of votes at the UN and in other international bodies. That puts them in a position to help or hurt. The Caribbean democracies have voted, en bloc, to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; they have consistently supported the U.S. position on Israel. Caribbean hostility could prove to be a considerable irritant. One can imagine, for example, the trouble that might ensue if the island nations went on record in the UN in favor of Puerto Rican independence.

Second, the Caribbean has become, by reason of its proximity to the United States and the increasing international prominence of the region’s leaders, a kind of litmus test of the attitudes and policies that Washington will adopt toward Third World countries generally.
Third, and most important, there remains the sheer scale of the human interpenetration between the Caribbean and the United States. The United States and the Caribbean import from each other music, dance, crime, literature, and political ideas and techniques. Grenada’s radical New Jewel Movement is led primarily by men who were influenced, as students in U.S. universities during the 1960s, by the Black Power movement. Jamaica’s Prime Minister, Edward Seaga, was born in Boston and educated at Harvard. People of Caribbean descent are making their presence felt in America, as they have, indeed, been doing since the 1920s, when the arrival in New York of some 40,000 black West Indians helped touch off what is now called the “Harlem Renaissance.” The large, active, and growing Caribbean communities in this country are already a fact of political life in Florida, New York, and New Jersey, just as the Mexican influence grows in the U.S. Southwest.

In short, an intimate relationship exists between the Caribbean and the United States, whether either party likes it or not. What remain to be determined are its nature and consequences.

III

CHARTING A POLICY

In pursuing its relationship with the Caribbean region, the United States has, in essence, four policies to choose from.

The first of these, not now in vogue, is what may be called the “traditional” policy, its chief principle well expressed by Assistant Secretary of State Francis Butler Loomis in 1904: “No picture of our future is complete which does not contemplate and comprehend the United States as the dominant power in the Caribbean Sea.” The traditional policy combines studied indifference to the Caribbean’s underlying economic and social realities with keen sensitivity to potential threats to the military security of the United States. At its crudest, it appears as the “gunboat diplomacy” of Roosevelt, Taft, and the Republican Presidents of the 1920s—or of Democrat Lyndon Johnson during the Dominican civil war in 1965. This is a deceptively attractive policy because it seems cheap and simple. But it is also short-sighted. It amounts, indeed, to putting out the fires while doing nothing to remove the flammable material.

A second approach would be for the United States to “disengage” itself from the Caribbean altogether. The assumption here is that the region is economically and strategically
irrelevant—and would perhaps fare better if left alone. This policy, too, has a certain appeal. Given all the other issues with which Washington must deal, how tempting to let the Caribbean stew in its own juices, to lavish upon each of these 32 struggling entities the “benign neglect” customarily reserved for Burma or Sri Lanka.

Again, such a policy is not really feasible. The United States cannot withdraw from involvement in its border region by a unilateral act of will. Even if the U.S. government tried to tighten restrictions on immigration, the movement of people to the mainland would continue. American businessmen operating in the Caribbean would still demand protection. American tourists would still migrate south in winter.

Going to the Source

A third Caribbean policy—the “activist” approach—is essentially the one pursued (in different ways) by the Carter and Reagan administrations. Its tenets are two: The United States must retain its special concern for the region’s military security and political stability, and it must, at the same time, increase economic and technical aid to the Caribbean.

The activist approach, which underlies the Reagan administration’s “Caribbean Basin Initiative,” calls for beefing up the U.S. presence throughout the area: politically, militarily, economically, culturally, through both the public and private sector. Its proponents favor adjustments in trade and tariff policy (rather than outright injections of money) to facilitate the transfer of capital and technology to the islands. When money changes hands, activists think it should be done via bilateral agreements to emphasize the American “partnership.”

The activists also hope to turn the Caribbean away from Cuba. From its very first days, the Reagan administration moved to counter Cuban diplomatic efforts and tighten restrictions on commerce and exchange. It is currently planning to establish a Radio Free Cuba. Secretary of State Alexander Haig has threatened repeatedly to “go to the source” to stop Cuban arms shipments to guerrillas in Central America.

The activist policy has some obvious plusses. Focusing more attention—and aid—on the Caribbean gives Washington a cer-

*Fidel Castro charged in July 1981 that the United States had also employed germ warfare in Cuba, accounting for the dengue epidemic as well as for the appearance of blue mold tobacco blight and roya rust, which attacks sugar cane. I have no evidence to support this, and I do not believe it, but one U.S. official’s observation that Castro is “now as paranoid as he was at the time of the Bay of Pigs” was not unambiguously reassuring. 

The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1982
136
tain leverage in the region. Most Caribbean states are so small that even limited American assistance would go a long way. The timing is also good: Cuba’s internal difficulties are growing, while general Caribbean trends are toward greater cooperation with the United States.

But there are also risks. One danger is creation of unrealistic expectations. Jamaica’s Prime Minister Seaga hopes for a U.S. commitment of $3 billion annually to the region—perhaps 10 to 15 times what is likely to be forthcoming. (The total U.S. foreign economic aid budget is currently $7.5 billion.) Moreover, the preoccupation of the State Department and the White House with Fidel Castro’s Cuba does not sit well with most Caribbean leaders, who perceive Castro as only one of many Caribbean actors rather than as a Cold War instrument. Indeed, most of them are not above “playing the Cuba card” to please domestic voters or curry favor in Third World meetings. Washington’s obsession with Cuba diminishes the chances of cooperating with Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela—all of which maintain diplomatic (if not cordial) relations with Castro’s government—to develop the Caribbean. This issue, more than any other, helped to dampen enthusiasm for any “mini-Marshall Plan” that depended on close U.S. cooperation with the three.

More generally, the activist approach to the Caribbean carries the risk that Washington will become too “interventionist.” Even assuming benign intent, active or covert U.S. pursuit of political goals could stifle local initiative or provoke nationalist reactions. And, to the extent that U.S. interest in the Caribbean appears to be merely expedient—not really concerned with the region’s people but rather only with potential threats to the United States—the chances increase that an active U.S. presence in the Caribbean will backfire.

The “Developmentalist” Alternative

The fourth possible U.S. approach—one favored, not surprisingly, by many Caribbean leaders—is the adoption by Washington (and others) of a sustained commitment to Caribbean development. Such a commitment would emphasize underlying economic progress rather than immediate military security; concentrate on the long-term rather than the short-term; and tolerate diverse political and economic approaches.

This “developmentalist” policy would involve large sums of money, channeled primarily through multilateral rather than bilateral channels; imaginative efforts to provide “non-aid” concessions to help Caribbean development; and a scaling down by
"Why Not Get the Breeding Ground?" was the caption of this cartoon, published during the 1965 Dominican crisis. Of late, U.S. officials have been raising the same question—with respect to crises in El Salvador.

Washington of its efforts to contain or reverse the Cuban revolution. Rather than building up U.S. visibility, Washington would downplay its own role and lay the foundations for a healthier future U.S.–Caribbean relationship by focusing on the region’s economic stagnation, extreme inequities, malnutrition, illiteracy, and poor social and health services.

The developmentalist approach responds to a fundamental U.S. interest—"security," in a broader sense than the strictly military—in having stable, working societies on our third border. It reflects both a moral concern (that one is, to an extent, one’s brother’s keeper) and a practical realization that festering problems in societies so intertwined with our own will eventually affect this country.

Three drawbacks are apparent, however.

One problem is, again, the danger of exaggerated expectations. It is not likely that the high aspirations of Caribbean peoples can all be achieved, even with substantial foreign aid. Some of the obstacles to sustained, equitable growth—meager
THE CARIBBEAN

resources (material and human), insufficient size, extreme vulnerability to bad weather and world market slumps—cannot be wished away.

Second, there is an inevitable tension between accepting any form of economic and social organization—even Cuba's—and reassuring domestic and foreign investors about the region's prospects. Stanching the flow of capital from the Caribbean (not to mention attracting more investment) depends in part on giving businessmen confidence that their role will be valued and their assets protected. The prospect of nationalization or outright expropriation undermines that confidence, to say the least.

Finally, the developmental approach would be hard to sell at home. Congress is not likely to go along with what would be portrayed as a "no strings" commitment to aid a bewildering cluster of small countries—at least not until Americans come to realize that their own future well-being depends, in some measure, on that of their neighbors. No administration so far has been willing to make that case, and it may be that none can.

IV

TOWARD THE FUTURE

Whether Washington maintains its current policy, or adopts a longer term developmentalist approach, several steps could be taken to better the Caribbean's lot:

1. Strengthening Caribbean agriculture, by earmarking aid funds for research and development, improving access to farm credit, and encouraging private U.S. investment in rural areas.

2. Improving access to U.S. markets for both farm products and manufactured goods. Tariff barriers could be lowered or even eliminated (as the Reagan administration has suggested). Indeed, Washington has already done this for one Caribbean country by granting duty-free status to 27 Jamaican products, including peppers and tomatoes. Reduction or elimination of the U.S. tariff on rum and cigars would have a more positive short-term effect on several Caribbean countries than almost anything else Washington could do.

3. Stabilizing the export earnings of Caribbean countries that depend on the export of one or two major products by bolstering international commodity and stockpiling arrangements.

4. Setting up regular procedures to help Caribbean territories cope with hurricanes and other natural disasters, as
chronic as they are unexpected.

- Expanding tourism—and making it more “efficient.” Shared air transport facilities, jointly agreed routings, and other measures would help Caribbean countries divide the annual revenue from tourism more equitably—and it would be far preferable to the current cut-throat island rivalry. A decision by the United States to increase the dollar value of duty-free imports permitted to returning tourists would be hailed by island merchants. So would a revision of U.S. income tax codes to allow expenses for business-related conventions held in the Caribbean to be treated as are conventions in Canada and Mexico.

- Promoting the transfer of U.S. capital and technology. For example, American companies could be induced, via tax and other incentives, to “export” many of their operations to the Caribbean.

- Expanding the existing “guest worker” programs and upping the current immigration quotas for the Caribbean. (U.S. quotas are now 20,000 annually from any sovereign nation, 600 from any dependency.) This would enlarge the “safety valve” for the many islands plagued by overpopulation and unemployment.

- Helping the Caribbean cope with its energy problem. No other region of the world has been harder hit by the rise in the price of oil since 1973. A breakthrough in solar energy, if it ever comes, might do more for Caribbean development than all other steps combined. But a solar collector that is both practical and economical does not yet exist. Because of the research costs involved, developing one is something only the United States and other industrialized nations can hope to achieve.

These steps, taken together, would cost money and stir much opposition. Letting in more agricultural produce would anger growers of winter fruits and vegetables in Florida and California. Lowering the tariff on rum would hurt Puerto Rican firms. A tax deduction for Caribbean conventions would raise the hackles of U.S. innkeepers. Encouraging added American investment in island industries would be labeled “exporting jobs” by the AFL-CIO and could hurt marginal businesses in the United States (although manufacturers in Asia may, in fact, sustain the biggest loss from Caribbean competition). Permitting more migration from the Caribbean would contribute to social tensions and the demand for public services.

What is more, the American taxpayer would certainly have a larger bill to foot: To implement all of these measures, the current $600 million aid package to the Caribbean (not includ-
ing U.S. payments to Puerto Rico from all noncommunist countries would, I estimate, have to be doubled; as usual, a large share of that increase would have to come from Washington.

The costs are undeniable. On the other hand, because the Caribbean countries are so tiny, the benefit to their economies from these measures would be greatly disproportionate to any expense the United States might incur. And one should not forget that doing nothing also has its costs: unregulated and illegal immigration, regional instability, and the quality of 30 million lives—not to mention the strains put on the health of democracy and free enterprise by the persistent failure of democratic societies to "make it" in the shadow of the United States.

Taking a special interest in the economic and social health of the Caribbean countries is the right thing for the United States to do. At the same time, Washington should refrain from proclaiming a "special relationship" and from promising "regional preferences" that significantly contradict basic U.S. policies on trade, finance, immigration, and the like. U.S. stakes in the Caribbean are fairly high, but there is even more at stake outside the Caribbean. On a practical level, history suggests that American interests in the Caribbean, however important they may appear from time to time, would not long sustain the adoption of policies and practices that contravene universal rules. Preferential policies that substantially hurt some other region important to the United States simply would not last.

For their part, local leaders in the Caribbean are uneasy about the idea of a special relationship. Historically, U.S. promises of "special treatment" have meant singling out the Caribbean for rhetorical or military attention: the approach either of Arpége ("Promise her anything . . .") or of Hallmark Cards ("When you care enough to send the very best"—the Marines).

The Caribbean is too near the United States to take for granted, yet too far—historically and politically—to integrate comfortably into a U.S. "sphere." The challenge for policymakers in Washington is to keep that in mind. It is up to U.S. officials to understand how sensitive the Caribbean is to the impact of the United States and how much our country is affected by the Caribbean. It is important for them to understand the Caribbean for what it was, for what it is, and for what it could become. And it is essential to focus on the realistic possibilities that exist for the United States to affect the region positively—for our sake as much as for the Caribbean's.
He had been in the Caribbean for only two months when, on Christmas Eve, 1492, Christopher Columbus wrecked one of his caravels on the shores of Hispaniola. The Indians came to the rescue. "On hearing the news," Columbus wrote in his log, "[their] king wept. . . . Then he sent all the inhabitants of the village out to the ship in many large canoes. Thus we began to unload her."

In effect, writes Franklin Knight in *The Caribbean: Genesis of a Fragmented Nationalism* (Oxford, 1978, cloth & paper), the kindly natives dug their own graves. Knight's book is one of the best historical introductions to the region: scholarly, authoritative, well-written.

The Caribbean that Columbus found was nothing like the India he tried to find. Its islands were sparsely inhabited (total population: 750,000, by Knight's estimate). Many of the smaller islands, such as Barbados and Antigua, were not permanently settled by any of the three local Indian groups—the primitive Ciboney; the proud and fierce Carib; or the sophisticated and peaceable Taino Arawak.

The Arawak were farmers and fishers who organized their villages around ceremonial ball courts. They worked gold, turned pottery, fashioned sculpture, and domesticated at least one animal, a type of dog. "They do not carry arms, nor know them," Columbus wrote. "For when I showed them swords, they took them by the edge and cut themselves out of ignorance."

The Indians succumbed first to smallpox, then to a cruel regime of forced labor. By 1502, a Spanish viceroy was resident on Hispaniola. By 1508, 12,000 Spaniards were on the island; African slaves were being imported to make up for a vanishing Indian work force; and Madrid's proconsuls reigned throughout the region.

"For more than a century," Knight writes, "Spain enjoyed the undisputed dominion of the Americas, sending out explorers, settlers, and priests to wander hither and yon. They settled where they could, moved where they liked, fought when the occasion arose, either against the Indians or among themselves. Some went for gold; some for glory; some for God and king. Many died; a few got rich; an undetermined number returned."

As Spain's power waned, other Europeans infiltrated the Caribbean, initially via privateers who harassed Spanish shipping, eventually through well-planned expeditions. By 1640, the peripatetic Dutch were in Guyana, Curaçao, and elsewhere; the English controlled Barbados, Antigua, Montserrat, and other islands; the French held Martinique and Guadeloupe. Even the Danes for a time (1666–1917) owned some of the Virgin Islands before selling them to Washington for $25 million.

Eventually, Madrid lost everything: Jamaica to England in 1655; one-third of Hispaniola (now Haiti) to France in 1697; Cuba and Puerto Rico to the United States in 1899.

Other first-rate surveys include *From Columbus to Castro: The His-

As Gordon Lewis points out in his study of Britain’s Caribbean territories, it was not primarily the gold-hungry Spanish but the English and French who created the islands’ tobacco and sugar industries.

Plantation society in the West Indies lacked the mythology of “gentility” and paternalism that evolved in the American South. The slaves, Lewis writes, were consigned to “heavy, unremitting work under brutalizing tropical conditions.” Against all odds, a small nucleus of “colored” freedmen managed to attend “free schools,” work as merchants and professionals, buy land, and build churches.

As plantation life declined—even before British emancipation in 1834—this Creole elite came to dominate island politics and commerce. Ironically, Lewis notes, “they were carriers, perhaps more than any other group, of the ‘white bias’ of the society.” The mass of ex-slaves remained at the bottom of the social hierarchy, disdained by whites and “coloreds” alike.

The white elite lived in constant fear of slave revolt. The abbé de Raynal, in 1770, warned of terrible retribution if blacks ever rallied around a courageous leader. Such a man finally emerged, Toussaint-Louverture, the “black Spartacus,” whose bloody, 15-year campaign to oust Haiti’s French masters and abolish slavery culminated on January 1, 1804, in a declaration of the country’s independence by Jean-Jacques Dessalines.

Haiti became the world’s first modern black-ruled state, but in the process destroyed its economy. (Owing to constant warfare, sugar production declined from 70,000 tons in 1789 to 16,000 tons in 1803.) The country never recovered. David Nicholls chronicles Haiti’s tragic history From Dessalines to Duvalier (Cambridge, 1979).

Haiti’s island neighbor, the Dominican Republic, gained its independence in 1844 after a revolt led by the idealist Juan Pablo Duarte (who was promptly exiled). The chief consequence of independence, according to Robert Crassweller in his vivid Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator (Macmillan, 1966), was to replace the rapacious rule of colonial governors with that of native dictators, even as outside meddling continued.

“So chimerical was Dominican sovereignty in these years,” Crassweller writes, “that an American naval captain surveyed the Samaná Bay area for use as a base even before negotiations [for transfer of the tract] had begun.”

If nothing else, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, son of a failed rural businessman, introduced to the Dominican Republic a measure of stability during his 31-year (1930–61) tenure. Able, sensuous, corrupt, nationalistic, capricious, theatrical, cruel, Trujillo proudly conformed to every cliché about Latin American despots. “His rule was hard and brutal and masculine to excess,” Crassweller reports, “but he used perfume by the cup and beauty aids, and he de-
lighted in feminine gossip.”

Trujillo's assassination in 1961 plunged the Dominican Republic into chaos. American troops landed on the island in 1965, after a confusing coup d'état toppled Donald J. Reid Cabral's unpopular and unelected (but U.S.-backed) regime.

In *The Dominican Intervention* (Harvard, 1972), Abraham Lowenthal untangles a plot so thick that officials in Washington could not keep up with events. Lyndon Johnson's overriding fear was of a communist takeover. "Little foxes, some of them red, are nibbling at the grapes," his Ambassador in Santo Domingo had warned, and that perception—inaccurate, Lowenthal demonstrates—acted as a kind of filter. Opposing assessments could not get through.

Other views of the Dominican crisis are provided by John Bartlow Martin in *Overtaken by Events* (Doubleday, 1966) and Piero Glejeses in *The Dominican Crisis, 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt, and American Intervention* (Johns Hopkins, 1979).

For obvious reasons, Cuba has attracted more scholarly attention than the rest of the Caribbean combined. Hugh Thomas's *Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom* (Harper, 1971) is an exhaustive (1,696 pages) and highly readable account of the island's history from the arrival of the Spaniards until the late 1960s.

In the words of Britain's Lord Albermarle, who captured Havana in 1762, Cuba had developed "with truly majestic slowness" under the Spanish. The island was a mere "provisioner" for Spanish galleons and a barracks for the 5,000 sailors of the Spanish grand fleet who escorted the gold convoys from Veracruz and Portobelo to Seville and Cádiz. Few people lived in the countryside.

The year-long British occupation changed everything. English merchants made Havana a commercial center, while imported slaves and machinery provided the ingredients for a plantation economy based on sugar. Cuba's sugar exports—a scant 500 tons in 1762—soared to 10,000 tons within a decade.

The United States acquired Cuba as a result of the Spanish-American War and gave the island its independence shortly afterward, in 1902. Jorge I. Domínguez takes the story from there up to the present in *Cuba: Order and Revolution* (Harvard, 1978). He provides an in-depth, balanced look at political, economic, and social life on the island both before and after Fidel Castro's 1958 revolution. Two important companion volumes, focusing entirely on the post-revolutionary period, are *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba* (Stanford, 1969, cloth & paper) by Richard Fagen, and Carmelo Mesa-Lago’s *The Economy of Socialist Cuba* (Univ. of N.M., 1981, cloth & paper).

Other case studies of individual island societies include Carl Stone's *Democracy and Clientelism in Jamaica* (Transaction, 1980), a comprehensive survey of the island's "political sociology" (class cleavages, voting behavior, public opinion); Selwyn Ryan's *Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago* (Univ. of Toronto, 1972); and Adalberto López's *The Puerto Ricans: Their History, Culture, and Society* (Schenkman, 1980).

A. W. Singham's *The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity* (Yale, 1968) traces the rise to power of Eric Matthew Gairy as his island of Grenada (population: 97,000) lurches toward independence during the early 1960s.

Among Singham's many insights:
his analysis of what “small scale” does to modern notions of bureaucracy. In a tiny, close-knit, highly interrelated community, he writes, “all issues tend to become personalized,” making a mockery of “the hallowed canons of British administrative practice: anonymity, secrecy, and political neutrality, along with the mythical distinction between policy and administration.”

David Lowenthal elaborates in West Indian Societies (Oxford, 1972). A West Indian described to him the Public Works Department in a town in Dominica: It “consists of one family—clerks A, B, C, D, E, and F. A is the brother of B and the husband of C. A and B are first cousins of D. B is the brother-in-law of E. C is the sister-in-law of B. F, I do not know how to place her. But I guess she is some kind of relative to E.”

Lowenthal perceives the West Indies, in a racial sense, as “a global microcosm,” but finds the “rosy image of multi-racial harmony” to be a distortion—another manifestation of the “Kodachrome syndrome” that flavors foreign perceptions of the region.

The local racial situation may be better than it is in many other parts of the world, Lowenthal concedes, but color differences still correlate with class differences, many cricket clubs remain quite exclusive, and there are still some whites who will disown their children for marrying someone with a “touch of color.” Yet, for the most part, Lowenthal writes, “whites no longer dominate public affairs, even in [former] plantation strongholds.”

The most concise recent overview of the Caribbean scene—its politics, economics, and migration patterns—is The Caribbean: Its Implications for the United States (Foreign Policy Association, 1981, paper) by Virginia R. and Jorge I. Dominguez. The authors call for a sustained “developmental” approach by the United States toward the region. The special obstacles to development of the Caribbean are identified by William Demas in The Economics of Development in Small Countries (McGill-Queens, 1965).


In “Piarco,” Roach voices a common theme: The islands cage us/and we long to leave them;/the cities scorn us/and we long to love them./Bite the earth's orange/and her pips are bitter.
POLITICAL PILGRIMS: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China and Cuba by Paul Hollander Oxford, 1981 524 pp. $25

Since the 1920s, a good many Western philosophers, artists, journalists, novelists, scientists, and critics have trekked to Marxist states in search of utopia. Many found what they went looking for—or thought they did. And that is the mystery that draws Hollander, a Sovietologist and Hungarian émigré, to his subject. For these pilgrims—indeed, individuals such as George Bernard Shaw, Edmund Wilson, Susan Sontag—made their livings by pointing out contradictions and unmasking hypocrisy in their own societies. Yet a short stint in Russia or Mao’s China or Castro’s Cuba transformed these professional doubters into “true believers.” Why were they so easily duped—or so willing to be duped? Looking at the records of their travels, their glowing testimonies, Hollander seeks answers.

During the 1930s, massive unemployment and poverty in the West disillusioned many intellectuals. The Depression seemed to signal collapse, capitalism in its death throes. By contrast, the Soviet “experiment,” as biologist Julian Huxley saw it, was successfully applying “scientific principles” to social and economic organization. Poet Pablo Neruda extolled the Soviets’ glistening new hydroelectric plants. Theodore Dreiser thrilled at the modesty of Stalin’s quarters, reading into them the triumph of social equality and the end of privilege. Shaw was impressed by Soviet “rehabilitation procedures” that made “ordinary men” out of “criminal types.” But beyond the institutional and material accomplishments, many Westerners thought they sensed a general moral uplift. John Dewey, the famed American educator, believed the great appeal of the new Soviet world was “psychological rather than political,” and critic Edmund Wilson deemed it “the moral top of the world.”

If Stalin purged his foes mercilessly and signed a pact with Hitler, that did not mean the utopian dream was dead. Chastened by Soviet developments, the next great wave of pilgrims, that of the 1960s and ’70s, sought out the communes of China, the work brigades of Cuba. This time many were fleeing the “ravages” of Western prosperity—the cash nexus, growing bureaucracies, increasing work specialization, stultifying schools. Now they searched for spiritual goods—“wholeness,” a sense of community—often turning a blind eye on economic or institutional flaws.

Thus, philosopher Simone de Beauvoir waxed lyrical over the Chinese countryside: The simple ways of the rural populace suggested “harmony” between land and people, people and government. Even journalist James Reston discovered there what American life “must have been like on the
CURRENT BOOKS

frontier a century ago.” In Cuba, workers chanted while they worked; it seemed to Susan Sontag as if the whole country were “high on some beneficent kind of speed.”

And if imperfections soon became apparent in China, in Cuba, or in North Vietnam, there was still Mozambique. There was still, as a group of Swedish students told George Kennan, Albania.

Hollander recognizes that many pilgrims were tricked by elaborate “techniques of hospitality”—modern “Potemkin villages,” beatific guides, honorific tributes. But most travelers proved all too eager to be taken in. This willingness to believe stemmed from more than a desire to witness social justice; it derived from a need among Western intellectuals to be appreciated. In earlier times, during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, intellectuals had struggled to advance secular values—science, reason, progress, liberalism. But now that those values have triumphed in the West, many intellectuals feel excluded. Hence, argues Hollander, they resort to championing more elusive, transcendent ideals (e.g., community) and imagine that in some distant land, some Albania, those values reign supreme. (A weakness of the book, though, is Hollander’s failure to discuss the exceptions, individuals such as André Gide who did see beyond their illusions as a result of journeys to communist countries.)

This fantasy, which blurs personal problems and public issues, could be forgiven, Hollander maintains, were it not so harmful to the societies from which the intellectuals come. Public censure of institutions has become a rite of passage for modern intellectuals, and dissent is protected, even rewarded, in the West. But a society derives much of its self-image from its more articulate spokesmen; and if these spokesmen see nothing but ill, a nation may begin to doubt its own worth. In their eagerness to believe that distant Marxist utopias provide all answers, Western intellectuals, Hollander concludes, have demoralized their own societies.

Hollander provides a fascinating account of the 20th-century political pilgrims, allowing them generous room to speak for themselves; his conclusions may be a shade simplistic.

—James Lang (78)

MIDNIGHT’S CHILDREN
by Salman Rushdie
Knopf, 1981
446 pp. $12.95

Born in Bombay in 1947, on the midnight of India’s birth into freedom, Saleem Sinai is endowed with magical gifts — as are the thousand other Indian children born at the same instant. Like them, he is both master and victim of his fate, in a destiny implacably, and often disastrously, twinned with the country’s. The son of a Muslim businessman, Saleem has adventures spanning affluence and poverty, politics and witchcraft, peace and war. India and Pakistan, fact and dream, often plunging him headlong into national events: the linguistic feud that resulted in the creation of Maharashtra and the Bangladesh War in 1971. In the end, still young, Saleem waits mysteriously for death in a pickle fac-

The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1982

147
tory back in Bombay, contemplating the fact that "all the 600 million eggs which gave birth to the population of India could fit inside a single standard-sized pickle-jar."

Like all fantasy, Saleem's chronicle is grounded in everyday life. Its sights, sounds, and smells evoke the texture of India on a scale no other writer has yet attempted. Ghosts of earlier eras, earlier cities are stamped on the ones we see. And an enormous cast of characters pushes through caricature to become entirely real. Yet beyond the people we meet is the insistent multitude, the ticketless travelers hanging onto trains bulging with humanity, the outcasts toward whom Saleem's fate inexorably propels him. Near the end, Saleem is living among beggars, in the shadow of the Friday Mosque in Delhi. Married to Parvati-the-Witch and friend of Picture Singh, the snake charmer, he becomes a victim of Indira Gandhi's Emergency when the slum settlement is bulldozed in a campaign to beautify Delhi. Journeying to Bombay, he hears the cry of the ticketless: "And now, at last, I knew how it felt to clutch on for dear life, while particles of soot and dust ash gritted in your eyes and you were obliged to bang on the door and yell 'Ohe, maharaj! Open up! Let me in, great sir, maharaj!' While inside a voice uttered familiar words: 'On no account is anyone to open. Just fare dodgers, that's all.'"

It is an astonishing feat to keep the reader exhilarated for 445 pages. Rushdie does so in a creative burst that appears to have been accomplished at a single sitting, so uninterrupted are the rhythm and impact of his story. Workmanship of microscopic detail does not often appear on a huge canvas. Yet here is a magician's brew that contains all, a mix of impossibles — and as impressive a novel about India as any that is likely to be written.

—Nayantara Sahgal
Those who can read their ancestors' language will be disappointed when they discover that editorial fiat limited the bibliographic references to publications in English; Harvard University Press's enthusiasm for ethnicity has its limits. And after their initial astonishment at having been included, "Yankees" and "Southerners" will be disappointed, too: The former are given rather skimpy coverage, and the latter are lumped carelessly into one category (what about black and white in the composite picture of the Southerner?). Despite such minor flaws and the puzzling omission of an index, this is the most serviceable book on American ethnicity published in the past decade.

—Willi Paul Adams ('81)

THE FAIR WOMEN
by Jeanne Madeline Weimann
Academy Chicago, 1981
611 pp. $29.95 cloth, $14.95 paper

The World's Columbian Exposition commemorating the four hundredth anniversary of Columbus's discovery of America opened in Chicago on May 1, 1893. The neoclassical Woman's Building, with its broad balconies and airy loggias, was one of the fair's big draws. But a few blocks away from the fairgrounds stood another monument to women, the Isabella Club House. A plain, six-story brick and stone structure, it had originally been planned as a grand Moorish palace, to be built on the fairgrounds accompanied by a bronze statue of Queen Isabella — a counterbalance to that of Columbus.

These two contrasting buildings resulted from a struggle between two women's groups. It began in 1889, when Chicago was campaigning to be selected as the site of the fair. A collection of Chicago women, wives of wealthy entrepreneurs, petitioned the city's all-male fund-raising corporation for a Women's Auxiliary corporation. They proposed to raise money, lobby Congress for the Chicago cause, and construct a pavilion to highlight the activities of women. Almost simultaneously, suffragists, meeting first in Chicago and then establishing offices in New York, Washington, D.C., and St. Louis — many of them professionals, doctors, lawyers — formed the Queen Isabella society; they called for the appointment of women to the fair's governing organization and for the exhibiting and judging of men's and women's work together.

Congress settled on Chicago in April of 1890 and directed the Fair's National Commission to appoint a Board of Lady Managers. The commission chose 117 ladies — two from each state and territory, plus an additional nine (eight of them from the Auxiliary). Mrs. Potter Palmer, wife of a
successful Chicago financier, was elected president. Wealthy, beautiful, wise to the ways of power, often dictatorial, she set the board on the course charted by the Auxiliary.

Weimann, a journalist, constructs a fast-moving, absorbing narrative, evoking (with 450 illustrations) the fin de siècle atmosphere of the fair and Chicago. The Isabellas, led by such figures as Susan Anthony, sought in the fair what they sought in larger economic, social, and political spheres. Their goal of combined male-and-female exhibits reflected their one-dimensional approach, their dedication to suffrage, and their belief "that women should be equal in all things with men." Not surprisingly, most women on the board were suspicious of suffrage, sexual egalitarianism, and political activity. Wielding a majority, Palmer blocked the major points of the Isabella program. Often resorting to underhanded tactics, she fired the duly elected secretary of the board (the sole representative of the rival group) and kept the Isabella building off the fairgrounds.

Yet it would be wrong to think that the Isabellas had no influence. If most lady managers embraced the "woman's sphere" of home and family, they came to reject the Victorian notion of the "woman-on-the pedestal." The women's exhibits, Palmer insisted, did reflect new social and economic realities. If some women were leaving home to work, she argued, they were doing so to protect themselves and their families from "cruel circumstances." Such women deserved fair wages, educational opportunities, and technical training.

And then, of course, the Woman's Building itself — an all-female production (except for the actual construction) from architectural design to sculpture, decoration, and the 80,000 exhibits — represented more than a triumph of the Auxiliary position. It provided overwhelming proof of women's accomplishments in art, industry, and, not least, organization. Perhaps most significant was Anthony's praise of Palmer's abilities at the fair's assemblies in 1893. Palmer reciprocated by acknowledging Anthony's efforts to draw attention to the needs of women. The conflicts within the women's movement did not disappear — they are perhaps even stronger today. But The Fair Women shows that a reasonable and productive reconciliation is not without precedent.

—Victoria Schuck ('80)
CURRENT BOOKS

NEW TITLES

Mark Twain described her as "by far the most extraordinary person the human race has ever produced," while George Bernard Shaw called her "the queerest fish among the eccentric worthies of the Middle Ages." Joan of Arc has been the subject of over 70 books published or reissued since 1970 alone. These two by Gies and Warner deserve notice. Gies, a Washington, D.C., historian, stays close to the chronology: Joan's childhood in Domremy, her first appearance in Charles VII's court in 1429 (where she reputedly identified Charles hidden among his courtiers), her part in raising the English-Burgundian siege of Orleans, her ecclesiastical trial and execution for heresy in 1431, and the hearing 25 years later that cleared her of that charge. Gies weighs the evidence for the often conflicting legends—Joan's visions of St. Michael and St. Margaret, her skill as a military commander—and concludes with a chapter on the treatment of Joan in literature and art from the 15th century to the present. By contrast, Warner eschews the chronological approach. Instead, she compares Joan with other men and women who have assumed the role of prophet, virgin, knight, heretic, harlot, amazon, or saint. As a prophet, Joan dealt in concrete prediction (the time and place of her wounding, for example) rather than in the sweeping and virtually unverifiable apocalyptic prophecies favored by contemporary seers; as a visionary, she had visitations too tangible and intimate for the more abstract tastes of 15th-century church authorities. Neither author uses her subject as the basis for a feminist tract. Nor does either claim the final word. As Warner, a London-based critic and historian, puts it, Joan belongs to the "splendour of the unaccountable, the particular, the anarchical."

The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1982
151
Despite the awful specter of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the 1950s saw a remarkable flowering of American confidence in the peaceful potential of the atom. Charged with overseeing both military and civilian projects, the Atomic Energy Commission zealously carried out Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" program to bring atomic energy to the rest of the non-communist world, trusting that bilateral agreements would prevent buyer nations from converting their nuclear capacity into atomic arsenals. The Nixon administration's commitment to commercial nuclear power led to the private ownership of enrichment plants and to the spread of increasingly sophisticated nuclear technology. Finally, in 1974, India's explosion of a nuclear device brought to an end over two decades of wishful thinking. Two years later, the United States launched its first full-scale review of atomic policy since 1953. Concluded during the last months of the Ford administration, the Fri Review urged subordinating commercial interests to nonproliferation considerations, but the responsibility for action fell to President Carter. While crediting him with good intentions, Brenner, a professor of international affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, shows how Carter alienated our friendly competitors in the nuclear energy trade, notably France and Japan, with his sudden unilateral pronouncements (e.g., his "ban" on the breeder reactor) instead of trying for nonproliferation accords through steady diplomacy. For the declining exclusivity of the "nuclear club," Brenner puts most blame on the early U.S. nuclear policymakers, who naively failed to consider the dangers down the road.

According to one scholarly view—voiced in the 1820s and revived in the 1960s—it was the white man who first taught friendly Indians to cut off scalps (of other Indians) as proof of a kill. Axtell, a historian at the College of William and Mary, mocks this account as the imaginative "product of Indian activism and white guilt." Citing archaeological discover-
ies and the writings of early Spanish explorers, he shows that the natives were scalping one another long before Columbus arrived. But the Europeans did introduce much that was new to the Indians, including typhus, smallpox, and yellow fever, which decimated tribes, destroyed family networks, and often weakened religious beliefs. Missionaries largely failed to tempt natives with "Christianitie for their soules"; it was hard to displace old faiths, polygamy, and easy divorce. Colonists frequently proved more willing to learn from the natives. Some captured Europeans were treated so well that they chose to remain with their adopted tribe when given the chance to leave. But, in general, contacts with the Indians served to convince Europeans of the "savage" baseness that could dominate human nature without the constraints of government, religion, and hard work.

Contemporary Affairs

With close analysis and considerable literary grace, Lebanese scholar Ajami accomplishes what so many outside (and inside) observers have failed to do: He produces a clear, coherent picture of the ideologies and movements that have swept through the Arab world in recent times. Concentrating on events since the humiliating Six-Day War of 1967, he traces a confrontation between modernity and tradition—the social, political, and cultural consequence of Arab defeat. He describes the collapse of pan-Arab and socialist movements, associated with states such as Egypt (under Nasser) and Syria, and the rising influence of more traditional monarchies such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Egypt, a country Ajami describes as a "mirror" of the Arab world, comes in for special attention: The legacy of Nasser, Sadat's experiments with nation-building and bold diplomacy, and Egypt's cultural ferment define the "limits and possibilities of Arab history." Finally, Ajami points to the 1973 October War and the spurious Arab victory as the start of a
new age, marked by a surge of oil revenues (and the domestic and inter-Arab antagonisms created by this wealth), as well as by increasing militancy among Islamic fundamentalists. Blaming Westernized Arab elites for ignoring the problems of their people, Ajami, director of Mideast Studies at Johns Hopkins, views the rise of traditionalism as a flight from economic, social, and political realities—and therefore no solution.

The abuse of language, and the disastrous intellectual consequences thereof, provided the theme of Mitchell's earlier book, *Less Than Words Can Say* (1979). Now the publisher of the spirited monthly *The Underground Grammarian* descends into the core of the current U.S. problem: a new breed of educators who are committed more to the cultivation of "human potential" than to the teaching of subjects. Behind the rise of modern educational theory, Mitchell sees the influence of Max Wundt, professor of psychology at the University of Leipzig at the turn of the century. Americans who studied stimulus-response behaviorism in his laboratories returned home to found their own programs of "educational psychology." Shifting pedagogic emphasis away from the substance of history, English, and other subjects and toward desirable "student outcomes," these early evangelists converted many a public school administrator. In 1913, the National Education Association's Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Schools published its *Cardinal Principles of Education.* Downplaying the traditional curriculum, this influential document declared that the real business of schools was to make better citizens—an impractical mission, says Mitchell. The educationalists' pseudo-scientific approach gave rise, furthermore, to impenetrable jargon. Thus, today's students learn "to anticipate factors likely to influence proposals for changes in human relationships." And if they master that, why should they bother with Shakespeare?
AMERICAN POLITICS: The Promise of Disharmony
by Samuel P. Huntington
Harvard, 1981
303 pp. $15

Why, at certain times, has America experienced so much political consensus—and, at others, so much political conflict? Huntington, a Harvard political scientist, answers with a provocative thesis. As he sees it, an inevitable chronic tension exists between the nation’s high “liberal ideals” and its “semi-liberal institutions.” The American Creed is egalitarian, individualistic, democratic, and hence against authority, even U.S. authority. Over time, the intensity of Americans’ belief in the creed varies. The 1960s uproar was an intense, angry reaffirmation of the creed, challenging most existing institutions and practices. Quite similar reformist upsurges occurred earlier, during the Age of Jackson (1820-40) and the Populist-Progressive era at the turn of the century. “America,” Huntington observes, “has been spared [European-style] class conflicts in order to have moral convulsions” every third generation. While complacency and hypocrisy are dangerous, mindless reformism could some day cripple the nation’s institutions and its ability to support liberty and democracy abroad. “Critics say America is a lie,” Huntington concludes. “They are wrong. America is not a lie; it is a disappointment. But it can be a disappointment only because it is also a hope.”

MARKETS AND MINORITIES
by Thomas Sowell
Basic, 1981
141 pp. $13.50

Sowell’s great strength is his ability to take a volatile issue—race—and discuss it in a dispassionate manner. The first chart in this volume sets the iconoclastic tone of the book: Ranking family income by ethnic group, it puts WASPs seventh, below, among others, Jews, Japanese, and Poles. As a partial explanation, Sowell offers the age factor (46 is the median for Jews, 18 years above average) and geographic distribution (the Japanese, for instance, are found disproportionately in prosperous California). Sowell’s purpose here is to demonstrate that no single factor can explain the wide ethnic differences in family income. He proceeds to look at the historical experiences of ethnic groups in America, examining the rise and fall of their relative positions and
the vehicles (politics, education, commerce) each has used to advance. He contests a number of liberal assumptions. Federal housing programs have not improved the living conditions of the poor. And minimum wage laws, enacted too late to “help” most European immigrants, have actually reduced the number of jobs available to blacks, Hispanics, and recent newcomers. Here, as in his Black Education: Myth and Tragedies (1972) and Race and Economics (1975), Sowell, a Hoover Institution economist, presses for rigorous scrutiny of issues that have been clouded by rhetoric, emotion, and academic taboos.

Arts & Letters

W. H. AUDEN:
A Biography
by Humphrey Carpenter
Houghton Mifflin, 1981
495 pp. $15.95

"The biography of an artist, if his life as a man was sufficiently interesting, is permissible," wrote W. H. Auden (1907–73)—"provided," he added, "that the biographer and his readers realise that such an account throws no light on the artist's work." Carpenter, whose previous books include biographies of J.R.R. Tolkien and C. S. Lewis, takes Auden's pronouncement to heart. For what we have here is a rich and sprawling life. From his boarding school days, when he "confided his first naughty hints about the facts of sex" through his many careers (schoolmaster, film-script and travel writer, lecturer), Auden, a born teacher, felt compelled to share what he learned. Deciding at age 15 to become a poet, the precocious son of a Birmingham physician chose, perhaps, the most difficult vehicle of instruction. His adult life was peripatetic—a year in Berlin after graduating from Oxford, camping in Iceland while researching a book, traveling to Spain and China to observe two wars, in 1939 immigrating to the United States, and then finally returning to Europe (Austria and England) for his last years. All this travel was accompanied by more important intellectual and emotional departures—from the practice of amoral promiscuity toward a firm belief in marriage and monogamy; from Freud to
Kierkegaard; from Christianity to atheism and Marxism and then back to Christianity. Without judging the man or his art, Carpenter provides a broad enough sampling of the latter to show how it served as the final laboratory for Auden's manifold experiments with life.

If monsters didn't exist, it would have been necessary to invent them, implies Friedman—and throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages, Europeans invented them with a creative flair. Friedman, professor of English at the University of Illinois, looks for reasons behind the lasting fascination with monstrous races. In his *Natural History*, the Roman Pliny (a.d. 23–79) compiled perhaps the most influential catalogue of “monsters.” Some, such as the Ethiopians and Pygmies, were simply natives of distant lands; others, like the Panotii (“all-ears”) and Apple-Smellers, were totally fanciful creations. The Plinian races served, in a negative way, to define *humanity*: Those who practiced alien customs or lived outside cities could not possibly be human. In Christian times, tales of monsters continued to reinforce ethnocentric norms but were further embellished by conflicting theological interpretations. One school of thought identified monsters as the descendants of Cain, and early maps of the world placed troglodytes and Sciopods (who used their huge feet as umbrellas) at the edge, “as far as possible from Jerusalem.” The *Letter of Prester John* (ca. 1163), reporting the conversion of heathens in the Far East, supported the more charitable Augustinean view that monsters possessed souls and therefore could be saved. And as early as the 12th century, a strain of “romantic primitivism” began to endow savages with noble characteristics. In most forms of medieval allegory, however, monsters served as vivid warnings to the faithful “against pride and disobedience.” New World explorations forced Europeans to give up their monsters, but the tendency to see the “outsider” as less than human persists.
CURRENT BOOKS

LITERARY DEMOCRACY:
The Declaration of Cultural Independence in America
By Larzer Ziff
Viking, 1981
333 pp. $20

In 1837, a serious economic crisis sent tremors of self-doubt through American society. That same year, Ralph Waldo Emerson offered a Harvard audience his profoundly simple solution to the country's ills: Believe in the primacy of "inborn values"; do not submit to material pressures; be better men, and a better world will follow. A nation whose genius, according to Tocqueville, lay in commerce rather than in art or ideas paid unusual attention to the widely published words of the Concord idealist. What could the American character be? Answers were not long in coming. Discovering that "America meant more than a new setting for time-honored forms," Emerson's literary contemporaries, Hawthorne, Melville, Poe, Whitman, and others turned away from the sentimental portraits by earlier writers such as Cooper and aimed for radical and imaginative reconstructions of what America truly was. Poe's dark tales, private to the point of solipsism, marked an extreme of the new quest, but others also sensed that truth could be found only through imaginative "isolationism." Indeed, argues Ziff, professor of English at Johns Hopkins, the terms of American writers' lives—their estrangement from the rest of society—provided them with vital clues to the American character and predicament. Celebrating the Self (Whitman), exploring the connections between man and nature (Thoreau), or unraveling the mystery of human communities (Hawthorne and Melville), these writers produced interior landscapes vast enough to match the sprawling terrain of their young and growing nation.

Science & Technology

THOMAS ALVA EDISON:
An American Myth
by Wyn Wachhorst
MIT, 1981
328 pp. $15

During his lifetime, Thomas Edison (1847-1931) obtained 1,093 patents. But Wachhorst, a historian at the University of California, is interested less in the man and his machines than in the changing Edison legend. As the Western frontier shrank during the late 19th century, Americans looked on Edison as a
new Adam in yet another New World Eden—
technology. Dubbed the "Wizard of Menlo Park," by newsmen, Edison became in the
public's eyes a near superhuman figure who—
with his perfection of the incandescent lamp
in 1879—brought light to the masses. After
World War I, Edison's image reversed. Caught
up in technology's swirl and noise—partly
fostered by Edison's invention of the phono-
graph, the carbon telephone transmitter, and
the motion-picture projector—many Ameri-
cans began to yearn for the old days of inno-
cence and rugged individualism. Edison
filled that bill too. He was the enterprising
All-American Boy (at age 12, he sold newspa-
pers on Michigan's Grand Trunk Railroad),
the Horatio Alger Hero (learning telegraphy
from a station master whose son he had
plucked from the path of an errant boxcar),
the Self-Made Man working through the
night in his lab. Wachhorst's study of Edison
biographies, press accounts, testimonials,
and even movies offers a lively panorama of
past American hopes and self-perceptions.

GENES, MIND, AND
CULTURE
by Charles J. Lumsden
and Edward O. Wilson
Harvard, 1981
428 pp. $20

There is no doubt among scientists that genes
play a role in behavior—even in collective be-
havior, which we call culture. Controversy
arises, however, over the extent of that role.
Here Wilson, a biologist, and Lumsden, a
physicist, postulate a process by which genes
and culture directly interact in evolution.
Furthermore, they attribute to genes the
dominant role in shaping the kinds of behav-
ior individuals will display within a given
culture. This genetic imperative is mediated
through primary and secondary "epigenetic"
rules—mental patterns that govern sensory
screening and the handling of information
through memory and emotional response.
These rules affect our choices among various
cultural options: to shave or not to shave,
preference for sweet or sour. Over time, cer-
tain forms of behavior are selected as more
conducive to survival; the genetic patterns
underlying these forms are accordingly se-
lected. The more traditional view, held by
most anthropologists and social scientists, allows genes only a very general influence in the shaping of collective behavior. The implications of the debate are far-reaching. For example, if aggression, which has marked much of human history, is, as anthropologists maintain, culturally based, then it is possible, through conscious innovation, to modify our behavior. But if aggression is part of our genetic heritage, as Wilson and Lumsden suggest, then prospects for change, at least over the short term, are much more limited.

Straddling three worlds, Charles Percy Snow (1905–80), physicist, novelist, statesman, sought in his own life, as in this engaging history, to make connections among them. Beginning with Cambridge physicist J. J. Thompson’s 1897 discovery of subatomic particles, Snow proceeds through the “golden age” of physics, the 1920s, during which a truly European community (with research hubs in Göttingen, Copenhagen, Rome, and Cambridge) plumbed the secrets of the atom. Instead of focusing on the biggest name, Einstein, Snow evokes, in anecdotal style, the multitude of individuals who toiled and the variety of talents they brought to bear on this scientific endeavor. Discovering the atom’s nucleus in 1911, Ernest Rutherford, the great experimental physicist, provided valuable data for Niels Bohr’s pioneering model of the atom. The work of the “marvelous decade” was crowned, in 1928, by Paul Dirac’s synthesis of various theories of atomic structure with Einstein’s theory of relativity. The community was splintered in the 1930s, when Nazi and Fascist anti-Semitism forced many physicists to flee to the United States. Snow defends the Manhattan Project and its refugee scientists, who, knowing the Germans were fully capable of engineering an atomic bomb, raced to beat them to it. No believer in the neutrality of science, Snow bids the modern physicist to speak out on the implications of his work and to avoid “letting the conscience rust.”
CURRENT BOOKS


Histories of the world are frequently burdened with elaborate theoretical structures—ideas about the meaning of history that too often leave little room for the details or textures of times past. The great projects of Arnold Toynbee and Oswald Spengler both suffered from this flaw. Here, though, Thomas, the versatile English historian (whose two previous books dealt with Cuba and with the Spanish Civil War), takes on the task in an admirably understated manner, showing at least as much concern for the smaller matters of human experience—"the history of brandy, of the thermometer, of the radish"—as for large events and forces. Like French historian Fernand Braudel, Thomas relishes the minute but telling particular: the differences between the two types of plague (bubonic and pulmonary); the role of the stirrup in the evolution of warfare; forms of currency (paper in ancient China, until abandoned for causing inflation). He moves easily between such considerations and broader trends, demonstrating, for example, how Renaissance "marriage patterns" affected the growth of modern capitalism. Organizing his study around subjects such as invention, disease, and housing, Thomas concludes with a calm, balanced endorsement of the West's liberal values and material progress.

A CHOICE OF DAYS. By H. L. Mencken. Vintage, 1981. 337 pp. $4.95

Selections from the original Happy Days, Newspaper Days, and Heathen Days, these autobiographical essays show Mencken (1880-1956) bustling through childhood, school days, and the beginning of a career, cub reporting on the fringes of Baltimore. ("You are supposed to keep on out the road," his editor ordered, "until you meet the Philadelphia reporters coming in.") Mencken loved the journalist's trade, for it kept him close to the uproar of daily life. A Herald man when young, he pitted the Sun reporters, who were "hobbled by their paper's craze for mathematical accuracy." Yet it was from a Sun man that he learned to "synthesize" the news, a talent that later served him well when he and another Herald editor concocted, with very few facts, the story of the Russo-Japanese naval battles of 1905 (and were later pleasantly surprised to find their version "corroborated" in a book written by an eyewitness). These sprightly essays capture the time and the city, the trade and the man.

ITALIAN FOLKTALES. Selected and retold by Italo Calvino. Pantheon, 1981. 763 pp. $9.95

Whether their plots derive from classical myths, oriental traditions, or medieval romances—whether they greet the reader as childhood friends rediscovered or mysterious strangers—these 200 tales are infused with wonder and charm. Peopled by princes, hunchbacks, and saints, they show people at their best and worst, avoid moralizing, and often have jarringly unhappy conclusions. Calvino, a novelist, narrates as well as edits, grafting literary manners over folkloric material. His willingness to combine variations of a story in order to gain rhythm, color, balance, or logic may disturb the purist. But, to paraphrase a Tuscan proverb, a tale becomes beautiful only when the narrator adds to it, embellishing with what is in his heart and experience. Though ours is a literary age, and Calvino a literary man, the magic of the oral tradition survives in this collection.

The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1982

161
Hawthorne's Divided Genius

To the Puritan—even the Puritan writer—art seemed to inhabit uncertain moral territory. To dedicate one's life to its pursuit, therefore, was to risk spiritual torment, even perdition. Yet, if Calvinism has proved a burden to many of America's strongest writers, from Herman Melville to John Updike, its insistence on rigorous self-scrutiny and moral accounting has fostered a turn of mind beneficial to their craft. Born in Salem, Massachusetts, Nathaniel Hawthorne grew up in the center of Puritan culture to become one of the nation's most acute observers of the American character. Here, biographer James Mellow describes the author "between" his two famous novels, The Scarlet Letter (1850) and The House of the Seven Gables (1851), showing how these works dramatized important moral dilemmas that complicated Hawthorne's own life.

by James R. Mellow

In one of those perfect antitheses that seem more natural to literary criticism than to literary history, Hawthorne's earliest major novels, The Scarlet Letter and The House of the Seven Gables, represent the opposite poles of his divided genius.

The first, published in 1850, is a gloomy allegory of sin and redemption set in Puritan Boston, a book that Hawthorne himself characterized as "positively a hell-fired story" into which he had found it impossible to introduce even a ray of cheering light.

The second, published a year later, was Hawthorne's depiction of contemporary Salem life (with flashbacks into the pasts of his fictional Pyncheon and Maule families) — a picture that Hawthorne had hoped to finish with all the minute detail of a Dutch genre painting. As he acknowledged in a letter to a friendly critic, The House of the Seven Gables was "a more natural and healthy product of my mind and [I] felt less reluctance in publishing it."

Hawthorne's discomfort over the earlier publication of The Scarlet Let-
An 1840 portrait of Hawthorne, 36, by Charles Osgood.

Courtesy of the Essex Institute, Salem, Massachusetts.

ter had not been feigned; but, strangely, he had been more concerned about the stark mood of the story than the possible scandal of its subject—the adulterous relationship between a sensitive and weak-willed Puritan minister, the Reverend Arthur Dimmesdale, and his beautiful parishioner, Hester Prynne, whose husband is mistakenly believed to have died at sea.

Originally, Hawthorne had planned The Scarlet Letter as a long short-story, one of a series of historical tales to be published in a single volume by his newly acquired publishers, Ticknor, Reed and Fields. But James T. Fields had encouraged him to expand the tale and publish it as a novel by itself. Writing to Fields on January 20, 1850, Hawthorne had explored his misgivings, maintaining that the story stuck too closely to its point, that it kept turning over "the same dark idea" and would very likely weary or disgust his hard-earned readership. *Hawthorne's concern was natural enough; he had never been a popular or a well-paid author and he was, at that moment, in the middle of a financial crisis.

"Is it safe, then," he asked Fields, "to stake the fate of the book entirely on this one chance?"

The question was rhetorical; it was clear from his letter that Hawthorne was ready to accede to Fields's suggestion. The fate of the book is a fact of literary history; it was a resounding critical success. For many critics, then and now, The Scarlet Letter established itself as the first indisputable classic in American fiction.

Considering the genteel taste of the mid-19th century American readership, with its preference for stories of sentimental love and characters of exemplary moral behavior—a literature written by what Hawthorne described as "a damned mob of scrib-

*He had earned his readership with such books as Twice-Told Tales (1837) and Mosses from an Old Manse (1845).
bling women”—a novel about adultery was a daring choice of subject. But Hawthorne, the anatomist of guilt rather than the historian of sin, completely avoided any suggestion of the sexual pleasures in which his loving couple might have indulged. He concentrated instead on the penitential burden they were forced to bear (one publicly, the other in private remorse) in their strict New England community.

**Offending the Prudish**

Hawthorne opened his narrative at the moment when Hester Prynne, carrying her infant daughter Pearl, and bearing the embroidered scarlet letter on her breast, stands on the scaffold, enduring her public penance and refusing to name her fellow-sinner. At that point—the first of three highly dramatic tableaux centering around the scaffold, which provide the novel’s structure—Hester catches sight of her husband, Roger Chillingworth, the deformed physician who becomes the catalytic agent for the Reverend Dimmesdale’s psychological fall from grace.

Hawthorne’s lovers may reflect upon or endlessly discuss their moral transgression, but they never look back upon the Eden of their passion. Only once does Hester suggest—with a boldness more characteristic of later feminist heroines than the usual insipid 19th-century female protagonist—that their love affair had its own justification, whatever the world’s view. “What we did had a consecration of its own,” she tells the minister during their meeting in the woods. “We felt it so! We said so to each other!”

But if *The Scarlet Letter* was the most licit of novels on an illicit theme, Hawthorne did not altogether escape criticism from some of his more sententious reviewers. An Episcopalian bishop, Arthur Cleveland Coxe, writing in the *Church Review*, characterized the story as “the nauseous amour of a Puritan pastor, with a frail creature of his charge, whose mind is represented as far more debauched than her body.” (The latter stricture refers to Hester’s somewhat emancipated views on the position of women in a male-dominated society.) The clergyman also complained of Hawthorne’s introduction of French realism into the purer streams of American fiction; he asked if “a running undertide of filth” would now become a prerequisite for a popular romance.

**Art and Adultery**

In the highly principled *North American Review*, another critic, Anne W. Abbott, questioned how Hawthorne, a writer with “a wizard power over language,” could have chosen such a revolting subject as adultery—a subject “to which fine writing seems as inappropriate as fine embroidery.” Subliminally, perhaps, she had caught Hawthorne’s analogy between works of

*James R. Mellow, 55, a graduate of Northwestern University, is the author of two biographies, *Charmed Circle: Gertrude Stein and Company* (1974) and *Nathaniel Hawthorne in His Times* (1980). This essay was originally published in slightly different form as the introduction to the New American Library’s combined edition of *The Scarlet Letter* and *The House of The Seven Gables*, with the permission of the author. Copyright © 1981 by James R. Mellow.*
literature and the sinful condition of human nature. For Hawthorne clearly intended to establish the parallel: It is one of the obsessive themes of his fiction. The scarlet "A," so artfully embroidered by Hester, is intended to signify art as well as adultery. For Hawthorne, writing—like Hester's embroidery—was an art that was something of a luxury "in a land that afforded comparatively little scope for its exercise."

Making a Splash

The fact that he had created a masterpiece on the theme of one of the capital sins exposed Hawthorne to a sharp attack from the influential social critic and labor reformer Orestes Brownson, who declared: "There is an unsound state of public morals when the novelist is permitted, without a scorching rebuke, to select such crimes, and invest them with all the fascinations of genius, and all the charms of a highly polished style." Brownson, writing in his own Brownson's Quarterly Review, obviously intended to administer that rebuke.

The success of The Scarlet Letter, however—by September 1850, it had gone through two editions, amounting to 5,000 copies, and a new edition had been called for—had less to do with the daring subject matter than with the notoriety of the author's recent ouster from his political post as Surveyor of the Salem Custom House. On June 8, 1849, by way of the newly instituted telegraphic service, Hawthorne was informed of his dismissal. He had been led to believe, by the local Whigs, that his position was secure, since the new administration under Zachary Taylor did not intend to remove qualified men for partisan political reasons. Hawthorne, an appointed Democrat, maintained an air of aggrieved innocence throughout the resulting scandal, which was a subject of nationwide editorial comment. A number of eminent Whigs—including Daniel Webster, William Hickling Prescott, the historian, and Horace Mann, Hawthorne's brother-in-law and a Massachusetts congressman at the time—tried to have him reinstated without success.

The publicity, however, proved beneficial when his novel was published seven months later. Hawthorne's wonderfully sardonic account of his tenure of office and his political "decapitation," written as "The Custom-House," the introductory chapter to his novel, only served to revive the controversy. Moreover, Hawthorne's publisher, James Fields, was an energetic publicist, prodding editors and critics with advance copies, courting favorable reviews, introducing stepped-up advertising campaigns, and plastering New York and Boston with show cards of his new publications. "We intend to publish your books à-la-Steam Engine," he told Hawthorne, by way of indicating his up-to-date approach to the trade. In certain respects, The Scarlet Letter was one of the first American novels to benefit from modern promotional methods.

The Hermit Myth

Despite all this, the image of Hawthorne as a shy, unworldly man, the reclusive author of dreamy tales and fantasies that had little relation to the life of his time, has become entrenched in our literary history.

It stands in the way of a fuller understanding of the complexity of his work and the complexity of his life. It is true that following his graduation from Bowdoin College in
1825. Hawthorne had returned to Salem to spend a decade living in seclusion on Herbert Street with his reclusive mother and sisters. (Hawthorne's father, a sea captain, had died in Surinam when Hawthorne was four.) There, writing in his "dismal and squalid chamber" under the eaves, he served his lengthy apprenticeship as a writer, producing, in 1828, an unsatisfactory novel, *Fanshawe* (which he later disowned), and the series of tales and sketches he began sending around to the ephemeral literary magazines and gift annuals of the period.

But Hawthorne was scarcely the hermit he liked to present himself as being in his later prefaces to his novels and volumes of stories. During his summers, he traveled: to Connecticut, Martha's Vineyard, the Shaker community at Canterbury, New Hampshire, and, once, during the cholera-ridden summer of 1832, as far west as Niagara Falls and perhaps to Detroit. His travels, as his letters and notebooks indicate, were meant to provide him with material for his stories and sketches. Sometimes during these excursions, according to his sister Elizabeth, Hawthorne engaged in mild flirtations with young women, but neither he nor his family seems to have taken these affairs seriously.

Even the briefest review of Hawthorne's political or professional careers gives the lie to the now-outmoded image of him as a literary recluse. In 1836, he served as the editor of the Boston-based publication, *The American Magazine of Useful and Entertaining Knowledge*. In 1837, with the help of his friends Senator Franklin Pierce and Representative Jonathan Cilley (both former Bowdoin students), he unsuccessfully...
tried to get a position as historian of the Wilkes Expedition, which circled the globe in 1838-42. In 1838, he pressed another friend, John Louis O'Sullivan, editor of the Democratic Review, to use his influence in obtaining for him the job of Postmaster in Salem.

In 1839, his future sister-in-law Elizabeth Peabody pressured the wily politician and historian George Bancroft into appointing Hawthorne a Measurer in the Boston Custom House. He kept the post until 1841, when he quit to become the unlikeliest member of the new utopian community, Brook Farm, in West Roxbury, Massachusetts. Hawthorne had hoped to establish a residence for himself and his bride-to-be, Sophia Peabody, but he soon found the taxing round of farm chores thoroughly unconducive to his literary ambitions.

For three years, following his marriage in 1842, Hawthorne actively campaigned for a political appointment in Salem and, after much wheeling and dealing, was rewarded with the Surveyorship in 1846. In 1852, with characteristic diffidence, he offered his services as campaign biographer to Franklin Pierce, who was running for President. Although Hawthorne maintained that he had no political intentions in making such a gesture, he promptly reconsidered and accepted the lucrative post of American consul in Liverpool when Pierce was elected. After a profitable post-inaugural trip to Washington, Hawthorne even managed to add to his consular salary the "emoluments" from the then-vacant consulship at Manchester. He was hardly the apolitical figure that literary critics and biographers have sketched for us in the past.

In one of those unpredictable mergers of art with personal life, Hawthorne's political embarrassment during his ouster from the Salem surveyorship bore fruit in the thematic circumstances of The Scarlet Letter. The poignancy of Hester Prynne's public penance, her ordeal on the scaffold, where she is pilloried for her sins, is directly related to the shame and bitterness Hawthorne experienced when his own name was unexpectedly "careering through the public prints."

No Innocent Parties

Throughout the controversy, Hawthorne had publicly maintained that he was merely an innocent man of letters who had been offered a political post, that he had been, at best, an indifferent politician who had never taken an active part in party politics.

His protestations of innocence were somewhat disingenuous. He had, in fact, deliberately campaigned to get the office. Prior to his dismissal, he had allowed himself to be used as a shield behind which his Democratic cronies held onto their posts in the Custom House. Finally, and with some justice, the Salem Whigs decided that the only way they could take over the Custom House patronage was to remove Hawthorne himself.

Hawthorne had not been the passive politician he claimed to be; one of his first acts of office was the dismissal of two elderly inspectors whom he had found it his duty "to report as incompetent," and whom he replaced with "firm friends of the administration." Nor is it altogether certain that Hawthorne was completely free of taint in the case of pressuring—or allowing his name to be used in pressuring—two of his subordinates into paying large as-
Hawthorne, whose obsessive sense of guilt motivated many of his finest stories, brought to his account of Hester Prynne's ordeal on the scaffold the burden of his own uneasy compromises during his recent political tenure. The reader of The Scarlet Letter who attempts to unravel the "inextricable knot" that ties together the fates of Hester Prynne, Arthur Dimmesdale, and Roger Chillingworth will find no innocent party. The only innocence in The Scarlet Letter is the cruel innocence of little Pearl, whose questions about the scarlet A only add to her mother's sense of guilt and shame.

An Early Freudian

The Scarlet Letter, however, is not important to us because of its autobiographical hints. Aside from the emblematic figure of Hester (one of the most vivid female characters in American fiction), the real significance of Hawthorne's classic novel lies in its psychological force.

In the Reverend Dimmesdale's fall from pedestal and pulpit, Hawthorne traces with uncanny intuition the hidden connection between physical suffering and repressed guilt. And in the dark relationship between Dimmesdale and the physician Roger Chillingworth, Hawthorne proves himself a premature Freudian, exploring—years before their actual discovery—the manipulative techniques of psychoanalysis.

His account of the process by which Chillingworth establishes his unwary victim's guilt is masterful:

A man burdened with a secret should especially avoid the intimacy of his physician. If the latter possess native sagacity, and a nameless something more—let us call it intuition; if he show no intrusive egotism, nor disagreeably prominent characteristics of his own; if he have the power, which must be born with him, to bring his mind into such affinity with his patient's, that this last shall unawares have spoken what he imagines himself only to have thought; if such revelations be received without tumult, and acknowledged not so often by an uttered sympathy, as by silence . . . then, at some inevitable moment, will the soul of the sufferer be dissolved, and flow forth in a dark, but transparent stream, bringing all its mysteries into the daylight.

Hawthorne was an explorer of the interior self. The above passage from The Scarlet Letter illustrates what Hawthorne's most perceptive admirer, Herman Melville, called the "power of blackness" in his prose—the ability to trace the darker emotions, the submerged torments of the mind. It was a quality that set Hawthorne's writing apart from the more popular but shallow fiction of his time.

Hawthorne made ambivalence a method. It was not simply a question of indecision or indifference or a means of escape from the hard social issues of the period—as some of his severest critics claimed. It was Hawthorne's attempt to hold in precise and delicate balance contradictory assumptions, a way of presenting a view of the world that was more complex than could be accommodated by the jingoism of either reactionaries or reformers. In his life, that ambivalence was to cost him uneasy relationships with his Concord neighbors and result in sharp criticisms from the New England abolitionists.

Early in the Civil War, for example, writing about a group of Confederate prisoners he had seen at Harpers Ferry, he could not bring himself to repeat the usual blood-
Hester Prymne, with child Pearl, stands accused before 17th-century Boston: "Thus she will be a living sermon against sin, until the ignominious letter be engraved upon her tombstone."


thirsty prejudices of the hour. And when Franklin Pierce, because of his outspoken anti-war, anti-Lincoln opinions, was being publicly branded a traitor, Hawthorne—against all advice—dedicated his book of English reminiscences, Our Old Home, to Pierce.

"I find that it would be a piece of poltroonery in me to withdraw either the dedication or the dedicatory letter..." Hawthorne wrote Fields. "I should never look at the volume again without remorse or shame."

In his writing, Hawthorne's ambivalence provided the opposing symbols, the seemingly antagonistic viewpoints that sustained the tension of his best stories and novels. In The Scarlet Letter, the primitive forest, the haunt of the Devil, and the still-rav community of Boston mark the symbolic antipodes of man's moral experience. The harsh justice of the Puritan colony and the private sexual consecration of Hester and the Reverend Dimmesdale appear to be irreconcilable. But in Hawthorne's moral universe, time—and the penitential exile of Hester from the community—bring about a change in public opinion.

In his introductory chapter to The Scarlet Letter, Hawthorne had bravely announced his intended departure from Salem. "Henceforth,"
he claimed, "I am a citizen of somewhere else." His native town—the Salem of his ignominious political defeat—would be remembered only as "an overgrown village in cloud-land, with only imaginary inhabitants to people its wooden houses and walk its homely lanes."

But Hawthorne was not able to dismiss it so easily. In the Berkshires, where he had moved his family in the summer of 1850, he came down with a "tolerable nervous fever," which was finally cured by doses of belladonna. "Mr. Hawthorne thinks it is Salem which he is dragging at his ankles still," Sophia Hawthorne wrote her family.

In his next novel, *The House of the Seven Gables*, Hawthorne recreated his native town, situating it not in "cloud-land" but in the everyday present: a village of (albeit fictional) shabby-genteel families and small tradesmen, elm-lined streets and paltry gardens with scratching hens, parochial ambitions, and past crimes (such as the notorious witchcraft trials and, quite possibly, Hawthorne's shameful political ouster) inescapably haunting its present.

**New Breed of Man**

Stylistically, the book represents another of the essential dichotomies in Hawthorne's work. Unlike the stark allegorical drama of *The Scarlet Letter*, it is full of rambling descriptions and homely details—the kind of details that Hawthorne ordinarily committed to his notebooks and letters. They reflected his sharp observational powers rather than his brooding imagination.

The Salem of *The House of the Seven Gables* has its history, of course: The ancient history of the Pyncheon house (modeled after the weathered old home of one of Hawthorne's family connections) symbolizes the heavy burden of the past upon its present occupants. But the Salem in which the principal action takes place is an American town in the mid-19th century, with its technological improvements—the railroad, the telegraph, store-bought clothes; a rising merchant class outstripping the declining aristocracy; a breed of new men—like the Honorable Judge Pyncheon—who have dispensed with the old republican virtues and are eager to take on the management of American politics and American society.

**Perspiration and Self-Importance**

As an instance of the contemporaneity that Hawthorne now sought as a writer, the profession he chose for his young hero, Holgrave, was that of "an artist in the daguerreotype line," a practitioner of the new science of photography, which had been introduced into the United States late in 1839 and, by the mid-1840s, was in high vogue. (Hawthorne, interestingly, in 1841 had been one of the early visitors to the "rooms" of the pioneering Boston daguerreotypist, Albert Sands Southworth. Unfortunately, the "miniature" that Hawthorne sat for seems to have been lost.)

*The House of the Seven Gables* has its balance of opposites: Holgrave, a representative of radical youth (like Hawthorne's former Concord neighbor, Henry Thoreau) makes speeches "full of wild and disorganizing matter." He is an apostle of individualism and self-reliance, a severe critic of the past, who complains "Shall we never, never get rid of this Past! It lies upon the Present like a giant's dead body." Phoebe Pyncheon, the symbol of conservative values and rural virtue, is at first...
put off by the young man because of his "lack of reverence for what was fixed"; but she soon tames him into love and marriage.

Clifford Pyncheon is the ineffectual dilettante and lover of the beautiful, a man out of step with the new American success ethic. Released from prison where he has served time for a crime he did not commit, he lives in a world of childish appetites and small secrets, petulantly whining, "I want my happiness. . . Many, many years have I waited for it! It is late! It is late!"

Even Clifford, with his aristocratic tastes, has his compulsion for the Hawthornean opposite. He experiences a mad urge to throw himself into a banal political procession wending its way along Pyncheon Street, the marchers all "perspiration and weary self-importance" (How many small-town parades are summed up in that accurate phrase!) — his way of identifying with something larger than himself, the plodding mass of ordinary humanity.

Ironically, one of the defenses Hawthorne had mounted against his political enemies in Salem was his contention that he had never in his life taken part in such processions. "I am almost tempted to say [I] would hardly have done anything so little in accordance with my tastes and character," Hawthorne explained with a fastidiousness that would have been thoroughly appropriate for Clifford.

Prisoners of Progress

Although Hawthorne's long narrative account of the death of Judge Pyncheon, reviewing in masterful prose the hypocrisy and opportunism of the American public servant circa 1850, is one of the great set pieces in American literature, his chapter, "The Flight of Two Owls," better illustrates his modernity and his use of ambivalence. In it, he sends his two principals, Clifford and his equally timorous and reclusive sister Hepzibah, in a tragi-comic flight to freedom, escaping from the prison of the old house and the dead Judge, only to find themselves prisoners in the new symbol of progress—a railroad coach whose destination they do not know. In their fear and flight, the two pathetic holdovers from an earlier generation have simply embarked on a journey to nowhere in particular.

Thundering Nay-Sayer

In the course of the journey, Clifford becomes a somewhat dotty exponent of modern technology, praising, for the benefit of the bewildered and uncomfortable passengers, the railroad that will bring about a new "nomadic" life for mankind, releasing it from its moneygrubbing ways and its adherence to property and real estate. "A man will commit almost any wrong," Clifford maintains, "he will heap up an immense pile of wickedness, as hard as granite . . . only to build a great, gloomy, dark-chambered mansion, for himself to die in, and for his posterity to be miserable in."

At the same time, Hawthorne introduces an elderly passenger, who enters into a discussion with Clifford and ends by pronouncing his views "All a humbug!" Yet the passenger, too, has his contradictory opinions on the subject of progress. He is wary of the telegraph—which Clifford has also praised—because he suspects it will become merely a tool for "speculators in cotton and politics," but regards it as "a great thing" for the speedy detection of bank robbers and murderers. Clifford, who was unjustly accused of murder and now
fears that he will be charged with the death of Judge Pyncheon, finds his newfound faith shaken. He immediately begins to argue against the telegraph as "an infringement" upon a man's "natural rights." Here, Hawthorne, in contradictory fashion, appears to be both endorsing and satirizing some of his own views, for his book was intended as a criticism of American materialism, an attempt— as he described it in his preface—to "convince mankind (or, indeed, any one man) of the folly of tumbling down an avalanche of ill-gotten gold, or real estate, on the heads of an unfortunate posterity."

No admirer of philosophy or the cloudy metaphysics of his transcendentalist friends and neighbors, Hawthorne was usually ill at ease with general arguments of the kind he produced in his preface. But as a writer, through his ambivalence and in the deployment of his fictional characters, he was able to turn an idea in several directions at once. One of his great gifts as a novelist is the realization of the irreducible personal bias of all our opinions, even our cloudiest metaphysical speculations. We think what we are, Hawthorne is saying, and what we allow ourselves to become.

The first half of the 19th century was a proving-ground on which the optimistic vision of the founding fathers was tested against the

"On every side the seven gables pointed sharply toward the sky, and presented the aspect of a whole sisterhood of edifices, breathing through the spirals of one great chimney." Such a house existed in Salem, though it originally had eight gables.
harsher realities of national experience. It was a period that marked a progressive shift from a rural agronomy toward industrialization and urbanization. It was a time of encroaching materialism in American values, a period of rising economic standards and recurring financial panics, of ambitious communitarian experiments (e.g., Brook Farm) that inevitably failed. A growing free labor force fostered a fledgling trade union movement and worker unrest. Politically, it was a time of drift toward civil war.

Hawthorne's ambivalence toward social and political reform made him an observer of the scene—never a joiner, never a partisan of causes. A Democrat in politics, he seldom, in good conscience, subscribed to the popular movements and popular prejudices of the educated classes. In literary matters, he, like his colleague Melville, remained outside the mainstream of popular American literature. Hawthorne's philosophy (if it could be called a philosophy rather than a pragmatic response to specific social issues on various occasions) was steeped in the old Puritan faith. He was never a committed or convinced churchgoer, yet a belief in original sin and the natural predisposition of man toward evil ruled his view of society.

Unlike Emerson, with his grand philosophy of unhampered individualism and his optimistic faith in the benefits of technological progress and reform, Hawthorne was never able to believe that reform in itself would overcome the materialism and the abuses of American society. He could not, in fact, subscribe to any philosophy that did not take into account the subterranean motivations of human nature.

Beneath the parade of good intentions, Hawthorne always suspected the darker personal characteristics of the reformers—their egotism and self-serving rationalizations, their urge for power, their tendency to manipulate others. His ambivalence, his talent for psychological insight, his ability to see through the heady optimism and inflexibility of his reformist acquaintances made him something of an outsider, even among America's intellectuals.

It was Melville, his peer in many respects, who understood the "great power of blackness" in Hawthorne's works and who recognized "the grand truth"—that Hawthorne was a man who could say "No! in thunder." That, indeed, is his uniqueness in American cultural history: In both his political and his literary careers, he remained the brooding, fallible, private man, a nay-sayer to the convenient rationalizations and prejudices of the American conscience.
The Comic Tales of Jaroslav Hasek

Archetypal "little man," buffoon in uniform, Central European Everyman—Good Soldier Svejk is all of these. But when Jaroslav Hasek's comic hero first appeared in print in 1911, most Czechs found him an embarrassing symbol of a defeated and passive people. Only gradually did they, and the rest of the world, come to cherish this master survivor whose antics always ended by exposing the stupidity and pomposity of his superiors, the officers and bureaucrats of the Hapsburg empire. For Czechs living under communist rule, Hasek's work has served as a popular antidote to gloom.

Hasek (1883-1923) was an unpredictable rebel—a folk hero in disguise. A descendant of Slavic peasants, he was born in Prague, a city dominated by an officious German minority. His early adult years were devoted to anarchism, drink, and the writing of satire. Drafted into the Austro-Hungarian Army in World War I, promptly captured by the Russians in 1915, he unashamedly changed sides. After all, the Russians were fellow Slavs fighting the common foe. Amid the turmoil of the Russian Revolution, he wrote a second series of Svejk stories, as well as short pieces that began to mock, ever so gently, his newly acquired Bolshevik sponsors. Perhaps saving his own skin (and certainly his renown in the Soviet Union, where he remains an officially approved author), the incorrigible Hasek returned to his native Prague in 1920. Coolly received—some Czechs considered him a traitor—he spent his last years writing his four-volume novel, The Good Soldier Svejk and his Fortunes in the World War.

These stories from Hasek's early days, newly translated by Sir Cecil Parrott, take aim at two pillars of the Hapsburg regime, the Law and the Church. In their own modest way, they foreshadow not only the Good Soldier but also the ordinary Czech's humor in dealing with life today.
PERSPECTIVES: COMIC TALES

“I’d like to know what the old man is thinking up for us this time,” Mr. Vohnoutek, the usher of the regional court, said to himself, as he went home from the tavern at eleven o’clock at night and saw the light still burning in the office of the counsellor, Mr. Zakon. The expression “for us” applied not just to the ushers and messengers, but to the whole staff of the regional court, for Mr. Vohnoutek considered himself to be the representative of all the gentlemen who worked under Mr. Zakon, and for that reason he expected from the Old Man only such things as would give all the officials plenty to swear about.

It must be said, however, that in this particular case Mr. Vohnoutek was wrong. The counsellor had in front of him a sheet of paper covered with beautiful writing, but it was not a ukase for

THE JUDICIAL REFORM OF MR. ZAKON, COUNSELLOR IN THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

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the regional court—it was a report, destined for His Excellency
the Minister of Justice, which had almost the character of an
academic treatise. The fact was that the Minister had issued a
circular to all criminal courts, in which he had pointed out that
the present state of justice in criminal cases was totally unsatis-
factory. The courts, he wrote, continued to be guided by the
outdated theory of retribution or, at best, the theory of the deter-
rent, whereas modern justice must aim principally at the crimi-
nal’s reform. And it was just in this direction that the results up to
now had proved unsatisfactory, because delinquency was not
decreasing. And therefore the Minister asked the judges of all
criminal courts to submit to him with the greatest possible haste
their proposals for an appropriate reform of the criminal judi-
cracy.

This circular from the Ministry came at such a particularly
opportune moment for Mr. Zakon, who had been occupying him-
self with these questions for many years, that, after having as-
sured himself that no one could hear him, he hissed between his
teeth, “At last something sensible for once.” Then he sat down
and began to write out his proposals, and at the very moment
when Mr. Vohnoutek was looking up at his windows he had just
completed them. Then he lit another cigar and read through the
most important bits of his expert opinion once more:

It is true that criminals, who have been convicted, habit-
ually promise the court that they will reform, but it is also no
less true that this promise is very rarely kept. The criminal
instinctively feels that the judge tries the case strictly according
to the letter of the law, and so he promises to reform only in
order to make out a case of alleviating circumstances for him-
self. But he does not keep his promise, because he regards the
judge as merely the representative of a system of justice which is
penal and therefore hostile to him. And so he thinks that a
broken promise to reform is a permissible and useful stratagem.

I regard it as quite out of the question that a simple asser-
tion by the judge that he is not hostile to him could change a
convicted man’s opinion. One should therefore rather consider
how it might be possible to make a promise of this kind binding

*Sir Cecil Parrott, 73, served as British Ambassador to Prague from 1960 to
1966. In addition to translating The Good Soldier Svejk (1973), Parrott has
written The Bad Bohemian: A Life of Jaroslav Hasek (1978). These stories are excerpted from The Red Commissar, by J. Hasek, translated by
C. Parrott, with the permission of The Dial Press. Copyright © 1981 by Sir
Cecil Parrott. In editing for WQ, diacritical marks have been omitted.*
in the eyes of the criminal. It would be appropriate to examine
the question whether there exists any legal or moral bond which
a criminal would consider as so particularly venerable or sac-
rosanct that he would keep his promise in all circumstances.

The science of criminology, advancing with the spirit of the
times, has paid special attention to the study of the psychology
of the criminal, and has reached the conclusion, as the Most
Honourable Imperial and Royal Ministry will be well aware,
that a criminal in all circumstances keeps his word, when he has
given it to another criminal. With the greatest respect the
undersigned begs leave to see in this conclusion a possible basis
for a judicial reform, which might lead to the noble results,
which the Most Honourable Imperial and Royal Ministry
wishes to achieve with its circular. The undersigned, again with
the greatest respect, does not attempt to conceal that the reform
which he proposes is a bold one. But he takes the liberty of
mentioning that in his own modest opinion it is a simple one
and, if carried out, will also be effective. The proposal involves
the appointment as judges of criminals who would be the best-
known ones in their circles. If it were to this kind of judge that a
criminal were to make a promise that he would improve, then
the feeling of solidarity among criminals would make that
promise binding on the man who gave it and would bring about
the reform of those unfortunates who have violated the law.

With the deepest respect the undersigned does not attempt
to conceal that three important objections may be raised
against his project. The first might be that the exalted rank of
judge should not be open to such doubtful elements. But this
difficulty could be removed, if the names of these former crim-
inals were changed and they were appointed exclusively to
courts where they had never been convicted. The second objec-
tion might be that they would lack the necessary education.
This could be alleviated by ensuring that when criminals, who
have been specifically earmarked for duties as judges, have
served their final sentence, special lectures could be arranged
for them in the field of criminal law and the criminal code.
Since these people obviously could not and would not be used
in any other sector of the judiciary but the criminal branch,
these two subjects will be quite sufficient. The third objection
is finally the problem of finance. A young lawyer or a doctor of
law, fortified in his knowledge of the laws, tolerates, if with
some difficulty at least with a clean conscience, his long years
of unremunerated practice. With these new officials one could
not presuppose the same moral fibre and it is naturally to be
feared that the poverty of such probationers and assistants
might drive them back onto the path of crime. For this reason
the undersigned, with the greatest respect, takes the liberty of
proposing that such officials should be appointed judges
forthwith, that is to say to the 9th-allocation grade of public

The Wilson Quarterly: Spring 1982
177
servants. One cannot deny that as a result of this the expense incurred by the salaries of the officials of the criminal courts would involve an increased financial burden, but in compensation for this the expenses for the upkeep of prisons would be cut, since as a result of this reform the number of cases of conviction would be reduced to the smallest proportions.

The counsellor read through his work and an expression of deep satisfaction could be observed on his face. Then he wrote on the envelope the address, sealed the letter carefully, and the next day his expert judgement was on its way to Vienna.

Six months later the counsellor received a reply from the Ministry of Justice. He opened it with a trembling hand. For as long as he could remember the Ministry had never dealt with any question so quickly. What lay concealed in this envelope? Praise or a snub? The counsellor once more repeated under his breath the whole of his judgement. At first his proposal seemed to him to be nonsense, but then he began to defend it to himself. After a while he recalled that that was really unnecessary. An irrevocable decision on his proposed reform lay before him on the table. He began to count the buttons of his waistcoat—should he open the answer at once or only after lunch. His counting showed that it should be later. Then he remembered that it was really quite immaterial whether he spoiled his lunch or his dinner, so he sat down at the table and energetically cut the envelope. . . . His proposal had been accepted.

If it had been possible for the counsellor to abandon all ideas of the dignity of an official in the 5th class, he would have started dancing, but, as it was, he lit a cigar and looked into the distance. And he saw how, in a short time, he would move to Vienna, perhaps to the Supreme Court or to the Ministry of Justice. And then become President of the Senate or Head of Department. . . . People like that were sometimes given the title of Excellency. . . . The counsellor beamed with delight.

He selected one of the old criminals from Pankrác prison, who was serving a fifteen months’ sentence for burglary with violence. He assured himself beforehand that this man understood German, since the authentic text of all laws was in German only, and then “Long Eda” was sent with the permission of the Ministry to the prison of the regional court, of which Mr. Zakon was the head. The latter spent more time in the prisoner’s cell than he did in his office. Mr. Vohnoutek shook his head over it. The whole staff of the regional court wondered what it meant. The most famous town gossip affirmed that the mysterious prisoner was the counsellor’s natural brother. But the greatest
surprise came when the mysterious prisoner finished serving his sentence. Mr. Zakon became President of another regional court and "Long Eda" disappeared with him.

Fourteen days later Mr. Zakon appeared at one of the district courts in his new region for an inspection. Some tatterdemalion had come up before the judge, Mr. Eduard Pablasek, accused of theft and vagabondage. Mr. Zakon was delighted when he saw the dignity and energy with which the former "Long Eda" set about things. The ragamuffin had not got the nerve to contradict the judge; he only cast furtive glances of amazement at him and wiped his eyes. For a moment it looked as if he wanted to say something, but in the end he did not utter a word. And he accepted without demur the severe sentence of six months' imprisonment.

When they led the convicted man away the counsellor asked, "Did he recognize you?"

"Of course he did."

"You have made a really excellent start, but you forgot to get him to promise that he would never again embark on a career of crime. Moreover that sentence was too severe."

"Just let me carry on, sir. I'm his old comrade. We used to call him 'Smart Joe'. I'll go and see him now in his cell and everything will be all right."

In the afternoon the two old friends met again. "Smart Joe" embraced the man he supposed was only masquerading as a judge and assured him that, compared to him, the Captain of Kopernick was like lemonade to arsenic. Then he wanted to indulge with his old comrade in memories of a merry past. But the new judge interrupted him with the energetic question, "Joe, would you like to be judge or even counsellor? . . ."

In the course of the next two years there was an unheard of change in conditions in Bohemia. The courts occupied themselves at the most with cases of libel or tavern brawls. There were no longer any real criminals. Anyone who had once been one was now a secretary or a counsellor, and, because there was no school of crime, there were no longer any criminals. Mr. Zakon was already Head of Department in the Ministry of Justice, "Long Eda" and "Smart Joe" had already attained "out of turn" the ranks of senior counsellors. Mr. Zakon and his protegés had won. The Minister of Justice now applied his judicial reform over the whole empire and said to him that he had only one fear and that was that the criminal courts, which had up to now had such wonderful moral successes, would become totally redundant. But should this fear prove to be unfounded, then the Head of Department could look forward to the title of "Excel-
After some years Mr. Zakon was indeed afraid that he might have gone a little too far in his attempts to wipe out criminality. But no. When he took up the evening paper he read that the police had caught an admirably organized band of young thieves and robbers. What was remarkable about this was that allegedly this whole honourable company was composed of probationary lawyers and those who had graduated in Law. This report should really have given pleasure to Mr. Zakon. It was a proof that in his humane effort he had not gone too far. But he was not pleased. He did not himself know exactly why. He had a kind of inkling that something terrible was going to happen. And this inkling proved to be right.

When the President of the Court of Justice asked the accused lawyers and probationers why they stole and burgled, he received this answer, unanimously, from all of them: “So that they’ll make us counsellors too one day.”

Mr. Zakon never received the title of “Excellency.”

AN IDYLL
FROM THE ALMSHOUSE IN ZIZKOV

When Granny Pintova, from the almshouse at Zizkov, looks back on it all, what she regrets most is that she has no teeth to gnash. But she raises her eyes to heaven and spits, and after that her bent, wizened figure shambles over to a corner of the room where she pulls a rosary out of the pocket of her grey skirt. And slowly but surely she prays for Chaplain Toman, that God may forgive him the treason he was guilty of at the Zizkov almshouse. When the other old women talk of that same event, Granny Pintova’s grey eyes take on a brighter gleam and she observes that even in those days, when Chaplain Toman was still coming to visit them, she did not like the way he behaved—he was rather loutish, more like an ordinary servant, she said, than a servant of God.

Of course they often quarrel among themselves, because they do not like Granny Pintova’s sharp tongue. But these quarrels are very entertaining and at least kill the tedium of those long hours in the almshouse.

The other day Granny Skuhrov ska said that in fact Granny Pintova herself was at the bottom of it all. But in my opinion
things developed of their own accord and the circumstances alone caused the catastrophe. It was, however, undoubtedly a catastrophe of very considerable consequences, which even affected the small flat flask which Granny Pintova kept in her suitcase. The flask is now empty, but when the stopper is removed an experienced nose can—merely by sniffing it—at once detect the smell of sweet kummel.

The flask will confirm that it used once to be full, and so, by a remarkable combination of circumstances, sweet kummel, Chaplain Toman, and the almshouse mutually complement each other.

Of course an important factor in all this was Granny Pintova’s dying, but that happened a long time ago. Now she curses the chaplain and she certainly does not lie in bed. But the chaplain’s tender heart must bear the blame for the whole episode. He was called to the almshouse some time ago because Granny Pintova was on her death bed and was asking for extreme unction.

It was the first time that the new young chaplain had had to administer, and he set about the task with enthusiasm. The surroundings and the situation had such an effect on him that after the whole religious ceremony was over he put his hand into his pocket and placed a gold piece in dying Granny Pintova’s hand. That was something that had never yet happened to the old women in the almshouse.

After the chaplain’s departure Granny Mlickova announced that he was very clever indeed at administering. And indeed the effect of the gold piece on Granny Pintova was such that that very same evening she actually ordered for herself some ham and kummel.
When the doctor came next morning to give her an injection to relieve her death agony, he found her sitting at the table in a very cheerful mood and singing “I love my love dearest of all.” A week later the kummel ran out, because the money ran out. Then one day the sacristan came and knocked at the chaplain’s door to say that Granny Pintova was dying again and wished him to come to her with the grace of the Lord.

When she saw the chaplain, she whispered happily, “O, my dear sweet Reverend Father, I don’t know, I really don’t, whether I shall have the strength today to hold that gold piece in my hand.” She managed all the same, and Chaplain Toman said to the sacristan, as they were leaving the almshouse, “She’s a tough one. She certainly hangs on to life.” She certainly did. The next morning, when the doctor came, he heard her walking about the room and singing.

She’s my darling dear.
I’m not the only one
After her to run.
There are thousands who
Do the same too.*

“My dear Mrs. Pintova! What is the matter with you?” “But that chaplain’s so very clever at administering extreme unction, doctor, sir.”

That was on Wednesday. On Thursday the sacristan came running to Chaplain Toman, and while he was still in the doorway, called out, “Reverend Father, we must go to the almshouse again. This time we have to administer to that little old woman, Skuhrovška.” But before they got there the dying woman had got into a quarrel with Mrs. Mlickova, who all of a sudden had insisted on lying down too so that the chaplain could administer to her at the same time. Mrs. Pintova had made the suggestion. The others had however persuaded Mrs. Mlickova that her turn would come on Monday. Mrs. Mlickova of course cried out that she wanted to die immediately that very day and she would not wait until Monday. What if something were to happen to her in the meantime? In the end she calmed down, but when she later saw the chaplain giving Mrs. Skuhrovška a gold piece after the spiritual consolation, she could not contain herself and said in a tearful voice, “Reverend Father, I feel it in my bones that it’s going to come to me too very soon.” When he remembers that day

*This ribald song, “I love my love dearest of all,” ends: “Do you know who she is? She’s my Virgin Lady.” (Translator’s note.)
the young chaplain shakes his head and a cold shiver runs down his spine.

In the almshouse they still remember what a row and up-roar there was when on Saturday old Mrs. Vankova began to complain that she was unwell and was feeling faint. Mrs. Mlickova said that it was a dirty trick on Mrs. Vankova's part and that it was her turn first, and if that was the way things were going she would rather get her dying over and done with now on Saturday, and on Monday Mrs. Vankova could send for the chaplain.

A lot of argument followed until finally Mrs. Vankova, being the younger woman, gave way; she was after all only eighty-nine and Mrs. Mlickova was eighty-nine and three months.

But when they came to fetch Chaplain Toman to the almshouse, he turned pale and said that the Senior Chaplain Richter could go today. Accordingly Chaplain Richter came and prayed fervently at Mrs. Mlickova's bedside, blessed them all, and was about to go away without giving her a gold piece. Granny Pintova, who like all the others was keeping a careful watch, caught Chaplain Richter by the edge of his cassock.

"Reverend Father, forgive me, but I must stand up for Mrs. Mlickova. We've always got a gold piece, when we have been given extreme unction. It's true, Reverend Father, that you prayed longer, but you forgot all about the gold piece."

And Granny Vankova hissed, "And Mrs. Mlickova was obstinate enough to insist on dying today, just so that that good chaplain should come to her, although her turn was not until Monday."

Deeply crestfallen, Chaplain Richter gazed at the old women and then fumbled for his purse...

The latest decision of the Zizkov town council is interesting. At the insistence of the chaplains it has decreed that the old women should be prohibited from dying on their own initiative. It has further laid down that extreme unction will in future always be administered in the almshouse once a month, and to all of them at one go. As a result the grandmothers' takings are now extremely meagre.

The flask smelling of sweet kummel is empty and an air of great calamity hangs over the almshouse. Mrs. Vankova hanged herself a fortnight ago, because the illustrious town council of Zizkov would not give her permission to die.
COMMENTARY

We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer’s telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editors’ requests for comment.

Breathing Easy

I was interested in David Binder’s general assessment of West Germany (“A New Nation,” WQ, Summer 1981). He is still holding his breath on the viability of that country’s “hothouse democracy.” I used to do the same until a few years ago when I happily exhaled.

Hans W. Gatzke
Professor of History
Yale University

West Germany:
Some Reasons for Caution

The otherwise informative and insightful articles on “West Germany” by Konrad Jarausch, David Binder, and David Schoenbaum tend to slight the “but” in their cautiously optimistic view that “things are going well but…”

Although Germany’s and the United States’s basic security concerns continue to dovetail, their political interests now diverge in important respects. Rather than serving merely as a barrier against the East, as originally conceived by Washington and Bonn and the Adenauer era, the Federal Republic has come to place considerable emphasis on its more recent role as a bridge to the East.

The stakes have become substantial. They include “progress” on the troubled “national question” (if not reunification, then the improvement of relations between East and West Germany) and Osthandel (trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe), for which there is now a powerful domestic constituency.

These considerations provide Soviet diplomacy with increasing leverage. Bonn’s ability to maintain a viable domestic political balance between the requirements of détente, Soviet-style, and those of defense, as viewed from Washington, is becoming problematic. The inroads of pacifism, neutralism, and anti-Americanism must be reckoned with.

Beastly behavior on the part of the Soviet Union in Europe may, of course, furnish a temporary corrective. But even that outcome is less than certain due to the gnawing self doubts and underlying psychopolitical malaise that has taken hold of various segments of West German society, something that can no longer be dismissed as being restricted to politically callow or aberrant youth.

At the heart of the matter are two perennial questions: Germany’s national identity and its larger purpose in the world. With the political exhaustion of the European idea and the strains on the Federal Republic’s transatlantic connection, yesterday’s formulas no longer provide emotional satisfaction nor even much of a rationale for the status quo.

Add to that the end, real or imagined, of the economic miracle that served to sustain the legitimacy of the Federal Republic in the eyes of its citizens, and the deeper dimensions of the “but” about West Germany today become apparent.

Melvin Croun
Professor of Political Science
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Time to Focus

The articles on West Germany should be useful to U.S. policymakers—particularly members of Congress, who rarely take time to focus on this country.

Konrad Jarausch’s piece (“Perceptions”) on various attitudes toward Germany through several centuries provides a needed precaution for those who would make hasty decisions about the national character of the German people. German history presents plenty of grist for any mill of preconception—military, politi-
cal, philosophical, economic. Germany has produced Romantic art and literature, Prussian militarism, great scientific minds and Wagnerian music. It produced the democracy of the Weimar Republic and the fascism of the Third Reich. This should at least warn U.S. policymakers not to base their decisions on any one view of German character.

But Jarausch is more successful in describing the rich diversity and the extremes of German society through the centuries than in giving insights into German character today. He ends by telling us that current American attitudes toward West Germany do not bear "much relation to the reality of the Federal Republic of 1981—its diplomatic aims, its social tensions, its peculiar view of the world." One is left wishing for another article to tell us what our misperceptions are and, more importantly, what are Germany’s diplomatic aims, social tensions, and peculiar view of the world.

Dick Clark
Senior Fellow
Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies

Mr. Clark was a U.S. Senator (D-Iowa) from 1973 to 1979. He served for four years on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.—Ed.

Agricultural Tradeoffs


If we are indeed entering an era of resource constraints, then there is considerable wisdom in investigating new programs and developing new research agenda. Past research projects and federal programs may not be relevant. The evidence that the end of surpluses is upon us is not conclusive. Nevertheless, it is sufficient warning.

In developing their arguments, however, the authors focused on quantities—of land, water, and energy. Quality dimensions are also assuming importance. Sad to say, agriculture is now one of the nation’s largest contributors to water and air quality degradation. And, equally unfortunate, there appear to be conflicts between improving the quality of rural resources and maintaining their quantity.

For example, soil erosion can be virtually eliminated on many soils with the use of minimum or no tillage practices. Such practices can also reduce fuel requirements per bushel. However, they are most profitable when combined with increased use of pesticides, particularly herbicides. The ultimate effect of increased use of these chemicals on the soil, on pest resistance, on wildlife, and on water and air quality is not certain. However, the possible relationships are troubling.

This conflict, like most others, stems from the fact that many of the objectives and beliefs we hold as a society are not compatible. We cannot vigorously expand exports, protect environmental quality, maintain the resource base, keep production costs low, and still provide consumers with low-cost food and reduced taxes.

The "new issues" are really the old agricultural policy questions of tradeoffs: How much, of what quality, of which agricultural resources are we willing to pay for? How should we obtain these goals, and who should pay the costs?

Sandra S. Batie
Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Polar Politics

The fate of the continent that caps the bottom quarter of this planet may well be decided within the next decade or two. The American role will be strongly affected by decisions made in Washington on funding of the costly U.S. effort in the region.

The chief reason for continued U.S. operation of the prestigious South Pole Station is that, should it be abandoned, the Soviet Union would probably take it over. Internationalization or at least cost-sharing, as in the Deep Sea Drilling Pro-
As Barbara Mitchell documents ("Cracks in the Ice," WQ, Autumn 1981), there is strong pressure on signatories of the Antarctic Treaty to agree on disposition of Antarctica's resources, including its poorly determined offshore oil potential. Several alternatives seem possible. One would be to defer the problem indefinitely, calling on adherents to the treaty and others to refrain from any commercial activity there, apart from limited tourism and harvest of marine resources.

Another possibility would be the collapse of efforts by the treaty powers to resolve the issue among themselves, leading to unilateral actions, such as oil drilling and mineral exploitation. Claimants conducting such activities would face the opposition of both great powers, neither of whom recognizes any of the claims.

Three treaties provide possible precedents for determination of Antarctica's future: that on the peaceful uses of outer space (1967), the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, and the pending Law of the Sea Treaty. All require (or have required) reconciliation of great power interests with those of other nations. Using the Law of the Sea Treaty as a model would certainly be unacceptable to the Antarctic Treaty adherents, since it would offer no special advantage to those who "got there first."

The adherents are therefore strongly motivated to resolve the issue among themselves in a way that would offer advantages to them all. This would not satisfy the Third World nations unless provision were made to give them, as well, some form of membership in the "club."

Finding a way through this maze of conflicting interests will be a major diplomatic challenge. Yet it could help create a climate for resolution of more dangerous conflicts elsewhere.

Walter Sullivan
The New York Times

Correction
Two credit lines were inadvertently switched in Frank McConnell's "Words and the Man: The Art of James Joyce" [WQ, Winter 1982]. Joyce's drawing of Leopold Bloom (p. 182) was reproduced by permission of the Special Collections Department of Northwestern University Library, Evanston, Illinois. Brancusi's drawing of Joyce (p. 187) belongs to the Poetry/Rare Books Collection, State University of New York at Buffalo.
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