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Editor's Comment

In this issue, we publish three major essays by Wilson Center folk. Their work hints at the diversity of scholarly interests and viewpoints among the Fellows and staffers who do advanced research in the Center’s lively home in the Smithsonian “castle.”

Our “cover story” on Thomas Eakins (p. 162) is former Fellow Elizabeth Johnson’s distillation of her biography of the noted American painter. Mark N. Katz, a research associate at the Center’s Kennan Institute, wrote the essay on contemporary Oman (p. 64) after two visits there; he has organized the Institute’s studies of Soviet policy toward the Third World. As a Fellow, George Weigel studied the changing views of U.S. Catholic bishops on issues of war and peace; for the WQ, he has analyzed the post-1945 American peace movement (p. 122).

Mr. Weigel is not the only Fellow to have looked at “war and peace” issues at the Wilson Center. Indeed, for more than a decade, there has been serious work here—by Fellows, by participants in seminars and meetings—on a wide variety of related topics, e.g., Soviet-American relations, “mutual deterrence,” arms control, NATO politics, conditions in places like the Persian Gulf, Korea, Afghanistan, Central America. Under Center auspices, historians have pondered the Cold War and reexamined the Vietnam conflict. Scholarly debate has usually been vigorous.

The results have often shaped essays—and ideas for essays—on international security matters in the WQ (see p. 147). And so it is in this New Year’s issue. As always, we welcome comments from our readers.

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The Wilson Center publishes the Quarterly as a self-supporting venture. It also issues a series of book-length "scholars' guides" (published by Smithsonian Institution Press) designed to help researchers in specific fields, from Soviet studies to film and video, find their way through the vast archival riches of the nation's capital.

All this is part of the Wilson Center's special mission as the nation's unusual "living memorial" to the 28th president of the United States.

Congress established the Center in 1968 as an international institute for advanced study, "symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relation between the world of learning and the world of public affairs." The Center opened in 1970 under its own presidentially appointed board of trustees, headed by former vice president Hubert H. Humphrey.

Chosen in open annual worldwide competitions, some 50 Fellows at the Center carry out advanced research, write books, and join in seminars and discussion with other scholars, public officials, journalists, business and labor leaders. Often they contribute to the Quarterly.

The Center is housed in the original Smithsonian "castle" on the Mall. Financing comes from both private sources and an annual congressional appropriation.

In all its activities, the Center seeks diversity of scholarly enterprise and points of view. Its company of Fellows has included such figures as Fernand Braudel, George Kennan, Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, Saburo Okita, Michael Howard, Mario Vargas Llosa, Shlomo Avineri, and Patricia Graham.
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World trade and national greatness

With newspapers, magazines, and the airwaves bringing us daily reminders of America's trade deficit—and pleas for protectionism, along with digs at our trading partners—we think it timely to discuss the broader issue of world trade. We'd particularly like to examine the relationship between world trade and a nation's prosperity and importance—its greatness, if you will.

Thousands of years before Christ, English flint was traded for throughout Europe, and used to make primitive tools. Traders of the time also dealt widely in salt from central European mines.

Centuries later, the Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans built trading empires even as they constructed political ones. The Phoenicians made Sidon and Tyre the centers of far-reaching trade. They, in turn, were followed on the world stage by the great city-states of Venice and Genoa. In the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries, the traders of Holland, Spain, Portugal, and Britain became reacquainted with the old worlds of the Orient and discovered new ones across the Atlantic. London ruled as the financial hub of the world until well into the 20th century, and America became a lead player after World War I.

Even from this brief, superficial, and far-from-complete excursion through the centuries, it becomes clear that a country's prosperity and role in world affairs—national greatness, for want of a better term—are largely derived from world trade. China, with its huge population and technological innovations in centuries gone by, never became a true world power, in no small measure because it repeatedly turned its back on the rest of the world. For China, as for most countries, isolationism and a reliance on the chimera of self-sufficiency have produced stark failures.

To accept the lesson of history is therefore to reject protectionism, which can lead only to economic isolation and a weakened national economy. But the trade deficit is real. If we can't blame it on the West Germans, the Japanese, the South Koreans, or even the Chinese themselves, then whom can we blame?

The answer, in our view, is to examine ourselves. If erecting barriers to imports is the wrong answer, maybe we should consider how to strengthen American factories and American farms and make ourselves better able to compete in world markets.

We ought to start from the premise that Americans are already pretty good at trading, deficit notwithstanding. The United States—and not Japan—is the world's leading exporting nation. In spite of the trade deficit with Japan, we sell more American products to that country than to any other nation in the world, except Canada. In fact, some 615,000 Americans owe their jobs to those exports to Japan.

The Japanese example is only a small part of the whole. According to a Commerce Department study, 25,800 American jobs are dependent on each $1 billion of U.S. exports. Between January and June of this year, U.S. merchandise exports totaled about $216 billion—meaning that they directly accounted for better than 5.4 million American jobs. Indirectly, better than six percent of all American jobs are in some way connected to overseas exports.

But in spite of the inescapable connection between American prosperity and world trade, America's leaders continue to make it harder for U.S. companies to compete. The new tax bill punishes American industry to the tune of $120 billion over five years—and weakens its stance in world markets. A new Superfund orphan waste dump cleanup bill imposes new taxes on crude oil to raise the energy costs of all American companies. As U.S. firms lose their competitiveness in world markets, foreign companies will gain—making the demands for protectionism even louder.

By historical standards, America's greatness has lasted for a fleeting moment, and it's far too early for another Gibbon to chronicle our decline. But we wonder whether, centuries from now, scholars will look back at America and trace its downfall to a series of self-inflicted wounds, and a failure to recognize that world trade is the stuff of which greatness is made.
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Governors Who Last


The presidency is the top U.S. elective office, but most governors can do one thing that a chief executive cannot: serve more than two terms. Nelson Rockefeller’s 14-year reign in New York, the modern record for continuous gubernatorial service, easily exceeded the record 12-year presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The mark for the longest non-continuous service as governor, 16 years, was set by Ohio’s James Rhodes. Michigan’s G. Mennen Williams and Arkansas’ Orval E. Faubus share the record for consecutive elections: six.

Does long gubernatorial tenure make for good government? Yes, say Lammers and Klingman, political scientists at the University of Southern California and McGraw-Hill, Inc. They studied “durable” governors, defined as those who get elected at least three times, and serve at least eight consecutive years. In part because about half the states have laws limiting gubernatorial tenure, the list is short: Of the roughly 400 U.S. governors who have served since 1940, only 17 qualify as durable.

As a group, 63 percent were lawyers (“only” 49 percent of all governors were). They won office at an average age of 45 (versus 47.4 for all governors). Most notably, the durables were deft at holding the hearts of their constituents, regardless of party ties.


Long-lasting Democrats tend to emerge in less populous, demographically homogeneous, rural states where they face little competition (e.g.,

Alabama, Wyoming). Durable Republicans flourish in states marked by liberal traditions, much political competition, and, often, by Democrat-controlled legislatures. All such governors excel at not wearing out their welcomes. Only eight percent finally get tossed out by the voters—a fate that awaits 30 percent of governors as a group.

Election Plays

"Elections and Wall Street: Taking Stock of Parties and Presidents" by Thorn Yantek and Andrew Cowart, in The Western Political Quarterly (Sept. 1986), Univ. of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112.

Stock market predictions are risky. But Yantek, a political scientist at Kent State University, and the late Cowart, who taught at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, assert that there are times when forecasting is safe: the six-month period around presidential elections.

Studying market patterns during the 12 presidential election years from 1935 to 1981, the authors found that prices always rose during the weeks before polling day. What then happened depended on who won. Almost always, Republican victories sent stock prices up sharply for several weeks more; almost always, Democratic wins brought a decline.

The pre-election weeks are bullish, say the authors, because investors buy stocks so as not to be caught on the sidelines if a post-election price surge occurs. That investors continue to buy after a G.O.P. win reflects the business community's "longstanding alliance with the Republican party." After a G.O.P. loss, Wall Street's distaste for Democratic policies prompts a sell-off—followed by bargain hunting. There have been excep-
PERIODICALS

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

ations—notably Democrat John F. Kennedy’s defeat of Richard M. Nixon in 1960. The market’s positive response to JFK’s win, the authors reckon, was “a sigh of relief.” Indeed, the placid economy of the Eisenhower years was subsequently perked up by Kennedy-proposed tax cuts.

Only once, 41 years ago, were investors (like other Americans) surprised by a widely unexpected result. “I felt like the moon, the stars and all the planets had fallen on me,” said Democrat Harry S. Truman after he defeated Thomas Dewey in 1948. That stock prices fell too, the authors say, is “ringing confirmation” of their theory.

Mayor Power

“Reconstituting the Democratic Experiment: The Mayoralty and the New Democracy” by Russell D. Murphy, in Urban Affairs Quarterly (Sept. 1986), Center for Metropolitan Studies, Univ. of Mo., 8001 Natural Bridge Rd., St. Louis, Mo. 63121.

Democracy’s institutions are often shaped by people “sure of their own rightness” but doubtful about “that of the folks next door.”

So argues Murphy, a professor of government at Wesleyan University. His example is the American mayoralty, a product of the progressive hopes and conservative fears of 19th-century urban, middle-class reformers. These civic-minded members of Good Government Clubs formed the National Municipal League in 1894. They hoped to end the system of party-based “boss rule” and rigged, ward-based elections, which seemed to flourish in the absence of strong executive authority.

The League developed a “strong mayor” plan to replace the existing system, under which mayors were city council appointees. An elected mayor (preferably League-endorsed), the argument went, would seed “honesty, efficiency, and economy” where only corruption had grown.

Despite the reformers’ fear that the cities’ immigrants—“illiterate peasants freshly raked from Irish bogs, or Bohemian mines, or Italian robber nests,” said Cornell University president Andrew White—might not appreciate “moral uplift,” several League candidates gained office. And the first immigrant mayors (New York’s William Grace, 1880–81, 1884–85; Boston’s Hugh O’Brien, 1885–88) won the League’s trust.

But by 1915, “strong mayor” zeal was waning. Too many reform-minded executives had been “pushed out of office,” League members complained, “just as they were becoming a real force.” Other mayors (e.g., Detroit’s Hazen Pingree, 1890–97; Toledo’s Samuel “Golden Rule” Jones, 1897–1905) had used their office chiefly to expand City Hall powers.

Today, Murphy observes, mayors occupy “an uncertain place.” Although hizzoners are highly visible in major cities, their powers are limited by state governments (which typically control education, welfare, transportation, hospitals, and public housing) and by city charters which give other executive officers—some appointed, some elected—authority over finance, personnel, tax assessments, and other functions.

Thus the 19th-century city reformers’ legacy—“an underlying ambivalence about democratic politics”—persists.
Party Hoppers

“Switching political parties can be embarrassing,” said the narrator of a television pitch used by Nevada Democrat Harry M. Reid in his 1986 campaign for the U.S. Senate. “Just ask Jim Santini.”

Ex-Democrat Santini had switched to the G.O.P. in 1985. Reid reminded voters of the old days, when Santini’s new Republican friends denounced him. (Reid won last November’s election handily.)

Party switching is not new, observes Brownstein, a National Journal reporter. But since the landslide 1980 election of (former Democrat) Ronald Reagan, the switching has changed directions. During the 1960s and 1970s, when the Democrats were riding particularly high, especially in Congress and in statehouses, some Republicans—e.g., New York representative Ogden Reid, Michigan representative (now senator) Donald Riegle, former New York mayor John Lindsay—joined them. Then came the Great Society, the Vietnam War, “stagflation,” the tax revolt—and a new conservatism among voters. Republicans such as Texas senator Phil Gramm (a Democrat until 1983) began wooing disaffected Democrats over to their side.

Yet last November many Republican newcomers fared poorly. Only six of 11 ex-Democrats who sought G.O.P. gubernatorial, House, and Senate nominations succeeded; only two—governor-elect Bob Martinez (R.-Fla.) and congressman-elect Richard H. Baker (R.-La.)—won election.

Among the notable losers were Texas’ Kent Hance and Wisconsin’s Jonathan Barry, Democrats-turned-Republicans who were soundly defeated in primaries for governor by G.O.P. veterans. Both Nevada’s Santini and former Democrat Linda Chavez (R.-Md.) lost Senate bids.

Convert candidates, says Brownstein, always lose some credibility with voters, particularly Republican voters. Indeed, “when the primary field is crowded, the Democratic credentials of the party switchers can stand out like a Mondale-Ferraro button at a Republican convention.”

Dealing with New Delhi


Are these signs of a blossoming Indo-American romance?

Not really, says Chadda, a political scientist at William Paterson College. Despite Rajiv Gandhi’s Western leanings, Chadda notes that economic and political ties between the United States and India have, in many
ways, deteriorated over the last few years. Whereas U.S. trade with China
increased by 25 percent during the first nine months of 1985, U.S. trade
with India dropped 10 percent from its peak level—$4 billion in 1983.

The problem is Pakistan, says Chadda. Indian officials view their Muslim
neighbor (pop.: 100 million) as a constant threat to India’s 763 million,
primarily Hindu, people. The countries clash over territorial rights in
Kashmir, nuclear issues, and Pakistan’s support of India’s Sikh extremists,
who assassinated Indira Gandhi in 1984. But the White House continues to
view Pakistan, bordering on both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, as an
ally. Thus, unlike India, which received 82 percent of its arms from Mos-
cow between 1976 and 1980, Pakistan is U.S.-supplied. It received U.S.
aid worth $4.02 billion in 1986; India got $311,000.

While U.S. policy makers must consider several factors—including the
Iran-Iraq War and the Soviet attempt to subjugate Afghanistan—in formu-
lating Asian policy, the Indians’ main concerns are the security of their
Chinese and Pakistani borders. “Strategic ties,” remarks Chadda, “are
forged in response to a perception of common threats. India and the U.S.
do not share common threats.” The basic Asian political alignments—
U.S.–China–Pakistan, and USSR–India–Afghanistan—remain.

The Carrier Gamble

The U.S. Navy has worked hard to prolong the life of its capital ships, big
aircraft carriers. The 15 behemoths now in commission—with nearly 100
aircraft and more than 6,000 crewmen apiece—will serve 40-plus years.

That worries Ortlieb, a systems analyst and retired submarine officer.
Given the ships’ longevity, he says, the Navy’s goals of operating 15 car-
rier battle groups—a carrier plus supporting craft—and building new car-
rriers until “at least” the late 1990s means that such vessels will remain
America’s capital ships “for another half-century.” Is that wise? he asks.

Carrier defenders say that the ships are irreplaceable; for instance,
U.S. power in the Middle East is projected mainly by carrier groups in the
Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean. And modern carriers have jet
aircraft, nuclear power, and the protection of Aegis cruisers and nuclear
attack submarines. Critics point out that carriers face modern threats
(e.g., homing torpedoes, missiles), and that their survivability has not been
tested in combat since World War II.

Ortlieb adds another worry, a historical one: the shrinking time be-
tween a weapon’s dominance and its decline. Consider, he says:
• The galley ruled the Mediterranean for 1,000 years, as did the
Norse longboat elsewhere. But sailing warships made both extinct.
• Steam-driven ironclads outmoded sailing ships within 400 years.
• As the dreadnought ushered in the era of heavily armored, center-
line-gun battleships, ironclads became obsolete within 60 years.
• World War II carriers dethroned battleships within 40 years.

A sure sign that “doom is approaching” for a naval weapon, Ortlieb
Could many low-cost mini-carriers do the work of a few big ones? Proponents of SWATH (small waterplane area twin hull) craft, like the one depicted here by Morgan Wilbur, say that they have the needed large-ship stability.

argues, is when its "de facto mission has become survival"—which is true, he says, of the heavily defended modern carrier battle group. Thus, the last Mediterranean galleys were huge, "with several hundred galley slaves and hundreds of troops." The sailing ship "met its fate as an elaborate, ornate, 100-120 gun, 1,000-man ship of the line." The last battleships carried almost 3,000 men and "bristled with antiaircraft batteries."

Each of "the queens," notes Ortlieb, "fell victim to longer-range offensive systems." Only "events" will show if carriers can defy history.

A Smart NATO?


North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Western Europe are outnumbered—in troops, tanks, and other categories—by the Warsaw Pact forces they face. Thus, should Soviet Bloc units attempt even a non-nuclear attack, NATO's present policy is to respond quickly with tactical atomic weapons, even at the risk of starting a wider nuclear war.

Barnaby, a physicist and chairman of Just Defence, a British group that promotes nonnuclear military strength, argues that this policy is outdated. New weapons—notably "smart" missiles—can stop any nonnuclear assault. A "non-provocative" NATO posture based on such weapons, he
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says, would reduce the chances of fighting ever breaking out.

As Barnaby notes, "warfare relies increasingly on smart weapons. A U.S.-made, $15,000 TOW or a $40,000 Hellfire missile can destroy a $3 million tank. The U.S. Standoff Tactical Missile, which deploys warheads that attack many tanks, is one of several new weapons being developed. These weapons' abilities are proven—as during the 1982 Falkland Islands War, where British and Argentine missiles sank ships and downed more than 100 planes. Such technology, Barnaby argues, would allow NATO to create a non-nuclear European defense zone, roughly 37 miles wide, along the entire 625-mile East-West frontier. The zone would be saturated with attack sensors and all manner of smart weapons. Mobile squads with "high firepower" arms would deal with whatever enemy forces managed to break through.

Because no counterattack would be needed, NATO forces "would not have main battle tanks, long-range combat aircraft, or large warships." Nonprovocative defense, while cheap, "morally acceptable, and unambiguously legal," would also, says Barnaby, be "militarily credible."

Battered Lives


Refugees are defined as people who flee from their own state to another because of war, persecution, or personal danger. By the United Nations' last reckoning (1981), the displaced now number some 8.7 million. Most have fled troubles they did not create and often do not even understand.

Benard, research director of the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Politics in Vienna, Austria, toured refugee camps in Pakistan, Nicaragua, Lebanon, Ethiopia, Thailand, and the Sudan. She found that the chief result of confinement and enforced dependency was a tendency toward violence.

In Thailand, warring Cambodian groups maintain headquarters in the camps and prey on each other's civilians; in one encampment of 250 Vietnamese, all of the women had been raped by Cambodians. Among Pakistan's Afghan refugees, violence often turns inward. Patriarchal husbands, humiliated by their powerlessness, vent their anger on their families.

Apart from such universal features of refugee experience, actual conditions vary widely. How well refugees are treated often depends upon what (if any) symbolic purpose they serve for their host country. Thailand, having no political use for its Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees, keeps them in a border zone where they are eligible neither for official status nor support from the United Nations' refugee agency.

Refugees in countries considered part of the Soviet sphere also fare badly, says Benard. The Soviet Union does not sponsor refugee relief, and Western relief groups typically refuse to help out Soviet-backed regimes. By contrast, most of the refugees seen as belonging to the "free world" fare relatively well. Dozens of Western voluntary organizations maintain offices in Pakistan, to help Afghan victims of Soviet aggression.

Like Nazi camp survivors, former refugees remain absorbed in the
singular trauma they endured. Thus the resettled Indochinese in Western Europe still identify with refugees, and try to keep track of them. As for “host” governments, Benard is reminded of how the ancient Greeks viewed refugees: Each was “more than a stranger, less than a citizen.”

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

Taxes: VAT Next?


West Germany has one. So do Britain, France, and five other Common Market nations. In fact, notes Gillis, professor of public policy and economics at Duke University, the United States and Canada are among “the few industrial countries without a national sales tax.”

U.S. critics of taxes on consumption (i.e., purchases)—rather than on earned income—have long denounced them as “regressive”: The poor and the prosperous shoulder the same burden. Of course, income taxes, Gillis notes, present big problems too: In inflationary times, they can push middle-income taxpayers into higher brackets (“bracket creep”); and they are costly to administer and vulnerable to evasion. Hence, a national sales levy has generated interest in Washington.

The focus is on the “value added tax” (VAT), whose adoption by such egalitarian democracies as Denmark, Norway, and Sweden—among others—suggests that regression may not be a great problem.

In a VAT system, suppliers of goods, rather than buyers, pay the taxes. In the dominant type of VAT, taxes are calculated at each stage of a product’s manufacture and distribution, but are only paid to the government by the final seller. Firms do not actually reckon the “value added” to a product by them; the tax is merely figured on total sales volume.

VAT systems sound complicated, Gillis says, but are not difficult to administer, and they can be tailored. To promote business growth, capital goods can be exempted; so can, say, medicine, to help the poor.

In European welfare states, VATs have been touted as a way to cut income levies. In the case of Denmark, the first country to adopt a VAT system (1967), 32 percent of government revenues in 1984 came from a 22 percent VAT. “Developing” nations value VATs as reliable income producers; in such countries as Mexico, Argentina, Morocco, Senegal, and South Korea, VATs provide one-fourth to one-fifth of total tax revenues.

The U.S. Treasury suggested a VAT in its 1984 tax reform proposal. Yet President Reagan staunchly rejects any form of consumption tax. Gillis concedes that introducing an American VAT might meet resistance from state governments (of which 45 levy sales taxes) and that conservatives would view a VAT as an expansion of federal power and a new “money machine” for the Big Spenders in Washington. Yet, Gillis concludes, in an age of huge federal deficits, “public discussion of this option will grow.”
The news about the U.S. economy, as Reagan administration spokesmen observe, has been pretty good. The inflation rate, which hit 13.3 percent during the Carter years, averaged only 1.8 percent during 1986. Economic expansion continues. Polls find Americans confident of the future.

But Epstein, an economist at the New School for Social Research, is unimpressed. A broad look at the Reagan record, he says, shows that while the administration “promised a miracle, it delivered a debacle.”

As outlined in its 1981 Program for Economic Recovery, the White House sought, with help from Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker, to enhance business profits, make U.S. exports more competitive, and prompt growth—while keeping inflation at bay. How? High interest rates would attract foreign investment and trigger a recession, forcing down inflation, wages, and consumer demand. Meanwhile, tax cuts would spark investment and spur industry to supply more goods—another remedy for inflation. The plan, says Epstein, aimed for an “economic equivalent of the Grenada invasion”—a quick victory over inflation coupled with “carrot and stick” business incentives.

But the plan failed. The victory over inflation was real, but Pyrrhic. Between 1980 and 1985, the average real growth rate hit a postwar low (2.1 percent); the U.S. trade deficit soared from $1.9 billion in 1980 to $117.7 billion in 1985. And, in 1982, unemployment reached a postwar high: 10.7 percent. Reagan’s decision to fight inflation instead of unemployment, contends Epstein, cost the nation from $800 billion to $2 trillion between 1980 and 1984, in terms of the lost output of idled workers.

The 1981 tax cuts did not spark investment as much as was hoped, and high interest rates discouraged business borrowing; instead of expanding, firms went on a merger and acquisition binge. Then the “strong dollar” tactic backfired: U.S. wages grew more slowly than did those of the nation’s trading partners, but America’s business costs increased faster than did its competitors’ in 1983 and 1984. The overvalued dollar ended up eroding U.S. gains in overseas markets.

Epstein believes that a policy aimed at lowering unemployment would have tamped down inflation successfully by increasing the supply of goods and services. The Reagan quick fix not only failed, but produced deficits that are “mortgaging our future.”

Are bosses necessary?

Not according to Harvard economist Stephen Marglin. In a widely noted 1974 essay, “What Do Bosses Do?”, he argued that capitalist employers do little more than subjugate workers, with a strategy once used
by "imperial powers" to rule colonies: "divide and conquer."

With the rise of division of labor in 18th-century factories, bosses were needed, as free-market economist Adam Smith outlined in *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), to streamline production. Indeed, worker specialization became a central feature of the streamlining process: By 1830, Swiss clockmakers divided watch assembly into 50 steps, utilizing nearly 150 laborers to craft a single timepiece. But what the history of high-volume manufacturing shows, according to Marglin, a Marxist, is not a quest for efficiency, but the lengths to which employers will go to turn hired hands into what Karl Marx called "crippled monstrosities."

Landes, a Harvard historian, retorts that history shows nothing of the sort. Factories, he says, did not emerge because owners sought to conquer employees; rather, they appeared when big machines were devised to "overcome the cost advantage" of cottage industry and "put-out" production. Owners, too, did not just coordinate work; they bought materials and sold finished products (thus *creating* profit) and advanced technology. The powered "water frame," Richard Arkwright's 1768 invention for making tough warp yarn, revolutionized textile manufacturing—but only after mill owners adapted it for assembly lines.

Bosses were essential here: "No one else was in a position to look upstream and downstream, as well as to competitors on either side."

As for "crippled" employees, Landes cites an 1806 House of Commons study of England's wool industry: "Not infrequently," it reported, "men rise from low beginnings, if not to excessive wealth. . . . [then] to a situation of comfort and independence."

In fact, entrepreneur Josiah Wedgwood (1730-95) trained so many specialists for his innovative pottery firm that he had to create managers—"a new profession," notes Landes, some of whom "became employers in their turn." When "workers learn that they can do without the capitalist, it is because they have become capitalists themselves."

Today, hierarchy—bosses—and technology are as vital to large socialist enterprises as to capitalist ones. "As every good economist knows," says Landes, "there is no such thing as a free utopia."

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**Defending the IMF**


Third World debt, changing exchange rates, yawning trade gaps. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has much to deal with. During 1980–84 alone, the Washington-based Fund's officials ran 94 "stabilization" programs in 64 Third World nations—all with money woes.

What concerns Amuzegar, a former IMF executive director, is another problem: rising criticism of the Fund, from many quarters.

U.S. liberals protest that the IMF "bails out big multinational banks." Conservatives dislike its economic *meddling* and its aid to anti-Western regimes. Foes on the Left say that its "help" deepens poverty and keeps poor nations in "imperialism's grip."
In 1944, when the IMF was founded (along with the World Bank) by the United States and its World War II allies, its mission, writes Amuzegar, was to cope with short-term, "1930s-style exchange and payment problems" in developed countries. The IMF now has no programs in such nations. Since the 1973-74 oil crisis, it has "gradually and erroneously" become "the world's master economic trouble shooter." For this, it has "neither adequate expertise nor sufficient resources."

Even so, argues Amuzegar, most criticism of the IMF is unfair. The Fund does not, as is often charged, apply the same "draconian" measures to all debtors. When programs in Gabon, Panama, and South Korea were emphasizing "demand restraint," for example, those in Burma and Sri Lanka encouraged public investment and increased imports. As for the allegation that IMF-imposed austerity destabilizes nations, Amuzegar notes that, of the nearly 70 nations under IMF care between 1980 and 1983, only 10 (including the Dominican Republic, the Sudan, and Argentina) have suffered serious social unrest, "not all of it Fund-related." Indeed, "many countries do not come to the IMF until the seeds of political turmoil are firmly rooted."

The IMF is biased toward free markets and free trade, goals enshrined in the Fund's charter. And its operations do reflect its Western founders' predilections: Aid has been denied to Vietnam and Grenada (when under Soviet-Cuban influence), but approved for El Salvador and South Africa. Yet the Fund does have Communist members (e.g., China, Romania, and Hungary), and has helped leftist regimes (in Jamaica, for instance).

The Fund can point to successes. Of the 21 African nations with IMF stabilization programs in 1981-83, for instance, one-fifth met their economic growth targets and half hit their inflation-reduction goals. What the critics should ponder, says Amuzegar, is "where [such] countries would be without the IMF."

**SOCIETY**

**The Mad Colonists**

"Madness in Early American History: Insanity in Massachusetts from 1700 to 1830" by Mary Ann Jimenez, in *Journal of Social History* (Fall 1986), Carnegie-Mellon Univ., Schenley Park, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15213.

Madness. In 1702, Cotton Mather defined it as a "black melancholy," inspired by Satan. Most other Massachusetts colonists viewed the mentally ill as merely "distracted"—odd, but not *sick*, victims of the Devil.

Even so, legend holds that 18th-century New Englanders jailed the insane, and even tortured them to purge their affliction. Not so, says Jimenez, a historian at the University of California, San Diego. While 19th-century mental hospital reformers like Horace Mann did blame abuse of the insane on pre-Revolutionary War practices, it was not until postwar days, says Jimenez, that insane people were beset by "sometimes unhelpful efforts to control them."
Some 19th-century physicians saw the insane as virtual beasts. In his Essays on the Anatomy of Expression (1806), British doctor Charles Bell used this illustration, Madness, to convey a sense of what mental torment could do to a man.

Early 18th-century communities tolerated insanity, to the point of allowing “the distracted” to wander freely if they were not violent. One example: Samuel Coolidge, a Harvard-educated schoolteacher in Watertown, Mass., who, “given to great horrors and despairs,” would meander dazed and often naked. He was often locked in the schoolhouse by his town’s selectmen—but only so he would be there to teach class.

The colonists sometimes confined insane paupers in almshouses, but not in isolation. They did not try to cure the mad. How could Satan’s work be undone? A mind weakened by lust or spiritual ills had provided, as Cotton Mather said, “a bed wherein busy and bloody devils have a sort of lodging.” By contrast, suspected witches were punished severely for consorting willfully with the Devil.

Toward the mid-18th century, says Jimenez, “insanity began to be seen as the result of a breach of the natural order”—an illness. By 1767, Boston minister Samuel Philips was directing the mad to doctors instead of clergymen, for a look at their physiological troubles.

“If insanity was part of the natural order,” Jimenez recounts, “there seemed to be new possibilities for human control” of it. The Massachusetts colonists, as their communities grew after the Revolution, reexamined their old tolerance of the insane. They began invoking long-ignored laws to jail mad folk, even those with money. Physicians tried out “cures”—like bleeding or plunging the insane in cold water—that subsequently led to reforms during the 19th century.

By then, the insane had reason to long for the good old days.
In 1949, the Truman administration pledged to make “a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family.” Since then, Washington has spent roughly $35 billion on housing, subsidizing 1.2 million new units for the poor, 800,000 apartments for moderate-income families, and 700,000 units for the elderly.

Why, then, is there still talk of a “housing crisis?”

Salins, an Urban Affairs specialist at Hunter College, offers a “moving target” theory: Once one problem is solved, bureaucrats go after another. Thus overcrowding, big news during the 1930s, gave way to inadequate plumbing during the 1940s. Dilapidation became the official priority during the 1960s. Today, “neighborhood quality” and “affordability” top the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s list.

Government standards are too “subjective,” says Salins. For example, families spending more than 30 percent of their income for rent are officially considered to be in trouble. Of course, as Salins points out, such spending might simply reflect a desire for good living, rather than unreasonable rent inflation.

Moreover, the government’s ever-broadening “eligibility base” for housing aid is creating “expectations that can never be fulfilled.” Before 1960, housing programs were geared to the poor. Then, during the Great Society era, Washington deemed it vital to help “moderate income” families as well. The unintended consequences were numerous and striking: Less aid went to poorer folk, the always-fragile private low-cost housing market shrank, and older neighborhoods crumbled as upwardly mobile lower-middle-class families moved out.

Housing aid has always been “a lottery,” Salins asserts. Today, among 100 eligible households, 85 will get no help at all, three may get a luxury apartment in a new neighborhood, four may get a modest unit in a decrepit area, and eight may end up with a slight rent reduction.

The bureaucratic impulse to create “a permanent housing problem,” Salins argues, is ripe for restraint. A cool look at aid programs might even reveal that the poor do not want “their meager allotment of subsidy crumbs from the public banquet table to take the form of housing assistance at all.”


During 1985, U.S. individuals, firms, and foundations gave nearly $80 billion to charity—more than twice the amount of only seven years ago.

Moreover, the rise in giving has outpaced inflation every year since 1981, and has exceeded personal income growth since 1982. The all-time peak year of generosity remains 1960, when taxpayers donated 2.2 percent of their net income, but 1985’s 2.0 percent was the highest since
1969. At least 47 percent of the dollars went to religious organizations, but a wide range of other recipients benefited, too.

Foundations and companies are large donors; corporate giving, up 13 percent between 1984 and 1985, is the fastest-rising area of U.S. charity. But personal giving—83 percent of the total in 1985—still dominates, says Edmondson, an American Demographics editor.

A Yankelovich, Skelly & White survey found that, while most Americans (89 percent in 1984) are donors, the prime givers have certain characteristics. They tend to be married (or widowed) professionals, aged 35 to 64, who earn more than $50,000 and attend church; at $990, the churchgoers' annual giving to all charities is triple that of other folk. (Protestants are the most openhanded.)

Yet all donors with $50,000-plus incomes have been cutting back lately, and the rich have done the sharpest trimming. America's 16,300 millionaires are the top donors per capita, contributing an average $139,300 in 1984, but their giving has fallen by 35 percent since 1981. Reason: The Reagan tax cuts. They have raised the cost of donations by reducing the amount of income that gifts can offset.

Charities are most perplexed by the stinginess of the big baby-boom generation. Yankelovich, et al. found that those aged 30 to 35 gave only 1.7 percent of their incomes, versus 2.6 percent for the 35–49 group and three percent for 50– to 64-year-olds. The acquisitive boomers may be financially strapped. But Edmondson sides with Yankelovich partner Arthur White, who finds that they give only when they feel close to a cause and think they know "where the money is going." Example: The 1986 Live Aid concert, which raised $70 million to fight hunger in one day.

What is burgeoning is the number of charity seekers. Of the 124,000 nonprofit groups vying for donors, two-thirds did not exist in 1960.

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**PRESS & TELEVISION**

**Greeley’s Greatness**

"Horace Greeley and Social Responsibility" by Warren G. Bovee, in Journalism Quarterly (Summer 1986), Univ. of S.C., 1621 College St., College of Journalism, Columbia, S.C. 29208.

Horace Greeley, the editor, social crusader, one-time Republican presidential candidate, and aphorist ("Go West, young man"), made a penny press he started in 1841 one of the 19th century’s leading dailies. His New York Tribune employed such correspondents as Margaret Fuller, Mark Twain, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and, in London, Henry James and young Karl Marx. For 30 years, his pen ranged with wit and authority over such events as the South’s defeat, Reconstruction, and the G.O.P.’s rise.

Upon his death in 1872, the Tribune passed to the Ogden Reid family; in 1924, it merged with James Gordon Bennett’s New York Herald. While "the Trib" still attracted talent (e.g., Walter Lippmann, Joseph Alsop), during the postwar years it lost out to the New York Times. New owner
A Thomas Nast view of the Tribune's founder in 1872, the year Greeley ran for president, lost to incumbent Ulysses S. Grant, and died at age 61. "Old Honesty's" sense of fairness was not to be confused with weakness. No subscriber to a paper, he wrote, "becomes one of its Editors, any more than by riding on a steamboat he becomes associate captain."


Press historians bemoan its passing, yet miss what made the Trib truly great, says Bovee, a journalism professor at Marquette University. That was Greeley's insistence on the media's "social responsibility."

While Greeley scorned "the peculiar Bostonian notion... that a paper should [not be] interesting," he also rejected the "pure libertarianism" of his day. That is, unlike other editors in his highly partisan age, he aired opposing views—not, he said, "as their adversaries understand or state them, but as they are stated by their champions." Thus, on the Erie Canal question (to build or not) in 1852, the Trib featured its competition's editorials—then berated the papers for not doing the same: "Our readers have seen both sides, why not yours?" In 1857, Greeley urged readers to study key pro-and-con arguments on the Dred Scott decision. In 1858, startled Trib readers found an editorial from the Philadelphia Southern Monitor calling for resumption of the African slave trade.

Greeley's commitment to what Bovee calls the "forum function of the press" cost him subscribers and taxed his forebearance (he was an ardent abolitionist). But in steering between what he called "servile partisanship" and "gagged, mincing neutrality," he was way ahead of his time. In 1947, a

The 18th-century French writer, Voltaire, reportedly said: "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." Greeley too took that view—but, of course, considered others.

**Britain's Pirates**

"Pirate Radio in Britain: A Programming Alternative" by Douglas A. Boyd, in *Journal of Communications* (Spring 1986), Annenberg School of Communications, Univ. of Pa., 3620 Walnut St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19104-3858.

The day before Easter, 1964: Disc jockeys on the vessel *Mi Amigo*, afloat in international waters southeast of England, began airing pop tunes.

The unlicensed "Radio Caroline" dazzled London-area listeners. Within three years, 11 other "pirate" stations were broadcasting from ships and offshore World War II anti-aircraft gun platforms.

Thus, writes Boyd, communications professor at the University of Maryland, began Britain's battle with bootleg radio.

Familiar to northern European listeners (and irritated governments) since the late 1950s, radio pirates staked their claim in the United Kingdom by supplying what the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) proudly would not—rock 'n' roll and commercial advertising. London officials, determined that Britannia should rule its airwaves, were incensed. The Italian and French governments would decide to sanction their countries' popular pirates; not the British. In 1967, over the protests of several M.P.s, Parliament passed a law providing for fines and/or jail for any citizens involved with the outlaw stations. Then the BBC introduced Radio One, a round-the-clock rock station; it featured lively, American-style deejays, some of whom had been lured from pirate radio ships to the BBC's plush London headquarters.

For a while, Boyd relates, unlicensed broadcasting all but ceased. Then gradually it returned—despite Parliament's 1972 move to permit independent commercial stations to take ads and air Top 40 music.

Soon *land-based* pirate stations appeared, many catering to highly specialized audiences: the elderly, blue-collar workers, fans of black and reggae music, speakers of Urdu and Hindi. For its roughly 150,000 Greek Cypriot listeners, London Greek Radio aired *bazouki* music, religious ceremonies, and soap operas; Radio Jackie raised money for charity, located lost pets, and advertised jobs. By 1985, roughly 20 pirates were in business in the London area alone. A Gallup poll showed that the pioneering Radio Caroline had four million listeners.

Although committed to free enterprise, the Conservative Thatcher government has continued the war against piracy. It created the Radio Investigation Service, an agency empowered to seize unauthorized equipment without a court order. To date, the pirates have been hurt—Radio Jackie, London Greek Radio, and Asian-People's Radio have been raided—
but by no means silenced.

The moral of the radio drama, writes Boyd, quoting the Economist: Official attempts to shut down a desired service “are like parents trying to stop teenage parties. They always pop up somewhere else.”

**OWI's Lost Battle**


In December 1941, the month Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, Horace Caton, a Chicago sociologist, wrote an article posing the question pondered by millions of his fellow black Americans: “Am I a negro first and . . . soldier second?” he wrote. “Or should I forget in any emergency [that] my first loyalty is to my race?” Asked in a 1942 Roosevelt administration survey how they would fare under Japanese rule, nearly half of the black respondents thought their lives would be no worse—or perhaps better.

Washington’s Office of War Information (OWI), charged with “arousing mass support,” had to win over blacks at a time when the armed services were still segregated, Jim Crow reigned in the South, and black civil defense volunteers could still find their applications filed under “Negro and Dead.” OWI’s first effort, a pamphlet called “Negroes and the War” that wrapped a thinly veiled “fight or else” message in a picture essay on black “progress” in America, was a resounding flop.

As Koppes and Black, historians at Oberlin College and the University of Missouri, relate, the OWI turned to Hollywood—then churning out 500 movies a year—as the best place to push propaganda. Anthropologist Philleo Nash developed the OWI’s working metaphor, “Uncle Sam’s Family”—diverse but equal, having “a common stake in an Allied victory.” A bureau was set up in Hollywood; OWI domestic director Wendell Willkie, and Walter White, the patient leader of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), began meeting movie folk to urge the depiction of the Negro “as a normal human being.”

The film studios’ liberal-left creative types were receptive, but moguls like Sam (“If you want to send a message, call Western Union”) Goldwyn preferred blacks for “pure entertainment.” That, joked screenwriter Dalton Trumbo, meant “tart” daughters, “crapshooter” sons, “Uncle Tom” fathers, and “grotesque” mothers.

OWI persuaded all the studios (except Paramount) to submit scripts for review. But the Office’s first attempt at a change—in *Tennessee Johnson*, a 1942 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM) Civil War film—failed. Rather than recast the pro-Confederacy plot, MGM simply cut out the blacks. With *Cabin in the Sky* and *Stormy Weather*, 1943 musicals starring Ethel Waters and Lena Horne, came another setback. OWI’s Hollywood staff feared the films’ “ignorant, superstitious” black stereotypes would rile the increasingly alienated NAACP. The OWI brass in Washington saw nothing offensive—but white Southern legislators did: all-black casts. Congress sliced the OWI film budget by 90 percent.

Soon, OWI’s reformist zeal flagged; it began merely suggesting that
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Negroes be “sprinkled” into crowd scenes. The Office’s Hollywood venture confirmed blacks’ suspicion that “Uncle Sam’s Family” was essentially white. Had OWI done more to retain the support of moderate black groups like the NAACP, contend the authors, a different picture would have been coming to U.S. theaters.

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

An Agnostic’s Lessons on God

What does it mean—for someone, or something—“to be?”

Not the sort of question one expects to overhear in an office elevator. But grappling with this very query in his first book, Being and Time (1927), brought German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) from obscurity to what was then the intellectual forefront: existentialism. It is a philosophy that rejects such notions as “divine purpose” and rejoices in individual responsibilities and freedoms.

Heidegger denied the existence of God, criticized the West’s obsession with science, and scorned Christianity’s “too rational” approach to the spirit. He maintained that modern man is so obsessed with achievement, with measuring himself against his peers, that he has lost touch with the simple “joy” of existence. Indeed, observes O’Meara, a University of Notre Dame theologian, Heidegger saw men as absorbed with “things” and petty cares, each in his private world, numb to the sense of participating in a larger universe.

Ironically, he wrote, only when this life of self-absorption culminates in a bitter Angst (anxiety) and a pinch of mortality do men feel a shock of pleasure—an intense awareness of their own “Being.”

His ideas were heretical; yet such heresy was not bred into him. The son of a local sexton, Heidegger grew up in the Black Forest town of Messkirch, which was heavily Roman Catholic. Educated by Jesuits, he aspired to the priesthood. At the University of Freiburg, he became enamored of medieval Christian mysticism; he found the simple “awe” of God in the works of 13th-century Franciscan theologian Duns Scotus and 14th-century Dominican Meister Eckhart overpowering. But, by his early 30s, Heidegger’s views changed. He was deeply affected by attacks on Scholasticism in the writings of 19th-century philosophers Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche, and by his mentor, philosopher Edmund Husserl. He abandoned Christianity’s “analysis of existence” for what he called a “presence of Being.”

While O’Meara concedes that “Heidegger was not a major thinker on God or the Christian faith,” he nevertheless believes that theologians have much to learn from the agnostic philosopher. In today’s seminaries, sterile textual analysis has superseded the quest for a divine spark. The mystical
joy Heidegger so admired in the medieval Scholastics has drifted away.

O'Meara warns that “any tradition which intends to survive in the world beyond the seminar and the library cannot live solely by words—no matter how sacred the text.” Nor can anyone enjoy spiritual growth without the kind of insights Heidegger came to outside of religion.

India’s ‘Downtrodden’

Although India’s 1949 constitution granted equal rights to all citizens, the dominant Hindu religion’s rigid caste system endured. And so, too, did the miseries of the lowest caste—the Harijan or “untouchables”—even after a 1955 law provided tough penalties for Indians who bar them from religious, social, or educational institutions.

Indeed, observes Gokhale, a visiting research scholar at the University of Pennsylvania, the curse of caste has clung to those Indians, now numbering in the millions, who have sought to leave the life of a Harijan by

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A depiction of the Hindu social castes by dalit artist Gobi David. A Brahmin priest or scholar stands atop warriors and merchants, who in turn are borne by laborers and peasants. At bottom: untouchables.
RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

converting to Buddhism.

The Hindu caste system, developed over 30 centuries, assigns society’s “unclean” tasks (e.g., disposing of animal carcasses, tending funeral pyres, collecting garbage) to the untouchables. Born as Harijan, forced to live on the outskirts of town, and entirely dependent upon state largesse and contributions of grain from higher-caste townsmen, these wretched beggars lived with only the hope that “obedience and sublime faith” might raise their caste in the next life.

Then, in 1956, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar—the first Harijan allowed to go through the Indian educational system—led a half-million joyful untouchables from Maharashtra, his native state, in a mass conversion to Buddhism. It was, he said, like “walking away from hell.”

Many more have followed since; in Maharashtra alone, there are five million converted Buddhists. Yet conversion has proved no panacea.

Loyal Hindus viewed the Buddhist converts as traitors and troublemakers. Community relations went from bad to worse as tasks suddenly spurned by former untouchables fell to other low-caste Hindus, the Mangs and Chambhars. And when the new Buddhists sought to keep the few privileges accorded untouchables, such as a quota of places in schools, they were reviled, says Gokhale, for trying to “have their cake and eat it too.”

In recent years, the converts have been victims of arson, rape, and public beatings. In one village, Hindus with nightsticks attacked a group of Buddhists for trying to draw water from a communal well after the untouchables’ well ran dry; in a suburb of supposedly cosmopolitan Bombay, a Hindu mob ravaged a Buddhist neighborhood. During 1986, caste riots broke out in two states. Anti-Buddhist violence does not seem of great concern to India’s rural police and civil servants, whose ranks, Gokhale notes, are “overwhelmingly” composed of caste Hindus.

The ex-untouchables—who call themselves dalits, the “downtrodden”—have carved out a political and religious identity outside mainstream Indian society, rather as U.S. black Muslims did during the 1960s. Dalit writings, often angry and obscene, deride Hindu gods and superstitions—or, more positively, celebrate a certain pride. “I am a Buddhist now,” wrote one recent convert. “I have become a human being.”

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

Squaring the Age Curve


At the beginning of the century, the U.S. population’s median age was 24 years, and average life expectancy was 47. Today, the median age is 31.5 (it will be 39 by 2010) and life expectancy is over 70. While senior citizens become ever more numerous, what Rothstein, a biochemist at the State University of New York in Buffalo, calls the medical “ideal” remains elusive—“to reach a very old age in excellent health and then die quickly.”
Until recently, notes Rothstein, that ideal—gerontologists call it "squaring off the age curve"—received little taxpayer support. In 1973, for instance, federal contributions to cancer research amounted to about $2 for every U.S. citizen, versus only three cents for studies on aging. But since then, federal support for such studies has grown more than sixfold, to some $150 million per year. The hope is that researchers can learn enough about the causes and treatments of age-related disease in time to reduce the next geriatric generation's incidence of traumatic terminal illness or debilitating diseases such as Alzheimer's.

So far, scientists have yet to unlock the cellular and molecular keys to healthy longevity. Study of the aging process continues on many paths, such as the theory that the wanderings of "free radicals"—tiny bits of jetsam left in cells as by-products of cell metabolism—wreak cumulative damage on the heart and nervous system. While this and other natural phenomena probably contribute to aging, says Rothstein, "a more central cause" remains to be found.

It appears likely that diet can dramatically affect longevity, though at present there is no consensus on how it actually works. University of Texas researchers found that rats live 50 percent longer when their caloric intake is reduced by 60 percent (which would seem to correlate with the fact that certain mountain folk, such as the Hunza on the Sino-Pakistani border, live much longer than the average American on 1,000 fewer calories per day). Then again, studies at Baltimore's Gerontology Research Center have determined that, for middle-aged and older people, somewhat higher weights than those in the standard "ideal weight" tables would help foster a long and healthy life.

At present, Rothstein observes, "the odds of a major breakthrough" in squaring the aging curve are those of "a million-dollar lottery." All the more reason, he argues, to buy "lots of tickets"—i.e. continue supporting a wide range of investigations.

How Music Made Time


Historian C. P. Snow, who bemoaned the contemporary split between the humanities and the sciences in The Two Cultures (1959), might have buttressed his argument with an account of how science and music merged in medieval days to create the modern concept of time.

As Szamosi, a professor of physics at the University of Windsor, Ontario, points out, the ancients, who did not need to measure time exactly, had very vague notions of it. Plato held that time was a product of motion, governed by the sun and the planets; Aristotle conceived of time as variable, like the seasons and the human heartbeat. Such views held sway right through the Middle Ages. When clocks first appeared in the West during the 14th century, prominent dials represented the movements of the seven known planets; a small one told the time, with little precision.
Medieval clockmakers had scant interest in the time. Here, a reproduction of the De 'Dondi Astronomical Clock (circa 1364), used to measure lunar cycles.

As late as the 1630s, when Galileo conducted his first experiments with time—including, it is said, attempts to measure how long it took cannonballs to drop to the ground from the tower of Pisa—most people reckoned time in terms of natural events such as the harvest or the cycles of the moon. Only music employed metric time.

The subtle polyphonic melodies of the early medieval Roman Catholic Gregorian chant, and the 12th-century style of singing known as melismatic organum (in which the durations of two sets of simultaneous notes remained constant while the melodies diverged), required careful temporal organization; intervals between notes had to be divided into equal or unequal parts and arranged in clearly defined relationships. Then, during the 14th century, musicians at the Notre Dame school in Paris developed a ground-breaking notation system of rhythmic modes, the precursors to the modern system (whole tones, quarter tones, etc.). Although primitive by today's standards, Notre Dame notation represented the first symbolic manipulation of measured time “independent of motion and detached from the environment.”

Notre Dame's musicians were not motivated by scientific or philosophical goals. But they would soon benefit science and philosophy as much as art: Galileo's ideas undoubtedly related to the musical training he received from his father, a pioneer in new musical styles.

Today we are comfortable with, say, the idea that the Earth revolves around the sun once every 31,556,925.9747 seconds. But this perceptual ease does not come naturally. As Szamosi observes, until roughly age nine,
children's temporal judgments amount to little more than disguised spatial judgments. "20th-century children are instinctive Aristotelians," he says. Like medieval man, they perceive the passage of time as the rhythm of their own concerns.

**The Brain's Maps**


Why do people remember a joke they heard in second grade, yet forget the howler they heard yesterday? Sigmund Freud viewed memory as a permanent record of past occurrences; but the record was unreliable, he thought, because emotionally charged events could be repressed.

Today, specialists do not believe that memories form a fixed record in the brain. But they underestimate the role of individual psychology in memory and perception, according to Rosenfield, a history professor at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City. It is our "individual needs and desires" that determine how we recall people and events.

Charles Darwin observed that the "typical" qualities we associate with humans and other animals are abstractions that conceal their true natures: biologically varied, genetically diverse, selected by the ability to survive difficult environments. If Darwin's theory of evolution holds, says Rosenfield, then Nobel Prize-winning neurophysicist Gerald Edelman has an intriguing explanation of memory's idiosyncrasies.

In 1978, Edelman suggested that the brain may be seen as a Darwinian system evolving through variation and selection. His task was to determine how, given a particular set of genes, enough variability could survive within the brain's overall structure. Early embryonic development provided Edelman with an answer. Studies of individual cells revealed that genes alone did not control their destinies; rather, they became liver cells, nerve cells, brain cells, or whatever, depending on where they were when specialization began. Thus brain function (and structure) appeared to depend on the activities of neighboring cells, as well as on the individual characteristics of the cells themselves.

Edelman's "neuronal group selection" theory holds that, in humans, groups of brain cells compete to record different sensations. For example, a man in a concert hall might hear someone say "nine o'clock," and recall a past nine o'clock event. One set of brain "maps" would locate the speaker while another enabled him to continue hearing the music. Months later, the man might have again forgotten the hour but suddenly recall it by humming the concert melody. His memory did not function by repeating past images; rather, the brain "recategorized" information when its mapping system was activated in another highly individual context.

Just as Albert Einstein replaced Sir Isaac Newton's theories with a larger view of space and time, Rosenfield argues, Edelman's ideas may yield a "deeper view of human psychology." At the very least, he says, neural Darwinism "challenges those who claim that science...is little concerned with the unique attributes of individuals."

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Is infertility among women on the rise?

To judge by the number of physicians specializing in fertility problems, and the media's attention to the matter, inability to bear children is a spreading phenomenon, particularly for career women who delay starting a family until their 30s. Indeed, a widely noted 1982 French study showed alarming proportions of women unable to conceive by the end of 12 "insemination cycles," or one year—26 percent of those below age 30, 35 percent in the 30–34 age group, and 44 percent of those between ages 35 and 39. The message: Increasingly, women who wait risk waiting forever.

Nonsense, say Menken and Trussell, professors of sociology and economics at Princeton, and Larsen, a researcher at Sweden's Lunds University. Among other flaws in the French study, they note, was its one-year standard. That is too short: Research has shown that the mean time required for conception is about eight months, and that at least 14 percent of women who become pregnant take more than a year to do so.

While ability to bear children does decline with advancing age, the rate of decline has remained roughly stable since 1965. The chance of a woman not being able to bear a child rises from about five percent for those aged 20 to 24 to 16 percent at most for those aged 30 to 35. In later years, the proportion of women who cannot conceive does rise sharply—to 30 percent by age 40, and 60 percent by age 44.

Why has fear of infertility risen? The authors think that the effectiveness of fertility control—which in 20 years has lowered the rate of unwanted births in the United States from above 20 percent to below seven percent—has led people to believe, mistakenly, that "controlling fertility was the real problem" and that "having children is easy."

For women of childbearing age who suspect infertility, the authors prescribe patience and persistence. One study has shown that 41 percent of such women who obtained professional treatment subsequently became pregnant. But so did 35 percent of the women who did not.
big TV transmitter, microwaves are clearly dangerous; they cause animal (including human) tissues to overheat and, in some cases, to develop tumors. But what about low-level exposure, such as the microwave bathing someone gets when he walks under overhead power lines, or cooks with a microwave oven? After 6,000 studies over 40 years, such exposure has not been proved to be risk-free. But while a few studies have found links to changes in the brain, blood, heart, and immune system, as well as to chromosome damage and cancer, most researchers have found no danger, observe Foster and Guy, biophysicists at the Universities of Pennsylvania and Washington.

Although physicians have used microwaves for heat therapy (i.e. diathermy) to loosen up stiff backs and to ease the pain of arthritis since the 1950s, they largely ignored the possible side effects. Then the U.S. military (particularly the Navy) began testing the biological effects of radar, invented during World War II. In 1953, a University of Pennsylvania researcher proposed a limit on human microwave exposure—a level one-tenth as intense as that of bright sunlight, or 100 watts per square meter of flesh; it was not until 1966 that Washington recognized this standard, on the recommendation of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), a private advisory organization.

By 1982, better methods of measuring energy absorbed by the body prompted ANSI to set more precise limits for exposure to high-intensity sources such as large antennae and military radars. Determined by calculations involving such factors as the position of people relative to the microwave source, the new limits are intended to ensure an energy dose that heats the body more slowly than does moderate exercise.

Still, doubts about such “safe” limits persist. Some recent U.S. experiments have produced disturbing results. One study has suggested that the “microwave auditory effect” (the “clicks” that people sometimes hear when exposed to microwave pulses) is due to vibrations within the brain. Another investigation has raised the possibility that microwaves cause tumors in rats.

So far, however, neither recent federally funded research ($10 million per annum) nor a review of the basic studies has convinced the authors that low-level microwave radiation will hurt anyone.

Zoning Out Ozone


It is just a colorless, odorless gas, and a natural one too. And in its proper place, the upper stratosphere, it is beneficial: Ozone shields the Earth's inhabitants from the sun's ultraviolet rays.

Environmentalists have long worried that the ozone layer aloft is being thinned out by certain gases used in aerosols drifting up from the ground. Now, observes Stanfield, a National Journal reporter, specialists at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are concerned about too much ozone at the Earth's surface.

Ozone forms in the surface air when hydrocarbons (e.g., gasoline vapors and paint fumes) combine with nitrogen oxide spewed out of smoke-
stays and auto tail pipes; weather and other factors play roles that are not
yet fully understood. What has become clear is that high concentrations of
ozone can cause chest pains, eye problems, and headaches; prolonged ex-
posure may permanently damage lung tissue. And plants, observes
Stanfield, are at even greater risk than people. In studies on California’s
southern coast and in the San Bernardino Mountains, researchers have
found that high ozone levels have reduced yields of tomatoes by 33 per-
cent, beans by 26 percent, and tree growth by as much as 67 percent.

Surface ozone, in short, is more harmful than was thought when Con-
gress passed the Clean Air Act of 1977, which mandates reducing the gas
to a maximum level (0.12 parts per million parts of air) by December 31,
1987. But even that goal is distant; At least 73 U.S. regions, encompassing
80 million people, will probably miss the deadline. Los Angeles has levels
triple the federal limit; in the New York City–Connecticut vicinity and in
Houston, the levels are roughly double the maximum.

Although ozone’s components have many sources, motor vehicles and
industry generate more than 70 percent of the hydrocarbons, which makes
them prime targets for regulation. But any fix will be expensive; thus the
oil companies want Detroit to outfit its cars with vapor-capturing canisters
(cost: $30–$150 each), and the automakers argue that all gas pumps
should have fume-recovering hoses and nozzles, costing filling station oper-
ators $12,000 to install and $2,000 a year to maintain.

The Clean Air Act empowers the EPA to penalize areas that fail to
meet the ozone limits with a cutoff of federal highway aid and a ban on
construction projects. But Stanfield doubts that the EPA will take those
tough steps, since some progress is evident. Nationally, ozone levels de-
clined seven percent between 1979 and 1984.

ARTS & LETTERS

Explaining Hitchcock

“Personality, Pathology, and the Act of Cre-
ation: The Case of Alfred Hitchcock” by Stanton
Peele, in Biography (No. 3, 1986), Dept. of
English, Univ. of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii
96822.

Gulls attack humans (The Birds, 1963); a mad motel-keeper stabs a
woman in the shower (Psycho, 1960); a husband hurls his wife from a
church belfry (Vertigo, 1958).

Such unsettling images, arising out of one man’s bizarre imagination,
made Alfred Hitchcock (1899–1980) the master of the macabre. The Lon-
don-born director’s gruesome style has also led some film critics to view
his work as pathological. In The Dark Side of Genius: The Life of Alfred
Hitchcock (1983), Donald Spoto went so far as to call this producer of 53
feature-length films a man gripped by misogyny, sadism, and fetishes con-
cerning the bathroom and other matters involving the body and sex.
“Hitch,” born to poor Catholic Cockney parents, was seriously malad-
justed, to the detriment of his art.
Peele, a social psychologist and critic, rejects this notion. He acknowledges Hitchcock's weaknesses—obesity, alcoholism, incessant loneliness despite a 54-year marriage, an obsession with blonde ice-queens like Tippi Hedren of *The Birds* and *Marnie* (1964), who spurned his affections. But, Peele maintains, his films "cannot... be regarded as elaborate excuses for their director's foibles and deficiencies, as uninhibited vicarious indulgences of Hitchcock's hidden yearnings." Rather, Hitchcock "transformed" his compulsions into great cinematic visions. If anything, his obsessions helped give his work its seemingly timeless popularity.

While one can easily harp on the vicious murders in, say, *Vertigo*, *Psycho*, and *Frenzy* (1972), a film such as *Rear Window* (1954)—about an invalid photographer who uncovers a murder while peeping into a neighbor's apartment window with binoculars—reflects a certain "moral tension," says Peele. Voyeurism is exonerated in the name of justice. Moreover, while Hitchcock portrayed rape and murder, "he never did so in the easy way of most contemporary films that might be thought to encourage the behavior." He stressed the brutality and consequences of violence. Thus *Marnie* emphasized the horror of rape, via the desolation of the heroine (Tippee Hedren), who attempts suicide.

To reduce Hitchcock's brilliance to his neuroses, Peele insists, is mistaken. "Indeed, the ability to separate one's personality from one's creation may be the hallmark of the successful artist, the failure to do so the sign of artistic mediocrity."

Alfred Hitchcock appeared briefly in his films—as he does here, eyeing Jane Wyman, in the 1950 thriller *Stage Fright*—just because it amused him and his audiences. Said he: "I practice absurdity quite religiously."
Houdini’s Magic


It has been 60 years since Hungarian magician Harry Houdini, born Erik Weisz in Budapest in 1874, escaped from manacles inside a lead-weighted packing case—nail-shut and dropped into Manhattan’s East River. But this and many of his other spectacular feats remain unexplained. And, notes Epstein, a poet, those feats were not exaggerated: Houdini’s escapes were “more public than the proceedings of Congress, and most of them he performed over and over, so no one would miss the point.”

He got out of the world’s most secure prisons. He wrestled free while being hung upside down from the tallest buildings in America in a straitjacket. He was sewn into a huge football and into the belly of a dead whale. In California, buried six feet underground, he clawed his way out. During 19 weeks of performances at New York City’s Hippodrome, an elephant was marched into an onstage cabinet from which Houdini made the pachyderm disappear by means still unknown. In London, before a house of 4,000, he picked open the supposedly tamperproof “Mirror Handcuffs” a local blacksmith had been preparing for five years. The list goes on.

Houdini died in Detroit of appendicitis on Halloween, 1926. The rabbi who spoke at his funeral, a close confidante, remarked that he possessed “a wondrous power that he never understood.” Houdini’s friend, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, agreed that certain of his escapes were “supernatural.” Houdini’s wife, Bess, recalled in a letter to Doyle that sometimes she had urged her husband to call on “Spiritism” when he appeared stuck during a particularly tough escape trick, after which he would soon spring free.

Houdini himself categorically denied that any of his effects were achieved by supernatural means; he even crusaded against mediums and clairvoyants. Probably, concedes Epstein, he was telling the truth as he saw it. For as the obedient son of a Budapest rabbi, Houdini knew that Talmudic law strictly forbade the performance of miracles. And Houdini was nothing if not strict about both his faith and his craft.

Did he possess “psychic powers,” as his wife, tantalizingly, both suggested and denied? For his part, Epstein can only conclude that “Houdini’s work was no more miraculous than his life. His life was no more miraculous than the opening and closing of a flower.”

The Grand Pianist


Glenn Gould, the renowned Canadian pianist who died of a stroke in 1982 at age 50, earned well-deserved praise for bringing new vigor to the tired classical canon of Bach, Mozart, Haydn, and Beethoven. His interpretations were modern and questioning: Each restless performance challenged the great composers to prove their genius in a different way.

At the same time, writes Schwartz, an art critic, Gould’s public performances seemed those of an eccentric brat. He used the sawed-off chair his
father had made for him as a prodigy who graduated from Toronto's Royal Conservatory at age 13. He played with shoes off, wearing mitts and a sweater that poked out under his dress shirt (he dreaded catching cold). Humming uncontrollably, his piano often cluttered with medicines, water glasses, or a magazine (for those boring moments in a concerto between piano parts), the maverick with the surly matinee-idol looks struck his swooning public as a Brando-like musical Bad Boy. A bachelor recluse, he slept by day and worked at night, keeping in touch with the world through telephone calls (by which he made friends he never met).

But Gould’s rebellion ran even deeper than his fans realized, reflects Schwartz. As shown by memoirs by and about him—The Glenn Gould Reader (1984), Glenn Gould Variations: By Himself & His Friends (1986), and Conversations with Glenn Gould (1986)—he worked hard at not being a rebel. When we hear his “coiled, passionate” playing, Schwartz writes, we may think it “willful” or “unreal.” What we are actually hearing is a man engaged in the very serious business of trying “to deny the most urgent part of himself.”

At 31, Gould quit the concert stage, saying that the live circuit, which generally makes a performer repeat “concert favorites,” drained him of his freshness. He began to argue against music’s star system; technology, he said, would soon allow listeners to make “ideal” symphonies at home by splicing together parts of several performances. Of course, the irony of what Schwartz calls Gould’s intensifying “quest for an anonymous, egoless performer’s art” was that Gould was monumentally self-obsessed. He became what he most despised: “a Napoleonic creator, a man with little connection to his fellows.”

Yet the playing remained exquisite, a constant counterpoint to the “tragic absurdity of a great artist’s saying that he doesn’t want to be an artist.” And perhaps it was precisely Gould’s self-sabotage—one might better call it self-sacrifice, muses Schwartz—that gave his Bach preludes such intensity and made them so affectingly his own. The late British poet Philip Larkin once remarked that deprivation was for him what daffodils were for wordsworth. Glenn Gould might have said the same.

OTHER NATIONS

Troubles Down Under

“One thousand miles south of the equator, washed by both the Indian and Pacific oceans, Australia (like New Zealand) is a Western oasis in the East. In this tranquil Commonwealth of 16,000,000 people, the passions are sports, beer (31 gallons downed per person per year), and gambling (on which more is spent than for defense). In bad times, notes Kraar, a Fortune editor, Australians say, ‘She'll be right, mate’—things will work out. But lately, says Kraar, Australians are less sanguine.”

Despite all the current hoopla over the America’s Cup sailing contest in Perth, which may generate $150 million in income, the national economy is weak. A sag in world prices for wool, wheat, meat, metals, and bauxite—Australia’s main exports—has led to an $8.3 billion trade deficit. Australia’s dollar has slipped as its foreign debt has climbed; at $52 billion, the debt equals 37 percent of the gross national product.

In recent years, while subsidized farmers in other Western countries (including the United States) and Third World exporters of commodities were expanding their sales abroad, the Australians grew fat and lazy. Nearly 30 percent of the workforce (versus 16.7 percent in the United States) is on various government payrolls. The welfare system supports not just the jobless and the poor—who are few, in a country with disposable income per capita of about $5,700—but also “dole bludgers” (loafers) who sun and surf at taxpayer expense. Strong unions have organized nearly 60 percent of the workforce; arbitrators fix labor contracts for all industries. Wildcat strikes abound, although most workers enjoy short hours, long annual vacations (four weeks), and a 17.5 percent annual bonus. Absenteeism, wasteful work rules, and featherbedding are endemic.

Arguing that an “age of realism” must begin, Prime Minister Robert Hawke, 56, has pressed unions for concessions and experimented with “workfare” programs. But Hawke’s Labor Party, in power since 1984, has suffered along with the economy. The leader of the opposition Liberals, John Howard, a conservative, calls for lower corporate taxes (now 60 percent) and breaks for management in labor contracts. His party may win the upcoming elections, to be held by February 1988.

Kraar sees hopeful signs, notably Australians’ new interest in ties with economically surging East Asia, “though many Aussies still identify more with Britain, 10,000 miles away, than with Indonesia, 300 miles away.” And a new breed of risk-taking entrepreneurs is emerging in the manufacturing and financial fields.

An Australian comeback would surely please U.S. investors—such as General Motors, International Business Machines, and McDonald’s—who have an $8 billion stake there. But first, an Australian economist, John McLeod, told Kraar: “wake up to the fact that they have been living in cloud cuckoo land.”

Lenin’s Mistake


A joke is making the rounds in Poland these days: In the West, trade unions protect workers from their exploitative capitalist bosses; in the Soviet Bloc, unions protect Communist leaders from the workers.

So true, says Laba, a Fellow at Harvard’s Russian Research Center.

The short life of Solidarity, Poland’s 100,000-member independent trade union—formed amid strikes in August 1980, outlawed 16 months later under martial law by the Gierek regime—was played out on a world stage. But Laba worries that Western observers, and even some Polish dissidents, missed the theme: They believe, as the official Soviet and Polish

line holds, that the revolt's "brain power" was the Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR), a group of intellectuals founded in 1976 to defend Polish protestors from state prosecution—or that the Catholic Church's opposition to Communist rule laid the groundwork for Solidarity. Actually, says Laba, contrary to the standard Leninist doctrine, which says that only an intelligentsia can run a revolution, KOR and the church were "auxiliaries rather than initiators" during Solidarity's brief flowering.

Although Solidarity's leader Lech Walesa did work closely with KOR members, scattered worker groups were demanding reforms from the Giercek regime as early as December 1970. In the wake of protests over food price hikes in the Baltic coast cities of Gdansk, Gdynia, and Szczecin, blue-collar Poles began seeking numerous practical reforms. Studying thousands of demands issued by 403 worker groups between 1970 and 1980—culled from the archives of the Gdansk Solidarity group—Laba found that most sought pay raises and redress of such wrongs as the policy that (as printers in Stupsk protested) housing grants only go to "the state security forces and the militia." But the chief cry was for trade unions free of party, state, or factory control—which also headed the Gdansk 21 Demands of August 1980, the basis of Solidarity's charter.

Moreover, observes Laba, trade union support has mostly come from workers in heavy industry and construction, and, geographically, from the Baltic coast. There, working in places like the 30,000-employee Lenin Shipyard, reside many migrants from eastern Poland, who are keenly aware of Soviet domination and fiercely nationalistic.
Lenin, Laba notes, felt that unions should merely be “transmission belts” of doctrine from party to people. In Poland, a message went from people to party; Solidarity’s emergence conferred “a prima facie validity on worker grievances against their rulers.”

Sino-Soviet Amity?

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Beijing’s relationship with Moscow has run the gamut: “eternal friendship” during the 1950s, “permanent enmity” during the 1960s and ‘70s.

Today, says Levine, an American University political scientist, relations between the two Communist colossi are slowly coming full circle. Although the PRC opened its doors to the capitalist West during the late 1970s, it did not welcome the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe until 1982. But economic cooperation soon flourished between Beijing and the Kremlin. In December 1984, Soviet vice prime minister Ivan V. Arkhipov visited China to establish a Sino-Soviet Economic, Trade, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Commission—which convened last March—and to agree on doing $14 billion worth of bilateral business during the 1986–1990 period. In July 1985, Arkhipov’s Chinese counterpart, Yao Yilin, signed the economic agreements in Moscow.

As a result, the value of Sino-Soviet trade rose from roughly $160 million in 1981 to $1.3 billion in 1985; by 1990, it should reach $6 billion, close to the present level of Sino-American trade. The Soviets tend to export heavy industrial products (e.g., electrical and transportation equipment, steel); the PRC ships, in addition to raw minerals, food and finished goods such as handicrafts and textiles—items much desired by Soviet consumers. Meanwhile, barter trade along the Sino-Soviet border has been revived. So has ship traffic between northeast China and eastern Siberia along the Heilongjiang and Songjiang rivers.

However, diplomatic progress between Beijing and Moscow has not been as smooth, Levine observes. To be sure, cultural avenues are now open: Soviet and Chinese artists, musicians, and athletes perform in each other’s arenas, while more than 200 students from each nation attend the other’s universities (up from 10 during 1983–84). But Beijing is hanging tough on its demands for removal of the “Three Obstacles”: The Soviet troops on the Chinese border, the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and Soviet support of Vietnam’s occupation of Kampuchea. Despite more than a dozen high-level meetings between Chinese and Soviet officials between 1982 and 1986, Moscow has not budged on these demands; Beijing, in turn, has not allowed the Chinese Communist Party to restore formal ties with the Soviet Communist Party.

Because the PRC and the Soviet Union are still ardent competitors—notably for influence in the Third World—Levine does not see them soon reaching a full accord. As Chinese vice prime minister Li Peng put it: “We hope that China and the Soviet Union will become good neighbors, but they will not become allies.”
YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK, which Theodore Roosevelt called "a natural breeding-ground" for wild animals, faces a peculiar crisis. Indeed, wildlife that Roosevelt saw in Yellowstone in 1903 has vanished. Gone are the wolf, coyote, and white-tailed deer, and formerly flourishing beaver, bighorn sheep, and grizzly bear populations have dwindled.

Chase, a nature writer, contends that "the park's reputation as a great game sanctuary is perhaps the best-sustained myth in American conservation history." He blames Yellowstone's condition on the agency assigned to protect it, the National Park Service. It manages wildlife by "natural regulation," a policy that is supposed to compensate for man's impact on animal populations.

It works like this: When Yellowstone rangers decided to exterminate the elk's natural predator, the wolf, creating an irruption of elk, natural regulation suggested that the number of elk would stabilize without man having to kill any. The animals would begin to exceed the carrying capacity of the range and the excess elk would eventually starve to death.

But natural regulation hasn't worked in Yellowstone, says Chase, because the elk destroyed their range before using up its food supply. They competed for food with other ungulates—such as white-tailed and mule deer—and then began eating alders, a primary food source for beavers and other once-plentiful animals now absent from the park.

The natural regulation policy was adopted in 1966 after then secretary of the interior Stewart Udall commissioned a report to establish guidelines for national park and wildlife management. The report recommended that Yellowstone's original ecosystems "be maintained or where necessary re-created."

But what was Yellowstone like before man arrived? Clearly, by 1966 man's activities had been affecting local ecology for more than a century. An environment had been established where grizzly bears, for instance, depended on human visitors' garbage for food. Only scientific studies could determine how to restore Yellowstone to its original condition—and how restoration might affect the animals now in the park.

But such studies were never done, says Chase. Instead, the Park Service deemphasized scientific study in favor of "park interpretation" for the public. Park Service researchers became "apologists for management." They gave excuses for wildlife losses (the animals were "hiding in the back-country") and made plans to close garbage dumps to the grizzlies.

Yellowstone's managers discounted the conclusions of private wildlife studies, e.g., John and Frank Craighead's grizzly bear research, which suggested that grizzlies might need the garbage dumps to survive.

Indeed, when the dumps were closed to bears in 1968-70, grizzlies suffered. Deprived of a food source they had relied on since Yellowstone's inception, grizzlies began roaming the park to find things to eat, coming into closer contact with visitors. Nuisance bears were captured and expelled by park rangers, or sometimes killed. By 1982, the park's grizzly population—one of the few remaining in the lower 48 states—had declined, until there were fewer than 200 bears left. Today they have all but vanished.

The Park Service blames Yellowstone's loss of wildlife on larger crowds of visitors and development adjacent to the park. But the real problem, in Chase's view, lies in official dogma. The Park Service mistakenly tried to remove man from the environmental equation, instead of managing the vast park and its animals within its new human-influenced ecological framework. The ironic result, says Chase, was to make Yellowstone's wildlife the "victim of an environmental ideal."
"How the Press Affects Federal Policymaking: Six Case Studies."
W. W. Norton and Co., 500 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10110. 373 pp. $25.00.
Authors: Martin Linsky, Jonathan Moore, Wendy O'Donnell, and David Whitman

"Impact: How the Press Affects Federal Policymaking."
Author: Martin Linsky

Most analyses of the news media's coverage of government focus on one side of the story: the journalists' performance, good or bad. These high-protein case studies, sponsored by Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, break new ground, examining in detail the behavior and interaction of both reporters and Washington officials as six "hot" stories developed during the 1970s and 1980s.

An essay on the Nixon administration's successful effort to stir public and congressional support for postal reform in 1969-70, by David Whitman, shows that coherent policies, fully explained by political leaders, can obtain a fair hearing in the news media. But Whitman's study of the 1977-78 neutron bomb controversy suggests that even sound initiatives can founder when officials fail to explain them.

The *Washington Post* broke the story of the "Neutron Killer Warhead" on June 6, 1977. For nearly a year, the media image of a "capitalist" bomb that "kills people but leaves buildings intact"—a paraphrase of a quote in the story by reporter Walter Pincus—would plague the Carter administration.

On June 6, Jimmy Carter postponed production of the neutron weapon, pending further study. The crucial job of explaining the nuclear device to the press and public fell to the Pentagon.

Designed for the potential battlefields of West Germany, the neutron bomb was intended to halt massive Soviet tank thrusts in wartime with "enhanced radiation" while limiting damage to German cities and towns. Already deployed in Europe, notes Whitman, were other U.S. tactical nuclear weapons with "more blast and radiation than the neutron warheads."

But the Pentagon, hoping the story would fade away, revealed little of this in its terse press releases.

That summer, popular opposition to the weapon grew in Western Europe. Only in November did Washington finally mount a concerted campaign to "sell" the weapon to the public.

By March 1978, Washington had negotiated a plan with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, intended mainly to counter news media criticism and Western Europe's growing antinuclear movement. The neutron weapons would be portrayed as a response to Moscow's new SS-20 missiles targeted on Europe.

But on April 7, 1978, after weeks of media speculation fueled by White House leaks, Carter announced that he would "defer" production of the weapon. In part, Carter seemed to fear being labeled an "international ogre." Instead, he gained a reputation for vacillation. And U.S.-European relations were soured while the European antinuclear movement was considerably strengthened.

Did the press kill the bomb? If not for Walter Pincus, one official observed, "nobody would have noticed" the weapon. As Whitman notes, there never was widespread public antipathy in the United States to building the bomb. But Carter, trying to steer clear of controversy, let TV and the press define the issues, and hence was repeatedly forced to react to media coverage. Ironically, the Reagan administration's 1981 announcement that it would begin producing the weapons stirred few protests at home or abroad.

In *Impact*, an analysis of the case studies, Martin Linsky, who teaches at the Kennedy School, argues that Washington policymakers must learn to reckon with the press. Some honest "management" of the news by officials, he concludes, is indispensable to effective government.
"Catholic High Schools: A National Portrait (Vol. 1); Their Impact on Low-Income Students (Vol. 2)."


The nation's high schools, once the showcases of public education, are on trial. In 1983, a blue-ribbon panel created by the U.S. Department of Education warned that a "rising tide" of "mediocrity" in the schools was eroding America's ability to compete on the world scene.

That same year, a groundbreaking study by James Coleman and Father Andrew Greeley stirred heated debate among educators. The two social scientists contended that Catholic high schools were superior to their public counterparts. Among other things, they found that Catholic high school students scored at least one grade level ahead of their public school peers in vocabulary, reading, writing, and mathematics.

The National Catholic Educational Association has now tested these findings in a nationwide survey of 910 (out of 1,464) Catholic schools. The results: Catholic students do indeed perform better.

The main reason, researchers found, is that Catholic schools set higher standards. Whereas the majority of public school students choose a vocational or "general" curriculum (with the fewest liberal arts requirements), 80 percent of those in Catholic schools take the academic, or college preparatory, "track" (including advanced courses such as calculus). Not surprisingly, 83 percent of Catholic high school graduates go on to college, versus less than 60 percent of those from public schools.

Research showed that Catholic schools do not achieve better results by spending more money. The average tuition is only $1,230, and the average cost of educating each student—$1,783—is roughly $1,000 less than public schools spend. Nor can Catholic schools claim more parental guidance. In fact, principals report they are disappointed by parents' "fair to poor" involvement in their children's education.

Catholic schools have often been accused of "elitism," but Volume II of the study concludes otherwise. By making a major commitment to educating urban minorities, the church has stemmed the enrollment decline that has closed down more than 2,000 Catholic high schools over the last 15 years.

Today, one-third of Catholic high school students come from families with incomes below $20,000. Another third have family incomes below $30,000. The schools accept 88 percent of their applicants (12 percent non-Catholic, eight percent Hispanic, and seven percent black) and expel only one percent—mostly for academic faults.

Disciplinary problems are relatively rare. Students who disobey the schools' written rules must sit through "detention periods." Some are glad to comply, at least in retrospect. One graduate remarked that had she not been taught "to be a lady" she would "have a baby by now and be living on the street."

The study tends to gloss over difficulties. However, it does not conceal the Catholic schools' apparent failure to bring black students up to par. Paradoxically, blacks display more self-confidence and have higher educational expectations than either whites or Hispanics. Yet, on average, they take home the least homework and enter and leave school with the lowest achievement scores.

Money is the schools' most pressing concern. Rock-bottom salaries ($11,121 to start, compared with $14,045 in public schools) attract young, zealous, but inexperienced teachers; more than half quit after five years or less. The turnover rate will probably increase as the number of teaching nuns and priests, who in the past formed the "stable core" of Catholic high school faculties, continues to drop. (During the past 20 years, the old 75-to-25 clergy-lay teacher ratio has been reversed.) By the 1990s, most of the teachers will be laypersons. The church schools must find a way to pay them competitive wages—or lose their newfound leadership role.
Omani children celebrating National Day (November 18). Omanis have rarely failed to charm foreign guests. Writing in 1982, Norwegian anthropologist Unni Wikan noted their "delicate style of grace, tact, and humility, the quietness and control in manner and speech, the calm and gentle integrity that distinguish them, be they girls or boys, women or men."
Oman

When Oman's English-educated Sultan Qabus visited the White House in April 1983, President Reagan genially cited his guest's accomplishments as well as a shared enthusiasm for horses and for Gilbert and Sullivan. For his part, the sultan said: "We are under no illusions. We realize that the important geopolitical position we occupy at the mouth of the Persian Gulf and the unstable situation that exists... make it imperative that we develop our country and its defenses." The sultan noted U.S. military aid and his own oil-rich country's strong links to the West, unique among Arab nations. Here, Calvin H. Allen, Jr., sketches the long exotic history of Oman. And Mark N. Katz looks at the sultan's independent fiefdom on the strategic Strait of Hormuz, not far from the battlefields of the continuing Iran-Iraq war.

A SEPARATE PLACE

by Calvin H. Allen, Jr.

Two things struck early European visitors to Oman: its heat and its desolation. In 1684, the Dutchman John Stuys compared living in Oman to roasting in a "boiling cauldron." Alexander Hamilton, a British traveler in Muscat in 1715, claimed that the Omanis roasted fish on the rocks. Upon his arrival in 1787, William Francklin complained that "the whole country round this place is one continued solid rock." Others might have echoed these remarks, but many died before they could record their thoughts for posterity. The first three agents of the British East India Company, for example, expired of heat stroke, as did two American missionaries during the 1890s.

First impressions, however, can be deceiving. Climate and geography have played vital roles in Omani history, but in a more benevolent manner than early Western visitors cared to acknowledge.

Located along the northern edge of the Indian Ocean monsoon system, Oman, unlike its neighbor Saudi Arabia, receives summer rains that have sustained local agriculture for almost 5,000 years. Although it occupies the southeastern portion of the Arabian Penin-
sula, Oman has long been virtually an island unto itself, surrounded by the vast desert of the Rub' al-Khali ("Empty Quarter") and Wahibah Sands to the west and south and the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea to the north and east. With few exceptions, as historian Robert Landen observes, the Omanis' "contacts with the rest of the world have been...via the sea." Coastal cities served as entrepôts that provided not only access to foreign markets, but exposure to foreign influences, especially from India and East Africa.

Spine and Stomach

Thus isolated from the rest of Arabia by geography, Oman evolved independently from its neighbors. Despite a history of chronic internal feuds, the country has nonetheless managed to forge a national identity that dates back to A.D. 750, when the Omanis, among the earliest converts to Islam, elected their first spiritual leader, or imam. Oman's strategic location invited foreign invasions, but it also provided a base for a powerful maritime empire. Today, the Saudis occasionally criticize Omanis as "non-Arabs"; but to Omanis, the Saudis—with their relatively young 200-year-old kingdom—seem unsophisticated arrivistes.

Roughly the size of Kansas, Oman is divided into three regions: Ru'us al-Jibal, also known as the Musandam Peninsula, a mountainous exclave jutting into the Strait of Hormuz; Dhufar, the southern province, by far the most pleasant part of Oman with its moderate temperatures and summer rains; and Oman Proper, the country's heartland, which includes the cities of Muscat and Nizwa.

Arab geographers have compared Oman Proper to the human body, with the Hajar Mountains (the "spine"), the Batinah (the "stomach"), a narrow coastal plain, to the east, and the Dhahirah (the "back"), the barren, interior gravelly plateau that merges with the Rub' al-Khali, to the west. Omani civilization has its roots in the outwash plains of the Hajar Mountains near Nizwa, where during the fourth millennium B.C. early farmers took advantage of water sources in the gravel of the wadis (river beds) to plant wheat, barley, and sorghum. They domesticated the date palm and the camel, built simple stone burial cairns and temples, and smelted copper for use in trade with Sumer, the Indus Valley, and East Africa. By the end of the third millennium, however, camel nomadism began to replace settled agriculture, probably due to a drier climate.

During the seventh century B.C., Persian settlers, encouraged by

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With an area of 82,030 square miles, Oman has the second lowest population density (after Saudi Arabia) among its Gulf neighbors. A long-simmering border dispute between Saudi Arabia and Oman has left the boundaries between the two countries undefined.

The expansion of Iran’s Achaemenid Empire, came across the Gulf and took control of the country. They began building the falaj irrigation systems that still form the basis for Omani agriculture. Elaborate tunnels, barrages, storage tanks, and surface channels enabled local farmers to tap water from a wide area to irrigate not only dates and wheat but bananas, grapes, limes, apricots, and mangoes.
The spread of the *falaj* system created a scattered network of small agricultural settlements across the country. More importantly, it fostered an elaborate social structure. The *falaj* played a part in everything from setting up crop schedules to calculating taxes. Agents, shareholders, and laborers not only oversaw the irrigation of date palms, but arranged for specified amounts of water to be distributed to a village's visitors and its poor.

Legend has it that the first wave of Arab migrants arrived in Oman after the bursting of the massive Marib Dam in Yemen had, according to the Koran, “made [the Arabs] bywords and scattered them abroad.” Whether this is true or not, by the sixth century A.D., the Persians were forced to recognize Arab autonomy and appoint an Arab as *julanda* (ruler) over the interior Omani tribes. Within a century, the Arab *julandas* had accepted a new faith, Islam, and had driven the Persian governor from Oman.

Islam brought few other changes. The caliphs in Medina and later in Damascus relied on the *julandas* to rule over the province. Located on the fringes of the Arab empire, Oman became a refuge for religious dissidents, notably the followers of 'Abd Allah bin Ibad, a seventh-century Kharijite teacher from Basrah in Iraq. Unlike their Shi'ite or Sunni brethren, the Kharijite “Ibadis” rejected hereditary leadership of the Muslim community. Instead, the Ibadis held that any physically fit Muslim male, well versed in Islamic law, was eligible for election by the menfolk as imam. Less fanatical than other Kharijite sects, the Ibadis also forbade the killing of other Muslims and were generally tolerant of non-Ibadis, who could marry Ibadis, testify in court proceedings, and inherit property.

**Hinawi versus Ghafiri**

Oman proved fertile ground for Ibad missionary, and the collapse of the Ummayad caliphate in A.D. 750 provided them with a opportunity to establish their “kingdom of God on earth.” Ibadism has been, and continues to be, the country's most powerful unifying force. A political as well as religious figure, the elected imam became an important rallying point for Oman's quarreling tribes. After rebuffing an invasion launched by the new caliphate in Baghdad, the Omanis enjoyed a period of peace under benevolent imams who, as one Omani chronicler put it, “walked in the way of truth, justice, and integrity, decreeing what was right and forbidding what was wrong.”

But while the imamate system promised unity, its democratic nature also invited discord. The deposition of the aged imam Salt bin Malik in 886 ended a brief golden age. In a pattern that would persist over the ages, Oman's 200-odd tribes fought among themselves as the clerics debated the legality of Salt's deposition and argued over a successor. Divided by geneology and religious faction, the tribes fell
OMAN

into two separate camps whose rough outlines have survived into the present day. The Yemenis tended to be Ibad; the Nizar, predominantly Sunni. During the 1720s, a civil war again broke out between the two confederations, the Yemenis then known as the Hinawi, the Nizar as the Ghafiri. Omani villages are still partitioned into different sections matching these ancient tribal divisions. In fact, some tribesmen have been known to refuse government arbitration if the arbitrator comes from a tribe long hostile to their own.

While the tribes in the interior quarreled, Oman's coastal cities flourished. Suwar, first built up under Persian rule, rose to such prominence during the 10th century that the geographer Istakhri proclaimed that "it is not possible to find on the shore of the Persian Sea nor in all the land of Islam a city more rich in fine buildings and foreign wares." Here Arab, African, and Indian merchants financed trading ventures throughout the western Indian Ocean and as far afield as China. Qalhat, with a more southerly location that enabled it to profit from Egyptian trade, eclipsed Suwar in the 13th century. Then Qalhat itself was eclipsed by Muscat with the arrival of the empire-building Portuguese at the dawn of the 16th century.

The Portuguese Interval

On his way to Qalhat in 1507, Portuguese admiral Afonso d'Albuquerque distinguished himself by destroying every Arab ship he encountered. The citizens of Qalhat escaped unharmed, but Muscat, whose rulers refused to accept Portuguese sovereignty, was sacked and burned; those inhabitants who resisted had their ears and noses cut off. The Portuguese established a garrison and a trading post. Despite their initial harshness, they adopted a largely laissez-faire attitude toward Oman during their 140 years of rule, and were content to control the country's coastal commerce. Aside from building the two stone fortresses of Merani and Jalali that guard Muscat's harbor, the Portuguese left almost no lasting impression.*

Their rule, however, did inspire Oman's tribes to set aside their differences and elect a new imam, Nasir bin Murshid al-Ya'aribi, in 1624. For almost 25 years, Nasir sought to drive the Portuguese from Oman. Only in 1650 was his successor able to dislodge them from Muscat, after a bloody struggle that, in the words of historian ibn Ruzaik, saw slain Portuguese soldiers scattered "prostrate like the trunks of uprooted date trees." The Portuguese never returned.

The Ya'aribah imamate (1624–1749) is regarded by Omani historians as the restoration of the medieval ideal of the kingdom of God on earth. It was a time of wealth and stability for Oman as slaves, gold, ivory, hides, coffee, spices, pearls, copper, rice, dates, fish, and

*One alleged Omani legacy to Portuguese culture was Muscatel wine, the product of grapes originally grown in Oman.
Trade brought prosperity to coastal Oman during the Middle Ages. One of the earliest exports: frankincense from Dhufar, valued throughout the Middle East and Asia as a medicine and perfume.

horses all flowed through Muscat. Armed with modern cannon, the vessels of the Ya’aribah fleet—often Indian-built copies of European warships—collected a tax from all seaborne traffic in the Gulf and extended the imamate’s sway from Bahrain to the Swahili coast of East Africa. Wealth from this maritime empire went into a rash of building projects—the round fort at Nizwa, the elaborately carved and painted palace at Jabrin, and restoration of the falaj system.

Once again, however, the old medieval pattern reasserted itself. Ibadi religious leaders criticized the hereditary, increasingly cosmopolitan and wealthy Ya’aribah regime. Disagreements sparked a 20-year tribal war, with the Persians intervening, hoping to take over Muscat’s trade.

Only in 1749 was Ahmad bin Sa’id Al Bu Sa’id, progenitor of today’s ruling Al Bu Sa’id dynasty, able to unite the country’s warring tribes and expel the Persians. (Ahmad effectively ended the threat by slaughtering Persian emissaries during a banquet celebrating a peace treaty.) The focus of Omani history shifted from the interior to Muscat. Ahmad bin Sa’id Al Bu Sa’id’s descendants, temporarily losing control of the interior, relinquished the title of imam, but they consolidated Muscat as the premier port in the Persian Gulf.

“There are at present such immense quantities of goods in this
town,” wrote Abraham Parsons of the English Levant Company in 1755, “that...there are not warehouses to contain half of them.” The hinterland tribes, meanwhile, were left to their own devices and suffered a series of incursions from Saudi Arabia.

This cycle of Omani history might have continued had not events in Europe dictated otherwise. The struggle between Great Britain and Napoleon’s France spilled across the Mediterranean to Egypt, which was invaded by French forces in 1798. Soon the western Indian Ocean became a war zone, as French and British ships did battle in numerous engagements. With its strategic location and good harbor, noted historian J. B. Kelly, Muscat itself “was admirably suited to serve Bonaparte as a rendezvous or staging point, should he decide to move upon India.” Indeed, Muscat already had ties to the French on the island of Mauritius, an important market for the slave trade. Alarmed, the British dispatched diplomats to Muscat in 1798 to conclude an agreement with Sultan bin Ahmad. He gladly pledged his friendship to the British, especially after they promised to send him a physician and increased the amount of salt that his ships could sell to the British East India Company. The French were kept out.

**Off to Zanzibar**

Sultan died from a musket wound incurred in a fight against pirates in 1804. After a two-year struggle, Sa’id bin Sultan (Sultan’s son) came to power by murdering his uncle. To his biographer ibn Ruzaiq, Sa’id was “the happiest of rulers, who attained quiet prosperity and perennial glory...conquered with the sword hitherto unknown countries, and made a straight road over the dismembered necks of the rebellious.” In reality, Muscat declined during Sa’id’s rule, not least because his attempts to use the British to further Omani ends generally backfired.

Playing on British concern with piracy in the Gulf, Sa’id sought London’s aid against his Arab rivals. However, a joint Muscati-British attack in 1819 eventually resulted in British recognition of Sa’id’s competitors in what is now the United Arab Emirates, thus precluding his hopes of defeating them. Sa’id’s close alliance with the British also incited French attacks on Muscati shipping. Finally, the British themselves exerted mounting pressure on Sa’id to abolish the lucrative slave trade.*

Muscat’s economic fortunes suffered. Arriving in 1829, British traveler J. S. Buckingham described the port as “meanly built, having no good edifices in it, except the residence [of Sa’id].” Sa’id turned his

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*In 1873, the sultan issued a decree forbidding Omanis to import or export slaves; the institution of slavery was not formally abolished until 1963. But as Robert Landen has noted, “often the relation between master and slave was purely a formality, the slave working where he pleased and returning to his master a portion of his earnings.”
ambitions increasingly to East Africa, where during the 17th century the Ya’aribah imamate had helped Swahili rulers expel the Portuguese. By 1829, having conquered the Swahili coast (now Tanzania and Kenya), Sa’id had resolved to abandon Muscat in favor of Zanzibar. There, his clove plantations worked by the slaves whom he could no longer sell provided a handsome income, in a much more hospitable environment. Appointing a regent in Muscat, he put the port’s financial apparatus in the hands of Indian agents and tried to buy the cooperation of powerful local rivals.

In his absence, however, the situation at home deteriorated. An American consul sent to Muscat during the 1840s stayed only six months, complaining to Washington that there was no trade. Sa’id’s death in 1856 marked the demise of Oman’s days as a maritime power. For that matter, trade throughout the Gulf and the Indian Ocean was changing. The advent of European steamships, carrying European manufactured goods, wiped out much local industry and commerce or brought it under foreign control. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 hastened the process. By the beginning of the 20th century, even the cotton cloth used to make an Omani tribesman’s robes came from Lancastershire mills.

Sa’id’s death heightened British influence as the British government mediated the dispute among Sa’id’s sons over the succession. Under the 1861 Canning Award, Muscat and Zanzibar became independent sultanates; in compensation, Muscat was promised a substantial British-guaranteed subsidy from Zanzibar. But the British remained reluctant either to guarantee the survival of the Al Bu Sa’id regime or to assume direct control of Oman. When tribal forces led by a revived imamate succeeded in briefly taking over Muscat, the British did little but express worry over the possible abuse of British nationals and withhold payment of the Zanzibar subsidy.

**Drifting into Isolation**

Ever in need of cash, the sultans in Muscat depended on the British-controlled payments from Zanzibar to keep their governments solvent. By 1895, J. T. Bent, a British traveler, could assert that “unquestionably our own political agent may be said to be the ruler in Muscat.” When a sultan sought to free himself of British domination, as when Faysal flirted with the French in the 1890s, London took appropriate action. In 1899, Faysal was ordered to board a British gunboat in Muscat harbor and informed that if he did not promptly break an agreement giving a coaling station to the French, his palace would be bombarded. The agreement was cancelled. In 1912 Britain also forced the Muscat government to end its profitable arms trade with the Persians and Afghans, granting in return a new subsidy that bound the sultans even more closely to the British.
Contributing to British dominance was the inability of Muscat’s sultans to protect themselves against frequent tribal attacks. The clerics and tribal leaders of the interior, determined to restore an Ibadi imamate that better embodied the old religious values, launched a strong uprising in 1913. Worried that Muscat would fall, Britain sent a detachment of Indian Army troops to defend the port. Seven hundred well-entrenched infantrymen beat back an assault by 3,000 tribesmen in 1915. The two sides began negotiations, but it took an economic blockade of the interior by Muscat and the assassination of the imam before Sultan Taymur bin Faysal, represented in the talks by the British, and Imam Muhammad bin ’Abd Allah al-Khalili were able to reach an agreement. In the so-called Treaty of Sib (1920), sultan and imam each agreed not to interfere with the affairs of the other. If not strictly in a legal sense, Muscat and Oman became, in fact, separate countries.

During the next 35 years Oman and Muscat remained at peace. Sultan Taymur was a reluctant ruler who sought only to abdicate and retire in peace to India. The British would not allow him to do so until Taymur’s son Sa’id had reached maturity. They pressured Taymur to modernize the Sultanate’s finances, provide the rudiments of modern ministerial government, and establish a local defense force—the Muscat Levies—to replace Britain’s Indian garrison.

The Omani Council of State (1928), including Bertram Thomas, Sultan Taymur bin Faysal’s finance minister. More intent on exploring than administering Oman, Thomas, known as the wazir (adviser), resigned in 1931.
"A TYRANNY OF INDIFFERENCE"

"The people shall not have what they want," Sultan Sa'id bin Taymur once said, "but what I think is good for them." Educated at a British school for princes in India, and speaking three foreign languages, Sa'id bin Taymur nonetheless kept his countrymen trapped in almost medieval ignorance and poverty for 38 years. He subjected them to what John Townsend, one of his former advisers, called "a tyranny of indifference."

Outside the Women's Hospital in Muscat, modern medicine was virtually unknown in Oman. As Sa'id put it, "If we build clinics, many more will survive, but for what? To starve?" Public education consisted of three state-run primary schools. Sa'id's reasoning: "I cannot afford to pay good teachers." Religious conservatism led him to restrict public singing, smoking, and the carrying of dolls. He insisted that Omanis wishing to import cars, build stone houses, or travel across the land first secure his permission. That in itself was no easy matter, for only a handful of officials had a radio link to his palace in Salalah.

Yet for all Sa'id's austerity, most foreigners who met him agreed with Colonel David Smiley, commander of the Omani armed forces, who found him a man of "quiet dignity and almost irresistible charm."

The sultan's frugality is best explained by what happened to his father, Sultan Taymur bin Faysal. Sa'id had watched as his father went into hock to Hindu merchants. He saw that the British would repay his father's loans, but only at a price. ("If the Sultan is in our debt," said British Resident Percy Cox in 1916, "we are in a stronger position to guide Muscat affairs.") Sa'id vowed that Oman, to retain its autonomy, would enjoy only what it could afford.

To Sa'id, penury was sound politics. Education was expensive—and risky. "That is why [the British] lost India," observed Sa'id, "because [they] educated the people." Surveying the Middle East, he noted that high expectations usually led to trouble. Citing the case of Egypt, where in 1952 young army officers led by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser toppled King Farouk I, Sa'id said to Colonel Smiley: "All revolutions in the Arab world are led by colonels. That is why I employ you. I am having no Arab colonels in my Army."

Unfortunately for Sa'id, his faith in British officers was misplaced. After Oman began to export oil in 1967, Sa'id's British advisers—worried about a growing insurgency in Dhufar—urged rapid economic reforms. But the sultan balked, little realizing that his refusal paved the way for British support of his son, Qabus, who ousted his father in July 1970.
In 1931 Taymur was permitted to abdicate in favor of his son Sa'id, who immediately adopted the policies that characterized his regime until its downfall in 1970: direct control over the various branches of government and an economic policy of rigid austerity [see box, facing page]. Oman drifted into isolation.

By the mid-1950s, however, a new variable had entered the political equation—the promise of oil wealth. The first concession in Muscati territories had been granted to the British D'Arcy Exploration Company in 1924, but Imam Muhammad bin 'Abd Allah al-Khalili had steadfastly refused to permit geologists access to the interior. Matters came to a head in 1954 when the imam died. Although no oil had yet been discovered, Sa'id authorized Petroleum Development Oman (PDO), the consortium then managed by Shell Oil, to occupy Jabal Fahud, far in the interior. The Muscat and Oman Field Force (the oil company's own militia) went further and seized the town of 'Ibri, well within the imamate's domain. With aid from Saudi Arabia, the new imam, Ghalib bin Ali al-Hina'i, counterattacked. But by December 1955, Nizwa, the imam's capital, had fallen to the sultan's forces. Ghalib resigned as imam and retired to his home in Bilad Sait. Oman was unified.

Sa'id was able to savor his new-found eminence as sultan of Muscat and Oman only briefly. In May 1957, the supporters of the imamate, with weapons and supplies provided by Saudi Arabia, attempted to restore Ghalib. The Oman Revolutionary Movement (ORM) easily ousted Sa'id's garrisons from Nizwa and Bahla. Sa'id wrote to the British consul general requesting "the maximum military and air support which our friend Her Britannic Majesty's Government can give." In response, the British dispatched a company of Scottish Cameronians and provided Royal Air Force support, forcing the ORM rebels to take refuge on the Jabal al-Akhdar (Green Mountain). A sheer limestone massif, with a large plateau at 6,000 feet and peaks rising nearly twice as high, the Jabal al-Akhdar made an ideal haven for the imamate's guerrillas.

Waiting for Oil

On the diplomatic front, a vigorous propaganda effort based in Cairo managed to get the "Oman Question" on the United Nations Assembly agenda in 1957. In July 1958 Sa'id again called for British help. Britain, under increasing criticism in the UN, agreed to step in, but only after the sultan promised to reform his medieval kingdom. It was all done in the old imperial style. The Sultan's Armed Forces were reorganized by British advisers and officers. Two squadrons of Britain's elite Special Air Service, airlifted from Malaya, stormed the Jabal al-Akhdar in January 1959 and captured the imam's headquarters. Ghalib and other leaders escaped, eventually to settle in Saudi
Arabia. Leaderless, the rebellion soon dissolved.

Sa‘id considered his victory Pyrrhic at best. The oil explorations that had inspired the conflict had discovered no oil. He had gone into debt to finance the war and had been compelled by the British to begin what he considered to be a frivolous economic development program. Fed up, Sa‘id retired to the isolation of Salalah, Dhufar’s chief city, never again to set foot in Muscat.

To most rural Omanis, the sultan’s difficulties mattered little. Their daily concerns did not extend beyond their virtually self-sufficient villages. Living in houses of sunbaked mud brick or burasti (palm fronds), drawing their water from the falaj, they subsisted on a diet of dates, limes, dried fish from the coast, or rice imported from India, supplemented occasionally by goat, mutton, and tinned fruit from Muscat. Contact with the outside world was minimal. There were no radios, TVs, newspapers—not even a postal system.

‘A Little Trouble’

Affairs of state were the concern of tribal sheiks, who served as the intermediaries between the people and Sa‘id bin Taymur’s walis (governors) in the larger towns. Justice, regulated by Muslim law, was administered by qadis, like the walis known more for their greed than their ethics. The sultan accepted their venality. As he saw it, “to do otherwise would require that I pay them a salary.” The rudiments of a Koranic education were provided to village boys by religious scholars, who might also dispense good-luck charms or apply hot irons to the sick.

Not surprisingly, Sa‘id’s move to Salalah failed to eliminate his political problems. Prior to his accession, Dhufar had been only loosely bound to the rest of Oman. “The people,” commented Bertram Thomas, Sultan Taymur’s finance minister, “composed of warlike and rival tribes, have always found law and order irksome.” They were to find Sa‘id’s rule irksome indeed. According to John Townsend, one of Sa‘id’s former advisers, the sultan treated the Dhufaris as if he were “a harsh Victorian nanny, save that his punishments tended ultimately to be fatal.” The Dhufaris reacted by attacking oil company facilities and ambushing army patrols. By 1965, the rebels had formed themselves into the Dhufar Liberation Front (DLF). In April 1966, DLF agents infiltrated Sa‘id’s bodyguard and attempted to assassinate him. They missed. Sa‘id promptly telephoned a nearby army camp and told a British officer there that “we seem to be having a little trouble down at the Palace and I wonder if you would be so good as to come down.”

Marxist radicals dominated the DLF by 1968, turning a quasi-nationalist struggle against Al Bu Sa‘id despotism into a leftist revolution. Following a familiar Third World script, the DLF became the
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). Its adherents began to receive military training, AK-47 automatic rifles, and Katyushka rockets from the USSR, China, and Iraq. South Yemen, newly independent (1967) and a Soviet ally, provided bases and other facilities. Although PFLOAG did not attract much of a following among the region’s Jibali tribesmen, by 1970 its guerrillas controlled Dhufar’s mountains and much of the coast.

The only good news for Sa’id was the discovery of oil at Fahud in 1964 and the beginning of exports in August 1967. With annual production near 100 million barrels, the Omanis now had enough money to launch a real development program. It came too late for Sa’id. For almost four decades, his guiding principle in financial matters was that Oman did without what Oman could not afford. Therefore, Oman did without almost everything. Even Sa’id’s isolation from his people was explained in financial terms; the gifts and banquets required of a proper Arab ruler would have been too great a drain on the treasury. Hated by his subjects for his meanness and petty restrictions, Sa’id in turn despised the Omanis for their backwardness and opposition to his rule. When the money came in, Sa’id permitted work to begin on a few projects—a new hospital, a modern harbor, and an international airport—but progress was slow, too slow.

Opposition to Sa’id spread. In early 1970 a National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf emerged, staging
mortar attacks on Nizwa and Izki. Another group, the Arab Action Party, was formed in Ru’us al-Jibal. It became apparent to pro-Western critics of Sultan Sa’id that a change had to be made. The focus of their hopes was the 29-year-old crown prince, Qabus bin Sa’id.

Born in November 1940 to Sa’id’s Dhufari wife, Qabus’s early years were spent in Salalah. In 1958, like many another Arab prince, he was sent off to boarding school in England, and thence to the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. After a brief stint with the Cameronians in West Germany, training in municipal administration, and a world tour, he returned to Salalah in 1964. There, the future sultan was kept under virtual house arrest, compelled to study Islamic law, and denied contact with all outsiders except a few of Sa’id’s trusted British advisers.

Worried that Oman would go the way of Marxist South Yemen, even some of the Britons began to conspire with Qabus. On July 23, 1970, a group of soldiers commanded by Buraik bin Hamud al-Ghafiri, son of the governor of Dhufar, entered Sultan Sa’id’s apartment in the palace. After a brief gun battle (Buraik was shot in the stomach, Sa’id in the foot), the sultan was arrested.* On July 26, the new Sultan Qabus made his first national radio broadcast, informing his subjects—few of whom had radios—of the coup.

The Dhufar War

“When the post-coup tumult and shouting had died,” wrote Townsend, “and the heady euphoria of the old sultan’s departure had abated, it came to be realized that Oman had no government, no plans for the future, no people able to take office and make clear and firm decisions.”

Qabus’s uncle (and Sa’id’s brother) Tariq bin Taymur was called back from self-imposed exile in West Germany to serve as prime minister. But jealousy and distrust between the two men ultimately led to Tariq’s resignation. Qabus assumed full control. After 1971 Qabus’s government, while involved in a much greater range of activities than under Sultan Sa’id, exhibited many of the characteristics of the ancien régime. The new sultan relied heavily on expatriates, especially in military and economic affairs, and traditional Al Bu Sa’id family retainers. Furthermore, he remained isolated from his subjects, very much in the manner of the Al Bu Sa’id Sultanate.

But unlike his father, Qabus immediately tapped the country’s oil wealth for schools, hospitals, roads, electrification, and radio and color television service. He established ministries for labor, health, and education, among others. Unfortunately, as a 1974 World Bank report noted, “the development effort [was] unavoidably ad hoc and largely uncoordinated.” Before securing the sultan’s approval for

*Taken by RAF plane to England, Sa’id died in exile in his suite at Claridge’s two years later.
their projects, ministers would rarely check to see if the necessary money was available. Newly rich, the country grew newly indebted. World Bank technical assistance and the establishment of a planning council helped to put Oman’s financial house in order by 1975.

These political and economic difficulties stemmed in part from Qabus’s priorities during his first five years—winning the Dhufar war. The conflict received little attention in the Western media. Not only were few journalists allowed in to cover the war, but events elsewhere in the Middle East—the 1973 Yom Kippur War, for example—proved more riveting. And with the pro-Western shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in control of Iran, the Gulf seemed secure. Yet even the shah recognized the danger posed by the Dhufar uprising, dispatching a brigade of paratroopers to help out his ally in Oman. Qabus devoted almost all of his attention to the conflict, frequently visiting his British-led troops to cheer them on.

One of Qabus’s first acts was to offer a general amnesty to all enemies of his father, particularly those in Dhufar. He began an ambitious hearts-and-minds campaign among the Jibali, building wells, roads, and schools. Between 1971 and 1975, Dhufar, with its population of about 50,000, received almost one-quarter of the funds spent on development. Surrendering guerrillas were retrained by the Special Air Service and turned into an irregular unit—the firqat. Meanwhile, the 10,000 men of the Sultan’s Armed Forces, led by British contract officers, concentrated on cutting supply lines between the roughly 2,000 rebels and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. RAF Strikemaster ground support aircraft flew missions from the RAF bases at Salalah and the island of al-Masirah. In 1973–74, with the arrival of Jordanian engineers and the Iranian paratroopers, government forces went after the guerrillas in the mountains.

By 1975, Brigadier John Akehurst, commander of the sultan’s Dhufar Brigade, could report that “Dhufar is now ready for civil development.” At the National Day celebrations in 1976 Qabus announced to his nation and the world that Oman was reunited and at peace. Oman’s new era could begin in earnest.
A NEW DAWN?

by Mark N. Katz

At the entrance to the Persian Gulf lies Oman's Musandam Peninsula, a fissured mass of black rock. Deep fjords cut into the land, their sheer sides rising out of the water as high as 5,000 feet. Largely devoid of shrubs or trees, the peninsula's interior consists of rows of wind-worn ridges, interrupted only by jagged peaks.

Sovereignty over the Musandam, barren as it may be, has made Oman a nation of paramount importance. On a clear day, the peninsula's Shihuh tribesmen, herding goats near their stone huts, can gaze across the Strait of Hormuz and see the brown hills of Iran, two dozen miles away. Nautical charts of the strait show two 2.5-mile wide navigational channels, 30–50 fathoms deep, in Omani waters between Iran and the peninsula. Marking their approximate midway point are the two Quoins, islands named by European sailors after the wedges once used to elevate ships' cannon.

In 1986, flying Liberian, Panamanian, or Japanese flags, roughly 15 to 20 tankers transited outward bound through the strait every day. Some of the VLCCs (very large crude carriers) are 1,000 feet long; each can carry as much as 1.8 million barrels of Gulf oil, or about 11 percent of U.S. average daily oil consumption in 1986. All told, about 14.5 percent of the world's petroleum production (from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf states) passed through the strait, supplying Japan with 55 percent of its oil and Western Europe with 25 percent.

Long a choke-point for Persian Gulf trade, the strait has preoccupied the West since the 1979 fall of the shah of Iran. The Ayatollah Khomeini now controls the narrow passage's northern shores. Worse, the border war between Iran and Iraq led, in 1986 alone, to more than 60 air attacks on vessels in the Gulf. Insurance rates for ships traveling above the 24th parallel have tripled since the outbreak of hostilities in 1980. Neither belligerent has yet tried to close the strait, but Iran's President Ali Khamenei vowed in September 1985 that "not one drop of oil would be allowed to leave the other ports of the Gulf" if Iraqi bombing blocked Iranian oil exports.

To those European nations needing Middle East oil, Oman is one of the few bright spots in a region known for its turmoil. Unlike the neighboring People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, where heavy fighting between rival Marxist groups broke out last January, Oman is not riven by factional political struggles. Thanks to a relatively tolerant religious climate, Omanis do not engage in the sectarian
quarrels that can arise in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.

In many matters of foreign policy, Sultan Qabus bin Sa’id of Oman is the Gulf’s odd man out. Although Qabus and his ministers consult with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Oman is not a member of OPEC, nor of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. Alone among the Gulf’s leaders, Qabus endorsed the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. He also signed a June 1980 agreement that gives the United States limited access to Omani military facilities. Impressed, the New York Times hailed Oman in March 1985 as “Washington’s most reliable ally in the Gulf.”

That Oman would one day be a stable, staunch friend of the West seemed unlikely 18 years ago. In 1969, the 37th year of the reign of Sultan Qabus’s despotic father Sa’id bin Taymur, the country had to contend with a Communist-backed rebellion in southern
Dhufar province spurred, in part, by popular resentment over living conditions one step removed from the Middle Ages. Even in the capital of Muscat, running water and electricity were rare. Wearing eyeglasses and riding bicycles were among the many activities either forbidden or strictly controlled. With London’s backing, Qabus deposed his father on July 23, 1970. Then the young sultan and his British-trained army mopped up the Dhufar rebels. Proclaiming “a new dawn,” he began to build schools, roads, and hospitals where there once were none—an achievement that inspired the popular slogan, “Before Qabus, nothing.”

When ‘God’ Speaks

Even allowing for the ban on published criticism of the sultan, his popularity seems genuine enough. Most Omaniis, especially those old enough to have lived under Sultan Sa’id, appreciate what Qabus has done. They regard him with almost filial devotion. There is a Sultan Qabus University, a Sultan Qabus Mosque, and a Sultan Qabus Stadium. Yet Qabus has avoided the excesses of a formal cult of personality. Except during the annual National Day (November 18) celebrations, his face is not exalted, Mao-style, on billboards and buildings. The sultan is seen rarely in public, preferring, like his father, to stay at his palace in Salalah, capital of Dhufar province.

A picture taken of Qabus shortly after he came to power shows a slight, almost bashful man with an unkempt beard, wearing a long white dishdasha. Today, even as he favors traditional garb—the dishdasha is compulsory for Omani cabinet ministers—Qabus, his beard neatly trimmed, is as likely to be seen in military uniform. He has gotten over his initial shyness. Foreign visitors are put at ease by his charm, his hospitality, and his excellent English—acquired during a four-year stay in England, including two years at the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst. Indeed, with his spit-and-polish uniforms, his passion for military parades, his meticulous attention to protocol and ceremony, the sultan is no ordinary Gulf ruler. As he told an interviewer in 1972, “I hope that you are not forgetting that I am a military man and a Sandhurst graduate.”

The sultan is also an absolute monarch. For all Qabus’s attention to his people’s needs, observes John Townsend, a former British adviser to both Qabus and his father, “the prime objective of the...
Sultan, in political terms, can be expressed in one word: 'survival.' Initially reliant on British counselors, he now stands as master in his own house, serving as head of state, prime minister, and minister of defense, finance, and foreign affairs. Advice comes from a State Consultative Council, but its 55 members, drawn largely from the ranks of cabinet undersecretaries, merchants, and backcountry tribal leaders, have no legislative powers.

No detail is too small to escape his attention. He has been known to tour Muscat at night, ordering the owners of dirty cars fined and rubbish removed. His own government employees refer to him as "God." When I asked why, several of them responded, "because he is all powerful but nowhere to be seen."

As Sultan Qabus has steered his country into the 20th century, it is oil that has provided the necessary propulsion. In 1984, the petroleum sector accounted for 95 percent of all export earnings and 90 percent of government revenues. Oman's daily production, as high as 600,000 barrels in 1986, is modest in comparison to that of its two neighbors Saudi Arabia (4.7 million) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (1.4 million). Even so, oil has enabled the country to more than quadruple its gross domestic product (GDP) since 1976. In 1984, GDP per capita stood at $6,600, slightly below that of the
United Kingdom ($7,488), but much lower than that of Saudi Arabia ($13,250) and the UAE ($28,000).

This prosperity is evident as soon as one lands at Muscat’s Sib International Airport. Buick sedans, Datsuns, motor scooters, and the occasional Mercedes taxi cruise the four-lane highway leading to the capital. Tower cranes loom over the steel and concrete skeletons of new offices and apartment blocks. Overlooking the sea, the hillside homes in the wealthy suburb of Qurrn are worthy of southern California. Even the poorer quarters of Ruwi, greater Muscat’s outlying commercial district, lack the grinding poverty one finds in, say, Cairo: Almost all the tiny, one- or two-room dwellings have air conditioners to ease the discomfort of 100-degree summer temperatures.

Of Toyotas and Televisions

Set in a crescent of rugged brown hills, Muscat has seen substantial urban renewal. Two 16th-century Portuguese forts still flank the city’s waterfront, but many of the elaborate stone and wood townhouses built by well-to-do merchants were torn down in 1974 to make room for Qabus’s new downtown palace. Of the half-dozen or so that survive, one has been turned into a museum, another is used as the U.S. embassy. Most modern business enterprises have moved outside the old city walls, within which no building is higher than six stories. The capital’s narrow, winding streets have been widened. Part of its old suq (market) is now a parking lot. Those who crave its former bustle can go to the suq in the adjoining port of Matrah, where the air is thick with the shouts of vendors and the smell of fish and dates. Tucked into narrow, crowded alleys, tiny shops and stalls sell gold jewelry, silver coffee pots, and khanjars (ceremonial daggers worn by Omani men), as well as stereos, television sets, and bootlegged video cassettes.

Muscat and its satellites of Matrah and Ruwi (total pop. 220,000) boast a higher standard of living than do the towns and villages of the interior, home to roughly half of Oman’s one million inhabitants. But the hinterland gets its share of consumer goods. When I arrived in Nizwa (pop. 15,000), some 100 miles southwest of Muscat, tribesmen were selling goats in the marketplace adjacent to the town’s 17th-century fort. Parked nearby under placards advertising Pepsi-Cola was a row of Toyota pickup trucks and Land Rovers.

More important, however, than cars, trucks, televisions, and stereos has been the steady improvement in the average Omani’s health and education. In fact, after almost four decades of imposed penury and isolation under Sultan Sa’id, Omanis can reel off “progress” statistics not matched by many countries. In 1970, the entire country had three schools with 909 male students (often hand-picked by the sultan himself), one hospital with 12 beds, and 10
Sultan Qabus's downtown palace now takes up much of old Muscat's waterfront, but the atmosphere of Matrah's suq is unchanged. Fifteen years ago, Ruwi, seen here with the highway leading to Sib International Airport, boasted only a few modern buildings amid its mud brick huts.

kilometers of paved roads. Now some 200,000 students (79,300 of them female) attend 590 schools, hospital beds number 2,587, and the road network stretches 3,308 kilometers. In the absence of radios, televisions, or newspapers, most Omanis heard of Qabus’s accession in 1970 by royal decrees posted on city walls or by word of mouth. Today, they can tune in to a color TV channel or two radio stations, or read six Arabic and three English-language papers.

As Ian Skeet, an oil executive in pre-1970 Oman, remarked after a 1983 return visit, “the Sultanate . . . is a different country set in the same surroundings.” My own two trips to Oman (December 1982 and February 1986) provided ample proof of progress. What I
saw, however, also pointed to the problems a society can encounter when it tries to jump, in the span of a decade or two, from medievalism to modernity. While much has been made of Oman's dramatic material transformation, much of its feudal framework remains intact.

To their credit, Qabus and his ministers have avoided many of the expensive mistakes made by Mexico, Venezuela, and other more advanced nations suddenly inundated by petrodollars. They have not tried to "buy" an industrial base overnight; nor have they relied overmuch on tomorrow's oil revenues to secure today's foreign loans. In 1980, Qabus began diverting 15 percent of annual gross petroleum revenues into a State General Reserve Fund—since used to cover annual budget deficits. Partly as a result, Oman enjoys an excellent reputation among international lenders.

Small Is Beautiful

Fiscal prudence is dictated by the limited size of Oman's proven oil reserves, estimated at four billion barrels in 1986. Small by comparison with Kuwait's 90 billion or the UAE's 33 billion—and barring future discoveries—they will last another 20-25 years at current production levels. Thus, while the UAE can afford to build seven jet airports—including two within 10 miles of one another—Oman cannot. "We don't really go... for prestige projects," said Minister of Information Abdul Aziz bin Mohammed al-Rowas in 1985. "We don't believe in them and we can't afford them."

Oman's largest nonpetroleum venture is a $213 million copper mine and smelter operated by the Oman Mining Company in Suhar. Other enterprises include the Oman and Raysut Cement Companies and the Rusail Industrial Estate, where small factories assemble water pumps, air conditioners, car batteries, furniture, and other items once imported from abroad. In 1984, manufacturing represented just three percent of Oman's GDP—insignificant, except that it had risen 41 percent since 1983. Construction and wholesale and retail trade have also helped to whittle down oil's share of the GDP from 61 percent in 1980 to 46 percent in 1984.

The oil industry provides cash but not many jobs for Omanis. The government (60 percent), Royal Dutch Shell (34 percent), Compagnie Française des Pétroles (four percent), and Partex (two percent) make up the Petroleum Development Oman consortium. It accounts for more than 95 percent of Oman's oil production but employed fewer than 5,000 Omanis in 1982.

Most Omanis, like their forebears, are fishermen and farmers. With its interior and fertile Batinah coastal plain suited to dates, limes, alfalfa, wheat, and sorghum, and its waters rich in kingfish, tuna, skipjacks, and sardines, Oman is one of the few Gulf states with the potential to both feed itself and export food. (After oil, Oman's
most valuable exports are frozen fish, copper, and limes.) The Bank for Agriculture and Fisheries (opened in 1981) has provided loans for seeds and fertilizer, subsidized the construction of jetties and harbors, and purchased outboard motors and new boats.

Yet despite this official encouragement, more and more Omanis are abandoning their fields and wooden dhows for the (relatively) bright lights of the capital. A 1977 study of the agricultural community of 'Ibri showed that three-quarters of the male population between the ages of 14 and 40 had left; nearly half of these men took low-ranking posts in the security forces, a quarter were unemployed, and almost all the rest worked as occasional laborers or messengers in government offices. Self-sustaining in food a generation ago, Oman had to import an estimated 90 percent of its wheat and 40 percent of its vegetables and meat in 1980.

Ironically, improvements in farming technology may be hastening the rural exodus. Crucial to rural society has been the intricate falaj irrigation network; villagers share responsibility for coping with seasonal variations in the water supply, maintaining canals, and distributing individual “shares” of water. The introduction of mechanical pumps is now lowering Oman’s water table; the pumps suck up water faster than it can be replaced. And because only the wealthier farmers can afford pumps, the gap between rich and poor is growing.

**Investments in Switzerland**

Further loosening local bonds has been the beneficence of the Qabus regime. New schools and health clinics have displaced such institutions as the waqf, a system of religiously organized charities that provided funds for the upkeep of mosques, education, the poor, and orphans. “The growth of a welfare state . . .,” writes Oxford geographer John Wilkinson, “administered by a remote central government, is replacing self-help and . . . communal responsibility.”

It is also replacing tribal authority. Where rural Omanis once relied on their sheiks for help or protection, they increasingly turn to the sultan’s wali (governor) or to local municipal councils.* As for the sheiks themselves, Qabus has sought to pry them from their followers with money and patronage. “These days,” said a civil servant quoted in the Economist, “the tribal leader does not want to know about the problem of one bedu who has lost his camel. He is more interested in his investments in Switzerland or his job in Muscat.”

These changes, social and otherwise, have been felt most strongly in Oman’s interior, historically more isolated and conservative than the coastal regions. Not surprisingly, some customs and

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*While Oman is governed by Islamic law, the qadi, who arbitrates according to the book (i.e. the Koran), is losing much of his power to the Royal Omani Police, who are now responsible for handling everything from traffic violations to murders.
traditions have been easier to alter than others. Bedouin women, for example, may be grateful that doctors now check them for trachoma, an eye disease striking 95 percent of the population as late as 1975. But some remain reluctant to remove the **burqa** (face mask) for the examination. For its part, the government has been prudent in such matters. "It is a mistaken policy to impose things," noted Qabus in 1985. "They must be allowed to evolve quite normally."

In general, however, the inhabitants of both the interior and the coast have taken to modernity with better grace than some of their counterparts elsewhere in the Gulf. Paolo Costa, an Italian anthropologist who has spent more than 20 years in the Middle East, put it thus: "If I wanted to take a picture of an Iraqi and his camel, the Iraqi would want to smash the camera because I was an imperialist looking down on him for being primitive. In Oman...the man will tell you, 'Yes, fine-looking beast isn't it? The Omanis are utterly secure in their sense of who they are.'"

Social mores tend to be more relaxed in Oman than in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, where, for example, the sale or consumption of liquor is completely forbidden. But in Oman, thirsty foreigners can go to bars in the Al-Bustan Palace, the Muscat Intercontinental, or other hotels. Omani women also enjoy much greater freedom, shopping at the **suq** in Matrah, Nizwa, or 'Ibri without veils and wearing brightly colored shawls. Some work as secretaries, teachers, factory hands, even policewomen.

**The U.K. Connection**

Omani women enjoy unusual opportunities in part because their country faces a chronic labor shortage. The population is growing at an annual average rate of three percent, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor now runs 10 vocational training centers. But Oman is still short of native mechanics, engineers, electricians, doctors, and teachers. From 1981 to 1985, as the economy grew, the number of foreigners employed in Oman rose by 64 percent. Egyptian and Jordanian teachers, Sri Lankan maids, Filipino nurses, Pakistani merchants, and Indian doctors and bureaucrats made up most of the 270,000 foreign workers who, in 1985, filled about two-thirds of all private sector jobs and one-third of those in the public sector.

If Omanis do not resent the presence of so many foreigners, it is because they are seen as necessary, or because they do the undesirable chores. But the presence of expatriate senior advisers, mostly British, in key ministries is another matter. Educated Omanis are anxious for these "expats," as the elite foreign group is known, to move on, and leave the directing of the country to its native sons.

The British presence has diminished since the early 1970s. Once-powerful royal counselors have gone home. But the British and
THE UNITED STATES AND OMAN

Few Arab nations boast such long-standing ties to the United States as Oman. After Sa'id bin Sultan signed a Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1833, Oman became the second Arab country (Morocco was the first, in 1787) to establish diplomatic relations with the young Republic. Seven years later, Sa'id sent his 20-gun corvette Sultana to New York, bearing the first Arab envoy to the United States and gifts—including two stud horses and a gold-mounted sword—for President Martin Van Buren.

Despite the fact that unruly New Yorkers delighted in pulling the beards of the Sultana's crewmen, relations between the two countries got off to a cordial start. But only with the accession of Sultan Qabus bin Sa'id did Oman and the United States become close allies as well. In April 1980, for example, Oman served as a staging point for the ill-fated attempt to rescue the American hostages held in Iran.

Qabus sees the United States as a valuable ally against Soviet expansionism. To the Pentagon, Oman is a valuable logistical link for the forces of its Central Command, responsible for any future operations in the Persian Gulf. In June 1980, after being rebuffed by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the Carter administration secured Qabus's approval of a treaty that grants the United States access to Omani military facilities, as well as permission to pre-position munitions and other supplies. In return, Washington promised to upgrade four Omani bases at Khasab on the Musandam Peninsula, al-Sib near Muscat, Thamarit in the interior, and the island of al-Masirah.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers completed its work—valued at $300 million—in 1985. Most of it was done at al-Masirah, built up by the British Royal Air Force during the 1930s and used as a training base during World War II. Its airstrip now has 12,000-foot runways—long enough for B-52 bombers—and storage tanks that hold six million gallons of jet fuel. A refueling stop for ships of the U.S. Sixth and Seventh fleets, the island sometimes serves as a base for antisubmarine reconnaissance flights by the U.S. Navy's P-3 Orions.

Qabus knows the 1980 treaty does not please some of his Arab brethren (notably Kuwait). He has stressed that U.S. forces can be introduced only "at the request of the majority of the Gulf Cooperation Council states in case of a direct threat which they cannot repulse with their own forces." But the rules are sometimes bent. In 1984, U.S. commandos visited Oman to monitor the hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner—an episode the Omanis officially deny.

Still, Washington has been careful to act with discretion. Mindful of the hostility engendered by a large U.S. presence in pre-revolutionary Iran, the United States maintains only a small military mission in Muscat. And while Qabus has said that he will not renew the current agreement (which runs until 1990), he seems relatively happy with the way things now stand. Indeed, in 1985 Minister of Information Abdul Aziz bin Mohammed al-Rowas told the Wall Street Journal that the U.S.-Omani accord could be "a model for a relationship between a superpower and a Third World nation."
Omanis have not ended what British ambassador Duncan Slater called in 1985 their "broad, deep relationship." Almost 11,000 Britishers work in Oman as engineers, architects, bankers, businessmen, or consultants. British officers serve as chief of the Defense Staff, commander of the air force, and commander of the navy.* (Only in 1984 was an Omani appointed commander of the army.) Some 1,000 seconded and contract British officers are in the armed forces, and their countrymen are prominent in the intelligence services.

Business As Politics

The British influence is felt in less formal ways as well. Those Omans rich enough to do so spend their vacations in London, where many own second homes. Although more Omani students now go to the United States for university training, a degree from Cambridge or Oxford commands greater respect. And if anyone hopes that, in Oman, there'll always be an England, it is Qabus himself. A dedicated Anglophile, he has flown in the London Symphony Orchestra for National Day, and played host to the Prince of Wales and his wife last November. He owns a country house in Berkshire. According to the London Financial Times, his palaces in Salalah and al-Sib are stocked with pieces of Crown Derby china on side tables and volumes of Wilde, Dickens, and Fielding in bookcases. He likes to give his British friends a helping hand. Reportedly at Qabus’s insistence, a British company, Airworks Limited, got half of a $50 million defense contract slated to go to the Vinnell Corporation, a U.S. firm.

In Oman, "conflict of interest," as American reformers know it, is an alien concept.† Unlike Saudi Arabia, where political power is concentrated among members of the ruling Saud family, in Oman only five of 23 members of the cabinet belong to Qabus’s Al bu Sa’id dynasty. Most ministers are businessmen first and public servants second. The most talented are by no means the most powerful. As Roger Matthews, Middle East editor of the Financial Times, has noted, the "power wielded by an individual minister ... relate[s] to his rapport with Sultan Qabus, rather than to the weight of argument he can marshal in cabinet."

Some ministers have not hesitated to turn the sultan’s absolute power to their own profit. In 1974, for example, the minister of communications requested a “minute” of the sultan after a ministerial meeting. Without a formal, detailed presentation, he convinced

*The sultan’s troops are widely acknowledged as among the best in the Gulf. Well trained and well equipped, the 16,500-man army, 3,000-man air force, and 2,000-man navy were allotted 46 percent of the national budget in 1985.

†A case in point: In July 1986, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission charged the Ashland Oil Company with paying one of Qabus’s closest advisers $29 million in bribes to secure an oil concession in 1980-83.
Qabus to grant permission for a $57 million desalination and electricity facility (which would also water the gardens in the sultan's new palace). According to John Townsend, the final bill for the plant—including, of course, the minister's commission—came to $300 million. Since 1981, the State Consultative Council has helped to curb such extravagances. For his part, Qabus has warned his ministers that "your business must not interfere with your service to your government and your people." But the sultan devotes more attention to military matters than to financial affairs, and he seems to have abandoned a 1982 attempt to draft a law regulating cabinet officials' participation in private ventures.

Qabus has spoken often of "the happy day... when more people will take responsibilities from my shoulders." In 1979, he told a *Time* correspondent, "I'd like to see us create a democracy for Oman, and I sincerely hope that day is not too far distant." Almost eight years later, he still shows little eagerness to yield real power, or to make his government more democratic. Unlike his counterparts in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Qabus does not hold a regular majlis, an informal conference in which ordinary citizens can present petitions and air their grievances. Instead, Omanis must wait for the two or
three times a year when Qabus sets off in a caravan to tour the land and meet with his subjects.

Some educated Omanis worry about Qabus's reliance on one-man rule. Most Omanis, however, seem to care more about whether the sultan will produce an heir—and thus continuity and stability—than about questions of participatory democracy. (His 1976 marriage to his uncle Tariq bin Taymur's daughter ended without child.) Qabus's autocratic reign is largely benevolent: There is no significant political opposition, underground or otherwise; Amnesty International knows of no political prisoners. If Qabus can continue to deliver economic gains to his subjects, he will likely encounter only occasional grumbling about his policies.

Empty Beaches

Thus, Oman's petrodollars have buttressed Oman's political stability. But what oil giveth it can just as easily take away: The global oil glut dropped the price of Omani crude from $27.35 per barrel in January 1986 to $8.20 per barrel seven months later. Not bound by OPEC's policies, Oman compensated by pumping more oil. Even so, oil revenues for 1986 will probably be half those of 1985. Qabus has cut government spending by 10 percent across the board and devalued the riyal against the dollar by the same amount. Projects called for under the third Five Year Plan (1986–90) have been canceled or delayed. Said Ahmad Makki, undersecretary of commerce and industry: "It is hard to plan what to spend when you don't know what your revenues will be."

Added to this uncertainty are the vicissitudes of foreign policy. True, Qabus does not have to worry overmuch about the remaining rebels in Dhufar, now no more than a handful. The rebels no longer receive support from the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, with whom Oman exchanged nonresident ambassadors in 1985. But Oman occupies a peculiar perch in Middle East politics. Qabus is seen as an outsider by the sheiks and princes of the upper Gulf. The sultan's closest ties are to King Hussein of Jordan and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak. Unlike his fellow Arabs, he is more likely to speak of the "Soviet threat" than of the "Palestinian question," and he makes no secret of his pro-Western sentiments, as witness his current close relations with the United States [see box, p. 73].

Aware that some Arabs criticized Oman as a "client state" of the West, Qabus opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in September 1985—a move designed, as he remarked, to "keep people on their toes." He also believes that his control over internal matters stems to some degree from his ability to limit Oman's exposure to the outside world. Foreign newspapers, magazines, video tapes and the like are scrutinized carefully, and some are occasionally...
banned. Most visitors, whether Arab or Western, must obtain a No Objection Certificate, and despite the obvious attractions of Oman's pristine seashore and rugged mountains, tourism is next to nonexistent. "Our people," observed Minister of Information Abdul Aziz al-Rowas in April 1986, "are not ready for bare-breasted [European] women on the beaches."

Perhaps so, but there are signs that official xenophobia may be getting out of hand. In February 1986, a royal decree went into effect banning all marriages between Omanis and foreigners (except citizens of other Gulf countries). The minister of justice invoked the "many social problems" that would result from children being raised under foreign influences. But to Omanis long used to marrying Muslim women from Pakistan, Baluchistan, and India, the ruling came as a shock, its prohibitions reminiscent of the bad old days of Sultan Sa'id bin Taymur.

In 1972, Qabus said of his father: "He didn't believe in change. His thinking went back to an age which is not this present age. So he had to fall from power, and this is what happened." Much has changed in Oman since 1970. Yet as historian John Peterson argues, "the post-1970 era should not be viewed...as the abrupt departure from the past that slogans such as 'new dawn' would have it."

The Sultanate survives as one of the world's remaining absolute monarchies—akin to those in Saudi Arabia, Brunei, and Nepal. If anything, it is stronger than in times past. The notion of a benevolent autocracy may affront many Westerners. However, for a variety of cultural and historical reasons, the Arab Middle East is not about to embrace the tenets of, say, Swedish democracy. Of the six nations belonging to the Gulf Cooperation Council, only Kuwait has an elected body (the National Assembly)—and even that was suspended last July by Emir Jabir al-Sabah. But thanks largely to Qabus's stewardship, Oman has avoided the brutality, violence, and poverty that plague other Middle East nations variously inspired by Marxism, Arab socialism, or Islamic fundamentalism. In that respect, the years since 1970 represent an unqualified success story.
OMAN

"The people of Muscat seemed to me to be the cleanest, neatest, best-dressed, and most gentlemanly of all the Arabs that I had ever yet seen," recalled J. S. Buckingham, a British traveler, after a visit in 1816.

Buckingham's observations are preserved in historian J. B. Kelly's Britain and the Persian Gulf (Oxford, 1968), a survey of British involvement in the region from 1795 to 1880. As Kelly makes clear, Britain's ever-growing commercial and political interests in the Gulf ensured that Oman saw more than its share of British adventurers, diplomats, and journalists.

Men like James Welsted, an Indian Army officer in Oman in the early 19th century, and Samuel Miles, British political agent in Muscat (PAM) from 1872-76, brought British influence directly to bear on the Sultanate.

Welsted's Travels in Arabia (J. Murray, 1838), a classic description of Oman in the early 1800s, traces its author's route through the interior and along the coast. Miles, combining diplomacy with exploration, traveled widely as "PAM," recording his impressions of Omani history and culture in Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf (1919; Cass, 1966).


Readers in search of good general histories of Oman, however, will have to look hard. Maverick U.S. oilman and amateur archaeologist Wendell Phillips provides one of the few in Oman: A History (Reynal, 1967). Highly colorful, somewhat idiosyncratic, Phillips's account draws on Arab sources to describe such intervals in Omani history as the "pirate wars" at the turn of the 19th century. "The most troublesome pirate captain," writes Phillips, "was one Rahma bin Jaubir, the very type of the 'Barbary pirate' of fiction: he had the capture of entire fleets to his credit, he gave no quarter...his body and face were a mass of disfiguring scars."

Buccaneering aside, tribes have always supplied the structure for Omani economic and social life, and Tribes in Oman (Peninsular, 1982) by J. R. L. Carter describes them. Carter, a former tribal liaison officer for Petroleum Development Oman (PDO), outlines one fundamental division that persists in modern-day Oman: "the old rivalry between the town or hadir tribes, and the desert or bedu tribes." The bedu like to tell a story about a townsman who, sleeping in the desert for the first time, thought that the stars were the Devil's eyes and died of fright.

Carter finds that, though they may deny it, townsfolk and nomads rely on each other in a patron-client relationship.

Interdependence has not always meant peaceful coexistence, as the Dhufar Rebellion (1963-75) proved. In polyglot Dhufar, under the sultan's direct administration only since 1880, "ferment had been a...pastime for hundreds of years," writes Brigadier John Akehurst in We Won a War (Russell, 1982), his chronicle of the assimilation of the isolated southern province.

Akehurst recalls the firqat (Jibali tribesmen recruited to fight for the sultan) and their enthusiasm for their new cause. When shown battle films, "chosen
mainly for their visual effect," the firqat would get so excited that they would fire their rifles at the screen.

Fortunately, northern Omani no longer say, 'If you see a snake and a Dhofari on your path, kill the Dhofari first,'" notes journalist Liesl Gratz in The Omanis: Sentinels of the Gulf (Longman, 1982). Gratz, in a rosy account of her own sojourns in contemporary Oman, argues that modernization has not yet destroyed the Omanis' traditional patterns of life.

In Suhar the oil boom has changed the lives of the inhabitants only slowly. Anthropologist Unni Wikan's Behind the Veil in Arabia (Johns Hopkins, 1982) pictures the enduring separation of the sexes: Suhar divides "into male and female spheres, roughly commensurate with the public and private domains." Outside the home, Suhari women wear the burqa (face mask) as "a secluding and beautifying device," to them no more a symbol of oppression than a blouse is to a Western woman.

Based on contacts with Suhari women inside their homes, Wikan's book also discusses the xaniths, transsexual male prostitutes who style themselves women and are accepted as such by both sexes.

As tolerance of the xaniths suggests, the old and the new may not be the polar opposites that many Westerners assume. J. E. Peterson argues in Oman in the Twentieth Century (Barnes & Noble, 1978) that even now "the new face of the country's politics [is] firmly rooted in pre-1970 foundations." Oil executives, for example, often rely on prominent sheiks, traditional arbiters, to act as intermediaries between the company and its tribal workers.

Even so, since Qabus's coup, the Omani regime has been "trying very hard to put a modern image before its own people and the world," comments John Townsend, former British adviser to Qabus, in Oman: The Making of a Modern State (St. Martin's, 1977). Remarkably candid, the book has been banned in Oman because of its mixed review of Qabus's government.

To Townsend, one of the more glaring failures of Qabus's regime is its failure to organize a system of water conservation and management. Qabus's top advisers apparently believe that it "is only a question of drilling [wells] in the right place"; as a result, "indiscriminate drilling and pumping" have caused irreversible damage to valuable ground water resources.

What happens to the "new" Oman depends as much on events outside its borders as decisions made within them. The Gulf states, argue the editors of The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey (Johns Hopkins, 1980), can be viewed as "a unit, with a common geography, history, economics, and culture." But political scientist David Long, in The Persian Gulf (Westview, rev. ed., 1978), thinks that differences predominate, with religious (Sunni versus Shi'a), ethnic (Persian versus Arab), and political (Marxist versus monarchist) schisms dividing the region.

Autocratic, multi-ethnic Oman will certainly feel the pull of other Gulf ideologies. But in Arabia, the Gulf and the West (Basic, 1980), J. B. Kelly emphasizes that the Omanis, looking to their long history, "have a tranquil pride which sets them apart." They are likely to defy easy prediction: "What the future holds for Oman is Oman's secret."

—Jennifer L. Howard

EDITOR'S NOTE: Jennifer L. Howard is copy editor of the Wilson Quarterly. Some of the titles in this essay were suggested by Calvin H. Allen, Jr. For related titles, see WQ Background Books essays on Saudi Arabia (Winter '79) and Energy: 1945-1980 (Spring '81).

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Ideas

THE USES AND ABUSES OF BIOLOGY

"I find it both depressing and amusing that so many of our intellectual efforts, though masquerading as attempts to understand nature, are really anodynes for justifying our hopes and calming our fears." So says Stephen Jay Gould, a noted Harvard scientist and popular author. For several years, he and his allies have been savaging sociobiologists—and particularly their dean, Edward O. Wilson, also of Harvard—as reactionary apologists for an unjust capitalist order; sociobiologists, in turn, have been no less hesitant to point to Gould's own leftist agenda. Where, one wonders, is pure science? Howard Kaye here argues that there is no such thing. In biology, at least, scientists' descriptions of how the natural world works inevitably draw upon personal views of how human society ought to be.

by Howard L. Kaye

Socrates told us that it is not to the trees or to the beasts of the country that we are to look for knowledge of how to live but rather to "the men who dwell in the city." Alas, poor Socrates lived in the days before the dramatic scientific breakthroughs associated with modern biology. Since the 1960s, such distinguished scientists as Konrad Lorenz, Jacques Monod, Francis Crick, and Edward O. Wilson have been spreading the good news to a surprisingly receptive public: Now, they proclaim, with our knowledge of the working of genes, the biology of animal behavior and social organization, and the machinery of the primate "mind," we can at last "biologize" the social sciences and moral philosophy.

The sweeping claims and enormous popular success of such works as Lorenz's *On Aggression* (1966), Monod's *Chance and Necessity* (1971), and particularly Wilson's *Sociobiology* (1975) and *On Human Nature* (1978), have provoked a torrent of passionate criticism [see "Sociobiology," *WQ*, Summer '77, Autumn '79]. Much of
the clamor has been misguided. Most critics focus on the potential political misuses of biology to justify sexism, racism, and economic inequality. Some, including Stephen Jay Gould and other members of the Science for the People group, have gone so far as to link contemporary efforts with the sort of pseudoscientific eugenics theories that "led to the establishment of gas chambers in Nazi Germany."

However effective polemically, such brown-shirt waving will not do. Sociobiology can be used to support any and all political positions, from the most revolutionary to the most reactionary. "Biophi-losophers" such as Lorenz and Wilson may indeed speculate about the biology of sex-role differences and of human aggression in ways that many find objectionable, but the critics are hardly rendered defenseless. The realm of nature is so vast and Darvinian fables so easily constructed that virtually any cause can find its mascot, any group its biological totem.

Critics, moreover, miss the main point when they attack the biophilosophers for their accounts of specific social patterns (e.g., genes for homosexuality or male dominance). In fact, the claims made by some recent biophilosophers are far more grand—nothing less, in some cases, than solutions to the remaining mysteries of life's origins,
workings, and ends. The biophilosophers propose to tell us who we are, what we can become, and what we must now do to live properly.

What is the status of such metaphysical and moral claims—science or speculation? What is their significance? And what exactly is the relationship between the legitimate scientific work of these biologists and the human implications or applications they claim to draw from that work?

Biologists Gould and Richard Lewontin and philosopher Philip Kitcher, though not alone, have been in the forefront of a movement that challenges human sociobiology on scientific grounds. They denounce its illogic and lack of rigor. Valid as such objections may be, they leave too many questions unanswered. How, for instance, can the same scientist be so rigorous in illuminating the behavior of macromolecules and slime molds and so fraudulent in studying our own molecules and behaviors? If so many otherwise exemplary scientists have strayed so badly along a path so fraught with danger, why have they done so at this particular historical juncture?

To most critics, such as Kitcher, the answer lies in the observation that contemporary biology (and biologists) have two faces—one legitimate, scientific, and admirable when addressing DNA and nonhuman animals, the other arrogant, unscientific, and potentially evil when studying man. In an increasingly conservative age, when Western democratic capitalism cannot make good on its promises of liberty, fraternity, and equality for all, biology's Mr. Hyde persona becomes attractive and useful, once again, as an ideological defense of the status quo in the West, as it allegedly has been since the days of "Spencerian social Darwinism."

In addition to substituting name-calling for analysis, the critics' argument obscures continuities that do exist between the nonhuman and human dimensions of these scientific works. Moreover, because critics have misunderstood past uses of biological theories in social thought ("the survival of the fittest" as capitalist "ideology," for example), they misunderstand their present significance as well.

If contemporary biophilosophers from Crick to Wilson have erred in viewing their analyses of human society as logically derived from objective and unambiguous scientific facts, their adversaries...
have been no less mistaken in branding all such efforts as "social Darwinism," that is, as a cruel ideological attempt to use biological ideas and analogies to explain and thereby justify existing social conditions by rendering them natural and inevitable. The critics seem to ignore the fact that such ideas can just as easily be used to denounce the existing social order as "unnatural" as to sanction it.

Indeed, since the publication of On the Origin of Species in 1859, Darwinian theory and other prominent biological principles have been used to support a wide range of political and economic possibilities from anarchism to totalitarianism, from laissez-faire capitalism to socialism. Contemporary Marxists in particular are all too prone to overlook Marx's and Engels's own use of Darwinism and Lamarckism to lend scientific authority to their social visions.*

The historical cliché of social Darwinism is of only limited value in illuminating both past and present social-biological efforts. Nevertheless, contemporary critics are right to remind us of the century-long debate that Darwinian theory has inspired.

Immediately upon its dissemination in 1859, Charles Darwin's theory of organic evolution by natural selection, like the more recent work of molecular biologists and sociobiologists, sparked wide debate among social and moral thinkers in the West. The weakening hold of Christian supernaturalism on Victorian minds created an intellectual and spiritual vacuum. Because Darwinism bore the imprint of theological, philosophical, and social ideas, it proved to be both attractive and accessible to many 19th-century seekers.

Darwin's revolution, it is important to recall, was an intellectual upheaval that drew as much on other people's ideas as on field work and careful observation. From William Paley's works on natural theology, for example, Darwin derived both his working assumption about each organism's perfect adaptation to its environment and the optimistic vision of divine justice that he so deeply craved. Nature's obvious cruelty, Paley declared, led inevitably to further progress.

Thomas Malthus's Essay on the Principle of Population (1798) provided Darwin with the insight that population pressure and the struggle for existence it inevitably caused in nature (where it was free of human moral constraints) were the engines of evolution. The writings of Herbert Spencer, Walter Bagehot, and other social theorists helped to provide Darwin with evolutionary explanations of our most prized mental and moral traits. The prehistory and nature of man could thus be incorporated into his biological scheme. And Darwin's own metaphysical commitment to naturalism encouraged him

*In an 1860 letter, Marx wrote that "Darwin's book [Origin of Species] is very important and serves me as a basis in natural sciences for the class struggle in history."
to include such extrabiological considerations both to complete his theory and to remind arrogant Anglo-Saxons to practice greater humility and compassion toward other species and races.

These were just some of the ideas and interests that helped to inspire and shape Darwin's efforts, both in the *Origin of Species* and *The Descent of Man* (1871). Their inclusion in his theory in no way keeps it from being one of science's greatest triumphs. Nevertheless, Darwin's breakthrough can hardly be cited as an example of objective facts gradually producing explanatory theory through the judicious application of reason and logic.

To many of our contemporary scientists, such as microbiologist Bernard Davis, the presence of "extrascientific" influences in any scientific work constitutes bias, error, and "a corruption of science." That view is remarkably naïve. As philosophers and sociologists of science have begun to argue, extrascientific biases may be invaluable as sources of scientific insight. Such appears to be the case with Darwinism. Even if Marx were correct in claiming that Darwin projected onto nature the brutal competition and Malthusian struggle for existence of 19th-century English society, the usefulness and legitimacy of the theory would hardly be destroyed.

Whether as a source of truth or error, the metaphysical presuppositions and moral concerns imbedded in Darwin's language—with its vocabulary of "natural selection" (suggesting to many a Natural Selector), "survival of the fittest" (suggesting inevitable progress), "higher" and "lower" forms of life, and "progress toward perfection"—encouraged a wealth of theological, philosophical, and social speculation.

Despite their variety, 19th-century debates about the human meaning of Darwinism shared many concerns and strategies. To theologians and social theorists, theists and atheists, capitalists and socialists, Darwinism's human implications appeared both attractive and disturbing. Theirs was an age in which Christian belief and Biblical authority were in decline. Western societies were experiencing rapid and disorienting changes. Consequently, the idea of evolution, both organic and social, proved invaluable as a source of guidance and reassurance. It gave a cheerful meaning to "progress," with which it was identified. To those who wished to remain Christian, evolution, properly understood, appeared to reconcile the teachings of their faith with the teachings of modern science. Although it challenged Biblical accounts of creation, the "fact" of evolutionary progress seemed to many to prove God's existence and benevolence and to place Christian providence on a scientific footing.

To those like Darwin and Spencer who no longer wished to be
believers but wished to retain Christian morality, evolution, properly interpreted, gave the practice of virtue a scientific rather than a supernatural basis. Evolution provided fables about the adaptive advantage of virtue and promised its ultimate diffusion and triumph throughout the world. Even to those like Marx who wished to challenge both Christian belief and its "bourgeois" morality, evolution, properly modified, could be used to sanction the necessity of social change. Furthermore, its suggestion of progress insured the ultimate beneficence of the historical process.

As a theory of evolution, Darwinism thus proved to be an invaluable and highly flexible means of lending the authority of science and nature to a number of conflicting political, religious, and philosophical claims.

But as a theory of evolution by natural selection, Darwinism proved to be a serious problem for everyone. Natural selection, with its emphasis on random variation, population pressure, and competitive struggle, suggested a nature that was "clumsy, wasteful, blundering, low and horribly cruel," as Darwin himself lamented. And a nature ruled by war, accident, famine, and death could easily appear godless and utterly indifferent to human hopes, regardless of their religious or political content.

Thus natural selection, the essence of Darwin's theory, seemed to undermine the moral and metaphysical benefits of the idea of evolution. To mitigate its threat to man, Darwinian theory variously had to be reinterpreted, altered, or even rejected. Intellectuals of all persuasions developed a variety of responses, the most common of which during the 19th century was to embrace the mechanisms of evolutionary development outlined by one of Darwin's predecessors, French naturalist Chevalier de Lamarck (1744–1829).

In contrast with Darwin, Lamarck accounted for the origin and spread of adaptive traits through the direct action of the environment on an animal or plant population, the effects of use and disuse of various traits, and the inheritance of these acquired traits. The appeal of the Lamarckian vision is obvious: It suggested that each organism had simply to stretch out its own neck or grow a thicker coat in order to adapt itself and its future offspring to the environment. According to this more genial scheme of things, there was no need for a creature to suffer, compete, and die while waiting for favorable, genetically based traits to arise and spread throughout the population.

Downplaying the role of natural selection in human development, thinkers as disparate as Spencer and Marx (and many theologians too) concluded that conflict need not be a permanent feature of human life. Even Darwin took comfort in the thought that inheritance
of acquired mental and moral traits would assure a steady and largely peaceful advance toward greater human intelligence and virtue.

For that minority of scientists, social theorists, and theologians remaining firm in its rejection of Lamarckism, other solutions to the problem of natural selection were possible. Some, including English naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913), simply insisted that natural selection played no role in the development of human mental and moral qualities; only supernatural intervention could account for their existence.

Others such as anarchist Peter Kropotkin and Scottish preacher Henry Drummond argued that “the law of Mutual Aid” or the “struggle for the Life of Others,” not natural selection, was responsible for evolutionary progress. Still others, often from Puritan backgrounds, were drawn to arguments like that of Yale’s William Graham Sumner, who held that the struggle for existence was fought between nature and society, not by man against man. In such a struggle, evolution sanctioned cooperation, virtue, and industry, not force and cunning. “Fittest” thus referred to the morally fit, not to the physically strongest.

With the erosion of faith in Lamarckism, thanks in large part to the work of German biologist August Weismann during the 1880s and '90s, the challenge of natural selection and its role in human lives had to be met anew.* If it were not, then only the law of chance, struggle, and death would remain. But such a law clearly was not and above all must not be the only law governing human affairs. Human social evolution, as many in the new fields of sociology and anthropology began to argue, could not be reduced to organic evolution. Such nonbiological, “cultural” processes as innovation and learning played at least as great a role in human destiny.

This argument from “culture,” given scientific support by T. H. Huxley in his famous lecture on “Evolution and Ethics” in 1893, emerged in the 20th century as the principal means of defending human hopes and values, for a number of reasons.

One was the eugenics movement. Aimed at “improving” the human species through the process of selective breeding, the movement acquired a particularly sinister aspect during the interwar years. Hitler’s scheme to eradicate non-Aryans and to create a “super-race” of blond Teutons made most applications of biological theory to humankind seem highly suspect.

Biological explanations of the human predicament were made even less attractive by the development of the so-called Modern Syn-

* Distinguishing between soma cells and germ cells, Weismann argued that the latter, as carriers of hereditary determinants, could not be altered by the behavioral or morphological changes of an organism during its lifetime.
thesis in population genetics during the 1930s. Largely the work of three prominent biologists—Ronald A. Fisher and J. B. S. Haldane of Cambridge, and Sewall Wright of the University of Chicago—this approach combined Darwin’s theory with Gregor Mendel’s work in genetics. The synthesis brought quantitative rigor to the study of evolution and filled in a number of gaps in Darwinian theory (e.g., the origin of variation). It also tended to strip “the survival of the fittest” of its qualitative connotations. In place of the Larmarckian idyll of inevitable progress and the Neo-Darwinist nightmare of brutal struggle, the Modern Synthesis substituted colorless mathematical formulations in which evolution was revealed as a simple change of gene frequencies within breeding populations. Fitness was defined as nothing more than quantitative reproductive success.

The potential loss of both nature and science as authoritative guides to right living proved unacceptable to many, including some of the leading theorists of evolutionary biology.

Julian Huxley, for example, complained that to conceive of fitness solely in terms of differential reproductive rates was to imply that the only direction in evolution was toward the production of more life. Rejecting such a disquieting implication, Huxley insisted that evolutionary biology disclosed a number of progressive trends in nature. The most important of these was progress toward the fulfillment and spiritual development of man. Such scientific knowledge, Huxley argued, constituted a new “Religion without Revelation,” which he believed provided the human species with a fresh source of consolation and inspiration.

In similar ways, other scientists, including C. H. Waddington, G. G. Simpson, and Theodosius Dobzhansky, succeeded in infusing the story of evolution with meaning and reassurance for man. They did not simply describe evolution by natural selection as a consequence of random variation, differential survival, and reproductive rates. They personified and praised it for its “creativity” and “opportunism,” discovering various progressive forces at work (e.g., greater complexity and adaptive flexibility). These forces, they believed, were conducive to greater human happiness and freedom.

Liberated from the messiness of organic evolution and the meaninglessness of its statistical nature, man had once again been preserved in his position of ascendency over nature, free to pursue his “higher” concerns above the vulgar struggle for “mere survival.” He could feel secure in the knowledge that his existence and superiority were not accidents but the culmination of an eternal creative process. By 1960, after a century of debate over the social and spiritual meaning of Darwinian theory, Homo sapiens found himself
where he had been a century earlier: at the "crown of creation."

Nothing had changed. European and American intellectuals of all persuasions had managed to respond to the challenges of Darwinism and its subsequent refinements in such a way as to reestablish Western hopes and values on a seemingly scientific foundation.

The shriveled husk of Christian mythology may have been discarded by many, and its kernel of morality, providence, and redemption dangerously exposed, but with the aid of new myths drawn from the science of evolution, that kernel could still be preserved. In the 19th century, this task of what psychologist Donald Campbell has termed "value salvage" was accomplished primarily through Lamarckism and other myths of inevitable progress. During the 20th century, Western intellectuals came to depend increasingly on a sharp distinction between biology and culture.

In short, what characterized the first 100 years of Darwinism's use and misuse was not the theory's ideological status as a rationalization of economic and political interests but its status as a "scientific mythology" serving interests far more metaphysical and moral than economic. As philosopher Stephen Toulmin has noted, science passes over into myth when its ideas and findings are dramatized and overextended not simply to explain natural phenomena but to give an emotionally powerful account of life's origins, workings, and ends. From this account, we in turn derive cosmically and scientifically sanctioned answers to our most troubling questions.

Thus it is today.

In spite of the claims to greater rigor and objectivity by which contemporary molecular biologists and sociobiologists have tried to distinguish their writings from those of the Spencers and Huxleys of the past, their efforts, too, constitute scientific mythologies.

When molecular biologists like Francis Crick, Jacques Monod, and François Jacob speak of the self-replication of DNA molecules as their fundamental "dream" and the "aim" of all life, or speak of evolution as a "wise" and "creative" process, they are not simply explaining the workings of nature and describing the findings of science. When sociobiologists such as Richard Dawkins and Richard Alexander speak of genes as "selfish" and "immortal masters" who "program" and exploit "survival machines" for their own purposes, they are not necessarily making capitalist exploitation and selfishness seem part of the natural order of things. When Crick argues that life on earth may owe its origins to the arrival, billions of years ago, of a spaceship loaded with bacteria sent by a doomed civilization of intelligent creatures like ourselves, desperate to ensure their survival, he is neither developing a scientific hypothesis to be tested nor sanctioning
imperialist expansion. Such personifications of natural phenomena serve instead as a means of arousing our emotions, shaping our thoughts, and guiding our actions.

But whereas the evolutionary myths of Darwinism’s first 100 years were used to shift moralities and cultural assumptions that had been religiously established onto a seemingly scientific basis, the aim of contemporary efforts is far more revolutionary. For if evolution in its wisdom has created all organisms, including ourselves, as expressions of DNA programs and devices for its replication, we must radically transform how we think of ourselves and what we value in life. Rather than God-ordained or at least specially endowed beings with souls to save, selves to fulfill, and just societies to create, we must first acknowledge and honor our responsibility as survival machines and live accordingly. To the extent that our societies diverge from our true biological interests they are maladaptive and must be corrected. To the extent that our culture diverges from biological necessities it becomes dangerous and must be reconstructed around life’s highest value: the survival and continued evolution of the gene pool.

That the reductive implications drawn by our contemporary biophilosophers are indeed culturally revolutionary is made quite explicit by these authors. Crick, for example, insists that while the science of biology is in the midst of shattering the traditional world view and values of Western culture, it “should [also] become the basis on which we are to build the new culture.” Such a “scientific” culture, with biologists as our guides, will free us at last from our harmful “prejudice about the sanctity of the individual” and of our fatal delusion about our special status in nature.

With similar enthusiasm, French biochemist Jacques Monod argues that “the molecular theory of the genetic code” will destroy, at last, “the disgusting farrago of Judeo-Christian religiosity, scientific progressivism, belief in the ‘natural’ rights of man, and utilitarian pragmatism,” along with the misguided values of salvation, justice, and self-fulfillment based upon them. In their place, science will sanction a new ethic based on “a clear-sighted appreciation of the urges and passions, the requirements and limitations of the biological being.”

For Edward Wilson, too, the discovery of the “morality of the gene”—our knowledge that any organism is “only DNA’s way of making more DNA”—totally discredits the myths and moralities of our Western heritage. At the same time, it replaces them with a “genetically accurate and hence completely fair” morality for man.

What had been feared and resisted for a century after Darwin—that the science of biology would corrode Western souls and transform the cultural order—is thus now readily acknowledged and even
celebrated by some of our foremost scientists. To them, our moral
task in life is no longer, in Tennyson's phrase, to "move upward
working out the beast, / and let the ape and tiger die," but rather its
opposite—to tame the wild beast of culture and restore, in Friedrich
Nietzsche's phrase, "the eternal basic text of Homo natura."

The biologists claim that such a Nietzschean "transvaluation of
all values" represents a valid deduction from unambiguous and objec-
tive scientific facts. But their claim proves to be baseless.

Scientific speculation about the biological basis of human value
judgments has not, as many scientists and philosophers now argue,
eliminated the philosophical distinction between facts and values. Ex-
ploring the social and spiritual implications of their work, biologists
have not acted in the disinterested fashion of scientists from another
planet, as they so often claim. They have instead been powerfully
motivated by an identifiable set of earthly philosophical commitments,
social concerns, and mythological ambitions.

Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to attribute the derivation of
social teachings from fundamental scientific discoveries simply to a
"naturalistic fallacy"—an illogical leap from facts to values and from
science to myth motivated by extrascientific concerns. The boundary
between science and a world view is, unfortunately, less clear than
both scientists and their critics imagine. As in the case of Darwinism,
what has rendered the transition from "is" to "ought" so subtle and
attractive to so many is the presence, within the scientific ideas
themselves, of such metaphysical presuppositions and social interests.
It is because of the views imbedded in some of the central theoretical
formulations of modern biology that they seem to resonate so
strongly with human significance.

The concerns of today's molecular biologists, ethologists, and
sociobiologists of course differ greatly from their Darwinian prede-
cessors. As the scientists themselves readily acknowledge, the mak-
ers of our current biological revolution share an abiding faith in a
world view of mechanistic reductionism, a faith that precedes, rather
than reflects, their fundamental scientific discoveries.

From Darwin to Dobzhansky, it was precisely such a program of
reducing biology to physics and chemistry, and virtue to reproductive
fitness, that was so consistently denied. But for today's biophi-
osophers, the assumption that the laws of the physical sciences can
account for the behavior of all living things, including the minds and
societies of men, constitutes a guiding principle in both their scientific
explorations and their social speculations.

Inspiring such strikingly similar formulations as Crick's "Central
Dogma" of molecular biology (DNA makes RNA, RNA makes pro-
tein) and Wilson’s “central dogma of evolutionary biology” (natural selection accounts for virtually all morphological and behavioral characteristics in all organisms), the commitment to reductionism transforms their meaning. However fruitful they have proven to be in the scientific enterprise, such statements are used not simply as research strategies or as hypotheses to be tested. They end up serving as unquestioned “truths” about the world, truths to be obeyed.

If we accept as unproblematic and value-free a theoretical and seemingly descriptive language that treats DNA as a “blueprint” or “program,” organisms as chemical “factories” and “cybernetic systems” serving DNA replication, behavior and social organization as “survival strategies” and “environmental tracking devices,” or even humans as “animals,” then moral implications do indeed appear plausible, regardless of the fine points of the logic.

If all organisms are genetically programmed, then we too must be. Hence genetic “reprogramming” to remove dysfunctional traits appears to be a sensible strategy. If behavioral patterns have evolved as survival “mechanisms,” then those of our behaviors that remain adaptive appear good and legitimate; those that are not appear irrelevant or self-destructive and require “retooling.”

If we are organisms like all other organisms, then obviously the needs, processes, and aims of organic life ought to take precedence over other interests, once thought to be “higher.”

Such mechanical metaphors, which dominate the descriptive and conceptual language of contemporary biology, are not dictated by nature itself. They greatly simplify and even distort some aspects of the working of genes and the nature of organisms, even as they illuminate others. In short, they represent a “mechanomorphism” that has proven to be every bit as value-laden as the anthropomorphisms of the past.

This reductive faith may have been important in shaping the fundamental discoveries of some of our leading biologists and in guiding the particular implications that they draw from their work. But it cannot fully explain the striking combination of urgency and elation with which these scientists have proclaimed to the public the coming cultural transformation. Nor can it account for the equally striking receptiveness of the public to such seemingly radical claims. Contributing to this latest transformation of science into myth is the powerful sense of hostility toward a modern Western cultural order believed to be on the verge of self-destruction—a perspective shared by these scientists and their audience.

Scenarios of doom have certainly proliferated over the last two decades and, remarkably, have often been given the sanction of sci-

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ence. To some seers, the coming apocalypse will take the form of overpopulation, genetic deterioration, or ecological disaster—all portrayed as the result of human meddling with, and indifference toward, biological patterns and purposes. To others, most notably Konrad Lorenz and his followers, our cultural self-destruction will probably take the form of nuclear annihilation, once again a symptom of civilized man’s sinful divergence from biological needs. As suggested by others, including Crick, Monod, and Wilson, the world may end with a whimper instead, as science at last destroys the unnatural Western beliefs in human uniqueness and divine ordination that have hitherto buttressed its morality and soothed its souls. Whatever its particulars, the sense of impending disaster as punishment for what biological anthropologist Robin Fox calls the “technological hubris” of a “brain-ridden species” has become widespread in both popular and scientific culture.

In such a period of apprehension, the authority and seeming certainty of science become dangerously attractive as a source for human guidance, thereby transforming science into myth. And in an age of intellectual hostility toward the existing cultural order, the confident simplicities of philosophical reductionism become a powerful tool for social criticism, as they have been in such movements as Marxism and Freudianism. But here again the influence of such extrascientific concerns may penetrate more deeply than we ordinarily imagine. They help give shape not simply to speculations about science’s human implications but to scientific knowledge itself.

Wilson’s monumental and highly regarded text, *Sociobiology*, provides an example of such influence in its very definition of altruism as “the central theoretical problem of sociobiology.” As important as the study of self-sacrificial behavior has been in the growing field of sociobiology, its selection by Wilson as the field’s central issue remains deeply problematic. So does his use of the concept of altruism to characterize the phenomenon to be studied.

Why not choose the evolution of communication or mentality, as embryologist C. H. Waddington suggested, especially since the mystery of altruism had already been solved by Darwin and Haldane, among others? And why use such a value-laden term as “altruism” to characterize any behavior that may have the effect of decreasing the personal reproductive fitness of the acting organism while increasing the reproductive fitness of other organisms?

Although Wilson and other sociobiologists have been criticized for their misuse of language, such language has a clear philosophical

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*Darwin and Haldane demonstrated that “other-benefiting” traits can evolve within a breeding population if the beneficiaries are descendants and near-relations.
and moral thrust. The use of the term "altruism" implicitly asserts the essential sameness of the aggregating behavior of single-celled slime molds, the unpalatability of moths, and acts of human martyrdom. It thereby reduces human intent, volition, and consciousness to mere surface manifestations of genetic calculations. However scientifically productive the focus on altruism has proven to be, its use and centrality reflect a quite self-conscious metaphysical commitment to reductionism, through which Wilson hopes to shed light on our current problems of living.

To Wilson, the fundamental problem faced by all human societies is how to keep in check our "selfish behavior and the 'dissolving power' of high intelligence," how to inspire "more encompassing forms of altruism" beyond those directed toward our kin. Religions have traditionally performed this essentially biological function, but they no longer do so. With our religious myths scientifically discredited, civilization, Wilson warns us, is "in immediate danger of decline" as moral consensus erodes and individuals regress to self-indulgence. Wilson thus defines altruism as the central theoretical problem of sociobiology because it is, for him, the central social and spiritual problem of the day—a problem that he hopes a reductionistic sociobiology will ultimately solve.

No one can doubt the enormous scientific achievements of biological revolutionaries like Edward Wilson. Yet such achievements have been made not in spite of their philosophical commitment to reductionism and their hostility toward a dying Judeo-Christian culture but, in part, because of them. Helping to guide the questions asked, the solutions sought for, the observations made, and the interpretations offered, such seemingly extrascientific elements may, at times, prove invaluable to the scientific enterprise.

Yet, however much the triumphs of science may seem to confirm the ideas and interests that helped to inspire them and to encourage their extension into myth, they cannot grant to such social and philosophical speculations the status of objective, positive science. They cannot—and we must not forget this—because scientific knowledge remains the tentative product of passionately committed and socially constrained minds.
The Hiroshima Prefecture Industrial Promotion Building, one year after the August 6, 1945, explosion of a U.S. atomic bomb directly overhead. The blast, equivalent in explosive power to 20,000 tons of TNT, killed 75,000 Japanese and leveled much of the city.
Since it emerged as a serious political force after the trauma of World War I, the heterogeneous American peace movement has often tapped widespread popular longings: for a world without war, for an end to costly U.S. interventions overseas, and, most recently, for relief from the nuclear threat.

Such sentiments have been understood by U.S. presidents. “I am a pacifist,” declared Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1940. “We are all pacifists.” Peace, observed John F. Kennedy in 1962, “is the rational end of rational men.” Long before his Reykjavik meeting last October with Mikhail Gorbachav, Ronald Reagan told a Eureka College audience: “Peace remains our highest aspiration.”

In fact, since Hiroshima, world peace of a sort has been maintained in the shadow of the Bomb. Despite an arms race, Soviet expansionism, and bitter local conflicts (e.g., Korea, Vietnam), World War III has not erupted. America’s NATO partners in Western Europe remain free and unscathed. Since the tense 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and the Soviets have avoided direct confrontation and they have taken some steps (e.g., improving the East-West “hot line”) to keep it that way. Deep differences in ideology, national purpose, and behavior divide the superpowers; men still die in battle (Afghanistan, El Salvador, Nicaragua); but the whole world is not engulfed.

How has the peace movement affected America’s role in the world? Since 1900, its supporters have included many of the nation’s notables—Mark Twain, Andrew Carnegie, Henry Ford, Albert Einstein, Benjamin Spock. Its allies, at times, have included leaders in both parties and in the White House. Its varied, often controversial, teachings have helped shape America’s political culture to the present day. Here our contributors examine the peace movement’s genteel beginnings, its strong impact before World War II, its stormy evolution in the Nuclear Age.
PEACE

June 28, 1914. Sarajevo, capital of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Gavrilo Princip, a member of the Serbian terrorist organization the Black Hand, shot Austrian archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife Sophie. The death of the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary set off a chain reaction. By late August, most of Europe was engaged in World War I. The ultimate victims of Princip’s revolver would be more than eight million war dead—and the dreams of the leaders of a trans-Atlantic peace movement that had been growing, particularly in America.

Americans at first believed that, as President Woodrow Wilson insisted, the war was one “whose causes cannot touch us.” The U.S. press displayed what the Literary Digest called a “cheering assurance that we are in no peril” of being drawn into Europe’s bloody quarrel. “Peace-loving citizens,” said the Chicago Herald, owe “a hearty thanks to Columbus for having discovered America.”

Indeed, “peace” was a flourishing cause in the United States on the eve of the Great War. Since 1900, nearly 50 new peace organizations had appeared, among them groups endowed by Boston publisher Edward Ginn (the World Peace Society) and Scottish-born steel magnate Andrew Carnegie, whose benefactions had been capped by a $10 million gift in 1910 to establish the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Carnegie thought the Endowment, based in Washington, D.C., could help government officials hasten “the abolition of international war,” the “ foulest blot” on civilization. As late as 1913, the editors of the Peace Forum could declare war obsolete: Statesmen “realize how ruinous it could be for them to fight.”

Thus August 1914 was doubly shocking to peace advocates. The Reverend Frederick Lynch, head of the Church Peace Union, a U.S. organization of antiwar clergymen recently launched with a $2 million Carnegie gift, thought that the world had “gone mad.” James Brown Scott, secretary of the Carnegie Endowment, felt “dazed.”

The peace movement had grown up at a time of ferment. Europe, that ancient cockpit of conflict, had survived almost a century without prolonged armed confrontation (the German seizure of Alsace-Lorraine from France in 1870–71 had failed to ignite a larger conflict). While the Great Powers were occupied with empire-building, science and technology had brought such advances as Charles Darwin’s ideas on evolution, Max Planck’s quantum theory of energy (1900), and Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity (1905), as well as
ways of making steel and steam and internal-combustion engines. Still, there was reason to share Henrik Ibsen's fear that the rapidly advancing world was "sailing with a corpse in the cargo."

The ambitious Germans were building a large navy, and along with their neighbors were embracing such military innovations as conscription (used by all the Continental powers after 1871), the torpedo, the mine, the machine gun, and smokeless gunpowder (patented by Alfred Nobel between 1887 and 1891). The Future of War (1902), by Polish scholar Ivan Bloch, and The Great Illusion (1910), by British economist Norman Angell, argued that armed conflicts would henceforth engulf whole nations. To Angell, war was now unthinkable; to Bloch, it was "impossible except at the price of suicide."

Across the Atlantic, immigration and industrialization were re-drawing the social landscape in the United States.

From only 35,000 miles at the end of the Civil War in 1865, U.S. railroads had grown to nearly 200,000 miles of track by 1900. As Americans moved West, new arrivals landed in force; nearly 1,285,000, mostly from Eastern Europe, debarked during 1907 alone. Between 1880 and 1910 the urban population tripled to 45 million; by 1920, most Americans were city and town dwellers. As
demands increased for better housing, improved working conditions, and access to political power, reformers launched the Progressive Era. Civic clubs, church groups, and new mass-market magazines like Collier's and McClure's all embraced what Kansas editor William Allen White called "the cult of the hour," a faith "in the essential nobility of man and the wisdom of God." Human progress was possible if the proper mechanisms could be put to work.

Reformers like Jane Addams set up settlement houses to help the urban poor; muckraking journalists investigated the sources and uses of wealth; unions sought to upgrade labor conditions; the Women's Christian Temperance Union took on "Demon Rum." But of all the reform goals, "peace" was the most socially respectable.

'Cult of Cranks'

Peace had been a human preoccupation for centuries, of course, going back well before St. Augustine's fifth-century assertion that "it is more honorable to destroy war by persuasion than to destroy men by the sword." In America, peace had first been the province of such religious sects as the Mennonites, the Brethren, and the Society of Friends (Quakers). Secular interest in peace appeared early.* But the organized movement began in 1815, with the founding of "peace societies" in New York by David Low Dodge and in Massachusetts by Noah Worcester. Both grew out of Northern opposition to the inconclusive struggle with Britain in the War of 1812. The Massachusetts group became part of the New England–based American Peace Society, launched in 1828 by William Ladd.

The Civil War divided Ladd's group, many of whose members backed the Union for its antislavery stance. Alfred Love, a deeply pacifist Quaker wool merchant, broke away to start a rival Universal Peace Union in 1866. By 1890, the "movement" consisted mainly of the American Peace Society, Love's group, and a few even smaller organizations. Most Americans were uninterested in the cause.

But by the late 19th century America was becoming a world power. Commodore Matthew C. Perry's ships had opened Japan to the West, financiers like J. Pierpont Morgan were forging links with European capital, and the 1898 Spanish-American War, highlighted by easy naval victories in Cuba and the Philippines, seemed to show

*Benjamin Rush, the Philadelphia physician and signer of the Declaration of Independence, proposed a cabinet-rank secretary of peace in 1789.

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that America could play a global role, as Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power upon History* (1890) said it must. The movement's aims grew beyond mere opposition to violence; indeed, a new generation of peace-group leaders often disdained "pacifists." Inspired as much as unnerved by technology, these leaders sought "practical" and "scientific" means of barring wars. And, they felt, their country was now strong enough to be heard.

The movement's ideas—that nations would abide by codes of international conduct; that U.S. democratic traditions would keep America out of "unjust" wars and permit combat only to preserve freedom—reflected the convictions of its upper-middle-class leadership. Members of peace societies were mostly Northeastern, Anglo-Saxon, and well educated; nearly two-thirds had professional degrees. They shared a faith that Americans, at least those like themselves, were morally blessed and could show others (especially the Europeans) how to avoid conflict. Peace, wrote Hamilton Holt, editor of the *Independent*, in 1911, was "a practical political issue," one on which "it seems destined that America should lead." The peace movement was "no longer a little cult of cranks."

**Musing on Lake Mohonk**

Typically, its leaders had come to prominence during the business expansion of the late 19th-century Gilded Age, a term coined by one of Andrew Carnegie's confidants, Mark Twain. Few were veterans of war or the tempering trials of elective politics. But they were men used to telling others what was best for them.

Educators like Stanford's president David Starr Jordan and Columbia's Nicholas Murray Butler, who scorned the "useless sentimentalism" of older peace societies, joined the movement to stress rational solutions to international problems. Editors and publicists (Holt, Edwin D. Mead) promoted peace proposals. Lawyers, viewing peace as a legal challenge, were much in evidence.

None were more so than Elihu Root, a New York corporate attorney who served presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt as secretary of war (1899–1904) and state (1905–09). "Square Root" was stern, aloof, and a brilliant administrator, "the wisest man I ever knew," said Roosevelt. Around him grew a "Root cult" of lawyers and State Department officials like James Brown Scott, a former law professor, absorbed with peace-through-law ideas. During the years before World War I, these "legalists" dominated the movement. Their views captivated the man who did most to give the peace cause visibility, Andrew Carnegie.

Carnegie arrived in America in 1848, and started out as a $1.20-a-week bobbin boy. By the century's end, the mills he built in the Pittsburgh area produced a fourth of the nation's Bessemer steel.
and profits above $40 million a year (in pre-income tax days). Carnegie's largesse to the cause of peace began even before the 1901 sale of his business for $480 million to J. P. Morgan, which made Carnegie (said Morgan) the "richest man in the world." More than his money, Carnegie's personal force and his contacts with political leaders in America and Europe lent respectability to the movement.

Like other peace leaders, Carnegie shared the social-Darwinist philosophy that the strongest and "best" elements in society would thrive. He regarded Anglo-Saxon, Protestant ideals as the glory of civilization; wherever they were adopted, peace and order would follow. Among those who agreed were Alfred and Albert Smiley, Quakers and ardent Progressives who owned a hotel on upper New York State's Lake Mohonk, where they had often held conferences on improving conditions for Indians and Negroes. Persuaded that the old peace societies' lack of influence stemmed from their habit of decrying war without proposing remedies, the brothers hosted a meeting on peace in June 1895. The educators, editors, lawyers, businessmen, clergy, politicians, and generals invited were directed not to dwell on the "horrors of war or the doctrine of 'peace at all hazards.'" They should explore "scientific" ways of settling disputes.

Remember the Alabama

New York University Law School dean Austin Abbot argued that conflicts should be "submitted to human reason, and some competent arbiter shall decide what is right." At length, the conferees agreed that "the feasibility of arbitration as a substitute for war is now demonstrated." The Smileys decided to make the "Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration" an annual event, at which guests in black tie could carry on their deliberations while invigorated by fine cuisine and the bracing Catskill Mountains air.

Arbitration was not a new idea. During the fourth century B.C. the Greek historian Thucydides described as "criminal" nations that would not submit disputes to a "tribunal offering a righteous judgment." In 1306 a Norman lawyer, Pierre Dubois, called for a Congress of States, a court of arbitration that could use economic and military sanctions to maintain peace. In America, by the late 19th century the settlement of labor issues by third parties had won acceptance. Arbitration had also been used in international disputes.

One example was the Alabama case, involving a U.S. claim against Britain for damage caused during the Civil War by a Confederate raiding ship that sailed with British crewmen and arms. Eager to restore good relations with Washington, the British dropped an earlier refusal to arbitrate (because "national honor" was involved). In 1872 an arbitral commission awarded the U.S. government $15.5 million for losses wrought by several British-backed raiders. America
and Britain, Carnegie asserted, had “taught the world Arbitration.”

Even as the Smilys’ guests were conferring at Lake Mohonk in 1895, President Grover Cleveland’s Democratic administration jumped into a boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana (now Guyana) that London had refused to arbitrate. Cleveland was harassed both by charges that he was pro-British (anathema to Irish-American Democrats) and by congressional calls for arbitration. His secretary of state, Richard Olney, told London that under the Monroe Doctrine America was “practically sovereign” in the Western Hemisphere, and hinted that Congress would demand military action if the British did not arbitrate. When Lord Salisbury, the prime minister, demurred, Cleveland announced that Washington would decide the border issue and view British failure to comply as aggression.

The Lake Mohonk conferees, seeing Anglo-American rapprochement as a key to world peace, urged the two countries to negotiate an arbitration treaty covering future disputes. Although Salisbury thought arbitration “one of the great nostrums of the age,” Britain was approaching a war with the Boers in South Africa. Peace with Washington looked attractive. In January 1897, Olney concluded an arbitration pact with the British ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote. Although the newly elected Republican president, William McKinley, endorsed it, the Senate rejected the treaty, out of a concern that it would limit U.S. sovereignty. Still, U.S. peace advocates saw the Olney-Pauncefote accord as a model for the future.

**40 Bishops, 27 Millionaires**

Indeed, “peace” seemed to be gaining momentum.

The year 1897 also brought Alfred Nobel’s endowment of an international peace prize. With military costs soaring, in 1898 the Russian tsar, Nicholas II, invited all nations to a conference the following year to discuss “the great idea of universal peace.”

Although that year would also see the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the conflict hardly ruffled U.S. peace advocates. A few pacifists were opposed; Alfred Love was burned in effigy in Philadelphia for his pains, but the jingoist view of McKinley’s secretary of state John Hay that the fight against Spanish imperial oppression was “splendid” was widely shared. To American Peace Society secretary Benjamin Trueblood, the war was “a temporary disturbance.” The Mormon Church, ending a half-century of pacifism, supported McKinley. Suffragist Elizabeth Cady Stanton said that “though I hate war,” she would be “glad” to see Spain “swept from the face of the earth.”

Focusing on the tsar’s conference, due to convene in The Hague in May 1899, Boston clergyman Edward Everett Hale and publicist Edwin Mead began a journal, the *Peace Crusade*, to tout the event and build support for an international arbitration panel. At the confer-
HENRY FORD'S 'PEACE SHIP'

On November 24, 1915, at New York City's Biltmore Hotel, automaker Henry Ford faced waiting newsmen. "We're going to try to get the boys out of the trenches by Christmas!" he announced. "I've chartered a ship and some of us are going to Europe." Ford's ultimate aim: "To stop war for all times."

So began a strange 17-month odyssey. Shocked by the carnage of World War I and fearful that America would join it, Ford aimed to end the European conflagration with "faith and moral suasion." He would set up a conference of nonbelligerents who would keep sending peace proposals to the combatants—too proud to cease fire on their own—until acceptable terms were found.

The idea had come out of the International Congress of Women held earlier that year at The Hague. One participant, a stout Hungarian feminist-divorcée named Rosika Schwimmer, went to the United States to seek sponsorship. The Wilson White House turned her down. Not so Ford, who, at age 52, was so horrified by the war that he would "give all my money—and my life—to stop it." At the Biltmore, Ford said he had asked 100 "representative Americans"—state governors, businessmen, educators, peace workers—to join the conference project. Press coverage of the "flyover diplomacy" plan was unflattering. One headline: FORD CHARTERS ARK, PLANS RAID ON TRENCHES. Said a Boston Traveler editorial: "It is not Mr. Ford's purpose to make peace; he will assemble it." Although such invitees as Harvey Firestone, Helen Keller, and Luther Burbank wished Ford well, the only acceptee who was well known in Europe was Chicago reformer Jane Addams.

The "Ford Peace Ship"—the Scandinavian American Line's Oscar II—sailed from Hoboken on December 4, as a dockside band played "I Didn't Raise My Boy To Be a Soldier" and cheers rose from a crowd that included Thomas Edison and William Jennings Bryan. But during the 15-day voyage to Christiania (now Oslo), Norway, the 143 peace pilgrims—Ford and 68 conference delegates, 35 students, 28 journalists, and 11 hangers-on—were embroiled in what a news dispatch from the ship called "teapot tempests and hencoop hurricanes" on various issues. The delegates included "name" folk like Addams and McClure's Magazine publisher S. S. McClure, but most were obscure writers, teachers, clergymen, and activists—"the queerest lot,"

ence, the 26 delegations responded to the urging of the U.S. representative, former Cornell president Andrew D. White, to "give the world" the beginning of a "practical scheme of arbitration." A "Permanent Court of Arbitration" was created where countries could have disputes settled by third-party judges selected from a list. The American Peace Society's president, Robert Treat Paine, descendant of a signer of the Declaration of Independence, thought the Hague meeting transcended "any human event which has ever taken place."

There were many doubters, among them Theodore Roosevelt, who had succeeded McKinley as president in 1901. A strong navy and an "efficient, though small army" were still vital, he said. "No

Put off by the advance publicity—including the revelation that a “black bag” that Schwimmer carried did not, as intimated, contain messages of support by officials of the warring nations—European pacifists refused to embrace the expedition in Norway. Ford, weary of the squabbling and pleading influenza, sailed back to New York four days after Oscar’s arrival. As Schwimmer, styling herself the group’s “expert adviser,” led a tour of neutral countries in search of backing, troubles mounted. The secretary of the Anti-War Council, an influential peace society based in the Netherlands, wrote to Ford that he was “familiar with Mrs. Schwimmer and her ways,” and was wary of extending any cooperation.

In February 1916, Schwimmer et al., having recruited unofficial representatives from Denmark, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands, organized the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation in Stockholm. After much wrangling, the delegates composed an *Appeal to the Belligerents* calling for, among other things, the creation of a world congress. The Appeal, like the conference itself, was well publicized—and ignored by both the Allies and their foes.

Back home, Ford soon forgot the peace mission. He had opposed military preparedness—“No boy would ever kill a bird if he didn’t first have a sling-shot or a gun.” But, in February 1917, when Germany announced all-out submarine warfare in the Atlantic, he assured President Wilson that Ford plants would produce arms if needed. The mission was told that all Ford funding—he spent $520,000—would be cut off on March 1. Six weeks after the end of what newsmen dubbed Ford’s “grand tour pacifism”—and historian Walter Millis called “one of the few really generous and rational impulses of those insane years”—America was at war and the Yanks were bound for the battlefields of Europe.
cabinet members, two former presidential candidates, four Supreme Court justices, 19 members of Congress, 40 bishops, 10 mayors, 60 newspaper editors, 18 college and university presidents, and 27 millionaires, shuttled among sessions in Carnegie Hall and banquets at the Astor Hotel. Reflecting Root's influence, TR's message to the meeting endorsed arbitration as the best method "now attainable" for ending disputes. Washington would seek "a general arbitration treaty" and "power and permanency" for the Hague Court.

Root, Scott, and other legalists valued arbitration as a step toward a formal international court with permanent judges and an accepted legal code. Wars, Root argued, were best prevented not by arbiters, but by rulings on "questions of fact and law in accordance with rules of justice." Yet the 1907 Hague conference did not create a world court; delegates could not agree on how to select judges.

Taft's Lament

The legalists did not abandon that goal. But for the time being Root's focus shifted to bilateral arbitration treaties. A series of them (with Britain and six other countries) had been negotiated by Secretary Hay, and amended into meaninglessness by the Senate. Root felt that even weak pacts were better than none. He negotiated 24 that the Senate accepted; the treaties were watered down to exempt disputes affecting the "vital interests, independence, or honor" of the involved nations.

Prospects for arbitration rose after William Howard Taft, a conservative lawyer with close ties to the peace movement, succeeded Roosevelt in 1909. In a remarkable New York speech that year, Taft embraced treaties that did not exempt disputes involving "national honor" or "vital interests." Unlimited arbitration of international disputes "will be the great jewel of my administration," said Taft.

Carnegie, not previously a strong Taft backer, was thrilled. "No words from any Ruler of our time," he wrote the president, were so "laden with precious fruit." He decided to back Taft's treaties, and to finance a study/advocacy foundation, the Carnegie Endowment.

Although Taft did conclude general arbitration pacts with Britain and France, the president had mixed feelings on arbitration as a means of preventing war. It was "strange," Taft said later. In espousing arbitration even on matters of national honor, "I had no definite policy in view. I was inclined, if I remember rightly, merely to offset the antagonism [in Congress] to the four [new] battleships for which I was then fighting, and I threw that suggestion out merely to draw the sting of old Carnegie and other peace cranks." Now it was becoming "the main fact" of his term.

Taft campaigned in 24 states for his treaties, which the Los Angeles Times had called the most praiseworthy presidential initia-
tive since the Emancipation Proclamation. The opposition was led by Roosevelt, Mahan, and Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Henry Cabot Lodge (R-Mass.). Lodge disliked both “mushy philanthropists” and the notion of creating a body that “might consist of foreigners” assuming powers that rightly belonged to “the President and the Senate.” Roosevelt felt that the nation should never arbitrate matters “respecting its honor, independence, and integrity.” Ending his friendship with Taft, TR ran against him as a “Bull Moose” Progressive in the 1912 presidential campaign.

In the Senate, Lodge led efforts to amend the arbitration pacts to death before passage. Then both Taft and TR lost the 1912 race to Democrat Woodrow Wilson. As for the treaties, Taft lamented that he hoped “the senators might change their minds, or that the people might change the Senate; instead of which they changed me.”

Despite their setbacks at The Hague and at home, the legalists’ influence in the movement expanded. Root and Scott had launched the American Society of International Law in 1906; Scott edited the American Journal of International Law. In 1907 Root helped establish an international court: the Central American Court of Justice, a regional dispute-settling body. Scott and Baltimore lawyer Theodore Marburg formed the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes in 1910; that year Root was made the Carnegie Endowment’s first president, and in 1912 he became the first sitting or former U.S. secretary of state to win the Nobel Peace Prize.* Carnegie funds flowed to other organizations, such as the American Peace Society, which set up a Washington headquarters.

Swords into Plowshares

The arbitration advocates and legalists enjoyed proximity to power. Root once said that the Carnegie Endowment was “almost a division of the State Department, working in harmony [with it] constantly.” But Woodrow Wilson’s arrival in the White House was unsettling. Peace leaders, while pleased with Wilson’s moralistic approach to foreign policy, were not sure where he stood. He had joined the American Peace Society, but he had not been active in the movement or comfortable with its leaders’ hopes for arbitration and a world court.

When Wilson, as president, sent troops in 1914 to settle a border dispute with Mexico, some peace leaders called for arbitration (though most did not; nationalism seemed more important, particularly in the case of a smaller nation in the Western Hemisphere). They did not hail Wilson’s choice as secretary of state: Indiana-born William Jennings Bryan, the three-time Democratic presidential can-

didate and eccentric “Prince of Peace,” who liked to give supporters miniature plowshares made from a melted-down sword. Bryan’s favored antiwar device was “conciliation treaties,” which would have nations submit disputes to an international commission for investigation before going to war; as he saw it, the study period, usually about a year, would allow passions to fade and peace to prevail.*

After August 1914, everything changed, including the peace movement.

Initially, the mainstream peace leaders and organizations opposed American intervention in the war. But they soon favored U.S. participation to save the hard-pressed British and French, to defend the idea of international law. The Carnegie Endowment, the American Peace Society, the Church Peace Union, and the New York Peace Society were all ahead of Wilson as he gradually veered from peace candidate in 1916 (his reelection slogan: “He Kept Us Out of War”) to warrior in April 1917, when he committed the nation to a struggle that would “vindicate the principles of peace and justice.”

**Women, Wobblies, Social Workers**

Many Progressives, worried that a war effort would eclipse domestic reform, also veered around—with a nudge from philosopher John Dewey. He wrote in the *New Republic* that the war had come at a “plastic juncture” in history and could well yield benefits, such as progress in “science for social purposes.” The mainstream press, especially after America declared war on Germany, was not gentle to diehard peace advocates. When Columbia fired two faculty members for opposing the sending of conscripts to Europe, the *New York Times* said that the university had “done its duty.”

With the peace establishment’s turn toward intervention, antiwar activity was increasingly dominated by political figures previously not active on foreign policy issues—notably on the Left.

Among them was labor organizer Eugene V. Debs, founder of the American Socialist Party and the International Workers of the World (the “Wobblies”), who opposed U.S. involvement in the European struggle. He was jailed for three years after giving an antiwar speech in 1918, joining more than 1,500 other Americans arrested under a wartime antisedition law. Women’s rights activists concentrated on peace questions: Jane Addams, Carrie Chapman Catt, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and Anna Howard Shaw opposed what Catt called the movement’s “over-masculinized management.” A Woman’s Peace Party emerged in 1915. That year, too, New York City social workers, socialists, and union members formed the American

*Bryan negotiated several such “cooling-off” treaties, but World War I erupted as they were being signed. Britain signed less than a month after the shooting began. (The Germans never signed, but Bryan somehow felt they had endorsed his idea in principle.*)
Union to agitate against any U.S. military build-up. But they were not the kindred spirits of the lawyers and legalists who had sought to eliminate war before 1914. Nor did they ever command a wide following among intellectuals and prominent politicians; their turn would come much later.

Essentially, the “establishment” peace advocates like Root, Scott, Holt, Carnegie, and Butler were conservative reformers. They hoped to maintain the relative stability in Great Power relations that had marked the late 19th century, and firmly believed that the use of Anglo-American legal concepts could accomplish that. During the deceptive calm of the prewar years, they had become increasingly optimistic, encouraged by their own prestige and the acceptance of many of their proposals by high U.S. officials. But while they considered themselves “internationalists,” they ignored violence in colonial areas, accepted U.S. preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, and, most important, failed to recognize Europe’s growing rivalries and the rise of German militarism.

For a time, their views were often echoed abroad. Three years before Sarajevo, the London Peace Society’s secretary declared that “never were Peace prospects so promising.” But those who dealt with the world as it was saw things differently. Speaking of arbitration, Lord Salisbury expressed amazement at “those who could have believed in such an expedient for bridling the ferocity of human passions.”

Elihu Root, as president of the Carnegie Endowment board until 1925, continued to believe. So did James Brown Scott and Nicholas Murray Butler. Looking to the future, when Europe was in flames early in 1915, ex-president Taft, Hamilton Holt, Theodore Marburg, and Harvard’s president A. Lawrence Lowell established the League to Enforce Peace, dedicated to devising measures (e.g., economic sanctions) to compel compliance with the verdicts of a world court. Among those opposed was Root, who had been awarded his Nobel Prize in part for his work on arbitration.

As World War I raged on, Root and James Brown Scott remained convinced that “world opinion” would supply all the enforcement power an international court might need. However, like many others, Andrew Carnegie, who died at 83 in 1919, the year after the Armistice, never recovered from the shock of 1914. “All my air-castles,” he said, “have fallen about me like a house of cards.”
PEACE

BETWEEN THE WARS

by Robert Woito

Europe, 1940. In a stunning blitzkrieg, German troops invaded Denmark and Norway in April, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France in May. The British force in France, cut off from its French allies, was evacuated from Dunkirk, leaving most of its equipment behind.

As Hitler’s Panzers drove toward Paris, Winston Churchill, the new British prime minister, made a desperate plea. He secretly asked President Franklin D. Roosevelt to declare an emergency and lend warships, aircraft, and other arms to Britain. Roosevelt was sympathetic. But “neutrality” laws passed by Congress were an obstacle. Churchill warned that delay might bring a British government that would not fight. By June 12th, when Paris fell, FDR’s dilemma was acute. Should America abandon Britain and prepare to defend the Western Hemisphere? Or should it aid the British and hope that they could hang on? There were not enough U.S. arms to do both.

Resisting pressure from isolationists, peace movement leaders, and pessimists like Joseph P. Kennedy, the U.S. ambassador in London, who thought Britain a lost cause, Roosevelt decided to send aid. Between June and October 1940, some 970,000 rifles, 200,500 revolvers, 87,500 machine guns, 895 75-mm artillery pieces, 316 mortars, and ammunition were shipped to Britain. After obtaining from London a pledge that Britain’s fleet would never be surrendered, and obtaining the use of bases in Newfoundland and Britain’s Caribbean isles, Roosevelt bypassed Congress to transfer 50 aging U.S. destroyers to the Royal Navy by presidential order.

The drama helped to expose America’s unpreparedness. As late as July 1940, the American army, with 291,031 men (and 350 usable tanks), was not much larger than the Belgian army, which had succumbed to the Nazis in a few days. The nation’s unreadiness had many causes. U.S. military strategy had been based on a World War I model that assumed a ground stalemate in Europe and British control of the Atlantic. And after the Great War, a disenchantment with European politics had set in among Americans, who came to view that conflict as a blunder from which European leaders had learned little. When the Depression struck, the economic crisis reinforced this isolationist impulse.

Perhaps most important, as we shall see, a small band of peace movement leaders succeeded in shaping the U.S. approach to world politics. Their constituency expanded to include mainstream business, educational, women’s, and world affairs organizations. Their goals
"Come on in, I'll Treat You Right. I Used to Know Your Daddy." In 1937, when the New York Daily News ran this cartoon by Clarence D. Batchelor, conflict loomed in Europe and Asia, but memories of World War I were still powerful. Batchelor's work won a Pulitzer Prize.

became U.S. policy in the 1929 Kellogg-Briand Pact "outlawing" war and in the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s. Yet their failure to recognize the true face of totalitarianism, and their perennial discomfort with the reality of power in world politics, had much to do with the crisis that Roosevelt faced in 1940, as Hitler gazed across the English Channel, a conquered Europe at his back.

For two decades, the peace movement had capitalized on the backlash of U.S. public opinion against World War I. The war to make "the world safe for democracy" had seen the fall of the Hohenzollern and Hapsburg dynasties—and U.S. troops had tipped the balance in favor of the Allies in 1917-18. But little more than 12 months of combat had cost America 116,516 dead and more than $30 billion.

World War I was the first modern war. Before it, as Paul Fussell has written, the word "machine" had a positive connotation; it was "not yet inevitably coupled with the word gun," as it would be after horrors like the Second Battle of the Marne, in which 280,000 men perished in twenty days. The barbed-wire realities of trench warfare shredded Wilsonian idealism. As Hemingway would write in A Farewell to Arms (1929), "abstract words such as glory, honor, courage, or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of regiments,
and the dates.” Antiwar novels such as Erich Maria Remarque’s *All Quiet on the Western Front* (1929) became best sellers.

The Treaty of Versailles mocked President Wilson’s promise of “peace without victory.” The victors imposed a reparations debt of $33 billion on Germany, helping to frustrate the nascent German democracy and fuel a desire for revenge. And Britain and France ignored the Wilsonian principle of self-determination by dividing up Germany’s colonies. Wilson did get the Allies to create a League of Nations, which would provide for collective security against aggressor states. But he could not win Senate approval of the League Covenant. His hopes for U.S. participation in the League (and the World Court at The Hague) were dashed by forces led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R.-Mass.), who saw the League as dominated by European powers who had stumbled into war in the first place.

**A Naval ‘Holiday’**

In 1920, an electorate weary of the sacrifices required by the pursuit of idealistic world goals turned against Wilson’s Democrats and elected Republican Warren G. Harding, who promised “not nostrums but normalcy.” The United States was soon launched on what F. Scott Fitzgerald would call the “gaudiest spree in history.” Industrial growth, the Tin Lizzie, jazz, and the booming stock market signaled what Harding’s successor, Calvin Coolidge, called “a state of contentment seldom before seen.”

Not everyone was as content as Silent Cal thought. The Senate’s rejection of the League gave new impetus to the formation of peace advocacy organizations like the League of Nations Association and foreign affairs education groups like the Council on Foreign Relations. Three months after the Armistice, the American Union Against Militarism persuaded Congress to reject the War Department’s proposal for compulsory military training. The Great War had already given birth to the pacifist Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). But the main instrument for broadening the movement was the National Council for the Prevention of War (NCPW), launched in 1921 by Frederick Libby, a Maine-born Quaker and Congregational minister who had served with the Friends’ relief group in France.

Libby wanted to unite what he saw as the big five natural opponents of war—farmers, churchmen, women, labor union members, and educators—behind such goals as arms reduction and “the sub-

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stitution of law for war.” He recruited 26 major organizations as NCPW members, among them the Foreign Policy Association, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National League of Women Voters, and the National Education Association (NEA). With a board that included such notables as Mrs. Louis Brandeis and Mrs. J. Borden Harriman, and a Washington staff of 52 and six regional offices the NCPW promoted its views via its member groups. The NEA, for example, reevaluated how war/peace issues were treated in high school textbooks and urged teachers to talk about Woodrow Wilson’s ideals and about arbitration of international disputes.

To be sure, the new peace groups had opposition. The Navy League, for instance, was created in 1920 to counter the postwar “tide of anti-preparedness and pacifism.” But President Harding courted the peace lobby, and pressed the first U.S. attempt at strategic arms control, a nine-nation conference on curbing the size of navies, held in Washington in 1921.

The conference led to treaties under which the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan agreed to a 10-year “holiday” from the building of capital ships (battleships and aircraft carriers) and set limits on the size and number of such vessels.* The treaties, widely hailed as a triumph for peace, in fact were gravely flawed. They imposed no limits on smaller ships, such as submarines. The lack of enforcement provisions made their violation by the Japanese a simple matter. (The Germans, who agreed to similar terms in a 1935 treaty, also cheated with impunity.) Yet, this first effort at arms limitation was popular with Americans; Congress did not authorize Navy ship construction up to the treaty limits until the eve of World War II.

Enter the Left

President Coolidge, in his turn, paid heed to the peace movement. When Mexico’s nationalization of U.S. oil and mining properties stirred talk of war, pressure from Protestant clergy and pacifist groups prompted the Senate to call for arbitration, and Coolidge went along. Coolidge retained enough leeway, however, to dispatch the Marines in 1927 to end a generals’ rebellion in Nicaragua.†

Developments overseas should have given pause to the peace movement. At the end of the decade, Adolf Hitler took control of the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany. In Italy, Benito Mussolini dissolved

*New capital ships were limited to 35,000 tons displacement each, and an overall tonnage ratio of 5:5:3 was set for Britain, the United States, and Japan; i.e., the British and Americans could each have capital ships totaling 525,000 tons, and the Japanese could have 315,000 tons. France and Italy were limited to one-third of the U.S. and British tonnage, or 175,000 tons each.

†There were few protests from pacifists. But one of the rebel generals, Cesar Augusto Sandino, who fled to the hills to launch an abortive guerrilla campaign, was hailed as a hero by the U.S. Communist Party and by the pacifist editor of the Nation, Oswald Garrison Villard.
parliament and established his fascist dictatorship in 1928. That year, in the Far East, Japanese forces made their first moves toward an invasion of Manchuria. But Americans, said the Philadelphia Record, “don’t give a hoot in a rainbarrel who controls North China.”

The peace movement reached its diplomatic apogee in 1928-29. In Paris, a 15-nation conference adopted the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war, drafted by U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg. In all, 62 countries agreed to “renounce war” and settle disputes by “pacific means.” The Senate added reservations to U.S. ratification: No one had to act in case of a treaty violation, and Washington would reserve the right to interpret the pact’s application in the Western Hemisphere. Skeptics like Senator Carter Glass (D.-Va.) viewed the treaty as “worthless, but perfectly harmless.” But peace leaders such as the FOR’s Kirby Page were euphoric: “Delegalizing war,” he said, was the movement’s “most vital” idea yet.

With Kellogg-Briand, pacifists like Page and Libby believed that their no-more-war goals were in sight. To liberal internationalists, such as James Brown Scott of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Clark Eichelberger, influential head of the Chicago office of the League of Nations Association, the 1920s had been a less
auspicious decade. The Senate spurned the League of Nations; a Coolidge-led effort to bring the United States into the World Court also foundered on isolationist opposition. But neither the president nor the Congress nor the press bemoaned such setbacks.

Domestic woes dominated the headlines with the 1929 Wall Street crash and the worldwide depression. By 1932, U.S. unemployment reached some 12 million. Socialist ideas and organizations gained favor as capitalism faltered, and they fit comfortably in the peace movement. A. J. Muste, the Marxist labor organizer turned pacifist, became an FOR leader. Socialist Gus Tyler spoke for the Marxist Left when he asserted that “capitalists” would “fling workers into war.” The U.S. Communist Party, obedient to Moscow, had its own League against War and Fascism, and controlled the American Student Union. The “merchants of death” analysis—which blamed the Great War on a conspiracy among munitions-makers—became popular; even business-oriented Fortune magazine spread the notion. But the conspiracy theory gained its greatest impact through the 1934 Nye Committee hearings on the arms industry.

That probe grew out of the joint labors of Dorothy Detzer, leader of the WILPF, and progressive Senator George Norris (R.-Neb.). They went over the Senate’s 96-member roster to determine who should conduct hearings on the arms manufacturers. One by one, senators were eliminated: copper interests too strong in one state; impending elections in another; militaristic sentiment too high in a third. Finally, one name was left: Senator Gerald Nye (R.-N.D.). Detzer persuaded Nye to lead the investigation; he, in turn, let Detzer choose his committee’s chief investigator, and join its staff.

FDR Afloat

Bankers like J. P. Morgan, munitions makers such as the Du Pont brothers, and others who had been involved in arming the Allies in World War I were called to testify on Capitol Hill. Every new witness seemed to confirm that a conspiracy among greedy capitalists had drawn America into the conflict. Even scholars who had once advocated U.S. intervention, like the eminent Charles Beard and Harry Elmer Barnes, concluded that there had been a conspiracy. The theme of the hearings, as historian James MacGregor Burns has observed, was that “Germany was not so guilty after all. The Americans had been saps and suckers.”

The Nye probe led to passage of a series of Neutrality Acts (1935–37), reluctantly signed by President Roosevelt, that made it illegal to lend money or export arms to belligerents. Initially, at least, U.S. arms could not be supplied even to victims of aggression.

The isolationist mood expressed by the laws reflected popular sentiments. The American Legion’s motto was “Keep Out, Keep
WAR AND PEACE ON CAMPUS, 1935–41

“We consider that America is endangered. We are for American peace as part of world peace. For peace, we maintain, is indivisible.”

So argued a November 1940 letter to the *Yale Daily News* from August Hecksher II, a recent graduate. Hecksher, chairman of the campus William Allen White Committee—named for the Kansas editor who had abandoned pacifism to champion U.S. arms aid to embattled Britain—was ahead of his time. Even then, when Axis forces were on the march in Europe, North Africa, and Asia, isolationist and pacifist sentiment dominated U.S. college campuses. The chairman of the *Yale Daily News*, Kingman Brewster—later a Yale president and Jimmy Carter’s ambassador to Britain—led the campus chapter of the America First Committee. Brewster argued that “the peace and sovereignty of the United States is the ‘last best hope on earth,’” and that U.S. involvement in the war on Britain’s side would be “disastrous.”

Many other students agreed. In 1940, Cornell undergraduates sent the White House a dummy tank bearing a plea to “Dear President Roosevelt” to “keep America out of war.” The nation, argued the University of Iowa’s *Iowan*, must stay out “at any cost.” America, echoed the University of Minnesota’s *Daily*, “can be an effective democracy only if it can remain at peace.”

Such sentiments were fraught with ironies. U.S. students had been prowar in 1917, and appalled during the 1930s by Franco’s rebellion in Spain. But by the late 1930s, their save-democracy zeal had faded: A Gallup poll after the 1940 Nazi invasion of Norway found only two percent of college youth in favor of U.S. intervention on the Allied side. Far less war-wary than their students, faculty members and university heads largely backed President Roosevelt’s efforts to increase U.S. military strength. Speaking at Berkeley in 1940, Robert Gordon Sproul, president of the University of California, endorsed the arms build-up “without reservation” and warned that “those who prefer to fiddle while Rome burns... shall get little sympathy from me.”

The backlash after World War I had been exploited by several youth organizations, mostly on the Left, through the early 1930s—e.g., the Young Communist League, the National Student League, the Young People’s Socialist League, and the Socialist Student League for Industrial Democracy. Such groups, often in concert with religious organizations, sponsored numerous demonstrations; on a “Peace Strike Day” in April 1935, some 175,000 college ready.” The Girl Scouts modified their “too-militaristic” uniform. The *Chicago Tribune*, the *New York Daily News*, and the Hearst press were strongly isolationist. Women’s groups supported neutrality, and farmers opposed increased armament (96,000 signed a petition to that effect in 1934). College students chanted “No more battleships, we want schools” (Vassar), organized the Veterans of Future Wars (Princeton), joined national one-day boycotts of classes,
students (out of a total of perhaps one million) across the country briefly quit their classrooms.

But more important than the Left (on many campuses, students were generally conservative during the 1930s) was the pull of pacifism and isolationism. At the University of Kansas, students put up white crosses “in memory of the tragic betrayal of 1917” and otherwise demonstrated to show that, as peace leaders said, the student body was “declaratively against war and all the agents of war.” At the University of California, worry over war was so strong by 1937 that the elected student government created a “Peace Committee”; after Hitler took Poland in 1939, its leaders circulated a petition saying that “we will volunteer for prison rather than volunteer for service if the United States enters this war.”

Why did most students oppose intervention against Hitler for so long? Following the June 1940 fall of France, a New Republic writer found a generational cause: “After two decades of faithful tutelage by their formerly disillusioned elders, students profess to understand both the causes and the effects of wars and are determined to keep out of them.”

But some students felt otherwise. At Harvard, senior John F. Kennedy wrote to the Crimson arguing that “the failure to build up her armaments has not saved England from a war, and may cost her one. Are we in America to let that lesson go unlearned?” A Yale senior, McGeorge Bundy, a future Kennedy national security adviser, led a chapter of the interventionist Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. Taking the other side, a future New Frontiersman (and Kennedy in-law) at Yale, law student R. Sargent Shriver, joined America First because, he said, “we weren’t prepared” for war.

By the time classes resumed in the autumn of 1941, stay-out sentiment was fading. The Daily Princetonian, stoutly antiwar in 1940, now considered isolationists to be “merely obstructionists.” At the University of Missouri, undergraduates held a “War Dance,” and Harlan Byrne, the new editor of the Student, declared that “we must tip our weight to the British side of the battle scales. Perhaps this will mean war participation.” The Cornell Sun asked: “When shall we declare war?”

The answer, of course, came that December. With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, student pacifism and isolationism all but vanished—even at such antiwar citadels as the University of Kansas. Said the Daily Kansan: “This shall be a bitter fight to the finish.”

and took the Oxford Pledge against military service.* Of Libby’s “natural constituencies” for peace, only labor stood aloof.

Such were the domestic political circumstances under which Roosevelt had to operate. Burns notes that during his first term

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*The pledge stemmed from an Oxford Union debate in 1933, after Hitler came to power, on the proposition, “That this House refuses in any circumstances to fight for King and Country.” The Union voted 275 to 153 in the affirmative (which Winston Churchill, then out of office, called “shameless”).
(March 1933–January 1937), FDR “seemed to float almost helplessly on the flood tide of isolationism.”* A Roosevelt proposal in 1935 that America join the World Court was not only blocked in the Senate but publicly derided by such varied critics as Louisiana populist Huey P. Long (“the Kingfish”), humorist Will Rogers, and Father Coughlin, the “radio priest” who blamed the nation’s ills on internationalists and the “Morgan, Mellon, Mills, Meyer” cabal of Eastern moneymen.

Roosevelt’s hope, according to Burns, was that the American people would be “educated by events” as to the impossibility of isolationism. Events were not lacking.

**Sympathy for the ‘Have Nots’**

The Japanese had invaded Manchuria in 1931, ignoring international protest and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In America, both the pacifist and internationalist wings of the peace movement urged an embargo of arms shipments to Japan, and backed U.S. diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union as a counter to Japanese influence in Asia. But fissures in the movement appeared. Eichelberger and other liberal internationalists called for “collective security” measures, e.g., arrangements with America’s European allies to try to contain aggression via the application of diplomatic and economic sanctions. The radicals turned their focus from preventing a war to keeping America out of the war whose opening moves had already begun.

Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 was followed by German rearmament (while the U.S. Congress focused on the Nye hearings and neutrality legislation). In 1935, the League of Nations proved impotent (again) in the face of Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia—another blow to those Americans who had put faith in international organizations. Then the Japanese advanced from Manchuria into China proper. Hitler repudiated the Treaty of Versailles and in March 1936 his troops reoccupied the Rhineland; again Britain and France did not rise to the challenge. General Francisco Franco, with help from Italian “volunteers” and the German Condor Legion, won a brutal civil war in Spain, ousting the Republican government supported by Stalin’s Soviet Union. The Axis was taking shape.

Yet, in America, movement leaders like Kirby Page urged sympathy for Japan and Germany. These nations, said Page, were “have-nots” who were shut out of global markets; they wanted only a larger role in a world economy dominated by the trans-Atlantic powers who sought peace only because they were “haves.” The AFSC, the WILPF, and the FOR, leading an Emergency Peace Campaign (1936–38), proposed to “Keep America Out of War” and urged political and economic steps to build “a just and peaceful world order.”

*Indeed, his wife Eleanor gave the $72,000 in speaking honoraria that she earned in 1935 to the pacifist-isolationist American Friends Service Committee.
The new facts of totalitarian intent and capability were ignored. After his 1936 reelection, Roosevelt moved gingerly to challenge the isolationist consensus. In a famous speech in Chicago, FDR likened aggression to an epidemic that must be placed “in a quarantine,” and warned of “international anarchy” that could not be avoided “through mere isolation or neutrality.” Although the Kellogg-Briand Pact had long since been mocked by bloodshed on three continents, Roosevelt still shared the internationalists’ view that concerted action could avert a world war. But what to do?

Time was short. In November 1937 the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis was established, and Hitler revealed to his generals his plans for Eastern Europe’s subjugation. Roosevelt considered various responses, including an Armistice Day conference at the White House where foreign diplomats would be pressed to join a new effort to agree on principles for peaceful international relations. In January 1938, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles argued that a comprehensive conference called by the United States (now the world leader in industry, finance, and trade) might avert war; the agenda could include economic sanctions against aggressors (which neither the League nor Kellogg-Briand required) and the reshaping of the depressed world economy to deal with the have/have not issue.

Niebuhr’s ‘Suffering World’

Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain of Britain, when sounded out on the Welles plan, asked Washington to wait. A “measure of appeasement,” he suggested, might lead Germany and Italy to spare the militarily feeble democracies. Roosevelt consented; in any event, he doubted that a U.S. initiative in Europe would have much domestic support. And America had little military strength, aside from its fleet (concentrated in the Pacific), to support its diplomacy.

Pacifist leaders feared that the White House aimed to break down antiwar sentiment in the country, perhaps with an eye to an alliance with Britain. In March 1938, the month that Hitler annexed Austria, the main peace groups—Libby’s NCPW, the FOR, and the AFSC—joined the Socialist Party in a rally at New York City’s Hippodrome Theater. Some 4,500 of the faithful, including Dorothy Detzer and Wisconsin senator Robert La Follette, Jr., applauded as Norman Thomas argued that “collective security means war.”

A countercurrent was slowly building, however. At the same time as the Hippodrome rally, 650 prominent members of such internationalist organizations as the Carnegie Endowment, the Foreign Policy Association, and the League of Nations Association met in Washington. The League’s Clark Eichelberger called for an international conference to reform the world economic system. Failing that, he advocated collective security and changes in the neutrality laws to
permit the president to embargo arms to aggressors only.

In September 1938, Neville Chamberlain, meeting Hitler in Munich, agreed to Nazi territorial claims on strategically critical, heavily armed, democratic Czechoslovakia as a guarantee of "peace in our time." Press commentary on Munich illustrated shifts in American opinion. The New York Times editorialized that Hitler had "accomplished by a mere ultimatum what Bismarck failed to achieve with armies." Collective security with Britain was "indispensable."

Chamberlain's "peace in our time" was short-lived. In early 1939, Mussolini sent Italian troops into Albania (his first European conquest) and signed a "Pact of Steel" with Hitler. Shaken by these events and Franco's triumph in Spain, FDR sent appeals to Hitler and Mussolini; the messages called for peace and asked the dictators pointblank to promise not to attack any one of a list of 31 nations. Responding sarcastically in the Reichstag, Hitler said he understood the impulse of "Mr. Roosevelt" to feel "responsible for the history of the whole world," but regretted that he could not help. "I, sir, am placed in a much smaller and more modest sphere."

After concluding his surprise Nonaggression Pact with Stalin, temporarily uniting the world's two largest totalitarian powers, Hitler

At a New York "America First" rally, May 1941: Senator Burton K. Wheeler, Charles Lindbergh, Kathleen Norris, Norman Thomas. After Pearl Harbor, Wheeler said, "The only thing now to do is to lick hell out of them."
invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, and subsequently divided that stricken republic with his new partner. Britain and France finally decided to oppose Hitler. World War II had come—and with it, turmoil in the American peace movement.

Some former movement leaders had already changed their minds. Influential Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, once a mainstay of the FOR, had abandoned pacifism in the early 1930s; now he abandoned neutrality as well. “In a suffering world,” Niebuhr wrote, it was wrong to “identify the slogan ‘Keep America Out of War’ with the Christian gospel.” Other recantations came from historian Walter (The Road to War) Millis and liberal lawyer Charles Taft. Taft still admired the pacifists he had known in the Emergency Peace Campaign, but he was “glad there are not too many.”

**Debating the Draft**

Libby, Thomas, and Detzer still claimed that the United States could best serve peace by observing strict neutrality. Yet events were thinning the diehards’ ranks. Libby’s NCPW, which lobbied hard (and unsuccessfully) against increased funds for the U.S. Navy in 1938, lost several affiliates, among them 11 Jewish organizations and the American Association of University Women. Libby soon moved into a strange-bedfellows alliance with the militantly isolationist (but decidedly nonpacifist) America First movement. The NCPW even mailed out some 140,000 copies of a “stay out of war” speech by America First’s hero-aviator, Charles Lindbergh.

As the conflict began in Europe, America’s military weakness preoccupied the White House. During the months of deceptive calm following Poland’s division between Hitler and Stalin, Roosevelt began to press Congress for rearmament; but the strength of isolationism was such that he also pledged not to send “your boys” outside the Western Hemisphere.

The “phony war” in Europe ended in 1940. As German bombers began the Battle of Britain and U-boats threatened to cut the island nation’s Atlantic life line, Roosevelt sent Churchill the 50 destroyers he had requested. Isolationist reaction was intense. FDR, said the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, was “America’s first dictator.”

While Britain struggled against the Luftwaffe, Italy readied an attack on Greece, and Japanese forces threatened Indochina, Roosevelt sought an unprecedented third term. His Republican challenger, Wendell Willkie, charged that FDR’s promise to avoid a foreign war was “no better than his promise to balance the budget.” But the isolationist-pacifist opposition had begun to crack. Willkie, an internationalist, did not fight Roosevelt over foreign policy until just before the 1940 election. In September, with Willkie’s backing, Congress passed a Selective Service Act—providing for 900,000 conscripts
who would serve for one year and only in the Western Hemisphere. 

In 1941, Roosevelt proposed the "Lend-Lease" bill, authorizing him to sell, lend, or lease supplies to Britain. Senator Burton K. Wheeler (D.-Mont.) charged that the aid program would lead to war and "plow under every fourth American boy." Norman Thomas asserted that the "certain evils" of U.S. involvement in the war against Hitler outwighed "the uncertain good we might accomplish." But this was the isolationists' and pacifists' last rhetorical hurrah.

The bill passed, with the aid of some reformed anti-interventionists. Although Libby thought the bill "monstrous," one of his NCPW founders, Mrs. Harriman, testified that the Norwegians had been subjugated "like sheep" because they were "peace-loving" and the Germans had posed as "their best friends." Reinhold Niebuhr argued that a war to prevent "the exploitation of the weak by the strong" was just. He launched the new journal Christianity & Crisis to combat pacifism and isolationism in Protestant churches.

Even so, as the 1940 Selective Service Act neared expiration, scarcely four months before Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt faced bitter isolationist and pacifist opposition to an extension. The measure passed the House of Representatives by one vote. The New York Times found that narrow margin "deeply regrettable," but was relieved "that the new American Army will be kept intact."

Nothing but Faith

Thus, while the peace movement had begun to unravel as war loomed during the late 1930s, the antiwar sentiment that it fostered and exploited remained strong in Congress and among the public. As late as autumn 1941, polls reflected a kind of national schizophrenia. Gallup surveys showed that 70 percent of Americans felt that it was "more important" to defeat Germany than to stay out of war; but 83 percent opposed a congressional declaration of a state of war, even as FDR dispatched Marines to Iceland, and U.S. Navy ships began to escort convoys to Britain.

During the interwar years, the various elements of the peace movement—internationalists, pacifists, isolationists, and assorted opportunists on the Left and Right—converged, diverged, recombined, and split again under the impact of world events. And yet the movement gained an unprecedented level of influence on U.S. foreign policy. Disillusionment over the Great War, traditional isolationism, and liberal Protestant moralism made for a powerful combination. Franklin Roosevelt is widely considered to be the paradigm of a strong president; but FDR clearly felt constrained. Only at the eleventh hour, with the 1940 election behind him, did he seek to break the hammer lock that the peace movement and its isolationist allies, with their mass following, had on U.S. foreign policy.
But the movement’s legislative success during the 1920s and ’30s was soon mocked by events. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, the movement’s great achievement in diplomacy, became a synonym for wishful thinking. The chief effect of the neutrality laws was to make Europe safe for Hitler and East Asia safe for Tojo.

The peace movement, like the isolationists, fundamentally misread the signs of the times. Movement leaders looked back to World War I as an evil to be avoided, and forward to a future without war; but they never looked down, as it were, to the facts on the ground in front of them. Attacking the “merchants of death” may have been morally and politically satisfying. But it diverted attention from the rise of totalitarianism. The movement’s leaders were largely blind to the aggressive designs of Germany, Italy, and Japan. When such designs were acknowledged, they were explained away as the reactions of “have-nots” to trans-Atlantic economic hegemony.

And finally, when the totalitarian threat could no longer be ignored, the movement ran out of ideas: As Norman Thomas admitted, it “had nothing to offer in the problem of stopping Nazism… except for a religious faith.”

Could the internationalist approach to peace—championed by Clark Eichelberger and, after 1937, less forcefully by FDR—have worked? The question is moot, since the alliance between isolationists and organized pacifists eroded the liberal internationalists’ constituency. Could Roosevelt have helped rally such a constituency? His anxieties about Hitler, expressed as early as 1933, were not matched by a willingness to challenge the ideas that the peace movement had been teaching the U.S. public.

FDR believed that the White House would be an ineffective base from which to confront the radicals’ allegations that “American intervention” in Europe, even in the form of collective security arrangements, would only lead to war. “Events,” the president hoped, would undercut the peace movement and dissolve isolationism. Eventually they did, but at the expense of American military readiness, and at the cost of an Axis-dominated Europe and East Asia.

Isolationism was routed, not by argument and presidential leadership, but by the Japanese bombs that struck Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Roosevelt now had the constituency to support an active U.S. role in the struggle for the survival of freedom. From a distance of decades, it is difficult to avoid the judgment that, because of their chronic difficulties in grappling with the realities of power in the world, the leaders of the American peace movement of the interwar era made World War II more, not less, likely.
On June 12, 1982, between 500,000 and a million Americans rallied in New York City's Central Park in support of a "nuclear freeze"—a ban on all further increases in nuclear weaponry. The New York Times editorialized the next day that "hundreds of thousands of demonstrators...can't be wrong." Conservative columnist Joseph Sobran saw the great "freeze" demonstration rather differently: "The rally was actually a broad coalition of people who hate the West and people who don't hate people who hate the West."

About a year later, America's Roman Catholic bishops adopted a pastoral letter on war and peace that was broadly sympathetic to the ideas that had generated one of the biggest political demonstrations in U.S. history.

Eighteen months after the bishops' letter, President Ronald Reagan, who had been vigorously denounced by the Central Park orators and whose defense policy had been sharply criticized by the bishops, was overwhelmingly reelected, carrying 49 states.

Has the peace movement since 1945 been a success, or a failure? It has, in fact, been both. How that can be is a complicated tale.

The years immediately after World War II were a time of great hope and energy in the American peace movement. These were the days when the United Nations (UN) was established at Lake Success, New York, with 51 member countries; when 17 state legislatures passed resolutions supporting world government; when many of the scientists who had created the atomic bomb organized to prevent its further use; when Emily Balch, of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) won Nobel Peace Prizes (in 1946 and 1947, respectively). The awesome fact of nuclear weaponry, and a widespread popular belief that the war's sacrifices ought to be redeemed by a more humane future, gave the postwar movement a special élan.

The bomb seemed both curse and blessing. The curse was clear from John Hersey's Hiroshima (1946), a vivid account of the Japanese experience. The blessing lay in the widely shared perception that atomic weapons meant "the end of world war," as Vannevar Bush put it. Robert M. Hutchins, president of the University of Chicago, called the bomb the "good news of damnation"; the threat of global destruction made a "world society" imperative. Dwight MacDonald, editor of the radical journal Politics, described Hiroshima as "Götterdämmerung without the gods." Norman Cousins, in a famous
Military observers at an atomic weapons test at Frenchman's Flats, Nevada (1951). U.S. armed services were becoming interested in low-yield “tactical” devices; pacifists’ protests came later.

1945 Saturday Review essay, “Modern Man Is Obsolete,” argued that the concept of national sovereignty was “preposterous now.”

A 1946 Gallup poll indicated that 52 percent of the public supported national disarmament and an international police force responsible for keeping the peace, while only 24 percent were opposed and 22 percent undecided. Even Reinhold Niebuhr, better known for attacking sentimentalism in foreign policy, was caught up; he wrote veteran activist A. J. Muste that, while the “whole development culminating in the atomic bomb is terrible,” its existence “may increase the fear of war sufficiently so that we can build a real world organization. Therein lies our hope.”

The world-government movement was the child of prewar liberal internationalism, whose leaders, such as Clark Eichelberger, had first tried to build a legal framework to prevent war and then championed U.S. entry into the war against Hitler. Founded in 1947 as a merger of 16 preexisting world-government organizations, the flagship agency of the revitalized movement, the United World Federalists (UWF), espoused a minimalist approach: a “world government of limited powers, adequate to prevent war.” The UWF was led by Cord Meyer, Jr., a highly decorated Marine veteran; among its vice-
presidents were Cousins, Grenville Clark, Thomas Finletter, and Carl Van Doren. By 1949 the UWF had 659 chapters and 40,000 adult dues-payers, who tended to be East Coast urban whites, liberal, Protestant, and affluent.

The UWF was neither radical nor pacifist; its leaders wanted to work in the political mainstream. Meyer, who proposed general and complete disarmament under the umbrella of a world federation, supported military deterrence as an interim step, and endorsed the Truman administration’s Marshall Plan of aid to war-torn Western Europe (opposed on the American Left as the “Martial Plan” and by Senate Republican conservatives, notably Robert A. Taft of Ohio, as a “give-away” to foreigners).

**Urgency and Opportunity**

Although some traditional pacifists welcomed the world-government advocates, others were skeptical. Emily Balch of the WILPF voiced “a very considerable distrust of government as such,” and could “see no reason to be sure that a world government would be run by men very different in capacity from those who govern national states.” Many pacifists preferred a “functionalist” approach: building international community through people-to-people cooperation. The UN Security Council, according to them, was not an instrument of peace; the UN Economic and Social Council was. Pacifists and nonpacifists alike criticized many world-government schemes as too abstract; Muste and Niebuhr agreed, for example, that brotherhood and a sense of international community could not be willed into existence by a world constitutional convention.

The politicization of the atomic scientists was the second key to the peace movement’s postwar resurgence. Physicists who had supported President Truman’s decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki joined with those few who had opposed using the nuclear weapon to form the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists in 1946. The Committee meant to “arouse the American people to an understanding of the unprecedented crisis in national and international affairs precipitated by the atomic discoveries.”

But the scientists’ new activism was not just alarmist; they felt responsible for the peaceful use of the extraordinary power they had put into human hands. The famous “minutes-to-midnight” clock on the cover of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, launched in 1945

George Weigel, 35, a former Wilson Center Fellow, is president of the Washington-based James Madison Foundation. Born in Baltimore, he received a B.A. from St. Mary’s Seminary and University (1973) and an M.A. from the University of St. Michael’s College (1975). He wrote *Tranquillitas Ordinis: The Present Failure and Future Promise of American Catholic Thought on War and Peace* (Oxford, 1987), and is the editor of *American Purpose*. 
by nuclear researchers in Chicago,* was not so much a symbol of fear as an emblem of urgency and opportunity: Something drastically new had entered the human condition, and it required new understandings and a new world politics, sooner rather than later.

The scientists enjoyed some immediate successes: Congress, for example, passed the 1946 McMahon Act providing for civilian control of U.S. atomic research. But the scientists’ measured approach was not welcomed by everyone in the peace movement. Muste, for one, argued that global annihilation, not the Soviet Union, was the real enemy; he urged that U.S. scientists simply refuse to participate in weapons research. Albert Einstein agreed, but Hans Bethe said that a scientists’ strike “would only antagonize the public of the United States who would rightly accuse us of trying to dictate the policies of the country.” Edward Teller wrote that scientists have “two clear-cut duties: to work on atomic energy under our present administration and to work for a world government which alone can give us freedom and peace.”

The scientists’ movement fissured during the controversy over thermonuclear weapons that followed the first Soviet A-bomb test (1949). James B. Conant, J. Robert Oppenheimer, Bethe, and Enrico Fermi opposed a U.S. effort to develop the H-bomb; Teller supported the project. A political and moral impasse had been reached, and by the end of 1950 the Emergency Committee disbanded.

Cold War Realities

Pacifists and radicals who had been the peace movement’s mainstays before Pearl Harbor were also active in the war’s aftermath. The New York–based War Resisters League got fresh leadership from conscientious objectors who had been radicalized by their experience in Civilian Public Service camps and federal prisons during the war. These men argued for nonviolent resistance and “direct action” tactics. Muste and David Dellinger launched the Committee for Non-Violent Revolution (1946) and the umbrella organization Peacemakers (1948); draft and tax resistance were key planks in the Peacemakers’ program, which was partially inspired by Gandhi’s campaigns in India.

The postwar detente between peace movement veterans (radicals, pacifists, and anarchists) and new recruits (the world-government and atomic scientists’ groups) was short-lived. Cold War realities—the Soviet atomic bomb, the 1948 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, Soviet rejection of the Baruch Plan to internationalize nuclear materials, the Soviet blockade of West Berlin, and finally the 1950 Communist invasion of South Korea—eroded the movement’s high hopes. Tensions among peace advocates were exacerbated by

*The Bulletin (circ. 27,000) remains an important voice for scientists today.
Nuclear pacifism (and anti-Americanism) has long been a theme of the Left,
threatening NATO cohesion in Britain, West Germany, Holland.

former vice president Henry Wallace's Progressive Party presidential
bid in 1948, and the controversy over Communist penetration of his
campaign organization.*

Peace, it now appeared, required more than a great act of U.S.
political will. The Berlin blockade was the last straw for Dwight Mac-
donald, who abandoned pacifist politics for cultural criticism. Cord
Meyer left the UWF for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and
by 1951, 16 states had repealed their resolutions in favor of world
government. The Korean War led world constitutionalist G. S.
Borgese to remark dourly that "ideas, too, have their Valley Forges."
The atomic scientists were never able to heal their rift; like the
World Federalists, they soon faded from a leadership position in the
movement. The movement's postwar euphoria had been broken by
the realities of foreign totalitarianism.

Movement historians often describe the first half of the 1950s—

*Wallace ran for president after breaking with Truman over the latter's anti-Communist foreign policy,
which Wallace called a "bi-partisan reactionary war policy." He proposed sharing nuclear weapons technol-
ogy with the Soviets. He won 1,157,140 votes, notably in New York City and Los Angeles. Among his
supporters: South Dakota political science professor George S. McGovern. Among his sternest critics:
Socialist candidate Norman Thomas.
the years of the Korean War, Senator Joseph McCarthy's 1950–54 crusade against domestic Communism, Eisenhower prosperity, and mass middle-class migration to the suburbs—as the "nadir" of the American public effort for peace.

The good feeling of the Eisenhower era seemed to muffle political activism. The costly Korean War ended in 1953, and if Americans had not triumphed, neither had they been defeated. Stalin died, and in 1955 Ike met Stalin's successors, Nikolay A. Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev, at the first postwar summit. The subsequent "spirit of Geneva" led to hopes for progress in Soviet-American relations. The president took the initiative with "open skies," the most radical arms control verification proposal ever made: the United States and the USSR would exchange blueprints of their military facilities and allow unobstructed overflight of each other's territory to permit observers to check treaty compliance.

Climbing Fences

But the Soviets rejected Ike's proposal, the Cold War continued, and eddies of anxiety over the bomb remained. They surfaced and the peace movement regained public visibility through the controversy over testing thermonuclear weapons in the atmosphere.

Two new organizations, reflecting the centrist-radical division in the peace movement, were born in the late 1950s.

The National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), led by pacifist Clarence Pickett and liberal internationalist Norman Cousins, opened its campaign for a unilateral U.S. suspension of atmospheric nuclear testing with a full-page ad in the November 15, 1957 New York Times headlined "We Are Facing a Danger Unlike Any Danger That Has Ever Existed." SANE, whose name was suggested by psychologist Erich Fromm, capitalized on intense public concern over the health effects of nuclear tests in the atmosphere (would strontium 90 end up in the milk drunk by American children?). Demonstrating how nuclear anxieties could be focused through the single-issue prism of a test ban, SANE had 130 chapters and 25,000 members by mid-1958.

Cousins and Pickett still endorsed disarmament under an effective international legal system. But they also understood that the test ban was a more immediately achievable objective, one that could be grasped by their primary constituency, which resembled that of the

*McCarthy had the support of G.O.P. conservatives, e.g., Senator William Knowland (R.-Calif.), who combined hostility to the domestic left with neo-isolationist wariness of a U.S. role in Europe's defense against the Soviet threat. U.S. membership in NATO, for example, was opposed both by Senator Robert A. Taft (R.-Ohio) and by the Nation, a revival of the old anti-interventionist coalition of the late 1930s.

†In 1956, Soviet tanks crushed the Hungarian uprising, and there was saber rattling over that year's Suez Crisis. Khrushchev visited America in 1959, but the 1960 U-2 incident involving the Soviet downing of a U.S. "spy plane" ruined Eisenhower's chances for a career-capping accord at the aborted Paris summit.
postwar world-government movement: urban professionals, liberal whites, typically Protestant or Jewish.

While SANE became a vehicle for liberals and centrists, the Committee for Non-Violent Action (CNVA) was created by radical pacifists who declined to be bound by SANE’s deliberately moderate education-and-lobbying approach. Founded in the autumn of 1958 by movement veterans including the ubiquitous A. J. Muste, CNVA conducted nonviolent “direct action” campaigns against nuclear weapons and testing. CNVA’s protest ships Golden Rule and Phoenix sailed into U.S. nuclear-testing zones in the Pacific Ocean. CNVA activists also mounted campaigns against the ICBM base near Omaha (the 75-year-old Muste climbing over the base’s fence to seek arrest) and the Polaris submarine yards at Groton, Connecticut (successfully “boarding” the missile submarines George Washington, Patrick Henry, and Ethan Allen). Those Northeast-based college students who joined the Groton civil disobedience campaign were a harbinger of the hurly-burly of the decade to come.

Antinuclear activism also began to attract prominent Protestant theologians, much as pacifism had been popular among them in the 1920s. By early 1959, the influential John C. Bennett of Union Theological Seminary was writing Muste that “for the first time I agree with you that, if the USA did take the initiative along your lines, this would probably be a better policy in terms of prudence as well as in terms of ethical sensitivity.” The path to the 1960s was being charted on many fronts.

A Higher Loyalty

The peace movement of the late 1950s was also influenced by the successful nonviolent techniques of civil rights activists in the South. The demonstration, the sit-in, and other civil disobedience techniques developed by black leaders like Martin Luther King, Bayard Rustin (a World War II conscientious objector), and James Farmer were not only congruent with CNVA tactics, they also helped white clergymen make the transition from the politics of persuasion to the politics of nonviolent coercion. The civil rights movement thus became a kind of training exercise for Vietnam-era peace activists.

By May 1960, SANE had developed sufficient political weight to stage a test ban rally in New York City’s Madison Square Garden. Walter Reuther, Eleanor Roosevelt, Alfred M. Landon, and Norman Thomas spoke; telegrams from Hubert Humphrey, Adlai Stevenson, and Jacob Javits were read aloud. Three years later, Norman Cousins played a back-channel role in the test ban negotiations as a private emissary between President Kennedy and Soviet premier Khrushchev. Kennedy expressed his gratitude by presenting to Cousins one of the original signed copies of the Partial Test Ban Treaty.
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following its Senate ratification in September 1963. SANE—and the protests of Muste and the CNVA—could thus claim a considerable success. SANE’s leadership had demonstrated an impressive ability to marshal significant public support behind a middle-of-the-road peace agenda. But something was missing. SANE’s 1957 declaration—that the “challenge of the age is to develop the concept of a higher loyalty—loyalty by man to the human community”—was a noble and, in many respects, true statement. But could that “higher loyalty” be married to a peace politics that recognized totalitarianism’s threat to peace and freedom? Would the peace movement take the relationship between peace and freedom as seriously as it took the relationship between peace and disarmament? As public attention turned from the test ban to Vietnam, events demanded answers to these questions.

The Rout of the Liberals

President John F. Kennedy is often remembered for telling an American University graduating class, in June 1963, that peace was the “necessary rational end of rational men,” and for undertaking his peace initiative that helped gain Soviet agreement to the Partial Test Ban Treaty.

But the Kennedy administration, all in all, gave the peace movement of the day little satisfaction—a fact now largely forgotten. Kennedy entered the White House on a pledge to “get America moving again”—which meant, among other things, Pentagon budgets and ICBM deployments considerably larger than those of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Kennedy’s presidency included the bungled CIA invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, confrontations with the Soviets over Berlin, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and the beginning of a U.S. military commitment in the Second Indochina War. And it was Vietnam—not nuclear weapons—that led to the enormous expansion of the radical wing of the peace movement, the eclipse of nuclear pacifism, and the rout of the movement’s liberal centrists during the years after Kennedy’s assassination.

Criticism of American intervention in Southeast Asia was not confined to the peace movement. Political realists like Hans Morgenthau and Niebuhr opposed U.S. policy on pragmatic grounds: Vietnam was the wrong war, at the wrong time, in the wrong place. Republicans and liberal Democrats attacked Lyndon Johnson for duplicity. Congressional hostility to the war during the late 1960s and early 1970s also reflected anxieties over constitutional questions of executive authority in foreign policy, and led to the constraints of the 1973 War Powers Act. Senior military leaders, obediently mute in public, had grave misgivings about President Johnson’s refusal to settle on a coherent Vietnam strategy, or to mobilize the country in
THE ARMS CONTROL CONUNDRUM

“Defense is moral; offense is immoral!”
So said Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin, pounding the table at a June 1967 summit meeting with President Lyndon Johnson in Glassboro, New Jersey.

As Robert S. McNamara, LBJ’s secretary of defense, writes in Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age (1986), Kosygin was dismissing U.S. concern about a new ABM (antiballistic missile) system around Moscow. This Soviet innovation, said the Americans, would force a major increase in U.S. nuclear forces to ensure “deterrence” against attack.

Two results followed. First, Washington developed Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles, or MIRVs, for each intercontinental ballistic missile—the “cheapest way,” notes McNamara, to expand U.S. nuclear forces. Second, in 1969 Richard Nixon began the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) as the centerpiece of an “era of negotiations” with Moscow.

Today, that history seems ironic. The latest summit, Ronald Reagan’s October meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, broke up over a U.S. ABM plan, Reagan’s antimissile Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or “Star Wars.” And despite 17 years of SALT—or, as Reagan calls it, START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks)—atomic weaponry has grown. From 1970 to 1985, the U.S. nuclear warhead total rose by 275 percent. The Soviet figure: 533 percent. The two nations’ arsenals each now hold some 10,000 weapons.

On the U.S. side, the early arms control impetus grew out of the internationalism that shaped other postwar policies. E.g., during the 1940s, U.S. officials, hoping that wide prosperity would ensure peace, fostered the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. But Josef Stalin refused to take part—just as he balked at the first U.S. nuclear arms control effort.

That was the 1946 Baruch Plan. It called for full nuclear disarmament in stages, following a treaty setting up controls by an international agency and providing for United Nations-imposed sanctions on violators. But the Soviets, still developing their own atomic technology, demurred. They wanted America’s nuclear weapons destroyed before controls were established.

After the 1957 Soviet launch of the first satellite (Sputnik I) and intercontinental missile, President Dwight Eisenhower asked Nikolay Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev to discuss ways to bar a “surprise attack” by either side. The talks, in Geneva, failed when the Soviets raised other issues.

An atmospheric testing moratorium begun in 1958 was ended (by the Soviets) in 1961. After the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviets—who then had 300 strategic nuclear weapons to America’s 5,000—pressed a build-up. In 1963 President John F. Kennedy tried to end all atomic tests, but Moscow insisted on allowing underground blasts. By the late 1960s, the Soviets were approaching nuclear “parity,” and were still working on an ABM system.

The 1972 ABM treaty negotiated by the Nixon administration placed sharp limits on antimissile defenses, to leave population centers on both sides open to attack. This was to sustain the logic of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD)—the basic concept urged on Lyndon Johnson by Robert McNamara.
during the 1960s, MAD held that neither side would launch a "first strike" if its civilians were left vulnerable to a retaliatory attack. Still, Washington, and then the Soviets, proceeded with MIRVs, even as SALT continued. During 1975–80, the number of Soviet warheads more than doubled.

The SALT I (1972) and SALT II (1979) treaties did "cap" strategic launchers (missiles and bombers) at 2,400 on each side; and no more than 1,320 could carry MIRVs. Though SALT II, never ratified by the U.S. Senate, expired in 1985, and neither treaty put a lid on warheads, the U.S. and Soviet arsenals are now in the rough equilibrium that is favored by most "mainstream" arms control theorists. What is sought from arms control now?

Soviet leaders, observes Brookings specialist Raymond L. Garthoff, view nuclear weapons as just one of a range of "economic, military, political, diplomatic, and psychological elements" in their dealings with the West. They can press for curbs now as ardent as they once resisted them. Pessimists (e.g., Colin S. Gray) worry that the Soviets oppose Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative for the same reason they rejected Jimmy Carter's 1977 "Deep Cuts" offer: They seek a first-strike capability. SALT proponents (e.g., McNamara) say that the Soviets, observing U.S. ardor for both SDI and new missiles (MX, Trident II), conclude, mistakenly, that Washington seeks first-strike capability.

On the U.S. side, the Reagan proposals, as they stood post-Reykjavik, were for a 50 percent cut in strategic missiles, sharp reductions in intermediate-range missiles (and their elimination in Europe), a phaseout of underground testing, and a promise not to pull out of the ABM treaty for 10 years. The proposals have not won unanimous praise, even from "doves" who have long sought big cuts. Some want warheads to be slashed by 90 percent. Other specialists ask, why cut at all? Reductions would save little (nuclear forces account for about one-fifth of U.S. military spending); they could force more spending for conventional forces—a political burden for many U.S. allies. Other doubters note that the smaller the strategic forces, the bigger the danger posed by cheating—and the more likely that one side will consider a preemptive first strike, if it thinks few of its missiles would survive an attack.

Some East-West talks yield unarguable benefits. In Stockholm last September, Warsaw Pact negotiators agreed to a NATO proposal to allow each side's observers to conduct "confidence-building" surveys of the other's military ground exercises in Europe—to reduce the chance of (Soviet) "maneuvers" becoming massive surprise assaults. But the plane on which SALT proceeds does not always seem quite so practical, at least where America is concerned.

One reason is that a key factor in White House SALT calculations—and in those of the Kremlin—has long been U.S. public opinion. Post-Reykjavik polls showed wide public support for Star Wars, even though Reagan's refusal to give up SDI prevented an instant deep-cuts deal and led to bitter Soviet complaints. But traditionally, notes Harvard's Joseph S. Nye, Jr., American public opinion "oscillates between twin fears of nuclear war and Soviet expansion." Since the 1960s, he argues, the "glue" that has reconciled these contradictory attitudes has been the hope—justified or not—that a safer world somehow could be gained via Soviet-American arms talks.
support of the war he sent Americans overseas to fight.*

But the impact of these criticisms paled in comparison to the sea change wrought in American political culture by the key teachings of the Vietnam-era peace movement, teachings that had little to do with realist calculations of the national interest, arguments over constitutional “checks and balances,” or questions of military strategy.

Amid all the turmoil and upheaval, movement opposition to America’s war in Vietnam evolved through three stages: Vietnam as policy error, as moral failure, and ultimately as a reflection of the illegitimacy of America.

De-Nazifying America

By 1967 at the latest, the movement’s dominant message was not the horror of war but the corruption of the American experiment; as Father Philip Berrigan put it during the 1968 trial of the draft-file-burning Catonsville Nine, “we have lost confidence in the institutions of this country.” America, not war, became the movement’s primary target. And while pacifists, anarchists, and liberal internationalists contributed to this evolution in their distinctive ways, the principal influence on the ideological transformation of the Vietnam-era peace movement was the New Left.

The New Left should be carefully distinguished from the Old Left, which found its expression in the small American Communist Party and its allies. The New Left did not consider the Soviet Union the paradigm of a humane future. Nor, contrary to the suspicions of LBJ, was it a disciplined cadre deployed at the pleasure of a foreign power. New Left ideology began, in the 1962 Port Huron Statement of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as a kind of social-democratic humanism. Rejecting the “depersonalization that reduces human beings to the status of things,” the Port Huron Statement was critical of, but basically optimistic about, American democracy. The job was to transform American society into one in which man’s potential “for self-cultivation, self-direction, self-understanding, and creativity” could be fully realized.

But SDS’s originally optimistic humanism would not last three years; by 1965, it had been displaced by a vulgarized Marxism. Lyndon Johnson, the peace candidate in 1964, had already sent the first U.S. combat troops to South Vietnam when SDS president Carl Oglesby took the microphone at a November 27, 1965, antiwar rally in Washington. His speech heralded a decisive shift in the ideology of the peace movement.

*After losing 58,000 men in Vietnam, U.S. military leaders, even as they seek bigger budgets, have become extremely reluctant to intervene overseas—the ill-fated deployment of Marines to Lebanon in 1982–83 was opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; there was great skepticism in the Pentagon over President Jimmy Carter’s 1979 creation of a “Rapid Deployment Force” ready to go to the Persian Gulf.
American liberalism, Oglesby charged, was hopelessly corrupt. The United States government had systematically lied about its post-war actions in Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam because it was the tool of "the colossus of history, our American corporate system." This evil system had led America to resist the revolution of the Viet Cong, which was "as honest a revolution as you can find anywhere in history." The problem was "the system." Radical change was required if the movement were to "shake the future in the name of plain human hope." Oglesby and his followers were not impressed by LBJ's claims that "the Great Society" was at hand. There could be no "Great Society," much less a humane society, while the structure of power in American life remained the same.

These 1965 SDS themes would so dominate the leadership cadres of the Vietnam-era peace movement that it often became not so much an antiwar movement as an anti-America movement.

Leaders of the movement traditionally had taught that peace required change in international politics and economics; the Vietnam-era militants specified the primary obstacle to change as an America controlled by the "military-industrial complex." Noam Chomsky, the distinguished Massachusetts Institute of Technology linguistics...
scholar, captured the essence of the radical critique in 1967 when he wrote: "The Vietnam War is the most obscene example of a frightening phenomenon of contemporary history—the attempt by our country to impose its particular concept of order and stability throughout much of the world. By any objective standard, the United States had become the most aggressive nation in the world, the greatest threat to peace, to national self-determination, and to international cooperation." What was needed, Chomsky concluded, was "a kind of denazification" of America.

This profound disaffection with America intersected with two other key movement themes: that American "interventionism" and anti-Communism were primary causes of the world's pain. A new isolationism emerged, and was married to a trendy anti-anti-Communism among many American intellectuals.

The movement's growing influence after 1965 was not simply a function of its oft-cited media access, although movement "guerrilla theater" tactics had a natural appeal for television, and the prestige press itself reinforced movement teachings in commentary on the 1970 Cambodia invasion and the 1972 "Christmas Bombing" of Hanoi. Lyndon Johnson's ambiguities and evasions left a vacuum that allowed the movement and its congressional allies to claim the moral high ground. But even more importantly, as the war went on, the primary themes of the Vietnam-era peace movement—-isolationism, a moralistic approach to foreign policy, rejection of American institutions—matched old cultural currents in American life. The strategic achievement of the peace movement was its discovery of new audiences for these classic themes.

**Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh**

Isolationism, which had appealed to farmers and Midwest conservatives and progressives during the 1930s, now attracted literary and intellectual leaders running the gamut of disaffection from Mary McCarthy to Susan Sontag. Moralism, which Reinhold Niebuhr challenged among liberal Protestants before World War II, took new roots among Roman Catholic and other religious activists; Daniel Berrigan was not alone in teaching that "the times are inexpressibly evil." Anarchist dissatisfaction with American institutions had been one traditional element in the pre-Vietnam peace movement; now it flowered anew in the Vietnam-era counterculture.

Did the movement that taught these themes and recruited these new audiences have a significant impact on American public opinion?

Political scientist John Mueller suggests that, while the war in Vietnam was eventually more unpopular than the Korean War, it became so only after U.S. battle casualties "had substantially surpassed those of the earlier war." According to his analysis of opinion
polls, the movement did not create the evolving public opposition to America's effort in Southeast Asia, an opposition fed, rather, by White House ambiguity, the failure to win quickly, and years of growing casualty lists.

Mueller also argues that the movement's rhetoric and style had domestic political effects opposite to those intended by its leaders: "the Vietnam protest movement [in 1968] generated negative feelings among the American public to an all but unprecedented degree ... Opposition to the war came to be associated with violent disruption, stink bombs, desecration of the flag, profanity, and contempt for American values."

The net result, according to Mueller, was that the movement played into the hands of the men it most despised: George Wallace drew 13 percent of the vote in 1968 and Richard Nixon captured the presidency twice. The movement's own paladin, George McGovern, was summarily crushed in Nixon's 1972 landslide. The "Silent Majority" to whom Nixon successfully appealed wanted the war to end but wanted little to do with Viet Cong banners on the Mall in Washington, D.C. Despite all the protests, Congress did not cut off funds for U.S. military activities in Indochina until after Nixon's 1973 "Peace with Honor," an ill-fated cease-fire accord with Hanoi.

**From Carter to Reagan**

After the fall of Saigon in 1975, the antiwar cause's credibility was temporarily shaken by events: Pol Pot's genocide in Cambodia, the deaths of thousands in Hanoi's "reeducation" camps, the ordeal of a half-million South Vietnamese boat people fleeing their "liberated" country. As Peter L. Berger, a distinguished sociologist and former member of Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam, put it in 1980: "Contrary to what most members (including myself) of the anti-war movement expected, the peoples of Indo-China have, since 1975, been subjected to suffering worse than anything that was inflicted upon them by the United States and its allies."

Yet the movement's successes at home during the Vietnam era cannot be denied. As the old liberal consensus on foreign policy crumbled, many of the movement's themes became respectable in crucial opinion-forming centers of American life: the elite universities, the mainline Protestant leadership, women's groups, New York and Boston publishing houses, commentators in the prestige press, and Hollywood.* From these cultural redoubts, movement teachings would continue to affect American political discourse.

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*In 1974, for example, Peter Davis's antiwar film, *Hearts and Minds*, won an Academy Award; a congratulatory telegram from Hanoi was read aloud at the Hollywood ceremony. Frances Fitzgerald's *Fire in the Lake* (1972) won the Bancroft Prize for history and a Pulitzer. Hanoi's "narrow flame of revolution," she predicted, would "cleanse" South Vietnam of the "corruption and disorder of the American war."
UTOPIANS AND ROMANTIC RADICALS?

In Rebels Against War (1984), historian Lawrence S. Wittner, himself a peace activist, described the post-World War II American movement. Excerpts:

Superficially, there may be no reason why an opponent of militarism cannot be an economic conservative, a racist, and a foe of civil liberties. And yet ... any analysis of [American] peace activists finds them overwhelmingly on the liberal Left. This coincidence of outlook suggests a sharing of certain attitudes: a humanitarian commitment, a basic egalitarianism and a strong belief in individual freedom. They may also have a similar character structure—what some writers have called the “libertarian personality” ....

The charge of naivety leveled against the peace movement cannot be totally dismissed, especially with regard to traditional pacifism.... Nor is this completely surprising, for, as a social cause based on a moral ideal, the peace movement [has] had an inherent weakness for other-worldliness.... Like other utopians and romantic radicals, pacifists could skillfully expose the inanities and injustices of the established order without always posing a relevant alternative.

Yet as the history of its two new action thrusts—non-violent resistance and nuclear pacifism—evidenced, [the peace movement] was indeed attempting, however clumsily, to deal with questions of power and its use. Were American policymakers during this period any more “realistic”?

Indeed, America's first elected post-Vietnam, post-Watergate president, Jimmy Carter, at first espoused policies that seemed to reflect Vietnam-era themes, and that illustrated the movement's impact on the thinking of the national Democratic Party, once the internationalist party of Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy.

The former Georgia governor appeared keen on “anti-interventionism” (e.g., in Iran and Nicaragua). He seemed to view the Soviet Union's policies as essentially defensive, and criticized human rights violations by anti-Communist U.S. allies in the Third World. Carter pledged, during his 1976 campaign against Gerald Ford, to cut defense spending by $5-7 billion, and a few months after his inauguration warned the American people against an “inordinate fear of communism.” He proposed the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea, tried to establish diplomatic relations with Havana and Hanoi, and in March 1977 tried (and failed) to reach a “deep cuts” nuclear arms reduction agreement with the USSR. Movement alumni gained highly visible administration jobs: Andrew Young as ambassador to the United Nations, Patt Derian as State Department coordinator for human rights, Samuel Brown as director of ACTION.

Despite his successes in gaining ratification of the Panama Canal treaties and in negotiating the Egyptian-Israeli accords at Camp David, President Carter's foreign policy soon changed under the impact
of events. The drawn-out Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 created a widespread impression of American weakness and vacillation. The president sought and won congressional approval for a revival of draft registration (which provided peace advocates with their first opportunity to raise the spectre of "another Vietnam"), and eventually sought major increases in the Pentagon budget.\(^*\)

Carter's overwhelming defeat by Ronald Reagan in 1980 seemed, at first, to demonstrate the peace movement's collapse as a political force.

The former two-term California governor, leader of the conservative revival since the late 1960s, came to the White House proclaiming the nobility of American intentions in Vietnam, describing the Soviet Union as an "evil empire," and scoffing at the possibility of meaningful arms control with a Kremlin partner who would "lie, cheat, and steal" to serve his own interests. U.S. defense spending rose dramatically during Reagan's first term. American forces were deployed in Lebanon. The United States invaded the small Caribbean island of Grenada in 1983, and ousted its Cuban-backed "revolutionary" regime. And the U.S. Navy challenged Libya's Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi to aerial dogfights over the Gulf of Sidra. Each of these actions drew strong protests from peace advocates and their allies in Congress.

What much of the movement found most offensive was Reagan's policy in Central America. White House support for the antiguerilla struggle of Christian Democrat José Napoleon Duarte in El Salvador and U.S. pressure on the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua directly challenged the post-Vietnam movement's anti-interventionism and anti-anti-Communism, and led to new forms of agitation. Dozens of Protestant and Catholic churches across the country offered "sanctuary" to Salvadoran and Guatemalan (but not Nicaraguan) refugees; the sanctuary movement was, by its own leaders' admission, a political effort to change U.S. policy south of the border.

'Stop Now'

Such opposition to Reagan policy, combined with the post-Vietnam anti-intervention sentiments of many Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives, persuaded Congress to interrupt U.S. military aid to the Nicaraguan "contra" rebels for two years, until it was restored in 1986. Polls indicated that it was the peace movement's description of Central American realities, not the president's, that most Americans believed, and political Washington paid heed.

But it was the nuclear freeze campaign that most dramatically

\(^*\)Gallup polls between August 1969 and February 1980 showed that the percentage of Americans who believed Washington was spending too little on the military rose from eight percent to 49 percent.
illustrated the peace movement’s ability to influence, however briefly, the terms of debate in Washington as it had once done during the Vietnam years.

The freeze effort began during the late Carter years. There had been little progress on arms control since the early 1970s. Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev had signed SALT II in Vienna in 1979. But the treaty’s Senate ratification was unlikely; polls revealed public skepticism about the complex agreement, and Carter was committed to the new MX missile program even under SALT II. Nuclear anxieties were intensified by the Soviets’ military build-up, by the Carter administration’s 1979 “Presidential Directive 59,” which shifted the United States toward a “counterforce” (i.e. war-fighting) strategy, and by the fears of domestic nuclear power that had been building among environmentalists and others long before the Three Mile Island drama of 1979. 

Couldn’t a simpler, more understandable arms control formula be found?

The basic freeze proposal, the “Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race,” was drafted in March 1980 by Randall Forsberg, a Boston activist and defense researcher who had once worked at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The freeze proposal

Dr. Helen Caldicott, holding baby aloft at an antinuclear rally on Boston Common, May 1982. "Somewhere in the last 38 years," she wrote in Missile Envy, “the United States has lost its direction and its soul.”
PEACE

paralleled the simplicity of the movement's basic message during Vietnam: Where the previous generation had reduced the war issue to "U.S., Out Now!" Forsberg and her allies crafted a similarly straightforward answer to the nuclear dilemma; "Stop Now." The superpowers should just stop where they were, ending the production, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons. Forsberg's "Call" became the centerpiece of a renascent peace movement that quickly attracted new recruits.

Congress Reacts

As the freeze campaign got under way in 1980–81, for example, such supporters as atomic scientist George Kistiakowsky helped resurrect Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), a long-moribund organization of doctors and other health care professionals who now found inspiration in the rhetoric of a Boston-based Australian pediatrician, Helen Caldicott. Caldicott, PSR, and a series of editorials in the stately New England Journal of Medicine claimed that most Americans were unaware of their nuclear peril, and had to be shaken out of their "psychic numbing" by slide shows and films emphasizing the horrors of nuclear war (PSR veterans often referred to these shock treatments as "bombing runs"). There were local rallies and protests, and leaflets. ABC-TV produced the nation's first prime-time nuclear war drama, "The Day After," in November 1983, just as the presidential election season was getting under way.

The Catholic bishops of the United States had already joined the physicians as recruits to the antinuclear cause. An explosion of episcopal criticism followed hard on the heels of Ronald Reagan's 1980 election. Archbishop John Quinn of San Francisco charged that the United States had "shifted to a first-strike . . . strategy." Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen of Seattle called the Trident submarine base in his diocese "the Auschwitz of Puget Sound." Bishop Leroy Matthiesen urged his congregants to leave their jobs at the warhead-assembling Pantex plant in Amarillo.

The bishops' critique, which reflected the movement teaching that the arms race resulted from a failure of American morality and will, eventually led to the National Conference of Catholic Bishops' 1983 pastoral letter, "The Challenge of Peace."

The letter, which drew front-page attention in the New York Times, and a Time cover story, was much less a theology and politics of peace than a commentary on weapons and nuclear strategy. The bishops' final proposals were shaped by conventional arms control theory and aimed at political Washington. Here the Catholic prelates followed the pattern set by their Protestant colleagues during Vietnam: a church-as-lobbyist model took precedence over religious leaders' classic task of culture formation through moral education.
The nuclear freeze campaign, mostly an upper-middle-class phenomenon, was criticized as simplistic by some active disarmament advocates. Among them was Roger Molander, a White House staffer under presidents Ford and Carter and founder of Ground Zero. He thought the freeze was a good way for citizens to express their nuclear concerns, but worried that “there is a little too much of the feeling that the whole problem is in this country and that if we can just get our act together, the Russians will go along.”

Almost a year after the Central Park rally, the campaign hit its political apogee in May 1983 when an amended freeze resolution passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 278 to 149. But 90 of the House Democrats who voted for the freeze voted less than a month later for MX appropriations; and the freeze resolution eventually died in the Republican-controlled Senate. Freeze pressure certainly contributed to President Reagan’s appointment of the bipartisan Scowcroft Commission on strategic forces; but the Commission’s recommended development of a small, single-warhead missile (“Midgetman”) did not fit the freeze’s “Stop Now” position. White House worries over eroding public support, influenced by the freeze campaign, for the traditional U.S. policy of nuclear deterrence may well have been a factor in generating the Reagan administration’s antimissile Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI); but SDI, too, was opposed by virtually all freeze leaders.

Seven out of eight Democratic presidential hopefuls endorsed variants of the freeze during the 1984 primaries; but former vice president Walter Mondale, a freeze supporter and the eventual Democratic nominee, did not make the freeze a central issue in his campaign. In any event, Mondale’s crushing defeat by President Reagan seemed to suggest that the American people wanted both arms control and military strength.

Hamburger Money

Helen Caldicott, pleading exhaustion, announced her retirement from the antinuclear fray, and in late 1985 Randall Forsberg all but threw up her hands: “The shock of what happened in the 1984 elections [has] left us reeling. It’s not that support has gone away. It’s just that we’ve tried everything.”

Yet the freeze campaign was an important exercise that, like the Vietnam-era protests, had a pronounced impact on the teaching centers of American life.

The Catholic bishops continued their criticism of the Reagan administration’s nuclear policy after the 1983 pastoral letter. The Methodist bishops flatly condemned deterrence in 1986, while the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. issued a study paper entitled “Are We Now Called to Resistance?”, which suggested that only massive civil
disobedience could avert nuclear catastrophe. The Episcopal Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York City was declared a "nuclear weapons free zone." Evangelical Protestants formed "Evangelicals for Social Action," and produced a monthly, Sojourners, that carried freeze themes to the country’s fastest-growing denominations.

The freeze campaign also stirred up interest in other aspects of disarmament and peace-keeping. Major foundations and individual donors poured millions of dollars into studies of arms control and U.S.-Soviet relations.* Many of them were sober academic exercises. But some were not. For example, Joan Kroc, widow of the founder of McDonald’s, distributed thousands of free copies of Helen Caldicott’s

*According to the Forum Institute (Washington, D.C.), annual private foundation grants in this area, broadly defined, rose from $16.5 million to $52 million in 1982-84. The big 1984 givers (to Harvard, Brookings, M.I.T., et al.): MacArthur ($18.5 million), Carnegie Corporation, Ford, Rockefeller. Meanwhile, Ploughshares, North Star, and smaller foundations funded scores of advocacy groups, peace lobbyists, and leftist think tanks—e.g., the Institute for Policy Studies, the Center for Defense Information, the American Friends Service Committee, the Washington Office on Latin America, the Peace Development Fund, SANE, Women’s Action for Nuclear Disarmament, and the freeze campaign itself. By one estimate, there were at least 5,700 local "peace" groups of various persuasions across the nation in 1985. In 1984, for its part, Congress established the grant-making U.S. Institute of Peace, with a modest $4 million budget.
Missile Envy (endorsed by no less a figure than Walter Cronkite), and gave $6 million to establish a peace studies institute at the University of Notre Dame. (The institute’s advisory board included Evgenii Velikhov, a Soviet scientist and candidate member of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee.)

Indeed, freeze teachings—that the arms race was an action-reaction cycle; that reversing the arms race was a matter of American will; that the U.S. “military-industrial complex” was the main obstacle to that reversal; that a sort of psychological dysfunction, not real-world differences in values and interests, caused U.S.-Soviet conflict; that the United States and the Soviet Union were morally equivalent culprits in the nuclear dilemma—flavored new “peace studies” programs in high school and college classrooms and a children’s best seller by Dr. Seuss, The Butter Battle Book.

Stalemates or Breakthroughs?

In the freeze campaign, then, as during Vietnam, the peace movement both won and lost: It lost the 1984 election and the public policy battle—narrowly defined—and may have prompted a backlash, but it made gains elsewhere. The ultimate impact of the freeze campaign remains to be seen.

The post-Vietnam peace movement’s importance in American public life has often been masked by its diversity, volatility, and lack of discipline, by Ronald Reagan’s victories, by the rise of the New Right, by congressional reaction to the shooting down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 and to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Foreign policy realists of both Democratic and Republican persuasion in Washington, D.C., may think of the peace movement as a marginal factor. Peace movement leaders may feel only frustration because Pentagon budgets grow, U.S. aid again reaches Central American anti-Communists, and arms control is stalled. Both groups are wrong. They fail to measure the changes in the nation’s political and cultural environment since 1965.

Indeed, Vietnam Moratorium veteran Sam Brown’s appraisal of the movement of his day—“We seem to have had little lasting influence on the nature either of American society or its approach to the world”—rings oddly to anyone familiar with foreign policy positions taken in recent years by the United Methodist Church, the National Education Association, several New York Times columnists, the Machinists’ union, the United States Catholic Conference, the League of Women Voters, and broadcast executive Ted Turner—and by younger Democrats on the House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations committees.

Drubbings in presidential elections aside, the peace movement, probably by accident, seems to have hit on a strategy: what 1960s
German radical Rudy Deutschke once called "the long march through the institutions." As we have noted, American religion, higher education, prestige journalism, and popular entertainment were deeply influenced by various movement themes during and after Vietnam. The initial impact has already registered in American politics: in the national Democratic Party, and in the constraints felt by even so popular a president as Ronald Reagan.

Yet, despite such gains, public support of the movement has never reached a point of critical mass. Why? For one thing, judging by the polls, its spokesmen have consistently failed to develop a response to the problem of totalitarianism in general, or the behavior of the Soviet Union in particular, that is satisfactory to the general public. Most Americans favor peace and arms control but remain convinced anti-Communists.

The movement's deeper failure lies elsewhere. Even radical movement leaders no longer spell their country's name "Amerika." But the impulse that lay beneath that Vietnam-era grotesquerie—the sense that there is an evil at the heart of an American darkness—seems to remain strong among many peace militants today. They see America as the problem. Most Americans do not. And there lies the basic point of disjunction, in my view, between the movement and the overwhelming majority of the American people.

The peace movement, since Vietnam, has been able occasionally to muster enough domestic pressure to help hobble U.S. policies—in arms control, in Central America, in U.S.–Soviet relations. But its ultimate effect on international politics, like that of its counterparts in Western Europe, has usually been to foster incoherence and stalemate, not breakthroughs. The peace movement's failure to challenge Soviet policy is the reverse of its apparent disaffection with the American experiment. Both sides of that coin have to be addressed, if the peace movement is to gain and hold widespread public support—and if it is to help make the United States a leader in progress toward a world that is peaceful, secure, and free.
“Other expedients than a resort to the sword for the adjustment of international difficulties are fast coming to form the established policy of Christendom. Let this process continue fifty years longer, and it will be well-nigh impossible to involve civilized nations in war.”

So argued one contributor to a 141-year-old essay collection called The Book of Peace (Beckwith, 1845; Ozer, 1972). The subject, says the preface by George C. Beckwith of the American Peace Society, is “a sort of Delos, whither the best spirits of every party, creed and clime gather to blend in sweet and hallowed sympathy.”

In making the case against war, the authors of the 64 essays invoke such authorities as Seneca (who found that, in conflict, “avarice and cruelty know no bounds”) and Napoleon (warfare is “the business of barbarians”). One author protests that the military received 80 percent of the average $26,474,892 spent (excepting debt interest) by the U.S. government between 1834 and 1840. The Navy, costing more than $6 million a year, should be “abandoned,” he said. A “most expensive TOY!”

As The Book suggests, the bibliography of peace advocates is vast. The classic early history of the U.S. peace movement is Merle Curti’s Peace or War: The American Struggle, 1636–1936 (Norton, 1936; Ozer, 1972). A later survey is Peter Brock’s Pacifism in the United States from the Colonial Era to the First World War (Princeton, 1968).

American pacifism had roots in the European Enlightenment that were not always easily transplanted to the New World. The early religious pacifists among the colonists, Brock relates, faced situations that the brethren they left behind never had to contemplate—hostile Indians, for example, and, in 1776, an armed revolt against English oppression.

The Society of Friends greeted the War of Independence by refusing to serve either in George Washington’s army or in public office. But not all Quakers, says Brock, were so minded. Philadelphia cloth manufacturer Samuel Wetherill, Jr., argued that the Continental government “cannot exist without defense, the sword being its sinews.” And being “defensive,” the war was “not sinful.” Soon “disowned,” he formed a new sect, the Free Quakers.

The rise of secular antwar sentiment is the subject of C. Roland Marchand’s The American Peace Movement & Social Reform, 1898–1918 (Princeton, 1972) and David S. Patterson’s Toward a Warless World: The Travail of the American Peace Movement, 1887–1914 (Ind. Univ., 1976). Patterson dwells on the appearance of “diverse” activists dedicated to often overlapping isms: pacifism, world federalism, internationalism, legalism. They shared “a hope for gradual evolution toward a peaceful world order.” But their faith tended to obscure the “menacing international problems of their day.”

In many ways, peace movement history is best approached through biography. For example, LeRoy Ashby’s rendering of Idaho’s Senator William E. Borah (1865–1940), The Spearless Leader (Univ. of Ill., 1972), supplies a portrait of the Progressive movement that spawned American isolationism.

But surveys are useful, too. Charles Chatfield’s For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914–1941 (Univ. of Tenn., 1971), and John K. Nelson’s The Peace Prophets: American Pacifist Thought, 1919–1941 (Univ. of N.C., 1967), trace the often convoluted history of peace organizations. In Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920 (Vanderbilt, 1969), Warren F. Kuehl deals with the
roots of the internationalist tradition.

As Kuehl notes, 18th-century American thinkers were drawn to German philosopher Immanuel Kant's idea that friction between modern nation states could be ameliorated if they agreed on principles of law and right and established a "world republic." As early as 1780, Benjamin Franklin was musing about a plan that would "oblige nations to settle their disputes without first cutting one another's throats." Thomas Paine also spoke of a "confederation of Nations."

Early peace advocates, while supporting "some type of world society," were pacifists first, internationalists second, Kuehl notes. But "the modern advocates of a politically organized world"—men such as Andrew Carnegie and William Howard Taft—"were internationalists first and pacifists only incidentally."

Yet even they had differences, as the League of Nations debacle showed. Kuehl blames the League's defeat in the U.S. Senate on the "Utopia or Hell" attitude of the internationalists. Rather than support the League during the 1919–20 debate over it, they squabbled over details; "legalists" were annoyed by President Wilson's disinterest—"well-known," scowled Taft—in a world court.

In those days, says Kuehl, "it took an independent thinker to become a practicing internationalist." These proud pioneers "never formed a catalogue of beliefs, and this was their failing."

One gauge of how historians can differ is the story of the Outlawry of War movement and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Outlawry was the brainchild of Salmon Levinson, a Chicago lawyer. He decided that lasting peace would result if nations simply banned war as a "decider of disputes," much as dueling had been outlawed and finally abolished. As Charles DeBenedetti relates in The Origins of the Modern American Peace Movement, 1915–1929 (KTO Press, 1978, cloth; 1984, paper), Outlawry offered Americans a way to "cleanse the processes of international diplomacy" without being mired in European politics, as the League would have required.

Support came from such disparate folk as liberal philosopher John Dewey and ardent nationalist William Borah, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Borah, who had presidential ambitions, persuaded the Coolidge administration to use a 1927 French suggestion for a treaty to "outlaw war" between the two countries as a springboard to begin talks toward a multilateral pact banning all war.

In DeBenedetti's view, the resulting 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact was morally "edifying" and politically deft. The pact appealed to Eastern internationalists and Midwest nationalists, who hoped it would "quiet quarrelsome Europeans." Other scholars, however, rank these events among the most bizarre developments of "the Fool's Paradise of American history," as Samuel Flagg Bemis called the post-World War I era. In Peace in Their Time (Yale, 1952, cloth; Norton, 1969, paper), Robert H. Ferrell found Outlawry and the Kellogg-Briand Pact to be prime illustrations of Americans' "appallingly naive" understanding of power realities. The French, seeking U.S. endorsement of the European status quo, manipulated Yankee idealism with "astonishing ease."

Lawrence S. Wittner's Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1933–1983 (Temple, 1984, cloth & paper), traces the fortunes of various peace advocacy groups over the past half century. Tellingly, his account gives short shrift to two achievements of the internationalists.

The United Nations (UN), as conceived in 1944, dismayed world federalists; the Fellowship of Reconciliation viewed it as "camouflage" for the big powers' "domination." And the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
overwhelmingly endorsed by the U.S. Senate in July 1949, was scorned by peace groups. The editor of *Fellowship* called it a "military alliance" that ends "the so-recent dreams of 'one world.'"

Not so, says Alan K. Henrikson in *Negotiating World Order: The Artisanship and Architecture of Global Diplomacy* (Scholarly Resources, 1986). NATO, he points out, was created partly because the founders were disappointed that the UN's development as a collective security group seemed stunted by Soviet abuse of the Security Council veto. NATO "remains, in principle," he argues, "a fragment of a wider security system, a section of a general world order." Peace activists were wrong, he says, to dismiss President Truman's assertion, on signing the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, that protecting "this area against war will be a long step toward permanent peace."

Many authors deal with the contortions of the peace forces in the later post–World War II era.

In *Who Spoke Up? American Protest Against the War in Vietnam, 1963–1975* (Doubleday, 1984, cloth; Holt, 1985, paper), Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan trace "the Movement's" long march "from the fringes of American politics into its very heart" (the impact of Hanoi's "harsh rule" after the 1975 fall of Saigon is relegated to a footnote). While young people, they note, "gave it needed energy," the movement was "a loose, shifting, often uneasy coalition of groups and individuals" led by adults. Indeed, as John E. Mueller points out in *War, Presidents and Public Opinion* (Wiley, 1973, cloth; Univ. Press of Amer., 1985, paper), at least through 1968, youths, Democrats, and the college-educated were less hostile to the war than were older people, Republicans, and non–college graduates.

The souring of liberal intellectuals on the war, and their alliance with the New Left, came with the movement's turn from an antiwar to an anti–America stance. For example, in *Armies of the Night* (New American Library, 1968; Signet, 1971, paper), his novel/history of the 1967 march on the Pentagon, Norman Mailer speaks of "the diseases of America, its oncoming totalitarianism, its oppressiveness." The "center of America," he writes, "might be insane."

The movement's middle-aged vanguard, "the re-emerged intellectual Left," is the focus of Sandra L. Vogelsgang's *Long Dark Night of the Soul* (Harper, 1974). Quiescent during the Kennedy administration, which courted them, the intellectuals confronted not only an undeclared war but a scrambled political lexicon. While the Old Left associated totalitarianism "with secret police and thought control, the New Left equated it with 'power'—the 'power elite' of the corporations, the universities, or the 'system.' Because they conceded power applied with 'social benevolence,' new radicals could and did condemn Berkeley as totalitarian while they praised Cuba as democratic."

The intelligentsia and the young, Vogelsgang writes, "found each other in the 1960s largely because of a sense of shared powerlessness. By the end of the Johnson era, it was not to be clear that they meant the same thing by power."

The prime post-Vietnam concern of the heterogeneous peace movement—and of "policy intellectuals" and government officials—has been nuclear arms. *Cold Dawn* (Holt, 1973), John Newhouse's exploration of the origins of the U.S.–Soviet SALT talks, displays the high expectations of its time; Newhouse finds SALT "probably the most fascinating, episodic negotiation since the Congress of Vienna," one that may "go on indefinitely." As befits its time, Raymond L. Garthoff's later comprehensive
Background Books: Peace

SALT history, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Brookings, 1985, cloth & paper), is cooler about results and prospects.

Advocacy publishing on nuclear issues, however, remains heated. Among recent warnings of atomic Armageddon are Missile Envy: The Arms Race and Nuclear War (Morrow, 1984, cloth; Bantam, 1986, paper) by Dr. Helen Caldicott, the Australian peace pediatrician; Robert Jay Lifton and Richard Falk's Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological Case Against Nuclearism (Basic, 1982, cloth & paper); and Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth (Knopf, 1982, cloth; Avon, paper).

The Schell book was followed by "Nuclear Winter," a theory pressed by Cornell astrophysicist Carl Sagan, in articles in Science and Foreign Affairs, that even limited nuclear combat—"a pure tactical war, in Europe, say"—would fill the atmosphere with smoke and dust and usher in an era of subzero darkness that would extinguish life around the globe. Though the computer model on which the theory was based was flawed, Nuclear Winter remains a powerful image, oft-invoked by antinuclear activists.

"Horror is needed," says Ralph K. White in Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of U.S.—Soviet Relations (Free Press, 1984). "The Peace movement cannot do without it." Also useful is an image of an overly aggressive U.S. military establishment—a false image, argues Richard K. Betts in Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises (Harvard, 1978). His study of the advisory role of senior military men since 1945 shows that, generally, they were no more (and often less) eager to intervene in foreign crises than were White House civilian advisers. Military advice has been most heeded by presidents when it opposed the use of force, and "least potent when it favored force."

Peace advocacy thrives on both fear and hope. Alan Henrikson notes in Negotiating World Order that it is "turbulent" times that "produce visionary blueprints of a better order." War has always been the "principal stimulus" to efforts at international peacekeeping. The Napoleonic Wars led to the Concert of Europe; the World War I "clash of alliance systems" spawned the League of Nations; the next war led U.S. leaders to look again at what Wendell Willkie called "One World," via the UN.

Henrikson observes that peace as St. Augustine conceived it, "the tranquility of order"—the goal of the classic internationalists, among others—is elusive at best. But from generation to generation, the quest for peace, however defined, retains its intrinsic appeal. For their part, in Who Spoke Up?, Zaroulis and Sullivan ask the reader's sympathy for the protesters of the Vietnam era:

"Like the Abolitionists over a century ago, they gave voice to their consciences; but America (like all nations) is not grateful to those who would tell her she is wrong. And so . . . the antinuclear movement has become quasi-mythical, half-buried in time, an increasingly dim and distorted historical presence remembered kindly by some, belittled and reviled by others, recalled inaccurately even by many who helped to make it happen."

Editor's Note: Readers may wish to consult titles cited in WQ Background Books essays on Strategic Arms Control (Autumn '77), The American Military (Spring '79), and America's National Security (Winter '83), and in Vietnam as History (Spring '78).
THE GREAT CHINESE
REVOLUTION:
1800–1985
by John King Fairbank
Harper, 1986
396 pp. $20.95

John King Fairbank's contributions to China studies can hardly be overestimated. In this latest offering, however, the celebrated Harvard historian seems less concerned with adding to his already refulgent scholarly reputation than with popularizing the study of China's past.

The colloquial style is one clue to Fairbank's intent: Readers are apt to see political notables "playing footsie" or learn that Mao Zedong's wife was a "two-bit movie actress." To be sure, the book draws on the author's wide learning and academic patronage, but there are few notes and no bibliography. In place of the latter, Fairbank simply appends the table of contents of the six volumes of the Cambridge History of China that he recently edited. Similar in chronology and level of presentation to his multiedition best seller, The United States and China (1948), The Great Chinese Revolution contains new findings and insights, new materials to support familiar Fairbankian themes.

The focus, of course, is "revolution," broadly defined to embrace not only politics, society, and economics but also "the entire historical process of modern times in China." Fairbank is particularly concerned with showing how the economic and cultural revolutions—what Marxists call the "base" and the "superstructure"—seldom proceeded at the same pace. In fact, they often undermined each other, in not altogether predictable ways. One learns, for instance, that the scholars of the New Culture Movement (1916–28) postulated that "new ideas to create a new China could come only from hard study and thought, which must precede political action." But if many intellectuals embraced progress, a goodly number of prominent scholar-officials remained preoccupied with more arcane matters such as "national essence" or the compatibility of Confucianism with modern science. And it was the latter who were heard by an essentially conservative political leadership.

Fairbank locates a pattern: Attempts by elites to bring about modernization through a reshaping of culture have repeatedly led to a hiatus between theory and practice, and to economic disaster—as in Mao's notorious Cultural Revolution (1966–76). Even the well-considered efforts between 1914 and 1937 to introduce modern Western educational ideas and practices (such as those of John Dewey) seem to have had relatively superficial impact, profiting mainly "city-bred children of the better-off."

Somewhat new is Fairbank's determination to examine China on its own terms. "China is China," says the author, and its modern form, he

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believe, should be understood as an outgrowth of its historical legacy, rather than as a reaction to the outside world. He asserts that "European comparisons offer little help in understanding China's revolution."

Favoring "vertical" analogies, he compares the administrative skill of China's current leader, Deng Xiaoping, to that of Yuan Shikai, the frustrated nation-builder who served as president of the young Republic from 1912 to 1916. Elsewhere, he compares Mao's adaptation of Marxism to Chinese conditions to Hung Shiquan's adaptation of Christianity to the populist yearnings of the Taiping Rebellion (1853-64). True, Fairbank does measure provincial governor and diplomat Li Hongzhang (1823-1901) against his German contemporary Otto von Bismarck, but only to underscore the contrast: The former failed to shore up the moribund Qing dynasty (even though he helped to crush the Taiping Rebellion), while the latter "engineered and won three wars to create the German empire...."

Fairbank's tendency to play down the relevance of the West sometimes leads to understatement of its impact. His view of the effect of Western imperialism, for instance, reads almost like an apology: Imperialism "might be truly exploitative in some situations but in others more like a crude form of development." Fairbank even minimizes the impact of Communism on modern China. Sometimes, this aversion to non-Chinese comparisons and international influences is so indefensible that not even Fairbank can adhere to it—as in his long and illuminating discussion of Western missionaries and educators during the pre-Communist period.

But generally the author's judgments and insights are sound. China's failure to modernize its economy on its own during the early part of the 19th century he attributes to an untimely population boom: A glutted labor market made mechanical innovation uneconomical. Fairbank is particularly good at making us see Western intrusion as the Chinese must have seen it: the meddling of an uncouth, uncivilized people. Such a perspective makes more comprehensible the Chinese techniques of "barbarian handling," which had proved so successful against Mongols and Turks but turned out to be catastrophically inadequate in dealing with the West.

Some verdicts may occasion controversy. Fairbank's thesis that the Kuomintang was influenced by the Nazis has already been attacked. Suffice it to say that the author here might have more wisely adhered to his policy of focusing on indigenous antecedents. And to attribute China's move into the Soviet camp during the immediate post-World War II era purely to American error—"our understanding was completely wrong, in fact stupid and not well based"—ignores the domestic and international repercussions that a shift in U.S. policy (from pro-Kuomintang to pro-Communist) would have entailed. It also neglects the point that, ultimately, responsibility for China's choice must rest with those who made it.

All things considered, this is a lively and fascinating tour de force. Not everyone will agree with all of Fairbank's conclusions, but they are expressed with spunk and forthrightness.

—Lowell Dittmer '86
PRODIGAL SONS: The New York Intellectuals and Their World
by Alexander Bloom
Oxford, 1986
461 pp. $24.95

THE LYRICAL LEFT: Randolph Bourne, Alfred Stieglitz, and the Origins of Cultural Radicalism in America
by Edward Abrahams
Univ. of Va., 1986
265 pp. $20

In Europe the separation of literary intellectuals from national politics seems not nearly so evident as it does in the United States. Some of the biggest monuments and broadest boulevards in European cities honor writers, poets, and artists. Only a winding river or a few stops on the busline separate a capital’s literary quarters from its parliament buildings. The critic and the politician exchange greetings at the café or at the opera. A conflict between them can become a national dialogue. No one would dream of calling Raymond Aron or Jean-Paul Sartre a “Paris intellectual.” Intellectual life is a national resource.

By contrast, the distance between the cultures of literary New York and political Washington can seem as great as the New Jersey Turnpike is long. In his splendidly detailed narrative, Alexander Bloom, a professor of history at Wheaton College, adds testimony to the immense gap between the avant-garde elitism of one city and the pragmatic populism of the other. The comparison is not a part of his purpose. Anti-Communism is the axis of Bloom’s history; it is also the base of the only apparent axis that his “New York intellectuals” and political Washingtonians ever managed to form.

But what does the phrase mean—“New York intellectuals?” At best, it is a slightly ironic self-description, as suggested in Irving Howe’s famous essay by the same name. At worst, as everyone who does not live in New York knows, “New York intellectual” serves as a code phrase for New York Jewish intellectual.

The sociology of this stereotype and the origins of this peculiar usage have never been as fully illuminated as in Dr. Bloom’s study. He has written the best available history of a preeminent group of Jewish writers making their way out of the constraints of the immigrant community, through the social radicalism of the Great Depression. By the sheer brilliance of their writing they not only broke through walls of prejudice but, by the late 1930s, began to reshape the literary and artistic canons of New York and, to some degree, of the whole nation.

Within a decade and a half after World War II, it would hardly be possible to imagine American literary culture in the exclusion of Lionel Trilling, Alfred Kazin, Phillip Rahv, or Saul Bellow; art criticism without Meyer Schapiro, Harold Rosenberg, or Clement Greenberg; social criticism without Daniel Bell or Nathan Glazer; historical studies in the United States without Richard Hofstadter.

Yet it is not the substance of their professional careers that primarily interests Bloom; nor does he uncover striking similarities in their intellec-
tual contributions. (Had he ventured further into these areas, this might have been the definitive study of this generation of Jewish thinkers.) What interests the author most is the ideological core of this group, the anti-Communism that formed the magnetic field of their relationships and that brought most of them together on the pages of Partisan Review, Commentary, and Encounter, and in the Congress for Cultural Freedom.

Of course, most of these men had been radicals in their youth. Whether Socialists or Communists, whether pro-Trotsky or pro-Stalin, they had all tended, at least up until the late 1930s, to interpret the world in Marxist terms. As Jews (for the most part), they had special reasons for being drawn to radical politics. On one hand, Bloom notes, the “cosmopolitan philosophy of radical causes offered the hope of a world where being Jewish would not make any difference.” On the other, radicalism was an assertion of their connection with the marginal ghetto world of their parents. Even after they abandoned Marxism, the “intensity and fervor” (as Irving Howe described it) of their radicalism has continued to characterize their intellectual style.

Though he avoids zooming in on all the factional and frequently petty disputes that divided them, Bloom moves cautiously and critically along the complex history of their hatred of Stalinism and of its American followers. Not always united about how to combat the threat, none doubted its gravity. In this they of course differed from a significant group of other New York intellectuals, many of them of similar ethnic origins. Precisely why that was so, how anti-Communism became a virtual obsession among one group of Jewish intellectuals while Stalinism commanded the prolonged loyalty of others remains something of a puzzle. But one virtue of this book is that it does not offer facile solutions.

If Bloom’s chronicle is another version of the American success story, Edward Abrahams’s double biography of writer Randolph Bourne and photographer Alfred Stieglitz is about ideals not lost but still unfulfilled. The short and poignant life of Randolph Bourne (1886–1918), our best-known critic of war and the warfare state, is here finally told with the appropriate mixture of passion and critical scholarship. One of the leaders of the cultural rebellion in Greenwich Village before World War I, Bourne was not, in the current usage of such terms, a liberal, a conservative, an anarchist, or a Marxist. He counted himself an intellectual, a status he prized for its connotation of independence from all forms of political or social control; a term that therefore required no qualifying adjectives.

As contributing editor of the infant New Republic and of the short-lived Seven Arts, Bourne managed to demonstrate his political immiscibility in a variety of ways, most famously by his scourging criticism of Woodrow Wilson’s war policies. About this elusive and, as some thought, slightly sinister figure (he was hunchbacked and his face had been disfigured at birth), Abrahams has uncovered new sources of information. These make it possible for him to describe and to analyze Bourne’s complex political views and his tortured personal relationships, above all with women.
An equally persuasive and textured portrait of Alfred Stieglitz (1864-1946) is drawn in the second half of this volume. The author has sure command of the world of modernist art over which Stieglitz ruled in America during the decade before and the decade after World War I. In addition, Abrahams, a historian of wide-ranging talents, manages to read Stieglitz's own photographs as texts illuminating the mind of this great artist and social critic. In his own work, as in that of the artists he exhibited, Stieglitz sought to establish photography as a new medium of self-expression. As the owner of the famous Manhattan gallery, “291,” and as editor of Camera Work, perhaps the finest photography journal ever published, Stieglitz introduced Americans to the most advanced art of the day.

As representative figures of the “lyrical left,” Bourne and Stieglitz emerge as spokesmen of the “inviolable autonomy of the self” in an age of ever-increasing political and social conformity. Through them, the author reminds his readers that, among other things, there were intellectuals in New York before there were “New York intellectuals.” And also that there has existed in New York a tradition of intellectual radicalism that has never been trimmed to suit the requirements of mere ideology.

—Carl Resek '86

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NEW TITLES

History

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SAUDI ARABIA: The Formative Years, 1902-1918
by Jacob Goldberg
Harvard, 1986
231 pp. $22.50

Saudi Arabia moves in ways strange to most Middle Eastern nations. Wary of “fraternal” Arab alliances, comfortable in their dealings with Western states, the Saudis appear remarkably free of ideological fervor. Goldberg, a professor at Tel Aviv University, traces the nation’s pragmatic foreign policy to the rise of the third Saudi dynasty during the first two decades of the 20th century.

In 1902, when Ibn Saud (1880-1953), heir to the Saudi throne, returned from exile and drove the rival Rashidi dynasty from Riyadh, observers (particularly the Ottoman overlords) expected a revival of Wahhabism. A fundamentalist brand of
Islam dedicated to converting all nonbelievers, Wahhabism spurred 18th- and 19th-century Saudi rulers to wage war against their neighbors. But each time the Saudis grew too menacing, the powerful Turks stepped in and crushed them.

Ibn Saud, worldly wise as a result of his years in British-dominated Kuwait, tempered ambition with a strong dose of realpolitik. He courted Britain’s favor and protection in his quiet struggle against Ottoman hegemony. At the same time, he openly pledged fealty to the sultan and refused to fight against the Turks during World War I. His policy succeeded: Unlike other Arab lands once under Ottoman suzerainty, Saudi territory was never made into a European mandate.

Saud’s deft diplomatic gamesmanship continued throughout the 1920s, as he vied with the rival Hashemites to secure favorable territorial boundaries for what came to be recognized, in 1932, as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Despite occasional outbursts of Wahhabi fervor (e.g., the 1979 takeover of the Grand Mosque of Mecca), Saudi policy continues to reflect “not the interests of Islam... but the interests of the Saudi dynasty.”

Rybczynski’s illuminating history of Western notions of home focuses on an aspect of the human dwelling that most contemporary architects seem to have forgotten: comfort.

Timeless as that quality might seem, the author, a professor of architecture at McGill University, ties its emergence to the rise of the European bourgeoisie during the late Middle Ages. To be sure, from the 11th century until the 17th, concern for comfort even among city dwellers was slight: Houses served both as shops and homes, with few distinct boundaries; privacy was minimal, and furnishings (as the French words meubles and mobiliers suggest) were moveable and functional.

But even if the English word “comfort” had no domestic applications until the 18th century, Rybczynski sees the turning point in the 17th century, when the Dutch virtually invented domesticity. As paintings by Vermeer and others attest, Holland’s clean, orderly dwellings, clearly separated from the workaday world, were objects of intense personal pride, arranged and overseen by
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the Dutch housewife (who, unlike her counterparts elsewhere in Europe, had few if any servants). Leisure and ease were the signal contributions of the 18th century, as ottomans and stuffed chairs encouraged relaxation, and improved fireplaces (and stoves) produced what historian Fernand Braudel called a "revolution in heating."

With scores of telling examples, the author follows the growing influence of technology, noting that "the great American innovation was to demand comfort not only in domestic leisure but also in domestic work." But the steady drift during the 20th century toward "conspicuous austerity," efficiency, and functionalism (despite nostalgic "period" revivals) has produced sterile domestic environments. "We must rediscover for ourselves the mystery of comfort," Rybczynski insists, "for without it, our dwellings will indeed be machines instead of homes."

THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY

The 14 essays collected here, most of which are reprinted, add up to an extended philosophical meditation on recent American politics, informed by the author's long and fundamentally liberal view of American history.

The pattern of our past, argues Schlesinger, an adviser to John F. Kennedy as well as a noted historian, is cyclical. Acknowledging theoretical debts to Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry Adams, economist Albert O. Hirschman, and even his own father, he rejects the image of a pendulum swinging between opposing fixed points—between, say, private and public interests, or conservatism and liberalism. Instead, Schlesinger envisions a spiraling cycle, with each new phase "flow[ing] out of the conditions—and contradictions—of the phase before and then itself prepar[ing] the way for the next recurrence." Schlesinger's cyclical scheme diminishes the role of labels (Reagan is too much of a reformer to be thought of simply as a conservative) and even of external events. Two severe depressions between 1869 and 1901 failed to spur liberal reforms or to stem the conservative tide; the Progressive Era (1901–19) got under way during a time of prosperity. Ultimately, Schlesinger argues, the "two jostling strains in American thought agree more than disagree" on such
fundamental matters as individual liberty and the rule of law.

Schlesinger muses on the Cold War ("The real surprise would have been if there had been [none]"); the conflict between those who consider America an experiment—subject at any time to failure—and those who see it as the divinely ordained "City on the Hill"; the reputations of presidents; and the future of the vice presidency. While the essays are devoted mostly to historical patterns, Schlesinger concludes with the argument that leaders alone "affirm free choice against the supposed inevitabilities of history."


In the summer of 1932, Josef Stalin demanded that 6.6 million tons of Ukrainian grain be handed over to the Soviet government for export abroad. By November, village granaries were empty, peasants were beginning to starve, and police "brigades" swarmed the countryside looking for offenders who withheld any of their crop. As the death toll mounted, Western relief was repeatedly turned back at the border. By the end of the next year, over seven million Ukrainians lay dead.

Horrible as these events were, Conquest, a noted Soviet historian, reminds us that they were only the culmination of a deliberate Bolshevik strategy, begun by Lenin and carried out by Stalin, to "collectivize" Soviet agriculture and to crush any nationalist resistance within the Soviet empire. Lenin had managed to wipe out only the wealthiest independent peasants (or kulaks) in 1920. But nine years later, Stalin sent some 13 million peasants to Arctic work camps, where roughly a third died. The peasants who remained at home were forced into collectives. Many resisted, of course, but none so firmly as the Ukrainians—a people long known for their opposition to Bolshevik policies. So Stalin gave his orders.

And Western observers, by and large, averted their gaze. Conquest lauds the few exceptions. The Manchester Guardian's Gareth Jones, traveling by foot through the Ukraine, reported the peasants' common lament: "There is no bread. We are dying." His dispatches were attacked not only by the Soviet press but also by many Western journalists, including the cynical careerist Walter...
Duranty of the New York Times. Most Westerners, such as socialist Beatrice Webb of Britain's New Statesman, were too busy looking for an earthly paradise to be troubled by nasty rumors. Conquest has chronicled the shame as well as the sorrow of this murderous harvest.

Contemporary Affairs

LETTERS FROM PRISON
And Other Essays
by Adam Michnik
translated by Maya Latynski
Univ. of Calif., 1986
354 pp. $25

Independent organizations are the bane of the totalitarian state—a truth that has steered historian Michnik's political career during most of his adult life in Poland. Born in 1946, he was imprisoned in 1968 for organizing student demonstrations in sympathy with Czechoslovakia's brief "Prague Spring"; later, he helped organize the Workers' Defense Committee, a sort of mutual assistance society, and served as an adviser to Solidarity, for which role he was twice imprisoned.

The seven letters written from prison bear largely on the tactics of political resistance in the specific Polish context, but their force and conviction transcend their immediate cause, as do the writings of, say, Thomas Paine or Mahatma Gandhi. Addressing his captors in one, Michnik makes a searing statement of individual defiance: "Let my little gesture of denial be a small contribution to the sense of honor and dignity in this country that is being made more miserable every day. For you, traders in other people's freedom, let it be a slap in the face." His instructions to the West are explicit: "In a way, ever since Yalta, Poland has been...a precise litmus test of Soviet intentions in foreign policy." On the effectiveness of linking economic ties with respect for human rights: "They constantly repeat that no American moves can have any impact.... They lie. Even Josef Stalin was once forced to open the gates of his camps and release Polish prisoners."

The historical essays that wrap up the volume provide background to Poland's current plight, but there is nothing musty about them. (In one detailing the turn-of-the-century debates between Polish nationalists and Polish socialists, Michnik sides, interestingly, with the latter.) Even when looking backwards, Michnik writes with the passion of an engaged political man.
Arts & Letters

NORMAN ROCKWELL: A Definitive Catalogue (2 vols.)
Text and catalogue by Laurie Norton Moffatt
Introduction by David H. Wood
Univ. Press of New Eng., 1986
1200 pp. $195 set

An illustration may lack the ambiguity and highly personal emotion of a work of art, but it fulfills a crucial cultural function. The illustrator gives his viewers an instantly recognizable moment in a narrative, drawing their attention to certain character types, relationships, and situations that make up a society's myths about human behavior. These myths often reach beyond the present to an imagined collective past; they tell what it means (or meant) to be a boy, to live in a small town, to celebrate a holiday. By and large, they are happy.

Norman Rockwell, America's best-loved recent illustrator, published his first picture in 1912 when he was 18 and worked unstintingly until just before his death in 1978. Known mainly for the 300 covers he did for the Saturday Evening Post, he also illustrated calendars, books (including Tom Sawyer), and advertisements. As if that were not enough, he painted more than 200 portraits.

This catalogue of all of Rockwell's known works contains 96 color and more than 3500 black and white plates; they all accompany entries arranged chronologically within each category of his work. Collectively, the illustrations provide a fascinating journey through an idealized 20th-century America, absorbing because its myths remained largely unchanged until the late 1960s. In Rockwell's world, Americans are mainly Anglo-Saxon and Christian, live in small towns or on farms, are mischievous if boys and sweet if girls, have loving if sometimes muddled parents, and are visited by a jolly Santa every year.

VN: The Life and Art of Vladimir Nabokov by Andrew Field
Crown, 1986
417 pp. $19.95

Vladimir Nabokov (1899-1977) was not simply one of the great prose stylists of 20th-century literature; he was great in two languages. In Russian or English, his stories and novels—The Defense (1929), Glory (1931–32), Pale Fire (1945), Ada (1969)—are elaborate linguistic puzzles in which details from his personal and family history are often cunningly concealed. If Nabokov's works are "self-referential through and through," Field cautions, "they only rarely demonstrate a connection with the life we know that Nabokov led."

As in his two earlier studies of Nabokov, Field illuminates many of those obscure links. One
learns, for example, that a romantic liaison between Nabokov's aristocratic great-grandmother and grandfather is a "neat reversal of the story of Lolita: the man marries the daughter to continue ... to be her mother's lover." In addition to literary cryptography, Field has skillfully recreated scenes from the author's peripatetic life: the privileged Petersburg childhood; struggles in Berlin during the 1920s, when Nabokov tutored by day and wrote by night, soon establishing himself, under the pen name Sirin, as a leading Russian author; teaching days at Wellesley, where, despite his strictness, he became something of a romantic idol among the students.

Nabokov's outspokenness on matters literary and political often served him ill: The president of Wellesley took a dim view of his anti-Soviet remarks, and Nabokov's pronouncements upon such writers as Boris Pasternak and Alexander Pushkin created tensions with his erstwhile friend Edmund Wilson, arguably the most powerful American critic of this century. Wilson's cool opinion of Nabokov's work may have delayed his apotheosis until the mid-1960s. Only then, says Field, did sporadic praise escalate "to the contention, beginning with an article by Eliot Fremont-Smith in the New York Times, that Nabokov was the world's greatest living writer."

An awesome one-man feat, the Dictionary of Samuel Johnson (1709–84) has frequently baffled even his most devoted admirers. In 1755, English critic Thomas Edwards complained that the 114,000 quotations used to define its 40,000 words added up to a "needless" and "intolerable" number. DeMaria, a professor of English at Vassar, disagrees. Far from superfluous, Johnson's pluckings from authors as diverse as Ovid and Isaac Newton were intended to be, as he himself said, "useful to some other end than the illustration of a word."

To reveal the scope of Johnson's ambition, DeMaria arranges the Dictionary's large and seemingly unrelated body of quotations into an encyclopedic compendium of 18th-century learning and values. Throughout the Dictionary, says DeMaria, Johnson strives to show that each field of knowledge, be it language or education, exists
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to lead man to an understanding of his subservience to God. Enjoining his readers to accept the limits of earthly knowledge, he invokes John Milton's words, "be lowly wise." While extolling the virtues of the next life, Johnson also suggests how to live well in this one. The maintenance of a "proper intellectual polity"—a balanced attention to sacred and profane matters—promises, according to Robert South, "serenity and complacency upon the whole soul." As for money, the via media is best attained by earning what James Thomson called "an elegant sufficiency."

As we learn from biographer James Boswell, Johnson derived more than monetary reward from the "muddling work" of lexicography. For a man who believed that life was virtually synonymous with work, the Dictionary, DeMaria says, provided "a way of knowing where the time went and of seeing that it was not wasted."

THE CITY AS A WORK OF ART
London, Paris, Vienna
by Donald J. Olsen
Yale, 1986
341 pp. $35

The 19th century was the best of times for urban architecture. Many of the older cities throughout Europe were transformed into imperial capitals, lavish and ornate symbols of the power and wealth of emerging nation-states.

According to Olsen, a Vassar historian, Paris and Vienna underwent the most dramatic and beneficial changes, but he begins his three-city study with John Nash's design of London's single boulevard, Regent Street. Linking two royal palaces, it was intended by Nash to combine "the functions of a triumphal way with that of a street devoted to the luxury retail trade." This brief burst of monumentalism was followed, from 1850 on, by more prosaic planning goals, including drains and sewers for improved sanitation, and by a drift toward "suburban coziness," as architects and builders catered to the English demand for private homes with small gardens.

Paris received a massive face-lift at midcentury. Baron Haussmann's urban renewal plan razed old landmarks, removed workers' quarters to the suburbs, and introduced the city's grands boulevards, where all levels of French society mingled in pursuit of pleasure and commerce.

In Vienna, the development of the Ringstrasse was an assertion of imperial order that defied the historical reality of the rapidly dissolving Haps-
burg state. Nevertheless, it provided “room for the pomp and spectacle of [its] court” as well as for “the time-wasting rituals of [the] leisure classes.” It was the latter, of course, that largely inspired the artistic and intellectual flowering of fin de siècle Vienna, the subject of much recent scholarship in America.

Although the empires that the three cities were meant to glorify have disappeared, the cities retain their majesty. They are also reminders of the importance of the street as the essential stimulus to urban life and beauty.

Science & Technology

GREAT AND DESPERATE CURES
The Rise and Decline of Psychosurgery and Other Radical Treatments for Mental Illness
by Elliot S. Valenstein
Basic, 1986
338 pp. $19.95

To perform a lobotomy, a surgeon typically would penetrate his patient’s skull with an instrument resembling, variously, “an apple corer, a butter spreader, or an ice pick,” and then blindly proceed to destroy portions of the prefrontal lobe. Between 1948 and 1952—the heyday of lobotomy—tens of thousands of mentally ill individuals in America, Europe, and Japan had the operation. On some psychotics it had a calming effect. Some died, and many were simply hurt. Yet the demise of psychosurgery during the 1960s resulted not from scientific scrutiny or public outcry but from the introduction of new drugs.

Valenstein, a neuroscientist at the University of Michigan, locates lobotomy within the long debate dividing both psychiatry and neurology since the 19th century. It pits those who believe mental illness is the product of “life experiences” against those who hold that it is biologically caused. To the latter, such drastic procedures as electroshock and lobotomy were more scientific, more truly “medical,” than mere “talking” treatments. They also promised quick results.

Valenstein tells the story largely through portraits of two ambitious physicians. Egas Moniz (1874–1955), an aristocratic Portuguese neurologist, performed the first “leucotomy” in 1935 and soon was claiming miraculous improvements in most of his patients. Moniz, who shared the Nobel in 1949, found an eager American disciple in psychiatrist Walter Freeman (1895–1972), who toured the country to perform about 3500 lobotomies. The media was briefly enthralled: “No Worse Than Removing a Tooth” ran the typical cheer of one small-town paper.

The anthology's title story, by journalist Sonu Hwi (b. 1922), reminds one of Alexander Pushkin's great poem, The Bronze Horseman. Although the latter treats 18th-century Russia and the former 20th-century Korea, both authors focus on the dreams and fears of a single man (Ko Hyon in Hwi's story) to show how an entire people can be crushed by forces of history over which they have no control. Hyon's father is a Korean patriot killed while fighting the Japanese occupation (1910–45); his grandfather is a superstitious traditionalist who accepts fate. Sharing traits of both, Hyon is drafted into the Japanese army, later defects to China, and finally in 1945 returns to a small Korean town just below the 38th parallel. When the Communists invade in 1950, Hyon, now a teacher, decides to resist, even if it means dying. "I must die only after showing proof that I've lived!" Less epic in scope, the other 19 stories are unified, says editor Lee, an Asia specialist at the University of Hawaii, by a common theme: their characters' oscillation "between negation and affirmation of traditional values."


Apart from the work of the two Maries (Curie and Pasteur), standard histories of science have remarkably little to say about the contributions of women. This anecdotal history is a useful corrective. Alic, a molecular biologist at Oregon Graduate Center, makes imaginative use of the often skimpy evidence: e.g., that women doctors existed in fourth-century B.C. Athens is proved by ordinances that outlawed them. The Alexandria-born Hypatia (A.D. 370–415), "the earliest woman scientist whose life is well documented," was renowned throughout the classical world for her work in mathematics, astronomy, and mechanics. Re-nown has its hazards: Hypatia was murdered by Christian fanatics because of her Neo-Platonic beliefs. In keeping with her time, Hildegard of Bingen, "Sybil of the Rhine" (1098–1179), wrote a widely respected cosmology that showed a thorough understanding of Aristotelian principles. Self-effacement ("I did nothing for my brother but what a well-trained puppy-dog would have done . . .") almost obscures the fact that Englishwoman Caroline Herschel (1750–1848) discovered comets and helped found sidereal astronomy. Such modesty characterized women researchers through the last century (where Alic stops): Even the "Queen of 19th-Century Science," Mary Somerville (1780–1872), believed that female scientists lacked creative genius and originality.
Acclaimed by only a small circle of friends during his lifetime, Thomas Eakins (1844-1916) today ranks as one of the outstanding American artists of his era, perhaps of the entire 19th century. His striking portraits of accomplished Philadelphians—oarsmen, doctors, musicians—stand as tributes to a certain form of heroism, the heroism of the disciplined professional life. Here, historian Elizabeth Johns surveys the career of this stubborn iconoclast who captured the hopes, and some of the disappointments, of his fellow Americans at the turn of the century.

by Elizabeth Johns

Thomas Eakins did not disdain fame. He craved recognition from his contemporaries, and he was disheartened when he received so little. Replying to an inquisitive admirer in 1894, he gave free rein to his bitterness: “My honors are misunderstood, persecution, and neglect, enhanced because unsought.”

Yet, in some ways, it seems that Eakins did everything in his power to avoid popularity during his lifetime. Never particularly sociable, he could be brusque in dealing with others. He spent almost all of his career in Philadelphia at a time when most other important American artists were working in New York or Boston or, in some cases, during long stretches of self-imposed exile, in Europe. He chose a genre of painting, portraiture, that most noted artists of the day found unworthy of their talents. He painted in a direct, strikingly realistic style that was often unflattering to his clients (many of whom refused to accept the finished product). And he preferred dark, intense colors. Such choices were bound to put off those art lovers who sought brightness, vivid colors, and pleasing effects in paintings.

What would have made him popular with both audiences and critics, he knew, were certain strategies adopted by his contemporaries—such men as William Merritt Chase and George Inness, for instance, who painted landscapes composed of light colors and fluid, Impressionist-inspired brushwork. Or, since Eakins favored portraits, he might have followed the example of his friend, John Singer Sargent, whose carefully contrived poses and flattering colors gave his subjects beauty, elegance, and a com-
manding presence.

Eakins, however, had a self-imposed mission, and he refused to compromise it by yielding to prevailing fashion. As a young man, he decided that his life work would be to paint the portraits of men and women who strove for extraordinary achievements, and to do so in a manner that would reveal some essential truth about their character. Most of his subjects would be fellow Philadelphians, a meritocracy of individuals who variously excelled in a broad range of pursuits—athletics, medicine, music, art, teaching, and the sciences.

Eakins was not alone in admiring the man, or woman, of accomplishment. During the 1870s and '80s, popular philosophers, journalists, and the general public viewed the dedication of the outstanding doctor or scientist as nothing less than heroic. It was, to be sure, a democratic brand of heroism, open to people of all classes, unlike the aristocratic form of the past. And it revealed itself in the skilled, self-disciplined execution of a task, not in acts of martial valor. As an embodiment of contemporary ideals, such heroism represented the best hopes of a people who had come out of a rending national experience—the Civil War—and were looking toward a peaceful future. But if Eakins was not alone in recognizing this heroism, he was unique among American artists in choosing it as the theme for his work.

How did this come about?

Eakins was born in 1844, the son of a Philadelphia writing master, Benjamin Eakins, and his Quaker wife, Caroline Cooperrthwait Eakins. On the faculty of a Quaker school, Benjamin used part of his
modest income to make judicious purchases of real estate. His speculations paid off. By the time his son was 21 and ready to choose a career, Benjamin could tell him that he would never have to earn a living. Financial independence was to make a crucial difference in Thomas's choices as an artist.

Thomas's classroom experiences also helped to shape those choices. At age 13 he began four years of study at Philadelphia's Central High School, where the curriculum included classics, natural science, and the practical skills of mechanical drawing. Physicians taught the science courses, paying special attention to the human body and encouraging students to attend anatomy demonstrations in the city's several medical facilities. By the time Eakins was 15, he had already acquired his lifelong fascination with the human figure.

Going to Paris

Just as important as the school's curriculum was its guiding philosophy. An unusual public institution, Central was open, free of charge, to boys of all classes and family backgrounds if they passed a stiff entrance examination. Once enrolled, students had to prove themselves by diligent effort. Newspapers touted Central as a democratic institution far superior to the area's private academies, which catered only to the "privileged few." To Eakins, the grandson of a Scotch-Irish artisan, Central's "bootstrap" philosophy seemed exemplary. Throughout his life he was to be attracted to people who pulled themselves up by means of talent and discipline, and to scorn those who had no particular capabilities or ambition.

In his late teens, certain of little more than his desire to be a professional artist, Eakins enrolled in drawing classes at the Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts. An old Philadelphia landmark, the academy had enlisted distinguished artists as teachers during the early years of the century, but by the 1850s it had no regular program of instruction and little to offer an ambitious student. After the end of the Civil War (Eakins did not join the colors, perhaps because of his mother's Quaker pacifism) he decided to go abroad, departing in 1866 for Paris.

Changing Fashions

Important shifts were then under way in the world of art. Before 1861, American audiences from New York and Philadelphia to Cincinnati and St. Louis had clamored for native American scenes—landscapes of the green Catskills and Adirondacks in New York, of the New England coasts, of the West's vast, overwhelming plains and mountains. They had encouraged genre painters to depict such unmistakably American characters as Yankee farmers, fur traders, and mountain men.

The demand for a "national" art had been so strong that several successful American artists did not study in Europe at all, preferring to stay at home to retain the purity of their vision. Patrons bought works with a patriotic gusto—landscapes by such artists as Thomas Cole and Albert Bierstadt, genre paintings by William Sidney Mount and George Caleb Bingham. American art, it was said, was fresher and more "democratic" than that of Europe.
After 1865, however, both well-to-do patrons and artists began to look across the Atlantic. Painters went to Europe to study, the wealthy went there to buy. Suddenly European contemporary art was “in,” the earlier American art, scorned as naive.

American devotees of European (especially French) painting divided into two camps. One favored the soft-edged gentle landscapes created by such “Barbizon” artists as Jean-François Millet. The other was drawn to the sharply lined, detailed narratives of the sort made by historical painter Jean-Léon Gérôme. The new vogues posed a clear challenge to Eakins’s fellow American artists: If they were to sell their works, they had to adopt the European styles.

But Eakins was free from such pressures. Independent in mind, he was also, thanks to his father, independent in means. He could paint what he chose. During the years of his study in Paris, his preoccupation with the human figure and with human achievement led him to choose the portrait.

Anatomy Lessons

He enrolled on arrival as a student of Jean-Léon Gérôme, attracted by his reputation as a great teacher. Before long Eakins was writing to his sister, Frances, that Gérôme painted portraits of “living, thinking, active men,” portraits especially moving because the faces told a “lifelong story.”

A slow learner but self-disciplined, Eakins began to work almost immediately from the nude model, first with charcoal and then with paint and brush. Despite discouragements, he persisted for months in learning to use color. To strengthen his anatomical accuracy, he visited dissection clinics in medical schools, as he had in Philadelphia. To make his figures persuasively three-dimensional, he studied sculpture with Augustin Dumont. As he attained competence, he spent a few weeks as a student of Léon Bonnat, a highly successful portraitist. Finally, after three years of hard work, Eakins finished his training.

But he still lacked something vital to his art—an inspiration, an ideal. Fortunately, before returning home, he traveled to Madrid to study the collection in the Prado. There he was awed by the rich tonal technique of the 17th-century painter, Diego Velázquez. The Spanish artist’s broadly brushed work in his portraits of the royal court contrasted with the precision of Gérôme’s style. Eakins exulted in his notebook that he had seen “strong painting” at last. And he vowed that, although he still respected Gérôme, he would never try to paint like him. He would strive instead to emulate the largeness, the strength, and the beauty of Velázquez’s style.

When Eakins returned to Philadelphia in 1870, he set to work right away. He soon determined that local rowing champions would be the subjects of his first heroic portraits.

Rowing had a special place in American life at this time. From its development as a sport in England early in the century, it had quickly spread to the United States. Wherever there were nearby rivers or lakes—Boston, Poughkeepsie, New York, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia—hardy young men (and occasionally young women) took it up. The first racing boats were heavy and slow, often manned by crews of eight or 10, but widespread enthusiasm for the sport led to the development of smaller, lighter hulls, eventually made of paper-thin cedar and fitted with sliding seats.

Scullers on the Schuylkill

Rowing appealed to Eakins for several reasons. First, it was a supremely democratic sport, open to anyone who could get to a river. It was also healthy—a matter of no small concern to desk-bound city folk. But above all, rowing called for self-discipline. Serious rowers not only abstained from alcohol, tobacco,
The Gross Clinic (1875).

Max Schmitt in a Single Scull (1871).
AN EAKINS GALLERY

The Concert Singer
(1892).

Home Ranch
(circa 1892).
coffee, and, before a race, virtually all food except beef and bread, they also developed a code of conduct that forbade giving up, no matter how arduous the pace. Single-scullers—admired above all other oarsmen—became public figures, celebrated in prints and newspaper prose. People who made rowing a part of their lives took on a definite glamour.

This was certainly the case in Eakins's native city. Enthusiasts from all parts of Philadelphia—young doctors, lawyers, clerks, artisans, high school and university students (and eventually Eakins and his friends)—took up rowing on the broad Schuylkill River just before the Civil War. They formed rowing clubs and competed against each other. When rowing stars traveled to Philadelphia from Boston or New York for well-publicized races on the Schuylkill, tens of thousands of spectators attended the spectacles. As popular as the sport was in Philadelphia, however, it was not until Eakins was in Paris that the city's rowing clubs began to hold amateur single-scull competitions. Much to the artist's delight, the first and consistent winner of the races was his boyhood friend, Max Schmitt. When Eakins returned to Philadelphia and took up his canvas and brush, he decided to paint this outstanding oarsman.

**On a Clear Day**

The painting that celebrates Schmitt's achievement, *Max Schmitt in a Single Scull*, radiates clarity. The viewer looks out over the Schuylkill River. The time is late afternoon on a warm, brilliantly sunlit day. The season is autumn, with the trees on the banks of the river already brown. Schmitt is in the center of the foreground, seated in a long, graceful shell so carefully delineated in its details that we can even read its name, *Josie*, on the side. Lines in the water, traces made by the shell and by the oars, reveal where Schmitt has been. The sunlight beats on his arms, back, and forehead. He pauses to look at us—appropriately enough for a portrait.

The scene is not a race but perhaps a workout, for there are other rowers here and there on the river. The most obvious of these fellow devotees is the one pictured in the right middle ground of the painting, rowing away from Schmitt and looking in the direction of the viewer: It is Eakins himself. Again, the clarity of the painting is such that one can read his signature across the front part of his shell. A wonderful series of swirls made by his dipping oars identifies the course Eakins has taken; a course parallel to Schmitt's, but heading in the opposite direction.

**The Depredations of Time**

Among the other craft on the river is a red shell, in which two rowers and a coxswain are practicing. They wear the black hats and coats of Quakers—signs by which Eakins subtly announced that this river scene was set in America's Quaker city. Just beyond a bridge in the background, in another discreet but charged touch, Eakins placed a tourboat in the act of discharging a big puff of steam. The mechanized boat makes a nice contrast to the personal rowing power of Schmitt and Eakins.

While Eakins's portrait clearly honors Schmitt and the sport of rowing, it does something more: It forces the viewer into a recognition of transience. A few small clouds seem to scud across the sky. The rowers Schmitt and Eakins move in opposite directions, soon to part from each other. The traces of the movement of the shells and the dipping of the oars that are now so clear on the water's surface will soon vanish, just as have the leaves on the bare autumnal trees on the river banks. The pleasures of winning a race, even the rower's delight in physical prowess, will inexorably fade. The painting holds this moment against the depredations of time.

Over the next three years Eakins concentrated on rowing, producing a total of
19 paintings and drawing studies in all. He exhibited a number of them in Philadelphia and New York. Newspaper critics vaguely encouraged his work, as they did that of many other beginners. The Philadelphia Bulletin predicted a "conspicuous future" for the young painter. Eakins's supporters cheered him on. Growing popularity seemed assured.

Then, in 1875, he undertook the most ambitious work of his career, a portrait of a surgeon. It was a fitting choice for Eakins, because surgery was, to him, a perfect expression of modern heroism: Its practitioners had to have steady nerves, skilled hands, and, above all, scientific knowledge.

The subject, Dr. Samuel D. Gross, was known throughout America and Europe for his contributions to the development of surgery. (We realize the limited nature of that development when we see in the painting that Dr. Gross, at the apex of his career in 1875, operated in street clothes and without the precautions of antisepsis.) In his own life Gross demonstrated the heroic dimensions of the pursuit: He was of humble origin, he worked diligently throughout his training, and he practiced with the highest ethical standards in a field that was changing rapidly.

It was also important to Eakins that Gross was a Philadelphia surgeon. Philadelphia had been the early center of medical and surgical development in the American Colonies; by 1875 it had been matched by New York and Boston, but its practitioners upheld a strong tradition of professional leadership. Gross was proof of this.

A School for Surgeons

Other considerations also mattered to Eakins. Jefferson Medical College, where Dr. Gross taught—and where Eakins had observed surgical clinics as a high school student and taken anatomy lessons on his return from Paris—had been founded in 1825 as a consciously egalitarian institution. The early leaders were determined to open the practice of medicine to men who were not born into the more privileged ranks of society. They took as their model of surgical instruction the French clinical system—identified also as peculiarly democratic—in which the patient was brought before large numbers of students in an amphitheater for every stage of his treatment. The English method, by contrast, involved students observing patients in hospital wards, where they were often unable to see anything of importance.

The Making of a Masterpiece

Originally called Portrait of Professor Gross (1875), though now referred to as The Gross Clinic, the painting shows Gross leading a team operation in the teaching amphitheater of Philadelphia's Jefferson Medical College. Dr. Gross, scalpel in hand, has just turned from the unconscious patient on the operating table to address the students in the amphitheater. Four surgeons and an anesthetist participate in the operation. The procedure and the explanatory remarks of Dr. Gross are being recorded by another physician at a nearby podium. Students and witnesses, including Eakins himself, occupy the amphitheater seats. The painting is dark and dramatic, and bright light on Dr. Gross's forehead and on his blood-covered hand and scalpel gives both the head and the hand metaphorical implications. What makes Dr. Gross a good surgeon, the light tells us, is his combination of moral force, intellect, and physical dexterity.

The painting is very large: eight feet by six. A more complex design than Eakins had ever before undertaken, it included six major figures and about 20 others. It demanded of Eakins more accomplished techniques in drawing and color than he had yet exhibited, a grasp of the potential of chiaroscuro (the relationship of light and dark), and a stunning audacity in undertaking the subject.
at all. "As I spoil things less & less in this one," Eakins wrote to a friend, "I have the greatest hopes of this one."

The subject was unusual but not altogether unprecedented. One likely model was Rembrandt van Rijn's *Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Nicolaas Tulp* (1632), a painting long popular in medical circles. More recently, a number of artists in Paris had painted group portraits of surgeons about to undertake anatomical dissections surrounded by students. But all of these pictures involved corpses (clean ones at that) and not a living, bleeding patient. In addition, these earlier pictures had been painted for the surgeons themselves. Eakins, however, intended his work for a general audience, submitting it as an entry in the forthcoming national Centennial exhibition of 1876, to be held in Philadelphia.

Rejection

In the painting, Eakins chose to show Dr. Gross performing what was known as "conservative" surgery for osteomyelitis, or infection of the bone, a serious problem that affected people approximately between the ages of five and 22. Rather than amputate the arm or leg above the infection—certainly a more dramatic procedure—Dr. Gross and other conservative surgeons treated the problem self-effacingly. They had discovered that, if they carefully monitored the patient through days of fever and pain, the dead part of the bone would gradually separate from the rest and the remaining healthy bone would generate new cells. The surgeon’s task was then, simply, to remove the dead bone.

This process took a long time, but Dr. Gross spoke reverently to his students of allowing nature to help in the healing. The wonderful result was that the young person was not consigned to life as an amputee. It is this quiet heroism, born of knowledge, patience, and respect for human dignity, that Eakins celebrates in this painting.

Unfortunately, not many viewers grasped Eakins’s subtle point. The artists who made up the jury of the Centennial exhibition deemed the painting objectionable. "It is rumored that the blood on Dr. Gross's fingers made some of the committee sick," noted a Philadelphia reporter, who went on to suggest that envy might also have played a part in their reaction. The jurors' response was not unlike that of the patient's mother in Eakins's image: A small figure in black just to the left of Dr. Gross, she raises her arm to her face in distress. (Just as it was not unusual to have non-medical observers in the surgical amphitheater audience, so it was not unusual to have a relative of the patient in the arena during the operation.) The jury refused to hang the painting in the Centennial art exhibit, but Dr. Gross arranged for it to be shown with the medical and surgical displays. Eakins, aware of the distinctiveness of his achievement, had autotypes (a kind of photographic print) made of the painting and autographed them as gifts to his friends and admirers.

Trouble in the Academy

The outright rejection of his painting by his peers was the first clear sign that Eakins's goals were going to get him into trouble. Nevertheless, his conviction that he had created strong work remained unshaken.

Critics, by and large, agreed with the Centennial jury, but one dissenter, William Clark of the *Philadelphia Evening Telegraph*, declared that he knew "of nothing greater that has been executed in America." Another admirer, Susan Macdowell, an artist who would later become Eakins's wife, was so struck by the power of *The Gross Clinic* that she introduced herself to its creator. After their marriage in 1884, she never ceased to encourage him. In her eyes, others—not Eakins—were out of step.

Eakins's unpopularity as a painter puzzles us today. But it is easier to und-
stand why, as a teacher, he posed a threat to Philadelphia's art world. During the mid-1870s, he had joined the staff of the Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts as a lowly teaching assistant. His students, particularly the good ones, were quick to appreciate his ability as well as his keen sense of humor, displayed, for example, in what one biographer described as a "remarkable gift for mimicry." Many in his classes clearly revered the man. "Why don't you call Eakins Mr. Eakins?" a new student from Toronto asked. "Do you say Mr. Jesus in Canada?" another replied.

By 1882, Eakins was the powerful director of instruction. Faithful to his tenets, he proposed rigorous standards for the academy's students, and this proved to be his undoing.

The academy was a private institution serving two main functions: to offer regular exhibitions, and to provide instruction in art. It succeeded very well in the former role, enjoying a reputation as a gathering place for Philadelphia's established or aspiring society folk. But as an educational center, it did less well. The problem was money. The academy's governing board—James Claghorn, Edward Horner Coates, and other upper-crust Philadelphians—insisted that the teaching program be self-supporting. This meant, of course, that the instructors had to appeal to a wide range of student interests and capabilities. Quite naturally, many students in the academy program had no intention whatsoever of becoming professional artists.

The Perils of Perfectionism

But Eakins viewed the pursuit of art as nothing other than a long, disciplined study, based above all on mastery of the human form. He had no patience with students who wanted to "shortcut" a rigorous curriculum that included drawing from live models, doing perspective exercises, sculpting, and even some dissecting of cadavers. "To study anatomy out of a book," he once declared, "is like learning to paint out of a book. It is a waste of time."

Eakins's high standards did not sit well with the directors, who were preoccupied with falling income from tuition. Stirred by complaints from female students, the academy's board took issue with Eakins's insistence that all students draw from the nude. ("Do you wonder why so many art students are unbelievers even infidels?" wrote one angry mother to the board.) In 1886, after undraping a male model before a mixed class, he was asked to resign.

Moving Inward

For Eakins, the dismissal was a psychological disaster—and a turning point in his artistic development. He was 42 years old. His job at the academy had given him what he had worked much of his life to attain: authority in a profession and a respected place in his city. Having cast his lot with Philadelphia when other artists, including his childhood friend William Sartain, had gone to New York, Eakins now felt betrayed and rejected.

A friendly physician recommended to Eakins that he go West for a "rest cure." Eakins took the advice, journeying by train to a place in the Dakota Territory not far from Theodore Roosevelt's ranch. The artist spent 10 weeks with cowboys out "on the line," eating and sleeping in the open air. The experience was not only restful but exhilarating, and Eakins returned with souvenirs: two horses, a complete cowboy outfit, and sketches from which he was to make several paintings.

His work was never to be the same. The paintings based on his Western experience show a clear change in focus—from heroism in the external world to a heroism of inner character, a heroism of persistence through disappointment and grief. The most moving of these paintings, Home Ranch (1892), shows a cow-
boy sitting in a ranch kitchen, singing and playing a guitar. The picture is warm toned but dark. Of medium size, it is loosely painted, the brushstrokes suggesting the emotion of the scene rather than describing it in small detail. The melancholy of the picture is haunting.

Eakins's turn to his sitters' inner life for his subject matter finds its counterpart in the observations made by a growing number of physicians and cultural critics during the 1880s and '90s. Dr. George Miller Beard (coiner of the term “neurasthenia”), warned in his book American Nervousness (1881) that the pace of life and competition among sedentary professionals, or “brain workers,” would lead to nervous exhaustion and breakdowns. The prognosis was echoed (not always in medical terms) by Henry Adams, Theodore Roosevelt, and scores of other commentators. Alert to the malaise, Eakins seemed in his late works to honor the heroism with which a person holds his own against the stresses of contemporary life.

Music played a major role in many of these pictures. One of them, The Concert Singer, painted in 1892, presents a young woman on a stage. Dressed in fragile pink, standing in a yielding posture with her head raised to sing her song, she embodies vulnerability and tender feeling. Across the bottom part of the frame of the picture Eakins carved the first line of Mendelssohn's aria “O Rest in the Lord” from Elijah, the text of which counsels those who have been abused and are discouraged. The combination of the young woman, the fragility of her pose, and the reassurance of the text makes a deeply stirring image.

Painting Walt Whitman

During the late 1880s and throughout the '90s, Eakins endured increasingly unfavorable reviews of his paintings. They were described as too “native” and not European enough. Sounding a familiar theme, one academic critic pointed to Eakins's “neglect of the beauties and graces of painting.” Nevertheless, Eakins still had his small corps of admirers. He taught a little, filled several commissions for public sculptures (e.g., the Trenton Battle Monument), and continued to paint portraits.

Probably the most rewarding experience for Eakins during these years was his meeting with Walt Whitman shortly after the painter returned from the Dakota Territory. Whitman, unwell and aging, was living in retirement in Camden, New Jersey, playing the role of the unappreciated artist. He and Eakins, who most definitely was unappreciated, took to each other immediately. Eakins apparently did not even ask Whitman if he might paint his portrait; he simply appeared one day with easel and brushes to begin work on it.

Farewell to Art

The completed portrait frankly reveals Whitman as an old man, heroically resigned to his physical decay. One can detect a twinkle in the poet's eye, and underneath his loose white mustache and beard his mouth appears to be moving, but the pose betrays a kind of psychological settling, the head and shoulders seeming to sink into the lower part of the picture. So impressed was Whitman that he later referred to the artist as "not a painter, but a force."

The Whitman painting was one of many later Eakins bust portraits that today seem almost unbearably poignant. He asked one person after another to sit for him—physicians, engineers, the occasional banker and military man, professors, musicians, fellow artists—and in each of these subjects he found a tentativeness, a resignation, a deep, melancholy isolation. Sometimes he captured these qualities through body weight or profile, sometimes through a tilt of the head or an averted glance. More often than not, the people who had agreed to sit for their portraits out of loyalty to
Eakins were dumbfounded and then infuriated by what he projected.

In 1908, near the end of his painting career, Eakins returned to a subject he had undertaken in preparation for the Centennial but had not finished until 1877. This was a tribute to the early Philadelphia sculptor, William Rush, a carver of ship figureheads who had also created a number of wooden sculptures that constituted Philadelphia’s first public sculpture. Among Rush’s pieces was an idealized nude, a nymph representing the Schuylkill River. Rush had died in 1833, but Eakins so admired his work that he painted a scene depicting Rush at work carving the nymph from a nude model. The painting was partly a bow of recognition to another artist who worked from the human figure and partly an assertion that such work constituted a fine Philadelphia tradition.

Thirty years later, when Eakins returned to the theme, he seemed to be announcing the end of his career. In the earlier painting, Rush had appeared as a dapper, slight figure, dressed in the style of his day (circa 1800); now, though, he has Eakins’s stockier build and wears the studio work clothes of a contemporary painter. He is helping the model down from the podium, but, unlike the model of the earlier painting, this one is neither young nor idealized. We see her from the front and she is rather awkward, her figure ungraceful. She has taken on the imperfections of real life. In an oblique way, the painting seems to suggest that Eakins’s modeling session—his artistic career—is over.

And indeed, after 1908, Eakins painted only a few more works. He died in 1916, ailing and tired, his wife Susan at his side. Soon thereafter, she and William Sartain, Eakins’s old friend, began the arrangements for a memorial exhibition. Taking place in New York and in Philadelphia in 1917 and 1918, the show marked the beginning of a sympathetic reassessment of the artist’s work. After seeing the exhibition, the critic for the New York Sun hailed Eakins as “one of the three or four greatest artists this country has produced.”

A Revival

One reason for the change in attitude is obvious: For the first time, people were beginning to see large numbers of Eakins’s paintings, works that for many years had lain about his house after being rejected by those who sat for them. More important, the paintings provided a relief from the increasingly puzzling works of modernist painters.

Robert Henri, guiding spirit of a new realist movement in American painting, described Eakins as “one who had attained the reality of beauty in matter as it is...[who] had no need to falsify to make romantic, to sentimentalize to make beautiful.”

The long process of recovering and interpreting Eakins’s works has continued to this day; only in 1986 was the last known cache transferred from private hands to the Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts. Biographical studies, notably Lloyd Goodrich’s Thomas Eakins: His Life and Work (1933), have also made the artist more comprehensible.

But in a very real sense, Eakins’s paintings contain the most revealing clues to his character. They sum up the man, his ambition, his forceful will, his sense of human possibilities and limits. As he himself put it, “My life is all in my work.”
Exhausting Mother Nature

Re: “Population and Economic Growth,” WQ, Winter ’86

To biologists, overpopulation occurs when an organism’s population exceeds the carrying capacity of its environment—the maximum number of individuals that can be supported indefinitely. Carrying capacity is not easily measured for organisms in natural settings; for human beings it is doubly difficult because of their adaptability and their capacity to alter environments and trade resources with people elsewhere.

Nevertheless, biological and physical constraints put a ceiling on the number of people that the Earth can sustain over the long term. And the collective behavior of the human population today tends to lower that long-term ceiling, not raise it.

Humanity depends on resources of two kinds, which may be viewed as capital and income. Capital consists of the nonrenewable resources that we inherited: land, water, minerals, and the present panoply of life. Income consists of solar energy, primarily that “fixed” by green plants in the process of photosynthesis. People reap that income as crops, domestic animals, fisheries, and forest products. Civilization was made possible by the use of resource capital as well as income.

Now, as the population passes five billion, signs of overshoot are unmistakable, as ever more capital is consumed to sustain growing human numbers, including resources that underpin our income.

We not only are accelerating the use and dispersal of minerals (including fossil fuels), but degrading vast tracts of land, wasting soils, mining ground water, and decimating nature’s inventory of plants, animals, and microbes. That inventory is intimately involved in supplying free ecosystem services (without which civilization could not persist), and is the source of much of our solar income.

Perhaps most telling, humanity now uses, diverts, or has degraded as much as 25 percent of the planet’s potential “net primary productivity” (NPP). NPP is the ultimate essential, limited food resource on which all animals (including ourselves) ultimately depend: the energy “fixed” annually by all of Earth’s photosynthesizers. More critically, people use or divert for their own purposes about 40 percent of all NPP on land.

Any substantial enlargement of the fraction diverted to human use seems likely to degrade even further the planet’s productivity through processes such as desertification, soil loss, and replacement of natural ecosystems with less productive human-dominated ones.

Economists habitually focus on how markets can efficiently allocate resources but they seem incapable of asking a much more fundamental question: Can the market determine the optimal scale of the global economy relative to the natural systems that sustain it?

Taking into account the increasingly accurately known constraints on that scale, one sees how dangerously we are living: squandering our capital and undermining the systems that supply our income, thus jeopardizing the well-being of our descendants.

To those familiar with the fundamentals of how the world works, regarding another doubling of the human population with complacency is sheer lunacy.

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The More the Wealthier

Nick Eberstadt’s argument [“The Third World,” WQ, Winter ’86] has been too long unknown to intellectuals, though the research results which underlie it have been becoming available for two full decades.

A central point of his essay is that population growth does not have a negative effect upon the rate of economic development even in poor countries, let alone in rich ones. For additional evidence, compare three pairs of countries that began with the same language, history, culture, and rate of population growth—North and South Korea, East and West Germany, China and Taiwan.

In each case, the section that became socialist began with lesser rather than greater population density. Clearly, population growth or density could not then have been the moving force in the large differences observed within the pairs—in the measured standard of living, and in such key development indi-
cators as newsprint per person, automobiles per hundred people, and telephones per hundred people.

The only reasonable explanation is the difference in social and economic systems. That said, there is nothing left for population growth to explain.

My only complaint is that the article does not go far enough. For example, the article's introduction says that "the size and growth of a poor country's population are seldom crucial to its material prospects." This suggests that an increase in population size is not beneficial in the long run.

But the data relating population density to the economic growth rate suggest that in the very long run, more people lead to better economic performance. And in the more-developed world as a whole, it is clear that a larger number of people leads to a faster growth in the stock of knowledge, the crucial determinant in economic development.

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Editor's Note: As a supplement to our Background Books essay on Population and Economic Growth, we note the following titles on the Eberstadt-Simon side of the argument: The Ultimate Resource by Julian L. Simon (Princeton, 1982); Investing in People by Theodore Schultz (Univ. of Calif., 1981); Population by William Peterson (Macmillan, 1969); Dissent on Development by Peter Bauer (Harvard, 1976); Scarcity and Growth: The Economics of Natural Resource Availability by Harold J. Barnett (Johns Hopkins, 1963); and two by Nobel Prize-winner Simon S. Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread (Yale, 1966) and Population, Capital and Growth (Norton, 1973).

Corrections

On page 115 of "The Third World" [WQ, Winter '86], economist Edgar M. Hoover was incorrectly associated with Princeton University. Mr. Hoover was a visiting professor of economics at Harvard in 1958.

Douglas Gomery's article, "Hollywood's Business" [WQ, Summer '86] should have attributed the 1984 remake of the film Scarface to director Brian De Palma, not to Martin Scorsese as indicated on page 56.
How to Help Save Lives and Reduce Injuries Automatically

Three-Point Passive Safety Belt Systems Are an Effective Complement to Belt Use Laws.

General Motors is equipping 10% of its 1987 model cars with automatic lap/shoulder belt systems for the driver and for the right-hand front seat passenger. It is the first step in meeting a federal requirement to phase in passive restraints.

The automatic systems will be standard equipment on most 1987 models of the Pontiac Grand Am and Bonneville, Buick Somerset, Skylark, and LeSabre, and Oldsmobile Calais and Delta 88. By 1990 we plan to equip all GM cars with passive restraint systems.

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