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The change to a full-color cover (designed by Nancy Root), a new typeface, and better paper does not herald a switch in the WQ’s basic format or in its special mission. This magazine’s goal remains what it was in 1976: to alert a sizable non-academic audience to the latest ideas and information, developed by scholars, on a broad range of significant topics. We emphasize clear prose. Like our parent institution, the Woodrow Wilson Center, we have a bias in favor of history, and we seek a lively diversity of scholarly viewpoints.

In so doing, the WQ’s editors benefit from the advice of the Fellows at the Wilson Center; the cooperation of the Smithsonian Institution, and access to the rich archival resources of the nation’s capital. We also profit from the comments of our readers (see pages 173–74), who seldom fail to tell us when we fall short of perfection.
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Why Scholars Now Like Ike

Few Chief Executives have fared so poorly among scholars of the presidency as Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–61). Only two years after he left office, a poll of historians ranked him 20th in stature among U.S. presidents—tied with Chester A. Arthur (1881–85).

But the scholarly rehabilitation of Ike is now under way. Indeed, according to Joes, professor of politics at St. Joseph’s University, this revisionism amounts to a minor “intellectual revolution,” reflecting a recent change in the way Americans view their presidents and the United States’ role in the world arena.

During his days in the Oval Office, the popular former World War II commander was no stranger to criticism. In Eisenhower: Captive Hero (1958), columnist Marquis Childs described the president as “a man little given to reflection” who “seemed to regard the presidency almost as a ceremonial office.” Childs faulted, among other things, Ike’s refusal to stop the anti-Communist “witch hunts” of Sen. Joseph McCarthy (R.-Wis.); his hesitant support for civil rights; and his apparent abdication of foreign policy-making to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. A bleak post-mortem came in Ordeal of Power (1963) by Emmet J. Hughes, a former Eisenhower speechwriter who cited Ike’s frequent consultations with his Cabinet as proof of failed leadership. Hughes concluded: “The 1950s were essentially a lost decade.”

The passage of time, notes Joes, has “cooled old passions” and yielded new evidence. Many historians now believe that Eisenhower “worked out a self-conscious strategy which allowed him to use political power while appearing to be above the sweaty political arena.” Thus, Eisenhower preferred to undermine McCarthy indirectly rather than to launch open attacks that might have generated added public support for the senator. Records of his Cabinet meetings reveal that the members met, more often than not, to
discuss issues that the President had already decided. According to current historians (e.g., Princeton's Fred Greenstein), Eisenhower's record should be judged in terms of what he prevented rather than what he achieved. His era saw "no roll-back of New Deal legislation, no further advance of the welfare state, and most of all, no intervention in another war."

With this new estimation of the 34th U.S. President, Joes suggests, the "professoriate" is falling into step with the electorate. "'Activist' presidents—those with glamorous agendas for social renewal—have long been the darlings of journalists." But today, after the turmoil induced by the Great Society, the Vietnam War, and the Watergate scandal, Eisenhower's low-key emphasis on "seeking consensus behind limited aims" seems more attractive to both scholars and the general public.

Democrats Divided


America's Democratic Party is a house divided. Ironically, the causes and consequences of that division are nowhere more evident than in Massachusetts, a state with unusually strong Democratic traditions.

Davies and White, historian and political scientist, respectively, at the University of Manchester (England) and the State University of New York, note that Massachusetts Democrats now enjoy a 3-to-1 advantage over Republicans in voter registration. They also control more than three-quarters of the seats in the state legislature.

During the last decade, however, a series of hotly contested Democratic gubernatorial primaries has highlighted the factionalism within what was once known as the "Everyone Party." In 1978, Edward J. King, a conservative Democrat, unseated incumbent Michael Dukakis by challenging his liberal stance on social issues, such as abortion rights and the death penalty. Four years later, Dukakis regained the governorship, after beating King in the Democratic primary by a margin of 54 to 46 percent.

Such voting shifts among the Massachusetts Democrats, argue Davies and White, point to a struggle "between an Old Class, the less educated, trapped in declining industries and potentially facing a future of long-term unemployment, and a burgeoning educated New Class working in highly profitable, expanding industries."

Social conservatives, the "Old Class" Democrats (mainly 45- to 65-year-old children of European immigrants) once toiled in the state's many textile, footwear, and jewelry plants. Today, most of those firms have either migrated south or gone out of business. (Between 1962 and 1973, some 130 Massachusetts shoe and textile manufacturers closed their doors.) Meanwhile, the state's computer and electronics industries—led by hi-tech firms such as Wang Laboratories, Raytheon, and TRW—have lured thousands of well-educated white-collar workers into the state. Joined by the roughly one-half million students (and their teachers) in Massachusetts's 118 col-
During the 1978 Massachusetts gubernatorial election, many "New Class" Democrats were so disenchanted with their party's unabashedly conservative candidate, Edward J. King, that they voted Republican. But in 1982, after Michael Dukakis (left) beat King in the primary, these voters swung back into the Democratic camp.

Arid without that coherence, the Democratic leadership cannot "take the support of either group for granted in the long run."

Separating State From Church


The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution stipulates, in part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Yet recent interpretations of those words by the U.S. Supreme Court have rekindled debates over the meaning of "religious liberty."

McCarthy, an education professor at Indiana University, argues that such
debates will not be resolved by trying to decipher the "intentions" of the First Amendment's authors. The Founding Fathers "could not have foreseen" the switch from "private, sectarian schools" to a public system designed to educate most of the nation's youth. Nor could they have predicted "the new threats" posed by today's "politically involved" evangelists.

Justices and legal scholars have always regarded the language of the First Amendment—which Thomas Jefferson said in 1802 was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and state"—as "opaque." In 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court referred to Jefferson's wall as "high and impregnable." Two decades later, the Court described it as "a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier." To define that barrier more precisely, the Court in 1970 decided to judge cases challenging a state or federal action for alleged violation of religious liberty in light of three criteria: whether the contested law (or action) has any "secular (nonreligious) purpose"; whether it has "a primary effect that neither advances nor impedes religion"; and whether it "avoids excessive government entanglement with religion."

Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have been more consistent, in McCarthy's opinion. State-imposed Bible reading for religious purposes was banned from public schools in 1963. But teaching Biblical history is now permitted (even encouraged) because of its relevance to American culture—a secular purpose.

Moreover, under the second criterion, the Court struck down an Alabama law authorizing a one-minute period of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer" on the grounds that it seemed to "promote" a religious cause. (Such laws are still on the books in 16 states, with similar legislation pending in nine others. McCarthy asserts that each statute will require separate court review.)

Excessive "entanglement" is the most complex criterion, notes the author. In 1979, for instance, the Court ruled that the U.S. National Labor Relations Board has no jurisdiction over lay faculty in religious schools, because federal meddling in the schools' administration would embroil Washington in their religious affairs. A later decision exempted such schools from the Federal Unemployment Tax Act for similar reasons.

In short, McCarthy sees no tidy ending to the controversy over church-state separation; she does fear that under pressure from the "Christian Right," Jefferson's wall may eventually give way.

State House Pros


Gone are the days when farmers, union members, and "county board types" constituted a majority of America's state lawmakers. Now, career politicians dominate a growing number of state legislatures.

The change, contends Rosenthal, a Rutgers University political scientist, is not for the better. As U.S. Rep. David Obey (D.-Wis.) put it, nowadays
state legislators are "much more materialistic, much more poll-oriented, much less willing to do what's tough but necessary" than their part-time, amateur predecessors. True, notes Rosenthal, these upwardly mobile professionals are also younger, better educated, and more likely to devote long hours to their legislative duties than were their "citizen" predecessors. But proceeding directly from law school or graduate studies to the campaign trail, they often lack the broad experience that helped former community leaders to serve their electorates.

In 1963, all members of the Wisconsin state legislature held down regular jobs—as attorneys, businessmen, farmers—in addition to their political posts; by 1983, 72 of the 132 legislators in Madison called politics their only livelihood. All told, Rosenthal estimates that almost "one-third of the nation's legislatures are . . . in the hands of full-timers." Only in the less populous states (Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming) do "part-time citizens" still occupy most state house and senate seats, and their numbers are declining.

Increasing demands on state legislators' time is one reason for the influx of professionals, says Rosenthal. Most state legislatures used to meet biennially; today, all but seven convene annually. Rising salaries have also enabled legislators to live as purely political creatures. Although New Hampshire still pays its legislature members only $100 per year (and no expenses), Alaska and New York pay almost $50,000. And higher salaries have changed the make-up of state government by luring modest-income folk into the state political arena: Since 1960, the number of former teachers in state legislatures has risen from three percent to more than 10 percent.

Today's state legislatures are suffering from this "new breed" of politician, concludes Rosenthal. Eager to "make it" in office, many careerists waste time needed for the public business on personal image-building and fundraising for re-election. And, when offered a more prestigious political post, they leave the legislature "as soon as they have a shot." All told, Rosenthal suggests, 20 years ago the average state legislator "placed more emphasis on the issues, on the art of legislating, as opposed to the art of politicking, getting elected, and staying elected."

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**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**

*Living with Risk*  

The era of Pax Americana—when the United States clearly enjoyed global military and economic supremacy—is over. Responding to that reality have been two groups of analysts: One group calls for a military build-up to regain past American superiority; the other, for a cutback in the country's commitments abroad.
Taking issue with both camps is Schlesinger, a former defense secretary now teaching at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies. Today, he argues, America must "live with the risks" that have long plagued other less favored nations.

Formerly the United States had little difficulty exerting its will. "Even in circumstances as inherently unfavorable as...the Berlin airlift (1948-49)," writes Schlesinger, "the Soviet Union felt obliged to give way." Yet by 1968, Moscow could overlook U.S. protests and assert itself in Czechoslovakia—or, later, in Afghanistan (1979) and Poland (1981). The decline of American power vis-à-vis the Soviets also meant that the United States would be "tested" more often by smaller nations such as Iran and Nicaragua.

American responses to such "tests" have been hamstrung by a lack of domestic consensus on what U.S. interests are and how they can best be defended. Furthermore, the trauma of the 1965-1973 Vietnam involvement has, among other things, increased tension between the executive and legislative branches of government, with a suspicious Congress often doing its best to stymie the White House. Schlesinger predicts that this tension will persist: "Whatever the longings of...the executive branch to 'roll back the legislative intrusion,' the good old days...will not return."

Those who call on the United States to reduce its overseas obligations are guilty of wishful thinking. Citing the uproar that ensued when Jimmy Carter proposed, in 1978, to reduce the number of U.S. troops in South Korea, Schlesinger observes that "for any great power to back away from its commitments is more easily said than done."

That leaves the United States facing a paradox: It must reduce its military commitments—except that it cannot. Moreover, despite the need for a national consensus, America must preserve its prestige by retaliating—with or without popular support—against terrorists and those who threaten U.S. economic and strategic interests. America may "win some and lose some," Schlesinger concludes, but "try as we will, there is no acceptable way that we can escape from...responsibilities or risks."

Are 600 Ships Enough?

The U.S. Navy is riding high. Buoyed by a wave of congressional support, and led by Navy Secretary John F. Lehman, it is on its way to achieving its goal of a modernized 600-ship fleet by 1989. Gordon, a National Journal reporter, wonders whether expansion is coming "at the expense of a balanced naval force."

Congress has approved funding for all but two of the 28 new ships requested by the Navy in the 1986 fiscal year. When completed, those 26 vessels will raise the fleet's total to 560—down from 1,055 in 1968 during the Vietnam War but above the 1980 low of 479. Behind this build-up,
January 18, 1911, in San Francisco Bay: An airplane lands for the first time on the deck of a Navy ship, the battleship Pennsylvania.

reports Gordon, is a Navy budget that has increased at a real annual rate of 7.5 percent over the last five years. This year, the Navy will account for 35 percent of total defense outlays ($244 billion).

Some critics of the planned expansion contend that the Navy is trying to do too much too soon. Cuts in maintenance funds may sideline up to 20 percent of the Navy's carrier planes by 1991. And Gordon says that Lehman has "front-loaded" the Navy budget by securing firm congressional commitments that often mask real ship-building costs. In 1983, for example, Congress earmarked $6.8 billion to construct two more Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. When the necessary support ships and aircraft are taken into account, the total bill will rise to $34 billion.

The Navy says it wants new ships, especially big aircraft carriers, to implement its "forward strategy"—a plan to bottle up the Soviet fleet in its home waters and to strike at military bases in the USSR if war comes. Yet this ambitious concept stirs strong criticism. Stansfield Turner, retired admiral and former CIA director, has noted that by the time the thin-skinned carriers came close enough to launch attacks on the USSR, "they would be within range of over 90 percent of USSR land-based bombers." Other critics regard the "forward strategy" simply as a marketing device designed to make the case for a larger Navy.

To Harris and Benkert, Navy commander and lieutenant commander,
respectively, war with the Soviet Union remains the Navy's "most demanding and important contingency"—though it is also the "least likely." They argue that in today's world of limited conflicts ("violent peace") more emphasis should be given to the use of (less expensive, less vulnerable) non-carrier surface ships to gather intelligence, demonstrate support for allies, and provide a U.S. military presence in trouble spots such as the eastern Mediterranean.

Indeed, the authors recount that of the roughly 200 "crises" to which U.S. naval forces have responded since World War II, only 55 percent resulted in deployment of aircraft carriers. Thus, proponents of the 600-ship fleet should remember that "ships which may be supporting players in global war may well be the lead players in peacetime."

A Forgotten Region


 Barely 10 years have passed since Saigon fell to the Communists, but hardly anybody in political Washington talks about Southeast Asia anymore. In the White House, observes Betts, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, only sub-Saharan Africa gets less attention.

Ironically, the neglect coincides with the mushrooming of U.S. economic interests in the region. American trade with the members of the Western-oriented Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—doubled between 1977 and 1982 (to $21 billion). And the Soviet Union has vastly expanded its military presence in the region since Hanoi granted its ally access to the former U.S. air and naval bases at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay.

Why the U.S. inattention? America's "painful hangover" from the Vietnam War and the authoritarian character of several of the ASEAN governments are contributing factors, Betts explains. Yet the chief reason that U.S. policymakers ignore Southeast Asia is that ASEAN faces no significant external threats from Communist powers.

The Soviets may deploy more warships and reconnaissance planes in the region these days, but Southeast Asia is "no greater a priority for Moscow than for Washington." (Indeed, Vietnam may provide the USSR with convenient bases, but at high rent: A 1983 State Department report estimated that the Soviets spend $3-$4 million per day to shore up Hanoi.) More important is China's swing into the anti-Soviet (and anti-Vietnamese) camp during the early 1970s. Fearing a reprise of the 1979 frontier war with China, Vietnam now keeps most of its one million-man army near its northern border. Some 100,000 troops occupy Kampuchea (Cambodia), where they are busy dealing with Chinese-backed local guerrillas. Any Vietnamese invasion of Thailand, which borders on Kampuchea, might well invite what Beijing calls a "second lesson" for Hanoi.

Internal insurgencies do pose varying threats to Thailand, Malaysia, and
the Philippines. In Betts’s view, however, only the Philippines is truly endangered. And, if worse came to worst, the United States could adjust to the loss of Clark Field and the Subic Bay naval base in the Philippines by shifting its forces to new outposts. One likely home for new U.S. bases: Australia. Japan could also contribute to ASEAN’s security by boosting its foreign aid. Canberra and Tokyo might not go along with such notions, Betts concedes, but that would only mean that they “do not see more reason to bolster the Western position in Asia than Washington does.”

What Matters Most? “The Real National Interest” by Alan Tonelson, in Foreign Policy (Winter 1985), 11

Prussia’s Frederick the Great once declared that he who tries to defend everything ultimately defends nothing. Tonelson, associate editor of Foreign Policy, offers the White House and Congress the same advice. Throughout the 1970s and ’80s, says Tonelson, the United States has continued to operate under the delusion that it can defend unlimited strategic interests with relatively limited means. Such a “universalist” policy is fine for “an omnipotent country,” he writes. “But today even President Reagan and his top aides regularly concede the need to recognize limits on American power.”

Because Washington’s universalist outlook fails to define vital U.S. interests overseas, the nation has no specific criteria for determining whether intervention is warranted in many foreign conflicts. The 1979 revolution in Iran and the fanaticism of Shi’ite Muslims in the Middle East, for instance, demonstrate that noncommunist “indigenous” movements can threaten American interests no less than Soviet-backed communist uprisings. And leftist rulers in Angola and Mozambique, although backed by the Soviet bloc, have shown themselves eager for U.S. economic aid and not unwilling to cooperate in U.S. diplomatic ventures.

Tonelson maintains that America must clarify its national interests and distinguish between high- and low-priority military commitments. Western Europe, Japan, South Korea, and the Persian Gulf—because of their strategic or economic value to the United States—all merit “significant” U.S. military resources, in Tonelson’s opinion, to offset any Soviet pressures. Yet he sees little reason to stretch those resources to cover the Philippines, sub-Saharan Africa, the South Pacific—or New Zealand. Israel and Egypt qualify as borderline cases. Future U.S. support should be contingent on their willingness to grant Washington access to military facilities.

Latin America, Tonelson concludes, is a special case. Instead of propping up unpopular (though “friendly”) regimes to stave off communism south of the border, America would be better off using military force directly to protect its interests (e.g., the Panama Canal, U.S. investments) if they are threatened. As yet, Nicaragua poses no significant threat. El Salvador has been mishandled: Rather than flood the country with military aid to demonstrate America’s resolve to defend democracy in Central America, says Tonelson, Washington should let the regime of José Napoleón Duarte “prove its worthiness to the American taxpayer.”

The Wilson Quarterly/New Year’s 1986
Since 1980, some Reagan administration officials and some congressmen have suggested taking a New Look at America's social security system. To help reduce the annual federal deficit (now $211.9 billion), they have advocated cutting benefits and dipping into the system's trust funds.

But Munnell, senior vice-president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, argues that there is "considerable confusion" about how social security—especially its trust funds—affects the total federal budget. In fiscal 1986, for example, taking in more than it pays out, the social security system will reduce the total federal deficit by nearly $23 billion, not add to it.

Four years after passing the Social Security Act (1935), Congress created three social security trust funds (for retirement, disability, and hospital insurance) to receive the social security taxes deducted from the payrolls of U.S. workers. When the system generates excess income, the surpluses are often invested or loaned to the U.S. Treasury to help offset current federal debts. The Treasury then pays interest on the money that it "borrowed," thus creating additional revenue for social security.

In fact, writes Munnell, during the last half century the social security system has produced a total of $58 billion in surplus assets. Moreover, the three trust funds are expected to accumulate a surplus of more than $480 billion during the next decade.

Why then the urge to tamper with social security? Munnell believes that including the system in the aggregate federal budget has obscured its positive financial contributions to the U.S. government. Originally, social security's accounts were listed separately from those of other federal programs. But, in 1969, following the advice of the President's Commission on Budget Concepts, President Lyndon B. Johnson unified the budget for the first time. (By doing so, Johnson also managed to convert a $1 billion deficit in 1969 into a $3 billion surplus.) But dissent in the legislature over this procedure slowly mounted. In 1983, Congress passed social security amendments that require the system's hospital and retirement plans to be itemized independently of the general federal budget, beginning in 1993.

Munnell backs this separation of accounts and advises moving up the date. "The sooner the separation occurs," she concludes, "the less chance for social security to distort... federal fiscal decisions."

**Why No Inflation?**


Annual inflation, a scourge of the American economy a decade ago, now lies dormant. In November 1985, the U.S. inflation rate stood at 3.2 percent, versus roughly 14 percent five years ago—marking the largest decline
recorded during a five-year period since the mid-1950s.

What happened?

Leading economists point to a three-year recession (1980-82), falling oil prices, lower annual wage increases, and the deregulation of several major industries (including banking). But Sinai, an economist at Shearson Lehman Brothers, sees the soaring value of the dollar in international markets as the driving force behind disinflation. Between July 1980 and February 1985, the dollar's value appreciated by 47.6 percent (relative to the average of currencies of 15 nations belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).

The dollar's strength, Sinai contends, promoted a surge of imported goods in the United States and a slackening of exports (down $57.5 billion since 1982). Faced with competition from manufacturers abroad, many U.S. businesses (especially in the auto and electronics industries) sought to lower their overhead and production costs by, among other things, raising the proportion of cheaper, foreign-made components in their own products. Meanwhile, American tourists took advantage of the dollar's increased buying power and went abroad to spend U.S. cash.

Soon, an anti-inflationary cycle began to take hold, Sinai says. The costs of basic commodities—grain, metals, oil—started to slide, allowing U.S. producers to cut the prices of their finished products. Labor costs fell too, mainly due to U.S. companies' increased use of low-wage workers overseas and a tight job market at home. Inventory hoarding and speculative business practices (known to bolster inflation) gradually slowed. By 1983, the cumulative effects of all these economic forces held inflation in check.

Using a computer model, Sinai found that without a strong dollar during the 1980-84 period, the rate of inflation would have been 4.5 to seven percentage points higher in 1984 than it was. "The sensitivity of inflation to changes in the value of the dollar," he concludes "is sizable"—a fact that may assume greater significance during the next year, now that the dollar's value has begun to decline.

Hello, Robots


When leading "artificial intelligence" engineers met in 1956 to evaluate the future of robot technology, they predicted that "within a single generation humanity would no longer have to work." Clearly they were wrong: After 30 years, mankind still has plenty of work to do. But the material and economic benefits of robotics are now tangible, reports Draper, associate editor of the New Leader.

In 1970, some 200 robots were operating in U.S. factories. Today, there are more than 16,000. The largest "employer" of robots is the auto industry, which uses them to help weld, paint, and assemble its cars. The General Motors Corporation, which in 1980 owned barely 300 robots, now has about 5,000 and plans to purchase 15,000 more by 1990.

In many risky jobs, notes Draper, robots are often less expensive and more efficient than their human counterparts. They do not tire, take vaca-
This 1882 cartoon depicts a "mad" robot ravaging a company town. The image captures the anxiety in 19th-century America over the industrial revolution and the increased use of machinery in the workplace—especially among those workers in the agriculture, railroad, and textile industries.

tions, or qualify for pensions; they function in extreme heat, radioactivity, and poisonous fumes “without filing a grievance.” From 1980 to 1983, robots helped U.S. auto manufacturers to expand output by 15 percent. Other industries—foundries, light manufacturing (plastics, food, drugs, cosmetics), and aerospace—have also had satisfactory results. Several electronics companies, including the Apple Computer Corporation, now rely on robots to assemble delicate machinery.

With such wide applications for robot workers, the outlook for the 60 or so U.S. manufacturers of robots looks promising. What Draper calls the “Third Industrial Revolution” may generate a $2 billion a year industry by 1992, as more companies go for robots.

But to America’s blue-collar folk, such visions of an automated “utopia” may not have the same appeal. The notion that robots will create rather than eliminate jobs is an “illusion,” Draper says. Several studies bear out his assertion: For every robot installed, General Motors has eliminated about two jobs; some British industries, about 2.5. West Germany’s Commerzbank estimates that “second generation” robots (with sensors and greater versatility) may wipe out as many as five jobs apiece. In California, a robot-guided mechanical tomato picker allowed farmers to trim their harvest force of migrant workers from 40,000 to 8,000, while at the same time tripling output.

It is still too early to tell exactly how automation will affect America’s labor force, Draper adds. But one thing is certain: Hundreds of thousands—if not millions—of low-level production workers will be displaced, beginning within the next decade.
Looking Again
At the 1970s

According to the conventional wisdom, America's economy slumped during the 1970s: Falling prey to high rates of interest, unemployment, and inflation, American industries stagnated.

Not quite, say Schwarz and Volgy, political scientists at the University of Arizona. They argue that America's troubles were "misdiagnosed," that "we confused the symptoms of an economy hard at work with those of an economy gravely ill."

Absorbing a surge of nearly 25 million entrants into the labor force and a near quadrupling of oil prices in 10 years, the U.S. economy performed well. In contrast to the "much admired" 1950s, the 1970s saw the creation of twice as many new jobs (26 percent versus 13 percent) and higher growth in real per capita income (22 percent versus 16 percent). Investment drew a greater percentage of the gross national product from 1970 to 1980 (16.1 percent) than from 1950 to 1960 (15.8 percent). U.S. manufacturing productivity during the 1970s grew faster than during the 1950s.

In short, Schwarz and Volgy maintain, during the Nixon–Ford–Carter era America was in the midst of a "marathon," not a "heart attack."

Moreover, even in recession, the United States kept pace with other nations throughout the 1970s. While Japan led with a 43.4 percent expansion of industry, America followed with 41.5 percent. France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom all lagged behind, with growth rates of 34.2 percent, 24.5 percent, and 18.5 percent, respectively.

Thus, say the authors, the Reagan administration's claim that it saved the economy in 1981–84 should not be swallowed whole. After adjusting for the oil price hikes of 1973 and 1979, the authors find that annual inflation during the past decade would have been roughly the same as it is now (3.2 percent). Moreover, the number of people entering the labor force today is 25 percent lower than it was 10 years ago. If today's economy were forced to absorb a work force growing at a 1970s' clip, the current unemployment rate, now around 7.1 percent, would "certainly exceed eight percent."

Value in Virtue

Exactly what role government social programs should play in American society has never been wholly resolved. Wilson, a Harvard sociologist, contends that many Americans would like those programs to help develop
"character in the citizenry."

This more "traditional" (i.e., European) view of government is somewhat at odds with the principles of America's founding fathers—namely, that people are born with a "human nature," which prospers when given enough "personal liberty."

Yet Americans increasingly have come to favor the notion that "in almost every area of important public concern, we [must seek] to induce persons to act virtuously," Wilson writes. "Not only is such conduct desirable in its own right, it appears now to be necessary if large improvements are to be made in those matters we consider problems: schooling, welfare, crime, and public finance."

Studies by Michael Rutter in 1979 (Fifteen Thousand Hours) and James Coleman in 1982 (High School Achievement) demonstrated to Americans that schools can—and therefore should—instill discipline and responsible behavior in their students. And America's welfare programs have been scrutinized in an effort to alter their negative incentives. Studies of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program suggest that households receiving guaranteed annual incomes broke up more often than those that did not (36 percent higher for white families, 42 percent higher for black ones). Also noteworthy is the fact that men receiving cash benefits lessened their working hours by nine percent, women lowered theirs by 20 percent, and young males without families cut theirs by 43 percent. Meanwhile, the stigma once attached to being on welfare seems to have evaporated. In 1967, 63 percent of all persons eligible for AFDC signed up; by 1970, the percentage was 91.

What link is there among these disparate events? "The character of a significant number of persons changed," says Wilson.

The erosion of moral precepts is evident too in the U.S. legislature. Whereas borrowing heavily and squandering capital were once thought to be morally wrong, nowadays they are business-as-usual. Wilson even goes so far as to suggest that economist John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) was a "moral revolutionary," shattering the traditional constraints on deficit spending.

"Virtue is not learned by precept," Wilson concludes. "It is learned by the regular repetition of right actions," especially among the young, whose characters are still forming. This notion—which Wilson attributes to Aristotle—is regaining favor in America. Its payoff will be evident in the long run, he says, since "the public interest depends on private virtue."

**Home Again**


As the 1980s take the "baby-boom" generation closer to middle age, America is once again becoming a "nation of homebodies"—with a difference.

So says Russell, the editor of *American Demographics*. Within a decade, three-quarters of all "baby-boomers" (the roughly 26 million Americans born between 1954 and 1960) will be married, most will have children, and two-thirds will own homes.
The "all-American" family of the 1950s looks out of place today. Home-making, the province of women 25 years ago, is now a husband-wife task.

But the mom-and-pop household of the 1990s will bear little resemblance to its domestic counterpart of 30 years ago. Russell suggests that homemaking as a full-time female occupation is on the way out. In 1960, nearly one-half of all American women were housewives; by 1984, fewer than one in five were.

Not only are the majority of American women in the labor force (54 percent) full- or part-time, but housewifery has become so unfashionable that only one in 1,000 female college freshmen, according to polls, now wants to make it a career. Moreover, those wives who are at home see homemaking as only a stage in their lives. One-third of all housewives say they plan to hold jobs sometime in the future. And according to a New York Times survey in 1983, only one-third of employed wives said they would rather stay home than work.

Such trends among women have changed the nature of fatherhood too. Dads between the ages of 25 and 44 are doing more housework. A University of Michigan study found husbands putting in 14 hours per week on household chores in 1981, up from 11 hours in 1975. In marriages where both spouses work full-time, many husbands share equally in cooking (21 percent), housecleaning (34 percent), food shopping (38 percent), and child care (45 percent).

Oddly, Russell notes, this quiet shift toward domestic egalitarianism throughout America seems to parallel a more publicized revival of the traditional importance of "home"—a notion that has not enjoyed such prominence in the mass media since the 1950s.
With university tuition in the United States rising faster than inflation, many students are seeking less costly postsecondary education. One answer, reports Gittell, a political scientist at the City University of New York, is the "community-based college."

These private, non-profit schools—offering both two- and four-year programs—enroll from 100 to 2,000 students apiece each semester. In 57 accredited colleges, some 150 non-accredited ones (usually affiliated with a nearby public college), and an estimated 300 other non-degree granting institutions throughout the United States, about 700,000 (mainly adult) students are honing their reading, writing, and arithmetic skills. Most of those enrolled are recent immigrants, working mothers, or inner-city minority folk (largely black and Hispanic) who have not had solid academic training, observes Gittell.

While these small institutions do not boast the broad curricula of their liberal arts counterparts, they do offer a variety of courses ranging from American literature to office management. Some emphases are narrower. Whether at Harlem's Malcolm King College or at Navajo Community College in Tsaile, Ariz., history courses tend to highlight the culture of a school's majority ethnic group (e.g., an emphasis on Black Studies or Native American Studies).

Money for the colleges comes primarily from federal subsidies and foundation grants, notes Gittell. But a shortage of such funding persists. Since 1980, nearly a dozen colleges have gone under—though not because of a lack of students. According to a 1981 report published in the Education Statistics Bulletin, at least one-third of all black college students were enrolled in community institutions. And the demand for such programs appears to be on the upswing.

Some educators argue that these local schools foster parochialism, segregation, and class distinctions. Not so, says Gittell. A recent Ford Foundation study concludes that community colleges not only "spend less money educating people who require more support," but also have "made an important contribution to higher education in America."

Lotteries are an American bonanza: Those who play sometimes win big, while those governments that run lotteries usually reap a nice harvest.

Today, 18 states and the District of Columbia are running games of chance that last year collectively grossed more than $8 billion. Three more states (Oregon, West Virginia, and Missouri) will soon start selling tickets too. As of mid-1985, more than 1,200 people had won $1 million or more, with one prize of $40 million going to a 27-year-old printer in Chicago.
With so much good fortune around, wondered Kaplan, a sociologist at the Florida Institute of Technology, what becomes of the people who win? Between July and September 1984, he surveyed 576 lottery winners (their prizes ranging from $10,000 to several million dollars). He found that despite the financial cornucopia, "the vast majority of winners and their spouses kept working." Specifically, only 11 percent of 446 winners and 13 percent of their 253 spouses who were employed at the time quit their jobs within a year of receiving the unexpected bonus. Moreover, Kaplan discovered that although nearly three-quarters of the adults in the surveyed group were married, "fewer of them are separated or divorced now than when they won, challenging the popular stereotype that money windfalls destroy marriages."

Some trends were predictable: The larger the cash prize, the more likely a victor was to leave his occupation. Nearly one-fourth of the million-dollar winners quit their jobs; no one getting a prize of less than $50,000 quit. Money was not the only deciding factor. Almost 40 percent of all lottery winners aged 65 or older chose to retire; many younger winners quit but did not leave the labor force permanently. (A handful of recipients had to leave their workplaces because of jealous supervisors.) Those winners most likely to stay on the job tended to be middle-aged, college-educated professionals. Their less educated counterparts were more likely to opt for change. Frequently, recipients who quit jobs used the cash surge to indulge their interest in other serious pursuits—graduate school, part-time writing, and full-time motherhood.

Kaplan sees all this as good evidence that the American work ethic still has plenty of devoted adherents.


Either the American public is quiescent these days, or America's journalists are doing a superb job. Whatever the case, Schneider and Lewis, a pollster for the Los Angeles Times and a Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, respectively, report that Americans voice few complaints against the people who bring them the news.

While surveys show that U.S. journalists lean to the Left politically, most Americans detect little bias in their reporting. A February 1985 nationwide poll taken by the Los Angeles Times queried 2,993 members of the general public and 2,703 journalists from 621 U.S. newspapers and found that a majority of journalists called themselves "liberal," while less than one-quarter of the population shared their sentiments.

In general, reporters and editors opposed increased defense spending.
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Big Business, and prayer in public schools, and they favored divestment from South Africa, affirmative action, and abortion rights, consistently more often than the average American. Yet fewer than half of the news readers surveyed characterized their daily newspaper as either liberal or conservative; those with an opinion split evenly between the two assessments. Moreover, regarding the newspaper they read, those surveyed gave "positive" ratings for: overall performance (96 percent); staff quality (83 percent); accuracy (91 percent); and impartiality (84 percent).

The authors maintain that "there is no evidence that people perceive the newspapers they read as biased strongly to the Left... Those with an opinion see their newspapers as sharing the public's (more conservative) views, not the prevailing liberalism of the reporters and editors."

Television news coverage also received a strong endorsement, note Schneider and Lewis. The viewers polled gave ratings of "fairly good" and "very good" to local TV news (95 percent) and network TV news (91 percent). The viewers objected only to a perceived "negativism." Roughly two-thirds of the respondents criticized the print and broadcast media for "overdramatizing," stressing "bad news," and "putting too much emphasis on what is wrong with America and not enough on what is right."

Despite such occasionally sharp criticisms, the authors conclude that, with respect to the Fourth Estate, "public opinion... is still heavily tilted in the positive direction."

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

Holy Days

"Lubavitcher Hasidim" by Lisa Harris, in The New Yorker (Sept. 16-30, 1985), 25 West 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

Along the Eastern Parkway in Brooklyn, N.Y., men garbed in black with long beards and broad-brimmed hats are often seen chanting at sundown on Friday nights, before going to synagogue. These Lubavitchers, members of a branch of Judaism called Hasidism, have been congregating in Brooklyn's Crown Heights section since the mid-1930s, when they first emigrated from Eastern Europe.

Devoutly orthodox in their religious rituals, notes Harris, a writer for the New Yorker, Hasidim (pious ones) place "prayer, mysticism, dancing, storytelling, and the sanctification of daily life on an equal footing with Talmudic scholarship [the study of Jewish laws]." The Lubavitchers are the largest Hasidic contingent, but other smaller groups—the Belzers, Bobovers, Sattmiers (whose names derive from their Ukrainian and Hungarian cities of origin)—add to the estimated 250,000 Hasidim worldwide. Nearly 200,000 of them live in the United States, roughly one-half of them in Brooklyn.

In 18th-century Lithuania, around the town of Vilna (then a major center of Old Testament study), Hasidism first took hold. There, Rabbi Israel ben
Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson is the present Rebbe, or spiritual leader, of the Lubavitchers. Born in the Ukrainian city of Nikolaeff in 1902, he immigrated to America in 1941 and became Rebbe nine years later. Except for a brief trip to Paris shortly after World War II, he has not left New York City since the day he arrived.

Eliezer (1698-1760), called Besht (master of the good name), popularized the little-known Kabbalist (mystical) tradition, especially the teachings of the prophet Isaac Luria (1534-72). Emphasizing the existence of a divine spark "everywhere," Besht taught that daily life is itself a holy experience and that God "hates sadness and rejoices when his children are joyful." When Besht died, Rabbi Schneur Zalman (1745-1813) followed as Rebbe, the Lubavitchers' spiritual leader. In his book the "Tanya"—one of the Hasidim's holiest—he taught that through soul-searching and contemplation, men could understand "all the dimensions of their world."

Since Zalman, six Rebbes have led the Lubavitchers, each a son or son-in-law of his predecessor. The present seventh leader, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, is the only Rebbe with a secular as well as religious education, having studied engineering at the University of Berlin and the Sorbonne. He has brought a vigor and breadth to his role not seen since the early days of Hasidism. "Chabad houses" (Hasidic study centers) and yeshivas (Jewish seminaries) now number more than 135 in the United States, with another 275 scattered throughout Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Canada, Africa, and most of Europe. He has created a "Jewish Peace Corps," Lubavitch youth groups, and women's organizations. These innovations have jarred the Hasidim's traditional insularity; they have also attracted thousands of new adherents.

"It is one of the curious twists of history," concludes Harris, "that the Hasidim, once considered the enemies of [Jewish] orthodoxy, today consider themselves its bulwark."
Merton’s Beliefs


In his New Seeds of Contemplation (1961), Thomas Merton wrote that men who try to live as their own "masters," without deference to a god, "inevitably live as the servant of another man."

Moreover, added the noted American Trappist monk: "It is the acceptance of God that... delivers [them] from human tyranny."

The deliverance to which Merton (1915-68) was referring, contends Conn, who teaches religion at Villanova University, is not the sort of conversion one might expect: that of a sinner to Christianity. Rather, says Conn, Merton meant conversion of "the good," the conversion of those persons who believe so strongly in their own inherent moral virtue that they have no need of religion at all and "imagine their task is to make others 'good' like themselves." Such self-righteous folk, in Merton’s eyes, are the ones who need religion the most.

Following his emergence from monastic life shortly after the end of World War II, notes Conn, Merton grew committed to the teaching of moral precepts. He ardently supported the view that "killing in war [was] insupportable on gospel grounds." During the 1960s, Merton protested U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, spoke out against racism, and condemned the nuclear arms race. Espousing the view that men must acknowledge an "objective moral good" (the existence of moral laws that distinguish "right" actions from "wrong" ones), Merton taught that to live only with a "good conscience," based only on "good intentions," was to fool oneself; such a life is no more than one of surface piety. To live a truly good life, Merton said in Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander (1966), each man must accept "the will of God," and use his moral convictions to contribute to the "social and political dimensions of life."

Conn sees more than a hint of Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948) in Merton, especially in his advocacy of active pacifism. Said Merton once, praising Gandhi’s ethics: "To conform is not to act well, but only to 'look good'”—highlighting the difference between insincere pious behavior and "genuinely ethical conduct."

Designer Drugs

"New Variety of Street Drugs Poses Growing Problem" by Rudy M. Baum, in Chemical and Engineering News (Sept. 9, 1985), 1155 16th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

One of the ironies of modern pharmacology is that the same techniques used to make lifesaving drugs can be used equally well to create narcotics. Consider the development of "designer drugs."
"Underground chemists," writes Baum, a reporter for *Chemical and Engineering News*, "are playing a deadly cat-and-mouse game with law enforcement authorities." The chemists tinker with the chemical structures of a wide variety of illegal "controlled substances" in order to produce new "technically legal" drugs with the same narcotic effects—but also the same dangers. As fast as the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency can outlaw a specific designer drug, the chemists modify their illicit recipes to produce a similar, legal "analog" compound that squeaks past the regulations.

The stakes in this game are high, Baum observes. A conviction for producing a "Schedule 1" controlled substance (one with no medical uses and a high abuse potential) carries a stiff fine and prison sentence. But these "bucket chemists" can make fortunes off their creations. One common designer drug is 3-methyl-fentanyl, a derivative of fentanyl (marketed under the trade name Sublimaze), which U.S. physicians have used as an anesthetic since the 1970s. By investing $2,000 in glassware and chemicals, a skilled chemist can synthesize one kilogram of the drug, a quantity worth millions of dollars on the street.

Seeking quick profits, underground manufacturers frequently turn out "sloppy" batches, with fatal consequences for drug users. Roughly 3,000 times more potent than morphine, 3-methyl-fentanyl has caused at least 100 deaths in California to date. Another narcotic, MPPP (an analog of meperidine, or Demerol) is only three times as potent as morphine but easier than fentanyl derivatives to produce. It can become contaminated with a highly toxic chemical known as MPTP, which causes irreversible Parkinson's disease. Many drug abusers who bought the drug as "synthetic heroin" now suffer permanent neurological damage.

So far, drug enforcement officials have had only limited success in their fight against designer drugs. "How," asks Baum, "does one design a law to make illegal a compound that has not yet been synthesized?" Another problem is that conventional blood and urine tests do not reveal most designer drugs, thus hindering the detection of drug users.

Two years ago, Congress began closing legal loopholes open to drug designers by passing the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Baum reports. It enables the U.S. attorney general to designate certain drugs as controlled substances within 30 days—a process that used to take years. Currently, Congress is reviewing an even more comprehensive "Designer Drug" Enforcement Act, which would give federal officials more authority to crack down on the bucket chemists.

_Myopia in Focus_


In 1930, approximately 14 percent of the American population was nearsighted, or "myopic," as their eye doctors told them. Today, that proportion has roughly doubled and is increasing at an estimated rate of one percent every three years.

Why are peoples' eyes getting worse? There are two theories: One
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blames bad genes, the other too much close work. Each faction of ophthalmologists offers its "definitive" studies, but according to Kolata, a reporter for *Science*, recent evidence weighs in favor of the close-work hypothesis.

Myopia occurs, Kolata notes, when an eyeball becomes elongated, placing the retina (back of the eye) beyond the point where the eye’s lens can focus sharply on an image. When a person does close work—reading, sewing, drawing, using a computer—his eyes must "accommodate," or curve the lens, in order to focus. Too much close work, the theory goes, puts too much strain on the eye, which can increase its internal pressure (pushing the retina back) or else weaken its ability to accommodate. Several population studies seem to back up this notion. In 1883, a scientist ranked Dutch military recruits by their former occupations and observed that the prevalence of nearsightedness rose as the men became more educated: from 2.5 percent among farmers and fishermen to 12 percent among craftsmen doing close handwork and 32 percent among scholars. A research project in Alaska found that young, literate Eskimos were more often myopic than their illiterate elders. It is also known that lawyers and graduate students have myopia rates approaching 50 percent.

Only within the last few years, the authors observe, have researchers been able to develop animal models to study the condition. Francis Young, a psychologist at Washington State University, has raised a colony of nearsighted monkeys. When their distance vision is limited to 14 to 20 inches (forcing full-time accommodation) for a year, many monkeys become nearsighted—a significant fact, since they are not normally myopic. Two other researchers, Elio Raviola and Torsten Wiesel, of Harvard and Rockefeller universities, respectively, discovered that sealing shut a monkey's eyes also stimulated myopia. However, the nearsightedness only develops if the monkeys are in the presence of light. Darkness halts the myopia. Thus, the researchers believe that perceiving fuzzy images through the monkey's eyelid is the cause.

Nearsightedness cannot be cured, Kolata reports, although some ophthalmologists are trying to retard its onset in children who are developing the condition. One treatment involves "atropine" eyedrops, which relax the eye's ciliary muscles. Another employs bifocals. Both methods aim for similar goals: to take the strain of visual accommodation out of close work.

How Does an Embryo Grow?


The development of a fertilized egg—a single, minute cell—into a complex and variegated creature is one of nature’s great mysteries. How exactly does it happen?

Biologists have known since the 1950s that the architecture of a developing organism is encoded in the helical strands of its deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), the storehouse for its genetic information. But the method by
which the DNA translates that code and orchestrates the growth of a complex fleshy animal (with hundreds of distinct tissues, organs, and systems) is only now becoming clear, reports Gehring, professor of cell biology at the University of Basel in Switzerland.

Every cell contains "active" and "inactive" genes, Gehring notes. Scientists now believe that "master" genes—containing small segments of DNA called homeoboxes—act as virtual switches, turning whole groups of genes "on" and "off." The homeobox does this by creating protein messengers that bind with some genes, and not others. The result of this intricate process is that sets of cells end up with special genetic instructions that differentiate them from other cells nearby. Each cell group then migrates to its proper place in the growing embryo and develops into a specific body part or system.

Gehring first became aware of these special genes in 1965, while studying the developmental stages of fruit flies. Observing strange mutations—legs sprouting up where antennae should be—he and his colleagues identified a wide range of "homeotic" genes that govern the physical layout of a developing embryo. As the scientists gained a more sophisticated understanding of the chemical mechanisms underlying these unique genes, they conceived of master genes overseeing the whole developmental process. Experiments in 1983 confirmed the existence of these master genes and their homeobox mechanisms.

Do such research findings apply only to fruit flies? No, Gehring maintains. Master genes have been found in the embryos of many other vertebrates, including humans. Indeed, he notes, "the discovery of the homeobox in a wide range of species suggests that the molecular mechanisms underlying development may be much more universal than was previously suspected." However, he adds, the discovery of these controlling genes is only one piece of a terribly complicated puzzle. The biologists' next question: What regulates homeoboxes?

RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

"San Francisco's Downtown Plan: Environmental and Urban Design Values in Central Business District Regulation" by Steven L. Vettel, in Ecology Law Quarterly (No. 3, 1985), School of Law (Boalt Hall), Univ. of Calif., Berkeley, Calif. 94720.

Like many big American cities, San Francisco has seen its share of development in recent years, particularly of its business district. In fact, writes Vettel, an attorney in San Francisco, "the city's downtown growth rate ranks as the nation's highest."

But unlike residents in other major urban centers, Vettel contends, San Franciscans have not allowed the developers' natural desire for profits to
overwhelm the city's unique architectural character. In November 1984, the city's Planning Commission adopted the Downtown Plan, a strict zoning system aimed at slowing the rate of office building construction, preventing "environmentally destructive" projects from being approved, and controlling the "cumulative effects" of growth in the city.

San Francisco's building boom began during the mid-1960s and picked up speed with the passage of a $1.5 billion bond financing a mass-transit system (Bay Area Rapid Transit). As new structures such as the 43-story Wells Fargo Building (built in 1966) and the 54-story Bank of America headquarters (1969) loomed large, many city residents charged that their picturesque, hilly landscape was starting to resemble a "refrigerator showroom." The Department of City Planning set up ordinances to control the height, bulk, and density of buildings in four downtown commercial districts. It created the Landmarks Preservation Advisory Board to review construction proposals. And it utilized the strict guidelines for proposed commercial sites set by the state legislature in the 1970 California Environmental Quality Act. Despite such measures, argues Vittel, the regulations were "piecemeal" and did not form a "coherent, comprehensive package of regulatory tools."

The Downtown Plan, though, is far more comprehensive, Vittel reports. It substitutes a "mandatory formal design procedure" for the presently inconsistent and confusing "discretionary review process," which sometimes permitted the construction of undesirable projects. Some aims of the new plan: to shorten and slim down future office towers; to preserve a greater number of "architecturally significant" historic structures (about 250); to give greater consideration to public transportation and housing;
and to open up space for more public facilities, artworks, and sunlight. Although the new guidelines are stringent, they are designed to slow, not stop, business district growth. By the year 2000, total downtown office space and employment are projected to rise by 21.7 million square feet and 91,000 jobs, respectively. The Planning Commission hopes the new rules will cut the rate of annual growth by anywhere from one-third to one-half and encourage some businesses to settle outside of the city.

Oil and Water Sometimes Mix

"Oil Pollution: A Decade of Research and Monitoring" by John W. Farrington, in Oceanus (Fall 1985), Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole, Mass. 02543.

There are few environmental disasters that spark more public alarm than does an oil spill. During the 1970s, a series of spectacular oil tanker mishaps—including the 1978 Amoco Cadiz spill off the French coast and a 1979 oil well blowout in the Gulf of Mexico—prompted environmentalists to issue dire warnings about the state of the world's oceans. But their fears, reports Farrington, a chemist at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, have not been realized.

In a report released last April by the National Research Council (NRC), more than 100 oceanographers offered "cautious optimism" about the ability of sea life to recover from petroleum toxicity. Underlying their rosier assessment, notes Farrington, was an "increased understanding of how the marine environment copes with oil."

Researchers now know that man is not the only one to sully the ocean with petroleum. Seepage from natural reservoirs beneath the ocean floor is also responsible, as is the erosion of sediments (such as shale) that contain petroleum-like hydrocarbons. All told, Mother Nature annually releases between 250,000 and 2.5 million tons of oil into the oceans. By contrast, man's accidents account for only an estimated 420,000 tons per year. A large fraction of oil pollution in the oceans, observes Farrington, can be attributed to "the chronic dribbling of petroleum from sloppy use by modern society." Municipal and industrial wastes, normal tanker operations, ships' bilges, and other non-accidental sources annually release more than 2.3 million tons.

What happens to oil in salt water? At first the two liquids do not mix, says Farrington. But over several months, the wind, waves, sun, and microorganisms gradually break down much of the petroleum mixture. Some chemical components dissolve; others evaporate. Another portion soaks into (or clings to) floating particles, which then sink to the ocean bottom. Chunks of the remaining residue end up as tar. But petroleum products can vary widely in composition, he cautions, making generalizations about their degradation troublesome: Sometimes 11 percent of the oil decomposes, sometimes 90 percent—depending on what has been added to it.

In terms of human health, the greatest threat from petroleum pollution comes from contaminated seafood, which can be laden with cancer-causing...
chemicals (mainly "polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons"). A daily diet of such seafood could pose potentially about the same risk as smoking two packs of cigarettes a day.

Farrington stresses that the optimistic conclusion of the NRC's 1985 report does not justify continued dumping of petroleum products into the ocean. Rather, the council has assessed the pollution damage done so far—prior to urging more sophisticated precautions in the future.

The Price of Poor Farming

The Great Farm Shakeout, as the newspapers call the current agricultural crisis, has awakened America to the financial mismanagement of many of the nation's farms. Yet money troubles are only half the story, contends Batie, an agricultural economist at Virginia Polytechnic Institute.

Batie argues that sloppy, shortsighted farming practices have damaged untold acres and increased the pollution of air, land, and water. Such adverse environmental effects, in turn, have made the public far less sympathetic to the farmers' plight than it was a decade ago.

Take, for example, some of modern agriculture's side effects. Excessive farming of wheat, corn, soybeans, and cotton has led to extensive topsoil erosion—almost three billion tons per year—and has reduced the value of agricultural output by some $40 million annually. It is especially shameful, Batie adds, since "effective techniques to combat erosion are available." Conservation tillage, contour planting, strip cropping, and terracing are measures known to reduce erosion rates by 60 to 90 percent.

Pesticide, herbicide, and fertilizer residues have contaminated, according to a U.S. Geological Survey study, an estimated 20 percent of U.S. wells with nitrates, which are potent carcinogens. Iowa and Florida are among the states hardest hit: The Iowa Geological Survey found residues of pesticides such as Atrazine, Sencor, and Bladex in more than two-thirds of the wells in northeastern Iowa. And in Florida's citrus growing regions, pesticides such as ethylene dibromide (EDB) have turned up in the drinking water.

Poorly managed irrigation has led to ground water pollution in California and several High Plains states—Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Texas. Runoff water from croplands can accumulate not only pesticide residues but also toxic levels of salts and minerals. Witness the debacle in California's San Joaquin Valley, says Batie. There, agricultural drainage carried salts, heavy metals, and selenium into the reservoir at the Kesterson National Wildlife Refuge. By February 1985, the pollution had become so bad that the "refuge" was declared a "toxic dump." In 1980, high levels of salinity in the Colorado River cost regional taxpayers more than $100 million from tainted soil, killed crops, and water treatment costs.

For rural pollution, Batie does not hold America's farmers wholly responsible. The government, she contends, has done its bit to encourage environ-
mentally hazardous farming practices—from subsidizing the overproduction of corn and wheat crops to promoting the destruction of wetlands. Yet as the word spreads, farmers are rapidly losing their old reputation as "stewards of the environment."

**Forster's Passage**


Few modern writers have achieved such universal acclaim as Britain's novelist E. M. Forster (1879-1970). *A Passage to India* (1924), his last novel, is a 20th-century classic. His reputation as a literary hero stands nearly unblemished.

Ironically, notes Epstein, editor of the *American Scholar*, a recent friendly biography of the author (*E. M. Forster, A Life*, by P. N. Furbank) actually deflates Forster's heroic image. The new portrait reveals facts that show him to be not a paragon of virtue but a mollycoddled "prig" who was bullied at school and unable to get along with his peers.

At Cambridge University he finally came into his own, Epstein says. Forster read Classics and fell in with an elite coterie of intellectuals, including philosopher Bertrand Russell and economist John Maynard Keynes. He sought to establish his independence. He shed his Christian upbringing and experimented with homosexuality. Yet he returned home after graduation to live with his mother. In his diary, Forster wrote that his life was "straightening into something rather sad & dull." He resolved to do "more exercise," not to "shrink from self-analysis," to "get a less superficial idea of women," and not to "be afraid to go into strange places or company, & be a fool more frequently."

Although Forster did not have to work (he inherited £8,000, then a tidy sum), he took jobs anyway as a cataloguer at the British National Gallery, secretary to the Maharajah of Dewas, and "searcher" for the Red Cross Wounded and Missing Bureau in Egypt during World War I. This period between Cambridge and the war was his most prolific. Between 1905 and 1914, he completed five novels. But commercial and critical success were not central to Forster's life. Rather, he was motivated by a vain effort to overcome a "relentless yearning, and the haunting feeling of missing out on life." Epstein suggests that Forster's longing for a young man in India may have played as great a role as his humanitarian convictions in his writing of *A Passage to India*. The book has an explicitly political theme—the brutality of British rule in India. Yet Forster thought of himself as "above politics." In 1939 he wrote: "I hate the idea of causes, and if I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country."

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Epstein does not accept Forster's apolitical declarations. Rather, Epstein believes that "the sterility of middle-class English life" was Forster's real enemy. What kind of world was the novelist seeking? One governed mainly by desires and passions—a kind of life that Epstein finds "thin, hollow, and finally empty."

**Audubon's Artistry**


"It is a strange snobbery that isolates botanical or ornithological illustration from... art," says McEwen, who writes for the *Times* of London. "John James Audubon [1785-1851] is one of the most notable victims of this prejudice."

It is true that Audubon, now widely remembered as a naturalist, has been ignored as an artist. Indeed, the amateur ornithologist after whom the Audubon Society is named was also the author and illustrator of *The Birds of America* (1827-38), a four-volume elephant-folio edition containing 435 plates and 1,065 figures—now valued at more than $1.5 million. Here Audubon depicted every known species of American bird in life-size pro-

Great Blue Heron (1821). Eager to record perfect images of American birds, Audubon not only shaded and drew them exactly as they appeared but also presented them in life size. Even birds with six-foot wingspans were squeezed onto the 27-by-40-inch plates by contorting their postures.
portion and detail. McEwen contends that the anatomical accuracy and meticulous preparation of the book's graphics (each was individually hand-colored) distinguish it as "the supreme refinement of illustration before the invention of photography."

Why has Audubon's art been forgotten? McEwen believes that "the oversight is largely due to the fact that Audubon remains the subject of folklorists and natural historians." Audubon's life as a quiet backwoodsman, for example, is often cited as a classic example of fervent 19th-century romanticism. The bastard son of a French naval officer and Creole woman from Haiti, Audubon returned with his father in 1789 to Nantes, France. There, according to McEwen, he claims to have "witnessed some of the most bloodyhysterical events of the [French] Revolution, perhaps the most notorious being when republicans sank so many boatloads of royalists in the Loire that the river actually dammed up with corpses." (Some modern biographers think he "embroidered" his life a bit.) Nevertheless, McEwen argues that Audubon was affected by the great terror of his formative years, a feeling that seems to show up in his later works ("the stricken great black-backed gull, the fierce hawks and their victims, the two golden-eye in the act of being shot... ")

In 1803, Audubon left France for America, to enter business and marry. But he failed repeatedly as an entrepreneur. By the time he was 35 years old, he decided to abandon business altogether and just paint birds. Within six years he had completed enough good drawings to persuade a London publisher, Robert Havell, to produce his major work.

To McEwen, Audubon—despite his relative artistic obscurity—still ranks as a quintessential American artist, one whose influence appears in the works of American painters as diverse as Winslow Homer, Ellsworth Kelly, and Jackson Pollock. In fact, Audubon's motto "America my country," says McEwen, "implies not just the freedom symbolized by his birds, but also that of the radiant skies and great rivers of his backgrounds, the forests and 'dark fields of the republic.'"

Golden Tunes in Tin Pan Alley

"The Great Songwriters of Tin Pan Alley's Golden Age: A Social, Occupational, and Aesthetic Inquiry" by Edward Pessen, in American Music (Summer 1985), University of Illinois Press, 54 East Gregory St., Champaign, Ill. 61820.

It may be that "Brother Can You Spare a Dime?"—Yip Harburg's 1932 song about the Great Depression—stands out as the typical product of the Tin Pan Alley songwriters of the 1920s and '30s. But to Pessen, a historian at the City University of New York, "Life Is Just a Bowl of Cherries" (penned in 1931 by Lew Brown) might be a more appropriate choice.

For the most part, Pessen contends, popular songwriters knew little of tin pans or alleys. While Irving Berlin, Billy Rose, and Ira and George Gershwin did come from working-class homes, they were more the exception than the rule. Musicians such as Cole Porter, Oscar Hammerstein II, and
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Vincent Youmans—whose upper-crust parents often looked askance at their sons' songwriting careers—were far more typical. In fact, notes Pessen, nearly two-thirds of those he deems the "outstanding" composers and lyricists attended college, one-third went on to professional school (usually law), and nearly 90 percent came from what were considered well-to-do families. This at a time when only five to 10 percent of American youths went to college and barely one percent completed professional school.

But popular music was fast becoming big business. Sparked mainly by the expansion of the record and radio broadcasting industries, professional songwriters copyrighted more than 100,000 popular tunes during this 20-year "golden age" of American songwriting. Of course, most of those ditties were flops. (Even the "giants" of the era could only count about five percent of their total output as commercially successful.) Yet the ones that hit, hit big. Royalties from recordings and sheet music of Berlin's "Alexander's Rag Time Band" (1911) pulled in more than $100,000 the first year; "Cheek to Cheek" (1935), about $250,000. Porter, Richard Rodgers, and Lorenz Hart each grossed about half a million dollars a year just from their songs. Outside this elite circle, Pessen finds a handful of unexpected "one-shot" winners. The essayist Dorothy Parker occasionally tried her hand at writing lyrics and made it to the top playing song charts with "How Am I to Know?" and "I Wished on the Moon." But poet Ogden Nash, a more prolific lyricist, succeeded only with "Speak Low."

While it is true, says Pessen, that "Tin Pan Alley rarely sang a song of social significance," he also believes that historians can glean something useful from the lyrics of that era. "The best of the songs... are gems that merit our attention not only for their value as a social barometer but also because they are things of beauty."

OTHER NATIONS

Gorbachev As Reformer?


For nearly two decades now, says Reddaway, program secretary at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, the Soviet Union has just been "muddling through."

Rates of crime, alcoholism, and divorce have risen; birth rates and industrial productivity have fallen. Chronic shortages of basic food and medicine persist. And, Reddaway observes, a perceived "lack of order" in everyday life has "demoralized" the Soviet population. Social discontent may provide the catalyst necessary to provoke a "change of course" in the Soviet government. "The entire situation might seem tailor-made for a reforming leader," namely Mikhail Gorbachev.
Since coming to power in March 1985, Gorbachev has replaced at least 18 of the 150 regional Communist Party first secretaries and spoken of "a profound reconstruction of the whole economic mechanism." He favors the decentralized decision-making and limited "capitalism in agriculture" that some dissidents (Andrey. Sakharov, Roy Medvedev) have advocated since the 1960s. He has also spoken of dispersing computers among Soviet workplaces, a daring notion in a totalitarian society where, as Reddaway notes, "every photocopying machine is closely guarded."

Unlike his recent predecessors, Gorbachev may pay greater heed to Soviet dissidents, since, in Reddaway’s opinion, "the [critiques] of the dissident groups during the last two decades will provide him with a useful guide to the underlying tensions he must try to resolve." Reddaway contends that the Kremlin has little to lose by easing up on several fronts: halting religious persecution (and freeing the 400 or so current "religious prisoners"); opening the doors to emigration; creating less arbitrary legal and penal systems; and appeasing some dissident ethnic groups, particularly the Muslim Tatars and Meskhetians who were ousted from Crimea and Georgia by Stalin in 1944.

Help for the “dissident” group most in need of reform—the proletariat—is not so close at hand, the author maintains. Various workers’ attempts to establish free trade unions (such as the Free International Association of Working People) have been crushed. Currently, such agitators have few good prospects, outside of Gorbachev’s eagerness to make the work force more productive.

But Gorbachev, as a putative reformer, faces plenty of obstacles, Reddaway observes. The Soviet leader lacks support among key elements of the Communist Party, including the police and military, certain government ministers, and economic planners. Neo-Stalinist sentiments are also sweeping the nomenklatura (ruling elite), a product of the revived age-old Russian desire for an “iron hand” to restore “order.” But Reddaway remains hopeful. In time, he says, Gorbachev may be able to prevail over his party’s own reactionaries.

Lawyers
In Bhopal

Within days after the December 1984 toxic gas leak at an American-owned Union Carbide chemical processing plant in Bhopal, India (which killed more than 2,000 local residents and injured at least 10,000 more), a host of emergency relief workers had rushed in to aid the victims. Hard on their heels was a contingent of American lawyers.

The American press has condemned those lawyers for responding "inappropriately" to the disaster. But Galanter, who teaches law at the University of Wisconsin, argues that the Americans presented a logical legal alternative to the Bhopal victims since the Indian legal system cannot handle liability suits for an accident of that magnitude.

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India's judicial system is relatively well organized (a legacy of former British rule), Galanter says, but it lacks an established "tort doctrine"—or set of laws defining liability for injuries. In 1882, codes were written for commercial, procedural, and criminal laws; torts were left "inexplicably" uncodified. Thus, judges who often have had little experience with tort issues must determine liability on a case-by-case basis. The result: Many injured persons receive little or no redress. (Indian damage awards rarely exceed $8,000—a pittance by American standards.) And although some 228,000 lawyers practice in India, most of them work alone, without the coordinated research efforts routinely mounted by large U.S. firms. Furthermore, by banning contingency fees (whereby attorneys take a cut from their clients' awards), the Indian government effectively discourages local lawyers from pursuing time-consuming cases on behalf of poor plaintiffs.

Given these Indian legal deficiencies, the resort to U.S. lawyers and courts makes more sense, Galanter maintains. Even the Chief Justice of the Indian Supreme Court reportedly said: "These cases must be pursued in the United States... It is the only hope these unfortunate people have."

In February 1985, the New Delhi government consolidated the 2,000 separate cases filed in Indian courts by local lawyers against the Union Carbide Corporation and appointed itself the legal representative of all the Bhopal victims. Working with a Minneapolis law firm, the Indian authorities in April rejected a settlement offer from Union Carbide (reportedly $200 million) and filed suit in New York against the corporation. Some 50 additional suits, filed independently (mostly by U.S. lawyers), are also under way, seeking over $250 billion in damages.

The American press, Galanter contends, was justified in portraying Amer-
ican lawyers as "carpetbagging." Yet some good may have come from the lawyers' greed. Galanter concludes that their sudden arrival in Bhopal "blazed a trail that the Indian government followed," forcing the authorities to take charge of a situation that they otherwise might have avoided.

**Democracy for South Korea?**

On February 12, 1985, more than 20 million South Koreans (about 85 percent of all eligible voters) went to the polls—the highest turnout in 27 years. There they elected to the country's National Assembly 148 candidates from President Chun Doo Hwan's ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP), 67 from the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), and 61 from other parties.

Although the DJP did prevail, Koh, a political scientist at the University of Illinois, argues that the election constituted a "vote of no confidence" in President Chun's regime. During the first election under Chun in 1981, his DJP made an exceptionally strong showing, with victories for all but two of its 92 candidates. "Anything falling below the 1981 benchmark," writes Koh, "would signal dissatisfaction." A breakdown of last year's election results demonstrated that the ruling party fared worst among highly educated voters and politically sophisticated urban folk. In South Korea's five largest cities, where 42 percent of all the votes were cast, the NKDP opposition party, headed by Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, outperformed the DJP by better than a 4 to 3 margin; its victory was especially pronounced in Seoul and Kwangju. (Korean journalists dubbed the phenomenon *yado yob'ou*, or "opposition in cities, government in villages.") In terms of the overall popular vote, the NKDP garnered 29.2 percent versus the DJP's 35.3 percent.

So what? Koh contends that the NKDP has effectively "challenged the legitimacy" of Chun's government—a feat that is especially surprising since the coalition did not make its political debut until less than a month before the election. Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung had been barred from political activity until November 1984, when Chun lifted the ban. Subsequently, the group established itself as Chun's chief opposition.

The emergence of the NKDP as the "number one opposition party" could have far-reaching effects for South Korea, Koh maintains. The Chun government must now face a "challenger," not just a docile "sparring partner." A real two-party system could well develop. And Koh expects the role of the National Assembly to change: Now that the NKDP controls more than one-third of the legislative seats, it can unilaterally convene the assembly, move to dismiss a member, and veto constitutional amendments. Consequently the assembly will likely take a more active role in shaping future policies rather than merely rubber-stamping Chun's proposals.

True democracy in South Korea still "remains a destination," Koh holds. But the recent election results, largely unexamined in the Western press, do appear to have moved the nation "a step closer to that elusive goal."

*The Wilson Quarterly/New Year's 1986*
“Economic Sanctions Reconsidered.”
753 pp. $45.00.
Authors: Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott

On September 9, 1985, President Reagan announced the imposition of certain economic sanctions against the government of South Africa. To prod Pretoria into dismantling its apartheid policies, Washington decided, among other things, to ban the export of American computers and bank loans to that country.

The White House action spurred debate in Washington: Would the sanctions work or not?

According to economists Hufbauer and Schott, sanctions are generally not effective. They may work, when applied "judiciously to reach carefully defined objectives."

The researchers based that conclusion on their survey of 103 post-World War I cases of economic sanctions—the "deliberate government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of 'customary' trade or financial relations."

The authors judged only 39 of the 103 cases to be "successful"—that is, sanctions did contribute to the foreign policy goals of the country imposing the measures. Successful efforts include U.S. imposition in 1960 of an "entry fee" on sugar from the Dominican Republic (to exert pressure on the regime of Rafael Trujillo); the 1972-79 Anglo-American ban on trade with Uganda (to weaken the government of Idi Amin); and the memorable 1973 Arab oil embargo against the United States.

Resorting to sanctions, Hufbauer and Schott found, is a bully's tactic. In more than one-half of all 103 cases, the sender's gross national product (GNP) was 50 times larger than the target's GNP. The United States imposed sanctions 68 times, Great Britain 21 times, and the Soviet Union 10 times.

Yet a country's economic power by itself does not ensure effectiveness. Much depends on what the instigator is trying to do. Sanctions designed to "destabilize" a country have succeeded 53 percent of the time, probably because they were often coupled with other measures (such as covert military action). Those meant to punish an enemy's military actions (e.g., the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) rarely work.

Not surprisingly, the more sanctions hurt the target country, the more effective they were in achieving political goals. When successful, the economic burden of sanctions equaled, on average, 2.3 percent of the target's GNP; in unsuccessful cases, less than one percent.

The government that imposes sanctions can do the most damage when it has had a high volume of trade with its target. In cases where sanctions worked, the country imposing them accounted for, on average, 27 percent of the target country's total volume of trade—compared with 19 percent in cases where sanctions failed.

Whether or not economic sanctions actually change the world, they may still serve political purposes. Politicians may impose sanctions to demonstrate "resolve" to voters at home and to assure allies that words will be supported by deeds. As former British prime minister David Lloyd George said in 1935, after the League of Nations imposed sanctions against Italy for attacking Abyssinia: "[Sanctions] came too late to save Abyssinia, but they are just in the nick of time to save the [British] government."
"Asian Americans: Growth, Change, and Diversity."

Authors: Robert W. Gardner, Bryant Robey, Peter C. Smith

"Once looked down upon as poorly educated, blue-collar 'Orientals,' Asian Americans are now often perceived as a 'model minority,'" according to the authors, who work at the East-West Population Institute in Honolulu.

The popular notion that Asian Americans are well educated and highly paid, they say, is true, although some Asian groups currently fare better than others.

Today, Asian Americans are a diversified lot. Whereas 58 percent of all Asian Americans were Chinese in 1960, only 21 percent are today. And they are joined by five other major Asian ethnic groups: the Filipinos (who account for 20 percent of all Asian Americans), the Japanese (15 percent), the Vietnamese (12 percent), the Koreans (11 percent), and Asian Indians (10 percent).

Their combined numbers are increasing: Asian Americans constitute the largest proportion of new immigrants to this country. In 1970, only 1.4 million Asians lived in the United States. But over the next 10 years the population of Asian Americans swelled by 141 percent.

Included among the new arrivals are the roughly 300,000 Indochinese refugees who have fled to the United States since the Vietnam War ended in April 1975. Some 5.1 million Asians now live in the United States; by the year 2000 that number may reach almost 10 million, or about four percent of the nation's entire population.

Asian Americans favor urban settings and the Western states. Forty-nine percent have taken up residence in either California or Hawaii. Ninety-two percent

WHERE IMMIGRANTS COME FROM.

In 1930, the United States (legally) admitted some 12,000 Asians. By 1984, half of the nation's 544,000 newcomers came from that region.
choose to live in cities—compared with 75 percent of all Americans.

Except for the nation's 634,000 Vietnamese, many of whom were destitute "boat people," Asian Americans are doing at least as well as, if not somewhat better than, white Americans, in socioeconomic terms.

The success story begins in the classroom. More than 90 percent of all 16- and 17-year-old Asian Americans are enrolled in school. Excluding the Vietnamese, more than 90 percent of all Asian males, aged 25-29, have finished high school; the figures for their white and black American counterparts are much lower (87 and 73 percent, respectively). And, whereas 17 percent of white Americans aged 25 and older have earned a university degree, 35 percent of all Asian Americans have done so.

Why have Asian American students done so well? The researchers credit "strong parental pressure and support and a level of discipline that other ethnic groups lack."

Asian Americans also outperform white Americans in professional life. A higher percentage of them hold white-collar jobs. And the 1980 median family income for Asian Americans ($23,600) is higher than for white and black Americans ($20,800 and $12,674), largely because a higher proportion of Asian American households (63 percent) contain two or more wage earners.

Indeed, most Asian American families are larger than their American counterparts, and many include adult relatives. These "members of the householder's extended family" help to boost family income, to provide child care, and to cut rent costs.

Thanks to such family teamwork, researchers conclude, "even the most disadvantaged immigrants begin to climb up the American ladder."

"College Responses to Low Achieving Students."
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Orlando, Fla. 32887. 108 pp. $28.00.
Authors: John E. Roueche, George A. Baker, Suzanne D. Roueche

Every autumn at the University of California, Los Angeles, about one-half of the incoming freshmen take, and fail, an English proficiency examination.

According to the authors, education specialists at the University of Texas at Austin, UCLA's students are not much different from those anywhere else. "It is not uncommon," they write, "to find 30-40 percent of entering freshmen reading below a seventh-grade level."

Why are today's high school graduates so ill-prepared for college work? Because high schools, the authors say, now require only that their graduates attain "competence" in reading, writing, and mathematics. And competence means performing on what is now defined as an eighth-grade level.

To find out how colleges and universities are coping with freshmen who have not mastered the basics, the authors queried 2,508 institutions of higher education—large universities as well as small liberal arts and community colleges.

Overall, they discovered, 84 percent of the institutions offered students basic skills courses; 80 percent provide some type of special services, such as counseling, or tutoring; and 41 percent have established "learning centers"—half of which have been constructed since 1970. Roughly 15 percent of all college freshmen now attend at least one remedial class in the three Rs.

While all types of colleges and univer-
Universities provide remedial education, some provide more than others. Ninety-five percent of community colleges, but only 67 percent of liberal arts colleges, offer basic skills instruction. The figures for public and private institutions vary widely: 92 percent versus 67 percent.

In 1977, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching urged colleges not to accept permanent responsibility for overcoming their students' basic deficiencies. But today most institutions of higher learning, the authors point out, cannot be too choosy in selecting the freshman class; the nation's pool of applicants has been shrinking since the passage of the large "baby boom" generation into adulthood. Thus, colleges must either prepare their new students for college, or go out of business.

"Mortality of Nuclear Weapons Test Participants."


On August 31, 1957, the U.S. military detonated a nuclear weapon in the desert near Las Vegas, Nev. In 1979, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta reported that eight of the 3,224 servicemen who had participated in the test, code-named SMOKY, had since died from leukemia, a form of cancer that can be caused by radiation.

Given the number and demographic characteristics of the servicemen, the CDC said, only 3.1 men should have died from that disease.

Why did an "extra" 4.9 men succumb to leukemia? The CDC report caused scientists to wonder if low levels of radiation were more hazardous than they thought. And some of the servicemen involved feared that the government might have needlessly endangered their lives.

To see if the CDC's findings were generally true, the National Research Council's Medical Follow-Up Agency (MFUA) examined the death records of 4,841 men who had participated in SMOKY and other nuclear tests, carried out at the Nevada Test Site and at the Bikini and Eniwetok atolls in the central Pacific during the 1950s.

The authors, all MFUA staffers, confirmed the CDC's findings: More SMOKY participants had died of leukemia than expected. But the opposite was true for the participants from the other test shots. Forty-six men died from leukemia—six fewer than expected. Why? The MFUA surmised that the soldiers, as a group, were healthier than most Americans.

What then caused the unexpected deaths from leukemia at SMOKY? The researchers conclude that it was either a "chance aberration" or SMOKY produced heavier doses of radiation than originally estimated.
A countryman and his son bicycling home in Provence. "Old France" lives in the nation's 36,433 communes (townships); 89 percent have fewer than 2,000 people, and local loyalties remain strong. In exasperation, Charles de Gaulle once asked, "How can you make a country that has 265 varieties of cheese act as one?"
France

The gloire has dimmed, but France's mystique endures. When Americans travel there, as some half a million do each year, they have two nations in mind. One is the land where the word civilization was coined, where Descartes, Rousseau, Louis XIV, Napoleon, Hugo, de Gaulle, and others still loom large. Then there is "the real France," a term suggesting an almost 19th-century world of swaying poplars, old chateaux, peasants, bistros, and beaches washed by sun and Mediterranean or Atlantic breezes. The reality is that since World War II, the French, now 55 million strong, have built one of the Free World's top four industrial powers. Their belated move into the late 20th century has brought both blessings and problems; in parliamentary elections this March, high unemployment (11 percent) and other ills may hurt President François Mitterrand's Socialists, who in 1981 formed France's first left-wing government in 23 years. Here, John Ardagh looks at how the Great Leap was accomplished and how French life has changed in the process. Diana Pinto examines the evolution of that hardy Gallic perennial, the intellectual.

H ow the French Got
A New Start

by John Ardagh

Charles de Gaulle loved France, but he never thought much of the French. "They can't cope without the State, yet they detest it," he said in 1966. "They don't behave like adults."

The Fifth Republic created by the Gaullists in 1959 ended the governmental disarray that plagued their predecessors. But the unruly French would persist in other irritatingly non-Gaullist patterns, including a love-hate relationship with things Anglo-Saxon. During the 1960s and '70s, one or two Wimpy's and McDonald's opened on the Champs Elysées, leading a new trend in le fast-food. Le Drugstore, a new kind of shop open till mid-
night with glitzy décor, restaurants, and toys, books, Scotch salmon, champagne, and much else besides medicine, became a hit. Movie and pop music stars with names like Johnny Hallyday (né Jean-Philippe Smet) and Françoise Hardy were born.

Was France losing its essence, becoming Americanized, as the press pundits said? One sign was the spread of franglais. Boutiques took names like Le Smart Shop. People spoke of le parking, le business car, le planning, le marketing, le cash-flow, le pipeline, le snack, un long-drink, le barman, le shopping, le pull (sweater), le smoking (dinner jacket), le jogging, and le footing (walking). Advertisers offered grand-standing homes and l'après-shampooing. There was shock when Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, on the day of his 1974 election as president, made a speech for foreign television in English.

Some patriots sought to Gallicize franglais, to turn the linguistic bulldozer into a beuledozer. In 1977, the Gaullists all but banned the use of foreign words, where equivalent French terms existed, in ads, on official documents, and on radio and TV—a step described as the “cultural crime of a crackpot nation” by a London columnist. Franglais waned, though even today no French oil company executive will speak of un appareil de forage en mer when he is making a deal on un oil-rig.

Franglais was a telling if trivial symptom. The French were encountering something that other Western Europeans had experienced much earlier: economic and social modernization.

At first, the modernization went almost unnoticed. While American headline-writers focused on the chaotic politics and agonizing colonial retreats of the 1947–59 Fourth Republic, France was transforming itself. Industrial output regained its prewar peak by 1951 and kept on climbing—more than tripling by 1973. Once dependent on farming and known for exports of wine, perfumes, and beaute couture, the French became leading competitors in autos, aeronautics, offshore oil, aluminum, nuclear power, and much else. By the 1970s, la gloire française was not so much military or cultural as commercial.

By 1985, France’s per capita gross domestic product had reached $9,538. That put it behind Switzerland ($14,950), the United States ($13,969), and West Germany ($10,633) but well

ahead of its old rival, Britain ($8,072). The French passed the British in both economic output and standard of living in 1967.

Despite the lingering presence of a post-1973 recession (including more than two million unemployed), France's prosperity today is undeniable. The French have money to spend. Before World War II, half the average family's budget went to food and drink; today, only 20 percent does. By 1983, 96 percent of French households had a refrigerator, 91 percent had a TV set, 73 percent had a car (the U.S. figure: 90 percent). As high a proportion of blue-collar workers as salaried white-collar cadres supérieurs (89 percent) had automatic washing machines.

The French have become cleaner and more health-conscious. Their "health and hygiene" expenses have more than tripled since the 1950s, and they now outspend everyone else (including Americans, by 50 percent) on patent and prescription medicines. With 22.3 million dogs, cats, and caged birds, they have overtaken even the British as pet-keepers. They crowd new "garden centers" outside many towns and have taken to the once-scorned endeavor of le bricolage, do-it-yourself home improvement. One in nine French families (versus one in 15 in America) has a weekend or vacation retreat.
They have also become great tourists, and by 1980 one in four of their trips took them abroad. (The United States, a popular destination, drew 323,000 French visitors in 1984.) One of Mitterand's first steps was to mandate a fifth week of paid vacation for workers. In the new factory- and office-bound urban France, with its tensions, sociologist Michel Crozier explains, "no one is truly at ease, and so the French need holidays more than, say, the Americans." Farmers, for whom leisure is still rare, put signs on routes through the countryside to the beaches saying "We, too, would like to see the sea."

A French professional may live nearly as well as his U.S. or West German counterpart, and better than a Briton. A British doctor who visited a colleague in Lyon was amazed. With two sons in private schools (a burden that few French parents inflict on themselves), the Briton rarely took a foreign holiday, had an old Cortina, had no household help, and could buy a new suit once every two years at best. Of his French host, the doctor said, "He drove us around in his brand-new Citroën CX, his wife wore Yves St-Laurent, and a maid served us at dinner in their luxury flat overlooking Lyon where his drinks cabinet had six different malt whiskies. They seemed to think nothing of spending 400 francs a head chez Bocuse [a famed "new cuisine" restaurant], and were leaving the next month for two weeks in the Caribbean."

**Small Was Beautiful**

Such affluence reflects a striking national comeback. The French lost much more prestige but far fewer lives in World War II than in World War I (202,000 versus 1.36 million). Yet the physical destruction was more widespread—during the 1940 German invasion, five years of occupation and Anglo-American bombing, and the Allies' drive from the Normandy beaches. By V-E Day 1945, railways were shattered; Le Havre, Brest, and other Atlantic ports were devastated, as were many northern towns and factories. But what the French really had to face were the effects of a far longer decline.

During the 18th century, France became the strongest power in the Western world. Royalty stippled the Loire River valley with chateaux; Louis XIV (1643–1715), the Sun King, poured imperial treasure into Versailles. In 1810 the French, numbering 30 million, were the most populous European nation, bigger than what is now West Germany (22 million) and far ahead of the British (16 million). But by then the slide had begun.

A monarchy bankrupted by extravagance and by wars with England and Spain fell before the 1789 French Revolution.
Thereafter, vast sums were expended on the Napoleonic Wars and other adventures. More funds were lavished on Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and other ornaments of a worldwide empire that never equaled that of the British and never returned much profit. At home, cherishing small towns, small farms, and small family businesses, the French failed to match the massive industrialization of Britain and Germany. By the 1920s and '30s, France had become a cheap, pleasant country to visit, a mecca for American artists and Lost Generation writers such as F. Scott Fitzgerald. It was not such a happy place for the French, especially the poorer ones. By the 1930s, its industrial production was falling.

**Monnet's Motto**

So was its population. Partly because of the Napoleonic law of equal inheritance, big families fell out of fashion. The French were outnumbered by the Germans and the British by 1910. Then came World War I, corrosive inflation, and the Great Depression. By 1935, France was counting only seven births for every eight deaths. By 1940, Nazi Germany had twice as many men of military age. Marshal Philippe Pétain ticked off the reasons for France’s quick capitulation: “Too few allies, too few weapons, too few babies.”

At war’s end, the situation was gloomy. During 1944, when de Gaulle, the leader of the Free French, arrived from London to lead a provisional government, 10,000 or more Nazi sympathizers were shot by Resistance bands. “Peace” brought strikes, trials of 125,000 accused collaborators, and the emergence of the rigidly Stalinist Communists as the best organized of the French parties. Unable to reign in the Left, de Gaulle resigned in 1946. France’s 14th constitution, partly written by the Communists and Socialists, led to the fractious Fourth Republic and what de Gaulle would call “the dance of the parties.” France drifted into futile wars against Communist-led insurgents in Indochina and Muslim rebels in Algeria that would drain the country until 1962.

Political decline did not end until de Gaulle returned to power in 1958. But the economic recovery had begun much earlier and was well under way by the mid-1950s. What caused the remarkable postwar resurgence? Studying it in 1967, Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist Charles P. Kindleberger rejected purely materialistic explanations. The rebound after 1945, he concluded, was basically “due to the restaffing of the economy with new men and to new attitudes.”

The political stability of the de Gaulle era (1958–69) played a key role. But some of the recovery, ironically, can be traced
A customer chatting with a clerk at a small food stand called an étalage in 1964. By now, French shoppers have grown accustomed to packaged foods, and to the supermarkets in which 60 percent of them are sold.

back to the German Occupation. The Pétain regime attacked the “too few babies” problem with a system of Family Allowances designed to encourage childbearing. These, and what demographer Alfred Sauvy has called “a collective conscience,” a national survival instinct triggered by the shock of the defeat and the Occupation, lifted the birth rate. After the war, both morale and population began to climb. Le bébé-boom would supply the young workers needed by expanding industries.

Thoughtful Frenchmen used the Occupation to ponder the future. Plans to renovate the economy were framed by Résistants in France and Free French émigrés in Britain, the United States, and other havens. A key group formed in Washington around Jean Monnet, a stubborn idealist who first observed foreign business practices as a salesman for his family’s brandy firm in Cognac. He plotted how to bring France up towards U.S. levels, by non-U.S. methods, and won de Gaulle over to his ideas at a 1945 Washington meeting. The Plan, as Monnet’s blueprint was called, had a motto: “Modernization or downfall.”

But how? America’s postwar boom, assisted by low interest rates and other federal pump-priming measures, was driven by pent-up demand for autos, houses, schools, highways, and goods and services of all kinds. Japan would flourish by channeling its industrial energies toward turning new technology into products
that would find markets worldwide. In West Germany, private business, working in a "structured" free market environment, would create an economic miracle through an export drive whose emblem would be the ubiquitous Volkswagen bug.

The French would need a somewhat different route to prosperity. True, they were hard-working, like the Japanese and the Germans. And they too would benefit from U.S. aid; they received about $2.5 billion of the more than $12 billion in Marshall Plan dollars that began to flow to Western Europe during 1948. Yet most of their industry was still weak, out-of-date, and too small in scale. This had to be changed—and would be, by bold decisions during the 1940s and '50s not just to foster industrialization but to force it, by joining West Germany in creating the European Economic Community. The Plan led to a state-directed économie concertée unique to France (see box, pages 56–57). It, in turn, transformed a family-enterprise economy into one of big firms capable of creating jobs and export income. Sales of French Renaults, Peugeots, Citroëns, and other cars to Germany would explode from a mere 11,000 in 1958 to 292,000 by 1977.

Perhaps the largest change in France since the war is reflected in one statistic. The share of the work force involved in farming has fallen to eight percent, still well above the 3.5 percent U.S. level but far below France's 35 percent of 1939. In what used to be called "the French desert," the provinces beyond Paris and the few other large cities, the old-style paysan, semiliterate and living little better than his animals, is disappearing.

**Sixty Acres, 320 Sows**

As World War II ended, the typical farm outside the big grain and cattle operations of the Paris basin and the northeast plains was small, poor, and backward. Only 25 percent had running water, and plows were pulled by horses. The Plan required modernization, and by 1954 some 230,000 tractors were deployed. "Surplus" peasants had to find new work in town; nearly six million would move off the land by the 1980s. Farms grew (the current average: 70 acres), and farmers' techniques improved. Productivity per farmhand has risen sixfold since the war. France now leads the Common Market in farm output.*

*A mixed blessing. Starting out with the lowest prices in the Common Market, French farmers benefited from rising sales to their neighbors. But the Common Agricultural Plan, a system of price supports and subsidies, encouraged other farmers to produce more; too. Result: huge surpluses. Wheat is in oversupply, thanks to the abundance of France's large northern farms. France turns out 24 percent more butter than it can use; West Germany more than twice as much milk; Denmark more than four times as much cheese. The surpluses, which are either stored away or "dumped" abroad, cost consumers dearly. Not only are high taxes required to pay for the farm subsidies, but Common Market food prices are nearly twice average world levels.

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A French Basque dairyman. France’s farmers rank third among the world’s producers of milk, fourth in meat and barley, seventh in cereals.

“New attitudes,” à la Kindleberger, played a role. During the 1950s, France’s deeply conservative older farmers, fearing that Paris officials wanted to wipe them out, burned crops and otherwise rebelled at government efforts to raise efficiency. The rural reformation was saved by younger paysans who had spent the Occupation pondering how to save the family farm. On their own, Michel Debatisse and other leaders of the Christian Farmers Movement, a group originally formed to combat rural atheism, dispatched emissaries to learn about techniques used in places as varied as Denmark and Kansas. They toured France to build political support for drastic measures, including government pensions to nudge aging farmers into retirement and steps to encourage younger ones to engage in joint marketing of crops.

And family farming survived. Jean Pierre Le Verge, a 39-year-old Breton, grew up with five siblings on a rundown farm with 27 acres, five cows, a wood stove for heat, and only a horse cart for transportation. He and his brothers persuaded their father to retire during the 1960s. Using loans, an anathema to older farmers, they expanded to 60 acres and built a modern piggery with 320 sows. “We felt like real revolutionaries,” Le Verge says. Today, with a modern house, a Peugeot, and an income of some 140,000 francs ($17,000), he says, “we live like town people.”
Another change: Small tradesmen, 943,000 strong in 1954, are fading. The shopkeeper is going the way of the peasant.

For half a century, family-run épiceries (grocer's shops), butcher shops, and other small purveyors brought charm to French streets, and pain to French shoppers and politicians. They had long connived to keep hours short and prices high, and by the end of World War II les BOF, stores selling beurre, œufs, et fromages (butter, eggs, and cheese) came to be a generic term of contempt for a whole class of war profiteers. When a fiery grocer-demagogue named Pierre Poujade led their fight for state protection from new competition during the 1950s, he was too late.

'Pre-Cast Deserts'

In 1949, 29-year-old Edouard Leclerc began selling biscuits at 25 percent below the usual price in a barracks-like store near Brest. He prospered. The retailing revolution he thus launched has since led to, among other innovations, more than 4,800 supermarkets—of which some 400 are "hypermarkets" claimed to be larger than any of their U.S. progenitors. Outside Marseille and Fontainebleau, the big Carrefour chain operates garish 22,000-square-foot monsters surrounded by vast parking and boasting as many as 70 checkout counters. Les BOF still have muscle: Pressure from shopowners led to a 1973 law requiring firms wanting to open large stores to win the approval of special local committees in the towns concerned. But increasingly, in Paris and elsewhere, small shops are run as "convenience stores" by energetic North Africans willing to stay open for the long hours that the old petit épicier would not endure.

Like its shopping, France's style of housing has changed. The French emerged from the war with the worst accommodations in Western Europe. As late as 1954 more than 40 percent of their homes had no running water, 73 percent lacked indoor flush toilets, and 90 percent were without bath or shower.

During World War I, rents were frozen to protect soldiers' families from profiteering landlords. The law was never repealed, new construction lagged, and the housing stock deteriorated.

During the 1950s, the government dropped some rent controls and began pumping money into construction. In 25 years, more than one-half of the population has been moved into "new towns" and housing blocks that ring every city. Today, only eight percent of French homes (versus 2.2 percent in America) lack indoor plumbing. Newlyweds from poor families, who once lived with parents for years, now get their own flats right away.

Yet the French, as fond of having their own homes as Ameri-
"DIRIGISME": THE STATE AS ECONOMIC NANNY

One index of France's transformation since World War II has been the rise of big firms. When Fortune ranked the world's 64 largest companies in 1964, no French names appeared. Now, seven of the top 64 (and nine of the top 100) are French, led by Elf-Aquitaine and Compagnie Française des Pétroles, the state-owned oil giant, and state-run Renault and privately held Peugeot-Citroën.

Some French firms have turned around what was once called le défi américain (the American challenge). Peugeot has taken over Chrysler (Europe) and Renault controls American Motors. Elf-Aquitaine, having blocked domination of the French oil market by the American, British, and Dutch Seven Sisters, owns a stake in Montana coal. The St. Gobain conglomerate (glass, engineering) has plants in 16 countries.

Other sources of French pride are state undertakings such as France's nuclear power program (42 reactors in service); Aerospatiale, head of the six-nation group building the Airbus (ordered by 37 airlines); and the 10-nation, French-run Ariane rocket project. France's space effort sputtered after its 1960 start by Charles de Gaulle, but the first Ariane launch (1979) was a success. Having "smashed the American-Soviet monopoly," as a French scientist says, France aims to make money launching satellites.

France is either blessed or cursed with a high degree of state control. It has the most broadly nationalized Western European economy outside Austria, thanks to President François Mitterrand's Socialists; in 1982 they brought under state ownership: 22 of the largest remaining private French banks and financial institutions; five of 36 major industrial groups remaining in private hands (including chemicals, aluminum, and electronics); and controlling interests in Matra (missiles) and Dassault-Breguet (aircraft).

The state-owned share of industrial capacity rose from 18 percent to 32 percent, above even Britain's 30 percent.

These were France's first big nationalizations since railroads, the Bank of France, and most arms manufacturers were taken over under the Popular Front regimes of the 1930s and Renault, Air France, electric and gas utilities, large insurers, and certain major banks were seized during the 1940s.

Yet the state's dirigisme (interventionism) goes beyond the management of national firms. The country's tradition of strong central authority dates back to Louis XIV; it is now maintained by a 2.6 million-member civil service bureaucracy directed from Paris.

Since World War II, dirigisme has taken many turns. Jean Monnet and the other brain trusters who launched the postwar recovery fashioned an économie concertée that combined state control with free enterprise. Working out of a Left Bank town house with a small staff (no more than 40), they carried out the Monnet Plan with few formal powers. Ignoring the political confusion of the Fourth Republic (22 governments in 12 years, 1946-58), they convened employers, union leaders, and bureaucrats in "modernization commissions" to set growth targets for everything from pig breeding to aluminum. They overrode patrons who feared the end of tariff protection that would come with the creation of the European Steel and Coal Community in 1951 and the Common Market in 1957. Coal and other key industries were made more efficient, though some specialists still
dismissed them during the 1950s as just an “enclave of modernization inside old France.”

De Gaulle’s great contributions were simple. Believing that “nothing effective and solid can be done without the renewal of the state,” he established the stable Fifth Republic, with its popularly elected presidency. He also took theorist Jacques Rueff’s advice to drive tariff barriers down quickly to force businesses to meet Common Market competition, and to devalue France’s sagging currency (a slimmed-down New Franc appeared in 1960). France was soon inundated with Italian refrigerators and West German office furniture, but exports of its inexpensive cars and other items surged. Sales to Common Market nations tripled in four years. France’s gold and currency reserves, all but gone in 1958, began to rise, reaching a value of 35 billion francs ($7.1 billion) by 1968. Many service and construction jobs went begging, bringing thousands of “guest workers” from Portugal, Africa, and Asia.

As the economy strengthened, de Gaulle de-emphasized the Monnet Plan and put “technocrats” in charge of key bureaucracies. Dirigisme increased. If a firm’s executives wished, say, to raise the price of a widget, they had to get their competitors to join in preparing a dossier showing how costs and other factors had affected the widget trade. They then went to the Ministry of Finance in Paris, whose officials would decree a new price for all widgets. With no price competition, efficiency suffered.

By 1974, when the archetypal technocrat, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, became president, the global stagflation triggered by oil price rises slowed France’s growth. Persuaded that France had to become a “specialized,” high-technology economy, Giscard used his dirigiste powers to force the change. Price controls were stripped away to make French firms learn how to meet tough world competition. The state stopped shoring up many failing companies, notably in textiles and steel. (As the number of unemployed grew, Giscard’s prime minister, economist Raymond Barre, said, “Let them start their own businesses.”)

President Mitterrand has been of two minds on state control. As part of a decentralization plan, in 1982 the Paris-appointed prefects in France’s 95 departements yielded much authority to local assemblies; local officials got a say in allocating state funds for the first time in 182 years. But Mitterrand also reinforced dirigisme, not only in his nationalizations but also in the austerity program (including a wage-price freeze) he imposed in 1982. That followed an attempt to spend France out of high unemployment that led only to deficits, double digit inflation, and Mitterrand’s slump in the polls to a 32 percent approval rating, the lowest in Fifth Republic history.

For all of France’s postwar economic success, West Germany has done better—with significantly less state intervention. Since Giscard’s troubles during the 1970s, public faith in an omniscient state has eroded. “The Socialists tried to re-establish that myth, but it didn’t work,” says Bernard Rideau, a one-time Giscard adviser. “France is moving from the doctrinaire to the pragmatic. That could be the salvation of this country.”
cans, have had to get used to apartment living. They speak of "sarcellitis," a disease with such symptoms as nervous breakdowns, juvenile delinquency, and wayward wives. Its name derives from Sarcelles, a pioneering project begun in 1956 near the Le Bourget airport outside Paris, today housing 40,000 in a gridiron of gray, box-like, five- to 17-floor apartment blocks. Early residents of the place, which one columnist described as "a loveless, pre-cast concrete desert," had to travel long distances to work or even to shop. But the planners have learned. South of Paris at Evry, a new town housing 10,000 in cheerful, multi-colored flats has hypermarkets, three theaters, a skating rink, dance halls, and a library. Nearby factories furnish jobs.

For all of such improvements, inadequacies and anomalies abound. As late as 1978, 17 percent of French housing was still classed as "overcrowded," meaning, say, that a family of three or four was making do with three rooms. Wealthy Paris bourgeois may cling to elegant old flats in the 16th arrondissement whose still-controlled rent costs the tenants only five percent of their income; yet the average couple struggles to buy and then hang on to their new abode. France has few U.S.-style mortgage lenders,
and not until the late 1960s did officials get around to devising a loan system that would allow young people with scant capital to buy a house; even then, they typically must come up with about 20 percent or more of the price on their own.

Despite the material improvements in French life since the 1940s, by the 1960s doubts about the moral and spiritual effects of progress were appearing. Film-maker Jean-Luc Godard, the son of a doctor, described his wry works as “reports on the state of the nation,” and the bulletins were grim. His 1965 sci-fi satire, Alphaville, shot around computer centers and modern buildings, including those at Sarcelles, dealt with a grim city ruled by technocratic planners. Weekend prophesied a prospering society disintegrating into a kind of cannibalism, symbolized by the weekly highway carnage caused by Parisians grimly driving off at high speed to enjoy their unwonted leisure in the country.

Weekend appeared in the watershed year of 1968. That May, Paris lycéens (high school students) rebelled against a rigid educational system that, as they saw it, made their schools “just pedagogic factories.” The uprising spread to lycées elsewhere and to France’s swollen universities, whose enrollment, then 563,000, had grown sevenfold in 35 years. Soon, nine million workers with various grievances walked off their jobs, and plants and offices all over France were “occupied,” in some cases by white-collar cadres. The unrest continued for about three months, and the government was shaken. De Gaulle’s education minister promised more “dialogue” in the schools. The general, who was deeply wounded by the strife in the nation he always viewed as “the princess in the fairy tales” and would soon retire to his small manor house at Colombey Les-Deux-Eglises, spoke vaguely of a need for employee “participation” in management.

A ‘Blocked Society’

Although the 1968 upheaval did not bring a new dawn, the new shifts in housing have done something to blur France’s class lines—those dividing the bourgeoisie (the propertied, or at least affluent, middle class) from the ouvriers (workers), the citadin (townsman) from the paysan. The families of a skilled worker and a minor government fonctionnaire (clerk, postal worker, primary school teacher) can nowadays often be found residing in the same modern apartment block. A worker may own the same car as a bourgeois, and off-duty he may dress similarly; the new generation of factory hands has given up the old uniform of cloth caps and dark jackets.
Even so, France’s class structure remains one of the most rigid in Western Europe. In Britain, the shoulder-to-shoulder experience of World War II led to increased social mobility. In France, which largely sat out the struggle, this did not happen, and prosperity has not helped break down class barriers either. Academics speak of la société bloquée, the “blocked society.” By 1979, Michel Crozier was complaining that France was more than ever a nation “whose citizens are passionately attached to the distinctions and privileges which separate them.”

The Spreading Middle

According to one survey, of the 2,500 most famous or powerful people in France today, only three percent came from working backgrounds. Under a 1977 reform, the junior classes of all private lycées were abolished, so children from both prosperous and poor families now mix in the same state schools until age 15. The hope was that more of the poor would then move on to universities and the grandes écoles, the 100 or so elite colleges that have traditionally produced future leaders in business, the bureaucracy, and the professions. Yet so far that has not happened. The proportion of university students from wage-earning homes was only nine percent in 1979, and may have fallen since.

A Julien Sorel, the poor youth who fought his way to power in Stendhal’s 1830 novel, The Red and the Black, is still rare. An autoworker’s son may become a white-collar, lower-middle class petit bourgeois by training to be a teacher, but he will rarely aspire to be an engineer or a doctor. For a family to change its place in the social pecking order takes at least two or three generations. A man’s accent will not give him away so quickly as in Britain, but his background clings to him more closely.

Change does occur, however. The paysan-citadin distinction faded as the farmer began to live more like the auto dealer or insurance agent in town. And while the wall between ouvrier and bourgeois remains high, the French middle class is spreading.

The upper-middle class remains in the hands of the proper-tied grande bourgeoisie (de Gaulle was an example) and, just below, the bonne bourgeoisie (the home of Mitterrand, a lawyer and the son of a businessman). But further down is a growing middle-middle class. It embraces newly affluent sales and advertising executives, middle managers in modern firms, even storekeepers who have moved with the times. In one town I attended a lavish party thrown by a master butcher. Twenty years ago he had a small shop; now he owns a chain of big ones and lives in nouveau-riche style in a country house with a pool.
Though France has long been known for wide divisions in both wealth and opportunity, efforts actually to measure the gulf have been rare and statistically shaky at best. The last try by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, in 1976, suggested that the top 10 percent of Frenchmen commanded some 30 percent of all take-home income, while the bottom 10 percent got under two percent. As property owners, France's richest one percent held 26 percent of all wealth—well above the U.S. number, 18 percent, but under West Germany's 28 percent and Britain's 32 percent.

Whatever its real size, the "wealth gap" has long loomed large in politics. After the death of de Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou, in 1974, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who had
been de Gaulle’s and Pompidou’s finance minister, moved to
narrow the gap. A modest capital gains tax was enacted, and there
were boosts in pensions and the minimum wage, known by its
acronym, SMIC. (At $3.15 an hour, or not far under the U.S.
minimum of $3.35, a smicard who washes restaurant dishes 40
hours a week now enjoys some discretionary income.) France,
Giscard said grandly, must become “an advanced liberal society.”

Helping the Helpful

How the wealth issue played in 1981 is hard to reckon. The
54 percent of the vote that gave Socialist Mitterrand the seven-
year presidency may not have reflected enthusiasm for his prom-
ised “sharp break with capitalism” so much as weariness with the
increasingly autocratic Giscard. In any case, the wealth issue has
not been strong enough to arrest the Communists’ decline.

Since the Party’s peak just after the war, when it drew 25
percent of the vote, it has been overtaken by the Socialists. In the
1981 National Assembly elections, Communists pulled 16 per-
cent of the vote to the Socialists’ 36 percent. After a five-year
union with the Socialists in a “common program” that it hoped
would carry it to power, in 1977 the Party turned Left, aiming to
keep its working-class support while making the Socialists appear
to be moving to the political center. Then in 1981 the Party
accepted Mitterrand’s offer of posts in a Socialist regime; it was a
cynical move that cost the Party much support.

The four Communists named to Mitterrand’s Cabinet quit in
1984, to the Socialists’ relief. Still strongly pro-Moscow—after the
1981 elections it endorsed the crackdown on the Solidarity
movement in Poland—the Party remains a puzzling anomaly in
democratic France. Communist mayors have long won re-elec-
tion in many towns and cities (Le Havre, Le Mans, the “Red Belt”
workers’ suburbs of Paris). But in national elections, much of the
Communist vote comes from people who merely wish to register
dissatisfaction with the other choices.* The core of the Party’s
support is the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), which
claims 2.1 million members. It is the strongest of France’s gener-
ally weak unions, which are organized on ideological lines rather
than by craft or industry as in the United States.

After his election, Mitterrand not only further raised the

*This also explains some of the growth of the Far Right National Front. Its leader, ex-paratrooper Jean-
Marie Le Pen, is a veteran of the failed fight against France’s withdrawal from Algeria (from which
750,000 French settlers returned in 1962–63). His party blames France’s ills on the four million
immigrants, especially the North Africans among them, who came to France in the boom times. Last
autumn polls showed the Front attracting 10 to 12 percent of the voters, about the same as the
Communists.
safety nets that Giscard had reinforced but took aim at those above. The Socialists imposed new taxes on expense accounts, yachts, and luxury hotels, and slapped a one-time 25 percent "supertax" on the 100,000 highest incomes. Then in 1982 they imposed an annual "wealth tax"; it rises to 1.5 percent on those households (numbering about 150,000) with property worth more than three million francs, or about $370,000.* After an outcry, Mitterrand got works of art exempted from the tax valuation, lest much of France's cultural heritage be sent abroad.

France was slower than some of her neighbors in framing a welfare state, but she has been catching up fast. Today various assistance programs amount to about 26 percent of the gross domestic product. (The U.S. level: 11.7 percent.) But unlike free-for-all programs elsewhere, France typically helps those who serve the state; they may or may not be those most in need.

### 10,000-Franc Children

The dole is generous for the jobless who have been employed and paying social security taxes for some time but stingy with those who have not—such as young people and those who are handicapped or otherwise unable to work. The basic monthly pension for citizens over 65, at 1,200 francs (about $150), is still no bonanza. On the other hand, the government spends heavily on a national health program that has turned a shortage of doctors and hospital beds into a surplus. It can point to good results: Infant mortality, once high, is down to about nine deaths per 1,000 births, lower than the U.S. rate and not far above Sweden's.

The central feature of French welfare remains the Family Allowance program. The French joke that a young married couple's first child is *biologique* and the subsequent ones are *économique*. The basic allowance, paid in the form of government checks mailed each month to eligible households, starts with the second child and rises with each additional *bébé*. A factory worker with a wife, three children, and a modest annual income of 50,000 francs (about $6,200) draws at least 1,250 francs a month to help support his brood. If the mother chooses to stay home to keep house rather than get a job, she gets a generous annual grant. In 1980, the government introduced an additional lump-sum payment of 10,000 francs payable on the birth of each

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*The levy is an answer to that old French pastime, tax evasion. Earners of large incomes may declare only a small part, and take the chance that they will not be caught by understaffed tax authorities. (On average, wealthy folk are audited only every 20 years or so.) One result of the evasion is that wage earners, accounting for only 55 percent of all earned income, pay 84 percent of all income tax. Another is that the government raises 60 percent of its revenue from a less evadable "value added tax," a national sales levy that has long been under discussion in the United States.*

*The Wilson Quarterly/New Year's 1986*
“And now, I'd like to pose a question to all our viewers. How does your own dream concept à la Kafka coexist with the irrational vision which you have of intrinsic existence?”

Charles de Gaulle giving a geography lesson to Harry S Truman and Britain's prime minister Clement R. Attlee after World War II.

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing after his austerity program took hold during the late 1970s.
"Watch out for the strike!", a comment on union weakness.

François Mitterrand in 1985, as the Rainbow Warrior scandal grew.
child after the second. Today, more than four million families benefit from these bonanzas, and over two million also receive housing subsidies, financed by a tax on employers. Such benefits add more than 50 percent to many breadwinners' take-home pay.

What Giscard called "the worst of all French social scourges," alcoholism, persists. While they drink almost 20 percent less than they did in 1951, the French remain the world's leading topers. They consume an average of 13.3 liters of pure alcohol annually, well above America's 8.2 liters. Perhaps four million adult males drink more than the liter a day of red wine that doctors regard as safe for a manual worker. Deaths from cirrhosis of the liver, delirium, and polyneuritis run at some 21,000 a year. More than 37 percent of the men and 14 percent of the women in public hospitals are alcoholic cases; two-thirds of all mentally handicapped children are born of alcoholics.

Government efforts to wean people away from alcohol go back to the 1950s and have sparked riots in southern wine-producing areas. (Some four million people owe their livelihood to the grape.) Thirty years ago, I would see babes of two or three in cafés being given full glasses of wine by their parents. The law now forbids the serving of spirits to anyone under 18, but barmen rarely refuse a father who asks for un rouge for his adolescent son. The scourge is worst in Brittany and the Nord, where business is often transacted over a liter of rouge in a café. In one fishing port, a merchant navy doctor set up his surgery in a bistro, the better to serve his clientele.

Remodeling the Boss

The French imbibe not so much through neurosis or unhappiness, like many Anglo-Saxons, as from ancestral habit. French alcoholism is linked to social backwardness in rural or slum areas. Among sophisticated city folk, it is uncommon. Thus there is hope that the rural exodus, more education, and rehousing (in new towns, the law allows no more than one bar per 3,000 residents) will curb the problem. Already many French are turning from cheap wine and cognac to less destructive potions. Since 1959, beer consumption has climbed by 70 percent.

Some of the large if subtle changes in French life have stemmed from the May 1968 upheaval. One casualty: the obedience to authority once so marked in France.

The 1968 strikes, which brought the occupation of factories and even the locking of bosses in their offices, marked the end of the autocratic French style of corporate command. The Patronat, the federation of most larger French employers, launched a "so-
cial marketing” effort to compete with the unions for the loyalty of employees. At many firms, the personnel manager, long an ignored junior executive, became a man with a large staff, equal in rank to the sales director. While German-style co-management remains taboo (the left-wing unions reject “collaboration with capitalism” in any case), “job enrichment” is in vogue.

At state-owned Aerospatiale’s helicopter plant at Marignane, near Marseille, the time clock was eliminated. The 6,500 employees now arrange their 41.5-hour work week largely to suit themselves. Staffers work in semi-autonomous groups, à la Volvo and Fiat, and are free to slip off to a rest lounge for a few minutes without permission—most unusual in a French factory. Each light Ecureuil (Squirrel) helicopter is assembled by two or three workers who agree to a certain output and produce it in their own time. A boss “must be a committed social activist,” says plant manager Fernand Carayon. “A patron [boss] who is not accepted by his staff as deserving that title is no true patron.”

A small but vocal women’s liberation movement emerged in France, as elsewhere, during the 1970s, but its influence remains minimal. This has been no great surprise. Few women paid much attention nearly four decades ago when Simone de Beauvoir lectured her female compatriots, in The Second Sex (1949), on escaping their “self-imposed inferiority.”

French women are so unmilitant that they did not get around
to winning the right to vote until the arrival of the Liberation Government under de Gaulle (not himself a noted feminist) in 1945. Prior to the 1964 Matrimonial Act, a wife had to obtain her husband’s permission to open a bank account, run a shop, or get a passport; divorce courts were obliged to regard a wife’s infidelity as more serious than a man’s. It was only during the years of Giscard, who created the post of secretary of state for women’s affairs, that the remaining statutory inequalities in matters of divorce, property, and right to employment were eliminated. Other measures legalized abortion and mandated a minimum 16 weeks’ paid maternity leave for female workers.

That some of this has come late may be due to the latent machismo of a Latin society with Catholic traditions. But French women themselves have not shown much interest in erasing all gender distinctions. Socially, they have been rarely segregated or treated as inferior, as in some Mediterranean nations. They see themselves, and are seen, as the equals of men—equal, but different. This remains the land of la petite différence, not one of suffragettes, or of the women’s club beloved of Anglo-Saxons.

**Fleeing the Nest**

But since 1968, a kind of feminism has spread among younger women. They do not want to lead the *same* lives as men, but they do expect equality of legal rights and access to careers. Girls of good family no longer sit at home until marriage; they get a job. More than 46 percent of university students are women, up from 25 percent in 1930; 15 percent of the 150 students at the Ecole Nationale d’Administration in Paris, the prestigious postgraduate civil service school, are female.

Women make up 39.4 percent of the overall workforce (close to the United States’ 43 percent), and fully 34 percent of the younger doctors are female. But their overall representation in the professions is still only 23 percent, and politics remains a *phallocracie*, as elsewhere. Only about five percent of the 485 winners of seats in the Chamber of Deputies in 1981 were women, but at that the Chamber is as female as the U.S. House of Representatives and slightly more so than Britain’s House of Commons. Party leaders from Right to Left are wary of running women as candidates, fearing that they do not pull votes. Said Foreign Trade Minister Edith Cresson, one of the record six women in Mitterrand’s 44-member Cabinet: “The convention persists that politics is a man’s affair, for discussions in bistro or parliament. A woman who pushes herself forward is *mal vu*.”

The national leadership remains confused about what
France wants from its women. Mitterrand named a Minister for Women's Rights, Yvette Roudy. But jobs are scarce and the birth rate remains a concern, so the government keeps raising its inducements to families to keep wives at home to raise children. Picturebooks in state primary schools still show men as bosses, women at a stove or cradle, or working as nurses or secretaries.

Change has come far more slowly in the world of jobs and careers than in private life. The old idea of France as a land of unfettered amour had always been a foreigner's fantasy. As late as the 1960s surveys showed unmarried French women as a whole, particularly in the provinces, to be among the most sexually unliberated in Europe, outside Italy and Spain. But, perhaps spurred by the Scandinavians' famed postwar tolerance, permissiveness has spread. "In general," says Dr. Pierre Simon, a leading sexologist, "sexual freedom in France has now reached the same level as in Britain, West Germany, or Sweden. That, for a so-called Catholic land, is quite a transformation."

Laws against contraception dating back to 1920, and intended to bolster the birth rate, were not repealed until 1967. Though acceptance of the Pill and other measures lagged for a
while, polls show that 81 percent of women between 15 and 49 approve of them, and 68 percent use them.

Fewer couples are going to the altar. A recent Church-sponsored survey found that some 60 percent of people between 21 and 34 “do not think it worth going through any marriage ceremony.” As the housing shortage eased, it became easier for a young unmarried couple to flee the parental nest to a small apartment of their own. Among middle-class youths, more than 50 percent of those who marry live together first.

**Pagans, Dropouts, Zips**

Divorce never became the divisive issue that it was in Catholic Italy. (It was finally permitted there in 1970.) Having risen steadily since the war, the rate of family breakup in France increased sharply after 1975, when an easy form of divorce by mutual consent, similar to U.S. and British no-fault procedures, was adopted. Today, one marriage in four terminates in the courtroom, and divorcées suffer little if any stigma. Many traditionalists have resented the image of loose adult living that has been fostered in fiction and films, from Flaubert’s *Madame Bovary* (1857) to *Cousin Cousine* (1975). When, back in 1964, Godard filmed a satire about a modern Bovary titled *The Married Woman*, Gaullist censors sprang to the defense of French marital honor and made the director change *The* to *A*. But such puritanism would hardly be imaginable today.

The postwar shift away from older values is vividly reflected in the transformation of Catholicism. Although some 80 percent of all infants still receive Church baptism, Mass attendance is low; only 14 percent of all Catholics (10 percent of those in Paris) attend weekly services. The priesthood is short of recruits. More than in stronger Catholic countries such as Italy and Ireland, the Church has lost touch with its popular roots.

One cause has been the depopulation of the rural areas where the old ways persist. (In the Vendée, 230 miles southwest of Paris, 80 percent of Catholics attend Sunday Mass.) Then again, having remained an establishment bastion long after its legal separation from the state in 1905, the Church has veered in several directions since the war; by now it has come to seem less a pillar of society than a loose network of iconoclastic militants. It encompasses angry conservatives such as 80-year-old Monsignor Marcel Lefebvre, who defies the Vatican by retaining the Latin Mass, “worker-priests” who take factory jobs to recruit left-wing believers, and others who preach and even practice sexual freedom. Surveys show that 86 percent of priests oppose celibacy; 84
percent never wear the cassock.

During the Occupation, a parish priest named Abbé Godin caused a stir with a book called *France, a Mission Country*; it argued that the nation was no longer Christian but essentially pagan. That thesis today seems just as tenable. Polls show that those who believe in God have dropped from 74 percent in 1968 to 65 percent; the decline has been sharpest among the young.

Indeed, French youths are something of an enigma. Docile during the 1950s and '60s, they seemed to explode during the events of 1968. Later than the young in Anglo-Saxon countries, they won freedom from parental authority. And thousands of students, young urban intellectuals, and *zipis* (hippies) trekked to rural utopias seeking a “purer” life in hill-farming and handicrafts. Most gave up, but others followed during the 1970s, when many young French discovered The Environment. Today some 10,000 self-styled *installés* (homesteaders) live in the Cévennes and the foothills of the Alps and Pyrénées.

But a year after the 1968 events, a study of 16- to 24-year olds suggested a generation that was generally content with the social order. And today sociologist Bernard Cathelat finds that about
one-half of French youths are "basically conformist," eager to settle into adult society; "they value the things of the past, they are not risk takers." A smaller group, perhaps 29 percent, are dropouts or quasi dropouts, mostly middle-class people with some education; "such people could well have stormed the barricades in '68, but today they believe in nothing." The least numerous category is "a lumpen-youth that has failed at school, and now has dreary jobs or none at all." They "find safety valves in motor-bikes, rock music, or minor delinquency."

Vicious Circle

Juvenile crime appeared later in France than in other Western countries and was never widespread. Ditto drugs; not until 1969–70 did marijuana or hard drugs turn up in quantity, and the problem has not reached U.S. or West German proportions; at 100 to 150 a year, deaths from overdoses run at one-third of the German level. Those young men who do not win exemptions dutifully report for their 12 months of compulsory military service. But few share the passionate work ethic that drove their elders to build the new France. "Our parents live for work; we work so as to live better," a young technician told me. As sociologist Jean Duvignaud observed in The Planet of the Young (1975), modern youths "do not rebel, they retreat. Their great search is for a refuge against a society that they see as impersonal and unwelcoming."

As growth slowed during the 1970s, the word crise (crisis) was widely heard. In the boom years, the French came to expect ever larger cars, smarter flats, costlier holidays. Now they had to recognize that this kind of happiness could be fragile. By the 1980s, sociologists were noting a national repli sur soi, a withdrawal into privacy. There was new interest in family roots, regional languages, history. Montaillou (1975), Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's look at life in a medieval village, was a best seller.

"The pendulum has been swinging back," suggests a leading social analyst, René Remond. "During the 1950s the French moved from the values of stability to those of growth and change. Now they are shifting back to stability." It is entirely possible to view the election of the Socialists in 1981 not as a vote for change but as a cry for at least a pause in all the progress the voters had had to absorb over the previous 30 years.

Despite that progress, much about French life remains the same—too much, many say. The state-citizen feuding that de Gaulle noted reflects a real issue: What price technocracy?

What the French call l'étatsme, the pervasive role of the

State, has roots in royalist history and was reinforced by Napoleon. Under the Fifth Republic, the State has remained strong, and the size and power of its governing elites have grown.

De Gaulle despised old-style career politicians. He promoted a breed of civil servants known as “technocrats,” apostles of rational planning, and made several of them ministers in his government. Some of them belonged to the dozen or so Grands Corps d’Etat, the club-like organizations that operate in parallel with government ministries yet wield much influence beyond. One of the most venerated of the Grands Corps, the Inspection des Finances (IF), nominally exists to audit state accounts. In practice, it furnishes a pool of administrators who can move back and forth between high-paid state and industry posts.

Coming from a few schools—the most celebrated being the Ecole National d’Administration (ENA), set up in 1946, and the Ecole Polytechnique, a Napoleonic creation—these mandarins constitute a self-perpetuating ruling caste. By now, their realm is broad indeed, given not only the state’s ownership of many businesses but also its role as France’s chief investor and banker.

The Grands Corps system, which has no parallel in the United States or even in old-boy Britain, continued under Pompidou and Giscard (who came to the presidency with Ecole Polytechnique and ENA diplomas and IF membership in his dossier). Few dispute that the technocrats and the power they
wielded were essential in such undertakings as the modernization of France’s coal mines, the creation of national oil companies to compete with the Seven Sisters, and the nurturing of Aerospatiale and Europe’s most ambitious nuclear energy program. But now that the French recovery has “matured,” some critics are asking whether l’étatisme has become a liability.

In a 1976 best seller, Le Mal Français, Alain Peyrefitte, a longtime Gaullist minister, bewailed the “vicious circle” in French civic life. “A population at once passive and undisciplined,” he wrote, justifies l’étatisme but also fosters “a bureaucracy which discourages initiative, suffocates activity, and manages to make citizens even more passive.” Thus the French “move in one bound from lethargy to insurrection, while the State passes from pressure to oppression.”

One manifestation of the state power–popular passivity syndrome was l’affaire Greenpeace, the uproar over the sinking by French agents of the nuclear test–protest ship Rainbow Warrior in Auckland harbor last July. The French were not angry that the government had done the deed so much as they were amused that it had got caught. As one Paris journalist noted, the episode recalled the remark of Joseph Fouché, the French secret service chief, when Napoleon ordered the execution of the powerful Duc d’Enghein: It was “worse than a crime—it was a blunder.”

Tales of bureaucratic insensitivity abound. When architects who were planning new public housing near Marseille wanted the main windows to face north and away from the heat of the Midi sun, it took them six months to win approval from their superiors in northerly Paris, where sunshine is prized. Then again, the individualistic French, while grumbling about state supervision, show little talent for action on their own. Local citizens will sign petitions demanding government funds for, say, a crèche or a youth club. It will seldom occur to them, as it would to Americans or Britons, to raise the money and run the project themselves.

Progress in France has typically depended on the emergence of the rare individual leader, as was the case with both the young farmers and the upstart retailers of the 1950s and ’60s. France “is full of exciting activity” in many areas, Michel Crozier has written. “But all the individual initiatives, all the innovations, stay halted at a certain level.” It is a state of mind that neither the State nor the governed yet seem able to change.
During the recession-ridden summer of 1983, when President François Mitterrand’s two-year-old Socialist government was sagging in the opinion polls, the prestigious daily Le Monde took action. Its editors ran a series of front-page articles lamenting “the silence of the intellectuals.”

Indeed, the lack of support for Mitterrand from Paris writers and thinkers was surprising. He not only had led the return to power of the Left, the historic home of the French intellectual, but, given his authorship of four books (including The Wheat and the Chaff, 1982) and his literary inclinations, he could claim a special affinity with the intellectual world. So why the silence? Bernard-Henri Levy, one of the anti-Marxist New Philosophers who emerged during the 1970s, had a theory: “The Left triumphed when it was already dead.”

Perhaps. Yet intellectuals, too, are not what they used to be, despite Le Monde’s traditional emphasis on their importance.

The French both coined the term “intellectual” and, in a variety of ways, granted to those who claimed the title a special influence unmatched anywhere else in the West. During the Enlightenment, Voltaire’s invective in Candide (1759) against the nobles, Catholic clergy, and other powers of the Old Regime, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ideas about a “social contract” that would end inequality among men, inspired leaders of the 1789 French Revolution and contributed to the 18th-century rise of republican government. Thinkers and writers would continue to command attention after the heyday of Victor Hugo, who fought Napoleon III’s dictatorship while writing Les Misérables (1862) in exile, right on through the World War II German Occupation. From his Left Bank haunts, Jean-Paul Sartre, the Marxist author of Nausea (1938), Being and Nothingness (1943), and No Exit (1944), spoke to the world on existentialism, the Soviet Union (“the country of freedom”), and “imperialist” America.

Such sages were courted by men of power. When Gen. Charles de Gaulle, the Free French leader, met a delegation of intellectuals led by André Gide (The Immoralist) in Algeria in 1943, he pointedly expressed a belief that “art has its honor, in the same way that France has hers.” He later made writer André Malraux (The Human Condition) his Minister of Culture.

GODS THAT FAILED

by Diana Pinto

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From the time he emerged as a distinct figure during the 18th century, the French intellectual enjoyed a special role. Men of letters, Voltaire declared, were “a necessary part” of society. They were the defenders of Reason. They were Humanity’s conscience, a bulwark against the State, whose power had burgeoned under Louis XIV and was consolidated after the 1789 Revolution by Napoleon Bonaparte. In contrast to Britain and America, where government mediated local interests, the French State embodied France’s universal interests. It brooked no opposition from regions and classes. Its will was absolute.

France’s intellectuals sought to rule the empire of Truth as absolutely as France’s kings ruled the State. When Rousseau wrote about the “General Will” and Voltaire penned his hymns to Reason, they claimed as much of a monopoly on the idea of Progress as France’s rulers did on power. Like the 18th-century nobility whose privileges they denounced, intellectuals knew little of “the people” they spoke for and disdained mundane matters such as economics. They argued that wisdom, as Voltaire said of philosophy and good taste, belongs to a few “privileged souls . . . It is unknown in bourgeois families, where one is constantly occupied with the care of one's fortune.”

Quite a contrast to Britain’s pragmatic thinkers, who included John Locke and Adam Smith. “Out of touch with practical politics,” Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in _The Old Regime and the French Revolution_ (1856), the French intellectuals “lacked the experience which might have tempered their enthusiasms.”*

The 19th century, which saw three kings, two republics, one emperor, a civil war, and the birth of an international socialist movement, brought the intellectuals’ apogee as custodians of Truth: turning false charges of treason against a Jewish army captain named Alfred Dreyfus into a _cause célèbre_. When Emile Zola published his “J'accuse . . .” in the journal _L'Aurore_ in 1898, what became known as _le parti des intellectuels_ joined in a battle between champions of justice on the Left and, on the Right,

*Historian Ernst Renan shared that lament in _La Réforme Intellectuelle en France_ (1871): “England has achieved the most liberal state that the world has known up to now by developing its institutions from the Middle Ages . . . Freedom in England comes from its entire history; from its equal respect for the rights of the king, the rights of the lords, the rights of the commons and guilds of every type. France took the opposite road. The king had long ago swept away the rights of the lords and of the commons; the nation swept away the rights of the king. The nation proceeded philosophically in an area where one should proceed historically.”

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Voltaire in the Bastille in 1717. A witty favorite of Paris salons and leader of the Enlightenment philosophers who questioned the old order, he was jailed for 11 months for mocking the Duc d’Orléans. His era, he wrote, saw “astonishing contrasts: reason on the one hand, the most absurd fanaticism on the other...a civil war in every soul.”

the military, the church, and other Old Regime pillars. The triumph of Dreyfus’s defenders led to the 1905 separation of church and state (which closed out the Old Regime) and established the Left as a power in politics. It also began the intellectuals’ engagement in left-wing causes.

Yet the Dreyfus case would be the last French affaire to provide the intellectuals with a “big” issue; afterwards, the durable if shaky Third Republic (1870–1940) offered little that could be attacked as absolute evil. The next cause would come with the 1917 Russian Revolution: the combat between communism* and capitalism. The Soviet Union became the center of Reason and Progress, America a force of evil (it was “counter-revolutionary” before it became “imperialist” after World War II).

From the 1920s on, attitudes about the Communist Party often determined one’s position in cultural fields. Allegiance or non-allegiance to the Party divided the writers and artists who followed the pioneering surrealist André Breton. Pablo Picasso

*Though Lenin adopted the label “communism,” the word seems to have first appeared in France. In 1779, a self-described auteur communiste named Hupay proposed an experiment in “Spartan” communal living near Marseille that would be the “nursery of a better race of men.” Restif de la Bretonne, a prolific Paris writer, made the term a revolutionary concept. During the 1790s, he urged that the “uncompleted republic” that followed the 1789 revolt be replaced by a communism that would eliminate private property. Only this would be “worthy of reasonable men.”
PEAS, GHERKINS, MAN, MARX

Existentialism long ago receded into the French intellectual background. But when Jean-Paul Sartre unveiled his ideas about Man’s essence in Being and Nothingness in 1943, he stirred a commotion—and confusion. The existential argument that the diminutive leftist set forth in his dense, 800-odd page work was variously hailed as the hope of a war-numbed generation that had found all other “isms” empty and mocked as a sour atheist’s Marxist fraud. Responding to the critics, Sartre protested in the journal Action that his notion was really “rather simple”:

In philosophical terminology, every object has an essence and an existence. An essence is an intelligible and unchanging unity of properties; an existence is a certain actual presence in the world. Many people think that the essence comes first and then the existence: that peas, for example, grow and become round in conformity with the idea of peas, and that gherkins are gherkins because they participate in the essence of gherkins. This idea originated in religious thought: It is a fact that the man who wants to build a house has to know exactly what kind of object he’s going to create—essence precedes existence—and for all those who believe that God created men, he must have done so by referring to his idea of them. But even those who have no religious faith have maintained this traditional view that the object never exists except in conformity with its essence; and everyone in the 18th century thought that all men had a common essence called human nature. Existentialism, on the contrary, maintains that in man—and in man alone—existence precedes essence.

This simply means that man first is, and only subsequently is this or that. In a word, man must create his own essence: It is in throwing himself into the world, suffering there, struggling there, that he gradually defines himself. And the definition always remains open ended: We cannot say what this man is before he dies, or what mankind is before it has disappeared. It is absurd in this light to ask whether existentialism is fascist, conservative, communist, or democratic. . . . All I can say—without wanting to insist too much on the similarities—is that it isn’t too far from the conception of man found in Marx. For is it not a fact that Marx would accept this motto of ours for man: make, and in making make yourself, and be nothing but what you have made of yourself?

linked up with the Party briefly; so did Jean Vilar, head of the Théâtre National Populaire. In science, the Nobel laureate Frédéric Joliot-Curie, who would be the first chief of France’s Atomic Energy Commission, led his colleagues in the Communist camp of “progress” against “bourgeois” foes.

“Intellectuals” divided into Party fellow travelers (such as Sartre) and those who were totally engagé (novelist Paul Nizan). There had long been non-Left writers, such as Honoré de Balzac during the 19th century and Drieu la Rochelle, Céline, and the Catholic novelists Georges Bernanos and François Mauriac dur-
ing the 20th. But they were not accepted as “intellectuals” by the left-wing writers, editors, and other panjandrums who dominated the realm of “ideas.”

Sartre and the Marxist philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty set the “proper” line for the faithful in their review, Les Temps Modernes. Along with Albert Camus and other grands intellectuels, they were national figures. They made headlines in Le Monde, Combat, and the weekly Le Nouvel Observateur. Like their counterparts in haute couture, whose designs would be copied widely, they set intellectual style.

**Down with the Lackeys!**

Their views on who was in the “good” camp of Progress (or in that of Reaction) and other matters percolated out to school-teachers, lycée professors, film producers, and others who were the “consumers” of intellectual fare. This was a large group: The 1954 French census listed “intellectuals” as a professional category and counted more than 1.1 million. It was also a disgruntled group, uneasy about the economic transformation of France that had begun after 1945. Often the attitudes of le parti des intellectuels paralleled those of the government (e.g., the Gaullists’ anti-Americanism). When they did not, few politicians would risk a clash. In 1959, some Gaullists urged that Sartre be tried for treason for encouraging, in a famous petition signed by 121 intellectuals, the desertion of French soldiers in the Algerian war; de Gaulle refused, saying simply that “one just does not touch Jean-Paul Sartre.”

By coupling France’s revolutionary tradition with that of the Soviet Union, the intellectuals kept the world as a stage at a time when France’s role was shrinking. They could transcend France’s social and economic problems, which did not interest them, by being the “conscience of humanity.” As they saw it, French “ideas” provided the cultural substrate for the “progressive camp” incarnated by the Soviet Union. Sartre’s existentialism asked people to choose between “good” and “evil” by embracing political engagement on behalf of the Revolution. Camus’s *The Rebel* (1951) and Merleau-Ponty’s *Humanism and Terror* (1947) suggested other ways of dealing with the nihilism wrought by war.

Those who argued for democracy and/or a more balanced evaluation of the superpowers were ostracized from the community of “intellectuals.” In 1955, the liberal political philosopher Raymond Aron, who had been a university classmate of Sartre’s, wrote a brilliant pamphlet, *The Opium of the Intellectuals*, de-
nouncing their psychological “need” of the Party and of revolution. He, and the antitotalitarian thinkers and Eastern European refugees who wrote for the liberal but anti-Communist review *Preuves*, were dismissed as “lackeys of the bourgeoisie.” Pluralism was not part of the French intellectual tradition.

The coupling of the French and Soviet revolutionary identities survived the early evidence on the Soviet system—the Moscow show trials of the 1930s, the denunciations of Stalin’s crimes at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 and the Hungarian invasion that year, even the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. When, during the 1960s, the intellectuals decided that the Soviet Union had become “too revisionist,” they merely turned to China and Cuba. As Jean-Luc Godard’s 1967 film, *La Chinoise*, detailed, French students took to Mao Zedong with a passion. Régis Debray, now a Mitterrand adviser, joined Che Guevara in his ill-fated attempt to export Fidel Castro’s revolution to South America.

Sartre, too, discovered the Third World; he became the director of *La Cause du Peuple*, a quarterly that was so communal it listed only him and Mao as contributors. As late as 1975, intellectuals could still rejoice in the victory of North Vietnam, while hoping for a “true” Portuguese revolution as a first step toward a Marxist Western Europe.

But then, in just a decade, the scene changed totally. Why?

The basic reason was France’s rapid transformation from an essentially rural, tradition-bound nation with a small, almost priestly intellectual class of writers, professors, and teachers into an urban, mobile, industrial society—a society whose better educated younger generations increasingly questioned all authority and were exposed to what was going on in other countries. One casualty was the intellectuals’ old confidence in the unique importance of France’s culture and ideas.

**An Addiction to Ideology**

Younger thinkers, among them the “structuralists” who emerged during the 1960s, saw things differently. As applied by anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, historian Michel Foucault, psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, literary critic Roland Barthes, and linguist philosopher Jacques Derrida, structuralism diverged from the Sartrian view that man could remake his world—and that literature, science, and all else must thus be politicized.

Though less a philosophy than a method, structuralism held that human freedom was limited; thought and action were “structured” by innate cultural traits that defied subjective will and history. The importance of ideas, per se, was exaggerated, Fou-
A pride of intellectual lions: Jean-Paul Sartre, his lifelong companion Simone de Beauvoir, and, behind them, Albert Camus (partially hidden) and André Gide. Devoted to "the revolution," Sartre, unlike Camus and Gide, rejected his Nobel Prize for literature (1964), and even in old age joined street riots to make good on his motto that "commitment is an act, not a word." When he died at 75 in 1980, 25,000 attended his funeral.

cault argued in Les Mots et les Choses (1966): "If we study thought as an archaeologist studies buried cities, we can see that man was born yesterday and may die tomorrow." The French not only lacked a monopoly on truth, Lévi-Strauss argued; they suffered from a psychological addiction to ideology and revolution.

It was in this new context that younger intellectuals embarked during the late 1960s and '70s on a re-reading of France's past. Its "silences" were scrutinized. Books and films, including The Sorrow and the Pity (1972), sought to shed light on dark spots such as Vichy France's wartime collaboration with the Germans and the persistence of French anti-Semitism.

Even so, when Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago appeared in France in 1975, Le Nouvel Observateur and other voices of the intellectual Left could still argue over the propriety of publishing the Soviet dissident's "reactionary" revelations about Moscow's network of prisons for political opponents—even if they were true. Intellectuals had known about the Gulag before; during the early 1950s, Sartre himself had anguished over reports of the "camps," as they were then called. But the intellectuals, including Sartre, chose to blind themselves to the truth. They said that history was on the side of the Soviets, the "black marks" were passing phenomena. By the 1970s, young intellectuals refused to accept this old orthodoxy.
Could the origins of the Gulag be found within the French revolutionary tradition? That was one question that absorbed Bernard-Henri Levy, André Glucksmann, and other New Philosophers. They were veterans of the 1968 student rebellion who had gone on to rebel against Marxism. In his angry 1977 book, Barbarism with a Human Face, Levy railed at how the prevailing intellectuals had brushed aside embarrassments such as the Gulags as “mistakes,” when in fact “the Soviet camps are Marxist, as Marxist as Auschwitz was Nazi.” Marxism, he discovered, was “not a science, but an ideology like the others, operating like the others to conceal the truth at the same time it forms it.”

Collapses of the Communist ideal elsewhere reinforced the Gulag revelations. The fighting that embroiled the “fraternal” Communist regimes of China, Vietnam, and Cambodia after the U.S. withdrawal and the brutal conditions that dotted the seas around Indochina with “boat people” could not be ignored. One result was a rather confessional piece published in Le Nouvel Observateur in 1976 by French journalist Jean Lacouture, an old Vietnam hand who had made a return visit. Not only did he find Communist rule in the south to be “oppressive”; he admitted that in years of previous reporting he had not focused on what a Communist victory might lead to, out of a “kind of solidarity” he felt with “a people struggling for independence.”

Looking at America

Then there was Angola, Afghanistan, and further repression in Eastern Europe, which the intellectuals on the Left had also refused to examine during the entire postwar period. The agonies of Soviet dissidents, notably physicist Andrey Sakharov, continued. With the end of reform hopes in Poland, signaled by the 1981 crackdown on Solidarity, intellectuals found virtue in what they had dismissed as the “formal” rights of the democracies.

Meanwhile, the French intellectuals’ home base was transformed. Pursuing a broader public not notably devoted to high culture, publishers became less ready to rush the latest polemic into print. As “ecologists” and others with a cause began competing for media attention, younger intellectuals became less content to write for eternity and a small audience; they wanted visibility now. To have a book reviewed in a serious journal was good; it was better to be asked by TV Host Bernard Pivot to hold forth on Apostrophes, a Friday evening author-interview show that draws five million or more viewers. The left-wing press struggled. While Le Monde remains influential, its circulation has slipped from its 1979 peak of about 450,000 to 385,000. Le
Nouvel Observateur has become a sedate, glossy weekly, fat with ads for ski condominiums and exotic vacations. Several trends produced an “opening to America,” which had long received bad press from both intellectuals and the Gaullists. Perceptions changed as more and more French academics visited U.S. campuses; books like Edgar Morin’s Journal de Californie (1969) ventured behind the caricatures, just as Jean-François Revel’s Ni Marx Ni Jesus (1970) explored the secular United States as the road of the future. Especially after the end of the Watergate drama in 1975, intellectuals and journalists came to admire the Americans’ robust two-party politics, independent press (print and broadcast), and decentralized economy. The country also attracted young backpackers in search of wide open spaces (psychological as well as geographical) and upward-bound executives seeking firsthand experience with U.S. technological and managerial know-how to add to their résumés.

In short, what Levy describes as “a kind of metaphysical hatred for everything American” has turned to intense fascination. Ronald Reagan’s presidency has provoked several intellectual treatises and a somewhat superficial best seller, Guy Sorman’s The Conservative Revolution in America (1984).

The 1981 victory of the Left consolidated the sea change for French intellectuals. It ended the old association of “power” with “the Right”—and of the intellectuals with anyone. “The essential merit of the left-wing government,” sociologist Alain Touraine has said, “has been to rid us of socialist ideology.” A poignant sign of the intellectuals’ abandonment of their 18th-century certitude has been the belated honors that have been accorded to Raymond Aron. So long overshadowed by Sartre, he has been avenged by younger writers aiming to emphasize who turned out to be right on totalitarianism. In a 1979 event, arranged by the New Philosopher André Glucksmann, Sartre agreed to meet Aron at the Élysée, the presidential palace in Paris, to seek aid for boat people fleeing life under communism in Indochina. Said Aron: “It’s Sartre who has changed, not me.”

The French intellectual was the grand old figure of an authoritarian past. His loss of a central role in shaping political discourse marks, more than any other social or economic development, France’s entry into the ranks of those pluralist democratic societies that Tocqueville admired. For the autocrats of ideas, the past decade has been a time to step down, “to cultivate one’s garden,” as Voltaire put it. It has been a step for the better.
Are the French like no other people? There is much testimony in the affirmative, from Gustave Flaubert’s claim that the French are “the premier people in the universe” to Charles de Gaulle’s view of France as a land of “destiny.” French youths are still taught that “the hexagon,” the mapmaker’s six-sided France, was always fated for greatness among nations.

The hexagon idea, at least, is a “myth.” So argues Sanche de Gramont in The French: Portrait of a People (Putnam’s, 1969). The French-born, Yale-educated journalist (who, now a U.S. citizen, writes under the name Ted Morgan) notes that France was not “geographically predestined to become a nation, as were such spatially defined units as the British Isles, Italy, and the Iberian peninsula.”

Its name comes from the Franks, Germanic tribes who during the fifth century ended the Romans’ rule of what they called Gaul. But by the ninth century, when the Catholic emperor Charles the Great held sway, “the French” were of Neolithic stock and that of Celtic, Roman, Frankish, Burgundian, and Norman arrivistes. Their initial success, dating from when the Gauls grew wheat and Cistercian monks burned forests to make fertilizer ash, lacked glorie: They built Europe’s first society of independent farmers, an achievement “as specific to France as the network of great trading cities was to Rome and the need for an empire-conquering navy was to . . . Britain.”

After the 10th-century fall of Charles’s empire, feudal nobles installed the Capetian kings, who led the 13th-century Crusades that established France’s cultural influence over most of Western Europe. During the 1337–1453 Hundred Years’ War, the House of Valois expelled the English from French soil. But decades of religious conflicts and civil wars finally led to the rise of the Bourbons. Their royal power was consolidated during the 17th century by the maneuvering of cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin, enabling Louis XIV to begin the costly wars that made France dominant in Western Europe.

C. B. A. Behrens’s The Ancien Régime (Harcourt, 1957, paper) and Gordon Wright’s survey France in Modern Times: 1760 to the Present (Rand McNally, 1960; Norton, 1981) sketch the monarchy. By the 1760s, barely one in 20 citizens were members of the First Estate (churchmen) and Second Estate (nobles), who held sinecures and tax exemptions. The crown’s habit of selling official posts produced a large bureaucracy. Even then, wrote Alexis de Tocqueville in The Old Regime and the French Revolution (Harper, 1856; Doubleday, 1955), officials had a “mania” for “managing every thing at Paris.”

The upheaval of 1789 is examined in several academic works, such as Georges Lefebvre’s The French Revolution (Columbia, 1964). James H. Billington’s Fire in the Minds of Men (Basic, 1980, cloth & paper) examines how the rebellion, unlike earlier ones in Holland, England, and America, became less dedicated to liberty than to a collectivist equality and fraternity, serving as a model for the intellectuals (Marx, Bakunin, Lenin) who later spread the “revolutionary faith” to Germany, Russia, and beyond.

In France, the revolution brought on a cycle of domestic tumult and wartime victory and defeat that extended from Napoleon Bonaparte’s First Empire (1804–15) to Napoleon III’s disaster in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71. Gordon Wright’s The Reshaping of French Democracy (Reynal & Hitch-
BACKGROUND BOOKS: FRANCE

cock, 1948; Fertig, 1970) picks up France's evolution with the 1870–1940 Third Republic. While its constitution offered "history's first example of the parliamentary republic," it was no recipe for stability. The Third Republic, during its span, had 102 cabinets and 14 presidents, whose modest gifts prompted Georges Clemenceau's quip, "I vote for the most stupid."

Roger Shattuck's *The Banquet Years* (Random, 1968) deals with the belle époque, the 30-year stretch of relative peace roughly bisected by the Paris Exhibition of 1899. These decades brought Baron Haussmann's remodeling of Paris (completed in 1880), aviator Louis Blériot's English Channel flight (1909), and a cultural flowering led by Monet, Matisse, and Renoir in painting; Delius and Saint-Saëns in music; Edmond Rostand (Cyran0 de Bergerac) and Sarah Bernhardt in drama; and poets and writers Arthur Rimbaud, Paul Verlaine, Emile Zola, and Marcel Proust.

Born during the belle époque was the man who seemed later to be its living antithesis, Charles de Gaulle.

The towering general who led the Free French during World War II and "picked the Republic out of the gutter" (his phrase) told his own story; *The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle* (Simon & Schuster, 1964, cloth; Da Capo, 1967, paper) has been called "a monument to de Gaulle, by de Gaulle." But the list of books about him continues to grow. Some titles: Jean Lacouture's *De Gaulle* (Editions du Seuil, 1965; New American Library, 1966); Brian Crozier's *De Gaulle* (Scribner's, 1973); Don Cook's *Charles de Gaulle: A Biography* (Putnam's, 1983).

The general looms large in other works about his times. David Schoenbrun's story of the World War II Resistance, *Soldiers of the Night* (Dutton, 1980; New American Library, 1980), recalls how de Gaulle's broadcasts from London assailed the peace arranged with the Germans by Marshal Philippe Pétain, his onetime commanding officer, as "dishonorable," and how he sent emissaries to assure the faction-ridden anti-Nazi underground that he was "a true son of France."

As Alistair Horne relates in his vivid chronicle of France's last colonial struggle, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962* (Viking, 1978, cloth; Penguin, 1979, paper), when de Gaulle was called to power to resolve the Algeria crisis in 1958 at age 67, his old mystique was intact. A French author wrote that "the best known of Frenchmen" remained "a monolith of indecipherable hieroglyphs"—while British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan concluded after a Paris visit that he was "as obstinate as ever."

Why did President de Gaulle block Britain's entry into the Common Market (1963, 1967), pull France out of NATO (1966), pique Ottawa by hailing Québec française during a visit to Canada, and embrace Israel only to turn later to the Arabs? In *Decline or Renewal?* (Viking, 1974), Harvard's Stanley Hoffmann agrees that de Gaulle "liked the stage" but insists that he also "had a script." The rule of world politics that "whoever slows down or stays put falls behind," says Hoffmann, holds true, particularly for middle-weight powers such as France.

De Gaulle did not romanticize his fellow countrymen, but he had faith in their collective talents. France, he wrote, was special, "going back and forth endlessly from grandeur to decline, but restored from century to century by the genius of renewal."
Americans are ambivalent about technology. They make folk heroes of the engineers who forge new technologies—Robert Fulton, Thomas Edison, and, most recently, Steven Wozniak, inventor of the Apple computer. Yet scholars and pundits chronically worry that technology and its servants will overwhelm the human spirit. In 1986, U.S. colleges and universities will graduate some 82,000 new engineers, trained to create space-age communications, plan bridges and dams, or design computer chips. Here, Princeton’s David P. Billington contends that their work is misunderstood; it will involve more art than science; it is a humanistic specialty. Far from being an enemy of the liberal arts, he says, engineering is one of them.

by David P. Billington

The 16th century was an era of religious crisis and Reformation in the West, and the late 18th century was a time of political Revolution. Today, we are in the midst of a technological Reordering of the world. Technology, from nuclear arms to pocket calculators, has changed radically the way we live. On television, in congressional committees, and around dinner tables, the dangers and dividends of technological change are constantly discussed. Yet Americans’ knowledge of technology—its whys and wherefores, its true values—is meager.

Americans seem to have concluded that a broad education, spanning the arts and sciences, is impossible in today’s complex world, that knowledge must be increasingly specialized and segmented, sliced fine and filed away. At American universities, liberal arts students often graduate without even a rudimentary education in technology. Institutions of higher learning seem to have deserted the notion that there is a unity to all knowledge.
Science as curiosity, politics as civic virtue, and art as imagination are all waning concepts, often ridiculed as "elitist" or worse, not even discussed.

While relatively few American scholars study technology, many academics readily blame it for what they consider the "sterility" and "narrowness" of modern life. In his best-selling book for Random House, *The Greening of America* (1970), Charles A. Reich portrayed modern men as "prisoners of the technological state, exploited by its economy, tied to its goals, regimented by its factories and offices, deprived of all those sides of life [that] find no functional utility in the industrial machine." Reich's lament still seems to ring true to many Americans, in and out of academe.

When people talk about technology today, they usually mean the *products* of modern engineering: computers, power plants, automobiles, nuclear weapons. Today, technology is essentially synonymous with modern engineering, though technology has been with us since primitive man first sharpened a stone into a knife, while professional engineering is a child of the Industrial Revolution. But what exactly is this elusive activity? How do we define its products?

Most people probably would give one of two answers. Some would say that engineering consists of applying laws of nature to the needs of mankind, that it is simply an "applied science." Others would reply that engineering is the business of building machines and other mechanisms.

Both answers miss the mark. The central activity of engineering is design, and the primary motive for design is the creation of an object that works. Engineers do not sit down at the drawing board aiming to apply some abstract scientific law. Of course, they take all of the help they can get from scientists—as well as from politicians, business executives, and others. They do study the laws of nature, but chiefly to ensure that their works do not violate them; they are not engaged in some kind of scavenger hunt for inspiration. Engineers are about as dependent on modern scientific theories and discoveries as poets are on the hypotheses of modern linguists.

Then there is the common misconception that modern machines, tools, and other devices are engineering's only artifacts. What kind of machine is a highway or a dam or a bridge? No kind at all. Contemplating this question is about the same as asking what kind of painting is *The Thinker* or the *Pietà*? They are
sculptures, but each still belongs, along with paintings, in the general category known as the visual arts. In the same way, the Brooklyn Bridge is not a machine but a structure, yet it also falls within the realm of modern engineering.

Structures and machines are the two sides of technology, and they cannot be understood only as isolated objects. They are parts of larger systems. Without the streets that feed it, the Brooklyn Bridge would be useless. It is part of the transportation network of New York City. The car crossing it is the product of a system of manufacture.

Engineering's systems can be divided into two complementary types: networks, such as streets or electric power grids, and processes, such as the assembly line or the refining of oil.

A network, like a structure, is a static system through which something travels, whereas a process, like a machine, is a dynamic system through which something is changed.

These are not exclusionary terms. Traveling over city streets, cars and trucks do change (sometimes disastrously), but the engineer's goal in laying out roads is to preserve the vehicles as intact as possible. A mechanical process, by contrast, changes individual parts into a coherent whole. In a chemical plant, the idea is to convert raw materials into a finished product. The network transmits, the process transmutes. The structure fixes, the machine frees.

These patterns are fundamental to society itself. No civilized life is possible without transmission and transmutation, without fixed principles and basic freedoms. In our politics, the U.S. Constitution is fixed and contemporary laws are in flux. There are static arts, such as painting and sculpture, and relatively dynamic ones, such as dance and drama.

This language suggests a deep affinity between engineering and the liberal arts. In the public mind, engineering remains essentially a branch of the natural sciences. Just as the natural

sciences in the West were misunderstood prior to the 20th century due to their classification as a branch of philosophy, so engineering has suffered in the house of science. Early in the 20th century, for example, a number of American engineers embraced the mathematical "deflection theory" as a guide to bridge design, which led to the construction of thinner and thinner suspension-bridge decks. Then, in November 1940, the four-month-old, 2,800-foot-long Tacoma Narrows Bridge collapsed during a storm, its deck twisted like a bobsled track.

A century before, the great engineers Thomas Telford (1757–1834) and John A. Roebling (1806–69) had warned of the danger of thin decks. But engineers who see their profession as an applied science tend not to look back. Engineers as designers of large-scale works for society must.

Science is discovery, engineering is design. Scientists study the natural, engineers create the artificial. Scientists create general theories out of observed data; engineers make things, often using only very approximate theories.

Modern engineering must be approached on its own terms if it is to be understood. It is practically oriented, but it is not a technique like repairing a car engine or using a word processor. In teaching my own course on engineering for liberal arts students, I find that they are drawn to the discipline by the same force that brings others to the natural sciences, curiosity. They want to find out how structures and machines work.

Science and engineering may share the same techniques of discovery—physical experiments, mathematical formulation—but students quickly learn that the techniques have vastly different applications in the two disciplines. Engineering analysis is a matter of observing and testing the actual working of bridges, automobiles, and other objects made by people, while scientific analysis relies on closely controlled laboratory experiments or observations of natural phenomena and on general mathematical theories that explain them. The engineer studies objects in order to change them; the scientist, to explain them.

The emphasis on practice links engineering to the social sciences. In America, successful engineering requires not only technical competence but an understanding of the public will, whether expressed by voters, who decide if engineers' public works projects will be built, or by buyers of privately produced machines and structures, who "vote" in the marketplace. To the scientists alone in their laboratories, public opinion is largely
Two news of the J3rok/lindge (1826), which Lewis Mumford called the symbol of the late 19th century's "willingness to attempt the untried and the impossible."

Two views of the Brooklyn Bridge (1883), which Lewis Mumford called the symbol of the late 19th century's "willingness to attempt the untried and the impossible."
Two of Robert Maillart's best known creations: above, the Salginatobel (1930); at right, the Schwandbach (1933).

A swimming pool pavilion and a flower shop by Felix Candela. A Spanish-born designer (born 1910) who works mostly in Mexico, Candela is noted for his imaginative concrete shell structures.
irrelevant. The scientific ideal is to follow curiosity where it leads.

Engineering is linked to natural science through its techniques of analysis, but it parallels the study of economics, business management, and politics in its attention to labor costs and practices, production schedules, and local legislation (zoning laws, safety regulations). Bridge designers, for example, must know that union work rules in some locales make it more economical to use steel than concrete. They have to weigh the environmental impact of placing the bridge at different points, the effect on the fortunes of nearby communities, and the costs of each option.

In that sense, engineering shares with the social sciences an underlying ideal about the common life. The worth of engineering artifacts—bridges, automobiles, computers—is measured in terms of their benefit to society. This is the ancient ideal of civic virtue. "As a great work of art, and as a successful specimen of bridge engineering," Roebling said of his Brooklyn Bridge, "this structure will forever testify to the energy, enterprise, and wealth of that community which shall secure its erection."

One of the best known offspring of engineering's concern with the public weal is cost-benefit analysis. But the discipline's civic ideal is far deeper, far richer. Cost-benefit analysis can help quantify the pluses and minuses of building a bridge or a highway, but it is no substitute for human judgment and creativity.

Engineering comes closest to realizing its civic ideal in massive public works such as the Hoover Dam, which straddles the Colorado River with one side anchored in Arizona, the other in Nevada. Hailed as visionary when it was completed in 1935 (only seven years after Congress authorized construction), the dam was actually the logical culmination of earlier engineering achievements. Yet this massive concrete structure—660 feet thick at its base and 726 feet high, and linked to a complex system of conduits, generators, and roads—attained a new level of engineering elegance. It tames a wild river, transforming its roaring currents into static water pressure that powers 17 giant turbines. Simply, economically, the dam delivers hydroelectric power, irrigation, and flood control to six Western states. In ways large and small, it has altered their destinies.

It says something about the engineer's art that the dam was named not to honor Herbert C. Hoover the President but Hoover the engineer, who, as Secretary of Commerce during the Coolidge administration, negotiated the complex six-state agreement
(involving Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) needed to begin work on the dam.

Engineers, said the French modernist architect Le Corbusier, are "healthy and virile, active and useful, balanced and happy in their work, but only the architect, by his arrangement of forms, realizes an order which is a pure creation of his spirit.... It is then we experience the sense of beauty." Le Corbusier’s image of engineers as happy, unimaginative technocrats is now probably the popular view. In the universities, Le Corbusier’s silly dictum has been taken at face value, and architecture has been accepted as central to the liberal arts (which it is) while engineering has been deemed irrelevant (which it is not).

Underlying this misconception is the notion that engineering is a purely rational activity, that for each technological problem there exists, as Jacques Ellul put it in *The Technological Society* (trans. 1964), a single solution that is the "one best way." All that engineers have to do is find it. Technology seems to dictate that artistic expression or personal taste are "frills" that engineers must do without. This is the logical outcome of the applied science view of technology. Blind to engineering’s aesthetic achievements, many writers see only the march of logic and efficiency, trampling art, sensitivity, and humanity itself. Some years ago, Aldous Huxley, scion of a family of distinguished scientists and author of *Brave New World* (1932), asserted that modern "technological systems of production and organization are virtually fool-proof." He added, "If anything is fool-proof, it is also spontaneity-proof, inspiration-proof."

"One cannot walk through a mass-production factory and not feel that one is in Hell," W. H. Auden once declared. Today, it is a fashionable view that modern Western society is a kind of technological wasteland, devoid of humanity, permeated by television and toxic wastes. In 1984, pundits by the dozen claimed that George Orwell’s 1949 prophecy had come true, that in many ways *1984* was as much fact as fiction. Such critics of technology stress its power, never its imaginative depth.

Is there at the core of technology as an activity any room for the individual imagination? Ellul claimed that the answer is No. During the 19th century, he noted, manufacturers tried to ornament their products: sewing machines bore cast iron flowers; tractor casings were engraved with bulls’ heads. "That it was wasteful to supply such embellishments soon became evident," Ellul wrote. "The machine can become precise only to the de-
AN ENGINEERING READER

In *The Existential Pleasures of Engineering* (1976), Samuel C. Florman likens engineering to the creation of an opera. There are genius engineering "composers" and thousands of quasi designers "seated like galley slaves in huge drafting rooms." But when the curtain rises on a new bridge or jet fighter, each engineer shares the credit and "the satisfaction of having participated in a great undertaking."

"Two engineering geniuses—Robert Fulton (1765–1815), inventor of the steamboat, and Samuel F. Morse (1791–1872), father of the telegraph—are the subject of Brooke Hindle's lively *Emulation and Invention* (1981). Fulton and Morse owed much of their success as engineer-designers to their early training as painters and their capacity for vivid spatial imagination. Hindle sees a worrisome sign of cultural malaise in the tendency of American intellectuals to dismiss engineering as strictly a "problem-solving" profession. Fulton and Morse were not mere technicians, he argues, but far-seeing inventors excited by the potential of "applying new machines to so rich a continent and so wide a world."

John A. Roebling, designer of the Brooklyn Bridge, was another man of vision, notes Yale's Alan Trachtenberg in *Brooklyn Bridge: Fact and Symbol* (1985). A student under Hegel, Roebling authored *Long and Short Railway Spans* (1869) and other technical tomes but was working on a volume on metaphysics when he died. Another fine study is Joseph Harriss's *The Tallest Tower: Eiffel and the Belle Epoque* (1975).

Today, computer engineers get all the glory. Tracy Kidder's *The Soul of a New Machine* (1981) is a gripping account of the frantic year that a team of young Data General Corporation engineers spent designing the Eclipse MV/8000 computer. The quest for rare "golden moments" of technological insight kept them going. Yet teamwork, not individual genius, was what counted. Computers, Kidder observes, "have been used in ways that are salutary, in ways that are dangerous...and in ways that seem harmless if a little silly. But what fun making them can be!"

gree that its design is elaborated with mathematical rigor in accordance with use.... There [is] no room in practical activity for gratuitous aesthetic preoccupations." Engineers, Ellul claimed, quickly adopted the utilitarian view that "the line best adapted to use is the most beautiful."

A century earlier, just after the birth of engineering as a formal discipline, Robert Fulton described the artistry of engineering in other terms. The engineer, he wrote, "should sit down among levers, screws, wedges, wheels, etc., like a poet among the letters of the alphabet, considering them as the exhibition of his thoughts, in which a new arrangement transmits a new Idea to the world."

Artists' and writers' reactions give the lie to Ellul's bleak view. The majesty of the Brooklyn Bridge, designed by the Ger-
Roeding himself declared, "Public works should educate public taste. In the erection of public edifices, therefore, some expense may and ought to be incurred to satisfy the artistic aspiration of a young and growing community." More often than not, however, Roebling's own designs did not require extra outlays.

Roel*ling and completed in 1883 under the supervision of his son, Washington A. Roebling, inspired the painter Joseph Stella and the lyric poet Hart Crane to create their own works of art. The beauty of San Francisco's Golden Gate Bridge stirs many who visit the City by the Bay. "Other art forms seem pretty piddling next to dams that challenge mountains, roads that leap chasms," architecture critic Ada Louise Huxtable wrote in the New York Times in 1964. "These structures stand in positive, creative contrast to the willful negativism and transient novelty that have made so much painting and literature, for example, a kind of diminishing, naughty game. The evidence is incontrovertible: Building is the great art of our time."

Engineering first received its full aesthetic due in 1947, when New York's Museum of Modern Art mounted an exhibition of the works of Robert Maillart (1872-1940), the Swiss structural engineer and bridge builder. As many artists, architects, and art critics had already discovered, Maillart's work is the prototypical example of imagination in engineering. Maillart was the first structural engineer to realize that steel-reinforced concrete, developed during the 1890s, could be used to experiment with new forms never seen in steel and concrete structures. And that is what he did, often to stunning effect, in dozens of bridges and buildings in Switzerland. It is wrong to say that Maillart made his structures beautiful by adding to their cost or even by adding superfluous materials. He did, in fact, just the reverse.

But, somebody will say, is that not the point? Is not the beauty of Maillart's works due precisely to the efficiency and economy of his designs?

It is all too easy to show that the world is filled with efficient and economical structures that are ugly and oppressive. Just look at the average railroad truss bridge. An engineer can no more create a beautiful structure based on these principles than can a poet write fine verse solely by limiting his arsenal of words. Something else is needed, and that something is imagination—a talent for putting things together in unique ways that work, that are beautiful, personal, and permanent.

To assert that Maillart had imagination is not to prove it. How

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*Roel*ling himself declared, "Public works should educate public taste. In the erection of public edifices, therefore, some expense may and ought to be incurred to satisfy the artistic aspiration of a young and growing community." More often than not, however, Roebling's own designs did not require extra outlays. Even if they are inclined to add expensive ornamentation, structural designers cannot afford to do so. Because designers must always meet tight budgets, their incentive is to achieve the greatest beauty with the minimum materials possible.
do we know that Hart Crane had a rich imagination? We read his finely wrought verse, his uniquely configured words, and their beauty moves us. But the general public needs some help in interpreting fine poetry. The same is true of the appreciation of structures. There is ample evidence that artistically sensitive people are moved by Maillart's works. Yet we still need to find a deeper basis for claiming that Maillart's works are triumphs of the imagination, not just products of technical expertise. We need to explore his intentions.

From private letters and public reports, it is clear that Maillart thought aesthetically right from the beginning of his engineering career. He conceived of his first independent design, his 1900 plan for the modest Zuoz Bridge in Switzerland, as an aesthetic and technical innovation. In 1908, he invented a "slab" warehouse (so called because the concrete slab floors were supported by smoothly shaped "mushroom" columns, without cross beams), calling it both "more beautiful and more rational" than similar structures—not more beautiful because it was more rational. During his last decade, when he became known in artistic circles, Maillart wrote frequently about aesthetics. He clearly intended his structures to be both beautiful and economical.

Could he merely have fooled himself? The answer is that if Maillart's talents were purely technical, if he had hit upon the "one best way," his work would have set a new standard for design that others would have to follow. It did not. Engineers learned from Maillart, but the best ones do not copy him any more than serious artists paint pictures exactly like those of Leonardo Da Vinci or Pablo Picasso.

Advocates of the "one best way" must assume that an optimum can always be found if we have computers that are powerful enough and analysts who are clever enough. But that is an illusion. There are two basic quantitative measures of designs: efficiency (minimum materials) and economy (minimum cost), and they are not reducible to any single measure. Efficiency is a measure of the type found in natural science; independent of time and place, it depends upon constraints such as gravity, wind, and the properties of steel and concrete. Economy, on the other hand, is constrained by labor practices, political controls, and other social factors. These can vary radically from place to place and from one time period to another. Gothic cathedrals might be built efficiently today, but certainly not economically.

Thus, engineers are always confronted with two ideals, effi-
ciency and economy, and the world's best computer could not
tell them how to reconcile the two. There is never "one best
way." Like doctors or politicians or poets, engineers face a vast
array of choices every time they begin work, and every design is
subject to criticism and compromise.

How can we judge the works of engineers? It would be
madness to study poetry by reading a random sample of all the
poems ever published. But if we start with a master such as
Shakespeare, we see poetry's potential. We recognize its beauty
and permanence and learn that it provides themes that allow us
to perceive the unity of all knowledge. And so it is with the works
of Roebling and Maillart and the many other great structural
artists of the past 200 years. Their works are the products of their
imaginations, they are beautiful and permanent, and they provide
us with themes that can satisfy the human urge for curiosity,
virtue, and imagination.

What is true of structural engineering holds, in varying mea-
ures, for other forms of engineering as well. The integrated
circuit and the space shuttle Columbia are each in their own ways
works of beauty and imagination, and each can contribute to the
common good. At the beginning of the 20th century, Americans
embraced technology with an innocent faith in its beneficence.
Today, many reject it with an equally naive conviction that it is
evil. To live happily with technology, Americans must learn that
engineering is a human activity with products that can be under-
stood, enjoyed, and judged by ordinary human beings.

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A meeting of Dakota Sioux chiefs and U.S. Indian commissioners at Fort Laramie, Wyoming, in 1868. For more than a century, white Americans, and many Indians, have variously agonized or exulted in the belief that Indians were approaching cultural extinction. Somehow, this has yet to happen.
The American Indian

For America’s Indians, the U.S. Supreme Court has become a major source of redress. During the last term alone, the Justices handed down seven rulings in cases involving the country’s oldest ethnic group; at issue were land claims, fishing rights, and mineral leases. The upsurge in Indian litigation signals a change in tactics by leaders of Indian organizations; they have largely abandoned the violent takeovers and sit-ins epitomized by the 1973 siege at Wounded Knee, South Dakota. Most Indian spokesmen assert that their broader goal is to maintain a distinct “Indian way of life.” Yet how to do so is a matter of deep disagreement. How isolated from America’s larger society can Indians afford to remain? How much development of the natural resources on Indian reservations should be permitted? Members of the nation’s 506 Indian “tribal entities” now debate such questions, even as they suffer from high rates of poverty, alcoholism, and unemployment. Here, our contributors examine the Indians’ current dilemmas, their long history, and the ways in which various Indian tribes have or have not adapted to the white man’s world.

HERE TO STAY

by Patricia Nelson Limerick


It seems that Anthony Patton Burton, an Arapaho-Cheyenne, had walked into the Denver town house of lawyer Robert Calt and removed “something shiny and metal” from a bag. Calt shot the intruder, killing him instantly. In the dead man’s hands was a can of spray paint, whose vapors he had been inhaling. Burton, 28, was an alcoholic and a jobless transient. A police spokesman concluded that he “probably just didn’t know where he was.”

Anthony Patton Burton was by no means a typical Indian, but
his difficulties were similar to those that afflict many of America's estimated 1.4 million Indians. A survey in Denver revealed that 78 percent of the city's 20,000 adult Indians were chronically unemployed. Some 69 percent had incomes below the poverty level. Between 60 and 80 percent were addicted to drugs or alcohol, or were "affected by a family member's problem." At the Rosebud Reservation in South Dakota, home to nearly 10,000 Sioux, the statistics tell a similar story. Seven out of 10 Rosebud Sioux of working age are unemployed. Roughly one-half of all Rosebud Sioux adults, male and female, are alcoholics.

As they have been throughout modern memory, American Indians are beset by troubles. Nearly 500 years after Christopher Columbus, the aftershocks of conquest are still being felt. That should not, really, be surprising. The most striking fact about Indians in 1986 is that, despite all that has happened to them, North America's aboriginal inhabitants remain visible and distinct in our midst.  

No one really knows how long human beings have lived in North America. Ten thousand years? Forty thousand years? Archaeologists disagree. Whenever they arrived, the first people on the continent were migrants from Asia who voyaged across what is now the Bering Strait. That, at least, is the prevailing theory among scholars. In the view of many Indians, this assertion represents yet another imposition: It contradicts the Indians' own histories, and it diminishes the Indians' claims to be Native Americans—the country's original inhabitants—by making them into just another variety of immigrant.

Indian people spread throughout the Western Hemisphere and adapted to widely varying local environments. North of the Rio Grande there existed nine major language groups, each divided into numerous, mutually unintelligible dialects. The Indian peoples were nearly as diverse in religion as they were in language. And, while scores of tribes traded with one another, they also fought wars and maneuvered for territory and power.

Most Europeans, note James Olson and Raymond Wilson in *The Oxford English Dictionary* defines aborigines as "natives found in possession of a country by Europeans who have gone thither as colonists." Other surviving aboriginal groups include the Aborigines of Australia, who number some 45,000, or 0.35 percent of the population; the Maori in New Zealand, 250,000 strong, or nine percent of the population; and the San of South Africa, whose 45–50,000 members are now scattered across Botswana, the western Kalahari, and Namibia.

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Europeans easily justified their conquest of the Indians: "This savage people," wrote Plymouth Colony's John Winthrop, "ruleth over many lands without title or property; for they inclose no ground, neither have they cattell to maintain it."

Native Americans in the Twentieth Century (1984), "insisted on viewing Native American culture through a single lens, as if all Native Americans could somehow be understood in terms of a few monolithic assumptions." Yet on the eve of its discovery by the Europeans, Indian America was as heterogeneous as Renaissance Europe, perhaps more so.

Life in the Northeast meant summers growing crops of corn, beans, and squash, and gathering berries and roots. Tribal groups, perhaps several dozen, dispersed during the fall and winter for a long season of hunting deer, then assembled in the summer to grow corn, pumpkins, and squash. Like Indian tribes elsewhere, the Wampanoag, Narragansett, and others of the Northeast invested the natural world with supernatural significance; animals and human beings were one in a larger spiritual community. Groups such as the Huron and Seneca placed great store by the interpretation of dreams.

On the other side of the continent, in the Pacific Northwest, Indians lived in coastal villages of roughly six to 12 families, isolated by mountains and distance from farming communities further inland. The waters yielded an abundance of salmon, otter,
seal, and walrus. The forests and meadows were flush with berries and game. Among the Kwakiutl, Kitamat, and similar groups, this cornucopia inspired a respect for wealth and its accumulation. At the core of their religious practice lay the famous “potlatches,” when, at great feasts, host groups of Indians would bestow lavish presents on visitors.

In the Southwest, several different ways of life coexisted. The Pueblo Indians lived in compact adobe villages (some with as many as 1,500 inhabitants), farmed intensively (beans, corn, and squash), and carried on an elaborate and demanding religious life. In the same dry part of the continent, the semi-nomadic Apaches lived as hunters and gatherers, sometimes raiding and sometimes trading with the Pueblos.

On the Great Plains, most Indians inhabited villages clustered along the rivers that drain the interior. The Plains Indians lived by growing corn and beans, supplementing this diet from time to time by hunting buffalo (on foot). Few Indian groups relied overly much on the buffalo or hunted the animal year-round.

The notion of early pan-Indian unity flourishes only in myth. Indeed, the diversity and sheer dispersion of the Indian tribes—their varied interests and cultures, their assorted alliances and enmities—virtually foreclosed any attempts to unite and expel the first Europeans.

The Europeans arrived, to stay, in 1492. Mistaking the Caribbean islands for “the Indies,” Columbus called the Arawak Islanders who greeted him “Indians.” The misnomer was soon applied to all of the native inhabitants of the New World.

Furs for Firearms

In both North and South America, the arrival of the Europeans produced an abrupt demographic disaster. The populations of the Old World had had centuries, even millennia, to adjust to Old World diseases and to develop immunities. When carried to the New World, these same diseases—chicken pox, measles, influenza, malaria, yellow fever, typhus, tuberculosis, and, above all, smallpox—met little resistance. Mortality rates in village after village ran as high as 80 or 90 percent.

Scholars still quarrel over the exact rate of depopulation, but no one questions its significance in weakening and demoralizing the natives and enhancing the power of the invaders. White Americans would come to view their relations with Indians as an inevitable contest between stronger and weaker civilizations. Writing in 1831, Alexis de Tocqueville summed up the prevailing white opinion of Indians: “Heaven has not made them to be-
come civilized; it is necessary that they die." Die many of them did. But the Indians' supposed cultural inferiority had nothing to do with it. Microorganisms and unprepared immune systems certainly did.*

Beyond microorganisms, the exchange between Indian and European involved the movement of plants, animals, and technology. Long before the arrival of the Europeans, the small, primeval horse that once roamed North America—*eobippus*—had met with extinction. The buffalo took its place on the Great Plains. The Spaniards reintroduced horses into the New World. Meanwhile, from the French in Canada and the Mississippi Basin, the Indians first acquired firearms—in exchange for furs.

**Exchanging Friendship**

The combination of horse and gun made the buffalo easy prey and aided expansionist tribes—the Comanche, the Cheyenne, and the Sioux—in their conquest of the Plains. Moving westward from the Great Lakes, the Sioux dispossessed or subjugated scores of other tribes. As historian Richard White has noted, to many Indians in the West, the Sioux, not white people, "remained their most feared enemy." Most American history books focus on the rearrangements of power during the 17th and 18th centuries among the French and English colonies along the Atlantic seaboard; during the same period, a parallel rearrangement occurred in Indian country, beyond the Europeans' ken.

Ironically, when American whites finally encountered the Plains Indians during the 19th century, they mistakenly regarded the hard-riding, buffalo-hunting, war-bonneted warriors as survivors of a pristine, pre-Columbian society. Painter George Catlin described the Plains Indians he saw as "noble" and "uncannabilized," living in "fearless freedom" with a "soul unalloyed by mercenary lusts." It was not the first time, nor would it be the last, that white men would attempt to construct for themselves a naive image of Indianness.

One other crucial exchange took place between Indians and Europeans: the exchange of friendship. Time after time in their initial encounters, the Europeans received a friendly welcome in the New World, even though the Indians at first held decisive advantages over the invaders—in numbers and in control of local food supplies. "The Indian," observed historian Alvin Josephy,

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*During the early 20th century, American anthropologists estimated that no more than one million persons lived in North America before the arrival of Columbus. In 1966, Cornell's Henry Dobyns revised that estimate upwards by a factor of 70. Dobyns's numbers are still disputed, but most scholars agree that the figure of one million is far too low.
"made possible the Europeans' first precarious footholds in every part of the Americas." It was the Europeans who needed the Indians. The Indians did not, at the outset, need the Europeans. Before long, they did.

One reason was the fur trade. When French mariners and fishermen set up their first outposts on the North American coast, Indians began trading beaver pelts and deer hides for metal knives, kettles, and ornaments; the French eventually pushed the fur trade deep into the American interior. At the same time, the Dutch, later supplanted by the English, carried on the fur trade in New York and elsewhere on the East Coast.

A Wolf by the Ears

During its opening phase, throughout most of the 17th century, Indian participation in the fur trade was not only voluntary but seemed tactically astute. In what is now upstate New York, the six tribes confederated into the League of the Iroquois—the Seneca, Mohawk, Onondaga, Oneida, Cayuga, and Tuscarora—became early participants in the trade. When their homelands became overhunted, the Iroquois pooled their forces and expanded into neighboring territory.

But the fur trade had an insidious consequence. It slowly led powerful, self-sufficient tribes into dependence on European manufactured goods; the availability of such goods brought on a decline in native know-how and self-reliance. Certain items—especially alcohol—created an unlimited demand. Unlimited demand prompted purchases on credit. Indians were soon hunting in one season to pay off last season's debts.

The trade tie was the crucial development in Indian-white relations. Once the pattern of trade was established, Indians were trapped—held by chains of debt and credit. By the early 19th century, groups such as the Iroquois in the North and the Choc-taw in the South had discovered that, while the fur trade brought a temporary upsurge in affluence (and influence), it came at a sobering price. "We have a wolf by the ears, and we can neither hold him nor safely let him go," Thomas Jefferson said of American slavery in 1820. American Indians could have said the same thing about the fur trade.

With loss of Indian self-reliance came loss of Indian land. Contrary to popular belief, the dispossession of the Indians was not the result of a steady sequential assault on one tribe after another. Rather than a "tide" or "wave" of white people rolling west, a more appropriate metaphor for Euro-American expansion would be a lake pelted intermittently with hailstones—multiple
The U.S. Census Bureau listed 1,364,033 individuals under the category "American Indian" in 1980—72 percent more than in 1970. Why the sudden increase? Partly better counting, partly because expectations of new federal benefits influenced respondents' "self-identification." Today, only slightly more than one-third of all Indians live on reservations, on tribal trust lands, or in Oklahoma's "historic areas" (reservations dissolved shortly before statehood in 1907). Most reservations—where the highest rates of Indian poverty and disease prevail—are home to fewer than 1,000 people; ironically, most also count more non-Indians than Indians as residents.

SELECTED SOCIAL INDICATORS 1980

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Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Indian Health Service; Bureau of the Census; National Center for Health Statistics.

*For ages 25 and over.
events sending out concentric rings of consequences. With the Spanish in the Southwest, the French in Canada and the Mississippi Valley, the Russians in Alaska, and the English on the Atlantic coast, North America was deeply involved in trouble borrowed from Europe. Intertribal feuds combined with European rivalries to produce shifting alliances and periodic warfare.

None of the early colonial powers could take Indian acquiescence for granted. After nearly a century of Spanish rule, the Pueblos in 1680 rose up to drive the Spanish completely out of New Mexico. During King Philip’s War (1675–76), colonists in New England found themselves forced to abandon inland settlements and retreat to the safety of Boston, Newport, and other towns nearer the coast. Even that was not enough. In 1675, at Medfield, less than 20 miles from Boston, Indians surprised and slew sleeping residents and set houses and barns afire. A contemporary account reported “fires being kindled round about [the people of Medfield], the enemy numerous and shouting so as the earth seemed to tremble, and the cry of terrified persons very dreadful.” Such incidents, not surprisingly, established a fearful new image in the white imagination: Indians as “murderous wretches,” as depraved barbarians rather than noble savages.

The Utmost Good Faith

Indian power grew in significance as various tribes found Europeans (and later, Americans) to be useful allies against common Indian foes. In 1637, in New England’s first major war, the Narragansetts joined with the English in bloody campaigns against the Pequots. After the Spanish reconquest of New Mexico and Arizona (1692–96), most of the Pueblos would join the Spanish in their fight against raiding Apaches.

The powerful tribes of the Mississippi Valley played a key role in the French and Indian War—on both sides. The war brought home to England’s authorities, once again, the importance of Indian good will. To mollify potentially troublesome tribes along the Appalachian frontier, London sought to preclude white settlement in the continental interior, “which cannot fail of being attended with fatal consequences,” in the words of the British Board of Trade. In its Proclamation of 1763, the British government formally prohibited white settlement beyond the crest of the Appalachians.

Like many later “solutions” to the problem of Indian-white friction, the Proclamation of 1763 set out to forestall potential conflict by separating the antagonists. But the border could not be policed. Down the Ohio River or through the Cumberland
Gap, the white settlers breached the Appalachians and set out to claim the wilderness.

Leaving behind their Indian allies, the British departed the 13 colonies in 1783. Americans soon discovered that victory in the War of Independence entailed assuming Britain’s administrative burdens. Unfortunately, the young government of the United States inherited England’s inability to control the frontier. Nevertheless, displaying a cheerful confidence, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and their colleagues took the high road. The new government declared that, in the words of the 1787 Northwest Ordinance, the Indians would be treated “with the utmost good faith.” The United States would enter into treaties with neighboring Indians, formerly Crown subjects, as it would with a foreign power, and it would adhere to the treaties it made. These treaties, beginning with the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (New York) in 1784, affirmed Indian title to their lands and gave tribes a unique legal status under the Constitution. To this day the tribes retain that status, its complexities and contradictions frequently addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court.

The new Republic’s lofty ideals were no sooner proclaimed than they began to clash with reality. The galvanizing issue: insistence by the Indians living in the Northwest Territories that the Ohio River mark the northern boundary of American settlement. American farmers and land speculators, infiltrating across the Alleghenies, paid no attention. When new treaties were ratified to distinguish between white and Indian lands inside the Territories, settlers again ignored the distinction. The Indians—Wyandot, Delaware, Shawnee, and several other tribes—went to war.

Happy Osages?

The Indian coalition scored some impressive early victories against local militia. On one occasion, in 1791, on the border between what are now Indiana and Ohio, Indians ambushed a force led by Ohio’s territorial governor, Arthur St. Clair, killing 630 men. This, according to historian Randolph C. Downes, “was the worst defeat ever suffered by [an] American army in proportion to the numbers engaged.” It took a federal expeditionary force and Gen. “Mad Anthony” Wayne, a Revolutionary War hero, to buy a measure of peace in the Ohio Valley. Wayne defeated the Northwest tribes at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, near the western tip of Lake Erie, in 1794. Under the Treaty of Greenville, the survivors ceded to the United States two-thirds of Ohio and a large chunk of Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan.

Two decades later, in 1811, the Ohio Valley was again
King Philip’s Pequots and other Indians launched attacks on 52 Massachusetts towns in 1675–76. Atrocities by both sides marked all Indian wars.

wracked by war as Tecumseh’s short-lived confederacy of Kickapoo, Potawatomi, Shawnee, and other woodland tribes rose up in revolt. By then, calls in Congress for a new kind of Indian policy were becoming increasingly frequent. As politicians such as James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Andrew Jackson saw it, with a certain grim logic, the Indians would inevitably stand in the way of white settlers until they were physically moved out of the way. “The hunter or savage state,” Monroe wrote to Jackson in 1817, “requires a greater extent of territory to sustain it than is compatible with the progress and just claims of civilized life and must yield to it.”

“Voluntary removal,” at government expense, got under way during the 1820s and proceeded in fits and starts. All along the frontier, from the Canadian border to the Gulf of Mexico, one tribe after another was escorted beyond the Mississippi River to reservations in what was then the far West.

Removal encountered the strongest Indian resistance in the Southeast. There, despite a century of white encroachments, a number of cohesive tribes—the Cherokee, the Creek, the Choc-taw, the Chickasaw, and the Seminole—had failed to melt away. On the contrary, many of them had adopted American practices: private land ownership, commercial farming, even slave-holding. Many of the Indians were literate, and often devout Christians. In 1827, using a writing system devised by the Cherokee intellectual
Sequoia, the Georgia Cherokees went so far as to produce a written constitution. White “friends of the Indian” encouraged the civilizing process with missionaries and money. They spoke of moving the Indians into the American mainstream, where they would lose their distinctive identity and cease to trouble sensitive consciences. “Yes—happy Osages,” wrote Thomas McKenney, the first U.S. Superintendent of Indian Affairs, in 1820. “The days of your gloom are about to close.”

The peaceful Southeastern tribes embraced much of European civilization but continued to cherish their independence and their ancestral lands. Protected by treaty, both were deemed an affront by white Southerners. Georgia, in the words of one governor, would never “submit to the intrusive sovereignty of a petty tribe of Indians.” It was particularly galling when gold was discovered on Cherokee lands. Citing their treaty rights, the tribes refused to move and won backing from John Marshall’s Supreme Court in 1832. Georgia held to its course, appropriating Indian land by legislative fiat and encouraging white settlement.

Andrew Jackson, sympathetic to Southern whites and loathe to fracture the Union over the issue of Indian rights, chose to ignore the Supreme Court. Throughout the 1830s, the Army forcibly removed some 100,000 Indians from the Southern states. Ironically, many Northern humanitarians supported the policy of removal, believing that only on faraway reservations would Indians at last be safe from white hostility.

Postponing the Inevitable

The proud Cherokees, in 1838–39, were the last to march along the 900-mile “Trail of Tears” from Georgia to new Indian lands in what became Oklahoma. Trying to save money, the federal government provided inadequate supplies for the long exodus. Thousands of Indians in detention camps succumbed to malnutrition and disease. Many lost their possessions along the way to plundering whites. “The whole scene,” wrote Gen. John E. Wool, who was entrusted with removing the Cherokees, “has been nothing but a heartrending one, and such a one as I would be glad to get rid of as soon as circumstances will permit.” Some 4,000 out of 18,000 Cherokees died on the Trail of Tears.

Of the Southeast’s Five Civilized Tribes, only the Creek and Seminole resisted by taking up arms. The bloody Second Seminole War in the Florida swamps (1835–42) claimed the lives of 2,000 U.S. soldiers and reduced the Seminole population to 500.

Removal made it clear that Washington—not white squatters or speculators but the U.S. government itself—was prepared to
violate treaties with Indian nations. The new, trans-Mississippi Indian territories were meant to be permanent enclaves, but few doubted that the business of drawing up “permanent” borders was merely postponing the inevitable. “In a few years,” predicted one Choctaw leader, “the American will also wish to possess the land west of the Mississippi.” The sanctity of the new Indian territory rested, after all, solely on the authority of Congress. What Congress had given, Congress could also take away.

During the 1830s, most Americans saw the Great Plains as a kind of desert, unsuitable for white farming and thus ideal as an Indian refuge. That perception was not to last. By the early 1850s, the white migration to Oregon and the California gold fields had drawn tens of thousands of pioneers through Indian territory. Further mineral discoveries prompted an influx of prospectors into Nevada and Colorado in 1859 and into Montana and Idaho during the Civil War. With American settlement on the Pacific Coast, the need for a transcontinental railroad became plain. Mile after mile of track began edging westward, opening up the interior. Meanwhile, a succession of “rushes”—after gold, silver, copper—dispersed the white newcomers thinly over the land, in a way guaranteed to provoke maximum friction with Indians. Recognizing their precarious position, settlers clamored for federal protection from the “savages.”

**Good-bye to Sitting Bull**

The Indian wars of the last half of the 19th century followed the pattern of the earlier wars. Again, this was no simple wave of conquest by the white man but a muddled sequence of agreements, defaults, evasions, postponements, misunderstandings, and fluctuating alliances and enmities—punctuated by bloodshed. The Army, undermanned and underfinanced, did as best it could, accused by settlers of coddling the Indians and by Eastern liberals of needless cruelty. “We are placed between two fires,” Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman once complained, “a most unpleasant dilemma from which we cannot escape.” Federal troops sought repeatedly to keep whites and Indians apart, usually without success.

The long, fierce Sioux War, which stemmed like the others from an irreconcilable conflict over territory, was triggered in 1854 when an Indian at Fort Laramie, Kansas, shot a white man’s cow. A young Army lieutenant, John Grattan, set out to arrest the culprit. Thanks to the work of an inept interpreter, a misunderstanding ensued and a band of Sioux slew Lieutenant Grattan and 30 of his men. The war was on.
In 1866 the Sioux War took an unsettling turn when the Indians succeeded in closing the Bozeman Trail through Wyoming, a main route to the Montana gold fields. After vain attempts to maintain a string of protective outposts, the Army's field commanders gave up. Ten years later, in 1876, at the Little Bighorn in Montana, the Sioux annihilated six troops of cavalry and their commander, Gen. George Armstrong Custer—266 men in all. But Chief Sitting Bull's comment after that episode ("We have won a great battle but lost a great war") proved prescient. Bit by bit, white Americans wore down Sioux resistance. That same year, the Sioux went on to suffer a stunning military defeat at Slim Buttes, South Dakota; Sitting Bull fled to Canada.

Creating the Ghost Dance

The prolonged, often dramatic U.S. wars with the Apache and the Sioux loom largest in the textbooks, but these conflicts were accompanied by many "silent conquests," losses of territory and independence as effectively accomplished by treaty and negotiations as by war. Groups such as the Pawnee and the Crow never fought against the U.S. Army. Indeed, disliking the Sioux and the Cheyenne as much as Custer did, their warriors enlisted as Army scouts. But in the end, they suffered the same fate as the aggressively hostile tribes.

First the Indians of the southern Plains, then those of the North, were pacified and confined to reservations. Their treaty-making powers were abolished. On the reservations, agents of the Interior Department's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) kept watch on their wards and, because the buffalo herds were gone, distributed rations.* To BIA agents, the opportunity for profiteering—in purchasing and transporting supplies, in leasing or sale of reservation timber and grazing land—was often the most appealing aspect of the job.

The Indians themselves, often deprived of their traditional way of life, fell into frustration and despair. On Sioux reservations the Ghost Dance soon appeared, promising the demise of the white man and the resurgence of the Indian. A new messiah, proclaimed a believer from the Rosebud Sioux reservation, "is going to cause a big cyclone or whirlwind by which he will have all the white people to perish."

Most whites believed that the end of the Indian wars meant

*In 1800, an estimated 60 million buffalo roamed North America, providing numerous Indian tribes with food, clothing, shelter, and tools. As white settlement advanced westward, buffalo came to be hunted not only for food but for sport. A popular pastime on the Kansas-Pacific Railroad was shooting at buffalo from car windows; carcasses were left to rot. By the 1890s, fewer than 20 wild buffalo remained. Today, some 75,000 buffalo exist in the United States, primarily in private herds and in zoos and parks.

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an end to the Indian problem. The notion of the “vanishing Indian” had been well established by the early 19th century; the Seventh Cavalry’s massacre of nearly 200 Sioux men, women, and children at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, in 1890 fixed a date for the final, symbolic disappearance. Confined to their reservations, Indians were certainly out of the public eye. Their numbers—some 250,000 in 1900—were at a historic low. But the Indians were not vanishing, neither as individuals nor as tribes. White desire for Indian land had not vanished either.

The establishment of the reservations had reformulated, but had not resolved, the old questions. What was the future for Indians? Would the reservations remain as permanent Indian tribal enclaves? Or would Indians be assimilated? And if so, would assimilation be voluntary or coerced?

From the 1880s until the present day, presidents and members of Congress would grapple repeatedly with those questions. Pushed and hauled by contrary pressures, Washington would discard the old answers, come up with new ones, return to the old ones, and then ask the questions anew. The policies that resulted were sometimes well intentioned and sometimes not. Today, in 1986, one fact emerges with ironic clarity: A century after peace came to the Great Plains, the conquest of the North American continent remains incomplete.

The treaties made with the Indians, honored in the breach, are still part of the record, still available as a basis for lawsuits. The status accorded by Chief Justice John Marshall in 1832 to Indian tribes—“domestic dependent nations”—is their legal status today. There is still a Bureau of Indian Affairs, the only federal agency devoted to the needs of a single ethnic group. In ways great and small, in ways that fully satisfy no one, Indians have, in effect, become institutionalized in American society.

The conquest doomed generations of Indians to a life of dependence, and many to a life of misery. When Indians lost territory, they lost their traditional means of making a living. But the reservations and U.S. law ensured that the Indians would never just fade away, that they were here to stay.
**THE NEW INDIAN POLITICS**

*by Stephen Cornell*

On December 28, 1890, near the Badlands of South Dakota, a band of exhausted Sioux Indians, including perhaps 100 warriors and some 250 women and children, surrendered to the blue-clad troopers of the U.S. Seventh Cavalry and agreed to travel with them to the Indian agency at Pine Ridge. The joint party camped that night in freezing weather at Wounded Knee Creek, 20 miles from Pine Ridge. Surrounding the Indian tepees were nearly 500 soldiers and a battery of four Hotchkiss light artillery pieces.

The next morning, the Indian men were told to turn in their weapons. Few obeyed. The cavalrymen began to search the tepees. When they turned up few additional guns, the troops began to search the warriors themselves. Reports of subsequent events vary, but tensions ran high.

A scuffle broke out between an Indian and some soldiers. In the struggle, the warrior, intentionally or not, fired his rifle. That did it. Instantly both Indians and soldiers began firing at each other. Within moments, the Army gunners were pouring explosive Hotchkiss shells into the Indian camp.

Most of the Sioux warriors died in the opening volleys. Others, along with a large number of women and children, were shot as they fled down adjacent ravines. By the time the firing ended, nearly 200 Indians—perhaps more, the estimates vary—had been killed.

The survivors of this slaughter were among the last Indians to come under the direct administrative control of the U.S. government. Confined to reservations, they joined 300,000 others, from coast to coast, in a state of despondent dependency, sunk in poverty, wards of a white man's government that they had learned not to trust.

Eighty-two years later, on the wintry night of February 27, 1973, a group of armed Oglala Sioux from South Dakota's Pine Ridge Reservation joined forces with activists from the American Indian Movement (AIM) and seized the reservation village of Wounded Knee, the site of the 1890 massacre. They did so to protest corruption in the tribal government at Pine Ridge as well as U.S. violations of the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty (which recognized Sioux sovereignty over much of what is now the Dakotas, Montana, Wyoming, and Nebraska). “We want a true Indian na-
tion," said Carter Camp, an AIM coordinator, "not one made up of Bureau of Indian Affairs puppets."

Within 24 hours, a force of 250 Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, U.S. Marshals, and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) police had cordoned off the village. The much-publicized siege lasted 10 weeks, punctuated by exchanges of gunfire that left two Indians dead and several men wounded on each side. In May, after lengthy negotiations, the Indians surrendered to federal authorities. The second battle of Wounded Knee was over.

The 1890 massacre brought one era to a close. The Euro-American advance across the continent was now complete. As Black Hawk, war leader of the Sauk and Fox, had said of himself a half century earlier, "He is now a prisoner to the white men; they will do with him as they wish."

86 Million Acres

The 1973 occupation also represented the culmination of an era. America's roughly 790,000 Indians still lived, for the most part, in considerable misery, afflicted by poverty, alcoholism, high unemployment, and inadequate education. But the days of dull Indian acquiescence were long gone. Beginning in the 1940s, Indians had not only been demanding a voice in federal Indian policy; increasingly, they had appropriated such a voice for themselves, forcing the surrounding society to respond. "We talk, you listen" was the title of a 1970 book by Sioux author Vine Deloria, Jr. And as they demonstrated at Wounded Knee, Indians did more than talk.

All in all, the path from the Wounded Knee I to Wounded Knee II traced an Indian political resurgence of striking proportions. There had always been, of course, politics about Indians. For the most part it was non-Indian politics, carried on in Washington, among the governors of Western states and territories, and among missionaries, reformers, and bureaucrats. The situation today is dramatically different, marked by the emergence of a new and genuinely Indian politics.

In hindsight, the turning point appears to have been the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934. Prior to its passage, two goals had guided federal Indian policy: the acquisition of Indian

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lands and the cultural transformation of Indians into Euro-Americans—in a word, “assimilation.” Those goals were enshrined in the Dawes Act (1887), which heralded the age of “allotment.” Washington broke up much of the tribal land base, withdrawing some property from Indian ownership and distributing other, often marginal, lands to individual tribal members. “Surplus” lands, more often than not the richest, were then sold off to white settlers. Between 1887, when the Dawes Act was passed, and 1934, when allotment ceased, some 86 million acres—60 percent of the remaining Indian lands—passed into the possession of non-Indians.

Allotment, which reached a peak just before World War I, was not merely a means of appropriating Indian territory. It was
part of a concerted effort to break up tribal nations, of which there were—and are—several hundred, each with a distinct history, most still with a distinct culture. This effort, like everything else on the reservations, was overseen by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, established by Secretary of War John Calhoun in 1824.

"The Indians," wrote Indian Commissioner Thomas Morgan in 1889, "must conform to 'the white man's ways,' peaceably if they will, forcibly if they must." On the reservations, BIA officials put Indian children into English-language boarding schools, dispersed village settlements, moved tribal members off communal (and on to individual) tracts of land, and took control of economic resources. Indigenous religious ceremonies, such as the Sun Dance of the Plains tribes, were outlawed.

**Waiting for FDR**

By the 1920s, white America's appetite for Indian lands (the best of which had already been taken) had begun to diminish. A postwar slump in farm prices helped reduce demand. Combined with the staggering extent of poverty, disease, and other social ills now apparent on the Indian reservations, these circumstances created a climate for reform.

The reform movement can be traced in part to the ideals of Progressivism and to the growing academic interest in the notion of "cultural pluralism" as a plausible alternative to the assimilation of America's ethnic groups. In 1922, when the Harding administration backed the Bursum Bill, which threatened the land and water rights of New Mexico's Pueblo Indians, a number of liberal, non-Indian organizations—the General Federation of Women's Clubs, for example—joined the Pueblos in opposing the legislation. The thriving community of artists, writers, and intellectuals around Santa Fe and Taos supported the protest. Writing in the *New York Times*, novelist D. H. Lawrence claimed that the bill played "the Wild West scalping trick a little too brazenly." The Pueblo leaders themselves, acting in concert for the first time since the Pueblo Rebellion in 1680, declared that the bill "will rob us of everything we hold dear—our lands, our customs, our traditions." After protracted debate, the Bursum Bill was defeated in Congress.

Such protests publicized the Indians' situation. But it was not until Franklin Roosevelt's election to the presidency, and his appointment of John Collier as Indian Commissioner in 1933, that a reform package won approval in Congress.

Collier, a former social worker and educator, and champion of the Pueblo cause during the 1920s, placed great faith in the
power of "community." Native American communities, he was convinced, "must be given status, responsibility, and power." Backed by FDR, Collier led a drive to reorient U.S. Indian policy. The result, in 1934, was the Indian Reorganization Act.

Indian policy did an abrupt about-face. The IRA legislation not only put an official stop to allotment; it actually allocated modest funds for expansion of the Indian land base. It provided money (though never enough) for economic development on Indian reservations and subsidies for Indians to set up tribal business corporations. But most important, it allowed Indians into the decision-making process by making explicit the right of any Indian tribe "to organize for its common welfare" and to adopt a constitution and bylaws for that purpose. By 1936, more than two-thirds of the tribes had endorsed the IRA in special elections (although far fewer actually organized themselves under its provisions).

The mechanisms of the IRA—representative government, for example, and the business corporation—were alien to Indian tribes. Even so, during the next few years many groups took advantage of what has been called "the Indian New Deal." The majority of today's tribal councils are one result. For some groups, such as the Papago and Apache in the Southwest or the Sioux tribes on the northern Plains, these councils represented the first comprehensive political institutions in their history. But their powers were limited. As an Apache leader from Arizona's San Carlos Reservation put it, "[BIA] Superintendent [James B.] Kitch was still the boss." Nevertheless, Indian groups enjoyed greater control over their own affairs, including a power of veto over some federal actions. For the first time in half a century, numerous Native American groups could also have federally recognized political organizations that could represent the tribal interests in Washington, state capitals, and the courts.

**World War II as Catalyst**

Another step followed. In 1944, representatives of 42 tribes founded the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), the first major attempt to pull together Indian groups and governments in a single, supratribal organization. In the NCAI and the regional organizations that came afterwards, tribal leaders began talking to one another. The purpose of the congress, which is still active today: "to preserve Indian cultural values; to seek an equitable adjustment of tribal affairs; to secure and to preserve rights under Indian treaties with the United States; and otherwise to promote the common welfare of the American Indian." In 1948,
THE PRICE OF ISOLATION

The poorest county in the United States, with an annual income per capita of $2,841 (in 1982), is not in the Deep South, the Appalachians, or any of the other regions in the United States frequently associated with rural poverty. It is in South Dakota: Shannon County (pop. 11,800), site of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation.

The poverty of Pine Ridge is shared by many Indians, especially those on the nation's 270 Indian reservations. Roughly 23 percent of all urban Indians and 33 percent of all rural Indians live below the official "poverty line"—compared with 14 percent for the entire U.S. population. In 1980, overall reservation unemployment stood at twice the national average; in some places, unemployment ranged near 80 percent.

Other statistics are even more sobering. In 1982, Indians ranked first in divorce and in deaths caused by suicide and alcohol consumption. Afflicted by poor health, family disarray, and low expectations, more than 40 percent of all Indian students entering high school drop out before graduation. No less important, note James Olson and Raymond Wilson in Native Americans in the Twentieth Century (1984), is the fear of many Indian parents that local public schools "alienate Native American children from tribal values." As a result, the percentage of Indians enrolled in schools is the lowest of any ethnic group in the United States.

To counter these and other difficulties, Indians on and off the reservations received roughly $2.6 billion in 1984 from federal agencies, notably the departments of Interior, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and Education. A total that includes Social Security payments and food stamps, this amounts to $1,900 per Indian. Yet in a 1983 report, the National Tribal Chairmen's Association claimed that 70 percent of the almost $1 billion allotted to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) was spent supporting 15,000 BIA employees—or one employee for every 23 reservation Indians.

The Reagan administration has sought to reduce red tape and spur employment on Indian reservations by turning over federal programs to state, local, and tribal governments, and by encouraging private industry to invest

the NCAI and other groups began a campaign designed to secure Indian voting rights—withheld at the time in both New Mexico and Arizona.*

If the IRA gave Indians the legal tools with which to organize, World War II gave many of them the motivation. In what the Interior Department described at the time as "the greatest exodus of Indians from reservations that has ever taken place," some 25,000 Indians joined the armed forces and saw action in Europe and the Pacific. Some 40,000 quit the economic desert of the

*Both U.S. citizenship and the voting franchise came to Indians in stages. Some Indians acquired citizenship through allotments, some through military service or congressional dispensation. In 1924, the Indian Citizenship Act made citizens of all Indians born in the United States, a status that some Indians, then as now, proscribed as imposed against their will. Until the 1950s, some jurisdictions nevertheless denied Indians the right on the grounds that Indian lands were exempt from taxation.
in Indian communities. Between 1982 and 1984, Congress cut spending on Indians by 18 percent. But because almost 30 percent of all employed Indians work in public sector jobs, federal spending cuts tend to increase unemployment before they do anything else. As Peterson Zah, chairman of the Navajo, pointed out, "We don’t have the people that Reagan is calling on—private sector development business people—to pick up the slack."

Those Indians who have prospered have done so primarily by leaving the reservation. Almost one-half of all Indians now reside in cities or towns, where a smaller percentage of Indians than of blacks or Hispanics live below the poverty line.

Yet few Indians adjust to urban life. Most return frequently to their reservations, where they often leave their children with relatives, and where they often choose to retire. Assimilation, the path to prosperity taken by generations of American immigrants, is an anathema to many Indians. "The pervasive fear of Indians," observes longtime Indian activist Vine Deloria, Jr., "is that they will . . . move from their plateau of small nationhood to the status of [just] another ethnic group in the American melting pot."

reservations for jobs in war industries. For many Indians, experiences in the factory or on the battlefront constituted their first real exposure to the larger American society.

The identities of Native Americans have long been rooted in tribes, bands, villages, and the like, not in one’s presumed "Indianness." The reservation system helped to preserve such identities and inhibited the emergence of a more inclusive self-consciousness. As a result, Indians, unlike American blacks, have had difficulty forming a common front. World War II brought Indians from different tribes into contact with one another, and with other Americans who thought of them indiscriminately as "Indians," not as Navahos or Apaches or Sioux.

It also forcefully brought home to Indians their second-class...
status. One Lumbee veteran told anthropologist Karen Bluf: "In 1945 or '46, I applied to UNC [University of North Carolina]. I had six battle stars. They said they didn't accept Indians from Robeson County." In the Southwest, not surprisingly, it was the Indian veterans who went to court to seek voting rights. Former G.I.'s were prominent in the NCAI. In 1952, the New York Times reported that "a new, veteran-led sense of political power is everywhere in Indian country."

Such analyses proved premature. There had always been strong opposition to the Indian Reorganization Act, from the political Right and from politicians of all colorations in the West, partly on the grounds that it perpetuated an undesirably distinct status for Native Americans.

After the fading of the New Deal, the status of Native Americans as wards of the federal government seemed to go against the American tradition of self-reliance. Sen. George Malone (R.-Nev.) complained that Indian reservations represented "natural socialist environments"—a charge echoed by Interior Secretary James Watt three decades later. Break up the tribal domains, so the argument ran, remove the protective arm of government, and cast the Indian into the melting pot and the marketplace. Everyone would benefit.

Such, in essence, was the conclusion of the so-called Hoover Commission on governmental organization, which in 1949 proposed "integration of the Indian into the rest of the population." It recommended that Indians leave the reservations and, implicitly, the tribal framework. Assimilation, the commission urged, should once again become "the dominant goal of public policy."

Ending Segregation

By the mid-1950s it was. Under "termination," as this latest turn in Washington's policy came to be called, Congress set out to dismantle the reservation system, disband tribal nations, and distribute their assets among tribal members. What Sen. Arthur V. Watkins (R.-Utah), an architect of the new policy, called "the Indian freedom program" received both liberal and conservative support. Liberal opinion during the late 1940s and '50s tended to view the problems of Indians in terms derived from the black experience and the early days of the struggle to end racial exclusion. Reservations were seen as "rural ghettos"; termination would put an end to "segregation." As historian Clayton Koppes has noted, this view reflected the liberal emphasis on "freeing the individual from supposedly invidious group identity."

This was exactly what most Indians did not want, but Wash-
ington was not in a listening mood. Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dillon S. Myer's orders to BIA employees were explicit. "I realize that it will not be possible always to obtain Indian cooperation," he wrote in 1952. Nonetheless, "we must proceed."

During the summer of 1953, under House Concurrent Resolution 108, Congress effectively repudiated the spirit of the Indian New Deal, stipulating that Indians were to be removed from federal supervision "at the earliest possible time," with or without Indian consent. Under Public Law 280, Congress transferred to California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin all civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations—previously under federal and tribal jurisdiction. Some tribal lands were broken up and sold, while many functions once performed by Washington—such as running schools and housing programs—were usually turned over to the states or other agencies.

Picking Up the Pieces

Meanwhile, to spur assimilation, Indians were urged to relocate to the cities. As Senator Watkins remarked: "The sooner we get the Indians into the cities, the sooner the government can get out of the Indian business." In 1940, fewer than 30,000 Indians were city residents; almost three-quarters of a million are today. But the government is not out of the Indian business.

That is because termination did not work. Take the case of the 3,000 Menominees in Wisconsin, one of the larger groups freed from the federal embrace. When Congress passed the Menominee Termination Act in 1954, the Menominee tribe was riding high. Poverty on the more than 200,000-acre reservation was widespread, but the tribe itself had large cash reserves and a thriving forest products industry that provided jobs and income.

With termination the Menominee reservation became a county. Tribal assets came under the control of a corporation in which individual Menominees held shares, while previously untaxed lands suddenly became subject to state and local taxes. The tribal hospital once financed by Washington was shut down, and some Menominees, faced with rising taxes and unemployment, had to sell their shares in the corporation. Before long, the corporation itself was leasing lands to non-Indians in an attempt to raise money. Soon it was selling the land in order to survive. By the mid-1960s the state and federal governments, forced to pick up the pieces, were spending more to support the Menominees than they had before termination. As more than one Menominee asked in frustration, "Why didn't they leave us alone?"

In 1969, faced with disaster, the Menominees began to fight
back, organizing a major protest movement in favor of restoration of federal jurisdiction and services, preservation of the land base, and a return to tribal status. Congress acquiesced late in 1973. The Menominee Restoration Act reinstated federal services to the Menominees, and formally re-established them "as a federally recognized sovereign Indian tribe."

The assimilationist orientation of the termination policy, and Washington's complete indifference to the views of its target population, aroused Indians across the country. They saw in termination the greatest threat to tribal survival since the Indian wars of the 19th century.

Termination did not die officially until 1970, when President Richard Nixon repudiated it. As federal and state officials came to recognize that the policy was creating more problems than it solved, protests by Indian groups slowed. Nonetheless, some Indian groups had been irreparably harmed.

In retrospect, the chief accomplishment of termination ran directly counter to Congress's intention: It provided Indians of diverse backgrounds with a critical issue around which to mobilize. At the American Indian Chicago Conference in 1961, re-
called Flathead anthropologist D'Arcy McNickle, the 500 Indians from 90 tribes who gathered for the event "had in common a sense of being under attack." The termination crisis persuaded many Indians of the utility—indeed, the necessity—of united action. Strength would be found in numbers. The category "Indian," invented and named by Europeans, was rapidly becoming the basis of a new wave of minority group politics.

**Uncle Tomahawk**

The tempest over termination coincided with a second development. Just as the late 1950s and early '60s were a time of change in the black movement for civil rights, they also saw the beginnings of change in American Indian leadership and its activity. In part, the change was one of tactics. There were glimmers of the future in actions by Wallace "Mad Bear" Anderson and other Iroquois in New York State: When the New York State Power Authority in 1958 sought to expropriate a large chunk of the Tuscarora Reservation for a new water reservoir, Anderson and 100 other Indians scuffled with state troopers and riot police, attempting to keep surveyors off the property. During that same year, several hundred armed and angry Lumbee Indians in Robeson County, North Carolina, reacted to Ku Klux Klan harassment by invading a Klan rally and driving the participants away with gunfire. The harassment stopped.

The new assertiveness reflected the emergence of a new generation of Indian leaders. During the 1950s the number of Indians enrolled in college in the United States substantially increased. According to the BIA, only 385 American Indians were attending postsecondary institutions in 1932; thanks in part to the post-World War II G.I. Bill, that number had swelled to 2,000 by 1957. On campuses, off the reservations, educated Indians from different tribes began to discover one another. That sense of discovery is apparent in Navaho activist Herbert Blatchford's description of the clubs that began to appear among Indian college students, particularly in the Southwest. "There was group thinking," he told writer Stan Steiner. "I think that surprised us the most. We had a group world view."

In 1954, Indian students began holding a series of youth conferences in the Southwest to discuss Indian issues. The largest such conference, in 1960, drew 350 Indians from 57 tribes. Some of the participants eventually turned up at the 1961 Chicago conference—and found themselves at odds with the older, more cautious tribal leaders. In *The New Indians* (1968), Steiner quotes Mel Thom, a young Paiute from Nevada who attended the
conference: "We saw the 'Uncle Tomahawks' fumbling around, passing resolutions, and putting headdresses on people. But as for taking a strong stand they just weren't doing it."

Two months later, at a meeting in Gallup, New Mexico, 10 Indian activists—a Paiute, a Ponca, a Mohawk, two Navahos, a Ute, a Shoshone-Bannock, a Potawatomi, a Tuscarora, and a Crow—founded the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC). "We were concerned with direct action," recalled Thom. It was time for Indians "to raise some hell."

They began raising hell in the Pacific Northwest. The trouble started during the early 1960s, when the State of Washington arrested Indians fishing in off-reservation waters. Though in violation of state regulations, "the right of taking fish at accustomed places" had been guaranteed by the Treaty of Point No Point and other agreements made during the 19th century between various Northwestern tribes and the United States. In 1964, a new regional organization—Survival of American Indians—joined the NIYC in protests supporting Indian treaty rights. They held demonstrations at the state capital in Olympia and, more provocatively, sponsored a series of "fish-ins," deliberately setting out to fish waters forbidden to them by the state.

**Equal Rights**

Growing numbers of Indian tribes became involved—the Muckleshoot, Makah, Nisqually, Puyallup, Yakima, and others—and began to assert their claims in defiance of court injunctions and state actions. The protests continued into the 1970s and became more violent. In August 1970, Puyallup Indians in a fishing camp on the Puyallup River exchanged gunfire with police who had surrounded them. No one was injured, but 64 Indians were carted off to jail. A year later Hank Adams, leader of Survival of American Indians, was shot by white vigilantes as he sat in his car on the banks of the Nisqually, near Tacoma.

Adams survived, and the struggle went on. Ultimately, in 1974, a federal district court ruled in the tribes' favor on the fishing rights issue, a decision upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court five years later. But the battle is not over. In November 1984, voters in Washington approved Initiative 456, designed to undermine the Treaty of Point No Point and other similar treaties.

Jack Metcalf, a Washington state senator and author of Initiative 456, says that "the basic point is not fish—it's equal rights." But, of course, the issue is fish and other treaty-protected Indian resources. From the Indian point of view, it is an issue long since resolved. In the treaties they signed during the 19th century, they
"You tell us of your claim to our land and that you have purchased it from your State," scolded Red Jacket, chief of the Seneca, in a speech delivered 160 years ago to white speculators near Lake Geneva, New York. "How has your State, which has never owned our land, sold it to you? Even the whites have a law..."

White law nowadays has become a key element in each tribe's survival strategy. More than 500 Indians today hold law degrees (versus fewer than a dozen 20 years ago), and virtually all of them grapple with issues of Indian jurisprudence. Those issues involve the nature of tribal government, protection of Indian lands, freedom of religion, hunting and fishing rights, rights to water from specified rivers and lakes, and other matters.

The tangled privileges and prohibitions that govern Indian life could discourage even Felix Frankfurter, who once described Indian law as "a vast hodgepodge of treaties, judicial and administrative rulings, and unrecorded practices." Because Indian law so often rests on treaties made by Indian nations with a foreign government—the United States of America—legal actions brought by Indians often end up before the U.S. Supreme Court.

In recent years, the drive by Indians to assert their rights has been led by the Native American Rights Fund (NARF), whose 11 lawyers work out of an old college fraternity house in Denver, Colorado. NARF was founded in 1970 with help from the Ford Foundation. Now headed by John Echohawk, a Pawnee, its annual budget is roughly $5 million.

NARF has been involved in almost every significant court case concerning Indians during the past 15 years. The group's attorneys helped the Menominee of Wisconsin and the Siletz of Oregon regain their status as tribes; fought for Chippewa fishing rights in Michigan; and established a homeland for the Traditional Kickapoo in Texas. In 1983 alone NARF handled business on behalf of 75 tribes in 25 states.

Three years ago, NARF lost three important water rights cases (Arizona v. California, Nevada v. United States, and Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe) before the U.S. Supreme Court. After many successes, the judicial reverses paralleled the rise of a political backlash sparked by groups such as the Interstate Congress for Equal Rights and Responsibilities. In some states, this movement has successfully contested the Indians' "special treatment" under the law. The Supreme Court of Washington, for example, has charged that the federal government, by treaty, "conferred upon tribal Indians and their descendants what amounts to titles of nobility."

Indians view their legal status not as something the white man gave them but as something the white man left them. That is why the Indian recourse to white justice will persist, seeking white support and reminding us that we are, besides much else, a nation governed by law:

—Richard J. Margolis

Richard J. Margolis is currently at work on a book on Risking Old Age in America; has written widely on Indian affairs and has been an adviser to the Rosebud Sioux and Navaho tribes.
agreed to give to the United States most of what are now the states of Washington and Oregon as well as parts of Idaho and California. In return, the United States, among other things, recognized forever their right to fish in Northwestern waters.

Indian activism did not appear only in the countryside; it erupted in the cities as well. For many Indian migrants of the postwar period, the move from the reservation to Denver, Chicago, Seattle, and other cities merely replaced one form of poverty with another. Largely unskilled, lacking experience in the non-Indian world, victimized by discrimination in housing and jobs, Indian migrants swelled the ranks of the urban poor.

**Landing on Alcatraz**

They also discovered that, unlike blacks or Hispanics, they had become “invisible.” In the eyes of state and local officials, urban Indians, just like reservation Indians, were the sole responsibility of the BIA. The BIA, for its part, believed that its responsibility stopped at reservation’s edge. In 1963, Indians in Oakland, San Francisco, and San Jose began protesting BIA relocation policies and the failure of the Bureau to deal with urban Indian problems. They took a cue from the tactics being employed by American blacks. Observed Vine Deloria, Jr.: “The basic fact of American political life—that without money or force there is no change—impressed itself upon Indians as they watched the civil-rights movement.”

The two most militant Indian political organizations took root in the cities: the American Indian Movement, founded in 1968, and Indians of All Tribes, which materialized a year later.

AIM first made its mark in Minneapolis, organizing an Indian Patrol to combat alleged police brutality in Indian neighborhoods. It soon had chapters in cities throughout the Midwest. Indians of All Tribes was founded in San Francisco in response to a specific incident. On November 1, 1969, the San Francisco Indian Center, which served the large Bay Area population, burned to the ground. There was no ready replacement for the building or the services that it provided. On November 9, a group of Indians—perhaps a dozen—landed on Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay, site of an abandoned federal prison, and claimed it for a new Indian center. Authorities removed them the next day. The Indians returned on November 20, now 80 strong. By the end of the month several hundred were living on the island, calling themselves Indians of All Tribes. Wary of public reaction to the use of force, federal officials pursued negotiations for 19 months. Not until June 1971, when the number of Indians on the
Rather than keeping agreements, some anti-Indian groups advocate breaking them. Organizations like the Wisconsin-based Equal Rights for Everyone favor abrogation of all Indian treaties.

The island had dwindled and public interest had waned, did federal marshals and the Coast Guard retake "the Rock."

Alcatraz was a watershed. It drew massive publicity, providing many Indians with a dramatic symbol of self-assertion. Said occupation leader Richard Oakes, a Mohawk: "This is actually a move, not so much to liberate the island, but to liberate ourselves." During the next five years Indians occupied Mount Rushmore, Plymouth Rock, and more than 50 other sites around the country for varying lengths of time. The wave of takeovers culminated with the seizure of the BIA headquarters in Washington, D.C., in 1972, and the Wounded Knee occupation in 1973. AIM, led by Dennis Banks and Russell Means, was a major actor in both. All made for vivid television news stories.

*Charges against AIM leaders Banks and Means were dropped on account of misconduct by government prosecutors. Banks was convicted in 1974 of charges stemming from a riot at a Custer, South Dakota, courthouse in 1973. He fled to California and was given sanctuary by Gov. Jerry Brown, who refused extradition. Republican George Deukmejian, elected governor in 1982, was less sympathetic. Banks surrendered to South Dakota officials in 1984 and served one year in prison. He now works as an alcohol-prediction counselor on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in Oglala, South Dakota. Means is currently associated with the International Indian Treaty Council, a lobbying group registered with the United Nations."

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The Indian activists, noted Yakima journalist Richard LaCourse, "blew the lid off the feeling of oppression in Indian country." They also provoked a concerted response from Washington. The FBI and the BIA began an effective infiltration campaign, directed in particular at the American Indian Movement. (AIM's chief of security, it would later be revealed, was an FBI informer.) More than 150 indictments came out of the Wounded Knee incident. Making headlines and the network evening news had its price. Conceded one AIM member in 1978, "We've been so busy in court fighting these indictments, we've had neither the time nor the money to do much of anything else."

**Going to the Courts**

Radical Indian action has abated since the mid-1970s. But the new Indian politics has involved more than land seizures and demonstrations. Beginning in the late 1960s, the Great Society programs opened up new links between Indian leaders and the federal government. By 1970, more than 60 Community Action Agencies had been established on Indian reservations. Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) funds were being used to promote economic development, establish legal services programs, and sustain tribal and other Indian organizations. Through agencies such as OEO and the Economic Development Administration, tribes were able for the first time to bypass systematically the BIA, pursuing their own political agendas in new ways.

Indian activists have also turned to the courts. The legal weapon is especially potent in the Indian situation because the relationship of Native Americans to the United States, unlike that of any other group in American life, is spelled out in a vast body of treaties, court actions, and legislation. In 1972, for example, basing their case on a law passed by Congress in 1790 governing land transactions made with Indian tribes, the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes filed suit to force the federal government to protect their claims to more than half of the state of Maine. This action led eventually to the Maine Settlement Act of 1980, which deeded 300,000 acres of timberland to the two tribes.

Behind such actions lies an assortment of Indian legal organizations that sprang up during the 1970s, staffed by a growing cadre of Indian lawyers and supported by both federal and private funds (see box, page 125). Indeed, organizing activity of every stripe has marked the past two decades. By the late 1970s, there were more than 100 intertribal or supratribal Indian organizations, ranging from the National Indian Youth Council to the Association of American Indian Physicians to the Small Tribes of
Western Washington, most with political agendas, many with lobbying offices in Washington.

Despite generally low Indian voter turnout, Indians have not ignored electoral politics. In 1964, two Navahos ran for seats in the New Mexico state legislature and won, becoming the first Indian representatives in the state's history. Two years later, 15 Indians were elected to the legislatures of six Western states. In 1984, 35 Indians held seats in state legislatures.

Of course the leverage Indians can exercise at the polls is limited. In only five states (Alaska, Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and South Dakota) do Indians make up more than five percent of the population. At the local level, on the other hand, Indians are occasionally dominant. (Apache County, Arizona, for example, is nearly 75 percent Indian.) Indians also can make a difference in particular situations. In 1963, after the South Dakota legislature had decided that the state should have civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations, the Sioux initiated a "Vote No" referendum on the issue, hoping to overturn the legislation. They campaigned vigorously among whites and were able to turn out their own voters in record numbers. The referendum passed. A similar Indian grassroots effort and high voter turnout in 1978 led to the defeat of Rep. Jack Cunningham (R-Wash.), sponsor of legislation in Congress to abrogate all treaties between Indian tribes and the federal government.

The Finest Lawyers

If Indians lack more than limited political clout in elections, during the 1970s they found new opportunities in the economy. The 1973–74 energy crisis and rising oil prices sent the fortunes of some tribes through the roof. Suddenly, Indian lands long thought to be worthless were discovered to be laden with valuable natural resources: one-quarter or more of U.S. strippable coal, along with large amounts of uranium, oil, and gas. Exploration quickly turned up other minerals on Indian lands. For the first time since the drop in land prices during the 1920s, Indians had substantial amounts of something everybody else wanted. In an earlier time this realization would have occasioned wholesale expropriation. In the political atmosphere of the 1970s, and in the face of militant Indians, that was no longer possible. Now the tribes began demanding higher royalties for their resources and greater control over the development process. The result, for some, was a bonanza. During the 41 years between 1937 and 1978, Native Americans received $720 million in royalties and other revenues from mineral leases; during the four years from
1978 to 1982, they received $532 million.

Most of this money went to only a few tribes, much of it to meet the needs of desperately poor populations. It also had a political payoff. Michael Rogers tells the story of an Alyeska Pipeline Company representative in Alaska, who during the mid-1970s lectured pipeline workers about the importance of maintaining good relations with local Indian and Eskimo communities. "You may wonder why they are so important," the representative told his hard-hats. "They are important because they are a people, because they were here before us, and because they have a rich heritage. They are also important because they belong to regional corporations that are able to afford the finest legal counsel in the country."

What Do Indians Want?

This new Indian assertiveness, in its multiple manifestations, had a major impact on U.S. policy. In 1975, responding to "the strong expression" of Indians, Congress committed itself to a policy of "self-determination," to providing "maximum Indian participation in the government and education of the Indian people." From now on, the government was saying, it not only would attempt to listen to Indian views and honor Indian agendas but would grant to Indians a central role in the implementation of policy.

But self-determination raises an awkward, chronic question. What is it the Indians want?

According to Bill Pensoneau, former president of the National Indian Youth Council and now economic planner for the Ponca Tribe in Oklahoma, what the Indians want is "survival." In his view, it is not individual survival that is of primary concern. What is at stake is the survival of Indian peoples: the continued existence of distinct, independent, tribal communities.

Among other things, of course, that means jobs, health care, functioning economies, good schools, a federal government that keeps its promises. These have not been any easier to come by in recent years. Federal subsidies to Native Americans have been cut steadily under the Reagan administration, by about $1 billion in 1981-83. Cancellation of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act program cost the Poncas 200 jobs. The Intertribal Alcoholism Center in Montana lost half its counselors and most of its beds. The Navaho public housing program was shut down.

Aside from those with lucrative mineral rights, few tribes have been able to make up for such losses of federal subsidies. With no economic base to draw on, most have found themselves...
powerless in the face of rising unemployment, deteriorating health care, and a falling standard of living.

But the survival question cuts more deeply even than this and reveals substantial divisions among Native Americans themselves. There are those who believe that survival depends on how well Indians can exploit the opportunities offered by the larger (non-Indian) society. Others reject that society and its institutions; they seek to preserve or reconstruct their own culture.

There are many points of view in between. Ideological divisions mirror economic and social ones. In the ranks of any tribe these days one is likely to find blue-collar workers, service workers, professionals, and bureaucrats, along with those pursuing more traditional occupations and designs for living. Most tribes include both reservation and city populations, with contrasting modes of life. The resultant Indian agenda is consistent in its defense of Indian peoples but often contradictory in its conception of how best they can be sustained. This proliferation of Indian factions, many of them no longer tribally defined, has made Indian politics more difficult for even the most sympathetic outsiders to understand.

The Indian politics of the 1960s and ’70s, both confrontational and conventional, was too fragmented, the actors were too dispersed, the goals too divergent to constitute a coherent, organized, political crusade. What it represented instead was the movement of a whole population—a huge collection of diverse, often isolated, but increasingly connected Indian communities—into more active political engagement with the larger society, seeking greater control over their lives and futures. To be sure, compared with other political and social events of the period, it was only a sideshow. It did not “solve” fundamental difficulties. But in the world of Indian affairs, it was a remarkable phenomenon, surpassing in scale and impact anything in Indian-white relations since the wars of the 19th century, which finally came to an end at Wounded Knee.
TWO CASE HISTORIES

by David Edmunds

At two in the morning on October 12, 1492, a lookout aboard the Pinta, one of two caravels accompanying Christopher Columbus's flagship, the Santa Maria, sighted a limestone cliff on the coast of San Salvador, an island in the Bahamas. At dawn, Columbus went ashore and claimed the island for Spain.

Following Columbus's discovery, Europeans came to realize that America was a New World. But they remained abysmally ignorant of its inhabitants, largely unaware, like Americans today, of the diversity of Indian cultures.

The hundreds of Indian tribes in what is now the United States adapted to Euro-American expansion in hundreds of different ways—as they had adapted to expansion by other Indian groups during the millenniums before Columbus. Against great odds, most tribes managed to preserve some degree of group identity in exchange for some sort of accommodation with the white majority.

The tradeoffs between Indian and non-Indian continue. What follow are two brief case studies: one of the Hopi Indians, a tribe that has hewed to its traditional ways; and one of the Potawatomis, a tribe that has chosen to change in order to survive.

I: THE HOPIS (ARIZONA)

They are a people with close ties to their land and to their past. Emerging from the ancient Anasazi culture, the Hopis—the name means "the peaceful ones"—have occupied their desert homeland in what is now northeastern Arizona for at least 1,000 years. In July 1540, when 17 Spanish cavalrymen, a few foot soldiers, and some Zuni Indian guides under the command of Don Pedro de Tobar came upon the Hopi pueblo of Kawaika, they found a farming people growing corn, beans, and other vegetables. The Hopi villagers lived in
autonomous pueblos scattered across the southern flanks of several large mesas.

The tribe lacked any centralized government, but the Hopi people shared a language, a culture, and a religion. A network of clans and extended families linked the many villages. The Hopis considered themselves to be the stewards of their environment, and all of the villages joined in a rich ceremonial life that reaffirmed ties to the land, to the spirit world, and to the kachinas (represented by masked dancers), who variously personified Hopi ancestors and the powers that bring rainfall, good harvests, and abundance. A yearly cycle of nine great ceremonies, the Hopi Road of Life, was celebrated in solemn, symbolic offerings and elaborate public dances—the Corn Dance, the Snake Dance, the Bean Dance, the Home Dance, and many others. Various secret societies, all-male, were responsible for particular ceremonies. Associated with the dances were rituals performed by men in the underground kivas, or ceremonial chambers. Many of these practices remain closely held secrets.

**Kit Carson’s Sympathies**

The extension of the Spanish Empire to the American Southwest brought many changes, but the Hopis, in their high, isolated pueblos, retained much of their traditional way of life. In 1629, the Franciscans established a mission at Awatovi; attempts to spread Christianity to other pueblos met with little success. The Hopis did, however, accept some Spanish technology, substituting metal knives, axes, and needles for the bone or stone implements used by their forefathers. They supplemented their diet of corns and beans with new foods introduced by the Europeans: watermelons, onions, peaches. The Hopis also welcomed European livestock, raising horses and small flocks of sheep.

In 1680, ties such as those the Hopis had with New Spain were abruptly severed when they joined other tribes from throughout northern New Mexico and Arizona in the great Pueblo Rebellion—spurred by repeated Spanish attempts to suppress native religion. The enraged Hopis killed numerous colonists and 21 Spanish priests, poisoning some clerics and hurling others from the mesa tops. Spanish troops eventually were able to reoccupy New Mexico and Arizona, but most of the Hopi villages, secure atop their mesas, escaped the ravages of reconquest. In 1710, Spanish officials admitted: “Since the uprising it has not been possible to reduce them, notwithstanding the efforts that have been made on the part of His Majesty’s forces as well as of the religious whose apostolic desires have always had as their aim..."
conversion of these souls."

A century later, the Hopis would spurn the Mexicans as they had spurned the Spanish. The Americans were another story. In 1850, following the United States' victory in the war with Mexico, the Hopis established relations with the federal government. Why? A relatively pacifist people, they faced frequent raids by the stronger and more aggressive Navahos. They welcomed efforts by the U.S. cavalry to subdue their powerful neighbors. Unfortunately, the same Yankee horsemen who fought the Navahos brought with them smallpox, and during the 1860s a smallpox epidemic swept through Hopi country. At the same time, the Southwest suffered a prolonged series of droughts. Kit Carson, in 1863 commanding a force of cavalrymen against the Navahos, found the Hopis "in a most deplorable condition. . . . Their only dependence for subsistence is on the little corn they raise when the weather is propitious." The Hopi population abruptly fell by almost 50 percent.

The Hopis' territory was shrinking, too. In 1869, Washington created an independent Hopi agency at Oraibi, a pueblo on Third Mesa. Thirteen years later, on December 16, 1882, President Chester A. Arthur signed an executive order creating a 3,920-square-mile reservation in northern Arizona for the Hopi tribe (and, fatefuly, for any other Indians whom the secretary of the interior should "see fit to settle thereon"). Meanwhile, the transcontinental Atlantic and Pacific Railroad brought ranchers, miners, and other settlers into the region. Between 1900 and 1910, the population of Arizona nearly doubled (from 122,951 to 204,354), and the new cities abutting the Hopi reservation, including Flagstaff, grew accordingly.

Hopi versus Navahos

The Hopi reaction to all of this was mixed. Some Hopis, led by Lolołoma, a leader from Oraibi who had once visited Washington, D.C., cooperated with the U.S. government. Others clung to the traditional way of life, shunning the Baptist, Presbyterian, and Mormon missionaries who flocked to the reservation, and refusing to send their children to the new government schools at Oraibi, Polacca, and Keams Canyon. Led by Lomahongyoma, also from Oraibi, the traditionalists successfully blocked government

attempts to "allot" the reservation—that is, to divide its land among its residents, destroying its communal character. After several clashes with Lololoma's followers, Lomahongyoma and his "hostiles" withdrew from Oraibi in 1906 to form a separate village, Hotevila, near Third Mesa. The rift between "traditionalist" and "progressive" Hopis persists.

With the Americans came economic opportunity—for some. The Navaho and Zuni Indians had introduced the Hopis to silversmithing during the 1890s; during the 20th century, the craft grew in importance. As more and more tourists ventured into the Southwest, demand soared for Hopi pottery, a beautiful polychrome clayware characterized by bold, stylized designs. Many other Hopis came to rely on wages earned off the reservation as ranch hands, miners, and laborers.

The Hopis' growing dependence on the outside economy led, inevitably, to a decreasing reliance on raising livestock. Into the vacuum stepped Navaho tribesmen from the surrounding countryside. Outnumbering the Hopis by 20 to 1, the nomadic Navahos began grazing their sheep and cattle on the fringes of the Hopi reservation, bit by bit penetrating further. During the 1930s, worried about overgrazing, the federal government forced both the Navahos and the Hopis to reduce their herds of live-
GENEROSITY

In 1967, the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) hired me to help investigate housing conditions on the Rosebud Sioux Reservation in South Dakota. With a team of self-described experts, I visited all 22 villages on the reservation, from Two Strike to Milik's Camp, and discovered, among other things, that Rosebud families had much to endure.

Many occupied dirt-floor shacks that lacked adequate heat or running water. Some were forced to sleep, even to cook, in rusted-out car bodies. In winter, the families were virtually defenseless against the frequent blizzards that swept the South Dakota prairie.

Our architectural consultant, a cheerful young man from Chillicothe, Ohio, went from door to door asking astonished Sioux mothers whether they preferred gas stoves to electric stoves; whether they liked bunk beds; whether the children could use a “mud room” for their boots and galoshes.

Few of the mothers could summon answers. I attributed their reticence to the fact that their houses had no gas or electricity; their rooms had no beds, and their children had no boots. But there was another explanation. As a tribal leader admonished us: “You should not ask so many questions. The people think there is a right answer and a wrong answer, and if they give the wrong answer, they will not get a new house.” Over the centuries whites have admired Indian silence as the complement to Indian eloquence. But it may also have been a way of avoiding trouble.

Two of the people I met during that Rosebud sojourn were Nancy and Sam White Horse, who lived in a shack atop a barren knoll near the town of Mission. Born around the turn of the century, they had spent most of their lives on the reservation, taking strong roles in tribal affairs and sharing with other members of the tribe in the manifold miseries and occasional improvements that came their way.

Now the arrival of “Washington officials” gave grounds for hope that housing might be the next item slated for progress. “You’re not the first to fly out here and look around,” Nancy White Horse told me as we stood amid the tall, yellow grass. “Nothing ever comes of it. But I’ll tell you what: if you can get some houses built for my people, I’ll make you a quilt.”

In time, the OEO built 400 houses on the Rosebud Reservation, including one for Nancy and Sam. Nancy was as good as her word. The quilt she

stock, but the Navahos continued to usurp pastureland formerly used by both tribes. When the Hopis complained, the Navahos pointed to the language in President Arthur’s 1882 executive order establishing the Hopi reservation and sanctifying the presence of any other Indian tribe that the interior secretary saw fit “to settle thereon.”

The Hopi-Navajo dispute continues. In 1962, federal courts decreed that many of the contested lands should be deemed a “Joint Use Area” open to both tribes, a decision that pleased neither. The 1974 Navaho-Hopi Land Settlement Act provided for
sent was a brilliant patchwork of red, orange, and white, with a large green star at the center.

It was hardly surprising that the bargain Nancy struck with me should benefit the whole tribe—"if you can get some houses built for my people"—rather than herself alone. In Indian country people tend to move forward in concert. Their individual struggles become a war of all on behalf of all. Nor was it unusual that out of the tatters of her daily life she should strive to fashion a gift of great beauty. That, too, went with the territory. In a culture with few commodities and virtually no market, creative generosity can flourish.

Do the Indians perhaps know something that we do not—not, to be sure, about getting ahead, but instead about not getting ahead? Is it possible that life is more fruitfully and magnanimously lived in the Indians' circular way (the turning of the earth) rather than in our accustomed linear fashion (onward and upward)?

Recently I returned to Rosebud for the first time in a dozen years. It took me a while to find Nancy White Horse because she had moved to a new neighborhood, a place named in honor of her husband, who had died a few years previously: the Sam White Horse Housing Project. Nancy's face had more wrinkles than I had remembered, and she walked very carefully, but otherwise she seemed unchanged, and certainly undiscouraged.

"What happened to your other house?" I asked. "The one that we built for you?"

"Oh," she said matter-of-factly, "there was a fellow who needed a place to live. So I gave him my house."

I thought of John Wesley, that troubled missionary who learned something in the 18th century that we may have forgotten in the 20th. Homeward-bound to England, Wesley gazed at a tossing sea and wrote in his diary, "I came to America to convert the Indians. But oh, dear God, who will convert me?"

—R. J. M.

the equal partition of these lands. Within a few years fences stretched across the desert, supposedly protecting the remaining Hopi lands from further Navaho encroachment. They did not.

By 1980, the Hopi population numbered about 9,000 while that of the Navaho approached 170,000; more than 2,000 Navahos were permanently settled on lands once designated as being under the jurisdiction of the Hopi. (Fewer than 100 Hopis were on Navaho lands.) Many Navahos have refused to relocate. As one Navaho woman put it during the late 1970s, "If I was beaten unconscious or put to sleep, then maybe I would be taken to the
place where we are supposed to move to. But it would not be of
my own will, and as soon as I was awake I would get up and
come back to this place."

The Hopis quarrel not only with the Navahos but also among
themselves—in particular, over the mining of coal and other
mineral resources. Since 1936, the Hopi progressives have con-
trolled the Hopi Tribal Council, in large part because Hopi tradi-
tionalists have boycotted the council elections. Backed by the
U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the council in 1969 granted
the St. Louis-based Peabody Coal Company the right to strip-
mine coal from Black Mesa, in northeastern Arizona. The mines
opened in 1970 and have brought some $500,000 in annual
royalties to the tribe.

Hopi traditionalists bitterly oppose the mining. They regard
it as a desecration. As one group of traditionalists stated: "We, the
Hopi leaders, have watched as the white man has destroyed his
land, his water, and his air. The white man has made it harder for
us to maintain our traditional ways and religious life. . . . We can-
not allow our spiritual homelands to be taken from us." During
the 1970s, as Indian activism increased nationwide, so did oppo-
sition among the Hopis to the mining operations at Black Mesa.
Thomas Banyacya, David Monongye, Mina Lanza, and other tradi-
tionalist leaders enlisted legal counsel to challenge the lease
agreements. So far, the tribal dispute remains unresolved in the
courts, and the coal mining goes on.

**Dolls for the Tourists**

Today, like other Indians, the Hopis are beset by a high
unemployment rate—in excess of 25 percent on the Hopi res-
ervation. Those Hopis who do work are generally low-income
herdsmen and farmers. Others make a living from crafts, perhaps
fashioning pottery or *kachina* dolls for the tourist trade. A few
Hopis have jobs in the coal mines or elsewhere in the private
sector. They, together with Hopis employed in white-collar jobs
by the BIA, account for many of the roughly 500 members of the
tribe who have incomes higher than $7,000.

But the Hopis do not necessarily view their condition as a
"plight." Perhaps more than any other tribe within the Lower
Forty-Eight, they have been able to preserve their traditional way
of life. Unlike most other tribes in America, they have continued
to occupy their ancestral territory, atop the same mesas as their
forefathers. They keep alive many of their religious traditions.
They disagree about whether (and how far) to enter the white
man's world. But that disagreement, too, is of long standing.
II: THE POTAWATOMIS (OKLAHOMA)

Their surnames are Pel-tier, Levier, or Beaubien, and they always have been masters of accommodation. When French fur traders met the Potawatomis during the mid-18th century, these adaptable people, "the keepers of the fire," were hunters, fishermen, and farmers by the shores of Green Bay, in modern Wisconsin.

At the time they numbered about 2,000.

To obtain French goods, including guns and knives, the Potawatomis served as middlemen between French fur agents, such as Robert de La Salle, and distant Indian tribes. French Jesuits preached among the Potawatomis, winning their souls for Christ and their hearts for King Louis. Many members of the tribe intermarried with Creole French settlers in the Great Lakes region. During the French and Indian War (1756–63), fighting the English, the Potawatomis called themselves "Onontio's [their name for the governor of New France] faithful." Their warriors supported the French siege of Fort George in New York. They also participated in the rout of Gen. Edward Braddock's redcoats in 1755, near modern Pittsburgh—a battle that George Washington survived.

When the French did not prevail in North America, the Potawatomis promptly shifted their allegiance to Great Britain. Meanwhile, they spread their villages across southern Michigan and northern Indiana. The American Revolution divided Potawatomi loyalties, as did the War of 1812; some tribesmen profitably aided both Americans and British. Throughout, the intermarriage of Potawatomis and whites continued, producing mixed-blood leaders such as Capt. Billy Caldwell and Alexander Robinson, Chicago fur traders who would later guide the tribe.

During the decades following the War of 1812, American settlers swarmed across Indiana and Illinois. It was the era of removal, and the Potawatomis were forced to cede large areas of their homelands to the United States. Like most other Indians, the Potawatomis rarely received full value for their territories. But they became adept at securing the best possible terms. In 1832, they signed three treaties with Washington that surrendered more than 780,000 acres in Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan—but
A member of the Potawatomi tribe pumping gas outside the tribal store in Shawnee, Oklahoma. Of the 11,568 Potawatomis recorded in 1979, only 2,928 had more than one-eighth Potawatomi blood.

In return they received an annuity of $50,000 for 15 years and manufactured goods worth approximately $250,000. Looking back on the deal, federal negotiators in 1833 acknowledged that "these half-breeds have soon learned how to vex their agents."

Following the land cessions, most Potawatomis were removed west of the Mississippi, where, in 1847, they accepted a reservation encompassing more than 500,000 acres near what is now Topeka, in east-central Kansas. There, on prairie land watered by the Kansas River, they erected their log cabins, planted their gardens, and ventured westward from time to time to compete on horseback with the Sioux, the Cheyenne, and other Plains tribes for the diminishing herds of buffalo. Although the Plains warriors resisted the Potawatomi intrusion, the newcomers, using military tactics they had learned from the British, readily defended themselves.

They were not so successful, however, against the flood of white settlers who gradually overran their lands. In 1861, a majority of the tribe agreed to the allotment of the Kansas Reservation. Pressured by land speculators, most Potawatomis, perhaps 1,500 of them, soon sold their property, accepted U.S. citizenship, and jointly purchased a new reservation in east-central Oklahoma, near modern Shawnee. About 500 members of the tribe refused to participate in the allotment process. Known as the Prairie
Band, they settled on a small reservation in Jackson County, Kansas, where the tribe can be found today, 1,326 strong.

In Oklahoma, the progressive, or Citizen Band, Potawatomis shared land with the Absentee Shawnees, descendants of those Shawnees who had fled from Ohio during the late 1700s. In 1890 the Oklahoma reservation was itself allotted; each Potawatomi received a plot within the former reservation. Surplus lands were opened to the white public during the Oklahoma Territory "land run" of 1891, and the tribe shared in the proceeds.

As their tribal acreage diminished, the Potawatomis gradually became more acculturated. In 1876, the Order of St. Benedict founded Sacred Heart Mission on lands donated by the tribe near Asher, Oklahoma. The mission opened two Indian schools, including St. Benedict's Industrial School, founded in 1877, and St. Mary's Academy (1880–1946). A new generation of educated Potawatomis established flourishing farms and ranches. Some became retailers, like G. L. Young, whose general store at "Young's Crossing" formed the nucleus of what is now the business district of modern Shawnee (pop. 26,506).

An Entrepreneurial Spirit

Like their white neighbors—and relatives—the Potawatomis endured the devastation of the Dust Bowl years. With other "Okies," many left their homes for a new life in Texas, California, and elsewhere. About one-half of the 11,600 Citizen Band Potawatomis are in Oklahoma, and some 2,500 still live in and around Shawnee. The rest are dispersed among all 50 states and several foreign countries. In Oklahoma, the Potawatomi occupational profile resembles that of any rural town's population. Unemployment is low compared to that of other tribes: 11 percent.

An elected five-man tribal council and an elected business committee oversee the affairs of the Citizen Band. John Barrett, the current tribal chairman, attended Princeton University and holds a graduate degree in business administration from Oklahoma City University. All told, some 40 employees make up the Citizen Band payroll, with jobs as diverse as publications editor and museum curator. Every summer tribal officials supervise federally subsidized job-training programs for 150 Indians.

Using tribal lands near Shawnee, the Potawatomis recently established an "enterprise zone" designed to attract business and industry into their community. Under the federal Tribal Government Tax Status Act (1982), the Potawatomis and other Indian tribes can offer private industries reduced tax rates if these firms locate within the tribal jurisdiction. Tribal lands are also exempt
from state sales taxes. Potawatomi leaders believe that they can attract Oklahoma businesses by charging lower taxes than the state. The revenues would be used to finance the tribal government, to purchase new tribal lands, to provide additional social services for local Potawatomis.

Negotiations with several major companies have already begun. In June 1984, the Potawatomis opened their own “trading post” on tribal lands. Because they charge no state sales taxes, the Potawatomi entrepreneurs can offer some commodities, especially tobacco, to Oklahomans at substantial savings. The one-story trading post currently takes in more than $200,000 a month in cigarette sales alone.

Accompanying the rise of the Potawatomis as a corporate entity has been a further dilution of their ethnic identity. Since 1961, when the tribe voted to restrict membership to those with more than one-eighth Potawatomi blood, the number of “pure” Potawatomi has continued to decline. Now, the tribal council is considering opening up tribal rolls to those with less than one-eighth Potawatomi ancestry. Few of the Citizen Band, however, wish to forgo the economic advantages that acculturation has brought them. Speaking of his tribe in 1984, John Barrett observed that “we have left the age of government programs and support…Trades unable to stand on their own two feet are going to find themselves fading into the background.”

In retrospect, the varied responses of Indian people to European and American society have produced tribes no less diverse than those that originally inhabited the United States. But different as tribes such as the Hopi and the Potawatomi may be, each must contend with the same economic realities.

The Hopis share the dilemma of more traditional tribes whose larger land base offers the prospect of oil or mineral development. Hopi traditionalists may oppose the desecration of their homelands, but history suggests that the pressures for development, from both within and without, are difficult for any tribe to withstand. With much less land, the Potawatomi have attempted to use their unique legal status as Indians to enhance the economic position of their tribe. Whether they succeed in doing so remains to be seen. For both the Hopis and the Potawatomis, however, one thing is certain: Without gaining additional financial strength, the Indian people will be increasingly unable to control their own destinies as communities.
The power of Indian oratory has long astonished non-Indians. Increasingly, many talented Indians are now turning from the spoken to the written word. They are producing a tough brand of poetry, fiction, and commentary worthy of the oral tradition from which they spring. Although much of this literature is centered in Indian country, it is sufficiently plain-spoken to be appreciated by all Americans.

The Native American Renaissance, to borrow the title of Kenneth Lincoln's study (Univ. of Calif., 1983), has been aborning for some time, helped along by a new generation of college-educated Indians.

An essential bridge from spoken to written language was provided half a century ago in South Dakota by Black Elk, the Oglala Sioux prophet (1863-1950), and by his tireless interlocutor, the late John G. Neihardt, the Nebraska poet and scholar who took down Black Elk's words.

"Always I felt a sacred obligation to be true to the old man's meaning and manner of expression," Neihardt wrote. "I am convinced that there were times when we had more than ordinary means of communication." Neihardt was able to translate Black Elk's visionary philosophy into the rhythmic English of Black Elk Speaks (Morrow, 1932, cloth; Pocket Books, 1982, paper). "For what is one man," Black Elk asks at the outset of his narrative, "that he should make much of his winters, even when they bend him like a heavy snow? So many other men have lived and shall live that story, to be grass upon the hills."

The book was first published in 1932 and was acclaimed by practically no one. But 40 years later, to Neihardt's astonishment, it exploded into popularity, thanks in part to a 1971 appearance by Neihardt on television's Dick Cavett Show.

Along with the Black Elk revival came a new breed of Indian writers untroubled by any need for white go-between. Scott N. Momaday, an Oklahoma Kiowa who studied at Stanford with poet Yvor Winters, won a Pulitzer Prize in 1969 for his lyric novel, House Made of Dawn (Harper, 1968, cloth; New American Library, 1969, paper), the story of a young Indian named Abel caught between the white man's world and the ways of his tribe.

Another bittersweet coming-of-age novel, James Welch's Winter in the Blood (Harper, 1974), appeared a few years later. A Blackfoot-Gros Ventres from Montana, Welch fused Indian alienation and existential anguish. "I was as distant from myself as the hawk from the moon," says the narrator.

Other writers followed with variations on the same theme. Fred Kabotie's powerful autobiography, Fred Kabotie: Hopi Indian Artist (Northland, 1977), suggested that it was possible to combine tribal fidelity and American-style success. Kabotie won a Guggenheim Fellowship in 1945. John Fire Lame Deer echoed Black Elk in Lame Deer Seeker of Visions: The Life of a Sioux Medicine Man (Simon & Schuster, 1972, cloth; 1976, paper), with Richard Erdoes assuming the role of interlocutor previously played by Neihardt. During the mid-1970s, the remarkable short stories of Russell Bates, like Momaday a Kiowa, began appearing in the Magazine of Fantasy and Science Fiction.

But it has been the poets, by and large, who have achieved the grander eloquence. The new Indian verse can be described as assertively bicultural,
AMERICAN INDIANS: KEY STUDIES

GENERAL SURVEYS: The American Indian and the United States (Greenwood, 1973) by Wilcomb Washburn: the basic reference work. Alvin Josephy, Jr.'s The Indian Heritage of America (Knopf, 1968, cloth; Bantam, 1969, paper) is a sympathetic but unsentimental overview. The American Indian Wars (Harper, 1960) by John Tebbel and Keith Jennison is possibly the most even-handed volume in that area of Indian history. Jennings Wise's sardonic The Red Man in the New World Drama (Macmillan, 1971) was viewed as an unorthodox, revisionist account of red-white relations when it first came out in 1931. The last volume of Edward S. Curtis's Indian photographs appeared around the same time. They can be found in The North American Indian (Aperture, 1972).

TRIBES AND CHIEFS: The Book of the Hopi (Viking, 1963; Penguin, 1977) by Frank Waters: an exhaustive dossier on the Southwest tribe. Ruth Underhill, in The Navajos (Univ. of Okla., 1956, cloth; 1983, paper), takes a look at America's largest tribe. See also The Eastern Band of Cherokees (Univ. of Tenn., 1984, cloth & paper) by John Finger, and Spotted Tail's Folk: A History of the Brule Sioux (Univ. of Okla., 1961, cloth; 1974, paper) by George E. Hyde. Joseph Brant, 1743–1807 (Syracuse Univ., 1984), the great Mohawk leader, is the subject of Isabel Thompson Kelsay's prize-winning biography; Mari Sandoz provides a profile of another famous Indian warrior, Crazy Horse (Knopf, 1942; Hastings, 1975), in an early work that still holds up well. Peter Matthiessen's superb Indian Country (Viking, 1984) offers chapter-length portraits of more than a dozen contemporary Indian groups.

MISCELLANEOUS: Textbooks and the American Indian (Indian Historian Press, 1969), edited by Rupert Costo and Jeannette Henry, challenges the standard portrayal of Indians in American schoolbooks. The Rights of Indians and Tribes by Stephen L. Pevar, an American Civil Liberties Union handbook, is a clear and comprehensive guide to the legal complexities. Voices from Wounded Knee, published in 1973 by Akwesasne Notes, a Mohawk newspaper, is perhaps the best expression of Indian militancy during the late 1960s, early '70s. The book (written collectively, of course) has no named author. It is now out of print.
The Indian poetic revival came of age during the mid-1970s, with the appearance of *Riding the Earthboy 40* (Harper, 1976) by novelist James Welch, and *Going for the Rain* (Harper, 1976, cloth & paper) by Simon Ortiz, an Acoma Pueblo from New Mexico. The books bear marks of the still-reigning Indian sensibility, which tends to be ironic and skeptical of values other Americans may cherish or take for granted.

In a poem called "Harlem, Montana: Just off the Reservation," Welch tells of "the three young bucks who shot the grocery up, locked themselves in and cried for days, we're rich/ help us, oh God, we're rich." In such poems, national holidays evoke unexpected sentiments. As Ortiz writes in "The Significance of a Veteran's Day": "I happen to be a veteran/ but you can't tell in how many ways/ unless I tell you"—which he then proceeds to do in a typically Indian manner:

Caught now, in the midst of wars against foreign disease, missionaries, canned food, Dick & Jane textbooks, IBM cards, Western philosophies, General Electric, I am talking about how we have been able to survive insignificance.

Only a few Indian poets have been lucky enough to find big-name publishers. Most have had to settle for not-so-mainstream literary reviews, such as the *Blue Cloud Quarterly*, published by the Blue Cloud Abbey in Marvin, South Dakota.

For a dozen years, under the editorship of Brother Benet Tvedten, the *BCQ* has devoted itself exclusively to the work of Indian poets. If the Indian voice today has been able to "survive insignificance," much of the credit goes to Brother Tvedten and his lively journal, which has displayed the talents at one time or another of virtually every Indian poet writing today. The list includes not only the voices of the 1960s but some fine younger poets of the late '70s and '80s. Among them: Maurice Kenny and Karoniaktatie, both Mohawk; Ralph Salisbury (Cherokee); G. Jake Bordeaux (Lakota); Charlotte deClue (Osage); J. Junda (Sioux); and Adrian C. Louis (Paiute).

The Sioux of old looked upon the bison as a gift from the good spirit, and after the bison had disappeared, the Sioux prophet Black Elk understood that "from the same good spirit we must find another strength." Before the massacre at Wounded Knee, he dreamed of leading the Sioux in that search, but the vision finally turned sour: "... the nation's hoop is broken and scattered. There is no center any longer, and the sacred tree is dead."

Now Black Elk's literary heirs grope for words, *English* words, that will mend the hoop and restore the center.
RADICAL ISLAM:
Medieval Theology
and Modern Politics
by Emmanuel Sivan,
Yale, 1985
218 pp. $18.50

Browsing through Arab bookstores in Cairo and Jerusalem a few years ago, Emmanuel Sivan was struck by the brisk sales of reprints of medieval texts on Islamic law and jurisprudence, and also by the manner in which modern Arab commentaries on these texts sought to apply medieval Islamic principles to present-day problems.

This extensive literature, Sivan found, is an insistently political literature. It reaches back to medieval times—the more effectively to criticize today's Arab governments. It argues seemingly arcane theological questions—the better to argue for political activism. And it provides the ideological underpinnings for the new wave of Islamic radical thought. It is the subject of Sivan's perceptive and pertinent book.

Sivan, a professor of history at Jerusalem's Hebrew University, not only introduces Western readers to scores of important but little known contemporary Islamic thinkers (Sunni thinkers, one should emphasize: hence, not in full agreement with Shi'ite fundamentalists such as the Ayatollah Khomeini). He also breaks new ground in his analysis of their work and activities. Sivan, for instance, shares the view of other scholars that defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War led many Arabs to re-examine long-held assumptions, but he dates the genesis of the ideas associated with Sunni radicalism back to the late 1950s and early '60s.

While the author focuses, quite naturally, on the Arab world, he attaches great importance to the influence of Abu Ala al-Maudoodi, an Islamic thinker of Indo-Pakistani origins. It was Maudoodi's works that first taught modern Islamic fundamentalists to think of their era as a second Jahiliyya—the age before the advent of Islam when paganism and ignorance reigned in Arabia. Maudoodi also draws on the great medieval jurist Ibn Taymiyya to argue that true believers have a duty to oppose rulers who, though professing Islam, fail to live by its teachings.

Sivan acknowledges that Islamic radicalism is a reaction to the external pressures of Westernization and modernization. But developments inside Islamic states, he believes, have been even greater catalysts. Egypt's fundamentalist Islamic Brotherhood, after all, showed little enthusiasm for Gamal Abdel Nasser (Prime Minister and then President of Egypt from 1954 to 1970), even though he was lionized throughout most of the Arab world. Muslim movements elsewhere—in Syria and Iraq—have been just as suspicious of other presumably revolutionary and progressive Arab governments. Indeed, says Sivan, revolutionary governments threaten Islamic fundamentalists precisely because their revolutionary and anti-imperialist credentials are so impeccable. They are more effective than their conservative predecessors in winning the favor of the masses and the middle classes.
And they are adept at using the military, the police, the bureaucracy, and the media to accomplish their goals—including, notably, the repression of religious zealots. One Syrian Islamic writer summed up the fundamentalists’ view of secular military juntas: “the most depraved social group... full of traitors, drunkards, fornicators, non-Muslims, and heretics.”

Sivan notes a change in the attitudes of radical Muslims, marked by growing self-confidence and uncompromising defiance. The change came sometime around the mid-1960s, when Sunni fundamentalists stopped going along with Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism. During the 1956 Arab-Israeli war, imprisoned members of the dissident Muslim Brotherhood volunteered to fight on the front and to return to prison afterwards. By contrast, during the 1967 war, political prisoners in Nasser’s jails refused to volunteer. “Israel and Nasser [are] both... but two variants of tyranny,” they said, “both totally inimical to Islam.”

Similarly, Islamic ideologues no longer feel any pressure to show that their faith is compatible with democracy. “The state in Islam obeys the law, not the people,” says one. They are also openly contemptuous of such notions as equal treatment of religious minorities and women’s liberation.

Sivan notes that Sunni radicals, though critical of governments and modern influences, have no qualms about seizing and using the modern instruments of the state for their own purposes. Even that great tool of Western devilry, the television set, can be put to orthodox ends. And although Sivan’s subjects are ultimately critical of Iran’s Shi’ite leader Khomeini, they grudgingly admire what he accomplished. Indeed, the Sunni radicals hope to do the same—crush the secular state and establish Islamic governments subject to Allah’s law.

—Shaul Bakhsh ‘85

NICARAGUA: Revolution in the Family
by Shirley Christian
Random, 1985
338 pp. $19.95

In this measured study of the tangled and bloody affairs of Nicaragua since 1970, Shirley Christian, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, exposes many of the myths that have bedeviled the American public debate over U.S. policy toward the troubled Central American nation.

Among those myths: that the shortsightedness of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua during the 1920s and ’30s precluded a useful American role during the 1970s and ’80s; that Latin American leaders wished only to be left alone by the yanquis; that the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was an ideologically mixed force, turned toward Leninism by the Carter and Reagan administrations; that opposition to the FSLN regime in Nicaragua is primarily led by ex-Somocista figures who hope to return their country to its authoritarian and oligarchic past.

Perhaps the most striking part of Christian’s book is her description of the vacillation of the Carter administration in 1978 and 1979. The tale
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approaches tragedy. Nicaraguan opposition to Anastasio Somoza Debayle was, as Christian makes clear, unusually broad-based. It included the Catholic Church, the business community, trade unions, many politicians, and the newspaper La Prensa, as well as the guerilla forces of the FSLN. The goal of most Somoza foes—a pluralistic, democratic society—was not, Christian emphasizes, that of the Sandinistas. Yet the democratic opposition believed that it lacked the muscle to topple the Somoza dynasty. So it joined forces with the Sandinistas. The Sandinistas willingly went along with the united-front strategy, encouraged by no less a figure than Fidel Castro.

The dangers of such an alliance soon surfaced. The democratic opposition, enlisting the aid of other Latin American leaders, urged Carter to pressure Somoza to step down so that they, the moderates, could retain control of the revolution. Carter hesitated, fearing charges of U.S. intervention. The result was an unnecessarily bloody war and the emergence of a Marxist-Leninist “vanguard” with a military grip on the nation’s future.

Nicaragua is, in many ways, a test case of U.S. policy toward its traditionally authoritarian allies throughout the Third World. Considered in light of Christian’s analysis, the principle of “nonintervention,” on which such high value has been placed in the postcolonial world, appears particularly deficient. For over two decades, the United States had nurtured political alternatives in Nicaragua. It supported independent labor groups, aided a range of nongovernmental institutions, and maintained regular contact with opposition politicians. But at the critical moment, writes Christian, “because of its desire to adhere to the nonintervention principle, the Carter administration could not make Somoza go.”

The post-Vietnam curse that hangs over the word “intervention”—and particularly the assumption that intervention must be equated with military force—clearly shaped the outcome of the Nicaraguan revolution. The lesson that emerges from Christian’s analysis is that there is no escape from responsibility for the United States. Nicaragua, for all its particularities, is still a sobering example of what could happen tomorrow in Chile, the Philippines, or South Korea.

—George Weigel ’85

MEDIEVAL RUSSIAN CULTURE
edited by Henrik Birnbaum and Michael S. Flier
Univ. of Calif., 1985
395 pp. $35

Of all subjects pertaining to Russia, no two have been more widely neglected than its medieval history (prior to Peter the Great) and its cultural heritage (prior to the great 19th-century novels). The vast pre-Petrine expanse is generally regarded as a period of darkness and Mongol influence; in fact it was a time of considerable artistic accomplishment. One, therefore, welcomes a volume that provides some of the best scholarship in the East and the West on the medieval culture of the Eastern Slavs.

Early Russia was shaped not just by Byzantium but by the forgotten
medieval civilizations of Bulgaria and Serbia. Its historical mythology came from the city of Novgorod as much as from Kiev or Moscow. Andrzej Poppe, a Polish scholar, demonstrates that Novgorod’s prelates invented some of the “antiquities” of Russia (icons and other holy relics) precisely to counter the rising power of its more landlocked and eastward-looking rival, Moscow, during the 15th century. Of course, the rival eventually emerged victorious as its rulers, the princes of Muscovy, assumed the imperial title of tsar. One of the volume’s editors, Michael Flier, relates the apocalyptical expectations of Moscow as the “third Rome” (after the fall of Constantinople, the “second Rome,” in 1453) to the emergence of the new name for Sunday, voskresenie, or “resurrection,” a usage that, among Slavic languages, is unique to Russian.

The influence of pagan folklore is another topic well explored. Konrad Onasch, an outstanding East German scholar, explains that many of the great figures on the icons had pagan as well as Christian origins. The icon of the female martyr Parasceve-Patnica, for instance, subtly recalled “the pre-Christian Finnic patron of domestic activities—spinning and weaving—and of trade.”

Afas, the philologists talk largely to one another, refuting half-forgetten hypotheses from the past rather than providing much of an overview. The exception is the brilliant and imaginative Boris Uspensky of Moscow State

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Diagram of an Old Russian icon screen.
University. He suggests that the old Muscovite Russia was not truly bilingual, with church Slavonic existing alongside a more vernacular Russian. Instead, a condition of “diglossia” prevailed, with both linguistic systems existing within the framework of a single-speech community.

Ricardo Picchio of Yale points the way to a better future understanding of Old Russia by stressing the importance of church culture to both Russian language and literature. His essay has particular salience today, as Russia approaches the one-thousandth anniversary of its conversion to Christianity in 988. Unfortunately, most scholars in the West, and in the officially atheistic Soviet Union, have paid scant attention to the role of religion during the long period of Russia’s rise and its colonization of the northeastern frontier of Europe. Yet it was this church-inspired culture that brought Russians across the Bering Straits to Alaska and down within sight of San Francisco Bay by the early 19th century.

Despite past scholarly neglect, there are signs that a new generation of young Russians is beginning to show a keen interest in its distant heritage. There are, for instance, currently over 30 million members of the Soviet Society for the Preservation of Antiquities. And the fact that two American scholars, both professors of Slavic literature at the University of California, Los Angeles, took the lead in preparing this volume is an encouraging indication that interest is spreading westward.

—James H. Billington, Director
NEW TITLES

History

JESUS THROUGH THE CENTURIES: His Place in the History of Culture
by Jaroslav Pelikan
Yale, 1985
270 pp. $22.50

Consider the various and sometimes conflicting images men have formed of Christ. Francis of Assisi, the 13th-century Italian saint, believed that he was imitating Christ by renouncing the world and living in poverty; by contrast, Charles Sheldon, a 19th-century American author, presented Jesus as the model corporate businessman. In the spirit of the Age of Reason, Thomas Jefferson edited the “rubbish” from the Gospels to present a “purified” account of Christ as enlightened moralist. And to Romantics such as William Blake, Jesus was nothing less (or more) than the embodiment of the “poetic.” Recounting the genesis, use, and abuse of these and other images, Pelikan, the noted Yale historian, has produced a work of scholarly virtuosity. It is also an insistently moral book. Pelikan asks, for instance, whether anti-Semitism would have been such a dark blot on Western history if later Christians had not forgotten (or suppressed) the earliest image of their Savior—that of Christ as Rabbi Jeshua bar-Joseph. Interpreting visual as well as written sources, crude Anglo-Saxon crosses as well as the novels of Dostoyevsky, Pelikan demonstrates that, to believers and non-believers alike, Jesus of Nazareth has been “the dominant figure in the history of Western culture for almost 20 centuries.”

THE CRABGRASS FRONTIER: The Suburbanization of the United States
by Kenneth T. Jackson
Oxford, 1985
352 pp. $21.95

To the early 19th-century American city-dweller, suburban had unsavory connotations. By 1870, things had changed: Americans yearned for suburban homes, although they still wanted the city to serve as the hub of their activities. Inexpensive building materials, cheap transportation, new construction techniques, federal tax benefits for homeowners—all helped to ease the exodus from the central city. The Federal Housing Administration, created by Franklin Roosevelt in 1934 to insure long-term mortgages, also contributed by favoring new-home construction over inner-city renovations. In 1980, two-thirds
of all Americans were living in "single dwellings surrounded by ornamental yards." Jackson, a Columbia historian, chronicles America's massive residential shift in illuminating detail, pointing to its effects, including the dispersion of work, family, and friends. Ironically, he observes, "the intelligent compromise" sought by 19th-century Americans—to live in a spacious, quiet neighborhood while enjoying contact with urban culture—has largely been replaced by "general suburban resistance to ... contacts with the larger society." Jackson notes the recent "re-gentrification" of city enclaves, but he predicts that energy shortages rather than fashion will eventually spell the demise of the suburban way of living.

THE POLITICAL MYTHOLOGY OF APARTHEID
by Leonard Thompson
Yale, 1985
293 pp. $22.50

In 1686, the Dutch ship Steenisse went down off the east coast of what is now South Africa. In three groups, the survivors set off for the settlement of Cape Town, encountering several African tribes on the way. Later, the Dutch reported that the natives they met were "civil, polite, and talkative," living in stable communities and engaged in agriculture. Twentieth-century archeologists have established the presence of blacks in the south since about 300 A.D. Yet in 1981, one white South African neatly summarized the Afrikaner version of the region's early history: "There were only Bushmen in South Africa when the whites landed at the Cape. The blacks were in Rhodesia. Basically we came here more or less at the same time." This "myth of the vacant land" is only one part of the white South African political mythology explored by Yale historian Thompson. Forged by Afrikanners in their struggles against the English in the 19th century, this cluster of beliefs serves to justify apartheid and white dominance. All nations, Thompson notes, have their myths. But the Afrikaners' myth has become "an independent conservative force" that prevents the regime from making changes. It is even taboo to examine the old beliefs. As recently as 1979, a mob tarred and feathered an Afrikaner scholar for proposing to study the Covenant myth (according to which the Afrikaners' victory over the Zulus in 1838
was proof of a special compact made between
God and the Dutch). Responding to this Afrika-
ner insufficiency, South African blacks are now
altering their own political mythology—from an
emphasis on common humanity to a rejection of
Western values and capitalism.

Contemporary Affairs

HERE THE PEOPLE RULE
Selected Essays
by Edward C. Banfield
Flanum, 1985
348 pp. $39.50

The bane of democracy is the pursuit of perfec-
tion. That, in a nutshell, is the argument under-
lying these 20 sensible, often provocative essays
by the author of Unheavenly City (1968).
Banfield, a professor of government at Harvard,
harks back to the Founding Fathers in his bed-
rock conviction that man is a "creature more of
passions than of reason." Thus, certain things
are inevitable, including, Banfield explains in a
discussion of American federalism, the futility of
trying to limit government to "some defined
sphere." People simply "cannot be relied upon
voluntarily to abide by their agreements, includ-
ing those upon which their own political order
depends." In a prescient essay written 25 years
ago, Banfield sees the perfectionist urge to
"clean up" political parties (and to make them
more "democratic") as a threat to their contin-
ued effectiveness; a follow-up piece surveys the
actual damages of subsequent reforms. Profiting
from his experience on a White House urban
task force, Banfield explores the contradictions
of Washington's Model Cities program (1966-
74), where plans quickly became "plans to
plan," and shows how grant-in-aid projects
aimed at social uplift can quickly run amok. He
laments the legacy of President Woodrow Wil-
son: Trying to separate the administration of pol-
icy (clean and scientific) from politics (dirty and
human), he only succeeded in producing a
bloated, self-serving bureaucracy. In addition to
his skeptical ruminations on topics such as ur-
ban crises, "public policy" studies, economic
explanations of political behavior, Banfield of-
fers some wry suggestions, including a plan for
structuring public libraries to serve the serious
reader rather than the consumer of pulp.

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Nearly 500 million people live in the 52 nations of Africa. It is a continent of “rich, varied cultures, and enduring civilization,” writes Ungar, a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Yet today most Africans share the same problems: inadequate nutrition and health care. According to the World Bank, 60 percent of all Africans currently consume fewer calories each day than are deemed necessary for survival. Little wonder, then, that five million Africans die each year from malnutrition and from other diseases, or that, in 31 nations, life expectancy is less than 50 years. Ungar makes clear that corrupt, inept, often repressive African governments deserve much of the blame. The 20 states that formed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1963 pledged “to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa.” But the OAU’s history, says Ungar, “is a tale of empty rhetoric.” Ungar’s even-handed survey focuses on Liberia, Nigeria, Kenya, and the “white nightmare” of South Africa. He also reflects upon Americans’ “childlike innocence about the second largest land mass in the world.” That long-standing ignorance, Ungar believes, has produced inconsistent, crisis-oriented policies in Washington, most strikingly evident in U.S. dealings with Pretoria. American efforts to bring about change in South Africa will not be credible, the author warns, until they are “matched by a parallel concern for civil liberties and freedom of political participation everywhere else on the continent.”

Samuel Pepys’s career as diarist spanned nine brief years, from 1660 to 1669. But what years those were for England! They encompassed not only the restoration of monarchy and war with Holland but also the Great Plague (which claimed as many as 10,000 Londoners a week during the cruel summer months of 1665) and London’s Great Fire of September 1666. Of the former calamity, Pepys sadly observed: “But now, how few people I see, and those walking
like people that had taken leave of the world."
Yet even during the bleakest of times, Pepys's optimism remained intact. He felt blessed, having risen from lowly origins (his father was a tailor) to a high administrative post in the British admiralty. A genius at organization, he was by no means a drudge. He loved city life, theater-going, conversations, political intrigue, fashion, the minutiae of everyday affairs. Whatever he observed or did (including the philandering that nearly destroyed his marriage), whatever he thought about a sermon or a play (he judged Shakespeare's A Midsummer Night's Dream "insipid"), he dutifully recorded in his calfskin daybooks, employing the Shelton method of shorthand. Eye problems brought the diaries to a premature close. (Pepys pressed on to the then venerable age of 70, dying in 1703.) Even so, the entire diary runs to 11 volumes in a University of California edition. Latham, a Cambridge scholar and coeditor (with William Matthews) of the complete edition, has brought the best of Pepys into the more manageable confines of this handsome single volume.

The DARE project was launched in 1965, not a year too soon. With each day's passing, radio and television make American English more homogeneous. Fortunately, this dictionary will preserve some of the local variations that once enlivened our national speech. In the introduction to their first volume, the editors describe their aims, scope, and methods. To read the text of the 1,847-item questionnaire used by the DARE fieldworkers, for instance, is to gain respect not only for the editors' thoroughness but also for the respondents' patience (sample question: "Any sign or trace: 'He left here last week and nobody's seen --- of him since."").
The fruits of the editorial labor are informative and entertaining. Here one finds the idiom of "back people" and "city jakes," insults, epithets (an "ace boon coon" is a close friend in New York City black lingo), and names for the myriad tools and furnishings of day-to-day life. Even the most "conceity" (Pennsylvania patois for hard-to-please) will have trouble finding this rich word-hoard "boresome."

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REPORT FROM THE BESIEGED CITY and Other Poems
by Zbigniew Herbert
translated by John and Bogdana Carpenter
Ecco, 1985
82 pp. $12.50

BARBARIAN IN THE GARDEN
by Zbigniew Herbert
translated by Michael March and Jarostaw Anders
Carnegie, 1985
180 pp. $14.95

Polish émigré poet Czeslaw Milosz is the winner of the world's splashiest literary awards, including the Nobel Prize, but to a growing number of readers, Zbigniew Herbert, the poet who remained behind, is the poet who matters most. Although his verses look sleekly modern, Herbert belongs to the classical tradition. Severe in his self-restraint, noble (yet unstuffy) in tone, he would be the last to promote his own importance. In our century, he writes in "To Ryszard Krynicki—a Letter," only Rilke, Eliot, and "a few other distinguished shamans... knew the secret of conjuring a form with words that resist the action of time without which/ no phrase is worth remembering and speech is like sand. . . ." Herbert apologizes for the pettiness of his political verses, lamenting that "we had opponents despicably small," for whom it was hardly worth lowering "holy speech/ to the babble of the speaker's platform the black foam of the newspapers..." But Herbert is too modest. His poems tackle important themes: the brute mendacity of leaders, the hollowness of ideologies, the cost of giving in to history's Big Lies. He also writes poems that verge on piety, as in "Prayer of Mr. Cogito—Traveler," where he thanks God for letting him visit "places/ that were not the places of my everyday torment."

Travel, too, is the motive behind the 10 essays of Barbarian in the Garden, but while they are inspired by visits to Western European places—to the painted caves of Lascaux, to the Gothic cathedrals of France, to the Italian city of Siena—they are not travelogues. They are, rather, encounters with works of art as well as meditations on history. In one, he recounts the story of the Templar Order. Founded in 1128 to protect the Holy Land, this powerful body of knights flourished for almost two centuries before the French king Philip the Fair deemed it a threat to his power. To quash the Templars, Philip accused their leaders of heresy. "Progress in our civilization," Herbert observes, "consists mainly in the fact that simple tools for splitting heads were replaced by hatchet-words, which have the advantage of psychologically paralyzing an opponent." But the work of our best poets—Herbert's included—remains the greatest impediment to such progress.
Marling's sympathetic study of selected drawings by Thomas Hart Benton, a Midwestern American muralist active from the 1920s until his death in 1975, defies several art-historical conventions. Marling, an art historian at the University of Minnesota, shows us Benton's drawings but not the murals in which they appear. She analyzes his work in relation to popular culture rather than in terms of artistic style. She identifies Benton's vision as American rather than as Midwestern. And she presents her ideas in a springy vernacular. While most people think of Benton's life work as the murals painted for places such as the New School for Social Research, the Missouri State Capitol, and the Truman Library, Marling argues that the heart of his work can be found in the more lively drawings and studies, almost all of them made on the road. Following a biographical essay that cuts back and forth across time (starting with the day of the artist's death), Marling writes with affectionate detail about 20 groups of thematically related sketches, their subjects ranging from farmers to churchgoers to city gangsters to Midwestern businessmen. Indeed, she makes clear that Benton had no restricted regionalist vision, that his topics are more properly understood as, in his own words, "a conglomerate of things experienced in America."

What accounts for the growing popularity of science writing—of books by, among other scientist-authors, John Gribbin, E. O. Wilson, Lewis Thomas, Peter Medawar, and the two under present consideration? Perhaps it is because the best of such prose, by depicting the play of reason, offers intellectual solace in a world much beleaguered by conflicting, irrational "isms." Weisman, a physician at Bellevue Hospital in New York City, works in the same essayistic vein as Thomas, his more widely known colleague. Often opening with an anecdote (a visit to the criminal ward of the hospital, a medical conference in Berlin, the treatment of a "bag lady"), he proceeds to some larger point about medi-
cine, or biology, or the relationship between science and society. The bag lady essay, for instance, ends up as a spirited defense of mental asylums against "trendy" intellectual critics (e.g., historian Michel Foucault) who typically portray them, says Weismann, as "elements of a police state designed to censor the self-expression of the mad." Weismann's target is, quite often, the extremist; indeed, his essays are a sustained hymn to the Archimedean ideal—measure in all things.

Likewise the essays of Harvard paleontologist Gould. Writing about the work of the biologist Ernest Everett Just, Gould explains how the best scientists work between the extremes of "mechanism" (the belief that life is reducible to its physical-chemical properties) and "vitalism" (the somewhat mystical notion that some vital principle endows matter with life). Science, Gould repeatedly shows, is the search for testable hypotheses; faulty science, such as that practiced by creationists, is marked by the unverifiability of its premises. Sorting out the uses and abuses of science, Gould recalls the careers of some of its lesser known yet fascinating practitioners: the Reverend William Buckland of Oxford (1784–1856) proposed and then, after fieldwork, rejected the theory that Noah's flood formed the earth's uppermost layers of loam and gravel; the naturalist Philip Henry Gosse (1810–88) argued that God had given the original types of all species the "appearance of pre-existence" (e.g., Adam was given a navel). Gould often brings the scientist's methods to nonscientific matters. To account for the disappearance of the .400 hitter in baseball, for example, he points to a tendency observable in the history of biological species: Trends in extremes result from systematic changes in amounts of variation. In the case of baseball, a decrease in the variation of batting averages has resulted in the demise of the extreme, the Ty Cobb slugger. Gould tells about the extinction of another creature, the dinosaur—the outcome, most likely, of a comet shower some 65 million years ago. The author's eclecticism and clarity have long attracted readers to his column in Natural History, where most of these pieces first appeared.

Death almost certainly made Gen. George Armstrong Custer (1839–76) into a hero, “an American Siegfried,” as biographer Connell dubs him. Without his dramatic demise at the Little Bighorn in the summer of 1876, his reputation would have rested on a number of dubious distinctions: graduation at the bottom of his West Point class; a reputation for “berserk” cavalry charges during the Civil War; strained relations with his peers and superiors; and extravagant vanity (expressed in buckskin coats, gold-laced trousers, cherry neckties, and his flowing reddish-gold curls). Connell neither vilifies nor romanticizes his subject; instead, he assembles the various and often conflicting accounts into a carefully considered whole. He also trots forth the huge supporting cast—soldiers and scouts, journalists and politicians, and, most colorful, Custer’s truly larger-than-life Indian adversaries. Connell offers a picture of the Old West that is fascinating in its bleak everydayness, a world “stupendously dull, and when it was not … murderous.”


If abstract art owes its origins to any one artist, it owes them to Wassily Kandinsky (1866–1944), the Russian-born painter who combined bright colors, bold lines, and irregular shapes in works bearing little resemblance to observed nature. Weiss, an art historian at Syracuse University, traces Kandinsky’s style to the two decades he spent in Munich around the turn of the century. In the ateliers and salons of the city’s bohemian district, Kandinsky, an erstwhile lawyer, mingled with Thomas Mann, Richard Strauss, and other notables. But what attracted him most was the city’s Jugendstil (youth style) movement, with its “reverence for the painting as a work of art … without reference to the real world.” With such works as “Improvisation XIV” (1910), he became known as the “artist who wanted to paint pictures without objects.” Weiss’s well-documented analysis clarifies Kandinsky’s artistic evolution. It also shows how Munich, in the early 1900s, gained its reputation as the “Athens on the Isar.”

WATERLAND. By Graham Swift. Washington Square, 1984. 270 pp. $6.95

The Fens of east England serve novelist Graham Swift as Yoknapatawpha County served William Faulkner: less as a geographical backdrop than as an active force shaping people’s lives. The history of the Fens—the mighty reclamation projects, the periodic floodings, the rise and fall of local family dynasties—emerges in the elaborate rendering of what is, in effect, a murder mystery. The narrator, a history teacher soon to be sacked from his job at a London comprehensive school, begins his story with the appearance of a dead body at the lock tended by his father. A score of dark questions arise. The narrator then delves into his family’s past, itself a tale riddled by mysteries: Why, for instance, did his mother, descendant of the powerful local brewing family, marry his father, a World War I veteran of humbler stock? Mysteries ramify but ultimately lead, as in all Gothic novels (including Faulkner’s), to a secret at the center of the family house. But a final question lingers after the end of the narrative: Does knowledge of the past comfort or weaken those who seek it?
HEMINGWAY

Stalking Papa's Ghost

Long before his suicide in 1961, Ernest Miller Hemingway had become the subject of a sizable scholarly/journalistic enterprise. His death, however, gave the Hemingway "industry" new direction and added impetus: Why, biographers asked, had the great novelist taken his own life? Two of the more extensive explanations were offered by A. E. Hotchner (Papa Hemingway, 1966) and Carlos Baker (Ernest Hemingway: A Life Story, 1969). Curiosity about Hemingway waned during the 1970s, perhaps reflecting the younger Woodstock Generation's flight from machismo and stoic self-control. But a revival recently has been in the works. No fewer than five reputable biographies, including Peter Griffin's revealing study of Hemingway's formative years, have appeared during the past two years. Here, on the 25th anniversary of Hemingway's death, critic Frank McConnell considers Papa's lasting influence on some of America's foremost writers.

by Frank McConnell

Nineteen forty-four was not Ernest Hemingway's best year.

In Europe to cover the last stages of the Allied struggle against Hitler, the foremost American novelist of his time was lurching between bravery and silliness in a way that boded ill for the remainder of his career.

Carlos Baker records that by the middle of the year, "after nearly a week of sticking his neck out, said Ernest, his only present war aim was 'to get to Paris without being shot.'" It was a singularly unglorious ambition for a man who had made the profession of risk almost the distinctive American pose of the 1920s and '30s. Just as the First World War made Hemingway a serious writer, so the Second World War marked the end of Hemingway's moment. Or at least appeared to do so.

While Hemingway was attempting to reach Paris without getting shot, a new talent in American letters, Saul Bellow, was publishing his first novel, Dangling Man (1944). It is the fictionalized journal of Joseph, a Chicago-based intellectual and agonized draft resister, a sensitive man who cannot even decide if he should enter the war to which Hemingway gave himself so enthusiastically. And it begins with what is essentially a refutation of the entire Hemingway mystique:
There was a time when people were in the habit of addressing themselves frequently and felt no shame at making a record of their inward transactions. But to keep a journal nowadays is considered a kind of self-indulgence, a weakness, and in poor taste. For this is an era of hard-boiled dom. Today, the code of the athlete, of the tough boy—an American inheritance, I believe, from the English gentleman—that curious mixture of striving, asceticism, and rigor, the origins of which some trace back to Alexander the Great—is stronger than ever. Do you have feelings? There are correct and incorrect ways of indicating them. Do you have an inner life? It is nobody's business but your own. Do you have emotions? Strangle them. To a degree, everyone obeys this code.
In retrospect, there is something a little too severe about Bellow's sendup of the "tough boy." Much of our contemporary sense of Hemingway, after all, is precisely a sense of how far from tough he really was. Philip Young was probably the first critic to demonstrate what great self-doubt and vulnerability underlay that charade of macho.*

But now we do not even need Young. We have the suicide. With the knowledge of that act, we can see that Nick Adams, Jake Barnes, Frederic Henry, Robert Jordan, and the whole Hemingway crew were always, in one way or another, weak men compensating desperately for their weakness.

Hemingway himself was a weak man—and sad because he knew that he was. His bluster, his bullying, his loud adventurism were a mask for a deep-seated insecurity. He was a miles gloriosus, a braggart soldier who could be taken as a figure of fun.

But, I would suggest, Hemingway managed to be all those absurd, laughable things and also to be something else, something permanently valuable for American letters.

He managed also to be a hero of consciousness, a writer and a stylist who made his cowardice, and his knowledge of his cowardice, the very stuff of his heroism and his endurance.

Bellow perceptively identifies the hard-boiled pose as "an American inheritance ... from the English gentleman—that curious mixture of striving, asceticism, and rigor." It might have been even more perceptive to substitute "English dandy" for "English gentleman." Like Lord Byron, Hemingway was a dandy—an ostentatious, elegantly vulgar man who made his insecure egotism the subject of his art. And like all valuable members of the sect (e.g., Charles Baudelaire, Oscar Wilde, T. E. Lawrence), Hemingway showed us something of the cost, as well as the value, of the dandy's pose.

For pose is precisely what the dandy does. The dandy values style above substance because he finds the world of substances empty, void, a sham. This is the Byronic abyss of cynicism, this is Lawrence's profound despair at politics, and this is Hemingway's celebrated nada. The dandy confuses the life and the work: He loves to show off, loves to be sketched or photographed in the various poses and costumes of his dandyism. See the portrait of Byron in Albanian garb or the photos of Hemingway, smiling over dead buffalo, in white-hunter slouch hat and khaki.

**Courting Nada**

The dandy also loves war for the same reason that he loves stylized brutality: because war is stylized brutality, the absolute triumph of technique over value. But the dandy loves war as he loves everything else: ironically.

"Abstract words such as glory, honor, courage, or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of regiments and the dates." That is Frederic Henry in perhaps the most frequently quoted passage from Hemingway's *A Farewell to Arms* (1929). Byronic romantic that he was, Hemingway believed in this wounded emptiness before he ever saw it manifested in the war. But he welcomed the war—and became its

*In Ernest Hemingway: A Reconsideration (1966).

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HEMINGWAY

Chief elegiac voice—just because it was the manifestation of the nada he carried inside himself. That gift of irony, that sublime hollowness, is his bequest to later American writers.

From Code-Hero to Hipster

Critic Harold Bloom has recently observed, in Agon (1982), that the chief genius of the American writer is for loneliness, for an isolation from his fellows and from the great tradition either imposed upon or earned by him. Bloom does not discuss Hemingway in this connection. Yet the observation seems nowhere more pointed than in Hemingway's case.

For if every artist, in good Freudian fashion, must kill or castrate his artistic father before he can begin to function on his own, then Hemingway is certainly the symbolic father of almost all him. The man who was called—and who liked to be called—"Papa" could certainly expect his share of literary-filial rebellion.

If the 1950s belonged to the rebellious sons of Hemingway, the two succeeding decades belonged largely to his more faithful inheritors. The dandy—the American dandy—may have gone temporarily out of favor. But give us an endless war; give us a real national moral vacuity; give us a mass-marketed nada adequate to express the full purposelessness of rational life—and watch dandyism once again rear its handsome, ironic, smiling head. So, at any rate, it proved to be with Hemingway, Vietnam, and the years just after mid-century.

The faithful son par excellence, the one who attempts to carry on Papa's ways, is of course Norman Mailer.

Here is Mailer in the early 1960s, reviewing Morley Callaghan's memoir of Hemingway, That Summer in Paris (1963). Callaghan relates how he once knocked down Hemingway in a boxing match refereed by F. Scott Fitzgerald. Mailer defends Hemingway's chagrin at the knockout, writing:

It is possible Hemingway lived every day of his life in the style of the suicide. What a great dread is that. It is the dread which sits in the silences of his short declarative sentences. At any instant, by any failure of magic, by a mean defeat, by a moment of cowardice, Hemingway could be thrust back again into the agonizing demands of his courage. For the life of his talent must have depended on living in a psychic terrain where one must either be brave beyond one's limit, or sink deeper into a bad illness, or, indeed, by the ultimate logic of the suicide, must advance the hour in which one would make another reconnaissance into one's death.

If Bellow is a little cruel in his parody of the tough boy, Mailer is surely too adulatory in his description of that physical and psychic vanity. But what is significant is the way both writers use Hemingway—the image of the man as well as the image of the books—to define their own stylistic identity. Bellow's suave disdain for the cult of the literary bully is virtually a précis of the wry, humane academicism that marks his best fiction. And Mailer's romanticism, his rhetorical pumping for Papa, is not just a defense but an assumption of the Hemingway voice.

"What a great dread is that," he writes. The sentence is clumsy, inelegant, until we realize that Mailer is writing Hemingwayesque. For it is just the sort of thing one of the peasants in For Whom the Bell Tolls (1940) might say. When in doubt, teaches the aesthetics of dandyism, write awkwardly.

Awkwardness is not just the earnest mark of sincerity; it is also the badge of the improviser. It is the shoestring catch, the nearly perfect veronica, the almost—but not quite—flawless jazz solo whose very failure of elegance is a
new kind of elegance. Byron may well have invented this transcendental clumsiness in the headlong improvisation of Don Juan (1821). But Hemingway turned it into the very basis of his style, and Mailer, his most faithful son, has made it a lingua franca in postwar American writing.

If Hemingway invented the "code-hero" whose measured hedonism was an island of sanity and control in a mad world, Mailer invents (or at least patents) the hipster as the logical extension of the code-hero. The difference—and it is a serious difference—is that the hipster chooses to live much closer to the ragged edge of neurosis, that very edge the code-hero spends so much of his time evading.

There is no equivalent, in recent American fiction, to the bitter but lyrical pastoralism of Hemingway's "The Big Two-Hearted River" (1925) or even of his posthumously published Islands in the Stream (1970). But the closest approach to it is Mailer's Why Are We in Vietnam? (1967), where the narrator, D.J., a manic and scatological Nick Adams, tells us of his crazy hunting expedition before his enlistment in the Army. Here, however, the solaces of nature have all turned ugly, parodic: Mailer may trust the irony of the Hemingway voice, but he cannot bring himself to trust its capacity for limited joy.

A larger irony surfaces here. While Mailer assimilates the bluster, the toughness, the outrageousness, and the suicidal risk of the style, it is Bellow—Bellow the anti-tough boy—who seems to have assimilated most successfully the hopefulness that runs through Hemingway's work. When Herzog cries out, in the midst of the novel named after him, "We owe the void a human life," it is difficult not to hear echoes of The Old Man and the Sea (man may be destroyed, but never defeated) and any number of earlier, similar utterances against nada.

High Culture . . .

Hemingway, as writer and as presence, has had a powerful influence on writers who have come after him—not only on Bellow and Mailer, and not only on creators of High Culture. Like Byron in his own day, Hemingway has had, in our century, at least as important an influence on so-called popular culture as he has on so-called serious writing. His short story, "The Killers," from In Our Time (1925), has provided a title and at least the bare bones of a script for two excellent gangster films (one directed by Robert Siodmak, 1946; the other directed by Don Siegel, 1964).

But beyond this explicit influence, it
is also evident that both Hemingway and the Hemingway style have exercised a strong, probably determinative, effect on the whole course of the American detective story in both film and literature.

...And Pop Culture

Dashiell Hammett and Raymond Chandler are usually credited as the originators of the American or "hard-boiled" style of detective writing. But, as the term "hard-boiled" may indicate, both Hammett and Chandler—and their contemporary heirs, Ross Macdonald, John D. MacDonald, Lawrence Sanders, and Stuart Kaminsky—would not really be possible without Hemingway. Indeed, the Hemingway hero is, by and large, the classic American hard-boiled private eye; the prose style that goes along with this peculiar figure is, by and large, the prose style Hemingway developed for a very different kind of character: the wounded, disillusioned veteran of World War I.

"Doctors did things to you and then it was not your body any more," thinks Frederic Henry in A Farewell to Arms. "The head was mine, and the inside of the belly. It was very hungry in there. I could feel it turn over on itself. The head was mine, but not to use, not to think with, only to remember and not too much remember."

"Only to remember and not too much remember"—that may be the distinctive definition of the Hemingway style. At its best, that style places a screen of words, a screen of short, ritualistically declarative sentences between the narrator-perceiver of the action and the terrible, tragic quality of the action itself. Jake Barnes is impotent; Frederic Henry does fail to make a "separate peace"; Robert Jordan does die needlessly.

It is a universe of defeat and disillusionment, and yet that telegraphic style—what Mailer calls the "dread" sitting in his short declarative sentences—almost reconciles us to the horror, since it all but masks the horror within an ironic, primitive, unremembering articulation.

The Hemingway style is a direct equivalent of the celebrated "code" of the Hemingway hero. Both are deliberate reductions of the flux of life to the dimensions of an elaborate game—the one in the world of behavior, the other in the world of utterance. That is precisely the tone of the classic American detective story, whether in film or in literature. It is a deliberate unremembering: a recapitulation of the violent past that filters the horror of the past—the horror of betrayal, of failure, of psychic impotence—through obsessive, descriptive detail.

A Separate Peace

In American film this is the tradition of the film noir, from classics of the 1940s such as The Maltese Falcon (1941) and Double Indemnity (1944) to recent attempts at recapturing that special tone in films such as The Godfather (1971), Chinatown (1974), and Body Heat (1981). All of these films celebrate a certain tender cynicism, a bullet-biting disengagement that enables one to survive the ravages of time with something like dignity.

That is the Hemingway tradition at its most popular—and perhaps at its most dangerous. The self-advertising "toughness" deliberately eschewed by a Bellow and self-consciously reassumed by a Mailer can also be adopted at its most vulgar and arrogant pitch of machismo. No one, for example, could seriously argue that the popularity of the Hemingway hero is directly responsible for America's venture into Vietnam. But, on the other hand, one could argue that the Hemingway vision is symptomatic of a certain strain of ir-
THE DOCTOR'S SON

Morley Callaghan once recalled that his friend Ernest Hemingway "couldn't walk down the street and stub his toe without having a newsman who happened to be walking with him magnify the little accident into a near fatality." The remark, while apt, is not completely fair. If Hemingway had press appeal, it was because he so often did what most people only dream about doing.

Yet that extraordinary life began in the most conventional of circumstances. Born in suburban Oak Park, Illinois, on July 21, 1899, the son of a doctor and a devout, musically gifted mother, he showed, even as a lanky youth, a keen interest in hunting and fishing, sports, and storytelling. Educated in the local public schools, Hemingway achieved local notoriety by writing sports stories and Ring Lardneresque pieces for his high school newspaper, the Trapeze. He did not go on to college.

Instead, in 1917 Hemingway went to the Kansas City Star, where, working as a police reporter, he saw another side of life—the world of bums and small-time gangsters. Although he learned a great deal during his six months at the Star ("Use short sentences," advised the paper's style manual), the lure of war in Europe was too great for the young man to stay put. From a friend, Hemingway heard about the volunteer Red Cross Ambulance Driving Corps, and in May 1918, he set off for Italy.

Action came quickly. On the night of July 8, 1918, while he was handing out supplies to Italian troops in the trenches of the Piave front, an Austrian artillery shell landed close by. Stunned by the explosion and peppered by shrapnel, Hemingway hoisted one of the wounded soldiers onto his shoulders and headed for the nearest command post. On the way, he was caught in machine gun fire and was shot in the knee, but he still managed to hobble to safety.

The word quickly got out: The first American had been wounded in Italy. Upon his return to the States on January 21, 1919, Hemingway was besieged by reporters. The Chicago American came out with a story declaring that he was "the worst shot-up man in the U.S."

Back in Oak Park, the young veteran felt at loose ends. He may have been a victim of what is today called the post-traumatic stress syndrome, but he was also brooding about the work that he wanted to accomplish. For a time he withdrew, fishing in northern Michigan, perhaps sketching drafts of the
Hemingway

stories that would later constitute his first book. He also began to pester the Toronto Star for assignments and soon ended up writing for a weekly section of the newspaper.

In 1921, after marrying Hadley Richardson, a native of St. Louis, Missouri, Hemingway returned to Europe. "Paris," as Sherwood Anderson put it, "was the place for a serious writer." Hemingway quickly fell in with fellow expatriates such as Ezra Pound, Gertrude Stein, and F. Scott Fitzgerald, supporting himself with journalistic pieces for the Toronto Star. But the publication of his first book, In Our Time in 1925, revealed that Hemingway was no hack. The creative outpouring of the next five years confirmed his literary standing: The Sun Also Rises and The Torrents of Spring appeared in 1926, Men without Women in 1927, and A Farewell to Arms in 1929, mostly to rave reviews. Time magazine said that The Sun Also Rises "fulfills the prophecies that his most excited admirers have made."

The Hemingway mystique grew apace. Here was a writer who had seen combat, a skilled outdoorsman who went after marlin in the Gulf Stream and big game in the highlands of Africa. Here also was a decent amateur boxer, an aficionado of bullfighting (Death in the Afternoon appeared in 1932), and a carouser who could out-drink and out-talk all comers. Maintaining the image had its cost, of course. Hemingway divorced Hadley in 1927 and married a Vogue editor, Pauline Pfeiffer, the following year. And by the middle of the 1930s, some critics complained that the celebrity was overtaking the artist. Reviewing To Have and Have Not (1937), one critic dubbed its "shocking lapses from professional skill."

But war was always a kind of tonic for Hemingway, and he eagerly went to Spain in 1937 to cover that country's brutal civil conflict. The two-year experience bore fruit. For Whom the Bell Tolls (1940) was a critical and popular success. But the literary comeback did not bring domestic tranquility. "Papa" changed mates again in 1940. This time he married Martha Gellhorn, a novelist and reporter for Collier's whom he had met in Key West, Florida, and after whom he modeled the character Dorothy Bridges in his Spanish Civil War play, The Fifth Column (1938).

The last two decades of Hemingway's life were years of renown. His face, according to the International Celebrity Register, was as well known as "the countenance of Clark Gable or Ted Williams." He continued to score literary triumphs (the publication of The Old Man and the Sea in Life magazine in 1952; the Nobel Prize in 1954) and to enjoy the outdoor life in Cuba and the American West. Mostly from afar, he watched his three children grow up. Yet several things boded ill, including his antics while covering the last year of World War II in Europe. Across the River and into the Trees (1950) was universally panned. And he went through yet another divorce and remarriage (to Time's Mary Welsh, in 1946). Little is known about his private torment. Papa was a stoic to the end. All that is known is that on July 2, 1961, in Ketchum, Idaho, he put a double-barreled shotgun to his temple and pulled both triggers.

Eulogies came from every corner of the globe, from statesmen as well as from fellow writers. But his generation's sense of loss was perhaps best summed up in a tribute from the Louisville Courier-Journal: "It is almost as though the Twentieth Century itself has come to an end."
responsibility, of cruelty, of dangerously arrested adolescence that is a permanent flaw in human character and a fatal flaw of empires.

There are clear dangers to incarnating the myth too well. Hemingway's irony ensured that his own books never became the cartoons of toughness they might have been; they also ensured that writers like Hammett and Chandler would retain, under his influence, that saving irony. But here is Mickey Spillane, another heir to the hard-boiled tradition, describing the final shoot-out in One Lonely Night (1951):

There was only the guy in the pork-pie hat who made a crazy try for a gun in his pocket. I aimed the tommy gun for the first time and took his arm off at the shoulder. It dropped on the floor next to him and I let him have a good look at it. He couldn't believe it happened. I proved it by shooting him in the belly.

They were all so damned clever! It could almost be a satire of Hemingway, the prose is so unmistakable in its provenance. And the very great moral ugliness of the passage is an indication of one of the risks of the style. For here, to remember and not too much remember means to be, effectively, an ethical moron. The "dread" has departed from the silences between the sentences, that dread that indicates the tension of irretrievable loss. What remains in its place is human emptiness. The style devised as a shield against nada has become the voice of nada.

Fearing History

What are we to make, then, of Hemingway's continuing presence in our writing? I have called him a hero of consciousness and have said that his measured, ironic despair shines—or darkens—through all his major successors. I have also said that the cruder aspects of his vision have become components of a childish mythography of moral irresponsibility. Where is the final shape of the man then?

According to critic Leslie Fiedler, writing during the early 1960s, the final shape of the man was precisely the shape of that contradiction. Fiedler's Waiting for the End (1964) is a dazzlingly intelligent survey of American fiction of the 1950s and early '60s, and over all the survey broods the shadow of Hemingway as both prophet and fool. Fiedler is not only one of the most perceptive of American critics but probably also the American critic closest in tone, spirit, and style to Papa. Writing of the suicide, he can lie even more romantic than Mailer:

One quarry was left him only, the single beast he had always had it in his power to destroy, the single beast worthy of him: himself. . . . With a single shot he redeemed his best work from his worst, his vision of truth from the lies of his adulators.

Eloquent, one thinks. But is not this kind of prose itself the prose of "one of his adulators"? A glance back at 1944, and Bellow's sardonic comments on the cult of the hunter-dandy, can remind us how contagious and how misleading the hard-boiled style of perception can be. No suicide, to speak bluntly, ever "redeems" anything.

Nevertheless, Fiedler is right about Hemingway's importance for the generation of "apocalyptic" young writers who were beginning to emerge during the early 1960s. If Mailer was the godfather of such sensibilities as Robert Coover, Kurt Vonnegut, and Thomas Pynchon, then Hemingway was their great-godfather. These then-young men were all, in one way or another, influenced not just by the American literary tradition but by the American adventure in Vietnam, that nightmare of
misguided honor and misdirected heroics that may prove to be the single most important psychic event of American life in the 20th century. Fiedler, writing in 1963—before he could have known what Vietnam would ultimately mean—described its meaning, and its relevance to the Hemingway vision, perfectly:

We inhabit for the first time a world in which men begin wars knowing that their avowed ends will not be accomplished, a world in which it is more and more difficult to believe that the conflicts we cannot avert are in any sense justified. And in such a world... all who make what Hemingway was the first to call 'a separate peace'... become a new kind of anti-heroic hero.

Well, not particularly a "new" kind of anti-heroic hero, but certainly an important kind. What Fiedler suggests here is of some importance: that the callow, frightened, diffidently revolutionary members of the youth movement of the Vietnam years may have been, one and all, the spiritual heirs of Frederic Henry and Jake Barnes. They, too, discovered that public expediency and private morality might be in contradiction.

"Only to remember and not too much remember": Of course public expediency and private morality have never been necessarily congruent, at least since the dilemma of Achilles in the Iliad, and that is one of the things the Hemingway vision does not remember—or conveniently forgets. But there is something more significant in that observation than mere historical ignorance. There is historical ignorance by choice. It is not too much to say of Hemingway that he invented a whole new way of, a whole new justification for, hating and fearing history.

And here again Hemingway's archetypical Americanness is evident. Hating and fearing history has always been an American disease. Alexis de Tocqueville isolated and identified the strain virtually before there was an American literature, and American literature and American foreign policy since Tocqueville have, by and large, supported his diagnosis. For all of Hemingway's major characters, history is the arena of defeat, and their styles of being and their forms of self-expression are ways of escaping its central horror.

But if this studied forgetfulness, this fear of history, has its debilitating and cynical consequences, it also has its peculiar spiritual rewards. Hemingway forgot history, escaped from history, to make "a separate peace," which is the separate peace of his vision and most specially of his ironic style.
His great countertype in early 20th-century American literature, William Faulkner, contemplated no such escape. Obsessed as he was by history and by the inescapability of guilt, Faulkner's mythic Southern landscape and narrative style are so perfectly the opposite of Hemingway's that it is difficult not to regard the two writers as manifestations of some deep-seated dichotomy in the human mind.

Vonnegut's Parables

Yet for all the power of his best work, Faulkner has not been the perennial presence in later writing that Hemingway has. One might have expected that the 1960s and '70s, from Vietnam and Watergate on, would have had the effect of a newly historicized sensibility for our best storytellers. But it has not been so. The Frederic Henry vision of the separate peace, the code-aesthetics of the dropout and the deserter, the dandy's solution of style as a counterpoint to the horror of history—these have been, in one way or another, the shape of the best American fiction of those years.

Kurt Vonnegut, the most accessible and the most "popular" of the young novelists to emerge in the 1960s, is also the most recognizably Hemingway-esque. His best books—The Sirens of Titan (1959), Slaughterhouse Five (1969), Breakfast of Champions, (1973), and Jailbird (1979)—are bitter little parables about the brutality of human beings, the impermanence of love, and the impossibility of any metaphysical solution to the ultimate nada.

But against that gloomy prognosis Vonnegut poses the solace of an often childishy simple style, and childishy simple pity for the human condition, that is not without its grace and its effect. Vonnegut is fond of inserting himself, as narrator, into his fictions: commenting on his own reactions to the plot in what at first looks like the manner of William Thackeray or the early Charles Dickens.

Desperate Dandyism

After a while we realize that this technique owes less to the Victorians than it does to the urge to remember, but not too much remember. For Vonnegut has really transformed himself into the sensibility of Nick Adams in Hemingway's "The Big Two-Hearted River." That is, wounded and saddened by the chaos of his age, Vonnegut retreats to fiction the way Nick retreats to the pastoral of nature. His simplicities are disingenuous simplicities, and all the more affecting for that, since they are chosen and held precisely to make a separate peace with his times.

Slaughterhouse Five, perhaps his finest novel, is not only an exceptionally original war novel but an extraordinary recreation of the spirit of Hemingway's response to war. As Vonnegut tells us in the introduction (which is, of course, an essential part of the fiction itself), the novel is written to allow him to come to terms with his own personal experience of apocalypse, his witnessing, as a prisoner of war, the Allied firebombing of Dresden at the end of the Second World. He frankly admits that he feels incapable of any adequate response to the horror he witnessed. And then he invents an elaborate, absurdist science-fiction plot to encompass that horror.

Many critics have faulted Slaughterhouse Five—and Vonnegut in general—for "frivolity" in his tales. But, as this and his other novels make clear, the frivolity is precisely the strong moral point of the work. It is a frivolity chosen, as the reductiveness of the Hemingway style is chosen, because any attempt to confront the unspeakable in terms of conventional "moral seriousness" is foredoomed to trivialize the
enormity of horror by its very pretense to "explaining." It is, in other words, dandyism—dandyism of the most desperate sort.

Other important writers of the same period reflect the same escape into style, and the same deep sense of style as a last resort against chaos. I have mentioned Robert Coover; but Donald Barthelme, John Barth, John Gardner, and even the poet John Ashbery could be added to that list of literary dandies. It is unusual, of course, to regard something such as the immense, self-conscious fictions of Barth or the tantalizingly gnomic riddles of Ashbery as Hemingwayesque. But in the context we have been describing, I think it is possible to see how that is, indeed, the case. Other "influences"—18th-century English fiction, studies in comparative mythology, continental theories of the "new novel"—are surely more evident than the Hemingway influence in works such as Barth's The Sot-Weed Factor (1960), or Ashbery's Houseboat Days (1970), than the Hemingway influence. But, as with Vonnegut and as with the later work of Mailer, the Hemingway presence here goes beyond considerations of literary influence.

All these writers have assimilated the writerly persona of Hemingway, that is, the ironist, the dandified stylist of chaos, the storyteller as survivor of history. And none—excepting, of course, Mailer—has approached the public persona; that is, these writers are remarkably anonymous except in their books, remarkably shy about the sort of high visibility Hemingway made so much a part of his career.

Keeping Cool

If indeed there are two Hemingways, the self-aggrandizing man and the writer who was a hero of consciousness, it may be fair to say that his heirs have learned an important lesson that he never learned: how to keep the two separate. And they have learned it, of course, from his example.

The work of Thomas Pynchon is the best and richest place to track Hemingway's ghost. (Pynchon is also one of the most "invisible" of contemporary novelists.) His two massive novels, V (1963) and Gravity's Rainbow (1973), and his novella, The Crying of Lot 49 (1966), may be among the most important works of fiction produced in America after the Second World War. They are certainly the most apocalyptic.

Pynchon's vision is paranoid. His is a world presided over by giant cartels and international war machines whose grand design is to turn human beings into mere mechanisms. It is a vision of entropy that closely resembles Joseph Heller's vision of the war in Catch-22 (1961), except that its grimness is more unrelenting and its comedy even
HEMINGWAY

blacker. And it is a vision that is directly inherited from Hemingway. In the same paragraph of A Farewell to Arms where Frederic Henry reflects on not too much remembering, he meditates on the surgery that has been performed on his knee:

Valentini had done a fine job.... It was his knee all right. The other knee was mine. Doctors did things to you and then it was not your body any more. The head was mine, and the inside of the belly. It was very hungry in there.

This very famous Hemingway passage could serve as an epigraph for all of Pynchon's fiction and for all of the recent fiction we have been examining. Life is increasingly encroached upon by the technologies of war and healing, both of which have the effect of robbing life of its vitality; the only escape from that warfare is into the neutral Switzerland of "the head and the inside of the belly."

Pynchon's heroes, more than any we have examined, are the contemporary reincarnations of this mode. Benny Profane in V, Oedipa Maas in Lot 49, Tyrone Slothrop in Gravity's Rainbow—all are weaklings, wounded and put-upon losers who are shocked into rebellion and a separate peace by the discovery that they are being turned into someone else's creation.

Their retreat is into style, into canniness—what Mailer would have called "hip"—and into the kind of bitter, end-of-the-world charity that also characterizes the best of Hemingway throughout his career. In V, the jazz musician McClintic Sphere articulates, in a brief scene, what may be the summary statement of the dandy's ironic humanism: "Keep cool, but care." And in the toughness and tenderness of that short line one hears echoes of all the sensibilities we have been examining, all with Papa at the center.

No final assessment of the Hemingway presence can really be made, of course. This has been a century of the triumph of partial visions, all of which have left their mark on what comes after. But Hemingway more than any other American novelist of the age represented and lived the vocation of art as risk, as a deliberate gamble with one's chances for sanity in a mad world. And in that he became something much larger and subtler than an influence for the most serious American writers of the postwar years. His ghost, the ghost of his finest perceptions and strongest acts of literary courage, is a very quiet ghost indeed. Its rumblings are an inescapable part of the splendid dissonance that is contemporary American fiction.
We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer’s telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editors’ requests for comment.

**Splitting the Atom, Not the Country**

William Lanouette’s excellent article, "Atomic Energy, 1945–1985" [WQ, Winter 1985], implies a political question of the profoundest sort: Can a participatory democratic society based on Jeffersonian federalism (the United States), as opposed to Jacobin centralism (France), succeed with technologies such as nuclear energy that pose risks as well as confer benefits?

Mr. Lanouette suggests that the answer to this question is not clear. Certainly the travail suffered by nuclear energy in the United States is far greater than that experienced in most other countries. My own recipes for creating The Second Nuclear Era (1985)—improved light water reactors that embody inherent safety, centralized siting, more powerful utilities—may work. Our nation ought to pursue these possibilities as a matter of high policy. Even these steps may not suffice in the face of our post-Vietnam loss of confidence in government, our irrational overconcern for environmentally induced illness (despite a continuing improvement in life expectancy), and our noisy, self-appointed guardians of the public interest.

What is being tested is whether nuclear technology can coexist with open, participatory, decentralized democracy. Were I forced to make a choice between the two, I would choose our society, even if it meant giving up nuclear energy. As a technological optimist, I continue to believe that with the aforementioned fixes, nuclear energy can be successful even in our open, uninhibited America.

**Judging the Soviets**

To anyone familiar with Soviet reality, the excellent descriptions of it provided by your authors ring true ["Soviet Life," WQ, Autumn 1985]. The more immediate question is whether these conditions really spell serious domestic difficulties. In the eyes of many Western observers, they do; some even believe that they pose a threat to the regime’s survival in the form of active popular discontent.

Most societies rest on a combination of consent and coercion, of interest and habit, of national pride and loyalty, and can survive on that basis for a long time. By the mid-19th century, the Russia of the tsars was universally recognized to be a “colossus with feet of clay.” Yet with all its problems and discontent, it lasted until a major war in 1917 knocked down its foundations. And there are vastly greater numbers of people in the Soviet Union than there were in tsarist Russia who are tied to the system by powerful bonds of interest and privilege—in the party and the government, in the economy and the military.

One should be careful about judging the resilience of a country’s social and political fabric and not make the mistake some critics of contemporary America have made, like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who sees in our troubles the “telltale symptoms by which history gives warning to a threatened or perishing society.”

**The Age of Jackson**

Harry L. Watson’s essay ["Old Hickory’s Democracy," WQ, Autumn 1985] is an intelligent and discriminating synthesis of the historical literature on Andrew Jackson. I note with interest the abandonment of the view, influential a generation ago, that Jackson was the great champion of entrepreneurial capitalism. Mr. Watson is quite correct in emphasizing the opposite view: that Jackson took from the tradition of civic republicanism a conviction of the corrupting effects of commerce, especially paper-money banking, on republican virtue.
THE FLUORIDATION WARS (cont.)

Fluoridation of public drinking water, as historian Donald R. McNeil noted in "America's Longest War: The Fight over Fluoridation, 1950-" (WQ, Summer 1985), provokes considerable passion among its foes. Some of our readers made this clear. Dr. John R. Lee, of Mill Valley, California, for example, denies Mr. McNeil's statement that he supports the notion that fluoride causes AIDS. "I have never made that statement," he writes, but adds, "Considering . . . the fact that AIDS's incidence is so much higher in fluoridated cities than in similar unfluoridated ones I see no reason for this possible relationship to be dismissed out of hand."

Paul S. Beeber, president and general counsel of the New York State Coalition Opposed to Fluoridation, said that Mr. McNeil ignored the results of a 1945 Michigan experiment that showed that "[tooth decay in unfluoridated Muskegon children was not significantly different from that in fluoridated Grand Rapids children."

Mr. McNeil's reporting of criticisms of Dr. George L. Waldbott, an early foe of fluoridation, was also attacked by Mr. Beeber, who said the article's "denigration" of the Detroit physician was "unconscionable." Mr. Beeber said that upon Dr. Waldbott's death in 1982, he was honored by his peers in the Annals of Allergy and the Journal of Asthma for his "pioneering work" as an allergist and "his extensive clinical research." What Mr. Beeber did not say was that neither journal praised or endorsed Dr. Waldbott's studies of fluoridation, which, according to Dr. M. Coleman Harris of the Annals of Allergy, "have never been widely accepted."

Edith M. Waldbott, the doctor's widow, provided a four-page list of his publications on fluoridation. She concluded, "It is axiomatic that [Dr. Waldbott] did not . . . routinely make 'his dire diagnoses without ever seeing his patients' (pages 147-48)," as alleged in the mid-1950s by a Milwaukee city health commissioner.

Mr. Watson is also correct in emphasizing that Jackson did not see government as the threat to liberty. His concern was rather with the use of government by the rich to strengthen aristocracy and monopoly. The Jeffersonians 40 years before were far more suspicious of the state. "Free government," Jefferson wrote in the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, "is founded in jealousy and not in confidence." But time, and the exercise of power, diminished this fear of the state. Where the original Jeffersonians counted on government to abuse power, Jackson in his farewell address relegated such abuse to the category of "extreme cases, which we have no reason to apprehend in a Government where the power is in the hands of a patriotic people."

Mr. Watson might have given more attention to Jackson's impact on the presidency as an institution. Jackson invented the tribute-of-the-people concept of the presidency. One great significance of the Bank veto lay in its direct appeal to the voters over the heads of Congress. By uncovering hidden resources of power in the executive, Jackson prepared the way for such strong presidencies as those of Lincoln and the two Roosevelts. But, while he believed in presidential power, he also believed in presidential accountability. As he once said, in words no president should be allowed to forget, the president must be "accountable at the bar of public opinion for every act of his Administration."

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
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(signed) Peter Hinson, Editor
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