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THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
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Editor's Comment

In this issue of the Wilson Quarterly, our contributors mark the 20th anniversary of the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Congress sought to end the long, shameful contradiction between racial discrimination and America’s professed ideal of “equal opportunity” for all.

In many ways, massive, if irregular, efforts to translate this act and others into the rapid advance of black Americans have yielded considerable success, as Gary Packer observes. These efforts have also, inevitably, run into contradictions and controversy—most notably over “colorblind” versus “color-conscious” remedies. As Terry Eastland reports, even legal scholars do not now agree on how to define racial “equity.”

Such issues, as William Julius Wilson notes, now seldom affect the daily lives of the black poor. Their condition has long been obscured by the rhetoric of Left and Right. Or, as Wilson points out, by academic taboos. For example, when Daniel P. Moynihan did his prescient analysis of the breakdown of the black family (1965), he was denounced as a racist; thereafter, few scholars, and fewer politicians, publicly discussed the link between the black family’s plight and the persistence of a large welfare-dependent urban “underclass” [see WQ, Summer 1980]; when Wilson himself argued that The Declining Significance of Race (1978) required a stronger focus on urban economic shifts and the persistence of the “rising tide of mediocrity” in the nation’s schools [see WQ, New Year’s 1984].

Racism has not died in America since 1964, our writers suggest, but other phenomena also merit close, dispassionate scholarly attention.

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The King's Ships Were At Sea
The War in the North Sea, August 1914 to February 1915
By James Goldrick

The first history of the period to take a careful and objective look at day-to-day naval events, this study evaluates initial British and German reactions to the challenge of war and examines the impact of new technology on the conduct of operations.

Goldrick analyzes the degree to which each country's navy was able to recognize its own shortcomings and mistakes and remedy them. He views major battles in the context of the overall situation, and shows how these first six months of the Great War were the beginning of modern warfare. By revealing how the British and German commanders performed in such a vastly new environment, Goldrick makes the book especially relevant to contemporary audiences.


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For more than a decade, Democrats and Republicans have searched for ways to shore up their party organizations. A vain exercise, declares Lowi, a Cornell political scientist. The best medicine for both would be a third national political party.

Lowi contends that Americans’ thinking about third parties is muddled by political myths. One article of faith, for example, is that the two-party system is the foundation of American democracy. In fact, from about 1896 until the 1950s, “we were governed by two competing one-party systems.” Democrats dominated the South, Republicans (to a lesser degree) the North. By the time two-party competition was restored, White House political power far exceeded that of the party organizations on Capitol Hill.

Also mistaken is the notion that two-way contests, because they produce clear winners and losers, make for more effective government. In Congress, the majority party rarely votes as one. Except during the brief “honeymoon” early in his first term, no U.S. president can count on his conferees on Capitol Hill to fall in line behind him. Hence, party programs and party labels mean little to voters (30 percent of whom now call themselves “independents”).

How would a third party help? Lowi believes that it “could clarify the policies, programs, and accountability of the two major parties by reducing their need to . . . be all things to all people.” That would not only make parties more cohesive and voters more loyal, but also relieve the president of an impossible burden of public expectations that Lowi feels is partly behind the ignominious exits of our past four chief executives.

Popular fears that a third party would mean political chaos leave Lowi unmoved. So much the better if a third-party presidential candidate won enough votes to deny either of his opponents an electoral college majority and forced the House of Representatives to pick the winner. That would make the president more responsive to Capitol Hill.
Hill. So what if third-party congressmen held the balance of power between the two parties? They would surely reach "across the aisle" and compromise, just as Democrats and Republicans frequently do today.

"Nothing about the present party system warrants our deep respect," Lowi concludes. "Presidents need a party and have none. Voters need choices and have none. Congress needs cohesive policies and has none." Americans ought to get over the notion that the two-party system is "the true and only American way to govern."

Defending Single-Issue Groups

"In Support of 'Single-Issue' Politics" by Sylvia Tesh, in Political Science Quarterly (Spring 1984), 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-0148.

"Single-issue" groups such as the National Rifle Association and the Gay Rights National Lobby don't have many defenders in academe. Yet Tesh, a Yale political scientist, finds it odd that "having a passionate conviction about abortion, disarmament, homosexuality, guns, feminism, tax laws, or the environment" is seen as a political vice.

Single-issue groups, she says, are often viewed as just another "special interest" or "pressure group." But traditional interest groups work for legislation that directly (often economically) benefits their members; membership is open only to certain occupational or ethnic groups. One must be a doctor, for example, to join the American Medical Association, a powerful force on Capitol Hill. "Issue" groups are open to the general public. "Frankly organized around ethical principles," Tesh says, they appeal not to self-interest, but to "moral convictions about the rightness of policies."

"Single issue" may be the wrong tag for such groups, she adds. Usually, they "consider issues concrete examples of abstract principles, and they advance them not only as important policies but also as a means to advance a particular vision of society." Right-to-life advocates, for example, see legalized abortions as a threat not only to unborn children, but to the traditional role of women and to religious belief.

Tesh doubts that issue groups are quite as uncompromising in their views as their detractors suggest. But she also argues that such groups should not compromise too much. After all, they represent ideas, not economic interests, and it is up to them to advocate their positions as forcefully as possible; compromise is the job of legislators, who weigh competing claims and arguments. And unlike traditional interest groups, which are supposed to "bring home the bacon," issue groups are formed to set right what they see as wrong. Settling for half-measures would cost them the loyalty of their members.

The ultimate goal of issue groups, Tesh notes, is "to make what was once the vision of a few become the vision of the many." And while everybody can reel off a list of obnoxious "single-issue" groups, one can also name other groups—antislavery Abolitionists, women suffragettes, black civil-rights activists—whose "tunnel-vision" brought the United States closer to its professed ideals.
Do Nonvoters Really Matter?

Most political scientists see the steady decline in U.S. voter turnout for presidential and congressional elections since the early 1960s as a sign of failing national political health. Ranney, a political scientist at the American Enterprise Institute, is not so sure.

In 1980, only 53 percent of voting-age Americans bothered to go to the polls to elect a president; in 1982, only 38 percent cast ballots in the congressional elections. But, Ranney asks, do the high turnouts in such nations as Venezuela (94 percent), Switzerland (64 percent), or Canada (76 percent) make them better democracies?

The notion that American politics would be radically different if Americans voted at the same rate as, say, Canadians, is also faulty. Public opinion surveys show that nonvoters are no more cynical about the honesty and responsiveness of government officials than are their more conscientious fellow citizens. Moreover, nonvoters' opinions on policy issues, both foreign and domestic, differ very little from those of voters.

A study of the 1980 presidential election showed that the outcome would not have changed even if the groups that had the lowest turnouts—blacks, Hispanics, poor whites—had voted at the same rate as middle-class whites. The additional voters would have added only one-and-a-half percentage points to Jimmy Carter's share of the total.

Voter registration drives have been most effective among blacks, 1.1 million of whom have been added to official voter rosters since 1980. Other targets of such drives are Hispanics and religious fundamentalists.
Ranney concedes that it may be right to worry that Americans who don't vote are "less than full citizens," and that nonvoting is a blemish on "democracy's high ideals." Yet if it is such a major ill, why not make voting compulsory, as Australia, Belgium, Italy, and Venezuela have done? Because, Ranney responds, "many of us also feel that the right to abstain is just as precious as the right to vote."

Lectures on citizens' civic duties won't raise voter turnout much, Ranney avers. He favors both get-out-the-vote drives and liberalized voter registration laws—allowing registration by mail, for example—but doubts that they would boost turnout by more than 10 percentage points. Blacks, Hispanics, and poor whites, the main stay-at-homes, won't be lured to the polls, he writes, until they "come to believe that voting is a powerful instrument for getting the government to do what they want it to do."

City Hall
Symbolism


Public buildings, from the White House to town meeting halls, are full of symbolism. In the changing interior designs of city halls during the past two centuries, Goodsell, who teaches at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, sees a chronicle of America's political evolution.

City council chambers built between 1800 and 1930, he writes, "openly asserted public authority." Massive staircases led from the lobbies to the legislators' domain, creating the impression of an ascent to a "civic sanctuary." Citizens could watch only from upper-level galleries with no access to the chamber floor. Ornate furnishings of dark, carved wood and plush upholstery reinforced the "majesty of authority" in the municipal buildings of older cities such as Baltimore and Pittsburgh.

A more egalitarian post–New Deal style is evident in municipal structures erected between 1930 and 1960. Spectators sat on benches on the chamber floor itself. In the "great turnabout," city councilmen no longer sat with their backs to the audience, facing the presiding officer, but looked out toward the audience. Such designs stressed government's accountability. Sparse furnishings "downplayed the officials' superior status," Goodsell observes. But all trappings of authority did not vanish. Officials still sat on raised platforms, and railings separated the governors from the governed.

Since 1960, a new inventory of civic symbolism has been created. Growing city bureaucracies are often housed in office towers, adjacent to a low city council building, as in Phoenix or Wilmington. The bureaucracy is, symbolically, out of reach; the low-lying council building belongs to "the people." Inside, the council chambers are smaller and more intimate. In many cases, the legislators sit in a "pit," below the citizens, with minimal physical barriers between them. Mindful of the presence of TV cameras, many architects create, "in effect, a television..."
San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors convenes in a majestic chamber (left) completed in 1915. By contrast, the contemporary layout of “the pit,” as locals call it, where the Fort Worth, Texas, City Council meets, fosters the impression of informal contact between citizen and legislator.

studio” that extends the intimacy to the community at large.

Overall, says Goodsell, the new council chambers suggest that citizens and their representatives are equals, “mutually engaged in the work of government.” He worries, though, that while the new designs reflect (and perhaps contribute to) openness in city government, they may also foster a false sense of intimacy and informality that will erode local government authority.

**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**

*Making the Bomb Obsolete*


Hoots of derision from scientists, journalists, and Washington politicians greeted President Reagan’s March 1983 call for a Space Age defense against Soviet nuclear attack.
But Jastrow, former director of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Institute for Space Studies, thinks that the President’s so-called Star Wars idea has merit.

A defense against Soviet missiles is needed, he argues, because the U.S. strategic “triad” is no longer a reliable deterrent: In a Soviet surprise attack, most land-based U.S. missiles and most B-52 bombers would be destroyed, leaving only the 34 nuclear-armed Trident submarines. Trident missiles, however, are too inaccurate to use against “hardened” military targets. And strikes against Soviet cities would provoke retaliation in kind. Surrender might be the only logical choice for U.S. leaders. (The same fear of retaliation against civilian targets, Jastrow adds, would stop Moscow from bombing U.S. cities, even in a surprise attack.)

Because neither side will put its cities at risk, an antimissile defense would have to protect only vital military bases, not the entire nation. The technology to begin such a “point defense” is inexpensive and available now, according to Jastrow. The first element would be ground-based “smart” missiles, using advanced microcomputers to home in on airborne Soviet ICBMs. More complex is President Reagan’s proposed space-based antimissile laser. Despite the ridicule heaped on the idea by some civilian specialists, White House science and defense advisers believe that space stations armed with lasers

Exotic technology, including lasers and possibly particle beams, is required for President Reagan’s proposed space-based antimissile defense. He is asking Congress for $1.7 billion in “Star Wars” research for 1985.
could be in orbit within 10 years, though at great cost.

Such weapons are banned by the 1972 ABM (antiballistic missile) treaty. But Jastrow contends that Moscow has repeatedly violated the pact. Last summer, for example, U.S. spy satellites discovered a sophisticated radar complex located near the Soviets' Siberian ICBM fields. The only possible use for the radar is to direct antimissile rockets. Other evidence suggests that Moscow has tested such ABMs.

Jastrow envisions a three-tier defense of lasers and "mini-missiles." If each layer had a 10-percent "leakage rate," only one Soviet warhead in 1,000 would reach its military target—not enough to disarm U.S. forces. (The Soviets now have 4,560 nuclear warheads.) Handing over the technology to the Soviets would give both sides a secure defense—and little practical use for their vast atomic arsenals.

Nuclear weapons will never disappear entirely, in Jastrow's view. But he believes that virtually impregnable defenses may eventually bring a day when nuclear weapons are outmoded and are taken off the firing line to be stockpiled against an unlikely suicide attack.

How to Ban the Bomb

Jonathan Schell's best-selling critique of the arms race, _The Fate of the Earth_ (1982), made him a hero of the antinuclear movement. Yet, as both Schell's friends and foes observed, the _New Yorker_ writer did not offer any way out of the world's nuclear predicament.

This is Schell's answer. Two standard antinuclear goals—unilateral disarmament and world government—he dismisses as impractical and possibly dangerous. But he contends that a third often denigrated alternative, an agreement among the world's nuclear powers to abolish nuclear weapons, could work.

The usual objection to complete disarmament is that while atomic weapons can be destroyed, the knowledge of how to build them cannot. Eventually, the temptation for one nation to rearm in secret to blackmail or conquer its rivals would be overwhelming.

But Schell proposes to use that imperishable knowledge to establish "weaponless deterrence." While each nation would disarm (in stages), each would retain just enough laboratories, factories, and other facilities to enable it to build new warheads within a few weeks. (Missiles and bombers would not be banned.) The capacity of their rivals to rebuild nuclear weapons, Schell argues, "would deter nations from rebuilding them and then using them, just as in our present, nuclear-armed world possession of the weapons themselves deters nations from using them."

As insurance against cheating, Schell would require regular inspections of all weapons production sites. Far more important, all nations would be permitted to build unlimited antinuclear defenses (including the space-based antimissile lasers President Reagan proposed in his
"Star Wars" speech last year) after disarmament was complete. Schell also favors limitations on conventional arms designed to insure East-West balance while allowing for strong defenses.

At least one nation, India, already practices "weaponless deterrence," Schell says. Indians do not exercise their capability to build nuclear arms, seeming to "count it sufficient that their adversaries know that they can build the weapons if they want to." In the game of chess, he notes, "when skilled players reach a certain point in the play they are able to see that, no matter what further moves are made, the outcome is determined, and they end the game without going through the motions." The United States and the Soviet Union, Schell writes, have reached the same point with nuclear deterrence. Except that armed deterrence leads to a constant arms race and yields no winners.

Winning in El Salvador

A negotiated settlement or a long, inconclusive war seem today to be the only options available to the U.S.-backed government of El Salvador. But Bernstein and Wagelstein, U.S. Naval War College professor and former commander of the 55 U.S. military advisers in El Salvador, respectively, have a plan to help the Salvadoran government win.

The United States, they argue, should "help the Salvadorns learn from our mistakes" in Vietnam. The 40,000-man army faces just 6,000-8,000 Marxist guerrillas. Yet up to 80 percent of the Salvadoran troops are tied down guarding vital dams, bridges, and power plants. U.S. military advisers are now training Salvadoran reconnaissance squads to seek out hidden guerrilla base camps. (The authors insist that most popular support for the guerrillas is limited to two of El Salvador's 14 provinces. They believe that a better-disciplined army could enlist the campesinos in intelligence-gathering.) Also needed are 350-man "hunter battalions," one in each province, to act quickly on the reconnaissance squads' reports by attacking rebel bases and keeping the guerrillas on the run.

The well-trained officer corps on which this strategy depends has not emerged from the yearly crop of 25-35 Salvadoran military academy graduates, an ineffective and "socially exclusive" lot. Some 1,000 Salvadoran cadets have passed through a U.S. Army training program at Fort Benning, Georgia, during the past two years. More will be needed.

Improved basic equipment—M-16 rifles, rot-resistant boots, communications gear—is also essential. To save lives and lift battlefield morale, Washington should provide more medical supplies and evacuation helicopters. In South Vietnam, only one of every 10 wounded Vietnamese and U.S. soldiers died; the mortality rate in El Salvador is one of three.

Two self-inflicted curbs must be ended, the authors insist: Congress must rescind its 1980 ban against using U.S. economic aid to finance
land reform and its 1974 prohibition against aid to (and hence U.S. influence over) local police forces. Both moves could ultimately help the U.S. aid generate more popular support for the El Salvador regime.

The price tag for the authors' program is $100 million annually in U.S. military aid, probably for several years. (Today's U.S. arms assistance totals $65 million, economic support $196 million.) Anti-Western guerrillas have been beaten before—in Venezuela, Greece, the Philippines—and Bernstein and Wagelstein insist that, with firm U.S. backing, they can be beaten in El Salvador.

**Terrorism on The Rise**

In 1983, terrorist attacks on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut and on the U.S. Capitol stunned Americans. More shocks are almost certainly in store, as terrorists around the world step up their campaigns.

Ironically, one of terrorism's major defeats—Israel's 1982 drive into Lebanon, which dislodged the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Beirut—is also contributing to its spread. Terrorists from at least 20 groups, from the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to the Japanese Red Army (JRA), were driven from PLO training camps. They now form a dangerous "terrorist diaspora," says Livingstone, a Washington, D.C., defense consultant. JRA exiles, for example, were responsible for a wave of anti-Semitic attacks in Italy last year. Western intelligence services' well-developed information networks in Beirut are now useless, so it will be harder to keep tabs on such groups.

Other trends are also ominous. "Contemporary terrorist groups are smaller, more numerous, more tightly organized, and better trained than in the past," Livingstone writes, and thus harder to stop. Virtually all of the groups now have governmental sponsors, chiefly the Soviet Union, Libya, and Cuba. (However, even the Soviets have not escaped attack. In Mozambique, two Russian geologists were killed and 24 of their countrymen kidnapped by antigovernment guerrillas last year.)

Livingstone worries that to capture the attention of a public inured to violence, terrorists may resort to increasingly dramatic acts. Documents captured by the Israelis in Lebanon in 1982, for example, indicate that Moscow has trained some PLO members in the use of chemical and biological weapons.

Latin America may replace the Middle East and Western Europe as the focus of terrorism in the years ahead. Peru, Chile, and Colombia already suffer frequent attacks, along with the nations of Central America. Mexico, with its ailing economy, pervasive government corruption, large population of political exiles from other Latin nations, and one-party government, may not be immune to political violence.

Nor is the United States out of harm's way, Livingstone warns. One natural target: the summer Olympic games in Los Angeles.

Even as American admiration for (and fear of) Japan's auto industry grows, surprising news is beginning to trickle in from the Far East. According to Webber, an auto industry specialist at the Harvard Business School, the "social contract" that has kept Japan moving ahead is beginning to show signs of strain.

The Japanese success stems from the 1950s, when a series of near-ruinous strikes swept the industry and forced a purge in the ranks of workers and management alike. Under the tacit agreement that ensued, management promised regular pay increases and lifetime jobs. Workers responded with 30 years of labor peace. Productivity surged: In 1980, the average Japanese auto worker produced 28 cars; the U.S. worker, 12.

Prosperity made the system work. Can it survive hard times? Partly as a result of recent European and American import restrictions, sales of Toyotas, Datsuns, and the nine other Japanese makes declined by 7.6 percent in 1982. Even worse, industry analysts see a long-term decline of annual growth in worldwide auto sales to just two percent a year. In Japan, idled plants have already hurt productivity. Nissan, for example, suffered an 18 percent drop in 1982 auto output per worker. Japan's auto workers no longer see their employers' guarantees as immutable, Webber writes. Like their counterparts in Detroit, they are beginning to worry about automation and unemployment. Renewed labor strife is possible.

Auto industry suppliers also seem to be losing confidence. In Japan's unique system, parts suppliers offer "just-in-time" deliveries (eight per day is not uncommon), minimizing the manufacturer's costs of inventory and quality control. Traditionally, one supplier does all its business with one company. Now that auto sales are declining, the suppliers quickly suffer the effects of cutbacks. Many of them are breaking the exclusive "family" relationship to search for new customers and no longer think of themselves as "just a cog in Toyota's machine," in the words of one Tokyo business analyst.

Government, the fourth partner in the Japanese auto manufacturing game, may become less cooperative. Pressure from the West to restrict exports and to open up Japan's domestic markets to imports, along with the need to increase domestic taxes, seem sure to force Tokyo officials to squeeze their automakers, Webber predicts.

However, he suggests, General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler should not relax now. The Japanese have shown themselves to be far more adept at coping with potential threats to prosperity than have their competitors.
Overall, the class of '83 faced a bleak job market. But job offers to humanities students were up, thanks partly to new corporate interest.

**Fading MBAs?**

A young lad or lass with a fresh MBA (master of business administration) diploma has long been widely regarded as a shoo-in for the corporate fast track. But Fraker, a *Fortune* editor, finds that MBAs have lost some of their luster. Big Business does not like to admit that it is changing its ways, but the fact is that corporations are hiring fewer MBAs. General Electric, for example, trimmed all new hiring by four percent in 1983, thanks to the recession, but took some 30 percent fewer MBAs (52 as opposed to 75). Xerox now recruits half as many newly-minted MBAs as it did in 1980. The new anti-MBA attitude is reflected in jokes currently making the rounds in executive suites. One sample: "If Thomas Edison had been working with MBAs, he wouldn't have invented the light bulb. He'd have made a bigger candle."

Top corporate executives are beginning to think that they "need fewer would-be stars and more solid supporting actors," reports Fraker. She says that repeated criticism of American managers for short-sightedness and ignoring product quality has shifted corporate attention from financial wizardry and razzle-dazzle headquarters staff work to the value of hands-on experience at the factory level. MBAs also demand high starting salaries (up to $50,000), even as their growing numbers have devalued the degree. Some 62,000 MBAs hit
the job market in 1983, versus only 4,640 in 1960.

Liberal arts graduates, who can be hired for 30–40 percent less than MBAs and yet can be more easily trained because they have “less expansive egos,” now look more attractive to corporate recruiters.

Fraker does not predict that many MBAs will wind up selling apples on street corners. For one thing, fewer students are now applying to business schools. Yet, as time goes on, she sees only the best graduates of the best schools—Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Wharton—being picked for the corporate fast track while other MBAs will have to get to the top by first becoming masters of the shop floor.

**Optimism About U.S. Industry**


Across the United States, dozens of steel mills, auto plants, and "smokestack" factories of all kinds have closed. Yet despite widespread fears that America is "deindustrializing," contends Lawrence, a Brookings Institution economist, U.S. manufacturers are actually outperforming most of their competitors in Western Europe.

Employment in the U.S. manufacturing sector fell by a stunning 10.4 percent between 1979 and 1982, but temporary recession and an over-valued dollar accounted for most of the drop. Longer-term trends are far more favorable, Lawrence says. Industrial employment, output, and investment all rose during the "stagflation" years between 1973 and 1980. American industry increased its outlays for new plant and equipment and research and development (R & D) at a faster clip than it did during the 1960s. An example: The number of scientists and engineers on industry payrolls grew by 1.6 percent annually between 1960 and 1973, but by 3.2 percent in 1973–80.

Factory employment grew by only .3 percent annually in the United States between 1973 and 1980, but that beat Japan, West Germany, France, and Britain. U.S. factory output expanded by 1.8 percent a year, exceeded only by Japan’s 2.9 percent. In R & D investment, U.S. growth rates were about the same as those in Japan and Western Europe, and its rate of capital formation kept pace with Europe’s. During the booming 1960s, the United States lagged behind in both categories.

Overall, Lawrence suggests that the Western Europeans are in the deepest trouble. Europe really is “deindustrializing,” he says, and has not been able to make up for the loss of jobs in declining industries such as textiles, furniture, and steel with gains in other areas. The U.S. economy appears to be the most flexible, shifting employment to high-growth industries—plastics, electrical machinery, industrial chemicals—even more rapidly than Japan’s.

That does not signal clear sailing ahead. But Lawrence says that policymakers ought to worry more about the slow growth of labor and capital productivity, which persists despite heavy business investment and R & D spending, and less about the woes of a few highly visible industries.
"The Crisis in Immigration Policy" by Edwin Harwood, in *Journal of Contemporary Studies* (Fall 1983), Transaction Periodicals Consortium, Dept. 541, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.

Immigration to the United States is nearing the record levels of the early 1900s, and public opinion surveys show that Americans increasingly favor tighter controls. Yet Washington is doing little to stem the tide.

The sheer number of immigrants entering the country every year (up to 800,000 legally, perhaps another 500,000 illegally) overwhelms both the 760 field investigators of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the federal courts, writes Harwood, a Hoover Institution scholar.

Manpower shortages force the INS to concentrate its efforts against illegal immigration on the Mexican border, where one agent can catch many "illegals," and, elsewhere, on terrorists, drug smugglers, and other dangerous aliens. But arresting an illegal alien is no guarantee of success. Elaborate due process protections in deportation hearings, lengthy appeals processes, vigilant civil-rights groups—all can drag out cases for years. And federal sanctions are mild: Some 40,000 aliens whose cases are now pending have vanished, knowing that they can often start the appeals process all over again if they are reapprehended.

An effective crackdown on illegal aliens would require curbs on their legal rights and a vast increase in INS staff, Harwood believes. The only major reform measure on the congressional agenda, the much-debated Simpson-Mazzoli Immigration Reform Act, would grant amnesty to the estimated two to five million illegal aliens, mostly Hispanics, now in the United States and bar employers from hiring new entrants. Enforcing the act would vastly overload the INS. Strong opposition from employers who rely on "illegals" as low-wage workers and from spokesmen for civil-rights and Hispanic groups threatens the bill's prospects of passage.

Washington has not even had much success in regulating legal immigration, Harwood says. The Refugee Act of 1980 set a limit of 50,000 on the number of refugees that the United States would accept annually, but exceptions were quickly made for Poles, Ethiopians, and the 125,000 Cubans of the September 1980 "freedom flotilla." Congress also liberalized the terms of political asylum in 1980 to eliminate the favoritism traditionally shown applicants from the Soviet bloc. By 1983, the INS had a backlog of 170,000 asylum cases, up substantially from 5,800 in 1979.

Harwood doubts that much can be done about today's immigration "crisis." A tangle of foreign and domestic political interests stands in the way of effective change. And many of the measures that might actually work would violate U.S. democratic traditions.
As an Iowa farm boy during the 1870s, novelist Hamlin Garland regarded the wonders of a traveling circus as the equivalent of "the visions of the Apocalypse." To most Americans today, the circus is largely a relic of "simpler times."

In ancient Rome, a "circus" was an arena where gladiators fought. The first modern circus was staged in 1768 when Philip Astley, a former English cavalryman, incorporated jugglers and acrobats into his trick riding exhibitions outside London. Twenty-five years passed before John Bill Ricketts opened the first American circus, reports Flint, a Smithsonian researcher and president of the Circus Historical Society.

Bad roads and the sparse population of frontier America limited early circuses to performances in existing arenas in the East until Somers, New York, promoter J. Purdy Brown took the first show on the road with a collapsible tent in 1825.

The golden age of the circus opened with the development of a nationwide network of railroads beginning in the mid-19th century.
Traveling by rail allowed touring circuses to bypass the smallest towns and to transport a vast array of props, trained animals, and human performers. (Rail travel had its drawbacks: Jumbo the African Elephant was tragically killed by a locomotive in 1885. An undaunted P. T. Barnum promptly put Jumbo's skeleton on display.) The Sells Brothers Circus, though by no means the largest, employed 500 men and women and logged 13,852 miles on its 1895 tour. Mark Twain's Huck Finn described the circus of this era as "the splendidiest sight that ever was."

The great circuses began to disappear with the advent of radio, the cinema, and other competitors for Americans' entertainment dollars early in the 20th century. The Great Depression killed off many of the survivors. The tent show became a rarity. In 1956, the merged Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Circus folded its Big Top for the last time, and its famed clowns, trapeze artists, and animal acts have since kept to indoor arenas like those in which the first American circuses played.

**Head Start's 'Charmed Life'**


Head Start is that miracle of miracles, a Great Society program that both conservatives and liberals hail as a success. Skerry, a Harvard researcher, explains why.

Born in 1965 as part of Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty, Head Start aimed to boost the intelligence quotients (I.Q.'s) of poor children through special pre-school education. The results have been, in Skerry's words, "positive but far from overwhelming." Students show short-term gains in I.Q. that seem to fade once they enter public schools.

Besides classes, the program provides hot meals and medical and dental care to some 400,000 preschoolers, as well as job and educational opportunities to their parents. The $1.05 billion in federal funds that is slated to go to 8,728 Head Start centers in fiscal 1984 will be matched by $250 million in local donations and volunteer support.

Though the centers are heavily subsidized by Washington, control is in the hands of the community. A typical center has 56 students, as well as a supervisor (and often an "education specialist!") who answers to a parents' committee; each center sets its own curriculum and hires its own staff. Teacher salaries are low ($7,200 to start), and little attempt is made to achieve racial balance at the local level. (Nationally, about half of Head Start students are black, 25 percent white, 15 percent Hispanic.) Unlike most federal social programs, and unlike today's public schools, Head Start centers are free of cumbersome bureaucracy—they are "not just another federal program," but community institutions.

To Skerry, local control and flexibility are the virtues that spur local involvement. Parents choose to enroll their children and many volunteer their services as well. Twenty-nine percent of Head Start's paid staff are parents of past or current students. Liberals call this "community participation," Skerry notes, while conservatives call it "self-help."
All could learn, he contends, from studying the program closely. By concentrating on the needs of children, Head Start avoids the "stigma" of welfare dependency, and it responds to blacks' "unique claims on the American conscience" without relying on racial quotas or other devices. And it is one of the few federal programs that manages to tap the creative energies of the communities it serves.

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*Tecumseh and His Brother*


Tecumseh, the famous war chief of the Shawnees, survives in American legend as the "greatest Indian." But according to Edmunds, a Texas Christian University historian, Tecumseh (1768-1813) was, in his day, overshadowed by his younger brother Tenskwatawa, the "Shawnee Prophet."

Born Lalawethika ("Loudmouth"), the prophet-to-be lapsed into alcoholism in his youth, along with many other Indians who encountered the white man in eastern Ohio early in the 19th century. But in 1805, at about age 30, Lalawethika fell into a coma from which he emerged claiming to have returned from the dead, sent by the Master of Life to save his people. He renounced whiskey, white man's food, and metal tools, and took the name Tenskwatawa ("The Open Door"), symbolizing his role as a leader of an Indian spiritual and moral revival.

Shawnee mythology had warned of the arrival of pale-faced invaders sent by the Great Serpent to sow disorder. Tenskwatawa's claim to be the Shawnee savior was inadvertently aided by Indiana's governor, William Henry Harrison (later the ninth U.S. President), who challenged the Prophet to perform a miracle. Tenskwatawa, tipped off to an impending solar eclipse by itinerant astronomers, proceeded to "darken the sun" and thereby gained a wide following among Delawares, Kickapoos, and other Indian tribes in the Great Lakes region.

In 1809, Tenskwatawa opposed but failed to block the Treaty of Fort Wayne (negotiated by chiefs among the Miamis, Delawares, and Potawatomis), which resulted in the U.S. annexation of three million acres of Indian land. Only after the Indians' ill-fated attack, inspired by Tenskwatawa, on Harrison's forces at Tippecanoe in 1811 was the holy man's powerlessness revealed. He soon lost his following and died in Kansas in 1836. Tecumseh, who had served as his brother's spokesman, mobilized Tenskwatawa's religious following in a last attempt to unite the Midwest tribes politically and militarily, says Edmunds. The effort failed; Tecumseh died in battle in 1813.

Why have white Americans immortalized Tecumseh and forgotten his brother? Tecumseh's bravery in battle, explains Edmunds, fit their stereotype of the "noble savage," and his political aims seemed more sensible to white historians than his brother's religious approach. In short, Tecumseh was a "white man's Indian."
Covering
Campaign '84

Covering the long, arduous contest for the White House is one of the supreme tests of the national news media. Senior editors long ago made their plans for 1984, hoping to improve upon their Campaign '80 performance.

No big changes are in store. The top print and television news executives interviewed by Bonafede, a National Journal correspondent, generally throw up their hands at most of the major complaints lodged against campaign coverage.

Charges by academics that the press focuses too much attention on front-runners and incumbent presidents, says the Washington Post's Peter Silberman, ignore "the way of American politics." Portraying the campaign as a "horse race," many editors believe, is the only way to keep readers and viewers interested as the weeks wear on. Similarly, news executives tend to doubt that public interest in "the issues" (as opposed to personalities and the intricacies of campaign tactics) is more than skin deep. Ronald Cohen, Washington bureau manager for United Press International, notes that few local newspaper editors print the issues-related stories that his wire service sends them.

What has changed? This time, campaign coverage began earlier. Reporters are paying more attention to labor unions, women's groups, and such voting blocs as blacks and Hispanics. In part because of the large field of Democratic candidates (eight in early 1984), more reporters have taken to the campaign trail. The Washington Post deployed 12 full-time newsmen on the story by late 1983; papers the size of the Boston Globe or the Christian Science Monitor assigned three to six. In a major departure from tradition, most reporters are being rotated, covering first one candidate, then another, to provide fresh perspectives. Public opinion surveys will be even more widely published than in the past.

The high cost of covering the 1984 campaign—about double what it was in 1976—has also influenced editors' plans. The respected Baltimore Sun will probably pay out about $750,000 during the campaign, not counting reporter salaries, and bigger papers such as the New York Times will spend twice as much. Combined campaign-related outlays by the three major TV networks will probably exceed 1980's $100–$150 million level. One result: Rather than pay the exorbitant airfares expected by money-hungry campaign managers, more editors will keep their political reporters in Washington, covering campaign headquarters instead of the candidate himself.

The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1984
**PRESS & TELEVISION**

*When Newsmen Look at Newsmen*

U.S. journalists are often criticized for being too "negative" about the people and institutions they describe. They may be, says Robinson, director of the Media Analysis Project at George Washington University, but at least they are consistent: These days, journalists are also hard on one another.

Robinson surveyed network TV news broadcasts and six major newspapers and newsmagazines during the first quarter of 1983 to see what the Fourth Estate said about itself. The search yielded 93 editorial commentaries and hard news stories. Thirty pieces were neutral in tone. Among the remainder, negative items outnumbered the positive by 3 to 1.

The major news media-related story during the survey period concerned a Jacksonville, Alabama, TV crew that filmed an attempted self-immolation without intervening to stop it—clearly "bad press" for journalism. On other matters, commentators offered explicit criticism, ranging from Milton Friedman's outburst of annoyance, in *Newsweek*, over the media's "liberal bias," to Bill Moyers's critique of "shallowness" in TV news, aired on the CBS Evening News.

Many of the jabs were self-serving, notes Robinson. Print journalists needled their counterparts on the network news shows, who in turn chided local broadcasters. (Later in the summer, the networks gloated over the case of Chris Craft, a Kansas City TV anchorwoman who sued her employer, Metromedia, charging sex discrimination.) The *Wall Street Journal* ran a long article about the networks' troubles with lawsuits for defamation and libel. Robinson found one consistent exception to the snipe-at-thy-neighbor pattern: the *Washington Post*’s ombudsman Robert McCloskey, who six times discussed criticism leveled at the *Post* and sided with the critics five times.

It is fortunate that newsmen enjoy harping on the weaknesses of their rivals, Robinson concludes. Otherwise, who would police the press?

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**RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY**

*Anti-Zionist Jews*

The repercussions of Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, designed to eliminate the Palestine Liberation Organization’s strongholds, are still being felt among Jews around the world, but only a few have turned their backs on the Jewish state.
Protests erupted in Israel after the Lebanese Christians' 1982 attack on Moslem refugee camps at Shatila and Sabra, in Israeli-occupied Lebanon. But Podhoretz puts Israel "at the bottom of the list of those responsible."

Jewish doubts about Israel predate the 1982 war. Even after the creation of the Jewish state in 1948, notes Podhoretz, editor of *Commentary*, there remained a minority of "anti-Zionist Jews." Some Orthodox Jews saw the establishment of the new state as a "forcing" of the messianic age promised in the Old Testament. Reform Jews feared that it was "a regression to tribalism," and socialists viewed it as "a monument to reactionary bourgeois nationalism." But when the Six-Day War of 1967 and the 1973 Yom Kippur War threatened Israel's survival and revived memories of the Holocaust, most such reservations vanished. For the first time in modern history, it was possible to talk of a world Jewish community.

In the West, Jews showed more interest in Jewish culture and religious observance. Despite official disapproval, Jews protested their second-class status in the Soviet Union, which has the third largest Jewish community in the world (behind the United States and Israel).

Yet, Podhoretz says, many of the former dissenters offered only conditional support to Israel, contingent upon its living up to their high ideals and behaving "in ways that they could easily approve." The Lebanon affair "became the occasion for going public with a reconsideration that had been brewing since the accession of Menachem Begin," the nation's first nonsocialist prime minister, in 1977.

The U.S. news media, however, vastly exaggerated the number of dissenters, Podhoretz contends. For most Jews in Israel, living "in a murderously hostile environment . . . had the enormously healthy effect of
clearing their minds" of any doubts about Israel's right to exist and to act. Jews in the Diaspora also remained firm in their commitment: Nearly 90 percent of American Jews polled in a 1983 public opinion survey said that they were pro- or very pro-Israel.

Until the mid-1970s, neighboring Arab states made no secret of their desire to erase Israel. Now, they proclaim that they will settle for a Palestinian state on the West Bank, and that seeming concession has sown discord among many Jews about Israel's jeopardy. But the overwhelming majority of Jews around the world realize that the Arabs are still intent on Israel's destruction. Podhoretz maintains, and they have found "the moral courage to hold firm against overwhelming external pressures and insidious inner doubts."

Savagery and Sentimentality

To be called "sentimental" in the 18th century was to be praised for one's emotional refinement. Today, the word connotes the sort of silliness seen in those who give Christmas presents to their dogs or get teary-eyed over the virtues of small-town America.

Sentimentality also has a darker side. The sentimentalist oversimplifies reality, making the object of his emotion sweeter and more blameless than it is. The danger arises, writes Jefferson, a British student of philosophy, because anything that threatens this picture of perfect innocence must be viewed, equally unrealistically, as "something unambiguously worthy of hatred."

Sentimentalists are not alone in misrepresenting reality. The "melodramatic" man, for example, seeks and finds emotional tumult where others might see none. But such fantasies are harmless, whereas sentimentality, writes Jefferson, creates "dangerous fictions"—fantasies that can lead to brutality.

Jefferson cites E. M. Forster's A Passage to India, where the British community's vague dislike for the chilly Miss Quested is suddenly transformed into the "sweetest and warmest" feelings when she claims to have been assaulted by an Indian man. As a sentimental symbol of the "purity...of English womanhood," she inspires violent loyalty. Even the chief local British official feels the urge to "flog every native" in revenge. In the American South, sentimental notions about the purity of Southern womanhood spurred many a lynch mob to action. During World War I, U.S. propaganda posters often capitalized on such emotions to mobilize domestic support for the war effort—depicting, for example, Belgium as an innocent woman under assault by a foul "Hun."

Obviously, sentimentality is often just what it seems—harmless, perhaps embarrassing. Life without any illusions would be "drab," writes Jefferson. But the illusions fostered by sentimentality can be surprisingly fraught with moral peril.

What is Wrong With Sentimentality?

"Remembrance of Things Partly" by Wray Herbert, in _Science News_ (Dec. 10, 1983), 231 West Center St., Marion, Ohio 43302.

"H.M.," as he is known to scientists, underwent surgery in 1953 in which much of the hippocampus region of his lower brain was removed to stop his epileptic seizures. In a freak accident with a fencing foil in 1960, another man, "N.A.," suffered an injury to the left side of his thalamus, in the middle of his brain. The result for both men: amnesia.

But different kinds of amnesia. Because of those differences, writes Herbert, a _Science News_ editor, the unique cases of H.M. and N.A. are keys to scientific studies of how human memory works.

For example, although both men can remember events that took place before amnesia struck, H.M. is unable to recall some things that happened just a few years before his surgery. When a McGill University researcher tested the memories of patients who had undergone electroconvulsive therapy (which also disrupts the hippocampus), she found that, like H.M., they had lost memories of events a few years prior to their treatment. The hippocampus, she suggests, is responsible for consolidating memories, a process that seems to take several years.

Other research indicates that there are perhaps dozens of memory "circuits" in the brain, each responsible for transmitting different aspects—texture, color, emotion—of the same experience. Herbert cites the unusual case of a woman who had "lost all memories of former acquaintances, but continued to respond with appropriate emotions to those she had liked and those she had not."

Their impaired memories make learning new things hard for H.M. and N.A. But both are capable of certain kinds of learning. H.M., who is able to recall next to nothing that has occurred since 1953, has nevertheless acquired new motor, perceptual, and other skills (such as puzzle solving).

Does the brain, then, make "a fundamental distinction between knowledge and skill"? Such a finding would be "stunning," reports Herbert. For years, cognitive psychologists have argued that behavior is the result of applying knowledge; behaviorists, that it is a product of conditioned responses. If a knowledge-skill distinction exists in the brain, both would be right. Conditioned responses (skills) would be the responsibility of one part of the brain, learned behavior of another. That might explain why babies are capable of some learning but as adults retain no memories of their infancy—the "habit" system of the brain develops faster than the intellectual "memory" system.

Such research, however, means little to N.A. and H.M. Amnesia is not susceptible to a knock-on-the-head cure, as it is in the movies. Even for the less seriously impaired N.A., writes Herbert, returning to his home is like "finding his way around a town he hasn’t been to in 20 years."
After 13 missions, U.S. space shuttle launches still capture the public imagination sufficiently to merit live network TV coverage. But not everybody is cheering.

To scientists, reports Waldrop, a Science correspondent, the shuttle represents unmet expectations. During the early 1970s, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) promised scientists that there would be 20 shuttle flights yearly as early as 1982, with plenty of room for their experiments. The European Space Agency (ESA), a consortium of 14 European nations, spent nearly $1 billion to develop the reusable Spacelab, which first flew in Columbia's cargo bay in late 1983, and made plans for four all-European Spacelab missions. Meanwhile, NASA solicited designs for 40 major Spacelab projects from U.S. scientists.

But a series of cuts in NASA's budget since the mid-1970s has forced a major reduction in shuttle flights. NASA has purchased a second Spacelab, but will buy no more; the ESA plans only one all-European mission (paid for by the West Germans and scheduled for 1985). And NASA so far has funded only three of the 40 proposed experiments, leaving a "bitter, suspicious community of space scientists," says Waldrop.

At best, Spacelab will be sent aloft about 10 times annually by the
end of the 1980s. And in all but one or two of each year's flights, the flying laboratory will be automated and unmanned—just another part of the shuttle's cargo. (The shuttle's payload is divided roughly equally among military, scientific, and commercial projects. Virtually all of the commercial uses involve launching communications satellites.)

NASA officials have sought to soothe the scientists. They say that the remaining 37 experiments will eventually get berths on the shuttle. On the waiting list are experiments in biology, astronomy, and materials research (e.g., growing silicon crystals in zero gravity).

But the shuttle is far from an ideal platform for scientific experiments. "It vibrates, it emits vapors and exhausts, it glows ever so slightly in the dark," notes Waldrop. A permanent orbiting space station would not suffer such drawbacks. But according to Waldrop, scientists' disillusionment with the shuttle was a "major factor" in a National Academy of Science panel's recent repudiation of NASA's tentative plans to launch such a station by the early 1990s.

Born-Again Diseases

"Are New Diseases Really New?" by Edwin D. Kilbourne, in *Natural History* (Dec. 1983), Membership Services, P.O. Box 6000, Des Moines, Iowa 50340.

The world's last remaining pockets of smallpox had hardly been wiped out when a series of baffling new illnesses—Legionnaires' disease, toxic shock syndrome, and, most recently, AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome)—seemed to materialize out of nowhere.

Most of these afflictions are actually old diseases given new life by man-made changes in the environment, explains Kilbourne, a Mount Sinai School of Medicine microbiologist.

The poliomyelitis scare during the first half of the 20th century grew, ironically, out of improved sanitary conditions that cut infant mortality and thus exposed more youngsters and young adults to the disease. Likewise, toxic shock syndrome is probably caused by a change in women's hygiene, namely the use of new high-absorbency tampons, which seems to nurture common staphylococcal bacteria.

The comforts and fashions of 20th-century living have also taken their toll. The outbreak of Legionnaires' disease that killed 29 people in a Philadelphia hotel in 1976 has been provisionally blamed on a bacterium that can flourish in unclean air-conditioning systems. Today's exercise craze has sparked its own plagues—such as tennis elbow.

As for AIDS, one hypothesis suggests that it is caused not by a mysterious new agent but by repeated sexually-transmitted infections of the common cytomegalovirus.

Is our quota of misery constant? Sometimes it seems so. A physician who can cure blindness by performing a cornea transplant can find that he has also transplanted the donor's latent brain-destroying Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease. But Kilbourne finds room for optimism. Some of man's worst mass scourges—typhoid fever, smallpox—are behind him. No disease that has surfaced lately threatens such devastation.

New York's Love Canal, Missouri's Times Beach, and other toxic waste dumpsites gone bad are making the oceans look better than they did 10 years ago as places to dispose of industrial by-products, municipal sewage sludge, and plain garbage.

Lahey and Connor, of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute and the Harvard School of Public Health, respectively, argue that the reassessment is not all bad.

In 1972, Congress passed a series of laws designed to curb ocean dumping, then largely unregulated. The volume of U.S. industrial wastes disposed at sea dropped from 4.8 million tons in 1973 to 2.5 million tons in 1980. Congress also required towns and cities to subject their sewage to costly secondary treatment before piping it into the nation's waterways. Preferably, processed sewage sludge was to be used as landfill or as fertilizer—or be incinerated. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) set 1981 as the target date for ending ocean dumping of all sewage and factory wastes.

The high cost of disposal on land (two to 10 times the cost of ocean dumping) and its health hazards have spurred a re-evaluation. In a controversial move, the EPA did not appeal a 1981 federal district court decision canceling the deadline set for that year. Applications for ocean dumping permits are inching upwards; some seven million tons of sludge were deep-sixed in 1982.

An increase in such dumping is practically inevitable, the authors suggest, so now is the time to take a new approach. "The ocean," they write, "is not as fragile as we once believed." Researchers have found that dumping in some offshore sites is relatively safe. At one deep-water site in use for 15 years 106 miles off New York City, industrial wastes are quickly dispersed by ocean currents, but a dump in shallow water only 12 miles southeast of New York takes a high toll of fish and other sea life. But some wastes, such as PCBs and dioxin, cannot be dumped safely anywhere and should be incinerated.

To rationalize the system, Lahey and Connor propose a sliding fee for ocean dumping permits varying according to the type and amount of waste. Biodegradable cannery leftovers, for example, would be assessed a low fee. Permits for dumping toxic chemicals would be costly. If ocean dumping of the most dangerous wastes were made as expensive as on-shore disposal, the authors believe, businesses might try harder to find ways to cut back on their output of such pollutants.
The forests that now blanket the tropics are being cut down at the rate of about 30 acres each minute. If the trend continues, half of the earth's remaining tropical forest area (already less than two-thirds of the original) will disappear by the year 2000.

Wholesale clearance of tropical forests began when European planters began colonizing Latin America in the 17th century, writes Jackson, a freelance journalist. Sugar and rubber plantations still cover vast expanses of land once occupied by rainforest. Today, "shifting cultivators," small-scale forest farmers numbering 150 million worldwide, are responsible for half of new losses as they slash plots out of the forest, then move on when the thin soil wears out.

Logging has occurred in 13 percent of the world's tropical forests, with four-fifths of the timber output used locally for firewood. And local demand for wood will jump threefold by the turn of the century, even as rapid population growth in the Third World brings new settlements to the countryside. Brazil, for example, is offering peasants homesteads in the Amazon Basin.

Once a tropical forest is cleared, the soil simply dries up and blows away, often making the loss irreversible. Further widespread clearance could threaten up to half of the earth's estimated 10 million species of plants and animals and alter the planet's climate.

To save the earth's rainforests, Rubinoff, of the Panama-based Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute, advocates an international Tropical Moist Forest Reserve, to encompass 10 percent of the remaining forests in 1,000 scattered blocks of at least 100,000 hectares (247,000 acres) each. Financed by a progressive tax on countries with an annual per capita gross national product of over $1,500, the program could collect more than $3 billion a year. An organization such as the World Bank could channel funds to nations willing to protect their forests.

Self-interest, not charity, Rubinoff maintains, should motivate developed nations to finance the forest reserves as insurance against the permanent loss of a vital planetary resource.

The federal government, which owns 34 percent of the land in the United States, is going to have to alter the way it manages its property. Change is inevitable, writes Clawson, a Senior Fellow Emeritus at Resources for the Future, chiefly because the value of federal properties...
RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

(and the timber, minerals, and petroleum they contain) has sharply increased in recent years while managing them is a drain on the treasury. Since the 1920s, for example, the 505 million acres administered by the U.S. Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Forest Service have appreciated 22-fold, and are now worth some $500 billion.

Clawson notes that the 200-year history of federal land use policy has been one of constant change. Until the early 19th century, the focus was on acquisition. A period of disposal through homesteading (which continued until 1934), sales, and land grants for colleges and railroads followed. Beginning with the creation of the first National Forests (then called "forest reserves") in 1891, the emphasis shifted to "reservation." Then came an era of simple management. By the late 1960s, growing pressures from business, environmentalists, and recreation seekers made federal land everybody's business.

Among the new directions under consideration today are land sales ("privatization"), turning over large tracts of public lands to mixed public-private management companies, or greatly expanding Washington's practice of leasing out land (up to 25 percent of it would find takers). Clawson dismisses the western "Sagebrush Rebellion" demand that land be given to the states. They have, he says, "a proven record of failure" as stewards of natural resources.

One way to help resolve today's land-use disputes among competing interests, Clawson suggests, is to grant long-term "pullback" leases for certain tracts. A lumber company, for example, would receive a lease, but conservationists (or anybody else) would have the right to claim up to a third of the land on the same terms.

The United States has evolved a sophisticated mix of public and private uses of its land. Public land can be privately used; most private land is publicly regulated. Today's challenge, says Clawson, is to find a better mix to satisfy business, environmentalists, and the public.

ARTS & LETTERS

John Cheever

As Novelist


The short stories of John Cheever (1912–82) are among the best of our time. Yet in spite of his literary gifts, argues Gussow, a Columbia University critic, Cheever was never able to write a truly successful novel.

Cheever was born into an old New England family that was down on its luck, and into an age whose values were torn apart by World War I. His sense of family contributed to the strong moral tone and nostalgic idealism that mark his work, while the influence of the "Lost Genera-

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The landscape of “Cheever Country” is a suburban America populated by what we would today call the “preppie class.” Cheever views his subjects with sympathy but detachment, engendered by his personal demons—a stormy marriage, alcoholism, and, later in life, growing homosexual proclivities.

With the exception of his first two (and best) novels, *The Wapshot Chronicle* (1957) and *The Wapshot Scandal* (1964), Cheever’s books were attempts to exorcize those troubles and find redemption, argues Gussow. Both *Bullet Park* (1969) and *Falconer* (1977) worked poorly because Cheever, ever the short-story writer, had to rely on unlikely twists of plot to sustain his longer fiction. And the final line of *Falconer*—“Rejoice, he thought, rejoice”—suggests by its lack of conviction that Cheever’s demons were still with him.

Ironically, Cheever’s last novel, *Oh What A Paradise It Seems* (1982) is his worst—he writes about “abstractions” rather than concrete people and places, Gussow contends—but it also suggests a greater tranquility. Water, an ambiguous symbol (of purity, of alcoholism) in Cheever’s stories, appears again. In the short story, “The Swimmer,” for example, the alcoholic protagonist spends a day compulsively swimming in all of the pools in his neighborhood, stopping for a drink at each. But *Oh What A Paradise It Seems* opens with the main character skating effortlessly on the surface of a pond whose clearness, in Cheever’s words, “seemed to have scoured his consciousness of the belief that his own lewdness was a profound contamination.”

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**Getting Rich in American Fiction**

Stories of self-reliant heroes succeeding through hard work pervaded early American literature. But despite the continuing influence of the Protestant work ethic in America, the nation’s fiction has increasingly reflected the lure of shortcuts on the road to riches.

Beginning in the second half of the 19th century, writes Zanger, an English professor at the University of Southern Illinois, American writers became fascinated with the impact of inherited wealth on individuals. Henry James, in both *Portrait of a Lady* (1881) and *Wings of a Dove* (1902), focuses on women whose lives are changed by inheritances. In Mark Twain’s *The Gilded Age*, Colonel Sellers waits “vainly for the great legacy that will transform [his] life.” Inheritances also figure prominently in novels by William Dean Howells, Sherwood Anderson, and William Faulkner.

Zanger links the popularity of the inheritance theme to changes in American society at the end of the 19th century. The “realities of the corporate industrial state” were replacing the idyll of rural America. Thrift,
hard work, and honesty—the virtues extolled in the stories of Horatio Alger—no longer guaranteed material success. In this new society, inheriting wealth seemed the only way to individualism and freedom; it "repudiated the crushing social environment and affirmed individual possibility and special fate in a world otherwise determined."

The image of inherited wealth drawn by such authors as James represented an escape from the "frantic acquisitiveness" that dominated American life. Characters were catapulted into wealth and high status, as Zanger points out, in a way that carefully avoided "any realistic examination of the practical and moral problems attached to the accumulation of money."

Ultimately, says Zanger, an aristocracy of inherited wealth contradicts the American ideal of the self-made man. Yet as long as fame and fortune appear out of reach to all but a select few, the popular longing for instant success will remain.

Romanticizing Beethoven

"Mystic prophet of music" is how Victor Hugo described Ludwig von Beethoven. The mere mention of the composer's name brings to mind the wild hair, rumpled clothes, and intense gaze of a tormented artist.

Such images of Beethoven, however, are largely fictitious, writes Newman, professor emeritus of music at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. They are the product of a Romantic movement "aroused to accept him in terms of its own concerns."

In fact, Beethoven (1780–1827) represents two distinct periods, the late 18th-century "classical" era and the start of 19th-century Romanticism. His brilliantly unconventional music lent legitimacy to the longing of Romantic composers, writers, and artists for self-expression and freedom from classical artistic forms. In turn, they portrayed Beethoven in art and literature as a redeemer or prophet, a magician, a social revolutionary, and an innocent "wild child." In short, they made the composer into all the things they saw as necessary to create great art, all the things they wanted to be.

Beethoven at the piano "looks like a wizard, overpowered by the demons whom he himself has called up," declared British writer (and Prime Minister) Sir John Russell in 1825. Artist Friedrich Geselschap portrayed Beethoven with a choir of angels in the background; his French colleague, Antoine Bourdelle, simply inscribed his sculpture of the composer with the words, "to the man and to the God Beethoven." Toward the end of the 19th century, Newman observes, some European writers came to view the joyous finale to the Ninth Symphony as "the Marseillaise of Humanity," a revolutionary call to brotherhood and socialism.

World War I brought the end of the Romantic movement and a more
A heroic 1892 portrayal of Beethoven. The composer's increasing deafness after age 20 made his achievements seem all the more awesome.

sober artistic assessment of Beethoven. The French composer Claude Debussy, while admiring the German's musical genius, failed to discern godlike qualities. "Beethoven hadn't two cents of literary worth in him," he remarked.

The Romantics' Beethoven mystique lingers, however, in popular perceptions of the composer. Today's audiences still enjoy the fantasy, Newman writes, along with such masterpieces as the *Moonlight* Sonata and the Fifth Symphony.

**OTHER NATIONS**

*The Swiss Army*  

For nearly 500 years, Switzerland has stayed out of Europe's wars by relying on what the Swiss call the "Porcupine Principle." The formula is simple, reports McPhee, a *New Yorker* writer: The tiny nation bristles with arms and its people stand ready to fight.  
Topography—the Jura mountains and the Alps—makes Switzerland
OTHER NATIONS

a natural fortress. But the Swiss have improved upon nature. Dug into the rock are thousands of artillery pieces (many loaded and manned full-time) trained on railroads and highways that invaders would likely use. Important bridges are rigged with explosives placed by their designers, ready to self-destruct on command. Mountains are honeycombed with airplane hangars, tunnels full of food and munitions, and command posts. Shelters against nuclear attack are everywhere; one alpine highway tunnel is fitted with five-foot-thick concrete doors at either end, making it "the biggest bomb shelter in the world."

Almost all able-bodied Swiss men are drafted into the Army (it has only some 30,000 professional soldiers) for 30 years of part-time service. Some 600,000 Swiss citizen-soldiers keep their rifles and ammunition at home, ready for instant mobilization. Enlisted men serve roughly two weeks of active duty annually, officers more, and their employers are only partially reimbursed for the salaries they must continue to pay. Almost every day a mock battle, staged with live ammunition, rages somewhere in Switzerland.

The nation has a fierce military tradition. Neutrality was adopted in 1515 after a defeat at the hands of the French. ("I have conquered those whom only Caesar managed to conquer before me," declared King François I.) Thereafter, many Swiss served as mercenaries; their earnings launched several of the nation's famous banks. Napoleon's assessment was simply, "The best troops . . . are the Swiss." To this day, the Pope retains 90 Swiss Guards at the Vatican.

During World War II, the Swiss mobilized several times to deter threatened attacks from Nazi Germany. In a few cases, they probably had to compromise their own neutrality to save it. Hitler, for example, demanded and seems to have won the right to send German trains carrying war materiel through Switzerland on their way to Italy.

The Soviets, the officially unacknowledged foe of today's Swiss Army, seem to view Switzerland "as a kind of capitalist Alamo," notes McPhee. Indeed, if Swiss forward defenses did not hold, the Army would probably retreat into the mountains and dare the enemy to follow. As the Swiss say, "Switzerland does not have an army. Switzerland is an army."

A Free Market
Flop in Chile?

"The Rise and Fall of the Chicago Boys in Chile" by Paul E. Sigmund, in The SAIS Review (Summer/Fall 1983), 1740 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Chile's nine-year-long experiment with Milton Friedman's brand of monetarist free-market economics came to an unhappy end in 1983. Sigmund, a Princeton political scientist, recalls the promising start of the test and asks what went wrong.

A Chilean corps of University of Chicago-trained Friedman disciples took over the nation's inflationary, government-run economy when a military junta headed by Augusto Pinochet replaced Marxist Salvador Allende in 1973. They quickly ended controls on prices and interest
rates, sliced tariffs, and encouraged foreign investment in Chile. It was not enough. In 1975, Friedman himself prescribed "shock treatment."

Finance minister Jorge Cauas promptly cut the government budget (by 15–25 percent) and slashed the public payroll (by 50 percent between 1973 and '77), boosted taxes, and slowed money supply growth. During the next three years, inflation plunged from 340 percent to 30 percent annually. Economic growth accelerated to a 7.3 percent annual rate in 1978. Some economists began talking about a "Chilean economic miracle."

By early 1982, however, that talk had been silenced. Industrial output fell sharply, unemployment climbed to 23 percent, and bankruptcies in the textile industry alone cost 40,000 jobs. Why? Sigmund lays part of the blame on the 1979 OPEC price hike and on the decline of the world price of copper, Chile's chief export, from $1.33 per pound in 1980 to 59 cents two years later. But the Chicago boys' inflexibility was chiefly responsible, he believes.

Fixed foreign exchange rates (not a monetarist doctrine) led to an overvalued Chilean peso, making exports too dear for foreign buyers and imports too costly. Low tariffs (10 percent across the board after 1979 compared to up to 500 percent in 1973) abetted a flood of cheap imports that drove Chilean firms out of business. Even Chile's chicken farmers were undersold—by Taiwanese competitors. The Chicago boys kept a tight lid on the government's overseas borrowing but refused on principle to regulate private sector foreign transactions. The result: heavy foreign debt and a $4 billion balance-of-trade deficit in 1981. Finally, tight money policies produced high interest rates.

By early 1983, Pinochet had had enough. He jettisoned the last of his doctrinaire economic experts and installed more moderate policymakers. What the Chilean experience shows is not that free-market experiments won't work in the Third World, Sigmund maintains, but that they can't work without "the self-correcting mechanisms of representative government" that curb the excesses of economic planners.

**Slavery's Impact On Africa**


Historians have debated for years whether the centuries-long slave trade with Europe, America, and the Middle East overwhelmed static African societies or was largely absorbed by an Africa that was already changing. Manning, a Bryn Mawr College historian, argues that the effects varied with place and time.

Portuguese sailors' reports from Africa during the 15th century indicated that slavery was by then a well-established institution there. But slaves were generally captives taken in battles waged for political, not economic, ends. With the advent of lucrative large-scale slave exports after 1650 (prompted by the growing demand for labor on sugar plantations in Brazil, Barbados, Jamaica, and other New World colonies),
A white colonial couple, probably British, as seen by a Nigerian of the early 20th century. Colonization began as the overseas slave trade declined.

capturing slaves became, in some places, an end in itself. In the area around present-day Nigeria, for example, the fluctuating prices offered by Europeans for slaves directly influenced the level of local conflict and the volume of slave exports. War, kidnappings, and other forms of violence increased when prices did. But in the kingdoms to the south, the supply of slaves increased in the mid-18th century far more than mere price increases would have warranted, suggesting that slave-taking through war and other means rose chiefly because of African political conflicts.

Slave exports peaked in the late 18th century, reaching an average of 100,000 per year. But the effect on African demographics and social institutions varied according to local characteristics of the slave trade. In West Africa, for example, the export of men to the New World and the resulting overabundance of women led to an expansion of the indigenous institution of polygyny. However, in the savanna regions of North and East Africa, which experienced a disproportionate drain of slave women to the Middle East, the right to more than one wife was gradually restricted to rich and powerful men.

The 19th-century decline of overseas demand for slaves, on the other hand, had a clear-cut effect, notably in western Africa. As prices dropped, Africans themselves began buying more slaves, and a black Af-
frican plantation economy began to take shape. Ironically, this new system was doomed by the influx after midcentury of reform-minded white colonists—the same Europeans whose ancestors had vastly expanded the slave trade 200 years earlier.

**Hong Kong’s Uncertain Future**

Nervous businessmen in Hong Kong, facing a Chinese takeover once Britain’s 99-year lease to the territory expires in 1997, were not reassured when China’s Deng Xiaoping told them several years ago to “put their hearts at ease.” As Lord Carrington, then British foreign secretary, pointed out, “It’s not their hearts they are worried about.”

Today, the leaders of the world’s third largest financial center fear local economic collapse under communist management. Rather than signing standard 15-year business contracts that would extend beyond 1997, Hong Kong’s industrialists are beginning to shift their capital out of the territory. Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand offer investment opportunities that encourage the exodus.

London opened negotiations with Beijing over the fate of Hong Kong’s five million citizens in 1982. But hopes for an early accord were dashed by the implacable negotiating stance assumed by each side. Deng declared Chinese sovereignty over the entire territory a “non-negotiable” issue. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher countered by invoking Britain’s “moral obligation” to consider the wishes of the people of Hong Kong, most of whom prefer the present arrangement.

Optimists in Hong Kong assume that the newly pragmatic world-view of post-Maoist Chinese leaders, and their need for the export earnings that a healthy Hong Kong could provide, will assure minimal Chinese meddling with the economic status quo. But Pye, an MIT China scholar, points out that even with a 70 percent drop in earnings, an assimilated Hong Kong would still generate more hard currency for China from exports than it now pays for the food and water it imports from the Chinese mainland. Furthermore, while Beijing’s desire for a good public relations image in Taiwan (a target for future absorption) could be a moderating force, Pye predicts that Beijing’s fear of “interference” from Taiwan will rule out electoral freedom: Chinese-appointed native administrators may be the most Hong Kong can hope for.

So far, says Pye, the Hong Kong Chinese have been “oddly devoid of political vitality.” But as 1997 draws nearer, political groups of young, well-educated Hong Kong Chinese have formed (Meeting Point, the Hong Kong Observers, China Spring), calling for varying degrees of autonomy. Pye surmises that the longer the negotiations drag on, the stronger the chance that an articulate nationalist figure will rise to transform the Sino-British transaction into a campaign by the people of Hong Kong for self-determination.

"The Change in Women's Economic Status."

Paper presented by June O'Neill before the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, November 9, 1983.

The first words in most public discussions of why working women earn less than men are "sex discrimination." O'Neill, an Urban Institute analyst, believes that there is more to say.

The male-female "pay gap" is not quite as wide as is commonly assumed, she notes. Feminists have popularized the fact that the annual earnings of women who work full-time average 59 percent of men's pay. But "full-time" workers include all those who work 35 or more hours weekly. Men put in more hours and more overtime than do women and are more likely to hold second jobs.

A better measure of the gap is hourly pay. By that standard, women earn 69 percent as much as men.

Women's career decisions, O'Neill argues, account for part of the remaining gap. A 1968 survey of women from age 20 to 24 revealed that 68 percent planned to be homemakers by the time they reached age 35. Yet a check-up 10 years later showed that 60 percent of these women were still working. "Early expectations," O'Neill writes, "influence courses chosen in school, early job experience, the extent of job search, and other activities that will have an impact on later earnings."

Many young women of the 1960s, in other words, never intended to become permanent members of the work force and therefore invested less in their future careers.

Child-bearing, of course, affects women's careers. Women who leave their jobs to have children gain less work experience than do men. A 1977 survey of white jobholders from age 40 to 49 showed that the men had been working virtually without interruption since leaving school, while the women had held jobs in only about 60 percent of the years since graduation.

Family responsibilities also influence the kinds of jobs women take. "Amenities such as short hours, long vacations, flexible schedules, or a [convenient] location ... are paid for through lower wages," O'Neill observes. And women tend to avoid jobs that pay extra for enduring harsh conditions, such as construction work.

O'Neill adjusted for most of these factors by statistical means in a 1983 study. Women earned 80 percent as much as males with equivalent schooling, work experience, and type of job.

Must the 20-point gap be laid entirely to sex discrimination? Not necessarily, O'Neill cautions. Unquantifiable differences, such as degree of job commitment or the "marketability" of one's education, may provide part of the explanation. On the other hand, some discrimination may have escaped measurement—for example, employers could be denying women on-the-job training.

In any event, O'Neill predicts, the pay gap will narrow "perceptibly" during the 1980s. Women are catching up to men in years of schooling and work experience. Younger women, in particular, seem to be ready to make the investments and personal sacrifices necessary to win high-paying jobs. In 1978, roughly 77 percent of the 25- to 29-year-old women interviewed for one study declared that they would still be working women, not homemakers, when they turned 35.
Casino gambling was supposed to be an elixir for all that ailed the decaying seaside resort of Atlantic City, New Jersey. But more than five years after the first casino opened its doors, the "medicine" seems more like snake oil.

Las Vegas is everybody's shimmering example of the legalized gambling bonanza, observe Sternlieb and Hughes, Rutgers urban policy specialists. Gambling tax revenues have enabled Nevada to avoid imposing personal and corporate income taxes. The gaming industry, and the associated tourist trade, account for about 25 percent of the state's jobs.

Promises of up to $500 million a year in state tax revenues (to be devoted to programs for the elderly), a quick fix for Atlantic City's economy, and a $1.3 million campaign by the casino-backed gambling lobby finally persuaded New Jersey voters to approve the gambling scheme in a 1976 referendum. (They had rejected it on three earlier occasions.)

But the only clear winner so far is the casino industry. Resorts International opened the first casino-hotel in May 1978 and recouped its investment within two months. By the end of 1982, nine gaming establishments, opened at a total cost of over $1 billion, had grossed $3.7 billion.

The state's payoff has been far less spectacular. The authors report. Gambling levies brought Trenton $117 million in 1982, just two percent of all state tax revenues and far short of predictions. The new benefits promised to the elderly never materialized. State legislators merely used gambling tax revenues for existing programs. And, overall, New Jersey residents lost $5 in Atlantic City's slot machines or at its blackjack and craps tables for every $1 the state collected in taxes.

For the city itself, casino gambling appears to be at best a break-even proposition. Most of the 30,000 new casino jobs were claimed by suburbanites and out-of-towners. The city's unemployment rate stood at 8.4 percent in 1981, down just one point from 1979, when the boom hit.

The hoped-for rebirth of the city's vacation industry and local businesses has flopped. The overwhelming majority of the 1.5 million gamblers who visit Atlantic City every month come by bus from New York, Philadelphia, and other nearby cities and return home the same day. "Atlantic City's gambler," the authors say, "is intent only on the game and has no interest in shopping or other amusements."

The city's budget looks better these days, thanks to a threefold increase in property tax revenues since 1978, but prostitution, robbery, and other offenses have also nearly tripled. City outlays for police and other casino-related services have consumed most of the windfall.

Meanwhile, real-estate speculators have sent property values (and tax assessments) soaring, driving many local businesses and residents out. So far, apart from the casinos, few new buildings have gone up.

Organized crime does not appear to have penetrated casino management, the authors add, but it has gained control of some firms that service the casinos (e.g., food suppliers, laundries) and some local labor unions.

New Jersey stumbled into gambling on the basis of "exaggerated claims, inadequate analyses, and wishful thinking," the authors conclude. Las Vegas, starting from scratch and surrounded by deserts, held no real les-
sons for decrepit Atlantic City, which is within a few hours' drive for 50 million potential “day-trippers.”

Proposals to legalize casino gambling are under active consideration for Florida's Miami Beach and the Catskill region of New York. Voters in those states, the authors advise, should keep their eyes firmly fixed on Atlantic City's unhappy experience and avoid being mesmerized by the Las Vegas mirage.

“The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces.”
Yale University Press, 92A Yale Station, New Haven, Conn. 06520. 252 pp. $19.95.
Author: Paul Bracken


U.S. forces did not react. The reason, says Bracken, a Yale political scientist, is that the United States has several parallel warning systems, and they did not confirm the NORAD alert. Bracken believes that such “redundancy,” created during the 1970s, makes the United States safer from nuclear war due to technical mishaps than it was 20 years ago.

But he says that the increasing sophistication of the U.S. nuclear command and control system—surveillance satellites, computers, even the AT & T telephone system—dangerously strains human organizations.

The 25,000-man U.S. command and control network is run by many different groups—the National Security Agency, NORAD, assorted units of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. In a crisis, each would focus its entire attention on the Soviet Union, churning out enough data to overwhelm analysts and paralyze decision-makers.

Bracken worries that the results, even under a full military alert short of war, could be disastrous. (Neither the Soviets nor the United States, he notes, has ever gone on full alert during the nuclear age.) If the White House failed to issue commands to the armed forces fast enough, military bureaucracies could be carried forward by their own momentum. World War I, in which political leaders lost control once they mobilized their forces, might be the likeliest precedent for World War III.

If Moscow did launch its missiles, the U.S. president would have only five minutes to react—if the warning pierced the buzz of information—before missiles from Soviet submarines in the Atlantic struck Washington.

After a Soviet attack, virtually all hope of limiting nuclear war would go out the window. Actual control of U.S. missiles and bombers would fall to the military units (such as the Strategic Air Command), possibly even to dozens of isolated local Air Force and Navy commanders. None would have much knowledge of what was happening elsewhere.

Soviet nuclear forces probably suffer from the same kinds of defects, Bracken adds. (U.S. Pershing IIs based in West Germany could reach Moscow in 12 minutes.) He points out that both sides can respond to the vulnerability of their leaders in only two ways: delegate more authority to military commanders or create a “safety catch” defense, in which the missiles are fired automatically if the central command post is wiped out.

Maintaining political control of the military is Bracken's greatest worry. He argues that the Pentagon's civilian
and military planners should see what can be done to insure that an unprecedented full nuclear alert would not lead to war, a subject they have neglected. He also favors a Soviet-American arms control pact removing U.S. Pershing IIs from Western Europe in return for a pullback of Soviet "Yankee" submarines from U.S. coastal waters. That would give political leaders on both sides a little more time to think during a crisis, and allow both sides to back away from dangerous "safety catch" defenses.

"Will Productivity Growth Recover? (Has It Done So Already?)"
19 pp.
Author: Martin Neil Baily

The long, painful slowdown in U.S. productivity growth rates may finally be over.

The slide began after 1965. Labor productivity in the business sector, which had improved by three percent annually since 1950, grew by only 2.14 percent during 1965–73 and by .64 percent during 1973–81.

Why? OPEC's 1973–74 price shocks provide the most obvious explanation (business costs rose but output did not), and Baily, a Brookings Institution economist, says that OPEC did have some effect. But, overall, oil, gas, and electricity bills are a small fraction of the costs of doing business.

Baily dismisses two familiar explanations for the drop. He doubts, for example, that there has been a decline in Americans' capacity for innovation. Indeed, business spending on research and development increased during the 1970s. A fading American work ethic does not explain much, either. After all, says Baily, the Japanese suffered the worst productivity slowdown of the 1970s, "and I have not heard much about declining work effort in Japan."

What about federal regulation of business? Most studies show that its effects have been small. Anyway, the Reagan administration has virtually halted the flow of new regulations.

Inflation, by encouraging businessmen to make investments with quick payoffs, had some effect, says Baily, but it, too, has been largely subdued. Finally, the 1970s run-up in inflation, regulation, and energy bills conspired to cause a fourth problem: suddenly obsolete factories and equipment.

The four culprits that withstand scrutiny, Baily notes, are short-term economic factors, not mysterious long-term trends. That means that the productivity slide should reverse itself eventually.

Baily speculates that the upturn may already have begun. From 1980 to mid-1983, labor productivity in manufacturing climbed by about 12 percent, far outstripping the eight percent gain for the whole period from 1973 to 1980. Baily suggests that productivity may even increase during the next few years at a faster clip than it did during the 1960s—exceptionally good news for American managers and workers.
Can a Negro Study Law in Texas? (1946), by artist Charles White. In 1950, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a Negro could. The decision in Sweatt v. Painter was one of a long series of rulings by the high court, beginning in the late 1930s, that chipped away at the legal foundations of segregation.
Blacks in America

On June 29, 1964, the United States Congress passed a sweeping Civil Rights Act, climaxing a decade of rising protest against the racial segregation that the Supreme Court had sought to end in Brown v. Board of Education. Since then, amid much turmoil, the condition of black Americans and notions of civil rights have vastly changed. Black leaders, notably the Reverend Jesse Jackson, have moved from protest into mainstream politics. The federal courts have begun to confront the thorny issue of "color-conscious" remedies for racial discrimination. Meanwhile, across the nation, seven million black Americans now live in households earning more than the white median income, many of them in integrated suburbs. Left behind is a large urban "underclass," victims of growing family instability, economic shifts, and mediocre schooling. Our contributors assess black gains and setbacks, many of them unpublicized, since the 1964 act was passed.

THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION

by Harvard Sitkoff

"There comes a time," Lyndon Baines Johnson liked to say, quoting Cactus Jack Garner, "in poker and politics, when a man has to shove in all his stack."

For LBJ, the moment came on November 22, 1963. President Kennedy was dead. Few Americans knew what to make of his successor. To the press, the Texan was known as a wheeler-dealer with a cynical disdain for principle. He had stolen (it was rumored) his first election to the Senate. In Congress, he had frequently thwarted the aims of the Democratic Left. His dislike of the Kennedy family was plain. Now, as President, he needed to establish his legitimacy.

Less than 24 hours after taking the oath of office in Dallas aboard Air Force One, President Lyndon Johnson decided to "go for broke" on civil rights.
On November 27, five days after JFK's assassination, Johnson told a joint session of Congress that "no memorial, oration, or eulogy could more eloquently honor President Kennedy's memory than the earliest passage of the civil-rights bill for which he fought." In the months that followed, Johnson steered through the House and Senate an omnibus civil-rights statute, a bill even stronger than the one that Kennedy had submitted in June of 1963. It was no easy task.

The Strength of an Idea

In the Senate, a coalition of Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans had stood for decades as an impassable barrier to any significant civil-rights legislation. Led by Richard Russell (D.-Ga.), the Southerners mounted a filibuster to keep the bill from coming up for a vote. They counted on the civil-rights forces being unable, as they so often had been in the past, to muster the 67 votes needed to impose cloture. Winter turned to spring as Russell's stalwarts droned on and on. Finally, in May, after several "good long talks" at the White House, Senate minority leader Everett Dirksen (R.-Ill.) cast his lot with the President. With the help of Dirksen's moderate Republicans, cloture was invoked. The Senate approved Johnson's civil-rights bill, 73 to 27, on June 29.

It was the first major civil-rights legislation since the era of Reconstruction, and it represented the beginning of a belated effort by the executive and legislative branches of government to back up what the federal courts had been saying for more than a decade. Among other things, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited racial discrimination by employers and labor unions, and in most places of public accommodation; authorized the government to withhold money from public programs practicing discrimination; created an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; and gave the attorney general power to file suits against school districts that maintained segregated facilities.

What it did not do, as opponents of civil-rights legislation had feared that it might, was require employers to hire workers on the basis of race to correct some sort of racial imbalance.

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“No army,” Everett Dirksen had said when announcing his support of the civil-rights bill, “can withstand the strength of an idea whose time has come.” Legal equality for blacks had been a long time coming. That it finally arrived was due in part to economic and demographic changes that had brought blacks north and into the Democratic Party. The Kennedy assassination provided moral impetus.

But most important of all was the disciplined, organized pressure—in the form of sit-ins, marches, and boycotts that frightened many whites, hurt others economically, and focused national attention on the Negro’s plight—by blacks who had grown tired of waiting. “For years now I have heard the word ‘Wait,’” the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., declared in 1963. “It rings in the ear of every Negro with piercing familiarity. This ‘Wait’ has always meant ‘Never.’”

Forging Alliances

During the final quarter of the 19th century, with the gains of Reconstruction beginning to recede, all three branches of the federal government had permitted the white South to reduce blacks to a state of peonage, to segregate them, and to disenfranchise them. Blacks did what they could to protest (or escape) the closed, rigid caste system that was the Southern way. Largely bereft of white allies, their successes were few.

For most blacks, life would not change until World War II. There were, nevertheless, a few glimmers of hope. Some stemmed from the mass migration of blacks to the urban North between 1910 and 1920. Few found the Promised Land, but most experienced some relief from the tenantry, poverty, and ignorance of the Black Belt. Northern blacks, moreover, could vote. Politically, the Negro began to command attention.

The New Deal gave blacks some economic assistance and considerable symbolic consolation, though Franklin Roosevelt made few concrete attempts to end de jure racial discrimination. Responding to the growth of the black vote in the North, and its pronounced shift away from the party of Lincoln after 1932, Roosevelt appointed more than 100 blacks to senior government posts and tripled the number of black federal employees. In the administration of relief programs, Roosevelt also made sure that blacks received a fair share of the pie, even in the segregated South. And the First Lady identified herself closely with civil-rights leaders and organizations. As All in the Family’s Archie Bunker would later complain, “Eleanor Roosevelt discovered the colored. . . . We didn’t know they were there.”
Louisville flood victims, 1937, by Margaret Bourke-White. New Deal relief efforts meant more to Negroes than to whites. Differences in income, literacy, and life expectancy narrowed during the Roosevelt era but remained wide.

FDR's appointments to the Supreme Court (including Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, and William O. Douglas) also made a difference. The high court's favorable decisions in cases involving the exclusion of blacks from juries, the right to picket against racial discrimination in employment, disenfranchisement, discrimination in the pay of black teachers, and the admission of blacks to graduate education all helped make the Afro-American less a freedman and more a free man.

Inevitably, the rising expectations of American blacks began to exceed Washington's performance. The onset of World War II helped bring matters to a head. The ideological character of the struggle against fascism (and Nazi racism), along with the government's desperate need for men in both overalls and uniform, led many blacks to anticipate a better deal. The result, when this did not occur, was a new militancy in black communities.

In 1941, for example, A. Philip Randolph of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters threatened to mobilize an all-black march on Washington unless the President opened up jobs in defense industries to blacks. Roosevelt responded with Executive Order 8802, which created a Fair Employment Practices Commission and prohibited racial discrimination in companies and unions engaged in war-related work. This, combined with a
wartime labor shortage, created jobs for two million blacks. Another 200,000 entered the federal civil service. The number of black union members doubled, to 1,250,000.

The war created the preconditions for a successful black crusade on behalf of racial justice. By war's end, many blacks in the North held decent blue-collar jobs. They were, as a group, more self-confident than ever before. Membership in the biracial National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) had grown sevenfold (to 351,000) during the war years. Several strong alliances had been forged: with the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, for example, and with Big Labor. Meanwhile, the new prominence of the United States as a world power, and its claims to moral leadership in the Cold War, elevated the "race problem" into a national embarrassment.

Harry Truman became the first U.S. President to identify his office with the specific objectives of the civil-rights movement. He did so despite intense opposition from within his own party. The coalition of Southern Democrats (including freshman Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas) and conservative Republicans on Capitol Hill stymied Truman's efforts to create a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission and killed his proposed antilynching and anti-poll tax laws. When the President endorsed the civil-rights plank written into the 1948 Democratic platform, Strom Thurmond (D.-S.C.) and other Southern delegates walked out of the convention and formed the splinter Dixiecrats, a split that nearly cost Truman the election.

**Assault on Jim Crow**

Truman rarely got his way in Congress on civil-rights issues, but he issued executive orders in 1948 ending segregation in the military and barring racial discrimination in federal employment and in work done under government contract. His Justice Department prepared amicus curiae briefs backing the positions taken by the NAACP as its lawyers argued major civil-rights cases before the Supreme Court. One such case, involving an eight-year-old in Topeka, Kansas, named Linda Brown—who had to travel a mile by bus to reach a black elementary school even though she lived only three blocks from a white elementary school—began its journey through the courts in 1951.

No issue in the immediate postwar years meant more to blacks than school desegregation, and the NAACP's Legal Defense and Education Fund, led by Thurgood Marshall, coordinated a series of lawsuits in several states charging that segregated education was discriminatory per se. Many blacks and liberal whites
## TURMOIL AND PROGRESS: 1940–1984

### 1940
Census finds 12.9 million blacks in United States, 9.8 percent of population.

### 1941
President Roosevelt establishes Fair Employment Practices Commission.

### 1942
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) founded by James Farmer.

### 1943
Race riots in Detroit, Mobile, New York (Harlem), and other cities; Army Air Force deploys first of two all-black fighter squadrons in Europe.

### 1944
President Truman creates Committee on Civil Rights.

### 1945
NAACP lawyers (Thurgood Marshall, center) outside Supreme Court, 1954

### 1947
Jackie Robinson breaks major league baseball color barrier, joining Brooklyn Dodgers.

### 1948
After black threats to boycott revived Cold War draft, Truman ends segregation in armed forces; 35 Southern delegates reject civil-rights platform at Democratic presidential nominating convention, endorse Dixiecrat candidate Sen. Strom Thurmond (D-S.C.).

### 1949
Supreme Court desegregates University of Texas law school; blacks fight in Korea in racially mixed units.

### 1950
Supreme Court rules public school segregation unconstitutional; Southern White Citizens Councils formed in protest.

### 1951
Montgomery bus boycott organized by Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.

### 1952
Southern Manifesto signed by 101 members of U.S. Congress.

### 1953
Martin Luther King, Jr., organizes Southern Christian Leadership Conference; President Eisenhower dispatches 101st Airborne to Little Rock to enforce federal district court school desegregation order.

### 1954
Integrating Central High, Little Rock, 1957

### 1955
Montgomery bus boycott organized by Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.

### 1956
Southern Manifesto signed by 101 members of U.S. Congress.

### 1957
Wave of sit-ins begins after four black students are denied service at Greensboro lunch counter; Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee formed.

### 1958
President Kennedy creates Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity; CORE Freedom Rides through South provoke white violence.

### 1959
Martin Luther King, Jr., at massive March on Washington, 1963

### 1960
U.S. Marshals escort James Meredith to University of Mississippi to guarantee his court-ordered admission to the school; long-awaited JFK executive order forbids racial/religious discrimination in federally supported housing.

### 1961
Sit-in protesting discrimination in Birmingham met by harsh white resistance; estimated 250,000 people at March on Washington; JFK assassinated (Nov. 22).
1964 Congress passes Civil Rights Act; President Johnson signs Economic Opportunity Act creating Job Corps, Head Start, VISTA; LBJ issues executive order on affirmative action; Martin Luther King, Jr., receives Nobel Peace Prize.

Lyndon Johnson declares war on poverty, 1964.

1965 Malcolm X assassinated (Feb. 21); Voting Rights Act passed; massive civil rights march from Selma to Montgomery; rioting and looting in Watts, Los Angeles, leaves 34 dead, 1,032 injured.

1966 Edward W. Brooke (R-Mass.) becomes first black elected to U.S. Senate since Reconstruction; Robert Weaver appointed U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, becoming first black cabinet member; rioting and riots in Lansing, Omaha, Cleveland, and other cities.

1967 Thurgood Marshall is first black named to Supreme Court; 14,000 army paratroopers, National Guardsmen, and state and city police required to control disturbances in Detroit.

Antibusing protest, Boston, 1976

1968 Martin Luther King, Jr., assassinated in Memphis (April 4); rioting and looting ensue in Washington and 125 other U.S. cities, leaving 38 dead, 3,300 injured.

1969 President Nixon’s Labor Department initiates Philadelphia Plan.

1971 Jesse Jackson founds Operation PUSH; Supreme Court upholds compulsory busing to achieve school desegregation.

1973 Supreme Court rules potential jurors can be questioned to detect racial prejudice.

1975 Violence in Louisville over first court-ordered cross-district school-busing program.

1976 Some 1,800 blacks hold elective office in Southern states.

Ronald Reagan signs King holiday bill, 1983.


1978 Supreme Court rules minority quota in medical-school admission policy unconstitutional.

1980 Race riot in Miami leaves 16 dead.

1981 President Reagan curbs spending for Comprehensive Employment and Training Act programs, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, food stamps, and other social welfare programs.

1983 Supreme Court bans tax exemptions for schools with racial barriers; Rev. Jesse Jackson declares candidacy for Democratic presidential nomination; Congress approves a national holiday (third Monday in January) commemorating Martin Luther King, Jr.

1984 Census reports 28 million blacks in U.S., 12 percent of U.S. population; in shift, U.S. Civil Rights Commission opposes race quotas in hiring.
believed that a Supreme Court decision ruling "separate but equal" schooling unconstitutional would promptly spell the end of Jim Crow in every other area of life.

On May 17, 1954, in the case of *Oliver Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka*, the Supreme Court, headed by former California Governor Earl Warren, ruled that separate educational facilities "are inherently unequal" and deprived blacks of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. The landmark decision was greeted with hosannas by black leaders and hoots by Southern politicians. Sen. James Eastland (D.-Miss.) asserted that the South would neither "abide by nor obey this legislative decision by a political court."

Eastland was right, at least for a while.

For a decade after 1954, despite the Supreme Court's decision in *Brown* and its subsequent rulings against other forms of segregation, virtually nothing of consequence changed in the South. In 1960, fewer than one percent of Southern black children attended school with white children.

'Massive Resistance'

Part of the blame lay with the Supreme Court. A year after *Brown*, the court issued its so-called *Brown II* decision, rejecting the NAACP's plea to order instant and total school desegregation and adopting instead a "go slow" approach. The Court assigned responsibility for drawing up desegregation plans to (white) local school authorities, requiring only that desegregation proceed with "all deliberate speed," a tempo otherwise undefined.

For his part, President Dwight D. Eisenhower was not disposed to press the matter. He did not like the *Brown* ruling. He stated flatly once that "I do not believe you can change the hearts of men with laws or decisions." No bigot, but blind to the importance of ending racial injustice, Eisenhower had no intention of enforcing compliance with the high court's ruling in the South. He was under no pressure from Congress to do so.

Not surprisingly, Washington's indifference emboldened white supremacists in the South, who pursued a campaign of "massive resistance" to desegregation. State governors felt free to defy the President himself, as Orval Faubus demonstrated at Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957. When Eisenhower intervened on that occasion with U.S. troops, it was less to ensure that nine black students safely took their seats in Central High School than to uphold the law and assert his authority as chief executive.

Eisenhower's failure to use his office as a "bully pulpit" to persuade whites that racial discrimination ran counter to both
law and morality was a lost opportunity. The costs would be high. Denied the fruits of the victories that they had won in court, and without support in Washington, blacks now looked to new tactics, organizations, and leaders. A battle that had been waged indoors, before the bench, now burst into the streets.

It began in Montgomery, Alabama, when Mrs. Rosa Parks, a black woman, said no to a bus driver on December 1, 1955. Her refusal to give up her seat to a white man on a crowded bus, and her subsequent arrest, sparked a bus boycott that would unite the city's 50,000 blacks and demonstrate the effectiveness of nonviolent mass protest. Led by 26-year-old Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., pastor of the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church, 90 percent of Montgomery's blacks shunned the Montgomery City Line beginning on Monday, December 5. Despite lawsuits, arrests, and bombings, they stayed off the buses for 381 days until vindicated by the Supreme Court.

The bus boycott won sympathetic coverage in the Northern news media. Blasts across the country took heart. More important, blacks now had a charismatic leader in the person of Martin Luther King, Jr. Not only had he fused the precepts of Christ, Gandhi, and Jefferson into a moral demand for racial justice; he had also displayed, in the course of a trying and dangerous year, a genius for organization. Eventually united in King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference, black ministers became a key element in the civil-rights struggle. (Today, 25 black Protestant denominations claim 17 million members; their churches remain local bulwarks of black social and political life.)

A Stroke of the Pen

Stirred by the example of Montgomery, black student activists began employing the "sit-in" at local restaurants throughout the South to demand the right to equal service. By the end of 1960, despite thousands of arrests, sit-ins had accomplished their purpose in 140 Southern towns and cities, and blacks were busily conducting wade-ins at beaches, kneel-ins at churches, sleep-ins at motels, and read-ins at public libraries. In 1961, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) stepped up its Freedom Ride campaign. To prod the White House, and its new occupant, John F. Kennedy, into enforcing Supreme Court desegregation orders, interracial groups of CORE members in May began boarding Greyhound and Trailways buses in Washington, D.C., and riding into the deep South.

The momentum of protest placed the new administration in a difficult position. As a senator, John F. Kennedy had seldom
raised his voice in support of racial justice. But needing the black vote (and the white liberal vote) to win the Presidency in 1960, he campaigned as a champion of racial equality. However, his narrow margin of victory—roughly 100,000 votes—gave him little room to maneuver. On the Hill, he faced the same coalition of Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans that had thwarted Harry Truman.

For most of his thousand days in the White House, Kennedy expediently balanced the conflicting claims of white and black, North and South, conservative and liberal. He appointed more blacks to high federal office than any previous president but deferred to James Eastland, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, on the appointment of several outright segregationists to the federal bench. He intervened to desegregate the University of Mississippi when a crisis forced his hand but did little to push integration in the public schools of the old Confederacy. He procrastinated for two years before fulfilling his campaign pledge to end discrimination in federally financed housing with "a stroke of the presidential pen."

On to Black Power

Unless the pressure became unbearable and relentless, Kennedy would not, or could not, act. Civil-rights leaders, tired once more of waiting—and worried, too, that lack of progress would strengthen the growing radical fringe of the movement—launched a new series of mass protests in April 1963.

The confrontation that King and his aides had plotted for Birmingham worked to perfection. Birmingham was more than just unyielding on segregation. It was, for Negroes, a dangerous city. Blacks called it "Bombingham" for the 18 racial bombings and more than 50 cross-burning incidents that had occurred there since 1957. Leading the vanguard of the last-ditch defenders of segregation was police commissioner Eugene ("Bull") Connor. King counted on Connor’s vicious response to peaceful black demonstrations to awaken both the nation and the President.

He was not disappointed. The vivid, televised scenes of police dogs lunging at peaceful protestors, of surging nightsticks and electric cattle-prods, of high-pressure water-hoses ripping the clothes off black women, of thousands of hymn-singing children being hauled off to jail—all of this aroused the conscience of millions of Americans. It went on for two months.

"The sound of the explosion in Birmingham," King observed, "reached all the way to Washington." In June, when Alabama Governor George Wallace sought to bar two black
students from enrolling in the University of Alabama, the President decided that the time had come.

In an address to the nation on June 11, Kennedy asserted his leadership on what he called “a moral issue . . . as old as the Scriptures and . . . as clear as the American Constitution.” He backed up his words with a deed, urging Congress to enact the most comprehensive civil-rights law in U.S. history. That August, some 250,000 Americans participated in the March on Washington, massing before the Lincoln Memorial to show their support for the legislation that Kennedy had sent to the Hill.

Yet, in the three months remaining to him, Kennedy had little more to say on civil rights, perhaps heeding opinion polls which indicated that white Americans thought he was moving too fast on integration. Congress took no action on the civil-rights bill. President Kennedy traveled to Dallas in November, apparently content to let future events create the sense of urgency necessary to vanquish the Southern foes of equal rights in Congress. Ironically, his assassination did just that.

A year after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed into law, in the wake of renewed black protest demonstrations, this time in Selma, Congress passed a Voting Rights Act that President Johnson declared would “strike away the last major shackle” of the Negro’s “ancient bonds.” The act prohibited literacy tests and other devices long employed to deter black voters in the South. It authorized federal examiners to register qualified black voters directly. Within four years, the number of Southern blacks registered to vote would grow from one million to 3.1 million. The lock on the ballot box was broken.

But so, in some respects, was the civil-rights movement. The summer of 1965 brought an escalation of the war in Vietnam and a bloody race riot in Watts, Los Angeles. The Watts riot inaugurated a succession of “long hot summers” for a troubled nation and spelled the end of the era of nonviolence. Within a year, the civil-rights movement was hopelessly divided over strategy and tactics, over Black Power and black separatism. A resentful Lyndon Johnson, who believed himself betrayed by those he had sought to help, devoted only 45 words to civil rights in his 1967 State of the Union address. The Second Reconstruction had set much in motion, but it was over.
REDEFINING CIVIL RIGHTS

by Terry Eastland

On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court launched the modern quest for racial equality in America when it struck down public school segregation in *Brown v. Board of Education*. That quest has developed slowly into a controversy about the meaning of civil rights and the idea of equality—a controversy that continues to inject itself into our politics today.

After the Civil War, black leaders and civil-rights advocates generally believed that the law should make no distinctions on the basis of race. As Richard Cain, a black who represented North Carolina in Congress, explained during the House debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1875: "We do not want any discriminations. I do not ask for any legislation for the colored people of this country that is not applied to the white people. All that we ask is equal laws. . . ."

In 1896, this position was eloquently defended by Supreme Court Justice John Harlan. In his dissent from the infamous decision (*Plessy v. Ferguson*) that upheld segregation, Harlan stated that "Our Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights all citizens are equal before the law. . . . The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights are involved."

The *Brown* decision seemed to reflect Harlan's dissent. Over the next 20 years, however, many of those Americans united in the effort to eliminate racial discrimination either rejected or temporarily shelved the idea of colorblind justice, accepting the alternative view that the law should indeed make some major distinctions based on race. In time, the federal government itself promoted the notion that only "race-preferential" policies could ensure (or accelerate) black gains in education, employment, and politics. Not only in government but in many areas of business and education, the idea took hold that blacks—and, later, other groups that could point to present or historic deprivation—now deserved compensation, even if it came at the expense of other American citizens.

A new, revised, and enlarged dictionary of civil rights appeared. It included terms such as "busing," "set-asides," "available pools," and "goals and timetables." The philosophy
underlying race preference was well summarized by Justice Harry A. Blackmun in 1978: "To get beyond racism, we must first take account of race."

Ironically, the same Brown decision that struck the fatal blow to segregation helped bring about the race-conscious policies of the future. The 1954 ruling seemed to say that it is constitutionally impermissible for government to make any distinctions based on race. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) had urged the Court to adopt exactly this principle, arguing that no government anywhere should be allowed to "confer" or "deny" benefits on the basis of color or race.

But in fact, the Brown decision nowhere explicitly said that racial distinctions made by government are unconstitutional per se. Had it done so, a precedent would have been established that later courts would have found most difficult to overcome. Instead, Brown left the nation's courts a grant of flexibility in dealing with matters involving race.

Other features of Brown augured the future evolution of the idea of civil rights. In particular, the decision reflected the judiciary's growing interest in the findings of social science—an interest that in time spread to other branches of government. Chief Justice Earl Warren's unanimous opinion leaned heavily on social scientists' judgments about the effects of segregation on minority schoolchildren.

Making Haste Slowly

What were these effects? "A feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community"—a feeling "that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Maintaining that "this finding is amply supported by modern authority," Warren cited seven scholarly works in his famous Footnote 11, among them psychologist Kenneth B. Clark's Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development (1950). Footnote 11 disturbed constitutional scholars: After all, "modern authorities" could be found to support a contrary view. But the application of social science data, especially statistics, to legal questions involving race became a common exercise in subsequent years. As Jesse Jackson observed 25 years after Brown: "Equality can be measured. It can be turned into numbers."

No less a portent was the Warren Court's treatment of blacks as a group. Looking beyond the individual plaintiffs in the case, the Court saw a class of Americans—blacks—and undertook to address the problem of discrimination endured by so
many of them. Instead of enjoining the school districts involved from segregating on the basis of race and then ordering the victorious Brown plaintiffs admitted, the Court, concerned about the broad implications of its decision, asserted that the question of relief "presents problems of considerable complexity." It asked for further argument the following year, and even then it temporized. As Columbia's Louis Lusky observed a decade later, what the plaintiffs actually received was "a promise that, some time in the indefinite future, other people would be given the rights which the Court said [they] had."

Not Enough

Thus, while the Supreme Court in Brown erased the color line of school segregation, it failed to shake off the old habit of regarding blacks as members of a group needing different treatment. This group approach, applied later in an effort to help blacks, became the foundation of the race-preferential policies of the 1960s and '70s. In common with Brown, these policies sought less to give relief to specific individuals suffering from specific acts of discrimination than to improve the economic, political, and educational condition, in group terms, of blacks and other minorities.

In 1954, of course, none of this was foreseen. The issues seemed simpler then. Asked by Justice Felix Frankfurter to "spell out in concrete what would happen" if the Court ruled for the plaintiffs in Brown, NAACP special counsel Thurgood Marshall said that his hope was that school district boundaries everywhere would be drawn "on a natural basis, without regard to race or color."

To Marshall, assistant counsel Robert L. Carter, and other civil-rights leaders, overturning Jim Crow laws and advancing the principle that nondiscrimination was a moral as well as a constitutional imperative seemed to go hand-in-hand. That principle was also deemed essential to black advancement: Eliminating race-based distinctions would in itself lead to progress in education and employment that in time would bring blacks fully into the American mainstream.

Yet, before long, many blacks began to wonder whether this theory ever would receive a fair test. For in the absence of pres-

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In a year marked by racial violence, poor people marched on Washington, athletes gave a Black Power salute at the Olympics, and Yale announced a new B.A. in Afro-American studies. 

Sure from the Supreme Court or the President, white Southern governors and state legislators successfully defied the Brown decision. Virtually all of the Southern states adopted "pupil-placement schemes" that were race-neutral on their face but in practice were employed to minimize desegregation if not keep blacks out of white schools entirely. By 1962, fewer than two percent of all black students in Texas, Georgia, Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Florida were enrolled in biracial schools. In Mississippi, South Carolina, and Alabama, there were no biracial schools at all.

As the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., assailed "institutionalized tokenism" in the South, the NAACP began taking aim at a different sort of problem in the North and West, where four million Southern blacks had taken up residence since World War II. There, school segregation existed not by law but because of residential segregation. In 1962, the NAACP launched its first successful attacks on de facto school segregation in a dozen communities, from Coatesville, Pennsylvania, to Eloy, Arizona.

Inevitably, some civil-rights leaders began to question
whether simply pulling down the color barriers would bring tangible educational gains in either North or South. In 1962, a group of blacks sued the Philadelphia school board, contending through its attorney that the city’s race-neutral policy of pupil assignment was “not enough.” The lawyer argued that the board “cannot be colorblind,” but must make decisions “in such a way as to accomplish . . . integration.”

Scaling New Peaks

The idea that colorblind policies might not be “enough” was seconded by social scientists in government and academe who, during the early 1960s, were beginning to produce reams of data showing that blacks as a group still lagged far behind whites, and not only in education. Blacks were less likely than whites to finish high school, more heavily concentrated in low-wage occupations, and afflicted with higher rates of joblessness. In 1964, the National Urban League’s Whitney Young cited the “serious disabilities resulting from historic handicaps” when he spoke of the need for a “special effort” on behalf of American blacks.

Young did not call for hiring quotas, only the granting of preference in hiring situations where a black and a white were equally qualified. Others, however, were bolder, couching their arguments less in practical than in moral, almost theological, terms. Charles Silberman, for example, wrote in a 1962 Fortune article that past oppression of blacks was a “sin” for which “all Americans owe some act of atonement.” In his 1964 book, Crisis in White and Black, Silberman maintained that “as soon as we agree that special measures are necessary, the question of numbers—of how many Negroes are to be hired in what job categories—inevitably arises.” Calling them a “meaningful measure of change,” Silberman became one of the first to endorse quotas for blacks, though his view was still that of a distinct minority.

On Capitol Hill, testifying on the 1964 Civil Rights Act, NAACP executive director Roy Wilkins emphasized that a quota system would be “unfair whether it is used for [blacks] or against [blacks]. . . . We feel people ought to be hired because of their ability, irrespective of their color.” Most civil-rights spokesmen and congressional liberals were of the same opinion regarding employment quotas and race-conscious policies in general. As a result, the Civil Rights Act specified that no employer would be required to grant “preferential treatment to any group” because of an “imbalance in [his] work force” and also that desegregation “shall not mean the assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome racial imbalance.”
The Civil Rights Act and the subsequent Voting Rights Act of 1965 were designed to outlaw all remaining legal barriers to schools, jobs, public facilities, and voting booths. Educational and economic opportunity were explicitly made independent of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The two acts also granted the federal government broad enforcement powers, including the power to withhold funds and initiate lawsuits.

Having pushed the pivotal rights bills through Congress, President Lyndon Johnson looked for new peaks to scale. Drawing on Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s observation that the next phase of “the Negro revolution” would include demands for jobs and income roughly comparable to those of whites, the President declared in his celebrated 1965 Howard University commencement address: “We seek not just freedom but opportunity—not just legal equity ... but equality as a fact and a result.” The Great Society programs, from Head Start to the Job Corps, were designed in part to help bring about this “equality as a result.” So was a little-noticed executive order signed in 1965 by Lyndon Johnson—Executive Order 11246—which backed an as yet ill-defined concept called “affirmative action.”

But 1965 also brought signs of trouble. The President committed major U.S. forces to the Vietnam War. In the predominantly black neighborhood of Watts, in Los Angeles, the National Guard had to be called in to quell a week of rioting and looting. Meanwhile, black leaders were increasingly divided over whether the movement should continue to endorse Martin Luther King, Jr.’s nonviolent means and integrationist ends, or join the militant proponents of Black Power in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Congress of Racial Equality. Black separatism, championed by Elijah Muhammad and Malcolm X, revived as an ideology.

Numbers

Despite this turbulence—indeed, in part because of it—federal authorities continued to seek ways of integrating blacks into the American mainstream. The first big target was school segregation.

Brandishing the government’s new power to withhold federal funds from public schools practicing racial discrimination, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in 1966 issued guidelines prohibiting “freedom-of-choice” plans and requiring school systems to bring about “some faculty integration” in each school and, as far as students were concerned,
BLACKS AND POLITICS: A NEW MATURITY

Politically, black Americans have entered Stage Three.

Stage One (1945–1964) was the postwar era of mobilization. New civil-rights groups such as CORE joined older ones such as the NAACP to make the condition of black citizens a national issue that Washington would be forced to address.

Stage Two (1964–1980) was the era of federalization. Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 removed the crudest constraints on blacks' social and political participation in American life; the Great Society programs created jobs and a new middle class. The civil-rights movement was rent by fissures that would not close, even as a new generation of black leaders emerged on the scene via politics, not protest.

During the 1970s, Republican and Democratic administrations alike expanded affirmative action, enforced the voting rights laws, and appointed blacks to cabinet posts. Today, there are more than 5,500 black elected officials nationwide (versus fewer than 300 in 1965), including 247 mayors and 21 Congressmen.

Stage Three is the era of sophistication, as blacks improve the quality and extend the range of their political behavior. It is essential for blacks to diversify their political stands and their political strategies—and thereby expand the potential pool of political allies—if they are to avoid a repetition of the early Reagan years.

The Reagan administration has been at best indifferent to the concerns of black Americans. At its mindless worst, it has sought to weaken provisions of the Voting Rights Act and to allow tax exemptions for private schools that refuse to admit blacks. The administration's budget cuts have curbed programs (such as food stamps and Medicaid) on which millions of poor blacks depend. The black community received barely enough support in Congress and the courts to contain the damage.

Blacks need new friends. They will find new friends when their political opinions and behavior more closely match those of other Americans. Though largely unremarked in the press, this transformation is already under way. Consider the findings of a study conducted by Data Black, a polling firm, in 1980. Of the blacks surveyed, 50 percent answered "harmful" or "unsure" when asked about the effects of welfare programs; 51 percent answered "increase" or "unsure" when asked about defense spending. Public Opinion Quarterly, meanwhile, has reported that 41 percent of blacks favor the death penalty for murder, and 72 percent favor tuition tax credits; roughly 60 percent oppose abortion for married women. This sample of black opinion would probably surprise most Americans.

Increasingly, black voters are making up their own minds. In Alabama in 1982, one-third of all black voters defied Coretta Scott King and other civil-rights leaders (who supported a white liberal, George
McMillan, in his race for governor) and helped hand former Governor George Wallace a victory in the Democratic primary. After his triumph in the general election, Wallace rewarded blacks swiftly, appointing two blacks (Alabama's first) to his cabinet and backing four others for committee chairmanships in the legislature. There is a lesson here for the Republican Party, if it would only open its eyes.

There were other portents in 1982. In California, Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley fashioned a broad coalition of whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Orientals, and came within 100,000 votes (out of 7.9 million cast) of becoming America's first black governor. Ironically, rather than hailing Bradley's achievement, civil-rights leaders such as the National Urban Coalition's Carl Holman depicted the outcome as the result of "racism-as-usual." Holman would have done better to chastize the 600,000 black Californians who did not register to vote. He might also have leveled some criticism at the 5,000 members of Alpha Phi Alpha who attended the fraternity's annual convention in California during the summer of 1982 but never even contemplated financing perhaps 100 of their number to stay behind and help with voter registration.

The fact is, political maturity demands self-criticism. Civil-rights leaders, who are no longer at the forefront of black politics but still wield considerable influence, need to understand this. Most black politicians already do.

Certainly Jesse Jackson does. Jackson is enough of a realist to know that he will not become the Democratic presidential nominee; he is intelligent enough to know that his candidacy can nevertheless accomplish a great deal. He has already jolted hundreds of thousands out of political apathy—like the many newly registered blacks in Chicago who helped elect Harold Washington mayor in April 1983. Some 41 percent of the 17.8 million eligible blacks are still not registered to vote. But, across the nation, efforts such as Operation Big Vote, now active in 50 cities, have already begun to reverse this situation. Jackson will provide new momentum.

"My running," he says, "will stimulate thousands to run [for elective office]; it will make millions register. If you can get your share of legislators, mayors, sheriffs, school-board members, tax assessors, and dogcatchers, you can live with whoever is in the White House."

—Martin Kilson

Professor Kilson teaches government at Harvard University.
to meet "performance criteria."

Specifically, districts in which eight to nine percent of the community's black students were enrolled in integrated schools had to double this proportion within a year; those with only four to five percent had to triple it. The HEW guidelines, focused on (but not confined to) Southern schools, represented the first time that Washington had mandated percentage requirements as a measure of desegregation.

The guidelines upset Congress. The House of Representatives (but not the Senate) promptly passed legislation prohibiting the use of cross-town "busing" to achieve integration, the first of several antibusing amendments the House was to pass. But HEW's actions were immediately upheld by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans. This same court subsequently declared that public school officials "have the affirmative duty . . . to bring about an integrated, unitary school system in which there are no Negro schools and no white schools—just schools." The Fifth Circuit rejected the view that the Constitution requires only that schools not discriminate. In the court's opinion, the Constitution requires actual integration. And integration has to be total—in terms of "students, faculties, facilities, and activities."

Zoning, Pairing, Busing

After 14 years of almost complete silence on the issue, the Supreme Court in 1968 finally declared its impatience with the slow pace of school desegregation. In a case arising in Virginia, Green v. New Kent County School Board, the Court ruled that public schools must not only eliminate discrimination "root and branch," but also devise a plan for doing so "that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now."

The proportion of blacks attending biracial schools began to rise rapidly—to 32 percent in 1968, and 86 percent in 1970. Even as many whites were fleeing big-city public schools, federal judges used a variety of means to try to bring about school integration, including geographical zoning, school "pairing"—and, of course, compulsory busing of schoolchildren. In 1971, the Supreme Court, now headed by a Nixon appointee, Warren Burger, unanimously upheld the legality of such busing in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. The path left open by Brown was now taken in Swann: The law may indeed take account of color. "Just as the race of students must be considered in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred," said the Court, "so also must race be considered
Meanwhile, even as busing became a court-sanctioned school integration strategy, often amid considerable local conflict, other “race-conscious” policies were being devised and adopted. During the mid-1960s, many whites were worried about (and frightened by) both urban riots and the strident new emphasis on black separatism. As Theodore Draper noted in *The Rediscovery of Black Nationalism* (1970), only a few years earlier “the tendency [had been] overwhelmingly ‘integrationist’ within the black community and among black leaders.” Now, however, integrationism “had become a bad word, and some form of ‘separatism’—cultural, political, or both—was all the rage, especially in black intellectual and youthful circles.”

**What Is ‘Affirmative Action’?**

Intellectually, many highly placed whites, particularly those staffing foundations and teaching in universities, had also come to accept the militants’ proposition that blacks deserved recompense; the legacy of past injuries, they believed, lingered on, preventing blacks from competing on equal terms with whites. “To treat our black students equally,” said Vanderbilt University Chancellor Alexander Heard, “we have to treat them differently.” Besides increasing black student enrollment and taking on more black faculty members, university officials agreed to create “black studies” programs and even separate black student centers. There was irony in this, for here the demands of young blacks bitterly denouncing integration were being granted by white academics who deeply believed in that very goal.

As hundreds of universities and some major corporations voluntarily opened their doors to more blacks, federal agencies began experimenting with Lyndon Johnson’s executive order on “affirmative action.”

LBJ’s Executive Order 11246, amended in 1967, not only prohibited most businesses with more than 50 employees on the payroll or with government contracts worth more than $50,000—a group that then included some 325,000 employers with a total of about 30 million workers—from discriminating “against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” The order also required such businesses to “take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed and that employees are treated” without regard to those characteristics. But what did “affirmative action” really mean?
In the Kennedy administration, the term had been used in directives calling for race-neutral actions: Recruit more widely; offer job training; rid employment tests of racial bias. While the U.S. Department of Labor did press contractors during the Johnson years to hire more minorities (defined as blacks, Hispanics, American Indians, and Asians and Pacific Islanders), it did not attempt to say how many more such people an employer should hire. It was the Nixon administration that first began to require hiring on the basis of numerical goals.

Thus, in 1969, the Nixon Labor Department drew up its "Philadelphia Plan," under which construction firms in that city were required to increase their percentage of minority craftsmen from the existing two percent to as much as 26 percent within four years. The Labor Department also began leaning on contractors in cities across the nation to hire more minorities, even when racial discrimination against identifiable individuals had not been demonstrated. The Labor Department's affirmative action effort aimed at gradually producing proportional minority representation. "Very few [contractors] are willing . . . to fight . . . through litigation," Under Secretary of Labor Laurence Silberman explained to Congress in 1971. "They usually come into compliance."

**Pools and Goals**

The Nixon administration's interest in more minority hiring in construction would fade as union opposition mounted. (Neither the Philadelphia Plan nor a similar program in Washington, D.C., ever met its goals.) But in other agencies, the drive for affirmative action remained strong. At HEW, for example, officials developed guidelines for achieving "equality as a result" in academe. Universities with government contracts were required to determine the "available pools" of labor, by race, qualified for each job, from janitor and secretary to professor and provost. The universities then had to compare the number of minorities working in each job category with their estimated "availability" in the "pools"—and hire more minorities if any "deficiencies" were apparent. Meeting such numerical "goals" was (and remains) an arduous task.\(^\text{*}\)

\(^{\text{*}}\)As administrators in academe, business, and the public sector have discovered, merely determining the proper "pool" can be tricky. In *Blacks and the Military* (1982), Martin Binkin listed some of the many yardsticks against which black representation in the armed forces (now about 20 percent) could theoretically be measured. They include the proportion of blacks among (1) all Americans (12 percent), (2) those from age 18 to 23 (13 to 14 percent), (3) high school graduates from age 18 to 22 (12 percent), (4) military-age people who would be expected to qualify for enlistment (five to eight percent), (5) noncollege males from age 18 to 23 (20 percent), (6) all blue-collar workers (14 percent).
During the early 1970s, HEW’s Office of Civil Rights cited 20 universities—among them Harvard, the University of Michigan, Vanderbilt, New Mexico State, and the University of Texas—for falling short of their assigned goals. In a 1975 settlement with the University of California at Berkeley, hailed by Washington officials as a model for affirmative action in higher education, the institution was required to place at least 100 additional women and minorities in teaching positions over the next 30 years. The seemingly modest number of jobs involved under the Berkeley Plan reflected the proportion of women and minorities in various labor pools, which for some academic specialties is very small.

Many of the top officials at universities that had pioneered in adopting their own race-preferential admissions policies during the late 1960s, and had applauded the affirmative action requirements imposed by Washington on business, now lamented HEW intrusions into faculty hiring. They argued that the dissimilarity between higher education and industry, and the special need of institutions of learning for autonomy, should restrain government zeal. But Washington did not readily back off. Said Stanley Pottinger, director of HEW’s Office of Civil Rights from 1970 to 1973: “We have a whale of a lot of power and we’re prepared to use it if necessary.”

An Uncertain Court

That same spirit animated yet another federal agency with muscle: the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which was responsible for enforcing the provisions against job discrimination in the 1964 Civil Rights Act. As early as 1969, the EEOC took the position that private firms’ equal employment opportunity programs must include consideration of their results—or lack of results—in terms of actual numbers of jobs for minorities and women.¹

Does affirmative action of this sort violate the Constitution? The Supreme Court has strained to avoid answering this question. But its rulings have permitted educational and employment practices that do make distinctions on the basis of race.

The Court first addressed the issue in 1978 in *Bakke v. Regents of the University of California.* Allan Bakke, the white plain-

¹The direct impact of federal affirmative action pressures on improved job opportunities for blacks is extremely difficult to reckon, especially in the private sector. The clearest gains have come in federal employment. Between 1970 and 1980, as the total of federal civilian employees rose by 13 percent, to 3,762,000, the number of blacks among them increased by 24 percent, to 693,000. Public sector employment now accounts for 53 percent of the jobs held by black managers and professionals.
tiff, had been denied admission to the University of California at Davis medical school in 1973, even though he was far more academically qualified than the minority candidates accepted under the school's quota program. The Court agreed that Bakke had been wronged and ordered him admitted to the medical school. But it refused to bar universities from considering race in admissions decisions.

A year later, the Court handed down its decision in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber. Brian Weber, the "blue-collar Bakke," had sued when his employer, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., turned him down for an in-house training program in which half the places were reserved for minorities. The court ruled that the Civil Rights Act does not prohibit private employers from voluntarily giving job preference to minorities.

A Matter of Health

Subsequently, in Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980), the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a "set-aside" program, established by Congress in 1977, under which a fixed percentage of some federal public works funds was earmarked for minority-owned businesses. In a plurality opinion, the Court understood the program as being of benefit to minority businesses actually disadvantaged by previous discrimination in the award of public construction contracts.

More recently, in cases involving police and firemen in Boston (1983) and police in Detroit (1984), the Court has declined to render any decision at all. In Boston, the demands of affirmative action quota plans had collided with the seniority principle of "last hired, first fired"; veteran white employees were laid off in budget-cutting moves, while blacks and other minorities were retained, even though they had far less seniority. A similar case from Memphis, Firefighters v. Stotts, is still before the court.

Overall, despite the Court's air of uncertainty, the race-conscious policies set into place by the early 1970s have become more entrenched. They have also provoked increasing debate.

The controversy over busing has involved issues of educational quality, racial understanding, and "white flight" (and, now, even some "black flight") to suburbs and private schools. In the matter of voting rights, the argument has focused on whether the purpose of the Voting Rights Act was simply to ensure and increase minorities' access to the polls, thereby yielding an integrated vote; or, in fact, to create conditions, via redistricting, in which minorities can elect public officials in
rough proportion to their numbers in the general population. The dispute over affirmative action, in the form of "goals" or "quotas," has centered on issues of academic standards and job qualifications; on the socio-economic advancement of minorities; and on "reverse discrimination" against nonminorities.

The fact that the courts, not to mention labor unions, employers, academics, and politicians, feel uncomfortable grappling with the question of whether and how distinctions should be made on the basis of race suggests the degree to which the civil-rights movement's first principle—that of nondiscrimination—remains compelling. That principle routed the diehard segregationists in the South and gave the civil-rights movement its remarkable moral force nationwide.

The polls hint at Americans' underlying beliefs. Even in 1963, a National Opinion Research Center survey reported that 80 percent of whites believed that "Negroes should have as good a chance as whites to get any kind of job." But in 1977, when the widely publicized Bakke case was argued before the Supreme Court, a Gallup poll on the question of whether any groups in America should have "preferential treatment" in finding jobs or places in college found support for the idea among only 11 percent of all those in the sample—and, interestingly, among only 30 percent of black respondents. Polls since then have yielded similar results.

The three decades since Brown have, unfortunately, been filled with instances in which the principle of nondiscrimination was variously denied, honored in the breach, or rationalized away. Despite all that, Americans have made considerable progress in treating one another as individuals without regard to race, and in expanding the range of opportunities available to everyone.

But it is worth pondering whether the civic climate would be healthier today had the nation acted firmly and rapidly in accordance with the principle of nondiscrimination in 1954, and then stuck to the principle after its clear articulation in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The past two decades have been good to a significant minority of the nation's blacks, the group referred to by the National Urban League as the "viable, albeit fragile, black middle class."

Thanks to the civil-rights legislation of the Lyndon Johnson era, the Great Society programs that opened up thousands of new government jobs to young blacks, the unprecedented economic boom of the 1960s, the uneven pressures of affirmative action, and, in general, a lessening of overt racial hostility, millions of black Americans today enjoy a level of education, political participation, and material well-being that is approaching that of the majority of whites. While the impact of four recessions since 1970 has slowed the pace of blacks' social and economic progress, sometimes dramatically, their gains are real.

Here is a progress report:

Income. At first glance, the Big Picture, so often publicized, is sobering — black median family income in 1982 ($13,598) continued to lag far behind that of whites ($24,603). But the median in this case is not the message, or at least not the whole of it. When statistics for the nation's total black population of 28 million are presented in the aggregate, the growing plight of the urban underclass tends to overpower some important distinctions.

In brief, black married couples are the "haves"; the "have-nots" are black single mothers and their offspring. Subtract the 2.9 million female-headed black households (now 42 percent of all black households) from the picture and the circumstances of blacks and whites in America appear far less divergent.

Thus, in 1982, the median annual income of all black married-couple families was $20,586, compared to $26,443 for white married-couple families. In households where both spouses were employed, the gap was even narrower — about $5,000. And, in households where the husband and wife, both working, were between ages 24 and 35, the difference was less than $3,000. With these young couples leading the way, the proportion of all black families earning $25,000 or more (in 1982 dollars) grew from 10.4 to 24.5 percent between 1960 and 1982. In all, some seven million blacks today live in households whose yearly earnings exceed the white median family income.
Education. By some indices, progress here has been even more dramatic. Today, the median level of schooling completed by blacks and whites, male and female, is above the 12th grade, and blacks lag behind whites by less than one-half year of classroom instruction.

Again, aggregate numbers mask part of the story. The fact that one-quarter of black youths do not complete high school hides, statistically, the progress of those who have pursued their studies further and thereby raised the educational level of the whole group. Between 1970 and 1980, the number of blacks annually enrolled full-time at American colleges and universities nearly doubled (from 522,000 to over one million).

Employment. Thanks in great measure to educational advancement, as well as to the changing nature of the U.S. economy, the kinds of jobs typically held by blacks have changed dramatically. In 1940, the largest single bloc of black workers—30 percent of the total—was employed on farms, mostly in the South. That figure today is two percent.

The long-term shift away from the farm has been matched by a long-term shift toward the retail store and the office building. Few blacks held white-collar jobs when World War II began, but 40 percent did in 1980 (versus 52 percent of whites), with black women making greater gains than black men.

Many of these jobs, of course, are clerical and many are in the public sector. But blacks have also made gains in the professions. Since 1960, the number of black doctors has tripled and the number of black lawyers has increased sixfold (though blacks remain under-represented in both professions).

Meanwhile, the number of black-owned businesses continues to rise, growing from 163,000 companies in 1969 to more than 230,000 in 1977 (the last year for which data are available). In 1983, according to Black Enterprise, the top 100 black-owned businesses, led by Motown Industries of Los Angeles, had combined sales surpassing $2 billion. While a plurality of these companies either were car dealerships or specialized in products aimed at blacks, half of the companies in the top 20 were involved in computers, communications, energy, or construction.

Residence. The big shift of the 1950s and '60s was the influx of blacks into the nation's cities. The untold story of the 1970s and '80s is the outflow of blacks to the suburbs. Between 1970 and 1980, the number of blacks living in suburban neighborhoods increased from 4.2 million to six million. To be sure, not all of these new residents are prosperous; some are slumdwellers who have moved (or been forced) into fringe areas soon to be abandoned by whites—and thus resegregated. But fully
one-third of all black families earning $25,000 or more now live in predominantly white suburban communities.

One could go on and on with statistics, but the data merely confirm the evidence of the senses. No analyst denies that many American blacks, almost half, live below, at, or near the poverty level as officially defined. But it is also true that millions of others no longer do. The ranks of what E. Franklin Frazier in 1957 disparagingly termed the "Black Bourgeoisie" have grown. And in the process, the character of that bourgeoisie has been profoundly altered, in many respects for the better.

Blue-Chip Blacks

Alongside Ebony (circulation: 1.5 million) and other publications founded by earlier generations, there have emerged sophisticated new magazines such as Essence (circ.: 800,000), Black Enterprise (circ.: 250,000), and Dollars and Sense (circ.: 110,000) aimed at a very different sort of black audience. Across the country, the black middle-class groups and associations founded prior to World War II (e.g., the NAACP, the National Negro Business League, Alpha Kappa Alpha) have been joined or superseded by a proliferation of new groups that more accurately reflect the concerns and strategies of the 1980s: the National Association of Black Manufacturers, the Council of Concerned Black Executives, the National Black Caucus of State Legislators, and scores of others.

So many young blacks are now enrolled in mainstream colleges and universities—from Yale to the University of Alabama—that the 114 traditionally black colleges, mostly founded after the Civil War, now face a brain drain and an uncertain future. In 1980, according to a poll by Black Enterprise, 82 percent of the magazine's subscribers agreed that black colleges are "serving a purpose that cannot be met by other colleges." Only half of these people hoped that their children would attend one of these schools.

The gains of the past several decades, sometimes startling in retrospect and still often dimly perceived by most Americans,
Emmett J. Scott and family in Tuskegee, Alabama, 1906. Scott, secretary to Booker T. Washington, typified the Negro elite of his era. His business interests included banking, insurance, and real estate, all for a Negro clientele.

should not be taken for granted. Nor should they obscure the fact that there were well-to-do blacks in the United States long before the 1950s and '60s. Indeed, there has always been a Negro elite of some kind. As America changed, so did this group's size and social role, along with the sources of its affluence, but most black leaders, and the ideas they espoused over the decades, originated within this class. Those ideas on how to better the lot of all blacks in America have changed with each generation.

We are in the midst of such a complicated change today, and young black leaders in politics, business, the media, and the professions—the “blue-chip blacks,” to use journalist Roger Wilkins's phrase—are grappling with its implications.

The first elite blacks appeared in the American South during the mid-17th century. Primarily West Indian-born or -bred, fluent in English and often baptized as Christians, they were brought to British North America as slaves or indentured servants. Most remained in servitude. But the severe labor shortage that afflicted Virginia and some other Southern colonies during these early years allowed some blacks to set the terms of their labor, establish families, obtain their freedom, buy farms, own
slaves themselves, even hold minor public office.

However, the 18th-century spread of the plantation system, and of the racial theories that justified it, ensured that these black yeomen would not become the self-sufficient precursors of a modern black middle class. On the eve of the American Revolution, there were an estimated 740,000 Negroes in the British colonies, most of them in bondage, and it was by then virtually impossible for a slave in the South to work his way to freedom.

The Revolution changed all that, briefly. Amid the chaos and confusion of the war years, thousands of slaves slipped their shackles. By 1810, some 100,000 free Negroes inhabited the Southern states, accounting for five percent of the South's free population and 10 percent of its black population. The largest clusters of free blacks could be found in Virginia, North Carolina, and the newly acquired Louisiana Territory, where the relatively freewheeling atmosphere of New Orleans attracted not only American Negroes but many from the Caribbean as well. The 1860 census revealed that 85 percent of the free black males in New Orleans were artisans, professionals, or proprietors.

Free blacks elsewhere in the South were not always so fortunate. Most endured dismal poverty and working conditions scarcely distinguishable from those of slaves. But some freedmen did manage to take advantage of the peculiar nature of the Southern economy, which depended on black craftsmen, and which required, among other things, a class of free black merchants, healers, lawyers, preachers, and teachers to meet the needs both of other free blacks and of slaves.

Intimacy in the North

Not all, nor even most, free Negroes stood aloof from white society and the white economy. In New Orleans, where most of the black population was of mixed blood, prosperous free Negroes identified with whites and distanced themselves from the mass of "uncultured" blacks. On a lesser scale, the same phenomenon could be found elsewhere. But, then as now, other blacks took a bolder stand. They nurtured a strong sense of race consciousness and eventually assumed a leadership position within the free black community. Men such as abolitionist Daniel Coker in Maryland or the members of South Carolina's Brown Fellowship Society were representative of this group.

In the North, of course, the circumstances were different from the outset. Not only were there always vastly fewer slaves than in the South, but a disproportionate number of them lived in cities and worked in close proximity with whites (as, for ex-
ample, domestic servants, stable keepers, or gardeners). Their relations with their masters were somewhat better as a result. A Southern visitor to Connecticut before the Revolution complained that slaveowners there were "too indulgent (especially the farmers) to their slaves, suffering too great a familiarity from them, permitting them to sit at Table and eat with them (as they say to save time) and into the dish goes the black hoof as freely as the white hand."

Blacks used the intimacy gained at their masters' tables to press for additional privileges—the right to visit friends, live with their families, hire themselves out on their own time. Many learned to read and write. These black bondsmen were the ancestors of the free black middle class that appeared in the North during the 19th century, and to this group many middle-class blacks today can trace their roots.

**Black Wealth in Philadelphia**

The upheaval of the War of Independence not only exposed blacks to republican principles but also helped usher in an improved regime throughout the Northern states. "Prior to the great revolution," John Jay of New York observed in 1788, "the great majority... of our people had been so long accustomed to the practice and convenience of having slaves that very few among them even doubted the propriety and rectitude of it."

The war (in which many blacks fought), and the principles of liberty and equality for which it was waged, changed many minds, though not by any means most. Yet, as Jay noted, the doctrine of the abolitionists "prevailed by almost insensible degrees, and was like the little lump of leaven which was put into three measures of meal." Massachusetts abolished slavery in 1783 and other Northern states soon followed.

To be sure, it was not long before harsh new restrictions on voting, holding property, education, employment, and travel were set into place. Race riots were frequent, and blacks in most Northern cities endured both poverty and scorn. But some free Negroes, often trading on skills learned in bondage, succeeded in achieving a degree of economic independence and even acquired modest fortunes. James Forten, as a child an errand boy around the docks of Philadelphia, became a sailmaker and left an estate valued at $100,000 upon his death in 1842. Forten was one of many black leaders who in 1830 attended a Negro convention in Delaware to consider "ways and means for the bettering of our condition."

Philadelphia boasted the wealthiest free black population
SUCCESS STORY:
BLACKS IN UNIFORM

Despite much pain and strain, ever since President Harry S Truman issued Executive Order 9981 desegregating the armed services in 1948, black Americans have advanced faster in the military environment of teamwork, earned rank, and command authority than anywhere else in U.S. society.

"The message was given," observed Jimmy Carter’s Army Secretary, Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., who is black. "The message was carried out."

Today, a decade after the end of the draft, 390,000 blacks account for 20 percent of all four services’ enlisted men and women, up from 10 percent in 1971, and from 9.7 percent in 1964, before U.S. deployments in Vietnam. Indeed, in 1981, roughly 42 percent of all “militarily qualified” black males, from age 19 to 24, had actually enlisted in the armed forces (versus 14 percent of comparable whites), according to Brookings analyst Martin Binkin’s 1982 study of Blacks in the Military.

The Army is the favored service, with blacks making up 32 percent of its enlisted personnel, 25 percent of its senior sergeants, and nine percent of its officers in 1983. Last year, 22 percent of all Army volunteers were black, down from a record 37 percent in 1978. As a group, young black male enlistees still suffer from disproportionately high rates of semi-literacy, violent crime, disciplinary offenses, and brief, unauthorized absences (AWOL), but black first-term volunteers do not drop out any faster than do whites. In fact, they do slightly better. And they re-enlist at 150 percent of the white rate.

Surveys show that young blacks choose the service for the same reasons young whites do—"to better myself in life," "to get training for a civilian job," "to serve my country," etc. Few civilian jobs for 18- and 19-year-olds can match the supervision, training, or pay ($573 a month, plus room and board) offered to new enlistees by the Pentagon.

The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines have come a long way since the race-and-drugs turmoil of the Vietnam era. Racial clashes occurred among Marines at Camp Lejeune, N.C. (1969) and among airmen at Travis Air Force Base in California (1971). In one month,
October 1972, militants staged “black power” near-mutinies aboard two Navy carriers, the Kitty Hawk and the Constellation. Shaken, the Pentagon ordered investigations into blacks’ grievances over military justice and promotion policy, quietly discharged the unfit, and assigned “equal opportunity” advisers to every base. Off-duty social self-segregation did not vanish, but discipline was restored; blacks encountered less “institutional” discrimination. Civil-rights leaders still see “cultural bias” in job placement tests that concentrate young blacks in nontechnical units (e.g., supply and food service, infantry, and artillery).

Helpful to integration has been the rapid growth and slowly recognized competence of the black officer corps, now 16,400 strong, with the Army in the lead and the Navy far behind. (Today, 5.8 percent of all military officers are black—in line with the proportion of all U.S. college graduates in the relevant age group who are black.) In 1975, the Air Force produced the nation’s first black four-star general, the late Daniel (Chappie) James, a much-decorated veteran of air combat in Korea and Vietnam who rose to head the North American Air Defense Command. In 1983, another Air Force Vietnam veteran, Lt. Col. Guion Bluford, became the first black astronaut in space.

During the 1970s, more black youths entered the service academies. Some quickly emerged as class leaders, but inferior public school educations still hurt others. At Annapolis, for example, roughly 38 percent of the 80 black men and women who entered as plebes with the class of ’83 failed to graduate (versus 23 percent of whites). High attrition rates have plagued graduates of traditionally black colleges in Army basic officer courses. And improved civilian opportunities have diverted many bright black university graduates who otherwise might have been prime officer candidates.

Even so, black officers have made major advances. They have made them on merit. Since 1970, black commanders have led the Army’s VII Corps in West Germany and seven of its 16 combat divisions, including the elite 82nd Airborne. Such assignments have helped two Army blacks achieve four-star rank. All in all, the Army now has 26 general officers who are black—gaining high-level management and leadership responsibilities that Fortune 500 corporations or federal agencies have yet to offer.
in the North. The city's black gentry—led before the Civil War by such men as Forten and Bishop Richard Allen (founder of the Bethel African Methodist Episcopal Church)—organized schools, churches, literary circles, newspapers, and benevolent societies. Not only Philadelphia but other cities along the eastern seaboard witnessed the emergence of a group of middle-class black intellectuals and social activists who railed against slavery in the South and racial discrimination in the North. They saw one of their wishes granted when the Grand Army of the Republic prevailed in the War between the States.

The effect of the Civil War, Emancipation, and Reconstruction on middle-class blacks was, of course, profound. In the South particularly, where four million former slaves now became free men, the old patterns of race relations enjoyed by affluent free Negroes began to crumble. While the great majority of former slaves remained in the countryside—and remained poor—a "great mass of unbleached Americans" (as one Raleigh newspaper called them) sought work in the cities as petty tradesmen, artisans, and laborers. As a result, the number of black-owned businesses in the United States, almost all of them in the South, increased impressively, from about 2,000 in 1863 to 40,000 in 1913. When Southern whites boycotted black businesses, Negro leaders urged blacks to retaliate by "buying black."

Welcome to Tuskegee

An urban middle class comprised of former slaves gradually displaced the older bourgeoisie, with various degrees of acrimony. In New Orleans, to cite the most extreme case, the old elite was virtually destroyed as a distinctive class. In Richmond, the ante-bellum mulatto upper crust of proprietors and entrepreneurs decided to close ranks with the upwardly mobile (and darker) newcomers; Jim Crowism and segregation combined in that city to nurture the development of a small but significant class of black businessmen and professionals that provided products and services to the black community (such as banking, undertaking, or cutting hair) when whites would not.

In Atlanta, the postwar economy likewise transplanted the economic base of the black middle class from the white to the Negro community. Prominent among the new businesses were the "cooperative" insurance and real estate concerns, many of them organized by new arrivals to the city who had no ties to Atlanta's venerable Negro elite, whose social supremacy they eventually assumed.

The middle-class Negroes in the South, despite political dis-
enfranchisement and social apartheid, were increasingly able to give their children the advantages of higher education at Tuskegee or Tougaloo or Fisk or one of the other new black institutions founded with the help of Northern philanthropists and missionaries. Prior to 1876, only 314 blacks in the United States had college degrees. By 1900, some 2,000 blacks held diplomas, and more than 28,000 black instructors were teaching 1.5 million black children in school. Up through the 1960s, the leaders of the black community in the South (and to some extent even the North), its intellectuals, ministers, and political activists, would be drawn overwhelmingly from the Negro middle class created after the Civil War. Booker T. Washington and Martin Luther King, Jr., are two prominent examples.

Good-bye to Dixie

Emancipation had little immediate impact in the North. What happened in Chicago is a good example of what happened to most Northern cities between the Civil War and World War II. Along the banks of the Chicago River, in the center of town, a small free black community had been growing since about 1840. When the guns fired on Fort Sumter, 1,000 blacks were living in Chicago. Social life centered on several small Baptist and Methodist churches, which also functioned as stations on the Underground Railroad. Abolitionists pointed with pride to this prosperous (but politically and socially subordinate) community of free blacks, at times hinting that certain portions of the white community, as one antislavery newspaper put it, might do well to emulate these “well-informed, and peaceable citizens [who] seldom see any of their brethren grace the police calendar.” There was no great influx of Southern blacks to Chicago (or other Northern industrial cities) after the Civil War, nor for half a century. The federal census of 1910 showed nine out of 10 blacks living in the Southern states, with three out of four inhabiting rural areas.

World War I proved to be the turning point. Hundreds of thousands of young white men, many of them sons of immigrants or immigrants themselves, enlisted to fight the Kaiser in France. Northern industrialists who had depended on immigrants to man the slaughterhouses and steel mills now experienced a shortage of labor. From Chicago (and Cleveland, Detroit, Toledo, and many other places) recruiting agents traveled south, railway tickets in their pockets and promises on their lips, urging rural blacks to come north to earn big money. It was a propitious time: The recruiters arrived to find the Cot-
Despite special help from both Washington and City Hall, 60 percent of new black businesses fail within five years. Black entrepreneurs blame the recession and lack of adequate financing by private banks. “Suburbanization” of blacks has also dispersed a once concentrated market.

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ployed in "manufacturing or mechanical" occupations, up from six percent in 1890. The expansion of the Negro urban population in the North offered countless opportunities in business and—a novelty to Southern blacks—in politics.

But blacks, particularly middle-class blacks whose daily concern was no longer simple economic survival, also began to feel more acutely the discrepancy between the promise of freedom and the realities of their own experience. The Northern cities became crucibles of group consciousness. There, the timorous, docile Negro of the white imagination acquired a more defiant and impatient personality. This transformation was reflected not only in the works produced during the 1920s by the writers and artists of the Harlem Renaissance but also in growing agitation for equality under the law, agitation that achieved many of its goals during the 1950s and '60s.

The new black middle class of the 1980s lives, as a result, in a very different world and is composed of a different kind of individual than the middle class of any previous generation. Not only is the contemporary black middle class growing in size, but most of the newcomers are young black men and women who are from poor or working-class families. The nature of their relationship to the larger U.S. economy has in many cases been transformed, to a degree that would have surprised earlier entrepreneurs, such as Madame C. J. Walker (inventor of a hair-straightening process known as the Walker System), whose fortunes were derived entirely from the parallel black economy. As Harvard's Martin Kilson pointed out recently in Dissent, "upper strata blacks are employed increasingly not in ghetto [enterprises] but in national job markets—in national (white) banks, insurance companies, retail firms, industries, universities, and government agencies."

Leaving the Men Behind

The problems that they face as American blacks have also changed. They have the law behind them now. The battle against legal discrimination was won by their elders. Many young, educated, and affluent blacks question the relevance of many of the institutional mainstays that supported an older generation. At the same time, the leaders of the black middle class are beginning to confront issues that have little to do with continued overt discrimination: for instance, the growing number of black female-headed households, teenage pregnancy, high black youth crime rates, illiteracy, drug abuse, and the relatively woeful state of blacks' health, especially that of black males.
Young, educated blacks are also concerned about several matters closer to their own daily experience—their high divorce rate (which is substantially higher than that of white counterparts); their continued low representation in the ranks of American entrepreneurs (black-owned companies, though increasing in number, still account for only two percent of all companies nationwide); their preference for jobs in the public sector (one out of five working blacks is on some government payroll).

Why have black women done so much better in the civilian job market than black men, especially when higher-status jobs are at stake? Between 1970 and 1980, the number of black women employed in the private sector as officials and managers, as professionals, as technicians, and as craft workers not only grew at a faster rate than that of black men but also exceeded in aggregate that of black men. Do broad affirmative action regulations on sex and race encourage a “two-for” syndrome? Do white employers feel less threatened by black women? Whatever the case, the phenomenon is striking, and its implications (for black men, for black families) are disturbing.

Gaining Confidence

Moreover, to a degree seldom appreciated by whites, the emotional strain on many successful young blacks can be intense. As Harvard’s Charles V. Willie has noted, psychologically, “the people who most severely experience the pain of dislocation due to the changing times are the racial minorities who are talented and educated and integrated, not those who are impoverished and isolated.” How does one properly adapt—and to what degree must one adapt—to the prevailing ethos of the white university, the white corporation, the white suburb?

And to what extent is one still responsible for the impoverished, underclass blacks who have remained behind? Journalist Orde Coombs, writing in Black Enterprise in 1978, probably spoke for many of his contemporaries when he wondered “what could we really say to them, now, except a murmured ‘How you doing, bro,’ as we hurried along to catch the train that would take us to another appointment, another conference, another step up our frenzied stair of upward mobility. Our eyes would pity them. Our palms would open to them and quickly shut again. And while we hated to talk about it, we knew that we had moved beyond them forever.”

Yet, as Kenneth Clark, John Hope Franklin, and other black scholars have emphasized, a certain vertical solidarity remains essential—for political, economic, and social reasons, and for the sake of all classes of blacks.
None of the issues just cited can be addressed by federal regulation or resolved by the tactics employed during the civil-rights era. With what new strategies will the young black elite respond?

Many of them, of course, will simply take life as it comes, like a large proportion of their white fellow citizens, gleaning their satisfactions from material comfort, family progress, and social occasions, from the new car, the swimming pool, the second house.

Others are already building new kinds of networks—in business, in academe, in politics—based on somewhat different premises than those that stirred the generations of the 1940s and '50s. These networks range from organizations such as the National Action Council for Minorities in Engineering, which has been highly successful in attracting blacks into the engineering profession, to the small group of black students at the University of Michigan who volunteer to help the institution recruit more minority students. They include new self-help organizations such as Adopt a Family and the Black Student Fund. What all of these fledgling efforts have in common, to greater and lesser degrees, is the propagation of middle-class virtues, by example if not precept.

The struggle to acquire personal dignity and access to the polls and to the marketplace long preoccupied the traditional black elite in America. When circumstances permitted, some of these men and women doggedly tried to build institutions and promote community values that would help to uplift all blacks. More often, especially prior to 1954, the struggle for equal rights—or simple survival—sapped their energies and disheartened their peers. Mindful of past experience, the Afro-American elite today is extremely sensitive to any acts that might threaten its recent gains. But a feeling is also abroad that the civil-rights movement, as an all-embracing effort to change the nation's legal codes, is moving toward a successful conclusion. In time, the new black middle class should slowly gain confidence and a sense of security and hence be better able to assist the mass of less fortunate black Americans than was any of its predecessors.
THE BLACK UNDERCLASS

by William Julius Wilson

It is no secret that the social problems of urban life in the United States are, in great measure, associated with race.

While rising rates of crime, drug addiction, out-of-wedlock births, female-headed families, and welfare dependency have afflicted American society generally in recent years, the increases have been most dramatic among what has become a large and seemingly permanent black underclass inhabiting the cores of the nation's major cities.

And yet, liberal journalists, social scientists, policy-makers, and civil-rights leaders have for almost two decades been reluctant to face this fact. Often, analysts of such issues as violent crime or teenage pregnancy deliberately make no reference to race at all, unless perhaps to emphasize the deleterious consequences of racial discrimination or the institutionalized inequality of American society.

Some scholars, in an effort to avoid the appearance of "blaming the victim," or to protect their work from charges of racism, simply ignore patterns of behavior that might be construed as stigmatizing to particular racial minorities.

Such neglect is a relatively recent phenomenon. Twenty years ago, during the mid-1960s, social scientists such as Kenneth B. Clark (Dark Ghetto, 1965), Daniel Patrick Moynihan (The Negro Family, 1965), and Lee Rainwater (Behind Ghetto Walls, 1970) forthrightly examined the cumulative effects on inner-city blacks of racial isolation and class subordination. They vividly described aspects of ghetto life that, as Rainwater observed, "are usually forgotten or ignored in polite discussions." All of these studies attempted to show the connection between the economic and social environment into which many blacks are born and the creation of patterns of behavior that, in Clark's words, frequently amounted to a "self-perpetuating pathology."

Why have scholars lately shied away from this line of research? One reason has to do with the vitriolic attacks by many black leaders against Moynihan upon publication of his report in 1965—denunciations that generally focused on the author's unflattering depiction of the black family in the urban ghetto rather than on his proposed remedies or his historical analysis of the black family's special plight. The harsh reception accorded to The Negro Family undoubtedly dissuaded many social scientists from following in Moynihan's footsteps.
The “black solidarity” movement was also emerging during the mid-1960s. A new emphasis by young black scholars and intellectuals on the positive aspects of the black experience tended to crowd out older concerns. Indeed, certain forms of ghetto behavior labeled pathological in the studies of Clark et al. were redefined by some during the early 1970s as “functional” because, it was argued, blacks were displaying the ability to survive and in some cases flourish in an economically depressed environment. Scholars such as Andrew Billingsley (Black Families in White America, 1968), Joyce Ladner (Tomorrow’s Tomorrow, 1971), and Robert Hill (The Strengths of Black Families, 1971) described the ghetto family as resilient and capable of adapting creatively to an oppressive, racist society.

In the end, the promising efforts of the early 1960s—to distinguish the socioeconomic characteristics of different groups within the black community, and to identify the structural problems of the U.S. economy that affected minorities—were cut short by calls for “reparations” or for “black control of institutions serving the black community.” In his 1977 book, Ethnic Chauvinism, sociologist Orlando Patterson lamented that black ethnicity had become “a form of mystification, diverting attention from the correct kinds of solutions to the ter-
rible economic condition of the group."

Meanwhile, throughout the 1970s, ghetto life across the nation continued to deteriorate. The situation is best seen against the backdrop of the family.

In 1965, when Moynihan pointed with alarm to the relative instability of the black family, one-quarter of all such families were headed by women; 15 years later, the figure was a staggering 42 percent. (By contrast, only 12 percent of white families and 22 percent of Hispanic families in 1980 were maintained by women.) Not surprisingly, the proportion of black children living with both their father and their mother declined from nearly two-thirds in 1970 to fewer than half in 1978.

In the inner city, the trend is more pronounced. For example, of the 27,178 families with children living in Chicago Housing Authority projects in 1980, only 2,982, or 11 percent, were husband-and-wife families.

**Teenage Mothers**

These figures are important because even if a woman is employed full-time, she almost always is paid less than a man. If she is not employed, or employed only part-time, and has children to support, the household’s situation may be desperate. In 1980, the median income of families headed by black women ($7,425) was only 40 percent of that of black families with both parents present ($18,593). Today, roughly five out of 10 black children under the age of 18 live below the poverty level; the vast majority of these kids have only a mother to come home to.

The rise in the number of female-headed black families reflects, among other things, the increasing incidence of illegitimate births. Only 15 percent of all births to black women in 1959 were out of wedlock; the proportion today is well over one-half. In the cities, the figure is invariably higher: 67 percent in Chicago in 1978, for example. Black women today bear children out of wedlock at a rate nine times that for whites. In 1982, the number of black babies born out of wedlock (328,879) nearly matched the number of illegitimate white babies (337,050). White or black, the

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WHAT WENT WRONG?

W. E. B. Du Bois (The Negro American Family, 1908) and E. Franklin Frazier (The Negro Family in the United States, 1939) were among the first scholars to ask this question about poor black families. Both came up with essentially the same answer—slavery.

Slavery, they noted, often separated man from wife, parent from child. Slave "marriage" had no basis in law. Negroes thus entered Emancipation with a legacy of "sexual irregularity" (Du Bois) that fostered "delinquency, desertions, and broken homes" (Frazier). Discrimination and migration perpetuated such patterns.

The "slavery hypothesis" was challenged during the 1970s by the works of Eugene Genovese (Roll, Jordan, Roll, 1974) and Herbert Gutman (The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1976). Genovese shows, for example, that blacks did establish strong families in slavery. And Gutman notes that as late as 1925, roughly 85 percent of black families in New York City were headed by a married couple.

If slavery did not undermine the black family, what did? Scholars as diverse as Jessie Bernard (Marriage and Family among Negroes, 1966), Elliot Liebow (Tally's Corner, 1967), William Julius Wilson (The Declining Significance of Race, 1978), and Stephen Steinberg (The Ethnic Myth, 1981) point the finger at economic hardship and urban unemployment. The rise of a "matriarchal family pattern" in the ghetto, Steinberg writes, was "an inevitable by-product of the inability of men to function as breadwinners for their families." Joblessness, in turn, eroded the black male's sense of manhood and family responsibility.

The disruptive impact of welfare on some black families is generally conceded but not easily quantified. Kristin A. Moore and Martha R. Burt (Teenage Childbearing and Welfare, 1981) suggest that Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) may influence a pregnant woman to bear and rear her child (and head up a new household) rather than marry the father, resort to adoption, or submit to abortion. Because AFDC is available only to single-parent families in half of the 50 states, the program may also encourage the break-up of married couples and deter unwed parents from marrying or remarrying.

Whatever its causes, the black family's worsening plight has belatedly been acknowledged by black leaders. So has the need for remedies. A 1983 report by Washington's Joint Center for Political Studies, A Policy Framework for Racial Justice, asserted flatly that "family reinforcement constitutes the single most important action the nation can take toward the elimination of black poverty and related social problems."
women bearing these children are not always mature adults. Almost half of all illegitimate children born to blacks today will have a teenager for a mother.

The effect on the welfare rolls is not hard to imagine. A 1976 study by Kristin Moore and Steven B. Cardwell of Washington's Urban Institute estimated that, nationwide, about 60 percent of the children who are born outside of marriage and are not adopted receive welfare; furthermore, "more than half of all AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Children] assistance in 1975 was paid to women who were or had been teenage mothers." A 1979 study by the Department of City Planning in New York found that 75 percent of all children born out of wedlock in that city during the previous 18 years were recipients of AFDC.

**Why No Progress?**

I have concentrated on young, female-headed families and out-of-wedlock births among blacks because these indices have become inextricably connected with poverty and welfare dependency, as well as with other forms of social dislocation (including joblessness and crime).

As James Q. Wilson observed in *Thinking About Crime* (1975), these problems are also associated with a "critical mass" of young people, often poorly supervised. When that mass is reached, or is increased suddenly and substantially, "a self-sustaining chain reaction is set off that creates an explosive increase in the amount of crime, addiction, and welfare dependency." The effect is magnified in densely populated ghetto neighborhoods, and further magnified in the massive public housing projects.

Consider Robert Taylor Homes, the largest such project in Chicago. In 1980, almost 20,000 people, all black, were officially registered there, but according to one report "there are an additional 5,000 to 7,000 who are not registered with the Housing Authority." Minors made up 72 percent of the population and the mother alone was present in 90 percent of the families with children. The unemployment rate was estimated at 47 percent in 1980, and some 70 percent of the project's 4,200 official households received AFDC. Although less than one-half of one percent of Chicago's population lived in Robert Taylor Homes, 11 percent of all the city's murders, nine percent of its rapes, and 10 percent of its aggravated assaults were committed in the project in 1980.

Why have the social conditions of the black underclass deteriorated so rapidly?

Racial discrimination is the most frequently invoked explana-
THE FEMINIZATION OF POVERTY
How income correlated with family status in 1982

The proportion of blacks living below the poverty line ($9,862 for a family of four) grew to 35.6 percent in 1982. The number of black, female-headed households continued to rise. Some 49 percent of all black children today live with only one parent. One black child in 10 lives with neither.

ILLEGITIMATE BIRTHS
Percentage of white and black children born out of wedlock since 1950

BLACK MEDIAN FAMILY INCOMES
As percent of white median family incomes, by family status

*Figures for 1950 and 1960 include small numbers of 'other' nonwhites.
tion, and it is undeniable that discrimination continues to aggra-
vate the social and economic problems of poor blacks. But is dis-
crimination really greater today than it was in 1948, when black unemploy-
ment was less than half of what it is now, and when the gap between black and white jobless rates was narrower?

As for the black family, it apparently began to fall apart not be-
fore but after the mid-20th century. Until publication in 1976 of Herbert Gutman's *The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom*, most scholars had believed otherwise. "Stimulated by the bitter public and academic controversy over the Moynihan report," Gutman produced data demonstrating that the black family was not significantly disrupted during slavery or even during the early years of the first migration to the urban North, begin-
nning after the turn of the century. The problems of the modern black family, he implied, were a product of modern forces.

Those who cite racial discrimination as the root cause of poverty often fail to make a distinction between the effects of historic discrimination (that is, discrimination prior to the mid-20th century) and the effects of contemporary discrimination. That is why they find it so hard to explain why the eco-
nomic position of the black underclass started to worsen soon after Congress enacted, and the White House began to enforce, the most sweeping civil-rights legislation since Reconstruction.

**Making Comparisons**

My own view is that historic discrimination is far more im-
portant than contemporary discrimination in understanding the plight of the urban underclass; that, in any event, there is more to the story than discrimination (of whichever kind).

Historic discrimination certainly helped to create an im-
poverished urban black community in the first place. In his re-
cent *A Piece of the Pie: Black and White Immigrants since 1880* (1980), Stanley Lieberson shows how, in many areas of life, in-
cluding the labor market, black newcomers from the rural South were far more severely discriminated against in Northern cities than were the new white immigrants from southern, central, and eastern Europe. Skin color was part of the problem, but it was not all of it.

The disadvantage of skin color—the fact that the dominant whites preferred whites over nonwhites—is one that blacks shared with Japanese, Chinese, and others. Yet the experience of the Asians, whose treatment by whites "was of the same violent and savage character in areas where they were concentrated," but who went on to prosper in their adopted land, suggests that
skin color per se was not an "insurmountable obstacle." Indeed, Lieberson argues that the greater success enjoyed by Asians may well be explained largely by the different context of their contact with whites. Because changes in immigration policy cut off Asian migration to America in the late 19th century, the Japanese and Chinese populations did not reach large numbers and therefore did not pose as great a threat as did blacks.

Furthermore, the discontinuation of large-scale immigration from Japan and China enabled Chinese and Japanese to solidify networks of ethnic contacts and to occupy particular occupational niches in small, relatively stable communities. For blacks, the situation was different. The 1970 census recorded 22,580,000 blacks in the United States but only 435,000 Chinese and 591,000 Japanese. "Imagine," Lieberson exclaims, "22 million Japanese Americans trying to carve out initial niches through truck farming."

The Youth Explosion

If different population sizes accounted for a good deal of the difference in the economic success of blacks and Asians, they also helped determine the dissimilar rates of progress of urban blacks and the new European arrivals. European immigration was curtailed during the 1920s, but black migration to the urban North continued through the 1960s. With each passing decade, Lieberson writes, there were many more blacks who were recent migrants to the North, whereas the immigrant component of the new Europeans dropped off over time. Eventually, other whites muffled their dislike of the Poles and Italians and Jews and saved their antagonism for blacks. As Lieberson notes, "The presence of blacks made it harder to discriminate against the new Europeans because the alternative was viewed less favorably."

The black migration to New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and other Northern cities—the continual replenishment of black populations there by poor newcomers—predictably skewed the age profile of the urban black community and kept it relatively young. The number of central-city black youths aged 16–19 increased by almost 75 percent from 1960 to 1969. Young black adults (ages 20–24) increased in number by two-thirds during the same period, three times the increase for young white adults. In the nation’s inner cities in 1977, the median age for whites was 30.3, for blacks 23.9. The importance of this jump in the number of young minorities in the ghetto, many of them lacking one or more parent, cannot be overemphasized.

Age correlates with many things. For example, the higher
When black children finally gained access to "mainstream" public schools, they arrived during the turmoil of the late 1960s. Schools were beset by falling standards, lax discipline, and rising rates of crime and vandalism, not to mention repeated efforts to achieve greater racial balance. The big-city public schools, in particular, were in poor condition to help an influx of black underclass youths overcome the cumulative effects of family instability, poverty, and generations of inferior education. When family finances permitted, blacks, like whites, often put their offspring in private schools or moved to the suburbs.

Blacks have nevertheless made some gains through public education. At the grade school level, the gap in school attendance rates between whites and blacks has been closed. Between 1970 and 1982, the proportion of blacks graduating from high school (now 76.5 percent) grew twice as fast as that of whites. The National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) reveals that blacks in grade school and junior high are improving their skills more quickly than are whites, though they still lag behind.

But high school students of neither race are doing better now than their counterparts were 10 years ago. Indeed, the NAEP reports that the proportion of 17-year-old blacks scoring in the "highest achievement group" in reading tests actually declined from 5.7 to 3.9 percent between 1971 and 1980. In the Age of Technology, blacks are still less likely than whites to take science and math courses. The modest gains by blacks during the past decade on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) still produced an average combined (math and verbal) score in 1983 of only 708 out of a possible 1600. The National Assault on Illiteracy Program estimates that 47 percent of all black Americans still read at a fourth-grade level or lower. As more blacks finish high school and college, such "functional illiteracy" will decline.

The median age of a group, the higher its income; the lower the median age, the higher the unemployment rate and the higher the crime rate. (More than half of those arrested in 1980 for violent and property crimes in American cities were under 21.) The younger a woman is, the more likely she is to bear a child out of wedlock, head up a new household, and depend on welfare. In short, much of what has gone awry in the ghetto is due in part to the sheer increase in the number of black youths. As James Q. Wilson has argued, an abrupt rise in the proportion of young people in any community will have an "exponential effect on the rate of certain social problems."

The population explosion among minority youths occurred at a time when changes in the economy were beginning to pose
serious problems for unskilled workers. Urban minorities have been particularly vulnerable to the structural economic changes of the past two decades: the shift from goods-producing to service-providing industries, the increasing polarization of the labor market into low-wage and high-wage sectors, technological innovations, and the relocation of manufacturing industries out of the central cities. During the 1970s, Chicago lost more than 200,000 jobs, mostly in manufacturing, where many inner-city blacks had traditionally found employment. New York City lost 600,000 jobs during the same period, even though the number of white-collar professional, managerial, and clerical jobs increased in Manhattan. Today, as John D. Kasarda has noted, the nation's cities are being transformed into "centers of administration, information exchange, and service provision." Finding work now requires more than a willing spirit and a strong back.

Beyond Race

Roughly 60 percent of the unemployed blacks in the United States reside within the central cities. Their situation, already more difficult than that of any other major ethnic group in the country, continues to worsen. Not only are there more blacks without jobs every year; many, especially young males, are dropping out of the labor force entirely. The percentage of blacks who were in the labor force fell from 45.6 in 1960 to 30.8 in 1977 for those aged 16–17 and from 90.4 to 78.2 for those aged 20–24. (During the same period, the proportion of white teenagers in the labor force actually increased.)

More and more black youths, including many who are no longer in school, are obtaining no job experience at all. The proportion of black teenage males who have never held a job increased from 32.7 to 52.8 percent between 1966 and 1977; for black males under 24, the percentage grew from 9.9 to 23.3. Research shows, not surprisingly, that joblessness during youth has a harmful impact on one's future success in the job market.

There have been recent signs, though not many, that some of the inner city's ills may have begun to abate. For one, black migration to urban areas has been minimal in recent years; many cities have experienced net migration of blacks to the suburbs. For the first time in the 20th century, a heavy influx from the countryside no longer swells the ranks of blacks in the cities. Increases in the urban black population during the 1970s, as demographer Philip Hauser has pointed out, were mainly due to births. This means that one of the major obstacles to black advancement in the cities has been removed. Just as the Asian and
European immigrants benefited from a cessation of migration, so too should the economic prospects of urban blacks improve now that the great migration from the rural South is over.

Even more significant is the slowing growth in the number of young blacks inhabiting the central cities. In metropolitan areas generally, there were six percent fewer blacks aged 13 or under in 1977 than there were in 1970; in the inner city, the figure was 13 percent. As the average age of the urban black community begins to rise, lawlessness, illegitimacy, and unemployment should begin to decline.

Even so, the problems of the urban black underclass will remain crippling for years to come. And I suspect that any significant reduction of joblessness, crime, welfare dependency, single-parent homes, and out-of-wedlock pregnancies would require far more comprehensive social and economic change than Americans have generally deemed appropriate or desirable. It would require a radicalism that neither the Republican nor the Democratic Party has been bold enough to espouse.

The existence of a black underclass, as I have suggested, is due far more to historic discrimination and to broad demographic and economic trends than it is to racial discrimination in the present day. For that reason, the underclass has not benefited significantly from "race specific" antidiscrimination policies, such as affirmative action, that have aided so many trained and educated blacks. If inner-city blacks are to be helped, they will be helped not by policies addressed primarily to inner-city minorities but by policies designed to benefit all of the nation's poor.

I am reminded in this connection of Bayard Rustin's plea during the early 1960s that blacks recognize the importance of fundamental economic reform (including a system of national economic planning along with new education, manpower, and public works programs to help achieve full employment) and the need for a broad-based coalition to achieve it. Politicians and civil-rights leaders should, of course, continue to fight for an end to racial discrimination. But they must also recognize that poor minorities are profoundly affected by problems that affect other people in America as well, and that go beyond racial considerations. Unless those problems are addressed, the underclass will remain a reality of urban life.
"I can't think there is any intrinsick value in one colour more than another, nor that white is better than black, only we think it so because we are so, and are prone to judge favourably in our own case."

Captain Thomas Phillips, the master of a slave vessel, made that assessment in 1694, and his opinion was not unusual for the time, according to historian Winthrop D. Jordan. In *White Over Black* (Univ. of N.C., 1968, cloth; Penguin, 1969, paper), Jordan surveys the evolution over three centuries of Anglo-American attitudes toward blacks. He observes that the black man's complexion was considered a "marvel"—until slavery was introduced into North America, and theories of inherent black inferiority developed to justify it.

The first Negroes arrived in Jamestown in 1619, and they probably came as indentured servants, not slaves. Indeed, the slave system took several decades to develop according to John Hope Franklin in *From Slavery to Freedom* (Knopf, rev. ed., 1980, cloth & paper), a comprehensive survey of blacks in America through the 1970s. There were only 300 blacks in Virginia in 1650, and the colony did not countenance slavery in law until 1661.

But by the end of the 17th century, the London-based Royal African Company was bringing 1,000 slaves into Virginia every year. Victory in America's War of Independence did not end the slave trade. By 1790, roughly one of every five persons in the new republic was black. August Meier and Elliot Rudwick cover much of the same ground as Franklin in *From Plantation to Ghetto* (Hill & Wang, 1976, cloth & paper).

Congress outlawed the importation of African slaves in 1807, but the domestic slave trade continued to thrive. Slavery made good economic sense in the South, where slave agriculture was "35 percent more efficient" than free agriculture in the North. So write Robert W. Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, arguing in their controversial *Time On the Cross* (Little, Brown, 1974, cloth & paper) that the slave was harder-working than the white farm hand.

According to Vincent Harding in *There Is A River* (Harcourt, 1981), the slaves never relinquished the hope that they would one day live as free men. The "river" of the title refers to the continuity of black struggle flowing from the shores of West Africa to the battlefields of the Civil War. Harding focuses on slave rebellions and the work of great abolitionists, such as Sojourner Truth and Harriet Tubman.

Frederick Douglass (1817–95), the mulatto ex-slave and orator from the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society, also figures prominently in this tradition. His *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave* (Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Office, 1845; Penguin, 1982, paper only), describes the misery he suffered as a slave and condemns the "slaveholding religion," the "women-whipping, cradle-plundering, partial and hypocritical Christianity of this land."

Though slavery was everywhere dehumanizing, the formal legal regime varied widely from state to state. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.'s historical survey, *In the Matter of Color* (Oxford, 1978), provides examples aplenty. Whereas Georgia and...
South Carolina permitted masters to execute disobedient slaves. Pennsylvania did not. Nor did Pennsylvania adopt a bounty system, which in Georgia reimbursed head-hunters for the return of a fugitive slave’s "scalp with two ears."

Other significant works on slavery include Albert J. Raboteau's *Slave Religion* (Oxford, 1978, cloth; 1980, paper); Eugene Genovese's *Roll, Jordan, Roll* (Random, 1974, cloth; Vintage, 1976, paper), a social portrait based on excerpts from Negroes' diaries, letters, travelers' journals, planters' records, and other sources; and Lawrence Levine's *Black Culture and Black Consciousness* (Oxford, 1977, cloth; 1978, paper), which brings to life the "sacred world" of slaves, their folk tales and songs.

Abraham Lincoln freed the slaves on January 1, 1863—those slaves, at any rate, in states that had taken up arms against the Union. As James M. McPherson points out in *The Negro's Civil War* (Pantheon, 1965, cloth; Univ. of Ill., 1982, paper), the Union abolished slavery in the rebellious states mostly to create chaos in the South, where slave labor supported the economy in general and the war effort in particular. "My paramount objective in this struggle," Lincoln wrote to New York Tribune publisher Horace Greeley in 1862, "is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery."

Congress passed four Reconstruction Acts in 1867-68 that reconstituted the 11 Confederate states as federal territories. To gain readmission to the Union, the territories had to adopt constitutions giving black adult males the right to vote. Territories also had to ratify the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibited states from denying to any persons "life, liberty, or property without due process of law."

But the progress of blacks during this period was short-lived, as Kenneth Stampp reminds us in *The Era of Reconstruction, 1865–77* (Knopf, 1965, cloth; Random, 1967, paper). Lincoln’s successor was Andrew Johnson, a Union Democrat from Tennessee who believed that "white men should determine the way of life that was to be led in the Southern states."

Still, black political representation did soar between 1865 and 1877. During that period, 22 Southern blacks, many of them former slaves, were elected to Congress. On the state level, the statistics are even more surprising. In *Black Over White* (Univ. of Ill., 1977, cloth; 1979, paper), Thomas Holt points out that "of the 487 men elected to the various state and federal offices in South Carolina between 1867 and 1876, more than half were black." But many of these black politicians were scions of the old free black elite, who "often were not failed to act in the interests of black peasants."

Other significant works on the Reconstruction Era include Leon F. Litwak’s *Been in the Storm So Long* (Knopf, 1979, cloth; Vintage, 1980, paper) and Howard N. Rabinowitz’s *Race Relations in the Urban South* (Oxford, 1978, cloth; Univ. of Ill., 1980, paper).

In retrospect, the Reconstruction Era was a tragic saga of missed, squandered, or compromised opportunities. But in the field of education, blacks continued to make substantial progress, thanks, in part, to the efforts of Booker T. Washington (1856–1915), the former slave and founder-director of the Tuskegee Normal and Industrial Institute in Alabama. Louis R. Harlan tells Washington's story in two volumes, *The Making of a Black Leader,*
Washington urged blacks to seek advancement through vocational education and small business enterprises and not to antagonize white authorities. "The wisest among my race understand that the agitation on questions of social equality is the extremest folly," he told Southern whites in his famous "Atlanta Speech" in 1895.

But many blacks criticized Washington's leadership. Among them was W. E. B. Du Bois, a privileged, free-born black, who sported a top hat, white gloves, and cane as a graduate student at Harvard. (He was the first black ever to earn a Harvard Ph.D.) Du Bois, who eventually embraced Marxism, opposed Washington's "Gospel of Work and Money" because it overshadowed the "higher aims of life."

Du Bois urged "a Talented Tenth" of blacks to attain a broad education and help guide the race to "a higher civilization," even as he condemned segregation in Dixie. The South needed "discriminating and broad-minded criticism," he wrote in The Souls of Black Folk (McClurg, 1903; Kraus, 1973). "for the sake of her own white sons and daughters, and for the insurance of robust, healthy mental and moral development."

As black partisans of competing strategies quarreled among themselves, white Americans in the South finished spinning a web of legal restrictions that disenfranchised blacks and mandated racial segregation in everything from schools to factories, hospitals, restaurants, and funeral homes. These "Jim Crow" laws—probably named after a song-and-dance routine of the 1830s—"lent sanction to racial ostracism" and reminded blacks of their inferior position, according to C. Vann Woodward's The Strange Career of Jim Crow (Oxford, rev. ed., 1974, paper only).

Ironically, while "Jim Crow" is usually associated with the South, Woodward observes that segregation laws first appeared in the North, where slavery had been effectively abolished by 1830. As slaves there became freedmen, whites sought legal means to keep the races apart. Black enclaves, such as "Nigger Hill" in Boston and "Little Africa" in Cincinnati, had long existed in Northern cities. Few of these communities achieved either growth or prominence prior to the black migration from the South during World War I. But by 1920, there were 152,000 blacks in New York City, according to Gilbert Osofsky in Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto (Harper, 1966, cloth; 1971, paper).

As the new immigrants replaced upwardly mobile Italians and Jews, Harlem became "a Negro world, unto itself." Ninety percent of Harlem blacks, Osofsky says, were "menials and laborers."

In A Ghetto Takes Shape (Univ. of Ill., 1976, cloth & paper), Kenneth Kusmer paints a less gloomy picture of Cleveland between 1870 and 1930, when many blacks made real economic progress. World War I "broke down the color barrier in Cleveland's heavy industries," Kusmer says, where they received double or triple the money they had earned in the South. While most blacks did not get rich, Kusmer emphasizes that the black ghetto was not an "undifferentiated mass of slum-dwellers."

Whatever their economic condition, Northern black communities, especially in New York City, experienced a cultural revival during the
BACKGROUND BOOKS: BLACKS IN AMERICA


American blacks made some economic and social progress during Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal. But it was the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education that "severed the remaining cords of a de facto slavery." So writes Richard Kluger in Simple Justice (Random, 1976, cloth; Vintage, 1977, paper), a comprehensive history of the social, political, and legal turmoil that culminated in the Brown decision on May 17, 1954.

Ironically, Kluger writes, the decision came unexpectedly, catching official Washington unawares. At the Supreme Court, most reporters were downstairs in the press room, when at 12:52 P.M., Chief Justice Earl Warren began reading the Court's opinion in Brown in a "firm, clear, unemotional voice."

Warren's opinion took only minutes to read, but the decision would take years to enforce, as civil-rights groups and their foes clashed in the North and South during the late 1950s and 1960s. This period inspired a sizable crop of books on civil rights and the condition of blacks in America.

Some of the better works include Clayborne Carson's In Struggle (Harvard, 1981, cloth & paper), which chronicles the rise and fall of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee; August Meier's and Elliot Rudwick's CORE (Oxford, 1973, cloth; Univ. of Ill., 1975, paper), which does the same for the Congress of Racial Equality; David Lewis's King (Praeger, 1970, cloth; Univ. of Ill., 1978, paper), a biography of the slain civil-rights leader; and Alan J. Matusow's comprehensive The Unraveling of America (Harper, 1984).

Amid the scholarly analyses, the memoirs and fiction of black writers have conveyed the experience of being black in America in vivid and convincing detail. These include Richard Wright's Native Son (1940), James Baldwin's The Fire Next Time (1963), and The Autobiography of Malcolm X (1964).

Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man (1952), the story of a young black man's search for his own identity in white America, arguably deserves the top spot on any list. Perhaps no one has evoked in more powerful terms the historic predicament of the Afro-American, who "took on the complex symbolism of social health and social sickness [and] became . . . symbolic of America's hope for future perfection."

—Neil Spitzer

EDITOR'S NOTE: Neil Spitzer is senior researcher of The Wilson Quarterly. Several of these titles were suggested by James M. McPherson, professor of history at Princeton. Other books worthy of note are cited elsewhere in this issue in the essays by William Julius Wilson and Terry Eastland. Readers may also wish to consult WQ's Background Books essay on Reconstruction (Spring 1978).
"Nothing," wrote Sigmund Freud, "is past or forgotten." Every individual's experience leaves permanent "memory traces," or "engrams," he said, whose recall is affected by the intensity of sensual associations with it. For centuries, scholars developed elaborate schemes to assist recall—diagrams, rhymes, and picture alphabets. Today, the psychiatrist seeks the origins of his patient's mental anguish. And scientists look for models of artificial intelligence, even as they develop machines with the ability to encode, store, and retrieve information. Here, historian Daniel J. Boorstin describes the evolution of memory as an art. But he suggests that in our age of information overload, forgetting may "become more than ever a prerequisite for sanity."

by Daniel J. Boorstin

Before the printed book, Memory ruled daily life and the occult learning, and fully deserved the name later applied to printing, the "art preservative of all arts" (Ars artium omnium conservatrix). The Memory of individuals and of communities carried knowledge through time and space. For millennia personal Memory reigned over entertainment and information, over the perpetuation and perfection of crafts, the practice of commerce, the conduct of professions. By Memory and in Memory the fruits of education were garnered, preserved, and stored. Memory was an awesome faculty which everyone had to cultivate, in ways and for reasons we have long since forgotten. In these last 500 years we see only pitiful relics of the empire and the power of Memory.

The ancient Greeks gave mythic form to this fact that ruled their lives. The Goddess of Memory (Mnemosyne) was a Titan, daughter of Uranus (Heaven) and Gaia (Earth), and mother of all the nine Muses. In legend these were Epic Poetry (Calliope), History (Clio), Flute Playing (Euterpe), Tragedy (Melpomene), Dancing (Terpsichore), the Lyre (Erato), Sacred Song (Polyhymnia), Astronomy (Urania), and Comedy (Thalia). When the nine daughters of King Pierus challenged them in song, the King's daughters were punished by being changed into magpies, who could only sound monotonous repetition.
In this detail from a painting in the Farnese Palace in Rome, Baldassare Peruzzi (1481–1536) shows the Muses with the god Apollo, whom the ancients also associated with the arts and sciences.

Everyone needed the arts of Memory, which, like other arts, could be cultivated. The skills of Memory could be perfected, and virtuosi were admired. Only recently has "memory training" become a butt of ridicule and a refuge of charlatans. The traditional arts of Memory, delightfully chronicled by historian Frances A. Yates, flourished in Europe over the centuries.

The inventor of the mnemonic art was said to be the versatile Greek lyric poet Simonides of Ceos (ca. 556–468 B.C.). He was reputed also to be the first to accept payment for his poems. The origins were described in the work on oratory by Cicero, who was himself noted for his mnemonic skill. Once at a banquet in the house of Scopas in Thessaly, Simonides was hired to chant a lyric in honor of his host. But only half of Simonides's poem was in praise of Scopas, as he devoted the other half to the divine twins Castor and Pollux. The angry Scopas therefore would pay only half the agreed sum. While the many guests were still at the banquet table, a message was brought to Simonides that there were two young men at the door who wanted him to come outside. When he went out, he could see no one. The mysterious callers were, of course, Castor and Pollux, who had found their own way to pay Simonides for their share of the panegyric. For at the very moment when Simonides had left the banquet hall, the roof fell in, burying all the other guests in the ruins. When relatives came to take away the corpses for the burial honors, the mangled bodies could not be identified. Simonides then exercised his remarkable memory to show the grieving relatives which bodies belonged to whom. He did this by thinking back to where each of the guests had been seated. Then he was able to identify by place each of the bodies.

It was this experience that suggested to Simonides the classic form
of the art of Memory of which he was reputed to be the inventor. Cicero, who made Memory one of the five principal parts of rhetoric, explained what Simonides had done.

He inferred that persons desiring to train this faculty must select places and form mental images of the things they wish to remember and store those images in the places, so that the order of the places will preserve the order of the things, and the images of the things will denote the things themselves, and we shall employ the places and images respectively as a wax writing-tablet and the letters written on it.

Simonides’s art, which dominated European thinking in the Middle Ages, was based on the two simple concepts of places (loci) and images (imagines). These provided the lasting elements of Memory techniques for European rhetors, philosophers, and scientists.

A treatise (ca. 86–82 B.C.) written by a Roman teacher of rhetoric and known as Ad Herrenium, after the name of the person to whom this work was dedicated, became the standard text, the more highly esteemed because some thought it had been written by Cicero. Quintilian (ca. A.D. 35–95), the other great Roman authority on rhetoric, made the classic rules memorable. He described the “architectural” technique for imprinting the memory with a series of places. Think of a large building, Quintilian said, and walk through its numerous rooms remembering all the ornaments and furnishings in your imagination. Then give each idea to be remembered an image, and as you go through the building again deposit each image in this order in your imagination. For example, if you mentally deposit a spear in the living room, an anchor in the dining room, you will later recall that you are to speak first of the war, then of the navy, etc. This system still works.

In the Middle Ages, a technical jargon was elaborated on the basic distinction between the “natural” memory, with which we are all born and which we exercise without training, and the “artificial” memory, which we can develop. There were different techniques for memorizing things or words. And differing views about where the student should be when he worked at his memory exercises and what were the best kinds of places to serve as imaginary storage houses for the loci and images of memory. Some teachers advised the student to find a quiet place,

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where his imagined impressions of the loci of memory would not be weakened by surrounding noises and passing people. And, of course, an observant and well-traveled person was better equipped to provide himself with many varied Memory-places. In those days, one could see some student of rhetoric walking tensely through a deserted building, noting the shape and furnishing of each room to equip his imagination with places to serve as a warehouse for his memory.

The elder Seneca (ca. 55 B.C.-A.D. 37), a famous teacher of rhetoric, was said to be able to repeat long passages of speeches he had heard only once many years before. He would impress his students by asking each member of a class of 200 to recite a line of poetry, and then he would recite all the lines they had quoted—in reverse order, from last to first. Saint Augustine, who also had begun life as a teacher of rhetoric, reported his admiration of a friend who could recite the whole text of Virgil—backwards!

The feats and especially the acrobatics of "artificial" memory were in high repute. "Memory," said Aeschylus, "is the mother of all wisdom." "Memory," agreed Cicero, "is the treasury and guardian of all things." In the heyday of Memory, before the spread of printing, a highly developed Memory was needed by the entertainer, the poet, the singer, the physician, the lawyer, and the priest.

The first great epics in Europe were produced by an oral tradition, which is another way of saying they were preserved and performed by the arts of Memory. The Iliad and the Odyssey were perpetuated by word of mouth, without the use of writing. Homer's word for poet is "singer" (aoidos). And the singer before Homer seems to have been one who chanted a single poem, short enough to be sung to a single audience on one occasion. The surviving practice in Muslim Serbia, which is described by the brilliant American scholar-explorer Milman Parry, is probably close to the custom of Homeric antiquity. He shows us how in the beginning the length of a poem was limited by the patience of an audience and a singer's remembered repertoire. Then the achievement of a Homer (whether he, she, or they) was to combine hour-long songs into a connected epic with a grander purpose, a larger theme, and a complicated structure.

The first manuscript books in the ancient Mediterranean were written on papyrus sheets glued together and then rolled up. It was inconvenient to unroll the book, and frequent unrolling wore away the written words. Since there were no separate numbered "pages," it was such a nuisance to verify a quotation that people were inclined to rely on their memory.

Laws were preserved by Memory before they were preserved in docu-
Mements. The collective memory of the community was the first legal archive. The English common law was "immemorial" custom which ran to a "time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary." "In the profound ignorance of letters which formerly overspread the whole western world," Sir William Blackstone noted in 1765, "letters were entirely traditional, for this plain reason, that the nations among which they prevailed had but little idea of writing. Thus the British as well as the Gallic druids committed all their laws as well as learning to memory; and it is said of the primitive Saxons here, as well as their brethren on the continent, that leges sola memoria et usu retinebant."

Ritual and liturgy, too, were preserved by memory, of which priests were the special custodians. Religious services, often repeated, were ways of imprinting prayers and rites on the youth of the congregation. The prevalence of verse and music as mnemonic devices attests the special importance of memory in the days before printed textbooks. For centuries the standard work on Latin grammar was the 12th-century Doctrinale, by Alexander of Villedieu, in 2,000 lines of doggerel. Versified rules were easier to remember, though their crudity appalled Aldus Manutius when he reprinted this work in 1501.

Medieval scholastic philosophers were not satisfied that Memory should be merely a practical skill. So they transformed Memory from a skill into a virtue, an aspect of the virtue of Prudence. After the 12th century, when the classic treatise Ad Herrenium reappeared in manuscripts, the scholastics seemed less concerned with the technology than with the Morality of Memory. How could Memory promote the Christian life?

Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), his biographers boasted, memorized everything his teachers ever told him in school. In Cologne, Albertus Magnus helped him train his memory. The sayings of the Church Fathers that Aquinas collected for Pope Urban IV after his trips to many monasteries were recorded not from what he had copied out but from what he had merely seen. Of course he remembered perfectly anything he had ever read. In his Summa Theologiae (1267–73) he expounded Cicero's definition of Memory as a part of Prudence, making it one of the four cardinal virtues, and then he provided his own four rules for perfecting the Memory. Until the triumph of the printed book, these Thomist rules of memory prevailed. Copied again and again, they became the scheme of textbooks. Paintings by Lorenzetti and Giotto, as Frances A. Yates explains, depicted virtues and vices to help viewers apply the Thomist rules of artificial Memory. The fresco of the Chapter House of Santa Maria Novella in Florence provides memorable images for each of Aquinas's four cardinal virtues and their several parts. "We must assiduously remember the invisible joys of paradise and the etern-
nal torments of hell," urged Boncompagno's standard medieval treatise. For him, lists of virtues and vices were simply "memorial notes" to help the pious frequent "the paths of remembrance."

Dante's Divine Comedy, with his plan of Inferno, Purgatorio, and Paradiso, made vivid both places and images (following the precepts of Simonides and Aquinas) in an easily remembered order. And there were humbler examples, too. The manuscripts of English friars in the 14th century described pictures—for example, of Idolatry in the role of a prostitute—not meant to be seen with the eye, but rather to provide invisible images for the memory.

Petrarch (1304–1374) also had a great reputation as an authority on the artificial memory and how to cultivate it. He offered his own helpful rules for choosing the "places" where remembered images were to be stored for retrieval. The imagined architecture of Memory, he said, must provide storage places of medium size, not too large or too small for the particular image.

By the time the printing press appeared, the arts of Memory had been elaborated into countless systems. At the beginning of the 16th century the best-known work was a practical text, Phoenix, sive Artificiosa Memoria (Venice, 1491), which went through many editions and was widely translated. In that popular handbook, Peter of Ravenna advised that the best memory loci were in a deserted church. When you have found your church, you should go around in it three or four times, fixing in your mind all the places where you would later put your memory-images. Each locus should be five or six feet from the one before. Peter boasted that even as a young man he had fixed in his mind 100,000 memory loci and by his later travels he had added thousands more. The effectiveness of his system, he said, was shown by the fact that he could repeat verbatim the whole canon law, 200 speeches of Cicero, and 20,000 points of law.

After Gutenberg, realms of everyday life once ruled and served by Memory would be governed by the printed page. In the late Middle Ages, for the small literate class, manuscript books had provided an aid, and sometimes a substitute, for Memory. But the printed book was far more portable, more accurate, more convenient to refer to, and, of course, more public. Whatever was in print, after being written by an author, was also known to printers, proofreaders, and anyone reached by the printed page. A man could now refer to the rules of grammar, the speeches of Cicero, and the texts of theology, canon law, and morality without storing them in himself.

The printed book would be a new warehouse of Memory, superior in countless ways to the internal, invisible warehouse in each person.
When the codex of bound manuscript pages supplanted the long manuscript roll, it was much easier to refer to a written source. After the 12th century some manuscript books carried tables, running heads, and even rudimentary indexes, which showed that Memory was already beginning to lose some of its ancient role. But retrieval became still easier when printed books had title pages and their pages were numbered. When they were equipped with indexes, as they sometimes were by the 16th century, then the only essential feat of Memory was to remember the order of the alphabet. Before the end of the 18th century, the alphabetic index at the back of a book had become standard. The technology of Memory retrieval, though of course never entirely dispensable, played a much smaller role in the higher realms of religion, thought, and knowledge. Spectacular feats of Memory became mere stunts.

Some of the consequences had been predicted two millennia earlier when Socrates lamented the effects of writing itself on the Memory and the soul of the learner. In his dialogue with Phaedrus reported by Plato, Socrates recounts how Thoth, the Egyptian god who invented letters, had misjudged the effect of his invention. Thoth was thus reproached by the god Thamus, then King of Egypt:

This discovery of yours will create forgetfulness in the learners' souls, because they will not use their memories; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves. The specific which you have discovered is an aid not to memory, but to reminiscence, and you give your disciples not truth, but only the semblance of truth; they will be hearers of many things and will have learned nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing; they will be tiresome company, having the show of wisdom without the reality.

The perils that Socrates noted in the written word would be multiplied a thousandfold when words went into print.

The effect was beautifully suggested by Victor Hugo in a familiar passage in *Notre-Dame de Paris* (1831) when the scholar holding his first printed book turns away from his manuscripts, looks at the cathedral, and says "This will kill that" (*Ceci tuera cela*). Print also destroyed "the invisible cathedrals of memory." For the printed book made it less necessary to shape ideas and things into vivid images and then store them in Memory-places.

The same era that saw the decline of the everyday empire of Memory would see the rise of Neoplatonism—a mysterious new empire of the hidden, the secret, the occult. This revival of Platonic ideas in the Renaissance gave a new life and a new realm to Memory. Plato had made much of the soul and its "memory" of ideal forms. Now a galaxy
of talented mystics developed a new technology of Memory. No longer the servant of oratory, only an aspect of rhetoric, Memory became an arcane art, a realm of ineffable entities. The Hermetic art opened secret recesses of the soul. The bizarre Memory Theater of Giulio Camillo, exhibited in Venice and Paris, provided Memory-places not just for convenience but as a way of representing “the eternal nature of all things” in their “eternal places.” The Neoplatonists of Cosimo de’ Medici’s Platonic Academy in Florence—Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) and Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494)—built an occult art of Memory into their elusive philosophies.

The most remarkable explorer of the Dark Continent of Memory was the inspired vagrant Giordano Bruno (1548–1600). As a young friar in Naples, he had been inducted into the famous Dominican art of Memory, and when he abandoned the Dominican order, laymen hoped he would reveal the Dominican secrets. He did not disappoint them. For his work On the Shadows of Ideas, Circe (1582) explained that Memory-skill was neither natural nor magical but was the product of a special science. Introducing his Memory-science with an incantation by Circe herself, he showed the peculiar potency of images of the decans of the zodiac. The star images, Shadows of Ideas, representing celestial objects, are nearer to the enduring reality than are images of this transient world below. Bruno’s system for “remembering” these “shadows of ideas contracted for inner writing” from the celestial images brought his disciples to a higher reality.

This is to form the inform chaos. . . . It is necessary for the control of memory that the numbers and elements should be disposed in order . . . through certain memorable forms (the images of the zodiac). . . . I tell you that if you contemplate this attentively you will be able to reach such a figurative art that it will help not only the memory but also all the powers of the soul in a wonderful manner.

A guaranteed way to the Unity behind everything, the Divine Unity!

But the everyday needs for Memory were never as important as they had been in the days before paper and printed books. The kudos of Memory declined. In 1580 Montaigne declared that “a good memory is generally joined to a weak judgment.” And pundits quipped, “Nothing is more common than a fool with a strong memory.”

In the centuries after printing, interest has shifted from the technology of Memory to its pathology. By the late 20th century, interest in Memory was being displaced by interest in aphasia, amnesia, hysteria,
hypnosis, and, of course, psychoanalysis. Pedagogic interest in the arts of Memory came to be displaced by interest in the arts of learning, which were increasingly described as a social process.

And with this came a renewed interest in the arts of forgetting. When Simonides offered to teach the Athenian statesman Themistocles the art of Memory, Cicero reports that he refused. "Teach me not the art of remembering," he said, "but the art of forgetting, for I remember things I do not wish to remember, but I cannot forget things I wish to forget."

The study of forgetting became a frontier of modern psychology, where mental processes were first examined experimentally and subjected to measurement. "Psychology has a long past," Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850–1909) observed, "yet its real history is short." His beautifully simple experiments, which William James called "heroic," were described in Memory: A Contribution to Experimental Psychology (1885) and laid the foundation for modern experimental psychology.

Ebbinghaus invented meaningless raw materials for his experiments. Nonsense syllables. By taking any two consonants and putting a vowel in between, he devised some 2,300 rememberable (and forgettable) items, and he put them in series. For his experiments the syllables had the advantage of lacking associations. For two years he used himself as the subject to test the powers of retaining and reproducing these syllables. He kept scrupulous records of all his trials, of the times required for recollection, and of the intervals between his efforts. He also experimented in "relearning." His efforts might have been of little use without his passion for statistics.

Now, Ebbinghaus hoped, not mere sense perceptions (which Gustav Fechner [1801–1887] had already begun to study and to whom he dedicated his work) but mental phenomena themselves could be submitted to "an experimental and quantitative treatment." Ebbinghaus's "forgetting-curve" related forgetting to the passage of time. His results, still significant, showed that most forgetting takes place soon after "learning."

In this unexpected way the inward world of thought began to be charted with the instruments of modern mathematics. But other explorers, in the Neoplatonist tradition, kept alive an interest in the mysteries of memory. Ebbinghaus himself said that he had studied "the non-voluntary re-emergence of mental images out of the darkness of memory into the light of consciousness." A few other psychologists rashly plunged into that "darkness" of the unconscious, but even as they did so they claimed to have invented a whole new "science."

The founders of modern psychology were increasingly interested in forgetting as a process in everyday life. The incomparable William
James (1842–1910) observed:

In the practical use of our intellect, forgetting is as important a function as remembering. . . . If we remembered everything, we should on most occasions be as ill off as if we remembered nothing. It would take as long for us to recall a space of time as it took the original time to elapse, and we should never get ahead with our thinking. All recollected times undergo . . . foreshortening; and this foreshortening is due to the omission of an enormous number of facts which filled them. "We thus reach the paradoxical result," says M. Ribot, "that one condition of remembering is that we should forget. Without totally forgetting a prodigious number of states of consciousness, and momentarily forgetting a large number, we could not remember at all. . . ."

In a century when the stock of human knowledge and of collective memories would be multiplied, recorded, and diffused as never before, forgetting would become more than ever a prerequisite for sanity.

But what happened to "forgotten" memories? "Where are the snows of yester-year?" In the 20th century the realm of memory was once again transformed, to be rediscovered as a vast region of the unconscious. In his Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1904) Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) started from simple examples, such as the forgetting of proper names, of foreign words, and of the order of words. The new arts of Memory for which Freud became famous had both the scientific pretensions of Simonides and his followers and the occult charm of the Neoplatonists. Of course, people had always wondered at the mystery of dreams. Now Freud found the dream world also to be a copious secret treasury of Memories. Freud's Interpretation of Dreams (1900) showed how psychoanalysis could serve as an art and a science of Memories.

Others, stirred by Freud, would find still more new meanings in Memory. Latent Memory, or the unconscious, became a new resource of therapy, anthropology, and sociology. Might not the tale of Oedipus record everyone's experience? Freud's own mythic metaphors hinted at our inner inheritance of ancient, communal experience. Carl Jung (1875–1961), more in the Hermetic tradition, popularized the "collective unconscious." Now Freud, his disciples and dissidents, had again rediscovered, or perhaps after their fashion reconstructed, the Cathedrals of Memory.
To NATO strategists, Norway represents the Northern Flank, guarding the North Atlantic, close to Soviet arctic bases. To American scholars, Norway, with King Olaf V as its constitutional monarch, is known for its orderly democracy, its high overall tax burden, and its generous welfare state.
Since World War II, Mexico, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Kuwait have all experienced the euphoria—and the subsequent pain—that accompanied an explosion of national affluence produced by a sudden gush of oil or natural gas. Since the 1960s, when oil was discovered in the North Sea, politicians in Oslo have vowed not to squander the nation's new wealth, not to repeat the mistakes of others. In large part, they have succeeded. Today, Norway’s pristine landscape and its “quality of life” are intact. Rates of divorce, crime, and drug abuse are still low, even by Scandinavian standards. The Norwegians remain committed to NATO and wary of their Soviet neighbors. Nonetheless, oil wealth has changed some things, notably the ability of Norwegian industries to compete in international markets. Here, our writers survey a Norway in transition, still trying to keep the rest of the world at arm's length, but clearly vulnerable to the political and cultural trends that have already changed life elsewhere in the West.

PARADISE RETAINED

by Robert Wright

In the year 1000, Olaf Tryggvason, the Viking king, prepared to do battle against an alliance of Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian warriors. At stake was control of southern Norway, part of Olaf's plan for a unified, Christian nation. According to chronicles compiled two centuries later, the King approached the conflict with no fear of the “miserable” Danes, or of the Swedes, who, he said, might as well "stay at home and lick their sacrificial bowls." But from the fighters led by Earl Erik, he warned his aides, “we can expect a sharp battle, for they are Norwegians like ourselves.”

Ten centuries after the Battle of Svold (King Olaf was defeated), tranquility reigns in Norway. But time has not extin-
guished the Norwegians’ ardent nationalism, nor dulled their sense of intra-Scandinavian rivalry. On any given day, the red, white, and blue national ensign flies from flagstaffs in tidy front-yard gardens from Kristiansand to Hammerfest. And, although the Norwegians now participate in numerous Scandinavian joint ventures, notably the Scandinavian Airline System (SAS), the prosperous Swedes still are the targets of unflattering, if lighthearted, remarks on the streets of Oslo and Bergen. “Do you know how to save a Swede from drowning?” one of countless ethnic jokes begins. “No,” is the typical reply. The punchline: “Good.”

A Model Nation

The conventional explanation of Norway’s chauvinism draws on the past. Norwegians learn as youngsters that their country spent much of its history dominated by Scandinavian neighbors—under Danish control from 1536 to 1814, and under nominal Swedish rule until 1905, when formal independence was finally won. (Flags first appeared in front yards as an unspoken invitation for the Swedes to vacate Norway.) Middle-aged Norwegians remember that during World War II, Nazi occupation troops were sustained by supply trains that passed unimpeded through a neutral Sweden. And all Norwegian adults are old enough to know firsthand that Sweden and Denmark have received most of the attention allotted Scandinavia by the international press since the war: The Swedes have stayed one step ahead of Norway in expanding the modern welfare state; Copenhagen’s recent tolerance of sinful fun (to the chagrin of many Danes) has earned it a reputation as the “Paris of the North.”

According to some analysts, history has thus instilled in Norwegians a certain insecurity. “You wouldn’t think that there was any man in the world as brave and carefree as the Norwegian when he stands smiling or laughing, hands in his trousers’ pockets and jacket nonchalantly unbuttoned, at the street corner, on the amateur stage, in the witness box,” Agnar Mykle, the 20th-century Norwegian novelist, has written. “But women and critics and examiners and judges and executioners will tell you that in his heart of hearts the Norwegian is full of uncertainty. . . .”

Yet, today, Norway boasts a combination of material security and “quality of life” found nowhere else in Scandina-

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"I shall paint living people who breathe, feel, suffer, and love," wrote Edvard Munch (1863–1944), Norway’s famed artist, seen here in a self-portrait.

via—or, perhaps, in the rest of the Western democracies. In The Moral Order (1983), Raoul Naroll, an American social scientist, assessed the countries of the world in 12 categories—ranging from per capita gross national product to per capita combat deaths—in order to select a "model nation." He concluded, "Norway not only is the nation with . . . the best overall average on my 12 meters; of the four leading nations on my list it is also the best balanced."

The macadam streets in Oslo are as close to spotless as streets can be. Citizens stride purposefully along the sidewalks. They are not generous with smiles and greetings, perhaps, but their eyes are not burning with tension, or vacant with alienation, either. In winter, children who look as if they just stepped out of a first-grade primer—rosy cheeked, bright eyed, wearing wool scarves and mittens—frolic in the parks. But, in school or at home, they accede to the requests of teachers and parents without undue resistance. They will live to be older than citizens of almost any other nation, and it is no mystery why: They ski and hike, and the typical Norwegian’s diet sounds like a public service message from the American Heart Association—fish, vegetables, fruits, whole-grain breads. Chocolate and coffee are the token vices. A Norwegian’s idea of “junk food” is the white bread reserved for weekend festivities.

Citizens partake of one of the richest smorgasbords of social...
entitlements found anywhere. Hospital care costs them nothing (except in high taxes). By law, workers get four weeks of paid vacation per year. One-fourth of them own vacation homes. Those few who wind up unemployed receive more than half of their previous salaries while they seek new work.

A college education is free to all who can pass the stiff entrance examination. Norway is a world leader in books published per capita, thanks partly to government subsidies. Newspapers, too, receive support from Oslo—both directly and through a ban on TV advertising. While three million people in Chicago, for example, must choose between two major daily newspapers, Oslo’s 450,000 citizens can scan nearly a dozen.

The government also subsidizes the past. While all nations pay homage to tradition, few have taken such pains to preserve old ways of living as has Norway.

**Buying Waterfalls**

One example is Finnmark, Norway’s northernmost county. There the 20,000 remaining Lapps are newly conscious of their ethnic heritage. Indeed, the word “Lapp,” though still used in the American press, has been disowned by the Lapps, just as “Negro” was disowned by many blacks during the 1960s. Lapps now call themselves Same. Oslo pays to train Lapp-speaking teachers and helps support the 2,500 remaining reindeer herders (thus securing the place of reindeer salami in the Norwegian diet). Government-backed linguists are gently updating a language that has 120 descriptive words for snow but few for modern technology.

In spite of the government’s generosity, Norway’s solvency is not in doubt. And it never was. As economic problems mounted for Denmark and Sweden during the 1970s, Norway was exempted from alarums about the “crisis in Scandinavian socialism.” By the fall of 1983, Norway had the lowest unemployment rate—3.1 percent—in Scandinavia. It is a sign of Norway’s prosperity since World War II that the opposition Labor Party has seized on such a modest jobless rate in trying to mobilize public opinion against the ruling conservative coalition.

Moreover, Norway seems to have resisted the side effects of postwar affluence and urban growth which, in Denmark and Sweden, have eroded the conservative Lutheran tradition that the three nations share. Its divorce rate is the lowest in Scandinavia—and one of the lowest in the West. Its murder rate is one-fifth of Sweden’s and one-third of Denmark’s. In many small Norwegian towns, front doors are never locked. And, notwith-
standing the morbid themes conveyed by Norway's most famous painter, the turn-of-the-century expressionist Edvard Munch, Norwegians tend not to succumb to the suicidal depressions that stereotypically afflict Scandinavians. The nation's suicide rate is about one-third of Denmark's and is less than Sweden's by almost half.

Theories differ as to why Norwegians are not prone to taking drugs, divorcing their spouses, or killing themselves or each other. Less puzzling is their success in building a welfare state virtually impervious to economic shocks. While hard work and careful planning have been essential, so has Norway's natural endowment of energy—first hydroelectricity, and now North Sea oil.

At the beginning of the century, when England, the United States, and other coal-rich countries were already reaping the rewards (and suffering the pains) of the industrial revolution, a young Norwegian engineer named Sam Eyde began buying up mountain waterfalls. After Eyde's hydro-powered factory in Rjukan began producing fertilizer, legions of capitalists followed in his footsteps. The resulting industrial base—aluminum smelters, paper mills, wood pulp factories, all run on "white coal"—financed the expansion, during the 1950s and 1960s, of the Labor Party's welfare program: Folketrygden ("the people's security"). Today, Norway produces more electricity per capita than any other nation.

The oil discovered in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea during the 1960s has helped keep Folketrygden intact, and the economy close to full employment, even in the worst of times. Today, petroleum accounts for 17 percent of Norway's gross national product and one-third of its exports. During 1981, oil levies brought in $4 billion—about $1,000 per citizen.

Like the Scots

But oil worries some Norwegians. It attracts foreign laborers, European financiers, American technical advisers, and, above all, lots of money. In 1970, before commercial drilling began, Norway's GNP per capita was 71 percent of Sweden's. By 1980, the figure had grown to 93 percent. Oil threatens to make Norway look more like Sweden, Denmark, and the rest of the industrialized world than its citizens would like.

Except for the explosive extroversion of the Viking age (800–1066) and the massive emigration from Norway to America during the 19th and early 20th centuries (see box, pp. 120–121), Norwegians have more or less kept to themselves (al-
Only Ireland contributed a greater share of its population to the American immigration of the 19th and 20th centuries than did Norway. Some 800,000 Norsken—driven by scarcity, drawn by the promise of cheap, fertile land and by the American ideals of equality and liberty—became U.S. citizens between 1825 and 1925. They settled mainly in the Midwest—Minnesota, Wisconsin, the Dakotas. Among them were Ole Evinrude, who built the first commercially successful outboard motor, and Knute Rockne, Notre Dame’s football coach during the 1920s. Former Vice President Walter F. Mondale’s last name is the Anglicization of Mundal, the village on the Sogne Fjord in southwestern Norway from which his great-grandfather, Frederick Person Mundal, emigrated to Minnesota in 1856. Here, drawn from the essay, “Letter to a Grandfather I Never Knew,” is TV commentator Eric Severeid’s sober 1975 tribute to immigrant Erik Erikson Severeid:

You were at ease with the word “duty.” You knew there could be no rights and privileges without responsibility. You found it natural to teach probity to your children, and self-denial, so that others, too, could have elbow room in which to live. You blamed yourself for misfortune, not others, not the government.

You knew what was known by ancient philosophers you never read—that civilized life cannot hold together without these values. Now, some speak of them as the “puritan ethic,” as a curious, outmoded illusion. But you were not wrong.

You knew your values were right because you carried to the new land no evil cargo of hatred or guilt. You and your contemporaries were freemen born, not slaves or serfs. You had much to learn but little to forget.

though 28,000 of them roam the seven seas aboard the world’s fifth largest merchant fleet). The Norwegian gene pool is considered the most homogeneous in Western Europe. By one reckoning, two-thirds of the people have pure blue eyes. Even today, ordinary residents of Drammen or Tromsø may point and stare upon seeing a black man. Like the Scots, Norwegians are not
Now there are some who believe your sojourn was in vain. That you and the others sought freedom and equality but found neither.

You knew such things are not found but created. This grandson believes that is what you did. I have seen much of the world. Were I now asked to name some region on earth where men and women live in a surer climate of freedom and equality than that northwest region where you settled—were I so asked I could not answer. I know of none. What you built still stands upon that prairie.

We are not entirely sure, anymore, that it will stand forever. You thought of democracy as natural; but it is far from certain that any law of nature will preserve it. In nation after nation, the people find it too difficult. They cannot combine justice with order, nor free thought and speech with life in unity.

The capacity to do this developed, in modern times, among the men and women who lived in the rocks and forests from which you came, and in other lands washed by the waters of the North Sea.

The secret of democracy was made manifest there. It was nurtured in the wooden churches, propagated in the small, clustering towns and the growing cities, passed on through the school rooms and the books. The secret was the knowledge that each man is his brother's keeper.

The secret knowledge is still manifest in those North Sea lands. It is still manifest in this new land, now growing old.

But it is in danger. We have been careless of what you bequeathed us. We have allowed self-interest to sicken the American idea. We have rotted some of it away by surfeit and indifference, and wounded it by violence.

We know that this society remains the central experimental laboratory in human relations. Success moved with you in this direction. There is a fear that failure here would spread eastward, back to the origins of success.

But not all the dangers have their origin here. Great wealth can poison life as we here have learned. And great wealth from beneath your native sea threatens the ways of life that have held so steady, so long, in your native land. The people see the danger. They know from our heedlessness here what could happen to them. A test of foresight and common sense is in the making. Norway, now, will become a critical experiment, testing man's capacity to live the life of reason under enormous contrary pressures. We and the world will watch and perhaps we will learn.

known for their friendliness to foreigners. (Whether their reserve reflects shyness, complacency, or hostility is a matter of debate among foreign travelers.) Nor do they embrace foreign ideas, or products, readily. In few Western nations did manufacturers of paper milk cartons fight a longer, tougher battle to replace glass bottles than they did in Norway.

*The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1984*
Norway’s reclusiveness is grounded in climate and geography. The spectacular mountains in the east, the open seas to the west and south, the ice to the north, and the long winters do not add up to a natural invitation to foreign visitors. In *The Scandinavians* (1966), Donald S. Connery wrote, “It is almost as if the weary and sophisticated Continent had set Norway apart as a national park or royal preserve and had appointed the Norwegians as custodians to keep the waters clear, the mountain snows untouched by industrial soot, and the wonders of nature unspoiled by thoughtless trespassers.”

The greater part of Norway is rugged and inhospitable. Two-thirds of the territory is more than 1,000 feet above sea level, and only three percent is arable. Nearly half of Norway is within the Arctic Circle. The flip side of the “midnight sun” is the “noontime moon”; in Hammerfest, the sun is not seen at all between November 21 and January 23.

**Staying Aloof**

Not surprisingly, most Norwegians have chosen to settle along the shores in the south; there they are only as far north as southern Alaska. Four of five live within 10 miles of the sea, near one of the fjords which, together, make the length of the Norwegian coastline a matter of definition. Overflying it by airplane, one would cover about 1,650 miles. Traversing it by foot (an impossible feat for all but the expert cliff-climber) would be a journey of 10 times that length.

Norway is larger than Michigan and Illinois combined, and its population of 4.1 million is only the size of greater Detroit’s. So there is some room to spread out even without climbing mountains. Four Norwegians in five live in one-family houses.

The white, wooden, two-story houses in Norway’s seaside villages would look at home in Middletown, U.S.A., but there they would be arranged more coherently. Around the typical fjord, what land there is between water’s edge and mountain’s base offers foothills, jagged boulders, and various other geological enemies of order and symmetry. Main Street is often a narrow lane snaking through town, rather than a broad, straight thoroughfare. Homes and shops—wedged between boulders, straddling knolls—form a crazy quilt covering what little flat and near-flat land nature has provided. Only in the broader valleys, notably around Oslo, can the Norwegians build exurbs that match those of Sweden or the United States.

The pleasures of exurbia were a long time in the winning, a fact that has not escaped the attention of many Norwegians. In
Norway's fjords, some nearly a mile deep, were formed during the Quaternary Period of the Ice Age, less than 2.5 million years ago, as glaciers deepened and broadened existing river valleys.

Returning to the Future (1942), Sigrid Undset, winner of the 1928 Nobel Prize in literature, wrote, "If any people in the world owns its land with honor and right, has conquered it, not from other people, but in obedience to the Creator's stern commandment that man shall eat his bread in the sweat of his brow, it is we Norwegians who call Norway our country."

Alone for centuries, aware of the evolution of Europe but largely untouched by it before World War II, the Norwegian people have come to view the world with a curious mixture of detachment and compassion.

While belonging to NATO, Norway keeps its distance from the Alliance, refusing to permit the stationing of allied troops on its soil (see box, pp. 134–135).* The nation has been aloof in other respects, too. In 1972, some 53 percent of the electorate voted not to join the European Economic Community—fearful, perhaps, that integration would adulterate the national character, and confident

*Norway actively supports peace and world order. A 700-man Norwegian battalion now serves in a United Nations peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon. Norway provided the first secretary-general of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, who backed U.S. efforts to repel Communist aggression in Korea in 1950.
that North Sea oil would make Norway a sought-after trade partner with or without Common Market membership.

Yet, Norwegians seem to relish participation—albeit vicarious—in the great global controversies of the day. South Africa, Afghanistan, or Central America may provoke as much parliamentary rhetoric and dinner-table conversation as the possible demise of a local fish cannery. In 1799, when the English economist Thomas R. Malthus visited Norway, he recorded in his diary: "I talked with a Mr. Nielsen who was a great Democrat and admirer of Thomas Paine. He abused a great deal the English government for their interference with the French—thought that Kings were now receiving a proper lesson, and that the light of the French revolution could never be thoroughly extinguished."

Today, Norwegians are likely to share Mr. Nielsen's sentiments. Reflecting Norwegian history, they tend to come down on the side of national self-determination and against the big outsider, Eastern or Western.

Similar sympathies apply in domestic matters. Underlying the long popularity of the Labor Party is a deeply ingrained antipathy toward the "haves." Serfdom did not gain a foothold in Norway during the Middle Ages, and in 1821, seven years after the end of Danish rule, the Storting (Parliament) abolished all titles of nobility. Norwegians agree on one point, wrote the Norwegian playwright Henrik Ibsen: They should "drag down what is most lofty." Today, a man without a family or a tax shelter must give the taxman 80 cents of each dollar he earns over $50,000.

The cost of mandated equality has begun to worry many Norwegians. In 1981, they went to the polls and gave the Conservative Party its first electoral triumph in 53 years. The Conservatives, led by Prime Minister Kaare Willoch, are now in the unaccustomed position of seeing the youth vote—long a property of the Left—siphoned off by parties to the right.

**Candy Cigarettes**

The most notable of these, the Progress Party, was formed only 10 years ago amid a tax revolt. The party has been compared by local analysts with the "Reagan Republicans"—a bit off the mark, perhaps; in Norway, "right wing" translates as "left of center" on the American political spectrum. Still, the Progress Party's leader, economist Carl I. Hagen, does echo the Reaganites' calls for drastically scaled down government, less regulation, and simpler solutions to social problems. His party
NORWAY has endorsed exiling drug offenders to the Arctic island of Spitsbergen and shrinking Norway’s tomes of legal codes to the size of a pocket diary.

The Conservative Party and parties to its right collected 40 percent of the vote in 1981. In 1969, the Conservative Party garnered 19 percent; then there were no parties to its right.

Part of this conservative resurgence was simply a matter of being in the right place at the right time—out of power during the worldwide “OPEC recession” that began in 1974. Half of Norway’s GNP comes from exports (mainly oil, shipbuilding, and shipping), so the governing party will always reign at the mercy of global economic ups and downs.

Conservatives have also profited from popular reactions to the Labor governments’ relentless expansion of the welfare state and their passion for high taxes and economic regulation. As Oslo borrowed against future oil revenues to ward off bad economic times, the government came more and more to be the economy’s chief actor. Between 1977 and 1981, some 85 percent of all new jobs were provided by the state or by municipalities. Today, 47 percent of Norway’s GNP ends up in the coffers of the national, county, or municipal government (versus 49 percent in

GIANTS IN THE EARTH

By O. E. ROLVAAG

The fullest, finest and most powerful novel that has been written about pioneer life in America

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FICTION

Ole Edvard Rølvaag’s 1927 novel about Norwegian settlers in the Midwest has become a minor American classic. Rølvaag (1876–1931), an immigrant who attended St. Olaf College in Northfield, Minn., founded the Norwegian-American Historical Association.
Sweden and 32 percent in the United States). At government-run liquor stores, taxes drive the price of a fifth of scotch to $35.

Under the Labor Party, Oslo's paternalism sometimes reached comical proportions. A law introduced in 1975 would have made it illegal not only to advertise cigarettes in the newspapers, but also to sell candy cigarettes to anyone under 16. (The law passed, but not until it was stripped of the latter provision.)*

Willoch did not enter office in 1981 with a sweeping mandate for change, and he knew it. "Norwegians are not tired of the welfare state," he told reporters. "But they know you cannot pay for a welfare state without economic growth, and you cannot have economic growth with taxes as high as ours."

Thus far, the Prime Minister has found it hard to follow even his own modest prescription. With unemployment rising (the number of jobless grew from 28,000 in late 1981 to 68,000 in late 1983), reducing state outlays has proven difficult. Willoch has cut income taxes marginally, but has raised the sales tax on new cars—which already ranged between 100 and 200 percent. The betting in Oslo is that the Labor Party stands a good chance to regain control of the Storting in 1985.

No to Cohabitation

Norwegian political pundits are debating not just whether 1981 marked a long-term drift to the right—but whether it marked the erosion of the middle ground. The Center Party, the Liberal Party, and the Christian People's Party, which stand between the Labor and Conservative parties on the ideological spectrum, have seen their share of the vote shrink considerably over the past decade.†

The three parties of the center have long drawn their strength from Norway's hinterland, thriving on long-standing differences between city slickers and country folk. But between 1960 and 1980, the urban share of the population grew from 32 percent to 43 percent.

*The government's war on vice is often waged more conventionally. In a land where "lost weekends" provide an escape from tranquility for many workers, drunk-driving laws are reputedly the toughest in the world—and are well obeyed. Driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.5 percent, which in many U.S. states is considered proof of sobriety, draws a minimum penalty of three weeks in jail.

†Political polarization, if it grows, could add to recent strains on the nation's long habit of seeking consensus. Management-labor negotiations, often government-mediated, have traditionally been civilized affairs. In 1972, there were only nine industrial disputes lasting more than one day. They involved a total of 12,000 workers. But in 1981, more than three times as many workers engaged in twice as many strikes.
RESISTING THE NAZIS

During the early hours of April 9, 1940, German warships crept into the harbors of Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, Stavanger, Kristiansand, and Oslo. For the first time in World War II, Hitler had launched an invasion without first issuing an ultimatum.

At peace for 125 years, Norway had only 7,000 soldiers to protect her neutrality. Allied reinforcements were too little and too late. The Nazis soon controlled all of Norway. But amid growing repression and economic hardship, the Norwegian people began a dogged resistance campaign that remains a source of national pride.

The brief defense of Oslo Fjord proved crucial. There, coastal artillerymen sank the cruisers Blücher and Brünnner. The Germans, surprised, were held at bay for eight hours, allowing King Haakon VII to escape to the north. From England, he led the resistance.

Norwegians listened to his speeches on contraband shortwave radios hidden in their basements. Young men fled to the forests to escape forced labor for the Nazis, and some became expert saboteurs. The Norwegian underground blew up railroads and helped British commandos destroy heavy-water plants at Rjukan that Hitler had hoped would help the Third Reich produce an atomic bomb.

Haakon requisitioned all Norway's merchant ships abroad—most of the 4.8-million-ton fleet—and placed them in Allied service. Some 3,600 Norwegian seamen died during the war.

The Nazis appointed Vidkun Quisling, founder of Norway's unpopular fascist National Union Party, as "minister president" of Norway. Quisling tried to turn churches and schools into founts of Nazi propaganda. (Until Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, Quisling's chief local supporters included the Communists.)

On Easter Sunday, 1942, most of the nation's clergymen resigned. Many escaped to neutral Sweden. Some 1,300 teachers who refused to use Nazi texts were sent to a concentration camp at Grini. Thousands of other Norwegians were arrested by the Gestapo.

In the spring of 1945, King Haakon greeted with reserve the news of German offers to capitulate. "Dignity, calm, discipline," the king exhorted from London. Nonetheless, he received a properly jubilant reception upon his return to Oslo.

Quisling was tried and executed. Today, his name lives on in English and Norwegian dictionaries as a synonym for traitor.

Vidkun Quisling
At the same time, the contrasts between urban and rural folkways have diminished. The Christian People's Party had long benefited from the tendency of rural Norwegians to answer with an emphatic No such questions as: Is cohabitation without marriage morally acceptable? Should the state continue to provide free abortions, no questions asked? But these days, abortions and premarital cohabitation raise fewer eyebrows, even in remote villages. The Christian People's Party lost seven seats in the 1981 election.

**Roughing Up the 'Pakies'**

For much of this century, Norway's "language problem" has aggravated rural-urban tension, and, hence, provided support for the parties of the center. Until 1852, the only written Norwegian language was Riksmaal—the "administrative" language, with a heavy Danish flavor, imposed by the Danes centuries earlier and spoken mainly in the cities. During the early 1800s, Ivar Aasen, a peasant and self-educated linguist, set out to codify the native Norse tongues spoken in the upland valleys. Lacking a single model, he wove dozens of dialects into a synthetic "genuine" language, "Landsmaal." This artificial vernacular was adopted widely in rural areas during Norway's late 19th-century cultural renaissance, having been propagated by such artists as the novelist Arne Garborg and the poet and journalist Aasmund O. Vinje. The result was a linguistically divided nation.

However, urbanization appears to be dimming the prospects for Landsmaal. Today, only one in six elementary school children speaks it regularly. And the distinction between the two tongues is blurring somewhat. Partly because programs in both languages are broadcast nationwide, TV in Norway—as in the United States—is serving as the great cultural homogenizer. The average Norwegian spends nearly two hours per weekday watching TV—half the average American's television time, but much more than that of the average Norwegian two decades ago.

The electronic media may also bring Norway into the mainstream of modern mass culture. American movies—with Norwegian subtitles—have long appeared on television. Now, with

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*In theory, the Norwegian constitution would lend strength to a religion-based party such as the CPP. It mandates that "the Evangelical-Lutheran religion shall remain the official religion of the State. The inhabitants professing it are bound to bring up their children in the same." But Norwegians have complied with the letter, more than the spirit, of this dictum. Today, while nine in 10 citizens are baptized in the Lutheran Church, only one in 10 goes to 10 or more services a year, and half attend none at all.*

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the advent of cable TV, viewers are exposed to an unpredictable array of imported distractions.

Other foreign influences are at work. Since the oil boom hit Norway in the mid-1970s, visions of good wages and equitable treatment have drawn Pakistanis, Turks, and other "guestworkers." The government has treated them humanely, extending to them the welfare benefits enjoyed by natives. Some natives have not been so kind. Juvenile gangs in Oslo or Trondheim sometimes rough up the "Pakies."

To date, no more than 10,000 Pakistani guestworkers have immigrated. Only in a country of Norway's ethnic homogeneity could such a small-scale influx attract so much space and discussion in the newspapers. Similarly, levels of youth crime and drug use that many American big-city mayors would welcome stir anguished debate among Norwegians.

An article titled "Norway Breaks into the World of Violent Crime" appeared in the Norseman two years ago. The writer noted that Oslo's murder rate had doubled in 1981; in a single weekend, three women had done away with their husbands. And a nursing home director had admitted to killing no fewer than 27 of his patients.

Even so, the author remarked, Norway's crime statistics stand up well in international comparisons. "Paradise," he concluded, accurately, "is not yet lost."
COPING WITH OIL

In 1965, when Esso secured the first license from Oslo for offshore oil exploration, hopes ran high that the North Sea fields would provide a stable source of energy for the West—and a stable source of income for Norway.

By the autumn of 1969, those hopes were fading. More than 200 exploratory wells dotted the seabed between Norway and Britain, and none had yielded enough petroleum to warrant commercial development.

In December, workers on the Phillips Petroleum drilling rig "Ocean Viking" suddenly struck oil 180 miles off the Norwegian shore, two miles beneath the ocean floor. By 1971, Phillips was extracting 40,000 barrels per day from "Ekofisk"—a dome-shaped formation of limestone eight miles long and four miles wide. Within a few years, the North Sea would rank second only to the Middle East in "proven oil reserves." One-third of those reserves were under Norway’s waters.

But there was no dancing in the streets of Oslo. The Norwegians, for the most part, reacted soberly to their windfall. Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli of the long-dominant Labor Party warned in 1974 that Norway’s undersea blessing could become a curse; oil wealth had to be handled judiciously. The nation, he vowed, would not allow revenues from oil and natural gas to overheat the economy. It would not let the petroleum business displace traditional export industries, such as shipbuilding and forestry, leaving the country’s prosperity hostage to fluctuations in the worldwide demand for energy. Only with great patience and self-discipline, he cautioned, could his fellow countrymen parlay their new-found inheritance into a sound economic future.

Oil Minister Ingwald Ulveseth concurred. "It is not our aim that every Norwegian have big automobiles," he told a correspondent for Dun's Review in the summer of 1974. "And we don’t plan to become sheiks with golden furniture and so on. That’s not the Norwegian way."

Yet, by the late 1970s, some Norwegians were caustically referring to their homeland as the "Kuwait of the North." The Economist, a British newsweekly, declared in 1978 that "the Norwegian nightmare of oil wealth drowning the existing industrial base is becoming a reality." Indeed, although oil money has kept Norway prosperous amid global recession, the underlying health of the Norwegian economy remains in doubt even today.

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Once-robust industries—shipbuilding, aluminum, forestry—suffer from inflated costs. Some companies flounder; others stay competitive in world markets only with the help of government subsidies; still others have died.

Increasingly, Norwegian journalists and politicians wonder aloud whether such wrenching domestic changes are the inevitable by-product of exploiting the country’s offshore Klondike—and, if they are not, how to cure or prevent them.

The drama is best viewed against the backdrop of the 1970s. It was then that the Norwegian petroleum policy, willy-nilly, began to suffocate the nation’s private enterprises.

In a 1974 white paper, Bratteli laid out his government’s policy on petroleum. The oil boom had not yet materialized. Mobil, Shell, Esso, Amoco, Phillips, and other multinationals had sunk hundreds of millions of dollars into the Norwegian sector of the North Sea but as yet were producing less oil per year than Norway consumed. Even so, the eventual value of the nation’s undersea assets was becoming clear. In October of 1973, the Or-

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*Ninety percent of Norway’s estimated recoverable undersea oil and natural gas reserves lie in fields not yet under development.*

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*Norway became self-sufficient in oil in 1975, and today it produces seven times as much petroleum and natural gas as it consumes. Under a 1964 agreement, the North Sea is divided into five sectors: Norwegian, British, Dutch, Danish, and West German. To date, most of the oil yielded by the sea has come from the British and Norwegian sectors. Production figures for 1982 were: Great Britain, 103.4 million metric tons; Norway, 24.5 million; West Germany, 4.9 million; the Netherlands, 1.9 million; Denmark, 1.7 million.*

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ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) had raised the price of crude oil from $3 a barrel to $5.

The social repercussions of sudden wealth were also becoming evident. In the port city of Stavanger, shipbuilding and engineering firms hired Swedish and Finnish laborers to replace Norwegians lured out to oil rigs by pay three times as high as their wages on the mainland. Storeowners stocked their shelves with French’s Cattlemen’s barbecue sauce to please the palates of roustabouts and oil executives from Texas and Oklahoma. In three years, the price of housing in Stavanger doubled.

A Buffer Against Pain

The academics and politicians who wrote the 1974 white paper worried that unbridled exploitation would entail more serious dislocations. Norway’s unemployment rate then hovered around one percent. With no slack in the economy, an influx of oil money could bring rampant inflation. The Labor government thus advocated a “moderate tempo” for drilling and argued that a large fraction of the revenues should be invested abroad. The oil money would be “exported” as loans to countries better able to absorb it. The Storting endorsed the proposal.

The ink on the white paper had hardly dried when Bratteli decided, in effect, to ignore the plan. The reason: The optimistic economic forecast on which it was based appeared less realistic with each passing day. As 1974 progressed, Norway began to feel the pinch of the OPEC-induced worldwide recession. Layoffs hit the shipping, shipbuilding, forestry, and fishing industries—all dependent on exports. Although the unemployment rate had not risen even to two percent, Labor Party leaders agreed that a new economic policy was in order.

Finance Minister Per Kleppe decided to use oil revenues as a buffer against the pain. And, since Norwegian oil was not yet flowing in abundance, the anticipation of oil revenues would

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have to serve. Drawing on Norway’s Triple A credit rating, the government would borrow enough money to stimulate the economy. When the oil began gushing, the debts could be repaid. The Storting approved the plan unanimously. Borrowing abroad, particularly from U.S. banks, accelerated. The 1974 white paper had called for channeling about 6 billion kroner of petroleum revenues into the Norwegian economy each year and sending the rest abroad. In fact, roughly twice that much annual domestic spending was financed by borrowing against untapped oil reserves between 1974 and 1977.

Much of the money went to prop up ailing industries. Subsidizing “endangered” enterprises, such as farming, had long been government policy. As the list of the needy grew, the cost of that policy soared. Oslo paid shipowners to mothball idle freighters rather than sell them at a loss abroad. Paper, aluminum, and steel mills kept producing in spite of sagging demand, secure in the knowledge that the government would pay them to stockpile their excess output until markets revived. By the beginning of 1978, about one-fourth of Norway’s manufacturing jobs depended on direct government subsidies.

Blue-eyed Arabs?

Superficially, the borrowing plan seemed to work. From 1973 to 1980, full-time employment grew at an average of 1.3 percent annually—more than twice the historical rate. The quarterly rate of unemployment never edged above the 1.6 percent it reached in 1975.

The standard of living also rose. In early 1978, a visiting New York Timesman reported that Oslo “reflects prosperity at every turn: Mercedes Benz taxicabs, shops bulging with fancy imported goods, and well-filled restaurants where the prices on the wine list look like telephone numbers.”

Indeed, prices had jumped by 9.2 percent in 1977. More importantly, wages were rising faster still. Since shipbuilding and metallurgy firms were paid, in effect, to hoard labor, and the oil business consumed more and more man-hours, unions found themselves in a strong bargaining position. Real wages in the manufacturing sector rose by one-fourth from 1974 to 1977.

Also contributing to wage inflation was the infusion of government cash into the welfare system. Retirement pensions, aid to the handicapped, and other benefits became more generous. New hospitals were built, principally in rural areas. Doctors, nurses, and a host of new bureaucrats swelled the government payroll. Between 1973 and 1981, public employment grew by
**NORWAY AND NATO**

Two NATO members—Norway and Turkey—share borders with the Soviet Union. Sixty miles east of the Norwegian frontier lies Murmansk, home base for more than 400 Soviet naval vessels, including two-thirds of Russia’s ballistic-missile submarines. This reality, Western analysts suggest, underlies Norway’s importance in any conflict between the Soviet Union and the NATO nations.

"World War Three may not be won on the Northern Flank," American military commentator Robert Weinland has written. "But it could definitely be lost there."

In the event of a non-nuclear war, NATO could use listening posts in northern Norway to help track Soviet naval movements. Therefore, the Soviet Union, as NATO analysts see it, would begin any attack on Western Europe by trying to subdue Norway. That accomplished, Norway’s dozen airfields and its sheltered fjords—kept ice-free by the Gulf Stream—could variously serve as staging points for air attacks on Britain or Central Europe or submarine forays against supply routes between Europe and the United States.

Advancing Red Army ground troops would encounter unfriendly terrain in northern Norway. The roads snake through easily defended mountain passes which, Norwegian military planners hope, would help stop Soviet armor columns. Each of the two 13,000-man Russian motorized rifle divisions routinely based on the Kola peninsula already includes 266 tanks.

In wartime, Norway would rely on NATO reinforcements, its own American-made F-16 fighters armed with locally produced Penguin missiles, and a small but agile navy, consisting mainly of corvettes, fast attack craft, and small submarines. Within 48 hours, 225,000 reservists could be mobilized. But the first shock would be borne by only 42,000 active duty troops—mainly one-year conscripts.

180,000, or 60 percent, further increasing the demand for labor.

Normally, companies competing in an international marketplace would feel the effects of higher labor costs immediately; forced to raise prices, they would lose business at home or abroad to more efficient foreign firms. But government subsidies insulated Norwegian industrialists from such painful repercussions. With a guaranteed market at home, they could afford to lose customers elsewhere. They did—in textiles, paper, and metals. Not until 1983 did exports of “traditional” goods climb back to 1973 levels. Meanwhile, worldwide demand for such products had grown by 30 percent. Norway had missed the boat.

Subsidies also left managers with little incentive to keep abreast of changing technology. Even as computerized record-keeping and automated production swept Japan, Western Europe, and the United States, the Norwegian government, in
Like Denmark, Norway has long prohibited the stationing of NATO troops and nuclear weapons on its soil. When NATO conducts joint exercises in Norway, allied forces are normally kept at least 300 miles from the Soviet border.

Such caution is partly a vestige of Norway's traditional neutralist sentiment and partly the result of an implicit bargain with Moscow. As a quid pro quo, some Western analysts believe, the Russians have limited troop deployments near the Norwegian border. But a recent Soviet build-up on the Kola Peninsula, as well as continuing disputes over boundary lines in the oil-rich Barents Sea, have made Oslo re-examine its neighborly policy. Last spring, a Norwegian frigate fired 10 rockets at an unidentified (but probably Soviet) submarine submerged in Hardanger Fjord. Despite Moscow's protests, the government has permitted the U.S. Marines to "pre-position" equipment in central Norway.

Soviet-backed repression in Poland and Afghanistan has also chilled Norway's relations with Russia. Many Norwegians see U.S. policy in faraway Central America as no better. Antinuclear protests by young Norwegians are aimed at both superpowers.

But most middle-aged Norwegians, remembering the Nazi invasion in World War II, endorse the Western Alliance. One poll found that more than 80 percent of all adults back continued NATO membership. Indeed, William Bogie wrote from Oslo last year in National Defense, "It is impossible to start a real debate on the subject."

The effect, discouraged innovation. And the "boom" atmosphere may have eroded the national tradition of pride in one's work. If, as it seemed, oil offered a better life for less effort, why should employees exert themselves unduly? Already in 1978, a Norwegian economist, sensing the broader implications of the government's "countercyclical" policy, remarked that 1977 had been "a good year for Norwegians, but a bad year for Norway."

Worse still, the oil revenues against which Norway's leaders had mortgaged the country's future were slow to materialize.

To be sure, the government had cut itself a big slice of the pie. One provision of the 1974 white paper was faithfully followed. Oslo insisted that the multinational corporations that had mapped out and searched the ocean floor play second fiddle when harvest time came. The government's zeal in dealing with the oil giants earned Norwegians the nickname "blue-eyed
The government created its own oil exploration and recovery firm, Statoil, in 1972. Within a decade, Statoil would grow to be Norway's second largest corporation in terms of revenues—thanks largely to the enterprise of American oil companies. It was given the option of claiming at least 50 percent of each petroleum find, regardless of whether it had invested in the search. (Even when Statoil located and retrieved oil unassisted, it had foreigners to thank; Statoil president Arve Johnsen hired a former Chevron executive to head the company's exploration program and a former Shell officer to oversee drilling operations.) In 1975, the government passed a steep tax on windfall petroleum profits. Between that levy and standard corporate taxes, Oslo aimed to take about 70 percent of net profit.

Neglecting Reality

But during the mid-1970s, there was precious little to tax. Facing long winter nights and storms that pushed waves as high as 80 feet, the oilmen found the job more time-consuming than expected—and more costly, in both financial and human terms. By the spring of 1977, accidents had claimed the lives of more than 80 workers on the North Sea oil rigs.

In that year, production reached only 107 million barrels, roughly half of what Oslo had projected. By midyear, the comfortable budget surplus that the government had expected by 1978 was nowhere in sight. The Ministry of Finance quietly pushed the date of the anticipated bonanza forward to 1981. During the spring of 1978, foreign debt reached $20 billion, equal to half of the gross national product. Norway now had the highest debt ratio ever attained by a member of the 24-nation Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The government's profligate ways drew fire not only from Conservatives, but also from Social Democrats. By 1978, Prime Minister Odvar Nordli of the Labor Party had decided that it was time to shift gears. He stepped up petroleum licensing, cut back on public spending, devalued the krone (which today is worth about 13 cents), and imposed a 16-month wage and price freeze—despite claims from spokesmen for leftist fringe parties that such measures constituted "the biggest treason since [that

*The government owns 100 percent of Statoil and appoints five of its seven directors; the other two are elected by Statoil's 3,000 employees. Norsk Hydro, the 51-percent state-owned company founded in 1905 to harness hydroelectricity, is the largest company in Norway. It manufactures fertilizer, processes metals, and now competes with Statoil for oil business. Saga Petroleum, a private firm, is the third major Norwegian oil company."

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Norwegian cartoonist Finn Graf depicts the impact of oil wealth on Oslo. Norway's urban population grew by one-fifth between 1960 and 1980.

of the quislings in] the Second World War." This austerity program yielded some immediate benefits. Between 1977 and 1980, a trade deficit equal to 10.8 percent of the GNP was replaced by a surplus of 4.8 percent. And since 1980, accelerated oil production has begun to pull Norway out of debt.

But much damage has been done. To this day, Norway's industrial competitiveness lags. The loss of world market shares in shipbuilding and aluminum production continues.* Knut Lofstad, president of the Union of Industries, Norway's employers' organization, declared last year that "Norwegians have gradually developed a tendency towards neglecting the economic realities."

In the end, the Labor government created what it had at first tried to avoid—an economy, and a welfare state, addicted to oil revenues. The result was a sluggish private sector, more dependent than ever on government subsidies.

Yet, it would be wrong to lay all the blame for the obsolescence of Norway's manufacturing industries at the feet of the

*Oil is, however, spurring a few companies to new heights. Aker, a Norwegian shipbuilder, had by 1975 become the second largest oil rig builder in the world, breaking the longtime American monopoly of that business. And Statoil is gearing up for what its chairman, Finn Lied, has called "the Norwegian man on the moon project"—drilling in the Troll field, which lies under 984 feet of water.
Labor Party. Partly, the problem is one of culture.

Norway is an old, highly homogeneous Scandinavian society that places a premium on social and economic equality and on cultural continuity. The "good life" is not equated with conspicuous consumption, and the individual quest for material gain that spurs entrepreneurship in many countries is not so highly regarded in Oslo. Nor is competitive ingenuity; factory foremen and executives often view new ideas as threatening. Many firms are family owned, and company strategy sometimes amounts to preserving the status quo until a competitor's success clearly seems to warrant imitation. And "marketing" (which in some U.S. corporations seems to take precedence over quality control) plays only a minor role in Norway's commerce. Managers cling to the notion that "good products sell themselves."

**A Morality Tale**

Thus bound by tradition (and weakened by government paternalism), Norwegian businessmen were psychologically ill-equipped to cope with the worldwide recession and technological flux of the mid-1970s. This same psychology now makes it hard for the average Norwegian to accept the consequences of failure in the marketplace—the slow death of industries that date back to Norway's independence in 1905. Norwegians worry that the decline of factories and mines in the hinterland could lead to an exodus of the rural folk and of the strong culture that has survived modern times so far. Oslo, Trondheim, and other cities could overflow with people dependent on government make-work for their livelihood.

In some respects, of course, this is the specter haunting many Western industrialized nations on the brink of the "information age"—masses of well-paid workers rendered unemployable by the transition from a "manufacturing" to a "services" economy. But in Norway, that transition is lubricated by oil. Traditionalists fear what the *Financial Times* of London calls the "Venezuelan effect": The petroleum industry becomes "the only provider to a population left mainly, otherwise, to cut each other's hair."

The Conservative government of Prime Minister Kaare Willoch was elected in 1981 partly on the basis of his promises to halt the slide toward a stagnant, government-dependent services economy. The plan was simple. By slashing subsidies, Oslo would expose Norwegian companies to international competition, leaving them to sink or swim. If "sunset" industries died, "sunrise" industries would be born. One way or the other, the dead weight would be eliminated, and the private sector resuscitated.
In practice, such rigor has proven difficult to sustain. Norway has hundreds of tiny towns tucked away in the hinterland. The survival of each may depend on a single factory or mine. The vision of entire villages left without a local source of employment has proven politically forbidding—particularly now that the Conservative Party depends on the rural-based Christian People's and Center parties as partners in a ruling coalition.

In its early days, for example, the Willoch administration refused on grounds of principle to rescue a dying aluminum smelter in Tyssedal, a village in southern Norway with a population of 1,400. But as protest grew, the government could not leave the townsfolk to suffer the agonies of economic Darwinism. Oslo recently agreed to help build an ilmenite smelter there instead.

Thus, the long drift toward a state-financed economy is difficult to reverse. No one likes to suffer or inflict pain. By the end of 1982, the “sheltered” sector of the economy—government services plus government-subsidized industries—accounted for 80 percent of Norway’s employment. Only seven years earlier, the figure had been 59 percent.

In purely financial terms, Norway can afford such self-indulgence. Total output of oil and natural gas is likely to rise to 60 million “tons of oil equivalent” (TOE) by 1985, and to 75 million TOE by 1990. With some 11 billion TOE beneath its allotted ocean floors, Oslo could maintain the projected 1990 production rate well into the 22nd century before supplies ran low.

But what will Norway look like after decades of such “prosperity” if its people do not reject the course charted during the 1970s? Will every worker’s paycheck come from the government? Will the nation’s mines and factories be idle, each surrounded by a ghost town? Or will they be artificially sustained in spite of sagging efficiency and stagnant technology, until finally they are little more than state-supported museums? Such questions grow more urgent each year as Norway’s leaders seek to reconcile its newest tangible asset with its oldest intangible assets—rugged individualism, pride in work, the “quality of life.”

Even in Norway, as in other new “oil countries,” the chronicle of sudden wealth has become a kind of morality tale.
The long, rocky half-peninsula that is now Norway could not be populated until it had thawed out. "If we disregard all fanciful notions of people living here before or during the last Ice Age," writes Anders Hagen in *Norway* (Praeger, 1967), an overview of prehistoric Norway, "we can set the...earliest settlements in the period 10,000-8000 B.C."

From that time, when glaciers finally receded from Norway's southern shores, until the dawn of the Bronze Age in 1500 B.C., the tribes that had migrated from the south and east increasingly supplemented their diet of fish and game with agricultural products. The sea remained central to life. By 500 B.C., boat-shaped graves—with tall stones at either end representing prow and stern—were common.

The boats themselves, Hagen notes, were growing sturdier. Around A.D. 600, Norwegians built the first full keel—a single, arched beam, usually oak, which undergirded the hull. Ships now could survive long voyages; Scandinavia had the technology to enter the Viking Age.

Of the many accounts of the Vikings' extraordinary outward surge during the ninth, 10th, and 11th centuries, the best include Per Sveass Andersen's *Vikings of the West: The Expansion of Norway in the Early Middle Ages* (Tanum, 1971) and Johannes Brøndsted's *The Vikings* (Penguin, 1965, rev. ed., paper).

In *A History of the Vikings* (Oxford, 1968), Gwyn Jones complains that too much of the Viking literature filtered down from "European Christian annalists and chroniclers" who turned "a many-faceted and durably important contribution to our European heritage into a sensational tale of raid, rapine, and conquest." Jones focuses on the Vikings' more constructive legacies, such as local representative assemblies and the jury of twelve, which was exported to England in the ninth century. In *Political Life and Institutions in Norway* (Univ. of Oslo, 1980), Gunnar Amundsen and Bard Bredrup Knudsen trace the "consensus-striving" in modern Norwegian politics to the insistence within Viking bands on equality and social stability.

By the end of the ninth century, most of Norway's tribes were united under King Harald Fairhair. National distinctions had emerged. The Danish Vikings headed southwest, to France, northern Germany, and what is now England; the Swedes went east, to Finland and deep into Russia; the Norwegians sailed west, to the British Isles, Iceland, Greenland, and Canada.

Jones's complaints about historical sensationalism notwithstanding, the Vikings wrought plenty of havoc. In Ireland, the Gaelic word for Scandinavian, "Lochlannach," soon came to mean "demon." And, as Jones notes, Erik the Red decided in A.D. 982 to colonize Greenland for lack of alternatives: The hot-tempered explorer had been banned from his native Norway, and from Iceland, for committing a series of murders.

The Vikings absorbed—and brought home—a new faith sometimes at odds with old Norse traditions. Christianity taught that the
meek shall inherit the earth, whereas Norse mythology reserved Valhalla for those who died bravely in battle. "Christianity and classical civilization had an unquenchable vitality which in the end subdued the invaders," Karen Larsen writes in her excellent, if overly romantic, _A History of Norway_ (Princeton, 1948). The Norsemen were tamed.

In 1397, familial ties among the Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian monarchs led to the unification of Scandinavia. But Sweden seceded in 1523. Norwegians were now expected not only to pay taxes to Copenhagen, but to provide soldiers for Denmark's periodic wars with Sweden. Peasants rioted in Telemark and Trondelag during the late 1500s. As Ronald Popperwell observes in _Norway_ (Praeger, 1972), the best book on Norway's past and present, "It did not . . . take the Danish kings long to discover that Norway had to be governed in her own way."

The Swedish kings were similarly enlightened. In 1814, after Denmark delivered Norway to Sweden as part of a peace settlement, prominent Norwegians met at Eidsvoll and drafted what is now the second oldest written constitution in the world, after the U.S. Constitution. The Storting, which it established, governed with little interference from Sweden until Norway won complete independence in 1905.

As Norwegians forged a political identity, they sought to revive their cultural identity. The peasant, long overshadowed by Danish-dominated city life, was now defied by Oslo intellectuals as the guardian of genuine Norse culture—a turnabout thoroughly examined in _National Romanticism in Norway_ (Columbia, 1933; AMS, 1968) by Oscar Falnes.

The realities of peasant life were less glorious. Hundreds of thousands of Norwegians immigrated to America, a saga best covered by Ingrid Semmingsen in _Norway to America: A History of the Migration_ (Univ. of Minn., 1978, paper only).

The literature on Norway's harsh World War II experience includes firsthand accounts, such as _I Saw It Happen in Norway_ by C. J. Hambro, and the more detached _The Bitter Years_ (Morrow, 1974) by Richard Petrow.

Hilary Allen, in _Norway and Europe in the 1970s_ (Universitetsforlaget, 1979), provides a chronicle of "what was probably the hardest fought political issue in the country [in this century]"—the decision not to join the European Economic Community. In _A History of Modern Norway 1814–1972_ (Clarendon, 1973), T. K. Derry suggests that social and economic trends may yet reverse that decision. "In the nature of things, [Norway's] society and way of life on the outskirts of Western Europe are indissolubly linked with events at its center."

—Terje I. Leiren
THE IDEA OF POVERTY:
England in the Early Industrial Age
by Gertrude Himmelfarb
Knopf, 1984
196 pp. $25

Who are the "truly needy," and how can their needs be attended to?

The questions are not merely rhetorical. Behind every effort to relieve the suffering of the poor, behind every plan to relieve society of the burden of supporting the poor, there lies an idea of poverty—a theory of what causes and what cures it. Such is the case today, and so it was during England's industrial adolescence, as Gertrude Himmelfarb, historian at the City College of New York, convincingly demonstrates.

She does so with a series of sharp intellectual portraits of significant British philosophers, journalists, novelists, and pamphleteers (and one German revolutionary), men who helped shape the vocabulary of poverty theory from the time of Adam Smith to that of Charles Dickens—a period extending roughly from the mid-18th to the mid-19th centuries. (A second volume will take the subject up to 1920.)

Himmelfarb begins with the political economist Adam Smith (1723–1790) because he was the most articulate and influential 18th-century exponent of what she terms the "traditional" outlook. Originating in the 16th century, this view assumed the poor to be just like everybody else. Smith believed in a social continuum—a democratic premise which endowed everyone, from the lowest ranks to the highest, with the same motives and gave them the same stakes in a successful economy. Every healthy Englishman was capable of participating in the free, expanding, industrial economy that he advocated (and which, to a certain extent, already existed). Nothing more was required, according to this optimistic blueprint, than the common human attribute, "the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange."

Ironically, it was an avowed disciple of Smith, Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834), who posed the most serious challenge to these sanguine assumptions. To Malthus—whose bleak forecasts helped give economics the name "dismal science"—the poor were outside, even a threat to, society because, he believed, they were morally deficient and therefore incapable of limiting their own birthrate. By raising the specter of a population constantly at the mercy of the food supply, he claimed to have discovered an inverse relationship where Smith had found a direct one, in an industrial society, between the "wealth of nations" and the "happiness and comfort of the lower orders."

The growth of industry would indeed promote the wealth of the nation, Malthus said, but only at the expense of the welfare of the poor; it
would lead to an increase of population without a matching increase in the food supply.

Such contrary assumptions about the nature of the poor led, as Himmelfarb shows, to equally opposed conclusions about poor relief. Smith was partial to holding out the carrot. He argued that it was the opportunity to better oneself through work that cured poverty. He also feared that most employers, if left to their own devices, would underpay their laborers and so destroy the workers' hopes of advancement. Accordingly, Smith counted himself among those who favored continuing England's old Poor Laws (promulgated by Queen Elizabeth I in the late 16th century), which provided the unemployed with more than a subsistence income. Only competition from a high level of poor relief would, he believed, induce employers to offer reasonable wages in order to attract and keep workers, thus increasing the wealth of the nation.

Malthus, favoring the stick, attacked the Poor Laws because he thought that only if the plight of the nonworking poor were truly miserable would laborers exert themselves to avoid poverty. Moreover, relief given to the poor would only increase their number, thus making their condition even worse. Relief, in other words, was itself a cause of poverty.

Much of the poverty debate through the mid-19th century drew on the conflicting assumptions of Smith and Malthus. Sharing Smith's belief in a single society was the historian Thomas Carlyle, who argued that work defined man—distinguished him from other animals and dignified him. Since all men were capable of working, the only real distinctions in society, Carlyle held, were political. The journalist William Cobbett, believing that all Englishmen possessed the same rights, crusaded in print to give to the poor what he believed they inherently deserved as Englishmen—the right to vote. The writings of Carlyle and Cobbett added a distinctly political dimension to the definition of, and the debate over, poverty. The poor were the disenfranchised. One solution to the problem of poverty, then, was to give the poor the vote.

Himmelfarb shows that those who worked from the Malthusian premise were a politically varied lot. On the far left, there was Friedrich Engels, son of a German mill owner, a fervent Left Hegelian, and the generous supporter of Karl Marx. Himmelfarb credits Engels with having "invented" the proletariat in his Conditions of the Working Class in England in 1844 (first German edition, 1845), a work based on his 21-month stay in Manchester. That Engels played fast and loose with the facts was typical of most contemporary writers on poverty. Nowhere in his study did he note, for instance, that laborers in Manchester, widely known as the most wretched industrial city in England, "could afford a quantity and quality of meat and drink that would have been the envy of the German or French worker." Engels was too eager to make of the working class and the bourgeoisie what Himmelfarb describes as "two radically dissimilar nations as unlike as difference of race could make them." Furthermore, she observes, "by pronouncing the proletariat at war with the middle class, he made them different as much by will as by circumstance..."

Thomas Mayhew's enormously popular and influential London Labour and the London Poor (1861–62), claiming to be a dispassionate statis-
tical study, unwittingly strengthened the Malthusian argument that the poor were a breed apart. Mayhew, a journalist, playwright, and literary jack-of-all-trades, professed to discuss all of London’s poor; in fact, he dwelt only on those who couldn’t or wouldn’t work. His vignettes of criminals and street people, whose colorful and often violent behavior lent an exotic touch to his data, gave dramatic force to the notion that the world of poverty was a separate, alien culture.

The contribution of 19th-century novelists to the poverty debate was perhaps an ambiguous one, as Himmelfarb shows in her discussion of Charles Dickens (1812–70). There is no question that the great novelist endowed the down-and-out in his works with a complexity of character and situation previously reserved, in fiction, only for the rich. Yet the case of Dickens shows that what authors intend is not always what readers see. Though he tried to emphasize moral rather than social distinctions, his characters were cited—and still are—as typical examples of the rich and poor. Try as a novelist might to depict the poor sympathetically, more often than not it was the picturesque criminal, not the dutiful laborer, who remained in the reader’s mind. Even if the novelist sought to uphold a more generous social vision (such as that of Adam Smith), he sometimes ended up reinforcing the Malthusian picture of the poor as a separate race.

Himmelfarb’s even-handed presentation of all points of view, her ability to plumb each writer’s position and to uncover its core assumptions about human nature, and her magisterial synthesis of Enlightenment and Victorian thought make this book an invaluable guide to England’s path from the Elizabethan Poor Laws to the Welfare State. Her greatest accomplishment, however, is as an advocate—not of one point of view or another, but of the argument that ideas can and do shape the course of history. Without straining to do so, she also sheds light on the many sides of our own contemporary debates over the causes and cures of poverty.

—Helen Nader

THE GRAND STRATEGY
OF THE SOVIET UNION
by Edward N. Luttwak
St. Martin’s, 1983
242 pp. $14.95

One school of American Kremlinologists has long held that the behavior of the Soviet Union abroad, and particularly its use of force, is largely defensive, a repeated response to Western challenges. That view, argues Luttwak, a Fellow at Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, is not only blurred but ostrich-like—and he offers an historical overview of Russian foreign policy to discredit it.

Since the time of Stalin, Luttwak insists, Marxist-Leninist ideology and the revolutionary vision of international communism have been cynically exploited by Soviet leaders to justify Russian imperial ambitions. Indeed, the Soviet Union has become a classic military empire, using, as did the Romans, a network of “client-states, nominally independent and
charged with the administrative and political governance of lands effectively dominated by the empire but not annexed."

Why this turn to expansionism, particularly in countries that border on or are close to the Soviet Union? Luttwak answers that the failure of the Soviets to prove the superiority of their economic system—and, thus, the efficacy of their ideology—has driven them to develop their military strength and to seek respect by becoming the world’s Number One superpower. Increased pessimism about the long-range future of their regime will make Soviet leaders even less hesitant to employ this strength. Comparable sentiments, he claims, underlay Japan’s decision to attack Pearl Harbor in 1941. I find the parallel shaky. But Luttwak is persuasive when he argues that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is totally irreconcilable with the apologists’ model of a defensive and prudent Soviet Union.

Not surprisingly, Luttwak believes that the only hope for containing the Russian empire is an alert, unyielding United States, unequivocal in its military support of Western Europe and Japan. One can agree with the prescription without fully accepting the diagnosis, however. Characterizing the Soviet Union as “the Russian military empire” may illuminate certain aspects of Soviet behavior, but, in the end, it distorts reality (and history) for the sake of coherence. Among other things, Luttwak largely ignores the fact that the Soviet Union’s military growth has been influenced as much by fear, justified or not, of external threats as by internal economic failures.

Luttwak is certainly correct in observing that “the military strength of the empire of the Russians is still most strongly felt on land, where there is direct territorial contiguity.” But imperial aggrandizement has not traditionally been the only, or even the main, reason for Russia’s dependence upon land forces; the need to defend its vulnerable borders has been at least as strong a factor. The problem here, as elsewhere, is that Luttwak’s knowledge of Russian history is spotty. Russian expansion, he claims, has taken place at the expense of weaker powers with only three exceptions: Russia’s encounters with the Ottoman Empire in the late 17th century, with Napoleon in 1812, and with Germany between 1941 and ‘45. Yet he fails to mention the Russians’ 200-year struggle (from roughly 1540 to 1740) with Sweden, which was then surely the stronger power.

Luttwak is an astute analyst of contemporary military affairs, but he is not really a Soviet expert. Were he one, he would not write that “today Soviet rulers are themselves almost all Russians (or Byelorussians),” a statement that mysteriously disposes of the many Ukrainians in key leadership positions, including Politburo members Konstantin Chernenko and Vladimir Shcherbitskiy. Luttwak has performed a valuable service by showing the weak points of one Western theory of Soviet foreign policy behavior. But his scholarship is insufficient to sustain the model that he offers in its stead. Unintentionally, his book serves to remind us of the answers that we still need.

—Jiri Valenta

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The story of early Vietnam is, for many historians, the story of a province on the periphery of the Chinese empire. Taylor, a historian at the National University of Singapore, paints a picture of a less assimilated Vietnam existing from around 300 B.C., the start of its recorded history, to the 10th century, when it threw off the Chinese yoke. The ancient nation was a "meeting place" for several cultures. Its language even now resembles such Austronesian and Austroasiatic tongues as Thai, Cham, and Jarai. So extensive were Vietnam's overseas borrowings (including weaponry and musical instruments) that one early myth held that the sea was the source of sovereign power. Ironically, the first great figure in Vietnamese history was King An Duong, a third century B.C. invader from the north, probably a native of the Shu province of China, and the first of a series of northern conquerors. In 111 B.C., the Chinese Han dynasty expanded its empire to include Vietnam, becoming one of several dynasties to rule the region. Unwilling to accept cultural differences, the conquering Chinese deemed barbaric the Vietnamese habit of going bare-footed and the custom of "levirate" (which gave a widowed woman the right to marry her husband's younger brother). But the persistence of such practices—many of which, like levirate, ran directly counter to Chinese notions of a patriarchal society—proves that Vietnam resisted total assimilation. With the collapse of the T'ang dynasty in A.D. 880, Chinese domination ended, and the Vietnamese began asserting openly their identity in such matters as art and architecture. This cultural revival was possible, writes Taylor, only because the Vietnamese "never broke faith with their past and its heritage."
Following their successful December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor, many Japanese military leaders succumbed to "victory disease." Under the aegis of the Rising Sun, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere would, they believed, unite the nations of the Pacific basin and rid them of Anglo-Saxon colonialism. Stephan, a University of Hawaii historian, details the plans of Combined Fleet commander Admiral Yamamoto's staff to conquer Hawaii and make it the keystone of the new Pacific order. Roughly equidistant between Japan and the United States, the Hawaiian archipelago was deemed essential to control of the Pacific. The large Japanese population already on the islands (160,000 in 1941, or 40 percent of all inhabitants) made conquest, and a smooth transition afterwards, seem feasible to Yamamoto's staff. They counted on anti-American sentiment among the local Japanese, who were denied jobs by the U.S. firms (the Big Five) which dominated the territory's economy. (From 1937 to '39, Hawaiian Japanese contributed more to the Japanese National Defense Fund than did native Japanese.) Plans for the "liberated" islands included dissolution of the Big Five, land redistribution, and revival of the Hawaiian monarchy. Japan's disastrous setback in the Battle of Midway on June 5, 1942, grounded such flights of fancy.

On September 6, 1884, Captain Tom Dudley and Mates Edwin Stephens and Ned Brooks of the shipwrecked yacht Mignonette arrived in Falmouth, England, after drifting 24 days in an open dinghy. The three Englishmen admitted, without shame, to killing and eating their shipmate Richard Parker, the youngest and sickest survivor, in order to save their own lives. They had no idea that their cannibalism—sanctioned by maritime custom in an era of frequent shipwrecks—would lead three months later to the conviction of Dudley and Stephens on charges of premeditated murder. (Brooks, who became the prosecution's major witness, said he had no part
in the decision to kill Parker.) Queen Victoria immediately commuted the death sentence to six months imprisonment, but the verdict set a major legal precedent by rejecting “defense of necessity” in favor of a more “honorable,” though perhaps less practical, moral code. Simpson, professor of law at the University of Kent, explains this legal development as an offshoot of “Victorian parlor morality.” He refers to contemporary editorials, letters, ballads, and sea chanteys to show how popular sentiment (which condoned the sailors’ decision) differed from that of genteel society. Though cannibalism at sea is all but unheard of today—the invention of the steamboat resulted, for one thing, in far fewer shipwrecks—Regina v. Dudley & Stephens is still cited by American and British lawyers and judges in cases of killing under extreme provocation.

*Arts & Letters*

**MADAME DE SÉVIGNÉ:**
A Life and Letters
by Frances Mossiker
Knopf, 1983
538 pp. $22.95

The letters of Marie de Rabutin-Chantal, marquise de Sévigné (1626–1696), have long provided historians, including Mossiker, with an insider’s view of the glittering court life of Louis XIV, the Sun King. Here, Mossiker weaves a narrative of Madame de Sévigné’s life into the correspondence, permitting her subject to speak for herself. The wit that fills these letters (many of which were devotedly written to her “cold, aloof” daughter) was, it seems, a paternal legacy; her noble ancestors were so deft at verbal exchange that rabutinage had become, by the 17th century, synonymous with repartee. Wealth came from her mother’s family, newly rich members of the Paris bourgeoisie. Marie’s husband, the marquis, might have squandered it all had he not been killed, in 1651, in a duel. Madame de Sévigné bloomed during the 1650s, the years in which Louis consolidated power by turning once-independent noblemen into petty court intriguers, desperate for royal favor. Sévigné’s wit and beauty were both assets at a court so viciously competitive that men vied
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**How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art:** Abstract Expressionism, Freedom, and the Cold War
by Serge Guilbaut
translated by Arthur Goldhammer
Univ. of Chicago, 1983
277 pp. $22.50

What accounts for the growing dominance of abstract expressionism in American art between 1946 and 1951? Not, as is often claimed, its aesthetic value or its "inevitability," argues Guilbaut, an art historian at the University of British Columbia, but its political suitability. Guilbaut shows how an art style expressing the impossibility of representation was made over into one that proclaimed the possibilities of a liberal version of the "American way." Left-leaning, avant-garde artists had been dismayed by political developments during and after World War II—notably the failure of Stalin's Soviet Union to become a worker's paradise and the revival of anticommunism in America. Many had been, during the '30s, Marxists and creators of "realist" paintings for the Works Progress Administration. But they heeded the postwar calls of artist-publicists such as Mark Rothko and Adolph Gottlieb for a "de-Marxized" aesthetic of freedom. Abstraction was proposed as the only artistic means of withdrawing from the madness of polarized world politics, which had already led to the Cold War and the threat of an atomic Armageddon. This vague, ambitious program of dissent happened to fit with the American art world's hopes for a new national style of painting, one that would be sophisticated but clearly home-grown and that would make New York, rather than Paris, the cultural cap-

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The tools of social science are exhaustively applied in this attack on the notion, once proclaimed by liberal and neo-Marxist social thinkers such as Kenneth Keniston, Erich Fromm, and Herbert Marcuse, that the student radicals of the 1960s were the cream of America's youth. Political scientists Rothman and Lichter, drawing on extensive interviews with former radicals, a battery of psychological tests, and a comparative look at West German leftists of the same period, find that the American New Leftists were anything but the most balanced, idealistic, or democratic members of their generation. Crypto-authoritarians, simultaneously desirous and resentful of power, they were also psychologically ill-adjusted (Jewish radicals typically suffering from overpowering mothers, Christians from "intrusive and demanding" fathers). Jewish domination of the Students for a Democratic Society, the Free Speech Movement, and other New Left groups was, according to the authors, the logical extension of a traditional Jewish alignment with radi-
cal politics, an alignment dating from the mid-19th century. But the Jewish radical of the 1960s was prompted, even more than his predecessors, by the desire "to estrange the Christian from society, as he feels estranged from it." New Left leaders, Jewish or Gentile, aided by the pressures of the Vietnam draft, succeeded for a time in generating a broad student movement "critical of nativist American institutions." But why did these troubled types get such high marks from the academics who first studied them? Because, as Rothman and Lichter note, those who "initiated the student movement were very often the children (ideologically, if not biologically) of those studying it."

THE ALLIANCE: America-Europe-Japan, Makers of the Postwar World
by Richard J. Barnet
Simon & Schuster, 1983
511 pp. $19.95

Readers expecting a radical polemic against the Alliance will be surprised. Barnet, codirector of the leftish Institute for Policy Studies, offers a comprehensive and balanced reminder of how a variety of formal and informal agreements, both military and economic, linking America, Western Europe, and Japan, has helped these nations adjust to an "anarchic international system" since 1945. At the very least, major U.S. allies have enjoyed economic growth: Just after World War II, Germans survived on only 500–600 calories a day, while nine million Japanese were homeless. During the 1960s, Japan's productivity grew four times the U.S. rate, and automobile exports from West Germany to the United States increased 250 percent. But the Alliance has never been easy for any of its partners. The postwar relationship between America and Europe, which "grew out of a compromise between the liberal vision of a world economic order" and the "gospel of national security," brought an end to peacetime U.S. isolationism. Western European leaders, for their part, did not altogether relish dependence on America for military security. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, founded in 1949) was, in Charles De Gaulle's view, the price Europeans paid for America's economic assistance. Recounting
the events that have shaken the Alliance (e.g.,
the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the
1973 Mideast War and the ensuing oil crisis),
Barnet argues that West European opposition
to America’s role in Vietnam accounts for the
"neutralist impulse" in Europe today. Fear
now seems to be the strongest cement holding
the partnership together—"fear," Barnet
writes, "of the Soviet Union and the lingering
suspicion of a Germany cut off from the
American alliance."

**Science & Technology**

**THE WINGED GOSPEL:**
America’s Romance with
Aviation, 1900–1950
by Joseph J. Corn
Oxford, 1983
177 pp. $17.95

Many Americans greeted the airplane in the
first half-century of its development with a
fervor normally reserved for the coming of a
savior. Indeed, some folk seemed convinced
that airplanes would usher in the millen-
num. (In the early 1920s, an elderly woman
asked the barnstorming Charles Lindbergh
how much he would charge to take her to
heaven.) Such faith was in keeping with
America’s "tradition of technological messia-


hism," writes Corn, a Stanford historian, and
even high-brow types were caught up in it:
One 1907 *Harper’s* article predicted the ad-
vent of “aerial man,” a higher form of hu-
manity that would be freed, by aviation, from
the physical and spiritual limitations of an
earthbound existence. But popular fascina-
tion with flying machines was soon tempered
by concern about the growing number of
“intrepid birdmen” who had crashed into
martyrdom. So the nascent aircraft manufac-
turing industry set about “domesticating”
the image of flight, with the help of “lady pi-
lots.” At least 500 women aviators were ac-
tive in the 1920s and ’30s; three were among
the top five finishers in the 1936 transconti-
nental Bendix Trophy air race. (The airline
industry, however, hired women only as
stewardesses until the 1970s.) The vision of
an “Airphibian” in every garage was eventu-
ally dashed by practical considerations. And
the “winged gospel” became a victim of its
own success: As flight became commonplace
during the 1950s, the ills it was supposed to cure (urban congestion, economic inequality, and even war) persisted. But if aviation is no longer the popular hope of the future, echoes of the gospel reverberate in the recent enthusiasm for "ultralights"—lightweight aircraft that fly over 100 miles for every gallon of fuel—and in the visionaries' dream of colonies in outer space.

**FIELD DAYS:**
Journal of an Itinerant Biologist
by Roger B. Swain
Scribner's, 1983
217 pp. $12.95

Swain's approach in these 23 essays is to light upon a commonplace item—avocados, flypaper, hamburgers—and then to trace its connections with the larger biological world. Throughout, Swain tempers his affection for nature with an unsentimental regard for facts. Acknowledging the allure of evergreens in wintry landscapes, he proceeds to explain that their slow rate of photosynthesis means longevity (but not immortality) for pine needles and other hibernal hangers-on. Swain, science editor of *Horticulture* magazine, can be amusing, pointing out, for instance, how easy it is to lure farm guests to work if the work involves heavy machinery such as tractors or chain saws. He demonstrates how felling large trees for firewood rather than lumber results in net energy and income losses for many communities. Swain writes shrewdly about fickle human nature and the ways in which it sometimes threatens a fragile ecosystem.

**FRAMES OF MIND:**
The Theory of Multiple Intelligences
by Howard Gardner
Basic, 1983
412 pp. $23.50

Psychologists have sought for decades to dispel the idea that intelligence is a single, measurable trait, like height or eye color. Gardner, a Harvard psychologist, attempts to finish the job, carefully documenting his theory that the human mind accommodates at least six different "intelligences." These distinct endowments—linguistic, musical, logical-mathematical, spatial, bodily-kinesthetic, and personal—are most obvious in geniuses or *idiots savants*. All types of intelligence are
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“relatively autonomous,” says Gardner, but they sometimes interact “seamlessly.” A preoccupation with pattern binds mathematical and musical intelligence; Mozart, Gardner notes, “even composed music according to the roll of dice.” Gardner’s definition of intelligence may strike some as too lax. Particularly debatable (and certainly difficult to quantify) is what he calls “personal” intelligence, marked by insight into self and society. No less vague is “bodily-kinesthetic” intelligence, of the sort that Norman Mailer once lyrically attributed to boxer Muhammad Ali. Whatever the book’s soft spots, it establishes that intelligence can never again be reduced to what Gardner calls “a group of raw computational capacities.”

PAPERBOUNDSS

RISK AND CULTURE: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers. By Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky. Univ. of Calif., 1983. 221 pp. $6.95

Why do some people perceive some dangers, such as the threat of industrial pollution or of radiation leakage, as more terrible and imminent than other dangers? According to Douglas, a Northwestern University anthropologist, and Wildavsky, a Berkeley political scientist, the reasons are never strictly objective or scientific. Indeed, write the authors, contemporary scientific “techniques for finding new dangers have run ahead of our ability to discriminate among them.” The assessment of risk is unavoidably a “social process,” with strong political and moral dimensions. Focusing on contemporary America, the authors identify the chronic conflict between those who endorse the values of the “center”—faith in institutions and large organizations, support for unlimited economic growth, acceptance of certain economic and social inequalities—and those on the “border” who reject such values. The latter, including many but not all environmental and antinuclear groups, resemble such earlier religious sectarians as the 16th-century German Anabaptists in their moralizing zeal, their Manichean sense of good and evil, and their scorn for

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anything that "represents social distinction, the division of labor, the making of wealth..." Not surprisingly, the modern sectarians view as most threatening those risks associated with or produced by Big Business. A modern society needs both supporters and critics of its major institutions, the authors conclude, but they are wary of the growing power of the "border" in recent decades. The unrestrained quest for a hazard-free environment may lead, for instance, to critical, even life-threatening, shortages of energy and to even larger state organizations charged with securing and maintaining the perfect, prophylactic society.

LETTERS TO A YOUNG DOCTOR. By Richard Selzer. Touchstone, 1983. 205 pp. $5.95

A practicing general surgeon in New Haven and a member of the Yale Medical School faculty, Selzer writes here, as in his three previous books, with almost priestly reverence for the healing arts of medicine. The 23 essays, most anecdotal, mingle practical advice (about comfortable surgical footwear, the ideal size and lighting of an operating room) with musings of a more esoteric, even mystical nature: "When the incision is made, the surgeon...shrinks to accommodate the dimensions of this unexplored place."

Selzer has no patience with notions of surgery as a depersonalized procedure. Just before an operation, he writes, a patient "feels himself to be alone in a green and clanking place where there are no windows and he cannot see the sky. Let him look into your eyes for whatever distance and space he can find there." Throughout these essays, Selzer reminds his readers that no amount of technology can replace the physician's touch as the supreme medical instrument.


In 1962, Balsdon, an Oxford classicist, advanced the frontiers of Roman social history with his authoritative survey of more than 1,000 years (753 B.C.—A.D. 337) of women's life in the ancient state. That this reissue shows signs of age makes it, in a way, more interesting. Dated, for example, is Balsdon's fascination with dress, coiffure, and the ways of noble women, such as Brutus's wife Porcia and Nero's mother Agrippina. Today's historians of women, by contrast, are likely to devote more attention to such matters as education, work, and contraception. When he wrote his book, Balsdon relied more than he now might on literary and historical sources—all written by men. He is aware of the pitfalls: "Always, be it noticed, in the ancient sources, it was the wife who was in danger of getting on her husband's nerves. You might think there were no irritating husbands." By his own admission, well-born Roman women "distinguished...by their high moral integrity...were perhaps just a little dull."

Less virtuous women—such as Messalina, who publicly married a lover while her husband, Emperor Claudius, was away on imperial business—tend to reinvigorate Balsdon's curiosity.
REFLECTIONS

The Education of Walker Percy

Since the mid-1940s, when tuberculosis forced him to abandon a medical career, Walker Percy, M.D., has been living and writing in the small Louisiana town of Covington, slowly adding to a body of work that now ranks among the best of recent American literature. In five highly acclaimed novels, two volumes of non-fiction, and a series of essays on topics ranging from bourbon to semiotics to race relations in Mississippi, Percy has established himself as an ironic moralist and as a deftly comic chronicler of life in one of America’s most peculiar subcultures—the New South. Here, Jay Tolson looks at the novelist’s ties to an older South and at other influences on Percy’s life and work.

by Jay Tolson

When Walker Percy's first novel, The Moviegoer, appeared in 1961, the initial critical reaction was anything but encouraging—little more, in fact, than a few bland short notices in the New York Times and other major review outlets. It was just the sort of literary debut that has driven fledgling authors into real estate sales or computer software design.

But just as the The Moviegoer was beginning its quiet passage to that special oblivion reserved for unnoticed first novels, the New Yorker writer A.J. Liebling picked up a copy of the book, having heard that it was set in New Orleans, where he had recently completed research for an article on Earl Long. Liebling liked the book so much that he recommended it to his wife, Jean Stafford, who happened to be on the 1961 National Book Award panel. She, too, was impressed and nominated it for the fiction prize. Then the seemingly impossible came to pass—a first novel by an unknown Louisiana author, an M.D. who had never practiced medicine, had suddenly won one of America’s most prestigious literary awards.

Perplexed literati began asking what this strange novel was up to—this seemingly unevenful story of a young stockbroker, living in a tacky middle-class suburb of New Orleans, moving from one half-hearted romance to another. Why, they wondered, does this peculiar fellow, Binx Bolling, seem to find more reality in movie houses than in his own life?
And what was one to make of the vague, indeterminate “search” he claims to be set upon? Another mystery was the relationship between Binx Bolling and his proud, uncompromising aunt, Emily Cutrer, a fierce spokeswoman for the aristocratic values of the old, defeated South. If Binx no longer believes in his aunt’s genteel world and its code of self-discipline, moral probity, and duty, then why doesn’t he simply cut loose, go to California, and become a cheerful, guiltless sensualist? Instead, almost perversely, he hangs around and allows Aunt Emily to attack him for his errant ways.

One critic, writing in the New Leader, gave the book a positive review, but faulted it for making the protagonist’s search “seem not neurotic but deeply spiritual.” That appraisal was, perhaps as much as anything, a product of the times—the therapeutic age just coming into its own. If Percy had only managed to get Binx on the analytic couch, the review seemed to imply, the novel might really have said something.

The novel’s epigraph, a quotation from the Danish theologian Søren Kierkegaard (“...the specific character of despair is precisely this: it is unaware of being despair”) should have alerted all latter-day apostles of Sigmund Freud to the fact that Percy was interested in a different game, with very different stakes.

But if Percy entered the literary world an unknown quantity, it did not take long for the labels to catch up with him. He was categorized, variously, as a Southern novelist, as a philosophical novelist working in the tradition of such European “existentialist” writers as Dostoevski, Sartre,
and Camus, and, finally, as a Catholic novelist. The labels are not, in any strict sense, inaccurate. Percy is Southern both by birth and by upbringing, Catholic by choice (he and his wife converted shortly after their marriage in 1946), and philosophical by inclination.

Yet the tags do Percy a mild disservice, suggesting provincialism, a somber High Seriousness, and even dogmatism, qualities conspicuously absent from his work. They also obscure the fact that Percy is, first and foremost, a novelist, and as such is committed to finding and defining his own "truth" through the making of his fictional worlds. A sounder approach to Walker Percy, therefore, is one which takes account of the ways his work both resists and incorporates the powerful pressures of background, ideas, and religion.

No one could imaginably be more burdened by the weight of the South than Walker Percy. He was born in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1916, the first of three sons. His father, a lawyer, was a descendant of an old, well-established Mississippi Delta family, a clan which claims to trace its roots to the fiery Harry Percy of Northumberland, depicted by Shakespeare in *Henry IV, Part One.* Passion, pride, and a certain recklessness run long and strong in the American Percy family, though in more recent generations those traits have been muted somewhat—or, in some cases, turned destructively inward.

**Uncle Will**

The first American Percy, Charles, landed in Louisiana shortly after the American Revolution bearing a Spanish grant to land in what is now Mississippi. He may have been a pirate or a last heir of the earls of Northumberland. Nobody knows for sure. All that is known is that Don Carlos, as he was sometimes called, had married a French woman and sired several children when an Englishwoman suddenly appeared, claiming to be Don Carlos's long-abandoned wife. As proof, she presented their son—a captain, no less, in the British Navy.

Don Carlos apparently had very little stomach for the domestic drama that ensued. According to the account of his great-great-grandson, Will Percy, he walked to a local creek, tied a sugar kettle around his neck, and jumped in. That inglorious exit from the world brought an end to the bickering. The wives settled peacefully in the same neighborhood; their children went on to become part of the Delta's landed gentry. It all ended so amicably that it is easy to overlook the dark detail: the suicide.

But that grim fact has haunted the Percy family. Walker's own father took his life when Walker was thirteen. And the act and implications of suicide have figured prominently in all of Percy's fiction. It is, of course, a quick and absolute alternative to a life of quiet desperation, the malady that plagues most of Percy's protagonists.

The suicide of Walker Percy's father was fateful in more than one way. It brought the family to Greenville, Mississippi, and into the house of William Alexander Percy, or "Uncle Will," as the boys called their

*Jay Tolson, 35, is an associate editor of The Wilson Quarterly.*
cousin. Two years after the move, in 1931, Walker’s mother was killed in an automobile accident. Uncle Will then adopted the three boys.

It was not the usual household. Yet, as Percy later described it, "It did not seem in the least extraordinary to find oneself orphaned at 16 and adopted by a bachelor-poet-lawyer-planter and living in an all-male household visited regularly by other poets, politicians, psychiatrists, sociologists, black preachers, folk singers, itinerant harmonica players." The house was, as Percy went on to observe, "a standard stopover for all manner of people who were trying to 'understand the South,' that perennial American avocation . . ."

'Lanterns on the Levee'

For a reticent boy with a bookish turn of mind, it was an ideal spot to sit back, observe, and take mental notes of the manners, speech habits, and eccentricities of those, both high and low, who trooped through the Greenville house. It was not every boy, after all, who had the chance to see the legendary Faulkner bash balls on his foster father’s tennis court, the erratic game progressively deteriorating with each of Faulkner’s visits to the house for a quick snort of bourbon.

Life with Will Percy offered more. For Walker, it was the most thorough education in literature, art, and music he was to receive. Here he was introduced not only to Shakespeare, Keats, and other poets (largely of the Romantic school), whose work Uncle Will read aloud, but also to the great composers—Brahms, Beethoven, Mozart, and Wagner.

"One way to Walker Percy," wrote the critic Alfred Kazin, "is by way of William Alexander Percy." If anything, Kazin understates the connection. Even more than being the source of an incomparable education, Uncle Will was, as Percy himself put it, "a fixed point in a confusing world."

William Percy was the living embodiment of much that was fine and noble, and of much that was muddled and wrong, about the planter class to which he belonged. Percy was a poet, but the book that made his reputation, Lanterns on the Levee, was a prose elegy to Delta life, particularly to the "aristocratic" ways of the planter class. His evocation of the Delta’s rural rhythms, the rising and falling of the Mississippi’s waters, has few equals: "For our soil," he wrote, "very dark brown, creamy and sweet-smelling, without substrata of rock or shale, was built up slowly, century after century, by the sediment gathered by the river in its solemn task of cleansing the continent."

But when Will Percy turned to the Delta people—its blacks, poor whites, and landed gentry—his observational powers gave way to sentimentality and stereotyping. Blacks are lovable folk, generous and caring, but hopelessly enchained to the moment. Incapable of self-governance, they must therefore be taken care of by the responsible people of Percy’s class. The white gentry and the blacks are the true partners of the Delta region, since they together pioneered it when it was a wild frontier in the early 19th century. The poor whites, the rednecks and peckerwoods who came relatively late to the Delta from the hills of Alabama and Mississippi, were, in Will Percy’s estimation, intellectually and spiritually infe-
It required no great prescience of Will Percy to see that the days of sharecropping, and therefore of the great plantations, were numbered. And with the gradual erosion of their economic base the cultural and political dominance of the planters would necessarily fade. The consequences of this change were, to Percy, terrible to contemplate. For the genteel Southerner, he believed, was one of the last standard-bearers of civilized values, values that he called chivalric but that were, in fact, far more Roman and Stoic than Christian. Duty, self-control, and honor took clear precedence over charity and faith.

Will Percy's code contained more than a trace of historical pessimism: The aristocratic minority would inevitably lose to the selfish, grasping mob, the Demos. Nevertheless, it was incumbent upon the best folk to continue acting as though "virtue was an end," and that the "survival values," mere getting and spending, "were means, not ends."

It is perhaps too easy to criticize William Percy's world-view. The material comfort that allowed his kind to develop such lofty principles was, as we all know, built squarely upon the backs of slaves. There was, moreover, no dearth of cold, hard money-grubbing among the people Percy idealized.

Still, the "fixity" that Walker Percy admired in his adopted father was not all self-delusion or rationalization. Living by his principles placed William Percy in difficult and dangerous straits, not only during World War I but also in his successful campaign to drive the Ku Klux Klan from Greenville. Though many of his class showed no particular concern for the larger life of the community, Will did. During the devastating flood of 1927, it was Will who steered the relief effort. He also provided free legal service to the poor. Will Percy may have been deluded in thinking that his class constituted an aristocracy, but the values he forced himself to live by were not hollow.

And for that reason he has remained (even after his death in 1942) a powerful influence upon his adopted son. There is, in fact, in all of Walker Percy's fiction, and in many of his essays, a sustained dialogue between the two, an effort on the part of the younger to tease out of his elder's creed its best and truest points, and, equally, to show where and why Uncle Will went wrong.

The quarrel with Uncle Will figures prominently in Percy's first novel. There, of course, it is Emily Cutrer who eloquently defends the aristocratic Southern creed. But eloquence alone is not enough to bring Binx Bolling (in whom, undoubtedly, there is more than a little of Walker Percy) into his aunt's camp. He is skeptical that her values are anything more than the elements of a style whose time has passed.

Yet Binx, like Walker Percy, is unable to dismiss outright the old genteel code. Even in reacting to it, he is still strongly affected by it. When Emily Cutrer asks Binx how her values could have meant so little to him, he responds forthrightly: "You say that none of what you said ever meant anything to me. That is not true. On the contrary. I have never forgotten..."
anything you ever said. In fact I have pondered over it all my life. My ob-
jections, though they are not exactly objections, cannot be expressed in
the usual way. To tell the truth, I can’t express them at all.”

Those lines could stand as a kind of coda to Walker Percy’s work. The
sense of being haunted by the past, by one’s own memory, by a tragic an-
cestral heritage is also a distinctive mark of the Southern writer, though
curiously, and somewhat disingenuously, Percy has often denied belong-
ing to the mainstream of the Southern literary tradition. “Faulkner and
all the rest of them were always going on about this tragic sense of his-
tory,” Percy complained in a recent interview, “and we’re supposed to sit
on our porches talking about it all the time. I never did that. My South
was always the New South. My first memories are of the country club, of
people playing golf.”

It is true that in his later novels, Love in the Ruins (1971), Lancelot (1977),
and The Second Coming (1980), Percy appears to be dealing with a South
that is not very different from Rye, New York, or Grosse Pointe, Michigan.
His settings are little pockets of upper middle-class suburban privilege,
worlds circumscribed by golf, television, polite church affiliations, tepid
adulteries, and the stifling pressure of too much comfort and ease. His pro-
tagonists are all men near wits’ end, desperate for life, disgusted with their
own half-heartedness, eager to care for something that matters.

In the most imaginative of those three novels, Love in the Ruins, an
apocalyptic satire set in July 1983 in one of those New South suburban
enclaves (called Paradise Estates), the narrator, Dr. Tom More, a de-
scendant of the English humanist-saint, ruefully observes the collapse of
American society and culture, even as he tries to invent a machine that
will restore unity to his patients’ riven souls.

Politically, the nation is divided between raving liberals (“Lefts”) and
equally rabid conservatives (“Knotheads”), each side pursuing its goals
with mad disregard for compromise.

A war in Ecuador has been going on for 15 years. “Not exactly our best
sided with South Ecuador, which is
largely Christian, believing in God
and the sacredness of the individual,
et cetera, et cetera. The only trouble is
that South Ecuador is owned by 98
Catholic families, is governed by a
general, and so is not what you would
call an ideal democracy. North Ecua-
dor, on the other hand, which many
U.S. liberals support, is Maoist-
Communist and has so far murdered
two hundred thousand civilians, in-
cluding liberals who did not welcome
communism with open arms.”

Political divisiveness is only part of
the problem in this troubled land.
Even the Catholic Church has split, half of it committed to theological relativism, the other half (the American Catholic Church, with its papal headquarters in Cicero, Illinois) to the Latin mass and a new feast day called Property Rights Sunday. The Protestant Churches are little better off, having gone the way of mindlessly cheery TV promotionalism and Christian golf tournaments.

Percy’s concern here is clearly not only the South, or even the New South. His scope is set on the larger nation. But at the novel’s end, after things have fallen apart and even begun to make a modest recovery (only now Paradise Estates is 99 percent black), Dr. More, the driven alcoholic doctor who had hoped to cure his patients’ spiritual dividedness with his machine, lives contentedly for the first time in his life, inhabiting old slave quarters with his new wife, hoeing collards in his small garden, and maintaining a small practice. It is a romantic agrarian vision, the arcadia of so many Southern writers, and it is based upon the belief that rustic simplicity is a means to the good life. It is, in fact, Faulkner’s tragic sense of history turned inside out: a comic vision of the past re-created. Dr. More’s new world also happens to restore some of the best elements of Will Percy’s idealized society—a place where concern for community and friends prevails over narrow, selfish interest.

An impatience with the vulgarity and insipidness of today’s deracinated, urbanized, industrialized world accompanies the agrarian vision of many Southern writers, and Percy partly shares that impatience. Indeed, in his fourth novel, *Lancelot*, Percy’s distaste for contemporary decadence almost becomes splenetic.

**Strength from Defeat**

The narrator of that novel, Lancelot Andrewes Lamar, a former college football star, a Rhodes scholar, a lawyer, and a cuckold, tells his story from a New Orleans mental institution, where he has been placed after killing his wife and her lover. “I cannot tolerate this age,” he confesses to his old friend, a priest named Percival. As he talks, it becomes clear that his opinions and values are similar to those of Will Percy, but even more ferociously held. “Make love not war?” Lamar rages. “I’ll take war rather than what this age calls love.” Recounting how his life went wrong, Lamar rails against moral looseness and proposes a new, stern morality of the strong. “Which is a better world, this . . . Happyland U.S.A. or a Roman legion under Marcus Aurelius Antonius? Which is worse, to die with T. J. Jackson at Chancellorsville or live with Johnny Carson in Burbank?”

If in explaining his South, his New South, Walker Percy has repeatedly insisted upon its similarities with other parts of the country, he nevertheless betrays an acute awareness of how regions—and not only the South—shape character, or at least outward behavior. Percy frequently uses regional traits to amusing effect. At the beginning of his second novel, *The Last Gentleman* (1966), the protagonist, Will Barrett, a Mississippian who has dropped out of Princeton, moved to New York, and taken a job as a dehumidification engineer in Macy’s, falls in with a band of Ohioans and, like the good chameleon he is, quickly adopts their ways. “He hadn’t
been in their company a week before he became one of them: He called a
girl named Carol Kerrell, said mear for mirror, tock for talk, ottonobile,
stummick, and asked for carme1 candy. The consonants snapped around in
his throat like a guitar string. In April he went to Fort Lauderdale. In short,
he became an Ohioan and forgot the old honorable quarrels of the South,
had not a thought in his head nor a care in the world.'

There is a good dose of nastiness and condescension in this portrait of
Ohioans, as well as a strong suggestion that Southerners are somehow
deeper and more interesting than folks from other places. One finds simi-
lar encounters between the complicated, past-haunted Southerner and the
more one-dimensional non-Southerner throughout Percy's fiction. Even
when the Southerners appear to be bested by others (Lancelot Lamar, for
example, is cuckolded by a Californian who speaks fluent psychobabble),
the Southerners seem to draw strength from defeat. Defeat can make a per-
son more cunning, more ironical, and thus, in one way, stronger.

Walker Percy, M.D.

The suicide of Percy's father and rueful pessimism of his Uncle Will
both no doubt fed that great self-uncertainty which marks the early stage
in the development of an ironist. That uncertainty could easily have de-
stroyed Percy, had he not, perhaps instinctively, set out on a very sane
course of action when he stepped out into the world on his own.

After leaving Greenville to attend the University of North Carolina,
Percy decided to take the pre-med curriculum. It was not the expected
course of study for a person who had as early as his high school years
shown literary leanings, and Percy, on the occasions he has been asked
about that decision, has usually been vague, almost evasive, suggesting
that he made it more or less to satisfy Uncle Will.

Whatever the reason, the choice was wise. Forcing him to work
through a rigorous body of knowledge, the study of science and medicine
was helpful in taking the introspective young man out of himself. Medi-
cine instructed Percy in objectivity and distance. It also gave him an-
other handle on the world—a handle that he has ably exploited in his
fiction, where doctors and medicine figure prominently. Indeed, while
being skeptical of those who place total faith in science, Percy has used
the scientific world-view to heighten the intellectual tension of his nov-
els, opposing it to various forms of subjectivism, healthy and unhealthy.

Percy received his M.D. from Columbia University's College of Physi-
cians and Surgeons in 1941. He seemed right on professional course
when, in the midst of his internship in pathology at New York's Bellevue
Hospital, he contracted tuberculosis. The disease proved to be more than
a physical or professional setback; it was a crisis, much like the ones that
beset the protagonists of his novels, and it forced him to reconsider the
direction of his life.

Recuperating in a sanatorium in western New York while the Second
World War ran its course, Percy began, as he himself described it, "to
read, for the first time, modern literature." By that, he meant modern
European literature, philosophy as well as fiction. Reading Dostoevski,
Camus, Marcel, Sartre, and Kierkegaard (particularly Kierkegaard), he found, again in his own words, "that my feeling of outsidedness, of abstraction, of distance, alienation, or whatever, was nothing more or less than what the modern writers had been writing about for 100 years."

Percy emerged from this self-imposed cram course in existential literature wary of science, or at least of its overly ambitious claims to explain human behavior. The process of generalization, necessary to the scientist, inevitably obliterated the individual, rendered him, in fact, irrelevant. Psychoanalysis was typically misguided, Percy concluded, in its effort to reduce the mystery of individuals to a system of libidoal imperatives. The social sciences were similarly arrogant and ill-founded. These objections were very much like the ones that Kierkegaard had raised against Hegelian philosophy, which dominated mid-19th-century European thought: Both scientism and Hegelianism dispensed with the individual in order to explain man and history with a body of laws.

But what was Percy, a man of science, to do with this new-found knowledge?

He did not know immediately. After recovering, he briefly taught pathology at Columbia, but a relapse sent him back to the sanatorium. Years later, he confessed that he was the "happiest doctor who ever contracted tuberculosis and was able to quit [medicine]." Continuing to read his Europeans, Percy gradually awoke to the possibility of a career as a writer.

From the decision to be a writer to the publication of The Moviegoer was a long stretch of roughly 15 years, lived, for the most part, in relative isolation in Covington, Louisiana, a small town located across Lake Ponchartrain from New Orleans. Percy settled there shortly after his marriage in 1946 to Mary Townsend, a nurse whom he had met in Greenville during visits home from medical school. Percy chose this spot because he needed a "nonplace" to get down to the solitary business of writing.

Living off an inheritance from Uncle Will, Percy spent his apprentice years writing philosophical essays, reviews, articles, and two unwieldy (and unpublished) novels. The poet Allen Tate read the first of these fictional efforts and commented tersely on its main defect: "This is dreadful—you've simply got to put some action in it."

To refine his craft, Percy went back to the best Europeans. In The Moviegoer and The Last Gentleman, for example, he took over certain strategies of Albert Camus, creating characters aware of something wrong in themselves and in the world around them but uncertain...
where the cause of the problem lies. Binx Bolling and Will Barrett suf-
fer, like Merseault in Camus's The Stranger, from a condition one might
describe as moral drift. Absurd, or seemingly absurd, acts seem to be
the only means of finding out where they are or what they should do.
Binx's decision to marry his emotionally troubled cousin Kate Cutrer (a
decision that outrages his aunt) is a first step toward breaking a cycle of
meaningless repetitions. Percy's use of an obsessed, unbalanced narra-
tor in Lancelot borrows the narrative technique that Dostoevski per-
fectioned in Notes from Underground. It allows Percy, as it allowed the
Russian novelist, to expose the ills of his society from an unusual per-
spective, extreme but not totally dismissable.

Like a number of European writers, André Gide, Thomas Mann, and,
once again, Dostoevski, Percy uses physical illnesses to force his charac-
ters to confront their spiritual and moral malaise. (And here of course he
is helped by his medical training.) When Will Barrett of The Last Gentle-
man is casually adopted by a most unusual Southern family, the
Vaughts, and is taken back to the South with them, he finds himself in-
creasingly affected by their brilliant young son, Jamie, who is dying from
leukemia. Jamie's terminal condition makes it impossible for Will—
whose "will" is weak—to keep putting off decisions. Binx Bolling's crip-
ppled brother and Tom More's daughter (who dies of cancer) serve similar
functions, giving the protagonist of each novel what critic Frederick Karl
describes as "energy and function, to proceed to the ethical stage of his life,
where he assumes responsibility for it and his actions."

What Is Humanity?

All of Percy's novels, from The Moviegoer to The Second Coming (where
Will Barrett reappears, successful but still deeply troubled), are studies of
what Kierkegaard called "stages in life's way." As Martin Luschei first
pointed out in his book on Percy, The Sovereign Wayfarer (1972), the devel-
opment of the characters in Percy's novels often follows the Kierkegaard-
dian progression from the aesthetic stage to the ethical stage and then on
to the religious stage—or at least to the brink of this last stage. Not that
this pattern is neatly duplicated in novel after novel. But we see such char-
acters as Binx Bolling, Will Barrett, Tom More all beginning as pleasure-
seekers, dabbles, spectators, men who live for the moment and believe in
nothing. Still, they have one advantage over most other people: They sense
that something is wrong. Keen observers, they are aware of sham and a
general emptiness in their surroundings. Knowing there should be some-
thing more, they are on to the possibility of a search—for what, exactly,
they are not yet sure.

Most of Percy's protagonists attempt to move to the ethical stage—the
point at which one decides to live according to a code, a morality, a sys-
tem of ethics. But like their creator, most of Percy's protagonists finally
conclude that the code alone is inadequate (the great exception being
Lancelot Lamar, who becomes a fierce enforcer of his warrior ethic). And
this awareness brings them to the ultimate choice—what Kierkegaard
called the "leap of faith."
Percy himself made this leap when he converted to Catholicism. But Percy's faith does not lead, in his fiction, to simple solutions. Dr. More, even after he has begun his simplified life, married, and returned to the Church, still feels the old pull of lust for other women; he still wants to perfect his fantastic machine; he cannot even regret his past sins. 

Faith even appears a little suspicious. At the end of *The Moviegoer*, Binx Bolling sees a prosperous-looking black man coming out of a church after mass and cannot decide whether the man has come because the church is socially fashionable or because he believes that God is present there. "Or is he here for both reasons: through some dim dazzling trick of grace, coming for the one and receiving the other as God's own importunate bonus?" Binx asks. He quickly offers his own answer: "It is impossible to say."

What, then, does Percy teach us if he remains silent on that most important question of faith, the question to which all of his fiction leads? First of all, despite his denials of being a "typical" Southern writer, Percy delves brilliantly into the subject of the hold of the past on the individual. One's own history, for better and for worse, constitutes a large part of one's individuality. A person who cannot come to terms with what he came from will never amount to much, at least not in Percy's fictional worlds. And that perhaps is a valuable lesson in an age that sees pasts as easily discardable.

Championing true individualism, Percy's work exposes the dangers of accepting ready or bogus explanations of what we are and why we do things. Since we are largely products of a scientific age, we must be most wary of using science to explain away our individualities. Accordingly, Percy takes particular delight in attacking the tyranny of experts. But all theories holding that man is basically this or basically that, a no-good rotter or a potential angel, come in for a share of Percy's scorn.

Most importantly, Percy teaches us the dangers of death-in-life, and he does so with considerable sympathy for the man in the middle. Percy's characters are middle-class professionals, doctors, lawyers, people who work hard and would like to do good but who find that dutiful obedience to routine is not enough. This seems a bleak message, but Percy holds out hope. Hope lies in searching. Indeed, Percy suggests that a person's humanity consists largely of his attempt to find it. And because the search is open to all who will venture upon it, Percy's fiction stands as one of the most affirmative statements in contemporary literature.
The Great Soviet Computer Conspiracy

by Walter Reich

In 1951, Harvard sociologist David Riesman published an essay called "The Nylon War." In it, he suggested that the easiest way to vanquish our Soviet adversaries would be to drop consumer goods on them from airplanes.

Deluge those deprived masses with Ansco cameras and Schick shavers, and they would soon forsake their jobs at the Red October Tank Works. Shower them with Camel cigarettes and Ronson lighters, and Karl Marx would quickly fade into the recesses of collective memory.

In fact, Riesman contended, such an operation—the so-called Bar Harbor Project—had secretly been under way for several months. During the first raid, some 800 U.S. C-54s dumped 200,000 pairs of nylon hose, four million packs of cigarettes, 35,000 Toni wave kits, 20,000 yo-yos, and 10,000 wristwatches on the Russian cities of Rostov and Vladivostok.

The result, according to Riesman, was "frenzied rioting as the inhabitants scrambled for a share."

Today, three decades later, it is clear that the Soviets are belatedly retaliating with a Bar Harbor Project of their own, a nefarious scheme to corrode the United States from within. But instead of raining vodka (or caviar, or sable pelts) upon the land, they have arranged to flood America with personal computers (PCs).

It happened like this:

Back in 1976, the PC revolution was just starting. The Soviets watched with interest as small computer companies—often housed initially in the family garage—began sprouting in California. They watched with even greater interest as these makeshift workshops produced ever more advanced devices in ever smaller packages.

The Soviets experienced both humiliation and anxiety when they saw that these modest enterprises were turning out portable computers that not only rivaled in sophistication their clumsy communist counterparts but could also be mass-produced and sold at a price that most Americans could afford.

As had been so often the case in the past, humiliation and anxiety became, for the Soviets, the parents of invention. Keen tacticians in the Central Committee suddenly recognized how they could paralyze the best minds in America.

What the Soviets did when they saw the PC revolution begin was to speed it up. By the late 1970s, hundreds of computer whizzes were emerging from their garages with promising new prototypes and programs. They were all looking for backers in order to go commercial. Neither the San Francisco banks nor the Wall Street venture capitalists would give them the time of day.

Moscow proved to be more sympathetic. Using millions of dollars in hard currency from foreign sales of Stolichnaya vodka, the Russians, via
intermediaries in the secretive world of international finance, provided the scruffy entrepreneurs with seed money on highly favorable terms.

The rest, of course, is history. Personal computers were soon rolling off the California assembly lines and into the offices, dens, and recreation rooms of the American bourgeoisie. No one suspected a thing.

Despite its public reticence, the Kremlin's chief targets are not hard to identify. At whom, after all, has most computer advertising been aimed? For whom, primarily, have the electronic spreadsheets and multicolor graphics and data base management systems been invented?

Answer: For the cadres of capitalism. For stockbrokers, businessmen, bankers, salesmen, and retailers.

The conventional wisdom, of course, is that personal computers are good for capitalism. Businessmen need tools to track expenses, forecast sales, plan budgets, and fix prices. Don't they?

This sort of attitude plays right into Soviet hands. For the truth is that, while it may be gratifying to an executive to be able to spread out, on a single computer screen, the figures for his company's April sales, and then instantly transform those numbers into pie charts or bar graphs, it is not, in the vast majority of cases, necessary. Yet businessmen who until now worked happily with paper and pencil, and consulted their accountants but once a month, are now falling all over each other at the local Computerland to buy up the latest "peripheral" for their hardware or "windowing" aid for their software.

Or they are throwing out all of their "old" equipment, purchased six months earlier, and replacing it with newer systems that will allow them to tell their computers what to do by touching the screen with a finger or by maneuvering a mechanical "mouse" across the desk.

Go into the nearest office building and observe a typical capitalist, chosen at random. You will not, I wager, find him building a better mousetrap. You will instead find him manipulating his mouse. You will find him playing with his VisiCalc. You will find him using electronic mail when a telephone call would do; mastering the intricacies of dBase II; studying one of his 30 instruction manuals; or trying to recover the data he lost when the power went out.

You will find him, in short, spending 20 hours a week to do, elegantly and precisely, what he used to do, sloppily and approximately, in five. And you will find him spending the other 20 hours of his working week at his PC, doing what he never needed to do before, and still doesn't. The bottom line: 35 hours a week in wasted digital bliss.

Walter Reich, 40, a former Fellow at the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute, is a contributing editor of The Wilson Quarterly.
But businessmen are by no means the only American professional group whose talents and energies the Soviets mean to sap. Moscow has also sought to neutralize the American intelligentsia, that bewildering muster of scholars, journalists, “policy intellectuals,” and other warriors in the ideological struggle for the ownership of history.

During the 1930s, the Soviets wooed Western intellectuals with a messianic ideology. Today, the chief instrument wielded by the Kremlin in its undercover campaign is the word-processing program.

Consider only one case among many, that of James Fallows. Mr. Fallows was for several years President Jimmy Carter’s chief speechwriter. He wrote a widely-praised book on national defense. More recently, he published a sensitive analysis of the problems of immigration into the United States.

But now, after a couple of years of using the WordStar word-processing program on his home computer (a Victor 9000), all he is doing, it seems, is thinking about, and writing about, WordStar. In the January issue of the Atlantic, he devoted an entire article to his adventures and troubles with that program (of which nearly one million copies are in use). He spent weeks rearranging the letters on his keyboard. And he figured out how to get into the program itself in order to change its codes and characteristics.

There was something fetching about the article, even lucid. Yet it was the lucidity, sadly, of a brilliant mind that, though it might have contributed an endless flow of creative solutions to our national dilemmas, chose instead to explain how to “scroll more smoothly,” “make space on Drive A,” or “allow the cursor to move more smoothly and quickly across the screen.” The Soviets must have been pleased.

Needless to say, our children offer another obvious target. American child prodigies, having rebounded from the education gap revealed in 1957 by Sputnik, have now been “gapped” again: They have abandoned higher math for higher hacking, expending their best efforts on breaking the computer codes of banks rather than the spines of books. Many children have abandoned the educational enterprise altogether, playing hookey at the screen with rented games of Snakepit or Temple of Apshai.

All in all, the great computer diversion has been an extremely clever Soviet scheme. It has now put in jeopardy our national mental capacities, already eroded by three decades of network television.

Clearly, America must retaliate massively. We must find some way of distracting and disrupting Soviet society. Unfortunately, nylon stockings and yo-yos will no longer do. More effective countermeasures are obviously in order.

Lawyers, for example; we could secretly endow, through UNESCO, 100 new Soviet law schools devoted solely to teaching the art of incessant litigation. Or have the Voice of America broadcast Monday Night Football. Or, most insidious of all, introduce them, by hook or by crook, to the joys of personal computing.
COMMENTARY

We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer's telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editors' requests for comment.

A Psychiatrist Replies

As one who has enjoyed caricatures of others' professions, I should be a better sport about a caricature of my own. Dr. Restak's article ['Psychiatry in America,' WQ, Autumn 1983], after all, presents a recognizable likeness, sophisticated, and not deceitful. I am afraid most readers may ignore its solid conclusions, however, because it makes psychiatry seem so ridiculous. The author gives a false impression by evenhandedly juxtaposing present with past, and the mainstream of the profession with its lunatic fringe.

Dr. Restak is right that the new biological orientation has great promise and that the "medical model" of mental illness will emerge pre-eminent. He is right to advocate a better distinction between the truly ill and the worried well. Certainly, he is right to ask for more objectivity about the value of various treatments and to require us not to pose as experts on all aspects of life. But most of us agree with him already.

Carl N. Brownsberger, M.D.
Watertown, Massachusetts

No Fun in Singapore?

In "Big Fish, Small Pond" [WQ, Winter 1983], Thomas J. Bellows writes that heavy fines are meted out for littering and jaywalking in Singapore. The government also recently prohibited waitresses wearing bunny costumes and swimsuits on the job. The police, meanwhile, have instructed restaurant owners to keep their establishments illuminated well enough for customers to see fellow patrons seated in far corners. And recently S. Shanabalan, the Foreign and Culture minister, announced that the government may ban chewing gum because it costs the Housing and Development Board about $75,000 yearly to remove the sticky stuff from floors and walls of the country's housing projects.

Singapore, writes Bellows, is "clean, honest, efficient." It's also not much fun.

Dave Morey
Washington, D.C.

Classroom Realities

I have read the expositions regarding the plight of public education ['Teaching in America,' WQ, New Year's 1984] with mixed feelings. My first reaction is "Great, these are the facts,..." Then, I think of reality. The typical teacher faces 35 kids, perhaps five percent of whom have an interest in learning: Some are on drugs, many use alcohol and tobacco, some have had no breakfast, perhaps one or two experience sexual abuse from an adult family member, several may not know where they will sleep that night—or who might be in for the night with a parent.

These kids are wise. They know of political corruption and sleaziness in the business world. Their idols are rock stars, TV personalities, professional athletes—not exactly the finest role models. They do not see the relevance of traditional academic programs, believing that a job and a paycheck await any 18-year-old, with or without a diploma.

Blame can be shared by many: teachers' unions, colleges, the public. Parents are indulgent and permissive and yet expect schools to discipline all kids—except their kids. Basically, schools reflect society. While constantly adding to what schools are to perform, communities have demonstrated too little concern for com-
THE JARGON GENERATOR

Apropos of "Teaching in America," one reader sent us this story by Paul Van Nostrand, San Diego Tribune staff writer:

Ever wonder how bureaucrats, educators, and others come up with the terminology they unload on an unsuspecting public?

They use a Jargon Generator.

The fellow who put it together is a Sweetwater Union High School District administrator who, for obvious reasons, shall remain anonymous.

His creation consists of three columns of nine words each. The first two columns consist of multisyllabic adjectives, and the third contains ambiguous nouns that defy strict definition:

1. integrated  1. management  1. outputs
2. total       2. organizational 2. flexibility
3. systematized 3. monitored  3. analysis
4. parallel   4. reciprocal  4. mobility
5. functional 5. logistical  5. factors
6. responsive 6. transitional 6. concept
7. synchronized 7. modular  7. capability
8. compatible 8. creative  8. guidelines
9. balanced 9. operational 9. contingencies

To use the Jargon Generator, merely take any three-digit number and apply each digit to the corresponding sequential column.

For instance, the number 641 will give you "responsive reciprocal outputs," an impressive and erudite phrase that can be applied in almost any situation.

And 159 will give you "integrated logistical contingencies," a statement that you can use to establish your expertise and authority on any subject.

Use of the Jargon Generator when you really have nothing to say, the author points out, will result in absolutely no one knowing what you’re talking about.

But, he adds, what really matters is that (1) they’ll never admit it and (2) they will accept you as a decisive thinker who possesses great ability to verbalize complex ideas.

Sort of a 297, one might say.

petence in basic areas.

What should be the primary goals of our schools, and how can we challenge today’s students?

Recruit brighter people, with the temperament to teach, and keep them in the classroom instead of "promoting" them to administrative positions. Without violating our democratic principles, we also need to differentiate between programs for the academically able and for those more inclined to manual skills.

Still, I am impressed by how bright many of our students are and how well they do academically.

Arthur Germad
Emmitsburg, Maryland

The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1984
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When In Beijing . . .

In "The Mosher Affair" [WQ, New Year's 1984], Peter Van Ness discusses the major issue of U.S.-China academic exchanges and the minor case of Stephen Mosher's dismissal by the anthropology department of Stanford University. But Van Ness correctly notes Zhao Fusan's statement that "even without Mosher, there inevitably would have been other problems that would have prompted a policy review."

I am not sure that, the Mosher case aside, practical research arrangements for mutual benefit can be made.

Historical, political, and ideological circumstances have made scholarly communications difficult between Americans and Chinese. The reasons that China is sending students to the West, after 30 years of no contact, do not require elaboration. And, clearly, normalization of the relationship with China serves the diplomatic, economic, and military interests of the United States. The problem is how American scholars can take advantage of the new opportunities.

U.S. research teams would not invite Chinese scholars to join them without qualifications that fit their ongoing research. In contrast, demands of American scholars in China are in areas where Chinese scholars have themselves only just begun to invest time and energy, such as demographic and sociological research. Up to now, academic research in many Chinese institutions has focused on issues of interest only to China.

Given this very recent re-emergence of scholarship in many fields of study in China, I think that "unacceptable" or "outrageous" arrangements made by the Chinese for some visiting American scholars are not necessarily deliberate. American students' ignorance of Chinese organizations also undoubtedly impedes research. Mutuality of academic interests grows slowly.

How should foreigners behave in China when the rules are unwritten and mores unfamiliar? Each and every person will have to figure out an answer. But the
Catch-22 situation with regard to neibu [internal] documents is more complex than that depicted by Van Ness. Mere possession of such documents does not inevitably make one vulnerable, particularly when they are of an academic nature. As Van Ness himself points out, Chinese have given neibu documents to many foreign scholars, but few have been arrested and expelled. A number of previously neibu publications have gone public, and I believe that other neibu materials will also shed the label. Without the neibu label, many scholarly articles would be published within China only after long delay.

Despite misunderstandings, U.S.-China academic exchange is proceeding through individual initiatives. Official numerical restrictions would not advance academic cooperation and, in China's view, would adversely affect further development of current collaborations. I should not like to think that Van Ness really means to suggest that unless academic exchanges are defined in black and white terms, we should quit or retrench.

H. Yuan Tien
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