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HANOVER AND LONDON
Since the mid-1960s, crime has become a staple topic of conversation among Americans who live in cities and suburbs. No longer is fear of robbery, theft, or physical assault restricted to "bad neighborhoods"; especially after dark, one must be watchful in downtown office buildings, on urban college campuses, in city parks, in subways, in neighborhood shopping centers, and on ordinary residential streets. The full social and economic costs of this dramatic environmental change wrought over two decades by relatively small but growing numbers of (typically) young American males may never be reckoned.

"What to do about crime" has preoccupied politicians and policemen alike. And an increasingly sophisticated corps of academic researchers has investigated the matter. In this issue, we present the findings from a dozen new studies of crime and criminal justice collected in Crime and Public Policy, edited by Harvard's James Q. Wilson.

The contributors question a number of popular assumptions: that protection per se, causes crime; that a rapid police "response time" greatly increases the chances of an arrest; that giving jobs to teenagers will keep them out of trouble; that convicts can be rehabilitated; that the national crime rate is increasing.

Wilson & Co. do not see any panaceas for crime, human nature and American society being what they are. But they do suggest that (1) it may be possible to identify chronic "violent predators" early in their careers, especially if courts allow access to juvenile crime records; (2) in stable neighborhoods, citizens can take steps to deter criminals; (3) police performance and incarceration can become more "cost-effective"; (4) researchers should examine the role of the family as an early deterrent to criminal behavior.

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The battles over the federal budget seem to become longer every year. The problem, says Caiden, a political scientist at the California State College at San Bernardino, is not only that "reform" is needed, but that the very idea of an annual budget is obsolete.

Originally, the annual budget, submitted by the President and modified on Capitol Hill, was intended to allow Congress to monitor programs and evaluate policy. But today, because of Washington's vastly expanded responsibilities, such goals are rarely met.

The official budget does not even give a full picture of Washington's activities. Between 1967 and 1981, outstanding federal loans, many of them "off budget," jumped from $47 billion to $187 billion. Invisible "tax expenditures" (revenue lost due to tax "breaks") grew from $36 billion annually to some $228 billion during the same period.

Meanwhile, time constraints and the need to pass budget proposals through a welter of House and Senate committees virtually preclude careful congressional review. And by 1981, 76 percent of federal outlays were classified "uncontrollable," up from 59 percent in 1967. Two-thirds of such spending goes for "entitlement" programs such as Social Security and food stamps—and is determined not by budget-makers but by the number of eligible recipients. Conflicting estimates of such needs and of future economic conditions in general make fixing even the overall shape of the annual budget an illusory exercise.

Attempts to reform the process have backfired. In 1974, Congress created the Congressional Budget Office to provide forecasts. Fixing overall spending limits became the responsibility of newly created House and Senate budget committees. But the reforms fragmented the process further and consumed more time.

A yearlong budget period, Caiden argues, "is too short for some purposes and too long for others." Spending for the military, public works, and some social programs must be planned years in advance; outlays to
cushion economic downturns must be increased on short order. The creation of separate budgets for various types of expenditures would help to rationalize matters. So would agreeing on a single economic forecast and giving more budget authority to either the legislature or the executive branch.

Congress is already considering some of these ideas. Caiden is unsure what the final product will be, but she believes that the days of the annual budget are numbered.

**The Fate of the Welfare State**

Ronald Reagan's conservative Republican administration and François Mitterrand's Socialist government in France have at least one thing in common. Both are pushing programs of political decentralization, trying to shift more power from the national to the local level.

For both nations, says Glazer, a Harvard sociologist, the changes represent a sharp departure that suggests a new direction for the modern Welfare State. In France, locally elected officials are gaining greater power at the expense of the central government in Paris. Reagan's 'New Federalism' and other proposals aim at giving states and localities more financial responsibility in all areas of social policy.

In the United States, the tide began to turn against Washington as Lyndon Johnson's Great Society got under way during the late 1960s. Acceding to demands for "power to the people" and "community control," LBJ's aides created elected local advisory boards for new federal urban uplift efforts such as Model Cities.

Today, this trend is far stronger. The soaring cost of social programs—old-age pensions, housing, health care—is one factor. And growing numbers of college-educated Americans are less willing to defer to the wisdom of "experts" of all kinds—government administrators, social workers, doctors, teachers. By the late 1970s, Glazer writes, the push for grassroots responsibility could no longer be characterized as either conservative or liberal.

Moreover, between 1965 and 1974, the number of Americans doing volunteer work—from delivering hot meals to house-bound elderly to teaching the illiterate—grew from 22 million to 37 million, according to the U.S. Labor Department. Analysts in other Western societies—the Netherlands, Israel, Great Britain—have also noted a resurgence of interest in "self-help."

Do such changes spell the demise of the Welfare State? Hardly, says Glazer. But given the overwhelming scope of government's purview today, "elections are no longer sufficient to ensure a popular role in government." And the heavy taxation and high deficits that afflict the Welfare State, he argues, bar further sizable increases in social outlays. The next logical step, he believes, is an enlarged role for voluntarism.

Political action committees (PACs) contributed about $80 million of the $300 million spent by candidates during the 1982 congressional campaign. But, despite growing criticism of the PACs’ influence, says Cohen, National Journal staff correspondent, the evidence that they “get what they pay for” is “mixed” at best.

Corporate PACs have come under the heaviest fire. Accounting of the 1982 campaign is not complete, but the tally so far shows that they gave $12.5 million, as opposed to $8.1 million for labor union PACs, $9.8 million for those of trade associations, and $2.8 million for New Right and other ideological PACs.

Surprisingly, in House and Senate races, Democrats collect more PAC money than Republicans do, accounting for 58 percent of such 1982 contributions counted so far. One reason: Labor gave 93 percent of its money to Democrats while corporate PACs gave only 56 percent of their donations to Republicans. As in the past, corporate givers tended to favor incumbents, regardless of party affiliation.

But the effects of PAC giving are far from clear. In 1980, for example, 32 successful challengers in House races spent an average of $350,000

An unresolved question: Do PACs buy votes in Congress, or do they merely support candidates who already share their views?

The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1983
on their campaigns—more than three times as much as did unsuccessful challengers. But the average winning challenger in 1982 spent only $287,000. Since most winners were Democrats, Cohen argues, other factors besides campaign outlays, such as the economic recession, must have led voters to turn out G.O.P. incumbents.

Some critics contend that PAC contributions influence votes in Congress. Yet as Representative Thomas Foley (D-Wash.) argues: "Members often receive money from people who like their views. But that doesn't mean the vote is because of the contribution."

Reformers, meanwhile, cannot agree on a solution. One option—limiting total campaign spending for each candidate—was written into law by Congress in 1974 but struck down by the Supreme Court in 1976. Other proposals meet with stiff opposition in Congress.

Also in the background is the cautionary example of the 1974 campaign finance reforms, which limited both PAC and individual donations. In response, donors simply created more PACs: Contributions by PACs have more than doubled since 1978.

"On Meddling with the Constitution" by Gary L. McDowell, in Journal of Contemporary Studies (Fall 1982), Transaction Periodicals Consortium, Dept. 541, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08803.

Recent years have brought a sharp increase in the number of constitutional amendments proposed in Congress, usually at the behest of special-interest groups. Far from being a sign of democratic vitality, says McDowell, a Dickinson College political scientist, the upsurge is symptomatic of an American political malfunction.

Since the Constitution was adopted in 1789, some 10,000 constitutional amendments have been proposed. Only 33 were sent to the states for a vote; 26 were ratified; the last, in 1971, permitted 18-year-olds to vote.

Amending the Constitution has always served as an outlet for the popular passions of the moment, McDowell notes. (An 1838 proposal would have barred anyone who fought in a duel from holding public office.) But the average number of amendments proposed each year suddenly rose to 310 during the 1963–68 period, from an average of 65 during the previous 35 years. Since 1969, U.S. Congressmen and Senators have introduced an average of 232 amendments each year.

The emphasis has changed since the early 1960s. In the past, proposed amendments were split evenly between those concerned with the forms of government—presidential elections, the tenure of judges—and with individual rights, such as divorce or voting. Today, rights-related proposals predominate.

Such developments, McDowell argues, reflect "a general deterioration in public faith in the institutions of republican government." Most of the amendments put forth today—on abortion, equal rights for
women, school prayer—do not involve constitutional questions. They involve ordinary political issues. Advocates of these amendments are simply not willing to do the hard work of advancing their cause through the regular democratic political process.

Some of today’s popular amendment proposals are attempts to bypass earlier Supreme Court rulings on school prayer, abortion, and busing to integrate schools. But the proper response to “judicial activism,” McDowell argues, is to convince Congress to vote to remove such matters from the Court’s jurisdiction. Advocates of the balanced budget and equal rights (ERA) amendments, he believes, are merely using the Constitution for political symbolism.

After the ERA was rejected last year, McDowell notes, more women began running for public office. Other amendment advocates should follow their example. Using the Constitution to resolve political grievances will render it “so easily changeable as to be meaningless.”

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

‘Strange’ War Revisited


The doctrine of “limited war” still shapes how and why U.S. conventional forces would fight in such far-off trouble-spots as the Persian Gulf. Yet, despite the failure of this doctrine in Vietnam, the theory of limited war has never been revised.

According to Rosen, an aide to the Secretary of Defense, Robert Osgood and Thomas Schelling, both academics, set the terms of American thinking on limited war in books published in 1957 and 1960, respectively. They emphasized that traditional military goals (i.e., destroying enemy forces) should be subordinated to the political goal of forcing the foe to negotiate. Thus, U.S. politicians, not generals, should direct the war effort.

At first, the American effort in South Vietnam was left mostly to military men. But by 1964, as American “advisory” commitments grew, high-level civilian officials became involved. Few had experience in combat or in military planning; most were former business executives, professors, or lawyers. They distrusted the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but were attracted to the academic theory of limited war, which seemed to offer both civilian control and flexibility.

Thus, Lyndon Johnson adopted a diplomatic “signaling” strategy in 1964–65. White House and Pentagon civilians controlled bombing targets and troop deployments. In late 1964, as intermittent U.S. bombing began, State Department official Walt Rostow complained that “too much thought is being given to the actual damage we do in the North,
not enough to the signal we wish to send." The result, according to Rosen: The U.S. commander in Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland, even "needed special authorization to use anti-personnel rounds in the artillery pieces defending Khe Sanh" in 1968.

By demonstrating American "resolve" through both diplomacy and force, Washington hoped to convince Hanoi that it was futile to continue fighting. But "signaling" was not really a strategy at all. Washington "did not define a clear military mission . . . ," Rosen says, and, until 1968, "it did not establish a clear limit to the resources to be allocated." Nobody had a plan to win the war.

Limited war is "strange" war, Rosen concludes. Civilian leaders must adapt to unusual conditions. While they should not simply give a free hand to the military, they should remember that "strange" wars are like all other wars in at least one way: Politicians must set clear military goals and let the generals find ways to meet them.

**Foreign Aid For What?**


The Reagan administration is gradually increasing U.S. foreign aid, but channeling more of it to military assistance. Wasserman, a former U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) official, argues that the United States would profit more by emphasizing development aid.

For 1983, the White House requested congressional approval of an 18 percent increase in foreign assistance funds, boosting economic development outlays by 5.5 percent and security-related expenditures by 35.2 percent. The latter category will now consume nearly half the foreign aid budget, versus 37 percent in 1981. Illustrative of the new emphasis, Wasserman says, is the one-third cut in food programs for Africa matched by a nearly 300 percent increase in military aid to African regimes between 1981 and 1983.

The battle between the two priorities is an old one: Traditionally, Wasserman observes, "foreign policy concerns dictate the [total] amounts allocated while development concerns predominate in determining how funds are spent within the country." President Carter emphasized economic uplift, establishing a bureau to coordinate overseas aid and boosting small-scale "people-to-people" projects, but the U.S. State Department successfully resisted radical change.

The Reagan administration has swung to the other extreme, Wasserman contends, construing U.S. security interests too narrowly. By its criteria, he argues, U.S. aid to India, totaling some $11 billion over the last 30 years, must be deemed wasted because of New Delhi's ties to Moscow and its public criticism of the United States. Yet U.S. help enabled India to achieve self-sufficiency in grain and thus become a stable democracy—surely to America's advantage.

The tension between security and development aims in foreign aid
While some critics oppose giving U.S. military aid overseas, others argue that little development assistance actually reaches the people. All told, 69 nations now receive U.S. bilateral aid.

policy is not likely to dissipate soon. In fact, the most successful U.S. aid programs—the 1947 Marshall Plan, the 1961 Alliance for Progress in Latin America—combined both. Such balanced efforts may not be ideologically satisfying to either conservatives or liberals, Wasserman says, but they are the most useful.

Shaping Up the Pentagon


The Reagan administration’s military build-up may be long overdue, but according to General Jones, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1978–82), a complete overhaul of the Pentagon bureaucracy is also needed to upgrade U.S. military effectiveness.

The Defense Department suffers the problems of all large organizations, compounded by structural flaws. The four independent service bureaucracies within the Pentagon—Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines—resist economy measures and changes in military strategy or organization. Yet civilian defense officials must draw heavily on their advice in drawing up the Pentagon’s annual budget. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is a possible counterbalance, but in reality the four service chiefs who dominate it merely reflect the views of the bureaucracies they represent. The Chiefs’ chairman, the only senior military adviser not tied to a particular constituency, has a staff of only five.

One result is inefficiency. The services tend to make major decisions on weapons purchases not by evaluating the nation’s overall military
needs, but by striking compromises among themselves. The lack of a unified command also impairs military operations, Jones warns. In Vietnam, for example, each service maintained its own independent air contingent. Indeed, the two services responsible for the final air evacuation from Saigon in 1975 each set their own “H-hours” for departure.

A greatly strengthened role for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs is needed to integrate defense planning and tighten control, says Jones. The chairman’s staff should be expanded and he alone, rather than all the Joint Chiefs, should speak for the military on operational needs.

The British armed forces recently adopted a similar centralized staff scheme, Jones notes, and it contributed to their success in the Falklands campaign. Unless the United States does the same, he warns, the outcome of its next crisis may not be nearly so happy.


Deep disagreement within NATO over defense policies and trade with the Soviets have prompted fresh debate on the future of the alliance. Olson, a retired U.S. foreign service officer, argues that Americans could learn much by looking at history.

Before World War I, Britain, like the United States today, was the world’s pre-eminent power. Its main interest in European affairs was to maintain the status quo as it tended to its far-flung overseas interests. But Britain finally “stumbled over the rock of Europe,” failing to prevent the Great War, the beginning of the end of its empire.

Olson argues that the U.S. position today is analogous. Washington seeks to keep things as they are—Europe divided between East and West, with Western Europe dependent militarily on the United States—even as the Europeans themselves become increasingly restive. The Americans’ deepening preoccupation with the complex “European Question,” meanwhile, has helped to prevent them from dealing effectively with other pressing global interests: Latin America, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Africa, and Cuba.

Before World War I, determining who would dominate Europe was the question. Today, it is finding a “European identity,” Olson writes. Behind today’s transatlantic discord is a desire among the Western Europeans for greater independence from the United States—and for more unity among themselves, possibly including political union.

Washington should encourage such moves, Olson argues, to free itself for a wider leadership role in the world. The danger of a united, independent Western Europe, he concedes, is that it might become a stronger commercial rival, neutral in the East-West contest, or, far worse, an ally of Moscow. But Olson says that gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from Western Europe “would probably concentrate the European mind.” By removing Europe from Soviet-American contention,
he adds, such a shift might also ease East-West tensions generally. Encouraging European unity would be risky, but it is a better alternative, Olson argues, than tripping over the "rock of Europe."

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**ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS**

**Third World Debt: A Mixed Bag**


The prospect of defaults by heavily indebted international borrowers such as Mexico and Argentina has raised fears that the entire Third World is on the brink of financial collapse. Actually, most overseas debtors improved their financial positions during 1982.

According to Gasser and Roberts, both economists at the New York Federal Reserve Bank, the total current accounts (trade in goods and services plus interest payments) deficit for developing countries outside of OPEC narrowed from $85 billion in 1981 to some $75 billion last year. Manufacturing countries such as Brazil, Singapore, and South Korea, which account for about half of the estimated $640 billion in loans outstanding during 1982, fared the best. But Mexico, Peru, Egypt, and other non-OPEC oil exporters, owing about one-third of the debt, are only now getting their deficits under control.

Much of the improvement came from reduced imports. Declining oil prices hurt the 12 non-OPEC petroleum exporters, but helped other Third World countries stabilize their annual oil costs at a total of some $70 billion. While debt service payments rose from $20 billion in 1978 to $66 billion in 1982, falling interest rates eased the burden, and should keep such payments at $66 billion in 1983. Exports, up three percent last year, would be helped by even a mild international economic recovery, especially if prices for minerals, cash crops, and other commodities rise from their current 25-year low.

Overall, Third World countries reduced their trade deficits from 21 percent of exports in 1981 to about 17 percent in 1982, far below the 25 percent record set in 1975. Yet, a few commodity-exporting countries—Colombia, Chile, the Philippines—are in far worse shape.

Third World debtors do face some serious problems. Nearly 25 percent of their loans are short term; they hold only enough cash reserves to cover 17 percent of their imports, down from 27 percent in 1978. And increasingly cautious international banks cut new loans to the developing countries from $45 billion in 1981 to $25–35 billion in 1982. If the banks cut back further, the authors warn, even some basically solvent countries could face cash squeezes. To avert a liquidity crisis, they urge new cooperative efforts by the debtor nations, the banks, and the international economic community.
PERIODICALS

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

Who Creates New Jobs?

Record unemployment has made creating new private sector jobs a top priority of Washington policy-makers. According to Greene, a U.S. State Department economist, focusing on the role of Big Business would be ill-advised. Recent studies show that small firms create the overwhelming majority of new jobs.

In a landmark 1979 study of 5.6 million businesses between 1969 and 1976, Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist David Birch found that two-thirds of all net new jobs were created by firms with fewer than 20 employees; 80 percent were generated by businesses less than four years old. Indeed, other research shows a net gain during the last decade of three million new jobs by small businesses, while the top 1,000 U.S. firms posted virtually no net increase in employment.

Birch also found that about 50 percent of all jobs were lost every year through bankruptcy, contraction, and other factors. “Boom towns” such as Houston both lose old jobs and generate new ones at a faster pace. Plant relocations, while much publicized, account for only about .1 percent of all job losses and gains.

The birth of new firms accounted for slightly more new jobs than did expansion by existing companies. In 1976, subsidiaries and branch offices opened by larger parent corporations accounted for 70 percent of the new jobs created by such births, but independent firms with no branches created the majority of new jobs resulting from expansion.

Until recently, Greene says, questions about the data Birch used cast doubt on his conclusions. But 1981 studies by Michael B. Teitz of the University of California, and by Catherine Armington and Marjorie Odle of the Brookings Institution confirm much of Birch’s work: The process of job creation is turbulent, dominated by smaller firms.

Such a diffuse market, involving thousands of local enterprises, is hard for Washington policy-makers to influence. But at least they know that the corporate behemoths, despite their financial prominence, play a relatively small role in the nation’s employment growth.

The Glitter of Gold

Advocates of a gold standard for the U.S. dollar tout it as the only way to end inflation and ensure stable long-term economic growth. But according to Cooper, a Harvard economist, history shows that the gold standard has never produced such happy results.

“The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1983
The gold standard has not been a major U.S. campaign issue since Republican William McKinley defeated Democrat William Jennings Bryan in the 1896 presidential election.

Gold served as the international money standard only from the 1870s to 1914; the United States maintained de facto gold backing for the dollar from 1879 to 1933. It did record one success, says Cooper: International exchange rates remained stable among those nations on the standard. But its domestic successes were few.

In theory, a gold standard keeps prices from rising and encourages economic growth by guaranteeing that a dollar will always be worth the same amount of gold. Indeed, the wholesale price index in the United States rose by an average of only .1 percent annually between 1879 and 1913. But the average conceals wide swings, says Cooper. During that 34-year period, wholesale prices fluctuated more sharply than they did between 1949 and 1979, and growth in U.S. per capita gross national product fell short of the 2.1 percent achieved between 1950 and 1980. Real short-term interest rates varied widely also, from 11.5 percent in the early 1890s to -2.3 percent at the end of the decade.

In part, such fluctuations were the result of changes in gold output, which spurred changes in the money supply. In 1895, the gold stock held by the world’s monetary authorities was twice what it had been in 1859, but by 1914, only 19 years later, it had doubled again.

Some economists estimate that a 2.5 to three percent annual growth in the gold stock is required for stability: More yields inflation; less leads to deflation. During the 1970s, Cooper notes, world gold production dropped; “monetary” gold stocks fell by four percent.

Restoring the gold standard now would also require fixing an arbitrary price for gold. At today’s official price of $42.22 per ounce, Washington’s gold holdings amount to only $11.1 billion, not nearly enough to back the U.S. currency in circulation. A price high enough to back all outstanding dollars would also be far above today’s market prices for
gold. Private gold-owners would sell their holdings, forcing the Federal Reserve to issue more paper money. The result: inflation.

Moreover, Cooper argues, by fixing the price of gold arbitrarily, Washington would undermine the faith in its unchanging value. The public might regard the gold standard as "a fair weather vessel, likely to capsize and be abandoned in the first serious storm."

**Learning from West Germany**


Cultural differences make it difficult to apply the lessons of Japanese industry in the United States. But according to Limprecht and Hayes, respectively a U.S. Foreign Service officer and a Harvard professor of business, West Germany is similar enough to offer useful models for U.S. managers.

Industries in the two countries face major problems. A doubling of real wages during the 1970s to an average of $16,000 made West German workers among the world's highest paid. Yet the 12 percent factory absenteeism rate is the world's second highest, only behind Sweden's. Moreover, German factories must import many raw materials; they must find overseas markets for 50 percent of their business, versus only 10 percent for U.S. firms.

The West German reputation for quality goods, the authors argue, is the result not of German cultural traits but of a deliberate strategy: The West Germans stress technical competence. Students are introduced to the sciences early, studying physics in fifth grade, and those not bound for college enter three-year company-run apprenticeship programs at age 16. Some 350,000 companies offer such programs; half of all 16-year-olds enroll annually. Experienced workers, not recent MBA graduates, are given shop-floor supervisory positions.

Indeed, there are no graduate business schools in West Germany; managers hold degrees in engineering and other technical fields. This nuts-and-bolts orientation, along with infrequent transfers (once every seven or eight years versus once every two or three for U.S. executives) ensures that managers stay in touch with workers on the shop floor. Such communication is a hallmark of the West German style. By law, all major corporate decisions must be ratified by worker councils.

West German management is distinguished by other traits. It tends, for example, to emphasize long-term planning over short-term performance. Indeed, corporate financial statements often obscure quarterly results. West German industry also leans heavily on incremental technological changes, while, "as the [U.S.] auto, steel, and machine-tool industries grimly attest," the authors say, top American managers slight such improvements and seek technological breakthroughs.

Although U.S. executives are widely admired for their financial and marketing acumen, Limprecht and Hayes note, they are often bested...
overseas because their competitors offer better products and customer service. Such attention to basics, they conclude, is not "so indelibly 'German' that Americans can't learn from it."

**SOCIETY**

**The Other Social Security Crisis**


Washington today is struggling to resolve a Social Security financial crisis that could plunge the system into bankruptcy by 1984. Yet Peterson, chairman of Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, argues that a far more ominous long-term crisis has gone unrecognized.

Many specialists assume that payroll tax increases scheduled to take effect between now and 1990 and increased revenues as "baby-boom" workers reach their peak earning years will guarantee the system's long-term stability. But Peterson argues that their estimates of future economic growth, productivity increases, and unemployment are too optimistic. The projected 1985 Social Security deficit of $30 billion pales beside the pessimists' prediction of a $16.3 trillion annual deficit by 2035. Closing that gap would require raising Social Security taxes to 44 percent of every U.S. worker's taxable income.

Social Security itself is a key source of the economic problems that threaten it, Peterson contends. Since 1949, payroll taxes have jumped by 3,960 percent, accounting for the entire increase in Washington's share of the U.S. gross national product since 1955. At $190 billion in 1982, Social Security consumed 26 percent of the federal budget.

The system today provides far more generous benefits than were originally intended. When it was created during the 1930s, life spans were shorter, the elderly comprised only 5.5 percent of the U.S. population (versus 12 percent today), and other sources of support were slim. Yet increases in benefits and life spans, as well as other factors, mean that the average worker who retired at age 65 in 1982 will collect some $520,000 during his remaining years. His total payroll tax contribution: $7,209. Generous benefits have encouraged the elderly to retire rather than to keep working: In 1950, nearly half those over age 65 were working; by 1980, only 19 percent.

Moreover, notes Peterson, the notion that many of the elderly are poor is mistaken. Indeed, two-thirds of the elderly own their own homes "free and clear."

Peterson contends that serious Social Security reform would not produce the political backlash that Washington fears. Among his propos-
als: raising the retirement age to age 68, reducing cost-of-living adjustments, and taxing the benefits of wealthier retirees.

Contraception by Corset

The sudden drop in birth rates in most Western countries during the 1870s is often attributed by scholars to the economic woes of the era. Parents kept families small to preserve their standard of living. At the same time, according to Davies, a University of Western Australia historian, the fad for corsets among middle-class Victorian women served as an "unconscious mode of birth control."

The fashion was born in the 1830s, when the invention of metal eyelets made extreme "tightlacing" possible. By the 1860s, wasplike figures had become a feminine ideal. In Britain, corset sales may have reached 12 million annually during that decade; women's waistlines shrank from a normal 25 to 28 inches to between 17 and 21 inches. Middle-class Victorian women, even expectant mothers, endured tight-laced corsets for 14 hours or more daily. Corseted women complained of ills ranging from constipation and backaches to anemia and apoplexy. One critic called tightlacing a "murderous practice." But the most damaging effect, says Davies, was the displacement of internal organs. The uterus could be pressed down on the cervix, making intercourse painful and thus reducing its frequency.

According to Davies, this may explain "the allegation of frigidity and lack of libido among middle-class Victorian women." Tightlacing also contributed to malnutrition (thus interrupting menstruation) by putting pressure on the stomach. It led to spontaneous abortion and miscarriages. These factors helped push fertility rates for middle-class British women down from only 11 percent below the mean during the 1850s to 26 percent below during the early 1890s. Working-class women, who did not take to the fashion, enjoyed higher fertility.


A typical corset, as advertised in 1898. Some corsets were steel reinforced.
Why did Victorian women endure the tortures of tightlacing? Historian Bernard Rudofsky contends that respectability was one reason: "An unlaced waist was regarded as a vessel of sin." Davies suggests that tightlacing was a sign of status analogous to the Chinese practice of footbinding, "which incapacitated the female and thereby attested to the . . . ability of the husband to maintain her idleness."

Tightlacing began to die out during the 1890s, as middle-class fashion began to stress the importance of exercise and recreation. By then, Davies notes, smaller families had become the norm, and couples turned to contraception and other means to limit family size.

Zoning Enterprise


Conservatives have long favored the creation of inner-city "enterprise zones" to attract businesses and reduce hard-core unemployment. But Banfield, a Harvard political scientist, contends that the idea suffers from some of the same flaws as Great Society efforts at social uplift.

Under a plan proposed by President Reagan in March 1982, Washington would grant companies in 75 slum neighborhoods special tax credits; state and local governments would be expected to ease regulations within the zones and to provide other incentives. So far, however, Congress has not passed the legislation.

Even if the proposal were adopted, Banfield argues, it would founder on reality. Few of the hard-core unemployed, he says, really want the kinds of jobs that would be created. In a 1968 experiment, for example, the IBM Corporation established a small factory in Brooklyn's blighted Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood, aiming specifically to provide jobs for 400 chronically unemployed black men. Despite high wages, job training, an all-black environment, and special dispensations—foremen went to workers' homes to fetch them from bed if they were late for work—IBM was forced to abandon its original goals after one year and began hiring other kinds of workers.

The problem, in Banfield's view: "If he must pay for [job opportunities] by accepting the discipline of a well-run workplace—if he must work whether he feels like it or not, learn new skills, take responsibility, and so on—a worker who is accustomed to the [underclass] style of life . . . may not accept opportunities of the kind that IBM presents." As for the upwardly mobile, he adds, it would be better to encourage them to leave the ghettos than to offer false promises.

Shoe-string enterprises that offer low wages and substandard working conditions but demand little discipline are the only firms that can profitably employ workers from the underclass. Once common in the big cities, such businesses have been driven out by government regulation of workplace health and safety, wages, and other conditions. The proposal now before Congress does not eliminate these barriers.

Compassion, Banfield concludes, is the quality most responsible for
the failure of U.S. antipoverty efforts. "Goodness," he says, "admirable as it is in private affairs, may be disastrous in public ones. What is required . . . is not goodness but virtue [which] often necessitates actions that are harsh or even cruel."

**Cars and Snobs**  
**In Detroit, 1910**


In the 1980s, the U.S. auto industry's woes appear to be strictly a matter of markets, competition, and interest rates. According to Davis, a University of Ottawa historian, the first upheaval in Detroit was caused not by economics but by the snobbery of some auto-makers.

Spurred by the success of Samuel Smith's Olds Motor Works, which paid annual dividends of 105 percent between 1899 and 1903, Detroit's "establishment" families invested heavily in the fledgling auto industry. By 1905, the companies they owned—Olds, Packard, Cadillac—were building 12,000 cars annually, half of Detroit's output.

But the auto market changed drastically after Henry Ford, scorned by Detroit's old guard, set up his own company in 1903; he was determined to build "a motor car for the multitude." By 1907, Ford was Detroit's leading producer. Within three years, Detroit's old-line families had dumped most of their holdings and owned less than three percent of the industry.

What happened? Davis argues that snobbery blinded the older companies. Cars had become America's ultimate status symbols, and the old-line auto-makers insisted on producing only luxury models, "particularly as the product carried the family name into every neighborhood and country club in the nation," Davis says.

Indeed, he notes, "In choosing a price class auto manufacturers almost invariably elected to serve their social peers." The directors and top executives of firms like Packard and Cadillac were mostly college-educated sons of successful businessmen and professionals. But "lower class" companies that mass-marketed cheap autos, such as Ford and Dodge, were led by a different breed. Twenty-two percent of their top executives were sons of workingmen, 24 percent were foreign-born, and only 25 percent had attended college. General Motors and Maxwell (later Chrysler) were exceptions: Owned by many far-flung stockholders rather than a few families, they were run by impersonal bureaucracies and thus, Davis says, manufactured cars in every price range.

In the end, the old families were doomed by their own parochialism. They lost their last strongholds in Detroit, the banks, when the Big Three automakers refused to bail them out during the 1930s. Thereafter, Detroit became a "satellite" of Wall Street, Grosse Pointe auto executives, and other outsiders.
Defense issues, because of their great complexity, are among the most difficult for the media to cover. But even the best newspaper and television treatments of such topics reveal serious flaws, argues Shapley, Washington editor of *Nature* magazine.

Thus, CBS News's widely publicized five-part series on "The Defense of the United States," aired in June 1981, suffered from TV newsmen's need to "find film"—graphic illustrations of particular points. "At its best," Shapley observes, "television can certainly take the viewer along to witness meaningful events." But it is not very good at conveying ideas. Thus, CBS paid $90,000 for a dramatic simulation of a nuclear attack on Omaha, Nebraska. Yet, a segment on the ineptness of U.S. troops on a mock nuclear battlefield in Western Europe left its point unclear: Were the soldiers incompetent? Is Army doctrine faulty?

One episode, "The Russians," explained the issues "with admirable clarity," Shapley says. But ironically, CBS was forced to rely on interviews with U.S. specialists—"dead television"—to most newscasters.

Newspapers face their own limitations. In 1977, for example, *Washington Post* reporter Walter Pincus discovered the U.S. Army's request for funding of the neutron bomb in an obscure line item of the budget. Pincus's coverage was "a journalistic success," Shapley notes, but important questions were ignored in the ensuing brouhaha.

At first, journalists focused on the weapon itself—a *Post* headline dubbed it a "Killer Warhead." Then attention shifted to whether President Carter would approve production. (He did not.) At first, nobody asked what the leaders of Western Europe, where the weapon was to be deployed, thought. And the press overlooked a basic question: whether any nuclear weapons ought to be deployed in Western Europe.

Shapley argues that journalists must overcome their "professional rigidities"—television's need for good "visuals" and newspapers' preoccupation with immediate issues. Given these media proclivities, she concludes, "Much is achieved, but much cannot be attempted."

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**Rating the News**

**From Lebanon**

Critics of U.S. press and TV coverage of Israel's June 1982 invasion of Lebanon have described it as hostile to the Jewish state and, in the words of the *New Republic*'s Martin Peretz, often "simply not true." But
Morris, a freelance writer, argues otherwise.

Examining nearly three months of coverage by the three major television networks, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and other leading newspapers, Morris argues that journalists reported “for the most part fairly and accurately and sometimes brilliantly.”

While critics argue that the U.S. media credited exaggerated estimates of civilian losses from dubious sources, Morris says his own careful examination of the record shows this to be untrue. NBC reported on June 6 that civilian casualties were “unknown”; CBS’s June 7 broadcast said only that “casualty lists climbed.” In the few cases where a network or newspaper did cite inflated figures, Morris contends, they were qualified or quickly corrected. In one widely criticized story, for example, Post reporter David B. Ottaway did cite high estimates of the casualties, but stressed that they “seem guesswork at best.”

Complaints that the news media ignored the complex history of Lebanon’s internal divisions and the favorable reaction of many Lebanese to the Israelis’ arrival are also dismissed by Morris. Between late May and July, the Times and the Post alone published some 20 stories on such issues, with nearly the same number appearing on television.

The two newspapers did print sharp op-ed page attacks on the Israeli invasion by such columnists as Anthony Lewis and Mary McGrory. But these were offset, according to Morris, by the columns of William F. Buckley, Jr., William Safire, and Evans and Novak. In their own editorials, the papers accepted the invasion as a “tragic inevitability” (Post) and part of a “tragic spiral” (Times). On television, NBC’s John Chancellor’s remarks in early August about “imperial Israel” spurred loud protests. But Chancellor’s views were balanced, Morris says, by two earlier news reports on the views of Israeli soldiers.

American journalists in Lebanon came under criticism, in part because they refused to settle for the bulletins provided by Israeli authorities—a legacy of their experience with U.S. officialdom in Vietnam. And as the Israeli bombardment of Beirut continued, they developed a sympathy for the civilian victims whose risks they shared. Morris believes such influences improved the reporting. Indeed, he argues, given the circumstances, “readers and viewers could have asked for little more.”

Roman Catholic bishops in several Western countries, including the United States, are edging towards declaring even the possession of nuclear weapons for deterrence immoral. But Bär, auxiliary bishop of Rotterdam, argues that they would exceed their authority and contra-

“Christianity and Deterrence” by R. P. Bär, in the Atlantic Community Quarterly (Fall 1982), 1616 H St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.
vene long-standing Catholic thinking on the subject.

"In the case of nuclear armaments," he notes, "it is very difficult to find cogent arguments in support of any single viewpoint in the Holy Scriptures." No statements by the bishops would be binding on individual Catholics. And while the Vatican could make such a pronouncement, it has avoided doing so.

One reason, says Bär, is that "although the word of God has implications for Christians in their political activities, [the Church] stands above, and in fact outside, politics." While the Vatican has stressed its desire for peace, it has addressed "all regimes without exception, thus avoiding any encouragement of unilateral initiatives." The "Christian peace movements," Bär contends, have plainly political objectives that would, in effect, require unilateral Western disarmament.

Their position is based on an appeal to conscience. But in traditional Christian thought, conscience is not merely emotional conviction, says Bär, but "the ability to understand the general rules on good and evil and to assess one's own deeds on the basis of this understanding." Conscience, the 1962–65 Vatican Council II declared, "frequently errs from invincible ignorance."

Indeed, Bär accuses the antinuclear activists of sinking into a "Utopian reverie." The church is not pacifist because it recognizes that it must exist in the real world; man was expelled from Paradise. It has "always known that an absolute 'no' to armaments and warfare is impossible, because right must be defended and oppression combated."

**Why Calvin Courted Women**


During the last 22 years of his life, Protestant religious reformer John Calvin (1509–64) did most of his proselytizing through letters from his home in Geneva. According to Blaisdell, a Northeastern University historian, his correspondence shows that he was as eager to convert women as he was to win over men.

Protestantism was as much a political as a religious movement. Calvin realized that success depended on gaining the support of western Europe's powerful nobility. And aristocratic women frequently took the lead in championing new causes. Calvin courted some of the most important women in 16th-century France, such as Renée de France, daughter of Louis XII.

The chief theme of Calvin's letters is to "take a firm stand and serve God." For many women, unequivocal support for Calvinism was dangerous. They feared not only official persecution but the wrath of Roman Catholic husbands. Yet Calvin did not offer them the solace and
John Calvin's theological teachings were most influential in 16th-century Holland, Germany, Scotland, and France.

advice they could have expected from a Catholic confessor. He "seems to have reserved no more sympathy for women than for men," Blaisdell says, and virtually ignored their special concerns.

Calvin held many orthodox 16th-century beliefs about the inferiority of women, but his letters show that he regarded them as the equal of men in spiritual matters. In one, he noted that it was a woman who brought the news of the Resurrection to the Apostles, who at first refused to believe her. Nor did women's "weakness" excuse them from religious responsibility in Calvin's eyes. When Jesuit priests persuaded Renée de France not to join Calvin's cause, he announced that "the devil himself could celebrate his triumph."

It was common for ambitious men of the time like Calvin to seek help from women in high places, Blaisdell notes, suggesting that in those days, "class differences were more significant than sex differences."

Is the Fetus a Patient?


Technological innovations during the 1970s make it possible today for surgeons to operate on fetuses in and outside the womb. They also raise potential ethical problems for physicians, parents, and society.
Surgeons in at least six U.S. hospitals can now perform nine different operations on fetuses, from repairing lesions to correcting nutritional problems. In one case, a fetus was removed from the uterus, treated for a urinary tract obstruction, and returned to its mother's womb.

"The fetus now begins to make serious claims for a right to nutrition, to protection, to therapy," Catholic theologian Richard McCormick argued in 1982. "How can tolerance of abortion be morally reconciled with those claims?" But according to Ruddick and Wilcox, both New York University philosophers, the new procedures will make little difference in the debate over abortion. "Liberals" are unlikely to change their views, since they already favor permitting abortions of healthy fetuses; "conservatives" have always believed that fetuses have a right to life regardless of their condition.

But for "moderates" and physicians, who seek a balance between the rights of the mother and of the fetus, the moral questions do become stickier. To a "moderate," the authors say, "abortion is justifiable to prevent the birth of a severely defective child." But should a mother be required to submit to surgery if her fetus has a treatable ailment? Is abortion justified if she refuses? For their part, the authors dismiss such worries, arguing that since fathers are not required to donate blood, bone marrow, or kidneys to spare their children suffering, women should not be required to undergo surgery.

The dilemma for doctors is similar: Who is the patient, the mother or the fetus? To avoid this conflict, the authors propose using "therapeutic contracts." A "gynecological" contract would leave all decisions to the woman; the "pediatric" would make the interests of the fetus paramount; the "obstetrical" would seek a balance between the two. Allowing "pediatric" contracts suggests that the fetus is a patient, and thus a person. But citing patients in extremis who are "brain dead," Ruddick and Wilcox argue that all patients are not necessarily persons.

They conclude that the possibility of fetal therapy will not create a moral bind for physicians. Such procedures are essentially gynecological, they argue, and the mother remains the principal decision-maker.

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"The Ice Planet" by Derral Mulholland, in Discovering Science 82 (Dec. 1982), P.O. Box 10790, Des Moines, Iowa 50340.

After Pluto, the sun's ninth planet, was discovered only 53 years ago, scientists set to work estimating its size, mass, and composition. Yet all of their best guesses about the planet have been disproved by recent research, writes Mulholland, a University of Texas astronomer.

Four billion miles from the sun, Pluto is barely visible even with powerful telescopes. It was discovered in 1930 by a 22-year-old amateur.
astronomer named Clyde Tombaugh, who was hired by Percival Lowell, a wealthy Bostonian, to carry out the search.

A 1950 estimate by the Palomar Observatory's Gerard Kuiper put Pluto's diameter at 3,800 miles, about half that of the Earth. A 1965 experiment that measured the time Pluto took to cross a star of known size narrowed the estimate to a maximum of 3,600 miles. When another "occultation" took place on Easter Sunday 1980, a new measurement technique allowed astronomers to fix the diameter at 2,500 miles—barely larger than Earth's moon.

It took nearly as long to discover Pluto's mass. Early estimates had put its weight at 6.6 times that of Earth; by 1955, Pluto had shrunk to roughly Earth's size. Astronomers believed that it was composed mostly of rock and iron, like Earth. Finally, in June 1978, James Christy of Washington's U.S. Naval Observatory discovered that Pluto had a moon, which he named Charon. Since the period of a moon is governed by its "parent" planet's mass, it was possible to calculate Pluto's weight—0.0024 that of Earth.

Putting information about the planet's diameter and mass together, astronomers determined that Pluto's density is only 35 pounds per cubic foot, making it the lightest planet in the solar system. A 1978 spectroscopy experiment revealed that Pluto is composed partly of frozen methane, possibly mixed with some rock and ice. Its dark side probably has no atmosphere; the sunny side's atmosphere contains methane gas and, probably, argon, oxygen, carbon dioxide, or nitrogen. When Charon crosses between Pluto and the sun two years from now, it will cause parts of the planet's atmosphere to freeze. By observing how quickly its gases turn to frost, astronomers will be able to pinpoint their identities.

Paring Pluto down to size has raised an intriguing question. Back at the turn of the century, scientists first hypothesized the planet's existence when they noticed that some unknown celestial body caused nearby Uranus and Neptune to wobble slightly. But Pluto is too small to produce such effects. That means there is probably a 10th planet yet to be found on the fringes of the solar system.

Sleeping by night and working by day are not merely habits, but rhythms dictated by internal human "clocks." According to Moore-Ede, a Harvard physiologist, understanding these regulators is particularly important now that one-fifth of the U.S. labor force works on night shifts.

Two "pacemakers" located within the brain appear to govern human sleep and wakefulness. Each functions on about a 25-hour cycle,
modified by environmental cues, such as darkness or work schedules. The crucial "X" pacemaker, so named because its precise location is unknown, regulates body temperature and other patterns. The "super-chiasmatic" pacemaker consolidates sleep into a single extended period. Sleep normally begins when body temperature is falling; a "warm up" period rouses the sleeper; temperature peaks in late afternoon. How long an individual will slumber is determined by how close he is to the automatic "warm up": A San Diego boy who set a 264-hour record for staying awake in 1966 afterwards slept only 14 hours before his rising temperature woke him.

While temperature cycles vary little, other circadian (24-hour) rhythms can change. People confined to windowless rooms for long periods often experience "internal desynchronization"—hormone levels and mental alertness begin to vary independently of the body's temperature cycle.

Internal clocks can be adjusted, says Moore-Ede, but there are limits to human adaptability. Workers with frequent shift changes perform poorly because of desynchronization. Indeed, mice and insects whose day-night cycle is shifted weekly suffer from 5 to 20 percent reductions in life span.

Desynchronization is particularly worrisome among people providing round-the-clock services—policemen, firemen, hospital personnel. Yet few work schedules take account of natural rhythms, Moore-Ede claims. Enlisted men in the U.S. Navy's nuclear submarine fleet, for example, exist on an artificial 18-hour day, six hours on duty, 12 hours off.

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A clock based on Swedish scientist Carolus Linnaeus's (1707–78) discovery that plants have their own internal "clocks." Different plant species open and close their flowers at certain times of day.

...as devised in 1753 by Linnaeus, "so that even in overcast weather, out in an open field, a person would be able to tell the time as precisely as if he had a clock with him."
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

Adhering to the 24-hour day, to infrequent shift changes, and to rotations only from earlier to later shifts to ease the body clocks’ adjustment, Moore-Ede concludes, would not only improve the quality of workers’ lives, but increase safety and efficiency as well.

Computers That Think Better


During the 1960s, “smart” computers that could defeat humans in chess matches caused a short-lived sensation, but failed to meet the higher expectations of their admirers. Today, however, artificial intelligence (AI) is making a comeback.

The first smart computers suffered from exaggerated claims, a high failure rate, and unwieldy size. But all this has changed, thanks to the semiconductor revolution and other technological advances, writes Kinnucan, a High Technology senior editor.

The keys to AI technology are “heuristic” computer programs that use knowledge to find short-cut solutions to problems. Conventional programs, by contrast, analyze data by following a rigid series of predetermined steps. The procedure is not only slow, but unworkable when answers are not clear cut.

Most AI systems rely on “expert” programs using “rules” of logic drawn up by human specialists. One 500-rule system developed at Stanford University diagnoses blood diseases; Cognitive Systems, Inc., is working on a program that will prepare income tax returns and interpret IRS regulations. Such systems perform long, complex tasks at which humans often err. Still other AI computers employ “fuzzy thinking,” i.e., reasoning on the basis of uncertain or partial information and ranking answers according to the computer’s “confidence” in them. One such system has already been used to help locate a several-million-dollar molybdenum lode in Canada. On the drawing boards are artificial vision systems for automated inspection robots and systems that will respond to verbal orders.

So far, home computers lack the speed and memory capacity to handle AI software, but specialists believe that the next computer generation will put expert legal, financial, and medical advice at consumers’ fingertips. Prices of AI systems have already dropped from millions of dollars a few years ago to an average of $50,000 today, and the size of the systems has shrunk accordingly.

AI technology is still in its infancy. Although the United States now dominates the field, Japan recently embarked on a $450 million effort to produce a 20,000-rule system. Meanwhile, computer scientists are working to eliminate one of the “expert” systems’ chief drawbacks—human error. “Deep knowledge” computers will be programmed not with rules, but with the theories, scientific models, and other information used in making rules.
Electricity from Salt Water?

In 1902, the Russian scientist A. von Kaleczinsky was surprised to find subsurface temperatures of over 185°F in Lake Medve, Transylvania (now part of Rumania). Today, researchers are capitalizing on his discovery to provide low-cost energy and heat in remote areas.

Salt water is the key to Lake Medve's warmth: Such "solar ponds" contain layers of water with different concentrations of salt, with saltier, heavier water nearer the bottom. The ponds are shallow, allowing the sun to warm the bottom layers, but the water there is too heavy to rise to the surface and cool. Solar heat is thus trapped and stored.

According to Edesess, an executive at Flow Industries, Inc., Israeli scientists built the first experimental solar pond in 1960. To extract heat for warming buildings, hot brine is simply passed through heat exchangers; to generate electricity, the brine is used to evaporate a liquid with a low boiling point and the steam drives a turbine. In 1979, the Israelis constructed a pond the size of five football fields—7,000 square meters—at Ein Bokek, near the Dead Sea. Its peak output is 150 kilowatts, enough electricity to power a large office building. By the turn of the century, the Israelis plan to build a huge complex in the Dead Sea, itself a big salt water pond, that would nearly double the nation's present total electricity output.

Today, however, generating electricity from solar ponds is practical chiefly in isolated communities requiring little power—Australia's Outback, remote tropical islands. The ponds can capture up to 20 percent of the solar energy striking their surface—half as efficient as conventional solar flat-plate collectors, but one-tenth as costly to build. But there are problems. Natural salt water ponds are rare; artificial ponds have high price tags. High maintenance costs, large space requirements for artificial ponds, and heat loss through the pond bottoms are also troublesome.

But salt water ponds could economically supply direct heating. A 2,000-square-meter pond, for example, heats the municipal swimming pool in Miamisburg, Ohio. Greenhouses, barns, and homes in the U.S. southwest are other candidates for such systems.

Research on solar pond technology was sporadic before 1974 when the cost of competing energy sources was low, Edesess notes. Although scientists in the United States, India, Israel, and Turkey have since started new demonstration projects, it will take another big jump in oil and gas prices to make solar ponds financially feasible.
RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

A Pall Over the Parks


The sizable energy and mineral resources of federal parklands make tempting targets for developers. But Rudzitis and Schwartz, geographer and graduate student, respectively, at the University of Texas, warn that if development proceeds, as urged by the Reagan administration, the resulting air pollution alone would hasten the already serious deterioration of the parks' beauty.

Public lands account for 34 percent of U.S. surface area. Under the surface may be up to 37 percent of the nation's potential oil resources, 43 percent of its potential natural gas, and 80 percent of its recoverable oil shale reserves. Although one-third of all federally owned land is available for development, only 12.5 percent had been leased out by 1980, accounting for about seven percent of U.S. oil and gas output.

The parks are already suffering. The number of park visitors, most of them arriving by auto, rose 75 percent during the 1970s, to 295 million a year. New factories and power plants have been built closer to park borders. A 1979 National Park Service survey of the 63 largest parks showed that more than 45 percent were experiencing deteriorating air quality and 60 percent faced threats to their scenic beauty. In the 'Golden Circle' of National Parks—including the Grand Canyon—in Nevada, Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona, average visibility has dropped from 60 miles to 40 since 1974.

Congress extended special protection to large national parks under the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, barring any nearby industrial project that might seriously erode air quality within their borders. But because of political opposition and the technical difficulties of setting standards, the law has not been fully implemented.

The only other way to protect the parklands, the authors contend, is by buying up costly "buffer zones" of 60 to 125 miles around them. Yet Interior Secretary James Watt cut an annual $200 million land acquisition appropriation from his budget in 1981. He called instead for upgrading existing holdings. That, the authors say, will be hard to do while Washington is also opening more federal lands to developers.

A Water Crisis in the Future?


While the energy crisis occupied center stage during most of the 1970s, other U.S. natural resources received scant attention. According to
RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

these nine Cornell specialists, state and federal policy-makers will soon have to make hard decisions about how fresh water is to be allocated in the United States.

While an individual drinks only 1.8 to 2.7 quarts of water per day, industry and agriculture boost daily U.S. water use to 1,900 gallons per capita. About 62 percent of fresh water used each day comes from reservoirs and other surface sources, 20 percent is pumped from underground, and the rest is desalinated. About 77 percent of the water withdrawn is eventually recycled; the other 79 billion gallons per day are “consumed.” Of that amount, only some 63 billion gallons are replenished by rainfall, the authors estimate, leaving a 16 billion gallon per day “deficit.”

Industry’s demand for water is high—manufacturing a single glass bottle requires up to 660 gallons—but it returns most of what it uses. Farm irrigation accounts for 83 percent of the water consumed, most of it lost through seepage or evaporation. Seventeen western states account for 93 percent of the irrigation water used. Because surface water is scarce in these states, they rely heavily on underground water, which is naturally replenished at a rate of less than one percent annually. The continental United States now pumps 25 percent more water from underground than can be replaced.

Water shortages in the west could grow far more acute by the end of the century. Farm production is expected to grow by 30 percent, agriculture’s water consumption by 17 percent. And if large-scale synthetic fuel production, a heavy water user, begins soon, total U.S. consumption could increase by up to 64 percent. Moreover, western farmers (and farm products) would suffer in the battle for scarce water: $1 of water yields $5 of corn, but $250 of synthetic fuel.

Fresh water can no longer be taken for granted, the authors warn. A national water policy is needed before the taps in the west run dry.

ARTS & LETTERS

Portraying the Handicapped

"Pity and Fear: Images of the Disabled in Literature and the Popular Arts" by Leslie A. Fiedler, in Salmagundi (Summer 1982), Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, N.Y. 12866.

A spate of popular plays and movies, such as Broadway’s The Elephant Man and Hollywood’s Coming Home, has put the handicapped in the spotlight. The effect, says Fiedler, a literary critic at the State University of New York at Buffalo, has not been entirely beneficial.

Up to the time of Shakespeare, the disabled were the butt of jokes. In Greek mythology, the god Haiphaistos, lame and a cuckold, was an object of ridicule on Mount Olympus. In Richard III, however, Shake-
Shakespeare made the king's hunchback frightening, not funny, an outward sign of inner evil.

It was not until the 19th century that the handicapped regularly appeared in literature as major characters. At one extreme were the "twisted avatars of villainy": Quilp, the horrible dwarf who stalks Little Nell through Dickens's *The Old Curiosity Shop*, Captain Ahab in Melville's *Moby Dick*, Long John Silver in Stevenson's *Treasure Island*. At the other extreme were such idealized objects of pity as Tiny Tim in Dickens's *A Christmas Carol*.

Such characters evoke in audiences both fear and its companion, pity—and force them to confront their complex feelings about "subhuman" beings. The evil cripples of the 19th century have their counterparts in today's horror movies, notably in Goldfinger and other sinister folk in the James Bond movies who use their artificial limbs as instruments of mutilation and murder. But the modern-day Tiny Tims, Fiedler says, are the "super-beautiful super-jocks and jockesses" seen in such television dramas as *The Other Side of the Mountain* and *Ice Castles*. Such superhuman characters "turn upside down" the "sense of inimitable difference which lies at the root of our troubled response to the disabled," evading the issue altogether.

In an ideal world, the arts would represent the disabled not as "some absolute, unendurable other," but simply as one pole in the spectrum of human variety. Meanwhile, Fiedler concludes, "we will have to exorcise our ambivalences toward the afflicted . . . by turning not to ersatz paeans to the heroism of the crippled, but to [the] disturbing mythic literature" of the past, which forces us to recognize our range of negative emotions.

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**The Fop’s Role in Society**

"A Few Kind Words for the Fop" by Susan Staves, in *Studies in English Literature 1500–1900* (Summer 1982), Rice University, P.O. Box 1892, Houston, Tex. 77251.

To today's theater-goers, the fops (or dandies) who appear in 17th- and 18th-century English comedies seem absurd. Yet Staves, a Brandeis literary historian, argues that fops were "early champions of new values," whose roles reflected changing attitudes about masculinity.

The typical fop—Sir Fopling Flutter in George Etherege's *Man of Mode* (1676), Sir Novelty Fashion in Colley Cibber's *Love's Last Shift* (1696)—was obsessed by fashion in clothes and manners. He refused to "kill, brawl, curse, consort with lewd women, or get stinking drunk," says Staves. Stage fops were effeminate and likely to faint at the prospect of violence, but they were not homosexuals.

The dandy was not just a theatrical character. Real-life fops paraded daily on the streets of London. Actors and playwrights took pains to keep their characters in tune with the latest fashions. Critics chided the stage dandies for failing to capture such details of the fop's life as the
Colley Cibber (1671–1757), a London playwright who played fop roles on stage, was also a fop in real life.

correct way to take snuff.

At first, fops were objects of disdain. An essayist in The Gentleman's Magazine asked whether "any thing that is Noble or Brave can be expected from such Creatures, who, if they are not women, are at least hermaphrodites?" But as table manners, civility, and sanitation took on more importance towards the end of the 17th century, fops appeared in a different light. Once mere foils for rakish heroes, they became well-rounded characters sympathetically portrayed. For example, the dandy Clodio married an attractive heroine in Cibber's The Fop's Fortune (1700) without the customary repudiation of his foppish ways. While audiences might still laugh at the fop, they did not despise him.

Fops disappeared from the casts of new plays during the 18th century, yet the qualities they embodied reappeared in far more admirable characters in the sentimental stage dramas of the latter half of the century. Indeed, says Staves, "the so-called effeminacy of these old fops was an early if imperfect attempt at the refinement, civility, and sensitivity most of us would now say are desirable masculine [qualities]."

Of Art Films and Plastic Sharks


Americans who regularly see foreign movies seem to believe that Europeans produce more intelligent, sensitive, and somehow "better" films than Hollywood does. Grenier, Commentary's movie critic, notes that
U.S. viewers have unrealistic notions about the international film industry. Only a tiny selection of foreign movies is distributed in this country. (Such "art films" accounted for one-half of one percent of U.S. film industry income in 1981.) Far more typical of the European cinema, Grenier says, are cops-and-robbers and adventure movies.

Indeed, across Europe, American films are most widely admired. Clint Eastwood, Paul Newman, and Robert Redford grace marquees all over Europe. In West Germany, Hollywood productions accounted for 55 percent of film revenues during 1980.

What accounts for the sophisticated American moviegoer's attitude toward European cinema? Grenier cites both the "Bloomingdale's factor"—the idea, inspired by designer imports featured at Manhattan's swank East Side department store, that "foreign is better"—and the biases of American critics.

He points to the critical praise lavished upon West Germany's Rainer Werner Fassbinder, director of The Marriage of Maria Braun (1979), Lili Marleen (1981), and some 40 other films, who died at age 36 in June 1982 of drug and alcohol abuse. Fassbinder and his Neue Welle (New Wave) cinema colleagues produced spectacular box-office failures at home, surviving only through Bonn's generous movie subsidy program, which sometimes even pays theater-owners to show films. Grenier describes Fassbinder's screen oeuvre as "an institutionalized amateur night"; the director did not even view the "rushes" of the scenes shot each day to take stock of his work.

Yet Fassbinder reigned on the international film festival circuit during the 1970s. In the United States, he rose to cult status among cosmopolitan moviegoers. The reason, Grenier suggests, was the "counter-culture flavor"—antimaterialistic, antibourgeois—of his works, which stamped them as "high art" in the eyes of the cinema elite.

Financial success in the film industry, muses Grenier, is a matter of sheer caprice, as the makers of Jaws (1975) can attest. They feared the public would never accept a plastic shark.


Beginning in 1965, the Soviet Union adopted three ambitious five-year plans for economic growth; all three failed to meet Kremlin targets. The latest plan, unveiled in November 1981, is far more modest, but
PERIODICALS

OTHER NATIONS

according to Rumer, a former Soviet economist now at Harvard, it, too, is doomed to failure.

The underlying cause, he says, is the industrial "renovation" policy of the Brezhnev era, continued under the 1981–85 plan. This policy emphasizes buying new machinery for existing factories rather than building new plants from scratch. But numerous contradictions have cropped up: New equipment does not fit into old facilities; machine-producing factories have not been geared up to meet the increased demand; plant managers favor new construction and seek to circumvent the policy. As a result, between 1972 and 1980, buildings declined only from 30 to 29 percent as a share of the existing Soviet capital stock; machinery added only two points to its share.

The 1981–85 plan calls for a paltry one percent increase in investment and 3.4 percent growth in national income. But it boosts industry's overall share of investment by 23 percent, earmarking much of the increase for oil and gas exploitation in Siberia. Investment in "nonproductive" sectors—housing, service industries, schools, and hospitals—already at a postwar low (28 percent of investment) will be further curtailed. Yet the Kremlin has promised its people more consumer goods.

The new plan also exacerbates old difficulties: While industrial renovation will be concentrated in western Russia, and new energy and raw materials sources will be developed in the distant east, no allowance has been made for increased transportation. And the underfinanced machine-building industry cannot meet the demand for new equipment. From the first to the latter half of the 1970s, Rumer says, the number of prototypes for new machinery dropped 27 percent for energy-related equipment and five percent for machinery used in manufacturing computers. Soviet factory managers must compensate for shortages by repeatedly overhauling old equipment.

If Moscow's new leadership decides to abandon renovation, it will have to accept a temporary drop in industrial output, increased Western investment, and a shift away from the heavy emphasis on defense-related production. But that may ultimately prove more attractive to Moscow than what it has now—no coherent investment policy at all.


After Egyptian President Anwar Sadat embarked in 1974 on his infitah (open door) policy to attract foreign investment, Cairo began reducing the state's role in the nation's economy. But as in other lands, says Ayubi, a UCLA political scientist, the bureaucracy has kept growing.

Why? Cairo still hires all college graduates who cannot find jobs in the private sector, adding some 100,000 new graduates and $47 million
to the government payroll annually. By 1978, the bureaucracy had swelled to 1.9 million souls, with another 1.3 million employed in government-owned corporations. (Egypt's 1979 population: 41 million.)

Overstaffing has reached monumental proportions: The Central Auditing Agency, for example, has no fewer than 72 undersecretaries of state. Other "bureaupathologies," Ayubi notes, include inefficiency and poor performance. Only 15 percent of government employees regularly report to work on time. Cabinet ministers, whose tenures average only 18 months, seldom gain control over their departments.

Some civil servants—teachers, policemen, staffers in prestigious ministries—do work hard, Ayubi notes. But spreading limited funds throughout the bureaucracy keeps salaries low. Annual inflation averaging 30 percent exacerbates the problem. Corruption is common.

The bureaucracy has been mushrooming ever since the 1952 revolution. Egypt's leaders have regularly sought reforms—in vain. Refusing to guarantee jobs for the educated would create a politically formidable disaffected group; hiring them deepens Egypt's bureaupathologies and makes the country less attractive to foreign investors.

The situation has its comic touches: Work schedules are so lax that rush hour occurs not in the morning or evening, but in the middle of the day, when "most people are either going to or coming from their offices." But it is a demoralizing problem that President Hosni Mubarak's government will have to solve.


Despite war, civil strife, and weak governments, none of the 40-odd (depending on how they are counted) nations of black Africa has disintegrated or even lost significant territory. The explanation, argue Jackson and Rosberg, political scientists at the universities of British Columbia and California at Berkeley, respectively, lies in the force of international organizations and homemade rules.

Black Africa's states appear ripe for catastrophe. Deep ethnic divisions have sparked civil disorders or wars in 10 nations since 1956. Forty-one governments in 22 countries fell victim to military coups between 1958 and 1981. The chronic weakness and inefficiency of these national governments also characterize their military forces. In 1981, the authors say, the governments of Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, and Uganda could not claim a "monopoly of force" inside their own borders.

Jackson and Rosberg trace the instability of today's black African states to the late 19th century, when European colonialists carved up the continent without regard to existing kingdoms. But the new African
Direct foreign intervention in sub-Saharan Africa is rare. But in the late 1970s, Cuba dispatched some 40,000 troops to Angola and Ethiopia; French troops were sent to former colonies in 1964 and 1979.

Nations accepted the arbitrary boundaries as they began to achieve independence during the late 1950s, making such recognition a cornerstone of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded in May 1963. Indeed, when in 1960 the old African kingdom of Buganda declared its independence from Uganda, then a British colony, all other states refused it diplomatic recognition.

In part, pan-African ideology, which calls for a united front against colonialism and white rule, kept (and keeps) the new rulers from serious quarrels among themselves. Fear also played a role: Because each ruler was weak, each had a stake in abiding by OAU rules. With a few exceptions—notably, Tanzania’s 1978–79 war against Uganda’s Idi Amin and Somalia’s attacks on Ethiopia—the OAU has successfully mediated most of the disputes among its members.

Pressure from the United Nations and other international organizations, meanwhile, keeps intervention by outsiders to a minimum. While French, Cuban, and Soviet forces have been active on the continent, the authors argue, most foreign involvement comes “in response to solicitations by African governments or revolutionary movements fighting against colonial or white minority regimes.”

Jackson and Rosberg call the survival of black Africa’s states “an international achievement.” Yet survival has not ended the perpetuation of incompetent or corrupt governments.
"America's Old Age Crisis: Public Policy and the Two Worlds of Aging."


Author: Stephen Crystal

Behind Social Security and other federal programs for the elderly is the unspoken assumption that most retirees are impoverished, decrepit, and lonely. In fact, says Crystal, an official with New York City's Human Resources Department, such notions hold true for only a small proportion of Americans over 65.

While poverty among the elderly during the 1960s averaged twice the national rate, today it is down to 15 percent, one point higher than the U.S. average. Thanks to advances in medicine, the "young old" between 65 and 74 today are likely to be as healthy as were those 10 years their junior in previous generations. And only 13 percent of the elderly responding to a 1981 public opinion survey reported that social isolation was a severe personal problem for them.

In reality, Crystal contends, there are "two worlds of aging"—one that conforms to the old stereotype and another, far larger, composed of relatively healthy, well-off retirees. By failing to distinguish between the two, he argues, federal policy perpetuates the split. The well-off get more help than they need, the disadvantaged less.

Social Security and other federal programs have done much to shape the way the elderly live. Today, for example, seven million of the 11 million aged Americans live alone. The chief reason: Given enough money, most of the elderly prefer independence from their children.

(Indeed, only about five percent of the aged receive any regular income from their children; twice as many give money to their offspring.)

Public policy also fosters inequities. Tax exemptions for worker contributions to personal and corporate pension plans will cost Washington some $46 billion in revenues in 1983—a hefty "tax expenditure." Nearly half of the work force is now covered by such plans, but blacks are only half as likely to be included as whites. As of 1977, only a third of working women (versus half of all male workers) were covered. Because employees typically are not "vested" until they have been on the payroll for 10 years, relatively few blacks or women collect their benefits.

The result: The systems' beneficiaries are mostly white males and their wives. One 1978 study found that 65 percent of all "tax expenditures" for retirement programs went to workers earning $20,000 or more annually. Overall, the median income for pensioners collecting only Social Security is $6,200; for those collecting additional benefits, $12,200.

Other federal old-age policies also disproportionately aid the middle class. Wealthier retirees, for example, are far more likely to use Medicare benefits than are their lower-income counterparts because of their sophistication and ability to pay the "deductible" portion of the insurance.

Retirees with incomes over $15,000 received twice as much in Medicare benefits as did those with incomes below $5,000, according to a 1968 study. About 42 percent of Medicaid outlays are collected by the five percent of the over-65 population in nursing.
homes. In 1976, 95 percent of these residents were white. Partly by choice, blacks are more likely to take care of their impaired parents at home. But federal aid for home care is meager.

Such inequities and rapid growth in the over-65 population require revised national old-age policies, Crystal contends. But he believes the current total ($190 billion) of direct outlays and “tax expenditures,” now nearly equal to one-third of the federal budget, should be “sufficient.”

Immediate pension “vesting,” for example, could be made mandatory. Strains on Social Security could be eased by eliminating the financial advantages of early retirement: Three-quarters of new recipients now retire before reaching age 65.

Other proposals: taxing a portion of benefits going to those with high outside incomes, slowing the growth of cost-of-living increases.

But Washington cannot return responsibility for the elderly to families, Crystal believes. Instead, it should aim federal resources at those most in need—the poor, the growing population of “frail” elderly over 75, and the disabled. “Severe need in old age,” he notes, “has now become and will continue to be largely a woman’s problem,” because women live far longer than do men.

A critical concern is long-term health care. Subsidies for at-home care should be increased; hospitals should not automatically shunt elderly patients to nursing homes; and more emphasis should be put on using the homes as gateways to the outside world rather than as permanent residences.

A comprehensive, coherent old-age policy would require a complete re-vamping of today’s programs, Crystal concedes. But as the elderly increase their share of the population from 11 percent today to 21 percent in 2030, such an overhaul will become unavoidable.

"TV Coverage of the Oil Crises: How Well Was the Public Served?"


Editor: Leonard J. Theberge

What did the three major TV evening news programs say about America’s two great “oil crises” of 1973–74 and 1978–79?

Not much that was relevant to the problem at hand, according to the Washington-based Media Institute, despite all the vivid TV film of gasoline lines, disgruntled motorists, OPEC leaders, oil industry spokesmen, and federal policy-makers.

The first crisis followed the Arab oil embargo of October 1973. As most TV newsmen failed to note, it also followed President Nixon’s below-market price controls on gasoline; domestic oil producers had cut back on production and exploration, and oil imports zoomed, providing 37 percent of U.S. needs in 1973. The 1973–74 gasoline lines, as economists pointed out, stemmed from Washington’s ill-fated efforts to allocate fuel and keep prices down.

Federal intervention continued, with varying impact on different segments of the oil industry. TV failed to observe that some firms profited, but others did not, even as OPEC reaped the main rewards.

Echoing other expert opinion, a 1977 Rand Corporation report (ig-
TV commentators were not alone in believing that U.S. oil price decontrol would be a boon to oil companies. Yet, today, gasoline prices are down.

As for discussions of "solutions" to the crises, only 21 percent of TV coverage cited proposals that favored a market solution. Fully 50 percent focused on conservation (e.g., turning out more lights, rationing), and 15 percent dealt, mostly favorably, with proposals for more regulation by Washington.

All in all, the Institute concludes, the TV networks, out of naivete and/or lust for melodrama, paid scant attention to the real policy issue in both crises: government solutions versus market solutions, such as deregulation. Rather, the network newscasters, relying heavily on Washington officials as sources, presented the answer "as a choice among [federal] non-market measures: conservation versus rationing versus forms of regulation and price controls."
Many economists maintain that the baby-boom generation, by sheer force of numbers, has determined the course of the economy since World War II and will continue to do so through the rest of the century. It has been blamed for high housing costs and unemployment, pitted for the increased job competition its members face. But Russell, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, argues that its influence is exaggerated.

As it matured, the baby-boom generation—born in the years 1947-57—swelled the ranks of elementary and secondary school students from 28 million in 1950 to 51 million in 1970. School systems were obliged to expand.

But according to Russell, they did far more than was necessary. The amount spent on each student rose from $596 to $990 in constant dollars during the same 20-year period. The requirements for teachers' certification were tightened even as their numbers ballooned. Universities, pursuing the new goal of universal higher education, expanded beyond what the population increase demanded. Despite its size, the baby-boom generation was not shortchanged.

Unemployment rates for the baby-boom generation are unusually high, but the evidence that the cause is increased competition for the available jobs, though plausible, is "inconclusive." And these higher rates contribute less than one percentage point to the national unemployment statistics—certainly not enough to account for the high joblessness of the 1970s.

Baby-boom workers do feel the pinch of their large numbers in their pocketbooks. The earnings of male workers from age 20 to 24 declined from 66 percent of those of their 45-to-54-year-old counterparts in 1958 to 56 percent during the late 1970s. Yet it is unclear how much of the decline is due to other factors—e.g., recession, the shift to service industries.

In absolute terms, Russell adds, the baby boomers enjoy far higher earnings than did any previous generation.

Did they account for the massive increase in home-ownership and other changes in consumer spending habits during the 1970s? Actually, older generations bought more than half the new housing built during the decade. Housing boomed because it was a good investment. Overall, Russell notes, interest rates, inflation, and other economic factors have far more influence on such decisions than do demographics.

Economists now fear the baby-boom generation, as it ages, will bankrupt the Social Security system. But, as in the past, changes in economic conditions and human behavior are likely to prove more important, confounding most predictions.

"Demography," Russell concludes, "is not destiny."
Originating on the Baltic seacoast, the now-outlawed trade union Solidarnosc (Solidarity) claimed at one point to represent 10 million of Poland's 13 million workers. Led by Lech Walesa, who had been involved in the 1970 and 1976 disturbances in Poland, Solidarity received broad support from Western labor unions — and over $185,000 from the AFL-CIO.
“Humanity must rejoice and glory when it considers the change in Poland.” The sentiments of Britain’s Edmund Burke were echoed by many Western politicians during the 16-month heyday in 1980–81 of the independent trade union Solidarity. Burke was referring to Poland’s adoption of the liberal “May Constitution” in 1791—a development that ultimately provoked Russia and Prussia into dismembering Poland in 1793. Two centuries later, the rise of free labor unions and the easing of constraints on political life were seen as a threat by both the Soviet Union and the regime in Poland itself.

What came to be called the “Solidarity period” began in July 1980 when Edward Gierek’s regime suddenly increased the price of meat. Popular protest initially took the form of scattered strikes around the country. Then, in mid-August, 16,000 workers seized control of the vast Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk. Led by an unemployed shipyard electrician, Lech Walesa, the Gdansk strikers virtually shut down Poland’s major Baltic seaport. Soon, Walesa and his colleagues found themselves at the head of a nationwide movement that pressed for sweeping political and economic reform. The regime gave in. Under the Gdansk Agreement of August 31, the communist government, in return for an end to the strikes, promised to recognize independent, worker-run trade unions, to honor the right to strike, and to relax censorship.

Solidarność—Solidarity—came alive, and so did Poland. Gierek resigned. The autumn air carried an intoxicating whiff of freedom. The Sejm, Poland’s Parliament, long a rubber-stamp legislature, began demanding real power. University officials started to insist on true academic freedom. Major newspapers began printing some straight news. Films banned for years started appearing on television. The Solidarity period was a time of extraordinary political and cultural ferment.

Walesa himself knew it would not last. On December 13, 1981, in a move that had been quietly planned for months, Gen-
eral Wojciech Jaruzelski, now First Secretary of the Communist party, declared martial law and arrested Walesa and 6,000 Solidarity leaders and supporters. In time, the independent union was officially suppressed. The crackdown was unrelenting and, despite strikes and occasional flare-ups of violent opposition, successful—at least in the short run.

The long run may be another matter, our three Polish authors make clear as they discuss the party, the economy, and the intelligentsia.

**THE PEOPLE VERSUS THE PARTY**

*by Leopold Unger*

What, Confucius was once asked, are the essentials of government? "First," the philosopher replied, "the people should not go hungry; second, the army should be powerful; and third, the government should enjoy the trust of the people." Which of these elements, the questioner continued, might be sacrificed in a pinch? "First," Confucius said, "I would do without the army; then I would sacrifice the people's food, since starvation and famine have existed since the dawn of mankind; but where there is no trust, common people will have nothing to stand on."

Confucius, of course, was unable to take into account 35 years of absolute Communist rule in Poland, where the Army is powerful, but shortages of food and trust persist. The people have "nothing to stand on," but the regime still endures. As far as Poland is concerned, it was not only Confucius who was wrong but also Stalin. In April 1945, he told Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito, "This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise." Thirty-eight years later, Soviet troops are still stationed in Poland, but Soviet ideas, though duly imposed, have yet to take hold.

What Poland's Communist masters failed to understand from the beginning is that Poland is a people before it is a state; it is the Polish people rather than the Polish state that has, over the years, lent coherence and continuity to the history of "Poland." For as a political entity, Poland's evolution has followed a
tortuous course, often dictated by outsiders. As anyone familiar with European history knows, Polish territory was long treated as a kind of modeler’s clay, sculpted (and diminished) by powerful neighbors. My own parents, for example, were born and married in the city of Lwów and never moved from there; yet what was Poland when I was born had been part of Austria when they were young, and was controlled by Germany when they were killed. They were buried in an unmarked grave in the city of their birth, which is now within the Soviet Union.

Of course, politically if not physically, the rest of Poland today also lies within the Soviet Union, even though a “sovereign” state has been reconstituted and can be found on any map of Europe. The state in question is ruled by the leadership of the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, or PZPR). The chief source of discord in Poland today, of spiritual discord in particular, is that the Polish Communist party is not and has never been Polish—not Polish, at any rate, in a sense that would be understood by most Poles.

Poland is no stranger to travail. Thrice during the late 18th century, her powerful neighbors—Russia, Prussia, and Austria—carved her up and feasted upon various portions. For more than 120 years after the Third Partition in 1795, Poland as such did not exist at all. Neither the Duchy of Warsaw (1807–15), established by Napoleon, nor the Congress Kingdom (1815–64), established by the Congress of Vienna (and dominated by the Russian Tsar), altered this fact. Nor did two ill-fated uprisings (in 1830–31 and 1863–64) or the revolutionary ferment of the Spring of Nations (in 1848–49). Nevertheless, the Polish people continued to insist, or at least to hope, that their dead state would one day be reborn. And from the ashes of World War I, so indeed it was.

Two groups in Poland, however, were adamantly opposed to the state’s rebirth. The groups in question were Rosa Luxemburg’s Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, and the Polish Socialist Party Left (the left-wing faction of the Socialist Party). “The slogan of independent Poland,” declared the socialist newspaper Nasza Trybuna on November 2, 1918, just days before independent Poland was established anew, “is the axis around which gather the powers of the social reactionaries.” In the view of extreme leftists, economically depressed Poland was ripe for proletarian revolution. Creating a bourgeois state would only delay the inevitable; it would constitute, moreover, an obstacle to the triumphal march of communism from Russia to Germany. In December 1918, the Social Democrats and the Polish Socialist Left merged to form the
Communist Party of Poland.

The Polish Communists regarded the new Polish Republic as illegitimate: "the easternmost segment of Western imperialism." They refused to seek legal sanction for their new party—though it would have been forthcoming—and boycotted the January 1919 election of a Polish Parliament, the Sejm. Having failed to register, the party was declared illegal and forced underground, where it stayed until 1944–45.

Instinct for Self-Destruction

At odds with Lenin (who, ironically, recognized the potency of Polish nationalism), Luxemburg redirected her efforts towards Germany. Ethnic Poles then high up in the Soviet hierarchy—notably, Feliks Dzierżyński and Józef Unszlicht, creators and chiefs of the Cheka, Lenin's secret police and forerunner of the KGB—were able to exercise increasing sway over the Polish party. When the Polish-Soviet war broke out in 1920, the Polish Communists insisted that it was not a contest between two sovereign states but instead a struggle for socialist revolution. Calling unsuccessfully for a general strike, the party urged its members to sabotage the Polish war effort and work to aid Bolshevik Russia. General Józef Piłsudski's "miracle on the Vistula"—his stunning defeat of the Red Army in the battle of Warsaw—dashed Communist hopes.

From its very inception, then, the Communist Party of Poland found itself out of step with the desires of most Poles. "With you, gentlemen," Polish Socialist Party leader Mieczysław Niedźwiadkowski told the Communists in 1923, explaining his refusal to join them in a united front, "one never knows if you are genuine political workers or agents of the Russian government." The question continues to be asked.

Regardless of the integrity and courage that many of its activists displayed, the Polish Communist Party was permanently fixed in the role of the outcast. Few rallied to its banner. It is difficult in 1983 to evaluate the strength of an illegal and under-

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ground political party a half-century ago, but the most credible statistics indicate that out of a Polish population of some 20 million, the Communist Party could boast only 5,000 members in 1922; 15 years later, despite “favorable” economic and social conditions, it had fewer than 4,000.

And the party was caught in a trap: The more unpopular it became, the more it had to rely on the Soviet Union; the more it did that, the more unpopular it became. During modern Poland’s first fling with parliamentary democracy (1918–26), and then during Pilsudski’s military dictatorship (1926–35), the party proved unable to break out of this vicious cycle. And it manifested from the outset an instinct for self-destruction, as when, in 1932, at the Party Congress held in Belorussia, the Polish Communists openly commiserated with the German Communists on the “Polish occupation of Upper Silesia.” Eventually, the Polish party became a creature of the Comintern, the Communist International. And after Stalin consolidated his power during the late 1920s, the Comintern served as little more than an instrument of the Russian government.

The internationalism of the Polish Communist Party was not enough to protect it from a dramatic end. Two blows removed it temporarily from history.

First, during the Great Purge of 1936–38, Stalin executed or
interned several hundred Polish Communists who happened to be on Soviet soil. Many Communists living abroad were lured back and executed. Of the 37 members of the Polish Communist Party's Central Committee elected in 1932, 30 perished, including the entire Politburo and Secretariat. (The few survivors, including Władysław Gomułka, a future First Secretary of the Polish party, owed their good fortune to the fact that, as members of an illegal organization, they were languishing in Polish prisons at the time.) Then, in 1938, on the pretext that the Polish party had been infiltrated by Polish police agents, Stalin dissolved it altogether.

There was, perhaps, a silver lining. Since it had ceased to exist, the Communist Party of Poland was spared the ignominy of having to endorse (as other Communist parties would do, after performing awkward ideological contortions) the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact signed on August 23, 1939. A week later, on September 1, came the German invasion of Poland—and World War II. The Polish Army, though it resisted valiantly, crumbled after a few weeks. The Red Army's attack from the east, launched on September 17, sealed the country's fate. By late September, Hitler and Stalin had split the conquered nation between themselves, like the partitioning powers of yore.

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The “Fourth Partition” was roughly along the Bug and San rivers. Germany took more than half of Poland and most (22 million) of its people. Part of the German conquest was formally incorporated into the Reich; the rest was treated as, in Hitler’s words, a “vast Polish labor camp.” All Jews and most educated Poles were marked for extermination. The concentration camps at Auschwitz, Treblinka, Majdanek and elsewhere were in operation by 1942.

The Poles in the Soviet-occupied sector of their country hardly fared better. Several hundred thousand were deported and imprisoned in distant parts of the Soviet Union. Many others were killed. Most of the 15,000 Polish officers taken by the Soviets as prisoners of war disappeared. Stalin’s foreign minister, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, boasted in October 1939: “Nothing is left of Poland, this ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty.”

But, already, the Polish resistance had begun. A government-in-exile was formed in Paris, with General Władysław Sikorski, politically a man of the democratic center, as Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief. Representatives of the Socialist, Peasant, and National parties were included in the government, which fled to London after the fall of France in June 1940. In Poland itself, the underground Armia Krajowa (Home Army) resisted the German occupation.

Looking Ahead

After Operation Barbarossa—the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941—Moscow changed its tune. The “imperialist” war fomented by the British and French “warmongers” now became the “Great Patriotic War,” and Britain and France became valiant allies. By the end of July, the Polish government-in-exile, under strong British pressure, uneasily reached an agreement with the Kremlin. The Soviets renounced the 1939 partition and gave “amnesty” to their Polish prisoners, allowing them to form a Polish Army, which fought in Africa and Italy.

Looking ahead, Stalin realized that a Polish Communist party would again be useful. He also recognized that his de facto (if short-lived) alliance with Hitler and his participation in the dismemberment of Poland—not to mention the old Polish party’s extreme unpopularity—made it inadvisable to use the word “communist” in the new party’s name. And so in the beginning of 1942, the Polish Workers’ Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza, or PPR) and its military arm, the Armia Ludowa (People’s Army), came into existence. The new group’s Moscow-trained leaders—
notably Marcell Nowotko and Pawel Finder—were parachuted into German-occupied Poland to direct the underground movement. Of course, the Soviets remained uneasy about Polish Communists, particularly when operating beyond Moscow’s physical reach. It is not surprising that both Nowotko and Finder soon met violent deaths—at the hands of comrades—under circumstances that have never been officially explained.

Stalin maintained his alliance with Sikorski’s government only as long as necessary. After the Russian victory over the Germans at Stalingrad in early 1943, Stalin rejected Polish claims to prewar Poland’s eastern territory. When the Germans in April announced discovery of the Katyn massacre—they had unearthed a mass grave containing the bodies of 4,250 Polish officers slain by the Russians in the Katyn forest near Smolensk—Stalin used the request of the government in London for a Red Cross investigation as an excuse to break off relations. In July 1943, Sikorski died in an air crash, and Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, a leader of the Peasant Party, became Prime Minister.

As the Red Army in the spring and early summer of 1944 neared the Moscow-recognized boundary with Poland (roughly the so-called Curzon Line, suggested by British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon in 1919), the Soviets began molding a subservient Polish “government,” using underground PPR members but with trusted Poles from Moscow brought in to run the show: Boleslaw Bierut, for example, a Comintern official, along with representatives of the Moscow-based and Kremlin-controlled Union of Polish Patriots.

Caesar’s Wife’s Sins

Local Polish Home Army forces, as directed by the London government-in-exile, helped the Red Army’s advance. But in most cases, once the Germans had sufficiently retreated, the Polish officers were arrested and their men impressed into the Soviet-commanded Polish Army. The liberated areas came under the control of the communist government installed in Lublin. In July, the Red Army neared the outskirts of Warsaw. On August 1, the Poles in the old capital rose up against the German occupiers—but Stalin’s legions just across the Wisla (Vistula) River did not come to their assistance. The Warsaw Uprising, thus doomed, nevertheless lasted 63 days. Neither the uprising, nor its 150,000 victims, nor its lesson, would be forgotten.

By the time the “Big Three” met at Yalta in February 1945, the Lublin government was firmly entrenched in Warsaw. Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt were convinced that they
could do little, short of war with the Soviets, to change that reality. They went along with Stalin’s designs for Poland, recognizing the Curzon Line as Poland’s eastern boundary and thereby placing the cities of Wilno (Vilnius) and Lwów (L’vov), centers of Polish culture for centuries, inside the Soviet Union. (The Allies agreed to compensate Poland by making extensive annexations to the west at Germany’s expense.) In addition, the communist government, rather than the London government-in-exile, was accepted by the Allied leaders as the nucleus of the future Polish regime, although, in an empty concession, Stalin promised to “reorganize” the Lublin government to include some “democratic leaders.” Stalin promised, too, that “free and unfettered” elections would be held. They would be, like Caesar’s wife, above suspicion. “I did not know Caesar’s wife,” Roosevelt told Stalin, “but she was believed to have been pure.” Replied Stalin: “I was told so about Caesar’s wife, but in fact she had certain sins.”

The Western leaders’ hopes were in vain. The postwar period of “dualism”—when the PPR, although effectively dominating the provisional government, kept a low profile, and when substantial personal freedom still existed in Poland—did not last very long. When elections were finally held in January 1947, they were not like Caesar’s wife. Had they been, Mikołajczyk’s

The Strike (1910).
Stanislaw Lentz
completed this painting
five years after Polish
workers, in a nation-
wide general strike,
sought a shorter workday
and a democratic
republic. The desire
for both “bread and
freedom” persists.
### POLAND: A CHRONOLOGY, 1772–1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1772</td>
<td>First Partition: Russia, Prussia, and Austria split up almost one-third of the “Noble Republic” of Poland-Lithuania among themselves.</td>
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<td>1791</td>
<td>May 3 Constitution adopted. The Sejm (Parliament) is strengthened, and a hereditary monarchy supplants election of Polish kings by nobles.</td>
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<td>1793</td>
<td>Second Partition: Prussia and Russia slice into Poland again, leaving a powerless “rump state.”</td>
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<td>1795</td>
<td>Third Partition: Russia, Austria, and Prussia at last eliminate Poland from the map.</td>
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<td>1807</td>
<td>Napoleon rewards Poles after his victories over Austria, Russia, and Prussia by creating Duchy of Warsaw.</td>
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<td>1815</td>
<td>Congress of Vienna establishes quasi-autonomous Kingdom of Poland, dominated by Russia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>Uprising in Warsaw for Polish independence. It is crushed by Tsar Nicholas I the following year.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Insurrection against tsarist rule. It is put down after 16 months, and the Congress Kingdom is abolished.</td>
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<td>1882</td>
<td>Polish Socialist party (Proletariat) is formed in Warsaw, suppressed by tsarist police within four years.</td>
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<td>1892</td>
<td>A second Polish Socialist Party is founded; supports creation of sovereign democratic republic.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>Rosa Luxemburg and others found revolutionary Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland (and Lithuanian); favors close cooperation with Russian Socialists.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>Roman Dmowski’s National Democratic Party formed; seeks united and liberated Poland; is strongly anti-German.</td>
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<td>1898</td>
<td>U.S. President Woodrow Wilson proclaims Fourteen Points, one of them calling for creation of Poland. Polish Socialists form provisional government and Pilsudski takes office as Commander in Chief and Chief of State. Polish Social Democrats and Polish Socialists-Left merge to form Communist Workers’ Party of Poland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>With outbreak of World War I, Dmowski lobbies in Russia (and later in London and Paris) for a Polish state; to the same end, Socialist Józef Piłsudski forms Polish Legion in Galicia with Austrian assistance and attempts invasion of Russian Poland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>Russian provisional government and rival Petrograd Soviet call for establishment of an independent Polish state.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Piłsudski’s forces defeat Red Army in Battle of Warsaw.</td>
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1921 Second Republic, dominated by Dnoowski's National Democrats.
1926 Piłsudski seizes power in coup d'etat; sets up Sanacja "cleanup" regime.
1938 Stalin dissolves Communist Party of Poland.
1941 Germany invades Soviet Union.
1942 Polish Workers' Party formed by communists, Hitler's "Final Solution of Jewish Problem" gets underway.
1943 Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. For three weeks, the city's Jews forcibly resist deportation to death camps. Germans reveal Katyn massacre.
1945 Soviets liberate Warsaw (January 17). A month later, Allied leaders meet at Yalta. Provisional Government of National Unity is formed by Communists and others and recognized by Western powers. Potsdam Conference (July 17-August 2).
1947 Communist-dominated "Democratic Bloc" wins rigged elections to Sejm.
1952 Adoption of Soviet-style constitution marks formal advent of Polish People's Republic.
1956 Bierut dies in Moscow, succeeded as First Secretary by Edward Ochab. Rioting by workers in Parnawa. Gomułka, rehabilitated, becomes First Secretary. Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, Poland's primate, freed after three years in detention.
1970 Bloody rioting by workers in Baltic shipyards of Szczecin, Gdynia, and Gdańsk. Gomułka replaced as First Secretary by Edward Gierek.
1971 Gierek starts effort to modernize economy and buy domestic peace with Western imports and credits.
1976 Economy sags. Workers riot.
1978 Kraków's Karol Cardinal Wojtyła is elected Pope John Paul II.
1979 Pope visits Poland as economic crisis worsens.
1980 Labor turmoil results in Gdańsk Agreement; Solidarity created. Gierek replaced by Stanisław Kania.
1981 General Wojciech Jaruzelski succeeds Kania as First Secretary. Jaruzelski on December 13 declares martial law.
1982 Solidarity leader Lech Walesa is released from detention after trade union is formally dissolved. Jaruzelski lifts "main rigors" of martial law, but does not release all detained activists. Pope announces plans for June 1983 visit.
Peasant Party, supported by most noncommunist forces in Poland, unquestionably would have won the largest number of seats in the Sejm. But thanks to terror and fraud—including mass arrests and raids on Mikołajczyk’s headquarters throughout the country, as well as legal measures that struck his party’s name from the ballot in about one-fifth of the election districts—the Peasant Party garnered only 28 seats out of 444.

Not surprisingly, the PPR and its Socialist and other allies in the “Democratic Bloc” emerged the winners. Before the year was out, Mikołajczyk himself, fearing that a price had been put on his head, fled to the West. In December 1948, the Polish Communists erased the last source of potential political opposition by effectively eliminating the Socialist Party—absorbing it into the PPR to form the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR). At the Unification Congress in Warsaw, members of the assembly chanted over and over again: “Sta-lin, Sta-lin, Sta-lin.” Poland as a state entered a new era. Poland as a people balked.

No ‘Polish Way’

Over Poland, as over the rest of Eastern Europe, night descended. The Communist parties everywhere did their utmost to interrupt institutional continuity, erode popular morale, and erase the memory of national history. Relying on force, corruption, blackmail, harassment, and sheer exhaustion, the Communists sought submission if not energetic support. Those in the parties’ ranks who expressed misgivings about following Moscow’s lead or adopting its economic model or embracing its ideas about cultural policy were accused of “nationalist deviation” and purged. In Poland, Władysław Gomułka, who had often spoken of the need to take “the Polish way to Socialism,” did not hold his party post as General Secretary for long. He was, in fact, arrested and imprisoned for three years. Stalin’s man Bierut took his place.

Outwardly, events in Poland resembled those taking place in its Eastern European neighbors. The Poles first heard of their refusal to accept Marshall Plan aid on Radio Moscow, just as Czech Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk learned of his nation’s rejection from Stalin himself. Poland’s leaders, like the leaders of other Eastern European states, paid obeisance to Cominform, the Communist Information Bureau, Comintern’s successor. But, inwardly, the Polish situation was different. The Polish Communist party never managed to subdue the populace. Indeed, it has never ceased capitulating to the people whom it wanted to rule unconditionally. Four times in 25 years—in 1956,
1970, 1976, and 1980—it faced a national revolt, and each time, whether armed force was employed or not, it was compelled to give in.

The history of the rest of Eastern Europe has not, of course, been uneventful. Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia did, to various extents, break with Moscow, but the power of each nation’s ruling Communist party was never effectively challenged. The Hungarian revolt in 1956 and the Czechoslovakian “spring” in 1968 both prompted Soviet intervention, but that was followed in each case by a quick return to normal (which meant that rulers and ruled led parallel lives in an atmosphere, insofar as possible, of mutual indifference).

Rejecting the Graft

But in Poland, there has never been a return to “normal.” The perverse cycle is by now familiar. It begins with the mismanaged economy functioning more eccentrically than usual. Then comes a spark, in the form of some ill-considered government decision (e.g., abruptly raising the price of basic foods). The resulting explosion fragments the party apparatus. Attempts to contain the conflagration, usually by force (54 people were killed at Poznań in 1956, more than 100 at Gdańsk in 1970), merely cause it to spread. Finally the party resorts to radical surgery, sacrificing its top leadership, promising reform, and finally, when all is calm, sliding back into its old rut.

Clearly, then, a question needs to be asked: What makes Poland so different? Why has the communist “graft” been repeatedly rejected as it has not been elsewhere in the Eastern Bloc?

The most fundamental reason, as I proposed above, is that the Polish Communist party has historically been unable to comprehend the nature of the Polish nation or to accept that the nation’s basic characteristics are, indeed, basic, unalterable, inherent. With 30 million people in 1945 and a land area of 120,700 square miles, Poland was the largest country to come under Soviet sway. It could boast a cultural coherence unrivaled in Eastern Europe. Its people spoke a single language, and its key institutions—the Parliament, the universities, the church, the trade unions—had long histories: decades in the case of unions, centuries in the case of the Parliament, a millennium in the case of the church. To succeed in Sovietizing Poland, the Communist regime had to root out and overcome these impediments. It had, in short, to overcome Poland itself.

Nor, from the Communist point of view, were the circumstances after 1945 ideal. Poland had suffered greatly as a result

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of World War II. It had lost one-sixth of its population—six million people, including three million Jews—and endured the nightmare of Nazi and Soviet occupation. But Poland had also greatly contributed to Allied victory. Poles fought at Arnhem and Monte Cassino and Lenino and, altogether, constituted the fourth largest Allied armed force, surpassed only by those of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain. At war’s end, the Poles who survived felt far more acutely than did the Czechs or Austrians or Hungarians that they had earned a right, ratified in blood, to shape their own destiny. The prospect of slipping permanently into a Soviet “sphere of influence” was abhorrent. It had been only a few years, after all, since the Russians had participated in Poland’s partition, brutally thinned its population, and cavalierly murdered a generation of its military officers. Even before all this, the Russians had not been regarded by the Poles with bonhomie.

It was inevitable, then, that attempts by the Polish regime to Sovietize the country and siphon away its character would at best antagonize and at worst antagonize and fail. But the Communist leaders had no choice but to push ahead. They were, themselves, being pushed.

Against the Grain

The regime promptly abolished the respected position of President of the Republic and in 1952 gave Poland a new socialist constitution that hollowly saluted “the fraternal bond with the USSR.” National Constitution Day (May 3), the anniversary of the adoption of Poland’s 1791 Constitution, the earliest democratic charter in Europe, was eliminated. The PZPR also proposed changing the Polish national anthem, Józef Wybicki’s “Mazurka,” which dated back to the period of the partitions. Even Stalin thought that was going too far and overruled it.

The success of such tactics is perhaps best judged by the fact that in 1981, taking advantage of the relative freedom of the 16-month Solidarity period, throngs of young people spontaneously celebrated the old “national day” of May 3, whose significance is not something learned in Polish schools. As we shall see, the events of the Solidarity period provided a window into a Polish consciousness unadulterated by the regime.

The Polish Army had always been irrationally precious in Polish eyes. The Warsaw government overlooked that. The Home Army, whose performance against the Nazis was a source of vast pride to all Poles, was reviled on posters as the “spit-soiled dwarf of the reactionaries.” Polish citizenship was taken
away from those who had commanded Polish forces in the West, and several high-ranking officers were condemned to death upon their return to Poland. The oath of allegiance was altered so that Polish soldiers swore loyalty not just to Poland but also to the Soviet Union. The regime accepted a Soviet Marshal, Konstanty Rokossowski, as Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army, Minister of Defense, and member of the Politburo. (On his new Polish uniform, Rokossowski wore the prestigious Virtuti Militari medal, pinning it, however, on the wrong side of his breast.) Soviet officers of Polish extraction were brought in to man sensitive posts, and a Soviet general, Seraphim Lalin, was put in control of Poland's secret police.

**Politicized Learning**

It is worth noting that workers in Warsaw in 1980 named a bridge after General Stefan Grot-Rowecki, the Home Army Commander, and proposed turning the home of Marshal Józef Piłsudski in nearby Sulejówek into a national museum. The names of these generals do not reverently cross Polish teachers' lips. A year later, in August 1981, a heavy cement monument appeared at the Powązki Cemetery in Warsaw. It consisted of a cross and a tombstone on which had been engraved a simple but resonant message: "Katyn—1940." The next morning, the monument had disappeared. Significantly, the Polish people had built the monument in broad daylight; the government had to remove it in the dead of night. Needless to say, Katyn as a Soviet atrocity is not in the textbooks either.

Nor is the best of Polish literature, past and present. Literature has long been Poland's conscience, but the regime from the outset tried to impose its own standards of style (a crude socialist realism) and, above all, of content while suppressing traditional classics along with the work of contemporary Polish writers. Polish censors (who would have found themselves aptly described by Orwell and Kafka, had their books been available in postwar Poland) spent their days compiling blacklists of books, movies, and plays. In 1968, the Polish authorities even removed Dziady ("Forefather's Eve"), by Adam Mickiewicz, from the Warsaw stage. Dziady, the most patriotic play in all of Polish literature, with the status of a national epic, was written in the 19th century when Warsaw was under Tsarist occupation. The regime felt obliged to shut the performance down, so up-to-date and anti-Soviet did it sound.

The effect of censorship was not, however, the end of Polish literature so much as the end of Polish literature published le-
To compensate for the postwar loss of its eastern half (mostly poor farmland) to the USSR, Poland won from Germany important industrial and coal-producing areas, including Upper Silesia, as well as greater access to the sea.

In Poland. The truly creative artists such as novelist Witold Gombrowicz and playwright Sławomir Mrożek continued to publish their work abroad. Inevitably, it filtered back and circulated widely in Poland. The regime, of course, has attempted to slay by silence the activities of Kultura, the émigré monthly and publishing house in Paris that has helped to keep alive everything the Warsaw government hoped to annihilate. Scores of Polish writers working in the West—including Czesław Miłosz, author of the powerful anticommunist critique, *The Captive Mind*—do not, as writers, officially exist. Yet when Miłosz was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1980, the Polish people expressed such pride in the work of this man of whom they were not supposed to have heard that the regime was forced to allow
him a triumphal visit to his native land. Poland's best writers were among the founders, in 1976, of KOR (the Committee of Workers' Defense), which helped provide the intellectual foundation of the free trade-union movement.

Independent learning, like the creative impulse, was an early target of the Communist government. For 500 years, Polish intellectuals had been at the forefront of European thinking. The University of Kraków, founded in 1364, is one of central Europe's oldest. But in 1951, the regime replaced the venerable Polish Academy of Knowledge with a crude, Soviet-style Academy of Sciences. The government politicized learning and flooded the universities with a vulgar Stalinist Marxism. A number of university posts went to party hacks, and party leaders, infused with a new snobbism, obliged universities to provide them with academic degrees of dubious merit.

Fighting for Souls

The corruption of the university, however, was far from total. Much of the professoriat maintained its integrity. In 1968–69, the regime was obliged to purge hundreds of eminent academics from their posts, including the economist Włodzimierz Brus and philosopher Leszek Kolakowski. Scholars continued nevertheless to agitate for liberalization in Poland. Their efforts supplemented those of the literary men who founded the KOR. Scholars from almost every conceivable field were instrumental in creating the "Flying University" which organized lectures around the country that would never have been permitted in the regular university seminar room—a recapitulation of the Warsaw Uprising, for example, or a revisionist assessment of contemporary Polish history, or a critique of the regime's economic policy, or a cold look at Poland's relations with the USSR.

The durability of intellectual life in Poland is perhaps best attested to by the number of scholars the regime sees fit to expel year after year.

Of all the institutions the Warsaw government attempted to suborn, the most important was the Catholic Church. The church has long served as the main and practically invulnerable stronghold of the Polish national identity. Conservative, traditional, and often intolerant, the church nevertheless had always been Polish, a quality of particular importance during periods of war or occupation. The Communist apparatus lost no other battle more decisively than it did its contest with the church for the soul of the Poles.

The Communists' original sin, so to speak, was the creation
in 1949 of the association PAX, a lay organization designed to "liberate" the populace from the church hierarchy. Under the leadership of Bolesław Piasecki (the prewar chief of Falanga, a Polish fascist organization), PAX expanded quickly, providing the government with an unpersuasive alibi whenever the regime wished to defy the official church hierarchy. PAX was at the Communists' side when they shut down important Catholic publications like Tygodnik Powszechny; it helped organize the "patriot-priest" movement; and it assisted the government in its anti-Semitic campaign of the late 1960s.

'Revolutionary Vigilance'

It must be granted that the regime tried its best to humble the church. It put Bishop Czesław Kaczmarek on trial in 1953, accusing him of "spying for the CIA," arrested nine other bishops that year for sedition, and "isolated"—confining him to a convent—Poland's Primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński. Party leader Bierut and others personally went to Moscow to coordinate an indictment against the Primate, and it was only at Moscow's insistence that the Warsaw government did not actually put Wyszyński on trial. Meanwhile, the regime pressed a Soviet-style propaganda campaign, banning religion from the schools, taking steps to curb the training of priests, and creating museums, associations, and publications devoted to atheism. If only on cultural grounds, such actions were a slap in the face of the Polish people.

The results of the regime's campaign against the church, predictably, were abysmal. Ostracized by local congregations, the patriot-priest movement fizzled. Catholic publications continued to appear underground and eventually were given official sanction. And after the workers' upheaval at Poznań in 1956, the new First Secretary, Gomułka, freed Cardinal Wyszyński as a sop to public opinion. Since then, the first act of every new First Secretary has been to meet publicly with Poland's Primate—as if to ask permission to form a government.

The election of Karol Cardinal Wojtyła, Archbishop of Kraków, to the papacy in 1978 further fortified Poland's church. Pope John Paul II's 1979 visit to his homeland may have marked a turning point in the country's modern history by giving millions of Poles for the first time a sense of their own power. One year later, in August 1980, Solidarity was born. The relative position of the church and the regime in Poland was nicely summed up by a Polish cartoon that appeared in 1979. It shows the Pope celebrating mass in Warsaw's Victory Square, looking
over a sea of heads. A party boss, standing behind the altar, points to the crowd of believers and orders a policeman: "Take down their names."

Unable to come to terms with the nation it had to govern, the Polish Communist party could wield power only by the continual reinforcement of "revolutionary vigilance"—the reinforcement, that is, of the apparatus of repression.

The party has never been monolithic. Its leadership, consisting not of ideologues but of adept individuals driven by the exercise of power, has remained distinct from its base, consisting of petty opportunists and even a few idealists. Over the years, the base of the party, periodically decimated by purges directed from on high, has proved to be anything but stable. Between 1959 and 1970, some 500,000 party members were expelled for "ideological apathy," 82 percent of them workers and peasants. It was a deliberate "de-proletarianization" of the party. The intellectuals came next, 8,000 of them, tainted by "revisionism," expelled in 1968. Who remained? The apparatus, the nomenklatura. Yet even the nomenklatura was not immune to factional infighting. During the 1940s, the "Soviets" were pitted against the "nationalists"; during the 1950s, the "dogmatists" against the "revisionists"; during the 1960s, the "veterans" against the "zionists"; and during the 1970s, the "technocrats" against the "regionalists."

Stalin Was Right

Blinded by their internecine disputes, and more interested in retaining their hold on the instruments of power than in employing them effectively, the leadership of the Communist party always studiously ignored the danger signals.

A year after taking power, in 1956, Gomulka crippled the economic advisory council when Oskar Lange and Michael Kalecki were devising workable solutions to Poland's economic crisis. In 1965, Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski went to prison for their "Open Letter to the Party," which criticized the regime's stifling bureaucratization. During the 1970s, Edward Gierek, surrounded by his technocrats, spurned the four reports of the "experience and future" group, which warned of imminent social and economic chaos. Deaf to all alarms, the party leaders knew nothing of the mess they had created until the wave of strikes along the coast in 1980. By then it was too late.

The extent of the isolation of Poland's leaders from the rest of the Polish people is hard to overstate. In 1965, Gomulka, speaking on TV to a nation beset by shortages of food, clothing,
and consumer goods, scoffed at the notion that women could not find tights to buy because "my wife just bought some" (at a state store for the elite). Gierak, according to an official party report, did not learn until 1978 of the massive increase of the Polish debt that had been building for years. Living in a small world of their own creation, the party leaders fought among themselves, jockeyed for influence, and by all accounts lined their pockets. After Gierak's fall from power in 1980, an official investigation showed that he, along with two Prime Ministers, seven Vice-Prime Ministers, 18 Ministers, and scores of Vice-Ministers, had used government money to build private villas for themselves.

Deep down, I suspect, Polish party leaders perceived the hollowness of their enterprise. The cynicism of Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz was legendary. Jan Pietrzak, for many years the manager of a satirical theater in Warsaw, once told him that they both had made a career out of running funny institutions. Cyrankiewicz replied, "Yes, but you have better results." Conscious of the lack of trust, party leaders have periodically sought empty legitimation in elections that they control. But what comfort, really, can they take from a pro forma 99 percent approval at the polls compared to the unofficial plebiscites represented by the strikes in 1970 and 1980, or by the welcome accorded the pope on his visit in 1979?

In the end, the party leaders had to resort to threats, as Gierak did in 1980 when he spoke of "the anxiety of our Soviet comrades." And when threats failed, there was only force.

By December 1981, after more than a year of social, political, and cultural ferment made possible by the emergence of Solidarity, the Communist party had nothing else to fall back on. A military man, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, had been Prime Minister since February, First Secretary since October. On the night of December 13, he became chairman of the Wron, the military council of national salvation. Martial law was declared. Bertolt Brecht, who knew the system well, once said that when a communist government lost the confidence of its people, it was the people who had to be dismissed. But in Poland, that was not possible; it had been tried and had never worked. Ultimately, the Army dismissed the party.

The events of the past 35 years make one conclusion inescapable. In August 1944, Joseph Stalin received Stanislaw Mikołajczyk, the Polish Prime Minister, in the Kremlin. Responding to Mikołajczyk's doubts as to the future of democracy in Poland, Stalin said: "Communism does not fit the Poles. They are too individualistic, too nationalistic..."

This time, Stalin was right.
Well before the summer of 1980, when angry shipyard workers in Gdansk rose up and led a strike that spread across the country, Poland’s economy was in serious trouble. With the end of the false prosperity of the early 1970s, shortages of meat, flour, sugar, and other staples had become widespread. Industrial productivity was low, the rate of economic growth had further declined, and the country was burdened with a massive external debt. The agricultural sector, once one of Poland’s great strengths, was in disarray.

Since the summer of 1980, the situation has only deteriorated. Rationing is in force, and as mundane an item as a tube of toothpaste now sells on the black market in Warsaw for four times its official price.

Poland’s economic difficulties—nothing new—have often been blamed on the mistakes, ineptitude, and corruption of the Communist regime’s leaders and bureaucrats. That, indeed, has been the official “line” following each successive economic debacle. First the “Stalinists,” then Wladyslaw Gomulka, and then Edward Gierak have had to take the rap for Poland’s badly malfunctioning economy. More recently, the regime of General Wojciech Jaruzelski has blamed the outlawed independent labor union, Solidarity, for “ruining the economy.”

Yet the current state of affairs is no more the result of strikes and labor unrest than the earlier ones were merely the fault of failed leadership. Poland’s various Communist rulers did, of course, contribute mightily to economic calamity. But the origin of Poland’s predicament lies in the Soviet-style economic system and development strategy that were imposed on Poland after World War II, and in the subsequent subordination of Polish interests to Soviet designs.

A centralized system of economic planning and management, as now exists to varying degrees throughout Eastern Europe and in the USSR, has the presumed advantage of being able, by fiat and force, to mobilize a nation’s resources quickly and fully and to deploy those resources to achieve the goals spelled out in the Plan, usually a five-year plan, the country’s overall economic blueprint. Poland, a nation of 36 million people, with abundant fertile land, and plentiful coal, copper, and other minerals, is not a poor country. But its “command"
economy—overly centralized and lacking any significant market mechanisms—has proved inefficient at exploiting the country's riches and clumsy at balancing supply and demand. Even butter has been in short supply at times.

Poland's economy has suffered in other respects from the nation's subservience to the Soviet Union. In pursuit of economic growth, Poland, beginning in the early 1950s, was compelled to copy the development strategy of its vast, populous, and very different eastern neighbor. Like Moscow, Warsaw stressed expansion of typically late 19th-century industries (e.g., iron and steel, heavy machinery, transport equipment), which required great quantities of capital, energy, and raw materials and were geared to large-scale manufacture. Production of food and of consumer goods (profitable endeavors to which Poland was well suited) was de-emphasized, while modern industries such as electronics and petrochemicals were neglected.

The result was that those sectors of the economy that could pay their own way—via the sales of coal, meat, or furniture, for example—had to subsidize the others, and so had little capital available for their own expansion and modernization. That is one reason why, as late as 1960, horses still provided about 86 percent of the traction-power on Polish farms.

**Following Orders**

Poland's commercial and financial relationships with other countries were also altered to serve Soviet economic and political interests. Though desperately in need of money for postwar reconstruction, Poland, on Soviet orders, rejected Marshall Plan aid and withdrew from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. During the late 1940s, Poland curbed its trade with the West dramatically, even as commerce with other Eastern European nations, and especially with the Soviet Union, increased. Until 1956, Polish coal was sold to the Soviets for much less than the world price. Other important—and probably unprofitable—exports to the USSR have included railroad cars and ships.

Finally, the economic system imposed on Poland was pro-
General Jarosław Dąbrowski, who fell leading the forces of the Paris Commune (1871), stares out from a 200-zloty bill, worth as little as 37 cents in 1983 and, in reality, worth even less, thanks to shortages of goods to buy.

foundly at odds with Polish traditions and culture. One cannot put a dollar value on this factor, but it was important. As observers outside and inside Poland have long noted, its proud but troubled history as a state, its tradition of intellectual freedom, its openness to Western ideas, its anticommunism, and its powerful Catholic Church, have all combined to produce an implacably romantic, sullenly restive, and sometimes openly rebellious populace. When, during the early 1950s, the Warsaw government tried to collectivize agriculture, the peasants resisted, engaging in a slowdown strike, consuming whatever they could themselves and delivering little surplus to the government. Urban food shortages and rationing quickly ensued.

In sum, then, Poland’s awkward planning apparatus, along with the other contradictions cited above, guaranteed that, whatever initial successes it might achieve, the country’s economy would not work well over the long haul. The high economic growth rates of the early years became ever harder to sustain and in fact steadily declined—from an average of 10.3 percent in 1950–54 to seven percent in 1956. Improvements in the standard of living were increasingly costly and difficult to bring about. Despite all this, no basic economic reform was undertaken.

During the early 1950s, when Stalinism was at its peak, the regime launched its industrialization drive and, as noted, sought to collectivize the farms. Disgruntled over the results, workers rioted in Poznań in June 1956, demanding “bread and freedom.” In October, Gomułka became the Communist party’s
new First Secretary, stirring popular optimism. The new regime quickly imported grains and foodstuffs to improve the average Pole’s meager diet. The government also backed off on collectivization. (The acreage collectivized had never amounted to much more than one-tenth of the arable land in Poland.) To encourage improvements in workers’ productivity, Gomulka increased output of consumer goods by reducing capital investment.

The period of hope was short lived. Bold proposals to decentralize the economy and introduce some market mechanisms—rather basic items like profits, interest rates, properly calculated costs, flexible prices—were discussed, but no lasting changes were made. In 1961, the industrialization drive was resumed. It came to a halt within two years, and the result was economic stagnation for the rest of the decade.

**Motorized Golf Carts**

To turn the situation around, Gomulka sought to revive and modernize the economy through new investment. With no outside sources available, he decided to finance his scheme out of savings achieved by forcing workers to live more austerely. But when he tried in 1970 to raise the relatively low food prices (by nearly 18 percent in the case of meat) and to hold down future wage increases, workers in the shipyards along the Baltic seacoast rioted, precipitating Gomulka’s fall.

Edward Gierek, his successor, repealed the price increases. Then he and his advisers adopted a “new development strategy” (nowa strategia rozwoju) aimed at redirecting the economy toward engineering, electronics, modern food processing, and light industry. The key to the whole effort was to be an influx of Western capital and technology, made possible by the first stirrings of détente—and by Western credits. The borrowed money would not only cover the capital investment needed to restructure the economy, but also provide more consumer goods. For without that, workers would have no incentive to become more productive. “Our supreme goal,” Gierek said in December 1971, is the “systematic improvement of living standards.”

Gierek and his circle of planners had high hopes. They anticipated that the “new development strategy” would enable Poland to increase vastly its export of high-quality manufactured goods, from color TVs and hunting rifles to motorized golf carts. These would be produced in new, or newly modernized, plants with the aid of Western machines and equipment, under Western licenses or in cooperation with Western firms. The result be-
fore long would be a favorable balance of trade—exports would exceed imports—and the debt to the West would be repaid. In the process, Poland's economy would finally be "modernized." It all looked good on paper, and the money and technology began pouring in, notably from West Germany.

The Polish spending spree of the early 1970s made a mockery of the 1971-75 five-year plan. (The plan is the chief means of maintaining economic order where market mechanisms do not exist.) The myriad alterations—e.g., increases in investment rates, in personal income, in imports of investment goods—were made on an ad hoc basis and added up to "too much, too fast." The economy could not easily adjust to such rapid and poorly planned change. The "command" system was too rigid, and its managers were too dogmatic to undertake fundamental reform.\(^{9}\)

Gierek's success crucially depended on expansion of Polish exports to the West both to repay the loans and to secure a steady flow of the imported materials, spare parts, and machines needed in a modern, open economy. But that expansion proved beyond Poland's abilities. For one thing, since official prices did not truly reflect the actual economic costs, it was impossible to calculate the real profitability of various export alternatives. Potential export items were also selected "from above" by central planners who lacked adequate information about world market conditions and even about actual domestic production capacities.

A Siberian Snow Shortage

Thus, nearly $1 billion was poured into developing and then producing, at a sprawling facility near Warsaw, a Massey-Ferguson tractor. But it turned out that, contrary to what the Poles first thought, their license from the Canadian firm did not allow sale of the products in the West. The tractors could not be sold to Poland's communist neighbors, either, because they were too expensive. And they would not be widely used at home because they could not be coupled with most Polish farm equipment. Hence, instead of the planned 75,000 tractors a year, the enterprise produced only 500. Such fiascoes were commonplace.

By the mid-1970s, a serious balance-of-payments deficit and

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\(^{9}\)The economic system was slightly modified in 1973 by the so-called WOG reform, named for the Wielkie Organizacje Gospodarcze, or "big economic organizations," that were involved. The idea was to introduce a certain measure of decentralization, along with some market mechanisms and flexible rules for setting prices, into the system. The decentralization, however, was only half-heartedly implemented and was soon abandoned.

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a swiftly mounting debt had become alarmingly apparent. Thanks to official discrimination against private farmers and heavy investment in unproductive state farms, even grain was being imported. Clearly, some belt-tightening was in order. Yet, instead of reducing imports from the West gradually, thus cushioning the economy from the shock, the Gierek regime made deep cuts. The sudden shortage of parts and equipment reverberated throughout the economy. Poland’s growth rate, which had experienced an artificial spurt during the early 1970s, now started to decline rapidly. From about 10 percent during 1972–74, it fell to five percent in 1977. Exports slumped, making matters worse.

By the late 1970s, the economy was careening out of control. The rate of growth of the national product fell to −2.3 percent in 1979 even as Poland’s hard-currency debt rose to $20.5 billion. City-dwellers experienced drastic shortages of foodstuffs and had to wait in seemingly endless lines to get what little they could. Poles joked that if the regime’s economic planners were ever sent to Siberia, they would cause a snow shortage there.

The government seemed helpless to effect a recovery. At the Eighth Party Congress in February 1980, the regime manifestly had no program beyond hopelessly tarnished plans to shift resources from investment to consumption, to severely restrict
imports, and to expand exports. To make their formal “plan” for 1980 appear to work on paper, government economists simply doctored the numbers. The patient, however, did not revive.

After the Gierek regime’s abrupt increase in meat prices in 1980 prompted a summer of labor turmoil—and the advent of the Solidarity era—the need for sweeping economic reform was given lip service. But that was all. No real reform of the economic system was ever undertaken, either under Stanislaw Kania (who replaced Gierek in September 1980) or under General Jaruzelski (who replaced Kania in October 1981). All the flaws cited at the outset of this essay remained in place.

A Political Solution?

In truth, the Communist leaders were far less interested in rescuing the economy than in suppressing Solidarity. In this, of course, they eventually succeeded. Meanwhile, farm and industrial production continued to drop, and the massive debt to Western nations and banks continued to grow (to $26 billion in January 1983). A look at what has transpired since the imposition of martial law in December 1981 suggests that recovery is by no means just around the corner.

The regime’s one economic success under martial law was an increase in production of coal. Coal output rose by 15 percent during the first three quarters of 1982 over the same period in 1981. But coal mining is a very special case. Unlike manufacturing microprocessors, say, mining coal is an industry in which the government can fix, and forcibly meet, high-output “targets” without worrying about quality.

This being so, the regime “militarized” the coal mines. Miners were subject to military discipline and could be court-martialed for disobeying orders. In addition to the “stick,” there were some “carrots.” For example, amid acute shortages of food, especially meat, miners got better meals in their cafeterias. And they got access to exclusive state stores where they could buy scarce items such as shoes and clothing.

But improved coal production, which meant more electricity, did not provide much relief for the rest of the economy. During the first three quarters of 1982, total manufacturing output (excluding production of coal and other minerals) decreased by six percent. In the textile industry, output declined by 14 percent; in iron and steel, by 10 percent; in food, by five percent.

Nor was the foreign trade picture any brighter. Not only did exports to nonsocialist nations decline under martial law, but so did imports from them, thanks both to Western sanctions and to
dissatisfaction with the quality of some Polish products—portable tape recorders, to name one, that produced sounds all right but were housed in an ugly casing that deterred buyers. Imports from socialist countries fell off, too. For while exports to those nations did increase somewhat, Moscow compelled the Polish regime to pay back the Soviet Bloc countries for credits received earlier, thereby siphoning off Poland's export earnings. Poland, its economy now import-dependent, was unable to substitute imports from the Soviet Bloc for the imports it needed but could not get from the West.

The government often invoked the need to control inflation, fueled by widespread shortages, as an excuse for its imposition of martial law in the first place. Yet figures for the first three quarters of 1982 make it clear that, despite draconian increases in prices to relieve excess demand, inflationary pressures did not diminish. This was because the average Pole's nominal personal income shot up nearly 60 percent more rapidly than it had during the same period in 1981, even as shortages of goods and services persisted. The amount of idle cash in the hands of the populace went up by 45.9 percent. In other words, people had more and more zlotys—and less and less on which to spend them. This surprising failure of the regime to control inflation can only be due to the government's fear of popular unrest—and to its consequent attempt to lull the public into believing that, despite the widespread shortages, their wages at least were increasing.

Martial law was suspended in December 1982, but the social situation in Poland remains explosive and the economy remains inert. The regime has, I think, only one way out of the morass: to begin to seek a "political solution." That means getting the support (even if greatly qualified) of the workers and, indeed, of the entire populace; taking steps that will persuade Western governments to remove their sanctions; and reestablishing economic ties with the West as soon as possible, all without upsetting the Kremlin.

The regime's decision to move toward ending martial law was interpreted by many commentators outside the country as proof of the military government's confidence and strength. In fact, however, it was probably just the opposite—a desperate action born of the regime's inability to arrest Poland's economic decline by force alone.
AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE

by Artur Międzyrzecki

Fragments from a notebook.

◊ No notes, no clippings, no folders filled with manuscripts. All of that has remained in Warsaw, Marszałkowska Street, in my room piled with books. Despair and relief. To be honest, I was not capable of reading those pages, so densely covered with writing, that no longer interest me—and for a reason. Once again the earth had trembled under our feet, and once again one had to start from scratch.

◊ My arm is still wooden. Since December 1981 I have not, until now, written a single sentence of prose. For months I could not even read a book. Letter writing was a form of torture. This had nothing to do with my feelings toward the addressees. It was simply a physical incapacity, a numbness, a feeling I had known in other difficult periods of my life.

◊ From the brains. To shake something out of the brains.
   I recall that this is how one of my notes begins in the yellow notebook, which lies under the glass paperweight.
   I must have been exhausted by the stacks of papers which had been hemming me in, by that necropolis of words and memories.
   And I am in a hurry. The glass paperweight is a remembrance of Antoni Słoniowski, the poet; but I mention it reluctantly, for I would like to limit myself to the essentials.

◊ My first volume of poetry appeared 40 years ago, during World War II. At that time, I was an artilleryman in the II Polish Corps of the British Eighth Army, and I took part in the Italian campaign. I think about those times as my own prehistory, since the main events in my biography came later and can be identified chronologically with the history of postwar Poland. During the second half of the 1950s, my principal volumes of poetry, prose, and essays began to appear. At the same time began my participation in public life: on the board of the Writers' Union and in the Polish PEN Club, as well as in international associations of people of my profession. In 1980, I was invited by Solidarity in Warsaw to become one of its advisers on literary and cultural matters. I mention all of this with the American readers of these fragments in mind. The need for self-introduction is one of the unpleasant aspects of a foreign stay. In one's own country, this need does not exist; one is qualified once and for all from the moment when one pronounces one's
meaningful "yes" or one's equally meaningful "no."

I realize that there is little left that I can change in my public image. Of course, I am the one who has shaped it but—today, years later—it is my image that exercises invisible control over every one of my moves. Indeed, many centuries are looking at us, as Napoleon reminded his soldiers in Egypt. But the most imperious of those looks comes from our own past. This applies not only to me. Every one of my friends acts within a similar crossfire of moral considerations and norms of behavior coded generations ago, with their conscious or instinctive limitations and tendencies.

This is not to say that none of them has encountered as well the gaze of the Grand Inquisitor and experienced anxiety because of it, or even—in more than one case—the unpleasant consequences of this threatening interest in their persons. It simply means that the traditions inherent in their position as intellectuals and writers, the moral pressures of their milieu and its social credibility, are sufficiently strong to mold attitudes—though promising nothing in return, apart from poetic justice, which in this case means no happy-ending melodrama but fulfillment of one's own often tired and embittered spirit.

The word "spirit" is not in fashion these days in political science and has gone out of circulation in literary criticism. But what else has been invented, what new infatuation, that is superior to the spiritual values of old European humanism with its natural tolerance, its universal fraternity, its recognition of the need for freedom in life and art? The usually vicious attacks on the Polish intelligentsia have been caused by the fact that the intelligentsia has always been and remains the social personification of such values. Its influence on public opinion, its support for democratic pluralism, its moralistic message—all of this gives the intelligentsia powerful enemies, especially in bad times.

In its reference to 19th-century post-partition Poland, the Larousse encyclopedia sums up the situation laconically: The partitioning powers sought to destroy or reduce the influence of both the church and the Polish intelligentsia.

This should come as no surprise.

Polish literature would at such times serve as a substitute for the political institutions that no longer existed. A poem by Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855) became the motto adopted by the insurgents of 1830. The theatrical writings of Mickiewicz, along with those of Juliusz Słowacki, 60, a Wilson Center Fellow, is vice-president of the Polish PEN Club in Warsaw and was an adviser on cultural affairs to the trade union Solidarity. His principal publications include poems (Selected Poems, 1957, 1971, 1979, 1980), essays, and prose. The latest book of his short stories, The Mentors' Age, appeared in 1979. He has also translated into Polish works by Racine, Molière, Emily Dickinson, Apollinaire, and others. One of his books is available in English: Fourteen Poems by Artur Międzyrzecki (Windover Press, 1972).
wacki and Zygmunt Krasinski, became the stage for public debate and dramatized Poland's historical chronicles. Earlier, veterans of the Napoleonic Wars, philosophers, and reformers founded the Society of the Friends of Learning, the future Academy of Sciences. In every age and in every discipline, representatives of the leading intellectual groups in Poland ensured the continuity and vitality of spiritual life and the nation's cultural identity.

It should be noted that in the tradition of the Polish intelligentsia, a distinction has always been made between patriotism and fanaticism, between the desire for sovereignty and nationalistic excess. This tradition is naturally democratic and naturally antitotalitarian. Its respect for the past is not motivated by anachronistic nostalgia, but is rather an expression of the fear that a nation that loses its memory ceases to exist. The Polish intelligentsia, as a social group, is in a way memory incarnate.

I think that this has been determined by historical circumstances, and that one ought not to exaggerate the innate particularity of the place. The intellectual in any country would, in circumstances such as ours have been, describe his role in like fashion. This would not inevitably lead, as it does not lead in this case, to chauvinism. A nation is not a sect, warned Cyprian Kamil Norwid (1821–1883), a precursor of our modern poetry. The banners of 19th-century Polish insurrections bore the slogan: "For our freedom and yours." No motto reflects Polish thinking more than this one. It is often, and correctly so, linked with the heritage of Romanticism. Yet, earlier, our Enlightenment also had its own legions of volunteers, ready to work their way across frontiers, to give active support to the ideals considered universal, to sacrifice their lives for those ideals. Enlightened officers in General Dąbrowski's Polish legions, who fought in Italy in Napoleon's army, had the motto "All free men are brothers" sewn onto their uniforms.

This same period gave birth to three legendary moments that, taken up later, and to which Romantic poetry added luster, would persist up to the present time as powerful stimuli to the collective imagination. These are the Polish legions in Italy (1797–1801), the Four-Year Sejm, or Parliament (1788–1792), and the adoption of the May 3 Constitution (1791).

The first of these events symbolizes participation in struggles for freedom, wherever they might occur. Seen in this perspective, the presence of Tadeusz Kościuszko at Saratoga and West Point appears as natural as the presence of Polish divisions alongside the Allies during World War II.

The Four-Year Sejm and the May 3 Constitution remain to this day symbols of the nation's past, the most venerated moments of which are still identified with the parliamentary tradition and the democratic spirit. What is more, the historic circumstances that accompanied the Constitution—the foreign intervention that prevented its implementation, the treacherous internal forces set in motion by that intervention, and the intervention's rhetoric of appearances—all of this turned into a
political knowledge coded in the minds of generations and continually confirmed by the experiences of one's own life.

Sixteenth-century Poland under the Jagiellon kings is also deeply impressed upon the collective memory. It was the Golden Age, when the state's might combined with freedom of thought, exemplary tolerance, and the growth of learning; the era of Copernicus the astronomer (1473–1543) and of Jan Kochanowski (1530–1584), perhaps the greatest of Polish poets. One should also mention this period because the spiritual families that make up Polish culture have together created a single chain of traditions, including political traditions. Foreshadowed by basic patterns of intellectual activity in the era of the Enlightenment, and beginning in the second half of the 19th century, the collective history of the Polish intelligentsia, in its role as the group that molds public opinion and voices the nation's aspirations, became part of them.

The intelligentsia's respect for the past, deep-seated as it is, hardly weakens the emotional force of its messages today. Voices from centuries long gone sometimes prove to be nearer to our own sensibilities than it might at first appear. Even today, the most popular Polish child is Urszula, the prematurely dead daughter of Kochanowski, to whom he devoted his *Laments*.

Yet the *Laments*, recognized as one of the outstanding poetic works of the European Renaissance, along with the rest of Kochanowski's writings, and the renown of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, the work of Copernicus, and the correspondence of the Polish King with Erasmus—all of this belongs both to the history of Poland and to the history of Europe. Like his contemporaries in other countries, the Polish Renaissance humanist, with his solid and multifaceted knowledge, was simultaneously a protagonist on the national stage and *l'uomo universale*. The equally natural coexistence of national and universal perspectives concerns all other historical periods. People resemble their fathers but also their contemporaries, as someone once said. Kościuszko was a hero of two nations, and his specific Polish character by no means prevented the poets of Germany and France from tying his person to the universal ideals of freedom. The free spirits of those times gathered in the Warsaw of the Four-Year Sejm with ardent hopes and curiosity just as did the foreign reporters who converged on Poland in 1956 and 1980.

The interweaving of the native and the universal is especially characteristic of Polish Romanticism as typified in the poems of Mickiewicz or the music of Chopin. The separateness of Romanticism in Poland is often cited, yet it was not only a literary phenomenon and an artistic novelty but also, if not above all, a political movement, a spiritual mission in the cause of national independence. Its messianic message linked Poland to the rest of the world and the rest of the world to Poland. The issue of Polish independence took on not only international but also metaphysical dimensions.

To the Romantics, freedom was indivisible, a political school of fraternity, an ecstatic flight of the independent spirit into the sky of the
impossible. The fates of nations were identified with the fate of this nation. The future of all free peoples was being decided in every confrontation with every tyranny, with no matter which of its demons and local acolytes. Polish Romanticism became a movement of spiritual energy which, like every other movement, could suffer defeat and failure, but which, unlike other movements, could not be stopped. The torrent went underground at times, but it did not cease to flow.

A special role in the formation of the Polish intelligentsia's attitudes was played by the dramas of Stanisław Wyspiański (1869–1907) and the writings of Stefan Żeromski (1864–1925). Without Mickiewicz, Wyspiański, and Żeromski, as one Polish poet has recently written, there would be no Poland. This statement needs no explanation in Poland, where the word retains its myth-making power and where the history of political ideas helps to create national reality to a no lesser—and sometimes to a much greater—degree than the history of political institutions. The constancy of national aspirations and the vitality of the public role played by the Polish intellectual yesterday and today would be inconceivable were this not so.

Wyspiański, one of the great innovators in modern theater—Gordon Craig counted him in the pantheon of European playwrights of that era—brought into being the monumental national drama aspired to by Mickiewicz, which on its enormous stage was to unite poetry with debate on current problems and with historical imagery. Żeromski, five years Wyspiański's senior, was a one-man moral institution. His novels educated at least three Polish generations in sensitivity to every man-

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IFESTATION OF NATIONAL MISERY AND SOCIAL INJUSTICE.

Zeromski’s protagonists, in revolt against such wrongs, usually stood alone and relied on their own spiritual reserves, not hesitating to sacrifice career or personal life or love. Some of them, such as Dr. Judym, hero of The Homeless People, became symbols of this sacrifice for service to society and points of reference not only in literary essays. One talked about them as if one knew them. Their fictional stories seemed to be the real biographies of our predecessors, their real lives. If Mickiewicz created the model of the Polish poet for 150 years, Zeromski, for his part, created the model of the Polish intellectual with his sense of obligatory responsibility for himself and for others.

His writing is also an example of the particularly close association between Poland’s political and literary history. The history of our literature is impregnated with politics because the long period of time in which Poland was deprived of a sovereign existence forced literature to take on social and political obligations, obligations that literature did not have in happier countries where, at most, one might wonder occasionally—as in post–World War II France—about the philosophical meaning of engagement. By the same token, the political history of our country is impregnated with literature. One would hardly have any idea about some of its periods without taking into account the role of books, of theater, or even of literary cafés (which were involved in the uprisings of 1830 and 1863).

In times closer to our own, it is not only books that serve as historical testimony but also open letters that concern matters of public import, signed by representatives of culture and learning. So do the histories of films and of theatrical performances and of the literary cabaret, in its professional or student versions. The banning of Mickiewicz’s Forefather’s Eve in 1968 was the direct cause of that year’s political and social events. The films of Andrzej Wajda have played not only an artistic but also a public role, and they have often drawn on literary sources. And it was on the stage of a literary cabaret that the song “Let Poland be Poland” was born, the song that was soon to become a slogan for the young generation who lived through the August miracle of 1980.

Ab urbe condita. From the founding of the city in its contemporary form, the Polish intellectual has been the go-between in the contacts of his own society with other cultures. These contacts, like the internalizing of history—that is, a view of history as communal biography, into which one’s own life is written—belong to the configuration of Polish culture. Simply put: They amount to accepted custom. Its nonobservance in any area—for instance, the absence at newsstands of the foreign press—as a rule testifies to bad times in cultural life. The Western character of Polish culture is not a matter of style; it is a fact that results both from religious inspirations—the presence of a Polish pope in the Vatican confirms their longevity and significance—and from humanistic traditions. These traditions, beginning with the Golden Age of the
Renaissance kingdom and continuing up to the aspirations of the last few years, display their specific traits related to the history and the place on earth of this nation. But they are far from local particularism and monothematic exaggeration.

There are reasons enough—Norman Davies has collected them recently in his book, *God's Playground: A History of Poland*—to justify even bitter exaggeration. But the people of this plain over which invaders' armies have so often rolled kept their faith in the sense of universal moral values in human actions. It is sometimes said that cynicism is more interesting in society and more useful in professional life. Perhaps. But it is an ally of enslavement. There is nothing that the world can do for us, but there is at least one thing we can do for the world: Tell it about our sacred naiveté and our unshakable belief in the freedom of choice. Even when the sense of life and the authenticity of everyday norms of behavior are upset, when, as a result of war or catastrophe, everything suddenly collapses and when people are deprived of the churches and institutions to which they are accustomed, the book collections, personal customs, people to talk to and work with, friends, they are still left with one last thing: a choice. Though taken out of public life, in physical danger, dependent on their inner spiritual resources, they can still choose between the cry of the jungle and their responsibility for themselves and the world.

◊ Some will say: Yes, but this concerns the more general issues of generations and the longevity of culture. What does this have to do with your own life and writing?

In the introduction I used the words "once again the earth had trembled under our feet." This is a travesty of a sentence written by Pascal when he described the earth tremor that shook his contemporaries, occasioned by popularization of the discoveries of Copernicus and Galileo. Our planet ceased to be the center of the cosmos, and this fact went hand in hand with a transformation of the European consciousness, a study of which has been written by Paul Hazard. It was the end of the world, one of many. And this is precisely what I had in mind, the end of the world with all its drama and grotesquery.

But why did I not dwell on this theme? It was probably a kind of self-censorship, unwittingly committed and which I, as a Polish writer, will not disown. There is already so much distress in the lives of my readers that it seems unworthy to add my own lament. Czeslaw Milosz wrote in one of his poems:

You could scream
Because mankind is mad,
But you, of all people, should not.

So, is it writing "to comfort the hearts"? This 19th-century device is indeed present in my thoughts. It must not be all that anachronistic or all that native, since it was adopted by William Faulkner. In any case, I do not emphasize the ends of the world that have been experienced by me, along with my generation, and perhaps this unconscious
impulse is limiting in my writing.

What is more, I feel it is my duty to defend every form of expression, even the most hermetic, regardless of any personal tastes. The defense of literature as a whole may condemn one to eclecticism, not to be expressed in one's own work but in the way one looks at cultural questions; an eclecticism that is related to the more general demands of pluralism and tolerance, to a feeling that authentic culture is a whole in which all of its spiritual families must function, be they close or distant to one's heart.

One might say: Polish Romantics, with all their political specificity, did indeed fight the Classicists ardently. But there were exceptions to this rule, and Adam Mickiewicz in his lectures at the Collège de France did not leave out the role played by his Classicist forerunners in shaping the views of his generation. One might also mention the syncretism of today's reflections on the history of culture. We have inherited all of its messages, and the poet Antoni Slonimski, for instance, in his writing, was an heir both to Romantic traditions and to the Rationalist trust of the Warsaw positivists of the 1870s. This alliance of Romanticism and Rationalism in time became the source not of a spiritual split but of the spiritual force that flowed from this type of interrelation. Remembering after many years the Declaration of Human Rights, which he had co-authored, and the text of which had been sent to wartime Poland, Slonimski asked himself: "Was it a naïve move to send these pious hopes to a country suffering the most cruel bondage?"

And he replied: "I think that something from our desires will, in some tiny quantity, find for itself a place in the future. I have learned to believe in the purposefulness of opposing lies, demagogy, and hypocrisy."

For me, this attitude is represented in the endeavors of the Polish intelligentsia in the past few decades. Not based on illusions, but originating in a feeling for history so natural that it evokes live persons and authentic voices, not shadows or echoes, it is a trust combined with a sense of reality, a trust confident of its rights.

As for the great earth tremors, the first one I experienced, along with my contemporaries, came in September 1939. The world in which we had grown up and which seemed to us as solid as rock suddenly collapsed. One had to begin a new life, underground, or in the Polish armed forces abroad, or in exile.

When I think about it today, I am struck by the naturalness of the impulse that made the then-young generation return to the traditions of the 19th-century uprisings and the conspiracies for independence that followed them. These boys had their first taste of battle right after high school, and they did not see themselves as volunteers, which they were in reality. They were simply fulfilling an obligation coded in their minds. The Polish army of that time, dominated by reserve officers from the intelligentsia, also recalled its historic forerunners. It was a wandering Poland, with a press network and school system, with social institutions that watched over civilian exiles, with its own theaters, and with quite an intensive—considering the situation—cultural life.
My first volume of poetry was printed in the Middle East and I received the first copy on the Italian front. Our wartime officers' school terminated in the toast: "To moral courage."

From wartime, I have preserved in my memory another sentence worth mentioning. It was delivered at some difficult moment by a British general and, as it turns out, I adopted it for life: "Gentlemen: The situation is hopeless, but we are too stupid to lose this war."

The currents and actors within the intellectual traditions I have attempted to describe: How do they affect my everyday life and those of my friends? I believe that they are reality itself, not only a symbolic reality, and that they sometimes decide the course of our biographies.

I have mentioned the events of 1968. The protest launched by a group of Warsaw writers against the banning of Forefather's Eve influenced their personal fates in the years to come. The Polish PEN Club was founded by Zeromski, and this to a great extent determined the moral posture and the social role of this association to which, in recent years, I have given much of my time and energies. Over the years, my friends have turned quite naturally to the works of Wyspianski and Zeromski: Antoni Słonimski wrote a screenplay based on Zeromski's Before the Spring; Andrzej Wajda created a film version of Zeromski's Ashes; Andrzej Kijowski adapted Wyspianski's The Wedding for another Wajda film. One can hardly list all such ties and continuities that belong to the pulsating reality of life and art.

In everyday life, this reality has comprised the shared hopes and warm relationships that have connected past and present. Antoni Słonimski, the former poet of the Skamander group, and his wife were frequently our guests. Together with Antoni, a whole world of reminiscences would walk into our home, a world that lived in his stories and anecdotes and in his very presence. Antoni's apartment in Aleja Róż was for decades a meeting place for the elite of Warsaw's intelligentsia. Its seniors were professor Edward Lipiński, the distinguished economist whose public activities began during the 1905 revolution and ended with his close collaboration with the independent workers' movement of the 1970s and '80s; and professor Stanisław Lorentz, the eminent director since 1936 of the National Museum, a rare example of this kind of continuity in Polish history. The youngest habitués were angry young men, whose names were to become well known over the years and whose fates currently cause anxiety. Among the other frequent guests were Monika Zeromska, the writer's daughter, and Karol Estreicher from Kraków, the last representative of several generations of professors at the Jagiellonian University.

At least three generations of Poland's intelligentsia were represented in this one place. Their common presence together with their common activities served in the postwar years as evidence of the continuity of spiritual life.

I write these words at a time when this life, after a new earthquake, begins a new period, and no one can yet know what forms of survival it will find.
"The lands of the Slavs are the coldest of all... When people breathe, icicles form on their beards, as if made of glass...."

Thus, in 965 A.D., in the report of a Moorish Jew, Ibrahim-Ibn-Jakub, a diplomat from Cordoba, did the land now called Poland make its debut in recorded history. And thus do we learn of Mieszko I, self-styled King of the North and chief of the Polonians.

Mieszko was betrothed to a Bohemian princess, Dubravka, the same year Ibrahim paid his visit. And in 966, as part of the marriage agreement, he embraced Christianity. "Of all his feats," writes Norman Davies in his splendid, two-volume God's Playground: A History of Poland (Columbia, 1982), "none but his baptism was permanent. By this one act, he brought his people into the world of Western culture and Latin literacy."

Mieszko's son, Boleslaw I Chrobry ("the Brave") became in 1024, with papal approval, the first crowned King of Poland. The new kingdom fared relatively well in its first century. But in 1138, Boleslaw III Krzywousty ("the Wry-Mouthed") left a will dividing the realm among numerous sons. Fragmentation invited incursions by Czechs, Prussians, and Russians, usurpation of vast tracts by the Teutonic Knights, and ultimately, in 1241, invasion by the Mongols.

During such periods of distress, Václav L. Beneš and Norman J. G. Pounds note, the church in Poland (Westview, 1976) was "the chief instrument in perpetuating the concept of a single, united Polish state."

Not until the 14th century were Poland's pieces reassembled into a single unit. The architect was Casimir III, the only Polish monarch ever to gain the epithet "the Great" from his people. Casimir reformed Poland's currency, codified its laws, promoted commerce, transformed Kraków from a city of wood into a city of stone, and founded a university there in 1364.

Casimir's chief failing was that he did not perpetuate his line.

Succession passed briefly to Louis of Anjou, and then in 1384 to his daughter, Jadwiga. A year later, at age 11, she was forced to marry the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jagiello, a pagan. Jagiello converted to Christianity, defeated many foes, and made the federated state of Poland-Lithuania into a strong European power.

Under the Jagiellons, Poland entered its Złoty Wiek, its Golden Age. This was the era of Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543) and the great poet Jan Kochanowski (1530–84). The flavor of the period is well caught in The History of Polish Literature (New York: Macmillan, 1969) by Czesław Miłosz, who carries the story up through the late 1960s.

The last of the Jagiellons died in 1569. Poland became a Rzeczpospolita (Republic or Commonwealth) under an elected monarch and with a bicameral Sejm, or Parliament, composed of nobles. In practice, certain peculiarities of this system abetted the nation's gradual decline into anarchy. After 1717, Poland was little more than an appendage of tsarist Russia. By the end of the century, as Lord George John Eversley relates in The Partitions of Poland (Dodd, 1st ed., 1915; Fertig, 1973), the country...
no longer existed.

That an independent Poland was reestablished at the end of World War I was a caprice of history. Nationalists such as Roman Dmowski and Józef Piłsudski realized that the war on the eastern front was a conflict among the partitioning powers—and hence represented an opportunity. Russia and her foes, Germany and Austria, competed with promises of future autonomy to secure the wartime loyalty of their Polish subjects, and two million Poles fought in three armies.

As it happened, Poland's renaissance resulted from the withdrawal of Russia from the war in the wake of the October Revolution in 1917 and the collapse of the Central Powers a year later.

Piłsudski arrived by train in Warsaw on November 10, 1918, and on the following day stepped into the vacuum, taking control of what would become, after Versailles, the Polish Republic.

The story is told in Titus Komarnicki's 776-page Rebirth of the Polish Republic (Heinemann, 1957) and in Hans Roos's concise A History of Modern Poland (Knopf, 1966).

Poland's experience between the wars was one of intellectual and cultural vitality, political turbulence, and, as the Depression set in, economic hardship—presided over by the dictatorial but somehow reassuring figure of Piłsudski (who seized power in a coup d'état in 1926). His death in 1935, Roos writes, "seemed a catastrophe, a forewarning of dark days to come."

The dark days arrived four years later with Poland's dismemberment by Hitler and Stalin. The Poles' ordeal is described by the last chief of the Polish resistance, Stefan Korbutonski, in Fighting Warsaw (Funk & Wagnalls, 1968).

Other worthwhile accounts of the war years include Jan Nowak's Courier from Warsaw (Wayne State Univ., 1982), Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski's The Secret Army (New York: Macmillan, 1951), George Bruce's The Warsaw Uprising (Hart-Davis, 1972), and Edward Rozek's Allied Wartime Diplomacy (Wiley, 1958).

There was no Poland when Władysław Gomułka, future party boss of the Polish People's Republic, was born in 1905. Nicholas Bethell traces his volatile career in Gomułka: His Poland and His Communism (Holt, 1969, cloth; Penguin, rev. ed., 1972), which does double duty as a survey of Poland's postwar evolution under communism.

Two other fine accounts of contemporary Poland are Peter Raina's Political Opposition in Poland, 1954-1977 (Poets and Painters Press, 1978, cloth & paper), and Neal Ascherson's journalistic The Polish August (Viking, 1982), which focuses on the Solidarity era and culminates with the imposition of martial law "in the snowy darkness of Sunday, 13 December 1981."

What the future holds for Poland is the subject of a book not yet written, but whose epigraph could well be a quote from Rousseau: "If you cannot prevent your enemies from swallowing you whole, at least you must do what you can to prevent them from digesting you."

EDITOR'S NOTE: Books were suggested for this essay by Wilson Center Fellows Maria Turlejska and Artur A. Miedzyrzecki.
IN PRAISE OF ERASMUS

"I wish to be called a citizen of the world," wrote Desiderius Erasmus in 1522. Every country in Western Europe tried to claim as its own Erasmus of Rotterdam, the peripatetic man of letters who shunned the public spotlight in favor of a quiet study—wherever he could find it. In 1974, the University of Toronto Press launched an effort to translate into English the complete Latin works of this prodigiously productive scholar. Nine volumes of The Collected Works of Erasmus, including his Adages, have already been published. Sixty-six more volumes are to come. Here, historian Paul F. Grendler describes the life of the wandering Dutchman, the intellectual arbiter of his age, the man of whom Sir Thomas More once said, "Wherever he is, he scatters abroad, as the sun its rays, his wonderful riches."

by Paul F. Grendler

In the summer of 1524, Desiderius Erasmus gave to publisher Johann Froben of Basel, Switzerland, his long-awaited public statement on Martin Luther, who, by publishing his 95 Theses seven years before, seemed to have declared war on the Roman Catholic Church—his own church and that of Erasmus. Erasmus's book, De libero arbitrio (Discourse on Free Will) appeared on September 1. All of literate Europe turned to it at once to learn whether Erasmus supported or condemned Luther's demands—and ideas—for radical reform of the Church. Would he offer or withhold his endorsement? The question was not academic; Erasmus was not only among the most respected men in Europe but also one of the most well known, and his books had sold more copies than anyone else's.

Ever since that time, many scholars and much of the interested public have tended to judge Erasmus on the basis of his
role in the Lutheran controversy, as if this were his most important contribution to history.

It was not. Erasmus matters most as the intellectual leader of his age, as the apostle of good learning and good morals—learning and morals based on the classics of both pagan and Christian antiquity. He was so powerful an advocate that Western culture and society have yet to escape his influence.

Erasmus's early life was inauspicious. He was born in the Netherlands city of Gouda, 12 miles from Rotterdam, in 1466, 1467, or 1469. (Erasmus was never sure of the date.) He did know one important, damaging detail: He was the son of a priest. Little is known of the circumstances, although Erasmus told a romantic yarn about his illegitimacy in his Compendium vitae Erasmi (1524).

According to the story, Erasmus's father and mother were living together in Gouda, intending to marry as soon as they could overcome strong familial objections. When his father was on a journey to Rome, his relatives sent word—falsely—that his
pregnant mistress had died. In sorrow and despair, Erasmus's father became a priest—only to return home to discover that his beloved was alive and well, with a baby boy. It is a fine story, with one difficulty: It fails to take into account the existence of Erasmus's older brother, born three years earlier. The truth of the matter is probably more straightforward and less defensible: Erasmus and his brother were products of priestly concubinage, the sort of clerical immorality that Martin Luther later denounced in fiery terms.

Erasmus's parents saw to it that he received a good early education, first at Gouda, then at Deventer in a school run by the Brethren of the Common Life, a loosely structured religious community whose members did not become priests. The Brethren, who eschewed questions of religious dogma in favor of living simply and emulating Christ, gave Erasmus a solid, if conventional, introduction to the Latin classics.

But in 1480 and 1481, Erasmus's parents died of the plague. The boy's guardians sent him and his brother to another school run by the Brethren of the Common Life at 's Hertogenbosch. In the boys' absence, their small inheritance disappeared. What was to become of the two illegitimate, penniless, orphaned sons of a priest? His guardians pressured Erasmus to take monastic orders. An embittered Erasmus later complained that his guardians had squandered his inheritance and then colluded with his teachers to ship him, unwilling, to a monastery. The facts, however, seem to be that he freely joined the Augustinian monastery at Steyn, near Gouda, where he professed his vows in 1487 and became a priest in 1492. The monastic life offered Erasmus what he wanted more than anything else in life, the opportunity to devote himself to his studies.

Erasmus was driven, as he later described it, by "an occult force of nature" to study literature. Like many other intellec-

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Perhaps Erasmus's best-loved work, the satirical Encomium moriae was dedicated, "as a keepsake from a friend," to Sir Thomas More, whose name, says Erasmus, inspired the punning title, which can be translated into English either as The Praise of Folly or as The Praise of More. The work is a light-hearted speech by the goddess Folly lauding herself and all things foolish. After celebrating certain of her foolish fellow gods and goddesses—Bacchus, Cupid, Venus—Folly turns her attention to humankind:

But now the time has come when, following the pattern of Homer, we should turn our backs on the heavens and travel down again to earth, where likewise we shall perceive nothing joyous or fortunate except by my favor. First of all, you see with what foresight nature, the source and artificer of the human race, has made provision that this race shall never lack its seasoning of folly. For since, by the Stoic definitions, wisdom is no other than to be governed by reason, while folly is to be moved at the whim of the passions, Jupiter, to the end, obviously, that the life of mankind should not be sad and harsh, put in—how much more of passions than of reason? Well, the proportions run about one pound to half an ounce. Besides, he imprisoned reason in a cramped corner of the head, and turned over all the rest of the body to the emotions. After that he instated two most violent tyrants, as it were, in opposition to reason: anger, which holds the citadel of the breast, and consequently the very spring of life, the heart; and lust, which rules a broad empire lower down, even to the privy parts. How much reason is good for, against these twin forces, the ordinary life of men sufficiently reveals when reason—and it is all she can do—shouts out her prohibitions until she is hoarse and dictates formulas of virtue. But the passions simply bid their so-called king go hang himself, and more brazenly roar down the opposition, until the man, tired out as well, willingly yields and knuckles under.

existence and man's life, and the relations between them. Later medieval philosophers such as William of Ockham (c. 1285–c. 1349) accepted the terms of discussion—logical syllogisms, definitions of being, essence, or quidditas (“whatness”)—but questioned Scholasticism's answers. That is, Ockham did not deny God or his universe, but he doubted whether the human mind could know much about them. The ensuing debates, arcane and technical, alienated those intellectuals who simply wanted to know how to live well and to serve God—among them, the Renaissance Humanists.

Italy, then the commercial, industrial, and intellectual center of Europe, was the birthplace of humanistic studies. Scholars such as Leonardo Bruni (1370–1444) and Lorenzo Valla (1407–57) developed the new humanistic studies; schoolmasters like Guarino of Verona (1374–1460) and Vittorino da Feltre (c. 1378–1446) taught them to future princes and scholars. Humanistic studies transformed the intellectual landscape of Italy and two generations later moved north. A pioneer northerner, Rodolphus Agricola of Germany, who was born the year Bruni died, studied with Guarino in Italy, then returned to Germany during the 1480s to spread humanistic studies.

Like the Italians, the Northern Humanists turned to the great men of classical antiquity—the poets Vergil and Ovid, the historians Livy and Sallust, the dramatist Terence, and the orator Cicero. Medieval thinkers were not ignorant of these authors (though certain of their texts had yet to be rediscovered: Cicero's *Letters to Atticus* was brought to light by Petrarch in the middle of the 14th century; his *De oratore*, in 1421). Rather, medieval Scholastics selectively chose concepts from the ancient classics, inserting them into their own philosophical and theological system.

Renaissance Humanists, on the other hand, studied the classics in the context of ancient Roman and Greek civilization. But the humanists also looked to the ancients for practical guidance—advice on the conduct of affairs, wisdom for raising a family, and moral courage for confronting life's painful choices. Finally, paradoxically, the humanists fervently believed that the pagan authors could help Christians live virtuously enough in this life to achieve salvation in the next. Cicero and Vergil, so the humanists contended, taught the same Christian morality as the New Testament.

Above all, Renaissance Humanists admired the good Latin (and Greek, if they mastered it) of the ancients. Classical Latin was eloquent and grand, sensitive and majestic; it was a mature language, capable of expressing the most sublime and complex
thoughts—just the opposite of the serviceable, but jargon-ridden and technical Latin of medieval Scholastics. On one thing Scholastics and humanists were agreed: They rejected vernacular languages. Italian and English might be adequate for such light literature as Petrarch’s sonnets or Chaucer’s *Canterbury Tales*, but they were insufficiently mature to bear weighty thoughts.

Erasmus devoted himself to the classics in the monastery at Steyn. He soon lost patience with his fellow monks and his superiors, many of whom criticized the “pagan” *studia humanitatis*. At this time he wrote his first book, *Antibarbarorum liber* (*The Book against the Barbarians*, not published until 1522), an attack on those members of religious orders “barbaric” enough to reject classical authors. Erasmus had no trouble justifying his own pursuit of the new humanistic learning: “All studies, philosophy, rhetoric, are followed for this one object, that we may know Christ and honor him. This is the end of all learning and eloquence.”

To broaden his studies and to make a name for himself, Erasmus embarked, in 1492, on a career outside the monastery. He served briefly as secretary to a bishop and as a tutor, and he sought patrons. He spent most of the years 1495–99 studying theology at the prestigious Collège de Montaigu, at the University of Paris. But Erasmus hated the rotten eggs and spoiled herring that bulked large in the student diet, and he found Paris’s intellectual fare—late medieval Scholasticism—even worse. He complained that his teachers talked as familiarly of hell as if they had been there. One of Erasmus’s later fictional characters (in his *Colloquies*) greets a new acquaintance from Montaigu College by saying, “You come to us full of learning.” The acquaintance responds, “No—full of lice.” In fact, Erasmus developed in Paris a lifelong antipathy to universities. Although offered many appointments, he agreed to teach at only one—at Cambridge from 1511 to 1514.

Erasmus also disliked intensely the other type of sinecure that intellectuals commonly sought to earn a living: secretarial posts in princely courts. He was willing to accept the occasional position as tutor to a young noble if it offered the opportunity to travel. And he wrote letters and orations flattering princes to obtain gifts and pensions. Gradually he acquired just enough income to scrape by. He also acquired a large circle of friends.
ERASMUS AND LUTHER

*From a letter written by Erasmus to Albert of Brandenberg, Cardinal of Mainz, October 19, 1519:*

I was sorry that Luther's books were published; and when some or other of his writings first came into view, I made every effort to prevent their publication, chiefly because I feared a disturbance might result from them. Luther had written, in my opinion, a very Christian letter to me, and I replied, advising him in passing not to write anything seditious, nor against the Roman pontiff, nor too arrogantly and passionately, but rather to preach the Gospel teaching in a sincere spirit and with all gentleness. I did this politely, so to accomplish more. I added that there were some here who favored him, with the hope that he might adapt himself more readily to their judgment. Certain simpletons have interpreted this to mean that I favor Luther. Since none of these men have admonished Luther up to now, I alone have admonished him. I am neither Luther's accuser nor his defender, nor am I answerable for him. I would not dare to judge the spirit of the man, for that is a most difficult task, especially when it is a question of his condemnation. Yet, if I were favorably inclined to him as a good man, which even his enemies admit him to be, or as one oppressed, following the dictates of humanity—indeed, as one oppressed by those who under the false pretext of being devout fight against learning—if I were inclined thus to take his part, what reproach would there be, provided I did not become involved myself in his cause? In short, I think it is only Christian to support Luther this far, for if he is innocent, I do not want him crushed by a faction of rogues, and if he is in error, I wish him to be corrected, not destroyed.


who appreciated his learning enough to offer him extended periods of hospitality. He made his first trip to England in 1499, where he met the young Thomas More, a man, Erasmus said, “born and created for friendship.” The Englishman who was later to give his life rather than allow his Prince, Henry VIII, to dictate his religious convictions attracted Erasmus irresistibly by his wit and charm: “If he were to lay it upon me that I join in a rope dance, I would readily comply,” Erasmus confessed.

In early 1506, he accepted employment as tutor to Alexan-
der Stewart, son of the King of Scotland, who wished to visit Italy. In Venice he joined the charmed circle of scholars, editors, and printers, who learned, worked, and dined together under the roof of Aldus Manutius (c. 1450–1515), founder of the Aldine Press, publisher of distinguished editions of Greek and Latin classics. Here Erasmus perfected his Greek.

Erasmus began his real public career in 1500 with the publication of the Adagia (Adages), his first book to see print. Thereafter, Erasmus shaped European opinion by the written and printed word. In addition to his numerous books, some 4,000 of his letters survive—the largest private correspondence of his age. The letters run the gamut from everyday matters discussed in a few lines (to the Swiss physician Paracelsus, he wrote hastily in 1527 seeking a remedy for kidney stones: “As I told you, I have no time for the next few days to be doctored, or to be ill, or to die, so overwhelmed am I with scholarly work”) to 50-page discussions of important contemporary issues. Erasmus corresponded with almost every learned man in Europe, with kings, popes, ministers of state and civic leaders, not to mention old friends without claim to importance. Erasmus wrote his letters knowing that they would be passed from hand to hand, copied, and eventually printed. The last point is the key one: Erasmus was the first intellectual who shaped European elite opinion by means of the press.

Johann Gutenberg and his associates had invented and brought together the technical processes that made possible movable type in Mainz, Germany, about 1450, though it took half a century before presses became numerous, their products cheap, and the network for distributing and selling books comprehensive enough for the printing press to become a means of mass communication. But by 1500, practically every small city and town had a printing press. Luther’s Wittenberg, a small university town in Saxony of about 2,000 souls, had one. And because printing developed so quickly that it left state and church regulations far behind, each printer was free to print what he pleased, unhampered by copyright laws. If a new book sold well, numerous publishers obtained copies and printed it. Within a few years, a book originally published in Basel might be selling under varying imprints in Strasbourg, Cologne, Antwerp, Paris, London, Lyon, Venice, and Florence without recompense for the original publisher or author.

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Erasmus’s popular satirical work, *Encomium moriae (The Praise of Folly)*, to take one example, first appeared in 1509, followed over the next 15 years by 40 more printings with an average press run of 1,000 copies. The original publisher issued but seven. Forty printings of 1,000 copies each may seem small by the standards of 1983, but the combined population of Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the British Isles was only 47 million in 1500. And only a minority of Europeans could read. (Thomas More speculated that in a major urban center like London, 60 percent of the people could read. Modern scholars doubt that the figure was that high in cities, and suspect very few rural dwellers were literate.) And even fewer could read Latin.

One of Erasmus’s major goals in writing was to bring all literate Europeans, not just scholars, to a better knowledge of the classics. In this respect, the most important of his works was the *Adages*, a collection of proverbs derived from the Latin and Greek classics. The first, quite small edition of 1500 contained 818 adages, accompanied by brief discussions of their origins and, often, witty essays satirizing human foibles. The last of many revisions (1536) had become a very large folio volume containing over 4,000 adages. Sometimes called “the world’s largest bedside book,” the *Adages* was for a century and a half the volume from which European writers and speakers culled proverbs and anecdotes to adorn their own literary efforts.

While in one sense a study of literature, the *Adages* might also be called an educational work. Erasmus wrote numerous others: advice on designing a curriculum of study, a manual for teachers on how to practice their craft, a guide to writing letters (based on the classics, of course), a concise primer of Latin grammar and syntax, another on the correct pronunciation of Latin and Greek, and a tract addressed to parents on “civilizing” their offspring.

Erasmus’s educational advice was as sensible as it was learned. Should a girl be educated? His reply was “yes, certainly!” In his view, a girl was much more likely to grow up virtuous and sensible if she attended school. The worst possible policy was to keep her at home, locked in the company of foolish and ignorant servants and grandmothers. Erasmus stopped short, though, of recommending that a girl attend university. He argued that since a woman had no public role to play (which
was perfectly true in his day), she did not need university training. His notion that a girl should be sent out of the home to elementary and secondary schools was daring enough in the 16th century.

Erasmus was not always so good-natured; he was also the age's sharpest and most persistent critic of religious and political sin, an intense reformer who hated war and hypocrisy. One of his chief targets was the Renaissance papacy. The popes, supposedly promoters of peace and virtue, instead bought and sold offices, broke their vows, and waged war rather than preached peace. One of the worst offenders was Pope Julius II (1503–13), a central figure in the European political struggle and the leader of a military campaign to reconquer parts of the papal states that had drifted out of his control. An anonymous satire, entitled Julius excludus (Julius Excluded), began to circulate in 1513, after Julius's death.

In the satire, Pope Julius demands admittance to heaven. St. Peter questions him at the gate:

Peter: What did you do on earth?
Julius: I revamped the finances, increased the revenue, annexed Bologna, beat Venice, harassed Ferrara.... I killed some thousands of the French, broke treaties, and celebrated gorgeous triumphs. I did this not by learning—I had none—nor by my popularity—I was hated—nor by my clemency—I was tough.

Peter: Tell me now. Why did you attack Bologna?
Julius: No.
Peter: Why then?
Julius: I needed the revenue!
Peter: Why did you harass Ferrara?
Julius: I needed it for my son.
Peter: What? Popes with wives and sons!
Julius: No wives, just sons.

Erasmus denied authorship of Julius Excluded, but not very convincingly. Renaissance contemporaries and most scholars today agree that he wrote it.

Julius Excluded typified the negative side of Erasmus's messages to Christians; the positive side was a call to men to follow the ethical example of Christ without worrying about theological complexities, dogma, or Church practices. Erasmus was
ERASMUS ON RELIGIOUS RELICS

In A Pilgrimage for Religion’s Sake (1526), several fictional characters discuss the shrine of St. Thomas Becket at Canterbury Cathedral. The pilgrim, Ogygius, recounts to a friend his visit to the crypt where the saint’s bones rest:

Leaving this place, we went into the crypt. It has its own custodians. First is shown the martyr’s skull, pierced through. The top of the cranium is bared for kissing, the rest covered with silver. . . . From here we return to the choir. On the north side mysteries are laid open. It is wonderful how many bones were brought forth—skulls, jaws, teeth, hands, fingers, whole arms, all of which we adored and kissed. This would have gone on forever if my fellow pilgrim [Gratian], a disagreeable chap, had not cut short the enthusiasm of a guide. . . . An arm was brought forth, with the bloodstained flesh still on it. He shrank from kissing this, looking rather disgusted. The custodian soon put his things away. Next we viewed the altar table and ornaments; then the objects that were kept under the altar—all of them splendid; you’d say Midas and Croesus were beggars if you saw the quantity of gold and silver. . . . My friend Gratian made a faux pas here. After a short prayer, he asked the keeper, “I say, good father, is it true, as I’ve heard, that in his lifetime Thomas was most generous to the poor?” “Very true,” the man replied, and began to rehearse the saint’s many acts of kindness to them. . . . Gratian, who’s impulsive, said, “For my part, I’m convinced the saint would even rejoice that in death, too, he could relieve the wants of the poor by his riches.” At this the custodian frowned and pursed his lips, looking at us with Gorgon eyes, and I don’t doubt he would have driven us from the church with insults and reproaches had he not been aware that we were recommended by the archbishop. I managed to placate the fellow by smooth talk, affirming that Gratian hadn’t spoken seriously, but liked to joke; and at the same time I gave him some coins.

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Convinced that the best way to get men to follow Christ was to encourage them to read the basic texts of Christianity, chiefly the New Testament and the writings of the early Church Fathers, such as Augustine, Basil, Chrysostom, Cyprian, Jerome, and Origen. Erasmus devoted much of his scholarly life to immense editorial labor designed to make these books available in accurate, unadulterated texts.

His 1516 edition of the New Testament, the first ever published in Greek, marked a systematic attempt to recover the very words of the language in which it was originally written.
Hitherto, the New Testament had been available to Renaissance Christians in the Latin “Vulgate” translation done from the original Greek by St. Jerome around 400 A.D.—the only version authorized by the Catholic Church. But Jerome’s translation was neither perfect, nor adequate for scholars, who gradually realized that their studies should be based on the original version.

Erasmus met this need; he based his Greek New Testament on four surviving Greek manuscripts, made a number of emendations correcting errors in Jerome’s translation, and added critical notes. Perhaps his most controversial change was to omit from the first letter of John the verse (1 John 5:7) traditionally used to prove the existence of the Trinity: “For there are three that bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit: and these three are one.” The verse did not exist in any of the Greek manuscripts he had assembled, and Erasmus, true to his scholarly principles, left it out, earning, for his trouble, a storm of clerical criticism. His New Testament was far from perfect; nevertheless, it was the pioneering work that inaugurated modern biblical studies. Everyone, from Luther on, used Erasmus’s Greek New Testament. It underwent at least 60 printings during Erasmus’s lifetime, and was not completely superseded until the 19th century.

Erasmus provided the Greek New Testament for scholars. For the rest of his audience, he wrote Latin paraphrases of the books of the New Testament, based on the Greek edition. In the paraphrases, he retold in simple language the story of Christ and the Apostles: “We are furnishing the Scriptures of Christian reading so that in the future more people may make use of this holy philosophy.” To Erasmus, following “the philosophy of Christ” meant, first of all, understanding the words of Christ in their original purity and simplicity, free of theological and ecclesiastical commentary.

Erasmus believed that everyone could profit from reading Scriptures: “the farmer, the tailor, the mason, prostitutes, pimps, and Turks,” as he put it in the preface to his paraphrase of the book of Matthew. He strongly endorsed the idea of translating Holy Scripture into the vernacular languages: “Would that the farmer might sing some portions of them at the plow, the weaver hum some parts of them to the movement of his shuttle, the traveler lighten the weariness of the journey with
Oddly, Erasmus himself could not translate the Scriptures into vernacular languages. Although he sojourned in the Netherlands, Belgium, England, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, he commanded no vernacular language beyond his childhood Dutch. He wrote and published exclusively in Latin and Greek; he never wrote a single book in any vernacular.

From 1500 to the 1520s, Erasmus dominated European discussion of religion, classical scholarship, biblical and patristic studies, education, and moral and political commentary. Then there appeared a barely visible cloud in the horizon. Martin Luther, an unknown friar who taught at Wittenberg, a third-rate university on the fringe of Europe, began his stormy public career in 1517. At first, Erasmus welcomed Luther as a fellow humanistic reformer. He wrote to Luther approving his criticism of greedy churchmen and of such superstitions as the worship of relics—both frequent targets of Erasmus’s own barbs.

Erasmus urged church officials to heed rather than repress Luther. “I know of no one who does not commend his life,” wrote Erasmus in 1519 to Frederick of Saxony, Luther’s prince. “Yet no one admonishes him, no one instructs, no one corrects. They simply cry heresy.”

But as Luther’s criticism of Catholicism became more abusive, Erasmus became increasingly troubled. “Let us not devour each other like fish,” he wrote in response to a stinging attack by Luther’s associate and Erasmus’s former friend Ulrich von Hutten. “The world is full of rage, hate, and wars. What will the end be?” Realizing that religious differences would degenerate into political warfare, he counseled moderation to Luther, suggesting that he would win souls more through love than through vituperation. But Luther could not compromise with what he viewed as the “Antichrist” in Rome. He upbraided Erasmus: “You with your peace-loving theology, you don’t care about the truth. The light is not to be put under a bushel, even if the whole world goes to smash.”

For its part, the papacy could not stand idly by while, in its view, Luther “led souls to hell” by establishing an heretical Protestant Church. Erasmus was squarely, unhappily, in the middle.

In the Discourse on Free Will (1524), Erasmus finally rejected Luther. He specifically repudiated Luther’s doctrine of predestination and human depravity, the notion that man cannot merit salvation through his own efforts. “Since the fall of Adam,” argued Luther, “free will exists only in name, and when it does what it can, it commits sin.” Only God, concluded
Luther, may, for his own reasons, choose to save sinful man.

Erasmus, not surprisingly, asserted the importance of man's reason and good works. Man can choose freely to do evil or good; if he chooses to do good, he can merit eternal salvation. Otherwise, asks Erasmus, "What wicked fellow would henceforth try to better his conduct?"

Luther, predictably furious, denounced Erasmus. But Erasmus had angered Catholics as well. Though he differed with Luther about man's nature, he continued to assert that he found much to admire in Luther. Nor would Erasmus write a treatise endorsing papal supremacy over the Christian Church.

In such works as Liber de Sarcienda ecclesiae concordia (On Mending the Peace of the Church) of 1533, Erasmus continued to try to play the mediator between Catholic and Protestant. But Catholic assailed him as the man who, by his earlier criticism of the church, had prepared the way for Luther's break. "Erasmus laid the egg that Luther hatched," went the old saw. Lutherans looked upon Erasmus with contempt, accusing him of cowardice, of failing to follow his convictions and join Luther. In 1536, Erasmus died in Basel, a disheartened man.

But if 16th-century Catholics and Protestants, locked in open warfare, came to scorn Erasmus, they accepted his scholarly and literary program, which endured for centuries. Erasmus laid out the agenda: good letters and good morals, scholarship and civilized discourse based on the pagan and Christian classics of antiquity. More than any other single individual, he was instrumental in establishing a classical education as the prerequisite for the learned and civil elite of Europe and North America well into the 20th century. His immense scholarly labors bore fruit a thousandfold as generations of scholars continued his work. And his penetrating common sense passed quietly into the heritage of the Western world.
When this issue of Detective Library appeared in 1883, the term "mugger" had already replaced "footpad." One hundred years later, the nature of crime has changed less than our thinking about crime. The 19th-century views of Cesare Lombroso—that criminals are born, not made—gave way in the mid-20th century to a critique of society itself. "The underlying causes of crime," former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark wrote in 1970, "will crumble before the forces of social change." Others are doubtful.
Crime

Is there a solution to the problem of crime? During the mid-1960s, politicians, police officers, and academic researchers were more confident of the answer than they are today, even as their proposed solutions varied from the harsh to the paternal. Two decades, hundreds of experiments, and billions of dollars later, high rates of crime persist—resistant, it seems, to wars on poverty, tougher sentencing, or serious attempts at offender "rehabilitation." In Crime and Public Policy, to be published in May by the Institute for Contemporary Studies, Harvard's James Q. Wilson stresses that "we offer no 'magic bullet' that will produce safe streets or decent people." What Wilson and his 10 contributors do offer is some fresh thinking. They also puncture a few strong myths. We draw from their work in the essays that follow on crime trends and types of offenders, on the criminal justice system, and on the relationship of crime to family life.

TRENDS AND TARGETS

by Jan M. Chaiken and Marcia R. Chaiken

Fifty years ago, crime was not regarded by the average urban American as a chronic threat to his family and his property. The wanton disorder in U.S. cities during the last half of the 19th century had steadily declined. Immigrants, impoverished but more or less peaceable, had occupied once-dangerous hellholes, places like Buffalo's Canal Street or Manhattan's notorious Five Points. There were still areas, of course, in both town and country, that had a deservedly evil reputation. Here there was no lack of pickpocketing, prostitution, or predatory violence. But if one kept away, one was reasonably safe. The most dangerous criminals, and the most professional, might prey on the rich, or on banks, or on each other, but the ordinary city-dweller did not feel he was taking his safety into his own hands every time he walked outside at night, and he did not necessarily lock his door when he did so. When newspaper headlines trumpeted "Crime Wave," they were referring to warfare among gangsters. On such occasions, the city morgue might fill up, but not with law-abiding friends and relatives.
Since World War II, all that has changed. Crime, like television, has come into the living room—and into the church, the lobbies of public buildings, the parks, the shopping malls, the bus stations, the airport parking lots, the subways, the schools. In 1981, 25 million American households were touched by crime. Crime and the fear of crime have spread from "traditional" high crime areas into once-serene urban neighborhoods, from the central city to outlying suburbs and towns, and into summer resorts and college campuses. One Florida village, Golden Beach, preyed on by car-born youths from nearby Miami, recently erected permanent barriers on all but one of the public roads giving access to the community. On the one open road, it installed a metal gate manned by security guards 24 hours a day. "We're circling the wagons in case of attack," Golden Beach's mayor explained. Many Americans have altered their behavior in less drastic ways, but in the big cities, vigilance is often the price of safety—at home and in the streets.

There is little comfort in the knowledge that, when viewed over a long stretch of time, crime rates in the United States (as in the rest of the developed world) have been trending downward for more than a century. The homicide rate in this country in 1960 was one-fifth the rate in 1860. In Boston, between 1849 and 1951, crimes that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) today characterizes as "major" declined by two-thirds. Of course, the descending slope has been marked from time to time by reversals of about a decade's duration—after the Civil War, for example, and during the 1920s. The most recent eruption has had Americans worried, judging by the polls, since the early days of Lyndon Johnson's administration, and that fear has not abated. If anything, it has grown.

Thus, the 1981 report of the U.S. Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime—the latest of many such blue-ribbon reports—

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Crimes of theft—personal larceny, household larceny, and household burglary, in that order—are by far the most common types of criminal offenses. Robbery and burglary are more likely to strike black households than white households, and burglary disproportionately afflicts households with incomes less than $7,500.

commissions—noted that "millions of our fellow citizens are being held hostage" by an epidemic of crime. The United States, its authors warned, faced a "crisis situation." In that same year, the Gallup Poll asked: "Is there more crime in [your] area than there was a year ago, or less?" Some 54 percent of the respondents said more, up 11 points since 1977. Only eight percent said less. In 1982, as during the late 1960s and '70s, the large number of "law and order" candidates in state, local, and congressional races demonstrated once again that crime and the fear of crime had yet to lose their salience as campaign issues.

There is no question that Americans are worried about serious crime, and they may well be more worried now than they were a decade ago. Whether they ought to be is another matter. Perceptions often lag behind the data. Today, the academic specialists who study crime, while not denying that fear does exist or that a considerable degree of fear is warranted, are taking a more sanguine view of what is happening to actual crime rates. They caution that statistics in general can easily be mishandled, even by well-intentioned users; that crime statistics in general are more flawed than most; and that American statistics, as one
scholar has lamented, are "the least reliable crime data of all western societies." Most of the scholars contend further that actual crime rates have probably leveled off during the past five or six years, and may even have begun to decline.

Counting Victims

Since 1932, the FBI has annually published a Uniform Crime Report (UCR), the standard source for U.S. crime statistics. If one reads, for example, that between 1977 and 1981 the murder rate per 100,000 inhabitants climbed by 11 percent, the robbery rate by 22 percent, and the burglary rate by 16 percent, one is looking at UCR data. The chief flaw in the report is that local police departments, which provide the information to the FBI, do not have uniform "recording" practices. An increase in the UCR's count of forcible rapes may mean an increase in the number of actual rapes, or an increase in the number of rapes reported to the police, or an increase in the number of rapes recorded as rapes (rather than, say, as aggravated assault). As Josiah Stamp observed in Britain long ago, "The government are very keen on amassing statistics. They collect, raise them to the nth power, take the cube root and prepare wonderful diagrams. But you must never forget that every one of these figures comes in the first instance from the village watchman, who just puts down what he damn pleases."

Though today's police are more methodical than village watchmen, their reports do skew U.S. crime data. A study conducted in Chicago by statisticians Richard and Becky Block found that during the mid-1970s only 50 percent of noncommercial robbery incidents were reported to the police. Only 73 percent were initially recorded as robberies. And just over a quarter of those incidents were ultimately considered "founded" (i.e., to have been crimes actually committed) by the police and were reported to the FBI as robberies.

Theoretically, a change in the reporting habits of local citizens and police could prompt a 350 percent increase in the robbery rate in Chicago without another person being mugged. And those habits do change. For example, more and more burglaries are being reported as more people buy insurance against theft. This is because insurance companies require a report to the police before they will cover the loss.

Partly to overcome such problems of reporting, the U.S. Justice Department launched a National Crime Survey in 1973. Every six months, some 132,000 individuals in 66,000 households are interviewed. "Crime histories" are taken, the results
tabulated, the final figures extrapolated to the nation as a whole. There are obvious technical reasons why the “victimization survey” and the UCR are not directly comparable in terms of volume, but the casual reader might expect that, though specific rates for specific crimes would vary, the basic trends in crime rates would at least be parallel. This, however, is not always the case.

Thus, in the period from 1974 to 1978, the National Crime Survey’s victimization rate for aggravated assault declined by 6.7 percent, while the UCR showed an increase of 13.5 percent. The survey’s victimization rate for forcible rape declined by one percent, while the rate reported in the UCR increased by 11 percent. Both sources did agree that the rates for auto theft and burglary had declined.

**No Epidemic**

The situation, in sum, is slightly confusing, but there is no way to look at the data and find evidence of a worsening “epidemic” of crime. Indeed, the latest UCR figures released by the Justice Department show a five percent drop in the number of “serious” crimes (e.g., murders, robberies, rapes) reported during the first half of 1982 over the corresponding period of 1981. No one doubts, of course, that crime is extensive in the United States. Scholars agree that, during the 1960s and early 1970s, the United States did experience a sharp rise in the incidence of all types of criminal activity—as did Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Great Britain, Sweden, and most of the rest of the industrialized world. The increase in reported crime during these years was simply too great to be explained away by “better reporting” or statistical flukes. The fact remains, however, that one can assess all of this criminal activity only imperfectly.

Given the sogginess of the numbers, how can specialists argue with any assurance that crime rates may have leveled off? The answer is that, while the Uniform Crime Report is an inadequate barometer of what is happening in the country as a whole, we can elicit important information by comparing its component parts. For example, the difference between crime rates in rural areas and in urban areas is so great and shows up in so many data sources that we can be sure that the difference is not just a fluke. The same goes for crimes committed by adults versus crimes by juveniles, crimes by whites versus crimes by blacks. Once we know this, we can deduce a lot more.

**Urbanization:** Big cities, not surprisingly, have substantially higher crime rates than smaller cities, which in turn have
THE SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL COSTS OF CRIME

The "multiplier effect" of government spending is a commonplace notion in economics; it is also useful in considering the social and economic impact of crime.

Where property crimes are concerned, the cost of any criminal "transaction" may drain the resources not only of the intended target but of insurance companies, credit card companies, police departments, and court systems; a full reckoning of the cost would have to include such things as repair bills for windows and doors and the price of new locks. Where crimes against people are involved, the price paid in fear is never confined solely to the victim.

According to the 1980 Figgie Report on the Fear of Crime, 41 percent of Americans surveyed evinced a "high" or "very high" fear of becoming a victim of violent crime, more than 80 times the proportion who will actually be so victimized in any given year. Women are more frightened than men, older people more than younger people, blacks more than whites. Yet relative degrees of fear do not necessarily reflect actual victimization. While blacks do suffer disproportionately from most crimes, women (except for rape) and the elderly (except for purse-snatching) have substantially lower-than-average victimization rates.

Fear exacts not only an emotional toll but a toll in freedom, in money—and, ultimately, in more crime. More than 50 percent of Americans surveyed in the Figgie Report say that they now dress more plainly than they once did to avoid attracting attention. Nine out of 10 do not open their doors unless the caller identifies himself. FBI Director William Webster recently cited cases of mothers routinely giving young children pocket money so that they might have something to give up if threatened. According to Insurance Magazine, individuals paid $127 million in premiums for insurance against burglary, robbery, and theft in 1977. One-half of all adult Americans are believed to own handguns.

In the nation's urban areas, the growing dispersion of crime since the 1950s has added to whites' fears of blacks, especially young black males who as a group commit a disproportionate share of mayhem. A 1982 Justice Department study of eight Chicago neighborhoods found that those homeowners (of both races) whose fear of crime was the greatest also believed that their neighborhoods were becoming increasingly black—even when this was not the case. Fear has prompted middle-class blacks and whites alike to flee to the suburbs, leaving the black "underclass" behind to dominate once-tranquil neighborhoods.

Survey data reveal that the public believes too little is being spent on combating crime. Yet state, local, and federal spending on criminal justice cost taxpayers $26 billion in 1979, a 147 percent increase over 1970. Total government spending rose by only 109 percent dur-
ing the same period. Local police forces absorbed about half of that sum (see chart), but their efforts are not sufficient. Thus, spending on alternative crime prevention services has also been on the rise. Detective agencies along with companies providing uniformed security guards to office buildings, warehouses, and shops reported a revenue increase of 84 percent between 1972 and 1977 alone.

The cost of trying to prevent or punish criminal activity is dwarfed by the impact of the activity itself. The most lucrative form of crime—white-collar crime—also happens to be the least feared, yet the American Management Association in 1977 estimated the cost of white-collar thefts such as fraud and computer crime to be $44 billion annually. While bank robbers grabbed $22 million during the first six months of 1980, bank embezzlers pilfered upwards of $103 million. Drug trafficking holds the No. 2 spot. The illicit drug trade is now thought to be a $30-billion-a-year industry, and it is the main reason why Florida, a major drug entry point, contains six of the nation’s 10 most crime-ridden cities—Miami, Gainesville, West Palm Beach, Orlando, Fort Lauderdale, and Daytona Beach. Across America, motor vehicle theft and burglary each netted about $3.5 billion in 1981; larceny, $2.4 billion; and robbery, $382 million.

While crime is commonly characterized as a purely parasitic enterprise, the relationship between offenders and the larger community of law-abiding citizens is in many respects complementary. So entrenched has criminality become in the United States that many legitimate social and economic activities, and not a few jobs, depend on it. Nearly 100,000 people work in state prisons and other detention facilities. Some 440,000 men and women earn their living as police officers, and almost 1.4 million work as private security guards (often part-time). One must not leave out judges, probation officers, attendants in hospital emergency rooms, locksmiths, lawyers, police reporters—and, of course, academic experts. The number of colleges and universities offering B.A.s in criminal justice rose from 39 in 1967 to 376 in 1977. The 1983 edition of Books in Print offers 17 small-type pages of works on crime-related themes, three pages more than are devoted to sex.

**HOW THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE DOLLAR WAS SPENT IN 1978**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal (prosecution)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incarceration</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigent defense</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
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</tbody>
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higher rates than rural areas. In 1981, there were more than 322 robberies per 100,000 inhabitants in large metropolitan areas, more than 60 in other cities, and fewer than 21 in rural counties. The pattern is strongest for property crimes, but it holds for all types of crime except homicide (where rural counties have a higher rate than small cities). The higher the proportion of the nation's population living in big cities, then, the higher the rate of crime nationwide.

One of the major demographic turnabouts of the 1970s was the steady depopulation of major American cities—in no small measure due to fear of crime. Many Americans are finding that smaller cities and towns are more “livable.” The semirural public schools are better—and far less dangerous. There is a feeling of neighborliness and “community.” Since 1950, the share of the nation's total population inhabiting the 32 largest U.S. cities has declined from 20 to 14.4 percent. “Will this deconcentration continue?” ask William P. Butz and his colleagues in a recent Rand Corporation study. “No one really knows, but, on balance, the evidence suggests that it will.” If the Rand study is right, a clear implication is that, all other factors held constant, the national crime rate will decrease in the years ahead.

Age and Race

Age of Population: Most crimes are committed by young people, usually males, under the age of 20. As Northwestern University sociologist Wesley Skogan notes, “crime is a young man's game.” It is therefore tempting to blame the sharp increase in reported crime that began during the 1960s on the “coming of age” of the postwar baby-boom generation.

The truth may not be quite so straightforward. The 1967 report of President Lyndon Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice puzzled over the fact that the rise in reported crimes was substantially larger than the growth in the size of the crime-prone age groups in the U.S. population. The authors of the report showed, for example, that if the arrest rate for teenagers had been the same in 1965 as it was in 1960, the total number of teenager arrests in 1965 would have come to 536,000. The actual figure was 646,000.

What this really shows, however, is that changes in the crime rate cannot be simplistically explained by isolating one variable or another. Yet, a correlation between rising crime and a rising proportion of young people in the population is too clear to be dismissed. Moreover, mathematical models incorporating rather basic demographic information have, as we shall see,
proved to be highly accurate in predicting future crime-rate trends. Suffice it to say that the current decline in the teenage population probably portends (other factors again held constant) a decline in the crime rate as a whole.

Race: Virtually all recent scholarly studies, regardless of locale or time period, show that arrest rates of blacks for almost every offense are considerably higher than those for whites. (Some exceptions: liquor-law violations, vandalism, running away from home.) Victimization surveys and victims’ descriptions of those who “got away” tell the same story. At the neighborhood level, the volume of crime is strongly correlated with the size of the local black population. The reasons for this link are many and complex, and they have less to do with race per se—or racism—than with the conditions in which millions of young blacks are growing up: in poverty, in broken homes, in decaying schools. Such circumstances are “criminogenic” for all groups in the population. The fact remains, as Skogan has remarked, that “the fear of crime and concerns about race have become virtually indistinguishable in the minds of many whites.”

Looking Ahead

The relationship of race coupled with age to overall crime rates is so overpowering that Northeastern University criminologist James Alan Fox was able to project crime rates into the future with a model that employed only three “exogenous” variables. These were (a) the percent of population that is nonwhite and age 14 to 17, (b) the percent of population that is nonwhite and age 18 to 21; and (c) the Consumer Price Index.

Fox’s model is not really all that simple. In constructing it, he employed other pertinent data, such as previous local crime rates and the size of area police forces. But the three variables highlighted above are important because they are the only factors that have to be estimated for the future in order to make forecasts.

The accuracy of the Fox model has been high. Thus, Fox estimated that the increase in the UCR violent crime rate in cities between 1972 and 1978 would be between 36.7 and 39.7 percent. The actual figure occupied the middle ground almost exactly: 38.5 percent. He predicted an urban violent crime rate for 1980 of between 735.9 and 752.4 crimes per 100,000 population. The actual figure: 745.9. Fox’s extended forecast shows the violent crime rate beginning to decline in the early 1980s (as, apparently, it has already begun to do) and reaching in 1992 a new
low about 19 percent below its current level.

If Fox's analysis is correct, then a great deal will be owed to the so-called "baby bust," the precipitous decline of fertility—among both blacks and whites (although the decrease has been considerably larger among whites)—from the postwar peak of 3.8 children per woman during the late 1950s to fewer than 1.8 in 1976, the lowest recorded level in American history.

**Equal Opportunity**

Not everyone agrees that the long-range forecast is favorable, however. As University of Texas sociologist Lawrence E. Cohen has noted, whatever the demographic portents may be, two factors will continue to encourage criminal activity. First, the increase in lightweight durable goods since World War II—televisions, radios, stereos, microwave ovens, video cassette recorders—has vastly increased the number of suitable targets for theft.* Second, a change in the pattern of family life—largely the result of an influx of women into the work force—means that more homes are being left empty for longer periods of time. Women today also have more opportunity to commit crimes. Since 1953, their arrest rates have shot up by 2,600 percent for larceny and 2,700 percent for fraud and embezzlement—far higher than the corresponding increases for men.

Then, too, there is the inescapable matter of biology. The period between physical maturity and social maturity has been noted throughout history as a troublesome interval. In the words of the Shepherd in Shakespeare's *The Winter's Tale*, "I would there were no age between ten and three-and-twenty ... for there is nothing in the between but getting wenches with child, wronging the ancentry, stealing, fighting." During the past few decades, children's improved nutrition and health have contributed to sexual maturation at relatively young ages. In the 1970s the onset of puberty for American boys occurred as early as 9.7 years of age. Meanwhile, American youths have been required to stay longer and longer in school, delaying their entry into the labor market and the discipline of a job. In sum, youngsters are spending twice as long in adolescence, with all that this entails, as they once did.

One of the more frustrating conclusions one might be tempted to draw from what we have said thus far is that the fluctuation in crime rates seems to depend on phenomena be-

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*In devising a model for predicting burglary rates, one of the variables Cohen included was the diminishing weight over time of the TV sets advertised in the Sears Roebuck catalog. The lightest television set available in 1960 weighed 38 pounds (versus 15 pounds in 1970).
Beyond the control of those who make and enforce the laws. There is little anyone can do, in a democratic regime, to shape the age structure of the population to one’s liking, to ensure that one parent is always at home (or that each child lives with two parents), or to further disperse large urban populations. While we know that crime increases during spells of good weather and decreases during bad, state legislatures remain unable to control the climate. Crime, it might appear, is at the mercy of broad, uncontrollable forces, even as many Americans are at the mercy of criminals.

To some degree, that conclusion is valid, but it is perhaps not entirely so. Consider the kind of misbehavior of which the average American is really afraid. It is certainly not “white-collar” crime, even though this is the most financially costly kind. It is not organized crime, which deals in gambling, drugs, and other illegal commerce. It is not car theft or prostitution or shoplifting. It is predatory crime: the muggings on a quiet street, the repeated burglaries, the senseless, unforeseen assaults like one that occurred in New York City last year: a young lawyer, walking with a girlfriend in Riverside Park, beaten and stabbed to death by three teenagers, then robbed. Detectives called it “random murder.”

There are many types of criminals with differing propensities, but the so-called violent predators account for a disproportionate though not precisely quantifiable amount of all criminal
activity. If there were some way of identifying these people early in their careers, we might have a valuable tool for minimizing the worst kinds of mayhem. So far, however, scholars have had better luck describing those we know to be violent predators than in predicting, from among a group of offenders, which ones are likely to join that category.

Tracking Them Down

In a recent study of 2,200 inmates at jails and prisons in California, Texas, and Michigan, we classified offenders according to the combinations of crime they had committed. The violent predators, the most dangerous category, were those who had committed at the minimum robbery, assault, and drug dealing; usually they had committed burglary, theft, and other crimes as well. We applied the term not to those who had merely committed each of these crimes at some point in their lives, perhaps at widely spaced intervals, but to those for whom such offenses were part of their annual repertoire. They were the most accomplished and versatile criminals. And they were busy.

Thus, the worst 10 percent of violent predators committed more than 135 robberies per year, 250 percent more than those who were exclusively robbers. Other “worst tenth” figures are: 18 assaults per year, five times more than for mere assaulters; 516 burglaries per year, three times as many as for burglars who do not commit robbery; and 4,088 drug deals per year, higher than for those who “specialized” in that crime.

Who are the violent predators?

We found that they typically begin committing crimes, especially violent crimes, before age 16. They are more likely than other offenders to have received parole and had parole revoked, and to have spent considerable time in state juvenile institutions. They are also more socially unstable than other types of criminals. Few of them are married or have any other kind of family obligations. They are employed irregularly and have trouble holding jobs. They also have characteristic histories of drug use. Most of them began using several types of “hard” drugs, and using them heavily, as juveniles. Although they are more likely than other offenders to have high-quantity, high-cost heroin addiction, their most distinctive trait is multiple drug use—heroin with barbiturates, heroin with amphetamines, barbiturates with alcohol, barbiturates with amphetamines, amphetamines with alcohol.

One might think, given this information, that violent predators would be rather easy to identify from their official criminal
records. In fact, they are not. An immediate problem is their youth (most are 23 or under). Because they are so young, their adult criminal records may not reveal a sufficient array of activity. Indeed, 91 percent of those we identified as violent predators did not have prior conviction records for robbery, assault, and drug dealing. (We learned what we did about them from "self-reports.") Many of the violent predators we surveyed did not have official juvenile criminal records. In some cases, juvenile records do exist, but varying degrees of confidentiality, depending on the jurisdiction, envelop these records, the idea being that juveniles should not be stigmatized for life by youthful misbehavior. For this and other reasons (including bureaucratic sloth), juvenile records are often unavailable to judges and prosecutors. That fact was driven home to much of the public by the widely reported 1976 Timmons case. Ronald Timmons, 19, arrested in New York for beating and robbing an 82-year-old woman, was released on $500 bail by a judge who was unaware that Timmons had appeared in juvenile court 67 times and was suspected of murdering a 92-year-old man.

Needless to say, if the task of a priori identification remains elusive, so do the answers to some important questions. What triggers the flurry of crimes by the novice predator? Will prison cut short or merely postpone his criminal career? Is incarceration itself criminogenic for less serious offenders? These are not questions that should interest only scholars. They have an impact on our daily lives.

The fact remains that a relatively small number of potentially identifiable criminals are responsible for a large volume of crime. The chief task of law enforcement must be to deal with them as best it can. It is heartening to note that police, prosecutors, and judges have picked up on the implications of the research that is being done—research that in some respects simply confirms their instincts. While the task of accurate, "fail-safe" identification continues to frustrate researchers, it may be that law enforcement officials, combining what scholars have learned with an intuition gained from years "on the street," will be able to improve their crime-fighting performance. The evidence suggests that they are at least beginning to do so.
In 1922, Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter urged that the criminal justice system be judged not “by the occasional dramatic case but by its normal humdrum operations.”

The American public has generally ignored this advice. In their choice of television shows, tabloid newspapers, popular fiction, and political rhetoric, Americans are drawn to the most fanciful, gruesome, bizarre, or self-serving portrayals of criminal justice. Public attention goes to the Juan Coronas, the Gary Gilmores, the Patricia Hearsts. Parole becomes the subject of a TV network news item, it seems, only when someone like Charles Manson comes up for it. It took an attempted presidential assassination to get the “insanity defense” into the headlines. President Reagan himself appears to be partial to “horror stories.” Complaining that felons too often escape punishment as a result of legal technicalities, he recently cited a bizarre Florida case where a drug conviction was thrown out because the search warrant authorizing police to inspect a couple’s home did not extend to the baby’s diapers, where the illicit cache was found.

Thus, the dramatic regularly elbows aside the routine. What actually happens between the time a typical criminal suspect is arrested by police and the time he or she enters prison or returns to the streets remains widely misunderstood. Justice can be as unpleasant in its gritty details as it is ennobling in its virtuous abstraction. But Americans avert their eyes from the criminal justice system at their own peril. If crime deserves punishment, if the public deserves protection, and if all citizens deserve due process, then what happens from arrest to incarceration (or release) deserves close attention.

“You have the right to remain silent.” So begins the Miranda warning, read by arresting officers to criminal suspects. First required by Chief Justice Earl Warren’s Supreme Court in 1966, the warning has become second nature to a generation of police officers. Contrary to what some critics of the Warren Court claim, the Miranda warning does nothing to protect criminals unduly. Ernesto Miranda himself, an Arizona drifter convicted of rape and kidnapping, won only the right to a new trial after the court ruled that police officers had failed to inform him of his rights. He did not go free. He was re-tried, convicted, and returned to jail.

For both law enforcement officials and the accused, bail is a
major concern soon after arrest. Originating in England more than a thousand years ago, the bail system attempted to guarantee appearance at trial by requiring a money deposit for release from jail until judgment had been handed down. Then, as now, bail also served as a means to keep crime-prone suspects in custody before trial. Under the current system, however, many of those who are jailed before trial should not be and many of those who are not, should be.

To the suspect, posting bail means freedom. Most of those arrested do manage to find the cash amount set by the court. The bail bondsman, a fixture in poor urban neighborhoods, will post bail quickly for suspects. His fee is a flat, nonrefundable 10 percent of the bail amount. (In New York City in 1973, 40 percent of defendants were required to post more than $1,000.) Contrary to public opinion, this system works, at least in getting suspects to appear for court proceedings. A 1976 survey of courts in 20 U.S. cities conducted by criminologist Wayne Thomas found that only five percent of the accused failed to show.

Two Reforms

Those suspects, however, who cannot post bail remain in custody regardless of the seriousness of their offenses. The U.S. Justice Department estimated in 1978 that 60,000 people—nearly 40 percent of all prisoners in local detention facilities—were simply awaiting trial. Studies show that these defendants face a triple disadvantage: more convictions, more prison terms, and longer prison terms than those who make bail. Confined in prison, they are not, as Steven R. Schlesinger, Acting Director of the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, explains, "completely free to aid in the preparation of their own defense, to locate evidence, assist their attorneys, and hold a job (both to earn money to pay counsel and to prove reliability at their trials)." Bail, in short, discriminates against the poor.

As a crime prevention measure, moreover, bail is in large measure ineffective. One suspect in six out on bail, according to a recent study, returns, not to face trial, but to face new charges (and one-third of these are rearrested more than once). The alternative is no more acceptable: Detaining all likely repeat offenders would jam already-crowded jails. And in all probability, many suspects who would not commit another crime if released, and who would show up for trial, would be penalized.

Whatever its defects, the original U.S. bail system remained largely unchanged from 1789, when the Judiciary Act created the federal bail system, until the passage of the Bail Reform Act.
of 1966. The 1966 Act established and encouraged nonfinancial conditions for release such as release on recognizance (ROR). It also assumed that pretrial release decisions would be based on the likelihood of an individual's appearance at trial rather than on the danger presented by his freedom. In 1970, however, Congress empowered the Washington, D.C., Superior Court to detain without bail any suspect whose alleged crime and prior record indicated that he was dangerous to the community. As is usually the case in law enforcement, state and local law, under which the vast majority of offenders are processed, has gradually followed the lead of the federal government. Public debate in the last 15 years has centered on the use of ROR programs and preventive detention.

**Screening Suspects**

ROR programs rely on actuarial tables based on factors such as the suspect's community and family ties, his prior record, and his employment history to estimate the chance of his returning for trial. Prisoners judged as low risks are released. Having proven as effective as traditional bail programs—Manhattan served as the first laboratory—ROR has been adopted by 120 cities. Among its advantages: It is less expensive than jailing suspects; it operates more quickly than the bail system; and it does not discriminate against the poor.

Preventive detention is more controversial, since it amounts to imprisonment before conviction. (Contrary to popular belief, the right of a defendant to be "presumed innocent" applies only to the trial; were it otherwise, no arrests would be made in the first place.) Nine states now permit their courts to consider a potential threat to community safety in decisions to grant bail. In 1981, the Reagan administration proposed that preventive detention be allowed in federal cases. What makes preventive detention attractive is that it would keep the most dangerous recidivists off the streets while perhaps helping to reduce the fear of crime in the local community. In 1982, Arizona voters ap-

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This essay has been adapted from chapters of Crime and Public Policy (Copyright © 1983 by the Institute for Contemporary Studies) written by Steven R. Schlesinger, Acting Director of the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (criminal procedure), Brian Forst of INSLAW, Inc. (prosecution and sentencing), Daniel Glaser of the University of Southern California (the supervision of offenders outside of prison), Alfred Blumstein, J. Erik Jonsson Professor of Urban Systems and Operations Research at Carnegie-Mellon University (prison populations and capacity), and Peter W. Greenwood of the Rand Corporation (the effects of incapacitation).
AFTER THE ARREST: DISPOSING OF CASES

Out of every 100 felony arrests
65 are brought to district attorney
25 are rejected or dismissed by prosecutor

9 are imprisoned (more than 1 year)
35 are sent to juvenile courts
40 are accepted for prosecution
34 plead guilty or go to trial

11 are jailed (less than 1 year)
12 get probation
6 are dismissed by judge or fail to appear after pretrial release

20 are incarcerated
32 are convicted (5 in trial)
2 are acquitted in trial

Source: INSLAW, Inc.; U.S. Department of Justice.

Not shown above: recidivism. A study conducted in Oregon reveals that, of every 100 persons arrested in a given year, 35 will be arrested again at least once within three years, 17 at least twice.

proved a referendum that would deny bail to any suspect "found to pose a danger to society." In its major legal test so far, U.S. v. Edwards, preventive detention was ruled constitutional in 1981 by the D.C. Court of Appeals, a decision the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review.

While defendants are worrying about posting bail, prosecutors are deciding which cases they want to pursue. Each attorney in a typical big-city prosecutor's office must decide how to dispose of about 100 felony cases per year. Obviously, a prosecutor cannot give Watergate-level attention to every third-rate burglary. Even the toughest prosecutor will free more suspected criminals than the most lenient judge. As Brian Forst of INSLAW, Inc. (formerly the Institute for Law and Social Research) has written, "about 40 percent of [adult] felony cases are either rejected outright at the initial screening stage or dropped by the prosecutor soon afterward." Prosecutors say that most often it is lack of evidence—weapons, stolen goods, eyewitness accounts—that forces them to abandon cases. This lack of evi-
dence results more from poor police work than from a criminal's skills. In seven U.S. cities during 1977–78, 22 percent of the local police officers who made arrests made not a single arrest that led to a conviction. A mere 12 percent of the policemen were responsible for one-half of all criminal convictions. Not surprisingly, the most "productive" officers turned out to be especially persistent about finding witnesses and more conscientious about follow-up investigation. They worked harder and smarter.

The second most common reason prosecutors dismiss charges is that the offense is not worth the bother. Prosecutors will sometimes divert less serious offenders into programs of counseling, restitution, or community service. In most instances, "trivial offense" cases are dropped outright.

Search and Seizure

The "exclusionary rule," which forbids the use of illegally obtained evidence in court, is said by its critics, including the President, to hamper prosecution greatly. Although the controversy is growing, the issue is not new. The Supreme Court imposed the rule on federal courts in 1886 and on state courts for many crimes in 1961. Its chief purpose is to deter police misconduct, but most of the evidence suggests that it fails to achieve this goal. For one thing, the impact of the rule falls more directly on prosecutors than on individual police officers (whose performance is usually judged by the number of arrests they make, not by the convictions that follow). Meanwhile, the exclusionary rule impedes the truth-finding function of the courts, fails to distinguish between flagrant and "good faith" errors by a police officer, benefits only the guilty, and undermines public respect for the judicial system.

Supporters of the exclusionary rule note that, in the nation as a whole, prosecutors drop only about one percent of all felony and serious misdemeanor cases a year because of the Fourth Amendment "search and seizure" procedural requirements. Yet, as Schlesinger points out, that one percent still amounts to 55,000–60,000 cases.\(^*\) He adds that "if the exclusionary rule is

\(^*\)For a good overview of the subject, see The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule: A Study in California, U.S. Department of Justice, 1982. Regardless of the number of cases actually dropped, the suppression hearings and appellate litigation made necessary by the rule are a major drain on the courts' time. A 1979 General Accounting Office study of 42 of the 95 U.S. Attorneys' offices in the country found that "thirty-three percent of the defendants who went to trial filed Fourth Amendment suppression motions." According to the report, the exclusionary rule was the single most important issue arising most frequently in federal criminal trials. At the appellate level in 1979–81, more than 22 percent of the criminal cases reaching the U.S. Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia required a decision as to whether evidence should be excluded.
misguided, then the release of even one convictable person is one release too many." The Supreme Court in late 1982 agreed to reconsider the exclusionary rule in its 1983 term, even as new proposals were being floated by Schlesinger and others to curb police misbehavior by making officers as individuals subject to disciplinary proceedings and liable for damages.

Copping a Plea

Courtroom drama rarely interrupts the peristaltic advance of a case through the criminal justice system. The television triumphs of Perry Mason notwithstanding, only about seven percent of all felony suspects have their guilt or innocence established by the clash of opposing lawyers and the judgment of a jury or judge.

When prosecutors decide that the nature of the evidence and the offense does warrant pressing on, nine out of 10 times they win a conviction by plea bargaining. So routine are these negotiations that they may take no more than five to 10 minutes to complete in a prosecutor’s office or a judge’s chambers. The form of the bargain is always the same: In return for relaxed prosecution, the defendant does not contest the charges. The substance of these agreements varies widely. As one Assistant U.S. Attorney told sociologists John Hagan and Ilene Bernstein, "We’ll let [the felony suspect] plead to a misdemeanor and won’t prosecute . . . all the way . . . to charging him with exactly what he did and saying nice things about him at sentencing."

Like most other aspects of the criminal justice system, plea bargaining has drawn intense criticism in recent years. Defense lawyer Seymour Wishman has charged that plea bargaining "often hides the incompetence or unlawful behavior of law enforcement officials or conceals the preferential treatment of defendants." The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended in 1973 that plea bargaining be abolished. Alaska, El Paso, Philadelphia, and other jurisdictions have experimented with doing just that. Yet few deny that plea bargaining will persist.

There are several reasons for its durability. It is time honored if not venerable. During the 1920s, political scientist Raymond Moley, later an adviser to President Franklin Roosevelt, studied the American criminal justice system and found plea bargaining already both pervasive and entrenched. And plea bargaining is quick and cheap. California’s Judicial Council found in 1974 that a jury trial in the state consumed an average of 24 hours of court time at a cost of more than $3,000; a guilty
Television's police dramas typically feature at least one arrest per episode. In real life, the average cop in a large (250,000+ people) American city makes only about 25 "collars" per year. Of these, only six are for major (or "index") crimes. Fewer than one out of five index crimes is "solved" by an arrest. Why is the figure so low?

One reason is that relatively few police officers are actively engaged at any time in combating crime. New York City boasts a police force of 28,000, but thanks to court appearances, administrative duties, and the burden of paperwork, only 6,600 are out on the streets during any 24-hour period, and this force is divided into three eight-hour shifts. According to a study by the Police Foundation, officers on patrol spend about half their time writing traffic tickets, investigating traffic accidents, waiting for tow trucks, arresting drunks, and traveling to and from the police station, the police garage, the courthouse, and their "beats." Another one-fourth of duty time is spent relieving boredom and tension—eating, resting, talking on the radio, girl-watching.

In the time remaining, the police cruise the streets and respond to calls. Seventy-five percent of all crimes are discovered well after the fact, and the perpetrators are unlikely to be apprehended. The police try to focus their attention instead on the other 25 percent ("involvement crimes"), where the victim has been in direct contact with the criminal. Reports coming in on the "911" or other emergency numbers, however, are often poorly screened at headquarters; patrol officers, as a result, must often deal with trivial complaints that could be handled by phone.

Victims are also slow in calling, if they call at all. (An estimated 47 percent of violent crimes and 26 percent of property crimes go unreported.) To judge from a survey of Jacksonville, Peoria, Rochester, and San Diego, 73 percent of all calls come after the critical first minute and 46 percent come after five minutes. Arrest statistics suggest that waiting five minutes is as bad as waiting 60. When police arrive, witnesses may be unavailable, unable to speak English, or so traumatized by the incident that their accounts are unreliable. All of which suggests that a rapid "response time" by police officers, something the public clamors for, is in fact a negligible contribution in the fight against crime. Luck seems more important.

plea took 15 minutes and cost about $215.

In New York City, 90 percent of all defendants, unable to afford a lawyer even for a brief trial, must rely on court-assigned attorneys or public defenders. Such counsel spends an average of only 30 minutes with each client before adjudication. Under such circumstances, a jury trial may well appear to the accused as an invitation to disaster. A plea bargain becomes a more at-
tractive alternative. Prosecutors also like to avoid trials because of their unpredictability.

Moreover, doing away with plea bargaining has its drawbacks. Two years after banning it, El Paso found city courts hopelessly backlogged. Authorities had to relent and permit some kinds of negotiations. Philadelphia discovered that its prosecutors simply switched to "trial bargaining," making deals on whether a defendant would receive a full jury trial or a so-called bench trial. Because bench trials last only a few minutes, the new bargaining differed little in results from the old. For better or worse, plea bargaining endures.

Judges and Sentencing

During the past 10 years, prosecutors have increasingly tried to target their best efforts at the "career criminal." As in ROR programs, the aim is to distinguish between the typical suspect whose run-in with the law is an unusual event and the hard-core minority who have criminal lifestyles. Bolstered by studies documenting the existence of a small but very active group of chronic criminals, the criminal justice system has mobilized to put them out of business. The Washington, D.C., and New York City police departments have formed career criminal task forces. San Diego, New Orleans, Kalamazoo, and 95 other cities have established career criminal prosecution teams. These teams resist plea bargaining and seek tough sentences. Their record, however, is mixed. A statewide effort in California boosted the conviction rate on the most serious charges (rape, murder, armed robbery, and so on) from 60 to 85 percent and won sentences that were a year longer than those awarded in similar cases not specially prosecuted. A 1981 Justice Department survey, however, revealed that the four big-city career criminal prosecution teams it studied won neither more convictions nor severer sentences. Still, the popularity of targeting career criminals continues to grow.

Sentencing practices vary widely. Depending on the location and the crime, judges, juries, prosecutors, or elected officials—or all four—may decide how the guilty are punished. In Texas and a dozen other states, the jury votes on the sentence; most states require jury sentencing in capital cases. In many jurisdictions, prosecutors and defense attorneys can settle on penalties in "sentence-bargaining" sessions and have the presiding judge rubber-stamp the agreed-upon punishment.

Judges have the single greatest influence on the sentence. Criminologist Brian Forst notes that sentences are determined
primarily on the basis of who the sentencing judge is rather than
on the basis of the seriousness of the crime, the criminal’s prior
record, and the criminal’s plea, all put together. Judges are
nonetheless generally tougher on the repeat offender than on the
first-time criminal, more lenient on those who admit their guilt
than on those who deny it and are convicted. Charles Silberman
found that, in New York City, judges were three times more
likely to imprison the robber who had victimized a stranger
than the one who robbed an acquaintance. They tended to treat
women more leniently than men for the same offense.

Most judges apparently do not discriminate against blacks.
“Blacks are overrepresented in prison populations primarily
because of their overrepresentation in arrests for the more
serious crime types,” a 1982 National Science Foundation panel
concluded.

Actions by state legislatures have taken away some judicial
discretion. By 1978, six states had instituted “determinate sen-
tencing” laws. Under these laws, judges retain the right to grant
probation to low-risk offenders but must adhere to legislatively
set sentences when putting an offender in jail. Six other states
have removed the judges’ sentencing power altogether in cer-
tain cases with mandatory sentencing laws that require prison
terms, usually for armed, violent, or drug-related crimes. Many
jurisdictions make use of nonbinding guidelines. Thus, in Mary-
land, judges are advised to give consecutive rather than concurren
t life sentences in murder cases if the defendants have also
been convicted of abduction or rape. The new legislation reflects
a dramatic change that has occurred since 1970 in the com-
monly accepted rationale for putting people behind bars.

The Demise of Rehabilitation

Of American penitentiaries, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in
1833: “It is not yet known to what degree the wicked may be re-
generated, and by what means this regeneration may be ob-
tained.” Yet, from the Progressive era through the 1960s, the
assumption that prisons could and should transform thieves,
hoodlums, and murderers into law-abiding citizens dominated
the criminal justice system. The rehabilitative ideal influenced
a vast array of penal developments in the 20th century. Prisons
became “correctional institutions.” Rehabilitation was the
reason for the indeterminate sentence (not to mention for the
creation of the first American juvenile court in 1899). When
prison officials decided that a convict had been successfully “re-
habilitated,” they would recommend his release. Despite many
examples of excessive leniency—one thinks of the Norman Mailer-induced parole in 1981 of Jack Henry Abbott, a convicted killer who went on to kill again after 45 days of freedom—the fact remains that those who make parole decisions usually believe in what they are doing.

And yet, ever since World War II, researchers have been compiling evidence that no rehabilitative program seems to work, at least in the aggregate. One-third of "rehabilitated" convicts, it turns out, commit crimes after release, about the same number as "unrehabilitated" ex-convicts. The late criminologist Robert Martinson of the City College of New York wrote the epitaph for the rehabilitative ideal in 1974. Summarizing 231 research studies, he concluded: "With few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had little appreciable effect on recidivism." Plastic surgery didn't help, counseling didn't help, job training didn't help. Judging by one Danish study, even castration proved insufficient to bring the recidivism rate of male sex offenders down to zero.

The debate about what criminal punishment could and could not achieve had actually come to a head well before Martinson published his findings. Frightened by rising crime rates, the American public during the late 1960s demanded, in effect, that "retribution" replace rehabilitation as the purpose of incarceration. Alabama Governor George Wallace made a surprisingly strong showing in the 1968 presidential race with
promises to "stop pussyfooting around" and to imprison lawbreakers "and throw away the key." New York's passage in 1971 of tough legislation providing mandatory sentences for drug law violations reflected the same impulse.

By the mid-1970s, the idea of "just deserts" was enjoying a certain vogue. Punishment, the argument went, should fit the crime and be based on no other criteria. Only so would it increase respect for the law and thus deter crime. Many elected officials used these claims in promoting mandatory sentencing laws. In any event, more people began going to jail more often. Between 1974 and 1979, the number of men in jail as a percentage of the adult male population jumped 40 percent.

Cost-Effective Justice

By the end of the decade, the most observable effect of tougher imprisonment policies was overcrowded prisons. Courts in 31 states had decided that wretched prison living conditions required judicial intervention. In a typical action in 1976, Alabama Judge Frank Johnson ordered state prison authorities to provide at least 60 square feet of space per inmate. State legislators soon counted up the costs of toughness—$50,000 to $70,000 for one new prison cell, $10,000 to $15,000 a year to keep a prisoner in it. During 1980–81, voters in Michigan and New York turned down prison-building referendums. In New Mexico, the legislature approved a $107 million prison construction bill only after the worst prison riot in U.S. history left 43 dead in the state penitentiary south of Santa Fe in February 1980.

The lesson of the 1970s seems to be that retribution as a crime-fighting philosophy has its limitations, too. While the crime rate seems of late to have steadied, population trends rather than tougher sentences are probably the reason. Meanwhile, because mandatory sentencing laws suffer from rigidity, the trend toward their adoption has slowed. New York has modified its drug laws to allow lesser offenders to plea bargain. The reason: Juries often refused to convict lesser offenders if conviction required harsh punishment. Among public officials, a con-

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*Four out of five convicted felons find themselves confined in a medium- or maximum-security facility. One out of two such facilities in America is more than 80 years old. A prisoner is likely to share with another inmate a cell designed for a single occupant, accommodations that the Supreme Court held (in *Bell v. Wolfish*, 1979) did not necessarily constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Prisoners are guarded by officers whose education is, on the average, only slightly better than their own and whose salaries average $15,000 per year. If California's prison system is typical, prisoners face a four percent chance of serious injury in any given year. They are likely to suffer homosexual rape, especially if they are young and white. Slightly more than half of them will be released within one year.

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sensus arose that the certainty, not the severity, of punishment best deterred crime.

Increasingly, criminal punishment today emphasizes cost-effectiveness above all other goals. "Incapacitation" is the byword of this new approach. The least expensive and most lenient treatment goes to criminals least likely to commit serious crimes again, regardless of the seriousness of their offense. The most expensive, that is to say, the harshest punishment goes to those who, in the words of Carnegie-Mellon University’s Alfred Blumstein, "represent the greatest crime threat if they were outside, either because the crimes they will be committing are the most serious, because they will be committing them at the highest rate, or they can be expected to continue committing them for the longest time into the future." Legal attention in the 1980s focuses on the removal of the most dangerous at the least cost.

This philosophy may seem to be nothing more than common sense, but considering how many long-accepted criminal justice goals it contradicts, it represents a significant development. The advocates of cost-effective justice take little interest in reforming the wrongdoer. They downplay the importance of "just deserts," an eye for an eye. They ignore the goal of putting away larger numbers of criminals. And they rely heavily on the unpopular sanctions of probation and parole.

Assessing 'Client Risk'

Thus, the average convicted criminal is now more likely to find himself spending more time out on the streets: 1.5 million of the 2.3 million U.S. convicts in 1980 were under court-ordered "supervised release." Another 270,000 were on parole, the supervised release that follows incarceration. The number of convicts on probation or parole increased 24 percent between 1976 and 1981.

The probationer or parolee also submits to more sophisticated supervision than in the past. In Wisconsin, all convicts on release formerly met with staff supervisors once a month. No more. Frequency of contact now ranges from once every 14 to once every 90 days, with the figure determined by an "Assessment of Client Risk Scale" similar to ones used in ROR programs. (Taken into account are such things as number of times the "client" has changed his address in the last 12 months of freedom, percentage of this time employed, alcohol problems, and so on.) The test, variations of which are used elsewhere, has reduced violations by the most closely watched while not affecting violation rates among the least supervised.
THE INCIDENCE OF CRIME: COMPARATIVE INDICATORS
(Percent of U.S. households touched in any year)

While serious crime is widespread, so are other calamities that Americans fear less (right). Nor does fear of crime correspond to its actual incidence (below right), and studies show that city folk feel safer in their own neighborhood, even if it is unsafe, than in other neighborhoods, even if much safer. Crime rates vary not only with age and race (above right) but also with the season (below); oddly, scholars have found no sure relationship between crime and unemployment.

CRIME AND THE SEASON: Fluctuations in rate relative to yearly average

(= 100)
ARRESTS IN 1981 BY RACE, AGE, AND OFFENSE (FBI Index Crimes)

RACE
- Blacks: 34%
- Whites: 64%
- Other: 2%

OFFENSE
- Larceny-theft: 52%
- Robbery: 6%
- Murder: 1%
- Rape: 1%
- Burglary: 21%
- Other: 6%

AGE
- Under 15: 11%
- 15-17: 21%
- 18-24: 34%
- 25-34: 20%
- 35+: 13%

FEDERAL AND STATE PRISON POPULATION, 1925-1980

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

VICTIMIZATION AND THE FEAR OF CRIME

Ages 20-24
- Female
- Male

Ages 25-34

Ages 65+

Victims of crime per 1,000 population
Percent with activities affected by fear of crime

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Authorities are also making heavier use of halfway houses. As criminologist Daniel Glaser notes, "halfway houses and work release are usually justified primarily as ways of helping prisoners become accustomed to community life before they are more completely free, but these residences also impose considerable control on offenders." Parolees must sleep at the halfway house. They must account for their whereabouts at work or with friends. They must take tests for alcohol and drug use—a once-cumbersome procedure now made easy by development of portable electronic urinalysis equipment. ("Open an attache case, perform a few simple steps . . . ." begins a full-page Syva Company advertisement in the latest American Correctional Association directory.) Halfway houses cost half as much as prisons and are growing more common. To ease prison overcrowding during 1981–82, California tripled the number of inmates assigned to halfway houses in major metropolitan areas. By using actuarial risk tables to select the people released, the state brought the halfway house escape rate to a 20-year low.

**Worth a Try?**

Glaser reports that some judges have begun sentencing criminals to halfway houses with no initial stay in prison. Rather than halfway out of prison, he notes, these inmates are halfway in. With prison congestion unlikely to ease until the 1990s, when, demographers say, the U.S. population of crime-prone young males will have greatly shrunk, the trend toward a "community-based" correctional system is likely to continue. In Massachusetts, halfway houses have entirely replaced reformatories for juveniles. However, the placement of halfway houses has ignited scores of "not-in-my-neighborhood" protests in places ranging from Prince George's County, Maryland, to Long Beach, California. Local opposition could retard the spread of such facilities in coming years, no matter how cost-effective they are.

While many low-risk lawbreakers may be safely placed back in the community, believers in incapacitation demand that high-risk offenders be incarcerated. Recent figures show this is happening. Between 1974 and 1979, the proportion of inmates serving time for violent crimes rose from 52 to 57 percent of all inmates.

As a sentencing practice, this "put-'em-away" approach naturally complements the career criminal control efforts of police forces and prosecutors. Judges and parole boards identify high-risk criminals with yet another variation on the actuarial
The Federal Parole Board guidelines, for example, allow offenders to be graded on a zero-to-11 scale based on various factors and recommend fixed prison terms for each grade of offender in seven categories of crime. Thus, a heroin addict with two prior convictions and two stints in the state pen, who was under 18 when first incarcerated, who had violated parole at least once, and who had spent less than six months at work or in school in the two years prior to his latest arrest would have a total of two points—marking him as a poor risk. If convicted of arson, he would get a prison sentence of at least 78 months.

Whether an incapacitation policy can help lower the crime rate by locking up the most active criminals will not be known for certain for years. Rand Corporation researcher Peter Greenwood asserts that because murder, rape, and assault are so rare for any one offender, the incidence of these crimes will not be affected by incapacitation. Nor, he believes, will incapacitation inhibit those convicted of larceny, fraud, and auto theft. Because these offenders now go to jail infrequently, imprisoning more of them would put an intolerable burden on the prison system.

"The crimes for which selective incapacitation principles appear most appropriate are burglary and robbery," Greenwood concludes. "They are the high volume predatory offenses of which the public is most fearful. They are also the offenses in which career criminals predominate, and they are the crimes for which a substantial number of convicted defendants are currently incarcerated."

The logic of incapacitation appears sound and its goal seems attainable. It offers, as other methods controlling crime once seemed to, a strategy for reducing crime without exceeding the country's capabilities. If not the most draconian solution to the problem, it is at least the best practical solution in a turbulent society where the financial cost of justice may soon rival the financial cost of crime.
Since the early 1970s, the Oregon Social Learning Center in Eugene, Oregon, has treated hundreds of families with "problem" children, children who bite, kick, scratch, whine, lie, cheat, and steal. As might be expected nowadays, this group of psychologists began with the assumption that the proper way to train difficult children is to reward their good deeds and ignore their bad ones.

The idea was, of course, that eventually the children would be so wrapped up in doing good that they would no longer consider evil. But after much struggling, the scholarly practitioners in Oregon came to the conclusion that children must be punished for their misdeeds if they are to learn to live without them.*

This conclusion may come as no surprise to millions of American parents who have spent years talking to their children, yelling at them, spanking them, cutting off their allowances, and in general doing whatever they could think of to try to get them to behave.

But the importance of parental discipline has been a rare notion among social scientists, especially those who deal with crime and delinquency. Criminologists tend to become interested in people only after they are capable of criminal acts. Not only is it then too late to do anything about their family situation; it is also too late to learn much about what their home life was like during the "child-rearing" years. As a result, we have many explanations of crime that implicate broad socioeconomic or narrow psychological factors but few that look to the family itself.

Thus, the Oregon group is swimming against the current, doing what few students of crime have had the time or inclination to do. They are actually going into the homes of families with potentially delinquent children and watching them in operation. And they are coming up with some not-so-revolutionary ideas.

In fact, the Oregon researchers start pretty much with the basics. They tell us that, in order for a parent to teach a child not

to use force and fraud, the parent must (a) monitor the child’s behavior, (b) recognize deviant behavior when it occurs, and (c) punish such behavior. This seems obvious enough. The parent who cares for the child will watch his behavior, see him doing things he should not do, and correct him. Presto! A socialized, decent human being.

Where might this simple system go wrong? It can go wrong in any one of four ways. Parents may not care for their child (in which case, none of the other conditions would be met); parents, even if they care, may not have the time or energy to monitor their child’s behavior; the parents, even if they care and monitor, may not see anything wrong with their youngster’s actions; and finally, even if everything else is in place, the parents may not have the inclination or the means to impose punishment.

I am impressed by the simplicity of this model. I believe it organizes most of what we know about the families of delinquents. I also believe that, when we consider the potential impact of any proposed governmental action on crime and delinquency, we should specifically consider its impact on the ability of parents to monitor, recognize, and punish the misbehavior of their children. A classic example is “full-employment policy.”

If one asks professors of criminology why the youth crime rate is so high, or if one asks students in criminology courses why a particular group has an unusually high rate of crime, they will almost invariably mention “unemployment” or “underemployment.” If one points out that homicide, rape, and assault do not typically produce much in the way of income, undergraduates can quickly figure out how to get to these crimes from job-
lessness by way of something like frustration or rage.

Thus, armed with the notion that people "turn to crime" only when nothing better is available, we ignore family considerations and, as best we can, try to provide good jobs for young people. What do we expect to happen? Employment of an adolescent would presumably not much affect his parents' ability to monitor his behavior. Teenagers are outside the home a good deal anyway, and the employer would to some extent act as a surrogate monitor. The parents' affection for their offspring may, if anything, be improved by his willingness to reduce the burden on his family, and work is certainly not going to affect the parents' ability to recognize deviant behavior. The only element we have left in our model of child-rearing is punishment. How, if at all, does the employment of a youth affect the family's ability to punish his deviant behavior?

A Minor Paradox

The power of the family in this situation will depend on the resources available to it relative to the resources available to the child. It will also depend on the child's aspirations. If the youngster wants to go to college at his parents' expense and to continue to drive the family Buick on weekends, and if he is really only picking up pocket money on the job, the damage to parental control is presumably minimal.

But if the child does not want to go to college, if his family does not own a car, and if the money he earns provides him a level of living which is equal or superior to that of his family, he is by definition no longer dependent on them. Affection and monitoring had better have done the job already, because the "child-rearing" days are over.

An outstanding feature of recent times has been the growing independence of adolescents from the family, made possible by expansion and differentiation of the labor market. This has resulted in an increased dependence of the teenager on other adolescents. But peers do not take the place of parents as socializing

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agents: They have little or no investment in the outcome, are less likely to recognize deviant behavior, and, most important, do not possess the authority necessary to inflict punishment.

Moreover, research that looks directly at juvenile delinquents offers no support for the notion that they are economically deprived when compared to other adolescents in their immediate area. On the contrary, young delinquents are more likely to be employed, more likely to be well paid for the work they do, and more likely to enjoy the fruits of independence: sex, drugs, gambling, drinking, and job-quitting.

By looking directly at the family, we are thus able to resolve one of the minor paradoxes of our time, the fact that crime is caused by affluence and by poverty. General affluence to some extent weakens the control of all families. It especially weakens the control of those families in which the adolescent is able to realize a disposable income equal to that of his low-income parents (or parent) almost from the day he finds a job. Unfortunately, life for him does not freeze at this point. His earnings do not keep up with the demands on them. Most offenders eventually show up on the lower end of the financial spectrum, thanks to the very factors that explain their criminality. Individuals who have not been taught to get along with others, to delay the pursuit of pleasure, or to abstain from violence and fraud simply do not do very well in the labor market.

**Back to the Protestant Ethic**

They do not do very well as parents, either. A 1977 study (*The Delinquent Way of Life*, by D. J. West and D. P. Farrington) concluded: "The fact that delinquency is transmitted from one generation to the next is indisputable." The authors found that fewer than five percent of the families they surveyed accounted for almost half of the criminal convictions in the entire sample.

Why should the children of offenders be unusually vulnerable to temptation? If we had the complete answer to this question, we would be much further down the road to understanding crime than we are. But we do have important clues. Recall that the model advanced above assumes that bad behavior is not something that parents have to work at cultivating but rather something that requires hard effort to weed out. Research shows that parents with criminal records do not encourage criminality in their children and are in fact as "censorious" of their illicit activities as are parents with no record of criminal involvement. But not "wanting" criminal behavior in one's children and being "upset" when it occurs, do not necessarily mean that
THE BEST OFFENSE . . .

In *The Death and Life of the American City* (1961), Jane Jacobs cited the anonymity of modern urban life as one of the chief causes of neighborhood crime. Not only had once tightly knit communities become unraveled, but people had left their stoops and gone indoors—lured by air conditioning and television, perhaps, or pushed by pollution, high-rise buildings, traffic congestion . . . and crime. No one was watching the streets. Ten years later, drawing on the ideas of Jacobs, Robert Ardrey, and others, Oscar Newman argued in *Defensible Space* (1972) that “people will defend themselves given the right physical framework”—an environment that provided a sense of “territoriality” and therefore enhanced “informal social control.”

During the 1970s, experiments in both “watching” and “defensible space” were conducted throughout the United States. The results, to judge from surveys by political scientist Charles Murray and the Police Foundation’s Lawrence Sherman, have not been a clear success.

The defensible-space strategy—brighter streetlights; windows in housing projects arranged to put more “eyes on the street”; local streets narrowed, routed, or blocked to discourage cruising “outsiders”; symbolic barriers (e.g., tree planters) to create semiprivate spaces that would generate possessive, protective community attitudes—appealed to city officials because it promised to reduce crime regardless of other factors (such as poverty or broken families). Housing projects or residential areas designed on defensible-space principles, like Clason Point and Markham Gardens in New York City and Asylum Hill in Hartford, came into fashion. Soon, defensible-space concepts were being applied to schools, commercial strips, and subway stations.

The demonstration projects, however, did not live up to expectations. At Clason Point, for example, crime did indeed decrease between 5 P.M. and 9 P.M., but it increased between midnight and 5 A.M. At Asylum Hill, robberies and burglaries decreased initially but then returned to “normal” levels. One problem, apparently, was that offenders, rather than steering clear, quickly learned to adjust to the new environment. Many of them, moreover, turned out to be not outsiders but insiders—community residents. Ironically, though, the fear of crime in Clason Point and Asylum Hill seemed to have lessened considerably, and researchers found optimistic signs of more “neighboring.”

great energy has been expended to prevent it. Criminal activity revolves around payoffs in the short run. There is thus little reason to expect offenders to be much interested in child-rearing, where gratification, as often as not, is delayed.

And indeed, according to research, supervision of offspring...
In the end, Charles Murray concludes, the crime-reducing effects of defensible-space projects "depend crucially on the pre-existing social environment"—on the proportion of welfare families, the teen/adult ratio, whether or not residents own their apartments, length of residence, ethnic mix. Where crime is worst, he writes, defensible-space policies will have the least effect.

Experiments in "watching" have had a slightly better record. The Fairfax County, Virginia, police, for example, credit Neighborhood Watch with a 30 percent decrease in burglaries in the past year. The same pattern has been observed elsewhere. (Some five million Americans are involved in such efforts.) A study in Seattle revealed, however, that after an initial surge of enthusiasm, citizens tend to lose interest—and crime rates climb back up.

Another application of "watching" is preventive patrol. As Lawrence Sherman notes, most police officers cruise in squad cars: "What the patrol car officer sees is familiar buildings with unfamiliar people. What the public sees is a familiar police car with an unfamiliar officer in it." Patrol car officers are waiting to respond (the "dial-a-cop" strategy), rather than watching to prevent. In experiments in Newark and Kansas City, selected neighborhoods were provided with stepped-up foot patrols. While the patrols had no effect on serious crime, local residents told researchers that the patrolmen had reduced the incidence of lesser infractions—broken windows, drunkenness, panhandling—that tend to advertise the lack of "social control" in a neighborhood and thus to breed more serious crime. Since disorder has been shown by many studies to increase fear of crime, it appears that foot-patrol officers reduced fear by reducing disorder. And, because fear of crime is an important factor in the flight of businesses and families from central cities, reducing public fear is an important achievement in itself, one that might deter crime in the long run.

The foot-patrol experiments had another positive outcome: Foot-patrol officers were more satisfied with their jobs than those confined to automobiles.

In families where one or both parents has a criminal background is often "lax" or "inadequate" or "poor." Punishment tends to be "cheap": that is, short term (yelling and screaming, slapping and hitting) with little or no follow-up.

I suspect that a more subtle element of child-rearing is also...
involved. This is the matter of recognition of deviant behavior. According to research at the Oregon Social Learning Center, many parents in "problem families" do not even recognize criminal behavior in their children. These parents may discount or ignore reports that their son or daughter steals on the grounds that they are unproved and should not be used to justify punishment.

As it happens, those parents, regardless of income, who succeed in crime prevention seem inclined to err in the direction of over-control, to see seeds of trouble in laziness, unreliability, disrespect for adults, and lack of concern for property. A catalogue of their attitudes could probably be entitled "The Protestant Ethic" or "Middle-Class Values."

**Helping Parents Cope**

Yet even a parent who knows what to do and has the will to do it may be hampered for other reasons. The percentage of the population divorced, the percentage of the homes headed by women only, and the percentage of unattached individuals in a community are among the most powerful predictors of crime rates. In most, but not all, studies that directly compare children living with both biological parents and children living in a "broken" or reconstituted home, the youngsters from intact families have lower rates of crime.¹

Some reasons for this seem clear. For one thing, a single parent (usually a woman) must devote a good deal of time to support and maintenance activities, which often include holding down a job, that are to some extent shared in the two-parent family. She must do so in the absence of psychological and social support. And she is less free to devote time to monitoring and punishment. As early as 1950, a study by Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck showed that mothers who worked, whether regularly or occasionally, were more likely to raise delinquent children than were women who did not work. This same report also revealed that the effect on delinquency of a mother working was completely accounted for by the quality of supervision she provided. When a mother was able to provide supervision for her children, her employment had no effect on the likelihood of delinquency.

The decline of the family is real enough. The extended household that was so effective in controlling everyone's behav-

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ior remains only in vestigial form; the nuclear family that replaced it does not have the stability and continuity it once had. One response, especially common among crime analysts, is to take note of these facts but to conclude that nothing can be done about them. Such neglect is reinforced by "modern" theories of crime, which assume that people are good by nature and that individuals would be law-abiding were it not for the flaws in the society around them.

This kind of stance toward the family is one I think we should avoid.

If nothing else, research on crime and the family may help prevent us from making a bad situation worse—for example, by adopting policies that, perhaps unwittingly, make the parents' job harder. And who knows what we may learn? It would be presumptuous to conclude in advance that studies of the family will have no useful application. The technique of child-rearing is not that complex, and someone may yet discover simple measures for improving the efficacy of parents in America as crime control agents. Since parents number in the millions, work for nothing, are stuck with the job, and usually prefer law-abiding children, they are a potential resource we cannot afford to ignore. Even modest bolstering of their role could result in large savings of time and money now devoted to correcting their mistakes.
The men and women who first settled North America imported from Europe not only their tools, their books, and their ministers, but also a conception of crime as synonymous with "sin" and (as Hester Prynne could attest) a criminal justice system that emphasized the public nature of punishment.

The colonies also imported not a few criminals. As Samuel Walker notes in *Popular Justice* (Oxford, 1980, cloth & paper), after an act of Parliament in 1717, Britain sent 30,000 felons to the American colonies.

Walker's concise, well-written history of crime and criminal justice in the United States runs through the late 1970s. He traces the origins of contemporary concern over rising crime rates—and the emergence of a new type of criminal—back to World War II. The turbulent war years, he writes, "stimulated concern about the problem of juvenile delinquency and generated an anti-delinquency effort that continued into the 1960s."

The juvenile "crime wave" of the 1940s and '50s prompted a great deal of scholarly research. Albert K. Cohen's *Delinquent Boys* (Free Press, 1955, cloth; 1971, paper) was one of the first of these studies. Cohen advances the notion of a "delinquent subculture" that reinforces antisocial behavior. His views reflect the earlier "differential association" theory of Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey as formulated in their classic *Principles of Criminology* (Harper, 1st ed., 1934; 10th ed., 1978). The authors argue that criminal activity, be it shoplifting or tax evasion, is learned through association with persons who condone such behavior. Cultural deviance rather than personality traits or basic human drives is to blame for crime.

A related but distinct explanation is the "differential opportunity" or "strain" theory, developed by Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin in *Delinquency and Opportunity* (Free Press, 1960, cloth; 1966, paper). Members of the underclass, they say, turn to crime to secure the rewards denied them by an affluent society, as well as to vent their rage on those who have the money and status (and even moral values) they desire for themselves. The chief objection to strain theory is that crime is not confined to the poor.

Variations of the views cited above are held by most American criminologists. A recent challenge comes from "control theory," espoused by Travis Hirschi in *Causes of Delinquency* (Univ. of Calif., 1969). Why do people commit crime? Hirschi prefers to ask: Why do people not commit crime?

Control theorists start off with the idea that the appeal of crime is obvious, that people are not necessarily "moral animals," and that certain tendencies (such as the natural covenousness of children) need to be corrected. They stress the importance of individual personalities and the element of rational calculation ("Can I get away with it?").

In sum, delinquency is something that must be averted: by strong attachments to family and friends, by inculcation of moral values and a belief in the "payoff" of good behavior.

Whether delinquency is learned or unlearned, it is something society must deal with when it occurs. Few Americans are well acquainted with any aspect of law enforcement and
criminal justice. William Ker Muir, Jr., provides a partial remedy in Police: Streetcorner Politicians (Univ. of Chicago, 1977, cloth & paper), an in-depth, graphic study of the police department of the real but pseudonymous city of Laconia (pop.: 500,000).

Other vivid (and troubling) accounts of the workings of justice in the United States include Peter S. Prescott's portrait of the juvenile courts in New York City, The Child Savers (Knopf, 1981, cloth; Simon & Schuster, 1982, paper) and A Prison and a Prisoner (Houghton, 1978), Susan Sheehan's profile of 57-year-old George Manilow, a "professional prisoner" at Green Haven Correctional Facility in Beckman, N.Y. Her book is perhaps the best survey of life behind bars: the "economy," the staff, the inmates, the politics, the racial tensions, the sexual violence.

Is learning something about the causes of crime of any use in controlling crime? Attempts to alter the criminal justice system often turn on one's answer to that question.

Both former Attorney General Ramsey Clark (Crime in America, Simon & Schuster, 1970, cloth; Pocket Books, 1971, paper) and Charles Silberman (Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice, Random, 1978, cloth; 1980, paper) contend that the only effective way to combat crime is to attack what they believe to be its causes: poverty, racism, community disorganization.

James Q. Wilson, in Thinking About Crime (Basic, 1975, cloth; Random, 1977, paper), demurs. The problem, he writes, "lies in confusing causal analysis with policy analysis." He does not argue that social programs are useless but notes that they often have unintended consequences. ("The contacts of upper-middle-class suburban youths with ghetto blacks as a result of the civil-rights programs," he contends, "increased access to the drug culture.") Social ills, moreover, cannot be quickly cured, while crime remains an immediate problem as well as a long-term one.

"If we regard any crime prevention or crime reduction program as defective because it does not address the 'root causes' of crime, then we shall commit ourselves to futile acts that frustrate the citizen while they ignore the criminal."


Criminologists often forget what movie-makers and novelists have always known: Crime can be entertaining. Carl Sifakis's The Encyclopedia of American Crime (Facts on File, 1982) boasts 1,500 entries on gangsters, trials, slang, weapons, detectives, con games, and some of the Great Questions of the Day: Can toothmarks, for example, be admitted as evidence in court?
CURRENT BOOKS

FELLOWS' CHOICE

Recent titles selected and reviewed by Fellows of the Wilson Center

WHO VOTED FOR HITLER?
by Richard F. Hamilton
Princeton, 1982
664 pp., $50 cloth, $16.50 paper

This long, intricate, fascinating book is a frontal assault on 50 years of received wisdom. Sociologists, political scientists, and historians have for years approvingly quoted one another's claims that National Socialism was a revolt of depression-enraged Archie Bunkers. Hamilton, a professor of sociology at McGill University, shows that these claims are based on flimsy evidence at best, and often on no evidence at all. He offers instead an analysis of voting and census data in large German cities, and concludes that the lower middle classes were if anything less Nazi than the upper middle class, or the middle class as a whole.

The failure of German scholars to do opinion research during the years before Hitler came to power in 1933 unfortunately makes it impossible to establish precisely who voted for Hitler and why; the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, Hamilton quips, was too occupied with Hegel's World Spirit to stoop to anything so empirical as polling. But Hamilton's analysis nevertheless leaves supporters of the "Archie Bunker" thesis in serious embarrassment. Nor does he hesitate to rub it in, describing his targets as victims of post-Marxist academic group-think, small minds who, in words of de Tocqueville that Hamilton quotes, have summoned up "a few mighty reasons to extricate them from the most difficult part of their work" and to "indulge the indolence or incapacity of their minds while...confer[ring] upon them the honors of deep thinking."

Hamilton certainly does not shrink from the difficult task of constructing an alternative explanation for the Nazi vote. He starts with the heretical premise that class structure and economic pressures do not directly determine political behavior. The depression did not much encourage equivalents of Nazism in Scandinavia, Britain, or the United States, although all shared deep economic distress and had large lower middle classes.

In Germany, Hamilton points out, religion was dramatically more important than class. Catholics, on the whole, did not vote for Hitler; Protestants, by the end, mostly did. He also suggests that the non-Nazi bourgeois press, often involuntarily, helped present the Nazis as the only bulwark against the alleged Red threat. Finally, he argues that the most important factor in Nazi success was the party organization, which com-

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bined incessant grass-roots agitation and organized violence in a manner other parties, particularly parliamentary parties of local notables and professional politicians, could not match.

Hamilton's explanation is a major improvement over the conventional unwisdom, but perhaps his zeal to debunk materialist interpretations does not go far enough: He still tends to place a disproportionate emphasis on economics. While he recognizes the galvanizing effect the memory of the "classless society" of the World War I trenches had on the Nazi cadres, and theorizes that the German equivalent of Britain's deferential and nationalistic "Tory workers" contributed to the urban Nazi vote, he also ascribes Nazi success in the countryside primarily to demagogic promises of debt relief for the peasants. But if, as Hamilton concludes, economic conditions in Catholic and Protestant farm areas were similar, why did so few Catholic peasants vote for Hitler? Obviously something besides economics was at work. Hamilton suggests that Catholic village notables kept the peasants' loyalties, notes the Church's strong disapproval of Nazism before 1933, and leaves it at that.

Understanding the split in the farm vote might have been easier had Hamilton systematically considered the possibility that the Nazis were more or less what they claimed to be: the militant mass party of German nationalism. The party made skillful appeals to the protest votes of innumerable interest groups, but owed much of its support to its ideology—its vociferous promises to abolish with fanatical energy the class, regional, religious, and political divisions of German society, exterminate the Left, and restore the national self-respect lost in 1918. Historically, German Protestantism and nationalism were intertwined, while Catholics and Socialists, although patriots, gave first claim to ideologies other than nationalism. Hence, the tendency of the Protestant small towns and countryside to vote lopsidedly for Hitler.

But whatever the deficiencies of Hamilton's own explanation, this brilliantly destructive book has helped to undermine many of the ancient clichés and open the way for fresh thought about the origins of the "Twelve Year Reich."

—MacGregor Knox

MEXICO'S AGRICULTURAL DILEMMA
by P. Lamartine Yates
Univ. of Ariz., 1981
291 pp. $19.95 cloth, $8.95 paper

Every blessing brings its curses, and one curse of the new abundance of Mexican oil and natural gas is that it has allowed Mexico to postpone crucial decisions on its "farm front." So argues P. Lamartine Yates, a British agronomist and adviser to the Mexican government, in this balanced analysis of Mexico's current agricultural woes—inefficiency, outdated land laws, and official corruption. The government's failure to address these and other basic economic problems has already produced dramatic consequences, as Mexico teetered last year on the
Things were not always so bad on Mexican farms. Between 1940 and 1965, as Yates shows, crop production more than quadrupled. With agricultural output growing at an annual rate of 5.7 percent, Mexico was able to feed its expanding population and export the surplus—fruits, wheat, rice, as well as beans and corn. In fact, more than half the dollar value of Mexico's exports came from the farm sector, providing much-needed cash to pay for imported raw materials and machinery.

What was the basis of this remarkable achievement? For one thing, explains Yates, Mexico brought about 15 million acres of new land into use. These gains were made not only in the rain-fed Gulf states but also in the arid north, where massive state investment doubled the area under irrigation to about nine million acres. Thanks to the “Green Revolution,” the widespread use of fertilizer, pesticides, and high quality seeds led to higher crop yields. And, finally, crop diversification reduced Mexico’s economic dependence on such traditional farm exports as beans and corn.

In light of this impressive growth, the gradual decline in farm productivity since the mid-1960s seems all the more puzzling. The rise in farm output has leveled off at about two percent a year—well below the growth in demand. As a result, Mexico must now import basic foodstuffs, a move that it can ill afford. To make matters worse, there is little good land left to bring into production.

What is to be done? To start with, Yates recommends revising an outdated land law which once promoted social justice but today breeds corruption and cuts productivity. Starting with the Agrarian Reform Act of 1915, the Mexican government began expropriating large plots of land from private landholders and handing them over to ejidos—groups of 20 or more farmers who made a collective application for a land grant. Today, 21,000 ejidos control about 70 percent of the nation’s cropland; the rest is held by comunidades (village-based communal farms) and a relatively small number (under 100,000) of private farmers.

The problem with this reform was that it soon created a clumsy, counterproductive system. When an ejido was formed, the individual farmer-participant received a large parcel of land. But each generation of farmers passed on subdivided plots to its children, and soon the individual parcels became too small for efficient farming. Meanwhile, as rural Mexicans began moving to the cities, the rigid ejido system obstructed the consolidation of larger plots. Since the ejido, not the individual, holds collective title to property, any land that is given up goes back to the ejido without compensation to the original occupant. Consequently, even those with other means of employment contrive to maintain their claims. Many city-dwellers, for example, will return to the family farm just long enough each year to plant a meager crop.

In addition, a variety of illegal schemes flourish. According to law, parcels cannot be rented out, not even to other members of the collective, but the practice is widespread—and protected by payoffs to the ejido boss. Understandably, illegal renters are reluctant to make improvements on land claimed by others. The result: inefficient, part-time farming with little investment in the land’s future productivity.
To restore the farm economy to health, concludes Yates, Mexican politicians must begin by facing the changed reality in the countryside. The *ejido* must be reorganized as a Scandinavian-style cooperative for marketing and for bulk purchases of equipment, seeds, and fertilizers, but it should not own land. Instead, *ejido* members should receive legal title so they can lease or sell plots to their neighbors. If this shift can be combined with greater emphasis on mixed farming—crops and livestock—Mexico may once again have a fully productive agricultural sector, and efficient family farms will have a more secure future.

—James Lang ('78)

**NATIONS BEFORE NATIONALISM**

by John A. Armstrong

Univ. of N. C., 1982

411 pp. $30

One surprise of the past 20 years—a surprise both to scholars and to national leaders—has been the resurgence of ethnicity as a powerful political force. "Modernization," many previously believed, was dissolving ethnic identities and drawing all peoples into a single global community. Or, according to the Marxist variation on this theme, the workers and farmers of the world would forget ethnicity as soon as they discovered their common class identity. Little wonder, then, that Soviet leaders, like those of Spain, Great Britain, and Yugoslavia, have been alarmed by rising, potentially divisive ethnic consciousness within their borders. Throughout the world, ethnic passions continue to flare up, spurring some minorities to rebel—and some scholars to reconsider.

Among such reconsiderations, one of the best is by John Armstrong, a political scientist at the University of Wisconsin. Like the French historian Fernand Braudel, Armstrong believes we can best see inside human culture if we look back over the *longue durée*—in this case at least 2,000 years. Armstrong's geographic scope is also large, his narrative reaching into the Islamic world, into Russia and Eastern Europe, and to Germany, France, and Spain.

Where, Armstrong asks, do such intense feelings of group identity, persisting over centuries, come from? Not necessarily, he finds, from language or from simple residence on a patch of land (indeed, in the nomadic Middle East, territoriality matters very little). Armstrong believes that ethnicity originates in the mind, the spirit. It is the human psyche, he observes, which "for better or worse [shapes] its own fate." Drawing mostly from religion and then from a shared history and a sense of group meaning and purpose (expressed in such resonant cultural symbols as poetry, dance, myths, historic documents), groups of people form and cling tenaciously to a conviction of common identity.

Boundaries, argues Armstrong, are of great importance to ethnic self-definition. Each ethnic group guards its borders, which are sometimes territorial and linguistic but are always a way of living, believing, looking, and feeling. To an elite falls the responsibility of recording and guarding the cul-
tural boundaries, which have as their essential condition an "other," an enemy, a vast community of aliens—sometimes forming the majority culture of a given nation—who must be excluded.

Nothing, in fact, is more important to ethnic self-consciousness than exclusion. Ethnic groups define themselves as much by what they are not as by what they are. Armstrong dwells at great length on how Western Christendom and the Islamic world forged their respective identities largely by asserting (particularly between the ninth and 13th centuries) their differences from each other. He shows also how, as each of these great (and almost "supraethnic") civilizations fragmentated, more specific and localized ethnic identities developed, particularly in those tense regions that were once the borders between the two worlds—the Ottoman Empire and Spanish Castile, for example.

As the title of his book suggests, Armstrong is interested in how ethnicity influenced the rise of modern nation-states. Why, for example, did certain ethnic groups emerge as the national leaders? He finds that the city was instrumental in this process, particularly in the "sedentary" West, in Byzantium, and even in Russia. Groups associated with great urban centers (Paris, Moscow, Vienna) helped shape the modern nations, and imposed their language and laws on the less powerful ethnic groups. In the Islamic world, by contrast, cities mattered less; capitals frequently moved from one location to another. Consequently, Moslem polities, with multiethnic administrations, were characterized less by a specific group identity than by a "common core of Islamic values."

But even in the West, minority ethnic groups did not simply surrender to the dominant national identity. Indeed, as recent history shows—in Wales or in the Basque region of Spain—the intensity of ethnic allegiance waxes and wanes with the fortunes of the larger nation. Ethnicity is an inconstant force.

Inconstant but far from extinct. Although it is only one of many identities people make use of (occupation and class being two of the others), ethnicity has a staying power that will confound those who deny or ignore it.

—Robert Kelley
A young mother suddenly falls ill, beer turns sour in a farmer's barrel, a "healthy" cow keels over—in 17th-century Connecticut and Massachusetts, such occurrences often raised the specter of witchcraft. Throughout most of Europe, the fear of witches was waning. But in the two Puritan colonies of New England between 1638 and 1700, 234 indictments or complaints were filed against people for "giving entertainment to Satan." Who were these witches? Examining court records, genealogies, and diaries, Demos, a Brandeis historian, finds that one-fourth were men. Most were, like Goodwife Garlick of Easthampton, Long Island, notoriously cantankerous (but not elderly) women of low social position. Though married, they were likely to be childless. Their accusers tended to be poor, middle-aged women, preoccupied, Demos suggests, with the recent loss of their own procreative powers. Because of its emphasis on brotherhood and "commonwealth," Puritan society was particularly susceptible to belief in witches, argues Demos. For people who took social concord as a sign of godliness, the discord that could fester in the close confines of an isolated village appeared ominous. Demos conveys a keen sense of the terror and bitterness of witchcraft's "victims" and of the pathetic souls accused by their neighbors of "signing the Devil's Book."

Between 1933 and 1945, when many nations throughout the world took in at least part of those populations that Hitler was attempting to destroy, Canada opened its door just a crack, admitting only 5,000 refugees, among them 3,500 Jews. Toronto historians Abella and Troper have set out the story of Canada's inhospitable immigration policy. Most politicians and bureaucrats supported restrictions...
to win popular favor—or, in one case, the approval of pro-German elements in prewar England. Hit by hard times, the public was either openly hostile to Jews (particularly in Quebec, where the Catholic hierarchy inveighed against Jewish immigration) or, at best, indifferent to their plight. The pleas of native Jewish leaders in Toronto were repeatedly rebuffed, even after Canada entered World War II. In 1940, the Polish ambassador begged Canada to shelter 2,000 Poles and 100 Jewish children for the duration of the war. Frederick Blair, director of immigration, refused; he argued that the Jewish children would bring in relatives and never leave. In the end, four orphans were permitted to immigrate. Only after the war, when Canada felt the need for more labor in a booming postwar economy, did it accept 65,000 refugees, including 3,000 Jews.

Judging by this exhaustive biography of Venezuela's first democratically elected President, political leaders do make a difference. Born and raised under a backwater dictatorship, Romulo Betancourt (1908–81) eventually transformed his country into a nation with a stable Presidency, a competitive two-party system, regular elections, a military under civilian control, and an educated citizenry. Perhaps his greatest personal triumph, according to Alexander, a Rutgers economist, was to avoid the bitterness that has consumed many a political exile. Forced abroad (1928–1940) for his involvement in radical student politics, he flirted with Marxism before finally rejecting it as antidemocratic. Betancourt spent most of his time in Latin America, though he traveled in Europe. He made good use of his involuntary odyssey, writing columns for Latin American newspapers, organizing Venezuelan political groups, and forming friendships with democratic leaders around the world. Shortly after coming to power as part of a coalition government in 1948, he was once again driven into exile by the military. Spending much of this
10-year stretch putting together Venezuela's Democratic Action Party, he returned home in 1958 to become his nation's first elected President. Among his many efforts, Betancourt initiated the gradual nationalization of Venezuela's all-important oil industry (completed in 1976) and built a modern system of public education. By declining to run in 1964 for a second term, Betancourt nurtured the infant two-party system and opened the way for a new generation of national leaders.

Contemporary Affairs

What explains the precipitous decline of American power since the end of the Eisenhower administration? Governmental economic mismanagement both at home and abroad, argues Calleo, a professor of European studies at Johns Hopkins. During the 1960s, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson overheated the economy by adopting expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to stimulate production and employment while maintaining expensive foreign aid and military programs and undertaking war in Vietnam. Inflation, which grew from one percent in 1960 to six percent in 1970, hurt American exports, and in 1971 the United States registered its first trade deficit of the 20th century. The "Nixon Revolution" of 1971—abandoning fixed exchange rates and letting the international market set the dollar's value—temporarily remedied the balance-of-payments problem. But Nixon did not address the underlying causes of inflation. Late in the Carter Presidency, soaring inflation, renewed trade deficits, and a plunging dollar forced the White House to slash the federal budget and the Federal Reserve to tighten credit. For the first time in this century, the economic well-being of the average American was highly dependent on world developments. Although the Reagan administration has slowed the growth in U.S. domestic spending, the White House still harbors extravagant ambitions, Calleo warns. Ronald Reagan's
proposed defense budget indicates his determination to restore U.S. pre-eminence, but high U.S. interest rates and high U.S. deficits have hurt the economies of both Western Europe and America. Calleo believes America faces an unavoidable choice: either "sacrifice more at home to pay for its international position, or . . . scale down its world commitments."

Continuing his career-long exploration of modern democracy, Dahl, a Yale political scientist, addresses a question that has long vexed students of political theory: the place of independent organizations, associations, or special interest groups within the democratic state. In any democracy larger than the ancient Greek city-state, groups with some degree of autonomy are inevitable. History shows, furthermore, that the more independent organizations a nation has, the more democratic it tends to be. The recent dismantling of Poland's independent union, Solidarity, provides a corollary to this historical axiom: Without independent groups, democracy cannot exist. A "rich organizational life" also brings other benefits: It provides a sense of community identity, preserves ethnic and minority cultures, and prevents any one group in a society from dominating others. But Dahl also finds pluralism "implicated" in a number of problems. Championing single causes (e.g., environmentalism, deregulation), powerful groups may distort the public agenda, limiting the range of possible political and social goals. Organizations may gain control over matters that should be left to the determination of the large populace (Dahl points to the inordinate economic power of the British labor unions). But most dangerous, argues Dahl, pluralism tends to perpetuate inequalities. Focusing on this problem as it appears in several nations, Dahl finds that the degree of economic inequality largely depends on the extent to which labor and social democratic parties play a role in government (the greater the role, the less inequality). He also raises the disturbing notion that a
powerful, authoritarian central government (such as Yugoslavia's) may be required to oversee a "decentralized" economy. Looking at the United States, Dahl discovers that America is unique in its sharp division of "public" and "private" spheres (a division which is far less clear elsewhere). For the American version of the pluralist dilemma, Dahl suggests two controversial remedies: a more egalitarian distribution of wealth, "democratization" (not nationalization) of major corporations.

Worried about declining profits, many American corporate leaders have recently taken to watching Japanese or German industry for clues to business success. They might better take a lesson from America's own "star performers" and put short-term profits farther down on their list of priorities, suggest business consultants Peters and Waterman. The consistent U.S. money-makers are charged with purpose. Service is the word at McDonald's, Delta, and IBM. Frito-Lay will spend hundreds of dollars "sending a truck to restock a store with a couple of $30 cartons of potato chips." Innovation drives other companies: Hewlett-Packard and 3M give their employees freedom to experiment and to write off their mistakes. Still others such as Johnson & Johnson and Procter & Gamble stick to basic products but emphasize quality. Hefty profits result from all these strategies, none of which would earn an A in business school. And that may be what is wrong with much of corporate America, say the authors. The average MBA organizes his company according to the latest blueprint for efficiency. But enduringly successful companies are chaotic but committed collections of "task forces" that shift and regroup to tackle new problems. If America had more leaders—more Tom Watsons or William Hewlettsto give companies a sense of purpose, say the authors, America could pull out of its managerial muddle.

In all history, argues Alsop, the retired Washington columnist, only five cultures have sustained "art traditions": classical antiquity, the West after the Renaissance, imperial China after the third century B.C., Islam after the ninth century, and Japan after the sixth century. The sine qua non of an art tradition, as Alsop sees it, is the practice of collecting, to be distinguished from mere treasure-hunting or antiquarianism. A culture with an art tradition, says Alsop, must also have a historical sense of, and theories about, art. Its artists must feel an obligation to "innovate" and go beyond their predecessors. It must also sustain art markets (with bloated prices, fakes, signed works, and snobbery) and museums. Alsop's criteria thus exclude the medieval and Byzantine periods; he insists there were no collectors in either period. Equally provocative is his argument that collecting has directly influenced ways of seeing and making art: He points to the Florentine humanist Niccolò Niccoli, a late 14th-century collector who, by urging the new fashion of the "antique" upon his artist-friends Donatello, Ghiberti, and Brunelleschi, helped set the course of 15th-century Italian art.

GRAMMAR AND GOOD TASTE: Language Reform in America by Dennis E. Baron Yale, 1982 263 pp. $19.95

From Noah Webster's 18th-century campaign for a uniform "Federal English" to TV newscaster Edwin Newman's mocking of contemporary misusages, America has had its share of would-be reformers of our common tongue. But these crusades, led chiefly by amateur grammarians, have had little effect. Americans, says Baron, a University of Illinois linguist, have never felt the need for systematic language-planning (such as exists in Norway, Turkey, Israel) or of institutions (such as France's sacrosanct Académie Française) empowered to carry out deliberate reform. Benjamin Franklin failed in his effort to establish a phonetic alphabet, intended, among other things, to help poor spellers. Bishop Robert
Lowth, aiming to "correct" his 19th-century countrymen's lamentable English, succeeded only in securing for his work a short-lived vogue as a college text. Edward S. Gould, in his Good English (1876), railed against the introduction of unnecessary "spurious words" such as leniency (lenity, he insisted, was the only correct English word). Baron doubts that future reformers will fare better. And, indeed, the reader is left wondering whether sweeping language reform, possibly led by a national academy, would really be preferable to the haphazard way in which English has developed over time.

Isak Dinesen: The Life of a Storyteller  
by Judith Thurman  
St. Martin's, 1982  
495 pp. $19.95

Her legal name was Karen Blixen, but the Danish writer is known to the English-speaking world by her pen name, Isak Dinesen. She wrote, among other books, Seven Gothic Tales (1934), a collection of deceptively old-fashioned and stylistically ornate stories, and Out of Africa (1937), a memoir in which the author seemed magically to enter the minds of both the humans and animals native to her beloved Kenya. Blixen herself (1885–1962) was, as biographer Thurman shows, a genuine anachronism: In a society (turn-of-the-century Denmark) which valued caution and propriety, she possessed a reckless, heroic view of life. It came from her father, who was himself an author as well as a politician, a traveler, and a swashbuckler. Blixen's love of the wilder parts of Africa duplicated her father's fascination with American Indians, among whom he wandered for a time. She even made living in Kenya a condition of marriage to her cousin, a minor count and a great romancer (who infected her with incurable syphilis). The two immediately moved to the family's Kenyan coffee plantation, where Karen lived and worked from 1914 to 1931 (after her divorce from "Blickie" in 1921, she went it alone). It took a worldwide depression to drive her back home. The cost of Blixen's unconventional life was considerable, to herself and to others: tragic ro-
mantic liaisons, deteriorating physical and emotional health, financial losses to the family corporation from the Kenya venture. Blixen justified it all by saying it was her Destiny. But the stronger justification of her life was the fiction that issued from it.

Science & Technology

PLUTO'S REPUBLIC
by Peter Medawar
Oxford, 1982
351 pp. $25

"Instead of wringing our hands over the human predicament, we should attend to those parts of it which are wholly remediable." Behind zoologist Medawar's tart pronouncement stands a long English tradition of imperturbable common sense. In 25 essays, Medawar castigates fuzzy thinkers, airy system builders, dogmatists, pseudoscientists, and other denizens of the intellectual underworld—Pluto's Republic. Critical of IQ scientists who insist intelligence is a fixed, measurable trait, he also raps psychoanalysis who assign psychic causes to neurological disorders. In "Ethology and Human Behavior," he pleads for a biology-based psychology to replace the "weird farrago of beliefs" that is psychology today. Medawar challenges the notion of a strict Scientific Method (e.g., the induction of general truths from known cases). A scientist makes up a story, much as a poet does; then he must test it to see if it can be found false. Stressing this modest view of scientific truth, the Nobel Prize winner is still optimistic about progress. In "Science and the Sanctity of Life," he argues that there are no technology-created problems that technology cannot solve. The reader may find much that is debatable here, but little that is not refreshing.
COLLECTED STORIES. By Frank O'Connor. Vintage, 1982. 702 pp. $8.95

Before his death in 1966, the Irishman Frank O'Connor was one of the great 20th-century masters of the short story. Unfortunately, by mid-century, the market for this once-popular form was much diminished: O'Connor never won the reputation he deserved. Bad luck for the reading public too, for O'Connor was one of the great “natural storytellers.” Reviving the bluff and tender characters of an Ireland in transit from rural to urban, his stories are carried forward by voices—the yarn-spinning voice of a narrator, the garrulous voices of dialogue. His themes are Irish and universal—the vice of extreme patriotism (in “Guests of the Nation,” Irish insurgents are ordered to kill two British prisoners whom they have befriended) or the folly of inflexibility. Yet O'Connor delighted in his fellow countrymen, even when he thought them foolish: “The Bishop had once been Professor of Dogmatic Theology in a seminary—a subject that came quite naturally to him, for he was a man who would have dogmatized in any station of life.”


In The Iliad, mortals do not make decisions. Gods do. This, according to Jaynes, a Princeton psychologist, was no mere literary convention. In early human societies, claims Jaynes, “gods” truly governed human affairs. Basing his argument on hemispheric differences of the human brain and on a wealth of archaeological lore (Greek, Egyptian, Mayan, Hebrew), Jaynes speculates that human behavior was once governed by “voices” emanating from the brain’s right hemisphere. Representing the collective wisdom essential to survival, the voices were seldom doubted or disobeyed by members of early social groups. But between 3000 and 1000 B.C., the voices grew silent. Increasing social complexity, growing populations, and possibly great natural disasters demanded too much of the right hemisphere; the left hemisphere, with its capacity for self-awareness and rational decision-making, began to assert control and to tilt the “bicameral” balance. But elements of the bicameral mind survive to this day—in religion, poetry, and schizophrenia.


England at the time of London’s Great Exhibition of 1851 was the center of the industrial revolution, the vanguard of material progress, and the home of a new and triumphant middle class. By the 1970s, this once-preeminent nation was caught in a spiral of declining industrial productivity. Wiener, a Rice historian, proposes a cultural explanation to complement the usual economic ones. Aristocratic, gentlemanly values, like the class that prized them, survived more vigorously in England than in France or Germany. The commercial class, even at its height, felt mocked by the aristocracy’s confidence and style. For more than a century, not only in most literature but in various movements (e.g., sentimental medievalism) and institutions (e.g., the elite schools and universities), the children of the middle class were taught disdain for cities, engineers, business, and petty materialistic ambition. And England slowly lost its competitive edge.
Chinese Science after Mao

Communist China’s detonation of a 20-kiloton nuclear device on October 16, 1964, gave many Westerners the impression that Chinese science had entered the modern age. In fact, it had not. Overlooked was Beijing’s reliance on Soviet and other foreign technology and expertise. And it was not only in nuclear science that China lagged behind other world powers. Chinese culture, it seems, was the chief culprit. Since 1978, China’s post-Mao leadership has committed itself to the “modernization” of science. Here Richard Baum discusses a number of strong traditions that still stand in the way of success.

Speaking at China’s National Science Conference in March 1978, Vice-Premier Fang Yi boldly proclaimed that China was “entering a new stage of flourishing growth” in science and technology.

“The dark clouds [of the Cultural Revolution] have been dispelled,” he averred, “and the way has been cleared. A bright future lies ahead of us.”

Fang Yi’s pronouncements were not simply official rhetoric. Science and technology in China have undergone a significant renaissance since 1978. Thanks largely to reforms enacted under the “Four Modernizations,”* budgets for basic scientific research have been boosted, and more than 100 professional, science-related societies have been founded or revived. Beijing’s new political leaders have allowed scientists rather than party cadres to head scientific institutes, and the work of research units is increasingly geared to China’s developmental needs rather than to broad, politically motivated (and frequently unrealistic) programs.

In addition to a general improvement of wages and working conditions, thousands of research scientists have been sent abroad for training. In 1982, for example, more than 10,000 Chinese were studying in Western countries, including about 6,000 in the United States.

These reforms have without question provided a more rational structure for the pursuit of China’s scientific and technological goals. They have also improved the status of China’s 600,000 research specialists, many of whom suffered severe persecution during the Cultural Revolution’s “decade of destruction” (1966–76). Yet, despite signs of progress, the

*Modernizations of industry, agriculture, science and technology, and defense.
Chinese remain their own worst enemies when it comes to modernizing science and technology. Chauvinism and fear of change are two qualities that have distinguished Chinese civilization for millennia. Unlike the Japanese, who for complicated historical reasons (e.g., internal group rivalries and power struggles) have been open to outside influences, the people of the “Middle Kingdom” have tended to look on anything from abroad as suspect and potentially dangerous, if not downright inferior.

Even with the passing of the traditional Confucian order, a process that began in the late 19th century and culminated with the Communist victory in 1949, certain distinctive styles of thinking and acting survived. They survived, moreover, because they were largely compatible with Chinese Marxism.

Several of these traditions impede China’s development of modern science and technology. One of the most powerful is “cognitive formalism,” an intellectual tradition with roots in the pseudoscience of classical Chinese philosophy.

According to Joseph Needham, the noted historian of Chinese science, cognitive formalism can be traced to the early (sixth century B.C.) Taoist theories of the “five elements”
(wood, fire, earth, water, and metal) and the "two forces" (yin and yang).

In Taoist philosophy (as subsequently expanded by the Confucians to include human relationships), the "five elements" were assumed to lie behind every natural substance and process. Indeed, everything in the universe susceptible of numerical categorization was associated or correlated with the "five elements" (or permutations thereof). To this view of nature was added an element of limited dynamism with the incorporation of the yin/yang theory of cyclic flux.

This theory explained change as the interplay of two powerful cosmic forces, one negative, passive, and weak (yin), the other positive, active, and strong (yang).

Both Taoism and Confucianism embodied what Needham has called "associative thinking."

It is a system that works by association and intuition, and it has its own laws of cause and effect. . . It differs from the type of thinking characteristic of modern science, where the emphasis is on external causes. It does not classify its ideas in a series of ranks but side by side in a pattern. . .

Things behaved in particular ways not necessarily because of the prior actions of other things, but primarily because their position in the ever-changing cyclical universe was such that they were endowed with intrinsic natures which made such behavior natural for them.

In Needham's view, the dominant features of Chinese associative thinking—as manifested, for example, in the metaphysical classic, the I Ching—are its emphases on organicity, order and pattern.

Many observers have connected China's slow scientific development in the 19th and 20th centuries with the classical Chinese philosophical tendency to seek order and harmony by dividing the human and physical worlds into a number of intuitively fixed categories.

**Irritating Mao**

According to Derk Bodde, a leading authority on classical Chinese civilization, formalistic "categorical thinking" failed "to produce a true physical science because, being based upon man-made analogies, [it] . . . distorted and forced natural phenomena into an artificial pattern."

Categorical thinking did not die with the imperial order. In an essay written in 1942, "Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing," Mao Zedong criticized his fellow party cadres for "not using their brains to think over problems and probe into the essence of things." Too many comrades, he argued, "are satisfied merely to list phenomena in ABCD order."

Mao likened such thinking to the schematic layout of the traditional Chinese pharmacy, where individual herbal tonics were neatly arranged "in cabinets with numerous drawers, each bearing the name of a (particular) drug."

Such schematic classification, complained Mao, "takes a conglom-

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Richard Baum, 42, is professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles. Born in Los Angeles, he received his A.B. (1962) from UCLA and his M.A. (1963) and Ph.D. (1970) from the University of California, Berkeley. His books include Prelude to Revolution: Mao, the Party, and the Peasant Question (1975) and China's Four Modernizations: The New Technological Revolution (1980). This essay was adapted from a paper presented at a Wilson Center conference on May 24, 1982.

The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1983
eration of concepts that are not internally related and arranges them simply according to the external features of things." Characterizing the pharmacy approach as the "most crude, infantile and philistine of all," Mao dismissed it as being "devoid of real content."

Although it is undoubtedly true, as the late historian Joseph Levenson once pointed out, that "the categories of Chinese communist thought are not traditional," and that "Confucian harmony is not Marxist struggle," many of the same qualities attributed by Needham to "associative thinking," by Bodde to "categorical thinking," and by Mao to "stereotyped formalism" continue to find expression in contemporary communist China.

**Pseudoscience**

The Chinese communists' penchant for neatly categorizing and labeling "correct" and "incorrect" ideas is one familiar example. Another is the tendency to believe in the reality of such abstract concepts as the "basic economic law of socialism," the "four fundamental principles," or the "10 major relationships."

Even in the origins and early development of the recent Four Modernizations campaign, one can find evidence of the formalistic approach. When erstwhile Chinese Premier and party chairman Hua Guofeng first outlined the Four Modernizations in 1978, he identified the success of the campaign with the completion of 120 key industrial projects, including mines, steel mills, power plants, and harbors. What he failed to consider adequately was the enormous financial cost and critical shortages of skilled labor, energy, and transportation.

Huá's analytical weakness was sorely evident in the case of the Baoshan Iron and Steel complex. Intended to be the showcase of his grandiose modernization plan, it was launched in 1978 without feasibility or economic cost-benefit studies. The result, not surprisingly, was a multibillion-dollar boondoggle.

When Huá's plan for quick-fix modernization proved unworkable, his economic thinking was officially derided as "unscientific." He was sternly rebuked by his party colleagues for having concentrated, in formalistic fashion, on the one-sided pursuit of the modern (xiándài) to the virtual neglect of the all-important process (huá) by which modernity was to be achieved.
Thus, the formalism that characterized classical Chinese thought is very much alive in the People's Republic of China—if not among Chinese scientists and technical intellectuals themselves (many of whom have grasped more sophisticated analytical methods), then at least among the nation's political leaders, who set the goals and priorities for the research and development sector, appoint administrators, allocate budgets, and oversee operations.

Another obstacle to China's scientific development—and one which seems to contradict the first—is a tradition of narrow empiricism. Because classical Chinese philosophy relied so heavily on the metaphysical theories of the "five elements" and the "two forces," a sizable gap developed between theoretical concepts and empirically perceived data. The concepts were often primitive and unsophisticated, reflecting the crude formalism of associative thinking, while the data were frequently rich in detail and often led to techniques of great practical utility.

A good example of this curious combination is the Chinese medical science of acupuncture, which has, over a period of many centuries, acquired great practical and technical precision. Yet these refinements were made in conjunction with a highly metaphysical theory of biological functions (which holds that all illnesses result from an imbalance of the "body's forces"), without benefit of scientific knowl-

A 17th-century diagram of one of the 36 acupuncture tracts. The points depicted on this chart are used to regulate the flow of yang—the active force.
edge of either viruses or bacteria, and without a viable neurological theory.

Demonstrably effective both as an anesthetic and as a therapeutic technique in the treatment of muscle strains, intestinal disorders, and other ailments, Chinese acupuncture is nonetheless theoretically primitive and pseudoscientific.

Fighting Cancer

Similarly, in the field of seismology Chinese scientists have perhaps gathered and analyzed more data on the precursors of earthquakes and catalogued more detailed seismographic information than have scientists of any other nation. Indeed, the Chinese have met with some initial success in predicting imminent tremors, as in 1975, when early detection saved most residents of the northeastern city of Haicheng from the effects of a major earthquake.

Yet, again, all this has been accomplished on the basis of raw observation, without benefit of a workable scientific theory of seismic activity, resulting in what one knowledgeable Western observer has called “an inability to evaluate and sort out the validity of precursors on a scientific basis.”

Even in the field of cancer research, where Chinese public health specialists have reportedly made enormous strides in recent years, work has been marked more by an emphasis on epidemiological data-gathering and clinical observation than by controlled laboratory experimentation or systematic analysis. Although Chinese scientists have painstakingly mapped differential cancer mortality rates in their own country, their approach to carcinogen research has been generally descriptive and unsystematic.

This is not to belittle Chinese science but only to point out that its main strengths, past and present, have been in the areas of observation rather than conceptualization, concrete thinking rather than abstract theoretical speculation, deduction rather than induction.

Since the early 1900s, Chinese students have gravitated toward the empirical and applied sciences—engineering, medicine, and applied mathematics, for example—rather than toward the more abstract and speculative disciplines. While such proclivities are not inimical to the overall scientific enterprise (indeed, they are essential to it), they are not in themselves sufficient to produce a qualitative scientific revolution.

A third obstacle to scientific progress in China has been the propensity to idealize science, to universalize its precepts, and thereby to elevate it from a method of inquiry to a dogma. This tendency, known in the West as “scientism,” has produced in China orientations and attitudes strikingly different from those of Western science.

Skeptics Beware

As a consequence of the post-Galilean, post-Baconian scientific upheaval in Europe, Western science continuously moved in the direction of mathematical hypotheses, controlled experiment, and inductive theory-building.

The key element in this evolutionary process—and perhaps the most important single by-product of the scientific revolution—was the cultivation of a skeptical outlook. This ingrained skepticism led Western scientists to question, as a matter of course, the validity of any and all a priori assumptions, dogmas, and received theories.
The virtual absence of such an intellectual ethos, along with the absence of a native tradition of inductive logic, must be reckoned as a major source of China’s prolonged scientific backwardness in the modern era.

Historians have traced the rise of scientism in modern China to the widespread sense of cultural despair and disillusionment that accompanied the collapse of China’s traditional Confucian order in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The spiritual vacuum following the collapse was initially filled by a utopian faith in what modernization enthusiasts of the time called “Mr. Science.” And it was but a short step, ideologically, from the uncritical embrace of “Mr. Science” to the equally uncritical embrace of the scientistic doctrines of Karl Marx’s “dialectical materialism.”

Yin and Yang

Classical Chinese formalism and contemporary Chinese scientism share a number of traits. The one assumes an underlying patterned organic unity in nature; the other posits dialectical laws of motion governing historical and even physical change. The one employs the yin/yang theory to explain cyclical flux; the other employs the theory of contradictions to explain struggle and progression. In each case, all of reality is held to be governed by immutable “laws,” intuitively derived and categorically affirmed.

Another trait shared by classical Chinese formalism and contemporary Chinese scientism is their overriding concern with preserving doctrinal orthodoxy—and hence the political legitimacy of ruling elites. Just as Shi Huang Di (247–221 B.C.) and Emperor Wu (302–49 A.D.) strove to eliminate heretical thought by burning the books and banning the ideas of dissident scholars in ancient times, so too have China’s modern political leaders, like those of other communist countries,* periodically imposed strict and often arbitrary limitations on the scope of scientific inquiry.

Noting the tendency to lump together political and academic issues, the eminent Chinese historian of science Xu Liangying observed in 1957 that “some areas in the scientific domain are arbitrarily designated as ‘restricted areas’, and some research aims are regarded as taboo.”

Mao’s Thought

Professor Xu also criticized the widespread phenomenon of political labeling in intellectual debates: “Seeking to demonstrate their own correct thinking and firm stand,” Xu wrote, “some people indiscriminately use political jargon in issues of academic debate . . . improperly labeling their opponents as ‘reactionary’, ‘anti-people’, ‘feudalist’, ‘capitalist’ and so on.” Xu learned how truly destructive this practice is; he was condemned as a “rightist” during Mao’s crackdown on dissident intellectuals that followed the brief “Hundred Flowers” liberalization movement in 1957.

Another feature of dogmatic scientism is the practice of obsessively quoting “authoritative” works to legitimize one’s actions. This practice reached its peak during the Cultural Revolution, when the “thought of Mao Zedong” was endlessly cited to justify all manner of partisan behavior. Mao’s thought was also credited with having inspired a variety of scientific and technical

*Notably Stalin, who prohibited scientific theories that ran counter to his own teachings.
achievements, from the surgical reattachment of a severed human limb to the chemical synthesis of insulin. Such ritualistic obeisance was also very much in evidence at China’s 1978 National Science Conference, where a leading official in China’s fledgling satellite research program publicly attributed the success of that program to the “brilliant thesis” put forward by Mao Zedong in his 1936 essay, “On Practice.”

Chinese intellectuals themselves have recognized the union of Confucian formalism and Maoist dogmatism as a major source of China’s continued backwardness. In recent years, many have openly called for the unconditional establishment of freedom of inquiry in scientific research. One scientist, writing in 1980, argued that the “first important condition for creative labor is to let scientific researchers dare to think and dare to act.”

The author went on to assert that for “science there can be no forbidden zones, no sacred cows, nothing which cannot be touched. Rigidity in thinking is the most formidable enemy of science.”

Science and Freedom

Since 1978, China’s political leaders have made a number of gestures—some symbolic, some substantive—in the direction of loosening the restrictions on academic debate and criticism. The spirit of these gestures is embodied in the widely publicized twin slogans, “Seek truth from facts” and “Practice is the sole criterion of truth,” promulgated in the spring of 1978. Since that time, thousands of intellectuals (including Xu Liangying) have been cleared of charges of “rightism,” and the practice of political labeling has been officially discontinued with the revival of the Hundred Flowers policy.

In similar fashion, the thought of Mao Zedong has been at least partially demythologized, and the ritualistic quoting of Mao’s works has been criticized as an “obsession” interfering with the scientific pursuit of knowledge.

Reacting to these developments, Xu Liangying, writing in early February 1980, enthusiastically proclaimed that the “march on science has again become a heart-stirring call.” Perhaps. But within days of Xu’s penning these words, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) formally proposed the abolition of those parts of the 1978 State Constitution guaranteeing Chinese citizens “the right to speak out freely, air their
views fully, hold great debates and write big-character posters." At the same time, party leaders began to reassert the political and ideological primacy of the "four fundamental principles" governing the tolerable limits of free speech, criticism and inquiry.

**Sky Labs?**

The dogmatic scientism of the Chinese is reinforced by another ancient Chinese tradition—"feudal bureaucraticism." Unlike bureaucracy, which is a structural property of complex formal organizations, bureaucraticism has to do with pathological patterns of informal human behavior within organizations. Unfortunately, the Chinese language makes no clear distinction between these two concepts, both of which are rendered as guanliao zhuyi.

Since 1979, the Chinese mass media have begun to criticize such "feudal remnants" in organizational behavior as patriarchy, nepotism, and factionalism. Nevertheless, in typically patriarchal fashion, many leading cadres still treat their areas of command as their own private spheres of influence. The patriarchal style of leadership and policy-making comes out as well in the case of China's 1978 adoption of an eight-point charter for science and technology modernization. Giving high priority to such exotic scientific fields as high-energy physics, sky labs, and space probes, the eight points were selected not by seeking a broad consensus on national priorities within China's scientific community but rather by administrative fiat on the part of a small handful of senior officials in the science and technology establishment, many of whom were political confidants of China's top party leaders. As one outside analyst noted, the eight points reflected "an arbitrary exercise of the prerogative of the elite."

As a consequence, China's 1978 goals in science and technology were noteworthy more for their glamour than for their feasibility or their relevance to China's immediate needs.

**Down with Copenhagen**

Bloembergen also found it puzzling that a disproportionately large share of resources was being devoted to the development of superconductor technology, a field whose "promise for [practical] applications in electrical engineering is not close to realization, even in Western economies." And, finally, he concluded that the extreme weakness of current Chinese research efforts in such important areas as fiber optics, infrared photodetection, solar cells, nonlinear spectroscopy and basic atomic mechanisms reveals a "serious imbalance of effort" which was "probably determined by somewhat arbitrary initial choices."

Leading cadres who legitimize their actions by appealing to the pre-
vailing political "line" sustain a feudal practice that is at least as stifling as patriarchalism. An anecdote related by Xu Liangying illustrates the problem: "Some young comrades ... on hearing that certain [high-ranking] people had severely criticized the Copenhagen school of physics, followed suit even before they could figure out whether Copenhagen was the name of a person or a place."

Because science has been so highly politicized and because the party line has frequently—and sometimes precipitously—changed, most organizational leaders are afraid to take the initiative. When black can become white virtually overnight, personal responsibility, initiative, and risk-taking—three characteristics generally deemed essential to innovation and creativity in science—are severely inhibited, to say the least.

Another harmful consequence of compulsive party line behavior in Chinese organizations is intense political and factional conflict.

The practice of labeling—a major weapon in such conflict—was widespread during the Cultural Revolution, when thousands of scientists and scholars were indiscriminately persecuted as members of the "stinking ninth category."

Labeling has been officially discontinued since 1979, and amendments have been made to the victims of persecution. But the compulsion to politicize academic controversy remains an essential element both of the Marxist-Maoist world view of dialectical struggle and of a 2000-year-old Chinese cultural tradition emphasizing moral rectitude, ritualized obeisance to authority, and the avoidance of risk through the establishment of mutually protective interpersonal relationships (guanxi).

Another deeply embedded feature of Chinese culture, and the last we shall consider, is its highly ritualized system of behavior. Ritual displays of emotion, loyalty, and moral affirmation can of course be found in all...
societies and cultures. What sets China apart, though, is the pervasiveness of its ritualized behavior.

The roots of this elaborate ritualism extend to the political needs of orderly imperial administration. Historically, the Chinese state lacked large standing armies to enforce imperial tax levies, tributes, and labor-service requirements; it similarly lacked a specialized, professional public administration to manage the affairs of a vast agrarian empire. Hence, adherence to the moral dictates of *li* (propriety) rather than *fa* (law) became the essential guarantee of public order. The secret of effective imperial governance was, as historian Ray Huang explains, "to induce the younger generation to venerate the old, the women to obey their menfolk, and the illiterate to follow the examples set by the emperor's court. To accomplish this, in turn, there was no substitute for ritualistic proceedings."

The maintenance of social harmony and order thus became largely a matter of everyone's perceiving—and responding to—the requirements of his or her particular role. To do otherwise was to risk losing face, to violate the expectations of others, and thereby to invite disorder and chaos (*luan*) into personal relations. One tried, furthermore, to avoid as much as possible all ambiguous or indeterminate obligations.

**Against the Grain**

Like the other cultural obstacles to scientific progress, ritualism is by no means limited to pre-communist China. The ritualized process of small-group "criticism and self-criticism" and the tendency among Chinese communists to classify and label political objects and events in terms of moral stereotypes (the "great, glorious and correct CCP," or the "heinous crimes of the 'Gang of Four'") preserve in modern idiom the conformist styles of traditional Chinese society.

The dialectical method itself, which the Chinese communists seem to have adopted more comfortably than has any other contemporary Marxist-Leninist regime, appears to be wholly compatible with the ritualism of traditional Chinese culture. Thus, for example, Mao Zedong's well-known obsession with "dividing one into two" (i.e., sharply distinguishing between the positive and negative elements in a given "contradiction") appears to perpetuate the traditional Chinese reliance on unambiguous moral categories.

This obsession was fundamental to
the Maoist perception of an irreconcilable "struggle between two roads" in the post-Great Leap era (1960–65); it similarly underlay Mao’s dogmatic insistence, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, that the portrayal of morally ambivalent "middle characters" in Chinese art and literature was destructive of socialist morality because it blurred the distinction between heroes and villains, positive and negative role models.

Science cannot flourish in a culture which strongly emphasizes formal propriety, individual dependency, and the denial of ambivalence and doubt. Ritualism is a mask used to obscure reality, to avoid uncertainty, and to resolve ambiguity. But modern science takes uncertainty and ambiguity as givens, and strives to penetrate the mask of the apparent in order to ascertain the nature of the real.

As Levenson insisted, Chinese communism is not merely "Confucianism with another name and another skin." Nevertheless, beneath the violent waves of revolutionary change that have swept over China during the past century, certain underlying cultural currents continue to flow. And while these cultural traditions have taken on new political forms, they remain, in many crucial respects, identifiable Chinese.

The recent, post-Mao institutional reforms in Chinese science and technology are significant because they cut directly against the grain of traditional (Confucian and communist) ways of thinking and acting. For precisely this reason, it is still highly uncertain whether the reforms will sustain even a modest advance toward modern science.

Despite official reassurances that science is henceforth to be protected as a vital and productive force, there are already disturbing signs: grumblings in the press over the "elitism" of the new scientific establishment, particularly the prestigious Chinese Academy of Sciences; charges that scientists are pursuing goals that have little relevance to the immediate economic needs of the People’s Republic.

To an extent, the accusations are just. And, indeed, they echo one of Joseph Needham’s most convincing explanations of China’s arrested scientific development: that Chinese scientists, unlike their Western counterparts, have never bridged the gap between theory and technique.

Under Mao and then under the Gang of Four, China attempted to bridge this gap through a campaign of ideological purification, a campaign inevitably accompanied by political intimidation and persecution. The results were dismal. China will have made some headway in the 1980s if its rulers remember this time that such traditional “purifying” solutions are, at least for science and technology, no solution at all.
A History of the Past: ‘Life Reeked with Joy’

"History," declared Henry Ford, "is bunk." And yet, to paraphrase George Santayana, those who forget history and the English language are condemned to mangle them. Historian Anders Henriksson, a five-year veteran of the university classroom, has faithfully recorded, from papers submitted by freshmen at McMaster University and the University of Alberta, his students’ more striking insights into European history from the Middle Ages to the present. Possibly as an act of vengeance, Professor Henriksson has now assembled these individual fragments into a chronological narrative which we present here.

Compiled by Anders Henriksson

History, as we know, is always bias, because human beings have to be studied by other human beings, not by independent observers of another species.

During the Middle Ages, everybody was middle aged. Church and state were co-operative. Middle Evil society was made up of monks, lords, and surfs. It is unfortunate that we do not have a medieval European laid out on a table before us, ready for dissection. After a revival of infantile commerce slowly creeped into Europe, merchants appeared. Some were sitters and some were drifters. They roamed from town to town exposing themselves and organized big fairs in the countryside. Medieval people were violent. Murder during this period was nothing. Everybody killed someone. England fought numerous for land in France and ended up winning and losing. The Crusades were a series of military expeditions made by Christians seeking to free the holy land (the "Home Town" of Christ) from the Arabs.

In the 1400 hundreds most Englishmen were perpendicular. A class of yeowls arose. Finally, Europe caught the Black Death. The bubonic plague is a social disease in the sense that it can be transmitted by intercourse and other etceteras. It was spread from port to port by inflected rats. Victims of the Black Death grew boobs on their necks. The plague also helped the emergence of the English

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Cramming (1931), by Norman Rockwell.

language as the national language of England, France and Italy.

The Middle Ages slimpared to a halt. The renaissance bolted in from the blue. Life reeked with joy. Italy became robust, and more individuals felt the value of their human being. Italy, of course, was much closer to the rest of the world, thanks to northern Europe. Man was determined to civilise himself and his brothers, even if heads had to roll! It became sheik to be educated. Art was on a more associated level. Europe was full of incredible churches with great art bulging out their doors. Renaissance merchants were beautiful and almost lifelike.

The Reformnation happened when German nobles resented the idea that tithes were going to Papal France or the Pope thus enriching Catholic coiffures. Traditions had become oppressive so they too were crushed in the wake of man's quest for resurrection above the not-just-social beast he had become. An angry Martin Luther nailed 95 theocrats to a church door. Theologically, Luthar was into reorientation mutation. Calvinism was the most convenient religion since the days of the ancients. Anabaptist services tended to be migratory. The Popes, of course,
were usually Catholic. Monks went right on seeing themselves as worms. The last Jesuit priest died in the 19th century.

After the reaffirmation were wars both foreign and infernal. If the Spanish could gain the Netherlands they would have a stronghold throughout northern Europe which would include their positions in Italy, Burgundy, central Europe and India thus surrounding France. The German Emperor’s lower passage was blocked by the French for years and years.

Louis XIV became King of the Sun. He gave the people food and artillery. If he didn’t like someone, he sent them to the gallows to row for the rest of their lives. Vauban was the royal minister of flirtation. In Russia the 17th century was known as the time of the bounding of the serfs. Russian nobles wore clothes only to humour Peter the Great. Peter filled his government with accidental people and built a new capital near the European border. Orthodox priests became government antennae.

The enlightenment was a reasonable time. Voltaire wrote a book called Candy that got him into trouble with Frederick the Great. Philosophers were unknown yet, and the fundamental stake was one of religious toleration slightly confused with defeatism. France was in a very serious state. Taxation was a great drain on the state budget. The French revolution was accomplished before it happened. The revolution evolved through monarchical, republican and totalitarian phases until it catapulted into Napoleonic. Napoleon was ill with bladder problems and was very tense and unrestrained.

History, a record of things left behind by past generations, started in 1815. Throughout the comparatively radical years 1815–1870 the western European continent was undergoing a Rampant period of economic modification. Industrialization was precipitating in England. Problems were so complexicated that in Paris, out of a city population of one million people, two million able-bodieds were on the loose.

Great Britain, the USA and other European countries had democratic leanings. The middle class was tired and needed a rest. The old order could see the lid holding down new ideas beginning to shake. Among the goals of the chartists were universal sufrage and an anal parliament. Voting was to be done by ballot.

A new time zone of national unification roared over the horizon. Founder of the new Italy was Cavour, an intelligent Sardin from the north. Nationalism aided Italy because nationalism is the growth of an army. We can see that nationalism succeeded for Italy because of France’s big army. Napoleon III-IV mounted the French thrown. One thinks of Napoleon III as a live extension of the late, but great, Napoleon. Here too was the new Germany: loud, bold, vulgar and full of reality.

Culture fomented from Europe's tip to its top. Richard Strauss, who was violent but methodical like his wife made him, plunged into vicious and perverse plays. Dramatized were adventures in seduction and abortion. Music reeked with reality. Wagner was master of music, and people did not forget his contribution. When he died they labeled his seat "historical." Other countries had their own artists. France had Chekhov.

World War I broke out around 1912-1914. Germany was on one side of France and Russia was on the other. At war people get killed, and then they aren't people any more, but friends. Peace was proclaimed at Versih, which was attended by George Loid, Primal Minister of England. President Wilson arrived with 14 pointers. In 1937 Lenin revolted Russia. Communism raged among the peasants, and the civil war "team colours" were red and white.

Germany was displaced after WWI. This gave rise to Hitler. Germany was morbidly overexcited and unbalanced. Berlin became the decadent capital, where all forms of sexual depravations were practised. A huge anti-Semitic movement arose. Attractive slogans like "death to all Jews" were used by governmental groups. Hitler remilitarized the Rineland over a squirmish between Germany and France. The appeasers were blinded by the great red of the Soviets. Moosealini rested his foundations on eight million bayonets and invaded Hi Lee Salasy. Germany invaded Poland, France invaded Belgium, and Russia invaded everybody. War screeched to an end when a nukuleer explosion was dropped on Heroshima. A whole generation had been wipe out in two world wars, and their forlorne families were left to pick up the peace.

According to Fromm, individuation began historically in medieval times. This was a period of small childhood. There is increasing experience as adolescence experiences its life development. The last stage is us.
Some people get very angry over what they read in THE NEW REPUBLIC.

Sometimes they're angry at us—we have a habit of jabbing at cherished political beliefs and philosophies. More often, they're angry along with us—sharing our outrage at some of the inanities that pass for reason in Washington these days.

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For example:

In a series of timely articles, THE NEW REPUBLIC explored the idea behind supply-side economics: that producers should be encouraged, through tax incentives, to produce. We agreed with the idea, but not the practice under Reagan. Are rich people, we asked, the true producers of wealth? Or just the most conspicuous consumers of it?

While everyone else was praising Japan's "miracle economy" to the skies, Daniel Yergin in THE NEW REPUBLIC predicted that the Japanese bulging man may be beached off the tracks. And for a reason you probably never thought of.

In several articles, we pointed out how giant corporations seem to be running American foreign policy. We didn't cite merely the obvious cases, like Chile. We showed how U.S. oil companies were propping up the Marxist regime in Angola and how banks were aiding with the Russians against Solidarity in Poland. And a special investigative report in THE NEW REPUBLIC revealed how Saudi Arabia secretly pressurized corporations into lobbying to pass the AWACS bill.

While even many conservative publications urged a wait-and-see attitude shortly after martial law was imposed in Poland, THE NEW REPUBLIC took a tough line from the start.

And if you also tend to get emotional about things cultural, there's still more in store for you. Our outspoken TV critic, Mark Crison Miller... who didn't hesitate to blast the phoniness of a sentimental special on race relations, or shy from praising a performer he thinks is a genius: Johnny Carson.

You'll also enjoy penetrating film reviews by Stanley Kauffmann, Robert Brustein's knowing theater coverage. And an incomparable roster of book reviewers, including Irving Howe, R.W.B. Lewis, Anne Tyler, Robert Coles and Alfred Kazin.

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COMMENTARY

We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer’s telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editors’ requests for comment.

Whose News?

I enjoyed Lawrence Lichty’s piece [“Video versus Print,” WQ, Special Issue 1982] on the importance of television news. A few months ago a colleague and I did a related study to learn how adequate the media were in their coverage of international news. We found that those people who preferred television as their source for international news knew considerably less about such news than those who said that newspapers were their preferred source. In other words, newspaper readers were knowledgeable about specific foreign news items while television news viewers had only a superficial awareness of the same stories.

Manny Paraschos, Chairperson
Department of Journalism
University of Arkansas at Little Rock

Mind Control

Richard Restak has written another timely, engrossing, but also misleading essay about the human brain [“The Brain,” WQ, Summer 1982].

I cite an example: “Penfield’s patients frequently reported that, upon stimulation [of the brain], everything around them seemed to have occurred before.” In fact, Penfield’s patients reported such experiences infrequently, and other neurosurgeons hardly ever observe it. Perhaps occasionally and inadvertently Dr. Penfield used too much current and several areas of the brain were excited, somewhat like the aura that can occur before a seizure.

Nor can I agree with Restak’s statement that “no neuroscientist can ever exert experimental control over the internal state of a human brain.” People have been controlled by drugs and torture, and should our civilization collapse, I could imagine selective control by malicious technical developments.

We don’t know enough about what types of neurons are doing what at different times in a human brain. As Restak says, it’s the “last frontier,” and the exquisite specificity of brain function should not deter us from analyzing it. I wish he wouldn’t encourage mystifiers by implying there is something not amenable to biological investigation and explanation because it is in the depths of one’s soul.

Herbert Lansdell, Ph.D.
National Institutes of Health

Which Door to the Future?

Willi Paul Adams and Aaron Segal [“A Dubious Host” and “The Half-Open Door,” WQ, New Year’s 1983] tell us clearly where we have been on immigration from the beginning of America until now. Both acknowledge that the day of unrestricted immigration is over. Neither can tell us just where we should be moving now as a matter of national policy. As Chairman of the U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy and as Co-Chairman of the National Committee on Immigration Reform—a bipartisan, private group—I can suggest a few important principles.

1. We desperately need a new immigration law. The current law is ineffective, while the pressures grow stronger each year. There are more refugees in the world today—about 16 million—than at the end of World War II. There are also a billion desperately poor people. Most want to come here, either legally or illegally.
Many will come, more as the pressures mount, and most illegally.

2. We need a new law which is fair and effective, nonracist, sensitive to family reunification, and consonant with our tradition as a nation of immigrants, a haven of hope to those in greatest personal danger and despair.

3. I have only been able to find one effective way of demagnetizing the magnet of economic opportunity that draws millions of illegal immigrants across our land and sea borders. We should make citizenship or legal residence a qualification for every job and find a simple, reasonably noncounterfeitable means of certifying that requirement for every job-seeker. We all have a Social Security card right now and we use it often for a dozen different purposes. Why not make it noncounterfeitable and use it for certification of legal work?

4. The Senate passed the requirements of No. 3 in the Simpson Bill last year, but the Mazzoli version was mired down in the House during the lame-duck session. If we could revive Simpson-Mazzoli during the current session, then we might also humanely move towards amnesty for the few millions of illegal immigrants who now live in the shadows, often depressing wages and working conditions for other Americans, living outside the law and in great fear of discovery and deportation. If they have been here some years, are working, and often paying income tax and Social Security through payroll deduction with no hope of benefits, why not clean up this messy situation, once and for all, and bring them out of the shadows?

Our commission was unanimous on this last point, but recognized that without regularizing immigration through employer sanctions and better identification, there would be no hope of amnesty. Without regularizing the process, amnesty would be just a new magnet for more illegal entries.

For those interested in further details, our commission report made about a hundred recommendations, but the above are the crucial ones.

Rev. Theodore Hesburgh, C.S.C.
President, University of Notre Dame

The Second Time Around

The Ninety-seventh Congress recently concluded without taking final action on the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982, commonly known as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill. But to paraphrase famous football coach Vince Lombardi: We didn’t lose, we just ran out of time.

I believe that Father Theodore Hesburgh, President of University of Notre Dame, and his Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy are correct in believing that the United States will close the back door (illegal immigration) in order to keep open the front door (legal immigration, refugee and asylum entrants) by enacting a sensible immigration reform bill.

A fair and balanced immigration reform law, supported by this administration, by newspapers, by leading scholars, and by major interest groups from every part of our society, could substantially reduce or stop illegal immigration while maintaining a generous level of admissions of immigrants and refugees into our country. Of course, any comprehensive legislation such as that seeking to change the nation’s ingrained immigration laws is by nature a compromise.

The Simpson-Mazzoli bill included the central elements of all major immigration reform studies: penalties against employers who knowingly hire undocumented aliens (to end the job lure which brings most undocumented aliens to the United States); legalization for undocumented aliens who have lived in our country for several years, who have established ties in the community, and who would be productive U.S. citizens; strengthening the Immigration and Naturalization Service; reforming the process for determining the validity of claims for political asylum (to end the 125,000-case backlog and the perceived biases in the present system); and a limited temporary foreign worker program permitting foreign workers to be recruited to take jobs only if Americans are unwilling or unable to take those jobs.

The Ninety-eighth Congress is still young, and the legislative agenda is not yet fixed. However, it would be a notably successful Congress if it passed a sensible,
humane, and effective immigration reform measure.

Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law
U.S. House of Representatives

Corrections

In Lawrence Lichty's article "Video versus Print" [WQ, Special Issue 1982], the sentence (page 55) which read "Fewer than one-third of U.S. adults view early local TV news; about 27 percent watch late evening news; and 23 percent watch one of the three major network evening news shows. Allowing for audience duplication, about 56 percent of all adults watch at least one program in one of these three categories of TV news on a given day." Roughly 68 percent of all adults see a daily newspaper, as Professor Lichty stated, citing 1981 Simmons data, in his WQ article.

Professor Lichty's analysis, not surprisingly, drew considerable fire, accompanied by contrary audience statistics, from the TV industry. (For a third-party view of this debate over data, see Thomas Griffith, "Where Do You Get Your News?" Time, Dec. 6, 1982.) However, his essential points do not seem seriously challenged: Americans get their news from a variety of sources; newspapers, not TV, seem to remain the leading source; the TV networks' evening news anchormen, e.g., CBS's Dan Rather, command a vast but fluctuating audience, with only two percent of U.S. adults watching Mr. Rather as often as 17 to 20 weeknights in a month.

In Dennis Dunn's article on the Vatican, "Global Reach" [WQ, Autumn 1982], the publication date of Volume One of Das Kapital was incorrectly given as 1848. The correct date is 1867.
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