

THE WILSON QUARTERLY

SUMMER 1978

A NATIONAL REVIEW
OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION

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THE WILSON QUARTERLY

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VOL. II NO. 3

Business and the rational mind, Part II

Doughnut-watching•The virtue of dissatisfaction•The egalitarian thrust

When it comes to evaluating the performance of the American economic system, it's hard to get some people to look at the substance. They get so hung up on shortcomings that they fail to discern accomplishments. Instead of comprehending the doughnut, they become fixated on the hole.

As a result, they come out almost totally negative and conclude that we ought to scrap the whole system and rebuild from scratch. In our view, this ignores the extraordinary benefits that our system—perhaps best called "democratic capitalism"—has produced for the ordinary person over the years. It also ignores the question of what to substitute for the most dynamic, most egalitarian, and most productive system in history, despite all its obvious flaws.

We don't feel any theological attachment to the American economic system. Certainly it can be improved. And this is exactly the point: The system has improved throughout the past 200 years, no matter how unevenly, is still improving, and seems likely to keep on improving if given a chance.

The best way to gauge any system's improvement is, of course, to monitor its performance.

If you look only at the hole, you'll find that both unemployment and inflation in the U.S. are still far higher than any of us would like.

But if you look at the doughnut over the 10 years through 1977—a decade that encompassed the Vietnam war, the oil embargo, and other afflictions—you'll find this: The number of people employed in this country increased well over twice as fast as our population did.

And, as Ben Wattenberg points out in his book *The Real America*, family income in the U.S., after adjusting for inflation, has doubled in a generation, and the steady upward movement of median family income in our country has created a "massive majority middle class... something that has never happened before anywhere..."

This is not to say any of us should be complacent. On the contrary, healthy and informed dissatisfaction with the status quo has underlain much of our country's progress. But this constant progress itself has created problems: By performing economic miracles, the system has created enormous expectations and a growing desire for instant gratification of those expectations.

The key to this dilemma is partly one of timing: Our system is indeed able to work wonders when it is allowed to operate within rational, realistic timetables for change and with minimal government intervention. The problem often lies in expecting too much too soon, and this in turn often leads to well-meaning but misguided government intervention, which does more harm than good.

Most of the critics of our system agree that it is wondrously productive, though they are reluctant to comprehend that material wealth is indispensable if a society is to support such essentials as health care, education, and other social services. They fault the system on "moral" or other grounds—including, sometimes, esthetics. And they focus disproportionately on the short-term malfunctions that punctuate the system's long-term performance.

At least part of the carping at our economic system is sheer intellectual faddism; it's easier to criticize than to learn the basics of economics, which can require one to overcome deeply rooted biases. Many elitists seem to feel that in the long run our country will be better off if the decisions are made by a select few rather than by the masses of people. Since our economic system is essentially egalitarian in its thrust, elitists often appear to fear and distrust it.

Being egalitarian, the system naturally develops a constituency that is large and loyal, even if not as vocal as those bent on remaking society in their own image. If left unchecked, this tendency of people to think for themselves will almost inevitably strengthen both our economic and political systems.

This is a prospect we find it easy to live with. We believe that over any reasonable period of time the American people, no matter how much they criticize their economic system, will devote themselves more to appreciating the doughnut than to denouncing the hole in it.

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

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

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

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

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

GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE 1980's
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SUMMER
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VOLUME II NUMBER 3

Editor's Comment

As every scholar knows, the arts and sciences are not immune from intellectual fads, sudden shifts in emphasis, and trendy responses to the headlines. During the 1950s, for example, "urban studies" began to get academic attention and foundation grants; the 1960s produced a surge in "black studies," now fading a bit; the 1970s have seen Chicanos, "native Americans," even "white ethnics," join "environment" and "women" as new go-go subjects for academic research, classroom discussion, and foundation largesse. Much nonsense and some solid scholarship have resulted.

However, the new campus boom in the study of "popular culture" (movies, TV, comics, etc.) seems to bear no such relation to current events. In part, as one of our contributors suggests, its growth may derive from its shrewd use by professors as a magnet to boost sagging enrollments in undergraduate humanities courses among a generation reared on TV rather than books. Or, as traditionalists complain, it may stem from the perceptions of a new wave of college teachers, products of the '60s, who now see popular culture as more egalitarian, more "relevant" (and less demanding) than the study of Shakespeare, Milton, or Henry James.

Whatever the explanation, "pop culture" is a growth industry in academe, and we here present essays by five of its serious critics and enthusiasts. Their views are likely to provoke counter-arguments—which we welcome.

We also look at the rise of science in America and at the shifting focus of federal science efforts. And other contributors re-examine that largely forgotten turning point in America's behavior as a world power, the Korean War, which ended 25 years ago this summer and left a continuing legacy to the evolution of U.S. foreign policy in the nuclear age.

Lastly, we reprint Richard Rovere's mock-serious 1962 essay, "The American Establishment," which supplied a new addition to the list of favored clichés in journalism and politics; Mr. Rovere provides a wry 1978 assessment of the Establishment's current state.

There is plenty of variety in the world of scholarship, and this issue of the *Quarterly*, we think, makes that abundantly clear.

Peter Braestrup

PERIODICALS

Reviews of articles from periodicals and specialized journals here and abroad

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

Voting On the Issues

"The Federal Initiative Idea" by Michael Nelson, in *The Nation* (Feb. 25, 1978), 333 Sixth Ave., New York, N.Y., 10014.

At a time when the American public is said to be "turned off" from government and "dropping out" of politics, use of the initiative, by which citizens can propose laws and have them voted up or down in general elections, is on the rise at the state and local level. Nelson, a contributing editor of *The Washington Monthly*, suggests that the time for extending the initiative idea to the national level may be at hand.

In the past 15 months, initiatives have produced a "sunshine" law in Florida, "returnable bottle" statutes in Michigan and Maine, a local-option fluoridation law in Utah, and an Arizona plan to improve procedures for the selection of judges.

Hearings on a constitutional amendment to permit use of the initiative at the federal level were held in the Senate last December and serious, if intermittent, debate is underway. Critics of the proposal argue that the initiative process would produce a "lawmaking binge" dominated by "hate issues" (e.g., anti-labor and race issues) or special-interest proposals. Nelson says the experience of the 23 states that now allow initiatives proves the contrary. (In Washington state, only 84 of the 407 initiative petitions filed since 1912 attracted enough valid signatures to qualify; of these, 40 were eventually rejected at the polls. None were frivolous or inconsequential.)

Ratification of a constitutional amendment requires formation of a broad consensus, says Nelson, and that takes time. One favorable omen: Respondents to a recent Caddell poll favored the idea by a margin of better than 2 to 1, and 74 percent said they would be "more inclined to go to vote if they could vote on issues as well as candidates."

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

Drawing the Line

"The Unfinished Revolution: Beyond 'One Person, One Vote' " by Bruce Adams, in *National Civic Review* (Jan. 1978), 47 E. 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

The U.S. Supreme Court decisions of the mid-1960s requiring periodic reapportionment—the decennial division of states into legislative districts for voting purposes—on the basis of "one person, one vote" eliminated the gross population inequalities among legislative districts.

However, "the reapportionment revolution remains unfinished," according to Adams, a senior official of Common Cause, the self-styled national citizens' lobby. With no standards other than substantial population equality to guide them, the state legislatures have been free to draw districts of bizarre configuration designed to serve personal and partisan ends. The intent is to produce the greatest number of legislative victories for the majority party by fragmenting or isolating minority party votes.

Such gerrymandering, says Adams, dilutes the value of citizen political participation, makes legislators less responsive to their constituents, and enfeebles political parties by allowing them to field weak candidates.

The next reapportionment will take place in 1981 (after the 1980 census) and Adams argues that now is the time for states to reform their procedures. What is required, he contends, is the establishment of rigorous antigerrymandering standards and the creation of independent, nonpartisan commissions to draw the lines of state legislative and congressional districts.

Locking the Door on the Suburbs

"Self-Interest in the Suburbs: The Trend toward No-Growth Zoning" by Michelle J. White, in *Policy Analysis* (Spring 1978), University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif. 94720.

Under the banner of "no-growth," suburban communities in the United States have been passing zoning ordinances that severely restrict the construction of any type of new housing. Justified by its advocates as an environmental safeguard, no-growth zoning has achieved a degree of respectability and has survived several key court challenges. Yet it is primarily intended to benefit residents at the expense of outsiders, says White, a University of Pennsylvania economist.

What makes the no-growth movement important is the rapid shift of business and industry from central cities to the suburbs. Without affordable suburban housing, low-income city residents must face long, costly commuting trips if they wish to compete for suburban jobs.

No-growth policies differ from traditional exclusionary zoning. Instead of using zoning to encourage higher-priced residential growth that will bring tax revenues greater than the expected cost of added

services (e.g., sewers, police protection, schools, etc.), no-growth proponents see no gain in *any* type of residential development. Some cite the pleasures of preserving a small-town atmosphere with open space and less congestion. Others fear fiscal burdens; higher municipal-bond interest rates (up from 2.3 percent in 1954 to 6.09 percent in 1974) have made new public facilities more expensive.

The shift of business to the suburbs has yet to peak, warns White, who urges that the states increase the access of low-income workers to suburban housing. This could be done by monitoring all zoning to bar exclusionary schemes or by forcing communities to permit a certain amount of low-rent housing as a condition for admitting new industry. States could also agree to absorb all or part of the cost of facilities required by new residents.

The President as "Executor"

"James Madison: The Unimperial President" by Ralph Ketcham, in *Virginia Quarterly Review* (Winter 1978), University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va. 22903.

No constitutional issue more consumed James Madison than that of achieving the "vital balance of republican government" between executive needs and executive excess, writes Ketcham, a historian at Syracuse University. Criticized by one contemporary as a weak, indecisive, "withered little applejohn," Madison remained true to his convictions, first as one of the architects of the U.S. Constitution and then as the fourth President (1809–17).

Madison received an early lesson in the disadvantages of a weak executive when he served (1778–79) in Virginia's eight-member Council

"Strict constructionist" Madison opposed increased federal power.

of State during the Revolutionary War. The Virginia governor had little power and could act only with the council's approval. The same problem plagued the Continental Congress, where committees exercised executive powers.

At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, Madison supported the idea of a single executive with power to appoint and dismiss officials; and with responsibility for conducting war and foreign affairs. At the same time, he resisted John Adams' suggestion that the executive be called "His Most Benign Highness" and later contested Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton's conception of the executive branch, as a "machine to lead and dominate the nation," rather than as the *executor* of congressional will.

The balance between authority and restraint was most precarious during war. As President, Madison encountered "near treasonable opposition" from the Federalists at home while trying to direct the War of 1812. "What are you to gain by giving Mr. Madison men and money?" asked Gouverneur Morris, former minister to France. Faced with obstructions to recruiting, tax-collecting, and the movement of troops, Madison, like later Presidents, believed that domestic discontent was "the greatest, if not the sole, inducement with the enemy to persevere."

Unlike some later Presidents, however, Madison refused to crack down on dissent, believing that to do so would be "to 'lose' the war by waging it incongruously"—by ignoring the principles he was fighting to preserve. "Madison won the war," Ketcham concludes, "by his republican conduct of it."

Taxing Vices

"No Smoking: New Sanctions for Old Habits" by Tabitha M. Powledge, in *The Hastings Center Report* (Apr. 1978), 360 Broadway, Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y. 10706.

Recent efforts to reduce cigarette smoking in the United States may foreshadow a host of other measures designed to encourage—or compel—people to take responsibility for their own health by changing the way they live, says Powledge, research associate at the Hastings Center.

A package of proposals from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the National Commission on Smoking and Public Policy, and the Food and Drug Administration are aimed directly at decreasing the number of smokers (currently estimated at 55 million) through education, advertising, and restrictions on smoking in certain public areas. In Virginia, where state law entitles all firemen who develop heart or lung disease to retire on larger-than-usual pensions, the town of Alexandria now requires all recruit fire fighters to give up smoking within 14 weeks of their employment.

The HEW proposals include a plea to the insurance industry to offer lower premiums to nonsmokers, not only for life and health insurance,

but for auto and fire insurance as well. With health care costs (estimated at $15 billion in 1977) approaching 1 percent of the gross national product, Powledge predicts increasing public support for proposals that would place more of the costs of health-damaging behavior on the individual rather than on society as a whole.

It has been suggested, for example, that health insurance rates might be scaled according to a person's weight, smoking and drinking habits, and driving record. Even injuries resulting from certain risky sports (e.g., hang-gliding, skiing, and football) might ultimately be excluded from the group of health costs society will be willing to shoulder. Lest this seem far-fetched, says Powledge, the Carter administration is said to be seriously considering a "vice tax" on tobacco and alcohol to help pay for national health insurance.

The Unresolved Abortion Issue

"The Supreme Court, Abortion Policy, and State Response: A Preliminary Analysis" by Jeanne Bell Nicholson and Debra W. Stewart, in *Publius* (Winter 1978), Center for the Study of Federalism, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa. 19122.

On June 20, 1977, the Supreme Court held that states were not required to subsidize elective abortions as a condition to receiving Medicaid funds and that state laws could prohibit nontherapeutic abortions at publicly-owned hospitals. This and a subsequent Court decision clearing the way for implementing the 1976 congressional provision restricting *federal* abortion funding to cases of "life endangerment" have shifted the abortion struggle from the federal courts to state and local decision makers.

The wide-ranging effects of this shift are only just beginning to show up, say Nicholson, assistant professor of government and politics at George Mason University, and Stewart, assistant professor of political science at North Carolina State University at Raleigh.

Thirty-five states have decided to stop all funding of abortions except when a woman's life is endangered. Three states (Idaho, New York, and Pennsylvania) continue to fund "medically necessary" abortions. The remaining 12 states (including California) and the District of Columbia have chosen to assume the financial burden and offer full abortion services under Medicaid. New York and California together account for close to 50 percent of the Medicaid abortions performed nationwide.

The most obvious result has been the shrinking number of legal abortions performed nationwide (as many as 274,000 poor women obtained abortions with the help of federal-state funding programs in 1976). Shifting responsibility to the states is expected to result in an increase in regulatory legislation (already introduced in every state and passed in Maine, California, and New York) requiring that a second physician be in attendance during hospital abortion procedures for the express purpose of sustaining the life of the aborted fetus if possible.

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

The authors also predict that the politics of abortion will involve more and more citizens, with coalitions forming on both sides. For example, fundamentalist church leaders, particularly in the South, have become a new and dynamic factor in the predominantly Roman Catholic pro-life movement.

The abortion controversy is not going to subside quickly, say Nicholson and Stewart. Like school desegregation, the abortion rights issue is too fundamental to be resolved by a single Court decision.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

The Enigma of Ultra

"The Historical Impact of Revealing the Ultra Secret" by Harold C. Deutsch, in *Parameters* (vol. 7, no. 3), U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 17013.

Publication of *The Ultra Secret* by Group Captain F. W. Winterbotham in 1974 stunned historians by revealing the extent to which the Western Allies had enjoyed access to the most secret communications of the German High Command during World War II. The revelations, says Deutsch, a political scientist at the U.S. Army War College, seemed to demand "immediate and wholesale revision" of historians' assumptions about the factors that determined the course and outcome of the struggle.

However, assessing the importance of Ultra (code name for the entire British effort of deciphering, evaluating, and exploiting the German radio traffic) is not easy. With the notable exception of the 1944 landing in Normandy (where Ultra allowed Allied officers to listen in on high-level German debates on where the invasion should be expected) it was probably only at the middle stage of the war (Summer 1940 to Summer 1943) that Ultra's role was decisive.

During the 1940 Battle of Britain, Ultra often supplied information (confirmed by radar) about the targets and approach routes of German bombers. It also told London when Hitler abandoned his invasion plans, permitting Churchill to send reinforcements to the Middle East. In the spring of 1941, during the Battle of the Atlantic, the British captured code books, wireless logs, and a German "Enigma" decoding machine that permitted them to destroy the Germans' system of supply ships for their U-boats and, for a two-month period, to reroute some 50 convoys to escape submarine attack. In North Africa, Ultra provided details of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's plans and allowed Allied aircraft to destroy many of his vital supplies.

But as Deutsch points out, when one side is clearly weaker, the best intelligence cannot turn the tide. The Allies knew all the essentials of the German order of battle during the disastrous campaign in Norway

(April 1940), but it was of little help to them. And the Allies won the Battle of the Bulge (December 1944) without preliminary warnings from Ultra, which had been frustrated by Hitler's decision to maintain tight radio silence prior to the German surprise attack.

Laser, Laser in the Sky

"Strategic and Arms Control Implications of Laser Weapons" by Barry J. Smernoff, in *Air University Review* (Jan./Feb. 1978), Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The United States and Russia are both spending heavily to develop laser weapons capable of destroying military targets by means of a high energy beam of electromagnetic radiation. The reason is obvious, says Smernoff, a researcher at the Hudson Institute: "Laser weapon technology has the potential to revolutionize the art of warfare during the next quarter-century."

The ultimate laser weapon system could fire a beam of energy from the ground thousands of miles into space with enough power to destroy enemy satellites and ballistic missiles, as well as bombers and cruise missiles. An intermediate weapon might be an airborne laser designed to shoot down enemy planes, satellites, and ballistic missiles launched from submarines (which are most vulnerable during the early minutes of flight).

Should Russia and the United States both develop laser antisatellite weapons, there would be a temptation for each to strike first, knowing that both sides depend on reconnaissance satellites for early warning of impending missile attack.

Experts believe that U.S. development of a high energy laser weapon able to protect our own satellites while capable of eliminating both enemy satellites and incoming ballistic missiles would represent a



Future conflicts may find laser-armed killer satellites roaming outer space.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Sputnik-like event—a technical achievement that could establish the United States as undisputed leader in defense-related technology.

Smernoff doubts that either Russia or the United States would tolerate the open deployment of such a weapon by the other. But he warns that there are broad gray areas between high energy laser systems designed only to *track* satellites and the lethal laser weapon systems. This blurring is likely to increase as high energy laser technology advances, producing severe problems for arms control negotiators. On the other hand, Smernoff suggests, perhaps the primary task of long-term arms control should be to seek a smooth transition from the instability of nuclear deterrence based on offensive weapons to reliance on nonnuclear (laser) defensive weapons.

Reassessing War Crimes

"Vietnam: New Light on the Question of American Guilt" by Guenter Lewy, in *Commentary* (Feb. 1978), 165 E. 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

Critics of American involvement in the Vietnam War, notably participants in the 1967 Stockholm International War Crimes Tribunal organized by the late Bertrand Russell, condemned as criminal such U.S. actions as relocation of civilians and the use of napalm and herbicides, and broadly indicted the U.S. military for atrocities.

However, Lewy, a political scientist at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, after combing through classified Pentagon archives, concludes that charges of officially condoned crimes and grossly immoral U.S. conduct in Vietnam are without substance.

Those charges, Lewy argues, were based on a distorted picture of battlefield conditions, ignorance of the U.S. and international rules of military engagement, and a tendency to construe every lapse of discipline and mistake of judgment as a wanton breach of the laws of war. Evacuation of civilians from combat areas to create "free-fire" zones, for example, not only enhanced civilian safety but could be seen as *required* by the 1949 Geneva convention on the treatment of civilians in wartime. Combat in populated areas stemmed from a Viet Cong tactic of converting hamlets into fortified strongholds (itself a violation of the Geneva accords). American bombing of North Vietnam from 1965 to 1968 was hedged about by so many precautions against damage to civilian life and property that the effectiveness of the missions was jeopardized.

Furthermore, says Lewy, a faulty impression of American conduct emerged from the news media and the willingness of many Western intellectuals to accept almost any allegations of U.S. wrongdoing at face value. A widely-published photograph of a young girl burned by napalm near Saigon in 1972 helped create the false notion that thousands of children suffered napalm burns; a photograph of a "prisoner" being thrown from a U.S. helicopter turned out to have been staged using a corpse; and accounts of the "tiger cages" at the Con Son island

prison proved to be inaccurate and sensationalized.

Accusations that American conduct amounted to genocide, as charged by the Russell tribunal, are "grotesque" and "absurd," says Lewy. The Vietnamese population increased during the war; American aid substantially improved medical care and (temporarily) raised the Vietnamese standard of living. The proportion of civilians killed—45 percent of all war deaths—was no higher than in other conflicts of this century and less than some, including Korea (70 percent of all war deaths).

These "cobwebs of mythology" that contribute to the sense of moral outrage about Vietnam felt by many Americans, especially the young, must be cleared away, Lewy concludes—not just for the sake of historical truth, but also for the sake of our national self-confidence, moral strength, and "future capacity to act responsibly in world affairs."

Dangerous Illusions

"Outwitting 'Smart' Weapons" by Jeffrey Record, in *The Washington Review* (April 1978), Transaction Periodicals Consortium, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.

In the early days of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, an Israeli tank brigade operating near the Suez Canal was virtually wiped out by Arab infantry armed with antitank rockets. This opening battle, says Record, legislative assistant for military affairs to Sen. Sam Nunn (D.-Ga.) has encouraged the "dangerous" illusion among U.S. light infantry forces (e.g., the Marines and the Army's 18th Airborne Corps) that the "latest generation of so-called smart antitank weapons can neutralize if not defeat the powerful Soviet and Warsaw Pact tank armies."

Of the approximately 3,000 Arab and Israeli tanks destroyed or damaged in the entire October war, says Record, at least 80 percent were knocked out by other tanks. The use of antitank guided missiles by both sides exerted only a marginal influence on the war's outcome.

Today's "smart" antitank missiles, whether guided to the target by wire or by laser beam, are a vast improvement over the recoilless cannon. But they are "line-of-sight" weapons that can hit only those targets which are visible to the naked eye. Soviet military planners have therefore put special stress on night operations and the use of smoke and camouflage. "Virtually every first-line Soviet tank and armored fighting vehicle has been equipped with externally mounted smoke dispensers which can render an entire armored column invisible within a few seconds," Record notes.

The Warsaw Pact countries, which surpass the NATO forces in antitank guided missiles (4,200 to 3,200) as well as in tanks and other armored fighting vehicles (40,000 to 11,000), would use self-propelled artillery to suppress NATO's antitank defenses. The bulk of U.S. ground forces, Record concludes, are simply not organized or equipped for this kind of European conflict.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Codifying Strategic Parity

"Arms Control and Soviet Strategic Forces: The Risks of Asking SALT To Do Too Much" by Richard Burt, in *The Washington Review* (Jan. 1978), Transaction Periodicals Consortium, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.

Western hopes for the success of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union have vastly declined over the past five years. Three trends in Soviet behavior have been especially disconcerting, says Burt, defense analyst for the *New York Times*. These trends are: the continuing momentum of Soviet weapons procurement; Moscow's emphasis on air defense and on steps to limit damage in the event of nuclear war; and violations of the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1972 SALT I accords by modernizing Soviet forces not covered in the agreements.

The chief concern of Western defense planners, says Burt, should be "the growing capability of the Soviet Union to attack U.S. strategic forces and limit damage to its own military and civilian assets in the event of counterattack." The Soviet SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs "pose serious problems for the survivability of the existing U.S. land-based missile force." Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the Soviet Union can successfully overcome the Western strategic "triad" of ICBMs, submarine-launched missiles, and bombers.

In a situation of uncertain mutual vulnerability in which each side adheres to a different view of a stable world, it is a mistake to expect too much from SALT, says Burt. Rather than nourish American expectations that cannot be satisfied, Washington should use SALT to achieve "mutual recognition" that the strategic arsenals of the two sides are roughly equal. " 'Political equivalence' or the codification of parity," Burt argues, "is a more realistic objective for the talks to pursue than 'technical stability'."

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

The Elusive Point "E"

"Taxes, Revenues, and the 'Laffer Curve' " by Jude Wanniski, in *The Public Interest* (Winter 1978), P.O. Box 542, Old Chelsea, New York, N.Y. 10011.

There are always two tax rates that yield the same revenues. A tax rate of 100 percent assures that all production ceases in the money economy; there is nothing for the government to tax and hence government revenues are zero. A tax rate of zero percent also produces no government revenues, but production is maximized with output limited only by the desire of workers for leisure.

THE LAFFER CURVE



From Jude Wanniski, "Taxes, Revenues, and the 'Laffer Curve'," The Public Interest, No. 50 (Winter 1978).

This simple proposition has been diagrammed by Arthur Laffer, professor of business economics at the University of Southern California, as what has come to be called the "Laffer curve."

The aim of any government is to maximize both revenues and production, on the diagram at point E. In effect, E represents the point at which both lower and higher taxes will fail to produce any increase in revenues. At points B and D the electorate desires more government services and is willing to pay higher taxes without reducing productivity. At points A and C, the electorate desires more private goods and services and lower tax rates.

"It is the task of the statesman to determine the location of point E," says Wanniski, associate editor of the *Wall Street Journal.* That location, which is variable, is the point at which the electorate desires to be taxed; in wartime emergencies, it can approach 100 percent.

Historical evidence bears out the claim that a reduction in taxes can lead to a rise in both revenues and output. English tax cuts immediately after the Napoleonic Wars (i.e., post-1815) set the stage for 19th-century English expansion; the tax cuts imposed by Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon in the 1920s were accompanied by a period of phenomenal U.S. economic growth. Conversely, argues Wanniski, the real source of Russia's chronic agricultural problems lies in the high marginal tax rates (90 percent) exacted on the state's collective farms.

Wanniski concludes that it is crucial to Western economic prosperity that "conservative" political parties press for reduced tax rates along the lower range of the "Laffer curve." Empires, he says, "are built on the bottom of this simple curve and crushed against the top of it."

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

The Economic Realities of Oil

"OPEC's Threat to the West" by Robert S. Pindyck; "Limits of Arab Oil Power" by S. Fred Singer; in *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1978), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

Gloomy predictions that world energy demand will exceed supply by the early 1980s, leading to another jump in oil prices and worldwide recession, are unrealistic. They fail to account for the fact that oil demand and production capacity are highly sensitive to changes in price. They also ignore the contrary objectives of the OPEC "spenders" (e.g., Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria)—countries with limited oil reserves that want much higher prices now—and the "savers" (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya) with larger reserves and long-term interests.

M.I.T. economist Pindyck finds the "savers" to be the stronger group; hence, the likelihood of a steady, gradual price rise (perhaps 2 percent annually over the coming decade). Singer, a University of Virginia political scientist, adds that a continued increase in excess productive *capacity*—now equal to about 20 percent of world production—may endanger the existence of the OPEC oil cartel as producing countries begin to try to undersell each other.

Many of the traditional perceptions of "oil power" bear little relation to practical politics, says Singer. An Arab oil embargo cannot effectively cut off all U.S. oil imports; the shortages that developed in 1973–74 were mainly due to fumbles in fuel allocation by the U.S. government. Furthermore, financial ties between the Arab countries (chiefly Saudi Arabia) and the United States mean that Arab investments in the United States are potentially hostage; Saudi security is also heavily dependent upon U.S. military assistance and diplomatic support.

Disruption of the Western banking system due to abrupt shifting of petrodollar accounts by Arab interests can be largely discounted. Arab refusal to recycle petrodollars, forcing ever-larger deficits on the Western oil-importing countries, would only mean that the oil producers were getting paper dollars for oil. To give value to that paper, they must either invest in the oil-consuming countries or buy from them.

Looking for a Sure Thing

"Make Way—The Foreign Investors Are Coming" by Robert J. Samuelson, in *National Journal* (Apr. 29, 1978), 1730 M St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Foreign private investment in the United States is soaring, reports *National Journal* correspondent Samuelson. Far from discouraging this trend, American officials now welcome foreign investment and, at the state level, actively compete to get it. (Twenty-three states now have offices in Europe and three states have representatives in Tokyo.)

Until a few years ago, foreign private investment in the United States

focused almost exclusively on the stock market, where foreigners held an estimated $45 billion worth of securities at the end of 1977. This is now rivaled by a great spurt of direct investment, says Samuelson, including the purchase of U.S. companies (e.g., Miles Laboratories by West Germany's Bayer AG), real estate (e.g., the purchase of farms and small real-estate developments by German and Italian investors), and in a few cases the construction of plants in the U.S. (e.g., Volkswagen's new factory in New Stanton, Pa.).

Although U.S. direct investment abroad ($137 billion at the end of 1976) still surpasses foreign investment here, the latter is growing faster. The flow of foreign direct investment jumped 50 percent between 1973 and 1976—from $20.5 billion to $30.2 billion. The OPEC oil countries, however, have channeled most of their funds into U.S. Treasury securities ($14.5 billion at the end of 1977), stocks and bonds ($10.6 billion), or interest-bearing deposits ($6.7 billion). The remaining $10.7 billion in oil funds, says Samuelson, is thought to represent prepayment of imports (including military items) and repayment of outstanding debts.

Why the surge? Often, says Samuelson, "fear is the driving force." Individuals and medium-sized companies see the United States as a refuge from upheaval at home. In other cases, companies have reacted to growing U.S. trade restrictions. Japanese television manufacturers and ball bearing producers, for example, have invested heavily here to minimize the impact of U.S. trade barriers.

The investment flow also reflects the impact of large, foreign-based multinational firms searching for markets and profits in the American economy, which is now expanding more rapidly and steadily than that of the European community. Lastly, investments in the United States have been made cheaper by the decline in the value of the dollar.

SOCIETY

The Reassuring Barbarian Myth

"The 'Barbarians' in World Historical Perspective: Myth and Reality" by W. R. Jones, in *Cultures* (vol. IV, no. 2, 1977), Université Catholique de Louvain, 62 Tervuurse Vest, 3000 Leuven, Belgium.

The Greek word *barbaros*—first applied to those non-Hellenic people who "babbled" or "barked" like animals—has always carried overtones of cultural and ethical prejudice. Through the ages, the concept of "barbarian," argues University of New Hampshire historian Jones, was less an historical reality than a mythical invention used by "civilized" men to furnish reassurance of cultural superiority and to justify the most brutal forms of political, religious, and cultural aggression.

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The clash between civilization and barbarians was most intense during three eras: the second millenium B.C., when Bronze Age charioteers charged out of Central Asia to seize all the land between Mesopotamia and China; the age of Attila the Hun, in the 5th century A.D., when the Roman Empire was under siege; and the 12th and 13th centuries A.D., when Genghis Khan created a nomadic empire extending from the Pacific to the Hungarian plain. The characteristics shared by these and other barbarians were pastoralism and a nomadic way of life. Lifestyle, not race, says Jones, defined barbarian man.

The Central Asian nomads eventually found themselves in hostile climates and environments and were forced to adopt more "civilized" forms of economic and social organization. By the early Middle Ages, the distinctions between "civilized" and "barbarian" cultures had become artificial. Yet cultural prejudice continued to cause civilized men to judge outsiders by their own ideals of virtue and propriety and to label as "barbarous" any who did not conform to accepted notions of spiritual and moral excellence.

Long after historical "barbarism" had disappeared as a real threat to the civilized Western world, the word retained its cultural and moral connotations, separating farmers and city dwellers, for example, from shepherds and nomads. The "barbarian" myth survives, says Jones. "Modern universal historians from Gibbon to Toynbee have continued to employ the concept of the 'Barbarian' as a category of historical generalization and cross-cultural analysis."

Sizing Up the Ideal City

"The Polis Perplexity: An Inquiry Into the Size of Cities" by Kirkpatrick Sale, in *Working Papers for a New Society* (Jan.–Feb. 1978), Center for the Study of Public Policy, 123 Mt. Auburn St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

Philosophers (since Plato) and contemporary urban planners are in remarkable agreement that the optimum population for a city is between 50,000 and 100,000. America's planned "New Towns" (e.g., Columbia, Md., and Reston, Va.) were designed for an average population of 73,000, and similar limits have been set for new communities in Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, Israel, and the Netherlands. So writes Sale, a writer specializing in politics and government. The root cause of today's urban crises, he says, may be that many older American cities have simply grown too big.

Today there is evidence that population size is the single most important factor in determining the quality of urban life. A U.S. city of 50,000 population can provide almost every business service found in much larger cities. Once a city exceeds 100,000, it becomes less efficient: Per capita costs of municipal services, such as schools and police, rise inexorably; the ability to deliver them declines. (In a city of 50,000–

100,000, the per capita cost of municipal services averages $229 per year; in cities from 500,000 to 1 million the cost rises to $426; and in cities over 1 million, to $681.) Violent crime rates are 100 times greater in cities of 250,000 than in cities in the 50,000 to 100,000 range. Increasing congestion, water and air pollution, poor schools, and high taxes raise the cost of commerce, encouraging business firms to flee.

Surveys show that Americans *want* to live in smaller cities (32 percent prefer small towns and cities, 25 percent suburban cities, 26 percent rural areas, 17 percent large cities, according to Sale's compilation); populations of the large older cities have been declining for the last 20 years. Therefore, Sale says, U.S. lawmakers have an "unshirkable obligation" to encourage settlement in smaller cities; federal urban aid programs should favor smaller cities in the allocation of funds and in offering incentives for business investment.

Is Death Un-American?

"American Attitudes to Death" by Charles O. Jackson, in *The Journal of American Studies* (Dec. 1977), Cambridge University Press, 32 E. 57th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

Twentieth-century custom enjoins Americans to repress grief and to deny any thought of death. But it has not always been so. Jackson, a University of Tennessee historian, reviews the scant literature and finds three distinct phases in the history of American attitudes and responses to dying.

In colonial times, when as many as one in four childen died before the age of 10, death was a harsh and common occurrence that could not be



The death's-head on gravestones in colonial times conveyed a macabre view of mortality in an age when life was short and none too sweet.

SOCIETY

denied. The death of even a single individual was experienced as a community loss and the community rallied to help the bereaved family. Popular belief in an afterlife was reflected in the inscriptions on gravestones, which also stressed physical decay, the brevity of life, and the grim certainty of death.

From the mid-18th to the mid-19th centuries, however, Americans became more attached to life and less certain of an existence after death. The dead were not so readily relinquished as before; spiritualism came into vogue. Death was sentimentalized and made less morbid: cemeteries were landscaped; cemetery art, formerly of skull-and-crossbones severity, became cherub-and-flowers poetic; embalming came into practice; and mourning jewelry was popular.

Since the end of the 19th century, which marked the beginning of the third phase, increasing attachment to life has been accompanied by urbanization, by rapid advances in medicine, and by an increasingly temporal outlook. Americans are less and less willing to involve themselves in death and dying. People are allowed to die in institutions and to be buried under unadorned, uninscribed tombstones. There is often no sense of community loss. Our secular society no longer believes in the certainty of afterlife, so natural death and physical decomposition have become too horrible to contemplate or discuss.

Jackson sees hints in recent months of a renewed willingness to discuss death in the United States. Whether or not this marks the start of a new era, he says, depends on our ability to recognize that death, even of a single individual, has significance and dignity.

Lingua Franca Spoken Here

"English Dethroned" by S. Frederick Starr, in *Change* (May 1978), NBW Tower, New Rochelle, N.Y. 10801.

The remarkable predominance of English as a world language has seriously discouraged foreign language study in the United States. There are signs, however, that the use of English may be waning, says Starr, secretary of the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies.

Beyond its strength as a native language (of 350 million people), English is an official language in numerous countries where it is not commonly spoken by the population at large. It is the world's leading second language, promoted by school systems in many countries. In the non-English-speaking world—excluding China—71 million of the estimated 93 million secondary-school students are studying English.

As a lingua franca, English is used by Japanese airline pilots seeking landing instructions at Paris and by Chinese technicians working on projects in Tanzania. It is the premier language for research in the sciences, social sciences, and the humanities. More than 50 percent of world scientific research is published in English.

But Starr argues that this dominance is unlikely to endure. Not only is the birthrate of native English-speaking peoples declining, but

former colonies are abandoning English as an official language because it tends to perpetuate the notion of educated, cosmopolitan elites and impedes vertical integration of economic classes. In Tanzania, for example, use of Swahili is spreading at the expense of both lesser local dialects and English; the same is happening in Nigeria with Hausa.

Meanwhile, America's growing dependence on foreign raw materials and markets provides an economic incentive for foreign language study in this country. American businessmen abroad already find it profitable to use local languages even when their hosts have a nominal command of English.

It is difficult to predict where and how much the use of English will decline, says Starr. But Americans should prepare now for a world of linguistic egalitarianism.

PRESS & TELEVISION

Was Agnew Right?

"What the *Times* and *Post* Are Missing," by Nick Kotz, in *The Washington Monthly* (Mar. 1977), 1028 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C.

More than 1,200 newspaper reporters are accredited to cover the activities of Congress and the federal government in Washington, but only a small fraction of them work for newspapers that are read regularly in Washington or New York. To a remarkable degree, says Kotz, a prize-winning former Washington reporter, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* dominate the treatment of news. They shape the agenda, not only for the Manhattan-based television networks and weekly newsmagazines, but also for the hundreds of papers that subscribe to the *Times* or *Post–Los Angeles Times* news services.

According to Kotz, Washington correspondents for the so-called "provincial press" complain that their reporting, some of it exclusive and worthy of national attention, "seldom becomes a major part of the political chemistry that occurs in the interaction between the federal government and the press."

Even their important exposés, such as a 1975 *Des Moines Register* series on abuses in the nation's multi-billion dollar commodity exchanges, have trouble getting broad visibility. The local-minded regional bureaus of the AP and UPI wire services seldom pick up such stories to send back to Washington and New York so politicians and other newsmen can read them and react.

Without better monitoring of the provincial press by all the news media, says Kotz, there will continue to be some truth in former Vice President Spiro Agnew's charge that the newsworthiness of a given event is determined by a few eastern newspapers.

PRESS & TELEVISION

Do the Media Miss the Message?

"Press Coverage of the Supreme Court: A Troubling Question" by William R. Dahms, in *Intellect* (Feb. 1978), Society for the Advancement of Education, 1860 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10023.

Meeting press deadlines and translating "arcane legal language into newspaper prose" are two problems endemic to media coverage of Supreme Court decisions. In the case of the Court's April 1977 ruling on *Ingraham v. Wright,* involving corporal punishment of school children, these two problems proved insurmountable, says Dahms, a University of Michigan consultant.

In *Ingraham v. Wright,* the Court decided, five to four, that corporal punishment of school children—no matter how severe—does not violate the Constitution. The *Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, Atlanta Constitution,* and *Ann Arbor News*—to name a few—made erroneous assumptions about the case and consequently led the public to believe that the Court was "opening up a dramatic, new era in terms of the way corporal punishment was going to be administered." Dahms says the decision was actually "quite the opposite."

The issues were whether school children are protected by the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment" (and traditionally has been reserved for punishment inflicted for violation of criminal statutes), and whether "due process" is required before punishment. The Court said no to both these questions.

Most newspapers failed to report that legal remedies exist on the state level for students who think they have been treated unjustly. Editorial writers, in particular, thought the Court was choosing between allowing corporal punishment or banning it totally as a violation of the Constitution. Even if the minority opinion had prevailed, says Dahms, "only those punishments which were excessively severe would have been prohibited."

While there is no evidence to suggest that press coverage of *Ingraham* was typical, it indicates, he concludes, "that the press would do well to examine, in a fundamental way, the procedures employed in covering future decisions."

Covering Swine Flu

"Swine Influenza and the News Media" by David M. Rubin and Val Hendy, in *Annals of Internal Medicine* (Dec. 1977), 4200 Pine St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.

The press, which has been variously blamed for America's "loss of nerve" in Vietnam and for the public's low regard for politicians, has also been widely criticized for turning the 1976–77 federal swine flu inoculation program into a $135 million fiasco.

The press was accused by some critics of sensationalizing the swine

flu story and convincing much of the public that the program was dangerous and ill-conceived. At the same time, newspapers and television were condemned by others for serving as the handmaiden of both the medical profession and the federal government in selling the program to the public.

To test such allegations, Rubin and Hendy, both of the New York University journalism faculty, analyzed stories in 19 daily newspapers, evening news broadcasts of the three television networks, and the output of United Press International for the week of October 11–17, 1976—the week when the inoculation program began in earnest and when three elderly persons died after receiving swine flu shots.

With few exceptions, they found that newspaper and TV coverage was neither sensational nor inaccurate. The media's portrayal simply reflected the contradictions and confusion among officials at the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in Washington, and local public health units. Nevertheless, only a handful of newspapers—notably the *New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times,* and *Miami Herald*—took advantage of the public's extreme interest and anxiety to provide coverage with depth and sophistication.

Other papers and the television networks relied heavily on Associated Press and United Press International output, which was "high in volume, reasonably accurate, and unsensational" but also "exceedingly superficial, focusing on numbers of dead rather than causes of death," and which provided little understanding of underlying issues such as the nature of swine flu and the risks of inoculation. Most disappointing were the three television networks, which offered no news "specials" on a story of obvious public concern.

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

"Artificial Cases Make Bad Ethics"

"Torture" by Henry Shue, in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (Winter 1978), Princeton University Press, P.O. Box 231, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Torture is universally and unanimously condemned in law and human convention, yet the practice is widespread and appears to be growing.

One partial justification for torture still current, says Shue, research associate at the University of Maryland's Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, is that "since killing is worse than torture, and killing is sometimes permitted, especially in war, we ought sometimes to permit torture, especially when the situation consists of a protracted, if undeclared, war between a government and its enemies." Torture, however, cannot meet the standards of "just-combat killing" because of the gen-

eral moral principle that prohibits assaults on the defenseless. Torture, Shue notes, has nothing to do with a "fair fight" between declared combatants; it begins only after the fight is finished.

"Suppose a fanatic, perfectly willing to die rather than collaborate in the thwarting of his own scheme, has set a hidden nuclear device to explode in the heart of Paris. There is no time to evacuate the innocent people or even the movable art treasures—the only hope of preventing tragedy is to torture the perpetrator, find the device, and deactivate it."

Is the torture morally permissible? Yes, says Shue, but "artificial cases make bad ethics." One cannot easily draw conclusions for ordinary cases from extraordinary ones, and "as the situations described become more likely, the conclusion that the torture is permissible becomes more debatable." Torture ought to remain illegal and anyone who believes it to be justified in a certain instance should be required to convince a group of peers in a public trial afterward that all necessary conditions for a morally permissible act were satisfied.

Relationships of Confidence

"Beyond the Priest-Penitent Privilege: The Church, the FBI and Privacy" by Dean M. Kelley, in *Christianity and Crisis* (Feb. 20, 1978), 537 W. 21st St., New York, N.Y. 10027.

On January 24, 1978, two female employees of the Episcopal Church were released from the Manhattan Correctional Center. They had been jailed for 10 months for refusing to answer questions posed by a grand jury investigating radical terrorist bombings in New York. In ordering their release, Judge Robert L. Carter rejected their claim that religious liberty was at stake, but concluded that six months should be the maximum period of confinement for civil contempt.

Kelley, an executive of the National Council of Churches, argues that Maria Cueto and Raisa Nemikin, former employees of the Hispanic Commission of the Episcopal Church, had a valid claim to the ordained clergy's generally recognized immunity from testifying about confidences obtained from a penitent's confession. (Judge Lawrence Pierce, who had ordered them jailed for contempt, had held that the two women, though calling themselves "lay ministers," had *not* been ordained and were engaged not so much in "religious ministry" as in "social work" within New York's Hispanic community.)

The priest-penitent privilege should not be confined to ordained clergy, Kelley contends. "Any person who can be compelled to testify can break the relationship of confidence and trust without which the religious community is no longer a community." The free exercise of religion, protected by the First Amendment, is not something that can be practiced by isolated individuals. It depends upon a community for its effectiveness. That community, Kelley says, is dependent upon a relationship of confidence and trust for its existence.

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

The Price of Christian Healing

"Religious Roots of a Medical Crisis" by David Kahn, in *Harvard Magazine* (Mar.–Apr. 1978), Wadsworth House, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

The concept of physician accountability dates back to 2000 B.C., but only since the 1930s has the incidence of medical-malpractice litigation begun to resemble a patients' revolt. The current rash of malpractice suits (some 16,000 claims are pending against U.S. physicians) may stem in part from some ancient religious assumptions about the role of physicians and the practice of medicine, says Kahn, a Stoughton, Mass., hospital executive.

Studies of medical patients today reflect a sense of abandonment by an overburdened, overspecialized, and impersonal physician who fails



Christ lays a healing hand on the brow of a sick child in this detail from an engraving by the French painter, Gustave Doré.

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

to play the father role that many patients seem to cherish. This concept of paternalism in medicine (sometimes called the "Marcus Welby syndrome") probably originated during the early Christian era, when illness was equated with God's punishment visited upon sinners and health was a blessing bestowed by a heavenly Father. Prayer, the laying-on of hands, and treatment with holy oils supplanted medication and treatment, and 2000 years of empirical medicine by the Babylonians, Egyptians, and Greeks were largely discarded.

Healing by faith exerted a magnetic power to draw new converts to Christianity, especially during the recurring waves of pestilence that ravaged the Holy Roman Empire during the first 500 years of the Christian era. The emotionalism of the child-father relationship established between patient and priestly physician was enhanced by the principle of charity that found expression in the Christian monasteries of 5th-century Italy.

Later, there was a gradual reconciliation with empirical medicine; by the 12th century, Church councils were forbidding monks and regular clerics to practice medicine. In 1242 the Holy Roman emperor Frederick II drastically undercut the authority of the Church by giving a medical school at Salerno exclusive right to examine and license physicians, a privilege hitherto reserved for papal legates.

The reemergence of fee-for-service medicine in medieval Europe encountered resistance from a public conditioned by hundreds of years of Christian charity. Kahn wonders if there is not "still locked deep within the public mind . . . a longing for that venerable Christian doctor who dispensed his medicine out of love for humanity and as God's agent on earth."

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

Losing the War Against Malaria

"Malaria Makes A Comeback" by Anil Agarwal, in *New Scientist* (Feb. 2, 1978), King's Reach Tower, Stamford St., London SE1 9LS.

The widely hailed 20-year-old malaria eradication program sponsored by the World Health Organization has failed. In those countries of Asia and Latin America where the disease had nearly been eradicated, there is now a serious resurgence. For example, India cut malaria cases from 100 million in 1952 to just 60,000 by 1962, but the incidence had grown to 6 million cases by 1976.

Worldwide, an estimated 200 million people suffer from malaria today. More than a billion people live in malaria-risk areas. Malaria, says Agarwal, editor of a London environmental news service, will not be

eradicated in the foreseeable future.

Why the gloomy prognosis? The main reason is the rapid spread of insecticide resistance in mosquitoes. Today, 43 species of malaria-spreading anopheline mosquitoes are resistant to the organochlorine insecticides BHC and dieldrin; 24 to BNC, dieldrin, and DDT; 6 to both organochlorines, organophosphates, and carbamates as well. The use of insecticides BHC and dieldrin; 24 to BHC, dieldrin, and DDT; 6 to both organochlorines, organophosphates, and carbamates as well. The use of health purposes.

While the prospects for a malaria vaccine have recently brightened (it may be possible three to five years hence to demonstrate in animals whether a vaccine is practical), an effective vaccine for humans may be elusive. Unlike viruses, malaria must be contracted several times before any immunity develops. More disturbing is the critical need for antimalarial drugs now that some strains of the disease have been found to be resistant to chloroquinine.

The best hopes for the future, Agarwal reports, lie in programs like those in China and Vietnam aimed at destroying mosquito-breeding habitats, even though such efforts are slow, complex, and costly. (Habitat control can range from swamp drainage to covering pits, wells, and other man-made containers that hold standing water.) The resurgence of malaria, he says, is less a failure of science than a failure of social and political systems to develop a strong, popular commitment to control all communicable diseases.

Nature v. Nurture

"Science and Values: The Eugenics Movement in Germany and Russia in the 1920s" by Loren R. Graham, in *The American Historical Review* (Dec. 1977), 400 A St. S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003.

Is there such a thing as value-free science? Not really, says Graham, history of science professor at Columbia, who supports his contention by comparing two rival theories of human genetics that arose simultaneously in Germany and Soviet Russia in the 1920s.

In both countries, Mendelian genetics (a system of inheritance by genes) and Lamarckism (belief in the inheritability of environmentally acquired characteristics) were seen as reputable scientific theories and debated freely by prominent scientists. Politics were irrelevant to the "nature versus nurture" argument in Moscow and Berlin. For a time, many socialists and communists in Germany supported the study of hereditary improvement (eugenics); some proto-Nazis regarded it as a leftist perversion.

In the Soviet Union, it was not until 1925 that Marxist theorists expressed concern that some Russian eugenists (who viewed the post-Revolution emigration of upper-class families as a serious loss to the genetic reserves of Russia) were emphasizing biological determinants of human behavior to the neglect of socioeconomic factors.

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By the early 1930s, political doctrine had pushed the two countries into opposite paths. In the "nature-nurture" debate, nature won out in the extreme genetic doctrines of Nazi Germany, which sought to create a "master race" of genetically pure "Aryans." Nurture won out in Russia, where an equally unsubstantiated Soviet doctrine, epitomized by Trofim Lysenko's version of Lamarckism, ignored genes and sought in vain to produce better strains of food plants environmentally.

Graham concedes that there may appear to be a natural alliance between eugenics and conservative, even fascist, sentiments. But that link was not logically preordained and was certainly not perceived in the early 1920s. Scientists and others interested in eugenics covered a broad range of political beliefs in Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia. All scientific theory and technological innovation exists in a social and political setting, Graham concludes, and the consequences can be overwhelming.

The Endo-Ecto Controversy

"Warm-Blooded Dinosaurs: Evidence Pro and Con" by Jean L. Marx, in *Science* (Mar. 31, 1978), 1515 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.

In recent years, the notion that dinosaurs, as reptiles, were cold-blooded creatures (ectotherms) whose body temperatures fluctuated with that of the environment around them, has been challenged. Some paleontologists now argue that dinosaurs were warm-blooded (endotherms) like mammals and birds, and suggest that this explains the dinosaurs' ability to dominate the earth for 140 million years.

The central question is the dinosaurs' level of activity, observes *Science* staff writer Marx. Reptiles are often depicted as slow, sluggish creatures incapable of much sustained effort because they are cold-blooded, with low metabolic rates, and therefore do not produce enough energy for vigorous action. Only by taking advantage of environmental heat (i.e., basking in the sun) can they warm their bodies and raise their metabolic rates to high-activity levels. By contrast, warm-blooded endotherms are independent of their environments and have metabolic rates high enough to give them ready energy to hunt for food and escape their enemies.

Paleontologists Robert Bakker of Johns Hopkins and John Ostrom of Yale have concluded that dinosaurs do not fit the picture of the slow, sluggish reptile. Instead, they had long limbs, erect postures, and (probably) four-chambered hearts characteristic of present-day warm-blooded vertebrates. They had greater speed and agility than modern ectotherms (e.g., lizards) whose limbs project out to the side.

Other investigators point out that the image of the sluggish reptile is misleading; a reptile can move very rapidly when startled. Moreover, some cold-blooded reptiles (like the crocodile) also have four-chambered hearts. The dinosaur, given its large size, may have had a

Ceratosaurus, on the right, 15 feet long and weighing two tons, balances on its powerful tail to slash with clawed hind feet at a pair of agile allosaurs (averaging 25 feet in length and weighing three tons).

large heat-storage capacity to reduce the changes in body temperature brought about by environmental temperature changes. Uncertainty surrounds other aspects of the endotherm-ectotherm controversy, which may never be resolved because of the need to rely on an incomplete fossil record and analogies with modern creatures.

Trouble Brewing for Basic Science

"Suspicion: Basic Research and Scientific Freedom" by Robert C. Cowen, in *Technology Review* (Jan. 1978), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Room 10-140, Cambridge, Mass. 02139.

Sputnik I, the first Soviet satellite, launched just over 20 years ago, was an "angel of deliverance" for hard-pressed American scientists who then faced the loss of vital federal funding for research. American scientists could use another Sputnik today, writes Cowen, science editor of the *Christian Science Monitor.*

American research and development is hardly starved for money; yet, on the whole, funding for it has reached a plateau. Federal support for basic science is uneven, and faltering in such fields as high energy physics and astronomy. According to the National Science Foundation,

the United States spent about $40.8 billion in public and private funds for research and development in 1977, up 9 percent from the $37.3 billion spent in 1976, or an increase of 3 percent in constant dollars. The federal government's share was about $21.8 billion.

These figures may inspire complacency, says Cowen. But the NSF has warned that the limited growth of basic research support in constant dollars (up an average of only 1 percent per year from 1968 through 1975) threatens the well-being of American science, especially when declining college enrollments mean a shrinking pool of scientific talent.

There are other problems besides insufficient funding. "Excessive caution, overregulation and anti-intellectualism also undermine our technological enterprise," Cowen contends. There is suspicion of scientific and technological activities not just from the public (e.g., community efforts to regulate research on recombinant DNA) but from the ranks of science itself (e.g., the efforts of so-called "concerned" scientists to restrict research on the possible connection between intelligence and genetics). All in all, there is trouble ahead for basic science and technical innovation in America.

Protesting Abuse of Scientists

"Science, World Politics, and Human Rights" by Richard J. Seltzer, in *Chemical and Engineering News* (Feb. 20, 1978), 1155 16th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

The abuse of science and scientists for political ends, and the backlash this has provoked, threaten to disrupt international scientific relations.

Among the most glaring issues are the denial of scientific freedom and human rights to scientists, especially in the Soviet Union and Argentina; the banning of Taiwanese, Israeli, and South African researchers from world scientific meetings; the politicization of UNESCO and other science-oriented UN bodies; and the use of psychiatry and mind-altering drugs for political repression.

These abuses, says *Chemical and Engineering News* staff writer Seltzer, have provoked a fundamental shift in attitude and behavior by many scientists and some scientific organizations. Sporadic and sometimes largely symbolic measures such as letters of protest or petitions are giving way to systematic efforts to monitor and correct repressive policies. Both the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the American Association for the Advancement of Science are organizing on-site investigative visits to countries accused of denying human rights to scientists. The American Psychiatric Association is setting up a permanent committee to deal with abuses of psychiatry or psychiatrists anywhere in the world.

The effects of such moves on international scientific relations may be substantial. Already an estimated 10 percent of U.S. scientists refuse to participate in exchange programs with the Soviet Union. The 35,000-member Association for Computing Machinery, for example, cut ties

with the Soviet Union following the arrest of Moscow computer scientist Anatoly Scharansky. Some 30 U.S. Nobel laureates in science began boycotting UNESCO activities after that organization castigated Israel in 1974 and 1975.

Do American protests and sanctions do any good? Opinions vary, says Seltzer. Some scientists fear that denouncing repression may encourage the very politicization of science they seek to prevent. But advocates argue that defense of scientific freedom and the pursuit of knowledge are—or should be—the primary missions of scientific societies.

RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

Forecasting a Warmer World

"What Might Man-Induced Climate Change Mean?" by Charles F. Cooper, in *Foreign Affairs* (Apr. 1978), 428 E. Preston St., Baltimore, Md. 21202.

Carbon dioxide makes up only .03 of 1 percent of our global atmosphere, but without this slight CO_2 envelope to keep heat from being radiated out into space, the earth would be 10 degrees centigrade colder. This is known as the "greenhouse effect." As the burning of oil, gas, and coal increases the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, the temperature of the earth may rise sufficiently to cause major economic and perhaps political consequences by the year 2000.

While all the effects of an increase in atmospheric CO_2 are still a matter of speculation, says Cooper, plant ecologist at San Diego State University, the increase itself is not in question; the upward trend now runs about .7 percent per year. This means that a doubling of the preindustrial CO_2 level (300 parts per million before 1890) may be expected between 2020 and 2040, raising the mean global temperature by 1.5 to 3 degrees centigrade. At the same time, as global warming draws greater water vapor from the land and oceans into the atmosphere, total precipitation will increase by an average of 7 percent.

A rise of as little as 1 degree centigrade in the mean global temperature would significantly affect growing seasons and rainfall patterns. Because temperature increases would be greater at high latitudes than at points near the equator, some nations would be gainers and others losers. Substantial areas of northern Russia, for example, would become available for crop production. Monsoon areas (India, Vietnam) would also benefit. But in the United States, corn production would drop 11 percent for every 1 degree centigrade rise in average temperature during the growing season. Grain-growing states like Kansas and Oklahoma would become dangerously exposed to drought.

How will the affected nations react? Cooper calls for more research to "limit some of the uncertainties which now make informed political

choice almost impossible." Meanwhile, whatever changes occur will not be of short duration; the excess carbon dioxide may remain in the atmosphere for centuries.

Energy Utopias

"Reflections on the Energy Wars" by Alvin M. Weinberg, in *American Scientist* (Mar.-Apr. 1978), 345 Whitney Ave., New Haven, Ct. 06511.

The great energy debate, like great religious conflicts of the past, stems from two differing conceptions of the future: "the solar utopia and the electrical, i.e., nuclear, utopia." Both utopias, says Weinberg, director of the Institute for Energy Analysis in Oak Ridge, Tenn., are conceivable, and the most prudent planning will aim at some combination of the two.

Radical, pro-solar opponents of nuclear energy have yet to prove that an all-solar system can satisfactorily overcome the handicaps of the sun's intermittency (requiring storage of solar energy in some form) and the sun's diffusion (requiring the collection of solar-derived energy to serve a concentrated, largely urban society).

On the other hand, says Weinberg, an electrical utopia based on nuclear reactors requires the creation of a system "that is both acceptably safe and acceptably proliferation-resistant."

To reduce the danger of catastrophic accident and render the accident-risk rate for breeder reactors (about 1 in 20,000 per reactor per year, according to a 1957 U.S. reactor safety study) acceptable to the public, nuclear energy ought to be confined to as few places as possible—perhaps 100 centers in the United States plus a few waste disposal sites. Such a siting policy, says Weinberg, would limit the area exposed to the risk of contamination. It would permit the formation of strong, professional reactor operating staffs, and would minimize security problems. He also urges that the generation of nuclear electricity be entrusted to powerful industrial entities like the Yankee Atomic Electric Company or Tennessee Valley Authority that can provide long-term management.

The total hostility of the solar proponents to the nuclear option is shortsighted, Weinberg argues, especially when the full economic, social, and political costs of the solar alternative remain obscure.

Promoting Proliferation

"Nuclear Power, Nuclear Weapons and International Stability" by David J. Rose and Richard K. Lester, in *Scientific American* (Apr. 1978), 415 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.

There are fundamental tensions between U.S. energy goals and U.S. nonproliferation objectives, say Rose, professor of nuclear engineering at M.I.T., and Lester, a Visiting Research Fellow at the Rockefeller Foundation. Electric utility companies are beset with uncertainties

about the future of U.S. policy on nuclear power that make raising capital difficult. They are unsure about coal as an alternate fuel because of environmental and supply problems. They may finally be forced to return to oil-fired generating plants, thereby increasing world demand for oil and driving up prices.

Skeptics abroad wonder if U.S. nonproliferation policy is not really designed to curb the global shift toward plutonium and the breeder reactor until U.S. technology has caught up with Western Europe's. Such doubts about the motives behind President Carter's maneuvers, and the fickle nature of the U.S. decision-making process, provide more incentive for the rest of the world, including the less developed countries, to set up enrichment programs and to go nuclear with or without U.S. assistance.

What should Washington do? The authors offer only partial answers: Continue development of both light water reactors and a practical breeder reactor as a long-term option. Reduce uncertainty in the U.S. electric utility industry by easing licensing procedures for nuclear power plants. Take on the entire burden of managing the world's radioactive spent fuel. Explore with other nations the costs and benefits of operating the controversial Barnwell, S.C., nuclear fuel reprocessing plant as an international facility. Intensify efforts to increase the security of the world supply of uranium. And strengthen the inspection arm of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The U.S. approach has been too self-centered and insensitive to the problems of other nations. The long-term solution to the nuclear-power problem and the larger problems of international stability, the authors contend, lies in mutually cooperative international action.

ARTS & LETTERS

Social Realism for the Ladies

"A Different View of the Iron Madonna: William Dean Howells and His Magazine Readers" by Laurel T. Goldman, in the *New England Quarterly* (Dec. 1977), Hubbard Hall, Brunswick, Maine 04011.

At the end of the 19th century, William Dean Howells—intimate of Mark Twain and Henry James, mentor to aspiring young writers, and a frequent magazine contributor—was the leading figure in American letters. Then, suddenly, his reputation waned as critics charged that he pandered to the bourgeois tastes of female readers.

Howells' eclipse, says Goldman, a doctoral candidate at University College in London, stemmed from an influential 1887 article, "Why We Have No Great Novelists," in which Hjalmar Boyesen argued that writing for magazines like *Harper's* and *Century* was "permanently injuri-

ous" because of the predominantly female readership of those publications. The writer's fate, Boyesen said, would be decided by the "Iron Madonna," who "strangles in her fond embrace the American novelist" and destroys his chances for greatness.

Later critics, like H. L. Mencken and Sinclair Lewis, turned on Howells and labeled his new brand of social realism—evident in *The Undiscovered Country* (1879) and *The Rise of Silas Lapham* (1885)—not only "commonplace" and "prudish" but inimical to literary esthetics. Howells, in fact, did believe that wealthy Americans read little and that critics were book-tasters, not book-readers. Women, on the other hand, were better educated, their tastes far more cultivated. Any writer, he declared in "The Man of Letters as a Man of Business" (1893), "must resign himself to obscurity unless ladies choose to recognize him."

Howells' goal was to give America a native and popular literature. As *Lippincott Magazine* editor J. F. Kirk once wrote to him: "You have given us truth instead of fancies, pictures instead of problems, creations instead of conventions." If Howells made any compromises, Goldman concludes, it was because he "had his sights on something far more demanding"—to prove the power of literature to speak to the majority.

Was Arthur a Steppe-Child?

"The Sarmatian Connection: New Light on the Origin of the Arthurian and Holy Grail Legends" by C. Scott Littleton and Ann C. Thomas, in *Journal of American Folklore* (Jan.–Mar. 1978), 1703 New Hampshire Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.

No one seems more English than King Arthur, even if scholars have long assumed that the Arthurian tales, as first related by chroniclers Nennius (fl. c. 800) and Geoffrey of Monmouth (d. 1155) were actually rooted in a pre-Christian, Celtic tradition. But two historians at Occidental College in Los Angeles now claim that the legends, which appeared in England in the 2nd century A.D., probably evolved in the steppes of South Russia among an aggressive, nomadic people known as Sarmatians.

According to Littleton and Thomas, the prototypes for Arthur and his paladins can be found in Sarmatian tales of a band of heroes called the Narts. The Sarmatian tradition predates the Arthurian tales but the parallels are clear: Both describe the supernatural destiny of a leader (Arthur), the quest for a sacred cup (grail), and the origins of a magical sword (Excalibur). Even the names of certain characters (Sir Bedivere and Sir Kay as well as Arthur's father, Uther Pendragon) may, the authors speculate, be traced back linguistically to ancient Sarmatia.

Coincidence? If it is, say Littleton and Thomas, then coincidence must account for a great deal more. In 175 A.D., for example, the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius subdued a renegade force of Sarmatians along the borders of what is now Hungary. Some 5,500 Sarmatian



Knights of King Arthur, from a special 1893 edition of Le Morte D'Arthur *with English text and original engravings by Aubrey Beardsley.*

cavalrymen were captured and sent to bolster Roman garrisons in northern Britain. (Archeological evidence points to a flourishing, close-knit Sarmatian community near the town of Ribchester.) Along with heavy armor, heraldic devices, and advanced cavalry techniques, these warlike Asians may also have transplanted the seeds of the Arthurian legends.

A last coincidence: The Roman commander of the Sarmatians in Britain was named Artorius.

Poetry for the People

"The Decline of Anglo-American Poetry" by Christopher Clausen, in *The Virginia Quarterly Review* (Winter 1978), University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va. 22903.

During the era of "high modernism" (1920–1960), traditional notions of form and function in Anglo-American poetry became passé. Meter, for example, was abandoned in favor of often obscure prose rhythms, prompting Robert Frost to say that writing free verse was like playing tennis without a net. Meanwhile, notes Clausen, a professor of English at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, fewer original works of poetry were published and poetry declined as a major cultural force. The sad result: Poets very nearly became their own sole audience.

The new modernist ideal held that contemporary human experience was so unique that it could only be described in radically new ways.

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Poetry became, as T. S. Eliot said in 1921, "more comprehensive, more allusive, more indirect." It repelled those who felt poetry must tell them something about life in words that stuck in the mind. And the "burdens of realism," Clausen contends, left the modernists of the 1960s with little sense of confidence or purpose.

But the poets are not entirely to blame, Clausen adds. The mass media have made such a mockery of lyric verse that traditional symbols of love, nature, and freedom have given way to toothpaste, Geritol, and political rhetoric. In this maudlin climate, it is not surprising that Rod McKuen becomes, according to his publisher, "the most widely read poet of all time" and singers John Denver and Bob Dylan are regarded by undergraduates (and some teachers) as our most important poets.

Readers' desires for clarity and memorable language cannot be dismissed as escapism or bad taste, Clausen concludes. On the contrary, this preference may simply indicate a desire for poetry that transcends the ills of modern life. Poetry must "reflect the complexity of [the poet's] thinking," as William Carlos Williams said late in his life, but it "should be brought into the world where we live and not be so recondite, so removed from the people."

Veils and Vaudeville

"Salomé Where She Danced" by Elizabeth Kendall, in *Ballet Review* (Winter 1977–78), P.O. Box 11305, Church Street Station, New York, N.Y. 10249.

Artistic dancing was slow to win acceptance from American audiences, thanks to generations of Puritan stodginess. When it finally caught on in the early 1900s, dance, as a dramatic language, provoked far more scandal than vaudeville chorus lines or "the naughty girls in tights and flounces" who danced ballet.

The breakthrough came, says free-lance writer Kendall, when the Metropolitan Opera mounted Richard Strauss's *Salomé* on Jan. 22, 1907. The sight of prima ballerina Biancha Froelich shedding seven veils and fondling the severed head of John the Baptist was too much for the Met's financial backers—J. P. Morgan, W. K. Vanderbilt, and August Belmont. They ordered *Salomé* withdrawn from the repertoire and thereby sparked intense debate in the press. Mlle. Froelich promptly transferred her *Salomé* to the vaudeville stage and Florenz Ziegfeld soon served up another version in the *Follies* of 1907.

Only the perseverance of Gertrude Hoffman, Isadora Duncan, and Ruth St. Denis convinced U.S. audiences to accept the dance as painting and music in motion. When St. Denis returned in 1909 from triumphal performances of her ballet, *Radha*, in London and Berlin, she set out to combine *Salomé* with Far Eastern drama and "sparked imaginations already sensitized to a whole range of exotic phenomena." Duncan invented the dance movements, Kendall writes, and "St. Denis invented the costumes."

St. Denis dazzled audiences in New York, Chicago, and Boston with her extravagant costumes and staging. But the key to her stardom was her personality. With a wink or a smirk, she won the confidence of her audiences and made them feel at ease with the "artistic" side of the dance.

The pioneers of modern dancing in America, great as they were, Kendall observes, unfortunately encouraged a crop of amateurs determined to display their own undisciplined talents, claiming that they were "sky-taught" and "nature-inspired." By 1913, she writes, "seriousness had come and gone from American dance, which now belonged to society ladies, little girls, and vaudeville funnymen." Modern dance did not really revive until the 1930s.

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Surviving in Iceland

"A Millenium of Misery: The Demography of the Icelanders" by Richard F. Tomasson, in *Population Studies* (Nov. 1977), Population Investigation Committee, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, Aldwych, London WC2A 2AE.

The 11 centuries of Iceland's known history provide the most consistently bleak record of death and suffering a European nation has ever known. Thanks to the Icelanders' passion for genealogy and their early development of popular literacy (in the 13th century), scholars have unparalleled written evidence of their capacity to endure what University of New Mexico sociologist Tomasson calls "the most extreme inhospitable environment in which a European people has been able to survive and maintain its culture."

Since the original 400 Norsemen and Celts arrived as settlers (mostly by way of Britain, Ireland, and the Hebrides) between 870 and 930 A.D., fewer than 2 million Icelanders have been born. Until the mid–19th century, due to disease and starvation, fewer than half of those born survived to adulthood.

Lying just below the Arctic Circle, Iceland has a maritime climate made temperate by the warm waters of the Gulf Stream. But the growing season is short (four to five months). Until the end of the last century, the size of the Icelandic population was largely determined by how well the summer grasses grew, so great was the dependence on fodder for sheep and other livestock. (Fishing was an unimportant source of food until the mid–19th century.)

Only remarkable fertility allowed the Icelandic people to survive intermittent calamities. The Black Death (bubonic plague) of 1402–04 killed 80,000 people, two-thirds of the population. In 1707, a smallpox

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

Disease, a taxing climate, and natural catastrophe plagued Iceland for centuries.

epidemic took 18,000 lives, one-third of the island's population at that time. Famine and disease in the aftermath of volcanic eruptions in 1783–84 claimed 9,936, or about one-fifth of the total. Unusually precise records reveal that 190,488 sheep (82 percent of the total) died of starvation because of damage to grasslands during that time.

Thanks to a long-standing tolerance of illegitimacy (some two-thirds of all first-borns are illegitimate), a high birth rate, and a rapid drop in mortality rates, the Icelandic population is expected to increase sharply in the years ahead. Barring some new calamity, it should grow by at least 40 percent, to more than 300,000, by the year 2000.

Cuba's Taste for Adventure

"The Cuban Operation in Angola: Costs and Benefits for the Armed Forces" by Jorge I. Dominguez, in *Cuban Studies* (Jan. 1978), Center for Latin American Studies, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15260.

Cuba's victorious intervention on the pro-Soviet side in Angola's 1975–76 civil war bolstered Fidel Castro's prestige in much of Africa. The venture also had a significant impact on Cuba's military establishment, writes Dominguez, Research Fellow at Harvard's Center for International Affairs.

The African expedition gave an important new mission to Cuba's Soviet-equipped, 180,000-man armed forces—readiness to engage in combat overseas. Internal order, contributions to economic production, and deterrence of (unlikely) U.S. attack are no longer the only justifications for a big military budget. Since Angola, the Cuban military has a special stake in the continuation of Castro's activist policy in Africa.

Reliable casualty figures are not available, but the Angolan war imposed a variety of direct costs on Cuba. Over half the 10,000 troops sent

to Angola were reservists; their mobilization took away key personnel from civil aviation and civilian Communist Party cadres. While there is no reliable evidence of strong popular opposition to the Angolan undertaking, Castro hinted in a report to the Party Congress in January 1976 that some factory managers resisted the call-up of certain specialists, claiming they were indispensable to production. "It is necessary," Castro told the Congress, "to combat the occasionally exaggerated criteria as to who cannot be dispensed with in production."

Close analysis of the Cuban military press and a careful reading of Castro's speeches, says Dominguez, suggest that the Angolan operation has provoked some troop insubordination, grumbling among the Cuban people over compulsory military service, and additional strain on the already touchy relations between the Communist Party cadres and professional military officers. Cuba's military involvement in Africa, of course, has sharply increased.

The Outcasts

"The Pariah State Syndrome" by Robert E. Harkavy, in *Orbis* (Fall 1977), 3508 Market St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.

For various historical and ideological reasons, Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, and South Korea now share the peculiar attributes of "pariahtude" marked by extreme diplomatic isolation and "widespread, obsessive, and unrelenting global opprobrium."

As "pariah states," all four nations are militarily exposed, lack legitimacy in the eyes of much of the Third World, have weak diplomatic leverage, and must depend on precarious sources of arms. And all are opposed by important powers or blocs. In addition, says Harkavy, a Cornell Senior Research Fellow, two of them—Israel and South Africa—must seriously consider the likelihood of suffering wholesale massacres in the event of military defeat.

These conditions, the author argues, inevitably compel "pariah states" to consider acquiring a nuclear capability. Three of the four (all but South Korea) have scientific establishments that might produce an indigenous nuclear weapon (Israel is widely believed to have already produced one).

Joint nuclear efforts cannot be ruled out. The pariah states have reluctantly begun to identify themselves as a group and there is already some military collaboration (e.g., Israel's sales of missile patrol boats to South Africa and Shafir air-to-air missiles to Taiwan). The 1976 visit to Israel of South African Prime Minister John Vorster gave rise to speculation about a possible Israeli–South African nuclear axis. Israel presumably has a weapons design capability, while South Africa has vast raw uranium reserves and a procedure for the separation of U-235. Less likely, but not to be ruled out, is nuclear collaboration between Taiwan and South Korea, or between them and the other two pariahs.

The nuclear aspirations of these countries, Harkavy observes, pose some painful dilemmas for both the United States and the Soviet Un-

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ion, whose leaders currently share a mutual interest in nonproliferation. The problem for the United States, which has traditional ties to the four principal pariahs, is especially acute. Washington can threaten to withdraw essential support to forestall proliferation. But a further decline in U.S. backing, says Harkavy, "particularly in the context of growing U.S. military weakness, vacillation and isolationism, might lend greater impetus to proliferation."

The Proxy War

"Western Sahara: The Diplomatic Perspectives" by Robert A. Mortimer, in *Africa Report* (Mar.–Apr. 1978), Transaction Periodicals Consortium, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.

The battle over the desolate Western Sahara continues to escalate militarily and diplomatically, pitting Morocco and Mauritania against the Polisario—the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguiet el-Hamra and Rio de Oro.

After Spain handed Western Sahara over to Morocco and Mauritania in 1976, in defiance of United Nations calls for a UN-supervised referendum, thousands of Western Saharans fled east to Algeria while Morocco and Mauritania carved up their newly acquired, mineral-rich territory.

The Polisario guerrillas, armed by Algeria, spread the fighting into desert regions of southern Morocco and Mauritania, which was forced to call on France for military and financial aid.

But the real protagonists are Algeria and Morocco, says Mortimer, a Haverford College political scientist. The region has rich phosphate reserves, but the big stake for Morocco's King Hassan is political; he has exploited the fight to build domestic support for the monarchy and a setback would undermine his regime. To Algiers, the stakes seem equally high. A larger, more powerful Morocco, buttressed by Mauritania, would strengthen what Algeria sees as a plot "to encircle the Algerian revolution," Mortimer writes.

Here, as elsewhere, the Organization of African Unity has been stalemated by a split between moderates and radicals. Morocco and Mauritania have gained support from Senegal, Zaire, and other moder-



Polisario guerrillas challenge Morocco and Mauritania for control of Spain's mineral-rich former colony.

ate Francophone states. The Polisario resistance movement has been endorsed by nine of the more radical OAU members (including Angola, Mozambique and Togo).

Meanwhile, neither Moscow nor Washington has encouraged its traditional ally (Algeria and Morocco, respectively); Algeria has tried in vain to curry favor with the Russians by condemning the peace initiatives of Egypt's Anwar Sadat and seeking to reintroduce the Soviet Union into the Middle East peace negotiations. Mortimer argues that Washington should encourage "self-determination" for West Sahara for the sake of stability in Northwest Africa.

Rx for Japan: Social Innovation

"Japan: The Problems of Success" by Peter F. Drucker, in *Foreign Affairs* (Apr. 1978), 428 East Preston Ct., Baltimore, Md. 21202.

Everyone in Japan talks "economics and only economics," says Drucker, professor of social science at California's Claremont Graduate School, but the basic problems facing that country today lie elsewhere. Social programs that worked well for a century are becoming obsolete; they now threaten Japan's cohesion and her ability to compete.

Especially damaging, says Drucker, are the seniority-wage system that sets incomes for everyone from manual workers to managers and professionals primarily by length of service rather than productivity; the education-career link which puts people into work categories for life; and the employee's lifetime commitment to one employer and one place of employment.

Japan's underlying problem is not the high price of oil and other raw material imports but population dynamics: low birthrate, a surplus of university-educated workers (58 percent of males now entering the work force are university graduates), a shortage of manual and farm workers, and an aging work force (retirement age for most employees is 55). Drucker writes that the 6-percent growth rate required for Japan to maintain her competitive position in the world "is simply not sustainable on the basis of available manpower and existing retirement policy."

The traditional link between formal education and career opportunity has made competition for high educational status a nightmare; pressure starts at the nursery level. Moreover, Drucker notes, parents must pay as much as $4,000 to admission committees as "voluntary contributions" to get their children admitted to the entrance examinations of a supposedly "free" elite public high school.

Drucker sees some encouraging changes: delayed retirement, retraining workers for new jobs, greater mobility for young professionals, a slight shift toward basing wages on productivity. For the short term, he says, Japan needs to counter the threat of social unrest by sharply cutting domestic consumer prices: food costs are twice those in the United States and rising at 30 percent per year.

RESEARCH REPORTS

Reviews of new research by public agencies and private institutions

"The Universe: Finite or Infinite?"

Smithsonian Institution, Office of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C. 20560. 2pp.
Author: George Field

The universe is now expanding, apparently as the result of a giant explosion some 15 to 20 billion years ago. Will it continue to expand indefinitely, or stop expanding and collapse?

While some recent observations suggest that it will expand through all eternity, scientists at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics are uncovering new evidence indicating that the universe will ultimately collapse.

The future of the universe and its spatial structure, writes Field, the Center's director, should be determined, according to Einstein's theory of relativity, by the amount of matter the universe contains. If that quantity is greater than a certain critical density (equal to three hydrogen atoms per cubic meter, on the average), space curves in on itself; thus, a finite universe. The gravitation exerted by that matter also should slow down and reverse the expansion. If less than the critical amount of matter is present, the universe is infinite and will keep expanding forever.

One way to estimate the amount of matter in the universe is to study the heavy hydrogen that exists in space. Another way is to measure the gravitational effects of one galaxy on another. But the suspicion is growing that additional matter exists undetected in intergalactic space. Hints of its presence may be found in the intense X-rays emitted from within clusters and "superclusters" of galaxies. Much of the "missing mass" needed to "close the universe" may be in the form of hot gas visible only in X-rays.

A series of X-ray–detecting satellites planned by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has already begun the search for more evidence of this "missing mass." But there is no cause for immediate alarm, says Field. Even if the universe is destined to collapse back upon itself, astronomers estimate that this will not happen for at least another 80 billion years.

"Manpower for Military Mobilization"

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1150 17th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. 47 pp. $2.75
Author: Kenneth J. Coffey.

The first casualty of the 1973 decision to rely on an all-volunteer Army has been the strength and well-being of the Army's reserve forces—the National Guard and the Army Reserve.

Without prompt corrective action, says Coffey, a military manpower consultant to Congress and the Department of Defense, by 1980 more than a third of the reserve personnel needed to augment the active Army upon mobilization will simply not be available. The Army's reserve forces must sign up 170,000 recruits annually to maintain the numbers authorized by Congress. But the advent of the all-

volunteer force and the demise of the draft have sharply eroded incentives for joining the Army reserves.

Reconstituting the draft is politically unfeasible. Costly boosts in reserve pay and fringe benefits would not adequately solve the problem. One drastic solution (perhaps also politically unacceptable), says Coffey, would be for Congress to reinstitute a modified draft designed specifically to provide trained ready reservists. Inductees could be required to serve for only a brief training period (perhaps four months) and then be liable for recall, in the event of emergency, for the following eight-month period. The induction of 650,000 young people annually would not constitute universal military training but would assure a far greater degree of participation than occurred under earlier draft policies.

A large, trained reserve is critical to the Pentagon's mobilization policy, which calls for bringing all existing Army units to full strength immediately and increasing Army strength from 715,000 to 1,780,000 within 120 days. Newly trained conscripts and volunteers could be available for combat 150 days after mobilization, too late to provide the manpower the Army needs to bring its units up to full strength in the early days of a conflict.

Coffey questions whether a total of 1.78 million men and women would be required so quickly. He also questions whether the United States has the airlift and sealift capacity to transport rapidly the reinforcements and equipment required in case of a NATO–Warsaw Pact confrontation in Europe. It would be futile, Coffey says, "to spend great sums of money on incentives or to draft personnel to provide additional reinforcements who could not be quickly transported to the battlefields, or who, once there, could not be supported with the necessary amounts of food, ammunition and other supplies."

Management improvements and policy adjustments can ease the reserve problem, Coffey concludes, but to meet stated Army requirements we must either abandon the all-volunteer Army idea, adopt a special draft to maintain trained reservists, or spend billions of dollars for new recruiting incentives. If the voters reject all these alternatives, Coffey says, "they are allowing a corollary increase in the possibility of both armed conflict [in Europe] and the use of nuclear weapons."

"Emergent Nationality Problems in the U.S.S.R."

The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California 90406. 33 pp.
Author: Jeremy Azrael

Changes occurring in the ethnic mix of the Soviet population could pose serious challenges to the Kremlin. While these changes are unlikely to threaten the Soviet system, writes Azrael, a University of Chicago political scientist, they could generate considerable internal stress and hinder the further growth of Soviet power.

There is a great disparity between the low growth rates of the U.S.S.R.'s "European" (Slavic and Baltic) nationalities and the extremely high growth rates of its "non-European" (Caucasian and Central Asian) nationalities.

Because the Europeans form such a large majority of the population, overall Soviet population growth has slowed to slightly over 1.3 percent per annum, while the proportion of "non-Europeans" has risen from 11.5

percent in 1959 to an estimated 17 percent in 1977 and is steadily increasing. By the end of this century, 20 to 25 percent of the U.S.S.R.'s total population and almost 40 percent of its teenagers and young adults will be "non-Europeans."

By the late 1980s, there will be too few "European" entrants into the industrial work force to replace "European" retirees, let alone staff new plants and enterprises. Continued economic growth will depend on the regime's willingness and ability either to shift its industrial center of gravity eastward toward the semideveloped republics of Central Asia, or to mobilize the presently nonmigratory natives of those republics for work in other regions. Both alternatives involve large costs and the risk of serious national unrest.

Future manpower demands may also force the regime to reduce the size of its armed forces or fill the ranks with poorly educated Central Asians who have a weak command of spoken Russian.

These difficult decisions could lead the Kremlin to impose harsher restrictions on nationalist movements. They could also induce the U.S.S.R. to enter into balanced force reduction agreements, to curtail Soviet "globalism," and to adopt a lower profile in world affairs.

"An Inventory of Federal Income Transfer Programs"

The Institute for Socioeconomic Studies, Airport Rd., White Plains, N.Y. 10604.
219 pp. $12.00
Authors: William J. Lawrence and Stephen Leeds

Many welfare reform proposals would substitute a single, federally financed income support system for the existing welter of overlapping programs that often discourage the poor from seeking work. It has proved difficult, however, to rationalize the present national income-transfer system without an accurate inventory of what that system includes.

The 1977 *Budget of the United States Government* uses a narrow definition of "income security" programs to include retirement, disability and unemployment insurance benefits, and food assistance. This totals $137 billion, or 35 percent of the federal budget. A companion document, *Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government*, adds some health, housing, and veterans' benefits to reach a total of more than $170 billion in direct expenditures.

This report from the Institute for Socioeconomic Studies uses a broader definition to identify 182 federal programs aimed at helping the needy. They account for $250 billion of the 1977 federal budget, or 69 cents out of every dollar collected by Washington in tax receipts. No overriding theme or theory unifies these programs, which provide any one of five types of benefits to support or supplement a person's current standard of living: direct cash payments (e.g., welfare, social security); tax relief through various reductions in personal income taxes; "in-kind" benefits that provide essential goods and services either free or at reduced prices (e.g., food stamps, Medicare); and credit and insurance at terms more favorable than those available in the private sector (e.g., student loans, flood insurance).

Some programs included here are not universally accepted as part of the federal income-transfer system.

Among them are disaster assistance in the form of low-interest loans to farmers, veterans' medical services, public-service employment, and economic development grants. But these account for only $7 billion, or less than 3 percent of the total inventory's outlays.

The five major components of the national social security system—retirement, survivors, and disability pensions, as well as Medicare hospital and medical benefits—represent 40 percent of the expenditures cited in the inventory. Tax relief accounts for $35 billion, or 14 percent. Only 23 percent of federal benefits (or about $55.5 billion) are distributed in whole or in part on the basis of *need*, and more than half of these benefits are dispensed in the form of in-kind goods and services.

"World Military and Social Expenditures 1977"

WMSE Publications, Box 1003, Leesburg, Va. 22075. 31 pp. $2.50
Author: Ruth Leger Sivard

Aggregate military spending throughout the world now tops $350 billion yearly and the backlog of orders for arms is two to three times the size of present deliveries. Sivard, formerly an economist with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, argues that this diversion of resources "impedes growth, fuels inflation, contributes to unemployment, and squanders resources in short supply." (The U.S. Defense Department in peacetime consumes half as much jet fuel as all U.S. commercial airlines combined.)

The disparity between the largesse devoted to "defense" and the funds

TEN MAJOR MILITARY POWERS & SOCIAL INDICATORS, 1974

	USA	USSR	West Germany	China	France	UK	Iran	Italy	Japan	Israel
Military Expenditures Billion US $	85.9	84.0	13.8	13.0	10.0	9.8	6.0	4.3	4.2	4.0
Rank among 138 countries in:										
GNP per capita	4	27	7	103	16	25	46	28	21	23
Literacy	1	1	1	24	1	14	82	29	1	36
Population per physician	17	1	9	91	23	25	67	10	33	2
Infant mortality per 1000 live births	18	33	22	49	9	12	106	25	3	24
Life expectancy at birth	18	27	18	53	9	9	82	9	5	9

Source: World Military and Social Expenditures 1977

devoted to other needs is growing wider. The world's budget for military research, for example, is more than six times the size of its budget for energy research. Industrialized nations investing heavily in arms often neglect their own social needs as well as those of the developing countries.

What could $17.5 billion (5 percent of the world's military budget) do to help correct the world's social ills? It could fund a vaccination program to protect all infants from common infectious diseases ($600 million). It could bring literacy programs to the one in four adults unable to read and write ($1.2 billion). It could provide supplementary food to the 200 million preschool children in Asia, Africa, and Latin America who are chronically hungry ($4 billion).

It could train health care aides, increase food production in the Third World, expand self-help housing programs for 300 million urban poor, provide supplementary feeding for 60 million malnourished pregnant or lactating women, and help build primary schools and hygienic water supply systems. Total cost: $11.7 billion.

"Vietnam, Consensus, and the Belief Systems of American Leaders"

Institute for Transnational Studies, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Calif. 90007. 164 pp. $4.00
Authors: Ole R. Holsti and James M. Rosenau

An extensive poll of a broad range of American opinion leaders indicates that the Vietnam War shattered the post–World War II consensus on the nature of the international system and how the United States should pursue its foreign policy goals.

Deep and profound divisions exist among these leaders concerning how the lessons of Vietnam should guide the nation's future. These divisions reflect "several rather coherent, if almost mutually exclusive, belief systems" that go beyond views on Vietnam itself.

The 2,281 persons surveyed included men and women in politics, labor, the foreign service, the media, and the military, as well as a random sample of persons listed in *Who's Who in America*. While a majority diagnosed U.S. intervention in Vietnam as essentially a futile undertaking, there were sharp differences about why failure occurred.

Despite the divisions of opinion, there was substantial agreement on some issues. Political scientists Holsti and Rosenau found that two-thirds of those surveyed predicted that the outcome of the war would "encourage Communist nations to seek other triumphs."

More than three-fourths agreed that in any future foreign intervention, U.S. force should be applied quickly rather than through a policy of graduated escalation. And at least three-fifths expressed some measure of agreement that the war effort resulted in neglect of more serious, nonmilitary threats to national security, such as a loss of faith in the honesty of government or structural damage to the economy.

Supporters of the war (including the 15.9 percent of respondents who said they consistently backed the goal of military victory and the 5.6 percent who said they adopted that position

toward the end of the war) were more likely to attribute U.S. failure in Vietnam to political restrictions on the conduct of the war than to the basic nature of the undertaking. And they believe that the price of failure will be paid in the international arena.

Critics of the war (the 16.6 percent of respondents who early favored U.S. withdrawal and the 38 percent who adopted that view in the latter stages of the war) tended to trace the U.S. failure in Vietnam to unrealistic goals, lack of understanding of the history and culture of the region, the motivations of the adversary, and the shortcomings of the Saigon regime. They view the consequences of the war in terms of its domestic costs.

Respondents occupying the middle ground between the two extremes are also deeply divided in their convictions, the authors conclude. This suggests that the task of rebuilding a workable consensus in support of U.S. foreign policy will not be easy.

"UDIS: Deinstitutionalizing the Chronic Juvenile Offender"

American Institutes for Research, 1005 Thomas Jefferson St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007. 222 pp. $7.50 (Summary: 36 pp. $2.50)
Authors: Charles A. Murray, Doug Thomson, and Cindy B. Israel

Juveniles under the age of 18 commit roughly half of all serious crimes in the United States. But the problem of youth crime in America has long frustrated law enforcement officials who suspect that traditional methods of dealing with juvenile offenders may do more harm than good.

This report, prepared for the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, concludes that getting serious delinquents off the street and into custody "has a powerful and apparently long-term inhibiting effect on subsequent delinquent activity."

Researchers studied 492 chronic male juvenile offenders from Cook County to determine which was more effective, incarceration in state training schools or an experimental Unified Delinquency Intervention Services (UDIS) program that provided counseling, vocational training, and other services to delinquents assigned to group homes, work camps, and other non-correctional institutions.

Both approaches produced a sharp drop in rearrest rates among the youths (down an average of 68 percent after their release) as well as a reduction in subsequent court appearances (down 64 percent) and violence-related offenses (down 74 percent).

Incarceration was slightly more effective than the experimental UDIS program, and the costs were similar. Of those assigned to UDIS, the *greatest* improvement was shown by juveniles taken from their communities and assigned to out-of-town programs such as work camps.

While researchers concluded that removing juvenile offenders from the community produced positive results, they found that the length of time spent in the UDIS program made little difference in their subsequent behavior. The results were the same if they remained for six months or one year.



BLACK HOLES AND BINARIES

Poet William Wordsworth was nearly correct when he noted how "the stars began to blink." The study of pulsating X-rays from distant stellar objects has become one of the most active fields in American science. One source may be X-ray binaries *(A), which consist of a small, dense star, possibly a* black hole, *orbiting a larger, normal star. A black hole is a collapsed star of great density but minimal (less than 10 kilometers) radius. In the diagram above, the gravitational attraction of a black hole pulls gas away from a normal star, forming a whirling accretion disk (B). The gas spirals toward the black hole's* horizon, *heating up and emitting X-rays along the way. At the* static limit, *the gas plunges into the hole. Black holes can curve space (C) and warp time; not even light can escape.*

Science in America

Since World War II the United States has spent more than $500 billion on research and development, and U.S. achievements in particle physics, genetics, astronomy, agronomy, and other fields have been unprecedented. (Americans have won nearly half of all Nobel Prizes awarded for science since 1946.) But congressional critics and increasing numbers of scientists now question the direction of the American science effort. Should research be targeted toward more immediate, practical goals? Are the big research universities outmoded? Do we need new types of scientific institutions? The current debate has a peculiar history. In the 19th century, American scientists lamented the contemporary emphasis on practical science as well as the new republic's lack of a European-style university tradition. The surprising thing about American science, in their view, was not that it had made so *little* progress but that it had made so *much*. Here historian Nathan Reingold reviews the rise of American science; Philip Abelson, a physicist, chemist, and geologist, describes its new frontiers; and John Holmfeld, a congressional staff specialist, reports on the shifting focus of federal science policy.

O PIONEERS!

by Nathan Reingold

In 1800, the score of professional scientists in the United States was scarcely distinguishable from the somewhat larger group of devoted amateurs—like the gentleman-scholar Thomas Jefferson and the multi-talented Benjamin Franklin. As befitted a nation of farmers, sailors, and craftsmen, most Americans pursued such sciences as zoology, botany, geology, and astronomy—sciences rooted in the world around them. There was a

constitutional mandate to "promote" the useful arts and sciences by regulating patents and copyrights, but the federal government's involvement in science was otherwise haphazard, tied to Antarctic naval expeditions or the western explorations of Lewis and Clark.

Today there are 500,000 American scientists in research and development alone, with 1 million more in other scientific or technology-based fields. Annual private and federal spending on research and development exceeds $40 billion. And astronomy, botany, and the rest have been joined by a host of other disciplines so diverse and some of them so arcane that one might now define a "generalist" as a scientist who knows his own subspeciality and one other sub-specialty. Despite this fragmentation of knowledge, U.S. science and technology have no peer.

How did the United States get to be No. 1? That seems like one question but it is really a dozen. A comprehensive answer must consider the progress of scientific knowledge, which may have a certain logic in retrospect, as well as the evolution of federal subsidies for research, which does not. An explanation must include the development of European science and the growth of American industry, education, and national wealth. The discussion must encompass the recurrent public controversies over what "science" really is and over the long-term value of "basic" versus "applied" science. And it must note the persistent insecurity in the broader American scientific community over its own status in society.

These factors are easier to identify than to put together. Physicist Samuel P. Langley observed in 1888 that we often hear scientific development "likened to the march of an army towards some definite end; but this, it seems to me, is not the way science usually does move. . . ." A better metaphor might be to compare these forces to ocean waves of different frequency that suddenly get "in step" to produce a giant wave with extraordinary momentum.

Such waves are preceded by deep troughs. Until the Civil War, the United States depended, in scientific terms, largely on Western Europe. "Who reads an American book?" asked the

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Nathan Reingold, 51, is a historian at the Smithsonian Institution and an Adjunct Wilson Center Fellow. Born in New York City, he received his B.A. (1947) and M.A. (1948) from New York University, and his Ph.D. (1951) from the University of Pennsylvania. He is the editor of Science in Nineteenth Century America: A Documentary History *(1964), and is currently editing the unpublished papers and manuscripts of physicist Joseph Henry, first Secretary of the Smithsonian.*

English wit Sydney Smith in 1820. There was some good native science—Nathaniel Bowditch's work in mathematics and navigation comes to mind—but not much. If the natural philosophers ("scientist" was a word not coined until 1840) in Paris and Berlin thought much about the United States, then like the great German naturalist Alexander von Humboldt they thought of it as a vast natural laboratory rather than as a place to build one.

From Telegraph to Cyclotron

But beginning in the 1840s, Joseph Henry, who discovered electromagnetic induction independently of England's Michael Faraday, turned the new Smithsonian Institution into a center for "abstract" science. In the 1860s Yale granted its first doctorate in science (the second would go to the outstanding theoretical physicist J. Willard Gibbs). The U.S. Department of Agriculture was created in 1862 and, through a system of tax-supported land-grant colleges established under the Morrill Act, planted the seeds of a sustained program of research in biology and chemistry—the government's first major plunge into the world of basic science. As the Army opened up the West, geologists and naturalists, including the one-armed John Wesley Powell, explored the virgin territories.

American science leapt ahead after the Civil War. Although mathematician Simon Newcomb could still complain that not a single U.S. entry had appeared in Germany's *Jahrbuch der Mathematik* in many years, the general record in just about every other field had improved enormously. In 1865, Britain's Royal Society noted in its catalogue that the backward American republic accounted for no less than 5 percent of all scientific articles published.

Before the Civil War, America's industrial revolution had done little to advance basic science. To be sure, the mills were humming and "every spindle turning," as Hezekiah Niles's *Weekly Reporter* observed in the 1830s, but industry as yet had little use for the scientific disciplines. Then, with the 1870s came the expansion of the Gilded Age, the steam-powered railroads and factories. A nation of inventors and tinkerers had turned into a burgeoning industrial giant. Crotchety Henry Adams would rail against the "dynamo," but scientists and engineers rallied to its support, as did most laymen.

In practical science, Bell and Edison gave us electrical sound and light. In abstract science, America began to approach parity with Europe. Swiss-born Louis Agassiz pursued important researches into rocks and fossils while creating Harvard's

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1740 IN BASIC AND APPLIED SCIENCE



Museum of Comparative Zoology. J. Willard Gibbs was working in thermodynamics; geologists James Hall and James Dwight Dana studied mountain formation and coral structures. In 1877, with the new 26-inch refractor telescope at Washington's Naval Observatory, astronomer Asaph Hall discovered Deimos and Phobos, the two satellites of Mars. Two years later, A. A. Michelson measured the speed of light.

From the 1890s on, the pace of discovery accelerated. Working closely with their European colleagues, American scientists began to explore the structure of the atom. In 1906, Lee De Forest ushered in the age of radio with his triode vacuum tube. In 1910, T. H. Morgan launched what is now called "classical



genetics" based on experiments with the fruit fly, *Drosophila melangastor*. A year later, Robert A. Millikan, who like other Americans of his generation had studied in Germany, calculated the electric charge on the electron.

In the next decades followed the early work in computers; the world of high energy physics opened by E. O. Lawrence's 1931 cyclotron; the discovery in 1932 of the neutron and positron; and the isolation, that same year, of deuterium by Harold Urey at Columbia. In 1944, Oswald Avery demonstrated that DNA was the material carrier of heredity. From the turn of the century through the Depression and World War II to the present, the story is one of continuous growth. Such projects as

the atomic bomb, nuclear energy, and the space program not only demonstrated sophistication in engineering and technology; they also depended on great strides in basic research.

Oddly, success has not inspired self-confidence among our scientists. Despite the assurance of public-opinion polls that they are respected by the American people, despite the heavy outlays of taxpayers' dollars devoted to research, despite the publicized advances in particle physics, genetics, and electronics, they fear a slackening of support; they agonize over real or predicted cuts in Washington's "basic research" spending. They shake their heads over the shrill polemics of the anti-DNA, anti-nuclear, and pro-environment absolutists. And as if to confirm their own worst fears of rampant know-nothingism, they sometimes take a perverse satisfaction in surveys like the poll conducted by *The Times* of London, which showed that while 15 percent of the public have faith in a "scientific" way of reasoning, 42 percent believe communication with the dead is a fair possibility.

A Double Strategy

If we could communicate with the dead, we would probably find that American scientists have always felt a bit insecure. As far back as 1832, physicist Joseph Henry decried what he saw as the nation's attitude toward what he called "abstract" science. In his view, a nation of go-getters had little use for abstract knowledge. Even its name—"abstract," "basic," or "pure" science—implied something valued for its own sake, of no use to a wider public.

Alexis de Tocqueville, a contemporary of Henry, contended that Americans would excel in the world of practical science but would never rise to theoretical eminence. Just as it was thought that a democratic society could produce popular or "vernacular" cultures but not "high" ones (an aristocracy was required for that!), so it was felt that Americans would always make a better mousetrap but would never add much to the world's knowledge of mice.

Henry feared what Tocqueville took as fact. Behind his fear was a belief that technological achievement depended on the advance of abstract science. In the America of the 1840s, to the extent that basic research existed at all it was usually scrambled together into applied fields. There were no graduate schools and only one research institute—the Smithsonian, founded in 1846 and headed by Henry. The age of the learned and professional societies such as the National Academy of Sciences still lay in

the future. In one sense, the American situation was unenviable; in another, it was an opportunity.

To counteract this perceived neglect of basic science, the leading American scientists of the pre–Civil War era evolved two deliberate strategies to advance theoretical knowledge while at the same time taking care of the utilitarian needs of a growing industrial society. That is to say they defined both a "broad strategy" and an "enclave strategy."

Jefferson's Precedent

The enclave strategy evolved before the Civil War when Joseph Henry designed the Smithsonian Institution—despite bitter opposition from those who wanted only a museum and library—as America's first center for abstract research sheltered from the pressures of immediate industrial or social demands.

This approach was continued by such organizations as the Rockefeller Institute (1901, now Rockefeller University), the Carnegie Institution (1902), and the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton (1930). It persists today in some government labs and in the federally funded, specialized centers within the great research universities, such as the Scripps Oceanographic Institute at the University of California. Here, the emphasis is largely on pure science pursued for its own sake.

While Henry struggled with the Smithsonian, his friend A. D. Bache framed a broad approach to take advantage of the already "mixed" character of applied and basic science. A great-grandson of Benjamin Franklin and first president of the National Academy of Sciences, Bache for years headed the Coast and Geodetic Survey, whose function was to issue maps and charts.

Bache's idea was simple. Americans, he felt, would never support scientific institutes like the Smithsonian to the degree that kings and aristocratic patrons supported such centers in Europe. But government agencies like the Coast Survey and the Army's Topographical Engineers had statutory missions that, with a little imagination, could be defined to include substantial amounts of abstract science. Essentially, Bache was following Jefferson's strategem. As President, Jefferson had defended the Lewis and Clark expedition in Congress on commercial grounds; to the Spanish Minister, through whose territory the party would have to pass, he described it as a geological mission.

In the Coast Survey, for example, Bache defined seismology, terrestrial magnetism, and other subjects as essential to the routine production of high-quality maps and charts. Similarly,

when the Smithsonian reluctantly acquired museum functions, Henry and his successors continued to sponsor basic research, seeing it as necessary for quality control in public exhibits. Finally, the creation of state agriculture colleges, designed to improve American farming techniques, inevitably led to research into genetics, soil chemistry, and climate.

What happened was this: In theory, American science maintained a distinction between applied and basic research; in fact, it maintained the distinction only in theory. Like the earth and the moon, the two were distinct yet inseparable, influencing and reinforcing each other in subtle ways. Vannevar Bush's work with practical engineering equations led him to develop the differential analyzer, which ultimately had theoretical implications. And Irving Langmuir's theoretical work in electron emission produced a better light bulb.

The Rise of the University

This tandem pursuit of basic and applied science was one of the vital differences between the evolution of European science and that of its precocious child in the New World. In Europe, the two were pursued as a bifurcated effort. In America, with some exceptions, they never really were. This mixture remained even when the rise of the elite universities, philanthropic foundations, and science-based industries in the 20th century combined to eclipse government-conducted research.

By 1900, for example, there were more physicists in American universities than in those of any other country, and their numbers were growing faster than anywhere else outside of Japan. Rising proportions of high school graduates swelled college enrollments. (In 1900, 6.4 percent of the population had graduated from high school; in 1940, more than half.) With the pioneering success of Johns Hopkins University, graduate schools flourished. By 1940, the 382 doctorates granted annually in all fields at the turn of the century had increased by 1000 percent.

More important, the universities branched out to service every cranny of an increasingly complex industrial society. To be sure, scientists still pursued the higher mathematics; astronomers gazed at the stars; and physicists followed closely the theoretical work of Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr and Ernest Rutherford. But university scientists also developed hybrids of corn and new kinds of wheat to feed a growing population. In short, even as they followed their noses into the theoretical unknown, scientists looked around en route for ways to harness

THE FIRST DEBATE

Americans are now used to scientist-advocates, be the issue recombinant DNA, the environment, or nuclear safety. But the phenomenon is a recent one; until the first debate in the late 1940s over the military use of atomic energy, U.S. scientists had kept a low profile.

Was the atomic bomb a breakthrough or a breakdown? After a first flush of enthusiasm, scientists began to wonder. One group, headed by physicist William Higinbotham, launched the apocalyptic *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, whose "clock" logo showed war inching ever closer. (The examples above are from before and after the first Russian atomic blast in 1949.) Others, including the "father" of the bomb, J. Robert Oppenheimer, drew up what eventually became the Baruch Plan (1946). The plan called for destruction of all nuclear weapons, with peaceful applications of atomic energy to be regulated by a new international agency. It was rejected by the Soviets.

America's only recourse was to stay ahead in the arms race. So argued those leading scientists (such as Edward Teller and E. O. Lawrence) who helped create the hydrogen bomb. Though opposed by Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, and Hans Bethe (Fermi wanted to "try once more" for disarmament), an American H-bomb was detonated in 1952; the Soviets followed suit in 1953. It was not a halcyon time for liberal physicists. As historian Daniel Kevles later noted, scientists were still listened to by the government, "but the voice most listened to seemed to be Edward Teller's." Later debates arose over nuclear testing and the neutron bomb.

what they found; when harnessed, it sometimes pulled them further.

Science was soon to acquire a home in industry as well when the work of such practical wizards as Edison and Bell took corporate form in the shape of ambitious new companies like General Electric and Bell Telephone. There was no mistaking the motives of these companies—they wanted profits. But technology does not exist in a vacuum; pure research was regarded as an essential component of scientific commerce. In 1927 H. D. Arnold, then president of Bell Laboratories, put the matter succinctly. Bell was interested, Arnold wrote, simply in producing more electrons to run its radios and telephones and, soon, its television sets. And Bell wanted its electrons cheaply. But the best road to this end, Arnold explained, "must include a thorough understanding of the broad facts of electron emis-

sion." Work in this area won Bell Laboratories' physicist C. J. Davisson the Nobel Prize (1937). Bell received another Nobel for developing the transistor (1956).

Policeman and Paymaster

What developed in the United States was a phenomenally diverse scientific enterprise, and in diversity it found vitality. Basic research was conducted not only by a few specialized federal agencies but by industry and the universities as well. It was paid for not only by the government but also by private philanthropy, by the great foundations, by university tuition, by industry, and by ordinary citizens who put down hard cash for a new radio, television, or telephone. And it so evolved that the accretion of new theoretical knowledge was often taking place on the same workbench, so to speak, where technicians and engineers were trying to turn theory into something men could use. There was little chance, despite the fears Lyndon Johnson voiced in 1966, that new scientific innovations would be "locked up in the laboratory." Indeed, some Americans now seem to fear that some discoveries will *not* be locked up.

Does all of this help to explain the evolution of American science? Some skeptics will surely note that the facts of history are like the letters of the alphabet—you can make them spell what you want. Others might contend that the rise of American science is essentially the same success story we have witnessed in Russia and in Japan: A rich nation's investments paying off.

And yet the special elements of the American story—the driving insecurity of scientists, the complementary broad and narrow strategies, the diversity of effort, the pragmatic partnership of science with education and industry—are too clear to be ignored. Even when, during World War II, the federal role in science took a quantum leap, and even after the government became both a policeman and a paymaster of science, these phenomena continued to shape American science and science policy.

Samuel Langley was right: Scientific progress in this country has not been the march of an army toward a goal clearly in sight. Instead, it has been something less controlled—and therefore, perhaps, more open to initiative and imagination. "In this Democratic Country," Joseph Henry observed, "we must do what we can when we cannot do what we would."

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THE NEW DISCOVERIES

by Philip H. Abelson

Very little human activity ever proves of much consequence in the anarchic scheme of history, and, whether fortunate or not, the fact is nonetheless irksome; men do not like to be told that they are plowing the waves.

The Roman poet Horace ventured one solution: Through art, he claimed, one could erect a monument "more permanent than bronze"—and he was right, at least in his own case. But today men are building a collective, not an individual, monument: the edifice of scientific knowledge.

The edifice has unusual properties. It is constantly being extended, tested, perfected. Ornaments are added regularly—and as regularly erased. Most unusual of all is that the edifice is being constructed by hundreds of thousands of people who, relying on standards implied in the term "scientific method," can build confidently on the foundations laid by others who may be thousands of miles—or hundreds of years—apart.

For that reason, if a scientist of 50 years ago suddenly visited a modern laboratory, he would undoubtedly be bewildered, but he could quickly be brought up to date. Unlike the wild boy of Aveyron, he would not have arrived as a blank slate in an alien culture. He would appreciate some of our pressing dilemmas—among them, that the more we learn, the less we understand. He would be at home, too, in the great areas of scholarly inquiry, though they have changed greatly since 1928.

Astronomers still observe the familiar stars but now perceive them as great nuclear reactors. They talk authoritatively of quasars, pulsars, neutron stars, and black holes, yet they hunger to know how the stars, the galaxies, and the universe were formed.

Plant biology remains of immense importance, but with our urgent needs for food and energy it has evolved from a descriptive science into an experimental one. Through biology and medicine we have eradicated some of the deadliest diseases

known to man—most recently, smallpox—but the mechanisms of genetics elude us as before, and we have only just begun to understand how the mind and memory work.

The *tools* of the modern researcher might easily confound our visitor from 1928. He would be puzzled by most of the equipment in a modern research lab and astonished by the fact that the annual cost of equipment per U.S. scientist is in the tens of thousands of dollars. He would probably ask to sit down when told that throughout the world scientists speak to one another through an intricate network of teleconferencing, computer linkups, and, when necessary, the relatively mundane telephone—all made possible by continuing developments in electronics. Here we have seen a major leap forward since the 1920s.

More Nimble than the Brain

Electronics stands behind the space program and the computer. It will soon transform the banking industry, making it possible to commit errors in one's checkbook without lifting a pen. In the end, the electronics revolution will prove as important as the Industrial Revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries, though for different reasons. The Industrial Revolution was crude and based on large-scale energy use. The electronics revolution is refined: It bends energy and force to our will, much as the brain directs the use of muscles. Yet, for some tasks, electronics can be more subtle, more nimble, and more dependable than the brain.

In their simplest form, electronic measuring devices convert a physical quantity, such as light, into an electrical signal. (A familiar example is the exposure meter used in photography.) In more complex devices, the signals are further processed and decoded by medium-sized computers. In these devices thousands of miniaturized integrated circuits can now be molded into silicon chips the size of a fingernail. Each chip costs about $1.00. Sixteen years ago, an electronic device with similar capabilities would have cost $6,000. And it would have been 30,000

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THE MICROELECTRONICS REVOLUTION

Most of the technological achievements of the last two decades depend on microelectronics. Without microelectronic devices there would be no satellites, no MIRVed missiles, no reliable computers, television sets, or bank records as we know them.

In the beginning was the transistor, a small, low-powered amplifier that replaced the vacuum tube. Invented in 1948 by the team of John Bardeen, Walter H. Brattain, and William Shockley at Bell Laboratories, the transistor has now evolved into a complex arrangement of "solid-state" integrated circuits on a chip the size of a fingernail. In modern microelectronic devices the circuits are formed on these chips by photolithography, in some cases using a steered electron beam.

The theory behind integrated circuits is relatively simple. Some substances, including most metals, are excellent conductors of electricity. Others, such as rubber and glass, are poor conductors and can be used as insulators. In between are substances such as silicon that are known as semiconductors.

By introducing small impurities—a process known as "doping"—atoms of pure silicon can be given either a positive or a negative charge. If a silicon atom, which has four electrons in its outermost or "valence" shell, is doped with phosphorus, which has five electrons in its valence shell, the resulting linkup will generate one "free" electron. This extra electron is capable of carrying a negative charge and thus gives the semiconductor a negative (n-type) orientation.

The silicon atom can also be doped with boron, which has three electrons in its valence shell, to form a bond that is missing one electron, creating a "hole" that gives a positive (p-type) orientation. When an electric charge is applied to the semiconductor, the extra electrons and holes are mobilized to act as charge carriers.

As in the first transistor, the p-type and n-type semiconductors can be arranged in layers to conduct electric charges in only one direction within a circuit; thus the circuit may be either "on" or "off." A certain electrical "input" will give a predetermined "output"—an arrangement called a "gate" that is the basic unit of electronic logic.

A unit that can go on and off in a predictable fashion can also be made to represent "yes" or "no"—or 1 and 0, the constituents of the binary number system used in all computers.

times as big. What Thomas Carlyle said of men may especially be applied to the scientist: "Without tools he is nothing; with tools he is all."

The most glamorous new tool is the laser. A laser can be made to produce a steady stream of light, but is usually adjusted

to emit an intense, controllable, monochromatic pulse that may be as short as one-trillionth of a second (one *picosecond*). These features permit sharp focusing of the light as well as precise timing.

Most Americans are now familiar with the use of a laser to repair detached retinas, cut steel sheets, or conduct high-accuracy land surveying. Some lasers are being used in endeavors to achieve nuclear fusion. But the most important applications will surely come in chemistry. Chemists have long known that some chemical reactions occur rapidly; in many instances, intermediate products are formed during a chemical process that may last for no more than one picosecond. (In some plants, the absorption of a photon of light takes *less* than one picosecond.) Lasers now are being used, in what is called *picosecond chemistry*, to make these reactions finally accessible to study.

Pulsars and Quasars

The laser is only one of many instruments that have increased the precision and speed of observation. At one time, for example, the chemical analysis of a typical rock required a one-gram sample and a week's time. The process resembled a python digesting a ram. The rock was first ground to a fine powder, then subjected to long periods of "digestion" by a mixture of corrosive acids until it was dissolved. A skilled chemist might complete a dozen analyses in a week. Today, using an electron microprobe, a sharply focused electron beam hits a tiny spot on the surface of the specimen and produces X-rays whose character will vary with that of the rock's constituent elements. These X-rays are then resolved and interpreted electronically. The process requires 10 minutes and one-billionth of a gram of rock.

In astronomy, intriguing new discoveries have come from the use of radiotelescopes—those dish-shaped receivers up to 300 feet in diameter that are exquisitely sensitive to radio signals reaching Earth from outer space. Until World War II, most astronomers had to rely on photographic plates to record their observations—a good technique as far as it went, rather like a silent movie about the Vienna Boys Choir. Now the great observatories have been converted into electronic laboratories, and their records are stored on magnetic tapes. Radiotelescopes helped astronomers determine the shape of our galaxy, the Milky Way—basically a flat spiral with a bulge near the center. Signals received by radiotelescopes also revealed that there were powerful radio stations in the sky, some of them switching

"BEAUTY," "TRUTH," AND "STRANGENESS"

In 1964 physicists Murray Gell-Mann and George Zweig independently predicted the existence of a fundamental, subnuclear particle that cannot be broken down into smaller constituents. They called the particle a *quark* (the word comes from James Joyce's *Finnegans Wake*), and theorized that quarks are building blocks that combine to form the atomic units known as *hadrons*, a family that includes protons, neutrons, lambdas, and mesons. (An unrelated family of atomic units, the *leptons*, includes electrons, neutrinos, and muons.)

Four types of quarks are currently believed to exist, distinguishable by the peculiar quantum characteristics of "up," "down," "strangeness," or "charm." All quarks have a fractional electric charge, angular momentum, and mass. For each type of quark there is also an *antiquark*, with opposite characteristics.

Quarks are characterized by their sensitivity to the so-called *strong* force that binds quarks together to form hadrons (the Greek word *hadron* means "stout" or "strong"). One up and two down quarks are combined by the strong force to form a neutron. One down and two up quarks form a proton. One up, one down, and one strange quark form a lambda. A quark-antiquark combination produces a particle of the meson group.

Although quarks have yet to be isolated in the laboratory (the strong force may bind them so tightly that isolation is impossible), recent evidence suggests that two more kinds of quarks exist. Their proposed names: "truth" and "beauty." Until such quarks are actually isolated, however, modern physics may take comfort in St. Paul's Epistle to the Hebrews: "Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear."

off and on as often as 30 times per second. Called *pulsars*, these signals are probably emitted by rotating neutron stars.

By using radiotelescopes in combination, moreover, it is possible to determine the precise location of a radio source in space through a procedure similar to "triangulation" used in navigation on Earth. Such cooperative activity enabled astronomers to detect and describe the first *quasars*—essentially radio signals from "quasi-stellar" objects with large *red shifts*. Red shift refers to the displacement of light toward the red end of the spectrum; it is approximately proportional to the velocity of a star or other stellar object as it recedes from Earth.

Another advance in astronomy has been the development of a more sensitive means of measuring light. Until recently the

ONE MAN'S REVOLUTION

Notions of how old scientific theories give way to new tend to be shaped not by scientists but by historians and philosophers of science. What is still probably the most generally held opinion among both scientists and the public is one that was shaped during the 1930s and 1940s by the school of positivist philosophers known as the Vienna Circle.

According to this view, science is a strictly logical process. Scientists propose theories on the basis of inductive logic, and confirm or refute them by experimental tests. When old theories fail, new theories are proposed and adopted because of their greater explanatory power, and science thus moves ever closer to the truth.

Logical empiricism, as this view is called, still has its defenders, but many philosophers and historians of science now favor perceptions of the scientific enterprise that take human factors into account as well as the purely logical structure.

Perhaps the principal force behind this change was a book published 16 years ago that cut blithely across the demarcation lines between the philosophy, history, and sociology of science. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* is a landmark in intellectual history that has attracted attention far beyond its own immediate field.

Thomas S. Kuhn, its author, was trained as a solid-state physicist but works as a historian at Princeton and the Institute for Advanced Study. His book still evokes a set of reactions that defies any general consensus. Common among science historians is the view that it is both brilliant and refutable.

"My own attitude toward the book," says one scholar, "is the same as toward a number of other books, that they are classics in the sense that they have been completely disproved in detail by the professionals in the field and yet they somehow survive."

Kuhn's thesis, in rough outline, goes as follows. Science is not the steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge that is portrayed in the textbooks. Rather, it is a series of peaceful interludes punctuated by intellectually violent revolutions. During the interludes, scientists are guided by a set of theories, standards, and methods that Kuhn refers to as a "paradigm."

ability of telescopes to make out dim and distant objects was limited by a faint, ever-present glow throughout the sky. (Even when the telescope is pointed to areas where there are no stars, a photographic plate receives some light.) Using electronic detectors, astronomers can reduce this airglow effect almost as easily as adjusting a car's rearview mirror for night driving. They can

The paradigm is the basis of the research tradition; it defines which problems are interesting and which are irrelevant. During the paradigm-governed interludes, called periods of "normal science" by Kuhn, scientists essentially solve puzzles generated by the paradigm. Study of mechanics after Newton's *Principia* is one example of a period of normal science; astronomy after Copernicus is another.

But the tranquility of normal science does not last. Sooner or later, scientists trying to extend the paradigm find that there are puzzles they cannot solve. The time comes when these puzzles can be ignored no longer. Then the field enters into crisis, such as befell the phlogiston theory before the understanding of oxygen.

At this point, a new paradigm may be proposed, its underlying discoveries almost always being made, Kuhn states, by men who are "either very young or very new to the field whose paradigm they change." But defenders of the old paradigm patch it up with ad hoc fixes, and the battle is joined.

The means by which this battle is waged is central to the thesis because in Kuhn's view, nonrational factors play an essential role. Logic and experiment, says Kuhn, are not sufficient: "The competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be resolved by proofs." In fact the transfer of allegiance from one paradigm to another "is a conversion experience that cannot be forced."

Nor can a new paradigm build on the one it succeeds; it can only supplant it. Science is not the cumulative process portrayed in the textbooks; it is a succession of revolutions, in each of which one conceptual world view is replaced by another. But Kuhn sees no ground for believing that the new paradigm gives a better understanding of the world than did the old. We may, says Kuhn, "have to relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes of paradigm carry scientists and those who learn from them closer and closer to the truth."

Since Kuhn does not permit truth to be a criterion of scientific theories, he would presumably not claim his own theory to be true. But if causing a revolution is the hallmark of a superior paradigm, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* has been a resounding success.

—*Nicholas Wade* © *1977* Science

now view objects so distant that the light that reaches us began its journey 10 billion years ago. The vistas opened by such research are truly cosmic: the detection of events at the far reaches of the universe, of events at the beginning of time, the creation and evolution of galaxies, the birth and death of stars.

In another direction, scientists have begun to peer deeper

into "inner space"—the human body. Genetics continues to puzzle researchers, but there has been some progress. The function of chromosomal DNA as the informational material for heredity has been established. We know the gross structure of DNA, including the pairing of DNA strands portrayed in the famous Watson-Crick double helix. But scientists still don't know what turns a gene "on" and "off." That is, what processes direct genes toward that complex series of steps that culminates in a new organism?

One way to find out is to isolate specific genes and work with them in test tubes. The best way to prepare these genes involves what is popularly known as "gene-splicing," a method based on the 1972 discovery of *restriction enzymes*. These enzymes, of which about 30 are known, split DNA in highly specific ways. Afterwards, one strand of the DNA protrudes beyond the other. The two pieces of the chromosome can be rejoined by what amounts to splicing.

Insoluble Puzzles?

Alternatively, two *different* chromosomes can be split, and then part of one can be spliced onto part of the other to create an entirely new form of DNA. This "recombinant" DNA can be introduced into bacteria; there, biological machinery will produce more of the DNA along with what, for the bacteria, are novel protein products.*

The deepest mysteries in the biomedical sciences surround the workings of the brain. People knew thousands of years ago that extracts from the opium poppy could relieve pain, ease anxiety, produce euphoria, or help bring sleep. During the past five years, scientists have discovered that the human nervous system makes its own opiates, different chemically from those of the poppy but producing similar effects. These substances were found to be *pentapeptides* (compounds formed by the union of five amino acids), and it was a simple matter to improve on nature by synthesizing a variant 50 times more powerful than morphine. Whatever their ultimate therapeutic value, the brain's own opiates may provide a tool for studying the nerve pathways responsible for pain, emotion—even for the thrill of discovery.

The scientific method is most effective, of course, when a

*Concerned about the consequences of such work, the National Institutes of Health in 1976 published guidelines governing recombinant DNA research. The rules provide for separation of altered organisms and require that research take place only on organisms incapable of life outside the laboratory.

problem can be separated into simple, solvable parts. Some biological phenomena are extremely complex; others are virtually inaccessible to observation. One goal that is likely to be approached only slowly for these reasons is control of cancer, which is not one disease but hundreds. Another is genetic engineering; complex ties among the biological systems that control growth guarantee that even minor tinkering remains distant, though not unrealistic. Far less probable is the much-publicized "cloning" of human beings or the extension of our life span much beyond the Biblical three-score-and-ten. Events will surely demonstrate that the answers to some questions are beyond human ingenuity.

Our visitor from 1928 would certainly recognize that problem. He would recognize other things as well, notably that the basic nature of scientific inquiry remains essentially what it was a half-century ago. It is hard work. When new ideas and insights occur, they come from individuals. In general they come from a person who has been immersed in a problem (like Archimedes in his bath when he shouted "Eureka!") and who has wrestled with a set of frustrating puzzles and contradictions until a light dawned.

The individual scientist's quest is still largely driven by the human desire to be the first to explore, the first to reach a new plateau of knowledge. Scientists will endure long periods of struggle and disappointment to enjoy the sudden pleasure of a new insight—followed by the reward of professional acclaim and, more rarely, a Nobel Prize. Do these motives seem impure? Perhaps they are. But the motives will be forgotten; the legacy to science will not.

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DILEMMAS DOWN THE ROAD

by John D. Holmfeld

Since World War II science has become a major claimant on the federal budget; it now involves every federal department, some 45 congressional committees, a score of specialized agencies, about 500 universities, and nearly 2 million scientists, engineers, and technicians—one third of them concentrated in research and development.

If this effort seems diffuse, there are nevertheless some overarching principles. Among them: that the federal government should, in fact, be in the business of supporting science, and that a substantial share of that support should go to the universities. This essentially political consensus underlies the growth of modern American science.

Often forgotten is the fact that the policy of federal support for science in general—and for the universities in particular—is less than four decades old. Like Keynesian economics, which served as a basis for U.S. government economic policy for 40 years until the "stagflation" of the 1970s, some of the general assumptions of federal science policy are now being challenged.

The public and private universities face severe enrollment declines in the 1980s; their scientific endeavors have already been weakened by inflation, and obsolete instruments and facilities have not been replaced. "There is no doubt," reports Charles Kidd of the Association of American Universities, "that academic science has decayed in recent years." Not yet by much, to be sure, but the trends are clear.

Meanwhile, congressmen and agency officials worry about the magnitude and direction of the larger research effort. Should the current diverse pattern of federal subsidies be somehow reshaped to funnel scientists into specific tasks? Recently there have been sizable increases in government outlays for energy and environmental research. At the same time, funds for basic research, which rose by 11 percent annually during the 1960s, are now increasing at a yearly rate of only 5 percent,

thereby encouraging "basic" scientists to go into "applied" fields. Should these trends be further encouraged by Washington? "If we push too far one way," warned Senator Edward Kennedy (D.-Mass.), chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Health, "it could mean loss of cherished scientific freedom; but if we push too far the other way, it could mean investing billions of public dollars on research that remains irrelevant to fundamental human needs."

One of the government's justifications for its support of scientific research is that an advanced society has an obligation, for inspirational or cultural reasons, to maintain the arts and sciences. There is continuing popular interest in such fields as astronomy, oceanography, and physics. Although no one can define what the "right" level of support for science as a cultural activity should be, it is surely exceeded by the present level. In fact, the current level can only be justified in terms of an eventual technological benefit to society.

The Reservoir of Research

The use of tax revenues to pay for scientific research stems from a dramatic change that took place during and immediately after World War II. Prior to that time, the government had fostered little research except in applied fields such as agriculture or in the "mission-related" activities of the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey and other agencies. During the 1920s and '30s, basic research was generally viewed by Washington and the public as the province of the lone, even eccentric scientist—of people like Albert Einstein, whose work in relativity and atomic physics was expected to have little practical benefit. Then came World War II, radar, the proximity fuse, mass-produced penicillin, and the atomic bomb, all growing out of the earlier "impractical" work of generally unknown American scientists.

As a result, the pendulum in the postwar years swung to the opposite extreme, with basic science seen as the key to national security, technological progress, and public health. The cost of this shift was cheerfully borne by Washington. As Vannevar Bush put it in his influential *Science: The Endless Frontier* (1945), "We can no longer count on ravaged Europe as a source of fundamental knowledge." Bush, the Yankee engineer and M.I.T. dean who became President Roosevelt's science adviser, stressed the urgency of replenishing the reservoir of research findings so that society could tap the results for their technological applications. Not all of it would be tapped immediately, he conceded, but most of it would be tapped eventually, even if it

was impossible to say exactly when and where.

With this rationale—prodded further by Sputnik and competition with the Kremlin—Washington embarked on a spectacular expansion of scientific support. From the modest sum of $74 million in 1940, federal science outlays have grown steadily. Last year $14.2 billion was spent in the United States on scientific research, of which $8.1 billion came from federal sources. Some $14.4 billion of the $40.8 billion invested in technological development also came from the government.

To disburse these vast sums there emerged an array of federal agencies: the Atomic Energy Commission (1946), the National Science Foundation (1950), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (1958), and several others. The investment yielded great advances in medicine, physics, space, oceanography, and indeed in every scientific field.

Questioning Dr. Bush's Rationale

In recent years, however, the pendulum has begun to swing back once again—the result of no single issue but of a pervasive sense on Capitol Hill and among the public that our money could be better spent.* In the popular press this is reflected in "horror stories" suggesting frivolous government expenditures on such subjects as "Polynesian Linguistics" or "Basic Labor Productivity Measures for Popular Breakfast Menu Items." But more serious expressions of concern have also been heard.

Some observers doubt that much current research will ever prove useful. Others wonder if basic scientific research will really provide the "best" solution to certain problems. These are not always simply "antiscience" questions; they are not aimed at getting government out of the laboratory. But they do suggest that there may be better ways to allocate science money.

The idea that most scientific research eventually finds a use

*One early manifestation was the Mansfield Amendment to the 1970 Military Appropriations Act. The amendment prohibited the use of defense funds for research that lacked "a direct and apparent relationship to a specific military function." Though no longer in effect, it has had a lasting—and inhibiting—effect on the Defense Department's basic research effort.

John D. Holmfeld, 48, is a staff member of the House Committee on Science and Technology with responsibility for science policy. He received a B.S. in engineering from M.I.T. (1957) and earned a Ph.D. in science, technology, and public policy from Case Western Reserve University (1969). The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the Committee on Science and Technology.

FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
(in billions of constant 1972 dollars)



R&D 'Performers' *



Federal R&D Obligations



Since 1967, total R&D support has slipped 3 percent, with the federal share down by 18 percent (top). The mix of major R&D performers is unchanged (above, left) but the emphases in federally funded research have changed substantially (above, right). Defense and space R&D are down 18 and 50 percent, respectively; civilian R&D, swollen by energy and environmental research, is up 48 percent.

*Excluding federally funded R&D centers and miscellaneous nonprofit research institutes.

BASIC RESEARCH (in constant 1972 dollars)

Federal Obligations by Agency*



Expenditures by Performer†



*U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; National Science Foundation; National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Energy Research and Development Agency (Atomic Energy Commission, prior to 1974); Department of Defense; Department of Agriculture.
†Excluding federally funded R&D centers and miscellaneous nonprofit research institutes.

Dramatic shifts have occurred in federal agencies' basic research funding, with HEW and NSF reaching new highs but all others dropping below earlier peak levels (above, left). Sharpest decline: in the Defense Department. Universities remain the chief performers of basic research (above, right) but their 1976 outlays are 4 percent below those of 1972.

FULL-TIME GRADUATE ENROLLMENT



In 1968–75, total graduate student enrollment in physics, chemistry, and mathematics declined by 30, 21, and 31 percent respectively. First-year enrollments have since picked up slightly in physics and chemistry.

Charts adapted from The State of Academic Science *(New Rochelle, N.Y.: Change Magazine Press, 1977) and* Science Indicators 1976.

was explored by a House subcommittee in 1976. It concluded that although we have an accurate picture of the resources going into the $22 billion federally supported R&D system, "in terms of what, so to speak, comes out the other end of the pipeline, little of a quantitative nature is available." Individual success stories—penicillin, transistors, the ball-point pen—have long served to justify the government's investment. These anecdotes, as one congressman noted, "are of undoubted veracity but of unknown representativeness." In terms of the Bush rationale, the question is whether a large percentage of scientific research placed in the common reservoir of knowledge ever emerges again. Even granting that many findings will contribute to technology indirectly through further advances in basic science, government officials wonder how many studies and papers sink to the bottom of the reservoir without a trace.

A second concern is that basic research may not provide the most effective solution to some major problems. This is especially apparent in the largest government-supported field, biomedical research, long a congressional favorite. Funded chiefly through the U.S. National Institutes of Health, a great deal of biomedical research is based on the notion that once a disease is understood, a cure is near at hand. Proponents of basic research point out that this approach has often been successful, and they note, anecdotally, that if efforts to deal with polio had been concentrated on the development of better iron lungs, progress would have been modest indeed.

Troubled Universities

In cancer research, it is becoming clear that this strategy is, at least for the short term, less effective. Here, prevention—the elimination of carcinogens from our food and environment—would probably save *more* people *sooner* than an eventual cure based on research into the nature of cancer. "We have wiped out smallpox, we have wiped out cholera and typhoid and typhus," one scientist reminded a congressional panel. "We don't know very much about how these diseases are caused, but what we do know is how to prevent them, and that can be something very different."

An alternative strategy would reduce reliance on basic research as the means of solving such problems. At issue is not the value of scientific research per se, but the magnitude of the effort and the need to be selective in the use of the government's money. It is too early to say how—or if—this dilemma will be resolved. But any modifications will certainly affect the current

precarious position of the great research universities, nearly half of whose 150,000 scientists and engineers are working on federally funded research projects with a combined budget of $2.5 billion.

The universities are plagued by problems they can do little about. Enrollments will decline by about 15 percent in the 1980s because the 1950s baby boom is over; the dollar will decline because inflation persists. Universities have already been forced into cutbacks to avoid or eliminate deficits. Graduate enrollments have dropped sharply in physics, mathematics, engineering, and to a lesser extent, chemistry.

These factors have reduced the ability of universities to hire young scientists fresh from their Ph.D. studies. This is the age group that most frequently makes the path-breaking discoveries (physicist Carl Anderson, for example, discovered the positron two years after earning his Ph.D.; he was 27). Now, science departments are overtenured (as high as 70 percent in some fields), and positions may have to be eliminated when the demand for graduate training drops.

Where To Invest?

There is no lack of proposed remedies. Students as well as the federal and state governments are being asked to contribute more to defray the cost of research and education—the latter already subsidized by "overhead" payments on research grants awarded to the universities. There is also pressure within the federal government for subsidies of general university operating costs—a course Congress has hitherto avoided. And Dr. Frank Press, now President Carter's science adviser, urged in 1975 that the traditional close association of teaching and research in the universities be weakened. Young scientists could then be hired not to teach but to do research exclusively in federally sponsored research centers within the universities. Whatever the proposals, the message is clear: both Washington and the research universities are worried about the future.

Basic to the debate is the question of whether the government should continue to invest so heavily in the universities in order to maintain this unique source of research; or whether it should instead place a greater share of its research funds in the hands of, say, industry, or perhaps entirely new types of institutions. In his 1945 report Vannevar Bush had touted the universities as "uniquely qualified" to carry on basic research. Since that time the government-university relationship has come to seem indispensable—and undissoluble. Frank Press ob-

served several years ago that the strength of U.S. science was "directly related to the health of the universities." But Press and others have noted that in its reliance on these institutions, the United States is unique. Other countries employ a more diverse group of institutions. Germany's Max Planck Institutes, which perform specialized research in medicine, chemistry, and physics with government funds, are often cited as an example.

Several recent proposals would shift some research responsibility away from the universities. The most notable was that of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, which has jurisdiction over the National Science Foundation. Pointing out that an increasing number of bright, young scientists were finding employment not in the university but in industry, the committee last year urged an end to NSF's preferential treatment of academic scientists. This proposal was not enacted into law.

However the matter is resolved, the government, looking to the future, must consider how society's needs will be served. University officials often describe the current labyrinthine funding arrangement—with its many sources of money in many different agencies—as a healthy kind of "pluralism." Looking in the direction of research "performers," the government may find pluralism healthy, too.

Less than 40 years ago the science-government relationship underwent a radical change. It may be on the verge of changing once again, as the principle of government support of science —mainly in the universities—comes under increased scrutiny. Even if it does change, we should not forget the resilience of American science, which moved from obscurity to the front rank in scarcely two generations.

BACKGROUND BOOKS

SCIENCE IN AMERICA

The scientists known to the American public today are not inventors like Thomas Edison, Alexander Graham Bell, and the others who became famous in the 19th century for technological innovations. Nor are they discoverers of new principles, like the 20th century's Albert Einstein. They are not leaders of the scientific community who have served as spokesmen in high places—such as Nobel Prize–winning physicist Robert Millikan after World War I and electrical engineer Vannevar Bush after World War II.

In the view of Rae Goodell, today's best-known scientists are those who pop up repeatedly in the media, aggressively seeking "to influence people and policy on science-related subjects—overpopulation, drugs, genetic engineering, nuclear power, pollution, genetics and IQ, food shortages, energy shortages, arms control."

In **The Visible Scientists** (Little, Brown, 1977), Goodell, assistant professor at M.I.T., names seven such scientists recognized largely for their public involvement: Paul Erlich, lepidopterist, who has been trying to halt the population explosion; Nobel chemist Linus Pauling, tireless both as promoter of vitamin C to prevent colds and as agitator for disarmament and world peace; Margaret Mead, for "50 years the people's anthropologist," who has moved from Samoan sexual customs to the "generation gap" to concern for the environment; B. F. Skinner, the "determinist" psychologist, now writing "a behavioral interpretation of my life as a behaviorist"; Carl Sagan, the "Pied Piper of astronomy, captivating youngsters and taxpayers with his 'cosmic overwhelm'"; botanist Barry Commoner, "the Paul Revere of ecology," who has propagandized the public with his books and articles; and Nobel physicist-turned-geneticist William Shockley, whose extreme views on the links between race and intelligence have made him a highly controversial figure.

Less publicized have been the scores of leading scientists who have worked in the laboratories and pushed for private and federal support over the years. The complex story of American science has many threads.

Daniel J. Kevles brings the strands together for one branch of science in his highly readable work, **The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America** (Knopf, 1978).

As Kevles follows physics from its beginnings as a minor element in the "natural philosophy" curriculum in American colleges before the Civil War to its present cosmic eminence, he also chronicles the evolution of federal subsidies for physics. Greatly enlarged for atomic research during World War II ("A Physicist's War," Kevles calls it), the funds available for physics have not continued to expand at anything like the rate of new discoveries in, for example, high energy "particle" physics. Although 6 of 11 Nobel Prizes in physics since 1965 have been won or shared by Americans, federal outlays for basic physics in 1977 totaled less, allowing for inflation, than they did in the Johnson years a decade earlier.

Charles Rosenberg, University of Pennsylvania historian, gives a good sense of how and why other sciences, including biology, medicine, and agronomy, have fared differently in attracting the public's interest and government research money. His essays are collected in **No Other Gods: On Science and American Social Thought** (Johns Hopkins, 1976, cloth; 1978, paper).

For an understanding of the early days of geology in the United States, the book to read is **Exploration and Empire: The Explorer and the Scientist in the Winning of the American West** (Knopf, 1966, cloth; Norton, 1978, paper). Pulitzer Prize-winner William Goetzmann describes the adventures of U.S. Geological Survey employees and other geologists working on their own or for the mining industry as they pushed the U.S. frontier to the Pacific Ocean. Scientific artists preserved a vivid record of what the explorers found as they moved into the mountains and desert canyons beyond the Mississippi in panoramic paintings, topographical maps, cross-sections of such wonders as the Grand Canyon, and biological and zoological drawings. A portfolio of their work is included in Goetzmann's book.

The beginnings of American science's institutional story are told in **The Pursuit of Knowledge in the Early American Republic: American Scientific and Learned Societies from Colonial Times to the Civil War** (Johns Hopkins, 1976). This collection of papers edited by Alexandra Oleson and Sanborn C. Brown describes the establishment of the Royal Society in America, the Philadelphia Academy of Natural Sciences, the Franklin Institute, and other important early centers for the promotion of the sciences from astronomy and botany to zoology.

One of the contributors to the Oleson and Brown book, Sally G. Kohlstedt, has written her own early history (1849–60) of the American Association for the Advancement of Science; **The Formation of the American Scientific Community** (Univ. of Illinois, 1976). She records the efforts of scientists in several fields to disentangle themselves from well-meaning amateurs and establish professional science on a firm footing.

In **Dollars for Research: Science and Its Patrons in Nineteenth-Century America** (Univ. of Washington, 1970), Howard S. Miller analyzes the growth of private subsidies for research in many fields. He credits U.S. Coast Survey Superintendent Alexander Dallas Bache (1806–67) with giving private support of science its early impetus. Legislators lacked scientific understanding and often bungled public appropriations. Private agencies like Boston's Lowell Institute, Bache thought, were wrong in only offering "a bounty for good lectures; we want a bounty for research."

With physicist Joseph Henry, Harvard mathematician Benjamin Peirce and astronomer Benjamin A. Gould, chemists Oliver Wolcott Gibbs and John F. Frazer, Swiss-American zoologist Louis Agassiz, and other occasional members, he formed "The Order of the Scientific Lazzaroni" (named after the poorest class of Neopolitan beggars) to marshal support for research. In 1846, when the Smithsonian Institution was established, Bache became its youngest regent.

An analogue to Miller's history of the private sector's investment in research is A. Hunter Dupree's classic (but out-of-print) **Science in the Federal Government: A History of**

Policies and Activities to 1940 (Harvard, 1957; Harper, 1964). Dupree takes the chronicle of Washington's fitful disbursement of taxpayers' money to scientists up to World War II. His principal interest, however, is in federal science policymaking and how it evolved.

Several practicing scientists extend that policy story from the end of the war through the Sputnik era. One of them, Vannevar Bush, actually *made* policy with the publication in 1945 of **Science: The Endless Frontier: Report to the President on a Program for Scientific Research.** Bush was then director of the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development. His historic report was reissued by the National Science Foundation in 1960 but is no longer available outside libraries. Following Bush's recommendations, information on wartime discoveries was released to private industry; the National Science Foundation was established (1950) following the consolidation and expansion of the National Institutes of Health (1948); and a series of new federally supported programs in basic sciences were begun in U.S. high schools, colleges, and universities.

Recent books by later top-level advisers are **Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology** by James R. Killian, Jr. (M.I.T., 1977) and **A Scientist at the White House: The Private Diary of President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Science and Technology** by George B. Kistiakowsky (Harvard, 1976).

Killian, who had been president of M.I.T. before his appointment, was succeeded by Kistiakowsky, a Harvard professor who had been part of the Los Alamos team; the two men did not always see eye to eye with each other or with the President and Cabinet members. Their memoirs are eloquent on the problems that arise in the marriage of science and politics, including a severe language barrier.

Two excellent narratives that explore the broad implications for Americans of government participation in science, and vice versa, are **The Scientific Estate** by Don K. Price (Harvard, 1965) and Daniel S. Greenberg's **The Politics of Pure Science** (New American Library, 1967). Price, recently retired as head of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, is the much-admired dean of academic analysts of the relationship between science and politics. Greenberg has long been accorded similar esteem among lay science writers.

Price observes that the 1945 Bush report "reversed the traditional policy of the United States in two ways" by persuading universities and private research institutions that they had to ask the government for financial aid and by persuading the government that basic science, as well as applied research, deserved support. But, "Hardly anyone stopped to ask the fundamental question: How is science, with all its new power, to be related to our political purposes and values, and to our economic and constitutional system?"

Lawrence R. Veysey, in his fine historical study **The Emergence of the American University** (Univ. of Chicago, 1965), notes that "'pure scientists' had a great deal to do with the university's development in the late 19th century." And as science shaped the schools, so have the schools shaped American science, Dael Wolfe shows in **The Home of Science: The Role of the University**

(McGraw-Hill, 1972).

The colleges and the government today share the problem of determining research priorities. Both also have a role in safeguarding the public from possible, or proven, harmful side effects of laboratory experimentation.

Recent work in genetics has produced the latest surge of uneasiness. A definitive but rather difficult book about discoveries in this field since German medical researcher Friedrich Miescher's 1869 identification of DNA (he called it nuclein) is **A Century of DNA: A History of the Discovery of the Structure and Function of the Genetic Substance** by Franklin H. Portugal and Jack S. Cohen (M.I.T., 1977).

Less detailed but more than enough for most lay readers is Nicholas Wade's **The Ultimate Experiment: Man-Made Evolution** (Walker, 1977). Wade assesses the possible dangers—especially that of epidemics of new diseases—from current recombinant DNA experiments ("gene-splicing"), in which new forms of cellular life are created. He considers the laboratory controls on them effective, at present.

James P. Watson's **The Double Helix: Being a Personal Account of the Discovery of the Structure of DNA** (New American Library, 1969, paper; Atheneum, 1977, cloth & paper) conveys the excitement of a scientist on the track of something new and startling. The author now heads an important biological laboratory at Cold Spring Harbor, New York. In 1962 he shared the Nobel award for medicine and physiology with his Cambridge University associate Francis Crick and their rival in a research race that came to a close finish, Maurice Wilkins of King's College, London. Engagingly uninhibited, Watson frankly reveals the tensions among researchers working independently toward the same goal. The Englishmen were nonetheless friendly competitors; all hoped to beat out (as they did) Linus Pauling, who was also working on the molecular structure of deoxyribonucleic acid, in California.

One behind-the-scenes rivalry barely hinted at in Watson's book has become a *cause célèbre* for the women's movement. It is the subject of Anne Sayre's **Rosalind Franklin & DNA** (Norton, 1975, cloth; 1978, paper). Franklin, who died in 1958, was a member of the King's College team working alongside Wilkins on DNA. Many geneticists today believe that her work provided the key to the final unraveling of the DNA mystery. But by the time the Nobel committee met, she was forgotten. Sayre's rehabilitation of the King's College laboratory assistant whom Watson calls "Rosy" in his book and consistently puts down ("the best home for a feminist is in another person's lab") is somewhat emotional. But it deserves to be read along with Watson's exuberant account by anyone interested in discerning the true path to the double helix.

EDITOR'S NOTE. *Many scholars of science contributed suggestions for this essay, particularly Nathan Reingold and John Holmfeld. Other ideas or specific titles were recommended by Wilson Center Fellow Ingemar Dörfer, by long-time* Science *magazine staffer John Walsh, and by Winfield Swanson, a medical science writer.*

Inspired in the 1950s by the work of France's Marcel Duchamp (Mona Lisa with moustache), "pop art" is a major movement in modern painting. The subjects chosen by such American artists as Andy Warhol (Campbell's Soup can, Coke bottles) and Roy Lichtenstein (sneakers, lettering) show pop art to be the opposite of popular culture. Pop culture deals in the mass production of "legitimate" artistic genres; pop art takes mass-produced, everyday objects and turns them into "originals."

Popular Culture

The old notion that real culture should never aspire to be popular has itself lately become unpopular, even in the academic world. Despite the strong skepticism of some scholars, many researchers have begun to see "pop culture" (everything from dime novels to Hollywood films and top-40 music) as a kind of Rosetta stone for deciphering the myths, hopes, and fears of American society. "There are two ways of spreading light," Edith Wharton once said, "to be the candle or the mirror that reflects it." Is popular culture a good mirror? Here critics Thomas Cripps, Jeff Greenfield, Arthur Asa Berger, John Cawelti, and Frank McConnell discuss, respectively, the pop culture boom, daytime television, the comic strip, the romantic novel, and blockbuster movies.

THE FOLKLORE OF INDUSTRIAL MAN

by Thomas Cripps

Scholars cannot agree on the nature of "popular culture," but they *do* seem to know its sources.

They point, for example, to a demographic bulge toward the end of the 17th century that restored Europe's population to the high levels of 1348—the year of the Black Death. This emergence of a new mass audience coincided with the first industrial revolution; cheaper printing and increased literacy soon helped nur-

ture the rise of popular literature. By the 18th century, graphic material could be reproduced; by the 20th, so could photographs. And shortly after physics unveiled quantum theory, popular culture made a quantum leap into radio, motion pictures, and television—all promoted with that sophisticated mixture of marketing and salesmanship made possible by the convenient concentration of mankind in cities.

What are we to make of the cultural fruits of this evolution—a peddler's sack filled with everything from *High Noon* and *L'il Abner* to Gothic novels and molded plastic replicas of Dürer's *Praying Hands?*

Intellectuals, except for such occasional mavericks as Gilbert Seldes, author of *The Great Audience* (1950), for many years stood aloof from the marketplaces and bazaars. Rather than studying popular culture as an expression of the values of a vast, otherwise inarticulate population, many critics were offended by its surface excesses: its directness, shrillness, and apparent simplicity. Others shared a contempt for any art that was "available" and "cheap," hence vulnerable to mass taste and easily corruptible.

And yet popularity, by definition, is what the student of popular culture most wishes to understand, and accessibility and cheapness are its generic traits. These popular arts are built on a new sort of creativity that depends for its success on imaginatively repeated and rewoven formulas and archetypes. Thus, through movies, television, the popular novel, and comics the serious critic of popular culture invites us to see reflections of many values and attitudes—the furniture of the mind—of American society.

Whatever their convictions, most scholars in one way or another regard popular culture as, in Marshall McLuhan's apt phrase, "the folklore of industrial man." Before the industrial revolution, the cultivation of faddish tastes was a perquisite of the rich. A rage for "Chinoiserie" followed 16th-century advances in navigation that allowed costly Chinese *objets d'art* to be brought to the bric-a-brac shelves of the rich. In Holland and

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Thomas R. Cripps, 45, is professor of history and coordinator of the graduate program in popular culture at Morgan State University in Baltimore. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Maryland in 1967, and has written numerous television shows and journal articles dealing with TV, movies, and the popular arts. As a Wilson Center Fellow (1976), he began work on the second volume of his history of blacks in the movies. Volume I, Slow Fade to Black: The Negro in American Film, 1900–1942, *was published in 1976.*

CANNED ARTS, PASSIVE MILLIONS

Popular culture has always been unpopular among many intellectuals. Distressed by the stage and literary offerings of his day, Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882) allowed that "my idea of heaven is that there is no melodrama in it at all." One hundred years later critic Paul Goodman assayed the state of the popular arts and found it wanting:

Half the population sees a two-hour drama every week; the radio nightly presents long hours of vaudeville to millions; records beat out music everywhere; there is no measuring the floods of printed matter, merchandising pictures, cartoons, that have, whatever else, an artistic purpose.

Now this sheer quantity itself is the first thing to explain. But the explanation seems to me to be obvious: people are excessively hungry for feeling, for stimulation of torpid routine, for entertainment in boredom, for cathartic release of dammed-up emotional tensions. . . . The life the Americans lead allows little opportunity for initiative, personal expression, in work or politics; there is not enough love or passion anywhere; creative moments are rare. But they are still feeling animals; their tensions accumulate; and they turn to the arts for an outlet.

They are a passive audience; they do not strongly or overtly react, nor do they artistically participate themselves. There is, of course, no point in overtly reacting to a movie-screen or radio; but it is the audience passivity that has made these canned arts become so important. . . .

And this passive reaction is superficial—this is why it is perpetually sought for again. It does not unleash, like the tragic or comic theater of old, a violent purgation of the deepest crises and thwartings, death, lust, scorn. These things are not purged every morning and night. Rather, *the American popular arts provide a continual petty draining off of the tensions nearest the surface.* Their workings can be fairly compared to chewing gum as a means of satisfying an oral yearning for mother love and sustenance.

Reprinted from Creator Spirit Come!: The Literary Essays of Paul Goodman *edited by Taylor Stoehr (New York: Free Life Editions, 1977).*

England, the preindustrial rich risked fortunes on the tulip craze, yet another precursor of popular culture.

More than any other factor, technology gave the middle classes access to culture. The combination of leisure, discretionary income, and books made cheap by advances in printing contributed to the growth of the novel and to making the 19th century the first great age of popular culture. Developments in structural steel, power sources, and transportation led to

world's fairs and, by the 1890s, to professional sports. In the next century, continuing advances in mass-produced color lithography and electronics gave rise to graphic magazine journalism, comic strips, motion pictures, and broadcasting. Symbolic of classless access to popular expression was the generic name of the earliest film theaters, the nickelodeon—a pleasure palace for a nickel.

Boosting Enrollment

And yet, although we are now awash in a great age to which historians might someday give a name (as flattering as "the Renaissance" or as contemptuous as "the Dark Ages"), we know so little that a precise definition of popular culture eludes us. What are its boundaries, its sources, its mythic systems? And what is the secret of its current success as a mode of inquiry on American campuses?

In German universities it is studied as *Trivialliteratur,* and England's University of East Anglia is a center for the study of pop culture. In America, nearly every college makes some gesture toward offering work in the subject, some of them admittedly to bolster declining undergraduate enrollments in, say, "The Victorian Novel." (Just change the title of the course to read "The Victorian Novel in the Movies.") And yet highly motivated students, too, take up popular culture with a brave disregard for consequences to careers or respectability. For them, the top of the heap is the doctoral program in "American Culture" at Bowling Green State University in Ohio. But at least 500 other universities offer work in the field, with the total number of courses approaching 1,000. Still more courses appear under such rubrics as "American Studies," "Mass Media," and even "The Absurd Arts."

The Popular Culture Association—the guild that represents the scholarly community—encourages inquiry so broad as to defy definition. In one recent meeting, an audience heard a prosaic academic paper on the depiction of Jews in silent movies, an analysis of the Wolf Man as tragic hero, and a discourse on matchbook covers. The territory covered by the *Journal of Popular Culture* and the Popular Culture Press is just as extensive, taking up with considerable rigor the iconography of the Coke bottle and the esthetics of the '57 Chevrolet.

If the interests of pop culture scholars are catholic, they are also colloquial. Like a postcard from Atlantic City, a teacher's essay in the *PCA Newsletter* begins: "Thought I'd write you a short account of some Popular Culture curricula reforms occur-

ring on the high school level here in Tempe, Arizona." One almost expects the next sentence to begin: "Some of the guys down at Marge's deli dreamed up this terrific new course. . . ."

This informal devotion to the craft is more refreshing than it is naive, more tolerant than exclusive, and more widespread than parochial. Topics range from ancient folklore to modern myths. Some students invoke the highest standards of traditional scholarship, while others see popular culture as a means of liberating intellectual inquiry from hidebound convention. Social scientists, literary critics, dilettantes, and plain fans share the platform at scholarly meetings. In such an atmosphere, breadth matters more than definition.

No one can say what the future holds for popular culture. Limitless sources of TV, movie, and print production reaching for limitless audiences demand limitless repetitions of formulas, genres, and themes. But as long as purveyors of pop culture speak to the hopes and fears of their audiences, they will continue to produce popular art that can be studied as a mirror of social values—and enjoyed in its own right.

Despite the contempt of many critics, popular culture persists as a lively art and a compelling if unrefined field of inquiry. And if critics still see it as Yeats's rough beast slouching toward Bethlehem to be born, it must be remembered that nowadays to be born again is itself popular.

PASSION ONCE REMOVED

by Jeff Greenfield

About 25 million Americans watch television between the daytime hours of 10 A.M. and 4 P.M. Most of these people are women; most of them are at home; and most of them are regular viewers. What they regularly see are soap operas and game shows—entertainments with far more in common than a mere preference for daylight.

These particular entertainments are the most enduring of broadcast forms, surviving and flourishing despite the fact that

each has been broadcast (on radio or TV) five days a week for more than 40 years. Both play on their viewers' thirst for passion—even vicarious passion—as well as for at least an artificial sense of dramatic peaks in the lives of "real" people like themselves. Whether this occurs through the frenzy of a game show or the never-ending chains of crises confronting the good folk of the soap operas, these daytime dramas work when, and only when, they touch a viewer's concern. And because these shows are as fickle—or as steadfast—as their audiences, to watch the characters on daytime TV is in a way to watch the people watching them.

Of course, for all their similarities, soap operas and game shows, like food and drink, engage the passions differently. The soaps, for example, make an overt dramatic play for the emotions. The game shows must rely on flashing lights and a fantasy environment that grotesquely parodies its own ancestry.

"Real-Life" Crises

In its original incarnations on radio and television, the game show was a *panel* show where erudite guests imparted a mixture of knowledge and wit. But beginning with Louis Cowan's *The $64,000 Question* (1955), the format gradually shifted away from substance—away from the actual game, quiz, or challenge—and toward a combination of glittering prizes (a new car, $20,000 in cash) dangled before ordinary contestants.

The formula remains intact to this day. Flawlessly "typical" contestants—they could be any of us, which is the point—are suddenly given a chance to win big. What we are left with is a blend of reality and fantasy, real people dropped into unreal environments where nothing bad—and possibly much good—can happen.

The soap opera operates in reverse: The people are fictions but the crises they face—and face, and face, and face—are very real. Believability comes not from surrounding ordinary people with glamour, wealth, and prizes but from subjecting imaginary people to "real-life" problems in melodramatic form. In direct contrast to the prime-time evening dramatic series, where every

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Jeff Greenfield, 35, was born in New York City and holds a B.A. from the University of Wisconsin (1964) and an LL.B. from Yale Law School (1967). He has worked as a speechwriter for Robert Kennedy and John Lindsay, and was for six years a political media consultant. His most recent book is Television: The First Fifty Years *(1977).*

episode cries for resolution, the essence of the daytime drama is that there is *no* resolution. As in real life, there is generally only another tunnel at the end of the tunnel.

The soap opera was born not in New York or Hollywood but in Chicago during the early years of network radio. The form was a natural for television, especially in the early days when bulky live cameras and cramped studios forced directors indoors to concentrate on the conversational and the intimate. As early as 1942, a soap called *Last Year's Nest* was telecast in Philadelphia. In 1950, CBS began *The First Hundred Years.* By 1952 such present-day staples as *Love of Life, Search for Tomorrow,* and *The Guiding Light* were on the air.

Exploiting the Taboos

The sheer longevity of these shows is remarkable. On prime-time television, fewer than half of all new shows last out their first year. A show that runs five years or more is exceptional. Yet on daytime TV, there are many shows that have run for more than 20 years. Actresses like Mary Stuart, on *Search for Tomorrow,* have been in the soaps for more than a quarter of a century.

But what has most surprised and in recent years impressed the scoffers—who have smirked at the endless stream of diseases, amnesia attacks, disappearances, adulteries, heartbreaks, divorces, and miscarriages in the soap operas—is the degree to which these dramas have incorporated social change.

As early as 1963, actor George C. Scott recognized that a "sense of growth and continuity has never been developed in broadcast series at all—except, interestingly, in the old radio soap operas." This principle has been extended to television. As in the daily comic strips that inspired them, soap-opera characters grow: They marry, have children, mature, even die. The daytime audience accepts this personal, drawn-out form of drama. Soap operas receive thousands of congratulatory cards and letters when a favorite character "marries"; countless telegrams and sympathy cards are received when a character "dies."

When the restraints imposed by network censors started to loosen, daytime characters began to experience the kinds of problems until recently ignored by prime-time television. On the more contemporary soaps, such as *All My Children* and *The Young and the Restless,* women's lib, antiwar protests, and widespread sexual promiscuity have all been incorporated into the plot line almost as a matter of course. As their partisans, includ-

"THE YOUNG AND THE RESTLESS"

Since 1974, *Daytime TV* magazine has provided plot summaries of network soap operas. The excerpts here are from CBS Television's *The Young and the Restless.*

January . . .

". . . Chris realizes Snapper is Sally's baby's father and falls, resulting in a miscarriage. She doesn't want Snapper to know the truth and has only confided in his mother. Leslie is happy her relationship with Brad is growing. Laurie is trying to win Jed from his wife, without much luck. . . .

February . . .

". . . Leslie returned from her concert tour a success and, with Brad's urging, has bought the restaurant from Sally. Brad and Leslie are engaged. Chris had asked Snapper for a separation for time to think out their problems and decide if he should go to Sally for her baby's sake. Mark Henderson has arrived to finish his internship. Kaye's son Beau has returned home and wants to help his mother. . . .

March . . .

". . . Leslie's restaurant opening is a success, except Laurie is there and brings Brad's old love, Barbara, from Chicago. Brad finally tells Leslie about his past. Chris and Snapper are slowly reconciling as Chris gains her self-respect. Gwen tried to commit suicide when Greg found her with another 'customer.' Kaye finally called AA. Snapper told Greg about Gwen and Greg beat up her boss."

ing writer Dan Wakefield, have noted, the soaps were the first broadcast dramas to touch on adultery, impotence, alcoholism, drug addiction, venereal disease, mastectomies, and other once taboo topics.

Prime time all but excludes expressions of vulnerability in its characters. But the people of Pine Valley and Hawkins Falls—and yes, even of Fernwood in the semi-parody *Mary Hartman, Mary Hartman*—do struggle and fail and learn to live with loss and disappointment and tragedy.

Until the 1970s, networks assumed that the daytime form could not be transplanted to nighttime, when men, teen-agers, and children are a large part of the audience. (The one exception: *Peyton Place.*) But as the '70s began, a number of factors combined to bring daytime into the night.

For one, there was a longing for the traditional values of home and family in the air—and on the air. In 1971, *The Waltons* jumped to the top of the Nielsen ratings, in large measure because of qualities that once would have been associated ex-

clusively with daytime. The show features no gunfights or car chases; there are moments of leisurely, uneventful conversation between the younger and older generations.

It is a curious inversion: Where once daytime TV fled prime time, prime time now copies daytime. The evidence is everywhere, from the success of *The Forsyte Saga* and *Upstairs Downstairs* (soap operas with extra starch) to major television serials like *Rich Man Poor Man, Roots,* and *Captains and Kings.* Spectaculars aside, even a regular offering such as *Family* reflects a soap-opera sense of continuity. The major characters suffer. They have affairs, consider marriage, drop out of school, worry about mortality.

It goes too far to say that daytime dramas are genuinely realistic. The necessities of the form require too many brushes with the kinds of crises that most families would suffer only a few times in a generation. But both soaps and game shows have certainly tried to move television closer to what Paddy Chayefsky called "the marvelous world of the ordinary." What daytime TV has given prime time is the possibility of exploring characters not through the prism of fantasy, but through a focus closer to the way most of us spend our lives. And that is no mean contribution.

TAKING COMICS SERIOUSLY

by Arthur Asa Berger

New art forms are often greeted with derision. Attic tragedy was denounced by conservative Greeks, impressionism by highbrow Parisians. Americans, too, have snubbed new, indigenous art forms. The comics, for example, like jazz music, are a homegrown American product; and like jazz, they were long ignored by "serious" critics.

As critic John Canaday recently noted, the pendulum has now swung to the other extreme: The comics have changed from

"entertainments to be read while lying on the floor" into "sociological testaments for intellectual evaluation." Perhaps the pendulum has swung too far. Where once Mussolini banned *Popeye* for being antifascist, latter-day commentators point to a perverse relationship between Batman and Robin; an oral fixation in husband Dagwood's eating jags in *Blondie*; and (as the government of Finland helpfully pointed out) an apotheosis of "bourgeois" capitalism in *Donald Duck*.

No longer dismissed as trivial, the comics have other feints to parry. Journalists have great sport with academics who "read meaning" into the comics, and the creators of many comic strips vehemently deny that their work is worth fussing over. We are told, constantly, that comics (or film, or television) should be enjoyed and not analyzed—because there is nothing to analyze.

This "know-nothingism" is naive. Like slips of the tongue or dreams, the comics have much to tell us if only we will ask.

One of the first scholarly works to consider the comics was Gilbert Seldes' *The Seven Lively Arts* (1924). Seldes' paen to *Krazy Kat* at once boosted the strip into the comic Olympus and created a cult in its honor back on earth. In *The American Language,* meanwhile, H. L. Mencken began tracing the words and phrases comics have given to English such as "jeep," "wow," and "grr." But until recently, most work in the field was done by non-Americans—Italians in particular—who took the same proprietary attitude toward U.S. comics that Britain's Lord Elgin took toward ancient Greek statuary.

Is a Barnacle a Ship?

The comics themselves are relatively ancient—by pop culture's standards. They have been with us for more than 80 years, and some have been appearing continuously for 50 or 60. *Mutt and Jeff* started in 1907, *The Captain and the Kids* appeared in 1914, *Blondie* in 1930, *Dick Tracy* in 1931. So rich is the heritage that in 1962, cartoonist Jerry Dumas could introduce *Sam's Strip,* a feature that depended for much of its humor on a kind of camp familiarity with the comics of the past.

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

George Herriman's vaudevillian Krazy Kat *(1913). Now hailed as a pop-culture classic, the strip was a commercial failure in its own lifetime.*

Beyond a common affection for the medium, however, cartoonists and scholars approach the comics from different directions. For example, by and large the jokes in the humorous or "bigfoot" funnies are culled from the absurdities of everyday life. To the scholar, this represents a gold mine he can sift for clues to the *Zeitgeist*. To the cartoonist, it represents hours of staring at the ceiling. As Mrs. Thurber would say when she caught her husband in a trance at the dinner table: "James, you're writing again!"

The other kind of comic strip—the serial or narrative adventure stories like *Rip Kirby* or *Apartment 3-G*—relies on a different kind of formula and tells us different kinds of things, both about today's world and the worlds we have lost. Here the problem for the cartoonist is sustaining reader interest over a period of months, and it is solved not by rooting the story in everyday life but by combining fantastic plots with lifelike characters who share the hopes and fears of us all.

Be it through humor or adventure, the comics open a special window onto the past whether they are overtly opinionated (as in *Little Orphan Annie*) or seemingly not opinionated at all (as in *Beetle Bailey*). Indeed, the "value-free" comics may prove the most valuable, for they constitute an implicit record of their audience's attitudes, not an explicit record of their authors'.

It is doubtful, for example, that Richard Outcault intended to leave posterity a record of the tumultuous 1890s when he first penned *The Yellow Kid*. And yet it was inevitable that the waves of immigration and the crowding of laborers into city and factory would leave their mark on his work. And so we find beneath the ostensible humor that the hero of the strip—a strange, bald,

jug-eared youth who always wears a yellow nightshirt—inhabits a squalid slum called Hogan's Alley. It is packed with children who are decidedly not childish: They wear derbies, smoke cigars, and may even be bearded. There is something poignant and heroic about the Kid and his friends; they are the first in a long line of spiritual orphans in the comics.

Unlike Outcault, Harold Gray in *Little Orphan Annie* had no qualms about putting his beliefs on the line. But like Outcault's Kid, Gray's Annie is an orphan, not the least because her philosophy is outworn and outdated. Annie spent over 40 years (beginning in 1924) railing against the direction American society was taking and championing the old, small-town virtues of yesteryear. As James Kehl observed in the *South Atlantic Quarterly*, "she is more than a modern Robin Hood with a heart of gold and a wicked left; she is an outlet for the expression of the political and economic philosophy of her creator and legal guardian, Harold Gray." An extract from a 1945 strip:

> *Annie:* But *why* did some papers and commentators say such terrible things?
>
> *Daddy Warbucks:* Oh, I guess it was fashionable to sneer at "big incomes." They fail to mention that most of those big incomes go to pay everyone's bills and make the load lighter for everyone else. I believe that the more a man makes honestly, the more he helps this country and everybody in it. What I think we need is a lot more million-a-year men! Mighty little *they* can keep anyway.

Consciously or unconsciously, "liberal" or "conservative," the comics *do* speak to the daydreams and ambitions of the many, and they survive only when they do. The comics are a populist institution that depends on a powerful but fickle mass audience. Skeptical newspaper editors are forever "dropping" comics to test their readers' reaction. (When *Prince Valiant* was cut from the *San Francisco Chronicle* last year, the newspaper received over 1,000 phone calls. The strip was restored and the editors apologized on page one.) These men trace their roots back to editor Arthur Brisbane of the *New York Journal*, who in 1910 refused to let cartoonist Harry Hershfield sign his own strip, *Desperate Desmond*, on the grounds that only "newspapermen" could have bylines.

"But my strip appears in the newspapers," argued Hershfield. "Doesn't that make me a newspaperman?"

"Is a barnacle a ship?" Brisbane retorted.

THE KID IS FATHER TO THE COMICS

There is considerable disagreement over when the prototype of the comic strip appeared. Some point to Cleopatra's Needle, others to Trajan's Column, still others to the Bayeux Tapestry. Encyclopedist Maurice Horn suggests that the "first strivings" toward the art form (if it is one) are to be found in Leonardo's *Notebooks*, though it was English illustrator William Hogarth (1697–1764), he adds, who first assembled the elements of text and image "into a single whole."

As far as American comics are concerned, however, there is no dispute. On May 5, 1895, Joseph Pulitzer splashed some yellow ink on a cartoon by Richard Outcault and published the result in his *New York World*. *The Yellow Kid* was an immediate sensation, and, according to cartoon historian Stephen Becker, evoked "that first gentle wave of mass hysteria which accompanies the birth of popular art forms."

The comics survive such occasional hostility because they appeal to a constituency the newspapers will never overrule. To be sure, this may have its drawbacks. *The Gumps*, premier symbol of the "Roaring '20s," declined as the Depression advanced. *Terry and the Pirates* and its unrelievedly cold-warrior outlook sank during Vietnam and détente. Still, dependence on a mass audience can also have its strengths. The same gangster-ridden Depression that weakened *The Gumps* spawned *Dick Tracy*; the tumultuous Vietnam era that toppled *Terry* and angered *Abner's* Al Capp helped to launch Garry Trudeau's irreverent *Doonesbury*.

Mocking Rhetoric

To what kinds of aspirations do the comics appeal? George Herriman's *Krazy Kat* dealt with two themes that emerge continually in the later strips: the triumph of illusion over reality and the victory of rebelliousness over authority.

For 35 years Herriman's willful, anarchistic mouse (Ignatz) threw bricks at a lovesick Krazy Kat who took the bricks as

signs of love. She in turn was pursued by Offissa Pup who tried desperately and to no avail to keep Ignatz behind bars. Herriman's use of shifting, semi-abstract backgrounds and his remarkable rhetoric show the possibilities of the comic art form. Listen to one of Herriman's characters rhapsodize about work:

> Indolence—the sin of the century . . . the error of the era—And labor is so lovely . . . toil so transcendent . . . the witchery of work so wondrous . . . industry looks upon the world with beauty . . . Diligence is a dainty delight . . . Endeavour is an enchanting endowment . . . effort effuses an affluent afflorescent effulgence . . . it is noble to strive, brave to strain, kingly to struggle. . . .

Interestingly, *Krazy Kat*, hailed today as the great comic classic, is more highly regarded now than it was when it was "alive." That it lasted so long was due to the rare intervention of a newspaperman: Publisher William Randolph Hearst so enjoyed the strip that he subsidized its publication for 20 years after it had stopped making money for the Hearst-owned King Features Syndicate.

Some of the other more familiar themes in the comics—the triumph of good over evil, for one—are relative newcomers, arriving with the great adventure strips of the 1930s: *Flash Gordon, Jungle Jim, Secret Agent X-9,* and *Tarzan.* These strips were drawn by master draftsmen like Alex Raymond and Harold Foster and written with skill and imagination (even Dashiell Hammett tried his hand—on *X-9).*

A Fear of Utopia?

In the adventure strips, the good guys always win. We know that Dick Tracy, who in his 47-year career has been maimed, crippled, and shot countless times, will get his man in the end. But there are many recurrent though less obvious themes: a distrust of rationally ordered societies, of technology, of grand visions. Tarzan prefers the jungle to the encroachments of civilization; X-9 takes aim at totalitarian scheming; and Flash Gordon, who relies on space-age gadgetry, must ever contend with dark forces who put that gadgetry to evil ends. In short, the adventure strips reveal a fear of utopia gone awry.

In most strips, these ideas are never spelled out in so many words. In some, however, the political or ideological content, so submerged in *Krazy Kat* or *Flash Gordon,* appears overtly. So it is with *Doonesbury,* our most important new comic strip (though not the most successful commercially; that distinction

DOONESBURY



goes to Dik Browne's *Hagar the Horrible*). Here, the political content is so direct and obvious that the line between comics and political cartoons almost disappears. To the Pulitzer committee which awarded Trudeau a prize for editorial cartooning in 1975 the distinction seems to have already disappeared. Writing social comment under the cover of humor, Trudeau satirizes a number of contemporary figures, ranging from TV correspondents to ex–flower children to Army recruiters. Since his allusions are so immediate, he is a very good guide to the contemporary social scene in America.

Does *Doonesbury* represent the swan song of a dying art form? Some observers think so. They note that many of the adventure strips have been casualties of television, that the syndicates have lagged in developing new talent, and that the edge in innovation has passed from the United States to Latin America, the Philippines, and Japan.

Even if those observers are right, the heritage of eight decades of comic art—and its reflections of our evolving culture—remains. And they may well be wrong: One could as easily interpret the growth of the foreign comic-strip industry as a sign of vigor. The comics are now read by hundreds of millions of people in more than 50 countries. As *Beetle Bailey's* Mort Walker has noted, that's probably the largest number of countries ever to agree on any one thing. That fact alone deserves some scholarly attention.

ROMANCE: THE ONCE AND FUTURE QUEEN

by John Cawelti

Foredestined! *A silken fervor caressed them, a flame consuming beautiful Star Lamont and dashing Captain Troy Stewart in a wave of ripening desire beneath the southern sky.*

Foresworn! *Across a fiery landscape scorched by the fury of slave revolt and the tumult of war—across the oceans and across the years—theirs is a story of surpassing grandeur, from a moment's shipboard encounter through a lifetime of everlasting love.*

Forever!

Everywhere one turns these days the paperback stalls sport torrid scenes of dashing Regency gallants and aggressive, wind-blown ladies embracing hungrily on the storm-swept moors. We are in the midst of a tremendous revival of romantic fiction—the last thing one would have expected from this supposedly cynical, alienated age.

The statistics are striking. Harlequin Books, a paperback series devoted entirely to romance, increased U.S. sales from 14,000 in 1966 to 50 million in 1976. (That same year, Rosemary Rogers' *Wicked Loving Lies* led the Avon Books list with over 3 million copies in print.) By 1977, the Harlequin series alone numbered more than 2,000 different titles. Barbara Cartland, who has contributed more than 200 books (*Punishment of a Vixen,* 1977; *The Temptation of Torilla,* 1977) to the romantic flood, likes to speak of the present not as the age of anxiety but the era of romance.

A romance is a special kind of love story presented in a characteristic style and from a particular point of view. In a way, it is the feminine form of the epic, for where the epic uses what Matthew Arnold called the "grand style" to sing of war and adventure, the romance applies that style to love, courtship, and marriage. Like the epic poet, the romance writer works within a highly formalized tradition that rests on familiar conventions of plot and style—florid language, pseudopoetic rhythms, appeals to destiny, and repetitive epithets ("beautiful Star Lamont"). Everything is larger than life.

The romance is above all a woman's story, the one literary form in which the protagonist and point of view are always feminine. (One exception to this general rule, Erich Segal's 1970 best seller *Love Story,* probably owed much of its extraordinary popularity to the way Segal departed from the romance tradition in this respect while nevertheless remaining faithful to the basic formula.) This feminine perspective explains why, despite its popularity, the love story has been given so little scholarly attention: Most scholars have been men.

Contemporary portrayers of the tender passions can trace their craft back in an unbroken line to at least the middle of the 18th century. By contrast, the Western did not begin until James Fenimore Cooper's first "Leatherstocking" novel in 1823, while there was nothing that could really be called a detective story until Edgar Allen Poe's Dupin tales of the 1840s. Science-fiction enthusiasts claim an ancestry going back to ancient times, but the earliest fantasy with most of the characteristics of modern SF was Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* of 1818. The spy thriller is of even more recent origin, emerging around World War I.

Unedifying Parallels

At least three general categories can be distinguished within the mass of "romantic fiction."

In the Gothics, a plucky heroine is beset by mysterious attackers, fortune hunters, insanity, amnesia, ghosts, or any of numerous other perils before finally being united with the hero. The queen of this genre is Mary Stewart, a topnotch popular writer who ranks with Agatha Christie and Helen MacInnes.

The Harlequin-type romances, on the other hand, are generally peopled by clean, delightful young men and women; even the jealous woman is usually generous and understanding. The characters are incontrovertibly moral; sex before marriage is unthinkable.

Finally, there is the recent phenomenon of so-called "women's fiction" that exploded with the 1972 publication of *The Flame and the Flower* by Kathleen Woodiwiss. In contrast to the Harlequins, these books are set in the past, and are brim-

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ming with rape, adultery, and prostitution—but, oddly, of a rather romantic, idealized kind.

The less edifying male analogue to romantic fiction is pornography, and the historical parallels between the two are striking. Just as the romance tradition originated in the 18th century with writers like Samuel Richardson, so the first modern pornographic work, *Fanny Hill,* was written in the same period and reads in many ways like a burlesque version of Richardson's *Pamela.* The Gothic romances of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, like those of Mrs. Radcliffe (the most popular novelist in England in the 1790s) and "Monk" Lewis, developed the motif of the alien seducer, which was soon reflected pornographically in *The Lustful Turk* (1828). In the 20th century, the proliferation of styles of romantic fiction has been paralleled by a similar elaboration of the types of pornography—thanks in part to the erosion of "anti-smut" laws. At the present time, romance and pornography are among the healthiest segments, in commercial terms, of the American publishing industry.

The Enchanted World

Parodied, ridiculed, or sullied, the romantic formula has nevertheless proved surprisingly durable over the centuries. Whatever the specific genre—Gothic, Harlequin, or "women's fiction"—the story usually begins with the heroine suddenly being thrust into a new situation. This can be a new job or a long voyage. It can be the consequence of death in the family. For Sara Claremont in Roberta Leigh's *Too Young To Love* (1977), it begins with news of her father's remarriage: to a "young and unknown fashion model called Helen who had come to promote British fashions at the Embassy and had also, it seemed, promoted herself to its Ambassador." This initial change of situation pushes the heroine into a state of affairs that is new, uncertain, and fraught with possibilities. The new world the heroine enters might be called the romantic or "enchanted" world, a place where evil and danger lurk—but also where people fall deeply and permanently in love.

Be it a brooding Gothic, a pristine Harlequin, or X-rated "women's fiction," the romance generally begins with the heroine forsaking her old life for an "enchanted world." There she meets her ideal lover. One plot line works to keep the lovers together; another works to keep them apart—until the last few pages.


HEROINE
suddenly is orphaned
becomes a governess
takes South Sea cruise
leaves convent school
takes jet to Europe
and meets HERO who is
contemptuous cavalry officer.
dark and menacing stranger.
wealthy and arrogant misogynist.
dashing Wall Street broker.
tormented, bereaved widower.
She
dislikes him from the start
restrains her ardor
but decides to marry to restore her family's fortune
but succumbs to an irrepressible infatuation
until she realizes he doesn't care about her money
until she finds the secret of the locked room
and eventually
after which she
falls desperately in love. But
she is a poor waif, not of his class
she discovers insanity runs in her family
the hero is killed in Afghanistan
her love is destroyed by a jealous sister
his mistress from the past appears
but chance inheritance gives her a fortune
then it turns out she is adopted
but actually, it was his renegade twin brother
who later begs forgiveness and flies to Australia
but she is loathe to spoil such true bliss
and they live happily ever after.

Here she encounters the hero—invariably older and more experienced than the heroine, as well as handsome, courageous, daring. He is frequently also wealthier and of higher social standing. Often the hero's easy superiority strikes the heroine as a mark of vanity and arrogance—the first of many misunderstandings. Here is how the hero is introduced in Sella Frances Nel's *Destiny Is a Flower* (1973):

> He was tall and slim-hipped, resilient grace being apparent as he slipped his thumbs into the waistband of tan whipcord slacks and surveyed her, almost contemptuously.

If this seems somewhat reminiscent of Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice,* that is not surprising. Austen's novel (1813) is one of the archetypal models for romance fiction.

From the moment of the initial meeting, it is clear that the hero and heroine are ideally matched and strongly attracted to one another. Before long, however, circumstances will conspire to keep them apart. These circumstances usually occupy the entire middle section of a romance and are the chief source of suspense and uncertainty. They invariably involve elements of suspicion, mystery, or unfaithfulness. In Phyllis A. Whitney's *Lost Island* (1970), for example, the heroine has borne the hero a child as a result of a youthful affair. Unfortunately, the hero thinks the child was actually mothered by another woman, his present wife. Though still in love with the heroine, he feels morally obligated to his wife.

Avowals in the Graveyard

The culminating moment of a romance comes when, obstacles surmounted, the heroine and hero avow their love and make plans for marriage. After much suspense, danger, and misunderstanding, the final avowal—as in this typical passage from Sara Craven's *A Gift for a Lion* (1977)—symbolizes a complete and permanent relationship:

> She was really crying now, regret for her own foolishness and lack of trust mingling with relief that she had been so disastrously wrong.
> "Ah no, *cara*." There was no mistaking the tenderness in his voice. "The time for tears is past. I ask you again, Joanna, will you be my wife?"

Many of these final avowal scenes take place in settings with traditional associations of magic and enchantment—caves, dark

ERASTUS BEADLE AND THE DIME NOVEL

Mass-market fiction was born in 1860 in New York City when publisher Erastus Beadle introduced the first in his series of (literally) "Dime Novels"—primarily Westerns and adventure tales for boys. Under the inspired guidance of editor Orville J. Victor, Beadle's total sales between 1860 and 1865 approached 5 million copies; within a decade, thousands of titles were in print. As historian Henry Nash Smith noted in his 1950 classic, Virgin Land, *"an audience for fiction had been discovered that had not previously been known to exist." Said Smith:*

Victor's contribution to Beadle's success was the perfection of formulas that could be used by any number of writers, and the inspired alteration of these formulas according to the changing demands of the market. Victor was what would now be called a born "mass" editor; that is, he had an almost seismographic intuition of the nature, degree, and direction of changes in popular tastes.

Writers on Victor's staff composed at great speed and in unbelievable quantity; many of them could turn out a thousand words an hour for 12 hours at a stretch. Prentiss Ingraham, whose father wrote *The Prince of the House of David,* produced more than 600 novels, besides plays and short stories. He is said to have written a 35,000-word tale on one occasion in a day and a night. Fiction produced in these circumstances virtually takes on the character of automatic writing. The unabashed and systematic use of formulas strips from the writing every vestige of the interest usually sought in works of the imagination; it is entirely subliterary. On the other hand, such work tends to become an objectified mass dream, like the moving pictures, the soap operas, or the comic books that are the present-day equivalents of the Beadle stories. The individual writer abandons his own personality and identifies himself with the reveries of his readers. It is the presumably close fidelity of the Beadle stories to the dream life of a vast inarticulate public that renders them valuable to the social historian and the historian of ideas.

forests, twilight graveyards, midnight beaches—but now the aura of enchantment can be carried over into the light of the day. Often this is done quite literally with two avowal scenes, one in the enchanted place where the lovers' total passion for each other is revealed, and another, later, in a more ordinary place where all misunderstandings are resolved.

When this double avowal appears, the enchanted scene



Both Pride and Prejudice *(1813) and* Isle of Desire *(1977) spring from a common romance tradition, a point emphasized by modern packaging.*

often contains a final misunderstanding that threatens to keep the lovers apart, though they now know that they will be satisfied only with each other; in a poignant interlude, they vow eternal fidelity. Then the final misunderstanding is resolved and the enchanted world rejoins the ordinary world—forever. For even if we know that enchantment is the most ephemeral of phenomena, it seems above all the task of romance to deny this knowledge.

Great Expectations

That, at least, is one basic function of romance. There are others. For instance, the romance also addresses itself to two problems that have traditionally been a part of many women's experience: the legal, economic, and psychological vulnerability that, until recent years, all but the most fortunate women have shared; and the tension between dependence and independence.

Women have always had to cope with the ambiguities of their identities as women and as individuals. Traditional customs and values have dictated that a woman establish a dependent relationship with a male—preferably a husband—and that she find identity in that dependence. As an individual, however, she seeks independence and personal accomplishment. The formulaic structure of romance works to embody a resolution of

this ambiguity by creating a perfect balance. In *Indigo Nights* (1977), Olivia O'Neill spells out this "balance" in a neatly contractual fashion:

> "Will you promise to take me with you wherever you go?"
> "Undoubtedly."
> "Allow me to run my own household and speak to the servants in their own tongue?"
> "Willingly!"
> "And dress as I like?"
> "How can I stop you?"
> "And give me"—she hesitated, blushing a little—"half a dozen children who look just like you?"

Several other factors are involved in the remarkable persistence of the romance tradition. First of all, romances present an idealized picture of basic mores. With their portrayal of an exciting courtship leading to a perfect marriage, they help younger women find relief from the confusions of adolescent sexuality while holding out the hope of a permanent and secure love relationship. Romances also convey some sense of the deep significance of the marital choice, thus helping to perpetuate the patterns of monogamous marriage and domesticity. For older women, romances are perhaps more a mode of escape or accommodation, even a palliative for the dashed expectations raised by romantic fiction in the first place. As feminist critics have pointed out, romances may be supporting cultural stability at a high price: the fostering of excessive expectations about sexual roles and relationships. They are no doubt right. And if current notions of masculinity and femininity, now under heavy feminist attack, change a great deal, the romance may change as well. If it doesn't, it may find itself going the way of the Norse saga or the nickelodeon.

WE ARE NOT ALONE

by Frank D. McConnell

At one point in Graham Greene's *The Confidential Agent,* the hero—a hunted spy—hides out in a movie theater. A nondescript Hollywood romance is on the screen, but the hero discovers in it a significance deeper than any intended by its makers: "It was as if some code of faith or morality had been lost for centuries, and the world was trying to reconstruct it from the unreliable evidence of folk memories and subconscious desires. . . ."

A splendid film critic in his own right, Greene realized that the movie comes closer than any other product of our culture to the happy status of the novel in Victorian England. It is at once attuned to individual human concerns and sensitive to the daydreams of the masses. And, a rarity in this century of lugubriously self-conscious art, the movies are genuinely fun.

That is why they have taken so long to be accepted as a legitimate object of study in the university. American academics, good Calvinists all, have operated for years on the assumption that Kulchur (as poet Ezra Pound contemptuously called it) should hurt, at least a little; that there must be a gulf between esthetics and entertainment. This attitude was concisely captured by the turn-of-the-century wit who said of Wagnerian music, "It's better than it sounds." By contrast, our best "serious" novelists and poets have always understood that we live in a creative and often profoundly humanizing *popular* culture—and that much of this culture is stored on celluloid.

American literature of the 20th century is filled with writers who built their vision of America upon a vision of Hollywood: F. Scott Fitzgerald in *The Last Tycoon,* Norman Mailer in *The Deer Park,* Saul Bellow in *Humboldt's Gift.* Others, like Brock Brower in *The Late Great Creature,* and especially Thomas Pynchon in his towering novel *Gravity's Rainbow,* have begun using not simply the fact but also the basic themes and myths of popular film genres in their work. To understand *Gravity's Rainbow,* for example, it is not sufficient to have a background in modern fiction and physics. One must also understand that his awesome tale, which seeks a refuge in fantasy from the terrors of the

modern city, swings unfailingly and recognizably between the extremes of *King Kong* and *The Wizard of Oz*.

The popular film, of course, is not of value simply because it prepares us to read Brower, Pynchon, and the rest. The serious celluloid fairy-tale genres—science fiction, melodrama, the Western—are much like officially sanctioned myths; their formulas are predictable. At the same time, these formulas undergo subtle shifts with time. To understand these shifts is, in its way, to excavate that mental city we all inhabit privately—and in common.

As Norman Mailer wrote in his 1961 open letter to President Kennedy on the Bay of Pigs invasion: "I can't believe the enormity of your mistake: You invade a country without understanding its music." Substitute "movies" for "music" and one comes close to stating the necessity of understanding film. In movies that catch the popular imagination, we see ourselves as in a funhouse mirror: distorted, yes, but distorted in a way that reveals more than photographic accuracy ever could. For it reveals who—and where—we really are, what we want and want to believe.

A Philadelphia Western

It is widely believed, for example, that our post-Vietnam, post-Watergate mood is one of moderate self-congratulation. But what is the real shape of this mood? How do we, in our film daydreams, project the new confidence in ourselves we think we have earned? Sylvester Stallone's *Rocky* is a film of obsessively unbounded optimism. It insists so strenuously that everything will be all right that we are forced to ask: What is it that we were afraid would go wrong?

The continually implied and finally averted possibility of disaster in *Rocky* is the failure of community. Rocky Balboa is a never-was, a club fighter in the Italian neighborhood of Philadelphia who supplements his scanty fight earnings by breaking bones for the local loan shark; a nobody whose great romance is

with the clerk in the neighborhood pet store, a drab girl named Adrian.

In a bizarre public relations gimmick, Rocky is selected to fight heavyweight champion Apollo Creed on the Fourth of July. The whole community falls in behind him, helps him train, gives him money, lets him pound away on beef carcasses. The night before the fight, Rocky tells Adrian he wants, if not to win, at least to go the full 15 rounds. "If I can do that, I'll know I wasn't just another bum from the neighborhood." He lasts the 15 rounds, losing to Creed only by a split decision. At that moment, bruised, bloodied, exhausted, he is able to tell Adrian, for the first time, "I love you."

Sentimental, of course, but intelligently so. We can trust it because it is so aware of its own sentimentality. Rocky begins as a lonely man trying to be a lonely hero. He discovers that he becomes a hero when he stops being alone. The film is a celebration of the single man who redeems the honor of his town.

It is, in other words, a Western. For in the Western—despite the bitter inversion of such films as *High Noon* (where the town abandons the hero) or *The Magnificent Seven* (in which the Seven are driven from the town they save)—our hopes for the tiny communities of the film West are always, implicitly, our hopes for the larger community in which we all live. Main Street is always Main Street, and *Rocky,* complete with final showdown, simply translates the myths into elementary terms. It tells us that little people can survive—but only if they are faithful to each other.

The Eternal Fairy Tale

George Lucas's *Star Wars* makes the assertion in a different key. Far from simply a science-fiction adventure, this highly self-conscious film is a virtual history of past motifs, situations, and even characteristic bits of dialogue from old Westerns, swashbucklers, war movies, and of course, science-fiction

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BANE OR BOON?

The billion-dollar movie industry depends on an audience of tens of millions to provide the financial margin for experimentation, even failure. But as film historian Kenneth MacGowan pointed out in Behind the Screen, *the mass audience is a double-edged sword:*

Mass production, mass distribution, and mass consumption stamp the motion picture as the only art that had become big business before radio and television—if radio or television can be called an art. The consequences have not been wholesome. Around 1905, the movies were catering to a semi-educated mass audience; many who sat in the store theaters had only just learned to read and some had trouble with the subtitles. Within 10 years, the level of the moviegoer was somewhat higher. Was it high enough to justify the poet Vachel Lindsay when he wrote: "The Man with the Hoe had no spark in his brain. But now a light is blazing"? The bane of American movies, and to a lesser extent those of Europe, India, and Japan, has been catering to a gigantic audience of 50 million or more. It has hindered experiment and put a premium on the universally obvious. Yet there is always the chance that the experimental or the obvious may prove to have universal validity in terms of high emotion. Then we have daring pictures such as *Citizen Kane* and *The Defiant Ones*, or films of the broad and deep appeal of *Brief Encounter* and *The Best Years of Our Lives.*

movies. Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, at least on the celluloid level.

This does not mean that *Star Wars* is "camp"—to use that shibboleth of critics who are excited by popular works they don't understand. Like *Rocky, Star Wars* is an experiment to see if the myths of popular culture have any life left in them. That these myths are still alive is reflected by nothing so much as the movie's phenomenal ($200 million) success—in cold cash, the most successful film in history. And for all its self-consciousness and formula predictability, it is a serious film about the possibility of heroism—not within a community but within our own imagination: Can we still believe in ourselves as heroes?

A hero, after all, is a corny thing to be; a century of psychoanalysis, sociology, and political science has taught us that. But *Star Wars,* great popular myth that it is, reminds us that the corniness of heroism, like that of love or honor, does not render it less important. The real "force" behind the famous *Star Wars* blessing—"May the Force be with you"—is that of fairy tales

and their power to humanize even after we no longer believe in their literal reality.

If *Star Wars* attempts to revivify some of the oldest conventions in the movies, Steven Spielberg's *Close Encounters of the Third Kind* does something more subtle, risky, and important. A resolutely popular myth, it is also an uncanny critique of the relationship between popular mythology and our nostalgia for the sublime—for a desire to believe, as the film's advertising copy says, that We Are Not Alone. Roy Neary, the Indiana electrical worker who sees a UFO and is thereafter compelled to visit the site where the alien visitors will show themselves, is a modern Everyman who in his boredom and confusion has become obsessed by a vision of transcendence—a terrible thing to experience, as St. Paul told us long before director Spielberg got around to it.

But Neary is an Everyman whose vision is itself shaped by the pop mythologies of transcendence that surround us. When we first see him, he is watching television: watching Cecil B. De Mille's *The Ten Commandments*, that earlier translation of miracle into special effects, of transcendence into kitsch. Later, his daughter watches a Bugs Bunny cartoon about invaders from Mars. And in the climactic sequence, when the UFOs land and speak to us, they speak through a lovely, funny jazz fugue, transforming the giant mother ship into a cosmic synthesizer playing the Muzak of the spheres.

The point is not that *Close Encounters* is a pop gospel of transfiguration. It is something better, an examination of our lives as already transcending their own limitations, if only we can understand our own daydreams. We are not alone because we speak to one another—and nowhere at a deeper level than through the mythology of film.

To say this much implies that the hieroglyphics of popular myths are at once naive and highly sophisticated about their own naiveté. For they rediscover the dignity of clichés and tell us again and again what we can never hear too often: We are most human not in despair or self-loathing but in shared laughter and delight—when, indeed, we are having fun.

BACKGROUND BOOKS

POPULAR CULTURE

Books on "popular" or "mass" culture are nearly as numerous as the formula novels, movies, TV shows, comic strips, popular songs, "pop" paintings, and other manifestations of 20th-century life with which they deal. Some are excellent studies. Others are themselves a kind of "pop" scholarship; these are written according to formula, aimed at the college campus. Sometimes they make good reading, but they often are no more nourishing than spun-sugar candy.

Moreover, few broad theoretical studies of the United States' constantly refurbished, repackaged, and recycled mythology are available. Hence, academic specialists often recommend French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss's brilliant but difficult analysis of the mythology and ethnography of South American Indian tribes as background reading.

To date, only two of the four volumes that make up his *Introduction to a Science of Mythology* are available in English translation. (A third is forthcoming.) In the first volume, **The Raw and the Cooked** (Harper, 1969, cloth & paper), Lévi-Strauss writes: "Apart from the fact that the science of myths is still in its infancy, so that its practitioners must consider themselves fortunate to obtain even a few preliminary results ... there does not exist, nor ever will exist, any community or group of communities whose mythology and ethnography ... can be known in their entirety."

The second volume, **From Honey to Ashes** (Harper, 1973, cloth & paper), includes various versions of several myths that recur among different Indian communities. One tells of a "Girl Mad About Honey, Her Base Seducer, and Her Timid Husband." In all of its local variations, this tale of woe underlines the high price paid for nondeferred gratification; suitably modified, the story would do very well for North American daytime TV.

Something slightly akin to Lévi-Strauss's ethnographic scholarship applied to contemporary culture is available in **Mythologies** by Roland Barthes (Hill & Wang, 1972, cloth & paper). But Barthes, a witty Marxist, argues that popular or mass culture does not simply arise out of a community. He sees it as imposed by the Right on the rest of society. His ideological critique covers recent films and literature, wrestling matches, and the (already outdated) art of the striptease.

Popular culture's best ethnography (defined by the *American Heritage Dictionary* as "the social anthropology of primitive tribes") to date may be that offered by Tom Wolfe in **The Pump House Gang** (Farrar, 1968, cloth; Bantam, 1969–77, paper). The people who attract his interest are not passive audiences but members of the media-incited communities that grow up around popular culture fads or celebrities.

In this collection, Wolfe writes vividly about the rituals and codes of *Playboy* creator Hugh Hefner's followers, about the adolescent shop clerks who blossomed into style setters in London's rock-and-clothes-

oriented "noonday underground" of the late 1960s, about the symbiotic relationship between the makers and buyers of "pop art," and much more. His psychedelic style is, of course, characteristic of the New Journalism (itself sometimes regarded as a form of popular culture), which he helped to create.

Arguments rage among academics over the terms "mass" versus "popular" culture. Some writers use the phrases interchangeably. Others more or less define the mass-produced - distributed - consumed product of 20th-century movies, paperbacks, the press, and TV as constituting mass culture. They reserve the term popular culture for folklore and the kind of phenomenon that country music used to be when Appalachian mountain people made it for themselves, long before it spread across all of America and Europe.

Herbert Gans, in **Popular Culture and High Culture: An Analysis and Evaluation of Taste** (Basic Books, 1975, cloth; 1977, paper), has a term of his own. The Columbia University sociologist lumps the mass, the popular, and the high under what he calls "taste cultures," which he defines as encompassing both "values" and "cultural forms": everything from music, art, design, literature, news, "and the media in which they are expressed" to consumer goods "that express aesthetic values or functions, such as furnishings, clothes, appliances."

Many other theoretical (or polemical) books on particular forms of mass and/or popular culture have been published over the past decade. TV is a favorite subject, and Martin Mayer's **About Television** (Harper, 1972) is a good survey, although inevitably some of the shows whose content he discusses, including "That Was the Week That Was," are now off the air.

Studies of popular culture are often packaged in glossy picture books of coffee-table size. A new one is **TV Book: The Ultimate Television Book** edited by Judy Fireman (Workman, 1977, cloth & paper). Not meant to be a critical assessment, it offers a fine photographic history of the medium and an assortment of personal essays, some thoughtful, some entertaining, by such contributors as sportscasters Eleanor Riger and Heywood Hale Broun, talk show host Larry Angelo, critic Michael Arlen, CBS President Richard S. Salant, former FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, and Peter Lubalin, the advertising man who went to Soviet Georgia to film the long-lived elders of Abkhazia eating Dannon yogurt. (He says they loved it.)

In the same format is **The Smithsonian Collection of Newspaper Comics** edited by Bill Blackbeard and Martin Williams (Smithsonian Press/Abrams, 1978, cloth & paper). It is a parade, in black and white and color, of strips from American newspapers, 1896–1976. The characters range from the Katzenjammer Kids (1897) to the Wizard of Id (1964).

A definitive 785-page illustrated reference book is **The World Encyclopedia of Comics** edited by Maurice Horn (Chelsea House, 1976, cloth; Avon, 1970, paper). It includes a short history of world comics, starting with the publication of William Hogarth's **A Harlot's Progress** in 1734, and a brief analytical summary. Horn concludes that "with the comics' growing cultural acceptance," cartoonists, "no longer dismissed as grubby purveyors of mindless entertainment," and their employers "must expect to be called

into account on aesthetic and ethical grounds" like novelists, publishers, playwrights, and filmmakers.

Among the best of the serious studies of the movies are James Monaco's **How To Read A Film: The Art, Technology, Language, History, and Theory of Film and Media** (Oxford, 1977, cloth & paper). Monaco delivers exactly what his title promises, with specifics on everything from lenses to the lingo of the film industry. (A "McGuffin" is Alfred Hitchcock's term for the device or plot element that catches the viewer's attention or "drives the logic of the plot," especially in suspense movies.)

Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings edited by Gerald Mast and Marshall Cohen (Oxford, 1974, cloth & paper) is widely used in college courses. Its well-chosen essays and the editors' commentary are exceptionally readable and recommended for a general audience. A brand-new course book is **Great Film Directors: A Critical Anthology** edited by Leo Braudy and Morris Dickstein (Oxford, 1978, paper). No comparable work is available. It covers 23 major directors. They include Sweden's Ingmar Bergman (*The Seventh Seal,* 1959, as seen by Andrew Sarris and *Persona,* 1965, as seen by Stanley Kauffmann and Susan Sontag); the Spaniard Luis Buñuel (his films from *An Andalusian Dog,* 1928, to *The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie,* 1972, as analyzed by Carlos Fuentes); Vienna-born Fritz Lang (his American films as seen by Graham Greene, Peter Bogdanovich, and François Truffaut).

Jazz, a special form of popular culture, has inspired an enormous literature. The writer always mentioned first among buffs and scholars is Gunther Schuller; his **Early Jazz: Its Roots and Musical Development** (Oxford, 1968) is a basic book. The Jazz Masters series, published by Macmillan under the general editorship of Martin Williams, director of the Smithsonian Jazz Program, includes one volume by Williams, **Jazz Masters of New Orleans** (Macmillan, 1967), that traces the history and relative importance of the tunes, the bands, and the records. It also evokes a strong sense of what the first jazz capital was like in the years when Jelly Roll Morton, who once asserted that he had invented jazz, was a slim young pianist yet to make his first recording (1923) and Louis Armstrong was still known only as "Little Louie."

All in all, the flood of "pop" culture books shows no signs of abating. "Pop" sculpture, 20th-century musical comedies and country music, 19th-century vaudeville, showboat melodramas, penny postcards, and Valentines—all have their interpreters who continue to get into print.

EDITOR'S NOTE. *Help in choosing some of these titles came from Wilson Center Fellows Frank D. McConnell and James J. Lang and former Fellow Thomas Cripps.*

"Living up to our responsibilities" was the caption under this widely reprinted St. Louis Post-Dispatch *cartoon by Fitzpatrick on President Truman's June 1950 decision to send U.S. troops to fight the Communists in Korea.*

Korea and America 1950–1978

Twenty-five years ago this summer, the guns finally fell silent in Korea, ending a bitter 37-month "limited war" that cost 34,000 American lives and engendered fierce political controversy at home. America's Korea veterans are now well into middle age, their efforts against the Chinese and North Korean invaders seldom remembered. But they succeeded in repelling Communist aggression, and the shock of that aggression changed modern American attitudes toward national security. The war's legacy in 1978 includes a big Pentagon budget, a continuing U.S. military commitment to South Korea, and, of late, the unfolding "Koreagate" scandal in Washington. President Carter has vowed to pull out all U.S. ground forces by 1982, while asking Congress for an initial $800 million in compensatory arms aid for Seoul; both proposals stir debate. Here four historians—Samuel Wells, John Wiltz, Robert Griffith, Alonzo Hamby—look back at the war and what it did to America. Retired diplomat Ralph Clough examines the two Koreas today.

THE LESSONS OF THE WAR

by Samuel F. Wells, Jr.

For most Americans over 40, the bitter conflict on the Korean peninsula from 1950 to 1953 evokes memories and lessons that differ from those of other wars. The Korean War had special, ironic qualities from the start. American intervention had little to do with prior U.S. plans or interests in northeast Asia;

the future development of Korea itself was largely irrelevant to many of Washington's critical war decisions; the clash of conventional armies ended amid secret U.S. threats of atomic holocaust. The accepted "lessons of Korea" have changed with each new generation of statesmen and scholars, but Korea is still recognized as a major turning point in the evolution of America's approach to peace and war in the nuclear age.

During the winter of 1949–50, responding to the recent Communist victory in China and the Soviet detonation of an atomic device several years earlier than predicted, President Harry S. Truman and his principal advisers developed a set of austere, clearly defined international policies.

They assumed that the United States would face a protracted but peaceful war of nerves with the Soviet Union and its satellites. They saw the major dangers to the Republic as those of losing our sense of purpose, allowing our economy to stagnate, and accepting Communist penetration of Western Europe. The administration decided to step up the development of a hydrogen bomb to maintain our lead in technology, and it relied on air power to deter Soviet aggression. Added emphasis was put on the new NATO alliance in order to stem Communist political, not military, challenges in France and Italy.

At the Bottom of the List

One broad review of national security policy produced the now-famous NSC-68 memorandum, which called for vastly increased U.S. military preparedness and more aggressive action to break up the Communist bloc. But Truman refused to approve the extra spending required; he ordered his Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, to keep the defense budget under a low $13.5 billion ceiling for the 1951 fiscal year.

In East Asia, the Truman administration decided to encour-

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age the tensions already evident between Moscow and the newly victorious Chinese Communists in Peking. Seeing American interests in the Korean peninsula as minimal, Washington decided to avoid any significant support for the one-man regime of Syngman Rhee in the South. The United States had already pulled its troops out of South Korea by the autumn of 1949. Only an advisory group remained behind. With regard to Soviet intentions, Major General W. E. Todd, director of the Joint Intelligence Group of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that in any ranking of Soviet targets for aggression "Korea would be at the bottom of that list. . . ."

The Acheson Speech

To make all this clear to both friends and adversaries, Secretary of State Dean Acheson spelled out the administration's Asian policy before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950. He defined the United States defensive perimeter as running from the Aleutians through American-occupied Japan and the Ryukyu Islands to the Philippines—a line which, significantly, excluded Taiwan, Indochina, and South Korea.

In an often neglected section of his speech, Acheson emphasized that the recent dominance of the Soviet Union in absorbing large sections of the four northern provinces of China was "the single most significant, most important fact, in the relation of any foreign power with Asia."* He then warned: "We must not undertake to deflect from the Russians to ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and the hatred of the Chinese people which must develop. It would be folly to deflect it to ourselves."

With the North Korean invasion of June 25, 1950 (Washington time), the Truman administration quickly reversed itself. The President committed first air power, then United States troops to help defend South Korea. The American decision to intervene rested on certain assumptions. Despite their awareness of Sino-Soviet friction, Truman, Acheson, and other Washington officials believed that Joseph Stalin and the Politburo not only sought world domination but controlled all major initiatives by Communist bloc governments, including China and

*Acheson mentioned Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Manchuria. Outer Mongolia had been Soviet-dominated since 1921 and declared its independence from China in 1945. In Manchuria, Acheson cited the Soviet-administered Far Eastern Railway. (He cited no specifics regarding Soviet behavior in Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia.) At the time Acheson spoke, Sino-Soviet negotiations were underway which resulted in the Russians relinquishing control of the Far Eastern Railway, and in a Soviet commitment to evacuate Port Arthur in Manchuria.

North Korea. Thus, virtually all the American policymakers assumed in June 1950 that the Kremlin had approved and directed the North Korean invasion.

Today, significant evidence from Soviet and North Korean sources indicates that Stalin had endorsed a limited North Korean military push across the 38th Parallel, but had urged that it come not before November 1950. There is good reason to think that Kim Il-sung, North Korea's strong-minded dictator, launched a larger invasion than Stalin authorized and on his own initiative advanced the schedule. But it is now apparent that Truman and his senior advisers, with a Cold War mindset shared by most Americans, did not perceive such possibilities or seek to exploit any potential differences between Moscow and Pyongyang.

Convinced that the North Korean attack represented a coordinated Communist test of American will, Truman saw little alternative to intervention. In his memoirs, the President recalled his thoughts of how Nazi aggression, unchallenged in the 1930s, had led to World War II. "I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall," he said, "Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores." Despite his inappropriate analogy to the Nazis and his simplistic view of the Communist bloc, Truman's instinctive decision to intervene was sound.

Responding quickly during a Soviet absence, the United Nations Security Council endorsed a resolution condemning the North Korean action as "a breach of peace" and on June 27 called upon all UN members to assist Syngman Rhee's Republic of Korea in repelling the invasion.

Turning the Tide

The big question for the United States, given the weak state of its military forces, was how to help. With North Korean troops advancing rapidly down the peninsula, Truman directed General Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo to provide air and naval support to the South on June 27. Two days later, acting without formal congressional authorization and expecting the conflict to be brief, the President ordered American ground forces to join this UN-sponsored "police action."

Under MacArthur's leadership, American troops turned the tide. Starting from a small, hard-pressed defensive perimeter around the port of Pusan, the general executed a classic envelopment of the North Korean forces with a daring amphibious landing at Inchon—near Seoul, the capital—on September 15.



The map of Korea became a familiar newspaper feature in 1950–53 as the battleline shifted—first south toward Pusan with the North Korean invasion, then north as the U.S. Marines landed at Inchon and retook Seoul, then south again as the Chinese Communists intervened to rout the overextended UN forces, which later counterattacked. By late 1951, the front line had stabilized above the 38th Parallel as truce talks began at Panmunjom. Peak U.S. strength: 302,000 men. Fourteen other nations (including Britain, France, Turkey, Ethiopia, and Colombia) sent 40,000 troops to fight under the UN flag (and U.S. command). The war saw the introduction of U.S. jet fighters in combat, the transport helicopter, the rifleman's nylon armored vest, and Koreans to fill out the ranks of U.S. units.

Within two weeks the Communist armies had been decimated and driven from South Korean territory.

The euphoria of victory then led MacArthur into a fateful miscalculation. Disregarding a warning from Peking that an American advance across the 38th Parallel would bring China into the war, the five-star UN commander stretched his instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who set as his military objective "the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces." To General George C. Marshall, who had become Secretary of Defense on September 21, MacArthur declared: "Unless and until the enemy capitulates, I regard all of Korea open for our military operations."

Truman vs. MacArthur

Against only slight resistance, widely-separated American and South Korean columns drove northward toward the Yalu River during October. Despite new reports of massed Chinese troops poised across the border in Manchuria, MacArthur pushed ahead, and the Joint Chiefs in Washington did not order him to stop. In the last week of October, American troops first encountered Chinese "volunteers." By late November, overwhelming Chinese armies had turned the UN advance into a costly retreat that shocked Washington and led to a major domestic debate over the wisdom of "limited" wars.

The Chinese intervention changed everything. It prevented a UN victory; a costly seesaw struggle led to a military stalemate that stabilized roughly along the 38th Parallel by late 1951.* The common desire of Peking and Moscow to sustain the North Koreans postponed for several years an open Sino-Soviet split. And intense hostility between the United States and the People's Republic of China endured until shortly before President Richard Nixon's dramatic visit to Peking in 1972. The Chinese intervention also led MacArthur, in an effort to restore his military reputation, to challenge both the limited war strategy and the authority of his Commander in Chief. But President Truman, convinced that America's principal danger came in Europe from the Soviet Union, refused to adopt MacArthur's proposals to take the war into Chinese territory. In April 1951, he brusquely fired the great hero of the Pacific war and, in the face of a popular uproar, made it stick.

The Korean War spurred a massive U.S. rearmament effort and a major shift in defense policy. Consistent with its assump-

* See David Douglas Duncan's photo-narrative *This Is War!* (1951) and combat historian S. L. A. Marshall's *The River and the Gauntlet* (1953) and *Pork Chop Hill* (1956).

tions about the war's origins, the Truman administration put the lion's share of its increased defense outlays into programs directed against the Soviet Union. The budget for defense and international affairs climbed from $17.7 billion in fiscal 1950 to $52.6 billion in fiscal 1953. The new departures included the development of tactical nuclear weapons, the rushed construction of numerous air bases at home and overseas, the dispatch of four additional Army divisions to Europe, the rearmament of West Germany within an integrated NATO force, expanded military help for other allies, and the inauguration of a more ambitious economic aid program. A new venture into psychological warfare was launched with the creation of the interagency Psychological Strategy Board in 1951. Covert operations increased, including the recently disclosed CIA mail surveillance (begun in 1952) and the American-supported coups in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala the following year. Additional U.S. commitments in Asia, aimed at containing China, included a pledge to defend Taiwan and sharply increased military aid to the French fighting Ho Chi Minh in Indochina.

An End to Relaxation

As Americans have had further opportunity to learn in recent years, it is much easier to intervene in a small distant country than to withdraw. After the Chinese indicated (via the Soviets) a willingness to discuss terms, truce talks began in July 1951. But peace did not come easily. The Chinese proved to be as uncompromising at the negotiating table as on the battlefield. Differences arose over the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, the compulsory repatriation of prisoners, and Syngman Rhee's efforts to prevent the signing of any agreement. As casualties continued to mount, American opinion turned increasingly against this limited war. Truman's popularity plummeted; the Republicans shrewdly chose Dwight D. Eisenhower, the hero of the European war, as their 1952 presidential candidate and ran him on a platform dedicated, in part, to ending the fighting in Korea. Early in his administration Eisenhower indicated the seriousness of his purpose by conveying through the Indian government a message to Peking: Continued deadlock at the truce talks could lead to American use of atomic weapons against China. With this incentive—possibly enhanced by the death of Stalin in March—negotiations at Panmunjom moved to the signing of an armistice in July 1953.

The most significant immediate results of the Korean War were a vast increase in American defenses against the Soviet

Union and a marked improvement in the power and morale of the NATO alliance. American leaders took a number of lessons from the war. Despite the "no more Koreas" consensus in Washington, Congress demonstrated a new willingness to combat Communist influence wherever it appeared. Under the Eisenhower administration, United States security interests were to be maintained by increased use of covert operations, by a "New Look" military establishment with a much smaller Army, and by greater reliance ("More Bang for the Buck") on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons within a strategy of Massive Retaliation. Never again were U.S. defenses to be reduced to the low pre-Korea level.

The Korean experience also served to bolster the authority of the President in foreign affairs and to increase the weight of national security arguments in public debate. In dealing with a Communist opponent who disregarded the established rules of international conduct, so the thinking went, the President had to have the authority to respond quickly and in kind to undeclared wars and covert operations. Since the Communists would exploit any weakness and would seldom negotiate in good faith, the United States must remain powerful and should never negotiate except from a position of strength. The MacArthur imbroglio showed that civilian authority must (and could) be maintained over the military. The North Korean attack and the Chinese intervention showed the importance of demonstrating the American will to resist Communist aggression. And most citizens agreed that the United States had to pursue a bipartisan approach to vital questions of national security.

History Misread

By 1960, the policy implications of the Korean War had changed significantly. The outcome came to be viewed as a Cold War victory, and American leaders—including the "defense intellectuals" in academe—concluded that limited war could be successfully pursued by a democracy. Democratic politicians noted that Truman had demonstrated the resolve to meet force with force under adverse circumstances; many believed that any successful future president would have to adopt the same firm posture. Generals Maxwell Taylor and James Gavin persuaded President John F. Kennedy that the United States could avoid political difficulties by training Special Forces units for guerrilla warfare and by devoting greater effort to winning and maintaining popular support at home.

But the energetic leaders of the New Frontier, along with

the press, Congress, and most of the public, ignored the crucial differences between Vietnam and Korea. "Controlled escalation" theories so popular in universities could not be applied successfully in Southeast Asia, for the circumstances were strikingly divergent. The Vietnam War in 1961–65 was not a formal military confrontation launched by an invasion across a recognized border, confined to a peninsula, fought by organized armies, and supported by coherent populations on two clearly distinguishable sides. In Korea, a limited military success was possible. In Vietnam, it was not.

THE KOREAN WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY

by John E. Wiltz

In the week before the news flashed around the world that Communist tanks had crashed across the 38th Parallel in Korea, nothing seemed more remote from the minds of the people of the United States than the prospect that within a fortnight tens of thousands of their countrymen might be committed to bloody combat on a rugged peninsula in East Asia.

Brewers were worried about a decline in the consumption of beer, but the national economy in the week of June 18–25, 1950, was nearing the end of its most prosperous six-month period since the Second World War. Indeed, consumers were buying so many automobiles and television sets—largely on credit, a source of concern to Edwin G. Nourse, the former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers—that the food and clothing industries were preparing a campaign to lure people away from auto and TV showrooms by reducing prices. Thomas E. Dewey announced that he would not run for a third term as governor of New York (a decision he would reverse less than three months later); Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R.-Wis.) sought to explain a

payment of $10,000 received from a prefabricated housing manufacturer for an article on housing he had written in 1948 while serving as vice chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Housing.

For the 33rd President of the Republic, the week before the Communist onslaught in Korea was most satisfying. Beneath a headline proclaiming, "The Sun Shines on Harry Again," *Newsweek* declared: "Just in case there was anyone who had forgotten November 1948, Harry S. Truman proved anew last week that it's always too early to count him out. No matter how bad a beating he's taking, he keeps coming back for more, boring in. And he doesn't seem to care how many of the early rounds he loses. In politics it's the last one that counts." Overcoming the conservative coalition of northern Republicans and southern Democrats on Capitol Hill, the President had secured an extension of rent controls and a displaced persons act, making it possible for additional refugees from communism to enter the country, and he seemed on the verge of winning passage of new social security legislation increasing benefits.

Life After Death

Elsewhere, 51-year-old Gloria Swanson continued to move about the country as an advance agent for her much-publicized "comeback" film, *Sunset Boulevard,* and the Cole Brothers Circus, featuring William Boyd (better known to legions of movie fans as Hopalong Cassidy), was preparing for a five-day appearance at New York's Yankee Stadium. A survey released by the *Christian Herald* disclosed that church membership had soared to an all-time high—81,862,328—and that 54 percent of the populace belonged to churches compared with 20 percent in 1880 and 35 percent in 1900. Finally, *Argosy* magazine reported the results of a poll in which 51 newspaper editors were asked to describe the news their readers would most like to see. Word that the Stalinist dictatorship had collapsed and that war had been permanently abolished, so the editors surmised, were the stories that would most gladden Americans. After that, they thought, Americans would like most to read that scientists had

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KOREA: A CHRONOLOGY

1945 U.S. and U.S.S.R. each occupy one half of Korea in accordance with Yalta and Potsdam agreements.

1947 *March* Announcement of Truman Doctrine of resistance to Soviet expansionism; Greece and Turkey get substantial U.S. aid. *June* Secretary of State George C. Marshall calls for a European Recovery Program (the "Marshall Plan").

1948 *February* Communists take power in Czechoslovakia. *July* Communists' Berlin blockade and U.S. airlift begin. *November* Truman re-elected in upset; the Democrats win both houses of Congress.

1949 *April* NATO treaties ratified by Senate. *June* Last U.S. occupation troops withdrawn from Korea.

1950 *January* Alger Hiss convicted of perjury in connection with his prewar membership in the Communist Party; Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivers speech omitting Korea from U.S. interests in Asia. *June* North Koreans invade South. *September* Congress, over Truman's veto, passes the McCarran Act requiring registration of Communists and "front organizations"; Inchon landings; rapid UN advance into North Korea. *October* Gen. MacArthur and Truman meet on Wake Island. *November-December* Chinese intervene in Korea; UN forces retreat; U.S. Marines fight through encirclement from Chosin Reservoir to the sea; Truman declares national emergency; Office of Defense Mobilization established.

1951 *January* Wage and price controls applied; Sen. Robert A. Taft (R.-Ohio) opens major foreign policy debate with harsh attack on administration policies. *April* Truman fires Gen. MacArthur. Gen. Matthew Ridgway takes command of counterattacking UN forces. *June* Draft extended; age limit lowered to 18½. *July* Truce talks begin.

1952 *March* Truman announces he will not run for re-election. *April* President orders government seizure of steel industry to prevent strike, but Supreme Court rules his action unconstitutional. *July* Steel strike ends after 54 days. *October* G.O.P. candidate Dwight Eisenhower says, "I will go to Korea." *November* With 55 percent of vote, Eisenhower elected President over Democrat Adlai Stevenson; G.O.P. also wins narrow congressional majorities.

1953 *February* President Eisenhower ends wage and price controls. *July* Armistice signed at Panmunjom.

found a cure for cancer, that Jesus of Nazareth had returned to earth, and that science had proved the existence of life after death.

Sugar and Nylons

"The news hit the United States like lightning out of a clear sky." So went one report of the initial response of Americans when, on Sunday afternoon, June 25, 1950, broadcasters interrupted regular radio programs—in much the same way as they had done on an epochal Sunday afternoon eight and a half years before—to report the first fragmentary dispatches disclosing that the Communists had invaded South Korea. For tens of millions of Americans whose memories reached back over the previous two decades, the dispatches brought forth visions of doomsday. Clearly the Soviets, who, in the view of most Americans (70 percent according to a Gallup poll taken six months before), were conniving to become "the ruling power of the world," were behind the North Korean attack. Just as the Japanese and the Italians and the Germans had begun their play for world conquest during the 1930s by armed aggression in Manchuria and Ethiopia and Czechoslovakia, so the Soviets were making their play in Korea.

Most of the citizenry grimly approved when President Truman, enjoying a quiet weekend in Independence, Missouri, rushed back to Washington and over the next few days committed American air and naval units and then Army troops to combat in Korea. Columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop seemed to catch the popular mood: "The whole momentous meaning of President Truman's decision to meet force with force in Korea can only be grasped in the light of what would surely have happened if he had decided otherwise. For there can be no doubt that the aggression in Korea was planned as only the first of a whole series of demonstrations of Russian strength and Western weakness, designed to lead to the crumbling of the Western will to resist."

About the only discordant notes came from Senator Robert A. Taft (R.-Ohio), the *Chicago Daily Tribune,* and the American Communist Party. Taft complained that Truman had violated the Constitution by sending American forces into combat without consent of Congress; the *Tribune* charged that the Communist aggression in Korea was an inevitable consequence of a decade of woolly-headed and even treasonous appeasement of the Soviets by the Democrats; and at a rally in Madison Square Garden in New York, some 9,000 Communist Party members

and friends demanded "hands off Korea."

Such broadsides stirred hardly a ripple of interest. The Republic was caught up in a crisis variously called a war, a conflict, and a police action; in the view of 57 percent of the populace, so a Gallup poll revealed, the United States was engaged in the opening round of World War III. In such circumstances a patriotic citizen rallied around the flag—and also looked out for himself.

Fearing that a new period of shortages might be at hand, Americans went on a buying orgy. A special object of their attention was sugar, and sales skyrocketed. A New York housewife who had placed two large orders for sugar in a week explained, "I'm trying to get some before the hoarders buy it all," and in Plainfield, New Jersey, shoppers snatched up six tons of sugar from a single grocery store in four hours. Shortening, canned goods, soaps, and cleaning agents also disappeared from grocery shelves. Scare buyers meanwhile were zeroing in on furniture, bedding, linens, towels, deep freezes, television sets, refrigerators, tires, nylon hosiery, and razor blades; inevitably, scores of thousands of Americans made their way to automobile dealers.

Several department stores took out full-page advertisements in newspapers to appeal to customers to refrain from scare buying. Macy's in New York moralized: "Every decent American should look on hoarding with revulsion! It always plays squarely into the hands of our enemies." But to little avail. Only when fears of an expanded war diminished and hoarders found themselves short of money did the buying binge of 1950 run out of steam.

While scare buyers were making their own special preparations against the possibility that the affair in Korea might escalate into a global crisis, the Truman administration was making preparations of a different sort. Foremost, it was setting in motion a dramatic expansion of the national defense establishment.

Cheering for Taxes

The first action came in the last days of June 1950, at the same time that American air and naval forces were moving into the Korean combat zone. Because the statutory expiration date (June 14, 1950) of the Selective Service Act had already passed, Congress—unanimously in the Senate and with only four dissenting votes in the House of Representatives—extended selective service for a year. Congress also gave the President something he had not requested: the authority to call to active duty,

"Candidate for a back seat" was the title of this July 1950 Christian Science Monitor *cartoon by Carmack.*

with or without their consent, units or individuals of the National Guard and other reserve components.

According to a Gallup poll taken in late August 1950, while hard-pressed United Nations forces in Korea were defending the Pusan perimeter, two-thirds of the citizens believed the United States had not erred in projecting itself into the Korean conflict. Few young men, however, felt much zeal. Or as Major General Lewis B. Hershey, director of the draft, put it, "Everyone wants out; no one wants in." Reservists and National Guardsmen who received orders to report to active duty and had served in World War II complained that it was unfair that they should be summoned in advance of younger men who never had answered a call to the colors. As for young men who were eligible for the draft, they maneuvered as best they could. Many joined the National Guard in the hope that their units would not be ordered into active service; others made sudden decisions to enroll in colleges or universities. Because most draft boards would not take men out of college, they could thus gain security from the draft at least until the following spring, by which time, they hoped, the police action in Korea would be over.

In July 1950, as the rusty selective service mechanism was beginning to turn and reservists were packing duffel bags, President Truman requested an emergency appropriation of $10 billion for the national defense establishment and removal of the

statutory limit of 2,005,882 on the manpower of the armed forces; increased military assistance to the NATO allies and "certain other free nations whose security is vital to our own" (including Taiwan and the French in Indochina); authority to establish priorities and allocations to prevent hoarding and nonessential use of critical materials; curbs on consumer credit for commodity-market speculation; increased taxes to pay the defense bill and restrict inflation; authority to impose price controls and rationing; and authority to make federal loans and guarantees when needed to stimulate military production and stockpile strategic materials.

The response to his proposals on Capitol Hill must have startled the man in the Oval Office. Or perhaps they prompted a sly grin. Republicans as well as Democrats stood and cheered when the clerks completed the reading of his message. In the words of one observer, "Republicans were tripping over Democrats in their eagerness to give President Truman what he thought he needed to win in Korea and prepare for the next Korea, whenever or wherever it might turn out to be."

The words and directives of the President and acts of Congress triggered what the news media called "mobilization." Partial mobilization would have been a more precise term. Semantics aside, the United States was girding itself to meet the challenge in Korea—and a much larger challenge if events came to that. What if the conflict in East Asia should come to an early end? It would make no difference. Or so insisted leaders in Washington. The United States, they emphasized, was committed to a permanent build-up of its armed forces to a level of 3.2 million men and women. Never again would the country drop its guard.

A Grim Sophistication

In the end, one may say that except for those dark weeks at the end of 1950, when it appeared that the Chinese might kick UN forces off the Korean peninsula or, worse, that the combat in East Asia might escalate into World War III, the conflict in Korea from 1950 to 1953 was a frustrating but not particularly traumatic interlude in the life of the people of the United States. About 34,000 Americans died in battle during the 37 months of fighting in Korea—less than a fourth as many as died on the nation's streets and highways during the same period.* Thus, the agony of armed conflict directly touched only a fraction of

* About 46,500 Americans died in combat in Vietnam, 1961–73; there were more than 10,000 additional "non-combat" deaths.—ED.

the citizenry. As for the 1.4 million young men who were tapped by their "friends and neighbors" (so stated the "Greetings" that draftees received when ordered to report to active duty) to serve in the armed forces, a majority of them never heard a shot fired in anger. Nor were more than a small percentage marked by psychological or physical scars when they returned to civilian life. On the contrary, the great majority of men who served in the armed forces from 1950 to 1953 slipped with comparative ease back into their former lifestyles. Nearly a fourth of them took advantage of Public Law 550, the Korean GI Bill of Rights enacted in 1952, to attend college or to receive vocational or job training.

Nor were Americans on the home front unsettled, as they would be a decade and a half later during the conflict in Vietnam, by antiwar students' angry demonstrations and charges that the United States was carrying on an inhumane and indefensible military campaign in East Asia. Throughout the Korean conflict, a majority of Americans remained convinced that their cause in East Asia, however frustrating, was just. And the students? Their most raucous activity came during the spring of 1952, when on campuses from Maine to California young men invaded women's residence halls in celebrated "panty raids."

The Korean conflict nonetheless left its marks on American society. On the plus side, America's participation provided a further economic stimulus and, as a consequence, the level of prosperity reached a new plateau. The MacArthur-Truman controversy of 1951 caused Americans to ponder anew the national tradition of civilian ascendancy over the military; the outcome, it is clear in retrospect, was a decided reinforcement of that tradition. Likewise, the MacArthur-Truman controversy compelled citizens to reconsider time-honored ideas about total victory in war. The result, it seems fair to say, was a certain grim sophistication in the United States about the nature and purpose of armed combat in the nuclear era.

EDITOR'S NOTE. *Mr. Wiltz's essay and those of Mr. Griffith and Mr. Hamby are adapted from longer analyses in* The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective *(The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), an anthology edited by Francis H. Heller for the Harry S. Truman Library Institute for National and International Affairs.*

THE CHILLING EFFECT

by Robert Griffith

The Korean War had an important influence on American politics and culture—less as a force that produced radical departures than as a force that accelerated and heightened processes already underway.

Both the New Deal and World War II unsettled traditional notions about the size and the character of American government. As a result, during the years following World War II American leaders were involved in negotiating a series of arrangements to reconcile competing claims to the government's enormously expanded resources—lower taxes, more social welfare, etc.

The arrangements also involved nonmaterial interests. For example, the impact of World War II and especially the Cold War produced a reordering of the prewar balance between the power of the state and the rights of the people—between the values of national security, on the one hand, and freedom and democracy, on the other. The Korean War influenced the way in which balances were struck in all of these areas.

Since 1947, the Truman administration had been emphasizing the menace of Soviet communism in an attempt to win public support for its foreign policies—the Marshall Plan, NATO, foreign aid. The administration also instituted a tough loyalty-security program, initiated the prosecution of American Communists, and, in general, waved the banner of staunch anti-communism. Conservative critics of the administration took an even more belligerent position, condemning the Democrats for their "softness" on communism both at home and abroad. This conservative attack intensified following the explosion of the Soviet A-bomb, the Communist victory in China, and the arrest of men and women accused of spying for the Soviet Union.*

*Notably Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, who were executed in 1953.

By early 1950 the targets of such charges included even fervent anti-Communists such as Secretary of State Dean Acheson; Senator Joe McCarthy, the politician who best symbolized and exploited the growing anti-Communist climate, was already a figure of national prominence.

It was in this context that the Internal Security Act of 1950, the so-called McCarran Act, had its origins. A bill first introduced in 1947 by Senator Karl E. Mundt (R.-S.D.) and Representative Richard M. Nixon (R.-Calif.) would have required groups labeled as "Communist political organizations" to register the names of their officers and members with the Attorney General. If the organization's leaders failed to do so, it then would become incumbent on individual members to register. The bill passed the House in 1948, but was bottled up in the Senate.

The Red Menace

Following the outbreak of war in Korea, however, Republicans renewed their drive to get the bill enacted, to prove that they were opposed to communism and to suggest, inferentially, that Truman and the Democrats were not. The response—and I believe this provides some gauge of the reaction within Congress to the Korean War—of Democratic liberals in the Senate was to introduce an alternative bill, a substitute for the Mundt-Nixon bill, authorizing the President to declare a national security emergency which would then allow the Attorney General and the FBI to round up and imprison potential subversives and saboteurs. So drastic was the liberals' bill that one White House aide characterized it as a "concentration camp" measure. The final result was a combination including both the "registration" measure introduced by Mundt and Nixon and the "detention" measure sponsored by Senators Paul H. Douglas (D.-Ill.), Hubert Humphrey (D.-Minn.), and other Democratic liberals. This bill passed both the House and the Senate by large margins, was vetoed by President Truman, and was then passed over his veto. The passage of this measure offers dramatic evidence of the way in which the Korean War heightened the ascendancy of national security values and contributed to the temporary erosion of dis-

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sent in Cold War America.*

Finally, and more generally, the war slowed—if it did not halt entirely—domestic reform on the part of the Truman administration, while further strengthening conservative forces. Truman was forced to abandon the remnants of the Fair Deal and to depend more and more on conservatives, both in Congress, where he was now forced to seek accommodation with the southern Democrats, and within his own administration. The emasculation of the Housing Act of 1949 and the shelving of programs for health care and civil rights bore witness to the impact of the Korean War. President Truman's reform agenda would not reappear until the 1960s under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. By then, it seemed, Democratic liberals, like Alice, were running faster and faster in order to only stand still.

PUBLIC OPINION: KOREA AND VIETNAM

by Alonzo L. Hamby

Public opinion polls are neither self-explanatory nor utterly reliable. However, if intelligently managed and interpreted, they can give us insights into popular attitudes vis-à-vis Korea and Vietnam available to students of few other historical periods.

American involvement in both wars began with about the same high level of popular support, but the approval level for Korea fell off much more quickly and sharply than for Vietnam. As late as May 1970, Gallup still found 36 percent approval, a figure comparable to that for Korea throughout 1951. Conversely, the level of *disapproval* shot up much more rapidly for Korea, peaking after about 15 months, then declining percep-

*The Internal Security Act's "registration" provision was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1965; its "detention" provision was never enforced. However, the act's exclusion of immigrants and visitors to the United States if they had any prior affiliation with totalitarian-minded (i.e., Communist) organizations had a "draconian" effect. See David Caute's *The Great Fear* (Simon & Schuster, 1978), pp. 38–39.—ED.

tibly; the level of disapproval for Vietnam increased fairly steadily, but it took nearly five years (until May 1970) to reach Korea's high point of 56 percent.

Such statistics confound one's impressionistic view that opposition to Vietnam was much more widespread.

Part of the answer, no doubt, is that polls seldom gauge the intensity of opinions. Beyond this truism, however, a study of the differing popular reactions to Korea and Vietnam reveals that, in significant respects, the America of the early 1950s possessed a far different political culture than the America of the middle and late '60s.

The contrasts in the nature of the disapproval of the two wars are enormous. Protest against Korea was spearheaded by a political Right outraged by what it considered administration bungling and a no-win policy. Fifteen years later, protest against Vietnam found its spearhead in a political Left outraged by the alleged moral depravity of American foreign policy. Korean War protesters waved the American flag; Vietnam protesters frequently burned it. Disapproval of Korea was encased in a lifestyle characterized by patriotism and conventional moral behavior; disapproval of Vietnam was inextricably tied to a countercultural revolution that defiantly challenged traditional morality. The contrasts seem overwhelming and leave one startled at the velocity with which history has moved in the middle third of the 20th century.

In June 1950, the Cold War was at its peak. The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia was less than two and a half years in the past; the Berlin blockade ended a year earlier; the last 12 months had witnessed the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, the fall of mainland China, detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb, and the American decision to build a hydrogen bomb. Most Americans believed that the grim Stalinist dictatorship was at the head of a worldwide, expansionist totalitarian movement.

Partly as a consequence, the radical Left was in decline. Opponents of the Cold War had failed to present compelling alternatives to the Truman administration's policies. Extending beyond the Communist Party and the various groups of Soviet

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POPULAR SUPPORT FOR TWO WARS AND FOUR PRESIDENTS: ANOTHER VIEW

KOREAN WAR

VIETNAM WAR

The charts above are adapted from John E. Mueller's detailed War, Presidents, and Public Opinion *(John Wiley & Sons, 1973). The key Gallup poll query concerning Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon was: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way (the incumbent) is handling his job as President?" The poll question concerning each war was: "Do you think the United States made a mistake" in going into the war? As Mueller notes, answers to this question do not indicate policy preferences (e.g., escalation or de-escalation). In the aggregate, he suggests, Americans reacted "in similar ways" to both Korea and Vietnam. Yet, Mueller finds, Korea seems to have had "an independent additional impact" on Truman's decline in popularity, while the war in Vietnam shows "no such relation" to Johnson's decline.*

sympathizers, the collapse of the Left included almost every independent radical movement—the various pacifist organizations, the Socialist Party, Wisconsin Progressives, Minnesota Farmer-Laborites, and others prone to oppose foreign military involvements. The energetic, militant, talented "movement" of the '60s had no counterpart during the Korean era. The dominant liberal force was a "vital center" liberalism willing to accept Soviet-American competition as an unhappy fact of life.

This reflected the immediacy of the World War II experience. As a result of that war, Americans were willing to accept the notion that their country must play a major role in world affairs. For many, that idea was made all the more attractive by American dominance of the United Nations. The memory of the disastrous consequences of appeasement was especially vivid; few observers questioned the Munich analogy. The main theme of protest against the Korean involvement was a demand for more vigorous resistance, not for nonresistance.

Two Morality Plays

By the mid-'60s, the political environment of the Korean War appeared to have been turned inside out. The process of détente with the Soviet Union was already underway, most notably with the 1963 nuclear test ban treaty. Munich, and World War II in general, were dim memories. A New Left was in the process of establishing itself as a vigorous force on the fringes of the American political scene and close to the mainstream of the nation's intellectual life. One of its major themes was a revolt against *Pax Americana*. By contrast, the militant Right had been in decline since Eisenhower had established a bland moderation as the dominant tone of Republicanism. McCarthyism was a bad memory, and charges of "socialism" against liberal Democrats had been relegated to the realm of political comedy. The Goldwater fiasco of 1964 was the last hurrah of traditional right-wing Republicanism. The differences between the political culture of the Korean era and that of the Vietnam era were at least as great as the differences between the two wars.

Yet for all these contrasts, Korea and Vietnam display one essential similarity—each war severely damaged and virtually forced out of office an incumbent president.* Each conflict not only stirred voter resentment over war policy but magnified *other* sources of discontent that otherwise might well have been

*Harry S. Truman announced on March 29, 1952, that he would not be a candidate for re-election; Lyndon B. Johnson did the same on March 31, 1968.

overlooked. A Gallup survey taken a month after the 1952 election illustrates this point. Voters who had cast their ballots for Eisenhower were asked to name the issue that had been most important to them in making their decision:

Issue	*All Voters*	*Normally Republican*	*Normally Democratic*	*Independent*
Corruption	42%	45%	35%	40%
Korea	24	21	32	23

Each voter category lists corruption first and Korea second. But one may doubt that the relatively minor scandals of the Truman administration would have loomed so large in the absence of the Korean conflict. One may also doubt that the much-publicized flaws in Lyndon Johnson's personality would have seemed so glaring without Vietnam.

Moreover, one theme united both the right-wing protest against Korea and the left-wing protest against Vietnam. That theme was a tendency to conceive of foreign and military issues in terms of a dualistic moralism—a struggle of absolute good against absolute evil. The result was the reduction of complex questions to the level of a hysterical morality play for the most vocal and visible of protesters during each era. To those who set the tone of the feeling against the Korean involvement, international communism was an absolute peril that had to be stamped out without compromise. To the left-wing protesters of the '60s, America had become the world's oppressor, and guerrilla insurgent movements were the hope of humanity.

Intellectuals may argue that limited wars are inevitable in a nuclear world but, whatever the merits of this viewpoint, they must cope with the fact that wars waged by a democratic society require voluntary popular support. It is difficult to argue with the impulse to keep a conflict as small as possible. But the examples of Korea and Vietnam appear to demonstrate that the American people are unlikely to support extended limited wars that promise neither a decisive victory nor a quick end.

THE TWO KOREAS AND WASHINGTON

by Ralph N. Clough

When the artillery finally stopped firing on July 27, 1953, Korea was a devastated land. The mountains and rice paddies were scarred by trenches and shell holes. Entire villages were erased. Seoul and Pyongyang were partly in ruins. And among the people, the trauma had been profound. The South Koreans had sustained 313,000 battle casualties; more than a million civilians had lost their lives; 2.5 million refugees had fled south from North Korea; and the economy was at a standstill. North Korea had suffered massive destruction and even heavier casualties than the South.

For its part, Washington had demonstrated, at considerable cost, that it would not permit people under its protection to be conquered by Soviet protégés. Similarly, the Soviets and Chinese had shown that they would not allow their communist neighbor to be eliminated.

The South Koreans (with U.S. help) and the North Koreans (with Chinese and Soviet aid) set about rebuilding their battered countries. American G.I.s stood guard with South Korean troops along the new 135-mile-long demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas. They faced the Chinese until 1958, when Peking pulled its divisions back across the Yalu River into Manchuria. Three years later, both the Chinese and the Russians signed defense pacts with North Korea, underlining their determination to maintain a communist buffer state along their borders.

Every American president since Truman has reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea. In 1971, however, the improvement of the South Korean Army convinced President Nixon that fewer American troops would suffice to deter an attack; he withdrew one of two U.S. Army divisions stationed in Korea. President Carter has decided that the remaining 14,000-man Second Division can be safely withdrawn by 1982—provided that the South Koreans get additional arms

to compensate for their relative weakness in tanks and artillery, and that U.S. Air Force squadrons in Korea and ships of the nearby Seventh Fleet remain available to back up the South Korean Army.

Today, 25 years after the signing of the armistice, the two Korean states are much stronger politically, economically, and militarily. They confront each other with undiminished hostility. Each of the interested big powers—China, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States—has far more to lose than to gain by renewed conflict in Korea, yet these countries have so far been unable to translate this common interest into agreements to reduce the risk of war. And Americans, concerned about human rights in Korea and Seoul's efforts to influence Congress by improper means, are reassessing the results, favorable and unfavorable, of their 25-year postwar involvement in Korea.

In constructing a political and economic system after the war, South Korea had an initial advantage in the leadership of Syngman Rhee, a fervently nationalist leader widely known to his countrymen, if not universally supported. For the Americans, Rhee, 78 years old in 1953, was a prickly ally who reinforced his nationalist credentials from time to time by clashing with the United States over critical issues. Opposing the 1951–53 armistice negotiations, for example, he declared:

> The cease-fire talks are meaningless to me. If necessary, Korea will fight on alone . . . to the finish! No least bit of our national territory should remain in Red hands; not a single Korean live a slave's life under Communist domination.

The South Koreans totally lacked the experience necessary to the functioning of a modern democratic state; during 40 years of Japanese rule they had been denied any training in self-government. Rhee and his supporters established a strong presidential regime, overcoming his political foes who sought a parliamentary system. Rhee's arbitrary actions as president—ranging from rigged voting to the midnight arrest of political opponents—made him many enemies. Finally, in 1960, at the age of 85, he was forced to resign in the wake of student riots in Seoul protesting fraudulent elections. With the blessings of Washington, his opponents installed a parliamentary system. But corruption, favoritism, factionalism, economic stagnation, and almost daily street demonstrations led to a military coup in 1961.

The coup leader, General Park Chung-hee, restored civilian

rule, of sorts, in 1963 by resigning from the army to win election as president. He re-established a strong presidential regime, bringing into his government both civilian administrators and ex-military officers, many of them trained in the United States. The Park government followed a pragmatic course, emphasizing political stability and economic growth. By Third World standards, considerable political freedom was allowed: Park's opponents in the 1967 and 1971 elections received as much as 45 percent of the total vote.

In 1972, however, already disturbed by the manifest strength of his opponent in the 1971 elections, Park was shaken by President Nixon's sudden détente with China and his decision to reduce U.S. forces in Korea. Park declared martial law. He made drastic changes in the Constitution, greatly expanding his own powers. He followed up with emergency decrees aimed at throttling dissent. He justified his actions as required, variously, by the changing international situation, the military threat from the north, and the need for unity in conducting negotiations with North Korea. Those negotiations began in 1971–72. A clandestine campaign to buttress support for South Korea in the U.S. Congress also began at this time. It was the beginning of a somber era in Korea's relations with the United States.*

Yet, under Park's rule, South Korea's economy flourished. In the decade from 1965 to 1976 the real GNP more than tripled.† Exports increased at a spectacular 45 percent annually on the average from 1970 to 1976, despite a temporary slowdown in 1975 caused by the rapid rise in oil prices. Export growth, together with ready access to foreign capital, made possible imports of nearly $11 billion in industrial equipment from 1965 to 1976. Expansion of the shipbuilding, steel, petrochemical, and fertilizer industries got top priority.

*According to the U.S. State Department, America's postwar economic aid to South Korea in 1953–77 totaled $5,163 million; military aid was $6,989 million.

†Economic data are taken from the Central Intelligence Agency study *Korea: The Economic Race Between the North and the South* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Document Expediting Project, ER 78-10008, 1978).

Ralph N. Clough, 61, is a Wilson Center Fellow and a retired U.S. diplomat. Born in Seattle, he received his B.A. (1939) at the University of Washington, his M.A. at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (1940). Most of his Foreign Service career was devoted to East Asia, including five trips to South Korea. His books include Deterrence and Defense in Korea: The Role of U.S. Forces *(1976).*

Per capita income increased year by year; income is now more equitably distributed in South Korea than in many other societies, including the United States. Through government support for agricultural prices and other subsidies, the average income of South Korean farm families has been brought up to the urban level—a rarity in Asia and the rest of the world.*

Expansion of heavy industry in South Korea now has a new goal: to catch up with and surpass the North Korean capacity to produce military equipment, and thus to make Seoul less dependent on outside sources. By 1978, local factories produced machine guns and helicopters, and were beginning to turn out 105 mm and 155 mm field artillery, weapons carriers, antiaircraft guns, and small naval craft.

Countless Miracles

In the North, unlike Syngman Rhee, Kim Il-sung was not well known at home or abroad when he returned to Pyongyang with Soviet occupation forces after the Japanese defeat in August 1945. But he soon became chairman of the North Korean Communist Party and subsequently purged his rivals one after the other—the homegrown Korean communists, the pro-Peking faction, and the pro-Moscow faction. He came to rely on members of his own family and a small group of senior officials who had been with him as anti-Japanese fighters in Manchuria. And he sought to bolster his legitimacy by encouraging a "cult of personality" approaching deification.

"The respected and beloved leader Comrade Kim Il-sung is a great thinker and theoretician who founded the guiding idea of the revolution of our era," the official party newspaper *Nodong Shinmun* proclaimed, "a great revolutionary practitioner who has worked countless legendary miracles, a matchless iron-willed brilliant commander who is ever-victorious, and the tenderhearted father of the people who shows warm love for the people of the whole country, embracing them in his broad bosom."

By the early 1960s, Kim had created, with Chinese and Soviet help, a tightly organized Stalinist society, boasting higher levels of both education and industrialization than South Korea. He ran into economic troubles in the mid-'60s, due partly to the temporary suspension of Soviet economic and military aid. Unlike Park, who had chosen to rely on foreign loans and the rapid expansion of exports to fuel South Korea's economic

*Overall, in constant 1975 dollars, South Korean per capita GNP rose from $245 in 1965 to $605 in 1976.

growth, Kim proclaimed the virtues of maximum self-reliance. North Korea's economy lagged behind the South's, in part because Kim focused on the costly expansion of military production. By the mid-'70s, Kim's regime had the capacity to produce complex weapons systems such as tanks and even submarines.

The "Nonaligned" North

In 1971–72, Kim was shocked (like Park Chung-hee) by the willingness of Moscow and Peking to enter into détente with the United States. He was discouraged by the failure of his infiltrating commando teams in the late '60s to instigate popular disorder and rebellion in South Korea. He agreed to a dialogue with Park's government. He also relaxed his policy of self-reliance, ordering factories and machinery from Japan and Western Europe in order to offset South Korea's increasing technological advantage. Kim's timing here was unfortunate: Trapped by the sudden rise in world prices of oil and manufactured goods in 1973–75, North Korea ran up debts of $1.4 billion with noncommunist suppliers—six times its annual hard currency exports—and owed some $1 billion more to communist creditors.

The dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang, begun amid much hopeful speculation in 1971, soon stalled. North Korea reverted to denouncing the Park Chung-hee government as a puppet of the United States. Kim Il-sung proposed (in vain) separate talks with Washington on the withdrawal of U.S. forces, whose presence he considered the principal obstacle to Korea's unification.

By early 1978, Pyongyang had established diplomatic relations with 92 countries and Seoul with 102; 53 nations, notably excluding the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan,* recognized both Koreas. North Korea had also gained membership in the group of "nonaligned" nations, which rejected South Korea's application. In 1973, South Korea abandoned its opposition to the admission of North Korea to the United Nations; Seoul proposed that both be admitted provisionally, pending reunification, but that proposal was rejected by North Korea on the ground that it would perpetuate Korea's division.

For the immediate future, neither significant progress in the dialogue between the two Koreas nor substantial change in the

*But including Austria, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Portugal.

COMPARATIVE MILITARY STRENGTH

NORTH KOREA
(Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

Population: 16,720,000
Total Armed Forces: 500,000
1976 GNP: $8.9 billion
1976 Defense spending: $1 billion (estimated)

Army: 430,000 (2,000 Soviet tanks, mostly T-54/55's, some surface-to-surface missiles)

Navy: 25,000 (10 submarines, former Soviet and Chinese vessels; 7 frigates)

Air Force: 45,000 (630 combat aircraft)

SOUTH KOREA
(Republic of Korea)

Population: 35,200,000
Total Armed Forces: 635,000
1975 GNP: $18.4 billion
1977 Defense spending: $1.8 billion

Army: 560,000 (Approx. 1,000 tanks, mostly U.S. M-47/48's; some surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles)

Navy: 25,000 (16 destroyers and destroyer escorts)

Marines: 20,000

Air Force: 30,000 (335 combat aircraft)

Source: *The Military Balance,* London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977.

rough balance in international recognition obtained between them seems likely. However, South Korea will probably extend its economic lead over the North, which continues to suffer from a shortage of exports needed to pay off its debts and a consequent inability to secure new Western credits. A recent CIA study estimates that South Korea—with a population twice that of North Korea, a large and diversified export industry, and easy access to foreign loans for the import of capital goods—will have a GNP in the early 1980s nearly three times that of the North.

Forgotten Benefits

In arms production, North Korea may still have an edge, although the South will greatly narrow the gap. If the United States makes available the grants and credits for military hardware proposed by President Carter as compensation for the

withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1981–82, Seoul's ground forces should be well equipped in the 1980s to defeat any attempted invasion from the North.

The benefits to American interests from the successful intervention in 1950–53 and subsequent U.S. support of South Korea are now often taken for granted. Yet these benefits are important. Twenty-five years of peace in northeast Asia, ensured by the presence of U.S. forces and an enlightened U.S. policy toward Tokyo, enabled Japan to become a strong industrialized democracy sharing with the United States and Western Europe an interest in an open world of expanding trade, travel, and intercommunication. Continued U.S. involvement in Korea has helped to sustain Japanese confidence in the U.S. defense commitment to Japan, and to ease pressures on Japan to arm itself with nuclear weapons. That commitment, endorsed since 1972 even by Peking, maintains the equilibrium among the big powers in the western Pacific. A growing benefit to the United States is trade. Already South Korea has become the 13th-largest trading partner of the United States; it is one of a very few nations in the world that buys nearly $1 billion worth of wheat, corn, and other farm products from the United States every year.

"Koreagate"

Inevitably, U.S. involvement in Korea has also brought problems. At Capitol Hill hearings on human rights in 1974–75, witnesses and members of Congress objected to continued U.S. military aid to an increasingly repressive government. Strains between Washington and Seoul over this issue were intensified the following year by the revelation that businessman Tongsun Park and other Koreans had tried to build support for South Korea through gifts to members of Congress.

For months, the Department of Justice and several congressional committees have been investigating the ramifications of these activities. The "Koreagate" scandals have produced such antipathy on Capitol Hill that Clement Zablocki, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, expressed doubt that the military aid requested for South Korea by the Carter administration could be approved by Congress this year.

American specialists are divided over what to do about the Korean relationship. Edwin O. Reischauer, former Ambassador to Japan, stresses the danger that Park Chung-hee's continued suppression of political and civil rights may provoke disorder and violence. He urges the U.S. government to threaten to withdraw all U.S. forces if conditions in Korea do not improve.

Analysts within the U.S. government, however, without condoning Park's harsh political methods, see little evidence of widespread disaffection that could threaten his position. They see the South Koreans' rising standard of living and their fear of the North as an effective damper on discontent. Others, such as Donald Zagoria, a specialist in Sino-Soviet affairs at Hunter College, are less concerned about South Korea's domestic politics than about the U.S. stake in its security. Zagoria urges top-level reconsideration of Carter's decision to withdraw U.S. ground forces from Korea. That decision, in his view, undermines Japanese confidence in U.S. steadfastness and creates an unacceptable risk of renewed conflict in Korea.

A Call for Patience

In my view, it is important that we keep our priorities straight. Renewed conflict on the Korean peninsula would be far more damaging than an American failure to persuade or compel the South Korean government to respond fully to American wishes in dealing with "Koreagate" or infringement of human rights. A recent report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Senator John Glenn (D.-Ohio) and the late Senator Hubert Humphrey urges that congressional decisions on military aid be based on the long-term security interests of the United States, not simply linked to the current bribery scandal. The Glenn-Humphrey report calls for assessment of the military balance in Korea and adequate consultation with both Tokyo and Seoul before each phase of the proposed U.S. troop withdrawal. Moreover, the report suggests, "A major diplomatic offensive should be undertaken to try to bring both Koreas to the negotiating table."

Only Seoul and Pyongyang have the power to moderate their mutual hostility. But the big powers can encourage movement toward peace by making clearer their common opposition to the renewal of conflict in Korea. Continuation of past self-restraint on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union in supplying advanced weapons systems to either Korea is important. Beyond that, vigorous and persistent diplomacy by the United States and Japan is needed. Mobilization of world opinion in support of both the admission of the two Koreas to the United Nations and of recognition of both Seoul and Pyongyang by all the big powers may gradually wear down Pyongyang's opposition to these reasonable propositions. As I see it, the principal weakness of the Carter administration's troop reduction plan is that it involves no comprehensive strategy to improve

the prospects for lasting peace.

Placing higher priority on establishing a stable peace in Korea than on making Park Chung-hee's government more democratic should not mean ignoring the repression of human rights in South Korea. In time, American concern for greater freedom and democracy will have an effect. Unlike the harsh society north of the DMZ, South Korean society remains open to the strong influences of the great industrial democracies, especially the United States and Japan. This openness will bring about the evolution of political and judicial systems in Seoul suited to Korean culture and tradition, but more responsive to the popular will than those systems are today. Patience, not pressure, is the appropriate attitude for Americans.

BACKGROUND BOOKS

KOREA

The final entry in Marine Sergeant Martin Russ's diary is dated September 10, 1953, Ascom City, outside of Seoul. The war in Korea was over; he and his comrades were going home after fighting the Chinese and the cold and the mud for 10 months.

"I dare say," Russ writes in **The Last Parallel: A Marine's War Journal** (Rinehart, 1957; Greenwood reprint, 1973) "that most of the men here are glad they went through the past year, and I dare say that most of them would be at a loss if asked why.

"This morning some of the new replacements landed at Inchon and were brought here. . . . They are less fortunate than we who made the varsity and played games in that enlarged playing field, No Man's Land. But they will get the feel of this sad country with its fine people and its awesome mountains."

A problem for most American readers is that few books convey the "feel" of Korea or of the U.S. experience there. The Korean War produced two or three novels but nothing to compare to those from World War I or II, or even, lately, from Vietnam. Russ, a St. Lawrence College dropout who joined the Marines in 1952, provides the best available equivalent of the fictional treatment given to earlier wars by the Ernest Hemingways and the James Joneses.

Korea's history did not, of course, begin with the U.S. entry into the 1950–53 war, although that period undoubtedly marks the beginning of many Americans' recognition of the Koreans as a separate people.

The strategic location of the Korean peninsula meant that from the beginning its inhabitants were often subjugated by outsiders, especially, for centuries, by invaders from the Chinese hinterland. The Chinese ruler Ch'i Tzu in 1122 B.C. subdued Korea's "Nine Barbarian Tribes" and found them "a fierce and ungovernable people," according to Canadian missionary historian James Scarth Gale (1863–1937).

Gale's **History of the Korean People,** first published in the *Korea Mission Field* magazine, 1924–26, and incorporated into Richard Rutt's biography, **James Scarth Gale and his History of the Korean People** (Univ. of Washington, 1972), reads like a romantic epic, with frequent references to what was happening in Europe at the time when Korean courtiers were composing lyric poetry and Korean warriors were fighting the wars that Gale chronicles, century by century. He describes the unification of the kingdoms of Korea in the 7th century and the turbulent period of Mongolian domination in the 13th and 14th centuries when "refugees from all parts of China made their terror-stricken way to Korea." In time Mongol gave way to Ming and Ming to Manchu overlordship. All this while Korea was developing its own distinctive culture.

The first Christian missionary did not arrive until 1836. But by 1866 half the world—Russians, French, British, Americans, Germans—seemed intent on forcing its way into a still closed Korea. During the latter years of the 19th century many foreigners did come in. War broke out between China and Japan—with Japan vic-

torious—and pro-Japanese and anti-Japanese factions emerged within Korea's ruling family. Then in 1895 the anti-Japanese Queen Min was assassinated, and the King and Crown Prince, hidden in sedan chairs, fled from the palace to the Russian legation, where they resided for a year. In 1904 the Russo-Japanese War began. It ended with the Russians' defeat and eclipse in the Far East, followed by the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 and a period of severe repression of the Korean people.

A good picture of the customs that developed in Korea over the centuries is given by Yale anthropologist Cornelius Osgood in **The Koreans and Their Culture** (Ronald Press, 1951). Osgood describes Buddhism and Confucianism as they have evolved and are practiced in 20th-century Korea, and the country's distinctive forms of social organization, its painting, pottery, printing, music, and literature—all Chinese-influenced but clearly Korean.

"It is important to remember," Osgood writes, "that the Koreans speak a language as different from Chinese as is French and that the people still show conspicuous contrasts in temperament, being no more like their neighbors in this respect than the Irish are like the typical Englishman."

Best of the studies of the 1950–53 Korean conflict is David Rees's **Korea: The Limited War** (St. Martin's, 1964, cloth; Penguin, 1970, paper). Out of print since 1976 but still available in libraries, it covers both the U.S. politics and the allied military actions that shaped the progress and outcome of the war.

Rees's prose is not pedantic. (Witness his description of the allies' first recapture of Seoul: "Surrounded by hills blazing with napalm and huge benevolently smiling posters of Stalin and Kim Il-sung, the Stars and Stripes floated over the shattered fifth city of Asia."). The political vulnerability of the Truman administration as the war went on, he writes, reflected the American public's "vast discontent with containment of the Communists." Yet, "rarely in history," Rees concludes, "has a great power sacrificed so much for so little material gain as the United States would do in defending . . . Korea."

The dramatic events in Washington and Korea during the first week of the Communist invasion are reconstructed in Glenn D. Paige's **The Korean Decision, June 24–30, 1950** (Free Press, 1968, cloth & paper).

Veterans of this era provide valuable insights in Paige's volume and in their own books. These include President Truman's **Memoirs, Vol. Two: Years of Trial and Hope** (Doubleday, 1958); General Douglas MacArthur's **Reminiscences** (McGraw-Hill, 1964); Dwight D. Eisenhower's **The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956** (Doubleday, 1963); General Matthew W. Ridgway's **The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge; How All-Out Asian War Was Averted; Why MacArthur Was Dismissed; Why Today's War Objectives Must Be Limited** (Doubleday, 1967); and other recollections by diplomats Dean Acheson, George F. Kennan, and John W. Allison, and by Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins.

The best of the official military histories are those done by the Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History. These include Roy E. Appleman's **South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, June–November 1950** (1961); Walter G. Hermes' **Truce Tent and Fighting Front** (1966); and James F. Schnabel's **Policy and Direction: The**

First Year (1972).

The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953 by Robert Frank Futrell (Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1961) describes the failure of "Operation Strangle" to block enemy supplies, the bombing of the Yalu bridges, and the destruction of North Korea's irrigation dikes, almost at war's end.

Two books that assess the role of Korea in American global thinking are Joyce and Gabriel Kolko's revisionist **The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954** (Harper, 1972, cloth; Pathfinder Press, paper) and Bernard Brodie's **War and Politics** (Macmillan, 1973, cloth & paper). In both books, Korea is one of several subjects discussed.

The Kolkos give it 100 of 716 pages. They probe the antecedents of the June 25, 1950 attack, including both Syngman Rhee's and General MacArthur's roles and intentions at this time and later when the Chinese entered the war. In the Kolkos' view, the symbolic importance of Korea to U.S. policies in Europe determined the reactions of Truman and the State Department throughout the war.

Brodie argues that the constitutional issue involved in Truman's decision to bypass congressional approval of his commitment of troops to help South Korea failed to become a key political question only because of the swiftness of events during the critical first year of the war. By the time the increasingly unpopular American involvement had come to be regarded as "Truman's War," armistice negotiations had begun.

The view from Peking is analyzed by Allen S. Whiting in **China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision To Enter the Korean War** (Macmillan, 1960; Stanford reissue, 1968). This RAND study explores the motivations for China's surprise late 1950 intervention, which was at first cautious and limited. Factors included China's fear of U.S. intentions and its wish to promote Communist revolutions in Asia.

In general, the period since the Korean War ended has not been broadly treated in books suited to general readership. Recent specialized collections are **The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs,** essays edited by William J. Barnds (New York Univ., 1976), and **The Future of the Korean Peninsula,** papers from a conference on Korea and the major powers edited by Young C. Kim and Abraham M. Halpern (Holt, Praeger Special Studies, 1977).

One broader account that does cover the postwar period in readable fashion is Gregory Henderson's overall examination of the Korean political character from its beginnings in the traditional culture 2,000 years before Christ to the mid-1960s. In **Korea: The Politics of the Vortex** (Harvard, 1968), he sums up the situation a decade ago: "If South Koreans lack the cohesiveness and loyalties of previous attachments, they also lack the traditionalism, the resistance to change, the nostalgia that the world of class and feudalism brings. Korean society is an unusually open one."

No major study has yet been done on the less open South Korean society of the 1970s.

EDITOR'S NOTE. *Ralph Clough and Samuel F. Wells provided advice on this selection of background reading. Additional recommendations were made by Donald P. Gregg, who served as special assistant to the U.S. Ambassador in Seoul, 1973–75.*

CURRENT BOOKS

FELLOWS' CHOICE

Recent titles selected and reviewed by Fellows of the Wilson Center

CHINESE SHADOWS
by Simon Leys
Viking, 1977
Penguin, 1978
220 pp. $10 cloth
$2.50 paper
L of C 77-23175
L of C 77-15419 pbk
ISBN 0-670-21918-5
ISBN 0-14-004787-5 pbk

A brilliant and controversial portrait of the New China, *Ombres chinoises* was published in 1974 by the Belgian Sinologist Pierre Ryckmans, who writes under the pseudonym Simon Leys. The translation includes a 1976 foreword in which the author states that "the pessimism that emanates from this book derives precisely from the unreality of its subject." Much of the text describes the Maoist gerontocrats (in this it is like Milovan Djilas's 1957 *The New Class,* also a grim portrait of Communist Party leaders long in power). Based on this reviewer's impressions of China in 1977 after a 30-year absence, Leys' shadows are *too* dark and distort the picture. But then, according to a Chinese maxim, which he quotes, "In a thousand observations, the wise man may make one that is foolish and the fool one that is wise." Leys is no fool, but a fine writer and a wise man who makes some exaggerated remarks.

—Joseph S. Sebes, S.J. ('77)

THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR: Sexual Arrangements and Human Malaise
by Dorothy Dinnerstein
Harper, 1976, 288 pp.
$10.95 cloth, $3.95 paper
L of C 72-23879
ISBN 0-06-011047-3
ISBN 0-06-090587-5 pbk

Every decade or so, a few books come along that have the originality and force to change the way we have been interpreting the past and imagining the future. *The Mermaid and the Minotaur,* not widely reviewed and dependent so far on scholarly and/or feminist word of mouth, may become such a book. Psychologist Dorothy Dinnerstein argues that since both boys and girls are raised by women in most cultures, children associate their visceral, vulnerable emotions solely with women, whose overwhelming care and power they experience before they are able even to speak. They see men, whom they experience later or at a greater distance, as more rational, more properly connected to and in command of the outside (adult) world. The

consequences include not only a continued fear of the power of women but also suppression both of women's full range of human talents and of men's nurturing qualities (as well as an exaggeration of overintellectualized or violent behavior as a way to prove masculinity and adulthood). The subservient versus dominant model that has arisen may have created a profound pattern for other divisions based on race and class. Rescuing Freudian (and other) insights from their swamp of biological determinism, Dinnerstein documents the long-term dangers of our current gender-based political structure and describes the evolutionary and revolutionary potential for rearranging it. For starters, she believes that the long dependency unique to young humans no longer has to be the primary, often unilateral, responsibility of women.

—Gloria Steinem

ECONOMIC POLICY BEYOND THE HEADLINES
by George P. Shultz and Kenneth W. Dam
Norton, 1978, 225 pp. $8.95
L of C 77-17981
ISBN 0-393-05674-0

Economics and politics meet somewhere between the unreal world of newspaper headlines and the jargon of professional journals. It is in this space that economics professor George Shultz (former Secretary of Labor, director of the Office of Management and Budget, Secretary of the Treasury, and assistant to the President in charge of the Council on Economic Policy, 1969–74) and Kenneth Dam (deputy to Shultz and executive director of the CEP) end some of the mystery of how economic policy gets made in the real world. They explore such aspects of "political economy" as the "driving and relentless interplay between equity and efficiency" in domestic and international policymaking, and the surprising interconnections among very different policy issues. Shultz and Dam are sharp observers of Washington wheelers and dealers, especially in such policy areas as income security, international trade, and taxes ("we all pay taxes, but . . . tax policy is dominated by the specialist and the interest group"). They provide a clear explanation of why and how the instruments of economic policy are often misused.

—Edward Clarke

ARDISTAN AND DJINNISTAN

IN THE DESERT

WINNETOU

by Karl May
Seabury Press, 1977, 654 pp. $12.95; 411 pp. $10.95; and 749 pp. $13.95, respectively
L of C nos. 77-12605, 77-13037, and 77-14342
ISBNs 0-8164-9316-2, 0-8164-9290-5, and 0-8164-9306-5

Ask anyone from Germany, Scandinavia, or Eastern Europe, particularly those who grew up before World War II, where they first learned about the American West or the Arab Middle East, and they will almost certainly reply, "from Karl May." A favorite of the youthful Albert Einstein, still very popular in Europe, translated into 22 languages, and the subject of many scholarly monographs in German, May (1842–1912) remains virtually unknown in the English-speaking world. Certainly his work is a remarkable and durable example of popular literature. In over 70 adventure novels, he vividly describes strange and exotic places that he never visited. For most adult readers, one May will be enough. The language seems rather clumsy. But the stories move rapidly, and at least one contemporary teen-ager read these three newly translated yarns with enthusiasm. May's heroes constantly get into apparently impossible situations and out of them in ingenious and plausible ways. The books are full of what seems to be accurate local color, Indian ceremonies, Bedouin customs, and the like. Both the Bedouin and the Indians of the American West tend to be idealized. Technology and violence are depreciated; many villains are knocked down, but few are shot and killed. Karl May, in short, is a lot better than most television—and readers may learn from him how to skin a buffalo, too.

—Walter M. Pintner

A CHANCE TO LEARN: The History of Race and Education in the United States

by Meyer Weinberg
Cambridge, 1977, 471 pp. $27.50 cloth, $6.95 paper
L of C 76-4235
ISBN 0-521-21303-7
ISBN 0-521-29128-3 pbk

The details vary, but similar patterns emerge in Meyer Weinberg's meticulous history of discrimination against blacks, Mexican-Americans, Indians, and Puerto Ricans in American education through the 1960s. Simple neglect or outright exclusion from schools is followed by admission to separate and woefully inadequate facilities; minority cultures are sometimes ignored in the classroom but more often demeaned. Separate schools for minority children were never designed to be equal—nor could they be. As Frederick Douglass put it in 1872, they created "a system

that exalts one class and debases another." Not until the 1954 Supreme Court decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* did integration become official policy. And even as this is being written, official policy and reality often remain widely separated. Weinberg, editor of the journal *Integrated Education* and for decades an active foe of racial discrimination, makes no effort to disguise his own sympathies. But he has not written a political tract. This carefully documented account deserves to be widely read not only by historians of American education but also by those who seek the origins of a problem as contemporary as the *Bakke* case.

—Harold Woodman ('77)

A HEALTHY STATE: An International Perspective on the Crisis in United States Medical Care
by Victor W. and Ruth Sidel
Pantheon, 1978
347 pp. $10.95
L of C 77-5196
ISBN 0-394-40760-1

The United States spent more than $139 billion on health and medical care in 1976, or $638 per citizen, making its investment in prevention and cure of illness the highest per capita in the world. Yet the nation ranks low by international standards in terms of results (19th in male life expectancy, four years less than Sweden; 15th in infant mortality, with a rate 80 percent higher than that of Sweden). The Sidels—he is chairman of the Department of Social Medicine at New York's Montefiore Hospital, she is a social worker—competently describe the financial disarray and medical shortcomings of the U.S. health care system. They then compare its history and organization with those of counterparts in Sweden, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. Because they clearly favor a state-run system, they at times seem to suspend critical judgment; for example, they ignore the Soviet Union's recent rise in infant mortality from 22.9 deaths per 1,000 in 1971 to an estimated 31 per 1,000 in 1976, twice the present U.S. rate. Their own proposal for a comprehensive U.S. national health service includes: greater availability of medical services, no direct financial burdens on the ill, community participation, improved planning, and more stress on preventive medicine.

—Christopher Davis ('77)

NEW TITLES

History

DIARY OF MY TRAVELS IN AMERICA
by Louis-Philippe, King of France, 1830–1848; Preface by Henry Steele Commager
Delacorte, 1977
202 pp. $14.95
L of C No. 77-23955
ISBN: 0-440-01844-7

France supplied several chroniclers of life in the nation-in-the-rough that was the United States in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Following Crèvecoeur and Brissot but preceding Tocqueville was a young Bourbon prince, Louis-Philippe, Duc d'Orléans, who in 1830 became his country's king. Banished to America during the French Revolution, and lacking the funds to keep up with Philadelphia's high society, Louis-Philippe in 1797, at the age of 23, set out on horseback to explore the country. He went as far south as New Orleans, as far west as the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, and as far north as Portland, Maine. Only a fraction of the journal he kept remains. What survives is in part a travelers' guide to country inns and roads, in part the musings of a homesick young Frenchman ("A landscape cannot be beautiful where there are only trees"). Pluck, humor, and an aristocratic sensibility flavor his observations. Westward migrants were "the most villainous breed of men I have ever come across .... crude, lazy, and inhospitable to an extreme." Cherokee tribesmen looked "as Capuchin monks would . . . if they let the hair grow inside their aureoles."

ANYANG
by Li Chi
Univ. of Wash., 1978
304 pp. $25
L of C 75-40873
ISBN 0-295490-5

At the turn of this century, Chinese antiquarians discovered "oracle bones" (tortoise shells on which diviners asked questions of the gods) near Anyang in Honan Province. During the drought of 1920, hunger spurred village diggers to find and sell many such artifacts to collectors and commercial dealers. But systematic excavations could not begin until a new generation of Chinese archaeologists, influenced by the West, broke through traditional taboos segregating book learning and field labor. Finally, in 1927, a major series of digs led by Harvard-trained anthropologist Li Chi got started. His book is

an account of the unearthing of an ancient capital of the Yin-Shang dynasty dating back to the second millenium B.C. The 1937 Japanese invasion halted Li Chi's work, but not before royal tombs, ritual vessels, chariot burials, stone carvings, weapons, and thousands of the inscribed tortoise shells were uncovered. The Yin-Shang culture, based on grain growing and the domestication of cattle, was highly religious. The Anyang excavations produced evidence of "some kind of sacrificial ritual that had to be performed every day of the year." Many tombs contained human bones and skulls that suggested ceremonial mutilation. Others held the skeletons of horses, elephants, dogs, even birds.

AMERICAN SOCIALISM AND BLACK AMERICANS: From the Age of Jackson to World War II
by Philip S. Foner
Greenwood, 1977
462 pp. $22.95
L of C 77-71858
ISBN 0-8371-9545-4

Few American historians have studied the relationship between white leftist radicals and blacks. And for good reason. American socialists of various stripes shared certain racist attitudes with their more conservative countrymen, a condition that resulted in a wavering and evasive policy toward "the Negro question." While granting that the Socialist Party often duped blacks, Foner rounds out the story with his focus on black socialists, especially West Indian–born New Yorkers W. A. Domingo, Otto Huiswood, and Cyril Briggs. In passing, he also touches upon many neglected and half-hidden political relationships among white radicals, such as the link between America's Fourier utopians of the 1840s and the abolitionists. Coming next from Foner: a volume on black Americans and the communists.

A SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE: Algeria 1954–1962
by Alistair Horne
Viking, 1978, 640 pp. $19.95
L of C 77-21518
ISBN 0-670-61964-7

The Moslem nationalist rebellion against *Algérie Francaise* shook apart the French Fourth Republic, brought Charles De Gaulle back to power in Paris, and, finally, at heavy cost, ended 132 years of French colonial rule. The 500,000-man French Army in Algeria won militarily, but France could not win politically. Horne, a British historian, provides the first comprehensive chronicle of the war in English. Vividly describing the long, cruel

Mediterranean drama with all its betrayals, blunders, and illusions, he conveys the intensity of the protagonists' passions without sharing them or holding them up to scorn.

GOLOMBEK'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHESS
by Harry Golombek
Crown, 1978, 360 pp. $14.95
L of C 77-7635
ISBN 0-517-53146-1

"Chess is a lake in which a gnat may bathe and an elephant may drown." The Indian proverb applies to encyclopedias as well. But in this one, British chess master Harry Golombek swims gracefully through rules, tournaments, history, and biography. His tales of battling giants like Russia's Tigran Petrosian and America's Bobby Fischer convey an almost epic sense of the game. He acknowledges its Walter Mitty aspects: In Budapest in 1960, blindfolded Hungarian János Flesch played 52 players simultaneously; he won 31 games, lost 3, and drew the rest. Golombek is at his best explaining the classic problems. Here, for example, is a problem (mate in five) composed by Sam Loyd in 1858 to confound a boastful player. Loyd bet the man a dinner that he could not say which White piece (opposite) would *not* give the mate.



Hint: The man selected QNP as the most unlikely—and paid for the dinner. To find out why, see page 192.

SOLDIERS, STATESMEN, AND COLD WAR CRISES
by Richard K. Betts
Harvard, 1977, 292 pp. $15
L of C 77-8068
ISBN 0-674-81741-9

Do the U.S. military brass always urge a more aggressive policy than the President's top civilian advisers? No, says Richard K. Betts of Brookings in this eye-opening scholarly study. He examines the advisory role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and lesser military men during each of some 20 Cold War crises, ranging from the Korean War and the 1961 Berlin crisis to Vietnam and the North Korean seizure of the *Pueblo* in 1968. Each service chief's views were shaped in part by his own service's organization and doctrine. But by and large the military were no *more* eager to intervene in crises abroad than the top civilians, and were sometimes *less* eager, as in the case of Laos in 1961. Once U.S. troops were in battle, however, the military tended to urge

stronger policies than did civilians, as in Vietnam after 1965. For better or worse, "military advice," says Betts, "has been most persuasive [to Presidents] as a veto of the use of force and least potent when it favored force."

Contemporary Affairs

THE JEWS
by Chaim Bermant
Times Books, 1977
278 pp. $12.50
L of C 77-79020
ISBN 0-8129-0705-1

"It's good to be a Jew, which is a somewhat un-Jewish thing to say, for Jews are rather more accustomed to hugging their wounds than counting their blessings." So begins this perceptive book by Bermant, a Glasgow Rabbinical College graduate, novelist, and historian. He believes that Sigmund Freud and the revolutionary Marxist Rosa Luxemburg exemplify "the inherited Jewish capacity to stand their ground in the face of all opposition." Others (the Rothschilds, Marc Chagall, Sandy Koufax, Leon Trotsky, Fanny Brice) reveal such traits of the Jewish psyche as a mixture of pride and diffidence stemming from the idea of God's Chosen; studiousness; a near-obsession with health; a strong propensity for charity; and "a pronounced sense of guilt." In Bermant's view, there is less anti-Semitism in the world today than ever before, but he sees American Jewry in the '70s as "waiting for the backlash." The psychological effects of the Holocaust linger on: "To have one's existence made a capital offense," he writes, "is not a fact which can fade quickly from the memory."

ARAB POLITICS: The Search for Legitimacy
by Michael C. Hudson
Yale, 1977, 434 pp. $22.50
L of C 77-75379
ISBN 0-300-02043-0

It makes sense to treat Arab politics as a whole. This attempt, the first in English to discuss in one book each of the 18 Arab states plus the stateless Palestinians, deserves praise despite its flaws. Hudson, director of the Center for Arab Studies at Georgetown University, examines the elements of Arab identity, the treatment of religions and ethnic minorities, the legacies of imperialism, and modernization. He finds throughout the Arab world an inability to open political participation to enough of the people to build needed

support for shaky regimes. But how much participation can there be in countries whose economies, oil-rich though many now are, extend in a real sense to only a fraction of the citizenry? Hudson does not say. His capsule surveys of the politics of individual Arab states have some shortcomings: Tunisia, which now faces a struggle over who shall succeed Habib Bourguiba, is cited as the most stable of all Arab countries; the Palestinians' views are uncritically accepted and their unity exaggerated; failure to examine the role of the non-Arab southern Sudanese makes the description of Sudan short-sighted. However, the portraits of Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia are excellent. And in sketching the recent politics of such little-known new states as the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen and the United Arab Emirates, Hudson is an enlightening guide. His book, a good start, should encourage successors.

LYING: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life
by Sissela Bok
Pantheon, 1978
326 pp. $10.95
L of C 77-88779
ISBN 0-394-41370-0

Her main task in this book, as blunt as truth, was not, writes Harvard Medical School ethics teacher Sissela Bok, "to produce a sordid catalogue of falsehoods and corrupt dealings." Nor was it "to go over once again what each day's newspaper reveals about deception in high places." Her interest is in the "vexing dilemmas of ordinary life . . . which beset those who think that their lies are too insignificant to matter much, and others who believe that lying can protect someone or benefit society." Appendixes skillfully excerpting works by Augustine, Aquinas, Bacon, Grotius, Kant, and others occupy 38 pages of the text, but the remaining argument is Bok's own. A moralist who avoids moralizing, she analyzes the effects on trust of lies of various kinds. She examines the excuses and justifications put forward by public officials (including honest ones) for lying "in the national interest"; by physicians, lawyers, and other professionals "protecting" patients, clients, and peers; and by social scientists practicing deception in the name of research. Her conclusion: "Some lies—notably minor white lies and emergency lies rapidly acknowl-

edged—may be more *excusable* than others, but only those deceptive practices which can be openly debated and consented to in advance are *justifiable* in a democracy."

Arts & Letters

THE PAINTINGS OF CHARLES BIRD KING (1785–1862)
by Andrew J. Cosentino
Smithsonian, 1977
214 pp. $22.50
L of C 77-608258
ISBN 0-87474-366-2

Charles Bird King is remembered today for his series of 130 portraits of American Indians, with and without their war paint. These sophisticated, ethnologically accurate studies, commissioned by the Department of War, were done mostly in Washington, D.C. as various tribal delegations visited to press their claims against the U.S. government or be feted by their White Fathers. Most of the paintings were destroyed in a fire at the Smithsonian in 1865, three years after the artist's death. Fortunately for posterity, King himself had made replicas of many, and others were preserved in lithograph copies. They were shown in a 1977–78 exhibition organized by the National Collection of Fine Arts. The show also included—and this book presents—King's *other* portraits (Mrs. John Quincy Adams at her harp, Daniel Webster, John C. Calhoun, President James Monroe comfortably disposed in the East Room) with some romantic landscapes of Harper's Ferry, W. Va., and the environs of Milan, Italy.

PETERSBURG
by Andrei Bely
Indiana Univ. Press, 1978
356 pp. $17.50
L of C 77-74442
ISBN 0-253-34410-7

The "greatest masterpieces of the 20th century," wrote Vladimir Nabokov, "are, in this order, Joyce's *Ulysses;* Kafka's *Transformation;* Bely's *Petersburg;* and the first half of Proust's fairy tale *In Search of Lost Time.*" Until now, English readers had no way of judging for themselves why Nabokov accorded so high an honor to Andrei Bely's forgotten 1916 novel—in which the central figure is the city of Petersburg as perceived during the ticking of an anarchist's bomb. The bomb, secreted in a sardine tin and intended for a high czarist official by none other than his own son, eventually explodes in the

official's lacquered study. By then, a series of interlaced plots and sub-plots has exposed Bely's gloomy notions of Russia, of civilization, and of the human will. Robert A. MacGuire and John E. Malmstad capture Bely's endless plays on words and almost musical use of sound in a new, annotated translation that has all of the texture of the original.

THE COLLECTED POEMS OF THOMAS MERTON
by Thomas Merton
New Directions, 1977
1,046 pp. $37.50
L of C 77-9902
ISBN 0-8112-0643-2

Monk, mystic, poet, and prophet Thomas Merton has been dead for 10 years. Yet reprints and analyses of his literary work appear at an accelerating rate, and nearly 50 theses and doctoral dissertations are now catalogued at Bellarmine College in Louisville, Ky. *The Collected Poems* documents a rare literary voyage. From the comparative simplicity of his 1940 poems through the complexity of *The Geography of Lograire* (1968), it is all here. The Trappist monk's widening Catholicism, his ecumenical insights, his fascination with the Oriental, and his concern, then rage, over the American social and political evolution and nuclear involvement are lightened by an occasional humorous poem evocative of the 1960s: *"Never call a babysitter when the revolution/ Is in full swing/Baby has hoisted the black flag and taken over/The telephone company and everything."*

SELECTED LETTERS OF CONRAD AIKEN
edited by Joseph Killorin
Yale, 1978, 350 pp. $15
L of C 77-20620
ISBN 0-300-02180-1

In his lifetime (1889–1973) Conrad Aiken never quite made it to the top rank of American poets, essayists, or novelists (although his *Selected Poems* won a Pulitzer Prize in 1930). He was, indisputably, a great correspondent. Unlike some other writers, Aiken did not keep carbons of his private letters, feeling that to do so was an invasion of privacy. Fortunately, family members and friends held on to some 3,500 originals. Among the lot selected by editor Killorin are several to or (waspishly) *about* T. S. Eliot, his Harvard classmate and lifelong friend-rival. A number reveal Aiken's relationship as teacher, admirer, and occasional paid keeper of dipsomaniac genius

Malcolm Lowry (*Under the Volcano,* 1947). Sample advice to Lowry: "Let loose some of your natural joy in swiftness and goodness and love and simplicity . . . . The influence of the Complex Boys, these adolescent audens spenders with all their pretty little dexterities, their negative safety, their indoor marxmanship, has not been good for you."

ANOTHER WORLD 1897–1917
by Anthony Eden
Doubleday, 1977
175 pp. $7.95
L of C 77-74298
ISBN 0-385-12719-7

THE DIARIES OF EVELYN WAUGH
edited by Michael Davie
Little, Brown, 1977
818 pp. $17.50
L of C 77-16214
ISBN 0-316-17450-5

INFANTS OF THE SPRING
by Anthony Powell
Holt, 1977, 214 pp. $10.95
L of C 77-71357
ISBN 0-03-020991-9

Good autobiographies and diaries are an art form as revealing as they are dishonest. These three volumes have Oxford in common, as well as a poignant appreciation of privileged life in the dusk of empire. Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, Foreign Secretary, then (1955–57) Prime Minister of Great Britain, once confessed to Evelyn Waugh that as a boy at school he had sat upon and killed a pet mouse in order to escape punishment. Such stoicism pervades his memoir of upper-crust boyhood before the Great War.

Novelist Evelyn Waugh, with Anthony Powell, knew Eden familiarly as "Jerk." Waugh's attitude is ironic, acerbic, spiteful, but clearly betrays a yearning for the aristocratic decay he condemns. His Oxford diaries are missing (why?), as are those pertaining to his disastrous first marriage. What remains suggests that the comic, manic world of Waugh's novels actually existed: With the Countess of Rosse, in Ireland one day, he came across a turf cabin where a crone sat amid pig dung smoking a pipe and complaining about the leaky roof. "Don't change a thing," advised the Countess. "It's simply *you*!"

Like Waugh, Anthony Powell (*A Dance to the Music of Time,* 12 collected novels published 1962–76) cherished the niceties of life, including the butler at Oxford's Hypocrites Club: "the ideal Jeevsian manservant . . . full of repartee and gnomic comment." Powell used the "intellectual recession" of his college days to revel with a circle of friends that included Harold Acton, Cyril Connolly, and, later, George Orwell. "Do your trousers strap under the foot?" Orwell asked Powell at their first meeting.

It was indeed spring in another world.

Science & Technology

THE CRIME OF CLAUDIUS PTOLEMY
by Robert R. Newton
Johns Hopkins, 1977
411 pp. $22.50
L of C 77-4211
ISBN 0-8018-1990-3

Claudius Ptolemy, who flourished around A.D. 130, formulated the geocentric theory of the universe, which held that the planets and stars revolve around a stationary earth. He was long considered the greatest astronomer in antiquity on the basis of the discoveries he described in his *Syntaxis*. To Johns Hopkins physicist Newton, the Alexandrian sage is "the most successful fraud in the history of science." The astronomer's reputation had already come under attack as a result of allegations by Nicolaus Copernicus in his widely publicized *De revolutionibus* (1543). Now Newton's meticulously documented study reveals that Ptolemy faked astronomical data, worked backwards from results he was trying to prove, and claimed to have made observations that could not have been made from Alexandria. His models of the moon and Mercury "conflict violently with elementary observation." Newton's conclusion: Astronomy would be better off if Ptolemy's *Syntaxis* had never been written.

LETTERS FROM THE FIELD 1925–1975
by Margaret Mead
Harper, 1978, 345 pp. $12.95
L of C 73-4110
ISBN 0-06-012961-1

Margaret Mead's experiences during anthropological field trips to Samoa, the Admiralty Islands, New Guinea, Bali, and elsewhere are the subject of 50 years of letters to friends and family who must have counted themselves lucky to be among her correspondents. "We have to wait for the water to rise for this village to do any ceremonies. At present it simply eats, drinks, sleeps, and has séances about crocodiles," she wrote in 1938 from Tamburam, upriver on the Sepik from Madang, New Guinea. The meticulous scientist emerges, one who typed her field notes on the most durable rag-content paper and felt relief when her research reached the point at which the data would be sufficient even if her work were interrupted. A thinker never trapped by the arcana of her anthropology, she vigorously describes individuals in hunting-and-gathering societies moving to a technological economy.

New Books by Fellows and Former Fellows

L'HOMME DEVANT LA MORT. By *Phillipe Ariès.* Paris: Éditions Du Seuil, 1977.

THE SPONSOR: Notes on a Modern Potentate. By *Erik Barnouw.* Oxford, 1978.

THE DIPLOMACY OF DETENTE: The Kissinger Era. By *Coral M. Bell.* London: Martin Robertson, 1977; St. Martin's, 1977.

MAX WEBER: An Intellectual Portrait. By *Reinhard Bendix* with a new Introduction by Geunther Roth. Univ. of California, 1978.

SOCIALISM AND POPULISM IN CHILE, 1932–52. By *Paul W. Drake.* Univ. of Illinois, 1978.

MODELS OF THE CHURCH. By *Avery Dulles, S.J.* Doubleday, 1978.

COMMUNISM, WEST, MIDDLE EAST, AND TURKEY. By *Ismet Giritli.* Istanbul: Bates Publishing House, 1977.

ETHNIC LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA. Edited by *John Higham.* Johns Hopkins, 1978.

THE JUROCRACY: Government Lawyers, Agency Programs, and Judicial Decisions. By *Donald L. Horowitz.* Lexington, 1977.

STATE AID TO PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION. By *A. E. Dick Howard.* Charlottesville, Va.: Michie Co., 1977.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND "A CANDID WORLD." Edited by *Lawrence S. Kaplan.* Kent State, 1977.

EAST-WEST TRADE: A Sourcebook on the International Economic Relations of Socialist Countries and Their Legal Aspects (4 vols.). Edited by *Dietrich André Loeber.* Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1976–77.

MARINE POLICY FOR AMERICA: The United States at Sea. By *Gerard J. Mangone.* Lexington, 1977.

QUEST FOR AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. By *K. P. Misra.* Bombay: Allied Publishers Private Limited, 1977.

FOUR YEARS IN PEKING: A China Retrospect (published in Japanese). By *Heishiro Ogawa.* Tokyo: The Simul Press, 1977.

NASTROJE AMERIKAŃSKIE. By *Longin Pastusiak.* Warsaw: Iskry, 1977.

OD JAMESTOWN DO YORKTOWN. By *Longin Pastusiak.* Warsaw: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1977.

POLACY W ZARANIU STAŃOW ZJEDNOCZONYCH. By *Longin Pastusiak.* Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1977.

WHAT IS GOVERNING? Purpose and Policy in Washington. By *Richard Rose.* Prentice-Hall, 1978.

SOVIET CRIMINOLOGISTS AND CRIMINAL POLICY: Specialists in Policy-Making. By *Peter H. Solomon, Jr.* Columbia, 1978.

THE LAW OF THE SEA: Issues in Ocean Resource Management. Edited by *Don Walsh.* Praeger, 1977.

ARTISTS IN REVOLUTION: Portraits of the Russian Avant-garde, 1905–1925. By *Robert C. Williams.* Indiana Univ., 1978.

REVOLUTION, STAAT, FASCHISMUS: Zur Revision des Historischen Materialismus. By *Heinrich A. Winkler.* Goettingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1978.

PAPERBOUNDS

NEW BURLINGTON: The Life and Death of an American Village. By John Baskin. New American Library, 1977. 259 pp. $2.95

Only recently has historical preservation become a widely held value in America. New Burlington, Ohio, a small farming village between Dayton and Cincinnati, is gone forever. A lake behind a dam built in the early 1970s by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers now covers the streets where its people strolled for nearly 200 years. But New Burlington's ethos survives in the pages of this compelling book compiled during the town's last days by a young writer. He collected poignant photographs to illustrate his tape-recorded interviews with the village's doctors, teachers, preachers, farmers, blacksmiths, widows, auctioneer, telephone operator. (There was only one, Della Wilson. When the dial system came, she left a recording of her voice so the old folks could hear it if they got lonely. It wore out in a month.) Baskin sees no villains, not even the engineers who drowned the town. Is it history? "When I think of history," he writes, "I think of a lady named Abigail Winas who said, 'History is a drunk in the snow with his feet sticking out.' "

ANDRÉ KERTÉSZ: Sixty Years of Photography. Edited by Nicolas Ducrot. Penguin, 1978. 224 pp. $8.95

At first glance, this collection of black-and-white photographs by a man whose 1927 exhibit in Paris was the first one-man show of photographs anywhere seems to be vaguely imitative of other great photographers (and even painters). Then one realizes that Kertész did it first; the later, more widely known works reflect his. Here is a close-up of a woman's careworn hands (1919); storytelling scenes of Kertész's native Hungary; a startling 1929 panorama of French rooftops seen through what looks like a window with a bullet hole in it (but was in fact a broken glass plate); stylized nudes; haunting portraits of children, soldiers, customers at a sidewalk cafe, Colette with her mind in her eyes; and Manhattan skyscrapers. Except for a brief introduction, there is no commentary. The pictures speak for themselves. In 1977 they brought the photographer, at 83, the Medal for Distinguished Achievement from the City of New York.

NEW MEANS OF FINANCING INTERNATIONAL NEEDS. By Eleanor B. Steinberg and Joseph A. Yager with Gerard M. Brannon. Brookings, 1978. 256 pp. $4.95 (cloth, $11.95)

Traditional ways of financing such international programs as economic development, population control, and global environmental measures are no longer adequate, say the authors of this lucid study. To supplement voluntary contributions from wealthy nations and loans guaranteed by the World Bank and other institutions, they weigh a number of possible new sources of financing: automatic levies on international trade and money transactions, taxes on polluters of the seas, revenues from the exploitation of ocean wealth (including the valuable, shrimp-like krill but excluding common commercial fish and shellfish). Such supranational income could be managed by existing agencies or by new organizations set up for this purpose.

LATIN AMERICAN LITERATURE TODAY. Edited by Anne Fremantle. Mentor, 1977. 342 pp. $2.25

Borges, Neruda, Gabriel García Márquez: The names, at least, are familiar to most serious U.S. readers. New translations of

their widely acclaimed work appear in Fremantle's anthology. So do selections by many young Latin American poets, novelists, and short-story writers who are talented enough to survive in the shadows of their elders but are often overlooked by translators. Some of the 38 authors are women, frequently brushed aside by critics in the male-dominated Latin culture. Their work seldom if ever reaches North America. Who, for instance, is familiar with Brazilian novelist Clarice Lispector's jaunty Rio de Janeiro housewives or has read *Office of Tenebrae* by Mexico's Rosario Castellanos? Both these writers display a fine talent for evocative prose.

RICH NEWS, POOR NEWS. By Marvin Barrett. Crowell, 1978. 244 pp. $5.95 (cloth, $12.95)

In this sixth annual Alfred I. DuPont–Columbia University report on the status of broadcast journalism, Marvin Barrett and 80 regional correspondents focus again on television evening news programs. They discuss the economics of network news and the coverage of business, particularly the question of whether TV news is "antibusiness." (It is, and it isn't.) Walter Cronkite's unfulfilled dream of an hour-long news format gets a chapter, as does Barbara Walter's departure from the *Today* show. Other topics include the Frost-Nixon interviews, political reporting (a perennial), and "live-action" electronic news-gathering. This computerized technology is given a once-over-lightly with passing reference to claims by some critics that it is responsible for the current world epidemic of terrorism, hijacking, and hostage-taking. The books in this series provide the best available summary of the year in TV. Unfortunately, like television itself, they also include much material that seems uncritically selected.

SAUL STEINBERG. By Harold Rosenberg. Knopf (with the Whitney Museum of American Art), 1978. 256 pp. $10.95 (cloth, $25)

Long known to *New Yorker* readers as the wry perpetrator of visual tricks and clichés, illegible documents with official-looking seals, and strange, uncannily accurate grotesques of everyday life, Rumanian-born illustrator Saul Steinberg came to the United States (with a faked passport) in 1942 via Italy, Portugal, and the Dominican Republic. His talents were immediately recognized by the U.S. Army, which sent him to China because of his ability to communicate through pictures. This catalog of his recent Whitney Museum retrospective, with 64 pages in color, demonstrates anew his extraordinary profundity as well as his outrageous sense of the artificial: "When I admire a scene in the country," Steinberg explains, "I always look for a signature in the lower right-hand corner." Even his

© 1946 Saul Steinberg

self-portraits are less character studies than visual puns on the "eptness and ertness" of drawing itself: "My line wants to remind constantly that it is made of ink."

The American Establishment

Serious articles are often lampooned, but only rarely are spoofs taken seriously. Richard Rovere's "The American Establishment" is a distinguished example of the latter. First published in the *American Scholar*, fleshed out in *Esquire* soon after, and finally brought out in book form, the essay purported to be the last word on who *really* ran things in America. Written with enough fact to be misleading and enough deadpan authority to be believed, the essay prompted widespread critical reaction and added the word "establishment" to the American political and journalistic vocabulary. Here we reprint Rovere's May 1962 *Esquire* article, shorn of most of its footnotes and slightly condensed. In a 1978 postscript, Rovere suggests that while, of course, the Establishment does not and never did exist, it has changed remarkably since 1962.

by Richard Rovere

To understand the United States today, it is necessary to know something about the Establishment.

Most citizens don't realize it exists. Yet the Establishment makes its influence felt from the President's Cabinet to the professional life of a young college teacher who wants a foundation grant. It affects the nation's policies in almost every area.

—The *News & Courier*, Charleston, S.C., October 18, 1961

It is now, of course, conceded by most fair-minded and objective authorities that there is an Establishment in America—a more or less closed and self-sustaining institution that holds a preponderance of power in our more or less open society.

Naturally, Establishment leaders pooh-pooh the whole idea; they deny the Existence of the Establishment, disclaim any connection of their own with it, and insist that they are merely citizens exercising citizens' rights and responsibilities. They

often maintain that the real power is held by some other real or imagined force—the voters, the Congress, Madison Avenue, Comsymps, the rich, the poor, and so forth. This is an ancient strategy; men of power have always known how to use it. "Wouldst thou enjoy first rank?" St. John Chrysostom wrote. "Then cede it to another." The *News & Courier* is absolutely right.

Conceptions of the Establishment, to be sure, differ widely, just as do conceptions of the Church, the State, and other important institutions. Hilary Masters, a leading member of the Dutchess County school of sociologists, defined it in a recent lecture as "the legitimate Mafia." To William F. Buckley, Jr. and his collaborators on the *National Review,* it is almost interchangeable with the "Liberal Machine," which turns out the "Liberal Line." Their Establishment includes just about everyone in the country except themselves* and the great hidden, enlightened majority of voters who would, if only they were given the chance, put a non-Establishment man in the White

*It is characteristic of most thinkers and writers on the subject to define the Establishment in such a way as to keep themselves outside it and even victimized by it.



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House and have John Kenneth Galbraith recalled from India or left there and relieved of his passport.

Galbraith, himself a pioneer in the field of Establishment studies, sees the Establishment as a rather small group of highly placed and influential men who embody the best of the Conventional Wisdom and can be trusted with substantial grants of power by any responsible group in the country. The perfect Establishment type, in his view, would be the Republican called to service in a Democratic administration (e.g., the present Secretary of the Treasury, Douglas Dillon) or the vice versa. "They are the *pivotal* people," he observed in one of his earlier studies. (Italics his.) That was before his appointment as the Establishment's man in New Delhi. (He is not a member of his own Establishment, however, for he could not hope to be held over in a Republican administration.)

True Blue

The fact that experts disagree on exactly what the Establishment is and how it works does not mean that they are talking about different things or about something that does not exist. Experts disagree about the Kingdom of God. This is not an argument against its existence; plainly the Kingdom of God is many things. Differences of opinion over the meaning of "justice" have given rise to one of the most honored professions in the world. One dogmatic Marxist may quarrel with another over the proper "role of the proletariat" and even about who should and who should not be counted as belonging to the "bourgeoisie." This does not make a fiction or a meaningless abstraction of either the proletariat or the bourgeoisie.

The Establishment can be thought of in many different ways, all of them empirically valid in one or another frame of reference. Masters, Buckley, Galbraith, and Corradini* look upon the Establishment from quite different points of view—which grow in the main out of their differing disciplines—but they would have no difficulty in agreeing that Douglas Dillon is true blue or that, say, Senator Thomas J. Dodd, of Connecticut, is on the outside looking in—disapprovingly, in his case. Despite their differences of emphasis and approach, none of them would have many reservations about the *News & Courier*'s definition:

> The Establishment is a general term for those people in finance, business, and the professions, largely from the Northeast, who hold the principal measure of power and influence in this country irrespective of what administration occupies the White House. . . . [It is] a working alliance

*H. E. Corradini, author of *Patterns of Authority in American Society* (Gainesville Press, 1958). Corradini, an anthropologist, draws a striking parallel between the American Establishment and the Ydenneks, an intertribal council that still functions in Canada.

Richard Rovere, 63, has been a staff writer for the New Yorker *since 1944. Born in Jersey City, he graduated from Columbia University in 1937, then worked briefly as an editor for* New Masses *and* The Nation. *His many books include* The General and the President *(1951, with Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.);* Affairs of State: The Eisenhower Years *(1956); and* Arrivals and Departures: A Journalist's Memoirs *(1976).*

of the near-socialist professor and the internationalist Eastern banker calling for a bland bi-partisan approach to national politics.

For my own part, I think the definition is a pretty good one. I would cavil a bit at the notion that "the Establishment is a general term" etc. It is a good deal more than a collective noun, as I shall make clear. Moreover, there is a slight ambiguity in the phrase "principal measure of power." Too many journalists, awed by their observations of the Establishment at work, leap to the conclusion that its power is not only great but invariably decisive. This is by no means the case. There are powerful anti-Establishment forces at work, and frequently they prevail.

It seems to me perfectly clear, for example, that the Establishment has never found a way of controlling Congress. Indeed, there are times when Congress appears to be nothing more or less than a conspiracy to louse up the plans of the Establishment. Whatever the Establishment wants, it often seems, Congress mulishly opposes.

Nor has the Establishment ever made much headway in such fields as advertising, television, or motion pictures. The basic orientation of the leaders in all these fields is anti-Establishment, and what Establishment strength exists is concentrated mainly on the lower levels—in advertising, the copy writers; in television, certain of the news departments (most notably at Columbia Broadcasting); and in the motion pictures, a few writers and actors. Still, Establishment strength in these areas is generally unimpressive.

The Establishment does not control everything, but its influence is pervasive, and it succeeds far more often than its antagonists in fixing the major goals of American society. Though it does not, as I have noted, come anywhere close to controlling Congress, Congress is everlastingly *reacting* to it.

Within the next couple of years, for example, Congress will spend a good part of its time fighting the Establishment program for a great revision of American trade practices and for eventual American association with the European Common Market. This whole scheme was cooked up at a three-day meeting of the Executive Committee at the Sheraton-Park in Washington immediately after President Kennedy's inauguration on January 20, 1961. The odds are heavily against the Establishment winning this battle in 1962 or even in 1963.

The important thing, though, is that the Establishment has taken the initiative and put its great antagonist on the defensive. Practically everyone is agreed that in time the victory, even in this difficult matter, will go to the Establishment.

The Presidium

The Establishment is not, of course, at any level a membership organization in the sense that it collects dues, issues cards, or holds meetings openly under its own auspices. It is a coalition of forces, the leaders of which form the top directorate, or Executive Committee —referred to sometimes as "Central." At the lower levels, organization is quite loose, almost primitive in some cases, and this is one of the facts that explains the differences in definition among experts.

In the upper reaches, though, certain divisions have achieved a high degree of organization. For instance, the directors of the Council on For-

eign Relations make up a sort of Presidium for that part of the Establishment that guides our destiny as a nation. The presidents and senior professors of the great Eastern universities frequently constitute themselves as *ad hoc* Establishment committees.

Now and then, the Executive Committee regroups as an Establishment front for some particular end. In the summer of 1961, as a case in point, when anti-Establishment forces in Congress and elsewhere threatened the President's foreign aid program, the Establishment, at the request of the White House, hastily formed the Citizens' Committee for International Development and managed to bull through a good deal of what the President wanted. The Establishment has always favored foreign aid. It is, in fact, a matter on which Establishment discipline may be invoked.

Summing up the situation at the present moment, it can, I think, be said that the Establishment maintains effective control over the executive and judicial branches of government; that it dominates most of American education and intellectual life; that it has very nearly unchallenged power in deciding what is and what is not respectable opinion in this country. Its authority is enormous in organized religion (Roman Catholics and fundamentalist Protestants to one side), in science, and, indeed, in all the learned professions except medicine. It is absolutely unrivaled in the great new world created by the philanthropic foundations—a fact which goes most of the way toward explaining why so little is known about the Establishment and its workings. Not one thin dime of Rockefeller, Carnegie, or Ford money has been spent to further Establishment studies.*

If it were not for the occasional formation of public committees such as the Citizens' Committee for International Development, Establishment scholars would have a difficult time learning who the key figures are. Committee rosters serve Establishmentologists in the same way that May Day photographs of the reviewing stand above Lenin's tomb serve the Kremlinologists. By close analysis of them, by checking one list of names against another, it is possible to keep tabs quite accurately on the Executive Committee.

A working principle agreed upon by Establishment scholars is this: If in the course of a year a man's name turns up 14 times in paid advertisements in, or collective letters to, the *New York Times,* the official Establishment daily, it is about 14 to 1 that he is a member of the Executive Committee. (I refer, naturally, to advertisements and letters pleading Establishment causes.) There are, to be sure, exceptions. Sometimes a popular athlete or movie actor will, innocently or otherwise, allow himself and his name to be exploited by the Establishment. He might turn up 20 times a year and still have no real status in the institution. But that is an exception. The rule is as stated above.

One important difference between

*Some have even gone so far as to encourage what might be called "red-herring scholarship"—efforts to prove that something other than the Establishment dominates the country. A notorious example is C. Wright Mills' *The Power Elite* (Oxford University Press, 1956). It was subsidized by the Huntington Hartford Foundation, Columbia University's Social Science Research Council, and Brandeis University. Even the parent body, the British Establishment, got into the act through the Oxford University Press, which, Mills admits, went "far beyond the office of publisher in helping me get on with this."

ėstæ• bli∫mĕnt

Establishment [Cf. OF. *establissement* (late AF. *establishement*), Fr. *établissement.*]

II. Something that is established.

8. The ecclesiastical system established by law; more fully *Church Establishment.* Hence *The Establishment* often occurs as a distinctive name for the established church (esp. of England, Scotland, formerly Ireland), in contradistinction to non-established churches or sects.

[**1667** J. CORBET, DISC. RELIG. ENG. 28 The Setling of a Nation may be made up of an Establishment, a Limited Toleration, and a Discreet Connivence, etc.] . . .

1824 SYD. SMITH, WKS. (1859) II.51/1 America . . . has no Establishment.

—Oxford English Dictionary

the American Establishment and the party hierarchy in Russia is that the Establishment chairman is definitely *not* the man in the center of the picture or the one whose name is out of alphabetical order in the listings. The secret is astonishingly well kept.

Was JFK a Member?

Some people, to be sure, have argued that when, as happens most of the time, the Establishment has a man of its own in the White House, he automatically becomes chairman—just as he automatically becomes commander in chief of the armed forces. I am quite certain that this is not the case. For one thing, the Establishment rarely puts one of its tried and trusted leaders in the White House. Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy have both served the Establishment and been served by it, but neither is or ever was a member of the innermost circle. Both, indeed, were admitted with some reluctance on the part of senior members, and Eisenhower's standing has at times been most insecure.

I am not sure who the chairman of the Establishment is today, although I would not be altogether surprised to learn that he is Dean Rusk. By a thrust of sheer intuition, though, I did get the name of the 1958 chairman and was rather proud of myself for doing so. In that year, I discovered that J. K. Galbraith had for some time been surreptitiously at work in Establishment studies, and he told me that he had found out who was running the thing. He tested me by challenging me to guess the man's name. I thought hard for a while and was on the point of naming Arthur Hays Sulzberger, of the *New York Times,* when suddenly the right name sprang to my lips.

"John J. McCloy," I exclaimed. "Chairman of the Board of the Chase Manhattan Bank; once a partner in Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, and also in Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaine & Wood, as well as, of course, Milbank, Tweed, Hope, Hadley & McCloy; former United States High Commissioner in Germany; former president of the World Bank; liberal Republican; chairman of the Ford

Foundation and chairman—my God, how could I have hesitated—of the Council on Foreign Relations; Episcopalian."

"That's the one," Galbraith said. He congratulated me for having guessed what it had taken him so much patient research to discover.

The Party Line

The Establishment is not monolithic in structure or inflexible in doctrine. There is an Establishment "line," but adherence is compulsory only on certain central issues, such as foreign aid. On economic affairs, for example, several views are tolerated. The accepted range is from about as far left as, say, Walter Reuther to about as far right as, say, Dwight Eisenhower. A man cannot be for *less* welfarism than Eisenhower, and to be farther left than Reuther is considered bad taste.

Racial equality is another matter on which the Establishment forbids dissent. Opposition to integration is a cause for expulsion, or at least suspension for not less than a year, unless it is mere "token" opposition. The only *white* Southern members of the Establishment in anything like good standing are reconstructed Southerners or Southerners the Establishment has reason to believe would be reconstructed if political circumstances would allow it.

Take Senator J. William Fulbright, of Arkansas. He is a pillar of the Establishment even though he votes with the unenlightened on racial matters. The Council on Foreign Relations gave him an "A-1" rating when he was up for chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.* The Executive Committee accepts him because it assumes his heart is in the right place. He is, after all, a former Rhodes scholar and a university president. Moreover, the Fulbright scholarships have provided an enormous subsidy for Establishment intellectuals.

In nonpolitical affairs, great doctrinal latitude is not only tolerated but encouraged. In religion, the Establishment is rigorously disestablishmentarian. Separatism is another matter on which discipline may be invoked. Like a city-wide ticket in New York, the Executive Committee is carefully balanced religiously as well as racially. (The only important difference is that several places are kept for nonbelievers.) The only proscribed views are the noisier ones. Though he now and then gets an audience in the White House, Billy Graham is persona non grata in Establishment circles. Bishop Fulton J. Sheen is regarded as a Catholic Billy Graham and is similarly a pariah.

Reinhold Niebuhr is the official Establishment theologian, and Bishop Angus Dun is the chaplain.

McCloy Abroad

In matters of public policy, it may be said that those principles and policies that have the editorial support of the *New York Times* are at the core of Establishment doctrine. And those irregularities and eccentricities that receive sympathetic *consideration* in the *Times* (not only on the editorial page but in the Sunday *Magazine* and the *Book Review*) are within the range of Establishment doctrinal tolerance.

It is essential to an understanding of the Establishment to recognize its essentially *national* characteristics.

*It exercised the veto power, though, when he was proposed as Secretary of State. It wanted Dean Rusk to get the job, and used Fulbright's record on racial questions as an argument against Fulbright's candidacy.

The whole of its power is greater than the sum of its parts. Its leading figures have national and international reputations but very often are persons of only slight influence or standing in the cities and states from which they come. Former Chairman McCloy, for example, cuts a lot of ice in Washington, Geneva, Paris, London, Rio de Janeiro, Bonn, Moscow, and Tokyo, but practically none in Manhattan. In Albany, he is almost unknown.

Hostile States

The relative weakness of the Establishment in the states undoubtedly helps to explain the shellackings it repeatedly gets in Congress. Statewide—or one might say, statewise—it is often torn by a kind of factionalism that seldom afflicts its national and international operations. In New York, for example, Averell Harriman and Nelson Rockefeller have often found themselves locked in combat like Grant and Lee; in Washington, they are Alphonse and Gaston. And so it goes.

A state-by-state canvass of Establishment strengths and weaknesses was conducted by Perry Associates, a St. Louis firm, in 1959. Some of the highlights follow:

In three states—Texas, Oklahoma, and North Dakota—the Establishment is virtually outlawed. There are no restrictive or repressive measures on the statute books, but there is persistent harassment by police and other officials. The American Civil Liberties Union had expressed some interest in arranging a test case, but no suitable one was found. Despite constant police surveillance, there is considerable underground Establishment activity in the Dallas area and in San Antonio.

The Indiana authorities are openly hostile to the Establishment, and there has been continuing agitation for a law requiring Establishment agents to register with the Attorney General and be fingerprinted. It is hard to see what would be accomplished by this, for the Perry people could find no trace of Establishment activity anywhere in Indiana, except at Indiana University, in Bloomington. The faculty people there are state employees anyway and can quite easily be dealt with. In neither Nebraska nor Idaho could *any* Establishment influence be found. There were only the faintest traces in Wyoming, New Hampshire, Utah, and Florida.

Florida was the one southern state in which Establishment forces seemed exceedingly weak. Elsewhere, it was learned, nearly all those who described themselves as "moderates" were actually connected with the Establishment.

The big centers are, as one might expect, the states with large cities and large electoral votes: New York, California, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Massachusetts. A rather surprising case, though, was Kansas, which ranked ahead of New Jersey and Maryland.

Beginnings

For some reason, Establishment studies have attracted few historians. Most of the work thus far has been undertaken by journalists, economists, sociologists, and psychologists. In consequence, very little has been done to uncover the origins of the Establishment.

One British historian, Keith E. D. Smith-Kyle, maintains, in *America in the Round* (Polter & Polter, Ltd., London, 1956), that "the American pretense to equality was, to speak bluntly, given the lie by the forma-

tion in the early days of the Republic of the sort of 'command' group similar in most respects to what Britons nowadays speak of as 'the Establishment.' By 1847, when the Century Association was founded in New York, power had been consolidated in a handful of hands. From then on, whenever there was a 'laying on of hands,' the blood in those extremities was the very blood that had coursed through those that had molded the clay of life in the so-called Federal period."

The First Committee

It is plain that Smith-Kyle is trying to say, in a roundabout British way, that a hereditary aristocracy runs the show here. He is as wrongheaded in this matter as he is in most others. American students, though they number few trained historians among them and none of a celebrity that compares with Smith-Kyle's, subscribe almost unanimously to the proposition that the Establishment came into being at a far later date—to be exact, as well as neat, at the turn of the century. They see the institution forming during the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, who by common consent was the first Establishment President—and in a way the last.*

The Founding Fathers of today's group zeroed in on T. R. as if they had caught him in a perfect bombsight. Consider them all, a few of them still alive, all of them within living memory: Henry L. Stimson, William Allen White, Nicholas Murray Butler, Robert Frost, Albert Beveridge, Abraham Hummel, Joseph Choate, William Travers Jerome, Jacob Riis, Charles Evans Hughes, Felix Frankfurter, Ida M. Tarbell, Joseph Pulitzer, Martin Provensen, Lincoln Steffens, Benson Frost, Learned Hand, W. Adolphe Roberts, Jane Addams, Nelson W. Aldrich, Eleanor Alice Burgess, John Hay, John Ray, John Jay Chapman, Van Wyck Brooks, Carl Schurz, Hamlin Garland, Oscar Straus, Winthrop Chanler, James R. Bourne, Whitelaw Reid, and Gifford Pinchot.

There, plainly, was the first Executive Committee!

Some uninformed publicists confuse the Establishment with the Organization. The two could not be more different. The Establishment Man and the Organization Man could not be more different, or more at odds. The Establishment uses the Organization from time to time, as a ruling group must in an industrial and commercial society. But it devoutly hopes that in time the Organization will wither away. The Organization would like to overthrow the Establishment. It had a near success when it ran its 1960 chairman, Richard M. Nixon, for President of the United States.

Time Out

The *New York Times* has no close rival as an Establishment daily. Technological advance is making it possible for the *Times* to become a national newspaper. This development should add immeasurably to the growth of the institution's powers.

Most Establishment personnel get at least one newspaper besides the *Times,* in order to keep up with Walter Lippmann and Joseph Alsop. Pa-

*This is a rather fine point. Since Roosevelt's time, every President except Harding and Truman has taken office with full Establishment approval. So far as can be determined, though, no one has ever gone directly from the Executive Committee to the office of Chief Executive. Woodrow Wilson is sometimes cited as an exception, but it is dubious in the extreme that he was one. Charles Evans Hughes, his 1916 opponent, was an Executive Committee man.

"THE GENTEEL NIGHTMARE OF RICHARD ROVERE"

Rovere accused columnist William F. Buckley, Jr. and others of defining "Establishment" to include everyone except themselves. In Rumbles Left and Right *(1963), Buckley genially took Rovere to task:*

So our Establishment is different from the British Establishment, a designation which Macaulay and Carlyle, stretching the original and merely religious meaning of the term, attached to the dominant men and institutions of England—the established order. So what? The English Establishment is more frozen than our own, primarily because theirs is a society based on class. Their Establishment has rites and honorifics and primogenitive continuities, and rests on deeply embedded institutional commitments against which the Socialists, the angry young men, the disestablishmentarians, have railed and howled and wept altogether in vain.

The "Establishment" Mr. Rovere is talking, or not talking, about is precariously perched; and every now and then it gets a terrific shellacking from its opponents. In the English Establishment, membership is to a considerable extent *ex officio;* in ours, far less so (though it is inconceivable, at least to this observer, that the head of the Ford Foundation could be an outsider). The chances are better that you might earn a berth in the American Establishment if you have gone to Groton and Yale; but no one has an automatic right to membership in it, not even the President of the United States (as Rovere, even in his flippant mood, admits). And membership in it is to an extent far greater than in England dependent on a man's opinions (and the way they are expressed); England, by contrast, has no trouble at all in countenancing Socialist earls.

It tends to be true in England that the Establishment prevails. It is less true in the United States, for the Establishment here is not so much of the governing class as of the class that governs the governors. The English Establishment mediates the popular political will through perdurable English institutions. The American Establishment seeks to set the bounds of permissible opinion. And on this, it speaks *ex cathedra.* It would not hesitate to decertify Mr. Rovere. But he gives no indication of waywardness.

pers that carry both these columnists are in good standing with the Establishment and get a lot of advertising that way.

There are some specialized magazines but none of general circulation that can be described as official or semiofficial organs. I have pondered long over the case of *Time* and have concluded that it has no real place in the Establishment. It goes too far in attacking Establishment positions and it has treated many Establishment members with extreme discourtesy and at times with vulgarity. The Establishment fears *Time,* of course, and it now and then shows cravenness in its attempts to appease

it by putting Henry Luce on some commission or other (on freedom of the press, national goals, and so forth), or by giving his wife some political job. But the Luce publications generally must be considered as outside the Establishment.

Now that control of *Newsweek* has passed to Philip L. Graham, publisher of the *Washington Post*, it may be that the Establishment will adopt it as an official weekly.

U.S. News & World Report is widely read but held in low regard.

Foreign Affairs has, within its field, the authority of *Pravda* and *Izvestia*.

Harper's, the *Atlantic*, and the *New Yorker* all have Establishment clienteles but none can be regarded as official. The *Saturday Review* was once heavily patronized but no longer is. The *New Republic* is coming up. The *Nation* has long since gone down. A few of the younger Establishment intellectuals read *Partisan Review*, but the more sophisticated ones regard it as stuffy and prefer *The Noble Savage*, edited by Saul Bellow and issued at irregular intervals by the World Publishing Company.

The Establishment has in its top councils some people who appear to the unsophisticated to be oppositionists. For example, Norman Thomas, the Socialist leader; Norman Mailer, the self-styled "hipster" novelist; and Norman Podhoretz, the firebrand editor of *Commentary*, all enjoy close relations with leading figures on the Executive Committee. The Reverend Martin Luther King has been proposed for membership on the Executive Committee. In 1957, a planning committee met for two days at the Royalton Hotel in New York and reported that "we need informed, constructive criticism fully as much as we need support" and urged the recruitment of "people who will take a long, cold look at our policies and procedures and candidly advise us of any weaknesses they see. We recommend that in the cases of people playing this indispensable role of 'devil's advocate,' all discipline be suspended."

Picking Presidents

It is interesting to observe the workings of the Establishment in presidential politics. As I have pointed out, it rarely fails to get one of its members, or at least one of its allies, into the White House. In fact, it generally is able to see to it that both nominees are men acceptable to it.

It is never quite powerful enough, though, to control a nominating convention or actually to dictate nominations. National conventions represent regional interests much as Congress does, and there is always a good deal of unarticulated but nonetheless powerful anti-Establishment sentiment at the quadrennial gatherings of both Republicans and Democrats. Nevertheless, the great unwashed who man the delegations understand—almost intuitively, it seems—that they cannot win without the Establishment, and the more responsible among them have the foresight to realize that even if they did win they could not run the country without assistance from the Executive Committee.

Over the years, a deal has been worked out that is almost an operating rule of American politics. I am indebted to the novelist Margaret Creal for this concise formulation of it:

> When an Establishment man is nominated for the Presidency by either party, the Vice-Presidential candidate must be drawn from outside the Establishment. When, as has occasionally happened, the

Establishment is denied the Presidential nomination, it must be given the Vice-Presidential nomination.

The system has worked almost perfectly for the last 30 years. In that time, the only non-Establishment man in the White House has been Harry Truman, and he had been Franklin Roosevelt's non-Establishment vice president. Putting Henry Wallace aside as a pretty far-out case and not counting Alben Barkley (a vice president's vice president), the vice presidents have all been non-Establishment: John Nance Garner, Harry Truman, Richard Nixon, and Lyndon Johnson.

Rockefeller and Rusk

Now observe what happens when the Establishment has to yield first place, as it had to do at the Republican convention in 1960. Richard Nixon, a non-Establishment vice president, simply could not be denied the presidential nomination. So the Establishment Republicans demanded and of course obtained Henry Cabot Lodge. There was a similar case in 1936, when the Republicans went outside the Establishment to nominate Alf Landon for first place. The vice presidential candidate was Colonel Frank Knox, the publisher of the *Chicago Daily News*, a Lippmann-Alsop paper, and later Roosevelt's Secretary of War.

Four years later, the Establishment nominated Wendell Willkie on the Republican ticket and agreed to Charles McNary, distinctly non-Establishment. In 1944, it was Dewey (Establishment) and Bricker (Non). The Establishment was particularly powerful in 1948 and not only got Dewey again but Earl Warren. In 1952, the usual deal was made in both parties: Eisenhower versus Stevenson (Establishment) and Nixon and Sparkman (Non). Same thing in 1956, with Estes Kefauver in for Sparkman.

The Russians have caught on to the existence of the Establishment and understand some of its workings quite well. Nikita Khrushchev showed himself to be no slouch when he told Walter Lippmann, last spring, that President Kennedy was controlled by Nelson Rockefeller. Many people regarded this as depressing evidence of the grip of old-school Marxism on Khrushchev's mind. They thought he was mistaking a faded symbol of industrial and mercantile power for the real wielder of authority under People's Capitalism.

He was doing nothing of the sort. He was facing the facts of Establishment life. Not as a Standard Oil heir but as an Establishment agent, Nelson Rockefeller had forced the Republicans to rewrite their platform so that it conformed very closely to Chester Bowles' Democratic platform and provided for a vigorous anti-Communist defense program. Where did the central ideas of both platforms originate? In—where else?—the studies made by the Rockefeller Panel for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and published as *Prospects for America.*

Who was on the Rockefeller Panel? Here are just a few of the names, left and right:

Dean Rusk	Lucius D. Clay
Chester Bowles	Arthur F. Burns
Jacob Potofsky	Henry R. Luce
Henry Kissinger	Oveta Culp Hobby
Anna Rosenberg	David Sarnoff

And when Kennedy became President, from what foundation did he get his Secretary of State? The Rockefeller Foundation, of course.

POSTSCRIPT

A 1978 COMMENTARY

by Richard Rovere

Summer, 1958. John Kenneth Galbraith and I were on the Isle of Rhodes at one of those getting-to-know-you conferences—Americans, Europeans, Asians, Africans, politicians, academics, journalists—that was paid for by a foundation I am now quite certain was a front for the CIA.

During a welcome break, I asked Galbraith if he had been reading any of the articles in the London weeklies about the British Establishment. He said that, indeed, he had and that, like me, he had been fooling around with the idea of an American Establishment. Did one exist? If so, what the hell was it, who ran it, how did it work?

Our thoughts were in some respects strikingly close together. There was no American Establishment; of course there wasn't, yet in a way there was, and in any case the chairman of the board had to be John J. McCloy.

We congratulated each other for good thinking. I imagine I would have left it at that, but then, a year or so later at a meeting of the *American Scholar* (not quite an Establishment house organ but not far from it) there seemed to be a dearth of material for a forthcoming issue, and Galbraith proposed that I put some of our findings and fantasies on paper. I did and they appeared in the Autumn 1961 issue. I used the title for a book, which was published in 1962 and soon remaindered at $1.19.

For years thereafter I regretted the whole affair. I thought I had done a good-natured spoof on political science, sociology, and scholarship—one that (I hoped) made some telling points about our society, but a spoof nevertheless. People began confusing me with C. Wright Mills, the author of *The Power Elite*, one of the people I was trying to parody. Strange, unwelcome things happened.

In Cuba, Fidel Castro was informed that I had unlocked the secrets of American political life; I am told that he distributed reprints throughout the higher and middle echelons of his government. Representative John Rousselot (R.-Calif.), a member of the John Birch Society, reached precisely the same conclusion and circulated it to right-wing groups throughout

America. (The Castro and Rousselot editions must have been pirated; I never got a dime for reprints.) Dozens of book reviewers in serious publications soberly reported that I had done the definitive job on the power structure. "Irony—it never really works," Harold Ross, the editor of the *New Yorker*, once said.

What is there to be said about it all today?

The word "establishment" is all over the place, in the newspapers and trendy magazines and on TV, sounding vague but somehow authoritative and sophisticated. It is used to conjure up the notion of pecking order, entrenched power, centers of authority, of either liberalism or Anglo-American conservatism, even where the notion scarcely applies.

There is, or soon will be, a "social welfare establishment," a "dental care establishment," and a "solid waste management establishment." Every trade, every profession, every social unit down to the family is now said to have an "establishment."

Like crime, corruption, and communism, the American Establishment is a good thing to be against. Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter owed much of their success to having denounced it and pledged to combat it. Sam Brown, an antiwar activist in the 1960s, became a spokesman for what became the anti-Establishment establishment, ran for office in Colorado, and then became co-opted into what might be called the post-anti-Establishment Establishment as a member of the Carter administration.

Broadening the Base

Thus, the Establishment is also a good thing to be a part of. How else did Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance get to be Secretaries of State? These two would, of course, scoff at the idea that the Establishment even exists. They would be both right and wrong.

It was perfectly clear what Carter meant when he spoke of himself as an outsider. But if Nelson Rockefeller had said it, he would have been branded an unconscionable liar. Yet there would be some merit even in his claim. You can't buy your way into the Establishment, at least not into its highest councils. Walter Mondale is closer to the top than Rockefeller ever was.

The top of what? I would say it is the top of what Carter was not part of even when he became a member of the Trilateral Commission, which is, of course, a quite transparent front for the Establishment.

I have a few new developments to report:

At a meeting of the Establishment's Executive Committee

held in Key West, Florida, on April 1, 1978, the Reverend Theodore Hesburgh, president of Notre Dame University, was named as chairman, succeeding former Secretary of Everything Elliot Richardson of Boston. There were 11 votes for, 3 against, with 2 abstentions. Father Hesburgh is the first Roman Catholic to hold the office.

Senator Muriel Humphrey (D.-Minn.) was named vice chairman by acclamation. It was proposed that the term "chairperson" be used, but this was voted down, though support for the Equal Rights Amendment was unanimous.

There was an obvious desire to broaden the base, for no Establishment organization could hope to survive without an affirmative action program, or quota system, for the disadvantaged. Five new members of the Executive Committee were appointed: Lora Tredway of Aurora, Nebraska; the Reverend Jesse Jackson of Chicago; Thurman Munson of Cleveland; Alberto Garcia-Gomez of Barranquitas, Puerto Rico; and I. F. Stone of Washington, D.C. A spokesman for the committee, Daniel Bell of Cambridge, Massachusetts, said, "We think it's a niftily balanced ticket."

A motion to replace the quarterly *Foreign Affairs* with the newer *Foreign Policy* as an official Establishment publication was proposed and tabled. A leading proponent of the proposition said that "some of us think that *Foreign Affairs* is tainted by its many Establishment connections," meaning that the magazine is no longer useful as a front. "Wait till next year," another said. It was decided that the 1979 meeting will be held at the Peleskie Center at the Hotel Iroquois in New York City.

At a closing session in the home of Mrs. Helen Thielen, of Key West, the novelist Peter Taylor addressed the group on "The Establishment and the Southern Muse, 1865–1978."

LETTERS

We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly *and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer's telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editors' requests for comment.*

Yugoslavia and America: A Common Interest

The essays by Dusko Doder and Laurence Silberman ["A Land Without a Country" and "Titoism and Beyond," *WQ*, Spring 1978] bring to mind the Yugoslav joke about Carter, Brezhnev, and Tito talking to God.

Carter asks: "When will the United States solve its economic problems and again be the greatest country in the world?" "In 50 years," answers God, at which Carter starts to cry, because he won't be alive to see the day.

"When," asks Brezhnev, "will the Soviet Union be economically efficient and the unchallenged leader of the world communist movement?" God answers, "In 50 years," and Brezhnev starts to cry, knowing he, too, will not live to see the day.

Then Tito asks, "When will Yugoslavia be a cohesive, productive, socialist society?" and God starts to cry.

The reasons for this despair are evident in Doder's account of Yugoslavia's explosive mixture of ethnic cleavages and economic difficulties. Therefore, what happens in the West economically will be of critical importance to Yugoslavia's political evolution. Prosperity and stability can ease the transition to the post-Tito era and help institutionalize Titoism without Tito. Such developments are essential, because Edward Kardelj, the only other truly *national* figure active today, is an unlikely heir apparent: He is too ill to play a key role. In the absence of a unifying figure, consensus fashioned among the republic's Party oligarchs will have to be the cement that keeps the system together.

As Mr. Silberman correctly observes, on many issues Yugoslavia and the United States have opposing positions, but I suggest that these differences do not threaten vital U.S. security interests. What transcends all their divergences is the deeply shared resistance to Soviet hegemony in Europe.

The Yugoslavs seek an end to military blocs, an end to superpower hegemonism, and a reduction of military forces in Europe. On issues such as Eurocommunism, the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Helsinki accords, MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe), and European economic cooperation, Yugoslavia is far closer to the United States than to the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia is no threat to the United States or its allies. Its policy of "equidistance" serves to keep foreign policy a minimal source of discord within the Yugoslav leadership, and it helps Belgrade in its dealings with the Soviet bloc. No Yugoslav leader views the military threat to Yugoslavia's security and independence as coming equally from the East and the West.

There are, indeed, serious differences between Yugoslavia and the United States, but friendship between the two countries is not a one-sided affair. Asymmetrical, yes; one-sided, no. An independent and nonaligned Yugoslavia remains very much in the American national interest.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
Professor of Political Science
University of Pennsylvania

No True Believers?

I liked Doder's piece, generally, but find myself in disagreement with him over the weight to be attributed to ideology. (Most people who think about the matter are on

his side, but that doesn't mean he should perpetuate a superficial view in the one book on Yugoslavia likely to be read outside academe.) Ideological uncertainty—confusion, even—doesn't indicate a lack of ideological seriousness. The 1948 split with the Russians was ideological, first and foremost, no matter what anyone, including the Yugoslavs, says. I think most people have trouble seeing this because Yugoslav ideology was informed early on by an obsession with the national question, and we're used to equating socialism with communism and Stalinist Marxism. Thus Western liberals end up playing the Russians' game, using Soviet criteria to determine who is socialist. So when Doder writes that he has never found a Yugoslav communist "who, when speaking privately, was a true believer," I found myself scribbling in the margin, "in what?"

Speaking of perpetuating superficialities, another thing bothers me about the piece, and that is the assertion that everything is owned by the state. Legal scholars in Yugoslavia are still trying to figure out just who does own everything. It's not as simple as it looks.

Cynthia W. Frey
Humanities Institute Program
National Endowment for the Humanities

The Secret of Tito's Success

Neither Dusko Doder nor Ambassador Silberman claims infallibility, and the very complexity of the Yugoslav scene as they describe it leaves room for other interpretations and predictions.

There is another way of looking at Yugoslavia, and that is by seeing the elements of disruption and conflict in the context of equilibrium and balance.

It is a well-worn cliché that Tito is too big for his country, and that Yugoslavia's role in world affairs is overblown simply because of the prestige of its noted leader. Yet Tito's accomplishments and his prestige are not separate from the Yugoslav experience, of which he is a product. His genius, as Doder notes, is that of the practical political manipulator. He is a man not of philosophy and doctrine but of political realism. Socialist self-management, after all, was at first a defensive reaction; it sought to find a Marxist-Leninist legitimacy as a means of repudiating Stalin and Stalinism.

The secret of Tito's success, in brief, has been adaptation and balance and the use of charisma to those ends—not devotion to some version of revealed truth. Both in internal and in foreign policy Tito has found a balance of forces serving Yugoslav interests.

The internal system compromises the Communist Party's authority with the needs for some self-expression by other social forces, for equilibrium among nationalities, and for decentralized economic decision-making and a relatively free national market. The system in practice does not match the elaborate theories of socialist self-management, but in a rough way it reflects political and economic realities. It can produce new leaders; not a new Tito, but men capable of compromise and of decision. It will undergo evolution, possibly in the direction of greater political freedom, as was happening in the 1960s before the explosion of Croatian nationalism induced Tito to call a halt. It is not easy to predict, but such an evolution might be less dangerous to the unity and stability of the country than a move by new leaders in the other direction. It might disprove the conventional wisdom, long current in Washington, that the only forces able to hold the country together are the Communist Party and the Army.

The foreign policy of nonalignment is based on assessment of world forces and on the need to maneuver between them. This is a Yugoslav requirement, not solely a reflection of Tito's genius. And its real importance is for Yugoslavia's position in Europe, no matter what the Yugoslav government does in Ethiopia or says about Puerto Rico in the United Nations. One can appreciate the annoyance of Americans, especially of the American who has the job of ambassador in Belgrade, at Yugoslavia's hectoring and lining up against us on a host of issues all

over the world. But the fetish of nonalignment and anti-imperialism, like the cultivation of good relations with Moscow, Peking, Washington, and Western Europe, has its place in the complex of policies all aimed at maintaining the equilibrium on which Yugoslavia's security and independence depend and at restraining any great-power move against it. Such a move would not come from the United States or from China.

We also have an interest in maintaining that equilibrium, and thus in supporting Yugoslavia's independence. That is indeed a part of our broad policy of security for the West. The Yugoslav phase of it does not cost much; large military and economic aid programs are a thing of the past. All that is required is firmness, and the ability to convince others that we mean it.

John C. Campbell
Director of Studies
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

Will the Soviets Go Fishing?

Both Silberman and Doder seem to feel that pluralism will gain ground after Tito disappears from the scene, and I agree.

When that event takes place, many observers foresee a major Soviet thrust, some even in the military field.

Would the Soviets, however, fish in troubled political waters should major nationality conflicts occur in Yugoslavia after Tito's passing?

History and logic speak against such a move. From the strategic viewpoint, Yugoslavia does not fall in the first-line security area of the Soviet Union. East Germany and Poland emphatically do. Hungary and Czechoslovakia are perhaps somewhat marginal cases, judging from the hesitations that preceded the interventions of 1956 and 1968. Yugoslavia is simply not vital to the security of the U.S.S.R.

The Soviets have no real friends in Yugoslavia. All the events since 1944, and particularly those between 1948 and 1953, turned those who were friends into enemies. Any overt or covert action on the part of the Russians would encounter bitter opposition, including military action. On the other hand, the Yugoslavs are among the most pro-American peoples in the world. The population at large has none of the ideological hang-ups of the senior Party leadership, and even the younger Party generation that will take over is likely to be more objective about the U.S. role in the world.

Walter R. Roberts
Executive Director
Board for International Broadcasting

Passing the Acid Test

Yugoslavia is not as totalitarian as either Dusko Doder or Laurence Silberman believe. Although Milovan Djilas currently is prohibited from traveling abroad and publishing at home, he is not under house arrest; Alexander Ranković is living unharrassed in quiet retirement in a Dubrovnik villa; and the League of Yugoslav Communists is the most diverse, and even pluralistic, communist party in the world—East or West, in power or in opposition. And while not conforming to communist dogma or Western interpretations of it, self-management works, at least better than Doder or Silberman give it credit. The acid test is how well people are faring, and they are faring better with each successful innovation each passing year. Edvard Kardelj, who along with Djilas and Boris Kidrić is a principal architect of self-management, is Tito's heir apparent and has been since the darkest days of the Partisan struggle. And the army remains loyal to a vital, progressive, and independent Yugoslavia.

Dennis Reinhartz
Professor of History
University of Texas, Arlington

Autonomy & Privacy: A Revolution

Re: "The Supreme Court and Modern Lifestyles" by A. E. Dick Howard and "Personal Privacy and the Law" by Kent

Greenawalt [*WQ*, Spring 1978]:

Sir Henry Maine, the British historian, once wrote that "the movement of progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from [law based on] Status to [law based on] Contract." In feudal times, individual rights were grounded on one's status in an elaborate legal and social hierarchy; with the advent of capitalism a new theoretical basis for liberty had to be found in concepts of property and contract.

Alan Westin, one of the founders of studies on the modern rights of privacy, used to remind his students of Maine's observation when explaining the significance of the Supreme Court's "Revolution of 1937." It was then, Westin noted, that the Supreme Court ceased to define liberty largely in terms of freedom from economic regulation and began to redefine it principally as an attribute of one's status—as a labor organizer, religious proselytizer, minority group member, defendant, voter, and political activist. Over the 40 years, the courts and legislatures have gone far to replace the property-rights foundation of American liberties with more modern concepts of personal status, dignity, and autonomy.

Nothing better illustrates this jurisprudential revolution than the rights of privacy that Howard and Greenawalt describe. These new rights, like the property rights they supplement, owe their origins to social changes at least as fundamental as those that destroyed feudalism. Urbanization, industrialization, electronic communications, and bureaucratization are just some of the forces now leading Americans and Europeans to demand more control over what others know about them, to insist upon freedom from the new technology of surveillance and data-keeping, and to assert modern concepts of psychological harm as the basis of new rights of personal autonomy. Where these demands will lead, few would dare predict, but where they succeed they must affect the distribution of political power in capitalist and socialist nations alike.

Christopher H. Pyle
Professor of Political Science
Mount Holyoke College

Autonomy and the Individual

As Tocqueville once observed, virtually every social issue and question in this country eventually becomes a legal one. The law is as broad as our society itself. But our law is not simply a seamless, confused and contradictory jumble of policy statements, though as a first year law student I might have subscribed to the view that this was exactly what American jurisprudence represented.

If we take a broad view of our Constitution and statutes we may be able to discern a pattern—some underlying theme that provides a foundation for our legal heritage.

I would suggest that this tradition represents an attempt to construct a system which can redress the natural imbalance that exists between the powers of large organizational bodies and the dignity and worth of the individual. At its best, American jurisprudence is designed to limit the influence of governmental and non-governmental entities and to enable the individual to prevail over their enormous powers—in short to control our own lives.

The right to privacy is the keystone of our Bill of Rights and our concepts of civil liberties. It is the right to be left alone and to keep to ourselves those thoughts, feelings, desires and facts that we do not choose to share with the world at large.

A citizen's right to privacy is the one concept that more than any other separates our system of government from those authoritarian systems that do not recognize the supremacy of the individual. Alexander Solzhenitsyn observed that one of the most chilling practices of the police state is its never-ending collection of personal information on its citizens. The resulting lack of privacy is the essence of control.

There can be no question that the functioning of a modern society requires institutions to seek certain information about individuals. We are not, after all, a nation of hermits. But we are a free, independent people and a proper balance must be struck between the never-ending demands for additional and more personal information and our right to privacy. If

we are to maintain this balance we must vigorously defend the right of Americans to assert this right, and we must become more aware of the potential dangers to it.

There can be little doubt that the individualist tradition carries with it a measure of inefficiency, but our Bill of Rights was not adopted by those who founded this country because it would make things more efficient. It was adopted to preserve for the individual the dignity, the security and the privacy inherent in a free people. Let us hope that our laws will be able to continue and further those values.

Birch Bayh, U.S. Senate
Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution

Reconstruction: The Foresight of Du Bois

I find nothing in the essays on Reconstruction by Armstead L. Robinson and James L. Roark ["The Politics of Reconstruction" and "From Lords to Landlords," *WQ*, Spring 1978] that could not be found in W. E. B. Du Bois' *Black Reconstruction* (1935) and little in James M. McPherson's well-taken cautions ["The Dimensions of Change"] that were not projected in the writings of Du Bois from the Cold War years of the 1950s until his death in 1963. At that time Du Bois' insight and courage earned him arrest and contempt; but, of course, yesterday's treason so often becomes today's wisdom. One would have hoped that the acknowledgment was fuller and clearer.

The class element in Reconstruction—rich versus poor (black and white)—was noted by Du Bois. One should add that this element, particularly class conflict among whites, was basic to southern history throughout—sharpened from about 1840 on, growing during the Confederate years, and intensified by the war's results. In that sense, Reconstruction was a continuation, on a higher level, of *southern* history. I would emphasize also that the class element helps to make clear the defeat of Reconstruction and its betrayal by the Republican Party—the rise of an increasingly industrialized capitalism with a growing appetite for the colossal resources of the South and the labor capacities of its people, especially if those people could remain divided by racism.

Herbert Aptheker
The American Institute for Marxist Studies
San Jose, Calif.

Flaws in a Southern Myth

James L. Roark, ["From Lords to Landlords," *WQ*, Spring 1978], retells the old story of what happened in the rural South after the Civil War. The main themes are familiar. Not only did the combination of sharecropping, country store credit, and cotton cultivation doom the blacks, who remained immobilized at the "bottom of the economic and social ladder," but it was scarcely better for the white landlords, who found it "permanently damaging" and could not "halt the economic deterioration of southern agriculture." Hence, "poverty became the South's most distinguishing characteristic."

If repetition alone could enhance the veracity of this story, it would by now stand quite beyond challenge. But repeating it, no matter how often, will not make it true. In fact, this old story is riddled with logical and factual flaws.

The truth is more complicated. Sharecropping did become a common contractual arrangement, but it never drove other arrangements from the field. Fixed rentals, payable either in crops or in cash, became steadily more common throughout the last 30 years of the 19th century, and by 1900 black fixed renters almost equalled black share renters. Share tenancy, however, was not necessarily a bad arrangement, and it was particularly desirable in high-risk areas because it divided the risks between the landlord and the tenant in proportion to their respective shares. The country merchants generally possessed little or no real monopoly power; there is no substantial evidence that they insisted on cotton monoculture; nor is there a compelling reason to believe that the southern farmers grew too much cotton for their own good. Although it is true that the blacks

remained relatively poor, it is also true that they experienced large absolute gains in material well-being during the half-century after the Civil War. Moreover, southern agriculture was not "deteriorating" during that era. Rather, it was slowly and painfully, but in most places successfully, re-establishing itself after being ravaged by a destructive war and an even more damaging revolutionary restructuring of its legal, financial, and organizational framework.

These are, I realize, rather sweeping revisions of a long-accepted story. The reader who wants to examine the basis for my claims can begin with my book *Competition and Coercion: Blacks in the American Economy, 1865–1914* (Cambridge, 1977) and the sources cited therein.

Professor Robert Higgs
University of Washington

A Fading Dream?

One does not have to be a cock-eyed optimist to believe, along with Professor James McPherson's student, that "this time the story will be different" ["The Dimensions of Change," *WQ*, Spring 1978]. Wiping out the blacks' civil rights gains since World War II the way the planters and Klansmen wiped out the post–Civil War gains in the South is inconceivable. To begin with, the civil rights revolution has gone too far to turn back, especially because it includes not only the blacks but also women, Chicanos, other minorities, the handicapped, etc. Then, too, we now live in an intimate relationship with a world that is two-thirds colored. Further, our civil rights problems are nationwide; a regional political arrangement (the 1876 Hayes deal removing the troops from the South) would be incredible today.

If any historical meaning can currently be squeezed out of the First Reconstruction, it must lie in the warning signals that the Second Reconstruction will end *before* the task is completed. After all, what has been accomplished by the past generation of Americans is a legal revolution that has turned the law, which once favored segregation and discrimination, upside down.

But the results have been disappointing as far as the daily lives of most blacks are concerned. The question before the nation is whether we are going to make some recompense for past discrimination through preferential affirmative action programs, busing for improved education, and other methods to compensate for the past. Here the fatigue of many civil-rights summer soldiers of the Second Reconstruction may indeed result in faltering before we have completed the task.

Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Vice President
Americans for Democratic Action

A Political Scientist's Challenge to Conquest

In "Some Notes on Political Science" [*WQ*, Spring 1977] Robert Conquest delivered a scathing attack on political science. Even allowing that his comments were taken out of a larger presentation and published with tongue in cheek, it should be said that he misses the mark on at least two counts.

First, being "scientific" is not a condition; it is a process. Bismarck's assertion that "Politics is not an exact science" should be restated as "Politics is not exactly a science; it is an art." Then, lest we confuse the subject of inquiry and the inquiry itself, we must distinguish politics (the art) from political science (the study of the art).

Second, political science is not alone in not having attained Mr. Conquest's implied condition of being a "science." No field of intellectual endeavor has yet developed into an absolute "science," in the sense of either condition or process.

As a political scientist, let me say that Mr. Conquest has picked on the most self-conscious discipline against which to level his attack. Political scientists are acutely aware of being unable to explain rigidly, experimentally control, and predict the phenomena that they study. Underlying our work, however, is the belief that regularities characterize political af-

fairs. Mr. Conquest's treatment suggests the denial of such regularities, though I trust that if confronted directly with the issue he would admit to their existence. Politics is not all that chaotic and random.

The "models," "systems," and other constructs that political scientists put forth are intended for one of two purposes: They are either "straw men" for the derivation of hypotheses that can be tested empirically, or they are intended to ease academic communication.

Attacking political science for its employment of the systems analogy is valid in one sense. Political scientists are eager to explore the applicability of new concepts, and they have sometimes become enamored of grand schemes. However, to put this particular example into proper perspective, I have yet to meet a systems analyst who did not consider his concepts to have universal applicability.

It is interesting to note that, in his condemnation of several of the social disciplines, Mr. Conquest did not specifically mention economics. If this omission was deliberate and not an oversight, it was probably due to the acceptance of economics as a "scientific" discipline.

Economics has earned its respect as a "science" by making certain simplifying assumptions, by relying on the law of large numbers, and by emphasizing phenomena that are readily quantified. Mathematics lends a semblance of exactitude to any endeavor; exactitude is a characteristic of a "science"; any discipline that extensively employs mathematics is patently more "scientific" than one that relies less on mathematics.

The models currently employed by the economists have entered into common usage because they have certain utility for understanding economic behavior, not because they fully explain this behavior. Some of the most successful economic models or theories have been the ones that achieved validity because their principles were accepted and subsequently implemented by those exercising political power.

Politics is like the weather—everybody talks about it. Armed with a few journalistic facts, some old adages, and perhaps a touch of common sense, any layman feels qualified to render authoritative interpretations of political affairs. Much as meteorology is scoffed at by many who have never tried to predict the weather accurately, the utility of political science as a discipline is denied by those who lack either familiarity or facility with many of the methods or results of political science.

Ultimately, however, we come back to the realization that politics is here to stay. And political science is the one discipline that has demonstrated a capability for advancing our understanding of politics in any orderly fashion or, at the least, a willingness to try.

Larry W. Williams

Mr. Williams is a Ph.D. candidate at Ohio State University and a political scientist in the International Studies Center at the Battelle Memorial Institute's Columbus Laboratories.

Vietnam as History: More Post-Mortems

In addition to the current military and academic studies on the Vietnam War already surveyed in the *Wilson Quarterly* ["Vietnam as History," *WQ*, Spring 1978], I have uncovered these others:

A U.S. Army project contracted to General Research Corporation is a source study—the accounts of the last days of the war by a dozen or so of former Army of Vietnam (ARVN) generals now living in the U.S.

The Naval Health Research Center (through its Center for POW Studies) at San Diego, Calif., is doing a series of interviews with former prisoners of war.

Outside of government, a wide and diffuse effort appears to be underway.

Several documentary and bibliographic studies are in progress. I am producing a highly ambitious project called *History of the Vietnam War on Microfilm*, a nine-volume documentary study that seeks to put nearly a million pages of material (captured documents, news-

paper clippings, other primary and secondary source materials) on microfilm. Allan W. Cameron of Tuft's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy is at work on a bibliographic study of the war.

Alexander Casella, a UN official who lived for two years in postwar Hanoi and is now on a Carnegie Fellowship, is writing a study on the changing balance of power in Indochina.

Denis Warner, the Australian newsman who covered Vietnam from 1949 until the fall of Saigon, has written *Certain Victory*, which is being published in the United States by Sheed Andrews & McMeel this summer.

Much of the current work appears directed to the final days of the war in early 1975. CBS newsmen Marvin and Bernard Kalb are working on a book tentatively titled *The Last Ninety Days.* Paul Steube is writing *Final Stages of the Communist Take-Over of Vietnam.* Karl Jackson of the University of California (Berkeley) currently is doing field research in Bangkok for a book on contemporary Vietnam that presumably will contain material on the final days. Rand Corporation is working on a retrospective study based on emigré interviews, tentatively titled "Perceptions of South Vietnamese Leaders on the Collapse of South Vietnam."

Although most academics who worked on Vietnam during the 1960s now have moved on to other fields, some additional academic work is underway. Here are the scholars and their projects: William Duiker, Pennsylvania State University, the evolution of Vietnamese Communist strategic thinking from the 1930s through the Vietnam War; John Donnell, Temple University, the Vietnamese Communist Party and its grassroots ties in the South; William Turley, on a sabbatical at the University of Virginia, the history of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), which he expects to finish this year; Phan Thien Chau, Ridder College, a biographical study of Vietnamese leaders; Allan W. Cameron, Fletcher, a new study of the 1954 Geneva Conference; John McAlister, Stanford University, a biographical study of Ho Chi Minh; Stephen Morris, an Australian, currently at Columbia University, a history of the National Liberation Front; Brian Shaw, University of Hong Kong, Vietnamese Communist leadership; Edwin Moise, a recent University of Michigan graduate, Marxist doctrine in Vietnam in the 1950s; Samuel Popkin, University of California (San Diego), the relationship of economic change and Vietnamese village peasant organizations over the past two decades.

In the audio-visual field, Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) is planning a 39-hour Vietnam War documentary series —a five-year, $2 million project now in the fund-raising stage. CBS News has announced plans for an hour-long documentary on the year 1968, including the Vietnam War.

There is no central clearing house for work on the Vietnam era. Some involved in research are reluctant to discuss it. Others simply are unknown. More than 2 million Americans went through Vietnam during the war and for all we know hundreds or even thousands of them are at work right now on studies, memoirs, or other accounts. I hope that this letter will trigger responses from others at work, bringing additional data to light.

Douglas Pike

Mr. Pike worked for USIS in Saigon from 1960 to 1969 and is the author of several books on the Vietnamese Communists. He is currently an analyst at the Library of Congress.

Correction

If the author of "Broken Hearts" [*WQ*, Spring 1978, p. 36] will check Acts 4:6 he will find Annas was High Priest and not Ananias (Acts 5:5), who may have died as he suggests.

W. S. Bishop
Samford University
Birmingham, Ala.

CHESS PROBLEM (from page 160): The choice of Loyd's challenger—QNP—is incorrect given the following solution: 1. P–QN4, R–B4+; 2. PxR, P–R7; 3. P–B6, B–B2; 4. PxP (5. PxN/Q)! Golombek notes that such a sequence, in which a pawn initially on its starting square promotes to give mate in the course of a problem's solution, has been dubbed "Excelsior."

CURRENT FELLOWS

GENARO ARRIAGADA, Fellow, Instituto de Estudios Politicos, Santiago

EARL BLACK, Associate Professor of Government and International Studies, University of South Carolina, Columbia

EDWARD CLARKE, Senior Management Associate, Office of Management and Budget

RALPH N. CLOUGH, East Asia specialist, former member of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State

MARCUS CUNLIFFE, Professor of American Studies, University of Sussex

PAUL DRAKE, Associate Professor of History, University of Illinois, Urbana

JOHN H. ELY, Professor of Law, Harvard University

EDWIN M. EPSTEIN, Professor of Business Administration, University of California, Berkeley

JEFF FISHEL, Associate Professor of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington

VLAD GEORGESCU, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of South East European Studies, Bucharest

BRONISLAW GEREMEK, Director, Center of Medieval Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences

DIETRICH GEYER, Professor of East European History, Tübingen University, Federal Republic of Germany

ARCHIE GREEN, Professor of Humanities, University of Louisville

SUKEHIRO HIRAKAWA, Professor of Comparative Literature, Tokyo University

JAMES J. LANG, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Vanderbilt University

LAWRENCE W. LICHTY, Professor of Communications, University of Wisconsin, Madison

DIETRICH A. LOEBER, Professor of Law, Kiel University Law School, Federal Republic of Germany

NORTON E. LONG, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center of Community and Metropolitan Studies, University of Missouri, St. Louis

BERNICE MADISON, Professor of Social Welfare, San Francisco State University

GREGORY J. MASSELL, Professor of Political Science, Hunter College

FRANK D. McCONNELL, Associate Professor of English, Northwestern University

DENTON E. MORRISON, Professor of Sociology, Michigan State University

HEISHIRO OGAWA, former Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, Embassy of Japan, Peking

WALTER M. PINTNER, Associate Professor of Russian History, Cornell University

FRANK M. SNOWDEN, JR., Professor of Classics, Howard University

HERBERT J. SPIRO, former Ambassador to Cameroon, Embassy of the United States of America, Yaoundé

GLORIA STEINEM, Co-founder, Editor, and Writer, *Ms. Magazine*

MANAKKAL S. VENKATARAMANI, Chairman, Centre for American Studies, Nehru University, New Delhi

ANDRZEJ WALICKI, Professor, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences

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In 1968 the Congress established the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars as an international institute for advanced study and the nation's official "living memorial" to the 28th President, "symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relation between the world of learning and the world of public affairs."

The Center opened in October 1970, and was placed in the Smithsonian Institution under its own presidentially appointed board of trustees. Its chairmen of the board have been Hubert H. Humphrey and, since 1972, William J. Baroody.

Open annual competitions have brought more than 250 Fellows to the Center since 1970. All Fellows carry out advanced research, write books, and join in seminars and dialogues with other scholars, public officials, members of Congress, newsmen, business and labor leaders. The Center is housed in the original Smithsonian "castle" on the Mall in the nation's capital. Financing comes from both private sources and an annual congressional appropriation. The Center—and *The Wilson Quarterly*—seek diversity of scholarly enterprise and of points of view.