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Editor's Comment

Ten years ago this fall, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars launched the Wilson Quarterly.

The new magazine's mission: "to bring the world of scholars and specialists to the intelligent lay reader [and] to provide an authoritative overview of current ideas and research on matters of public policy and general intellectual interest."

The first 160-page issue (Autumn '76), noting the nation's Bicentennial celebration, included two scholars' analyses of the American Revolution; other "clusters" of articles dealt with Brazil and with the continuing debate between "pessimists" and "optimists" over the future of the world's natural resources and environment in the wake of the gloomy 1972 Club of Rome report. There were 71,000 charter subscribers.

Today, the WQ has 110,000 subscribers across America, and publishes five, instead of four, issues each year. In its purpose and basic format, the magazine has not changed, despite the addition of more charts and illustrations, and a shift to a full-color cover. We are pleased that surveys indicate that roughly 80 percent of our readers, notably senior public officials, professionals, newspaper editors, and college teachers, save WQ back issues for ready reference. This magazine, unlike many others, was designed to have a long shelf life.

In this issue, we signal our tenth birthday in two ways. We include an index to all major articles that have appeared in the WQ. We revive one short essay ("Life Reeked with Joy," pp. 148-151) that has been reprinted more widely than any other we have published.

In 1976, we invited our subscribers to send us "counter-arguments and amplification" in response to WQ essays. We have not been disappointed. For the latest readers’ commentary—on feminism and Finland—see pages 154–159. We renew our invitation.

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Business is bound to change.

Change upsets people. Always has. Disrupts routine and habit patterns. Demands constant adaptation.

But change is inevitable. And essential. Inability to change can be fatal.

Unfortunately, most of man's institutions are highly resistant to change.

This, as much as anything else, underlies the explosive reaction of many people in our country in the past few years. They took a fresh and uncluttered look at the world around them, and found many institutions archaic. Higher education. Government. Religion. Business.

These institutions have begun to respond to the need for change, even if not always with breathtaking speed.

Among these institutions, business is by the nature of things compelled to change more rapidly—and perhaps more realistically—if it is to survive. Companies that cannot foresee change and adapt to it quickly enough die. There is seldom anybody to subsidize business inefficiency for any length of time.

One reason business—especially big business—can respond to change quickly is that basically it is in the business of change. Business depends heavily on forward planning, and planning is the orderly management of change.

Another reason is that business itself produces more change, probably, than any other institution. Through its research and development programs. Through new technology it develops and applies. Through new plants it builds. Through its need to be a good employer. Because its own long-term self-interest dictates a better life for people everywhere. Because it must face facts and think rationally about what may appear to be unthinkable.

Business can be plenty wrong, and wrongheaded, despite all those things we just listed. But its record for bringing change-with-meaning to society is impressive. Which has an obvious moral for anyone today who wants to change the world, rationally and constructively.

Change doesn't always produce a Renaissance, of course. But it can—if business, and the rest of society think hard and clearly enough about where we want change to take us. And how fast. And what the options are. And whether benefits at least equal costs.

One sphere where clear, contemporary thinking would produce some urgently needed change is in the stereotypes and obsolete concepts that some people who should know better still harbor about all big business. Some of those concepts may once have been valid across the board, and some, unfortunately, may still be valid with respect to some corporations. But not to all.

Times have changed. So have many of us big businesses. Because change is what we're inseparably bound to.
Reviews of articles from periodicals and specialized journals here and abroad

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**Politics & Government**


Congressional campaigns may well be America's newest growth industry. Even after adjusting for inflation, between 1974 and 1984 the average cost of running for a House or Senate seat more than doubled.

Indeed, two years ago, House and Senate candidates collectively spent more than $374 million, much of it on television advertising.

To Mathias, U.S. senator (R-Md.) and chairman of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, the growing expense of running for public office poses a threat to U.S. democracy. Too often, he says, victory goes to the richest candidate, while qualified opponents are scared off by incumbents with overflowing war chests.

In 1974, no House candidate disbursed more than $500,000; eight years later, 67 spent more than that. Bids for the Senate cost more: Whereas six candidates each dropped at least $2 million in 1978, 16 did so during the 1984 elections. In fact, that election year saw a record-breaking $26 million race in North Carolina between Republican Jesse Helms and Democrat James B. Hunt, Jr. (Helms spent $16 million and won.)

Mathias sees several disturbing consequences. More and more elected representatives come from the ranks of the wealthy. In the 1982 elections for Senate seats, half the candidates reportedly were millionaires. The high cost of getting elected, observes Mathias, has created "an ever increasing dependence on highly organized special interests for campaign funds." The number of political action committees (PACs) has risen from 608 in 1974 to 4,000 today. Although Congress voted in 1974 to limit PAC contributions to $5,000 per candidate, total PAC giving in 1984 was more than triple ($105 million) its 1978 level. Moreover, PACs give incumbents a financial edge over their challengers. In the 1984 House elections, incumbents received $81 million, versus $19 million for challengers.

Forced to spend more time soliciting funds, U.S. representatives and senators have little time to do their jobs. Reports Senator Alan Cranston (D-Calif.): "To raise my $3 million campaign fund in 1980, I averaged a fundraiser every 2.5 days, every 60 hours, for two straight years."

Perhaps the best remedy, Mathias suggests, is public financing for candidates and incumbents—an idea first proposed by President Theodore
Since 1976, U.S. taxpayers have helped to finance presidential election campaigns. Opposition to subsidizing congressional campaigns persists.

Roosevelt in 1907. They would receive federal grants, plus independent private donations, but be bounded by strict ceilings on overall spending and on their own personal campaign contributions.

Public financing would free politicians from many fundraising chores, says Mathias. It would also "level the playing field."

Power to the States

"My administration is committed—heart and soul—to the broad principles of American federalism," said President Reagan before a Washington conference of state legislators in 1981.

Conlan, a Democratic staffer on the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, agrees that Reagan wants to transfer more responsibility from Washington to the states—unless that means compromising his other goals, such as reducing the federal deficit, cutting government regulation, and advancing the conservative agenda.

Federalism, notes Conlan, is not new. The Nixon administration increased state authority by replacing "categorical grants" with "block grants," thus giving state officials more leeway with federal monies.

The Reagan administration has invoked federalism, Conlan says, as a rationale for cutting social programs. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, for example, consolidated dozens of federal aid programs into nine new or revised block grants. In so doing, at White House request, Congress slashed funds for those programs by 25 percent.

The administration, Conlan contends, has also undercut state authority on behalf of commercial interests. Secretary of the Interior James Watt,
for example, repeatedly attempted to open bidding on new offshore oil and gas drilling leases, despite state objections. And in 1982, Secretary of Transportation Drew Lewis proposed and won federal legislation that preempted more stringent state laws regulating the trucking industry.

The White House has also asserted its authority over the states on social issues. On July 17, 1984, the president signed legislation requiring states to adopt a minimum drinking age of 21, or face a 10 percent reduction in federal highway aid. “The [drinking] problem,” said the president, “is bigger than the individual states.”

Thus, Reagan may favor federalism in principle. But no administration, conservative or liberal, Conlan asserts, wants to give up power.

Economic Justice


During the past decade, a conservative reaction to Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society has taken hold in political Washington. The judiciary has not been immune, contend Dudley and Ducat, political scientists at George Mason and Northern Illinois universities, respectively.

Under Chief Justice Warren Burger (1969–86), the U.S. Supreme Court produced an unusually mixed bag of judicial decisions. On matters of civil liberties the Court largely leaned to the Left. Yet, in decisions on economic issues, the authors argue, the justices tilted to the Right.

Dudley and Ducat examined the Court’s 350 economics cases decided between 1972 and 1980. Defined as those “involving conflict between the affluent and the underprivileged,” the cases included disputes pitting union and nonunion workers against employers, conflicts within unions, and corporate challenges to federal regulations. In one case (National League of Cities v. Usery, 1976) the Court re-examined a “quintessential New Deal-type issue”: whether the federal minimum wage law applies to the states as employers. The Court ruled that it did not, but then reversed its opinion in 1985.

For the sake of consistency, the authors considered a “liberal” position to be support for workers against employers, for government regulation of business, and for the power of states to tax businesses.

During the nine Court terms, the authors found the Court rendering conservative opinions in a majority of economics cases: 65 percent between 1972 and ’74, and 58 percent between 1975 and ’80 (the dividing line being the 1975 retirement of Justice William Douglas and his replacement by John Paul Stevens). While the opinions of the justices did vary, justices Douglas, William Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall nonetheless held firm as liberals. At the other extreme was Justice William Rehnquist, who rarely wavered from his trademark conservatism. Also in the conservative camp on economic issues were justices Warren Burger and Lewis Powell, who supported liberal positions less than a third of the time.

After the era of the Warren Court (1953–69)—which handed down
PERIODICALS

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

liberal decisions in 60 percent of its economics cases between 1953 and '59—the Burger Court’s economic conservatism deserves attention, say the authors. In their view, it underscores the erosion of the New Deal consensus and a waning commitment to economic justice.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Armchair Generals


Republican or Democrat, hawk or dove, nearly everyone in political Washington agrees that the costly U.S. armed forces need an overhaul.

The botched 1980 rescue mission in Iran and lackluster military coordination during the 1984 U.S. invasion of Grenada, among other things, have “convinced many observers that something is profoundly wrong,” writes Cohen, who teaches at the U.S. Naval War College. Dissatisfaction in Congress has led to such legislation as the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, sponsored by Senator Barry Goldwater (R.-Ariz.), which seeks to revamp the command structure at the Pentagon.

Clearly, some critics are more competent than others. Cohen thinks well of Arthur T. Hadley, a World War II combat veteran and military affairs journalist. Hadley's Straw Giant (1986) highlights certain peacetime military ills, notably persistent interservice rivalry, overcentralized control, and, most important, the “Great Divorce” between the all-volunteer armed services and society.

No society, Hadley argues, that exempt its best and its brightest from service can expect to field first-rate military forces. Moreover, Cohen comments, “a society in which most men have donned fatigues is more likely to avoid the extremes of both deference and dismissiveness that [Hadley] detects in a generation of congressmen, journalists, and academics who know [nothing] of barracks inspections and wet bivouacs.”

As examples, Cohen cites Senator Gary Hart (D.-Colo.) and his aide William Lind, whose much-publicized book America Can Win presents remedies for what ails the U.S. military. Whereas Hadley can accept the “occasional necessity of war,” observes Cohen, Hart and Lind envisage only deterrence, based on “pacifistic and romantic conceptions” of battle.

The Hart-Lind critique may sound plausible to laymen, says Cohen. But their analysis is badly flawed. They are obsessed by cheaper aircraft and ships (e.g., diesel submarines), and by tactics. They disregard strategy—why the United States should fight and how it should win. Their advocacy of the doctrine of “maneuver” (unbalancing an enemy) versus “attrition” (wearing down the enemy), regardless of context, ignores the many times in the past when attrition worked best.

There is a larger significance to these divergent literary efforts, says Cohen. “It is the difference between an author [Hadley] who wants to understand the problems and [inexperienced] authors who are convinced they have all the answers.”
Dissatisfied with President Reagan's limited economic sanctions, the House and Senate voted in September 1986 for stricter measures against South Africa, including embargoes on imports of coal, uranium, and textiles.

Are Sanctions The Right Move?

Racial violence continues to plague South Africa, claiming the lives of more than 150 blacks each month. In 1985 alone, nearly 19,000 blacks were arrested for protests. At issue is apartheid, the system of racial segregation enforced by President P. W. Botha's conservative white-ruled government that has long isolated and disfranchised the republic's 23.8 million black citizens.

Meanwhile, the United States and the 12 members of the European Communities (EC) have been puzzling over a proper response to Pretoria. Although the White House agreed in September 1985 to limited actions (bans on imports of Krugerrands, on new loans to Pretoria, and on computer sales for use by Botha's security agencies), in general, the Reagan administration, Britain's Thatcher government, and Helmut Kohl in West Germany oppose punitive economic measures. Yet, in September 1986, the EC did impose sanctions, banning imports of iron, steel, and gold coins (all valued at $500 million in 1985), and prohibiting European companies from making new investments in South Africa.

Are sanctions and disinvestment the best choices? Suzman, a 33-year liberal member of South Africa's Parliament (and long-time foe of apart-
heid), and Relly, chairman of the South Africa–based Anglo American Corporation, do not think so.

Sanctions will likely produce “a siege economy, more oppression, and more violence,” Suzman argues. She backs the “very reasonable proposals” of the 1985 Commonwealth Conference: To end violence by Pretoria and the black African National Congress (ANC); to release black leader Nelson Mandela from prison; to remove the military from black townships; to legalize the ANC and the Pan African Congress (a black political organization); and to ban detentions without trials.

Western supporters of sanctions, Suzman says, often forget that 20 percent of South Africa’s white electorate has already voted against apartheid. Nor do they realize that, if the Botha government falls, the next regime, white or black, might well be even more oppressive.

Relly agrees. He adds that bludgeoning South Africa’s economy will hurt its black workers, as well as neighboring black countries that depend on South Africa for transport and trade. South Africa needs Western trade to create 300,000 new jobs each year. (The present level of black unemployment is 25 percent.) With an annual population growth rate of 2.7 percent, the nation must achieve a six percent annual rate of economic growth. Since 1981, the rate has been only 1.1 percent.

In the long run, Suzman and Relly contend, an expanding South African economy and responsible foreign firms—which educate and house their black employees—will do more to undermine apartheid than Western sanctions or disinvestment. Through black unions and small businesses, black economic status will slowly improve; political power will follow.

Those who think that Western sanctions will provide a “quick fix” for South Africa’s troubles, says Suzman, are “sadly misinformed.”

Trimming the Fat


Cost overruns, three- and four-year delays in deliveries, overpriced spare parts: Chronic problems plague the Department of Defense (DOD) each year, as it purchases some $170 billion in weapons and equipment.

Such inefficiencies are not inevitable, says Packard, a former deputy secretary of defense (1969–71), and chairman of President Reagan’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management.

The current funding and procurement process, he writes, is a tragi-comedy of Washington mismanagement. The United States has, most importantly, no coherent defense strategy. The rival services—Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines—seek congressional funding for their own pet projects. Congressional committees, meanwhile, focus on the minutiae of line items in defense bills. And the annual budgetary cycle mocks the secretary of defense’s so-called Five-Year Plan. The Pentagon’s 1981 budget projections for 1986, Packard points out, exceeded what Congress eventually approved by $77 billion.

The production process is no better. The Pentagon sometimes gives
the go-ahead on weapons systems before working out the mechanical bugs. American taxpayers, for example, spent $2 billion on the Army’s flawed DIVAD anti-aircraft gun before it was cancelled. Once weapons projects are under way, the DOD’s 233 key program managers must answer to “a variety of staff advocates,” who insist on more competition in bidding, or on awarding more subcontracts to minority-owned businesses, etc. The result: New weapons systems take 10 to 15 years to develop—about twice as long as the timetables for products of similar complexity (e.g., the Boeing 767 transport) in the private sector.

Packard, also the chairman of Hewlett-Packard Company, proposes a businesslike approach: The White House’s National Security Council should draft a comprehensive statement of the country’s basic security objectives. The president would then draw up five-year budget guidelines, from which the military’s Joint Chiefs of Staff would develop an overall plan. The Congress could then appropriate monies for a two-year period, consistent with the president’s guidelines.

In the Pentagon, each weapons program manager would be allowed to run things as he saw fit—as long as he produced high-quality hardware on time and within his budget. Prototypes of new weapons and aircraft, moreover, would “be tested in real-life operational conditions,” before going into production. Observes Packard: “Fly and know how much it will cost before you buy.”

The key to overall improvement, Packard concludes, is “centralized policy control, and decentralized execution.”

**Fighting Terrorism**

"Reflections on Terrorism" by Walter Laqueur, in *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1986), 58 East 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

There is no good defense against any terrorist willing to die for his cause or country. Whether Sri Lankan Tamils, Punjabi Sikhs, or Irish Republicans, the “blood of martyrs is the seed of the church.” So argue many Washington pundits.

Laqueur, a scholar at Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, disagrees. Exactly that kind of thinking, he contends, has allowed terrorists to get away with murder.

Dictators rarely have trouble stamping out terrorism. During the 1970s, Argentina’s military regime used force to suppress the People’s Revolutionary Army—as Iran’s Khomeini government did to overcome a mujahedeen onslaught in 1981. In Turkey, a more moderate regime relied on mass arrests and execution of convicted murderers in 1980 to cut short a wave of terrorism that had killed 3,000 Turks. Uruguay has controlled Tupamaros terrorist uprisings without excessive brutality.

Although democratic societies are constrained by laws, Laqueur nonetheless believes they can “subdue terrorism without surrendering the values central to the system.” Italy is one good example. Italian authorities quashed the Red Brigades without dictatorial methods; they penetrated terrorist ranks and promised reduced prison terms for penitents. And Israel and Greece have checked terrorism using only legal means.
The worst strategy is appeasement, contends Laqueur. For the most part—especially in regard to Libya’s Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi—Western Europe and the United States long allowed themselves “to be blackmailed.” Moreover, seeking better ties with groups or nations that sponsor terrorism does not deter attacks: Greece’s and Austria’s unhappy experience with Libya, and France’s and Italy’s failed flirtations with the Palestinians, serve as evidence.

Terrorism remains more of a “nuisance” than a threat to Western societies, the author says. Even Qaddafi “is still only a minor troublemaker.” Yet terrorist attacks—especially state-sponsored ones—could get out of hand. While Western nations should retaliate first with public condemnations, diplomatic protests, and economic sanctions, they should never rule out appropriate military action.

In some cases, says Laqueur, the West may have to root out terrorism through covert counterterrorism of its own. As General George Grivas, head of the National Organization of Cypriot Combatants, once observed: To catch a mouse, one uses a cat, not a tank.

One of the traditional yardsticks of economic strength is manufacturing. Throughout most of this century, the United States boasted robust manufacturing industries (e.g., steel, motor vehicles). They consistently employed roughly 25 percent of the labor force—until 1969, when contraction set in. By 1985, the number of workers who actually produced something tangible had sunk to 19 percent of the labor force total.

Taking up the employment slack has been the “service” sector. While the jobs here range from hamburger flipper to brain surgeon, the main components are the health, legal, “business services,” and entertainment fields. This hodgepodge is now the economy’s largest and fastest-growing area, embracing 24 percent of the work force, up from 18 percent 20 years ago. By 1995, says the Bureau of Labor Statistics, manufacturing jobs will drop to 17 percent of the total, while services will rise to 26 percent; business services (encompassing such disparate folk as accountants and computer technicians) may surpass construction as an employer. While average earnings in services are three percent below those in all other industries and eight percent below those in manufacturing, the lag is partly due to the large role in services played by women, who generally earn less than men in all job categories.

To many economists, the rise of services spells trouble—a national economy whose mainspring is not the production of goods but merely “taking in each other’s laundry.” Browne, vice president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, observes: “The Service Economy” by Lynn E. Browne, in New England Economic Review (July-Aug. 1986), Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, Mass. 02106.
Reserve Bank of Boston, disagrees.

A thriving service sector, she argues, is a sign of prosperity, not decay. Service industries expand when incomes (national and personal) rise. Service employment has risen markedly in several wealthy nations, notably Germany and Japan, where the number of such jobs grew by 12 percent between 1960 and 1980 (versus only nine percent in the United States). Such growth tends to correlate closely with increases in gross national product per capita. Even within the United States, the poorer Southern states have smaller-than-average service sectors.

Furthermore, adds Browne, service firms do contribute to economic progress. They enable other businesses to cut costs by “contracting out” for specialized work, and increase demand for manufactured products (e.g., communications equipment, computers).

All in all, says Browne, the simple laundry analogy does not wash.

“American Farm Subsidies: A Bumper Crop” by Elmer W. Learn, Philip L. Martin, and Alex F. McCalla, in The Public Interest (Summer 1986), 10 East 53rd St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

"Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God." So wrote Thomas Jefferson in 1785.

Washington, D.C., it seems, has chosen them too. Fifty years ago, the average farm family’s income was less than half that of other Americans. Today, aided by some $18 billion in annual subsidies, the median farm family income is $21,000—not far below the overall national figure.

But if farmers in general are doing well, small family operations are in trouble. Roughly 100,000 farmers went out of business last year. Learn, Martin, and McCalla, agricultural economists at the University of California, Davis, blame federal programs that further enrich the big operators but do little for the truly needy.

During the Great Depression, Washington began helping farmers by supporting minimum prices for major agricultural commodities; the government became the buyer of last resort for cotton, tobacco, rice, milk, and pork. Farmers, in turn, agreed to limit supplies by not farming some of their acreage. Today, federally assisted farmers pledge their major crops, such as wheat, corn, and rice, to the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) in exchange for loans. When prices rise above a guaranteed minimum, they sell their crops and repay the loan. When prices are depressed, they keep the money and the CCC keeps the crops.

Price supports made sense during the 1930s, when most of the 6.8 million U.S. farms were family-owned businesses. But farming soon became a big export enterprise. New seed varieties, improved pest controls, and better machinery raised yields threefold. America now produces enough food for itself—plus an extra 30 to 40 percent to ship abroad.

Agrribusiness now dominates farming. Just five percent (or 112,000) of America’s 2.4 million farms produce half of the nation’s food. Though their net incomes average $170,000, these large farms are the recipients of
On Feb. 5, 1979, hundreds of U.S. farmers gathered near the Capitol, snarling rush-hour traffic with their tractors, to protest low grain prices.

nearly one-fourth of Uncle Sam's subsidies—money ill spent, in the authors' view. In an international marketplace, subsidies end up supporting higher world prices. And limitations placed on U.S. crop acreage help to make life easier for competitors, such as Argentina and the 12-nation European Communities.

Meanwhile, the country's 554,000 small farms receive only 15 percent of the subsidy cash. If Washington really wants to save the revered "family farm," the authors say, it should do away with price supports and help proprietors directly, via a guaranteed income plan.

**Free Trade**


Trade between bordering nations is hardly uncommon, but Canada's dependence on the United States does border on the extreme. In 1960, Canada sold 55.8 percent of its exports (ranging from wood products to machine parts) down south. Today that figure is 78.8 percent.

Yet while the 25 million Canadians benefit hugely from proximity to the U.S. market, many of them have long supported protectionism at
home, as did former prime minister Pierre Trudeau’s Liberal government (1968–79, 1980–84). Canadian businesses, the reasoning went, could not stand much competition from the colossus to the south. But now Conservative prime minister Brian Mulroney wants to pull down trade barriers between the two nations. According to Naftali and O’Hagan, both political scientists at Johns Hopkins University, Mulroney’s policy reflects a new confidence in Canadian industry.

Ottawa and Washington have been jousting over trade since 1854, when they first signed a “Reciprocity Treaty.” After 12 years, Washington reneged, prompting Ottawa to adopt a highly protectionist national policy (1879). In 1911, acting on a U.S. initiative, the two nations agreed to lower tariffs, but then the Canadians failed to ratify the agreement. A period of liberal trade followed World War II, spurred partly by the “Auto Pact” of 1965, which cut tariffs on cars and parts. Americans began investing heavily up north. By 1968, U.S. firms owned 58 percent of Canada’s mining industry and 46 percent of its manufacturing.

Then, in 1971, America suffered its first postwar trade deficit. Washington slapped a 10 percent surcharge on all imports. Ottawa reinvoked protectionism. Canada also slid into recession, and since then has been plagued by double-digit unemployment and inflation.

Behind Mulroney’s free trade initiative lies his desire both to lock up access to U.S. markets before American protectionism rises, and to reap the benefits of competition. “In particular,” observe the authors, Mulroney & Co. share the “conviction that freer continental trade will improve the Canadian standard of living.”

Yet free trade is unlikely to be Canada’s cure-all. Canadian economic forecasters estimate that the open door policy could swell the country’s gross national product ($454 billion in 1985) by eight to 10 percent, improve productivity by one-third, and increase wages by 25 percent in the long run. But in the short run, U.S. competition could crush several industries (e.g., textiles and shoes) and displace six percent of the labor force.

Mulroney is ready to pay that price. He believes, say the authors, that Canadian industries could use “a cold water bath.”

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**SOCIETY**

**Self-Defense**


There are 120 million privately owned firearms in the United States, and they are present in roughly half of all homes. A large percentage of these weapons are kept for the expressed purpose of self-defense.

How safe are gun owners? Kellerman, a physician at the University of Tennessee, and Reay, the chief medical examiner for King County, Wash-
PERIODICALS

SOCIETY

In predominantly urban (92 percent) and white (88.4 percent) King County (1980 pop. 1,270,000), which includes Seattle, the authors examined the records of the 743 gunshot deaths that occurred between 1978 and 1983. Most (53.6 percent) of the killings took place in the home where the gun was kept. Of these 398 fatalities, 333 were suicides (83.7 percent), 50 were homicides (12.6 percent), 12 were accidents (three percent), and three had undetermined causes. Only two deaths (0.5 percent) involved an intruder shot during a break-in. Even after excluding the firearm-related suicides, the authors found, "guns kept at home were involved in the death of a member of the household 18 times more often than in the death of a stranger."

More than 80 percent of the gunshot killings in the survey took place during domestic altercations; in some cases, easy access to a lethal weapon could well have led to a homicide that otherwise might not have occurred. Where suicide—frequently an impulsive act—was involved, a gun at hand probably increased the chances of an attempt. Most (70.5 percent) of the deaths involved handguns (revolvers or pistols), weapons purchased chiefly for self-protection rather than sport.

The authors concede that firearms figured in only 23 percent of all violent deaths (excluding auto fatalities) in King County during the study period. But they also note that they did not analyze the county's numerous nonlethal gunshot episodes.

Old Soldiers Never Pay


"Old soldiers never die: they just fade away," as General Douglas MacArthur said on his retirement in 1951. And as they fade, many require expensive medical treatment for injuries and illnesses—most of which were acquired not in uniform, but in civilian life.

Even so, the Veterans' Administration (VA) is legally obligated to help all ex-G.I.s—rich or poor, regardless of how or when their medical problems began. Levinsky, a Boston University professor of medicine, wants the VA to stop treating old soldiers whose ills are not service related.

The practice of doing so goes back to 1811, when Congress founded the first "naval home" in Philadelphia as "a permanent asylum for disabled and decrepit Navy officers, seamen and Marines." More such facilities followed. They not only housed poor and disabled veterans, but offered medical help to all ex-servicemen, for all their ills.

The VA was established in 1930 to provide services hard to find in private medicine, such as special counseling and rehabilitation for those who had lost a limb or endured spinal cord injuries. Like other federal agencies and programs, the VA ballooned after World War II. It now maintains 172 hospitals (with some 80,000 beds), 115 nursing homes, and
a 200,000-member staff that cares for some 1.4 million inpatients every year. Total annual budget: $8.5 billion.

Only 16 percent of inpatients at VA hospitals are treated for ailments acquired on active duty. While veterans under 65 must pass a means test to receive non-service-related care, older ones do not. Only four million of the nation’s 28 million ex-servicemen are in the elderly category now, but its ranks will grow to nine million by the year 2000. Fully 88 percent of veterans aged 65 and over are covered by Medicare or a private health plan. But one-third of the 12 percent who are not covered require long-term care for chronic illnesses not unique to veterans.

The Reagan administration proposes that only senior veterans living on less than $15,000 a year get VA help with nonservice disabilities. Levinsky has another idea: Washington should simply extend Medicare benefits to any elderly veterans not otherwise covered.

Would Work Work?

There is wide agreement among scholars that the nation harbors a distinct and debilitating “culture of poverty.” Kaus, the New Republic’s West Coast correspondent, examines why federal efforts to “crack the culture” have failed, and what might succeed.

Current welfare programs, Kaus observes, were meant not to solve, but merely to alleviate the problems of the “underclass.” Reluctant to “blame the victim,” liberal politicians of the 1960s sought only to help the poor stay (barely) afloat. The result was such programs as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which funnels cash (typically $4,680 a year) to single parents, at a total annual cost of $15 billion. AFDC payments, the core of “welfare,” as it is known today, have helped sustain the poverty culture by sending young women a message: Have a child, and the state will take care of the baby and its mother as long as the parents do not live together.

Critics of all political persuasions increasingly argue that welfare recipients should earn their money. “Workfare,” a term dating back to the Nixon administration, is in vogue: 28 states have programs under that rubric. But, says Kaus, they do not really attack poverty. “Soft” programs, such as Massachusetts’s Employment and Training Choices (ET), do not make anyone take a job; ET demands only that welfare mothers register for education, job-training programs, and the like. “[Harder] plans that “require” work for pay are full of loopholes. California’s Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN) is a “poverty lawyer’s playpen,” says Kaus: It exempts welfare recipients who are “seriously dependent upon alcohol or drugs,” have “emotional or mental problems,” or suffer from “a severe family crisis.” Also excused are unwed mothers whose eldest child is under six years old—two-thirds of California’s welfare caseload.

What Kaus urges is a plan to create a “Work Ethic State.” He would simply have the federal government guarantee a job for everyone 18 and over. Those in need would show up at designated sites, do assigned tasks
(e.g., painting bridges), and then get paid. No means test would be needed:
The low pay (say, $3 an hour) would not attract people employed elsewhere. The elderly and disabled would still require aid. But otherwise, nonworkers would receive no cash. Unwed mothers would only be provided day care centers, to enable them to take a job.

Kaus concedes that his scheme would draw opposition, especially from public employee unions. But only such a plan, he argues, can skirt workfare’s central problem: getting people to work after they have received money. The Work Ethic State, he says would not “need to ‘require’ work. Work would be all that was offered.”

Bathing’s Beauty

“Cleanliness is next to godliness,” advised John Wesley, the 18th-century Methodist. Wesley notwithstanding, notes Wilkie, a sociologist at Central Michigan University, regular bathing was a rarity for the average American as recently as a century ago.

During the early 19th century, indoor plumbing was next to nonexistent. Although a few hotels (Boston’s Tremont House, New York City’s Astor) had bathtubs in the 1820s and ’30s, no U.S. private dwelling boasted an installed indoor tub until 1842, when Adam Thompson put one in his Cincinnati home. During the latter half of the century, only the wealthy had tubs (usually painted metal or porcelain); rural areas and poor neighborhoods lacked the necessary water and sewage systems.

And why bathe? many wondered. The practice had to be promoted, and the earliest selling point was health. In 1831, Dr. John Bell of Philadelphia touted the “revitalizing” effect of immersion in “tepid water” of 92–98 degrees Fahrenheit. (Cold baths could cause shock, he said; hot water led to “caloric” excitement.) Other physicians, persuaded that warm water weakened the constitution, endorsed the “cold plunge.” A British engineer, J. H. Walsh, suggested in 1857 that shower baths could relieve “congestion of the brain.”

Before long, the bath was being hailed as therapy for cholera, whooping cough, and other ills. Theodore Roosevelt, who took a portable tub on his hunting excursions, praised bathing’s rejuvenative powers. In short, says Wilkie, the bath “became an ordeal one suffered for the sake of one’s health,” rather than a way to relax.

That changed as indoor plumbing spread to middle-class homes, and the price of tubs fell. (As late as 1910, a cast-iron model cost a princely $200.) Between 1921 and 1923, the number of tubs in the United States doubled, to 4.8 million. By 1931, 71 percent of all urban dwellings had bathrooms with fixed tubs.

The medical factor was still important. The realization that bathing helped to curb the spread of germs, Wilkie says, made it seem “necessary to wash the masses to protect the affluent,” and public baths appeared.
In the 16th-century Netherlands, bathing was a royal pleasure. Above, servants bathe a Dutch princess, from the tapestry Life of a Knight.

But bathing was also now generally praised for its “sensual benefits.” Specialists maintained that “cold baths invigorated and refreshed; warm baths brought relaxation and relief from the hectic pace of industrial life.”

To a degree, maintains Wilkie, bathing thus won wide popularity not for reasons of godliness or even cleanliness. It became a way for middle-class Americans to indulge in a sensuality that was otherwise suppressed. The “plunge that bath advisors lauded made one acutely aware of one’s body without seeming self-indulgent.”

PRESS & TELEVISION

East Side Story

“Pitfalls of Journalistic Reporting on Arms Control Negotiations with the USSR” by Gerhard Wettig, in Aussen Politik (No. 2, 1986), 7000 Stuttgart-Hohenheim, Schloss, West Germany.

As the long history of U.S.–Soviet talks on arms control makes clear, the negotiation of curbs on weaponry is a tortuous business. So, too, is the work of journalists who report on the maneuverings of the superpowers. Wettig, a historian at the Federal Institute for Eastern and International Studies in Cologne, West Germany, takes Western reporters to task. Lately, he argues, they have tended to blame the Reagan administration’s
"adamancy" for the lack of arms control progress, while the Soviet Union, playing on "the biases of Western media people," has escaped its fair share of bad press for the stalemate.

Wettig's case in point is the abortive Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations in Geneva between 1981 and 1983, notably the rendering of "key events" in the talks in Deadly Gambits, the 1984 book by Time's Washington bureau chief, Strobe Talbott.

Seeking to break a deadlock, in July 1982 U.S. chief negotiator Paul Nitze and his Soviet counterpart, Yuli Kvitsinsky, took an unofficial "walk in the woods" in the Swiss Jura Mountains. There they discussed an impromptu proposal of Nitze's: The United States would forgo the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Western Europe and limit its stock of cruise missiles there if the Soviets would not deploy cruise weapons in Eastern Europe and would limit the number of SS-20 missile launchers to 75 in Europe and 90 in Asia.

In the end, both sides rejected the proposal. But Wettig observes that while Deadly Gambits deals at length with President Reagan's mid-September decision not to pursue the Nitze plan, the book conspicuously underplays the nyet that came from Moscow two days later. Moreover, when Kvitsinsky later said to Nitze that there would be "no more walks in the woods unless you are under instructions, too," this did not mean, as Deadly Gambits implies, that U.S. intransigence had put off the Soviets. In fact, says Wettig, Kvitsinsky's remark showed Soviet intransigence: It meant that the White House had to commit itself to concessions without having any idea how the Kremlin would respond—an unrealistic demand.

Although Deadly Gambits does mention Soviet unwillingness to compromise, the book, says Wettig, suggests that "U.S. proposals were deliberately non-negotiable," and thus Washington caused the negotiations to fail. Yet Wettig's study of the INF talks showed that the "unacceptability of the Soviet stand" throughout had at least as much to do with the talks' collapse as any "misbehavior" on the U.S. side.

Easy Mark?

When the space shuttle Challenger exploded on January 28, 1986, only 73 seconds after launch, the shock waves spread far and wide.

Public confidence in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was severely shaken. Boot, a pseudonymous Columbia Journalism Review editor, argues that the episode also exposed a conspicuous failure of U.S. journalism.

Dazzled by NASA's apparent technological wizardry and the mystique of space flight, Boot says, major print and broadcast news organizations did not examine the five-year-old shuttle program so much as celebrate it. Throughout, the tone of their reporting was pretty much typified by a 1981 Newsweek story that found NASA's big silver bird "magnificent on
the pad, a space age Taj Mahal.” By the time the birds had made 26 flights, the enthusiasm had become ennui. The postponements of attempts to launch the Challenger before January 28 drew journalistic jibes. On the eve of NASA’s disastrous decision to fire the Challenger into space despite very cold weather at Cape Kennedy, Dan Rather opened the “CBS Even-
ing News” with a remark about “yet another costly, red-faces-all-around space shuttle launch delay.”

Although specialized magazines (e.g., Science, Aviation Week) had long reported signs of trouble in the shuttle program, notes Boot, the mainstream press largely ignored the “red flags.” One prominent flag was the May 1984 decision by the U.S. Air Force to back out of its satellite launch contract with NASA, on the grounds that the shuttle was unreliable. But this event, like various shuttle glitches—failing landing gear brakes (April 1983), blocked fuel valves (June 1984), and balky computers and overheated engines (July 1985)—stirred little press investigation. Nor did NASA’s exaggerated claims about the shuttle’s value in repairing orbiting satellites (the craft cannot reach the altitude of the most important satellites) and as a space “truck.” In truth, the cost of each flight swelled to more than $200 million; unmanned rockets are capable of launching satellites far more cheaply.

What blinded journalists to the shuttle’s shortcomings? Boot quotes New York Times reporter John Noble Wilford: “NASA always had the defense that ‘it works’ and our editors would also say, ‘Yeah, they do have some problems with the equipment, but it works.”’

All along, observes Boot, the shuttle program’s troubles “were reported as isolated events, not perceived jointly as a mosaic of danger.” If NASA’s promotion of the shuttle was a “con job,” the general press, “infatuated by man-in-space adventure, was an easy mark.”

Great Censors

“The press has hailed Ronald Reagan as the “Great Communicator.” Yet many of his top aides, argues Bonafede, the National Journal’s senior contributing editor, operate as if they were great censors.

While tension between the press and public officials is nothing new, Bonafede maintains that the Reagan White House has gone to unprecedented lengths to curb the flow of news about the federal government. The administration, for example, has given agencies more discretion to classify information as secret, and has exempted the “operational files” of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from the Freedom of Information Act. It has also demanded that senior officials promise never to publish books or magazine articles without first submitting them to the government for prepublication review to protect national security information. After former CIA director Stansfield Turner handed his 1986 book, Secrecy and Democracy, to the agency’s censors, they made nearly 100 deletions, and took 18 months to do so.
The administration has also tried to plug leaks by making the punishment for committing such misdeeds more serious. Last year, the Department of Justice prosecuted Samuel L. Morison, a Navy Department intelligence analyst, for selling secret satellite photos of a Soviet shipyard to the British magazine, *Jane's Defence Weekly*. Morison was convicted of violating the Espionage Act of 1917—a rarely invoked law that had previously been used to prosecute people for aiding a foreign enemy, but not for leaking to the Western press.

Buoyed by the Morison conviction, CIA director William Casey disclosed last May that the administration had considered prosecuting three newspapers (the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and the *Washington Times*) and two magazines (Time and *Newsweek*) for publishing articles on how the National Security Agency gathers intelligence. No charges were filed, but Casey made his point: Journalists daring to disclose classified information were asking for trouble.

All in all, says Bonafede, with the "notable exception" of the Nixon White House, no other administration has been "as blatant and intimidating in its efforts to manage, if not control, the news." Why, then, has there been little outcry, at least by major news organizations? Bonafede quotes the *Los Angeles Times* Washington bureau chief, Jack Nelson: "The economy is not bad, there is little inflation, people are fairly happy. That feeling permeates the news media."

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### RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

*Heresy of the Poor*  

During the late 12th century in France, a man named Valdes, alias Peter Waldo, became one of Europe's most renowned heretics. Until recently, little was known about Waldo or his ascetic brotherhood, the Waldensians. But in 1979, Alexander Patschovsky, a Munich historian, discovered six parchment leaves containing records of inquisitions—trials of heretics—involving Waldensians; the trials were held in Bohemia during the 14th century by a Dominican friar, Gallus of Neuhaus. The discovery, says Lerner, a Northwestern University historian, "revolutionized" scholarship in the field by showing that the 14th-century inquisitions, previously thought to have occurred only in southern France and northern Italy, had spread to Bohemia, Austria, and Silesia.

Between 1335 and 1355, Gallus of Neuhaus alone "examined" some 4,400 Waldensians and condemned 200 or more to be burned. Throughout medieval Germany, as many as 10,000 Waldensians died by "judicial fire." The records, as Patschovsky noted, paint a picture of "terror as a lasting fact of life."

Waldo had been a rich merchant. But disillusionment with wealth, and a heartfelt desire to obey Christ's teachings literally, led him to renounce all
his belongings and become an itinerant evangelist. His followers called
themselves "the poor." With no fixed abode, and living by begging, they
walked "two by two, barefooted, dressed in wool, possessing nothing, but
holding all in common after the example of the Apostles." The Roman
Catholic Church despised them, says Lerner, both for their "ostentatious
poverty" (which put high-living orders in a bad light) and their unre-
strained lay preaching. Waldo tried to gain Rome's blessing, but instead
was excommunicated around 1182. By 1184, Pope Lucius III had declared
all Waldensians heretics.

Their religious radicalism only increased. They held priests in con-
tempt; they rejected the notion of Purgatory and some of the sacraments.
Although they confessed regularly, took Communion annually, and fasted,
they would not pray for the deceased (comparing such prayers to feeding
dead horses) and denied the sanctity of churches. Their refusal (obeying
Christ's pronouncement) to "swear" meant they would not participate in
secular courts. Citing the Scriptures, they condemned all legal proceed-
ings, trials, wars, and capital punishment.

Despite the church's efforts, the Waldensians survived. Their persecu-
tion ceased during the late 15th century. In 1484 the Kingdom of Sardinia
granted them freedom of worship, and eventually they settled throughout
Europe. Today, roughly 50,000 Waldensians are prospering in Italy,
Argentina, and Uruguay, as well as some 3,000 in the United States, mostly
in New York City and Valdese, North Carolina.

Saving Grace

The Reverend Jonathan Edwards (1703–58), the great American Puritan,
liked to flay his flock with metaphors: A sinner, for instance, was like "a
helpless spider" dangling over a flame.

Edwards's hellfire analogies, sprinkled throughout sermons with titles
like "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God" (1741), have secured his
reputation as Colonial New England's chief "preacher of terror." But
Yarbrough, a historian at Texas A & M University, points out that he did
more than bedevil congregations with visions of damnation.

A pastor's son who entered Yale at 13, Edwards was as much impas-
sioned by nature as by theology. In addition to dissertations on philosophy
(Freedom of Will) and religion (Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin
Defended), he wrote on natural phenomena ("Of the Rainbow"). And as a
theologian, says Yarbrough, he sought to create a new religious "rheto-
ic," one that would inspire a direct apprehension of God's spirit.

For Edwards, an understanding of the world, of morality, of God, de-
depend deeply on language. Of course the goal, in his scheme, was to
receive "communication" from God. But, while he believed that "a person
cannot have spiritual light without the Word," he also maintained that "the
Word" does not in itself "cause that light." The spirit of God must be
From 1751 to 1757, Jonathan Edwards served as pastor of the frontier church in Stockbridge, Mass., where he ministered to white settlers and acted as missionary to the Housatonic Indians. Unlike his Puritan predecessors, Edwards believed that Indians, too, could be saved by Christianity.

grasped directly, in an experience Edwards called "grace."

What was the key to this heightened state?

The Scriptures and nature. Even as a child, Edwards doubted the traditional Protestant doctrine of "predestination"—the notion that some souls are born to salvation, some to damnation. By age 18, he was convinced that anyone who read the Bible and studied nature could receive God's glory—provided that he had achieved "grace." For Edwards, that moment was unforgettable: "God's excellency, his wisdom, his purity and love, seemed to appear in everything, in the sun, moon and stars."

The importance of "grace" to Edwards, says Yarbrough, was its ability to confer on people a special "rhetorical authority": Only the possessors of this authority were fit to interpret and teach God's Word.

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

Fire and Ice

"Bolts from the Blue" by Peter H. Handel, in The Sciences (July-Aug. 1986), 2 East 63rd St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

Scourge of pilots and picnickers, delight of romantics, thunderstorms have a certain majesty. As Handel, a physicist at the University of Missouri, St. Louis, notes, they have a certain mystery, too.

Since 1916, when Scottish physicist C. T. R. Wilson set forth his theories about atmospheric electricity, meteorologists have known this much: As the afternoon sun beams down on land and sea, updrafts of heated,
humid air occur. If the updrafts are powerful enough to soar into the cold troposphere, five to 11 miles up, tall, anvil-headed cumulonimbus clouds form. As the tropospheric wind rises, temperatures fall, and the high-vaulted clouds become electrically charged—negative on top and positive on the bottom. In reaction, the underlying sea or land surface takes on a negative charge. As the electrical attraction between ground and cloud grows (as high as 100 million volts), it eventually overcomes the insulating effect of the intervening air. A series of ascending and descending bolts of current begins to flow, appearing as a single flash—lightning. Such discharges can also occur within a cloud, between clouds, and between clouds and air. Indeed, each day, around the globe, there are some 44,000 thunderstorms producing eight million lightning flashes.

Missing from this model, though, is an account of what first causes the clouds to become electrified. As it turns out, the key is ice. Unlike the well-ordered ice crystals found in snowflakes, writes Handel, the microscopic crystallites that compose the upper two-thirds of a cumulonimbus cloud have an irregular structure. In 1968, H. Peter Glockman of Munich's Technical University observed that these crystallites become electrically polarized, like little magnets, in the frigid high-altitude air. Individually, these polarized crystals have little power. Collectively, the millions, if not billions, of crystallites can set in motion a “polarization catastrophe,” in which the whole cloud is charged. As the ice crystals adhere to each other and grow in size, however, they lose their polarity. The electrical bonds among them shatter, and bolts of electricity begin to equalize the ground–cloud polarity.

As long as the warm, moist surface air continues to rise, the polarization process continues, and so does the lightning. Eventually, though, the updrafts cease, the cloud empties its electrical charges and dissipates, and nature recovers from the outburst.

The Mayan Millennia


Classic Maya civilization flourished for 600 years (from A.D. 300 to 900), across 125,000 square miles of Central America. That it was an advanced society is not in doubt: The Maya boasted an elaborate social structure, a rich ceremonial life, and a cosmology involving a wide array of gods and natural forces.

Until recently, scholars believed that these features of Classic Maya civilization had emerged rapidly, during the third century A.D. But discoveries during the past decade, reports Hammond, a Rutgers University archaeologist, prove that Classic Maya culture evolved slowly, and over several thousand years.

The idea that the Maya first occupied the Central American isthmus around 900 B.C. got a strong jolt in Belize. There, an archaeological team from the University of Texas has uncovered stone projectile points strongly resembling those used by big-game hunters of the Clovis culture.
which took root in North America some 10,000 years ago. This suggested to archaeologists that the Classic Maya culture could have appeared at roughly the same time. Radiocarbon dating shows stable Mayan farming communities forming as early as 2500 B.C. By the Middle Preclassic period (1250 B.C. to 450 B.C.), trade had become sophisticated, with Mayan communities exchanging obsidian glassware and jade throughout Guatemala.

The Late Preclassic period (450 B.C. to A.D. 300) saw the emergence of religious and political conventions typical of Classic Maya civilization. In 1980, working near Cuello, Belize, Hammond discovered that Mayan villagers had replaced their small courtyard with a large ceremonial site around 450 B.C. To commemorate that event, the villagers sacrificed some two dozen young men; among their remains were found bloodletting instruments bearing a royal Mayan crest—evidence, says Hammond, that during the Late Preclassic period “real political power had been forged.” This development was followed by the building of impressive Preclassic structures like the pyramids at El Mirador in Guatemala. Moreover, the astronomical orientation of El Tigre, an 18-story pyramid, suggests that Mayan understanding of the motions of stars and planets had been acquired before the Classic period.

Mayan culture, scholars still agree, would not fully mature until A.D. 300. But, by the Late Preclassic era, the Maya, Hammond says, “had accumulated almost all the trappings of Classic civilization.”

A Living Fossil?

Among the most beautiful creatures in the sea is the nautilus, whose pearly, glistening shell houses a spiral of chambers in which lives the deep-sea cephalopod, a relative of the octopus and squid.

Noting the similarity between today’s nautilus shells and those of millions of years ago, biologists long regarded the nautilus as a living fossil. But within the last decade, writes Miller, a reporter for Science News, that view has changed. Scientists now believe that “rather than being at an evolutionary standstill,” Miller writes, the nautilus is “evolving at a rate faster than that of many other modern animals.”

The earliest cephalopods in the fossil record were “nautiloids.” They are thought to be the first organism to have jaws, and among the first predators. Roughly 25 million years ago, some 17,000 species of them swam the world’s seas. Today, restricted to a region bounded by the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, and the Fiji Islands, only five or six species remain, the most common being *Nautilus pompilius*.

Like its ancient ancestors, the modern nautilus is slow-moving (traveling no more than 100 miles a year) and slow-growing: It takes 10 years of its average 14-year life to reach maturity. But, whereas the nautilus was once a shallow-water creature, competition for food from big fish has forced it into the deeper waters (400–800 feet) inhabited by eels, crabs, and shrimp. The evolution of larger shells has enabled it to drift at greater
depths. To stay above 800-foot depths where it would be crushed, the nautilus pumps water in and out of its shell chambers, like ballast in a submarine, to regulate its buoyancy. Feeding at night, the nautilus relies mainly on smell. Its primitive eyes are lensless, like a pinhole camera. At nine inches it can barely discern what a human can see at 165 yards.

Genetic studies of nautilus tentacle tissue by David Woodruff at the University of California, San Diego, show that, if anything, the speed of nautilus evolution is increasing. Indeed, the genes of *N. pompilus* are far more variable than those of the human species. The half-dozen modern nautilus species developed only one million to five million years ago. Now the species appear to be in the early stages of diverging again.

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**RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT**

*Exotic Crops*


Crambe, kenaf, jojoba: Creatures from another planet? Delegates at a United Nations conference? Neither, writes Hinman, a professor at the University of Arizona College of Agriculture. All are plants nearing commercial production that promise an “amazing variety” of commodities with agricultural and industrial applications.
Spurring the development of such new crops, observes Hinman, is, among other things, a 1978 report sponsored by the National Science Foundation. The report warned that the genetic pool of existing crops might become too shallow, leaving plants vulnerable to disease or environmental shock. Farmers were urged to shift away from crops that need large amounts of water and soil nutrients, or that cannot survive in a broad range of temperatures and soil conditions.

Several plants native to the United States offer alternatives. The buffalo gourd, a relative of the squash and pumpkin family, is one. Indigenous to the arid and semiarid regions of North America, its vines are rich in protein and can serve as forage; the roots contain starch transformable into simple sugars. The plant even yields an oil that can be refined into a diesel fuel or ethanol. Likewise, crambe, a member of the *Cruciferae* family (e.g., mustards, cabbages, rapes) turns out to be an excellent source of erucic acid, an industrial lubricant now derived mainly from rapeseed oil, a commodity becoming ever scarcer in the United States. Found originally near the Mediterranean Sea, the fast-growing plant (its season is 90 to 100 days) fares well in most American states. Crambe oil also produces chemicals valuable in the making of nylons, lacquers, and plastics.

When, during the 1970s, oil from sperm whales was banned in the United States in an effort to protect the endangered species, manufacturers of cosmetics and transmission fluid, among others, sought a substitute. Jojoba, a shrub native to the Sonoran Desert of Mexico and the U.S. Southwest, provided an answer. Jojoba seed oil (valued today at more than $30 per gallon), Hinman points out, can replace whale oil; the meal left from the pressing of the seeds can be processed as heating fuel (costing only $50 to $75 per ton) and as a source of tannin, a compound used to make dyes. Another stand-in came out of a U.S. Department of Agriculture search for a substitute for wood pulp for paper: kenaf, a bambooleike herbaceous stalk native to Central Africa. This fibrous plant, Hinman says, yields pulp "as good as or better than wood pulp."

Such agricultural exotica offer enormous opportunities to U.S. industry, Hinman suggests. Indeed, as botanists and agronomists develop the tools of molecular biology, designer plants may not be far off.

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**Dam Damage**

"Dams: Managing to Keep Rivers Wild" by Tony Davis, in *Technology Review* (May-June 1986), Rm. 10-140, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. 02139.

Even staunch environmentalists agree that dams are among the greatest feats of 20th-century engineering. They can be used to control floods, irrigate crops, store water against droughts, and generate electricity.

Yet the trouble with dams, notes Davis, a Seattle-based environmentalist, is that they do damage to the wildlife and environment of the river basins they were designed to control.

Consider the 30-year-old Glen Canyon Dam, a 710-foot-high concrete structure on the Colorado River in Arizona. It produces enough electricity
to power a city the size of Phoenix. Its reservoir, Lake Powell, stores more water than half the U.S. population can drink in a year. All in all, contends Davis, the dam has done more to “transform the Southwest into the Sunbelt” than any other public works project. Various critics, including ecologists from groups like Friends of the Earth, are now faulting the dam: Lake Powell has become “Lake Foul”; lower downstream water temperatures have killed off four native species of fish; beaches are eroding for lack of river-borne sediment.

The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, which built and oversees Glen Canyon, has taken such complaints seriously enough to launch a $4 million study of the dam’s environmental effects. Similar alarms have been raised about such colossuses as the Hoover Dam at the Colorado-Nevada border, the Bonneville Dam at the Oregon-Washington border, and California’s Shasta Dam. Some dam-operating agencies have undertaken expensive remedies. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is spending roughly $8 million to install special equipment (“metallic hub baffles”) on its 27 dams to oxygenate river water and bring the fish back. By releasing water very sparingly, the TVA dams had created a “eutrophication” problem: In still waters, micro-organisms absorb oxygen needed by fish, which either die or move away. The Bonneville Power Administration will spend up to $30 million to fit screens on its 15 dams to keep migrating salmon from getting hacked up by the blades of the 60-foot turbines.

Most U.S. dams were designed and built long before the 1970 National Environmental Policy Act, which requires an ecological “impact” study on major water projects before construction begins. Needless to say, fixing a dam after the fact is very expensive, and at this point, there are no good alternatives. But it is ironic that, as Davis observes, “the question now is not how to tame the rivers but how to keep them wild.”

ARTS & LETTERS

James Bondovich


The late Soviet premier Yuri Andropov may have savored the novels of America’s Jacqueline Susann, but for most Soviet readers the writer of choice is fellow citizen Julian Semyonov. Laqueur, a Georgetown University professor of government, calls Semyonov’s “documentary novels” “mirrors of Soviet thought and a powerful influence on public opinion.”

What makes for a Soviet best seller? In a country where Tass and Pravda provide the party line on recent history, Semyonov’s tales offer welcome diversion. His breezy narratives, often melding fiction and historical fact a la John le Carré, deal with such once-taboo subjects as Moscow’s criminal underground, Nazi Germany, and even (gingerly) Josef Stalin. His bad guys are not always “imperialistic” or “bourgeois” thugs.
Born in Moscow in 1931, Semyonov started out writing for Ogonyok, a newsweekly. In 1963, after a string of modest successes with fiction, he became a sensation with the publication of Petrouka 38, a thriller that described Soviet police methods in detail.

Semyonov's next eight novels featured his most popular character, Maxim Stirlitz. He is the Soviet James Bond: athletic (a tennis champion), sensitive, educated (he can discuss Pascal and Kant), and courageously loyal, as might be expected of one who knew Lenin and Litvinov before the 1917 revolution. In early novels, Stirlitz hunts for the fallen tsar's jewels, survives intrigues in 1930s Shanghai, and, disguised as a Nazi officer, spies on the Third Reich. In one World War II story, 17 Moments in Spring, the hero foils a conspiracy between future U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director Allen Dulles and the Nazis to redeploy German troops in Italy against the Red Army. A Bomb for the President finds Stirlitz stopping West German and U.S. firms from producing nuclear weapons for Mao Zedong's China.

In Semyonov's stories, Laqueur observes, America comes off as a "thoroughly materialistic society." The only Amerikantsy the author seems to like are Franklin Roosevelt, George Gershwin, Louis Armstrong, and Ernest Hemingway (a Semyonov idol). To Laqueur, this suggests that Semyonov, however popular, must still pay tribute to "the established rules of the system." Indeed, the Soviet leadership and the star pop novelist are remarkably like-minded. When U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz visited Moscow on the eve of the 1985 Geneva summit, Premier Mikhail Gorbachev charged that the United States was run by the CIA and defense suppliers like General Dynamics—a theme echoed in Semyonov's latest novel, Press Center, which tells of a CIA-sponsored counterrevolutionary coup in Central America.

Van Gogh's Stars


On the second floor of New York's Museum of Modern Art hangs Vincent van Gogh's The Starry Night, unquestionably one of the museum's masterpieces. With its "blazing turbulence," writes Soth, a Carleton College art historian, the painting captures the main currents of the tormented Dutch artist's work; filled with sublimated religious images, it exalts the imagination and consoles the soul.

Van Gogh (1853–90) strove to offer "consolation"—a frequent word in his correspondence—to his fellow man, first as a missionary and then as a painter. But his impulsive behavior often got the better of him. In 1880, while preaching among poor coal miners in southwest Belgium, he gave away all his belongings—prompting his dismissal from his order for a too-literal interpretation of the Bible. Rejecting religion, he turned to painting full time. His refusal to follow academic principles led to his departure from an Antwerp art academy in 1886; he then moved to Paris, working with painter Paul Gauguin. Relations between the two artists deteriorated, and, in a fit of despair, van Gogh cut off part of his own left ear on Christmas
Eve in 1888. In May 1889, fearful of losing his capacity to paint, he entered the asylum of Saint-Rémy-de-Provence.

It was during this period that van Gogh produced *The Starry Night*, whose motif, he had written a year earlier, "preoccupies me continuously." Two previous nocturnal works—*Café Terrace at Night* (1888) and *Starry Night over the Rhone* (1888)—displeased him, says Soth, as too "descriptively realistic."

What van Gogh wanted, as he said in a letter to his sister, was to paint from "pure imagination." *The Starry Night*, with its amalgam of scenes, was pure indeed. Mountains were visible from his St. Rémy cell, but the town and the cypress groves in the painting were not. There were sharp-steepled churches in his native Brabant, but none in St. Rémy.

Soth also sees a strong link between *The Starry Night* and van Gogh's repressed religious feelings. Writing to a friend, van Gogh speaks of "having a terrible need of—shall I say the word—religion. Then I go out at night to paint the stars." And after scraping off the canvas of his second attempt to depict the Biblical tale of Christ's agony in the garden of Gethsemane, van Gogh said: "I have the thing in my head with the colors, a starry night, the figure of Christ in blue... and the angel blended citron-yellow"—the two main colors in *The Starry Night*.

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The Starry Night (1889) by Vincent van Gogh. Inspired in part by the works of Delacroix and Corot, this passionate scene, created a year before van Gogh's suicide at 37, is among the best known of his 800 oil paintings.
Christ’s agony, when an angel is sent down from Heaven to comfort him on the eve of the Crucifixion, was a powerful image for van Gogh. He referred often to its themes of consolation amid suffering. Soth suggests that, unable to paint conventional religious imagery, van Gogh sought in The Starry Night to create “a sublimated image of his deepest religious feelings.” Yet any consolation the artist gained was surely short-lived: One year later, he shot himself.

‘Cool’ Ballet

Few art forms get more criticism than does classical ballet. Seizing on its aristocratic air, its rigidity—from leap to en point spin, every move is prescribed—and the seeming lack of social “relevance” of such ballets as Tchaikovsky’s Swan Lake and Prokofiev’s Romeo and Juliet, proponents of free-flowing modern dance denounce ballet as an art for mere aesthetes. The critics, notes Copeland, a teacher of theater and dance at Oberlin College, charge that it “lacks ‘sincerity,’ has nothing to do with the ‘real’ world, and consists of little more than a hollow, decorative, arbitrary display of technique.” Isadora Duncan, the 1920s doyenne of modern dance, added a feminist and physiological complaint: Ballet “condemns itself by enforcing the deformation of a beautiful woman’s body.”

Copeland argues that the critics all miss the point. Most of the great balletomanes (e.g., André Levinson, Rayner Heppenstall, Lincoln Kirstein) became devotees of the classical dance form not so much for its aesthetics as its ethics. Ballet, Copeland contends, does have a “morality,” but it is one of “form—not content.”

In training, ballet dancers must give up their “slack” habits and allow themselves to be molded into “upright” creatures. As Russian balletomane A. K. Volinsky observed in his Book of Exultation, the association of verticality, in style and posture, with honesty goes back to the ancient Greeks, who despised “the bent and crooked” in all things. The openness and clean lines of ballet stances, says Copeland, also connote “clarity and intelligibility.” While modern dance is murky, focusing on the performers’ “inner” experiences, ballet has “nothing to do with anything that is private or internal.” Its style is strongly impersonal.

This ethic of “impersonality,” says Copeland, is one of ballet’s virtues. In a culture that is “endlessly fascinated with the personal lives of artists,” if not with their work, ballet demands selflessness; dancers must vanish into the composition. While modern dance features solos, ballet values “harmonious interaction between individuals.” The epitome here is choreographer George Balanchine’s New York City Ballet, whose “cool, impersonal” performances never commit the sin (as modern dance does) of inviting the audience to go “wallowing in [its] own emotions.”

That, Copeland argues, is high art. T. S. Eliot, who observed in his essay “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1919) that “the progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of the personality,” would agree.
Like him or not, Fidel Castro has made Cuba a more literate, healthier, and better-educated nation—or so many American journalists and government officials believe.

These folk do not include Eberstadt, a Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He argues that only by fudging key statistics has Havana been able to pass itself off as a “socialist showcase.”

In 1977, a visiting U.S. congressional delegation was told that Cuba had succeeded in boosting its literacy rate from only 25 percent in 1959 to 95 percent today. But Cuban literacy was never so low to begin with, nor is it so high today. The country’s last pre-Castro census—held in 1953, six years before the revolution—put the literacy rate at 76 percent. To push the rate upward, Eberstadt says, Havana juggled the population sample. A 1970 census that showed an illiteracy rate of 13 percent included all adults over the age of 15. But a tally taken in 1979 that showed less than five percent illiteracy encompassed only those between the ages of 15 and 49, excluding older Cubans who were less likely than their younger compatriots to be able to read and write. Had all adults been counted, Cuba’s present rate of illiteracy would hover around seven to 10 percent—about the same as the rates in Dominica, Grenada, and Trinidad and Tobago.

Havana also seems to be playing games with health statistics. The regime claims that Cuba’s infant mortality rate has fallen by 75 percent since 1959. A closer look at official figures indicates that infant mortality steadily increased until 1969, when it reached 46 per thousand, but thereafter plunged, falling to 17 per thousand in 1982. Research by other demographers, says Eberstadt, suggests that Havana’s numbers cannot be true. “The sharp drop in [Cuba’s] infant mortality rate from the mid-1970s to 1980,” maintains Kenneth Hill of the National Academy of Sciences, “is not supported by the available child survivorship data.”

But fudging the numbers is nothing new in Havana. During the 1960s, says Eberstadt, reports on Cuba’s lackluster sugar harvest were rewritten to avoid giving comfort to “enemies of the revolution.”

Guatemala is, as guidebooks say, a land of contrasts.

The economy of this tropical nation of coffee, cotton, cattle, and 8.2 million people is in a shambles, thanks to a long-running guerrilla war. Guatemala also has one of the worst human rights records in the Western Hemisphere. Then again, late last year the country held its first elections.
in two decades that were free of fraud.

The elections brought to power Mario Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo, 43, the leader of the Christian Democratic Party. He is only the third civilian chief that Guatemala has had since socialist Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was overthrown, with U.S. help, in 1954. If Cerezo is to survive his five-year term, writes Perera, a teacher of writing at the University of California, Santa Cruz, he "will need qualities of political judgment and courage well beyond those he has demonstrated so far."

Cerezo's biggest problem is how to end the fighting between leftist guerrillas and Guatemala's army, in which more than 100,000 civilians have died since 1954. (Another 38,000 have become desaparecidos [disappeared ones].) Chief among the victims have been Guatemala's roughly four million Indians, who have long chafed at the dominance of the country's "Europeans."

Three guerrilla groups, with almost 2,000 hard-core fighters, are active in the central and western highlands and on the southern coastal plantations. They will negotiate only if Cerezo purges the army's high command and pledges better treatment for the Indians. But so far, Cerezo has not challenged the armed forces directly. He has not charged any officers with crimes committed during the last two military regimes, or kept a promise to disband the million-man rural militia, widely blamed for many civilian deaths. The Group of Mutual Support, a human rights organization run by relatives of the desaparecidos, has found scant solace in Cerezo's claim that "only" 560 political murders occurred during his first six months in office.

Guatemala's ills also include big budget deficits, heavy unemployment, and 38 percent inflation. To get more help from Washington (which cut aid from last year's $101 million to $77 million), Cerezo must curb human rights abuses. That, again, means reining in the soldiers.

Perera reports, however, that Cerezo, buoyed by strong local Christian Democratic chapters, has much popular support. He has pleased labor unions by creating 40,000 new jobs, and pleased businessmen by obtaining development loans from the United States, Mexico, Venezuela, and Western European countries. And while few rural Guatemalans expect radical change, they seem willing to give Cerezo a chance.

Stalemate in 'Stan'

"The War in Afghanistan" by Craig M. Karp, in Foreign Affairs (Summer 1986), 58 East 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

When Premier Mikhail S. Gorbachev announced last July that the Soviet Union would withdraw 7,200 troops from Afghanistan, some Western pundits began to wonder: After seven years of fighting the rebel mujahedeen, has Moscow had enough?

Not yet, says Karp, a Near East specialist at the U.S. State Department. Though thus far unable to crush the rebels, the Soviets are unwilling to give up their political objectives and will not abandon neighboring Afghanistan anytime soon.
The Soviet military campaign in Afghanistan has been no circus, as cartoonist Gene Langley observed in 1981. In addition to heavy casualties, Moscow's troops have suffered from various diseases (notably dysentery and hepatitis), severe morale problems, alcoholism, and drug abuse. Some soldiers have even sold supplies to buy heroin.

Since the Soviets first arrived in December 1979, their expeditionary force (now 120,000 strong) has suffered perhaps 30,000 casualties, including 10,000 dead; close to 800 aircraft have been lost. The Soviets have had successes, notably the destruction last April of a mujahedeen stronghold at Zhawar, near the Pakistan border. But the second and third largest cities, Herat and Kandahar, remain in rebel hands. In Kabul, the capital, whose population has been swollen by refugees to about two million, "the noise of explosions can be heard year round," observes Karp. The Soviet-sponsored Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) resembles "a city-state with military outposts in the hinterlands."

Unable to control the interior of the country, the Soviets have moved to cut off the arms (from America and other suppliers) flowing in from Pakistan and Iran. Punitive air strikes have uprooted thousands of Afghans; 1.8 million now reside in Iran, 2.6 million in Pakistan. Yet, according to Karp, these raids "have harassed and complicated, but not significantly curbed, the operations of the mujahedeen," a coalition of seven Afghan resistance groups.

Attempts to win Afghan hearts and minds have proved no more successful. Membership in the Afghan Communist Party has grown, slowly, but high desertion rates hamstring the regular Afghan army. Guns, money, and pledges of protection have persuaded few villages and tribes to take up arms against the mujahedeen. Displeased by the failure of the DRA to generate popular support, the Soviets forced the replacement last May of Secretary General Babrak Karmal of the Afghan Communist Party with Najibullah, former head of the Afghan secret police.

Gorbachev has called the war a "bleeding wound," its starkest characterization yet by a Soviet leader. Soviet news coverage (mostly pessimistic) of events in what returning troops call "Stan" has increased. So, appar-
ently, has popular discontent with the continuing imbroglio: New edicts have been issued to curb draft evasion. But all this does not point to a Soviet retreat, Karp believes. Rather, he concludes, "Moscow is preparing its own people for a long struggle."

Stirring Dragon


For Nakasone Yasuhiro, Japan's prime minister since 1982, as for his predecessors, defense policy is a delicate matter. Too little military spending sparks U.S. complaints that Japan is getting a "free ride" on defense. Too much triggers charges of "revived militarism" at home and reminds Japan's neighbors of their harsh wartime experiences.

Johnson, a political scientist at the University of California, Berkeley, salutes Nakasone for avoiding the extremes while being Japan's "most militarily realistic leader" in at least 25 years.

Guiding postwar Japanese defense policy have been three principles: the no-war clause (article nine) of the 1947 constitution; Prime Minister Sato Eisaku's 1968 pledge that "Japan will not produce, possess, or let others bring in" nuclear weapons; and Prime Minister Miki Takeo's 1976 decision to cap defense spending at one percent of Japan's gross national product. Thus Japan has no strategic weapons (e.g., missiles), and the portion of government spending devoted to its 241,000-man Self Defense Forces is small—5.2 percent in 1982, versus 29 percent that year in the United States, 39 percent in Taiwan, and 35 percent in South Korea. Yet no nation, observes Johnson, "profits more from international political and military security than Japan."

But various developments—including tension between Tokyo and Moscow since the late 1970s over such matters as Japan's rapprochement with China—have raised Japanese interest in defense. Nakasone has upped his military budget by 4.6 percent in real terms for each of the last three years and has agreed to Reagan administration proposals that Japan take on more regional defense responsibilities. At home, where polls show that most Japanese believe their armed forces' chief role is disaster relief, he has publicized defense issues, pointing out that the Soviets have at least 135 SS-20 missiles in Siberia and bases on the nearby Kuril Islands.

At the same time, the 68-year-old prime minister has engaged in what Johnson calls "sensitive diplomacy" with Japan's wartime victims. Generous aid packages have been forthcoming for South Korea and China. And in October 1985, Nakasone made a formal apology at the United Nations General Assembly for his country's behavior during World War II.

Some Nakasone calligraphy hanging in the Japan Defense Academy, where he was director general in 1970–71, reads: "Amid wind and rain, hidden deep in the mountains, there lies a reclining dragon." To Nakasone, this conjures up an image of a military establishment ready for any emergency. In Johnson's view, the words also describe a statesman whose talents, hidden for many years, are now coming into play.
"National Service: What Would It Mean?"
Lexington Books, 125 Spring St., Lexington, Mass. 02173. 307 pp. $16.
Authors: Richard Danzig and Peter Szanton.

"Compulsory national service"—an idea that has come and gone many times in recent U.S. history—is seeing a revival.

A recent Gallup poll found 65 percent approval of a program in which young people would serve their country—either in the military or a public service agency—for at least a year. Says Senator Gary Hart, a Democratic presidential hopeful: "Compulsory national service may be the biggest issue of the eighties.

Drawing from a host of other studies, Danzig and Szanton, both former Carter administration officials, explore how such a program might actually work.

National service, its proponents argue, would alleviate several ills at once. First, it could ease the Pentagon's looming problems with manpower quantity and quality. With baby boomers now in their late 20s and early 30s, the pool from which the 13-year-old all-volunteer force is drawn has shrunk dramatically. Today, only one in six young men signs up for the military; of those who do, only 10 percent have any college education.

Second, "national service participants" (NSPs), as the authors call them, could fill jobs that are important to society but now go begging. Danzig and Szanton estimate that some 3.5 million additional hands are needed in hospitals and hospices, in national forests and wildlife preserves, in public libraries and museums. As a side benefit, national service would reduce unemployment among young people (20 percent of 16 to 19-year-olds who are out of school are jobless).

Either as soldiers or in service work, young NSPs would gain good job experience, more self-respect, a greater sense of responsibility, and exposure to people from other socioeconomic classes. Moreover, the country would rediscover something it has lacked for a long time: a sense of community in American life.

Danzig and Szanton consider the merits of several national service programs. Under a "school-based" plan, Washington would provide funds to states that required high school seniors either to do 240 hours of service work (in lieu of classes, or after hours), or enroll in a three-month basic training program. A second scheme calls for the resumption of a two-year military draft for men, but with a twist: conscripts would be permitted to opt for some kind of civilian service. Another approach would be to expand existing voluntary programs, such as the Peace Corps and VISTA, to generate some 180,000 jobs.

Danzig and Szanton argue that only a universal and mandatory system for all youths, "regardless of circumstances or capacities," would meet the country's needs for military personnel and service workers. Under the program that the authors urge, all Americans would be required to do either military or civilian service after turning 18; those failing to report for duty by age 20 would face a five percent income tax surcharge every year, until they met their obligations. A new federal agency would work with the states to place those who chose service work (paid at the minimum wage) with public agencies or private, nonprofit organizations. Estimated annual cost: $10 billion, after five years.

Danzig and Szanton admit that their particular plan is fraught with uncertainties. They worry about "high levels of turbulence, waste, and mismatch between participants' skills and assignments." Still, "national service," the authors hope, could give its graduates the sense that "through some modest sacrifice they had become participants in a nation that, on the whole, offers much and asks very little."
"Debt and Danger: The World Financial Crisis."
Authors: Christopher Huhne and Harold Lever

The Debt Crisis continues. By now, the borrowings owed to foreign lenders by 123 developing countries exceed $828 billion. Huhne and Lever, British economists, know whom to blame: "Santa Claus had appeared in the guise of sound commercial activity, and no one wanted to shoot him."

When the oil cartel raised prices in 1973-74, Western governments urged commercial banks to "recycle" excess petrodollars as loans to poorer nations, to help them pay their fuel bills and maintain economic stability. The task seemed both profitable and noble, as, for a while, it was. But, by the early 1980s, the banks found that their loans could not be repaid, only extended. So they cut back credit.

Now both lenders and debtors are in pain. In 1985, the seven top borrowers (Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Argentina, Venezuela, Indonesia, and the Philippines) sent the banks some $32 billion more in payments than they got in new credit. If the debtors default, some big banks would be in trouble.

The International Monetary Fund presses debtor governments to cut spending and take other hard steps to pay their loans. Huhne and Lever say this only hurts their economies. To service debt and fuel growth, the countries need at least $30-40 billion in new credit.

To provide it, the authors say, government agencies like the U.S. Export-Import Bank must step in, perhaps guaranteeing new loans while curbing the debtors' "profligate" spending. For that, the commercial banks were "profoundly ill-suited."

"Are Takeover Targets Undervalued?"
Author: John Pound

Both corporate "raiders" and their critics agree that such companies as Gulf, Conoco, and Continental Airlines have fallen to unfriendly takeovers because they were "undervalued." The market price of their stock was below the firm's "intrinsic" worth, however measured.

But both disagree why companies become undervalued. Raiders blame poor management. Critics counter that stock prices may not reflect true value: Investors favor firms that yield short-term profits, not those that seek long-term growth.

Pound, a Yale economist, examined 113 targets of takeover attempts, successful and otherwise.

The shares of such companies, he confirms, do tend to have a relatively low "P/E ratio"—the ratio of a stock's price to the company's annual earnings per share. (In June 1986, the average ratio for all firms was 16.6 to 1.) But were the targets all pursuing long-term growth?

No, says Pound: The firms did not invariably make above-average capital outlays. Pound's research also undermines another antiraider charge: that sharks attack firms with low debt, so that they can later sell assets to pay for the takeover. Actually, targets tend to have high debt.

Pound shies away from saying that takeover attempts do good. But at the moment, he says, the burden of proof in the debate "falls more heavily" on the critics. They have yet to prove that "takeovers are damaging to the economy."
Jordan is a thinly populated (2.5 million) desert country, largely free of the Islamic religious fundamentalism that besets other Arab nations, and blessed with a remarkably stable monarchy, led since 1953 by a shrewd king, Hussein, with an American-born wife and a pro-Western stance.

But can Jordan remain a Middle East "moderate" much longer? Palestinian refugees from neighboring Israel are now a majority in the country. Israeli hard-liners like General Ariel Sharon maintain (wishfully) that "Jordan is Palestine." If King Hussein and his designated successor (and brother) Prince Hassan were to disappear tomorrow, would Jordan indeed become a Palestinian state?

Day, a former State Department Middle East specialist, thinks not. Hussein, he argues, has at last fashioned a "cohesive" Jordan with an identity of its own.

The Jordanians are a collection of tribes. The king's own Hashemite tribesmen, who came from the Hejaz, a rugged strip along the Red Sea, gained little prominence until 1921, when the British made Hussein's grandfather the emir of Transjordan. In 1946, when Britain relinquished control, "Jordan" became a sovereign constitutional monarchy.

The East Bankers, who lived along the eastern side of the Jordan River, were Jordanians from the start. The Palestinians arrived as refugees, in two waves: The first followed David Ben-Gurion's 1948 proclamation establishing the state of Israel; the second followed the 1967 Six-Day War, when Israeli forces seized the Gaza Strip from Egypt and the West Bank from Jordan. Both groups, says Day, were bitter and "determined to eventually go back."

The East Bankers did not greet the Palestinians warmly. Coming from such cities as Jaffa and Jerusalem, the Palestinians were better educated and more urbane than the East Bankers, and far more interested in Palestinian nationalism. Hussein's anxieties about the armed strength of Yasser Arafat's Amman-based Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led to "Black September," the bloody 1970 expulsion of the PLO (which moved to Lebanon). Even now, Palestinians are excluded from the upper echelons of the Jordanian military and government bureaucracies. And Jordanians joke that, while all the lawyers are Palestinians, the judges are East Bankers.

But time and economic progress have lessened the differences between the groups. Between 1974 and 1980, Jordan's gross national product (GNP) grew by eight percent a year, with the help of rising oil prices and assistance from other Arab nations. With a GNP per capita of $1,912, Jordan is ranked by the World Bank as an "upper-middle income" country.

All Jordanians have enjoyed the fruits of such growth, including better education. Whereas a small minority of elderly Jordanians are literate, over 80 percent of young Palestinians and East Bankers can read and write. Thirty years ago, observes Day, Jordan was a "society half-modern and half-traditional." Now it is "a good deal more homogenous."

Thus, Day believes, a "Palestinian" Jordan is unlikely. The 76,000-man army is committed to the monarchy. In any case, the Palestinian middle class has made "a very comfortable home for itself." Even the most discontented émigrés know a new Palestine-in-Jordan would foreclose their claims to what they consider their true homeland: the land occupied by Israel.
In 1907, when Edward Penfield painted this Manhattan scene, only 140,300 Americans had the inclination (and the money) to own a car. By 1920, auto registrations had jumped to eight million, one car for every 13 Americans.
The Automobile In America

One hundred years ago, Germany's Carl Friedrich Benz patented an odd-looking three-wheeled vehicle powered by a tiny gasoline engine. Most scholars agree that the Benz was the world's first automobile with a workable internal-combustion engine. Henry Ford's Model T came 22 years later. Starting before the First World War, the automobile would transform the United States, spawning a giant industry based in Detroit and capturing the affections of Americans. What has the auto wrought? Suburbs and "exurbs," Sunday driving, "beltways" and shopping malls, jobs by the million, the family motor vacation, unprecedented individual mobility—in short, a way of life that has intrigued researchers and stunned foreign visitors. America's "car culture" encountered its first yellow light during the 1970s: sharply higher gasoline prices and a Japanese-led "import invasion." Today, those threats have receded, at least for the moment. Ahead lie the long-term prospects of more expensive fuel and stiffer competition in the world market. Here, we offer two reports on the Auto Age: a chronicle of the car and an analysis of the culture the car created.

THE INDUSTRY

by David L. Lewis

"The automobile industry stands for modern industry all over the globe," wrote management specialist Peter F. Drucker in 1972. "It is to the 20th century what the Lancashire cotton mills were to the early 19th century: the industry of industries."

In the United States, where cars probably matter more to people than they do anywhere else in the world, autos represent more than an industry. They are a part of the American self-image. From Henry Ford, the founding genius of the auto assembly line, to Charles
Henry Ford, at left, and a gathering of Detroit's business leaders at a 1929 banquet of the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce. They include (1)

(“Engine Charlie”) Wilson, the General Motors (GM) president turned U.S. secretary of defense during the Eisenhower years, to Lee Iacocca today, autodom has probably turned out more colorful executives than any other industry. Detroit's successes become symbols of national achievement; its blunders, like Ford's Edsel, metaphors for failure. In 1957, after the Soviet Union beat the United States into space with Sputnik, Defense Secretary Wilson assured the nation that a U.S. satellite would soon follow. “Yes,” said Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson, “and it will have a two-toned paint job and window washers.”

In recent years, the U.S. auto enterprise has come under fire, its own shortcomings serving as symbolic evidence of all that ails industrial America. Even Henry Ford II (grandson of Henry), then

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chairman of the company that bears his name, worried in 1974 that “we may become a service nation one day because our manufacturers could not compete with foreigners.” Ford may be right—Detroit and U.S. industry in general are facing an unprecedented challenge from Japanese and other foreign competitors. But few of Detroit’s harshest critics recall that, except during the halcyon years of the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. auto business has never been serene.

William C. Durant, the man who founded GM in 1908, lost control of the company in 1910, regained it six years later, lost it again, started a new, briefly successful car company (Durant Motors) in 1921, and died in 1947, his managerial talent reduced to running a bowling alley in Flint, Michigan. Henry Ford, who died the same year, meanwhile had allowed his company to decline. As Fortune reported, Ford’s accounting system would have embarrassed “a country storekeeper.” Even the formidable Japanese have had their problems. During the mid-1970s, Toyo Kogyo (Mazda) nearly went bankrupt when its innovative rotary engines proved to be too fuel-hungry for energy-conscious drivers.

Despite all the red ink, layoffs, and desperation in Detroit in recent years, the automobile industry remains by far the nation’s
largest manufacturing enterprise. It directly employs some 1.2 million people, while the payrolls of auto dealers, service stations, and other related businesses are several times larger. All told, the industry provides jobs for one in every six American workers.

If the glory days of the 1950s and '60s will never be repeated, Detroit still is far from moribund. More likely, it will return to something like the hypercompetitive climate of its early days, when numerous "independents" competed with what are now the Big Three—GM, Ford, and Chrysler. (The sole surviving U.S. independent is American Motors.) Only instead of Willys-Overland, Crosley, Hudson, and Packard, the competitors will bear names like Toyota, Nissan, Mercedes, and Hyundai.

America's first gasoline-powered car was built not in Detroit, but in Springfield, Massachusetts. There, in 1893, Charles and Frank Duryea, two bicycle mechanics, assembled their first gasoline-powered horseless carriage. Three years later, Francis E. and Freeland O. Stanley began manufacturing steam-powered buggies—the famous Stanley Steamer—in the Boston suburb of Watertown. Most other Eastern carmakers followed the Stanleys into steam or worked, with some success, on electric vehicles—a strategic wrong turn. It was left to Midwesterners, especially those around Detroit, to achieve success with the internal-combustion engine.

A Car for the Multitude

Detroit was well placed. It was home to a number of capitalists whose families had amassed great wealth from Michigan copper, iron ore, and timber, and who were receptive to new investment opportunities. As it happened, Detroit was also the launching pad, along with Lansing, Michigan, for the industry's first high-volume producer of gasoline-powered cars, Ransom E. Olds, a young man who had already prospered by manufacturing gasoline engines. After he showed the way to high profits, producing 3,000 fast-selling "Merry Oldsmobiles" in 1903, Detroit was seized with automania, much as California's Silicon Valley would be swept by computer fever seven decades later. By 1905, Detroit was the nation's auto capital. "Detroit lives, moves and has her being from the motor car," enthused Cycle and Automobile Trade Journal in 1909. "People talk automobile at their business, at their luncheon, in their sleep.... Every mechanic is an inventor in his odd hours and Detroit makes more applications for patents than any other town of its size in the world."

At first, only the wealthy could afford cars: The average price was $2,800 at a time when most workmen earned less than $500 annually. Auto salesmen talked reliability rather than cost. One of the best tests of a car's stamina was the motor race. And it was here that Henry Ford, an ex-farmer who had become the chief engineer of
Detroit's Edison Illuminating Company, acquired his early reputation. In 1901, he beat Alexander Winton, the world-record holder for the mile (one minute, 6.8 seconds), driving a car of his own design at a Grosse Pointe racetrack. Twice, wealthy investors were impressed enough by Ford's designs to back him in creating a new company. Both efforts failed—as have some 2,500 other U.S. auto manufacturers over the years. Finally, in 1903, with new backers, he launched the Ford Motor Company in Dearborn, Michigan.

At that time, the industry consensus was that the future lay in luxury vehicles for the well-to-do. Ford had another idea. "I will build a motor car for the great multitude. It will be constructed of the best materials by the best men to be hired. . . . But it will be so low in price that no man making a good salary will be unable to own one—and enjoy with his family the blessings of. . . God's great open spaces."

In 1908, after Ford had enjoyed considerable success with eight fairly conventional cars, the affordable and technologically advanced Model T (with a fully enclosed engine and transmission and a solid-cast cylinder block) made its debut. Sticker price for the touring car: $850. The car was an immediate success. Then, in 1913, Ford opened his first moving assembly line at his new Highland Park plant. Production jumped, and costs dropped. The T's price fell to $440 in 1914, to $360 in 1916.

Not that other firms could not compete. General Motors, pieced together by Durant beginning in 1908 and including Buick, Olds, Cadillac, and a score of other companies, challenged Ford from the beginning. Chevrolet, then independent, and Willys-Overland were also strong competitors. Charles F. Kettering's self-starters, introduced in the 1912 Cadillac as an alternative to the hand crank, encouraged women and older folk to drive; the affordable closed car, pioneered by Hudson in 1920–21, made year-round driving practical.

**Planned Obsolescence**

Ford and GM epitomized two radically different approaches to manufacturing and marketing cars. Ford's strategy, reflecting the strong beliefs of its founder, was to sell a single plain but reliable automobile (the T) while using the proceeds from increasing labor productivity to cut prices steadily.

GM early on followed a different path. After the final departure of the flamboyant Durant in 1920, a methodical engineer named Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., shaped the company into a marketing-oriented colossus. GM, he declared, was in business "to make money, not just to make motor cars." Already, the company had offered installment loans to make it easier for customers to buy. Sloan pioneered the notion of offering many models, each targeted at a different class of buyer. As a company saying later put it, "Chevrolet is for the hoi
A Model A chassis at the end of the assembly line at Ford's River Rouge plant, depicted in 1933 by Diego Rivera. “The Rouge,” covering 1,115 acres, was a completely integrated factory, even making its own steel.

polloi, Pontiac for the poor but proud, Oldsmobile for the comfortable but discreet, Buick for the striving, and Cadillac for the rich.”

But Sloan’s most important marketing innovation was the annual model change, or “planned obsolescence,” as critics have called it. “The changes in new models,” Sloan declared in 1922, “should be so novel and attractive as to create dissatisfaction with past models. . . . The laws of Paris dressmakers have come to be a factor in the automobile industry.” Outdoing even the haute couture houses, the automakers surrounded the autumn debut of their new models with the suspense of a Hitchcock thriller and the hoopla of a circus.*

In time, even the Model T, like a prim spinster gussied up for her last fling, was offered in multiple colors. But the effort failed, and, in 1927, the Model A replaced the Tin Lizzie. Henry Ford expected it to rival the T in longevity, but after four years consumer interest waned. By then, GM’s sales had outstripped Ford’s, and Sloan’s company has remained number one ever since.

*The autumn promotional blitz declined in importance after 1964, when Ford successfully introduced the Mustang in the spring. Cosmetic annual model changes continue, although they influence fewer car buyers than in the past.
As they expanded at home, U.S. automakers grew abroad. Within months of its founding in 1903, Ford began exporting cars and appointing dealers in Canada, Europe, and the Far East. By 1912, the Model T was rattling around every part of the world. Twenty Tin Lizzies were used in the construction of the Amur River Railroad in Siberia; in India, they bore 20 princes in a procession that included elephants, camels, and horses to celebrate King George V's arrival in Delhi. A Model T was driven 700 miles across the Gobi Desert to be delivered to the Tasha Lama of Urga; the French army used Ford’s flivvers to pursue bandits in Morocco.

The Arsenal of Freedom

By 1923, Ford was selling more than eight percent of its total output abroad. To meet demand, between 1919 and 1926 the company opened seven assembly plants in Latin America, six more in Europe, plus one in Japan. (The latter plant kept assembling Fords from U.S.-made parts until World War II.) Ford of Canada sold cars in British possessions around the world. GM also expanded vigorously overseas, mostly through the acquisition of such firms as England’s Vauxhall (1925) and Germany’s Opel (1929).

Apart from the Model T, American-made cars never sold well overseas. Europe and South America were the chief potential markets, but almost all overseas trade was closed off by high tariff barriers beginning during the 1920s. Largely because of the longer driving distances in America, U.S. cars were bigger and heavier than foreign models, reducing their appeal in countries where governments imposed stiff taxes on gasoline and on large engines. Thus, Detroit never became a major exporter; instead it developed overseas subsidiaries, which built entirely different cars for foreign markets.

Another major characteristic of the modern U.S. auto industry, antagonism between management and labor, took shape during the 1930s. During its early years, Detroit avoided many of the labor problems, and almost all of the violence, that had plagued Chicago, Pittsburgh, and other major industrial centers. By custom, Detroit was (like the South today) “open shop.” Its rapidly expanding, well-paid work force was union free. At first, the industry’s biggest labor problem was turnover. In 1914, Henry Ford hit upon a radical solution: He more than doubled wages to an unheard-of $5 a day, while reducing the length of the workday from nine to eight hours. Ford’s act, described years later by the London Economist as “the most dramatic event in the history of wages,” earned him many enemies among his fellow industrialists. But it solved Ford’s turnover problem and helped keep the unions at bay.

In auto manufacturing, as elsewhere, management treated labor paternalistically at best—inspectors from Ford’s Sociological Depart-
THE DETROIT COCONO

How did Detroit come to grief? Brock Yates, author of The Decline and Fall of the American Automobile Industry (1983), puts the blame on Detroit's unique corporate culture.

The auto moguls have reams of excuses for their woes: unfavorable currency markets, cheap overseas labor, a churlish union work force, and a penchant for recalling the words of the late GM design genius, Charles F. Kettering, who once said, "It isn't that we build such bad cars; it's that they are such lousy customers."

Sadly, this attitude prevails in Detroit to this day. While we read of Detroit's conversion to the new religion of quality and engineering, the fact remains that the major automobile companies of America are infested with old-line executives who believe that bigger is better, and that once America comes to its senses, it will shuck its fascination with "foreign junk" and once again embrace the whitewalled, vinyl-roofed, brocaded, "longer, lower, wider" land arks of yore.

The industry that once dominated world markets is run like a local business. Its environs stretch from Bloomfield Hills in the north to Grosse Pointe in the east to Dearborn in the west. Most of its inhabitants are natives of the Midwest who graduated from the University of Michigan, Michigan State, Purdue, or Ohio State, and whose adult lives have been spent squirming upward through the social strata built up in the trade. Nirvana is Bloomfield Hills, one of America's most affluent suburbs, where the moguls live together, play together, and dream together. "If they weren't isolated in Bloomfield Hills, driving their Cadillacs and Lincolns and Imperials," says one ex-auto executive, "they'd understand why imported cars sell so well."

The car men incessantly discuss how their relatives or close associates like or dislike the new models they are driving. Neither the cost nor the maintenance of these cars reflects the reality of owning and operating an automobile in America. Many of the cars have been obtained through special management buy/lease programs, or they belong to vast, painstakingly maintained corporate pools. The corporations discourage young executives from driving the cars of their competitors—or even renting them on business trips. It is as if the president of the United States were to judge commercial air travel based on his flights aboard Air Force One.

The government even visited the homes of workers to check on the character and habits of Ford employees. During the Depression years of the 1930s, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal and the Wagner Act made it easier to unionize workers. Still, it took a bitter 44-day sit-down strike at GM in 1937 before the first company signed a contract with the fledgling United Auto Workers (UAW) union. Fourteen union activists were wounded by GM security guards during the confrontation. A stubborn Henry Ford held out for four more years until, in a not uncharacteristic gesture, he signed the most generous
contract negotiated by the UAW up to that time ($1.15 an hour), even agreeing to Detroit's first payroll “checkoff” for union dues.

The UAW’s divide-and-conquer strategy, abetted by the automakers’ fears of federal antitrust suits if they presented a united front, gave the UAW the upper hand for many years. The companies and the union settled into wary collaboration. As Harvard’s William J. Abernathy and two colleagues observed in a recent study, “There was no genuinely cooperative relationship, only an armed truce.” Over the years, both sides agreed to a proliferation of work rules, executives because the specifications made for more “scientific” management, labor because they provided protection against arbitrary actions by the bosses.

Labor’s great victory came during the industry’s most depressed decade. The automakers sold only 1.3 million vehicles in 1932, one-quarter of the number delivered in 1929. As the Depression progressed, six manufacturers perished. But Detroit began to revive during the late 1930s, as the pre–World War II arms build-up began. After Pearl Harbor, the city’s “arsenal of freedom” turned out one-sixth of the nation’s war materiel—tanks, bombers, even submarine nets and belt buckles. Detroit also stored up healthy profits to be used in the postwar reconversion to civilian production.

But for Detroit, as for such industries as steel and meatpacking, the war’s end also brought a series of strikes, including a 113-day shutdown at GM. Walter Reuther, head of the UAW and “the ablest man in the industry,” according to Charles Wilson, demanded a 30 percent wage hike after wartime wage controls were lifted, and settled for 16.4 percent. In 1948, GM made a fateful concession: the cost of living allowance, or COLA, which guaranteed that workers’ wages would rise automatically in tandem with the inflation rate.

**Tail Fins and Horsepower**

For the next 20 years, however, auto executives were little troubled by increased labor costs; they could simply be passed on to the customers. The Korean War (1950–53) dampened production, but when it was over, America entered into a long upward curl of prosperity. People had money to spend; foreign competition did not amount to much. Cars, like their makers’ profits, grew bigger, and also gaudier and more powerful. Adorned by chrome, three-tone paint jobs, and skyward-shooting fins, and propelled by engines of 200 or more horsepower, they reflected one side of America itself—rich, confident, somewhat lacking in good taste.

Styling, size, and horsepower moved the merchandise and made money. Nothing else seemed to matter. Fuel economy? Through the 1950s, gasoline prices ranged from 26 to 31 cents a gallon. Safety? When Ford, then headed by “whiz kid” Robert F. McNamara, pro-
promoted its "lifeguard" features in 1955—deep-dish steering wheels, padded dashboards, and the first (optional) safety belts—customers yawned. The joke in Detroit was that "McNamara is selling safety and Chevy's selling cars." As for "economy" cars, Ford and GM planned such vehicles during the early postwar years but abandoned them. GM discovered that, chiefly because of its high investment in plant and equipment, the manufacturing cost of a small auto was only $100 less than that of a standard-size Chevrolet. Between 1950 and 1954, Nash, Kaiser, Willys-Overland, and Hudson all brought out little cars—with disappointing results.*

Enter Ralph Nader

The result was America's first import invasion, led by the "Beetle," the ungainly but economical German Volkswagen (people's car), which sold for $1,500 in 1955, versus $1,728 for a stripped-down Chevrolet. By 1959, as the U.S. economy was recovering from the second brief "Eisenhower recession," imports had captured an unprecedented 10.1 percent of the U.S. new-car market. But in 1959, the Big Three struck back with new "compacts"—Chevrolet's Corvair, Ford's Falcon, Chrysler's Valiant/Dart. Foreign car sales shrunk to about five percent of the U.S. market.

Detroit had one major advantage over its foreign competitors: It still made the best autos around. According to Car and Driver columnist Brock Yates, for example, the big high-compression, overhead valve V-8 engines and three-speed automatic transmissions that Detroit conceived during the 1940s and improved into the 1960s were the best the world had seen. (Most manufacturers, foreign and domestic, still use the basic American design for automatic transmissions.) "Since then," Yates charged in 1983, "American manufacturers have made a few laudable efforts in the area of high-tech.... In the main, Detroit spent the '60s and '70s immersed in an inane preoccupation with gadgetry."

For many years it did not matter. During the 1960s, the industry competed with itself, selling styling, options (e.g., air conditioning, power steering, whitewall tires), and horsepower. After imports began rising again during the mid-1960s, Detroit unveiled a new set of compacts—Ford's Maverick and Pinto, the Chevrolet Vega, and the American Motors Gremlin. But this time the anti-import strategy did not work. The Pinto and Vega, notes historian Robert Sobel, were "dismal failures, mechanically unsound and poorly constructed."

Yet these were the only small cars that Detroit had on hand

*The 1950s brought the final consolidation of the independents. Crosley closed its doors in 1950; Willys-Overland merged with Kaiser in 1953 and left the car business in 1957; Studebaker and Packard merged in 1954 and hold on until 1967. Only American Motors, the product of a 1954 Nash-Hudson merger, remains, but is now 46 percent owned by Renault. Detroiters refer to it as "Franco-American."
when disaster struck: the 1973–74 OPEC oil price shock. Gasoline shortages appeared, rationing was discussed, and retail prices climbed from an average of 39 cents per gallon in 1973 to 53 cents a year later. Suddenly, Japan’s inexpensive, fuel-stingy Toyotas, Datsuns, and Hondas looked attractive to American drivers. Even so, once the gas lines disappeared, it was business as usual again. Imports remained at an acceptable level—roughly 15 percent of the American market—and the automakers enjoyed healthy profits. Congress even helped keep alive the illusion that the old days could last forever by imposing price controls on domestic oil in 1976, thus reducing the rise of gasoline prices. The 1977 Ward’s Automotive Yearbook summed up the results in a headline: “Market Prefers the Larger Cars.”

Despite its outward health, the American auto industry was ailing. Detroit’s once-impressive factories were aging; wages were growing faster than productivity, and both management and labor seemed complacent. So high was worker absenteeism on Mondays and Fridays that Ford and GM occasionally were forced to shut down entire plants for the day. To make matters worse, the automakers were under attack in Washington.

For years, the federal government had scrutinized the automakers for antitrust violations, but left the actual business of making cars to Detroit. That began to change after Ralph Nader, a Harvard-trained lawyer and freelance writer, published Unsafe at Any Speed

“Traffic Arrest in the Year 2000,” a 1956 rendering of the car of the future. The shape of such “dream cars” has changed little over the years. However, the speed limit envisioned here is 120 m.p.h.
in 1965, alleging that GM executives had authorized the continued production of what they knew to be dangerously flawed cars (e.g., the Corvair). GM officials made the mistake of hiring private investigators to discredit Nader. Soon after the scandal aired in Capitol Hill hearings, Congress passed the U.S. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which forced Detroit to add numerous safety features to its cars. Then, in 1970, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to require drastic reductions in motor vehicle exhaust emissions. In 1975, the lawmakers also mandated increased fuel economy.*

In the space of a decade, the Detroit manufacturers were forced to redesign their cars substantially. “Downsizing” increased fuel economy; catalytic converters cut noxious emissions; energy-absorbing bumpers enhanced safety. But as mileage, pollution control, and safety improved, quality remained static at best. By the reckoning of Consumer Reports, American and Japanese cars were roughly equal in reliability until 1972. Thereafter, consumers complained less about their Toyotas, Datsuns, and other Japanese cars, somewhat more about the Big Three’s products. In 1977, the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration actually ordered the recall of more American-made cars than Detroit built that year.

Still, American cars continued to sell well. It took another crisis to make Detroit realize how serious its competition was.

The Price Gap

In 1979, after “the Shah left town,” as Lee Iacocca put it, Iran’s oil disappeared from the world market and gasoline prices jumped a second time—nearly doubling within a year. Small cars were in demand again, and again the industry had few “puddle jumpers” to sell. The Japanese did, and they quickly and almost effortlessly increased their share of the U.S. market from 12 to 21 percent, a gain that would have taken many years under more normal circumstances. Indeed, before the 1979 oil crisis, some 750,000 Japanese subcompacts were sitting on American docks, unwanted and unsold.

During the next few years, Detroit suffered unprecedented losses. In 1979, Chrysler nearly went bankrupt, saved by the federal government’s $1.5 billion loan guarantee, along with state loans and substantial concessions by the UAW and Chrysler’s suppliers. The next year, Japan surpassed the United States to become the world’s leading auto producer. In May 1981, with Congress threatening to pass protectionist legislation, the Reagan administration persuaded Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko to accept “voluntary” restraints on

*As detailed by a 1986 Brookings Institution study, the Japanese were helped by the fuel-efficiency rules because, unlike the American manufacturers, they did not need to overhaul their cars, quickly and at high cost, to increase mileage. And while Tokyo allowed its automakers to cooperate on research into ways to meet the new safety and emissions regulations, Washington warned the Big Three of antitrust action if they pooled their efforts. Even so, Japanese gains stemmed mostly from superior cars.
Japanese car exports to the United States. Deep recessions in 1980 and 1981–82 followed the oil price shock, dragging auto sales down to their lowest point in nearly two decades. In the carnage of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the automakers permanently shut down 10 major auto plants; some 115,000 blue-collar and 28,000 white-collar jobs have since disappeared, not counting the employment losses among Detroit’s suppliers. (The United States has lost a total of 1.8 million jobs in manufacturing since 1979.)

By 1982, Detroit’s Japanese competitors had also built up a considerable price advantage in the market for small cars. According to a 1982 National Academy of Engineering (NAE) study, Japan’s offerings arrived in U.S. showrooms costing between $750 and $1,500 less than comparable American models.

A ‘Chastened’ UAW?

Detroit’s ills have been diagnosed by dozens of analysts (and not a few quacks). “None of the major [U.S.] producers sought to achieve a competitive advantage through superior manufacturing performance” after the 1960s, the NAE panel concluded. “The basis of competition was located outside manufacturing—in marketing, styling, and the dealerships.”

On the shop floor, meanwhile, the Americans endured multiple disadvantages. U.S. workers earned more in wages and fringe benefits ($20 per hour versus $12) than their Japanese counterparts, but produced less. Economist Martin L. Anderson of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) reckons that during the early 1980s, the making of a typical American auto consumed a total of 175 hours of toil by management and labor, versus fewer than 100 hours for a Japanese car. Labor-management relations in U.S. industry were beset by arteriosclerosis: Most labor contracts contained roughly 150 pages of work rules. In Chrysler’s Detroit Trim factory, Fortune reported in 1983, workers were not allowed to unplug a machine themselves; they had to call a plant electrician to do it.

But 1983 was also the year that the Big Three returned to profitability (together reporting earnings of $6 billion), helped by the Japanese quotas and a reviving U.S. economy. In retrospect, the turnaround began even when the future seemed darkest, with the introduction of successful new made-in-America small cars after 1979: Chrysler’s K-cars, Ford’s Escort/Lynx (now the top-selling car in the world, ahead of the Chevrolet Cavalier and the Volkswagen

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*One of Japan’s great advantages in manufacturing is the “just in time,” or kanban, production system, which reduces inventories and costs by carefully spacing deliveries of car parts to the shop floor. Ironically, the system was pioneered by Henry Ford but abandoned during the 1930s, a victim of the Great Depression and UAW work rules. And Japan’s vaunted worker “quality circles” were the inspiration of an American business consultant, W. Edwards Deming, whose likeness appears on Japan’s top award for industrial excellence.

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Imports sell best when the U.S. economy is sluggish. A new factor: Annual output of foreign cars assembled in America may reach 1.4 million by 1990.

Data for years prior to 1970 are new car registrations. Import categories include "captive" imports, built overseas but sold through U.S. manufacturers. Some overlap may occur. Studebaker through 1967 only.

Car prices began rising faster than incomes during the "stagflation" of the 1970s. Since 1981, Japan's "voluntary" export quotas have eased pressures to keep prices down. Detroit's cars now sell for an average of $11,629; imports, $12,556.

Auto and steel workers traditionally have earned more than their counterparts elsewhere in industry. The average 1986 U.S. manufacturing wage is $9.72 an hour, or roughly what assembly workers in U.S. electronics plants earn.
THE COST OF GASOLINE
(Per gallon)

Do rising gasoline prices influence motorists? Not much. In 1982, with prices near an all-time high, they drove their cars an average of 9,553 miles, some 400 fewer than in 1970. Americans now travel 1.3 trillion miles by car annually.

HOW AMERICANS GOT TO WORK, 1983

Commuting by car increases every year. Most specialists predict a further decline of mass transit as Americans, by choice or necessity, take to their autos.

HOW FREIGHT TRAVELS BETWEEN CITIES
(As a percentage of all ton miles)

Contrary to popular perception, railroads remain the nation's leading haulers of freight. Overall, moving freight is a $259 billion-a-year industry.

Golf) and GM’s X-cars (Citation, Phoenix, Omega, Skylark). The Big Three began investing heavily, spending $65 billion on new equipment and designs between 1979 and 1983. And, in 1982, the UAW, then led by Douglas Fraser, signed new labor contracts, exchanging wage and fringe-“givebacks” for increased job security. Between 1981 and 1983, labor productivity in autos jumped 18 percent. “A chastened UAW is now a convert to Japanese methods,” reports the Economist. Obsolete work rules are being jettisoned as the union and the companies experiment with Japanese-style “Quality of Work Life” programs and the introduction of new technology. At Detroit Trim, workers can now pull plugs without an electrician’s help.

Old Lessons

Moreover, the Japanese have lost one great advantage: unbalanced exchange rates. During the first six months of the 1986 model year, as the value of the yen increased, the Japanese automakers increased their prices at nearly three times the rate of their U.S. competitors.

Today, the worst of Detroit’s problems probably can be seen in the rearview mirror rather than through the windshield. Even ailing Chrysler has returned to health, its savior and chairman, Lee Iacocca, now mentioned as a contender for the U.S. presidency. At GM, Roger B. Smith—“the most innovative GM chairman since the legendary Alfred P. Sloan,” according to the Wall Street Journal—is leading the company into high-technology engineering.

Challenges remain. In response to U.S. import restrictions, Toyota (in partnership with GM), Honda, and Nissan have opened assembly plants in the United States, using mostly Japanese-made parts, employing highly paid American workers, and apparently achieving nearly the same efficiency that they do at home. Other foreign companies will surely follow. (Volkswagen was the first foreign maker to establish a plant on U.S. soil after World War II, at New Stanton, Pennsylvania, in 1978.)

To prosper, the U.S. automakers increasingly must resort to “offshore sourcing”—buying parts and completed cars in low-wage countries such as Mexico, South Korea, and Taiwan. And it is an open question how well the automakers would fare if the “voluntary” quotas on Japanese vehicles (currently 2.3 million) were lifted today. In Detroit, some analysts estimate that, as foreign competitors open more assembly plants in the United States during the next few years, the Big Three may lose another 10 to 20 percent of the U.S. market, reducing their share to as low as 55 percent.

But they are fighting back. Costs are down. Largely as a result of improved management and the UAW’s more flexible approach, the quality of U.S.-built cars is rising. Ford, generally considered De-
Detroit's current leader in the quality contest, reports that its customers' complaints about their new cars have dropped by 60 percent since 1980. Detroit still lags behind Japan in cost and perhaps in quality, but if it can continue to close the gap, it should be well positioned for the next phase of automotive competition: the race toward robotics and computer-integrated manufacturing. Here, the huge U.S. companies (GM and Ford rank first and second, respectively, among the world's automakers), with their vast financial resources, may enjoy an advantage. With their heavy investments in recent years, they are beginning to exploit it.

As a result of the new emphasis on quality cars and high-technology manufacturing, a 1984 MIT study concluded, "the shift to low-wage locations will not occur on the scale once expected." New jobs will be created in electronics, plastics, and Detroit's other supplier industries, but automation will mean the loss of more highly paid blue-collar jobs in the Big Three's plants. Like steel, textiles, and rubber, Detroit is being downsized. Manufacturing, the nation's number one employer as recently as 1979, now ranks third, behind wholesale and retail trade and "services."

But automobiles remain America's showcase industry. Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., once said of Henry Ford: "The old master failed to master change." By relearning some of the old master's lessons about building cars that are affordable and reliable, Detroit may once again show the way for the rest of American manufacturing.
THE AUTOMOBILE AGE

— The Horse he is a mild beast
And lets you pat his head,
But the Motor is a wild beast
And butts you till you're dead.

—Anonymous

When cars began appearing in great numbers on the nation's country roads and city streets during the first decades of the 20th century, many Americans shared the sentiments in this fond ode to the horse. Before long, however, they saw the automobile as the means to a brighter future for all citizens of the Republic.

By 1913, Scribner's Magazine was predicting that cars would bring "greater liberty, greater fruitfulness of time and effort, brighter glimpses of the wide and beautiful world," and "more health and happiness... Thank God we live in the era of the motor car!"

More than any other people, Americans would embrace the automobile. Not just transportation, it became for many a status symbol, an alter ego, a key to personal autonomy. Cars crept into song ("Nothin' outrun my V-8 Ford," Chuck Berry boasted during the 1950s), television ("My Mother the Car"), and literature (On the Road, The Great Gatsby). More important, cars and the roads that carried them shaped the face of the nation by allowing a growing urban population to spread out into ever more dispersed suburbs and neighborhoods, to live and work and buy and relax. No other society has reaped so many benefits from the automobile, and none stands to learn so clearly what its eventual costs may be.

The steam engine (1800) was technology's first gift to the American traveler, and railroads opened up the West. In 1869, the tracks of the Central and Union Pacific lines joined at Promontory, Utah, linking the opposite shores of a 3,000-mile continent for the first time. Until then, San Francisco had been a full month away from New York by rail and stagecoach, up to five months away by wagon train from Missouri, and six months away by windjammer around the Horn from East Coast ports. Now the trip took only a few days.

The Iron Horse moved goods and people across a big country. In 1884, with four railroad lines crossing the prairie, more than 800,000 head of cattle left Dodge City and Abilene for the markets of Chicago and the East. San Francisco importers sent Oriental silks to Chicago in two days; bankers in Omaha, Nebraska, dined on Pacific salmon. In 1867, the Pullman Car Company introduced the popular sleeping car, ending many uncomfortable nights for businessmen
"Gridlock" before the auto? Electric trolleys, horse-drawn carriages and wagons, and pedestrians caused this 1909 traffic jam at the corner of Randolph and Dearborn in Chicago. Not a single car is in evidence.

traveling from Boston to Washington or Atlanta to Baltimore.

However, the horse remained the prime mover in short-haul transportation. In 1884, the same year that Dodge City's beef cattle moved east by rail, Americans employed more than 15.4 million draft horses. In cities and towns, horse-drawn wagons or carriages variously hauled freight from rail depots into city business districts, met passengers at the train station, delivered beer barrels to taverns and ice or milk to households, took ladies and gentlemen to the opera, and transported the two tons of coal needed to warm an average Pennsylvania house in winter. Blacksmiths, numbering 220,000 in 1900, according to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, were essential craftsmen in every community.

In the countryside, horsepower (or footpower) provided the chief means of everyday locomotion. In 1890, over half the nation's people (65 percent) still lived in rural areas. The greatest burden of rural life before the car, reminisced popular author Edward R. Eastman in 1927, was "the curse of isolation and loneliness." The Farm Woman's Problems, a pamphlet published by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, reported that the average rural family lived three miles from church, five miles from market, six miles from school, and 14 miles from a hospital—long distances by horse and wagon.
In the days before the truck, farmers often flourished or went broke according to their proximity to railroads. Those fortunate enough to live within 10 miles of a rail junction—and thus, a town—could earn hard cash selling their crops or livestock after long wagon trips along dusty or muddy roads, often nearly impassable. Farmers less well situated eked out a bare subsistence or joined their fellow migrants in the growing industrial cities of the North.

Across the nation as a whole, the rural population grew. But while immigrants from Scandinavia, Germany, and other European nations moved into farmlands, particularly in the Midwest, from 1860 to 1900 America's urban population quadrupled. “We cannot all live in cities, yet nearly all seem determined to do so,” said New York journalist Horace Greeley during the late 1860s. Families jammed themselves into New York's tinderbox tenements, or Philadelphia's equally grim three-story wooden row houses, smirched with soot.

Rosary Beads

These slums, graphically depicted by journalist Jacob A. Riis, novelist Theodore Dreiser, and other naturalistic writers of the day, became tense ethnic warrens of new immigrants and native-born Americans from the farms, linked only by poverty and a common need to live within walking distance of their jobs at steel mills, slaughterhouses, and textile plants. Factories were also crowded together, bound to the waterways and rail lines at the cities' core.

The electric trolley, introduced in Richmond, Virginia, in 1888, and operating in most major cities by 1900, helped break up some of these urban amalgams. (Boston opened the first subway in America in 1897, but underground systems were not extensive even in New York until the 1920s.) Many blue-collar workers moved into older middle-class neighborhoods encircling the inner city, sorting themselves out by income levels and ethnicity.

However, trolleys did not end the demand for animal transportation. Hay remained a major cash crop for farmers on the outskirts of cities. About 15,000 dead draft horses were removed from New York City's streets every year, killed by heat and sheer exhaustion. Horse-drawn traffic created its own pollution. In 1890, according to historian James J. Flink, horses deposited an estimated 2.5 million pounds of manure and 60,000 gallons of urine on the streets every day in New York City alone. “Street dust” (dried dung) inflamed residents' nasal passages and lungs and turned to a syrupy mess when it rained. The flies that bred on the ever-present manure heaps, as medical authorities warned, carried 30 communicable diseases.

Not surprisingly, many wealthy city dwellers became commuters long before the coming of the car—especially in the heavily industrial Northeast. Only they could afford the time and expense in-
volved in commuting by railroad. Starting in midcentury, like rosary beads on a string, suburbs appeared in discrete formations along the rail corridors. (As early as 1848, Boston was served by 118 commuter trains a day.) Meanwhile, the new trolleys enabled middle-class families to undertake short-distance commuting, at a cost of 10 to 20 cents per day. “Streetcar suburbs” (such as Boston’s Roxbury and Dorchester) often gave the growing American metropolis a new star-shaped outline, extending some 10 miles from its center.

The tremendously popular trolleys snarled already chaotic city traffic. Privately owned and operated, they ran along duplicate competing routes, frequently broke down, and were always crowded. During the early 1900s, newspaper editorials described trolley commuters hanging “like smoked hams” from the straps, or “packed like sardines with perspiration for oil.”

The automobile was expected to change everything. “Imagine a healthier race of working men toiling in cheerful and sanitary factories,” wrote the New York Independent in 1904, who would “in the late afternoon, glide away in their own comfortable vehicles to their little farms or houses in the country or by the sea 20 or 30 miles distant!” Americans equated greater mobility with greater justice and liberty. The car would satisfy two great American hangenings: allowing ordinary folk to dwell in Arcadia while permitting more freedom of movement. Forward motion—personal, economic, social, moral—was what the nation was all about. “Passage, immediate passage!” cried Walt Whitman in 1892. “Have we not stood here like trees in the ground long enough?”

Out of the Mud

Even so, rural Americans despised cars at first. Wealthy big-city “autoneers” explored the countryside in noisy “touring” cars prone to breakdowns and flat tires, laden with Scientific American’s recommended equipment (calfskin trousers, mask and goggles, oilskins, medicines, a six-shooter), plus a 32-piece Hammacher Schlemmer tool kit, 30 spare parts, and various indispensable guidebooks. The new vehicles spooked farmers’ horses, ran over chickens, and raised clouds of dust that settled on laundry lines. Farmers retaliated: In Gloversville, New York, one tried to horsewhip a passing motorist; Mitchell, South Dakota, banned cars altogether.

City dwellers proved more receptive, although the first cars were rightly described as “toys of the rich.” In 1900, only 8,000 cars were registered in the United States. Then came the great equalizer: Henry Ford’s sturdy, reliable, affordable Model T. By 1914, six years after its introduction, it cost $440, about half the original price and nearly $500 less than its nearest reliable competitor. The car was now within the means even of Ford’s own assembly line workers.
1927, when prosperity reigned and one Model T rolled off the assembly line every 10 seconds and cost a mere $290, one in every five Americans owned a car.

The masses could at last afford to travel, but there were few good roads. Owing to the growth of railroads after 1830, and, to a lesser extent, of canals such as the Erie (completed in 1825), an early 19th-century boom in turnpike construction had abruptly ended, leaving America with the worst roads of any Western nation.

The first census of U.S. roads, carried out by the U.S. Department of Agriculture in 1904, revealed that of 2,151,570 miles of highway, only seven percent were surfaced (with stone, macadam, gravel, sand, brick, even wooden planks); the remaining 93 percent were plain dirt. At around the same time, a “Good Roads” campaign, launched during the 1880s by the League of American Wheelmen (a group of wealthy Newport, Rhode Island, bicycle enthusiasts), began to gather support from the car contingent, especially the fledgling American Automobile Association (AAA). Railroad executives now saw the advantage of building feeder routes from farming areas to their depots. They sponsored “Good Roads” trains staffed with specialists from the Department of Agriculture’s Office of Road Inquiry, who spread the gospel (“Lift our people out of the mud”) and unwittingly hastened the railroads’ decline.

Killing Off the Steamboats

In 1916, President Woodrow Wilson signed a $75 million Federal Aid Road Act to improve rural post roads, the first in a long series of federal subsidies encouraging America’s shift to the car. President Warren G. Harding followed with the Federal Highway Act of 1921, a limited program that provided 50-50 matching grants to the states for road construction. Sparsely populated Western states with low tax revenues hit upon the gasoline excise tax as a way to raise highway construction funds. By 1930, all 48 states were collecting gasoline taxes—commonly three or four cents per gallon—to build and maintain what was now a patchy nationwide web of two-lane concrete highways.

All earlier forms of transportation suffered from the new competition, noted historian Samuel Eliot Morison. Livery stables went bankrupt; so did carriage and wagon factories, blacksmiths, harness makers, and every other trade that fed the horse economy. Hayfields reverted to brush and forest. About the only commercial enterprises that still used horses after the early 1920s were funeral parlors; it was considered undignified for the dead to be hustled to the grave in a big, shiny car.*

*Today, at drive-in establishments such as the Frank Givens Funeral Home in Detroit, open past midnight, mourners can drive up to a viewing window and exit into traffic in less than 30 seconds.
Before the interstates: Model A Ford at an Atlanta, Georgia, garage (1936); a truck stops for fuel on U.S. Route 1 near Washington, D.C. (1940); migrant workers near Bridgeton, N.J. (1942); a couple going on vacation in an MG, trailer in tow (1950); Arizona map (1927) shows two-lane highways.
Steamboat, flatboat, and freighter traffic on the Ohio, the Mississippi, and the canals, already diminished by the railroads, died "a lingering death," according to Morison. Once-flourishing river towns, such as Marietta, Ohio, and Salem, Oregon, faded with the decline in waterborne commerce. Trucks could move freight more quickly to more places. The automobile revolution was under way.

Americans now think of the 1950s as the golden era of the car. In reality, most of its powerful socioeconomic effects were being felt well before World War II. Trains and trolleys had encouraged city dwellers to migrate away from the urban core, but settlement was still restricted to the relatively densely populated areas they served. The auto, by breaking those bonds, opened a new suburban frontier.

Improving the Species

The old frontier—rural America—changed radically. Farmers were no longer so isolated. Doctors could make more house calls, children rode buses to consolidated schools, teenagers went to the picture show and farm wives went shopping in town. By 1926, 93 percent of Iowa farmers owned cars, a typical proportion in Corn Belt states, at a time when few possessed electricity or telephones.

Automobiles expanded the rural family's range of social contacts. However, the new relationships may have been weaker than those formed in horse-and-buggy days. As sociologist James M. Williams observed in 1931, "Instead of coming to stay the afternoon, the farmer's family is out for a long ride to some adjacent city and drives into a friend's yard for a few minutes; then away they go."

Not all relationships suffered. One of the automobile's chief accomplishments, as editor and author Frederick Lewis Allen pointed out, was to crack that cornerstone of American morality, "the difficulty of finding a suitable locale for misconduct." In the days before the car, a young farmer's search for female companionship was restricted to a range of five miles or so—a world of church suppers, parlor sofas, hovering parents, pesky siblings. The car extended that range to 10, 20, 50 miles or more, and the less inhibited quickly discovered its utility as the proverbial "bedroom on wheels." Sociologists of the day predicted that increased mobility would lead to less inbreeding and improve the American species.

They also speculated that the automobile, by reducing the isolation of rural life, might stem the trek to the cities and, as the popular slogan ran, "save the farm." Henry Ford insisted that the "drift" from the country would be checked by "the cheap automobile," good roads, and the small-town "moving picture theater."

In The Devil Wagon in God's Country (1979), historian Michael L. Berger noted that the automobile did not save the family farm. However, along with its offspring, the truck and the tractor, it
changed the nature of urban migration and may have slowed the exodus to the big cities.* The new automobile economy enabled farm families to make extra money close to home—working in gas stations, roadside stands and restaurants, gift shops, country inns, even renting out their yards to touring “autocampers” for $1 a night.

Cars also acted as a catalyst in the development of small and medium-sized towns (10–25,000), where rural families increasingly moved to take jobs as salespeople (in dime stores, dress shops) or as laborers (stocking feed stores, loading lumber). The population of America’s rural villages and towns grew by 3.6 million between 1920 and 1930, while the farm population shrank by 1.2 million.

In the big cities during the 1920s, automobile traffic quickly replaced horse traffic, managing to create just as much congestion. Indeed, the Literary Digest fretted in 1924 that citizens were thinking more about a place to park than about the League of Nations. The chairman of Atlanta’s City Planning Committee pronounced its traffic “well-nigh unbearable,” and the New Orleans commissioner of public safety announced in 1927 that “millions of dollars” in retail trade had been lost because of “inadequate provisions for traffic regulation.”

The Flight to Autopia

The cities remained unpleasant for reasons that had little to do with car traffic—overcrowding, lack of open space, slums, crime, filth, noise. Many Americans shared Henry Ford’s philosophy. “We shall solve the urban problem,” he proclaimed, “by leaving the city.”

Across the nation, elected officials and planning specialists abetted the great exodus. Under the direction of urban planner Robert Moses, New York State built the first lavishly landscaped roads for passenger cars only: the Bronx River (1921), the Hutchinson River (1928), the Saw Mill River (1929), and the Cross County (1931) parkways, linking New York City to the new suburbs and parks of Westchester County.

In other cities as well, there were new escape routes: Philadelphia’s Ben Franklin Bridge (1926), the San Francisco Bay Bridge (1936) and the Golden Gate Bridge (1937). At the same time, telephones, electric lights, refrigerators, and public water and sewer systems came to suburbia, loosening the city’s hold over amenity-seekers. The early Auto Age vision of a little house with a garden could be realized—among all but the working class. The population of elegant Grosse Pointe, Michigan, grew by 725 percent during the 1920s; Beverly Hills expanded by a remarkable 2,485 percent. Many middle-class suburbs, such as Kansas City’s Country Club District and Baltimore’s Roland Park, sprang up in corn fields and pastures.

*The first crude tractors had been built about 1902. In 1910, tractor production reached 4,000 a year; by 1920, it had passed 200,000 a year.
MIND READING IN THE MOTOR CITY

“We are in the business of giving the public what it wants,” declared General Motors executive Harlow Curtice as the 1950s dawned, “and not telling it what it should want.”

For decades, Detroit has spent a great deal of time and money trying to find out what kinds of cars Americans do want. In the early days of the industry, customers had few choices to make. Henry Ford offered them the Model T in any color they liked, he said, “as long as it was black.” The rise of “bent metal,” multiple hues, tail fins, and other ephemera followed GM’s creation of its Art and Color section in 1927 under the famed designer, Harley Earl. Cars, announced his GM colleague, Vincent Kaptur, Jr., should signify “status, power, fun, glamour, and freedom.”

Advertising campaigns targeted every possible kind of consumer. There were cars for women, for status-seekers, for the practical-minded. In 1937, Nash introduced what came to be called “the young man’s car,” equipped with a fold-down bed for roadside trysts.

Even so, the automakers knew precious little about consumers’ tastes and preferences apart from what their sales figures told them. In an effort to cover all the bases, they offered a growing array of styles, engines, and accessories. In 1965, a Yale physicist counted all the options available from Chevrolet and concluded that there were more permutations of the Chevrolet than there were atoms in the universe.

One of the first cars to be built with the aid of the new “science” of market research—demographic studies, opinion surveys, “focus” groups—was the Ford Mustang. “The normal procedure in Detroit was to build a car and then try to identify its buyers,” wrote Lee Iacocca, who created the Mustang when he was a Ford vice president. “But we were in a position to move in the opposite direction—and tailor a new product for a hungry new market.” The Mustang was meticulously designed for the first adults of the baby-boom generation. Iacocca and his aides even learned from market research that 42 percent of college students wanted bucket seats. The car, billed as “a new breed of horse” and introduced in the spring of 1964, was an immediate hit. The company sold 418,812 Mustangs within a year. One young woman, appar-

Over the next decades, the federal government and the states contributed to this “suburban sprawl” in several important ways, notably by financing highways, insuring private home mortgages, and making the interest on mortgages tax-deductible, a particularly powerful subsidy. No other industrialized nation offered its citizens so many inducements to leave the cities.

The Depression slowed the growth of suburbanization. However, it did not shake America’s faith in cars. During the grim 1930s, private automobile registration decreased only 10 percent, from 26.5 million to 23.9 million, in a nation of 131 million (by 1940). President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Civil Works Administration put thousands of
ently overwrought, wrote to Ford that “Mustang is as exciting as sex.”

Today, the automakers and their consultants have a fairly clear picture of who buys what and why. According to the researchers’ findings, some stereotypes about cars and their owners are confirmed while others crumble.

“Yuppies” (young urban professionals), for example, do favor imported Swedish Saabs. Surveys show that more Saab buyers are college-educated (75 percent) than any other group of car purchasers. Volvos and Volkswagens are also popular among the highly educated. (Black yuppies, or “Buppies,” also favor Saabs, along with the Cadillac Allanté and the sleek Ford Taurus.) Cadillac buyers are older (57, on average) and Jaguar devotees earn more ($108,700 annually) than any other brands’ buyers. On the other hand, men are making fewer and fewer decisions about what cars to drive home from the showroom. Women chose only about 15 percent of the cars sold during the early 1960s, according to Ford researcher Ray Windecker, but 42 percent in 1985. Their choices are now worth some $46 billion annually to Detroit.

According to the “psychographics” devised by a consulting firm, J. D. Power & Associates, women tend to be “comfort seekers” and “autophobes,” preferring luxury vehicles, foreign or domestic, or large, “safe” cars such as the Chevrolet Caprice.

One of the most interesting trends of recent years is the rise in sales of small trucks and vans, up from some 1.7 million in 1980 to 3.6 million units last year. Again, the market researchers have an explanation. Many of the buyers are young “upscale” office workers in search of that macho feeling. Ford’s Windecker discovered that 70 percent of the purchasers of his company’s light trucks used them only for recreation or commuting to work.

The market researchers have also provided Detroit with some good news. Domestic makers, for example, dominate the small truck business. More important, as the “greying of America” proceeds, is that nine out of 10 new car buyers aged 55 or over do not choose Toyotas or Datsuns but stick with GM, Ford, Chrysler, or American Motors. Oversize instrument panels, wide-opening doors, and the reassuring big-car “feel” of the domestic products are among the reasons why.

jobless Americans to work, building, among other things, some 500,000 miles of roads, at a cost of $4 billion. Sociologists Robert and Helen Lynd revisited “Middletown” (Muncie, Indiana) and reported: “If the word auto was writ large across Middletown’s life in 1925, this was even more apparent in 1935...Car ownership stands to them for a large share of the ‘American Dream’; they cling to it as they cling to their self-respect.”

Popular attitudes were summed up in a joke about a man who claimed his family was starving: “If you don’t believe it,” said the man, “I’ll drive you over to our place and you can see for yourself.” As Will Rogers remarked, America was the only country that could
go to the poorhouse on wheels.

The much-publicized 1939-40 New York World's Fair raised the nation's hopes that the worst of the Depression was over. And GM's "Futurama" exhibit, by far the fair's most popular attraction, suggested that cars and highways would be the key to that brighter future. A total of five million people rode Futurama's "carry-go-round" chairs along an "automatically illuminated Motorway of 1960." They gaped at futuristic cars speeding into a huge, high-rise city bisected by green spaces, grand boulevards, and raised sidewalks. (It looked a lot like today's Houston.) "As the spectator circles high above the city," said Futurama's announcer, "he is able to compare the congested, badly planned areas of the 1930s with the well-organized districts of the newer city."

Paved with Good Intentions

The announcer did not exaggerate the urban muddle of the moment. In fact, the Depression slowdown caused many officials to underestimate the traffic problems that would emerge after World War II. City planners and politicians had failed to develop adequate public transportation systems during the 1920s, when cities could still afford them, and when demand was still strong. Most trolleys, buses, and subways remained in the hands of private entrepreneurs; during the 1930s, many ran in the red. As they tumbled into bankruptcy, city governments were forced to step in.* Many planners threw up their hands. Chicago's Angus S. Hibbard proposed to bar shipping from the Chicago River and pave it over to make the Loop accessible by car from three sides.

The answer everywhere, as Futurama suggested, seemed to be, More roads! More cars! At a 1940 ceremony to dedicate the nation's first "limited access" freeway, California's public works director proudly explained that freeways would not permit "string towns" or "ribbon cities" to develop as they had along the old-fashioned state highways, with their stoplights, roadside hot dog stands, motels, and gas stations. No one had yet seen exit ramp sprawl.

After World War II, the United States's revived prosperity permitted the full flowering of America's Auto Age. In Western Europe, by contrast, the car culture was still in its infancy. The Europeans, less affluent than the Americans even before the war, owned far fewer autos, and their postwar governments were unwilling to divert scarce funds to superhighways. They stood aside and watched as Americans leaped ahead, all but the poor now able to buy new or secondhand cars.

Auto registrations increased from 28 million in 1946 to 40 mil-

*By 1960, virtually all U.S. urban mass transit was operated at a loss. By 1967, 58 percent of all transit passengers were carried by publicly owned companies; by 1975, the figure was 90 percent.
lion by 1950, when there was one car on the road for every three households. Not surprisingly, the suburbs of New York recorded a 117 percent gain in population during the baby-boom era (1945–64). The population of downtown Detroit fell by nearly 20 percent, while that of its suburbs almost doubled.

Critics often described the renewed suburban migration that began during the 1950s as “white flight” from the Southern blacks who streamed into Northern and Midwestern cities and school systems during and after the war. (In 1910, 73 percent of the black population lived in rural areas; by 1960, 73 percent lived in cities.) But many whites probably left for the same reasons a new black middle class would follow them two decades later: Affluence gave them the means to trade urban crime and congestion for suburban amenities; cars and highways allowed them to commute to work.

The shift to the suburbs was speeded by the crowning achievement of the Auto Age, President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1956 Interstate Highway Act. The proposed 41,000-mile, $27 billion interstate system would become the world’s largest public works program since the pyramids.* It would link all regions of the country, connect 42 state capitals, and occupy two million acres of land. (The Portland Cement Association calculated that the concrete alone would build six sidewalks to the moon.) Eisenhower hoped the new toll-free four- and six-lane superhighways would accomplish several goals: provide vital defense routes in case of war, reverse a post–Korean War economic downturn, and accommodate more passenger cars in peacetime, which to his mind meant “greater convenience ... greater happiness, and greater standards of living.”

First Doubts

In Washington, the measure was pushed by a formidable coalition: highway builders, steelmakers, state and local governments, organized labor, motorists’ organizations, farm groups, the auto companies. There was little opposition. To finance the interstates, Congress earmarked taxes on gasoline, auto parts, and tires, as well as fees on trucks and other heavy vehicles, for a special Highway Trust Fund. Eisenhower raised the federal share of road construction costs from 50 to 90 percent. But Congress did not vote a penny in federal funds for interstate repairs until 1976.

The interstates, combined with new state toll roads and metropolitan “beltway” systems (the first was the Boston area’s Route 128, completed in 1957), not only enabled drivers to go faster. They also accelerated social and economic change: People moved farther from the central cities; towns and businesses served by the new highways flourished, while those bypassed declined or failed to grow.

*The authorized mileage later increased to 42,500. Construction costs so far have totaled $108 billion.
But even as the first miles of the interstates were being paved, many Americans were having their first serious doubts about the automobile. The initial anxieties were over safety. Ralph Nader targeted Detroit in his 1965 best seller, *Unsafe at Any Speed.* “For over half a century,” he declared, “the automobile has brought death, injury, and the most inestimable sorrow and deprivation to millions of people.” Noting, for example, that a Cadillac El Dorado at normal cruising speeds took the length of a football field to come to a full stop, he indicted Detroit for building dangerous cars. He also helped make pollution a national issue, publicizing earlier research by California biologist Arlie ("Dr. Smog") Haagen-Smit, which linked air pollution and its ill effects to auto emissions.

Rocky’s Magic Show

During the late 1960s, a time of generalized dissatisfaction and cultural upheaval, intellectuals and activists often decried the car as a curse, rather than a blessing—a source of pollution, a symbol of materialistic capitalism, a threat to the environment. For the first time, Washington also acknowledged the car’s drawbacks; Congress imposed stiff safety and pollution regulations for cars.*

Highways, too, suddenly began to look more pernicious. When Nader’s book appeared, Lady Bird Johnson, wife of the 36th president, was lobbying for the antibillboard Highway Beautification Act of 1965, and local activists in many areas were trying to block proposed urban expressways. The new roads, many of them interstates, were cutting through black neighborhoods in city after city, displacing thousands of residents and destroying established communities. “White roads through black bedrooms,” as critics called them, were cited as one factor in the riots that erupted in urban ghettos. Governor George Romney of Michigan, former head of American Motors, blamed downtown freeway construction for contributing to the unrest that provoked Detroit’s bloody 1967 riot.

The highway builders soon found themselves in unexpected difficulties. In Ossining, New York, virtually all of the residents threatened with displacement by Governor Nelson Rockefeller’s proposed Hudson River Expressway were black. On the first night of public hearings in 1968, the local National Association for the Advancement of Colored People handed out large, circus-like posters: “Welcome to Rocky’s Magic Road Show... See Gov. Rockefeller make 1,000 BLACK PEOPLE DISAPPEAR.” The expressway plan died.

The last hurrah was Westway, the 4.2 mile interstate that New York City officials proposed in 1970 for Manhattan’s West Side. The estimated construction cost: $300 million per mile. Local oppo-

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*Emission controls (1970), safety bumpers (early 1970s), and structural requirements for roofs, frames, and other parts (mid-1970s) were imposed. In 1974 came the 55 m.p.h. speed limit.
A uniquely American creation: the drive-in church. In 1972, the faithful gather for a sermon at the Reverend Robert Schuller's "22-acre shopping center for Jesus Christ" in Garden Grove, Calif.

Facing lawsuits by environmentalists and others, a dozen big cities, including Atlanta, Denver, and Philadelphia, scaled down urban freeway plans during the 1960s and '70s; Boston and San Francisco scrapped them altogether. In 1974, at President Nixon's behest, Congress even tapped the once-sacrosanct Highway Trust Fund to provide subsidies for urban mass transit.

Foes of the automobile voiced a certain I-told-you-so satisfaction during the oil crises of 1973 and 1979. (Others reacted angrily, as when a Cadillac owner crashed a gas line in Hollywood, California, waving a gun while he filled his tank.) It was for many Americans a shock to see how dependent they had become on the automobile. Not only wouldn't they give up their cars—they couldn't.

Indeed, the popularity of the suburbs, and after them the "exurbs" (the suburban fringe and beyond), continued apace—among both homeowners and businesses, President Jimmy Carter summoned Americans to respond to the energy crisis with "the moral
equivalent of war.” But commuters and business travelers simply bought more fuel-efficient cars and resigned themselves to paying more than 50 cents a gallon, versus 37 cents in 1970. (By early 1980, the price had reached an unprecedented $1.60 a gallon.) While cities lost 4.6 percent of their populations from 1970 to 1977, the suburbs grew by 12 percent. Lured by cheaper land and lower taxes, more than 170 Fortune 500 companies moved their offices or factories out of the troubled cities.*

By the mid-1980s, the suburbs were no longer simply residential “bedroom communities” with backyards and two-car garages. Across the nation, these counties surrounding central cities had been turning into self-sufficient ad hoc urban complexes (“minicities” or “urban villages” in sociological jargon), linked by beltways (the new Main Streets), sustained by innumerable clusters of new office buildings and industrial parks (the new workplaces), and by some 20,000 shopping malls (the new downtowns). A resident of the emerging “doughnut metropolis” never needed to set foot in the central city. As the Atlantic recently noted, 27 million Americans commuted from one suburb to another in 1980; only half that number traveled from suburbs to downtown business districts. Today, the political pressure in many metropolitan areas is not for new roads into the cities, but for “outer” beltways and cross-suburb expressways to serve local workers, corporate employers, and the trucking industry.

A Nation Driven?

“The automobile,” observes historian James A. Dunn, Jr., of Rutgers, “has done just about as much as it could do to shape U.S. urban and suburban environments.” With 130 million cars, 40 million trucks and buses, and nearly 3.9 million miles of roads, the United States seems wedded to the car. The tremendous dispersion of a growing population and its changing economy could only have been accomplished with the car—and only by the car can it be sustained.

In Western Europe, governments continue to curb the auto’s influence by levying heavy taxes on gasoline and vehicles, skimming (by U.S. standards) on highway construction, and channeling new housing development into densely populated areas served by subways, trains, trams, and buses. There are costs to this strategy, too. For example, European officials are reluctant to reveal the total subsidies for their nationalized railroads, but, according to a 1979 estimate by the U.S. Department of Transportation, as much as 60 percent of their operating costs (as in Great Britain) are subsidized.

*Another development, as a 1978 Congressional Research Service report noted, was a “backlash” migration pattern to rural areas entirely dependent on automobiles and highways, especially in the West and Southwest. The nation’s rural population increased by 21 percent during the 1970s. Towns of 10–25,000 inhabitants grew 10 percent, due partly to an influx of retirees.
Amtrak, a perennial target of federal budget cutters, receives some $600 million annually from Washington, roughly 40 percent of the passenger railroad's budget.

But many of the costs of America's dependence on the car are often shrugged off: traffic jams, accidents, air pollution, long-distance commuting, the "Los Angeles-ization" of suburbia. Competition from shopping malls has sapped the vitality of Main Streets everywhere. Ridership on public transportation—buses, subways, trains—continues to decline. Seven states (New Hampshire, Maine, Wyoming, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Hawaii, and Alaska) are virtually without passenger train service; business travelers must rely on airlines and rented cars; thousands of individual communities are linked to the rest of the nation only by television, telephone, and ribbons of asphalt and concrete. The annual cost of extending and maintaining the nation's aging roads and highways reached some $46.5 billion in 1986, up $14.7 billion since 1980. And every new highway eventually seems to generate new traffic congestion.

The ultimate "hidden cost" may be America's continuing dependence on massive imports of petroleum, and its underlying vulnerability to the whims of foreign oil ministers. Barring a breakthrough in the technology of the internal-combustion engine, the car culture promises to cost a great deal more at some time in the future. Yet Americans are unlikely to shrink at the price. Practical necessity aside, as Frederick Lewis Allen wrote in 1952, any American "who has been humbled by poverty, or by his insignificance in the business order, or by his racial status, or by any other circumstance that might demean him in his own eyes, gains a sense of authority when he slides behind the wheel of an automobile and it leaps forward at his bidding, ready to take him wherever he may personally please."

The car is no longer so uncomplicated a symbol of freedom. Yet the symbol has not lost its appeal. A nostalgic mood is much in evidence, as Life's March 1986 pictorial essay, "Car Love: Fifty Years of Cars," or novels like The Last Convertible (1978), attest. These backward glances also tell us something about the future: Although cars still represent freedoms beloved by Americans, they no longer promise to create new ways of working or living. Once the dream of a better future, the automobile has in some ways become a throwback to our imaginary past. But it is very much with us.
"Business is never as healthy as when, like a chicken, it must do a certain amount of scratching for what it gets," declared Henry Ford in My Life and Work, with Samuel Crowther (Doubleday, 1922; Arno, 1973). "Money chasing," he added, "is not business."

Such down-to-earth pronouncements, published over the years in newspapers and magazines, and aired on radio, made Ford an American folk hero.

As a result of the industry's stunning growth (General Motors passed the $1 billion sales mark in 1926), Detroit and its entrepreneurs during the Jazz Age were to manufacturing what New York City, with its Yankees, Dodgers, and Giants, was to baseball.

Americans admired the automakers, and they loved their cars. In Americans on the Road: From Autocamp to Motel, Nineteen Ten to Nineteen Forty-Five (MIT, 1979), Warren J. Belasco quotes an early enthusiast: "He who runs by rail but makes an acquaintance; he who runs by road makes a friend—or sometimes an enemy; he at least gets intimate."

Despite his dark side (he dabbled in anti-Semitism), Ford, the visionary tinkerer who was wont to pick up a hitchhiker and give him a job, remains the most compelling automaker of them all. "It was useless to try to understand Henry Ford," wrote Charles E. ("Cast Iron Charlie") Sorensen in My Forty Years with Ford (Collier, 1962). "One had to sense him."

Like virtually all of Ford's colleagues and biographers, Sorensen did not recall him fondly. The inventor was autocratic, capricious, sometimes cruel, often vain. "After the name of Henry Ford became a household word," Sorensen recollected, "men in Ford Motor Company who might temporarily get more publicity than he did aroused his jealousy. One by one they were purged."

Sorensen, ever dutiful, carried out many of the purges himself. For dirtier jobs—strikebreaking, intelligence-gathering, and all-around "fixing"—Ford employed the infamous Harry Bennett, notes Robert Lacey in his lively saga, Ford: The Men and the Machine (Little, Brown, 1986). Bennett, a gregarious, pistol-packing ex-sailor, directed Ford's so-called Service Department, a strong-arm force of 3,000 men.

The rise of William C. Durant, the soft-spoken salesman from Flint, Michigan, who parlayed a modest carriage business into General Motors, is chronicled by historian Bernard A. Weisberger in The Dream Maker: William C. Durant, Founder of General Motors (Little, Brown, 1979).

Ford and Durant were inspired men, but neither possessed much managerial talent. As their backyard creations grew into vast corporations, the early entrepreneurs were replaced by a new generation of "team players."

At GM, Durant was succeeded by Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., who was to become the ultimate "organization man."

Sloan realized, as he wrote in Adventures of a White-Collar Man, with Boyden Sparkes (Books for Libraries, 1941; Doubleday, 1970), that "in an institution as big as General Motors ... any plan that involved too great a concentration of problems upon a limited number of executives would limit initiative, would involve delay, would increase expense, and would reduce efficiency." Sloan's solution: divide the corporation into dozens of subunits, each headed by a single executive. His greatest legacy may be the corporate organization chart.

Even so, Detroit has continued to produce colorful executives. Best known today is Chrysler's Lee Iacocca, whose rags-to-riches yarn, Iacocca: An Auto-
biography, with William Novak (Bantam, 1984, cloth; 1986, paper), became a phenomenal best seller. J. Patrick Wright's *On a Clear Day You Can See General Motors* (Wright, 1979, cloth; Avon, 1980, paper) profiles John Z. DeLorean, the brilliant ex-GM executive who founded his own car company in 1975 and later ran afoul of the law. Scathingly critical of GM's bureaucracy, DeLorean argued that the company had abandoned Alfred P. Sloan's ideal of decentralization. All power flowed from the isolated 14th floor of GM's Detroit headquarters: "For the most part, a top executive by the time he works his way through the system is a carbon copy of his predecessors. If the men in place cannot do the job, there is no reason to believe that their handpicked successors can."

To executives on the 14th floor, the chief ogre was Walter P. Reuther, the tough-minded head of the United Auto Workers (UAW) between 1946 and 1970. An anti-Communist Social Democrat, he rarely missed a chance to rain scorn on "the bosses." Yet, he proved one of organized labor's most farsighted leaders, urging the Big Three to build small cars and cut prices during the late 1940s, and accepting the industry's need to introduce new technology on the assembly line. He is the central character in his brother Victor's memoir, *The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW* (Houghton, 1976).

*The Company and the Union* (Vintage, 1974) is journalist William Serrin's engaging history of the UAW's costly strike against GM in 1970. The two sides could have averted the walkout, says Serrin, but the UAW's leadership needed a strike to prove its zeal to the rank and file. Management and labor, Serrin argues, "are victims of the relationship they have fashioned."

Distrust has not ended in Detroit. In *Car Wars: The Untold Story* (Dutton, 1984), one of the best recent books on Detroit's travails, historian Robert Sobel cites a 1983 survey of employee attitudes in several industrialized nations. More than their counterparts overseas (including those in Japan), U.S. factory hands professed a commitment to the work ethic. But only nine percent believed that their hard work would be rewarded with higher pay; in Japan, 93 percent of the employees did.

However, Sobel and most other scholars are reasonably hopeful about Detroit's prospects. Assessing the social and economic impact of *The Car Culture* (MIT, 1975), historian James J. Flink of the University of California, Irvine, disagrees. The wasteful "patterns of growth and development" spawned by the automobile and the cost of keeping gas tanks filled will doom "the age of automobility."

For another view of Detroit's future, see *The Reckoning* (Morrow, 1986), an artful collage that contrasts the industry and its leaders in the United States with Japan, by David Halberstam, the author of *The Best and the Brightest*. "In just 25 years," financier Felix Rohatyn told him, "we have gone from the American century to the American crisis." But one senior Chrysler executive added that the Japanese cost advantage could be eliminated if U.S. companies could "do a car right the first time."

Tokyo is worried, too. Already, the Japanese are looking over their shoulders—not at Detroit, but at such rising South Korean carmakers as Hyundai and Samsung. To the South Koreans, the Japanese are "the lazy Asians."
As an articulate champion of liberty and toleration, of common sense and healthy measure in all things, England’s John Locke (1632–1704) became in many respects the guiding spirit for America’s Founding Fathers. His perception that personal freedom requires the private ownership of property remains a cornerstone of American political thought. Nonetheless, Locke is a hazy figure to most Americans, even as they approach the 1987 bicentennial of the Constitution, which embraces many of his ideas. Here, Maurice Cranston reviews the man’s life and work.

by Maurice Cranston

Among the philosophers of the modern world, John Locke has always been held in especially high regard in America. His influence on the Founding Fathers exceeded that of any other thinker. And the characteristically American attitude toward politics—indeed, toward life—can still be thought of as “Lockean,” with its deep attachment to the rule of law, to equal rights to life, liberty, and property, to work and enterprise, to religious toleration, to science, progress, and pragmatism.

Like the Founders, Locke had participated in a revolution—the bloodless Glorious Revolution of 1688–89, in which the English overthrew the despotic King James II to install the constitutional monarchy of William and Mary and confirm Parliament’s supremacy. Locke had justified that rebellion in his writings with arguments against “unjust and unlawful force,” arguments that were cited as no less powerful in the American Colonies during the 1770s.

Earlier philosophers had theorized about justice, order, authority, and peace. Locke was the first to build a system around liberty.

Locke’s chief works—An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Two Treatises of Government, and his first Letter Concerning Toleration, all published in London in 1689–90—spoke in terms that Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and other Americans recognized. Men were created equal by God and endowed by Him with natural rights; the earth was given by God to men to cultivate by...
their own endeavors, so that each could earn a right to property ("the chief end" of society) by the application of his labor to the improvement of nature. In the New World, Locke's message received a warmer welcome than in crowded, feudal Europe.

The practical men who led the American Revolution and wrote the Constitution and the Bill of Rights recognized Locke as a Christian, like themselves, who had discarded nonessential dogmas and yet retained a pious faith in the Creator and in the Puritan virtues of probity and industry. Other European philosophers influenced the Framers' thinking: Montesquieu (1689-1755) contributed a republican element and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) a democratic element, neither present in the constitutional-monarchist system of Locke. But the French philosophers, though they worked in a field prepared by Locke, did not have his hold on the American mind.

But who was John Locke?

Paintings, including a 1672 portrait by John Greenhill that Locke admired, show a tall, lean, and handsome man with a dimpled chin and large, dark, languorous eyes. He had asthma; one of his teachers, the great medical scientist Thomas Sydenham, urged him to rest much to conserve the "needful heat." A contemporary at Oxford called him a "turbulent spirit, clamorous and never contented," who
could be "prating and troublesome." The earl of Shaftesbury, his long-time patron, thought him a "genius."

So, apparently, did Locke. His self-esteem shows in the understated Latin epitaph he wrote for himself before he died at age 73. The plaque at the Essex church where he was buried describes him as merely a scholar "contented with his modest lot," who "devoted his studies wholly to the pursuit of truth."

Locke was never a candid man. He had an almost Gothic love of mystery. A Tory spy once wrote that at Oxford Locke "lives a very cunning unintelligible life"; he was often absent, but "no one knows whither he goes." In his letters and notebooks, he used ciphers and a shorthand system modified for purposes of concealment. Yet a picture emerges from these and other sources: Locke was one of the most adept, compelling, and idiosyncratic "new men" to rise in what he called "this great Bedlam," 17th-century England.

John Locke was born on August 29, 1632, at Wrington in Somerset in the west of England, where modern commerce first began to challenge the old medieval order. His grandfather, Nicholas Locke, was a successful clothier. His less prosperous father, John Locke, was a lawyer and clerk to the local magistrates. His mother came from a family of tanners; she was 35 when her first child, the future philosopher, was born; her husband was only 26. The baby was baptized by Samuel Crook, a leading Puritan intellectual, and brought up in an atmosphere of Calvinist austerity and discipline.

England was Bedlam partly because of tension between the arrogant, authoritarian, and High Anglican King Charles and the increasingly assertive and Puritan House of Commons. In 1642, when Locke was 10 years old, the Civil War began between the Royalist forces (the Cavaliers) and the Parliamentary army (the Roundheads). The struggle was religious and social as well as political. The ultimately victorious Parliamentarians tended to be drawn not from the traditionalists of the Church of England and the leaders of feudal society, but from the Calvinists and Puritans, men from England's "new class" of rising merchants.

Among these were Locke's Devonshire cousins, named King, who rose swiftly from the trade of grocers to that of lawyers, and then via Parliament to the nobility itself. Young John, too, would

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benefit from England’s great upheaval.

During the Civil War, his father was made a captain of Parliamentary Horse by Alexander Popham, a rich local magistrate turned Roundhead colonel. Popham became fond of his captain’s son. When Westminster, the country’s best boarding school, was taken over by Parliament, Popham found a place there for the boy.

That was the first stroke of fortune that would assist Locke’s rise from the lower- to the upper-middle class—a group whose aspirations he may have reflected when, as a political philosopher, he gave the right to property first priority among the rights of man.

At Westminster, Locke was influenced by headmaster Richard Busby, a Royalist whom the Parliamentary governors had imprudently allowed to remain in charge of the school. By the time Locke won a scholarship to Oxford’s premier college, Christ Church, which he entered at age 20, he was well ready to react against the rule of the Puritan “saints” at the university.* By 27, Locke had become a right-wing monarchist; by 1661, when he was 29, and the Restoration had put the deposed king’s son Charles II on the throne, Locke’s political views were close to those of the conservative thinker of the previous generation, Thomas Hobbes.

In a pamphlet Locke wrote at that time, he said that no one had more “veneration for authority than I.” Having been born in a political “storm” that had “lasted almost hitherto,” he had been led by the calm that the Restoration brought to value “obedience.”

*By his early 30s, Locke was less interested in politics than in medicine, a new subject at Oxford. During the summer of 1666, he chanced to perform a small medical service for a student’s father, Anthony Ashley Cooper, the future earl of Shaftesbury and leader of the Whig party, champion of the rights of Parliament over the Crown.† Even then Shaftesbury, a wealthy Presbyterian, was a vocal political “liberal,” the chief foe of measures designed by the Anglican majority to curb the freedom of religious Nonconformists. If Locke had not already come over to Shaftesbury’s views, the earl must soon have pulled him across the last few hurdles.

At 35, Locke went to live at Shaftesbury’s London house as his physician. After he saved the earl from the threat of a cyst of the liver, Shaftesbury decided that Locke was too talented to be spending his time on medicine alone, and work of other kinds was found for

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*The Oxford routine was still medieval. Undergraduates had to rise at 5:00 a.m. to attend chapel, and do four hours’ work in Hall before supper at noon. Conversation with tutors, and among students in Hall, had to be in Latin. Students had to hear at least two sermons a day, and visit their tutors nightly “to hear private prayers and to give an account of the time spent that day.”

†The name Whig seems to have come from Whiggamore, a term for “horse thief” used by 17th-century Anglicans or “Tories” to express scorn for Scottish Presbyterian.
him. Thus began Locke’s 15-year association with a powerful patron.

Gradually, Locke discovered his true gifts. First he became a philosopher. At Oxford he had been bored with the medieval Aristotelian philosophy still taught there. Reading French rationalist René Descartes first opened his eyes to the “new philosophy” that was providing the underpinnings of modern empirical science. Discussions with Shaftesbury and other friends led him to begin writing early drafts of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, his masterpiece on epistemology, the study of how we know what we know.

Shaftesbury, short, ugly, and vain, shared Locke’s interest in philosophy and science. He was pragmatic: Though anti-Catholic, he thought that religious toleration would help unite the nation, the better to pursue the kind of commercial imperialism that was proving so profitable for the seafaring Dutch.

Charles II, though he favored toleration primarily for the sake of Catholic recusants, agreed with Shaftesbury. In 1672, the king made Shaftesbury his chief minister, lord high chancellor. But the two soon fell out. Shaftesbury came to believe that England’s main rival in trade and her potential enemy was not Holland but France, while Charles II remained strongly pro-French. Ousted as the king’s minister, Shaftesbury became his leading adversary.

Later, when Charles II refused to deny his brother, a professed Catholic, the right to succeed him as James II, Shaftesbury tried to get the House of Commons to make the succession illegal. The people, he said, had a right to say who should rule. When Charles resisted, Shaftesbury called on his allies to rebel. The plot was nipped, and in 1682 the earl fled to Holland, where he soon died.

Locke, too, went to Amsterdam. One year later he was expelled in absentia from his “studentship” at Oxford by the king’s command. The next summer, after Charles II’s death and James’s accession to the throne, the duke of Monmouth led a failed rebellion against the new king. Locke, named by the government as one of Monmouth’s agents in Holland, went into hiding as “Dr. van der Linden.”

Locke’s friends in Holland included many of those who plotted with the Dutch prince William of Orange to topple James II, who was indeed deposed in 1688. We do not know how deeply Locke was involved, only that he returned to London in 1689 with William’s wife Mary, the new English queen.

These were the events behind Locke’s most famous works.

By the time the Two Treatises of Government appeared, Englishmen had come round to Shaftesbury’s view: They justified deposing James II not just because he advanced Catholicism, but also because he had tried to be an absolute monarch like France’s Louis
XIV. In his preface, Locke said that he hoped the Two Treatises would help "justify the title of King William to rule us." But he did most of the writing when Charles II was king. Then, the question of whether a people had the right to rebel against their ruler was not a backward-looking moral issue but a forward-looking moral challenge.

Thomas Hobbes wrote Leviathan (1651) to provide new reasons for men to obey kings. In the Two Treatises, Locke used Hobbes's "social contract" to justify revolt against despots.

Hobbes's social contract united men, whom he viewed as natural enemies, in a civil society with a common purpose. Locke did not see men as enemies. He took a Christian view. He argued that men were subject, even in a state of nature, to natural law, which was ultimately God's law made known to men through the voice of reason.

Hobbes's theory had simplicity: Either you are ruled or you are not ruled, either you have obedience or you have liberty, either you have security and fetters or you have chaos and danger. Neither condition is ideal, said Hobbes, but the worst government was better than none at all.

The Lockean analysis was less pessimistic.

Locke believed that men could be both ruled and free. While subject to natural law, men also had natural rights—notably rights to life, liberty, and property. These rights were retained when men contracted to form political societies. Instead of surrendering their freedom to a sovereign, as Hobbes suggested, men had merely entrusted power to a ruler. In return for justice and mutual security, they had agreed to obey their rulers, on condition that their natural rights were respected. Natural rights, being derived from natural law, were rooted in something higher than the edicts of princes, namely the edicts of God. They were "inalienable."

Locke's "right to revolution"—to reject a ruler who failed to respect natural rights—thus derived not only from the social contract but also from the supremacy of God's law to man's. People who might have misunderstood, or been unimpressed by, the social contract in abstract philosophy could appreciate the principle that God's law is higher than that of kings. And while Locke based his politics on religion, his was not the astringent faith of the Catholics or of Calvin, but that watered-down Christianity later known as Modernism.*

Locke's writing during his stay in Holland included a travel journal. It revealed how he would visit some great cathedral or chateau, but then take an interest only in working out the exact dimensions.

*Locke rejected original sin. He maintained in The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695) that Christ had come into the world not to redeem wrongdoing man, but to bring immortality to the righteous. Locke, a professing Anglican, here argued like a Unitarian, though he felt that word conjured up the unpopular image of a skeptical dissenter.
LOCKE'S 'SHATTERED AND GIDDY' ENGLAND

The tremors that rocked John Locke's times echo in his letters. England's fissures—between Crown and Parliament, Anglicans and Dissenters, aristocrats and achievers, rich and poor—had left a "shattered and giddy nation," he wrote at age 27. Few men "enjoy the privilege of being sober."

During the century before Locke's birth in 1632, England's population almost doubled, topping five million in 1640. But with growth came several woes: rising prices, falling "real" wages, and poor harvests and frequent famines caused by a miniature global ice age that lasted from about 1550 to 1700. While England was a naval power, as the 1588 defeat of the Spanish Armada had shown, the Dutch were far ahead in turning maritime prowess to profit.

But business was becoming important: Retail shops created by a new breed of merchant began to replace the old market fairs. Abroad, firms chartered by the Crown traded English woolens and African slaves for West Indian molasses and sugar and American fish and timber; the East India Company (est. 1600) dealt in textiles and tea. Commerce had not (yet) remade England; if Locke's home county, Somerset, prospered from new industries (notably clothing), it was also plagued by such poverty that people, wrote one chronicler, "hanged themselves from want." But, slowly, medieval England was becoming the mercantile nation that, by the 18th century, would create the British Empire.

Authority was eroding. The Roman Catholic Church's supremacy had been broken by the Protestantism that had arrived via Martin Luther's Germany and Huldrych Zwingli's and John Calvin's Switzerland, and by King Henry VIII's 1534 creation of the Church of England. And while the peerage was still dominant, the expanding landed gentry and the new commercial class now had to be heard. By the early 17th century, as historian Lawrence Stone has noted, "respectful subservience [to aristocracy] was breaking down."

King Charles I (1625–49), was besieged by troubles. Suspected by his Protestant subjects of "popish" leanings, he waged an unpopular war in Europe and, later, failed to secure Parliament's support in his effort to quash rebellion in Scotland, leading to the Civil War in 1642. The pro-Parliament Roundheads tended to be Calvinists (Presbyterians), Puritans, or Protestant

He detested ceremonies and show, which he thought irrational and wasteful, and was pleased to find that one of the best Dutch universities had nondescript architecture. It proved "that knowledge depends not on the stateliness of buildings, etc."

"Knowledge" is the key word. Locke's philistinism was no aberration. He wanted to get away from the imagination, from the vague glamour of medieval things, from unthinking adherence to tradition, from enthusiasm, mysticism, and glory; away from all private, visionary insights and down to the plain, demonstrable facts. This was central to his mission as a philosopher and reformer. His antipathy to poetry and imaginative artists was coupled with scorn for ivory-tower
Nonconformists—the rising merchants and the gentry. The royalist Cavaliers were High Church or Catholic aristocrats. The 1648 triumph of the Parliamentary Army under (among others) the ardent Puritan, Oliver Cromwell, was to an extent a victory—and not the final one—of the “new” middle-class England. Soon after, the English did what most Europeans then considered unthinkable: They beheaded their king and established a commonwealth.

Within five years, Cromwell assumed absolute power. His Protectorate was austere. Fancy dress, amusements such as alehouses and horseraces, and lively arts such as theater were discouraged. The Puritan zealots who controlled Oxford, wrote one of Locke’s contemporaries, enjoyed “laughing at a man in a cassock or canonical coat.” They would “tipple” in their chambers, but would not enter taverns or permit such diversions as “Maypoles, Morises [folk dances], Whitsun ales, nay, scarce wakes.” So unpopular were Puritan efforts to impose moral discipline that most Englishmen joined Locke in hailing the Restoration of Charles II in 1660. But the monarchy would never be the same. After Charles’s successor, James II, was deposed, William and Mary became England’s first constitutional monarchs. Merriment returned to everyday life. At Oxford, nearly 400 taverns flourished, as did, said one critic, “easy manners, immorality, loose language, disrespect.”

While Protestantism—particularly Puritanism—played a large role in 17th-century politics, its influence went further. In the arts, it infused the epic poem *Paradise Lost* (1667), John Milton’s eloquent attempt to “justify God’s ways to man.” In science, the mental traits fostered by Protestantism—inde- pendence, individualism, skepticism of authority—were central.

Early in the century Francis Bacon had called for close scrutiny of the natural world, for the adoption of the experimental method, and for an inductive style of reasoning. Among those who heeded him were Isaac Newton, Robert Boyle, and William Harvey, the pioneering anatomist. All helped dispose of scholasticism, the medieval system of inquiry that proceeded, in Aristotelian style, by deduction from untestable assumptions. The “new science” that they espoused encouraged a radical reconsideration of all areas of thought—in political theory, in economics, and in philosophy itself. It was, of course, an upheaval to which Locke himself made vital contributions.

scholars who talk “with but one sort of men and read but one sort of books.” They “canton out to themselves a little Goshen in the intellectual world where the light shines... but will not venture out into the great ocean of knowledge.”

Locke’s venturing made him a polymath, but he was in no sense a smatterer. True, his expertise was not equal in all the subjects he chose to study. Compared to his friends, chemist Robert Boyle and Sir Isaac Newton, the great physicist, he was an amateurish scientist. His knowledge of the Scriptures was questionable. Although he wrote influential essays on monetary policy, he could not appreciate the subtlety of other economists. But what was important in Locke’s case
was not his versatility, but that each department of knowledge was related in his mind to all the others.

In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke says in the opening "Epistle" that in an age of such "master builders" as Boyle, Sydenham, and "the incomparable Mr. Newton" it is "ambition enough to be employed as an under-laborer in clearing the ground a little and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge." Locke did much more than that: The Essay provides the first modern philosophy of science.

A recurrent word in the work is a Cartesian one, "idea." Locke's usage is curious. He does not merely say that we have ideas in our minds when we think; he says that we have ideas in our minds when we see, hear, smell, taste, or feel. The core of his epistemology is the notion that we perceive not things but ideas that are derived in part from objects in the external world, yet also depend to some extent on our own minds for their existence.

The Essay attacks the established view that certain ideas are innate. Locke's belief is that we are born in total ignorance, and that even our theoretical ideas of identity, quantity, and substance are derived from experience. A child gets ideas of black and white, of sweet and bitter, before he gets an idea of abstract principles, such as identity or impossibility. "The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet." Then the mind abstracts theoretical ideas, and so "comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the materials about which to exercise its discursive faculty."

In Locke's account, man is imprisoned in a sort of diving bell. He receives some signals from without and some from within his apparatus, but having no means of knowing which if any come from outside, he cannot test the signals' authenticity. Thus man cannot have any certain knowledge of the external world. He must settle for probable knowledge.

Locke's general philosophy has obvious implications for a theory of morals. The traditional view was that some sort of moral knowledge was innate. Locke thought otherwise. What God had given men was a faculty of reason and a sentiment of self-love. Reason combined with self-love produced morality. Reason could discern the principles of ethics, or natural law, and self-love should lead men to obey them.

Locke wrote in one of his notebooks that "it is a man's proper business to seek happiness and avoid misery. Happiness consists in what delights and contents the mind, misery is what disturbs, discomposes or torments it." He would "make it my business to seek satisfaction and delight and avoid uneasiness and disquiet." But he knew that "if I prefer a short pleasure to a lasting one, it is plain I cross my
own happiness.”

For Locke, in other words, Christian ethics was natural ethics. The teaching of the New Testament was a means to an end—happiness in this life and the next. The reason for doing what the Gospel demanded about loving one’s neighbor, etc., was not just that Jesus said it. By doing these things one promoted one’s happiness; men were impelled by their natural self-love to desire it.

Wrongdoing was thus for Locke a sign of ignorance or folly. People did not always realize that long-term happiness could usually only be bought at the cost of short-term pleasure. If people were prudent and reflective, not moved by the winds of impulse and emotion, they would have what they most desired.

The preface to the English edition of the first Letter Concerning Toleration says, “Absolute Liberty, just and true Liberty, equal and impartial Liberty is the thing we stand in need of.” Many people assumed these words to be Locke’s; Lord King, a relative, made them an epigraph in a Locke biography. In fact, they were the words of the translator of Locke’s original Latin, William Popple.

Locke did not believe in absolute liberty, any more than he believed in absolute knowledge. He thought the way to achieve as much as possible of both was to face the fact that they were limited and then to see what the limitations were. As he did with knowledge in the Essay, Locke focused on the liberty that men cannot have, to show the liberty they can achieve. The limits are set by the need to protect the life, property, and freedom of each individual from others, and from the society’s common enemies. No other limits need be borne, or should be. Locke set men on the road to the greatest possible liberty by the method he used to set them on the road to the greatest knowledge—teaching the impossibility of the absolute.

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Locke guarded his anonymity with elaborate care. The Essay, which made him famous throughout Europe in his own time, was one of the few works that appeared under his own name. Most were published anonymously. When an English translation of the first Letter Concerning Toleration was issued in London, Locke protested that it had happened “without my privity.”

Some of his secrecy stemmed from his days of hiding in Holland, some was for fun, some plainly neurotic. Some added a needed touch of romance to his relations with his women friends.

While Locke never married, he sought female affection and courted a formidable lot of professors’ bluestocking daughters. Once, when he was 27, his father wrote to him of a Somerset widow who was “young, childless, handsome, with £200 per annum and £1,000 in her purse,” but Locke would not settle down. His closest relation-
ship with any person developed in 1682, when Locke, then 50, met Damaris Cudworth, the 24-year-old daughter of a Cambridge philosopher. They exchanged verses and love letters (signed “Philander” and “Philoclea”); he called her his “governess,” a role that he was oddly fond of inviting his women friends to assume. Yet no union resulted, although the two were to remain close, even years after she married a nobleman and became Lady Masham.

Locke, as he wrote to an old friend, considered “marriage and death so very nearly the same thing.”

Locke was careful with money. His detailed accounts show that during his 30s he had a modest income of about £240 a year from rental property in Somerset, in addition to stipends from Christ Church and profits from investments.* Once, when going abroad, he asked an uncle not to let his tenants know, “for perhaps that may make them more slack to pay their rents.”

Locke’s attentiveness to important people brought him not only lodgings—he had no home, being always the guest of various admirers—but job offers as well. He was once the Crown’s secretary of presentations, a £300-a-year job involving ecclesiastical matters. He refused an ambassadorship in Germany, saying that the duties there more befitted someone who could “drink his share” than “the soberest man” in England. Shaftesbury made him secretary of the Lords Proprietors of Carolina, in which role he advertised for settlers (people who could behave “peaceably” and not use their “liberty” for “licentiousness”) and helped write a constitution for the colony.†

In his mid-60s, Locke became the dominant member of a new Board of Trade. Though the post paid £1,000 a year, Locke complained to a friend: “What have I to do with the bustle of public affairs while sinking under the burdens of age and infirmity?”

Among other things, Locke’s board made linen-making the “general trade” of Ireland (partly to keep the Irish out of England’s wool business). When pauperism became an issue, Locke argued that the problem was not “scarcity of provision or want of employment,” but indiscipline and “corruption of manners, virtue, and industry.” He urged (unsuccessfully) new laws for the “suppression of begging drones.” Healthy men between 14 and 50 caught seeking alms

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*Though no plunger, Locke did speculate with some success (as Shaftesbury had) in the slave trade and in sugar plantations in the Bahamas. He wrote at least some books for money, among them a volume on French grape and olive cultivation (something good has “come out of France”). The estate he left, worth close to £20,000, was no fortune, but not a pittance either.

†Rejecting a “numerous democracy,” the document prescribed legislative power balanced between citizenry and a local aristocracy; freemen had to “acknowledge a God.” Locke received membership in the Carolina aristocracy and some land. But the colonists, who began arriving in 1669, repudiated the Lords Proprietors; the aristocracy was never created, and Locke’s land appears to have yielded no rent.
should serve three years on navy ships “under strict discipline at soldier’s pay.” Boys and girls under 14 should be “soundly whipped.”

Lady Masham explained that Locke was “compassionate,” but “his charity was always directed to encourage working, laborious, industrious people, and not to relieve idle beggars, to whom he never gave anything.” He thought them wastrels, and “waste of anything he could not bear to see.”

Locke was 68 before he retired, to the Masham country house, to spend his last years writing a commentary on the New Testament.

Although Locke has sometimes been dismissed as an ideologue of the age of bourgeois revolutions, he is in many respects the 17th-century thinker whose teaching is most relevant to the concerns of our own time. During the 19th century, that great age of nationalism and imperialism, Locke’s individualism seemed narrow and dated. But in the presence of the kind of despotic and totalitarian regimes that have emerged during the 20th century, Locke’s defense of the rights of man has taken on a new immediacy. During World War I, Woodrow Wilson looked to Locke to justify the use of force against tyranny. When World War II posed an even more intense challenge to democracy, Winston Churchill proclaimed the aim of victory in Lockean terms, as “the enthronement of human rights.”

Numerous declarations and covenants of human rights have since expressed the principles through which the West has sought to formulate its demand for freedom under law. That is something we have claimed not only for our fellow citizens, but (as Locke did) for all men—not an ideal of perfect justice, but a minimal standard to which any government can fairly be called upon to conform. We no longer expect every nation to govern itself as democratically as we do ourselves, but we do demand that they all respect human rights, and we can still look to Locke for the classic formulation of the philosophy that informs that demand.

Modern opinion has often sought to add to assertions of the rights of individuals, pleas for the rights of groups, economic, ethnic, racial, regional, or whatever. But again, that was anticipated by Locke when he argued for the toleration of dissidents and minorities. In his time, religious persecution was at issue; in ours it is political. But persecution as such has not changed its character, and the case for toleration that Locke worked out 300 years ago is no less pertinent today than it was then. It is, if anything, more urgent, since progress has made persecution more common, efficient, and cruel.

The “storm” of change in which Locke was born continues. So, remarkably, does the value of his ideas on how to deal with change, maintaining the maximum liberty and justice for all.
In Beijing (1902), hungry Chinese await distribution of rice by American relief groups. The developing world's poverty and hunger aroused sporadic concern in the West, but were not widely linked to population growth. Indeed, until the 1930s, population grew faster in the West than in the poorer countries.
Population and Economic Growth

The world’s population, increasing by more than one million human beings a week, reached a total of five billion in 1986. Since the time of Thomas Malthus (1766-1834), scholars and philosophers have worried that population growth, if unchecked, would doom mankind to famine, disease, and dire poverty. Today, that threat seems acute among some of the rapidly growing peoples of the Third World. Here, Harvard’s Nick Eberstadt examines the diverse economic effects of the much-publicized “population explosion.” His surprising conclusion: The size and growth rate of a poor country’s population are seldom crucial to its material prospects. What matters most, he contends, is how well a society and its leaders cope with change.

THE THIRD WORLD

by Nick Eberstadt

The world’s poorer nations are in the midst of an unprecedented “population revolution.” The revolution is occurring not in the delivery room, but in the minds of men who run governments. In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, political leaders of the Left and Right have variously agreed that one thing is crucial: shaping the size and growth rate of their populations.

These officials, along with many Westerners, have come to embrace the idea that slowing the birthrate in the Third World is essential to economic progress, and, indeed, will foster rapid modernization. As early as 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson endorsed this view. “Five dollars in family planning aid,” he said, “would do more for many less-developed countries than $100 of development aid.”

Family planning programs, directed by governments and implemented on a massive scale, seemed feasible only after the 1957 invention of the birth control pill by Gregory Pincus, an American
scientist at the Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology. Third World governments, however, were long reluctant to make population control a top priority; They rebuffed U.S. efforts to win backing for the idea at the 1974 United Nations (UN) World Population Conference in Bucharest. A delegate from Communist China, the planet's most populous nation, declared that "the large population of the Third World is an important condition for the fight against imperialism." Many Third World delegates argued that Washington and its well-to-do Western allies were simply trying to divert attention from their obligations to the poor nations. To Washington's chagrin, the conference voted, as an Algerian delegate put it, "to restore the paramountcy of development over the matter of negatively influencing fertility rates."

A Plea for Modesty

"After the brouhaha of Bucharest, however," recalls Charles B. Keely, of the Population Council in New York, "the population establishment, led by the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, set about its business; and soon family planning programs and a government role in them became the accepted wisdom in most developing nations."

Today, with UN encouragement, more than 40 Third World regimes, including the governments of six of the world's largest nations, are developing or implementing "population plans." Overall, some 2.7 billion people live under regimes committed to carrying out such policies. They comprise about three-quarters of the population of the less-developed regions of the earth, and nearly three-fifths of the entire world population.

In the past, national governments often performed tasks with demographic consequences—the regulation of immigration, for example, or the eradication of communicable diseases. But the demographic impact of such efforts was always secondary to their intended purpose (e.g., the preservation of national sovereignty, the promotion of public health). The policy of harnessing state power to the goal of altering the demographic rhythms of society per se suggests a new relationship between state and citizen.

In South Asia, for example, General Hossain Mohammad Ershad's regime in Bangladesh is committed to reducing the fertility

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rate of the nation's 95 million people to 2.5 births per family by the year 2000. In West Africa, the government of Ghana (pop. 13 million) is aiming for 3.3 births per family. Parents in Bangladesh, however, seem to be having an average of six children and Ghana's parents an average of perhaps seven children. Statistics on Third World nations are unreliable, but the families of Bangladesh today appear to be as large as ever, and Ghanaians seem to be having bigger families than in the recent past. If Bangladesh and Ghana are to attain their targets, both governments must oversee a 50 percent reduction in their people's fertility during the next 15 years.

How such a radical alteration of personal behavior in so intimate a sphere—the bedroom—is to be achieved is not clear. But if these governments are serious about meeting their goals, they will need to resort to direct, far-reaching, and possibly even forceful intervention into the daily lives of their citizens. Among the nations that already have turned to coercion is India, where hundreds of thousands of men and women were sterilized against their will during the mid-1970s.

Unfortunately for the ordinary people in all of the 40 countries
devoted to activist population plans, their governments have acted on
the basis of a serious misconception.

The fact is that there is much less to the “science” of population
studies than most politicians realize or proponents concede.

Do slower population gains cause economic development, or
vice versa?

What other factors are involved?

None of the studies done by population specialists answer these
questions. In the same year that Lyndon Johnson voiced his faith in
family planning, Simon Kuznets, Harvard’s late Nobel laureate in eco-
nomics, called for “intellectual caution and modesty” on population
issues. Scholarship, he declared, “is inadequate in dealing with such a
fundamental aspect of economic growth as its relation to population
increase.” Kuznets’s plea was, as we know, largely ignored.

THE PERILS OF DEMOGRAPHY

Writers and thinkers have debated the “population question” for
centuries. Plato argued that the ideal community would limit itself to
exactly 5,040 citizens; Aristotle warned that overpopulation would
“bring certain poverty on the citizens, and poverty is the cause of
sedition and evil.” John Locke, on the other hand, suggested in 1699
that large numbers were a source of wealth. In 1798, Thomas Mal-
thus, the spiritual father of today’s pessimists, published An Essay on
the Principle of Population, the famous treatise in which he argued
that population would inevitably outstrip “subsistence.” During the
1930s, John Maynard Keynes and other economists warned that fall-
ing birthrates would exacerbate unemployment, erode living stan-
dards, and spark a food crisis—precisely the threats that pundits see
in today’s high birthrates in the Third World.*

Few of the basic issues in this centuries-old debate have been
resolved. One lesson that can be drawn from the recurring argu-
ments, however, is that the population question has usually engaged
man’s fervor more than his intellect.

That is not surprising. After all, the debate involves many mat-
ters of deep personal conviction. To talk about population issues is to

*Among the less-heralded intellectual forebears of today’s “science” of population studies are the 19th-
century social Darwinists, who warned that “inferior” nations, ethnic groups, or social classes might
outprocreate their betters. Toward the turn of the century, an English anthropologist named Francis
Galton founded the pseudoscience of eugenics, claiming that he could identify individuals and entire “races”
edowed by heredity with superior qualities. One eugenist, Madison Grant, president of the New York
Zoological Society, urged America to “take all means to encourage the multiplication of desirable types and
abate drastically the increase of the unfit and miscegenation by widely diverse races.”
touch upon the nature of free will; the rights of the living and the unborn; the roles of the sexes; the obligation of the individual to his society or to his God; the sanctity of the family; society’s duties to the poor; the destiny of one’s nation or one’s race; and the general prospects of mankind.

These are fundamentally questions of conscience or creed, not of science. Avowed political ideology is not always a reliable indicator of a country’s stance on “population policy.” Communist China’s “one-child” policy, with its harsh penalties for large families, represents the contemporary world’s most drastic current effort to curb population growth [see box, p. 125]. But Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, who governs a nominally open society with a nominally democratic government, has embraced policies with many of the same precepts.

Around the world, today’s campaign against “overpopulation” resembles nothing so much as a religious crusade. Faith, far more than facts, inspires the politicians and intellectuals, North or South, who fervently believe that they have found a “magic bullet” solution to the problems of economic development.

This zeal emerges in the messianic pronouncements of some of today’s most influential thinkers on population control. They often evoke the specter of a population apocalypse—and justify the enormous sacrifices they favor by holding out the prospect of demographic salvation. Thus, Stanford biologist Paul Ehrlich began his 1968 best seller The Population Bomb with the prophetic words: “The battle to feed all of humanity is over. In the 1970s the world will undergo famines—hundreds of millions of people will starve to death in spite of any crash programs embarked upon now.”

**Changing the Date**

That dire prediction was echoed in 1972 by an international group of researchers gathered under the aegis of the Club of Rome. Their much-publicized report, The Limits to Growth, predicted a population “collapse” more devastating than that caused by the Black Death in medieval Europe unless global ecological and population trends were reversed. A feat of that magnitude presumably could only be accomplished with far-reaching and praetorian social controls. And in 1973, Robert McNamara, then president of the World Bank, warned that “the threat of unmanageable population pressures is very much like the threat of nuclear war.... Both threats can and will have catastrophic consequences unless they are dealt with rapidly and rationally.”

Few of these true believers are nonplused when events prove them wrong. Like disappointed prophets of the millennium, they simply move the day of reckoning forward or refashion their dire predic-
"More Sex—Fewer Babies: Are the Germans Dying Out?" asked West Germany's Der Spiegel in 1975. Northern Europe's population "implosion" has created new woes: a shortage of young workers and military personnel.

In recent years, faith in such prophets has waned somewhat in Western official and academic circles. In 1986, for example, the U.S. National Research Council, which had published an alarmist assessment of global population trends in 1971, issued a much more sober-minded study, Population Growth and Economic Development: Policy Questions. Family planning programs, it concluded, "cannot make a poor country rich or even move it many notches higher on the scale of development."

But Third World governments are still attracted by the prospect of "scientifically" advancing their national welfare through population control. And Charles Keely's "population establishment"—at the UN, in academe, and in numerous private think tanks in America and Western Europe—is still sounding the alarm. Almost always, popular journalism reflects their convictions. "The consequences of a failure to bring the world's population growth under control are frightening," Time declared in 1984. "They could include widespread hunger and joblessness...heightened global instability, violence, and authoritarianism."

Population studies cannot be expected to provide solutions to such problems. Just as no one would demand that historians create a unified "theory of history," it is asking too much of demographers to expect them to provide overarching "laws of population." For all the mathematical rigor of some of its investigations, population studies is
a field of social inquiry, not a natural science. Researchers may uncover relationships between population change and prosperity, poverty, or war in particular places at particular times, but none of these findings can be generalized to cover the world at large.

Indeed, it is difficult—even to forecast the long-term growth rates of human populations with any accuracy. During the 1920s, Raymond Pearl, one of America's leading population biologists, predicted that U.S. census-takers would not count 200 million Americans until the start of the 22nd century. In fact, the United States passed that mark during the 1960s. During the 1930s, France's foremost demographers agreed that the French population was certain to fall between five and 30 percent by 1980. However, despite the losses it sustained during World War II, France's population rose by about 30 percent.

**An Embarrassment of Theories**

Some long-range estimates of population trends have been quite accurate. But long-term forecasts for particular regions or countries are still frequently wrong. In 1959, for example, the UN's "mid-range" prediction envisioned India's 1981 population at 603 million, too low by nearly 20 percent.

Despite improvements in the software and computers that demographers use, it is actually getting harder to foresee the demographic future. One reason is that new medicines and public health programs have enabled even the poorer nations to make deep cuts in their death rates quickly and inexpensively—if their governments choose to spend the money.

The unpredictable "human factor" also affects fertility. In England and Wales, it took almost 80 years during the 19th and early 20th centuries for the birthrate to fall by 15 points, from about 35 to 20 births per 1,000 people. Following World War II, Japan experienced a 15-point drop between 1948 and 1958 without any aggressive government intervention, and birthrates may have dropped by 20 points in China during the 1970s.

So every nation follows its own path: Personal choice and national culture seem stronger influences than any pat structural parameters of social science.

Low fertility, for example, is often said to go hand in hand with high levels of health. Yet life expectancy in contemporary Kenya, where women now seem to bear more than eight children on average, is almost exactly equal to that of Germany during the mid-1920s, when that country's total fertility rate was only 2.3 children per woman. Nineteenth-century France experienced a drop in fertility even though the nation's death rates were considerably higher than those in Bangladesh today.

Another demographic truism is that people in poor nations have
MEXICO

"Poor Mexico, so far from God, so close to the United States," mourned President Porfirio Diaz a century ago. Yet the proximity that he lamented has, in one way, proved a godsend to his successors and to millions of Mexicans.

Every year, an estimated one to six million mojados (wets) illegally cross the Rio Grande in search of work on farms or in factories. After saving the lion's share of their earnings for a few months, most return to their villages; later, they head north again. The unemployment rate in Mexico officially averages 8.5 percent, but "underemployment" is said to reach 40 percent. In a land of some 79 million people, the working-age population grows by 3.2 percent annually.

Those statistics, argue many U.S. scholars and politicians, are all one needs to know about the causes of illegal immigration. "With unemployment increasing and hundreds of thousands of field hands moving illegally into the United States, the crisis nature of Mexico's annual population increase became evident" in 1972, writes Marvin Alisky, an Arizona State University political scientist. The "crisis" prompted Mexico's government to mount an expensive family planning campaign, publicized in a TV soap opera, "Maria la Olvidada" (Maria the Forgotten One), a victim of her husband's machismo. Officials were helped by the Mexican Catholic Church, which broke with Rome to implicitly endorse the program. With their priests' consent, millions of Mexicans felt free to begin using modern contraceptives. Within 10 years, overall annual population growth slid from an estimated 3.6 percent—very high for such a relatively prosperous nation—to 2.3 percent, or about the same rate as in Egypt.

The fact is that many Mexicans would trek north even if there were no "population pressure." One big reason: Wages in the United States are three times as high as those in Mexico.

Even so, the illegal influx probably would be smaller were it not for Mexico's long series of wrong turns in economic policy. In some ways, Mexico is one of Latin America's success stories, with a record of rapid economic growth since World War II surpassed only by Brazil's. But growth has not created a corresponding number of jobs. During the 1960s, the Mexican economy expanded by more than six percent annually; yet, according to one study, its demand for labor rose by only 2.3 percent per year.

Under President Miguel Alemán Valdés (1946-52), Mexico, like many other Third World nations, adopted a policy of "import substitution," seeking more children than those in wealthier lands. The limits of that generalization are suggested by the World Bank's World Development Report 1985. According to those statistics, Zimbabwe's level of output per capita and its birthrate are both about twice as high as the corresponding measures in Sri Lanka.

Demographers have, in a sense, an embarrassment of theories. As historian Charles Tilly puts it, they offer "too many explanations
to nurture steel, chemicals, and other industries to reduce the need to buy manufactured goods from abroad.

Alemán and subsequent presidents imposed stiff tariffs on foreign goods, exempting only the foreign-made tools and machinery that Mexico's infant industries needed to get started. They offered cheap loans to Mexican entrepreneurs. Bowing to labor union pressure, the government also required industrial employers to contribute heavily to new pensions, schooling, and profit-sharing programs for their workers.

All of these measures artificially boosted the cost of labor relative to capital, encouraging Mexico's industrialists to replace workers with machinery.

At the same time, protectionism eased competitive pressures on Mexican factory managers, especially those in state-run enterprises, to control costs and improve quality. Mexico's exports suffered; more jobs were lost. To make matters worse, the government neglected Mexican agriculture, which employed the bulk of the nation's workers. As the wage gap between farmers and factory workers widened, many Mexicans deserted the countryside, subsisting in the city slums without work or in marginal occupations—shining shoes, peddling fruit or flowers—in the hope of landing the elusive "high-paying job." The population of greater Mexico City soared to 17 million.

Paradoxically, the discovery of vast new oil reserves in Mexico in 1976 hurt its basic economic health. As in Nigeria and Venezuela, swelling oil revenues made it easy to import foreign products without relying on exports of domestic goods to pay the bills. Succumbing to the "oil syndrome," President José Lopez Portillo (1976–82) went on a spending spree, borrowing heavily, expanding the government payroll, and boosting industrial subsidies.

Today, five years after world oil prices began to fall, Mexico is $98 billion in debt. Despite its continuing promises of reform to the World Bank and other lenders, the government of President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado appears to have done little to relieve the productivity-constricting restraints it has imposed upon the national economy.

Encouraging citizens to seek jobs in the United States may simply be seen, in Mexico City, as a substitute for taking painful economic measures at home.

—N. E.
1983—again implying a two percent margin of error. The unhappy surprise is that Somalia has no registration system for births whatsoever, and has never conducted a census. The World Bank’s numbers were essentially invented: guesses dignified with decimal points.*

Somalia, of course, is an extreme example. Almost every modern nation has by now conducted at least one census of its people. Even so, it would be a mistake to take for granted the precision of estimates by the World Bank or by the many other international organizations that publish them. Only about 10 percent of the Third World’s population lives in nations with near-complete systems for registering births and deaths. And the published economic data on most poor nations are even less reliable.

What Is Overpopulation?

Nevertheless, the general outlines of the population trends that some scholars and political leaders call a “crisis” are not hard to sketch. Until the 20th century, births and deaths were roughly balanced in most of the Third World, with both at relatively high levels. During this century, improved sanitation and health care have cut death rates dramatically, especially among children, while birthrates have stayed relatively high. As a result of these changes, the Third World did indeed experience a “population explosion,” growing from two billion souls in 1960 to 3.6 billion in 1985, according to the UN’s best estimates.

Based on the West’s experience, some specialists assume that Third World birthrates will now begin to fall until a new equilibrium between births and deaths, and more stable population growth, is achieved. That interpretation seems consistent with current trends, for example, in many of the nations of Latin America. But it is far from clear that such a “demographic transition” will occur quickly or even of its own accord. That uncertainty has spurred political leaders from Karachi to Mexico City to try to curb “overpopulation” by government action.

But what is overpopulation? There are no workable demographic definitions. Consider these possible indicators:

- **A high birthrate.** The U.S. birthrate during the 1790s was about 55 per 1,000 people, more than 20 points higher than the latest World Bank estimates of the birthrates for India, Vietnam, Indonesia, or the Philippines.

- **A steep rate of natural increase (births minus deaths).** By this measure, the United States was almost certainly overpopulated between 1790 and 1800. Its annual rate of natural increase then was

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*Over the years, the World Bank also issued seemingly precise data on Ethiopia. In 1985, after Ethiopia conducted its first census, the Bank was obliged to drop its estimate of the nation’s birthrate by 15 percent and to boost its figure for Ethiopia’s population by more than 20 percent.
three percent—almost exactly the rate that the World Bank ascribes to Bangladesh today, and considerably higher than the rates prevailing in Haiti and India. Today, population is growing faster in the United States than it is in Cuba, Eastern Europe, or the Soviet Union, all of them in economic torpor.

- **Population density.** By this measure, in 1980 France was more overpopulated than Indonesia, and the United Kingdom was in worse shape than India. The world’s most densely populated nation in 1980: Prince Rainier’s Monaco.

- **The “dependency ratio” (the proportion of children and the elderly to the “working-age” population).** According to 1980 World Bank data, the world’s least overpopulated lands were crowded Singapore and the United Arab Emirates, where immigration was helping to achieve an ultrarapid population growth rate of 11 percent a year.

- **Poverty.** Inadequate incomes, poor health, malnutrition, overcrowded housing, and unemployment are the unambiguous images of poverty. But it is a profound error to equate these social and economic ills with problems of population. Upon closer examination, it becomes clear that many of these Third World woes are closely related to ill-advised government policies, such as those that discriminate against farmers in favor of city dwellers or stifle private initiative. More generally, what are often mistaken for “population problems” are usually manifestations of state-imposed restrictions that prevent ordinary individuals from pursuing what they see as their own welfare and the welfare of their families.

## II

**THE POOREST OF THE POOR**

The catchall term “Third World” conceals at least as much as it reveals about the 133 nations it encompasses. Any classification that lumps together Hong Kong and Chad, or Iran and Jamaica, or Cuba and South Africa, loses much of its meaning. Even within a single country, social, cultural, and economic differences can be profound. India, for example, has a single central government, but at least six major religions, six alphabets, and a dozen major languages. Life expectancy is thought to be 20 years greater in Kerala, India’s healthiest state, than in impoverished Uttar Pradesh. The fertility rates in these two states of India differ by almost three children per woman.

Such variations, to say nothing of the dubious social and economic statistics available for many less-developed countries, suggest
that the best way of gaining some insight into the population question may be to examine a few specific cases.

Let us begin by looking at the most troubled populations of the modern world: the nations at the low end of the national income spectrum. By the reckoning of the World Bank’s *World Development Report 1984*, eight of the 34 nations that the Bank classifies as “low-income economies” were poorer in terms of gross national product (GNP) per capita during the early 1980s than they were in 1960. The unhappy eight were: Chad, Nepal, Zaire, Uganda, Somalia, Niger, Madagascar, and Ghana.

By the World Bank’s estimate, these nations had a total of over 90 million inhabitants in 1982. Between 1960 and 1982, their economies grew, albeit slowly. Population, however, increased faster—indeed, the rate of population increase is said to have *accelerated* in five of the nations. The Bank’s estimates of population growth range from just under two percent annually in Chad to more than three percent a year in Niger.

**War, Politics, Chaos**

Do these numbers mean that rapid population growth dragged these nations deeper into poverty?

Not necessarily. For one thing, many of the statistics that point to a drop in GNP per capita are suspect or contradictory. Take the numbers for Niger: According to the *World Development Report 1984*, the former French West African colony’s GNP per capita fell by about 29 percent between 1960 and 1982. According to other tables in the same report, however, private consumption per capita in Niger *increased* by about three percent during the same years, investment per capita jumped by over 35 percent, and government spending maintained a steady share of GNP. The only logical conclusion: GNP per capita must, in fact, have gone up.

Another set of figures from the same report supports that conclusion. Based on what the report’s authors say about the growth of Niger’s exports (which include uranium, peanuts, and cotton) and the share of its GNP derived from them, one comes to the conclusion that Niger’s GNP per capita *grew* by almost six percent annually between 1960 and 1982. That would add up to a cumulative jump of 240 percent during those years.

What, in truth, are the correct numbers for Niger?

It is impossible to tell from the World Bank’s figures.

Let us ignore such inexactitudes for the moment, however, and accept the World Bank estimates of growing poverty in these eight nations as accurate. Would they allow us to conclude that population growth was to blame? No. The figures show only that their economies grew more slowly than population, not *why* they did.
Although the World Bank estimates that the rate of natural increase in these eight nations quickened between 1960 and 1982, the speedup, according to Bank numbers, was chiefly the result of a drop in death rates. In other words, their people suffered less sickness and disease. How could that have reduced their productivity?

The cause of the economic woes of these countries must lie elsewhere. In three of the eight nations—Chad, Somalia, and Uganda—the explanation seems clear enough. Chad has been convulsed by unending civil war since the late 1960s, with Libya joining in; Uganda remains in chaos even though Idi Amin’s barbarous eight-year rule ended in 1979; Somalia has been fully mobilized for war against Ethiopia for nearly a decade. (The Somali government claims that it spends “only” 14 percent of GNP on defense; U.S. defense outlays are 6.5 percent of GNP.) Politics can fully account for the misfortunes of these three African nations. There seems to be no need in these cases to resort to demographic explanations.

What about the difficulties of Ghana, Madagascar, Nepal, Niger, and Zaire (formerly the Belgian Congo)?

Many development economists argue that rapid population growth retards economic progress by slowing the accumulation of capital needed to build factories, harbors, and roads. However, if the World Bank’s figures are accurate, low investment was not a major problem in four out of these five stricken nations.
In Nepal, Zaire, and Niger, the investment ratios for 1983 were all reckoned at 20 percent or more—higher than those in many advanced industrial nations, including the United States (17 percent). Indeed, a number of Third World nations with higher rates of population growth and lower investment ratios outperformed this trio.

Ghana is the only one of the five suffering from capital scarcity today. But that was not always so. By the World Bank's reckoning, Ghana's gross domestic investment ratio in 1960 was 24 percent—more than twice as high as the 1960 estimates for Singapore or South Korea.

If the World Bank's numbers are correct, the economies of these five countries have been afflicted by an extremely low ratio of growth to investment. In other words, heavy capital outlays yielded very meager dividends. (Madagascar's ratio of economic growth to investment appears to be only half the U.S. rate; Zaire's seems to be less than a third as high as Spain's; Ghana's during the 1960s and '70s was about one-tenth that of South Korea.) To find out what has been going wrong in these countries, one must inquire into the economic policies of their political leaders.

A Reign of Error

Take Ghana. During the late 1950s and early '60s, it was one of a select group of nations (including Burma, Chile, and Egypt) that economists were touting as bright prospects in the Third World.

After the West African nation gained its independence from Britain in 1957, Kwame Nkrumah, the charismatic new prime minister, quickly embarked on an ambitious "reform" program. Casting aside such economic considerations as competitiveness and productivity, he decided to seek prosperity by political means. "The social and economic development of Africa," he declared, "will come only within the political kingdom, not the other way round."

Nkrumah aimed to transform Ghana into a prestigious industrial power at all costs. The nation's long-successful small farmers were to foot the bill.

Nkrumah forced the farmers to sell their cocoa, the nation's chief export, at a fixed price to the government, which then sold it abroad at a profit. The proceeds were poured into Nkrumah's industrial development schemes.* By the late 1970s, long after Nkrumah, the self-styled " Redeemer," had been deposed, Ghana's small cocoa farmers were getting less than 40 percent of the world price for their crop—an effective tax of over 60 percent. Not surprisingly, Ghana's cocoa output and cocoa exports plummeted.

As these new policies made their mark on agriculture, Nkrumah

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*Nkrumah also received generous aid from abroad during his 10-year rule, including $145.6 million in economic assistance from the United States.
took aim at industry. Shortly after independence, he nationalized the nation's foreign-owned gold and diamond mines, cocoa-processing plants, and other enterprises. Ghana's new infant industries were also state-owned. The result was inefficiency on a monumental scale. According to one study, between 65 percent and 71 percent of Ghana's publicly owned factory capacity lay idle 10 years after independence.

To cut the price of imported goods, Nkrumah allowed the Ghanaian cedi to rise in the world currency markets. Unfortunately, that also drove up the price of the products Ghana was trying to sell overseas. The nation's trade balance tilted deeply into the red.

Under these diverse pressures, the nation's visible tax base began to shrink, even as the government budget swelled. Foreign aid did not solve the problem. Deficit spending increased: By 1978, tax revenues paid less than 40 percent of the government's budget. Inflation spiraled, climbing by over 30 percent a year during the 1970s, according to the World Bank. With annual interest rates fixed by law at levels as low as six percent (to reduce the cost of capital), it made no sense for Ghanaians to put their money in the bank.

By 1982, only one percent of Ghana's GNP was devoted to investment. Black Africa's most promising former colony had become an economic disaster.

So Ghana's current economic travails can be explained without recourse to demographic theory. The nation's parlous economic straits are the result of Accra's 29-year reign of error. Rapid population growth may have compounded the woes caused by mismanagement, or it may have eased these pressures somewhat by creating a better-educated, healthier, and potentially more productive work force. It may have done both. But its overall impact on the course of events does not seem to have been great.

**Food for the Hungry**

The most haunting evidence of a Malthusian crisis in Africa—a growing number of hungry mouths to feed and ever-diminishing resources—is the images of hunger and starvation that regularly appear on TV news broadcasts. The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates that farm output per capita in Black Africa dropped by nine percent between 1969–71 and 1979–81. In one African country after another, write Lester R. Brown and Edward C. Wolf of the Worldwatch Institute, "demands of escalating human numbers are exceeding the sustainable yield of local life-support systems—croplands, grasslands, and forests. Each year, Africa's farmers attempt to feed 16 million additional people."

In this bleak view, population pressures are pushing people into marginal lands, which are eventually reduced to desert by overgrazing and deforestation. Indeed, the evidence of food shortages and
famine in the nations of the Sahel—from Senegal in the west to the Sudan in the east—is undeniable.

But does all of this mean that population growth per se is causing food shortages in sub-Saharan Africa?

In fact, none of the nations with the poorest records of farm output—Ghana, Mozambique, Uganda (where output per capita dropped by more than 30 percent between 1969–71 and 1979–81), and Angola (where it fell by more than 50 percent)—is in the drought-stricken Sahel. Several African nations have creditable records of improving farm productivity, and they are right next door to the nations with the most severe problems: Prosperous Kenya is contiguous to Uganda, Mozambique adjoins Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia), and a common border unites Ghana and the flourishing Ivory Coast. Since the climates and population growth rates of these na-
The world's poorest countries do not have its fastest-growing populations. Most destitute is Ethiopia, with a GNP per capita of $120, and a population growth rate equal to Hong Kong's.

In the overwhelming majority of cases, the food crisis in Black Africa has obvious political and economic causes. In Uganda, Mozambique, and Angola, coups or revolutions were followed by continuing domestic violence, persecution of minority groups, and, as in Ghana, destructive economic policies. In Ethiopia, where mass starvation has reached its most tragic proportions, the fault lies largely with the forced collectivization of farming and other cruel and disastrous accomplishments of a 12-year-old Marxist regime, now headed by Mengistu Haile Mariam, turning an ordinary drought into a deadly famine. But Ethiopia is only one of the most extreme cases. During the decades since independence, more and more regimes in Black Africa have adopted misguided policies that have variously restricted trade, discouraged farm production, and depressed local industry.
On the basis of demographic criteria alone, four of the most likely candidates for severe “population problems” after World War II were Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. As they entered the 1950s, they were among the most densely peopled lands in the world. There were almost four times as many people per square mile in Taiwan as in mainland China; South Korea’s population density was nearly twice as high as India’s.

These crowded lands were blessed with comparatively little in the way of oil, coal, iron, or other natural resources. Hong Kong and Singapore imported even their drinking water. All four had high fertility levels during the early 1950s: six births per woman was the lowest level. During the period from 1950 to 1980, population grew faster in Taiwan (2.7 percent per year), Hong Kong (2.7 percent), and Singapore (2.9 percent) than in the world’s less-developed countries as a whole (an estimated 2.3 percent). South Korea, despite suffering perhaps one million deaths during the Korean War, still grew by an average rate of about two percent annually.

Dependency ratios were high, with the young and the elderly vastly outnumbering workers. Twenty-five years ago, unemployment and underemployment were still pervasive. The signs of poverty and even destitution—sprawling city slums, malnutrition, unemployment—were everywhere.

Many observers expected nothing but grim futures for these impoverished lands. In 1947, General Albert Wedemeyer, dispatched from Washington to assess South Korea’s prospects, reported: “Basically an agricultural area, [it] does not have the overall economic resources to sustain its economy without external assistance... It is not considered feasible to make South Korea self-sustaining.”

Such judgments proved almost ludicrously wrong. Today, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea are known as Asia’s “little dragons.” In all four lands, GNP per capita quadrupled between 1960 and 1980, despite rapid population growth. Unemployment (and, with the exception of South Korea, underemployment) have virtually disappeared. Despite an “adverse” balance of “dependent” age groups to working-age population, each society sharply increased domestic investment per capita. Despite high ratios of population to arable land, measured malnutrition was virtually eliminated. Even without a wealth of natural resources, all four have emerged as major export centers and commercial entrepôts.

What explains these success stories? Edward K. Y. Chen, an economist at the University of Hong Kong, has attempted a break-
A Taiwanese farmer plants his field using a rice transplanter. By allowing crop prices to rise and dispersing industry throughout the countryside, Taiwan has avoided many of the pitfalls of economic development.

down of the “sources of growth” for the four from the late 1950s through 1970. By his accounting, increased “inputs” of capital and labor alone explain less than half the growth of Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea and barely more than half of Hong Kong’s. Improvements in “total factor productivity” (net output per unit of net expenditure) account for the remainder. In short, the economies of the little dragons were simply more efficient than were those of other less-developed nations.

Not that they all found a single success formula. Hong Kong’s economy is freewheeling and lightly regulated, while Taiwan’s Nationalist government owns a number of inefficient large enterprises. South Korea blocks most foreign investment and runs constant balance of payments deficits, while Singapore holds more foreign currency reserves than does oil-rich Kuwait. Hong Kong is a British colony, Singapore a nominal parliamentary democracy, and South Korea a virtual dictatorship. But there are common elements in their success: “outward-looking” export-promotion policies, including reduction of barriers against imports, minimal restraints on interest rates, subsidies to encourage production for foreign markets, and an openness to the adoption of technology from abroad.

The relationship between population change and economic
development in the little dragons is more ambiguous. During their decades of astonishing economic growth, all four enjoyed rapid fertility declines. (Rates now range from two children per woman in Hong Kong and Singapore to just under three in South Korea.) Many development specialists credit state-sponsored family planning programs with bringing birthrates down in these countries. But, as we have seen, that explanation may not suffice.

A Nobel Prize winner, Paul Samuelson of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, once observed that there are always two plausible, and opposite, answers to any “common sense” question in economics. So it is with the effects of population growth.

Such growth may impose costly new burdens on a government, or it may expand the tax revenue base. It may cause food shortages, or it may speed the division of labor by which farm productivity is increased. If it tends to increase unemployment by adding new workers to the labor pool, it also tends to reduce the danger of insufficient consumer demand that so troubled Keynes and many other Western economists during the Great Depression of the 1930s.

The overall impact of population change on a society seems to depend on how the society deals with change of all kinds. Indeed, coping with fluctuations in population is in many ways less demanding than dealing with the almost daily uncertainties of the harvest, or the ups and downs of the business cycle, or the vagaries of political life. Societies and governments that meet such challenges successfully, as the little dragons did, are also likely to adapt well to population change. Those that do not are likely to find that a growing population “naturally” causes severe, costly, and prolonged dislocations.

IV
HUMAN CAPITAL

Spinning the globe offers a broad perspective on the impact, or lack of impact, of population change. One can also “come down to earth” to examine the behavior of individuals and their families.

Much of today’s alarm over population growth springs from simple arithmetic. Every newborn child shrinks the wealth per person of his family and his nation. In a sense, he begins life as a debit in the national ledger.

During his lifetime, the child will require food, clothing, schooling, and medical attention. But there is no guarantee that he will be able to “repay” his debt during his working life. And if his homeland is developing rapidly, his debt actually grows larger, because the cost
of raising children soars and the length of their dependency increases as the economy demands more skilled and educated workers.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, development scholars, notably Ansley J. Coale and Edgar M. Hoover of Princeton, crafted influential economic models that demonstrated that, beyond some ideal point, additional births would indeed impose an intolerable economic burden on society. These “excess” children, they warned, would, in effect, be “living off capital,” draining their societies of savings and investment desperately needed to fuel economic growth.

**Getting Rich**

Economists have since recognized the limitations of these models. Coale, Hoover, and their colleagues made a number of questionable assumptions. Among them: that economic growth results solely from the accumulation of capital; that the rate of return on capital is fixed; and that education, health care, and all other forms of human consumption bear no productive returns.

Today, the old argument has reappeared in a new, albeit more cautious, form. Some development scholars now contend that Third World governments are in effect subsidizing the births of too many children. How? By providing free services, such as public education, that make it cheaper for families to raise children but increase society’s costs.

The Soviet Union offers a fascinating example of how such “externalities” work. To prevent any upsurge of unrest in its Muslim republics, Moscow is spending millions of rubles to provide schools, jobs, and health care for its Muslim citizens. Children are indeed a “bargain” for Muslim parents. Not surprisingly, total fertility in Soviet Central Asia remains in the vicinity of six births per woman—higher than the World Bank’s current estimates for neighboring Iran, or nearby Pakistan and India. In this case, the development scholars appear to be right about externalities.

Yet such dramatic gaps between public and private costs rarely occur. Only serious failures of the market mechanism, or, as in the Soviet Union, political decisions, make them possible. In either case, such policies are costly. Except under extraordinary circumstances, they cannot be sustained for long—certainly not long enough to have pronounced effects on childbearing patterns.

Another cause of worry among population specialists is the tendency of poor people to have more children than rich people. If the poor and the well-to-do also have nearly the same death rates, as is now the case in most countries, it makes sense to expect that poverty will spread and the gaps between rich and poor widen.

As it happens, however, the record of modern history does not bear out these fears. In Western nations where the poor have borne
U.S. officials got little applause when they told a 1984 UN conference on population in Mexico City that Washington would end its aid to family planning efforts that embraced abortion. But total U.S. help for overseas birth control programs increased slightly, to $317 million in 1985.

more children than the well-to-do for a century or more, long-term economic growth has not slowed. And economists' measures of income distribution, though imperfect, give no indication that the gaps in the West between rich and poor have widened over the long term. In fact, most studies suggest that they are narrower today than they were a century ago.

The data on wealth and poverty in the Third World are even less reliable than comparable statistics on the West, but careful long-term studies have been made of two countries, India and Taiwan. The results show no clear evidence of increased inequality in either nation since World War II, despite population growth, and there is a hint of reduced inequality in Taiwan.

The modern world has witnessed two general, though not universal, trends. First, the productivity of individuals has climbed steadily, enough not only to cover rising standards of living, but also to add to national wealth. That is what has happened in North America and Western Europe over the past four or five generations, despite wars and recessions. And these improvements were not financed by "dipping into capital": Assets per capita in these societies are vastly greater today than they were a century ago.
Thus, over the generations, the people in these societies produced more than they consumed. The pattern was repeated during the rapid climb of Japan and Israel into the ranks of economically advanced nations. Following close on the heels of these industrial powers are Asia’s little dragons and an encouraging number of other Third World countries.

Their success highlights the second general trend of the post-World War II era. Despite the rhetoric of Third World partisans in the “North-South” debate, the history of the past 25 years shows that it is possible for the poor, as well as the rich, to become richer. In fact, the productivity of the poor can rise more rapidly than that of the rich. But certain things have to happen.

Adding Value to Time

In his now-classic studies of economic growth, Simon Kuznets discerned two distinctive features of the economic development of the West between the beginning of the 19th century and the middle of the 20th. The first was that increases in GNP could not be explained simply by the growth of population and the accumulation of physical capital. Secondly, he found that while dividends from capital and other property (e.g., farmland) grew as economies developed, the share of GNP from wages, salaries, and earnings grew even more rapidly. Long-term economic development, Kuznets concluded, depended much less on building factories, power plants, and other capital stock than on the improvement of “human capital”—the ability of human beings to put to work a growing body of knowledge, research, and technology.

Theodore W. Schultz, Nobel laureate in economics at the University of Chicago, refined this notion of human capital. In a series of studies beginning during the 1950s, he showed that government outlays on education, health, and nutrition were not unproductive “consumption,” as some economists had defined them to be. Usually, these investments in human beings bore productive returns—often very high ones.

Originally trained as an agricultural economist, Schultz had observed that even in impoverished, “backward” societies, poor people tended to make the most of whatever resources were available to them. He argued that even penniless men and women with nothing to invest but their time would often behave like entrepreneurs. The process of economic development, he argued, is in large part the extension of human choice made possible by the rising value of human time. Time, after all, is the single resource that is absolutely fixed in quantity, nonrenewable, and impossible to trade or save.

By helping their people to improve their health and gain better schooling, for example, governments increased the value of human
A CONTRARY VIEW

The nations of the West achieved prosperity despite rapid population growth. Can the Third World follow the same path, without imposing government-sponsored family planning programs? Sharon L. Camp, vice president of the Population Crisis Committee, writing in Population (Feb. 1985), argued that the West’s experience does not apply to the Third World:

During Europe’s [18th–19th century] population explosion, annual rates of population growth rose from about 0.5 percent to about 1.5 percent. In contrast, Third World countries now have higher birthrates and lower death rates than did Europe, and their annual rate of population increase is about 2.4 percent (excluding China). Some African countries are growing by three to four percent a year—a population doubling time of just over 20 years. The analogy with historical Europe is thus suspect.

The post–World War II population explosion in less-developed countries is largely the result of a precipitous drop in death rates spurred primarily by a revolution in public health and improved response to food crises. The speed and magnitude of these changes are unprecedented. In 18th- and 19th-century Europe, by contrast, death rates declined slowly in response to rising standards of living and remained relatively high compared to current rates in many developing countries.

The reverse is true of birthrates. During Europe’s Industrial Revolution, cultural and other factors kept birthrates well below the biological maximum. Marriage was delayed to the mid-twenties and not uncommonly to the late twenties. Significant numbers of adults did not marry at all or did not survive their reproductive years. In most Third World countries today, marriage is nearly universal and the majority of women are married by their late teens. Although maternal and infant deaths take a large toll, it is not unusual to find women in developing countries who have been pregnant a dozen times and have eight to 10 living children.

Not only are Third World countries growing two to three times faster, many are starting from a much larger population base than did European countries at a comparable stage of economic development. In most developing countries, population density on arable land is at least three times higher than in 19th-century Europe and rural population growth is twice as rapid despite massive urbanization. The combination of a larger population base and a more rapid rate of growth means that the total number of people added to the Third World’s population in the last decade alone exceeds the total increase in Europe’s population over the whole of the 19th century.

time, and thus of human capital.

Poor people and poor nations can actually enjoy a paradoxical edge in building up human capital. Because of what the late Alexander Gerschenkron of Harvard called the “advantages of backwardness,” they can climb the “learning curve” of economic development much more quickly than the pioneers in other societies who preceded
them. Whether by importing penicillin invented and manufactured in the West, or by borrowing the technology for manufacturing computer chips, they can reap at relatively low cost the advantages that others paid dearly for. This is precisely what Japan and the little dragons did during their post-World War II economic "catch-up."

Demographic events can profoundly influence when and where this catch-up occurs. Migration is an obvious example. When they move from countryside to city, or from one nation to another, most families pursue economic advantages. The Nigerian who leaves his farm for the city of Lagos makes a personal economic calculation. But by putting himself where his time can be used more productively (e.g., in a factory), he enhances national wealth. In the same way, America’s immigrants have added vastly to the nation’s affluence (and their own) by fleeing lands where, among other things, their labor was less productively employed.

Small-Family Formula

Another important economic event is the recent fall in mortality rates in many less-developed nations. Coming largely as a result of improvements in nutrition, hygiene, and health care, the drop can be seen as an enormous deposit in the human capital “bank.” Not only will the productive working lives of many people be lengthened, but the returns from further “social investments” can be higher. Healthy children, after all, can profit more from extra schooling than can malnourished children.

The economic implications of changes in fertility are more ambiguous. Few parents decide whether or not to have children solely on considerations of profitability. If Western parents did so, they would be childless.

On the other hand, personal choices are always constrained by what is economically feasible. And the economics of the family vary enormously from place to place. In the West, where the economic value of human time is high, preparing a child for adult life is a lengthy and expensive proposition. It consumes a great deal of time that many parents could otherwise devote to work, and few will call upon their young for financial help in their old age. It is not surprising, then, that Western parents tend to have small families.

In a farming society such as Kenya, on the other hand, children may start working in the fields at an early age and help support their parents long after they reach adulthood. In such societies, where the costs of raising a child are low and the benefits high, it may not be financially punitive to have large families. In India, there is a saying: "One son is no sons." In short, parents may have different views of the family than do their political leaders or their governments’ technocrats, a fact worth remembering.
The Third World’s population is considered to be “exploding,” despite the fact that governments in all but 27 of these 133 nations promote the use of modern contraceptives among their people, and often distribute them at little or no charge.

The political energy and financial resources expended on these family planning programs are considerable. By the World Bank’s estimate, Third World governments spend more than $2 billion annually on such efforts. (The actual purchasing power is probably much greater than dollar figures indicate.) International organizations, Western governments, and charitable institutions also make substantial contributions. Between 1969 and 1984, they added another $7 billion (in 1982 dollars). In some less-developed countries, e.g., Bangladesh, governments spend more on family planning programs than on all other health-related services combined.

What do such programs, and national population policies, actually accomplish? How do they affect current living standards and the prospects for economic development?

Today’s national family planning bureaucracies are in the business of subsidizing and promoting the use of birth control pills, intrauterine devices (IUDs), condoms, diaphragms, and other modern contraceptives. These methods are not necessarily more effective than some old approaches to family planning: On grounds of effectiveness alone, nothing can improve upon total abstinence or infanticide. Of course, modern contraception is much more acceptable than these extreme alternatives, and it is also more reliable than some widely used traditional techniques of birth control (such as coitus interruptus, the rhythm method, or drinking native contraceptive potions). Moreover, by making it easier to exercise choice, modern contraception reduces unwanted pregnancies that can cause sickness and death among mothers and infants—notably by preventing closely spaced births. So a voluntary family planning effort can be a useful public health service, one of many government activities that can increase choice, reduce mortality, augment human capital, and improve the well-being of individuals and families.

It is not so clear, however, that voluntary family planning always delivers the big reductions in “unwanted” births that Third World governments seek.

Family planning workers from Nepal to Kenya have discovered that making modern contraceptives available to all does not by itself stimulate a revolution in attitudes toward family size. In Kenya, for example, total fertility appears to have increased from under six
The newest development in contraceptive technology: NORPLANT capsules, five-year steroid implants for women. Now used in Scandinavia (but not yet in America), they will soon be available in the Third World.

children per couple to more than eight despite nearly 20 years of officially sponsored family planning efforts.

As Lord Peter Bauer of the London School of Economics has observed, people of all nations are quick to buy Western-style cosmetics, soft drinks, and transistor radios. In most Third World countries, birth control pills, IUDs, and diaphragms are just as available, but are in much less demand.

In the Third World, Bauer writes, “the children who are born are generally desired. They are certainly avoidable. To deny this amounts to saying that Third World parents procreate heedless of consequences. This view treats people with... contempt.”

Indeed, in many parts of the globe, truly effective family planning might actually increase the birthrate. In Zaire, Gabon, and other nations of sub-Saharan Africa, for example, families have demonstrated little interest in modern contraception, but considerable concern about infertility. In these societies, a wife who cannot bear children faces an unenviable fate. Increasing parents “freedom to choose” will always serve the purposes of parents, whatever the preference of the government and its advisors.

Of course, the thrust of most family planning efforts in less-developed countries over the past generation has been antinatalist.
And the principal international institutions supporting these programs, including the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development, remain firmly in favor of reducing birthrates. Unquestioning faith in this goal has led some of the world's poorest governments to pour extraordinary amounts of money into family planning. In 1980, for example, the World Bank estimates that Ghana's family planning program spent $68 per contraceptive user, Nepal's $69. The Bank's data also suggest that government outlays for all other health programs totaled only $20 per family in Ghana and $8 in Nepal. In these and other poor nations, government officials seem to believe that birth control yields tremendous benefits.

The Bottom Line

That faith extends even into the academic world. Only a handful of researchers have attempted to measure the impact of family planning against a "control group" (i.e., a similar population which lacks the service)—standard practice in the health sciences. The few properly conducted studies do not reveal many differences in fertility decline between "control" and "experimental" groups.

In a little-noticed 1984 study, Donald J. Hernandez, a demographer at Georgetown University, attempted to disentangle the effects of family planning efforts from "natural" declines in fertility. Among the nations he examined were four that have been widely hailed as exemplars of successful family planning programs: Two little dragons, Taiwan and South Korea, as well as Costa Rica and Mauritius.

In Mauritius, he found, family planning might have pushed birthrates down by as much as three to six points over 10 years. However, because of shortcomings in his own methodology, Hernandez cautioned against ascribing too much meaning to this calculation.

In Taiwan, South Korea, and Costa Rica—where Hernandez felt that his methodology would produce more reliable results—he estimated that family planning efforts brought birthrates down only by between 0.1 and 1.6 points over periods ranging from four to 11 years. Hernandez rightly concluded that family planning programs may be able to speed the fall of birthrates somewhat where this decline has begun on its own. But such programs experience "little success and considerable failure in initiating fertility reductions independently of socioeconomic and other indigenous factors."

One sure way to bring birth trends down is to resort to Draco-

*Some family planning advocates claim that there is an enormous unmet need for birth control in the Third World, which only a 50 percent boost in outlays can satisfy. That claim is based on the results of surveys showing that many women say they want no more children or wish to delay the birth of their next child, and also say they are not using modern contraceptives. The researchers ignore the fact that many of these women may be using traditional birth control methods. In any case, Western survey methods are rarely reliable—especially among poor, uneducated people in less-developed nations. Moreover, the interrogators never put their questions to men, who, in many societies, have the final say in such matters.
Kenyan pamphlet takes the mystery out of modern birth control. Kenya has Africa's fastest-growing population; only eight percent of Kenyan women in their childbearing years use modern contraceptives.

A case in point is Romania's radical effort to increase fertility during the 1960s. The nation's Communist leaders had long been concerned that declining birthrates (by that time below the net replacement level) would exacerbate the nation's troublesome labor shortages. In 1966, one year after taking the helm of the Romanian Communist Party, Nicolae Ceausescu announced a series of measures designed to raise the national birthrate. The most important of these was a sudden restriction of access to abortion, at that time Romanians' principal means of birth control.

Taken unawares by the change in rules, Romanian parents had many more children that year than they had been planning. Romania's crude birthrate in 1967 jumped to 27 per 1,000—almost double the 1966 rate of 14 per 1,000. But as parents reverted to traditional methods of contraception (e.g., rhythm, withdrawal, abstinence), fertility dropped back toward the pre-1966 level. Between 1967 and 1972, the crude birthrate fell from 27 to 18.

But Romania is still paying for its artificial birthrate "blip." Infant mortality jumped and maternal death rates more than doubled between 1966 and 1967. Ceausescu's edict also created a peculiar...
bulge in the Romanian age structure. To accommodate the needs of this “cohort” as it passed through the different stages of childhood and youth, Bucharest has been forced to create and then close down kindergartens, elementary schools, and health clinics—a costly proposition. Entirely apart from the damage done to Romanians’ physical health, Bucharest’s demographic shock may well have done more to retard the pace of economic progress than to hasten it.

Singapore has taken a more constant approach to population policy, and with the opposite end in view. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s prime minister since 1959 and the chief architect of its economic success, seems to be deeply impressed by some of the arguments of the prewar eugenicists. “We are getting a gradual lowering of the general quality of the total [world] population,” Lee fretted in 1973. “Over the long run this could have very serious consequences for the human race.”

For the island republic of Singapore, he sought “zero, possibly even negative [population] growth. Then we can make up for it with selective immigration of the kind of people we require to run a modern higher technology society.”

**Penalizing Big Families**

Lee’s vision of the solution was specific. “We must,” he said, “encourage those who earn less than $200 a month [then about half of Singapore’s households] never to have more than two [children]” so that Singapore might as its economy progressed be spared a “trend which can leave our society with a large number of the physically, intellectually, and culturally anemic.”

In August 1972, Lee’s government announced a new policy of “social disincentives against higher order births,” to take effect the following year. Among the many disincentives were restrictions on maternity leaves for mothers bearing a third or higher-order child and the elimination of family tax deductions for children born fourth or later, as well as official discrimination against these children in public school placement.

The demographic impact of these strictures is unclear. It is true that since 1975—the third year of the “social disincentives” policy—Singapore’s fertility rate has fallen. But the rate was already dropping before 1973, and Lee’s new edicts do not appear to have hastened the speed of its fall.*

While the demographic consequences of Singapore’s population

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*During the decade before the disincentives were announced, Singapore’s birthrate dropped from 22 per 1,000 people to 17 per 1,000. Since 1973, Singaporeans have had smaller families. In 1980, fourth and higher-order births accounted for about seven percent of all live births—as against more than 28 percent in 1970. But this pattern was not distinctly different from those in comparable countries. In Hong Kong, which imposes no penalties for having large families, only nine percent of all births in 1980 were children born fourth or later.
"Every stomach comes with hands attached," Chairman Mao once said in explaining his laissez-faire attitude toward population growth. In 1982, Beijing's census-takers counted one billion stomachs, nearly double the number in 1949, when Mao took power.

Mao's successors, led by Deng Xiaoping, had already rejected Mao's benign view. In 1979, they launched an ambitious population control program, calling on every couple to have a single child. "Husband and wife," declared the new constitution of 1982, "have a duty to practice family planning."

The intensity of China's "one-child" campaign has varied over time and from locale to locale. Billboards, newspapers, and radio broadcasts trumpet the message. Beijing offers economic rewards (e.g., cash awards and free medical care) to parents who agree to stop having children after their first child, and penalties (e.g., fines equaling 15 percent of family income for seven years) for those having a second child. At the height of the campaign in 1983, Beijing ordered the sterilization of one spouse in every couple with more than one child. Reports of forced abortions in China began reaching the West [see "The Mosher Affair," WQ, New Year's '84].

Deng has put population control near the top of the Chinese political agenda because he and his colleagues blame the nation's economic woes—occasional food shortages, unemployment, lackluster economic growth—on its vast human numbers. But studies by Western economists point directly at China's official policies—such as Mao's 1958 Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s. According to K. C. Yeh of the Rand Corporation, for example, the overall efficiency of Chinese industry and agriculture fell by more than 25 percent between 1957 and 1978. If China had merely matched India's improvements in productivity during those years, its output per capita in 1978 would have been two-thirds greater than it was.

In the short term, Deng's "one-child" policy will surely work. Fertility, which had already dropped sharply during the 1970s, has continued to decline. By 1984, the Chinese population was growing by only 1.1 percent annually.

What price China will pay for this success is not yet entirely clear. Smaller families by themselves mean a lower quality of life for couples who desire more children. And, in the nation's fields and rice paddies, one-child families find themselves short-handed—especially if the child is a girl. Female infanticide seems to be on the upswing among China's peasants.

Moreover, limiting couples to one child may not be in the best interests of the country's future elderly population. China's parents must be asking themselves today: Will Beijing keep its promise to provide for them in their old age, when their child (and spouse) may be supporting four grandparents?

—N. E.
sanctions are murky, some of the social and economic effects are unmistakable. Lee's program has reduced the living standards of Singaporeans who choose to have large families, widening income gaps in the nation. It has also created a new disadvantaged minority: the youngest children born to large families since August 1973.

Under Lee's law, these youngsters stand last in line for spots in the nation's desirable schools and universities, an important consideration in a society that places a premium on schooling. How the new "undesirables" will finally fare, and how their fate will affect Singapore, remains to be seen. The eldest are only 13 years old today.

VI
THE VALUE OF A LIFE

What, finally, can be said with confidence about the impact of population change on social and economic development in the Third World? As we have seen, much less than partisans in the population debate currently claim. So it may be appropriate to conclude with a few observations distinguished more by their tentativeness than by their insight.

First, population growth (or decline) is a relatively slow form of social change. A rate of population increase of four percent a year is extremely high; four percent price inflation a year is, today, generally considered to be blessedly low. And, for all the uncertainties of long-term population forecasting, annual shifts in the size and composition of a national population can be predicted with far greater accuracy than can changes in inflation, unemployment, the gross national product, or crop harvests.

For nations that cope poorly in general, any quickening of the pace of change—including the rate of demographic change—is likely to cause difficulties. Yet adapting to novel conditions is in itself an integral part of modern economic development for any society. Development is in a sense a learning process. To the extent that population growth stimulates this learning process, it can accelerate a society's material progress.

Second, demographic change since World War II has typically been both benign and relatively favorable to economic growth. It has come about chiefly because of dramatic improvements in human health, lengthening the life expectancy of people all over the globe. Better health, moreover, can help augment human capital, which is the ultimate basis of economic productivity. Increasing human capital alone does not assure material progress; such progress depends on
many other things, including the priorities governments place on developing and utilizing human talents. But it does make it possible to quicken the pace of economic advance.

Third, to assume, as many academics and public officials do, that preventing the birth of poor people will help eliminate poverty appears to be a fundamental error. Mass affluence is the result of human productivity and human organization, and it is not at all clear that these factors would be enhanced by falling birthrates, or, for that matter, by rising birthrates.

To make the economic case for aggressive population control, demographers and economists would have to show, in effect, that the cost of raising a child born in a particular society would be greater than his lifetime economic "value." That would be an extraordinarily difficult task. Economists and corporate executives constantly go astray in estimating the economic value of such relatively simple things as machinery, factories, and dams. Imagine how much more difficult it would be to determine the value of an unpredictable, living human being, or to have decided, in 1955, whether a baby born in Ghana was "worth" more than one born in South Korea.

Such population controls, in any realistic sense, would be fruitful only if no new technologies were ever created, societies did not change, and individuals were given few options in shaping their futures. That kind of world would be incompatible with the very essence of economic development, which is the successful management of change, and, ultimately, the extension of human choice.

There is little chance that enforced family planning in the Third World or elsewhere will yield benefits without great social costs and a sacrifice of human freedom. This approach reflects, as Peter Bauer notes, a contempt for ordinary people. In most of the countries where they have been tried, population policies, "soft" or "hard," have amounted to little more than attempts to solve through demographic tinkering economic problems that can, in fact, be traced to misguided governmental policies. To make a reduction of the birthrate the focus of so many high hopes is to divert attention and political energy from the real sources of poverty and lagging economic growth in many countries of the Third World.
“The scourges of pestilence, famine, wars, and earthquakes have come to be regarded as a blessing to overcrowded nations, since they serve to prune away the luxuriant growth of the human race.” So wrote the Christian theologian Tertullian during the second century A.D., when the earth’s population was only about 300 million—or six percent of what it is today (five billion).

Tertullian’s observation, and the book in which it appears—Garrett Hardin’s Population, Evolution and Birth Control (W. H. Freeman, 1964, cloth; 1969, paper)—remind the reader that the Reverend Thomas R. Malthus (1766-1834) was not the first writer to reflect on the hazards of under- or over-population. Hardin pulled together a rich menu on the subject—everything from Han Fei-Tzu’s fifth-century B.C. observations on fecundity and prosperity to the government of India’s 1962 birth control campaign slogan: “Don’t postpone the first, don’t hurry up the second, and don’t go in for the third.”

Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population (1798; Penguin, 1970, paper only) still stands as the single most influential work on population. The English economist’s argument is well known: “It may be safely asserted,” Malthus wrote, “that population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical progression whereas the means of subsistence, under circumstances most favorable to human industry, could not possibly be made to increase faster than in an arithmetical ratio.”

Thus Malthus, as Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal observed 142 years later, “shifted the blame for misery from Society to Nature, from environment to heredity.” Myrdal believed that a prudent society could control its own destiny. But in Population: A Problem for Democracy (Harvard, 1940), Myrdal foresaw a conflict in democratic countries between private wants (whether to have children) and public needs (to boost or limit population). “The population question,” he predicted, “will dominate our whole economic and social policy for the entire future.”

Myrdal’s prognosis was at least partly correct. The immediate post-World War II years saw the appearance of several population “scare books.” William Vogt’s Road to Survival (William Sloane, 1948), for example, stressed what would become an oft-repeated theme: the interdependence between human beings and their planet. “An eroding hillside in Mexico or Yugoslavia,” Vogt said, “affects the living standard and probability of survival of the American people.” Vogt also alerted Americans to the increasing multitudes of “Moslems, Sikhs, Hindus (and their sacred cows),” whose populations ballooned due to “untrammeled copulation.”

Paul R. Ehrlich’s Population Bomb (River City, rev. ed., 1975, cloth; Ballantine, rev. ed., 1976, paper) dramatized the threat of overpopulation for the next generation of Americans. Only some five million people, Ehrlich estimated, had inhabited the planet in 6000 B.C. Doubling every 1,000 years, the world’s population reached 500 million by A.D. 1650, and then began to accelerate rapidly. It doubled again in just 200 years, hitting one billion by 1850, and reached two billion by 1930. Should the world’s population continue to grow by two percent annually (doubling every 35 years), Ehrlich warned, 60 million billion people (or 100 for every square yard of the globe’s surface) would be swarming the earth by the year 2900.

Ehrlich also publicized many of the environmental hazards commonly associated with overpopulation and industrialization—such as the “greenhouse ef-
BACKGROUND BOOKS: POPULATION

fect”—all well known today. A slight warming of the globe, resulting from an overabundance of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, generated by the burning of fossil fuels, could melt the polar ice caps, raising ocean levels by some 250 feet. Asked Ehrlich: “Gondola to the Empire State Building, anyone?”

More recent works on the “population problem” are less apocalyptic, for several reasons. As Rafael M. Salas, executive director of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, points out in Reflections on Population (Pergamon, 2nd ed., 1986), the rate of population growth worldwide has dropped dramatically, from 2.03 percent in 1970-75 to 1.67 percent in 1980-85. Demographers now expect the globe’s population to hit 6.1 billion by A.D. 2000, and level off at 10.2 billion by the end of the next century. And, “despite rapid population growth,” as the National Research Council’s scholarly Population Growth and Economic Development (National Academy, 1986, paper only) observes, “developing countries have achieved unprecedented levels of income per capita, literacy, and life expectancy over the last 25 years.”

Much current research focuses on the environmental (rather than the economic) effects of population growth. The best, most comprehensive surveys include State of the World 1986 by Lester Brown et al. (Norton, 1986, cloth & paper); the World Resources Institute’s World Resources 1986 (Basic, 1986, cloth & paper); and economist Robert Repetto’s Global Possible (Yale, 1985, cloth & paper). All of these works emphasize that the “state of the world” varies from country to country. Two of the 23 scientists and environmentalists who contributed to Repetto’s book, for example, found that the rate of annual deforestation ranges from a safe 0.6 percent of all woodlands in the Congo and Zaire to a dangerous four to six percent in the Ivory Coast and Nigeria. Limiting population, Repetto says, is just one way to help preserve world resources. Governments, he stresses, must also provide better management of land, forests, and waterways. Underdeveloped countries, meanwhile, need easier access to credit, new technologies, and small-scale investment.

Indeed, these three books suggest that the “spaceship earth” approach to population and development problems may be misguided. As former New York Timesman Pranay Gupte writes in his highly readable Crowded Earth (Norton, 1984), “people do not live on the ‘globe’ but in villages and towns, within the walls of their houses or shacks or tenements.”

Gupte spent 14 months traveling through 38 impoverished countries around the world to discover how ordinary people cope in overpopulated and underdeveloped communities. He spoke, for example, with Ibrahim Mesahi, a grocery store owner in bustling downtown Lagos. The population of Nigeria’s capital shot up, largely through in-migration, from 1.4 million in 1970 to 3.6 million in 1985. But Gupte found that Mesahi had no interest in birth control, at least not for himself. “I need all the help I can get,” explained Mesahi. “I have 10 boys and one girl... with my children, at least I can watch them. They are honest.”

The author, however, still favors population education programs. “When it is demonstrated to people that ‘small is beautiful,’” he says, “their choice will be for small families, not large ones.”
HENRY THOREAU:  
A Life of the Mind  
by Robert D. Richardson, Jr.  
Univ. of California, 1986  
455 pp. $25

In his bemused and brilliant book, *Amérique* (1986), French critic Jean Baudrillard writes that “America is neither a dream nor a reality, but a hyper-reality... because it is a utopia that, from the beginning, lives as if it were already accomplished.”

The observation is not new. America-watchers, from Tocqueville through D. H. Lawrence, have remarked upon the special tension between dream and reality, visionary lyricism and Yankee common sense, in the mythology of the “American self.” Nevertheless, Baudrillard’s point is worth noting, if only to remind us how few Americans have had the courage fully to live through that tension in their own lives. Henry David Thoreau (1817-62) was one of those people; Richardson, a professor of English at the University of Denver, suggests that he may be pre-eminent among them.

*A Life of the Mind* is more than an apt subtitle for this fine biography. It would be difficult to write any other kind of life of Thoreau. He was, as Richardson says, a “stay-at-home,” and a recluse as well. Born in Concord, Massachusetts, he made during his brief life three trips to Maine and one daring journey, which he did not enjoy, through the alien landscape of Quebec. He seems to have had only one (unsuccessful) romance, that with a beautiful 17-year-old girl, Ellen Sewall, who rejected first his brother’s and then his own advances. (“I have always loved her,” he said about Ellen on his deathbed.)

More painful to Thoreau than the one amorous sally, however, was his failure to be recognized by his own age as a great writer. The disciple of Ralph Waldo Emerson and friend of Margaret Fuller, Bronson Alcott, William Ellery, and Nathaniel Hawthorne (who helped him build his cabin on Walden Pond), he published little during his lifetime: two books, *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers* (1849) and *Walden* (1854), and a few essays, including “Civil Disobedience.” None of these met with much critical enthusiasm. Thoreau finally had to agree to subsidize part of the publishing cost for *A Week*—humiliating for an author, even in those days.

Like two other 19th-century American utopians of the imagination, Emily Dickinson and Herman Melville, he had to wait until this century for critical intelligence to catch up with his vision. Unlike Melville, who grew bitter when ignored, Thoreau knew how to wait. Richardson is nowhere more revealing than in his account of Thoreau’s life as patient observer and omnivorous reader. Thoreau seems to have known that a life devoted to the observation of nature and the love of books (ranging from ancient
literature to contemporary science) could not fail to be significant.

He was right, of course. Take a fast Thoreau quiz. What do the mass of men live? (Lives of “quiet desperation.”) Why might someone not keep step with his fellows? (Because he hears a different drummer.) The quiz could be longer, but the point is made: Thoreau, more than any of his friends, including Emerson, enriched the world and our language with an imperishable set of humanizing aphorisms. His parables have passed into the consciousness of his countrymen. For a “stay-at-home,” the son of a small-town lead-pencil manufacturer, that is no minor accomplishment.

Yet because of his association with the transcendentalists, notably Emerson, Thoreau has sometimes been dismissed as one of those impractical utopians whose rose-colored visions were corrected, in part deservedly, by the nay-saying of Hawthorne, Melville, and Twain. However, Richardson reminds us that the Concord crowd, for all its love of German idealism, was also made up of hard-headed Yankees, among them Thoreau. *Walden*, Richardson writes, “is an affirmation of life—not an easy acquiescence, but the earned affirmation of a man who had to struggle almost constantly against a sense of loss, desolation, and decline that grew on him with age. When he chose to crow, it was not for want of alternative voices.” A man who earns his living as a surveyor and part-time carpenter, a man who builds a cabin in the woods and grows his own food there for two years, is not likely to be ignorant of reality, no matter how much Kant or how many Hindu Upanishads he has read. In his visionary practicality, Thoreau seems more our contemporary than many another “classic” American writer, more in the mold, one might say, of Wallace Stevens, apocalyptic poet and insurance executive.

What made Thoreau’s utopianism distinct was that his utopia had a population of one. Never a joiner, he refused to participate in the transcendentalists’ Brook Farm commune. And though he craved friendship, he found it difficult to meet and keep friends. His solution was similar to that of Walt Whitman (whom he met once and admired): to transmute his loneliness into a vision of communion with all being.

Emerson had reservations about his disciple’s prose style, and even Thoreau’s most passionate advocates will admit that it can be thorny and soporific. His prose was arduously crafted, refined and rewritten past the limits of even extraordinary care. His slight publication during his lifetime was the by-product of a dedication to writing so serious that it could not allow any experience not fully articulated to see print. The voluminous journals (which Princeton University Press is now in the process of editing) indicate how much he did succeed in articulating, often better than he himself knew.

Richardson’s book is the best introduction and guide to Thoreau’s thought that we are likely to obtain. It leads us to re-read Thoreau, to admit to ourselves the difficulty of the writing, and yet finally to recognize that we are hearing a unique, and perhaps essential, American voice.

—Frank McConnell ‘78

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NEW TITLES

History

PERILOUS MISSIONS: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia
by William Leary
Alabama, 1986
281 pp. $22.50

Blending a Cold War chronicle with a business story, University of Georgia historian Leary recounts the rise and fall of an unusual airline.

Born amid China’s postwar chaos, Civil Air Transport (CAT) was the brainchild of two “Asia hands” who sought both profit and adventure. One was a hero-celebrity, General Claire L. Chennault, friend of Nationalist leader Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The other was a young Chennault aide, lawyer Whiting Willauer, Princeton '28. Financed by Washington investors, the two set up shop in Shanghai, battled Chinese and U.S. red tape, and finally, in 1947, with 19 war-surplus C-47s and C-46s, began airlifting relief supplies across China under contract to the United Nations. As the Communist-Nationalist civil war broke out, CAT pilots, all gung-ho American ex-servicemen, flew everywhere, braving death or capture, to supply Chiang’s hard-pressed troops.

After Mao Zedong’s triumph in 1949, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stepped in and bought the near-bankrupt CAT to support its growing, often ill-conceived “covert” Far East operations, including the dispatching of agents to mainland China. Further south, CAT pilots, such as the famed “Earthquake McGoon,” flew through heavy Vietminh flak to parachute supplies to the doomed French garrison at Dien Bien Phu in 1953–54. Eventually the CIA turned to other “proprietary” airlines; CAT was allowed to expire in 1968, a product of the fearless, often naive “can-do” spirit of the early years of American involvement in Asia.

THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF JAY GOULD
by Maury Klein
Johns Hopkins, 1986
595 pp. $27.50

That Jay Gould (1836–92), speculator and railroad magnate, was once considered “the most hated man in America” was largely the work of a hostile press, says University of Rhode Island historian Klein. His sympathetic biography attempts to demystify the legend of the notorious Gould, who organized the giant Union Pacific Railroad, gained controlling interest in Western Union Telegraph Company, and caused the “Black Friday” panic by attempting to corner the gold market in 1869.

The resulting portrait is that of a relentless worker, a devoted family man, and a pivotal figure in an era when speculation expanded private fortunes as well as the boundaries of the newly indus-
CURRENT BOOKS

PERMANENT EXILES:
Essays in the Intellectual Migration from Germany to America
by Martin Jay
Columbia, 1985
328 pp. $30

The atrocities and betrayals of the Stalin era prompted many American leftist intellectuals to jettison their faith in Marxism. Why did Marxism enjoy a resurgence on America’s campuses during the 1960s? The answer lies partly in the influence of the men treated in this book, a handful of German-Jewish intellectuals who came to the United States after Hitler’s rise to power in 1933. Setting in New York, they relocated their Institute for Social Research at Columbia University.

Founded in Frankfurt in 1923, the Institute harbored thinkers like Theodor Adorno, Leo Lowenthal, and Herbert Marcuse. All of them rejected “vulgar” Marxism—the economic-determinist ideology that had become the Soviets’ state religion. They did, however, incorporate in their critiques of capitalist society many notions (e.g., alienation) developed by the “early,” or philosophical, Marx. They lamented the “ravages” of capitalism—the authoritarian personality, the homogeneity of mass culture, and the precariousness of critical thinking in a technocratic age.

Jay, a University of California historian, charts the main currents and controversies within the In-

trialized nation. Gould’s drive, Klein suggests, came partly from his early proximity to death: The sickly, sunken-eyed boy who grew up in the harsh conditions of New York’s Catskill Mountains saw tuberculosis take most of his family. Gifted at mathematics and writing, he completed a history of his native Delaware County in 1856—and quickly rewrote it when a fire destroyed the 426-page manuscript.

The ironies of Gould’s life are not lost on Klein. At 14, the frail youth penned a stirring essay entitled “Honesty Is the Best Policy”; at 15, he left home with five dollars in his pocket. By 21, after various jobs, including a stint at managing a tannery, he was immersed in the business of Wall Street. There, observes Klein, like “a newcomer to a slaughterhouse he grew inured to the sight of blood, the butchering of carcasses.” Success soon brought charges of deceit and treachery—the greatest irony, Klein thinks. In fact, Gould was too blunt in going after what he wanted, refusing, unlike most robber barons, “to mouth pieties to disguise his course.”
stitute—and also the contributions of allied intellectuals such as Hannah Arendt. Jay shows not only how these aging émigrés helped shape the ideas of America's New Left but also how the American experience left its mark on them. Highly critical of American culture while here, Adorno nevertheless wrote, upon his return to Germany, that "any contemporary consciousness that has not appropriated the American experience, even in opposition, has something reactionary about it."

Contemporary Affairs

THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION: Fifty Propositions about Prosperity, Equality, and Liberty
by Peter L. Berger
Basic, 1986
262 pp. $17.95

Elaborating on 50 propositions (e.g., "There can be no effective market economy without private ownership of the means of production"), Boston University sociologist Berger presents a theory of capitalism explaining how the modern market economy affects the culture, politics, and values of an advanced society.

Such comprehensive theories have mainly been attempted by Marxists, whose findings, Berger says, are flawed by "a priori assumptions." He claims, however, to work from empirical evidence to show, among other things, that capitalism has generated the greatest productive power and the highest standard of living for mass society of any economic system in history.

Of considerable interest is Berger's analysis of a form of class friction that Marx never anticipated: "protracted conflict" between the old middle class (producers and distributors of goods and services) and a new middle class (manipulators of "symbolic knowledge"). The latter group, which includes journalists and educators, has a vested interest in basing privilege on educational credentials rather than economic clout. Its members typically favor the welfare state. Not surprisingly, Berger concludes, it is a major antagonist of capitalism.

Berger acknowledges that capitalism lacks mythic or ideological luster, "that no poets sing the praises of Dow Jones." Its emphasis on individual autonomy poses other problems. Capitalism functions best when there are strong institutions (family, church) to balance individual isolation with "communal solidarities."
SEMITES AND ANTI-SEMITES: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice
by Bernard Lewis
Norton, 1986
283 pp. $18.95

Christian anti-Semitism dates back almost 2,000 years, but Islamic anti-Semitism is something new under the sun. Indeed, says Lewis, a professor of Near Eastern studies at Princeton, it emerged in this century, and the Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine has caused it to spread.

Christian anti-Semitism, rooted in Gospel accounts of the Jewish role in the death of Christ, stems from an age-old fear, notes Lewis, that Jews are “a dark and deadly power, capable of deeds of cosmic evil.” In the Muslim Qu’ran, by contrast, a Jew “might be hostile, cunning and vindictive, but he was weak and ineffectual.” And, in fact, medieval Islamic societies, as well as the later Ottoman Empire, tended to be more tolerant of Jewish communities than were their European counterparts.

Lewis traces the rise of Islamic anti-Semitism to the early 1930s, when such groups as the Young Egypt Society began publishing Nazi-style anti-Jewish propaganda and openly harassing Jews in Cairo. The hate campaign has tended to be a “top-down phenomenon,” issuing more from the rhetoric of leaders and intellectuals than from popular sentiment. During the 1950s, Egyptian premier Gamal Nasser expressed “deep regret at the Nazi defeat”; in 1974 Lebanese socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt urged that Nazism be “revived somewhat.” Full-fledged “demonization” of Jews began after Israel’s seizure of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, as Arab intellectuals started depicting Jews as ancestral enemies—“descendants of the Jews who harmed the prophet Muhammed”—in textbooks and histories. Lewis’s prognosis is bleak: Nothing less than open dialogue between Arab and Israeli leaders will halt an “unending downward spiral of mutual hate.”

BROTHER ENEMY: The War after the War
by Nayan Chanda
Harcourt, 1986
303 pp. $24.95

One justification that U.S. presidents from John F. Kennedy to Richard Nixon gave for intervention in Vietnam was to thwart the expansion of Communist China. Yet when China went to war against Vietnam in 1979, it had Washington’s blessings.

The war after the Vietnam War contained other ironies. Not least is that the three regimes involved—in Cambodia, Vietnam, and China—were Communist, formerly united by anti-American fervor. Chanda, a journalist for Far Eastern Econ
nomic Review, explains how ancient national rivalries, submerged during more than a century of colonialism and foreign intervention, resurfaced in fierce power politics, diplomatic maneuverings, and bloody clashes.

Even as the last U.S. personnel withdrew from Saigon in 1975, Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia began purging suspected Vietnam sympathizers; purges soon led to direct attacks on Vietnamese villages. To the Khmer Rouge, says Chanda, this was a "preventive war of survival" against a hereditary enemy. Vietnam viewed the attacks as a predatory ploy, backed by its millennia foe, China; it responded by invading Cambodia in 1977. China, for its part, saw its hegemony in Southeast Asia threatened by an old rival who, moreover, had close ties with the "barbarian" to the north, the Soviet Union.

Chanda believes that the United States could have fostered a balance of power in the region. But President Carter's concern about Soviet expansion made him avoid normal diplomatic ties with Hanoi and deal exclusively with Peking. Even today, Chanda contends, seven years after consolidating its hold in Cambodia, Hanoi would break off its marriage of convenience with Moscow if America would provide guarantees against Chinese aggression along Vietnam's northern border.

**Arts & Letters**

**THE AMERICAN NEWNESS: Culture and Politics in the Age of Emerson**

by Irving Howe

Harvard, 1986

99 pp. $12.50

Twentieth-century cynics tend to look down on Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–82) as the pundit of unrealized possibility, a curious reminder of strangely optimistic times. But Howe's little volume, drawn from lectures delivered at Harvard, places Emerson on a broader plane.

During the period of "newness"—America in the 1830s and '40s—Emerson reigned as the main spokesman of transcendentalism. Having abandoned traditional Christianity (he had begun his career as a Unitarian minister), Emerson saw in the breakdown of New England Puritanism the first days of a "Central Man" who would base his life on "self-reliance." "What Washington and Jefferson had enabled institutionally," Howe writes, "Emerson would now bring into fruition in the
sphere of the spirit, and therefore in the life of the culture.” Far from being the musings of a recluse, Emerson’s lectures and essays, adjuring individuals to look to their own hearts for truth and guidance, reached a wide audience.

Walt Whitman took Emerson’s line of thought and turned it into a celebration of individuality. Henry Thoreau took it to the extreme of literal isolation. Even in reacting against Emerson, other writers acknowledged their debts to him. Nathaniel Hawthorne described how self-reliance could lead to loneliness, mental breakdown, and even to sin. And as Hester Prynne in *The Scarlet Letter* learned, indulging the self could lead to exile from the community.

The Civil War and industrialization may have killed the Emersonian “moment,” but writers still look for the fresh start that Emerson hoped for in the rosier days of antebellum America.

These 18 essays by Russian émigré poet Brodsky include autobiography, literary appreciation and criticism, personal recollections of great writers, and reflections on the state of Soviet society and culture. Born in 1940 in Leningrad, Brodsky grew up with the conviction that nothing that happened around him—whether the dull ideological monotony of school, deadening factory work, or even prison life—could change who he was inside. Belonging to what he calls a “bookish” generation (relationships were “broken up for good over a preference for Hemingway over Faulkner”), he and his peers sensed “a strange intensity in the air” during the early postwar years, only to see life soon “reduced to uniform rigidity by the centralized state.”

In one of two essays about W. H. Auden, Brodsky sums up the healing genius of the poet he considers the 20th century’s greatest writer: “[Auden] went among the world’s grave, almost terminal cases not as a surgeon but as a nurse, and every patient knows that it’s nurses and not incisions that put one back on one’s feet.” Brodsky’s detailed reading of Auden’s “September 1, 1939,” is a masterful and reverent exegesis; his assessment of Caribbean poet Derek Walcott’s work—“these poems represent a fusion of two versions of infinity: language and ocean”—
is equally illuminating. Strangely, Brodsky says somewhat when discussing Russian poets, perhaps because he is too close to poems in his mother tongue to carry their brilliance over into English. But his critical eye (and tongue) sharpens when he comes to Soviet fiction, which he finds to be a dreary brand of realism “that compromises the life it describes.” Brodsky extends his harsh verdict even to those novelists, such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who have resisted the regime. Despite their stand, they remain prisoners of a “stylistic conventionality” that is at odds with imagination and with art itself.

MOUNTAIN OF TRUTH: The Counterculture Begins, Ascona, 1900–1920
by Martin Green
Univ. Press of New Eng., 1986 287 pp. $19.95

Mention the early locales of the 20th-century “counterculture” and Vienna, Paris, or Munich might come to mind. Green, a professor of English at Tufts, would have us add the tiny Swiss village of Ascona to the list.

Founded in 1900 as a nature cure resort by seven young European men and women repelled by industrial-bourgeois society, this alternative community soon began to draw artists and intellectuals to its alpine streams, mud huts, and vegetarian diet. Visitors included such luminaries as theologian Paul Tillich, psychologist Carl Jung, novelist D. H. Lawrence, and dancer Isadora Duncan. Theosophy (an eclectic and highly mystical religion), nature worship, and the celebration of the erotic mixed with feminism and primitive anarchism to produce peculiarly Asconan brands of modern dance, poetry, and theater. The colony’s philosophers of choice were Richard Wagner and Friedrich Nietzsche, both prophets of the “superman.” The way to a higher human condition, Asconans believed, was through an exploration of the irrational and faith in the power of nature.

Although the coming of World War I spelled the end of the Ascona community, its spirit persists. In the arts, its imprint has been clear, notes Green, because it “always involves experimental form and extremist mood.” Ascona’s political legacy is more problematic: Irrationalist notions such as racial destiny merged all too well with Nazi anti-Semitism. Yet the antimodern emphasis on the “simple life” is a healthier side of what Green calls a “recurrent movement in Western culture, a lyric scherzo not without its tragic resonance.”
Forty-one years after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States and the Soviet Union deploy 50,000 nuclear warheads—enough megatons to obliterate each other and threaten conditions for life on the planet.

The 41 essays presented here, most appearing in the 40th anniversary issue of the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, examine the superpowers' arms race and the many effects of nuclear weapons on society, science, and international relations. Nobel laureate Hans Bethe questions the "technological imperative"—as seen in the H-bomb program and more recently in President Reagan's "Star Wars" antimissile efforts— which says that new weapons systems must be developed to avert the threat of nuclear war. Bethe charges that this approach leads not to security but only to the development of more offensive weapons. Disagreeing, Michael May, associate director of Livermore Laboratory, argues that weapons were "bound to come," not only as a result of what is known in physics but also of what is demanded by contemporary politics. Labs must develop weapons while governments negotiate to restrict them.

Some of the essays offer strategies to reduce international tensions. Political scientist Mary Kaldor suggests that both the Soviet Union and America "disengage" from Europe to "increase the accountability of [European] governments to their citizens." Most of the authors strike a reasonable tone on a subject that many find unthinkable even after four decades of the Atomic Age.

*The Chimpanzees of Gombe: Patterns of Behavior* (1971) first brought the public's attention to the remarkable research of Jane Goodall, a young Englishwoman who in 1960 journeyed to Tanzania's Lake Tanganyika to study man's closest primate relative, the chimpanzee.

The present volume is not only a comprehensive update of her fieldwork (now the longest continuous field study of any animal) but also a readable survey of significant research on the subject of *Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii*. A stout, fact-filled tome, her book has all the scholarly trappings—diagrams, maps, tables—and proceeds in orderly fashion through various aspects of chim-
panzee behavior, from territoriality to mating. But it is animated by something more rare than scholarly thoroughness—Goodall’s ability to capture the individual and social dramas of the Gombe chimps’ lives. One shares the author’s fascination as she describes complex power struggles, lasting bonds of affection, or remarkable tool-using skills (“Not only did the ‘dentist,’ Belle, clean the teeth of a young male with twigs, she actually performed an extraction, removing a loose deciduous premolar in one and a half minutes”). Of particular interest are Goodall’s revisions of her earlier impressions about the nature of the chimpanzee. Having in recent years witnessed acts of murderous violence (including infanticide), she no longer thinks, as she did 15 years ago, that “chimpanzees [are] far more peaceable than humans.”

In an earlier book, Pluto’s Republic (1982), biologist Medawar averred that the lives of scientists “almost always make dull reading.” His own autobiographical ramble is a happy exception. One puts this book down convinced that Medawar’s Nobel Prize–winning work in immunology was as much the product of a flinty, independent nature as of a formidable brain. To demonstrate that human skin could be transplanted without being rejected, for example, he and his colleagues first had to overcome the deeply rooted notion that “the normal rejection reaction was part of the [human] genetic make-up.”

He had faced prejudice before: The son of a Lebanese father and English mother, he suffered the snobbery and racism of his peers at boarding school before going on to do brilliant work at Oxford. He encountered similar attitudes when he became engaged to Jean Taylor, his wife and collaborator since 1937. Years of trial-and-error laboratory work preceded the great breakthrough in immunology and the Nobel in 1960. Medawar’s discovery that “no real life research is one long march of triumph” was valuable: It provided the central themes of his many books on the methods and practice of science—his belief, for instance, in the importance of false starts and faulty hypotheses, and the need for collegiality among scientists. Medawar suffered several strokes during the mid-1970s, but his literary output has never flagged.

"I have read almost everything," said poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) the year before writing "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner." It was no unwarranted boast. Coleridge's bibliophilia has posed a formidable challenge to literary detectives. Of these, none have thought more deeply about the workings of Coleridge's imagination than Lowes, a Harvard dean and professor of English until his death in 1945. His definitive study, first published in 1927, remains unsurpassed in identifying the likely sources of Coleridge's exotic images, motifs, and symbols. Leading a tour through Coleridge's varied reading list (e.g., Captain George Shelvocke's Voyage Around the World), Lowes offers dozens of explanations for the famous albatross (unaccountably slain by the ancient Mariner) and seven sources for the lustrous water-snakes. Lowes also reconstructs Coleridge's life, drawing from the poet's diary and letters. A bit of wild psychological guessing sometimes muddies the picture. Still, no critic has seen more clearly into Coleridge's "deep well of unconscious cerebration."


By 1860, there were nearly 250,000 free "people of color" in the American South. One of the most successful was William Ellison (1790-1861), a skilled cotton-gin maker who bought his own freedom in 1816 and soon became a prominent citizen of Stateburg, South Carolina. Historians Johnson and Roark have reconstructed Ellison's life and world from a cache of letters found in 1935 by three girls while playing under their upcountry South Carolina house. Their history takes Ellison from his days as a quick-witted apprentice, where he learned the trade that would allow him to buy his freedom, to the eve of the Civil War, when he was a wealthy plantation master with his own slaves. Along the way, the authors show, Ellison continually walked a tightrope, knowing that any slip "could erode white patronage and ... undermine all he had constructed." Ellison died in 1861, fearing that war would bring down his family. But despite years of hardship, his industrious heirs flourished during Reconstruction and for decades after.
Shortly after receiving the 1982 Nobel Prize for literature, Colombian novelist Gabriel Garcia Marquez remarked upon the mysterious failure of the Nobel committee to recognize the elder statesman of modern Latin American letters, Jorge Luis Borges: "I still don't understand why they don't give it to him." It was not false modesty. Like other Latin American writers, Garcia Marquez owes much to the labyrinthine imagination of Borges, who died last summer. His luminous \textit{ficciones} combine playful metaphysical musings with tight, detective-story plotting. The result, as Alastair Reid here explains, is a rare form of writing that takes us "to the very limits of language."

\textbf{Mapmaker of Imaginary Worlds}

News of the death of Jorge Luis Borges, in Geneva, on June 14th at the age of 86, reached me in Mexico. Paradoxically, that gloomy circumstance brought on not just a flood of eulogy in the press but the replaying, on television, of some of the interviews he had given over the last 20 years, so that, having died, he reappeared nightly, on one occasion even talking about his own death. His greatest horror, he often used to say, was of immortality; and he looked on death as a familiar, as a surcease that would separate him once and for all from "Borges," that Other on whom he would often vent his ironies, and who now survives him, in book form.

At the insistence of an Argentine friend, I first began to read Borges in the early 1950s, when he was little known outside Argentina, and I was so astonished by his writing that I began to translate him. To translate the work of any writer requires a total immersion in the text, but in Borges's case I was amply rewarded: Once read, his brief fictions go on reverberating in the mind.

I met him first in Buenos Aires, in 1964, and encountered him with some regularity, in different parts of the world, for, as his reputation spread through translation, he traveled widely, giving lectures and readings, and granting interviews indefatigably. We kept up over the next two decades a running conversation, mostly about writers and writing, and I never failed to be astonished
at the breadth of his reading, the crispness of his memory, and the subtlety and wit of his observations.

In the autobiographical essay he wrote in 1970, he remarks: “If I were to name the chief event in my life, I should say my father’s library. In fact, I sometimes think I have never strayed outside that library.” His father’s library consisted mainly of English books, for Borges’s paternal grandmother was English, and Borges learned English as a matter of course. His father, a lawyer, lecturer, and occasional writer, began to lose his sight early, a hereditary affliction that passed to Borges in his fifties. Borges writes: “From the time that I was a boy, when blindness came to him, it was tacitly understood that I had to fulfill the literary destiny that circumstances had denied my father. This was something that was taken for granted (and such things are far more important than things that are merely said). I was expected to be a writer.”

In his childhood, the greatest punishment his mother could inflict on him was to threaten to take away his books. In 1914, Borges’s father took an early retirement, and the family moved from Buenos Aires to Europe, where they were to remain for the next seven years. Borges went to school in Geneva, learning Latin, French, and German, and reading voraciously in these languages; and, during the time the family spent in Spain before returning to Argentina in 1921, he began to publish poems, reviews, and literary essays.
I can think of no other writer whose life was so bound up with books as was Borges's. In Buenos Aires, he edited and wrote for a number of small literary magazines, and introduced many foreign writers into Spanish. He also began to translate, for which he was admirably prepared, and produced distinguished translations of James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, and William Faulkner; he became a cornerstone of Victoria Ocampo's celebrated review, Sur, which regularly published his writings. His early books of poems and collections of literary essays gained him a not inconsiderable reputation as a writer, and he enjoyed the company and conversation of the literary figures of the day.

In 1938, he took a job as assistant in a municipal library on the outskirts of the city, a post he held for eight years until he was dismissed on the orders of Argentina's dictator Juan Perón, against whom he had spoken out. After that, he maintained himself by lecturing on literary subjects, all the while continuing to write and publish. Then, in 1955, with the overthrow of Perón, he was appointed director of the National Library in Buenos Aires, a supreme irony, for his sight had diminished to the point of making reading almost impossible, an irony that he dwells on in his most moving “Poem of the Gifts.”

Borges lived in and through books. He often used to say that reading was a form of traveling in time, and he would speak of writers like Stevenson, Chesterton, de Quincey, and Coleridge as if they were friends. “I have always been a greater reader than a writer,” he says in one interview, and, even in his fantastic stories, the point of departure is most often a book or a text. In his early poems and literary essays, however, there is yet no inkling of the extraordinary writer he was to become, although his sense of irony is apparent. The crucial year in Borges's life is 1938, the year in which his father died and in which he himself suffered an accident that led to grave septicemia. From that point on, he began to write the inimitable stories that are collected in Ficciones (1944), his most celebrated single volume.

Games with Time and Infinity

Borges called his stories “fictions,” and it is worth stopping to consider what he means, for the word has in Latin America a different sense, I think, than it has in English-speaking countries. Borges's stories are always reminding us that they are verbal constructs. To mistake them for reality is to be deceived, because the gap between language and reality is uncrossable. In one of his most celebrated stories, “Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” Borges makes passing reference to a work, Die Philosophie des Als Ob (The Philosophy of “As If”), a study of the nature of fictions by the German metaphysician, Hans Vaihinger. Unlike hypotheses, which posit a possibility and go on to test its truth, fictions are understood to be no more than linguistic formulations. They are ways of bringing chaos into a temporary verbal order, rather than the
expressions of conviction or even of opinion.

Borges goes on to add: “The metaphysicians of Tlön are not looking for truth, nor even for an approximation of it; they are after a kind of amazement. They consider metaphysics a branch of fantastic literature.” For Borges, all literary creations are fictions, games played with words, which, treated as if they were true, may throw light on reality, but must never be confused with it.

This paradox is at the heart of Borges’s work. Inherent in the notion of fictions is a fundamental distrust of language, a wariness, an irony. A book, as Borges shows us often, is itself an irony: Held in the hand, it mocks the writer who created it, for it has moved out of the physical realm of time into the dimension of the timeless, while the writer must go on living in time and, eventually, die.

In “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” the point of departure is a book. Borges and his friend Bioy Casares discover in an encyclopedia a reference to a mysterious planet called Tlön. Little by little, further references to Tlön turn up, until it is eventually revealed that Tlön has been created by a secret company of scholars as a counterreality, which the inhabitants of this planet, however, are eager to embrace, preferring the intelligible, created reality to the real. So it is with literature, in which we willingly embrace the illusions created in language, but out of which we must inevitably return into time. The worlds created through language, then, are illusions, but glorious illusions.

At the conclusion of the story, Borges writes: “I go on revising, in the quiet of the days in the hotel at Adrogue, a tentative translation into Spanish, in the style of Quevedo, of Sir Thomas Browne’s Urn Burial, which I do not intend to see published.” Literature will change nothing, but it exists as solace, magnificent solace, to the mind.

In a celebrated essay, “Pascal’s Sphere,” Borges makes the following observation: “Perhaps the history of the universe is the history of the diverse intonations of a few metaphors.” The essential metaphors for existence recur, and the business of the writer is to restate them, give them a new incarnation.
Let us look at one of these, the duality of the Self and the Other, to which Borges gave new life. In the short parable "Borges and I," he separates the living self from "Borges," the Other, the literary figure, to whom, however, he is inevitably shackled. The piece concludes: "Years ago, I tried ridding myself of him and I went from myths of the outlying slums of the city to games with time and infinity, but these games are now part of Borges and I will have to turn to other things. And so, my life is running away, and I lose everything and everything is left to oblivion or to the other man. Which of us is writing this page I do not know." He made this duality tangible and real.

In recent years, he grew reluctant to lecture, and would ask me to sit with him and give a charla, in which I would ask him questions, or read out questions from his audience. Quite often, his questioners would quote him, bringing up something he had said or written and, just as often, he would disclaim it, attributing it to "Borges," the Other, who had become to him a separate being. His modesty was legendary, so that, when anyone praised his work in his company, he would redirect the praise to "Borges," of whom he often took a very wry view.

Peering over the Edge

The circumstances of Borges's life, spent among books, occupied with literature, are directly transmuted into the central images and figures in his writing. The library becomes the infinite library of Babel, containing all possible books and turning into nightmare. The accident he suffered in 1938 becomes a symbolic death in "The South." The recurring image of the mirror crystallizes duality. The tiger, an obsession of his childhood, crops up again and again to represent pure physicality, being beyond language. The insomnia from which Borges suffered is transposed to the figure of Funes the Memorious, who is condemned to remember everything in its inexhaustible particularity. And Buenos Aires, whose streets he never tired of walking, becomes in his stories the setting for miraculous happenings.

What distinguishes Borges from other writers, I think, is the particular effect his writings have on his readers. Certain words crop up again and again in his work to become his trademarks: The Spanish word asombro, which means "amazement, awe," and the adjective vertiginoso, "vertiginous, vertigo-inducing." His writings take us to the very limits of language, and make us peer over the edge, so that, after reading certain stories of his, some quite ordinary event like, say, missing a bus, will suddenly become charged with ominous significance.

This sense of awe is, for Borges, what lies at the heart of great literature, through which we truly contemplate the whole mystery of existence. It was part of Borges's genius to find such moments in the writing of others, like the passage from Coleridge's notebooks that he was fond of quoting: "If a man could pass through Paradise in a dream, and have a flower presented to him as a pledge that his soul had really been there, and if he found that flower in his hand when he awoke—Ay!—and what then?"

Borges's brief texts are amply strewn with reference and quotation. It is only on close scrutiny, however, that the reader discovers that a fair proportion of these sources are imaginary, their authors nonexistent, that Borges
really did regard scholarship as a branch of fantastic literature. Borges is a literary minimalist, capable of containing infinitely resounding paradoxes in the compass of a brief paragraph.

Let me proffer two examples, from the volume *El hacedor* (The maker) (1960). The first Borges attributes to one Suárez Miranda, from an apocryphal text dated 1658 that carries the title, *On Precision in the Sciences*:

... in that Empire, the Art of Cartography had achieved such perfection that the map of a single Province occupied a whole City, and the map of the Empire, a whole Province. With time, these disproportionate maps gave no satisfaction, and the College of Cartographers conceived a Map of the Empire that had the same dimensions as the Empire, and that coincided with it at every point. Subsequent Generations, less concerned with the study of Cartography, understood that the extended map was useless and with a certain impiety abandoned it to the inclemencies of the Sun and of Winters. In the deserts of the West, certain tattered fragments of the Map are still to be found, sheltering Animals and Beggars; in the whole country, nothing else remains of the Discipline of Geography...

The other passage concludes Borges's epilogue to the same book, and also makes use of the figure of a map. Read it aloud:

A man sets himself the task of making a plan of the universe. After many years, he fills a whole space with images of provinces, kingdoms, mountains, bays, ships, islands, fish, rooms, instruments, stars, horses, and people. On the threshold of death, he discovers that the patient labyrinth of lines has traced the likeness of his own face.
Cramming (1931) by Norman Rockwell.
A History of the Past: 'Life Reeked with Joy'

"History," declared Henry Ford, "is bunk." And yet, to paraphrase George Santayana, those who forget history and the English language are condemned to mangle them. Historian Anders Henriksson, a veteran of the university classroom, has faithfully recorded, from papers submitted by freshmen at McMaster University and the University of Alberta, his students' more striking insights into European history from the Middle Ages to the present. Possibly as an act of vengeance, Professor Henriksson has now assembled these individual fragments into a chronological narrative that we present here.

Compiled by Anders Henriksson

History, as we know, is always bias, because human beings have to be studied by other human beings, not by independent observers of another species.

During the Middle Ages, everybody was middle aged. Church and state were co-operative. Middle Evil society was made up of monks, lords, and surfs. It is unfortunate that we do not have a medivel European laid out on a table before us, ready for dissection. After a revival of infantile commerce slowly creeped into Europe, merchants appeared. Some were sitters and some were drifters. They roamed from town to town exposing themselves and organized big fairs in the countryside. Medieval people were violent. Murder during this period was nothing. Everybody killed someone. England fought numerously for land in France and ended up wining and losing. The Crusades were a series of military expaditions made by Christians seeking to free the holy land (the "Home Town" of Christ) from the Islams.

In the 1400 hundreds most Englishmen were perpendicular. A class of yeowls arose. Finally, Europe caught the Black Death. The bubonic plague is a social disease in the sense that it can be transmitted by intercourse and other etceteras. It was spread from port to port by inflected rats. Victims of the Black Death grew boobs on their necks. The plague also helped the emergence of the English language as the national language of England, France and Italy.

The Middle Ages slimpared to a halt. The renasence bolted in from the blue.
Life reeked with joy. Italy became robust, and more individuals felt the value of their human being. Italy, of course, was much closer to the rest of the world, thanks to northern Europe. Man was determined to civilise himself and his brothers, even if heads had to roll! It became sheik to be educated. Art was on a more associated level. Europe was full of incredible churches with great art bulging out their doors. Renaissance merchants were beautiful and almost lifelike.

The Reformation happened when German nobles resented the idea that tithes were going to Papal France or the Pope thus enriching Catholic coiffures. Traditions had become oppressive so they too were crushed in the wake of man's quest for resurrection above the not-just-social beast he had become. An angry Martin Luther nailed 95 theocrats to a church door. Theologically, Luther was into reorientation mutation. Calvinism was the most convenient religion since the days of the ancients. Anabaptist services tended to be migratory. The Popes, of course, were usually Catholic. Monks went right on seeing themselves as worms. The last Jesuit priest died in the 19th century.

After the reformation were wars both foreign and infernal. If the Spanish could gain the Netherlands they would have a stronghold throughout northern Europe which would include their positions in Italy, Burgundy, central Europe and India thus surrounding France. The German Emperor's lower passage was blocked by the French for years and years.

Louis XIV became King of the Sun. He gave the people food and artillery. If he didn't like someone, he sent them to the gallows to row for the rest of their lives. Vauban was the royal minister of flirtation. In Russia the 17th century was known as the time of the bounting of the serfs. Russian nobles wore clothes only to humour Peter the Great. Peter filled his government with accidental people and built a new capital near the European boarder. Orthodox priests became government antennae.

The enlightenment was a reasonable time. Voltaire wrote a book called *Candide* that got him into trouble with Frederick the Great. Philosophers were unknown yet, and the fundamental stake was one of religious toleration slightly confused with defeatism. France was in a very serious state. Taxation was a great drain on the state budget. The French revolution was accomplished before it happened. The revolution evolved through monarchial, republican and tolarian phases until it catapulted into Napoleon. Napoleon was ill with bladder problems and was very tense and unrestrained.

History, a record of things left behind by past generations, started in 1815. Throughout the comparatively radical years 1815–1870 the western European continent was undergoing a Rampant period of economic modification. Industrialization was precipitating in England. Problems were so complexicated that in Paris, out of a city population of one million people, two million able bodies were on the loose.

Great Britann, the USA and other European countrys had demicratic leanings. The middle class was tired and needed a rest. The old order could see the lid holding down new ideas beginning to shake. Among the goals of the chartists

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were universal suferage and an anal parlirnent. Voting was done by ballad.

A new time zone of national unification roared over the horizon. Founder of the new Italy was Cavour, an intelligent Sar- dine from the north. Nationalism aided Italy because nationalism is the growth of an army. We can see that nationalism succeeded for Italy because of France's big army. Napoleon III–IV mounted the French thrown. One thinks of Napoleon III as a live extension of the late, but great, Napoleon. Here too was the new Germany: loud, bold, vulgar and full of reality.

Culture fomented from Europe's tip to its top. Richard Strauss, who was violent but methodical like his wife made him, plunged into vicious and perverse plays. Dramatized were adventures in seduction and abortion. Music reeked with reality. Wagner was master of music, and people did not forget his contribution. When he died they labled his seat "historical." Other countries had their own artists. France had Chekhov.

World War I broke out around 1912–1914. Germany was on one side of France and Russia was on the other. At war people get killed, and then they aren't people any more, but friends. Peace was proclaimed at Versigh, which was attended by George Loid, Primal Minister of England. President Wilson arrived with 14 pointers. In 1937 Lenin revolted Russia. Communism raged among the peasants, and the civil war "team colours" were red and white.

Germany was displaced after WWI. This gave rise to Hitler. Germany was morbidly overexcited and unbalanced. Berlin became the decadent capital, where all forms of sexual deprivations were practised. A huge anti-semantic movement arose. Attractive slogans like "death to all Jews" were used by governmental groups. Hitler remilitarized the Rineland over a squirmish between Germany and France. The appeasers were blinded by the great red of the Soviets. Moosealini rested his foundations on eight million bayonets and invaded Hi Lee Salasy. Germany invaded Poland, France invaded Belgium, and Russia invaded everybody. War screeched to an end when a nukuler explosion was dropped on Heroshima. A whole generation had been wipe out in two world wars, and their forlome families were left to pick up the peaces.

According toFromm, individuation began historically in medieval times. This was a period of small childhood. There is increasing experience as adolescence experiences its life development. The last stage is us.
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Vive la Différence!

Re: your essays on feminism ("Feminism in America, 1848–1986," WQ, Autumn '86):

Steven Lagerfeld's incisive article "Measuring the Effects" weaseled on one key point. No one, he declared, denies that discrimination accounts for part of the gap between male and female incomes. He is wrong. I deny it.

The net effect of current discrimination in the work force favors women, not men.

Under the influence of civil rights legislation and cultural pressures, companies and government offices everywhere increasingly base their personnel policies on documented credentials and qualifications and ignore the aggressiveness and drive that are actually far more important in work performance and leadership.

Since women are generally superior in educational environments and men excel in commitment and drive at work, credentialism effectively and irrationally discriminates in favor of women. This bias persists despite the men's overwhelmingly greater likelihood of staying in the work force, concentrating all their efforts on the job, and competing hard for advancement.

Although surveys show that female doctors and lawyers, for example, spend far less time at work than comparable male professionals—and are far more likely to withdraw from their professions for extended periods—women are actually favored in admissions to law and medical schools. In business schools the situation is similar.

The tendency to favor women over men in the work force, in training programs, and in exclusive professional institutions partly accounts for women's success in acquiring two-thirds of the new jobs created in the U.S. in recent years, and also explains why the favored women's work—part time, flexible, indoor, close to home—still pays less than characteristic male employment. [Married] women understandably seek convenience rather than money as their prime goal at work and have flooded the job market when these special benefits were offered to them.

Nonetheless, all the efforts of government policy have failed to induce married women to compete persistently with men in the work force. Less than 30 percent of married women work full time all year, and married women still earn on average less than one-fifth of the income in intact families (with husbands present).

The reason why women earn less than men in all societies is that women discriminate in favor of their families. If they did not, family life would collapse, and the additional gains in output attributable to the women's work would be overwhelmed by the additional expenses of police care for men and boys, and for child care in a society largely bereft of maternal love and parental discipline.

As anthropologists have long observed, men do not remain in families unless they retain the key role of chief provider. As in Scandinavian countries today, the unisex model of work and family life leads to the rapid decline of marriage as an institution and to birthrates so far below the replacement level as to portend near genetic extinction in five generations. Still, women refuse to earn as much as men, even in Sweden.

As some of us have noticed over the years, men and women are decisively different. Normal men and women like it that way.

George Gilder, Author
Men and Marriage (1986)
Tyringham, Mass.

A Fourth Wave?

It is fashionable nowadays to say, as Rita Kramer does in "The Third Wave" (WQ, Autumn '86), that feminism is "in deep disarray." We also hear from others that today's young women are "post-feminist."

Those who argue that feminism is now in disarray usually forget that the women's movement has always been diffuse and disorderly. We have always lacked strong central organizations and clear lines of authority, and had trouble agreeing on clear definitions of long-term goals, as well as precise strategies for achieving concrete short-term goals.

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Nothing in the experience of the young women I described above leads them yet to identify with the oppressed or constrained side of womanhood. If they are aware of the women's movement, they associate it with the distant past—the perhaps admirable but sternly unattractive suffragists, the ax-wielding temperance campaigners, the Victorian reformers—or a highly distorted version of the more recent past—the "bra-burners," the shrill man-haters, the quixotic but ineffective supporters of the ERA.

Such a mood and situation are unpromising material for social reform, let alone a feminist revolution. But those who use this as an argument for the end of feminism are on very
shaky ground.

The young women of today provide a classic case of "rising expectations." Nothing fuels social reform so effectively as expectations that rise forcefully only to be dashed or denied. This generation is coming up against the barricades that still stand: the prejudices against women in positions of authority, the sexual stereotypes that render true corporate camaraderie impossible for women and make them invisible as serious competitors, and, most of all, the cruel choices these women will confront when it comes to career versus home and family.

These young women are not about to give up their ambitions and accept only one truncated portion of a good life—either love or work. They will want it all, and cannot have it; they will fight to get it, by working for better child care, flexible schedules, alternative routes to the top of the ladder. All the education and experience that lulls them into believing that they face no obstacles will be marshalled into opposition to those obstacles that still exist.

Jane Mansbridge's thoughtful study Why We Lost the ERA (Univ. of Chicago, 1986) makes clear that the struggle for the ERA raised the consciousness of women and men around the country about feminist causes, despite the loss of this particular battle. Both those who were supportive of ERA and those who were opposed became more aware of issues such as job equity and child care. This is true across the country, not just in the big cities; and it is true of all classes, not just those who were active.

Thus the young women who fight the next battles of feminism will find alliances with other women, including older women who are fighting their own versions of such battles later in their lives.

This is the Fourth Wave, and it is already coming. Unlike some versions of feminism in the past, this wave accepts no unreal dichotomies between "working women" and "housewives." This wave sees the basic interest of all women—and all men—in multiply satisfying lives, and in a society that makes such lives possible.

Idealistic? To be sure. We are only just sketching out the lines of the argument that could unite us around this definition of our cause. We will be hampered, as always, by
the hugeness and diffuseness of the undertak-
ing, and the formidable obstacles we face. But
we know that feminists have over time been
patient, supportive, humorous, and deeply
persistent.

Here's to the next wave.

Nannerl O. Keohane, President
Wellesley College

What About the Family?

All of the WQ's articles on feminism are ex-
cellent, both in their presentation of facts and
in their interpretations. What I found missing
was a comparative perspective.

Detailed comparison with other industrial
ations' experiences would have been helpful
in understanding the direction American fem-
inism has taken and may take in the future.

On the one hand, the social experience of
women in the United States is but part of a
broader international pattern of social and
economic change. On the other hand, there
are striking differences between the Euro-
pean and American experiences. We seem to
be, for example, more ideologically feminist
than Europeans, as the presence of women in
our military academies suggests. Another
striking difference is our lack of a national
policy on families.

Somehow, family policy was overlooked in
your issue, perhaps on the assumption that it
has little to do with feminism. Yet if feminism
implies a revolution in the traditional family,
then surely a policy that might accommodate
or facilitate that revolution is imperative.

Such a policy would begin by recognizing
that only women bear babies. Sometimes, in
the name of equality, it is asserted that gov-
ernment policy should treat a woman's preg-
nancy no differently from a hernia operation.
The analogy, however, is weak. No one wants
a hernia, but some people really want babies.
A caring society would recognize that fact by
making it possible for the only human beings
who bear children to do so even though they
also work for pay.

This year, for the first time in our history,
Congress will vote on a permanent "child
care and leave policy" bill for working par-
ents. Yet even in that measure the backward-
ness of America shows through. The bill pro-
vides for leaves without pay; comparable

leaves in European countries generally in-
clude income, something indispensable to
working-class families.

A family policy in this country that would
grant leaves with pay, along with improved
child care facilities, would do much to over-
come American feminism's historical and
present deficiency: the inability to bring to-
gether middle- and working-class women un-
der one ideological or organizational roof.

Equality of opportunity for women and men
must always be the test of good policy, but
failure to recognize where they differ intro-
duces a new kind of discrimination rather
than eliminating an old one.

Carl N. Degler
Professor of History
Stanford University

Finland: Another Viewpoint

Keith W. Olson ("Between East and West")
and Pekka Kalevi Hamalainen ("The Finnish
Solution") demonstrate an impressive mas-
tery of Finnish political history (WQ, Autumn
'86). They present a much-needed, accurate
picture of Finland at a time when the U.S.
Foreign Service is still wedded to the ill-con-
ceived and misleading notion of
Finlandization.

My disagreements with the authors are mi-
nor. Olson argues that Finnish socialists in
1917 were eager for their own Bolshevik
revolution. The record shows, however, that
leaders of the January 1918 seizure of power
(e.g., Yrjö Sirola) wanted their revolution to
be judged apart from the Russian Revolution.

Olson also overdoes his description of Fin-
lund as "Europe's innocent bystander." In
fact, he waters down his own position with
admissions that some Finns were courting
Russia's enemies, that Finns allowed German
troops and materiel to transit through their
country, that Germany deployed five divisions
in Finnish Lapland with the approval of Hel-
sinki, and that Finnish operations in World
War II were not entirely defensive. It is per-
haps in this context that one should weigh the
absence of any reference, either textual or
bibliographical, in the Olson article to the ex-
pansion-minded Greater Finland movement of
the 1930s, with its prominent military and
political supporters.
Hamalainen’s balanced account of postwar Finnish-Soviet relations has only cosmetic imperfections. For example, Soviet leader Andropov was general secretary, not the premier, and Finnish leader Mauno Pekkala was a left-wing socialist, not a communist. It is perhaps also relevant to call attention to the recent death (on August 31) of Urho Kekkonen (1900–86), the controversial architect of Finland’s policy of “active neutrality,” a phrase that the former president liked to use in order to distinguish his foreign policy from that of the Paasikivi era.

John H. Hodgson
Professor of Political Science
Syracuse University

Corrections

Two typographical errors appeared in the WQ’s Autumn ’86 issue:

In 1976, Finland and the Soviet Union were nearing their 60th anniversaries, not their 70th as stated on page 73.

The footnote on page 106 should have indicated not 21, but 12 Republican senators voting against the Nineteenth Amendment (women’s suffrage) in June 1919.
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