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Editor's Comment

In this issue of the Wilson Quarterly, Richard Restak outlines the growing debate among scholars over the role of psychiatry, whose impact in America on law, education, and even literature is unmatched elsewhere. Sigmund Freud, it seems, has gained far more devotees in this country than Karl Marx ever did. Today, the psychiatric profession itself is in turmoil, "a good thing and long overdue" says Restak, "like New York City's brush with bankruptcy during the 1970s."

The controversy over America's "psychotherapeutic notions" is only the latest example of scholarly discussion that is edging into the public arena. Think of the public schools [see WQ, Autumn 1979], beset by a long-documented "rising tide of mediocrity" that now promises to become a 1984 election issue; or the renewed Washington debate over arms control, defense policy, and the "all-volunteer Army" concept [WQ, Autumn '77, Spring '79]; or the recent public emphasis by some civil rights leaders, if not by radical feminists, on the importance of the beleaguered two-parent family [WQ, Summer '80, Autumn '82] to the future progress of black Americans.

These matters and others, ranging from U.S. energy policy to the changing role of the Supreme Court, preoccupy relatively small bands of specialists who dig up fresh evidence and argue over it. At their best, these men and women shed new light on major questions, often long before their researches fuel new "issues" in Washington or in the mass media. Thus, seeking, summarizing, and presenting such scholarly findings has been one of our prime tasks and, as always, we welcome readers' comments on what the scholars have to say.
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—Kirkus Reviews

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Six Years in The Oval Office?

Debated by the 1787 Constitutional Convention, endorsed by most 19th-century U.S. Presidents, denounced by Harry S Truman, the idea of a single six-year presidential term is once again gaining political appeal.

Wicker, a New York Times columnist, recalls that the last serious effort to establish a six-year term came early in 1913, when the U.S. Senate approved a Constitutional amendment needed to implement the change. But President-elect Woodrow Wilson, his eye on a second term, had it killed in the House of Representatives. In 1981, according to the Gallup Poll, the idea was endorsed by 34 percent of the American public, its highest approval rating since Gallup first asked about it in 1936.

Today’s six-year backers—from Jimmy Carter to G.O.P. Senator Strom Thurmond, a South Carolina conservative—contend that political calculations warp White House policy decisions as elections draw near. For example, President Gerald Ford, under fire from conservative challenger Ronald Reagan during the 1976 primary season, backed away from his earlier commitment to seek Senate ratification of the Panama Canal treaties.

Faced with a 12–18 month reelection campaign, the single-termers add, a president has little time to tend to the nation’s business. One longer term would relieve him of that conflict. And in an era when few presidents serve two full terms (Dwight Eisenhower was the last to do so), it would reduce the frequency of sudden changes in direction, especially in sensitive foreign policy.

But pointing to President Richard Nixon’s feats in the shadow of the 1972 elections—his trip to China, expanded détente with Moscow, progress toward a U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam—Representative Morris Udall (D.-Ariz.) disputes the belief that good politics...
makes for bad government. Clark Clifford finds the notion of a President above politics “inconsistent with our system of government.”

Others worry that not having to run for re-election could make a chief executive feel less concern about the effects of his policies. Harry Truman argued that a single term would make the man in the Oval Office an instant “lame duck.” And six years, Wicker suggests, might be too long for a bad president, too short for a good one.

Wicker does not believe that the terms of the White House lease will be changed any time soon. Even if Congress approved the necessary Constitutional amendment, three-fourths of the states would have to ratify it. But because Americans still believe that “somehow, someday they will . . . be able to purge their government of politics,” he doubts that the idea will ever die.

**Narrowing the Confidence Gap**

Beginning in 1964, public opinion surveys show, the average American’s confidence in the federal government began a long downhill slide. But that trend may now have reversed.

According to Miller, director of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research, biennial opinion polls conducted by the Institute show that 62 percent of those polled in 1964 believed that Washington could be trusted “to do what is right” most of the time. In 1980, after Vietnam and Watergate and Iran, only 23 percent felt that way. By 1982, however, the favorable response had grown to 31 percent.

In 1964, only 29 percent of those polled agreed that the U.S. government “is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves.” Sixteen years later, the cynics constituted an overwhelming 69 percent majority. But by 1982, negative responses were down by eight percentage points. In 1980, 78 percent of Americans polled believed that Washington wasted “a lot” of their tax money. That figure had dropped to 66 percent two years later.

In 1980–82, Democrats’ faith rose nearly as much as that of Republicans, suggesting that Ronald Reagan’s election was not directly responsible for the change. Democrats who were optimistic about the economy in 1982 or who favored cuts in government spending registered the biggest gains. Conservatives remained more skeptical than liberals. Blacks, whose faith in government had risen during the Carter administration, were the only group whose responses countered the positive trend in 1982.

Miller contends that post-1980 economic changes, first in inflation and then in interest rates, convinced many Americans that “government can act effectively.” Yet an overwhelming majority of Americans still distrust their government. That is no cause for celebration.
American political liberals are beginning to look almost as imperiled as the snail darter once was. Many liberals left the fold during the 1960s and '70s to become "neoconservatives." Today, even more are decamping to join the "neoliberals."

Notable defectors, writes Peters, Washington Monthly editor and himself a self-styled neoliberal, include Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist Lester Thurow, Democratic Senators Gary Hart (Colo.), Bill Bradley (N.J.), and Paul Tsongas (Mass.). They still believe in "mercy for the afflicted and help for the down and out," he explains, but they have curbed their old "knee-jerk" reflexes. Big Government and labor unions are sacred cows no more; the military, the police, and Big Business get a more sympathetic hearing.

The neoliberals flunk several standard liberal litmus tests. They support silent meditation in public schools and oppose the courtroom insanity defense. They favor a peacetime military draft as a way to trim Pentagon spending for generous all-volunteer force salaries and to bring rich and poor together in national service.

In the private sector, the neoliberals' "hero is the risk-taking entrepreneur who creates new jobs and better products." Pay hikes, whether for union workers or the denizens of the executive suite, must be tied to improvements in productivity. Workers, they add, should consider accepting stock in their companies in lieu of wage increases.

Neoliberals would also hold government to higher performance standards. Peters ridicules the city of Los Angeles, for example, for cutting back on street repaving and public libraries' hours while paying its fire
POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

chief a hefty $93,688 salary. Nor are federal social programs immune from criticism. Peters argues that Social Security benefits should go only to the needy aged, not "my aunt who uses her . . . check to go to Europe."

"We want a government that can fire people who can't or won't do the job," Peters declares. "And that includes teachers." He favors gradually making up to half the federal government's 2.8 million civil service slots appointive positions, with terms limited to five years. That would bring risk-takers and innovators into the government. Invigorating the bureaucracy, not tearing it down, is Peters's goal. But too many bureaucrats are getting "fat, sloppy, and smug."

Traditional liberals, Peters believes, were beginning to take on some of those same traits. The neoliberals prefer the lean and hungry look.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Good Neighbor?

"The Explosive Soviet Periphery" by Jiri Valenta, in Foreign Policy (Summer 1983), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

The Soviet Union's reactions to unrest in Poland, Hungary, Afghanistan, and other neighboring states have repeatedly strained superpower relations since World War II. To avert such tensions, says Valenta, a Soviet affairs specialist at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Washington must somehow steer Moscow toward a more tolerant view of its neighbors' domestic matters.


In 1968, when Czechoslovakia's Alexander Dubček carried his "Prague Spring" reforms too far for Moscow's liking, Washington went to the other extreme. President Lyndon Johnson, preoccupied with the Vietnam War and its domestic repercussions, seemed indifferent to Czechoslovakia's fate. By continuing to call for SALT talks, he implied American "acquiescence" to Soviet aggression, says Valenta. Again, the Red Army marched in.

Before Moscow's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, Jimmy Carter's White House sent contradictory signals, leaving Moscow no way to anticipate the resulting U.S. grain embargo and the death of the SALT II treaty.

Over the years, American efforts to discourage Soviet military intervention in Poland may have been more successful. In October 1956, the Soviet Union, after flexing its muscles, chose not to invade, deterred chiefly by Polish leader Władysław Gomułka's expressed resolve to put...
up armed resistance. But President Dwight Eisenhower's offer of economic assistance to Gomulka's reformist regime—a moderate but credible sign of U.S. concern—may also have influenced the Soviet decision.

During the 1980 Polish crisis, the Carter administration drew up a list of sanctions to impose in the event of invasion (and privately threatened to supply China with advanced weapons), while offering economic aid to debt-burdened Poland if Moscow restrained itself.

Such carrots and sticks, argues Valenta, can help forestall conflict on the Soviet periphery (particularly if Washington avoids the kind of "empty rhetoric" that misled Hungary's freedom fighters).

Yet, he adds, short-term measures are not enough. The United States must convince the Soviet Union that unrest among its neighbors is due not to American efforts but to local Communists' rigidity on political and economic issues. In fact, only by allowing real reform to occur in its troubled satellites can Moscow avoid the peripheral flare-ups that threaten to erupt into wider conflict.

**Mixed Ideas for The Pentagon**

"Alternate Futures" by Adam Yarmolinsky and Gregory D. Foster, in *Parameters* (March 1983), U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 17013.

The new military "reformers"—junior officers, academics, and Senators and Congressmen, notably Senator Gary Hart (D.-Colo.)—all agree that, in both weapons and Pentagon budgets, bigger is not necessarily better.

Yet Yarmolinsky and Foster, a former Pentagon official and a defense consultant, respectively, note that contradictions are beginning to emerge in various reformers' arguments.

What worries the reformers is the Pentagon's penchant for high-tech weaponry—the $2 million M-1 tank and $22 million F-18 jet fighter—equipped with costly and unreliable electronic gadgetry. Too few defense dollars, they believe, are devoted to "training, maintenance, and general readiness."

Some reformers pin their hopes on simple, rugged, and inexpensive weapons that they believe would be more reliable in combat. This emphasis would free more Pentagon money for "readiness." But other reformers also admire the "sophisticated simplicity" of weapons such as the heat-seeking Sidewinder air-to-air missile and "smart" antitank missiles. Planning for "automated" warfare, conducted mostly by skilled technicians, the authors note, may save money by "obviating the need for overwhelming firepower." But this vision of the battlefield of the future is a far cry from back-to-basics.

Another favored theme of the reformers is "maneuver" warfare. Its advocates would, for example, replace the current U.S. military doctrine for the defense of Western Europe, based on a fixed-line "forward defense" and massed firepower, with a mobile, lightly armed defense...
against Soviet attack. Again, this approach is at odds with the automated battlefield scenario.

Reorganization of the Pentagon is the aim of another group of reformers. Their leader is David C. Jones, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who argues that to minimize interservice rivalry, the chiefs should be made more independent of the services they represent [see WQ, Spring 1983, p.17]. That would allow them to make decisions without becoming bogged down in the Pentagon bureaucracy.

In sum, the reformers' four approaches do not all necessarily go in the same direction, the authors note. But rising defense outlays ($233 billion next year, up eight percent in real dollars) are sure to make some of their ideas increasingly attractive on Capitol Hill.

The Falklands War Revisited

When a sea-skimming Argentine Exocet missile sank the British destroyer Sheffield off the Falkland Islands last year, some U.S. defense analysts declared that the incident proved that sophisticated missiles have rendered large warships obsolete.

But Friedman, a Hudson Institute staff member, contends that the lessons for U.S. defense planners are precisely the opposite. The Falklands War shows how vital a large fleet of sizeable ships is to military expeditions far from home. Indeed, Britain's ship losses demonstrate the high cost of skimping on the navy.

During the 1960s, London began economizing by building smaller, "no frills" warships. The Sheffield was a product of the "new" Royal Navy, lacking, among other things, many standard damage-control features. The Exocet that struck it never actually exploded, but it ignited an oil fire in the ship's engine room that spread rapidly and sank the ship.

The older, larger destroyer Glamorgan, by contrast, was also struck by an Exocet, but remained in action. Three other British warships, all smaller frigates, went down in the Falklands, victims not of the French-built Exocet missiles, but of ordinary bombs dropped by Argentine jets. And two of them were particularly vulnerable because they had superstructures made of aluminum—lighter and cheaper than steel, but liable to bend or even burn after an explosion. The U.S. Navy, too, now uses aluminum in most new ship construction.

The two aircraft carriers (Hermes and Invincible) dispatched by London as part of its 26-ship Falklands task force also suffer the defects of the slimmed-down Royal Navy. They are too small to carry patrol planes with "look down" radar that detects missiles such as the Exocet, which are capable of dipping below ships' radar. And they carry only nine fighter-bombers each (a typical U.S. carrier holds 70–95), not enough to maintain a regular guard against the Argentine bombers that...
Big aircraft carriers are the mainstays of today's U.S. Navy. But reformers argue that the ships are "sitting ducks" in an age of "smart" missiles.

launched the Exocets. Moreover, the British carriers' Sea Harriers were too few to give full air support to the British assault force on the island itself or to knock out the Argentines' airfield at Port Stanley.

Friedman has reservations about the "big ship, big navy" school of thought. Surface ships are vulnerable. But for a nation fighting a far-away war, there is no substitute for a sturdy, full-fledged navy.

"Grasping the New Unemployment" by A. F. Ehrbar, in Fortune (May 16, 1983), 541 North Fairbanks Ct., Chicago, Ill. 60611.

Some economists and politicians worry that high-tech factories and foreign competition will cost millions of American blue-collar workers their jobs over the next several decades. But Ehrbar, a Fortune editor, says such fears are "overblown."

An oft-cited Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report, for example,
suggests that as of last January, 1.6 million American workers were permanently “displaced” from their jobs, due chiefly to an influx of Japanese autos, Brazilian steel, and other foreign goods. But that figure includes all workers laid off or fired in declining industries. Once the economy picks up, Ehrbar contends, most of them will return to work.

A better measure of the “displaced” is the number of unemployed who had 10 or more years on the job and have been out of work for at least six months: 60,000, or some .5 percent of the 11.4 million unemployed.

The-sky-is-falling estimates of future “displacement” will prove equally wide of the mark, Ehrbar believes. Pat Choate, a senior analyst at TRW, Inc., predicts that 10-15 million blue-collar jobs will vanish by the year 2000 [see WQ, New Year’s 1983, p. 40]. He pins part of the blame on industrial robots, whose numbers he expects to grow from a few thousand today to more than 200,000 by 1990. But other studies peg the total robot population in 1990 at a maximum of 150,000—and a low of 70,000.

Ehrbar adds that the long decline of America’s “smokestack” industries now appears to have bottomed out. Between 1950 and 1978, their share of all U.S. employment fell from 34 percent to 24 percent. But the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics predicted this year that the proportion will drop no further during the 1980s, and that the absolute number of manufacturing jobs will increase by five million by 1990.

In Ehrbar’s view, the massive national job retraining programs sought by Choate and his allies are not needed. U.S. corporations already spend $30–50 billion annually on employee education, much of it for retraining; as the Baby Boom generation matures and labor markets tighten, businesses will have even stronger incentives to retrain their few “displaced” employees. Federally funded programs to match people with jobs could help those who fall by the wayside.

It will be a very long time, Ehrbar says, before the only jobs left in America will be sweeping up after the robots.

Electrifying U.S. Factories

A century ago, American industry was just beginning to switch from steam to electric power. By 1930, most American factories had plugged in, spurring a complete physical overhaul of the shop floor that revitalized the U.S. economy.

The typical 19th-century factory was powered by a single “prime mover” steam engine, fed by coal, which turned several main line shafts that ran along the ceiling of each floor for the length of the building. These were connected by pulleys and leather belts to subsidiary shafts, which were in turn belted to the production machinery.
The "direct drive" system, says Devine, an Institute for Energy Analysis researcher, was enormously inefficient. It needed constant maintenance, required inflexible arrangements of machinery on the shop floor, and squandered energy, because using even one machine meant turning on the whole system. Worst of all, if the prime mover broke down, the whole factory came to a standstill.

The first electric motors were no remedy—factory owners simply used them as new prime movers. But during the early 1890s, H. C. Spaulding of Columbia University pioneered the concept of "group drive," arranging machinery in small groups around short drive shafts, each powered by its own electric motor. Yet in 1900, 80 percent of American factories still ran on steam.

Two developments speeded steam's retreat during the next decade—the advent of individual unit drive and the spread of electric utilities. (Most early users generated their own power.) By 1920, electricity was driving nearly 60 percent of American factories; by 1930, 80 percent.

Energy savings were not the chief lure of the new technology. Unit drive let manufacturers deploy machinery according to the demands of the production process, not those of the drive shaft, saving valuable floor space. It reduced the threat of complete shutdowns or fire (and thus the cost of fire insurance). And, by liberating the factory from the prime mover's inflexible array of drive shafts, it made plant expansion easier.

This 1850 steam-powered soap factory was organized to accommodate a single line shaft that drove all the machinery on the shop floor.
ECONOMICS, LABOR, & BUSINESS

The results were dramatic: Labor productivity nearly doubled during the 1920s, as factory owners installed electric machinery and learned how to use it better. At the same time, electrification reversed an ominous 20-year-long decline in U.S. output per dollar of investment.

No Experience Necessary

"Corporate Kidnap' of the Small-Business Employee" by Bradley R. Schiller, in The Public Interest (Summer 1983), 10 East 53rd St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

Newspaper "help wanted" ads always seem to say, "Experience required." How does the first-time job-seeker get such experience? Mostly in small companies, which in effect subsidize job training for America's big corporations.

Hiring and breaking in a new worker can cost up to $10,000, according to Schiller, an American University economist. Since most companies, large and small, lose 15 to 20 percent of their work force annually, five out of every six "new hires" are replacements, not recruits for newly created jobs. Big Business minimizes costly employee turnover and training by hiring more reliable, experienced personnel, many of them "kidnapped" from smaller companies.

To prove his point, Schiller cites his 1982 study of Social Security data on 2.9 million young men (average age: 19) for the U.S. Small Business Administration: Two-thirds of them were first hired by firms with fewer than 100 employees, only 11 percent by Big Business (companies of more than 1,000 workers). After nine years, only 1.2 percent of all the men were still with their original employer. Most had moved to companies of about the same size. But small business suffered a net loss of 301,000 workers to larger firms. Nearly half of those who moved up were hired by Big Business.

In smaller companies, workers do not always acquire sophisticated skills. Gas stations, fast-food restaurants, and local merchants were typical first employers, and they paid an average starting salary of $5,878 (versus $11,407 for the largest corporations). But less tangible gains—in punctuality, self-discipline, organizational ability—are no less valuable.

Big Business can easily skim the cream off its little brothers' labor force: The salary gain for workers "moving up" to larger firms averages 23 percent. The 30,000 newly trained young men whom small business loses to big competitors each year represent an investment of at least $200 million.

Collectively, small businessmen provide the nation's number one job-training program. And Schiller believes they could hire even more newcomers if their labor costs were reduced—by tax cuts, a lower minimum wage for youths, or federal training vouchers. Yet Washington has long focused its hopes and its job subsidies on large corporations. With youth unemployment now at 23 percent, federal money would be better spent to help the local storekeeper beef up his work force.
Pluses & Minuses
For Women

One of America's continuing social dramas, with mixed repercussions on the family, the economy, and welfare policy, is the "revolution in women's lives," write demographers Spain and Bianchi, analyzing fresh U.S. Census data.

By marrying later, studying and working longer, today's women have begun to "establish independence from their families." They have fewer children than did women a generation ago, and roughly two-thirds of all mothers of school-age children are now working, full- or (mostly) part-time. Divorce rates have doubled since 1960. One-half of all U.S. marriages from the early 1970s will probably end in divorce; indeed, even today, 12 percent of all women aged 35 to 39 are divorcées. Women now head one in three U.S. households (41 percent of black families, 12 percent of white families). Poverty has become increasingly concentrated in female-headed homes.

Meanwhile, by 1981, younger women's college-enrollment rates had surpassed those of men. Most female students still eschew science, engineering, and business, but by 1978, 17 percent of college women (and 22 percent of men) were majoring in business; women now earn one-fifth of all degrees awarded in law and medicine.

Black women now earn 76 percent as much as black men. But white women on average still earn 40 percent less than white men, partly because they enter and leave the labor force more frequently. They also have less advanced schooling and experience and are concentrated in low-paid occupations. The "pay gap," however, is narrowing among the better-educated young. A female college graduate aged 25 to 34 earned 71 percent of her male counterpart's income in 1980.

American women have come a long way during the past two decades, the authors observe, "but there is still a way to go." And the way, statistics show, can sometimes be lonely.

A Dim Outlook
For Vouchers

President Reagan has proposed a welfare reform that many conservatives and liberals applaud—and that Congress, predicts Stanfield, a National Journal correspondent, will not enact.

By giving vouchers to the poor to "buy" housing, education, and
health insurance, the President hopes to get Washington out of the business of directly providing services, and thus to cut administrative costs. Some liberals also like vouchers because they may ultimately transfer more income to the poor and would spare recipients the indignity of standing in line for "handouts."

Experience shows vouchers can work. The $11.2 billion food-stamp program helps feed some 22 million Americans. Intermittently since 1944, the federal government, in effect, has used vouchers to enable former G.I.'s to buy college educations. Why then is Congress sitting on its hands? Partly because the new voucher proposals are Reagan's, partly because they have real flaws, says Stanfield.

For example, no matter how efficient housing vouchers are in theory, they are useless if there is no housing. And rental housing for the poor, especially for large families, is in extremely short supply. Across the nation, there are 2.4 million poor families with five or more members, but only one million large rental units now anywhere within their means. Government efforts to relieve the shortage—tax breaks and rent guarantees given to developers—merely make subsidized private low-income housing more costly per unit than public housing.

Education vouchers present a different problem. Reagan would channel federal funds (which totalled $3 billion in 1982) targeted to provide "compensatory education" for poor youngsters directly to their parents, who could then enroll them in the school of their choice. But the vouchers would be worth no more than $500, while per pupil expenditures at public schools average $2,900 per year, and tuition at private secondary schools runs up to $5,000. And liberals fear that all public education would eventually come under the voucher plan, a move they believe would encourage middle-class students to desert the public schools, leaving the poor behind.

For the present, concludes Stanfield, expansion of today's limited voucher system remains no more than an idea whose time has come. Many Washington policy-makers favor the notion in theory, but a host of problems dim prospects of its becoming a reality.

Men's Changing Fashions

What makes a "manly" man? The topic is not much discussed nowadays (except in soap commercials), but for much of the 19th century, Americans kept coming up with different answers.

Toward the end of the 18th century, explains Rotundo, a historian at the Phillips Academy (Andover), the masculine ideal was defined in terms of spiritual and communal values and social utility. The "good man" served his family, friends, country, and God. "May God preserve
you, my child," wrote Federalist politician Timothy Pickering to his son in 1788, "and make you eminently useful." Washington and Lafayette, says Rotundo, "were honored as heroes who risked their lives for political principle, not as warriors with a fighting spirit."

One hundred years later, a more physical, sometimes even bloodthirsty, set of masculine values prevailed. Men took nicknames such as "Tornado" and "Savage." Theodore Roosevelt urged American men to explore the wilderness where, he said, they could lead "a nearly animal existence." Civil War heroes were lionized. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., praised the courage of the soldier who could "throw away his life . . . in a cause which he little understands . . . ."

Rotundo, drawing on private letters and diaries as well as published sources, attributes the change in large part to the emergence of a new style of family life among the well-to-do. During the 18th century, sons were viewed as extensions of their fathers. By the end of the 19th century, under the pressures of the Industrial Age, fathers had retreated from the center of family life. A new concept of motherhood as an "exalted calling," explains Rotundo, fostered an emotionally powerful "mother-son bond." Encouraged by their Victorian husbands to suppress unseemly passion, women turned to their children as objects of physical affection. They monitored the health of their sons "with anxious vigilance," heightening their awareness of their bodies. College men filled their letters home with accounts of their diet and health.
PERIODICALS

SOCIETY

Changes in the workplace reinforced such worries. Young men left farms and physical labor behind to push paper in city offices—and to complain about the lack of activity and fresh air. Feeling confined in large business organizations, youthful office clerks filled their diaries with reports of their weekend outdoor exploits. Masculine literary tastes ran to physical "fantasies"—Wild West novels, frontier heroes. Ironically, reports Rotundo, genteel women, who contributed so much to the change, found the new rugged manhood disturbing. Wrote one young woman at the turn of the 20th century, the modern man "shakes you up, awfully and seems... to trample you underfoot."

PRESS & TELEVISION

Short Circuit in The 'Wired City'  

"Cable at the Crossroads" by Gary Rothbart and David Stoller, in Channels of Communications (July-August 1983), Box 2001, Mahopac, N.Y. 10036.

A few years ago, cable television seemed poised to take over America's living rooms, providing everything from movies to home banking to home security systems. But today, many big cities, including Chicago, Washington, and most of Philadelphia, still haven't joined the "wired society" envisioned by cable's champions. What happened?

Cable companies promised "too much too soon," say Rothbart and Stoller, two New York-based specialists on the communications industry. Cable executives underestimated the cost of construction—up to $1,000 per subscriber—and financed it at the high interest rates of the early 1980s. In Atlanta, Cable America saw costs balloon from $13.6 million to $23.3 million. And in New York City, the number of people illegally tapping into systems almost equals those who pay for service, a problem that costs the industry, nationwide, $289 million a year.

Another obstacle, Rothbart and Stoller suggest, is political. City governments insist that cable companies wire poor as well as affluent neighborhoods. But in the inner city, subscribers are scarce and installation costs high. In New York's squalid South Bronx, 80 percent of the system must be installed underground, a costly alternative to using the existing overhead utility lines in less densely populated areas.

Revenues are low—Cablevision has, at $30 per month, the highest average fee per subscriber. But at least $40 a month is now needed to cover costs. To escape red ink, cable must both diversify its programming and offer more high-priced "extras," such as home shopping and data banks. Meanwhile, the delays that the industry has encountered are allowing competitors—the telephone industry, direct broadcast satellites, and private cable services installed by real estate developers—to muscle in on cable's territory.

Rothbart and Stoller, who see cable as "the infrastructure of a new
information economy," still predict a “wired” future for America’s cities. They recall that another revolutionary communications instrument, the telephone, suffered similar difficulties at first. But once its true significance was clear, ways were found to assure access for all.

Liberal Reporters, Unbiased News


America’s top journalists are more liberal-leaning in their personal opinions than is the man on the street, but that does not necessarily mean that their reporting is ideologically slanted.

So argues Robinson, a George Washington University political scientist. He notes that conservatives have used opinion surveys portraying the liberal cast of the Big League press corps to condemn media news coverage [see WQ, New Year’s 1983, p. 23]. But his study of 6,000 news stories on the 1980 elections (mostly from the CBS Evening News and United Press International) turned up no evidence that their personal views influenced reporters’ work.

The press balanced its 1980 campaign coverage between the two major presidential candidates: Ronald Reagan received 50.6 percent of CBS’s relevant news time, and 48.1 percent of UPI’s output. Jimmy Carter had the rest.

To test for ideological bias, Robinson constructed two “bad press” indexes based on unfavorable stories by UPI and CBS for the first 10 months of 1980. (The UPI index twice yielded no winner.) Edward Kennedy and Jimmy Carter, the campaign’s leading liberals, were hung with 11 of the 18 “Worst Press of the Month” awards. Assaying the general tenor of campaign coverage, Robinson found that 80 percent of CBS’s stories were neutral. In the remaining 20 percent, the Democrats took it on the chin more often than did the Republicans.

The only evidence of a liberal slant was the extraordinary media visibility that John Anderson, the National Unity candidate, gained early in the campaign. But, as if to compensate, the press quickly soured on Anderson; he garnered “Worst Press of the Month” honors five times. A more obvious example of bias was the media’s near-total neglect of the other third party presidential candidates. Libertarian Ed Clarke received a grand total of 170 seconds of air time on CBS; Barry Commoner of the leftist Citizens’ Party got none.

Indeed, says Robinson, it makes more sense to indict the news media for sensationalism and superficiality than for partisanship. CBS and UPI ran seven times as many stories on Jimmy Carter’s errant brother Billy as on the struggle in the U.S. Senate over ratification of the SALT II treaty. The nation’s top journalists, he concludes, are more cynical than liberal. In 1980, they favored “nobody and nothing.”

Journalists long regarded the U.S. Supreme Court's 1964 New York Times v. Sullivan decision, which sharply restricted the right of "public figures" to sue for libel, as a landmark victory for press freedom. But the decision has proved increasingly costly to the press, says Lewis, a Times columnist and specialist on the law.

To sue for libel, the Court said, a "public figure," whether a government official or a movie star, had to prove not only that a news organization's statements about him were defamatory and false, as other plaintiffs must, but also that they had been published with "actual malice"—that is, with knowledge that they were false. But that opened the door to new problems.

In 1979, the Court ruled in Herbert v. Lando, a libel suit against CBS, that plaintiffs must be given the right to question newsmen and to inspect their files in the search for "actual malice." It returned the case to a lower court for trial. So far, the "discovery" process has cost CBS $3-4 million in legal fees. Other libel suits will take a similar toll.

Meanwhile, says Lewis, juries often misconstrue the Sullivan rule. In 1982, for example, Mobil Oil president William Tavoulareas won more
than $2 million in a libel suit against the *Washington Post*, which had published a story claiming that he had set up his son in a business that had contracts with Mobil. But interviews with five of the six jurors after the trial revealed that none thought the story false. They faulted the original story for failing to prove it was true.

Juries also think "media giants can afford hefty damages and might as well pay," according to Lewis. Indeed, a 1982 study shows that media defendants win only 11 percent of the cases decided by juries, but 75 percent of those decided by judges. Such odds scare off journalists contemplating controversial stories about government.

Lewis suggests a remedy. "Public figures," whether officials or private citizens, could sue for libel only when a story did not concern government business. Otherwise, libel suits would be barred. Public officials' performance, in particular, should be fair game for press criticism, even inaccurate criticism. "Their recourse is not litigation but rebuttal," Lewis says. Without stronger curbs on officials' right to sue, Sullivan risks gagging the press with its own pocketbook.

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**RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY**

**Painful Choices**

**For Doctors**


Today's physicians often face an ethical dilemma: whether to prolong life or to spare pain when treating terminal cancer victims and other incurable patients. According to Pernick, a University of Michigan historian, doctors confronted a similar issue 130 years ago.

Until the mid-19th century, practitioners of medicine, lacking anesthesia, often had no choice but to inflict agony to save their patients' lives. Early 19th-century American doctors and surgeons, like their predecessors, steeled themselves to the suffering they caused because they knew it was necessary. An 1824 medical text backed them up: "Severe pain should never be an obstacle in the fight to preserve life."

Then, in 1846, William Morton, a Boston dentist, demonstrated that ether anesthesia made possible painless surgery. But the vapor of diethyl ether posed, then as now, a very real risk to life. Initial reactions to the dilemma were unambiguous. A physician's duty, one M.D. declared, was to preserve life, not endanger it, especially not in order to relieve "mere anguish."

But the profession's attitude toward pain soon changed. By 1850, ether and chloroform were in general use in major medical institutions. In 1855, a Philadelphia surgeon advocated that surgery, with its attendant risks, be used not only to save lives, but to ease pain from incura-
ble diseases such as breast cancer. During the early 1860s, Silas Weir Mitchell experimented with neurosurgery to relieve chronic pain.

The growth of sentimentalism in Victorian America’s literature, art, and religion was partly behind the change. The *Philadelphia Bulletin* echoed popular opinion when it editorialized in 1860 that the man most fit “to officiate at the couch of sickness . . . is kind and gentle.”

And as time went on, physicians like Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., who prided themselves on their sternly “rational” approach to medicine, were eager to end squabbles within the profession’s ranks. Beginning in the 1850s, they looked to medical statistics to compare the risks and benefits of competing remedies. A technical “calculus of safety,” they believed, would enable physicians to sidestep touchy ethical questions when prescribing treatment.

But, as contemporary physicians can testify, the question of whether relieving pain can justify steps that may deprive a patient of life has not yet been answered in a way that is acceptable to society. As today’s practitioners try to do what is “best” for their incurable patients, asks Pernick, will they again be tempted to search for an illusory technical “fix”?

**The Quiet Success Of the Hutterites**

Few Christian sects are more obscure than the Hutterites, whose 250 tiny but flourishing farm communities dot the plains of South Dakota and western Canada.

Like the Pennsylvania Amish, the Hutterites adhere to centuries-old traditions and religious practices—both sexes are darkly garbed, but women wear distinctive polka-dot kerchiefs. Unlike their Pennsylvania counterparts, the Hutterites fully exploit modern technology. Today’s Hutterite farmer is likely to be found chatting on his CB radio from the air-conditioned cab of his power combine.

Ironically, the sect was founded around 1527 by Swiss and German peasants and craftsmen who looked backwards, to prefeudal society, for a communal economic alternative to the crumbling medieval order. Led by Jacob Hutter, explains Peter, a Simon Fraser University sociologist, they embraced pacifism and communal ownership of property and refused to acknowledge the authority of any state.

Unlike other Protestant dissenters of the day, the Hutterites held that individuals could achieve salvation only if the entire group were also saved. At first, community life was exemplary. But by the 1590s, Hutterite preachers were chiding some parishioners for sexual promiscuity and for coming to church drunk. Church leaders tightened the rules and redoubled their emphasis on group conformity.

As a result, Peter writes, the Hutterites’ social life and religious doc-
trine became fixed. The lehrens (sermons) read in their South Dakota churches today, for example, are virtually identical to those of 1660.

But such rigidity does not extend to the Hutterites' economic activity. They are quick to capitalize on technological change. Hutterite groups fleeing religious and political persecution in 16th- and 17th-century Europe found they could sell their skills as craftsmen of glass, pottery, and iron to local nobles in return for protection. To gain continued sanctuary, they had to offer superior products. Innovation and improvement became the rule.

Nevertheless, the Hutterites' fortunes waxed and waned several times; by 1874, when they emigrated to the United States, they numbered only 440.

Today, the Hutterite population is nearing 24,000. Their large families—the 4.12 percent annual rate of natural increase is one of the world's highest—are the driving force behind the quest for productivity in their collective farming ventures. Constant modernization is required just to produce a surplus. The Hutterites' unique brand of socialism is a success—but it is not a model many will be able to follow.

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**SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY**

*Unzipping the Past*  
"The Slide Fastener" by Lewis Weiner, in *Scientific American* (June 1983), P.O. Box 5969, New York, N.Y. 10017.

Millions, perhaps billions, of zippers are opened and closed around the world every day, and nobody gives them a second thought. Yet zippers did not become everyday items until 60 years ago.

America's Whitcomb L. Judson (1846–1909) is often credited with patenting the "slide fastener" in 1893. But according to Weiner, a consulting engineer to the zipper industry, Elias Howe, best known for his development of the sewing machine, received the first patent in 1851. Judson was the first to market the new devices; he had his troubles.

Early zippers were attached across the opening to be closed, like the buckles on a pair of galoshes, and they were actually no more than two parallel rows of "hook and eye" clasps opened and closed by a slide. They tended to pop open under stress, and the hooks had sharp edges that cut fabrics. Wary American consumers refused to buy.

Judson's company (now called Talon, Inc.) came up with a hookless zipper in 1917, which, Weiner says, "took hold, so to speak." More than 24,000 were sold as America entered World War I, mostly for money-belts popular among U.S. Navy sailors. Another 10,000 were used in Navy flying suits the next year. But the big breakthrough came in 1923, when the B. F. Goodrich Company put the first "slide fasteners" on galoshes and registered the name "zipper" as a trademark. By 1934, U.S. zipper output reached 60 million annually. (It peaked at 2.3 billion dur-
The Plako fastener, introduced in 1913, promised to solve the pop-open zipper problem. The manufacturer boasted that the Plako was a "made-perfect" version of its earlier C-Curity fastener. But such hopes proved premature. The Plako flopped in the marketplace.

The modern zipper works like this: Each tooth, called a "scoop," is identical, consisting of a small "dome" on top and a small pocket on its underside. As the top of the slide is pulled along to close the zipper, it holds the two sides apart at an angle; the flanges at the bottom of the slide then push them together, so domes and pockets interlock. A wedge-shaped "neck" separates them when the slide is pulled down.

Zipper technology did not come to a halt after 1913, Weiner says. The plastic zipper, for example, was invented only after World War II. Today, "slide fasteners" have new worlds to conquer. Coming up are surgical zippers to replace stitches. In the future, doctors will simply unzip patients whose transplanted organs, heart pacemakers, or other internal organs need regular maintenance.

'Magic Bullets'?

"Monoclonals: The Super Antibodies" by John Langone, in Discover (June 1983), 541 North Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill. 60611.

The human body's immune system is curiously inefficient. It releases many kinds of antibodies when only one is needed to combat a particular invader, or antigen. By contrast, laboratory-produced "monoclonal antibodies," just coming into use, are "magic bullets"—and, potentially, a highly useful treatment for cancer.
Medical researchers Georges Kohler and Cesar Milstein produced the first monoclonal antibodies in England eight years ago. The process is complex: A mouse is injected with the chosen antigen, its spleen with antibody-producing white cells is removed, and the cells are fused with mouse cancer cells. The resulting "hybridomas," endowed with the cancer cells' ability to reproduce rapidly, are factories for antibodies that combat the original antigen.

The "hybridomas" are cloned, tested, cultured, and, finally, the antibodies are extracted to begin their work: They bind themselves to the attacking antigen, in effect marking it for destruction by other cells in the blood.

According to Langone, a Discover staff writer, doctors are only now beginning to explore uses of the new antibodies. Stanford researchers used monoclonals to push one California man's lymphatic cancer into remission in 1981. Johns Hopkins's Dr. Stanley Order has successfully injected patients with monoclonals bearing radioactive iodine to treat liver cancers. Because the monoclonals do not bind to normal cells, the patient avoids the side effects of conventional chemotherapy. Among their other uses, monoclonals can be employed to combat rejection of transplanted organs, enabling the body's immune system to destroy its own white blood cells before they attack the alien tissue.

Inevitably, problems arise. A patient's immune system, recognizing monoclonals themselves as foreign, sometimes deactivates them. Creating monoclonals that distinguish between healthy and cancerous cells is difficult. And they are ineffective against fast-growing tumors.

Researchers warn that monoclonals should be used in conjunction with other cancer treatments. But the new antibodies' full potential is still being explored.

**How High The Moon?**

Eleven years have passed since the last of the six U.S. Apollo manned missions to the moon returned home, and there are no plans on the drawing boards for another visit. Yet Mark, deputy administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, believes that Americans will soon be back. He backs up his prediction by recalling the earthbound race to the South Pole.

On December 14, 1911, Norway's Roald Amundsen reached the South Pole, some five weeks ahead of Britain's Robert Falcon Scott, who died before reaching his base camp on the return journey. A thirst for world prestige had sparked the competition, but official interest waned once the goal was achieved. Like the moon, inner Antarctica was simply too hard to reach very often. The similarities, notes Mark, are striking: Both missions demand artificial life-support systems, and...
both require staging bases to support the expeditions.

What made continuous Antarctic exploration feasible was the development of the airplane; 1942 was the last year in which no humans "wintered over" in Antarctica.

Needed, Mark contends, is a similar "enabling technology" for the moon: an Earth-orbiting space station to serve as a staging base and an "orbital transfer vehicle not burdened by the equipment needed to re-enter the Earth's atmosphere." Today's space shuttle program could produce both by 1990. And Mark believes that the first small U.S. lunar base could be in place by 2000.

His scenario follows closely the Antarctic timetable—30 years between the "dash to the pole" and the establishment of regular bases on the continent. And just as Antarctica yielded few of its mysteries before the 1957 International Geophysical Year, extensive lunar exploration may not begin for roughly another 15 years. Today, 70 years after Amundsen reached the South Pole, commercial exploitation of Antarctica's mineral resources (e.g., oil and natural gas) is about to begin; the first cargo from the moon should arrive after a similar interval.

Such a timetable is not only practical, Mark believes, but probably too conservative. The moon, after all, has fired more imaginations than has the South Pole. And, for the United States, the stakes, military and scientific, are far higher than they were in the frozen continent.

RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

A Requiem For Conservation


During the late 1970s, Washington made decontrol of oil and gas prices, rather than active government intervention, the chief U.S. strategy to spur home energy conservation. The results have been largely disappointing.

Between 1972 and 1980, energy consumption per household dropped by only 13 percent, despite spectacular price hikes for heating oil (421 percent), natural gas (205 percent), and electricity (118 percent). In fact, the nation's aggregate energy use rose due to an increase in the number of households, say Frieden and Baker, professor and student, respectively, of urban planning at M.I.T.

Even with tax credits of up to $300, few consumers during the decade made energy-saving investments in insulation, storm windows, and the like. Most simply turned down their thermostats or used appliances...
more sparingly—and the poor made a disproportionate share of such sacrifices. A 1979 U.S. Energy Department study revealed that no energy-saving measures at all had been adopted by 10 percent of those surveyed. Sixty percent of the households queried had invested nothing in conservation. As for the rest, the average outlay per household was only $266; those most likely to invest were young and relatively affluent.

The lesson: Higher energy prices spur less affluent families to reduce their living standards, while only those who can easily afford it make lasting improvements. Renters, one-third of U.S. families, have little reason to spend anything on conservation. And during 1978 and 1979, some 600,000 households simply converted from oil to gas heat, say the authors, a step that "saved money without saving energy."

Conservation at home will never yield the big energy savings its most fervent advocates envisioned during the 1970s, the authors assert. But without active promotion by Washington—better financial incentives, better technical advice, improvements in notoriously inaccurate home energy "audits"—it will produce next to nothing in terms of greater U.S. "energy independence."

Natural Gas


A chaotic system of production and distribution is depriving the United States of the full benefits of "a nearly perfect fuel."

Methane, the principle constituent of natural gas, is clean, plentiful, easily transportable. But Commoner, a Queens College biologist and third-party presidential candidate in 1980, asserts that U.S. natural gas supplies have been consistently mismanaged. More than half the nation's reserves are in the hands of oil companies, which are more interested in selling oil. Congress complicated matters in 1978 by voting to deregulate gradually natural gas prices within seven years. For the interim, it created 28 different categories of gas, each with its own price. The result: In 1981, some gas could be had for 19.7 cents per thousand cubic feet and some for more than $6.

Consumers, meanwhile, have reaped few benefits because pipeline companies are locked into contracts that prevent them from buying the cheapest gas.

Congress has erred before. Based on alarmingly low estimates of remaining U.S. natural gas reserves, it passed a law in 1978 requiring many large factories and utilities using gas to switch to coal. Today, gas is so plentiful that wells are being capped.

A rock-bottom estimate of current reserves is nine hundred trillion cubic feet—a 45-year supply. But when natural gas from such unconventional sources as deep wells (beyond 15,000 feet), "geopresseded" methane trapped in brine far below ground, and gas locked in densely
packed rock formations is counted, enough supplies exist for 160 years. Methane is also a renewable resource, produced when bacteria break down sewage and garbage. Several trillion cubic feet of such renewable methane could be produced by this method every year.

Congressional blunders and the narrow interests of some producers and pipeline companies have kept natural gas prices high. With intelligent regulation, methane could be the answer to what Commoner sees as the real energy crisis: the high cost of energy, not its scarcity. And, eventually, methane could serve as a bridge to a society completely powered by renewable solar energy sources.

Solar Power's Uncertain Future

Solar energy research no longer grabs the headlines it did during America's energy-obsessed 1970s. But engineers have developed a surprising array of promising new technologies and are quietly eliminating more and more technical barriers.

Photovoltaic electricity, writes Finneran, editor of the Solar Lobby's Sun Times, remains the "great soft hope" of nuclear power's foes. It is not competitive with conventional power today, but if costs drop to $4 per peak watt by 1986, as some specialists predict, it would be economical. The total output of all the photovoltaic cells manufactured last year was only six megawatts; a single coal-fired plant can generate 1,000 megawatts.

Standard photovoltaic technology relies on ingots of silicon crystals painstakingly grown in vats and sliced into thin, round cells. Sunlight striking the cells frees electrons and generates electric current. Such cells are both inefficient, converting only six to nine percent of the available sunlight (when linked together on a panel of some 40 cells), and, at $15 to $20 per peak watt, costly.

Researchers today are developing other ways to use silicon. Several companies, including IBM, synthesize ribbons of crystallized silicon and cut them into squares, which waste less space than circular units when mounted on panels. The ribbons are up to twice as efficient as standard cells, but are currently far more expensive.

Another option is to sacrifice efficiency for economy by relying on silicon that is not formed into a regular crystalline structure. "Amorphous" silicon cells now on the market capture only four percent of the energy available, but cost only $6 per peak watt. RCA recently claimed it had achieved 10 percent efficiency with such a cell. But amorphous cells are plagued by poor durability.

Texas Instruments is working on a unique system that combines crystallized silicon and chemical processes to produce electricity and heat. Washington recently cut off funding for the research, but the com-
pany sees enough potential rewards to push ahead with its own money. Reagan-era austerity may be harder on other projects, Finneran warns. Federal solar research outlays were slashed from $633 million in 1980 to $268 million in 1982. Washington plans to spend only $73 million next year. That may mean fewer new ideas under the sun.

**ARTS & LETTERS**


Business and poetry may seem to mix like oil and water, but in America they blend surprisingly often. Despite the seeming contradiction, writes Gioia, a poet and General Foods executive, the nation's businessman-poets have profited from their dual identities.

Wallace Stevens (1879–1955), vice president of a Hartford insurance firm and one of America's greatest poets, became the best-known hybrid. T. S. Eliot wrote *The Waste Land* (1922) while working at Lloyd's Bank of London. Present-day examples include James Dickey, who had a successful career in advertising before he quit to write full-time in 1961, and A. R. Ammons, who was a glass salesman in New Jersey when his first book (*Ommateum, with Doxology*) was published in 1955.

Oddly, none of these poets ever wrote a word about his nine-to-five existence. A key reason, Gioia suggests, is that American poetry is intensely introspective; it is also inspired more by other poetry than by experience in the wider world.

Yet business did shape the writing of these poets. Unlike their counterparts in academe or Greenwich Village, who wrote colloquially, the hybrid poets tended towards the difficult and fantastic in language and grammar. "Sensible, no-nonsense talk in the office," Gioia speculates, may have convinced them that spoken English was no medium for poetry, and they may have drawn a special thrill from writing "extravagantly" on their own time.

There were some drawbacks. The workaday world consumed precious time and energy; the poets were isolated from their literary peers. But there were advantages as well. Financial security was one (all of these poets were successful in business). Their business interests also shielded them from many of the anxieties that brought on madness and sometimes suicide in other poets. A job, Gioia says, gave direction to the poet's life, "providing him with a sense of place and purpose in his society. It gave him attainable goals," whereas poetry demanded a perfection seldom achieved.

Business put poetry in perspective, making these poets realize that there is more to life than writing. Even so, all except Stevens abandoned the business world at the first opportunity.
**PERIODICALS**

**ARTS & LETTERS**

*Genius Manqué?*  
"The Tragedy of Leonard Bernstein" by Leon Botstein, in *Harper's* (May 1983), P.O. Box 2620, Boulder, Colo. 80321.

Despite his unrivaled stature in American music, Leonard Bernstein has never become the artist he could have been. Having just reached 65, Bernstein has one “last chance” for greatness, says Botstein, president of Bard College.

Bernstein’s accomplishments are legion. His Omnibus TV shows of the 1950s and ’60s popularized classical music in America and made him a celebrity. Like German composer Kurt Weill and only a few others, he successfully exploited the techniques of serious music in composing such scores as *West Side Story* (1957) and *Candide* (1956). Bernstein has also turned to more serious composing—his Kaddish (1963) and *Mass* (1971) are well known to contemporary listeners. On top of all this, Bernstein is an accomplished pianist. His recordings of Schumann and Mozart are superb.

Even so, argues the author, Bernstein’s career “has been an accumulation of false starts, spent opportunities.” His popular compositions lack the “melodic invention” of Weill or Cole Porter. In his symphonies, Bernstein imitates and often trivializes the art of his predecessors. Seeking profundity, he achieves “only grandiose gesture.”

Bernstein has gained his greatest fame as a conductor, notably as head of the New York Philharmonic during the 1960s. But even here he has succumbed to theatricality. His expressive physical performances are mere “podium acrobatics,” Botstein contends, that conceal poor control over his orchestras and bland readings of musical scores.

How to account for the shortcomings of America’s “most gifted musician”? Bernstein longed to be great, Botstein believes, but sacrificed that ambition to his “need for adulation, for instant and perpetual acclaim.” But now that he has achieved stardom and has reached what are for most conductors the peak years, he may at last discipline his talent to achieve “the monument he deserves.”

*American Icon*  
"In Detail: Grant Wood’s *American Gothic*" by Wanda Corn, in *Portfolio* (May-June 1983), P.O. Box 2714, Boulder, Colo. 80322.

Grant Wood’s *American Gothic* (1930) is an American classic. Yet art critics have dismissed Wood’s work as trivial. Most other Americans see his famous picture of a dour Iowa farm couple as a satire and remain ignorant of his other works. A reappraisal of Wood’s career, writes Corn, a Stanford art historian, is long overdue.

Born on an Iowa farm in 1891, Wood had an unremarkable early career. He viewed his years as a student at the state university and the Art Institute of Chicago during the early 1920s as his “bohemian” period. He adopted an impressionist style and visited Paris briefly. Back in Cedar Rapids, Wood supported himself with a variety of jobs and gained...
Grant Wood’s preliminary sketch for American Gothic. The two people were not man and wife, as many viewers assumed, but a father and his spinster daughter.

the patronage of local businessmen eager to make the growing Iowa city a cosmopolitan center.

By 1930, Corn says, Wood had “invented a brand-new hard-edged realist style” and become a confirmed regionalist painter, devoting himself to Midwestern scenes. Part of the change she attributes to the influence of the Flemish Renaissance masters—Memling, Holbein, and Dü rer—whose works of “crystalline realism” he saw during a 1928 visit to Germany. Also at work was his nostalgia for his farm childhood.

In the new style, Wood painted Woman with Plants (1929), using his mother as the model, and Stone City (1930), a self-consciously primitive landscape. In 1930, American Gothic won the surprised painter a bronze medal from the Art Institute of Chicago. Instant public acclaim followed. Wood’s newfound fame led to an art teaching appointment at the University of Iowa in 1934; he died eight years later.

Far from ridiculing his subjects, Corn writes, Wood meant to pay them affectionate tribute as tokens of his own past. “These people had bad points,” he said, “and I did not paint them under, but to me they were basically good and solid people.” From the simple, blunt colors, to the man’s dark jacket suggesting a preacher, to the potted plants emblematic of domesticity, every element of American Gothic is calculated to reveal the couple’s character and background.

Intending only to capture something of his own roots, Corn believes, Wood almost unwittingly painted the “national ancestral icon.”
Flawed Marvels


Last year, Colombian novelist Gabriel García Márquez, author of One Hundred Years of Solitude, won the Nobel Prize in literature at the youthful age of 54. Is he already a great writer, asks Epstein, editor of the American Scholar, or just a very talented one?

Since it first appeared in 1967, One Hundred Years of Solitude, a history of the fictional town of Macondo, has been translated into 30 languages and has sold more than six million copies. As literary critic Alastair Reid noted in 1976, most reviewers considered the novel "beyond criticism," a latter-day Alice in Wonderland or Don Quixote.

The novel's "magic realism," a blend of fantasy and reality, helps make it a "dazzling" book, says Epstein. In homely, decaying Macondo, rain lasts five years and an infant born with a pig's tail is carried off by ants. García Márquez again awed readers with The Autumn of the Patriarch (1975), using a technique he calls "multiple monologue" in telling the story of a mythical dictator who lives for more than 200 years. Points of view shift several times within single sentences in this "relentlessly modernist" novel that, Epstein believes, rivals James Joyce's work in its attempt to capture "the whole of life."

In no sense is García Márquez an ordinary writer. The New York Times called him "the most active of the continent's writer-politicians." He frequently rubs elbows with world leaders. His good friend Fidel Castro reportedly called him "the most powerful man in Latin America." García Márquez himself makes no bones about his leftist politics. His own reading of Solitude is political: "I did want to give the idea that Latin American history had such an oppressive reality that it had to be changed—at all costs, at any price!"

Epstein argues that by embracing Latin revolutionary orthodoxies, the novelist blinds himself to the "agonies of moral turmoil" so vital to most great writing. García Márquez is nevertheless a "marvelous" writer, Epstein says. "The pity is that he is not better."

Khomeini Holds Out

"Iran's Durable Revolution" by Elaine Sciolino, in Foreign Affairs (Spring 1983), Reader Services, 58 East 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021

The collapse of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's revolutionary government in Iran always seems imminent. In fact, contends Sciolino, a Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, the mullahs are
securely in the driver’s seat, and seem likely to remain in power. During the past four years, Khomeini has weathered an inconclusive border war with Iraq, an exodus of middle-class technocrats, political factionalism, a stricken economy, and a terrorist campaign by the leftist Mujahedeen-al-Khalq that took the lives of several senior government officials.

Systematic repression of dissent—there have been 4,500 documented executions since Khomeini took power in 1979—has been vital to the regime’s survival. Another key: effective “state-building.” Khomeini quickly replaced the Shah’s bureaucrats with loyalists; he established new quasi-governmental organizations, such as the 150,000-man Revolutionary Guards and thousands of neighborhood watch committees. His Islamic Republican Party controls the Majlis (parliament); the nation’s network of 100,000 mullahs oversees everything from the revolutionary courts to the writing of school textbooks.

Now the regime is showing signs of pragmatism. Khomeini has promised to ease up on repression. His regime has abandoned its policy of slashing oil exports to reduce dependence on foreigners. Oil sales have more than tripled since last year; the economy is beginning to recover from 40 percent unemployment and 70 percent annual inflation.

Sciolino sees few threats to Khomeini’s rule. Teheran’s policy of “neither East nor West” has kept the superpowers at bay; trade with the Third World has increased. The war with Iraq seems to be turning in Iran’s favor; it will shore up national unity as long as it lasts.

Even the death of the 83-year-old Khomeini probably will not topple the revolutionary regime. An heir-apparent, Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, has already been named, and a special council of mullahs will pick a replacement if Hussein’s leadership falters. Sciolino adds that Westerners should not count on an early transition. Longevity is a family trait: The Ayatollah’s older brother is 98.

**India’s Sikhs**


In October 1982, several thousand radical Sikhs stormed India’s Parliament House in New Delhi, killing four policemen. That incident, writes Singh, former editor of the *Hindustan Times* and a Sikh himself, marks a dangerous escalation of a restive minority’s quest for greater autonomy.

The Sikhs first flourished as a religious sect during the 15th century under the Guru Nanak, who offered a casteless, monotheistic alternative to Hinduism. By the 18th century, after long wars with the Moguls to their east, the Sikhs had carved out their own kingdom in the fertile Punjab region of northwest India. They enjoyed privileged status after 1849 under the British, who granted them a large measure of autonomy in return for military service. But the creation of Moslem Pakistan in 1947 split the Punjab in two, leaving one million Indians dead and
transforming once-prosperous Sikh farmers into landless drifters.

Today, 30 percent of the Sikh population is scattered around the world. Most of the remaining 13 million, two percent of the Indian population, have gathered in the Punjab Suba (state). They are again a prosperous people, thanks in part to government irrigation and educational projects that have helped make the Punjab India’s breadbasket. Little now distinguishes Sikh males from their Hindu countrymen, says Singh, apart from their beards and their reputation for aggressiveness.

But Sikh discontent has festered, drawing on a tradition of independence and fueled by a new religious fundamentalism paralleling Islamic and Hindu resurgence. The Sikhs are demanding more control over the economic development of their state, an expansion of its territory, and guarantees of continued Sikh control should the sect lose its majority status.

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made a few minor concessions (for example, banning meat, tobacco, and liquor stores from the Sikh holy city of Amritsar) last February, but has refused to budge on larger issues. If she fails to grant the Sikhs more power over their own destiny, Singh fears, Sikh radical separatists will gain the upper hand in Punjab. That would set the stage for a showdown and, possibly, bloodshed rivaling the Hindu-Moslem carnage of 1947.

The Wilson Quarterly/Autumn 1983
In Sweden, have they gone about as far as they can go?

The nation's Social Democratic party ruled without interruption for 44 years (1932-76) as it gradually expanded the welfare state. Since its return to power late last year, writes Smith, a London Times columnist, the search for new initiatives has forced it to contemplate programs considered beyond the pale by many Swedes.

Consensus was the key to the Social Democrats' success during the 44 years of "Harpsund Democracy" (named after the Swedish prime minister's official residence). The prime minister regularly conferred with leaders from business, labor, and other interest groups. Business remained mostly in private hands: Only five percent was publicly owned. In return, the government gained broad support for its programs and policies.

But in 1976, the Social Democrats, led by Olof Palme, campaigned for a program that threatened to disrupt the old consensus: a trade union plan to increase worker ownership of industry. Business opposition to the proposal, along with widespread discontent over Sweden's high taxes and Palme's support for nuclear power, helped Thorbjorn Fälldin's centrist coalition win the election.

But the centrists were happy simply to maintain the status quo. The voters returned Palme to office. The first hurdle he faced was Sweden's ailing economy. The gross national product was stagnant, inflation was up to 10 percent annually, unemployment had reached three percent—high by Swedish standards—and the nation's trade deficit climbed to $2.9 billion last year. Palme set to work quickly. In October 1982, he devalued the krona by 16 percent to cut the cost of Swedish goods in foreign markets. Results are not yet in.

Meanwhile, voters expect Palme to enlarge and improve the welfare state. But there is little room left for expansion in Sweden's traditional cradle-to-grave social welfare system. That leaves the more unconventional worker ownership plan. Business, whose cooperation Palme needs to revive the sputtering economy, is still opposed to it. Palme has temporarily shelved the proposal. Forcing the issue could disrupt Sweden's long social peace.

But, eventually, the Social Democrats will have to do something. "A party that claims to be radical and progressive," Smith believes, "cannot rest on the achievements of past years."
"Living With Nuclear Weapons."
Bantam Books, 666 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10103. 269 pp. $3.95 paper.
Authors: Albert Carnesale, Paul Doty, Stanley Hoffman, Samuel P. Huntington,
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Scott D. Sagan

"Living with nuclear weapons is our only hope. It requires that we persevere in reducing the likelihood of war even though we cannot remove the possibility altogether."

So argue the six foreign affairs specialists of the Harvard Nuclear Study Group.
They see advocacy of achieving either strategic superiority over the Soviets or nuclear disarmament as "atomic escapism." Banishing nuclear weapons is impossible without complete trust among nations; each would be tempted to rearm in secret. But neither does a massive build-up of America's nuclear arsenal offer any realistic hope of eliminating the Soviet threat to American society.

Arms control, the authors argue, can keep a lid on the arms race while ensuring that each side maintains a sufficient deterrent. Over the long term, it offers the hope of guiding both superpowers to nuclear weapons that are less destabilizing.

Unlike disarmament, arms control can succeed in an atmosphere of minimal political trust. In 1959, well before the Cold War had thawed, the superpowers signed their first major treaty, an agreement barring military activities in Antarctica. Other accords followed: the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), which brought an end to above-ground nuclear tests and slowed the development of new weapons; the Outer Space Treaty (1967), banning weapons of mass destruction from earth-orbit; and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968).

These agreements were possible because they focused on issues and weapons in which neither side dominated. And verification techniques, particularly after the development of surveillance satellites—first used by the United States in 1960 and by the Soviets in 1962—enabled each superpower to see for itself whether the other was cheating.

The landmark 1972 SALT I Treaty, the most comprehensive yet, set ceilings for the first time on the numbers of Soviet and American intercontinental and submarine-launched missiles. The 1972 ABM pact, negotiated in tandem with SALT I, sharply limited deployments of newly developed defensive antiballistic missiles. Talks were eased by the fact that the Soviets were nearing strategic parity with the United States; neither side had enormous advantages to preserve.

But during the mid-1970s, thanks in part to Soviet adventurism in the Third World, three treaties—the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and SALT II—failed to win the approval of the U.S. Senate.

Yet, despite today's chill in Soviet-American relations, the authors remain hopeful. Communication between the two sides is far more open than it was during the Cold War: Trade, tourism, and scholarly exchanges are firmly established. Regular talks on the implementation of existing treaties continue, and each
side has honored the unratified SALT II Treaty and has not interfered with the other's vital surveillance satellites. As for future arms negotiations, the Study Group is skeptical of both the Left's nuclear freeze proposals and President Reagan's call for "deep cuts" in nuclear arsenals on both sides.

Freeze advocates want to halt development, testing, production, and deployment of new nuclear weapons. That, the authors argue, would pose a verification nightmare. But "deep cuts" might also prove destabilizing. For example, America's nuclear-armed Trident submarine fleet is now the backbone of the nation's deterrent forces. But if a 50 percent reduction in weapons were agreed upon, "fewer than 10 [U.S.] submarines would have to be tracked and destroyed for a successful surprise attack."

Among the ideas the authors see as promising is a bilateral freeze on the number of strategic warheads (both sides now have some 11,000). Shaping the development and deployment of new weapons, as in the 1972 ABM Treaty, offers the greatest hope. Anti-satellite technology and cruise missiles are both promising candidates for mutual restrictions. Tight limits would foreclose future arms races in these fields and prevent either side from gaining an edge it would be tempted to exploit.

None of these alternatives promises a quick turnaround in the arms race. Yet they do represent progress.

The authors liken today's nuclear dilemma to juggling: "Eventually even the most skillful juggler is likely to drop a ball. But if there is enough time ... the juggling game can be cautiously brought to an end."

"Oh, sure, you'll always have your fringe element..." Late 1982 public opinion surveys revealed that three-quarters of all Americans supported a verifiable freeze if it granted no significant advantage to the Soviets.
"Public Works Infrastructure: Policy Considerations for the 1980s."

The collapse of an 100-foot bridge span on Interstate 95 in Greenwich, Connecticut, on June 28 merely highlighted what engineers have been saying for a decade: America's public works "infrastructure"—highways, mass transit, airports, air traffic control, dams and canals, sewage treatment plants, and municipal water supplies—is falling apart.

Yet the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that by shifting some federal subsidies, cutting others, and increasing user fees, Washington could not only repair the crumbling system, but reduce overall federal public works outlays as well.

Federal infrastructure spending now totals some $24 billion a year, or four percent of all nondefense outlays.

But many of today's continuing public works programs "were designed [to reach] important goals that have now been met," such as building irrigation systems to promote agriculture in the West. The CBO believes that by channeling more money to what might be called the "three R's" of infrastructure—repair, rehabilitation, and replacement—Washington could reduce its spending for the next seven years to an average of $20 billion a year.

An example is the Interstate Highway system. Federal funding formulas ($9 from Washington for every state and local dollar) still encourage states to build new roads, although only 1,700 miles of the 42,900 miles planned in 1956 remain to be built. The price tag for the new roads: $36.3 billion. Meanwhile, 41 percent of the existing system needs major overhauls. By reducing its contribution to new Interstate construction and shifting the funds saved to the "three R's," Washington could save $1.3 billion annually and get the repair job done.

The CBO's other remedies are more painful. One is ending all federal aid for airport construction, a saving of $800 million annually.

Today, airlines pay their fair share of airport costs, but private and corporate aircraft do not. Higher fees for noncommercial fliers at congested airports would divert them to nearby underused fields, reducing new construction while also raising revenue for the remaining building needs.

According to the CBO, a similar strategy could cure the ills of the nation's major municipal water supply systems. Cities will need to raise roughly $7 billion by 1990 to expand or repair their water systems. In Boston's antiquated system, for example, 43 percent of the city water escapes through leaks in the pipes.

The CBO's chief solution is simple: Double the cost to consumers. Water rates average $1 per 1,000 gallons in the United States, less than half the Western European norm; per capita water consumption, 100 gallons per day, is about double the European rate. Raising fees would increase local revenues for repairs and encourage water conservation, thus reducing the need to enlarge existing systems.

Although the United States no longer needs to make massive investments in new public works, the CBO says, stressing the "three R's" will require more money. Investment in infrastructure by all levels of government dropped from 2.2 percent of the gross national product in 1960 to 1.3 percent in 1980. Given the yawning budget deficits in Washington's future—an estimated $201 billion in 1984 alone—state and local governments and those using the facilities will have to pay more of the bill.

Even as democracy slowly returns to a few nations in Latin America, financial woes, war and chronic civil strife, and persistent poverty imperil further progress.

The Inter-American Dialogue's 47 participants, ranging from David Rockefeller to Xabier Gorostiaga of Nicaragua's Institute of Social and Economic Research, call the 1980s a time of "unusual danger and . . . special opportunity."

Topping the list of dangers is Latin America's debt crisis, notably in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Costa Rica. Governments and businesses in the region now owe some $300 billion to overseas creditors, up from just $27 billion in 1970.

The group worries that the debt crisis may lead to neglect of Latin America's persistent social distress—up to two-thirds of its people still live in poverty. Forcing the indebted nations to defer critical domestic spending to meet their bills, it warns, "would only reinforce inequities and require repression."

The panel supports the Reagan administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative ($350 million in economic aid, along with trade and investment incentives) but criticizes the White House for its emphasis on military aid. Washington should recognize that domestic problems, not simply communist intervention, have fostered civil strife in El Salvador and elsewhere.

Given Latin Americans' bitter memories of past U.S. intervention, the panel argues, the Reagan administration should neither oppose "profound change" nor try directly to promote democratic institutions.

In Central America, Washington should back the effort begun by Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela with the 1982 Contadora Declaration to mediate among the contending parties, including Cuba as well as the governments of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Salvadoran elections, with the participation and safety of the insurgents guaranteed, should be a key goal.

A revitalized Organization of American States (OAS) could provide a forum for resolving future conflicts. To this end, the group favors empowering the OAS Secretary-General to intervene on his own initiative. In economic affairs, the OAS needs to coordinate the multitude of existing private and governmental aid programs for Latin America rather than simply to sponsor its own.

The military regimes that took power in many Latin American nations during the 1960s and '70s have proved unable to cope with today's economic difficulties, leaving the region at a political crossroads.

In recent years, democracy has been, more or less, restored in Bolivia (1982), Ecuador (1979), Honduras (1982), and Peru (1980). Brazil and Argentina have taken the first steps in that direction. But Latin America will have to get back on its feet financially to ensure further progress.
A Russian rendering of The Return of Don Quixote (1952). Over the years, independent Soviet writers, artists, and intellectuals have used Cervantes’s hero to symbolize their own high-minded “tilting at windmills.” The tragi-comic, self-deluding aspect of the role is accepted, even flaunted. “The sole advantage of Don Quixotes,” Soviet writer Fridrikh Gorenshtein wryly observed in a recent story, “is that they’re ridiculous and go unrecognized.”
The Soviets

There are few enduring staples in the average American's diet of news from abroad. The Soviet Union is one of them. In major U.S. daily newspapers, to judge from a 1980 survey, the Soviet Union receives more of the space allotted to foreign news than does any other nation.

Yet the scope of the reporting is fairly narrow, inevitably shaped by the Soviet Union's status as an adversary and superpower, and severely constrained by Moscow's tight controls on foreign journalists. Typically, daily news stories focus on political ups and downs in the Kremlin, on a handful of Soviet dissidents, on Soviet economic gains and losses, on Moscow's diplomatic coups and setbacks around the world. So familiar have the big issues become that a shorthand list suffices to bring some particulars of each to mind: "Poland," "detente," "SALT," "human rights," "Afghanistan."

Among U.S. academics, the focus is somewhat different. Of several thousand scholars working in Soviet studies, the majority concentrate on Russian history or Russian language and literature. Economists and political scientists make up most of the remainder. Relatively few researchers work in anthropology, sociology, philosophy, or religion, fewer still in Soviet art and music or other aspects of popular culture in the USSR.

One result of these understandable preoccupations among journalists and scholars is that even Americans who consider themselves well informed about the Soviet Union—who can trace Yuri Andropov's rise to power, for example, or outline the Soviet negotiating position on arms control at Geneva—often lack a sense of how the country looks to the people who actually live there. That the USSR is a totalitarian state, or attempts to be, is well known. But, in a Russian's daily life, what kinds of accommodations must he make to exist comfortably? How much freedom does he have (and freedom to do what)? Where, if anywhere, is the "give" in the social and political fabric? How efficient is censorship? How far is "too far" for an artist or writer?

There is no simple answer to any of these questions, and the
answer to each may vary from decade to decade or year to year, or even from one person to another. As individuals, the Russians maneuver within the system in ways that at times seem peculiar, at times reckless, at times deceptively circumspect, and at times so subtle as to elude recognition.

A painting (below) entitled “Don’t Babble,” by Soviet “pop” artists Vitali Komar and Aleksandr Melamid, is daring for reasons a Westerner might not immediately appreciate. When pop art first appeared in the Soviet Union during the early 1970s, the subject matter consisted not of Campbell’s Soup cans but of the officially sanctioned artistic style known as socialist realism. “In capitalist life, in America, you have an overproduction of things, of consumer goods,” Komar and Melamid once explained. “Here we have an overproduction of ideology.” And that is what they chose to parody.

Their work, however, could never be exhibited publicly. “The Soviet government must have boundaries,” novelist Vasily Aksyonov observed at a recent Wilson Center meeting. Fortunately for artist and citizen alike, the boundaries shift. Here Walter Reich describes a recent visit to the Soviet Union and the lives of the people he met. S. Frederick Starr chronicles the influx of rock ‘n’ roll into the USSR and the government’s unsuccessful attempts to bring it under control. John Glad looks at Russian science fiction and the political implications of fantasy.

The cartoons published on the following pages first appeared in Funny People from the Club of the Twelve Chairs (Moscow, 1972), edited by Viktor Veselovskii and Ilya Suslov.
THE SOVIETS

THE LAND OF SINGLE FILE

by Walter Reich

The doors of Soviet shops are often arranged so that only one person can enter or leave at a time. If a public hallway is too wide, grille-work is erected to make it narrower, the easier to watch and control. In every store, there is a line in front of the cashier, who gives the customer a receipt proving he has paid for the items he wants, and a line in front of the counter where the receipt is then shown and the items given. In the street, someone opens a box and begins to sell its contents. A line materializes from the masses hurrying home: a line of quiet and resigned faces, of people sometimes innocent of what is being sold but willing to stop for anything that might be available.

Lately, bed linen has been in short supply; the box might contain bed linen. Sometimes it is toilet paper. Sometimes the manager of a restaurant, not having used up his meat delivery that week or having decided to sell part of it for some other reason, sets up a box of it on the sidewalk in front of the restaurant, or in the courtyard behind, inviting a line of customers who know they might not find such meat in a store.

For the foreigner, too, the Soviet Union is a land of single file—more comfortable than for the Soviet citizen, certainly more privileged, but even more controlled. If a hotel has eight doors at its entrance, only one is unlocked, with a guard posted at it to exclude those without passes. A foreigner wishing to meet with a Soviet colleague may not simply walk in off the street. Nor may he even call up and walk in. He has to make arrangements with the proper authorities, who have to give their approval for the meeting, usually long in advance, and only after they have assured themselves that the approval will not lead to trouble, trouble for which the approver might have to pay.

During a recent visit to Russia, this foreigner entered the designated doors, showed the required passes, and obtained the necessary approvals. But he also found other doors to open and nonofficials to see. And in experiencing the control, as well as in evading it, he encountered a life very different from his own.

It is very different, first of all, to be afraid to write. It is an
THE SOVIETS

odd sensation for a visitor who has been a scribbler for years to realize that any scribble might be taken from him at his departure or even before, and used against him—or worse, used against someone he has mentioned by name or even against someone he has left unnamed but recognizable.

Only in the Caucasus, in Georgia and Armenia, did I feel safe taking notes in public. Though Stalin’s image is still engraved on Georgian buildings, his name still attached to Georgian streets, and his memory still alive as a local boy who made good, a foreigner writing in a small hand in a tiny notebook on a park bench in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, provokes little notice. And in Yerevan, Armenia’s capital, he even elicits friendly interest. “What are you writing about?” curious Armenians asked me every few minutes. “I’m writing about Lenin,” I answered, sitting under a huge statue of the man.

Getting and Spending

More than one Armenian asked me for an appointment or, more precisely, pressed one upon me. “I’ll meet you under Lenin’s statue at 8:00 p.m.!” Or, “You’ll have dinner in that restaurant? I’ll find you there, don’t worry!” Most just wanted to talk with someone from the outside. One, a 38-year-old engineer, brought his young son to our meeting. Learning that I was a physician, the engineer told me that he had just visited a clinic because of some pains, for which he had been given pills. After hearing about the pains—in his chest, in his left arm, and only after exercise—I told him it didn’t require a physician to make a diagnosis of possible heart disease.

Had he been told that? He hadn’t. Did he know what kinds of pills he’d been given? He didn’t. Did anyone tell him about the need for more tests? No. About the need to reconsider his diet and habits of life? No, even though most of the food he ate was fat—butter, cheese, oil, sausage—heavily laced with salt and usually followed by tobacco. I penciled a note suggesting some tests to the doctor he had seen and wondered why this intelligent man had received only veterinary care.

Younger Armenians were more forward. A 16-year-old, like

Walter Reich, 40, a Fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, is research psychiatrist and program director of The Staff College at the National Institute of Mental Health, lecturer in psychiatry at Yale, and chairman of the Program in the Medical and Biological Sciences at the Washington School of Psychiatry. His interests include Soviet psychiatry and politics. This essay is copyright © 1983 by Walter Reich.
a 15-year-old before him and a 13-year-old before him, asked me if I would be willing to exchange my dollars for his rubles, or to sell him a pair of jeans or anything American. I told him I wouldn’t. Why won’t you? he asked. Because I’m afraid, I explained; the last thing I wanted, I told him, was to visit a Soviet jail. “Don’t worry,” he assured me, “Soviet law doesn’t reach here.” He proudly displayed a Japanese calculator watch he had bought on the black market for 150 rubles—about $210 at the official exchange rate. I told him that in the United States such a watch could be bought, in a store, for $25. Yes, he said, he knew that, and he was just in the process of figuring out how to get to Los Angeles. Did I know an Armenian-American girl who might come to marry him? He could make it worth her while.

Armenians often asked me, before asking anything else, how much money I earned. An electrician wanted to know how much American electricians made. And American factory workers—how much do they take home? He quickly calculated that many of them earned enough to buy a car every few months. I cautioned him about such simple calculations. Had he heard about housing costs and heating bills? Such expenditures are, by comparison, minuscule in the Soviet Union.

Never mind, he answered. The differences are still amazing.
He earns, he pointed out, 1,800 rubles a year—about $2,500 at the official exchange rate. True, his apartment is cheap. But it is small and crowded. And true, he earns something on the side—he admitted to doubling his income by illegally painting apartments on weekends, sometimes during his regular working hours, for people who are unwilling to wait five years for their official paint jobs. But the paint costs him dearly: The middleman who sells it to him gets it from a trucker who delivers for the paint warehouse, and the trucker, who had to pay a union secretary 1,000 rubles to land his lucrative job, charges twice the official price for every can, not always of the right color, that he smuggles out.

Unrequited Consumerism

Besides, the electrician and others pointed out to me, there’s more to life than a roof over your head and cheap heat. Food staples are affordable, if you’re willing to spend your time waiting for them. But so much else is beyond most people’s range. A small car costs about 7,000 rubles. And for the privilege of paying that sum, equal to several years of your total income, you have the choice of either waiting a decade for your name to reach the top of the car-purchase list or pushing it to the top by paying someone on the side—unless, of course, you have special connections or earn the privilege of buying a car by your loyal devotion to the factory or the party.

A man’s suit, often poorly made, costs as much in Yerevan or Moscow as in New York: 125 to 150 rubles. A vinyl briefcase—leather cases are rarely seen—costs 20 rubles, and a piece of vinyl luggage, 50. A silk scarf is a fantastic luxury at 100 rubles. A color TV is 700 to 800 rubles; a stereo system, 200 to 800; a small gas range, 135; and a clothes washer, 495. Some items are tolerably priced: a man’s necktie at 2 rubles; a cup of coffee, mostly ersatz but warm and very sweet, in a stand-up café, at 22 kopecks; a pack of cigarettes, 60 kopecks; and a hula hoop, 2 rubles 20 kopecks. But a soccer ball can set you back 25 rubles; a pair of vinyl shoes, the same amount; a jogging suit, if you must have one, 55 rubles; and a portable typewriter, 150.

In short, except for the necessities, those consumer goods that are available in the Soviet Union, regardless of quality, cost as much as or more than they cost in the West; while Soviet consumers have about one-fourth as much as their Western counterparts to spend on such consumption. What is worse, prices for some consumer goods, including staples, were raised shortly after Yuri V. Andropov, the new Soviet leader, came to power.
And yet, ironically, in a country where consumer goods are unavailable or exorbitantly priced, and where there is little advertising, they form the core of some people's lives, if not in fact then in desire, no less than they do in the West. The home—and mind—of one scientist I met was centered on his video gadgetry. As even a visa to Bulgaria was hard to obtain, he pointed out, there was nowhere interesting to go, and with only Pravda and the like on the newsstands, there was nothing interesting to read. And so, he explained, he had plenty of time to tinker with his video recorder; although, he sadly admitted, there was nothing from the official airwaves that he wanted to record.

Toasting Kiev

Which is not to say that the Soviet airwaves carry nothing to commend them. To be sure, much of Soviet television is tiresome—more tiresome, no doubt, to a Soviet citizen than to a curious Westerner. Most movies, for example, seem to be about either the Great Patriotic War or a crisis on a collective farm. In the war movies, the ideals of Marxism-Leninism lead the soldier to victory; or, if he's mortally wounded, then those ideals, expressed through his selflessness and articulated in a protracted final speech, lead his battalion to victory. In the collective farm crisis movies, the chairman, usually young and animated by those same ideals, has to do battle with those who would take the easy road.

In the war films, at least there are battle scenes to liven the action. The collective farm movies, by contrast, are filled with meetings in which the idealistic chairman argues against those of his workers whose faith is imperfect or, back in the capital, against those of his superiors whose vision is less pure. Eventually he manages, through effort and persistence, to gain his objective—to transport the bread across the frozen tundra or grow the wheat where no one thought it could ever grow—and he wins his medal, not to mention the girl.

Some television fare, on the other hand, is extraordinarily professional. For example, in celebration of Kiev's 1,500th anniversary last year, the Soviets aired an extravaganza of awesome proportions executed with utter perfection. A cross between Ziegfeld and Ed Sullivan, it offered to all Soviet viewers—all, because no other television program was allowed to compete with it—act after complicated act, as exquisitely arranged as any Bolshoi production. A hundred Ukrainian dancers were followed by 200 Ukrainian singers. As each act ended after only a few minutes on the giant, multimedia stage, the stage itself
BEHIND CLOSED DOORS

Refuseniks—they call themselves that, using the English word with the Russian suffix—gather Friday and Saturday evenings in front of the synagogue on Moscow’s Arkhipova Street. A policeman passes by occasionally; playing children pay no attention in a yard nearby.

Inside the synagogue, old men chant old tunes. On the wall, in large letters, in Yiddish, is painted a prayer for the well-being of the Soviet government. A young woman with long red hair, carrying a small child, rushes up to the oldest of the men to beg advice. First she tries in broken Yiddish, then discovers that his Russian is as good as hers. It is a domestic problem, and she thought someone in the synagogue could help. The man hesitates. He seems unaccustomed to the role of rabbi—or psychiatrist.

Services, at least this Saturday evening, are in the small chapel on the side, the bais hamidrash; there aren’t enough worshipers, barely a minyan, to make use of the main chapel itself. A middle-aged man approaches a stranger to ask where he is from. Really? America? He wants to know about Israel. Is what he has read really true, that no one can find a job there? That it is impossible to live? That everyone is leaving? That there is nothing to eat?

The refuseniks, for their part, stay outside. Most are not religious, but many speak Hebrew they have learned in small groups, groups whose teachers are harassed and sometimes arrested. A young American Jew, religious, is visiting Moscow with his new bride; they have made plans to emigrate to Israel upon their return to the States; he answers the refuseniks’ questions. The refuseniks’ Hebrew has a truer accent than his. While my arrival on Arkhipova Street was an accident of schedule, the visit of this American couple was the purpose of their trip. For them it was a mitzvah to give succor.

And succor they need. They look crazed. Not crazy, crazed. As Jews, they are already members of a group that has been pushed outside the life of Russia; as refuseniks, they are doubly outside. Fired from their jobs, identified as traitors, all they have is one another—and the occasional foreigner who stops in their city to tell them there is a world outside. During the 1970s, when emigration was at its peak, many Jews had applied for exit visas. In 1979, 51,320 were allowed to go. Since then, the door has virtually been sealed shut, due partly to souring East-West relations and partly to reasons that are still obscure. In 1982, only 2,688 got out. Earlier this year, the rate of moved off, carrying away the old act and bringing in the new. If the Soviets can fight a war as efficiently and flawlessly as they can put on a show, we are all in trouble.

Still, it is not entertainment to which the Soviet media are most devoted. Television, at least as much as the newspapers, is
emigration fell to a few dozen a month. Those who have sought documents that would permit them to apply to emigrate—a group numbering at least 350,000—have grown increasingly desperate. And most desperate of all are the roughly 15,000 who have actually applied and whose applications have been refused.

One young man standing outside the synagogue, perhaps 20 years old, his speech damaged by a severe lisp, wants to know my views on religion. He is himself very religious. Not only does he wear a hat; he also wears earlocks, like the religious Jews who used to live in Eastern Europe and the Chassidim who now live in Brooklyn. Ten years ago, there was probably no one in Russia who looked like that. Where did he learn to look like that? Even now, there may be only a handful. Are his parents religious? No, he responds, not at all. What do they think of his ways? They have learned to live with them. Where did he learn the laws? He learned Hebrew, and then he read. But what about the traditions, the things that aren’t in the books, the things you learn from your home, the things you have to see in order to do? He heard about them, and then he carried them out in his fashion. Does he have a job, looking like that? No, he works as an artist. An artist? Yes, he paints pictures.

One refusenik, in his late 20s, is a former engineer. After applying to emigrate, both he and his wife lost their jobs. Their applications were refused, and they have been without work for two years. He asks me to help him practice his English, which he learned while jobless. I assume he feels desperate, but he tells me that he is not. There is a little food, people help, and it looks as if he might find work as a laborer.

Two economics students carrying briefcases stop by. They do so every Saturday. One, dark, is a Jew from central Asia; the other has a Jewish father and a Russian mother. The half-Jew is upset because someone has just told him that, according to Jewish law, one can be a Jew only if one’s mother is a Jew. He wants to be a Jew. I ask him why. He says he feels it in his bones.

—W.R.

a means for the transmission of information; what is regarded as information is only what the government says it is. In the Soviet Union, all people, especially the leaders, want only peace; in the United States, many people, especially the leaders, are itching for war. In the Soviet Union, collective farms and factories
THE SOVIETS

are daily exceeding their most vaunted expectations; in the United States, the results of exploitative capitalism are dragging all sectors of production into an economic abyss.

When, during my visit, U.S. unemployment figures reached a postwar high, a Soviet TV correspondent in New York confided to his audience back home that the true figures were, of course, much higher than those reported by the U.S. government, as could be seen in the accompanying shots of Harlem slums, Bowery bums, and Broadway bag ladies. Yet, the correspondent added grimly, despite the inevitably dismal state of the American economy, the United States was pouring billions of dollars into arms. The screen then filled with Vietnam-era clips of American soldiers boarding troop carriers and American fighter-jets poised menacingly on military runways.

Fooling Some of the People . . .

I began to understand, watching this night after night, what I had been hearing day after day. In talking with waiters, taxi drivers, students, and scientists, I repeatedly heard that, of course, the United States is planning for war. Maybe not all Americans want war, but certain circles in America do. Businessmen do. Reagan does. He refuses to rule out first use of nuclear weapons. He is probably planning a war right now!

When I first heard that, I thought it was a line inevitably fed to a foreigner. But I began to realize that I was hearing it even from those who were willing to express their antipathy to Soviet life and their sympathy with American ways. Could it be that they really believed their own media? It could be. If the same thing is said again and again, in every place one looks, without variation or demurral, how could it not sink in?

One evening, sharing a meal with Russian intellectuals, some of whom had lived for years on the fringes of artistic dissent, and all of whom had deep reservations about Soviet politics and culture, I asked whether I had simply been taken in by those I had met, or whether my sample of contacts was too small or too skewed to reflect common attitudes. I hadn’t been taken in, they assured me. The Soviet media have really been successful in presenting the government’s case on the question of war and peace. Not everyone believes everything, but many believe much of it. In the large cities, perhaps 50 percent believe 50 percent of it; elsewhere in the country, among groups with little sophistication, the figures may be higher, much higher. What, I wondered, does that portend?

One of the newest fashions among Soviet youth is the sport-
ing of jackets, sweaters, or sweatshirts imprinted with the insignia of American universities: UCLA, Ohio State, Stanford. Those who cannot get the originals create their own. One young Leningrader wore a white jacket with a dark blue Y sewn on the back, the letter in a shape not to be seen on real Yale jackets.

An older fad, popular among all ages, is the wearing of lapel pins. Some of these znachki simply depict a monument in Moscow, Leningrad, or some other city, serving thereby to identify the wearer’s home town. Most, though, depict revolutionary themes and figures. There is one of Feliks Dzerzhinskii, the first head of the Cheka (forerunner of the KGB), who energetically eliminated the early counterrevolutionaries. But most are of Lenin. There are some of Lenin with a cap, some of him without; some of Lenin within a star, some of him within an iridescent circle. And there are some of Lenin as a child.

The Lenin-child struck me as odd at first, but then as altogether logical. The country is full of cities, squares, streets, and parks named for the man; of monuments built in his image; of houses where he lived, slept, ate, and wrote. Beatification and deification have been going on for some time. Lenin was not only the founder; he was the First Cause. Relics of his life are preserved and cherished, and Russians think nothing of waiting in line for six hours to view his remains.

. . . Some of the Time

Whether Yuri Andropov will ever become the object of a similar process of sanctification is, at this point, still unclear. To be sure, attempts, albeit limited ones, were made to exalt if not sanctify Andropov’s immediate predecessor. During much of Leonid Brezhnev’s rule, the front pages of Soviet newspapers were plastered with his pictures and speeches, his name was mentioned frequently and everywhere, and his likeness appeared on posters and billboards almost half as often as Lenin’s. The building-sized billboard renditions showed, until the very end, a vigorous man in his mid-40s, and were accompanied by a quote from him about the future or about peace. During his last few years, however, such displays were given the lie by the reality recorded by television cameras. The nightly news, though strictly edited, revealed an old man seated in place, not just aging but superannuated. Of such stuff, personality cults were hard to make. Now that he is dead, many of the billboards have come down. Brezhnev is mentioned less and less frequently, though his successor has arranged for an obscure city on the Kama River, formerly named Naberezhnye Chelny or “Dugout

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I asked a young Leningrad radio engineer why it was so hard to find a telephone directory in the Soviet Union. The question irritated him. "Foreigners always ask me, 'Why don't you have telephone directories?' 'Why don't you have computers?' 'Why don't you have consumer goods?' Well, why do you in America have telephone directories? Why do you have computers? Why do I have to explain why we don't? Why is it so normal to have telephone directories?"

In the Soviet Union, at least, it isn't normal. One person I asked told me that not providing directories saved paper. Another said that it was done for reasons of security: The less access there is to information, the less likely that somebody, especially a foreigner, might use it for some nefarious end. Once, wanting to reach a Muscovite by phone, and not having his number, I asked a hotel clerk for the number of the information operator. The clerk, a middle-aged woman, who until then had always had a smile for me, suddenly looked at me with open suspicion. "The number of the information operator? There is no information operator!" "But how do you look up a number?" "You don't look it up; you have to have it." "But how do you get it?" "The person you want to call has to give it to you." "But what if you don't know that person?" "Then why would you want to call him? Besides," she asked, "whom do you want to call?"

—W.R.

Banks," to be renamed in his honor.

In Leningrad, another city named in someone's honor, there is an apartment house with one of the finest views in town. It is situated along the embankment of the grand Neva River, not far from the spot where the cruiser Aurora, whose gun supposedly signaled the start of the October Revolution, is moored. For a friend who has lived in Leningrad all his life, that building, identified on no tourist map, symbolizes the modern history of the city and the country better than any other.

"That apartment house was built some years after the Revolution for those persons who had been exiled by the Tsar. They were invited back to the country, and they were 'given' apartments in that building. In this country, by the way, you don't rent an apartment; you're 'given' it. In fact, that word has acquired such a usage here. When you see an old babushka lumbering down the street with oranges, and you want to know where she bought them, you ask her, 'Where were they given?"
The authorities want you to feel that everything you have is from them, that it was awarded to you as a gift, a kindness.

"Anyway, those apartments in that building were 'given' to those former exiles and to Old Bolsheviks. By 1939, at the end of the period of Stalin's great purges, the building was empty. Then loyal party officials were given apartments in that building, but workers started agitating and complaining. Why give such desirable apartments to party officials when workers have no place to live? And so there was a minor scandal, and the building was emptied again and the apartments 'given' to workers. Of course, the party officials found even better apartments elsewhere."

This same Leningrader is the most "American" Russian I know. Not that he has ever been in America, but he acts like an American in Russia. And that causes him endless trouble.

His main problem is that he likes to be open. He refuses to censor himself. While others simply accept the inconsistencies in Soviet life between what is and what is supposed to be, he makes a point of exposing them. If some act is permitted in theory but forbidden in practice, he deliberately does it and points, as if naively, to the clause in the regulations that permits it. Even—in fact, especially—at his job. The most productive worker there, he gives his superiors only grief. He is always questioning their principles. And his boss has begun, of late, to accuse him of being obsessed, paranoid, crazy.

Once, intending to have dinner at a restaurant, we encountered a line. For me, it was just another Soviet line, and I automatically placed myself at its end. My friend, for his part, walked up to the entrance of the restaurant and peered inside. He saw what those waiting patiently at the head of the line also saw: Half the tables were empty, the waitresses idle and gossipping. He called over the restaurant manager. "What's going on here?" he demanded of her. "Is this a way to treat Soviet people? Why do we have to wait in line?" She looked at him as if he were mad. The people in line shuffled in embarrassment. He was acting like an American in the land of single file. And I, the American, was embarrassed by my own embarrassment.
THE ROCK INUNDATION

by S. Frederick Starr

In 1946, Winston Churchill declared that an Iron Curtain was descending on Europe, dividing East from West. The metaphor was apt.

As Stalin saw it, the curtain of isolation had two functions. First, it was to shelter the people of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe from the disruptive influence of the West. Second, it was to provide a secure environment in which ordinary mortals could be transformed into exemplars of the New Soviet Man.

It never worked this way. Russians, being a resourceful people, found countless ways of drilling at least small holes through the barriers separating them from the West. Through these breaches, they informed themselves on everything from science and technology to modern art, from Harold Robbins to Andy Warhol. Many Soviet citizens became quite capable of forming their own opinions on issues, rather than simply accepting the government’s view on the Great Questions of the Day.

Of all foreign influences, those that Soviet leaders feared most emanated from the United States. The fear was justified. It was precisely the United States about which the Soviet public was most curious and from which it was most eager to borrow. In spite of an official Soviet campaign of vituperation, the United States after 1945 emerged in Russian minds as the most pertinent model for their own country’s development. For all its power, the Soviet state was unable to dissuade large parts of the educated public from this view.

Soviet popular culture, dominated as it was by American taste and fashion, provides some particularly vivid examples. From the late 1940s through the 1960s, millions of Soviet youths were raised on jazz. So strong was the public’s attachment to what the government called "the music of spiritual poverty" that jazz could not be repressed. It had to be co-opted. And so Komsomol, the Communist youth organization, opened jazz clubs across the Soviet Union. For several years during the 1960s, it looked as if this unruly music had been tamed.

But then the public’s taste in music suddenly shifted. The government once again found itself in the position of following rather than forming public values. By 1973, Moscow jazz critic Arkadii Petrov could observe ruefully that "Rock has invaded
The Leningrad rock group, Aquarium. The present young adult generation is the first to share fully in European and American popular culture.

the big cities where jazz festivals used to be held, while jazz festivals have moved to small towns...

Rock music had indeed taken over. The throb of electric guitars was heard where avant-garde free jazz had recently reigned. Songs of reckless desire, broken hearts, and broken lives replaced the abstract improvisations of hard bop. The modern jazz revolution of the late 1950s had been swept aside by the music of the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, Stevie Wonder, and the Shadows.

A hint of the change in popular taste was evident as early as 1957 at the VI World Youth Festival in Moscow. Many of the visiting performers shocked the Russians with their bizarre dress and offensive music. The journal Soviet Culture received more than a few letters complaining about the foreigners' "stiliagi jackets, trousers, and wild haircuts," and songs like "Crazy Rhythm" and "Rock 'n' Roll." None of the letter-writers was quite sure whether rock 'n' roll was a song or a style of music, but it certainly was not good. Another early public performance

"Stiliagi, meaning style-seeking or, more loosely, beatnik."
of rock music in the USSR was in a 1958 theatrical scene representing Hell. And when in 1960 Igor Moiseev’s renowned folk-dance troupe worked up a satire on American rock music, it was titled “Back to the Monkeys.” Poor Moiseev must have been thunderstruck when Moscow audiences burst into applause at the rambunctious music and remained indifferent to the satire.

In the West, rock music was still in its infancy. Elvis Presley’s “Don’t Be Cruel” and “Hound Dog” were hit songs in the United States only the year before the Moscow Youth Festival. Yet recordings of these works, not to mention hits by Chubby Checker and Bill Haley, were available even in the Russian provinces within the year, reproduced on x-ray plates. The youth of Khrushchev’s Russia soaked up the new music like blotters. Working-class Soviet youngsters were especially receptive. The long-haired imitators of the Beatles who appeared in the provincial city of Petrozavodsk late in 1964 were proletarian stiliagi, failing students and dropouts, to whom “making it” seemed a futile, and certainly an uninspiring, dream.

Little Red Devils

Access to the new fashion was even less of a problem after 1967, when the Voice of America inaugurated a program devoted to rock and soul music. The growth of tourism and student exchanges opened unprecedented channels for acquiring the latest recordings by Bob Dylan, Aretha Franklin, the Jefferson Airplane, and others. But finding instruments on which to play the new music was as difficult as it had been for Soviet jazz musicians during the 1920s. Electric guitars were not produced in the Soviet Union. They were, however, manufactured in Poland and East Germany, and exchange students from those countries did a thriving underground business at universities and technical institutes. Guitars sold for 300 to 400 rubles (then equivalent to about $330 to $440) during the 1960s, and

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amplifiers—provided they were available—for 1,000 rubles. In 1966, the East German government opened in Moscow a store called Leipzig, offering 10 electric guitars for sale on its first business day. All were sold within minutes to blackmarketers and resold at a 200 percent markup.

Some guitarists built their own equipment. A young Moscow rock musician named Yuri Valov consulted electrician friends, copied published photographs, and “followed straight logic” to construct his own guitar and amplifier. Demand was so great that unofficial manufacturers set up shop in many Soviet cities. Tens of thousands of instruments were produced in the private “second economy” and distributed through the black market. Many of the guitars were terrible, but a few were of exceptionally high quality. Gena Kolmakov, a black-market manufacturer in Odessa, copied Fender and Marshall instruments so beautifully, adding improvements in the process, that foreign musicians visiting Odessa on cruise ships would exchange the genuine articles for his forgeries.

Rock music was, of course, officially banned by the regime, and when the Beatles craze hit Russia during the mid-1960s, efforts to reinforce the ban were strengthened. These efforts backfired disastrously. By reinforcing the sense of generational confinement on which rock music fed, the prohibition created a vital underground culture, featuring such groups as the Eagle, the Guys, the Little Red Devils, the Scythians, and the Melomanes. Most of these bands were organized by students to play for dances at technical institutes and universities, but they all gradually turned professional.

Cultivating Deviance

Scores of new rock bands sprang up in the Moscow region every year, but Moscow was by no means the rock capital of the Soviet Union. Baku was several years ahead of Moscow, according to musicians familiar with both cities. Musicians in Riga, Tallinn, and the major cities in the Caucasus were equally quick to take up the latest fashions in rock. All Soviet rock groups during the late 1960s reflected the strong influence of British bands. Cliff Richards’s Shadows were as popular as the Beatles, and the Dakotas and the Animals followed closely behind.

In fact, an Animals’ recording provided the name for one of the best Moscow rock bands of the period, the Winds of Change. Sasha Lehrman was an 18-year-old cello student at the distinguished Gnesin School of Music in Moscow when he became the group’s leader in 1967. He and four other cellists at the school—
two of them promising students of Mstislav Rostropovich—had earlier formed a rock group so successful that Lehrman decided to turn professional. Members of the Winds of Change wrote most of their own lyrics. Their subjects were the classic themes of love and loss, sung with an honesty and sincerity long absent from products of the official music industry. “We were political by being unpolitical,” recalled Lehrman.

Numerous bands, including the Winds of Change, sang many of their lyrics in English. Besides testifying to the Soviet educational system’s commendable emphasis on foreign languages, the practice was a deliberate affront to the older generation. Among the young, English was a cult language, like Latin for the educated of much earlier generations. Terms such as “underground,” “bit grupa,” “rock bend,” “grupi,” and “sashon” (i.e., session, meaning any rock event) came into general usage. Many Soviet rock groups even wrote their original lyrics in English.

The world of rock encouraged “social deviance” as an end in itself. Marijuana and alcohol were common in the rock underground, although hard drugs were rare outside Moscow. Men sported long hair and pleated bell-bottom trousers ornamented with gold buttons down the outer seams; neckties, required of all male students, were abandoned in favor of gaudy open-necked shirts with strings of beads showing. Women wore

As early as the 1920s, young people in the Soviet Union had turned away from “dull, deadly, and gray” official music, preferring Western imports like Vincent Youman’s “Tea for Two,” which Dmitri Shostakovich arranged as a fox trot for orchestra called “Tahiti Trot.”
miniskirts, loose hair, and heavy eye make-up. Every major city acquired sleazy hangouts for the local rock ‘n’ roll set.

The cultivation of purposeful deviance and outright rebellion among Soviet youth reached a new high with the appearance during the late 1970s of aggressively antisocial punk and heavy metal bands. Such groups deliberately assaulted respectable society with garish costumes, ferocious volume, and obscene lyrics. Most cities managed to stamp out the more offensive bands, but punk groups appeared with some frequency at dances at Batumi and other Black Sea resorts. The nearby Georgian Republic was far more tolerant of rock music than was the Russian Republic, and a number of fairly provocative bands like the Varazi flourished there.

Armenia’s “Woodstock”

The combination of enormous public demand and ineffectual official opposition enabled rock music to develop a complex and efficient organizational network. At the center stood a group of private entrepreneurs, the “organizers” (organizatori), who formed bands, booked concerts, and accumulated large bankrolls. A few of these promoters were themselves musicians, including a grandson of Presidium member Anastas Mikoyan, who founded the popular and successful band, the Flowers. Most were pure impresarios. Typical was Yuri Eisenspitz, the organizer, manager, and financier of the popular Moscow rock band, the Eagle. Clean-shaven, conservatively dressed, and entirely conformist in appearance, the young Eisenspitz is said to have made a fortune in the unofficial market in furs. His real love was putting together rock events.

To stage the events, Eisenspitz and other organizers took advantage of opportunities to rent the cafés and restaurants that the government makes available cheaply for weddings and anniversary parties. The budget for a typical evening might include: 400 rubles for the hall, 300 rubles for the band, and 500 rubles for food and liquor (purchased in the semilegal “second economy” at bargain prices). To offset these expenses, an organizer might charge 10 rubles a head and expect 200 people, yielding 800 rubles profit, the equivalent of several months’ wages for a typical Soviet worker. Eisenspitz deemed it prudent to hire two burly bodyguards to accompany him on his rounds.

To avoid entanglements with the police, promoters like Eisenspitz preferred to stage their events on the outskirts of big cities, at suburban cafés such as the Northern near Moscow. There were police raids from time to time, although until the
late 1960s and early '70s they rarely led to jailings. Indeed, the situation was sufficiently loose and lucrative to attract far more daring impresarios than Eisenspitz. The unquestioned king of Soviet rock entrepreneurs, the Bill Graham of the USSR, was an Armenian, Rafail Mkrtchian. When he burst on the rock scene, "Rafik" Mkrtchian was in his early 40s and balding. Temperamental and shrewd, he remains a shadowy figure, even to those who worked for him. "I never asked about [his background], he never volunteered," recalled Sasha Lehrman.

Particularly murky are Mkrtchian’s dealings with Komsovomol in the Armenian capital of Yerevan. Presumably through Mkrtchian’s efforts, the Young Communist officials were talked into lending their organization’s name to the annual Festival of Rock Music, the first of which he mounted in Yerevan in 1969. For several years, the event was an annual Soviet Woodstock, attended by 5,000–8,000 people daily over several weekends.

Each winter, Mkrtchian scoured the Soviet Union for the best bands and personally invited them to participate in his May festival at Yerevan’s Palace of Sports. The events were well advertised locally on billboards, but the rest of the Soviet citizenry learned of the festival only by word of mouth. The musicians dealt exclusively with Mkrtchian. Participating bands came from Moscow, Leningrad, Latvia, Estonia, and Georgia. Their performances were completely free of control by the Repertory Commission or other censors. Thanks to Mkrtchian’s protection, Armenia became the Mecca of Soviet rock music.

**Cracking Down**

The parallels between Mkrtchian’s Armenian rock festivals and the Woodstock festival were deliberate, although the former were infinitely more sedate. Mkrtchian even attempted to produce a film of the Armenian Woodstock in 1972. Four of the biggest rock stars in the Soviet Union formed a new group for the occasion. Leonid Berger, formerly of the Orpheus band, played piano and sang in the style of his idol, Ray Charles. The bassist and the guitarist came from the Scythians, while Yuri Fokin, soon to enter an Orthodox Christian monastery but for the time being the best rock drummer in Russia, provided rhythm. The film was produced but never released. Mkrtchian, it seems, had failed to share enough of his profits with Armenian officials. He was jailed for 10 years. Musicians who played in the 1972 festival were interrogated. Eisenspitz and other successful promoters were rounded up as well.

Rock music had gotten out of hand, and most attempts to
curb it were too primitive to be effective. In Leningrad, however, a crisis in 1967 led to a "solution" that was widely emulated elsewhere. One of the most popular local rock bands, the Argonauts, had been engaged to perform at the Polytechnic Institute. The hall was packed with students and rock fans, among whom word had spread that this was to be a wild evening. The fans drank vodka and smoked marijuana in the hall. When the Argonauts performed, a few fans attacked the stage and began shouting and grabbing the musicians. The incident led to a special session of the City Committee of the Communist Party and a decree asserting official control over all vocal-guitar bands in Leningrad. Amateur groups were forbidden to perform in public until they had passed official censorship at the House of Public Creativity. The Leningrad Artistic Council was made directly accountable to the local party.

The Turning Point

The ensuing effort at co-optation penetrated even to the high schools. In 1968, a group of 10th graders at Special English School No. 185 in Leningrad wanted to form a rock band modeled on the Beatles. They were permitted to do so and were even invited to participate in a citywide competition of rock bands run by the Palace of Pioneers. But a special instructor would arrive periodically at the school to check on the band’s repertoire. Not only did he review the entire tune list and select songs that were appropriate for the competition, but he provided succinct critical advice, such as "This is too loud," or "This part is too Western." In spite of all his efforts, the final competition, held in the spring of 1968 at the Palace of Pioneers and open only to Komsomol activists, included many long-haired musicians playing pure Western-style rock music.

A more sinister form of surveillance was exercised in Moscow. The most serious attempt to exert official control over rock in the capital came with the creation of the Beat Club at Moscow’s Melody and Rhythm Café in 1969. Komsomol was its nominal sponsor. In reality, it was a KGB operation from the outset. Many of the best rock musicians in the capital were enticed onto the new club’s board, which then announced that it would hold open auditions for members. Promises of concerts, imported instruments and amplifiers, and foreign tours produced a long waiting list of those wishing to register. But registration was no simple matter. It involved filling out a long questionnaire touching on every aspect of the applicant’s biography. Still, the applications flowed in. Once registration was
completed, however, the club’s activities began to dwindle. One band was sent on tour to Africa and the Middle East, but suspicions grew among the musicians. When the Beat Club was finally disbanded a year later, everyone was disenchanted except the KGB, which had acquired full dossiers on hundreds of the best rock musicians of Greater Moscow.

This devious episode did not quell the underground rock movement, but it did mark a turning point. Henceforth, rock music became a major concern of Komsomol and the state-run variety agencies. In order to pre-empt the private market, salary ceilings for officially approved musicians were raised enormously. With most of the "organizers" in jail, the leading stars bought off, and the Armenian Woodstock shut down, rock music appeared to have been neutralized by 1972.

"Rah, Rah, Rasputin"

But consumer preferences didn’t change. The better rock musicians understood this and tried to stay close to the public’s tastes. The Singing Guitars of Leningrad, one of the first official rock groups to appear, succeeded by borrowing heavily from the repertoires and styles of the unofficial groups. Not all official rock musicians felt the need to respond to their audiences, however. After all, the state concert agencies, not the public, directly paid their salaries. Therefore, it was only the bureaucrats who had to be pleased. The Blue Guitars, a commercial outfit under the Moscow Concert Agency, gradually evolved into a bland and old-fashioned variety show. Igor Granov, their businessman-organizer, mixed Russian folk tunes and maudlin ballads with the band’s other numbers by the Beatles and Jimi Hendrix. Conservative officials liked the act and sent the group on tour to Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America.

For every polished official group like the Blue Guitars, there were dozens that turned to mush under the combined pressures of commercialism, official prudery, and freedom from competition. The Happy Guys were formed in 1968 to present an image of healthy Soviet youths to young audiences. They were a study in officially sponsored prissiness from the start, even though the group boasted several very capable musicians and an eclectic repertoire including many Western tunes. The Balladeers from Minsk were similar, although their use of folk instruments led them down original paths, and their greater distance from Moscow permitted them to be slightly bolder in setting their own course.

The government’s commitment to détente during the 1970s
complicated its effort to control rock music. As a sign of improved diplomatic relations with the West, a number of American and European rock bands were permitted to tour the USSR. New York's Joffrey Ballet brought along a small rock group called the Vegetables on their 1975 tour, and the following year the Nitty Gritty Dirt Band performed a foot-stomping blend of rock and country music while on a cross-country tour. In Yerevan, 6,000 fans clapped and danced inside the hall where they performed, while another 15,000 without tickets surged against the outside gates until they were dispersed by police tear gas. Rhythm-and-blues star B. B. King's 1979 tour received no advance publicity but produced hordes of ticket scalpers in every city, as well as a near-riot in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi, where two people sat in each seat in the theater.

By the late 1970s, the Soviet bureaucracy had accepted rock music as an unavoidable social reality. Officially sponsored rock festivals were held in various parts of the country, the Estonians taking the lead with the Muusikapäevad in 1979 and the Tartu rock festival in 1980. Lyrics were still closely censored, and anything resembling pornography forbidden. The government tried to foster homegrown tunes drawing on nationalistic subjects. Rock was even exploited for anti-Western propaganda.

Official Soviet efforts to control popular music did succeed in buying off a few rock stars, but at the price of hardening the line between the official and unofficial and of confirming underground groups as the standard-bearers of heroic independence. Foreign influences continued to prevail: In 1979, Bob Dylan's album *Blood on the Tracks* was bringing 150 rubles on the black market in Moscow, more in the provinces. When the British rock group Boney M came to Moscow, it was forbidden to play its big hit, "Rah, Rah, Rasputin, Russia's Greatest Love Machine." Yet within a week, the house band at the rustic Saisare Restaurant in the remote Siberian city of Yakutsk was using its new synthesizer to perform the tune, over and over again. For all their efforts to guide popular taste, Soviet officials were still unable to do more than respond to the vital private market.
The next time you are in an American bookstore, take a look at the science-fiction section; in some stores, it is almost as big as all of the other fiction categories put together. Walk into a Soviet bookstore these days, and you'll find... probably no science fiction at all. Go to a Soviet secondhand bookshop, and your chances of finding science fiction there will be equally slim. But take a stroll past the Moscow Art Theater to where Pushkin Street intersects Kuznetskii Most, and you'll find what you're looking for—though not in a store.

The action is out in the street, where middle-aged men in old-fashioned caps gather in small groups with housewives and bright-eyed teenagers. A man of perhaps 35, wearing a mouse gray jacket, asks you in a low voice if you are a fan of Boris Leonidovich. He has a furtive look about him, and you stare at him in silence for a few seconds before you realize that he is referring to Pasternak. No, you say, you're interested in science fiction. "Aha," he responds, "Sasha's got a few things."

Sasha, it turns out, has volume 14 of a multi-volume anthology of science fiction. The back page says it was published in 1967 in an edition of 215,000 copies, and the list price is 93 kopecks. Sasha will let you have it for only 35 rubles—almost 40 times the official price. Aside from that, he has two well-thumbed issues of the magazine Baikal, each containing half of an anti-utopian novel—The Snail on the Slope—by Boris and Arkadii Strugatskii.

Anti-utopian fiction has not always received a warm welcome in the Soviet Union, though even the most conservative literary critics recognize that historical forces make some such literature inevitable. (As reviewers E. Brandis and D. Dmitrevskii once observed, "Vicious, slanderous, fantastic novels aimed against Marxism and the socialist state become more and more widespread as the crisis and decay of world capitalism increase.") The editors of Baikal were fired in 1968 for publishing the Strugatskii story, and copies of the offending issues were removed from libraries. For the two issues, Sasha wants 140 rubles, the average worker's salary for a month. And he will get it.

To say that science fiction—nauchnaja fantastika, or science fantasy, as it is known—is popular in the Soviet Union is an understatement. It is so popular that bookstores could not keep...
"sci-fi" novels in stock even back in the good old days—over a decade ago—when large quantities of science fiction were still being put out by Molodaia Guardiia, Znanie, Mir, and other publishing houses; and this despite the fact that pressruns of popular literature in the Soviet Union are typically much larger than they are in the United States. (The number of titles appearing in any one year, on the other hand, is considerably smaller.) Today, for reasons I will come to, almost no new science fiction is seeing print in the USSR. Yet the Soviet black market in science fiction, as with so many other consumer goods, is thriving.

The popularity of science fiction is not confined to some privileged "elite." A survey conducted in 1966 revealed that while 38 percent of science-fiction readers had completed higher education, 58 percent had at most a secondary education. While 39 percent of the readership was under age 20, 41 percent was over 30. Sci-fi was for a while a major part of the literary diet of an estimated one-quarter of the USSR's population—a higher proportion than that found in Britain, Japan, or the United States, the three other major consumers (and producers) of science fiction. And science fiction has apparently been quite influential in the Soviet Union. One study during the mid-1960s found that 40 percent of young physicists, astronomers, and astrophysicists first considered taking up their specialties after reading Ivan Efremov's *The Andromeda Nebula* (1957).

What accounts for the appeal of *nauchnaja fantastika*? To
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begin with, reading per se is popular in the Soviet Union, there being few other ways to amuse oneself. (Until recently, books were also very cheap—the one item any Soviet citizen could actually afford to “collect.”) Science fiction has little competition from other types of “drugstore” pulp fiction: Louis L’Amour, John Jakes, Trevanian, and Barbara Cartland have no real counterparts in the USSR. Readers embrace sci-fi because much of it is devoid of the “socialist realism” that has enjoyed so long a reign in the Soviet Union. For their part, writers gravitate—or once did—toward science fiction because the shift to a different time period or planet allows them greater latitude politically. The usual official prescriptions about “depicting Soviet reality” are more easily ignored in the (at first glance) otherworldly setting. This “forbidden fruit” aspect, of course, has its dangers.

Urging on the Future

And not every author has been tempted. The writers of science fiction in the USSR have always been a varied lot—like their audience. There was Count Aleksei Tolstoi, a rich boy and distant relative of Leo Tolstoi. He emigrated from Russia after the 1917 Revolution but discovered that royalties were bigger back home and returned. There was Aleksandr Beliaev, a cripple who wrote gothic adventures from his bed. There were and are unrepentant Stalinists like Sergei Ivanov, still around to level critical blasts at “liberals” and other anti-regime types (whose names I prudently omit out of concern for their health). There are former liberals who have discovered that the pickings are richer in the official Writers’ Union circle. (I won’t name them either; who am I to disparage people who are simply trying to get through life by making “small accommodations”?)

I suspect also that science fiction appeals to some quality in the Russian soul. I say this because science fiction and its relatives have long been popular in Russia. Certain characteristics of Soviet society—its materialism, its glorification of technology—may enhance the attraction of science fiction, but the genre,

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or something like it, could be found in Russian society two centuries ago. In 1784, Prince Mikhail Shcherbatov wrote his Voyage to the Land of Ofir, wherein a shipwrecked Swedish nobleman discovers a somewhat technologically advanced, Rousseau-esque society ruled by a benevolent monarch. Then, as now, the censor was no pushover, and the book was not actually published until 1896.

The Russians did not invent the utopian fantasy. Indeed, utopian tales appeared in Russia belatedly—in Shcherbatov’s case, 268 years after Thomas More’s Utopia was published in London and 85 years after François Fénelon’s Aventures de Télémaque, fils d’Ulysse first appeared in Paris. Even so, the Russians quickly embraced the genre. In official eyes, it is today the most honored form of science fiction, the duty of the communist writer being, as critic Aleksandr Kazantsev put it in 1979, to “urge the people into the future which we are creating.”

In 1830, Faddei Bulgarin published his Believable Fantasies in the Twenty-Ninth Century. In the novel, the narrator drowns but is entwined in a precious grass, radix vitalis, which revives him 1,000 years later. The future world is one of wealth, steam carriages, and submarines. Technology is not an unalloyed blessing, however. As Bulgarin writes, “Each woman carried on her left hand a leather shield covered with impenetrable lacquer to guard herself against immodest [male] eyes armed with telescopic lenses which were quite fashionable.”

Retreat from Utopia

Telescopic lenses have not yet come to pass, but one feature of Prince Vladimir Fedorovich Odoevskii’s The Year 4338 (1840), another utopian novel, has. In that tale, people address each other as “comrade.” Odoevskii’s work, like Shcherbatov’s, was a victim of tsarist censorship and circulated in handwritten manuscript form only, anticipating the underground samizdat literature of today’s Soviet Union. The same was the case with Nikolai Chernyshevskii’s revolutionary fantasy What Is to Be Done?, which greatly influenced young V. I. Lenin.

The optimistic tenor of Russian science fiction persisted through the 19th century. But in the decade prior to World War I, as if to herald the impending cataclysm of war and revolution, Russian writers took the lead in establishing the anti-utopian novel, or dystopia, as a distinct genre. It had been Leo Tolstoi, after all, who noted that while happy families were all alike, unhappy families were unhappy in different ways. The same held true, writers came to realize, for societies. In science fiction,
there was a certain sameness to utopias: Technology is triumphant, the social order humane, and all too often, as Aleksandr Beliaev observed during the 1930s, the characters run around in "clothing that reminds one of ancient Greek togas and tunics." Dystopias, by contrast, offered more variety.

One of the earliest examples of an anti-utopia was Valerii Briusov's Republic of the Southern Cross (1907). Briusov describes an industrial society created under glass at the South Pole. All of the people's needs—medicine, food, shelter—are provided by the government so that there is no need for money. Every aspect of the nation's life is regimented, clothing and architecture are monotonous, and meals are taken simultaneously. It is an utterly functional, utterly rational society. Eventually, however, the Republic is shaken by a strange disease—mania contradictiens. People begin to do and say precisely the opposite of what they intend. The epidemic spreads rapidly. Murder, cannibalism, and violence of all sorts are rampant.

Briusov states that it is up to the historians to determine to what degree the structure of the state was responsible for the Republic's demise, but the message is clear. For obvious reasons, this work leaves modern Soviet critics cold.

**Foiling Capitalists**

The 1917 October Revolution marked the beginning of what would become a curious boom/bust cycle in the production of science fiction in the USSR: periods of intense creativity interrupted by stretches of enforced inactivity. Thus, little was published during the first years of the Soviet state, as the nation contended with famine and civil war. By the early 1920s, however, the situation began to improve. In 1922, Evgenii Zamiatin wrote We, an anti-utopian vision of a meticulously organized society where even one's personal affairs are subject to the will of the Benefactor. The doomed rebels against this system take as their symbol the square root of -1: an imaginary number that mocks the Benefactor's rationalism. Widely translated abroad, We influenced both George Orwell and Aldous Huxley. But Zamiatin himself was exiled from the USSR, and his book is available there today only in contraband editions.

In some respects, the period after the Revolution resembled the period just before it. Along with the dystopias, there reappeared the adventure fantasies, Aleksei Tolstoi's best-selling Aelita (1924) being but one of many. Foreign works were also popular: Between 1923 and 1930, some 100 science-fiction books by Western writers were translated and published in the Soviet
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A CAROUSEL OF WORTHLESS GOODS

The world as it looks—officially—to Moscow has always been reflected in the work of some Russian science-fiction writers. Life in the decadent West is a favorite target. In their story "This Unstable World" from the magazine Fantastika (1966), B. Zubkov and E. Muslin satirize American consumerism and "planned obsolescence." An excerpt:

Swaying and moaning from his ordeal, Price emerged from the subway. Half-naked, he crawled to the nearest clothing automat, dropped in his money and put his feet, arms, and neck into the openings. The automat slapped on one-day shoes, glued on a single-wear collar, stuck on missing buttons, patched his torn clothes with a short-lived plaster, and shoved at him a stylish "Dispose-Hat." . . . The metallic wonder boys turned out flimsy goods, "things for a day," all unreliable, like rope made of dough, and short-lived as ice on a sizzling grill. They were no different than a handful of smoke or dust. Here you could buy books, printed with disappearing ink so that after a week all the pages were blank, or newspapers that turned black so quickly that hourly editions had to be printed. Or perhaps you would like a thin, easy-to-melt skillet or a pillow which soon felt like concrete, or a self-clogging faucet or some perfume which turned to skunk spray after a week. Rusty metal nails or paper televisions . . . . Their low cost did not compensate for their awful workmanship, and low prices ruined the consumer. The carousel of worthless goods spun faster and faster, emptying the pockets and the soul.

Price put his last coin into a slot on a yellow post. Part of the sidewalk sprang open, and up came a small bench for a brief rest. After his recent exertions, Price thought he deserved such a luxury. Just then a tiny dog stopped beside the yellow post . . . . The dog bared his teeth, causing Price to leap backwards. Stray dogs were murderous! Following the Universal Trade Theory, the company Pomeranians-Dachshunds Limited supplied old ladies with dogs as companions. Since the dogs turned rabid after three weeks, the owners would turn them loose on the street before their guarantee period expired.

Price suddenly plummeted downward—the short rest-bench he had been sitting on had collapsed and withdrawn into the sidewalk.

—translated by John Glad

Union, volumes by Jules Verne and H.G. Wells heading the list. (Wells, who was married to a Russian, once outraged a gathering of Soviet writers when, at a dinner in his honor at the Petrograd House of the Arts, he thanked his hosts for having allowed him to observe their "curious historical experiment.") Inevitably, though, the ascendancy of Marxism-Leninism prompted the
emergence of whole new branches of science fiction—among them, the roman o katastrofe and the krasnyi detektiv novel.

Iprit (1925), by Viktor Shklovskii and Vsevolod Ivanov, is an example of the latter, the “red detective” genre, in which a common man, against all odds, foils the machinations of the evil capitalists. A Russian sailor who has fled the USSR is shipwrecked in England and mistaken for Tarzan by a millionaire’s daughter. The girl’s father has invented a chemical—Iprit—with which he hopes to create a poisonous, 100-kilometer-wide belt around the USSR to stop the revolution from spreading. He has another chemical that eliminates the need for sleep and that will allow him to produce vast quantities of Iprit by working his minions in London around the clock. The sailor, of course, leads the fight against the millionaire and wins by attacking London with sleeping gas.

Related to the red detective stories are the so-called catastrophe novels, in which the struggle for possession of some scientific invention causes a major disaster—usually in the degenerate West, where such horrors are to be expected—which in turn destroys the global balance of power and usually (but not always) brings about world revolution.

The second half of the 1920s also saw the appearance of Aleksandr Beliaev, whose writings, heavily influenced by Jules Verne, remain especially popular among younger readers. Instead of positing futuristic technological breakthroughs—time machines, space stations, and so on—Beliaev preferred tinkering with human biology. He created characters who could breathe under water (The Amphibian Man), fly (Ariel), shrink to microscopic size (The Marvelous Eye), or use the powers of the brain to control people and objects at a distance (Ruler of the World). In Professor Dowell’s Head, he explored the implications of head transplants, inspiring one team of Soviet surgeons during the late 1930s to attempt transplants of dogs’ heads.

Science fiction vanished from the shelves once more during the early 1930s: Stalin’s austere First Five Year Plan (1928–33) aimed at providing steel, not books. When sci-fi reemerged later in the decade, the writing was guarded. In the un-utopian conditions of Stalinist Russia, utopian themes virtually disappeared from science fiction. The future—technologically and socially—was treated only in terms of the next few years, since making a “wrong” prediction could be dangerous. With the onset of World War II, science fiction again went underground.

Not until after the war did science fiction begin to regain some of the vigor it had displayed during the 1920s. The death of Stalin in 1953 provided more breathing room, and with the pub-
A satirical view of Soviet publishing, 1934. Turgenev, Dostoevsky, Gogol, and Dickens wait outside an editor's office with their manuscripts. Only the bureaucrat with an "official memorandum" gets in.

Publication of Ivan Efremov's The Andromeda Nebula four years later, the "thaw" was underway in earnest. After a long winter of "safe" science fiction—children's books in which characters hitch rides on rockets, novels in which the hero builds an electric power plant underground—The Andromeda Nebula was received enthusiastically by the Soviet reading public as a refreshing treatment of long-forbidden subjects: the cosmic theme, social relationships, the technological accomplishments of the distant future.

Of course, Efremov's novel had its conservative critics. "Just what planet is being treated," asked one of them indignantly. "Is this really the Earth? After all, in the history of the planet that I. Efremov calls by this name no one has kept in his memory such events as The Great October Revolution, such names as Marx, Engels, Lenin." But the thaw survived such chill blasts, at least for a while. For the first time, authors of science fiction were admitted to the Writers' Union. Science-fiction clubs sprang up everywhere.

Humor and parody became a permanent feature of Soviet science fiction. The traditional melodramatic theme of the sinis-
ter invention run wild was lampooned, for example, in I. Var-
shavskii's *Delta Rhythm*. A scientist is keeping alive a fused
brain mass taken from a group of cats. It is pointed out that
brain cells in mammals are virtually identical and that man's
intellectual superiority stems from the manner of organization
of these cells. The large brain mass is several times the size of a
man's, and its abilities in its new, restructured form are un-
known. The scientist feels some force taking over his mind when
he is in the immediate vicinity of the tank with the brain. He
and his doctor decide that he should yield to the force to see
what the results will be. He does so—and catches a mouse.

But among some Soviet writers, something deeper was
going on, something Isaac Asimov had wondered about in a
1962 introduction to an anthology of translated Soviet science
fiction. In the essay, he divided Anglo-American science fiction
into three periods. The first, extending from 1926 to 1938, was
marked by a predominance of adventure literature with a mini-
num of attention devoted to technology. The period running
from 1938 to 1950 he classified as technology dominant: Plots
continued to be adventurous, but technology was emphasized
and plausibly described by authors with scientific training. So-
viet science fiction more or less repeated this progression, al-
though treatment of truly advanced technical themes was not
achieved until the late 1950s. But Asimov noted that the third
stage in Anglo-American science fiction—which he called "soci-
ology dominant," what we might call social criticism—was
missing from the anthology. He wondered whether a stage-three
tradition was possible to achieve in the USSR.
At that time, Soviet science fiction really was at a stage-two level of development, but was on the verge of breaking into stage three in a big way, albeit not for long.

In general, the 1960s brought a continued loosening of official control over science fiction. After Soviet writers had experimented with new technical themes, they began to test the limits of the new permissiveness by branching out into social criticism—subject matter that had long been derided as peculiarly Western, reflecting the ugly realities of capitalism. (The horrible creatures in H.G. Wells’s *The Island of Dr. Moreau* were not, it was argued, merely the creations of a talented surgeon but rather “sinister basic images which characterize modern capitalist society.”) In the official view, Soviet society was by nature, and by way of contrast, optimistic. Yet during the mid-1960s, fewer and fewer writers of science fiction seemed to agree.

**Hard Times, Again**

The criticisms were, of course, usually oblique—aimed at fictional societies of the future, or conditions on other planets or, conveniently, in “the West.” There was little doubt in Soviet readers’ minds, however, that the words on the page were often meant as a commentary on contemporary (and local) reality. Thus, in one story, people of a distant future contemplate whether the housing shortage on Earth will ever be solved. In another, human beings have finally achieved harmony—but at the price of being fused into a lump of limbless flesh, from which peer millions upon millions of passive, despairing eyes.

Works of satire were sometimes more explicit. In *After Rerecording*, by A. Sharov, a character who has been exiled to Siberia is aided by a former professor, who sends him scientific literature, publishes his articles anonymously, pays him the royalties, and eventually hopes to help him return to Moscow and take over his chair when he retires. The former pupil speeds things up by denouncing his benefactor for being connected with an “enemy of the people”—himself. The professor ends up in a concentration camp, and the former pupil gets his position.

By the late 1960s, two brothers, Arkadii and Boris Strugatskii, were writing even bolder tales purporting to describe fictitious future societies that could be recognized as, at best, caricatures of Soviet society. In *The Snail on the Slope*, the authors create a grotesquely inhuman world, ridden with greed, stupidity, and bureaucracy, in which the theme of flight is so predominant that even machines seek escape:

“Probably she [the machine] just couldn’t stand it any
more. They shook her on the vibrostand, they tormented her with great self-concentration, they dug around in her inner parts, burned her thin nerves with soldering irons. She choked from the smell of rosin. They forced her to commit stupidities, they created her to commit stupidities, to commit more and more stupid stupidities. In the evening they would leave her, tormented, helpless, in the hot, dry room. Finally she made up her mind to escape, although she knew everything—the senselessness of flight and her own inevitable doom. And now she has surely comprehended all that about which she earlier only guessed—that there is no freedom, that whether all doors are open or shut before you, everything is stupidity and chaos, and there is only loneliness."

The "dissident" potential of such stories is hard to overlook. By the early 1970s, the authorities had tired of the "lack of positive conceptions" displayed in recent Soviet science fiction; they "drew the appropriate conclusions" and took matters in hand. The word went out. Science-fiction clubs were disbanded. Magazines cut back on the number of sci-fi stories they printed, while book publishers ignored science fiction almost entirely. Pessimistic, critical, or anti-utopian stories were denounced as "totally incompatible with the tasks set before Soviet literature." Science fiction—once again—had fallen on hard times.

By 1982, the amount of original science fiction published in the Soviet Union every year was estimated to have been reduced to about 500 pages—leaving out translations, reprinted works, and technical scientific material. The writers and the critics have either gone on to other things or emigrated—just one more reflection of the general intellectual climate of the country as a whole. The black market in science fiction today is a black market in secondhand science fiction.

And tomorrow? Who knows? An easing of official restrictions? A revival of limited freedom of expression? Or just more of the same? "No one knows what will happen tomorrow," says the jubilant narrator in Zamiatin's We. "You understand? I don't know, no one knows; it's unknown!"
“The child is healthy and all its authors are in a positive state of mind.” So said novelist Vasily Aksyonov and his collaborators, the proud parents. The child was the Soviet literary almanac *Metropol* (Norton, 1982), edited by Aksyonov and four fellow writers. It was published in the United States and France in 1982, after officials in the USSR banned the collection.

An eclectic anthology of poetry and prose by 23 Soviet writers, *Metropol* represented yet another attempt by established literary figures to move beyond the constraints of official literature. The harsh reaction from the Kremlin was due as much to the unsanctioned nature of the group effort as it was to the content of individual pieces of writing. Aksyonov and some of his colleagues are now émigrés.

Such episodes surprise Westerners; they show the persistence, the resilience, the unpredictability of nonofficial creative effort in the Soviet Union. An unofficial culture (both “high” and “pop”) continues to survive; it is alive, though not always well.

The existence of this “parallel” culture extends beyond literature and the arts to politics, the law, and the economy. It makes Soviet reality inordinately difficult for an outsider to comprehend. Despite its monolithic official self-portrait, Soviet society is full of contradictions.

Two books by Russian émigré lawyers—Konstantin Simis’s *The Corrupt Society* (Simon & Schuster, 1982) and Dina Kaminskaya’s *Final Judgment* (Simon & Schuster, 1983)—focus on “the system” and how Soviet citizens get around it. The system, as they explain it, reminds one of Swiss cheese: quite solid wherever there is cheese, but riddled with holes. The problem is that the holes sometimes lead nowhere.

In an anecdotal account drawing upon a successful legal practice and not a few unsavory clients, attorney Simis conducts a tour of the USSR’s private “second economy.” There, bribery is the grease of commerce, entire factories exist only on paper, and underground millionaires in the Georgian Republic are brought to trial only after too blatantly overstepping the bounds of discretion. “Homo sovieticus,” Simis maintains, “is not immoral, he simply has two separate systems of morality [public and private].”

Dina Kaminskaya, Simis’s wife, achieved renown in the USSR by representing political dissidents in court. In her overview of the Soviet legal system, Kaminskaya condemns the general bias in the USSR against the accused but comes to the defense of some aspects of Soviet justice. As a defense attorney, she often won mitigation of sentences and occasionally even outright acquittal, suggesting that the wide gap between the rights guaranteed in theory by the Soviet constitution and the actual dispensing of justice can at times be bridged.

Western reporters in Moscow, unlike émigré writers, are able to observe the paradoxes of everyday life in the USSR with a certain detachment. *New York Times*man Hedrick Smith and the *Washington Post*’s Robert Kaiser offer vivid portraits of

Noting the mixture of cynicism and idealism in his Soviet friends, Smith observes that "Don Quixote could be a Russian hero." With a sure eye (and ear) for detail, he adds a special human dimension to his portrait of the half-modern, half-backward Soviet society. In figures of speech, folk sayings, and superstitions, Smith notes, much of Old Russia remains in the new. "So strong," Smith writes, "are the inhibitions against shaking hands across the threshold, for fear that it foreshadows a quarrel, that I came home to America hesitating to reach my hand through an open door."

The persistence of traditional Russian values in the USSR, despite a thick overlay of state ideology, is likewise documented in British sociologist Christel Lane's *Christian Religion in the Soviet Union* (State Univ. of N.Y., 1978, cloth; Allen & Unwin, 1979, paper) and in her *The Rites of Rulers* (Cambridge, 1981, cloth & paper). Many postrevolutionary public rituals, she contends, from mass parades to marriages held in "Palaces of Weddings," draw heavily and perhaps unconsciously on Russian Orthodox tradition and symbolism. The Kremlin has imposed the new "political religion" of Marx and Lenin, without entirely eliminating the old Orthodox, and even vestiges of pre-Christian, forms of worship.

The diverse religions and cultures of the USSR's many ethnic groups—almost half of the population is non-Russian—further complicate generalizations about the Soviet Union. The history of these peoples and of Moscow's behavior toward them—the Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Tadzhiks, and the rest enjoy considerable cultural and political leeway—is the subject of *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (Praeger, 1978), edited by Jeremy R. Azrael. Nonspecialists will find Hélène Carrère d'Encausse's *Decline of an Empire* (Newsweek, 1979, cloth; Harper, 1981, paper) a more readable treatment of the same issues, though the title implies far more serious erosion of Moscow's authority in the hinterland than most U.S. specialists consider likely.

In the Soviet Union, those who reach the top—as scientists, artists, dancers—are generally also those with the most to reveal about the boundaries between official and unofficial culture.

Dancer Valery Panov tells his story in *To Dance* (Knopf, 1978, cloth; Avon, 1979, paper). A maverick performer from Vilnius, Panov was celebrated during the 1950s and '60s for his unique interpretations of classical and avant-garde ballet. At first apolitical—the dance, he believed, "couldn't be manipulated to fool oneself or others"—Panov eventually came to resent official interference in artistic decisions, as well as the empty, "showcase" style of the Kirov ballet company. His favorite role was the clown-puppet (controlled by a powerful magician) in Stravinsky's *Petrushka*. He danced the ballet as a metaphor for Stalinist (and, more generally, Soviet) repression.

Panov was so taken with the West during his first tour outside Eastern Europe in 1959 that worried KGB supervisors sent him home early. Barred from foreign trips for the rest of his life, Panov became the "bad boy" of Russian dance; only his virtuosity saved him from harsher punishment. Ambivalent authorities...
declared him Honored Artist of the Dagestan and Russian Republics but prohibited him from staging his own unorthodox ballet about an 18th-century rebel-hero.

After applying for exit visas to Israel in 1972, Panov and his dancer-wife Galina endured a series of debilitating ordeals. Finally, in 1974, thanks in part to a sustained publicity campaign in the West, the Panovs were allowed to emigrate.

The career of the greatest collector of Russian avant-garde art, George Costakis, also ended in the West. This remarkable Greek, who was employed for decades by the Canadian embassy in Moscow, began after World War II collecting works by “unofficial” pre- and postrevolutionary artists like Chagall, Kandinsky, Malevich, and Rodchenko, whose experiments with modernism were considered too Western or decadent to be openly exhibited. Costakis’s apartment, crammed from floor to ceiling with paintings, became a legendary private museum and a “must” stop for Soviet intellectuals and savvy Western visitors.

Costakis’s goal—to rescue a generation of Russian artists from public obscurity—was partially fulfilled during the late 1970s, when he applied to leave Moscow. Under the agreement he reached with the authorities, Costakis was allowed to take with him about 20 percent of his collection to display in the West. Moscow’s respected Tretiakov Gallery—really a museum—agreed to buy the rest, promising to build a new wing to house the artwork. (It has not yet been built, however.)


The lesson to draw from the zigzag experiences of many Soviet artists is that one generation’s officially unpalatable experiment may become the source of the next’s condoned pleasure. But the pleasure is not always for its own sake. In the Soviet Union, the rival champions of official and unofficial art have political messages to convey—a circumstance that leads to chronic disputes over artistic method and technique, when it does not lead to censorship and repression.

“Art should teach high moral principles,” says a character in The Ascent of Mount Fuji (Farrar, 1975, paper only), a play about moral guilt and betrayal in the Stalinist era by Chingiz Aitmatov and Kaltai Mukhamedzhanov. “But how?”
IN DEFENSE OF HENRY ADAMS

In a recent essay, critic Alfred Kazin praised Henry Adams for possessing a "a mind so fine that no 'practical' ideas about anything could violate it." But when similar judgments were voiced by Adams's contemporaries, they were not intended as compliments. Judged by the pragmatic standards of the 1890s, Adams, the descendant of American presidents, appeared to be a failure. And in some of his own writings, this troubled Bostonian criticized himself as an overprivileged dabbler. All this has too often obscured Adams's real achievement—his lucid analysis of American culture on the brink of the 20th century. Here, historian Jackson Lears reconsiders that accomplishment.

by T. J. Jackson Lears

"What was the matter with Henry Adams?" the novelist Owen Wister once asked Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Holmes replied with brusque assurance: "He wanted it handed to him on a silver platter." Both Wister and Holmes knew what "it" was: political power, prestige, influence in the world of public affairs. To a scion of the house of Adams, a descendant of two presidents, national eminence seemed a birthright. And Henry Adams never attained the kind of eminence he thought he deserved.

To be sure, Adams's life was crowded with accomplishments. He was born in Boston in 1838. A childhood attack of scarlet fever nearly killed him, leaving him shorter and slighter than his classmates. But young Henry Adams's mind remained robust, his wit puckish, his curiosity omninous. He graduated from Harvard College in 1858, studied briefly in Berlin, returned to the United States, and then traveled to Britain to serve as secretary to his father, Charles Francis Adams, Sr., who was Ambassador to the Court of St. James during the Civil War. He edited the influential North American Review and taught history at Harvard for seven years. He also authored two biographies, two novels, and a nine-volume History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison (1889–91). Toward the end of his life, Henry Adams penned two extraordinary volumes of cultural criticism: Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres (1904), an elegiac lament for the lost intensi-
ties of medieval faith and feeling; and The Education of Henry Adams (1907), an idiosyncratic autobiography.

Rather than parading his achievements in the conventional Victorian manner, Adams's Education aimed to show (among other things) how inadequately he had been fitted for life in modern industrial America. Exuding dust and ashes, the autobiography pronounced its author a "failure," detailing his disillusionment with the national creed of progress and predicting unprecedented social chaos as technological power outran the human capacity to control it. The Education established Adams's reputation as a fastidious dilettante who inflated his private disappointments into a vision of technological apocalypse and who never sought high public responsibility because he wanted it handed to him on a silver platter.

Generations of historians have tended to accept Justice Holmes's view. From Van Wyck Brooks to Richard Hofstadter, they have taken The Education at its word and treated Henry Adams's career as an example of the decline of the powerful Northeastern families at the turn of the century. From this view, Adams was merely the most thoughtful and articulate among a generation of sour patricians unable to adjust to a raw new industrial democracy. Rejected by the populace, discomfited by the new world of machines, they retreated from worldly achievement to escapist fantasy (like Adams's medievalism) or languorous aesthetic dabbling. Their careers, once bright with promise, dimmed to the autumnal glow of fin de siècle decadence.

An 1868 sketch of Henry Adams by Samuel Laurence. Adams briefly took up journalism in Washington that year—"the nearest approach to a career for a literary survivor of a wrecked education," he later wrote.

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The problem with this argument is that it is grossly oversimplified. The whole notion of a "waning patriciate" is based on the complaints of the patricians themselves. In recent years, demographers and social historians have made clear that the old American gentry have kept a tenacious hold on wealth and power from the Civil War down to our own time. Around the turn of the century, they merely became less visible, moving from elective office to the Foreign Service, from manufacturing to investment banking. Quietly they helped formulate a new, pragmatic liberalism that sanctioned a partnership between big business and the regulative state, providing a firmer rationale for corporate capitalist development. For every "begonia" like Henry Adams (as a Republican Senator once called him), there was a strapping bully-boy like Theodore Roosevelt.

But was Adams really such a begonia? Certainly in the activist view of men such as Holmes, an Army veteran and Supreme Court Justice, Adams's withdrawal from the strife of the world was somehow unmanly and un-American. There is an almost stereotypical quality to Holmes's dismissal of Adams: The patron saint of pragmatic liberalism puts down the quintessential aesthete and pessimist. That put-down was based on the assumption that the man who is not up and doing, particularly if he has Adams's talents and advantages, has somehow squandered his birthright. And that assumption led to the conclusion that Adams's work as a speculative artist of ideas could be regarded as a whine of petulance.

The petulance is certainly there, along with snobbery, anti-Semitism, and fastidious aestheticism. The aestheticism has made Adams a hero to legions of literary critics who have come to revere him as an early example of the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss's bricoleur—an intellectual absorbed only in the "free play" of ideas. This detached attitude was largely a pose, part of Adams's pretense that he was merely amusing himself when he was desperately serious. But the snobbery and anti-Semitism were genuine—if commonplace. Like other Boston patricians, Adams fretted wryly that "the new socialist class, rapidly growing, promised to become more exclusive than the Irish." And even the Virgin Mary, according to his depiction in Mont-Saint-Michel, "hated Jews." These attitudes are disagreeable enough, and there is no getting around them: They are the inherited deformities of Adams's caste. Selective quotation can make Henry Adams look like little more than a broken-down old clubman, a fugitive from a New Yorker cartoon.

Yet there is more than Brahmin prejudice in Henry Adams—just as there is more than lapsed-Catholic prurience in James Joyce. Adams's
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letters, now being published by Harvard University Press in a superb, comprehensive edition (three volumes have so far appeared), reveal an elegant style, a supple intelligence, and a remarkable capacity for observation. His accounts of Samoan life (1890–91) are amazingly precise and sensitive evocations of an alien culture. The letters also show Adams's sustained capacity for loyalty, tenderness, and warmth toward family and friends. His playful letters to children are particularly touching; they express a sensibility that is almost entirely suppressed in his Education.

But it is for The Education that Adams is most widely—and justly—remembered. That book is far more than the wail of a displaced patrician; it is a devastating assault on the most complacent assumptions of the transatlantic Victorian culture: that Anglo-American civilization represented the highest point mankind had ever reached, that the reign of rationality could be painlessly achieved through the expansion of industrial capitalism, that material improvement meant moral advance as well. Yet The Education also acknowledged that the emerging post-Victorian culture, for all its therapeutic nostrums and its demands for “more life,” might be more dangerous than its predecessor.

Adams’s critical stance was only partly shaped by class and ethnic prejudice. It was far more powerfully influenced by his personal turmoil as son, husband, and doubting religious seeker. This may seem surprising, because on the surface The Education is the most impersonal of autobiographies. Adams was reticent about his relationship with his parents, silent about his relationship with his wife. He wrote about himself in the third person, in a tone of bemused detachment, creating a nervous, bumbling “Henry Adams” persona. “The habit of doubt;... the tendency to regard every question as open; the hesitation to act except as a choice of evils; the shirking of responsibility;... the horror of ennui...”—these habits of mind characterized the young Adams of The Education and intensified as the narrative proceeded.

Adams was not merely engaging in ironic self-deprecation but elevating personal conflicts to a philosophical plane. By emphasizing the fragmented and diffuse nature of his own identity, Adams implicitly scored contemporary notions of self-made manhood achieved through conscious will and choice. By exaggerating his own ineffectuality, Adams dramatized his failure to free himself from his inherited cultural traditions: a Victorian moral code; a liberal faith in individual autonomy; a positivist belief that science could explain the universe through all-embracing “laws”; and a progressive assumption that improvements in material life meant moral advance as well. These were the foundations of 19th-century bourgeois values; in The Education they were embodied in Charles Francis Adams, Sr. Repeatedly, The Education examined the paternal heritage and found it wanting. The “failure” of Henry Adams, The Education implied, was traceable to the failure of his father’s culture.

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Early on in *The Education*, Henry Adams’s faint praise sets up his father as a convenient target. Charles Francis Adams, Sr., “possessed the only perfectly balanced mind that ever existed in the name.” His “memory was hardly above the average; his mind was not bold like his grandfather’s or restless like his father’s, or imaginative or oratorical—still less mathematical; but it worked with singular perfection, admirable self-restraint, and instinctive mastery of form. Within its range it was a model.” Henry Adams denied to his father all the mental qualities the son had come to value: memory and imagination, boldness, restlessness, analytical precision; there was nothing left but the coldness of “perfect poise.” Yet the criticism was not merely personal. From the outset, Adams made clear that his father’s shortcomings were those of a transatlantic bourgeois culture. “The Paris of Louis-Philippe, Guizot, and de Tocqueville, as well as the London of Robert Peel, Macaulay, and John Stuart Mill, were but varieties of the same upperclass bourgeoisie that felt instinctive cousinship with the Boston of Ticknor, Prescott, and Motley.”

And of all these, the calmest and most confident were the Boston Unitarians who controlled Harvard College. In their view, “politics offered no difficulties, for there the moral law was a sure guide. Social perfection was also sure, because human nature worked for Good, and three instruments were all she asked—Suffrage, Common Schools, and Press. On these points doubt was forbidden. Education was divine, and man needed only a correct knowledge of facts to reach perfection.” This progressive creed produced balanced and moderate men like Adams’s father. Harvard College was full of them; so were the New England congressional delegations that Adams encountered during the secession winter of 1860–61, when he prepared to accompany his father to his ambassadorial post in England. As he said, in one of his characteristically self-canceling sentences: “The New Engander’s strength was his poise which amounted almost to a defeat.”

Under the shadow of such sanity and poise, it was not surprising that the young Henry Adams betrayed similar qualities of mind. Even his Class Day Oration at Harvard, he wrote in *The Education*, “was singularly wanting in enthusiasm”—though “one of the elderly gentlemen noticed the orator’s ‘perfect self-possession.’ Self-possession indeed! If Harvard College gave nothing else, it gave calm.” In retrospect, Adams saw himself as a priggish, pale reflection of his father, performing a series of filial submissions that left his own identity unformed and progressive platitudes unchallenged. After seven years under the paternal thumb in London, Adams returned to Washington and briefly jousted against corruption, earning some reputation (though little money) as a crusading journalist. Finally, he bowed to his father’s urgings and returned to Harvard as a member of the history faculty in 1870.

By this time, popularized distortions of Darwinian evolutionary theory had provided scientific sanction for faith in progress and made
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A relief figure of the Virgin from Chartres. Adams idealized Mary as the source of medieval “unity.”

"a new religion of history." As Adams noted dryly, "Never had the sun of progress shone so fair. Evolution from lower to higher raged like an epidemic." From the perspective of The Education, a professor of history at confident, Unitarian Harvard could be little more than "a school master . . . a man employed to tell lies to little boys." No wonder Adams titled the chapter on his return to Harvard "Failure.

Yet even in the early years, there were hints that Adams had not entirely submitted to his father's world view. Travel had promoted perplexity. Rome, for example, where Adams journeyed in 1860, "could not be fitted into an orderly, middle-class, Bostonian systematic scheme of evolution." And science could be turned against itself, as Adams learned when he discovered the existence of the fish Pteraspis, the first vertebrate, which despite its position "at the top of the column of organic evolution" had vanished some 400 million years ago. To Adams, the Pteraspis became an emblem of the flaws in evolutionary theory as well as an ironic father-symbol: "To an American in search of a father, it mattered nothing whether the father breathed through lungs, or walked on fins, or on feet." Substituting Pteraspis for his father, he implied a rejection of his father’s faith in a progressive, orderly cosmos. Embracing contradiction and paradox, he abandoned the certainties of 19th-century science.

Toward the end of The Education, Adams increasingly questioned
the assumptions of popular scientific thought. Amid new discoveries, the attempt to form universal scientific laws—especially the law of progress—began to seem quixotic. Adams read Karl Pearson on the limits of scientific research and Henri Poincaré on the notion of hypothesis as convenience; to Adams, both undermined the 19th-century faith that scientific advance would soon explain the universe through the steady accretion of knowledge.

Adams also discovered that the experiments of Marie Curie and Wilhelm Conrad Röntgen with radiation and those of Michael Faraday with electricity suggested the existence of forces which could not be mechanically measured. Adams believed the new forces fatally weakened scientists' claims to certainty. Nineteenth-century science had provided a kind of surrogate religion, unifying and explaining the cosmos; that explanation had been shattered by "the sudden irruption of forces totally new." The false unity and order proposed by evolutionary optimism was giving way to the multiplicity and randomness acknowledged by 20th-century science. For Adams, the master symbol of the powerful new forces was the dynamo, which he first encountered at the Paris Exposition of 1900. The dynamo generated extraordinary amounts of electric power while "scarcely humming an audible warning"; its murmuring bulk expressed "ultimate energy"—a disturbing new "kingdom of force" that was more powerful than the men entrusted to govern it.

And if the new physics had undermined the concept of a unified cosmos, the new psychology had discredited the idea of a unified self. Like many of his contemporaries, Adams was fascinated with unconscious dreams and fantasies, with multiple personalities and other mysteries of divided selfhood. It was not accidental that The Education emphasized his own sense of psychic fragmentation in contrast to the willed unity of his father's character. In Adams's view, the modern personality "took at once the form of a bicycle rider, mechanically balancing himself by inhibiting all his inferior personalities, and sure to fall into the subconscious chaos below, if one of his inferior personalities got on top. The only absolute truth was the subconscious chaos below, which everyone could feel when he sought it." Normal waking consciousness was a product of "artificial balance," and the "perfect poise" of 19th-century men like Adams's father was even more precarious. The apparently rational man, Adams wrote, "was an acrobat, with a dwarf on his back, crossing a chasm on a slack-rope, and commonly breaking his neck."

Preoccupied by subconscious and cosmic chaos, the mature Henry Adams was remarkably attuned to some of the deepest intellectual currents of his age. Translating his personal quarrel with his paternity into an enduring critique of modern culture, he concluded that "Chaos was the law of nature; Order was the dream of man." Yet Adams continued to dream of unity amid modern confusion. His search for meaning and
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purpose led him away from what he saw as the “masculine” world of systematic achievement into the “feminine” realm of sensuous responsiveness, aesthetic sensitivity, and religious faith. The Education recounts that quest as well.

Adams’s reverence for the “feminine” realm sprang from labyrinthine sources. He had always disliked “the strife of the world,” preferring “taste and dexterity” to strength. He adored his sister Louisa and persistently sought female friends. In Marian Hooper, whom he married in 1872, he found a witty and willful female partner. (Charles Francis Adams, Sr., never liked her.) To Adams’s painful disappointment, the couple was childless. An equally serious problem was that Marian, an accomplished photographer, seemed to draw nearly all her strength from her father, and little or none from her husband. After her father, a prominent Boston doctor, died in 1885, Marian entered a depression that led to suicide at the end of that year.

Adams’s life was “cut in halves.” Gradually he emerged from mourning to finish his History and to embark on the years of travel and study that produced Mont-Saint-Michel and The Education. Frustrated by his own childlessness, Adams was saddened beyond words by the loss of his wife. He never mentioned her in The Education, but her presence brooded over many a page, providing the emotional impetus for his apotheosis of the Virgin Mary. The Virgin possessed a special (and certainly unorthodox) significance for Adams. In Mont-Saint-Michel, he had exalted her as a kind of vital force, a mother-goddess who embodied a religion of love rather than law, and whose queenly power unified medieval culture for a brief historical moment—until men lost their faith by trying to codify it in syllogisms. In The Education, Mary preserved this significance and became a kind of heavenly counterpoint to the demonic energy of the dynamo.

Adams’s celebration of Mary as an emblem of emotional and instinctual vitality stemmed from his own idiosyncratic needs, but it was also part of a much wider restiveness at the turn of the century: a desire to escape the sexless aridity of the Victorian world view and to seek intense, immediate experience. This “vitalist” strain linked Adams with philosophers (William James, Henri Bergson), literati (Guillaume Apollinaire, e.e. cummings), and a host of popular therapists promising to heal the wounds in the modern psyche through the cultivation of an authentic “real life.” For some, the pursuit of intense experience involved “masculine” commitment to Theodore Roosevelt’s cult of “the strenuous life”; for others—like Henry Adams—it meant escape to a wider “feminine” world. Whatever paths it took in particular cases, in the United States as a whole the quest energized a broad cultural revival that helped ensure the resilience of the Protestant upper class. Adams was both exemplar and critic of that revival; The Education was its most sophisticated manifestation.

Alongside its criticism of Adams’s paternal heritage, The Education contained a retrospective record of his effort to create a richer sense of self than Boston Brahmin culture approved. As a boy, he preferred summer to winter, the country to the town, the “smell of hot pine-woods and sweet-fern” in Quincy to the “thick, muddy thaws” in Boston.

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A BRAHMIN IN SAMOA

Five years after his wife’s death, a still-grieving Adams traveled to the South Pacific. This 1890 letter to his friend Anna Lodge reveals a keen eye as well as a marked improvement in the author’s spirits:

Samoa is very little changed from what it was in pagan times. The Christianity is native, and differs little from the native paganism except that more customs are kept secret. I am not sure but that if we stayed here a few months anywhere except in Apia, we should be obliged, in order to maintain our dignity as chiefs of America, to take wives and contract alliances with neighboring chiefs. The relation need not be permanent, and our partners at our departure would be regarded with great respect and would probably marry native missionaries instead of pining for us...

Every married woman here, after a few years’ residence with her husband, returns to her father with half the children, and lives as she likes. I think the custom will commend itself at once to New York society, not to mention that of Washington...

Our European rival, Robert Louis Stevenson, lives in the hills and forest, where he cannot rival us in social gaiety. We have been to see him, and found him, as he declared, very well. I should need to be extremely well to live the life he has led and is still leading, but a Scotchman with consumption can defy every fatigue and danger. His place is, as he says, “full of Rousseaus,” meaning picturesque landscapes. I saw no Rousseaus, the day being unfavorable, but I saw a very dirty board cabin, with a still dirtier man and woman in it, in the middle of several hundred burned tree-stumps. Both the man and woman were lively, and, in their respective way, amusing; but they did not seem passionately eager for constant association with us, and poor Stevenson can’t talk and write too. He naturally prefers writing...

I mean to enclose some photographs if I can get them, to show what is the matter with us; but remember that the photograph takes all the fun out of the tropics. Especially it vulgarises the women, whose charm is chiefly in their size and proportions, their lines, the freedom of their movements, the color of their skin, and their good-natured smile...

The softness of lights and colors, the motion of the palms, the delicacy and tenderness of the mornings and evenings, the moisture of the atmosphere, and all the other qualities which charm one here, are not to be put into a photograph, which simply gives one conventional character to New England and Samoa alike.

Summer was a riot of immediate sense experience; “winter was school.” Yet the pull of winter, and of Bostonian duty, remained. “Life was a double thing.”

If Adams’s masculine upbringing was marked by a series of failures, the cultivation of his “feminine” side was characterized by mystery and delight. Even in the early years, there were intimations of a world of experience beyond the boundaries of Boston gentility; not only in Quincy, but in the Southern town of Washington, D.C., where “the
brooding indolence of a warm climate and a negro population hung in
the atmosphere heavier than the catalpas.” In the South, “the want of
barriers, of pavements, of forms” soothed his anxious spirit. Rome
brought “soft forms felt by lost senses.” And in Berlin, “he was one day
surprised to notice that his mind followed the movement of a Sinfonie.

A prison-wall that barred his senses on one side of life, suddenly fell
... a new sense burst out like a flower in his life, so superior to the old
senses, so bewildering, so astonished at its own existence, that he could
not credit it, and watched it as something apart, accidental, and not to
be trusted. ... Mere mechanical repetition of certain sounds had stuck
to his unconscious mind.” Like other fin de siècle vitalists, Adams
looked to the unconscious as a source of imaginative impulses denied
by an overly genteel society.

But unlike some of his peers, Adams never sentimentalized the
realm of instinct or “nature.” Recollecting his youthful response to Eu-
rope’s medieval lights and shadows, Adams remarked that “he merely
got drunk on his emotions ....” Without a larger framework of mean-
ing, vitalism degenerated into an aimless cult of experience. This lesson
became even clearer at the bedside of his sister Louisa, dying of lockjaw
in an Italian hotel room in 1870. “Death took features altogether new to
him, in these rich and sensuous surroundings. Nature enjoyed it,
played with it, the horror added to her charm, she liked the torture, and
smothered her victim with caresses.”

Nature, the Great Mother, was both creator and destroyer. After
the nightmare of his sister’s death, Adams could never celebrate “the
natural” as did many of his vitalist contemporaries and their succes-
sors. “For the first time in his life, Mont Blanc for a moment looked to
him what it was—a chaos of anarchic and purposeless forces,” he
wrote.

Sentimental vitalism could not bring clarity and order to modern
incoherence: That realization drove Adams to seek transcendent mean-
ing in the Virgin Mary—particularly the 13th-century Virgin enshrined
in Chartres Cathedral. She alone, he believed, had unified self and cos-
mos—not by devising scientific laws but by embodying the mystery of
maternity. When 13th-century men subordinated themselves to the ir-
rational power of the Virgin, they reached “the point of history when
man held the highest idea of himself as a unit in a unified universe.”
But the moment they abandoned instinctive faith in maternal unity
and began trying to impose the masculine unity of rationality, the drift
toward 20th-century fragmentation had begun.

Try as he might, Adams could not worship at the Virgin’s shrine.
He was too “masculine” and too modern. As The Education makes
clear, even during his later life he still loved to lurk about the corridors
of power, plotting geopolitics with Secretary of State John Hay.
Though he feared the dynamo, he remained fascinated by the power it
embodied. The 20th-century American, Adams announced, “—the child
of incalculable coal-power, chemical power, electric power, and radiating energy . . . must be a sort of God compared with any former creation of nature." He remained suspended between dynamo and Virgin, masculine and feminine ideals, longing for a sacred sense of meaning while he pursued the knowledge which corroded it.

It is easy to dismiss Adams as a nostalgic reactionary, unwilling to take on the challenge of the modern adventure. A more sensible reaction would be to acknowledge that Adams had the courage of his contradictions. His willingness to embrace insoluble conflict proved his greatest strength. He concluded that his most honorable course was not to flee modern doubt by creating a sentimental facsimile of medieval belief or by embracing the equally sentimental religion of progress. Nor did he retreat into cynicism. He kept asking ultimate questions. He kept trying to understand the cosmos and to preserve his faith in a supernatural dimension of meaning, without ever ignoring the tangled contradictions of the human condition—above all, the contradiction between the longing for infinite life and the certain fact of death. Facing squarely the tragic limits on human aspiration, Adams sustained his will to believe. For that, he deserves a place alongside Pascal, Kierkegaard, William James, and Miguel de Unamuno: All helped to create an honorable religious viewpoint for skeptical modern believers.

Adams's heterodox religious outlook underlay his critique of Amer-
ica's dominant culture. He realized that the new cult of intense experience was merely a sleeker, therapeutic version of progressive optimism—substituting medical for moral standards of value but preserving the fundamental evasiveness of the national creed. “America has always taken tragedy lightly,” he observed. “Too busy to stop the activity of their twenty-million horsepower society, Americans ignore tragic motives that would have overshadowed the Middle Ages; and the world learns to regard assassination as a form of hysteria, and death as neurosis, to be treated by a rest cure." Adams understood that the belief in a progressive march into the future—whether justified in Victorian terms or by a therapeutic idiom—was in part a flight from death itself.

Adams's own view involved more than a pessimistic rejection of official optimism. It also implied a sympathetic awareness of human fallibility and moral complexity, a refusal to join the terrible simplifiers of the world, a distaste for cant and empty ideology. These are essential virtues in the 20th century, when the terrible simplifiers are armed to the teeth.

The final irony, one Adams would have appreciated, is that the progressive flight from death now threatens us with unparalleled death. Twenty years ago, at the height of the fallout shelter boom and Kennedy’s confrontation with the Soviets, Lewis Mumford wrote “An Apology to Henry Adams” in The Virginia Quarterly Review. He was sorry, Mumford said, that he had once dismissed Adams’s apocalyptic predictions; now he realized that “the American Nostradamus” had uncannily anticipated the madness of the nuclear arms race.

We stand at a similar historical moment today, and Adams once again bears close reading. He worried about “the effects of unlimited power on limited mind”—a timeless problem but particularly resonant in the 20th century. He was delighted by the smashing of 19th-century certainties, but he knew that 20th-century science demanded “a new social mind” to control it. All the reasonable arguments of the last four decades have not yet created that “mind” among our policymakers—or among those of other powerful nations, for that matter. We badly need a thorough ventilation of what passes for thought in our higher circles of power; we could do worse than start with Adams’s tough-minded patrician skepticism.

What was the matter with Henry Adams? He was elitist, ethnocentric, excessively self-conscious, maybe a little diffident. And he knew too much.
Over the centuries, human beings have resorted to everything from purges to Thorazine in an effort to cope with mental illness and emotional distress. England’s King George III, who periodically lapsed into lunacy, was immobilized, beaten, stoned, and chained to a pole (to no avail). In this painting by Hieronymus Bosch (1450–1516), a quack doctor extracts the Stone of Madness from his patient’s head.
Psychiatry in America

“To us he is no more a person/ Now but a whole climate of opinion.” Poet W. H. Auden wrote those words after learning of Sigmund Freud’s death in 1939. Freud’s writings left their mark on many endeavors outside psychiatry, and nowhere more so than in the United States. Lacking familiarity with psychiatry and psychoanalysis, a visitor from Mars could make little sense of much of contemporary America. He would fail to understand the cartoons of Jules Feiffer, the movies of Woody Allen, the novels of D. M. Thomas or Philip Roth. His grasp of U.S. politics, education, and criminal justice would be incomplete. Psychiatry in America today is, by one estimate, a $20-billion-a-year industry. As a professional field, it is also unkempt and overgrown, with no regular boundaries. Practitioners cannot always agree on which forms of treatment “work” and which do not. And yet, ironically, in its broader social impact, psychiatry’s intellectual disarray has long been irrelevant. Here, in a five-part essay, psychiatrist and neurologist Richard Restak surveys the state of the profession and its unusual role in American life.

by Richard M. Restak

Frederic Worden, a noted psychoanalyst and brain researcher, once observed that, unlike violinists, who all play violins and know what one looks like, psychiatrists “are not all playing the same instrument”; indeed, he said, “some are playing instruments that others disapprove of or disbelieve in or even, in some cases, instruments whose very existence is unknown to others in the group.”

A lack of precision and rigor that most Americans would never accept from physicists and engineers has for years been widely tolerated when psychiatrists are involved. Thanks to such indulgence (especially by the news media), thanks to deliberate cessions of authority to psychiatrists by courts and legislatures, and thanks to lobbying and proselytizing by organized members of the profession, psychiatrists in America today probably have far more influence, direct and indirect, over the lives

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of ordinary citizens than they do in any other nation on Earth.

If an American says or does something unusual, especially if it has legal consequences, he may be required to explain himself to a psychiatrist. If he is accused of a crime, a psychiatrist may be asked to determine whether he was or was not responsible for his actions. Psychiatric opinion may determine whether he gets a job, enters the armed forces, or prevails over his estranged mate for custody of the children. It may be used to deprive an individual of his liberty. All in all, concludes Jonas Robitscher in *The Powers of Psychiatry* (1980), "The psychiatrist is the most important nongovernmental decisionmaker in modern life."

Questions of sanity or emotional distress aside, we now ask psychiatrists how to educate our children, reduce crime, succeed at the office, achieve multiple orgasm. They are brought in to determine whether separate can be equal, whether might can make right, whether fat can be fun. By now accustomed to this expansive role—one, to be fair, often thrust upon them—some psychiatrists have ranged even further afield. Psychiatry, it would seem, is pertinent to everything. There now exists in Washington a thriving Institute for Psychiatry and Foreign Affairs, devoted to helping diplomats understand "the irrational aspects of human response." At last May's meeting of the American Psychiatric Association (APA), psychiatrist Milton Greenblatt proposed that a committee of mental health professionals be assigned routinely to the White House. "What security do we have," he asked, "that the [owner of the] hand that presses the button is sane and stable?"

If a certain immodesty is apparent among psychiatrists, it is even more evident in the larger "psychotherapeutic community." In addition to some 32,000 psychiatrists working in the United States (one-third of all practicing psychiatrists in the world), there are now about 70,000 psychologists and hundreds

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"Darling, what do you suppose they're going to tell their psychiatrists about us?" Every year, almost one million children under age 16 consult a psychiatrist.

of thousands of other mental health-care specialists, including trained nurses, social workers, and clergy, as well as a variety of marriage counselors, sex therapists, and others who may or may not have received any sort of professional certification. Millions of Americans are caught up in the worlds of Est and Esalen, of Transcendental Meditation and transactional analysis, Rolfing and rebirthing, biorhythms and biofeedback.

The ethos of psychiatry, its methods and its terminology, has trickled down to Everyman. Were the profession and its literature suddenly abolished, much of its language and not a few of its dogmas and heresies would endure for generations, preserved in popular culture. The New York Times best-seller list regularly features books of the "self-help" variety, offering advice on how to be your own best friend, win through intimidation, or look out for Number One. More than 100 "psychochatter" programs currently appear on television in the United States (there are many more on radio). Prominent public figures are now sculpted not only in stone but also in "psychobiographies" by "psychohistorians" such as Doris Kearns (Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, 1976) and Fawn Brodie (Richard Nixon: The Shaping of His Character, 1981).

And yet, even as the psycho-saturation of U.S. culture appears to be nearly total, psychiatry as a profession is not in good health.

During the 1970s, the percentage of graduating medical students entering psychiatry dropped from 10 to four, thanks in part to encroachments by nonmedical personnel in the therapy
field and, more importantly, to a serious identity crisis within the profession itself, precipitated by the threat of "biologism" to the traditional "talk therapies."

The American public, meanwhile, despite its enduring fondness for individual self-analysis, has of late been reluctant to give psychiatrists free rein—evident in a 1982 Berkeley, California, referendum banning the use of electroshock therapy and in recent moves by insurance companies, led by Blue Cross/Blue Shield, to limit payments for psychiatric care. Books critical of the profession are appearing more frequently, taking their place on the shelf alongside Thomas Szasz's once-lonely The Myth of Mental Illness (1961). Even the U.S. Supreme Court has taken a swipe at the therapeutic society, ruling last April that "psychological stress" among area residents was both immeasurable and not germane in determining whether a nuclear power plant at Three Mile Island, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, could resume operation.

**Solace for the Privileged**

The very notion of psychiatry as a sound medical enterprise has increasingly been called into question as rival practitioners spar in public—often during celebrated trials, such as that of John W. Hinckley, Jr., in 1982 for his attempted assassination of President Reagan a year earlier—over the diagnosis of insanity. In the wake of the Hinckley trial, three of the men wounded in the assassination attempt brought a $14 million suit against Hinckley's psychiatrist, charging malpractice on the grounds that the doctor "knew or should have known" that his patient would become violent.

But the public distress over psychiatry cannot be blamed simply on a series of isolated mishaps or highly visible blunders. Nor is it "all in the mind." The unease can be traced to something that Harvard Law School's Roberto Unger touched on in an address to the annual meeting of the APA in 1980. "An unmistakable and unsettling fact about modern psychiatry," he told his audience, "and especially about psychotherapy, is that it flourishes in the rich countries of the contemporary Western World... where the privileged devote themselves to the expense of selfish and impotent cultivation of subjectivity."

Part of the problem with psychiatry, in other words, is that many Americans suspect its very success may be symptomatic of a social ailment. Psychotherapy, they fear, both reflects and panders to certain tendencies in American society, tendencies that do the country no good.
WHO ARE THESE PEOPLE?

The official, bare-bones definition is clear enough: According to the APA, psychiatrists comprise "all medical and osteopathic physicians who had psychiatric residency training experience, and/or whose primary compensated work was psychiatric in nature, and/or whose compensated work was in a mental health setting (or mental health component of a larger facility), and/or who presented themselves to the public as psychiatrists or neuropsychiatrists."

As noted, about 32,000 people in the United States meet this rather loose definition. Some 28,000 of them are members of the APA. The average American psychiatrist is roughly 48.5 years old. Like most doctors, he is probably a male Caucasian (only 15 percent of psychiatrists are women, only two percent are black), American-born and trained (though one-fifth are not), and lives in a big city on either coast. Washington, D.C., boasts the most psychiatrists per capita in the United States—44.8 per 100,000 population, thanks in part to the once-liberal mental health-care provisions in federal employees' insurance coverage—followed by Boston (43.6), New York (40.5), and San Francisco (38.3). According to the Washington Post, four times as many psychiatrists have offices in a single Connecticut Avenue apartment building in Washington, D.C., as in all of Wyoming.

Because few of his patients die during treatment, or call him up in the middle of the night, the average psychiatrist would seem to have an easy life. And yet for reasons that remain obscure—perhaps the type of individual drawn to the field in the first place, and the intense, introspective nature of the work—one out of every six (16.5 percent) psychiatrists dies a suicide. In a survey conducted several years ago in San Francisco, 68 percent of the psychiatrists queried agreed that they were afflicted with emotional problems that their nonpsychiatric colleagues were spared.

The typical psychiatrist works in a private office where he sees patients individually—this accounts for 71 percent of all clinical practice. He may spend part of his time working for a mental hospital, but if he is a white male, he probably does not.  

*Psychiatrists in 1980 earned an average of $65,100, which put them near the bottom rung of the medical ladder, just above pediatricians. But they spent less than half as much ($24,800) as other physicians did on rent, equipment, and supplies. And they worked almost five fewer hours per week—45.5, with seven of those hours devoted not to patient care but to teaching, lecturing, supervising other psychiatrists, writing articles, or giving advice to, say, the local school board or police department.
THE THERAPEUTIC SENSIBILITY

In his controversial The Culture of Narcissism (1979), Christopher Lasch detected a pervasive spiritual malaise in the West, and blamed it in part on a post-Freudian "therapeutic sensibility." An excerpt:

Plagued by anxiety, depression, vague discontents, a sense of inner emptiness, the "psychological man" of the twentieth century seeks neither individual self-aggrandizement nor spiritual transcendence but peace of mind, under conditions that increasingly militate against it. Therapists, not priests or popular preachers of self-help or models of success like the captains of industry, become his principal allies in the struggle for composure; he turns to them in the hope of achieving the modern equivalent of salvation, "mental health."

Therapy has established itself as the successor both to rugged individualism and to religion; but this does not mean that the "triumph of the therapeutic" has become a new religion in its own right. Therapy constitutes an antireligion, not always to be sure because it adheres to rational explanation or scientific methods of healing, as its practitioners would have us believe, but because modern society "has no future" and therefore gives no thought to anything beyond its immediate needs. Even when therapists speak of the need for "meaning" and "love," they define love and meaning simply as the fulfillment of the patient's emotional requirements. It hardly occurs to them . . . to encourage the subject to subordinate his needs and interests to those of others, to someone or some cause or tradition outside himself. "Love" as self-sacrifice or self-abasement, "meaning" as submission to a higher loyalty—these sublimations strike the therapeutic sensibility as intolerably oppressive, offensive to common sense and injurious to personal health and well-being.

Only one-third of psychiatrists are attached either full- or part-time to institutions, and these physicians are likely to be either women or foreign medical graduates (FMGs), mostly from Asia and Latin America. Fully 60 percent of all psychiatrists in public mental institutions are FMGs.

To judge from such documents as the 1977 report of the U.S. Commission on Mental Health, psychiatrists do not think their own numbers are sufficient. The commission recommended, in fact, that, in light of "unmet needs," psychiatry be designated by Congress a "medical shortage specialty." Do we really need more psychiatrists? The commission's estimate that 15 percent of all Americans are in need of "some form of mental health services" is undoubtedly soft. Yet other data seem to show that the U.S. mental health-care system is sorely taxed. Between 1955 and 1977, the number of inpatient and outpatient psychiatric
treatments, excluding private practice, rose from 1.7 million annually to 6.6 million. In 1979, there were 1.8 million “inpatient episodes.” The average stay in a mental institution was 47 days.

One would be more sympathetic to psychiatrists’ claims, however, if the people represented by such statistics were the ones with whom most practitioners spent most of their time. But, as a group, psychiatrists devote their energies to those who, as a group, need help least. The very young, the very old, alcoholics, drug abusers, sociopaths, the mentally retarded, those with brain disease, those hospitalized for long periods of time—these people receive little or no sustained psychiatric attention. Barely two percent—mostly women—of the nation’s psychiatrists spend any appreciable amount of time with the elderly.

Their choice of patients is one reason why women psychiatrists (like women doctors generally) earn less money than men. The correlation between those persons in sudden or protracted need of psychiatric help and those persons with ample surplus income is not high. The 6.6 million “treatments” cited above account for only a fraction of the consultations with psychiatrists in any year.

Remaining are the millions who see a psychiatrist in his private office, often simply because they want to. (The National Center for Health Statistics estimated the number of office visits to psychiatrists at 16 million in 1981 but has no data on the number of patients involved.) Such people are mostly middle to upper middle-class whites. Women far outnumber men. By catering to the silk-stocking trade, American psychiatrists in effect have consigned most of the truly mentally ill to the “allied” mental health professionals. “The affluent and educated elite are surrounded by first-class healers,” writes psychiatrist E. Fuller Torrey, “while the masses must make do with whatever second-class services are left over. It is a two-class profession.”

II

THE ROOTS OF MADNESS

The discretionary, even fashionable, aspect of psychiatry was unknown in the United States until two generations ago. Before then, emotional distress was a stigma rather than a badge of sensitivity. In colonial days, madness was blamed not on “society” or other environmental factors (such as one’s upbringing) but on unsavory agents—witches, the devil, lack of religious faith, “humors”—that besmirched the victim’s own character.
Few public provisions were made in America for treating or housing the insane, and it was not until 1773 that the first mental hospital (in Williamsburg, Virginia) opened its doors.

By the turn of the century, however, the ideas of Benjamin Rush had begun to achieve recognition. Rush, a signer of the Declaration of Independence and the father of a boy who would today be considered psychotic, devoted much of his time to the mentally ill at Philadelphia’s Pennsylvania Hospital. Unlike most European theorists (who, imbued with the spirit of the Age of Reason, attributed insanity exclusively to a distortion of rationality), Rush believed that mental illness—“moral derangement,” he called it—could occur even in people who retained their normal faculties of reason.

Cold Water

He employed a vivid image in his Medical Inquiries and Observations upon the Diseases of the Mind (1812): “Exactly the same thing takes place in this disease of the will that occurs when the arm or foot is moved convulsively without an act of the will or even in spite of it.”

The significance of Rush’s beliefs lay in linking mental illness with physical processes. American physicians followed Rush’s lead for a century, but they had little more success than Rush in tailoring effective medical treatments. Rush experimented with bloodletting, purging, and various forms of “ingenious intimidation.” He also tried “moral therapy,” imposing on his patients a regimen of strict discipline to help them conform to society’s rules and values. In doing so, he anticipated later attempts to find “environmental”—social or psychological—solutions for what in many cases were physical problems.

Ignorance of what exactly should be treated persisted for years, even as physicians tried to stand by the “medical model” of mental illness. In his Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity (1838), Isaac Ray confidently asserted that “No pathologic fact is better established than that deviations from the healthy structure are generally present in the brains of insane subjects.” Therefore, it seemed reasonable to assume that almost anything that adversely affected the brain—a fall from a wagon, for example—might result in some form of insanity. And why limit etiology to direct causes?

It was common knowledge during the last century that diseases in parts of the body other than the brain could affect one’s mental health: a bilious attack or stomach disorder, say. And yet, even stretching physical causation to its limits (masturbat-
tion, for example, was frequently blamed), 19th-century physicians were forced to concede that demonstrable body illness accounted for only a tiny fraction of the cases of insanity.

And so, while in theory never quite abandoning their physiological suspicions, in practice alienists (as "mind-doctors" were then called) fell back on "social" theories of mental illness and corresponding "social" cures. To explain insanity, physicians looked to everything from America's economic system to family habits and public schools. One alienist listed 43 distinct sources of mental illness among the patients at a New York City asylum. Included were religious anxiety (77 cases), loss of property (28), excessive study (25), political excitement (5), and a solitary instance of "going into cold water."

Given this view of things, what the doctors ordered in cases of psychiatric disorders was a kind of sociological prophylaxis—helping the patient, by means of a variety of therapies, to "learn" healthy behavior. This kind of treatment, doctors came to believe, was best administered within the special environment of the asylum. Although throughout the 19th century most of the mentally ill in the United States would be found in prisons, almshouses, or at home with their families, a mental hospital "movement" steadily gathered steam. In state after state, the

Physician Benjamin Rush introduced his "Tranquilizer" at Philadelphia's Pennsylvania Hospital in 1811. A year later, Rush published his Medical Inquiries and Observations upon the Diseases of the Mind, the first American treatise on mental illness.
WHO SEES PSYCHIATRISTS

By sex and age

Out of 16 million office visits in 1981:

MALE
- 6.7 million

25-44

45-64

65+

FEMALE
- 9.3 million

25-44

45-64

65+

... AND WHY

Schizophrenia

Organic brain syndromes

Mental retardation

Undiagnosed

Depression

Alcoholism

Personality disorders

Childhood disorders

Transient situational disorders

Social maladjustments

Neurosis

WHERE THE MENTALLY ILL ARE TREATED

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MAJOR FEDERAL MENTAL HEALTH OUTLAYS, 1948–1983

What One State Spends on Mental Health

Total Illinois mental health budget, 1982: $535.9 million

Source: Characteristics of Admissions to Selected Mental Health Facilities (1975), National Institute of Mental Health; Illinois Department of Mental Health; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Veterans Administration.
publicly funded asylums, run by doctors, supplanted the old madhouses, run by lay entrepreneurs."

The physicians moved quickly to consolidate their power. In 1844, 13 directors of state mental hospitals formed the Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions, renamed in 1892 the American Medico-Psychological Association and in 1921 the American Psychiatric Association. Physicians though they were, however, it is difficult to appreciate what alienists had in common with medical doctors. Nor, eventually, could they claim to provide humane care. As the century wore on, and the nation opened its doors to millions of European immigrants, the asylums grew more crowded and conditions deteriorated. Despite their good intentions, alienists became little more than gatekeepers of the insane.

Carrying the Plague

At the 1894 convention of the American Medico-Psychological Association, S. Weir Mitchell, a prominent neurologist, castigated alienists for isolating themselves from other physicians, and for their abysmal ignorance of the human brain: "We, neurologists, think you have fallen behind us, and this opinion is gaining ground outside of your own ranks, and is, in part at least, your own fault. . . . You live alone, uncriticized, unquestioned, out of the healthy conflicts and honest rivalries which keep us up to the mark of fullest possible competence."

Within a decade of Mitchell's attack, American psychiatry began to experience something of a revival, thanks in part to the efforts of Adolf Meyer. Meyer, director of the Pathological Institute of the New York State Hospital, and the acknowledged "dean" of American psychiatry until his death in 1950, emphasized neither social nor neurological contributions to the exclusion of the other. Rather, he advanced the sensible notion that emotional disturbances often reflected a psychobiological reaction involving both physical and mental components. His cardinal principal was the union of mind and body—Cartesian dualism just wouldn't do—and he had no patience for the antagonism between brain scientists and most psychiatrists.

With a flair for public relations, Meyer helped popularize the idea of "mental hygiene" (a term he coined) in the United States, most notably by promoting Clifford Beers's *A Mind That

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By 1860, 28 of the 33 states operated at least one insane asylum, and 8,500 individuals were institutionalized. Almost a century later, in 1955, mental hospitals housed 538,000 patients. Today, there are 280 mental hospitals run by state or local governments, 136 facilities run by the Veterans Administration, and 184 privately run psychiatric hospitals.
Found Itself (1908), the most widely read book on mental illness ever penned by a layman. Americans had always had an appetite for self-improvement, and during the early decades of the new century, fueled by a new faith in medical progress, it proved insatiable. Scores of tracts, such as The Healing Power of Mind, appeared in bookstores. Good Housekeeping and the Ladies Home Journal vied in filling their pages with useful advice. Alienists became psychiatrists, and psychiatric programs were launched in prisons and juvenile homes.

This was the fertile ground in which psychoanalysis was sown. Sigmund Freud never liked the United States; he called it "a gigantic mistake." Yet as his ship neared New York in 1909, bringing him to North America for the first time, he reportedly worried about the effect his ideas would have. He felt, he told a companion, as if he were carrying the plague.

MORE THAN SCIENCE, MORE THAN ART

Freud (1856–1939) trained to be a neurologist, and his early studies on infantile cerebral palsy and aphasia are today considered classics in the field. As a neurologist, he frequently saw patients with psychiatric complaints, and he tried a number of treatments, including hypnotism, on some patients exhibiting symptoms of neurosis or hysteria.

In his quest for successful treatments, Freud eventually began urging his patients to recall forgotten thoughts and events, hoping to find in such recollections a back door to pathology. When one of his patients unexpectedly interrupted his queries and begged to be allowed to continue her discourse, Freud, following what he later termed an "obscure intuition," let her talk.

He began giving other patients the same freedom. As they reclined on the couch in his surgery at Berggasse 19 in Vienna, he would sit behind his patients, out of their sight, a geographical orientation that now has its own justifying literature, although he himself put it down to not being able to look at the human face for eight hours a day. And he would listen.

By allowing his patients to speak discursively in "free association," Freud hoped to glimpse their "unconscious" thoughts and motives. He came to believe, in biographer Ronald Clark's words, "that human actions were more governed by unconscious motives than had previously been thought possible; ... that repressed tendencies, pushed from the conscious mind and
down in the unconscious, played a great and unsuspected role in human life." Freud eventually concluded—there is nothing to prove him wrong, and much to suggest that his intuitions were often correct—that the origin of many mental disorders lay in hidden emotional conflicts, often buried deep in the events of childhood.

For the sake of convenience, we can say that the Freudian Era commenced in 1900, at least in Europe, when his *Interpretation of Dreams* was published. In that study (perhaps his most influential, and certainly the one psychiatrists most often cite, along with *Civilization and its Discontents*, 1930, when asked why they chose their profession), Freud asserted that the unconscious mental activity sublimating dreams actually refracted, as though through a strange lens, conscious desires and thoughts.

Beyond a select circle of grateful patients and contentious disciples in central Europe, Freud's theories, particularly the notion of infantile sexuality, were not, at first, widely accepted. They had little effect on American psychiatry until 1909, when psychologist G. Stanley Hall invited Freud to lecture at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts. Psychoanalysis—as Freud's method of treatment was called—acquired its first
By 1911, a New York Psychoanalytic Society had been founded. But the advance of psychoanalysis was slow. Encouraged by the conclusive link established between syphilis and insanity in 1913, and still smarting from the criticisms of men such as Mitchell, many American psychiatrists over the next couple of decades became avowed "organicists" and began experimenting with sometimes bizarre treatments: insulin coma, induced convulsions, electroshock therapy, sterilization, lobotomy, sleep therapy.

Ultimately, Adolf Hitler provided the chief impetus to psychoanalysis in the United States. The great majority of psychoanalysts in Europe were Jewish, and citizens of Germany or Austria. As the Third Reich extended its rule after 1936, hundreds of Freud's disciples—and Freud himself—fled to England or the United States. Most came to America. "Two Freudians together constituted a seminar, three a training institute," psychoanalyst Leslie Farber has recalled. "What they were promulgating was not psychiatry but psychoanalysis, which in Europe, under Freud's supervision, had already detached itself from medicine." It had not done so completely, however. Indeed, the Freudians' pursuit of psychosomatic medicine—applying psychoanalytic principles to medical problems that had clear emotional associations (peptic ulcers, hypertension, asthma, migraine headaches)—helped ease the acceptance of psychoanalysis among skeptical American psychiatrists.

After World War II, for a variety of reasons, psychoanalysis entered the Promised Land. Its methods were, in the first place, seductive, and they often seemed to work. Psychoanalysis appealed to a basic American belief in self-improvement; it also went hand in hand with "the pursuit of happiness." And there was an ideology to it, one that, as Paul Roazen has observed, appealed to intellectuals disillusioned with God and Marx.

"Not only has Freudian theory plugged the intellectual hole of Marxism," Roazen wrote, "but it has also provided for some a similar basis for radical aspiration. It is possible to find in Freud not merely a substructure for one's ideas, a central intellectual core, but also a moral criticism of the status quo." In his writ-

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"According to the Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry, psychoanalysis, "as a technique for exploring the mental processes, includes the use of free association and the analysis and interpretation of dreams, resistances, and transferences. As a form of psychotherapy, it uses the investigative technique, guided by Freud's libido and instinct theories and by ego psychology, to gain insight into a person's unconscious motivations, conflicts, and symbols and thus to effect a change in his maladaptive behavior." Psychoanalysts in the United States must be physicians in order to belong to the American Psychoanalytic Association, whereas in Europe psychoanalysts may be psychologists, social workers, or other nonmedical practitioners. The issue of medical training has long been a controversial one, with Freud himself arguing that a psychoanalyst need not be a physician.
ings, Freud had leapt beyond the individual psyche and taken on
grander themes, such as the origins of civilization. His ideas, or
so it seemed to many psychiatrists, were as applicable to society
as they were to patients. Moreover, the very figure of Freud in-
spired a kind of reverence. As sociologist Philip Rieff has noted,
almost all of the psychoanalytic canon was written by one man:
“It is as if Paul had composed the entire New Testament; or,
much more aptly, as if Moses had compiled the entire Pentateuch.” Of
the Freudian canon itself, Rieff says: “This is more than science,
more than art—it is another sort of reality.”
Another factor contributing to the popularity of psycho-
analysis was money. In 1946, for the first time, the federal gov-
ernment entered the psychiatry business in a big way, setting up
the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) and giving it, in
its first year, $6 million to spend, a large sum in those days.
NIMH earmarked much of its budget for psychoanalytic re-
search and for training psychoanalysts and psychotherapists.
At the same time, the United States during the postwar era
embarked on three decades of sustained prosperity. There soon
existed (as there had not during the Depression) a large class of
Americans with considerable surplus income. Psychiatry be-
came a consumer good, more chic than many in some social cir-
cles. And as it did so, its center of gravity shifted even further
away from the mental hospital—a trend apparent since the
1920s—and closer to the private office.

Competing Therapies

Freudian psychoanalysis is now the second most popular
method of psychiatric treatment after individual psychother-
apy, which is itself derived largely from psychoanalysis. Unlike
psychoanalysis, which is rather strictly defined and closely fol-
loows the Freudian model, psychotherapy is a generic term for
any number of verbal treatments for psychological disorders.
(One practitioner has wryly characterized psychotherapy as “an
undefined technique applied to unspecified cases with unpre-
dictable results. For this technique, rigorous training is re-
quired.”) Its evolution during the past half-century has been
helter-skelter. Richie Herink’s The Psychotherapy Handbook
(1980) identifies more than 250 competing therapies: Jungian,
Gestalt, Rankian, Adlerian, Rogerian, and so on.
Today, someone seeking treatment may find himself lying
on a couch talking about childhood experiences or, in a form of
Reichian therapy, lying face-down on the floor as a therapist
walks over his back, all the while intoning, “Have you ever con-
sidered the possibility that your problems stem from your tendency to let people walk all over you?" He may be asked to participate in group swims in the nude, or encouraged to jump up and down on a pillow, which, he is asked to imagine, is his mother or father. The new therapies in part help to account for, and in part merely reflect, the proliferation of mental illnesses classified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (1980).

Sharing and Caring

While psychiatrists in the past concerned themselves primarily with schizophrenia and "affect" (mood) disorders, today they can pick from a longer menu, including narcissism, tobacco abuse syndrome, and academic underachievement disorder. Melvin Sabshin, medical director and chief executive of the APA, had this sort of syndrome inflation in mind when he noted last May that "the boundaries of psychiatry in America are more broadly drawn than anyplace else in the world. . . . There are some psychiatrists who behave as if the prevalence of psychopathology in the United States is 100 percent."

More than half of all American psychiatrists today favor an eclectic approach to patient care, mixing several different therapeutic methods. At first glance, such an orientation sounds sensible: Take what is useful among a variety of possible treatments and discard what does not work.

But in practice, most psychiatrists fall back on the style of treatment in which they have been trained and with which they are most comfortable. They tend to apply the same methods to widely differing problems. To a psychoanalyst, a case of elevator phobia would require intensive discussions to uncover the hidden meaning of the patient's fear (was his father, perhaps, not upwardly mobile?). To a family therapist, the phobia would somehow tie in with problems of family life. To a behaviorist, neither the patient's nor the family's history would be of much interest; he would try to treat the problem simply by helping the patient to suppress his phobia.

Yet no single method of psychotherapy is demonstrably better than another. In 1980, Mary Lee Smith, Gene V. Glass, and Thomas I. Miller reported on 475 case studies of psychotherapy in their book, The Benefits of Psychotherapy. They concluded: "Differences in how psychotherapy is conducted (whether in groups or individually, by experienced or novice therapists, for long or short periods of time and the like) make very little difference in how beneficial it is."

When groups of patients receiving therapy are compared
with individuals in “control” groups who are not, psychotherapy does seem to help alleviate less serious disorders, ranging from anxiety to minor phobias or some sexual dysfunctions. But the data are remarkably spongy. Precisely what are patients responding to? Is it the particular therapeutic mode? Or is it something more generalized, such as emotional catharsis or the presence of a sympathetic listener? Our picture of psychotherapy’s value may also be blurred by a tendency among patients, when interviewed by researchers, to exaggerate their progress. As for major mental disturbances, psychotherapy alone usually does not do much good.

Nor is there any real expectation among psychiatrists that they can actually cure many of their patients. One problem is defining what “cure” means in a psychiatric context. A second is determining when the patient has met the definition. A third is getting him to that point: leading him through an often agonizing therapeutic process, fraught with opportunities (and temptations) for both doctor and patient to bow out.

Psychiatry today, whatever its merits, can scarcely be called a science. It is practiced by physicians who do very little medical work. Many of the conditions they attempt to treat do not correspond to “illness” in any accepted sense. The methods of psychiatry have been adopted by nonphysicians: clinical psychologists, psychiatric social workers, the clergy, and, if the term is sufficiently diluted, by bartenders and helpful neighbors. As a result, the American public tends to distinguish psychiatrists from all other doctors and treat them as a special breed.

Psychiatry’s detachment will not last much longer, however. Earlier in this century, America saw the practice of psychiatry move from the insane asylum to the office building. Now it is finding a home in the laboratory as well.

IV

MEDICINE OF THE MIND

In 1948, an Australian psychiatrist named John Cade made a discovery. He learned that one of his patients, a “little wizened man of 51” who had been hospitalized in a state of manic excitement for five years, suddenly was able to function in society after treatment with lithium, an alkali metal that had been used to alleviate gout since the mid-19th century. Without lithium, the man had been “amiably restless, dirty, destructive, mischie-
In 1981, pharmacists in the United States filled 154 million prescriptions for psychoactive drugs. Average cost per prescription: $10. Almost half of these medications were for relief of simple anxiety.

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The discovery of lithium's psychotherapeutic value, soon followed by the introduction of chlorpromazine hydrochloride (Thorazine) and other major tranquilizers, and then by the major antidepressants, marked a revolution in the field of mental health. The new drugs dramatically reduced the number of patients who had to be sequestered in asylums (and often physically restrained). Ever larger numbers of the mentally ill could now remain in society and be treated privately or, in the United States, by psychiatrists in an expanding network of publicly funded Community Mental Health Centers.*

Uncrowding the asylums is an achievement of some note (even if not, as we shall see, an entirely benign one), but the fundamental significance of the biological revolution lies in redi-

*Under the Community Mental Health Act (1963), Washington provided grants to local groups wishing to establish and operate local psychiatric clinics; it also awarded grants to state governments to fund construction of facilities. The first Community Mental Health Center (CMHC) opened in 1965; by the end of 1966, there were 130 centers in operation; a year later, 331. There are now 768, located in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the District of Columbia. (Total cost in 1981: almost $1.7 billion.) From the outset, CMHCs have had to contend not only with mental illness but also with all kinds of legal, moral, social, economic, and political issues. Inevitably, psychiatrists sought greener pastures; today, only one CMHC in five is run by a psychiatrist.
recting attention to physical processes. Put simply, if some patients "improve" with the help of psychoactive drugs, then it follows that the source of at least some forms of mental illness may be in the structure of the brain itself, rather than in, say, a traumatic adolescence.

During the past 20 years, the discovery of a variety of chemicals that contribute to both normal and abnormal brain functioning has led researchers to some novel theorizing about mental illness. In 1965, Harvard psychiatrist Joseph Schildkraut developed his influential "catecholamine hypothesis," arguing that some depressions may stem from a deficiency of catecholamines (a family of neurotransmitters) at receptors in the brain. Similarly, elation or mania may result from an excess of catecholamines. Today, as research continues into the biological nature of some mental illnesses, more serious disturbances than depression—schizophrenia, for example—now and then yield to new drugs aimed at restoring the proper balance of neurochemicals.

The Age Factor

One might think, given its track record, that biological psychiatry would quickly have made major inroads into traditional psychiatry. In fact, most psychiatrists (though not the National Institute of Mental Health) have resisted it. To be sure, psychiatrists who do not prescribe psychoactive drugs for at least a few patients (usually in conjunction with psychotherapy) are now a distinct minority. Almost one-half of the topics discussed at the 1983 meeting of the APA had a biological slant. The American Journal of Psychiatry and the Archives of General Psychiatry now devote almost one-third of their pages to biological psychiatry.

Yet beneath the surface, the historical gap between psychiatric theory and psychiatric practice endures. Fewer than one percent of the nation's psychiatrists claim that their principal method is organic or biological. Only 213 psychiatrists in the United States have completed residency training in neurology.

Part of the problem is age. While all psychiatrists are physicians, many are middle-aged physicians who have not dealt with physical illness on a daily basis for two decades. A 1977 study by C. W. Patterson revealed that 81 percent of psychiatrists do not perform physical examinations on their patients and do not refer their patients to other physicians for such examinations. One-third of those surveyed in another study admitted that they no longer knew how to perform a physical examination.

The reasons psychiatrists give for omitting physical exams
range from saving time to avoiding "transference" of emotions between patient and doctor, which could jeopardize psychotherapy. Some psychiatrists cite the erroneous notion that physical disorders are rarely the cause of mental illness. But in fact, mental illness and physical illness are so interrelated that it is often absurd to look initially for a psychological disorder.

Robert S. Hoffman, writing last year in the *Journal of the American Medical Association*, found that 41 percent of 215 patients admitted to a San Francisco hospital with psychiatric problems actually had obvious neurological complaints that could be treated with drugs. At government-run outpatient clinics, in one case out of 10, medical illness turns out to be the sole and exclusive cause of psychiatric symptoms.

**Faking It**

It is not unfair to conclude that many psychiatrists are willing to see psychiatric problems wherever they happen to look. If a patient is not mentally ill, their thinking seems to run, then why has he come to a psychiatrist? In 1973, David Rosenhan, a psychologist and law professor at Stanford University, set the psychiatric profession on its ear with an article in *Science* magazine, "On Being Sane in Insane Places." Rosenhan conducted an experiment to see whether eight people with no history of mental illness could gain admission to mental hospitals for psychiatric disorders. The "pseudopatients" gained admission to 12 different mental hospitals (11 public, one private) by pretending to have heard voices. Once admitted, the patients were instructed to behave normally. In every case but one, the pseudopatients were diagnosed as schizophrenic.

In a later study, Rosenhan forewarned the staff of one hospital that, at some time during the next three months, one or more impostors would attempt to gain admission. No one from Rosenhan's group appeared. Nevertheless, out of 193 patients admitted for psychiatric treatment, 23 were considered suspect by at least one psychiatrist. Rosenhan's conclusion: "Any diagnostic process that lends itself so readily to massive errors of this sort cannot be a very reliable one."

Such experiments and, more importantly, growing criticism from the biological wing of the profession have forced traditional psychotherapeutic psychiatrists at least to acknowledge the competition. One would have to be blind not to notice, at the more recent annual conventions of the APA, the hundreds of middle-aged practitioners shifting restlessly in their seats, doing their best to follow the arcane ruminations of
Dinner in the Asylum (1916), by Ernst Ludwig Kirchner. On an average day in 1979, 232,073 people were in the nation's mental institutions. Fewer than 0.5 percent of those admitted as inpatients receive a diagnosis of "no mental disorder."

some psychoneurologist on "The Search for the Lesion in Melancholia," wishing they were next door listening to another colleague—a real colleague—talk about cults and mass hysteria, or the clinical applications of psychodrama.

Doubtless, few of them will convert to biological psychiatry, for reasons with which one can only sympathize. "It takes a very special training to partake of that knowledge," psychiatrist Walter Reich observed recently in Encounter. "You have to know neurochemistry; and for that you have to know biochemistry; and for that you have to know organic chemistry; and for that inorganic chemistry; and for that you have to go to school, and for that you have to be young."

The generation gap is increasingly apparent. In 1973, Hagop Akiskal and William McKinney, Jr., published a survey of American psychiatrists in the Archives of General Psychiatry. They reported that psychiatrists trained since 1970, though still heavily oriented toward psychotherapy, were more apt to be "tough-headed"—to be better informed about the brain sciences, to practice some form of biological psychiatry, or to devote themselves to research—than were their predecessors. The

*The Wilson Quarterly/Autumn 1983*
authors termed the older psychiatrists, trained before 1970 and more likely to practice some form of psychotherapy, “soft-headed.” The “softheads” tended to be politically liberal and to emphasize the importance of the social environment in understanding mental illness.

The biological types have cause to be proud of some of their clinical accomplishments. They have no right to be cocky (although some are). No drug employed thus far, no matter how effective in treating the symptoms of certain mental disorders, actually cures those disorders. Moreover, some treatments have extremely deleterious side effects: “Tardive dyskinesia,” for example, a severe involuntary movement disorder, results from prolonged use of antischizophrenic drugs.

The Revolving Door

There are less tangible, albeit no less worrisome, side effects as well. Biological psychiatry promises to reinforce the mechanistic, coldly scientific approach to health care that already characterizes so much of modern medicine. (Say what you will about psychotherapy, but the patient as an individual is still the center of attention, and the procedures themselves are thoroughly “humanistic.”) Perhaps more troubling, biological psychiatry also panders to one of Americans’ worst instincts: the belief in a “quick fix,” a “simple, painless remedy.”

A glance at the statistics on pill-popping in the United States shows the dimensions of one aspect of this problem: Sixteen percent of the U.S. adult population take some sort of psychotherapeutic medication every year on one or more occasions. Since 1964, the number of prescriptions filled annually for antidepressants has trebled. Biologically oriented psychiatrists do not, of course, condone pharmacological promiscuity—as it happens, physicians in general practice, who treat a far greater number of America’s mentally ill than do psychiatrists (60 percent versus 20 percent, with the remainder untreated), write most of these prescriptions—but they certainly helped to create the climate that sustains it.

Finally, by helping mental hospitals to transfer hundreds of thousands of patients out of the wards and back into society, biological psychiatry solved one problem and created another. Today, in New York City alone, an estimated 34,000 former mental patients are crowded into halfway houses and single-occupancy hotel rooms. Such psychiatric ghettos now exist in virtually every American city. The former patients, heavily sedated or otherwise drugged, get little assistance in readjusting to life in
the "real world." They are among the more frequent victims of predatory crime. As time passes, many neglect to take their medicine and suffer relapses. In this respect, the biological revolution is really a revolving door.

V

CHANGING COURSE

In the present decade, as during the recent past, the softheads have largely defined for the American public the scope and practice of psychiatry. At least until the late 1970s, the softheads held most of the hospital chairmanships in psychiatry and most of the offices in local and national psychiatric societies. Three generations of Americans have acquired softhead jargon ("psychobabble," as its most adulterated form is known) at their mother's—or mother figure's—knee, and it is typically on pronouncements by softheads at the annual psychiatric conclaves that television and newspaper reporters do their stories.

The "toughheads" have at times gone overboard in both their claims and their criticisms, but they have rightly chastised their brethren on the other side of the aisle for their chronic willingness to issue advice on such topics as poverty, race, education, crime, politics, and arms control. Arnold Mandell, chairman of the department of psychiatry at the University of California, San Diego, put the matter bluntly at a meeting of science writers in 1974: "We made highly quotable, unsubstantiated statements, and they were quickly taken up by the media. . . . Many of the things we became famous for turned out to be things which were really in fact beyond our area of competence."

And yet, in the nine years since Mandell spoke, psychiatrists at the annual APA meeting have staked out positions and passed resolutions on issues as diverse as affirmative action, marijuana laws, abortion, desegregation, capital punishment, and the United Nations Draft Program against Racism, all on vague mental health grounds. The psychiatrists assembled in congress endorsed the Equal Rights Amendment in 1974, after the association's president, John Spiegel, declared that passage of the amendment, "clearly, will vastly improve the mental health of about one-half of our population."

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that personal preference continues to masquerade as clinical judgment, as it so often has in the past. During the Vietnam War, numerous psychiatrists aided young men anxious to avoid military service by submit-
ting negative “fitness” reports to local draft boards. Before the liberalization of the abortion laws, when women often needed psychiatric grounds to terminate a pregnancy legally, many psychiatrists were willing to supply them as a matter of routine. In both instances, ideology, not medical opinion, proved decisive. During my own training, I sat in on (but did not participate in) many diagnostic meetings that involved a question of abortion. I do not recall an instance when the patient’s request was refused. “Until the law is more enlightened,” a psychiatrist explained on one occasion, “we have to be willing to undertake the duty of helping women in these kinds of situations.”

The issue here is not abortion or the draft or marijuana laws per se but rather the matter of standards. Psychiatry, after all, is a specialty within medical, not political, science. If psychiatric opinion is continually cited when social and political questions arise, why should not politics help define mental illness? Psychiatrists can no longer ignore this rude question. During the early 1970s, for example, after repeated disruptions of APA conventions by homosexual demonstrators, the association’s membership succumbed to pressure and struck homosexuality from the roster of mental illnesses in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. Homosexuals hailed what they called an “instant cure.” Few of the incidents cited above, revealing though they are, were widely publicized or in the news for very long. This is not the case with sensational trials—those, for example, of Sirhan Sirhan, Patricia Hearst, and John Hinckley—when psychiatrists are invited to assay the sanity (in the legal sense) of a defendant.
Perhaps more than any other single factor, the public disputes of psychiatrists on the witness stand have undermined the average American's confidence in the psychiatric profession.

The 1982 Hinckley trial was one of the more damaging in recent memory. Because everyone conceded at the outset that John Hinckley had indeed pulled the trigger in an attempt on President Reagan's life, the substance of the trial consisted of psychiatric gossamer. For two weeks, teams of opposing psychiatrists floated different interpretations of what Hinckley had said and done, "plunging ever deeper into the realm of psychiatric jargon, inkblot tests, and learned theorizing," as the New York Times put it.

The jury reached agreement, even though the expert witnesses could not, and acquitted Hinckley by reason of insanity because he appeared to be "impaired to such extent that he lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the law." Amid the ensuing uproar and angry calls for abolition of the insanity defense, the APA felt compelled to issue a strongly worded statement backing more stringent laws that would hold individuals with "antisocial" personalities legally accountable for their actions. The U.S. Justice Department, which had proclaimed Hinckley's sanity throughout the trial, now finds itself in the ironic position of having to use the evidence of insanity it had contested in order to keep the President's assailant confined at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C.

A Brush with Bankruptcy

All in all, the situation that modern American psychiatry finds itself in today is roughly as follows:

First, a basic but little-publicized shift in the nature and practice of psychiatry—the emergence of biologism—has shaken the profession to its core.

Second, a series of embarrassing public episodes has chipped away at the profession's reputation and perhaps at its authority.

Third, the whole culture of psychotherapy, which has influenced everything from report cards to sermons, from welfare reform to the training of our soldiers, has become cloying, even disturbing. One is reminded of Rollo May's warning "that psychoanalysis and psychotherapy in general [could] become part of the neurosis of our day rather than part of the cure."

Yet, if the profession is in turmoil these days, that is a good thing and long overdue, like New York City's brush with bankruptcy during the 1970s. My own prognosis for psychiatry is
guardedly optimistic. It is clear today where reform is needed, and there is more willingness than before to undertake it. To me, the next few decades look like this:

¶ The new biological orientation in psychiatry, particularly among younger practitioners, will not be reversed. No new Freud will recapture the momentum for psychoanalysis or psychotherapy. This is not to say that psychodynamic therapies will not and should not continue. There is no question that they can be effective. “Let’s face it,” I remember one psychiatrist saying, “I’ve helped a lot of people over the years so I must have been doing something right.” But the “medical model” of mental illness will emerge preeminent, permanently.

¶ Psychiatrists in the future, of whatever orientation, will have to make their treatments less ad hoc and experimental. Some of the pressure here is coming from the courts. Malpractice suits involving psychiatrists are arising more frequently, and the standard for adequacy of treatment laid down in Rouse v. Cameron (U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, 1966) is unequivocal: Treatment must be adequate in light of present knowledge. Psychiatrists will have to be real doctors, familiar with the possible biological aspects of a patient’s disorders. Because no physician can be expected to know everything, we will therefore see psychiatrists dividing up their tasks far more than they have before.

¶ Finally, there will be new attempts to define what is and is not a mental illness. The most important distinction to make is between those who are truly ill and those we might call the “worried well.” Today, the worried well—people who perhaps feel a little sad or “maladjusted,” or who are fine and dandy but aspire to perfection—are the mainstay of private psychiatric practice. A century ago, psychiatry was not much of a profession, but psychiatrists were among the few people in the country who tried to help the insane and the seriously disturbed. That commitment needs to be revived.

Some critics would do away with psychiatry altogether, allowing it to be nibbled away by neurologists from one side and psychologists and social workers from the other. That would be a mistake. It is a unique profession, one whose members possess knowledge and skills that cannot be exactly duplicated by neuroscientists, clinical psychologists, or social workers. Only psychiatrists will be able to merge the new discoveries about the brain with older theories about how personality is shaped (and warped). Only psychiatrists, as medical doctors, stand a chance of radically improving the quality of care for the insane.

And psychiatrists are in the best position to begin "de-
psychologizing” America. The task is considerable: Large numbers of Americans are excessively preoccupied with what is going on inside their heads. “The old alchemical dream,” Tom Wolfe has written, “was changing base metal into gold. The new alchemical dream is: changing one’s personality—remaking, re-modeling, elevating, and polishing one’s very self . . . and observing, studying, and doting on it.” Everyone does a little of this; millions of Americans do a lot. They pay others to help with the overhaul. In effect, they mortgage some part of their free will and autonomy when they look to specialists for definitive answers: Who am I? How can I be happy? Should I do this or that?

Psychiatry in and of itself is not responsible for this odd situation. Psychiatrists, along with psychologists, Eastern mystics, fitness experts, and others merely reaped a harvest that was already ripening. The long bibliography of self-improvement books published during the 19th century suggests that the “new alchemical dream” has been with us for some time. It was Henry David Thoreau, not Dr. Joyce Brothers, who asserted that “the unexamined life is not worth living.” But since World War II, the popularization of psychiatry and the assumptions about self and society that go with it have made matters worse.

Even as traditional beliefs came under siege, psychotherapeutic notions encouraged individuals to make themselves (rather than God, society, or the family) the one overriding point of reference. That preoccupation undermines many things vital to any free society: a sense of community, shared values, strong families. It contributes to the erosion of basic distinctions—between rights and duties, collective and individual responsibilities. And ironically, as the “Me Generation” is beginning to find out, such self-indulgence does not make one any more independent, but simply dependent on something different.

By retreating from some of the terrain they have staked out over the years, by emphasizing that therapy is a limited form of treatment rather than a world view, and by talking less grandly in public, psychiatrists will be doing some good for their profession, their patients, and the larger American society.
All societies, not just 20th-century America, confront the mysteries of the deranged, disturbed, or eccentric mind. In the past, they have variously responded by elevating the "touched" to positions of considerable influence or mystical significance, by ostracizing or killing them, or by subjecting them to harsh physical or psychological ordeals in the hope of effecting a cure.

The crucial question is: Who is really deranged?

"Every culture, to my knowledge, has some category that can be called 'madness', but madness is not always clearly distinguished from other categories of thought and behavior. At what point do we draw the line between innovative and insane, between visionary and psychotic?"

So writes Bennett Simon in *Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece* (Cornell, 1978, cloth; 1980, paper). Among the Greeks, "deviance" was often a relative matter. Plato, for example, assumed that any political dissident was by definition disturbed; he therefore proposed in his *Laws* that atheists, as dissidents, be placed for five years in a *sophroniaterion*, or "house of sanity."

Whether symbolically in their myths, or explicitly in their medical and philosophical treatises, the ancient Greeks seem to have anticipated everything from psychotherapy and the interpretation of dreams to biological explanations of melancholy and hysteria.

Not surprisingly, Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and other early European psychoanalysts felt the tug of Greek antiquity. As Simon observes, Freud "saw Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* not merely as a convenient illustration of his newly discovered 'complex' but as an almost close-to-conscious attempt at analysis of the inner workings of the mind."

The influence of Freud on the practice of psychiatry is difficult to overestimate, and the Freudian literature is consequently immense.

The man's own work—beginning with a "Report on my Studies in Paris and Berlin" (1885) and ending with "Anti-Semitism in England" (1938)—is available in the 24-volume *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Norton, 1976). Most of the better known monographs (e.g., *The Interpretation of Dreams*, 1900; *Totem and Taboo*, 1913; *Civilization and its Discontents*, 1930; *Moses and Monotheism*, 1939) are also available individually in paperback from W. W. Norton. Freud was a superb writer, whose prose style drew high praise from authors as diverse as Thomas Mann and Herman Hesse.

Freud was fortunate in his first biographer, Ernest Jones, whose hagiographical *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud* (Basic, 1961, cloth & paper) helped place the Viennese psychoanalyst on the high pedestal he still occupies. Two recent biographies provide a more balanced perspective—Ronald W. Clark's *Freud: The Man and the Cause* (Cape and Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1980) and Frank J. Sulloway's *Freud: Biologist of the Mind* (Basic, 1979).

One of the better overviews of Freud's ideas and their impact in the United States is *Psychiatry in America*.
can Life (Little, Brown, 1963), a highly readable, though dated, collection of 15 essays edited by Charles Rolo. The book, whose contents originally appeared in the Atlantic, includes chapters by Brock Brower (on "The Contemporary Scene"), John Seeley (on "The Americanization of the Unconscious"), and Alfred Kazin (on "The Language of Pundits").

Kazin blames "Freudianism" for a deterioration in the quality of modern American fiction. "It is impossible," he writes, "for the haunted, the isolated, the increasingly self-absorbed and self-referring self to transcend itself sufficiently to create works of literature."

David Stannard has a different bone to pick. In Shrinking History (Oxford, 1980, cloth; 1982, paper), he looks askance at the influence of psychoanalysis on historiography. Among the gems he culls from the prose of the new psychohistorians is this one: "Bosch, of course, is just a more finicky da Vinci. And da Vinci is just [Martin] Luther with a talent for drawing."

Ironically, contends psychoanalyst Bruno Bettelheim in his latest book, Freud and Man's Soul (Knopf, 1983), the conventional interpretation of some of Freud's ideas may be the product in part of faulty translation. For instance, translators have customarily rendered Freud's die Seele into English as the coldly impersonal "mental apparatus," rather than as "the soul," as Freud intended.

Examples of such heavy-handedness are numerous. The inevitable result, in Bettelheim's view: Few readers of Freud in English appreciate that "he was a humanist in the best sense of the word."

Freud's ideas penetrated the United States in the years before World War I. But there was psychiatry in the United States long before there was Freud, and a mental health "establishment" was in existence by the mid-1800s. David Rothman, in The Discovery of the Asylum (Little, Brown, 1971, cloth; 1972, paper), and Gerald Grob, in Mental Institutions in America (Free Press, 1973), cover the period from colonial times to the beginning of the 20th century. Though bureaucratic histories in some respects, both books are clearly written and easily accessible to the lay reader.

The Psychiatric Society (Columbia, 1982), by Robert Castel, Françoise Castel, and Anne Lovell, brings the story up to the late 1970s, with particular emphasis on the evolving role of state and federal governments, and of organized psychiatry as a professional guild. The volume concludes with a critical survey of the broad array of "psy services," from gestalt therapy to primal scream to bioenergetics, now available in the United States.

What makes this book especially interesting is that it is written from an outsider's perspective (two of the authors are French) and with a European audience in mind (the book was first published in France). Noting that the United States is the country where psychiatry "has penetrated most deeply into the social fabric," the authors warn that "the American dream of mental health is not just a curiosity. . . . If we can learn to see it as in some ways a model of what is in store for us in Europe, perhaps we can keep it from becoming the nightmare of our tomorrows."

Among U.S. critics of psychiatry, the most prominent has long been Thomas Szasz. Szasz's argument is aptly summarized in the title of his first book, The Myth of Mental Illness (Harper, rev. ed., 1974). He con-
tends that, strictly speaking, the term "illness" refers to an abnormal biological condition; it should not, therefore, be applied to most forms of psychiatric distress.

Szasz attributes the "mental illness" notion partly to a tacit compact between the public and the psychiatrists, sealed during the 19th century. The latter agreed to regard certain types of individuals as "sick"—thereby providing a justification for putting these people away. The former agreed to regard the latter as "doctors." The compact was ratified by many patients, since it relieved them of personal responsibility for ethical or spiritual dilemmas.

Psychiatry is often viewed only in the abstract. Two staff writers for the New Yorker provide chapter and verse in a pair of recent books.

Janet Malcolm, in Psychoanalysis: The Impossible Profession (Knopf, 1981, cloth; Vintage, 1982, paper), profiles a pseudonymous New York analyst, Aaron Green, "a slight man with a vivid, impatient, unsmiling face." Green talked with Malcolm for weeks on end about his patients, himself, his colleagues, and the nature of his vocation.

Green compares psychoanalysis, when it works, to the end of A Midsummer Night's Dream, "when the human characters wake up and rub their eyes and aren't sure what has happened to them. They have the feeling that a great deal has occurred—that things have somehow changed for the better, but they don't know what caused the change."

There are no magical Pucks and Oberons in Susan Sheehan's Is There No Place on Earth for Me? (Houghton, 1982, cloth; Vintage, 1983, paper). Sheehan chronicles the life of a paranoid schizophrenic named Sylvia Frumkin, from grade school through adulthood in New York, in and out of mental hospitals, from one examining psychiatrist and round of drugs to the next. Sheehan was given complete access to Frumkin's psychiatric records and did most of her reporting on the scene.

The result is a solid indictment of contemporary mental health care in the United States. No Place is also a profoundly depressing story. One comes away from the book hoping only that psychotherapy and drugs, despite their current inadequacies, will one day be able to help the Frumkins of the earth.
MACKINDER: Geography as an Aid to Statecraft
by W.H. Parker
Oxford, 1982
295 pp. $34.95

The British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder (1861–1947) is today best remembered for his "Heartland" theory: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island: Who rules the World-Island commands the world." He is also recognized for coining "land-power," "man-power," and other terms now enjoying wide currency among policy-makers.

But Mackinder did much more than expand the lexicon of geopolitics. In addition to lecturing and writing extensively on geography, he served as a High Commissioner to Russia, a member of Parliament, and director of the London School of Economics. Impressive as Mackinder's career was, W. H. Parker, a former Oxford lecturer in geography, concentrates more on his subject's ideas and influence than on his life. Though Mackinder was an old-fashioned conservative in his politics, he possessed a powerful, future-oriented intellectual vision. Indeed, many of his notions have more relevance today than they did in his own time.

Some writers, including Parker, see the Heartland concept as the foundation of the American theory of Soviet "containment," though there is little evidence that the chief architect of containment, diplomat George F. Kennan, drew anything from Mackinder's work. Others clearly did. Mackinder's theory, distorted by German interpreters, was invoked by Hitler to justify his invasion of the Soviet Union, the vast interior of which corresponded to the Heartland. Richard Nixon, in his recent book, The Real War (1980), uses the concept to describe Soviet ambitions. Russians have always been puzzled, and a little alarmed, by Western strategists' preoccupation with their relatively inaccessible interior. As Mackinder himself originally envisioned it, the Heartland was simply that inner part of Eurasia having "no available waterways to the ocean"—a no-drainage zone. (He discerned a "second" Heartland in Africa, south of the Sahara.) Since the 1973 oil embargo, the strategic advantages of the Soviet interior—both its mineral wealth and its proximity to the resources of the Persian Gulf nations and of China—have become more apparent, thus giving more substance to Western fears.

Although usually considered a theorist of land-power, Mackinder, as a loyal son of the British Empire, was (like the American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan) a believer in "sea-power." Unless Great Britain were more efficiently linked to her overseas possessions, he argued, she would be overtaken by the emergent "continental empires": America, Russia, China. He realized, however, that imperial unity could be maintained only...
by cooperation between England and its dependencies. Alert as a political geographer and social conservative to the virtues of local autonomy, he outspokenly favored partial devolution for the Empire and even for the British Isles themselves. In 1919, he proposed in Parliament a plan for subdividing England into three parts—London, agricultural England, and the industrial North—giving legislative powers to each, as well as to Scotland, Wales, and the two parts of Ireland. "Would my hon. Friend not go a little further and re-establish the Kingdom of Kent?" a critic mockingly inquired. Growing interest in administrative decentralization in Great Britain today makes Mackinder’s scheme seem less fanciful.

Mackinder’s fundamental concern, stated most fully in *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (1919), was to maintain the vitality of the British people. A country’s manpower ("capital fixed in humanity") was its greatest asset. Nothing threatened Britain’s manpower more, Mackinder foresaw, than massive unemployment, to which Britain’s free-trading, specialized economy made her especially vulnerable. Though in theory profitable for any society, laissez-faire, he believed, would eventually impoverish imperial England, not by reducing its "wealth" but by undercutting its technical versatility and its adaptiveness. A united, educated citizenry, confident of its varied skills, was far more important than cheap imports. Therefore, although he had begun his career as a champion of free-trade imperialism, he quickly became a leader in the movement for tariff reform (i.e., protectionism). The trend of present-day liberal-internationalist thought interestingly parallels Mackinder’s evolution.

The century’s most famous geographer stands out as the embodiment of what he himself liked to call "outlook"—taking the long view. “I can see him now,” recalled a former student, Sir Horace Wilson, “explaining the economic (and politico-economic) significance of the Urals, the Alps, or the Andes as if he were atop one of them—or was indeed a part of them.”

—Alan K. Henrikson, ’78

BEHIND THE VEIL IN ARABIA:
Women in Oman
by Unni Wikan
Johns Hopkins, 1982
314 pp. $23.50

Unni Wikan is a young Norwegian anthropologist whose first book was an extraordinary work called *Life Among the Poor in Cairo* (1980). In it, she described the family lives of a small group of people in one of the slums of the sprawling Egyptian capital, painting a bleak picture of continual quarreling and malice, gossip and violence, suspicion, emotional crudity, and hypocrisy, all in a crowded and filthy environment.

Wikan’s latest study took her to Sohar, a town that could hardly be more different from Cairo. Located on the coast of Oman, near the mouth of the Persian Gulf, it has a population of only about 15,000. Its menfolk live mainly by migrant labor, the cultivation of date palms, and fishing. In sharp contrast to Cairo, the town is relatively homogeneous in terms of

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class, but ethnically very mixed. Only a little over half the people are Arabs, the rest mostly Iranians and Baluchis.

Wikan studied the Arabs, who are everything that the Cairene poor are not: blessed with beautiful manners, dignified, serene, and poised. They also mind their own business. If a wife is unfaithful, even if she prostitutes herself, that is a matter between her and her husband. Her neighbors, women of impeccable reputation, will treat her in the same polite and friendly way that they treat anyone else, whether visiting her in her home or receiving her in theirs. Even the transvestite male prostitutes have an accepted place. The Sohar women are also in the highest degree reserved and inexpressive. Under quite ordinary circumstances, a group of them may sit together for eight hours and exchange no more than a few dozen sentences.

The sexes are segregated in Sohar to an extent unusual even in the Islamic world. Women move in a tiny social circle consisting almost exclusively of the women and children of a few adjacent houses. Shopping is done by men, for a woman would be ashamed to go to the market. Fertile ground, one might think, for a women’s liberation movement—or at least for resentment. Not at all, says Wikan: The women, far from objecting to these restrictions, welcome them as a sign that they are honored and protected by their men.

Wikan, a fine ethnographer, has an eye for everything that is distinctive about the culture and by the careful use of small details builds up a wholly convincing picture. Above all, there is a sustained attempt to penetrate the inner lives of these strangely serene people, an attempt that may lead other readers, as it did me, to ponder what individual sacrifices, intellectual and emotional, might be required to maintain a social facade of such unruffled calm.

—Frank H. Stewart


"Franz Liszt was a delightful fellow." So began the first biographical essay I ever read on Hungary’s greatest composer. After 30 years of reading in the Liszt bibliography (which currently embraces over 10,000 items), I see no reason to challenge that verdict.

The man was improbably handsome, charming, decent, and unselfish—at least during the years covered by Walker in this new, definitive study. Later on, during his years in Weimar and through his vie trifurquée (Liszt’s own phrase for his restless old-age wanderings in Italy, Hungary, and Germany), there would be outbreaks of melancholia and misanthropy, expressed in the savage, atonal music that his countryman Béla Bartók found so fascinating. But these black depressions were like spots on the sun: Liszt was too radiant a personality to indulge them for
long. He remained a “delightful” fellow to the end of his life, happily curbing his own ambition to help along the careers of others. Schumann, Berlioz, Wagner, and Grieg were but a few of the many who owed their early successes to Liszt’s patronage and counsel.

Not that Liszt’s career suffered as a result of his generosity. At age 14, he saw one of his operas staged in Paris. By 1841, his piano recitals had put him at the center of a craze that was sweeping cultured Europe—a frenzy of adulation that the German poet Heinrich Heine dubbed “Lisztomania.”

It follows that Liszt biographers are more than normally prone to what the English historian Thomas Macaulay called lues boswelliana, the disease of admiration. Walker, professor of music at McMaster University, has not escaped unscathed after 10 years of studying the man more closely than any previous scholar. He goes to great lengths, for example, to prove that Liszt was virtually the only prominent mid-century European not to sleep with the notorious “Spanish dancer,” Lola Montez (born Eliza Gilbert of Limerick, Ireland). Be that as it may, this biography—massively researched, gracefully written, and elegantly produced—is certain to emerge as the most important full-length study of Liszt to appear in nearly a century.

The volume at hand is dense with new material, notably from the vast Esterházy Archives in Budapest. It proves among other things that Liszt, despite his aristocratic mien and rumored patents of nobility, was born to virtual serfdom, rising from his humble Magyar origins only through the irresistible force of his genius. Adam Liszt at long last receives his due as the most inspiring and supportive of musical fathers, Leopold Mozart not excepted. Franz’s own (inherited) religiosity, his agonized self-transformation in Paris in 1832 (“Ah! provided I don’t go mad, you will find in me an artist. . . .”), his difficult romance with Marie d’Agoult (who left her husband in 1834 and lived with Liszt for 10 years), his grand tours of Europe and Asia Minor—all are treated in revealing detail. Yet even this book is not exhaustive. One would like, for instance, to have read more about what made Liszt so unique a pianist (the excellent eyewitness accounts by Sir Charles Hallé are unaccountably missing) and composer. Doubtless, these questions will be dealt with fully in Professor Walker’s next volume. Musicians and music-lovers everywhere await it eagerly.

—Edmund Morris

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NEW TITLES

History

BLOOD RIVER: The Passionate Saga of South Africa’s Afrikaners and of Life in their Embattled Land
by Barbara Villet
Everest House, 1982
255 pp. $16.95

Neither her earlier visits to the country nor marriage to a white South African fully prepared journalist Villet for her 1980 confrontation in Johannesburg with a young Dutch Reformed minister. His “black eyes glittering,” he informed the American writer that the Declaration of Independence was one of the most “corrupt documents ever written.” It was blasphemy, he held, not to think that God had made “some men for mastery and others for servitude.” Villet’s history traces the Afrikaner’s world view to the creed of John Calvin, laid down in 1534, and brought to the Cape of Good Hope by three shiploads of Dutch colonists in 1652. Seeing themselves as the Children of Israel, the first of roughly 6,000 Afrikaners began, in 1836, their northward trek to escape British dominion and to establish their own republic. Two years later, 500 Afrikaners defeated 15,000 ostrich-plumed Zulus at Blood River, confirming their sense of a special covenant with God. Autonomy was short-lived: From their defeat in the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) until they gained a majority in the South African Parliament almost fifty years later, they chafed under English rule. Constructing an elaborate system of apartheid during the 1950s, the Afrikaners thought they had fulfilled their God-given mission to rule the land. But growing tensions, signalled by the Sharpeville and Soweto riots of the 1960s and ’70s, have forced them into a political dilemma that old dogma will not resolve.

EVE AND THE NEW JERUSALEM: Socialism and Feminism in the Nineteenth Century
by Barbara Taylor
Pantheon, 1983
394 pp. $9.95

“Every family is a center of absolute despotism,” from whose center spreads “a contagion of selfishness and love of domination,” wrote the 19th-century English journalist William Thompson, an enthusiastic convert to the socialist vision of Robert Owen (1771–1858). Unlike later Marxian socialists, followers of Owen (a successful Manchester industrialist before he became a fierce oppo-
Both in his teaching at Louisiana State and in his writing, Williams (1909–79) subscribed to what he called a version of the "great man" theory of history. These essays take up some of the same personalities and issues that inspired such widely acclaimed books as *Lincoln and His Generals* (1952) and *Huey Long* (1969). In "The Military Systems of the North and South," Williams briskly contrasts the strategies and leadership of the opposing armies, showing how Lincoln (though militarily untutored) "interfered to make a sound offensive strategy stronger" and Jefferson Davis (a West Point graduate and war veteran) "interfered to make a defective defensive strategy more defensive." Elsewhere, he discusses Lincoln's strained wartime rela-
A SORT OF UTOPIA
Scarsdale, 1891–1981
by Carol A. O'Connor
SUNY, 1983
283 pp. $34.50

At the turn of the century, Scarsdale, N.Y., was still a farming community, supplying dairy products and other perishable foods to nearby New York City. By 1981, the farmers had long been supplanted by bankers, lawyers, and other well-to-do folk who found a haven from the storm and stress of Manhattan life. During the intervening years, Scarsdale gained its current reputation as the quintessential suburb, the jewel of Westchester County, boasting innovative municipal services (including a fermentation method of garbage disposal), first-rate schools, and a tradition of local administration free of partisan politics. But utopia has its costs, including the price of a house (1981 average: $230,000) and tax burdens commensurate with the high level of village services. In this balanced study, O'Connor, a Utah State historian, chronicles local feuds (particularly anti-communist attacks on the schools in the early '50s), the shift from a predominantly Protestant population in 1940 to a predominantly Jewish one by 1980, the arrival of blacks in the community, and the entry of women into village government. Having accepted such social changes, Scarsdale, she concludes, can now “lay claim to being a capitalistic utopia, open to all of society’s achievers with little regard to race, religion, or sex.”
SON OF THE REVOLUTION
by Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro
Knopf, 1983
301 pp. $15

Growing up in Mao's China taught Liang, now a U.S. citizen, one terribly important lesson: “the danger that lies in blind obedience.” Born in 1954 in the central Chinese city of Changsha, Liang, like most toddlers, was taught that Mao was “like the sun itself.” But the ways of this almighty figure were, he quickly learned, frighteningly unpredictable. In 1957, his mother, a party functionary, following the orders of the reformist Hundred Flowers Movement, criticized one of her superiors. The next year, when the party inaugurated the Anti-Rightist Movement, she was punished for following Mao’s earlier command. To show his loyalty to the “Great Saving Star,” Liang’s father, a journalist, divorced his wife, but the family remained stigmatized. Liang’s narration of subsequent tribulations (a six-day stint of solitary confinement at age 15 for corresponding with a “rightist”), his growing disillusionment, and his attempts to survive (joining a gang of teenage hoodlums, he felt “truly free” for the first time) reads like a Kafka fable come true. Allowed to enroll in Hunan Teacher’s College in 1978, he there met Judith Shapiro, an American teacher, whom he subsequently married and with whom he penned this vivid account of a truly lost generation.

“Consequences of Party Reform”
by Nelson W. Polsby
Oxford, 1983
267 pp. $8.95

“If it ain’t broke,” current wisdom in Washington goes, “don’t fix it.” This study of the consequences of the 1968–72 reforms of the presidential candidate selection process suggests that skepticism toward political tinkering is warranted. Acknowledging that back-room politics can produce presidential disasters of the Warren G. Harding variety, Polsby, a Berkeley political scientist, charges that the liberal reformers’ moves to “open up” the presidential selection process have backfired. Not only have they increased the power of the media and special interest groups in shaping elections; they have driven...
many Americans away from the polls. Replacing the “closed” state party conventions, presidential primaries are indeed sending more women, blacks, and Hispanics to the national conventions, but they are nonrepresentative (wealthy, highly educated) minorities who displace “mainstream” delegates. Early primary winners go on to be rubber-stamped by party convention empty of political substance—i.e., compromise, coalition-building. If they win the Presidency, such candidates may take office as experts in being nominated and elected, but novices in governing the heterogeneous American populace. Polsby’s recommendations? Let parties be parties. Some state and local parties conform to the reformers’ ideal of openness. Others, “exclusive, narrow, and hierarchical” as they are, he argues, are still more “broadly based and highly diversified” than any other interest groups. U.S. parties will produce worthy, astute candidates if reformers keep their distance.

Arts & Letters

PRISONERS OF HOPE: The Silver Age of the Italian Jews, 1924-1974
by H. Stuart Hughes
Harvard, 1983
188 pp. $15.00

Although the word “ghetto” is Italian in origin (Venetian Jews were first segregated on an island, the site of a foundry, or geto, in 1516), Italy can boast a tradition remarkably lacking in religious prejudice. Its ancient Jewish communities are among the most assimilated in the world. Is it then possible, asks historian Hughes (now of the University of California, San Diego), for Jews “both to be highly assimilated and to treasure their Jewish heritage”? Hughes considers the literary careers of six notable 20th-century Italian Jewish writers. The first to receive critical recognition, Italo Svevo, author of The Confessions of Zeno (1923), a comic novel praised by James Joyce, made very little of his Jewishness; the last, Giorgio Bassani, was unique in treating his origins explicitly and affirmatively in such works as The Garden of the Finzi-Contin (1962). For most of the six, a sense of religious heritage came with age, though for some the experience of suffering...
and ostracism during Mussolini's later years forced "the private, muted, ancestral consciousness" to the surface earlier. Nevertheless, argues Hughes, because Jews in Italy were in many respects "indistinguishable" from their Christian compatriots, they wrote ecumenically of their ordeal, testifying "on behalf of all victims," anti-Fascist Christians as well as Jews. Always striving for "what was universal," Jewish writers affirmed the resilient optimistic humanism of their heritage.

**OUR NIG; or, Sketches from the Life of a Free Black**  
by Harriet E. Wilson  
introduction and notes by Henry Louis Gates, Jr.  
Vintage, 1983  
232 pp. $10.95 cloth, $4.95 paper

This landmark of black American fiction—it was the first novel by a black woman to be published in this country—suffered more than a century of neglect. A sentimental novel focusing on white racism in the antebellum North, it resembled in some respects the widely read slave narratives written during the mid-19th century. Its heroine, Frado, an indentured servant, suffers under her cruel white mistress until, at age 18, her health broken, she is thrown out upon the world. Wilson's largely autobiographical 1859 novel touched on interracial marriage and the hypocrisy of abolitionists. Such matters were far less palatable to white readers than those treated in the more exotic slave narratives. *Our Nig* did not receive a single review. It remained known only to a few librarians and scholars, who considered it a curiosity authored by a white woman. Gates, a Yale scholar, has done a masterful piece of detective work in establishing the identity of the author. His efforts have given this work its proper place in a vigorous literary tradition.

**THE ART OF DESCRIBING: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century**  
by Svetlana Alpers  
Chicago, 1983  
273 pp. $37.50

Dutch painting of the 17th century, though widely admired by gallery-goers for its richness of detail, has usually received less than the highest marks from art historians and critics. Alpers, a Berkeley art historian, attributes their faint praise to the fact that most "analytic strategies" used by modern academic critics were developed "in refer-
ence to the Italian [Renaissance] tradition," with its emphases upon elaborate perspective systems, the human form, and iconography (i.e., the painting's allusion to religious or mythical texts). By contrast, the works of such painters as Pieter Saenredam, Willem Kalf, and Jan Vermeer reflect the distinctive cultural climate of 17th-century Holland—a society fascinated by the visible world. The popularity of the camera obscura (prototype of the modern camera), optics, and lens-making disposed artists toward a kind of visual reporting. While the Italians sought primarily to interpret the world, the Dutch sought to describe the world—an impulse shared by Holland's skilled cartographers.

The interest in description found intellectual support in a number of widely circulated philosophical and scientific texts, including Sir Francis Bacon's empiricist arguments and Johannes Kepler's treatise on the eye. Alpers acknowledges exceptions to the Dutch pattern. Rembrandt's thickly layered canvases, his moody orchestrations of light and shadow, and his frequent treatment of Biblical themes suggest an emphasis on things felt rather than seen. But most Dutch artists strove to depict the teeming here-and-now, a task at which they had few equals.

"Can any of us imagine saying no to all the great benefits that the bioengineering of life will bring to bear?" Rifkin, author of the controversial Entropy (1980), here argues that we should. "Algeny," a neologism coined by Dr. Joshua Lederberg, a Nobel laureate biologist, is the belief that all living organisms are merely temporary sets of DNA-based relationships on their way to becoming something else—and now, with the aid of genetic engineers, cybernetics, and computers, something "better." The new "algenetic" theory of evolution will, Rifkin believes, supplant the Darwinian theory, and become the justification for a world in which living organisms are
viewed as immediately manipulable "patterns of information." Rifkin's book is mostly a meditation on the relationship between a society's beliefs, such as the theory of evolution, and the interests of its most powerful members. Most biologists will have few quarrels with Rifkin's restatement of the argument that Darwin transferred to nature the "hidden hand" of Adam Smith's marketplace, thus giving the authority of natural law to the emerging disparities of wealth in industrializing England. His assertion that Darwinism is on the way out will raise many eyebrows. Still, this is a forceful warning against the dangers of bioengineering, including the looming prospect of widespread, commercialized eugenics.

Breakfast in bed may sound like a peculiarly modern form of self-indulgence. But according to Binford, professor of archaeology at the University of New Mexico, prehistoric hunter-gatherers used their beds for a variety of private activities, including eating and tool-making. Examining the material remains—bones, fragments of pottery, and other artifacts—is only one technique Binford employs to "decode the archaeological record." Equally important are comparative ethnographic studies of surviving hunter groups (e.g., Nunamiut Eskimos and !Kung Bushmen) and the experimental simulation of cooking, hunting, and other living patterns that may have prevailed in the distant past. Concerning his life-long interest—the prehistoric transition from hunter-gatherer to farming societies—Binford assails the Marxist theory of a "goal-oriented" change. A nonmigratory agricultural life was, he argues, more a matter of necessity (expanding human populations reduced the stocks of wild game) than of desire; Eskimos today barely tolerate the change to sedentary life. Binford provides an excellent introduction to what has come to be called the "New Archaeology," distinguishing its more scientific orientation from earlier, antiquarian approaches.
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LOOKING FAR NORTH: The Harriman Expedition to Alaska, 1899. By William Goetzmann and Kay Sloan. Princeton, 1983. 244 pp. $8.95

This beautifully written account describes one of the last great privately sponsored scientific expeditions of the 19th century. A luxurious adventure by steamship up the coast of Alaska in the summer of 1899, it was financed and led by railroad tycoon Edward H. Harriman. Mixing reconnaissance with recreation, the magnate was considering the prospects for a railway that would connect Alaska (via a long tunnel beneath the Bering Straits) to Siberia and “circle” the world. Guests and crew, 126 souls in all, included Harriman’s family, artists, physicians, photographers. Present were two dozen of the nation’s leading scientists, among them geologist Grove Gilbert and naturalist Charles Hart Merriam. Three pioneers of the conservation movement, notably John Muir, rounded out the group. The expeditioners discovered two of the Alaskas that we know today: “one, the stunning pristine land of forests and mountains and magnificent glaciers, the other, a last frontier, being invaded by greedy, rapacious, and sometimes pathetic men.” The authors, both professors of American studies at the University of Texas, relate the scientific achievements of the journey, but their book’s main appeal lies in its evocation of a few brief months at the century’s end when the good ship “George W. Edler” became a kind of floating “think tank,” full of eminent Victorians of the American variety.

IN THE SHADE OF SPRING LEAVES: The Life and Writings of Higuchi Ichiyo, a Woman of Letters in Meiji Japan. By Robert Lyons Danley. Yale, 1983. 335 pp. $10.95

In the rush to Westernization that came with the Meiji Restoration (1867–1912), many Japanese writers flocked to embrace contemporary European literary styles, abandoning their own classical traditions. Ichiyo (1872–1896) never compromised her art in this way. Weaving entries from Ichiyo’s journal into his own biographical narrative and translating nine of her stories, Danley, an Orientalist at the University of Michigan, traces her development from an imitator of classical models into a realist of a distinctively Japanese stamp. Ichiyo’s first tales relied on the literary conventions (wordplay, allusion, and ritualized plots) of the Heian period, epitomized by Murasaki’s The Tale of Genji (ca. 1000 A.D.). Yet perhaps her middle-class family’s declining fortunes prevented her work from becoming a series of pale, stylistic echoes. A youth spent in Tokyo’s seamy quarters, amid brothels and bustling shops, introduced her to a harder world. Her later stories, including “Encounters on a Dark Night,” focused on orphans, misfits, and prostitutes, people who shared the impoverished conditions that led to Ichiyo’s own
death (of tuberculosis) at age 24. Appearing in these stories were characters whom another great Meiji writer, Mori Ogai, praised as "real human individuals" superior to "those beastly creatures of Ibsen and Zola."

**A GOOD MAN IN AFRICA.** By William Boyd. Penguin, 1983. 312 pp. $3.95

Morgan Leafy, protagonist of this novel, may be one of the more engaging Everymen to emerge in recent English fiction. On his first diplomatic assignment to the tropical African state of Kinjanja, Leafy is letting his unruly appetites, particularly for drink and women, get the better of him. A "dose" contracted from his African mistress brings a quick end to his courtship of the chief of mission's attractive, vacuous daughter. More seriously, Leafy's lechery exposes him to the blackmailing schemes of a local politician. Boyd, a lecturer at Oxford, describes the cancerous progress of corruption—and the men who resist or submit to it. He also describes the disorderly urban hodgepodges that grow in postcolonial Africa like "some ominous yeast culture, left in a damp cupboard by an absent-minded lab technician." Boyd's touch is comic, but, like Graham Greene, he explores a serious theme: the moral education of an average, sensual man.

**EMULATION AND INVENTION.** By Brooke Hindle. Norton, 1983. 162 pp. $5.95

The development of the steamboat and telegraph tells much about invention in early America and about the general workings of mechanical ingenuity. While there were two earlier American pioneers of the steamboat (James Rumsey and John Fitch), it took the American painter and artisan, Robert Fulton, to bring all the parts together in an efficient, workable design. The overlap of technology and the arts was also epitomized by Samuel Morse, the portraitist and NYU professor who in 1832 designed the first telegraph on a canvas-stretcher. The artist's skill in copying, redefining, and conceiving images is crucial to the inventor, argues Hindle, a Smithsonian historian, and was recognized as such 100 years ago. He shows, in pictures as in text, that technology and art are at bottom always linked. A sense of their connection enabled 19th-century Americans to fill a relatively undeveloped, unregulated environment with images that worked.
John F. Kennedy And The Intellectuals

In the minds of many Americans, the assassination of John Fitzgerald Kennedy—20 years ago this November—marks the symbolic beginning of that turbulent era known as the Sixties. But to a large extent, argues historian Allen Matusow, the '60s had their roots in the late 1950s, when a handful of East Coast intellectuals sought to revitalize American liberalism—and thereby the nation itself. The United States, they said, had gone soft. With the prosperity of the Eisenhower years had come moral and political lethargy. Ironically, that same prosperity bolstered the liberals' belief that the nation's domestic problems—unemployment, racism, and poverty—could now be rapidly solved while America defended freedom around the world. As a candidate for President in 1959-60, John F. Kennedy gradually embraced the liberal platform. He campaigned as a liberal after receiving the Democratic nomination. And after his death, his successor, Lyndon Johnson, went on to translate Kennedy's pledges into action at home and overseas. Unhappily, Matusow concludes, "like the premise of abundance that nourished the decade's idealism, the premises of its liberalism proved far more fragile than they seemed at the time."

by Allen J. Matusow

The election of 1960 became a classic of American political history. It attracted the highest rate of voter participation in half a century (64 percent), marked the emergence of a glamorous new personality (John F. Kennedy), and restored to power, after an eight-year lapse, the normal majority party (the Democrats). More important than the fate of men and parties, the Kennedy election initiated the resurgence of American liberalism, which had not commanded the political landscape since the first term of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Broadly speaking, contemporary liberalism could claim legitimate descent from historic bourgeois liberalism, with its affirmation of reason, progress, order, and the rights of the individual within the context of capitalism. But liberals long ago had cut loose from the original faith in the invisible hand and the limited state. Confronted by the problems of 20th-
century industrial society, proponents of liberalism had experimented with so many intellectual reformulations that liberalism seemed less a creature of the past than of mere mood.

The liberal mood of 1960 was largely defined by intellectuals residing on the East Coast, principally in New York City and Cambridge, Massachusetts. These intellectuals—nearly all of them liberals—shared a world view that profoundly influenced the political climate in this election year. The views of the elite intellectuals originated after World War II, when revulsion against Stalinism inspired a major reappraisal of beliefs. Liberal revulsion had little in common with popular anticommunism because it was that of a sinner in the throes of confession.

The alleged sin, committed in the Great Depression, was the sin of romantic delusion. As the intellectuals remembered the 1930s, too many of them had flirted with Marxism, dreamed of utopias, idealized common folk, joined popular front groups manipulated by Communists, and praised Russia as a progressive state. Because it was not wholly false, this caricature acutely embarrassed the intellectuals during the early years of the Cold War, and they did penance by eventually rallying to Harry Truman’s ideological crusade against Soviet communism.

Living in the shadow not only of Stalin’s purges but of Hitler’s death camps, those intellectuals who had once harbored chiliastic hopes and radical illusions abandoned them. “More and more of us have come to
feel, with Melville, Hawthorne, and Dostoevsky," wrote Robert Nisbet of his fellow intellectuals, "that in men's souls lie deep and unpredictable potentialities for evil that no human institutions can control."

Creating the ADA

The manifesto of postwar liberalism was Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s The Vital Center, published in 1949. At 32 already a famous Harvard professor and winner of a Pulitzer Prize in history, Schlesinger took aim in this book at those "progressives" who, he said, were still clinging to the dreams of the 1930s, still believing in the perfectibility of man, still blind to Soviet imperialism and the malevolence of the American Communist Party.

Thanks to a "restoration of radical nerve," Schlesinger wrote, the vogue of the fellow traveller was diminishing. Liberals were prepared now to reject all forms of totalitarianism unequivocally and to affirm a realistic democratic creed. As Schlesinger described it, this liberalism inspired the formation of the anticommunist Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) in 1947. It favored containing communism in Europe and aiding progressive regimes in former colonial areas. It relied on piecemeal reforms to solve the remaining problems of capitalist society. And it recognized the complexity of reality, the ineradicable sinfulness of human nature, the corruption of power, the virtues of pragmatism and gradualism, and the narrow possibilities of all human endeavor.

Prominent intellectuals not only declared for the West in the Cold War; they volunteered to be foot soldiers in the ideological battle. In 1950, a former Army colonel connected with the U.S. occupation in Germany organized the Congress for Cultural Freedom and invited intellectuals from Western countries to attend an inaugural session in West Berlin. The purpose of the Congress, which became a Cold War fixture, was to extol the virtues of intellectual life in the West.

A Truce

In the United States, the affiliate of the Congress was called the American Committee for Cultural Freedom, whose membership included some of the brightest liberal intellectuals: Schlesinger, David Riesman, Daniel Bell, Reinhold Niebuhr, Sidney Hook, Dwight Macdonald, Richard Rovere, Lionel Trilling, James Wechsler, and the coeditors of the Partisan Review, Philip Rahv and William Phillips. Most of the Americans affiliated with the Congress presumably did not know that its activities were partly subsidized by

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CIA funds laundered through dummy foundations.

As the intellectuals rallied to the defense of America during the early 1950s, they retreated from their role as critics of society. For one thing, there no longer seemed much to criticize. After the war, the crisis of capitalism had failed to make its expected reappearance, and unprecedented prosperity began eroding the old liberal antagonism toward big business. Here, the representative figure was the Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith, whose *American Capitalism* (1952) codified the terms of the truce.

Enter 'Mass Man'

Galbraith's message was that liberals should quit worrying about contemporary capitalism. Governments knew enough Keynesian economic theory to prevent another depression. Large corporations were not the enemies of economic efficiency but the promoters of technological progress. And concentrated corporate power was now "held in check by the countervailing power of those who are subject to it," by big unions, cooperative buying organizations, and government actions to increase the market power of the economically vulnerable.

Liberals heeded Galbraith's message and relaxed. The intellectuals also stopped worrying about economic inequality. Indeed, the condition of the masses during the 1950s acclamation more celebration than regret. Historian Richard Hofstadter observed that "the jobless, distracted, and bewildered men of 1933 have in the course of the years found substantial places in society for themselves, have become homeowners, suburbanites, and solid citizens." Only the re-emerging issue of legal and political equality for Southern blacks engendered any passion.

Gone with the old issues was the old feeling of kinship with the masses. During the 1930s, intellectuals had expected politics to be the battleground of ideologies, the focal point of class conflict, the medium for translating the will of the people into policy. During the 1950s, "the people" were transformed into that scourge of the age—"mass man."

In *Quest for Community* (1953), Columbia's Robert Nisbet typically explained mass man as the end result of historical forces which, since the Middle Ages, had ground down the primary associations of family, village, church, and guild, reducing individuals to social atoms and depriving them of community. Demagogues achieved power in this century, Nisbet explained, by promising to lead the alienated and lonely masses "to the Promised Land of the absolute, redemptive state."

Hurray for Pluralism

When Senator Joseph McCarthy rose to prominence during the early 1950s by conducting an unscrupulous Red hunt, the liberals fit him neatly into their facile categories. He was only the latest totalitarian demagogue, mobilizing the masses by voicing their resentments and fears. By contrast, the conservative elite, which had once borne the brunt of earlier liberal attacks, seemed now to be the last principled defender of liberty left—except, of course, for the intellectuals themselves.

Sociologists David Riesman and Nathan Glazer observed that "Wall Street was much closer to the liberal intellectuals on the two issues that were still alive—civil rights and civil liberties—... than were the former..."
allies of the liberal intellectuals, the farmers and lower classes of the city. The problem of democracy, it now appeared, was how to save it from the people.

The problem had a solution that almost all the intellectuals advanced: pluralism, defined as a multiplicity of autonomous associations responsive to the genuine needs of individuals and strong enough to resist both the state and the destructive impulses of the masses.

Despite the occasional aberration, most of the intellectuals believed America had already done a tolerable job of creating a pluralistic society and containing the masses. Politics in contemporary America was seen as a beneficent competition among interest groups, not as a struggle among ideologies with their pernicious tendency to arouse mass man.

Deploring Tail Fins

"The tendency to convert concrete issues into ideological problems, to color them with moral fervor and high emotional charge, is to invite conflicts which can only damage a society," wrote Daniel Bell in 1960. Fear of excited electorates was one reason why Bell hailed "the end of ideology."

Though contained politically, mass man dominated culture, the lone realm where the intellectuals continued to despise America. The trouble with the masses, they agreed, was their deplorable taste. The Democratic Vista (1958), by the Columbia literary critic Richard Chase, was characteristic.

On politics, Chase was brief: "For the moment, American politics and economics, on the domestic scene, appear impenetrable, mysterious, and roughly successful. A revolutionary politics or economics makes no sense to contemporary America. What do make sense are the liberal virtues: moderation, compromise, countervailing forces, the vital center, the mixed economy...."

Though the middle way was acceptable in politics, Chase said, in culture it fostered complacency, orthodoxy, and conformism. The danger was that mass culture would boil all taste and opinion into a sort of middlebrow mush. Thus, while they no longer attacked big business, intellectuals railed endlessly against the organization man, Madison Avenue, hidden persuaders, television, tail fins on cars, and the grosser evidence of American materialism.

Thanks to Sputnik

As the 1950s began to wane, the intellectuals grew restless. They liked to think of themselves historically as the friends of progress and justice, but found themselves now in uncomfortable alliance with privileged classes and institutions. Arthur Schlesinger in 1957 noted the widespread feeling "that liberalism in America has not for 30 years been so homeless, baffled, irrelevant, and impotent as it is today."

In the end, it was the Russians who inspired a revival of liberal purpose. On October 4, 1957, two months to the day after Schlesinger’s words appeared in the New York Times, the Soviet Union launched into orbit an 184-pound satellite called Sputnik, and in the process struck a devastating blow at America's self-regard and sense of security.

If the Russians had Sputnik, a host of commentators concluded, they probably had intercontinental ballistic missiles as well. If they were capable of concentrating resources inferior to America’s to launch Sputnik, their will to prevail in the Cold...
War just might be firmer than ours. The conservative New Hampshire Republican, Senator Styles Bridges, for once catching the national mood, declared: "The time has come clearly to be less concerned with the depth of pile on the new broadloom rug or the height of the tail fin on the new car and to be more prepared to shed blood, sweat, and tears."

An Affluent Society?

But concern about the nation's purpose found its chief spokesmen among the liberal intellectuals. Sputnik gave a point to their invocations against complacency and hedonism. It lent urgency to their preference for community well-being over narrow personal pursuits. And it made social criticism fashionable again.

J. K. Galbraith was writing another book in 1957. He had no high hopes for its reception until the Soviets launched their satellite. Then, he later recalled, "I knew I was home." A best-seller in 1958, *The Affluent Society* took exception to what it claimed to be the preeminent social goal of the American people—the perpetual increase of production for private use.

In a society where the real wants of most people were already satisfied, Galbraith argued, more private consumption meant less production for the public sector, social imbalance, and public squalor amid private opulence. Accordingly, Galbraith advocated higher taxes to divert wealth from private consumption into schools, parks, police departments, hospitals, slum clearance, and scientific research. One benefit of spending more on schools and slum clearance would be the reduction of such poverty as still existed.

As he knew it would, Galbraith's call for less materialism and more attention to the public welfare perfectly suited the nation's post-Sputnik temper.

The attacks on Galbraith's book were as important as the book itself. Leon Keyserling, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Truman, took aim at the heart of Galbraith's argument by denying that the United States was an affluent society.

Not only did most families not live in luxury, a huge minority—25 percent—were actually poor. Poverty on this scale could be diminished neither by spending more on public services, as Galbraith argued, nor by redistributing the wealth, as Galbraith did not argue. Poverty could be reduced in the future mainly as it had in the past—by large increases in production for private use and hence in general living standards.

Faster Growth

Thus, while Galbraith ridiculed growth, Keyserling sang its praises. He blamed the Eisenhower administration for an annual growth rate in GNP of only two percent in 1953-57 and advocated policies to increase it to five percent a year. Thanks in large measure to Keyserling, the issue of faster economic growth became a deepening liberal concern as the decade neared its end.

After Sputnik, liberal anxiety over national security became obsessive. When liberal intellectuals talked about reviving the public sector, they usually included building nuclear missiles, improving conventional military forces, and increasing economic aid to progressive noncommunist regimes in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. The Yale economist James Tobin, a liberal, a Keynesian, and a future member of Kennedy's
Council of Economic Advisers, asserted in 1958 that if the nation's leadership would only inform the people of the dangers, they would willingly "pay the taxes necessary to keep the Western World ahead in basic science, in weapons research and development, in armaments..."

**Tough on Ike**

The liberal intellectuals, who had entered the 1950s in retreat, were departing the decade in a fighting mood. Inspired by Galbraith, they summoned the nation to a higher purpose than mere production for private consumption. Persuaded by Keyserling, they demanded a national commitment to increased economic growth. They urged the nation to repair the public sector, and they pleaded with it to spend more to win the Cold War.

But though more aggressive than in the early 1950s, the liberals had amended none of the premises with which the decade began. Their program contained no hint of radicalism, no disposition to revive the old crusade against concentrated economic power, no desire to stir up class passions, redistribute the wealth, or restructure existing institutions. The liberals remained dedicated to that Pax Americana whose benefits to mankind would seem less evident later than at the time. At the end of the decade as at the beginning, the intellectuals were holding fast to the vital center.

Thanks to the anxieties provoked by Sputnik, the elite intellectuals found the public increasingly attentive to their exhortations.

Democratic politicians were especially receptive, since the critique of the intellectuals lent itself readily to partisan purposes. The nation was threatened by a missile gap, the Democrats said, but Eisenhower was more worried about the budget. The nation needed spiritual inspiration, but Eisenhower was playing golf. The nation needed strong leadership and an activist government, but Eisenhower was old, tired, and increasingly dominated by reactionary advisers.

During the first half of 1960, a presidential election year, American self-esteem suffered its worst setbacks since Sputnik, making prophets of the intellectuals and issues for the Democrats.

In January, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev alarmed the gullible by boasting again that he had nuclear rockets capable of wiping any country "off the face of the earth." In May, the Russians shot down an American U-2 spy plane and captured its pilot. In Paris for a summit meeting, Eisenhower endured Khrushchev's denunciations of the spy flights, refused to apologize, and finally left deeply depressed. In June, as Eisenhower was preparing to depart for Japan, anti-American riots in Tokyo forced his hosts to withdraw their invitation.

**The National Purpose**

Communist influence, meanwhile, was increasing in the Middle East and Africa, the military situation was deteriorating in Southeast Asia, and Fidel Castro was rapidly leading Cuba into the Soviet bloc.

Liberal intellectuals and Democrats led the nation in an orgy of self-flagellation. "If I wanted to destroy a nation, I would give it too much and I would have it on its knees, miserable, greedy, and sick" — so wrote novelist John Steinbeck. "With the supermarket as our temple and the singing commercial as our litany, are we likely to fire the world with an ir-
resistible vision of America’s exalted purposes and inspiring way of life?"—that was Adlai Stevenson.

One evidence of the spreading malaise was the search in 1960 for the national purpose. President Eisenhower appointed a commission to define it. Life magazine engaged distinguished Americans to recover it. The Junior Chamber of Commerce exhorted its 200,000 members to discuss it. The national purpose eluded all pursuers, but one thing was certain. Whoever was the Democratic presidential candidate in 1960 would insist on its restoration.

Superman

As it turned out, that candidate was John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

The intense national interest in the campaign of 1960 owed as much to the personality of John Kennedy as it did to the somber character of the issues. The man intrigued nearly everybody, including novelist Norman Mailer, who wrote the year’s most interesting appraisal of the candidate for Esquire magazine.

Mailer dismissed Kennedy’s public mind as “too conventional” but hailed him nonetheless as “a great box-office actor,” a character of genuine mystery and heroic dimension. Mailer sensed that Kennedy as hero would have a more profound impact on America than Kennedy as statesman, that a Kennedy Presidency might give “unwilling charge” to energies now confined to the American underground.

Kennedy, Mailer thought, might rescue mass man from the supermarket of contemporary culture by reviving the myth that every American is potentially extraordinary. Mailer entitled his piece “Superman Comes to the Supermarket.”

Was Kennedy really extraordinary? To some extent Mailer was the victim of supermarket advertising in buying the Superman image.

Kennedy was hailed as a naval hero of World War II for rescuing his crew after a Japanese destroyer rammed his PT boat in the Pacific in 1943. But his fatally bad judgment at moments during this episode might have earned him a court martial as easily as the Navy Cross.

He wrote a Pulitzer Prize-winning book in 1955, Profiles in Courage, about courage in the Senate, but he himself had demonstrated precious little of it in his eight years as a member of that body. Kennedy was, as advertised, an extremely intelligent man, but his was an intelligence concerned with process and technique, not with ends and values.

Politics First

He was an expert practitioner of the cool style so much in vogue in his time—self-mocking, detached, ironic, graceful under pressure. But the cool style made a virtue of stunted feelings, in Kennedy’s case not only for people, women especially, but for the causes that stirred other men.

In truth, legions would follow Kennedy not because he was extraordinary but because he might be, not for his achievement but for his promise. If not Superman yet, he might become Superman, and this was the secret of his personal and political magnetism.

Mailer found the political Kennedy uninteresting, but it was only as a politician that Kennedy might truly be described as extraordinary. “Kennedy became a statesman,” his close political aide Lawrence F. O’Brien has written, “but he was a politician first, a tough and resourceful one, the best of his time.”
was an aspect of the man of which there had been no early hint.

Kennedy won election from Massachusetts to the U.S. House in 1946 and to the Senate in 1952 on no more than his good looks, his father's money, and his war record. In Congress, he attempted neither to gather power nor to wield influence, content to remain on the fringes and play the loner. But during the mid-1950s, he emerged as something of a Washington matinee idol—author and war hero, husband of a beautiful socialite, a millionaire who enjoyed the pleasures of the world. These qualities were enough to bring him within a few votes of the nomination for Vice President at the 1956 Democratic convention.

**Dips in the Pool**

Only then did Kennedy determine his true vocation, which was to secure the top spot for himself in 1960.

His mission set, Kennedy rapidly developed into the complete politician. In 1957, he began crisscrossing the country, sizing up local politicians, learning the terrain in strange regions, charming audiences, making friends. To set the stage for his presidential bid, he sought and won a massive majority in his campaign for re-election to the Senate from Massachusetts in 1958. The following April, Kennedy met with his closest advisers at his father's house in Palm Beach and between dips in the pool planned the most effective national machine in the history of presidential politics.

Two weeks later, Larry O'Brien began touring the primary states to gather intelligence and seek alliances. "I kept waiting for the opposition to show up, but it never did," O'Brien recalled. The opposition consisted of Senator Stuart W. Symington of Missouri, whose main advantage was that he had few enemies; Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas, the Senate majority leader who nurtured the fantasy that influence in Washington could produce delegates at the convention; Adlai E. Stevenson, the darling of the liberals and two-time party nominee, longing to be drafted for one more try; and Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, the talkative liberal from Minnesota with a legislative record that put Kennedy's to shame.

**The Catholic "Issue"**

After he announced his candidacy in January 1960, Kennedy plunged into the primaries. He had to enter several and win each one to convince the party managers that a Catholic at the head of the ticket would not bring ruin in November.

Only Hubert Humphrey was willing to contest the primaries with him. Kennedy hoped to finish off Humphrey with a crushing victory in Wisconsin in April and then march through the rest of the primaries unopposed. But when Kennedy scored a less impressive victory in Wisconsin than anticipated, the dogged Humphrey pursued him into West Virginia, a Bible-Belt state not famous for charity toward the Catholic Church. For the first and only time of the campaign, gloom descended on the Kennedy camp.

But Kennedy's people blitzed the state, and the candidate himself, never more effective, disarmed bigots by forthrightly discussing the issue of religion. Kennedy's victory in the West Virginia primary in May was a dazzling achievement that assured his nomination at the July convention in Los Angeles.

Kennedy was not equally successful with all groups. Notably resistant
to his embrace and hostile to his heroic poses were the liberals, especially the liberal intellectuals.

They remembered that the candidate's father, Joseph P. Kennedy, American Ambassador to Great Britain before the United States entered World War II, had supported the appeasement of Hitler. They remembered Jack Kennedy's irresponsible charge from the floor of the House in 1949 that procommunists were influencing America’s Far Eastern policy. They remembered Kennedy's comment to an interviewer in 1953 that he was not a true liberal and did not feel comfortable with people who were. And they remembered, indeed could not forget, that the entire Kennedy family had regarded Senator Joe McCarthy as one hell of a fellow.

**Wooing the Eggheads**

But Kennedy needed the liberal intellectuals, the soul of the Democratic party, the guardians of its ideals; in 1959 he set out to win them too. He began making occasional trips to Boston to meet with Cambridge academics, soliciting their advice, sometimes even taking it. Some of the professors agreed to write position papers for his campaign. In 1960, Kennedy flooded the intellectual community with copies of his campaign tract, *The Strategy of Peace*. In primary states he made contact with groups of local intellectuals, flattering them with his attentions.

Most of all, Kennedy’s speeches that spring reflected the concerns of liberal intellectuals with such fidelity that he was indistinguishable on the issues from his major liberal rivals, Humphrey and Stevenson.

Though still sentimentally attached to Adlai Stevenson, most liberals were preparing for a realistic switch of allegiance to the new power in the party as the Democrats met in Los Angeles, July 11, 1960. Kennedy nearly lost the liberals again when, after his first ballot nomination, he chose Lyndon Johnson as his Vice President. The conservative Texan was a man whom liberals could not abide. Before the balloting, they rejoiced as Kennedy deftly dispatched Johnson’s bitter challenge for control of the convention. Now Kennedy was cynically resurrecting Johnson to buy the loyalty of Southern Democrats. The liberals went home angry and stayed angry into the next month.

**Winning Cold Wars**

On the eve of the campaign against the Republicans, late in August 1960, the national board of the Americans for Democratic Action met in secret to endorse candidates at the Congressional Hotel in Washington, D.C. The most important voice of independent liberalism in the United States, the organization's national leadership urged unqualified support for Kennedy and Johnson. But, as Arthur Schlesinger reported in a letter to Kennedy, delegates from the local chapters either opposed endorsement or favored it with "utmost tepidity." Schlesinger had expected to find apathy for the ticket at the meeting, but not the hostility he actually encountered. He warned Kennedy that he was in danger of losing the liberals and the intellectuals, "the political crusaders in the Democratic party—the issue-oriented people who would ordinarily by this time be covering their cars with Kennedy stickers, arguing with their friends, sending letters to the papers, manning local organizations, canvassing their neighborhoods, and, in general, charging the campaign with emotion and zeal..."
Schlesinger urged Kennedy to make use of liberals in the campaign and to run as a liberal himself. He need not have worried. Kennedy had been running as a liberal for some time and did not intend to change course now. When that became clear, as it soon did, most of the ADA types, who had cursed the candidate in August, would find him no less extraordinary, no less heroic, than did Norman Mailer.

From the opening address of his campaign in Detroit’s Cadillac Square on Labor Day to his tumultuous homecoming in Boston on election eve, Kennedy appealed for votes using the issues developed by the intellectuals during the late 1950s. They saw complacency, lethargy, imminent decline and decay. So did he. They called for national sacrifice, for energetic executive leadership, for the will to repel communism abroad and repair the public sector at home. So did he.

Kennedy’s main issue was the Cold War and how to stop losing it. “My campaign for the Presidency,” he reiterated, “is founded on a single assumption, the assumption that the American people are tired of the drift in our national course, that they are weary of the continual decline in our nation’s prestige . . . and that they are ready to move again.”

To discourage Russia from launching a surprise attack, he pledged to build more missiles. To stamp out “brush fire wars,” he promised to
procure more conventional weapons. He would never be content with second place in the space race, with producing fewer scientists than the Russians, or with an economy that grew one-third as fast as Russia's.

Wiping Out Poverty

Second only to the Cold War as an issue in Kennedy's campaign was economic growth and how to increase it. Faster growth would keep us ahead of the Russians, impress the uncommitted peoples, cure unemployment, and pay for improvements in the public sector.

Too busy to learn much about the growth issue before his nomination, Kennedy sought expert guidance soon after he won it. On August 3, 1960, the candidate spent several hours on his yacht off Cape Cod, conferring with liberal economists J.K. Galbraith, Paul Samuelson, Seymour Harris, and Richard Lester. (Galbraith was there mainly for the sunshine and Bloody Marys, since growth was hardly his issue.)

The economists told Kennedy that faster growth depended on getting businessmen to increase their rate of investment in new plants and equipment. How could the government induce businessmen to invest more? Simply by lowering interest rates to reduce the cost of borrowing, the professors explained.

But nothing is really simple in the arcane world of economics. Cheap money posed dangers of its own, Samuelson warned, because it could trigger inflation. To avoid inflation, Kennedy would either have to put a brake on the federal budget or raise taxes on individuals. In his summary of the meeting, Samuelson wrote: "Thus an over-balanced budget or one with a lower deficit would be the counterpart of the investment-inducing easy-credit policy."

Kennedy found the advice of Samuelson and company to his liking. "I think it was the first real education he had in modern fiscal policy," Seymour Harris said later. In his campaign, Kennedy promised to reverse the disastrous Republican policy of tight money and to run a budget surplus in good times, thereby achieving faster growth without inflation.

Repair of the public sector was Kennedy's other (Galbraithian) variation on the theme of getting the country moving again. He promised to clear the slums, wipe out poverty, bring prosperity to depressed areas, provide a decent education to every school child, restore dignity to the aged, and remove the hardships resulting from automation.

A Dilemma

A large gap separated these goals from Kennedy's specific proposals, which turned out to be merely the piecemeal reforms advocated by the Democrats unsuccessfully in recent Congresses. They included more urban renewal, federal loans to businessmen locating in depressed areas, Medicare, federal aid to help build classrooms and pay teachers, and higher minimum wages. These were mere extensions of the welfare state perhaps, but sufficient to permit the candidate to run in the tradition of Wilson, Roosevelt, and Truman.

Finally, there was the issue of civil rights, fast becoming the most emotionally charged topic in American politics. It posed an apparently insoluble dilemma for Kennedy. To win the election he needed the black vote and would have to support the cause of civil rights to get it. But he also needed white Southern votes, which he might lose if he pressed the issue too hard.
Throughout August, Kennedy wrestled with the political dilemmas of the civil rights issue. Among those in his camp urging Kennedy to go all out for the Negro vote was Harris Wofford. A friend of Martin Luther King, Jr., and a former staff member of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, Wofford left a post at the University of Notre Dame Law School in the spring of 1960 to join the Kennedy staff. By August, he had emerged as a key figure in the campaign’s civil rights division.

A Stroke of the Pen

Wofford found his candidate neither knowledgeable about the civil rights problem nor committed to a position on it. One morning in August 1960, Kennedy spotted Wofford looking for a cab and gave him a lift to the Senate Office Building. Kennedy was driving his red convertible fast, Wofford recalled, "and his left hand was tapping on the door. ... And he said, 'Now, in five minutes, tick off the ten things that a President ought to do to clear up this goddamn civil rights mess.'"

By the time the campaign opened in September, Kennedy had decided to run as the civil rights candidate, as the liberals had urged. He promised to offer a bill early in the next session of Congress to implement the civil rights pledges of the Democratic platform. He said that with "a stroke of the presidential pen," he would do what Eisenhower had not done—end bias in federally aided housing. He even gave oblique sanction to the growing campaign of civil disobedience against segregation.

The President, he said, had to exert moral leadership "to help bring equal access to facilities from churches to lunch counters, and to support the right of every American to stand up for his rights, even if on occasion he must sit down for them."

When the presidential campaign began in early September, the polls rated the contest a tossup, but seasoned observers gave the edge to the Republican nominee, Vice President Richard M. Nixon. As it turned out, the election was the closest in history. Kennedy won 49.7 percent of the popular vote to his opponent’s 49.5 percent, and his plurality was only 118,550 votes.

In a close election, of course, every stratagem, every accident, the contribution of every voting bloc can be made to seem decisive. The results in 1960 were due to many things: to economic recession, to Kennedy’s performance in four televised debates with Richard Nixon, to his success in defusing the issue of religion, to his running mate’s exertions among white Southerners, to much else besides.

Raising the Issues

Yet, from hindsight, not the least of the causes of Kennedy’s victory were the issues that he raised. By appropriating the critique of the liberal intellectuals, Kennedy acquired a political identity, gave contour and content to his candidacy, and invested his campaign with a sense of historic purpose. No one, in the end, was more impressed by the performance than the liberals themselves, imitation being the highest form of flattery.

As it turned out, Kennedy’s liberalism had been just another ploy in his brilliant campaign. Only in the realm of foreign policy did the new President promptly honor his promises, initiating a major arms build-up soon after his inauguration and deploying American power in a campaign to "assure the survival
and the success of liberty."

In 1961, when his Council of Economic Advisers urged Kennedy to adopt Keynesian measures to restore vigor to the domestic economy and reduce unemployment, he turned them down rather than offend corporate prejudices. When the civil rights lobby demanded the legislation pledged during the campaign, Kennedy not only reneged, he crafted a strategy calculated to avoid a challenge to Southern segregationists. When, in 1961, he proposed a series of social welfare programs that were merely warmed-over measures from the 1950s, Oscar Gass, speaking for many other liberals, accurately remarked in Commentary: "How small a gap separates the critics of the Affluent Society from the most devoted spokesmen for the affluent."

Kennedy's caution owed something to the slim margin of his victory in 1960 and the continuing domination of Congress by Republicans and Southern Democrats. It owed not a little also to his instinctive conservatism that the rhetoric of the 1960 campaign had been designed to obscure. But Kennedy was an intelligent conservative capable of responding flexibly to events.

The event that educated him and millions of other Americans during the early 1960s was the growing black protest movement, gaining force year by year and rapidly moving north, a movement that painfully clarified the interconnection among unemployment, poverty, and racism. When that movement mobilized tens of thousands to march in the streets, as it did in 1963, Kennedy responded as any intelligent conservative would. To forestall radicalism and diminish the threat of violence, he moved to redress the grievances of the oppressed.

It was then that he turned to the liberals for guidance.

In January 1963, he endorsed a judicious application of Keynesian principles in the form of a $10 billion tax cut to revive the economy and reduce unemployment. In June, following Martin Luther King, Jr.'s showdown with segregation in Birmingham, he sent Congress the most far-reaching civil rights bill in American history. And that same month, his chief economist, Walter Heller, reflecting Kennedy's expressed concern, began working toward an anti-poverty program.

By the end of his abbreviated tenure, Kennedy had become the President the liberals always hoped he would be. If some of the programs he helped to launch proved inadequate, flawed, or badly conceived, the fault would lie less with him than with the liberals and intellectuals whose instrument he had belatedly become.
We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer’s telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editors’ requests for comment.

Return to Eden

Three different authors mourn the post-1946 passing of Israel as a moral utopia ["Israel," WQ, New Year’s 1983]. Each regrets grand dreams gone sour. But in judging Israel in 1983 by the standards of 1948, the essayists do a disservice to 35 years of astounding Israeli achievement in the political, economic, and even moral spheres.

Professor Shlomo Avineri ["The Roots of Zionism"] traces the link between Zionism and rural socialism that motivated so many of the earliest Jewish settlers in Palestine. Both Don Peretz ["A Different Place"] and Lawrence Meyer ["Into the Breach?"] cherish the memory of the rugged, frontier nature of the early years of Israeli statehood, seeing in Israeli society a socialist version of Jefferson’s yeoman farmer. Peretz claims that with the shift to an urban life, "the simple life is no longer virtuous, or at least not fashionable," while Meyer likens Israel in 1983 to King David, progressing from shepherd to great warrior, only to succumb to the temptations of the flesh.

Peretz and Meyer would keep the mass of Israeli society down on the farm, where a life of hard labor would teach strong character. The authors bewail the rise of high-tech industries and mechanized agriculture, and even link them to the country’s presumed moral decay and the rise of antidemocratic elements in its politics.

But these same economic shifts have raised the level and intensity of Israeli political participation higher than ever before. Israel has progressed no differently than other Western cultures where the integration of diverse ethnic groups has been contingent on a similar shift from rural to urban-based production and population. Israel continues today its efforts to bridge the gap between Ashkenazim and Sephardim, and to find the proper role for its Arab population. Substantial progress has been made in both these areas.

Meyer’s failure to mention the implacable hostility of its Arab neighbors as the crucial element shaping Israel’s position as policeman on the West Bank, instead blaming "a simple urge for territorial possession," borders on the ludicrous. Meyer rejects the possibility that Menachem Begin’s Israel has any inclination to make peace with the Arabs. Instead, he characterizes the current government as a barbaric aberration, which has abandoned traditional, cherished, Jewish values. Each author conveniently ignores the peace treaty with Egypt and the May 1982 withdrawal from Sinai. Israel remains "a just and humane society," as well as a strategic asset for the United States.

Mark Doctoroff
American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee
Washington, D.C.

Measure of Democracy

I read the three essays on Israel when the painful memories of Lebanon were still fresh, when the inquiry commission was preparing to hear Ariel Sharon again, when King Hussein was here in Washington saying No, in effect, to the American pleas that he join the Israelis at the negotiating table—and these articles helped put the whole story of Israel in proper perspective. A kind of political therapy.

There were times during this past year when I was indeed deeply worried about Israel, about American-Israeli relations, about the elusiveness of any real Middle East peace. I was frightened—and angry—when I heard talk about "Israel losing its soul." I rejected such talk, but I nevertheless wondered myself: whether something ominous was happening. But
while my concerns are not all gone, and while I have some serious differences with the government of Israel over the future of the West Bank, I found myself at year’s end an unabashed, proud, firm supporter of Israel. If I had to point to a single explanation for the renewed, strengthened affinity for Israel, it would be the inquiry commission.

The story of the inquiry is as impressive as it is unique, especially in that part of the world, because the democratic process worked when massive demonstrations and demands for an inquiry came from both Israelis and Israeli supporters around the world.

Today’s tensions between America and Israel must not be permitted to blunt the essential truth that common interests and hopes for humanity make our two countries the most natural of allies.

Hyman Bookbinder
The American Jewish Committee
Washington, D.C.

Controlling Immigration

Aaron Segal attempts to present both the problems and benefits of large-scale immigration ("The Half-Open Door," WQ, New Year’s 1983), but ultimately believes that “immigration is not a real but a psychological affliction.” To the millions of unskilled Americans recorded as unemployed, the annual influx of over a million unskilled legal and illegal immigrants is a real affliction indeed. As laborers in factories and construction, illegal aliens take jobs that pay well above the minimum wage. It is fantasy to pretend that illegal aliens, who are more pliant, docile, and cooperative than American workers, are not displacing the latter.

Professor Segal dismisses the most serious long-term problem created by massive immigration with a brief comment: “immigration at present rates would add 35 million people to the U.S. population by the year 2000.” He does not ask whether a 15 percent increase in our population in only 18 years is a good thing for our country. Uncontrolled population growth undercuts economic and social advancement, depletes resources, and damages the land and ecology. If we do not regain control of immigration soon, we give up forever these broader concerns. Our children deserve better.

Roger Connor
Executive Director, Federation for American Immigration Reform
Washington, D.C.

Doorman’s Dilemma

Willi Paul Adams ("A Dubious Host," WQ, New Year’s 1983) clearly portrays that the United States historically has been of two minds about immigration. What remains to be examined in American immigration history is the state interest in the control of immigration. In the contemporary immigration debate, the emphasis on the perception that immigration is “out of control” and that an essential of sovereignty is control of who enters indicates the nature of this interest.

State interest is not always to be re-

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The effort to end the national origins quota system coincided with a thrust toward an "open society" during President John Kennedy's administration. But government action is not just a reflection of other forces in society. That dimension of U.S. immigration history still remains unexplored.

Aaron Segal wrote about "The Half-Open Door" in the same issue, but there is not one door. There is a front door (legal immigration) and a back door (illegal immigration). The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy suggested keeping the front door open and closing the back door [see WQ, Spring 1983, pp. 173–74]. As the Simpson-Mazzoli bill wends its way through Congress, there seems to be a movement to close the front door and, if anything, to leave the back door open and to encourage further illegal migration by families and so complicate the enforcement of sanctions on employers of illegal migrants as to make a mockery of the policy.

Charles B. Keely
The Population Council, Center for Policy Studies
Washington, D.C.

Chuckin' the Facts

Information omitted from "A History of the Past: Life Reeked with Joy" [WQ, Spring 1983] includes the following: Solo man and Pecking Man were two of our ancestors. Xerox led the Persians at Thermopylae. Julius Caesar and Mark Antony were interested in Cleo Patrick. The Grammatic tribes invaded Rome, Charles Darwin wrote The Origin of Spices, and Sigmund Fudd originated psychoanalysis.

Korean is the holy book of Islam, one “Pillar of Islam” is a month of fastenings, and carmelis provided transport.

Americans speak English because the French knew some English and taught the Spanish or vice versa. Or they could have learned it from the Indians. The government should educate all to a certain extent. Finally, the problem of knowledge is that people got too much.

Heinz D. Schwing
Evanston, Illinois

Vietnam Lessons

I welcome Colonel Harry G. Summers's rejection of the argument by many of his fellow officers that the United States lost in Vietnam because of a homefront "stab in the back" fostered by the New Left and the media ["Lessons: A Soldier's View," WQ, Summer 1983]. I also agree with him that President Johnson would have spared himself much opposition and grief had he asked Congress for a declaration of war. But I am skeptical about Col. Summers's prescriptions for a winning strategy in Indochina: "notably, ... cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail and isolating the southern battlefield." My best recollection is that the proposal of an anti-infiltration barrier was rejected not only by the much-criticized civilian strategists but also by our [senior] military leaders and General Westmoreland. No barrier, it was concluded, could work without ground forces tending it. This would have meant tying down very large numbers of American troops in quasi-static positions in the jungles of Laos and Cambodia without assurance that they would be able fully to stop the North Vietnamese supply effort. Expanding the conflict into North Vietnam, on the other hand, in my view would only have magnified the difficulties faced in South Vietnam, especially finding and fixing the ever-elusive enemy.

Nor can I agree that the struggle for the "hearts and minds" of the South Vietnamese people was a secondary issue. Col. Summers argues correctly that the war on the U.S. side could not be won without the American people understanding why they and their sons should make major sacrifices. Why, then, should we expect the South Vietnamese soldier to have risked his life for a cause he neither understood nor identified with? Much evidence shows that the ignominious collapse of South Vietnam's army in 1975 was due not only to that army's inferiority in heavy weapons and a shortage of ammunition but also in considerable measure to lack of will and morale. Progress in building a viable political community was simply not far-reaching enough to create the sense of purpose necessary for a successful defense against the
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communist enemy. The lessons here are that a revolutionary war cannot be won by military means only and that gaining the “hearts and minds” of the people remains a critical task.

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Editor’s Note:

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Right Side Up

A reader noted that at the end of our article “Chinese Science after Mao” [WQ, Spring 1983], we printed the Chinese character upside down. It means “reason” and should appear as shown below.
MISSING SOMETHING?

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Some news is good news

It's a wonder sometimes that Americans ever venture out of their homes. If they don't fall victim to violent crime, they're sure to be caught up in the maelstrom of a mass demonstration. If they survive that, they still have to live through the daily neighborhood explosion on their way to catch a bus which is certain to careen over an embankment. Such, after all, is life as portrayed by the news media.

Since the President is, by tradition, the nation's first citizen, he speaks for all of us when he says that he's sick and tired of nothing but bad news. When President Reagan last year called upon the media to observe "National Volunteer Week" by concentrating on the brighter side of life in this United States, he had not only catastrophes in mind. He also addressed himself to the relentlessly pessimistic assessments of just about everything that happens on the international and domestic scene: Isn't there anything redeeming to be said about world events?

Like the President, we think there is—although you'd never know it from the media.

During one recent week, three New York TV channels devoted one-quarter to one-half of their newscasts to crime stories. An earlier, more formal study in Public Opinion Quarterly compared CBS news coverage with that of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. It found that "aggressive news"—violence and protest—accounted for 36.5 percent of the U.S. network's broadcasts over a three-week period compared with only 17.8 percent on the Canadian broadcasts, even though both had access to the same pool of reportage and film clips.

We recognize that more TV viewers may stare at scenes of a body being dragged from a bloodstained sidewalk than at pictures of children dancing around a maypole. And it's common wisdom that headlines about violence, corruption, and bedroom proclivities may sell more newspapers than accounts of garden club meetings. But what about media responsibility?

Skewed news selection distorts the perceived temper of this country. It cheapens human values to the danger point—people may more readily resort to violence since "everybody's doing it." Finally, it erodes the trust the public has in established journalism because most people are loath to accept such a high degree of aggressiveness.

The constant diet of bad news is already beginning to backfire on the media. A Harris Survey, comparing attitude changes, showed that TV audiences trusted television news reporting less in 1981 than they did in 1969. A similar pattern emerged for faith in the veracity of newspaper reporting.

We doubt that these surveys are an indictment of reporting as such. But they do put into question the judgment of those who determine the emphasis to be given different types of news events.

Most Americans, we're convinced, believe that, with all our problems, America remains a far better place than the media would have us think. It follows that—without censorship and without slanting the news—it should be possible for the media to keep the big picture in better focus.

After all, some news is good news.
In 1968, Congress established the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars as an international institute for advanced study and the nation’s official “living memorial” to the 28th President, "symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relation between the world of learning and the world of public affairs."
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