The Dangerous Decade

"The times are hard and rough, and every man and every woman must play it with all their might. Personal interests, party interests, class interests, sectional interests—all these will have to take second place to national interests if we are to get around the corner without disaster."

This is true today as when Winston Churchill said it 61 years ago.

Our America of 1979 is a handcuffed giant, blessed with an abundance of potential energy resources that will take years of hard and costly effort to make usable. Meanwhile, frustrating delays in the formulation of a rational and comprehensive national energy policy have increased U.S. dependence on foreign oil, making our nation even more hostage to foreign countries. This so outrages many Americans that they find it hard to adapt to the changed situation and look instead for someone to blame for the passing of cheap and abundant energy.

In some ways the U.S. today is about where it was after Pearl Harbor, when we had the potential to produce 50,000 war planes a year, but hardly any air force in being;...when we had the potential to turn out a Liberty ship a day, but only a small merchant fleet in relation to our sudden great need. The difference is that we had then the national will and popular support to mobilize our resources to realize our potential. We must bring that cohesion and national consensus to energy, and soon.

For America has entered its Dangerous Decade. Within the next 10 years we must make substantial progress in reducing dependence on foreign oil or face intolerably slow economic growth, higher unemployment, lower living standards, diminished freedom in our foreign policy. What stands between the United States and increased energy security?

Mainly confusion and anger, and time-wasting efforts to fix blame in a complex situation in which no one is blameless. Government, trying to make quick fixes with allocation programs, has succeeded mainly in exacerbating the shortage. Industry, faced with continuing disruptions in its supply and distribution patterns, has made mistakes, too—not the least of which has been a failure to be clear enough with the facts so the public can recognize that the crisis is real.

What's needed, if we are to work our way through the Dangerous Decade, is to cut through the confusion and anger and make a firm start toward redirecting America's energy course. That requires the urgent adoption of a national energy policy which meets America's prime need: increasing production of domestic energy supplies.

President Carter's 1977 energy program made hardly a bow to the need for production; the stress was almost all on conservation.

In his 1979 program, the President urged decontrol of crude oil prices to provide greater incentive to search for oil and natural gas—and then promptly urged the removal of most of this new incentive through additional taxes. He coupled that with inflammatory rhetoric that buried any hope for rational legislative consideration.

Little wonder that the public does not know where to turn.

If the country is to concentrate on essentials, people must understand that the oil-exporting countries are sovereign governments fully capable of acting in what they consider their own interest, no matter how much this may upset us, that those countries apparently intend to keep worldwide supplies of oil tight enough to keep prices high for a long time to come; that there isn't much any of us can do about it in the short term.

In the long term, though, there is plenty we can do if we can just calm down. We can increase the production of conventional domestic energy—crude oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear—to buy time to develop alternative energy sources. But we will not be able to mount the massive effort required so long as Americans are subjected to a battering of suspicions, allegations of conspiracies, and name-calling.

Let each editor, each state energy commissioner, each elected official ask himself: am I being constructive in this crisis? Let each oil company ask itself the same, and do a better job communicating the facts so public confusion will be reduced and we can focus on the task to be accomplished.

What is at risk in the Dangerous Decade could be nothing less than the survival of our form of government. We believe this form of government is preeminently worth defending—by everyone who is able to rise above emotion to comprehend the implications of the energy problem, to understand the options, and act responsibly and responsively.
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After their annual survey of American attitudes toward public schools, the Gallup Poll and the Kettering Foundation released their findings this summer: Only 8 percent of 1,514 adult respondents gave their local schools a grade of A, only 34 percent a grade of A or B. "Lack of discipline" was most often cited as the No. 1 classroom problem. And 85 percent of those polled favored competency tests for teachers.

All in all, the pollsters found echoes of a widespread suspicion that, as one educator put it, school children of this generation may be the first in America's history not to surpass, or even reach, the educational level of their parents.

Public perceptions, of course, do not invariably mirror reality. But enough evidence exists to show that current perceptions are not wide of the mark. All too often, despite vastly increased dollar outlays, local school performance constitutes a scandal of major proportions. The problems—functional illiteracy, vandalism, low expectations, confusion and incompetence among educators—now touch children not only in big cities but in prosperous suburbs as well.

Oddly enough, these troubles have not become the subject of a sustained national debate (like energy or inflation), perhaps because this time there is no surprise Soviet "Sputnik" to shock us into reappraisal. The nation's most prestigious educators have launched no crusades for reform in the manner of Harvard's James B. Conant during the 1950s. More surprisingly, we find that even the nation's bigger newspapers (with a few bright exceptions) have not closely examined their local schools. Instead, like TV, they focus on the mini-melodramas—teacher strikes, busing disputes, drug arrests.

In this issue of the WQ, four noted specialists try to put "The Public Schools" in perspective. The schools' current troubles are not unprecedented, and they may reflect a certain disarray in the larger society. In our concern, we admit to some self-interest: If the schools (and the parents) do not better inspire and instruct the young, eventually there will be no one left in America who wants to read what serious writers have to say.

Peter Braestrup
PERIODICALS

Reviews of articles from periodicals and specialized journals here and abroad

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POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

What Tax Revolt?


The much-publicized citizens' "tax revolt" of 1978 didn't really happen.

Proposition 13, the property tax relief measure passed by Californians in June 1978, was widely heralded by economists and politicians as the opening shot of a middle-class antigovernment, antitax movement. Indeed, proposals to limit taxes and/or government spending appeared on ballots in 13 states the following November. Yet there were essential differences among them, writes Lucier, an economist at Denison University, who analyzed both the proposals and polls of voter sentiment.

Most voters did want relief from local property taxes but not if that meant significant reduction in government services (e.g., schools and police protection). Fed up with property taxes well above the national average, Californians gave themselves more than a 50 percent break. They realized, however, that the loss of local revenues would be made up by a $5 billion state budget surplus. Citizens in Michigan and Oregon, on the other hand, defeated similar measures, fearing their effect on local services.

Nevada residents (expecting a state budget surplus equal to 17 percent of expenditures) approved a tax-cut plan. But their vote has no immediate consequence; under Nevada's constitution, it will not take effect unless ratified by a second vote in 1980. Residents of only one other state, Idaho, chose to lower property taxes, virtually guaranteeing curtailed government services. (The law they approved, however, conflicts with the state constitution in 35 instances, Lucier says, and may not survive court challenges.) Proposals to slow the escalation of
property taxes were approved in Alabama, Massachusetts, and Missouri.

In several states, Lucier says, voters were more interested in controlling the growth of state spending than in rolling back county or city taxes. Constitutional amendments approved in Hawaii, Arizona, Michigan, and Texas tied state spending increases to expansion of the state’s economy or personal income.

Lucier’s conclusion: Voters are concerned about rising state spending and taxes. However, the notion that the public is “pointing a shotgun at government, pulling the trigger, and being unconcerned with the effects on government services” is highly inaccurate.

Easing the Regulatory Burden

Federal regulators are beginning to heed the demands of businessmen for “more efficiency, less intrusion,” writes Clark, a National Journal correspondent. Efforts to develop “alternative regulatory schemes” fall into four categories.

The market approach, says Clark, depends on “economic incentives.” For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—whose regulations cost business $15.4 billion in 1978—is experimenting with the “bubble” concept. Announced in January 1979, it encourages factory owners to devise the least expensive way to meet an EPA standard for their plant’s total emissions, rather than forcing them to install expensive pollution control devices for each specific pollutant. A variant of the bubble is EPA’s “offsets” policy. Under it, new plants can create additional pollution if pollution levels elsewhere in the area are simul-
taneously reduced. The Virginia Department of Transportation, for example, lowered statewide hydrocarbon emissions from its road surfacing operations by switching to water-based asphalt, thus allowing construction of an oil refinery in Portsmouth.

Performance standards also leave industries free to reach regulatory goals in their own way. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration last year dropped 900 specific workplace regulations and replaced them with broad standards.

Information approaches are used by the Federal Trade Commission and other agencies; the idea is that if consumers are given enough information about a product (e.g., a used car), they will make intelligent choices. The Food and Drug Administration, Clark says, has proposed that drug manufacturers tell consumers in greater detail "the purposes of their products and possible adverse reactions to them."

Self-regulation (now being tested by the Consumer Product Safety Commission in the manufacture of chainsaws) asks simply that industry set and meet voluntary standards.

So far, Clark reports, reaction to new regulatory methods has not been favorable. Businessmen appear suspicious of the changes, environmentalists fear lower pollution standards, and labor unions worry about trade-offs in worker safety. Acceptance, Clark concludes, will come slowly.


American Presidents' emergency powers have been expanding since the Civil War, says Klieman, a political scientist at Tel Aviv University.

In 1861, President Abraham Lincoln adopted emergency measures "previously thought to fall entirely within the competence of the Congress or at least to require its approval," writes Klieman. But the Constitution offered no guidelines for governing during crisis. Congress was out of session, and Lincoln invoked his duty as the commander in chief to defend national security; he proclaimed a naval blockade of the Confederate States and authorized military tribunals to hear cases against civilians in non-military areas.

During World War I, Woodrow Wilson carefully sought congressional approval before issuing emergency orders (including establishment of a military draft and national administration of the railroads). His presidential proclamations were revoked soon after war's end. Franklin Roosevelt, however, greatly expanded the concept of "national security," Klieman says, when he declared a state of emergency to "wage a war" against the economic Depression. (His first measure: the national bank holiday of 1933.)

Harry S Truman declared a national emergency in 1950 to speed
mobilization for the Korean War and cited “national security” in an attempt to take over the steel industry threatened by a strike in 1952. The Supreme Court overturned the action (in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer) on the grounds that Truman acted without required congressional sanction. Later, President Nixon declared national emergencies to thwart a postal strike in 1970 and to impose import quotas during a 1971 “international monetary crisis.”

Roused by administration mismanagement of the Vietnam War and by Watergate, Congress sought to regain some of its lost authority in 1973. A Senate subcommittee was shocked to find that, technically, the country had been in a state of emergency since March 4, 1933; since that date, 470 laws had been enacted giving the President various emergency powers—to seize property and certain commodities, mobilize industry, restrict travel, regulate private capital, control transportation and communication. In 1973, Congress passed (over Nixon’s veto) the War Powers Act limiting the emergency commitment of U.S. military forces to combat, in the absence of congressional approval, to 60 days. Finally, the National Emergencies Act of 1976 empowered Congress to end any declaration of emergency unilaterally. This act, Kliean observes, marked the “resumption of institutional checking and balancing.”

Spurred by revelations of illegal corporate contributions to the 1972 Nixon presidential campaign, Congress enacted legislation in 1974 to control business donations to federal office-seekers. Now liberals are worried that corporate “special interest” money can buy favors on Capitol Hill. Malbin, a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, says such fears are misplaced.

The Federal Elections Campaign Amendments of 1974 (drafted by the “citizens’ lobby,” Common Cause) allowed corporations and others to establish committees, funded by voluntary contributions from employees, to distribute money to federal candidates—presidential and congressional. Called “political action committees” (PACs), they are required to register with the Federal Elections Commission and are limited to gifts of $5,000 to each candidate they support. The reformers hoped that the $5,000 ceiling would curb the influence of corporate political action committees. But they didn’t count on the corporations’ eagerness to engage in politics. There were 89 corporate PACs in 1974; by 1978, there were 646.

Despite their popularity, Malbin observes, PACs do not really spend enough money to “buy” congressional favors. In the 1978 campaign, for example, 17 of the 25 largest American businesses (as rated by Fortune)
John Gardner, chairman of Common Cause, which drafted the law that imposed limits on campaign contributions.

gave an average of only $505 per candidate. Today, only 254 of the top 1,000 U.S. corporations operate political action committees. Corporate PACs, Malbin writes, tend to give small amounts to a number of candidates. The real “special interests,” he says, are single-industry businesses and unions (e.g. in shipping), which traditionally support only incumbent Congressmen whose committees have jurisdiction over their activities. But even their contributions, Malbin says, rarely equal 10 percent of a candidate’s campaign chest.

Limiting PAC contributions further, Malbin concludes, creates risks: Candidates, particularly political newcomers, will have to depend more on direct-mail fundraisers (such as Richard Viguerie on the Right) who play on “polarizing emotions” to attract individual donations.

Richard Nixon, more than any other recent U.S. President, tried to strengthen White House influence over the federal bureaucracy by manipulating Civil Service hiring and firing practices.

When a Democratic Congress balked at Nixon’s “new federalism” programs—e.g., general revenue sharing and welfare reform—during his first term (1969-73), the White House devised another strategy. Policy changes would be achieved “through bureaucratic decision-
POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

making.” A 1972 White House Personnel Manual outlined purge tactics that included transfers of some unsympathetic senior bureaucrats and suggestions to others that they retire. White House nominees were urged upon Civil Service personnel officers to fill the vacancies.

Did the strategy work? To a degree, say the authors, political scientists at George Washington and Purdue universities, respectively: “Republican career executives were about 3 times as likely to be promoted to senior positions in the social service agencies” (e.g., the Departments of Housing and Urban Development and of Health, Education and Welfare, which were prime White House targets) than were Democrats. They were “more than 1.5 times as likely to be promoted” in all other agencies.

Yet, say Cole and Caputo, White House efforts were “doomed to insignificance.” Only 15 percent of all top career posts ever became vacant during the Nixon years. By 1976, the proportion of high-level civil servants listing themselves as Republican was only 16 percent—with self-styled Democrats at 38 percent and Independents at 46 percent.

Nonetheless, in that year, a majority (60 percent) of all top federal managers surveyed favored the administration’s New Federalism philosophy. “A considerable reservoir of potential presidential support,” the authors conclude, exists among “independent” civil servants who are generally willing to accommodate themselves to the goals of the administration in power.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Soviet Dilemma


Future Soviet-American relations may hinge on Russian oil supplies, says Cobb, assistant professor of social science at West Point.

Currently the world’s third largest exporter of crude oil (after Saudi Arabia and Iran), the Soviet Union may have to start importing 2 million barrels of oil a day in 1990. The reason: 75 percent of the country’s people and 80 percent of its industry are concentrated in “the European part of the USSR”; yet 80 percent of its remaining oil and gas is in Siberia. The Soviets, Cobb says, do not have the technology to extract oil and gas in frozen, remote regions and then transport them thousands of miles to major cities.

As total Soviet oil production drops, Moscow may have to reduce some industrial activities. And the Soviet Union may have to sacrifice some of its economic control over Eastern European bloc nations, traditionally dependent on Moscow for cheap energy. The Russians will also lose major sources of foreign “hard” currency (from oil exports to
West Germany and Italy, for example) needed to finance purchases of Western grain and technology.

Where will the Soviet Union get more oil? (Neighboring Iran already ships natural gas to southern Soviet Republics.) "At a minimum," Cobb writes. "Moscow hopes for a 'Finlandized' Iran," free of military ties with the United States and ready to provide oil to Western Russia. And if leftist rebel movements in other pro-West oil states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates) seek Moscow's help, "Soviet and Cuban troops are stationed in [Southern] Yemen and Ethiopia in sufficient numbers to render assistance."

Providing the technology recently sought by Moscow to drill for Siberian oil could prove a thankless task for the United States, says Cobb. Americans should not place too much faith in the Kremlin's promises of future oil in return. Yet, he observes, U.S. "economic influence" in the form of technical aid for Russian energy programs could yield diplomatic advantages. Washington should resist the temptation to apply economic leverage blatantly (e.g., freedom for Jewish dissidents in exchange for oil drills). But economic pressure applied "subtly," he says, may inspire Soviet leaders to greater prudence in their broad strategic calculations.

A Future for Bombers


President Jimmy Carter's July 1977 decision to halt production of the B-1 strategic bomber was the latest development in a 20-year struggle to choose a successor to the nation's fleet of aging B-52s.

At the dawn of the atomic age in 1945, the manned bomber was pre-eminent; it was the only way to transport nuclear bombs to enemy targets, writes Kohout, an Air Force Pentagon staff officer. The payloads of the early bombers, the B-29 and B-50, reflected almost exactly the size of the nuclear weapons of the day. Their range "defined the strategic 'reach' the United States could claim."

The new generation of jet bombers, including the B-47 and the B-52 (the first of which was delivered in 1955), was designed to fly high and fast to avoid improved Russian fighters. By the late 1950s, however, the advent of Soviet ground-to-air missiles and sophisticated radar demanded radical new tactics. The pilots of the U.S. B-47s and B-52s were trained to fly as low as possible to confuse enemy radar and to make interception by Russian missiles and fighters more difficult.

Yet performance standards have not changed quickly enough, observes Kohout. Bombers continue to be designed for speed and high altitudes—despite the fact that these today add little or nothing to an aircraft's strategic capabilities. The B-1's "excessive capabilities" (it
The B-1 strategic bomber, criticized for its "excessive capabilities," was equipped to cruise at supersonic speeds and unprecedented price tag ($88 million each), Kohout writes, made it "uniquely vulnerable to its domestic critics." The United States needs a new reasonably priced bomber, he says, that has "generous range, payload, and inherent growth potential, and the ability to employ a variety of munitions and tactics."

Now part of a strategic "Triad," with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the manned bomber's most valuable attribute is its flexibility. Once airborne and safe from surprise attack, bombers can launch the new cruise missiles and then hang back, striking targets selectively (with short-range missiles) after the ICBMs, SLBMs, and cruise missiles have damaged enemy defenses. They can be deployed as a show of force (a missile cannot), and they are the only existing strategic vehicles that can be modified for nonnuclear warfare.

"Dilemmas for America in China's Modernization" by Lucian W. Pye, in International Security (Summer 1979), The MIT Press (Journals), 28 Carleton St., Cambridge, Mass. 02142.

Since their break with Moscow in the early 1960s, the communist Chinese have been practicing "Chicken Little" diplomacy, writes Pye, a political scientist at MIT.

They have issued shrill warnings regarding Soviet intentions, charging, in effect, "that NATO is about to be tested and is likely to be found wanting, that Japan should prepare more earnestly for war in Asia, and that the Vietnamese are now the 'Cubans of the East.'" Yet the Chinese have allowed their own military power to steadily decline in relation to the Soviet Union's ever-modernizing forces.
Chairman Hua Guofeng has placed "modernization" of the military among Peking's four top goals (together with modernization of agriculture, industry, and science and technology). But to procure even a "rudimentary defense capability" Peking would have to invest the impossibly high sum of $10 billion a year for several years. The Chinese army, Pye writes, still relies primarily on 1950s-era hardware; the air force, equipped with aging Soviet-model MiG 19 jet fighters, would be no match against the Russians' MiG 25s, MiG 23/27s, and SU-19s.

The Chinese realize that the first steps toward modernization will be the riskiest. They need a wide range of weapons to offset Soviet forces, yet development or purchase of even one new weapons system could provoke the Russians, says Pye.

Should the United States provide technological aid to China? Strengthening the Chinese may "improve the level of [Moscow's] civility." But it could also jeopardize SALT II and future arms control treaties.

There is another, less obvious risk. For all their xenophobia, the Chinese tend toward "psychological dependence" on allies, observes Pye. This was obvious during their bittersweet 1950s alliance with the Soviet Union; they expected more than they got. Peking's disappointment helped lead to the Sino-Soviet rift of the 1960s. Washington should be wary; any shortfall in American-supported modernization of China's technology may be seen by Peking as a case of U.S. betrayal.

Differing Views of Deterrence

There are important differences between Russians and Americans in the way they look at the arms race and at nuclear "deterrence."

According to Legvold, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington policymakers see the U.S. strategic forces (ICBMs, bombers, Polaris submarines) as elements designed to reinforce Western bargaining positions and deter aggressive Soviet moves, including nuclear war.

But the Soviet strategists do not have an elaborate deterrence theory. They "skip directly to the problem of prosecuting a war, ultimately nuclear war." Their apparent goal, if war comes, is to knock out U.S. missile forces, denying the Americans the capacity for destroying Soviet society, and then to fight a war "as traditional as possible," using all types of forces.

"Stability" and mutual "constraint" in the arms race, prized by Americans, are not prized by the Russians. In arms control talks, they have tended to prefer a "free hand for themselves, even if this means giving a free hand to the other side," says Legvold. For example, during the SALT II negotiations, they did not seek to curb U.S. development of new MX mobile missiles, lest they be barred from developing their own.
version of the MX.

In Washington's eyes, Moscow has set the pace of the arms race, with large numbers of new "destabilizing" heavy missiles. The Soviets, however, fear that the United States, with its technological superiority, controls the direction of the arms race—with new weapons like the cruise missile and the Trident submarine. Hence they object in "blanket fashion" to all U.S. advances and greet with suspicion "the numbers, the focus, and the formulas the United States advances in SALT."

_The H-Bomb Decision_


On January 31, 1950, President Harry S Truman gave the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) the go-ahead to continue development of the hydrogen bomb. Although his decision was backed by both civilian and military advisers, recently declassified government records show that the reasons for their support differed greatly.

As early as December 1945, intelligence reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that U.S. conventional forces, rapidly demobilized after World War II, were barely strong enough to defend the Western Hemisphere, even as they occupied Japan and West Germany. Soviet troops, however, were judged capable of taking most of Western Europe, the Persian Gulf, Korea, and North China. By June 1946, the military had drawn up a plan, code-named "Pincher." It called for nuclear weaponry to offset the disparity between Soviet and American conventional power in case of war. The Soviet oil industry (67 percent of which was located in 17 cities) was selected as the prime target for atomic attack.

At the time, says Rosenberg, a historian and consultant to the U.S. Navy, the American atomic force consisted of "about a dozen" unassembled bombs. To boost American firepower, the Joint Chiefs asked for a stockpile of 400 atom bombs by 1953.

Perhaps most influential in reinforcing the military's reliance on atomic weapons was Truman's 1948 announcement limiting the 1950 defense budget to a low $14.4 billion. (Atomic weapon production was under the AEC budget and not subject to Truman's ceiling.)

When the Russians successfully detonated an atomic bomb in August 1949, Truman's civilian advisers gave up hope for a ban-the-bomb treaty with Moscow. They urged speedy development of the H-bomb. The Joint Chiefs' support was less enthusiastic. With explosive power 1,000 times greater than that of the Nagasaki A-bomb, the thermonuclear device, they thought, packed more force than the Pentagon needed to destroy Soviet cities. They went along, however, because they saw the new weapon "as a natural extension of existing strategy" to balance Russian strength.
"Competition or Rationalization in the Liner Industry?" by Robert A. Ellsworth, in the Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce (July 1979), Jefferson Law Book Co., P.O. Box 1936, Cincinnati, Ohio 45201.

More competition in the U.S. merchant shipping industry (advocated by officials of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division) will neither increase efficiency nor reduce shipping rates.

The very nature of the dry-cargo business precludes normal competitive conditions, writes Ellsworth, chief of the Office of Economic Analysis at the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC). Two factors are the long life (25 years) and high cost, up to $45 million, of each new freighter or container ship; operators cannot easily cut expenses or switch to other activities when business drops. As a result, they keep charging high rates, despite under-utilization of shipping capacity. Even under normal conditions, most carriers have to operate at 80 percent capacity to make ends meet. And high overhead, including outlays for sailors’ wages, fuel, and maintenance, leaves little margin for profit.

Competition is also skewed by the varying support governments lend to their flag fleets for reasons of prestige. Most nations (the United States included) provide ship owners with ship-building and operating subsidies, tax incentives to buy new ships, and low-interest loans. Some provide more than others, however. The fleets of the Soviet Union and Singapore, for example, are government-owned; the state aid they receive allows them to be far less profit conscious than their American competitors.

To survive, many foreign-owned fleets have engaged in cooperative “rationalization.” They share routes and cargoes to keep rates low and ships busy. The FMC, however, fearing antitrust violations, has thus far refused to allow American shippers to follow suit. Without such large-scale cooperation, Ellsworth says, American carriers’ excess capacity will grow, pushing their shipping charges higher and further hindering their ability to vie for a share of the market with foreign flag rivals.

The latest generation of container ships: West Germany’s Ostasien.

The Wilson Quarterly/Autumn 1979
The Perils of East-West Trade

Growing East-West trade will eventually cause friction in the West and undeserved financial gains for East Europe's communist regimes. So contends Vernon, an economist at Harvard Business School. The inequities inherent in trade between market-based and government-controlled economies increase with the volume of transactions. (Over the past 15 years, annual East-West trade has grown from $3.5 billion to over $35 billion.) Because the state is the sole buyer for the entire economy in communist countries, Western firms, eager to gain access to a vast market, compete fiercely, cutting prices to get a foot in the door. At the same time, communist exports, priced cheaply by export ministries (which don’t have to answer to stockholders or unions) are highly competitive on the world market. And the Soviets’ preference for bilateral trade pacts often forces Western trading nations to import a wide range of Russian goods, thus harming the export business of their non-communist allies. For example, Vernon writes, “Western European countries tolerate the imports of steel and textiles from Eastern Europe while barring similar imports from Japan and the developing nations.”

East-West trade will continue to expand, Vernon predicts. He suggests that the 24 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (including Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, West Germany, and the United States) informally agree to cooperate on trade with the Soviets and their Eastern European partners. The terms of such cooperation: “No trade should...take place unless it contributes a net economic benefit to the [Western] market economies as a group.” The big problem, he admits, will be convincing the Soviet Union and other Eastern countries to abandon some “long unchallenged assumptions,” notably that their trade restrictions can be justified as purely economic measures, while decisions made by Western countries to block trade deals are politically motivated sanctions.

Loopholes for the Poor

Thanks to individual income tax “loopholes,” 260 Americans who made over $200,000 paid no federal taxes in 1975. But, then as now, the vast majority of legal tax deductions favored people earning less than $10,000.

Freeman, a senior researcher at the Hoover Institution, and former White House adviser, writes that one-fourth of the 82 million Americans who filed returns with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 1975...
reported no taxable income. Of these non-taxpayers, 95 percent had an adjusted gross income below $10,000, while only .009 percent (1,845) reported incomes over $30,000. Most of the untaxed earnings went to people in low- and middle-income brackets and included: (a) income below minimum taxable levels; (b) payments from social security, welfare, and unemployment compensation; (c) nontaxable military pay allowances.

Many individuals in the over-$200,000 bracket who avoid paying taxes appear richer on the IRS's ledgers than they actually are, Freeman argues. Most have profited from investments made with borrowed money. For example, a loan of $2 million at 10 percent interest, invested at a 12 percent rate of return, delivers the investor a gross income of $240,000 (putting him, according to the IRS, in the over-$200,000 bracket). But he pays out $200,000 in nontaxable interest on the loan. If he has no other income beyond his remaining $40,000 but can claim enough medical, charitable, and other deductions, the government collects nothing.

About 85 percent of the taxpayers reported incomes under $20,000 in 1975. To please them, politicians will probably continue to assail "loopholes for the rich," writes Freeman. But, in fact, he claims, the U.S. system of income tax and tax deductions has become the nation's way of redistributing income. It "shows the same bias that characterizes the entire American fiscal structure: in favor of the low (or no) producer and against the high producer or earner."

Do Women Make Better Managers?

Female business managers, using a style of leadership clearly different from the techniques of their male counterparts, are more successful at promoting employee morale, report Baird, a management specialist, and Bradley, an Indiana University speech professor.

Baird and Bradley surveyed 150 Midwestern hospital, clerical, and production-line workers about communication with their bosses. They found that female supervisors, more than males, were willing to share information with their subordinates about other company departments. Workers (of both sexes) supervised by women more often described their bosses as being "receptive" to employees' ideas and suggestions. And women managers tended to pay more attention to individual workers' problems and to reward efforts with encouragement or a pat on the back. Such qualities, say the authors, parallel the prescriptions for effective supervision offered by prominent management theorists.

Meanwhile, employees depicted their male managers as trying to
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Male bosses were quick to challenge employees who disagreed with them and to direct the course of conversation. Are women better supervisors? The authors make no definitive claims. While the female managerial style does seem to boost worker morale, they say, its effectiveness in other areas (e.g., production) remains to be determined.

SOCIETY


How does one get into Who's Who in America?

Analyzing listings in the 1924, 1944, and 1974 editions of Marquis' Who's Who, University of Arizona sociologists Lieberson and Carter found that occupational "pathways to national prominence" differ greatly between blacks and other Americans. (The researchers relied on surnames to indicate ethnic origins; race was determined from records developed by other sociologists and by comparing 1974 entries with listings in Who's Who Among Black Americans, 1975-76.)

In 1924, most of the 80 blacks in Who's Who were clergymen (47.5 percent) or educators at black universities (22.5 percent). Fifty years later, educators still comprised 19 percent of the blacks listed, but one-third of them were working at institutions that were not predominately black. By contrast, churchmen made up only 6 percent of the blacks cited in 1974. Blacks gained renown in other categories: sports, up from 0 in 1924 to 14 percent of black listings in 1974; government and politics up from 1 to 13 percent; entertainment up from 3 to 15 percent.

While black achievers were branching out, prominent whites tended to become concentrated in a few fields. By 1974, most whites in Who's Who were either educators (37 percent) or businessmen (20 percent). Other shifts were noted: Only 14 percent of Who's Who Scandinavians were in politics and government in 1974, versus 20 percent in 1924. Singers and musicians, 35 percent of the Italians listed in 1924, accounted for only 8 percent of the Italians in 1974. Of the directory's English-surnamed Americans, 7 percent were listed as physicians in 1924, only 3 percent in 1974.
### WHO'S WHAT IN WHO'S WHO

Changing Occupational Distribution of Ethnic Groups, 1924–1974

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<td>Educators</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>23%</td>
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<td>Singers.</td>
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<td>Musicians</td>
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<td>Athletes</td>
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<td>All others</td>
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Though black representation in *Who's Who* remains low (.37 blacks per 10,000 of total U.S. population, compared to 3.88 Americans of English origins and 8.39 Jews), Lieberson and Carter suggest that blacks are slowly "making it," gaining recognition in previously segregated or restricted professions.

### Drinking and Thinking

"Does Drinking Weaken Resistance?" by Robert N. Bostrom and Noel D. White, in *Journal of Communication* (Summer 1979), P.O. Box 13358, Philadelphia, Pa. 19101.

Plying someone with alcohol does not make him more amenable to persuasion, according to Bostrom and White, communications professors at the University of Kentucky and Eastern Washington University, respectively.

The authors performed an experiment to gauge the effect alcohol has on a person's willingness to change his attitude when confronted by "persuasive messages." Participants (students over 21 years old) drank a measured amount of alcohol—a 150-pound individual received the...
equivalent of 4.4 ounces of 80 proof whiskey—and were asked to read essays debunking popular beliefs (e.g., "frequent medical checkups are necessary").

The authors found that the individuals who imbibed the most alcohol registered less change in attitude than the participants who drank no spirits at all (the control group). Differences were less dramatic between the nondrinkers and those who consumed small amounts of alcohol. One unexpected discovery: Although they were less likely to agree with the debunking essays, the heavy alcohol drinkers did not offer a significantly higher number of counter-arguments than the sober people.

According to the authors, most research shows that argumentative messages generate central nervous system activity, or "psychological discomfort." Since alcohol depresses the central nervous system, Bostrom and White theorize, the subjects who drank large amounts of alcohol were, in effect, immunized against discomfort. As a result, they felt no compulsion to reconsider their attitudes or to offer arguments to dispute those in the essays.

Growth of Black Suburbs

In 1960, 2.7 million blacks lived in America's suburbs; by 1974, the number had grown to 4.2 million. Nonetheless, housing in suburbia is still largely segregated.

So says Clay, professor of urban studies at MIT. Census Bureau data show that the average post-1960 black suburbanite is six years younger than previous black suburban dwellers and is more likely to earn over $10,000 a year (52.5 percent in 1970 compared to 47.4 percent in 1960). And today, many blacks are moving to formerly all-white communities: In 1960, 53 percent of the neighborhoods in Maryland's affluent Montgomery County (bordering Washington, D.C.) were less than 1 percent black; by 1970, only 24.2 percent were in that category.

But census data also show that only one-fourth of the blacks going to the suburbs settled in neighborhoods where the average home cost $25,000 or more; only one-fifth took up residence in locales that had significant amounts of new housing. Black families set up housekeeping, Clay writes, in areas that "share certain striking physical and socioeconomic resemblances" to the "declining central-city neighborhoods they left behind." Blacks, he says, move into areas where the housing is older and cheaper, while the white former residents depart for the newer communities created during the 1960s housing boom.

Clay's conclusion: Black suburbanization is following the same patterns found in the racially segregated urban housing markets. Without a new national policy "to open up the suburbs" to blacks, they could become the "crisis ghettos" of the future.

"The Process of Black Suburbanization" by Philip L. Clay, in Urban Affairs (June 1979), 275 South Beverly Dr., Beverly Hills, Calif. 90212.
Give Them Science News

What do newspaper audiences like to read about? According to Nunn, a Newspaper Advertising Bureau executive, more Americans are taking time to scan news of science and technology.

In a 1971 NAB survey, "science and technology" failed to make the list of the 17 subjects most favored by newspaper readers. Six years later, however, this topic ranked No. 11. And 32 percent of the science stories in the 1977 survey were rated "very interesting" by readers. By contrast, only 24 percent of all newspaper content received such high marks.

Adults under 30 years of age (the generation, Nunn says, that some observers claim have given up on science) are slightly more likely than those over 30 to rate science news highly. The difference (3 percentage points) is significant, he says, because young people tend to give lower ratings to newspaper content than do their elders.

In 1977, asked which subjects they would assign more space to if they were newspaper editors, adults under 30 ranked "consumer news" first, followed by "the environment" and "health/nutrition." (Science was not among the choices offered.) The over-30 group placed health/nutrition second—after "best food buys"—and the environment sixth (behind human interest stories, editorials, and consumer news).

The "average" newspaper did print more items on the environment and public health in 1977 than in 1971 (up .1 percent and .4 percent, respectively). However, the percentage of all non-advertising space given over to news of science and technology shrank, from 1 percent to .7 percent. Space for two notably unscientific features—horoscopes and puzzles—grew from 2.4 percent to 2.9 percent.

Women in TV

Some feminist sociologists claim that TV news and entertainment programs perpetuate stereotypes about women's "place" in society. The networks' images of women will only change, they argue, when more women hold responsible positions in the television industry. Tuchman, a sociologist at Queen's College, N.Y., disagrees.

"Women's Depiction by the Mass Media" by Gaye Tuchman, in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society (Spring 1979), University of Chicago Press, 15801 Ellis Ave., Chicago, Ill. 60637.
As feminists see it, television producers persist in presenting outdated images of women in American society.

But some statistics seem to support the feminist position, she writes. A 1977 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights study found that, since 1954, women have accounted for only 45 percent of the people “presented on television” and 20 percent of those with TV jobs. (In fact, women now make up 52.4 percent of the U.S. population and 50.7 percent of the labor force.) Less than 10 percent of station-break announcements are made by women. Even in the “pseudo-cabalitarian world” of soap operas, male characters dominate the drama; they, more than women, provide advice on “personal entanglements.”

Women are not yet on an equal footing with men in television’s corporate offices. “Evidence of discrimination in hiring and promotion,” Tuchman notes, “was strong enough for women employees to have won lawsuits or achieved substantial out-of-court settlements from each of the three television networks” during the early 1970s.

But, once in a position of responsibility, will television’s corporate women be quick to make changes? Women who wish to get ahead in the business, Tuchman says, are expected to support the company line, whether it is sexist or otherwise. Most important, future women professionals seem to have the same image of the female population that men do. In a 1977 survey of female journalism students, for example, the typical young interviewee described her own interest in politics as “unusual” for her sex. Most women, the students averred, prefer the traditional fare found on the “women’s pages” of newspapers.

Electronic Thievery

"Your Money and Your Life" by David A. Cook, in Columbia Journalism Review (July/Aug. 1979), Subscription Service Dept., 200 Alton Pl., Marion, Ohio 43302.

Americans pay a high price for commercial television, argues Cook, an English professor at Emory University. The business of television, he contends, is not, as popularly assumed, selling products to the viewer. Rather, it is selling potential consumers
to advertisers. The stakes are formidable. Ninety-eight percent of U.S. homes have a television set, and the average American spends more than four hours a day watching TV.

For the privilege of addressing their large audiences, the networks charge advertisers hefty fees. In 1979, 60 seconds of prime time (8 to 11 p.m., EST) sells for an average of $100,000. Most commercials are costly—production charges can run up to $50,000. The consumer ends up bearing the brunt of the advertisers' expenses in increased prices for goods, Cook writes. And, in effect, he also willingly gives away his time to the networks, which then sell it to the advertisers "at a huge net profit annually." (The television industry's revenues reached $5.9 billion in 1977.) Drawn by the promise of free entertainment, he concludes, "we are selling off our most precious and nonrenewable resource—the time of our lives—for a handful of electronic gimcracks."

**RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY**

*Why Jonestown?*  

More than 600 religious sects have been established in the United States since 1650. All have suffered from the jibes and hostility of the American public, observes Bowden, a religion professor at Douglass College, Rutgers University.

U.S. religious sects "have exhibited the widest possible range of attitudes regarding private property, sexual relations, [and] governmental theories," Bowden writes. Most have been short-lived; the exceptions—Quakers, Mormons, Black Muslims—have acquired a respectability that their early critics could not have foreseen. Contemporary sects are no easier to fathom. Who could have predicted the grisly evolution of the Reverend Jim Jones' People's Temple?

Individuals who are drawn to religious sects tend to feel isolated from established churches. As members of a sect, their alienation is heightened by the pressure within a small group to conform. Later, public disapproval reinforces their isolation.

Excessive conformity deadens the members' critical sense, Bowden says. Members may "compensate for their inadequacies by projecting religious ideals" onto the group leader. Mass deaths, such as occurred at Jonestown, Guyana, in November 1978, are, Bowden says, "simply the most graphic of the types of suicide possible within isolated, high-pressure sectarian communities."

Yet God "speaks to mankind" in "many different ways." To con-
demn another religion, Bowden cautions, is to judge the source of spiritual fulfillment; it places “human standards above God’s autonomy.” Each sect should be judged by its fruits (do its members abide by the spirit of the Old Testament admonition to “do justice, love mercy, and walk humbly with the Lord”?) and by the limits to the power it entrusts to its leader. Human nature’s potential for “distortion and misguided self-seeking” must be kept in mind when evaluating claims of personal spirituality made by a Jim Jones or any other religious leader. “Idolizing human patterns,” Bowden says, “is not only unwise, it is blasphemy.”

Morality and Plea Bargaining

To be accepted in courts, a defendant’s guilty plea must be entered voluntarily, according to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. But thus far, the Supreme Court has failed to give the lower courts a clear definition of “voluntariness,” writes Wertheimer, a University of Vermont political scientist.

When a prosecutor allows a defendant to plead guilty to a lesser charge, the state saves time and money, and the accused usually wins a lighter sentence. Chief Justice Warren Burger has written that “plea bargaining is an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged.” But the procedure remains a matter of controversy.

The Supreme Court in 1967 struck down two lower court convictions obtained by self-incrimination. In the first, a New York lawyer was threatened with disbarment if he refused to testify; in the second, a New Jersey police officer incriminated himself after prosecutors told him he could lose his job if he held back information. Yet the Court in 1970 upheld the conviction of a North Carolina man who pleaded guilty to murder (and received the life sentence mandated by state law) rather than go to trial before a jury empowered to impose the death sentence.

In these and other decisions, Wertheimer says, the Court has not fully explained what factors render a defendant’s actions involuntary. The Court’s rulings do, however, suggest a “two-prong test.” Does the prosecution’s pressure leave the accused with “no other prudent choice” but to confess? And is the defendant’s decision also influenced by threat of a penalty that the state has no right to impose?

In the North Carolina murder case, the Court seems to be saying, made a “prudent choice” between two legal consequences—certain life imprisonment or the decision of the jury. As for the lawyer and the policeman, Wertheimer observes, the state threatened them with deprivations it had no right to impose; thus, the accused parties acted involuntarily.
Changing the Prayer Book

"The Prayer Book under the Scalpel" by Philip Edgecumbe Hughes, in New Oxford Review (June 1979), American Church Union, 6013 Lawton Ave., Oakland, Calif. 94618.

A revised version of the Book of Common Prayer was adopted last September by the 3.2-million-member U.S. Episcopal Church. But the new compilation of prayers and services waters down essential doctrine, according to Hughes, an Episcopal priest and theologian.

The seriousness of sin is diminished in the new Book, Hughes says, apparently in response to complaints that the old version (last revised in 1928) was too gloomy. For example, the Confession of Sin has been made optional in rites for Holy Eucharist and morning and evening prayer. Also optional is the reading of the Ten Commandments (the Decalogue), which, according to the 1928 Book, was required at least one Sunday each month. Hughes fears that the Decalogue ("the only..."
RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

firm basis for an orderly society in a fallen world”) will seldom be heard by Episcopalians.

Missing from the new edition is the phrase “by the merits of His [Christ’s] most precious death and passion,” formerly in the post-communion prayer of thanksgiving. This omission, Hughes writes, implies that, contrary to apostolic teaching, worshipers may rely on merits other than Christ’s to gain God’s acceptance. He asks: “Is the stage being prepared for us to celebrate our own merits?”

Several references to the wrath of God have been expunged. Yet churchgoers need to be reminded, Hughes contends, that they must strive to be saved from divine anger incurred by their sinfulness. Hughes chides the authors of the new book for deleting phrases in the eucharistic services that portray Christ’s sacrifice of himself on the cross as sufficient atonement for man’s fall.

Hughes concludes with a plea that the old forms of Episcopal worship be retained. Failing that, he asks that the Church at least allow the continued use of the 1928 prayer book by those who have “a strong preference for its worship and theology.”

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

Exporting Innovation


Ever since Adam Smith published The Wealth of Nations (1776), scholars have seen technological innovation as a major spur to economic growth. Now many U.S. analysts worry that the United States’ technological capacity is on the wane. Not so, says Graham, professor of management at MIT.

The United States has been an innovative society since the late 19th century—when its big internal markets and high per capita income stimulated costly research and development. The U.S. lead in metalworking, Graham says, was obvious before 1900; American chemical technology equaled Europe’s by the 1920s. Moreover, the rich U.S. markets allowed American industrialists to refine and commercialize foreign inventions (including the radio, sewing machine, internal combustion engine).

After World War II, its technology gave the United States a clear advantage in world markets. That advantage, some economists fear, may be slipping away as the economies of Western Europe and Japan expand. Economist Charles Kindleberger of MIT points to the “protectionist posture” of U.S. industries threatened by foreign competition;
he sees a reduction in new products made for export as a sign that the United States, like Great Britain in the late 19th century, is stagnating. And Commerce Department studies indicate that the U.S. trade balance of "technology-intensive goods" is deteriorating.

But U.S. exports of such goods, Graham notes, in rebuttal, have steadily increased since 1968. If the "technology gap" is narrowing, he says, it is because other industrialized nations are becoming more innovative, not because the United States is any less innovative.

**What Happened to Atomic Power?**


In 1948, the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) correctly predicted that, with the investment of billions of dollars, industry support, and "a lot of luck," about half of the new electric power plants ordered by American utilities in 1968 would be nuclear powered. Since 1975, however, all orders for new nuclear plants have been cancelled or postponed.

Wilson, professor of contemporary technology at MIT and the AEC's first general manager (1947–51), notes several much-publicized reasons for the *de facto* moratorium: rising costs ($1 billion for a new plant); more stringent safety standards; the jump in uranium prices (from $23.46 per kilogram in 1970 to $112.83 per kilogram in 1978); the "increasing number of anti-nuclear objectors"; the ambivalent attitude of the Carter administration; and lengthy licensing procedures.
But the chief causes of the decline, he says, go back to the early years of nuclear energy. During the 1940s and '50s, scientists showered attention on the "front-end" of the process, the reactor. The less glamorous "back end"—disposal of nuclear waste—was ignored. There was no incentive, no public or political pressure to do otherwise. Today, finding an acceptable way to get rid of radioactive by-products looms as the greatest obstacle to commercial nuclear power, and, Wilson concedes, "We seem to be years away from a real solution."

Wilson cites still other mistakes, overlooked in the salad days of nuclear power, that have returned to haunt its advocates; among them, the choice of large control rooms to operate nuclear facilities, an idea transplanted from conventional power plants. (Responsibility for running a nuclear plant, he insists, should rest with a single, highly skilled operator). He contends that the rapid "scale-up" of nuclear power facilities occurred before government or industry had gained sufficient experience with the early, smaller reactors designed for Navy submarines.

One of the AEC's most "grievous errors" in the 1960s, Wilson adds, was the commission's failure to destroy a small reactor in an experiment to see what would happen if the core began to melt. Instead, the AEC relied on computer models to set safety standards.

Silence in Space

"Wrong Number?" by Robert G. Wesson, in Natural History (Mar. 1979), P.O. Box 6000, Des Moines, Iowa 50340.

If civilized societies, populated by creatures similar to humans, inhabit any of the 2.5 billion planets in the Milky Way now presumed capable of supporting life, it is not likely that even one of them has achieved the level of technological expertise to broadcast word of its existence to Earth.

Wesson, a political scientist at the University of California, Santa Barbara, speculates that any major civilizations on other planets would progress much as advanced societies have done on Earth; once locally established, they would expand to conquer weaker neighbors. But after creating an empire, most leaders' main objective is to preserve it. Innovation, which brought civilization in the first place, emerges as a challenge to the status quo.

Before the Greek city-states were consolidated into the Macedonian Empire (c. 336 B.C.), the intense competition among them nurtured new ways to make pottery, cloth, and an early form of steel. Aristophanes, Euripides, Plato, Socrates, and Xenophon all flourished in the period before consolidation. Under Macedonian rule, Wesson says, the pace of discovery declined. It came to a standstill when the Roman Empire was extended to Greece in 196 B.C. Astrology replaced astronomy and "Roman philosophers asked how to deal with the regnant order or how to accommodate it," rather than inquiring into the basic nature of things. Similar patterns governed the evolution of the great empires in Latin America, China, Egypt, Sumeria, and India.
The exception, of course, is Western civilization. The breakup of the Roman Empire into competing towns, cities, duchies, and finally nations resulted in conditions conducive to innovation that still prevail. Technology has thrived in the West, Wesson says, because all modern attempts to reconstitute the Roman Empire by would-be Caesars (Charlemagne, Louis XIV, Napoleon, Hitler) have failed. It is doubtful, he says, that these "very special circumstances" have been duplicated on many other planets.

Loch Ness Monsters


In the fall of 1958, fisherman H. L. Cockrell spent several nights in a kayak on Scotland’s Loch Ness hoping to catch a glimpse of the "monster" long said to inhabit the waters. On his third night out, he saw a "slightly whiskery and misshapen" creature swimming toward him. Suddenly, a small squall rose on the lake; when it passed, Cockrell observed a stick, four feet long and one inch thick, floating on the surface.

Lehn, a professor of electrical engineering at Canada’s University of Manitoba, writes that Cockrell and others who have reported sightings of “lake monsters” (at Lake Manitoba and Lake Winnipeg, as well as
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

Loch Ness) may have been fooled by visual distortions that occur frequently at lakes in cold temperate regions.

Temperature inversions—i.e., when a layer of warmer air hovers over colder air—are common at lakes, where the water is often several degrees cooler than the air. In an inversion, Lehn says, horizontal light rays tend to refract downward as they strike cooler, denser air. Light rays reflected from a single point on an object may be bent in varying degrees as they pass through air of different temperatures. The viewer, says Lehn, assumes that what he sees has come to him in a straight (unrefracted) line but in fact perceives a single point as several. If the inversion is buffeted by an offshore breeze, the distorted image may appear to grow, shrink, or vanish. If it is stationary, the observer’s movement, however slight, can alter the shape and size of the object.

In the Loch Ness sighting, Lehn suggests, it is probable that the stick Cockrell later observed had been magnified by a refraction caused by a temperature inversion over the lake (77 percent of the Loch Ness Monster sightings occur in May through August, the months when lake temperature is well below air temperature). When the storm struck, the inversion was disturbed, thus allowing Cockrell to view the stick in its normal aspect.

RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

Treasures from the Sea?


The world’s ocean mineral resources are only valuable insofar as their availability helps keep down the prices of land-based supplies. That being the case, writes Crutchfield, a University of Washington political scientist, “the present value of most mineral resources in the marine environment (with the obvious exception of oil and gas) is at or near zero.”

The technology to locate and mine ocean mineral formations does not yet exist. And most dissolved minerals are present in concentrations too small to extract efficiently. The exceptions are salt (30 percent of the world’s supply comes from the sea), magnesium, and bromine; but high-grade deposits of the latter two are more cheaply exploited on land. Dredging nets a significant $80 million worth of sand and gravel per year worldwide. Tin, aluminum, iron, and zircon are also dredged up, but in amounts too meager to have much effect on world prices.

Yet, on the ocean floor, the much-publicized ferro-manganese “nodules” (usually ranging from walnut- to potato-sized) seem promising as a source of copper, nickel, cobalt, and manganese. Indeed, several major industrial combines plan to prospect for nodules. These
ventures have stirred heated debate at UN Law of the Sea Conferences, where Third World spokesmen contend that the sea's resources should be shared by all. As long as that issue remains, Crutchfield says, the United States should take care not to jeopardize trade relations with other nations in order to gain access to nodules whose exact value has yet to be determined.

Moreover, the United States should not move too fast to tap its offshore oil and gas reserves. Crutchfield asks: Why not leave such reserves intact until foreign oil becomes prohibitively expensive? Contrary incentives, however, are built into the U.S. Interior Department's present "bonus bidding plus royalties" leases on potential offshore oil fields. With oil companies investing up to $250 million for a single lease (in effect, for an oil "hunting license"), "the pressure to produce is tremendous."

Clouds of Dust

“Dust from the Sahara” by Joseph M. Prospero, in Natural History (May 1979), P.O. Box 6000, Des Moines, Iowa 50340.

Reddish dust from the North African Sahara Desert creates a persistent, dense haze off Africa's west coast. Saharan dust has turned up in England—where automobiles were tinted red overnight in July 1969—and in the Alps and the Pyrenees, where "red snows" are not uncommon. One regular route, however, is westward, across the Atlantic.

The dust arises from great storms, some covering areas 600 miles long and 200 miles wide, writes Prospero, a geophysicist at Miami (Fla.) University. Hot air radiates up from the Sahara’s barren surface to a height of three or four miles, where it mixes with high velocity wind streams. Wind speeds accelerate throughout the warm air, churning up the desert. A cloud of dust moves west to the African coast. From the coast, shifting trade winds carry it across the ocean at speeds between 17 and 21 miles per hour—southerly toward French Guiana in winter, northerly toward Miami, Fla., in the summer. Every summer, Saharan dust colors the sky over Miami a “milky yellow gray” and turns the setting sun into "a pale yellow gray disk."

During the early 1970s, the amount of atmospheric dust crossing the Atlantic increased—a change Prospero attributes to the drought in the Sahel region of Africa. Dust concentrations dropped after the drought ended but have remained above pre-1970 levels.

Overall, 20 percent of the earth’s surface is arid or desert land, including parts of Central Asia, the southern Soviet Union, Australia, and the western United States. No one knows what would happen if the amount of dust in the earth’s atmosphere increased markedly, observes Prospero, but there are some clues. The heavy dust concentrations off the coast of northern Africa, for instance, seem to inhibit the formation of cumulus clouds (a source of showers and thunderstorms), creating thin, “sheet-like” clouds instead.
American environmentalists have long objected to the construction of atomic power plants along the Atlantic coastline (e.g., at Plymouth, Mass.; Southport, N.C.; Scrook, N.H.). They contend that, over time, the discharge of water used to cool the nuclear reactors would raise the temperature of local waters high enough to alter the ocean environment.

As a result, writes Csanady, a senior scientist at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission now requires the construction of costly cooling towers to dissipate most waste heat from such coastal power plants into the atmosphere, not into the ocean. Yet, argues Csanady, the environmentalists' early fears may have been exaggerated.

Research on water circulation over the North American Continental Shelf shows that the Atlantic flows in large, regular patterns, driven by deepwater oceanic gyres (vast bodies of circulating water). Shelf waters generally move northeastward with the Gulf Stream from Miami, Fla., to Cape Hatteras, N.C., and southwestward to Cape Hatteras from Newfoundland. The latter flow, Csanady theorizes, may be traced to

Gyres of water, moving counterclockwise like this one off the coast of North Carolina, could quickly dissipate heated waste water discharged from coastal nuclear power plants.
one narrow, counter-clockwise gyre located north of Cape Hatteras between the coast and the Gulf Stream. It is impelled by a mixture of gravity, drift, and strong winds stirred up by the warm waters of the Gulf Stream. The temperature in this gyre (which transports 10 million cubic meters of water per second) would rise only .3°F if the heated waste water from 1,000 power plants of 1,000 megawatts each were released into it.

Csanady concludes that the daily waste heat of one large power station (equal, he says, to the heat emptied into the ocean “during a summer day by a medium-size lagoon”), pouring out almost anywhere on the coast, would quickly, harmlessly “mix with the massive shelf-slope currents, and ultimately with the mass of world ocean.”

A Green Arctic

In northern Canada, near the Arctic Circle, summer temperatures rarely rise above 50 degrees; permafrost extends to within a few inches of the tundra’s surface. Most of the Arctic receives under 10 inches of rainfall a year, “technically making it a desert” (but one dotted with countless lakes). The small, low plants that occur naturally are edible but not particularly tasty.

In this austere environment, members of a Canadian government agriculture team have been growing summer vegetables at Baffin Island’s Frobisher Bay, 1,300 miles north of Montreal. According to Webb, its director, the experiment is less fanciful than it seems. Except for the caribou and local fish taken by the area’s 1,500 Eskimos, all food supplies must be flown in—or shipped in when the sea thaws in July—at great expense. The Eskimos eat the indigenous plants, but the area’s 700 whites need vegetables, says Webb, if only as a psychological link with the south.

In greenhouses warmed by the sun (15 hours of near cloudless daylight in April, almost 24 hours in July), Webb grew cabbages, broccoli, cauliflower, and other vegetables in raised planting beds. Large drums filled with water absorbed the sun’s rays during the day and warmed the greenhouses at night. (Getting great amounts of water into a liquid state is often a problem in the Arctic. Webb’s source of water was a lake warmed by waste heat from Frobisher Bay’s power plant.) Because the cold temperatures retard the decay of plant material, a commercial fertilizer was used to enrich the nitrogen-poor soil.

Webb contends that solar-heated greenhouses, insulated by snow that covers the ground up to 10 months each year, could operate at Frobisher Bay from April to October, even though outside temperatures would be well below freezing (averaging 7 degrees in April, for example). And such gardening has some special advantages: Produce is sweeter than in the south because of the longer days, and few insects or weeds thrive in the Arctic.
A Chinese Connection

The highly sophisticated Mayan civilization of southern Mexico flourished from about 1500 B.C. to roughly A.D. 1200. Advanced in mathematics and astronomy, the Mayas developed, among other things, an accurate calendar and an 850-character system of hieroglyphics. Then, for unknown reasons, its leaders and priests abandoned their temple cities and disappeared.

Today, farming like their ancestors, the Mayas' descendants on the Yucatán peninsula number 2 million—making them the "largest single group of American Indians north of Peru."

Where did the Mayan culture originate? Early European settlers attributed their splendid stone cities to the Egyptians or Phoenicians, to the Minoans of Crete, or the Lost Tribes of Israel, notes Fleisher, editor of Attimagazine. Indeed, Mayan writings contain accounts of "mysterious seafaring invaders" from the Atlantic. Mexican anthropologists generally believe that the Mayan culture developed in isolation.

But there is evidence, says Fleisher, that the Mayan culture came from China—from the pre-Buddhist Shang and Chou dynasties (1600 B.C.–256 B.C.). Fleisher speculates that Chinese seafarers sailed to Mexico's west coast and there encountered the Olmec Indians. (The Olmec culture, most anthropologists agree, is the "mother culture" of the Mayas and the source of most native Mexican religions and iconography.) The Chinese, Fleisher reasons, introduced the Olmec to many of the advanced ideas and skills adopted from their trading partners in the West, including the Egyptians and Sumerians.

The oriental features of this Olmec sculpture lend credence to the theory that Mexican cultures were influenced by Chinese adventurers who settled on Mexico's Pacific Coast.

Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, D.C.
The Olmec, Fleisher notes, "were the first Mexicans to build temple cities, great basalt altars, stelae, and sarcophagi," common achievements of many other ancient civilizations (e.g., the Egyptians and Chinese). The Olmec also revered jade, carved rock figures with "decidedly narrow, oriental eyes," and fashioned stone axes like those of China's Shang Dynasty.

Fleisher's tentative conclusion: Partly inspired by their Chinese visitors, Olmec "priests, artists, architects, and astronomers set the pace for later people (probably the Mayas) who conquered them and developed the culture further."

They Wanted a Lovely War

Modern critics of Alfred Lord Tennyson's Crimean War poetry ("Maud," "The Charge of the Light Brigade") find the verse troublesome. Many fault its bellicose tone; most rank it well below the English poet laureate's more idyllic works. The problem, says Adams, a historian at North Kentucky University, is that today's scholars are examining the mid-19th-century poems from a late-20th-century, anti-war perspective.

The British industrial revolution and the rise of the merchant class frightened many contemporary English intellectuals; they saw the traditional values of duty and honor symbolized by the gentry as being overrun by the commercial values of avaricious businessmen. Charles Dickens, in *Hard Times* (1854), for example, noted the decline of the upper classes. Tennyson shared Dickens' concern but looked to war as a rejuvenative force that could restore England's spirit and verve.

The impoverished hero of "Maud," disgusted by a society "consumed by money lust," was forced to flee abroad after killing his girl friend's brother (a "co-opted aristocrat") in a duel. In Tennyson's view, he can regain his sanity, self-confidence, and sense of purpose by joining the fight in the Crimea against Russian expansion. The cavalrymen in "The Charge of the Light Brigade" dutifully followed a botched-up order to attack the wrong guns, thereby sacrificing themselves for the sake of their fellow. This act, portrayed in heroic terms by Tennyson, fired the imaginations of their countrymen.

Similar attitudes enjoyed a vogue in the United States. Ralph Waldo Emerson and James Russell Lowell, among other Americans, welcomed the Civil War as an antidote to the greed of Northern merchants and the cruelty of Southern slaveowners. The opening attacks on Fort Sumter, S.C., by Confederate forces was greeted by poet W. W. Howe with the lines: "A nation hath been born again./Regenerate by a second spirit." Not until the slaughter of World War I, Adams concludes, did American and British intellectuals' romantic ideal of war begin to fade.
Leonardo da Vinci’s famous mural, *The Last Supper* (1495-97), has never adhered well to the wall in the Dominican friars’ refectory of the church of St. Maria delle Grazie in Milan. Dissatisfied with the technique of painting frescoes on wet plaster (because he was a slow worker), Leonardo experimented with an oil-tempera medium that failed to penetrate and bond with the plaster, as fresco does.

Today, the 28½-by-15-foot painting is in desperate need of repair, reports Gendel, Rome correspondent for ARTnews. The picture is afflicted by dirt and damp mold, and its paint is flaking. Efforts to preserve it are mired in a controversy that awaits resolution by the Italian art bureaucracy. Giovanni Urbani, head of Italy’s National Institute of Art Restoration, wants to install air conditioning in the refectory to provide a stable, dry, clean atmosphere. But the retired superintendent of Milan’s monuments, Gisberto Martelli, an influential figure who occupies an apartment above the refectory, opposes air conditioning; it would, he argues, generate too much noise and vibration. He prefers an air filtering system and a $1 million rehabilitation of the refectory building. Martelli would also require that visitors remove their shoes before entering the building.

*The Last Supper* has endured trying times before, Gendel writes. In the 17th century, friary monks cut a door through the wall, eliminating forever part of the tablecloth and Christ’s feet. And over the centuries, several well-meaning craftsmen have repainted portions of the mural in an effort to preserve the composition. Much of their handiwork has yet to be removed. Of the masterpiece’s famed perspective background, 80 percent is painted over, and “only about 20 percent of it salvageable,” according to Urbani. The figures of Christ and his apostles have fared better—a mere 15 percent of their overpainting requires removal.

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New Leaders for Thai Rebels


When protesting Bangkok university students toppled Thailand’s corrupt military regime in October 1973 and saw it replaced by a parliamentary democracy, the small Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) was as surprised as anyone else. The students, long passive, were sud-
Suddenly the country’s chief political activists. Their new strength attracted the CPT’s interest.

Before 1973, Thai Communists were hobbled by the government’s rural anti-guerrilla operations and by the arrest of several key members in 1968. It concentrated its efforts in the hinterland, write Morell and Samudavanija, who teach political science at Princeton and at Thailand’s Chulalongkorn University, respectively. But, after 1973, in the new liberal climate, the party was free to proselytize among the students. Its agents distributed party publications on the campuses and emphasized to student leaders that the egalitarian society they envisioned could only be achieved by violent revolt.

Impatient with the slow pace of reform and alarmed by increasing violence from the Right, students from Bangkok began visiting the 250 Communist-controlled hamlets in the Northeast, North, and South. By 1975, some 1,000 had gotten weapons training and indoctrination at remote camps. Student publications soon attacked "U.S. imperialism," "foreign capitalists and investors," and "the liberal democratic forms of government," terms borrowed from party rhetoric. In 1975, official estimates put CPT membership at 10,000 insurgents and 7,000 civilian supporters, many of them students. When a 1976 coup returned the military to power, still others joined the Communists hiding out in the hills.

A Red takeover is not imminent; in Thailand (pop. 40 million), military repression has hampered activity. But the authors claim that the party’s prospects have been vastly improved by the influx of energetic young ex-students capable of formulating strategy and coordinating rural guerrillas and urban dissidents. "To a great extent," they conclude, "the future of Thailand now rests in their hands."

Sadat’s Egypt

A reluctance to realistically assess the future pervades Anwar el-Sadat’s Egypt. Strongly conscious of their roots in the Middle East, Egyptians have become isolated from other Arab nations and increasingly dependent on the United States and the West.

Egyptians have long considered their homeland the leader of the Arab world, writes Ajami, a Princeton political scientist. They point to its relatively developed economy, sophisticated cities, and a history of civilization unmatched by its neighbors. The country’s self-confidence was shattered, however, by defeat in Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 1967 Six-Day War against Israel. The war was supposed to cement Egypt’s leadership in the region. Instead, it resulted in Israeli occupation of the Sinai and a national “identity crisis” that simmered on until Sadat ordered the assault on Israel in 1973. No matter, Ajami says, that Sadat had to call on Henry Kissinger to save Egypt’s Third Army after the
counterattacking Israelis crossed the Suez Canal. The 1973 war, for Egyptians, regained Egypt's honor and prestige, and made Sadat a hero.

After the war, Sadat's penchant for dramatic, solo diplomatic gestures (his 1977 trip to Jerusalem, for example) offended the sensibilities of other Arabs, particularly the close-knit, conservative Saudi Arabians. He was soon "isolated from his brethren," Ajami says. And what began as a "dialogue" with the United States has ended in an "embrace" of Western values that has eroded Sadat's support at home. Among the disenchanted are Egypt's Moslem conservatives and the Nasserites, who remain true to the dream of pan-Arabism.

Meanwhile, Sadat has virtually ignored his country's domestic problems—poverty, crowded cities, a sluggish bureaucracy. Opposition to Sadat will grow, Ajami concludes. In the name of Islam and Arab authenticity, challengers to Sadat will arise, attacking him for imposing a Western veneer over Egypt's Arab "soul."

Israel's Woes

"Israel's Economic Plight" by Ann Crittendon, in Foreign Affairs (Summer 1979), P.O. Box 2615, Boulder, Colo. 80322.

After two wars, Israel's economy is in serious straits, writes Crittendon, economics specialist for the New York Times.

The statistics are grim. Prices rose almost 50 percent in 1978. The national debt stands at $12.5 billion, the world's largest per capita. The
balance-of-payments deficit last year was $3.25 billion, nearly one-fourth of the country's Gross National Product.

Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s Likud coalition government now relies heavily on the United States ($2.8 billion in aid in 1979 as part of the Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement) and contributions from overseas Jews ($600 million annually, including revenues from the sale of Israeli bonds). In Jerusalem, senior officials privately admit they fear the effect their country's economic dependency will have on Israel's diplomatic freedom in the Middle East.

The 1967 and 1973 wars forced Israel to make large investments in military hardware. In 1966, the country imported $116 million worth of armaments; by 1972, the figure was $800 million. Military expenditures hit $2 billion in 1975. In the fall of 1977, the new Begin government "floated" the Israeli pound to make exports cheaper, removed or reduced export subsidies, and eliminated certain currency controls to attract foreign investors. This "New Economic Policy" was a moderate success. Exports rose 25 percent in 1978, and foreign investment increased by more than 50 percent. But Begin failed to accompany these measures with cutbacks in defense and welfare.

Some critics fault the economic inexperience of the Likud coalition, after 30 years of rival Labor Party rule, for Israel's distress; Begin's Finance Minister, for example, was formerly the manager of a small optical company.

But Crittendon blames the constant threat of war and Israel's Zionist mission, which requires "a vast social welfare state to cushion the adjustment of immigrants to their new land." (Ironically, inflation, coupled with war, has weakened Israel's appeal: Only 40 percent of the Jews leaving the Soviet Union, for example, now choose to settle in Israel.)

What is the way out for Israel? Crittendon suggests aggressive pursuit of a comprehensive Mideast peace settlement that would allow military reductions and restructuring of the Israeli economy. This suggestion, she says, is not apt to be seriously considered by the Israelis, who have long viewed national security as divorced from economics.

The Pains of Nationalization

Third World regimes have generally justified the seizure of foreign-owned industries as an assertion of any country's right to control its natural resources and to reduce the influence of foreigners.

Such were the official explanations during Venezuela's peaceful takeover in 1976 of the local operations of 14 major oil companies (including Shell, Mobil, Exxon, Texaco, and Gulf). So far, writes Bye, a member of the International Peace Institute in Oslo, the transfer has
done little to diminish the country's economic reliance on the multinationals.

Oil is Venezuela's most important product, accounting for 77 percent of the government's income and 95.6 percent of the country's exports in 1975. It constitutes Venezuela's only major industry and helped create a large middle class, much of it employed in oil-related enterprises. Nationalization occurred after a series of laws enacted in the early 1970s gave the Acción Democrática Party government increasing shares of oil revenues, power to set oil prices, and authority to approve all changes in oil company operations (including those affecting exploration and volume).

Much has remained the same, however. Although the government plans to eventually merge the 14 state-run oil companies into 5 or 6 firms, each has thus far retained the personnel of its multinational predecessor. (Even before nationalization, most oil company employees were Venezuelan; only 37 of Shell's 6,000 workers, for example, were foreigners.) The state continues to rely on the multinationals for technology, marketing, exporting, and refining (two facilities, owned by Shell and Exxon in Curacao and Aruba, refine more Venezuelan crude than does Venezuela). These service contracts enable the multinationals to take more money out of the country, Bye suspects, because the foreigners no longer re-invest in the Venezuelan plants.

Meanwhile, the government's net oil income has dropped: It is investing heavily in oil and other heavy industries and must pay indemnification ($1 billion over five years) to the multinationals. Left out, Bye contends, are Venezuela's poor, who should be the major beneficiaries of the 1976 nationalization.

Spain's Armada

"Why Did the Armada Fail" by Scan O'Donnell, in Oceans (Mar. 1979), P.O. Box 10167, Des Moines, Iowa 50340.

In July 1588, King Philip II of Spain sent his supposedly invincible Armada of 130 ships to Calais on the English Channel. There the fleet, led by the inexperienced Duque de Medina-Sidonia, was to rendezvous with a Spanish army based in the Netherlands and then launch an invasion of Britain.

In one of history's greatest military blunders, the troops did not appear—messages between the Armada and the army had been muddled. Alone, the Armada's slow and unwieldy warships engaged Queen Elizabeth I's Navy of light, maneuverable ships (some commanded by Sir Francis Drake) armed with long-range cannon. The British sank one Spanish galleon, severely damaged five others, and blocked the Spaniards' southern escape route back down the channel, forcing them to sail north around Scotland. An autumn storm in the North Atlantic destroyed almost half of the fleet, smashing several ships against Ireland's rocky west coast.

Why was the Armada so vulnerable? O'Donnell, science correspon-
After a two-week running battle in 1588 against the British Navy, the Spanish Armada sailed homeward. But almost half the fleet was destroyed in an Atlantic storm off Ireland.

dent for the Irish Times, writes that recent investigations of Spanish shipwrecks off the Irish coast provide some answers. Only two dozen of the Armada's ships were big galleons built for both battle and heavy seas; most of these rode out the storm and returned safely home. The ships now being raised, however, were smaller wide-beamed merchantmen built for the calmer waters of the Mediterranean. These were pressed into service for the planned invasion. One ship now being examined, the Santa Maria de la Rosa, supplies a case in point: Its keelson (the timber bolted to the keel to reinforce it) is of "unusually small dimensions" for an Atlantic vessel. O'Donnell concludes that it was one of the "fragile Mediterranean hybrids" hastily outfitted for war.

Another reason why the Armada fared so badly: inferior armament. Pieces of cannon lifted from the Spanish wrecks have been found with off-center bores, which would cause the cannon to burst upon firing. That, O'Donnell suggests, may explain why Spanish gunners were able to sink "just one tiny and noticeably insignificant boat" during the two-week running battle with the British.
Random House, 201 East 50th St., New York, N.Y. 10022. 353 pp. $12.95
Editors: Robert Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin

Over the next decade, total U.S. energy use from all sources will rise from its current level equal to 37 million barrels of oil a day to the equivalent of 54 million barrels of oil a day.

Relying on increased imports of oil from the Middle East is dangerous and expensive; instead, the United States must exploit its domestic energy supplies, say the authors of this much-debated report from the Harvard Business School’s Energy Project.

However, Americans cannot rely on any of the four conventional alternatives—domestic oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear—to fill the energy gap left by reduced oil imports. None of them “can supply much more energy than they do now,” say the authors.

Because most domestic sources of oil and natural gas have already been tapped, the United States will be lucky to maintain production at today’s level—the equivalent of 19 million barrels of oil daily. (Current daily consumption of oil and gas is up to 27.6 million barrels of oil equivalent.)

“Energy Future” is defined as the “United States has enough coal,” the report’s authors say, “for at least the next hundred years.” But coal is environmentally troublesome; when burned, it releases harmful amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. The environmental and health constraints will probably make coal’s total contribution to energy supplies the equivalent of 10 million barrels of oil daily by 1985, not the 13.5 million barrels predicted by the Carter administration’s 1977 National Energy Plan.

Nuclear power’s future is uncertain. Unless procedures to safely store nuclear waste are found, some atomic plants may be forced to shut down by 1983. Yet even if all nuclear plants currently in existence and on order are operating at full capacity for the next 12 years, they will provide a daily equivalent of only 3 million barrels of oil (twice as much as current levels).

The answer to the United States’ energy dilemma lies in unconventional sources of power—conservation and solar energy.

Conservation, say the report’s authors, is the “key energy source.” Such measures as better insulated buildings, more stringent fuel economy standards for automobiles, and the use of industrial waste heat to warm plants could cut U.S. energy consumption by 30 to 40 percent without impeding economic growth.

And widespread application of solar energy techniques—a broad range of techniques—could provide up to 20 percent of U.S. energy needs over the next 20 years.

Stobaugh and Yergin suggest that the government offer incentives for individuals and businesses to conserve conventional energy and use solar...
They recommend a program of federal reimbursements—60 percent of solar installation costs, 40 percent of industrial conservation investments, and 50 percent of residential and commercial conservation measures—financed by a "windfall tax" on decontrolled domestic oil.

"National Longitudinal Study: A Capsule Description of Young Adults Four and One-Half Years After High School."

This study is the third in a series of four national surveys of 20,000 young Americans who graduated from high schools across the nation in 1972. Its purpose is to record "the educational and vocational activities, plans, aspirations, and attitudes of young people after they leave high school."

The report shows some major changes in the relative status of women and minorities. Among whites, for example, 25 percent of the women held "professional or managerial" positions, compared to 24 percent of the men. Sixteen percent of black men held such jobs, 14 percent of black women. The figures for Hispanic men and women were 23 percent and 14 percent, respectively.

By October 1976, 72 percent of the young adults were employed full-time. Most young women (56 percent) worked in clerical and sales positions; most men (42 percent) were employed as "operators, service workers, farmers, and laborers." Sixteen percent of the black women surveyed were out of work, compared to 8 percent of the white and Hispanic women.

Among those from families with low and middle "socioeconomic status (SES)," the report says, "whites were less likely to have attended college than blacks or Hispanics. Only in the high SES group were whites more likely to have attended college."

Among the young adults who did go to college (54 percent of the group), 30 percent graduated on schedule, 26 percent were still in school in October 1976, and 35 percent dropped out. The dropout rate varied by race: 34 percent of the white men left school, 43 percent of the black men, and 57 percent of the Hispanic men. (The report notes that the corresponding figures were almost identical for women.)

College graduates working full-time earned an average annual salary of $9,500. Engineers led the class with salaries of $13,200. At the bottom were those who had majored in the humanities or fine arts ($8,200 a year). The report includes no salary figures for those who did not attend college.

Only 20 percent of the women who went on to graduate school enrolled in "professional degree programs"—e.g., law, medicine, dentistry—compared to 43 percent of the men. Women outnumbered men by more than 3 to 1 in education graduate programs and by over 13 to 1 in health services.

By October 1976, 41 percent of the black women and 33 percent of the black men had "ever married."

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Relatively few women or men believed that they had been treated unfairly in getting a good education because of their sex (8 percent of the blacks and Hispanics, 3 percent of the whites). And the respondents who said they had been treated unfairly were equally divided by sex.

Women, more than men, said they were given a "special advantage" because of their sex.

The tendency of minorities, more than whites, to say that sex was either an advantage or a liability, the report theorizes, may be attributed to the fact that for "blacks and Hispanics, it is difficult in certain situations to separate a sex advantage or disadvantage from what may actually be a race advantage or disadvantage."

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"Restrictions on Business Mobility. A Study in Political Rhetoric and Economic Reality."

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1150 17th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. 61 pp. $3.25

Author: Richard B. McKenzie

In the U.S. Congress and in the Ohio and New Jersey state legislatures, laws have been proposed to penalize large manufacturers who shift operations to another state. Yet current worries that a large-scale business migration is underway from the Northern industrial "Snowbelt" to the Southern "Sunbelt" are unfounded, writes McKenzie, an economist at Clemson University.

Under the proposed National Employment Priorities Act of 1977, the U.S. Secretary of Labor could deny a "runaway plant" investment tax credits, accelerated depreciation allowances, and deductions for expenses incurred by the move. The proposed Ohio law could require "a business that relocates to pay employees left behind severance pay equal to one week's pay for each year of service"; payments would also be made to compensate for the community's increase in unemployment.

Advocates of such laws ignore the facts, says McKenzie. Business moves accounted for only 1.5 percent of job losses in the Northern states in 1969–72 (98.5 percent of employment loss was caused by the death or contraction of existing firms). And "only 1.2 percent of the South's employment gain was the result of in-migration of businesses" during the same period.

Employment is rising nationwide. It
went up 18 percent in the North Central region from 1972 to 1978, 16 percent in the Northeast. In the South and West, employment gains were 17 percent and 15 percent, respectively. Numerically, manufacturing jobs lost in the North have been offset by new positions in the expanding Northern service industries (for example, education, finance, insurance, and medical care).

Moreover, differences among regional per capita incomes are gradually diminishing. In 1929, for example, Mid-Atlantic per capita income was 129 percent higher than in the Southeast; in 1977, it was only 23 percent higher. "Given the convergence in regional standards of living," McKenzie writes, "the long-term movement of industry is likely to be less dramatic in the future than it has been in the past."

Restricting business mobility will hamper national economic growth, argues McKenzie. Businesses will no longer be able to cut production costs by moving to a region where taxes are lower and raw materials are close at hand. Unions will increase their demands (making production more expensive) when "the immediate threat of job loss is taken away." But wages will not rise; more people will compete for secure jobs at firms forced to stay put.

Finally, "because businesses will not be able to 'vote with their feet,'" McKenzie concludes, the power of state and local governments to raise taxes or lower the quality of public services will increase.

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"Small Futures. Children, Inequality, and the Limits of Liberal Reform."


Author: Richard H. deLone, for the Carnegie Council on Children

Over the last 150 years, liberal American reformers have tried to correct the economic inequalities between rich and poor by providing equal opportunities to children, especially children born to poor parents. Such efforts have failed, argues deLone in this egalitarian critique, because they have done little to relieve the immediate "penalties" of poverty.

Reformers assume "that adulthood is too late to do much to influence development," deLone writes, so they programs—Horace Mann's common schools, the settlement houses of the late 19th century, the 1960s' Great Society programs—concentrate on the young.

Yet in 1976, 10.1 million children (15.8 percent of all American children) under 18 were members of families below the national poverty line ($5,815 for a nonfarm family of four). Only 20 percent of American males "exceed the status of their fathers through individual effort and competition," deLone says; the distribution of income and wealth has been "virtually frozen" since World War II, even as average family income has sharply increased. Poverty, he argues, must be seen as a "relative" condition and remedied by greater economic equality.

Most current welfare programs in-
advertently harm children. Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits, for example, are reduced if a member of the welfare family earns over $30 a month; benefits are taken away (in some states) if a man heads the household. Poverty is a stigma in American society—"some children whose main 'problem' is poverty are misclassified as having emotional or mental disorders," deLone writes.

He argues that socioeconomic equality must be created directly, "not indirectly through children." He calls for federal programs to ensure full employment, investment in poverty-stricken areas, and "affirmative action" hiring. Washington should do away with welfare programs and redistribute wealth. His goal: "a decent minimum income," namely, one-half the nation's median family income, or $7,480 for a family of four in 1976.

To pay for all this (cost: about $16 billion), deLone says, government should tax all income—earned and unearned—at a flat 50 percent rate. Each household should be given a tax credit for every family member—$1,400 for children, $2,800 for adults. Contending that the government would save money (by ridding itself of welfare programs) and that families with annual incomes up to $24,000 would pay less in taxes than they do currently, deLone concludes: "Cost is not the real issue. Economic justice in a liberal society is."

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"The Decline of the Best? An Analysis of the Relationships Between Declining Enrollments, Ph.D. Production, and Research."
Discussion Paper Series, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 79 Boylston St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138
Author: Robert E. Klitgaard

Educators fear that a declining birth rate will reduce not only enrollments but also the number of teaching posts at U.S. colleges and universities. The result, many say, will be a decline in research and scholarship, as a "Lost Generation" of potential teachers and researchers seeks employment outside academia.

Yet Klitgaard, associate professor of public policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, finds grounds for optimism.

Enrollment patterns are not easily predicted; in the future, a larger percentage of 18-year-olds may decide to attend college "because of the greater importance of higher education in an increasingly 'service-oriented' economy." U.S. enrollments may also be boosted as more older people return to college part-time and by the growing influx of foreign students (their number doubled to 203,000 from 1966 to 1976).

The effect of any academic cutbacks would probably vary by discipline, observes Klitgaard. For example, from 1960 to 1974, 54.4 percent of the people with doctoral degrees in chemistry worked in business and industry; only 28.1 percent taught. On the other hand, 87.5 percent of the humanities Ph.D.s (with degrees in English, philosophy, fine arts) were employed at colleges or universities.
Grim campus job prospects will not daunt the most gifted students, whatever their field, he says. According to one Harvard admissions officer, "the very best students are those that just love the subject, even if they are going to starve."

And reducing the number of jobs should not affect the quality of research. In many fields of science, for example, "the top 2 percent of researchers produce 25 percent of the research, and their output is also of higher quality."

Some university administrators have suggested that a decline in the number of positions available to young, untenured scholars would have a dampening effect on the rate and quality of research. The reason: Young researchers are more productive. Not true, says Klitgaard.

"Scientists are slightly more productive during their forties" than any other time of their lives; in fact, the productivity of scientists over 60 is about equal to that of researchers under 35.

So far, it has been impossible to identify in advance students who will go on to perform brilliant research. There is no correlation between a student's scores on the Graduate Record Examination (required for admission to most graduate schools) and the quality of his research after receiving a Ph.D. "It will be hard for graduate schools to keep up the numbers of the very best potential scholars if enrollments go down." Klitgaard concludes, "unless proportionately more of the very able [students] still apply."

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

“Layers of Peaks Rise Green,” a contemporary Taiwan landscape painted in the traditional Chinese style by native artist Wei Ching-lung.
Taiwan

On New Year's Eve, the last major official link between the United States and the government of Taiwan—a treaty of mutual defense—will be broken. Washington now formally recognizes the regime in Peking as "China." Yet, for almost three decades, the United States was anti-Communist Taiwan's indispensable ally. The Americans supplied the late Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime with military backing, money, and, in the UN, support for its claim to represent all China. Can Taiwan's prosperous people survive the rupture with Washington? Here, Taiwan scholar Parris Chang looks at the island's neglected early history; political scientist Gerald McBeath sums up the vast changes on Taiwan since 1949; and former diplomat Ralph Clough speculates on the future.

BEAUTIFUL ISLAND

by Parris H. Chang

An old Chinese legend holds that a fiery dragon created Taiwan by piling great rocks up in the sea. The tale is not all that fanciful. Some 60 million years ago, a massive earthquake rocked the East Asian shore, submerging the entire coastline. A second earthquake heaved a narrow chunk of sunken crust up through the waters. As the elements over millennia eroded the jagged landscape, the island spread out into its present shape.

"The earthquake and typhoon have played an important part in the formation of the [Taiwanese] character," W. G. Goddard, the leading British historian of the island, once wrote. "The island was no place for weaklings. It afforded no sanctuary for the indolent. Only the strong could survive."

Taiwan is about twice the size of New Jersey or slightly larger than Holland. It is separated from the fishing and rice-growing province of Fukien, on the mainland of China, by the Taiwan Strait, which varies from 89 to 124 miles in width. Par-
allel mountain ranges—the Chung-yang Range and three others—form a rugged green spine along the eastern coast of the island, facing the broad Pacific; rich farmland lies on the western slopes and on the coastal plain stretching toward the Strait. The climate is subtropical: Rainfall totals 100 inches annually; the average temperature is 75°F.

Of the 17 million people on Taiwan today, some 14.5 million are “Taiwanese” (descendants of Chinese who settled the island prior to the 20th century), more than 2 million are “mainlanders” (post-1945 Nationalist refugees from the Chinese mainland), and approximately 200,000 are aboriginal tribesmen. The stocky aborigines are variously believed to have arrived, by raft or outrigger canoe, from the Malay Peninsula, the Philippines, the mainland of south China, or the Ryukyu Islands in prehistoric times.

The aborigines generally have straight rather than slanted eyes. Their old tradition of headhunting, for which they were called shengfan (‘raw savages’) by the Chinese, served for centuries as a strong deterrent to settlement of the island from the mainland.

Yet beginning around A.D. 1000 and intensifying during the 16th and 17th centuries, mainland Chinese began crossing the Strait from Fukien in large numbers, some as part of a government-planned migration, some to escape war or famine. Many of the early mainland migrants were the much-suffering Hakkas (literally, ‘guest people’), descendants of immigrants from northern China who had settled in eastern Kwangtung; latecomers to south China, they were reviled by local Chinese. The Hakkas and others gradually drove the aborigines into the remote mountain regions along Taiwan’s eastern coast, where their tribal descendants, known as kaoshan (“mountain dwellers”) still lead a semi-nomadic existence.

The first Western contact with Taiwan came a century after Bartholomeu Dias sailed around the Cape of Good Hope, when Portuguese sailors en route to Japan discovered the place in 1590, naming it Ilha Formosa (“beautiful island”). The Portuguese did not follow up; others did. By the early 1600s,
Archer, scholar, pirate, the versatile Koxinga established Taiwan's first government. "This island was the dominion of my father," he told Dutch colonists. "Foreigners must leave." Although Koxinga's father betrayed the Ming cause, the old man's death affected Koxinga deeply, and at night he would "mourn and weep facing the north."

there were small Spanish and Japanese trading colonies on the north of the island (the Japanese withdrew in 1628), and a pirate confederation, led by Li Han (also known as "Captain China"), prowled the seas and ravaged the mainland from Taiwan's sheltered, silted harbors. Most of the island was a political no-man's-land, and the 25,000 immigrant Chinese, as well as the aboriginal population, were pretty much left alone to fish, farm, or hunt as they had always done.

In 1624, the Dutch invaded Taiwan, eventually ousted the Spanish, and set up a fortified colony of several hundred in the southwest called Fort Zeelandia, near present-day Tainan. The Dutch used Taiwan primarily as a base for trade with China and Japan, but they exploited the local population whenever they could: The Java-based Dutch commercial empire in Asia was not founded on kindness.

Dutch rule was short-lived. "Formosa would perhaps have been theirs to this day," wrote James Davidson, U.S. consul in Taiwan, in 1903, "had not the [Dutch East India] Company, with extraordinary short-sightedness, been so engrossed in making the maximum of profits for the moment that they refused to expend the money necessary to secure themselves against
Chinese invasion." Then as later, Taiwan's fate depended on the politics of the mainland.

The nemesis of the Dutch was Cheng Cheng-kung (Koxinga). He was born in Japan in 1624 of mixed Chinese and Japanese parentage. His father, Cheng Chih-lung, a Fukienese tailor-pirate of Hakka origin, plied both his needle and his sword in and around Taiwan. When the nomadic Manchus wrested Peking from the Ming government in 1644, the elder Cheng's fleet of junks became the last hope of the pro-Ming resistance. In 1646, however, Cheng Chih-lung defected to the winners. His son, throwing his scholar's robe into the fire at the temple of Confucius, vowed to continue the fight against the Tartar hordes.

Bribing and Boodling

Although only 23 years old, Cheng Cheng-kung was hailed by Ming loyalists as their leader. Had not the Ming Emperor Lung-Wu, impressed by the young lad, conferred upon him the imperial surname? (Kuo-hsing-yeh, or "Koxinga," means "Lord of Imperial Surname"). From 1646 to 1660, the flamboyant Koxinga, with 70,000 men and a 3,000-junk fleet—"the sight of them inspired one with awe" wrote Vittorio Ricci, a Jesuit missionary in China and friend of Koxinga—scored a succession of brilliant tactical successes against the Manchu armies in South China. But his adversaries' superior numbers finally forced him to transfer his fleet and his base of operations to Taiwan in 1661. He made short work of Dutch pretensions to hegemony over the island. After a nine-month siege, he captured Fort Zeelandia and expelled the Dutch.

Koxinga's takeover had an enormous impact on Taiwan. By stamping out all traces of Western rule, he ensured that Taiwan, unlike other Asian island territories (e.g., Indonesia, the Philippines), could retain the supremacy of its language, culture, and religion. More important was a new exodus of Chinese to the island from the mainland, far surpassing previous waves of immigration. Not only officials and soldiers serving under Koxinga but also thousands of Ming loyalists followed Koxinga to Taiwan. By the 1680s, some 250,000 Chinese newcomers were farming and prospering on the island.

It is tempting to imagine what Koxinga, had he lived, might have accomplished, either as ruler of Taiwan or leader of a pro-Ming return to the mainland. But he passed away in 1663, at the age of 39, less than two years after his victory over the Dutch. As death neared, he was holding the sacred testament of
the founding Ming Emperor and muttering: "The Great Ming pacified the empire and restored its ancient splendor. How can I meet him in heaven with my mission unfulfilled?"

Today, Koxinga is honored by all Chinese as a national hero for his expulsion of the "red-haired barbarians" from Taiwan. But the Nationalists, who fled to Taiwan in 1949, also think of him as the man who provided a refuge for opponents of the alien Manchu conquerors, then struggled relentlessly to recapture the mainland, a kind of 17th-century forerunner of Chiang Kai-shek. (A magnificent temple to Koxinga today stands in downtown Tainan, and Nationalist authorities commemorate his birthday every May). For their part, many native Taiwanese regard Koxinga as the founder of an independent state on Formosa. Not surprisingly, the mainland Communists prefer to honor Koxinga's grandson, Cheng K'o-shuang; he surrendered Taiwan to the Manchu government in 1683, thereby bringing about Taiwan's "reunification" with the mainland.

The two centuries of Manchu rule on Taiwan (1683–1895) were marked largely by sporadic repression and neglect. George MacKay, a Canadian Protestant missionary who spent 22 years in Taiwan, described the situation in the nineteenth century:

> From the highest to the lowest, every [mainland] Chinese official in Formosa has an "itching palm," and the exercise of official functions is always corrupted by money bribes. . . . In the matter of bribing and bootlegging, the Chinese officials in Formosa could give points to the most accomplished office-seekers and money-grabbers in Washington or Ottawa.

For 200 years, local Chinese factions fought one another or, together, took on the aborigines. Between 1683 and 1843, there were 15 bloody anti-government rebellions, sometimes fired by yearnings for independence, sometimes simply by blind rage. Despite such handicaps, the population of Taiwan increased rapidly, due largely to immigration from the mainland, where civil strife was no less frequent and the population pressure was far worse. There were perhaps 250,000 Chinese on the island in 1683; this number grew to 1,300,000 by the end of the 18th century, and to 2,546,000 by 1893. And, during interludes of peace, they prospered. The island’s soil and climate were well-suited to the growing of rice, sweet potatoes, sugar cane, tea, vegetables, and fruits; food from Taiwan often averted famine in south China.

As Manchu power eroded, the great 19th-century surge of
European imperialism in the Far East opened up mainland China to Western commerce. The Treaty of Tientsin in 1858 also opened up Taiwan's ports of Keelung and Tamsui to the ships of France, Britain, Russia, and the United States. Beginning in 1869, two Hong Kong-based British mercantile houses, Jardine Matheson & Company and Dent & Company, set up shop on Taiwan to secure opium, camphorwood, and tea for Western markets. American traders arrived in 1865.

The Yellow Man's Burden

The hopes of foreign powers with regard to Taiwan were not confined to trade. As early as 1833, British merchants in south China had urged their government to occupy Taiwan as a "convenient and desirable acquisition." After opening up Japan, the U.S. Navy's Commodore Mathew Perry sent an expedition to Taiwan in 1854 and pressed the State Department to acquire the island. Three years later, Gideon Nye, an American merchant in China, presented the U.S. commissioner to China, Peter Parker, with a plan for the "colonization" of Taiwan. President James Buchanan rejected the proposal, in part because he felt that growing U.S. domestic tensions, which would soon erupt in the Civil War, made foreign adventures ill-advised.

Finally, in 1884, following the Franco-Chinese war over Indochina, the French invaded Taiwan in a gambit to hold the island as a guarantee for the payment of an indemnity from the weakened Chinese government. French troops took Keelung and the Pescadores Islands. But the gambit failed; they could make no further progress against Chinese defenders and were forced to withdraw after a year.

Forcibly alerted to Taiwan's new strategic importance, the Manchu government in Peking moved to strengthen the island's defenses, reform its government, and revitalize its economy. In October 1885, Taiwan, hitherto merely a tao, a county, of Fukien Province, was proclaimed a province in its own right; Liu Ming-chuan was appointed its first governor. Liu, a farmer's son and mercenary captain turned intellectual, was the most progressive official Peking had ever sent to Taiwan. He was determined to help bring China into the 19th century, and he conceived of Taiwan as the first step in a bold experiment. "The West," he once wrote, "[is] making technological improvements by the day and by the hour. If . . . we linger and procrastinate, our backwardness will make us too frail to stand up as a nation at all."

Liu moved the island's capital from Tainan in the south to
Taipei in the north, near the best harbors. There he built Taiwan's first electric power station in 1887, installed street lights, and provided the city with a limited postal system. Liu also founded a Western-style school in Taipei, with English and Danish instructors. (Taiwan's schools had hitherto stressed Chinese classics, with little or no attention given to technical subjects or foreign languages). In 1891, Taiwan's first railway (the second in all of China) was completed. The Chinese on the mainland came to think of the island as a model province.

But the island's happy status did not last long. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 began as a struggle over Korea; it ended with the beaten Chinese handing over Taiwan. The acquisition of the island marked Japan's entry into the world's "colonial club," hitherto restricted to Western powers, and the Japanese were eager to make their venture a success. A contemporary Japanese historian, Yosaburo Takekoshi, put it this way:

The white people have long believed that it has been the white man's burden to cultivate the uncivilized territories and bring to them the benefits of civilization. The Japanese people now have risen in the Far East and want to participate with the white people in this great mission. Will the Japanese Nation, as a yellow people, be capable of performing this mission? The rule of Taiwan may well provide the answer.

At first, heavy-handed Japanese warrior-administrators embittered the Taiwanese, using little imagination and much savagery to suppress first a revolt aimed at independence, then an outbreak of brigandage and banditry. The arrival in 1898 of Governor-General Gentaro Kodama and his civilian aide, Dr.
Shimpei Goto, ushered in a new era. Kodama, a career military man, streamlined the colonial bureaucracy, recruited a qualified corps of Japanese civil servants, and imposed a series of bold changes designed by Goto to ensure stability, raise revenue, and step up economic production.

Chief among these was establishment of an efficient police force, which was given considerable latitude—including responsibility for supervising agricultural improvements and public works projects—in dealing with the populace. In addition, the old Chinese paochia system was revived. By 1902, peace and order had been restored throughout the island, though the antipathy of the native population to their alien rulers persisted.

The Glory of the Emperor

The colonial government boosted agricultural exports; production was geared to the Japanese market, which accounts for the growth in the rice, sugar, banana, and sweet potato crops. (Taiwan's trade with Western governments virtually ceased during the Japanese period). To increase farm output, the colonial government broke up the old feudal land tenure system (turning tenants into owners) and introduced new farming methods, including the use of chemical fertilizer and hybrid seed.

The Japanese were bent on exploiting Taiwan for the glory of the Emperor, but the wealth they generated was shared to some degree by the native population, who came to enjoy a standard of living considerably higher than that of mainland Chinese. Bicycles, radios, textiles, watches, and other goods from Japan flooded into Taiwan in return for rice and sugar. Malaria and cholera virtually disappeared as the Japanese stressed sanitation. Taiwan's population doubled during the 50 years of Japanese rule to more than 6 million in 1945, despite an almost total ban on immigration from the Chinese mainland.

Concern for public health prompted colonial administrators to open up the fields of medicine and hygiene to Taiwanese. They otherwise did little to foster native education until the increasing industrialization of the island in the 1920s and '30s created a demand for skilled local workers. In 1932, only one-half of all school-age boys (and one-fifth of the girls) were enrolled in elementary school. Ten years later, however, over 90

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A paochia was a group of about 100 households, headed by a senior member elected by the group. The leader answered to the police for the misdeeds of the families under his supervision. In turn, he held each family head responsible for the actions of all members of his family. As Dr. Goto refined the system, the Japanese had final approval over the choice of the senior member of each household group.
percent of native Taiwanese, and even 75 percent of the aboriginal children, were attending the free, six-year grade schools.

Beyond grammar school, education policy was dilatory and discriminatory. In high schools and at the only university—the Imperial University of Taipei, established in 1928—Japanese students greatly outnumbered Taiwanese, who were subject to restrictive quotas. In 1939, for example, only 90 Taiwanese were registered at the university, and they were permitted to study only medicine, agriculture, and other practical sciences. Many Taiwanese did study at the American- and British-supported Presbyterian Seminary in Tainan, a private college that still exists and has had great influence on the island's intellectual growth. Many well-to-do Taiwanese also sent their children to universities in Japan.

Liberation

The Japanese progressively adopted a policy of "Japanization" of the Taiwanese, in the hope that the natives would embrace "the unique and divine culture of Japan." Instruction from elementary school on was in Japanese, and persons not fluent in the language were denied positions of prestige or importance. After 1937, no newspapers could be published in Chinese, or even carry a Chinese language column. By 1944, about 70 percent of the Taiwanese were literate in the Japanese language. Yet intermarriages were few, and the Taiwanese remained socially apart from the 350,000 Japanese, most of whom were in government service, the armed forces, the police, and industry.

Cut off from Chinese influence, the Taiwanese were culturally adrift, seemingly neither Chinese nor Japanese.

Yet in many respects, the Taiwanese were lucky. They fared far better under Japanese rule than did the people of Korea and Manchuria. Even the briefest comparison with the U.S. record in the Philippines, or with the Asian colonies of France, Britain, and Holland, suggests that, whatever their motives, the Japanese did relatively well by their island colony. Apart from developing "infrastructure"—roads, railroads, power plants—the Japanese gave numerous Taiwanese a thorough technical training, creating a reservoir of skilled manpower that made an important contribution to Taiwan's post-1949 economic growth.

During the Second World War, Japan used Taiwan as one of

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*There are 170,000 Presbyterians on Taiwan, most of them native Taiwanese. Mainlanders who have converted to Christianity are generally Roman Catholics or Methodists. Buddhism and Taoism are the main religions of the island.
Taiwan is self-sufficient in natural gas, but must import 99 percent of its oil. By the 1990s, nuclear power will provide about 40 percent of the island's electricity. Taiwan is defended by a modern air force and a 330,000-man army, one-fourth of it deployed on the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu (inset). There are no longer U.S. military forces on Taiwan.
its main staging bases for the southward surge of imperial forces after Pearl Harbor. During the war's final months, Taiwan suffered severely from U.S. bombing but escaped the more serious damage that a full-scale invasion would have inflicted. (U.S. forces bypassed the island in favor of seizing Okinawa.) In September 1945, after the surrender of Japan, China's Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek sent in Nationalist troops to take over the island administration.*

Lost Opportunities?

The Taiwanese were initially exuberant. The island province was back in the fold, free of foreign occupation. Disillusionment set in as Chinese Nationalists made it clear that they intended to treat Taiwan as a conquered territory, its population as a subjugated people. “Carpet-baggers” from China swarmed over Taiwan, enriching themselves as they acquired sinecures at all levels of government, supplanting the Japanese. The Nationalists quickly expropriated 90 percent of the island's key industries (including the utilities and the processing of sugar, tea, and tobacco) and replaced senior Taiwanese workers, regardless of experience and ability, with mainland émigrés.

Within 18 months, Taiwan's economy collapsed. Food shortages developed after heavy shipments of grain went to the war-ravaged mainland. Between November 1945 and January 1947, prices rose an estimated 700 percent for food, 1,400 percent for fuel and building materials, and 25,000 percent for fertilizer. A breakdown in health services caused epidemics of cholera and bubonic plague.

The island was ripe for rebellion. On February 27, 1947, a Taiwanese woman selling black-market cigarettes was killed by a Chinese Nationalist policeman. When a large crowd protested the following day, the police opened fire, killing at least four people. Insurgents rallied throughout the island. The Taiwanese organized a "committee for the settlement of the February 28th incident" and presented General Chen Yi, the island's Chinese Nationalist governor, with demands for political and economic reform. Chen temporized, then, with reinforcements hastily dispatched from the mainland, slaughtered more than 10,000 Taiwanese, systematically liquidating native educators, doctors, businessmen, publishers, politicians. A whole generation of

*The Cairo Declaration of 1943, jointly issued by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Britain's Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, had stated that "all territories Japan had stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be returned to the Republic of China."
Taiwanese leaders was lost; by the end of March 1947, the island's populace was firmly under Nationalist control.

Most Taiwanese would probably agree with U.S. General Albert Wedemeyer, writing in the aftermath of the 1947 rebellion, that at that early stage in its postwar rivalry with the Communists, the Nationalist government had lost "a fine opportunity to indicate to the Chinese people and to the world at large its capacity to provide honest and efficient administration."

Chiang Kai-shek soon had other worries. Civil conflict, interrupted by World War II, was raging again on the mainland, and the American-supplied Nationalist armies were steadily losing ground to the Communists led by Mao Zedong. By the end of 1948, all of northern China was in the hands of the Communists, and 5,000 mainland Chinese refugees were pouring into Taiwan every day. By April 1949, the Nationalists had evacuated their capital at Nanking. A month later, the Communists took Shanghai. In December, Taiwan was all that was left of the Republic of China, and Chiang Kai-shek, with 2 million refugee loyalists and a priceless hoard of art treasures and dismantled factories from the mainland, set up his "temporary wartime capital" in Taipei.

In Washington a few weeks later, President Harry S Truman announced a "hands off" policy toward the cornered Nationalist government. Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared, in effect, that the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia did not include Taiwan. Chinese Communist troops slowly massed on their side of the Taiwan Strait. Pentagon analysts agreed that the Nationalists could not hold out on their island fortress for more than one year.

Taiwan was on its own.
A week before Christmas, 1949, Time described Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's escape to Taiwan from the Communists on the mainland:

"For the stubborn aging (63) leader, the flight across the sampan-flecked Strait of Formosa was a time for bitter remembrance... He had broken warlords, checked an early international Communist conspiracy, survived Japanese aggression, only to go down before Mao Zedong's armies and the corruption which grew up in his own wartorn regime... Chiang would try to fight on Formosa though the U.S. and British governments had written off the strategic island..."

Aside from Time's publisher, Henry R. Luce, the Nationalist (Kuomintang) cause had few powerful sympathizers left in the United States. Washington's recriminatory debate over "who lost China" had yet to flower. President Harry Truman was ready to "let the dust settle."

Yet, as their well-disciplined troops occupied the mainland's coastal cities, the Communists were far from euphoric. Although Chiang had fled, along with more than 1 million of his cadres and troops, Mao Zedong still faced what Radio Peking called "Kuomintang remnants" and other guerrilla foes in the vast hinterland; much of China was suffering from famine, inflation, and the chaotic aftermath of both Japanese occupation and four years of civil war.

And the People's Liberation Army had already learned that across-the-water assaults were difficult. In October 1949, perhaps 10,000 Communist troops boarded a fleet of coastal junks in Fukien Province for an attack on Quemoy Island (known to the Chinese as Kinmen) just offshore. To everyone's surprise, the Nationalist garrison repulsed the invasion, killing 3,000 of their foes and capturing the rest (who were later "integrated" into the defense of Taiwan). It was clear that any attack across the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait would demand a major logistics build-up, more shipping, and sophisticated planning. Finally, in the
spring of 1950, Mao Zedong's commander-in-chief, Marshal Chu Teh, announced that sizeable forces were being assembled to take Taiwan—"the most pressing task of the entire country."

During those grim days, the key to the survival of Chiang Kai-shek—and a non-Communist Taiwan—was the attitude in the White House, which soon changed from "hands off" to a revival of active support. First, Mao helped the Nationalists by announcing gratuitously that he would side with Russia against America in any new world conflict; his agents arrested or harassed U.S. diplomats still on the mainland, and, in effect, made it politically impossible for Washington to follow London's lead in recognizing the new regime in Peking. Indeed, under prodding from the famed "China Lobby" leader, Senator William F. Knowland (R-Calif.), Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced a modest economic aid program for Taiwan two months after Chiang's flight from China.1

But the real change came with the start of the 1950–53 Korean War. As President Truman sent U.S. forces into Korea to help repel the Communist North Korean invaders, he also ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait. Thereafter, despite its heavy bombardment of Quemoy in 1958 and other pressures, Peking had to postpone its plans for the "liberation" of the Taiwanese.

After Chinese Communist troops entered the Korean War, U.S. military and economic aid to Chiang's regime vastly expanded; and American air, logistics, and advisory detachments were based in Taiwan for two decades. A 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty gave Chiang an official U.S. commitment. Until the 1970s, Washington, albeit with decreasing ardor, formally endorsed the Nationalists' claims as the legitimate government of China and kept Peking out of the UN.

Chiang, like France's Charles DeGaulle, was often upset by his overseas allies. American Presidents—Truman, Eisenhower,

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1 Knowland's championship of the Nationalist cause gained him the title of the "Senator from Formosa." His allies in the so-called China Lobby included U.S. Representative Walter Judd (R-Minn.) and William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan, former head of the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS). No longer powerful, support for the Nationalists is now organized under the Committee for a Free China, whose Washington office is headed by Judd.

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Kennedy, Johnson—politely refused to join the Generalissimo in a crusade to recapture the mainland from Communism. And the Nixon-Kissinger rapprochement with Peking in 1971-72 (without advance notice to Chiang) meant that Taiwan would eventually lose her U.S. insurance policy, as she did last year when Carter officially recognized the Peking regime as the legitimate government of all China. Chiang died, a bitter man, in 1975. His son, Chiang Ching-kuo, then 65, succeeded him.

Yet the U.S. “umbrella”—and two decades of military and economic aid—were the external conditions allowing the Nationalists (or “Chinats,” as the GIs called them) to survive, to consolidate, and, over time, to produce an “economic miracle,” if not a showcase of democracy, out of the lassitude and despair that prevailed on the island in 1949.

Land to the Tiller

Although the Japanese had given the island a basic infrastructure (ports, railroads, power plants), Taiwan’s economy in 1949 was “preindustrial.” Most Taiwanese workers were landless villagers producing rice, camphor oil, sugar cane, vegetables. Few were educated beyond the third grade. The gross national product was $95 million, which meant an annual income per capita of less than $100. In economic terms, Taiwan was definitely among those countries now politely classified by the World Bank as “less developed.”

Thirty years later, Taiwan’s economy is industrial and highly complex (petrochemicals, ships, textiles, electrical equipment); its labor force is urban, educated to the ninth grade level or above, willing to work six days a week. If high technology is still scarce, talented managers and entrepreneurs are not. The GNP has increased nearly 7-fold, industrial production 20-fold, and the annual per capita income exceeds $1,300—considered the takeoff point for a “developed” economy. Along with Brazil and South Korea, Taiwan has long since left behind most of the Third World.

What did it? There were some unusual assets. For one thing, before he fled the mainland, Chiang had prudently sent off to Taiwan the Nationalist treasury (including 500,000 ounces of gold). He also saved some 250,000 Chinese art treasures; the Nationalists, and most overseas Chinese, saw his regime both as the guardian-in-exile of China’s culture, religions, and Confucian traditions, and as promoter of the San Min Chu I (“Three Principles of the People”), the progressive teachings of Sun Yat-sen, architect of the first Chinese Republic of 1911.
LAST OF THE CHIANGS?

Chiang Ching-kuo, the 69-year-old son of the late Chiang Kai-shek, and President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), has three undistinguished sons and a younger brother who seems content to head Taiwan’s military staff college. There is no obvious successor to the aging Nationalist leader in sight.

Chiang Ching-kuo himself was not the obvious candidate for the job he now holds. In 1925, at the age of 17, he was sent to the Soviet Union by his father as a pledge of the Nationalists’ good intentions in their (temporary) alliance with Moscow. Chiang attended the Soviet Military and Political Institute, learned to speak fluent Russian, became assistant director of a tool factory in the Urals, and (it is thought) somehow fell victim to the Stalinist purges of the 1930s and was sent to Siberia. He came back to China in 1937 with a Russian wife.

The Generalissimo’s son was received without fanfare upon his return. Yet, after an intensive “re-education” period, he proved himself in a number of key administrative posts on the mainland. His first job on Taiwan, in 1949, was as director of the China Youth Corps (an affiliate of the Nationalist Party). During the early 1950s, he spearheaded party reforms and reorganized the Secret Police. He became Defense Minister in 1966, Vice Premier in 1969, and Premier in 1972. When his father died in 1975, Chiang Ching-kuo already had the government in his hands.

Moreover, some hard lessons—about peasant support, mismanagement, inflation, corruption—had been learned from the mainland debacle. Those on hand in Taiwan to ponder them included perhaps the best of Chiang’s Westernized administrators (the most corrupt Nationalist bureaucrats were either purged or chose a softer life in Hong Kong or the United States). There were enough such technocrats to run an underdeveloped island, and they were driven by their predicament. “Desperation is the mother of reform” said K. C. Wu, former mayor of Shanghai and Taiwan’s new governor in late 1949. “We need new ideas and new men.”

Perhaps the best new idea was land reform—without bloodshed. Politically, it was not divisive; few of the ruling Nationalist émigrés had any holdings in Taiwan, and native Taiwanese landowners lacked political power. Above all, Chiang correctly saw the support (or acquiescence) of the Taiwanese peasantry as essential to his regime’s survival on the island.
A hard-working leader, he often tours the countryside where, in the words of one diplomat, “he pumps hands and bounces babies like an American politician.” He has quietly retired the Nationalist Party’s elder statesmen of the 1940s, replacing them with younger, Western-trained technocrats, like Premier Y. S. Sun. And, by all accounts, he has reduced both official corruption and red tape in the mainland-dominated bureaucracy. Such measures—and a certain liberalization of political life—seem to have gained him support from Taiwan’s ordinary citizens.

What happens when he dies? The people of Taiwan may heed Chiang Ching-kuo’s motto: “Do not be disquieted during times of adversity. Remain calm with dignity.”

Even before the final collapse on the mainland, Chiang ordered the reduction of rural rents, invoking Sun Yat-sen’s call for “land to the tiller.” Traditionally, tenant farmers had paid up to 70 percent of the total yield of their crops to absentee landlords, big and small. The Nationalists cut this to 37.5 percent. Then, in 1953, absentee landlords were compelled to sell their acreage to the state, which sold it back to the tenants on the installment plan.

With U.S. dollars and the technical assistance of the Sino-American Joint Committee on Rural Reconstruction, the $100 million plan worked. Compensation to the old owners was in cash, rice bonds, or stocks in former Japanese-owned industrial enterprises. Thus, private funds flowed into industry and substantially “de-nationalized” it, and landlords became urban capitalists. Farmers’ real income rose 94 percent from 1952 to 1967, and new markets were created for the output of Taiwan’s factories. By 1971, nearly 90 percent of all arable land was
owned by the farmers who tilled it."

On the industrial side, Chiang and his technocrats at first thought in terms of making Taiwan "self-sufficient." As the invasion threat waned, the American-equipped 500,000-man army was put to work building roads and modernizing the Japanese-built railways. Foreign imports were discouraged, and the new Taiwanese entrepreneurs were encouraged to produce foodstuffs and clothing for the small domestic market to replace imports. It took less than 10 years for the Nationalists to see that this orthodox strategy was getting them nowhere in terms of economic growth.

In 1958-59, the Nationalists, led by economist K. T. Li, decided to put their bets on exports, foreign investment, and less red tape. "Developing agriculture by virtue of industry, fostering industry by foreign trade" was the new slogan in Taipei. In 1966, duty-free export-processing zones for industry were set up in the ports of Kaohsiung, Nantze, and Taichung; import controls were liberalized, and foreign investors got tax breaks and other concessions.

**Round Two to the Technocrats**

In 1968, the government made nine years of schooling compulsory and thus upgraded the labor force, which rapidly expanded. (The mechanization of agriculture, better education, and new factory jobs pulled peasants out of the lovely countryside into the grimy cities, producing complaints in the press over rising crime and the erosion of family ties.) Unions were permitted, but a no-strike law kept factory wages low. Price controls on food and rent reduced pressure for higher pay. Perhaps as much as anything, a relatively egalitarian wage-and-salary structure helped dampen worker discontent. (Distribution of income in Taiwan is less unequal than in Japan or the United States.)

Statistics tell part of the story. During the early 1950s, Taiwan's major exports were sugar, rice, tea, and bananas (as they were during the Japanese colonial era). Exports and imports comprised no more than 10 percent of Taiwan's GNP; of this figure farm crops contributed 24 percent, processed agricultural goods 63 percent, and manufacturing only 13 percent. By the late 1970s, Taiwan's major exports were textiles.

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When rural incomes lagged behind those in the cities in the late 1960s, the regime in Taipei sounded the alarm: a reform program, including an increase in rice prices, a reduction of agricultural taxes, an easing of the terms of farm loans, reversed the decline.
The people of Taiwan are ethnically Chinese (or Han), but the Taiwanese "identity," like the legal status of the island itself, is more difficult to define.

As a colony of Japan (1895–1945), Taiwan was cut off from the political ferment on the mainland that was marked in 1911 by Sun Yat-sen's proclamation of the first Republic of China and then by continued war and civil strife. Taiwanese schoolchildren were taught in Japanese and learned nothing of Chinese history. When Taiwan was "liberated" by the Chinese Nationalists in 1945, 75 percent of all Taiwanese were competent, if not fluent, in Japanese; many were illiterate in Chinese. The Nationalists began a drive for "re-Sinification" aimed especially at the young. Chinese history and geography became an important part of the school curriculum, and all pupils were instructed in the life and works of Sun Yat-sen.

Language was a problem. Taiwanese generally spoke one of two old South China dialects that had evolved independently of the mainland since 1895. But the 1 million mainlanders who fled to Taiwan in 1945–49 spoke Mandarin. The Nationalist regime launched a successful campaign—the National Language Movement—to make Mandarin the standard language of the island. That removed one obstacle to the integration of mainlander and Taiwanese. Other barriers are falling. Taiwan's mainlanders, once confirmed city-dwellers, now live and work all over the island, mixing with Taiwanese in schools, social clubs, the workplace; intermarriage is common. Today, the vast majority of the island's population is Taiwan-born, including, of course, the younger sons and daughters of the mainland émigrés. Recent studies by U.S. scholars suggest that the children of both mainlanders and native Taiwanese now share virtually identical social and political attitudes. The inhabitants of Taiwan are slowly becoming a self-conscious "people."

But how "Chinese" are they? The only answer may be another question: Compared to whom? The Taiwanese have had contacts with mainland China during only four years (1945–49) of the past 83. Young Taiwanese reject many old Chinese social traditions, such as arranged marriages. They are somewhat "Western" in their dress and lifestyle. "Sinicity" is a complicated business. Culturally and linguistically, the Taiwanese are as Chinese as the people across the Strait. Politically, they are alienated from the mainland. By way of analogy, how "English" were the Americans in 1776?
and machinery, electric equipment—including TV sets, appliances, lumber, and plastics. Exports and imports comprised more than 90 percent of Taiwan's GNP (perhaps the world's highest proportion). Of the exports, agriculture contributes only 7 percent, processed goods 10 percent, and manufacturing a whopping 83 percent. Two-thirds of this industrial production is in private hands, and four out of five capitalists are native Taiwanese.

Thus, in less than a generation, the economy shifted from using natural resources to produce food and clothing for the domestic market to using human resources to produce low-wage manufactured goods for the foreign market; and the average annual growth rate of over 12 percent in 1978 was among the highest in the world. International politics seemed not to matter; today, none of Taiwan's top trading partners (the United States, Japan, West Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Australia, Canada, Britain, Singapore, the Netherlands) has diplomatic ties with the Nationalist regime.

Export promotion succeeded because management, money, and labor were available and committed to that strategy by the government. Massive aid from Washington was a crucial factor, making up the deficits in a Nationalist budget largely devoted to defense. The United States provided $2 billion in economic aid through 1965, when the program ended. Military aid of more than $4 billion also helped the civilian economy. U.S. economic aid accounted for 40 percent of Taiwan's net domestic investment through 1965, and it paid off as economic liberals, with American advice, successfully pressured military hardliners to modernize the economy. And, in the 1960s, Taiwan (like Japan, Singapore, and South Korea) got a special boost from Pentagon "off-shore" contracts for cement, sandbags, barbed wire, and other materiel needed for the U.S. effort in Vietnam.

A Layer Cake

Foreign private investment of nearly $2 billion played a strong secondary role. The big investors in 1975 were from the United States (33 percent, including Ford, General Instruments, RCA, Gulf Oil, Union Carbide, and IBM), Japan (16 percent) and overseas Chinese (mainly from Hong Kong, investing about 30 percent of the total in smaller projects, such as food processing plants and hotels).

Essential to this economic surge were political leadership and stability. These were by no means assured when the Nationalist leadership landed in 1949. Making up only 14 per-
cent of the population, the Nationalists were outsiders who, as the natives saw it, took the best jobs, even outside the government, and were not loathe to line their own pockets. Moreover, the Nationalists were committed not to developing the island but to "return to the mainland," a slogan they used to justify their claim to represent China in the UN and their rule over the "province" of Taiwan. It was a two-layered cake. The Nationalists sat on top with their increasingly anachronistic all-China parliament, while the Taiwanese, at best, participated in provincial affairs. Only slowly did the Taiwanese get a piece of the icing.

In 1979, a generation later, native Taiwanese (86 percent of the population) not only own the farms and most of private industry but also hold positions of influence in the Nationalist party and the government (particularly at the local level), and dominate the junior officer corps in the military. They do not yet exercise power equivalent to their numbers. Only one Taiwanese general, Chen Shou-shan, holds an important position in the Army, for example. But interest groups (such as the Farmers Association) created by the party have become autonomous, and old Taiwan hands doubt that the Nationalists still

*In the 1950s, only half those taking civil service exams, and one-third of the civil servants, were Taiwanese. Twenty years later, more than 90 percent of those taking, passing, and scoring high on these entrance exams were Taiwanese; and two-thirds of the nonmilitary bureaucracy was Taiwanese.
run politics from “the top down.” They pay heed to Taiwanese sentiments, to local issues, to local leaders. Today, the ritualistic “recover the mainland” slogans have been largely replaced by official calls for “self-strengthening” through economic development, an end to corruption, and political reform. In the 1977 provincial and local elections, one-fifth of the Nationalist candidates actually lost to “non-partisan” opponents. Clearly, the old clichés of “Nationalist one-party rule” and “a police state” on Taiwan no longer fully describe the island’s politics.

A Kind of Freedom

Aside from its tight control of the press and TV, the Nationalist government has not intruded unduly on daily life in Taiwan. In contrast to the regime on the mainland (and to most Communist regimes), the Nationalists allow most ordinary citizens to stay out of politics, although they recruit heavily among Taiwanese businessmen and professionals. The growing middle class benefits greatly from the regime’s economic policies. Farmers and factory workers appear only slightly less supportive. Some college students and intellectuals criticize the remaining political taboos, but their occasional protests have stirred more reaction from the regime than from the public.2

The taboos have changed. During the 1950s and early 1960s, as the Western press often noted, the government was nervous, harsh on dissenters. Forbidden as “treasonous” were criticism of Chiang, published doubts about a “return to the mainland,” any attempts to form an opposition political party, even the reading of Marxist texts. But after 1965, the area of permissible dissent seemed to widen. The regime has tolerated opponents whom, in other days, it would have sent to the Green Island prison camps.† “Constructive” criticism, which does not “transgress the constitution, injure national interest, oppose the anti-Communist policy, slander the government,” is officially tolerated. In 1977–78, editorials in the United Daily News questioned the continued need for martial law; a non-partisan politician, Kuo Yu-hsin, called publicly for an end to the Nationalist political monopoly; and at Taipei Area University, professors and students could candidly discuss Taiwan’s future, without fear of the police.

To some Western scholars, the apparent liberalization of

1 In the 1977–78 academic year, 13,650 Taiwanese were studying in U.S. universities. Taiwan ranked second (after Iran) in the number of students in the United States.

† Recent estimates of the number of political prisoners on Taiwan range from 254 (the official government figure) to 8,000 (the émigré opposition’s figure).
Taiwan's domestic politics was a cynical device to strengthen Chiang Ching-kuo's succession to power. To others, it seemed designed to attract Western support by drawing attention to the contrast between Taiwan's relatively open local elections and everyday freedoms and the authoritarian excesses on the mainland. Whatever the Nationalists' motives, such changes have, willy-nilly, substantially softened the nature and style of Nationalist rule.

Chiang Ching-kuo's ascension to power has accelerated these trends. When appointed to the premiership in 1972, he selected a cabinet that was more Taiwanese, younger, and better educated than any previously. Chiang picked the popular, independent Taiwanese mayor of Taipei, Henry Kao, as a cabinet minister. Several of his new ministers were Western-educated scholars; the average age of members dropped five years—to 60. When “CCK” assumed the Presidency in 1978, he selected as his running mate a Taiwanese, Hsieh Tung-min.

Several outspoken Taiwanese critics of the Nationalist party have continued to win elections—such as legislator K'ang Ning-hsiang (who has called for full political democracy in Taiwan). And alleged irregularities in the 1977 Taoyuan county election led to a riot in Chungli that the Nationalist regime was forced to handle gingerly. Sensitive to its public image, the leaders of the party redoubled their efforts to find candidates and issues with voter appeal; this paid off in a string of Nationalist party victories in local elections in 1978 and 1979.

By world standards, Taiwan is definitely “freer” than most African or Asian states, notably the People's Republic of China. But one should not exaggerate the blooming of liberal politics on the island, or forget that old Nationalist dogmas persist. Martial law is still in force. The mainlander-dominated security bureaucracy remains vigilant—not only against Peking's infiltrators but also against the tiny independence movement. Chiang Ching-kuo, even as he makes hand-shaking tours of the villages, is determined that his regime will stay in power. By adapting, sometimes badly, more often well, to the island's realities, the Nationalists have survived and helped Taiwan to prosper. They have learned some lessons. No one would have thought it possible 30 years ago.
TAIWAN'S FUTURE

by Ralph N. Clough

Drawn on the world map, Taiwan's shape and position—slightly askew, off the southeast coast of China—suggests nothing so much as a ship adrift, isolated, vulnerable to storm and tide. No one now takes seriously the old, persistent claims of Taiwan's government-in-exile to sovereignty over the mainland. The island's one-time allies and sometime friends dwindle in number, as rich and poor nations alike hasten to curry favor with the vast People's Republic across the Strait. Jimmy Carter's administration is only the latest to join the crowd.

President Carter's decision, announced last December 15, to transfer recognition from Taipei to Peking came as no surprise to Taiwan's President, Chiang Ching-kuo. Ever since former President Richard Nixon's 1972 trip to China, Sino-American normalization had been in the cards. The only questions were when and with what consequences for our long-time island ally.

In the view of some Asia specialists, the loss of formal ties with Washington represents merely "a short hiccup" in Taiwan's development; with the necessary adjustments, they believe, the island will remain secure and prosperous. Other observers, citing the loss of a firm U.S. defense commitment, as well as the psychological damage to the people of Taiwan, are less sanguine. "There's no use pretending that normalization on the terms we got won't hurt," said Robert Parker, president of Taiwan's American Chamber of Commerce. "It will."

Certainly the trends of the past decade are sobering. Withdrawal of diplomatic recognition by the United States reduces the number of nations with which Taiwan maintains diplomatic relations to 21; nearly all of these are small nations with little influence in world affairs. Since 1971, the People's Republic has occupied the "China seat" in the United Nations, a symbol of legitimacy accorded to Taiwan during the first 26 years of the

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*Taiwan currently has diplomatic relations with Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, the Holy See, Honduras, the Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Malawi, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Swaziland, Tonga, and Uruguay. Of these, the most important is Saudi Arabia, which supplies most of Taiwan's crude oil and has lent $140 million at low interest rates to the island for railway electrification and other projects.*
"High Lob" was the caption for this 1971 cartoon by Pat Oliphant. The Washington-Peking rapprochement began in April 1971, when Communist China opened its doors to a U.S. ping-pong team.

UN's history. Most international organizations, including the World Health Organization, the Inter-Governmental Civil Aviation Organization, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, have ousted Taiwan's representatives (though the island still retains membership in a few key bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank).

In other circumstances, few nations would think twice about recognizing the government of Taiwan. The exile regime has unchallenged jurisdiction over 17 million people, a population larger than that of two-thirds of the countries in the United Nations. And the islanders are far better off than most peoples represented at the UN. Rapid economic growth has boosted annual per capita income to $1,300—three times that of mainland China, and a level surpassed in Asia only by Japan and Singapore. Foreign trade with more than 100 countries—most nations will accept Taiwan's business card if not its flag—exceeded $24 billion in 1978, more than the foreign trade of the People's Republic of China. Taiwan is the eighth largest trading partner of the United States. In everything but name, Taiwan has all the attributes of a sovereign state.

Yet, in an uncertain world, Taiwan's name—and status—are important. Washington's severance of diplomatic ties will be followed by termination, on New Year's Day 1980, of the Treaty of Mutual Security between the United States and the Republic
of China, a military cooperation pact that has been in force since 1954. Shorn of their chief ally, Taiwan's leaders now appear to have three options: to accept reunification with the long-hated People's Republic of China; to declare the island an independent, sovereign nation with no claims on the mainland; or to maintain Taiwan indefinitely in its present ambiguous, virtually indefinable status. Each choice is painful.

Peking, of course, acknowledges only one option—reunification. Moving promptly to take advantage of Taiwan's fading official links to the United States, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress broadcast a conciliatory message to "compatriots in Taiwan" hours after champagne toasts in Washington and Peking marked the end of U.S. relations with the island's Nationalist government. The message announced an end to the firing of "propaganda shells" on odd-numbered days against the Nationalist-held offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. (The artillery fire, involving small, explosive air bursts that scattered Communist leaflets on the ground below, had been going on since 1958; Taiwan still sends propaganda balloons across to the mainland from Quemoy.) Peking praised the "Taiwan authorities" for upholding the principle that Taiwan was an integral part of China, not an independent state. It assured the people of Taiwan that only "reasonable" measures would be taken to bring about reunification, "so as not to cause the people of Taiwan any losses."

To underline its accommodating posture, the Standing Committee proposed direct trade links, shipping and mail service, and personal visits between Taiwan and the mainland. (There is currently no official contact and no authorized private contact between the "two Chinas.") China's senior vice premier, Deng Xiaoping, went further in a January 9, 1979, meeting with Senator Sam Nunn (D.-Ga.), chairman of a Senate Armed Services subcommittee, and several of Nunn's Senate colleagues.

Since ratification of a treaty requires the approval of two-thirds of the U.S. Senate, some legislators argue that termination of a treaty requires similar Senate consent; Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), along with eight other Senators and sixteen Representatives, has brought the issue before federal courts. Historically, U.S. Presidents have canceled treaties on 11 occasions without congressional approval. However, when John Adams annulled the U.S. alliance with France in 1798—the only time the United States has terminated a mutual defense pact—he sought and got congressional backing, in advance.

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He declared that, after reunification, Taiwan could retain full autonomy within the People's Republic of China, including the right to its own security forces. Nunn quoted Deng as saying: "The social system on Taiwan will be decided by the people of Taiwan... We will not change the society by force."

To no one's surprise, Taiwan has spurned Peking's overtures. President Chiang Ching-kuo told a foreign journalist flatly: "We shall not negotiate with the Chinese Communists, nor shall we enter into any other forms of contact with them."

Many of the 2 million Chinese who fled the mainland with Chiang Kai-shek in 1949 to escape Mao Zedong's victorious Communists fear reprisals should Taiwan fall under Communist control—whatever promises of leniency Peking may now make. By all accounts, natives of Taiwan believe that control by Peking would lead to a rapid decline in their living standards and sharp restrictions on personal freedom. The present authoritarian regime in Taiwan, for all its shortcomings, has bettered the lot of most people on the island; few wish to trade it for a harsher totalitarian system imposed by Peking. Kang Ning-hsiang, one of the few native Taiwanese in the legislature, and a frequent critic of the island's government, summed up the situation: "What is there to talk about? Our standard of living is so much higher than theirs."

Slaps in the Face

Among the 15 million native Taiwanese, some sentiment exists for establishment of Taiwan as a separate, independent state. Public advocacy of independence is banned in Taiwan, but a few Taiwanese intellectuals and businessmen abroad, most of them in the United States and Japan, have organized to further the cause. They contend that the island's qualifications for recognition—a government in effective control of population and territory for 34 years—are as good as, perhaps better than, those of many other states created in recent years.

Yet a declaration of independence would create severe domestic contradictions for President Chiang Ching-kuo. The official rationale for domination of the government by mainland émigrés is that the present regime, prescribed by a constitution adopted on the mainland in 1946, is representative of all of China. Abandoning that rationale, and restricting the government's claim to Taiwan alone, would probably stir irresistible pressure at home and abroad to give key positions to members of the Taiwanese majority.

Furthermore, advancing a *de jure* claim corresponding to
U.S. PUBLIC OPINION: ATTITUDES TOWARD TAIWAN

Since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Americans have voiced considerable support for the government of Taiwan. Opinion polls also reveal persistent skepticism toward the People's Republic of China. In 1954, 41 percent of respondents to a Gallup poll felt the United States should intervene militarily in Taiwan's defense should Communist China invade the island. Another 28 percent backed emergency arms shipments. By wide margins, Americans later consistently opposed "normalization" of relations with Communist China at the expense of diplomatic ties with Taiwan (45 percent "against" versus 27 percent "for" on the eve of President Carter's announcement of normalization in 1978, for example).

In January 1979, after normalization, the New York Times/CBS News poll asked respondents, "How would you rate your feelings toward (name of country)?" The results:

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Taiwan's de facto independent status would be a slap in the face to the leaders in Peking. The risk that Peking would use force against Taiwan would rise sharply. And Taiwan would gain little: Few nations would be willing to establish relations with the new state at the cost of cutting ties with the PRC.

If neither reunification nor independence is expedient, Taiwan's leaders are left with maintaining the island in its present ambiguous condition—at considerable cost. The island's more educated and politically sensitive citizens chafe under Taiwan's lack of recognition by the world community. "Americans don't know how it feels to have their passports rejected nearly everywhere," complained one Taiwanese journalist.

Because Taiwan has diplomatic relations with so few nations, Taiwanese officials and businessmen must overcome numerous barriers at every turn in their promotion of trade, shipping, commercial aviation, and travel. The government of Taiwan has proved remarkably adept at improvisation.
A network of 33 private offices around the world, under various names, and reporting to the China External Trade Development Center in Taipei, serves in lieu of embassies and consular offices to promote trade and investment. Other private organizations, including the Sun Yat-sen Center in Madrid and China News Agency offices throughout the world, further cultural exchange and disseminate information about Taiwan. Visitors to Taiwan receive their entry permits through a variety of unorthodox channels, such as the Taiwan Travel Service in Frankfurt, the Trade Span (N.Z.) Ltd. office in Auckland, and the China Airlines offices in Thailand and Malaysia.

Using the Back Door

The most elaborate mechanisms were those created by Japan and Taiwan after Japan severed diplomatic relations in 1972 in order to establish ties with Peking. As a substitute for their defunct embassy, the Japanese set up an unofficial "Interchange Association" in Taipei; Taiwan in turn established an "East Asian Relations Association" in Tokyo. Both offices were staffed with foreign service officers, temporarily on leave from their foreign ministries.

The change in the form of relations between Japan and Taiwan had little effect on the substance of those relations. During the first five years, trade between the two countries more than tripled to $3.5 billion, the number of Japanese visiting Taiwan each year nearly doubled (to 520,000), and Japanese investments in Taiwan grew to more than $200 million.

The United States has followed suit. Congress last March passed a Taiwan Relations Act (S.245, H.R.2479), which was signed into law on April 10 by President Carter. The act authorized creation of an unofficial but government-funded "American Institute in Taiwan," staffed by some 40 U.S. Foreign Service personnel temporarily separated from the State Department. The institute issues visas (after referring them for approval to the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong) and performs services for Americans in Taiwan normally performed by American consuls. The legislation maintained in effect all but one of the 59 treaties and agreements between the United States and Taiwan. It authorized the Export-Import Bank to continue to

*The act was passed by a margin of 90 to 6 in the Senate, 345 to 55 in the House of Representatives. Overwhelming support for the bill masks a wide spectrum of congressional opinion on President Carter's recognition of Communist China, ranging from "a gutsy, courageous decision" (Senator Frank Church, D.-Idaho) to "an act of treachery" (Representative John Ashbrook, R.-Ohio).
make loans in Taiwan and provided for the uninterrupted supply of enriched uranium for Taiwan's nuclear power plants. (Two are in operation, four are being built, and six more are planned.) Taiwan established in Washington a "Coordination Council for North American Affairs," also run by experienced diplomats, to conduct its affairs in the United States.

A Surge of Civility

The one treaty that will be terminated is the long-standing U.S.-Taiwan mutual defense pact. However, the Taiwan Relations Act stresses the abiding interest of the United States in Taiwan's security, and President Carter has made known his intention to continue to sell defensive military equipment to Taiwan. (Since 1951, the United States has lent, given, or sold military equipment to Taiwan valued at $5.6 billion, including destroyers, submarines, short-range jet fighters, ground-to-air missiles, helicopters, and transport aircraft; commitments totaling an additional $500 million have been made under the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales Program, for delivery through 1983.) Although the mainland’s Premier Hua Guofeng once said that the PRC would "absolutely not agree" to this policy, Peking nevertheless went ahead with normalization.

Washington hopes to achieve a delicate balance: enough support for Taiwan to ensure that the use of force against the island would entail high political and military costs for the Chinese Communists; enough momentum in Washington-Peking relations to keep mainland China satisfied with the arrangement. Managed adroitly, such a policy could enable the United States and the PRC to live with the unresolved Taiwan problem for a long time to come.

No one expects an early attempt by Peking to incorporate the island by force. "The People’s Republic of China," President Carter declared in an interview on December 19, 1978, "does not have the capability of launching a 120-mile attack across the ocean" against the resistance of Taiwan’s well-trained armed forces. It could blockade the island, but at a price. "A decision by China to use force against Taiwan," Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher warned last spring, "would in effect be a decision to renounce good relations with industrialized nations and hence to abandon the program of modernization." Moreover, Peking is unlikely to risk alienating the United States at a time of military confrontation with Vietnam to the South and heightening tension with the Soviet Union to the North.

But Taiwan’s leaders, looking ahead to a time when the
"Although China has a large number of combat aircraft, many are obsolescent [Soviet-type] fighters, limited in range and payload. Few are equipped with air-to-air missiles, and pilot proficiency is well below Taiwan's standards. Although China has a large diesel submarine fleet, its Navy is primarily a coastal defense force, and the PRC lacks the amphibious shipping necessary to mount a successful invasion of Taiwan. . . . For its part, Taiwan possesses an impressive deterrent. Taiwan's air defense capability rests upon a mixture of surface-to-air missile battalions and an interceptor fleet of 300 aircraft. The latter are fitted with late-model, air-to-air missiles that are more sophisticated than anything the PRC can deploy."


Mainland may be stronger and less inhibited, have increased the island's military budget this year by 50 percent (to $2.9 billion). They are seeking to buy advanced weapons, such as F-16 fighters from the United States, and, just as important, to expand Taiwan's own military production. As Premier Y. S. Sun has noted, Taiwan has no choice but to establish a "self-sustaining defense industry." The island already turns out small arms, artillery, machine guns, mortars, ammunition, and trucks, and, with U.S. firms, coproduces helicopters and F-5 aircraft.

According to a 1977 U.S. government report, Taiwan's scientists and engineers could build an A-bomb within one to three years of a decision to do so. "We have the technical know-how and so forth," admitted James C. H. Shen, Taiwan's last Ambassador to the United States, "but as a matter of basic policy, we're not going to do it." If they did, the United States would immediately cut off the supply of enriched uranium for the island's vital nuclear power plants.
For the time being, Peking will try, probably by threats and blandishments, to create popular support in Taiwan for direct negotiations or other forms of contact. The PRC may also try to sever Taiwan’s unofficial links with other countries, although such efforts have only occasionally succeeded in the past. At Peking’s prodding, for example, Mexico ordered Taipei’s local commercial office closed; the representative of Taiwan’s China News Agency was expelled from Ethiopia. So far, Taiwan remains unfazed: Peking simply lacks the political and economic clout to disrupt Taiwan’s web of relations with scores of foreign banks and thousands of foreign companies.

Whether Taiwan can maintain a firm footing depends partly on internal politics: The native Taiwanese majority wants—and will eventually get—a larger role in the island’s government. The odds favor orderly change. The specter of the PRC is a powerful inducement to both the dominant Nationalists and the under-represented Taiwanese to avoid disorder.

Taiwan’s future also hinges on the United States. Support among Americans for close ties with the island is strong, and American bankers have already demonstrated their confidence. In the first half of 1979, the Bank of America put together an $80 million syndicated loan for Taiwan, and the U.S. Export-Import Bank made a $9.6 million loan for factory expansion.

The most likely prospect for Taiwan over the next 10 years is the status quo. The obstacles standing in the way of official talks between Peking and Taipei will not hamper the growth of indirect contacts and communications. A new civility has appeared in media references by each side toward the other, with “Taiwan authorities” replacing “imperialist lackeys” in the mainland’s lexicon, and “Chinese Communists” substituted for “Communist bandits” in Taiwan’s pronouncements.

Political commentators in Taiwan, noting the demands in Peking wallposters last spring for a better life and more responsive government, are calling on their own leaders to challenge the mainland to peaceful competition in political and economic development. As popular pressures force the Peking government to become more like the “Taiwan model”—so the theory goes—the stage will be set for reunification in the distant future. Each regime wants reunification, but on its own terms. Keeping such hopes alive on both sides paradoxically offers the best prospects for a prolonged and tranquil coexistence of the “two Chinas.”
For three decades, Taiwan has served as a kind of "substitute China" for American scholars barred from the mainland. With their Confucian traditions, complicated ethnic differences, and remarkable adaptability, the islanders have fascinated anthropologists and economists alike—especially since Taiwan began its own Great Leap Forward into industrialization.

In Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860–1970 (Yale, 1978), Samuel P. S. Ho draws the Big Picture in great detail. Taiwan’s current industrial surge, he makes clear, is the end result of many trends, notably a gradual “modernization,” particularly of farming, going back to the 19th century. Taiwan’s assets have included the diligence of her people, political stability, heavy investment in education, beneficial contacts with Japan and the West. Taiwan’s lesson, as Ho sees it, for other Third World nations: build a prosperous agriculture, vastly increase literacy, then think about steel mills.

The island’s economic growth was also a success for U.S. foreign assistance. As Neil H. Jacoby writes in U.S. Aid to Taiwan: A Study of Foreign Aid, Self-Help, and Development (Praeger, 1966), the annual gain in GNP per dollar of U.S. aid was higher in Taiwan during the 1960s than in Korea, the Philippines, or Turkey. In Jacoby’s view, Washington “wisely” fostered local private enterprise and eschewed using U.S. aid as “leverage” to force political reform in 1950–65.

Perhaps no single action by Chiang Kai-shek was more important than his American-financed “land to the tiller” program of the 1950s. In The Socio-Economic Results of Land Reform in Taiwan (East-West Center Press, 1970), Martin M. C. Yang suggests that the psychological effects were enormous. Not only did former tenants gain property, independence, and status, but they soon saw opportunities to “get ahead” through education, new profit-oriented farming techniques, and community action.

In a 1957–58 study of a village on the island’s western coast, Hsin Hsing, Taiwan: A Chinese Village in Change (Univ. of Calif., 1966), Bernard Gallin finds that in that case one early effect of land reform was to eliminate the local gentry as village leaders, with new leaders slow to appear.

“Modernization” does not mean “Westernization” in rural Taiwan. Old customs persist, even as the young go off the land to take factory jobs. Women and the Family in Rural Taiwan (Stanford, 1972, cloth & paper) by anthropologist Margery Wolf provides an intimate portrait of village life, with its gossip, taboos, superstitions, and family tensions. And, Wolf makes clear, “a truly successful Taiwanese woman is a rugged individualist who has learned to depend largely on herself while appearing to lean on her father, her husband, and her son.”

Wolf’s The House of Lim: A Study of a Chinese Farm Family (Appleton, 1968) is equally good reading. Lim Han-ci, the hard working family patriarch, was a terror to his sons; but he taught them to aim high, and they

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prospered in farming and politics. After his death, the memory of the old man long kept his quarreling descendants together in the same house; in the end, it was not enough.

Two other fine anthropological sketches of the Taiwanese are Kinship & Community in Two Chinese Villages (Stanford, 1972) by Burton Pasternak, who examines the recent erosion of family dominated hamlets, and The Cult of the Dead in a Chinese Village (Stanford, 1973) by Emily Ahern, who illuminates the intricate variations in ancestor worship. A disinherited son, for example, is allowed to leave the care of his father's grave to his luckier brothers.

In The Man Who Lost China: The First Full Biography of Chiang Kai-shek (Scribner's, 1976), journalists Brian Crozier and Eric Chou find that Mao Zedong was simply “more exceptional” than Chiang. The authors are not unsympathetic to the Generalissimo’s achievements, particularly on Taiwan; but they trace his loss of the mainland to his fateful, demoralizing decision in 1931 not to resist Japanese aggression until he had defeated his Chinese Communist rivals.

Chiang, writes former State Department official George H. Kerr in Formosa Betrayed (Houghton Mifflin, 1965; Da Capo reprint, 1976), “quite inadvertently” was saved by Mao in 1950, when Peking publicly sided with Moscow against Washington at the height of the Cold War, then sent its troops into Korea to fight American GIs.

Kerr’s book covers the period from World War II through the mid-1960s and argues for Taiwanese independence. He provides a grim picture of Nationalist repression of the native Taiwanese following their 1947 uprising. He also discusses the place of Taiwan in U.S. politics. The 1950s “Help Chiang return to the mainland” debate in Congress, Kerr contends, and the “Democratic reluctance to increase aid” gave Republicans the chance to charge “pro-Communist sympathies in the State Department.”

As former diplomat Ralph Clough notes in his well-knit survey of Island China (Harvard, 1978), America went to the brink in 1958, when Quemoy was shelled and blockaded by the Communists. On President Eisenhower’s orders, the U.S. Navy helped Chiang break the blockade by escorting his supply ships; the crisis eased when the Communists eventually restricted their shelling to odd-numbered days (“to demonstrate,” writes Clough, “its rejection of the cease-fire urged by the United States and its ability to impede or permit at will the resupply of the islands”).

The 1960s saw a relaxation of tensions over Taiwan. When economic upheaval disrupted the mainland in 1962, Chiang prepared to take advantage of it. Analyzing U.S. policy under Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, in U.S. China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan (Colorado Associated Univ. Press, 1971), William B. Bueler shows that President John F. Kennedy destroyed a dream; he informed Chiang that America would not back an attack on the mainland by Chiang’s forces.

Later in the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet split diverted Peking’s attention from Taiwan, America became deeply involved in Vietnam, and Taiwan no longer needed U.S. economic aid.

In A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader (Holt, 1972), Peng Ming-min, a leading Japanese-educated Taiwanese
legal scholar, recalls how he was first wooed by the Nationalists, then jailed as he agitated against Kuomintang domination. He escaped (rather easily) to Sweden in 1970, then to the United States, where he taught at several universities. But, as he concedes, facing both the Communist mainland and strong Nationalist rule at home, few Taiwanese have been ready to press hard for independence.

In a helpful collection of essays, *Taiwan in Modern Times* (St. John's Univ., 1973), which covers the history of Taiwan from early Chinese settlement (A.D. 230) to 1972, editor Paul K. T. Sih and his contributors acknowledge the brain drain of Taiwanese youths who leave for the United States to study and never return. Duly noted are other looming problems—not enough jobs for the college-educated young, high middle-class expectations, urban congestion. The book contains few sweeping predictions. But, says Sih, "Anyone who claims that Taiwan can be separated from and independent of China is denying historical facts as well as present-day realities."

It is a debate that reaches far back into Taiwan's history. In *Koxinga and Chinese Nationalism: History, Myth, and the Hero* (Harvard, 1977, cloth & paper), Ralph C. Croizier demonstrates how, for three centuries, differing groups have created their own image of the hero who expelled the Dutch from Taiwan in 1661. Honored by both Nationalist and Communist Chinese, Koxinga, according to Croizier, may one day become the symbol of a renascent Taiwanese independence movement as well.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Suggestions for this essay came from Parris H. Chang and Edwin A. Winnikler, assistant professor of sociology at Columbia University.

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When sociobiology, the new study of the biological elements in social behavior, touches on human behavior, it causes a stir. Yet the “nature versus nurture” controversy goes back to Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of the Species (1859) and his theory of natural selection. The man who wrote Sociobiology: The New Synthesis in 1975 is Harvard entomologist Edward O. Wilson. To his surprise, he became the target of academic critics, notably Marxists who argued that sociobiology, in effect, preached “genetic determinism” and thus reinforced sexism, racism, and the status quo. In this speculative essay, drawn from his follow-up book, On Human Nature, Wilson tackles one issue among many: How can modern society bypass deep-rooted sexual inclinations to eliminate inequalities, and what are the costs?

by Edward O. Wilson

Sex, of course, permeates every aspect of our existence. Its complexity and ambiguity are due to the fact that sex is not designed primarily for reproduction.

Evolution has devised much more efficient ways for creatures to multiply than the complicated procedures of mating and fertilization. Bacteria simply divide in two (in many species, every 20 minutes). Fungi shed immense numbers of spores. Hydras bud offspring directly from their trunks. Thus, if multiplication were the only purpose of reproductive behavior, our mammalian ancestors could have evolved without sex. Every human being might be asexual and sprout new offspring from the surface cells of a neutered womb.

Nor is the primary function of sex the giving and receiving
of pleasure. The vast majority of animal species perform the act mechanically and with minimal foreplay. Pairs of bacteria and protozoans form sexual unions without the benefit of a nervous system, while corals, clams, and many other invertebrate animals simply shed their sex cells into the surrounding water.

Pleasure is at best a means for inducing creatures with versatile nervous systems to make the heavy investment of time and energy required for courtship, sexual intercourse, and parenting.

There are good reasons for reproduction to be nonsexual: It can be made private, direct, safe. Sex itself is a risky activity. The reproductive organs of human beings are anatomically complex in ways that make them subject to lethal malfunctions, such as ectopic pregnancy and venereal disease. One sex chromosome too few or too many, or a subtle shift in the hormone balance of a developing fetus, creates abnormalities in physiology and behavior.

Why, then, has sex evolved?

The principal answer is that sex creates diversity. And diversity is the way a parent hedges bets against an unpredictably changing environment.

A Matter of Survival

When two individuals mate they combine their sex cells, each of which contains either a dominant (A) or a recessive (a) gene for each possible genetic characteristic (e.g., brown or blue eyes). Since each adult contributes sex cells bearing either A or a, three kinds of offspring are possible: AA, Aa, and aa. Suppose the environment changes—due to a hard winter, a flood, or the invasion of a dangerous predator—so that aa individuals are favored to survive. In the next generation, the sexually reproducing population will consist predominantly of aa organisms until conditions change to favor, perhaps, AA or Aa individuals. Through such diversity, the species thus can adapt and survive.

Not surprisingly then, a two-sex system prevails through most of the living world.

The anatomical difference between the female egg and the male sperm is often extreme. In particular, the human egg is 85,000 times larger than the human sperm. The most important immediate result is that the female places a greater investment in each of her sex cells. A woman can produce only about 400 eggs in her lifetime. Of these, a maximum of about 20 can be converted into healthy infants. The costs of bringing an infant to term and caring for it afterward are relatively enormous.
In contrast, a man releases 100 million sperm with each ejaculation. Once he has achieved fertilization his purely physiological commitment has ended. His genes will benefit equally with those of the female, but his investment will be far less than hers unless she can induce him to contribute to the care of the offspring. If a man were given total freedom to act, he could theoretically inseminate thousands of women in his lifetime.

The resulting conflict of interest between the sexes is a property of not only human beings but also the majority of animal species.

It pays males to be aggressive, hasty, fickle, and undiscriminating. In theory, it is more profitable for females to be coy, to hold back until they can identify males with the best genes. In species that rear young, it is also important for the females to select males who are more likely to stay with them after insemination.

Human beings obey this biological principle faithfully. It is true that the thousands of existing societies are enormously variable in the details of their sexual mores and the division of labor between the sexes. This variation is based on culture. Societies mold their customs to the requirements of the environment and in so doing duplicate in totality a large fraction of the arrangements encountered throughout the remainder of the animal kingdom: from strict monogamy to extreme differences between men and woman in behavior and dress.

Nevertheless, this flexibility is not endless, and beneath it all lie general features that conform closely to the expectations drawn from evolutionary theory.

We are, first of all, moderately polygynous, with males initiating most of the changes in sexual partnership. About three-fourths of all human societies permit the taking of multiple wives, and most of them encourage the practice by law and custom. In contrast, marriage to multiple husbands is sanctioned in less than 1 percent of societies. Monogamous societies are monogamous but usually only in a legal sense, with concubinage and other extramarital stratagems being permitted to allow de facto polygyny.

Edward O. Wilson, 50, is Frank B. Baird, Jr. professor of science and curator of entomology at Harvard's Museum of Comparative Zoology. Born in Birmingham, Ala., he received his B.S. (1949) and M.S. (1950) from the University of Alabama and his Ph.D. from Harvard (1955). His books include The Insect Societies (1971), Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975), and On Human Nature, which won the 1979 Pulitzer Prize for general nonfiction.
Anatomy bears the imprint of the sexual division of labor. Men are on the average 20 to 30 percent heavier than women. Pound for pound, they are stronger and quicker in most categories of sport. The proportion of their limbs, their skeletal torsion, and the density of their muscles are particularly suited for running and throwing—the archaic specialties of the ancestral hunter-gatherer males.

The world track records reflect the physical disparity. Male champions are always between 5 and 20 percent faster than women champions. Even in the marathon, where size and brute strength count least, the difference in 1974 was 13 percent. Women marathoners have comparable endurance, but men are faster—their champions run 27 five-minute miles one after another.

The gap cannot be attributed to a lack of incentive and training. The great women runners of East Germany and the Soviet Union are the products of nationwide recruitment and scientifically planned training programs. Yet their champions, who consistently set Olympic and world records, could not place in an average men's regional track meet.

It is of equal importance that women match or surpass men in a few other sports. These are among the ones furthest removed from the primitive techniques of hunting and aggression: long-distance swimming, the more acrobatic events of gymnastics, precision (but not distance) archery, and small-bore rifle shooting. As sports and sport-like activities evolve into more sophisticated channels dependent on skill and agility, the over-
REORIENTING SOCIAL THEORY

Sociobiology cannot create a wholly new science of man in one stroke, but it can and will reorient social theory in many ways, eventually bringing the social sciences—anthropology, psychology, sociology—into closer alignment with biology. Some realignment has already occurred, as sociobiologists have tested new theories of sexuality, altruism, aggression, and religion.

In any new field of knowledge, elementary principles must be established before the complexities can be fully understood. Unique qualities of human behavior certainly exist, but they cannot be fully understood until they have been perceived as having ultimately biological origins.

For many persons, the most troubling feature of human sociobiology is its notion that human behavior is in some way controlled by genes. They fear that human beings might come to be seen as automatons lacking free will. But that is not what "genetic constraint" really means: Each group of genes affecting a given trait establishes a range of possible traits, the expression of which depends on an organism's interaction with its environment.

The idea, popular to the point of dogma among social scientists, that the desires and propensities of human nature are determined by culture cannot be sustained. Desires and propensities can be influenced by culture, sometimes strongly and sometimes weakly, but the overall possibilities for behavior, and the resulting pattern of human social organization, are limited by our genetic endowment.

all achievements of men and women can be expected to converge more closely.

The average temperamental differences between the human sexes are also consistent with the generalities of mammalian biology. Women as a group are less assertive and physically aggressive. The magnitude of the distinction depends on the culture, ranging from a tenuous, merely statistical difference in egalitarian settings to the virtual enslavement of women in some extreme polygynous societies. Still, women differ consistently in this qualitative manner regardless of the degree.

The physical and temperamental differences between men and women have been amplified by culture into universal male dominance. History records not a single society in which women have controlled the political and economic lives of men. Even when queens and empresses ruled, their intermediaries remained primarily male.* In about 75 percent of societies studied

*When Margaret Thatcher became Britain's Prime Minister last spring, she appointed no women to her Cabinet.
Our deepest feelings—the source of our ethical code—are innate creations whose ultimate function is genetic survival. They may appear (or even be) sublime, but they are based ultimately on physical laws, not some mysterious, supernatural set of instructions. We are on our own, the product of a very special genetic and cultural history.

A dilemma grows out of the realization that in making ethical judgments we must choose among our innate feelings on the basis of those very same innate feelings. People repeatedly face essentially unresolvable moral problems, such as whether to protect national territory by going to war or to surrender it and save lives. Such choices have to be made on the basis of purely internal, conflicting guides.

A more awesome dilemma arises from the new realization that we will eventually be able to alter human nature, including the innate ethical guides, by reprogramming the brain and thereby eliminating ambiguity and conflict. But the form that a new human nature might take, and the decision to make a change, can only be based on those same ethical guides waiting to be transformed by “genetic engineering.”

Perhaps fortunately, we have more immediate and demanding problems facing us today. The choices concerning genetic engineering must be left to future generations, who will, I hope, accumulate the wisdom and judgment needed to solve the dilemma in a way that provides Homo sapiens with a long, happy tenure on earth.

—E.O.W.
year of life. Frequent smiling then becomes one of the more persistent of female traits and endures through adolescence and maturity. By the age of six months, girls also pay closer attention to sights and sounds used in communication than they do to nonsocial stimuli. Boys of the same age make no such distinction. One-year-old girls react with greater fright and inhibition to clay faces, and they are more reluctant to leave their mothers' sides in novel situations. Older girls remain more affiliative and less physically venturesome than boys of the same age.

In her study of the !Kung San, University of New Mexico anthropologist Patricia Draper found no difference in the way young boys and girls are reared. All are supervised closely but unobtrusively and are seldom given any work. Yet boys wander out of view and earshot more frequently than girls, and older boys appear to be slightly more prone to join the men hunters than are girls to join the women gatherers. From these subtle differences, the characteristic strong sexual division of labor in !Kung encampments emerges by small steps.

At Birth, the Twig Is Bent

In Western cultures, boys are also more venturesome than girls and more physically aggressive on the average. Stanford psychologists Eleanor Maccoby and Carol Jacklin concluded that this male trait is deeply rooted and could have a genetic origin. From the earliest moments of social play, at age 2 to 2½ years, boys are more aggressive in both words and actions. They have a larger number of hostile fantasies and engage more often in mock fighting, overt threats, and physical attacks, which are directed at other boys during efforts to acquire dominance status.†

The skeptic favoring a totally environmental explanation might still argue that the early divergence in role playing has no biological component, it is merely a response to biased training practices during very early childhood. If it occurs, the training would have to be subtle, at least partly unconscious in application, and practiced by parents around the world.

*The !Kung San (the exclamation point here indicates a clicking "Q" sound) are a Bushmen tribe of the Kalahari desert in Botswana. The average male height is five feet, two inches; the average for women is five feet. Draper's research on the !Kung is published with studies by other anthropologists in Richard B. Lee and Irven DeVore, editors, Kalahari Hunter-Gatherers: Studies of the !Kung San and Their Neighbors, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976.
Chinese "footbinding" helped enforce female chastity by making it difficult for a woman to stray very far.

From Chinese Footbinding: The History of a Curious Exotic

So at birth the twig is already bent a little bit. What are we to make of that? It suggests that the universal existence of sexual division of labor is not entirely an accident of cultural evolution. But it also supports the conventional view that the enormous variation from country to country is due to cultural evolution. Demonstrating a slight biological component delineates the options that future societies may consciously select.

Here a major dilemma presents itself. In full recognition of the struggle for women’s rights that is now spreading throughout the world, each society must make one or the other of the three following choices:

*Condition its members so as to exaggerate sexual differences in behavior.* This already is the pattern in almost all cultures, and it was deliberately chosen by the Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers in Iran following the overthrow of the Shah. It results more often than not in domination of women by men and exclusion of women from many professions and activities. But this need not be the case. In theory, a carefully designed society with strong sexual divisions could be richer in spirit, more diversified, and even more productive than a unisex society. Such a society might safeguard human rights even while channeling men and women into different occupations. Still, some
THE KIBBUTZ EXPERIMENT

Can equal opportunity for women create sexual equality? In On Human Nature, Edward O. Wilson discusses the push for egalitarianism in Israel's famed kibbutzim, or communal villages:

From the time of the greatest upsurge of the kibbutz movement in the 1940s and '50s, its leaders promoted a policy of complete sexual equality, of encouraging women to enter roles previously reserved for men.

In the early years, it almost worked.

The first generation of women were ideologically committed, and they shifted in large numbers to politics, management, and labor. But they and their daughters have regressed somewhat toward traditional roles. The daughters have gone further than the mothers. They now demand and receive a longer period of time each day with their children. Time significantly entitled "the hour of love." Some of the most gifted have resisted recruitment into the higher levels of commercial and political leadership, so that female representation in these roles is far below that enjoyed by the same generation of men.

It has been argued that this reversion merely represents the influence of the strong patriarchal tradition that persists in the remainder of Israeli society, even though the role division is now greater inside the kibbutzim than outside. The Israeli experience shows how difficult it is to predict the consequences and assess the meaning of changes in behavior based on either heredity or ideology.

amount of social injustice would be inevitable, and it could easily expand to disastrous proportions.

Train its members so as to eliminate all sexual differences in behavior. By the use of quotas and sex-biased education it should be possible to create a society in which men and women as groups share equally in all professions, cultural activities, and even, to take the absurd extreme, athletic competition. Although the early predispositions that characterize sex would have to be blunted, the biological differences are not so large as to make the undertaking impossible. Such control would offer the great advantage of eliminating even the hint of prejudice based on sex. It could result in a much more harmonious and productive society. Yet the amount of regulation required would certainly place some personal freedoms in jeopardy, and at least a few individuals would not be allowed to reach their full potential.

Provide equal opportunities and access but take no further action. To make no choice at all is of course the third choice open to all cultures. Laissez-faire might, on first thought, seem to be...
the course most congenial to personal liberty and development, but this is not necessarily true. Even with identical education for men and women and equal access to all professions, men are likely to maintain disproportionate representation in political life, business, and science. Many would fail to participate fully in the formative aspects of child rearing. The result might be legitimately viewed as restrictive on the complete emotional development of individuals.

Costs and Benefits

From this troubling ambiguity concerning sex roles, one firm conclusion can be drawn: The evidence of biological constraint alone cannot prescribe an ideal course of action. However, they can help us to define the options and to assess the price of each. The price is to be measured in the added energy required for education and reinforcement and in the attrition of individual freedom and potential. And let us face the real issue squarely: Since every option has a cost, and concrete ethical principles will rarely find universal acceptance, the choice cannot be made easily.

Can we learn anything from our ancestors?

Neither sociological theory nor archeological evidence from 2 million years ago can satisfactorily explain sex roles in early human societies. Instead, we must rely on data from the living hunter-gatherer societies, which in their economies and population structure are closest to the ancestral human beings. Here the evidence is suggestive but not decisive.

Christian families in the Middle Ages were based upon monogamous marriage. "The family," according to Wilson, "remains one of the universals of human social organization."
IS SOCIOBIOLOGY SEXIST?

Some academic critics on the Left have charged sociobiologists with attempting to explain or even justify social inequalities. In Science for the People (May-June 1977), sociologist Barbara Chasin equates sociobiology with sexism:

From our earliest days, so the story goes, man was the active, aggressive, subsistence-providing person, while the little woman cleaned the cave, cooked the mastodon, and reared the kiddies. A charming picture but, in all probability, completely false. [The sociobiologists] create a never-never land, which they then "explain" with allegedly hard-headed science. . . .

There are societies where neither sex is aggressive. Preliminary reports on the Tasaday of the Philippines have noted the gentleness of males and females and their lack of anything resembling fighting. There is no war, no word even for war. Such leadership as there is has at times been exercised by a woman. In pygmy society too it is hard to find examples of males being more aggressive than females. . . . The cross-cultural evidence on sex roles is crucial and largely ignored or misrepresented in the works of the sociobiologists.

There are societies, and one can argue that these were the typical human groupings for millenia, where there is little division of labor. But even where some division exists, it is far different from that portrayed by Wilson. Men and women may engage in different tasks, but women are not confined to puttering around the campfire all day doing domestic chores. . . .

While claiming to be scientific, then, Wilson, like the other biological determinists, makes no attempt to deal with material that does not support his theories. This is not science; it is propaganda. . . .

Biological determinists such as Wilson have not consciously decided to protect American capitalism from the threat of women's liberation, but their ideas are used by the people who control the media, the publishing industry, and the scientific and social scientific establishments. . . .

The faults in society, the injustices, the inequalities do not lie in genes; they are rooted in social institutions and class structure.

In virtually all of the more than 100 such societies that have been studied around the world, men are responsible for most or all of the hunting and women for most or all of the gathering. Men form organized, mobile groups that range far from the campsites in search of larger game. Women participate in the capture of smaller animals, and they collect most of the vegetable food. Although men bring home the highest grade of protein, women generally provide most of the calories. They are also frequently but not invariably responsible for the fabrication of
clothing and the building of shelters.

Human beings, as typical large primates, breed slowly. It is to the advantage of each woman of the hunter-gatherer band to secure the allegiance of a man who will contribute meat and hides while sharing the labor of child-rearing. It is to the reciprocal advantage of each man to obtain exclusive sexual rights to women and to monopolize their economic productivity.

If the evidence from hunter-gatherer life has been correctly interpreted, the exchange has resulted in near universality of the pair bond and the prevalence of extended families with men and their wives forming the nucleus. Sexual love and the emotional satisfaction of family life can be reasonably postulated to be based on enabling mechanisms in the physiology of the brain that have been programmed to some extent through the genetic hardening of this compromise.

Human beings are unique among the primates in the intensity and variety of their sexual activity. Among other higher mammals they are exceeded in sexual athleticism only by lions. The females of most primate species become sexually active, to the point of aggressiveness, only at the time of ovulation. But human females are extraordinary in lacking the estrus, or period of heat. Their ovulation is hidden, to such a degree that it is difficult to initiate pregnancies or to avoid them even when the time of insemination is carefully selected. Women remain sexually receptive, with little variation in the capacity to respond, throughout the menstrual cycle.

Two !Kung San families leave camp for the day. The men hunt with the weapons they carry, and their wives gather fruits and vegetables.
WHY THE BROUHAHA?

"Why has sociobiology caused an uproar? In a July 1979 Commentary article written shortly before his death last May, philosopher Charles Frankel considered that question:

Wilson’s views are usually conventional ideas in biological wrappings. On the whole, despite the brouhaha he has caused, he leans to the view that social environment is the primary agent in shaping human behavior. What separates him from the critics with whom he shares that view is only the qualification that, while environment is responsible for most of our behavior, it is perhaps not responsible for all.

Why, then, the brouhaha? One reason, undoubtedly, is that his critics are rendered anxious even by this small qualification. They would rather not have it expressed. It is obvious to them, as it is obvious to anyone, that human beings have characteristics which no society has created and to which all societies must respond or face trouble.... But they would prefer that such truths be treated with silence. The open mention of them, like the mention of sex in polite Victorian circles, can only incite wicked thoughts. Wilson, in their eyes, has opened a dangerous door: Once opened, no one can know what new and more disturbing reservations may have to be entertained about the omnipotence of environmental influences.

Why has women’s sexual responsiveness become nearly continuous? The most plausible explanation is that the trait facilitates bonding. Unusually frequent sexual activity between males and females of primitive human clans served as the principal device for cementing the pair bond. It also reduced aggression among the males. In baboon troops and other nonhuman primate societies, male hostility is intensified when females come into heat. The erasure of estrus in early human beings reduced the potential for such competition and safeguarded the alliances of hunter males.

Human beings are connoisseurs of sexual pleasure. They indulge themselves by casual inspection of potential partners, by fantasy, poetry, and song, and in every delightful nuance of flirtation. This has little if anything to do with reproduction. It has everything to do with bonding.

The nonhuman species that have evolved long-term bonds are also, by and large, the ones that rely on elaborate courtship rituals. Love and sex do indeed go together.8

8In my view, the biological significance of sex has been misinterpreted by the theoreticians of Judaism and Christianity. To this day, the Roman Catholic Church asserts that the primary purpose of sexual behavior is reproduction.
My central argument here has been that human sexuality can be much more precisely defined with the aid of the new advances in evolutionary theory. To omit this mode of reasoning is to leave us blind to an important part of our history, the ultimate meaning of our behavior, and the significance of the choices that lie before us.

Through the instruments of education and law, each society must make a series of choices concerning sexual discrimination, standards of sexual behavior, and reinforcement of the family. As government and technology become more complex and interdependent, the choices have to be correspondingly precise and sophisticated. One way or the other, intuitively or with the aid of science, evolutionary history will be entered in the calculations, because human nature is stubborn and cannot be forced without a cost.

There is a cost, which no one can yet measure, awaiting the society that moves either from juridical equality of opportunity between the sexes to a statistical equality of their performance in the professions or back toward deliberate sexual discrimination. Another unknown cost awaits the society that decides to reorganize itself into smoothly functioning nuclear families or to abolish families in favor of communal kibbutzim.

We now believe that cultures can be rationally designed. We can teach and reward and coerce. But in so doing we must also consider the price of each new culture, measured in the time and energy required for training and enforcement and in the less tangible currency of human happiness that must be spent to circumvent our innate predispositions.

School house in Genesee Falls Township, New York, c. 1880. Local children now attend the modern, 1,700-pupil Letchworth Central School (kindergarten through 12th grade) in nearby Gainesville. A new addition, opened last month, includes a gym, stage, cafeteria, and "library/media" center. Letchworth's elementary school principal, Miss Edalyne Everett, attended the old one-room school, which was in use until 1946.
The Public Schools

H. G. Wells once called history a “race between education and catastrophe.” In America, the public schools always seem to be cast in the role of the tortoise. Despite the Founding Fathers’ belief in popular education, it took more than a century to establish a serious U.S. public school system. Along the way, educators and politicians have quarreled over shifting notions of what school teachers are supposed to do: “Americanize” immigrants? Train future factory workers? Provide equal opportunity? Today, the debate is over “quality,” and disarray in the classroom. The troubles are unmistakeable—functional illiteracy, apathy, indiscipline. They are not unprecedented. Here, education writers Fred and Grace Hechinger look at the past; journalist Diane Divoky analyzes the rise and fall of Americans’ faith in the schools since the 1950s; and political scientist Joel Berke examines the political and financial outlook for public education.

A LONG TUG-OF-WAR

by Fred M. and Grace Hechinger

The history of American public school education is the repeated triumph of hope over experience. Reform billed as new and revolutionary has often turned out to be an unconscious reprise of earlier innovations. Time and again after the early 1800s, novel ideas about teaching turned sour as their champions insisted they had found “the one best way.” We have aimed high and missed, adjusted our sights and missed again. We have never accepted the fact that there are limits to what education can accomplish; in the process, we have accomplished a great deal.

America’s faith in education, noted by Tocqueville in 1835 and by many another European visitor before and since, did not bloom early in the wilderness. Struggling for survival, the early settlers spent little time on the diffusion of knowledge. Self-
paced learning and open classrooms were not envisioned in the early American philosophy of education.

Indeed, in the South, there were hardly any classrooms at all; the children of the well-to-do received their book-learning at the knees of private tutors. Other children often went without.

New England was always a different story. By 1700, the literacy rate for white adult males was 95 percent in New England, 60 percent in the Southern colonies. The Puritans, who pioneered the idea of public education, saw children as miniature adults, contaminated by original sin and in need of being purged, often harshly, of evil. The New England Primer, the most popular textbook in the 18th century, began its lesson with a no-nonsense reminder:

In Adam's fall,
We sinned all.
Thy life to mend,
God's book attend.

As early as 1647, Massachusetts required every town of 50 families or more to support an elementary school, with tax monies if necessary, in order that “learning may not be buried in the graves of our fathers.” By 1763, most New England villages operated “free schools,” and some even boasted “grammar” (or high) schools. The school day often ran from 6 A.M. to 6 P.M., and the ill-paid teachers were generally young—and between other jobs.

Poor roads and a dispersed population made New England’s educational system, if such it can be called, highly decentralized. It was authoritarian and exceedingly religious. Birch-wielding masters did not hesitate to beat their more unruly charges into submission. But America was changing. While most of the colonists undoubtedly hoped that their children,
Horace Mann (1796–1859) believed that the purpose of education was not to "freeze" the status quo but to serve as an engine of social mobility. "If education be equably diffused," he wrote, "it will draw property after it." Mann's opposition to corporal punishment angered Boston schoolmasters.

with the help of God and an occasional whipping, would grow up in the true religion, they also believed in new worlds to conquer. The frontier, with its apparently unlimited abundance of land and resources, was not an environment congenial to submissive spirits. Freedom and opportunity—these were cherished values; and, slowly at first, they made their mark on the way society viewed children. The writers of the New England Primer, ever quick to adapt, put it this way in a new 1790 edition:

He who ne'er learns his ABC,
Forever will a blockhead be.
But he who learns his letters fair,
Shall have a coach to take the air.

The Founding Fathers had education much on their minds. Thomas Jefferson cautioned that "if a nation expects to be ignorant and free ... it expects what never was and what never will be." John Jay called knowledge "the soul of a republic." Tentatively, at first, they sought to put their principles into practice.

Thus, the Land Ordinance of 1785, drafted largely by Jefferson and passed by Congress under the Articles of Confederation, earmarked the proceeds from certain public lands for the support of schools in the vast Northwest Territory (the present states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin). The
schools themselves were rather miserable places. Outside New England, public education grew at a sluggish pace, in part because the U.S. Constitution made no reference to the subject and so left it as one of the implied powers of the states. Thomas Jefferson tried to create an elaborate statewide system for Virginia but found so little support that he turned his energies to founding the University of Virginia. Yet there were some gains—on paper. The 13 former colonies’ newly adopted constitutions all affirmed state responsibility for education, and most states, beginning with New York in 1812, hired state superintendents of schools. The foundations, at least, were in place.

One reason for the lag in public education was the stigma of “charity” that attached to the public schools. And well into the 20th century, many rural folk regarded extensive schooling as a luxury for youths whose labor was needed on the family farm. (“Books cost a heap and take a power of time,” lamented one Illinois pioneer in the early 1800s.)

Branded on the Tongue

More to the point, the wealthier adversaries of free education sensed, accurately, that it posed a threat to the old social order, promising to replace an aristocracy of inherited privilege, however modest, with an aristocracy of talent. And the old social order would have to foot the bill. Daniel Webster stated the “egalitarian” case concisely in 1821: “For the purpose of public instruction, we hold every man subject to taxation in proportion to his property . . . whether he have or have not children.” The “elitist” view was expressed in 1830 by Philadelphia’s National Gazette, which termed a proposed education tax “evil” because it would make affluent citizens feel that “they toiled for the benefit of families other than their own.”

Just as important as the establishment of schools in these early days was the question of what their function was to be. In contrast to its counterparts in France or England, the American public school has never been an institution run by a single-minded national elite. Local, heterogeneous in curriculum and standards, this non-system has reflected at every turn the nation’s larger social and political turbulence.

Noah Webster (1758–1843), a self-promoting lawyer and lexicographer, created the tools for the schools’ post-independence task of “Americanization”—one of the few purposes on which succeeding generations of liberals and conservatives would agree. The American language, as presented in Webster’s Blue-Backed Speller (1783), his Reader (1785), and his
American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)—was the banner under which “Americanization” marched. If Americans had yet no common heritage, they would have a common speech, just as every Englishman (as George Orwell later noted) was branded on the tongue at birth. In public schools across the continent, no matter how inadequate, Webster’s Speller gave Americans what historian Henry Steele Commager has called “shared baggage.”

“The One Best Way”

If the schools played a critical role when most of the U.S. population was of “Anglo” descent, the hopes invested in education increased as the ethnic balance began to shift. Indeed, more than anything else, immigration transformed America’s view of public schools. By the 1840s and ’50s, the steady trickle of foreigners into the United States had become a torrent—and, as the Massachusetts Teacher put it in 1850, a “cause of serious alarm to the most intelligent of our people.” Even those elitists who had balked at educating poor, native-born Americans realized that something had to be done.

But the schools needed an overhaul. So far they had evolved here and there in a haphazard way. There were no “standards,” few teachers were seriously committed to their profession, and public spending lagged. A new breed of educators—men like Horace Mann (1796–1859)—rose to lead the way to a new sense of professionalism.

Born in Franklin, Massachusetts, the son of a farmer, Mann had a harsh upbringing and little formal schooling. But he was a bright youth, and, with the help of a tutor, was accepted at Brown University. Later, he became a lawyer and entered Massachusetts politics. Following a distinguished career in the state legislature, he was named in 1837 the first secretary of Massachusetts’ new board of education—the first state board of education in the United States. Two years later, he founded America’s first state teachers college in Lexington.

As secretary of the board of education, Mann had little statutory authority. But he used his position as a pulpit. He organized conventions of teachers and the public across the state to educate them about education. He founded the Common School Journal and every year published an annual report—essentially a statement of his educational philosophy—that was widely cir-

Some 370,000 immigrants entered the United States in 1850, most of them Irish (164,000), German (79,000), or English (51,000), but including 5 Poles, 4 Indians, and 3 Chinese.

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culated around the country. At his urging, the Massachusetts legislature raised teacher salaries by 62 percent, built 50 high schools, spent $2 million on repairs to existing schools, and established a mandatory six-month school year.

Not to be outdone, other state legislatures set up boards of education and began in earnest to reform their educational systems—along Mann’s lines.

Mann realized that the growing diversity of the American people, with all their ethnic differences, might shatter the young nation’s precarious sense of unity. Only a new institution could create a sense of community and joint purpose: the “common school.” As Mann used the term, it was a school not merely for the poor or the common people—which is how public schools were widely perceived at the time—but for all the people. “Education,” he wrote, “beyond all other devices of human origin, is the great equalizer of the condition of men—the balance wheel of the social machinery.” In Horace Mann’s hopes, among others, one finds the egalitarian antecedents of the War on Poverty and the Great Society programs of the mid-1960s.

Americans were quicker to acknowledge a public responsibility for education than they were to set up a comprehensive system. To be sure, the reforms of Mann and others had strengthened and expanded the public schools. Teachers were becoming increasingly “professionalized.” Yet in 1870, barely half of those Americans aged 5-17 were in public schools, and there were only 200 public high schools.

As American cities began to grow, nourished by expanding industrialization and by a second, larger wave of immigration during the last half of the 19th century, urban public school systems inevitably grew too. Then, as later, the new schools meant jobs, contracts, patronage. Partly because the schools

There were 7 farmers, 3 of whom drank rum and whisky, and became miserable; the rest drank water. and were healthy and happy. How many drank water?

were highly decentralized, public education became the play-
thing of ward politicians and bosses. The inauguration of a new
mayor often meant the departure of the school superinten-
dent—and the teachers.

Admittedly, the big city bosses were often the only people
interested in responding to the immigrants’ everyday social and
economic needs. Yet the situation was ripe for reform, and
urban school superintendents, with much to gain, led the way,
moving toward uniformity, and, above all, toward city-wide
control, with a vengeance. Their slogan came to be “the one best
way,” the professionally approved solution, the “scientific” ap-
proach to the schools. John Philbrick, Boston’s superintendent
from 1856 to 1878, put it bluntly: “The best is the best every-
where. If America devised the best school desk, it must go to the
ends of the civilized world.”

**Punctuality, Regularity, Silence**

Since the efficiency of the country’s new factories seemed to
provide the best and most economically designed product, why
not apply the same industrial principles to the school? A state-
ment on “The Theory of Education in the United States,” signed
by leading public schoolmen in 1874, and written by William
Harris, St. Louis superintendent of schools and later a U.S.
Commissioner of Education, placed major stress on “(1) punctu-
ality, (2) regularity, (3) attention, and (4) silence, as habits that
are necessary in an industrial and commercial civilization.” At
least the schools ran on time.

Also pressing for greater effectiveness were captains of in-
dustry and university giants like Charles W. Eliot, president of
Harvard for 40 years, and Columbia’s Nicholas Murray Butler
(who ran his university with despotic efficiency). They en-
listed the well-to-do in the cause. Of the 104 members of the
“Committee of One Hundred”—the citizen-activists for school
centralization in New York City—92 were listed in the Social
Register.

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As Philbrick’s remarks suggest, American education since the mid-19th century has been
marked by strong homogenizing influences, even as its diversity has endured. Among these
influences are the schools of education—particularly Columbia University’s Teachers Col-
lege (founded in 1887) and, to a lesser extent, the University of Chicago’s Laboratory School
(1896). The number of these institutions, heavily oriented toward classroom techniques and
“philosophy,” has grown. Textbook publishers, who sell their wares nationally, are another
force and have been since the days of McGuffey’s Reader. And then there are the powerful
teachers’ unions, primarily the National Education Association (founded in 1857) and the
smaller American Federation of Teachers (1916). In the 1950s, the federal government en-
tered the picture with major special-purpose subsidies to the schools under the National
Defense Education Act (1958) and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1965).

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Verbs.


Far from radical, this new elite was nevertheless committed to the expansion of public education. Eliot in particular called for more schools, while insisting on "common and higher standards." With Eliot as chairman, the National Education Association (NEA) in 1892 established a committee to map out the subjects to be studied as well as "the best method of testing" the results—an American preoccupation that has yet to subside. In the view of the Eliot committee, the high school curriculum should consist of English, foreign languages, natural history, physical science, geography, history, civil government, and political economy, as well as Latin, Greek, and mathematics. The committee concluded that every subject should be taught in the same fashion to all students.

The Classroom as Society

In time, Eliot was appalled by the excesses of the reforms he had helped to initiate. When one school administrator told him that there was no need to treat students as individuals, urging instead that pupils "move together like soldiers on parade," he was shaken. So were many others, and none more so than the leader of the "Progressive" counter-movement, John Dewey (1859–1952).

Dewey, a philosopher and psychologist, was the son of a Vermont grocer. He spent most of his teaching career—47 years—at Columbia University, and his interests gradually broadened to include social and educational issues.

Dewey's views on education, expressed in such books as The School and Society (1899) and The Child and the Curriculum...
(1902), were to revolutionize pedagogical tinkering around the world. He rejected the idea of the classroom as simply a training ground for the skilled manpower demanded by the Industrial Age. He wanted school to be far more than it had ever been—"a genuine form of active community life," an "embryonic society." Not unlike Benjamin Franklin, who had repeatedly urged learning to be "delightful," Dewey hoped schools might create a new society, "more worthy, lovely, harmonious." Instead of recitation and drill, he wanted children to learn through experience and exploration, "by doing."

**Anything Goes**

Seen against the rigidity of those who had "reformed" the system by regimenting it, Dewey was indeed a liberator. But, like Eliot, Dewey found it impossible to protect his ideas from his disciples. An intensely shy man for much of his life, he often expressed himself ambiguously. (For example, he once called himself a "Socialist," but meant only that he was concerned about social questions.) It should not be surprising that some of his notions were misunderstood. Yet Dewey was shocked to hear a Los Angeles school superintendent say in 1913: "The principal business of the child is to play and to grow—not to read, write, spell, and cipher."

Indeed, most of those who thought they were following in the master's footsteps overlooked Dewey's basic assumption that scholarship and order were the bedrock from which educational liberation must proceed. In 1918, the NEA's "Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education" stressed "social efficiency" above intellectual rigor. History, which Dewey had considered crucial, was replaced by "social studies," defined as an investigation of the "social efforts to improve mankind"; in a first draft of the document, the "three Rs" were not mentioned at all. Mathematics and foreign languages were all but discarded.

To be fair to the Progressives, who seemed hell-bent on abandoning all academic standards, their influence coincided with an enormous expansion of the high schools (51 percent of those aged 14–17 were attending high school in 1930 versus 11 percent in 1900). In the absence of enough able teachers, the easiest way to serve the many seemed to be to demand little. It

*Throughout the 19th century, secondary education was primarily a private affair, designed for students planning to attend university. Thus, in 1900, 75 percent of all high school graduates went on to college, compared with 25 percent in the early 1950s, when high school was universal. The figure today is 45 percent, reflecting the enormous expansion of higher education.

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may well be that a populist, expansive, open-door approach to education—essential to the maintenance of a fluid society—inevitably leads to periods when quality is temporarily subordinated to quantity.

The reaction to the post-Dewey Progressives came after World War II. On one front, suspicious politicians attacked as subversive the Progressives' challenge to teachers to "dare" to change society. (Had not Dewey called himself a Socialist?) On a second front, college professors and university administrators charged that the Progressive "anything goes" approach to education had sapped public schools of intellectual stamina. As Paul Woodring wrote in Let's Talk Sense About Our Schools (1953), "The best thing about contemporary education is that a great many teachers ignore the gobbledygook and pedagoguese and go right ahead and do a sensible job of teaching." With a powerful psychological boost from the Soviet launching of Sputnik I in 1957, a new movement picked up strength, calling for a return to academic rigor without any retreat from the idea of a "common school."

Organizers Versus Romantics

Again, a Harvard president took the lead. James Bryant Conant, a devoted advocate of universal public education, rallied support for his reform plan, outlined in The American High School Today (1959). The time had come for a return to the "hard" subjects—English, history, science, mathematics, foreign languages—which Conant insisted, should be studied at least by the upper 20 percent of the academically talented. A firm believer in the "comprehensive" high school, he urged intellectual and vocational training to live side by side under the same roof. (In many European countries, children are sorted out and sent to different schools after age 11.)

From coast to coast, Conant addressed school boards, businessmen, community leaders, concerned citizens, conventions of teachers and school administrators. With incredible stamina, he endured the lukewarm chicken dinners and watery fruit cocktails—to no other end than to save American public education from the academic decline that he felt was eroding it from within.

Conant's was not to be the last battle of the education wars. As early as 1959, he warned that the growing number of badly educated, out-of-school black youths in the urban ghettos was "social dynamite." For that there would be crash programs and radical critiques aplenty in the 1960s—a period of reformist zeal
that, in the nature of things, was destined to be followed by another period of consolidation.

Thus, over the years, the progress of American education has zigzagged between two opposites, led by two contending groups that one might call the Organizers and the Romantics. The Romantics—people like Mann and Dewey—have dreamed the dreams, welcomed the future. The Organizers—the Eliots and Conants—are perhaps a little more down to earth, skeptical of visionaries, politically astute, pragmatists, not averse to reform but ever on the lookout for the "administrative solution."

It is easy to ridicule the excesses of both groups, or to condemn the periodic swings between both extremes as an irrational state of affairs. But, as we see it, the long-term historical effect seems quite different: The pattern is not so much one of mutual nullification as one of balance. Whenever one or the other faction gains too much power, the natural American mistrust of any one "orthodoxy" tends to deny its proponents' appeal for further support.

Amid all the hubbub, the American public school has chalked up some remarkable achievements. According to a 19-nation study conducted in 1973 by Sweden's Institute for the International Evaluation of Educational Achievement, the "academic elite" (the top 9 percent) in America's high schools contains the largest percentage of children from lower-income homes (14 percent) of any of the nations surveyed. (The figure in West Germany, for example, is 1 percent.) Three-quarters of all those who start high school in the United States finish it—not Utopia, but a better record than any other Western nation can boast. There are still serious problems and gross inequalities and, to put it mildly, room for intellectual improvement. But U.S. public schools remain the gateway to opportunity that they were meant to be.
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

A LOSS OF NERVE

by Diane Divoky

As the 1970s draw to a close, everyone has something to say about "the schools." Congressmen variously fret about why Johnny can't read, or why he must be bused 10 miles to school to achieve "racial balance," or why he is subjected to tests clearly biased in favor of those who can write "Standard English."

From the Washington bureaucracies and the tax-exempt education lobbies come studies documenting the vandalism, drug abuse, and violence in the schools, the impact of sharply falling enrollments, the need for ever more "funding." Parents are paying more in taxes to support their local schools; to hear them talk, they are getting less and less in return for their money. Educators counter with reports of a rising incidence of teacher "burn-out," the classroom equivalent of shell-shock; beset by administrative busywork, indiscipline, and a perceptible lack of esprit in the classroom, thousands of teachers are fleeing to greener pastures.

Dissatisfaction exists in many quarters. Like civilian employers, the armed services are now aware of a "new illiteracy"; this year, the Pentagon has been forced to launch remedial reading programs for thousands of its $419-a-month recruits, many of whom hold public high school diplomas, just to make sure they can understand basic safety manuals. Virtually every major college, from Yale to Stanford, has remedial classes in mathematics and English.

Reflected in bleak TV documentaries, in Time cover stories, in Redbook essays, is the gnawing popular suspicion that, as educator and author Paul Copperman told a congressional committee earlier this year, "for the first time in our history, the educational skills of one generation will not surpass, will not equal, will not even approach those of their parents."

This suspicion is not confined to journalists, reactionaries, or the relatively well-to-do. Even in the nation's less affluent precincts, private schools are doing a brisk business. In Washington, D.C., it is calculated that the average child's test scores drop further below the national median with every year he
spends in District schools; black and white parents of even modest means seek out Catholic and independent institutions. In Oakland, California, the parents of 40 percent of all schoolchildren, many of them low-income blacks, are scrimping to educate their offspring outside the municipal system. In all of California, once the nation's pace-setter in public education, the private schools' enrollment share has doubled in three years, to 12 percent.

On a more general level, the press, politicians, parents, and school administrators have revived an old American debate over "standards." There is plenty of evidence that, despite increased outlays for education, the measurable results, at least, are unsatisfactory. In the decade ending last year, average scores on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) taken by high school seniors, dropped 37 points on the verbal portion of the test, 24 points on the mathematics segment. A 1976 test administered to all Philadelphia high school seniors revealed that 13.5 percent of them could not fill out a job application; more than 8 percent did not know the meaning of "credit," "deposit," or "beware." And according to a 1979 report prepared for Senator George McGovern (D.-S.D.), "functional illiteracy" among 17-year-olds may be as high as 13 percent for whites, 42 percent for blacks, and 56 percent for Hispanics.

Back to Basics?

Admittedly, trying to define "functional illiteracy," as Theodore Roosevelt said in another context, is like "trying to nail currant jelly to the wall." Yet something is clearly amiss when even school children complain that the schools are too soft. According to a 1978 Gallup Poll, 57.5 percent of elementary-school students and 44 percent of those in high school felt that school and homework "weren't demanding enough."

The politician's impulse, under pressure, to "do something" may lead him into a briar patch. In 40 states, legislators have sought to prescribe complicated new recipes for "minimum competency" and "proficiency," attempting to satisfy both egalitarians and meritocrats. Almost invariably, they have ended up devising standards that really change nothing. When

*For a dissenting view, see "No Homework: A Student's Right!" by Jerry F. Kotour, in Education Digest, May 1978. Kotour, learning coordinator at Orchard Ridge Middle School in Madison, Wisconsin, reports that many teachers have concluded that homework "not only deprived students of their 'free time' but added a great deal of unnecessary work for themselves. And, by not giving homework, teachers have found that student attitudes toward school work improve."
most of a school district's children fail one set of competency tests, as they did recently in Baltimore, the solution is to name a new commission to replace it with another, more palatable test. If that doesn't happen, the courts may step in. Thus, Florida's minimum competency test was voided last July by a federal judge, who found the exam "valid and reliable" but also "racially biased."

In reaction to middle-class parents' complaints about a lack of rigor, school bureaucrats have here and there created "back-to-basics" programs or special "fundamental schools," both harking back to a simple, golden era (which never was). The back-to-basics "movement," which originated in the small town of Lagunitas, California, in 1972 and is promoted by numerous groups throughout the country, claims to have inspired fundamental schools in 21 states. "Basics" does not mean a return to a 19th-century classical education—there is no sudden resurgence of interest in logic, Latin, or versification—but instead heavy doses of discipline, patriotism, and the "three Rs." In essence, the basics movement springs from a nostalgic mood that periodically sweeps the nation; it incorporates no substantive educational philosophy.

Tracing Failure to Success

Some critics of the basics approach, despairing of broader reform, have joined specialized lobbies—the Council for Exceptional Children, the Association for the Gifted—and so champion the neglected subgroup of their choice. Partly as a result, children are now screened and sorted by educators into categories for special attention under ever more exotic labels: "pre-delinquent," "pseudo-hyperkinetic," "dysgraphic," "agnosic."

Other educators care less about particular kinds of students than about particular kinds of "useful" or "relevant" courses. The curriculum groans under their demands: We have career education, sex education, health education, nutrition education, death education, leisure education, and courses in wilderness survival and mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. All of them are

Diane Divoky, 40, a writer for the Sacramento (Calif.) Bee, was born in Cleveland, Ohio, and received a B.A. from Trinity College in Washington, D.C. (1961) and an M.A. from Harvard (1965). She has taught in public, private, and parochial schools and from 1965 to 1967 was education editor of the Boston Herald. From 1972 to 1979, she was an editor at Learning Magazine. Her books include The Rights of Students (1972, with Alan H. Levine) and The Myth of the Hyperactive Child (1975, with Peter Schrag).
competing for a place on the classroom menu. And the competition can be fierce. Howard D. Mehlinger, a professor at Indiana University, has described one (unidentified) school where the "teachers' guide" to English and social studies begins:

In the 10th grade, study is concentrated on the growth of democracy, and especially on the form of government which developed. Such a study should be brief and to the point in order to allow time for the unit on driver education.

During the ups-and-downs of the last 20 years, school administrators have proved themselves to be adaptable, flexible, \textit{au courant}, concerned. Implacable in their open-mindedness, willing to try all solutions to any problem, they now seem to puzzle over why they appear to have accomplished less as they have sought to do more and more.

A "crisis in the schools" is not a new phenomenon. Articles in education journals routinely begin with italicized citations bemoaning declining standards, lax discipline, and rotting skills. "Sound like 1979?" the author asks. "In fact, it's from a study conducted in 1949." Or 1929. Or 1900. Sometimes the problems have been overcome; sometimes they have not. Sometimes the solutions have created problems of their own. Some of today's problems may stem from a "victory" two decades ago.

During the 1950s, when the "rising tide" of postwar Baby-Boom kids started entering school at the rate of 4 million a year, twice the wartime rate, split classroom sessions and crowded buildings became a fact of life. TV commentator Edward R. Murrow lamented that the United States had become a "have-not" nation ("We have not enough teachers... We have not 340,000 classrooms..."). The problem was clear, the solution obvious.

We passed the bond issues, poured the foundations, put up the walls, pump-primed the technique-minded teachers colleges—in short, made the system bigger fast. The number of teachers grew from less than 1 million in 1950 to 2.3 million in 1970, as America's per-pupil spending on schools doubled. In the midst of expansion, when the Russians boosted Sputnik I into orbit in 1957, many Americans echoed \textit{U.S. News & World Report} ("What Went Wrong in U.S. Schools?") and were eager to play catch-up in quality as well as quantity. The brain race of that era—which essentially meant teaching science, math, and foreign languages faster and better to more bright boys (there was no call for women engineers)—seemed just another expression of
THE AMERICAN TEACHER: A PROFILE

There are 2.2 million teachers in U.S. public schools, half of them in small towns or rural areas, the other half divided about equally between suburb and city. Teacher salaries vary by region. While the average U.S. teacher earned $14,244 in 1978 (less than the average policeman or fireman), the average salary in Mississippi was $11,150, and teachers in New York City received $18,600. (The differential reflects the higher formal credentials of New York teachers as well as their higher costs of living.)

Americans continue to rate teachers highly in public opinion polls and in the voting booth: Of the 55,000 teachers who ran for local office last year, 80 percent were elected. State and local education officials, however, are burdened by incompetent teachers who occasionally attract considerable publicity—and are almost impossible to fire. (Of the 239 teachers New York State sought to dismiss in 1977-78, only 18 actually lost their jobs.) Some school districts, notably Dallas, are now giving standardized tests to candidates for teaching positions to weed out the incompetent before contracts are signed.

The loss of experienced teachers may be more serious than the presence of bad ones. Teachers’ median age and number of “years in teaching” are declining, indicating a higher dropout rate. Classroom violence, red tape, and lack of support from administrators take their toll, especially in big city schools. When the National Education Association asked its members in 1976 if they would choose teaching as a career if they could do it all over again, only 37 percent said they “certainly would,” down from 52 percent a decade earlier.

America’s love of “bigger and better.” In 1958, when Congress passed the National Defense Education Act, the U.S. Office of Education budget doubled. For the first time, the federal government was in the school business in a big way.

The speedy, effective response to both the Baby Boom and Sputnik left a lasting psychological impression on teachers and policymakers alike. By the early 1960s, confidence in the schools to accomplish any mission that society might assign it—be it helping win the Cold War or ending racial strife—was abnormally high. There was a bullish sense that if education could

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*Under the impact of Sputnik, the proportion of college-bound high-school students studying a modern foreign language rose from 20 percent (1957) to 24 percent (1965). But the all-time high—36 percent—was reached in 1915. A precise figure for 1978 is not available, but by all accounts it will not exceed 15 percent. Interestingly, it now appears that Russia’s Sputnik “triumph” was largely illusory; Soviet technology lagged far behind that of the United States. See Leonid Vladimirov, *The Russian Space Bluff*, London: Stacey, 1971.*
erase our perceived lag in science, it could erase our social ills as well. Never mind that serious books, such as Evan Hunter’s harrowing Blackboard Jungle (1954), had already disputed that notion. When the civil rights movement appeared on the national scene, few educators doubted that providing equal opportunity and social uplift for blacks, Hispanics, and the poor was one of their responsibilities. And politicians fell over themselves to endorse that belief. “The answer for all our national problems,” said President Lyndon Johnson, “comes to a single word. That word is education.”

Education had always been a central concern in the United States, a path to economic opportunity for the poor, the crucible of assimilation for the vast waves of immigrants arriving in the 19th and early 20th centuries. But during the 1960s, the claims for education became excessive. If the federal government
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

would only put up the money—as indeed it did during 1965–69, the peak years of Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society”—the schools would finish the job: integrate sparring social groups, compensate for past inequalities, boost the have-nots to a better life. “Upward Bound,” “Higher Horizons,” “Headstart,” and all the other pioneer “compensatory” education programs of the mid-1960s, with their upbeat names and their common assumption that a couple of years of educational tinkering and a couple of billion dollars from Washington would turn disadvantaged youngsters into middle-class achievers, seem incredibly naive in retrospect. But what must be remembered is how deeply educators believed—and were encouraged to believe—that they could cope with any social challenge rapidly and efficiently.

The first tremors of doubt—doubt that “more of the same” was enough—could be felt just as the 89th Congress set the Great Society programs into place, once again doubling the federal education budget. The assault came first from a group of writers—Paul Goodman (Growing Up Absurd), Edgar Z. Friedenberg (Coming of Age in America), John Holt (How Children Fail), Jonathan Kozol (Death at an Early Age)—most of them more or less radical teachers and social critics. As the United States drifted into the Vietnam War, as conditions for many blacks in the inner city failed to improve, these “New Romantics” called America’s values into question—and especially the role of the schools in forming and perpetuating those values. They did not doubt that the schools could change society; but they insisted that the schools must be changed first.

These writers and others attacked the schools as deadening institutions that taught a mindless subservience to authority, encouraged competition that pitted child against child, and stuffed students full of useless facts instead of nurturing their abilities to think and, above all, feel. “Children are subject peoples,” wrote John Holt in How Children Fail (1964), adding:

School for them is a kind of jail. . . . We encourage children to act stupidly, not only by scaring and confusing them, but by boring them, by filling up their days with dull, repetitive tasks that make little or no claim on their attention or demands on their intelligence. Our hearts leap for joy at the sight of a roomful of children all slogging away at some imposed task . . .

Teachers were stung by such criticism and, perhaps, attracted by the Rousseauean simplicity of the proposed remedies. If rigid instruction was a barrier to curiosity, then loosen the
reins. Before long, the rhetoric, if not the reality, of open classrooms, free schools (with no fixed curriculum), "self-paced" instruction, and "affective" education was visited on the schools—first in the suburbs, where people were more trendy and prosperity reigned; then in the cities, nourished with "seed money" from such philanthropic foundations as Ford and Carnegie. As time went on, superintendents of schools in rural Indiana or North Dakota boasted of their innovations and alternatives, even gave tours of the rooms where pillows and rugs and hamster cages had replaced the rigid rows of maple desks.

Day Care Extended

Administrators may have known that many of the changes were merely cosmetic, but many teachers took the complaints to heart and tried earnestly to keep abreast of the (latest) new wave. As sociologist Christopher Jencks has pointed out in Working Papers (July–August 1978), teachers, in their role as colonial administrators, have always made accommodations to keep the natives happy, have used "bread and circuses" to ease tensions. But in the past, such concessions were generally coupled with the inner conviction that there were nevertheless bodies of knowledge—history, Latin, math, English—worth teaching and worth learning, whether or not a teacher had any real enthusiasm for the subject he taught. Amid the turbulence of the late 1960s, Jencks contends, all that changed:

There seemed to be so many competing interpretations of reality that it was hard to defend one to the exclusion of others. This led not only students but many teachers into the kind of spongy cultural relativism that treats all ideas as equally defensible. But if all ideas are equally defensible, none is worth bothering with.

For the many teachers who had long taught a certain set of novels or social studies "units" only because that was what the local school board decreed—teachers who did not in fact believe that Shakespeare or the U.S. Constitution could be exciting or relevant—the challenges of the 1960s were particularly unnerving. When students asked for "relevance" or "honesty" or "excitement," educators found it easier to throw out the staples in favor of what might amuse or appease, rather than defend the traditional curriculum. Milton and Wordsworth were often replaced by the lyrics of Bob Dylan, essay writing by film criticism, history by courses with names like "Social Concerns
THE “TOP TEN” SCHOOLS--
IN NATIONAL MERIT SCHOLARSHIPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
<th>Student/Teacher Ratio</th>
<th>1978 Semifinalists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phillips Exeter*</td>
<td>Exeter, N.H.</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>8:1</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuyvesant</td>
<td>New York, N.Y.</td>
<td>2,762</td>
<td>N.A</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronx Science</td>
<td>New York, N.Y.</td>
<td>3,320</td>
<td>22:1</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evanston Township</td>
<td>Evanston, Ill.</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>14:1</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. J. Reynolds</td>
<td>Winston-Salem, N.C.</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>22:1</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walt Whitman</td>
<td>Bethesda, Md.</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>30:1</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Franklin</td>
<td>New Orleans, La.</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>24:1</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarsdale</td>
<td>Scarsdale, N.Y.</td>
<td>1,709</td>
<td>14:4:1</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phillips Academy*</td>
<td>Andover, Mass.</td>
<td>1,166</td>
<td>14:1</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaker Heights</td>
<td>Shaker Hts., Ohio</td>
<td>1,677</td>
<td>15:1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Private School

Source: National Merit Scholarship Corporation and staff interviews.

What makes a good school good? The 10 high schools with the most semifinalists in the 1978 National Merit Scholarship test—a nationwide exam given to high-school juniors—differ greatly in size, ethnic composition, and median SAT scores.

But the similarities are even more striking. All assign “heavy” amounts of homework, and all have little faculty turnover and low student-teacher ratios. All kept their basic curricula more or less intact during the 1960s. Half the schools choose their students by means of tough exams and/or admissions procedures. The other half are selective by accident: They are located in prosperous suburbs where many parents are college graduates and most care deeply about their children’s education. “Our community regards success as an ordinary activity,” explains C. A. Zimmerman, the principal of Shaker Heights High School.

At each of the top 10, students and teachers share a distinctive esprit. “Traditionally, R. J. Reynolds has been a super high school,” says its principal, Robert D. Deaton. Money can’t buy that feeling. A recent study—Fifteen Thousand Hours: Secondary Schools and Their Effects on Children, by Michael Rutter et al. (Harvard, 1979)—suggests that the “spirit” of a school, fostered by a strong principal and strong teachers, can make the difference between success and failure, even in slum areas.

Does Exeter’s “timeless vision” (as its catalog puts it) account for its No. 1 ranking? An admissions dean at rival Andover thought not. Students taking the National Merit Test, he sniffed, compete only against other students in their state, and New Hampshire has a notoriously poor public school system.
CHANGING PATTERN OF INTEGRATION IN U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minorities 0-49%</th>
<th>50-89%</th>
<th>90-100%</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racially integrated</td>
<td>Predominantly minority</td>
<td>Racially isolated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BLACKS</td>
<td>HISPANICS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100%      0           100%


Hispanic students are increasingly attending "racially isolated" schools (above); the situation for blacks is slowly improving, except in the Northeast. Parents' worries a decade ago over poor facilities and teachers have given way to different concerns (below).

SCHOOL PROBLEMS MOST CITED BY PARENTS
("What do you think are the biggest problems with which the public schools in this community must deal?")

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public school parents</th>
<th>Parochial school parents</th>
<th>No children in school</th>
<th>National total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discipline</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finances</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor curriculum</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor teachers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of facilities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1879–1979: A HISTORICAL SUMMARY

<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total public school</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enrollment (1,000s)*</td>
<td>9,867</td>
<td>25,678</td>
<td>25,434</td>
<td>36,087</td>
<td>45,619</td>
<td>43,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursery, K-8 (1,000s)</td>
<td>9,757</td>
<td>21,279</td>
<td>18,833</td>
<td>27,602</td>
<td>32,597</td>
<td>24,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent of population</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aged 5–17 in public schools</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total nonpublic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>school enrollment (1,000s)*</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>2,651</td>
<td>2,611</td>
<td>5,675</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>5,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Catholic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>school enrollment (1,000s)*</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>2,464</td>
<td>2,396</td>
<td>5,253</td>
<td>4,658</td>
<td>3,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public high school</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>graduates (1,000s)*</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>1,143</td>
<td>1,627</td>
<td>2,589</td>
<td>2,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent of all</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-year olds graduated from all high schools</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>75.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pupils per teacher†</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in public schools*</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average length of</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>school term (days)</td>
<td>130.3</td>
<td>172.7</td>
<td>175.0</td>
<td>178.0</td>
<td>178.9</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*elementary and secondary day schools
†includes librarians and other nonsupervisory personnel


The average pupil-teacher ratio in public schools has declined by almost one-half over the last century. The school year has grown by two months. The proportion of students graduating from high school crested at 75.7 percent in 1969. As the data make clear, demographic declines are nothing new; the birth rate dropped sharply during the 1930s' Great Depression, with a predictable effect on enrollments.
for Today.” If one didn’t really know what was important to learn, then it didn’t matter what one taught.

Besides, a glossy, packaged kit called “Focus on Self-Development” made the hour between 10:00 A.M. and 11:00 A.M. go faster for teacher and pupils than grammar or spelling ever had. In wealthier school districts, technology provided new toys: computers, “audio-visual” machines, closed-circuit TV. The school library became a “multi-media resource center.”

By the early 1970s, unquestioning acceptance of the old curriculum had given way to mindless New Approaches under which often the only criterion was what might entertain both student and teacher. In the process, whatever academic rigor and discipline the schools had been held to in the past faded. To avoid complaints, students were automatically promoted from one grade to the next, ready or not. The longer-term effects were somebody else’s worry. Many schools’ purposes were, in fact, no longer so much educational as custodial—a kind of extended day care system, even in middle-class suburbs.

The kids were the first to smell the difference, to sense that the game had changed. At education conferences, perceptive teachers began to talk about the “faintly hostile boredom” they were encountering in the classroom—the new, easy defiance and facile cynicism of those who would once have been enthusiastic, model students. What the teachers seldom understood was that these new attitudes were a direct response to the shakiness at the center, among the teachers and administrators.

The loss of nerve at the front of the classroom, and in the depths of the educational bureaucracy, got few headlines until the mid-1970s when it was evidenced in lower student SAT scores, and even in a few (unsuccessful) lawsuits brought on behalf of children against their schools for “educational malpractice.” By then, the schools were beleaguered on all fronts.

First, bit by bit, researchers began to confirm what some already suspected: The Great Society school programs designed to remedy the effects of poverty were not working, at least not at the fast clip at which Americans had come to believe they could solve their problems. For example, it turned out that the significant gains achieved with preschool children in Headstart, the darling of the compensatory movement, were washed out by second or third grade.9

A second blow came when faith in integration, as both an

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9The most comprehensive survey of the plusses and minuses of compensatory education programs is the $15 million National Institute of Education Compensatory Education Study (1978), available from the National Institute of Education.
educational and social tool, lost ground. Putting white and black children together in the same classroom—hailed in the 1966 "Coleman Report" as having an almost magically positive educational effect on minority children, as well as social benefits for whites—proved to be costly, complicated, and, at any rate, no panacea for educational problems. Sociologist James Coleman himself recanted last year: "What once appeared to be fact," he conceded, "is now known to be fiction." With the decline of many liberals' high hopes for integration has come a dimming of the time-honored ideal of the "common school," that place where children of all backgrounds could come together to earn their place in American society.

Meanwhile, the numbers began to diminish. Educators employ a variety of wooden euphemisms—"reappraisal," "decline"—to refer to a trend that began in 1971 with the abrupt loss of 500,000 children from U.S. schools. With the end of America's Baby Boom, the school-age population began to shrink fast. At first, administrators viewed the situation as a simple problem that a few adjustments—such as reducing the number of prospective teachers in the pipeline—would fix. Some optimists predicted more money for fewer children. Others saw an eventual decrease in the tax burden.

Burdens and Blessings

Of course, with the rise in average teacher salaries (from $8,840 in 1969 to $14,244 last year) and an inflation rate that halves the value of a dollar every decade, the end of the Baby Boom has meant none of these things. As total enrollment in public schools has dropped by 2 million since 1971—with the prospect of a net 4 million loss by 1985—the cost of running the schools has risen dramatically, some 56 percent between 1971 and 1976.\(^a\)

Retrenchment means laying off teachers, closing neighborhood schools, and creating bad blood among all parties. A "reduction in force" (or RIF, as teacher layoffs are called) has become an annual rite in many communities. Districts are gen-

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\(^a\) What happens to the school age population after 1985 is anyone's guess, since children who will begin school that year have yet to be born. The Baby-Boom bulge passed through elementary school in 1971, through high school in 1975. A new upturn in the number of births began in 1976, as the huge postwar generation began bearing children of its own. It is impossible to predict the size of this demographic "echo." Because the effects of birth-rate decline are compounded (or negated) by migration—families are moving away from the industrialized "frostbelt" states—it is likely that local enrollment patterns will vary widely for the remainder of this century. See "The Ups and Downs of Education" by Hazel H. Reinhardt, in American Demographics, June 1979.
COMPETING WITH THE SCHOOLS

Defenders of the public schools often cite "outside" factors as the source of current classroom difficulties—parental neglect, a general disrespect for authority, and, above all, television. In a recent speech, author-critic Clifton Fadiman suggested that TV is only part of a broader problem. Excerpts:

The idea of education was never before opposed by a competitor. It was taken for granted because no alternative appeared on the horizon. But today there is a complete "alternate life" to which children submit themselves.

The alternate life is the consequence of the communication revolution. It is a highly competitive educational system, opposed in almost every essential way to traditional schooling. This system is the linked structure of which television is the heart and which numbers among its constituents film, radio, comic books, pop music, sports.

This alternate life is a life; it is not a diversion. It takes up as much of a child's time as school does, and it works on him with far greater effectiveness. It offers its own [contrasting] disciplines, its own curriculum, its own ethical and cultural values, its own style and language.

And this competition, [teachers] are not trained to meet. The alternate life has one special psychological effect [on children] which handicaps the teacher: a decline in the faculty of attention, and therefore a decline in the capacity to learn. Television's great attraction is that it does the work for you, skillfully and systematically.

Generally required to send "pink slips" to teachers the spring before the ax will fall. Because districts can't see that far ahead, they often overestimate the losses and RIF too many teachers. Last spring, for example, San Francisco school officials RIF'd every teacher hired since 1968. Teachers are invariably hit harder than administrators. In Springfield, Illinois, during the last two years, the number of teachers in all public schools declined by 7.5 percent; the number of administrators actually grew by 6.7 percent.

School closings, a new phenomenon in American education, can be divisive and traumatic. Since 1970, more than 2,800 public schools have been closed nationwide, with the rate of shutdowns increasing. Maryland's Prince George's County has closed 25 schools; San Francisco has lost 32. Particularly for suburban systems, school closings seem to set off a kind of midlife crisis. People in the cities have by now become accustomed,
perhaps inured, to decay; their schools have been in turmoil for two decades and longer. The newer suburbs, however, were built in the 1950s expressly as places to raise and educate children; the realization that a community has aged, that its social mix has changed (more singles, more elderly people), and that it has, on average, 10 percent fewer of the young families with children for which it was designed, comes hard.

As a larger and larger proportion of the citizenry, by virtue of age or decisions not to have children, does not have offspring in school, the support that the schools can expect from the public grows more and more tenuous. The success of Proposition 13, the 1978 “ballot initiative” that cut California property taxes in half, was an angry vote against soaring levies and fat bureaucracy; but it was also a vote against expensive services, mainly schools, that primarily benefit young families and children. Somewhere down the line, there are embarrassing questions to ask about the values of a community that does not see children as its chief burden and blessing, about whether such a place is a community at all.

No one any longer expects our schools to revamp society, but selfishness is not the way to help the schools rise to meet our lowered expectations. We may need a collective largeness of spirit. For all their rhetorical excesses, the radical reformers of the mid-1960s had a point: Schools in America reinforce the values of the society at large. And the values of that larger society currently suffer from a certain confusion. By putting the entire burden of reform on the schools, as Frances Fitzgerald has pointed out in America Revised, we are saying in effect: “Let us be saved by the next generation.” The real question today is whether the current generation of adults can save the next one.
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION

by Joel S. Berke

The main hearing room of the House Education and Labor Committee in Washington—Rayburn 2175—has a 30-foot ceiling, a two-tiered mahogany rostrum seating 36 committee members, and gold carpet covering its auditorium-sized floor. But it is not so big that proceedings there cannot be dominated by Representative Carl Perkins (D-Ky.), with his quiet, slow voice, his whispered asides to his experienced staff, and his wisdom in the ways of Congress. When the committee convenes to deliberate on the fate of such laws as Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, school administrators, teachers, and politicians around the country pay close attention.

Title I, which is worth $3 billion every year, is the largest single federal subsidy to education. The money is targeted at below-average pupils in high-poverty areas, and it is distributed among school districts via the states according to a complicated formula that purports to identify just where those disadvantaged children are. The formula is based primarily on “poverty counts” culled from 1970 Census data, and, as a result, “poor” Southern states get a relatively large piece of the Title I pie, while “rich” Northern and Midwestern states get less.

The formula is the key. Even modest tinkering with it can shift millions of dollars from one state to another. Thus, when the formula expired last year, Congressmen from the Midwest and North, regions slighted by the out-of-date figures, pinned their hopes on a new $10 million report from the Census Bureau and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The study updated the 1970 census numbers and underlined the growing prosperity of the “New South” and Sunbelt regions, the declining economies of the industrial Northeast and Frostbelt. At the first opportunity, a group of committee members, led by Representative William Ford (D-Mich.), the second highest ranking member, successfully amended the formula in committee to utilize the updated figures. But Chairman Perkins, a firm friend of Title I, is an even firmer friend of his home district. With the
quiet support of the Carter administration, the chairman, backed by a coalition of like-minded Congressmen, reversed the initial vote, and retained the 10-year-old 1970 census as the principal basis for allocating Title I funds, thus keeping the old beneficiaries, including Kentucky, happy.

Leavening good educational intentions with hard-ball politics is not peculiar to Capitol Hill. Public education is big business everywhere and the stakes are high—for rural building contractors bidding on a new central school, for city school boards hoping to avoid teacher strikes, for entire states facing court orders to change the ways they have customarily paid for education. Local, state, and federal governments spent $86 billion last year on public elementary and secondary schools. Only the armed forces consume more tax dollars; yet, with 3.9 million full-time employees on their payrolls—teachers, janitors, librarians, guidance counselors, administrators, secretaries—the public schools top even the military in manpower.

Who Calls the Shots?

If public education is big, it is not monolithic. No single group in American society pays for it, benefits from it, or controls it. No one unit of government has complete responsibility for it. The buck, so to speak, doesn’t stop anywhere. As Rufus Miles, a Princeton professor and a former assistant secretary of HEW, has put it: “Where you stand depends on where you sit.”

If you are one of the 100,000 Americans sitting on local boards of education, you probably feel put upon by outsiders of every stripe: Washington bureaucrats, state legislators, unhappy teachers, aggrieved parents, the courts. School boards, though no longer as powerful as they were in the late 19th century, are generally still responsible for hiring and firing of personnel, for putting a budget together, and—to the extent that they can avoid violating a variety of state or federal mandates—

48 STATES' PER CAPITA SPENDING ON EDUCATION, 1976–77


Spending, per capita, on each state’s public schools varies significantly (not shown: Alaska, $1,072; Hawaii, $534). On average, these outlays represent about 5.5 percent of all total personal income in each state.

for setting the curriculum. The nation’s 15,000 school boards and their jurisdictions come in all sizes. Chicago’s 11-member board presides over the business of 500 schools, while South Dakota, until the late 1960s, had more school board members than teachers. (Hawaii is the only state that eschews local school boards and runs its entire educational system from a central office.)

Given the rate of turnover and the part-time nature of school-board membership, local school administrators usually turn out to be the powers behind the throne. School board meetings typically amount to approval of a set of proposals put together by the superintendent of schools and his professional staff. Moreover, by law, school boards exist entirely at the pleasure of the state.

Until recently, state education agencies were the lightweights of school politics, and with few exceptions simply comprised a confused assortment of “information-gathering” bureaus. Recently, however, state agencies have found them-
selves in the thick of controversy: notably over busing, graduation requirements, and school finances. The states serve as conduits of federal aid. And, in a dozen states, a new breed of vigorous state school chief has taken the helm—people like Gregory Anrig in Massachusetts and Wilson Riles in California. Reflecting these developments, and the growth of federal aid programs, between 1964 and 1976 the total personnel of education agencies in all 50 states grew from 11,000 to 22,000. (One-third, of them, however, are paid from the U.S. Treasury.)

Education Grab Bag

State education agencies do not have the field to themselves. Former U.S. Commissioner of Education Ernest Boyer has observed that education is increasingly perceived as “too important to be left to the educators.” Under pressure from parents and various “public-interest” lobbies, state legislators are increasingly taking certain educational matters into their own hands, imposing high school graduation requirements and statewide competency tests. Since the mid-1970s, they have generally taken a “What are we getting for our money?” attitude toward the schools.

And then there are the federal and state courts—the most publicized entrants in the educational policy game. Contending with 100-year-old state constitutions, mountains of statistical evidence, and the often conflicting testimony of dozens of expert witnesses, judges have had to hand down rulings on everything from school finance to desegregation. They have, in effect, taken on the “hot” issues that legislators prefer to avoid. They are not universally applauded.

Generally speaking, the federal government steps into the public education scene with programs to enforce civil rights and improve the education of minorities or the underprivileged. Except for “Impact Aid”—which was primarily designed to compensate local districts for the presence of children whose parents live on federal property (and hence may not pay local property taxes)—federal education money is targeted at carefully defined groups and purposes: handicapped, bilingual, or migrant children, for example.2

There are well over 100 aid programs administered by the

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2 Bilingual education is one of the fastest growing, and most controversial, federal programs. Launched by Congress in 1968 with a modest $7.5 million, the effort to teach children in their “native” language instead of primarily or exclusively in English, now claims $157 million from Washington alone; 20 states have set up their own bilingual programs. About 80 percent of the 320,000 children enrolled are of Hispanic origin.
U.S. Office of Education, and these represent less than half of all federal funds for education. The Department of Agriculture runs the school lunch and breakfast programs (for 29 million children). "Headstart" is administered by the Office of Human Development, which is part of HEW but not of the Office of Education (which is also part of HEW). Schools on Indian reservations are run by the Department of Interior. This grab bag is mirrored in Congress, where 28 committees and subcommittees, ranging from the Senate Committee on Alcohol and Drug Abuse to the House Judiciary Committee, have "oversight" over various educational activities.

Not surprisingly, then, education politics in Washington involves quiet alliances among bureaucrats (who want to expand their programs), their client constituencies (who want to keep their congressional funding), and interested politicians (who want to do both). As in the politics of agriculture, defense, or welfare, such "iron triangles" are often impervious to the influence of Presidents, cabinet secretaries, and congressional leaders—as Jimmy Carter recently found out.

Serrano and Beyond

Carter's campaign promise—winning him the support of the powerful teachers union, the National Education Association—was to bring all of the federal education programs together into a single, cabinet-level Department of Education. It was a noble scheme. Headstart, a program for poor children that the President had personally penciled into the proposed department, was the first to wriggle free after a well-organized campaign spearheaded by the Children's Defense Fund. The Fund argued that the program's autonomy was essential to its effectiveness. The school lunch program was the next to go. This time the campaign was led by the Senate Agriculture Committee, which indicated that it wanted the program left right where it was, thank you. By the time the dust had settled, the proposed Education Department looked just like the old Office of Education, which it was supposed to replace.

For an overall view of just how this complicated system of "governance" manages to function, it is best to look at a single issue that cuts across every level of education politics. One such issue is financing.

Currently, all levels of government help foot the U.S. education bill. On average, local governments shoulder about 44 percent of the burden, state governments 48 percent. The federal government covers the remaining 8 percent. Life does not oper-
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

THE FINANCES OF THREE SCHOOL DISTRICTS, 1977–78:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REVENUES (per pupil)</th>
<th>Macon County, Ala.</th>
<th>Oakland, Calif.</th>
<th>Lower Merion, Pa.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income</td>
<td>$2,775</td>
<td>$5,491</td>
<td>$10,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School enrollment</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>53,221</td>
<td>8,472</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Per pupil revenues:**

- **All local taxes:** $51, $1,243, $2,280
- **State government:** 610, 726, 153
- **Total federal aid:** (270), (200), (31)
  - **Impact aid:** 30, 18, 0
  - **Elementary and Secondary Education Act:** 113, 91, 18
  - **School lunch/milk:** 114, 76, 13
  - **Other federal aid:** 13, 15, 0

**Miscellaneous:** 71, 182, 186

**Total (per pupil):** $1,002, $2,351, $2,650

Where a school’s money comes from—and where it goes—is a matter of circumstance. Alabama’s Macon County is a depressed rural area with no industry and little good farming. Industrial Oakland’s system is steadily losing pupils to private schools; like Macon, it relies heavily on federal and state funds. Suburban Lower Merion, outside Philadelphia, foots most of its budget on averages, however, and neither do the states. In New Hampshire, local communities pay 85 percent of their school costs; the state provides less than 10 percent. In Hawaii, the proportions are reversed. Similarly, the federal bounty is unevenly distributed under more than 100 programs, with Sunbelt states generally doing better than the Frostbelt states.*

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*Mississippi, New Mexico, Louisiana, Hawaii, and Arkansas all count on the federal government for more than 15 percent of their education budgets; New Jersey, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, New York, and Nevada, less than 5 percent. Most federal aid to education (in 1979) falls under the following programs: Title I, $3.078 billion; handicapped, $977 million; school assistance to federally affected areas (Impact Aid), $816 million; Vocational and Adult Education, $774 million; Emergency School Aid Act (desegregation), $332 million.

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Despite such diversity, one basic trend is apparent: While the average federal share since 1967 has remained about constant at 8 percent, the average state share has grown by almost 8 percent, and the average local share has shrunk by the same amount.

Why? The primary reason is really one of equity. Ever since Elwood P. Cubberley’s historic analysis, School Funds and Their Apportionment (1905), school administrators and politicians have known that heavy reliance on property taxes to pay for schools leads to gross disparities in school quality from one district to the next. When Cubberley looked at Connecticut’s seven
poorest and seven wealthiest towns in 1905, he found that the rich communities taxed themselves at a rate of about $2.75 per every $1,000 of assessed property value; the rate in poorer communities was $4.37. Yet, while poor districts taxed themselves more, they still generated 20 percent less revenue per pupil than the wealthy districts. The situation in that regard had not changed a whit by 1977. The poorest Connecticut towns had a tax rate twice as high as the richest towns, but they ended up generating $500 less per pupil.

Similarly, in California, the difference between schools in Beverly Hills and Baldwin Park was more than just a half-hour ride on the freeway. In 1970, the parents of John Serrano, a pupil in one of California’s poorer school districts, filed a class-action suit challenging the state’s school financing system. A year later, the state supreme court, in *Serrano v. Priest*, ruled that the system, with its heavy reliance on local property taxes, had denied Johnny Serrano the equal protection of the laws. "Affluent districts,” wrote Justice Raymond L. Sullivan for the court in a 6 to 1 decision, “can have their cake and eat it too: They can provide a high quality education . . . while paying lower taxes. Poor districts, by contrast, have no cake at all.” Facing court orders, or hoping to forestall judicial intervention, nearly half of the 50 states have changed their school financing since *Serrano*.

Do dollars really make a difference? The 1966 “Coleman Report” (*Equality of Educational Opportunity*) suggested that such “variables” as school facilities, type of curriculum, classroom size, and so on had far less relationship to how pupils performed than did students’ socioeconomic characteristics—family background, poverty, race, parents’ educational level. However, more recent studies suggest that school services do in fact have a strong positive relationship to learning, and that many of these services directly reflect a school district’s spending.† Because exurban Princeton, New Jersey, has a two-to-one advantage in revenues over nearby Paterson, for example, it can hire 50 percent more teachers for the same number of students.

*Minnesota, Kansas, New Jersey, Connecticut, New York, Washington, West Virginia, and Colorado were ordered by courts to change their financing systems. Florida, Illinois, Texas, Arizona, Michigan, North Dakota, New Mexico, Iowa, Ohio, Maine, Wisconsin, Indiana, Utah, Montana, and South Carolina acted in the absence of legal decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court, in *Rodriguez v. San Antonio* (1973) declined by a vote of 5 to 4 to impose a nationwide ruling similar to *Serrano*.

It wasn't only *Serrano* that nibbled away at California's reliance on property taxes to support the schools; it was also Proposition 13, the 1978 rollback of the state's property taxes to 1 percent of assessed value. In the spirit of Proposition 13, some states—Colorado, New Jersey, and Tennessee—have adopted "fiscal limitation" bills aimed not so much at curbing local property taxes as at putting a ceiling on state spending. Even as states shoulder more of the school burden, the growth in spending on schools is slowing down. In the 1960s, total expenditures on schools grew by an annual average rate of 10.6 percent across the nation; in the last three years, it has averaged only 7.4 percent. As the effects of fiscal limitations are felt, the growth may slow even more. And even as the size of the pot shrinks, the stakes get higher, the contending pressures become fiercer.

The Fight of the Century

Among the key forces here are the teachers—organized into the 1.8-million-member National Education Association and the smaller (520,000) but faster growing American Federation of Teachers. Trying to keep up with inflation, the two unions have stoutly resisted school boards' proposals to reduce teachers' perquisites or curb pay increases. The unions often can muster superior expertise. When a strike threatens, the union local can call in a negotiating team from headquarters as well as a public relations agent, a budget analyst, and contract specialists. All told, there were 176 teacher strikes in 1978-79, compared to 9 in 1964—a fair measure of the increase in teacher militancy.

The federal government also pushes up costs. In order to qualify for any federal subsidies, school districts have to meet accompanying requirements, such as those of the 1975 Aid to Handicapped Children Act. This act required that all states provide handicapped children with a "free and appropriate public education"—which meant not only ramps for wheelchairs but also special counseling and therapy. Full compliance will cost at least $8 billion annually, with the federal government contributing only about 12 percent of that amount.

Nor does each dollar from Washington mean one dollar less that the states themselves will have to find. Virtually all of the 100 or so federal education programs contain "maintenance of effort" provisions. That means that if states start cutting back on their education budgets in anticipation of a windfall from Washington, they will lose a proportionate share of their federal aid.

A third force that could push up education costs even fur-
ther is the private schools, whose spokesmen have long been arguing for a share of public education money. About 10 percent (or 5 million) of all U.S. school children are in private, mostly religious schools, and during the last several years, private school administrators have been pressing for direct public support either through tax credits or "pick-your-own-school" voucher plans. Tax credit legislation nearly passed Congress last year and is on the agenda again. A voucher initiative will probably be on the ballot in California next spring. Albert Shanker, president of the American Federation of Teachers, has predicted that stopping such measures will become "the fight of the century" for public-school teachers.

Public school lobbyists fear that letting private schools tap into state and local treasuries, even indirectly, will diminish funds for the public schools. There is also the thorny constitutional issue of the separation of church and state. Lastly, many educators argue, vouchers and similar measures would encourage divisiveness—religious, racial, economic—and undercut the "unifying" aspects of public education. And well they might.

But the fact is that on this issue as on so many others, there is room for honest disagreement. Cooperation and consensus come hard in education because school issues touch both the deepest feelings and highest aspirations of our society. And its financing and governance involve the most basic questions in democratic politics: Who pays? Who benefits? Who controls?

American federalism, it has been written, is a marble cake, not a layer cake—a swirl of contending influences, not a neatly stacked hierarchy of federal, state, and local powers. The politics of education is the ultimate example.
Apart from the Civil War, perhaps no topic has generated more books about America by Americans than education. The two subjects have at least one thing in common—enduring controversy among the specialists.

In Schooled to Order: A Social History of Public Schooling in the United States (Oxford, 1979), David Nasaw sums up the current "radical" critique of education: "Public schools are social institutions dedicated not to meeting the self-perceived needs of their students but to preserving social peace and prosperity within the context of private property and the governmental structures that safeguard it."

School administrators, Nasaw charges, stress vocational education for poor and minority students, while offering academic programs to white middle-class youths.

A sharp counterargument comes from Diane Ravitch in The Revisionists Revised: A Critique of the Radical Attacks on the Schools (Basic Books, 1978). Ravitch contends that lower-income Americans have rightly trusted the schools to improve their children’s prospects for higher economic status. She cites studies (by Stephan Thernstrom and others) indicating that upward mobility has characterized life in America during the last 100 years.

Schools may provide the ticket to a better life, but do they prepare students for the journey? In her thoughtful analysis of changing themes in American history textbooks, America Revised (Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1979), Frances FitzGerald faults most narratives for depicting the world as a place "without malice or stupidity." Pupils who learn bland versions of the past, she suggests, risk feeling "that their own experience of conflict or suffering is unique . . . and perhaps un-American."

Controversy over the purposes of education in a democratic society is not new, as Lawrence A. Cremin’s general histories make clear. The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1879-1957 (Knopf, 1961, cloth; Vintage, 1964, paper) traces the debate over academic rigor versus the "use of the schools to improve the lives of individuals," from the common schools to the launching of Sputnik.

Two giants who helped shape U.S. schools were Horace Mann (1796-1859) and John Dewey (1859-1952).

Known as "the father of the American public school," Horace Mann was a tireless, ever-optimistic reformer. In Horace Mann: A Biography (Knopf, 1972), Jonathan Messerli recounts his broad interests in politics and social uplift. In addition to serving in the Massachusetts legislature and as a U.S. Representative, Mann bitterly opposed slavery and helped establish America’s first state hospital for the insane at Worcester, Mass., in 1833.

In The Life and Mind of John Dewey (Southern Ill., 1973, cloth; 1978, paper), George Dykhuizen demonstrates that Dewey, like Mann, was something of an overachiever. Co-founder, with Charles Sanders Peirce and William James, of the philosophical school of Pragmatism,
his writings had a lasting effect on the disciplines of philosophy, psychology, and pedagogy.

There are books that describe education and books that attempt to change it. During the 1950s, James Bryant Conant took "academic inventories" of American high schools. Many of the Harvard president's recommendations, recorded in The American High School Today: A First Report to Interested Citizens (McGraw-Hill, 1959), have been widely adopted, particularly in the suburbs: third- and fourth-year language courses, tuition-free summer schools, the grouping of students in each subject according to ability.

In 1964, Congress ordered a survey of educational opportunity. Two years later, sociologist James S. Coleman and six fellow researchers issued Equality of Educational Opportunity (Government Printing Office, 1966). They reported on the relationship between students' achievement and the kinds of schools (segregated, integrated, rich, poor) attended. Among their findings: Minority students from poor homes do better in affluent white schools. Their research helped convince the courts to adopt plans for "immediate integration" (i.e., busing).

Two contrary studies followed, headed by Harvard sociologist Christopher Jencks. Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America (Basic Books, 1972, cloth; Harper, 1973, paper) shows that an adult's income is determined primarily by employers' biases and "luck," rather than by family background and the number of years spent in school. "The evidence suggests," the authors contend, "that equalizing educational opportunity would do very little to make adults more equal."

Jencks' second analysis devotes only a few chapters to education's impact on adult Americans' paychecks. Who Gets Ahead? The Determinants of Economic Success in America (Basic Books, 1979), is rigorous, technical, and difficult to read. It reveals, among other things, that the earnings of white- and blue-collar workers are not affected by the quality of primary and secondary education they received.

Various groups in the United States have distrusted the public schools and have attempted to do the job themselves. In Catholic Education in a Changing World (Holt, 1967, cloth; Univ. of Notre Dame, 1969, paper), George N. Shuster notes that in 1840 America's 200 Catholic schools served a missionary function. Later, their role changed. Catholic immigrants saw them as bulwarks of the faith and as guardians of traditional values.

Meanwhile, the sons of both ministers and millionaires went to austere Protestant boarding schools in New England. In The Headmaster: Frank L. Boyden of Deerfield (Farrar, 1966, cloth; 1979, paper), John McPhee superbly describes a man "at the near end of a skein of magnanimous despots." Boyden came to Massachusetts' Deerfield Academy in 1902 and was headmaster for 66 years. McPhee ranks him with other famed Yankee autocrats—Groton's Endicott Peabody, Andover's Alfred Stearns, and Exeter's Lewis Perry.

The poor had to settle for less. According to Henry Allen Bullock in A History of Negro Education in the South: From 1619 to the Present (Harvard, 1967), as late as 1910 there were no black public institutions in the South's segregated school systems that offered even two years of high school. Oddly, neither Bullock
nor any other historian has examined in depth black successes in education below the university level. Black prep schools in the South evolved into colleges. Washington, D.C.'s Dunbar High School, America's first black public high school, was founded in 1870; over an 85-year period, 75 percent of its graduates went on to college.

Unlike the United States, where education is left to the individual states, Britain loosely controls its school system through four separate ministries that answer to Parliament. In Education in England and Wales (Shoe String, 1978), H. C. Dent notes that school principals decide what subjects to teach and which teaching methods to use. Religious instruction is mandatory in primary and secondary schools. Secondary "grammar" schools provide the brightest 20 percent with an academic curriculum leading to final exams, a General Certificate of Education, and, often, a university. The remainder attend technical schools or secondary "modern" or "comprehensive" schools, offering tracks from academic to vocational.

A Common Entrance Examination taken by boys 12 and 14 years old sorts out candidates for entry into the famous "public" (private boarding) schools—e.g., Eton, Harrow, Winchester. In a colorful history, The Old School Tie: The Phenomenon of the English Public School (Viking, 1978), Jonathan Gathorne-Hardy examines these schools' reputations for snobbery, homosexuality, brutality, and solid academic performance.

In Education in Japan: A Century of Modern Development (Government Printing Office, 1975), Ronald S. Anderson notes that students must attend classes from one to two months a year more than their American counterparts; thus by the end of the ninth grade, many have logged nearly two additional years in the classroom. Students go into either academic or vocational programs in high school. "A graduate of the vocational track," writes Anderson, "cannot go on to the university, no matter how promising he may be."

W. D. Halls notes that central control of French schooling predates the 1789 Revolution, in Education, Culture and Politics in Modern France (Pergamon, 1976, paper): "The school is the instrument of the State to promote national feeling...to induce a sense of civic responsibility...to foster loyalty to the regime." The Ministry of National Education in Paris still directs teacher training and dictates all curricula. Thus, for example, at a given hour, all French children at the same grade level will be studying Descartes.

The closest thing America ever had to a national curriculum was McGuffey's Eclectic Readers (7 vols., Van Nostrand reprint, 1978), 100 million copies of which were sold between 1836 and 1900. The Primers were concerned with morals, God, and elocution, as well as with the alphabet, words, and simple sentences. The Fifth and Sixth Readers exposed very young children to Defoe, Shakespeare, Dickens, Emerson, Thoreau, Jefferson. The current faddish nostalgia for the Readers should not be held against them; they were successful in getting generations of American children to read.
Troubles overseas faced FDR soon after his election to the U.S. Presidency in 1932: German Nazism, Italian Fascism, Japanese militarism. Yet, during the Great Depression of the 1930s, isolationist sentiment dominated Congress and the electorate. Roosevelt, always a believer in a strong U.S. role in world politics, was ultimately successful in convincing the American people that freedom and democracy at home were inevitably linked to their fate abroad. He moved cautiously as he prepared the country for World War II—artfully exploiting Americans' sympathies and cultural affinities for embattled Britain. During the 1940 presidential campaign, while pledging to keep the U.S. out of a foreign war, he and Winston Churchill boldly closed a deal that traded 50 overage U.S. destroyers for naval and air bases in seven of Britain's Western Hemisphere possessions.

Dallek, a U.C.L.A. historian, argues that FDR's latter-day critics have underestimated his dilemma before Pearl Harbor as he contemplated both the people's desire to avoid war and their hopes for an Axis defeat. Dallek's balanced analysis leads to a disturbing question: If so masterful a politician as Roosevelt had such difficulty persuading Americans to accept uncomfortable truths, what can we expect from less skillful leaders?

—Stephen Pelz (79)

Most books about war stress battles and military heroics; this World War II diary focuses on the messy side effects. Lewis, a British intelligence officer attached to the U.S. Fifth Army, arrived in Naples a month after the Italian surrender in September 1943. As the fight against the Germans went on to the north, liberated Naples was plagued by
thievery, starvation, prostitution, and perhaps history's biggest black market operation. After years of Fascist rule, city politics underwent a revival, although a corrupt one. It was a Beggars' Opera world in which small criminals sometimes got caught, but big ones usually prospered, with the complicity of local administrators or the Allied troops, who brought much-needed food, clothing, and other essentials. There was no systematic allocation of these supplies among the Neapolitans, giving ample incentive to local politicians and crooks to traffic in stolen goods. War often deposits this sort of chaos in its wake, but rarely does it find so thoughtful a reporter. At one point, Lewis, dining in a restaurant, observes that all the Italian patrons' overcoats were made from stolen U.S. army blankets. His writing is precise and evocative: "Ragged, hawk-eyed boys ... wandered among the tables ready to dive on any crust ... to snatch up left-overs ... I couldn't help noticing the intelligence—almost the intellectuality—of their expressions. No attempt was made to chase them away. They were simply treated as nonexistent."

—Geoffrey Best (’79)

In March 1954, more than 200 Marshall Islanders and the 23-man crew of the Japanese fishing trawler Lucky Dragon suffered classic symptoms of radiation poisoning (nausea, fever, bleeding gums) as a result of a U.S. nuclear bomb test on Bikini Atoll. The blast was part of a U.S. effort to stay ahead in the nuclear arms race, which had accelerated when the Soviet Union detonated its first hydrogen bomb in August 1953. After the Lucky Dragon incident, public debate over atmospheric testing intensified. Divine, a University of Texas historian, gives us a well-documented account. Proponents of an atmospheric test ban included prominent scientists (Linus Pauling) and politicians (Adlai Stevenson). Senior U.S. military men opposed a ban, but they played a minor role in the Washington debate; far more influential in arguing against a ban were Atomic Energy Commis-

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sion chairmen Lewis Strauss and John A. McCone, physicist Edward Teller, and a succession of civilian Secretaries of Defense (including Charles E. Wilson). Strauss & Co. insisted that the risks to health of occasional bomb tests were insignificant compared to the risk of allowing the Soviet Union to gain an edge in the nuclear arms race. Their argument was rejected by President Eisenhower, who recognized the essentially political nature of the issue. In 1958, he began negotiations with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev on a test ban and imposed a moratorium on U.S. atmospheric tests that lasted until 1962. In August 1963, Eisenhower’s successor, John F. Kennedy, signed a limited nuclear test ban treaty in Moscow, barring U.S. and USSR atmospheric testing. It was a prelude to SALT.

—David MacIssac (79)

Does it seem that everyone these days talks about sex? Foucault, a noted French social historian, tries to account for our attitudes about sex and for our public obsession with it. He refutes a traditional hypothesis (put forth by Freud, as well as Marx) that modern industrial societies, particularly during the Victorian era, have increasingly repressed sexuality. Talk about sex (indeed, sex itself), he speculates, was not so much repressed as channeled into a variety of “discourses.” Doctors, psychologists, educators, and sociologists all formed their own distinct vocabularies for describing sexuality. Because of their emphasis on how we talk about it, sexuality entered all aspects of our lives (Foucault calls this the “deployment of sexuality”). Today, many teachers, social scientists, therapists, and other specialists believe that they have lifted curtains of repression surrounding sex. In fact, says Foucault, they have further structured popular attitudes toward sex, thereby shaping behavior. He argues that the constant analysis of sex stems from the West’s continuing obsession with creating systems of knowledge (e.g., psychol-
ogy, sociology) and of control (e.g., legal codes, schooling) of human conduct. He presents here the same kind of challenging heterodoxy that he demonstrated in *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (1965) and *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1978).

—Kurt Lang ('79)

**THE CAJUNS:**

*From Acadia to Louisiana*

by William Faulkner Rushton

Farrar, 1979

342 pp. $15.95

In 1755, more than 18,000 French Acadians inhabited the fertile valleys of maritime Nova Scotia. From the great tides of the Bay of Fundy, their dike had reclaimed 14,000 acres; this rich farm land, supplemented by fishing and grazing, made the colony self-sufficient. Between 1755 and 1760, the British, who had been ceded the Acadian provinces by France after the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–13), rounded up and deported the Acadians—to England’s American colonies, to the West Indies, and to France—because they refused to swear allegiance to the English crown. Barely half of these refugees survived the hazardous sea voyages and shipboard smallpox epidemics. Gradually, however, most of the remaining “Cajuns” (a frontier American corruption of “Acadians,” as “Injuns” is of “Indians”) regrouped in subtropical southern Louisiana, drawn there by the cultural similarities of the area’s French inhabitants. Here, writes Rushton, a New Orleans journalist, they reassembled their families and resumed their rural communal lifestyle. Today, they speak a dialect, “Frenglish.” (Example: *laisser les bons temps rouler*, or let the good times roll). They grow rice and sugar cane. Most important, Cajun fishermen net a quarter of America’s seafood, mainly shrimp, crabs, and oysters. But the fragile ecology of Louisiana’s Mississippi delta is menaced by oil slicks and by salt water intrusion, caused by the oil industry’s navigation and pipeline canals. These threats are as ominous, in some ways, to America’s Cajuns as the British expulsion of 1755.

—James N. Lang ('78)
NEW TITLES

History

THE DEVIL'S HORSEMEN: The Mongol Invasion of Europe
by James Chambers
Atheneum, 1979
202 pp. $11.95
L of C 78-22055

The great Mongol emperor Genghis Khan first led his fierce horsemen westward out of Mongolia into what is now Turkestan in A.D. 1220. He encountered only feeble resistance. Europe lay ahead. By 1260, the Mongol Empire stretched all the way to the Carpathian Mountains, loosely encompassing what is today Russia, eastern Poland, much of Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania, and the Mideast before it receded. Usually outnumbered, the superb Mongol cavalry forces relied upon shock, speed, and mobility to overwhelm their European foes. They used flag and torch signals to coordinate units and set up a kind of Pony Express courier system linking their new domains. They also exploited the West's weaknesses: the rigid tactics of its feudal armies; the quarrels between Pope Gregory IX and Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II that prevented a united European front; the isolation of Poles, Hungarians, Bulgars. Yet repeatedly, as total victory loomed, the Mongols paused. Each time, the loss of momentum resulted from the death of a leader and ensuing squabbles over succession. In the end, concludes Chambers in this rich military history, the unruly Mongols defeated themselves, sparing most of 13th-century Europe from Asian conquest.

MUNICH: The Price of Peace
by Telford Taylor
Doubleday, 1979
1084 pp. $17.50
L of C 73-22794
ISBN 0-385-02053-8

The very word "Munich" has come to signify not only appeasement but also willful capitulation to an aggressor. In September 1938, Neville Chamberlain, Edouard Daladier, Adolf Hitler, and Benito Mussolini met in Munich to settle German territorial claims against Czechoslovakia. The resulting agreement virtually gave the Nazis a free hand. Hitler expressed satisfaction; Chamberlain returned to Britain proclaiming that "peace with honor" had been preserved. It was a peace that would last less than a year. Win-
ston Churchill, then out of office, saw it clearly when he told Chamberlain: "You were given the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor, and you will have war." Should the Western allies, ready or not, have gone to war to stop Hitler in 1938? This is the key question that Taylor examines in detail. Best known as a U.S. prosecutor at the 1945-46 Nuremberg war crimes trials, the author does not allow hindsight to blur the reader's view of contemporary perceptions—Allied memories of the slaughter of World War I, French political disarray, British unpreparedness. Yet, after weighing the evidence, Taylor concludes that "Chamberlain must be held primarily responsible for the parlous state of British arms in 1938 and 1939" and that the "British and French governments should have realized ... that they could confront Germany more advantageously with Czechoslovakia in 1938 than without her during the next several years."

Surviving and Other Essays
by Bruno Bettelheim
Knopf, 1979
432 pp. $12.95
L of C 78-20388

Half of the essays in this collection, written over the last 37 years, grapple with the Holocaust experience. Bettelheim himself is a survivor of Dachau; after immigrating to America in 1939, he served as head of the University of Chicago's Orthogenic Institute for autistic children. Having spent his career studying the "reintegration of personality," his concerns remain "autonomy, self-respect, integration, and the ability to form meaningful and lasting relations." In "The Ignored Lesson of Anne Frank," he postulates that extreme situations require extreme reactions: The Frank family was doomed because, while in hiding, they tried to carry on their normal lives instead of preparing for escape from Nazi-occupied Amsterdam. Elsewhere, Bettelheim ponders the complex psychological needs that led some Holocaust victims to cooperate with their captors and even participate in their own destruction. Those lucky enough to survive the death camps suffered what Bettelheim calls the "survivor syndrome"—severe, often debilitating guilt over having been spared.
THE OFFICIAL MILITARY ATLAS OF THE CIVIL WAR
by Major George B. Davis et al.
Arno/Crown, 1979
178 double-spread pp. $60
L of C 78-16801
ISBN 0-405-11198-3 (Arno)
0-157-53407-X (Crown)

The Civil War changed the course not only of American history but of American historiography, as well. For the first time, the U.S. government entered the field of the historian, compiling military documents from both Confederate and Union sources. Begun in 1864 under Army auspices, the project gained momentum in the 1870s and took until 1895 to complete. The result was the 128-volume War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Arno/Crown has reprinted the 35 folios of maps and engravings that accompanied the Records in one full-color volume. (The originals long ago entered the lost or stolen category in even the best libraries.) Included in the 178 plates are 821 maps, 106 engravings, and 209 drawings, most of them prepared during the war by engineers, draftsmen, officers, and, occasionally, generals. The maps, of major battles as well as skirmishes, show geographical and topographical features and troop movements. The Battle of Gettysburg (July 1–3, 1863), for example, is represented by seven maps (three Union, two Confederate, two drawn after the war). The engravings are chiefly of fortifications, many shown from various angles; drawings depict weapons, logistical equipment, uniforms, and unit flags. This oversized, 10-pound volume will be welcomed by professional historians and Civil War buffs alike.

Contemporary Affairs

JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE: Lessons for America
by Ezra F. Vogel
Harvard, 1979
272 pp. $12.50
L of C 78-24059

Japan has learned from the West, so why not the reverse? Asserting postwar Japan's general superiority over the United States, Vogel, a Harvard sociologist, explains why the Japanese have been so successful in managing their society. The Japanese bureaucracy is small and effective—in part because the government makes private companies and citizen groups (e.g., the shingikai, or "deliberative councils," composed of well-known private citizens) responsible for formulating and implementing much policy relating to the environment, taxation, health care, and
welfare. The Japanese legal system emphasizes problem-solving rather than adversary proceedings between lawyers. Social pressures reduce crime; in 1973, “there were approximately four-and-a-half times as many murders per person in the United States, five times as many rapes, and 105 times as many robberies” as there were in Japan. Lacking abundant natural resources, the island nation could not permit the waste that accompanied U.S. growth. Now that the United States faces scarcities of fuel and other commodities, Vogel believes it could learn from the Japanese experience. Yet he does not ignore Japan’s unhappy trends: the stifling of individual rights and creativity due to overregimentation in the work place, the resurgence of national chauvinism, and a high suicide rate among its youth. And he concedes that not all Japanese solutions suit U.S. problems, if only because of America’s size, heterogeneous population, and focus on the individual.

EUROPE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS: The Enduring Balance
by A. W. DePorte
Yale, 1979
256 pp. $18.50
ISBN 0-300-02229-8

Until World War I, the European system of states, which had emerged at the end of the Middle Ages, remained essentially stable despite frequent wars. By 1913–14, however, Germany was leading Europe in arms expenditures ($554 million compared to Britain’s $384 million and France’s $287 million) and industrial output (producing three times as much pig iron and ferro alloys as France). American and Russian involvement in both World Wars was necessary to prevent German hegemony. Since 1945, the rivalry between the United States and the USSR has meant relative peace, independence, and prosperity for Western Europe, according to DePorte, a member of the State Department’s policy planning staff. At least, the superpower standoff in Europe has been better than the possible alternatives: Soviet control of all of Europe, or Germany’s reunification by force, with a revival of German aggression. DePorte argues that the most important development in Europe since 1962 (the year of the Cuban Missile Crisis) has been the successful U.S.–
USSR effort "to stabilize their relationship at a lower level of tension" than existed during the 1950s. However much the people of Eastern Europe would welcome a loosening of Soviet ties, their experience—the Russian invasions of Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968)—makes clear that power relations in Eastern Europe are not apt to change. Soviet dominance over Eastern Europe will continue to threaten the security of Western Europe; and Western Europe will continue to rely on U.S. might and money to deter the Russians and to help maintain the cooperative economic system that brought prosperity in the years following 1945.

From an avowed "left-liberal" perspective, Columbia sociologist Herbert J. Gans soberly examines four leading national processor-purveyors of news—and finds them wanting. He does not share the conservative view that a leftish Manhattan bias pervades the output of Time, Newsweek, CBS, and NBC. Rather, his periodic researches (in 1965–69 and 1975) indicate that these media uphold America's "dominant" values. For the most part, these organizations report "on those at or near the top . . . and on those, particularly near the bottom, who threaten them" to a vast audience located in the middle. To hold audiences, news executives focus on Big Names in government, politics, show business, or crime, on melodramatic conflict and disaster. They favor domestic "trends" over foreign news. (Vietnam became a "domestic" story when American GIs entered combat.) Well-paid Time and Newsweek editors, says Gans, universalize their own "upper-middle-class lifestyles"; they have little contact with ordinary Americans. TV commentators attack erring politicians or individual corporations as "bad apples"; they do not question the "existing economic order." Journalists transmit the only nonfiction that most Americans see, hear, or read. As counterpoint to David Halberstam's anecdotal bestseller on the media, The Powers That Be, analyst Gans argues for increased "diversity" in the
news—more stories on the views of Right and Left, of teachers and businessmen, parents and children, employers and employees. He is not optimistic.

**Arts & Letters**

Novelist Vladimir Nabokov and critic Edmund Wilson engaged in much-publicized disputes—about Boris Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* (Wilson praised it; Nabokov considered it pulp fiction), about Nabokov's *Lolita* (which Wilson liked “less than anything” Nabokov wrote). Yet they were close friends, as their letters make clear. In 1945, “Bunny” Wilson, who helped the Russian expatriate get writing assignments at the *New Republic*, the *New Yorker*, and the *Atlantic Monthly*, wrote to "Volodya" Nabokov: “Our conversations have been among the few consolations of my literary life through these last years.” Nabokov shared with Wilson his sketches, some of which found their way into *Lolita* (1955) and *Pnin* (1957), of odd and sundry Americans: a drama teacher who resembled the Duchess of Windsor, a timid bachelor who purchased a 75-foot flagpole for his backyard, a foul-mouthed bigot talking to two soldiers on a train.

Vladimir Nabokov “impressed, even possibly influenced” me, wrote Flannery O’Connor. Given their disparate backgrounds and writing styles, it is a surprising connection. O’Connor, born and bred in rural Georgia, a practicing Roman Catholic who wrote in the Southern gothic tradition, is best known for her collections of short stories—*A Good Man Is Hard to Find* (1956) and *Everything That Rises Must Converge* (1965). She died in 1964 at age 39, the victim of lupus erythematosus, an incurable disease of metabolic origin. Collected here, her letters attest to her courage and stoicism in facing her invalidism, her uncompromising belief in Catholicism, and her self-confidence. Novelist John Hawkes once asked her why she wrote, and she snapped back, “Because I’m good at it.” The letters—to friends, readers, other writers—are folksy,
full of local news, and funny. She recounts a literary conversation with her mother: "'Who is this Kafka?' she says. . . . A German Jew, I says, I think. He wrote a book about a man that turns into a roach. 'Well, I can't tell people that,' she says. . . ."

Hollander, a Yale professor of English, writes some of contemporary America's most intriguing verse, at once scholarly and accessible, humorous and meditative. Blue Wine offers a range of tones—from speculations on painting and sculpture to unabashedly lyrical love poems. The title work was inspired by a row of bottles that Hollander saw in New Yorker artist Saul Steinberg's kitchen, decorated with "mock (or rather visionary) wine labels." The poet bore the vision of these homeward, "In the clear cup of his own eye, to see what he will see." His meditations—in 11 distinct styles, including mock-Homeric—sound the relation of life to art, the boundaries between the seen and the unseen. In "A Statue of Something," Hollander gives a clue to what this collection is about: He is leading his model out into interpretation, Life after art, re-engagement with a world whose shadows/Are insubstantial and always full of motion.

In 1906, the Stephen sisters, Vanessa (Bell) and Virginia (Woolf), and their brother Thoby were living in London's "antiquated, ex-fashionable" Bloomsbury district. As a student at Cambridge, Thoby met future economist John Maynard Keynes, writer Leonard Woolf, biographer Lytton Strachey, art critic Clive Bell, and literary critic Desmond MacCarthy. Before he died, Thoby introduced them to his sisters. Later joined by painters Roger Fry and Duncan Grant, this group began meeting on Thursday nights to read poetry and discuss art, politics, sex. Drawn together by common interests in art and philosophy (as agnostics, they were all influenced by G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell) and by a penchant for unconventional
sexual arrangements, they kept meeting, and sometimes cohabiting, until 1930. In public, they forever protested that they were a circle. (It made it easier for them to praise one another.) But few were fooled. Leon Edel, author of the five-volume *The Life of Henry James*, traces the lives and interactions of the nine principals to 1920, when they were all middle-aged, firmly established in their separate careers, and had begun to record their own histories. He concedes their arrogance and snobbery but prefers to emphasize their sizeable contributions to the arts and British society. Virginia Woolf’s stream-of-consciousness technique helped move the modern novel away from the ensconced tradition of straightforward narration. Fry coined the term “Post-Impressionism”; he and Bell introduced that school of painters to England. And Keynes—who wrote of the group, “I can see us as water spiders, gracefully skimming, as light and as reasonable as air, the surface of the stream without any contact at all with the eddies and currents beneath”—went on to revolutionize economics with *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1936).

**SCIENTISTS IN POWER**

by Spencer R. Weart

Harvard, 1979

356 pp. $17.50

ISBN 0-673-79515-6

Early in 1939, physicist Frédéric Joliot and several colleagues at the Collège de France in Paris discovered how an atomic chain reaction could be ignited in a mass of uranium. By the middle of the year, writes Weart, a historian at the American Institute of Physics in New York City, they had prepared, and kept secret, an application for a patent on a crude uranium bomb; planned a workable nuclear reactor; and persuaded the French government and the Belgian mining firm Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (which had discovered uranium in Africa) to underwrite their research. The 1940 German invasion of France cut short Joliot’s efforts. Several members of his research team fled to Britain, the United States, and Canada (where some of...
them continued their work on breeder reactors). After the war, President Charles De Gaulle formed France's Atomic Energy Commissariat (CEA)—enlisting both scientists and politicians—charged with developing nuclear fission for energy and weapons. Joliot was named its first high commissioner. A Communist and an outspoken foe of the development of French atomic weapons, he was dismissed in 1950. Soon the scientists were no longer in power. Yet "whether the scientists willed it or not," Weart concludes, from the start the CEA had conducted research, including the development of breeder reactors, that "logically culminated in the production of enough plutonium for bombs." In February 1960, the French exploded their first plutonium bomb above the Sahara desert.

As in his previous collection of essays, The Medusa and the Snail: More Notes of a Biology Watcher (which won a 1974 National Book Award), Lewis Thomas ruminates on a variety of topics ranging from disease to the essays of Montaigne, from toes to warts. In "Medical Lessons from History," he disputes the premise that modern medicine originated in the mid-1930s with the introduction of sulfonamides and penicillin. Its roots, he says, go back 100 years earlier, when nonsensical human experimentation (e.g., bleeding) was discredited by physicians who began to observe that some diseases were "self-limited [and] got better by themselves" and that doctors' cures often did more harm than good. Thomas, president of Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York City, argues that today's major research efforts should be in the broad area of basic biological science, not in applied medicine, because doctors do not yet have the "high degree of certainty about the basic facts" that successful applied science requires. And he is critical of the contemporary American obsession with health: "Chewing gum is sold as a tooth cleanser. Vitamins have taken the place of prayer... The new danger to our well-being... is in becoming a nation of healthy hypochondriacs, living gingerly, worrying
ourselves half to death." Yet, no matter what
his subject, it is clear where Thomas places
his faith—in science and in mankind (warts
and all).

**THE EIGHTH DAY OF**
CREATION: Makers of the
Revolution in Biology
by Horace Freeland Judson
Simon & Schuster, 1979
686 pp. $15.95
L.C. 78-12159

The year 1953 brought a new approach toiology that rivaled the transformation of
physics after Max Planck introduced the
quantum theory (1900) and Albert Einstein
published his theory of relativity (1905). The
revolution was set off by the discovery by
James Watson and Francis Crick of the
molecular structure of DNA (deoxyribonucleic
acid), which determines individual
hereditary characteristics. It has led to to-
day's research into cell differentiation and
"genetic engineering." In this richly detailed
chronicle, Horace Freeland Judson, former
*Time* science reporter in Europe, traces the
DNA story from Johann Friedrich Miescher's
discovery of nuclein (a complex of DNA and
the protein normally associated with it in
higher organisms) in 1869, through the
Watson-Crick collaboration, to Crick's later
work on the way that the "information" in
the DNA molecule is translated into the mak-
ing of proteins and Max Perutz's recent work
on the structure of the protein hemoglobin.
In the quest for DNA's secret, Watson, a young
American, joined Crick in England—after
being turned down for graduate study by
Harvard and the California Institute of
Technology. When they made their "find" in
1953, Crick was only 36, Watson 25. Along
with Maurice Wilkins, who specialized in
X-ray studies of DNA, they were awarded the
Nobel Prize in 1962. The DNA discovery pro-
vided a coherent outline of life's processes in
the simplest of single-cell creatures. Yet, Jud-
son notes, the molecular biologists' early con-
fidence that the outline could be stretched to
include higher organisms was premature: the
mysteries of cell multiplication and diversi-

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PAPERBOUNDS


In a more perfect world, people who write would, like drivers, have to be licensed. If such were the case, this book would be their Operator's Manual. In 1959, the New Yorker's E. B. White published a revised version of the privately printed "little book" written by his English professor at Cornell, William Strunk, Jr. White published a second edition in 1972. This new, third edition, he writes, underwent a general overhaul "to correct errors, delete bewhiskered entries, and enliven the argument." The advice is always simple and direct, and it makes sense: "Never tack -ize onto a noun to create a verb Usually you will discover that a useful verb already exists. Why say 'moisturize' when there is the simple, unpretentious word moisten?" White comes down hard on other jargon, e.g., "offputting" and "ongoing": "As a simple test, transform the participles to verbs. It is possible to upset something. But to offput? To ongo?"


The battle of Verdun lasted for ten months. It was the longest in history (by comparison, the World War II battle of Stalingrad lasted five months). Three-quarters of the French Army's divisions served at one time or another on the 15-mile front; and although other World War I battles exacted higher casualties, Verdun resulted in "the highest density of dead per square yard that has probably ever been known." French and German losses amounted to 420,000 dead and 800,000 gassed or wounded; after the war, another 150,000 unidentified and un-buried corpses (or fragments of corpses) were discovered. British historian Horne describes the tactics of both sides (the Germans introduced flame-throwers and phosgene gas) and examines the personalities of the opposing military leaders: France's Joseph Joffre, who "thought from his belly rather than with his head"; Germany's ruthless Erich von Falkenhayn; England's Douglas Haig, whose visits to casualty clearing stations made him physically ill. Verdun's influence on later French strategists was enervating. The heavy toll of World War I, especially at Verdun, led the French, as World War II began, to embrace defense as the safest policy and the fortified Maginot Line along its eastern border as a security blanket. Horne sees Verdun as World War I in microcosm, "an intensification of all its horrors and glories," an "indecisive battle in an indecisive war."


Malcolm Cowley succeeded Edmund Wilson as literary editor of the New Republic from 1929 until 1944. In this overview of 20th-century American letters, he examines many of the concerns and trends (the re-examination of America's past by writers of the 1930s, the decline of storytelling in fiction especially during the 1960s) of modern writing. Recent critics have dismissed Hemingway too easily, Cowley says—a case of the sons killing off the father. Cowley also champions writers he feels have been too often ignored or underrated—S. Foster Damon (reading his poems makes Cowley think of "New Hampshire fields that are strewn with boulders"), Robert M. Coates (who gave everything he wrote "a consistent
finish as if he were polishing steel”), Conrad Aiken (whose candor “evolved into a system of aesthetics and literary ethics that unified his work”). John Dos Passos' fictional trilogy U.S.A. (1930–36) was both a somber history of America during the first 30 years of this century and, by means of such impressionistic devices as the “Camera Eye” passages, a reflection of the author’s own feelings. Despite the passing from fashion of young Dos Passos’ radical views, U.S.A. “holds together,” writes Cowley, “like a great ship freighted with the dead and dying.”


The idea of a Jewish homeland had its roots in early 19th-century European Jewish nationalism. In Serbia, Rabbi Judah Alkalai was one of the first to translate biblical prophecy into a more contemporary framework. In an introduction to an 1839 textbook, the rabbi alluded to the need for establishing Jewish colonies in the Holy Land as a prelude to religious redemption. The grandson of one of the rabbi’s disciples was Theodor Herzl (1860–1904), a Hungarian Jewish journalist. In 1903, Herzl secured from Britain’s Prime Minister Balfour an offer of territory for a Jewish state in East Africa; the proposal severely divided Zionists, and it was eventually withdrawn by London. In 1917, Balfour, then secretary of state for foreign affairs, tried again. He issued his famed declaration supporting a national home for Jews in British-occupied Palestine, with the proviso that the civil and religious rights of Moslem and Christian communities in that area would not be prejudiced. Sachar, a history professor at George Washington University, provides balanced accounts of the sequels—the 1936 Palestine Arab revolt; the 1947 UN partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, the ensuing civil war, and the creation of Israel in 1948; the 1956 Suez Crisis; the 1967 Six-Day War; the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Sachar has added a brief epilogue carrying Israel’s story from 1976 (when his book was first published) to 1978. Here his treatment of Israeli domestic politics is less detached. He interprets Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s May 1977 election as a repudiation of the Labor government’s “flaccidity and corruption” after almost 30 years in power and blames the old Labor government’s regulatory zeal for Israel’s declining economic growth.


Robert Graves, 84, perhaps best known as a British traditionalist poet, is also an essayist, literary critic and theorist, classical scholar, novelist, and short story writer. All of his talents and interests come to bear in these 30 stories, written between 1924 and 1962. The earliest, “The Shout,” is an eerie, subtly erotic tale of a lunatic who has learned to utter (or thinks he has) a demonic shout that can drive people mad and even kill them. In “Epics Are Out of Fashion,” Graves demonstrates his taste for the fanciful when he resuscitates an aspiring poet of Roman times who thinks his epic will stay in fashion because “I make my warriors use modern weapons; I rule out an absurd personal intervention of the gods; and I enliven the narrative with gruesome anecdotes, breath-taking metaphors, and every rhetorical trope in the bag.” Graves has lived on Majorca since 1929, and the 11 stories set on that Mediterranean island are colorful—tales of bicycle thieves, young lovers, low-level bureaucrats, superstition.
What are the origin and nature of religion? The question has haunted the West for centuries. Religious dogma long supplied the answers, as Jewish and Christian theologians variously insisted that other religions were distortions of the original, pure, monotheistic faith. In the 18th century, rationalists, notably France's Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Voltaire, proposed a new dogma: Mankind had originally placed its faith in reason; latter-day religions were the distortions. With the 19th century, however, came a science of religion that claimed not to be dogma. Its supporters explained religion in terms of historical and psychological factors, among others. Two of its advocates—Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud—were raised under similar conditions (each had German Jewish parents and grew up in an anti-Semitic environment). Both rejected Judaism for atheism. Marx called religion "the opium of the masses"; Freud described religion as science's "really serious enemy ... unworthy of belief." Yet theologian Hans Küng, in this essay drawn from his new book Does God Exist?, questions just how unreligious Freud really was.

by Hans Küng

In 1854—the same year that Pope Pius IX in Rome promulgated the dogma of Mary's immaculate conception—open conflict broke out at the 31st assembly of German natural scientists and doctors in Göttingen. It was the famous "materialism controversy" between medical specialist Rudolf Wagner, working in the field of anatomy and physiology, and physiologist Carl Vogt.

Wagner sought to defend, by philosophical and theological arguments, the existence of a special, invisible, weightless "soul
Signs of Freud's brother, Alexander, was six years old when Sigmund, then 16, told him: "Look, ... our family is like a book. You and I are the first and the last of the children, so we are like the strong covers that have to support and protect the weak girls who were born after me and before you." Pictured from left to right are Sigmund, Adolphine, Alexander, Anna, Paula, Marie, and Rosa Freud.

substance" against recent physiological theories. Vogt sharply discounted this venerable concept; he compared the relationship between brain and thought to that between liver and bile or between kidneys and urine."

For the educated public in Germany at that time, Vogt and the materialists had won the battle. After the controversy, it was clear to them that religious persuasions had no place in questions of natural science or medicine. The interconnection of mechanical and natural laws had to be investigated to the very end without philosophical or theological reservations; there was no activity of consciousness without cerebral activity, no soul existing independently of the body; religion had nothing to do with science and—if it counted at all—was a private matter.

Two years later, while the controversy was still brewing, Sigismund Freud was born on May 6, 1856, in the small Catholic town of Freiberg in Moravia, now in Czechoslovakia. (Named  

*The debate had begun when Wagner proclaimed his support of the traditional Judeo-Christian belief of mankind's descent from a single pair of human beings, Adam and Eve, as told in Genesis 2-5. Vogt assumed that there were several original human couples.
Sigismund by his parents, Freud began using the name Sig- 
mund when he was 17). Only 2 percent of the townsfolk were 
Protestants, with a similar proportion of Jews. Sigmund's 
father, Jakob Freud, a wool merchant, was a patriarchal figure. 
He had been educated an Orthodox Jew, yet, despite his liberal, 
a aloof attitude to Jewish tradition, he was never converted to 
Christianity, unlike Karl Marx's father.

According to Ernest Jones, author of a monumental three-
volume biography of Freud, the boy 'grew up devoid of any 
belief in a God or Immortality and does not appear to have felt 
the need of it.'** This is a surprisingly sweeping statement, for 
which Jones, who sometimes goes on at great length about the 
most trivial details concerning his hero, can produce no evi-
dence. In any case, Freud himself wrote that reading the Bible 
had made a strong impression on him as a young man.

It was Freud's mother, Amalie, who instructed him in the 
Jewish faith. Such instruction, of course, could be of very dubi-
ous value, as is clear from Freud's later recollection:

When I was six years old and was given my first lessons 
by my mother, I was expected to believe that we were 
all made of earth and must therefore return to earth. 
This did not suit me, and I expressed doubts of the doc-
trine. My mother thereupon rubbed the palms of her 
hands together—just as she did in making dumplings, 
except that there was no dough between them—and 
showed me the blackish scales of epidermis produced by 
the friction as a proof that we were made of earth.

Two kinds of "antireligious" experiences made a deep im-
pression on Freud at an early age: his experiences of Christian 
ritualism and his experience of anti-Semitism.

The old nanny who looked after him during his earliest 
years was efficient and strict, a Czech Catholic who implanted in 
the small boy Catholic ideas of heaven and hell, and probably 
also of redemption and resurrection. She used to take him with


Hans Küng, S.I., is professor of dogmatics and director of the Institute for 
Ecumenical Research at the University of Tübingen in Germany. Born in 
Lucerne, Switzerland, he was educated at Gregorian University in Rome 
and received his doctorate in theology from the Institute Catholique and 
Sorbonne, Paris (1957). His numerous books include That the World May 
Believe (1963), Infallible?—An Inquiry (1971), On Being a Christian 
(1976), and Freud and the Problem of God (1979).
her to Mass in the Catholic Church. At home afterward, he would imitate the liturgical gestures, preach, and explain "God's doings." Could this have been the source of Freud's later aversion to Christian ceremonies and doctrines? At any rate, it cannot be accidental that his first essay on religion, in 1907, bore the title "Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices."

"Our God Logos"

Then there was anti-Semitism. Freud considered himself a Jew and was proud of the fact. But he had to suffer for it. As an outsider at primary and secondary school, where he was quite clearly first in his class, his position was similar to that of Karl Marx in Trier from 1830-35. He had only a few non-Jewish friends; humiliations of all kinds at the hands of anti-Semitic "Christians" were his daily lot. He would have preferred to have been educated, like his nephew John, in the more liberal atmosphere of England.

Freud lost much of his respect for his father when he learned at the age of 12 that Jakob Freud had simply swallowed the insult when a boy had thrown his new fur cap into the mud and shouted, "Get off the pavement, Jew." Such experiences unleashed in Freud feelings of hatred and revenge at an early date and made the Christian faith completely incredible to him. It was no better at the University of Vienna: "Above all, I found that I was expected to feel myself inferior and an alien because I was a Jew. I refused absolutely to do the first of these things."

These negative experiences with religion, however much they discredit Christianity, need not have shaken Freud's Jewish faith in God. How did this come about?

When Freud went to medical school in Vienna at the age of 17, he found himself surrounded by the main proponents of the new mechanistic physiology, which explained all life and its development in terms of biological and chemical factors. This school of thought had emerged from a group of young physicists and physiologists in Berlin in the 1840s. Mechanism renounced all traces of vitalism, the Aristotelian and Scholastic tradition, which assumed that organisms had been endowed by the Creator with immaterial factors as well and therefore with higher roles and ultimate objectives.

It is understandable that many people began to see the universal panacea for all the sufferings of the late 19th century in natural science and not in religion, politics, or philosophy. A method of investigation was turned into a world view; people
Sigmund Freud had to live with his public reputation as an arrogant, uncaring egotist, and he knew it. In a letter to fellow psychiatrist C. J. Jung, he once sighed, "As you know, I suffer all the torments that can afflict an innovator; not the least of these is the unavoidable necessity of passing, among my own supporters, as the incorrigibly self-righteous crank or fanatic that in reality I am not."

Indeed, Freud's letters to family and friends reveal another side—the devoted family man, who took pleasure in raising his three daughters and three sons.

The center of Freud's life was his wife, Martha Bernays. Freud married her in 1886 when he was 30 years old, after a four-year engagement during which he sent her more than 900 love letters. He once wrote, "Before I met you, I didn't know the joy of living, and now that 'in principle' you are mine, to have you completely is the one condition I make to life, which I otherwise don't set any great store by."

In another letter to her, Freud took stock: "For a long time I have known that I am not a genius and cannot understand how I ever could have wanted to be one. I am not even very gifted; my whole capacity for work probably springs from my character and from the absence of outstanding intellectual weakness."

Beginning in 1891, Freud lived and worked for almost 47 years at Bergasse 19, a house near Vienna's historic Tandelmarkt. Freud and his family inhabited the third floor, while his offices (complete with couch) were on the second floor. (The ground floor included a butcher's shop.) The punctual doctor gave each of his patients exactly 55 minutes; during his five-minute breaks, he often ran upstairs to visit his family. He frequently received patients until 10 at night but still found time for writing, chess, and the theater.

When the Nazis took over Austria, Freud resisted leaving Vienna. On March 15, 1938, Gestapo agents forced their way into his home and searched some of its rooms. But when Freud appeared, saying...
nothing but with eyes blazing, the intimidated intruders left. A week later, however, they picked up Freud’s daughter Anna for interrogation. She returned that same day, but the experience was enough to persuade Freud to flee.

In June 1938, Freud left Vienna with Martha and Anna. Soon after World War II began, he died in London on September 23, 1939, at the age of 83, after suffering stoically for 16 years from a cancer of the palate. With Freud’s consent, the family doctor gave him an injection of morphine to ease his last hours.

After Spanish surrealist Salvador Dali drew this sketch of Freud in July 1938, Freud wrote to a friend, “I was inclined to look upon surrealists, who have apparently chosen me for their patron saint, as absolute (let us say 95 percent, like alcohol) cranks. The young Spaniard, however, with his candid fanatical eyes and his undeniable technical mastery, has made me reconsider my opinion.”

inadequacy of man and of his progress, Freud nevertheless emphatically confessed his faith (“We believe that it is possible for scientific work to gain some knowledge about the reality of the world”) and forswore unbelief—“No, our science is no illusion.”

Freud viewed religion as quite obviously psychological in character. In “Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices,” he described obsessional neuroses as a “pathological counterpart of the formation of a religion” and religion itself as a “universal
obsessional neurosis."*

In 1912, Freud expanded this thesis and attempted to corroborate it by examining the history of religion. This he did in four essays published as a book under the title Totem and Taboo. Whether investigating the horror of incest, taboo prohibitions as a whole, animism and magic, or totemism,‡ he inevitably found a similarity between the customs and religious attitudes of primitive tribesmen on the one hand and the obsessive actions of his neurotic Viennese patients on the other.

Freud believed that behind totemism what was secretly at work was nothing other than the Oedipus complex: attachment to the mother and death wish toward the father, who is seen as a rival. And the very core of totemism—the annual totem meal in which the totem animal as a sacred object is ritually killed and eaten, then mourned, and finally celebrated by a feast—makes it clear that killing the father is the starting point of totemism and thus of the formation of religion as a whole. In the case of Christianity, in Freud’s words, “the ceremony of the totem meal still survives, with but little distortion, in the form of Communion.”

Ultimately, however, Freud looked beyond religious rites to ask what are “religious ideas.” The study of this question occupied him the rest of his life. In his main critical work on religion, The Future of an Illusion (1927), Freud applied to the phenomenon of religion the model of wish fulfillment he had first discovered in dreams and neurotic symptoms. Where did religion acquire its force? Religious ideas, he proclaimed, are “not precipitates of experiences or end-results of our thinking” but “illusions, fulfillments of the oldest, strongest, and most urgent wishes of mankind.

“The secret of their strength lies in the strength of those wishes,” he wrote. Among the wishes he described were those of the childishly helpless human being for protection from life’s perils, for the realization of justice in this unjust society, for the prolongation of earthly existence in a future life, for knowledge

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*Neuroses, according to Freud, are a category of psychiatric disturbance in which an individual generally suffers minimal loss of contact with popularly accepted views of reality but exhibits defensive, generally unconscious and self-defeating, behavior. Obsessional neuroses are characterized by the repeated intrusion of ideas that the neurotic person finds unwelcome. Obsessional neuroses are common and may be manifest in compulsive behavior that can either be crippling (e.g., pyromania—the compulsive setting of fires) or minor (e.g., habitual ear-pulling).

‡ In totemism, a clan or tribe regards itself as related to—sometimes even descended from—a particular animal (the totem animal), which, in the belief of the clan, protects the clan. The animal can neither be harmed nor killed by members of the clan, except for their ritual totem meal. Scottish theologian-anthropologist W. Robertson Smith (1846–94) was the first to define totemism, which he had observed in a primitive Australian clan, as the original religion. Freud accepted Smith’s deduction.
of the origin of the world, of the relationship between the corporeal and the mental: "Immortality, retribution, the whole hereafter, are such representations of our psychical interior . . . psychomythology."

Obsessional neuroses, the Oedipus complex, and wish fulfillment—these were the major elements of Freud's thinking on religion. It is to his immense credit that he worked out how much the unconscious determines the individual human being and the history of mankind, how fundamental even the earliest childhood years, the first parent-child relationships, and the approach to sexuality are for a person's religious attitudes and ideas as well. But no conclusions can be drawn about the existence or nonexistence of God from analysis of the influence of psychological (or economic or social) factors on religion. The believer in God can still say:

¶ Religion, as Marx shows, can certainly be opium, a means of social assuagement and consolation (repression). But it need not be.

¶ Religion, as Freud shows, can certainly be an illusion, the expression of a neurosis and psychological immaturity (regression). But it need not be.

¶ All human believing, hoping, loving—related to a person, a thing, or God—certainly contains an element of projection. But its object need not be a mere projection.

It does not follow from man's profound desire for God and eternal life that God exists and eternal life and happiness are real—as some theologians have mistakenly concluded. But those atheists who think that what follows is the nonexistence of God and the unreality of eternal life are mistaken too.

Freud's explanation of the psychological genesis of belief in God does not refute faith itself; his atheism thus turns out to be a pure hypothesis, an unproved postulate, a dogmatic claim. And at bottom Freud was well aware of this. For religious ideas, though incredible, were for him also irrefutable. In principle they might also be true. Even for him, what has to be said of their psychological nature by no means decides their truth.

Freud's thesis, then, of the supersession of religion by science turns out to be an assertion without any apparent foundation: an extrapolation into the future that even today, in retrospect, cannot in any way be verified. Can faith in science replace faith in God? Contrary to Freud's prophecy, neither in the West nor in the East has belief in God yet disappeared to make way for
"A REALLY SERIOUS ENEMY"

In 1933, six years after The Future of an Illusion, Freud returned to the question of the relationship between religion and science in the last chapter of New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis.

Scientific research looks on the whole field of human activity as its own, and must adopt an uncompromisingly critical attitude towards any other power that seeks to usurp any part of its province.

Of the three forces which can dispute the position of science, religion alone is a really serious enemy. Art is almost always harmless and beneficent; it does not seek to be anything else but an illusion... Philosophy is not opposed to science; it behaves itself as if it were a science, and to a certain extent it makes use of the same methods...

Philosophy has no immediate influence on the great majority of mankind; it interests only a small number even of the thin upper stratum of intellectuals, while all the rest find it beyond them. In contradistinction to philosophy, religion is a tremendous force, which exerts its power over the strongest [human] emotions...

If one wishes to form a true estimate of the full grandeur of religion, one must keep in mind what it undertakes to do for men. It gives them information about the source and origin of the universe, it assures them of protection and final happiness amid the changing vicissitudes of life, and it guides their thoughts and actions by means of precepts which are backed by the whole force of its authority...

The scientific spirit began in the course of time to treat religion as a human matter and to subject it to a critical examination. This test it failed to pass... But it was long before any one dared to say it aloud: The assertions made by religion that it could give protection and happiness to men, if they would only fulfill certain ethical obligations, were unworthy of belief.

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for science. For a long time, we have ceased to take every advance in science as a contradiction to belief in God—as was assumed in Freud’s student years.

Atheists accuse religion of being wishful thinking. But we for our part may ask whether atheism too might not be wishful thinking, projection.

This question, which we raise with the utmost caution, is not intended to neutralize Freud’s criticism of religion. Nevertheless, there is food for thought in the fact that Freud was not brought up without religion. He testified in “An Autobiographical Study” (1925) that he was quite familiar with the Bible, but oddly enough, he said so in a sentence that was added only in 1935. He also admitted that he was seized in his early
years by a strong bent toward speculation on the riddle of the world and of man but, as he put it, "ruthlessly checked it." Thus he "secretly nursed the hope" of arriving, by a detour through physiology, at his "original objective, philosophy."

Freud the atheist undoubtedly rejected Christianity in principle. But in practice was he so remote from it? "As you admit, I have done a great deal for love," Freud wrote in 1910 to Oskar Pfister, a Reform Church minister in Zurich, Switzerland, and the first clergyman known to embrace psychoanalysis. In Freud's system at that time, however, there was no place for any concept except that of sexually determined love, the all-embracing libido.

Only at the end of his life did Freud discover nonsexual love. Man then became for him more than the mechanistically understood system, driven by the ego instinct and libido—an *homme machine*, basically isolated and egoistic. Man was now seen as a being essentially related to others, driven by vital instincts demanding unification with others. Life and love belonged together and were more deeply rooted than all sexuality.

In 1930, in his *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud had described the Christian commandment of love of neighbor as "not reasonable," as "unpsychological" and "impossible to fulfill." Three years later, in view of the darkening world situation with Hitler's seizure of power, in an open letter (not published in Germany) to Albert Einstein, Freud called for love "without a sexual aim" as an indirect way of opposing war: "There is no need for psychoanalysis to be ashamed to speak of love in this connection, for religion itself uses the same words: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.'"

What Freud admitted here in theory—love of neighbor—he had practiced for a long time, but without knowing why. As early as 1915, he had written to James Putnam, the Harvard neurologist: "When I ask myself why I have always behaved honorably, ready to spare others and to be kind wherever possible, and why I did not give up being so when I observed that in that way one harms oneself and becomes an anvil because other people are brutal and untrustworthy, then, it is true, I have no answer."

Is there really no answer?

EDITOR'S NOTE: In addition to the Ernest Jones biography of Freud, readers may wish to consult Sigmund Freud: His Life in Pictures and Words, edited by Ernst Freud, Lucie Freud, and Ilse Grubrich-Simitis (1976), and Freud: Biologist of the Mind, by Frank J. Sulloway (1979).
The enduring popularity of Charles Dickens (1812-70) in the West is nowhere more evident than in America. All of his novels from *Pickwick Papers* to *The Mystery of Edwin Drood*, are readily available in good bookstores, and there has been a recent surge of scholarly interest in England's muckraking novelist. Recently published have been a new biography, *Dickens: A Life*, by Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie; a revised paperback edition of Edgar Johnson's *Charles Dickens: His Tragedy and Triumph*; and Michael Slater's *Dickens on America and the Americans*. Here we present Robert R. Harris' discussion of the great author's trips to America and excerpts from Dickens' own voluminous observations on the new republic.

by Robert R. Harris

''Is Little Nell dead?'' shouted people in the waiting crowds on Manhattan docks to the passengers on incoming vessels from England.

A year before he came to the United States in 1842, Dickens enthralled Americans with his story of an innocent girl and her senile grandfather in *The Old Curiosity Shop*. The novel appeared in Britain in serialized episodes (in *Master Humphrey's Clock*) that were subsequently pirated by U.S. newspapers.

It was a time when popular novelists attracted the kind of attention reserved today for Hollywood entertainers, rock stars, and TV anchormen. Dickens was a trans-Atlantic celebrity, and Little Nell a household name.

Dickens' own story was not quite rags to riches—but close to it. His life reads like one of his novels. Dickens was the eldest of eight children of a feckless clerk in the Naval Pay Office in Portsmouth. In 1822, the family moved to London. A few days before Dickens' father, John, went to debtor's prison in 1824, Charles, then just 12, was sent to work 12 hours a day in a blacking factory, wrapping and labeling pots of paste-black (used for boots and fire-grates). Although he toiled in the factory for only four months, he was angered and humiliated.
"Even after my descent into the poor little drudge I had been since we came to London," he wrote later, "no one had compassion enough on me—a child of singular abilities, quick, eager, delicate, and soon hurt, bodily or mentally—to suggest that something might have been spared, as certainly it might have been, to place me at any common school."

Yet Dickens was to make good use of these early experiences. David Copperfield, his most popular novel and the one he liked best, is in many of its details veiled autobiography; the character Micawber has many of John Dickens’ traits. A comically overdrawn portrait of Charles’s mother, who favored sending him to work in the factory, is found in the character of Mrs. Nickleby in Nicholas Nickleby. And the time in the blacking factory accounted both for Dickens’ irrational fear of poverty when success came and for the fascination with London’s underclass so evident in his novels.

When John Dickens received a small inheritance in 1824, Charles went to Wellington House Academy, a commercial school. In 1827, he was hired as a legal clerk, taught himself shorthand, and, in 1830 at age 18, became a legal reporter for several London newspapers, covering court cases, the House of Commons ("particularly strong in clowns," he wrote), and, later, the House of Lords.

As a budding freelance journalist, Dickens walked London’s streets during the riots that accompanied the struggles over Parliamentary reform, attended public hangings, visited prisons, went often to the theater, and reported on political meetings in and outside of London. In 1835, the Evening Chronicle published his first essay under the pen name Boz, criticizing London manners and morals. His literary career was launched. His essays were soon published as a book, Sketches by Boz, and his first novel, Pickwick Papers, was in serialization by the time he was 24.

In 1836, Dickens married Catherine Hogarth, eldest daughter of George Hogarth, Dickens’ editor at the Evening Chronicle. Charles and "Kate" had 10 children before he left her in 1858 for Ellen Ternan, a 19-year-old actress who performed in one of the many plays Dickens was fond of staging. Ellen, 27 years younger than Dickens, remained his mistress for the rest of his life.

With the success of Sketches and Pickwick (originally intended by
Dickens as a series of follow-up journalistic pieces to Sketches), Dickens had become a renowned journalist. He founded three weekly publications: Master Humphrey's Clock (1841), solely a vehicle for his fiction; Household Words (1850); and All the Year Round (1859), which reflected his social concerns.

Dickens was an advocacy journalist and his muckraking articles earned him a reputation as champion of the underdog. In his weeklies and in pamphlets, he berated his countrymen for their neglect of the poor; opposed child labor, slavery, public executions, and capital punishment; raised funds for schools for slum children and for rehabilitating prostitutes; exposed the living and working conditions of coal miners and factory workers. He portrayed in his novels the special horrors for children of poverty and adult cruelty (Oliver Twist, The Old Curiosity Shop, David Copperfield); life in debtor's prison (Little Dorrit); greed and the exploitation of the working class (Hard Times).

His weapons, writes biographer Edgar Johnson, were caricature and burlesque, melodrama and unrestrained sentiment, ridicule and exaggeration. If nothing else, he stirred Britain's new middle class into awareness of serious social issues.

Intrigued by republican America, Dickens yearned to set "foot upon the soil I have trod in my day-dreams many times." When he finished Barnaby Rudge in 1841, he had been writing without let-up for five years. He decided to go to the United States, which symbolized for Dickens the democratic ways that he hoped England would embrace. He also wanted to leave his mark on the New World: "Washington Irving writes me that if I went," he told a friend, "it would be a triumph for me from one end of the States to the other."

Culture Shock

He planned to write a travel book that would set right the distortions in such earlier works as Frances Trollope's Domestic Manners of Americans (1832), which claimed that American society was one "of jarring tumult and universal degradation."

When Dickens arrived in Boston aboard the sailing ship Britannia in January 1842, he was welcomed as an international celebrity. He was feted at dinner parties and a public ball; he hobnobbed with novelist Richard Henry Dana, Jr., historian George Bancroft, poets Henry Wadsworth Longfellow and James Russell Lowell; and he visited the state capital, a courthouse, a seamen's chapel, and Harvard.

Although their newspapers nicknamed Boston "Boz-town" when they learned of Dickens' tumultuous reception there, New Yorkers were determined to outdo the New Englanders. When Dickens arrived in Manhattan, his hosts threw an even bigger ball than had been held in Boston, and Washington Irving held a public dinner. Insatiably curious, the English visitor inspected the Tombs prison, the turbulent Irish slums of the city's Five Points district, and a lunatic asylum on Long Island.

The mutual admiration between Dickens and the Americans was dampened when Dickens spoke out (in Boston and Hartford) in favor of
an international copyright law; and the U.S. press excoriated him for raising the issue. "Some of the vagabonds," Dickens shot back, "take great credit to themselves... for having made me popular by publishing my books in newspapers: as if there were no England, no Scotland, no Germany, no place but America in the whole world."

After his squabbles with the press began, Dickens' feelings toward the New World turned sour. He complained about the railroads and the hotels and was offended by the Americans' rough-and-ready manners—a kind of culture shock.

Dickens' observations in letters home became more caustic ("This is not the Republic of my imagination... In everything of which it has made a boast—excepting its education of people, and its care for poor children—it sinks immeasurably below the level I had placed it upon"). However, his desire for first-hand knowledge of the United States was still strong. Dickens continued his travels.

In Philadelphia, he met Edgar Allan Poe and visited the Eastern Penitentiary, where he was appalled by the practice of putting prisoners in solitary confinement. He traveled by rail to Washington, Richmond, and Baltimore. By steamer, he went down the Ohio River and up the Mississippi to St. Louis. He witnessed a

"Pittsburgh," wrote Dickens in American Notes, "is like Birmingham in England; at least its townpeople say so... It certainly has a great quantity of smoke hanging about it, and is famous for its ironworks."
American cartoonists, including Thomas Nast, delighted in needling Dickens about the money he made from his readings and in portraying him (falsely) as a speaker of Cockney dialect. This newspaper cartoon, “Dickens’s Farewell to America,” appeared in 1868 after the author’s second visit to the New World.

slavery and empathy for Southern blacks.

Regarding the war, says Michael Slater, “as entirely a matter of dollars and political struggles,” Dickens “was happy to use the southern cause . . . to belabour his old Yankee enemies” in the Northern press.

Unlike his first trip to the United States, which Dickens undertook largely out of curiosity, Dickens’ second tour (December 1867—April 1868) was spurred almost entirely by a false sense of financial insecurity.

In 1858, Dickens began giving dramatic readings of his works; they were extremely popular. He was a wealthy man. But, haunted by childhood memories, he feared economic ruin. “A life begun as a flight from poverty,” write his biographers, Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie, “was ending in a compulsive search for cash.” The lure of U.S. dollars was overwhelming.

On his return to America, Dickens saw many of the cities he had seen 25 years earlier. The old feuds were forgotten. His dramatic readings were sell-outs. In New York, 40,000 people heard him read his own works; $2 tickets were scalped at $20 or more. Dickens netted almost $200,000 in America.

He completed his tour with a glow-
ing testimony at a press banquet at Delmonico's in Manhattan, praising the "amazing changes" he had observed in America and promising to include his compliments in future editions of American Notes and Martin Chuzzlewit. But the grueling winter trip, which friends had advised him against, took a toll of Dickens' health. He died two years later in 1870 at age 58.

Edgar Johnson has written that the unifying thread in all Dickens' prose was a "critical analysis of 19th-century society unsurpassed by any novelist in grasp or scope." Dickens turned his journalist's eye on mid-19th-century America, and his observations in 1842—recorded in his letters, in American Notes, and in Martin Chuzzlewit—on its people, customs, and institutions remain fresh and vivid more than a century after he wrote them.

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AN ENGLISHMAN IN AMERICA


Americans are friendly, earnest, hospitable, kind, frank, very often accomplished, far less prejudiced than you would suppose, warm-hearted, fervent, and enthusiastic. They are chivalrous in their universal politeness to women, courteous, obliging, disinterested; and, when they conceive a perfect affection for a man (as I may venture to say of myself), entirely devoted to him.

I have received thousands of people of all ranks and grades, and have never once been asked an offensive or unpolite question—except by Englishmen, who, when they have been "located" here for some years, are worse than the devil in his blackest painting.

The State is a parent to its people; has a parental care and watch over all poor children, women labouring of child, sick persons, and captives.

The common men render you assistance in the streets, and would revolt from the offer of a piece of money. The desire to oblige is universal; and I have never once travelled in a public conveyance, without making some generous acquaintance whom I have been sorry to part from, and who has in many cases come on miles, to see us again.

But I don't like the country. I would not live here, on any consideration. It goes against the grain with me. I think it impossible, utterly impossible, for any Englishman to live here, and be happy.

From a letter to Dickens' friend and biographer, John Forster

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AFTER-DINNER CONVERSATION

Dickens' wrote Martin Chuzzlewit in 1843. Here the young hero, fresh from England, surveys his fellow lodgers at a Manhattan boarding house.

It was a numerous company, 18 or 20 perhaps. Of these some five or six were ladies, who sat wedged together in a little phalanx by themselves. . . .

After dinner several of the gentlemen got up, one by one, and walked off as they swallowed their last morsel; pausing generally by the stove for a minute or so to refresh themselves at the brass spittoons. A few sedentary characters, however, remained at table full a quarter of an hour, and did not rise until the ladies rose, when all stood up.

'Where are they going?' asked Martin, in the ear of Mr. Jefferson Brick.

'To their bedrooms, sir.'

'Is there no dessert, or other interval of conversation?' asked Martin, who was disposed to enjoy himself after his long voyage.

'We are a busy people here, sir, and have no time for that,' was the reply.

So the ladies passed out in single file; Mr. Jefferson Brick and such other married gentlemen as were left, acknowledging the departure of their other halves by a nod; and there was an end of them.

Martin thought this an uncomfortable custom, but he kept his opinion to himself for the present, being anxious to hear, and inform himself by, the conversation of the busy gentlemen, who now lounged about the stove as if a great weight had been taken off their minds by the withdrawal of the other sex; and who made a plentiful use of the spittoons and their toothpicks.
It was rather barren of interest, to say the truth; and the greater part of it may be summed up in one word. Dollars. All their cares, hopes, joys, affections, virtues, and associations, seemed to be melted down into dollars.

Whatever the chance contributions that fell into the slow cauldron of their talk, they made the gruel thick and slab with dollars. Men were weighed by their dollars, measures gauged by their dollars; life was auctioneered, appraised, put up, and knocked down for its dollars.

The next respectable thing to dollars was any venture having their attainment for its end. Make commerce one huge lie and mighty theft. Deface the banner of the nation for an idle rag; pollute it star by star; and cut out stripe by stripe as from the arm of a degraded soldier. Do anything for dollars! What is a flag to them?

A VISIT TO A CINCINNATI SCHOOL

"Cincinnati," wrote Dickens, was "honourably famous for its free schools."

Cincinnati is a beautiful city; cheerful, thriving, and animated. I have not often seen a place that commends itself so favourably and pleasantly to a stranger at the first glance as this does: with its clean houses of red and white, its well-paved roads, and foot-ways of bright tile. Nor does it become less possessing on a closer acquaintance....

[The town's free schools are] so many that no person's child among its population, can, by possibility, want the means of education, which are extended, upon an average, to 4,000 pupils, annually.

I was only present in one of these establishments during the hours of instruction. In the boys' department, which was full of little urchins (varying in their ages, I should say, from 6 years old to 10 or 12), the master offered to institute an extemporary examination of the pupils in algebra; a proposal, which, as I was by no means confident of my ability to detect mistakes in that science, I declined with some alarm.

In the girls' school, reading was proposed; and as I felt tolerably equal to that art, I expressed my willingness to hear a class. Books were distributed accordingly, and some half-dozen relieved each other in reading paragraphs from English history. But it seemed to be a dry compilation, infinitely above their powers; and when they had blundered through three or four dreary passages concerning the Treaty of Amiens, and other thrilling topics of the same nature (obviously without comprehending 10 words), I expressed myself quite satisfied.

It is very possible that they only mounted to this exalted stave in the Ladder of Learning for the astonishment of a visitor; and that at other times they keep upon its lower rounds; but I should have been much better pleased and satisfied if I had heard them exercised in simpler lessons, which they understood.

From American Notes

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LIFE ON A CANAL BOAT

Traveling on the Pennsylvania Canal from Harrisburg to Pittsburgh, Dickens found his fellow passengers as exotic as they found him.

Bless your heart and soul, my dear fellow,—if you could only see us on board the canal boat! Let me think, for a moment, at what time of the day or night I should best like you to see us.

In the morning? Between five and six in the morning, shall I say? Well! you would like to see me, standing on the deck, fishing the dirty water out of the canal with a tin ladle chained to the boat by a long chain; pouring the same into a tin-basin (also chained up in like manner); and scrubbing my face with the jack towel.

At night, shall I say? I don't know that you would like to look into the cabin at night, only to see me lying on a temporary shelf exactly the width of this sheet of paper when it's open (I measured it this morning), with one man above me, and another below; and, in all, 8 and 20 in a low cabin, which you can't stand upright in with your hat on.

I don't think you would like to look in at breakfast time either, for then these shelves have only just been taken down and put away, and the atmosphere of the place is, as you may suppose, by no means fresh; though there are upon the table tea and coffee, and bread and butter, and salmon, and shad, and liver, and steak, and potatoes, and pickles, and ham, and pudding, and sausages; and 3 and 30 people sitting round it, eating and drinking; and savoury bottles of gin, and whiskey, and brandy, and rum, in the bar hard by; and 7 and 20 out of the 8 and 20 men, in foul linen, with yellow streams from half-chewed tobacco trickling down their chins.

Perhaps the best time for you to take a peep would be the present: 11 o'clock in the forenoon; when the
barber is at his shaving, and the gentlemen are lounging about the stove waiting for their turns, and not more than 17 are spitting in concert.

I am writing this in the ladies’ cabin, which is a part of the gentlemen’s, and only screened off by a red curtain. Indeed it exactly resembles the dwarf’s private apartment in a caravan at a fair: and the gentlemen, generally, represent the spectators at a penny-a-head. The place is just as clean and just as large as that caravan you and I were in at Greenwich-fair last past. Outside, it is exactly like any canal-boat you have seen near the Regent’s-park, or elsewhere.

I am considered very hardy in the morning, for I run up, bare-necked, and plunge my head into the half-frozen water, by half-past five o’clock. I am respected for my activity, inasmuch as I jump from the boat to the towing-path, and walk five or six miles before breakfast, keeping up with the horses all the time.

In a word, they are quite astonished to find a sedentary Englishman roughing it so well, and taking so much exercise; and question me very much on that head.

The greater part of the men will sit and shiver round the stove all day, rather than put one foot before the other. As to having a window open, that’s not to be thought of.

From a March 28, 1842, letter to John Forster

THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER

A portrait of the river at its junction with the Ohio, near Cairo, Illinois.

But what words shall describe the Mississippi, great father of rivers, who (praise be to Heaven) has no young children like him!

An enormous ditch, sometimes two or three miles wide, running liquid mud, six miles an hour: its strong and frothy current choked and obstructed everywhere by huge logs and whole forest trees; now twining themselves together in great rafts, from the interstices of which a sedgy lazy foam works up, to float upon the water’s top; now rolling past like monstrous bodies, their tangled roots showing like matted hair; now glancing singly by like giant leeches; and now writhing round and round in the vortex of some small whirlpool, like wounded snakes.

The banks low, the trees dwarfish, the marshes swarming with frogs, the wretched cabins few and far apart, their inmates hollow-cheeked and pale, the weather very hot, mosquitoes penetrating into every crack and crevice of the boat, mud and slime on everything; nothing pleasant in its aspect, but the harmless lightning which flickers every night upon the dark horizon.

From American Notes

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FACTORY GIRLS

Dickens had visited many grim manufacturing towns in England; the textile mills in Lowell, Massachusetts, gave him some surprises.

These girls were all well dressed: and that phrase necessarily includes extreme cleanliness. They had serviceable bonnets, good warm cloaks, and shawls; and were not above clogs and pattens. Moreover, there were places in which they could deposit these things without injury; and there were conveniences for washing.

They were healthy in appearance, many of them remarkably so, and had the manners and deportment of young women: not of degraded brutes of burden.

The rooms in which they worked, were as well ordered as themselves. In the windows of some, there were green plants, which were trained to shade the glass; in all, there was as much fresh air, cleanliness, and comfort, as the nature of the occupation would possibly admit of.

Out of so large a number of females, many of whom were only then just verging upon womanhood, it may be reasonably supposed that some were delicate and fragile in appearance: no doubt there were. But I solemnly declare, that from all the crowd I saw in the different factories that day, I cannot recall one young face that gave me a painful impression; nor one young girl whom, assuming it to be matter of necessity that she should gain her daily bread by the labour of her hands, I would have removed from those works if I had had the power. . . .

I am now going to state three facts, which will startle a large class of readers on this side of the Atlantic.

Firstly, there is a joint-stock piano in a great many of the boarding-houses. Secondly, nearly all these young ladies subscribe to circulating libraries. Thirdly, they have got up among themselves a periodical called THE LOWELL OFFERING, "A repository of original articles, written exclusively by females actively employed in the mills,"—which is duly printed, published, and sold; and whereof I brought away from Lowell 400 good solid pages, which I have read from beginning to end.

The large class of readers, startled by these facts, will exclaim, with one voice, "How very preposterous!" On my deferentially inquiring why, they will answer, "These things are above their station." In reply to that objection, I would beg to ask what their station is.

It is their station to work. And they do work. They labour in these mills, upon an average, 12 hours a day, which is unquestionably work, and pretty tight work too.

Perhaps it is above their station to indulge in such amusements, on any terms. Are we quite sure that we in England have not formed our ideas of the "station" of working people, from accustoming ourselves to the contemplation of that class as they are, and not as they might be? I think that if we examine our own feelings, we shall find that the pianos, and the circulating libraries, and even the Lowell Offering, startle us by their novelty, and not by their bearing upon any abstract question of right or wrong.

From American Notes
Guest of the Governor of Massachusetts, Dickens spent a weekend in Worcester in February 1842. Of New England he later wrote, “delicate slopes of land, gently-swelling hills, wooded valleys, and slender streams, abound.”

SLAVERY IN VIRGINIA

Traveling by rail from Fredericksburg to Richmond, the English author got his first views of the South and its “peculiar” system of slavery.

In this district, as in all others where slavery sits brooding, (I have frequently heard this admitted, even by those who are its warmest advocates;) there is an air of ruin and decay abroad, which is inseparable from the system.

The barns and outhouses are mouldering away; the sheds are patched and half roofless; the log cabins (built with external chimneys made of clay or wood) are squalid in the last degree.

There is no look of decent comfort anywhere. The miserable stations by the railway side; the great wild wood-yards, whence the engine is supplied with fuel; the negro children rolling on the ground before the cabin doors, with dogs and pigs; the biped beasts of burden slinking past; gloom and dejection are upon them all.

In the negro car belonging to the train in which we made this journey, were a mother and her children who had just been purchased; the husband and father being left behind with their old owner. The children cried the whole way, and the mother
was misery's picture. The champion
of Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness, who had bought them,
rode in the same train; and, every
time we stopped, got down to see
that they were safe. The black in
Sinbad's Travels with one eye in the
middle of his forehead which shone
like a burning coal, was nature's
aristocrat compared with this white
gentleman.

From American Notes

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CONGRESSMEN AT WORK

Dickens visited both Houses of Congress during a week-long stay in Washington.

Did I see in this public body an as-
ssemblage of men, bound together in
the sacred names of Liberty, and
Freedom, and so asserting the chaste
dignity of those twin goddesses, in all
their discussions, as to exalt at once
the Eternal Principles to which their
names are given, and their own
character and the character of their
countrymen, in the admiring eyes of
the whole world?

I saw in them, the wheels that
move the meanest perversion of vir-
tuous Political Machinery that the
worst tools ever wrought. Despicable
trickery at elections; under-handed
tamperings with public officers;
cowardly attacks upon opponents,
with scurrilous newspapers for
shields, and hired pens for daggers;
shameful trucklings to mercenary
knaves, whose claim to be consid-
ered, is, that every day and week they
sow new crops of ruin with their
venal types, which are the dragon's
teeth of yore, in everything but
sharpness; aidings and abettions of
every bad inclination in the popular
mind, and artful suppressions of all
its good influences: such things as
these, and in a word, Dishonest Fac-
tion in its most depraved and most
unblushing form, stared out from
every corner of the crowded hall....

It is the game of these men, and of
their profligate organs, to make the
strife of politics so fierce and brutal,
and so destructive of all self-respect
in worthy men, that sensitive and
delicately-minded persons shall be
kept aloof; and they, and such as
they, be left to battle out their selfish
views unchecked. And thus this low-
est of all scrambling fights goes on,
and they who in other countries
would, from their intelligence and
station, most aspire to make the
laws, do here recoil the farthest from
that degradation.

That there are, among the repre-
sentatives of the people in both
Houses, and among all parties, some
men of high character and great abil-
ities, I need not say....

They are striking men to look at,
hard to deceive, prompt to act, lions
in energy, Indians in fire of eye and
gesture. Americans in strong and
generous impulse; and they as well
represent the honour and wisdom of
their country at home.

From American Notes
A VISIT TO THE PRESIDENT

Occupying the White House in 1842 was John Tyler, who as Vice President succeeded William Henry Harrison after Harrison died in office in 1841.

I was taken there [the White House] by the Secretary to the Senate: a namesake of mine, whom "John Tyler" had dispatched to carry me to him for a private interview which is considered a greater compliment than the public audience. We entered a large hall, and rang a large bell—if I may judge from the size of the handle. Nobody answering the bell, we walked about on our own account, as divers other gentlemen (mostly with their hats on, and their hands in their pockets) were doing, very leisurely.

Some of them had ladies with them to whom they were shewing the premises; others were lounging on the chairs and sofas; others, yawning and picking their teeth.

The greater part of this assemblage were rather asserting their supremacy than doing anything else; as they had no particular business there, that anybody knew of. A few were eyeing the moveables as if to make quite sure that the President (who is not popular) hadn't made away with any of the furniture, or sold the fixtures for his private benefit. . . .

We went up stairs into another chamber, where were the more favored visitors who were waiting for audiences. At sight of my conductor, a black in plain clothes and yellow slippers, who was moving noiselessly about, and whispering messages in the ears of the more impatient, made a sign of recognition and glided off to announce us. . . .

In five minutes' time, the black came back, and led us into an upper room—a kind of office—where, by the side of a hot stove, though it was a very hot day, sat the President—all alone; and close to him, a great spit box, which is an indispensable article of furniture here . . . .

The President got up, and said, "Is this Mr. Dickens?"—"Sir," returned Mr. Dickens—"it is." "I am astonished to see so young a man Sir," said the President. Mr. Dickens smiled, and thought of returning the compliment—but he didn't; for the President looked too worn and tired, to justify it. "I am happy to join with my fellow citizens in welcoming you, warmly, to this country," said the President. Mr. Dickens thanked him, and shook hands.

Then the other Mr. Dickens, the Secretary, asked the President to come to his house that night, which the President said he should be glad to do, but for the pressure of business, and measles.

Then the President and the two Mr. Dickenses sat and looked at each other until Mr. Dickens of London observed that no doubt the President's time was fully occupied, and he and the other Mr. Dickens had better go. Upon that they all rose up; and the President invited Mr. Dickens (of London) to come again, which he said he would. And that was the end of the conference.

From a March 12, 1842, letter to Albany Free-Blanque, editor of the London Examiner.
We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer’s telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editor’s requests for comment.

Mathias on Mexico: A Time for Courtesies

Re your three articles on Mexico [WQ, Summer 1979], a comment:

One of the most difficult emotional adjustments required of human beings is the recognition of maturity in another who was previously considered immature. This can create problems between fellow employees; it frequently disrupts homes, and it may affect neighborly relations when the child next door is involved. So it is with the United States and Mexico.

Many Americans know little about Mexico and picture it from the stereotypes in movies and on television. That inadequate source of knowledge misrepresents the scene and ignores Mexican achievements in many fields. Even well-traveled Americans who visit Mexico and find the accommodations, the food, the ancient and modern art and architecture to be the equal of any in the world still observe with some condescension that it was the low prices that attracted them. It seems hard for us to recognize that we have a mature neighbor whose national attainments are so impressive.

Perhaps more is at work than simply human nature.

Mexico is part of the Hispanic world, and Spain was feared and hated by many generations of American colonists and their English forebears. From Sir Francis Drake to General Zachary Taylor, the enemy was the power of Spanish civilization to threaten the English-speaking world. Old prejudices die very slowly.

But, whatever the cause, the time has come for us to remove the emotional blockage and to rejoice that the North American continent is blessed with a nation as remarkable as Mexico.

Beginning with its pre-Columbian monuments and including its scholars and universities, its artists and authors, its great cities and magnificent countryside, there is much for the world to admire and for us to appreciate. Problems exist, but so does potential.

For too long now, however, we in the United States have professed friendship with Mexico while neglecting the little courtesies and considerations that feed a friendship. As Ralph Waldo Emerson very wisely observed: “Friendship should be surrounded with ceremonies and respects, and not crushed into corners.”

If we hope to realize the great potential inherent in cordial U.S.-Mexican relations, then we must stop crushing Mexico into a corner of our consciousness and start to address that relationship with the seriousness it merits.

Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.
United States Senate

A Sports Myth for Black Youth

Regarding American sports and black athletes [*Sports in America,* WQ, Summer 1979], one thing is often left unsaid, namely, the statistical infrequency with which blacks excel in sports.

In the opinion of an increasing number
COMMENTARY

of black sociologists, administrators, and former athletes:
—The myth that a sports career is an escalator from poverty to the good life damages every black community in the nation. Actually it’s a "treadmill"—not an escalator—"a treadmill to nowhere."
—There’s more chance of becoming a surgeon or architect than an all-star infielder.
—For every O.J. Simpson, Julius Erving, or Reggie Jackson, hundreds of thousands of young American athletes try and fail.

"You can work out the odds with a pencil and paper," says Harry Edwards, a sociology professor at the University of California, Berkeley. "Less than 900 black athletes are earning a living in sports—and not more than 1,500 overall including coaches and trainers. By comparison, there are perhaps 3 million black youths between 13 and 22 who dream of a career as an athlete. The odds are 20,000 to 1 or worse. Statistically, you have a better chance of getting hit by a meteorite in the next 10 years than getting work as an athlete."

Says Los Angeles mayor Tom Bradley: "In pro sports, only a handful make it—and they make it only for a short while. If they rely solely on athletics, they’re in trouble once that career ends."

Arthur Ashe, a former Wimbledon tennis champion, strongly advises against inviting the lucky few—"Walt Frazier or O.J. or Abdul-Jabbar"—to appear before black schoolboys.

"Invite a benchwarmer or a guy who didn’t make it," Ashe suggests, noting that these types are in the overwhelming majority—white or black. "Ask him whether he graduated. Ask him what he would do if he became disabled tomorrow. Ask him why he slept every night. Ask him whether he graduated. Ask him what he would do if he became disabled tomorrow. Ask him where his old high school athletic buddies are."

Those who have looked into it speak with one voice on what they call the "real" problem: As New York University’s Roscoe C. Brown, Jr., says, sports are overrated in the black community. As Edwards says, respected American black athletes are creating wrong role models today—to the detriment and disadvan-

tage of the black community. With the effort he put into basketball, Dr. J. could have been a brain surgeon.

Bob Oates
Los Angeles Times


Sport Is Sport Is Sport

Gertrude Stein’s reiterative statement about a rose being a rose is dismissed by many as a tiresome verbal doodle, but there is a value in the warning that when we call things other than what they are, the world gets out of joint.

Sport is sport is sport. It is not a means of making the player a better person, or possibly even a more healthy one. In the long run, and perhaps because of long runs, it has probably killed as many as it has revivified.

It is not a means of showing the superiority of one’s person, school, or nation. The ability to hit or kick a ball is just that, and success at doing such things does not in fact make the kicker or hitter a judge of the worth of consumer products.

Sport is physical diversion played either by rules spontaneously adopted by a group or by a code accepted through custom. It is supposed to provide pleasure and excitement for the participants and to take them for a time out of the regular rhythms of the world in which they live.

Although success or failure must be believed to be tremendously important at the time of play, they should, at the close of play, be recognized as unimportant.

By failing to recognize that sport is sport is sport, the world has turned sport into work, and ugly work at that. There is, in the mixture of piety, cruelty, and cupidity that marks much of it now, proof again that the pursuit of happiness has always seemed just a little frivolous to the Better Sort of People.

Still, there’s hope. It’s in every meadow where kids, escaped from their parents, are choosing up sides, in every street

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where a broom handle and a rubber ball are the tools of magic, in all the places where, at a game, the laughter is louder than the cheers.

Heywood Hale Brown
Commentator, "Sunday Morning News," CBS

Soccer and Violence

Michael Novak's descriptions of soccer in the "Soccer and Hockey" box ["A Holy Trinity," WQ, Summer 1979] contain inaccuracies and misrepresentations. In the black African countries, effortless running and freedom are indeed hallmarks of the game, but it is played on baked mud surfaces not in green fields as in Europe. Similarly, in India and Pakistan the game is played on baked mud areas and is more or less exclusively played by immigrants. Traditionally, the Indians and Pakistanis play field hockey and cricket. Indeed, as a teacher in Pakistan I saw only the Moslem boys from South Africa play soccer. No native-born Pakistani would play such a violent game!

The violence of soccer is reflected by the high percentage of player injuries and even wars declared (El Salvador and Honduras declared war on each other as a result of the outcome of one World Cup Soccer match in 1969). The effects of the hot climate and Latin temper are not confined to players alone. In Brazil as in Argentina and Uruguay, spectators are caged behind high wire netting fences. They are only let out after the end of the game.

European soccer spectators are no less violent than their South American counterparts. Mass destruction and even murder occur among rival groups of fans. Several European soccer clubs are now banned from entering international competitions because of vandalism inflicted by visiting club supporters on host cities.

No, soccer is not the epitome of a game with an almost total absence of violence and force.

Nigel K. Roberts, M.D.
Los Angeles, Calif.

Atomic Power: Past and Present

Recently I purchased the original of the cartoon below at an exhibit featuring the work of a young cartoonist Salih Memecan. What a total contrast to the optimistic Gunder cartoon of 1959! [in Alvin Weinberg, "Salvaging the Atomic Age," WQ, Summer 1979].

Erika H. Gilson
Cherry Hill, N.J.

A Lesson Well Learned

While I respect Alvin Weinberg greatly as an outstanding scientist, there are several important points in his article with which I disagree.

Three Mile Island (TMI) arose from a "blind spot"—an industry/regulator preoccupation with catastrophic accidents and a failure to focus sufficiently on this particular accident sequence. The equipment and operators could have safely overcome the initial transient if the operators had been trained to deal with it. After TMI this error was rapidly corrected at other reactors throughout the country.

The question then is how to eliminate or severely reduce the likelihood of other
future "blind spots" in the system. The new Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, established by the utility industry, will help with its ongoing analyses of operating experience from reactors. Lessons learned will be fed back to reactor operators.

Beyond this there has been an immense "consciousness raising" on the part of managers of utilities with nuclear plants. I believe Weinberg underestimates the impact that TMI has had on top utility executives. I have seen it first hand in a number of meetings with them.

Also, Weinberg has revived his long-time proposal for energy parks of up to 10 reactors. There are many reasons why such a wholesale change is impractical. However, we may expect some additional reactors at existing sites because of economic considerations and difficulties in obtaining new sites. Weinberg suggests improvement by reorganization. I feel what we actually need is improvement by inspiration and hard thinking.

Competency of an operator to run a reactor safely need not depend on the utility's size and number of reactors. It does depend on the level of safety awareness among its management and on the resources committed to support the individual operation. In recognition of these factors, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations will establish industry-wide benchmarks for excellence in the operation of reactors and conduct audits to ensure that standards are maintained.

The "blind spot" that made TMI a serious accident has already been corrected. Many other lesser lessons have also been learned and are being applied. Restructuring is not necessary to achieve the goals we mutually seek.

Carl Weiske, President
Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

Saudi Arabian Profit Sharing

The assertion of Mr. James V. Knight ("Commentary," WQ, Spring 1979) that Saudi Arabia did not technically receive a tax subsidy from the U.S. Treasury commencing in 1950 is the final "snapshot view" of a series of events. Taking the sequence back to the point when Aramco finally agreed that a 50-50 split with the Saudis was the way to go, there were only two means available to do this. One would have been to cut into Aramco's profit, and the second would have been to raise the posted price, thus making Saudi oil unattractive on the world market. Neither was acceptable to Aramco.

The late John M. Blair in his book, The Control of Oil, suggests that a Treasury official proposed the introduction of corporate taxation into the naive accounting practices of Arab Sheikdoms. This was accomplished by a joint Treasury-Oil Industry team that toured the Mideast in 1950.

Thus, instead of raising Saudi royalties from the existing 12 percent to 50 percent (a burden that would generate an after-tax impact on Aramco of about 50 cents on the extra royalty dollars), the Saudis took their increased share as tax on Aramco's operating profit (said to be about 50 percent at that time). This new levy was therefore tax deductible in the United States (at the expense of other tax revenue providers).

Whether the maneuver can be labeled a subsidy in terms of all overseas corporate activities is debatable, but it provided a most lucrative loophole at a time when the major part of oil company profits was at the well head. Although the U.S. Internal Revenue code allowed for this bilateral provision in commercially developed countries, the introduction of corporate taxation in Saudi Arabia came after the Saudis' demands for a 50 percent royalty fee, which was the traditional way of profit sharing there.

Thomas B. Bamford
Lincolnville, Maine

Unfortunately a number of responses to Mr. Weinberg's widely-cited article arrived too late for inclusion in this issue. The WQ will publish these comments in the Winter 1980 issue.—ED.
Our Future with the Saudis

U.S.-Saudi economic relationships have become increasingly complex since the oil price increase of five years ago. While we weathered the quadrupling of oil prices, we have the critical problem of how to ensure adequate supplies of a depletable resource at reasonable prices. We need to continue our policy of cooperation with Saudi Arabia to ease the transition to a world economy in which alternative energy resources will play an increasingly important role. Efforts such as joint cooperation in solar energy research, currently underway under the U.S.-Saudi Joint Economic Commission, serve the objectives of both countries.

The excellent articles by William Rugh, John Duke Anthony, and David Long on Saudi history, society, foreign policy, and oil [WQ, Winter 1979] are most helpful in understanding Saudi attitudes toward issues of major importance to the United States. Everyone living today has witnessed major changes in his environment. However, changes taking place in the Saudi environment are particularly rapid and pervasive.

The development of the kingdom’s natural and human resources at a pace consistent with the maintenance of religious and cultural values is an important objective of the Saudis and is related to their attitudes toward increasing production of oil.

Our future relationship with Saudi Arabia lies in closer consultations and better understanding of each other’s objectives and perception of issues so that rational policies can be pursued to benefit not only the United States and Saudi Arabia but the world community as well.

Bonnie Pounds, Director
Office of Saudi Arabian Affairs
U.S. Treasury Department

Great Britain:
An Outsider’s Opinion

The future of Britain cannot be predicted because its present situation cannot be explained—so much is agreed by Marcus Cunliffe and Geoffrey Best [“Letter from England,” WQ, Spring 1979]. However, it may be that the solutions are not impossible to see from the outside.

Best [in the box entitled “Troubled Britain: Another View”] puzzles that Britain has long been industrialized and is divided into classes, but has not experienced the revolution predicted by Marx. Marx expected the most efficient produc-
ers to secure enormously profitable monopolies. The monopolies that exist in Britain are, as Cunliffe reminds us, the creatures of special privilege and are signally unprofitable. Since they are subsidized by a progressive tax system, they act to oblitelite, not to accentuate, the social order. There is therefore no reason to apply Marx’s reasoning to Britain. In any case, those who do not share Marx’s conviction that the future is determined are actively changing the future.

Cunliffe wonders whether Britain is ungovernable, and poses the riddle, “If Scotland and Wales acquire separate parliaments, should there not also be one for England?” The question that Cunliffe really wishes us to answer is, “Must a union of as few as three states have as many as four legislatures?” There could be one legislature, in which the Scottish delegation has a veto, the Welsh delegation a veto, and the English delegation a veto: Each delegation would very soon learn not to interfere with bills affecting only another constituency. Or there could be three legislatures: Instead of a measure requiring the assent of commons, lords, and crown, it would require the assent of England, Wales, and Scotland.

A Defense of Community Colleges

By and large, Larry Van Dyne [“The Latest Wave: Community Colleges,” WQ, Autumn 1978] presents an accurate picture of the community college in America. Unfortunately, however, he perpetuates the acidulous comparison of community colleges with universities. So long as one looks at the academic community as a hierarchy—becoming more exclusive and hence more prestigious as graduate study is approached—then the view that Van Dyne offers probably will stand. Community colleges will remain at the bottom of the ladder unless they are perceived in the light of their own objectives and contributions.

Community colleges are not preoccu- pied with “high intellectual status”—but with service at low cost and close to home. Nor are they “struggling along.” They have the resources, the facilities, the excellent teachers that are required to meet the objectives that have been set for them. And they have popular support.

It was not the educators alone who pushed for these new colleges. Citizens did it. They taxed themselves heavily for college opportunity that was not there before to make available at least two years of further education for all high school graduates. Community colleges were not to replace the place of four-year colleges. Nor were they designed as alternatives. They were seen as institutions that would extend and expand opportunity for entry into college.

The community college is an egalitarian institution. More than 4 million students of every race, creed, color, age, sex, and socioeconomic background are enrolled for credit—and a like number in noncredit programs. At least one-third will complete bachelor’s programs. Students who go on perform well in the universities. At least another third are in the occupational programs—including mounting numbers with bachelor’s degrees—mostly because they want to be in them. Community colleges do not track people. Students move in and out of programs—and even colleges—as their needs, interests, and aspirations change.

The system is not rigid. In California’s “three-tiered” system, for example, thousands eligible for the state colleges and universities opt for community colleges. Two-thirds of the undergraduate students enrolled on the 19 campuses of the California State University and Colleges system in 1977 had transferred from community colleges. One-half of those who received baccalaureate degrees had started in community colleges.

True, not all the answers are in on the community college. But from what we know now, the “latest wave” has indisputably improved the quality of life for millions of Americans. Not a bad score.

Edmund J. Gleazer, Jr., President
American Association of Community and Junior Colleges, Washington, D.C.
Corrections

Catching up with a bit of Quarterly reading, I noticed that the date given for Paul Gauguin's self-portrait ["Gauguin: The Artist as 'Savage,'" WQ, Autumn 1978] is 1814. On the opposite page the text reads that Gauguin was born in 1848. There must be an error somewhere.

Also, your article recounts the tale of Vincent van Gogh cutting off his ear and giving it to a prostitute. I wonder how much of his ear was removed as I have heard several versions of the story? I would appreciate it if this detail was once and for all resolved, for the severing of van Gogh's ear is here to stay in colorful history.

Martha A. Kopochis
Wildwood, Ill.

Thank you for your keen eye in spotting the error in the date of Gauguin's self-portrait. The actual date was 1889.

There are different accounts as to whether van Gogh cut off just a part or the whole ear. A French newspaper of the time reported that in a fit of rage he cut off part of his ear and hurried to a downtown maison de la tolerance where he offered it to a woman named Rachael saying, "Keep this object carefully."

Many a historian of pre-Columbia Mexico has puzzled over the possible location of the Aztecs' mythical homeland of Aztlán. I am glad to see that the mystery has now been cleared up. On page 151 ["Background Books: Mexico," WQ, Summer 1979] we are told that Aztlán was a Caribbean island "off the coast of the present state of Nayarit."

Don Johnstone
Albuquerque, N.M.

Mr. Johnstone is, to our sorrow, correct. Nayarit is not on the east coast of Mexico, but on the west, bordering the Pacific Ocean.

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