On the death of cheap energy

Cheap labor is gone. So is cheap housing. Cheap land is vanishing fast, and cheap education is a nostalgic memory. Cheap medical and hospital care passed on some time ago. In each of these cases, there was widespread public consternation at their demise. And now time has caught up with cheap energy, and the bell tolls both the funeral and the attendant public outrage.

To some extent, we and many other oil companies must plead guilty to the accusation that we made energy too cheap for too long. We weren't alone, of course. On natural gas, for instance, the government maintained a policy on pricing that ignored the true worth and replacement cost, intentionally keeping it so cheap that conservation was foolish, capital investment was discouraged, and supplies of natural gas grew perilously short. And, in the meantime, we were searching everywhere for more energy. Whenever we found it, we marketed it at the lowest feasible cost.

Even the prices of almost every other product were climbing steadily. Energy prices stayed low—a little upward bump now and then, cushioned by long periods of stability. In economic terms, measured by the work a given unit of energy could accomplish, energy costs were a freak, an anomaly. Even today, government controls keep the cost of energy in the U.S. a bargain in comparison to its cost in most other countries.

Cheap energy was instrumental in creating a civilization—the one we now enjoy. Some say it made too much civilization, in too many places, on too many pristine shores and tranquil plains. These are the people who criticize Mobil, and companies like us, for having found and delivered all this cheap energy to America.

They do not care for the way America has used its cheap energy, and many agree with the view endorsed by Amory Lovins in Nonnuclear Futures that "even if we had an unlimited energy source, we would lack the discipline to use it wisely." Solar energy appeals to them, not so much as a technological solution, but because, as Lovins writes in the same book, "...it limits the amount of mischief we can get into."

It is as though Americans had proved themselves a gaggle of unruly children. We do not agree. Is the huge interconnected power grid that reaches out to every state in the continental U.S. some sort of blunder? Were we silly to build the great net of highways that made us a more unified people? Is the industrial might of this nation a gross mistake, one we should have passed by for the simpler, agricultural existence of the 19th century? Were our farmers deluded in using energy as the base for the most efficient and productive agricultural enterprise on earth? Of course not.

We think the results of the U.S. energy boom are a magnificent tribute to American enterprise and ingenuity, the envy of all the world. And, if we had our druthers, we think America, and every other country, would make good use of more cheap energy.

But at the moment there isn't any. And there is not likely to be any for quite some time to come. If there's any around, we hope to be the first to find it or develop and deliver it.

Until then, all we can do about cheap energy is join you in mourning the great times we had with it, and in wishing it had lasted forever.

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In this issue of WQ, for example, we present, in translation, the concluding chapter of Fernand Braudel's monumental new history of capitalism. Some of Professor Braudel's unconventional ideas were debated during his stay as a Fellow at the Center in 1976. For our three-part examination of Puerto Rico, we draw heavily on the Center's Latin American studies program, which is holding a major conference on the Commonwealth's prospects this spring. Our cluster of articles on "Health in America" includes a provocative commentary by author-physician Lewis Thomas, who addressed a Center seminar late last year.

The Center has a growing network of alumni and friends around the world. They provide the Quarterly with a unique range of intellectual assets, and we plan to make even greater use of them in the future.

Peter Braestrup
Desegregate, but Don’t Integrate

Judicial decisions are shaped by political and economic realities as well as by legal principles. The Supreme Court’s landmark school desegregation ruling, Brown v. Board of Education (1954), is no exception, says Bell, a Harvard Law School professor.

In principle, the Court’s decision in Brown rested on the conviction that state-imposed school segregation violates blacks’ right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because segregation harms them. Yet in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), and thereafter until 1954, the Court by and large upheld the right of whites to freedom of association despite black charges of discriminatory treatment. Bell suggests that the Court’s abrupt shift in 1954 from sanctioning “separate but equal” schools grew partly out of a convergence of black and liberal white self-interest that temporarily eclipsed the preferences of lower-class Southern white segregationists. During the 1950s, for example, lawyers for the NAACP and the federal government both argued that the United States could score critical points with Third World countries by renouncing segregation. Time said that racism had “damaged” America’s image abroad. And many white businessmen and government officials contended that segregation was crippling the South’s industrial potential.

But the biracial coalition that made Brown possible was fragile. Once it became clear that black gains could only be achieved at some cost to white freedoms, many well-to-do whites backed away from supporting affirmative-action programs and busing. The Court began having “ju-
Outraged by court-ordered busing in 1976, rioting Boston students attack a black lawyer with Old Glory. Stanley Forman’s photo won the 1977 Pulitzer Prize.

Outraged by court-ordered busing in 1976, rioting Boston students attack a black lawyer with Old Glory. Stanley Forman’s photo won the 1977 Pulitzer Prize.

dicial second thoughts,” too. In recent decisions such as Milliken v. Bradley (1974) and Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (1977), the Court has “erected barriers” to achieving racial balance in schools—chiefly by rating “local control” just as important as integration (effectively preventing school busing between the suburbs and the inner city), and by forcing plaintiffs to prove that segregation has been “intentionally and invidiously” fostered by school officials.

Brown’s promise of quality education for blacks will never be achieved simply through court-ordered school integration, Bell argues. “White flight” to “safe” school districts has often led to resegregation.

Even in integrated schools, blacks often face segregated classes and harassment. But Brown has established the right of blacks to the same educational benefits as whites. According to Bell, putting more emphasis on first-rate all-black schools and creating high-quality “magnet schools” open to whites and blacks—”desegregation remedies that do not integrate”—may serve black interests best.

Two Can Play at This Game


One lawyer inveighs against “no-growth” advocates such as the Sierra Club. Another files a suit challenging President Carter’s decision to abrogate the U.S. defense treaty with Taiwan. Both attorneys are part of a new movement: the conservative, not-for-profit law firm.

There are now more than 10 such groups in the country, promoting
economic growth and higher business profits and challenging government regulations, reports Singer, a National Journal correspondent. They charge no fees and are tax-exempt. The oldest, largest, and most powerful group is the Pacific Legal Foundation. Founded in 1973 by lawyers who helped redesign California's welfare system under Governor Ronald Reagan, the firm boasts 18 attorneys and offices in Sacramento, Seattle, and Washington, D.C.

At a time when the more than 100 liberal public-interest law firms face major financial problems, the conservatives are prospering. Twenty-seven percent of Pacific's present $2 million budget comes from corporations. Chambers of Commerce, trade associations, foundations, private law firms, and individuals also provide money. Typical Pacific cases include a suit to permit the use of DDT in the Northwest and an attack on California's moratorium on nuclear plant construction.

By definition, liberal critics assert, public-interest law should serve clients and causes that otherwise might not be heard. Pacific's Raymond M. Momboisse responds that his firm's probusiness activities help "the little guy." And, argues another conservative lawyer, "business is not monolithic." When conservatives attack government regulations on behalf of reluctant businessmen fearing federal reprisals, or aid landowners whose property is threatened by national wildlife programs, they contend they act in the great tradition of public-interest law—representing the unrepresented.

Congress's Ethical Dilemma


To protect the U.S. Congress from executive or judicial harassment, the Constitution charged the Senate and House of Representatives with defining the "disorderly Behavior" of their own members. Today, Congressmen are finding that the new codes of ethics they devised in 1977 have created as many problems as they have solved, writes CQ's assistant managing editor Tarr and reporter Arieff.

Forty-two members of Congress have been criminally indicted in the last 40 years, according to a CQ survey—28 of them since 1970. Most cases have involved attempts at personal enrichment—bribery, income-tax evasion, and misuse of government funds—and more recently, violations of federal election laws.

In 1977, keenly aware that Watergate had eroded public trust in elected officials, the House and Senate adopted new codes of ethics. Both require disclosure of members' finances. The Senate's code, in addition, limits outside earned income to 15 percent of a Senator's $57,500 salary, restricts the use of blind trusts, and curtails the deployment of staff aides to election campaigns. Many Senators complain of unfair personal restrictions and bookkeeping burdens.
Persuading members to serve on the House and Senate ethics committees has been difficult. As a result, five of the six seats on the Senate Ethics Committee are occupied by freshman Senators. Last February, just before the “Abscam” scandal involving seven Representatives and one Senator made news, the Senate voted 78 to 0 to review its ethics procedures “from top to bottom.” In March 1979, the Senate suspended its limits on outside income until 1983.

Legislators do not like congressional ethics committees serving as investigator, prosecutor, grand jury, and judge. Some advocate splitting the investigative function and the trial role between two different panels. Others agree with Senator Harrison E. Schmitt (R.-N.M.), former ethics committee vice chairman, that when a member’s ethics are questionable, “the constituents should be the judge of what should be done, not the Senator’s colleagues.”

Many of his contemporaries called him “the ideal man and statesman” and “leader of the human race.” In 1913, one year after his Bull Moose presidential campaign failed, an American Magazine poll named Theodore Roosevelt “the greatest man in the United States.” Dalton, an American University historian, contends that Roosevelt’s popularity flowed less from his accomplishments as governor of New York (1898-1900) and as President (1901-08) than from the assurances he gave the American people that “the old ideals would get them through.”

Though he drew most of his electoral support from the urban middle class, T.R. was a truly “national hero” to all Americans. His message: They could remain masters of their own fate despite the growth of cities, rapid industrialization, and rise of monopolistic corporations that marked early 20th-century America.

Roosevelt’s most memorable official actions achieved only modest practical results. His 1902 federal law suit against Northern Securities (the giant railroad combine created by the likes of J. P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller) did not break up Big Business. But it did hearten Americans fearful of corporate oligarchy, and it did help to expand the government’s regulatory role. His meetings with black educator Booker T. Washington and reformer Jane Addams were more than simple tokenism. They were important “symbolic stands” for unity.

T.R. appealed to menfolk by championing masculinity in an age of soft city living, besieged individualism, and a growing feminist movement. The mystique of the former cowboy, Rough Rider, and avid big-game hunter retains its vigor today. His picture appeared on the August 9, 1979, cover of Newsweek with the caption “Where Have All the Heroes Gone?”
Great
Expectations

In a recent Gallup Poll, 73 percent of Americans surveyed said that “the public expects more of a President today than in the past.” Another survey late last year showed that Americans believe “strong leadership” to be the single most important quality in a President.

In 1787, the Founding Fathers designed the Presidency as a “managerial” position; Presidents were not supposed to take many domestic initiatives, writes Cronin, a University of Delaware political scientist. Today, many academics agree with historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., that the three-branch U.S. system of government has worked best when strong Presidents have “overcome the tendency toward inertia inherent in a structure of checks and balances.”

Yet Americans have conflicting attitudes toward the Presidency. They are a people, says Cronin, “who want to be led, yet [who] also want to be free and to be left alone.” Hence, the oft-repeated pattern of an activist President followed by a more conservative one. Americans have visions of a presidential candidate “blessed with the mind of a Jefferson, the courage of a Lincoln, the grace of a Kennedy,” yet early in an election year, they are apt to mistake eloquence for effectiveness.

Cronin worries that Americans’ expectations are impossibly, even dangerously, high: “We venerate the presidency,” he writes, and therefore, “we often savage our presidents.” Americans should realize that a healthy society can get along with good rather than great leaders.

Maturity
or Weakness?

All U.S. Presidents during the 1970s portrayed the communist takeover in Indochina, OPEC’s new power, and the Soviet Union’s rise to military parity as evidence that Washington could no longer hope to dominate world politics, says Tucker, a Johns Hopkins political scientist. Consequently, he writes, they characterized the nation’s loss of military superiority and its acceptance of OPEC as elements of a foreign policy of “maturity.”

He suggests that the seeds of America’s inability to deter Moscow’s moves in Afghanistan were planted by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. Both men felt that Vietnam had soured the American people
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on high Pentagon budgets and on any intervention abroad. Groping for a strategy to neutralize growing Soviet military might, Nixon and Kissinger apparently duped themselves. In Tucker's view, they thought the job could be done painlessly through the economic and diplomatic "carrots" (U.S. trade, SALT) offered by detente.

By mid-1975, Tucker contends, Kissinger recognized that his detente policy had failed. Since then, he has backed higher military spending and tougher anti-Soviet policies. But, ironically, his Democratic successors accepted and extended Kissinger's original approach.

According to Tucker, Carter took office convinced that new conditions—chiefly, the nuclear stalemate and the West's economic dependence on the Third World—made the superpowers' military strength largely irrelevant. The new keys to global pre-eminence were economic power and ideological appeal—traditional American strengths and Soviet weaknesses. Carter resolved not to repeat Kissinger's mistake—which stemmed from a preoccupation with Soviet muscle—of vainly opposing leftist forces in the Third World.

Tucker argues that military strength is still the basis of national power. And the Soviets are determined to use such strength to expand their influence throughout the Third World. America now finds its access to vital Persian Gulf oil threatened and its ability to spur NATO resistance to the Soviets diminished.

Requests for higher defense spending in 1980 and a new willingness to protect the Persian Gulf indicate that Carter has abandoned old illusions, says Tucker. But the military weakness they helped to create will take years to overcome.

The First Hostage Crisis

"First Time Farce" by Bruce Hardcastle, in The New Republic (Dec. 22, 1979), Subscription Services Department, P.O. Box 705, Whitinsville, Mass. 01588.

Everything was reversed in the first U.S.-Iranian "hostage" crisis, writes Hardcastle, a Mideast scholar at the National Archives who reconstructed the bizarre affair from declassified U.S. documents.

The incident began on the morning of March 27, 1935, when the shiny chauffeur-driven Packard bearing Iranian Ambassador Ghaffar Khan Djalal, his wife, and dog was stopped for speeding by police chief Jacob T. Biddle in the hamlet of Elkton, Md. Biddle was ready to let the group go with a warning when an infuriated Djalal—who allegedly smelled of drink—grabbed the chief by the tie and shook him. Djalal's claims to diplomatic immunity as a "minister of Iran" impressed no one at the county sheriff's office. Exclaimed one bystander, "Why, he's just a damned preacher!" The Iranian was detained for 1 hour and 45 minutes, before a local justice of the peace dropped all charges.

A formal apology from Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the swift dismissal of Chief Biddle seemed to settle the matter. No complaint was heard from Shah Reza Pahlavi (father of the current Shah) in Tehran.
But the Ambassador soon seized on his arrest as an opportunity to blackmail Hull into a show of esteem that would convince the increasingly skeptical Shah of his diplomatic worth. When Hull refused even to invite the Ambassador to tea, Djalal told his Foreign Minister that his arrest had been part of an American plot to insult Iran. The state-controlled Iranian press was soon branding the United States a land of gangsters who violate “all the existing codes of international law, custom . . . and courtesy.”

Five months later, the New York Mirror published a story alleging that the Shah had been a stableboy for British diplomats. The still-smoldering Iranian government recalled its envoys. The Iranians waited three years, in vain, for Hull to apologize for the Mirror, before returning to Washington. To the Americans, Hardcastle explains, “Iran was not yet important enough for any urgency.”

Shifting the Blame


Was General Douglas MacArthur “stretching” his orders in late November 1950, when he attempted to drive north to Korea’s border with China on the Yalu River? His critics so contend. But according to UCLA sociologist Lo, recently declassified U.S. documents show that the Truman administration explicitly supported MacArthur’s ill-fated campaign.

By November 1950, the tide of war in Korea had turned. A counterattack by United Nations forces begun in September had pushed the North Koreans back beyond the 38th Parallel, deep into their own territory. At that point, MacArthur launched his offensive to reach the Yalu. He was surprised by 300,000 Chinese troops and suffered one of the worst U.S. defeats since the Civil War.

Civilian leaders in Washington later claimed that MacArthur’s advance caught them unawares. No one, wrote Secretary of State Dean Acheson, knew what MacArthur was “up to” in the “amazing military maneuver that was unfolding before disbelieving eyes.”

Yet, as early as September 9, the White House’s National Security Council had urged “a roll-back in Korea north of the 38th Parallel,” provided the Chinese or the Soviets did not intervene. On November 20, Acheson, Defense Secretary George C. Marshall, and White House adviser W. Averell Harriman rejected on Truman’s behalf proposals by the British Foreign Secretary and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to stop MacArthur well short of the Chinese border—despite word of Chinese troops massing in Manchuria and recent U.S. skirmishes with Chinese “volunteers.” On November 21, the Joint Chiefs of Staff specifically
The changing Korean battle front (left to right): highwater mark of the communist invasion (August 1950); the deepest UN thrust northward (November 1950); the furthest Chinese counterattack (January 1951).

gave MacArthur the option of “advancing to” the Yalu.

Truman and his advisers believed that a decisive military victory would convince Far Eastern nations such as Japan and India that, in a U.S.–Soviet showdown, siding with America would be a safe bet. Moreover, writes Lo, U.S. strategists feared growing neutralist sentiment in Britain and elsewhere in Europe. They hoped a resounding success in Korea would spur support for a strong NATO.

A Scheme to Save Minuteman


The destruction of America’s 1,000 land-based Minuteman missiles in their silos by a Soviet surprise ICBM attack is a possibility that haunts U.S. defense officials. Garwin, a Harvard strategic weapons analyst, recommends that the Minuteman—backbone of America’s nuclear forces—be protected by a “launch-under-attack” policy.

In a launch-under-attack system, some portion of the Minuteman force would fire automatically as soon as the Soviets sent up their ICBMs. The strategy has been neither officially embraced nor renounced by U.S. Presidents, perhaps to keep the Soviets guessing.

Garwin calls for a network of orbiting satellites sophisticated enough to detect the known infrared emissions from a Soviet missile launch and to distinguish a genuine attack from tests. Such U.S. satellites already exist. Enough of them should be kept aloft (along with numerous, less costly decoys) to frustrate Soviet antisatellite weapons.

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Detection of a Soviet launch by the satellites would trigger transmission of the codes required to fire selected Minuteman missiles. The code combinations—hidden in constantly changing cryptographic memory banks (similar to message-security systems already in use)—would render the odds against accidental launch or Soviet interference astronomically high. To further reduce the dangers of a mistaken launch, the satellites would activate Minuteman missiles with “inert” warheads, which could be armed in flight electronically by U.S. authorities.

A launch-under-attack strategy, contends Garwin, is inherently no more accident-prone than the current Minuteman firing system, which requires a human decision to launch. And since the plan is designed primarily to deter a Soviet first strike, the more “dangerous” it seems to Moscow, the better it fulfills its mission.

Odd Job

"A Job That Doesn’t Work" by I. M. Destler, in Foreign Policy (Spring 1980), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

The tendency of White House National Security Advisers such as McGeorge Bundy, Henry Kissinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski to become "highly visible policy advocates" has handicapped Secretaries of State, irritated Congress, and confused America’s friends and enemies abroad. The job should be abolished, says Destler, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Dwight D. Eisenhower created the position of National Security Advisor in 1953 to coordinate foreign policy planning among the various agencies represented on the White House’s National Security Council. In 1961, John F. Kennedy dramatically changed the job. He asked his forceful National Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy, to serve also as his personal foreign policy coordinator. Bundy became responsible for controlling the flow of information to and from the President. By 1965, he was shielding Lyndon B. Johnson from much advice against Vietnam escalation, says Destler.

The influence of the National Security Adviser peaked during the Nixon administration. Henry Kissinger beefed up the NSA’s staff from 12 (under Bundy) to more than 50 aides (Brzezinski has since reduced it to around 35). Kissinger used his proximity to the President to completely overshadow Secretary of State William P. Rogers.

In the Carter administration, the prominence of Brzezinski alongside Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance has given the impression at home and abroad of a fragmented U.S. foreign policy. In June 1978, apparent discrepancies in their public statements became so glaring that 14 Congressmen formally asked President Carter to clarify "U.S. policy on such issues as Soviet-American relations and Africa."

The Secretary of State, as in Truman’s time, should be “clearly and visibly pre-eminent,” says Destler; the White House coordinating job should go to a silent junior aide.
In Washington, bad economic data may result in bad policy. Feige, a University of Wisconsin economist, finds the federal government's statistics on the U.S. economy so incomplete as to be nearly worthless.

The main problem: the official data exclude "irregular" economic activity—from illegal drug trafficking and gambling profits to moonlighting and "off-the-books" bartering. Economist Peter Gutman pegged the U.S. "underground" economy at nearly $200 billion in 1976—an amount then equal to roughly 12 percent of the official U.S. Gross National Product. But Feige says even these figures are too low. He compared the total volume of on-the-books cash and credit transactions in the U.S. with the total income declared by individuals and businesses. The difference between the two indicated to him the amount of irregular economic activity in America. His calculations point to an irregular economy of $369 billion in 1976, equal to 22 percent of the measured GNP.

In 1978, he says, this figure rose to $704 billion—fully one-third of recorded output. (High taxes and inflation appear to be behind this phenomenal growth, nudging individuals and businesses into under-the-counter and sometimes illegal activities.) Put another way, the irregular economy is growing about four times faster than the regular economy.

Feige admits he could be several hundred billion dollars off—either too high or (more likely) too low. Still, if his general assessment is correct—and the irregular economy grew 91 percent between 1976 and 1978—then the total U.S. economy expanded by a spectacular 22 percent in real terms during that period (not 9.9 percent, the official rate).

In any case, employment and real growth are much higher than government statistics indicate. Given this cushion, economic policymakers can probably afford to fight inflation with tighter fiscal and monetary restraints than they are using now, according to Feige. The "recession" that could result is likely to exist only on paper.

The American labor market faces unusual shifts in the 1980s. During the past decade, young people from the Baby Boom of the late '40s and early '50s, and unprecedented numbers of women, flooded the job mar-
The work force expanded by 2.3 percent annually, nearly double the rate of increase during the '60s. Unemployment hovered between 7 and 9 percent throughout the mid-'70s.

But during the '80s, says Weber, professor of economics and public administration at Carnegie-Mellon University, the labor force will grow by only 1.1 percent annually. And the American work force as a group will age. The proportion of workers in the 16-to-24 age bracket will decline from the current 23.9 percent to 18.4 percent by 1990. And, although the number of people age 55 and over will rise from 44.1 million in 1980 to 47.1 million in 1990, fewer of them will be working or seeking work.

Declining birth rates are one reason for the shrinking labor supply. The trend toward frequent holidays and early retirement plans—pushed by unemployment-conscious unions—is another. (The United Auto Workers union secured 12 additional days of leave in 1976 alone.) Employers now need more workers per job.

Meanwhile, more generous federal disability benefits and unemployment compensation provide alternatives to job-hunting. Between 1972 and 1977, the number of individuals receiving disability payments shot up 45 percent, to 2.8 million. Weber suggests that more workers with minor handicaps today choose disability payments rather than test the job market.

Nominal "full" employment (4 percent joblessness) is possible by the mid-'80s, says Weber. By then, illegal immigrants will be badly needed as unskilled labor. Yet, the number of Americans in the 25-to-44 age group will swell by one-third—making up 33 percent of the work force—as the Baby-Boom babies grow up. The better-trained workers in this group will have to "jostle and elbow" for white- and blue-collar jobs and promotions. The competitive pressure here will probably produce more opposition to federal affirmative-action programs, a frantic scramble for graduate degrees to embellish job credentials, and growing political demands to retire older workers.


During the 1970s, economists and wealthy aid-giving nations learned that economic growth and new industry alone do not raise living standards in the Third World. In countries such as Brazil and India, for example, impressive advances in manufacturing and trade coexist with hunger and desperate poverty.

Stewart, an Oxford economist, reports on recent World Bank findings that contradict most theories variously linking high living standards to capitalism, or socialism, or even growth itself. In practice, a capitalist country is just as likely as a socialist or communist regime to provide
adequate food, shelter, health care, and education. Almost regardless of their economic growth, nations can launch successful antipoverty campaigns. Indeed, the few Third World governments that have made solid progress in raising living standards—including Burma, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Hong Kong, North Korea, South Korea, Panama, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and Uruguay—constitute a very mixed bag.

Capitalist nations such as South Korea and Taiwan have spread the benefits of rapid growth (respectively 10.1 and 7.2 percent annually in 1970–77) by encouraging labor-intensive industries and promoting land reform to help rural folk. Poorer countries have raised living standards by spending scarce public funds on social services instead of promoting industrial investment. In Sri Lanka, this tradeoff has achieved a 75 percent literacy rate and an average lifespan of 69 years—despite sluggish (3.1 percent) economic growth and a low ($200) per capita income. In communist nations such as Cuba, the tradeoff also involves sharp official curbs on private consumption. Cuba’s economic growth has virtually stopped (2.1 percent annually in 1970–77), but its citizens’ average life span (72 years) and literacy rate (96 percent) are among the world’s highest.

All of these countries have two things in common. Each provides effective health, education, and food-subsidy programs. And, regardless of growth rates and the government’s economic role, each regime emphasizes creating jobs and distributing income throughout the society. Their policymakers seek to boost the purchasing power of the poor, recognizing that the benefits of economic growth do not "trickle down" automatically.

SOCIETY

In Defense of Group Justice


Are federal "affirmative action" programs inherently unfair because they favor some racial and social groups but not others? Should the government instead focus on helping individuals? No, argues MIT economist Thurow. Any society serious about helping victims of poverty and discrimination must seek "group justice."

American traditions have always emphasized the individual. But patterns of discrimination cannot be identified by studying any one person's experience. Thurow argues that unknown factors such as luck—which not even the most ambitious government policies can affect—explain 70 to 80 percent of the gap in earnings between any two
Americans. But the concept of an entire race or sex “down on its luck” defies common sense. Group statistics can and do accurately reveal the systematic denial of opportunity. They show, for example, that the average black full-time worker earns only 72 percent and the average Hispanic only 73 percent as much as their white counterpart.

The fact is, Thurow points out, that the federal government has long geared its economic policies to group needs. Agricultural price support programs, for example, are designed to help American farmers—even though, Thurow contends, farm income per capita was 6 percent higher than nonfarm income in 1976. Social security payments are designed to help the elderly—even though Americans 65 and over enjoy a per capita income only 6 percent lower than the national average.

Thurow calls the recent criticism of affirmative action in the name of “individualism” pure camouflage—“simply a more sophisticated version of the types of individual discrimination that have been outlawed in the past two decades.”

Teen-age mothers—are they destined for a life of poverty, dead-end jobs, and rocky marriages? A recent study by Hofferth and Moore, researchers at the Urban Institute, indicates that early childbearing does limit future earnings and opportunity. But their findings also show that early births alone cannot explain the plight of many young mothers.

The authors studied the experiences of 1,268 women age 14 to 24 of all races and economic classes over a seven-year period beginning in 1968. They found that postponing a first birth generally pays off for both single and married women. Each year a young woman delays having her first child can be linked statistically to $193 in extra earnings annually by age 27. Thus, a woman whose first child comes at age 22 can expect to be earning nearly $1,000 more per year (in 1975 dollars) at age 27 than a woman who gave birth at age 17. Each year a first birth is postponed boosts the income of other family members by $477. The tendency of late childbearers to be better educated than younger mothers (and, the authors suggest, to marry educated men) explains only a quarter of the difference. The sooner a woman bears her first child, the more children she is likely to have—and the fewer years she will spend in the workforce. Family income must be spread more thinly.

Surprisingly, however, in some cases early childbearing is associated with economic benefits. Very young unwed mothers (age 15 to 16) can enter or re-enter the job market—and stay there—at relatively early ages. As a result, they can work more hours by age 27 than women whose first children come slightly later. Moreover, 15- and 16-year-old
mothers are less likely than 17- and 18-year-old mothers to leave their parents, quit school, and start unstable marriages.

Teen-ageders who bear children are not doomed. The authors argue that after the first child, birth control, infant day-care programs, and further education can help young mothers build successful lives.

The History of Gambling

Gambling—the word today conjures up images of the Las Vegas "strip," regulated racetrack betting operations, the numbers game, and the pervasive influence of ruthless mobsters. It wasn’t always this way, writes Temple University historian Haller.

In 1900, Americans in a sporting mood had several choices. They could try their hands at cards or roulette at the usually illegal casinos found in any city or sizeable town. They could play "policy," an underground lottery run by big-city gambling rings. Or they could bet on the horses—either at illegal racetrack booths or at neighborhood "parlors" set up by bookmakers in bars and other men’s meeting places. Urban gambling was largely controlled by the Irish, without much fuss.

The picture changed radically during the 1920s. Young Jewish and Italian bootleggers like Al Capone, Meyer Lansky, and Benjamin "Bugsy" Siegel muscled in on the old policy syndicates and turned gambling into a violent business. These men were skilled entrepreneurs. They had devised complex transportation networks and marketing arrangements to keep America "wet" during Prohibition. And they transformed gambling into a highly organized, multibillion dollar

Horse racing’s popularity peaked during the early 1900s. "Bookies" learned to elude police crackdowns by taking illegal bets over the telephone.
enterprise. (Their biggest success: turning Las Vegas from a sleepy desert town of 20,000 in 1944 into a booming national gambling and entertainment center by the early '50s.) Meanwhile West Indian blacks introduced the numbers game—another form of lottery—into New York City in the early '20s. By 1930, West Indians such as Jose Enrique (Henry) Miro, “Big Joe” Ison, and Everett Watson had built powerful empires in the burgeoning ghettos of New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Detroit.

Nothing hastened the spread of gambling as much as the telephone. By 1914, bookies such as Arnold Rothstein and Frank Erickson of New York had learned to elude police crackdowns by taking bets over the phone. The telephone also made it possible to handle more clients than ever before. By the early '20s, large, well-staffed organizations were using big telephone banks to take bets from all over the United States. The neighborhood bookie, last remnant of gambling's simpler days, had become obsolete.

Sterilization in America


After the Pill, surgical sterilization is the most widely used form of contraception in the United States.

In 1977, there were nearly 10 million Americans who had undergone surgical sterilization (not counting hysterectomies)—a threefold increase since 1970. As of 1976, this included 30 percent of all widowed, divorced, and separated women and single mothers age 15 to 44. Moreover, in nearly 30 percent of all married couples where the wife was of childbearing age, one partner was surgically sterile.

Women—especially black women—are more likely to be sterilized than men. (According to the private Association for Voluntary Sterilization, sterilization is most popular today among women who are 25 to 34 years old. But as recently as 1971, 80 percent of all sterilizations were performed on men. Government figures indicate that black and other minority women were twice as likely to be sterilized as white women in 1970-73.)

Several factors underlie these trends, says Petchesky, a political scientist at Ramapo College. Growing numbers of working women view sterilization simply as a foolproof method of birth control. It is also considered to be much safer than the Pill. Political and legal attacks have prompted cutbacks in federally- and state-funded abortion programs, spurring low-income women to turn to sterilization. And the willingness of health insurance companies to fully cover such operations makes them an attractive option for the middle class.

Petchesky contends that the growing acceptability of sterilization could lead to certain excesses. During the early 1970s, for example,
press reports and court testimony disclosed that hundreds of thousands of women had agreed to government-funded sterilizations out of fear of losing welfare payments. Corrective sterilization guidelines were issued last year by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. But Petchesky asserts that many "health professionals" and family-planning advocates still encourage sterilization as a form of population control; their prime targets remain poor, uneducated women seeking protection from unwanted pregnancies.

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**SOCIETY**

Avoiding conflicts of interest is one of a reporter’s first rules. But on the corporate boards of the leading U.S. newspapers, a double standard is at work, contend Dreier, a Tufts sociologist, and Weinberg, director of the University of Missouri’s Graduate Reporting Program.

Among the corporate directors of America’s 25 largest newspaper companies (which account for more than half the circulation of U.S. dailies), there are more than 200 overlaps with the boards of Fortune 1,300 companies (including banks, utilities, and other service businesses); more than 100 with universities; and dozens with think tanks and chambers of commerce. Barbara Barnes Hauptfuhrer, for example, is a director both of the Knight-Ridder chain (with 33 papers) and of General Public Utilities—which owns the Three Mile Island nuclear plant. Marian Heiskell sits on the boards of both The New York Times and Consolidated Edison, the controversial New York City power company.

Newspaper executives argue that directors with strong business or government contacts are important to a paper’s financial future—but have no effect on news content. Dreier and Weinberg claim evidence to the contrary. Los Angeles Times publisher Otis Chandler’s position on the board of GeoTek Resources Fund, Inc., inhibited his paper’s coverage of that company’s run-in with the Securities and Exchange Commission, according to Times reporters. St. Louis Globe-Democrat correspondents contend that a 1977 investigation of profitable not-for-profit hospitals was blunted by publisher Duncan Bauman, who sits on the boards of two such institutions.

In the days of press barons like William Randolph Hearst and Robert McCormick, a newspaper’s slant was public knowledge. But the anonymity of today’s newspaper board members makes board interlocks potentially insidious. Two solutions have been proposed by pub-
lishers and reporters: greater, systematic disclosure and a voluntary ban on interlocks. Neither scheme is making much headway, the authors report.

No News Was Bad News

Between 1975 and 1979, after their “liberation” by communist leader Pol Pot, an estimated 3 million Cambodians died from starvation, from disease, or by execution. This great human tragedy long went virtually unreported on evening network TV newscasts, say Adams, professor of public administration at George Washington University, and Joblove, a Duke University law student.

Cambodia’s tragedy had all the elements that TV newsmen look for in a story—“good pictures” of squalid refugee camps, drama, controversy, and human suffering. Yet from April 1975 to December 1978, NBC aired only 10 stories on life in the “new Cambodia” amounting to 17 minutes 35 seconds of air time. CBS ran 13 stories totaling 28 minutes 55 seconds, and ABC 6 stories adding up to 11 minutes 25 seconds. (By comparison, Americans witnessed three hours worth of cumulative network coverage of Jonestown, Guyana, during the week after the mass deaths there.) Only once did the Cambodian tragedy rate the day’s top news story—when NBC led off its July 20, 1975, newscast with a brief item on an escape attempt by 300 Cambodians.

The networks did not devote significant air time to Cambodia’s plight until mid-1978, when the Carter administration began verbally attacking the Pol Pot regime.

Some network defenders argue that TV news editors wisely downplayed sensational reports that could not be confirmed because American journalists were banned from Cambodia. Adams and Joblove suggest three other reasons for TV’s neglect. First, they note, postwar events in Cambodia contradicted the then-fashionable “lessons of Vietnam” (“Indochina Without Americans/For Most, a Better Life,” read a telling headline in the New York Times in April 1975). And, since the networks focus much of their news coverage on the White House, presidential silence on the subject was another factor. Lastly, the authors argue, if the New York Times and the Washington Post (among other newspapers) had paid more attention to Cambodia’s plight—each averaged two or three relevant reports per year from 1975 to mid-1978—the networks no doubt would have followed suit.

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**Tuning Out in Taganrog**

More than half the Soviet population can now tune in Western radio broadcasts. An estimated 20 percent or more of Soviet city-dwellers regularly follow the BBC, Voice of America, and West Germany's Deutsche Welle. This access is putting a strain on the Soviet domestic propaganda apparatus, says White, a University of Glasgow Sovietologist.

A series of studies reported last May by Pravda reveals that the Soviet people are tired of hearing about communist theory and party history in the political lectures and indoctrination classes they are required to attend either on the job or after hours. They want more hard news, more information on sports and cultural subjects.

Survey results from Taganrog, a city of some 200,000 located on the Black Sea's north shore, are typical. Roughly 95 percent of the townspeople polled by government researchers asked for more information about world, national, and local events. Only 37 percent wished to learn more about Marxist-Leninist philosophy or "scientific communism." A mere 40 percent professed genuine interest in Marxist economics, and only 50 percent requested more Communist Party history in indoctrination sessions.

In fact, more than one-fourth of Taganrog's inhabitants indicated they were bored with the philosophical and political subjects emphasized by Soviet propagandists. More than one-third of them claimed to attend lectures reluctantly. The people of Tomsk, in Western Siberia, showed their dissatisfaction more openly—nearly 40 percent had not attended a propaganda session in three months. There, as in Moscow, adult disinterest in the party line appears to be percolating down to the young. A survey conducted in both cities showed that one-quarter of high-school students could not define "proletariat."

**Soap-Maker's Soap Opera**

Television advertising rates have risen dramatically for the last 20 years (over 15 percent annually since 1975). In the latest effort to hold costs down, TV's biggest advertiser, Procter and Gamble, has resurrected a practice from the medium's past. Its program *Shirley* is the first prime-time sponsor-produced series in 10 years, reports *Fortune* associate editor Kiechel.

The infant TV industry of the 1950s inherited from radio the practice of selling large chunks of air time to advertisers. (Remember Milton Berle's Texaco Star Theater, Perry Como's Kraft Music Hall, and the U.S.
Steel Hour?) By the late ‘60s, however, advertisers had pulled out of the TV production business, except for soap operas and occasional specials. Two cost factors were responsible, explains Kiechel. First was the "seemingly inexorable rise" in the price of commercial air time, which discouraged the typical advertiser from betting all his dollars on one show. Second was the increase in the cost of producing programs. Advertisers responded with "package buying"—the practice of purchasing commercial time on many different shows. Program production of shows was left to movie studios and independent producers.

By 1978, both production and commercial costs had soared. Thirty seconds on a prime-time hit show sold for $125,000. As the networks tried and killed new series searching for instant hits, producers began demanding huge ($400,000) fees for one or two episodes of their shows. This forced advertising rates higher still.

Enter Procter & Gamble—the company that introduced both "package buying" and soap operas in the ‘50s. In an attempt to slow the growth of its $400 million yearly advertising budget, P&G. negotiated with NBC to produce its own one-hour dramatic series, Shirley, starring Shirley Jones. In late 1978, P&G. bought a half-hour of prime time from NBC, with the network selling commercial time for the remaining half-hour of each Shirley episode to other advertisers. In return, NBC agreed that if the show were successful, network charges to P&G. would rise at a slower than normal rate. (Unfortunately, Shirley flopped in the ratings after its debut in October 1979. The show was taken off the air in January 1980.)

The experiment demonstrated enough cost-cutting potential to make P&G. and other sponsors likely to try it again.

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

Born Again

"Who and Where Are the Evangelicals?" in Christianity Today (Dec. 21, 1979), 465 Gundersen Dr., Carol Stream, Ill. 60187.

The 1980s could be the "decade of the evangelicals," predicts pollster George Gallup, Jr. His surveys reveal that 20 percent of American adults 18 years or older (31 million people) profess to being evangelical Christians. And, Gallup notes, since teenagers are more apt to be evangelical than are their parents, the movement will probably keep on growing.

Gallup defines evangelicals as conservative Christians who read the Bible regularly, interpret it literally, and attend religious services at least once a month. Included are "conversionalists," who have had a powerful religious experience compelling them to ask Christ "to be-
According to the Gallup survey, the typical adult evangelical is a middle-aged white Southern woman from a lower- to middle-class background. She is married and less likely to be college-educated than other Americans. Sixty percent of evangelicals are women (who comprise 53 percent of the total U.S. population). The South, with 28 percent of the American people, has fully 43 percent of the evangelicals; Democrats outnumber Republicans by a 3 to 2 margin. Blacks are more apt than whites to be evangelical. They make up roughly 10 percent of the population but 15 percent of the evangelicals.

While liberal Protestant denominations such as the United Presbyterian and United Methodist churches have been losing 75,000 to 100,000 members annually during the '70s, conservative evangelical churches like the Pentecostal and the Assembly of God are growing rapidly. Gallup suggests that with their large numbers of youthful adherents (13 million under age 18) and increasingly outspoken ministers, evangelicals will be a strong political and social force in the decade ahead.

*Narrow-Minded Philosophers*


Many modern philosophers tend to regard the great issues—death, God, happiness—as passé. They focus solely on the technicalities of logic and language in a spirit that Seeskin, a philosopher at Northwestern University, calls one of "caution, qualification, and retreat."

English-speaking philosophers today have been overwhelmed by the breakthroughs in logic and semantics of Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead in the first half of the century. They forget that these giants explored the nature of man, mind, and religion, as well as the relation between logic, grammar, and mathematics. Now, philosophers tinker with the meanings of ordinary words and endlessly refine technical proofs of even the simplest concepts. Many believe that the great problems and dilemmas of the past can be boiled down to logical or linguistic confusions.

Seeskin argues that today's philosophers have made the fundamental mistake of viewing their discipline as a science. Frustrated because philosophy is no closer to a satisfactory description of the world now than it was in Aristotle's time, they attack specific questions, arrive at final answers, and hope to reach quick agreement on some basic "truths"—such as the undeniable existence of the external world. But philosophy's true value lies in its denial of final answers to any question; Seeskin agrees with Socrates that philosophers should meet accepted beliefs with doubt. And philosophy does promote progress. By increasing the range of human perceptions, philosophers help prevent rigid, dogmatic, and possibly erroneous beliefs from taking root.
The study of mathematical logic should be removed from philosophy's purview—just as physics, chemistry, economics, and psychology were in the past. For their part, philosophers should step outside the ivory tower and grapple with current political, judicial, and cultural issues. The emergence of journals like Philosophy and Public Affairs and Philosophy and Literature and the critical success of John Rawls' controversial, egalitarian A Theory of Justice (1971) indicate that some philosophers are already moving to rejuvenate their field.

 Hell-Bent on Tolerance


If Americans take their religion seriously, how can they tolerate rival faiths? Tocqueville had a simple answer in the 19th century: American religious beliefs were either shallow or irrational.

Marty, a historian at the University of Chicago Divinity School, disagrees. In part, he says, tolerance stemmed from a tactical judgment made by early American religious leaders. By the 1700s, it was evident to many that the presence of a multitude of sects assured that no single one would emerge dominant. Each small denomination saw a stake in tolerance. But added to this perception was the strong desire for a common spiritual bond.

In 1749, Benjamin Franklin urged the fostering of religious attitudes to promote national unity—while disdaining the zealous faiths that divided neighbors. In the 19th century, Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau advocated a public religion that transcended established churches and exuded nationalism. Philosopher John Dewey went even further—in A Common Faith (1934), he favored replacing church religion with a godless faith in democratic ideals.

In general, Americans have sought the benefits of religious unity—and of religious freedom—while avoiding the divisiveness of pluralism. Thomas Jefferson held that the basic morality of all religions would safeguard political liberty and justice. In 1978, President Carter raised this belief to the international level, attributing the Camp David Egyptian-Israeli accords in part to the piety of Anwar Sadat and Menahem Begin. As a young priest informed Tocqueville, Americans do not demand religious conformity, but they do demand that everyone be religious.

Some intolerance has, of course, marked religious attitudes in America. Early U.S. Baptists and Methodists competed for souls “with larynxes and fists alike.” Mormons and Catholics encountered persecution in the 19th century. But borrowing a phrase from 19th-century philosopher William James, Marty describes the American religious scene then and now as “a sort of Republican Banquet.” Each denomination respects the others’ “personal sacredness.” Each hears “one nation under God” and pictures its own.
As the 1980s dawn, the U.S. space program is beset with problems. The space shuttle, the No. 1 project of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), is currently behind schedule (by 15 months) and way over cost projections. Budget-cutters in Congress are complaining, the public is disenchanted, and the agency’s staff is divided.

The space shuttle has been a big embarrassment for NASA officials, says Smith, a Science staff writer. Planned as a reusable transport to haul men and cargo between orbiting vehicles and earth, the shuttle was to be the space workhorse of the ’80s. But design changes have slowed its development (and have added $3.4 billion to its original $5 billion price tag). This overrun has set back several NASA projects five years and forced the cancellation of others. The latest NASA budgets passed by Congress ($4.55 billion in 1979 and $4.92 billion in 1980) do not even keep up with inflation.

Meanwhile, no new projects were recommended by Congress or the Carter administration last year, and none are expected in 1981. Only 7 or 8 planetary missions, such as the Voyager and Pioneer probes, seem possible in the ’80s, compared with 22 during the ’70s. From 1981 to 1986, the agency will receive no new data on other planets from U.S. spacecraft.

NASA’s problems have many causes. The unifying goals of reaching
the moon and outdoing the Russians are in the past. NASA planners
have lately been caught in disputes between scientists and the en-
gineers who accuse them of supporting grandiose schemes and basic
research without clear benefits. And exploration is harder to sell to the
public these days than weather or communications satellites. Today’s
planetary missions, riskier than the Apollo moon landings, can take 10
years to organize and cost $500 million.

NASA is hard at work on improving its public relations, says Smith.
Its administrator, Robert A. Frosch, has enlisted celebrities such as Ray
Bradbury, James Michener, and Jacques Cousteau to testify on the
agency’s behalf. But Congress is still skeptical. Many legislators are
convinced that public money should go to pressing needs on Earth.

Particle physicists—who study the nucleus of the atom—are nearing an
understanding of the basic nature of matter and its building blocks,
says Chemical and Engineering News correspondent Waldrop. Among
the pioneers are Harvard physicists Sheldon Glashow and Stephen
Weinberg, and Abdus Salam of the International Centre for Physics in
Trieste, Italy, all winners of the 1979 Nobel Prize for Physics.

In the 1950s and 60s, most physicists discarded the notion that na-
ture’s fundamental units are electrically charged particles called neut-
rons, protons, and electrons. They discovered dozens of new
particles—rho’s, pi’s, sigma’s, and others—showing atomic structure to
be far more complex. Protons and neutrons were found to be mere
members of a larger particle “family” called hadrons. The simpler elec-
trons were understood to belong to another group, the leptons.

In 1963, Murray Gell-Mann of Caltech (a 1969 Nobel Prize-winner),
realized that the existence of so many different hadron types could be
explained best if all hadrons were composed of still simpler entities.
These he called “quarks,” after a nonsense word from James Joyce’s
Finnegan’s Wake. Repeated attempts to isolate quarks have failed. But
experimenters are convinced that “hard, point-like things” exist within
all hadrons. Still, many questions remain. Are there different varieties?
And why can’t single quarks be found?

The theories advanced (chiefly by Glashow, Weinberg, and Salam)
partially answer these questions. They hold that quarks are distin-
guished by two basic properties governing their behavior—dubbed
“flavor” and “color.” Flavor measures the way different quarks re-
spond to electromagnetic forces. Color refers to the kind of charge—
closely resembling an electrical charge—carried by each quark. For
convenience’s sake, physicists have assigned the name of a color for
each of these charges. The color concept helps explain why quarks

"Physicists Close in on a Theory of Mat-
ter" by Mitch Waldrop, in Chemical and
Engineering News (Jan. 21, 1980), Mem-
bership and Subscription Services, ACS,
P.O. Box 3337, Columbus, Ohio 43210.
cannot yet be isolated. It posits that, contrary to standard electromagnetic behavior, the forces attracting quarks to one another increase the farther apart quarks are pulled, creating a rubber-band-like effect.

Two major tasks now loom before particle physicists. They must determine whether quarks are truly basic building blocks or composed of still smaller entities. And they need to find out how color and flavor interact, in order to formulate one comprehensive theory of matter. No designs drawn to date are satisfactory, but all include one spectacular, unsettling assumption: Protons are unstable and constantly decaying. Glashow sets the proton's lifetime at $10^{32}$ years. If this is true, then $10^{33}$ years from now, there will be no solid matter left in the universe, only a gas of leptons and electromagnetic photons.

**Eternal Life Is Not in the Cards**

The only obstacles separating man from eternal life may well be disease and that mysterious pattern of decay known as "the aging process." But seekers after perpetual youth will probably be disappointed. Recent findings in cell biology suggest that aging is one of the body's normal functions, instead of a breakdown of those functions, writes Hayflick, a biologist at the Children's Hospital Center of Northern California.

In cell biology, age is measured by the ability of cells and their "descendents" to function and divide—not by the "life-span" of a single cell. A California medical team grew cultures of human fetal lung cells in glass bottles. The cells divided and doubled their numbers until they covered the bottles' bottoms. At this point, crowding prevented further divisions, so the cultures were split in half and transferred to two different bottles. Again, the cells divided and doubled their populations until overcrowding set in. The researchers repeated these steps to assure further population doublings. But though the size of the "daughter cultures" continued to be controlled, cell division consistently stopped after 50 total population doublings, which occurred between the seventh and ninth month. Then, the cells decayed and died.

Cells in a living body act differently from those grown in a lab. Therefore, the experiment does not bear directly on the natural length of human life. It does suggest that aging is a property built into cells.

Calculating life-span from these results is also complicated by the fact that different kinds of cells age at different rates. Specialized cells such as nerve and sensory cells produce fewer generations than do skin cells. The systems they comprise undergo the greatest age-related changes. As cells near death, they lose their ability to function. If not replaced, this loss reduces the body's overall performance; and the fundamental cause of death in the later years is the body's increased vulnerability to accidents and disease.
What Is ‘Genius’?

How can the process of scientific creativity be explained? Do discoveries result from inductive reasoning, with scientists cautiously constructing theories from a growing foundation of facts? Or are they the products of sudden, inexplicable strokes of genius by the gifted few?

Gould, who teaches the history of science at Harvard, rejects both theories. Describing Charles Darwin’s progress toward a theory of natural selection, he argues that the real path to scientific discovery lies between the two.

Darwin (1809–82) generally saw himself as an inductivist. He claimed that the idea of natural selection “crept up gradually” on him during the voyage of the Beagle (1831–36) as he sifted his findings “in a sieve of utter objectivity.” But recent scholarship shows that Darwin started with a hunch, even as he collected facts during the voyage. And he arrived at his conclusions only after two subsequent years of mental struggle. All the while, he devoured works of poetry, philosophy, and economics—searching for further insights.

Darwin’s debt to the writings of Thomas Malthus (1766–1834) on population growth and human survival is well-known. But Darwin did not turn to Malthus by chance, as he implied in his autobiography. His thinking was first stimulated by Adam Smith’s theories of economic competition, political philosopher Auguste Comte’s insistence that theories be able to predict, and an attempted statistical proof of Malthus’ law. Only then could he leap from Malthus’ projection of an overpopulated world struggling to feed itself to the notion that evolution results from the competition of species and the survival of the fittest.

True genius does not touch everyone, nor is it beyond the reach of “ordinary mortals,” observes Gould. But genius does have a common denominator—a wide range of interests combined with the ability to construct useful analogies. As Louis Pasteur noted, “fortune favors the prepared mind.”

Pueblo Astronomy

A New World Stonehenge—that is what archaeologists are calling a recently discovered 700-year-old “solar calendar” made by a now-extinct race of Indians in New Mexico’s northwest corner.

Called the Fajada Calendar, the structure consists of three 2-ton sandstone slabs propped up against a cliff. The center and right slabs are positioned so that two dagger-shaped shafts of sunlight (one longer than the other) can pass between them and strike two spirals carved on the cliff. As the seasons pass, the positions of the “daggers” shift, mark-
American Indians carved two spirals on a cliff to make this solar calendar. Two rays of sunlight change position with the seasons.

ing solstices and equinoxes. (At summer solstice, for example, the larger ray vertically bisects the larger spiral; at winter solstice, the two daggers of light perfectly frame it.)

The Fajada Calendar is only the most recently discovered remnant of an unusually advanced Anasazi culture, reports Frazier, a freelance writer. The Anasazi flourished in the nearby Chaco Canyon between A.D. 800 and 1250. Skilled builders and traders, they developed advanced irrigation systems and lived in massive, sophisticated pueblos. One multistoried complex contained some 800 rooms. Between 30 and 40 Anasazi towns were linked by hundreds of miles of smooth dirt roads, some 30 feet wide. The roads also led to agricultural areas and rock quarries, indicating a highly organized network of farming, manufacturing, and commerce.

The calendar is as accurate as any known mechanism built by the advanced Mayans of 9th-century Central America. It reveals a knowledge of geometry and astronomy previously unknown among North American Indians. Yet it has not, to date, shed any new light on the mysterious decline of the Anasazi in the 13th century.

One-Celled Wonders

"A Biological Network to Safeguard Nature’s Unseen Assets" by Edgar J. Da-Silva, in Impact of Science on Society (vol. 29, no. 3, 1979), UNESCO, 7 Place de Fontenoy, 75700 Paris, France.

Man uses microorganisms for a staggering array of tasks. Rhizobia enrich soil by helping plants trap nitrogen from the air. Penicillin and streptomycin are important vaccines. Petroleum-eating pseudomonas may soon fight oil spills.
Apart from the technical challenges of discovering and isolating new microbes, scientists in the field have faced critical logistical difficulties—getting news of recent microbe finds and locating reserves of valuable strains. But a new program at the United Nations has been coming to their aid, helping to shape the direction of new research in the process, reports DaSilva, of the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

In the past eight years, UNESCO, the UN Environment Program, and the UNESCO-related International Cell Research Organization have opened Microbiological Resource Centers in Australia, Thailand, Sweden, Kenya, and Brazil. By monitoring worldwide research and keeping records of discoveries, these institutes are starting to serve as reference centers for microbe specialists. They can help experts find and obtain strains they need, and identify projects and experiments that could benefit from microbe supplies on file. (Tens of thousands of microbe strains are catalogued in the system's directory.) They also train new microbe specialists from developing countries and promote new applications of microbiology—such as water purification, conversion of garbage to methane fuel, and even the microbial manufacture of solar energy.

The UN microbe centers are particularly interested in using microbes to aid agriculture and industry in the Third World. Microbes able to convert carbon dioxide into protein could combat hunger. And UN economists view microbial methane production as precisely the kind of low-technology industry that developing countries need to promote lasting and equitable growth.

RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

Early Man's
Climate Changes


Long before the advent of modern industry and technology, man had drastically modified the Earth's surface. Sagan, a Cornell astronomer, and Toon and Pollack, NASA research scientists, note that the major manmade changes have coincided with climate shifts, and suggest that the two phenomena are linked.

Roughly 15 percent of the Earth's surface has been changed by man. Twenty thousand years ago, the use of fire had already greatly changed world vegetation patterns. In the 16th century, Spain's explorer Ferdinand Magellan saw just how this could happen. When he rounded Cape Horn, he noticed so many fires set by South American Indians
that he named the region Tierra del Fuego.

In India's Rajasthan desert, overgrazing destroyed vegetation and reduced rainfall by sending vast clouds of dust into the atmosphere, starting around 2000 B.C. In West Africa's Sahel, experts trace the region's weak plant life to both overgrazing and slash-and-burn agriculture centuries ago. "Killer droughts" such as occurred in 1973-74 were probably a recurring result.

Humans have cleared 7 million square kilometers of tropical forest alone, equivalent to half the Earth's present jungle area. Forty percent of the rain forests of Africa and Brazil have been destroyed. (Today, between 50,000 and 250,000 square kilometers of tropical forests are being cleared annually, mainly to increase croplands.) Most of the temperate forests in China and the Mediterranean basin were destroyed by A.D. 500; some 8 million square kilometers of such forests were cleared in Europe and North America in 1400-1900. The authors suggest that deforestation triggered the mild Little Ice Age that affected the world from A.D. 1200 to 1900. During this period, glaciers advanced, and the Earth's mean temperature stood 0.5°C lower than it does today.

The more barren the Earth's surface, the higher its albedo—its ability to reflect sunlight. The more sunlight the Earth reflects, the cooler it gets. Rainfall slacks off, too. The authors speculate that this albedo-related cooling is countering the warming "greenhouse" effect on the planet caused by the heat-trapping pollution from fossil fuels.

Iron Curtain
Nuclear Protests


Grassroots opposition to atomic plants has spread from the West to the East. Nuclear development throughout the Soviet bloc has aroused concern and even public protest behind the Iron Curtain, say Eastern Europe specialists Motyl and Karatnycky.

Last year, in Czechoslovakia, a group of dissident energy experts complained publicly of inadequate safety measures and excessive secrecy surrounding their government's nuclear programs. The Yugoslavs have gone further; demonstrations in the town of Zadar in 1978 forced cancellation of a proposed nuclear power plant on the Dalmatian coast.

Soviet worries about nuclear accidents are also apparent, if muted. A recent Russian feature film, unobtrusively titled The Investigation Commission, deals with a breakdown at a Soviet nuclear plant. Though the communist media usually play up Western failures, Izvestia and other news organs have soft-pedalled last spring's events at Three Mile Island, Pa.

The Soviet Union has 27 nuclear reactors, East Germany 4, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria 2 apiece; Hungary will soon build its first. Rumania has just bought two nuclear plants from Canada. Already
several accidents have occurred. Soviet dissident scientist Zhores Medvedev claims that an immense nuclear explosion rocked the southern Ural Mountains in 1957 or 1958, taking hundreds of lives and contaminating some 1,000 square miles. In 1960 or 1961, the authors say, a Soviet reactor at nearby Kyshtym seriously malfunctioned. A cooling system foul-up crippled a breeder reactor near the Caspian Sea in 1973. In Czechoslovakia, one power station leaked radioactive gas in 1976 and radioactive waste water in 1977.

Will a strong "no-nuke" movement develop within the Soviet bloc? Probably not under the more repressive regimes in the USSR, East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, say the authors. But in Poland and Hungary, where Western newscasts have alerted radio listeners to the inadequate designs of Soviet nuclear power plants, open opposition may soon increase.

Behind Buffalo's Big Blizzards

"Snow Belt of the Great Lakes" by Gloria Ellenton, in Natural History (Nov. 1979), Membership Services, Box 6000, Des Moines, Iowa 50340.

Why does it snow so much in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Chicago? Blame the five Great Lakes, says Ellenton, a climatologist from the University of Waterloo, Ontario.

Every year, winter storms dump snow over areas 10 to 30 miles wide and 50 to 100 miles long along the southern or eastern shores of Lakes Superior, Michigan, Huron, Ontario, and Erie. Where the snow falls depends on exactly where the northerly and westerly storm winds are blowing. As local residents know, towns adjacent to the heavy snow "corridors" may get only a light dusting.

The lakes contribute to big snows in two ways. Their great size (the smallest, 7,600-square-mile Lake Ontario, is larger than New Jersey) gives them enormous capacity to store up summer heat. In winter, the temperature contrast between the relatively warm lake water and the colder air and land surrounding it tends to produce localized low-pressure storm systems.

The lakes also encourage formation of cumulus clouds. When the lowest levels of cold winter air are heated by the warmer water surface, bubbles of moist, buoyant air rise from the lake into the atmosphere. This moist air rises and cools until it is saturated. Small liquid water droplets begin to condense, and they begin to form cumulus clouds. When these clouds are driven by cold winter winds, the moisture eventually drops as snow.

The blizzards that regularly batter Buffalo and other Great Lakes cities are created by huge single-cloud bands that form when wind blows along the length of a lake. These clouds can cause continuing snowfall over a limited area for 40 hours. But since weathermen cannot predict the exact direction of the wind, blizzards can still strike snow belt communities without much warning.
Fiction with a Future

Postmodernist fiction—à la John Hawkes, Thomas Pynchon, Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., and others—defies easy definition. Some critics say it focuses on the art of writing and ignores objective reality. Others call it a sterile imitation of modernism—the early 20th-century work of Eliot, Faulkner, Joyce, and Proust, which challenged 19th-century conventions of plot, time, language, and morality. Some say it has no future.

Novelist Barth, who admits to being a postmodernist writer, begs to differ. He argues that postmodernist authors have an opportunity to synthesize the best elements of the modernists and of the 19th-century "bourgeois realists" such as Hugo, Dickens, Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky. They should remember the great lesson taught by the modernists—that middle-class morality, linearity, cause and effect, and transparent language cannot capture the chaos of 20th-century life. Disjunction, simultaneity, and irrationality must be incorporated into literature. But the postmodernist must also remember that the bewildering works the modernists wrote as protests against traditionalism have made their point. We don't need any more *Finnegan's Wake*, writes Barth. Postmodernists should give us books more readable than the forbiddingly difficult classics of modernism.

Two novels that Barth believes contain the ideal postmodernist synthesis are Italo Calvino's *Cosmicomics* (1965) and Gabriel Garcia Marquez's *One Hundred Years of Solitude* (1967). The former mixes themes "as modern as the new cosmology and as ancient as folktales," as well as traditional and modern narrative techniques. The latter combines "straightforwardness and artifice . . . magic and myth" to produce a work that is "wonderful as well as . . . merely important."

Abstract Art: A Dead End

Modern artists committed an "act of voluntary self-castration" when they stopped drawing, painting, and sculpting the world around them. Abstract art denies "human" responses. As a result, argues Mandel, professor of humanities at the California Institute of Technology, it must be considered minor art.

Devoid of subject matter and removed from the "precious fabric of human experience," nonrepresentational art is incapable of deeply touching us emotionally, ethically, or even intellectually. To be sure,
abstract art can never "sink as low as figurative art." One never finds a work by Jackson Pollack or Robert Motherwell to be obscene or sentimental—as some have found the "gushing colors" of Renoir's "dolls." But the artist's refusal to risk failure also rules out major success.

Ironically, abstract artists' reliance on simple shapes, blobs, scratches, and squiggles frees them to claim a concentration on "the underlying significance of reality." When a painting holds no inherent meaning, the painter can give it any meaning he wishes. A piece called St. Xavier in the Indies that closely resembles another titled Harvest and a third named Jazz City cannot produce the "shock of recognition" needed to evaluate and appreciate art. There is nothing to recognize.

Abstract artists' subject is art itself. Their experiments with design and color can be interesting only in a technical, critical sense. Minor art "has its perfections," says Mandel, but the claims made for it should "match the modesty of its achievements."


Dickens, the Closet Naturalist

Charles Dickens' often hackneyed and unconvincing descriptions of nature and rural life contrast sharply with his brilliant, authentic rendering of life in London. But Bodenheimer, assistant professor of
ARTS & LETTERS

English at Boston University, contends that Dickens' landscape writing improved greatly during his career. His increasing interest in nature paralleled his growing concern with psychology.

The country settings of *Oliver Twist* (1838) offer a brief respite from the gritty, teeming urban environment that dominates the novel. But Dickens' countryside seems drawn from a fairy tale, with Oliver spending his time picking wildflowers "for the embellishment of the breakfast-table" and learning how to care for pet birds. The battered young victim of London's cruelties abruptly turns into a middle-class child free of scars. His transformation is not believable.

It was not until *Great Expectations* (1860–61) that Dickens effectively used a nature setting—the novel's unforgettable marshes—to illuminate character, and vice versa. Early in the book, the boy Pip looks out on "the dark, flat wilderness," "the low leaden line of the river," and "the distant savage lair of the sea" and is reminded of his infancy. Later, the marshes reflect Pip's emotional progress and setbacks. The mists symbolize his youthful confusion; the unobstructed path the marshes offer to the sea suggests his expanding ambition. Finally, the emptiness of his life is illustrated during his river escape with Magwitch. The surrounding banks suggest the marsh country beginnings he never truly left. The decaying ballast-lighter and lighthouse nearby symbolize his own decline.

In *Oliver Twist* and other early novels, nature is separated from the "real world" of strife and personal tragedy. But as the marshes are an integral part of Pip, so nature is an integral part of *Great Expectations*.

OTHER NATIONS

*Iraq: New Arab Power?*

"Iraq—New Power in the Middle East" by Claudia Wright, in *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1979/80), 428 East Preston St., Baltimore, Md. 21202.

Oil-rich Iraq has often been neglected by Western policymakers. In viewing Saddam Hussein, its President since 1968, as just another shaky Arab dictator, American specialists underestimate both his political skills and Iraq's growing influence in the Middle East, says Wright, Washington correspondent for London's weekly *New Statesman*. A former lawyer, Hussein has launched a drive to establish Iraq as Egypt's successor as leader of the Arab world.

Iraq sits atop the world's second largest oil deposits (potential reserves: 95 billion barrels). Yet for two decades after World War II, Iraq was a country of poverty, disorder, and political violence. Ten coups or attempted coups occurred between 1958 and 1978. Chronic border dis-
OTHER NATIONS

Oil-rich Iraq sits in the middle of the Middle East. Its President Hussein seeks Arab unity.

Debates with Iran, Kuwait, and Syria made Iraq heavily dependent on Soviet military aid. Since 1968, Hussein has used oil revenues (about $17 billion in 1979) to feed, educate, and house the population of 11.8 million. Special farm and school programs assist the rural poor. Moreover, Wright says, Iran-style religious strife is unlikely. Iraqi culture has long been more secular than that of its Arab neighbors. The prosperity and youthfulness of the population (two-thirds of all Iraqis are under 25) can only further weaken Islam's influence.

In recent years, border settlements with Syria and Kuwait, and Iran's domestic disarray, have eased Hussein's most pressing foreign policy problems. Moving away from Moscow, he has urged Saudi Arabia to move away from Washington. His aim: a united "Arab nation," unfeathered by superpower ties and ready to campaign against Israel. Moreover, Hussein has used oil to secure sophisticated arms and technology from Western Europe.

According to Wright, better Iraqi-American relations in the near future are unlikely. Moreover, excessive American pressure on the Saudis for more oil could push the Saudis closer to Iraq. Hussein's influence can only increase as he awaits 1982, when he succeeds Fidel Castro as head of the Third World's so-called nonaligned movement.

'Consultative' Dictatorship

Western perceptions of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) have changed during the country's 30-year history. Until the mid-1960s, many U.S. and European analysts pooh-poohed East Germany's economic prospects and depicted the regime as no more than a Soviet
puppet. But of late, Western scholars have overcompensated for past errors. They paint a rosy, "fundamentally distorted" picture of East Germany, argues Naimark, a Boston University historian.

Academic sociologists and political scientists minimize East Germany's pervasive repression, to the point of describing the political system as "consultative authoritarianism." They contend that communist rule is based mostly on propaganda and persuasion, not on force. The GDR's national identity and political legitimacy, it is said, are firmly established domestically and internationally. The regime is further bolstered by an "economic miracle" that has produced the world's 18th highest per capita GNP (behind Japan, ahead of Britain).

Naimark argues that Communist Party chief Erich Honecker's goals of creating a distinct East German sense of nationalism and of winning popular loyalty remain remote. Communist control depends largely on force—the sealed Western border, the Berlin Wall, and the 1.2 million Soviet and East German troops and policemen inside the GDR. Dissatisfaction with the regime is widespread among the 17 million East Germans. Of no help to Honecker are the population's easy access to West German radio and TV broadcasts, and detente, which has increased contacts with West Germany.

Honecker's efforts to buy domestic peace by providing his fellow countrymen with the Soviet bloc's highest standard of living are in deep trouble. East Germany owes $8 billion to the West (roughly $4 billion to West Germany alone) and $1 billion to the Soviet Union. And the labor-short GDR cannot export enough to repay its creditors.

Naimark sees Honecker as facing a dilemma. He can keep borrowing from the West and grant Bonn's requests for more travel and other contacts that expose East Germans to the influences of the Free World. Or he can let living standards decline and keep order by tightening controls over citizens who already feel the new economic squeeze. Since 1978, the regime has harrassed Western newsmen and stiffened penalties for internal dissent. Naimark believes East Germany is heading toward "a new and dangerous phase of political repression."

Soviet-dominated East Germany was 30 years old last October. Here, a West German cartoonist sends his birthday greetings.

By Horst Reisigle. Reprinted by permission.
Politics in Prewar Japan

"Fascism and the History of Pre-War Japan: The Failure of a Concept" by Peter Duus and Daniel I. Okimoto, in Journal of Asian Studies (Nov. 1979), Association for Asian Studies, 1 Lane Hall, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48109.

"Fascist," with its overtones of racism and repression, is a word often used to describe Japan just before World War II. It is a word wrongly used, say Duus and Okimoto, Asia specialists at Stanford.

The mass movements, personality cults, and bloody purges that marked fascism in Germany, Italy, and Hungary never appeared in Japan during the 1930s. Unlike the "posturers, street fighters and misfits" who seized power in Europe, Japan's leaders were mostly bureaucrats. They were not very different from the democracy-minded politicians who prevailed during the '20s. The country's few avowed fascists gained little power or influence; indeed, many were executed or forced to commit hara-kiri.

Before the social and economic upheavals of 1910-30, Japanese society was shaped by the old rural values: duty, conformity, and cooperation. But by the end of World War I, Japan was rapidly industrializing. Nearly half the labor force worked in manufacturing, construction, or services. During the '20s, big corporations and militant unions gained influence. By 1930, the old values seemed in danger.

Some politicians proposed remedies with fascist overtones. Among them was Kita Ikki, whose writings inspired the military's ambitions in the '30s. And the Army high command dragged Japan deeper into war with China. But the most important domestic change was the evolution of a "managerial state." Its leaders moved to reduce corporate power, curb the market, and direct the economy—spurred in part by the Great Depression. Japan's domestic political evolution before Pearl Harbor was part of a pattern of responses to the outside world that had characterized Japan for decades.

Energy from Down Under


During the next decade, much of the world's energy is going to come from Down Under, reports Haubold, correspondent for the Neue Zuercher Zeitung of Zurich. Both domestic political changes and rising world energy prices favor a bigger role for Australia as an exporter of coal, uranium, natural gas, and possibly oil.

Australia's estimated coal reserves are enormous: 40 billion tons of low-sulfur anthracite (hard coal) and 70 billion tons of soft lignite. World coal prices ($25 a ton for power-plant grade coal) are as yet too low to encourage large-scale mining for export. But the rising cost of
PERIODICALS

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OPEC oil and the resulting growth in demand for coal seem likely to force up coal prices to a profitable $30 a ton. By the year 2000, Australia is expected to ship 136 million tons of coal abroad, surpassing the United States as the world's leading exporter.

The half million tons of uranium oxide discovered in Australia since 1970 represent about 20 percent of known world reserves. During 1972-75, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam's Labor government blocked most mining and prevented exports. Both aborigines and most labor unions shared his concerns over environmental and safety hazards. But Liberal Malcolm Fraser, Prime Minister since 1975, is pushing hard for energy development. Further, the new jobs promised by such mining have split both the Labor party and union leadership, greatly weakening the old opposition.

Natural gas prospects are also bright. British Petroleum, Shell, and other oil companies are jointly planning to exploit the 12-trillion-cubic-foot gas reserves located off Australia's northwest coast. Though the gas fields lie under a 120,000-square-kilometer stretch of the Indian Ocean, production for export is scheduled to begin in 1985.

Australia still imports 30 percent of the oil it needs. But the Fraser government is using tax incentives to spur exploration on land and offshore. Exxon is currently drilling off southern and western Australia. And oil shale deposits in northeastern Australia reportedly contain the equivalent of 2 to 3 billion barrels of crude. Here, production—but not export—of 250,000 barrels per day is expected by 1982.

Iran's History of Anti-Semitism

When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's revolutionaries ousted the Shah in early 1979, Iran's 70,000 remaining Jews feared that the Shiite Muslim leader would encourage a new wave of persecution and discrimination. Littman, a specialist on Jews in Muslim countries, suggests that Iran's history justifies such fears.

Jews were frequently victims of oppression in Iran (or Persia) after Islam swept through the region in the 7th century. Their lot was particularly hard under rulers belonging to the Shiah sect. Shiah Islam became Persia's state religion with the advent of the Safavid dynasty in 1502. For most of the next 150 years, Jews were forced to accept the unequal relationship (dhimma) between Muslims and non-Muslims. They were also regarded as ritually "unclean" by the Shiite clergy. Sometimes only Persia's fiscal needs saved Jews from forced conversion—in 1661, a five-year ban on the practice of Judaism was lifted to permit Persian officials to reimpose a tax on infidels.

The persecution of Persia's Jews dramatically increased under the Kajar dynasty (1794-1925). The slaughter of all 400 of Tabriz's Jews in 1830 began a decade of massacres and forcible conversions. Through—
PERIODICALS

OTHER NATIONS

out the 19th century, Stillman writes, European visitors reported "the profound misery of Persia’s Jews."

Starting in 1873, the Alliance Israélite Universelle, a Paris-based organization of European Jews, began protesting the plight of Persian Jews. By the 1890s, the Alliance persuaded the Kajar Shah to order a halt to all mistreatment and discrimination. But by then the monarchy had little control over the clergy or local authorities. It was not until the last Shah’s father, Reza Pahlavi, began a new dynasty in 1925 that religious tolerance became the law, strictly enforced.

Looking Beyond

Idi Amin

The overthrow of Uganda’s dictator, Idi Amin, by Tanzanian troops in April 1979 was widely expected to revive cooperation among Britain’s former East African colonies. But according to Africa Report editor Hughes, the continuing failure of Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya to improve relations indicates that Amin was not the basic problem.

The three nations had been linked by common government services during 40 years of British rule. The newly created East African Community and Common Market held them together more superficially after independence came during the early 1960s.

But each new regime followed a different path. Kenya (population: 14.6 million) under the late Jomo Kenyatta favored free enterprise and the West. Massive British aid to colonial Kenya created a stable economy able to withstand later soaring oil prices and runaway population growth. Kenya’s politics are “manipulated” but relatively free. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania (population: 16.4 million) moved in a socialist direction. Abroad, he courted Mao’s China and became a leader of the nonaligned movement. At home, his one-party regime nationalized most businesses and industry and collectivized agriculture. The economy stagnated.

These differences led to outright hostility during the early 1970s. Amin’s rise in Uganda created political strains; world energy and monetary crises shook financial relationships. By 1976, the Common Market and Community had collapsed in all but name. Kenya and Tanzania closed their common frontier. Relations worsened again following the short Tanzania-Uganda border war that led to Amin’s ouster. Nyerere felt Kenya’s leaders tilted toward Amin, and many Kenyans feared further Tanzanian expansion.

Lately, Kenya and Tanzania have edged toward conciliation. Nyerere and Kenya’s new President Daniel Arap Moi re-established reciprocal airspace rights. A World Bank official is trying to fairly divide the Community’s assets and debts. Yet the Kenya-Tanzania border is still closed, and ideological differences remain. Hughes sees “little hope of accommodation,” let alone a return to the cooperation of decades past.

Authors: Alan S. Blinder and William J. Newton

If the "New Economic Policy" followed by the Nixon administration from 1971 to 1974 is any indication, mandatory wage-price controls alone cannot significantly curb inflation, say Princeton economists Blinder and Newton.

President Nixon began wage and price controls in August 1971 (when inflation reached 4.8 percent) with a 90-day freeze on most wages, prices, and rents (excluded were taxes, mortgage interest rates, and farm produce prices). From November 1971 until December 1972, the administration permitted most wages to rise only 5.5 percent. Businesses were allowed to raise prices only enough to cover rising costs that they could not control—such as increases in the prices of foreign goods. Higher profit margins were prohibited.

After several efforts at gradual decontrol (the final one, carried out industry-by-industry, actually squeezed profit margins), the controls program ended on April 30, 1974. But in February, "catch-up" inflation had already begun, as decontrolled industries scrambled to jack up prices and regain former profit levels. By March, controls on long-inhibited industries such as steel, petroleum, and retail food were finally lifted. The "catch-up" efforts they began combined with OPEC's oil embargo, its 400 percent increase in oil prices, and global shortages of other key raw materials to produce a shocking 12.72 percent inflation rate between March and September 1974.

To determine how much the Nixon controls actually restrained inflation, Blinder and Newton examined changes in prices, income levels, and unemployment during the eight-month-long period of double-digit inflation from February to October 1974 and during the preceding and succeeding eight months.

They calculated that controls cut inflation by only 1.34 percentage points from June 1973 to February 1974 (when inflation dipped to 5.9 percent). But decontrol was responsible for fully 5.12 percentage points of the 12.72 percent overall inflation rate from February to October 1974. After this burst of "catch-up" inflation subsided, prices rose at a 7.84 percent annual rate, but decontrol was responsible for only 0.28 percentage points of this.

Did the Nixon wage and price controls leave the country worse off? Yes, say the authors. They note that the freeze that began in August 1971 substantially slowed the inflation rate. But wage-and-price freezes eventually produce massive distortions of the economy, notably shortages of certain goods. The administration's only option was to raise prices and wages in a selective way. But because so much of the Nixon-era inflation stemmed from factors beyond the controls' reach—such as commodity prices abroad and the growth of the federal budget—the controls had little effect on the overall
rate of inflation. Blinder and Newton contend that decontrol after early 1974 greatly increased the acceleration of inflation, as did the controls' uneven application. Yet they add that the Nixon policymakers had little choice. Unless controls "make exceptions" for industries with major external costs, or for needy groups such as low-wage earners, market disruptions and unnecessary economic hardship are almost sure to result. In short, no good choices existed.

"Economic and Energy Problems as Security Issues: France, Europe, and America."
Author: Robert J. Lieber

"The real danger for France today is the oil crisis, not the [Soviet missile] SS-20," said a leading French expert on foreign policy recently. His statement, contends Lieber, a political scientist at the University of California, Davis, is yet another indication that many European nations now see energy shortages as the prime threats to their survival.

The energy crises of 1973–74 (touched off by the Yom Kippur War) and 1978–79 (during the Iranian revolution), showed Europeans how "desperately vulnerable" they have become to cutoffs in the flow of imported oil. France's experience has been typical.

In 1950, coal—most of it domestic—provided 77 percent of France's total energy consumption, and imported oil only 20 percent. But the modernization of the country's industrial plants, the lack of domestic petroleum, and the low price of foreign oil during the 1950s and '60s spurred a massive shift. By 1979, oil imports supplied 57 percent of France's energy and 24 percent of total French imports.

Partly as a result, the annual rate of inflation in France has increased from 6 percent in 1973 to 11 percent today. And annual economic growth has slowed from 6 percent seven years ago to 3 percent today.

France's go-it-alone response to its energy vulnerability has strained Western unity since 1973. In addition to adopting a strongly pro-Arab stance on Mideast issues, Paris has courted Arab oil-producing countries with offers of advanced technology, nuclear power reactors, and arms. Moreover, France has consistently opposed American efforts to forge an alliance of oil-consuming nations to counter OPEC strength. (Yet, unlike the Americans, Lieber writes, France has helped the cause by holding its oil imports for the past six years to below the 1973 level.)

The oil-related economic problems that will likely plague France and the rest of Europe—with or without future energy crises—could limit NATO members' abilities to keep up their current rates of defense spending.

Moreover, writes Lieber, Americans' failure to significantly cut oil consumption suggests to their allies an insensitivity to Europe's prime concerns. U.S. inaction "risks undercutting much of the basis for alliance cooperation and ultimately for European security itself."
"Environmental Contaminants in Food."

Thirty thousand chemical and radioactive waste dumps currently dot the United States. Two thousand of them threaten water supplies, crops, and feed with contamination by highly toxic substances such as mercury, radioactive strontium, and PCB compounds.

And these contaminants are only the tip of the iceberg, says Congress's Office of Technology Assessment. Seventy thousand chemicals are now produced in the United States; but federal and state monitoring systems test only for the handful of substances known to have actually poisoned animals or humans here or abroad. Though the technology to detect other possible contaminants exists, it is not being used, say the authors. Reason: The monitoring apparatus scattered among dozens of federal and state agencies has not kept pace with the tremendous growth of the chemical industry (which now accounts for 7 percent of the U.S. GNP).

The Food and Drug Administration, for example, sets acceptable contamination levels immediately following poisonings. But since the FDA only studies contaminants after trouble strikes, its data tend to be "incomplete" and "scanty," the authors claim. The little long-term research that does take place often follows rigid and arbitrary guidelines. Some "maximum permissible intake" levels, for example, are calculated for human weights between 132 and 154 pounds—resulting in inadequate safeguards for women and children.

Cooperation among the federal agencies charged with protecting against food contamination—principally, the Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the FDA—is poor. When the Agriculture Department discovered PCB contamination in animal feed in Montana in 1979, it took five days for the news to "go through channels" to the proper office at the FDA—which, in turn, took five days more to launch its investigation. By then, contamination had spread to several states.

The report's authors recommend that Congress create an investigatory center (in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's Center for Disease Control or in the FDA) that would not only continue monitoring levels of known contaminants but would also study the effects of other substances likely to enter the food chain.

One agency, preferably the FDA, should coordinate all federal efforts against food contamination.

"The State of Black America 1980."
National Urban League, 500 East 62nd St., New York, N.Y. 10021. 297 pp. $12.50

For black Americans, the 1970s were a period of only limited economic and social progress—and some backsliding.

As expected, the gap between black and white individual income continued to narrow. (From 1969 to 1977, black men increased their earnings relative to white males from 67 percent to 73 percent. Black women virtually caught up to white women, advancing from 84 percent of parity to 95
percent, according to figures from American Demography.)
However, Dr. Robert B. Hill, the Urban League's research director, contends that individual incomes are a misleading indicator of economic success. The dramatic increase in the number of two-earner white households and a decrease in the number of two-earner black households make family income the most accurate measure of black and white status. Between 1969 and 1978, the number of black families headed by single women rose 257 percent, versus 57 percent for whites, due largely, says Hill, to a huge increase in out-of-wedlock births among young black women. All told, nearly 23 percent of black families, or 1.3 million families, are now headed by single, no-longer-married, or widowed women (versus only about 12 percent, or 580,000 families, in 1969).

Partly as a result, the average income disparity between black and white families widened. In 1969, blacks' median family income of $6,063 was 61 percent of whites' median family income of $9,958. But in 1978, the black median family income of $10,879 equalled only 59 percent of the white income ($18,368). The gap widened in all regions of the country except the South, where black family income rose from 57 to 59 percent of parity.

Claims by some academics that more than half of all black families have entered the "middle class" are misleading, according to the report. The proportion of black family heads holding "white-collar" jobs rose from 51 percent to 61 percent between 1969 and 1978. But in 1977, only 30 percent of all black managers and 26 percent of all black professionals earned $15,000 or more. At the same time, 29 percent of black managers and 25 percent of black professionals earned less than $6,000.

The numbers of very poor and "middle-middle" class black families both rose during the '70s. But they remained at 28 percent and 25 percent of the total number of black families (5.7 million). A large plurality of black families remains in a lower-middle-income bracket, with earnings between $6,000 and $18,699.


Chronic malnutrition cuts short the lives, stunts the growth, and dulls the mental faculties of an estimated one-eighth of the world's people. More than three-quarters of those afflicted live on the Indian subcontinent, in Southeast Asia, and in sub-Saharan Africa. Half are under five years of age.

Although food production has been increasing faster in the developing nations (except in Africa) than in the industrialized world, rapid population growth in these areas is likely to increase world food deficits over the next two decades.

Today, developing countries grow 87 percent of the food they need; by the end of the century, the figure will fall to 74 percent.

If global grain production (including wheat, rice, corn, barley, sorghum, oats, and rye) continues to rise by 2.7 percent annually, world grain output will be 40 percent above the current level by the year 2000. This will be enough to meet the projected commen-
cial demand for food. But it will not be enough to feed the Third World's expected population of 4.5 billion.

An extra 32 million metric tons of grain will be required as early as 1990 to feed the estimated 416 million people who will be too poor to buy their own food.

Part of the looming food gap can be closed by reducing spoilage, which annually ruins at least 10 percent of the world's durable-crop harvest (grains and legumes) and 20 percent of its nongrain perishable staples (such as yams, cassava, and fish).

But the main hope for ending hunger lies in drastically boosting Third World food output, says the Presidential Commission on World Hunger. Annual increases of 4 percent will be necessary, requiring a doubling of Third World agricultural investment, from $4 to $8 billion per year, devoted to fertilizer, irrigation, and farmer education. Much of the financing will have to come from the wealthier countries.

The commission recommends that the United States, the world's largest food producer, "move as rapidly as possible" to increase foreign economic aid as a portion of its GNP from the current 0.22 percent, or $5 billion, to 0.7 percent (a target figure also set by the United Nations). The United States must "make the elimination of hunger the primary focus of its relations with the developing world."

"School Crime and the Social Order of the School."

IRCD Bulletin (Winter 1979), the Institute for Urban and Minority Education, Box 40, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 10027. 10 pp. $1.00

Authors: Francis A. J. Ianni and Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni


Today, 8 percent of American public schools are seriously affected by crime, virtually the same level as in 1971. From 1974 to 1976, the proportion of teachers reporting attacks by students dipped slightly (from 3 to 2.9 percent). And the proportion of teachers reporting personal property damage declined (from 11.4 percent to 8.9 percent). Many schools have successfully fought crime even as neighborhood crime rates soared.

Currently, 15 percent of city schools are troubled by violence, compared to 6 percent of suburban and 4 percent of rural schools.

The risk of being attacked or robbed in school generally shrinks as age and grade level increase, but there are a few exceptions. Seventh-graders are likely victims, possibly because of the difficult adjustments they face moving from strictly supervised grade schools to the greater freedom of junior high. Students age 19 and older are also vulnerable. Most have failed at least one grade and have problems getting along with their peers.

Most crimes involve offenders and victims of the same race, but fully 42 percent are interracial. Surprisingly, student offenders are, as a group, also the most common victims of school crime. These youngsters—many of them from broken homes or bad neighborhoods—comprise a "hard core" of troublemakers.

The courts have been a major spur to school administrators to fight against crime, say Ianni, a professor at Columbia University Teachers Col-
lege, and Reuss-Ianni, research director of the Institute for Social Analysis in New York City. Ironically, decisions such as the Supreme Court's *Goss v. Lopez* (1975) that make it more difficult to suspend rowdy students have forced educators to fall back on time-honored methods such as after-school detention.

In schools with reduced crime rates, punishment is swift but fairly meted out. Rules are carefully developed and publicized. Principals tend to be highly visible and available to students and staff. The student body usually numbers fewer than 2,000; faculty morale is high, and good student-teacher relationships create the kind of "school spirit" that discourages crime and violence.

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**Farm and Food Policy**

**Issues of the 1980s**

*By Don Paarlberg.* Writing from years of experience near the center of agricultural power in Washington, Paarlberg focuses his considerable forecasting skills on the farm politics of the 1980s. Among the issues he examines are commodity programs, the environmental movement, occupational safety and health, the use of land, water, and energy, the decline of the family farm and the rise of agribusiness, and international trade policy. A must for legislators, policymakers, farmers, consumers, and others with a direct stake in agricultural policy. **$16.50**

**University of NEBRASKA Press**

901 North 17th Street Lincoln 68588
"The cause of every malady you've got! He knew, and whether dry, cold, moist or hot! He knew their seat, their humor and condition. He was the perfect practising physician." So wrote Geoffrey Chaucer of the Physician in The Canterbury Tales (c. 1390). Above, a contemporary view of a 14th-century doctor diagnosing a variety of ailments.
Health is as much a cultural value as an objective state of being. Among the Indians of one South American tribe, reports microbiologist René Dubos, a skin ailment called pinta is so prevalent that the unaffected are considered to be ill. In China, health (jian-kang) is regarded as a matter of physical and psychic harmony. In France, santé is a quality one "possesses." Americans are of two minds. Since Colonial days, health has been associated with purity: of the soul, of food, of air and water, of "lifestyle." Health is also something Americans this year will spend one-quarter of a trillion dollars trying to buy—with some success—even as Congress weighs conflicting proposals to further subsidize its cost. Here, medical writer Cary Kimble traces the nation's evolving perceptions of health; sociologist Charles Bosk looks at the doctors; and author-physician Lewis Thomas, in a reflective essay drawn from his remarks at a recent Wilson Center seminar, surveys medical progress over the past two generations and speculates on contributions yet to come.

IN PURSUIT OF WELL-BEING

by Cary Kimble

If one has any doubts about the intensity with which Americans think about their health, the New York Times best-seller list—dominated during the 1970s by such books as The Complete Book of Running (772,000 copies sold) and the American Heart Association Cookbook (400,000)—should help dispel them. Some other statistics may seal the argument. During the ’70s, 18 medical schools opened, and total enrollment jumped from 35,000 to nearly 64,000. The number of persons employed in "health services" grew from 4.2 million to more than 7 million. In terms of total spending, health care became the nation's third largest "industry" (after construction and agriculture). By

The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1980
the end of the decade, Americans were spending 11 cents of every dollar of personal after-tax income on medical care, compared to less than 5 cents 30 years ago.

In all, the United States will spend an estimated $244 billion on "health" this year, almost as much as the entire U.S. Gross National Product in 1950. And that figure does not include the money spent on "high-fiber" bran cereals, jogging togs, self-help books, or cleaning up the environment.

Author-physician Lewis Thomas recently wondered what some "alien historian" might make of this boom in health—or at least in health spending. Perhaps, the outsider might infer, the nation's health had suddenly disintegrated, prompting a kind of domestic Marshall Plan to meet the crisis. Or, maybe, the technology for dealing with illness had become so advanced that its cost had gone through the roof. There was a third possibility, too: that Americans had somehow been caught up in the momentum of a "huge, collective, ponderous set of errors" in public policy and private choice.

Healthy Hypochondriacs?

The alien historian's first impression would be wide of the mark. U.S. citizens can expect to live five years longer today than in 1950. Since 1968, death due to heart disease has actually decreased by a remarkable 25 percent in the United States, even as the toll continues to mount in Western Europe. In short, as U.S. Surgeon General Julius B. Richmond put it last year, "the health of the American people has never been better."

The second suggestion has a bit more merit. The issue here is not so much routine procedures like the 4.5 billion lab tests U.S. doctors ran in 1976 (more than 20 for every American), although these certainly cost money. The capital investment required for such "big-ticket technologies" as renal dialysis, computerized x-ray (CAT) scanners, and fetal monitoring becomes in itself an incentive for overuse; the potential benefits to patients become the justification. CAT scanners, each of which may cost $750,000 to buy and about the same amount to operate per year, will account for one-third of all diagnostic charges this year. Insurance reimbursements for technology are increasing far more rapidly than reimbursements for "physician-patient interaction," and doctors can double or triple their incomes

Job and his Wife, by Albrecht Dürer (1471–1528). Smitten with boils “from the sole of his foot unto his crown,” Job bore his affliction stoically, refusing to curse God or, like many Americans today, to change his lifestyle.

merely by adopting a high-technology “style.” In all, inflation in health-care expenditures rose an average of 10.2 percent annually during the last three decades.

But, according to most estimates, technology accounts for only about 15 percent of the upsurge in spending. Thomas’s third suggestion raises this possibility: that Americans’ perceptions and, above all, expectations of good health have shaped their behavior—and the votes in Congress for medical funding; that we are, in short, “healthy hypochondriacs.” The United States has eliminated starvation and all but a few pockets of absolute poverty. Now, it can be argued, Americans have fastened on perfect health as an unmet national need. Our forefathers would be astonished.

In colonial times, the United States was what would now be considered a very poor “underdeveloped” country. By present standards, death rates were intolerably high, owing to childhood illness and frequent outbreaks of typhus, typhoid,
smallpox, and cholera. In such circumstances, it was perhaps fortunate that the early settlers saw sickness visited and health restored as part of God's Plan. The physician may have had the medications and the instruments to relieve pain in some cases, even (rarely) to prolong life. But it was God who ultimately determined who would die and who would live.

Cotton Mather (1663–1728), the outspoken Boston clergyman and physician, spelled out both the prevailing attitudes toward health and the direction American medicine would eventually take. Sin, he explained, "brings on a sickness in the Spirit [which] will naturally cause a sickness in the Body." On the other hand, Mather believed, "a skillful and faithful physician will do more for a poor patient than all the saints in the Roman Calendar."

"Spiritual Kinship"

The 19th century brought some hope in this regard. While Americans still faced devastating epidemics, notably in the immigrant-packed cities of the East, medical schools began producing the first generations of genuinely "scientific" doctors. Public hospitals emerged as centers of medical care throughout the country. Surgery of all kinds—orthopedic, abdominal, neurological—became somewhat more sophisticated and, due primarily to the general use of anesthesia (ether) beginning in the 1840s, considerably less hazardous. Concern for public health led to water-flushed sewer systems and the public parks of Frederick Law Olmsted. The verification of the germ theory of disease by French chemist Louis Pasteur in 1860 brought a new understanding of the relationship between specific microorganisms and specific illnesses.

Such developments gradually reinforced a lasting transformation in Americans' perception of health, a realization that disease was sometimes conquerable and often preventable. Capitalizing on this notion, reformers like Sylvester Graham (1794–1851), now remembered chiefly for his Graham cracker, toured the land promoting vegetarianism, natural foods, roughage, exercise, sunshine, fresh air, weekend bathing, and sex hygiene. Not for the last time, Americans began to change their "lifestyles." The middle class, especially, enjoyed an upsurge in participatory sports—tennis, golf, baseball, bicycling. Spas and "hydropathic institutes" became the vogue, and newsletters like the Herald of Health graced bourgeois parlors. Among proponents of the new fads, there was, as one historian has noted, a kind of "spiritual kinship."
HEALTH IN AMERICA

**THE TOP 10 HEALTH BOOKS OF THE 1970s**

**Sales since 1970**

1. *Better Homes and Gardens Family Medical Guide* (1964) 3,129,000
2. *Dr. Atkins' Diet Revolution: The High Calorie Way to Stay Thin Forever*, Robert C. Atkins (1972) 1,000,000
3. *Weight Watchers New Program Cookbook*, Jean Nidetch (1979) 900,000
5. *The Complete Scarsdale Medical Diet Plus Dr. Tarnower's Keep-Slim Program*, Herman Tarnower and Samm S. Baker (1979) 650,000
6. *The American Heart Association Cookbook*, Ruthe Eshleman and Mary Winston (1973) 400,000
7. *Total Fitness in 30 Minutes a Week*, Laurence E. Morehouse and Leonard Gross (1975) 206,000
8. *Doctor's Quick Inches Off Diet*, Irwin Stillman and Samm S. Baker (1969) 200,000
9. *The Save Your Life Diet: High Fiber Protection from Six of the Most Serious Diseases of Civilization*, David Reuben (1975) 175,000
10. *Dr. Atkins' Superenergy Diet: The Diet Revolution's Answer to Fatigue and Depression*, Robert C. Atkins and Shirley M. Linde (1977) 131,954

Note: All sales are publishers' estimates, in hardcover only. None of the figures include book club sales.

*This list excludes sex manuals like Alex Comfort's *The Joy of Sex* (1972) and David Reuben's *Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Sex But Were Afraid to Ask* (1969)—which sold 1 million and 600,000 copies respectively. (To put these figures in perspective, the No. 1 hardcover nonfiction, nonhealth best seller of the decade was Alex Haley's *Roots*, published in 1976; it sold 1,174,000 copies.) After sex, Americans like food: Seven of the Top 10 books are guides to dieting or healthful cooking. Dr. Benjamin Spock's *Baby and Child Care* does not rank among the Top 10 for the 1970s, but it has sold more than 23 million copies, almost all in paperback, since it was first published in 1946.*

The federal government, too, stepped tentatively into the health business in the 19th century. In 1813, Congress passed a bill "encouraging" the use of Edward Jenner's cowpox vaccine. Later came the Import Drugs Act (1848) and the Animal Inspection Act (1892). A landmark Food and Drug Act was signed into law by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1906. These and other
legislative initiatives reflected a new feeling among U.S. politicians, encouraged by some of the new philanthropic foundations, that there existed some kind of citizen "right" to health, be it the positive right to vaccination or the right to be free from harmful food, drugs, and other products. This laudable notion underlay the establishment of charitable hospitals and, eventually, the growth of tax-subsidized health care, notably Medicare and Medicaid.*

As America entered the 20th century, great accomplishments lay ahead. A baby born in 1900 could expect to live 47 years. By 1980, life expectancy would be about 73 years. The annual death rate in the United States would drop from 17 to about 9 per 1,000. The United States was riding a seemingly endless crest of hope: the discovery of vitamins in 1912; the isolation of the hormone insulin in 1921; the discovery of penicillin in 1928; the mass-production of antibiotics spurred by World War II; the development of open-heart surgery in 1954; the triumph over dreaded polio in 1955; the first human-heart transplant by South Africa's Dr. Christiaan Barnard in 1967.

One Organ at a Time

By then, one could almost say, the only dangerous infectious disease left seemed to be optimism. A 1965 Gallup poll found that 77 percent of those surveyed believed a cure for cancer would be found by 1985; almost half thought the common cold would be licked. A decade later, the President's 1976 Biomedical Research Panel boldly proclaimed that science had at last reached the stage where the capacity to conquer all human disease was within reach. There do not appear, the panel reported, to be any more "impenetrable, incomprehensible diseases."

Yet, inevitably, rapid progress has provoked re-examination. Despite obvious scientific progress on many fronts, Americans are increasingly worried about the sheer cost of medical care. (A simple appendicitis operation and a five-day hospital stay, for example, can cost $3,500.) Already the taxpayers pay up to $40,000 a year per patient for kidney dialysis (in effect im-

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*The Medicare and Medicaid programs were established by Congress in 1965 at the behest of President Lyndon Johnson to help aged and poor persons meet the cost of medical care. Both programs are lodged in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Medicare is essentially a national health insurance program for people age 65 or older and for certain disabled persons. Medicaid, which is funded by state and federal governments, and which varies from state to state, is a "medical assistance" program for people with low incomes and for the "medically needy"—i.e., those who may earn enough to cover daily living expenses but not enough to pay for medical care. Total program costs for both Medicare and Medicaid are projected at $56.3 billion in 1980.

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In 1939, there were 3,000 psychiatrists in the United States. By 1978, the number had grown to 28,000. Between 1963 and 1973, psychiatry was the third fastest growing specialty in the United States, after internal medicine and radiology.

At least one out of every four psychiatrists in the world today is American—and probably white. Only 3.3 percent of U.S. psychiatrists are of Hispanic background; 2.1 percent are black; 0.5 percent, American Indian. Fourteen percent of U.S. psychiatrists are women. While the national average is 12.4 psychiatrists per 100,000 people, New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maryland all have more than 20 per 100,000. The District of Columbia enjoys the highest ratio: 58.9 psychiatrists per 100,000 people. (One reason is that health insurance for federal workers automatically pays for extensive psychiatric as well as physical care.)

About 3 out of 10 Americans, not all of them mentally ill, are given mental health care at some point in their lives. In any one year, according to the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, about 15 percent of the American people suffer “mental disorders.” Relatively few receive formal treatment. In 1975, some 6.7 million Americans (3 percent of the population) consulted psychiatrists, psychologists, or counselors. Almost half of those who did so for the first time were diagnosed as depressed (17 percent), schizophrenic (16 percent), or alcoholic (11 percent). Men and women consult private psychiatrists in equal proportions, according to a 1976 American Psychiatric Association Survey.

Twenty-five years ago, a diagnosis of mental illness virtually guaranteed that the patient would be institutionalized. In 1955, three out of four mentally ill persons were treated in hospitals; 20 years later, the proportion dropped to one in four as the number of patients in state and county mental hospitals fell from 559,000 to 191,000. Reasons for the shift include the discovery and widespread use of tranquilizers and other mood-altering drugs; the development of community mental health centers; the transfer (thanks to Medicaid and Medicare) of mentally ill aged people from hospitals to nursing homes; and, perhaps, a growing tolerance in the United States of unusual behavior.

Within the field of psychiatry, two increasingly prominent specialties are child psychiatry and biological psychiatry, the latter reflecting a new emphasis on the chemical and nutritional roots of mental illness. Yet, for medical students in general, the attraction of psychiatry seems to be waning. Many now disdain the field as “professional handholding.” In 1970, 11 percent of graduating medical students went into psychiatry; by 1978, that figure had dwindled to 3.6 percent.
PAYING THE BILLS

The 1980s will probably see Congress enact some kind of tax-paid national health insurance plan, served up with great expectations. If so, chances are that the dull but crucial details of "implementation" will have been largely ignored in the debate. National politics, observe the authors of a new Urban Institute study,* "highlight questions of whether or not to enact a program; issues of administrative design usually attract less interest."

Yet these "nuts-and-bolts" details—who makes the rules, who writes the policies, who signs the checks—could mean the difference between costly success and costly failure.

For example, should the federal government unilaterally promulgate guidelines and control the purse strings of the nation's health insurance from Washington? Should it relegate part of the task (and cost) to state governments? Should private insurance carriers be tapped as Washington's surrogates in the hinterland? Each approach, the authors demonstrate, has unique advantages and built-in flaws.

Purely federal administration would promote "uniform" and "equitable" treatment of beneficiaries nationwide—at the expense of efficiency. Part of the problem here is the rigid federal bureaucracy. And Washington, with its rising tax revenues and penchant for deficit spending, has little incentive to control costs. States show more flexibility, and, thanks to pressure from Washington, have generally done well in administering Medicaid programs. Several states (e.g., New York, California, Wisconsin) have even set up innovative programs to curb health-care costs. But no state has kept within the federally set "maximum error rate"; allegations of Medicaid fraud by patients, doctors, and hospitals are common.

Using private insurance carriers as "administrative agents" (as is done in Medicare) would allow the greatest amount of "individual preference." The risk is that private insurers would be tempted to shift overhead costs from their private business to their public operations. Alternatively, the government could provide tax credits or vouchers to help individuals buy health insurance on the open market. But the dollar value of the vouchers would have to increase steadily to keep up with rising premiums. And insurance companies might then avoid "high-risk" individuals.

There are many "wrong" ways to administer a multibillion-dollar national health insurance program, the authors conclude. But careful thinking about the headaches—in advance—can narrow the gap between legislative goals and bureaucratic results.

implementing a national health insurance program one organ at a time, as a congressional staff member observed). Should we do the same for heart transplants? Can we afford any more lifesaving breakthroughs?

New ethical questions—e.g., when to halt treatment for the terminally ill—prompt fierce arguments in courts of law, as well as hospital corridors. The post-1950s concern over environmental causes of illness—chemical pesticides, radiation, pollutants—has belatedly uncovered some genuine hazards; but a certain unreality sometimes pervades the discussion: No risk is deemed acceptable. Many Americans appear to seek what never was, a prophylactic, "zero defect" environment.

And, too, people have vested medicine with great responsibilities, greater responsibilities, in some cases, than they are willing to shoulder themselves.²

Legislating Health

Such inflated hopes and confused aims are enshrined in the charter of the UN’s World Health Organization (WHO). Promulgated in 1946, it remains an expansive definition of health, a definition that has triggered debate ever since among academics, doctors, diplomats, and politicians—but also one that many American "laymen" might endorse without giving the matter much thought. Health, reads the preamble of WHO’s charter, "is a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity."

With these words, the WHO charter set hopelessly unattainable objectives for medicine, in effect "gerrymandering" the definition of health, as Georgetown neurologist Leon Kass put it, thereby making even happiness the doctor’s business. As a result, Kass observed, a whole grab bag of complaints has been placed at medicine’s doorstep, "from sagging anatomies to suicides, ... from marital difficulties to learning difficulties, from genetic counseling to drug addiction, from laziness to crime." Just as America’s public schools have been saddled with responsibility for curing a broad spectrum of social problems, so medicine is now held accountable for any "ill" that happens to involve a human body or a human mind. There is growing confusion between medical needs and individual desires. Under which category do nose jobs and straight teeth fall, for example? What about the estimated 20 million Americans using Valium

²In some cities, more than a third of all schoolchildren have not received measles or polio vaccination, the result of parental neglect—and perhaps a sense of false security. Among teenagers, venereal disease has reached epidemic proportions, despite its easy treatment.
on doctors' prescriptions?*

Such an all-embracing concept of health poses an immense challenge to the resources of any nation, particularly one like the United States where the "pursuit of happiness" has official sanction to begin with, and where there is a chronic impulse—born of good intentions and crowd-pleasing politics—to take social challenges seriously. In some ways, the WHO charter seems to have shaped the agenda of Congress and the White House for more than three decades.

The federal health-care effort has three major elements.

*In 1977, agents acting on the central nervous system (including tranquilizers, hypnotics, antidepressants, narcotics, and stimulants) accounted for more than 25 percent of the U.S. sales (but only 14 percent of foreign sales) of the 140 member firms of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association. Total U.S. sales of the 140 PMA firms topped $8 billion in 1977.
First and most obvious is the fight against disease, beginning, as noted earlier, with smallpox vaccination, expanding during the 1930s with VD prevention and the establishment of the National Cancer Institute and the National Institutes of Health, and accelerating after World War II to encompass mental health, polio vaccination, and research into heart and lung disease, stroke, Cooley's anemia, sickle cell anemia, diabetes, lead poisoning, kidney disease, and much else. In more recent years, Washington's interest has broadened to include combating alcoholism, drug addiction, and (with Food Stamps and school lunches) malnutrition. Buttressing all of the above has been the federal government's postwar "capacity building" effort: manpower training, subsidies for hospital construction,
grants to medical schools.

The second element, and one that consumes more than 80 percent of all federal health outlays, involves controlling—or subsidizing—health-care costs. Public discussion of some kind of national health insurance began as early as 1910, but the first major health insurance bill—the Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill—was not introduced into Congress until 1943. It died. During the next two decades, Congress set into place a patchwork of programs providing for limited health-care assistance for the aged and destitute, as well as for disability insurance. With passage of the multi-billion-dollar Medicare and Medicaid programs in 1965, Congress crossed the Rubicon, so to speak. Subsidized health insurance was no longer assailed by conservatives as “socialized medicine.” Today, a dozen national health insurance bills are in the congressional hopper; passage of some version now appears to be only a matter of time.

Enemies and Ingrates

The third element of the federal effort encompasses what may loosely be called “regulation.” From the 19th century on, the U.S. government has periodically acted to ban hazardous substances, regulate the food and drug industries, and clean up air and water. Since 1960, that effort has mushroomed to include not only toughened clean-air and clean-water statutes but also pesticide bans, noise restrictions, radiation emission guidelines, and stiff regulations concerning cigarette advertising, mine safety, factory safety, auto safety, and consumer-product safety. The government monitors doctors, hospitals, and the manufacture of wooden legs and glass eyes. And, over the years, Washington has used an array of legal and financial incentives and disincentives to “fine-tune” the supply of nurses, doctors, dentists, and therapists, much as the Federal Reserve Board intervenes to expand or contract the money supply.

Thomas Jefferson once complained that every presidential patronage appointment he made created 12 enemies and 1 ingrate. Washington’s efforts to bring forth a healthy society have at times had similar consequences. Scores of “public-interest” lobbies now exist in Washington to press for new regulations and belabor old ones as inadequate. And, because medicine, even with Washington’s succor, cannot deal with everything dumped in its lap, there has been a backlash—against doctors, against the drug industry, against seemingly “frivolous” basic research, against technology itself.

Out of this reaction has come a revived interest among many
HEALTH IN AMERICA

THE TOP TEN KILLERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>As % of all deaths</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>As % of all deaths</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per 100,000</td>
<td>population</td>
<td>Per 100,000</td>
<td>population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heart Disease</td>
<td>211.2</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>333.9</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pneumonia &amp; Influenza</td>
<td>146.5</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cancer</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>181.6</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronic Kidney Infection</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strokes</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidents*</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certain Conditions of Infants</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto Accidents</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastrointestinal Infections</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*including legal executions

Source: U.S. Public Health Service.

Owing to advances in combating infectious illness, a shrinking handful of diseases now claims the lives of a growing proportion of Americans. The 10 leading causes of death in 1978 accounted for more than 83 percent of all deaths (versus 70.7 percent in 1929). Because Americans live longer, the incidence of death due to cancer and heart disorders has doubled.

Americans in “lifestyle” health care: jogging and bicycling, health foods, special diets, sports and exercise, yoga and meditation, health spas, reformed smoking and drinking habits. The nation’s top popular health magazine, Robert Rodale’s Prevention (circulation: 2,225,000), has grown faster in the last five years than any other U.S. magazine except People. A “new” branch of medicine, the holistic school, stresses the interdependence of body, mind, emotions, and spirit in maintaining a general (presumably WHO-approved) state of “wellness.” Thus, the Omega Institute of Hoosick, New York, offers well-attended summer seminars on “holistic massage,” “health through living foods,” “biofeedback and stress control techniques,” and “consciousness dying.” As before, there is a kind of “spiritual kinship” among the devotees of health cults.

Even among doctors, there appears to be growing support for a technological slowdown and a partial return to earlier
values. "It is difficult to say which is the more troubling image," says Dr. Louis Lasagna, a teaching physician at the University of Rochester, "the primitively limited ability to practice medicine properly in the 18th century, our own century's failure to integrate technological progress with a personal, caring approach, or the grim prospect of a 21st century characterized by a totally dehumanized, computer-governed practice of medicine."

There are limits to what formal medicine and medical technology can do. A national health insurance scheme, whatever its ultimate financial costs and benefits, is not likely to improve health. Even a cure for cancer would not lengthen average life spans much; there are other things to die from. The fact is that every medical advance has simply taken us closer to a point one can never reach; that the shrinking "residuum of sickness," as historian Morris Vogel has called it, now comprises the most difficult research problems; that future breakthroughs will be relatively discrete and undramatic.

Money cannot change these facts, and even greater public investment will not appreciably speed up the rate of scientific return. Indeed, the most dramatic step Americans could take to improve today's general level of health would be to start living properly, rather than just urging Washington to spend more money on fighting disease or on regulating the environment. With its novel implication that an individual shares some responsibility for his own fate, this notion conflicts with the assumptions behind much congressional legislation in recent decades. It may be the only pill Americans won't swallow.
There is a certain cachet in the term "American doctor," much as there is in "Swiss banker," "French chef," or "Soviet dissident." Hardly a month goes by without a team of U.S. physicians flying off to perform delicate surgery on some ailing international celebrity. The Nobel Prize in medicine has long been dominated by Americans. A large share of the science news chronicles the achievements of our physicians. There is nothing wrong with such eminence. But the headlines leave out a lot—if only because most doctors don’t make headlines.

In 1977, the number of active physicians in the United States, excluding those employed by the federal government, approached 400,000. If one adds the doctors at Veterans Administration hospitals and government agencies like the National Institutes of Health, as well as the graduates of U.S. medical schools during the past three years, the current total is roughly one-half million. It is almost impossible to make valid generalizations about this group.

Most are men, but a growing proportion (now 8 percent) are women.* One in six was born outside the United States. The majority (231,000) deliver patient care in some form of office practice, but about 25 percent work full-time in hospitals as interns, residents, or hospital-based specialists (anesthesiologists, for example). Some 30,000 physicians do not even consider patient care their principal activity but opt instead for research, teaching, or other medical-related duties. Doctors are full-time administrators at, for example, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the New England Journal of Medicine, and the Association of American Medical Colleges.

The closer one looks, the more one is impressed by the diversity within the profession. Some physicians confine their

*The barriers to women in medical practice have fallen more quickly than barriers based on race, ethnicity, or age. The dramatic rise in the number of women medical students (from 5.4 percent of first-year students in 1940 to 27.8 percent in 1980) obscures continuing male-female differences. Most women M.D.s still end up doing "women's work." For example, among first-year women medical students in 1977, 26 percent hoped to enter family practice, 10.6 percent favored pediatrics; only 1 percent had considered teaching or research. Bias is one factor. Many young women M.D.s also hope to combine a family and a career, and so choose less demanding specialties with more regular hours.
practices to specialties like hematology-oncology and deal primarily with the gravely ill; others are in general practice and cater to basically healthy people. The half million U.S. physicians are all in different stages of their careers. For some young surgeons, virtually every experience—the routine repair of a hernia, say—is a "first." For older practitioners, even the unexpected death of a patient is part of a pattern that has occurred countless times before.

In the end, all that can be said with certainty about doctors as a group is that the rest of American society generally holds them in high esteem, pays them well, and, often unwittingly, subjects them to enormous stresses and demands.

Affluence, Autonomy, Idealism

The fact that physicians occupy a privileged and, despite the occasional complaints in journals like Medical Economics, well-remunerated place in America is hardly news. An individual doctor's net income varies widely according to age, location, and specialty (ranging from a low of $35,023 a year for general practitioners in New England to a high of $89,571 for radiologists in the Midwest), but average annual net income for physicians is high, reportedly about $60,000 in 1976.

The investment in medical school—up to $12,000 a year for a minimum of four years—begins to pay large dividends immediately upon the completion of training at age 28 to 32 and continues to do so until age 60. Medicine stands consistently near the top (after TV news and higher education, according to a 1979 Harris poll) in popular ratings of institutional prestige. It is the one career (or so it seems to youths) where individual autonomy and idealism fit easily with personal advancement and affluence.

The competition for medical-school admission confirms the profession's drawing power. In 1977-78, some 40,569 students applied for 15,977 positions in 119 American medical schools, a ratio of 2.5 to 1. This represents a slight drop in actual numbers over the previous year—but a slight rise in relative terms given the decline in the number of graduating university seniors. The average number of applications to different schools filed by each

Charles L. Bosk, 31, is assistant professor of sociology at the University of Pennsylvania. Born in Baltimore, Md., he received his B.A. from Wesleyan University (1970) and his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago (1976). He is the author of Forgive and Remember: Managing Medical Failure (1979) and is currently working on a book on genetic counseling.
Union surgeons at work during the battle of Gettysburg, 1863. Ignorance rarely stayed a physician's hand. "The more intricate the wound," wrote Louisa May Alcott of one Army surgeon, "the better he liked it." By the end of the 19th century, however, the growth of medical knowledge brought greater sophistication, and the beginning of specialized practice.

applicant in 1977–78 reached a record high of 9.16."

If the role of the physician has its rewards, it also has its special burdens. The moral and legal responsibility a doctor assumes for a patient's well-being can weigh heavily on his psyche. Surgeon-essayist Richard Selzer has written of the doctor who, "after a lifetime of grand gestures and mighty deeds, comes upon the knowledge that he has done no more than meddle in the lives of his fellows and that he has done at least as much harm as good."

"There is reason to suspect that, despite enrollment increases among blacks (who now make up 6.5 percent of first-year medical students) and Hispanics (1.7 percent), medical-school student bodies are growing more rather than less homogeneous in terms of social class. A 1979 Journal of Medical Education profile of the medical-student population reported that between 1974 and 1977, "students from lower-middle income families ($10,000 to $16,000) declined from 21 to 15 percent and those in the $17,000 to $20,000 bracket dropped by 2 percentage points. By contrast, students in the middle-middle income bracket range ($21,000 to $25,000) increased steadily from 10 to 14 percent and those in the upper-income brackets from 48 to 50 percent."
A reliable estimate of the toll that doctors' work exacts is difficult to obtain, though there is much public discussion these days of "physician impairment." The American Medical Association estimates that 10 percent of all U.S. doctors have a problem with alcohol during their careers; 1 to 2 percent have a drug problem. There are more than 100 physician suicides a year. The incidence of marital instability among physicians is reportedly high. Indeed, the unhappy doctor's wife has long been a stock figure in novels (Madame Bovary), plays (Enemy of the People), and soap operas (General Hospital).

More than most people, physicians have themselves to thank or blame for their blessings or their woes. To a greater extent even than the law, medicine is a self-regulating, self-policing guild. The organized political activities of the Chicago-based, 210,000-member American Medical Association have long helped to shape attitudes in Congress and the White House toward issues ranging from national health insurance and subsidized hospital construction to affirmative action and aid for medical schools. Individually and collectively, doctors shape the local environment in which they work, even define what that "work" consists of.

**Rites of Passage**

The corporate influence of American physicians is not, of course, limitless. Since the end of World War II, there has been an explosion in government expenditures in the health sector of the economy—from $50 million in 1950 to $50 billion in 1979. As a result, physicians have found their pre-eminence challenged by organized interest groups representing hospital administrators, pharmaceutical firms, nurses, insurance companies, consumer groups, and others. Insurance companies, for example, have a vital interest in reducing health-care costs, an interest not necessarily shared by doctors paid on a fee-for-service basis.

Even so, the organized medical profession has a wide range of powers. Through its involvement in administration, it runs many hospitals and determines which doctors have access to them. Through its specialty boards, it determines who is licensed to practice (by setting the passing score on the National Boards) and defines "acceptable" standards of medical care. Through local medical societies, it has the last word on the remedial steps necessary when shortcomings are discovered (from suggesting refresher courses to, in extremis, revoking a doctor's license). Perhaps most important, it controls who is allowed to enter medical school (by dictating admissions requirements).
DISTRIBUTION OF PHYSICIANS BY STATE, 1977


The widely publicized "maldistribution" of U.S. physicians (above) is really two distinct problems: (a) a shortage of doctors in rural areas (139 counties have no active physicians treating patients); and (b), a preponderance of specialists in urban areas, where doctors are abundant, at the expense of primary-care physicians. On average, specialists (below) earn considerably more than doctors in general practice.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCTORS by specialty</th>
<th>as percent of all doctors</th>
<th>Projected net income</th>
<th>Minutes of patients' waiting time</th>
<th>Fee for initial office visit</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Practice</td>
<td>80.3%</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>$52,400*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal Medicine</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>64,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgery</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>75,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pediatrics</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>50,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstetrics/Gynaecology</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>79,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychiatry</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>49,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anesthesiology</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>67,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1978 average


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MOVING TOWARD GROUPS

According to Princeton economist Uwe Reinhardt, the majority of American doctors may well be in group practice by 1990. Varieties of group practice abound—partnership or corporation, multispecialty or single specialty—but all share one characteristic: the cooperative practice of medicine by three or more physicians.

U.S. doctors typically practiced "solo"—European-style—until the late 19th century. During the 1870s, the Homestead Mining Company set up a medical group for its workers in South Dakota; in 1883, Northern Pacific Railroad followed suit. The prototype for large American group practices is the Mayo Clinic (founded in 1887 in Rochester, Minn.), which trained thousands of doctors in the Midwest. By 1930, more than 2,000 American doctors worked in 150 group organizations. Today almost 70,000 physicians in nearly 9,000 groups handle some 600 million "patient visits" a year.

For the doctor, the advantages of group practice are clear. Greater administrative efficiency means group practitioners can work fewer, more regular hours. They earn a higher average net income than those working alone ($72,000 versus $49,400). Patients also benefit. While group practice does not save patients money, superior record-keeping and peer review make for better medical care, "Per unit of quality," contends Reinhardt, "the product is cheaper."


and what students must study while there.

The intensity and duration of medical education marks it as one of the most distinctive forms of adult "socialization" in our society, comparable only to what occurs at West Point, say, or in the seminary. Dissecting a cadaver, attending an autopsy, delivering a baby, witnessing a death—all are part of a unique set of tests, ordeals, and rituals designed to transform an ordinary person into a doctor. Throughout this rite de passage from premed to M.D. to intern to resident to (in some cases) specialist, an individual is exposed for the first time to the question marks hanging over the doctor's world: How are pain and suffering to be interpreted? How are difficult treatment decisions made? What are the limits—intellectually, physically, emotionally—to the physician's job? Surprisingly, despite the stresses of medical school, the drop-out rate is low. In 1979, less than one-half of one percent of the nation's 63,000 medical students called it quits.

Playing God

How are students taught to be physicians? First, they receive rather explicit and formal instruction in the vast, hopelessly fragmentary, science of the human body. Day and night, medical students, interns, and residents can be found looking at x rays, viewing microscopic slides, and locating, Xeroxing, collecting, and trying to remember specialized journal articles in an attempt to understand what is happening to their patients. Passing examinations, making diagnoses, citing the relevant literature, designing research projects—these are the indicators to faculty and student alike that lessons are being learned. And the lessons don't stop with graduation. The American Medical Association has actively pressed for continuing medical education, and periodic "recertification" is required in some specialties. In 1978, half of all doctors spent $1,350 or more on refresher courses accredited by the Association of American Medical Colleges. *

A person who has not been through medical school may find it hard to understand how totally medical training pervades

*The expense of continuing medical education first appeared in Medical Economics' Continuing Survey of Practice Costs in 1978; it is becoming, as the journal's editors note, "a big-ticket item." Yet the data are somewhat misleading because refresher courses are often part of a "package deal" that may include a Caribbean vacation or Black Sea cruise. In a recent advertisement appearing in the New England Journal of Medicine, the Palo Alto Medical Clinic offered continuing medical education lectures on topics ranging from cardiology to gastrointestinal surgery. The lectures were to be given on board the ocean liner Sagafjord during a two-week cruise; various itineraries were available. "These seminars," the advertisement stated, "have been designed to comply with the 1976 tax reform act."
students' lives, infects their dreams, conditions their perceptions. In an anguished but often witty 1979 essay in *Change* magazine, first-year medical student Abigail Zuger wrote:

After an hour looking through a microscope, I find that even ordinary objects begin to take on a strange new identity: The pattern of my dining room tablecloth, for instance, looks so much like atrophied leg muscle cells that I am tempted to get a new one, whereas the tiles on the floor of the ladies' room at school are arranged just like the cells in a tubercular lung, and I must resist the urge to crawl under the sinks in search of the primary lesion.

If the part of medical education that communicates the facts of science is explicit, the portion that instructs young physicians in how to apply this knowledge with compassion and sensitivity is hidden, buried in the crowded routines of hospital life, or trivialized in a few sessions on "caring," "the doctor-patient relationship," "death." Yet, beyond the science of medicine, physicians need to learn its craft: how to treat seriously ill patients and their families with respect and dignity; how to take seriously the judgment, knowledge, and skills of nurses, social workers, and psychologists; how to manage one's own feelings of rage, despair, or helplessness in the face of unjust suffering; how to monitor responsibly the work of one's colleagues—and submit to such monitoring oneself.

Students learn these skills on the job, if at all. The relative dearth of explicit instruction in such ethically murky areas as when to revive a patient and when to leave well enough alone is striking. The principal character in physician-author Robin Cook's 1972 novel *The Year of the Intern* laments that "medical school never taught me how to play God." It is not clear that medical-school faculty would know exactly how to proceed with this task, even if they were disposed to accept the notion (which, for the most part, they are not) that it is a responsibility medical schools could—or should—address.

The problem here is not simply that medical schools may be turning out gruff physicians with little concern for ethical questions. The fact is, what happens in medical school affects the whole U.S. "health delivery" system. A case can be made, for example, that the nature of medical education is partly responsible for the maldistribution of M.D.s in the United States.

There are two separate distributional problems. First, rural areas are medically "underserved" relative to urban areas, even as the U.S. population is shifting away from big cities. Second,
in urban areas where the total supply of physicians is abundant, specialization greatly reduces the pool of physicians available to deliver primary care. Recent congressional legislation requires that federally aided schools increase efforts to produce primary-care physicians. But whatever long-range consequences such legislation has, the career choices of physicians over the last 15 years indicate that doctors by and large prefer high-paying specialty practice in such glamorous fields as cardiac surgery to the daily drudgery of sore throats, back pains, and upset stomachs.

Physicians specialize because it allows them to reduce uncertainty by circumscribing the area of their expertise to, say, a particular organ system (the heart) or set of procedures (orthopedics); to confine their efforts to what they as individuals find intellectually satisfying; and to draw a boundary of involvement with and responsibility for their patients. In short, specialists never have to let go of an outlook encountered and acquired in medical school.

Looking Inward

The very structure of medical training leads to an exaltation of specialty-based hospital practice as "real" doctor's work and the denigration of primary care as "scut" or menial work. As one Stanford University medical school professor frankly told Science magazine last January: "In the early 1970s, the admissions committee went overboard in the admission of students who knew from the day they came that they wanted to be general medical practitioners. Stanford is not the place to train that kind of individual."

Further, the often desultory way in which human issues are treated in medical school implies that the social aspects of medicine are neither important nor a collective concern. Much ambiguity exists because the unwritten code of medical conduct is also unspoken. As a result, the medical profession's responsibili-

*In response to a widely publicized "shortage" of 50,000 doctors, Congress in 1963 passed the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act to promote the training of physicians via construction grants to medical schools and scholarships to needy students. Further legislation in 1965 and 1971 boosted the level of federal support and explicitly linked continued government aid to enrollment increases. By all accounts, these federal programs succeeded in the avowed aim of expanding the medical-school pipeline. Concerned about maldistribution, Congress in 1976 created the National Health Service Corps, which awards medical-school scholarships to prospective M.D.s in return for a period of service after graduation in doctor-short areas. At the same time, Congress required that, in order to qualify for federal assistance, medical schools set aside 35 percent of their first-year residencies for primary care. Since most prospective specialists do a residency in internal medicine anyway (which counts as "primary care"), the program has had little impact.
THE AILING HOSPITAL

Overregulated, overbuilt, and undermanaged, the American hospital is an institution in need of succor.

Of the $244 billion that Americans will spend on health this year, some $100 billion will go to America's 7,000 hospitals. Owing to a combination of poor planning and bad management, more than 200,000 of the nation's 1 million hospital beds now lie empty. Many hospitals are still run by doctors with no business training. Until the 1960s, observes Tulane professor Hugh W. Long, graduate schools of hospital administration gave short shrift to the "nitty-gritty": accounting, finance, marketing.

Urban hospitals are in the worst condition. Because of the middle-class flight to the suburbs, most of the patients in urban hospitals are now poor people who rely on federally funded, state-run Medicaid programs to foot their bills. (Nationwide, government now pays for 54 percent of all hospital costs.) Yet, Medicaid reimbursements usually cover only about 90 percent of actual expenses. Suburban hospitals, many of them for-profit and privately owned, can compensate for Medicaid losses by inflating by as much as 30 percent their bills to affluent patients carrying private insurance (which covers actual charges, not a bureaucrat's idea of "cost"). Inner-city hospitals have no such buffer.

Squeezed between mounting expenses and plummeting revenues, the urban hospital can stay afloat only by cutting back on quality—which in turn further discourages private patients. Political debates rage over whether places like New York's inefficient Metropolitan Hospital should be kept open primarily for the employment they provide.

Outside inner cities, consortia of not-for-profit hospitals have cut costs and increased their purchasing power by pooling capital and centralizing essential services: laundry, computers, x rays, lab work. Some enterprising groups like the Harvard University teaching hospitals have even set up their own malpractice insurance companies.

Despite such innovative tinkering, hospitals as we know them are ties to the larger society are often left undefined. Should doctors see to it that the underserved receive care? Even where duties are defined, as in the profession's responsibility to monitor the performance of its members, the means are often unspecified. The few formal mechanisms that do exist, such as chart review (a comparative survey of each hospital doctor's track record), are usually the result of governmental or consumer pressure.
probably on the way out. Likely to take over are “health maintenance organizations” (HMOs), providing comprehensive care for a fixed, prepaid fee that now averages about $1,500 a year. (The cost is borne by employer and employee.) Acting as both insurer and provider, HMOs cannot afford the inefficiencies of the usual “fee-for-service” health-care system. By contracting for hospital services (or buying hospitals outright), HMOs have reintroduced cost-consciousness and competition. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is encouraging the growth of HMOs through loans and grants, and hopes to boost HMO enrollment from the current 8.2 million to 20 million by 1989.

In affluent areas, hospitals may wind up as parts of larger “human renewal centers” set up by medical corporations to sell a wide range of health services instead of just in-patient care. One such center already under construction is nonprofit Fairview Community Hospitals’ “Ridges” development, located on a 120-acre campus outside Minneapolis. By 1988, Ridges will comprise doctors’ offices, a nursing home, a 150-bed hospital, a mental health center, a community clinic, government offices, housing for the elderly, restaurants, a post office, a health-products shopping mall, and a Lutheran church.

**WHO PAID AMERICA’S HOSPITAL COSTS, 1960-78**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Direct Consumer Payments</th>
<th>Private Insurance</th>
<th>Government</th>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>$20</td>
<td>$40</td>
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Source: Health Care Financing Administration.

Left to its own devices, the medical profession would probably leave evaluation to the consciences of individual doctors.

The authority of the medical profession, however, has not gone unchallenged in recent years. The continuing rise in both the number of medical malpractice suits and the size of awards is one key index. An estimated 20,000 malpractice claims are brought against doctors each year; the average award grew from
$6,000 to $23,000 between 1970 and 1974. Increasingly, consumer and even ethnic groups have been willing to confront the guild of physicians—and they get results. Consider the changes in the techniques of childbirth prompted by the women's movement; the development of prenatal Tay-Sachs screening to aid prospective Jewish parents; the research into sickle cell anemia demanded by the black community.

To its credit, the medical profession has lately subjected itself to a great deal of soul-searching and self-doubt. Articles like Yale pediatrician Raymond Duff's anguished discussion of the ethical dilemmas involved in treating—or not treating—critically ill newborns; organizations like Students for Humanistic Medicine; continuing symposia like UCLA's Forum on Law and Ethics in Medicine—all of these evidence new concern generated within the profession about the direction of medicine.

The impetus to reflection has stemmed largely from the fact that medical knowledge has grown faster than the profession's ability to assimilate it, or to deal with its far-reaching ramifications. Treatment technologies like amniocentesis, organ transplantation, and psychosurgery raise very large questions about their proper use. For once, doctors are not debating these issues in isolation but have sought the counsel of lawyers, theologians, social scientists, patients.

Predicting the outcome of these diverse challenges—from within but primarily from outside the medical profession—is far from easy. It seems clear that as more responsibility for paying doctor's bills is centralized in the hands of the federal government, the work of physicians will be increasingly subject to public, or at least bureaucratic, scrutiny. Whether this results in still more burdensome paperwork with little public benefit or in fact leads to improved services at lower cost is impossible to say. What is certain is that like others—newspaper editors, school principals, prison wardens, corporation executives—physicians are finding it increasingly difficult to do as they please.

Less certain is where Americans will draw the line on doctors' independence. There is an irrational side to a patient's needs. We want our physicians to be frank, fatherly, wise—not just anonymous providers of a heavily regulated service, like truck drivers. Challenges to medical authority, I suspect, will only go so far—a distance limited by our desire to have doctors act in heroic and priestly ways when we fall ill, as we all do.
A friend of mine, a biomedical scientist with responsibilities for the future of one of the country's major research institutions, sent me a memorandum recently containing a set of questions about the application of biological science to medical problems. Heading the list was the hardest and the most embarrassing: What are some examples, he asked, of the usefulness of the biological revolution itself, beginning with the discovery of the double-helical structure of DNA in 1953 and culminating in today's insights into gene structure and function, recombinant DNA, jumping genes, and all?

Must we assume, he asked, that medicine will always lag a half-century behind the rest of biological science, only capable of making useful applications when the last, final details of disease mechanisms have been revealed?

How can this process be speeded up, or can it be speeded up?

Questions like these are being raised more often today than ever before, in the press and in Congress—partly out of sheer impatience with what is perceived to be the slow pace of medical advance in treating or preventing today's major health problems; partly because medicine, in its present condition of incomplete half-way technology, costs so much more each year. And, partly because the justification for the spectacular national investment in basic research out of taxpayers' money during the past three decades has been the implicit promise that health problems can ultimately, and only, be solved in this way.

But here we are, 30 years down the line, and cancer, heart disease, stroke, and schizophrenia are still with us. Arthritis and multiple sclerosis have not disappeared. And more of us in our declining years are being incapacitated, and our families ruined, by dementia, or senility.

Could it be that we're on the wrong track, that science is the wrong way to go, that diseases like cancer and senile dementia are part of the human condition, that we should be doing something else?
Questions like these are being asked, and I have never known a time of such quick and ready answers. We become ill, it is now said, because of the environment we’ve created for ourselves, or because of failures in our life style, or because of lack of exercise, or being out of touch with our bodies, or, and this is the most fashionable of all, thinking wrong.

There is a serious question here underlying all the others and penetrating the noise: How can it be that we have learned so much in such rich detail about the inner workings of all sorts of cells and still be stuck with the unfathomability, for example, of cancer?

A Perceptible Buzz

Part of the uproar stems from the very fact that real scientific progress has been made with real medical applications of great value to society. Whenever this has happened, we quickly become used to the fact, taking such progress for granted as though it had always been there as a fixture in the culture. And we expect more to follow on. You don’t have to look back more than 50 years to see almost the whole process.

Consider my father’s experience. He was a family doctor in New York City with his office in the house for about half his professional life. Then he taught himself surgery and became a surgeon, which was the custom then. He was graduated from the College of Physicians and Surgeons in 1904 and interned at Roosevelt Hospital in Manhattan. He and my mother, who had been a nurse at Roosevelt, decided to move to a country town. They chose Flushing, now in the borough of Queens.

My father worked very hard all his life, but hardest during the years when he was a general practitioner. The telephone rang alongside his bed, and most nights we could hear him heaving himself out of bed two or three times, swearing softly to himself in the dark, and off in the automobile of the time, a Maxwell first and then later a Franklin, making house calls.

He told me once, during the 1930s, when I was still a medical student, that he couldn’t convince himself that anything he

Lewis Thomas, 66, is president of the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center and professor of medicine at the Cornell University Medical School in Manhattan. Born in Flushing, N.Y., he received a B.S. from Princeton (1933) and an M.D. from Harvard (1937). He was a member of the President’s Science Advisory Committee from 1967–70. He is the author of The Lives of a Cell: Notes of a Biology Watcher (1974) and The Medusa and the Snail: More Notes of a Biology Watcher (1979).
New York’s Bellevue Hospital, 1860. Hospital doctors, wrote Oliver Wendell Holmes, carried infection “from bed to bed, as rat-killers carry their poison from one household to another.”

had ever done for a sick patient during all those years of hard work had made any difference at all. The patients thought so, to be sure. My father was a successful physician with a large number of devoted patients who believed that he had helped them greatly, even saved their lives. But he was doubtful about this.

In his doctor’s bag that he carried off in the night on house calls was a handful of things. Morphine was the most important, and the only really indispensable drug in the whole pharmacopoeia. Digitalis—for heart patients—was next in value. Insulin had arrived by the time he had been practicing for about 20 years, and he had it in his bag. Adrenalin was there in small glass ampoules in case he ran into a case of anaphylactic shock, which he never did.

But most of the patients who called him out at night could not be helped by the contents of that bag. There was nothing at all to do for someone stricken by acute rheumatic fever, or poliomyelitis, or meningitis, or tuberculosis. Least of all tuberculosis, which was the single disease most feared by my father and by everyone else in town. Once it had been typhoid that killed most people. Now it was TB.
The other disease that frightened everyone and was never talked about was insanity, but not today's version. What filled the state hospitals with demented people at that time was tertiary syphilis.

The pharmacopoeia at my father's disposal was enormous, and like all the doctors of his day, he wrote prescriptions of great complexity in Latin for almost all his patients. Most sought after by patients were "tonics." These were generally alcohol extracts of something green believed to act by toning up the heart and the muscles, or the liver, or whatever, and they were charms, magical potions sometimes reinforced by just enough alcohol to produce a perceptible buzz.

In effect, the pills were amulets warding off evil, and the prescriptions were incantations. If my father could have done a little dance at the bedside with his eyes rolled back, he would have qualified as a shaman in the ancient Indian tradition.

But he, and most of his colleagues in those decades from 1905 to 1935, did other hard things that had to be done to qualify as a good doctor. Medicines were only the ritual laid on as a kind of background music for the real work of the 16-hour day.

First of all, the physician was expected to walk in and take over. And second, and this was probably the most important of his duties, he had to explain what had happened and, third, what was likely to happen.

A Gift of Tongues

All three duties required experience to be done well. The first two needed a mixture of intense curiosity about people in general and an inborn capacity for affection, hard to come by but indispensable for a good doctor. And the last, the art of prediction, needed education. Good medical schools produced doctors who could make an accurate diagnosis and knew enough of the details of the natural history of disease to be able to make a reliable prognosis.

This was all there was to science in medicine. Indeed, the store of information that made diagnosis and prognosis possible for my father's generation was something quite new during the first quarter of the 20th century.

When he was an intern in 1905, the chief of the service on the medical ward at Roosevelt Hospital was an elderly eminence of New York medicine who was typical of the generation trained before the influence of Sir William Osler, who introduced skepticism into medical education.

This man enjoyed the reputation of a skilled diagnostician
with a special skill in diagnosing typhoid fever, then the commonest disease on the wards of New York City's hospitals. He specialized in the tongue, not only placing reliance on the appearance of the tongue (which was then universal and is now entirely inexplicable), but he also believed that he could detect significant differences by palpating that organ.

The hospital rounds conducted by this man were essentially tongue rounds. Each patient would stick out his tongue while the eminence felt its texture and irregularities, moving from bed to bed, diagnosing typhoid in its earliest stages over and over again, and turning out a week or so later to be right to everyone's amazement. He was, of course, in the most literal sense a typhoid carrier.

The Dread Bacillus

When the time of psychosomatic disease arrived, my father remained a skeptic. He indulged my mother by endorsing her administration of cod-liver oil to the whole family, excepting himself, and even allowed her to give us something for our nerves called Eskay's Neurophosphates, which arrived as free samples from one of the pharmaceutical houses. But he never convinced himself about the value of medicine.

In my own clinical years and in the wards at the Massachusetts General, the Peter Bent Brigham, and the Boston City hospitals, students were taught by Harvard's most expert clinicians, but all of the teaching was directed at the recognition and identification of disease. Therapy was an afterthought, if it was mentioned at all. Diagnosis was based almost entirely on the taking of a history, and a meticulous physical examination was the central business of the physician.

The transformation of medicine to something like a science with its own genuine technology was almost ready to begin, but it had not yet happened.

Mind you, this was in 1937, just a little over 40 years ago, on the eve of World War II. At that time, the thing to worry about the most was catching something. Infectious diseases were all around. There was a huge separate building alongside the Boston City Hospital called the South Department containing several hundred beds for contagious disease.

In the wards of the main hospital, lobar pneumonia was the chief problem. The work-up of a patient was an acute emergency requiring concentrated frenetic work for several hours on each case for the serological typing of the responsible pneumococci and then, if we dared do it, the intravenous injection of anti-
LOOKING UNDER ROCKS

In recent U.S. history, dramatic campaigns have been launched against two major diseases, polio and cancer. Both benefitted from political support—of very different kinds.

Poliomyelitis was classified as a distinct disease during the 19th century. After 1900, epidemics broke out annually in some part of the United States; the disease was at its worst between 1942 and 1953. While the existence of a polio virus had been pinned down in 1908 by Karl Landsteiner and Erwin Popper, further research lagged until 1938. In that year, President Franklin Roosevelt, a victim of the disease, launched the March of Dimes campaign and lent the prestige of his office to the fight against polio.

The new polio fund directors made a key decision: to spend money not on applying existing knowledge to the treatment of the disease (or “better iron lungs”), as had been the practice, but on basic research investigating the nature of the illness.

Between 1938 and 1955, the privately run March of Dimes dispensed $25.5 million to vaccine researchers; slightly more than $4 million was directly controlled by Dr. Jonas Salk of the University of Pittsburgh. Following refinements in research techniques and the definition of the disease, Salk announced discovery of a vaccine; a 1954 field trial proved it effective. The few polio cases that occur today (9 in 1978 versus 18,000 in 1954) are generally unfortunate side effects of inoculation with the vaccine.

Politicians have been declaring war against cancer since 1898, when the New York State legislature founded the Roswell Park Memorial Institute to find a quick cure for the disease. In 1910, President William Howard Taft budgeted $50,000 in federal money for the study of cancer in fish. Finally, in 1937, after a push from Henry Luce’s Fortune, Time, and Life magazines, Congress estab-
lished the U.S. National Cancer Institute (NCI). But cancer researchers have never had an FDR as patron, and there has been no consensus on how to spend the money appropriated by Congress.

Cancer became embroiled in Washington politics in the early 1970s, when, against the advice of most American scientists, Congress voted for a "moon-shot" type of crash program to find a cure. (Researchers like Harvard Medical School’s Dr. Howard Hiatt resisted the spending spree, warning that the necessary "science base" had not yet been established.) The annual budget of the National Cancer Institute is now nearly $1 billion, versus $175 million in 1970. In the period from fiscal 1972 through 1981, NCI spending will total $7 to $8 billion—three times the total federal cancer outlay from 1938 through 1971. Almost one-third of NCI’s current spending is on "unfocused" basic research—simply finding out "more about the universe," in the words of National Institutes of Health director Donald Fredrickson.

Some good work is being done. But despite modest gains, researchers are still groping blindly; conceivably, just about any scientific investigation now being carried on in America could turn out, in retrospect, to have been work on cancer. There is a "looking-under-rocks" aspect to cancer research. After polio was discovered to be a virus, finding a cure became only a matter of time. In cancer research, on the other hand, scientists are still looking for what to look for.

The first polio poster child.

the affected tissue by injecting air into the pleural space to collapse the lung temporarily, or cutting away the ribs to collapse it permanently. There were no drugs of any value at all.

The basic research on tuberculosis was begun in the 1890s with Robert Koch in Germany, and the effort that followed the discovery of the bacillus over the next 40 years consumed the scientific lives of hundreds of investigators in laboratories all around the world. Gradually, they gained a fairly clear understanding of the ways in which tuberculosis became disseminated throughout communities, and the public health techniques for early detection and isolation were developed. The
underlying mechanisms enabling the tubercle bacillus to destroy living tissue were explored (although the matter remains to this day largely a mystery), and some of the factors in the environment that affected the course of the disease were identified: crowding, malnutrition, genetic predisposition perhaps, immune responsiveness, and possibly even the stress of living.

The whole mass of results of research on tuberculosis filled numberless huge volumes in the world’s medical libraries, but throughout 40 years the central, absolutely crucial piece of fundamental science was the information that the tubercle bacillus was the real cause of the disease and the sole cause.

Faith Healing

Other factors, environmental or genetic, might be contributing to susceptibility or making a difference for the final outcome, but at the center of the theoretical demonology was that bacillus; there was no argument about this. If you could get rid of the tubercle bacillus and kill it off without killing the patient, you could cure the illness.

This was the scientific background that led to the work of Nobel Prize–winning microbiologist Selman Waksman with his inspired hunch that some of the microorganisms living in the ecosystems of the soil might produce chemicals capable of restraining the growth of other competing bacteria.

But without the existence of the tubercle bacillus in hand, there would have been no point in looking for something with the properties of streptomycin, nor any technique for screening samples of soil for anti-tuberculous activity.

Streptomycin, developed by Waksman, was an immense encouragement, but it was not good enough. It helped, but it actually cured only those patients with relatively early disease. It could not be relied upon to reverse the devastations of miliary tuberculosis or TB meningitis.

Nevertheless, it was a gift of hope, and it proved that tubercle bacillus was vulnerable in living tissues. Given this hope, the investigators set about looking for other drugs to enhance the action of streptomycin, and para-aminosalicylic acid was found. Then a few years later came isoniazid, and the conquest of tuberculosis became at last a stunning success.

However, scientists argue about this point today. Looking back at the records of infectious disease in Western society over the past two centuries, it is obvious that the incidence of most bacterial diseases began to fall long before the introduction of the sulfonamides and the antibiotics.

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A DRIFT TOWARD CAUTION?

There is a tendency now throughout the whole federal science system favoring the taking on of relatively safe and sound research projects. There is a general disinclination to gamble, to take fliers, to run risks on flights of imagination. Running risks is considered to be simply too risky.

This drift toward caution and this new concern for getting tidy things done on schedule could be the deadest of dead hands on science, and I am fearful of it.

I realize that it is the result, perhaps the inevitable result, of the shortage of funds in a highly competitive system, but this is not the whole cause. I have a feeling that fundamental attitudes within the bureaucracies responsible for science have also changed, and there is more and more an insistence that research must be planned and performed like any other job of work, contracted for and paid for by public money.

Perhaps this was inevitable once the national science support programs became of such sheer magnitude as to hold them under constant public scrutiny. Who can go about in a bureaucracy calling for more chance-taking, more gambling, and hope to survive? And yet, the stakes here are very high indeed. It is not just basic research in the biomedical sciences that is at issue; it is basic science in general.

We cannot go on drawing down from the banked store of fundamental information about nature without constantly replenishing that bank; if we do this we will find the country drifting further and further behind the rest of the world.

—L.T.

The mortality from tuberculosis was being halved every 20 years since the mid-19th century, and something like this was also happening to pneumonia and streptococcal infections.

This steady improvement in human health has been variously attributed to better sanitation, better nutrition, better housing, less crowding, and a generally better standard of living for all segments of society in the West.

Looking at these events, a number of influential epidemiologists and public health professionals have suggested that perhaps the impact of chemotherapy on infection was an illusion. We would have gotten where we are today relatively free from the threat of tuberculosis and the other infectious diseases without scientific medicine, it is said, by allowing society to continue to improve our ways of living together. Fix society, fix
the environment, change our lifestyles, mend our ways—and human disease will vanish.

If you believe this, you automatically take a different and highly skeptical view not only of the social value of medical science in the past but also of its prospects for the future. You can get along by abstinence and jogging and maybe a bit of faith healing. It has an undeniable appeal.

My own view of the argument is a totally biased one, but I cannot help this. I have been conditioned by the experience of seeing children with miliary tuberculosis and tuberculous meningitis cured of their illnesses that were by definition 100 percent fatal in my student days, and I saw no reason to doubt my eyes.

I have watched patients with typhoid fever and meningitis and streptococcal septicemia and erysipelas and overwhelming pneumococcal infections get better, sometimes overnight, and I am as certain as I am of my sanity that these were real events and not illusions.

In short, I haven’t any doubt at all as to the effectiveness of today’s antibacterial and immunological measures for disease control, although I am worried about the future of antibiotics (as is everyone else in the field of infectious disease) if we do not continue to do research on the appalling problems of antibiotic resistance among our most common pathogens.

Small Steps

As we look back at a cure for tuberculosis, I think we are today perhaps somewhere along in the same sequence of scientific events for cancer. The ambiguous word somewhere is needed here because we do not yet possess pieces of information with anything like the power of Koch’s identification of the tubercle bacillus.

We know a fair amount about environmental influences including the irrefutably convincing evidence about cigarettes and lung cancer, but we do not yet know what happens at the center of things to switch normal cells into the unrestrained life of neoplastic cells.

However, we do seem to be getting there. At least I think so. It is unlikely that a virus or some kind of infectious agent is involved, but there is in any case a high probability that a centrally placed regulatory mechanism whose nature remains to be elucidated has gone wrong and that it is the same mechanism for all forms of cancer.

The most solid evidence of scientific progress has come just
in the past five years or so. The drugs now in use are not nearly as debilitating as those available a decade ago. A great deal has been learned about the value of intermittent therapy with combinations of several drugs, as well as about the value of combining chemotherapy with radiation treatment.

There have been advances in the complicated technology of radiation itself to the extent that Hodgkin’s disease, which was a totally untreatable condition a generation ago, is now generally accepted to be curable.

The malignancies of childhood, including bone sarcomas, are beginning to respond so well to chemotherapy that it is becoming permissible to talk, tentatively at least, about cures.

Cures Are Possible

In short, some real advances have been made and are being made today in the treatment of cancer. All around the world, research at the basic science level has been turning up new bits of information in the fields of molecular genetics, immunology, cellular biology, membrane structure, and the like; and although nobody would claim that we have as yet an understanding of the underlying process of neoplasia, it is generally agreed that the problem is an approachable one. It is a puzzle that can eventually be solved.

There was a time less than 50 years ago when no one in medicine would have dreamed of the possibility of ever curing subacute bacterial endocarditis. This was one of the master diseases, 100 percent fatal, and we stood in awe of its power to kill people. Hence medical students were taught not to meddle. There was nothing to be done, and never would be. There was a time when most professionals dealing with poliomyelitis were totally pessimistic about the prospects for anything other than iron lungs in this disease. Generations of physicians were trained to believe that tuberculosis was an undefeatable enemy of mankind.

It is really only within the last 40 years or so that most of us have become convinced that it is possible to cure certain human diseases, and even now there are some major disorders for which our minds are set against the possibility.

We tend to be deferential about chronic illnesses simply because they are chronic, as though there were something especially imponderable about a disease that occurs late in life and lasts a long time. In the absence of good sharp clues about etiology or pathogenesis, we tend to use terms like multifactorial or environmental. We talk about certain illnesses as being societal
in origin. And we do this for most of today's diseases that are not yet understood: coronary thrombosis, stroke, atherosclerosis, schizophrenia, arthritis, and, most of all, cancer. They are often discussed as though they were part of the human condition inevitable in our kind of world and beyond our reach.

And it may be that this attitude gets in the way of research from time to time.

Yet the professional investigators who are actually working on the mechanisms of our still unexplained diseases seem more optimistic about the prospects for their respective fields than at any time previously. It is interesting that each of them is skeptical about the chances of the others. The immunological people feel that they are beginning to work quite close to the center of things, but they doubt that their colleagues in neurobiology or cardiology are getting anywhere, and so it goes. The virologists and molecular geneticists and cell biologists each believe that they will have the crucial answers before anyone else.

The overall atmosphere is, however, one of considerable excitement and anticipation. There are groups of young researchers in laboratories located in New York, Dallas, Pasadena, and Paris who are working together with colleagues in Melbourne, London, and Tokyo almost as intimately as though they were in the same corridor of the same building.

So I am entirely optimistic about the prospects for biological and medical science for the future, the long-term future.

I believe that immense advances have been made in just the last 30 years in our understanding of how normal cells work, how tissues develop and become organized, how cells communicate with each other by chemical signals, how organisms defend themselves, and even, in glimpses, how the brain works.

I do not believe there are any barriers to prevent our reaching a deep understanding of disease processes, and I see no reason why we should not be able ultimately to gain a reasonably satisfactory control over human disease in general.

This has nothing to do, by the way, with mortality. We will still die on schedule and probably on something pretty much like today's schedule, but I think we can spare ourselves the incapacitating and painful ailments that now make aging itself a sort of disease.
"I observe the physician," wrote the English poet John Donne in 1623, "with the same diligence as he the disease." Yet until the 20th century, doctors and diseases were largely neglected by historians, and few good general histories exist today.

One of them is A Short History of Medicine (Oxford, 1928; 2nd ed., 1962). Author Charles Singer reckons that not until the 1500s did European medical science attain the level of sophistication reached by the Greeks in the 6th century B.C., notably in their studies of anatomy and physiology.

When Europeans ventured to the New World, they brought their medicine (as well as smallpox and measles) with them.

In a well-written textbook, Public Health: Its Promise for the Future; A Chronicle of the Development of Public Health in the United States, 1607–1914 (Macmillan, 1955; Arno reprint, 1976), Wilson G. Smillie, a Cornell scholar, describes the devastation wrought in the Americas by smallpox. Introduced by the Spanish conquistadores during the early 1500s, it killed half the Indian population of Mexico and quickly spread throughout the Western hemisphere. In New England, smallpox wiped out 9 out of 10 Indians shortly before the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth Rock in 1620, leaving the way clear for relatively peaceful British settlement.

Medical progress in 18th- and 19th-century America was hampered by physicians' ignorance and by hostile popular sentiments. Covering Medical Education in the United States Before the Civil War (Univ. of Pa., 1944, Arno reprint, 1972), historian William F. Norwood notes that public feelings ran high against the dissection of human bodies. (In 1788, an antidissection lynch mob attacked New York Hospital; seven rioters were killed.) As a result, many doctors remained largely ignorant of the human body's internal structure.

The rise of Jacksonian democracy in 1828—with its distrust of institutions and authority—brought calls from state legislators for "free trade" in medicine as in commerce. In The Formation of the American Medical Profession: The Role of Institutions 1780–1860 (Yale, 1968), University of Virginia historian Joseph F. Kett writes that during the 1830s and '40s, nearly every state repealed its medical licensing laws. The inevitable result: rampant quackery.

Laissez faire medicine came at the worst possible time. Crowded by new waves of immigrants, most cities suffered steady increases in their annual death rates. In New York City, for example, the death rate climbed from 1 in 46.5 in 1810 to 1 in 27 in 1859. Sanitation was virtually unheard of, as was a balanced diet.

After the Civil War, European innovations (the use of morphine and quinine, the hypodermic needle, and the microscope) caused many U.S. doctors to abandon such medieval cure-alls as bleeding.

The disheveled state of American medical education, however, changed only with Abraham Flexner's exposé, Medical Education in the United States and Canada (1910; Arno reprint, 1972).

Flexner, founder of Princeton's In-
stitute for Advanced Study, reported that many medical students could barely read or write. The only prerequisites for opening a medical school, it seemed, were a skeleton and a couple of practitioners willing to teach. Flexner argued that fewer schools would produce better doctors. Twenty schools closed to avoid being publicized by Flexner. Ten years later, the number of U.S. medical colleges had decreased from 155 to 85. Of those 85, most became affiliated with universities or hospitals, per Flexner’s recommendation. Medical schools began admitting only applicants with at least two years of college.

With discoveries such as penicillin (1928) and the wider application and standardization of technical procedures (x rays, for example), medical knowledge quickly grew. Doctors found it difficult to keep up; they began to specialize.

Rosemary Stevens, professor of public health at Yale, reports in American Medicine and the Public Interest (Yale, 1971, cloth & paper) that the percentage of U.S. doctors specializing in a single branch of medicine rose from 17 percent in 1931 to almost 80 percent in 1970. As doctors have become more specialized, so have our notions of disease—once considered the result of vague “ill humors.”

The connection between occupation and disease was noted in the early 16th century by Georgius Agricola, a doctor in the German mining town of Joachimsthal. Agricola’s observation that miners contracted certain lung diseases by inhaling mineral dust is recounted in British physician Donald Hunter’s The Diseases of Occupations (Little, Brown, 1955; 6th ed., 1978, paper only).

In the same century, typhus was first accurately described as a distinct disease. In his freewheeling “biography” of typhus, Rats, Lice and History (Atlantic–Little, Brown, 1935) microbiologist Hans Zinsser contends that typhus and its “brothers” (cholera, typhoid, and dysentery) have had a decided influence on history. Epidemics contributed to the Roman Empire’s fall and the failure of the Great Crusades.

If diseases can affect politics, the reverse is also true. In Cancer Crusade: The Story of the National Cancer Act of 1971 (Princeton, 1977), the Rand Corporation’s Richard A. Rettig analyzes how the fight against disease becomes a political issue on Capitol Hill. As the 1972 presidential election drew near, both President Nixon and a potential rival, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D.-Mass.), vied to become the acknowledged “patron” of the government’s effort to cure cancer. The eventual result: a fivefold increase in federal spending on cancer research—and a recurrent debate over Congress’s role in setting priorities in biomedical research.

John Fry, a British physician, argues that a nation’s character is reflected in its health-care system, in Medicine in Three Societies: A Comparison of Medical Care in the USSR, USA and UK (American Elsevier, 1970). His conclusions: American free enterprise often turns doctors into entrepreneurs; the shrinking British economy depresses health-care standards; Soviet rigidity stifles innovation. (In Russia, it is estimated, doctors make less than factory workers and are held in low regard; 70 percent of Soviet M.D.s are women.)

The skyrocketing cost of health care is a dilemma in all developed nations. And government intervention, asserts Alan Maynard, a British
economist, does not seem to be the answer. Maynard coolly analyzes Western Europe's "socialized" health-care systems in *Health Care in the European Community* (Univ. of Pittsburgh, 1975). They range from inadequate (in Italy, the weakness of postwar governments has prevented a restructuring of the chaotic health-care system) to good (in Denmark, the poor have been treated for free since 1818).

A National Health Service (established in 1946) ensures that the poor of Britain are treated well; but it has produced a bureaucracy that can neither respond to doctors' needs for new technology nor pay salaries that keep up with inflation.

The United States as yet has no national health-insurance program, although numerous bills are currently under consideration in Congress. A concise description of each, compiled by the Senate Committee on Finance, is contained in *Comparison of Major Features of Health Insurance Proposals* (Government Printing Office, 1979).

Canada has had public health insurance for more than a decade. But the Canadian Department of National Health and Welfare's influential *A New Perspective on the Health of Canadians* (Canadian Government, 1974) strongly urges people to help themselves: Improved health, concludes the study, will come not as a result of expensive technology, but only when people stop smoking, overeating, and drinking.

Among the radical environmentalists, Ivan Illich, an Austrian Catholic priest living in Mexico, goes furthest. In *Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health* (Pantheon, 1976, cloth; Bantam, 1977, paper), he contends that we will never be "healthy" until we stop doctors from making us sick. Viewing modern medicine as "the seamy side of progress," Illich claims that today's drugs, over prescribed, numb people to "meaningful" suffering.

A more widely shared attitude is expressed by Lewis Thomas in his elegant *Lives of a Cell: Notes of a Biology Watcher* (Viking, 1974, cloth; Penguin, 1978, paper). What Thomas holds to be true was known before the time of Hippocrates: "Most things get better by themselves."

EDITOR'S NOTE: *Titles in this essay were suggested by Dr. George A. Silver, professor of public health at the Yale University School of Medicine, and Dr. Abraham M. Lilienfeld, University Distinguished Service Professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public Health.*
"With the dramatic experiments carried out by the socialist countries," writes French historian Fernand Braudel, "capitalism has disappeared from a large part of the earth." Gone, too, is the capitalist's euphoria—and clear conscience—of the early 19th century. Is capitalism an endangered species? What kind of animal is it? What are its origins? In his monumental *Civilisation Matérielle, Economie, et Capitalisme*, completed in late 1979 and published in France earlier this year, Braudel describes today's capitalism in terms of the big banks, big financiers, and multinational corporations that dominate Western economies; but its evolution, he argues, began centuries before the Industrial Revolution. Capitalism, he notes, has been in trouble before. Each time it has been rescued—by its own adaptability and by the resilience of the competitive "market economy" of smaller firms from which capitalism draws innovation and strength. Here, we present the concluding chapter, slightly abridged, of Fernand Braudel's three-volume work, following a brief introduction by historian Frederic Cheyette.

*by Frederic Cheyette*

"The present," writes Fernand Braudel in the third and final volume of his *Material Civilization and Capitalism*, "is largely the victim of a stubborn past bent on self-preservation." That remark is one key to a broad vision of history.

When Fernand Braudel became an editor of the French historical journal *Annales: Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* in 1948, and when in 1956 he was named director of the 6th Section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, France's most prestigious social science research center, he took on the mantle of two men who, more than any others, shaped French historical
writing in this century: Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre. The appointments made Braudel the intellectual director of a large group of younger scholars who had found excitement in Bloch’s and Febvre’s vision of past human experience.

These responsibilities demanded, too, that Braudel continue the search for solutions to the many problems of historical method that the older men’s vision—their “Combat for History” (Febvre’s title for his collected essays)—had bequeathed to the profession. First planned in 1950, Braudel’s newly completed Material Civilization not only crowns the long, pioneering career of its author; it also brings into focus, as no other work has done, the methods of the Annales school.

At the time Febvre and Bloch began their university careers in the second decade of this century, a focus on “court and cabinet, drum and trumpet” narrative dominated the teaching and writing of history in Europe and America. History was a story of politics and that alone. If the landscape, the labors of the peasants, the activities of artisans and merchants, or the development of technology appeared in a historical treatise, they did so as part of a stage set, as the introductory backdrop—“tableau” was often enough the key word—against which great
men acted out their great or nefarious deeds. These elements were mentioned and forgotten, Braudel once wrote, "as if the flowers did not come back every spring, the flocks of sheep migrate every year, or the ships sail on a real sea that changes with the season." *Histoire événementielle*, the history of events—to Bloch, Febvre, and their colleagues, the phrase became one of derision. *Real* history they found elsewhere, in the history of ideas and attitudes and in the history of whole societies.

**The Shape of Time**

The history of ideas became Febvre’s favorite subject: not just the ideas of formal philosophy but those reflected in literature and indeed in all human activities. "Mental tools," Febvre liked to call them, whose history required an understanding as much of psychology as of literature, theology, or philosophy. "We have no history of Love," he once complained to students at the Ecole Normale Superieure in 1941, "We have no history of Death. We have no history of Pity nor of Cruelty. We have no history of Joy."

Bloch, strongly influenced by Emile Durkheim and his new sociology, devoted himself to the history of societies, attempting to delineate in his two great works—*French Rural History* and *Feudal Society*—the complex interconnections between geographical patterns, technology, "mental attitudes," class structures, and institutions.

In 1929, the two men founded the *Annales d’histoire économique et sociale* (renamed the *Annales: E.S.C.* in 1946) as their weapon against, and eventually within, the historical establishment. It quickly developed both a set of themes and a style of its own, pungent and combative (a regular section was entitled "Debates and Fights"), flouting traditional rules of French style, alternately florid, hortatory, and quantitative-scientific. The young Braudel quickly came under its influence.

Braudel had begun his doctoral thesis in 1923 on the Mediterranean diplomacy of King Philip II of Spain (1527–98). During the 1930s, it matured into a gargantuan history of the Mediterranean region in the 16th century. When published in 1949, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* was immediately recognized as a monument to the
Annales and, in the decades following, in turn inspired hundreds of articles, monographs, and even more gargantuan theses.*

When he turned from the traditional concerns of diplomatic history to the history and destiny of the Mediterranean and the people who inhabited its shores, Braudel was faced with problems of understanding and of organization quite unlike any that his masters in the craft had ever considered. These problems have stayed with Braudel throughout his career. His solutions, partially developed in the first edition of The Mediterranean, reworked and clarified in the second edition (1966), have now been brought to fruition in Material Civilization.

The first of these problems is the very shape of time itself. The political historian easily delimits the time span of his narrative—the reign of a king, the administration of a President, the years from one treaty to another. So, too, the historian whose work is "problem-oriented" (as were both Febvre's and Bloch's), for whom chronology is set by the problem.

**Long-Term, Short-Term**

But how does one narrate the history of an economy or a society? Where does one begin and end? Above all, what are the rhythms? How fast or slowly does the clock run? Populations expand and contract. Peasants plant new crops and abandon old ones. The climate warms and then turns cold. Prices rise and fall. On these many long-term movements, the deaths of kings have no impact. Their boundaries, rhythms, and shapes cannot be known in advance or applied from the outside. The historian's first task must be to discover what in fact they are.

Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that one kind of history moves at the same pace or has the same "shape" as another. The move from political history to the history of economies and societies thus calls into question the most basic chronological framework of traditional historical understanding, the yardstick by which change is measured. To concep-

*The impact of the Annales school on French historians has been profound. Its impact elsewhere is harder to pin down. Among historians in Britain and the United States, for example, a growing interest in social or "pots and pans" history has been evident for two decades, manifested in such books as Keith Thomas's Religion and the Decline of Magic and Salem Possessed by Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum. Whether this represents cause and effect or simply parallel development is impossible to determine. Doubtless few historians outside France would call themselves "members" of the Annales school; some who are doing Annales-type work may never have read a page of Bloch, Febvre, or the rest. Suffice it to say, then, that while the work of the Annales has substantially altered Western historiography, one cannot chart all the byways of its influence with the same precision that one can plot, say, the genetic legacy of Queen Victoria's hemophilia.

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nalize this problem of time, Braudel turned to the study of
business cycles, where he found the economists’ images of long-
term and short-term movements and the possibility of superim-
posing the graph of one movement upon another. He organized
The Mediterranean around the theme of different times: the very
long-term shifts of social groups and economies; and the short-
term changes of politics and diplomacy. In Material Civilization,
it is the long-term that gives coherence to the whole.

How are these different movements of times connected, one
to the other? Are the societies, economies, and cultures within
which men live more than just the stages on which they act out
their individual dramas or comedies?

This was the second problem that the Annales methods im-
plicitly posed. One may scorn political events but that does not
get rid of them; and Braudel felt obliged to devote the last third
of The Mediterranean to their narration. Yet, although his
metaphors suggested that the day-to-day events of diplomacy
and politics were determined by the long-term movements he
had so exhaustively traced (those movements, he wrote, are “the
deeper realities of history . . . the running waters on which our
frail barks are tossed like cockleshells”), his narration of politi-
cal events showed very little of it. In Material Civilization, a
theoretical context is given for understanding how the flood of
the long-term bears on its teeming surface the eddies of human
passions, intentions, and actions.

Inertia Always Wins

One may imagine Braudel beginning Material Civilization
with some simple questions: Between the 16th and 18th
centuries, what did people experience as they went through
their daily chores? What could they expect when they awoke in
the morning?

Braudel, true to his motto that “to see and to tell is half the
historian’s task,” spreads the answers richly before us: the
density of people on the land, famines and diseases, food and
drink, household furnishings, dress, technology, transports,
money. In other hands, this could have been mere anecdotage,
but Braudel, sure of his craft, imposes a strong theoretical frame
upon it. This world of production and consumption is the world
of “material civilization,” giving shape to individual lives but
immune to individual influence. It is a world in which cultural
choices (e.g., growing cereals in Europe, rice in Asia, maize in
America), once made, have their own consequences, impose
their own rhythms, determine the expectations of those who live
FERNAND BRAUDEL

Historian Fernand Braudel: "Capitalism is the perfect term for designating economic activities that are carried on at the summit, or that are striving for the summit."

by them. Subject to short-term fluctuations (as, for example, the rapid shifts in birth- and death-rates in pre-industrial populations) and to sudden alterations (as when American syphilis arrived in China nearly a century before American maize)—fluctuations and alterations that are part of its nature—the history of material civilization is measured in the long-term. It has the power of inertia, and it always wins.

Within and on top of "material civilization," Braudel finds two economies of exchange—the "market economy," the world of true competition and low profit margins, where every participant operates with about the same degree of knowledge or ignorance; and "capitalism," the summit of the economic pyramid, the world of monopoly or oligopoly, high profits, special positions, freedom, and power. These, too, have their long-term histories: Market economies can be found in even the most primitive societies, and the origins of capitalism go back to the ancient world. If invention, intention, and the acts of individuals have any meaning, it is here at the summit; and here, on equal footing with capitalism, is the world of politics and the state.

As his conclusions make manifest, Braudel is reading back from the 20th century to a younger world, and forward from then to now. Relativist history, perhaps, but it achieves what Bloch and Febvre hoped history some day would do. Its underlying theory is deterministic—we are what we have been—yet through Braudel's extraordinary vision, it liberates the reader from his own narrow place in the long-term of civilization.
WILL CAPITALISM SURVIVE?

by Fernand Braudel

1 A Long Life

Capitalism as a potential force emerges from the dawn of history, developing and perpetuating itself over centuries. Well in advance, there were signs heralding its arrival: the take-off of cities and exchanges, the appearance of a labor market, population density, the diffusion of money, long-distance trade.

When India, in the first century of our era, seized the far-off Indies, or at least penetrated it; when Rome held the entire Mediterranean and more under its sway; when China, in the 9th century, invented paper money; when the West, between the 11th and 13th centuries, reconquered the Mediterranean; when, with the 16th century, a "world" market began to take shape—at all of these times the "biography of capital" was being written, in one way or another.

In search of capitalism's origins, some historians refuse to go back much beyond the 16th century. Many prefer to draw the line at the 18th century, identifying capitalism with the prodigious burst of the Industrial Revolution. But even in this "short" perspective, there are three to five centuries involved; we are looking at a structure of long duration. Sometimes, rarely, great ruptures intrude, and the Industrial Revolution is certainly one of them. But capitalism has remained fundamentally recognizable over the years. Indeed, this is one of its chief traits: Capitalism maintains itself precisely through change itself. It feeds on change, always adapting itself to the limits that, in different eras, define the rewards and possibilities of the economy of men.

Just as it is wrong to imagine that capitalism is a newcomer, so it is an error to suppose that capitalism grew by stages: first precapitalism, then, seriatim, merchant capitalism, industrial capitalism, and financial capitalism, with "real" capitalism coming late, after its seizure of the means of production in the 19th century. In fact, the great "merchants" of the preindustrial era never were so specialized. They dabbled—simultaneously, successively—in commerce, banking, high finance, market speculation, even manufacturing.

The coexistence of several forms of capitalism was already
apparent in Florence in the 13th century, in Amsterdam in the 17th, in London from before the 18th. When, at the beginning of the 19th century, technological advances made manufacturing a sector of great profit, capitalism, to be sure, adapted to it in a big way. But the capitalist always kept his options open. When, in England, increasing competition began to chip away at the profitability of textiles, capital flowed to steel and the railroads. There was a resurgence of finance capitalism, banking, speculation, international trade, colonial exploitation. Look at the Wendel family in France: They were simultaneously owners of iron forges, bankers, clothiers in the Vosges, and outfitters of the French military expedition to Algeria in 1830.

In short, the principal privilege of capitalism over the centuries, today as yesterday, remains the freedom to choose. And because it can choose, capitalism has the ability, at any moment, to change tack: That is the secret of its vitality.

Such agility cannot, of course, shelter capitalism from every risk. At times of great crisis, many capitalists go under. But many others survive, and others still enter the ranks from below. The historian d’Avenel was astonished—and rejoiced—that wealth, over time, passes from hand to hand, so that different “races” of unrelated landowners succeed each other upon a
single piece of real estate. This is what happens with capitalism. Even as it changes, it has an infinite ability to replace itself. Consider the words of Henry Hope, an Amsterdam businessman of some importance, who remarked of trade in 1784 after the fourth Anglo-Dutch War that "it often falls ill, but it never dies."

II Society Envelops Everything

It is the greatest of mistakes to contend that capitalism is simply "an economic system" without acknowledging that it is on a nearly equal footing with the state and always has been; that it is buttressed by the culture within which it operates for the simple reason that culture, whatever its contradictory currents, is rooted in the status quo; and that it props up a society's dominant classes since they, by defending capitalism, defend themselves. Capitalism cannot be extricated from the society in which it is embedded; money, government, culture confront one another but support one another all the same.

Which of these dominates? The answer must be: now one, now the other.

Businessmen these days are quick to charge that government is currently in the driver's seat. There is certainly no lack of solemn observers who speak of the state as the Beast, crushing all and robbing the private sector of its initiative, robbing the innovator of his freedom. And the Beast, they say, must be forced back into its cave.

Just the opposite may be said as well: that capital itself is permeating everything, rolling over everything in its path.

Let us not deceive ourselves. State and capital—or at least that of the massive firms, the big companies, and the monopolies—make good bedfellows, today as yesterday. And capital, right under our noses, makes out rather well. To the state it has left, as in the past, those tasks that are unrewarding or too costly: maintaining a highway system, communications, the army, education, research. It has granted the state responsibil-

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Traders in 16th-century Istanbul. "In the Islamic world, just as in Europe, the cities gradually stripped the villages of their markets, swallowing them up. . . . A whole network of credit and commercial organizations connected Moslem cities with the Far East."

ity for public health and social welfare. It lives shamelessly off the conveniences, exemptions, subsidies, and liberties of the state, that machine for the collection of the enormous sums of money that flow toward it, sums that it redistributes. Above all, the state spends more than it receives and so becomes a borrowing machine. Capital is never very far from this deep and always flowing spring. This alliance of capital and state stretches across all modern centuries. When the state trips, capitalism falls on its face.

Capitalism's rapport with culture is ambiguous because it is seemingly contradictory. Culture is at once capitalism's accomplice and adversary. In the Germany of Martin Luther, the protests against the monopolies of the great firms of the Fugger, the Welser, and others, were quickly extinguished. Culture almost always comes back to protect the existing order, including capitalism.

Consider the student turmoil of 1968 in Western Europe and America. Herbert Marcuse, who involuntarily became the pope of that revolution, was correct in saying that "it is foolish to speak of 1968 as a defeat." It shook the social edifice and shattered customs. The social and familial fabric was sufficiently torn that new "lifestyles" appeared on all levels of society. In this respect, it was an authentic cultural revolution. And ever
since that time, capitalism, at the core of our shaken society, has been insecure, attacked not only by socialists and Marxists but also by new groups who attack power in whatever form it rears its head: Down with the State!

But time passes. A decade is nothing in the slow history of societies, but quite a long time in the life of individuals. Behold the protagonists of 1968 absorbed by a patient society, whose very slowness gives it a remarkable force of both resistance and absorption. Inertia is what it lacks least. That 1968 produced no "defeat" is certain; but an absolute victory? Indeed, do absolute victories or defeats really exist in cultural matters? The Renaissance and the Reformation appear to have been two magnificent and long-winded cultural revolutions. Yet, everything calms down eventually. The wounds heal.

III Will Capitalism Survive?

While capitalism is going through crises and vicissitudes today in the West, I don't believe it is a "sick man" about to expire. Granted, it no longer inspires the sort of admiration that Marx himself could not suppress. It is no longer viewed, as by Max Weber, as a final evolutionary stage. But any system that might gradually replace it would resemble it like a brother.

And I doubt that capitalism will break down by itself, of "endogenous" causes. A breakdown would require an extremely violent shock from the outside—as well as a credible alternative ready to take its place. Every socialist victory so far has benefited from an exceptionally violent external shock—the Russian Revolution in 1917, the regimes of Eastern Europe in 1945, the Chinese Revolution in 1947. Moreover, these movements were buoyed by complete confidence in the socialist future. That confidence has since eroded. Capitalism, then, will not easily be overturned by speeches and ideological programs, or by momentary reversals at the polls. Economically speaking (I don't say ideologically), it may even emerge fortified.

We know what economic crises ordinarily led to in preindustrial Europe: elimination of dead wood, or of the little guy, les petits, the fragile companies spawned in times of economic euphoria. The consequences: an easing of competition, a new concentration of essential economic activities in a few hands, the hands of the great capitalists.

Nothing has changed today. In 1968, the president of Fiat, Giovanni Agnelli, predicted that "in 20 years, there will be no more than six or seven makes of automobiles in the world." Today nine automakers account for 80 percent of the world's car
production. At home and abroad, there is a reshuffling of the cards, a "new deal," but to the advantage of the most powerful. Herbert Marcuse was right: "Crises are essential for the development of capitalism; inflation and unemployment favor the centralization and the concentration of capitalism."

Centralization and concentration are, in effect, the silent builders and demolishers of our social and economic architecture. The present crisis is a very traditional one. In the course of readjustment, certain industrial activities atrophy or simply disappear. But new lines of profit are drawn at the same time, to the advantage of the survivors.

Great crises prompt a similar redistribution on the international level. There also the weak become weaker; the strong, stronger. Look at what has happened during the last few decades. There has been a shifting of the American economy from the Northeast toward the South and the West of the United States to the point where it is possible to speak of a "shift" of the center of the world from the Atlantic to the Pacific, around a kind of U.S.-Japanese economic axis. There has been a division of the Third World, between the new wealth of the oil producers and the poverty and accrued difficulties of everyone else. And, too, thanks largely to Western firms, particularly the multinationals, there has been increasing industrialization of these struggling nations that only yesterday were cast in the supporting role of mere raw-materials producers.

In sum, capitalism is not withering away. It is changing its tack, reorganizing its forms of domination. Its built-in advantages are enormous. It can choose the ground on which it will fight. Above all, unlike the theoretical alternatives vying for allegiance, there is a certain presumption in capitalism’s favor simply because it is already here.

"Tradition and previous generations," Marx wrote, "weigh like a nightmare on the minds of the living," as well as, we might add, on the existence of the living. Jean Paul Sartre may dream of a society where inequality does not exist, where there will no longer be domination of one man by another. But no society in the world has yet renounced tradition and the use of privilege. The example of the socialist countries proves that the disappearance of a single hierarchy—the economic one—does not ring in equality, liberty, or even abundance. Even a clear-sighted revolution—Can there ever be one?—would have trouble demolishing all that has to be demolished while conserving what must be conserved: basic freedoms, an independent culture, a truly free market economy, and more than a little fraternity. That’s a lot to ask.
IV  Capitalism and the Market Economy

The great capitalist upsurge of the last century was seen by Marx and even by Lenin as eminently and soundly competitive. What is surprising is that this image (though long questioned by economists) is still the common coin of politics, journalism, and the classroom. Already, before 1929, Keynes spoke of imperfect competition; contemporary scholars go further. As they see it, there are market prices and monopoly prices, in other words a "competitive sector" and a monopoly sector—a two-tiered economy. Up top are the monopolies, underneath is the competitive sphere occupied by small and medium-sized businesses.

Though the distinction is not yet made in common usage, the practice of alluding to the upper-tier alone as "capitalism" is gaining ground. Capitalism has come to be regarded, more and more, as a superlative. Capitalism does not mean the shop where I buy my newspaper; it means the chain which supplies it. It does not mean the artisans' workshops and the small independent businesses known in France as "the 49" because they prefer, given various legal and tax disincentives, not to surpass the onerous benchmark of 50 employees. These small businesses, these miniscule units, are legion. Sometimes, en masse, some wide-ranging crisis brings them to our attention.

Thus, during the two decades leading up to its climactic crisis of the 1970s, New York City, then the industrial center of the world, witnessed the decline, one after another, of those small businesses, many with fewer than 20 employees, that were its commercial backbone: the garment industry, printers, food processors, contractors—in other words, the whole "competitive" sphere. Once, these thousands of businesses provided New Yorkers with everything they wanted, all manufactured and stored on the spot. But Big Business supplanted and destroyed them, preferring new factories located outside the city.

Sometimes we notice the competitive economy not because it is suddenly gone, but because it is thriving against all odds. Prato, a large textile center near Florence, is the best example I know of, a real oasis of very small and lively businesses, with a corps of skilled craftsmen attuned to fashions and trends. The great Italian textile firms are currently in a slump, yet Prato boasts full employment.

My purpose here is not to enumerate examples but only to point out the existence of a lower tier—and a considerable one at that—of the economy. Don't think that capitalism is equivalent to the economic structure as a whole, that it encompasses whole
societies. The workshops of Prato, like the printer going out of business in New York, are not part of "capitalism," either in social terms or in terms of economic management.

The market economy does not encompass everything left alone by capitalism. There also exists today, as in the 18th century, a third, or "basement," tier of the economy that accounts for perhaps 30 to 40 percent of all activity within industrialized countries. This volume is the sum total of all the activities outside the market and the control of the state: evasion, smuggling, barter in goods and services, moonlighting "off-the-books," and, above all, work performed at home that, for Thomas Aquinas, was the *economia pura.*

This "tripartite" model of the economy is as valid now as it ever was, and it compels us to revise our views on the existence of an economic "system" that is capitalist from top to bottom. There is, on the contrary, a lively dialectic between capitalism and everything beneath it. The truth of the matter is that capitalism needs units smaller than itself, mostly to dispose of a thousand-and-one chores indispensable to the life of every society, chores for which capitalism, as I define it, has neither the taste nor the talent.
The relationship between capitalism and its lower tier is not strictly of an economic nature. Government policy intrudes. Since World War II, for example, several European countries have deliberately downplayed small businesses, which they consider a thing of the past, a sign of economic backwardness. So the state created such monopolies as Electricité de France, now a virtual state within a state. It is the big corporations that have received, and still receive, state credits and subsidies, even as banks tighten, under order, their credit to smaller firms, condemning them to stagnation and, finally, death.

There is no more dangerous policy. It amounts to repeating the fundamental error of the socialist countries. As Lenin said: "Small-scale commercial production gives birth every day, every moment, to capitalism. . . . Where individual enterprise and free trade exist, capitalism appears." To get rid of capitalism, one must pull up individual enterprise and free trade by the roots.

Lenin's remarks pay homage to the enormous creative power of the market, to the second tier, to craftsmanship and "know-how." This creative strength, too, is a safety net during periods of crisis, war, of serious economic breakdowns. The second tier can always catch its breath: It is the realm of resources, of impromptu solutions, of innovations, even though the best of its discoveries eventually fall into the hands of the owners of big capital.

What I personally regret is the refusal of politicians to draw this distinction between capitalism and the market economy, or to present it as an all-or-nothing proposition, as though it were impossible to retain a market economy without giving free rein to monopolies, or to get rid of monopolies without "nationalizing" them outright. The program of the 1968 "Prague Spring" in Czechoslovakia—socialism at the top, freedom ("spontaneity") at the bottom—was designed as a double solution to an unsettling double reality. But what form of socialism can maintain the freedom and mobility of private enterprise? As long as the proposed solution amounts to a replacement of capital monopoly by state monopoly—thereby combining the faults of both—who can wonder that the classic solutions offered by the Left do not arouse much enthusiasm?
The most influential treatises on capitalism were written by the so-called classical economists—Adam Smith (1723–90), David Ricardo (1772–1823), and John Stuart Mill (1806–73).

In *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776), Smith, reacting to the high tariffs and other restrictions of 18th-century mercantilism, advocated laissez faire—the doctrine that governments should end all restraints on trade and prices. The result, he argued, would benefit both individuals and, in the aggregate, the public. Ricardo, in *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (1817), and Mill, in *Principles of Political Economy* (1848), were in basic agreement with Smith. Karl Marx was not.

Reacting to the Industrial Revolution's harsh treatment of the worker, Marx (1818–83) urged the masses to rebel. He called for public ownership of all the means of production and for the ultimate "withering away" of all central governmental authority. The first volume of his *Das Kapital* appeared in 1867.

The Great Depression of the 1930s shaped the thinking of John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) and Joseph Allos Schumpeter (1883–1950).

Keynes's *A Treatise on Money* (1930) and *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (1936) introduced such "counter-cyclical" concepts as government deficit spending, with a lasting influence on public policies in the West. Schumpeter did pioneering work in defining *Business Cycles* (1939).


Irving Kristol argues that this new class has sought political influence through an expanded welfare state while scorning traditional U.S. values in *Two Cheers For Capitalism* (Basic Books, 1978, cloth; New American Library, 1979, paper).

Kristol is among those who believe that capitalism, for all its faults, works. "People who . . . subscribe to the social philosophy of a capitalist order . . . do indeed better their condition." Although "this prosperity is not equally shared," over the long term "everyone does benefit, visibly and substantially."
El Pan Nuestro (Our Bread), by Ramón Frade (1875–1954). The painting depicts a jibaro, the farmer of Puerto Rico's mountainous interior.
Puerto Rico

When the Spanish-American War broke out in 1898, Finley Peter Dunne's comic Mr. Hennessey urged prompt acquisition of Cuba and Puerto Rico. "An' yet," replied his friend Mr. Dooley, "'tis not more than two months ago since ye learned whether they were islands or canned goods." Today, the Commonwealth's 3.3 million Spanish-speaking inhabitants are U.S. citizens who do not vote in U.S. elections or pay federal taxes. Operation Boot-strap—the promising drive for economic growth launched in the 1950s—stalled during the '70s. Unemployment now hovers around 20 percent; only massive subsidies from Washington prevented serious economic hardship. Inevitably, such disappointments have helped to rekindle debate over the island's future. Here, political scientist Jorge Heine looks at the island's history and current politics; economist Jaime Santiago examines the Commonwealth's economy; and filmmaker Pedro Rivera sketches a portrait of a Puerto Rican migrant family in Hoboken, New Jersey

A PEOPLE APART

by Jorge Heine

"Puerto Ricans," wrote the island's governor, E. Montgomery Reily, to President Warren G. Harding in 1922, "as all continentals say, are 'children' and change their attitudes almost daily." Not all American officials have been as patronizing as Reily, but his remark reflects a certain condescension or ignorance that persists to this day in Washington and elsewhere on the U.S. mainland.

An odd relationship has existed between the United States and Puerto Rico ever since American troops occupied the island in 1898. Despite eight decades of U.S. rule, Puerto Ricans re-
main a Latin American, Catholic, and Spanish-speaking people; their culture is distinctive and remarkably resilient. The island embodies all of the characteristics of a "nation." But, as U.S. citizens, Puerto Ricans are viewed on the mainland as merely another minority (and a relatively small one at that) within the vast American melting pot.

As befits an island torn between two identities, even the scenery seems to take sides. It is only a short walk from the beauty of the cobblestoned Calle Cristo in Old San Juan to the Condado beachfront with its gleaming hotels and Miami Beach atmosphere. As elsewhere in Latin America, the average man's quest for a "modern" life has created urban squalor in San Juan; yet the unspoiled lushness of the interior is only a few miles away. The most striking contrast in Puerto Rico is between its potential and its reality. Endowed with a balmy climate and fertile soil, Puerto Rico has had a history not of riches or even self-sufficiency but of destitution. In 1765, the Spanish royal envoy, Alejandro O'Reilly, described the Puerto Rican people as "the poorest in America." Even today, after 82 years under the U.S. flag, Puerto Rico's 3.3 million people have a per capita income of only $2,681, considerably below that of Mississippi, the poorest state in the Union.

Boriquén

Puerto Rico's recorded history goes back nearly 500 years. In late 1493, during his second voyage to the New World, Christopher Columbus dropped anchor off the green, mountain-ribbed island. He did not tarry. Traveling with Columbus was Juan Ponce de León, a young Spanish officer, who was struck by the island's beauty. He returned in 1508 to establish a settlement at San Juan Bay, and to fraternize with the gentle native Taino Indians (who called the island Boriquén, whence the present-day national anthem, La Borrinqueña).

With its formidable Morro Castle and La Fortaleza (now the governor's mansion), San Juan soon became a key outpost. But Mexico and Peru, not little Puerto Rico (the island is only 100 miles long and 35 miles wide), were the sources of Spain's over-

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seas wealth; Madrid regarded San Juan simply as a strategic garrison on the gold and silver routes from the New World.

A sense of "nationhood" emerged among Puerto Ricans only in the 19th century. Economics provided the impetus. The island's agriculture, once based on small, independent farmers who lived off their own produce, had slowly evolved into an enterprise based on cash crops (coffee, sugar, tobacco) grown for export on large estates, or haciendas. The new hacendados, who made up only about 2 percent of the population, soon found themselves at odds with the entrenched Spanish elite—the military, the bureaucrats, the bishops, the San Juan merchants. Eyeing the nearby U.S. market, they chafed under official policies that prohibited trade outside the Spanish Empire. Increasingly they demanded autonomia.

There was a short-lived insurrection in 1868 (the Grito de Lares), whose leaders proclaimed a Republic of Puerto Rico; later, a few Puerto Rican exiles in New York worked hand-in-hand with Cuban patriots to throw off the Spanish yoke. But for the most part, the hacendados preferred political reform to popular revolt. In 1870, they founded the Liberal Reformist Party to oppose the Conservatives, who represented the Spanish loyalists. Led by such men as Luis Muñoz Rivera and José C. Barbosa, the Liberals finally extracted substantial concessions from Madrid—notably, internal autonomy and the right to ne-
gotiate trade agreements with foreign countries. Spain’s concessions were embodied in the *Carta Autonómica* of 1897.

Four months later, after the sinking of the battleship *Maine* in Havana harbor, the United States declared war on Spain, sending expeditions to seize the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. Secretary of State John Hay called it “a splendid little war”; it was soon over. Puerto Rico was quickly occupied by U.S. troops in the summer of 1898 and formally ceded to Washington by year’s end. So much for the *Carta Autonómica*.

In early 1900, with passage of the Foraker Act, Congress granted civilian rule, of sorts, to Puerto Rico. Washington would appoint the American governor and his 11-member advisory council, and a nonvoting Puerto Rican Resident Commissioner would sit in Congress. A 35-member parliament could be elected by the Puerto Ricans, but Congress, the President, or the governor could veto its actions. The island, with its Spanish-
speaking population of almost 1 million, was now almost as much a colony as, say, French Indochina or Dutch Surinam.

Why did the United States annex Puerto Rico?

There is no simple answer. Obviously, long before the war with Spain, some U.S. officials had seen the Caribbean as a potential *mare nostrum*. Wrote Secretary of State James G. Blaine in 1891: "There are three places of sufficient value to be taken: one is Hawaii and the others are Puerto Rico and Cuba." Aside from its potential usefulness as a coaling station for the U.S. fleet in the Caribbean, Puerto Rico was coveted by some American businessmen. Only later would "defense of the Panama Canal" (completed in 1914) be cited as a factor.

The effect of the American occupation on the average Puerto Rican's life was meager. Public health improved, to be sure, and the benefits of primary education (in English) slowly spread throughout the island. But the mass of Puerto Ricans were poor peasants when the Americans arrived, and they stayed poor for another half century. Like the British in Nigeria, Washington had but two hopes for Puerto Rico: tranquility and profits.

The island economy underwent a fundamental change under U.S. rule. Heavy property taxes and sharp credit restrictions bankrupted many *hacendados*, who sold off their estates to American-owned sugar companies like the Central Aguirre Association. The long-term effects of this basic shift were profound. It meant, first, that Puerto Rico's agriculture, once diversified and based on coffee, sugar, tobacco, and numerous subsistence crops, now became a "monoculture" ruled by King Sugar. (Sugar production grew from less than 100,000 tons in 1900 to 1.3 million tons in the peak year of 1952.) Second, it set the pattern for Puerto Rico's economic development throughout the 20th century: development based on external control of all major economic activities.

**Amid the Cacophony**

Local politics was lively but ineffectual. Statehooders, *autonomistas*, and *independentistas* jockeyed for power—power that meant nothing in Washington. The Americans' most formidable foe in the years before World War II was Pedro Albizu Campos, leader of the pro-independence Nationalist Party (founded in 1922). Dark-skinned, with high cheekbones and wavy hair, Albizu Campos captivated rallies throughout the 1920s and early '30s with his hypnotic, steely voice. His speaking style, rich in similes ("The homeland has to be loved like a woman, both physically and spiritually"), cut through the
cacophony of island politics.

Yet, Albizu Campos was unable to link his abstract ideas of independence and "Puerto Ricaness" to a pragmatic social program that workers and peasants could understand; his party suffered disappointments at the polls. After an outbreak of violence in 1936 sparked by official repression and the excesses of his own followers, Albizu Campos landed in federal prison, where he spent most of the rest of his life.

Luis Muñoz Marin tried a different approach. The son of Luis Muñoz Rivera, he had spent much of his early life in the literary salons of New York and Washington. Returning to Puerto Rico in 1931, he became editor of La Democracia, the Liberal Party newspaper, and quickly emerged as a leader of the party’s progressive, independentista wing.

The Commonwealth Is Born

Disillusioned with the feasibility of independence after Senator Millard Tydings (D.-Md.) in 1936 sponsored legislation designed to make Puerto Rico pay dearly for its freedom, Muñoz Marin broke away from the Liberals.* He founded his own party, the Popular Democratic Party, whose members were known as the Populares. Muñoz Marin put the status question on the back burner and instead traveled throughout the island preaching a gospel every jibaro, or peasant, could understand: breakup of the sugar centrales, a minimum wage, Spanish-language schools, unemployment benefits. He became a crucial link between the Puerto Rican masses and the political leadership. In 1940, Muñoz Marin's Populares took control of the legislature. For the next three decades, the party dominated island politics.

Working closely with Governor Rexford G. Tugwell, a Roosevelt appointee, Muñoz Marín whittled away at sugar company holdings, enacted a minimum wage, and carried out a land reform. He engineered the appointment of a Puerto Rican as governor in 1946 and was himself elected governor in 1948. Four years later, taking advantage of the anticolonial fervor sweeping the fledgling United Nations (and U.S. embarrassment over Puerto Rico's colonial status), he midwived into being the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Estado Libre Asociado, after the plan was approved by Puerto Ricans in a 1951 plebiscite by a margin of 387,000 to 119,000.

Briefly, the idea of the Commonwealth was to leave "inter-

* Disturbed by the mounting toll of political violence on the island, Tydings had angrily called for Puerto Rican independence within four years, with tariffs rising 25 percent annually. The bill never got out of committee.
Pedro Albizu Campos (1891–1965), Harvard-educated lawyer and fiery independentista. "Independence is not a matter to be negotiated," he proclaimed, "and if it is, it will be with bullets."

Internal affairs in the hands of San Juan, and external affairs in the hands of Washington. In practice, of course, the distinction has not always been clear-cut. From the FBI to the IRS, from HEW to the NLRB, almost all federal agencies, commissions, and departments do business in Puerto Rico. While Puerto Ricans pay no federal income tax and have complete autonomy in budgetary and fiscal matters, Congress has never acknowledged that it has anything less than absolute power over Puerto Rico.

Nevertheless, Commonwealth status gave Puerto Ricans more self-government than they had had since the short-lived Carta Autonómica of 1897. Moreover, fiscal autonomy meant that Muñoz Marín could use the island's tax advantages to turn the island into an "investment paradise"—which is exactly what he did under Operation Bootstrap.

Hundreds of American companies began building plants on the island. As capital poured in, the Gross Domestic Product soared, tripling between 1950 and 1970. Per capita income became the highest in Latin America. A university system sprouted (1978 enrollment: 123,000). In 1976, there were 812,000 registered automobiles on the island, one for every four Puerto Ricans. A growing middle class began to enjoy what it saw as the "good life," meaning credit-buying and consumerism,
Puerto Rico (area: 3,435 sq. miles) is roughly the size of Connecticut.

American-style.

Within a generation, Operation Bootstrap transformed Puerto Rico from a poor agricultural island to a booming industrial park. Inevitably, as industrialization accelerated and cities grew, Muñoz Marín's rural-based Populares found themselves challenged by the "new" Puerto Rican they had helped to create. Urban workers and the middle class found the Populares' symbols (a pava, or peasant's straw hat) and slogans ("Bread, Land, and Liberty") increasingly irrelevant. The beneficiaries of the island's transformation have been the "stateholders," led by the New Progressive Party (NPN) and drawing support from the poor and unemployed as well as some of the island's richest men, such as industrialist Luis A. Ferré, who was elected to a four-year term as governor in 1968. Another NPN candidate, Carlos Romero Barceló, was elected governor in 1976 with 48.3 percent of the vote.

The statehood movement seems incongruous. Puerto Ricans are acutely aware of the differences that divide island and mainland: different languages, cultures, histories. Puerto Ricans have an unquestioned sense of insularismo, of being a community "apart." There is no question that most Puerto Ricans value U.S.
citizenship and appreciate the benefits of "free association" over the past three decades. Yet, they do not feel "American" in the same way a Californian or New Yorker does. It is impossible for a continental (the official euphemism for Americans) or gringo (the more common expression) to win election to any public office in Puerto Rico.

Why have so many Puerto Ricans voted for the NPN, the statehood party?

Given the 30-year dominance of the Populares, a vote for statehood often represented a protest vote—"get the rascals out." Moreover, during the 1970s, the enormous increase in federal funds going to the island has heightened a sense of dependence on Washington. Statehood provides the best guarantee that those unemployment checks and Food Stamps will keep on coming. Finally, the influential 50,000-strong emigré Cuban community in Puerto Rico, made up mostly of professionals and businessmen, has consistently supported the NPN and thereby augmented the statehood vote.

The Great Debate

Whatever the cause, the steady swelling of pro-statehood sentiment over the last decade has revived the status debate; it will dominate the island's elections this November.

The Populares, now led by former governor Rafael Hernández Colón, still defend the Commonwealth formula. For better or worse, they contend, Puerto Rico became a U.S. territory and suffered the indignities of colonialism—but now reaps the benefits of unrestricted access to the American market and of federal relief programs estimated at more than $3 billion in 1979. The Commonwealth arrangement is flexible. Puerto Ricans elect their own governor and legislature; they are exempt from federal taxes. As a small, overpopulated island with few natural resources, Puerto Rico simply cannot afford independence; statehood would destroy the island's fiscal autonomy, undermine its traditions and heritage, and subject it to the whirlwind of national politics. Hernández Colón concedes that the present Commonwealth formula is threadbare. He has proposed a "new thesis" calling for Washington to transfer sweeping powers to San Juan. Commonwealth in some restructured form, say the

*Presidential primaries were held in Puerto Rico this year for the first time. The candidates brushed up on their Spanish and made no embarrassing errors. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., the island's governor from 1929 to 1932, was not so lucky. It is said that while addressing a large crowd in Maricao, a small town in western Puerto Rico, he concluded with a ringing "Somos todos Maricaenos!" (literally, "We are all homosexuals"). Residents of Maricao are actually called Maricaenos.

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Four times during the last decade, the United Nations has held hearings on Puerto Rico's political status. According to the UN Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (also known as the Decolonization Committee), Puerto Rico is a colony of the United States, a dark island of "persecutions, harassment, and repressive measures."

The UN Charter requires nations that administer territories lacking a "full measure of self-government" to submit annual reports on their economic, social, and educational conditions. In 1947, the U.S. government agreed to report on Puerto Rico as a "non-self-governing territory"—a colony, in other words. But in 1952, Puerto Ricans voted overwhelmingly to adopt Commonwealth status; in 1953, the UN agreed that reports on Puerto Rico were no longer warranted.

At the urging of Castro's Cuba, however, the Decolonization Committee took up the question of Puerto Rico in 1972. In 1973, it declared the island a colony. There the matter rested until 1978, when, for the first time, spokesmen for all four major Puerto Rican parties told the committee of their dissatisfaction. Among the 40 witnesses who flew from San Juan to New York was Governor Carlos Romero Barceló, a proponent of statehood, who lamented "the undeniably ambiguous nature" of Puerto Rico's political status.

The 1978 hearings lasted three weeks. Last year, the Decolonization Committee's discussion of Puerto Rico ended after three days. The result: a joint Cuban-Iraqi resolution citing "the inalienable right of the people of Puerto Rico to self-determination." It passed by a vote of 11 to 0, with 12 abstentions. The line-up was predictable,

*Populares*, provides the best of both worlds: all the benefits of U.S. citizenship, none of the costs.

But statehooders argue that half a loaf is no loaf at all. Commonwealth status is a legal hybrid; no clause in the U.S. Constitution justifies it, even implicitly. Under Commonwealth, Puerto Ricans are second-class citizens, unable to vote in presidential elections or to send a voting delegation to Congress. (Puerto Rico, if admitted to the Union, would have two Senators and a minimum of seven Representatives, a larger delegation than 25 of the 50 states.) With statehood, Puerto Rico would qualify for vastly more federal funds—an extra $800 million annually, proponents say. And its Washington representatives could make sure the island's share grew and grew.

The *independentistas* (led by Rubén Berrios Martínez of the
with pro-Soviet countries like Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria supporting the resolution and Australia, Chile, India, Indonesia, Sweden, and Yugoslavia refusing to go along.

Meanwhile, Puerto Ricans have had ample opportunity to express their own preferences, which are changing (see the chart below). One note: Observers across the political spectrum suspect that independence per se has more support among the islanders than do the minority independentista parties.

**PERCENT OF POPULAR VOTE**

Puerto Rican Independence Party and Juan Mari Brás of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party) hold that, despite 80 years of legal tinkering, Puerto Rico's status as a U.S. colony has never changed substantially. Imperialist exploitation has always motivated U.S. interest in the island. American corporations first monopolized the sugar industry, then monopolized the island's manufacturing, turning Puerto Rico into "Profit Island, U.S.A.," as one government brochure put it. In terms of national defense, Puerto Rico has become a giant aircraft carrier in the Caribbean. Roosevelt Roads is one of the largest (37,000 acres) naval installations in the world, and the U.S. Navy uses the offshore island of Vieques for target practice. Puerto Ricans have served in four American wars; 1 out of 42 U.S. casualties in Korea was Puerto Rican.
More to the point, the independentistas claim, federal jurisdiction over everything that matters on the island, from immigration to shipping, has made a mockery of “autonomy.” The main beneficiaries of the “common market” with the United States, they add, are not the Puerto Rican people but the American companies that flood the island with expensive consumer goods. (Puerto Rico is America’s fifth largest export market.) The independentistas acknowledge that the transition to independence would be difficult but, given appropriate financial arrangements with the United States, a new emphasis on agriculture, and much hard work, it could be done. In any event, they believe, real economic and social development will not occur in the context of association with the United States.

The most likely scenario at this point is that the current, pro-statehood governor, Carlos Romero Barceló, will be re-elected in November by a small margin and that he will then call for a plebiscite on the status question in 1981. Given the long-term electoral trends, it is quite possible that the statehood option, for the first time in Puerto Rican history, will receive a small majority of the vote (55 percent, say). It would then be up to the U.S. Congress to decide whether Puerto Rico should become the 51st state.

Who Will Choose?

President Carter has pledged to “respect the wishes of the people of Puerto Rico and [their] right to self-determination.” So has the U.S. Senate in a unanimous 1979 resolution. Yet Puerto Rico’s future status is not a burning issue in Congress, and most Congressmen would probably be content to leave things as they are.

Does 55 percent of the electorate have the right to impose on the other 45 percent something as definitive and permanent as full incorporation into another nation? The question is especially relevant given the intensity of feelings regarding the status question. There is a strong undercurrent of violence in Puerto Rican politics. It emerged with particular force in the 1930s and early ’50s and is on the rise once again. Overt and covert harassment of the independentistas by state and federal police is one of the givens of Puerto Rican politics. (A federal grand jury is currently investigating the 1978 shooting deaths of two independence proponents by Puerto Rican government undercover agents.) Right-wing Cuban emigré terrorists operate in San Juan. The independentistas themselves have a long tradition of violence that spilled onto the mainland with their at-
tempted assassination of President Harry S Truman in 1950 and their 1954 shooting spree in the U.S. House of Representatives. Last December, two American sailors were killed when a nationalist group attacked a U.S. Navy bus. If statehood comes to the island, Puerto Rico could well become another Northern Ireland.

That aside, statehood would only exacerbate the deep structural imbalances in the Puerto Rican economy that led voters to endorse statehood in the first place. By removing the incentives for external investment (tax exemptions would disappear under statehood) as well as the impediments to stepped-up welfare payments from Washington, statehood, in my view, would merely accelerate the “ghettoization” of the island. The ultimate irony is that the ostensibly anti-American independentistas want Puerto Ricans to face the future with the old Puritan values of self-reliance and hard work; the pro-American statehooders advocate all-out welfarism, a notion decidedly at odds with mainland sentiment these days.

If the statehood issue comes before Congress in the '80s, American legislators may seek guidance in the words of philosopher Johann Herder: “Whom nature separated by language, customs, and character, let no man artificially join together by chemistry.”
Part colony, part state, part independent nation, Puerto Rico is an anomaly with no true counterpart anywhere in the world. The island’s economy is hostage to this circumstance. It is a victim, too, of nature. Puerto Rico has virtually no natural resources. It is self-sufficient only in people, of whom it has long been a net exporter. For other resources it must rely on the outside world, primarily the United States, its chief trading partner for nearly 100 years.

Like Taiwan and South Korea, Puerto Rico faced a postwar challenge. It had to devise an economic strategy that could somehow turn the island’s basic vulnerability—or someone else’s strength—to its own advantage. Three decades ago, Puerto Rico found such a strategy, or so it seemed.

Puerto Rico was desperately poor. Its strength and resources had been sapped by more than 400 years of colonial rule. During the 1930s, two great hurricanes and one Great Depression had hit the island. The Puerto Rican economy depended largely on sugar, but world sugar prices were at rock bottom. What few “industries” there were had been crippled when the U.S. Congress in 1938 set 25¢ as the minimum hourly wage, then about five times the going rate on the island. Real per capita income in 1940 was less than $125 a year, slightly better than Bulgaria’s at the time, slightly worse than Hungary’s. Illiteracy and infant mortality were high.

With some justification, Puerto Rico was popularly considered “the poorhouse of the Caribbean.” Island politicians smarted at the designation, but they did little to try to change it. Indeed, for more than a century, “politics” on the island had been synonymous with factional squabbling over Puerto Rico’s once and future political “status.”

The first major local politician to behave differently was Luis Muñoz Marín, leader of the Popular Democratic Party, or Populares. For Muñoz Marín, any status that enabled Puerto Rico to address its chronic problems of poverty and high unemployment was acceptable. He was willing to make do with the “status” quo, and he got his chance when the Populares took control of the island legislature in 1940.
The Spaniards began importing slaves into Puerto Rico in the early 1500s; from the 17th century onwards, most of them were employed on great sugar plantations. Slavery was abolished in 1873, but sugar remained the backbone of the island's economy until the 1940s.

Muñoz Marín's chief ally in those early days was World War II. Some 65,000 young islanders, mainly from depressed rural areas, enlisted or were drafted into the U.S. armed services; their families received generous dependents' allowances. At a cost of $30 million, new U.S. military bases were built and old ones were expanded. The island's road system, extended with Washington's help, soon linked mountain villages to the cities. Personal income climbed, and conspicuous consumption acquired a permanent foothold among all of the island's classes.

The war fattened the Puerto Rican government's bank balance. When domestic U.S. liquor distillers converted to industrial alcohol production in 1942, Puerto Rican rum filled the void. Because excise taxes on Puerto Rican rum sold in the United States were returned to Puerto Rico, the island government quickly built up a $179 million "grubstake," giving Muñoz Marín cash in hand to finance his ambitious schemes.

He began in the early 1940s with land reform—predictably enough, since the Populares' electoral base was in rural areas. Many (but not all) sugar plantations of more than 500 acres, the long-unenforced legal limit, were broken up and run on a cooperative basis. The government built rural housing and distributed land to farmers in new farm communities.

Although Muñoz Marín's emphasis was decidedly on ag-
riculture, he also dabbled in manufacturing, believing it might one day become a strong “second sector.” In 1943, under the mantle of the new, state-owned Industrial Development Company, he launched an experimental program with a simple premise: If the government took the lead in building and operating small companies—and showed it could be done profitably—private entrepreneurs would soon follow suit. To that end, the state acquired a cement plant and several factories producing shoes, bottles (for rum), and cardboard (for shipping rum).

**Operation Bootstrap**

Muñoz Marín’s agricultural policies had little impact on farm output or income; his industrial policies did no better. Once whiskey production started up again in the United States after the war, the bottom fell out of the Puerto Rican rum (and bottle, and cardboard) industry. It turned out, too, that Puerto Ricans preferred stylish American shoes to the rather basic, homemade product. Only the cement plant turned a profit. Moreover, the 3,000 jobs created by state-owned factories helped only a small fraction of the 80,000 unemployed Puerto Ricans. And local entrepreneurs, lacking venture capital, assiduously kept their hands out of manufacturing.

Muñoz Marín scrapped his “semi-socialist” industrial experiment in 1947. He was now convinced, however, that industrialization, not farming, was the key to Puerto Rico’s economic future. Virtually all of the island’s arable land was in use, even as the rural population continued to grow. Though important as a source of employment, agriculture was not going to provide many more jobs—and, in terms of exports, could hardly compete with the mechanized “agribusiness” of the U.S. mainland.

Muñoz Marín turned instead to something that island economists had been quietly studying since 1944: tax exemption to lure American factories to the island. Under section 931 of the IRS code, private companies operating in Puerto Rico and other U.S. possessions were exempt from federal taxes on profits. In 1947 and 1948, at Muñoz Marín’s behest, the island legislature enacted laws granting factories relocating to the island a 10-year “holiday” from local Puerto Rican taxes as well. There

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were other incentives. Wages were lower in Puerto Rico than on the mainland. The island lay within the U.S. “customs union” and used American currency. Cheap Venezuelan oil was only two tanker-days away. In short, Puerto Rico offered all of the advantages of, say, Haiti but none of the potential disadvantages—political instability, currency devaluation, expropriation.

Operation Bootstrap, as the Muñoz Marín program came to be called, worked as planned for 25 years, carefully nurtured by Puerto Rico’s new Economic Development Administration (Fomento, in Spanish). By 1960, some 500 new factories had set up shop in Puerto Rico; by 1975, there were 1,700 Fomento-sponsored plants. Union Carbide, Upjohn, Levi Strauss, RCA, Johnson & Johnson—these and many other companies found that the projections of their financial analysts tallied nicely with the upbeat tenor of Fomento ads in Business Week and the New York Times. Between 1948 and 1974, more than 140,000 new manufacturing jobs were created.

The construction industry boomed, employing 80,000 workers in 1973. Tourism prospered with a hand from the growing

"100 percent tax exemption for all corporations that build a factory in Puerto Rico." This 1976 advertisement was placed in the West German weekly Der Spiegel by the Puerto Rico Economic Development Administration. Tax exemptions for industry have since been reduced.
airlines, and from Castro's takeover in Cuba. The island became an urban society where life expectancy reached 72 years and literacy was almost universal. Real annual per capita income climbed from $278 in 1948 to $1,865 in 1974. By the early '70s, GNP was growing at a rapid annual rate of more than 6 percent.

In retrospect, it is apparent that Operation Bootstrap, for all its promise and real achievement, harbored some of the seeds of its own destruction. At its peak, manufacturing was never completely able to offset job losses due to the decline of the island's agriculture. (In 1948, 36 percent of employed Puerto Ricans worked on farms; the proportion dwindled to 6 percent by 1973.) Puerto Rico's economic "miracle" thus depended largely on massive out-migration to the United States. Between 1945 and 1970, about one-third of the island's population left to seek a new life on the mainland, thereby helping to keep unemployment low "back home." Even then, the island's official jobless rate never fell below 10 percent.

Operation Bootstrap was flawed in other respects. Its very success in attracting U.S. factories and creating jobs inevitably narrowed the "wage gap" between Commonwealth and mainland, a problem compounded by the ever-rising U.S. minimum wage. Puerto Rico became less attractive to labor-intensive industries, such as textiles, more attractive to capital-intensive endeavors, such as pharmaceuticals and petrochemicals. The latter did little to alleviate unemployment. Many industries simply went elsewhere. Puerto Rico's factories, of whatever type, also needed sewage systems, water, electricity. Since most of the companies themselves were tax-exempt, the Puerto Rican people had to foot the bill.

The built-in weaknesses of the Puerto Rican economy became a serious problem in 1970. Puerto Rico had weathered the first four postwar U.S. recessions—1948, 1954, 1958, 1960—without much trouble. The downturns generally hit the island six to nine months after appearing on the mainland, but the island economy always picked up rapidly.

In 1970, the pattern changed. The island's construction industry, long sustained by heavy demand for factories and second

*The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was amended in 1940 to allow the minimum wage in Puerto Rico to be set somewhat below the mainland level for selected industries. However, further amendments to the act in 1974 and 1977 require Puerto Rico to achieve "parity" with the mainland by January 1, 1981, when the U.S. minimum wage will be $3.35.

†Puerto Rico's progressive personal income tax takes a bigger bite than federal income tax does on the mainland. There are also stiff excise taxes on liquor, cigarettes, and automobiles, and a flat 5 percent sales tax on all nonfood items. But owing to widespread tax evasion at both ends of the income ladder, Puerto Rico's effective tax base is narrow.
homes, suddenly went into a slump. Tourism slackened as wealthy Americans sought new pleasure spots while middle-class Americans, hit by recession, stayed home. And, in a reversal of a 25-year trend, Puerto Rican migrants to the United States began returning to the island.

Faced with a mounting economic crisis, Governor Luis A. Ferré (1969–73) opted for a quick fix, a kind of Keynesian sleight-of-hand. Instead of trying to promote job creation in the private manufacturing sector, Ferré made the government the employer of last resort and sank millions into public-works projects to refuel the economy. To pay for it all, the government borrowed money, much of it from U.S. banks. This cushion of debt, which Governor Rafael Hernández Colón, Ferré’s successor, kept inflated, buoyed the Puerto Rican economy for a time.

Debt and Taxes

Then came the deep 1974–75 U.S. recession. It gave the mainland a bad cold and Puerto Rico pneumonia. Brought on in part by the quadrupling of OPEC oil prices in 1973, it bared the island’s underlying structural problems. In 1975, growth in Puerto Rico’s real GNP fell to 2.5 percent. The jobless rate soared to 20 percent, with employment in the vital construction industry cut by half. Inflation stood at 15 percent, far above the mainland rate. Fomento officials found it increasingly difficult to show U.S. factory owners the advantages of moving to an island that was 99 percent dependent on imported oil. External investment fell by $400 million from the 1972 peak. The U.S. bond markets were virtually closed to the Puerto Rican government, which was already $6.5 billion in debt.

In December 1975, a Puerto Rican government study overseen by Yale economist James Tobin called for “drastic adjustments” in the island’s economic practices. The bottom line: austerity. To his credit, Governor Hernández Colón acted on the recommendations. He decreed sweeping tax increases, a cut in real government expenditures, and a wage freeze for government workers (one in five of all employed Puerto Ricans). It was a painful program, and as such it virtually guaranteed that La Fortaleza, the 16th-century governor’s palace, would not be Hernández Colón’s residence after the 1976 elections.

As his advisors struggled to devise a new, long-term economic strategy, Hernández Colón grabbed a life line from Wash-

Puerto Rico relies heavily on aid from Washington. In 1978, 1.5 million Puerto Ricans, nearly half of the island’s population, supplemented their grocery budgets with USDA Food Stamps valued at $831 million—10 percent of all Food Stamps issued during that year.

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Gross Domestic Product (per capita)</th>
<th>Life Expectancy at Birth (in years)</th>
<th>Infant Mortality (per 1,000)</th>
<th>Literacy (percent of population)</th>
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tington in the form of federal transfer payments, primarily Food Stamps, which had just been introduced to the island.* The volume of transfer payments to Puerto Rico had been growing slowly since 1969, but between 1974 and 1976, federal outlays to the island doubled. In 1975, Puerto Rico received $600 million in Food Stamp cupones alone. About 60 percent of the population was eligible for the program. Today, federal transfer payments account for 16 percent of personal income in Puerto Rico, compared to 9 percent on the U.S. mainland.

Welfare Island?

What Hernández Colón regarded as a temporary cushion his successor, Carlos Romero Barceló, made the bedrock of economic policy. Romero Barceló is an ardent champion of statehood for Puerto Rico; the sure-fire way to achieve it, he believes, is by gradually eliminating industrial tax exemption and increasing Puerto Rico's dependence on federal welfare funds. Essentially, he wants to bring Puerto Rican policies into line with those on the mainland, not create further distinctions. (Upon assuming office in 1977, Romero Barceló promptly made tax exemption partial, thereby eroding its attractiveness for U.S. business.) He is selling his program with the slogan "Statehood is for the poor"; by joining the Union, he believes, Puerto Rico can keep the welfare faucet open.

Tempting though they are, federal transfer payments come with a high social cost: a compelling disincentive to work. Real unemployment in Puerto Rico now probably hovers around 40 percent (as opposed to the official 18 percent) if one counts the underemployed and the octosos voluntarios, the voluntarily idle. The proportion of persons 16 years of age or older in the labor force (working or looking for work) has dropped from 53 percent in 1950 to 43 percent in 1979.

Idleness has simply become too comfortable. Because 400,000 island families receive Food Stamps, and many of them are entitled to welfare or unemployment compensation as well, it often doesn't pay for a "breadwinner" to work. So great is the island's current dependence on federal funds that Puerto Rico in the future could well become a kind of welfare sump, a South Bronx in the Antilles. Already, Food Stamp cupones have become almost a second (illegal) currency.

Puerto Rico's economy is, without question, in deep trouble.

*Owing to its peculiar Commonwealth status, Puerto Rico can participate in only 644 out of 1,046 federal domestic assistance programs. The island is excluded from Revenue Sharing and its participation in Medicaid and Aid to Families with Dependent Children is limited.
In 1980, real economic growth (according to official estimates) will fall from 5.4 percent to somewhere between 1.7 and 3.9 percent. In my own view, real growth will be closer to zero. The island remains almost entirely dependent on outside capital; there seems to be no alternative, given Puerto Rico's negative personal savings rate, a consequence of unchecked consumerism. The island's balance of trade is consistently unfavorable—to the tune of $1.6 billion in 1977 alone. According to one recent estimate, 192,000 Puerto Rican youths between the ages of 16 and 24 are neither at work nor in school. The economic situation in Puerto Rico is explosive, and there is no consensus on what to do about it.

There has been some fresh thinking, however.

One idea was put forward recently by former governor Hernández Colón, the Populares' candidate for governor in 1980. Last summer, Hernández Colón proposed what has come to be called La Nueva Tesis, "the new thesis." In it, he calls for Washington to transfer broad new powers to San Juan within the framework of a much-revised Commonwealth formula—"culminated Commonwealth" as it has come to be called. Briefly, he would like Puerto Rico to be able to set its own (lower) minimum wage, relax environmental controls, erect tariff barriers to protect local manufacturers, and make its own labor relations laws. There is a belated emphasis, too, on reviving agriculture, the island's sickest sector. (Puerto Rico imports about half of its food.) The ultimate goal is to return to the strong productive roots of Operation Bootstrap, but with an emphasis on self-sufficiency, not on reckless growth.

Neither independence nor statehood strikes me as a workable option at this time.

Puerto Rico's overriding economic problem lies in the character of its relationship with the United States, not the fact that a relationship exists. The island needs strong economic ties with the mainland. But, like any developing nation, it also needs insulation. Puerto Rico can hardly "make it" while saddled with the acquired regulatory baggage—and consumer habits—of a fully developed, highly industrialized country. Unfortunately, this issue is not high on the agenda in Washington, where Puerto Rico has roughly the importance of the human appendix: that is, no importance at all until the pain becomes unbearable.
There are perhaps 2 million Puerto Ricans—South American-born or, increasingly, mainland-born children of migrants—now living in the continental United States. They account for less than 1 percent of the total U.S. population and for less than one-quarter of all citizens of Hispanic origin living on the mainland.

Yet their presence is keenly felt. By and large, they are clustered in a handful of cities: New York and its environs (the main point of entry for the 800,000 Puerto Ricans—one-third of the island’s population—who arrived during the three decades after World War II) and increasingly Chicago, Gary, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Newark, Bridgeport, Hartford, and Boston. In the New Jersey suburbs of Hoboken, Perth Amboy, and Union City, across the Hudson from Manhattan, more than 50 percent of all public-school children are Hispanic, and most of these are probably Puerto Rican.

“Probably” is used advisedly. Because the U.S. Bureau of the Census has not distinguished in its decennial surveys between Puerto Ricans and other Hispanics (a policy that will change with the 1980 census), it is impossible to determine the “flow” of Puerto Ricans through the United States. While East Harlem’s El Barrio—and New York City in general—appears to be losing much of its Puerto Rican population, no one can tell precisely where the exodus is going, who these people are, their ages, occupations, sex, incomes, or educational attainment. Because federal aid programs for disadvantaged groups are “targeted” on the basis of just this kind of information, the question is one of more than academic interest.

In general, Puerto Ricans have not prospered as much as others in this country. In a comprehensive 1976 report, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission glumly conceded what many already knew: that the “incidence of poverty and unemployment [in the Puerto Rican community] is more severe than that of virtually any ethnic group in the United States,” including blacks.*

Not all migrants have fared badly, of course. While the estimated percentage of mainland Puerto Ricans receiving public assistance is far higher than the national average, some three-

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quarters of all Puerto Rican families receive no government assistance. Tens of thousands hold managerial and professional jobs. Many have “disappeared” into the upper middle class and the affluent suburbs, sometimes leaving their heritage (and their Hispanic surnames) behind.

But for the most part, mainland Puerto Ricans find themselves in low-skilled, blue-collar occupations, particularly in “light” or labor-intensive industries (such as the garment trade) where employment is often seasonal and layoffs are frequent. Most live in impoverished, often crime-ridden, neighborhoods. In 1975, according to the U.S. Department of Labor, the median income of Puerto Rican families—$7,629—lagged far behind that of blacks ($8,779), Mexican-Americans ($9,498), and all other U.S. Hispanic groups ($11,410).

Who’s Counting?

Given such statistics, the latest phenomenon spotted by newspaper and TV trend-watchers—the apparent “reverse migration” of as many as 45,000 Puerto Ricans back to the Commonwealth a year—seems understandable, even predictable. “For the first time in American history,” concluded William Stockton in a 1978 New York Times Magazine article, “a major immigrant group is giving up on the American dream.”

That assessment, like many similar reports, is simplistic. Puerto Ricans are hardly the first to have “given up.” Frank Bonilla, director of New York’s Center for Puerto Rican Studies, has pointed out that during the peak years of immigration from Europe to the United States (1890–1910), no fewer than 4 out of 10 of foreign-born residents in this country returned to their native lands. Between 1908 and 1932, as many as 4 million immigrants went home. Immigration to the United States, Bonilla cautioned, has not always been the “once-and-for-all” decision that history books would have us believe.

Moreover, statistics on the volume of Puerto Rican migration (figured by calculating the difference between total arrivals to and departures from the island by sea and air) are a matter of debate. Some Puerto Rican militants in the United States have charged that island officials deliberately undercounted the volume of out-migration in order to minimize the problem. But it is more likely that the volume of return migration may have been significantly overstated. During the early 1970s, it appears that one major U.S. airline mistakenly counted Puerto Ricans arriving on the island with round-trip tickets as coming in but not going out.
The net outflow of Puerto Ricans from the island became a net influx during the 1970s, or so it seems. What data exist are often ambiguous; the picture that emerges should be regarded only as a rough indication.

To make matters more complicated, Puerto Rico has now become a gateway to the United States for legal and illegal aliens alike. There are tens of thousands of migrants from the Dominican Republic living on the island, for example. One wonders how much "Puerto Rican" migration to the mainland actually consists of Dominicans. Conversely, many Hispanic immigrants from Mexico and other Latin countries who legally enter the U.S. mainland eventually move to Puerto Rico, attracted by the familiar language and climate.* How much of the "return migration" is made up of these new arrivals?

Finally, Puerto Rican "return migration" is nothing new,

even if the volume has apparently grown. Indeed, the circularity of the Puerto Rican flow, the periodic back-and-forth movement of individuals and whole families, has always been the distinguishing characteristic of migration from the island, a kind of "fingerprint" that long set Puerto Rican immigrants apart from others.

Puerto Ricans are known to have lived in the United States since the early 19th century; as the Spanish-American War neared, groups of Puerto Rican independentistas working out of New York plotted the overthrow of the island's Spanish masters. Their numbers were small, however. The 1910 census, conducted 12 years after Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the United States, found only 1,513 Puerto Ricans living in the continental United States.

During subsequent decades, the trickle of migrants became a steady stream. U.S. tariff policies effectively undermined the Puerto Rican coffee trade, destroying the livelihood of thousands of coffee growers. At the same time, American syndicates like the South Porto Rico Sugar company assembled a patchwork quilt of small, locally owned holdings into great plantations, displacing many small farmers and creating a landless rural proletariat. In the United States, farmers began importing surplus workers for seasonal labor: harvesting peaches in South Carolina, apples in Vermont, tobacco in Connecticut.

**Safety Valve**

The stream swelled into a torrent in the 1950s, as an average of 40,000 Puerto Ricans arrived in the United States every year. Then as now, unemployment was high on the island, and attractive factory jobs were few. The population was growing quickly, owing mostly to improved public health, not to any rise in the birth rate, which had in fact been declining.* Thousands of Puerto Rican GIs, veterans of World War II or Korea, came home with a taste for "modern" American life. With the U.S. economy booming, employers from the mainland came down with contracts and signed up willing workers for the garment industry and the growing "service" sector—hotel work, dishwashing, house-cleaning. Many Puerto Ricans emigrated on their own, first by ship, soon by airplane.

Just as important, Puerto Rican politicians encouraged the

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*Between 1899 and the 1940s, Puerto Rico's annual rate of population growth rose from 14.3 to 20.1 per 1,000 people; the annual death rate fell from 31.4 to 15.8 per 1,000; the birth rate declined from 45.7 to 40.6 births per 1,000. See A Summary in Facts and Figures, 1964-65, Puerto Rico Department of Labor.
outward flow, even lobbied the Federal Aviation Administration for low plane fares on the New York–San Juan airborne “highway.” (Until the early 1960s, a two-way ticket for the three-hour trip cost less than $100.) They saw migration as a “safety valve”—a counter to growing pressure for jobs—that kept life tolerable for the Puerto Ricans who remained behind. Migration made the island’s economic “miracle” possible. According to one estimate, without migration Puerto Rico’s unemployment rate would have been 25 percent in 1970; but in fact, island unemployment dropped from 15 to 10 percent between 1950 and 1970. Encouraging migration was an easy alternative to coming to grips with Puerto Rico’s underlying economic problems.

**Coming Home to Roost**

For reasons that remain unclear, the pace of migration began to slow during the 1960s; by the early ’70s, as noted, the net outflow from the island reversed itself and became a net inflow of substantial, if not precisely knowable, proportions. Several factors were probably involved: the 1967–68 black riots, which ravaged many Puerto Rican neighborhoods in U.S. cities; two severe recessions; the narrowing of the wage gap between Puerto Rico and the mainland; the extension of “transfer” programs—e.g., welfare, Food Stamps—to large portions of the island population; unusually cold mainland winters; and the sentimental urge of ’50s migrants, now retired, to return home.* It is impossible to say just what weight one should assign to each of these reasons. (It is interesting to note that even as many Puerto Ricans began going back to the island, many U.S. blacks started leaving Northern cities and returning to the South.)

The economic impact of increased return migration could be serious for Puerto Rico. The island is already beset by a growing “resident alien” problem due to migration from the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and other nations in the Caribbean whose residents do not need visas to enter Puerto Rico. Due in part to return migration, Puerto Rico’s population increased by 48 percent (706,000) between 1963 and 1976 (compared to 25 percent in the mainland United States during the same period). Those who return suffer far higher unemployment rates than Puerto Ricans who never left home, partly because their low status on the mainland frequently led to high absenteeism and job turnover rates. Too, there is subtle discrimination against these “Neoricans.” Return migration tends to ac-

celerate when the island can handle it least—during economic downturns in the United States, which unfailingly ripple through the Puerto Rican economy.

In effect, the tranquility of the Commonwealth is premised on massive out-migration; that premise has been overtaken by events. There is a growing belief among politicians and intellectuals in Puerto Rico today that yesterday’s “safety valve” may be tomorrow’s time bomb.

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**ANGEL AND AUREA**

*by Pedro A. Rivera*

Once, after World War II, policymakers and economists saw the massive Puerto Rican migration to the United States as a partial and temporary solution to the island’s poverty and unemployment (as well as a cheap source of labor in the fields and factories of the U.S. mainland). The migrants, too, often saw their sojourn as temporary, hoping to return someday to Puerto Rico and buy a house and a small plot of land, a **parcela**.

For many of the migrants, this hope foundered on reality. Instead, they found themselves in a recurring cycle of migration and return. Yet people like Angel and Aurea Ortiz, despite the odds, and despite their own disappointments, are confident they can succeed where tens of thousands have failed.

Angel, 37, and Aurea, 31, live in Hoboken, New Jersey, across the Hudson River from Manhattan. Hoboken is a city of 45,000, an old, ailing garment center whose Puerto Rican population (now more than 10,000) has doubled in the last decade, even as its total population has declined. Angel and Aurea pay $100 (plus utilities) per month for a four-room apartment in a community comprising Italians, Irish, blacks, and Puerto Ricans like themselves. It is a solid, working-class neighborhood. The Ortiz children—Sandra, 15; Elsie, 13; Angel, 11; and David, 8—all attend local public schools.

Angel and Aurea are both garment workers, he a skilled coat
presser with Rosemary Fashions in Hoboken, she a sewer for Bella Rosa in the same town. Neither has a high-school diploma, though they believe in the importance of a high-school education (at least) for their children. Together, they make about $450 a week before taxes. They have a 1972 Chevrolet Impala, a black-and-white television set, and a savings account.

Migration has shaped the lives of their parents and relatives. Angel’s father, José Irene, who now lives on Social Security in his hometown of Guayama, came to the United States a dozen times beginning in the late 1940s. Always leaving his wife, Alejandrina, behind, he would take seasonal work on New Jersey truck farms, save his pay, then fly home. His three sons, Miguel, Pablo, and Angel (the youngest), eventually followed him to the United States.

Washing Dishes

Angel’s first job after he arrived in 1959 was as a $1.15-an-hour dishwasher in Chicopee, Massachusetts. He moved to New Jersey in 1963 to aid his sister-in-law after his brother Miguel suddenly died of appendicitis. He entered the garment trade as an apprentice that year. (Brother Pablo, 39, also a Hoboken garment worker, is married and has three children.)

Aurea’s parents, Tomás and Vincenta Rivera, came to the United States from Mayaguez in 1949 when Aurea was 10 months old, settling in the Bronx. Both found work at the All-Right Belt Company in Manhattan and, on the side, ran a small bodega, or grocery store. The Riveras still live in New York, stymied in their attempts to return permanently to Puerto Rico, a dream they have cherished ever since they arrived.* Aurea dropped out of school to work in a coat factory when she was 15, moving in with her sister, Gladys, who lived in Hoboken. She met Angel on the job, and they were married in 1965.

Like their parents, Angel and Aurea have tried often to return to Puerto Rico. By Puerto Rican standards, they have done well here, but, at the same time, there remains a strong emotional tie to the island and its culture. The Ortizes have friends and family there. Says Angel: “I want my children to be brought up in Puerto Rico so that they can know who they are and where

*The Riveras visit Puerto Rico frequently, but the longest they have managed to stay is nine months. They bought a parcela in Mayaguez in 1964, built a house there in 1967, and in 1976 opened a grocery store with a view to settling in Puerto Rico for good. The business failed. Says Aurea: “My father thought that he could run his bodega like he did in New York, where he used to sell on credit, and people paid him back. In Puerto Rico, he also sold on credit, but, when people picked up their food stamps, they ran to the supermarket to do their shopping and forgot about their debts.”
Puerto Rican migrants get their first glimpse of New York. During the 1940s, islanders already established in the city called the newcomers "Marine Tigers" after one of the ships that made the run between San Juan and New York.

Drawing by Manuel Otero. Reprinted by permission of the Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, City University of New York.

they come from." Angel and Aurea have made sure that their children learned Spanish—not as typical a parental practice as is commonly believed—and Spanish is spoken at home. (My interviews, for example, were conducted in Spanish.)

Angel also believes that the everyday environment for working-class Puerto Ricans in the United States is deteriorating. "To give you an example," he says, "when I came to Hoboken in 1963, there weren't as many abandoned buildings. Now it is a total disaster. It has left me stunned." And he harbors deep resentment against the small elite of Puerto Ricans who have "made it," taking white-collar jobs in the state and local bureaucracy and social welfare agencies. Such people, he charges, "are living off our problems."

Pedro A. Rivera, 29, is a documentary film-maker based in New York City. Born in Caguas, Puerto Rico, he holds a B.A. (1972) and an M.A. (1975) from the State University of New York, Buffalo. With associates at the Center for Puerto Rican Studies, he is currently writing and producing a documentary on Operation Bootstrap.
The Ortiz family moved to Puerto Rico for the first time in 1972 when, enticed by their friends' and relatives' description of a forthcoming economic boom on the island, they sold most of their possessions, paid out $1,500 for six round-trip airplane tickets, and joined Angel's father in Guayama. The children were enrolled in local public schools. Yet, while the boom was real—for investors and manufacturers, anyway—the Ortizes' expectations proved too high. Though jobs were available, what the Ortizes regarded as good jobs were scarce; neither Angel nor Aurea could find any work comparable, in pay or status, to what they had in the States. They lived off their savings and unemployment compensation, and in 1974, when funds ran low, returned to the United States—and to their old jobs.*

Back and Forth

Determined to try again, they went back to Guayama in 1975. "We started to build a house with my cousin's help," recalls Angel. "Even Aurea and the kids were mixing cement. It was a united family effort. From Monday through Sunday, working like horses, but for a cause." Family support is one thing the Ortizes can count on in Puerto Rico.

But the job situation had not improved. Aurea went to work for a pantyhose factory in nearby Salinas, where many of her coworkers were migrants from the Dominican Republic. ("Puerto Rico is to them what the United States is to us," she observes.) She earned $2.18 an hour, about two-thirds what she earned in the United States.

Angel commuted to a Starkist fish-canning plant in Ponce, 45 minutes away by car. A 10-year veteran of the International Ladies Garment Worker’s Union in the United States, he was not prepared for sudden immersion in Puerto Rican factory life, where wages are lower and union organizing is still difficult. "They told me I couldn't talk about unionization there, and I said 'What do you mean . . . ?' I worked there for about two weeks. There was a lack of trust among everybody. The Puerto Rican who came from the States was looked at with suspicion."

Angel then bought a concession and sold hot dogs and beef sandwiches outside factory gates in Guayama. With a combined pretax income of $250 a week the Ortizes could barely make

*The Ortizes' jobs in Hoboken serve as a kind of safety net. Because the work is seasonal, Angel and Aurea are frequently laid off for long periods, during which both collect unemployment benefits. In the interval, the family can try its luck in Puerto Rico. If things do not work out, Angel and Aurea come back to their jobs when the garment business picks up again—with no loss in seniority or pay.
PUERTO RICO

ends meet. There was no money for even the occasional luxury. In 1977, they boarded up their house and returned to the United States, resuming work at their respective factories.

The next time they go back, Angel wants to open an auto-parts shop, and he plans to attend night school in Puerto Rico to learn the business. The previous trips have taught him much, he believes: the importance of planning, certainly, and also that factory jobs in Puerto Rico are not worth seeking. "That would be the greatest of mistakes," says Angel, "to go to Puerto Rico and get a factory job."

Like many Puerto Rican working-class families in the United States, the Ortizes face a cruel dilemma. They recognize that urban conditions for many Puerto Ricans on the mainland are worsening, yet they are obliged to stay in the United States until they can somehow establish a beachhead in Puerto Rico. They yearn for the cultural familiarity of life on the island, even as that culture (they feel) is fast disappearing. "Those of us who go back and forth," says Angel, "are always in a trauma."

Will the Ortizes succeed? Both Angel and Aurea believe political independence for Puerto Rico would make their task easier and at the same time free thousands of Puerto Ricans from the need to come to the United States in the first place. Yet migration has become a way of life for millions of workers in Latin American countries that have already achieved formal political independence. Independence for Puerto Rico is conceivably part of a solution; but the Ortiz family, like its counterparts elsewhere, must look at a bigger picture.

The prime spurs to migration throughout the hemisphere have been the changes, for good or ill, wrought by capital: industrialization, urbanization, and the mutation of age-old agricultural patterns. These changes, and the rising expectations they tend to foster, are tearing apart the traditional economic and social structures of countries as diverse as Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador. Displaced in one country, Latin American workers are absorbed by another—notably, the United States, where they fill jobs that U.S. workers aren’t willing to take.

In this situation, it is as difficult for migrants to stay home as it is for government officials to keep them there—and as it is for U.S. factories and farms to do without them.
The 16th-century Indians of Puerto Rico believed that Spaniards were "immortal and incapable of dying from wounds or other disasters." Their awe did not last. As a test, writes Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo y Valdés, natives drowned one hapless conquistador just to see if he would come back to life. When he did not, they were emboldened to resist the European invaders, who slaughtered them.

Oviedo y Valdés (1478-1557) was court chronicler to Emperor Charles V of Spain. In the handsomely illustrated The Conquest and Settlement of the Island of Boriquén or Puerto Rico (Limited Editions Club, 1975), many of his reports have been reprinted. Oviedo y Valdés never visited Puerto Rico. He based his stories on observations by, among others, Juan Ponce de León—who colonized Puerto Rico in 1508—and peppered them with Old World prejudices about "naturally ungrateful" Indians.

Balanced accounts, in English, of Puerto Rico's history before the United States took possession in 1898 are rare. Two concise essays by historian Adalberto Lopez—in Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans: Studies in History and Society (Wiley, 1974), edited by Lopez and James Petras—provide a useful overview.

Lopez notes that as a result of warfare with the Spaniards and of smallpox epidemics, the island's population declined drastically from an estimated 30,000 after the Spanish arrived to a few thousand by 1520. Labor shortages led to the importation of black African slaves.

Life for the slaves in Puerto Rico was "short, nasty and brutish," writes Lopez. Yet, in contrast to their predominance on other richer Caribbean islands, Africans during the 18th and 19th centuries constituted a relatively small fraction of the total population (32,000 out of 618,000 in 1872).

For 400 years, Spanish administrators ruled Puerto Rico. They stayed in San Juan and built few roads or schools; at the end of the 18th century, more than 90 percent of the people could not read. Native landowners, subsistence farmers, and urban craftsmen remained isolated from one another and relatively content to let the Spaniards run the island—unlike their counterparts in much of the rest of Spanish America.

In Puerto Rico: A Socio-Historic Interpretation (Random, 1972, cloth; Vintage, 1972, paper), Manuel Maldonado-Denis, an independentista political scientist, glowingly describes Puerto Ricans' occasional attempts to gain freedom from Spain and later the United States, from the early 19th century to the late 1960s.

A more comprehensive study is Gordon K. Lewis's Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean (Monthly Review, 1963; reprint, 1975). Lewis, a British historian, observes that prior to 1898, North Americans were preoccupied with westward expansion; most Latin Americans were busy consolidating their newly gained freedoms. Each culture, he says, nur-
tured "an abiding assurance of its own innate superiority." Puerto Rico, ceded to the United States after the Spanish-American War, provided the first arena for real interaction between Protestant North and Latin South.

In *Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal* (Univ. of Fla., 1960), historian Thomas Mathews examines the effects of Washington's early efforts to alleviate the island's chronic poverty. The Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration, manned mostly by islanders, ran slum-clearance programs and hydroelectric projects—closely supervised by bureaucrats on the mainland. "Thirty years of neglect," he concludes, "were exchanged for excessive management."

Rexford Guy Tugwell, an intimate of FDR's, was the last mainlander to serve as governor of Puerto Rico. In *The Stricken Land: A Story of Puerto Rico* (Doubleday, 1946; Greenwood reprint, 1968), he gives an account of his difficulties in getting Washington to provide economic aid, while describing the rise of his friend, journalist Luis Muñoz Marín, who became the island's first elected governor in 1948.

Muñoz Marín emerged as a strong political father-figure in 1940 when his new Popular Democratic Party gained control of the island's legislature. According to economist David F. Ross—in *The Long Uphill Path: A Historical Study of Puerto Rico's Program of Economic Development* (San Juan: Talleres Gráficos Interamericanos, 1966)—Muñoz Marín's success grew out of his direct appeals to the *fíbaros*.

"Before, at political meetings the leaders would [present] truly eloquent orations about the mists, the seas, the fishes, and great things," recalled one poor Puerto Rican farmworker. "Then, Muñoz Marín . . . came speaking of the rural worker, of the cane, and things were easier to understand." Anthropologist Sidney W. Mintz offers this and other evidence of Muñoz Marín's skills in his examination of peasant existence, *Worker in the Cane: A Puerto Rican Life History* (Yale, 1960; Greenwood reprint, 1974, cloth; Norton, 1974, paper).

One perceptive study of the postwar period of rapid growth is by Henry Wells, a University of Pennsylvania political scientist. His *The Modernization of Puerto Rico: A Political Study of Changing Values and Institutions* (Harvard, 1969) focuses on the leaders who came into power in the 1940s and remained influential through the late '60s. Mainland-educated, many wavered between seemingly conflicting values—Spanish "fatalism" (the conviction that life is shaped by God, not man) and a strong respect for rigid hierarchies in society and the family, versus a North American faith in mankind's ability to manage nature and control fate, to create equality and progress.

Today, perhaps inevitably, Puerto Ricans of all classes identify themselves with Hispanic traditions less than do other Latin Americans. That is the conclusion of anthropologist Oscar Lewis in *La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty—San Juan and New York* (Random, 1966; Irvington reprint, 1979).

Among other evidence, Lewis cites Puerto Ricans' spoken mixture of English and Spanish and their Hispanicization of many English words (e.g., *el bosso, la T-shirt*).

A portrait of Puerto Ricans in New York City is drawn by sociologist Patricia Cayo Sexton in *Spanish
Harlem: An Anatomy of Poverty (Harper, 1965). Impressed by crime, drug addiction, and run-down tenements, she argues, many visitors to El Barrio overlook the inhabitants’ strong family and neighborhood ties. During the 1964 Harlem riots, she points out, the Spanish sections remained peaceful.

Not all Puerto Rican immigrants to the mainland gravitate to large cities, notes Marxist economist Felipe Rivera, in Labor Migration Under Capitalism: The Puerto Rican Experience (Monthly Review, 1979), a survey by the History Task Force of CUNY’s Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños.

Agricultural jobs in Puerto Rico declined from about 200,000 in 1940 to 35,000 in the late ‘70s, partly as a result of mechanization and industrialization. Many farm workers—lacking the training to work in the island’s industries—headed for the mainland. Rivera estimates that 60,000 Puerto Rican farm migrants out of the 74,000 now on the mainland work without contracts (notably, in Florida and New Jersey) and have little job protection.

The scholars’ statistics take on new life in the hands of Puerto Rico’s transplanted poets and novelists.

Piri Thomas, a black Puerto Rican, paints a harsh, loving picture of growing up in Spanish Harlem in the 1940s and ‘50s in Down These Mean Streets (Knopf, 1967, cloth; New American Library, 1968, paper). Pedro Juan Soto’s Spiks (Monthly Review, 1973, cloth; 1974, paper) is a collection of short stories that conveys the passion with which New York’s young Puerto Ricans strike out at the law and one another.

Puerto Rico’s rich indigenous literature has, for the most part, gone untranslated. Two representative anthologies are available, however: The Puerto Rican Poets: Los Poetas Puertorriqueños (Bantam, 1972, paper), edited by Alfredo Matilla and Ivan Silen, and Borinquén: An Anthology of Puerto Rican Literature (Knopf, 1974, cloth; Vintage, 1974, paper), edited by Maria Teresa Babin and Stan Steiner.

The most influential 20th-century Puerto Rican poets have been Luis Llorens Torres (1878–1944) and Luis Palés Matos (1899–1959). Palés Matos belonged to a group of Puerto Rican and Cuban poets who wrote “black” poetry. In Literary Currents in Hispanic America (Harvard, 1945; Russell & Russell reprint, 1963), critic Pedro Henriquez-Ureña notes that, rather than describing the sufferings of their race in the New World, Hispanic poets have harkened back to African traditions, imitating the cadencies of African language and dance.

Llorens Torres’ poems, like much Puerto Rican literature, are explicitly nationalistic: Blue swan the Hispanic race/ lay an egg, blind and deaf,/ in the nest of the fat/ North American duck. And already, from my window/ I see the northern ducks,/ of gloomy, hypocritical peak,/ who the swan of Puerto Rico,/ of blue plumage and red peak,/ they call Ugly Duckling.

EDITOR’S NOTE: This essay is based on research conducted by Barbara Mauger, an intern at the Wilson Center’s Latin American Program. Former U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia Ben Stephansky, Wilson Center Fellow Angel A. Rama, and Jorge Heine also advised on the selection of titles.
THE THIRD ELECTORAL SYSTEM, 1853–1892: Third parties in U.S. politics. Who supported parties such as the Free-Soil, Greenback, Liberty, and Populist parties? Who voted for Democrats and the fledgling but strong Republican Party—and why? Kleppner, a Northern Illinois University historian, finds that diverse religious and ethnicities underlay American voting patterns. In the North, Republicans gained the votes of “pietists” (mainly Northern-born Baptists, Quakers, Congregationalists, Methodists, Norwegian Lutherans), who stressed spiritual “rebirth” over religious ritual. They favored abolition, prohibition, and Sunday-closing legislation and opposed the power of Catholics. Northern Democrats, on the other hand, won the support of “liturgical” Christians (Southern-born Baptists and Methodists, native-born Episcopalians, and most immigrant Catholics and German Lutherans). The Democrats urged religious toleration and emphasized personal choice, especially when it came to prohibition. (In the South, after the Civil War, all such differences gave way to the race issue; whites united under the Democrats against the Party of Lincoln.) Both parties feared that economic issues would not excite their constituencies. Third parties rose to fill the gap, drawing dissatisfied voters away from the major party coalitions. Greenbackers promoted currency inflation in the 1870s; Populists urged a silver standard and a graduated income tax in the 1890s. Using a computer, Kleppner applies current voting-analysis techniques to the politics of the past and comes up with a new, controversial historical portrait.

—Michael Les Benedict (’79)
JESUS: An Experiment in Christology
by Edward Schillebeeckx
Seabury, 1979
767 pp. $24.50

Edward Schillebeeckx is one of Europe’s leading (and most controversial) Catholic theologians. In this first section of his monumental three-volume Christology, the Belgian Dominican priest explores the traditions behind the New Testament and reconsiders the meaning of Christ’s Resurrection and divinity. Schillebeeckx interprets the “Easter experience” as a conversion— independent of the traditions that center around both the “empty tomb” in Jerusalem and the subsequent appearances of Christ. He holds that the Easter appearances, instead of causing belief in the risen Jesus, arose out of such faith. Moved by experiences of guilt (at leaving Jesus in the lurch), repentance, grace, and forgiveness, the disciples shifted from confidence in Jesus as God’s messenger to an affirmation of faith in him as the crucified and risen Lord. “He renews for them the offer of salvation,” Schillebeeckx writes. “This they experience in their own conversion; he must therefore be alive.” For Schillebeeckx, the apostles’ visions of the risen Christ resulted from a “process of maturation.” Notwithstanding some contestable positions, this book is a major theological achievement, argued with great skill and erudition.

—Avery Dulles, S.J. (’77)

THE NUCLEAR QUESTION:
The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976
by Michael Mandelbaum
Cambridge, 1979
277 pp. $14.95

“The world has learned to live with the bomb,” argues Mandelbaum, a Harvard professor of government. Mandelbaum recounts evolving U.S. strategic doctrine, beginning with the 1946 “Baruch Plan” (rejected by the Soviets) to give the atomic secret to the United Nations. The principles of “massive retaliation” embraced by defense analysts soon thereafter until the 1960s, he contends, were essentially “pre-atomic” (despite the first Soviet atomic explosion in 1949): Weapons exist to fight wars, it was believed; the United States must retain strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. Mandelbaum’s detailed examination of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis suggests that eyeball-to-
eyeball confrontation forced both sides to recognize the special destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Defense planners in the Kennedy administration began to think in terms of nuclear balance—each country’s arsenal existing to deter the use of the other’s. Under conditions of “mutual assured destruction” (MAD), it was said, marginal strategic superiority holds little significance. This perception, Mandelbaum posits, led to the 1963 limited nuclear test ban treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union and to the beginning of Strategic Arms Limitations Talks in 1969. The 30-year coexistence “of the age-old ‘anarchic’ international system with the terrifying fruits of modern science” has been the “achievement, and unquestionably the purpose, of nuclear strategy and nuclear diplomacy.”

—Dusko Doder (77)

**DIXIE’S FORGOTTEN PEOPLE: The South’s Poor Whites**

by J. Wayne Flynt
Ind. Univ., 1979
206 pp. $12.95

King Cotton, slavery, and the fashionable society of the great plantations dominate our image of the Old South. But in the isolated southern Appalachians and the Ozarks, in Georgia’s farmed-out clay hills, and in the pine-barrens of Alabama and east Mississippi, poor, landed whites eeked out a separate, hardscrabble existence. Primarily of Scotch-Irish descent, the South’s “hillbillies, crackers, and clay-eaters” kept alive ancient ballads, Celtic dance tunes, the hammer dulcimer. The craftsmen among them recycled what well-to-do neighbors discarded; colorful patchwork quilts, for example, were sewn from scraps of old cloth. Low cotton prices during the 1880s and ’90s forced many small farmers into tenancy and sharecropping. By 1930, half of all Southern farms were operated by tenants; nearly two-thirds of these 1.8 million tenant families were white. The New Deal brought little relief. As Flynt, an Auburn University historian, notes, “courthouse gangs” of planters, industrialists, and merchants dominated county politics and controlled the local administration of state welfare programs. Since the 1930s, the
mechanization of agriculture has further uprooted the South’s rural whites, forcing many into the cities of both the North and South. By 1970, 30,000 Southern white migrants had settled in Detroit alone. Despite the rapid industrialization of Southern cities in the 1950s and ’60s, white poverty has persisted. Only recently, notes Flynt, has industry begun to disperse into the countryside, “where needs are the greatest.”

—James Lang (’78)

Why do human beings cover the things that they value with elaborate patterns and then pay only marginal attention to these decorations? In this companion to Art and Illusion (1960)—which explored the psychology of pictorial representation—British art historian Gombrich locates the key to “unregarded art” in the basic human sense of order. Unable to give equal attention to all of our surroundings, we rapidly comprehend the regularities in an environment and focus instead on the irregularities. Repetitive scrolls, arabesques, and checkerboard designs keep the eye moving—more than a blank surface does. Thus, patterns on the walls of a Gothic cathedral highlight religious inscriptions and portraits that are unique and held to be meaningful. In general, the more sumptuous the decorative background for a work of art, the more remarkable the work is—partly because of its environment. An ornate setting, such as the frame around Raphael’s painting, Madonna della Sedia, in the Pitti Palace, both defines a work of figurative art and dignifies it. This wide-ranging, eclectically illustrated book looks not only at picture frames but also at Persian carpets, Slovak folk hats, and Maori canoe paddles.

—Alan K. Henrikson (’79)
In 1580, the textile town of Romans lay within the old French province of Dauphiné, near Grenoble. Ladurie, one of France's distinguished historians, depicts the town midway between Reformation and Counter Reformation, on the winding road to the French Revolution. As in his best-selling Montaillou, Ladurie probes a single incident in an ordinary town to understand a larger world. His focus here is the 1580 Mardi Gras. The principal actors: Judge Antoine Guérin, social-climbing son of a jeweler and "powerful boss of the local political machine," and draper Jean Serve-Paumier, spokesman for commoner and craftsman, "a man of pacifist, perhaps temporizing nature." On the night of February 15th, Guérin's costumed thugs suddenly trained their harquebuses on Paumier and his followers and opened fire; many survivors were summarily tortured and hanged. Why? Ladurie portrays Romans as a town wracked by popular resentment at entrenched privilege, bloated bureaucracy, and cruel taxes. Great lords, clerics, and urban magnates were exempt, by charter or custom, from many tax levies; but the mass of commoners, as one contemporary chronicler observed, "wept they could take it no more." With tax revolts proliferating throughout France like spring crocuses, Guérin's bloody move, then, was a pre-emptive strike. (To commemorate the deed, Guérin designed a new coat of arms for himself—an uprooted apple tree, or pommier—a tasteless pun on his victim's name.) Culling the details of life in Romans from tax rolls, land registers, and contemporary descriptions, Ladurie builds his story to a crescendo, in deft counterpoint to the theatrical rhythms of Carnival.

By contrast, the 18 spirited essays collected in The Territory of the Historian are to Ladurie
as finger exercises are to a pianist—warm-ups for work to come, experiments in sheer technique. Topics range from the history of contraception to the rich research potential of the computer. In two fascinating chapters, Ladurie reviews the work of a dozen scholar-detectives who are piecing together the history of the Earth’s climate. Their tools: tree rings, fossil pollens, the oxygen isotope 0-18 in glaciers, and fragmentary evidence about wine harvests a millennium ago. Ladurie’s well-directed curiosity is everywhere evident.

AARON BURR: The Years From Princeton to Vice President, 1756–1805
by Milton Lomask
Farrar, 1979
443 pp. $17.50

Twice during his life, Aaron Burr (1756–1836) saw his innocence vindicated—once while on trial for the killing of Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton in an 1804 duel, and again three years later at a federal court hearing on charges of conspiring to head a Western secessionist empire. Given the views of many contemporaries and most historians, the courts appear to have held a minority opinion. In this first of two volumes, historian Milton Lomask joins novelist Gore Vidal (Burr) in defending Burr. He finds Burr too self-absorbed and ambivalent during emotional crises to serve his best interests. (Andrew Jackson saw the former Vice President differently: “As far from a fool as I ever saw and yet he is as easily fooled as any man I ever saw.”) When the presidential election of 1800 was thrown into the House of Representatives, Burr failed to push his cause with tie-breaking Federalists; in the end, they preferred Jefferson’s “radical” positions to Burr’s unpredictability. Lomask stresses Burr’s admirable side: the superb political organizer who wooed New York voters with the first intensive canvassing by a political organization; the aspiring writer who wanted to chronicle the unsung heroes of the Revolution; the appreciative husband and father. Perhaps the final verdict on the man comes from Burr himself: “He is a grave, silent strange sort of animal, inasmuch as we know not what to make of him.”
UTOPIAN THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN WORLD
By Frank E. & Fritzie P. Manuel
Harvard, 1979
912 pp. $25

Over the centuries, many intelligent and sincere people have tried to visualize heaven on earth. The Manuels, both historians, examine Western utopian fantasies from the Bible to Herbert Marcuse. Paradise has never been for everybody. Thomas More's *Utopia* (1516), the island society with “equality of property” for all citizens, maintained the institution of slavery for criminals, the conquered, and volunteer foreigners. The Manuels observe a distinction between utopias depicted in paintings and drawings (usually blissful states located far away or in the future) and reasoned and detailed plans. Since the Middle Ages, the latter have increasingly become programs for revolutionary action, beginning with the millennial theology of Thomas Müntzer—a precursor of Karl Marx who roamed the countryside encouraging the poor to storm castles and monasteries in 16th-century Germany. Analyzing the utopians as well as their ideas from a controversial Freudian perspective, the authors conclude that many, including Francis Bacon, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Charles Fourier, and Marx, have had paranoid personalities. Obsessively fearful of the world, each has sought to create a better one.

THE ACTION FRANCAISE AND REVOLUTIONARY SYNDICALISM
by Paul Mazgaj
Univ. of N.C., 1979
281 pp. $19

Strange bedfellows are the subject of this detailed examination of the dalliance (never fully consummated) between French monarchists and socialists in the years before World War I. The Action Française was a rightist movement with strong royalist and nationalistic beliefs. The revolutionary syndicalists sought to control industry through workers' unions and general strikes. These seemingly disparate groups were not so out of place together, suggests Mazgaj, a University of North Carolina historian. Both looked forward to radical change. Both groups' hopes for the overthrow of Georges Clemenceau's Third Republic were colored by anti-Semitism. Attempts to reconcile the goals of Left and Right began in 1908 with discussions and joint publications. After 1911, however, the question of France's military prepared-
ness gained in importance, and on that issue the two groups found themselves diametrically opposed. The monarchists took an anti-republican stance only with regard to internal French politics. When their beloved country was threatened from without, they parted company with the syndicalists, whose faith in international socialism committed them to advocate the avoidance of hostilities at almost any price. Historically, Left and Right have always been at each other's throats. The unique coalition of French monarchists and syndicalists seems to have been doomed from its inception.

Contemporary Affairs

In *Making It* (1967), Norman Podhoretz, editor of *Commentary*, blew the whistle on the liberals' climb to success. "Ambition," he wrote in characteristically blunt fashion, "seems to be replacing erotic lust as the prime dirty little secret of the well-educated American soul." In *Breaking Ranks*, Podhoretz describes his personal political evolution from the early days of the Kennedy administration—when he joined the radical reaction against the stolid 1950s—to his current counter-revolution against the New Left. Podhoretz' disenchantment began in 1964. He believed that writers and academics of the Left were recklessly fomenting and exploiting campus anarchy. Their behavior opened to question their allegiance to democracy and their dedication to high intellectual and moral standards. Podhoretz argues that the radicalism of New Left intellectuals (especially Norman Mailer and Paul Goodman, but just about anyone writing for the *New York Review of Books*), among other things, helped to divide and defeat the Democratic Party in 1968 and 1972. Many liberals, shaken by Vietnam, mistook the New Left's scorn of American values "for a form of idealism," he contends. In fact, 1960s radicalism grew out of "an infection of self-hatred."

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FAMILIAR TERRITORY: Observations on American Life by Joseph Epstein Oxford, 1979 204 pp. $11.95

Like the 19th-century French traveler Tocqueville, Epstein is intrigued by what kind of people Americans are. Writing informal essays in the tradition of Addison and Steele and Montaigne, Epstein, who is editor of the American Scholar, is more inclined to be inquisitive about educational fads, television, and publishing than about foreign affairs or the economy. He rebels at Americans' fascination with psychology: "We have become connoisseurs of grievance—one nation problematical with anxiety and aggravation for all." He warily notes the popularity of the King Tut exhibit, the success of book clubs, and the celebrity status indiscriminately granted to almost anyone who writes, paints, or performs. Americans' "appetite for culture is palpably there," he remarks; "at issue is the quality of the diet it is being fed." Readers of this slim volume need not fret about the quality of the fare.

ACCOUNTING FOR SLOWER ECONOMIC GROWTH: The United States in the 1970s by Edward F. Denison Brookings, 1979 212 pp. $16.95 cloth, $7.95 paper

Since 1973, the U.S. economy has been plagued by "stagflation"—slow growth, chronic inflation, and a sharp decrease in productivity. (Ten of the nation's 11 leading industries have experienced sluggish growth, communications being the sole exception.) In this sober, densely written study, Denison, a Commerce Department economist, echoes neither those critics who blame lethargy within business nor those who blame burdensome demands on business by government and labor. Increased federal outlays (and higher taxes), he writes, have not had a noticeable adverse effect on growth and productivity. Federal and industry research-and-development expenditures have held constant, even taking inflation into account, since the mid-1960s. Total employment has risen; it is output per worker that is down. Government safety and health regulations, the high costs of needed environmental protection, and rising crime rates (with more money and manpower now funneled into security) contributed to the down-turn in productivity. Inflation and high energy prices have also had an impact. But inflation's ef-
CURRENT BOOKS

Charlotte Bronte's Jane Eyre was thwarted in her love for the brooding Mr. Rochester by his mentally deranged wife, a prisoner in Thornfield Hall's attic. To Gilbert and Gubar, both professors of English, Bertha Mason Rochester is Eyre's (and Bronte's) second self, an alter ego trapped in claustrophobic anger and struggling to be free. In this credible reevaluation of the Brontes, Jane Austen, George Eliot, Mary Shelley, Christina Rossetti, Elizabeth Barrett Browning, and Emily Dickinson, the authors are largely successful in their search for a uniquely female creative imagination. These eight Victorian novelists and poets invented characters and voices to act out both private guilt—over having abandoned traditional woman's roles for writing careers—and their gnawing resentment of the male-dominated literary establishment. "Even the most apparently conservative and decorous women writers," Gilbert and Gubar contend, "obsessively create fiercely independent characters who seek to destroy all the patriarchal structures which both their authors and their authors' submissive heroines seem to accept as inevitable." On their surfaces, Jane Austen's refined novels of manners revolve around young heroines who willingly submit to male authority. On another, deeper level, the authors argue, Austen's inner conflict over this paternalistic view of women is evident in her portrayals of shrewd older women (e.g., Lady Catherine de Bourgh in Pride and Prejudice) who tamper with the docile heroines' lives. The study ends...
with Emily Dickinson, locking not a character but herself—along with her poems—in her father’s attic.

**THE STATE OF THE LANGUAGE**
edit ed by Leonard Michaels and Christopher Ricks
Univ. of Calif., 1980
609 pp. $14.95

Everybody, it seems, is speaking a different language—and calling it English: doctors, lawyers, bureaucrats, politicians, social scientists, Californians, critics, women, blacks. The American and British contributors to this gathering of 56 breezy essays and seven short humorous poems take stock of the ways in which language is used—and abused—in fields as diverse as popular music and philosophy, business, and psychology. Cambridge political scientist Quentin Skinner writes on “Language and Social Change.” During the 16th century, he observes, entrepreneurs sought to emphasize that the activities of commerce could be viewed as acts of piety. They began to use the word religious to commend “punctual, strict, and conscientious behavior.” Their customers never did completely buy the new connotation; during the following century and ever since, dictionaries have drawn a sharp distinction between the adjective’s original definition and its commercial application. Elsewhere, in this collection, lawyer David S. Levine takes a lighthearted look at his peers’ speech in “‘My Client Has Discussed Your Proposal to Fill the Drainage Ditch with His Partners’: Legal Language,” and Geneva Smitherman describes black English in “White English in Blackface, or Who Do I Be?”

**PARIS: A Century of Change, 1878-1978**
by Norma Evenson
Yale, 1979
382 pp. $30

To many, the City of Light exists as a living monument to Western Civilization. In contrast to New York, generally considered to be forever in the process of being built, Americans and Europeans alike have often thought of Paris as complete. Yet, notes Evenson, a Berkeley professor of architectural history, change—and bitter reaction to it—has repeatedly wracked the French capital. In 1889, construction of the Eiffel Tower was vehemently opposed by a group of 300 French artists and intellectuals, including Alexandre
Dumas. “American commercialism itself,” they wailed, would recoil at this “odious column of tin.” Evenson traces the city’s evolution from the drastic 1853–70 renovation carried out by Baron Haussman under Napoleon III to the present. Haussman’s work—long straight vistas, uniform facades, boulevards 30 meters wide—exemplified a strict engineering approach to city planning. At his direction, the Île de la Cité, site of Paris’s oldest settlement, was razed, and government offices constructed there. Subsequent unplanned growth has also brought problems (limited access to the center city, housing shortages, pollution) and political debate. President George Pompidou favored rapid modernization in the 1970s; but his plan for a superhighway along the Seine’s Left Bank was killed by his successor, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. Overall, contends Evenson, Paris remains a city of innovation as well as preservation. Gertrude Stein’s contention, uttered four decades ago, should retain its truth two decades hence: “Paris was where the 20th century was.”

Science & Technology

More than 700,000 Americans attending Chicago’s 1934 Century of Progress Exposition went to gawk at the streamlined Burlington Zephyr—the train with the look of the future. “Streamlining”—a style of industrial design employing sweeping horizontal lines, rounded corners, and shields to shroud machinery and protuberances—captured the nation’s imagination, becoming a fad in the mid-1930s. In a readable, well-illustrated account, Meikle, a professor of English and American studies at the University of Texas, explores its genesis (in Chrysler’s wind-tunnel tests) and psychological appeal. During the late ’20s, businessmen were among the first to realize that streamlined vacuum cleaners, bath scales, and tricycles met less sales resistance than did older models, that packaging could sell a product. Engineers and de-
signers started to work with new materials (plastic, chrome, stainless steel), which, together with the new shapes, made some goods easier to produce. During the Great Depression, streamlining took on a transcendent meaning. With contemporary events “too complex to comprehend,” Americans needed signs that the future would be better, smoother, simpler, more efficient. Streamlining had its critics, particularly among artists. “Streamlined paper cups, if dropped, . . . fall with less wind resistance,” joked a New York Museum of Modern Art official. But were they really better than the old ones for their purpose? Designers contended that streamlining was the first truly American design style.

Readers may not be familiar with Raymond Loewy’s name, but all will recognize his work. The company insignia of Exxon and Shell, the Lucky Strike cigarette package, the Coke bottle, the Sears Coldspot refrigerator, the U.S. postal service emblem, the 1961 Avanti automobile, Skylab—all were designed by the iconoclastic Frenchman, who emigrated to America in 1919 (in time to become a leader in the streamlining movement). Industrial Design is a lavishly produced picture book with scant text, a striking visual record of Loewy’s achievements. To an astonishing extent, the man has (literally) shaped the world around us.

During the 19th century, some prestigious schools, Harvard among them, admitted women to graduate science courses but refused them degrees. A shortage of male applicants during World War II helped to change this; and by 1961, 52 percent of male Ph.D.s and 51 percent of female Ph.D.s had trained in either “distinguished” or “strong” science departments. Columbia sociologist Cole has conducted a meticulous statistical analysis of men and women scientists employed at colleges and universities (he did not study private industry). Although there are more men employed in academic science than women, he finds no significant differences between them—in terms of status and peer recogni-
tion, number of publications and awards, rank of employing institution, and positions held. Among the explanations he cites are the liberalization of occupational and social stereotypes; an increased demand for scientists, especially during the Sputnik scare of the late 1950s; the proliferation of top-notch state universities; and the affirmative action requirements of the federal government, a prime source of funds. Cole concludes that there is no bias against hiring women in the scientific community. He demonstrates that salary discrimination has diminished, but not disappeared. During the early 1920s, women scientists earned only 54 percent as much as their male counterparts did. By 1954, their salaries were between 84 and 89 percent of men’s; the same was true in 1975, the last year for which Cole supplies data.

THE WINE OF LIFE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON SOCIETIES, ENERGY & LIVING THINGS
By Harold J. Morowitz
St. Martin’s, 1979
265 pp. $10

Morowitz, a Yale professor of molecular biophysics and biochemistry, has a noble goal. He is determined to make “hard” science enjoyable and germane. He often succeeds. His title essay recounts the heated feud between Claude Bernard, a physiologist from Beaujolais, and Louis Pasteur. “What stands,” observes Morowitz, “is the whimsical idea that the ultimate confrontation between these two giants of French science revolved around the issue of... how grape juice becomes wine.” Discussing the production of human hair, skin, and nail cells, Morowitz discredits shampoos and hair conditioners purportedly containing “protein.” “What hair preparations contain is not protein but a collection of amino acids. To sell someone amino acids and maintain that it is protein is like selling someone a pile of bricks and [pretending] that you are selling them a house.” Reacting to a popular assertion (found on a greeting card) that the chemicals making up the human body are worth a mere 97¢, Morowitz executes some calculations of his own. If all the body’s ingredients, including hemoglobin, DNA, and crystalline insulin, are counted, everyone of us, he finds, is a six-million-dollar man.
CURRENT BOOKS

PAPERBOUNDS

ORIENTALISM. By Edward W. Said. Vintage reprint, 1979. 368 pp. $4.95

During recent months, many Americans have come to realize that they do not understand the Muslim peoples of the Middle East very well. In this examination of 19th-century British and French "orientalist" writers, Said, a Columbia professor of comparative literature, observes that analysts have long approached the Middle East, or the "Orient," as it was called 150 years ago, with closed eyes. Spurred by Napoleon's 1798 expedition to Egypt, most European author-visitors echoed stereotypes dating back to the first Western contacts—that the Middle East was underdeveloped and therefore inferior to the rational and humane West; that it was "different" and hence to be feared. France's diplomat-historian François René de Chateaubriand and poet Gérard de Nerval and Britain's historians Edward Lane and Alexander Kinglake either sought out the region's exotic aspects or treated its people as objects, never as equals in human terms. Under the influence of Darwinism, they wrote with certainty: The Orient is only a doomed, degraded relic of its former greatness. Seldom challenged, these biases seeped into modern Western (including American) scholarship, influencing Western politicians, who repeatedly underestimated the complexity, strengths, and richness of the area's deep-rooted Islamic culture.

BIRDY. By William Wharton. Avon reprint, 1980. 343 pp. $2.50

"I'm beginning to hear the difference in the things she says," young Birdy reports, referring to his favorite pet canary, Birdy, a daydreamer, and Al, a tough lad, were boyhood friends—growing up together in a small Pennsylvania town before World War II. Birdy raised birds and dreamed of flying, of becoming a bird. (He even tried soaring off a roof, and survived.) Al's struggle with adolescence took a more pragmatic bent—he learned to wrestle so he could pin (defeat) his overbearing father. After the war, Al visits Birdy, diagnosed as shell shocked, in a VA hospital and finds him flopping and squatting. Psychiatrists are stymied. Al alone recognizes the recurrence of his friend's near-psychotic childhood struggle to fly. Wharton is convincing in his depiction of Birdy's fantasy bird-life. He deftly contrasts Birdy's surreal world with harshly realistic scenes of conflict—military and parental. This graceful first novel by an American artist living in Paris unhesitatingly explores the special province of boyhood imagination and camaraderie.

RUSSIAN THINKERS. By Isaiah Berlin. Penguin reprint, 1979. 312 pp. $3.95

"The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing," wrote the poet Archilochus in the 7th-century B.C. Isaiah Berlin's most famous essay, "The Hedgehog and Fox" (1951), begins this collection of the British philosopher's writings. Hedgehogs (Plato, Dante, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche) "relate everything to a single central vision, one system less or more coherent or articulate." Foxes (Aristotle, Shakespeare, Goethe, Joyce) seize upon "the essence of a vast variety of experiences and objects for what they are in themselves." Tolstoy, argues Berlin, "was by nature a fox, but believed in being a hedgehog." In his novels, he conveyed reality in its multiplicity and expressed a fox-like "lethal nihilism," yet he yearned for absolute moral values. The 19th-century Russian intelligentsia—including M. A. Bakunin, Alexander Herzen, and Vissarion Belinsky—forced him to accept
Western moral and political beliefs to search for one monolithic truth, Berlin contends. After the 1917 Revolution, the notion, shared by Marx and Engels, of "a single universal purpose" provided one of the arguments for Soviet totalitarianism.


Until late in the 19th century, American history was written by "well-to-do gentleman-amateurs" seeking to tell a tale that would confirm the nation's pride. They ignored or reconciled the discrepancies between visions of America as a land of innocence and a nation of progress. In this readable combination of historiographical criticism, intellectual history, and biography, Columbia's late historian Richard Hofstadter shows that with the rise of the great Progressive historians—notably, Frederick Jackson Turner (1861-1932), Charles A. Beard (1874-1948), and V. L. Parrington (1871-1929)—history ceased to be romantic and became critical. These academically trained professionals delved into contradictions—the ideals of unity, democracy, equality, tolerance versus the realities of regionalism, racism, and violence. Later historians may be more impartial, Hofstadter concedes, but he reserves high praise for the Progressives, who applied their understanding of the past toward explaining events of the 20th century.


"He was demonic, neurotic, demanding, selfish, noble... sarcastic, unpleasant... irascible, impatient, exuberant... and a genius." As critic Harold Schonberg's description suggests, Viennese composer/conductor Gustav Mahler (1860-1911) cuts a fine figure for biographers. This earnest and reliable biography touches on such diverse topics as fin de siècle Viennese Jewry, the Budapest Opera (where Mahler conducted Die Walküre in Hungarian), and the influential writings of playwrights Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Arthur Schnitzler and poet Stefan Zweig. Gartenberg, a music professor at Penn State, portrays an authoritarian and enigmatic Mahler, a man who bridged two centuries. Mahler feuded with Toscanini, was analyzed by Freud, and wrote romantic music that is more widely loved today than at any time since his death. He drew heavily on the works of Beethoven, Liszt, Tchaikovsky, and Wagner. In turn, his experiments with the dissolution of tonality influenced Arnold Schönberg, Benjamin Britten, and Alban Berg. Gartenberg recounts the fascinating effort, by a band of ardent admirers, to complete Mahler's 10th Symphony after its composer's death. Their devoted labors disintegrated into passionate argument; each thought he knew the master's intentions best.


"The aim in writing," observes Pulitzer Prize-winning poet Louis Simpson, "is to convey a feeling, [to give] the reader the impression that he is passing through an experience." From these four anecdotal studies emerges an aggressive aesthetic. Simpson warns against confessional poetry, as practiced by Sylvia Plath. He draws sharp distinctions between the use of the personal voice to create "a symbolic life... a feeling of community" and its narrow use by writers to relate their own experiences. Good poetry is not "mere feeling" nor "merely stating" what poets see and feel. Thus, in his view,
Robert Lowell, like W. H. Auden in the 1930s and '40s, often lacks passion; some of Lowell's works, to borrow a phrase from Wallace Stevens, are "literary activity," not "vital activity." As for Allen Ginsberg's "syntactical sawdust": "The impression of density in writing is created by penetration into the subject, not by leaving out articles, prepositions and connectives." For all his sometimes harsh appraisals, Simpson accomplishes the task of a good critic—he sends us back to the poetry.

**Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt.** By Barrington Moore, Jr. M. E. Sharpe/Pantheon reprint, 1979. 540 pp. $7.95

Why do people rebel? Why does injustice sometimes lead to revolt and sometimes to passivity? Social historian Moore asks Big Questions. He answers them by closely examining specific cases: India's untouchables, Nazi concentration camps, the French and Russian revolutions. About one-third of his book is devoted to a study of Germany's alienated working class during the period of rapid industrialization between 1848 and 1920. In almost any circumstance, generalizes Moore, "the workers' idea of a good society is the present order with its most disagreeable features softened or eliminated." A handful of minor reforms instigated by trade unions sustained German labor's conservatism, even after World War I had discredited the monarchy, the bureaucracy, and Big Business. Human beings are inclined to grant rulers (good or bad) moral authority, observes Moore; pessimistically, most men view injustice as inevitable. If the events of 1789 in France and 1917 in Russia are any indications, no revolutionary movement succeeds "until decay overtakes the apparatus of repression."


The essayist, according to E. B. White, "can be any sort of person—philosopher, scold, jester, raconteur, confidant, pundit, devil's advocate, enthusiast." During his long career at the *New Yorker*, where 22 of these 31 compositions first appeared, White has tried on all the essayist's hats. Whether he is describing his affection for his Maine farm or explaining his benign fascination with New York City, the combination of wry wit and simple truth is White's specialty. A city dweller, he finds, "is likely to keep on the move, shopping for the perfect arrangement of rooms and vistas." Country folk prefer permanence, and even the death of a pig is "a departure which the community marks solemnly on its calendar." Dying railroads and old Fords, among other subjects, are nicely limned by White. The "man who has written a letter is stuck with it for all time," White once remarked. He need not fear posterity. More than just his good humor holds the reader's attention to his letters, variously addressed to friends, readers, writers, and notables between 1908 and 1976. White has devoted a lifetime to writing ("a blank sheet of paper holds the greatest excitement there is for me"), and the most striking aspect of his correspondence is the substantial portion of it that he devotes to talk about his chosen craft. (Indeed, his letters were nominated for a 1976 National Book Critics Circle Award in the category of criticism.) No writer, he reflects, "begins to get good until he gets shed of tricks, devices, and formulae." Few have done their "shedding" better than White. His letters—to James Thurber, John Updike, Groucho Marx, Felix Frankfurter, and others—are immensely enjoyable mini-essays.
New Books by Fellows, Former Fellows, and Wilson Center Staff


The Election of 1880

The United States is now in the middle of its 49th presidential election campaign. As the 36 primaries, 16 state caucuses, and 2 national party conventions draw to a close, the press will give us the "horse-race" results. The television networks will "project" the winners on Election Night even before all the ballots are counted. In all probability, only about half of us will go to the polls. It was not always like this. Here, historian Allan Peskin reflects on the presidential campaign of 1880, pitting Congressman James Garfield against General Winfield Hancock, when politics was virtually the only game in town, and almost everyone who was eligible showed up to vote.

by Allan Peskin

One hundred years ago, 50 million Americans approached a presidential election with an eager anticipation that our more jaded age can scarcely hope to match:

- In tiny Warren, Ohio (population: 4,428), 40,000 people turned out in late September to hear New York's golden-voiced Senator, Roscoe Conkling, praise the Republican Party.
- In New York City, a Republican-sponsored torchlight parade that began at midnight took four hours to pass the reviewing stand.
- All across the country, Democrats scrawled their cryptic symbol, "329," on barns, sidewalks, and gutters, while Republicans circulated more than 12 million pieces of campaign literature (one for each eligible voter).

The year 1880 was a time for optimism and enthusiasm. Memories of a bitter Civil War were beginning to fade; a deep economic depression, which had begun in 1873 and stirred the nation's first serious labor strife, was starting to lift. Over a thousand European immigrants a day were arriving to man the new factories that were rapidly being built. Steam power now plowed the prairies and linked the oceans. Such new-fangled inventions as typewriters, telephones, and electric lights were beginning to give American big-city life the look of modern times.

Politics, as always, lagged behind technology. Presidents and would-be...
Ten thousand spectators and 756 delegates assembled on June 2, 1880, in Chicago’s Exhibition Building—“one of the most splendid barns that was ever constructed”—for the quadrennial national Republican Party convention. They adjourned six days later with General James A. Garfield, a Civil War hero, as their surprise presidential nominee.
Presidents seemed to devote more attention to refighting the sectional feuds of the past than to discussing problems posed by an industrial present.

To the modern eye, the candidates of a century ago may all seem cut from the same drab cloth—"Their gravely vacant and bewhiskered faces mixed, melted, swam together," recalled 20th-century novelist Thomas Wolfe. Yet, the politics of 1880 worked. It was a supremely logical response to a set of conditions very different from those of today.

The major difference was that in 1880 American politics was conducted within the framework of a functioning, evenly balanced two-party system. Unlike the electorate today, when nearly 40 percent of voters call themselves "Independents," Americans of the 19th century firmly believed in party loyalty. "Dilletanti" who flitted from party to party were held in contempt. Real men, it was widely felt, stood up for their beliefs and came to the aid of their party.

Such loyalty often puzzled foreign observers. To Great Britain's scholar-diplomat Lord James Bryce, the two parties were as alike as two bottles. "Each," he said, "bore a label denoting the kind of liquor it contained, but each was empty."

Bryce missed the point. There were genuine differences between Republicans and Democrats. The stirring events of the recent past had shaped both parties in important ways.

Republicans, as they were continually reminded by party orators, belonged to the Party of Lincoln, the party that had saved the Union and struck the shackles from 4 million

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slaves. Their shared experiences of the Civil War gave them a common determination to safeguard their victory from Southerners and Democrats, who together threatened to disenfranchise the Negro and diminish the national government’s power.

Party of the Future

To Republicans, the Northern Democrats (even those who had supported the Union) were tainted by their alliance with the South—an unfair but not totally unfounded perception. The South, along with the largely Irish Catholic immigrant populations of Boston, Philadelphia, and New York, had been a traditional bastion of the Democratic coalition ever since Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr first forged it in the 1790s. Southern interests often dictated the party platform. The Democrats’ support of States’ rights and limited central authority ("The world is governed too much," they insisted) was based on an awareness that a nation strong enough to govern effectively might also be strong enough to protect the rights of former slaves.

It was no coincidence that college-trained men (at least in the North) generally gravitated to the Republican Party and that the reform-minded Progressive movement later drew its chief strength from their ranks. The Democrats often seemed to be a party of negations, animated by nostalgia for an imagined agrarian golden age. Their opponents appeared to be the party of the future, more in tune with the most advanced movements of the 19th century—nationalism, egalitarianism, and industrial power.

Perhaps no issue better illustrated the differences between the two parties than the perennial (and rather colorless) tariff dispute. Republicans tended to support a high tariff on manufactured imports to protect American industry from foreign competition. The Democrats’ general support of low tariffs was dictated by the economic interests of the cotton-producing South, where
farmers had to sell their goods on an open world market but buy higher-priced tariff-protected domestic products. These differences captured Americans' attention in a way that may seem hard to understand today. Never before or since has voting been so widespread as it was during this Gilded Age, the years between Reconstruction and the Spanish-American War. Only 54.3 percent of the electorate bothered to show up at the polls for the 1976 presidential election. In 1880, 78 percent of eligible voters proudly cast their ballots.*

A Sporting Element
Yet politics in the late 19th century, as today, was more than platforms and programs; there was also a certain sporting element about it. Politics was not only a game; it was virtually the only game in town. With organized religion in decline and organized sports not yet ascendant, politics filled an entertainment gap. Rallies and parades provided spectacles; Southern barbeques and Northern clambakes provided mass get-togethers; stump-speaking local politicians helped satisfy the almost insatiable appetite of 19th-century Americans for public oratory.

The political game was made even more exciting because the contestants were so evenly matched. Although the preponderance of Republican Presidents gives the impression that these were years of Republican dominance (from 1873 to 1897, Democrats occupied the White House for only eight years), the major parties were actually in a state of near equilibrium. No President

*Excluded, for the most part, were Southern blacks, who were being systematically stripped of their voting rights.

after 1872 was elected by a majority of the voters until Republican William McKinley received 51 percent in 1896, and no more than a few percentage points ever separated the winner from the loser.*

There were 10 Congresses from 1875 to 1895: Democrats controlled the House of Representatives eight times and Republicans only twice; in the Senate, this was neatly reversed. Seldom did any party enjoy a comfortable majority in either House, and in only 4 of those 20 years (1889-91 and 1893-95) did the Presidency, the House, and the Senate all belong to the same party.

With the parties so evenly balanced, with straight-ticket voting the rule, and with no sizeable reservoir of independent votes to draw upon, a presidential candidate could do no more than rally the faithful of his own party and hope that their unity and enthusiasm would be stronger than the opposition's. The "safe candidate" was not necessarily a man of eminence but a man without enemies, as Lord Bryce observed in The American Commonwealth (1893). "Besides," he added, "the ordinary American voter does not object to mediocrity."

Logic, not whim or passion, dictated each party's choices of standard bearers. Out of this logic, a pattern emerged. In 1880, victory required at least 185 of the 369 electoral votes. The Democrats could count on the 107 votes of the 11 former Confederate states and on those of most of the border states as

*In 1876, Rutherford B. Hayes won election with 47.9 percent of the popular votes. In 1880, James Garfield won with 48.3 percent. Benjamin Harrison's winning percentage in 1888 was 47.8, and Democrat Grover Cleveland's victories in 1884 and 1892 were achieved with 49.1 and 46.2 percent, respectively.
PERSPECTIVES: ELECTION OF 1880

CAMPAIGN COVERAGE

The 1880 election capped a decade of remarkable newspaper growth in the United States. While the U.S. population expanded by 30 percent during the 1870s (due largely to immigration), the number of newspapers nearly doubled—to almost 7,000. Meanwhile, newspapermen's interests broadened; to their editorial comment and reports on politics and government were added more and more columns of business, science, and human interest stories.

Increasingly, editors chose to remain outside the political fray. The partisan newspaper had been a major means of firing up party members during the '70s, but by 1880, trade directories listed one-fourth of the nation's papers as "independent," "neutral," or "local." New York Tribune editor Whitelaw Reid described his hopes for "independent journalism": "An end of concealments because it would hurt the party; an end of one-sided expositions... an end of slanders that are known to be slanders."

A predecessor of today's Associated Press covered the campaign for its 7 member papers and 348 clients. Called the New York Associated Press, it was founded in 1848 by a consortium of six New York City papers. In 1880, it spent nearly $400,000 on domestic telegraph tolls and was expanding its foreign service to include "every part of civilized Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America."

During the summer of 1880, the AP provided ballot-by-ballot bulletins from the lengthy national party conventions in Chicago and Cincinnati. Major newspapers, including the New York Times and the Washington Evening Star, also printed stories telegraphed by their own convention correspondents. Throughout the year, journalists dutifully reported the infrequent speeches of the presidential candidates' chief local allies, political events from around the country, and the comments of other newspapers on the campaign.

well. To this total of perhaps 137, they needed only to add a few large Northern states, such as New York (35 votes) and Indiana (15), and victory was theirs. Almost invariably, they nominated a New York governor and chose a Midwesterner as his running mate. (Southerners were repaid for their loyalty by being ignored.)

Among Republicans, an equally logical pattern emerged. They had to hold almost every state north of the Mason-Dixon line, which meant that the high-electoral-vote states of the Middle West—Ohio (22), Illinois (21), Indiana—became decisive battlegrounds. They usually selected as their leader a Midwesterner with Civil War credentials to remind Americans of their party's finest hour. And since New York had the most electoral votes, the Republicans, like their foes, balanced their tickets with the Empire State in mind. Four of the five Republican vice-presidential candidates from 1876 to 1892 were from New York.
Another pattern emerged also. Republican candidates were invariably bearded, while Democratic nominees tended to be clean-shaven, except for a moustache or two.

Only once from 1868 to 1904 did Republicans break with their traditional strategy. In 1884, they nominated an outstanding party leader, Senator James G. Blaine, for President. He was from Maine, not the Midwest, and was not a Civil War veteran. He lost.

**Discrediting “Rutherfraud”**

For Democrats, the campaign of 1880 began after the 1876 presidential election. A special commission of eight Republicans and seven Democrats had awarded 19 disputed electoral votes to the Republicans, giving Rutherford Hayes the Presidency (over Samuel J. Tilden) by a count of 185 to 184. Convinced that they had been robbed, the Democrats long devoted their energies to discrediting “Rutherfraud” Hayes and vindicating Tilden.

But the Democrats did not waste time on recriminations when they gathered in Cincinnati on June 22, 1880, to pick a presidential candidate. In a surprise move, the delegates turned to New York’s portly, mustachioed General Winfield Scott Hancock. “Hancock the Superb” was a political innocent, valued more for his military credentials than for his executive abilities. The Democrats had adopted the Republican “military” strategy—a bold gamble and shrewd move. “For the first time in 20 years, [they] did not blunder,” declared a Republican in reluctant admiration.

As Hancock’s running mate, the Democrats selected an Indiana banker and former Congressman, William H. English, who had been out of politics since 1861.

Republicans actually had more to fear from one another. At their convention in Chicago three weeks earlier, their party had been bitterly divided. The self-styled Republican “Stalwarts,” headed by the elegant and arrogant Senator Conkling, pinned their hopes on a comeback attempt by Ulysses S. Grant, the hero of the Civil War, who had left the White House in 1877 amid charges of corruption in his Cabinet.

Grant entered the convention as a...
clear favorite, with almost half of the delegates committed to him in advance. Most of his support came from the large boss-controlled states of New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois, where the local party conventions had been rigged in his favor. He embodied the hopes of the party's somewhat unsavory machine element.

Grant's major rivals—Senator Blaine and the icy Treasury Secretary John Sherman—could not muster comparable strength. The convention remained deadlocked for more than 30 ballots, with Grant stymied just short of a majority. Then, in perhaps the most dramatic scene ever witnessed in a national political convention, the delegates turned to Sherman's floor manager and fellow Ohioan, Representative James Abram Garfield, who was not even an announced candidate. At the conclusion of the 34th ballot, the Wisconsin delegation suddenly cast 16 of its 20 votes for Garfield. First, the convention chamber reacted with astonished silence; next, it erupted with tumultuous cheering. "The popular chord had been touched as if by the wave of a magician," one proud Wisconsin man recalled.

A Fit of Reform

On the next go-around, Indiana added 27 of its 30 votes to Garfield's total, which reached 50. The 36th ballot brought a stampede of crossovers, as Garfield went over the top with the necessary 378 votes. While 10,000 delegates and spectators chanted his name, and the thunder from six cannons posted outside punctuated the crowd's singing of "Rally 'Round the Flag" within, the surprise nominee sat impassive, perhaps the only calm man in the crowd.

The Republicans selected Chester Alan Arthur as their vice-presidential nominee. Arthur, one of Conkling's cronies, had prospered mightily as collector of customs for the Port of New York until President Hayes removed him in 1879 in a fit of reform.

On the Porch

In retrospect, the choice of Garfield was supremely logical. He embodied all the obligatory characteristics of the typical Republican candidate: Born in a log cabin, later a respected Union general, he had served usefully in Congress for 17 years without offending any important segment of the party. He had taken middle-of-the-road positions on the issues that most divided Republicans (e.g., Civil Service reform).

Hard-working and reasonably honest by the standards of his day, Garfield had, nonetheless, been touched by scandal—most notably in the Crédit Mobilier affair in which, it was charged, he had accepted a $329 bribe from Massachusetts Congressman Oakes Ames. (It was to remind the voters of this lapse that the Democrats chalked that number on sidewalks everywhere.) Garfield was both an intellectual, whose idea of relaxation was to translate Goethe or Horace, and an affable politico, whose fairmindedness could be mistaken for indecision. Not yet 50, he had crowded into his life enough careers to satisfy the American ideal of the self-made man: canal boy, minister of the gospel, president of Western Reserve Eclectic Institute (now Hiram College), soldier, constitutional lawyer, legislator, stump speaker.
Speaking ability, however, would not be required in the coming contest. The idea of debates between presidential candidates did not appeal to election strategists. Moreover, local politicians were expected to go out on the hustings; presidential candidates were expected to be more dignified. Hayes advised Garfield merely "to sit cross-legged and look wise until after the election."

Impatient in such a passive role, Garfield invented a new technique—the "front-porch campaign." By staying close to his Mentor, Ohio, farm and daily receiving delegations of reporters and distinguished guests, he could maintain the appearance of difference even while exhorting the faithful. "Lawnfield" (as reporters dubbed the farm) became the center of national press attention, as Garfield enjoyed a "busy though pleasant summer."

Garfield forsook the comforts of home for only one extended foray, and that effort was not directed at the opposition. It was designed to conciliate disaffected fellow Republicans. Conkling was still sulking over Grant's defeat at Chicago. To jolly him back into line, a conference of Republican leaders, including Garfield, met August 5 at New York City's Fifth Avenue Hotel. Conkling did not deign to attend, but his cronies were assuaged. Party unity was secured, at least until Election Day.

The Democrats, too, devoted most of their efforts to rallying their own followers. They also hoped that by stressing General Hancock's heroic deeds at Gettysburg 17 years earlier, they could steal some of the Republicans' patriotic thunder. The general had "saved the army from disaster, and the country from dismemberment," claimed the Democrats' Campaign Text Book.

A Last-Minute Hoax

However, some Republican strategists, notably Blaine, had already concluded that the time had come to lay the Civil War aside and concentrate on the new problems of the industrial age. Blaine urged that the tariff be the chief party campaign issue. Hancock naively played into his hands. In an interview, he dismissed the tariff as "a local question," an observation that Republicans gleefully seized upon as fresh proof of his ignorance.

With party unity secured and a winning issue handed them, Republican prospects seemed bright. But
the opposition still had a last-minute trick to play.

In late October, Garfield found himself the target of a classic election-eve hoax. A New York newspaper, misleadingly named Truth, printed a letter purportedly from Garfield advocating the importation of cheap Chinese labor. Garfield in fact had come out in favor of restricting Chinese immigration to protect "American" workingmen (most of whom were Irish-born). But Democrats happily circulated hundreds of thousands of copies of the letter on the Sinophobic West Coast.

The hoax probably cost the Republicans California (which they lost by only 22 votes), but it was not quite enough to save Hancock's candidacy. Garfield carried every Northern state except New Jersey and Nevada. The Democrats, for their part, captured every old slave-holding state. The popular vote was the closest ever: Garfield's plurality over Hancock was only 7,368 votes (less than 0.1 percent of the total). The Republicans gained a majority in the newly elected House of Representatives (their first in six years), but by only a dozen seats; the Senate, reflecting the national mood, was evenly divided, 37 to 37 to 2,* giving Vice President Arthur a crucial deciding vote.

The election of 1880 settled little. In those days, politics was not expected to settle things, only to keep them running at a time when there was still uncertainty over where the country should be going.

Much has happened in the last century to change American politics. The electorate has grown—to include women (since 1920), Southern blacks (effectively since the Voting Rights Act of 1957), and 18- to 20-year-olds (since 1971)—but the result has been a net decrease in the percentage of eligible voters taking part in national elections.

In 1880, it was the political parties that mobilized voters, gave them a sense of identification with the political process, and maintained a sense of continuity from one election to the next. Today, however, the President and the candidates for President tower over party organization. The parties themselves have been gravely weakened by well-meant reforms designed to encourage "participatory democracy." As a consequence, something valuable has been lost from American politics: the vitality and enthusiasm that the voters clearly demonstrated as they cheered their candidates and went to the polls a century ago.

*Two Senators were Independents. One usually voted Republican, the other Democratic.

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J. D. Salinger: Writing As Religion

J. D. Salinger’s last book, Raise High the Roof Beam, Carpenters and Seymour: An Introduction, was published in 1963. His last New Yorker short story appeared in 1965. Since then, he has published nothing, even as his most famous book, The Catcher in the Rye (1951), continues to sell some 400,000 copies a year. The author of a recent article in the New York Times Magazine asserted that Salinger “retreated to a New England fortress when he could no longer write.” Indeed, many literary critics have interpreted Salinger’s self-imposed exile in rural Cornish, New Hampshire, as a sure sign of artistic exhaustion. Here, critic Dennis O’Connor takes a fresh look at Salinger’s published works and goes on to suggest that the critics have been wrong to assume Salinger’s “exhaustion,” and wrong, too, to neglect his diverse religious interests. These religious concerns are, in fact, the key to Salinger’s fiction.

by Dennis L. O’Connor

J. D. Salinger is not a typical literary star. He does not appear in People magazine, plug himself into the vacant chatter of TV talk shows, write book reviews, ride the lecture circuit, or allow himself to be photographed.

The last time he went public was in a 1974 front-page New York Times interview, the first he had granted since 1953. Noting a recent unauthorized attempt to publish some of his early uncollected stories, Salinger said then:

There is a marvelous peace in not publishing. It’s peaceful. Still, publishing is a terrible invasion of my privacy. I like to write. I love to write. But I write for myself and my own pleasure. . . . I pay for this kind of attitude. I’m known as a strange, aloof kind of man. But all I’m doing is trying to protect myself and my work.

Variously ridiculed as a “recluse,” a self-indulgent narcissist resorting to Greta Garbo-ish ploys to gain attention, Salinger, in fact, approaches writing more as a religion than as a profession.

His professional life quietly challenges the current penchant for conspicuous achievement; his ideas are no less singular. Holden Caulfield,
Despite his self-seclusion, Salinger has a close circle of friends and relatives. In 1955, he married Claire Douglas, a former Radcliffe student. They have two children—Margaret Ann, now 24, and Matthew, 20.

the hero of The Catcher in the Rye, sought simple, genuine communication between people, roundly condemning snobbery, pretense, and intimidation. His championing of spontaneity and openness, especially as found in children, has touched millions of young people during the past three decades.

Whether exploring anti-Semitism in "Down at the Dinghy," sexual exploitation in "Pretty Mouth and Green My Eyes," or the evil of total war in "For Esme—With Love and Squalor," Salinger always directs the reader to consider the sacred dignity of human beings. He subtly points us toward spirituality through a wealth of references to Hindu, Buddhist, Taoist, Christian, and Jewish traditions. It is not a fashionable vision.

Born on New Year's Day, 1919, in New York City of an Irish mother and Jewish father, Jerome David Salinger grew up in Manhattan with his sister Doris, who was eight years older. After flunking out of prep school, he attended Pennsylvania's Valley Forge Military Academy (where he was literary editor of the yearbook before graduating in 1936). Salinger took a course at New York University in 1937, then went to Europe with his father, a prosperous meat importer. Young Salinger
failed to develop a yen for the meat business, but he learned French and German.

Starting Out

He returned to America in 1938. The following year he enrolled in Whit Burnett's short-story course at Columbia; and within two years, he had stories published in Collier's, Esquire, and the Saturday Evening Post. The New Yorker bought one of his Holden Caulfield stories in December 1941 but did not print it until five years later.

Drafted into the Army in 1942, Salinger went overseas in the Counter Intelligence Corps; his proficiency in foreign languages proved useful in ferreting out enemy agents. In 1944, after training at Tiverton in Devonshire (the probable setting of "For Esmé—With Love and Squalor"), he took part in the invasion of Normandy. Despite the war around him, he continued to write, and publish, at an impressive rate.

By January 1948, the New Yorker had awarded him a contract and published "A Perfect Day for Bananafish." Now back in New York, he published from 1948 to 1953 a steady stream of distinguished stories that established his reputation as a young writer of extraordinary ability.

In July 1951 came The Catcher in the Rye. The immediate reaction to the novel, a Book-of-the-Month-Club selection, was mixed. "Brilliant," proclaimed one critic; "monotonous and phony," countered another.

After traveling abroad to escape the publicity surrounding the publication of Catcher, Salinger returned to New York to continue work on what became his Nine Stories (1953).

The first story, "A Perfect Day for Bananafish," leads us—or rather displaces us—into the world of Seymour Glass. Seymour and his wife are vacationing in Florida. When Seymour teases a young girl about bananafish—a mythical fish that swims "into a hole where there's a lot of bananas" and subsequently dies because it can't fit through the door—he is obliquely describing his marriage. Seymour returns to his hotel, glances at his wife sleeping on the bed, takes out a gun, and blows his brains out.

Salinger's allusions in the story to Rainer Maria Rilke's poetry and T. S. Eliot's The Waste Land suggest that Seymour, too, is a poet. They alert the reader to the need to go beneath the surface of the text. The chaos within Seymour, Salinger seems to be saying, only bespeaks the madness surrounding him. By killing himself, Seymour reveals the high price of "seeing more" in our society.

Salinger (at about the same age as Eliot was when he composed The Waste Land) is also writing about the desolation of a world war. Eliot's poem and Salinger's story—so polished and assured, so richly allusive, so difficult because of their intentional lack of transitions—seem anything but autobiographical. Yet, paradoxically, their restraint suggests a burden of intense personal

Dennis L. O'Connor, 36, is assistant professor of literature at Georgetown University. Born in New York City, he received a B.A. from Fordham University (1966) and an M.A. (1968) and Ph.D. (1975) from Cornell University. He has taught at SUNY (Onewta), Hobart-William Smith Colleges, Stiana, and Cornell. His essay here is drawn from a longer article.
THE CATCHER IN THE RYE

In a conversation with his little sister, Phoebe, Holden Caulfield describes a fantasy—the novel's central metaphor—and thus his abiding concern with the world's lack of feeling. In retreating to nature and in protecting the innocent children, Holden rejects the "phony" values he sees in adult life:

"You know that song 'If a body catch a body comin' through the rye'? I'd like—"

"It's 'If a body meet a body coming through the rye'!" old Phoebe said. "It's a poem. By Robert Burns."

"I know it's a poem by Robert Burns."

She was right, though. It is "If a body meet a body coming through the rye." I didn't know it then, though.

"I thought it was 'If a body catch a body,'" I said. "Anyway, I keep picturing all these little kids playing some game in this big field of rye and all. Thousands of little kids, and nobody's around—nobody big, I mean—except me. And I'm standing on the edge of some crazy cliff. What I have to do, I have to catch everybody if they start to go over the cliff—I mean if they're running and they don't look where they're going I have to come out from somewhere and catch them. That's all I'd do all day. I'd just be the catcher in the rye and all. I know it's crazy, but that's the only thing I'd really like to be. I know it's crazy."

In what is probably Salinger's most famous story, "For Esme—With Love and Squalor," a lovely, intelligent 13-year-old English girl named Esme approaches the narrator, an untested American soldier stationed in Devonshire, and joins him for tea. Eager to give and receive affection, Esme unwittingly reveals the depth of her loneliness and sorrow. The story ends with the narrator reading a touching love letter from Esme. In it, Esme's little brother Charles has added "HELLO" ten times and then misspelled his name, "Chales." Charles's "mistake" furthers Salinger's purpose.

"Chales", in fact, is a Middle English form of the modern word chalice. Esme's gift—her splendidly stilted letter, Charles's string of hellos and his revelatory signature, and their father's watch, which she has enclosed—is a many-layered eucharist. It restores the American after war has stripped his nerves.

The original stimulus for Salinger's interest in religion remains obscure. Scholars have failed to uncover any evidence of his involvement with religion during childhood and adolescence. Later, he was to shroud his personal life in secrecy. Yet, the sketchy facts do speak.

In 1938, he attended Ursinus College, then affiliated with the Protestant Evangelical and Reformed Church, for a semester. During the 1940s, he became interested in Buddhism, attending a series of lectures on Zen delivered by D. T.
Suzuki at Columbia. It has also been reported that he studied Advaita Vedantic Hinduism at the Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center in New York under Swami Nikhilananda before moving to New England in 1953.

In 1961, 10 years after *Catcher* and 8 years after *Nine Stories*, Salinger published *Franny and Zooey*, two Glass family stories that originally appeared in the *New Yorker* in 1955 and 1957. These related tales recount young Franny Glass’s unsuccessful effort to avoid her vocation to be an actress by frantically (Salinger plays on both the hint of frenzy and St. Francis of Assisi in her name) taking refuge in the Jesus Prayer.*

**Into Dreamless Sleep**

Franny finds herself in an impossible contradiction: An actress who dares not act, a highly sophisticated college woman who wishes to follow the path of renunciation and simplicity but can only manage to have a “tenth-rate nervous breakdown.” This convoluted tale ends when Franny’s brother Zooey helps her to understand her situation by recalling their brother Seymour’s advice to them as children: Act so that everything you do is for Christ. Zooey tells Franny that “the only religious thing you can do, is act. Act for God, if you want to—be God’s actress, if you want to. What could be prettier?”

This joining of Eastern and Western wisdom* in “Zooey” lifts Franny out of her hysteria and despair and into a higher state of consciousness—dreamless sleep.

**A Prose Home Movie**

With the publication of “Zooey,” Salinger’s work became unmistakably experimental. Instead of a tightly constructed short story, “Zooey” is a “prose home movie.” The Glasses are vaudevillians and prodigies. Larger than life, they do not fit the norms of realism or naturalism. Salinger steps away from conventional plot toward a self-reflexive spiral more suitable to the portrayal of a spiritual quest.

In 1963, Salinger collected two more Glass stories in *Raise High the Roof Beam, Carpenters and Seymour: An Introduction*. The book introduces Buddy Glass’s complex relationship with his older brother, Seymour, who, we learn, was a poet, a seer, and a mukta (one who, in Advaita Vedantic Hinduism, has achieved spiritual liberation).

Narrated by Buddy and supposedly written by him to reveal Seymour’s character, “Seymour” emphasizes Buddy’s journey into his own heart. Salinger is concerned here with an author’s relation to his reader. As Buddy examines himself in order to understand Seymour, so must a reader examine his inner self to “participate” in (i.e., to gain insight from) the story.

Having abandoned tightly constructed narrative elegance in

*This prayer—“Lord Jesus Christ, have mercy on me”—aims at drawing the petitioner into the depths of his own heart in order to find God. Part of the hesychast tradition (from the Greek hesychia, the quality of stillness or silence), the Jesus Prayer, or the Prayer of the Heart, has its roots in the spiritual practices of the Desert Fathers, a group of 4th-century Middle Eastern and European Christians who sought isolation from secular society and organized religion.*

*Throughout the book, Salinger alludes to Rilke, Sappho, the *Mundaka Upanishad* and *Bhagavad Gita* (two crucial Vedantic Hindu texts), Zen Buddhist sages and poets, *The Way of the Pilgrim*, and the *Philokalia* (the great compendium of teachings concerning the Prayer of the Heart), as well as to various works by Stoic philosophers, Christian theologians, and European and American novelists.*

*The Wilson Quarterly/Spring 1980*
In The Catcher in the Rye, 16-year-old Holden Caulfield, having fled boarding school, confides to a Manhattan taxi driver his concern over where the ducks on Central Park's lake go in winter. Salinger, taking his cue from Hindu and Buddhist beliefs, equates the image of the bird with that of the human soul.

"Zooey," Salinger goes even further stylistically in "Hapworth 16, 1924," his last published story (1965). Cast in the form of a letter written from summer camp in Maine, this tale reveals Seymour at age seven, mindful of previous incarnations, present proclivities, and future problems.

Seymour's counselors are concerned, he writes,

that my consuming admiration for God, straight-forward and shapeless, will upset the delightful applecart of my poetry; this is not stupid; there is always a slight, magnificent, utterly worthy risk that I will be a crashing failure from the word go, disappointing all my friends and loved ones, a very sober, rotten possibility that brings the usual fluid to my eyes as I bring the matter into the open. It would be quite a moving, humorous boon, to be sure, if one knew quite well, every single day of one's splendid current appearance, exactly where one's everlasting duty lies, obvious and concrete.

This extraordinarily frank child, whose precocity would be intolerable if it were not so generously funny, terrible, and self-accepting, sheds some light on the poet and mukta who later kills himself. The child Seymour confesses to "personal instability," "excess motion," and a "heritage of sensuality." But Seymour's last gesture, his suicide in "A Perfect Day for Bananafish," ul-
Despite his deep religious and philosophical themes, Salinger is a master of the evocative detail. In "Zooey," Mrs. Bessie Glass, worried about her children, steals a moment for reflection as she examines the contents of the bathroom's medicine cabinet. What she finds introduces us to the Glass family in 1950s America:

“She surveyed the congested shelves with the eye—or, rather, the masterly squint—of a dedicated medicine-cabinet gardener. The shelves bore iodine, Mercurochrome, vitamin capsules, dental floss, aspirin, Anacin, Bufferin, Argylol, Musterole, Ex-Lax, Milk of Magnesia, Sal Hepatica, Aspergum, two Gillette razors, one Schick Injector razor, two tubes of shaving cream, a bent and somewhat torn snapshot of a fat black-and-white cat asleep on a porch railing, three combs, two hairbrushes, a bottle of Wildroot hair ointment, a bottle of Fitch Dandruff Remover, a small, unlabelled box of glycerine suppositories, Vicks Nose Drops, Vicks VapoRub, six bars of castile soap, the stubs of three tickets to a 1946 musical comedy, a tube of depilatory cream, a box of Kleenex, two seashells, an assortment of used-looking emery boards, two jars of cleansing cream, three pairs of scissors, a nail file, an unclouded blue marble, a cream for contracting enlarged pores, a pair of tweezers, the strapless chassis of a girl’s or woman’s gold wristwatch, a box of bicarbonate of soda, a girl’s boarding-school class ring with a chipped onyx stone, a bottle of Stopette—and, inconceivably or no, quite a good deal more.

Ultimately remains impenetrable.*

While people continue to buy and read Salinger’s books, critical response has been mixed.* Commentators could react to Catcher without having to address its underlying religious dimension, but the later Glass family stories unavoidably raise religious issues. Salinger’s critics—notably England’s George Steiner and the New Yorker’s own John Updike—were hostile or unresponsive to his interest in Eastern and Western religions. And the noted New York critic Alfred Kazin contended that Salinger lost “the deepest possibilities of literary art” by his excessive attachment to, and

*Seymour's other clues to Seymour's personality in "Hapworth." He alludes, for instance, to Irish mathematician Sir William Rowan Hamilton (1805-65), a fastidious writer who published little of his extensive research. Significantly, Hamilton, like Seymour, was a child prodigy of astonishing linguistic ability. Also like Seymour, he was the equivalent of a full professor at 21, had an extraordinary memory, and a passion for exactitude. Described by contemporaries as delighting "in music, playing with children and reading their fairy tales," Hamilton distinguished himself in mathematical optics. Salinger calls Seymour "our double-lensed burning glass . . . and one full poet." Seymour also resembles Shankara (A.D. 788-820), the Hindu philosopher and mystic who, like Seymour, died at age 31.

*Seymour's four published volumes are still in print—in hardcover, from Little, Brown, and in paperback, from Bantam Books.
obsession with, the “cute, narcissistic” Glass family.

The critics’ failure to explore the complex aesthetic and spiritual traditions from which Salinger’s stories draw their strength is crucial because his religious concerns structure his approach to language, characterization, and humor. As writer Buddy Glass says to his readers, “It’s the truth. Please don’t simply see it; feel it.”

**Straight to the Heart**

From the time of Emerson, Thoreau, and the transcendentalists, through Whitman, T. S. Eliot, Allen Ginsberg, and Thomas Merton, a strong religious tradition has flourished among American writers. These authors were captivated by Eastern religions and their notions of the nature of man’s spirituality. They integrated these ideas in their criticism of American acquisitiveness and competitiveness.

The dazzling verbal surfaces of Salinger’s stories are deceptively colloquial and American. Yet, they lead us to an understanding of an alternative perception of the universe that welcomes all experience as divine gift. This perception is Buddy Glass’s revelation that “all we do is move from one little piece of Holy Ground to the next.”

Salinger tries to communicate not information but the ability to see; he seeks to change the reader’s heart by moving him to see himself in the text. Thus, through “indirect communication,” the text gradually changes from an amusement, to a mirror, to a crucible in which the reader literally takes the story to heart so that it consumes and irradiates his everyday interaction with the world at large.

Like Kierkegaard, who insisted on the reader’s inescapable duty to “undo the knot” of life for himself, Salinger adamantly refuses to comment on his writing: “The stuff’s all in the stories; there’s no use talking about it.” His fictions, like the koans and paradoxical observations in Zen and Taoist literature, try to lead the reader to reflect on his own spirituality, not only to feel but also to think from the heart, or the core of being where one is in touch with all life.

Salinger, again echoing Kierkegaard, describes—with playful seriousness—who his reader is.

Kierkegaard imagined his “edifying discourses” finally meeting “that individual whom with joy and gratitude I call my reader, that individual whom it seeks . . . who is benevolent enough to let himself be found.” likening his book to “an insignificant blossom,” Kierkegaard imagined “how the bird whom I call my reader, suddenly . . . flew down to it, plucked it off, and took it to himself.”

**A Gift to the Reader**

Salinger consciously builds on this account when he has Buddy Glass describe his reader in “Seymour”:

I found out a good many years back practically all I need to know about my general reader; that is to say, you, I fear, but I’m really in no position to take your word for it. You’re a great bird lover . . . you’re someone who took up birds in the first place because they fired your imagination; they fascinated you because ‘they seemed of all created beings the nearest to pure spirit’. . . . I privately say to you, old friend (unto you, really, I’m afraid), please accept from me this unpretentious bouquet of very early-blooming parentheses: ((( )))

The bird, of course, symbolizes the human soul, the immortal human heart. And those parentheses, which
have blossomed for 20 years, present the key to this story.

As gestures or signals, they resemble prayerful hands holding pure mystery. They resemble stillness, the bull’s eye of perfection, the openness of a cave, a womb, a plenitude of referential meaning. Whatever one’s personal reactions to this strange bouquet, the parentheses, which expand or contract depending on one’s point of view, are meant to penetrate the human heart, to strengthen its relationship with the Divine.

Salinger has spent his entire career since *Catcher* trying to integrate a vision of Eastern and Western holiness with artistic achievement. It is in the Glass family saga that his unique contribution to American letters is most evident.

He has not stopped writing. At age 61, he continues to work daily on the Glass family history—in a concrete-block studio, so it is said, near his secluded house in New Hampshire.

Perhaps some day we will learn more about the relationship between the elder Glasses. Or maybe we will understand Seymour better because we will know more about his twin brothers, Walt and Waker. Perhaps they, like Seymour, kept diaries, and Buddy will share some future Glass chronicles.

In his own way, Salinger is as much a visionary as Emerson or Whitman and as consummate a craftsman as Eliot or Faulkner. No less a judge of American letters than Edmund Wilson said in 1967 that “Salinger really is our greatest living American writer.” Thirteen years later, Wilson is still right.
We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer’s telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editor’s requests for comment.

Candidates and the Hypothetical Question

I was cruising along smoothly with Captain Hess ("Does Foreign Policy Really Matter," by Stephen Hess, WQ, Winter 1980) until his ultimate assertion, at which point I fell off.

Surely he is right that foreign policy matters (even really matters) with some definable wide slice of the electorate wedged between the alienated and the obsessed. How much it matters surely varies; the evidence on the question is as shaky as a human rights treaty with the Argentines. And surely he is right that the great middling body of Americans, however helpful they may try to be to George Gallup’s agent on the doorstep, have only very vague ideas as to what in the world is going on.

To find out, we the people turn to journalism, which tells us. The press and its picturing offshoot [TV] clearly play a heavy role and bear a heavy responsibility for the mental images that shape policy, foreign and domestic. My next tome will show how that happens in elections.

But to say, as Hess says right here, that "contenders for the Presidency do not answer hypothetical questions," is, well, wrong. That’s almost all they do. And he wants them to do more of it. We get these candidates running around pontificating from a plane of meaningless abstraction about what they will do, want to do, hope for, yearn to see achieved, etc. John Connally claims that, put into power, he will turn the government around within 48 hours; one wonders why it would take him so long.

In any case, every presidential year sees the victory of the subjunctive hypothetical. What we need instead is a war about the facts. Journalists ought to jettison the dull old what-would-you-do-if ma-larkey—that brought us Happy Dick Nixon on the heels of Lyndon Johnson, the Dove of Peace—and get the candidates talking about the facts of life in the contemporary world. What does he (or, eventually, she) know? The danger of contemporary Presidents is self-hypnosis issuing in illusion and tragedy; the hope is for a curious, informed, open, and aware First Citizen in the White House, one who cares enough to find out how the real world works.

The article thus seems to me 99 percent pure but that last little bit won’t wash.

James David Barber
James B. Duke Professor of Political Science
Duke University

A Vote of Confidence

With 10,000 strategic nuclear weapons plus other awesome forces of destruction under his command and control, a modern U.S. President has almost godlike powers. The voters are placing someone’s finger on the button of physical survival, and they know it.

An incumbent is at an advantage, because he already has his finger on the button. Moreover, he is in position to benefit from the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon in time of crisis and is capable of international initiative as the election nears.

In President Carter’s case, there is a danger, however, that accumulation of crises could bring a voter judgment that he is inadequate to the foreign policy task, despite years in office. Prior to the
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Camp David agreements of late 1978, there was a widespread lack of confidence in Carter. This could return if things go poorly overseas over an extended period.

In the turbulent international setting of the present, and especially in a time of instantaneous international mass communications, foreign policy is more vivid and important to the electorate than before. More than on the details of foreign policy issues, which as Hess points out may be meaningless, elections can turn on voter confidence in the international performance of those seeking the job of playing God.

Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post

Recruiting in Public Schools

Re "The Public Schools" [WQ, Autumn 1979]:

In recent months, many column inches of space in a wide assortment of publications have been devoted to reporting the failure of the armed forces to achieve their goals in the 1979 recruiting year.

The reasons cited are many and varied—poor perception of military service as a career, inadequate entry-level pay, a shrinking population of service eligibles, and failures by the Congress and various administrations to adequately support the volunteer concept.

Another reason is less well known—the failure of a significant segment of the country's educational establishment to support the notion of volunteerism.

Nationwide, 25 percent of our secondary schools deny armed service recruiters on-campus access to the students at any time. Another 25 percent of the schools let recruiters make on-campus contacts only during yearly "job fairs." All this effectively bars recruiters from half our high schools and denies full access to the prime source of quality volunteers.

Speculation on the reasons for this resistance on the part of educators wanders in several directions but always comes back to antimilitary sentiments imbued during the Vietnam War and entrenched in the minds of teachers and administrators who were college students then.

This state of mind is contrary to that which seems to prevail on college campuses, where reserve officer training programs are increasingly popular.

Phillip H. Stevens
Col., USA (Ret.)

Who Will Be Working?

After reading Richard Freeman's "The Newcomers" [WQ, Winter 1980], there are a few emphases that I would like to add.

Since we have consistently underestimated the flow of women into the labor force in the past, I see no reason for believing that we may not be making the same error in looking at the '80s, especially when one makes allowance for the following: generational changes in expectations and lifestyles; greater investment in human capital; inflationary pressures; and the continuing rise in female single-headed households.

If inflation continues apace (and who is bold enough to suggest that it will soon unwind?), the number of Americans who remain at work (at least part-time) past 60 and 65 may increase rapidly.

One must remember that the rate of new job creation will depend in the first instance on economic trends, and these are beyond the scope of any one of us to foretell. What we do know is that the advanced industrial nations are facing increasing difficulties in using macro-policies to run their economies at (or close to) full employment. If a substantial gap between performance and potential develops and persists, I would expect powerful new political pressures to distribute the existing opportunities for jobs so that no group is arbitrarily consigned to the unemployment pool.

But let me conclude on an upbeat note. It is surely possible that some years down the road, after 1982-83, many advanced economies may begin to face quite tight labor markets. If we knew now what would happen, we would miss the fun of being pleasantly surprised.

Eli Ginzberg
Columbia University
CURRENT FELLOWS

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RALPH DELLA CAVA, Professor of History, Queens College, City University of New York
LEON EPSTEIN, Bascom Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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MARIO VARGAS LLOSA, Novelist, Peru
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