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VOL. II NO. 2

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We believe the United States has entered a period in which people will increasingly want to know more about a corporation than just the quality of its products and services. We believe that more and more people are going to want to know something of the value patterns and basic convictions of the individuals who run a corporation, the individuals who in many ways set the tone for the entire company and who inevitably exert an impact on society.

Which is to say that what people think of a company has a lot to do with whether or not it makes money, or indeed even survives. A company such as ours certainly cannot plead that it exists solely to sell goods and services and to earn a profit. No such company can any longer take for granted even the right to be in business because that right could be withdrawn any time such action seemed desirable to enough people.

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Clearly, however, a corporation labors under severe handicaps in trying to establish itself as a good citizen. The criteria are frequently hazy and subject to sharp differences of opinion among contending groups. There are, and probably always will be, those who find something sinister in the very existence of a large corporation—particularly, we suppose, a large oil company.

Many people view the modern corporation as a glorified slot machine created and operated by glassy-eyed, flint-hearted bankers, lawyers, and technocrats. All this quite naturally plays into the hands of political demagogues, who realize that relatively few of the general public have the information necessary to make value judgments where complex issues of economics and technology are involved.

Since many politicians’ concept of infinity extends only to the next election, it is probably unrealistic to expect them to behave otherwise. But this compounds the problems of more-responsible politicians and of businesses that are laboring to persuade the public by concrete examples that they are fair, conscientious, public-spirited, and socially desirable.

This is not to argue that all businesses—or any of them, for that matter—are perfect. Far from it. But the individuals who run businesses did not resign from the human race when they became corporate managers. And the individuals who devote themselves in such large measure to denouncing our industrial civilization do not thereby acquire halos. We all have our frailties.

Having said that, we have to add that we are mystified that so many of our critics can forget that we have to breathe the same air they breathe, drink the same water they drink, live in the same towns and cities they live in, enjoy the same beaches they enjoy, and exist in the same society in which they exist. How could we possibly be oblivious to the quality of life or to the aspirations of an upwardly mobile society?

We think the public is ill-served by a situation in which private business and its critics find themselves in a running battle of charge and counter-charge. In our view, our country needs and is entitled to a calmer, more constructive dialogue to delineate more sharply the most productive relationship between business and society. That way, we believe, lies the best hope for the future.

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Reappraisal, of course, is the name of the game in serious scholarship. More than most, this issue of the Quarterly is devoted to reappraisals of important matters: the new laws relating to personal autonomy and privacy; Washington's policy toward "nonaligned" Yugoslavia; the tortuous American experience with Reconstruction after the great Civil War.

Most controversial of all, perhaps, is the recent American involvement in Vietnam. A handful of historians, in the face of general academic neglect, are now beginning to probe the complicated "whats and whys" of the long U.S. intervention. Two scholars write in one forthcoming study that the historical evidence is "still alive, being shaped by bitterness and bewilderment, reassurances and new testimony." We report here on the state of such investigations, note the wide gaps which remain, and recall those few Vietnam books, among the hundreds published, which seem to retain some usefulness as the war begins to be taught in the colleges as "history."

Lastly, we take a fresh look at a notable writer of fiction. The late Evelyn Waugh's famed early comedies are only recently available again in America. But American newsmen overseas have long savored Scoop and old Africa hands have both deplored and relished Black Mischief. Many an American in London has found happy enlightenment in Vile Bodies and Decline and Fall. Our Waugh sampler is intended to serve as a timely new introduction to the terrible man of whom a contemporary observed, "at his best, and to me, this is very often, he is a genius, with no reservations."

Peter Braestrup
PERIODICALS

Reviews of articles from periodicals and specialized journals here and abroad

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POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

**Merge and Purge:**

Reforming the CIA


Amid dissension within and public antagonism without, the Central Intelligence Agency embarks on its fourth decade uncertain of its "vanguard" role in the American intelligence community. Admiral Stansfield Turner, its sixth director in as many years, has the unenviable task of leading the beleaguered agency through an era of reform. His duty: to balance the demands for openness in a free society against the needs of national security.

After the recent disclosures of CIA abuses, Congress took steps to curb the power of the "virtually autonomous" agency, writes Bonafede, a *Journal* staff writer. Prohibitions against assassination and domestic spying, elimination of paramilitary operations, and congressional scrutiny of all agency expenditures over $5,000 are some of the new constraints.

These changes, combined with the purge of 20 percent of the CIA's 4,500-man operations division, have shaken morale and spurred the resignations of senior agency officials.

Yet, if President Carter has his way, even more changes are in order. He is seeking fuller public disclosure of the overall U.S. intelligence budget, estimated at $6 billion annually. Under his CIA reorganization plan, all intelligence activities, including those of the State, Defense, Treasury, and Energy departments, will be placed under Admiral Turner's budgetary control. The emphasis will be on "accountability instead of autonomy."

Conservatives fear that these proposals could compromise the effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence effort. Others argue that granting to Turner or any one man such overall power is inviting the abuses the new system is designed to prevent. One conclusion is certain, says Bonafede: "the old CIA belongs to history."
In 1960, many Americans voted for John F. Kennedy to disprove the notion that a Catholic couldn't be elected President. A similar feeling about Southerners may have helped Jimmy Carter in the 1976 elections. But according to political analysts Scammon and Wattenberg, such issues as region and religion, once resolved in an election, tend to disappear. As a result, Carter could run into trouble in 1980.

The "external" issue of Carter's Southern background provided the edge he needed to defeat President Ford. In the 1976 race, Carter reaped a full 54 percent of the vote in the largely conservative South, reversing the steady decline in the Democratic share of the Southern vote since 1960. But this external issue, the authors contend, will play a less decisive role in 1980 than it did in 1976. Carter's Southern support in the next election will turn on ideology, not his place of birth.

Carter needs the South to win, believe Scammon and Wattenberg. But if his current stance continues—"pro-Panama 'giveaway,' pro-quotas, pro-welfare, anti-growth, pro-Cuba"—he will find himself most vulnerable in the region where he can least afford to be.

Three landmark Supreme Court decisions since 1953 have expanded the scope of the "great writ" of habeas corpus—the constitutionally mandated procedure that allows a federal judge to review the cases of prisoners, including state prisoners, if presented with evidence that the appellant was imprisoned or otherwise held in custody unlawfully.

Those decisions, writes Journal editor Cole, have made federal habeas corpus "an impediment rather than an instrument of justice" by clogging court dockets and undermining the authority of the state court systems.

The key Supreme Court decision, *Fay v. Noia* (1963), in effect ended the requirement that a prisoner's appeals through state courts be exhausted before he petitions for federal habeas corpus. Together with *Brown v. Allen* (1953) and *Townsend v. Sain* (1963), this decision "opened the floodgates" on applications for habeas corpus reviews. In 1940, 89 petitions were filed; by 1969, the number had reached 12,000. There are virtually no barriers to a convicted state prisoner who seeks federal review of his conviction; Clovis Green, an inmate in Missouri, has filed 219 appeals, many of them based on habeas corpus.

In more recent years, the Court itself has begun to limit the scope of habeas corpus. But Cole argues that Congress should enact statutes to
stiffen the "exhaustion" requirement in the state courts. Thus, he observes, when a case reached federal court for review, it would already have been refined and analyzed—facilitating the work of the federal judge.

What Money Can't Buy


President Carter signed a $14.7 billion housing measure last October, calling it a "giant step forward" for the nation's cities. But the evidence is growing, says Weltner, a federal judge and former congressman, that "throwing federal dollars" at urban problems may be next to useless. As a case in point, he cites his hometown of Atlanta, Ga. (pop. 1.7 million).

Weltner was an early proponent of Lyndon Johnson's Model Cities effort and the only Georgian in Congress to vote for it in 1966. Atlanta was one of the 10 original target communities. With its progressive tradition and active black leadership, the city seemed an ideal municipality to direct a mix of federal aid and other help focused on a single blighted neighborhood. Hopes ran high as federal officials tried to translate the "precepts of liberalism" into reality.

In six years, Atlanta received more than $173 million in aid from a dozen local, state, and federal agencies. At program's end, the inner city was left with some capital improvements—but one-third fewer people. The percentage of substandard housing remained virtually the same. Unemployment ran at 20 percent, up from 8.6 percent when the program began. Education and health services showed moderate improvement, but crime increased dramatically, from 34.3 "serious crimes" (homicide, rape, robbery, and assault) per 1,000 people in 1968 to 94.6 in 1974. What was the net benefit of the Model Cities effort in Atlanta? "Very little," Weltner concludes.

Banki Dannykh

"Banki dannykh: nastuplenie na grazhdanske prava v SShA" [Data banks: The attack on civil liberties in the USA] by M. Iu. Dykhovichnaia and G. B. Kochetkov, in Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo (no. 6, 1977), 121019, Moscow, G-19, ul. Prunze, d.10.

The growth and refinement of computerized "data banks" (banki dannykh) pose a severe threat to American civil liberties, write two Russian specialists on the United States. The federal government alone, they say, operates 850 data banks on American citizens and organizations, containing 1.25 billion pieces of information. (The Senate Judiciary Committee estimates that something about every U.S. citizen is on file somewhere.) In addition, credit bureaus keep dossiers on 105 million
Americans; tax archives have 205 million entries more; and the U.S. Army has computerized files on every active political group in the United States.

Taking their information entirely from U.S. sources, the Soviet authors observe that the United States regulates little of this data bank activity. There is no precise definition of what kinds of information must legally be considered absolutely private. Worse, charge the Soviet analysts, U.S. data-collecting agencies ignore those few regulations that do exist.

Meanwhile, the Senate has been wrestling with the most important question of all: Should the existing pyramid of public and private data banks be capped by a national data bank? If it is, the Soviet authors contend, the American “bourgeois state” will be able to plug into the telephone conversations, credit ratings, and political affiliations of all Americans. The result would be an “authoritarian state” that would repress “bourgeois law and order,” constitutional rights, and liberal elements.

Apparently, say the authors, the only political force “consistently and on principle” opposing Big Brother in America is the Communist Party of the United States.

**John Smith’s Tall Tales**

Historians have long questioned the veracity of Captain John Smith’s personal account of his role in the establishment of the Jamestown colony in Virginia in 1607. That being so, says Florescu, a historian at Boston College, it is not surprising that Smith’s earlier exploits in Romania—recounted in his *The True Travels, Adventures, and Observations* (1630)—have also raised scholarly eyebrows. Nevertheless, contends Florescu, Smith’s tall tales ring true.

Smith claimed that, in the heat of battle in Eastern Europe, he had slain three Turkish military commanders in quick succession. Later, in 1602, he wrote, he was sold in captivity to Lady Charatza Tragbigzanda, a Greek living in Istanbul. When Smith explored the coast of Virginia and New England, he named what is now the Cape Ann peninsula “Cape Tragbigzanda”—in honor “of the woman who perhaps had loved him.” Likewise, three islands off Cape Cod were christened “The Three Turks’ Heads.”

Smith badly wanted “to be the hero and darling of the gentle sex,” Florescu concedes. But to assume that, while Smith was making his New World discoveries and struggling to found his Virginia colony, he was at the same time scheming to publish imaginary exploits, seems far-fetched. *The True Travels* may contain gross inaccuracies. But his major exploits “fit marvellously well within the context of Elizabethan adventurism.”
Food Stamps: Not a Bargain

Basic changes in the American welfare system over the past decade have led some analysts to conclude that widespread, de facto welfare reform is underway. The food stamp program and Medicaid, for example, which provide help “in kind” rather than in cash, have delivered more benefits to more people than ever before. (In-kind expenditures now greatly exceed cash outlays in the federal welfare budget.) But if “reform” also means a more equitable and efficient system, then “in-kind transfers” have not advanced the cause and may have retarded it.

The $5-billion-a-year food stamp program is unfair and wasteful, contends Barmack, an urban affairs specialist at Portland State University. Its complex rules and varying levels of aid have produced unintended anomalies. Households on public assistance are automatically eligible for food stamps; equally needy families who are not on welfare may not be. Regulations governing food stamp benefits tend to provide eligible, higher-income households with disproportionately large allotments, while many poorer families receive few or no benefits.

The program exacts high costs (the result of error, fraud, and labor expenses) from government agencies and private businesses serving intermediate functions, such as selling food and processing the used stamps. Food stamps have also proved incapable of increasing food consumption among the poor.

Although a well-intentioned response, Barmack concludes, the food stamp program may hamper real welfare reform by the political and bureaucratic inertia it encourages.

Individuals and the State

Few founding fathers felt that an experiment in full-fledged democracy would work. Washington, John Adams, and the Federalists, for example, believed that universal suffrage would probably end in demagoguery and despotism. Yet all these men considered the self-interest and political apathy of the average citizen and sought to grant him enough “elbow room” to pursue the goals and pleasures of his life. A politics—which Gouverneur Morris called the “sublime Science”—based on happiness and personal freedom was the raison d’être of the American state.

What distinguished 18th- and early 19th-century Americans from their successors and their European contemporaries, according to the late novelist John Dos Passos in this reprint from his Essays on In-
divinduality, was that they thoroughly understood the world they lived in. For the New England fisherman, the Midwestern merchant, and the Southern planter, the family was his fiefdom—his vocation as well as avocation. But with the growth of industrial society, Americans became subject to so many rigid “sovereignties”—corporations, unions, and above all, tiers of government bureaucracy—that conformity took precedence over individuality, and the family was relegated to “leisure time.”

The irony of American history, Dos Passos contends, is that in our recent haste to solve problems through government action, Americans have lost the conviction that the best government is self-government. Americans need to reaffirm an individual commitment to work for the public good—to disprove the 19th-century historian Macaulay’s contention that “institutions purely democratic must, sooner or later, destroy liberty or civilization or both.”

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Taiwan’s Future


U.S. concern for the security of Taiwan is the chief obstacle to normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese demand the cutting of U.S. ties with Taiwan, abrogation of the 1954 U.S.–Taiwan mutual defense pact, and withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the island. Solomon, director of the Rand Corporation’s research program in International Security Policy, thinks it unlikely that normalization would expose Taiwan to an invasion from the mainland for at least a decade.

The 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait, he writes, presents a major barrier to direct amphibious assault. By all indications, the People’s Republic neither possesses nor is constructing landing craft suitable for such an attack. Nor is Peking training enough pilots to provide the air cover such an invasion would require. Despite Peking’s 15-to-1 advantage in aircraft, Taiwan’s modern air defenses would take a heavy toll.

Mainland China could try to isolate Taiwan through military and diplomatic pressure. But that would lead to conflicts with the United States and Japan. Taiwan’s major trading partners. As long as the Soviet border threat preoccupies the Chinese military, Peking will seek good relations with Tokyo and Washington.

The future status of Taiwan is an emotional issue in both China and the United States. However, Solomon argues, further delay on normalization could spark a return to Sino-American hostility or outright confrontation. With the U.S. military presence on Taiwan already fading
(from 10,000 troops in 1972 to about 1,000 today), the United States might someday find itself in the awkward position of having a commitment to Taiwan without the means to meet it.

Pro and Con on NATO Arms


Standardization of military hardware, long an operational goal of the 13-nation Atlantic alliance, is the “key” to NATO’s survival as an effective deterrent, according to Senator Bartlett (R.-Okla.). But General Polk, former commander in chief of the U.S. Army in Europe and the Seventh Army, believes that standardization is generally not worth the time, effort, or money required.

Lack of standardized weapons and parts in the NATO force, says Bartlett, creates a “domino-like chain of inefficiency.” The Senate Armed Services Committee, on which Bartlett serves, estimates that NATO has lost 30 to 40 percent of its effectiveness because of its confused mix of weapons systems. The alliance now fields 31 different antitank weapons (with 18 more under development), 7 different tanks, 8 armored personnel carriers, 24 families of combat aircraft, 100 kinds of tactical missiles, and 50 varieties of ammunition. With NATO nations plagued by rising manpower costs and faltering economies, distribution of common equipment, Bartlett argues, could save $10-15 billion a year.

But Polk questions Bartlett’s estimates of potential savings. He sees a greater need for cooperation in battle rather than for peacetime economies. Standardizing spare parts, he argues, is “impractical, costly, and idealistic.” Efforts to standardize should be confined to “essential” items, such as fuel and ammunition. As for other duplication, Polk concludes, “the best policy is to forget it.”

Bomb the Ban

“Candor, Compromise, and the Comprehensive Test Ban” by Donald R. Westervelt, in Strategic Review (Fall 1977), U.S. Strategic Institute, 1204 K St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

For two decades, the United States has sought to negotiate a treaty with the Soviet Union to eliminate underground testing of nuclear weapons. But according to Westervelt, a staff member of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, the problems inherent in such a “comprehensive” test ban (current treaties cover only above-ground testing) could eventually result in a shift of the strategic balance in favor of the Soviets. He believes that only with a “limited” test-ban treaty—or none at all—can the United States maintain its technological edge over the U.S.S.R.
The major problem with any broad new treaty, says Westervelt, is that, given the primitive state of electronic inspection devices, the Soviet Union could easily circumvent the terms of a "comprehensive" ban without detection. The closed nature of Soviet society adds to the problems of verification. Small underground tests, Westervelt believes, would pass without notice, enabling the Soviets to test and modernize their weapons systems.

In the United States, however, underground explosions could be easily detected. Inability to test new weapons as they come on line could cost the United States the "technological superiority" on which its defense posture now depends. During the 1958-61 moratorium on testing, for example, the United States added a new weapon to its stockpile. Elaborate calculations vouched for its effectiveness. When tests were finally conducted in 1963, the weapon's performance was revealed to be "totally inadequate."

Finally, Westervelt notes, strategic questions aside, testing is necessary for reasons of safety. Accidents happen—as when a U.S. B-52 bomber crashed with its nuclear bomb load in Spain in 1966. Fortunately, the design of American bombs prevented a nuclear detonation. But new designs require continual testing to ensure their effectiveness.

**The Japanese Manhattan Project**

The U.S. effort to make the atomic bomb during World War II—via the Manhattan Project—was prompted by fears that Nazi Germany was nearing completion of its own nuclear weapon. But unbeknownst to the United States, says Shapley, a *Science* staff writer, the Japanese too were working on an atomic bomb.

According to recently published documents and diaries, the Japanese effort began in the early 1940s and was headed by Japan's leading physicist, Yoshio Nishina. The Japanese had closely followed developments in the field in Europe and America, and had assembled much of the hardware—including five cyclotrons—necessary for construction. However, says Shapley, because of lack of manpower, money, and uranium, the project was "probably doomed from the start."

Research on the atomic bomb in Japan stalled in 1943 after a colloquium of Japanese scientists determined that construction would be impossible even for the United States during the war.

The revelations cast new light on several historical controversies. In November 1945, U.S. occupation forces deliberately destroyed all five of Japan's cyclotrons. An outraged U.S. scientific community pointed to this incident as evidence that the military was "insensitive" to the needs of science, and the subsequent debate fueled a successful drive to keep American research and development in civilian hands. It now appears that destruction of the Japanese cyclotrons stemmed from fear...
of Japan’s potential nuclear capacity.

The new findings also call into question the arguments of historians who contend that dropping a second bomb on Nagasaki in August 1945 was unnecessary. In their view, the earlier Hiroshima bomb had broken the Japanese will to fight. But, according to Shapley, after the Hiroshima bomb was exploded, physicist Nishina was summoned to Tokyo and asked first whether the bomb had been atomic, then “whether Japan could have one in six months.”

Back to Basics


During World War II and the Korean conflict, the U.S. Navy repeatedly carried out major Marine amphibious landings against stiff opposition ashore. This capability has all but disappeared; instead, the Navy has deployed small “amphibious ready groups” (four to five ships, 2,000 Marines) in the Far East and the Mediterranean to show the flag and deter would-be troublemakers.

However, writes Salzer, the deterrent value of such small “gunboat diplomacy” units is now questionable. Even Third World nations have jets, antihelicopter and antiship missiles, and well-armed ground forces. The Navy’s 30,000-man total amphibious force is costly and its few big helicopter-carrying assault ships, like the Tarawa, are highly sophisticated; but the fleet cannot now provide enough sealift and supporting gunpower to duplicate, say, the Marines’ famed Inchon landing of 1950.

Back to basics is Salzer’s plea—with reliance on the merchant marine, and enough sealift for a Marine division (of 20,000 men) in each ocean. The Navy, he says, still needs to be able to “hold, occupy, or if need be wrest from unfriendly hands the bases from which critical ocean areas could be dominated.”

Will the MX Missile Fly?


The Carter administration’s record on defense issues—including reportedly “lopsided” concessions at SALT and cancellation or deferral of several strategic weapons systems—has created confusion and uncertainty in U.S. strategic planning, argues Ulsamer, an Air Force senior editor.

The “zigzag” decision to cancel funding for the manned B-1 bomber, Ulsamer writes, has renewed congressional doubts about the wisdom of recent Carter administration changes in U.S. defenses. The administration contends that deployment of the low-altitude, air-launched “cruise” missile will be sufficient to uphold the “air power” leg of the...
Smaller than the Soviet SS-19 but as accurate as the Minuteman III, the proposed MX intercontinental ballistic missile would be launched from a hardened shelter (left) or a hardened trench (right).

U.S. strategic “triad.” (The other two “legs” are submarine-launched missiles and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.) However, without the B-1 to deliver it, the cruise missile will need a range of 3,500 kilometers if it is to provide credible deterrence. Reports of a SALT proposal to limit the missile’s range to 2,500 kilometers have alarmed the Department of Defense and its congressional allies.

So have SALT proposals concerning the MX missile (a nearly “kill-proof,” medium-sized ICBM) program. The Pentagon breathed new life into the MX program last October despite the administration’s earlier slowdown.

The tentative MX design calls for a 190,000-pound missile at least as accurate as the Minuteman III, but with four times its throw-weight and substantially more MIRVs (independently targetable warheads). The MX could be launched from a “hardened” trench or shelter. But once again, says Ulsamer, SALT curbs—in particular, restrictions on testing and deployment—may undercut the MX program.

Cutting Fat in Foggy Bottom


A recent British commission concluded that Her Majesty’s diplomatic service was irrelevant and should be disbanded. The U.S. State Department has also had its share of problems, including chronic bad relations with Congress and insecurity dating back to the McCarthy era. These traditional ills, writes Pringle, a foreign service officer, are now being aggravated by numerous others, including an acute “malaise” among middle- and upper-level State officials.

The State Department is a “bureaucratic midget” with a 1976 budget of a mere $1 billion (compared to $128 billion for the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare. Like other federal departments, it is plagued by weak internal management, a rigid personnel system, and a lack of long-range planning. At least 65 studies since 1951 have identified these shortcomings, but no corrective action has been taken. Promotion panels still tend to penalize those who seek experience "outside the stagnant mainstream."

The oversupply of senior officials will increase in the months ahead as a result of a recent Supreme Court decision raising the mandatory retirement age from 60 to 70. This development, combined with affirmative action programs that threaten to "force-feed a large dose" of minority applicants into the already clogged personnel system, has made State Department service unattractive to many young college graduates.

Pringle cites the most recent study of the State Department, conducted by the late Ambassador Robert Murphy in 1975, which urges a redefinition of the Department's role. With domestic issues so closely linked to international interests, the Murphy Commission argues, the Department is no longer qualified to oversee all aspects of foreign policy. Agriculture and energy issues, for example, may best be left to their respective departments, with the President handling coordination.

What role is left for State? Articulating the "broader national interest." In short, says Pringle, Foggy Bottom should concentrate on "what it can realistically do, then do it well."

**ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS**

**U.S.–Cuba Trade:** Great Expectations


As Cuba and the United States contemplate normalized diplomatic relations, U.S. businessmen are trying to anticipate the scope of future trade between the two nations. According to Zimbalist, an economist at Smith College, the magnitude of U.S.–Cuban trade will "not approach pre-Revolutionary levels [the United States accounted for 71 percent of Cuba's exports in 1958], but it could be sizeable nonetheless."

Foreign policy issues aside, there are several barriers to a resumption of commercial ties. First, the terms of Cuba's trade agreements with the Soviet Union discourage large-scale economic deals with the industrial nations. The Soviets pay Cuba three times the market price for sugar, 25 percent more for nickel. Thus, Cuba can afford to sell only a small share of its commodities on the open market.

A second obstacle involves the $1.8 billion in American assets Cuba expropriated in the early 1960s. Without a claims settlement, Cuban
goods arriving in the United States could be subject to court action initiated by the expropriated companies. The result: confiscation of Cuban merchandise.

Even so, says Zimbalist, increased trade with the United States seems inevitable. Cuba is constructing or refurbishing 27 hotels in apparent expectation of a new tourist boom. Americans have not lost their taste for rum and cigars. And Cuba could satisfy some of the U.S. demand for sugar and nickel (22 percent of U.S. sugar imports now come from the Philippines, 78 percent of the nickel imports from Canada and Norway). Moreover, Cuba badly needs spare parts and other technology to maintain its (expropriated) industries. In sum, Zimbalist predicts, U.S.-Cuban trade will reach the $1 billion mark soon after trade restrictions are relaxed.

**Should Banking Laws Be Loosened?**

"Bank Regulation: The Reforms We Really Need" by Sanford Rose, in *Fortune* (Dec. 1977), 541 N. Fairbanks Ct., Chicago, Ill. 60611.

In the wake of allegations concerning the banking practices of Bert Lance, former Office of Management and Budget director, Congress is considering a Safe Banking Act to tighten controls over the banking industry. But the guns of regulation are off-target, says *Fortune* editor Rose, who argues that the regulatory agencies (such as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), not the banks, need policing.

To inhibit the chartering of new banks, for example, the comptroller requires that any founder own no more than 10 percent of the capital stock—"a capricious and discriminatory barrier," Rose contends. The comptroller also demands assurances that the new bank will not cause "undue injury" to existing banks (at best a "nebulous concept").

Government regulators argue that new banks run a high risk of failure while weakening established institutions. On the contrary, says Rose, a "competitive" policy would foster higher interest rates on deposits, encourage more frequent loans, and reduce excess overhead. Even failures, should they occur, play a vital role by "uncluttering" the marketplace. Moreover, Rose writes, by permitting mergers of existing institutions as bail-outs for faltering banks, current regulatory policy rewards inept banking practices. In 1975, for example, Long Island's Security National Bank was able to exchange its worthless stock for $40 million in cash in a merger with New York's Chemical Bank.

Rose suggests that instead of discouraging the rise of new, "risk-taking" banks, the FDIC should simply make them pay higher insurance premiums. To allay bankers' fears of "political pricing," the FDIC could simply invite a private insurance company to co-insure the first $1-$5 million of the bank's deposits.

Liberalizing "bank entry" should be the major goal of the regulators. Restraints on competition and a "failure paranoia," Rose concludes, serve the needs of a bygone era.
Curbing Inflation But Not Growth

Since the early 1970s the United States has suffered from high unemployment and high inflation, a situation new to both American history and economic theory. Successive administrations have responded with traditional monetary and fiscal measures. The failure of these remedies should surprise no one, argues Okun, a Brookings Senior Fellow. "Stagflation"—inflation in a stagnant economy—is not simply a recombination of old, familiar woes; it is a new phenomenon requiring a fresh response.

Changes in the American market for goods and services account for the apparently inexorable climb of costs and prices. In their dealings with customers and employees, businesses have abandoned textbook free-market mechanisms. Pure supply and demand, for example, actually govern prices in only a small sector of the economy. And wages reflect not the size of the available labor force, but employers' desires to keep reliable workers over the long haul. The expectations among labor and management of annual rises of 6 percent in prices (to keep up with the current inflation rate) and 8 percent in wages (to provide a real gain in income) have become firmly established. Recent congressional action raising both social security benefits and the minimum wage reinforces the upward tendency.

Because fiscal and monetary policies cannot affect prices, they take their toll in unemployment and lost production. The only solution, Okun asserts, is a program that fights inflation but not growth. His own proposals: a government commitment to adopt no measures that would increase costs to businesses or prices to consumers; subsidies to states to reduce their sales taxes; and tax rebates to employers and employees who hold wage and price increases below 6 and 4 percent, respectively.

The Japanese Challenge

It is time for Europe to devise a new response to the Japanese export challenge, writes Sautter, director of social studies at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes in Paris. Western Europe now buys nearly 11 percent of Japan's total exports, while Japan accounts for a mere 5.6 percent of European exports. (The percentages were nearly equal in 1968.) Faced with mounting trade deficits, European governments have reacted by arguing for restrictions on Japanese imports and a boost in European exports to Japan. Neither represents a long-term solution, according to Sautter.

Japanese trade is characterized by two features: (a) Europe is the
only major market from which Japan buys manufactured "primary" goods such as textiles and chemicals—thus making European exports highly vulnerable to Japan's protectionist forces; and (b) the Japanese need for a balance-of-payments surplus to pay for their oil imports—between 1973 and 1976, annual Japanese outlays for Middle Eastern oil climbed by $13.8 billion.

Japan's success in the competitive struggle unleashed by the oil crisis is due above all to its vigorous private sector, observes Sautter. Although its population is one-half and its GNP ($492 billion) one-third that of Europe, it nonetheless boasts 44 more major corporations than Europe (compared to four fewer than Europe as recently as 1975).

Japan follows intensive initial capital investment with sharp price-cutting, a process that eliminates all but the most efficient firms. This "industrial Darwinism" is kept within politically acceptable limits by the MITI (Japan's powerful ministry of industry and commerce). Sautter argues that European industry, plagued by union and government restrictions, must encourage a similar pattern. This strategy could be regulated by a European equivalent of MITI.

Such a comprehensive approach, Sautter warns, will depend largely on West Germany's participation. With a trade surplus of $54 billion in 1973–76 (versus Japan's $17 billion for the same period), Bonn could either decide that its long-term interests are tied to the rest of Europe—or decide to go it alone.

**SOCIETY**

*The Social Costs of Early Death*


In devising policy on health and safety, Federal planners should not consider death rates per se but the years of useful life lost due to death, writes Vaupel, professor of public affairs at Duke University. Out of a total of 2 million deaths of Americans in 1974, 700,000 were before age 65. Such early deaths deprive the individual and society of far more years of useful activity than late death; losses should thus not be measured in numbers of deaths but in "quality-adjusted life-years" lost—a figure reached by assuming that quality of life remains constant until age 65, when it declines rapidly.

The likelihood of "early death" in the United States—28 percent at birth—is higher than in other Western countries. (Sweden's rate is under 19 percent.) Furthermore, early death in America tends to strike nonwhites disproportionately (39 percent). Little attention has been focused on such "life-span inequality." The main causes, all found to a
greater degree among nonwhites, are cardiovascular disease, cancer, infant mortality, accidents, and homicide.

The social and economic consequences of attacking early death, Vaupel writes, are less disruptive than those of extending old age. Reductions in early deaths would be unlikely to produce major demographic changes in the population. Designing programs to deal with the problem will nevertheless be a vast undertaking, Vaupel acknowledges. New funds for "early death" research, health care, and education would require cutbacks elsewhere—a "politically difficult" and "highly charged" task.

Till Divorce Us Do Part


The U.S. divorce rate is high and the number of unmarried couples "living together" is increasing steadily. But according to the Population Reference Bureau (PRB) the divorce rate may soon level off—and living together may be one of the reasons why.

The Census Bureau reports that 2 million Americans are living together without being married, most of them young (in the 1960s, most unmarried couples consisted of a middle-aged or elderly woman with a younger man as a tenant). In about a third of these couples, the woman is the breadwinner, with an "unrelated man" living in.

The U.S. divorce rate, meanwhile, is the highest in the world (5 divorces annually per 1,000 population). In 1976, there was one divorce for every two marriages (1,077,000 versus 2,133,000). It is estimated that of each 100 first marriages, 38 will end in divorce; 29 of the 38 divorcees will remarry; 13 of these 29 will be divorced a second time.

But the divorce rate has reached its peak, the PRB contends, and may even decline in the next two or three years. One reason: Couples are having fewer children, which tends to improve the family's economic position—a key factor in marital stability. Another: "Living together" may lead to "a more careful selection of a spouse and thus to a more enduring marriage."

Washington's Mule Program


Not the greatest, but possibly the least known of George Washington's concerns when he assumed the Presidency in 1789 was the dearth of mules in the young republic. Five years earlier, on his return to Mount Vernon after a decade of war, the general had tackled the problem with singular dedication. Washington believed that reliance on horses as draft animals had produced a "ruinous" system of agriculture: Horses
ate too much, worked too little, and died too young. The remedy, as he saw it, was to breed mules.

Seeking no ordinary mules, but "a race of extraordinary goodness," Washington, says Powell, set himself a considerable challenge. The greatest obstacle was the fact that mules, being the hybrid offspring of a male jackass and a female horse, are sterile. Washington's efforts to unite mares and asses, by turns comic and moving, remained untold for more than a century and a half after his death.

Jackasses of the size and quality Washington's vision demanded were not easily found. The best were Spanish and under export restrictions. For a time the general despaired until he received a royal gift from Spain's Charles III of two blooded jacks, one of which survived the Atlantic crossing to reach Mount Vernon in 1785. Lafayette soon sent over another, from Malta.

Breeding proved an uncertain business, but Washington persevered; so did the jacks. When he returned to Mount Vernon after his two-term presidency, drought had taken a heavy toll on his farms—but the jacks had thrived. Their offspring were numerous and healthy. Though Washington's last days were full of disappointment, they were not without some satisfaction. "He left a nation behind him," Powell observes, "and he left it stocked with mules."

Northern Myths About Dixie


Feudalism, the agrarian utopia, the bigoted society—more than any other region in the United States the South has been the subject of literary mythmaking. Curiously, the most familiar myths were created by Northerners: In Uncle Tom's Cabin, Harriet Beecher Stowe, a New Engander, molded the stereotype of "the faithful darkey." The home of composer Stephen Foster, contrary to popular belief, was not Kentucky but Pittsburgh. And "Dixie," the anthem of the Confederacy, was written by an Ohioan, David Decatur Emmett.

Gerster and Cords, historians at Minnesota's Lakewood Community College, review the work of several major historians who have tried to analyze the Northern attraction to Southern ways of life. Some scholars have argued that the creeping Northern egalitarianism of the mid-19th century sufficiently threatened Yankee property owners to provoke a "hankering after aristocracy" which eulogized Southern stability. Others have ascribed the North's envy of Southern aristocracy to "the airs of grace and decorum, secretly yearned for but never realized."

After Reconstruction, Northern writers like Melville, James, and Henry Adams contrasted the political and commercial excesses of the "Gilded Age" with the agrarian values of the ante-bellum South. These values seemed neither as hypocritical nor as unsavory as those of New York's corrupt "Boss" Tweed or the robber-baron financier Jay Gould.
Perhaps, the authors conclude, historians should focus less on the South and more on what William Faulkner called the North’s “volitionless, almost helpless capacity and eagerness to believe anything about the South.”

**Witchcraft: Off on a Technicality**

Witchcraft trials were common in France during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. During the 17th century, however, the highest court in the land, the Parlement of Paris, began to reduce the sentences meted out to men and women convicted of sorcery.

According to most modern scholars, the Parlement’s harsh attitude began to change only in 1624 when, after long association with Sorbonne theologians and Parisian freethinkers, the judges decreed that henceforth all sentences by lower courts entailing torture or execution be automatically subject to appeal. Some Western historians have argued that this more lenient judicial attitude reflected a “mental revolution” brought on by the dawn of scientific rationalism.

Not so, says Soman, a historian at the Centre National de Recherche Scientifique in Paris, who has examined newly available archives relating to 750 trials held between 1565 and 1640. In fact, he writes, the Parlement had treated sorcery with surprising clemency since the mid-1500s. Growing sophistication in jurisprudence, together with social changes—a lull in France’s Catholic-Huguenot religious warfare, for example—affected the Parlement’s treatment of sorcery more deeply than did changing intellectual theories. Finally, the men of the Parlement, “long before doubting the reality of sorcery itself,” were concerned with the strict application of accepted legal methods—such as rules of evidence—in sorcery cases.

**Suicide and the Schools**

Many Americans now believe that lack of “discipline” is the public schools’ biggest problem. Wynne, a professor of education at the University of Illinois, contends that the disorderliness of American adolescents masks a much deeper and more subtle malaise. For two decades, bellwether indices of social disorganization—youth drug and alcohol abuse, homicides, teen-age pregnancy—have been steadily
Conservatives see US. as...intellectuals' may have simplified...the actual state of affairs—but not by much. According to extensive study...academics are more liberal than other professionals (such as doctors and lawyers) but are 'far from being radicals.'
compared with a 42 percent Carter vote among other professionals. Academics are also more likely to approve of premarital sex (62 percent) and to favor reductions in military spending (46 percent). They are more likely than leaders of feminist groups, civil-rights organizations, students, and newspaper and television reporters to advocate ceilings on personal income.

However, a sizeable majority of professors (65 percent) indicated confidence in bankers and financiers. More than two-thirds agreed that the growth of government in the United States "poses a threat" to freedom and individual initiative. And more than half endorsed the view that economic growth, not redistribution of wealth, should be the "primary objective" of American economic policy.

Differences in "liberal" and "conservative" orientation are pronounced among the various academic disciplines. Professors in the social sciences and humanities tend to be farthest to the left, followed, in order of declining liberalism, by those in the natural sciences, business administration, and engineering. Professors of agriculture are farthest to the right.

PRESS & TELEVISION

"A Small World"


Major American newspapers are fond of advertising their worldwide coverage of the news. But one scholar's study of the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Miami Herald, and Chicago Tribune, conducted during the last three months of 1974, reveals that their attention to most nations "borders on the nonexistent."

According to Semmel, a political scientist at the University of Cincinnati, 79 of the world's 132 countries received only 5 percent of the total number of foreign news stories; 12 countries received almost two-thirds of the coverage. This "mix" was virtually identical in all four newspapers.

Semmel speculates that there is a "law of communications magnetism": Nations alike in terms of power, wealth, or culture pay attention to each other; unlike nations ignore each other. Thus, he says, England, the Soviet Union, Japan, France, Canada, Israel, Italy, and West Germany consistently dominate foreign news in the American press. On the other hand, internal developments in Central and North Africa, in most of Asia and South America, and, surprisingly, in Scandinavia, go largely unreported. These neglected areas get coverage only in cases of riot, famine, political upheaval, or war. One exception is the...."
in-depth reporting by the *Miami Herald* of Latin America and the Caribbean—an emphasis that appeals to Miami’s large Spanish-speaking population.

All nations are not equally important to Americans or to each other, the author concedes. But reliance on occasional “fuzzy snapshots” of events in most countries, he argues, is likely to lead to pervasive ignorance among the American public of the “scope and novelty” of changes occurring throughout the world.


The conflicts between the “radical” school of race relations, led by black writer-educator W. E. B. Du Bois, and Booker T. Washington’s “accommodationist” school were fought out in the pages of black-edited journals published after the turn of the century. The bitter competition between the two men, write the Johnsons, who teach at Howard University and Georgetown University, respectively, paved the way for the eventual creation of black-financed newspapers and magazines (particularly, the still flourishing NAACP bimonthly, *Crisis*).

Washington’s espousal of gradual black economic advancement, the authors contend, endeared him to the white business community—and attracted financial support. But for black magazines, white money proved as much a bane as a boon. Thus, when editor Pauline Hopkins attempted to publish black protest writing in the Boston-based *Colored American*, she offended the magazine’s white backers. Washington, who had secretly bought into the publication, was able to have her ousted. She was replaced by an editor who “boomed the theories of Washington.” Similar troubles plagued the influential *Voice of the Negro*, which collapsed in 1907.

Du Bois, on the other hand, downplayed “conciliation,” advocated
socialism, and encouraged the revival of Afro-American literature. A founder (1910) of the NAACP, he had tried repeatedly to launch an independently financed black journal. Although his early attempts were unsuccessful, his later efforts, including *The Moon Illustrated Weekly* (established 1905) and *Horizon* (1907), reached a wide audience. Both magazines, supported by subscriptions only, ridiculed Washington's "soulless" materialism. Du Bois's philosophy was simple: "If you are going to take up the wrongs of your race, then you must depend for support absolutely upon your race."

Du Bois's success, the authors conclude, spurred the establishment in 1911 of *Crisis* by convincing the rest of the NAACP leadership that a black journal could attract and retain a large readership while remaining independent of white financing or influence.

**Who Scoops Whom?**


Chronic Madison Avenue disputes over magazine "audience ratings" (used by publishers to determine readership and therefore advertising rates), recently flared up again when the two best-known survey firms—W. R. Simmons and Axiom Market Research—released sharply different findings. Simmons reported "hefty" readership gains, while Axiom claimed "major declines."

Welles, director of Columbia University's Bagehot Fellowship program, predicts that similar disagreements will arise among experts over the size of the audience for TV news.

According to surveys conducted by the Roper Organization, says Welles, television is by far the American public's main source of news—and TV's share of the news audience is growing steadily at the expense of newspapers. In 1976, Roper reported that 64 percent of those polled said they obtained "most" of their news from television. The figure in 1959 was 51 percent.

But Welles cites new research that calls the Roper findings into question: Two University of North Carolina professors, who have completed their own study, argue that the Roper polls measure "attitudes, not actual behavior." They contend that the number of people who watch any television on an average day is smaller than the number who read a newspaper. In fact, they find, on any given day, only 19 percent of their sample watched network television, while 80 percent read a newspaper. Welles adds that a 1972 Surgeon General's report found that, in fact, people watch television "less than is commonly believed—or than viewers themselves think." The Surgeon General's close study of 20 families revealed that they consistently "over-reported" their viewing time by about 50 percent.
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Television spokesmen have countered with contrary evidence and have questioned the methodology of the North Carolina study. Nevertheless, Welles contends, the "primacy" of television news can no longer be considered a "sacrosanct truth."

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

Why Spinoza?

"Why Spinoza Was Excommunicated" by Yirmiahu Yovel, in Commentary (Nov. 1977), 165 E. 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

In 1656, Amsterdam's Jewish Council of Elders excommunicated a 24-year-old member of their community. His offense: He had proclaimed his view that the Bible was full of contradictions; that the laws of the Torah were arbitrary; that nature and God were one; and that knowledge of nature was therefore knowledge of God. Undaunted, the youth, Benedict Spinoza (1637-77), went on to formulate one of the most important metaphysical systems in the history of philosophy.

Yovel, a philosopher at Jerusalem's Hebrew University, believes that to understand the "phenomenon of Spinoza" one must understand his social and cultural environment. Living in the shadow of the Catholic Inquisition, Amsterdam's Jews were struggling to reintegrate the refugee Marranos into Judaism. (The Marranos were Spanish Jews who had "converted" to Christianity to avoid persecution but continued to practice Judaism in secret.) Dutch rabbis and elders were responsible for ensuring religious cohesion while maintaining the Jewish community as a shelter for the continuing stream of refugees from Spain. They demanded total obedience. At a less critical time, Yovel speculates,
Spinoza's challenge might have been viewed more sympathetically.

In breaking with both Judaism and Christianity, Spinoza chose the path taken by many Jews of later generations. "Perhaps we can see in him," writes Yovel, "the first 'secular Jew' at a time when this category did not exist." There is no longer one norm of Jewish existence, he adds, no single compulsory model: Judaism today is determined by the way Jews live it.


The current "orgiastic self-denigration" of American life by the cultural oracles of the upper-middle class has a parallel in the American religious community's "crisis of credibility," suggests Berger, a sociologist at Rutgers University. This crisis, he says, which has hit "mainline" Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, is marked by a weakening of traditional symbols and an accelerating secularization.

According to Berger, organized religion's present troubles have their roots in the Enlightenment, when religious leaders paid misguided obeisance to the "cultured despisers of religion." In its modern form, the Christian churches, seemingly embarrassed by their tenacious belief in transcendent values, have stressed the secular aspects of their creeds: social uplift, the search for "true community," and so on.

One result is that while many Americans have not lost their faith, their belief in spiritual values is typed as "backward" or "reactionary" by the religious avant-garde. Ironically, the more these religious trend-setters—priests, ministers, and theologians—bend over backwards to accommodate secular opinion-makers, the more they are held in contempt. Berger cites "ominous threats" in Congress to the tax-exempt status of religious organizations that take strong stands on political issues.

An awesome collection of human hopes rides on the survival of American democracy, Berger concludes. But the re-spiritualization of American religion is an even greater imperative, "for it points beyond America and indeed beyond history."

"Thinking" by Hannah Arendt, in *The New Yorker* (Nov. 21, 28, and Dec. 5, 1977), 25 W. 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

The 1961 war crimes trial in Jerusalem of former Nazi officer Adolf Eichmann left one witness with an uneasy sense of the "banality of evil." Reflecting on the implications of that phrase, the late political philosopher Hannah Arendt concludes that Eichmann's crimes indeed lacked "base motives." Neither pride, nor envy, nor any of the other sins to which responsibility for evil has been traditionally assigned
RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

were at the root of Eichmann's behavior.

In this three-part article, left in manuscript form at the time of her death in 1976, Arendt writes that Eichmann's "deeds were monstrous, but [he]. . . was quite ordinary, commonplace, and neither monstrous nor demonic." Not any kind of willfulness but a profound thoughtlessness—an utter unreflectiveness—made the proper operation of his conscience impossible.

Arendt suspects that wickedness, however defined, is "not a necessary condition for evildoing." Instead, she argues, our "faculty for telling right from wrong" is connected with our "faculty of thought." Arendt follows Plato in viewing the thought process as a "soundless dialogue" that each person carries on with himself—a private activity demanding withdrawal from the world. The distinguishing mark of this inner conversation, she maintains, is consistency. A criminal like Eichmann who is unfamiliar with this silent intercourse (in which we examine what we say and what we do) does not mind contradicting himself—"nor will he mind committing any crime, since he can count on its being forgotten the next moment."

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

The Changing Face of Flu


Influenza was reported by Hippocrates in Greece as early as 412 B.C. In 1918–19, it reached pandemic proportions in Europe, Asia, and America, killing 20 to 40 million people. Until recently, however, little was known about the disease.

The influenza virus was isolated in pigs during the 1920s, in humans a decade later. Subsequently, the influenza A virus, the only type that causes pandemics in man, was found in several species of lower animals. But the origin of these periodic pandemic strains (as opposed to relatively localized viruses) remains a mystery. Kaplan and Webster, research scientists with the Pugwash Conference and the World Health Organization, respectively, suggest two possible sources: (1) genetic recombination of human strains with lethal animal viruses and (2) transmission of virulent animal strains directly to man.

The RNA—ribonucleic acid containing genetic information—of the influenza virus is included in the virion (see illustration) as eight separate, single segments, thus easing rearrangement with influenza strains from horses, pigs, and ducks. Such recombination, the authors write, is of "key importance" in accounting for the "drift" and "shift" of influenza viruses. Drift refers to a naturally occurring mutation of the virus. Shift means a dramatic mutation caused by genetic recombin-
After infection by an influenza virion (right), the body forms antibodies to prevent the hemagglutinin spike from combusting with red blood cells. But rearrangement of the RNA, or genetic information (red), can change the composition of the hemagglutinin, rendering antibodies ineffective and permitting reinfection.

Since the influenza virus is continually changing, the human body’s resistance to one strain may not be effective in resisting a deviant strain appearing months later.

The authors’ conclusions: A “successful” flu vaccine will have to be continually updated; and influenza remains a “continuing and evidently ineradicable threat to man.”

The Heresy of Science

Early in the 12th century, a small group of Western European intellectuals—including Adelard of Bath, Thierry of Chartres, John of Salisbury, and Peter Abelard—struggled to define natural science as a distinct and separate discipline. These proto-scientists or “cosmologists” (they called themselves physici) boasted a respect for empiricism (derived from Arab science) and confidence in the power of reason (gleaned from the study of Aristotelian logic). In retrospect, their work may represent the first gropings toward modern science in the West.

Stiefel, a historian at Pace University, has pieced together the physici’s program from arguments scattered, or deliberately buried, in their writings. “There is nothing in nature without ratio,” explained Adelard of Bath. The Creator was not merely all-knowing but supremely rational, as Plato had proclaimed in the Timaeus; nature must therefore be “purposeful, logical,” and subject to the probings of reason. Adelard and others advocated basing hypotheses on careful observation, formulating data in mathematical terms, and deducing illustrative models. More provocatively, they suggested that systematic doubt was the beginning of scientific wisdom. “By doubting we come to inquiry,” wrote Peter Abelard, “by enquiring we perceive the truth.”
This was too much for 12th-century Europe, Stiefel writes. The physici were attacked as heretical or, at best, ignored. Science remained subordinate to theology for another 400 years. Ironically, she adds, the translation of Aristotle’s scientific works may have helped defeat this early conceptual revolution. His writings seemed to provide answers to all questions, thereby furthering scholasticism (concerned with applying Aristotle’s philosophy to the tenets of Christianity) rather than original inquiry.

**Broken Hearts**


A 71-year-old woman arrived by ambulance at a hospital emergency room with her stricken 61-year-old sister, who was pronounced dead on arrival. The elder woman collapsed at the news, developed a heart attack, and died.

According to Dimsdale, a Harvard psychiatrist, the annals of medicine and folklore are filled with stories of people who, in situations of hopelessness and intense emotion or after violating some taboo or being “hexed,” abruptly die. Many theories purport to explain how otherwise healthy people can suddenly succumb to momentary stress. What has been lacking in studies of the phenomenon, Dimsdale contends, is collaboration between cardiologists and psychologists.

Cardiac arrhythmia (irregularity of heartbeat) can be induced in healthy patients asked to recall emotionally upsetting situations; stress on a diseased heart at a certain stage in the cardiac cycle may well trigger a fatal arrhythmia. (What may be the earliest recorded case of this kind occurs in the New Testament’s Acts of the Apostles, which tells how the high priest Ananias fell down dead when St. Peter remarked, “You have not lied to man but to God.”)

That there is a link between the emotional and physical causes of death seems certain. However, abrupt, psychosomatic heart failure remains unlikely. What is surprising, Dimsdale writes, is not that these incidents occur, but that in a country plagued by heart disease, hypertension, and nervous stress, they occur so infrequently.

**It’s All in the Head**

“The Brain’s Own Opiates” by Solomon H. Snyder, in Chemistry and Engineering (Nov. 28, 1977), P.O. Box 3337, Columbus, Ohio 43210.

Painkilling opiates such as morphine are effective at extremely low dosages because they zero in on specific areas in the human brain. These sites, called “opiate receptors,” were first identified in 1973 by the author, a professor of pharmacology and psychiatry at Johns Hopkins. According to Snyder, the familiar “pinpoint pupils” in the eyes of heroin addicts may be explained by the concentration of opiate recep-
tors in areas of the brain that control pupillary dilation.

But why should the brain contain receptors for substances the body itself does not produce? In fact, the human body does produce such substances. During the past four years, researchers have discovered opiate-like substances 5 to 50 times more powerful than morphine. These chemicals, called enkephalins (Greek for "in the head") occur naturally in the human brain and offer scientists the hope of developing relatively nonaddictive painkillers.

Experiments show that electrical stimulation of certain sectors of the brain relieves pain in fully conscious patients. That is, the brain is stimulated to release its own painkillers. (Acupuncture seems to have a similar effect.) When enkephalin was finally isolated in 1975, it was found to occur in the same areas as opiate receptors—in the nerve cells that process information related to pain, pleasure, and the emotions.

In short, says Snyder, opiates are simply drugs that mimic enkephalins. This suggests new ways of studying brain functions—particularly sensory perception. By blocking (or enhancing) enkephalin production, it may be possible to regulate emotional disorders. Tests are already being conducted with schizophrenic patients.

To Dea Now
Nat To Be?

In 1927, physicist and mathematician Sir Arthur Eddington proposed a modern version of an ancient philosophical conundrum: Could an army of monkeys drumming on typewriters eventually produce all the books in the British Museum? In 1960, to illustrate the magnitude of the problem, comedian Bob Newhart claimed he was working on the random reproduction of a single line from *Hamlet*. He later announced that one of his imaginary monkeys had typed out the line "To be or not to be, that is the gesorenplatt." Scientists were quick to question his methods: It would take an uncoaxed monkey some $10^{36}$ years to hit on the first nine mono-syllables of *Hamlet's* soliloquy.

Bennet, who teaches applied science at Yale, proposed some modifications to give the "monkeys," in their computerized incarnation, a fighting chance. He devised a typewriter weighted in favor of the characters most frequently occurring in the third act of *Hamlet*. Thus, Bennet's "monkey," striking at random, would be more likely to hit E's than O's, O's than T's and so on. When the computer-typewriter was further adjusted so as to include "second-" and "third-order" correlations—to favor, for example, QU over QX and QUE over QUX—performance improved dramatically. Some 50 percent of the letter groups struck by Bennet's third-order "monkey" were words. After only one night's clacking, the computer typewriter chanced upon a truly random *gesorenplatt* approximation: "TO DEA NOW NAT TO BE WILL AND THEM BE DOES DOES ORNS CALAWROUTROULD."
### SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

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<th>Fourth-order Medieval Latin monkeys</th>
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By “weighting” a computer-typewriter to account for an author’s most commonly used letters, the famous monkey problem can be applied to almost any field of literature. The examples above are based on Hamlet, A Farewell to Arms, and Roger Bacon’s Secretorum.

Better-educated fourth-order computers yielded 90 percent words in their letter groups, but Hamlet’s soliloquy remained elusive. Unfortunately, the biggest computers today are not capable of simulating correlations of a higher order. Further development of this method of producing masterpieces, Bennet suggests, may best be left to the human brain, with its $10^{10}$ closely packed neurons and more sophisticated processing procedures.

### RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

**Conservation as a Moral System**


The conservation philosophy of the 1960s and 1970s—which values preservation of natural ecological systems more highly than enhancement of human comfort—has failed to offer the public sufficient justification for abandoning 1,000 years of resource exploitation, writes Nash, a historian at the University of California. Real progress will come, Nash argues, only when conservation is accepted on ethical grounds: because it is right.

Most Americans regard the earth, with its animate and inanimate forms, as beyond the scope of ethics: “The rights of animals are dubious; the rights of rocks an absurdity.” Yet environmental ethics—an “extended” moral system that encompasses the land and all its life—has been promoted by thinkers from 12th-century ascetic St. Francis of Assisi to Charles Darwin.

That “extended” ethic influenced the American environmental...
movement through a young forester named Aldo Leopold (1913–1948), founder of the American profession of wildlife management. In *A Sand County Almanac* (1949), Leopold expounded the notion that man's sense of right and wrong has evolved historically to include larger and larger communities: from self to family, to tribe, nation, race, and all mankind; then on to mammals, all animals and plants, all life. Environmental ethics, which recognizes the rights of nonhuman life and of the nonliving environment, represents the highest level of ethics.

Nash speculates that primitive man may have possessed such an extended ethic but lost it under the pressures of technological development. Today, he adds, thanks to the decline of some natural resources and a growing understanding of ecological reality, we may be groping our way back.

**The Future of Oil Shale**

The United States in the 1970s has become reliant on high-priced foreign sources of petroleum. According to Maugh, a *Science* staff writer, this combination of inelastic demand and rising prices has made the development of domestic oil shale economically feasible.

Oil shale—oil locked tightly in solid shale formations—has been touted before as a solution to America's energy crisis, but Maugh believes large-scale domestic production may soon begin in earnest. Techniques for underground conversion of oil shale into crude oil have been improved; federal tax incentives have increased; and as the price of imported oil rises, the relative cost of oil shale conversion becomes less prohibitive.

Deterrents and uncertainties remain, Maugh notes. Shale oil contains high concentrations of nitrogen, sulfur and paraffin; refining is expensive. A slowdown in federal subsidies, a rise in inflation, or a drop in the price of imported oil could doom the prospects for oil shale. But the oil industry is clearly interested. Within a 200-kilometer radius of the juncture of Utah, Colorado, and Wyoming, is the equivalent of 2 trillion barrels of shale oil—50 times the total U.S. petroleum reserves.

**Water, Water, Everywhere**

Despite general progress on environmental quality in the United States, researchers have yet to determine the long-term physical effects of the 300-odd organic and inorganic chemicals found in America's local water supplies.

According to Sterrett, a Hofstra University chemist, scientists face two major obstacles: the sheer scope of the necessary research and the

"Drinkable, But . . ." by Frances S. Sterrett, in *Environment* (Dec. 1977), P.O. Box 3066, St. Louis, Mo. 63130.
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"human testing problem." The federal government has set maximum contaminant levels for a number of inorganic chemicals, including arsenic, lead, mercury, and nitrate. But concentrations of these chemicals in the water supply vary not only from place to place but also from season to season. It is difficult to determine the precise source of any one contaminant present in the human body. (The poisons may come from food or air as well as water.)

Our ignorance is compounded by the problems of conducting human tests. The primary threat posed by water pollutants lies in their long-term, low-dose cumulative effects. Because humans live about 35 times longer than mice and have a far more variable genetic composition, high-dose animal exposure tests are no good for determining maximum exposure concentrations in humans.

Despite the lack of adequate testing techniques, says Sterrett, scientists must keep plodding along, taking care to continuously "review, re-evaluate, and update" all standards—a process that will have to continue far into the future.

ARTS & LETTERS

Philadelphia's Third Dimension


In 1782, Benjamin Franklin, then ambassador to France, advised Italian sculptor Giuseppe Ceracchi not to pin his commercial hopes on the American market. Private persons, he wrote, were not rich enough to afford sculpture, while the public, "being burden'd by its War Debts, will certainly think of paying them before it goes to the Expence of Marble Monuments."

Yet three years later, Franklin returned to Philadelphia with French sculptor Jean Antoine Houdon in tow. According to Craven, an art historian at the University of Delaware, the Virginia legislature surprised Franklin by commissioning Houdon to execute a marble statue of George Washington. As time went on, however, Philadelphia, not Virginia, led the way in making sculpture an equal partner to painting in the American arts.

Before the Revolution, New York, Williamsburg, and Philadelphia boasted classical ornamental statuary. But only after Independence was sculpture perceived as an integral part of the cultural scene. The arrival of Houdon and, later, of Ceracchi in Philadelphia sparked great excitement—and numerous commissions. As these artists' work appeared throughout the city, Philadelphians demanded more and more—busts, figures, monuments, garden statuary. Then, local wood-
carvers, long regarded as mere artisans, were encouraged to refine their work and to emulate the "high art" styles of Europe. Painter Charles Wilson Peale (1741–1827) and sculptor William Rush (1756–1833), both connected with the founding of the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts in 1805, worked with American craftsmen and their Old World tutors to bring American sculpture up to the level of American painting. Their aims were advanced by the Philadelphia architect William Strickland, who routinely incorporated sculpture into the many new public buildings he designed for the city. By the time of Houdon's death in 1828, Philadelphia displayed a sculptural landscape unmatched elsewhere in the new nation.

Philadelphia's William Rush, who was once a carver of ship's figureheads, executed this statue of George Washington in 1814.

**Robert Frost:**

**Fire and Ice**

"Vanity, Fame, Love and Robert Frost" by Donald Hall, in *Commentary* (Dec. 1977), 165 E. 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

During his lifetime, poet Robert Frost (1874–1963) enjoyed a popular image as the benign sage of New England. But after his death, a second Frost, revealed by biographers, rose up and destroyed the first—the conniving, self-absorbed abuser of his suffering wife and children. Hall, a noted poet who knew Frost for 20 years, contends that neither image is correct.

Young Frost suffered greatly for his art; so did his wife and children,
who, living in rural poverty while he wrote, variously experienced "madness, suicide, and early death." Both in his eyes and in theirs, he bore the blame for his family's misery. But Frost's guilt and fanatical perseverance in his work are two sides of a granite-like ego, driven by a need to convince the world of his superiority. From this compulsion, says Hall, Frost constructed his public persona (the simple rustic) and his professional image (the fierce competitor bent on sitting alone atop the "steeple of literary acclaim").

Frost himself believed that he was an evil man who had to be tricked into acts of kindness—he joined in efforts to free poet Ezra Pound from a mental hospital, but only because he thought Pound's release would bring personal publicity. In fact, says Hall, it was neither selfishness nor misanthropy but a more complex drive toward love and "fame" that motivated Frost. "Fame is the word for the love everyone wants," Hall writes, "impartial love, love from strangers for what we are, what we do and have done." A deeper desire than vanity, a more demanding goal than mere celebrity, fame so honed Frost's ambition that he became in its pursuit both a heartless father and the creator of enduring works of art.

The Adventures of Daniel Defoe

Modern readers know Daniel Defoe (1660–1731) as the author of great adventure stories. Few realize, however, that his own life was at times as topsy-turvy as that of his characters, or that Robinson Crusoe and Moll Flanders, which immortalized his name, represent only a small fraction of his literary output. Indeed, argues Scott, an Edinburgh writer, literature was simply an economic expedient for Defoe. His real loves were politics and commerce.

Defoe combined politics with writing during a career as an English spy in Edinburgh immediately before and after the formal Union of England and Scotland in 1707. A failed London merchant (he sold hosiery, wine, and bricks), he took up journalism to feed his wife and seven children. But his penchant for politics, along with his gratitude to the Queen's chief minister, Robert Harley, for arranging his release from prison on charges of illegal pamphleteering, led Defoe in 1706 to become Harley's paid eyes and ears in Scotland.

With his genius for inventing believable characters, Defoe adopted a variety of "covers," ranging from fishmonger to salt merchant and linen-draper. His secret mission included "black propaganda" work. Under pseudonyms implying either English or Scottish authorship, he wrote numerous polemics in favor of Union. One of the "Scottish" pamphlets recently fooled a modern historian.

Defoe's writing probably had little effect on the decision for Union. But he was intensely proud of one accomplishment: His proposal for a tax on beer got into the Treaty of Union in his own words.
Soames Forsyte, Connoisseur

Although long regarded as a gold mine for the social historian, John Galsworthy's fictional series, The Forsyte Saga, has never been recognized as a harbinger of changing English taste in art. Businessman Soames Forsyte, the Saga's central character, is a collector of paintings; by the time the novels have spanned the years 1886–1926, Soames has acquired works by Matisse and Picasso—well before his real-life English contemporaries had realized their value. In fact, writes Ormond, a professor of English at King's College, London, Soames becomes "the most enterprising and intelligent collector in the whole range of the English novel."

Though not a collector himself, Galsworthy (1867–1933) frequented art galleries and private collections. After World War I, his interest in art grew, and he transmitted the same interest to Soames. In the early novels, Soames's taste for French paintings is "hardly exceptional," reflecting the average rich Englishman's preference for the more traditional artists of the 1880s and 1890s. By 1910, however, he has already acquired a Monet ("stripey, streaky creations") and works by other Impressionists and post-Impressionists (Matisse and Gauguin, in particular). Despite "aesthetic reservations," Soames purchases these paintings with his eye "firmly fixed on the market."

Galsworthy created Soames as the epitome of "that instinct to possession" which is the focus of the Saga. But Soames the collector, Ormond contends, has a weakness for beauty that conflicts with his "cautious flair for moneymaking." And in Swan Song (1928), the final Forsyte novel, Soames risks his life to rescue his collection from a fire in his gallery—and saves his favorite Gauguin: "a South Sea girl with nothing on."

Paul Gauguin painted Manoa Tupapau in 1892. Was this the painting that graced the gallery of the fictional Soames Forsyte?

_Courtesy of the Albright-Knox Art Gallery, Buffalo, N.Y._
PERIODICALS

OTHER NATIONS

Hawks and Doves in Argentina


When the military government of General Jorge Rafael Videla seized power in 1976 from President Isabel Peron, Argentinians faced both unbridled terrorism and an annual inflation rate as high as 480 percent. Videla moved quickly to crack down on terrorism. But according to Rouquié, the terrorist threat is now being used chiefly as an excuse for continued civil repression.

Since the late 1960s, when the current wave of terrorism began, some 2,000 Argentinians have been killed; another 5,000 are missing. The government has mounted raids against terrorists—but it has also clamped down on protests by labor, the clergy, and the universities. According to Rouquié, the declining threat posed by the People’s Revolutionary Army (a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group) and by the Monteneros (self-proclaimed heirs to the Peronist movement) does not justify the continuing government crackdown. These groups have been reduced to sporadic bomb attacks.

The real source of the regime’s antidemocratic posture is the radicalization of Argentine political life in general. As inflation continues, students and workers have become more vocal, with the army divided over how to respond. The moderates, led by Videla, seek an eventual return to civilian government and have taken pains to preserve Argentina’s political parties. But a hard-line faction distrusts political parties and wants the army to play a more decisive role in creating a conservative, rural-oriented “new order.”

According to Rouquié, the hard-liners may be in the ascendent: Argentina’s economic program now emphasizes aid to the healthy agricultural sector at the expense of the nation’s ailing industrial base.

Will Europe Be ‘Finlandized’?


Some foreign policy analysts have suggested that Western Europe, in the face of mounting pressures from the Soviet Union, may eventually become “Finlandized.” That is, democratic European governments may be forced to move from a “pro-Western” to a Soviet-leaning “neutral” stance, while at the same time sacrificing a measure of autonomy.

Laqueur, chairman of the research council at Georgetown Univer-
The Center for Strategic and International Studies, notes that discussions of "Finlandization" are usually conducted with little knowledge of political life inside Finland. There is no systematic Western press reporting from Helsinki, and, as a result of Finland's own Russian-inspired practice of "self-censorship," American scholars have access to little detailed information.

Although Finland, unlike Estonia and Latvia, escaped outright annexation by the U.S.S.R. in 1945, there was a price: diminished sovereignty. As a result, the Finns have officially supported the Kremlin's invasion of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The nation's current status, says Laqueur, is "neither satellite nor neutral."

In many ways, Finland remains a free country. There are 10 political parties, regular elections, and no political prisoners or arbitrary arrests. Most of the Finnish economy, including agriculture, is not state-run. But in all areas of public life, the Finns are sensitive to Soviet proximity; and the Kremlin exercises a de facto veto over Finland's foreign policy and domestic politics.

Albania


Continued rule by a strict Stalinist regime threatens to split the little Balkan state of Albania (pop. 2.1 million) from its only ally, the People's Republic of China. According to Pano, a historian at Western Illinois University, party leader Enver Hoxha hopes to solidify his 32-year rule by blindly maintaining rigid Communist positions that the Chinese have apparently abandoned.

Created after the pre-World War I Balkan Wars to deny Serbia access to the Adriatic Sea, Albania faces chronic poverty and tremendous problems of internal cohesion. Hoxha's Albanian Party of Labor, which came to power after World War II, created a pro-Soviet police state—until Soviet Premier Khrushchev's "revisionism" prompted Hoxha to sever ties with Moscow and throw his support to Mao Tse-tung in the late 1950s; the Albanian representative long served as China's spokesman in the United Nations.

During the 1970s, however, ideological disputes strained the country's relations with Peking. Albania criticized Chinese rapprochement with the United States and endorsed the Chinese radical "gang-of-four" in their unsuccessful bid to supplant Peking's "pragmatists" led by Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng. But the Chinese, says Pano, have not been deterred in the least by Albania's actions.

Although Hoxha has contemplated an ideological break with China, writes Pano, diplomatic and economic ties will probably be maintained. Albania desperately needs Chinese aid ($458 million between 1971 and 1975); moreover, domestic morale would plummet if Albanians, already isolated from most of the world, found themselves suddenly orphans in the Communist movement as well.
OTHER NATIONS

Let Them Eat Oil


A 13 percent annual increase in food consumption, together with rural out-migration and sluggish farm productivity, threatens the Shah of Iran's ambition to build an industrial society rivaling those of the West, reports Weinbaum, a political scientist at the University of Illinois. Despite crash programs to spur agricultural development, he contends, food policy has fallen victim to the Shah's preoccupation with Iran's industrialization and international status.

Modern agribusinesses, occupying 165,000 acres in the Southwestern province of Khuzistan, are showcases of Iran's agricultural efforts in the '70s. Although they were expected to produce quick profits for foreign and Iranian investors, costly land-leveling and a dearth of farm labor have undermined these prospects. Other "cooperative" ventures have suffered equally, with many small farmers balking at the idea of exchanging their land for intangible shares of stock. As a result, while industry is growing by 20 percent annually, agriculture has consistently fallen short of its modest 4-7 percent annual targets.

Iran's Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources—with the help of young, Western-trained economists—is responsible for managing the new development programs, but funding squabbles and an inept bureaucracy hamper the government's ultimate goal: 80 percent food self-sufficiency.

As long as oil revenues run high, says Weinbaum, there is no question of Iran's capabilities—"only of its priorities." But while the Shah hopes to make Iran independent of foreign economic pressures, the country's agricultural imports have jumped to $1.4 billion a year, half of it coming from the United States. Consumption of red meat alone rose 75 percent in 1976 over the previous year. But Iran's import and pricing policies actually encourage dependence on foreign foods. Weinbaum's conclusion: Such shortsightedness may eventually deny Iran the security and influence it so badly wants.

Ending the Stalemate


Communist governments officially view the state as an instrument to move society from a "socialist" to a truly "communist" stage. But their national constitutions reflect practical considerations as much as Marxist-Leninist ideology.
Stalin's 1936 "framework" Soviet Constitution, for example, reflected his need for personal flexibility in a society that had yet to mature politically. By contrast, Khrushchev's vain effort to adopt a "new" Soviet constitution during the late 1950s and early 1960s was an attempt to bar new Stalinist "cults of personality" by placing more rigid, legal controls over the Soviet system. Meissner, director of the Institute for Eastern Law at the University of Cologne, finds that both these tendencies persist in the draft Soviet Constitution published last spring after two decades of stalemate. (The constitution went into effect last October.)

According to Meissner, the new Constitution strengthens one-party rule in the Soviet Union by explicitly acknowledging the Communist Party's "vanguard" role in society. Moreover, by simple legislative fiat, it proclaims the end of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and heralds a "developed socialist stage," called the "society of the whole people." Soviet "federalism" is weakened, and the powers of the central government—particularly the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Russian parliament—are broadened.

The new charter concentrates power in the Party leader's hands by ending the 13-year division of authority between the Party Secretary and the President. With the ouster of President Nikolai Podgorny in 1977, both jobs are now held by Leonid Brezhnev. Nevertheless, Meissner argues, the constitution has theoretically created the beginnings of a genuine constitutional state by obliging all Russian institutions, including the Communist Party, to operate within its guidelines.

"Never Call Retreat"

A decade ago, French commentator and politician Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber predicted that by the 1980s, the No. 3 industrial power in the world would be not Europe, but American industry in Europe. His prophecy has been partially fulfilled: U.S. investments on the Continent over the last decade have risen from $16 to $55 billion; sales from $40 to $200 billion. But Economist business editor Hugh-Jones contends that the power of U.S. multinational corporations is on the wane.

American multinationals in Europe, which date back to the turn of the century when Kodak went to Britain and Gillette to France, are now hampered by local competition, government regulation, and trade unionism. As a result of widespread European unemployment, work permits for foreign nationals are increasingly hard to get; in the Netherlands, for example, only one American company out of five employs any Americans.

The worries of U.S. businessmen over future investments in Europe are not without cause. Many multinationals there deal in services (hotel chains, car rentals, management systems), which are vulnerable both
to recession and to regulation. Moreover, U.S. firms dislike losing control over their workers—a familiar management complaint in Europe, where employees sit on the boards of many companies. And there is pressure on the multinationals at home: Congress is calling for the creation of more jobs in the United States while seeking to curb tax breaks on overseas operations.

Despite predictions of an American pullout, says Hugh-Jones, American multinationals will continue to operate in Europe much as before—but with "their wings severely clipped" by a mixture of law, regulation, government intervention, and trade union power. These new constraints will cause grumbling, but they will not, he believes, drive the companies home.


Luis Echeverría became president of Mexico in 1971 with his country’s economy buffeted by global recession. His response was to stress "el modelo estabilizador," a state-run investment program designed to increase agricultural and industrial output. But the results, say Griboment and Rimez, economists at the Catholic University of Louvain in Belgium, were largely disappointing.

Under the Echeverría program, the government doubled its investment in agriculture. Some 400,000 acres were irrigated; public works outlays increased tenfold (to $7 billion) in 1975; and 75,000 kilometers of new roads were built to connect outlying farm regions with national markets. Wages were increased both to boost workers' purchasing power and to keep up with an annual inflation rate of 30 percent.

However, to finance such projects, Mexico borrowed heavily from private banks in Europe and the United States and from international lending agencies such as the World Bank. In 1976, Mexico owed $19 billion to foreign creditors and was spending as much as 40 percent of its export revenues on debt service alone. Although overtures to Third World nations opened new markets to Mexican manufacturers (exports tripled during the Echeverría administration), by the time José Lopez Portillo assumed power in 1976, imports had outstripped export earnings by some $3 billion.

Thus, despite some progress, Mexico has been left with staggering debt, massive (20–25 percent) unemployment, continuing emigration, and reliance on the Yanquis for investment and lending. The discovery of large deposits of oil in 1974 notwithstanding, the authors conclude that Mexico may have already mortgaged its future.
"Religion in America"


Many social commentators have assumed that the age of "permissiveness" and relaxed moral standards has prompted Americans to abandon their churches. But according to a Gallup survey, a strong religious climate still exists in the United States.

Some 38 percent of all persons interviewed felt a "great deal" of confidence that organized religion can perform its role in society. Of seven other major public institutions (including government, law, and education), only medicine received comparably high ratings.

A 58 percent majority considered its religious beliefs "very important" personally, while Americans split almost evenly on the question of whether organized religion is gaining or losing influence.

In 1977, for the first time since 1958, church attendance increased, with 42 percent of Americans participating in services during an average week. Those responding most affirmatively to questions on religious matters were likely to be women, nonwhites, Southerners, less-educated, lower-level wage earners, or residents of small towns and rural areas.

The survey also documents the rise of newer religious movements. President Carter's public assertion that he is a "born-again" Christian—one who has experienced a turning point and pledged himself to Christ—is echoed by one out of three adult Americans of all denominations. To a lesser degree, experimental religions are attracting followers: faith healing, transcendental meditation, and yoga involved 7, 4, and 3 percent respectively, of the Gallup respondents.

"Urban Transportation and Energy: The Potential Savings of Different Modes"


Transportation in large American cities eats up 25 percent of all oil consumed in the United States. But with new, urban rapid rail systems, such as San Francisco's BART and Washington's METRO, it is commonly thought that much of this energy can be saved. And in terms of simple energy use for propulsion, these mass transit systems do in fact rank among the most energy-efficient methods of transport.

But in terms of overall energy consumption—including energy used in construction and maintenance—new rapid rail systems "actually waste energy rather than save it."

According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the most fuel-efficient method of urban transportation is the "vanpool," where passengers living in the same general area ride vans or mini-buses to work. Vanpools can promote energy savings (above the norm) of 7,720 British thermal units (Btu) per passenger mile; carpools, 4,890 Btu; express
Under a Carter administration proposal, 92 million acres of Alaskan wilderness (red), along with numerous marine habitats (circles), may soon be placed off limits to development. That figure could jump to 116 million acres.

"Alaska National Interest Lands"


Author: W. Wendell Fletcher.

Alaska is the scene of the biggest battle over conservation in recent decades. At issue is how much of the state's vast federal landholdings (228 million acres) should be placed off limits to intensive development, such as mining and timbercutting.

Under the 1971 Native Claims Settlement Act, Alaskan Eskimos and Indians were ceded 44 million of the state's 375 million acres, and the state government was entitled to choose 103 million acres for itself.

Congress, under a 1978 deadline, was authorized to add more of the federal land to the 50 million acres that have already been placed under the stringent protection of the "four systems": the National Park System, the National Wildlife Refuge System, the National Forest System, and the Wild and Scenic Rivers System.

The question of "how much?" has generated heated debate among timber, mining, oil, and gas interests, conservationists, commercial fishermen, native Alaskans who live off the land, and many others.

A half dozen proposals are currently before Congress. The bill favored by the state government and most Alaskans would add about 25 million acres to parklands already under strict federal control. But a bill favored by environmentalists would place 116 million acres—roughly the size of California—under "four-systems" management.

Combined with the 50 million federal acres already set aside, this plan would make almost half the state virtually untouchable (compared to 24 percent of California and 23 percent of Washington State).
buses, 3,590 Btu. New rail transit, however, brings a net loss of 980 Btu; dial-a-ride (a service similar to calling a cab) is by far the least efficient, resulting in a loss of 12,350 Btu.

The principal cause of the ultimately poor energy performance of rapid rail systems is the customers' supplementary use of private cars, typically carrying only one or two passengers, to get to and from the train station. Of all conventional urban transit systems (bus, trolley, subway), contends the CBO, buses offer the greatest fuel savings—especially since express bus service draws heavily from commuters who would otherwise drive automobiles.

“Selective Admissions in Higher Education”
256 pp. $12.95.

Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, now before the U.S. Supreme Court, is widely viewed as a test of whether an applicant's racial origin may be considered by colleges and universities in their admission procedures. At stake are the divergent interests of public and academic policy: Academic priorities could obstruct affirmative action; public priorities could lower standards.

The authors of this Carnegie Council report seek a golden mean between both positions, while asserting that the race of an "academically admissible" applicant is among the relevant criteria for admission.

They recommend a two-stage admissions policy, distinguishing "admissibility" from "selection." In the first stage, schools should eliminate all applicants who are clearly unqualified by applying academic standards uniformly without regard to race, sex, or other categories.

But at the next stage, when the school selects its student body from the applicant pool that remains, "race should be considered"—if it reflects a disadvantaged background. Both white and black students with such backgrounds should receive special consideration.

According to the authors, the two-stage model allows sufficient latitude for schools to exercise their professional judgment. Courts, legislatures, and governments should not intervene "except when clearly required by the public interest."

“Redefining National Security”
Worldwatch Paper #14, Worldwatch Institute, 1776 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. 46 pp. $2.00.
Author: Lester R. Brown

Since World War II, most nations have viewed their security almost exclusively in military terms, leading to worldwide military expenditures of $350 billion in 1976. Some 30 million men and women are under arms; a quarter of the world's scientific talent is devoted to weapons development.

But as the world becomes increasingly interdependent—politically and economically—new and extraordinarily complex threats to all nations have emerged, ranging from dwindling oil reserves to mounting pressures on the
earth's biological systems. The result, says Brown, president of Worldwatch Institute, is that purely military concepts of security "may be diverting attention from more serious problems."

For example, unless the world's oil-dependent economies shift rapidly to alternative energy sources, the downturn in world oil production—which may occur within 15 years—is "almost certain to shake the foundations of the global economic system."

Moreover, says Brown, the major biological systems on which the world depends for food and industrial raw materials show serious signs of stress.

Overfishing has reduced productivity in ocean fishing grounds, the world's primary source of high-quality protein. Grasslands suffer unprecedented overgrazing by a global livestock population of nearly 3 billion. Scarce resources have already contributed to global "food insecurity;" the world's grain stockpile vanished in 1974, a bad crop year in the United States, Canada, India, and the Soviet Union, and is less than ample now. India's poor 1972 harvest resulted in an estimated 829,000 hunger-related deaths.

What's more, inflation has assumed global dimensions in the 1970s. With it, has come rising unemployment. These problems strike poor nations most severely; they are ultimately translated into social unrest and political instability.

"The purpose of national security deliberations," Brown concludes, "should not be to maximize military strength but to maximize national security." The current emphasis on military strength by both large and small nations siphons off money, management skills, and scientific know-how that should be devoted to emerging nonmilitary threats.

"Youth Unemployment"

Rockefeller Foundation, 1133 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N.Y. 10036. 80 pp. Free on request.

Author: Lester Thurow.

The problem of widespread (40 percent) unemployment among inner city blacks is well known. But according to M.I.T. economist Thurow, their plight is only part of a larger phenomenon.

In this Rockefeller Foundation report, he notes that in 1976 3.4 million black and white youths aged 16 to 24 were looking for work and unable to find it—nearly 15 percent of this age group. (The jobless rate for the population as a whole is 7.7 percent and 4.2 percent for married men.) These figures do not include an additional 1 million youths who are unemployed and not looking for work.

Thurow examines two widely suggested remedies. The simplest method would be to lower the minimum wage, which, some analysts feel, has priced young, inexperienced labor out-of the market. However, Thurow warns, while a lowered minimum would probably put more young people onto private payrolls, the young might displace the old. This kind of "reshuffling" would create as many problems as it would solve.

A second proposal is direct federal job creation. But again, Thurow warns against a "quick fix." Any new federal jobs will have to be of high quality, with rigid work standards, under which workers could be fired for poor performance. Without such safeguards, private employers in the future would avoid hiring veterans of the federal "make-work" programs.

Finally, Thurow notes, the old reliance on more education and more training is not an answer to the problem of youth unemployment. On the average, the jobless young today are better educated than their employed elders; labor surpluses among youths exist at all education levels.
"Violent Schools—Safe Schools"


In recent years, increasing public attention has been focused on crime and violence in the nation's public schools—despite a lack of hard data on how bad the problem really is.

Now, a three-year study by the National Institute of Education (NIE) concludes that the situation is serious indeed—but it is not getting worse.

According to NIE, the incidence of vandalism, robbery, theft, and assault, which rose steadily throughout the 1960s, has leveled off.

However, the risk of violence to teenagers remains greater in school than anywhere else. Some 40 percent of the robberies and 36 percent of the assaults on urban teenagers occur in school—where city youths spend no more than 25 percent of their time. But the crime problem, the study emphasizes, "cannot be seen as essentially urban": Of the 6,700 American schools with a "serious" problem of crime (defined as at least five "incidents" per month), more than 4,000 were located in suburbs or rural areas.

The most widespread offense is theft, which strikes 2.4 million junior high school students each month; another 282,000 students are assaulted and 112,000 are forcibly robbed.

"Current Demographic Change in Regions of the United States"

Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. 90406. 37 pp. $3.00.

Author: Peter A. Morrison.

During the last decade, the U.S. birthrate has declined. At the same time, regional migration patterns have changed. These circumstances have turned migration—and efforts to control it—into a powerful influence in determining which areas of the United States grow and which do not.

Urban population growth is shifting away from "mature" industrial cities, particularly in the Northeast and Great Lakes, or "Frostbelt" region, toward the cities of the South and West, or "Sunbelt" region. At the same time, strong increases were registered in nonmetropolitan areas—such as Northern New England and the Upper Great Lakes (popular as recreation areas) and the Ozark-Ouachita Uplands (popular among retirees)—as part of the so-called rural renaissance.

The new trends spur protests both from the localities that are population "gainers" (hard-pressed to provide services such as welfare and schools) and from the "losers" (whose tax base is declining). The report identifies three federal responses: (1) controlling or redirecting migration flows, a politically impossible undertaking; (2) assisting cities and counties in coping with the problems of growth or decline; and (3) transforming migration-related burdens, such as welfare, into national responsibilities.

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tax data

The smaller the number of people with access to Americans' income tax forms the less the danger that information on the forms will be put to an improper use.

Snoopers Now On Every Side

"We haven't done the job unless we've found out and reported ... if promiscuous ... class of partners ... possible homosexuality ... dress ... associations with opposite sex?" Jerry Poth said.

"A lot of our investigations now are pre-employment checks, general backgrounds, and we do pre-marital checks. There's actually a need for this," Jerry Poth said.

"I'd say," Jerry Poth claimed, "we could tell you just about everything about yourself."

Even where I went after leaving the Tug Tavern?

"I'm sure." That's the worst part about snooping. No one should be able to know what you can't even remember.

- By 81 to 13 per cent, Americans believe overwhelmingly in the right "not to have one's phone conversations tapped for any reason, except with a court order."
- By 77 to 14 per cent, they assert the right "not to have one's mail opened by the government, except with a court order."
- By 80 to 12 per cent, they claim the right "not to be spied on by any kind of electronic surveillance, except with a court order."

Repeal of No-Knock Bank Accused Of Snooping

Midland Bank has been charged in a $250,000 lawsuit with intercepting and opening the mail of a man on whose business the bank had foreclosed.

"The improper procurement and use of medical information has had devastating effects upon unsuspecting individuals. Marriages have been ruined and reputations have been destroyed," he said.

Birth Control Bill Data Banks

Anybody who has ever disputed an erroneous department store bill with the firm's computer must experience a thrill of horror at the information that 54 executive branch agencies of the federal government now possess no fewer than 868 data banks, containing more than a billion records on individuals.

The Fourth Amendment, we should remember, forbids only "unreasonable" searches and seizures. Reasonableness is a disputed term but over the years the courts have defined its main characteristics.

Financial Disclosure

"I catch hell about this even when I go to church," Mr. Cooper reports, adding, "A lot of folks, particularly small-town Southerners, figure it isn't anybody's business what their kin are up to. The reports are open to the public, for anyone who wants to come in and look around."
Autonomy and Privacy

Rights to personal autonomy and privacy are nowhere expressly guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution. Yet in recent years the Supreme Court, and lower courts as well, have upheld both the claims of individual citizens to a generalized “right to be let alone” and more specific demands for greater control over the uses made of personal information. Judges and legislators have not always found it easy to balance rights of individual privacy and autonomy against competing interests, such as freedom of the press and the upholding of accepted community values. Here two scholars discuss these growing issues: A. E. Dick Howard examines autonomy and Kent Greenawalt looks at privacy.

THE SUPREME COURT AND MODERN LIFESTYLES

by A. E. Dick Howard

Constitutional litigation in America frequently mirrors the shifting moods and conflicts of the nation. Successive generations have developed a habit of bringing great policy issues to the federal courts for resolution, rather than looking only to legislative bodies. The results are not always predictable. In the early years of the New Deal, a stubborn Supreme Court lagged behind the rest of the country. In the historic school desegregation decision of 1954, the Court opened a new chapter in American race relations.

As often as not, the courts have been a special source of

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redress for those persons and groups labeled "different"—such as members of racial, political, and religious minorities. If the Constitution was meant to create a representative democracy, it also established unmistakable anti-majoritarian restraints. Thanks to the Bill of Rights, the rights of free speech do not depend on the consent of a political majority. But sometimes, to uphold these individual rights, important competing interests must yield, as when society's interest in effective law enforcement conflicts with the Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures.

In the 1960s and 1970s, no social trend has been more publicized than changing personal "lifestyles"—new attitudes toward family roles, greater sexual permissiveness, unconventional manners and dress. The war in Vietnam and unrest on American campuses brought in its wake challenges to conventional morals and old ways. High school boys wanted to wear long hair; women sought unrestricted access to abortions; homosexuals talked of "gay rights."

**Limits to Sovereignty**

The debate over personal autonomy—over what is loosely called "doing your own thing"—did not originate in the 1960s. John Stuart Mill, hoping in the 19th century to reform English law, asked in his classic essay *On Liberty* (1859) whether there was a sphere of personal autonomy that the state and the law should respect: "What, then, is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual over himself? Where does the authority of society begin?" Mill's answer: "The sole end for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."

Shades of Mill's thesis appear in modern efforts to change the laws to accommodate new lifestyles. One example is the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, which proposes

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that homosexual conduct taking place in private between consenting adults no longer be a criminal offense. But state and national legislators are often slow to respond to such proposals to amend the laws, especially when a lifestyle conflicts with traditional notions of morality. Hence, those who seek the freedom to do what others may think unconventional or aberrational, or perhaps immoral, have often gone to court. In doing so, the petitioners have drawn on the now venerable American notion that one’s personal preferences are a constitutional entitlement.

The Constitution says nothing about the right to an abortion, the right to wear one’s hair the length he pleases, or the right of consenting adults to have sex in the fashion they prefer. So petitioners have invoked the “majestic generalities” of constitutional law—for example, notions of “liberty” protected by due process of law, an alleged right to privacy, and the Ninth Amendment (declaring that the Constitution’s listing of certain rights does not imply that there are not other, unstated rights).

Although specific claims arise out of modern contexts, such constitutional arguments have earlier roots. In 19th-century America, conservative lawyers and judges looked for ways to give capital and industry judicial protection against reformist social legislation. They found the “due process” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment made to order. In an 1897 opinion (Allgeyer v. Louisiana), Justice Rufus W. Peckham defined “liberty,” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, to mean

not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.

Substantive due process was then used, above all, in defense of economic enterprise and laissez faire—for example, to strike down minimum wage and maximum hour statutes (as in Lochner v. New York, 1905). But the doctrine could be used to protect noneconomic rights, too, as when the Supreme Court in 1923 (Meyer v. Nebraska) struck down a Nebraska statute forbidding
THE SUPREME COURT AND AUTONOMY:

**Griswold v. Connecticut** (1965)
Invoking a right of marital privacy, the Court invalidated a Connecticut statute that forbade the use of drugs or devices for the purpose of contraception.

**Loving v. Virginia** (1967)
Declaring marriage to be one of the "basic civil rights of man," the Court unanimously struck down a Virginia statute prohibiting interracial marriages.

**Stanley v. Georgia** (1969)
Noting both privacy and First Amendment interests, the Court held that a state may not prosecute a person for possession of obscene material in his own home.

**Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville** (1972)
The Court unanimously invalidated a municipal vagrancy ordinance that was capable of being applied to people of nonconforming lifestyles.

**Roe v. Wade** (1973)
Interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as a protector of "liberty," the Court held that a woman, in consultation with her doctor, has an absolute right to decide to have an abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy and a qualified right thereafter.

**Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth** (1976)
Reinforcing the right to an abortion declared in Roe v. Wade, the Court in Planned Parenthood invalidated several provisions of a Missouri statute enacted after Roe, including the requirement that, for an abortion, an unmarried woman under 18 must have her parents' consent, and a married woman of any age her husband's.

the teaching of foreign languages to young children.

Another spur to personal autonomy cases is the idea of legal protection for privacy. Perhaps the classic sense of privacy is that stated by Columbia University Professor Alan Westin: "Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others." Claims to the right to control information about oneself are, however, only one aspect of privacy as that term has come to be used in modern law. Sometimes an individual resists intrusions, not in order to restrict access to information about himself, but rather in the
AUTONOMY & PRIVACY

IMPORTANT RECENT CASES

Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney (1976)
Without giving reasons, the Court summarily affirmed the decision of a federal district court in Virginia, dismissing a challenge to Virginia's sodomy law by male homosexuals.

Kelley v. Johnson (1976)
Distinguishing the "liberty" interests recognized in cases such as Griswold and Roe, the Court held that a county police department need only show a "rational basis" in order to uphold a regulation limiting the style and length of policemen's hair.

Finding a decision whether or not to bear or beget a child to be "at the very heart" of constitutionally protected rights of privacy, the Court struck down a New York statute that made it a crime (1) for anyone to sell or distribute contraceptives to minors, (2) for anyone other than a licensed pharmacist to distribute contraceptives to persons over 16, and (3) for anyone to advertise or display contraceptives.

Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977)
Ruling that the Constitution protects the "extended" family, the Court found that a municipal ordinance violated the rights of a grandmother by preventing her from living with her two grandchildren (who were cousins).

Beal v. Doe (1977); Maher v. Roe (1977); Poelker v. Doe (1977)
In Beal and Maher, the Court held that neither the Constitution nor federal legislation requires the states to fund nontherapeutic abortions for poor women. In Poelker, the Court rejected an attack on the refusal by the city of St. Louis to permit elective abortions in its public hospitals.

interest of being left alone, in having peace and quiet, or in not being an unwilling audience for unwanted messages or images (for example, music and advertisements piped into public buses and nude figures in sidewalk ads for pornographic movies). This is also the kind of "privacy" desired by people objecting to door-to-door solicitors or to obscene advertisements received in their mail.

Yet another kind of "privacy" claim turns out, on examination, to be a claim to personal autonomy or individuality—an assertion of the right to make choices as to one's behavior or lifestyle. Sometimes the behavior is private, such as the use of

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birth control devices; sometimes it is public, such as the wearing of long hair or casual dress in public schools. In either instance there is a claim to do as one pleases, free of state interference.

Zones of Privacy

The cornerstone case in the modern Supreme Court is *Griswold v. Connecticut*, a 1965 decision overturning the criminal conviction of defendants, including a doctor, who had been charged under Connecticut law with giving information and medical advice to married persons on means of preventing conception.* A majority of Justices agreed in striking down the law, but their reasons differed. Justice William O. Douglas found a "zone of privacy" formed by "emanations" from explicit guarantees in the Bill of Rights. Other concurring Justices looked to the Ninth Amendment and to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Justice Hugo L. Black, who dissented, thought the Connecticut law "every bit as offensive" as did his brethren. But that, he said, did not make it unconstitutional. Remembering how judges of another generation had read their own economic philosophy into the Constitution, Black complained of the *Griswold* majority's excessive willingness to discover a right of privacy: "The Court talks about a constitutional 'right of privacy' as though there is some constitutional provision forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge the 'privacy' of individuals. But there is not."

Notwithstanding Black's sharp dissent, *Griswold* quickly became a standard citation for litigants hoping to bring other kinds of behavior within the zone of privacy. That *Griswold* was concerned with the intimacy of a socially approved institution, marriage, did not prevent the decision's being cited in support of a wide range of behavior—such as sexual conduct between consenting adults—having nothing to do with marriage.

The concept of a constitutional zone of personal autonomy received a further boost in 1969 in *Stanley v. Georgia*, when the Court reversed a conviction for knowing possession of obscene matter. State and federal agents, looking for evidence of bookmaking in Robert Eli Stanley's home in Fulton County, Georgia, had instead found three reels of pornographic movie film. Georgia, seeking to uphold the conviction, said in effect, "If the State

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*Earlier challenges had failed when the courts ruled that the Connecticut law was not being enforced. However, in *Griswold*, a doctor at the Yale Medical School and the officers of Planned Parenthood in New Haven had openly defied the Connecticut statute by opening a birth control clinic in the city.*
can protect a citizen's body, may it not also protect his mind?" To that the Court responded that "a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds."

The composition of the Supreme Court changed markedly after 1969. By January 1972, four Nixon appointees—Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justices Harry A. Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William H. Rehnquist—had come to the bench. When they took their seats, the idea of constitutional protection for personal autonomy—as suggested by decisions like Griswold and Stanley—was largely untested, its underpinnings unsure, its contours unclear. One might well suppose that a tribunal in many ways more conservative than the Warren Court might be reluctant to expand the zone of personal autonomy and privacy. For one thing, the behavior for which protection was sought in some of the autonomy cases was often unconventional, even offensive to many citizens. Moreover, four justices appointed by a President proclaiming his belief in judicial "conservatism" might be slow to embark on an activist path of discovering new rights for which the Constitution offered no explicit textual support.

Nevertheless, some decisions of the Burger Court strongly endorse the thesis that there is an emerging zone of personal autonomy and lifestyle protected by the Constitution. By far the most remarkable opinion—as activist as any handed down by the Warren Court—is Roe v. Wade (1973), holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause protects a woman's right, as a matter of privacy, to decide whether to have an abortion. (Anti-abortion groups have reacted vigorously to Roe v. Wade, urging state statutes to limit its effects, congressional action to cut off federal funds for elective abortions under Medicaid, and a "right-to-life" constitutional amendment.)

**Abortion and Vagrancy**

The scope of the "privacy" right in Roe goes far beyond that declared in Griswold. For one thing, Griswold was more nearly concerned with privacy in the traditional sense, as the case involved the intimacy of the marital bedroom. What was at stake in Roe, on the other hand, was a claim of personal autonomy—the right to make and carry out the abortion decision without state interference. A further difference in the two cases lies in the nature of the competing state interest. In Griswold, the state was
hard pressed to show that a persuasive interest was served by regulating the contraceptive practices of married couples. In Roe, by contrast, the state could claim that in preventing abortions it was protecting an incipient life, that of the fetus.

The Burger Court has also decided several cases that give freer play to unconventional lifestyles. In a unanimous decision (Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 1972), the Court invalidated a locality's vagrancy ordinance under which, in the Court's words, "poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers" might be required to comport themselves "according to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville police and the courts." In another case (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1972) the Court vindicated the preferred lifestyle of the Amish by upholding their challenge to Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law. Even "hippies" had their day when the Court (in U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 1973) invalidated Congress's exclusion from the food stamp program of households containing persons who were not related, an exclusion which the Court majority saw as aimed at preventing "hippies" and "hippie communes" from getting help under the federal program.

Undeleted Expletives

Modern modes in speech—including expressions that others find offensive or tasteless—have been given constitutional protection, though not without dissent from some of the Justices. When Paul Robert Cohen, an opponent of the Vietnam War, entered the Los Angeles Courthouse wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft," he was arrested and charged with disturbing the peace. Reversing Cohen's conviction, Justice John Marshall Harlan observed (in Cohen v. California, 1971) that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." In another case (Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 1974)—in which a defendant had been cited for contempt when he referred in his testimony to another person as "chicken shit"—Justice Powell commented, "Language likely to offend the sensibility of some listeners is now fairly commonplace in many social gatherings as well as in public performances."

Such decisions—some resting on due process of law, others on the First Amendment, still others on other provisions of the Constitution—give individuals greater freedom to behave in ways that society at large may find unconventional or distasteful. In some of these opinions, the supposedly "conservative" Burger Court takes personal autonomy and the protection of unconventional lifestyles beyond even the "liberal" Warren
Court. On reading such opinions, a little more than a hundred years after John Stuart Mill wrote *On Liberty*, one may readily suppose that the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have become Mill’s disciples.

In fact, the Court has not gone as far as Mill. There are limits to the majority’s willingness to find new applications of a right to privacy or otherwise to create zones of autonomy for the individual and his self-expression. Some critics argue that personal appearance—wearing one’s hair or dressing as one pleases—ought to fall within the protected zone of personal autonomy. But the Court has had no difficulty upholding regulations limiting the length of policemen’s and firemen’s hair in the interest of discipline, appearance, and safety on the job. And the Court has steadfastly refused even to hear cases involving the length of students’ hair. Some lower courts have upheld challenges to school hair regulations, but the Justices of the Supreme Court seem to agree with the late Justice Black, who once observed that “surely few policies can be thought of that States are more capable of deciding than the length of the hair of school boys.”

Homosexuals have sought to have the Court bring their sexual preferences within the ambit of constitutional protection but have gotten short shrift. Some homosexuals attacked Virginia’s antisodomy statute on the ground that, as applied to the private sexual conduct of consenting adults, the law violated their constitutional right of privacy. In 1975, in the federal district court, one judge, agreeing with the plaintiffs, read *Griswold* and *Roe* as establishing that “every individual has the right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into one’s decisions on private matters of individual concern.” But that judge was outvoted by his brethren, who concluded that if Virginia, in the name of “morality and decency,” saw fit to forbid homosexual acts even when committed in the home, it was not for the courts to say that the state lacked that power.

When the Virginia case was appealed, the Supreme Court (*Doe v. Commonwealth’s Attorney*, 1976) summarily affirmed the lower court ruling, not even troubling to write an opinion. Nor have other homosexuals—such as a Washington State high school teacher who was dismissed for being a homosexual (he had not been accused of engaging in improper conduct)—had any success in enlisting the Court’s sympathies.

The lifestyle and personal autonomy cases have important implications. In the first place, no general theory of autonomy has emerged from the decisions of the Burger Court. The cases
have an ad hoc quality about them. Certain specific areas—marriage, contraception, abortion, child rearing, and family life in particular—receive judicial protection as "fundamental rights." But the Justices have not generalized from these specifics nor tried to weave them into an overall theory of privacy or autonomy.

Strong arguments can be made for judicial protection of personal lifestyles. Choices about personal appearance, manner, sexual behavior, and other aspects of "personhood" can reflect one's individuality and aspirations, much as do free speech and free exercise of religion—activities expressly protected by the Constitution. As University of Virginia law professors J. Harvie Wilkinson III and G. Edward White have commented, "A compelling mission of the Constitution has been to protect sanctuaries of individual behavior from the hand of the state." In particular, where there is good reason to think that the state is using its power to impose conformity, the case for constitutional protection becomes even stronger.

The Decent Society

Lifestyle and autonomy claims invite attention to the social interest alleged to be served by the challenged law. Where school hair regulations have been upheld, it has commonly been on the finding that they are reasonably related to the school's need for discipline and an environment in which education can flourish. When homosexuals seek constitutional protection, it is easier to understand the state's interest in deciding who shall teach young children in the classroom than it is to articulate the state's interest in what individuals in the privacy of their own home do with other consenting adults.

Personal autonomy cases illustrate the interplay between law and morality. Lord Devlin, a distinguished British jurist, has argued (in The Enforcement of Morals, 1965) that society is entitled to use law to enforce its "common morality"—his answer to those who hope to see "victimless" crimes such as homosexuality and prostitution decriminalized. Lord Devlin appears to have his followers on the Supreme Court. When the Court ruled (Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 1973) that states may regulate the exhibition of obscene materials in "adult" theaters, Chief Justice Burger emphasized the public's interest in the "quality of life" and its right to "maintain a decent society."

Sketching the contours of personal autonomy is not merely a philosophical exercise. When claims to lifestyle are poured into constitutional vessels, decisions such as Griswold and Roe
WHAT THE CONSTITUTION SAYS

The constitutional language on which Supreme Court Justices have based many of their important decisions affecting personal autonomy and lifestyles is rarely self-revealing:

**First Amendment** “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

**Fifth Amendment** “No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”

**Ninth Amendment** “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”

**Fourteenth Amendment** “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

raise serious questions about the proper role of courts as arbiters of contemporary standards. Sometimes the Supreme Court is explicit about its role in charting changing social values. In capital punishment cases, for example, there has been near unanimity on the proposition that deciding what constitutes "cruel and unusual" punishment requires looking at society's evolving standards. Less obviously, but still inevitably, people with claims involving lifestyles and autonomy ask the Court, in effect, to declare as constitutional law the Justices' notions of contemporary morality and fundamental right.

What we have witnessed is a rebirth of "substantive due process." Once used by conservative judges to defend property and the right of contract, this judicial technique is now used to create new zones of privacy. Some scholars welcome such activism. Stanford University Law Professor Thomas C. Grey sees the courts as "the expounders of basic national ideals of in-
individual liberty and fair treatment, even when the content of these ideals is not expressed as a matter of positive law in the written Constitution.” Others are more dubious of the legitimacy of the courts’ translating judges’ notions of morality into constitutional norms. Objecting to the Court’s failure in Roe to ground its abortion decision somewhere in the Constitution, Harvard’s John Hart Ely concluded in 1973 that, whatever the other merits of a principle, if it “lacks connection with any value the Constitution marks as special, it is not a constitutional principle and the Court has no business imposing it.”

Justice Black once took strong exception to the notion that judges have a “natural law” power “to expand and contract constitutional standards to conform to the Court’s conception of what at a particular time constitutes ‘civilized decency’ and ‘fundamental liberty and justice.’” Such warnings have fallen on deaf ears in Griswold and Roe and other “privacy” cases. The process of adding to the catalogue of protected “lifestyle rights” continues. In 1977, for example, the Court ruled (Moore v. City of East Cleveland) that due process protected the right of an “extended family”—a grandmother and her two grandsons (who were first cousins)—to live together, notwithstanding a municipal zoning ordinance designed to maintain “single family” neighborhoods. The Court, following the path of the late Justice Harlan, declared that “liberty” as protected by due process cannot be limited to “the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution.”

Whatever the cynics say, the Court does not follow the election returns. But its decisions have a way of reflecting the temper of the times. New patterns in family life, sexual mores, and self-expression have compelled judges to determine the limits to which society, in the name of morality, can restrict individual autonomy. Many will count it a clear gain that the judges have stepped in to dismantle outdated moral codes when legislatures have refused to act. But the way in which judges, lacking relevant constitutional language, have seemed to pick and choose among the lifestyles to be protected is cause for concern. Perhaps Justice Black was right in objecting to judges translating their personal predilections into constitutional law.
PERSONAL PRIVACY
AND THE LAW

by Kent Greenawalt

During the last decade, the right to personal privacy has gained the status of a central social value in America. This new emphasis is, of course, related to the long-standing American belief in personal freedom and the basic dignity and worth of the individual. But the more immediate cause has been public anxiety about the increasing dominance of government, corporations, and other large bureaucratic organizations—and fears of what these organizations may do with the vast amounts of personal information they accumulate.

Americans, with their traditions of English common law, Protestantism, and reliance on constitutional protection, have tended to be less tolerant than their European brethren of surveillance by government, the church, and other authority. Among the chief irritants of British colonial rule in America were the official inspections carried out under "writs of assistance"—general warrants that authorized searches of someone's property, home, and place of business for evidence of customs violations. American merchants, to be sure, did engage in extensive smuggling to avoid paying taxes to the British Crown, and some thus grew rich. Nevertheless, these searches contributed to the resentment that led to the Revolution of 1776.

The Bill of Rights, which followed closely upon the original Constitution of 1789, contains three explicit protections of privacy:

The Third Amendment prohibits the quartering of soldiers in people's homes during peacetime.

The Fourth Amendment bars unreasonable searches and seizures.

The Fifth Amendment contains the privilege against self-incrimination.
Many state constitutions have similar provisions. Yet, apart from these limits on the powers of government, and the traditional legal barriers against trespass and personal assault, American "law" played only a modest role in the protection of privacy through the 19th century.

At a basic level, privacy is a universal value. In all societies there is some compelling need for separateness and protection against encroachment. Yet, what is perceived as one's own, proper, personal space, and what are regarded as encroachments, vary greatly from one society to another.

Cultural anthropologist Edward T. Hall has noted, for example, that Germans tend to claim a larger sphere of privacy than do Americans or Englishmen—a demand epitomized by the German law that prohibits photographing strangers in public without their consent. 1 The English exhibit a certain reserve, which keeps others at a distance. The French appear to enjoy, or tolerate, physical contact in public places, but seldom permit outsiders to intrude upon the privacy of the home.

Beyond some minimal protection of personal space, the value attached to privacy is largely dependent on other varying social concepts. Marxist regimes preaching an anti-individualist ethic of social cooperation, not surprisingly, place little store on privacy. Liberal democracies, on the other hand, accord special privileges of privacy to the family, to religion, and to the sanctity of communication between doctor and patient, lawyer and client, and within the confessional.

Yet, in America, it was not always so. Our Puritan forefathers tried to regulate one another's activities with meticulous care. The Puritans allotted themselves quiet and solitude for private prayer, but church members also took seriously their mandate to expose one another's sins. Unmarried men and women, for example, were required to live within a family household so that they would not be free of observation and constraint. Even in later periods, despite our professed belief in liberty, we have tended to be intolerant of solitary eccentrics and suspicious of those holding minority views. Intense scrutiny of those with odd personal habits or unpopular political views

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has been, as during the McCarthy era, a forceful weapon in the suppression of deviance. And, as political scientist Alan Westin has indicated, a strong "populist" strain has nurtured the belief that democracy in America requires that political activity be open and that governmental bodies and associational groups have little legitimate claim to privacy.

The Sanctity of Solitude

Nevertheless, prevailing American conceptions have continued to attach importance both to individual and group privacy. The American notion arises from a set of needs present, if not always satisfied, in every society. At various moments, individuals seek solitude and intimate companionship. Privacy, in the most obvious sense, is freedom from outside interference, whether from a curious neighbor, a police officer, or from a radio blaring music from the apartment next door. In a more subtle, but perhaps even more significant respect, privacy can be invaded by intrusions into one's thought processes, as by brainwashing, psychosurgery, or, on a more mundane level, subliminal advertising.

A second aspect involves the protection of private information. Indeed, some scholars have gone so far as to define privacy solely in terms of the control that individuals have over information about themselves. One can feel "penetrated" or "exposed" or "threatened" as much by the awareness that one's intimate thoughts and feelings are known by others as by an unwanted visitor. Our expectations of privacy of information extend to some facts that are initially public. If, for example, we attend a controversial political meeting, we may expect our presence to go unnoted. No doubt, many who attended a speech by black activist Eldridge Cleaver at Iona College in 1970 were disturbed to learn later that police officers had recorded their names and the license numbers of their cars.

There is a third aspect of what has become the modern conception of privacy: the freedom to make autonomous decisions about one's personal life without interference—to work out one's own form of sexual satisfaction, to use drugs, to wear one's hair long. Individuals are freer to make many of these choices if their private lives are not exposed to public view. Thus privacy of information supports the value of autonomy. If there were broader public tolerance of deviant personal habits and behavior, there would be less need for secrecy and some forms of privacy might be less important than they are now.

During most of the 19th century, since the main threat to
privacy was the curiosity of one's neighbors, there was little need or possibility of curbing intrusions through extensive legal controls. What has caused a radical transformation in the problems of privacy are such changes as the development of mass media; the urbanization of American society; the expansion of federal, state, and local bureaucracies; the growth of huge corporations; and the much-publicized advances in the technology of information acquisition, retention, and dissemination.

It was the thirst for gossip and scandal of the mass-circulation newspapers and journals in the heyday of “yellow journalism” that triggered the initial formulation of a right to privacy in a famous 1890 law review article by two young lawyers, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery,” they wrote. Worried about exposure of private and family matters, they urged that the courts explicitly recognize the right of citizens to recover damages for unreasonable publicity.

The common law, they argued, granted “to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.”

Newspapers, magazines, and now television seek to appeal to audiences with news about the lives of the very rich, the very famous, and the very powerful, whether they be politicians, rock singers, or tennis stars. They also give us vivid details of the lives of ordinary people, like Karen Quinlan, who become caught up in dramas of compelling journalistic interest.

The Limits of Unreasonableness

The law in most states has made a response to the argument made by Warren and Brandeis. Between 1890 and 1950, the common law principle of an individual’s right to privacy was adopted by most states. The courts now routinely support the notion that damages may be recovered if one's name or picture is used for advertising or other commercial purpose without one's consent; one's private life is exposed to unreasonable publicity; one is placed in a false light by publicity; or one's seclusion is intruded upon.*

*Ralph Nader, in a suit settled out of court in August 1970 for $425,000, charged that General Motors invaded his privacy by interviewing acquaintances about his private life, tapping his telephone, having him followed by private detectives, and attempting to entice him into indiscretions with attractive women. In another noteworthy case, Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis in 1972 won the protection of a federal court from the attentions of an energetic free-lance photographer, Ron Galella, who constantly lay in wait for her and her children in order to take candid photographs of them.
Ironically, the shakiest branch of this law is the one that concerned Warren and Brandeis most—the right to be free of unreasonable publicity. The difficulty lies in the First Amendment right of freedom of the press, which sets limits on what can be considered unreasonable publicity.

The Price of Anonymity

Other changes in society have been more complex than the development of the mass media, making appropriate legal responses more difficult to determine. A city environment brings people close together and thereby impinges on privacy, yet urban living is notoriously anonymous. In contrast to the gossipy folksiness of many small towns, big city people today frequently eschew involvement with others, even to the extent of ignoring pleas for help from victims of crime.* One typical aspect of city and suburban life is the separation of one’s neighbors, work associates, and relatives. Even if neighbors acquire unwelcome information about one’s personal life, it is not likely to be communicated to the persons one most cares about.

Paradoxically, this increased freedom is offset by a different form of intrusion. Prospective employers, banks, government agencies, and the like can no longer depend on the widely held knowledge of a person’s character and circumstances that used to exist in the traditional small town. As a result, the collection of dossiers substitutes for personal acquaintance.

Because of the demands of public education, taxation, social security, welfare, and law enforcement, government agencies now acquire enormous quantities of information about people, including those who have never served in the military or been on the public payroll. A 1976 inventory showed that within 97 federal agencies there were 6,753 systems of records and 3.8 billion dossiers—many of them computerized—on individuals.

It is not sufficient to say that most information in public and private records is obtained from the subject or with his consent. Few people will forego the chance to obtain a job or other important benefit if that is the price of preserving privacy. What is needed is some fair assessment of whether the social value of information outweighs the cost to privacy.

The computerization of records poses a special problem. When a person supplies data about various aspects of his daily life—whether it involves banking, education, or whatever—he often does so with the hope or expectation that it will be held in a confidential manner by the collecting organization, used for a

specific purpose, and not released except as required by law or with the person's consent.

But record keepers—including corporations, insurance companies, hospitals, and credit bureaus—now routinely exchange information on a mutual basis. And computers can gather bits of information that, when assembled, may be used to support conclusions that would be impossible for those in possession only of the individual pieces of information. For example, if all of a person's personal checks are centrally recorded, an investigator with access to those records may be able to conclude that the person is living way beyond his normal income. Of course, the assumption that he has unreported income will sometimes be erroneous, as when he is spending savings or serving as a legitimate purchasing agent for a group. But even if the inferences drawn from records systems were uniformly accurate, the increased exposure of our lives to outside scrutiny would be disturbing.

Another fearsome feature of records systems—one symbolized by computers but not unique to computerized records—is their impersonality. Decisions affecting a person's credit, the availability of insurance, even access to a job may be influenced by records that are based on false or incomplete information. The problem is compounded when the individual involved has no ready access to the information filed and thus may be unaware of damaging data until he has already been victimized.

James C. Millstone, a highly respected assistant managing editor and former Washington correspondent for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, was one victim. Only when his insurance was abruptly canceled did he discover that he was the subject of a consumer credit report filled with innuendo, misstatements, and slander. It cost Millstone a lawsuit in 1976 to compel the credit reporting company to reveal fully its derogatory and inaccurate dossier on him.

**Truth in Spending**

Civil libertarians and others are giving close attention to the implications of "electronic fund transfer" (EFT) systems now undergoing widespread testing by banks and retailers in California and the Midwest. With EFT, payment for purchases is made at the point of sale by using telecommunications and computers to transfer money automatically from the bank account of the buyer to that of the seller.

Justice William O. Douglas once observed: "The banking transactions of an individual give a fairly accurate account of
his religion, ideology, opinion, and interest . . ." But the Supreme Court, in *U.S. v. Miller* (1976), recently rejected the argument that the confidentiality of personal banking transactions is constitutionally protected against federally imposed disclosure requirements.

“The Supreme Court decision,” according to the July 1977 report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, “comes at a time when electronic funds transfer services, and other developments in personal data record keeping, promise far-reaching consequences. . . .” The commission, which was created by the Privacy Act of 1974, worried that transformed EFT systems could become “generalized information-transfer systems.” For example, as with credit cards, both the payer and payee under EFT are likely to want a written record of the date and place of purchase and a description of the items bought. Thus, the monitoring of electronic transactions “could become an effective way of tracking an individual’s movements.”

**Privacy Post-Katz**

Record-keeping systems, of course, are not the only technological threat to privacy. Electronic eavesdropping and wiretapping have been especially useful to police, to federal security agencies—and to those engaged in industrial espionage. And both courts and legislatures have sought to bring electronic surveillance under some control.

The Supreme Court’s most significant step came in *Katz v. U.S.* (1967). The Justices overruled a 1928 decision (*Olmstead v. U.S.*) in which a sharply divided Court had held that a wiretap was not an illegal search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Four decades of scientific advance had produced miniature recorders and transmitters and a host of other electronic marvels with which it was possible to listen in on conversations without the awareness of those involved.

The Justice Department argued that Katz’s conviction for illegal gambling—based on evidence obtained from an FBI wiretap of his conversations with bookies from a public telephone booth—was perfectly proper; there had been no physical penetration of the phone booth. The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Potter Stewart, held that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” and that what a person seeks and expects to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.

The Court decision left the government free to engage in court-ordered eavesdropping if law enforcement officials could
establish in advance, to a judge’s satisfaction, that a wiretap or listening device would probably produce evidence of criminal activities. Prior to 1968, Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act had been interpreted to forbid wiretapping. But federal officials had done almost nothing to discourage wiretapping by local law enforcement officials, and the Justice Department asserted the right to wiretap as long as it did not disclose what it discovered. The result was federally authorized wiretapping against suspected foreign agents and domestic political activists, including civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

**Surveillance Without Warrant**

In the 1968 Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Congress banned all private electronic eavesdropping but permitted law enforcement agencies to eavesdrop under court order when investigating a broad range of serious criminal offenses, including, for example, all drug violations and illegal gambling. Whether wiretapping and roombugging should be allowed in ordinary criminal cases is the subject of recurrent debate, and many states continue to prohibit it. Advocates stress society’s need for better weapons against organized crime; opponents argue that the net of electronic surveillance catches innocent as well as criminal conversations. Even if one accepts the need for some eavesdropping, the present act permits it, in my view, for too many crimes and for too long a period.

The 1968 act left open the legitimacy of surveillance without a warrant for national security purposes. But the Supreme Court in 1972 (*U.S. v. U.S. District Court*) rejected the Nixon administration’s theory that “domestic subversives,” such as radical political groups, should be subject to surveillance without a court order. The Court left unresolved the constitutional status of warrantless surveillance by federal officials for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes both here and abroad.

Hearings on various proposals to curb national security wiretapping within the United States were held through the 1970s, spurred by intelligence agency abuses reported by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence headed by Senator Frank Church (D.-Idaho). The committee found that: “. . . through the uncontrolled or illegal use of intrusive techniques—ranging from simple theft to sophisticated electronic surveillance—the government has collected, and then used improperly, huge amounts of information about the private lives,
Proposals have been made by both the Ford and Carter administrations for congressional legislation authorizing electronic surveillance for security purposes under court orders issued on the basis of a less stringent standard of "probable cause" than would be permitted in an ordinary criminal case.

Such legislation would impose a degree of regularity and control that is now absent, but some civil libertarians are made very uneasy by the idea that wiretapping should ever be explicitly authorized without prior evidence of crime.

Certainly one lesson of the Watergate era, and of the post-Watergate disclosures of CIA and FBI excesses, is that even when the legal restrictions are spelled out there is a danger that overzealous officials will disregard them. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, U.S. intelligence agencies conducted surveillance of thousands of American citizens. Most of these citizens were not themselves suspected of committing crimes or contemplating espionage, but the government wanted to know more about their lawful political activities, on the theory that such monitoring might uncover covert criminal activities or connections to groups threatening national security. Some agencies, like the Internal Revenue Service, went further and undertook tax audits intended to harass individuals and groups believed to be politically hostile.

Alternative Intrusions

While government wiretapping and eavesdropping represent the most dramatic threats to personal privacy, there is a more mundane problem posed by the growing use of lie detectors and intrusive questionnaires to monitor the honesty of existing employees and to screen prospective employees for sensitive jobs.

Obviously, banks, educational and medical institutions, law enforcement agencies, and the like must protect themselves and the public from people with physical or moral disabilities that could impair their performance. It is certainly appropriate to ask a prospective bank teller if he has been convicted of fraud, and to inquire whether a would-be drugstore delivery boy has been a narcotics addict. But questions that require the most personal revelations, and techniques that seek to lay bare the applicant's emotional responses, often bear too little relation to any genuine need to be justified. Occasionally courts have intervened against overly intrusive inquiries. For example, a Pennsylvania junior high school was stopped from instituting a
program designed to identify potential drug abusers by questionnaires that asked about the home life of students and their attitudes toward fellow students. *

Thus far, Congress has placed few significant limits on the kinds of personal information that either the government or the private sector may seek. Obviously it is difficult to deal with such matters by general legislation. And Congress has proved unsympathetic to creating an agency that could evaluate the justifications and drawbacks of particular screening systems.

It has, however, sought to control the retention and transmission of information once it has been acquired by federal agencies. After finishing its 1974 inquiry into federal data banks, the House Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights concluded: "Once information about an individual is collected by a Federal agency, it is likely that information will be fairly readily passed on to other Federal, State and local agencies."

The ensuing Privacy Act of 1974 was based on the following premises: Individuals should be able to find out what information about them is contained in federal records and how it is used; they should be able to prevent data given by them for one purpose from being used for another without their consent; they should be able to correct or amend records about themselves; and organizations handling identifiable personal data should assure its reliability and timeliness, and prevent its misuse.

**Routine Abuses**

The law has not been a total success. Government agencies have found various ways to avoid some of its strictures, most notably by defining very broadly the "routine uses" of information that are exempt from the limits on dissemination imposed by the act. For example, the IRS is perfectly free to exchange income tax data with state and local tax authorities. Nevertheless, the law has compelled most agencies to be more careful, and it provides a reasonably solid foundation upon which improvements can be built.

Some years ago, it seemed likely that the judiciary would use constitutional concepts of privacy and due process of law to oversee the fairness of records systems, but the Supreme Court has evidenced little zeal for being drawn into such matters, rejecting individual claims in cases involving records of banking transactions, abortions, and the use of sensitive prescribed drugs. A few state courts have been more responsive, but the

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burden of protection now lies mainly on legislatures.

A logical further step in federal and state legislation is the extension of legal controls to cover record-keeping systems in state government and in certain key business sectors. Federal restrictions already exist to protect the privacy of personal information kept by schools and colleges that receive federal funds. The 1971 Fair Credit Reporting Act provides for some access by individuals to data about their credit ratings, as well as procedures for challenging inaccuracies. But the records held by banks, insurance companies, hospitals, and telephone companies are not yet sufficiently protected. We can, and should, continue to seek sensible and workable rules for record keeping and dissemination of information that can be broadly applied to major private organizations as well as all public agencies.

Too often in the past, incursions on control of information and other invasions of privacy have occurred as an unconsidered by-product of the pursuit of other objectives. The last decade and a half have taught us a lesson that must not be forgotten. New technology should be evaluated in light of its perceived effects on privacy and should be developed in a way that is responsive to society's values; for in the end, oddly enough, the loss of privacy represents a loss of control over our very lives.

The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.

This doctrine, set forth by John Stuart Mill in *On Liberty* (London, 1859; Norton, paper, 1975), was, as he put it, “anything but new.” But it is from Mill’s stout defense of the individual’s rights versus those of society, and from his concise discussion of the range of issues involved, that the modern debate over the relationship between law and morality can be seen to flow.

First to rebut Mill (with something of the same strength of argument) was Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, in *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity* (London, 1873; Cambridge Univ. Press, 1968). Finding Mill’s fundamental error to be “too favourable an estimate of human nature,” Sir James characterizes liberty as “both good and bad according to time, place, and circumstance.” He holds that the punishment of immoral behavior is an objective as legitimate as that of preventing harm to others.

A view of personal liberty developed a century after Mill is expounded in Baron Patrick Devlin’s collection of essays, *The Enforcement of Morals* (Oxford, 1965, cloth; 1970, paper). “The criminal law as we know it is based upon moral principle,” he writes, and he emphasizes a common morality as the cement of society. Thus marriage is both part of the structure of society and the basis of a moral code that condemns fornication and adultery.

Although he apparently leans more toward Stephen than toward Mill, Lord Devlin at the same time sees the rights of the individual as a competing interest that must be taken into account: “As far as possible, privacy should be respected.”

H. L. A. Hart, in *Law, Liberty, and Morality* (Stanford, 1963, cloth & paper), undertakes a modified defense of Mill’s position. He agrees that any restriction of freedom is an evil per se. However, there may, in his view, be grounds for justifying the legal coercion of the individual apart from the prevention of harm to others. Hart recognizes one form of paternalism—protecting people from inflicting harm upon themselves—as a permissible basis for making certain conduct illegal.

In his classic work, *The Limits of the Criminal Sanction* (Stanford, 1968, cloth & paper), Herbert L. Packer argues that “the law’s ultimate threat” should “be reserved for what really matters.” Packer sees the enforcement of morals as “a costly indulgence.”

A passionate plea for the invalidation of laws regulating sexual behavior—in particular, homosexuality—is made by Walter Barnett in *Sexual Freedom and the Constitution: An Inquiry into the Constitutionality of Repressive Sex Laws* (Univ. of New Mexico, 1973). Exploring constitutional attacks that can be made on “morals” laws, Barnett hopes to see the state “expelled from a sanctuary to which it should never have been admitted in the first place—the intimate private lives of its citizens.”

Alan F. Westin’s *Privacy and Freedom* (Atheneum, 1967), considered
by many scholars to be the best general
treatment of problems of privacy, is un-
fortunately out of print. It offers five in-
teresting case studies on polygraphs, on
personality testing, electronic eavesdrop-
ping, subliminal suggestions, and the "in-
formation revolution," as well as a 1960s
status report on relevant law at the time
Westin was writing.

**DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY:**
*Computers, Record-Keeping and Privacy*
(Quadrangle, 1972, cloth; 1974, paper) by
Alan Westin and Michael Baker is a care-
ful study of the effects of computerization
on privacy. The authors conclude that
computers have made less difference than
many Americans once feared but that
modern technology nonetheless poses
significant dangers. They recommend
legal protections for individualized rec-
dords. A related appraisal of computer
technology is Arthur R. Miller's *THE AS-
SAULT ON PRIVACY: Computers, Data
Banks, and Dossiers* (Univ. of Mich., 1971,
cloth; NAL, 1972, paper). Miller describes
possible protections for records systems.
And James B. Rule's *PRIVATE LIVES
AND PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE: Social
Control in the Computer Age* (Schocken,
1974), a study of five such systems in the
public and private sectors, shows how
large enterprises actually handle a vari-
ety of kinds of records.

Three useful collections on privacy and
autonomy for the general reader are
Richard A. Wasserstrom's *MORALITY
AND THE LAW* (Wadsworth, 1970,
paper); *PRIVACY* (Atherton Press, 1971),
edited by J. Roland Pennock and John W.
Chapman; and John H. F. Shattuck's use-
ful *RIGHTS OF PRIVACY* (National
Textbook, American Civil Liberties
Union, 1977). Wasserstrom provides ex-
tracts from Mill, Devlin, and the dialogue
sparked by Lord Devlin's lectures in Eng-
land and the United States. Pennock and
Chapman assemble essays by fellow so-
cial scientists and by philosophers, as
well as lawyers.

The Shattuck textbook on problems of
privacy and autonomy includes excerpts
from key Supreme Court opinions. Con-
cerning recent legal trends in abortion,
homosexuality, and other issues of au-
tonomy, little nonpolemical literature
exists as yet outside the dense pages of the
law reviews, and Shattuck is also a good
source for these articles.

Lest the reader who chooses to browse
through these pages of legalese should
conclude that they raise principles not
noticed by Britain's John Stuart Mill in
the mid-19th century, or facts not known
to every kid on the block until the 1970s,
one more background book of quite a dif-
ferent sort is recommended: David H. Flah-
erty's *PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW
ENGLAND* (Univ. Press of Va., 1972).

Under early American laws, Flaherty
reminds us, informing was an integral
part of the justice system. Informers got
a share of the fines that were levied.
"Whereas religion may have served as an
incentive for the elect," he notes, "money
was more stimulating to the unregener-
ate. Some remarkable individuals broke
the liquor laws and informed on them-
selves in order to claim a share of the
fine"—usually collecting extra money by
reporting on friends as well.

All in all, Flaherty's book is a bracing
study of our ambiguous Puritan heritage.
It illustrates the gap between moral codes
and the lasting realities of human nature.

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**EDITOR'S NOTE.** Most of the above titles were suggested for background reading by the
authors of the preceding articles, A. E. Dick Howard and Kent Greenawalt.
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with a population of 21,330,000, is a patchwork of ethnic entities. The country's 98,766-square-mile area (the size of Wyoming) is divided into six republics, plus two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo)—but, as the chart shows, none of these are as ethnically pure as their names suggest. Farming occupies almost half the population in a land which is two-thirds forested and mountainous. Per capita income figures for 1975 show Yugoslavia ($1,340) trailing both Greece ($2,601) and Bulgaria ($1,420).
Yugoslavia

Thirty years after President Tito, now 85, broke with Moscow, Yugoslavia has evolved into the world’s first “nonaligned,” “atypical” communist state. But everything is relative. American travelers reaching Belgrade from Moscow almost feel as if they were back in the West. Others, arriving in Belgrade from the West, have no doubt that they are behind the Iron Curtain. Here Washington journalist Dusko Doder, in an informal essay drawn from his forthcoming book, looks at the country and its prospects “after Tito,” and former U.S. Ambassador Laurence Silberman challenges the conventional American view of Yugoslavia’s role on the world scene.

A LAND WITHOUT A COUNTRY

by Dusko Doder

Perhaps understandably, Yugoslavia’s image in the West has never been sharply defined. Most Americans know little more about the country than that Marshal Tito fought the Nazis, defied Stalin, and in 1948 pulled out of the Soviet bloc. But even the Yugoslavs have a blurred conception of themselves. In ethnic terms, there is no such thing as a Yugoslav. There are Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and many other “nationalities.” Although they share a common South (or Yugo) Slav origin, they speak different languages, write in different scripts, and until 1918 had never lived under a common flag.

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Social differences are just as pronounced. In the north, the country is increasingly "bourgeois," the roads cluttered with billboards for Fiat, Lufthansa, and Coca Cola (osvezaza najbolje reads the sign—"refreshes best"). The region has been seduced, to borrow George Ball's phrase, by "ideology on four wheels." But in the backward south, peasants still tie two tractors together and drive them in opposite directions—as they once did with bulls—to determine which is the stronger. Throughout Yugoslavia, 9 out of every 10 homicides are due to blood feuds growing out of offended male pride or old tribal quarrels.

A Byzantine Politician

It has been said that there is, in fact, only one true Yugoslav: Tito. All nations, of course, have their great men, but Tito is unusual. As a dictator, he stands in sharp contrast to his contemporaries—the bloodthirsty Stalin, the fatuous Mussolini, the manic Hitler, the erratic Khrushchev, the unimaginative Franco. Tito is more humane; he has killed fewer people. He has been willing to experiment. And though he considers himself a Marxist, he is less an ideologue than a practical politician with a Byzantine mind.

In his mid-80s, Tito still jets around the world. His immense self-confidence has been reinforced, with age, by a growing conviction of his own greatness. Yet he retains a real hold on the people. "I am for Tito," a young textile worker in Pirot told me. "As long as he is alive, I know the Russians will not come here." And why should the Russians come? He motions toward the Bulgarian border. "Ask them over there."

Among intellectuals and some Party members, however, Tito's penchant for luxurious living provokes private sneers. As if to compensate for the rigors of his early life, 17 castles, villas, and hunting lodges are maintained for his use. For travel, the President has his choice of a special "blue train," a Boeing 727, a

Dusko Doder, 40, is a reporter for the Washington Post and a former Wilson Center Fellow. Born in Yugoslavia in 1937, he came to the United States after World War II. He received his B.A. from Washington University in St. Louis in 1961 and holds advanced degrees in journalism and history from Columbia. As a foreign correspondent with United Press International, he served in London and Moscow (1968-71) and has covered Canada, Cuba, the Middle East, and the State Department for the Washington Post. From 1973 to 1976, he was based in Belgrade as chief of the newspaper's East European Bureau. This article has been adapted from Doder's The Yugoslavs, to be published this spring.
yacht, and a fleet of limousines. The furniture inside the presidential compound on Uzicka Street in Belgrade might have been designed in Hollywood in the 1930s for a Samuel Goldwyn movie. Most Yugoslavs know this is not the way a Communist leader should live, but as one Yugoslav Marxist has noted: "It's far better to have a bon vivant type of dictator like Tito than an ascetic type like Stalin. Our man enjoys the good life and understands that we want to live better too."

One of 15 children of a Croatian peasant farmer, Josip Broz Tito was born near Zagreb in 1892. He left home while still in his teens and worked at odd jobs until he was drafted into the Austro-Hungarian army during World War I. Captured by the Russians, he joined the Bolsheviks when they seized power. He returned to Yugoslavia in 1920, joined the Communist Party, and in 1928 was arrested and imprisoned by the royalist government of King Alexander. After another sojourn in Moscow, he became secretary-general of Yugoslavia's clandestine 2,500-member Communist Party. By the time he began fighting the invading Germans in 1941, membership had climbed to a modest 12,000.

Tito had a gift for attracting bright young men, and he selected as deputies three men, all roughly 20 years younger than himself: Edvard Kardelj, a Slovene schoolteacher; Milovan Djilas, a Montenegrin writer and student leader; and Alexander Rankovic, a worker from Serbia. They would work with him for many years.* His guerrilla Partisans, meanwhile, emerged as the only force waging an uncompromising struggle against the Nazis. Tito won recognition—and supplies of arms—from the United States and Britain in 1943, as well as backing from Moscow. By 1945, he controlled the entire country.

Tito pursued rigorously Stalinist policies to crush domestic opposition after the war, but his foreign policy, which early hinted at his current "nonalignment" stance, was too independent for Stalin's taste. When the Russian leader sought to crush Tito in 1948, Tito fought back by adopting an even harsher Stalinist line at home. His anti-Western rhetoric reached new heights as he launched a massive effort to collectivize the countryside. At the same time, thousands of suspected Soviet sympathizers were jailed.

*Of the three, only Kardelj, Tito's heir apparent, remains in power. He has been a member of Yugoslavia's "collective presidency" since 1974. Djilas, author of The New Class (1957), Wartime (1977), and many other books, was expelled from the Communist Party in 1954 and imprisoned for five years. He now lives under a form of house arrest. Rankovic too is still alive; after serving as Minister of Interior and Vice President (and as chief of the country's secret police), he was ousted in 1966.
Russia's sudden economic blockade inflicted enormous suffering, and in 1950 Tito turned toward the West. (He had signaled his intentions a year earlier by sealing the Yugoslav-Greek border, thereby dooming the postwar Greek Communist insurgency.) Gradually he relaxed his police methods, abandoned collectivization, and began improvising a political-economic system of his own. The Yugoslav Communists were still Marxists, but as C. L. Sulzberger later put it, their dogma might "have been written by Groucho, not Karl."

The Last Hapsburg

Tito was never a romantic dreamer. More than anyone else in his regime, he understood the role of myth in politics. Ideology had to be adjusted to the mentality of backward Yugoslavs who saw the world in terms of ancient epics and legends. Tito reached the peasants not through appeals to class consciousness (they had none) but through displays of sheer physical courage and his movement's sympathy for all South Slav nationalities. He gave himself the title of Marshal in 1943—as he would later assume a regal lifestyle—in part because he realized that the trappings of power have a hold on an army of rustics.

The measure of Josip Broz Tito is not his vanity or his other human failings but the conception he has had of his country and its place in the world: nonalignment abroad and ethnic independence and "self-managing" socialism at home. As he said in 1945, he has no intentions of letting the big powers use Yugoslavia as "small change in their bargaining." At home, he has moved hesitantly away from the grim totalitarian practices of the postwar years and sought to offset the historical weight of Yugoslavia's accumulated ethnic hatreds. British historian A. J. P. Taylor has described Tito as "the last Hapsburg," an apt allusion to the problems involved in holding together a multinational state.

The Yugoslavs have been divided in the most profound way throughout the centuries. In the northwestern half of the country, for example, Roman Catholic Slovenes and Croats lived under Austro-Hungarian rule and belonged to the world of Europe. The Eastern Orthodox Serbs and Macedonians, on the other hand, were long plunged into the darkness that the conquering Ottoman Turks imposed on the Eastern Mediterranean world.

For more than a hundred years, a mad cycle of violence, insurrection, war, and conspiracy, culminating in the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in 1914, gave the Balkans a repu-
YUGOSLAVIA: A CHRONOLOGY

1804-1817 After four centuries of Turkish rule, Serbian uprisings result in creation of a semiautonomous Serbian state.

1878 Treaty of Berlin makes Serbia an independent nation.

1903 Assassination of Serbian King Alexander I; installation of rival dynasty under Peter I.

1914 Assassination of Austria’s Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo by Serbian nationalists; outbreak of disastrous war with Austria and World War I.

1918 Proclamation of Yugoslav Kingdom under Serb dynasty.

1934 Assassination of King Alexander III in Marseilles by Croatian separatists.

1941 Conquest of Yugoslavia by Nazi Germany.


1948 Comintern in Moscow expels Yugoslavia for “doctrinal errors”; Soviet-Yugoslav rift begins.

1949 Tito closes border with Greece, thereby greatly aiding the defeat of the Communists in the Greek Civil War.

1951 Yugoslavia and U.S. sign agreement whereby the United States supplies arms to Yugoslavia.

1954 Milovan Đilas expelled from League of Communists for “doctrinal errors.”


1961 Belgrade Conference of Nonaligned Countries, led by India, Egypt, and Yugoslavia.

1965 Major reforms advance concept of “market socialism”; end of price controls; devaluation of dinar.

1966 Alexander Rankovic, Tito’s chief of secret police, is ousted; police power is significantly restricted.

1968 Tito denounces Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.

1971 Economic problems spark outburst of Croatian nationalism; Tito threatens to use army to maintain unity.

1973 Yugoslavia permits use of country’s airspace to Soviet planes carrying supplies to Egypt during Yom Kippur War.

1974 Adoption of Fourth Constitution with provisions for collective presidency and greater decentralization.

1977 After some debate, the United States approves sale of nuclear reactors to Yugoslavia.
tation as "the powder keg of Europe." From the rubble of World War I, the Yugoslav union was born—the child of President Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of self-determination. It was a problem child from the start.

The most intense rivalry has occurred between the two largest nationalities—the Serbs and the Croats—who share a common language but little else. The smaller groups—the Slovenes and Macedonians—speak entirely different tongues; they have no leadership ambitions, but in other ways they are a problem, too. Each nationality has its own "national" church, which acts as spokesman for the ethnic community and, as a result, often bears the brunt of government repression. More police scrutiny is directed at the Croat Catholic Church, for example, than at any other organization in Yugoslavia.

Nationalist Passions

The 1.7 million Slovenes occupy the Alpine country in the far north. They speak an archaic Slavic language not easily understood by other Yugoslavs and have never had their own state. An industrious, practical people, they value the Yugoslav federation because it gives them a large market for their industrial goods. With 8.3 percent of Yugoslavia's population, the Republic of Slovenia accounts for 16.5 percent of the country's gross national product and more than 20 percent of its foreign trade.

Far to the south, the 1.6 million Macedonians farm among arid hills dotted with the symbols of long-vanished civilizations. In Macedonia, you needn't recreate the past; you are right in it—even though the men in Turkish-style black pantaloons and the women in long embroidered skirts carry transistor radios and haul their produce to the market in West German trucks.

The Croats, who number almost 5 million, are urbane and self-possessed, but nationalist passions run deeper among them than is generally believed. Many Croat intellectuals complain privately about the Yugoslav federation: "If Upper Volta can be independent, why not Croatia?" A proud people, the Croatians lost their independence in the 12th century, largely as the result of a quarrel over whether to use Latin or Glagolitic script. They were subsequently ruled by Hungarians, Austrians, and Turks, with portions of the Dalmatian coast under the control of Venice until 1805.

When the Croats joined Yugoslavia in 1918, they expected to be equal partners in the new state; instead, they were forced to accept a Serbian king. Centuries of subjugation have politically emasculated the Croat elite, whose experience lies in the realm
of intellectual opposition rather than in the exercise of political power. This has given an exclusivist character to Croat nationalists, particularly in their relations with the Serbs, whom they covertly fear and overtly despise.

The 9 million Serbs are as proud as the Croats—perhaps insufferably more so, because they are the only group of South Slavs who managed to throw off the foreign yoke (the last Turks were expelled early in the 19th century). Serbian ties with the Greek Orthodox Church are responsible for a bent for speculative thought that has left the Serbs without much notion of democratic procedures. It is not that they love freedom less, but that they love order more. Serbs have long dominated the army, the police, and the bureaucracy.

At national soccer games between top Croatian and Serbian teams, animosity runs deep. In one recent game, Croatians jeered so loudly that the government-run television network cut the sound altogether. In an earlier game, jubilant Croats celebrated victory by heaving cars with Serbian license plates into the Adriatic. Both incidents occurred, appropriately, in a city named Split.

Ethnic cleavages have been the most intractable of Yugoslav dilemmas. Before Tito, national rivalries produced a constant drama, marked by frequent assassinations (including King Alexander's in 1934), vocal opposition to Serbian predominance, and incessant meddling in Yugoslavia's ethnic affairs by other nations. During World War II, Serbs and Croats fought the Nazis but also slaughtered each other. Although some 1,700,000 Yugoslavs died in the war, only about 300,000 were killed by Germans. The rest were victims of fratricidal warfare—among Tito's Partisans, Draza Mihailovic's Chetniks, Croatian fascists, and others.

After Liberation

Out of this war-cum-civil war, Tito's Communist Party emerged as the only solid political force committed to the idea of South Slav unity. The Party had several advantages: able leadership, a clear sense of purpose, and a membership spanning all ethnic groups. Originally, the Communists adopted a centralized, "unitarist" approach to governing the nation (had not Marx proclaimed the natural erosion of ethnic differences under socialism?) and their rhetoric was enriched with confident predictions of future concord.

A largely fictitious federation was set up in which Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, and Serbia became constituent republics. A
YUGOSLAVIA

DJILAS: THE AGONY OF LIBERATION

At the end of World War II, Yugoslavia erupted in bloody factional strife. The scars remain to this day. Milovan Djilas's vivid recollections of those turbulent times are from his recent book, Wartime.

How many victims were there? I believe that no one knows exactly, or will ever know. According to what I heard in passing from a few officials involved in that settling of scores, the number exceeds twenty thousand—though it must certainly be under thirty thousand, including the Chetniks, the Ustashi, and the Home Guards. They were killed separately, each group on the territory where they had been taken prisoner. A year or two later, there was grumbling in the Slovenian Central Committee that they had trouble with the peasants from those areas, because underground rivers were casting up bodies. They also said that piles of corpses were heaving up as they rotted in shallow mass graves, so that the very earth seemed to breathe... Yet [the secret police organization] continued to carry out executions, according to its own often local and inconsistent criteria, until late in 1945, when at a meeting of the Central Committee Tito cried out in disgust, "Enough of all these death sentences and all this killing! The death sentence no longer has any effect! No one fears death anymore!"

The war and the revolution were at an end. But the hatreds and divisions continued to bring destruction and death, both inside and outside the country.


region between Serbia and Croatia containing Serbs, Croats, and 1.5 million Islamic Slavs—mostly around the city of Sarajevo with its 100 mosques—was declared the (single) Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Montenegro, a small Serb state whose people had defied the Turks and remained free in their wild mountains, become the sixth republic. Within the Serbian Republic were two autonomous regions: Kosovo, with its one million volatile Albanians (who have the highest birth rate in Europe), and Vojvodina, with a number of minorities, including Hungarians, Slovaks, Czechs, Romanians, and Ruthenians.

But government from Belgrade proved unwieldy. In the early 1960s, Tito sided with his Party's progressives and prepared the ground for the current experiment in which all nationalities are entitled to home rule and the right to full ethnic and cultural development—in fact as well as in law.

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How serious is the ethnic problem now? It is impossible to say. The evidence is too contradictory. Young Yugoslavs have much more in common than their fathers ever did; they have also lived through an unprecedented 30 years of peace. Moreover, the whole country is in the throes of a consumerism that sharply diverts attention from the spiritual to the material. Yet ethnicity remains a sensitive issue. One Croat, when asked whether he was happy that Tito, a Croat, was in power, shot back, “Tito is not really a Croat. Tito is a Communist.”

**Ideology Without Fervor**

Aside from the army, the League of Communists, led by Tito, is the only “national” institution in Yugoslavia. It defies conventional notions of a Communist Party as a tightly knit secular order imbued with ideological zeal. Quite the contrary. I have spoken to hundreds of Party members but have never found one who, when speaking privately, was a true believer. Undoubtedly among Yugoslavia’s 1.4 million Party members there must be a few zealots, but it is difficult for an outsider to discover who they are.

Ideological weakness among Yugoslav Communists is hardly surprising. Ideological conflict with the Russian Communists has left Yugoslavs disoriented. So have internal squabbles. First, Djilas was ousted in 1954 for advocating political pluralism. Then in 1966, Rankovic was expelled for opposing pluralism. Finally, Tito and Kardelj were themselves challenged in the 1970s on nationality issues by moderate Communists in Croatia and Serbia. These shifts have drained the Party’s proclaimed ideology of its vigor and left the rank and file confused and cynical.

Ironically, the Communists have done far more to foster the average man’s participation in politics than did Yugoslavia’s earlier regimes. Yugoslavs have never felt part of a body politic; they are generally far less concerned with national politics than with local issues—which usually mean ethnic issues. That is why Tito’s “self-management” doctrine, when finally applied in earnest in the mid-‘60s, appeared so ideally suited to the country. In brief, self-management sought to replace centralized economic planning with decentralized decision-making on the regional, local, and even factory level. And it has indeed introduced elements of civic and economic responsibility while easing some ethnic tensions.

It has also produced an upsurge of nationalism among the regional Communist Parties. The crisis in Croatia in 1971 was a
major jolt. There, the young Communist chiefs saw themselves as Croatia's national leaders, not as part of Yugoslavia's Communist leadership. Eventually, Tito drew the line. It was one thing to give workers more responsibility. It was quite another to watch centrifugal forces pull apart the ruling oligarchy. Tito set in motion a wholesale purge of the younger liberal regional officials, while adding several hundred thousand new members to the Party to replace ousted cadres. Party membership again became the prerequisite for all top jobs. "We had to do it," one senior Party official explained. "We were close to complete anarchy."

The Croatian crisis introduced a somewhat more repressive overall attitude in the mid-'70s (in 1975, for example, the regime banned the critical Marxist journal Praxis). Yet the Yugoslav system, taken on its own terms, still stands up well against other authoritarian systems. Despite the absence of serious public debate on key issues, a good deal more private and informal consultation occurs within the Yugoslav Party than in some political parties in the West. The hold of the Party on the average Yugoslav is like a choke collar on a dog: The leash is very long; one doesn't feel it until one forgets it exists. As Finance Minister Momclo Cemovic once put it, the Party is "like a schoolmaster who doesn't use his stick often."

A "Most Wonderful" Conspiracy

What makes Yugoslavia unique in the Communist world is its hybrid internal system—that mixture of socialism, capitalism, utopianism, and Balkan anarchism the Yugoslavs call samoupravljanje, or self-management. The country is a self-managed commonwealth; each citizen is a self-manager; together, citizens make decisions in a self-managed manner, suggesting a New England town meeting gone wild. Except for cars, homes, farms, land, and personal possessions, everything is owned by the state: banks, factories, newspapers, theaters, public utilities. The operation of each enterprise, however, from distribution of profits to capital investments, is supposed to be determined by its employees—unlike enterprises in the rest of the Communist bloc, where state and party bureaucrats make all the decisions.

Before the effects of Tito's economic alchemy were felt in the mid-'60s, Yugoslavia's system of central planning was almost identical to the Kremlin's. It was guided by experts in Belgrade who sought maximum growth, but it also produced waste, rigidity, uneven development, and chaotic distribution.
The replacement of Soviet-style economic centralism with self-management introduced the dynamism of the market place.

Many left-wing intellectuals outside Yugoslavia consider self-management an alternative to the two tested industrial systems, capitalism and communism, but as practiced in Yugoslavia it is really something else. Self-management, the dull official weekly Kommunist once noted in a rare flash of whimsy, "is the most wonderful ideological conspiracy in the world."

Self-management was hatched as an ideological conspiracy by Milovan Djilas and Edvard Kardelj in 1949 when, in the aftermath of Tito's feud with Stalin, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Communist movement. Djilas seized on Marx's idea of free associations of producers as a possible alternative to the Russian model: The six republics and most businesses would run themselves, with the government in Belgrade retaining responsibility for defense, foreign policy, and other "essential" functions. After much debate, Tito announced the new law of self-management in 1950.

For more than a decade, self-management existed primarily as a propaganda slogan, with most enterprises still controlled from Belgrade, but compelling practical reasons soon forced a more rational approach to the economy. The regime was faced with popular dissatisfaction. In 1958, some 4,000 coal miners staged a three-day strike in Slovenia—the first known strike in Tito's Yugoslavia. Stoppages spread rapidly. There were 225 strikes in 1962, and 271 in 1964.

The Economic Reform Act of 1965 ended centralized economic planning and introduced a market system. In a single stroke, the government shifted responsibility for business operations to employees, who were forced to sink or swim on their own. At first, factories stopped hiring, then began laying off workers. The shock brought self-management to life. The number of strikes dropped sharply.

A Touch of Madness

Perhaps, just perhaps, self-management might have worked properly in a highly advanced, ethnically homogeneous country, or in a Yugoslavia where all nationalities were in a comparable state of economic and social development. That was not the case. Although the acquisition of regional home rule, whose development paralleled that of industrial self-management, led to a laissez-faire economy and the release of unsuspected business talents, it also fueled graft, corruption, and cutthroat competition, and the country lurched into the bourgeois world.
There was a good deal of chaos to it all—and a touch of madness. The system quickly created regional interests, practically destroyed the unity of Tito's Party, and revived his ingrained fear of ethnic nationalism. Since 1972, Tito's lieutenant, Edvard Kardelj, has been charged with doctoring the system to keep it from acting up again. The state and the Party have reverted to the old system of tight control.

Faults and pretensions aside, self-management has introduced some real changes. It has legitimized self-expression and dissent—to a degree. More importantly, with its help Yugoslavia has managed a smoother transition to industrialization than any other East European country. The traditional agricultural society that existed before World War II (in 1938, 80 percent of all Yugoslavs lived on farms) has all but disappeared. Three out of five Yugoslavs now work in industries or services. Illiteracy is down to 15 percent; 70 percent of the people have electric stoves; purchases of cars, washing machines, and TV sets in the period 1968-73 showed a 100 percent jump over the preceding two decades.

But as historian Sir Charles Webster once cautioned, there is a difference between participating in and participating at decision-making, and self-management swings indecisively between the two. In some places, workers really run the show. In others, the enterprise is under management's thumb. One executive told me that his company had placed a Lear jet at his disposal. When requesting permission to land, his pilots are routinely asked to identify the owner of the craft. "I have trained them to reply to these queries, 'The jet belongs to the working people of ——,'" he said and gave the name of his company. He then broke into convulsive laughter.

If one of the problems of self-management is that it has not been successful enough, the other is that it has been too successful. With the elimination of state-subsidized jobs, Yugoslav unemployment climbed sharply. It now stands at 11 percent. One result has been a dramatic increase in the export of migrant labor, as young Yugoslavs travel to other parts of Western Europe to seek work. For 60 percent of these young workers, a West European job is their first.

About one million Yugoslavs at any given time are dispersed over the Continent from Sweden to Switzerland to France, most of them doing the hard, dirty jobs that prosperous West Europeans are no longer willing to do. Like migrants from Greece, Turkey, Italy, and Portugal, they man the assembly lines of automobile plants in Sweden, Germany, and France, clean the streets of Paris and Geneva, collect garbage in Zurich, and
YUGOSLAVIA

MILITARY POLICY

Defense Doctrine: Sensitive to their anomalous position between the Eastern and Western powers, the Yugoslavs base their defense upon the concept of a "nation in arms." A strong regular Army and a very large Territorial Force are the main components of the Yugoslav deterrent.

Regular Forces: Consisting of 20 divisions, the 193,000-man regular Army is well trained and well led. Domestic production accounts for 80 percent of arms needs, but sophisticated weapons must be imported. The Air Force is equipped with 287 combat aircraft largely of Soviet make, although a Yugoslav/Romanian fighter has been developed. The Army sees itself as the guardian of national unity in the face of both internal and external threats. In case of attack, the Army is to provide time for the Territorial Force to mobilize.

Territorial Force: Created in the late 1960s, the Territorial Force and its youth auxiliary numbers 900,000 and will eventually reach 3 million. Participation is compulsory, with units organized and commanded locally. In case of invasion, it is estimated that 77 percent of the population would be enlisted in the resistance. Belgrade hopes that the very existence of this force makes it clear to Moscow that Yugoslavia will be a far more difficult target than Czechoslovakia was in 1968.

unload cargo in Malmo. All earn handsome wages, especially by Yugoslav standards.

To get the money for a house (and a de luxe model Peugeot), Franjo Fric, a stocky, curly-haired lathe operator, left his hometown in Croatia in 1969 and spent two years in a Daimler-Benz automobile plant near Stuttgart in West Germany. There was no other way; in Yugoslavia he made the equivalent of $90 a month. "That was too little for my family. I wanted a house."

He was 34 when he went to Germany and didn't speak German. He lived in a factory dormitory with other Yugoslavs, four to a room, working overtime whenever possible, preparing his own food, and saving his money. "After a month," he recalls, "I was making the same salary as a German worker. And because I didn't spend it, I had enough after two years to come home and carry out my plan."

There is no reliable figure on the number of Yugoslavs who have lived and worked in the industrial centers of Western
Europe since the early 1960s, but it is probably several million. Yugoslavia has benefited enormously. Expatriate Yugoslavs send home more than $1 billion a year, the largest single source of hard currency for the Tito government. The sheer size of the current Yugoslav contribution to West European industry is staggering. Those one million workers—"our seventh republic," as the weekly Yugoslav newsmagazine NIN called them—account for nearly 20 percent of the country's labor force. This involvement in Western Europe has provided returning Yugoslav workers with the skills that helped propel Yugoslavia into the technical age.

Psychologically, the West is Yugoslavia's new frontier. Yugoslav migrants bearing cardboard suitcases and the stamp of Balkan life arrive in the industrial cities looking like turn-of-the-century immigrants at Ellis Island. They return home in new clothes that testify to the indelible marks of the West. The migrants' re-entry is frequently painful.

Finally, there is the political aspect. The expatriates have seen democracy at work and have become acquainted with the notion of social consensus. In Sweden, for example, they are permitted to vote in local elections even though they are foreigners. After returning home, they are not likely to accept authoritarian decision-making without a challenge.

**Titoism Without Tito**

In the winter of 1976, Belgrade's diplomatic community was buzzing with one of those periodic rumors about Tito's failing health. The Western wire services broadcast the speculation, and diplomats made cautious inquiries. As usual, the Yugoslav press said nothing. Then a week or so later, a photograph of Tito popped up on the front pages of the papers: Tito hunting in the Bosnian mountains, posing with a rifle beside the body of a dead brown bear. It was Tito's annual bear-hunting picture. But as the President grows older, his hunting exploits become less believable, and the temptation to crack jokes about them becomes greater and greater.

With the passing of charismatic leaders, countries invariably turn inward. Lesser men get bogged down in domestic problems, and dreams of masterstrokes in foreign policy fade. Tito's heir must come to grips with the most difficult question before the country: How much individual freedom can be permitted? Tito has grappled with the question for years, sidestepping the issue in many ingenious ways. He has adopted a series of half measures—consumerism, open borders, self-manage-
ment, ethnic rights, freedom of movement—all to divert attention from the central question.

But Tito’s heirs, whoever they are, will not have the broad popular appeal needed to sustain the Titoist illusion that something new has emerged at the juncture of Eastern and Western Europe and that new Marxist truths have been discovered. The genius of Tito has never lain in ideology but always in practical policy. He has sought to force on his country a cultural renaissance and an industrial revolution in only three decades. His has been an era of dramatic innovation. His heirs must seek a different muse.

It would be impossible today, short of cataclysmic civil war or direct Soviet intervention, to turn Yugoslavia into a people’s democracy of the East European type. It would be equally impossible for Tito’s heirs to turn the country quickly into a Western democracy. So cornered, they will probably try to maintain the status quo—Titoism without Tito. But the status quo cannot be maintained for long. Tito’s successors will have to move toward reform or find new props to shore up the autocracy.

For the new, younger men, this will be a dialectical situation. They have helped set in motion an improbable process of change and reform. In their lifetimes, they have seen the country transformed by electricity, technology, upward mobility. Despite these achievements, the right of the people to pursue their destiny in a free political environment has been denied. The country now seems to have reached the point where it is ready for the ultimate test, the test of personal freedom, without which all previous social experiments seem like ploys and illusions behind which an oligarchy simply maintained itself in power.

“We are in the age of Communist Reformation,” one prominent Belgrade writer told me. “In the 16th century you had different ways of interpreting the Bible. Now you have different ways of interpreting Marx. The regime remains authoritarian, there’s no doubt about that. But it took Tito five years to close down Praxis. In Russia, they could have done it in a few days without any fuss. The younger men would like to see a pluralistic society in Yugoslavia. As long as the old Partisans are in power, nothing like that will happen. But eventually . . .”
What is Yugoslavia's significance now? What will it be after Tito? Conventional answers usually point to the country's anomalous international position—neither Eastern nor Western, neither capitalist nor (in the Soviet sense) communist, neither neutral nor satellite. But these are descriptive clichés, not answers.

A real analysis of Yugoslavia's importance must focus on more tangible factors: on its geographical position, its volatile ethnic situation, its much-touted internal system of "self-management," and its "nonaligned" foreign policy. These elements define modern Yugoslavia. And, collectively, they must underlie any speculation about Yugoslavia after Tito.

Yugoslavia's geostrategic importance, for example, cannot be denied, especially with Greece and Turkey feuding within the NATO alliance, with Italy sliding deeper into a political morass, and with the Middle East as troubled as ever. What are the ramifications of Yugoslavia returning completely to the Russian orbit? What are the consequences of closer ties with the West?

And what of the thorny nationalities question? Surely a resolution of Yugoslavia's ethnic tensions, particularly the centrifugal tendencies of Croatians and Albanians, has implications for other nations facing similar challenges—Spain with its Basque minority, Great Britain with its Welsh and Scottish separatists, and most importantly, the Soviet Union, where more than half the population is not of Russian stock.

Then, too, there is Yugoslavia's precariously balanced internal structure, that indigenous brand of communism the Yugoslavs call "self-managing socialism" and outsiders dub "Titoism." Some Western analysts—among them, many State Department policymakers—view this hybrid regime as a possi-
ble model for the evolution of Eastern Europe. Others—Soviet planners, perhaps?—appear to find it a pattern for the evolution of Western Europe. And some American academics see it as a pacesetting example for the Third World. Indeed, they argue, there may be characteristics even the United States would do well to emulate.

Such analysts assume that Yugoslavia is important because it is betwixt and between: because it has forged an attractive middle course between the competing powers, ideologies, and cultures of capitalist West and communist East.* Yugoslavia, in this analysis, is like Bossom, the young Member of Parliament who rose to deliver his maiden speech. "Bossom, Bossom," muttered Winston Churchill, rolling the name over on his tongue. "Why, it is neither the one thing nor the other." When in fact, I would argue, Yugoslavia is rather more one thing than the other: more communist than socialist, more authoritarian than democratic, more anti-American than nonaligned. And much of the country's significance lies in the fact that the United States has failed to realize this.

Joycean Fictions

Take its internal system, for example. One cannot deny that Yugoslavia has introduced elementary aspects of a market economy; that its businesses have some degree of autonomy; or that political repression is less heavy-handed than in other Eastern European countries. But these modifications of orthodox, Russian-style communism are minor compared to Yugoslavia's efforts to adapt and apply basic Marxist ideology. "Self-management," after all, was never intended as a break from communism; it was a post hoc rationale to soften the blow of Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Communist movement in 1948. The Yugoslavs wanted, and got, their own compass; but the needle points in the same general direction as before.

To be sure, one hears diaphanous lectures in Yugoslavia about "restrictions" on the Communist Party, about what it should and should not do. But although the Party is called the "League of Communists"—deliberately suggestive of a friendly discussion group that does not actually decide issues, like the Ripon Society or the League of Women Voters—the fiction wears thin when, as in December of 1975, Tito sternly reminds his countrymen that they are governed by a Communist Party

*These scholars owe a considerable debt to Russian dissident Andrei Sakharov's controversial "convergence" theory. See Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom, New York: Norton, 1968.
dictatorship whose function is to lead.

This inability to articulate squarely the extent of Communist Party control is reflected in the oft-amended Yugoslav Constitution (which reads like *Finnegans Wake*) and in a series of recent statutes (which Yugoslavs describe as an “impenetrable fog”). The Constitution is thought to point to greater decentralization—politically and economically. However, Belgrade’s actual tendencies reveal a push toward greater centralization.

In Yugoslavia, there is still political repression; even private thoughts, privately confided to a private diary, can lead to imprisonment. The most effective way of dealing with a recalcitrant, “heretical” bureaucracy remains the purge. And since 1971, when Croatian and Serbian liberalism frightened Tito into tightening Belgrade’s control, Yugoslavia, in my view, has been tending toward more repression, not less.

Is this the Yugoslavia proffered as a model for East and West and South? Eastern Europeans may envy the relative freedom Yugoslavs now enjoy. But the Poles, Czechs, East Germans, and Hungarians—even the Russians—do not take Yugoslavia’s institutional structures seriously. Without the presence of Soviet troops, as the Czechs tried to show in 1968, the rest of Eastern Europe would quickly liberalize beyond the point Yugoslavia has reached.

In Western Europe and America, only academic romantics enchanted by false images of workers’ councils dancing around maypoles believe Yugoslav “self-management,” with all its contradictions, worth emulation. Even the radicals of the Third World, infatuated with verbal Marxism, have not paid close attention to Yugoslavia’s domestic policies. Indeed, during my time in Belgrade, Third World diplomats seemed particularly patronizing towards Yugoslavia’s static experimentation.

**Anti-American Nonalignment**

By contrast, Yugoslav foreign policy commands enormous Third World attention and admiration. Tito has deftly maneuvered between the two superpowers, and he helped found the 86-member “nonaligned” bloc that has successfully manipu-

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The importance of Yugoslavia's strategic location on the Adriatic Sea is reinforced by the ideological diversity of her neighbors. The United States has no current aid agreement with Tito but did provide just under $700 million in military assistance between 1951 and 1959. Economic aid totaled $2.2 billion during the years 1951 through 1966, with most of this coming during the 1950s.

lated the United Nations in order to amplify and thereby exaggerate its own power. The mistake here is to take "nonalignment" to mean nonalignment. For it does not.

Yugoslavia follows an anti-American foreign policy. It is structurally independent of the Soviets but pursues similar basic goals. And while nonalignment has brought some tangible economic benefits to Yugoslavia—such as cheaper Libyan and Iraqi oil, as well as joint industrial ventures with African nations—it is a strategy based less on pragmatism than on ideology.

Tito, with India's Nehru and Egypt's Nasser, launched the nonaligned movement in 1961. Its members range from Brazil and Argentina on the right to Cuba and North Korea on the left; the fulcrum, however, is decidedly to the left of center. The nonaligned nations, led by Yugoslavia, consistently oppose the Western democracies—particularly American economic and political power. They have called for the "decolonization" of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands and for withdrawal
In October of 1949, the Soviet humor magazine Krokodil portrayed Tito as ready to sell Yugoslavia to Wall Street and likened him to Adolf Hitler.

of U.S. troops from South Korea. In the United Nations, they supported the "Zionism-is-racism" resolution of 1975.

But that's not all. The Yugoslavs allowed Soviet overflights to supply the Arab armies in 1973 and the pro-Soviet MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) during the Angolan civil war in 1976. They have fed fictional accounts to the State Department concerning their violations of the terms of at least half a dozen trade contracts with the United States. And most recently, they have sent U.S.-built tanks to Ethiopia in blatant disregard of solemn agreements with this country.

After Tito, What?

As I have noted before,* U.S. policy toward the Yugoslavs, oddly, takes little of this into account. To paraphrase Dr. Johnson, the State Department has but two ideas about Yugoslavia, and they are wrong ones: that our only interest in Yugoslavia is to prevent it from sliding back into the Soviet bloc; and that we further that end by providing open-ended military and economic support. On the first point, surely U.S. interests also include undercutting Yugoslav attempts to frustrate American aims throughout the world. Moreover, the Yugoslavs stayed Moscow's hand without our help for three years (1948–51) and have maintained a credible deterrent ever since. A Russian invasion against a "population in arms" on rugged Balkan terrain would cost Moscow dearly. On the second point, our one-way friendship seems only to have encouraged the Yugoslavs to see how far they can go. It may well be that the less support Yugoslavia got from the United States, the more it would feel obliged to resist Soviet pressure in order to maintain its autonomy.

* See "Yugoslavia's 'Old' Communism: Europe's Fiddler on the Roof," in Foreign Policy, Spring 1977.
Whatever the merits of that argument, U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia will probably undergo a major upheaval when 85-year-old Josip Broz Tito finally relinquishes his astonishingly persistent hold on this life. The questions then facing the Yugoslavs will be the very ones confronting State Department planners: What will happen to Tito's foreign policy ventures? What will become of Yugoslavia's mixed-bag domestic program? And how will the Soviets respond? No one can answer these questions; at best we can only guess.

Even in the late 1930s, Tito was called Stari ("the old one") by his much younger subordinates—who today make up the aging Yugoslav leadership. No one in the country in a position of influence has known a time when Tito didn't potentially, if not actually, exercise ultimate authority. No matter how much the Yugoslavs seek to discount the impact of Tito's death by prior arrangements to assure continuity—the Constitution, for instance, provides for a collective nine-man presidency to succeed the Marshal—it is unlikely that Titoism, in all its unique manifestations, can long survive its creator.

Yugoslav foreign policy seems most likely to change. After Tito, it will probably recede in importance both to the Yugoslavs and to the world. When a leader achieves a greater impact on the global stage than his country's size or wealth would dictate, his death is usually followed by a period of retrenchment. India turned inward after Nehru, France after De Gaulle, Ghana after Nkrumah, Indonesia after Sukarno, Egypt after Nasser. (Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat's bold Mideast initiatives have been prompted largely by a desire to disentangle Egypt from foreign conflict.)

Pluralism's Appeal

But what will turning inward do to Yugoslavia's internal development? Will the system gravitate towards the West? The Belgrade leadership denies this—as, of course, it must. But the average Yugoslav does, in fact, look towards Western Europe to see the direction of Yugoslav change. The influence of Western culture is pervasive and Western economic progress, which Yugoslavs envy, is seen by most Yugoslavs as inextricably linked to Western political structures.

Even the new middle class—those professionals, technocrats and intellectuals who achieved newfound status under Tito's Communism, and who might be thought to have much to gain by a continuation of the status quo—appear sympathetic to political pluralism and restraints on government power. Natu-
rally, the Communist Party does not lightly contemplate loss of its influence. But there are diverging currents within that organization, and certainly some of its leaders are not immune to pluralism's appeal. Edvard Kardelj, the most influential Yugoslav after Tito, recently predicted in his typically elliptical fashion the evolution of a unique Yugoslav pluralism. That he spoke in such terms at all—"pluralism" had been officially taboo—reveals the party's sensitivity to underlying currents.

The Army is another matter; it is probably the most conservative force in Yugoslavia, and anti-Western attitudes are a good deal more prevalent in the military than many in the West have hoped or imagined. While the only real function of the Yugoslav military (Belgrade's propaganda to the contrary) is to deter and, if need be, counter a threat from the Soviet Union, the military is indoctrinated in training as if the primary threat were from NATO. Even a gradual move towards Western pluralism could be bumpy, and the Yugoslav military—like most militaries—prefers a stable political climate.

Post-Tito Yugoslavia could well move towards the West in fits and starts, dragging the military along like a sea anchor. But there are two unknowns: the nationalities problem and the Soviets. We simply cannot know how virulent Croatian or, for that matter, Albanian separatism will become. Some recent Croatian émigrés have displayed a shocking, devil-take-the-hindmost attitude towards Croatian independence. This view is not dominant inside Croatia, but one would be foolish to discount it. Any sign of real separatism, as opposed to simple Croatian desires for greater federalism, might decisively chill Belgrade's push for liberalization.

As for the Soviets, there may well be a small planning group in the Kremlin whose job it is to calculate the degree of Yugoslav deviance that amounts to abandonment of communism and, thereby, deals an unacceptable blow to the Leninist doctrine of inevitable triumph. If so, the Soviet response is unpredictable; unfortunately, so too is that of the United States.
In 1937 British novelist and journalist Rebecca West, with her banker husband, spent an Easter holiday in Yugoslavia. The vitality of its people and the primitive countryside captured her imagination. She went on to immerse herself in the research for BLACK LAMB AND GREY FALCON: A Journey Through Yugoslavia (Viking, 1941). Her 1,180-page book remained in print for 33 years and is still available in most libraries. It may be the best book ever written about Yugoslavia.

Dame Rebecca’s rich, old-fashioned mixture of travelogue, cultural history, and political reportage builds slowly but once begun is hard to put down. She combines an encyclopedic knowledge of political theory and the past with a gift for conveying ideas through the reality of people, places, and events.

A willful, charming trio of Yugoslavs meets the travelers on the railway station platform as they arrive in Zagreb and provides a kind of chorus for her narrative. They are Constantine, a Serbian Jew of Polish descent who sees Yugoslavia as a political necessity; Valetta, who believes in an autonomous Croatia and “might suddenly stop smiling and clench his long hands and offer himself up to martyrdom for an idea”; and Gregorievitch, the oldest, also a Croat and veteran of the struggle against Austro-Hungarian domination. To Gregorievitch, Yugoslavia is “the Kingdom of Heaven on earth” and Valetta is a traitor, while Constantine “seems impious in the way he takes the nation for granted.”

Their Yugoslavia—a nation-state that emerged from World War I after centuries of alien rule—is not Tito’s Yugoslavia, any more than Rebecca West’s Europe of wagon-lits and leisure is today’s Europe of autobahns, 747s, and hurry-up. But her chronicle of quarrels among compatriots in a period of relative freedom from outside pressures between the wars links the present to the historic past.

A good, brief survey of the country’s divided East-West background is provided in A SHORT HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA: From Early Times to 1966, edited by Stephen Clissold (Cambridge, 1966, cloth; 1968, paper). Five noted British historians and observers of the Balkans offer lucid studies of the individual states and regions that were patched together to make Yugoslavia in 1918; these are followed by analyses of political, economic, and military developments to the mid-’60s.

What happened in the mountains and fertile valleys of Yugoslavia before its first incarnation as a unified, predominantly peasant state is too complex for successful compression, even in the 282 pages of the Cambridge Short History. But the essayists clarify the importance of the resistance offered by the Yugoslav peasantry to the invading armies that from time immemorial have marched into southeastern Europe. Much of the energy of these disparate rural groups was devoted to attempts to absorb, dominate, or unite with one another against a common enemy.

The Turkish victory at Kosovo in 1389 led to the destruction of the medieval Serbian state, the conversion to Islam of most of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and the dependence of Croatia and Dalmatia on the Catholic powers (Hungary, Austria, Venice). Not until the plight of Macedonian Christians, recoiling before further “Ottomanization,” precipitated the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 was Turkey finished in Europe. The imprint of the eastern
(Ottoman) empire remained—just as the influence of the western (Austro-Hungarian) empire survived Woodrow Wilson’s insistence on Yugoslavia’s independence following World War I.

That this political amalgam of antagonistic rural peoples lasted through the inter-war years is remarkable. That the imposed and inherited differences among them erupted in civil war even as they fought against the Axis occupiers is no surprise. That their union was reaffirmed by the Partisans and then was formally re-established “under the stern guidance of Marshal Tito’s Communist regime” is, as Clissold remarks, “a notable achievement.”

U.S. diplomat Walter R. Roberts, in TITO, MIHAJLOVIĆ, AND THE ALLIES, 1941–45 (Rutgers, 1973), gives a well-documented account of the World War II Resistance and the civil war in which Tito triumphed over Droja Mihailović’s Chetniks. Tito emerged as “a foreign Party leader who did not owe his existence to the Soviet Union” and who therefore could not be “a true and reliable Communist in Stalin’s eyes.” Roberts concludes that only an Allied landing in Yugoslavia might have altered the outcome of the internal struggle.

Dissident Yugoslav writer Milovan Djilas has published 12 books in the West. THE NEW CLASS (Praeger, 1957, cloth; 1974, paper), which followed his 1954 break with Party leaders, was a devastating portrayal of Communist bureaucrats and bigwigs. His latest, WARTIME (Harcourt, 1977), is an old Partisan’s account of the brutal 1941–45 struggles that Roberts covers as an outsider.

A variety of analyses of Yugoslavia’s special hybrid brand of socialism have appeared in the 1960s and 70s. Today’s Yugoslavia is a political scientist’s dream and an irresistible challenge to sociologists and economists.

YUGOSLAVIA AND THE NEW COMMUNISM, by George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal (Twentieth Century Fund, 1962) is the enduring granddaddy of these books. The authors voice the scholarly consensus: After Tito (his death or “retirement” was a bone already being chewed 16 years ago), Titoism—neither totalitarian nor democratic—will endure.

Tensions notwithstanding, Yugoslav institutions are still as likely to succeed as they are to fail in realizing “their own proclaimed principles of self-managing socialist democracy,” according to Dennison Rusinow in THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIMENT, 1948–1974 (Univ. of Calif., 1977). Rusinow, who has worked in Yugoslavia and Austria with the American Universities Field Staff since 1963, provides a good introduction to domestic politics.

No comparable single study dealing with Yugoslav foreign policy exists. However, John C. Campbell’s TITO’S SEPARATE ROAD: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics (Harper, 1967) traces Belgrade’s changing ties not only with Washington but also with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the Third World from Tito’s 1948 split with Stalin. “Yugoslavia needs both the East and the West in its trade and other economic relations,” Campbell wrote 10 years ago. Most U.S. diplomats today share his opinion that the West “has the opportunity... to strengthen the country’s independence.” A. Ross Johnson’s YUGOSLAVIA: In the Twilight of Tito (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1974) covers recent twists and turns in Yugoslav nonalignment policy and military strategy. His prognosis: “For all its internal controversies, Yugoslavia will at worst muddle through.”

In AN ESSAY ON YUGOSLAV SOCIETY (White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1969) and THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC SYSTEM: The First Labor-Managed Economy in the Making (Sharpe, 1976),
Branko Horvat, a provocative Belgrade economist, criticizes foibles and weaknesses that he knows first hand. He writes that Yugoslav socialism will stand or fall on its success at the factory level, and that "there is still a long way to go to the realization of genuine self-management."

Barnard professor Deborah D. Milenkovic, in PLAN AND MARKET IN YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC THOUGHT (Yale, 1971), questions whether a socialist state can decentralize and remain socialist. It can, she concludes, but she believes that centrally planned production and investment decisions in Yugoslavia became impossible for strictly political reasons. The interests of the six republics differed so sharply that "no consensus about . . . objectives . . . [or] development strategy was possible."

An interesting new addition to the literature on Tito's Yugoslavia is PRAXIS: Marxist Criticism and Dissent in Socialist Yugoslavia (Indiana Univ., 1977), edited by Gerson S. Sher. The Praxis group, named after the bimonthly journal published in Belgrade from 1965 until its suppression by the authorities in 1975, were Marxist dissidents. The magazine was perhaps the most freewheeling publication in the Communist world and an ornament of Yugoslavia's unique road to socialism. Notable in Sher's volume is a reprint from the final issue of an article by novelist Dobrica Cosic (himself a lifelong Communist and until 1968 a member of the Serbia Party's central committee). "We have been deceived, but we are also swindlers," says Cosic. "Deprivation of freedom is, socially, the worst crime."

In January of this year, Cosic's new novel, A TIME OF DEATH (Harcourt, 1978), appeared in English translation. Set in 1914, it is an epic of the period when the peasant army of Serbia fought starving Austrian troops, while Serbia's Prime Minister was trying to secure Russian aid, and Serbia and Bulgaria also warred over a helpless Macedonia. The confusion of nations and interests against which personal dramas are played out reflects the great themes of Yugoslav historical fiction.

The classic among such novels is Ivo Andric's THE BRIDGE ON THE DRINA (Allen & Unwin, 1959; Univ. of Chicago, 1977, paper). Dr. Andric, a Yugoslav diplomat, wrote in the Serbo-Croatian language. Bridge, first published in Belgrade in 1945, won the Nobel Prize for literature in 1961. It is a deeply moving story about passing generations—Moslem and Christian—in the Bosnian town of Visegrad. Their lives are dominated by a stone bridge of remarkable grace and strength built in the 16th century at the order of an enlightened grand vizier. Yet another Yugoslav symbol (with Rebecca West's black lamb and grey falcon), the bridge survives winter ice, spring floods, wars, and local feuds until it is blown up in the fighting between Serbian and Austrian troops in the Balkan Wars. As the bridge crumbles under shellfire, the town's eccentric old Moslem hodja dies, thinking, as his heart gives out: "Anything might happen. But one thing could not happen; it could not be that great and wise men of exalted soul who would raise lasting buildings for the love of God, so that the world should be more beautiful and man live in it better and more easily, should everywhere and for all time vanish from this earth . . . That could not be."

EDITOR'S NOTE. Advice and comments on a number of books were supplied by Laura D'Andrea Tyson, assistant professor of economics, the University of California at Berkeley, and a participant in a conference on Yugoslavia held by the Kennan Institute of the Wilson Center in October 1977. Ruzica Popovitch, Yugoslav area specialist at the Library of Congress, also made valuable suggestions.
The principal actors in the drama of Reconstruction were President Abraham Lincoln, Radical Republicans Sen. Charles Sumner of Massachusetts and Rep. Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, President Andrew Johnson, and President Rutherford B. Hayes, elected in 1876.
Reconstruction
1865–1877

The Reconstruction era after the Civil War has been called "the bloody battleground of American historians"—so fierce have been the scholarly arguments over the missed opportunities following black emancipation, the readmission of Southern states to the Union, and other critical developments of the 1865–1877 period. The successes and failures of Reconstruction retain a special relevance to the civil rights issues of the present day. Here, three noted historians offer their interpretations: Armstead L. Robinson reviews the politics of Reconstruction; James L. Roark analyzes the postwar Southern plantation economy; and James M. McPherson compares the first and second Reconstructions.

THE POLITICS
OF RECONSTRUCTION

by Armstead L. Robinson

The first Reconstruction was one of the most critical and turbulent episodes in the American experience. Few periods in the nation's history have produced greater controversy or left a greater legacy of unresolved social issues to afflict future generations.

The postwar period—from General Robert E. Lee's surrender at Appomattox in April 1865 through President Rutherford B. Hayes's inauguration in March 1877—was marked by bitter partisan politics. In essence, the recurring question was how the
Northern states would follow up their hardwon victory in the Civil War. The downfall of the Confederacy not only assured the permanence of the federal union but also confirmed the destruction of the "peculiar institution" of slavery.

How to readmit 11 former Confederate states and how to guarantee the rights of 3.5 million former slaves became the central issues of Reconstruction. To the extent that our society, a century later, continues to experience racial crises, and that our national politics must reckon with the remnants of a self-consciously "Solid South," it is clear that the first Reconstruction failed to resolve these central issues completely. Thus, the ambiguous heritage of this failure remains relevant to contemporary America.

The partisan battles in Washington during Reconstruction raised very basic questions, questions then focused around Southern readmission and emancipation. The struggle between Congress and the President for control over the process of readmission foreshadowed the subsequent political crises generated by conflicts between an expansive modern Presidency and the statutory powers of the legislative branch.

Reconstruction also produced America's first truly national political scandals, especially the Crédit Mobilier and the Whiskey Ring episodes. These scandals forced the country to wrestle with the conflict arising when certain practices condoned in the world of business were transferred to the arena of public trust. And, lastly, Reconstruction raised the question of how far the government would go in the resolution of racial inequality in America.

Confusion and conflict marred the nation's post–Civil War years. What renders Reconstruction such an enigma is the pervasive sense that somehow American society bungled the process of national reconciliation. So complete was the Northern military victory in 1865 that the way seemed clear to make good on Abraham Lincoln's promise, in his second inaugural, of reunification "with malice toward none and charity toward all." Yet malice proved to be the stock in trade of many Reconstruction politicians, and charity is difficult to discern amid the fury

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of Ku Klux Klan violence. Far from generating a national political consensus, Reconstruction was marked by confusing discontinuities as first Lincoln, then Andrew Johnson, then the Radical Republicans, and then Ulysses S. Grant and Rutherford B. Hayes took turns directing and misdirecting Washington’s efforts to cope with the ebb and flow of the intertwined national and local struggles over readmission and emancipation.

We normally think of Reconstruction as beginning with the end of the Civil War. However, the political struggles of the postwar period make no sense whatsoever unless viewed as part of a sustained debate whose roots lay in the war itself. Both emancipation and readmission influenced the conduct of the Civil War. Indeed, much of the postwar bickering between the President and Congress must be understood as an attempt to resolve questions raised during the war but left unresolved at its conclusion.

The Spoils of War

The struggle between Lincoln and some of the Republicans in Congress for control over the readmission process opened almost as soon as the war began. In July 1861, a sharp debate arose over a proposal by Illinois Republican Senator Lyman Trumbull that would have given Congress the right to control military governments established in areas recaptured from the Confederacy. The battle over emancipation followed a similar course. The prominent New York abolitionist Lewis Tappan, for example, published a pamphlet on May 14, 1861 that insisted, "Slavery is the cause of the present war ... What then is the remedy? ... Immediate Universal Emancipation."

Thus, pressure from antislavery radicals to transform Lincoln’s struggle to save the Union into a war against slavery went hand in hand with congressional insistence that the legislature ought to control readmission of the rebel states. Paralleling the military struggle to win the Civil War were a series of disputes about how best to conduct it and how to get the most from the hoped-for victory.

The wartime argument within the ruling Republican Party over the readmission question turned upon the theoretical issue of how to describe the process of secession. Radicals such as Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts and Representative Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania argued that secession ought to be viewed as "state suicide," while Lincoln insisted that secession was the result of treasonous political leadership. Beneath these semantic differences lay the substance of their dis-
pute. For if the state suicide theory prevailed, then Articles I and IV* of the Constitution gave Congress the obligation to establish the terms upon which these former states could be re-created. But if the treasonous leadership concept was accepted, then all a president had to do was use his power as commander in chief to punish the traitors and restore civil order. Having done so, he could then empower loyal Union men to revive the state and restore it to its former status.

By recognizing a phantom government headed by Francis H. Pierpont at Wheeling as the legitimate government of Virginia, Lincoln actually began presidential Reconstruction in June 1861. This regime had no power. However, Lincoln hoped that the Northern army would install Pierpont as Virginia's governor as soon as Richmond fell. But the Confederacy blocked this plan by clinging stubbornly to its national capital. In the end, Lincoln found himself compelled in late 1862 to accept the creation by Congress of a new state, West Virginia, which was carved out of Virginia's territory. Pierpont was replaced. The new state clearly owed its legitimacy to congressional action and not to presidential dispensation.

Lincoln's inability to coerce Congress on the readmission question dogged his wartime Reconstruction efforts. He could and did appoint military governors to manage civil affairs in states conquered by the Union army. However, he could not compel Congress to accept representatives elected by these governments. And as long as Congress refused to accept these representatives, the states would continue to be excluded from the federal government.

The Price of Readmission

The process of wartime presidential Reconstruction went furthest in Louisiana because the Union army managed to capture the state's capital at Baton Rouge as well as its major commercial center, New Orleans. In Louisiana, representatives elected in 1863 were actually seated by Congress.

Heartened by apparent congressional acquiescence, Lincoln proceeded in December 1863 to promulgate his famous 10 percent amnesty plan, a plan that offered readmission whenever a number of voters equal to 10 percent of the state's vote in the

*Article I, Section 5—"Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members. . . ."

*Article IV, Section 3—"New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State: nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress."
1860 presidential election took the oath of allegiance. Congress responded early in 1864, first by refusing to continue accepting Louisiana’s delegation, and second by enacting its own plan for Reconstruction, a version embodied in the Wade-Davis bill. Because Lincoln’s renomination was by no means a certainty in the critical summer of 1864, the President chose to sidestep the issue. He blocked the Wade-Davis bill by pocket veto on July 7 and then issued a proclamation on July 8, 1865 that offered the seceded states the option of seeking readmission under his 10 percent plan or under the more stringent requirements of Wade-Davis.*

Emancipation also followed a zigzag course. But while he acted boldly on the readmission question from the outset, on the emancipation issue Lincoln evinced a marked inclination to wait and see.† Kenneth Stampp offers the most cogent summary of the new perspective on the evolution of Lincoln’s emancipation policy: "If it was Lincoln’s destiny to go down in history as the great Emancipator, rarely has a man embraced his destiny with greater reluctance than he."1

Lincoln moved toward emancipation when it became clear that freeing the Confederacy’s slaves—and thus depriving the South of its black labor force—was the only means available to turn the balance of the Civil War decisively in the North’s favor. Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, recorded the first public utterance of the President’s change of mind on July 13, 1862. While riding in a funeral procession, Welles recalled, Lincoln mused about emancipation: “He had given it much thought and had about come to the conclusion that it was a military necessity absolutely essential for the salvation of the Union, that we must free the slaves or be ourselves subdued. . . .”2

The President’s reservations about his power to free the slaves show clearly in his Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation of September 22, 1862. Emancipation, as Lincoln proclaimed it, did not affect slaves in states that had not seceded, such as Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, nor did it

* The Wade-Davis bill provided that each Confederate state was to be ruled temporarily by a military governor who was to supervise the enrollment of white male citizens. A majority of the enrolled electorate, rather than merely 10 percent, was required to take an “ironclad” oath of allegiance before a legal state government could be reconstituted.

† In the course of his debates with Stephen Douglas in 1858, Lincoln asserted, “I am not, nor have ever been, in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black races.” The President applied these beliefs during the Civil War when he urged a group of black leaders meeting at the White House in August 1862 to leave the United States if they wanted to achieve equality. “Go where you are treated the best,” Lincoln advised.
apply to slaves in areas conquered by the Northern army prior to September 1862, such as Tennessee and southern Louisiana. (Freedom for these slaves had to await either state action or ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in December 1865.)

What Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation actually offered was a powerful inducement for slaves to run away from their masters. As we shall see, the threat of a slave exodus proved critically important for the course of Reconstruction. But the tentative nature of Lincoln’s strategy toward emancipation reflected his sense that the prospect of freeing the slaves raised fundamental political questions in the North.

Speaking in Washington in February 1862, Senator Trumbull expressed the perspective that most Northerners took on the question of wartime emancipation. Trumbull demanded to know what plans were being made to cope with the newly freed blacks if emancipation ever came about: “We do not want them set free to come among us; we know it is wrong that the rebels should have the benefit of their services to fight us; but what do you propose to do with them?”

Popular resistance to resettlement of the freed blacks outside the South found expression in a series of wartime race riots, most prominently the 1863 Copperhead draft riots in New York, Detroit, and Chicago, sparked largely by the reluctance of new Irish and German immigrants to be conscripted for a war of emancipation. What these riots told Northern politicians was very clear: Reapportionment was a national political question but the social consequences of emancipation would ultimately have to be resolved within the former slave states.

As slaves became aware of the promise of freedom contained in Lincoln’s emancipation policy, they ran away from their plantations whenever Northern troops drew near. Because much of the Union army tended to move by water—as in the Sea Island, South Carolina, Fort Henry, and Vicksburg campaigns—it its advances brought it into close proximity with the largest plantation regions in the South. Slaveholders in such areas had little choice if they expected to retain their human property; either they had to move or watch most of their slaves flee. Plantation abandonment made short-term sense. But by leaving vacant much of the richest land in the South, such as the 20-mile swath along the Mississippi River from Memphis to New Orleans, the exodus of planters and slaves created an opportunity for significant land redistribution in the postwar period.

Such redistribution became the heart of the earliest Radical Republican plan for coping with emancipation. Senator Sumner wrote in March 1865, “We must see that the freedmen are estab-
To uphold Reconstruction laws, federal troops remained in the South for a decade: 20,117 of them in 1867, but only 6,011 in 1876.

lished on the soil and that they may become proprietors. From the beginning I have regarded confiscation only as ancillary to emancipation." By giving the freed people small plots of land upon which they could support themselves, Radicals felt they would remove any inducement to a massive migration of land-hungry blacks out of the South. These plans were embodied in the Freedmen's Bureau bill passed by Congress and signed into law by Lincoln on March 3, 1865, a month before Appomattox. Although the agency created by this law came to be known as the Freedmen's Bureau, its actual title was the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands.

The bureau was designed as a general welfare agency whose basic purpose was to assist in the reconstruction of the South. It was empowered to take control of property abandoned during the war and to distribute it in 40-acre parcels to poor whites and poor blacks. The inclusion of "refugees," that is, poor whites, stemmed from the Northern Democrats' refusal to allow the bill to pass until it did as much for whites as it promised to do for blacks; it seemed unfair to give land only to blacks when many

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whites were both impoverished and landless. And indeed, in many states, the Freedmen's Bureau actually fed more poor whites than former slaves during the lean summer of 1865.

Neither poor whites nor poor blacks were ever likely to benefit permanently from the bill because Lincoln insisted as early as 1861 that no federal confiscation act could remove the actual title to the land from the heirs of the former owners. Thus, the bill provided for the lease of abandoned land to blacks and whites for only four years, after which time the government would sell the lessees "whatever title it can convey."

**Political Plotting**

Later, the Radicals renewed the legislative battle for permanent land confiscation and distribution. They failed in their efforts to make this part of the First Reconstruction Act passed on March 2, 1867. By the time the Second Reconstruction Act was enacted on March 23, 1867, land distribution was a dead issue. It was a keen disappointment to Senator Sumner who, during the debates on the Reconstruction bills, insisted that Reconstruction "would be incomplete unless in some way we secured to the freedmen a piece of land."

All in all, a tangled situation greeted Andrew Johnson as he embarked upon his Presidency. In the aftermath of Lincoln's assassination on April 14, 1865, the Republican Party found itself in the anomalous position of having a former Southern Democrat as its titular head. Johnson had been a senator from Tennessee and had served during the war as the state's military governor. Lincoln selected Johnson as his running mate in 1864 to broaden the base of support for his ad hoc National Union Party. After the assassination, Johnson recognized that he had no real future in the Republican Party; he used his powers during the earliest stages of presidential Reconstruction trying to build a national conservative coalition that he could lead.

But Johnson faced politicians who had postwar goals of their own. Northern Democrats, led by Representative Samuel Cox of Ohio, looked with horror upon Republican success at exploiting the wartime crisis to push through most of its prewar high-tariff, pro-industry economic program as embodied in the Morrill Tariffs, the Homestead Acts and railroad land grants.*

*The Morrill Tariff, enacted March 2, 1861, ended a period of low duties by imposing an import tax of 10 percent on specific items. There was a gradual rise in duties to an average of 47 percent by 1870. The Homestead Act of May 20, 1862 granted a 160-acre parcel of public land to any settler who would reside on it for five years and pay a small fee. The railroad land grants gave generous portions of public land to railroads as inducements to extend the rail system.
Democratic hopes for the future lay in speedily reviving their Southern wing so as to forestall further Republican political gains.

Moderate Republicans, like Senator John Sherman of Ohio, wanted to perpetuate their party's rule while using Reconstruction to guarantee the inviolability of the Union. Their plan was to create a Republican Party in the South at the local level to garner black votes and to ease the task of electing a Republican president. Radical Republicans shared Sherman's goals of political power and national unity and hoped to implement them by effecting the removal of those ante-bellum Southern leaders thought responsible for starting the war. Realizing the delicacy of their position, Southern Democrats, led by former Governor Herschel Johnson of Georgia, fought a masterful holding action, hoping that delays in Washington and in the South would prevent the imposition of truly radical changes on the structure of Southern society. Thus, the immediate postwar period produced conflicting visions about how the process of reunification ought to be accomplished. That the Radical Republicans triumphed for a time suggests how tangled and confused these politics actually became.

**Presidential Power Plays**

With Congress in adjournment from April through December 1865, President Andrew Johnson had an opportunity in the early months after Lincoln's death to exert great influence upon the outcome of these disputes. During that summer, Johnson used his presidential pardon and amnesty powers to relieve Southern landowners from the civil disabilities (e.g., loss of the right to vote and to hold public office) contemplated in the Freedmen's Bureau bill while simultaneously asserting the President's power to supervise the process of readmission. In his Amnesty and North Carolina proclamations, both issued on May 19, 1865, Johnson set out to complete Lincoln's program.

By pardoning thousands of former Confederates, Johnson not only gave them back their land—scotching any redistribution plans—but also allowed them to re-enter politics in their states during the crucial autumn and fall elections in 1865, elections that determined the entire slate of state officers and congressional representatives. Thus Johnson hoped to establish conservative (Democratic) governments headed by men who owed their positions to him. But Johnson could not control what the Southerners did with the power he gave them. In every former Confederate state except Tennessee and Texas, the pro-
visional governments held elections that put numerous former Confederate officials—men like the Confederacy's former Vice President, Alexander Stephens—in high state and national posts.

During this same critical period of 1865, the reconstituted Southern state legislatures took their turn at coping with emancipation. In South Carolina, the legislature declared as vagrants any blacks found without regular employment; it then decreed that blacks could not leave the premises without their "master's" permission; and finally, it barred blacks from any non-agricultural jobs or the skilled trades without special permission from a local judge. As a group, these laws, which came to be known as the "black codes," had the effect of denying the recently freed former slaves most of their basic citizenship rights. The blacks could neither vote nor serve on juries and they were subject to vagrancy laws designed to control the labor force by restricting blacks' movements.

**Southern Self-Determination**

By propelling so many former Confederates into high offices and by enacting what many Northerners considered to be oppressive black codes, Johnson's provisional governments provided ammunition for the President's Radical adversaries. Johnson temporized on the black codes, refusing to condemn them, perhaps because he felt that "white men should determine the way of life that was to be led in the Southern states." When the commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau, General O. O. Howard, issued decrees in the fall of 1865 that invalidated the Mississippi and South Carolina black codes, Johnson responded to Southern protests by observing that, "none of the (codes) should be nullified except by courts of law."

Johnson's complicity in the attempt to deny civil rights to former slaves allowed congressional Radicals to brand him a Southern sympathizer. In addition, Johnson played into the Radicals' hands by making ill-tempered personal attacks on their leaders. During a celebration of Washington's Birthday on February 22, 1866, the President delivered an off-the-cuff speech attacking his congressional opponents. When challenged to give the names of the men he said were as guilty of treason as the Confederacy's leaders, Johnson replied, "A gentleman calls for their names. Well, I suppose I should give them . . . I say Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania—I say Charles Sumner of Massachusetts—I say Wendell Phillips of Massachusetts."6

Having decided to fight the Radicals rather than com-
The National Freedmen's Relief Association, privately organized in 1862 to help freed slaves, was the precursor of the Freedmen's Bureau.

promise with them, Johnson achieved some initial successes with his vetoes of a bill to strengthen and extend the life of the Freedmen's Bureau in February 1866 and of a civil rights bill in March 1866. But the tide turned quickly. The hasty actions of the governments Johnson created in the South—such as passage of the black codes—and Johnson's own misreading of the national political temper combined to force moderate Republicans, like Senator John Sherman of Ohio, into the Radical camp; it soon became clear that there was no alternative between support for Johnson's apparently pro-Confederate policies and support for the Radicals, who at least remained loyal to the Union.

Johnson looked to the November 1866 congressional elections for popular vindication. Unfortunately for him, during the spring and summer of 1866, race riots erupted in Memphis and New Orleans, riots initiated by Southern whites enraged at what they considered disrespectful conduct by former slaves. The riots added to the North's growing conviction that former
Confederates would not accept the war's results. Although Johnson embarked upon an energetic "swing around the circle" through New England and the Midwest trying to stem the tide, Republicans swept all before them in the fall elections, winning two-thirds majorities in both houses of Congress.

Taking this victory as a mandate for radical action, Congress passed four Reconstruction acts between March 1867 and July 1868. These laws embodied the state suicide theory against which Lincoln had struggled for so long. Former states were to be treated as territories, complete with military governors under the control of Congress. The former states had to adopt new constitutions in order to qualify for readmission at Congress's discretion. These constitutions had to allow all adult males to vote, blacks as well as whites; prominent former Confederates were barred from the conventions in which the new constitutions were drafted and the states had to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment as a condition for readmission.

The Futility of Impeachment

Passage of the Reconstruction acts marked the height of the Radical Republicans' power but they, in turn, soon squandered this influence in a futile effort to remove Andrew Johnson from the Presidency. Many congressional Radicals viewed Johnson's conduct of his office as verging on treason. For example, during an unsuccessful effort in 1867 to have the House of Representatives impeach Johnson, the House Judiciary Committee accused the President of trying to reconstruct the "Rebel states in accordance with his own will, in the interests of the great criminals who carried them into rebellion." This effort failed, in large measure because the Judiciary Committee could find no impeachable offense.

The Radicals tried again and in February 1868 they succeeded in getting the House to vote for Johnson's impeachment. During the Senate trial, Sumner and Stevens exerted tremendous personal, political, and moral pressure to achieve Johnson's conviction and removal and they came within a razor's edge of achieving their goal. The Senate's vote on each of the 11 articles of impeachment was 35 for to 19 against, just one vote short of the required two-thirds majority.

This episode was a turning point of the whole Reconstruction story: the failure to oust Johnson served to shatter the Radicals' political power. Neither Stevens nor Sumner ever recovered his former influence. Grant's nomination and election as President in the 1868 campaign signalled the end of effective
BLACK SOLDIERS AND RECONSTRUCTION

Nearly 180,000 black soldiers (including 100 commissioned officers) fought for the Union during the Civil War. Several thousand of these veterans were stationed in the South as part of the occupation forces during the first year of Reconstruction. Some Southern historians—among them, E. Merton Coulter in *The South During Reconstruction, 1865–1877* (1947)—have maintained that black occupation soldiers “ravished white women” and exerted a “vicious influence.” Such assertions reflect the bias of the Southern interpretation; the black soldiers, more than three-quarters of them former slaves, were generally better disciplined than white soldiers.

To placate Southern whites during the pre-radical phase of Reconstruction (1865–66), the army quietly withdrew its black troops from the South in 1866. By this time nearly all of the black (and white) soldiers in the great Civil War volunteer army had been demobilized. Most black veterans returned to their Southern homes. There, some of them joined the state militia regiments—some black and some racially mixed—formed by Republican governors, notably in South Carolina, Louisiana and Mississippi, to protect freedmen and Republicans against Ku Klux Klan violence. In most of the armed clashes between the militia and white paramilitary groups, the whites were victorious.

Although Southern historians have often blamed the black militia for provoking racial bitterness and violence, the truth was more nearly the reverse. As in the case of the black Union soldiers, it was not the militia’s behavior but its very existence that inflamed white hatred. Armed black men in uniform were the most frightening symbol to whites of the racial revolution of the late 1860s and therefore attracted the most concentrated counter-revolutionary violence.

—James M. McPherson

Radical control in Congress as a group of moderate conservative Republicans led by John Sherman seized the reins of power. Ironically, the Radicals lost national power just at the point when their Reconstruction program was being put into effect in the former Confederate states. They were forced to watch from the sidelines as the more conservative Grant administration temporized and delayed implementing a Radical program with which it disagreed.

This Radical plan for Reconstruction looked toward creating new political alignments in the South. Only in South Caro-
lina and Louisiana were black voters likely to be able to sustain a majority position. Thus, in the rest of the former Confederacy, Radicals sought to fashion a biracial coalition of poor whites and poor blacks, with some assistance from wealthy former Whigs such as Mississippi’s James Alcorn. As improbable as it may sound, these alliances worked for a time during 1867–68, especially in Mississippi. The constitutional conventions mandated by the Reconstruction acts proceeded to modernize archaic Southern state constitutions. They updated the criminal codes, chiefly by effecting a sharp reduction in the number of capital crimes. The conventions also established a whole range of social services unknown in pre–Civil War times, such as state-supported public schools and institutions for the care of the retarded. Indeed, the brief Reconstruction-era alliances of poor whites and poor blacks brought about major changes in the laws of every former Confederate state before the white counter-revolution began.

The wealthy slaveholding group which led the South into the war did not need to be told that this newly forged Republican coalition had the potential to remain in power simply because it represented a majority of the voters. Predictably, these ante-bellum leaders reacted bitterly to every Radical move. For example, during the summer of 1866, the Memphis Avalanche, a conservative newspaper, protested sharply when it discovered that the Freedmen’s Bureau intended to continue the policy of maintaining schools for former slaves. By the fall of 1865, these Bureau schools were offering blacks in Memphis formal instruction in basic literacy; hundreds of freed people, from children to the very elderly, seized this new opportunity. The Avalanche disapproved of federal interference in what it considered local social matters, and was especially indignant about schools that taught “Ethiopian wretches to play the piano.”

Ending Republican Rule

Similarly, the Republican plan for biracial coalitions among the poor found itself a target for conservative criticism. In August 1868, the Raleigh, North Carolina Daily Sentinel quoted the former chief justice of the state’s supreme court as saying he had joined the Republican party in order to put “an end to that alliance between the negro and the lower class white which is the other side of the Republican coin.” In short, Radical Reconstruction confronted the South’s white political leadership with a serious threat to its survival. Responding to the threat, this leadership used whatever means seemed necessary

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to terminate Republican rule.

These means varied greatly from state to state. In Virginia, conservatives led by Alexander H. H. Stuart were able peacefully to delay action on the 1868 constitution until they could dominate the election that ensued in 1870. As a result, although Gilbert Walker, the first governor selected under the new constitution, was a Republican, he owed his position to conservative influence; Walker pursued a course so mild that Virginia is generally regarded as having escaped congressional Reconstruction. In Mississippi, on the other hand, conservative whites endured Republican control from 1867 through 1875. In 1876, these conservatives employed racial demagoguery, terrorism, fraud, bribery, and corruption to remove the Republican government. Conservatives threatened to kill any white man caught engaging in Republican political activity, and they warned that blacks who voted Republican would never find employment. Where threats failed, violence was used; indeed, the Democratic slogan in 1875 was, “Carry the election peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must.” Yet, in South Carolina, Democrats were unable to oust the Republicans until the 1876 presidential campaign. By removing federal troops in 1877, President Hayes permitted local conservatives to complete the destruction of South Carolina’s Republican Party.

The Redeemers

Among the most persistent of Reconstruction myths are those which seek to justify the tactics employed by the self-styled “Redeemers” as they struggled to “rescue” the South from Republican control. By depicting the Republican state governments as being wastefully corrupt regimes dominated by ignorant former slaves acting as dupes for vicious scalawags and greedy carpetbaggers, the Redeemers, who were mostly wealthy former slaveowners, tried to justify their use of extralegal means. Myths die hard, particularly when they appeal to regional or racial pride.

Corruption certainly existed in Reconstruction state governments, as in the fraudulent misappropriation of Florida railroad bonds in the 1870s. But these governments also created public schools across the South, a region that possessed none before the Civil War. And the Redeemers, themselves, did not put an end to corruption (though they did cut back the public schools severely).

We ought not to allow ideology to confuse our perceptions of what actually occurred during Reconstruction. A large number
of poor men, black and white, found themselves in positions of real political power for the first time. Mistakes were made but there were solid achievements as well. Given the contemporary background of national political corruption, the Tweed Ring in New York City, and the Crédit Mobilier and Whiskey Ring scandals in Washington, D.C., the corruption of Reconstruction state governments was small potatoes indeed.

The End of Reconstruction

Reconstruction ended as it began, amid bitter partisan conflict and confusion. In the November 7, 1876 balloting for President, Samuel J. Tilden, the Democratic nominee, received 184 of the 185 electoral college votes needed to win. Rutherford B. Hayes, the Republican, received only 165. But there were 20 disputed electoral votes in four states that held the balance—South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, and Oregon.

For Hayes to win, some method had to be found through which each of the 20 disputed votes could be awarded to him. A deal was struck between Southern Democrats willing to abandon their party's nominee and Hayes's representatives. As it happened, South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana were the last states in which garrisons of federal troops were still nominally active in overseeing civil affairs. Southerners knew that Tilden intended to remove these troops. But they sided with Hayes in return for concessions and promises, including the U.S. Postmaster Generalship and federal assistance for Southern internal improvements—such as repairing Civil War damage to river levees and providing federal subsidies for the Southern Pacific Railroad.

No one would argue that Reconstruction offers noble examples of how democracy ought to operate. The corruption of the Grant era followed hard on the heels of Radical moral idealism, when this idealism spent its force during the futile effort to remove Andrew Johnson from the Presidency. The Grant era was marked by a Southern strategy that practiced benign neglect as far as enforcing Radical Reconstruction. Indeed, so alienated did the Radicals become that they supported Horace Greeley's liberal Republican revolt against Grant's conservatism; Greeley ran an unsuccessful campaign for the Presidency on a national fusion ticket with the Democrats. Grant defeated Greeley in 1872, running on a platform that restated his 1868 campaign slogan, "Let us have Peace." Thus, Grant's two victories reflected a national yearning for a period of normalcy after the tumult of Civil War and Radical Reconstruction.
Grant's status quo attitude on civil rights enforcement mirrored the country's reversion to a laissez faire ideology; one saw the reassertion of the ideal that each person ought to take care of himself, with the government assuming as small a role as possible in the resolution of social problems.

History seldom repeats itself and never in precisely the same context. But there are uncanny parallels between the Civil Rights Era out of which we are emerging and the Reconstruction period. In the cases of both Andrew Johnson and Richard Nixon, the President who followed an often unpopular wartime leader found himself beset by congressional furies intent upon reasserting the power of the legislative branch, even if this required removing him from office. In both instances, a period of explicit national commitment to the cause of civil rights was followed by a conscious drawing back as new administrations refused to push vigorously for the enforcement of laws with which they disagreed. And in both instances, these more conservative administrations generated major political scandals, scandals that touched the Presidency itself.

Historian C. Vann Woodward put it best when he argued that the first Reconstruction willed a legacy of ambiguity to our time. It is a legacy seen in the continuing struggle to integrate blacks fully into American society and to enable them to share fully in the fruits of that society; a struggle to give further substance to the American dream of equal opportunity.

By April 1865, the Southern planters' dreams of perpetuating slavery in an independent republic had vanished. Secession had cost the South a quarter of a million men dead and nearly $3 billion in slave property when three and a half million black laborers were freed. As some Southern anti- Secessionists had prophesied, the Civil War ended in the destruction of the "peculiar institution" it was intended to make secure.

Before Appomattox, the planters had identified the South's entire society and culture with slavery. When they came home from the war, economic survival required that they grapple with emancipation at its most immediate and practical level—as the loss of their labor system. If we assume that ownership of 20 or more slaves constituted membership in the "planter class," then some 43,000 previously well-to-do Southern white families, heavily dependent on slavery and the plantation system, were threatened in 1865 with economic extinction.

Before the war, slavery had led to the rapid concentration of land and wealth. The Southern countryside was dominated economically by great slave plantations. Plantation staples—cotton, sugar, rice, tobacco, and hemp—were produced for the market rather than for home consumption. Cotton was clearly king. In 1860, cotton employed more than three-fourths of all the slaves engaged in agriculture. The crop that year reached nearly 4 million bales (valued at $250 million), two-thirds of which were exported, making up the major portion of the world's supply.

During and after Reconstruction, the primary goal of the planters was the economic recovery of plantation agriculture, with some new form of black labor. The problem for the planters was not just economic. The war-stricken South's transformation from a slave economy to a free labor economy represented a
psychologically shattering loss of power for the planter—a shift from being lord to being landlord. Although planters' daily lives continued to revolve around cotton culture, black labor, and the plantation, they knew they had passed "from that Old World to this New One, through the war-Storm."1

The first summer of peace found most members of the planter class back on their plantations, face to face with what one of them called the "emancipation trials." A few planters had emigrated—some to Northern cities and the rich farmlands of the West, others to Europe and Latin America (from whence most returned within a few years)—but a majority stayed, not because they wanted to but because they felt they had no alternative. "I am obliged to try," wrote Georgia planter John Dobbins to a friend in January 1866, as he returned to his cotton fields, "for I have no other way to make money."2

A willingness to return to the fields did not mean that they had changed their view of society. Where attitudes toward slavery and blacks, Southern agriculture, and Southern civilization were concerned, the planters ended the war much as they had begun it.

Reinventing Slavery

"Nothing could overcome this rooted idea," a visiting Northern journalist, Whitelaw Reid, noted in the summer of 1865, "that the negro was worthless, except under the lash."3 Slavery may have been destroyed, but planters remained convinced that blacks were innately and immutably inferior, that without total subordination they were dangerous and destructive, and that without coercion they would not work.

Without slavery, the Charleston Mercury had asserted in January 1865, the South would become a "most magnificent jungle." Emancipation would mean that "our great productions, cotton, rice, and sugar . . . must quickly be swept away." It was "absurd to suppose that the African will work under a system of voluntary labor . . . the labor of the negro must be compulsory—he must be a slave."4

Emancipation, therefore, confronted planters with a problem their deepest convictions told them was impossible to resolve—the management of large plantations employing free black labor. But even as they equated successful plantations with slavery, the gentry could not acquiesce in the final decline of their holdings just because the old labor system was gone. Preservation of their estates had dictated the planters' behavior for generations, and most were resilient enough in 1865 to make
yet another effort.*

What planters believed they needed to ensure satisfactory black performance was a comprehensive labor law shaped to fit their needs. Consequently, in late 1865, several Southern states began devising a new labor system under so-called Black Codes. Officially, the aim of the codes was to "guard [blacks] and the States against any evils that may arise from their sudden emancipation." But the immediate effect was to channel blacks back to the plantations, and once there, to coerce them into working.

The codes differed from state to state, but they clearly defined a new system of involuntary servitude. In some cases, the codes made it illegal for blacks to own land or to work except as field labor and in domestic service. Loosely drawn vagrancy statutes made it possible for police to round up unemployed blacks in time of labor shortages. Planters would then post bond, bail the blacks out of jail, and "allow" them to work off their debts at wage rates of a few pennies per day.

Radical Republican Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts saw the codes as a blatant attempt at "semi-peonage." The planters thought they were absolutely necessary, for in the behavior of blacks lay the key to the future of the South.

Resurrection of the old plantation system required the continuation of white supervision, work gangs, task systems, clustered cabins, and minimal personal freedom. But members of the planter class were no longer able to organize and operate plantations as they wished. Congress, through the Fourteenth Amendment, legally disallowed the Black Codes by forbidding the states to pass discriminatory legislation against the rights of any citizens, even as the Army and the Freedmen's Bureau rendered null the harsh provisions of some codes by not permitting them to be carried out.

*Emancipation caused some planters to overcome their traditional fear of foreign immigrants, and there were organized efforts to attract white immigrant labor to the South. Few chose to come and these few did not relish plantation work. In 1866, John Floyd King brought about 100 German immigrants from New York City to work on plantations along the Mississippi River. Within weeks, 35 had fled.

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Before everything else, the freed slave wanted land of his own as a material base with which to support his legal freedom. Although lacking well-developed political power, blacks were determined to remove all vestiges of slavery, and they expected the federal government to supply them with the means. If they could not share the land in 1865, they wanted at least to share in decisions about how they would farm the land. They wanted the right to decide whether or not to work their children in the fields. They wanted to be rid of gang labor which, under slavery, had meant dawn-to-dusk plowing or hoeing on assigned amounts of acreage under constant white supervision.

Wholesome Compulsion

Like the planters, however, the federal government was eager to keep freedmen working on plantations. There, the blacks would be fed, clothed, productively employed, and off the federal relief rolls. General Oliver Otis Howard, commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau, cheerily remarked apropos of labor contracts for blacks that "wholesome compulsion eventuated in larger independence." Building upon a contract labor system developed during the war in some areas occupied by Union forces (parts of Virginia and the Carolinas, Louisiana, and the Mississippi Valley), the Freedmen's Bureau launched a campaign to bind ex-slaves and ex-masters by legal contracts.

Planters entered into these contracts in 1865 with little confidence that the agreements would solve their labor problems. But in reality, the contracts were largely favorable to the planters, and Bureau agents saw to it that blacks signed and fulfilled contracts to work on plantations. Federal encouragement took many forms—patient explanations, tirades, whippings, even hanging by the thumbs. The recalcitrant were sometimes made to work on government road gangs or threatened with denial of government food rations.

But Federal troops, and more importantly, the new Freedmen's Bureau, stood guard against re-enslavement. The Bureau was ready to protect freedmen from the planter's whip and it sought to make sure that the planters also lived up to the contracts; planters were ordered to provide whatever food, clothing, shelter, medical care, if any, was called for in the contract, as well as to pay the stipulated cash wages or shares of the crop.

The minority of planters that could put the psychology of the master-slave relationship behind them soon recognized that Bureau enforcement of contracts meant the restoration of planter control, perhaps even plantation prosperity.
early years of Reconstruction, however, a majority of planters regarded the contracts as humiliating symbols of their lost power and of the transformation of blacks from slaves to freedmen. Instead of treating the black as chattel, the planter now was compelled to sign a contract with him as an equal.

Frustrated Hopes

Nor were the freedmen satisfied. Although a series of Reconstruction measures was eventually enacted by Congress, the new laws fell short of buttressing the freedom of ex-slaves with the economic security of land ownership. During the War, Northerners had struck a blow at property rights—the rights of slaveholders to their slave property. But during Reconstruction, despite the pleas of some Northern radical Republicans for a revolution in Southern landholding, Congress refused to strike a second blow by permanently confiscating plantations and redistributing land to freedmen. Congress had decided to maintain the system of large landholdings in the South rather than replace it with a system of small yeoman farms.

Why? The Republican-controlled Congresses of the immediate postwar years were not primarily worried about the well-being of Southern aristocrats. They were more concerned with upholding property rights. They were determined to restore the Union and feared that expropriation of white-owned land in the South would be highly divisive and a permanent obstacle to binding up the nation’s wounds. They feared social and racial turmoil in the South and were anxious to restore agricultural production, particularly of cotton, which made up 60 percent of American exports in 1860.

In short, the victorious Northerners blocked the conflicting plans and hopes of both white and black Southerners for agricultural reorganization. There was to be neither pseudo-slavery under the Black Codes nor the black man’s hope of “40 acres and a mule.” Northern policy demanded adjustments from both former masters and former slaves, but it did no more than sketch the broadest outlines of the economic system that would replace slavery.

Thus, the South’s new economic system was developed not in Washington but on the plantations. Battle lines were formed in thousands of separate plantations. On one side stood an army of formerly enslaved agricultural workers, on the other a smaller but more powerful force of landlords. Landowners without laborers confronted laborers without land.

“All the traditions and habits of both races had been sud-
COTTON PRODUCTION AND SLAVE LABOR

- Each dot represents 4000 bales of cotton, 1859.
- Counties in which at least 50 percent of the total population were slaves, 1860.

The population of the South in 1860 totaled 10,800,000, of which almost 4 million were slaves heavily concentrated in a rich cotton belt that produced more than 5 million bales in 1859.

Suddenly overthrown," Joseph B. Killebrew, a Tennessee planter recalled, "and neither knew just what to do, or how to accommodate themselves to the new situation." Even so, planters and freedmen set about experimenting with new arrangements, moving ahead by trial and error, hoping to find a system that worked. Planters were determined to keep their plantations from breaking up, and almost no one would sell land to blacks. Many whites even refused to rent, arguing that renting to Negroes was "very injurious to the best interests of the community."

During the first two years after the war, many planters were successful in retaining slave-style gang labor, paying blacks either wages or shares of the crop. Some landowners adopted the practice of paying shares because they were short of cash with which to pay wages and because they hoped that workers with an interest in the outcome of the crop would be a steadier, more industrious labor force.

Although the share system was widespread, it was unstable.
Freedmen sought independence, not gang labor and shares. If they could not own land, then they wanted to rent land, and if they could not rent land, then they wanted to sharecrop.*

Wage labor survived in the rice and sugar regions of the South, but in the cotton belt sharecropping gradually came to dominate. Black families worked small patches of land owned by whites, and landlord and laborers divided the crop at the end of the season. Sharecropping made it possible for planters to obtain labor without paying cash wages and for freedmen to obtain land to till without buying it or paying cash rent. Sharecropping was a compromise, satisfying neither whites nor blacks. It offered blacks more freedom than the labor gangs, but less than owning land or renting it; it offered white landowners a means of resuming production and of exercising some supervision of black labor, but less control than they believed necessary.

For a few years the South's agricultural arrangements resembled its well-known patchwork quilts. "On twenty plantations around me," an Arkansas planter observed a year after the war, "there were ten different styles of contracts." But in time, a degree of uniformity appeared in the cotton South. Thus, sharecropping, originally intended as simply a temporary expedient, a makeshift arrangement spawned by a lack of cash and credit and the breakdown of the labor system, was fastened on the region. Once established, it varied little until well into the 20th century.

Seedy Remnants

Under the sharecropping system, cotton production revived, attaining prewar levels in the late 1870s. In time, whites accepted the fact that slavery was not indispensable after all for growing cotton. Planters did not necessarily praise the new labor arrangements, however. Virginian George W. Munford complained in 1870 that "the sharing system is a shearing system." In this instance it was the planter who felt "sheared." Remembering their former wealth, power, and status, the Southern planter aristocracy found that sharecropping in times of falling cotton prices meant economic decline for most, disaster for some.

William Alexander Percy, born in Mississippi in 1885, described the post-Reconstruction generation: "There was no em-

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*Working for shares and sharecropping were not the same. The former allowed for gang labor and plantation discipline. The latter meant independent family labor on rented farms, the rent being paid by a specified share of the crop going to the landlord.
battled aristocracy, for the descendants of the old-timers were already a rather seedy remnant, and there was no wealth. White folks and colored folks—that’s what we were—and some of us were nice and some weren’t.”

**War and the Boll Weevil**

In many ways, however, the South remained what it was when the Civil War began, a region with a highly inequitable distribution of land. Plantations not only survived, but, as a 1910 census revealed, actually increased in size and remained the most important units of agricultural production in the South.

Small farmers throughout the United States were finding it increasingly difficult to hold onto their lands (for example, there was a 35 percent rate of tenancy in the Midwest by 1900), but the small Southern landowner faced the added problems of wartime destruction: postwar tax laws that represented a shift from personal property taxes to land taxation, and a slide in land values that meant a loss of collateral with which to secure credit. On top of these came problems caused by poor growing conditions in 1866 and 1867, a decline in cotton prices, and, in the late 19th century, the ravages of the boll weevil.

Without being given land and without cash wages, blacks found it difficult to become landowners in the first place. In 1910, only about 20 percent of black agricultural workers in the South owned the land they farmed. But the problems faced by all small farmers meant that by the 1930s two out of every three tenant farmers in the South were white.

Yet, the survival of the large plantation did not necessarily mean the survival of the ante-bellum planters. The transfer of land titles by court order, mortgage foreclosures, and the sale of plantations after the war left many properties intact but dispossessed their ante-bellum owners. How many is impossible to say. A recent study of five black-belt counties in Alabama reveals that only 43 percent of the elite planters who were there in 1860 remained in 1870. An enormous though still unquantified number of plantations changed hands in the decades after the war.

James Gregorie, for example, was a cotton planter in coastal South Carolina who found himself in desperate circumstances in 1867. He sought and found operating capital from Charles Rose, a New York financier. Rose loaned him $15,000 that year, and Gregorie resumed planting. His next crop was a complete failure. Unable to pay even the interest on the loan, he appealed...
Because local banks were either unable or unwilling to extend credit, crucial financial functions devolved upon country merchants, thousands of whom arose in the rural South to supply provisions to millions of black and white tenants in exchange for a lien on their share of the cotton crop. Exercising a monopoly in their local areas, they were able to demand that their customers grow only cotton, an easily marketed commodity. When it came time to settle up at the end of the season, the tenant was likely to find that he had fallen even further into debt. Tenants were more severely injured, but planters, judged by their income, the value of their lands, and the productivity of their farms, also found the new economic system permanently damaging.

Poverty became the South's most distinguishing characteristic. Its monopolistic credit system prevented economic diversification, and in 1900 the South's share of the nation's manufacturing output was smaller than it had been in 1860. Its inefficient system of agricultural production (and the unwillingness of freedmen to work like slaves) meant that in 1900 its agricultural output per member of the rural population was only three-quarters of that achieved under slavery. Its reliance on a single agricultural crop, at the moment when the world price for cotton was declining precipitously, meant that the South's per capita income at the turn of the century was only about half that of the North—less than it had been on the eve of the war.

For six seasons, Gregorie met disaster and six times the New Yorker bailed him out. Each year—just as a rich crop of sea-island cotton was about to ripen—rain, drought, or caterpillars destroyed it. In 1873, after thousands of dollars had been invested and not a penny returned, Rose foreclosed and Gregorie lost his plantation.

Lands such as Gregorie's were often acquired by the rising merchant and industrial class of Southern cities, by banks, by rural merchants, and by wealthy Northerners who would continue planting with the services of a resident manager or perhaps let the land go back to bush and use it as a hunting preserve, the fate of many rice plantations along the Carolina coast.

Few of those prewar planters who managed to hold on were able to restore their plantations' prosperity or former organizational structure. By 1880, the internal fragmentation of the cot-
ton plantation into an assemblage of small tenant farms was almost complete. Measured either by the size of the cultivated unit or by the persistence of gang labor, fewer than 1 percent of all farms in the cotton belt bore any resemblance to ante-bellum plantations.\(^\text{13}\)

The arrangements eventually made between landlords and laborers on Southern plantations were more than mere parochial agreements made in an economic context. Collectively, they provided the answer to the question that was at the heart of Reconstruction—the place of blacks in Southern society. In March 1864, during debate on a land-reform bill (which, if it had passed, would have confiscated the lands of disloyal planters and redistributed them in 40-acre plots), Republican Congressman George W. Julian of Indiana asked, "Of what avail would be an act of Congress totally abolishing slavery, or an amendment of the Constitution forever prohibiting it if the old agricultural basis of aristocratic power shall remain?"\(^\text{14}\)

No Happy Ending

Throughout the Reconstruction period and afterward, planters and plantations continued to dominate the rural landscape in the South. In place of the master-slave relationship, white Southerners developed sharecropping and liens, segregation and militant white supremacy. Whites regained control of state government, and blacks remained at the bottom of the economic and social ladder.

As the major landholders in an agricultural society, planters continued to wield considerable power, but slavery had perished, and with it much that had characterized the ante-bellum South. Accustomed as they were to mastery, planters felt crippled and frustrated. Plantations were reorganized, but prosperity remained elusive. Plantations survived, but plantation life was transformed. Enmeshed in an unyielding economic network, planters saw their prized independence slipping away. In the end, white Southerners of all classes joined hands to end Republican rule in the South, but the planter class was unable to regain unquestioned political dominance or halt the economic deterioration of Southern agriculture.

2. John Dobbins to Elisha Laurey, Jan. 29, 1866, John S. Dobbins Papers, Emory University Library.

5. Theodore Brantner Wilson, *The Black Codes of the South*, University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1965, passim.


Eight or nine years ago, during a classroom discussion of the federal government’s retreat in the 1870s from its commitment to protect black civil and political rights in the South, a student offered a remark that remains etched in my memory. "This time," he said, "the story will be different." Having grown up during the civil-rights movement of the 1960s, his generation, he asserted, was "more enlightened" than its forebears and would make sure that no backsliding occurred. That attitude reflects many Americans’ views of both the first and second Reconstructions.

The first Reconstruction is usually defined as the period from 1863 to 1877. It began with the Emancipation Proclamation, witnessed the conferring of equal rights to the freedmen as part of a program to restore the defeated Confederate states to the Union, and concluded with a compromise that resolved the disputed 1876 presidential election in exchange for the removal of federal troops from the South and the abandonment of the black man to his fate.

No such clear signposts mark the beginning or end of the second Reconstruction, defined as the federal effort to confront and eliminate racial discrimination in the mid-20th century. Indeed, many consider it to be still in progress; and no consensus exists on whether its beginnings should be dated from the famous report of Truman’s Civil Rights Commission in 1947, the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education school desegregation decision in 1954, the Montgomery bus boycott led by Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1955, or from some other event.

Whatever dates one chooses, the parallels between the two Reconstructions are obvious and striking. President Kennedy’s
eloquent support for civil-rights legislation came almost exactly a century after President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation; the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reinstated many provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1875; Supreme Court decisions outlawing discrimination based on the Fourteenth Amendment occurred almost on the centennial of the passage and ratification of that Amendment in 1868; the Voting Rights Act of 1965 accomplished some of the same results as the Reconstruction Acts of 1867; and the election in recent years of a number of blacks to government positions recalls the years between 1868 and 1875 when hundreds of blacks were elected county officials, state legislators, lieutenant governors, congressmen, and United States senators. Yet, despite these parallels, the first Reconstruction is generally considered a failure and the second, so far at least, a success.

Scholars’ evaluations of the first Reconstruction have varied over time. For a half century after 1900, the dominant interpretation reflected a Southern viewpoint. It portrayed Reconstruction as an era of fraud and repression imposed on the prostrate white South—with vengeful Northern radicals and rapacious carpetbaggers using ignorant black voters as dupes in an orgy of misgovernment and plunder.

The Progressive interpretation, which enjoyed a brief vogue in the 1930s, depicted federal Reconstruction policy as a cynical plot to protect Northern industrial capitalism from a resurgent, Southern-dominated Democratic Party. Puppet governments were set up in the South, it was argued, primarily to ensure continuing Republican control in Washington; and the Fourteenth Amendment, which declared that no state could deprive “any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,” was construed by Republican Congressional leaders as shielding businesses, notably the railroads, from state regulation.

The Marxist interpretation, also popular in the 1930s, described the radical Republicans of the 1860s as bourgeois revolutionaries who destroyed the Old South’s feudal organization
and replaced it with free, democratic, capitalist institutions in step with the world-historical march toward the ultimate triumph of socialism.

During the 1960s, the Liberal interpretation came to the fore as a product of the second Reconstruction. This analysis emphasized the parallels between civil-rights legislation of the 1960s and Reconstruction measures of the 1860s. Both, it was thought, sprang from a creative alliance between egalitarian activists and political pragmatists; both attempted to extend equal rights and opportunities to black people; and both achieved triumphs of justice over oppression, of democratic nationalism over reactionary regionalism.

All of these interpretations sprang from a common perception of the 1860s as a decade of revolutionary change. The foremost proponent of the Progressive view, Charles A. Beard, called the Civil War/Reconstruction period "the Second American Revolution" because it transformed the United States from a Southern-dominated agricultural country into a Northern-dominated industrial one. The Southern, Marxist, and Liberal interpretations emphasized the revolutionary changes in the status of black people. All four considered the 1870s a decade of reaction during which most of the race-related changes of the 1860s were wiped out.

The Compromise of 1877

By 1876, the Democratic Party had regained control of the House of Representatives and of all but three Southern states (Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina) and had come close to claiming the White House in the presidential election of that year. Although the Republican Rutherford B. Hayes was inaugurated in 1877, he gained the Presidency at the price of conceding "home rule" to the South, which meant the rule of Southern states by the white-supremacist Democratic Party. In the Progressives' opinion, this represented not so much a counter-revolution as a "return to normalcy" by which Northern capitalists, who had never really believed in racial equality, made their peace with the now friendly New South.

The Compromise of 1877 was seen by the Southern school as a triumph of decency and civilization over darkness and misrule. To the Marxists and Liberals, it meant a counterrevolutionary betrayal of the gains of the 1860s.

But a fifth interpretation, espoused by some historians in the late 1960s and early 1970s, maintains that there was no counterrevolution in the 1870s because there had never been a
true revolution in the first place. This neo-Progressive reading holds that, during and after the war, the policy of the Union Army and the Freedmen’s Bureau toward the emancipated slaves was to ensure “stability and continuity rather than fundamental reform.” A disciplined, tractable, cheap labor force rather than an independent, landowning yeomanry was the real goal of Reconstruction. The Republicans who freed the slaves were themselves infected with racism. Their biases limited their vision of the Freedmen’s place in the new order, undercut the effectiveness of Reconstruction legislation (whose revolutionary potential was largely an unwanted by-product of attempts to strengthen the Republican party), and predestined the quick and easy retreat in the 1870s from the limited gains of the 1860s. In the words of John S. Rosenberg, a pioneer neo-Progressive, the Civil War was “a tragedy unjustified by its results. . . . What little progress Negroes have been allowed to achieve has occurred almost exclusively in the past fifteen years.”

Reading History Backwards

Apart from its failure to acknowledge that much recent progress has been based on constitutional amendments and legislation passed during the first Reconstruction, this argument suffers from faulty logic and empirical narrowness. It reads history backwards, measuring change over time from the point of arrival rather than the point of departure.

An increase of black literacy from about 10 percent in 1860 to 20 percent in 1870 and 30 percent in 1880 may appear minimal, even shameful—from the perspective of nearly 100 percent literacy today. But for the black people of the 19th century, long denied access to education while living in the midst of one of the world’s most literate populations, the sudden opportunity to learn to read and write, however limited, represented radical change. In 1860, only 2 percent of the black children in the United States attended school; by 1880, the proportion had grown to 34 percent. During the same period, the proportion of white children in school rose only slightly, from 60 to 62 percent. In no other period of American history did either the absolute or relative rate of black literacy increase so much.

If one turns from education to political and economic developments, the same radical changes appear. In 1866, only one-half of 1 percent of American black adult males could vote. Yet in 1870, with the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, all one million of them possessed the franchise, and at least 700,000 voted in the 1872 presidential election.
The Civil War and emancipation also accomplished the most sudden and vast redistribution of wealth in American history. Three billion dollars worth of capital were transferred from slaveholders to former slaves, who—by now owning themselves—possessed the human capital once the property of their masters. A recent study by economists Roger L. Ransom and Richard Sutch has attempted to calculate the economic benefits of emancipation for blacks. It concludes that the immediate benefits were dramatic. Under slavery, the slave received in the form of food, shelter, and clothing only 22 percent of the output he produced. With freedom this jumped to 56 percent. Another recent analysis by economist Robert Higgs describes even greater economic progress for blacks after emancipation. Between 1867 and 1900, according to Higgs, the per capita income of black people increased about 140 percent, a growth rate one-third greater than the increase of white per capita income during the same period.\(^3\)

In the matter of landownership, a vital measure of wealth in an agricultural society, the picture at first glance appears bleak. In 1880, nearly a third of the blacks employed in Southern agriculture were laborers owning no property. Of the remaining two-thirds, classified in the census as farm operators, only 20 percent owned their land. At the same time, two-thirds of the white farm operators owned their land, and the average value of white-owned farms was more than double that of farms owned by blacks. Negroes were unquestionably at the bottom of the economic ladder.

**An Uplift Struggle**

Yet viewed another way, the 20 percent who owned their farms in 1880 represented an extraordinary increase from 1865, when scarcely any blacks owned land in the South. And while black farmers were progressing from almost nothing to 20 percent landownership, the proportion of white farm operators who owned their land was declining from about 75 percent at the end of the war to 66 percent in 1880.\(^4\)

The point here is not that Reconstruction was a golden age in black history. Of course it was not. Despite educational gains, most blacks were still illiterate. Despite voting and holding office, they did not achieve political power commensurate with their numbers (although in South Carolina they did constitute a majority of elected officeholders from 1868 to 1876, something never again matched by blacks in any American state). And despite economic gains, most blacks were sharecroppers and wage...
laborers, victims of a ruthless credit system in the poorest sector of the American economy. They were also the victims of violence and intimidation practiced by the Ku Klux Klan, the White League, and similar organizations.

Southern whites of the 1860s knew that they were living through a revolution, even if some modern scholars do not. "The events of the last five years have produced an entire revolution in the entire Southern country," declared the Memphis Argus in 1865. It was the "maddest, most infamous revolution in history," said an editorial in a South Carolina newspaper in 1867. Black spokesmen made the same point in reverse. "The good time which has so long been coming is at hand," said one. "We are on the advance," declared another. Black leaders were aware that the revolution was incomplete, and modern scholars who point out the inadequacies of the Reconstruction are of course correct. But to conclude that there were no "fundamental changes," that "the new birth of freedom never occurred" is a mistake that those who lived through these events did not make.

Not all the gains of Reconstruction were eliminated immediately after the troops pulled out in 1877. The full-scale disfranchisement and legalized segregation of blacks in the South occurred in the 1890s and 1900s when a new generation of Southern whites came to power—not immediately after the withdrawal of federal troops. Negroes continued to vote in substantial numbers in most Southern states until the 1890s, and their turnout actually exceeded that of whites in some state elections during the 1880s. The Republican party, predominantly a black party in the South, garnered some 40 percent of the Southern vote in the three presidential elections of that decade.

Black men continued to be elected to Southern state legislatures after Reconstruction: 67 in North Carolina from 1876 to 1894; 47 in South Carolina from 1878 to 1902; 49 in Mississippi from 1878 to 1890; and similar numbers elsewhere. Every U.S. Congress but one from 1869 to 1901 had at least one black congressman from the South.

Black literacy improved steadily, from 30 percent in 1880 to 55 percent in 1900 to nearly 90 percent by 1940. In the economic sphere, the quantum leap of black per capita income may have leveled off by 1880. But by 1910, 25 percent of black farm operators in the South owned their farms, while the percentage of white owners had declined to 60 percent.

What about the second Reconstruction? Have the 1970s been free of regression from the gains of the 1960s?

Consider the matters of income and employment. Between
THE BLACK OFFICEHOLDERS IN DIXIE

Several hundred black men were elected as state legislators and state officials during Reconstruction. Hundreds more—no one knows exactly how many—served in local or county offices. Most had been born slaves, but some were free-born, and a substantial number had been educated in the North.

Francis L. Cardozo, who was South Carolina's secretary of state for four years and state treasurer for another four, had attended the University of Glasgow and theological schools in Edinburgh and London. Jonathan Gibbs, secretary of state in Florida, was an 1852 graduate of Dartmouth College.

Of the 22 black men elected to the U.S. Congress—20 to the House (five of them after 1876) and 2 to the Senate (in 1870 and 1875), 10 had attended college, and all but four had gone to secondary school. This record compares well with that of white congressmen of that era.

Indeed, one black Northern-born congressman, Robert B. Elliott, was educated at Eton in England, studied law in London, and after the war moved to South Carolina, where he owned one of the finest law libraries in the state.

One of South Carolina's slave-born congressmen, Robert Smalls, achieved fame in 1862 when he took the Confederate dispatch-boat Planter, of which he was assistant pilot, out of Charleston harbor and turned it over to the Union navy; Smalls became a pilot and an honorary captain.

Two of the slave-born congressmen, James T. Rapier of Alabama and John M. Langston of Virginia, were the illegitimate sons of their white owners, who freed them and provided them unusual opportunities, including education in the North or abroad. In sum, the black congressmen and state officials were for the most part reasonably talented, dedicated men who provided good leadership for their race against strong odds. And, although less able, the lower-echelon black officeholders merit greater respect than most historians have given them.

—J.M. McP.

1958 and 1970, the median income of black families, expressed as a percentage of median white income, increased from 49 to 61 percent. Since 1970, it has declined to about 58 percent. From 1965 to 1969, the median income in constant dollars of black families increased by 32 percent. But black income barely kept pace with inflation between 1969 and 1973, and since then there has been an actual decline in real median income.7

From the Korean War to the mid-1960s, the unemployment
rate among blacks averaged slightly more than twice the white rate. This ratio began to decline in the late 1960s, reaching a low of 1.8 to 1 in the early 1970s. But in the last three years it has climbed again and in the final quarter of 1977 stood at a ratio of 2.3 to 1, a historic postwar high.8

The Compromise of the 1970s

Of course the total economic picture for blacks is not all bad. There have been significant gains in the percentage of blacks holding professional, white collar, and skilled-labor jobs. But even here the rate of gain has slowed in recent years. It seems impossible to argue that the economic improvement of the black population, measured by the degree of change, has been greater in the second Reconstruction than in the first.

Well then, what about school integration? The first Reconstruction produced nothing to match it, for outside of a few pockets—New Orleans, the University of South Carolina, and Berea College—there were virtually no integrated schools in the South during the 19th century. One might speculate that the opening of schools of any kind to blacks in the first Reconstruction was a greater achievement than desegregation in the second. But let us assume that the integration of schools in the last 20 years has been an important accomplishment. I would then insist that the much discussed "white flight" from the urban public school systems constitutes a major retreat from the goals of the second Reconstruction. If the withdrawal of troops from the South was the Compromise of 1877, the withdrawal of whites from integrated public schools is the Compromise of the 1970s.

From 1972 to 1975, some 40,000 white students left the Atlanta public schools, creating a student population now nearly 90 percent black (up from 56 percent in 1972). Public schools in Baltimore, Detroit, Newark, New Orleans, St. Louis, Chicago, and Philadelphia are 70 to 85 percent nonwhite. In three years (1973–76), half the white students vanished from the Memphis public schools, and the system went from 50 percent white to 75 percent black. More than 100,000 white students have disappeared from the Los Angeles public schools in the past six years, and the school population is now only 33 percent Anglo-Caucasian, compared with 45 percent in 1970–71.9 At the time of the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954, only one of the nation’s 20 largest cities, Washington, D.C., had a white minority in its public schools; today whites are a minority in the schools of 18 of the country’s 20 largest cities.
Private schools have been the beneficiaries of white flight. Their enrollments tripled within three years in Memphis and doubled within five years in Charlotte, N.C., when these cities underwent court-ordered busing to achieve integration. While Pasadena's public schools have lost half their white students, its private schools are flourishing. The time is soon coming, probably within three years, when more white students in Pasadena will attend private schools than public schools. The whole state of California may eventually go the same way. The tradition and quality of public education is stronger there than in perhaps any other state. Students in California's public schools now outnumber those in private schools by more than 10 to 1. But if recent trends continue, white students in private schools will outnumber those in public schools within about 30 years.¹⁰

Benign Neglect

By 1877, prominent supporters of radical Reconstruction in the 1860s had come to the conclusion that the national government had tried to force too many changes too fast in the South. They called for a period of benign neglect in racial policy; they began to argue that "intractable" social problems could only work themselves out gradually, that big government and national "solutions" had failed. There is an uncanny similarity between the rhetoric of lapsed liberals of that day and their "neoconservative" counterparts today. One of the latter wrote:

The basic lesson most of us have learned from the 1960s is that the great majority of the publicly funded programs then begun were utter fiascos. Without accomplishing anything for the poor, they enriched poverty-program bureaucrats. While crime was increasing, once-stable neighborhoods were being destroyed, schools became jungles, business left in disgust, and the middle class fled in despair.¹¹

With some changes in wording but not in spirit, this statement could have appeared a century ago in Harper's Weekly, The Nation, or in numerous other journals that spoke for Northerners disillusioned with the first Reconstruction.

I do not mean to suggest that we are about to witness an abandonment of the second Reconstruction or that the reaction of the 1890s will repeat itself in the 1990s. I do mean to suggest that an interpretation of the first Reconstruction that denies the occurrence of meaningful change and contrasts that era un-
favorably with our own is off the mark. It is true that white Americans a hundred years ago were less enlightened than we are today in matters of race, economics, and the role of government in social change. Black Americans were then mostly illiterate, propertyless, and still shackled by the psychological bonds of slavery. Given this disparity in knowledge and resources, it is remarkable that our ancestors accomplished so much—and we so little.


4. Ransom and Sutch; for landholding by whites in 1860, see Frank L. Owsley, Plain Folk of the Old South, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1949, Appendix, pp. 150-229.


Without the negro there would have been no Civil War. Granting a war fought for any other cause, the task for reconstruction would, without him, have been comparatively simple." So wrote Walter Lynwood Fleming in *THE SEQUEL OF APPOMATTOX: A Chronicle of the Reunion of the States* (Yale, 1919).

"With him, however," Fleming went on, "reconstruction meant more than the restoring of shattered resources; it meant the more or less successful attempt to obtain and secure for the freedman civil and political rights, and to improve his economic and social status. In 1861, the American negro was everywhere an inferior, and most of his race were slaves... in 1868 he was in the South the legal equal of the white even in certain social matters."

The historians of Reconstruction have a history of their own. Fleming's view, the classic Southern view, had already been enunciated in William A. Dunning's *RECONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC, 1865-1877* (Harper, 1907), and this scholarly perspective persisted into the 1940s. E. Merton Coulter's *THE SOUTH DURING RECONSTRUCTION* (La. State Univ., 1947, 1970) may be its last, best statement. Earlier, however, with the publication—and selection by the Literary Guild—of Claude G. Bowers' *THE TRAGIC ERA: The Revolution after Lincoln* (Houghton Mifflin, 1929, cloth; 1930, paper), the Southern view reached its widest audience.


Du Bois's radically different—some thought alarmingly radical—interpretation garnered favorable reviews in the *New York Times*. Jonathan Daniels, then editor of the Raleigh (N.C.) *News and Observer*, wrote that *Black Reconstruction* had "far less narrative in it than argument" but was "well written throughout, with some passages approximating poetry" and called it "a corrective for much white history about a period in which the negro played a great part." The *New Yorker's* reviewer, in a pithy paragraph, noted that Du Bois "with great earnestness, sometimes rising to moving passion... takes the odd view, in distinction to most previous writers, that the Negro is a human being."

Today's reader may want only to know that the above books exist (all are still in print) before turning to more recent treatments of the period. One good survey to start with (its first chapter is a detailed discussion of the changing interpretations over the years) is *THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877* by Kenneth M. Stampp (Knopf, 1965, cloth; Random, 1967, paper).

Another brief, readable account is *RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR* (Univ. of Chicago, 1961; cloth; 1962, paper) by John Hope Franklin, the dean of black historians. Franklin's treatment is thorough and dispassionate.

*THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION* by James G. Randall and David Donald (Heath, 1969; Little, Brown, 1973) is a solid textbook, and there are other excellent specialized studies with a narrower focus that help to clarify broad Reconstruction issues.

The story of those dissident Southerners who opposed slavery, supported the Union, and became Republicans during

The blacks of South Carolina's Sea Islands are the subject of *REHEARSAL FOR RECONSTRUCTION: The Port Royal Experiment* by Willie Lee Rose (Bobbs-Merrill, 1964; Oxford, 1976, cloth & paper). Federal forces occupied the Sea Islands in November 1861. Former slaves were recruited as Union soldiers, and the first extensive schools for blacks got under way; abandoned land was confiscated, and freedmen were given temporary title to it. Rose, an award-winning author, takes full advantage of what she calls "a rare opportunity to review the vast spectacle in miniature and see it in its germinal phases."

There were severe limits on the experiment. Congress was unwilling to commit itself to full black equality, and even though Sea Islands blacks fared better than their brothers elsewhere (many were able to retain small patches of land and in time became a kind of yeomanry), they discovered overall that "revolutions may go backward."

In *FROM CONTRABAND TO FREEDMAN: Federal Policy Toward Southern Blacks, 1861-1865* (Greenwood, 1973), Louis S. Gerteis contends that wartime federal policies in the South aimed mostly at mobilizing black laborers and soldiers and preventing violent change; these policies "did not create the necessary conditions for sweeping reforms" during the postwar years.

YANKEE STEPPATHER: General O. O. Howard and the Freedmen by William S. McFeely (Yale, 1968, cloth; Norton, 1970, paper) is one of those biographies that provides a better understanding of events and of institutions under stress through the experience of one individual. McFeely argues that the flaws of the newly reunited America—particularly its conservatism and racism—were mirrored in the Freedmen's Bureau itself, and most particularly in its commissioner, General Oliver Otis Howard (for whom Howard University is named). Although the commissioner began with the radical goal of obtaining land for blacks and assisting them in gaining employment and education, his on-the-job record was one of "naivete and misunderstanding, timidity, misplaced faith, disloyalty to subordinates who were loyal to the freedmen, and an attempt to diminish the Negroes' aspirations."

Another biography of the period, Eric McKittrick's *ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION* (Univ. of Chicago, 1960), is neither blindly hostile nor overly sympathetic toward the "accidental" President. McKittrick argues that Johnson's good intentions were undercut by the limitations of his own background.

Scholars frequently suggest certain novels as useful background reading on Reconstruction. One of these is Margaret Mitchell's perpetually popular *GONE WITH THE WIND* (Macmillan, 1936; most recent ed., Avon, 1976, paper), later made into a movie that still draws record crowds whenever it is revived. The romantic story of Scarlett O'Hara, says an academic enthusiast, is "probably as effective as any of the formal histories in getting at the essential truths of Reconstruction and its aftermath."

Another novel recommended by scholars is William Faulkner's *LIGHT IN AUGUST* (N.Y.: Smith & Haas, 1932; Random, 1967, cloth; 1972, paper). The Nobel laureate's portrayal of displaced Yoknapatawphans makes painfully real the South's outraged, enduring pride of place.

Out of Reconstruction and the plantation world that preceded it came "the New South"—in several successive guises, vividly described by succeeding generations of writers.
Wilbur J. Cash, a Southern journalist who came to maturity in the 1920s and '30s, saw his South as a place where white people were held together by a "proto-Dorian pride." In THE MIND OF THE SOUTH (Knopf, 1941, cloth; Random, 1960, paper), a sweeping interpretation of Southern intellectual history, he pictured Reconstruction as a successful attempt to destroy the old Southern world: "The land was stripped and bled white—made, indeed, a frontier once more, in that its people were once more without mastery of their environment and [had to] begin again from the beginning to build up social and economic order out of social and economic chaos."

C. Vann Woodward, the most widely respected of all contemporary white historians specializing in Reconstruction, has written many books about the political and social consequences of the failure of the Radicals. In REUNION AND REACTION: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction (Little, Brown, 1951; rev. 1966, cloth & paper), he sorts out the tangled circumstances under which Rutherford B. Hayes managed to gain the Presidency in the disputed election of 1877. In ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913 (La. State Univ., 1951; rev. 1972, cloth & paper), he describes in detail the process by which the South was, in effect, reduced to a colony. In a study that has had considerable influence, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (Oxford, 1955; 3rd rev. 1974, cloth & paper), he traces the evolution of American racial attitudes and practices from the first through the second Reconstructions.

Finally, in a volume of collected essays, THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY (La. State Univ., 1960), Woodward makes this observation: "Once Southern historians have purged their minds of rancor and awakened out of a narrow parochialism they should be in a singularly strategic position to teach their fellow countrymen something of the pitfalls of radical reconstruction: of the disfranchisement of old ruling classes and the indoctrination of liberated peoples. . . . They should at least have a special awareness of the ironic incongruities between moral purpose and pragmatic result, of the way in which laudable aims can be perverted to sordid purposes, and of the readiness with which high-minded ideals can be forgotten."

EDITOR'S NOTE. The above titles are selected from a considerably larger number recommended by specialists on the Reconstruction period. Our advisers included the authors of the articles that this essay follows: Armstead L. Robinson, James L. Roark, and James M. McPherson, whose own useful books are mentioned in their biographies. Other scholars who furnished advice and comments are Wilson Center Fellow ('77) Harold D. Woodman, Purdue University, author of KING COTTON AND HIS RETAINERS: Financing and Marketing the Cotton Crop of the South, 1800-1925 (Univ. of Ky., 1968), and Joel Williamson, now at the Center for Advanced Studies, Stanford University, and author of AFTER SLAVERY: The Negro in South Carolina During Reconstruction (Univ. of N.C., 1965, 1969, cloth; Norton, 1975, paper).
CURRENT BOOKS

FELLOWS' CHOICE

Recent titles selected and reviewed by Fellows of the Wilson Center

HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: The Family Besieged
by Christopher Lasch
Basic Books, 1977
230 pp. $15
L of C 77-75246
ISBN 0-456-02883-7

Historian Lasch, author of The New Radicalism in America (1965), is impatient with the quality of discussion provoked by today's changing family. Happily, his reaction has not produced yet another set of panaceas, either so incremental as to be insignificant or so utopian as to discourage action. Instead, he trenchantly dissects the theories developed by social scientists and professional counselors to explain the American family's past and current ordeals. Too many of these "experts," he says, rely on misinterpretations of Freud and fail to note that "the family has been coming apart for a hundred years." With impressive scholarship, Lasch (himself a strong pro-family man) links the decline to the growth of Western capitalism. His book raises the level of discussion about the American family, but he may take too parochial a view. A look at the troubles of the family in Soviet society—noncapitalist and Freudless—might yield additional explanations.

—Bernice Madison

AFFAIRS OF STATE: Public Life in Late Nineteenth Century America
by Morton Keller
Harvard, 1977
640 pp. $17.50
L of C 76-21676

Writers on the period 1865–1900, even when portraying its virtues, usually repeat its pejorative designation as "The Gilded Age." They also tend to rely upon the testimony of imaginative writers such as Mark Twain and William Dean Howells. Morton Keller of Brandeis prefers a view of history that achieves freshness by being deceptively old-fashioned. Though his range of inquiry is wide, he ignores scandal, anecdote, and the familiar cast of characters (Robber Barons, New York society's Four Hundred) and looks instead at public issues as articulated in courts, legislatures, books, or journals of opinion. He does not glorify the spokesmen of the era. Yet he conveys an informed sympathy in his picture of Americans grappling with
new problems such as big industry, and veering between conservatism (sometimes reasoned, sometimes crass) and innovation (sometimes intelligent, sometimes feckless). Like all first-rate scholars, Keller convinces and illuminates. His interpretation of 19th-century America will be plundered by other writers for a long time to come.

—Marcus Cunliffe

Fairly strict regulations and planned back-up legislation have reassured scientists and laymen about the danger of epidemics caused by new microbes escaping from laboratories in the course of recombinant DNA experiments. But worry about the long-run ecological and evolutionary impact of "gene-splicing" continues unabated. Nicholas Wade, senior writer for Science, briskly demonstrates that molecular biologists have reason to be proud of their initiative in working out self-restraining rules to guard against epidemics. His neat little essay on the sociology of science also makes it clear, however, that most members of the scientific community have shown the gambler's unconcern for the future and the cabalist's hostility toward the general public. Could a repressed bad conscience be at work here? One thinks of all the times when scientists have claimed credit for the practical benefits of their discoveries while disclaiming responsibility for the harmful side effects.

—David Joravsky

William Morris (1834–96) worked with revolutionary zeal to overthrow banal mid-19th-century taste in interior design and architecture. He was also a romantic poet in the tradition of Tennyson, a translator of Icelandic sagas, the author of a utopian novel (News from Nowhere, 1890), and organizer of the Society for the Preservation of Ancient Buildings. Not last, but least remembered, he became a serious political activist, who served as secretary of the Socialist League and editor of Commonweal. Nikolaus Pevsner's Pioneers of Modern Design from William Morris to Wal-

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—Kermit Parsons ('77)

Trying to explain Latin America's failure to forge "modern" political systems has been the bane of many a social scientist and historian. Dealy here advances a cultural explanation that derives from the differing moral behavior of Catholic man in public and private spheres. Finding the origins for Catholic man's duality in St. Augustine's doctrine of the Two Cities, he contrasts him to Protestant man, who extended morality from the private sphere to the entire realm of human activity (and thus could be saved only in the City of God here on earth). Dealy's contribution to the study of political behavior in "traditional" societies is intelligent, but he passes too lightly over the economic and social structures that sustain and mesh with the ethos of Latin cuadillaje (political bossism).

—Sara Castro-Klarén

Written prior to the 1977 CIA report predicting a likely Soviet need to import oil in the 1980s, this remarkable study of the role of oil in Soviet domestic and foreign policy provides an overview of conflicting trends during recent decades. Klinghoffer contrasts Moscow's blustering demands for concessions from Iran in the late Stalin years with the businesslike relations with Russia's southern neighbors that evolved later. But he also notes that the U.S.S.R. pays less for the natural gas it imports from Afghanistan and Iran than it charges for its own gas exports to Europe, even while touting its economic aid to the Third World.

—Walter C. Clemens, Jr. ('77)
To Philadelphia, Mississippi, 1964 brought a summer of violence. Just outside the town, the Ku Klux Klan, protected by the police, brutally executed three young civil-rights workers, James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner. Most townspeople, both the “white trash” and the genteel families who controlled the churches, businesses, and politics, rallied behind the sheriff they had elected “to keep the niggers of Neshoba County in their place.” But one woman in her early 40s and a small circle of her friends, at great personal cost to themselves, resisted the poll-tax crowd to aid the FBI investigation and testify against the Klansmen. In 1967, a jury presided over by a Mississippi judge found eight defendants guilty of conspiracy to commit murder—the first time a jury in the state had returned a guilty verdict in a major civil-rights case since Reconstruction. Florence Mars’s moving account of how she stood against her town and the county in which eight of her great-grandparents were buried helps to explain why it was possible in the ’60s for the Old South to become the New South.

—James J. Lang

Oxford University’s Nevil Johnson makes a strong case that the key problems facing Britain today are constitutional rather than political. Issues such as Scottish self-rule or the future of the welfare state can only be resolved after re-examination and restatement of the fundamental ideas about civil rights and social objectives that underpin British political life. Two world wars and an increasingly complex society have eroded tacit understandings reached over one hundred years ago. A new statement of rights is needed, Johnson believes, perhaps as a formal Bill of Rights, guaranteeing judicial review of Acts of Parliament. He reports that Britons are now seriously discussing the idea. Well-organized and clearly written, this book gives the American reader a fresh perspective on current British problems while reviving the art of constitutional thought and argument.

—Robert Hawkins ('76)
**NEW TITLES**

**History**

**The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge**
by Maurice Mandelbaum
Johns Hopkins, 1977
232 pp. $12.95
L of C 76-46945
ISBN 0-8018-1929-6

Johns Hopkins philosopher Maurice Mandelbaum once characterized himself in a seminar as one of only two “real gestalt psychologists” still around. This lucid book supports that contention. Must reading for anyone interested in the analytical philosophy of history, it begins with the author showing the unity of historical inquiry while simultaneously suggesting valuable distinctions among various modes of historiography. Mandelbaum next analyzes the concept of causality, arguing that “the more evidence a historian possesses concerning what occurred in a society at a particular time, the less arbitrary and perfunctory his assertion of causal connections can be.” Finally, he offers a penetrating discussion of objectivity and of the extent to which different forms of history can be objective. Throughout, he conveys his own profound reflections and an exhaustive knowledge of earlier inquiries.

**Life in Custer’s Cavalry: Diaries and Letters of Albert and Jennie Barnitz, 1867–1868**
edited by Robert M. Utley
Yale, 1977, 302 pp. $15
L of C 76-52425

U.S. Cavalry officer Albert Barnitz and his bride Jennie spent most of their first two years of marriage apart. He participated in the Army’s campaign against the Plains Indians, and she waited in Cleveland until he came home after being wounded in 1868 at the Battle of the Washita. This collection of the couple’s letters and entries from both their journals is remarkable for its coherent picture of 19th-century frontier army life, complete with notes on “roast hind quarter of a nice fat buffalo calf” and “chasing Antelope with Genl. Custer’s Greyhounds.” Albert was plagued by floods, locusts, deserting and drunken soldiers, and by Custer, whom he calls “the most complete example of a petty tyrant that I have ever seen.” (“Mrs. Custer did not leave the house as clean as she

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Two social historians take a look at the changing ways of childbirth in America since Colonial times. Much material is drawn from human documents—midwives' reports, diaries, letters. They make for lively reading on the decline of midwifery; the growing notion of pregnancy as illness; surgical intervention in delivery; and painkilling, including the use of amnesiac drugs in "twilight sleep." Illustrations range from a 16th-century woodcut of a fetus to photographs of an elegant Roosevelt Hospital room, complete with Oriental rug (1896), and husbands' candid camera shots of their wives giving birth by the "natural" Lamaze method. The authors hail the return of interest in childbirth at home.

Like Lillian Hellman in her memoir Scoundrel Time, English satirist Jessica Mitford (best known for The American Way of Death, 1963) adds little to our knowledge of American communism in the 1940s and '50s. But like Hellman, she brings to life an odd mini-chapter in Anglo-American history, taking up her family's achievements and misadventures where Daughters and Rebels (1960) left off. Here are "Farve" (her eccentric paternal parent, Lord Redesdale), unflappable "Muv," and sisters Nancy, the wry novelist who ridiculed middle-class pretentiousness in her essay on U (upper-class) and non-U English usage; Diana, the outspoken British fascist, imprisoned in the 1930s for her political activities; and Unity, a member of Hitler's entourage, who committed suicide the day World War II broke out. A self-styled "Red Menace," Jessica Mitford married an American and became a member of the Communist Party in California. She quit the Party in 1958, finding it by then "an embattled...occasionally comical organization."
CURRENT BOOKS

THE RIVER CONGO: The discovery, exploration and exploitation of the world's most dramatic river
by Peter Forbath
Harper, 1977, 404 pp. $15
L of C 77-3749
ISBN 0-06-122490-1

"Congo: the two sudden syllables beat on the imagination like a jungle drum . . ." Peter Forbath's prologue sounds like the start of a penny dreadful. But the story of the Congo often justifies florid prose. Long after the 15th century, when a Portuguese captain discovered the river's mouth, the Congo basin was the scene of extraordinary adventuring on the part of European explorers driven by ego and religious obsession to search for the true sources of the Nile in East Africa. (Some, like David Livingstone, died without knowing that the real achievement had been to discover the Congo's headwaters.) The story has its heroes and martyrs, including the imposing black reformer, Affonso, who ruled the Kingdom of Kongo in the early 16th century, and Beatriz, the black Jeanne d'Arc, burned at the stake in 1706. But the Congo is also synonymous with almost unrelieved savagery—at least 4 million slaves taken from the region by the Portuguese, at least 5 million people slain during the personal rule of the so-called Free State by Belgium's Leopold II (1895-1908).

KRAAL AND CASTLE: Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa
by Richard Elphick
Yale, 1977, 266 pp. $17.50
L of C 76-49723
ISBN 0-300-02012-0

When Dutch sea captain Jan van Riebeeck established the first trading post at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652, he found there a friendly, brown-skinned, pastoral people. One hundred years later, with white settlement a fact, the Khoikhoi, known to the Dutch as Hottentots, were gone—the first victims of racial conflict in South African history. Yet there had been no genocide and no enslavement. The Khoikhoi, who had only recently changed from a hunting to a pastoral economy, succumbed to a combination of subtle economic and social forces that are carefully traced in this study by a young historian at Wesleyan University. The Dutch takeover of grazing land, recruitment of adult males into menial wage labor, venereal and other ailments to which the Khoikhoi were not immune—all fundamentally undermined their traditional society. Once they were gone, the stage was set for the continuing conflict between white South Africans and the Bantu tribes, unre-
THE LATIN AMERICANS: Their Love-Hate Relationship with the United States
by Carlos Rangel
Harcourt, 1977
302 pp. $11.95
L of C 77-73121

Venezuelan journalist and TV commentator Carlos Rangel sets out to demolish a series of myths that Latin Americans have long cherished about themselves and the United States. He slashes away at the “noble savage” image of pre-Hispanic society, the “black legend” of the enormous destruction wrought by colonial Spain, the alleged spiritual superiority of the Latin Americans over their materialistic Yankee neighbors. In his view, Latin American society’s shortcomings have bred a profound love-hate relationship vis-à-vis the obvious success of the United States. Without much detailed analysis of the facts of Latin American society, Rangel goes on to make his own claims—about the prevalence of personal selfishness, the absence of a work ethic, the tacit Church-Marxist alliance—while shooting down those of his leftist critics. The result: his provocative, stimulating, and unabashedly pro-American book (originally titled in Spanish “From the Good Savage to the Good Revolutionary”) is often stronger on assertion than evidence.

COMING INTO THE COUNTRY
by John McPhee
Farrar, 1977
438 pp. $10.95
L of C 77-12249
ISBN 0-374-12645-3

John McPhee can take the most unpromising subject—atoms, oranges, lawns—and weave a work of reportage that is rich, complex, and, to the reader, effortless. Coming into the Country is his most ambitious—and successful—attempt to date. Its subject: Alaska today. McPhee moves from Arctic wilderness to urban sprawl to the regions between, always with an eye for history, an ear for conversation, and a sure sense of the telling vignette. Essentially, he says, Alaska is a foreign country “significantly populated with Americans.” Twice the size of Texas but with half the population of Dallas, it has yet to recover from statehood. Meanwhile, Eskimos, Indians, governments, and corporations are dividing and subdividing some 300 million
"We are in great haste to construct a magnetic telegraph from Maine to Texas, but Maine and Texas, it may be, have nothing important to communicate," wrote Henry David Thoreau (Walden, 1854). That the comment remains relevant is clear from one of the bits of information provided in this collection of 21 essays from a series of seminars at M.I.T. marking the centennial of the telephone: Even though the telephone now links not just Maine and Texas but every part of the world, about half of all office calls are made to phones within two miles of the originating station. The same is true of home phones. And about one-fifth of all calls from residences are to just one other number; half to only five different numbers. The subject matter in Pool's volume ranges broadly. It includes the telephone in history, literature, urban development, and its relation to women, geography, use of time and language. The stated goal of describing "how much difference ... a device invented 100 years ago ... made in our lives" is not achieved, but these essays may stimulate further research on an intriguing topic.

The "threat of unintended war is growing," Richard Barnet fears. The leftist revisionist scholar, whose previous works have sharply criticized American Cold War strategy, now questions the benefits of Soviet-American détente. Russia, he argues, has gained more than the United States, and American misgivings toward foreign intervention since Vietnam and Watergate may encourage Soviet adventurism abroad. SALT I has failed to slow dangerous qualitative improvements in nuclear weaponry; the rise in East-West trade may win no more Soviet political concessions than did the U.S.-led boycott of the 1950s; and the economic and cultural "convergence" of Soviet-bloc and Western societies will not necessarily improve the prospects for peace. He suggests no remedies.
CURRENT BOOKS

Alastair Reid (translator of the poems) has written that "it does a great disservice to Borges to isolate any one branch of his writing from any other, for they are all parts of a vertiginous whole." Thus the two volumes here, along with the great Argentine writer's previous works, should best be read as companions. The poems serve almost as notes for the stories, and the stories (translated by Norman Thomas Di Giovanni) amplify the poems. Borges's familiar themes recur: Old Norse and Anglo-Saxon literature play a part in "Ulrike" in The Book of Sand—a story about a meeting between a mythical Norwegian girl and a literary Colombian bachelor in England. Whitman-like "list" poems in The Gold of the Tigers call up Bede, Shakespeare, Berkeley's God. Borges, now in his 70s and blind, moves easily from form to form, always inhabiting the same poetic world, whose center is the paradox of language. It is a world where all things exist at once, on occasionally converging planes, as in the Japanese-sounding "It Is Raining" (one of "Fifteen Coins"): In what yesterday, in what patios of Carthage does this rain also fall?

At age two, in 1838, James Murray took a primer into the nursery "to show little brudder [a new baby in the family] round O and crooked S." The roundness and crookedness of the English tongue was to occupy the maker of the great Oxford English Dictionary almost all his days. An extraordinarily eclectic Scotsman (he taught the young Alexander Graham Bell about electricity), Murray took on the dictionary task in 1879. He started with a mildewed, rat-gnawed mass of haphazard notes dating back to 1857. Practically without funds, depending on erratic but dedicated volunteers (including many Americans), fighting the criticism of Oxford scholars who scorned his lack of formal academic training, Murray doggedly set the pattern for the OED and pursued it against all
CURRENT BOOKS

A DICTIONARY OF CATCH PHRASES: British and American, from the Sixteenth Century to the Present Day
by Eric Partridge
Stein & Day, 1977
278 pp. $17.95
L of C 77-8750
ISBN 0-8128-2321-4

"Man is a creature who lives not by bread alone but principally by catchwords," wrote Robert Louis Stevenson. A catchword may be like a catch phrase, but lexicographer Partridge, who has compiled many collections of slang and clichés, along with more scholarly works, prefers to define it by example rather than precept. From "all chiefs and no Indians" (Australia, surprisingly, 1940) to "demure as a whore at a christening" (Britain, 1726), he ranges through the quaint, the colorful, and the unseemly. His book is just what the doctor ordered (a generalized 20th-century catch phrase "of unqualified approval, applied to anything . . . exceptionally good or unexpectedly agreeable").

HEARTS AND MINDS: The Common Journey of Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre
by Axel Madsen
Morrow, 1977
320 pp. $10.95
L of C 77-2896
ISBN 0-688-03206-0

Jean-Paul Sartre met Simone de Beauvoir in the spring of 1929. He was 23, she 21, he a city boy, she a country girl. Both were in their last year at the Sorbonne, she in philosophy, he in literature. They quickly became intellectual companions and lovers and have remained so without marriage for nearly 50 years (until Sartre became blind in 1973, they did not live together for any length of time). In researching this dual biography, Axel Madsen (also the biographer of André Malraux) interviewed existentialist Sartre, feminist Beauvoir, and their friends and read all of the couple’s separate works—a total of 9 novels, 10 plays, and some 30 major works of nonfiction, including autobiography. Madsen traces their remarkable common journey in the mainstream of European philosophy, journalism, theater, literature, and left-wing politics. In her first published novel (L’invitée), Beauvoir summed up her feelings about Sartre: "You and I are simply one . . . neither of us can be explained without the other." Of Beauvoir, Sartre has said, "In a way I owe everything to her."
In the 1870s, no more than 75 U.S. scientists called themselves "physicists," and federal support for research was virtually nonexistent. Even so, a few scholars—notably the Smithsonian's Joseph Henry—foresaw the day when America would "lead the science of the world." That day has come: The United States has won 7 of 11 Nobel Prizes in physics since 1965, and annual federal outlays for basic physics alone top half a billion dollars. In the past 10 years, theorists and technicians working in high-energy (particle) physics have nearly obliterated the boundary between cosmology and physics as they draw ever closer to explaining the origin of the universe itself. Nevertheless, support for such abstract science may be eroding as the public realizes, to quote one physicist, that "isobaric analog states in nuclei won't solve racial tensions in Detroit." With verve and wit, Kevles chronicles such milestones in physics history as the "miraculous year" of 1932, which saw discovery of the neutron, the positron, and the hydrogen isotope deuterium.

"As a result of the studied neglect of the science of culture," writes Columbia University anthropologist Harris, "the world is full of moralists insisting that they have freely willed what they were unwittingly forced to want." If a bright, popularly written book can help to correct this situation, Harris has provided it. He believes that human progress is not inevitable. Traipsing over a vast historical terrain from the Aztecs to the ancient Hebrews for supporting evidence, he asserts that, time and again since the Stone Age, population control has broken down; proteins have become scarce, sometimes resulting in cannibalism and/or food taboos; and new environmental balances have been struck, sometimes at the cost of a civilization. His chapter on the origin of war (as play? as "human nature"? as politics? as none of these?) is particularly striking.
CURRENT BOOKS

PAPERBOUNDS


For more than two decades, Richard Wilbur has been called the foremost American formalist poet. This reissue of his latest (1976) collection is a good occasion for dropping the qualifier and admitting that the man who once wrote the line I am for wit and wakefulness is one of our better poets of any sort. Again and again in these lyrics Wilbur demonstrates the power of poetry to excoriate and delight us, to shake us while reconciling us, through the charity of intelligence, to the things of this world. Who else could have written "To the Etruscan Poets"? [They,] joining world and mind, I... strove to leave some line of verse behind I Like a fresh track across a field of snow, I not reckoning that all could melt and go.


Wilfred Sheed wrote the introduction to these interviews, as "partly an act of reparation" for a "lofty piece" on the second series, in which he "artfully concealed" how much he had enjoyed the volume ("I was too young to be honest"). He makes the point that gossip is the very stuff of literature, "the materia prima of which both books and authors are made," then goes on to say that these interviews are more than gossip, are in fact themselves art. Writers, seemingly allowed to question themselves, "collaborate in their own limits." This time around, we have 16 collaborators—from the late Isak Dinesen to John Updike. They discuss everything from lust, which Robert Graves tells the interviewer "involves a loss of virtue, in the sense of psychic power," to the importance of being on time and approaching a novel with "some urgency." This, Anthony Burgess declares, James Joyce failed to do in Ulysses: "The ending is different from the beginning. Technique changes halfway through. [He] spent too long on the book."


Painters and sculptors have an advantage over writers when it comes to autobiography—providing that the prose they use to supplement the illustrative material also shines with talent. In both these books, the words work splendidly. Calder was first published in 1966. In a new introduction, the sculptor’s artist son-in-law, Jean Davison, extends the sense that Calder himself conveyed (to the day of his death in 1976) of a life filled with gusto, joy, family fun, and artistic battles. Davison asked “Pop” the lesson of his 77 full years, which began with Calder posing for sculptures by his father and paintings by his mother and ended with the world enriched by his giant steel “stabiles” and lightsome, delicately balanced “mobiles.” “I guess I am very proud of myself,” Calder answered.

In Georgia O’Keeffe’s world, joy and pride figure, too. But here a quality of austere sensuousness makes the artist’s life—and work—very different. A limited $60 edition of her book was published in slightly larger format in 1976. She wrote the brief text and closely supervised the production. The result is an annotated collection of 108 remarkably true color plates of her flower and desert paintings, many never before reproduced. O’Keeffe’s
words provide sparse autobiographical details, but they plainly reveal the woman and artist, now 80, still trying in her oils on board and canvas "to find the feeling of infinity on the horizon line or just over the next hill."

THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST. By Charles L. Schultze. Brookings, 1977. 93 pp. $2.95 (cloth, $7.95)

Schultze, long-time Brookings senior fellow and now chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, is well known as a spokesman for liberal Democratic concepts of government. It is no surprise to find him writing that "private markets cannot make it possible for individuals to buy clean rivers, uncongested city streets, safe neighborhoods, protection from exotic chemicals, or freedom from discriminatory practices." But in this plainspoken short book he comes out strongly for ending "command-and-control" intervention by bureaucracy in many other areas. Schultze does not flesh out his new proposals, but he sees possibilities for greater efficiency through more reliance on the private market, in such matters as health care and manpower training.


Until the 1960s, school reform in the United States was guided by certain articles of faith, and education was seen as a nonpolitical public enterprise. Classroom integration as part of the civil-rights effort and later demands for "community control" changed everything. Today, Americans have to build a new theory of public education and seek a new consensus on how our schools ought to be organized and operated. What, for example, is the role that parents and children, as citizens and consumers, should play? In this collection of essays, noted academics and practitioners tackle basic questions of educational reform. Columbia Law Professor R. Kent Greenawalt predicts that if the growing secularization of society continues, "aid to sectarian schools may . . . [like] aid to sectarian colleges . . . seem more acceptable."


William Blake (1757-1827), poet, painter, prophet, continues to speak to our age. His work is as attractive for its spiritual vision as for its social criticism. Both aspects are displayed in Milton Klonsky's handsome illustrated introduction to Blake's pictures. The volume contains 50 of them, over half in color, including selections from Songs of Innocence and Experience and The Marriage of Heaven and Hell; in these books, Blake, working in the Renaissance tradition of emblem poetry, wove together pictures and words. Blake the painter's passionate endorsement of human freedom emerges in his line engravings for J. F. Stedman's A Narrative, advocating the abolition of slavery.

The poet's deep interest in the political events of his day is shown in David Erdman's monumental work, first published in 1954. Erdman sees Blake as fiercely attached to the cause of the American and French Revolutions, not merely because they promised the end of political despotism but because, to him, they were harbingers of a universal revolution that would restore the reign of Albion, the poet's universal God-man.
The World of Evelyn Waugh

The late Edmund Wilson, America's foremost critic, once hailed Britain's Evelyn Waugh as "the only first rate comic genius in English since George Bernard Shaw." Waugh's more serious work, including *Brideshead Revisited* and his war trilogy *Sword of Honour*, has steadily gained renown in this country. Yet until last fall, when they were re-issued here to coincide with the publication of his diary, Waugh's early comic novels were hard to find in America. Here, we present Kathleen Darman's profile of Waugh, followed by several excerpts from those penetratingly funny early books.

by Kathleen Emmet Darman

A comic, detached ambivalence lies at the heart of Evelyn Waugh's work. He immersed himself in the glittering, sordid swirl of prewar England but at the same time believed it would be "very wicked indeed to do anything to fit a boy for the modern world." He could be generous, charitable, and kind, but in his novels he clearly, if genially, detests Americans, blacks, peers, machines, Englishmen, Jews, everything. He meted out prejudice equitably, outrageously, irresistibly.

He hated Communism, existentialism, Liberalism, and at times, although a devout Catholic, Catholicism. (Still, he found the Church's Index of forbidden books a "convenient excuse for not reading Sartre.") He came out of a Victorian middle-class family but chose the high life among the titled rich, the merely rich, and the leisured indigent—most of whom he both loved and deplored. His first published essay was a defense of Cubism; but in the end, as he conceded in his autobiographical *The Ordeal of Gilbert Pinfold*, "his strongest tastes were negative. He abhorred plastics, Picasso, sunbathing, and jazz—everything, in fact, that had happened in his lifetime."

This mix of intimacy and detach-
Decline and Fall was behind him, Vile Bodies yet to come, when Evelyn Waugh, aged 26, sat for this portrait by Henry Lamb. He was like a “prancing faun,” recalled Oxford friend Harold Acton, “thirty disguised by conventional apparel.” But Waugh switched disguises—the reckless dandy, the pious Christian, the crusty Tory—several times before his death in 1966.
ment made Waugh, as Edmund Wilson put it, "the only first rate comic genius in English since George Bernard Shaw." Waugh could not have captured the world of fashionably decadent, upper-crust England if he had been born into it. He had not. And Wilson ("Is he an American?" sniffed Waugh), one of the first critics to take Waugh seriously, recognized this as an asset rather than a liability. Approaching the London social scene as an outsider, Waugh had to re-create it for himself.

Evelyn Arthur St. John Waugh was born in London in 1903. His father, Arthur Waugh, was a publisher of some note who described himself as "incorrigibly Victorian," though he lived until 1943.

Reacting against what he perceived as his father's emotionalism and "weakness," Evelyn cultivated a different style. Even as a schoolboy, he was ostentatiously aggressive, at times a downright bully.

Despite his parents' rather tepid Anglicanism, Waugh early showed an unusual interest in religion and was sent to Lancing, a public school with pronounced High-Church tendencies. He was a reasonably contented and, his diaries suggest, surprisingly conventional schoolboy, but in his last years at Lancing there was a change. At school he was rebellious; at home, openly hostile toward his father.

The real break came at Oxford. Waugh went up to Hertford College in 1922 and spent his first two terms quietly. But he had formed romantic preconceptions of "a quintessential Oxford which I knew and loved from afar and intended to find." He was not disappointed.

Near the end of his second term, he joined the Hypocrites Club, a center of hard drinking, dandyism, and Oxford high life. Here Waugh found the Oxford he was seeking; the world of the "Bollinger Club" he would re-create in Decline and Fall; the "smooth young men of uncertain tastes" whose backgrounds were dramatically, seductively unlike his own; exotics like aesthete Harold Acton; aristocratic dandies like Hugh Lygon, a model for Sebastian Flyte in Brideshead Revisited.

Waugh was not a leader in this group; he was too poor, too socially insecure, too ambivalent in his feelings about "modernity." But he was an enthusiastic follower, relishing all that Oxford offered him—from The Waste Land to drunkenness and, for a time, homosexuality. Only academic work failed to excite him and he never received a degree. But he did receive access to the "hot springs of anarchy" in his nature, which his upbringing had undervalued and ignored.

As the '20s waned, the dandies' world shifted from Oxford to London, and the circle expanded to include younger, more daring elements—the Bright Young People of Vile Bodies, whose parties were theatrical productions, lavishly executed in full costume. Condemned by the newspapers as the epitome of reckless modern youth, the Bright

Kathleen Emmet Darman, 35, is completing a critical study of Evelyn Waugh's life and work. Born in Boston, she received a B.A. in history and literature from Radcliffe (1964) and an M.A. from Tufts (1971). She has taught at Federal City College (now the University of the District of Columbia) and American University in Washington, D.C.
Young People obligingly turned London into an immense children's playground. Their parties and hoaxes were duly reported in the gossip columns and consumed with relish and indignation. Such heavy investments in fantasy and frippery were foredoomed; in *Vile Bodies*, Waugh makes the frailty and unreality of his so-called Bright Young Things very clear. Even at Oxford he realized that the aristocracy was more aura than energy and had in fact been largely replaced by a menagerie of arrivistes, Fleet Street barons, and trendy socialites. But Waugh remained enchanted with their antics, and the enchantment lasted all his life.

Waugh came down from Oxford £20 in debt, with no serious ambitions or plans for a career. For a time he attended art school but soon realized he had "not the talent nor the application—I lacked the moral qualities." Nor did steady journalism seem to be his métier. A stint at Lord Beaverbrook's Daily Express lasted 16 days.

Worse, he was unhappily in love with Olivia Plunket-Greene, one of the Bright Young People, a moody and difficult girl. Partly through Olivia, Waugh was drawn into the London scene, where he led an increasingly expensive and exhausting social life. He went deeper into debt and was obliged, like Paul Pennyfeather in *Decline and Fall*, to get a job as a schoolmaster, first at a school in Wales, then at a school near Oxford (from which he was fired for drunkenness), finally in London. Although these episodes would later bear comic fruit, Waugh saw them at the time only as dreary additions to "an almost continuous record of failure." At one point, he tried to drown himself, leaving behind a suicide note in the form of some appropriate verses from Euripides. This, too, proved unsuccessful in a wonderfully Waugh-like way; a jellyfish stung him on the leg, and the pain drove him back to shore.

By 1927, however, Waugh had fallen in love with Evelyn Gardner. Her mother, Lady Burclere, was not receptive to the prospect of an impoverished schoolteacher as a son-in-law, so Waugh settled down to writing, although it had never given him as much pleasure as drawing. Nevertheless, he went seriously to work.

In June of 1928, the two Evelyns were secretly married in London. Three months later, *Decline and Fall* was published and well received, and the Waughs, though not well off, seemed happily established. He- and she-Evelyn, as they were known, were a striking pair—"like two little boys," Nancy Mitford said; at home in their "smart little bandbox of a house," they seemed to combine sophistication with idyllic innocence. Within a year, however, the idyll was over, disastrously.

The 1929 London season had been particularly feverish, and in July Waugh went to the country for some peace to work on *Vile Bodies*. In his absence, she-Evelyn fell in love with a mutual friend. She confessed the affair but attempts at a reconciliation failed. In September, Waugh sued for a divorce, and it was granted. A year later, he entered the Catholic Church. The wound of she-Evelyn's betrayal was deep, yet neither divorce nor conversion produced a dramatic change in Waugh's writing or his way of life.

With the publication of *Vile Bodies* in 1930, Waugh achieved a certain celebrity. Access to the glittering inner circles was far more easy than
it had been in the '20s, and in his London diary for these years, he sounds tough, self-assured, very much the dandy about town, conspicuously enjoying his success.

But Waugh, like others of his generation, found England in the '30s a less congenial place. He spent much of his time roaming, usually to remote and primitive places. He went to Ethiopia for Haile Selassie's coronation and, later, to cover the Italian invasion. He traveled in Africa, in South America, and to the Spitzbergen Islands in the Arctic. Out of these voyages came material for newspaper stories that he ultimately turned into the comic novels *Black Mischief* (1932), *A Handful of Dust* (1934), and *Scoop* (1938).

In 1937, when the Catholic Church finally annulled his first marriage, Waugh married Laura Herbert, a cousin of his first wife. (“I thought we'd heard the last of that young man,” one aunt said.) For the first time Waugh had a permanent home of his own—Piers Court in Gloucestershire. The decision to leave London and establish himself as a country squire was an indication that he was forsaking dandyism for a more traditional way of life. *Scoop* was his first novel from Piers Court, and the brief portrait of the preposterously feudal Boot family, for all its ostensible irony, reveals Waugh's romantic attraction to rural, eccentric "Englishness."

With the same traditional enthusiasm, Waugh welcomed World War II as a heroic renaissance for himself and for England. *Put Out More Flags* (1942), perhaps his finest novel, conveys the optimism of his early wartime years. The central group of the novel are the rogues and dandies of earlier books who now, in wartime, have put aside the reckless habits of peace.

Still, it is characteristic of Waugh's divided nature that the heroes of the novel, the characters who engage Waugh's deepest imaginative attention, are two brilliant misfits, Ambrose Silk and Basil Seal. They will have nothing to do with the war and continue the solitary, anarchic ways they followed in peacetime.

Ultimately, the war disappointed Waugh. Because of his age, he had trouble getting a commission. Eventually he was accepted into the Royal Marines and later transferred to a commando unit under Colonel Robert Laycock, whom he liked and respected. Waugh served bravely in combat at Dakar and on Crete but, on the whole, he was impossible: rude to his superiors, a bully to his men. When Laycock sailed for Italy, he left Waugh behind, confiding to a friend, "I'm afraid Evelyn will be shot. . . . Oh, I don't mean by the enemy."

The most important event of the war years in terms of Waugh's artistic career was *Brideshead Revisited* (1945), his first serious, fictional attempt to reconcile his religion with his art. The first part of the novel is a wonderfully nostalgic evocation of Oxford and the aristocratic country-house world. The second half, a religious story of redemption and conversion, is less successful. As a whole, the novel is a radical failure, for the new order that Waugh finds in the Catholic Church is never depicted with the conviction he brings to the eccentric, irresponsible age he has renounced.

Modern times pressed hard on Waugh in his last decades. The decline of the aristocracy, the encroachment of American power, and, above all, the ascendance of the liberal movement in the Catholic Church appalled and depressed him.
Waugh, like his father, had a histrionic streak; he promoted his "idiosyncratic Toryism" and played the role of curmudgeonly squire with gusto. He realized that his behavior could be trying and, when told as much, once replied: "Can you imagine how much worse I'd be if I weren't a Catholic?" In his last years, he found his pleasures chiefly in his family and a small circle of friends. He died on Easter Sunday 1966.

Waugh claimed to regard writing not as an investigation of character but as "an exercise in the use of language." Like Gilbert Pinfold, he "regarded his books as objects which he had made, things quite external to himself, to be used and judged by others." But this is only partly true, for Waugh's novels are passionate extensions of himself. Why he chose to project a veneer of detachment remains a complex question.

In early life, Waugh adopted the arrogant, upper-class pose of "never apologize, never explain." Later, sadly, aloofness came to reflect his distaste for the modern world. But in his best work he creates a tension between the two: between his strong sense of tradition and the pleasure he took in assaulting it. For the man who publicly wished he'd been born in the 13th century always knew that he was peculiarly a child of the 20th.

DECLINE AND FALL

Waugh published Decline and Fall in 1928, shortly after his first marriage. This comic novel traces the career of Paul Pennyfeather, a young man of piety who is expelled from Oxford for indecent behavior. Pennyfeather's misfortunes begin with the annual dinner of Oxford's exclusive Bollinger Club. As the book opens, Mr. Sniggs, the Junior Dean, and Mr. Postelthwaite, the Domestic Bursar, are in their rooms overlooking the inner court of Scone College, listening to a "confused roaring and breaking of glass."

There is tradition behind the Bollinger; it numbers reigning kings among its past members. At the last dinner, three years ago, a fox had been brought in in a cage and stoned to death with champagne bottles. What an evening that had been! This was the first meeting since then, and from all over Europe old members had rallied for the occasion. For two days they had been pouring into Oxford: epileptic royalty from their villas of exile; uncouth peers from crumbling country seats; smooth young men of uncertain tastes from embassies and legations; illiterate lairds from wet granite hovels in the Highlands. . . . All that was most sonorous of name and title was there for the beano.
"The fines!" said Mr. Sniggs, gently rubbing his pipe along the side of his nose. "Oh, my! the fines there'll be after this evening!"

There is some highly prized port in the senior common-room cellars that is only brought up when the College fines have reached £50.

"We shall have a week of it at least," said Mr. Postlethwaite, "a week of Founder's port."

A shriller note could now be heard rising from Sir Alastair's rooms; any who have heard that sound will shrink at the recollection of it; it is the sound of the English county families baying for broken glass. . . .

"There must be fifty of them at least," said Mr. Postlethwaite. "If only they were all members of the College! Fifty of them at ten pounds each. Oh, my!"

"It'll be more if they attack the Chapel," said Mr. Sniggs. "Oh, please God, make them attack the Chapel."

"I wonder who the unpopular undergraduates are this term. They always attack their rooms. I hope they have been wise enough to go out for the evening."

"I think Partridge will be one; he possesses a painting by Matisse or some such name."

"And I'm told he has black sheets in his bed."

"And Sanders went to dinner with Ramsay MacDonald once."

"And Rending can afford to hunt, but collects china instead."

"And smokes cigars in the garden after breakfast."

"Austen has a grand piano."

"They'll enjoy smashing that. . . ."

It was a lovely evening. They broke up Mr. Austen's grand piano, and stamped Lord Rending's cigars into his carpet, and smashed his china, and tore up Mr. Partridge's sheets, and threw the Matisse into his water jug; Mr. Sanders had nothing to break except his windows, but they found the manuscript at which he had been working for the Newdigate Prize Poem, and had great fun with that. . . . But there was still a treat to come.

Paul Pennyleather was reading for the Church. It was his third year of uneventful residence at Scone. He had come there after a creditable career at a small public school of ecclesiastical temper on the South Downs, where he had edited the magazine, been President of the Debating Society, and had, as his report said, "exercised a wholesome influence for good" in the House of which he was head boy. . . .

Little suspecting the incalculable consequences that the evening was to have for him, he bicycled happily back from a meeting of the League of Nations Union. There had been a most interesting paper about plebiscites in Poland. He thought of smoking a pipe and reading another chapter of the Forsyte Saga before going to bed. He knocked at the gate, was admitted, put away his bicycle, and diffidently, as always, made his way across the quad towards his rooms. What a lot of people there seemed to be about! . . .

Out of the night Lumsden of Strathdrummond swayed across his path like a druidical rocking stone. Paul tried to pass.

Now it so happened that the tie of Paul's old school bore a marked resemblance to the pale blue and white of the Bollinger Club. The difference of a quarter of an inch in the width of the stripes was not one that Lumsden of Strathdrummond was likely to appreciate.

"Here's an awful man wearing the Boiler tie," said the Laird. It is not
for nothing that since pre-Christian times his family has exercised chieftainship over uncharted miles of barren moorland.

Mr. Sniggs was looking rather apprehensively at Mr. Postlethwaite. "They appear to have caught somebody," he said. "I hope they don't do him any serious harm."...

At length the crowd parted, and Mr. Sniggs gave a sigh of relief. "But it's quite all right... It's Pennyfeather—some one of no importance."

"Well, that saves a great deal of trouble. I am glad, Sniggs; I am, really. What a lot of clothes the young man appears to have lost!"

Next morning there was a lovely College meeting.

"Two hundred and thirty pounds," murmured the Domestic Bursar ecstatically, "not counting the damage! That means five evenings, with what we have already collected. Five evenings of Founder's port!

"The case of Pennyfeather," the Master was saying. "seems to be quite a different matter altogether. He ran the whole length of the quadrangle, you say; without his trousers. It is unseemly."...

"Perhaps if we fined him really heavily?" suggested the Junior Dean.

"I very much doubt whether he could pay. I understand he is not well off. Without trousers, indeed! And at that time of night! I think we should do far better to get rid of him altogether. That sort of young man does the College no good."...

At the gates Paul tipped the porter.

"Well, good-bye, Blackall," he said. "I don't suppose I shall see you again for some time."

"No, sir, and very sorry I am to hear about it. I expect you'll be becoming a schoolmaster, sir. That's what most of the gentlemen does, sir, that gets sent down for indecent behaviour."

VILE BODIES

Vile Bodies (1930) is a manic tale of London's 1920s smart set. Through a whirl of parties—"Masked parties, Savage parties, Victorian parties"—runs the on-again, off-again romance between Adam Fenwick-Symes, an impoverished writer, and Nina Blount, daughter of a batty country aristocrat.

Coming home from France, Adam has had the typescript of his autobiography—his only hope of solvency—impounded by an English customs officer, along with a copy of Dante's Purgatorio. ("French, eh? . . . and pretty dirty, too, I shouldn't wonder.") Desperate, he is hired as Mr. Chatterbox, the gossip
columnist on London's Daily Excess. Unfortunately, Lord Monomark, the newspaper's owner, has forbidden further mention of the 62 most prominent Londoners, including the Prime Minister and the Archbishop of Canterbury, all of whom are suing the paper. (Adam's predecessor had deliberately libeled all of them in his last column.)

Forced to write about "a murky world of nonentities," Adam nevertheless brings a certain ingenuity to the task—culminating in his invention of the remarkable Imogen Quest.

He started a series of "Notable Invalids," which was, from the first, wildly successful. . . . He followed it up with a page about deaf peers and statesmen, then about the one-legged, blind and bald. . . . Finally, he ransacked the lunatic asylums and mental houses of the country, and for nearly a week ran an extremely popular series under the heading of "Titled Eccentrics." . . .

"Lady — whose imitations of animal sounds are so life-like that she can seldom be persuaded to converse in any other way . . ."

And so on.

Besides this, arguing that people did not really mind whom they read about provided that a kind of vicarious inquisitiveness into the lives of others was satisfied, Adam began to invent people.

He invented a sculptor called Provna, the son of a Polish nobleman, who lived in a top-floor studio in Grosvenor House. Most of his work (which was all in private hands) was constructed in cork, vulcanite and steel. . . . Such is the power of the Press, that soon after this a steady output of Early Provnas began to travel from Warsaw to Bond Street and from Bond Street to California. . . .

Encouraged by his success, Adam began gradually to introduce to his readers a brilliant and lovely company. He mentioned them casually at first in lists of genuine people. There was a popular young attaché at the Italian Embassy called Count Cincinnati. He was descended from the famous Roman Consul, Cincinnatus, and bore a plough as his crest. Count Cincinnati was held to be the best amateur cellist in London. Adam saw him one evening dancing at the Café de la Paix. A few evenings later Lord Vanburgh [a rival gossip columnist on the Morning Despatch] noticed him at Covent Garden, remarking that his collection of the original designs for the Russian ballet was unequalled in Europe. Two days later Adam sent him to Monte Carlo for a few day's rest, and Vanburgh hinted that there was more in this visit than met the eye, and mentioned the daughter of a well-known American hostess who was staying there at her aunt's villa. . . .

But Adam's most important creation was Mrs. Andrew Quest. There was always some difficulty about introducing English people into his column as his readers had a way of verifying his references in Debrett. . . . However, he put Imogen Quest down one day, quietly and decisively, as the most lovely and popular of the younger married set. And from the first she exhibited signs of a marked personality. Adam wisely eschewed any attempts at derivation, but his readers nodded to each other and speedily supplied her with an exalted if irregular origin. Everything else Adam showered upon her. She had slightly more than average
height, and was very dark and slim, with large Laurencin eyes and the negligent grace of the trained athlete (she fenced with the sabre for half an hour every morning before breakfast). Even Provna, who was notoriously indifferent to conventional beauty, described her as "justifying the century." . . .

Soon Imogen Quest became a byword for social inaccessibility—the final goal for all climbers.

Adam went one day to a shop in Hanover Square to watch Nina buy some hats and was seriously incommoded by the heaps of bandboxes disposed on the chairs and dressing-tables ostentatiously addressed to Mrs. Andrew Quest. He could hear her name spoken reverently in cocktail clubs, and casually let slip in such phrases as "My dear, I never see Peter now. He spends all his time with Imogen Quest," or "As Imogen would say . . ." or "I think the Quests have got one like that. I must ask them where it came from." . . .

Finally a message came down that Lord Monomark was interested in Mrs. Quest; could Mr. Chatterbox arrange a meeting? That day the Quests sailed for Jamaica.

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BLACK MISCHIEF

Black Mischief (1932) centers on the quixotic fortunes of Seth, Emperor of Azania, Lord of Wanda, and "Bachelor of the Arts of Oxford University." Having imperfectly assimilated the fruits of Western progress, young Seth has embarked on an ambitious One Year Plan to move his backward African homeland into a New Age. To that end he has appointed Basil Seal, a college acquaintance and irrepressible cad-about-London, as Minister of Modernisation. Seal in turn, is assisted by an expatriate Armenian wheeler-dealer, Youkoumian, who serves as Financial Secretary.

In his relentless quest for modernity, Seth has organized a Pageant of Birth Control to promote infertility among his bewildered people. Although the idea is opposed by the Azanian nobility, the Nestorian Church, and "a few of the decayed Arab intelligentsia," the tribesmen and villagers are surprisingly enthusiastic.

This development was due directly and solely to the power of advertisement. In the dark days when the prejudice of his people compassed him on every side and even Basil spoke unsympathetically of the wisdom of postponing the gala, the Emperor found among the books that were mailed to him monthly from Europe, a collection of highly inspiring Soviet posters . . .

An artist was next found in the
Armenian colony who, on Mr. Youkoumian’s introduction, was willing to elaborate Seth’s sketches. Finally there resulted a large, highly colored poster well calculated to convey to the illiterate the benefits of birth control.

It portrayed two contrasted scenes. On one side a native hut of hideous squalor, overrun with children of every age, suffering from every physical incapacity—crippled, deformed, blind, spotted and insane; the father prematurely aged with paternity squatted by an empty cook-pot; through the door could be seen his wife, withered and bowed with child bearing, desperately hoeing at their inadequate crop. On the other side a bright parlour furnished with chairs and table; the mother, young and beautiful, sat at her ease eating a huge slice of raw meat; her husband smoked a long Arab hubble-bubble (still a caste mark of leisure throughout the land), while a single, healthy child sat between them reading a newspaper. Inset between the two pictures was a detailed drawing of some up-to-date contraceptive apparatus and the words in Sakuyu:

WHICH HOME DO YOU CHOOSE?

Interest in the pictures was unbounded; all over the island woolly heads were nodding, black hands pointing, tongues clicking against filed teeth in unsyntactical dialects. Nowhere was there any doubt about the meaning of the beautiful new pictures.

See: on right hand: there is rich man: smoke pipe like big chief: but his wife she no good: sit eating meat: and rich man no good: he only one son.

See: on the left hand: poor man: not much to eat: but his poor wife she very good, work hard in field: man he good too: eleven children: one very mad, very holy. And in the middle: Emperor’s juju. Make you like that good man with eleven children.

And as a result, despite admonitions from squire and vicar, the peasantry began pouring into town for the gala, eagerly awaiting initiation to the fine new magic of virility and fecundity.

“If you ask me,” said Basil, one morning soon after the distribution of the poster, “loyalty to the throne is one of the hardest parts of our job.”

“Oh, gosh, Mr. Seal, don’t you ever say a thing like that. I seen gentlemen poisoned dead for less. What’s e done now?”

“Only this.” He handed Mr. Youkoumian a chit which had just arrived from the Palace:

For your information and necessary action; I have decided to abolish the following:

Death penalty.
Marriage.
The Sakuyu language and all native dialects.
Infant mortality.
Totemism.
Inhumane butchery.
Mortgages.
Emigration.

Please see to this. Also organise system of reservoirs for city’s water supply and draft syllabus for competitive examination for public services. Suggest compulsory Esperanto. Seth.

“E’s been reading books again, Mr. Seal, that’s what it is. You won’t get no peace from im, not till you fix im with a woman. Why can’t e drink or something?”
Later, two representatives of England’s Society for the Prevention of Cruelty of Animals, Dame Mildred Porch and Miss Tin, arrive in Azania on a fact-finding tour. Seth decides to demonstrate Azania’s new-found modernity by honoring the visiting ladies with a state dinner. He tells Basil:

“It shall be an entirely Azanian party. I want the English ladies to see how refined we are. I was doubtful about asking Viscount Boaz. What do you think? Will he be sober? ... and there is the question of food. I have been reading that now it is called Vitamins. I am having the menu printed like this. It is a good, modern, European dinner, eh?”

Basil looked at the card. A month ago he might have suggested emendations. Today he was tired. ...

So the menu for Seth’s first dinner party went to the Courier office to be printed and came back a packet of handsome gilt edged cards, laced with silk ribbons in the Azanian colours and embossed with a gold crown.

March 15th.

IMPERIAL BANQUET FOR WELCOMING THE ENGLISH CRUELTY TO ANIMALS

Menu of Foods.

Vitamin A
Tin Sardines
Vitamin B
Roasted Beef
Vitamin C
Small Roasted Suckling Porks
Vitamin D
Hot Sheep and Onions
Vitamin E
Spiced Turkey
Vitamin F
Sweet Puddings
Vitamin G
Coffee
Vitamin H
Jam

“It is so English,” explained Seth. “From courtesy to your great Empire.” ...

Presently when the last vitamin had been guzzled, Viscount Boaz rose to propose the health of the guests of honour. His speech was greeted by loud applause and was then done into English by the Court Interpreter:

“Your Majesty, Lords and Ladies. It is my privilege and delight this evening to welcome with open arms of brotherly love to our city Dame Mildred Porch and Miss Tin, two ladies renowned throughout the famous country of Europe for their great cruelty to animals. We Azanians are a proud and ancient nation but we have much to learn from the white people of the West and North. We too, in our small way, are cruel to our animals”—and here the Minister for the Interior digressed at some length to recount with hideous detail what he had himself once done with a woodman’s axe to a wild boar—“but it is to the great nations of the West and North, and specially to their worthy representatives that are with us tonight, that we look as our natural leaders on the road of progress. Ladies and gentlemen we must be Modern, we must be refined in our Cruelty to Animals. That is the message of the New Age brought to us by our guests this evening. May I, in conclusion, raise my glass and ask you to join with me in wishing them old age and prolonged fecundity.”
Written in 1938, soon after the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, Scoop remains a classic, a devastating portrait of the world of the foreign correspondent. William Boot, a countryman and live-at-home nature writer ("Feather footed through the plashy fen passes the questing vole . . .") for London's Daily Beast, has been mistakenly assigned by Lord Copper, the Fleet Street magnate, to cover an incipient civil war in Ishmaelia, located on the African mainland not far from Azania. Young Boot dutifully sets off to join the scores of foreign journalists misreporting events in Jacksonburg, Ishmaelia's capital. En route, aboard the S.S. Francmaçon in the Red Sea, he picks up a few tips from Corker, a veteran reporter for the Universal News Service.

Corker looked at him sadly. "You know, you’ve got a lot to learn about journalism. Look at it this way. News is what a chap who doesn’t care much about anything wants to read. And it’s only news until he’s read it. After that it’s dead. We’re paid to supply news. If someone else has sent a story before us, our story isn’t news. Of course there’s colour. Colour is just a lot of bulls'-eyes about nothing. It’s easy to write and easy to read but it costs too much in cabling so we have to go slow on that. See?"

"I think so."

That afternoon Corker told William a great deal about the craft of journalism. The Francmaçon weighed anchor, swung about and steamed into the ochre hills, through the straits and out into the open sea while Corker recounted the heroic legends of Fleet Street; he told of the classic scoops and hoaxes; of the confessions wrung from hysterical suspects; of the innuendo and intricate misrepresentations, the luscious, detailed inventions that composed contemporary history; of the positive, daring lies that got a chap a rise of screw; how Wenlock Jakes, highest paid journalist of the United States, scooped the world with an eyewitness story of the sinking of the Lusitania four hours before she was hit; how Hitchcock, the English Jakes, straddling over his desk in London, had chronicled day by day the horrors of the Messina earthquake; how Corker himself, not three months back, had had the rare good fortune to encounter a knight’s widow trapped by the foot between lift and landing. . . .

Many of Corker’s anecdotes dealt with the fabulous Wenlock Jakes. " . . . syndicated all over America. Gets a thousand dollars a week. When he turns up in a place you can bet your life that as long as he’s there it’ll be the news centre of the world.

"Why, once Jakes went out to cover a revolution in one of the Balkan capitals. He overslept in his carriage, woke up at the wrong station, didn’t know any different, got out, went straight to a hotel, and cabled off a thousand-word story about barricades in the streets, flaming churches, machine guns answering the rattle of
The Loved One (1948) is Waugh's most perverse novel; he recommended that the squeamish "return their copies to the library or the bookstore unread." The setting is Whispering Glades Memorial Park, a lush California necropolis modeled, despite disclaimers, on Hollywood's Forest Lawn Cemetery. The title of the book refers to the cemetery's clients as well as to Miss Aimée Thanatogenos, resident cosmetician and aspiring embalmer. She is being amorously pursued by Mr. Joyboy, dean of American morticians, and by a young Englishman, Dennis Barlow, a sometime screenwriter now employed as an attendant at the Happier Hunting Grounds, a Whispering Glades for pets.

Sir Francis Hinsley, just fired by Megalopolitan Pictures, has hanged himself with his suspenders. Dennis, his friend and fellow countryman, must make arrangements for the funeral. With recorded strains of the "Hindu Love-song" in the background, he opens preliminary negotiations with a Mortuary Hostess.

"We want my friend buried."
"This is not your first visit to Whispering Glades?"
"Yes."
"Then let me explain the Dream. The Park is zoned. Each zone has its own name and appropriate Work of Art. Zones of course vary in price and within the zones the prices vary according to their proximity to the Work of Art. We have single sites as low as fifty dollars. That is in Pilgrims' Rest, a zone we are just developing behind the Crematory fuel..."
dump. The most costly are those on Lake Isle. They range about a thousand dollars. Then there is Lovers’ Nest, zoned about a very, very beautiful marble replica of Rodin’s famous statue, the Kiss. We have double plots there at seven hundred and fifty dollars the pair. Was your Loved One married?”
  “No.”
  “What was his business?”
  “He was a writer.”
  “Ah, then Poets’ Corner would be the place for him. We have many of our foremost literary names there, either in person or as Before Need reservations. You are no doubt acquainted with the works of Amelia Bergson?”
  “I know of them.”
  “We sold Miss Bergson a Before Need reservation only yesterday, under the statue of the prominent Greek poet Homer. I could put your friend right next to her. But perhaps you would like to see the zone before deciding?”
  “I want to see everything.”
  “There certainly is plenty to see. I’ll have one of our guides take you round just as soon as we have all the Essential Data, Mr. Barlow. Was your Loved One of any special religion?”
  “An Agnostic.”
  “We have two non-sectarian churches in the Park and a number of non-sectarian pastors. Jews and Catholics seem to prefer to make their own arrangements.”
  “I believe Sir Ambrose Abercrombie is planning a special service.”
  “Oh, was your Loved One in films, Mr. Barlow? In that case he ought to be in Shadowland.”
  “I think he would prefer to be with Homer and Miss Bergson.”
  “Then the University Church would be most convenient. We like to save the Waiting Ones a long procession. I presume the Loved One was Caucasian?”
  “No, why did you think that? He was purely English.”
  “English are purely Caucasian, Mr. Barlow. This is a restricted park. The Dreamer has made that rule for the sake of the Waiting Ones. In their time of trial they prefer to be with their own people.”
  “I think I understand. Well, let me assure you Sir Francis was quite white.”
  As he said this there came vividly into Dennis’s mind that image which lurked there, seldom out of sight for long; the sack or body suspended and the face above it with eyes red and horribly starting from their sockets, the cheeks mottled in indigo like the marbled end-papers of a ledger and the tongue swollen and protruding like an end of black sausage.
  “Your are sure that they will be able to make him presentable?”
  “We had a Loved One last month who was found drowned. He had been in the sea a month and they only identified him by his wristwatch. They fixed that stiff,” said the hostess, disconcertingly lapsing from the high diction she had hitherto employed, “so he looked like it was his wedding day. The boys up there surely know their job. Why if he’d sat on an atom bomb, they’d make him presentable.”
  “That’s very comforting.”

Dennis’s next appointment is with the cosmetician of the Orchid Room, Aimée Thanatogenos. Clad in the white livery of her profession, she is, he thinks, the “sole Eve in a bustling, hygienic Eden.”
Her full face was oval, her profile pure and classical and light. Her eyes greenish and remote, with a rich glint of lunacy.

Dennis held his breath. When the girl spoke it was briskly and prosaically.

"What did your Loved One pass on from?" she asked.

"He hanged himself."

"Was the face much disfigured?"

"Hideously."

"That is quite usual. Mr. Joyboy will probably take him in hand personally. It is a question of touch, you see, massaging the blood from the congested areas. Mr. Joyboy has very wonderful hands."

"And what do you do?"

"Hair, skin and nails, and I brief the embalmers for expression and pose. Have you brought any photographs of your Loved One? They are the greatest help in recreating personality. Was he a very cheerful old gentleman?"

"No, rather the reverse."

"Shall I put him down as serene and philosophical or judicial and determined?"

"I think the former."

"It is the hardest of all expressions to fix, but Mr. Joyboy makes it his speciality—that and the joyful smile for children. Did the Loved One wear his own hair? And the normal complexion? We usually classify them as rural, athletic and scholarly—that is to say red, brown or white. Scholarly? And spectacles? A monocle. They are always a difficulty because Mr. Joyboy likes to incline the head slightly to give a more natural pose. Pince-nez and monocles are difficult to keep in place once the flesh has firmed. Also of course the monocle looks less natural when the eye is closed. Did you particularly wish to feature it?"

"No, let us eliminate the monocle."

"Just as you wish, Mr. Barlow. Of course, Mr. Joyboy can fix it."

"No. I think your point about the eye being closed is decisive."

"Very well. Did the Loved One pass over with a rope?"

"Braces. What you call suspenders."

"That should be quite easy to deal with. Sometimes there is a permanent line left. We had a Loved One last month who passed over with electric cord. Even Mr. Joyboy could do nothing with that. We had to wind a scarf right up to the chin. But suspenders should come out quite satisfactorily."

"You have a great regard for Mr. Joyboy, I notice."

"He is a true artist, Mr. Barlow. I can say no more."
Vietnam as History

This spring, 10 years after the diplomats from Hanoi and Washington first began peace talks in Paris and three years after North Vietnamese tanks rolled triumphantly into Saigon, there seems to be a tentative willingness among many Americans to take another look at the Vietnam War.

A half-dozen movie makers are gambling that the passions of the Johnson-Nixon era have waned sufficiently to make Vietnam, or at least a Hollywood version of it, good box office. In recent months, front-page reviews have greeted such non-polemics as C. D. B. Bryan's sober Friendly Fire, Michael Herr's surrealistic Dispatches, Philip Caputo's confessional A Rumor of War, and Frank Snepp's allegations of U.S. bungling during the fall of Saigon, in Decent Interval. At the University of North Carolina and elsewhere, the war is being taught as "history"; those who now study it as undergraduates were in grade school in March 1968 when Lyndon Johnson announced on TV that he would not seek re-election as President and ordered a partial halt to the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

For the benefit of students, teachers, and the general reader, we present here a survey of scholarly works-in-progress on the war, then a New Look at the existing Vietnam literature, focusing on those few books which either break new ground or seem to have survived the cruel test of time.

by Peter Braestrup

Were our Presidents right or wrong in involving the United States in Vietnam? Did our leaders adopt the best strategy for fighting the war? Were they genuinely seeking a compromise peace?

The answers to these big questions—and others—remain elusive, subject to debate likely to be renewed with each generation of historians, as after other U.S. wars.

From the vast literature dealing with Vietnam, only a few dozen books covering the origins, conduct,
and outcome of the war remain useful. We describe them below. But first we consider the current crop of scholarly work, which is buttressed by newly available documentation and fresh perspectives on our direct intervention in 1965–73.

Perhaps the most important academic work-in-progress is The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked by Leslie Gelb with Richard Betts of the Brookings Institution. It is slated for publication later this year by Brookings. A decade ago, Gelb directed the famed "Pentagon Papers" study of U.S. Vietnam decision-making, 1946–67. Irony draws heavily on the Papers' mother lode and other archives in examining the same subject.

Gelb and Betts dig at the "whats and whys"; they note that the historical evidence is "still alive, being shaped by bitterness and bewilderment, reassurances and new testimony." Old Vietnam hands may challenge some of the brief Gelb-Betts interpretations of events in Saigon and on the battlefield. But when it focuses on Washington, Irony torpedoes many an assumption long cherished by either hawks or doves. It does not show, for example, that Lyndon Johnson, while running against Barry Goldwater in 1964, secretly decided to escalate the war, while saying the opposite in his campaign speeches. Rather, the book tends to confirm that whenever crisis loomed in Vietnam, LBJ, like his predecessors, usually did only what then seemed necessary to stave off a Communist takeover. Even as he escalated the war in 1965–67, Johnson glumly chose the "middle course," say Gelb and Betts, without any real strategy except "to persevere."

Political scientist Guenter Lewy of the University of Massachusetts has completed, for publication in September, America in Vietnam, an omnibus 1965–73 war history, using newly available military archives. He researched and wrote the book, Lewy said, in part because his television-reared students had such foggy notions of how and why the war was fought.

Anthropologist Gerald Hickey, former Wilson Center Fellow and author of the classic Village in Vietnam (1964), has completed his mammoth history of Vietnam's embattled Montagnards, or mountain tribesmen. An analysis of U.S. intervention in Saigon politics by George Kahin, director of Cornell's Southeast Asia program, is under way. Lawrence Lichty, now a Wilson Center Fellow, is compiling a detailed history of the television coverage of the war.

Neil Sheehan, former New York Timesman in Saigon, is preparing a major biography of Colonel John Paul Vann, the archetypal U.S. adviser. And the Associated Press's prize-winning Peter Arnett, whose Vietnam experience spans the entire 1962–75 period, is writing a reporter's memoir.

These efforts and a half dozen newly published studies, cited below, should not be interpreted as a full-blown renaissance.

Long after the United States first landed troops in Vietnam in 1965, many a professor rushed into print with analyses of the conflict and proposals to end it. But serious academic research devoted to Vietnam then, or earlier, was meager, and it is meager today. *

*According to Allan E. Goodman, in Freedom at Issue (Sept.–Oct. 1973, p. 19), out of 7,615 Ph.D. dissertations produced at U.S. universities in 1954–68 in the fields of modern history, international relations, and political science, only 22 were on Vietnam.
At Harvard, for example, there is now no Indochina specialist on the faculty and none at Princeton, Berkeley, or Yale. Most students and faculty associated with Cornell's small Southeast Asia Center are devoting themselves to matters other than the Vietnam War.

At low ebb is the Vietnam Center of the University of Southern Illinois, set up in 1969 with a five-year $1 million federal grant—which has not been renewed. Its current director, Nguyen Dinh Hoa, survived early attacks by antiwar radicals, built up graduate studies and a major Vietnam archive, but now runs what is largely a language program. The Japanese Foreign Ministry sends young diplomats, destined for embassy posts in Hanoi, to Dr. Hoa for language training; one alumnus is already on duty in the capital of the New Vietnam.

The Gold Is There

Neither the major foundations nor the major universities have encouraged scholarly research on the war and its effects, even as the military and such institutions as the Lyndon Johnson Library make more material available. Parts of the record, particularly for the Nixon-Ford era, remain classified. But as Gelb, Lewy, and others have demonstrated, much gold is there, waiting to be mined. In effect, the academics are leaving most of the mining to others, notably the historians of the military services.


Many of these efforts provide revealing data and documentation, but they suffer from the flaws inherent in “official” history: parochialism, heavy reliance on official papers, blandness, and a reluctance to explore error, command failure, or confusion.

More than its counterparts, the

Army's Center for Military History benefits from a tradition of solid scholarship and freedom from censorship by higher-ups, as exemplified in its mammoth chronicles of World War II and the Korean War. Historian Charles MacDonald is directing the preparation of a 21-volume Vietnam series, covering not only combat but also such matters as the military's relations with the media, pacification, and decision-making at "Pentagon East" in Saigon. The first volume will appear sometime after 1980.

Disaster at Tet

The Defense Department has collected post-mortem essays by (and interviews with) leading Vietnamese émigrés dealing with the 1975 fall of South Vietnam for publication later this year. But neither the Defense Department nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff are likely to publish their respective official histories of the high-level Vietnam decision-making for years to come. The State Department publishes selected documents but does not "do" much diplomatic history. And the Central Intelligence Agency keeps its history, not surprisingly, in the vault at Langley, Virginia.

Few leading military figures have written useful nonofficial accounts. But General Westmoreland's *A Soldier Reports* (1976) is notable for (1) suggesting that in 1964 and early '65, what with political chaos in Saigon, the United States, prior to any massive troop commitments, could have honorably pulled out, and (2) showing how LBJ manipulated the U.S. commander in Vietnam into becoming, in effect, a spokesman for the administration in the domestic political arena.

Of the high-level Washington actors in the crucial Johnson era, only the late President and his chief national security aide Walt W. Rostow published their own book-length accounts. Former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and the late General Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, did not.

LBJ's defensive, uncharacteristically bland *Vantage Point* (1971) slides over many key details; Doris Kearns's post-1968 interviews as recorded in *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (1976) provide insights into the ex-President's fears and frustrations. Rostow's *Diffusion of Power* (1972) is crisp and kind to the President, even as Rostow implies that LBJ's irresolution helped to make the climactic Tet 1968 political crisis a "self-inflicted wound."

Vivid media accounts and some doubters within the Johnson Administration portrayed Hanoi's Tet offensive against the South's cities as a local "disaster" for the allies—even as it stunned Washington. Don Oberdorfer's *Tet!* (1971) remains a first-rate newsman's account of that drama, in Vietnam and on the homefront; he wrote without benefit of *The Pentagon Papers* and newer documentation. Filling in the Washington gaps is *The Unmaking of a President* (1977) by Herbert Y. Schandler (WQ, Summer 1977).

Memoirs to Come

No new *Pentagon Papers* has been published on the 1969-75 Nixon-Ford period and much remains obscure. Access to high-level documentation is difficult, but most of the key actors are still around. Among them, only former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former CIA Di-
PERSPECTIVES: VIETNAM

rector William Colby, and Mr. Nixon are known to be publishing memoirs.


The Other Side
A new comprehensive scholarly analysis of the 1963–73 diplomacy is Allan Goodman’s well-knit The Lost Peace (1978). In Goodman’s view, grave weakness lay in early and persistent U.S. hopes that gradual, limited increases in military pressure combined with a conciliatory diplomatic stance would lead to a negotiated settlement. This assumption helped to obscure “what the [ultimate] costs of intervention were likely to be and, equally important, what the ultimate gains [in Vietnam] might look like.” The North Vietnamese, from the outset, had told Washington that there was really “nothing to negotiate”; Hanoi’s objective was victory, not a return to the prewar status quo.

During the war, little was known but much was written about Hanoi’s goals, decisions, and political appeal in the South. A neglected early primer was Douglas Pike’s Viet Cong (1966). Pike’s brief 1978 History of the Vietnamese Communist Party and Robert F. Turner’s Vietnamese Communism (1975) trace Party development back to the crucible of the anti-French struggle and note the cohesion and stamina of Ho Chi Minh’s ruling Politburo and the Party’s operational trinity: organization, mobilization, motivation. “If there was a secret weapon in the Vietnam War,” writes Pike, “this was it.”


“Pacification” was the name given to the long-troubled American-assisted effort, from 1961 on, to root out rural Vietcong guerrillas and tax-collectors and bring relative security and socioeconomic uplift to the countryside, as distinct from the Big War against the North Vietnamese regulars.

“Vietnamization”
The Counter-Insurgency Era (1977) by Douglas Blaufarb, a CIA veteran, provides a critical overview of such antiguerrilla drives in both Vietnam and Laos. Robert Komer, who reorganized and led the Vietnam effort in 1967–68, speculates in Bureaucracy Does Its Thing (1972) that, if the allied drive had been organized better, earlier, U.S. troops might not have been needed in 1965 to save the South from collapse.

Komer & Co. do not come off as well as the Viet Cong in Harvey Meyerson’s Vinh Long (1970), a
Gary Viskupic’s Washington Post drawing illustrates the dramatic media portrayal of Hanoi’s surprise 1968 Tet attacks against South Vietnam’s cities.

newsman’s impressionistic portrait of a troubled Delta province in 1967.

Jeffrey Race’s more scholarly War Comes to Long An (1971) describes the impressive rise and 1970 slump of the Viet Cong organization in another Delta province. In The Village (1972), F. J. West, a Marine analyst, traces the bittersweet experience of a Combined Action Platoon (14 Marines, 40 Vietnamese militiamen) shielding Quang Ngai peasants against both the Viet Cong and the occasional intrusions of regular U.S. troops. John L. Cook, a gung ho Army captain, describes “his” hamlet war northeast of Saigon in The Advisor (1973). As the local Viet cong faded and the Americans began pulling out in 1970, Cook writes, “I could see the difference between what was supposed to happen [under the Nixon ‘Vietnamization’ program] and what was actually happening... The two had little in common.”

Pilots and POWs

There has been no comprehensive history of the “gradualist” U.S. air effort in Southeast Asia. However, as a statistics-crammed study, The Air War in IndoChina (1972), prepared by a Cornell peace group, makes clear, most of the U.S. bombs fell not on the North but on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and on targets in the South; Hanoi was relatively unscathed.

Guided tours by the North Vietnamese for selected Western newsmen and antiwar activists resulted in a dozen graphic accounts of bomb damage in the North, beginning with Harrison Salisbury’s Behind the Lines (1967). The random destruction of the 1967 air war (and U.S. ground operations) in the South’s Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces is described in Jonathan Schell’s The Military Half (1968).

Two personal accounts by U.S. airmen provide a sense of the courage and frustration of the pilots who braved the North’s strong air defenses: Thud Ridge (1969) by Colonel Jack Broughton and Frank Elkins’ The Heart of a Man (1973), the posthumously published diary of a Navy carrier pilot.

Hundreds of pilots (and a few ground soldiers) wound up facing years of torture and privation in Communist prison camps. A dozen grim accounts have been published. Most revealing are John G. Hubbell’s survey, P.O.W. (1976), and Zalin Grant’s Survivors (1975), contrasting personal accounts of some POWs who collaborated with their captors and of some who did not.


Unhappily, no broad detailed studies exist as yet of South Vietnam’s frail but long-resilient administration and army. The collected *New Yorker* pieces of Robert Shaplen—*The Lost Revolution* (1966), *The Road from War* (1970)—convey an old Asia reporter’s contemporary impressions: political fragmentation, governmental corruption, bureaucratic weakness. Howard Pen DHNNINHAN’S scholarly *Elections in South Vietnam* (1973) credits the Thieu regime with some zigzag moves in 1966–67 toward a working legislature. Allan Goodman’s technical *Politics in War* (1973) suggests that by the end of 1969, the Saigon Parliament’s lower house had begun to “link population to government” through legislators’ services to constituents.

What of the 20 million ordinary South Vietnamese? The war’s effects on these people became the subject of an abundant literature, focused largely on U.S. misdeeds. Jonathan Schell’s *Village of Ben Suc* (1967), Daniel Lang’s *Casualties of War* (1969), and Seymour Hersh’s account of the 1968 massacre at My Lai 4 (1970) survive as the best-written in this category. *Vietnam: The Unheard Voices*, (1969) by Don Luce and John Sommer is a protest against the war’s impact on South Vietnamese
society. Focusing on Communist
misdeeds, Douglas Pike's low-key
*The Vietcong Strategy of Terror* (1970)
includes an analysis of the 1968 Hue massacre.

Susan Sheehan's portraits of ordinary
folk—a landowner, a soldier, a
farmer, captured Communists—in
*Ten Vietnamese* (1967), compiled with
the help of Nguyen Ngoc Rao, are
most illuminating. Rural society is
covered by James B. Hendry's
*The Small World of Khanh Hau* (1964) and
*The Vietnamese and Their Revolution*
(1970), by John T. McAlister, Jr. and
French sociologist Paul Mus.

Drawing upon Mus's work, jour-
nalist Frances Fitzgerald's passio-
nate indictment of U.S. intervention,
*Fire in the Lake* (1972) hailed the
"narrow flame" of Hanoi's revolu-
tion and its cleansing effect on Viet-
namese society.

**Unanswered Questions**

What she and other American
writers have not explained is this:
Why were most ordinary South Viet-
namese willing to resist Hanoi's rev-
olution for almost two decades—
despite heavy casualties, much pri-
vation, and poor leadership?

For that matter, what kept the
Americans going so long? John E.
Mueller's eye-opening *War, Presi-
dents, and Public Opinion* (1973)
contradicts many popular assumptions.
He says, among other things, that
youths, Democrats, and the college-
educated were more supportive of
the war, at least through 1968, than
were older folk, Republicans, and
non-college graduates. In *Vietnam
and the Silent Majority* (1970), Sidney
Verba, Philip Converse, and Milton J.
Rosenberg note that, of those Demo-
crats who voted for "peace candi-
date" Eugene McCarthy in the 1968
New Hampshire primary, anti-John-
son "hawks" outnumbered anti-
Johnson "doves" 3 to 2.

Even so, argues Thomas Powers in
*The War at Home* (1973), the antiwar
protests exacerbated a growing na-
tional political malaise that forced
Lyndon Johnson and his successor to
forgo any effort to "fight and win";
the protesters divided the Demo-
cratic party and thus helped elect

Personal accounts by student ac-
tivists include Ken Hurwitz's *March-
ing Nowhere* (1971), which embraces
Harvard, love, and the 1969 demon-
strations in Boston and Washington,
and Steven Kelman's *Push Comes to

The greening of the anti-war
movement's quarrelsome middle-
aged vanguard, "the re-emerged in-
tellectual Left" is chronicled by
Sandy Vogelgesang in *The Long Dark
Night of the Soul* (1974), which con-
tains an excellent bibliography of the
sizeable antiwar literature. Too often,
she writes, the dissenting intellectu-
als "rejected serious politics in
favor of psychodrama" and were
largely ineffectual in converting the
broader public. But, Vogelgesang
notes, the dissenters dominated dis-
cussion of Vietnam in academe,
shook the Eastern elite, and helped
spur a re-examination of U.S. foreign
policy.

**Looking Back**

Lastly, we have the recent post-
mortems. Douglas Kinnard's *The
War Managers* (1977) polls 173
former Army generals who served in
Vietnam and finds them retrospec-
tively condemning such things as
exaggerated official "body counts" of
dead enemy, academics and former
Washington "policy intellectuals"
dominate the Council on Foreign Re-
lations' uneven collection of essays,
The Legacy of Vietnam (1976), edited by Anthony Lake. More detailed, with a fresh focus on the military is The Lessons of Vietnam (1977), edited by W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell of Tufts' Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

The “hawkish” critique prevails in All Quiet on the Eastern Front (1976), an anthology edited by Anthony T. Bouscaren, featuring former Ambassador Graham Martin, General Westmoreland, and William F. Buckley. But it contains a poignant, non-hawkish elegy by the Wall Street Journal's veteran Peter R. Kann for his South Vietnamese friends who were left behind, to succumb to Hanoi's superior discipline and tenacity.

"The stronger side is not necessarily the better side," Kann writes. "'Better' becomes a question of values, and much as I may respect Communist strength and stamina, I cannot accept [the claim] that the Spartan Communist society of North Vietnam is better than the very imperfect South Vietnamese society that I knew. . . . The new Vietnam will be powerful and successful and those are the qualities that seem to count among nations, as among men."

A VIETNAM BOOKLIST

Air War Study Group, Cornell Univ., The Air War in Indochina (Beacon, rev. 1972)


Frank Callihan Elkins, The Heart of a Man (Norton, 1973)


Don Oberdorfer, Tet! ( Doubleday, 1971); Tim O'Brien, Going After Cacciato (Delacorte, 1978), If I Die in a Combat Zone, Box Me Up and Ship Me Home (Delacorte, 1973)


Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Univ. of Calif., 1971); Walt Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History (Macmillan, 1972)


NOTE: The academic Vietnam Studies Group issues a useful Bulletin on current research.
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LETTERS

We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer's telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editors' requests for comment.

U.S.-Cuban Relations: Castro's Character and Aims

After a few tentative steps, the Carter administration has discovered just how far it has to go and the price it will have to pay for better relations with Cuba. Fidel Castro is quite correct, as usual, in stating that normal relations will not come about until the second Carter administration—if then.

Why is the problem of U.S.-Cuban relations so difficult to resolve? There is, alas, no short answer. And blaming past American mistakes and subsuming them under a label like "hegemonic presumption" [Abraham Lowenthal's term, quoted by Martin J. Sherwin and Peter Winn in "The U.S. and Cuba," WQ, Winter 1978] explains little.

Fidel Castro has been called both popular and pragmatic. It is implied that American policymakers must accept these judgments as fact in any future negotiations.

As for President Castro's popularity: In nearly two decades, it has never been tested at the ballot box. Castro's well-stocked prisons and "rehabilitation camps" attest to his regime's lack of support by some Cubans. Possibly only a few thousand persons are involved, but in a well-run police state, only a minority take any risks at all. The vast majority cooperate in varying degrees of enthusiasm or remain silent.

As for his pragmatism, that much abused word hardly describes the host of bizarre schemes ordered by the Cuban leader over the last few decades: from indiscriminate industrialization in the early years and the 10-million-tons-of-sugar campaign in 1970 to such misfired projects as the isle of youth, the abolition of money, and Havana's green belt. He has left the Cuban people exhausted and impoverished.

Castro remains an orthodox Marxist-Leninist. As a Marxist zealot he knows where his history is leading, and as a Leninist he is willing and able to assist the process. To state the painfully obvious: There is no room in the future (as he sees it) for an America determined to protect its Constitution's antique bourgeois liberties. And to him, assisting history means being in such unlikely places as Angola and the African Horn and remaining there until Marxist regimes are made secure.

Bargaining with Cuba will remain a difficult, drawn-out process. [Moreover] it involves renewing selected ties (primarily economic) that will directly benefit the Castro regime and make it an even more effective tool in shaping the future of the world.

Roger W. Fontaine, Director of Latin American Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University

A Good Time for The American Novel

Literary history urges us to be cautious, even humble, in making pronouncements about our contemporaries. Not only can a writer not see himself, he may be totally and incomprehensibly blind to the virtues of his comrades.

One thinks of James Joyce and his baffling indifference to Proust, of Lawrence's dislike of Joyce, and of Woolf's haughty dismissal of Lawrence. We know Melville's fate during his own lifetime, and...
Fitzgerald's—when he died in 1940 his novels were little read, and many of the most astute "men of letters" of his era considered him a failure. And if Faulkner had died young.

It is quite possible that the writers discussed in the Wilson Quarterly essays (Winter 1978) by Earl Rovit, Jerome Klinkowitz, Melvin J. Friedman, and Tony Tanner will be seen as the central writers of our time: Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that they will not be. Yet it's altogether possible that the finest writer of the epoch is not even mentioned, and is at the present time little read.

So my instinct is to be humble, to state only that the novel in 1978 seems to me marvelously fluid, very nearly a collective experimental phenomenon that calls to mind certain highly energetic and inventive and exciting periods in art—for instance those of the futurists and the cubists.

It is a good time to be a reader. And a writer.

Joyce Carol Oates

Doctors in Sweden

One interesting reform not mentioned in the articles on Sweden (WQ, Autumn 1977) was implemented in 1970. It abolished fee-for-service and placed all Swedish hospital doctors on straight salaried remuneration.

Some American visitors have believed that this change wrought havoc with doctor morale. The September 1974 issue of the now-defunct AMA journal Prism carried a pessimistic report illustrated by a full-page drawing showing a physician waiting to punch a time clock. The caption indicated that doctors at Karolinsky Hospital had to do this "just like the other workers."

Dr. Bo Hjern, the director of the Swedish Medical Association, on a visit to Washington University in 1975, said that the report that doctors punched time clocks was in error. He indicated that the Swedish Medical Association regards itself as a union just like other unions of white-collar and manual workers. It bargains with the public employers on behalf of its members in conjunction with all other professional unions affiliated with the Federation of Professional Unions.

Although the changes [in the Swedish health care system] were not initially welcomed by all doctors, they have come to be accepted by them. I have inquired whether many doctors have voted with their feet by emigrating to practice in other countries. Apparently this is not the case to any significant extent.

Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Professor of Political Science, Washington University
St. Louis, Mo.

Strategic Arms:
Taming the MAD World

It's a mad, mad, mad, mad, mad world. And the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) as described by Samuel F. Wells, Jr. in his piece "America and the 'MAD' World" (WQ, Autumn 1977) gives an admirably detached and scholarly description of the madness.

On the Op-Ed page of the Washington Post, November 9, 1977, Alton Frye, a Senior Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, proposed a new acronym: PAR, for Program Assured Restraint. MAD has become, in his words, "a term so freighted with emotion that it seriously distorts public discourse. It lends itself to caricature. It focuses on means rather than ends. It implies that a policy limiting nuclear weapons to a retaliatory role actually favors wholesale murder, when its real aim is to discourage any use of such indiscriminate weaponry. In short, MAD obscures the true objectives of American strategic doctrine."

But hiding the balanced nuclear madness, on which the survival of modern civilization apparently now depends, be-
hind the euphemistic PAR is probably a form of analytic cosmetology only a professional defense analyst could devise. The fact remains: MAD is bad and PAR is no better.

As a layman, my knowledge of nuclear defense strategy and tactical-strategic weapons systems is limited to what I read in books, newspapers, and periodicals. However, I believe that there is a real need for someone to emphasize the necessity for total world disarmament.

Most professional defense strategists take the need and existence of weaponry and the concomitant balance of terror as a given (witness Wells and Frye). Being of necessity pragmatic, defense analysts seldom, if ever, speak in terms of total disarmament.

Therefore I propose a two-pronged acronymic slogan: "TAMED or DEAD." TAMED represents the concept of "Total, Absolute, Mutual, and Expeditious Disarmament," and means the scrapping of all strategic and tactical war weapons by all nations. DEAD is the consequence of not taming the current proliferation of war weapons. It stands for "Destiny: Assured Destruction."

David Macias, Baltimore, Md.

Did We Eat Better in 1850?


This statement deviates so far from my own view of the period that I must suppose that Professor Pessen and I use the language in ways that are altogether different. In 1850, meat production seems to have been running at a level of about 240 dressed pounds for every man, woman, and child, which is roughly 60 pounds per head more than per capita meat consumption in 1970, a year when Americans were said to be eating more red meat than was good for them. And bear in mind that the fraction of the population composed of small children (i.e., small eaters) was much greater in 1850 than in 1970.

Other indices equally suggest a rude plenty, not "marginal existence" and "minimal consumption." Indeed, at a guess, most free Americans of 1850 were better off, materially, than most human beings who have ever lived. That is one reason why Europeans and Orientals began migrating to the United States in such large numbers in the second half of the 19th century.

Robert E. Gallman
University of North Carolina

Money: What the Data Conceal

It is difficult for someone concerned with the accuracy and the conceptual relevance of data to discuss the articles headed "Money and the Pursuit of Plenty in America" [WQ, Autumn 1977]. The authors attempt to paint a general picture of long-term trends. When trends are massive, quibbles about the data or their meaning are uncalled for. However, in discussing more recent changes, some problems arise. Even if we focus on the distribution of income, not wealth, the data leave much to be desired.

The definition of family income commonly used omits non-money income (food stamps, rent subsidies, imputed rent), which is of growing importance, and takes no account of differential work-leisure combinations, which change dramatically as more and more multiple-earner families have high incomes and little leisure. The definition includes transfer payments—like Social Security, ADC, and welfare—that have grown within an unchanged income distribution (but in many cases with rules making it difficult or illegal to have or accumulate any savings).

Moreover, looking at one-year incomes ignores the crucial distinction between transitory and persistent poverty. Our data show that the description of the poverty population is dramatically changed if one looks only at the persistently poor.

Similar conceptual problems arise with data on trends in expenditures, since we...
are really interested in trends in consumption but our data are expenditures, including purchases of durables and mortgage payments (including repayment of principal) on houses.

Most important of all, however, is our lack of data of even minimal adequacy on what has been happening to the distribution of wealth. It cannot be deduced from the lack of change in income distribution that the wealth distribution is also unchanged.

We have been through a period of good business, inflation, gyrating asset values, unemployment. Such a period might be expected to produce great gains for some—frequently in forms like unrealized capital gains that do not show up in taxable incomes. A proliferation of forms for hiding assets in trusts and private retirement accounts makes inferences from tax return data or income from assets shaky. Increases in equities in owned homes may be widespread, of course. And the stock market has not risen with inflation as expected—raising yet another conceptual problem as to how we treat wealth when the yield (dividends) has risen but the sale value of the rights to those dividends has not.

Finally, we are in a period of high volatility, making discussions of short-run change treacherous. For example, Helen H. Lamale ("Spending") rightly points out that by the end of 1974 the University of Michigan Survey Research Center’s Index of Consumer Sentiment had fallen to new lows, but it rose dramatically during 1975 and 1976, and it has remained high through 1977.

James N. Morgan, Research Scientist
Institute for Social Research
University of Michigan

Sociobiology: The Debate Goes On

Several questions are raised by the series of articles on Sociobiology [WQ, Summer 1977] that I felt were dealt with by neither the advocates nor the adversaries. David P. Barash seems to come to three conclusions: (1) People and animals are more likely to help a relative than a stranger; (2) Human and animal societies adapt to their environments in order to survive; (3) Males try to attract females in order to reproduce.

If this is what sociobiology has to offer, it deserves to be condemned on the grounds of the banality of its supposed insights, let alone any more serious objections to its methods or ethics.

Pierre L. van den Berghe’s article, "Sociobiology, Dogma, and Ethics," suffers from a fault more serious than banality. He appears to present a logical contradiction that undercuts sociobiology’s claim to be a scientific discipline relating the study of social behavior to biology and genetics. To be considered valid, this claim demands that sociobiologists must produce some biological and genetic evidence to support their theories. Twice in his article, however, Professor van den Berghe seems to deny the need to demonstrate a genetic basis for his theories. ("My argument is clearly not that we have a gene for the double standard," and later, "There is no need to postulate any genes for altruism.")

He does not go on to explain what he does see as the relationship between the behavior he describes and genetics. Instead, he continues to theorize that these behaviors in humans are somehow cultural or moral codifications of reproductive strategies that themselves may or may not be genetically determined, and he fails to account for similar behaviors in animals.

If sociobiologists cannot provide proof of the genetic basis of their theories or attempt to duck the issue, their theories cannot be considered anything more than an interesting intellectual exercise whose logical consistency is at best questionable. If they insist on arguing by analogy and fail to back up their analogies with data, one might as well propose a new synthesis based on socio-chemistry or socio-physics with laws of sociodynamics analogous to the laws of thermodynamics and motion. (The total energy associated with any social process remains unchanged. A society at rest remains at rest or a society in motion continues in uniform motion unless acted
upon by an unbalanced force. This could explain quite a bit of social behavior.) Anthony Leeds, in “Sociobiology, Anti-Sociobiology, and Human Nature” attempts to show how sociobiology is inadequate to the task of explaining human social behavior. He does this by arguing from a different set of premises than those accepted by the sociobiologists. It is therefore inevitable that he disagree with the sociobiologists, but it is also inevitable that he miss the opportunity to debate the sociobiologists on their own terms.

For example, if one accepts that man is biologically an animal, related to other animals by nature and evolution, how does one deny the applicability of sociobiology to humans without also denying its applicability to other animals? If man is essentially different from animals, then sociobiology might well be a valid interpretation of animal behavior but not of human behavior. If this is the case, however, to what extent is man further exempt from natural laws that apply to animals but not to man? To what extent can this question be answered in scientific terms?

Perhaps the premise of his criticism prevents Professor Leeds from attempting to answer these questions, but it seems that he could have begun had he not passed so lightly over Edward O. Wilson’s comment in Sociobiology (the book that started the debate), “I see maybe 10 percent of human behavior as genetic.” Perhaps the “science” of sociobiology is too new to have had time to deal with the questions that occurred to me as I read the articles, but I would appreciate a response of some sort.

Peter Notier, LaGrange, Ill.

Critiquing Fuentes’ “Critique”

On first reading Carlos Fuentes’ “Don Quixote or the Critique of Reading” [WQ, Autumn 1977], I felt that perhaps Fuentes had been a student of Tom Lehrer. (“Plagiarize, don’t shade your eyes, plagiarize . . . Only remember to call it, please, research.”)

Fuentes’ ideas correspond somewhat to Borgesian notions of the Quixote expressed (ambiguously, of course) in his “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote” and “Partial Magic in the Quixote” (Labyrinths, 1964).

On closer examination the similarities seem, like truth, to melt away. Fuentes’ article is vague and ambiguous (ambiguity is richness, according to Borges) in several instances. One such: He never makes clear . . . how Jewish influence in Spain affected Cervantes . . . A brief perusal of the Talmud will show that Jews had invented plural readings long before Cervantes.

But back to Borges and Fuentes . . . Compare Fuentes’ use of Hamlet in explicating the new “reading” that Cervantes invented with Borges’ use of Hamlet in “Partial Magic.” “Why,” Borges writes, “does it disturb us that Don Quixote be a reader of the Quixote and Hamlet a spectator of the Hamlet? I believe I have found the reason: These inversions suggest that if the characters of a fictional work can be readers or spectators, we, its readers or spectators, can be fictitious.”

The idea is similar. According to Fuentes, Don Quixote when he is “read” becomes real, and his new reality results in his disillusionment.

There are several other similarities. On the whole, Fuentes’ ideas are original, in that they expand on Borgesian ideas. But I feel that Borges is due some recognition.

D. Clive Thompson, Graduate Assistant Memphis State University

Not Members of the Team

Jack Snyder’s article [“The Enigma of Soviet Strategic Policy,” WQ, Autumn 1977] lists as “prominent” members of “Team B,” General George J. Keegan, Jr. and Professor Leon Gouré. This information is incorrect. Neither General Keegan nor Professor Gouré served on “Team B.”

Richard Pipes, Department of History, Harvard University

Professor Pipes, himself a member of “Team B,” is technically correct. However, author Snyder informs us, both General Keegan and Professor Gouré were “important consultants and kibitzers.”
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The Center opened in October 1970 and was placed in the Smithsonian Institution under its own presidentially appointed board of trustees. Its chairmen of the board have been Hubert H. Humphrey and, since 1972, William J. Baroody.

Open annual competitions have brought more than 200 Fellows to the Center since 1970. All Fellows carry out advanced research, write books, and join in seminars and dialogues with other scholars, public officials, members of Congress, journalists, business and labor leaders. The Center is housed in the original Smithsonian "castle" on the Mall in the nation's capital. Financing comes from both private sources and an annual congressional appropriation.