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SEVEN DISCUSSIONS AT THE WILSON CENTER
DECEMBER 1980 FEBRUARY 1981

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190 Commentary
For various reasons, the importance of the Democratic and Republican parties—each a loose-knit federation of state and local party organizations—began to decline long before the great election campaign reforms of the 1970s. The ability of an energetic minority faction to win a party's presidential nomination for its candidate—only to go down to disaster in November—did not start with George McGovern's race under the new rules in 1972. And there are few calls for a return to the days of "nomination-by-boss."

But a number of noted scholars and politicians have begun to see flaws in the rapid "democratization" of the presidential nominating process during the '70s. The reforms, it is now said, went too far: By 1980, there were too many state primary elections (over 30 in each party), too many "media consultants," too few links between the candidate and his party, with the national nominating conventions shorn of real power. "It's a frightful system," observed John Sears, a former campaign manager for Ronald Reagan.

As is so often the case in America, a half-dozen distinguished study groups have convened, under various auspices, to take a New Look. One such group, the Duke University Forum on Presidential Nominations, has held four conferences since May here at the Wilson Center. Led by Terry Sanford, Duke's president and a former governor of North Carolina, the forum has mustered both scholars and practitioners—the latter including Gerald Ford, former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, and former Democratic National Chairman Robert Strauss.

With Duke political scientist James David Barber as moderator, they have examined a wide range of matters—the impact of TV on the campaigns, the proper role of elected officials and party leaders, the impact of federal curbs on campaign spending, the possibility of changing the rules.

In this issue of the Quarterly, political scientist Jack Walker draws on the forum's sessions on "reforming the reforms"—and reminds us that it takes more than new rules, however desirable, to keep democracy healthy.

*Peter Braestrup*
"My Countries, Right or Wrong" by Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., in Foreign Affairs (Summer 1981), 428 East Preston St., Baltimore, Md. 21202.

Of late, foreign governments—Taiwan, South Korea, South Africa—have sought to affect U.S. foreign policy by lobbying Congress. But the "real powerhouses of foreign influence are homegrown" and frequently cultivated by vote-conscious politicians, writes Mathias, the Republican senior Senator from Maryland.

Irish-Americans were the first ethnic activists, in the early 20th century. Their opposition to British rule over the Emerald Isle helped delay U.S. entry into World War I and strained U.S. relations with London during the crucial interwar years. More recently, powerful Irish-American politicians such as the "Four Horsemen" (U.S. Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Daniel P. Moynihan, Governor Hugh Carey of New York, and House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill) have called for a "united Ireland." Dublin has cautioned U.S. legislators against giving in to demands by private U.S. groups (such as the Irish National Caucus) for congressional hearings on the subject.

American Jews, by contrast, remained quiet on foreign issues until after World War II, for fear of arousing Gentile hostility. The Nazi Holocaust helped change that. As early as 1946, respect for the "Jewish vote" had pushed Harry Truman into endorsing the establishment of Israel against advice from diplomatic and military aides. More recently, the influential "Israel lobby"—at Israel's behest—has fought closer U.S. military ties with oil-rich Saudi Arabia. Jewish groups also induced Congress to pass the 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment linking more trade with the Soviets to freedom of emigration for Soviet Jews. The amendment backfired. The Kremlin angrily canceled a 1972 U.S.—Soviet trade pact and curtailed the Jewish exodus.
In 1974, groups claiming to represent three million Greek-Americans pushed an arms embargo through Congress in retaliation for Turkey's unlawful invasion of Cyprus. Turkey, a NATO ally like Greece, closed 26 valuable local U.S. installations. Even so, the embargo remained in force for three years. (The Turks are still on Cyprus.) Ethnic lobbies have reminded legislators of the "moral" issues in foreign policy (e.g., the plight of southern Africa's blacks), Mathias observes. But their single-minded devotion too often hinders coherent U.S. diplomacy. Ethnic interest groups must realize that solutions to world problems now transcend "the boundaries of ethnic group, race, and nation."


Congress has never passed a gun control law, despite the fact that public opinion polls over the past two decades have consistently shown 70 percent of the population favoring such legislation. The standard explanation for this discrepancy has been that gun control opponents feel much more strongly about the issue than do proponents. Schuman and Presser, sociologists at the University of North Carolina, dispute this.

In 1978, they inserted two questions into a University of Michigan survey to gauge the "intensity" and "centrality" of the gun control issue in respondents' minds. Surprisingly, slightly more people who favored gun permits reported holding "extremely strong" convictions (18 percent) than did anti-permit people (17 percent). At the other end of the "intensity scale," the results were similar. Only 17 percent of the pro-control respondents said their feelings were "not strong at all," while 24 percent of their foes gave that response.

The "centrality" question asked respondents how the issue would affect their vote for or against a candidate for Congress. This time, 7.7 percent of the anti-permit respondents said the issue would be "one of the most important" determinants of their vote, compared to 5.4 percent of those favoring permits. Schuman and Presser note that because there are so many more people who favor permits, the percentages translate into a nearly equal number of "single issue" voters.

But later, the authors asked the same people what they actually did about their beliefs. About 12 percent of all respondents said they had written a letter to a public official or donated money to a lobbying group. But almost two-thirds of these "activists" were opponents of gun control legislation. Put another way, slightly more than 20 percent of all the opponents surveyed were "activists," versus only 7.1 percent of the supporters. That big difference, Schuman and Presser suspect, was the result of mobilization efforts by anti-gun control lobbies such
as the National Rifle Association.
On some issues, such as abortion, say the authors, subjective feelings clearly do determine the degree of an individual's activism. But, as the gun control issue illustrates, the connection between individual action and organized efforts by special-interest groups is "more subtle and more reciprocal than is often recognized."

Progressivism's Ironic Fate


Where does progressivism fit into American history? Did its burst of political and economic reforms in the early 20th century sever the unseemly ties of politics to Big Business and restore government to "the people"? Or was the Progressive Era an age of government accommodation with business and a triumph for "robber barons" who captured and controlled new regulatory bodies? Both views are partly correct, argues McCormick, a Rutgers historian.

Large-scale industrialization during the 1890s shook the complacency of many Americans over their governments' long-standing practice of boosting railroads, utilities, and other corporations. The economy's slow recovery from the Panic of 1893 touched off labor violence and
class conflict. The common man yearned for cheaper utilities and better public services, but national leaders, committed to a weak federal government, stood pat. Some municipal and state politicians responded, but from New York to California, inexperience and low funding crippled fledgling regulatory commissions.

The spark for effective reform came from muckraking journalists and legislative investigations, writes McCormick. From 1904 to 1908, reporters such as Lincoln Steffens shocked the nation with tales of graft in the smallest towns, while legislators in Alabama, Ohio, Vermont, Colorado, and elsewhere exposed bribery by the railroads, the power companies, and the insurance industry. What many citizens had viewed as isolated incidents of corruption began to be seen as systemic.

Politicians got the message. From 1903 to 1908, the number of states that regulated legislative lobbying jumped from zero to 12, and the number banning corporate campaign contributions rose from zero to 22. States enacting direct primary laws shot up from four to 31. And from 1905 to 1907 alone, 15 new state railroad commissions were established. Even the federal government began, haltingly, to regulate railroads and the food and drug industries.

But reform sentiment had heated up too fast. Many politicians eschewed strong antibusiness measures in favor of the “quick fix,” hiring “impartial experts” to run commissions in place of corruptible politicians. State agencies were usually based in remote capitals such as Albany and Sacramento, where business interests could wield power outside the scrutiny of reformers in the big cities. Once policy shifts were announced, writes McCormick, public concern waned; Big Business often won over the new regulators as it had the old.

**Judicial License**

"A Theory of U.S. Constitutional History"

The principles behind judicial review have changed profoundly since the Supreme Court first struck down an unconstitutional act of Congress in 1803 (in *Marbury v. Madison*). Wolfe, a Marquette political scientist, sees two major phases: one lasting from the post-Revolutionary period through the Civil War, and another starting in 1937 and continuing to this day.

Influenced by John Marshall, the early Courts tied their decisions closely to the words and intent of the Constitution’s framers. Justices held that the Constitution vested the legislature with *kinds* of power (e.g., power to tax) and that only politicians should decide the *degree* of legitimate power to exercise (e.g., levels of taxation). From 1789 to 1861, they struck down only two acts of Congress (in *Marbury* and *Dred Scott*) and 36 state laws, a low tally by today’s standards.

The “modernists,” says Wolfe, have gone further. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in a 1929 decision, cases now “must be consid-
erred in the light of our whole national experience, and not merely in the light of what was said a hundred years ago.” Justice Benjamin Cardozo (1932–38) argued that effective interpretation by the Court fills the Constitution’s “vacant spaces.” Modernists often wrestle with matters of degree, as in free speech cases in which judges decide whether an utterance poses “clear and present danger” to others.

Modernists usually invoke the due-process clause of the Fifth Amendment (adopted in 1791, it barred deprivation of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law”) and the Fourteenth Amendment (adopted in 1868, it guaranteed “equal protection of the laws”). But did the Fifth Amendment’s authors mean to lay the foundations for broad Supreme Court review—when even “limited” review was then controversial? Wolfe thinks not. And Congress’s debate over passage of the Fourteenth Amendment makes clear its intention only to solve Southern race problems, not to launch a “constitutional revolution.”

The modernists prize the democratic results of their actions—their protection of free expression, privacy, and minority rights. But by making the Constitution a “container into which the desired content may be poured,” argues Wolfe, they sacrifice “government by law” for “government by men.”

**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**

**What China Really Wants**


“The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Such reasoning, and fears of growing Soviet power, led the United States and China to formal contacts in 1971. Since then, the Carter and Reagan administrations have nursed along a quasi-alliance with offers of military and economic aid. Yet Robinson, a political scientist at the National Defense University, warns U.S. policymakers to expect a double-cross.

The erosion of America’s military edge over the Soviets has made close ties with China a must for Washington, writes Robinson. But enlisting U.S. help in containing Soviet power is only a short-term ploy of Beijing’s. China’s huge standing army is equipped largely with obsolete 1950s weapons, and the new drive for economic modernization launched by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping will channel scarce resources into civilian industry. Beijing’s foreign-policy priority now is to avoid international conflict—hence its strong interest in defusing its 20-year feud with Moscow. Western arms aid is needed to allow China to negotiate with the Soviets as a near-equal.

Other factors may push China toward the Soviets before long. Many
of the scientists and economic managers central to Deng's plans were trained in the Soviet Union, or by Soviet personnel in China. They make up an important pro-Moscow pressure group. Further, the regime still regards itself as unalterably opposed to capitalism. The Sino-Soviet dispute began as a doctrinal squabble, Robinson notes. But having adopted market-oriented reforms themselves, the Chinese no longer revile the Soviets as "revisionists" but simply as power-hungry "hegemonists." Since Mao's death, Beijing has twice made diplomatic overtures to Moscow—in mid-1977 and in mid-1979. They were cut short, respectively, by the Vietnamese invasion of China's ally, Cambodia, and by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Ultimately, Robinson writes, Beijing aims to supplant both U.S. and Soviet power in East Asia. But for the time being, he contends, the United States must strengthen China to help counterbalance Soviet might. Only by building up its own military and reducing the need for a "China crutch" will Washington prevent the price of future cooperation—acquiescence in Beijing's dominance of her neighbors, including Taiwan—from rising too high.

A 'Massive' Ploy


"Massive retaliation," the nuclear doctrine first articulated by President Eisenhower in 1954, evokes a frightening image of the Strategic Air Command "on rampage" against Moscow at the slightest provocation. Actually, says Wells, a Wilson Center scholar, it was a far subtler strategy, shaped by politics and a desire to cut defense outlays.

Eisenhower was elected in 1952 after he promised to end the deadlocked Korean War and to cut military expenditures (then consuming 70 percent of the federal budget). "If our economy should go broke," he said during the campaign, "the Russians would have won even a greater victory than anything they could obtain by going to war." But the former NATO commander was under intense pressure from hardline Republicans who demanded a credible new global strategy to replace Truman's "containment" doctrine.

"Massive retaliation" offered a solution to Eisenhower's political problems. Although it depended on weapons and air power developed under Truman, the policy sounded new and stern. And, by relying on nuclear might, Eisenhower was able to justify cutting back America's post-Korea conventional forces. His fiscal 1955 budget called for $31 billion for the military, down from the $41.5 billion Truman had sought right before leaving office in 1953.

Eisenhower consciously exaggerated what he meant by massive retaliation, writes Wells. New York Times columnist James Reston voiced the popular view when he said in 1954 that the administration meant to use nuclear weapons against the Soviets even in the event of a local
brush-fire war. Ike’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, later soft-pedaled that notion, but toughened public rhetoric by Vice President Richard Nixon and others seemed to belie his disclaimer.

Eisenhower clearly was prepared to use nuclear weapons in situations short of total war—say, a Chinese invasion of Southeast Asia. But documents show that Eisenhower did not really intend to blanket Moscow or Beijing with hydrogen bombs in every conflict with the communists. He was notably cool to proposals to employ atomic bombs to save the French at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam in 1954.

Eisenhower’s deliberate ambiguity allowed him to placate hawks at home while reinforcing the deterrent effect against the Soviet Union and China. But “massive retaliation” as popularly understood, says Wells, was “more symbol than reality.”

Persian Gulf Folly?

"America Engulfed" by David D. Newsom, in Foreign Policy (Summer 1981), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

Less than one month after the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter plunged the United States into a new global commitment—defense of the oil-rich Persian Gulf against “outside forces.” More recently, President Reagan has stated his desire to station U.S. ground forces in the region. Newsom, Carter’s Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, charges that this new strategy is probably unnecessary and nearly impossible to execute.

The Carter Doctrine “grew out of last minute pressures for a Presidential speech,” recalls Newsom. No detailed study of its implications was made before or after the address. Nor has one been undertaken by
the current administration. Congress has held no hearings on it. Yet, Newsom maintains, fears of a Soviet thrust were overdrawn. Moscow's forces would need five days to reach the Gulf from Afghanistan. And U.S. naval units in the neighboring Indian Ocean are stronger than their Soviet counterparts. Moreover, the Kremlin has not even committed enough forces in Afghanistan to defeat rebel tribesmen, much less to drive south. Upheaval in Poland and the continuing threat from China make a massive new Soviet military venture unlikely.

Most Middle Eastern leaders will not accept U.S. land forces, says Newsom. They fear that a large, obtrusive American military presence would galvanize local dissident movements—witness Iran under the Shah. Only Oman has approved U.S. staging facilities; lacking the volatile Palestinian population of its neighbors, the sultanate nonetheless insists that U.S. forces be small and stationed away from cities.

America lacked the military capacity to back up the Carter Doctrine when it was declared, says Newsom, and it still does. Washington rushed two carrier task forces into the Indian Ocean after the Iranian revolution in early 1979, but only five U.S. warships cruise the Gulf itself. Pentagon planners estimate that dispatching a 10,000-man force to the region would take at least three weeks.

Given all of the obstacles, Newsom urges the Reagan administration to settle for improving the Indian Ocean fleet's combat readiness and developing military support facilities recently made available in Oman, Kenya, and Somalia. No U.S. ground troops should be sent to the Gulf until Washington is sure that its European allies, and the host states themselves, will back them up.

The Peaceful Generals


Are military regimes, so common in the Third World, any more apt to go to war against their neighbors than civilian governments are? No, says sociologist Andreski of the University of Reading. Indeed, most "militocracies" have been "notably pacific in (their) external relations"—in contrast to civilian dictatorships.

Why? Andreski argues that there is a fundamental incompatibility between the domestic use of the army to coerce the citizenry and its use against foreign foes.

To fight wars, an army needs popular support and national solidarity; using soldiers as police has the opposite effect. Worse yet, when the army leadership is involved in the intrigues and factionalism of politics, the troops' esprit, trust, and efficiency decline. Arab military regimes such as Syria and Iraq have not fared well in wars against Israel. In 1979, Tanzania's civilian strong man, Julius Nyerere, easily unhorsed Uganda's martial Idi Amin.
FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Far more aggressive were Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini. They controlled their generals but used police for coercing the populace. Even wartime Japan, however “militaristic,” was not run by military dictatorship. General Tojo was appointed Prime Minister by Emperor Hirohito and dismissed shortly before Japan’s surrender.

Organized and indoctrinated to defend the nation, the army is not very good at running—or reforming—it. Instability results, as seen in the succession of army coups in Africa and Latin America. But wars are few. Indeed, in Latin America, “militarism,” in the true sense, does not exist; the armed forces, says Andreski, are simply “misnamed police forces.” Instead of saber rattling, Latin military strongmen extend help to one another in dealing with domestic opposition.

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

A Banking Revolution

"Competing for the Savings Dollar—Should Washington Change the Rules?"

The new kids on the block in the $4 trillion personal savings industry—the money market mutual funds—have enjoyed a tremendous growth that could soon revolutionize American banking, according to Samuelson, a National Journal correspondent.

Introduced in 1973, the money market funds have mushroomed from a modest $13 billion in January 1974 to $117.5 billion last April, with $43 billion of that coming in this year alone. Managed by brokerage houses, they accept deposits starting at $500 and invest in short-term securities, such as U.S. Treasury bills. During a period of tight money and rising interest rates (e.g., the present), the money funds pay 12 to 15 percent on deposits and draw investors like flies.

And that, say many bankers, is the problem. Federal ceilings imposed in 1966 prevent commercial banks and thrifts (savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks) from paying more than 5 and 5.25 percent, respectively, on savings accounts. No one knows how much business the particularly hard-hit thrifts have lost as a result, but the growth of their deposits has slowed from a $4.3 billion increase in March 1980 to a $3.6 billion rise in March 1981. Moreover, the thrifts are in a poor position to build their assets by buying money in the form of high-interest certificates of deposit; a big chunk of their investments are tied up in long-term mortgages negotiated when interest rates were well below 10 percent. The number of thrifts could fall by 20 percent over the next five years.

In 1980, Congress tried to bolster the thrifts by permitting them to offer interest-bearing checking (NOW) accounts and by promising to
How They Save
(Location of household savings, December 1980; in billions)

- **Cash and checking accounts**: $241.9
- **Savings accounts**: 1,299.7
- **Money market funds**: 74.4
- **Securities***: 1,734.0
- **Private pensions**: 450.7
- **Government pensions**: 279.1
- **Private life insurance**: 223.2
- **Other**: 92.2
- **Total**: $4,395.2

*Includes common stocks, bonds, U.S. government securities, mutual fund shares and other short-term securities

**SOURCE**: Federal Reserve Board

High-yield money market mutual funds gained an additional $43 billion in the first quarter of 1981. Their rapid growth threatens to put many small "thrift" institutions out of business.

Reagan administration officials hope that lowering inflation will save the thrifts. Other analysts believe that thrifts will survive only by diversifying into short-term consumer loans and "adjustable rate" mortgages (keyed to interest rate fluctuations) and by edging into the brokerage field themselves.

**Ethics or Excuses?**

"Business ethics"—universities teach it, businessmen argue about it, and some lawmakers have tried to legislate it. Drucker, an NYU business professor, maintains that any definition risks becoming an all-purpose justification for corporate actions.

Central to Judaeo-Christian ethics is the idea that one standard of behavior applies to all, prince and pauper alike. The notion of a separate category defined as business ethics, says Drucker, smacks of "casuistry," a long discredited Western school of thought. First propounded...
by Reformation theologian John Calvin in the 16th century and later picked up briefly by the Jesuits, casuistry was an early attempt to probe the concept of "social responsibility." It held that the special responsibilities inherent in "ruling" (flowing from the ruler's impact on others' lives) comprise an ethical imperative that can outweigh strictures on individuals.

Casuistry appears to make extra demands on individuals whose decisions affect others but ends up serving as an apology for whatever actions they take, says Drucker. Thus, to casuists, Lockheed Aircraft executives were almost duty-bound to pay extortion money to a Japanese airline to secure orders for its floundering L-1011 jetliner, in 1975. The orders preserved thousands of jobs on Lockheed's payroll.

If universities must teach "business ethics," contends Drucker, let them blend two codes of conduct: Aristotle's ethics of prudence and Confucius's ethics of interdependence. Aristotle assumed that a leader's only choice is whether to lead others to right or wrong action. Everyone knows the difference, he said, and a leader must face up to his own deeds as well as those he inspires. Confucius divided behavior into five types of interaction: master/servant; father/child; husband/wife; oldest brother/sibling; friend/friend. In each relationship, "right behavior" consists of mutually beneficial actions.

Aristotelian ethics acknowledges that highly visible executives in today's "society of organizations" can "set the tone" for subordinates. And, says Drucker, Confucian ethics' emphasis on mutual benefits should appeal to manager, consumer, and employee alike.

No Threat to Textiles


Are Third World countries, with their armies of cheap labor, taking over the world textile and clothing trades? Have Western textile manufacturers lost their competitive edge? Keesing and Wolf, senior economists at the World Bank, dispute both widely held notions.

The United States and Western Europe still dominate the textile and clothing businesses. The $72 billion in U.S. gross output led the world in 1976 by a wide margin—followed by the nine countries of the European Economic Community, with a combined $68 billion, and Japan with $33.9 billion. Though touted as the next textile powers, the poorer countries of southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Yugoslavia) accounted for only $11.7 billion in manufactures. And the super-exporters Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan combined produced only $14.4 billion worth. Third World trade feats have been exaggerated, as well: North America, Western Europe, and Japan accounted for nearly 75 percent of textiles exported in 1978.
However, advanced countries have recently become net importers of clothing. In 1978, developing countries enjoyed a $7.5 billion clothing trade surplus and were responsible for 37 percent of the world's clothing exports. Even so, their market penetration ranges from only eight to 18 percent in Western Europe (excluding France and Italy) and roughly 10 percent in the United States.

The tide turned against Third World exporters of clothing and textiles several years ago, contend the authors. Declining relative wages and controlled energy costs at home gave the United States an advantage. U.S. exports of cotton, wool, and synthetics swelled from $2.3 billion in 1978 to $3.3 billion in 1979 (in current dollars). And Western trade restrictions have cut increases in imports from the Third World to below five percent annually since 1976, down from 14.4 percent. However, Italian exporters have filled much of this gap, while British and German manufacturers continue to suffer. (Italy is now the world's leading net exporter of clothing and textiles combined.)

Despite the industrial countries' large and growing deficit in the clothing trade, Keesing and Wolf conclude, the greatest threats to Western manufacturers today are other Western manufacturers, immune from quotas aimed at the Third World.

**SOCIETY**

*The Games Slaves Played*


Americans have traditionally judged an individual's worth by the fruits of his labors. But such values held little appeal to people bought and sold like cattle. Slaves in the old South drew on other sources for self-esteem and identity, as their children's games reveal, writes Wiggins, an assistant professor of health at Kansas State University.

Usually exempted from hard labor until their early teens, slave children performed light chores and cared for infants while their parents toiled. On weekends and evenings, there was time to frolic with friends. Favorite pastimes included horseshoe pitching, hopskotch, "ring games" (which involved dancing and singing around a circle 15 to 30 feet in diameter), and ball games such as the hockey-like shinny. Girls played most boys' games but often preferred jumping rope or "playing house."

Some slave children learned to count and spell through games such as "ole Hundred." And, at play, they often re-enacted aspects of slave
Bought and sold like cattle and facing lives without hope, slaves in the Old South bolstered their self-esteem with play. Children's games in particular helped to build slaves' sense of community.

Children's games in particular helped to build slaves' sense of community. They simulated not only church services and songfests but also funerals and even slave auctions. Athletic contests helped the strong and the swift achieve the status denied them elsewhere (especially when white children competed and lost).

Child's play revealed slaves' strong "sense of community," writes Wiggins. Boxing and wrestling matches were rare; they ran counter to the slaves' "social philosophy" of survival through cooperation. Nor did blacks enjoy games with elimination rules, such as dodge ball, for they evoked the indiscriminate slave sales that tore apart families.

Black children were fond of card games and other forms of gambling, which white children generally shunned. And where slave youths' play was usually informal and improvised, white boys and girls favored games with strict rules. To Wiggins, this suggests that blacks' and whites' notions of work and play differed: Southern slaveholders adhered to the work ethic and regarded play as a frivolity "to be engaged by gentlemen only in the most organized and refined fashion." For slaves, however, survival depended less on skill and effort than on luck. Play was to them one field in which they "could realize a certain degree of dignity" and brighten a harsh existence.

The Politics of Language


In 1970, the U.S. Census Bureau asked Americans "what language, other than English" was spoken at home when they were children. The question—broad enough to elicit replies regardless of how often or by
whom a foreign tongue was used—was designed to collect data on ethnicity, not on language proficiency, says McArthur, a Census Bureau statistician. But the answers have provided the numerical guidelines behind recent federal legislation to assist non-English-speaking Americans, with costly results.

Just who is a "non-English speaker"? Is it someone whose "mother tongue" (language spoken in a child's home) is foreign, whose usual language is foreign, or who speaks no English at all? Depending on the criteria, the count in this country ranges from six million to 28 million (13 percent of the population). The definition used can have a tremendous impact on federal programs. The 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, for instance, require bilingual ballots in districts where five percent or more of the population speaks a single language other than English and where that group's election turnout is under 50 percent. The Bilingual Education Act of 1976 requires special help for children from "environments" where English is not the "dominant language." Both rely on 1970 census data—i.e., on the "mother tongue" criteria.

Yet a special 1976 Census Bureau survey suggests that of the 28 million Americans with a foreign mother tongue, only 6.4 million usually speak it at home (Spanish accounts for one-third, followed by Italian, Chinese, and French). Some 8.6 million use it only as a second language. And only 19 percent of those who speak a foreign language reported problems with English. (Age was clearly a factor; only four percent of children aged four to 13 reported any difficulty.) Living in a household where English is not usually spoken could affect a child's educational progress, however. Six percent of such children aged eight to 17 were not even enrolled in school, versus only two percent of all children. And 18 percent lagged two or more grades behind their peers, versus only eight percent of all children.

The 1980 census asked several language-related questions, including whether respondents usually spoke English and how well. As a result, McArthur believes, we may finally discover not only how many Americans truly are isolated beyond the language barrier but also where they live, what language they speak, and whether they are more likely to need elementary textbooks or foreign-language brochures on medicare.


City life puzzles sociologists. Surveys consistently show that city dwellers are less likely to help strangers and are more exposed to conflict and violence than are their country cousins. Yet other research indicates that personal friendships thrive as vigorously in cities as in Podunk and that the pressures of the urban "jungle" do not create disproportionate psychological stress.
Fischer, a sociologist at the University of California, Berkeley, analyzed a survey of 1,050 residents of 50 northern California communities ranging from small rural towns to central San Francisco neighborhoods. He found that, more strikingly than most, city people inhabit two worlds—one public and the other private. Surrounded by a “mosaic” of social and ethnic groups and often encountering unconventional, potentially threatening characters, city dwellers learn to “type” strangers and keep unknowns at a distance.

Indeed, fully 31 percent of the central-city households approached by Berkeley pollsters refused to be interviewed, compared with 20 percent or less elsewhere. (However, once admitted into urban homes, surveyors found their hosts just as cooperative as small-town folk.) Fischer also discovered that urbanites were far more apt to cite groups (blacks, gays, “older people”) as the best or worst aspects of their neighborhoods. City dwellers were the most likely to distrust “most people,” but they were no more likely than exurbanites to feel that way about their own neighbors. In fact, they reported chatting casually with neighbors and borrowing small items from them just as frequently as did small-town residents.

City dwellers see their relatives less frequently, but they socialize more often with friends. Fischer found no differences in the closeness of small-town and urban friendships. Nor did he turn up any correlations between urban living and “feeling upset, nervous, or depressed,” “feeling angry,” or “feeling pleased and happy.”

Life in the city, Fischer concludes, estranges individuals from “unknown, socially dissimilar” people—without affecting their capacity to form deep, long-lasting relationships.

Press & Television

Journalism

Uber Alles?

“A cross between a bootlegger and a whore”—if this description from Ben Hecht and Charles MacArthur’s Front Page (1928) ever did fit reporters, it certainly does not now. But even as newsmen in the national media have gained in earnings, status, and influence, their credibility has nose-dived among “Middle Americans.” In response, many journalists have embraced a “self-serving”—and indefensible—“First Amendment ideology.” So charges Kraft, a syndicated columnist.

Most newsmen concede that complete objectivity is impossible. But many have defended a reporter’s autonomy by maintaining that the sheer number of news organizations and their intense rivalries cancel out any journalist’s biases. However, Kraft counters, this defense is valid only if journalists comprise a diverse group. The need for special-

ists who can cover increasingly complex issues has created a press corps that is "better educated, more highly-paid, more sure of itself" on average than are most Americans. As a result, says Kraft, reporters now hold the attitudes of most affluent, highly educated Americans—including skepticism of military and law enforcement officials and a receptivity to minority complaints. They tend to dismiss Middle America's anxieties about gun control and abortion as "disconnected single issues." The reaction has been unmistakable: Public confidence in the print media, for instance, fell from 24 percent in 1975 to 19 percent in 1980, according to a Harris poll.

Lately, journalists have contended that "the news" is so important to America's well-being that reporters' rights supersede everyone else's. In 1971, for example, the Stanford Daily News unsuccessfully argued in the courts that the Constitution shields newspaper offices from police searches even when the information sought is crucial to law enforcement. In the 1978 Farber case, New York Times attorneys contended, in vain, that a reporter's right to keep his sources confidential outweighs a criminal defendant's right to confront his accuser.

The First Amendment and freedom of the press are precious, Kraft writes, "but not transcendent in value." Only by dropping their self-righteous posture and acknowledging competing claims will journalists regain public support.

H. L. Mencken, Closet Feminist

An avowed connoisseur of voluptuous, compliant women and a confirmed bachelor most of his life, Henry Louis Mencken (1880–1956) encouraged his reputation as one of America's most piggish male chauvinists. Yet much of his locker-room rhetoric was a satirical put-on, masking ardently pro-feminist views, contends Martin, an English professor at Middlebury College (Vt.).

Starting out as a reporter and editorial writer in Baltimore, Mencken emerged in the Roaring Twenties as one of America's leading cultural commentators. It was a period when sexual tensions had flared, notes Martin. The Nineteenth Amendment gave women the vote in 1920. The free-living flapper was in vogue. Mencken often lampooned the sexual revolution, paying leering tribute to flappers and buxom waitresses in his writings, and ridiculing the stridence of the suffragettes. In his In Defense of Women (1918), he burlesqued the absurdities of male-female relationships by showering the fair sex with outrageously lavish praise.

Yet the same Mencken, in a more serious vein, described his feminine ideal as "emancipated from convention and superstition . . . the full equal of her man." He endorsed women's suffrage in his editorials. Privately, he associated with independent, professional women, such as Sara Haardt, the writer whom he married. And as book critic for The Wilson Quarterly/Autumn 1981
H. L. Mencken let it be known that "rosy, healthy, appetizing" flappers (as immortalized by 1920s illustrator John Held, Jr.) were his feminine ideal. Was he, in fact, a "closet feminist"?

Smart Set, he praised works that supported women's cultural emancipation, such as Theodore Dreiser's *Sister Carrie* and Sinclair Lewis's *Main Street*.

As a young man, Mencken had been discouraged by his father from entering the "feminine" world of literature and compelled to join the family cigar business. The experience, writes Martin, made him sympathetic to women's efforts to escape the roles that social convention imposed on them. (One result of the feminine experience, he believed, was a "cynical humor"—not unlike his own.)

Mencken was a conservative man. He lived in the Mencken family home until his marriage at age 50. He cherished many orthodox notions of femininity—wanting no "grotesque parody" of a man "smoking bad cigars, monkeying with his labor and vices." But he held that neither sex, "without some fortifying with the complimentary characteristics of the other, is capable of its highest reaches of human endeavor."

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**The Scoop Syndrome**

"Rush toJudgement" by Martin Mayer, in *American Film* (June 1981). Subscription Service, P.O. Box 966, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

Most Americans agree that network TV newsmen's finest hour came in the aftermath of President John F. Kennedy's assassination in 1963. TV coverage of the shooting of President Reagan last March, by contrast, was marred by rumor-mongering and major factual errors. Mayer, an *American Film* contributing editor, blames a post-Watergate suspicion of "official information" and a new breed of TV journalist.
PRESS & TELEVISION

Newsmen in 1963 enjoyed some advantages. The official information from Dallas was essentially correct, while some initial statements from the Reagan White House erred—e.g., the word that the President had not been hit. Scare stories did circulate in 1963 (that the Vice President had been shot, that a plane carrying Cabinet members was in danger), but broadcast journalists generally stuck to facts. Rumors were reported only with confirmations or denials from official sources. Newsmen reassured the nation by accurately stressing the continuity of government.

Last March, however, several rumors were aired as "facts." All three networks falsely "confirmed" the death of Press Secretary James Brady. From the hospital, NBC's Chris Wallace reported that Reagan was undergoing "open heart surgery." Back in the studio, his colleague Edwin Newman briefly raised the specter of conspiracy, noting that some of Reagan's entourage had looked away from the gunman just before the shots.

Burned by a hostile Nixon White House, many TV newsmen in 1981 were "frantic with suspicion" of White House and hospital officials. But this only partly explains their willingness to transmit unchecked rumors. Television journalism, says Mayer, has passed into new hands. Most TV newsmen today lack newspaper experience prior to 1964—when the Supreme Court loosened slander laws in The New York Times v. Sullivan and removed most of the financial risk to news organizations of "getting it wrong." Moreover, a television broadcast lacks the permanence of print. The false report over the air doesn't linger to cause embarrassment; there is less incentive to curb the "scoop mentality."

Mayer suggests that, during a crisis, news teams should cite their sources when relaying any information or interpretations of events. Journalists are not obliged to calm the nation, he concludes. But they do have a duty not to raise false alarms.

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

Jesus as Psychologist


Jesus' sermons and parables reveal a concern with human psychology—as well as with moral instruction and spiritual transformation. So contends Erikson, a Harvard psychologist.

Jesus delivered most of his sermons in Galilee, a fertile, northern region of Roman Palestine with a mixed Jewish-Gentile population. Wedged between rival empires and ground underfoot by numerous conquerors, the populace had, by Jesus' time, sunk into despondency, rallying only occasionally in response to messianic leaders. Jesus' cures
and miracles raised their hopes of political independence and spiritual rejuvenation.

But, says Erikson, Jesus sought more. He used parables to instill in his listeners an “inner light” that would better enable them to understand their own longings and behavior. Jesus’ first known reference to this “light” was in the Sermon on the Mount, when he declared, “Nor do men light a lamp and put it under a bushel, but on a stand, and it gives light to all in the house” (Matthew 5:15). According to Erikson, Jesus spoke of what psychologists today call a sense of I—an awareness of oneself as the center of one’s universe that individuals must possess to comprehend their place among their fellows.

Crucial to developing a sense of I is a person’s childhood relationships with parents. Jesus may have shown an understanding of this when he appealed to God at Gethsemane as “Abba” (an Aramaic term Erikson likens to “Daddy”). Indeed, he emphasized that “whoever does not receive the kingdom of God like a child shall not enter it” (Mark 10:15).

The “inner light” enables an individual to break down the barriers that separate human beings from God—and from one another. Thus, Erikson believes that the central message of the parable of the Prodigal Son concerns not the steadfast love of the father (God) but the errant son’s need to understand himself before he can live with his family. And, Erikson argues, as people feel more comfortable with their inner natures, they are more able to risk behavior that is morally right but that violates social norms or upsets political authority. Thus, by advancing the development of human consciousness, Jesus accelerated the evolution of human conscience as well.

Born-Again Shinto


Shinto has endured as Japan’s indigenous religion since prehistory, resisting submergence by such imported faiths as Buddhism and Taoism. At least, that is the view held by most Japanese. Yet Kuroda, professor of humanities at Osaka University, maintains that Shinto did not emerge as a fully independent religion until modern times.

An amalgam of folk beliefs, rituals, and nature worship without a clear doctrinal structure, Shinto is the font of both ancestor and emperor worship in Japan. The word Shinto appears in the eighth-century Nihon Shoki, the best-known ancient collection of Japanese legends, but it seems to have had several meanings then: “popular beliefs in general”; Taoism (which had been coming in from China for seven centuries); the power of local deities and ancestor spirits, known as kami.

Then, in the eighth century, the Empress Shōtoku took up Buddhism, making it the state religion. Modern scholars have argued that objections by the nobility led to heightened kami worship, to the organiza-
tion of the unique, non-Buddhist shrine at Ise (near Osaka), and to the final transformation of Shinto into an independent, purely Japanese faith. But Kuroda contends that the kami came to be viewed by most as the secular form in which the Buddha taught and saved humans. Even priests at Ise were students of Buddhism. In Japan, as in Tibet and elsewhere in East Asia, Buddhism absorbed native beliefs and gave them a new authority, without obliterating them.

Only in the 15th century, as the imperial system started to deteriorate and heresy fragmented Japanese Buddhism, did Shinto begin to depart from orthodox Buddhism. The split widened during the 17th century, with the spread of a Confucian brand of Shinto. Its central concept of “dō” (a “political or moral norm”) further secularized Shinto.

The idea of Shinto as Japan’s indigenous religion developed in the 18th century, among scholars of the National Learning School, who urged the Japanese to cleanse their culture of foreign influences. Finally, in the late 19th century, the Meiji emperor formally separated Shinto and Buddhism and tried to suppress the latter. Ironically, says Kuroda, it was this isolation that gave Shinto its “primitive” quality—for the Meiji emperor had severed Shinto’s long-standing bond with a deeper religious philosophy.

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY


Until recently, scientists divided all living matter into eukaryotes (cells of which all animals and plants are made) and prokaryotes (bacteria). But Woese and fellow biochemists at the University of Illinois have found bacteria that constitute a hitherto unsuspected branch of life. The discovery of these “archaebacteria” may upset conventional theories about life’s beginnings on Earth.

Eukaryotes are relatively large (0.0000393-inch-long) organisms with well-defined internal structures such as nuclei and mitochondria (the respiratory mechanisms of animal cells). Prokaryotes are only one-tenth as long and lack such structures. Sketchy fossil evidence has long led researchers to believe that the ancestor of both was a fermenting prokaryote, which appeared at least 3.5 billion years ago, when the Earth was less than one billion years old and its atmosphere consisted mainly of carbon dioxide and hydrogen.

Eventually, bacteria evolved that could manufacture energy from sunlight and release oxygen in the process. Earth’s changing atmosphere, scientists thought, spurred the evolution of the more advanced eukaryotic cells. Different kinds of prokaryotes carry their own genetic material and correspond roughly with different parts of the eukaryotic
cell; some scientists speculated that these prokaryotes became “entrapped” in larger cells of unknown origin, established a symbiotic relationship, and evolved into new eukaryotic cells.

But what was the trapping cell? This remained a mystery until Woese began examining the genetic structures of modern bacteria. He found some kinds of bacteria that were as different from other bacteria as they were from eukaryotes. Though they looked like regular bacteria, they represented a third form of life, the archaebacteria. Their genetic make-up suggests that they are even more ancient than the prokaryotes. Moreover, those archaebacteria that “breathe” methane would have been perfectly suited to primitive Earth’s atmosphere.

The existence of archaebacteria indicates to Woese that the universal ancestor cell was not a prokaryote but a “progenome”—an organism so simple that its primitive genetic mechanisms constantly misfired and produced mutations. Since the eukaryotic nucleus contains genes resembling those of both archaebacteria and prokaryotes, it was probably composed even before the first true prokaryotes appeared. Hence, the eukaryotic nucleus may represent not an advance over the prokaryotes but simply another “mistake” made by the genetically primitive universal ancestor.

Most theories of evolution hold that eukaryotes (plant and animal cells) developed when prokaryotes (such as aerobic bacteria) became components (e.g., mitochondria) of larger cells. But the discovery of a new branch of life, archaebacteria, suggests that eukaryotes originated much earlier, from the genetic quirks of a universal ancestor.

The Wilson Quarterly/Autumn 1981
**Yellow Fever's Comeback**

The disease killed 4,000 Philadelphians in 1793, and it so decimated Memphis, Tenn., that the city lost its charter in 1878. Last seen on an epidemic scale in this country in 1905 (in New Orleans), yellow fever appears to be making a comeback after nearly two decades in abeyance in the Western Hemisphere. So reports Leonard, a free-lance writer.

The yellow fever virus, which attacks the liver and kidneys, was transmitted in American cities by an urban mosquito called *Aedes aegypti*. The *aegypti*, writes Leonard, is a “human camp follower” — like the cockroach. Its larvae die in moving water, and other mosquitoes’ larvae eat them in swamps and ponds. But in the stagnant water of roof gutters, flower vases, and old beer cans, they thrive.

In 1947, the member states of the Pan American Health Organization launched a massive attack on *aegypti*, which cleared most of South and Central America of the mosquito by 1960. But, relying on vaccination and the availability of DDT pesticide, U.S. health officials never launched a serious campaign to clean up *aegypti*’s choice breeding spots. Protests from Mexico finally sparked a belated program in 1962; but house checks met strong citizen resistance, and many breeding sites remained when the effort was dropped in 1969.

The U.S. failure to wipe out *aegypti* takes on threatening dimensions because the yellow fever virus continues to flourish in impregnable jungle refuges, living in a cycle traveling between monkey and jungle mosquito. In 1978 alone, 200 people contracted jungle yellow fever in Latin America. If one of them had arrived in a Southern U.S. city and been bitten by an *aegypti*, a yellow fever epidemic could have started here.

Urban yellow fever has not yet reappeared in Latin America, but jungle yellow fever cases are on the rise. Moreover, dengue (or “breakbone fever”), also borne by *aegypti*, has been spreading rapidly through Latin America, with 2.5 million cases reported in the Caribbean in 1977. In 1980, a Brownsville, Texas, woman contracted the first U.S. case (not imported by a tourist) since 1945. Yellow fever, Leonard suggests, may not be far behind.

**Academic Overruns**


In 1979, the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) awarded $1.58 billion in research grants to universities. But nearly 27 percent of that sum ($422 million) never reached the laboratory. It was collected to recoup “indirect costs,” or overhead, by academic administrators.

Brown, a physiologist at the University of California, San Francisco,
medical school, writes that dramatic increases in the overhead share of federal research grants are depriving scientists of valuable funds for their research. In 1966, for example, just over 12 percent ($53 million) of the NIH’s total research grant budget went to indirect costs—from maintaining laboratory facilities to paying university managers—while $378 million directly underwrote research. By 1979, the allotments for indirect costs had jumped eightfold, while direct funds had risen only threefold.

The erosion of the federal research dollar began with a 1966 U.S. Bureau of the Budget decision that permitted universities to renegotiate their overhead allotments yearly, instead of abiding by a fixed percentage fee (16 percent of total direct costs in 1965). Today, panels of scientists carefully judge the scientific merits and direct costs of individual grant proposals. But there is no similar system for assessing indirect costs before—or after—a grant has been awarded.

University administrators not only lack incentive to keep overhead costs low, but they find it pays to allot as many expenses as possible to the overhead category so that the proposed projects seem less costly to federal evaluators. Partly as a result, indirect cost rates vary tremendously—from an average level of about 25 percent on University of California campuses to Yeshiva (N.Y.) University’s 63.8 percent.

Since World War II, universities have undertaken much research at Washington’s urging, and the federal government should assume some of the resulting overhead expenses, writes Brown. Yet faculty careers and university reputations are largely built on research. Since the colleges gain, they should share the financial burden: Brown urges the government to re-establish its old practice of supporting universities for research overhead at a fixed rate.

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**RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT**

**Sea Power**


Sea water on the ocean’s surface heated by the sun’s rays is much warmer than water thousands of feet deep. Some scientists now believe that this temperature gap represents an energy source that could provide millions of kilowatts of electric power by the 1990s.

Ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC) works on the same principles as a conventional steam power plant, according to the authors, both researchers at Energy Research and Development, Inc., in Pittsburgh. In steam plants, water is heated in a boiler. The resulting steam
turns the blades of a turbine attached to a generator. Then it flows to a
condenser, is cooled to a liquid state, and returned to the boiler to start
the cycle anew. In an OTEC plant located in the tropics, water from the
ocean’s surface (as warm as 80°F) provides the boiler’s heat source, and
water from 1,500- to 3,000-foot depths (as cold as 40°F) is the coolant;
ammonia, which boils at 68°F, is the working fluid.

OTEC can operate year round, day and night (though output can vary
seasonally, during the evening, or on cloudy days). But several engi-
neering hurdles remain. Because OTEC is an inefficient energy source,
gigantic equipment is needed. In a 100-megawatt OTEC plant (with
one-tenth the capacity of a large nuclear plant), the pipe used to pump
cold water up to the condenser would have to be 1,500 to 3,000 feet long
and 50 feet in diameter and handle a flow as great as five million gal-
lons of water per minute. The plant’s innards must be not only heat-
conducting but also corrosion-resistant.

The U.S. Department of Energy plans to allot OTEC more than 90
percent of its latest $37 million budget request for ocean energy re-
search and development. Its chief project so far is OTEC-1, a World War
II Navy tanker revamped to carry a one-megawatt boiler and con-
denser. Currently floating 18 miles off Hawaii, OTEC-1 supports cold
water pipes 2,200 feet long and four feet in diameter. If further tests go
well, sea-going OTEC plants off Florida and Louisiana hooked up to the
mainland via underwater transmission cables could supply 30 percent
of the Southeast’s electricity by the year 2000.

Pass the
Pickleweed

Most efforts to put the world’s abundant salt water to work for farmers
have involved costly desalinization. But scientists from the University
of Arizona have come up with an alternative—cultivating the salt-
tolerant plants (halophytes) that survive on beaches, tidal flats, and es-
tuarine swamps. Among the edible species, reports Neary, a free-lance
writer, are plants that go by such unappetizing names as pickleweed,
Palmer’s grass, and saltbush (or Altriplex).

No one is sure just how halophytes work. Ordinary plants filter out
salt at their roots; even in a mildly brackish environment, the salt they
exclude collects around them, slowly shutting out water. Halophytes,
on the other hand, avoid “congestion” by permitting some salt to enter.
Pickleweed isolates salt in vacuoles—small cavities in its leaves sur-
rounded by membrane. Altriplex plants form special salt cells on their
leaves’ surfaces; when the cells get full, they burst, and the salt is
washed away by the rain or tides.

In the United States, saline accretion, caused mainly by irrigation,
threatens 12.7 percent of the farm land in California and up to 25 per-
cent of the acreage along the lower Rio Grande. Such areas are good candidates for halophyte cultivation, Neary suggests. Indeed, a quarter-million square miles of the United States (one-twelfth of the continental land area) lies atop “reachable” saline aquifers. Beneath the water-short Western states alone is a salt water supply that would fill Lake Michigan. The trick will be to convince conventional farmers and finicky consumers to give halophytes a try.

The British put pickleweed in salads. And the seeds from Palmer’s grass, once a staple of Pacific Coast Indians, contain 80 percent soluble carbohydrate (comparable to corn or rice). But the *Atriplex* is most likely to appeal to farmers, with its six-ton-per-acre yield (twice that of alfalfa) and its 20 percent protein content (equivalent to alfalfa). Unfortunately, the plant is also 30 percent salt, and researchers have yet to find a cheap, efficient way to purge its briny flavor.

The Earliest Conservationists

"The Earliest Traces of a Conservation Conscience" by Robert M. Alison, in *Natural History* (May 1981), Membership Services, P.O. Box 6000, Des Moines, Iowa 50340.

Kublai Khan, Akhenaton, and Montezuma—their names alone evoke mighty armies and towering monuments. But these leaders were also vigorous conservationists. In fact, conservation laws have existed almost as long as civilization has, according to Alison, a Canadian science writer.

The earliest known “environmental regulations” were decreed by the Middle Kingdom pharaohs of Egypt, who, more than 3,000 years ago,
issued hunting licenses to limit the slaughter of waterfowl. The ancient Romans, Greeks, Assyrians, Chinese, and Indians also safeguarded wildlife. Around 1900 B.C., the Sumerians and Babylonians enacted the first known law protecting vegetation, setting a fine of half a mina of silver for cutting down a tree.

But perhaps no society has practiced conservation more assiduously than the English. King Ine (c. 700) issued the earliest known English environmental statute. He forbade the burning of forests and the cutting of any tree “big enough to shelter thirty swine.” After 1066, the first Norman kings marked off royal game preserves; their foresters brutally enforced a ban on nonroyal hunting.

Even the Magna Carta (1215) had two sections devoted to environmental protection—one calling for reforestation along England’s rivers. During the reign of Edward I (1272–1307), Parliament passed its first conservation act, abolishing the death penalty for killing a deer but establishing a fishing season for salmon. In succeeding centuries, more and more species came under official protection, with one conspicuous exception. The otherwise bird-loving Henry VIII (who ruled from 1509 to 1547) pledged a bounty as encouragement to his countrymen to “kill and utterly destroy all manner of Crows.”

Broad as early English conservation laws were, there were major gaps. They ignored nongame animals. They protected trees, which are marketable, but neglected noncommercial vegetation. Though conservationists rallied to defend individual species that became endangered, they paid little heed to the surroundings. Not until the 20th century did the total “environment” become an issue.

ARTS & LETTERS

Cézanne’s Role


In recent decades, the reputation of French post-impressionist Paul Cézanne (1839–1906) has been caught in a crossfire—between art historians who credit Georges Braque with the invention of cubism and those who tout Pablo Picasso.

Cézanne’s omission of detail and his penchant for rendering areas as planes of color have long reminded critics of the cubists’ efforts to reduce nature to its basic geometric forms—rectangle, sphere, cone, and cylinder. An influential art historian, William Rubin of New York’s Museum of Modern Art, has persuasively argued that most of Cézanne’s “distortions” of nature flowed from the same conscious wish to de-
Rubin challenges the conventional view that Picasso fathered cubism in the early 1900s and that Braque merely helped him refine it. He has demonstrated that back in the late 19th century, Cézanne employed a technique of overlapping and linking geometric planes in steplike configurations, called *passage*, that violated fundamental rules of perspective. This technique ultimately became a pillar of cubism. *Passage* was absent in Picasso’s works as late as 1908 but appeared in paintings by Braque, whom most scholars agree was influenced by Cézanne.

Donnell-Kotrozo, an Arizona State University art historian, disputes this portrayal of Cézanne as protocubist. To be sure, Cézanne found the strict “model-copy” relationship of the 18th- and 19th-century naturalists inadequate, she writes. He believed that faithfulness to Nature’s every detail prevented a painting from fusing into a coherent whole. His reorganization of nature—his omissions and simplifications—represented an effort to transmit nature’s effect on him to the viewer, not a rejection of the world around him.

At the core of the Cézanne controversy is a philosophical dispute over the nature of progress in art, says Donnell-Kotrozo. Rubin and his adherents imply that the greatest artists *consciously* contribute to some “preordained pattern of evolution.” Alternatively, she suggests, every stylistic invention may be viewed as “a probe that reaches to the limits” of an artist’s imagination. By allowing hindsight to color their theories, art historians belittle the motives and personal achievements of the unsuspecting artist.

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**Tastefully**

*Tacky*


During the 1920s, when motion pictures became America’s favorite entertainment, the ultimate in movie-going was the movie palace. Built between 1913 and 1932, these palaces typically seated 1,800 to 2,500 viewers and featured plush interiors, doormen in resplendent uniforms, and sometimes stage shows and orchestras. The palace was a uniquely American contribution to show business architecture, writes Herzog, an art historian at William Rawley Harper (Illinois) College. But it reflected its ancestry—the vaudeville theaters, traveling shows, and penny arcades where movies snared their first skeptical audiences during the 1890s.

The first movie exhibitors thought that they were taking a chance on a “new-fangled invention.” Most of them hedged their bets by retaining their stage attractions. Even proprietors of the first full-time movie theaters adopted a low-risk strategy, keeping alterations in their converted stores to a minimum. To lure pedestrians inside, they borrowed the circus technique of displaying flashy banners and posters outside.

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By around 1903, it was clear that the movies would make it, and fancier showplaces—nickelodeons—evolved. Their owners covered the theater’s exterior with shiny pressed tin and copied the electric light displays of penny arcades—the first marquees. They brought the box office out to the customer on the street. And by moving the theater’s front doors back from the sidewalk and under the marquee, they subtly drew pedestrians inside.

Yet glitter was not enough. Movie proprietors wanted to cultivate a movie-going habit among middle-class Americans. Thus, palace owners emulated the designs of vaudeville and the legitimate theater. They built plaster and terra cotta exteriors, which conveyed a sense of permanence and “culture” when molded into Roman arches and arabesque balustrades. (The Roxy Theater in New York, for example, fused Gothic, Moorish, and Renaissance styles.) Moreover, by the 1920s, movies were no longer a novelty that could keep customers inside a dreary theater. Foyers, promenades, and lounges offered not only comfort but also a certain touch of “class.”

The most pretentious palaces never lost the brashness of the early huckster days. They combined their interior marble pillars and monogrammed drapes with flashing marquees and lurid posters to create the “refined vulgarity” that became their trademark.

Fallen Heroines


Troubled by the “decline of the family,” late-18th century English novelists focused on one of literature’s most touching—and tragic—stock characters: the seduced maiden.

According to Staves, a professor of English at Brandeis, such fictional maidens were typically 15- to 18-year-old village girls; their seducers were dashing, wealthy cads in their late 20s. Like Olivia Primrose of Oliver Goldsmith’s The Vicar of Wakefield (1766), they surrendered only after a protracted siege and acted out of love, not lust. They were not so virtuous as to be unseducible, but they were delicate and morally upright; most bore illegitimate children and died young.

Why did these sweet, star-crossed girls intrigue 18th-century novelists? Staves writes that their plight symbolized the decline of parental power precipitated by the secularization of English society.

After the English Revolution of the mid-17th century, the Puritan theocracy’s civil courts steadily expanded their jurisdiction to cover morals charges (such as fornication) previously decided by unpopular ecclesiastical courts. Parents liked the new courts’ willingness to award monetary damages for seduction—often for the loss of a pregnant daughter’s household labors. Yet they forfeited the exclusive power to discipline their offspring, which the church courts had tacitly allowed.
Olivia Primrose with Squire Thornhill in Oliver Goldsmith's Vicar of Wakefield.
The plight of such "sweetly pathetic" maidens symbolized to many 18th-century English readers the decline of parental control.

Soon, even this system broke down. The English could no longer tolerate laws that viewed young women as little more than chattel. Starting in the late 18th century, English courts began treating women as individuals, and during the 19th century, young girls came under the protection of statutory rape laws.

English popular novelists, however, focused not on the maiden's suffering but on the parents' lasting shame and loss. In the popular Charlotte Temple (1801), Susanna Rowson wrote that daughters cry tears, but aggrieved fathers weep "drops . . . from bleeding hearts." The authors usually kept their protagonists out of court, refusing even to acknowledge the state's new role. Their readers, concludes Staves, shed tears "not only for the death of innocence, but also for the death of an idealized older form of the family."

OTHER NATIONS

Is Britain Reviving?

"Don't Sell the Great Thatcher Experiment Short" by Walter Guzzardi, Jr., in Fortune (May 18, 1981), Time-Life Building, Chicago, Ill. 60611.

By many standards, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's conservative prescriptions for Britain's sick economy seem to have flopped. Unemployment has doubled to 10 percent since she took office in 1979, and
REVISIONS

**Revising**

**China’s Past**

During the past 30 years, archaeological finds across the People’s Republic have forced scholars to revise many cherished ideas about China’s remote past.

Until the 1970s, specialists believed that agriculture in China began around 3000 B.C.—late in the world’s “prehistory”—reports Chang, a Harvard anthropologist. This indicated that farming spread to China from the Middle East or Southeast Asia, where agriculture began several millennia earlier. China’s first farmers—the Yangshao people—lived in the Yellow River basin, grew millet, raised dogs and pigs, lived in earthen houses, and fashioned painted red pottery.

By 2200 B.C., this New Stone Age culture had produced China’s first recorded hereditary dynasty, the Xia. They developed China’s first...
writing and bronze metallurgy. The Xia were thought to have been sup-
planted in north central China by the Shang around 1750 B.C. And the
Shang in turn were conquered in 1100 B.C. by the Zhou, who ruled until
221 B.C., when the Qin monarch Shihuangdi united the Zhou and neigh-
boring states into a Chinese empire.

But radiocarbon dating has enabled archaeologists to push back the
origins of the Yangshao to 5000 B.C. More important, new digs have re-
vealed the existence of another culture that followed that of China’s
preagricultural Old Stone Age hunters. Millet seeds, stone and bone
hunting gear, and wild animal fossils heaped together at several scat-
tered sites now strongly suggest that Chinese “cave men” developed ag-
riculture on their own.

Specialists are now convinced that the Yangshao coexisted with two
other cultures, the Dawenkou and the Qingliangang. Similarities in
pottery and tool styles indicate that shortly after 5000 B.C., these peo-
oples made up a single cultural entity—“early China.” During the third
millennium B.C., the Longshan culture emerged. This sophisticated new
civilization gave China rigid social classes and organized, sustained
warfare between “states.” From the Longshan, the author believes,
came the Xia, Shang, and Zhou cultures, which simply represented dif-
ferent periods of political supremacy.

These new discoveries are not only filling gaps in our knowledge of
ancient China, writes Chang. By expanding the global data about an-
cient cultures, they will also strengthen or refute current notions about
the origins and evolution of civilization around the world.

Guatemala Next?

"Guatemala: The Coming Danger" by Marlise Simons, in Foreign Policy (Sum-
mer 1981), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

El Salvador has grabbed the headlines, but the real test of President
Reagan’s policy to check the growth of communist influence in Latin
America will come in Guatemala, predicts Simons, a Washington Post
correspondent. There, military rulers battling a growing leftist rebel-
lion have disdained compromise and mounted a campaign of terror
that has claimed thousands of lives since the mid-1970s.

Bordering on four countries (including oil-rich Mexico), Guatemala
boasts Central America’s largest population (6.9 million). In 1950,
Jacobo Arbenz became the nation’s first peacefully installed President
in more than a century. But when he sought to buy up the U.S.-based
United Fruit Company’s vast land holdings at the corporation’s own
book value, the Eisenhower administration branded him a militant
communist. In 1954, the Central Intelligence Agency engineered his
overthrow. Since then, American arms and military advisers have
helped a succession of Guatemalan strongmen fight small bands of
guerrillas.

By the late 1960s, the government had crushed the rebels—at a cost
Crackdowns by Guatemala's military rulers have ignited a civil war, which could bring leftists to power.

of some 10,000 civilian lives. But after crooked elections in 1974, the guerrillas reappeared. Aided by Catholic priests, they mobilized the previously apolitical Indians (53 percent of Guatemala's population), who resented the military's seizure of lands and forcible conscription of village youths.

Surprisingly, repression eased between 1974 and 1978 under President Kjell Laugerud García. But the rise of leftist guerrillas in nearby Nicaragua and neighboring El Salvador panicked Laugerud's successor, Romeo Lucas García, who charged that the Carter administration's human rights policies were encouraging rebellion. He cracked down so hard on real and imagined foes that his own Vice President fled the country.

The Reagan administration would like to see Guatemala's 1982 presidential elections pave the way for liberalization and has encouraged the Christian Democrats to nominate candidates. But the centrists have been cowed by the right wing's death squads. The contest is likely to be dominated by Lucas, former President Carlos Arana Osorio, and Mario Sandoval Alarcon, whose rightist National Liberation Movement includes a 3,000-man paramilitary force and calls itself the "party of organized violence." Meanwhile, the guerrillas—who have received only token Cuban aid—have grown strong enough to attack government patrols and outposts almost daily.

U.S. options are limited, Simons contends. She urges the Reagan administration to drop its plans to resume military aid (cut off by President Carter) and to suspend funding for civilian public works projects. "The issue in Guatemala," she concludes, "is not how to prevent change, but how to guide it."

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"Hitler and the Arabs"


Many historians have assumed that Adolf Hitler was a strong ally of Arab nationalists before World War II, opposing French rule in Syria and British support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Not so, says Nicosia, a historian at St. Michael's College (Vt.). The Fuhrer rejected Arab requests for help; indeed, for a time, the Nazis supported Zionism.

When Hitler rose to power in 1933, Arabs throughout the Middle East rejoiced. Leaders such as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem admired not only his anti-Jewish policies but also his criticism of the 1919 Versailles Treaty, which had strengthened British and French control over much of the region. Arab nationalists even approached German diplomats with plans to create Arab Nazi parties.

Such appeals conflicted with Hitler’s prewar fantasies. He wanted to forge an “all-Aryan” Anglo-German alliance: Germany would endorse the British Empire if Britain endorsed Nazi expansion in Eastern Europe. Though London repeatedly spurned Hitler’s offers of friendship, the Fuhrer did not give up hope for almost a year after World War II erupted in 1939. German diplomats were instructed not to meddle in British Palestine’s “domestic affairs.”

Moreover, in Nazi eyes, the Arabs were at the bottom of the racial hierarchy. In 1935, the German Consul General in Jerusalem approvingly quoted T. E. Lawrence’s alleged observation, “I do not know how one can ever take the Arabs seriously. . . . It is not worth the effort.” Nazi officials declared that National Socialism was not exportable to Arab countries. Jews, however, were. Before war broke out, the Third Reich promoted Jewish immigration to Palestine to achieve a “racially pure” Germany—over the protests of puzzled Arabs. The Gestapo even helped Zionist groups outwit the British ban on Jewish immigration imposed in 1938 to stem Arab violence.

Only twice did the Nazis briefly support Arab goals. In 1938, before the Munich agreement, German secret agents backed a Palestinian Arab revolt in order to divert British attention from the planned Nazi takeover of Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland. And in the summer of 1939, Germany publicly agreed to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia (the guns were never delivered). The aim: to deter London from opposing the coming Nazi invasion of Poland by threatening to establish a power base in the desert kingdom, strategically located near the Suez Canal. [Later, during the war, Hitler’s only serious Middle Eastern intrigue was a failed effort to support a pro-Nazi coup in Iraq.]
The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency startled the world in 1977 by predicting that oil output in the Soviet Union, the world's largest producer, would soon peak; the communist world, said the agency, would become a major petroleum importer by 1985. The CIA has backed off slightly from its widely criticized forecast, but the impression persists that the Warsaw Pact nations may soon be competing with the West for OPEC oil—with rubles or arms. A group of specialists commissioned by Congress's Joint Economic Committee (JEC) disagrees.

The CIA contended that Soviet oil production would peak at 11 to 12 million barrels per day (mbd) in the early 1980s and fall to 10 to 11 mbd by 1985. (It is already 12.3 mbd.) Its projections described a "worst-case" scenario—assuming that overproduction would rapidly drain the gigantic western Siberian oil fields and that major additional finds were unlikely over the next five years.

The CIA put proven Soviet oil reserves at only 4.1 to 4.8 billion tons—roughly half the estimate of most other Western analysts. But as if to bear out the agency's claims, the Kremlin has indicated that it will hold oil and gas imports to its energy-poor Eastern European allies at 1980 levels through 1985.

In fact, there is a Soviet oil problem, say the JEC specialists, but it concerns the period 1985-90. By then, the Soviets could feel pinched if large new fields (which can take years to get into production) are not found soon.

Since the late 1970s, uncertainties over the oil and gas resources of remote Siberia and the Arctic coast have fueled an energy debate in the Kremlin, write the authors. President Brezhnev and the oil and gas industries maintain that the looming shortages can be avoided simply by boosting oil and gas production in western Siberia. But another faction (once led by the late Premier Aleksei Kosygin) stresses coal and nuclear power expansion.

While the growth in Soviet oil production has slowed—from 5.8 percent as late as 1976 to 2.9 percent in 1980—output continues to increase. The geologic structure underlying western Siberia suggests the presence of 10 billion more barrels of relatively accessible oil (not included in the CIA estimate). The Soviets have continued their heavy investment in western Siberian pipelines, apparently banking on Brezhnev's assumption.

The CIA has also undervalued Moscow's maturing gas industry, say the authors. The Soviets have announced proven reserves of 28 trillion cubic meters, more than one-third of the world's total. Since 1975, gas production has risen at least nine percent annually, and gas should increasingly replace oil in Soviet factories and power stations.

Such abundance is fortunate, because conserving energy in the Soviet Union will be difficult. Many of the biggest oil, gas, and coal deposits are located far from cities and towns; considerable energy is consumed just to transport the fuel to consumers.
The rising energy prices that have cut usage in the capitalist world play a minor role in the Soviet Union's "command economy." And so few Soviets own cars that greater automotive fuel efficiency or reduced driving—factors central to Western conservation efforts—would have a negligible impact.

The Soviet Union's net annual oil surplus is likely to shrink from 130 million tons to between 85 and 100 million tons by 1985—a far cry from the 55-million-ton deficit foreseen by the CIA. If oil output keeps expanding as planned, the Kremlin should meet most of its allies' energy requirements and feel no "pressing need . . . to invade the Middle East oil producers."

But the United States can hardly relax, assert the authors. If Soviet energy output does indeed gradually expand through the next decade, Soviet leaders will be tempted to increase their influence abroad by offering more energy supply deals to important neutral nations such as India and to U.S. allies such as West Germany, France, and Italy.

"Effects of Eliminating Public Service Employment."

As part of his federal budget-cutting campaign last spring, President Reagan asked Congress to eliminate by 1982 funding for public service employment (PSE) programs authorized by the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). By May 1981, the White House had slashed PSE rolls from 307,000 to 131,000.

In this report, prepared before Congress passed Reagan's budget in June, Congressional Budget Office staffers argue that the White House could not possibly save the $1.2 billion it projects for 1981 by dropping the remaining PSE workers through the end of the year. Nor should the administration count on the $3.6 billion that it expects to save in 1982 from rescinding all outlays for the 310,000 PSE jobs originally planned for that year. Their study shows how American society's many "safety nets" can blunt economizing drives.

As many as half the laid-off or would-be PSE employees could draw on other federal assistance programs for cushioning. Between 20 and 50 percent could receive Unemployment Insurance averaging $1,600 in 1981—costing Uncle Sam between $79 million and $177 million. (In 1982, however, the higher figure might turn into a net $100 million unemployment insurance saving, because the exodus of workers from PSE payrolls to unemployment lines will have ended.)

In addition, the loss of these PSE jobs is likely to increase federal welfare and food stamp spending by between $34 million and $54 million in 1981, and between $100 million and $157 million in 1982. (Factoring in the individuals who would have been expected to enter PSE programs for the first time in 1982 accounts for the increase.)

A decline in personal income among PSE jobholders will also cut federal tax revenues—by up to $127 million in 1981 and $371 million the following year. Foregone employee and employer Social Security contributions would represent 55 percent of this loss.

Though the administration expects to save $1.2 billion with its PSE cuts in 1981, these "secondary budget effects" may reduce net federal savings to only $869 million. And net savings in 1982 from discharging all 310,000...
workers may fall below $3.1 billion—
$500 million less than anticipated.

But the precise impact of the Rea-
gan proposals won’t be certain until
the fate of welfare eligibility require-
ments is decided—and until the effec-
tiveness of the administration’s entire
economic program in achieving non-
inflationary, job-creating growth be-
comes known.

"Challenges for U.S. National Security—Assessing the Balance:
Defence Spending and Conventional Forces."

Authors: Leslie Gelb and the staff of the Carnegie Panel on U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control

Comparing American and (estimated) Soviet defense budgets does not reveal much about relative fighting strengths, although Central Intelligence Agency figures on Soviet spending do suggest that Moscow will continue to gain on the United States in overall military capability.

Nor does "bean-counting"—simply comparing numbers of men, ships, aircraft, and weapons on each side—add up to an accurate picture of the worldwide military balance.

Reflecting the detailed views of a bipartisan 27-member Carnegie panel of scholars, generals, and others, the authors suggest a "more realistic" emphasis on politics, geography, doctrine, allies’ contributions, support capability, technology, and, above all, "the purposes for which the forces were established."

The most serious political difficulty facing NATO in any crisis, for instance, is the need for 15 sovereign governments to act together quickly and decisively. Moscow too would have problems; in wartime, Soviet troops would probably have to be diverted to secure the "reliability" of its Warsaw Pact allies (including Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia), with reserves kept ready to deal with China.

Geography hurts any NATO defense of West Germany. U.S. reinforcements must come across the Atlantic and be funneled in through vulnerable ports and north-south communications lines close to likely West German battlefields. If France, a NATO "ally" but not a NATO member (since 1965), quickly joined in, NATO supply lines could go through France.

Despite the Soviets’ growing edge in ground firepower, the "more serious problem" for NATO is not the oft-cited threat of a Soviet "standing-start" surprise attack but a Warsaw Pact assault after a seven-to-14-day mobilization period.

Some analysts estimate, for example, that Moscow could build up a 2.4-to-one ratio in combat troops in Germany after 10 days’ mobilization, versus one-to-one in a "standing-start." French participation would be more critical after such preparation.

Whereas decisions to respond to an actual Soviet attack would be virtually automatic, NATO politicians might tend to put off difficult mobilization choices during a build-up when Moscow’s intentions were ambiguous; some Western civilian leaders might even hope that abstaining from NATO mobilization would defuse the crisis.

Looking ahead, NATO faces several "potentially divisive" decisions regarding both its conventional forces and its so-called theater nuclear forces.
(notably U.S. cruise missiles and the ground-based Pershing II missiles that can reach Russia). All seem to involve politics as much as anything else. Among them, NATO must decide whether to continue with its plans (announced in 1979) to employ theater nuclear weapons to offset Soviet missiles in Europe, despite Soviet warnings and growing political opposition in Western Europe.

There are costs in not deploying the NATO missiles. Moscow might perceive that many Western European leaders raised the problem of apparent Soviet advantage in missiles in 1979 and then "in the end were not prepared to do anything about it."


Authors: James L. Medoff and Katharine G. Abraham

What determines job security and pay in America today? Performance? Union membership? A big factor is sheer staying power—seniority. So find Medoff and Abraham, economists at Harvard and MIT, respectively, after surveying managers at 561 U.S. nonagricultural, nonconstruction companies.

Seniority seems to matter most in those businesses where employees are unionized. Sixty-eight percent of man-

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agers interviewed from these environs said that they would never lay off a senior employee before a less-experienced one. Another 28 percent said that they would give the pink slip to a senior worker only if his junior handled the job significantly better. Among managers of nonunion, hourly employees, however, allegiances were weaker: 29 percent answered “never” and 50 percent would consider individual performance but with a bias toward seniors.

Seniority shelters salaried employees least—particularly those who do not fall under minimum-pay and overtime laws (notably, other managers). Only eight percent of their bosses said that they would “never” terminate a veteran first. Salaried employees protected by the laws (e.g., secretaries) accrue just a bit more security with the years; 13 percent of their supervisors replied “never.”

But most employers of salaried workers—56 percent who supervise protected employees, 63 percent of the others—still said that they would give a junior a break in termination decisions only if he significantly outperformed his elders.

Seniority influences promotion decisions to a lesser degree, Medoff and Abraham observe. Its impact seems “automatic” only among a minority of unionized hourly-wage earners. Seventeen percent of the individuals who supervise this category would “never” advance a junior worker “instead of a more senior employee who wanted the job.”

This iron rule was acceptable to far fewer managers of other groups—four percent in nonunion hourly shops, three percent in protected salary workplaces, and two percent in unprotected salary offices.

In all, the authors contend, 73 percent of American nonfarm, nonconstruction employees work in settings where senior employees enjoy “substantially” greater job security than their junior counterparts. Half work for firms that similarly favor veteran employees in promotions. They benefit from on-the-job tenure whether their real value to an employer grows or not.


Author: Chandra Hardy

Throughout the 1970s, the soaring debts of Third World countries to Western governments and commercial banks touched off periodic credit crises. Hardy, a World Bank economist, contends that today’s makeshift arrangements to manage debt problems are outmoded.

The developing countries have been borrowing to stay afloat and to finance modest growth in a period of rising oil costs, stagnant foreign aid, and shrinking markets in the recession-ridden West. From 1970 to 1980, the total Third World debt (of 94 nations) quadrupled to $400 billion.

The developing countries’ borrowing has grown faster than their revenues from exports and domestic economic growth combined. Moreover, loans from private Western banks have been growing by over 25 percent annually and now comprise more than half the total Third World debt. The banks’ terms, tougher than most foreign aid loans, have helped
shrink the average repayment schedule from 17.5 years in 1972 to 14.5 years in 1979.

Consequently, the number of countries in arrears rose from three in 1974 to 22 in 1980, and the value of overdue payments shot up from $500 million to $5.5 billion. Half of the total outstanding Third World debt is due by 1985, but prospects for substantially improved economic performances needed to pay these bills are dim.

Poor economic management has aggravated the debt problems of some Third World countries. Zaire’s President Mobutu Sese Seko sank too much capital into dead-end industrial “prestige” projects while neglecting his backward nation’s farmers. When world prices for Zaire’s copper began to plummet in 1971, total foreign debt soared—from $800 million in 1972 to $3.5 billion in 1977—partly to cover agricultural imports.

But lender nations are also at fault. The rules of the “Paris Club” (an unofficial group of Western creditor nations) prohibit discussing a new schedule for payment until outright bankruptcy is imminent.

Hardy also contends that the Paris Club members (including the United States) have withheld debt relief to financially strapped countries for political reasons. During the early 1960s, for example, pro-communist President Sukarno of Indonesia repeatedly sought relief from Western creditor nations in vain. Four years after he was overthrown in 1966 by the pro-Western General Suharto, Paris Club members rescheduled all of Indonesia’s $2.1 billion debt at 30 years, with no interest.

Meanwhile, private banks have been guilty of excessive, erratic lending, she writes. Though skyrocketing oil prices and slumping exports plunged Turkey deeply into the red after 1974 with no prospects for a quick improvement, some 250 Western banks let Ankara’s outstanding private debt balloon to between $8 and $12 billion. [During this period, Western banks were hard-pressed to find borrowers for the huge increases in OPEC countries’ deposits following the sharp 1973–74 oil price hikes.] Then, in 1978, they rescheduled payments on unrealistically harsh terms, virtually destroying Turkey’s chances for early recovery.

But most debt reschedulings, Hardy writes, only ward off financial chaos for a year or two—usually until the International Monetary Fund is asked by the debtor to step in and provide aid in exchange for the adoption of stringent economic austerity programs. This system wastes considerable time for commercial banks and Western governments; it has also cost them roughly $2 billion in payments that had to be completely written off between 1956 and 1980.

The root cause of the debt problem is the scarcity of low-interest long-term funding for development. (During the 19th century, the United States and other modern industrial powers financed factories and transportation networks with 50-year bonds.) As long as Third World countries have to rely heavily on private banks, she argues, recurring default scares will be an inevitable by-product of today’s mercenary world economy.
The Terra Nova, Captain Robert Scott's ship, photographed in 1911 by Herbert Ponting from a cavern in an Antarctic iceberg. The deaths of Scott and four companions as they tried to get back to the ship from the South Pole climaxed the "heroic age" of Antarctic exploration.
Antarctica

Two hundred years ago, Captain James Cook circled Antarctica, saw that it was ice-covered, and lamented that man would "derive no benefit from it." But European and, later, American explorers still pushed south, driven by what one of them called the "Intellectual Passion"—the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. By the end of the 19th century, Antarctica was the last uncharted territory on Earth. Today, the geography of the continent is less mysterious; scientists probing beneath the ice have found coal, uranium, titanium, and strong evidence of oil deposits. Here, historian Peter Anderson describes the great age of exploration. Political scientist Barbara Mitchell assesses recent developments. Antarctica, she writes, has become a "giant, open-air laboratory" for experiments in science, in fisheries, and, willy-nilly, in international relations.

HOW THE SOUTH WAS WON

by Peter J. Anderson

As the age of the dinosaurs dawned 225 million years ago, the land mass of Pangaea—mother of continents—was being broken apart by earthquakes and volcanoes. Lava surged through great rifts in the Earth's crust, and the continent was split in half. A sea began to form, separating the southern "supercontinent" that geologists have named Gondwana (comprising South America, Africa, Australia, India, and Antarctica) from its northern twin, Laurasia.

At the time, Gondwana probably lay somewhere in the vicinity of the equator, surrounded by a warm-water ocean. The portion of Gondwana that would become Antarctica—and eventually be covered by a crushing ice sheet—was once, it seems, a hospitable place. Parts of it may have resembled the Pacific Northwest, with thickly forested mountains giving way to lush
lowlands drained by meandering rivers and streams. Eruptions by Gondwana's many volcanoes occasionally spewed hot ash and lava across the countryside, possibly contributing to a gradual warming of the planet. (Antarctica today is pockmarked with extinct volcanoes.) Tall, pine-like trees flourished from the rainy uplands down to the warm, flood-prone plains. Cooler, danker locales sustained giant ferns and 30-foot-tall *Glossopteris* trees with large tongue-shaped leaves.

**Wandering Continents**

One of the earliest inhabitants of the land was the carnivorous *Labyrinthodont*, which appeared even before Pangaea began to break apart. These primitive amphibians probably shared their watery habitat with the *Lystrosaurus*, a vegetarian reptile and an ancestor of the hippopotamus. In 1971, paleontologists found fossil skeletons of the *Thrinaxodon*, a spry, reptilian carnivore built somewhat like a weasel. In the trees lived the *Prolacerta*, a foot-long, lizard-like reptile with powerful limbs and a supple body. It probably fed on insects and on the young of other creatures. Antarctica's exposed rock has yielded other reptile fossils, suggesting that a rich and varied history of animal life may lie buried beneath the ice. Whether Antarctica was ever inhabited by dinosaurs or their relatives is not known.

Even as the Antarctic menagerie evolved, all of Gondwana was slowly drifting south and beginning to break apart. First, South America and Africa tore away from the mother continent, the Atlantic Ocean ultimately forming between them. Antarctica, Australia, and India, still linked together, continued to move slowly to the south, arriving near the South Pole about 100 million years ago.

Some 35 million years later, Australia and India broke free and began edging north toward their present positions; India eventually collided with the Asian continent, plunging under it and forming the great "uplift zone" that we call the Himalayas. Antarctica was now alone at the South Pole.

The once-pleasant continent began to ice over between 10 and 25 million years ago, for reasons that are little understood.

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It became a great frozen desert, larger than the continental United States and Mexico combined, with a meager annual precipitation of only two inches in the vast interior plateau. But the long Antarctic night (during the March to September winter, the sun skirts the horizon, disappearing for months at a time) and the reflective qualities of the ice cover ensured that very little ice would ever melt. So it accumulated, layer by layer.

Today, 98 percent of the continent’s surface is covered year-round by ice. Only in a few coastal areas does the summer temperature rise to near freezing, and inland it commonly drops to near -100°F during winter. The coldest temperature ever recorded anywhere in the world was almost -127°F, reported by the Soviets’ Vostok station in the interior in 1960. On the Antarctic Peninsula, the continent’s long “tail,” the climate can be far more hospitable. Balmy 40°F temperatures have been reported there in summer, and precipitation is relatively heavy.

As the ice built up, it became so heavy that the land beneath it was pushed, on average, about 2,000 feet into the Earth’s crust. (Much of the original Antarctic land mass now lies well below sea level.) Mile-high mountains were buried up to their tops. Today, their summits (called “nunatuks”) protrude modestly above the thick ice cover, some of them only a few feet high. Yet, in other places, mountains unconquered by the ice draw themselves up to their full height—almost 17,000 feet.

Homo sapiens evolved long after the continent froze over. But philosophers and explorers have presumed its existence since the beginning of Western civilization.
The Greek philosopher, Crates of Melos, speculated in the second century B.C. that the Earth was a sphere composed of four separate, equal-sized continents, with two in the Northern Hemisphere and two in the Southern. The Greeks already knew about one of the southern continents—Africa—but the other was unknown to them. They envisioned it as temperate in clime, a land of abundance inhabited by a peaceful people.

The first man thought to have actually approached Antarctica was the Polynesian sailor Ui-te-Rangiora in about A.D. 650. According to Polynesian legend, Ui-te-Rangiora sailed south in a large open canoe called Ti-Ivi-o-Atea until he reached an immense frozen ocean.

During the Middle Ages, the dream of a fabulously rich southern continent took hold in the West. European thinkers then had no contact with the Polynesians. Little by little, however, evidence supplanted supposition. In 1497, for instance, the Portuguese navigator Vasco da Gama sailed around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa, disproving a popular notion that the “southern continent” was really just an extension of Africa.

**Dashed Dreams**

Early maps typically reflect Europeans’ hopes and ignorance more accurately than Antarctica’s shape and position. Yet there are some mysterious exceptions. In 1532, for instance, a French cartographer named Oronce Fine published a remarkable map in Antwerp showing the Antarctic coast as it would appear today if free of ice. A terse notation says only that the continent was “recently discovered, but not yet fully known.” Possibly, then, Antarctica’s glaciers had receded considerably by the 1400s, and some now unknown sailors had visited the continent.

The old dreams of riches persisted until Britain’s George III dispatched his kingdom’s finest navigator and explorer, Captain James Cook, to settle the issue once and for all in 1772. Cook was directed to survey the southern seas, partly to aid British merchant ships. But his “prime object,” as he saw it, was to discover the southern continent.

Between 1772 and 1775, Cook circumnavigated Antarctica, braving high winds and severe cold. But he was unable to penetrate the barrier ice packs that girdle the continent. While Cook never saw land, he realized that any continent beyond the pack ice would be no paradise and remarked that it would “afford no better retreat for birds, or any other animals, than the ice itself.
Cook’s voyage was a remarkable achievement. The southern seas are among the world’s stormiest, because the continent’s cold air collides with the much warmer air from the north, creating constant high winds that circle Antarctica. Closer to the mainland, the ocean is studded with icebergs, formed when slices of the permanent ice shelves that cover the continent’s embayments break away. These flat-topped, “tabular” bergs may be hundreds of feet tall and the size of a small country. (During the 1970s, a tabular iceberg the size of Luxembourg was seen.) Tabular bergs in turn “calf” dozens of smaller icebergs.

**An Accidental Discovery**

In winter, the Antarctic seas freeze over for up to 700 miles from the continent, virtually doubling its “land” area. As this pack ice breaks apart with the approach of summer, the floating bergs cluster together in the surrounding seas. The pack is inhabited by penguins and seals, who visit the mainland only to breed, and is frequented by killer whales.

Antarctica itself was not sighted until some 45 years after Cook’s expedition. It seems to have happened by accident. Around 1800, American and British sealers and whalers, having depleted their quarry in the Arctic, began working the South Atlantic. Small fortunes could be made on a single trip. (The brig *Betsy* took 100,000 seal pelts worth $680,000 in one season.) On November 17, 1820, a 19-year-old American sealing captain named Nathaniel Palmer apparently became the first man to sight Antarctica. The coastline he saw many miles distant was desolate and inaccessible: “Thought it not Prudent to Venture in ice Bore away to the Norther’d and saw 2 small Islands and the shore every where Perpendicular.” The sight was of little interest to a sealer.

Actually, there are two other candidates for the honor of first to espy the continent. The Russian admiral Fabian von Bellingshausen circled Antarctica between 1819 and 1821, charting the seas and islands in the region with remarkable accuracy. He may have sighted land without even knowing it, for more than once he approached to within 20 or 30 miles of the coast. But Bellingshausen never claimed he saw land. It was not until 1949 that the Soviet Union—alarmed by new Antarctic territorial claims by other nations—asserted that he had.

Also in the region at the time was an Englishman, Sir Edward Bransfield. Like Bellingshausen, he came close to land but never claimed to have seen the continent. Bransfield sent a
At right, the Gondwana puzzle, showing how South America, Africa, India, and Australia fitted together with Antarctica some 200 million years ago.

written account of his journey to London late in 1820, but the Admiralty promptly lost it, and it has not been seen since.

Whaling and sealing captains again dominated the region after Bellingshausen and Bransfield departed. The next wave of exploration did not come until 20 years later, and it was motivated as much by scientific inquiry as by commercial interests. Captain James Clark Ross, an Englishman, had sailed to the North Magnetic Pole in 1831. The German scientist, Johann Gauss, believed that if the South Magnetic Pole could be found, the erratic compass readings that plagued sailors near the ends of the Earth could be corrected. Three nations launched expeditions, almost at the same time.

The Redoubtable Ross

The first to head south, in 1837, was a French group, headed by Jules Dumont d'Urville commanding the *Astrolabe* and *Zélée*. D'Urville could not make it through the pack ice near the Weddell Sea. In 1839, he tried the Pacific side, encountered little ice, and eventually sighted land. On January 22, 1840, he stepped ashore on a small, rocky island 100 yards off the coast of Antarctica. Looking across the water, d'Urville saw an unbroken featureless shoreline terminating in sheer ice cliffs. He named it Adelie Land, after his wife. Antarctica, he wrote, "appears to consist of a formidable layer of ice, rather like an envelope, which forms the crust over a base of rock." Somewhere beyond its cliffs lay the Magnetic Pole, but he was not prepared to venture inland.*

An American expedition had been envisioned as early as 1821, with an eye to commercial prospects, but Congress dragged its feet for 15 years before authorizing one. Lieutenant Charles Wilkes, a stern and stubborn naval officer, was given the command, setting sail from Virginia in the summer of 1838. He felt, he said, "like one doomed to destruction." Under his command were 440 unhappy crewmen and five leaky ships. Two of them, the *Sea Gull* and *Flying Fish*, were refitted New York harbor-pilot boats. The *Sea Gull* later sank in a storm.

Like d'Urville, Wilkes penetrated the pack ice on his second try, sighting land on January 19, 1840. He raised the Stars and Stripes over a small offshore island 26 days later. By then, Wilkes's men were exhausted, cold, and hobbled by scurvy. But

*In 1840, the South Magnetic Pole was located at some still unknown point in the Antarctic interior. But both magnetic poles are peripatetic. When T.W.E. David reached the South Magnetic Pole in 1909, it was in Victoria Land; today, it is close to 600 miles away, off the coast of Adelie Land. The "South Pole," by contrast, is a fixed geographical point.
the lieutenant pushed on. "I considered it my duty to proceed and not to give up the cruise until the ship was totally disabled, or it should be evident to all that it was impossible to persist any longer," he later recalled. His men begged him to turn back. Wilkes did, but not before completing a month-long cruise along 2,000 miles of the coast, now called Wilkes Land.

The third man to visit Antarctica was the redoubtable Captain James Clark Ross, a seasoned Arctic explorer. The Ross expedition was well-manned and well-equipped. Ross arrived in two specially built ships, Erebus and Terror, and bearing the British flag he had flown over the North Magnetic Pole. The ships' reinforced hulls crashed into the pack ice early in January 1840. Four days later, intact, the ships broke into open seas.

Wintering Over

On the 11th of January, a lookout spotted a distant coastline, which Ross named Victoria Land in honor of the Queen. His two ships continued along the coast, traveling farther south than anyone yet had gone, until he reached an island with "a stupendous volcanic mountain in a high state of activity" (as one crew member put it), which he called Mount Erebus. The island, and the 400-mile-long "barrier" ice shelf along the coast beyond it, were named after Ross.

The Ross Ice Shelf would later become the "highway to the South Pole"; expeditions routinely established their base camps there. It is a floating, flat-topped piece of ice, more than a thousand feet thick in places and about the size of France. The shelf is permanently attached to the land and is fed by glaciers. Every year, it grows by about 1,000 feet along its seaward edge, but most of this growth falls off, creating tabular icebergs.

After Ross's departure, interest in the continent subsided. The next surge of exploration began after representatives to the Sixth International Geographical Conference declared at their 1895 London meeting that Antarctica represented the "greatest piece of geographical exploration still to be undertaken." Between 1897 and 1916—the period known as the "heroic age"—15 expeditions sailed for the great southern continent.

The first of them was a Belgian-led enterprise, under the command of Lieutenant Adrien de Gerlache de Gomery. In January 1898, de Gerlache's ship, the Belgica, reached the Antarctic Peninsula and made 19 landings. It was rough going. A small

*Wilkes was court-martialed when he went home, charged by his officers with "oppression, injustice, administering illegal punishments, falsehood, and scandalous conduct." He was acquitted, but Congress denied him the funds to publish his account of the voyage.
party sent inland covered only one mile in seven days. The ship's surgeon, an American, Dr. Frederick Cook, reported: "On 1st of February we made another effort struggled a few hundred yards into the interior, but fog and wind and crevasses made frequent halts necessary. The sledges were difficult to drag, and altogether the work of traveling and the discomfort of camping were such that life was miserable in the extreme."

De Gerlache cruised leisurely along the coast—a bad mistake, for the brief Antarctic summer was drawing to a close. Soon, icebergs moved in, and the sea froze over, trapping the Belgica. Its 18 men drifted with the ice in their captive ship for 13 months. They suffered scurvy, depression, and what Cook called "polar anemia." When the sun disappeared during winter, two sailors went mad. (One recovered when daylight reappeared.) Dr. Cook wrote of life in the darkness: "The skin grows pale, muscles grow weak, and the organs are unable to function with their usual vigor. This effect is most noticeable in the action of the heart, which . . . is deprived of its regulating force, and becomes now quick, now slow, but never normal." Finally, the crew cut a channel through ice seven feet thick and reached the sea, then less than half a mile away.
In January 1912, Edgar Evans, Edward Wilson, L.E.G. Oates, and Robert Scott stand despondently beside the tent that Norway's Roald Amundsen had left behind to mark his arrival at the Pole more than a month earlier.

Another expedition faced even more extreme hardships. In February 1902, the Antarctic put Swedish scientist Otto Norden- skjold and four other men ashore at Snow Hill Island, off the Antarctic Peninsula, to carry out scientific work. Norden skjold’s men were astonished to find tiny wingless flies and mites living there—Antarctica’s only year-round indigenous inhabitants apart from fleas and lice. These insects live on rocks warmed by the sun and "hibernate" for all but a few months of the year. The explorers also found fossil remains of a pre-historic penguin that probably stood between five and six feet tall.

The Antarctic sailed further south, planning to return during the austral spring. But in December, on its return trip, the ship became icebound. Three men were dispatched to travel over the frozen sea to reach Nordenskjold and bring him to safety. They encountered a gulf of open water and had to turn back. But the Antarctic was gone.

The three men built a shelter on Paulet Island and prepared to wait out the long, dark Antarctic winter. For nine months, they huddled in a hut. Inside, the temperature hovered a few de-
degrees below zero, the "warmth" sustained only by burning seal blubber, which, along with penguins, was also their main food.

By September 1903, it was clear that the Antarctic was not going to return. The three men set out for Snow Hill Island, where Nordenskjold had last been seen. Although they were starving and at one point lost their tent to high winds, the trio took the time to collect rock specimens. By a lucky coincidence, they encountered Nordenskjold, who was on a field trip. At first, the scientist mistook the men for penguins as they approached. "I am asking myself to what primitive sub-species they belong, when one of them holds out his hand: 'You don't recognize us, do you!'" The travelers were completely blackened by blubber soot. A week later, they were all back at Snow Hill Island. On November 8, an Argentine rescue ship appeared offshore.

The Race to the Pole

The Antarctic, meanwhile, was at the bottom of the sea. It had been crushed by the ice, nine months before. The crew of 20 escaped and made a winter camp on the coast, subsisting, like the other scattered members of the expedition, on seals and penguins. Killing penguins was simple. With no natural land predators, the birds waddled up to a man out of sheer curiosity.

As the summer neared, the Antarctic crew set out for Snow Hill Island. Miraculously, they reached it on the evening of November 8, 1903, hours before the Argentinian ship was scheduled to leave with the other survivors.

Gaining scientific knowledge was but one spur to exploration during the heroic age. Above all stood the elusive, symbolic quest for the geographic South Pole, more than 800 miles inland across the highest, windiest, and coldest territory on the Earth.

The first major treks into the Antarctic interior occurred between 1901 and 1904. Robert Falcon Scott, a British Navy lieutenant with no previous experience in either polar region, had established a British Royal Geographical Society base at McMurdo Sound. Accompanying Scott was another young lieutenant, Ernest Shackleton. In November 1901, Scott, Shackleton, and Dr. Edward Wilson, a physician and painter, set out with dog sledges to cross the Ross Ice Shelf. It was a foolhardy escapade, for all three men were poor skiers and novices when it came to handling dogs. In 93 days, they made a 960-mile round trip, but they also lost their 19 huskies and nearly starved to death. Shackleton, disabled by scurvy, had to be taken back to base on a sledge hauled by his companions.

During that trip, Scott and his companions encountered
ANTARCTICA FIRSTS

First Landing (1821): Boat crew from New Haven (Conn.) sealer Cecilia goes ashore on Antarctic Peninsula.

First Fossil (1830): American geologist James Eights discovers 30-inch fragment of petrified wood lodged in iceberg.

First Death on Mainland (1899): Nikolai Hanson, a Norwegian taxidermist, dies of scurvy while wintering over with Carstens Borchgrevink’s party.


First Book Published (1908): Shackleton’s crew prints 90 copies of whimsical narrative, Aurora Australis, using wood from packing cases for covers.

First at South Magnetic Pole (1909): Australian T.W.E. David, age 51, leads three-man expedition 600 miles inland to magnetic pole.

First Plane Flight (1928): Australian Sir Hubert Wilkins flies single-engine monoplane Los Angeles along Antarctic Peninsula coastline.


many of the unique hardships that make Antarctic exploration so perilous—snow blindness, caused by the unrelieved glare off the ice; “sastrugi,” the rugged ridges of hard snow; and the deep, hidden crevasses that could abruptly swallow up a man and a whole team of huskies.

Some hazards they were spared. During a brief jaunt over the sea ice on a later expedition, a photographer named Herbert Ponting encountered a school of killer whales. Swimming at top speed, these aggressive predators crash through the sea ice from below, hoping to catch an unsuspecting penguin or seal. This is what happened to Ponting. The ice suddenly heaved beneath him, breaking into small chunks. “It was all I could do,” Ponting wrote, “to keep my feet as I leapt from piece to piece of the rocking ice, with the whales a few yards behind me, snorting and blowing among the ice blocks.” But he escaped.

Shackleton was the first to return to the continent expressly for an assault on the Pole. He advertised in a London newspa-
First Movie Shown (1929): Members of first Byrd expedition watch *Moana of the South Seas*, a 1925 Paramount romance.

First Woman on Continent (1935): Caroline Mikkelsen, wife of a Norwegian whaling captain, sets foot on coast near snow-free Vestfold Hills.

First Act of War (1941): German raider *Pinguin* captures Norwegian whaling fleet off Queen Maud Land.

First Visit by Head of State (1948): Chilean President Gabriel González Videla lands on the Antarctic Peninsula, establishes Bernardo O'Higgins Base.

First Overland Crossing (1958): British tractor expedition led by Sir Vivian Fuchs completes 99-day, 2,100-mile passage from Weddell to Ross Sea.

First Nuclear Reactor (1962): United States activates nuclear power plant at McMurdo Station; replaced in 1972 by diesel generator.

First Women at South Pole (1969): Six women—five scientists, one newspaper reporter—jump hand-in-hand from ramp of transport plane at South Pole.

First Child Born (1978): Emilio Marcos Palma, son of Argentine Army captain, born at Esperanza Station on the Antarctic Peninsula.


per: “MEN WANTED for Hazardous Journey. Small wages, bitter cold, long months of complete darkness, constant danger, safe return doubtful.” The response was overwhelming. As Shackleton wrote later, “It seemed as though all the men in Great Britain were determined to accompany me.” In January 1909, Shackleton and three companions came within 97 miles of their goal but were forced to turn back for lack of food.

Late in 1910, three expeditions ventured to Antarctica in search of the South Pole. The first, commanded by Lieutenant Choku Shirase of the Japanese Navy, turned back because of bad weather. Scott, now a captain, left a post at the Admiralty to head up a British effort. The third was led by the Norwegian Roald Amundsen; a veteran of the *Belgica* journey and of numerous expeditions in the north polar regions. Amundsen had actually hoped to reach the North Pole, but when Admiral Robert Peary of the United States got there first, in 1909, he secretly decided to try the remaining alternative. Amundsen feinted north,
then turned around in mid-sea. "Beg leave to inform you proceeding Antarctica," he cabled Scott. The race was on.

Amundsen was a big, bluff, plain-spoken fellow with a driving desire to be first. Scott was a stiff, old-school naval officer—he maintained separate officers' quarters even at his cramped base camp—but also a complex, sensitive man. One reason he disliked using dogs in polar exploration was that the weaker ones often had to be killed to feed the stronger. Scott settled on Siberian ponies (which, unfortunately, quickly died) and man-hauled sledges for his trek to the Pole. Amundsen, who had far more experience in polar travel, used huskies—the preferred means of transport. Scott also intended to carry out an extensive program of scientific research. "Science is the rock foundation of all effort," he once said. Amundsen, by contrast, had a single mission: to get to the Pole before anyone else.

An Awful Place

Both teams established their bases near the Ross Ice Shelf late in 1910. Amundsen gambled on a site upon the ice shelf itself, near the Bay of Whales. It was 60 miles closer to the Pole than Scott's base on Ross Island. On October 20, 1911, in the Antarctic spring, Amundsen set out with four men, four sledges, and 52 dogs. Scott left four days later, accompanied by seven men, three of whom would turn back after establishing food depots for Scott's return trip (a task Amundsen's men had accomplished the year before).

Amundsen's account of his trip is almost light-hearted. The men rode on the dog sledges for the first 100 miles and were pulled along on skis for many of the next 300. They encountered the usual difficulties, but these Amundsen brushed aside. His chief complaint was frostbite: "The left sides of our faces was one mass of sore, bathed in matter and serum. We looked like the worst type of tramps and ruffians."

On December 14, 1911, they reached the South Pole. Five pairs of hands grasped a flagpole with the Norwegian colors and drove it into the ice to mark the spot. Amundsen and his party stayed there for two days, taking bearings to make certain they were at the right place. By January 25, they were back at the Bay of Whales. "The going was splendid," Amundsen recalled. "We were in high spirits and bowled along at a cracking pace."

Eight days before, after an exhausting, 86-day march, Scott himself had reached the Pole. He was not so ebullient. "Great God! this is an awful place," he wrote the next day, "and terrible enough for us to have laboured to it without the reward of prior-
ity." For there to greet his team stood the small black tent and Norwegian flag that Amundsen had left behind. "Now for the run home and a desperate struggle," Scott added. "I wonder if we can do it."

They could not. The piercing wind, the unrelenting cold, and the terrible labor of pulling the heavy sledges over sastrugi and through patches of deep, soft snow began to take their toll. Because Scott and his men traveled slowly, sometimes covering only three or four miles in a day, they had to ration their food. Though aware of their peril, they spent the better part of one day "geologising," as Scott put it.

Edgar Evans died first, on February 17, probably the result of a concussion sustained when he fell into a crevasse. Captain L.E.G. Oates was next. Frostbite had blackened his feet, and he could walk only with great pain. On March 16 or 17 (the party had lost track of dates), Scott wrote: "He slept through the night before last, hoping not to wake; but he woke in the morning—yesterday. It was blowing a blizzard. He said, 'I am just going outside and may be some time.' He went out into the blizzard and we have not seen him since." The next day, Scott discovered that his own foot was frostbitten. "These are the steps of my downfall," he wrote.

**Antarctica’s ‘Mayor’**

On the 21st, Scott and his two remaining men were trapped by a blizzard only 11 miles from a supply depot and forced to stay put. About a week later, still stranded, Scott wrote simply, "Last entry. For God’s sake look after our people." Their bodies were found less than eight months later.

One more journey would be made before World War I closed the book on the heroic age. In 1914, Ernest Shackleton returned to Antarctica intending to cross the continent. But his ship, the *Endurance*, became icebound in the Weddell Sea and drifted for 10 months in the floe’s embrace before it was finally crushed. For another five months, the entire crew drifted on the sea ice, at last escaping by lifeboat to barren Elephant Island. From there, Shackleton and five of his men made a daring voyage in a small open boat to the whaling station at South Georgia Island, 800 miles away. They arrived in May 1916, almost a year and a half after the *Endurance* was first trapped. All of the men on Elephant Island were saved.

Antarctic exploration did not resume until 1928. Now it was the Americans who led the charge, not the British and Norwegians. The Americans brought new equipment with them—air-
planes, tractors, and radios—that would dramatically change the character of Antarctic exploration.

The most colorful figure of the period was Admiral Richard E. Byrd, the first man (along with Floyd Bennett) to fly over the North Pole. He arrived in Antarctica in 1928 with the intention of flying over the South Pole as well, making sure to erect three 70-foot radio towers from which he could broadcast news of his exploits directly to the rest of the world. (When another party visited Byrd's "Little America" base near the Bay of Whales 30 years later, they found the towers almost completely buried in snow; all that remained were three steel-girder "nunatuks" barely taller than a man).

Byrd and three others flew across the Pole on November 29, 1929, and Byrd made several other flights, traversing broad expanses of previously uncharted territory. In his 19-hour flight to the Pole and back, he saw more territory than Scott and Amundsen covered in their months-long journeys. He discovered and laid claim to Marie Byrd Land (named after his wife) and mapped 450,000 square miles of the continent using aerial photography. "I am mayor of this place," Byrd proclaimed, "until the government gets around to owning it." But the State Department never pressed the territorial claims that he made. Altogether, Byrd mounted four expeditions to Antarctica before the outbreak of World War II.

Exploration ceased in 1941, after America was drawn into the Second World War. But the accomplishments of Byrd and the small group of other prewar explorers paved the way for a new era of Antarctic inquiry. They had mapped large areas of the interior, reducing the unknowns that man would have to face. They had also established the basics of contemporary polar technology. Never again would men be forced to haul sledges across vast distances or huddle, shivering, through the long Antarctic winter.

If this was gained, perhaps something was lost as well, for the ordeals they faced forged the heroism of men like Shackleton and Cook during the first 150 years of Antarctic exploration. Yet they had set the stage for another monumental effort beginning in the years after 1945, when men would flock to the continent in the name of science. These later years would also bring a growing knowledge of the continent's hidden riches, far different from those imagined in earlier ages. For the first time, thorny questions about who would own and govern this remote land would have to be faced.
"The world is small and rapidly getting smaller," Admiral Richard E. Byrd wrote in 1935, but "the Antarctic has shrunk least of all." His observation still holds true, even though the world, driven by science and by economic and political imperatives, is steadily moving in on the continent.

Today, scientists are extracting new information from Antarctica about our planet—its past, its climate, and its inhabitants—and about the universe itself. While they have not found rubies and diamonds, today's explorers are uncovering other kinds of wealth: Coal, copper, iron ore, and uranium all exist on the continent, in quantities not yet fully known. There is also reason to believe that Antarctica's continental shelf may contain sizable reserves of oil and natural gas, perhaps matching those of Iran. And fishing fleets have already begun harvesting krill, the shrimp-like creatures, high in protein, that flourish in Antarctic waters. For the 14 nations with direct interests in the continent, the payoff may not be far away.

Politically, Antarctica was sliced up like a pie before the end of World War II, with wedge-shaped national claims radiating from the South Pole to the coast. Britain pressed the first claim, in 1908, on the basis of its early exploration of the continent. Later, it ceded territory on the continent to New Zealand and Australia, and France staked a claim in 1939. Anxious to forestall a "land grab" by Nazi Germany, Norway advanced a claim in 1939, citing the expeditions of Roald Amundsen and others. Chile and Argentina staked claims on the easily accessible Antarctic Peninsula in 1940 and 1943 respectively, both tracing their historical rights to a Papal Bull of 1493 and to the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, which granted all lands west of the 46th meridian to Spain. (These two claims, and Britain's, overlap.)

The Germans never did get a slice of the continent, although Nazi Reichsmarshal Hermann Goering in 1938 dispatched the catapult ship Schwabenland to the Queen Maud Land region of Antarctica for the specific purpose of claiming territory for Hitler's Germany. Seaplanes launched from the ship's deck mapped 350,000 square miles of the continent by air, dropping steel markers stamped with swastikas to establish the claim. After World War II, however, both East and West Germany de-
decided not to press the matter, apparently to avoid the appearance of renewed German expansionism.

Antarctica played only a minor role in the war. Beginning in 1940, Nazi cruisers operating from Antarctic waters attacked allied cargo vessels rounding the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn, sank the Australian cruiser *Sydney*, and mined the Australian harbors of Sydney, Melbourne, Hobart, and Adelaide. Britain responded by sending warships south to search for the German raiders, but they eluded detection. In 1944, London launched Operation Tabarin, establishing a base at Deception Island to deny use of its natural harbor to the Third Reich.

**A Giant Aircraft Carrier?**

The war highlighted one conflict on the continent that did not simmer down after V-E Day. During the war, British and Argentinian shore parties ripped up each others' flags and destroyed claim markers where the "territories" of the two countries overlapped on the Antarctic Peninsula. In 1952, an Argentine naval unit fired machine guns over the heads of a British party coming ashore in a disputed sector. The Argentines later apologized for the incident, explaining that the gunfire was merely a friendly greeting. A year later, the British arrested two Argentine nationals for "trespassing" on Deception Island.

Argentina, like neighboring Chile, has always considered the defense of its beachhead on the nearby continent a matter of national honor. Leaders of both countries have consistently denied the validity of claims based on discovery alone, insisting that "effective occupation" is required. To that end, in 1973, the President of Argentina took his entire Cabinet to Vicecommodoro Marambio station, on an island off the peninsula's coast, and declared it the provisional capital of his country. (It is the law of the land in both nations that all locally published maps depict Antarctic territory as part of the mother country.)

For all the postwar difficulties regarding claims and boundaries, potentially the most troublesome rivalry over Antarctica arose between two countries with no formal claims: the Soviet

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Union and the United States. Nazi Germany's marauding warships had proved that Antarctic waters could serve as a useful military base. In a war between the two superpowers, some Americans feared the Soviet Union might use the continent as a kind of giant, immobile aircraft carrier or, worse, as a base for intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Hammer and Icicle

In 1946, the United States sent 4,000 men and 13 ships south in Operation Highjump, the largest exploratory expedition ever assembled. During Highjump, the Navy mapped many small sections of the coastline, with the secret objective of establishing the basis for a U.S. claim "over the largest practicable area of the Antarctic continent." The expedition also served as an opportunity to train soldiers and try out equipment for use in polar regions. But a plan to test submarines in the Antarctic failed when the diesel submarine Sennet, running on the surface, was battered by pack ice and had to be towed out by an icebreaker. Since then, Antarctica has not figured prominently in the Pentagon's view of the world.

The Soviets, for their part, established a stake in Antarctic affairs by asserting in 1949 that the Russian admiral Thaddeus von Bellingshausen had been the first to sight the continent in 1820. The hammer and sickle flew over Antarctica in 1956, with the establishment of a Soviet base in the Australian sector. The Soviet presence has continued to expand, but there is no evidence that the Soviets see any more military significance in Antarctica than America does.

The 1957-58 International Geophysical Year (IGY) was a turning point for the continent. During the IGY, scientists around the world carefully coordinated their experiments and observations in many fields—climatology, meteorology, and cosmic ray research—in order to further their knowledge of global phenomena. The effort brought scientists and military support units from 12 nations to Antarctica, where they worked together without friction.

The chief lesson of the IGY seemed to be that international scientific cooperation could work, at least in Antarctica. In 1959, at the urging of the United States, representatives from the 12 countries active on the continent put together an Antarctic Treaty and signed it in Washington.* The treaty is a remarkable

*The original signatories included the seven claimant countries (Argentina, Australia, Britain, Chile, France, New Zealand, and Norway) and five others (Belgium, Japan, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United States).
The map above shows the location of stations staffed year-round by an average of 30 or more people. In all, there are 45 bases on the Antarctic mainland or nearby islands, distributed among 12 nations: Argentina (10), the Soviet Union (nine), the United States (six), Britain (five), Australia and Chile (three each), Japan, New Zealand, and Poland (two each), and France, South Africa, and West Germany (one each). Pinched financially, Norway and Belgium closed their last bases in 1959 and 1961, respectively, but retain full standing as signatories of the Antarctic Treaty. Norway has purposely left the northern and southern limits of its claim undefined; legal recognition of the "sectoral" principle could endanger its claims in the Arctic. In the unclaimed sector, where the United States has the strongest legal case for title, the United States and Soviet Union each maintain a tiny base. The Soviets have no formal claim anywhere on the continent.
agreement. It freezes the legal status quo in Antarctica, theoretically suspending the struggle over claims at least until the pact becomes subject to review in 1991. (The treaty will be reviewed only if one of the signatories requests it.) Until then, the continent is supposed to remain a kind of open-air laboratory, with free access to the whole continent guaranteed to any nation that cares to send an expedition there. Local testing of nuclear weapons and the disposal of nuclear wastes are banned, and each treaty nation has the right to inspect the others’ facilities. No military activities are allowed, although military personnel and equipment can be used “for scientific research or other peaceful purposes.”

There is no secretariat and no headquarters. Representatives from each signatory country simply meet every two years in a different capital to discuss plans and coordinate activities. (The most recent treaty meeting was held in Buenos Aires in June 1981.) The treaty provides that any intractable dispute be referred to the International Court of Justice at the Hague (with the consent of all concerned), but that has never been necessary.

**Antarctica on $400 a Day**

The Antarctic Treaty has made the continent the province of scientists, who conduct research there in such fields as glaciology, paleontology, ornithology, and even human psychology. Approximately 900 people spent the 1980 austral winter on the continent; during the summer of 1980–81, the population rose to more than 2,000.

The accommodations have improved since the days of Scott and Amundsen. At McMurdo Station, the main American base, managed by the Navy, the summer residents can avail themselves of four saloons, a chapel, a Jacuzzi bath in the fire station, fresh kiwi fruit from New Zealand, and piña colada–flavored frozen yogurt. Windows sometimes have to be kept open in the dormitories—the rooms are heated to 85 degrees. The Annual Scott’s Hut Race, a five-mile run over ice, draws many local joggers.

Antarctica even has a small tourist industry, the only commercial activity on the mainland. Two airlines began flying sightseeing tours over the mainland from New Zealand and Australia in 1976, but these tours were suspended in 1979 after an Air New Zealand DC-10 crashed into Mount Erebus. All of the 257 people aboard were killed instantly. Today, only the Australian airline offers the tours. Cruise ships have visited the continent regularly since 1966, bringing some 900 tourists to the far
south each year. A five-week tour can cost up to $14,000. The ships visit research stations, penguin rookeries, and abandoned whaling bases.

Antarctica is no playground, however. Each of the 45 stations is a hub of research activity. About one-quarter of McMurdo's summertime population are scientists; the rest are Navy and civilian staff who provide support services.

Nature's "Anti-Freeze"

Hardly touched by man, Antarctica is remote from factories and their by-products, providing an ideal location for monitoring global trends in pollution. Scientists based in Antarctica track pollutants in the upper atmosphere and measure their accumulation as they fall on the continent's ice. Antarctica's purity serves other purposes. Last winter, a microbiologist from the University of Wisconsin used McMurdo's isolated population to test iodine-soaked "killer Kleenexes" as a cure for the common cold. (Due to their isolation, those who winter-over seldom catch colds or other common illnesses until new people arrive in the spring. Then everyone gets sick.)

Scientists studying the formation of the solar system are taking advantage of one of the continent's most plentiful resources—meteorites. In Antarctica, one can find meteorites that fell to the ice a million years ago and, thanks to the cold, remain uncontaminated. The shifting ice sheet has clustered them together in just a few locations—making Antarctica this planet's biggest known depository of other-worldly refuse. A dozen years ago, only 2,000 meteorites had been found anywhere in the world. But, since the Japanese first discovered meteorites in the Antarctic in 1969, over 5,000 samples have been collected there. In some of these specimens, scientists have discovered amino acids, leading to the conclusion that these chemicals, which are essential building blocks of life, must exist on other planets.

Researchers have also been trying to pin down precisely how Antarctica's few plant and animal species adapt to their harsh environment. For example, it appears that Antarctic fish contain glycoproteins that prevent their blood from freezing. The proteins seem to bind to the minute ice crystals that form in the blood of the fish, somehow melting them before they grow large enough to do damage. These "anti-freeze" proteins may have a number of practical applications. Transplant organs, sperm, and blood, for example, could be stored for far longer periods of time than is now possible if they could be kept at very low temperatures without freezing. A patient with failing kidneys would
not have to wait for a donor to die if doctors could build up a supply of these organs.

Other scientists, working in Antarctica's "dry valleys," have discovered a completely unique form of life. Free of snow and ice, the dry valleys lie between snow-covered mountains in a few scattered locations, inland from the Ross Sea. They were probably created when the surrounding glaciers receded and have been kept clear by the winds roaring off the polar plateau. They are as dry as a desert, and their rocky brown soil seems entirely barren and forbidding.

In one of these valleys, however, near the Ross Sea, there is a frozen lake fed by the occasional summer run-off from nearby glaciers. Two American scientists burned a hole through the permanent 15-foot-thick ice covering it and dove into what one of them called "a window on the past." In the middle of the lake, 120 feet below the surface, there is no gaseous oxygen in the water; the scientists found algae that seemed to be thriving on hydrogen sulfide instead of the oxygen that is essential to most other forms of life. The lake's blue-green algae are extremely
primitive. They were among the first forms of life to appear on the planet and thrive in Antarctica virtually unchanged.

Antarctica's ice has provided a record of past climatic conditions. Two U.S. scientists recently put forward the controversial theory that the volume of nitrates preserved each year in the accumulating ice sheet provides a record of the sun's annual energy output. These scientists maintain that they can detect the impact of the Little Ice Age, between 1645 and 1715, when solar energy levels were lower and average temperatures declined by about 2°F.

Because the polar plateau is so high (it is a mile above sea level, on the average), and because ice is such a poor conductor, Antarctica serves as a perfect radio "tower." At one U.S. station in the interior, scientists strung a 13.6-mile-long cable on 15-foot poles to make an antenna for very low-frequency, long-distance radio experiments. Anywhere else in the world, it would have cost hundreds of millions of dollars to build towers that high above sea level. The Antarctic antenna cost only $75,000.

Inevitably, man's extensive scientific investigation of Antarctica has also produced a growing inventory of the continent's natural resources. Ever since 1909, when Ernest Shackleton found a coal seam near the Beardmore Glacier, geologists have been aware that the continent is more than just ice and worthless rock. But Antarctica's remoteness and hostile climate make exploitation a difficult business.

**Looking for Oil**

Today, with the widening search for scarce resources, development is increasingly attractive. Indeed, a good deal of the scientific work being done in Antarctica today overlaps with simple resource exploration. It was "pure" science that provided some of the first indications of Antarctica's potential wealth. If the Gondwana hypothesis (the theory that some 250 million years ago, Antarctica, South America, Australia, Africa, and India were all joined together in a "supercontinent") is correct, land that was once contiguous should have similar geologic characteristics. If certain minerals are common in, say, the Andes, then there is reason to believe that they will also be found in the Antarctic Peninsula.

Oil drilling or exploration is already under way off the coasts of New Zealand, Australia, and Argentina. Not surprisingly, researchers have detected thick layers of sedimentary rock beneath the ocean floor of Antarctica's continental shelf—suggesting the presence of oil and gas. In 1972 and 1973, the U.S.
research ship *Glomar Challenger*, plying the Ross Sea, discovered methane, ethane, and ethylene, even stronger indicators. (The ship avoided drilling in the most likely locations of oil deposits, for fear of creating a blowout, which it was not equipped to control.)

No one has actually pumped a drop of oil in Antarctica—or even proved that it is there—but the evidence of petroleum deposits is overwhelming. A U.S. government report prepared for the 1976 meeting of the Antarctic Treaty nations in Paris stated that "it appears that the Antarctic continental shelf could contain potentially recoverable oil in the order of magnitude of tens of billions of barrels." In 1979, a Gulf Oil spokesman estimated that the Ross and Weddell Sea reserves alone would come to 50 billion barrels. But there is probably oil beneath the Bellingshausen Sea as well.

**A Last Resort**

Over the past 12 years, a number of U.S. oil companies have made tentative inquiries at the State Department about obtaining licenses for exploratory work. The governments of Norway, Japan, and West Germany have funded offshore seismic surveys—a good example of mixed scientific research and resource exploration.

But oil and gas exploration is proceeding slowly, in part because a big strike would raise a vexing question: Who owns the deposit? Moreover, there would be environmental problems. In the event of a spill, oil would decompose very slowly in the severe cold and might damage the coastal seal and penguin rookeries and the offshore fisheries.* The environment also poses other obstacles: The great depth of Antarctica's continental shelf, the brief summer, and the difficulty of drilling through the constantly shifting ice that covers the seas would all have to be overcome. Yet no one believed that the oil companies would be able to drill successfully in the Arctic, either.

Antarctica contains the world's largest coal field and "enough iron ore to supply the planet's needs for 200 years. But both coal and iron are still available in great quantities elsewhere in the world, where they are more accessible and cheaper to mine. Antarctica's coal is located mainly in the forbidding Transantarctic Mountain range, and no one is likely to consider exploiting it until coal prices climb a great deal higher.

*Such concerns led the treaty powers to conclude a very loose "gentlemen's agreement" at their 1977 London meeting. It provides that they will delay industrial exploration or exploitation so long as negotiations on a minerals treaty, scheduled to begin next year, are "making progress."
TO THE SOUTH POLE STATION

The longest day at the U.S. South Pole Station lasts from September 22, when the sun rises after the dark austral winter, to March 22, when the sun sets once again. This is Antarctica’s summer, and the station’s population swells to 70 scientists and staff. Around New Year’s Day, the temperature peaks at about -18°F. But by mid-February, the weather begins to deteriorate and the last plane leaves for McMurdo Sound, 800 miles away. For the next eight months, the South Pole Station’s skeleton crew of 17 will be alone, under the auspices of the National Science Foundation, continuing experiments in astronomy, meteorology, and glaciology initiated 24 years ago during the International Geophysical Year.

Americans who winter over at the Pole inhabit three buildings of modest size protected by a 52-foot-high geodesic dome. The complex, only 155 yards from the Pole, was completed in 1975, replacing a collection of steel and wooden huts that had fallen victim to 40 feet of drifted snow. (The new dome will be covered over before 1990.) Living quarters are cramped, but there is wall-to-wall carpeting, central heating, and modern plumbing. The mess-hall diet is varied: lobster Newburg, steak, cherry cheesecake—a far cry from the hard biscuits and pemmican (dried beef bars) that sustained Robert Falcon Scott.

This peculiar environment leaves its mark. Average body temperature drops to 96.6°F, and most people, for unknown reasons, are deprived of deep “slow wave” sleep. Work that takes an hour in summer may consume five hours in winter. Tedium is the main enemy; odd rituals, the main weapon against it. Thus, a tape of the Super Bowl, kept since January, is screened on Midwinter Day, June 22. In August, when the mercury first dips below -100°F, tradition requires the winter staff to sprint naked from the station sauna to the barber pole that marks the bottom of the world. (Actually, the red-and-white striped pole is some 55 yards off the mark, but by 1986 the moving ice will have positioned it precisely above the geographic South Pole.)

Despite such diversions, the isolation, monotony, and close company are exacting, and few researchers seek to prolong their tour of duty. Billiards, ping-pong, and reading pall after eight months. Insomnia, the “big eye,” is common. (In the mid-1960s, one winter scientist grew irrational and violent and was temporarily confined in an improvised brig.) Small comfort that one can theoretically nudge time along by walking around the pole and crossing the International Dateline, thereby advancing Thursday, say, to Friday.

In early November, the first aircraft of the season flies in from McMurdo Sound with fresh faces from the outside world, and the cycle begins again.
Many other minerals have been found, but none (so far) in quantities large enough to spur commercial development. On the Antarctic Peninsula, there are small quantities of chromium, nickel, cobalt, copper, gold, silver, manganese, and molybdenum. Elsewhere, explorers have found titanium, platinum, lead, zinc, tin, and uranium.

The most likely site for any mineral extraction on land is the relatively hospitable peninsula, but unless a large, accessible deposit of an extremely valuable mineral is discovered, mining even there will remain too costly for a long time to come.

**Palate vs. Protein**

One Antarctic resource that is already being exploited is the krill, a three-inch crustacean resembling a prawn that abounds off the coast and lives nowhere else in the world. (Krill is a Norwegian word that means "small fish.") Antarctica, the world's most barren continent, is surrounded by what are among the world's richest seas. About 450 miles off the tip of the Antarctic Peninsula, the frigid polar waters collide with the warmer oceans, producing a strong upwelling that lifts great quantities of mineral nutrients from the ocean bottom. This Antarctic Convergence, as it is called, forms an irregularly shaped, constantly shifting ring around the continent.

The convergence is an ideal habitat for phytoplankton, and the tiny plant-like organisms turn the seas a muddy brown. When frozen into the sea ice, they produce extraordinary hues of blue and green. Krill feed on phytoplankton, and in turn serve as the main food source for the whales, seals, and birds that range about in these waters.

Until the 1960s, krill was left strictly to these gourmands. But the decline of other fisheries and the extension of coastal limits (Exclusive Economic Zones) to 200 miles encouraged countries with large fishing fleets to take a closer look at Antarctic krill. By the late '70s, the Soviet Union, Japan, Poland, Chile, West Germany, Taiwan, South Korea, and East Germany had all fished for krill in the southern ocean.

The total annual catch was probably less than 200,000 metric tons until 1979. But last winter, a West German research ship spotted a Soviet fishing fleet of about 50 vessels, including factory ships, near Elephant Island. West German scientists estimate that the Soviets alone netted 360,000 tons of krill during the 1980–81 Antarctic fishing season.

Krill are easy prey. They congregate near the surface in dense swarms up to half a mile across. (The Soviet fishing ves-
sels off Elephant Island reportedly encountered one exceptional swarm of 10 million metric tons covering several square miles.) How much krill could we harvest? Some older estimates put the possible total as high as 110 to 115 million tons each year. That would triple the world’s total annual fish catch. A group of U.S. scientists has estimated that between 1 and 2.5 million tons of krill could be caught each year without damaging the convergence ecosystem. That would still place krill among the world’s top 10 fish catches.

Information about krill is sketchy. Scientists are not sure how much of it is needed to ensure the survival of its predators. Because the whales, seals, and birds have no other major source of food, overfishing of krill could cause widespread starvation. A blue whale alone consumes up to five tons of krill a day.

Another problem is getting people to eat krill. It tastes something like crab and contains as much protein (15 percent by weight) as steak or lobster. It could be an extremely valuable food, but no one has figured out quite how to market it. The Japanese have been fairly successful, probably because small, whole shrimp are already a major part of their diet.

The “Iceberg Prince”

Processing presents obstacles, as well. Krill must be cooked or frozen on factory ships as soon as it is caught, for it decomposes rapidly. Because its digestive enzymes have adapted to the frigid Antarctic waters and continue to work when frozen at normal temperatures, krill is very difficult to freeze effectively.

Most of the krill-fishing nations have used it to make fish meal as feed for cattle and poultry. There have also been a number of innovative experiments. The Chileans have dipped frozen krill bars in batter, selling them as “krill fingers.” The Soviets have pioneered the development of krill paste, which they use as an additive in sausages, cheese, and soup. They have even brewed a krill beer. However, none of these products has been a big seller.*

Antarctica’s most abundant resource is also the one most often overlooked—its ice. The Antarctic ice sheet contains about 70 percent of the fresh water supply in the world. If it all melted, the oceans would rise by between 150 and 300 feet, submerging cities such as New York up to their penthouses.

In 1977, Prince Muhammad al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia, the “Iceberg Prince,” hired the French engineering consortium

* It is worth remembering that when Albert P. Halfhill first canned albacore tuna in San Pedro, California, in 1903, local fishermen declared, “That ain’t eatin’ fish.”
Cicero to study the feasibility of bringing Antarctic ice to Jidda. Cicero concluded that it would be possible to cut up an 85-million-ton tabular iceberg like a loaf of bread, cover the “slices” to protect them from the sun and erosion by the sea, and tow them to Saudi Arabia for conversion to drinking water. It would be cheaper than the desalinated sea water the Saudis rely on, the French predicted. This ambitious plan came to nothing when the French company went bankrupt, but the idea is still alive. Today, New Zealand, Australia, and Britain are all looking into the possibility of towing icebergs to arid lands.

Yours, Mine, or Ours?

Because of the potential wealth and political prestige that a stake in Antarctica might bring, many governments are beginning to give the continent more of their attention. In a 1975 speech to the General Assembly, the president of the UN Law of the Sea Conference, Shirley Amerasinghe, argued that the principle of “equitable sharing of the world’s resources” should somehow be applied to Antarctica. The idea has not gained much public support so far, largely because Third World governments have more pressing issues to confront. Privately, however, many Third World officials regard Antarctica as the undeserved exclusive preserve of a rich nations’ “club.”

The parties to the Antarctic Treaty, for their part, have worked out several agreements to demonstrate that the continent is under responsible management. In 1972, they drew up a treaty on the conservation of Antarctic seals, followed in 1980 by a treaty regulating the harvesting of krill.* Their next goal is to establish a set of rules governing the development of Antarctic oil and minerals.

The twelve treaty countries have kept a firm grip on Antarctic affairs. To join their ranks, a nation must demonstrate interest in Antarctica by conducting “substantial scientific research activity” on the continent, which in effect means they must establish a scientific research station. Since 1961, when the treaty became effective, only two countries (Poland and West Germany) have joined the club. West Germany spent $100 million to build its station.

The possibility of hidden wealth in Antarctica has aroused some dissension even among parties to the Antarctic Treaty. New Zealand, once the leading “internationalist” party to the accord (during the 1950s, Wellington offered to abandon its ter-

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*The agreement on krill sets no quotas but contains an innovative provision prohibiting krill fishing that would damage the other convergence species that rely on it for food.
ritorial pretensions if the others would follow suit), has become much more interested in protecting its claim now that it is thought to include rich offshore oil deposits. Australia has become almost as intransigently "territorialist" as Chile and Argentina.

The United States has stuck to the position articulated by Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes in 1924. Hughes, sounding much like the leaders of Argentina and Chile, declared that sovereignty over a claim is not ensured "unless the discovery is followed by an actual settlement of the discovered country." The United States has never made an official claim although Admiral Byrd and other veteran explorers and their allies tried to rally public support for such a move. The United States refuses to recognize other claims and reserves the right to advance its own if the Antarctic Treaty should lapse. On the basis of claims made by American explorers (particularly Byrd) but never formally pressed by the State Department, the United States could annex large chunks of the continent.

One reason the United States chose not to make a formal claim was that the sector where the legal foundation is strongest, Marie Byrd Land, seemed to lack promise, and its icebound coast was impenetrable to ships. (American icebreakers did not make it through the pack until 1960.) Today, geologists think Marie Byrd Land's continental shelf may prove to be among the most promising oil and gas sites. Marie Byrd Land remains the continent's only unclaimed sector.

Settling for Utopia

Another reason why Washington held back was that the State Department believed the United States had more to gain by demonstrating an interest in the entire continent. As State Department spokesman Herman Phleger testified during the Senate's hearings on the treaty's ratification in 1960, "If we were to make a claim right now, we might be confined to an area of 20 percent [of the continent]. . . . We would have to give up, certainly, the claim which we have maintained to date, that we have a right in all of Antarctica." Today, the State Department insists that all new agreements on Antarctic resources must provide for free international access to the entire continent.

The United States protects its interests by maintaining a considerable presence on the continent. The base at McMurdo Sound is the largest on the continent and, until recently, had Antarctica's only airstrip. The United States spent $63 million on Antarctic programs in 1981, up slightly from the previous
year. But most of the budget is consumed by the cost of providing support services, particularly air travel, which is increasingly expensive due to the rising price of fuel. Only about $10 million of the Antarctic budget goes directly to research.

The Soviets do not publish their budget for Antarctic research, but the USSR maintains nine bases, and more than 250 Soviets winter over every year, by far the largest contingent from any nation.

The Soviet Union has one of the most extensive onshore geologic research programs in Antarctica and initially seemed very interested in offshore oil and gas, too. Publicly, however, the Kremlin has supported the idea of an indefinite moratorium on the "industrial" exploration and exploitation of minerals on the grounds that such activities could be environmentally harmful.

Sending scientists to Antarctica serves various nonscientific purposes: bolstering the treaty; defending territorial claims; supporting the grounds for free access. As Edward Todd, director of the National Science Foundation's Division of Polar Programs, said during a 1979 visit to the continent: "What we have here is a mutually beneficial symbiosis between science objectives and foreign-policy objectives. If the Antarctic Treaty ceases to be effective, our research program gives us an excuse to be here. In a free-for-all, our presence is well established."

Political considerations also affect the location of research stations on the continent. The U.S. South Pole station serves no
indispensable scientific function, but it does give the United States a foot in each sector of Antarctica, claimed or unclaimed. Deprived of the convenient South Pole site, the Soviets achieved a similar end by building a chain of stations along the continent's periphery in almost every sector.

Men have been trying to conquer Antarctica since the 1820s. First, they sent down explorers, now they send down scientists. Yet Antarctica remains untamed and beyond national jurisdictions. The Antarctic Treaty has proved to be a workable interim measure that sets some precedents worth preserving.

In some ways, indeed, the treaty is a utopian model. It includes the most comprehensive disarmament agreement in the world and is the only one to provide explicitly for on-site inspection. The treaty has fostered a remarkable degree of East-West cooperation: The exchange of research findings and scientists in Antarctica and the establishment of joint programs have no parallel elsewhere. A glance at the other end of the globe shows what Antarctica could be like. Arctic research is completely uncoordinated, and the exploration and exploitation of resources is going ahead with no international cooperation at all. Nor are there any limits on military activities in the Arctic.

But the success of the current treaty as a short-term solution is due precisely to its authors' failure to address the fundamental questions: Who owns Antarctica? How will Antarctica's krill, oil, gas, and minerals be exploited? Who will reap the benefits? How will the continent's environment be protected? These questions will have to be tackled before 1991, when the treaty will probably come up for review. By then, Third World governments will probably be demanding a role in the governance of the continent, and the parties to the Antarctic Treaty will have to consider that matter, too.

Conceivably, the 14 treaty powers could choose to maintain the status quo. But the stakes may be too high by 1991 to permit the perpetuation of a fuzzy legal regime. In that event, the alternatives would be either a free-for-all or the forging of an effective international agreement. There are many precedents for the former. Is it too much to hope that the latter might itself become a precedent?
BACKGROUND BOOKS

ANTARCTICA

The geologists and paleontologists and ornithologists who followed the early Antarctic explorers unlocked some of the continent’s secrets. But many things about the Earth’s fifth-largest land mass—its political future, its distant past—remain a mystery.

In other ways, too, it is sometimes difficult to get a fix on the continent. In Antarctica (Mayflower, 1979), lavish color photographs by Peter Johnson and a spare text by Creina Bond and Roy Siegfried help to establish a sense of place, even if that place is always shifting. Place a wooden stake at the South Pole, the writers observe, and it will stay there for a moment only: “Tomorrow the ice will have crept [several] centimeters.”

Man got to know Antarctica slowly. One of the best accounts of the early voyages of exploration is Quest for a Continent (McGraw-Hill, 1957) by New York Times science editor Walter Sullivan. Antarctica repeatedly failed to live up to expectations. In 1820, Sullivan writes, an optimistic British Admiralty sent Lieutenant Edward Bransfield to search for land in the far south, directing him to “observe the character, habits, dresses, and customs of the inhabitants, to whom you will display every friendly disposition.”

The only natives Bransfield met, however, were the seals, penguins, and skua gulls of the continent’s enveloping ice pack.

For later visitors, the Antarctic held a fascination of its own. British physician Edward Wilson believed that the emperor penguin might be the missing evolutionary link between birds and reptiles and sought an emperor embryo to make his case. In 1910, Wilson set out from McMurdo Sound for a remote penguin rookery. One of his two companions, Apsley Cherry-Garrard, remembered the trip as The Worst Journey in the World (Constable, 1922; Chatto & Windus, 1965).

The problem: Emperor penguins breed only during winter, in almost total darkness and in temperatures far below zero. (They shelter and warm their eggs beneath their bellies while standing virtually motionless for a period of two months.) The three explorers barely survived the 36-day trek. Their sweat formed a thin layer of ice upon the skin, and their clothes froze if they stayed in any position for too long. But they got their eggs.

Such experiences were not unique. The literature of Antarctic exploration is harrowing. Two fine first-person accounts are Frederick A. Cook’s Through the First Antarctic Night 1898–1899 (Doubleday, 1909; McGill-Queens, 1980) and Edward Wilson’s Diary of the Discovery Expedition to the Antarctic Regions, 1901–1904 (Humanities, 1967).

Wilson perished with Captain Robert Falcon Scott in 1912 on the return trip from the South Pole. That fatal journey is described most vividly by Scott himself in his journal, Scott’s Last Expedition (Smith, Elder, 1913; Dodd, 1964). Not all subsequent accounts have been sympathetic.

Roland Huntford, a former correspondent for the London Observer, depicts Scott as a “heroic bungler”...
in Scott and Amundsen (Putnam’s, 1980). The British captain, he says, doomed his party by providing poor organization and scant rations.

In this controversial critique, Huntford also questions the accuracy of Scott’s journal as it has come down to us. He claims that Scott’s heirs excised all passages that indicated bitterness toward his Norwegian rival, Roald Amundsen, or criticism of his companions, or Scott’s own incompetence. But for his “martyrdom” and brisk literary style, Huntford argues, Scott would have become a symbol of ineptitude. Indeed, Scott “was a suitable hero for a nation in decline.”

Huntford dismisses the importance of the 35 pounds of geologic specimens that Scott’s men collected near the Beardmore Glacier and refused to abandon. Yet the rocks contained the plant fossil Glossopteris, also found in India and Africa, providing the first solid evidence for the existence of the prehistoric “supercontinent,” Gondwana.

The Gondwana hypothesis did not win immediate acceptance. The skepticism expressed by such prominent polar researchers as geologist R. E. Priestley and ornithologist Robert Cushman Murphy in Problems of Polar Research, edited by W. L. G. Joerg (American Geographical Society, 1928), reflected the attitude that prevailed until the “Air Age” of Antarctic exploration produced compelling new evidence.

The airplane opened up the continent but, as Paul A. Siple observes in 90° South (Putnam’s, 1959), it didn’t make staying there any easier. Siple, who accompanied Richard E. Byrd to Antarctica as a 19-year-old Boy Scout in 1928, recalls how the admiral, aware of the psychological toll the Antarctic environment could take, once brought a morale “specialist” to Little America. The specialist, Siple writes, “equated good morale with an ability to play the ukulele. He had brought along boxes of ukuleles and was prepared to teach us how to strum the strings to keep us from growing morose or homesick. Unfortunately, the men considered it a morale booster not to have him or his ukuleles around.”

Byrd himself once foolishly attempted to stretch the limits of human endurance. During the 1934 Antarctic winter night, he single-handedly manned the Bolling Advance Weather Base, deep in the interior, as he recalled in Alone (Putnam’s, 1938; Grosset, 1961). Driven to “know that kind of experience to the full,” Byrd nearly died of gradual carbon monoxide poisoning owing to a faulty stove that he was unable to repair. For two and a half months, he struggled with a steadily deteriorating mind and body before his garbled radio transmissions alarmed his colleagues and a tractor party from Little America II rescued him.

Byrd, the symbol of the early Air Age and an accomplished self-promoter, wrote several other books on the Antarctic, including Little America (Putnam’s, 1930) and Discovery (Putnam’s, 1935; Gale, 1971).

After World War II, air travel to and around the continent became routine. By the time Richard S. Lewis and Philip M. Smith published their wide-ranging collection of essays, Frozen Future (Times Books, 1973), geologists airlifted into the Transantarctic Mountains had uncovered fossil remains of the Lystrosaurus, a prehistoric animal that was also common to Africa and India. Lystrosaurus dispelled any lingering doubts about Gondwana. Because the now-extinct reptile could not
have crossed the oceans that today separate Africa, India, and Antarctica, scientists concluded that these lands must once have been joined.

The contributors to Frozen Future—Antarctic scientists, for the most part—address such topics as glaciation, climate, biological adaptation, and research policy. All of them stress the need to maintain the cooperative spirit of the 1957–58 International Geophysical Year, whatever the continent’s commercial allure. Antarctica, they argue, must remain an “international laboratory.”

So far, it is just that. Antarctica, and most of the writing about it, falls mainly within the scientists’ domain. Specialists report on their experiments and activities in several journals. Chief among these are the Polar Record, published by the Scott Polar Research Institute (United Kingdom), and the Antarctic Journal of the United States, published by the National Science Foundation.

Not all of the research is disinterested, however. As Barbara Mitchell and Jon Tinker show in their detailed introduction to Antarctica and Its Resources (Earthscan, 1980, paper only), the 14 parties to the Antarctic Treaty and other nations have long had their eyes on the continent’s oil, gas, fish, and mineral resources.

If the region’s past experience of commercial exploitation is any precedent, Antarctica could be in for trouble. Its waters were once the world’s premier whaling grounds, producing 10 times more whale oil than did all others combined, according to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s data-laden Polar Regions Atlas (CIA, 1978, paper only). But some of the largest whale species were nearly hunted to extinction. The population of blue whales is down to 5 percent of its 1900 level; for the smaller humpback, the figure is closer to 3 percent. Only the drastic quota cuts decreed by the International Whaling Commission in the early 1970s curbed the slaughter.

Today, the focus has shifted from whales (and seals) to krill and oil. In her comprehensive Antarctica in a Resource Age (forthcoming), Science reporter Deborah Shapley argues that the United States has failed to protect its own interests in the new Antarctic resource sweepstakes.

Before the 1961 ratification of the Antarctic Treaty, she points out, the United States could have laid claim to as much as 80 percent of the continent. Today, owing to its weak resource exploration effort under the treaty’s loose arrangements, America may be taking a back seat in Antarctic affairs to Japan, the Soviet Union, and West Germany, nations that are pushing ahead with plans for commercial ventures.

It is inevitable, Shapley concludes, that when the treaty comes up for review in 1991, decisions about the management and exploitation of Antarctic resources will be shaped by governments that know something about them. Hence, she argues, the United States should step up its research program and take a more active role in Antarctica.

EDITOR’S NOTE: Many of the titles in this essay were suggested by Franklin Burch, director of the U.S. Center for Polar and Scientific Archives.
"I don't care who does the electing," New York's William Marcy "Boss" Tweed once remarked, "just so I can do the nominating." Since the 1980 election, a number of leading scholars, under the auspices of Duke University, the Wilson Center, and other institutions, have been taking a hard look at the U.S. presidential nominating process. Their conclusion: It is too erratic, too time-consuming, and too vulnerable to manipulation by minority factions. Partly to blame are the well-intentioned campaign reforms of the early 1970s. So are the rapid changes in American society since 1960. Here, political scientist Jack Walker examines the ailing system and some of the remedies proposed. But just changing the rules, he warns, may not be enough.

by Jack Walker

The drawn-out scramble for the Republican and Democratic 1980 presidential nominations, involving almost two years of campaigning by a dozen rival candidates, has led many scholars, journalists, and politicians to conclude that reforms of some kind are urgently needed. As Washington Post columnist David S. Broder wrote in June 1980:

[The] presidential primary season has ended—at last—with a prize political paradox. On the face of it, the system worked perfectly. The two men, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, who were the favorites of their party's rank-and-file, have emerged as the victors. And yet there is more widespread dissatisfaction being expressed with the choices for the general election than I have heard in 25 years on the political beat.

Since Election Day, the target of criticism has shifted from the choices per se to the electoral process that produced those choices. A proliferation of primaries, some say, has needlessly prolonged presidential campaigns, given undue importance to
television, and put a premium on candidates’ “style” rather than on their past performance or their positions on “the issues.” Changes in party rules, others note, have destroyed the nominating conventions’ prime functions and have gravely diminished the mediating role of political parties in America.

A few commentators, taking the long view, observe that, during the 1970s, the increasingly complex task of winning a party’s nomination for President no longer had much to do with the task of governing as President; that the qualities now required for success in one endeavor were largely irrelevant to success in the other.

“A Crazy Obstacle Course”

To help put things right, no fewer than five privately financed study groups—at Duke University, at Vanderbilt, at Harvard, the University of Virginia, and the Public Agenda Foundation—are now examining the presidential nominating system and debating possible modifications. It seems inevitable that the Congress, the state legislatures, and the leadership of the Republican and Democratic parties will take steps before the 1984 election to change the nominating procedures for presidential candidates.

The status quo is obviously unsatisfactory. “Eastern Airlines, searching for a president, could go outside its ranks and pick an astronaut as its chief executive,” former North Carolina Governor Terry Sanford, president of Duke and one of the most prominent advocates of electoral reform, wrote last year. “The Stanford Graduate School could reach into the business world for its dean. [But] the political party delegates to the national nominating conventions can consider [only] one or two survivors who have run a crazy obstacle course.”

I happen to share many of the worries of the would-be reformers. I also remember that little more than a decade ago, other reformers pushed through what former Democratic National Committee chairman Lawrence O’Brien called “the greatest goddamn change since the two-party system,” implementing a package of electoral reforms to which some of our current woes may be traced. So, before they attempt further “reforms” of our already much-reformed presidential nominating system, the latest advocates of change should ask themselves a few fundamental questions.

First, how have our society and the electorate changed since the “good old days” of the 1950s that reformers both abhor and lament? To what extent have court decisions and changes in the
law accelerated those trends? How have the political parties responded? Which, if any, of the subsequent reforms actually worked as anticipated?

Aspiring re-reformers must remember at the outset that the United States has only lately emerged from two decades of social and economic upheaval. Leaving aside the uncertain legacy of Watergate, the Vietnam War, black riots, and a series of demoralizing political assassinations, several basic structural transformations are apparent. Large segments of the U.S. population have moved to the South and West, enhancing the political power of the Sunbelt states. During the past two decades, as many as 10 million Hispanics have moved into the United States. Accelerated urbanization and suburbanization have left only 26.5 percent of the U.S. population living in rural areas. All of this “people movement” has disrupted patterns of political behavior that had persisted for several generations.

Yet the most important underlying change in American politics during the past three decades has been the increase in the average educational attainment of the electorate, a development that, as it turns out, has greatly expanded the pool of potential civic activists—and hence, ironically, the potential for political conflict and disarray.

**Freedom Summer and the New Activists**

Only 15 percent of the voting public that chose Dwight D. Eisenhower for President in 1952 had ever attended college, and more than 40 percent had completed only elementary school. In 1976, 34 percent of the eligible voters had attended college, and the number with an elementary school education only had shrunk to 17 percent. In political behavior, education is a key factor. The more education people have, the more tolerant of new ideas they are likely to be, the more willing to associate with members of other racial or ethnic groups, the more active—and independent—politically.

As the educational level has risen in America, so has the pressure that Congressmen and Senators get from their constituents. Since the mid-1960s, the number of adults in the United

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States who say they have written letters to elected officials about public issues has grown by 65 percent. Americans are also more willing to put their money where their mouths are. More than 16 percent of the electorate—some 21 million people—contributed money to political campaigns in 1976, versus four percent in 1952, and some 23 million people that year chose to check “yes” on their income tax returns to a $1 contribution to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund. Both indices were expected to be up in 1980. (Data is not yet available.)

Thus, in contrast to low overall voter turnout in U.S. elections, we are witnessing a dramatic expansion of the American electorate's active core. This large, new bloc is relatively well-educated, often more committed to "causes" or broad ideological principles than to party labels, and apt to cast votes for candidates of opposing parties for various offices. Analyzing the vote in the 1980 presidential contest, political scientist Everett Carll Ladd has found fresh evidence of a gradual "dealignment" of the electorate. In a dealignment, he writes "more and more of the electorate become 'up for grabs' each election."*

One cannot attribute this volatility entirely to education. Citizens have also been attracted to independent political activity by the proliferation of well-financed lobbies for virtually every cause imaginable, from school prayer to clean air. Indeed, since the late 1950s, a diffuse and uneven but nationwide process of political mobilization has been under way, bringing many new elements of the population into closer contact with

the nation's political process. But, by cutting across party lines, "activism" on such issues as race, Vietnam, or women's rights has been a spur to political fragmentation.

Mobilization began in 1957 with the Montgomery bus boycott and continued with the subsequent sit-ins, freedom rides, and protest marches of the civil-rights movement. Armed with the legal authority of recent Supreme Court decisions and backed by an ad hoc coalition of white political liberals, clergymen, academics, and journalists, Martin Luther King and other black civil-rights leaders challenged the moral foundations of the racial status quo in the South. They successfully bucked the system, changed it, and gave others a language and a strategy for doing it over and over again.

Thus, many of the white college students who came home from the Mississippi "Freedom Summer" in 1964 began telling their fellow students—at Berkeley, Harvard, and elsewhere—that they, too, were (somehow) members of an oppressed class. Many of these elite universities were soon wracked by civil disorder, initially over students' rights, later over Vietnam and the draft. The 1960s and early '70s also saw the growth of "claimant" movements involving women, Hispanics, the elderly, the handicapped, homosexuals, and many other formerly quiescent segments of American society. Scores of such movements came into being, many of them with a valid point to make, a few of them merely shrill contestants for public attention. Ideological feuds, lack of money, or personality clashes destroyed some of these organizations. But politicians began to pay heed. So did the voters.

Mobilization began among the deprived or disadvantaged. But the propaganda-lawsuit-proselytizing approach was soon adopted by white upper-middle-class activists during the 1970s to seek federal protections for the environment, consumers, and the working man on the job. For "public interest" organizations, the business of recruiting and retaining a devoted, dues-paying membership across the 50 states was made easier by technology. Computers were now on the market that could store and classify millions of names and addresses, allowing associations to print out "personalized" letters virtually overnight that would reach the kinds of people most likely to respond favorably with money.

The differing intensity of public reactions to the undeclared

*Most of the groups formed during the late 1950s and '60s were dedicated to liberal causes, but they were eventually matched by conservative countermovements that grew even stronger during the '70s. The National Abortion Rights League encountered the National Right to Life Committee; the leftist National Council of Churches faced the right-wing Moral Majority.*
wars in Korea and Vietnam illustrates graphically how much advocacy groups have transformed America's political culture. As John E. Mueller has shown, the timing and extent of the initial decline in Americans' "approval rating" of both conflicts, as measured by opinion surveys, was quite similar.* But Americans during the early 1950s, unlike their counterparts during the late '60s, were not accustomed to unconventional public forms of political expression. Vocal opposition to Truman's "limited war" policy in Korea came from the Right and was largely channeled through the G.O.P. As popular support for Washington's Vietnam policy began to slide badly in 1968 and 1969, political leaders began to hear about it in congressional testimony, protest demonstrations, and acts of civil disobedience all over the country. Nothing remotely comparable occurred in 1952.

**Fracturing Local Forces**

Political mobilization, social upheaval, and the "dealignment" of the electorate would have placed the U.S. election system under considerable strain under the best of circumstances. But these trends both coincided with and encouraged an extraordinary series of institutional changes unmatched since the introduction of the Australian (secret) ballot, direct primaries, and referendum and recall petitions, during the days of Robert La Follette and Woodrow Wilson before World War I.

First, the Supreme Court decided in *Baker v. Carr* (1962), *Reynolds v. Sims* (1964), and various subsequent rulings that seats in state legislatures, city councils, and the U.S. Congress must be apportioned according to population. In the words of the Court, "one man's vote is to be worth as much as another's." These decisions had their greatest impact on Southern states such as Georgia and Mississippi that had long been controlled by a single dominant party (the Democrats) or in states such as New Jersey and Michigan where carefully constructed political coalitions based in rural areas and small towns had blocked proportional representation of urban areas in the legislature.

The immediate result of reapportionment was rapid turnover in all legislative bodies. In the 1959 statewide elections in New Jersey, only 20 percent of those elected to the state senate were new members; in 1967, the figure was 75 percent. Many Southern states lapsed into protracted disputes over redistricting that required numerous court orders and several re-appor-

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tions to resolve. No sooner was the issue settled than the 1970 census figures became available, requiring yet another round of district drawing. The Tennessee state legislature was redistricted six times between 1962 and 1973. This continual turmoil fractured local political organizations.

The second landmark was a double-barreled assault on voting restrictions, beginning in 1964 with ratification of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, which eliminated the poll tax in Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia. A year later, the Voting Rights Act barred the use of literacy tests and provided for federal registrars to enroll blacks in Southern counties where their voting participation was below specified levels.

The results were dramatic. In 1964, only 28,500 blacks in Mississippi were registered to vote; a decade later, the number had increased 10-fold. The addition of one-quarter of a million blacks to the voting rolls changed the power balance in the state. Candidates for statewide office openly began to court black voters. Blacks began running for office. (Today, 22 of the 174 seats in the state legislature are held by blacks.) In effect, the procedural reforms of the 1960s brought about the true reconstruction of Southern politics, a century after the Civil War.

One Wave after Another

The third landmark reform affected the entire country, although its impact fell short of expectations. In 1971, under the new Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 18-year-olds were granted the right to vote, bringing about the largest expansion of the electorate since 1920, when the franchise was extended to women. Democrats made special efforts to cultivate these new voters in 1972 but were disappointed to find that it was difficult to get young people to register—or to go to the polls. Only about 48 percent of all 18-to-20-year-olds voted in the 1972 election, versus 71 percent of those aged 45 to 54.* Moreover, young people did not vote as a cohesive bloc. Even more than their parents, they tended to avoid firm ties to the Democratic or Republican parties. Some 50 percent of the 18-to-21-year-old voters in 1976 registered as Independents, versus 23 percent of first-time voters in 1958.

By changing the rules and bringing new, sometimes volatile

*The Democrats should not have been surprised. Historically, turnout among newly enfranchised groups has initially been poor, depressing the participation rate nationwide. When women first voted in 1920, overall national turnout (men and women) dropped from about 62 percent to about 49 percent. Women were less likely to go to the polls than men until the 1980 election.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS

constituencies into the electorate, the reformers of the 1960s eroded the power of the two major political parties to build durable coalitions, to mediate among contending factions, even to decide what the "issues" would be in any given election. Still, these changes, by and large, were overdue. What few foresaw was that the first wave of reform would lead, inevitably, to a second. It began during the August 1968 Democratic Convention.

"The Day of the Bosses Is Over"

Most Americans over 30 remember the Chicago convention as a tumultuous affair, with violent off-stage street battles between city police and anti-war demonstrators. It was the first major party convention where newly mobilized groups of voters—blacks, women, young people—made up a substantial portion of the delegates. They were still, however, "underrepresented." Only 5.5 percent of the convention delegates were black, only 13 percent were women, and 16 state delegations contained no delegates under the age of 30.

The supporters of the chief antiwar candidate, Senator Eugene McCarthy (D-Minn.), had a different complaint: The delegate selection process, varying from state to state, was so byzantine, so susceptible to manipulation by state political leaders, that an insurgent movement within the party stood little chance of success. They noted angrily that, by the time McCarthy entered the race for the party's nomination in December 1967, one-third of the 3,057 delegates to the Chicago convention had already been chosen in various states.

These issues led to the angry confrontations over rules and delegates' credentials that plagued the 1968 convention, divided the Democrats in the general election, and helped to put Richard Nixon in the White House. Afterward, in a good-faith effort to heal the wounds, Democratic leaders set up a commission to change the way the game was played in time for the 1972 convention. "We are in the process of invigorating our party with a massive injection of democracy," wrote Senator George McGovern of South Dakota, the first chairman of the group, in 1970. "The day of the bosses is over." The McGovern Commission (it was taken over by Minnesota Congressman Donald Fraser after McGovern announced his decision to run for President) was followed by a second commission to establish rules for 1976. A third commission was formed after the 1976 commission convention, chaired by Morley Winograd, state chairman of the Michigan Democratic party, to set the 1980 rules. Most of the Democrats' reform efforts of the decade
emerged from the labors of these commissions; the Republicans adopted many of the proposed changes after the Democrats had done so.

The work of the three commissions, plus the Campaign Finance Acts passed by the Congress in 1971 and 1974, transformed the presidential nominating process.

To remedy the problem of underrepresentation, state Democratic parties were now obliged to "overcome the effects of past discrimination" by taking "affirmative steps" to include as delegates to future conventions young people, women, and minorities "in reasonable relationship to their presence in the population of the state." As a result, 35 percent of the delegates to the 1972 Democratic convention were women, 23 percent were under the age of 30, and 14 percent were black.

The great irony was that representation of these groups reached respectable levels just as the role of "delegate" was being reduced to a symbolic presence. Most of the delegates at the 1972 conventions were chosen in primaries and were legally bound to vote for a specified candidate on the first—and sometimes the second and third—ballot.

Chicago Mayor Richard Daley at the 1968 Democratic Convention. Later, reformers sought to shift power from party leaders to the rank and file.
The rapid increase in the number of primaries was the most far-reaching consequence of the post-1968 reforms. There were 17 state primaries in 1968, 23 in 1972, 30 in 1976, and 36 in 1980. The members of the Fraser-McGovern Commission had not deliberately encouraged this rapid move away from the traditional system of state caucuses and conventions. But the new rules that the reformers created to make the selection process more “open” and “democratic”—i.e., to shift power from career politicians to the rank and file—were so complicated when applied to caucuses and conventions that many state party leaders adopted the primary system as a lesser evil.

Money and Momentum

After 1972, the Democrats also prohibited any state from using a “winner-take-all” system in allocating delegates after a primary. The Republicans did not require states to follow this practice, but soon both parties in most states apportioned delegates in rough accordance with the number of votes each candidate received in the primary.

To some politicians, it seemed at first that the proliferation of primaries (the first coming more than four months prior to the party conventions) combined with proportional allocation of delegates, would often lead to a stalemate among several candidates, thereby reviving the convention as the final arena of choice. This has not been the case. The first-ballot nomination of George McGovern by the Democrats in 1972 and of Jimmy Carter in 1976 made this clear.

Under the reformed system, candidates who win, or who do better than the press expects them to, in the early primaries are able to establish “momentum” and successfully drain away money, volunteers, and network TV coverage from all competitors. The point of the early primaries is not so much to get delegates as to get “exposure”; winner-take-all primaries have been replaced, as James W. Davis has noted, by “winner-take-all journalism.” Thanks to his near-sweep of the early 1976 primaries, candidate Jimmy Carter received 59 percent of all coverage of Democratic contenders in Time and Newsweek, for example, between February 24 and April 27—even though one of his opponents, Senator Henry Jackson (D.-Wash.), had gone on to win the Massachusetts and New York contests and at the end of this period actually led Carter in the total number of primary votes received.

The system of public financing for primary campaigns used in 1976 and 1980, in which candidates receive federal matching
funds up to certain prescribed limits, actually increases the importance of private contributions (and hence of momentum) rather than decreasing them as the reformers intended.* The federal matching dollars magnify the advantages of the candidate who gets off to a fast start by doubling the benefits from the surge of private contributions usually received by him in the wake of an early primary victory.

**First Tuesdays**

Once it became evident that early successes were the key to victory under the reformed rules, the marathon campaign was born. Candidates such as George McGovern, Jimmy Carter, and George Bush devoted two years or more to an exhausting, full-time pursuit of publicity and grass-roots support in the early primary states that counted. The marathon campaign places potential candidates with heavy responsibilities in government—members of the House or Senate leadership, say—at a disadvantage. They can compete effectively only at the expense of the public business. In 1980, Howard Baker (R.-Tenn.) was severely handicapped as a presidential candidate by the demands of his job as Senate Minority Leader in Washington.†

While open primaries are theoretically more "democratic," convention delegates selected in primary elections may be less representative of majority opinion among Republicans or Democrats than those chosen under the old system of party conventions and caucuses. This is so because primary turnout is usually low (averaging about 50 percent of participation in the general election), and because those who turn out to vote in primaries tend to be older and wealthier than the electorate in general. To further distort matters, some states, such as Wisconsin, still allow "crossover" voting, which means that members of one party may vote in the other party's primary. In a large field, it is also possible for a candidate to cinch the nomination

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*Congress enacted major campaign finance bills in 1971 and 1974. Among the existing provisions: Contributions by private individuals to candidates for federal office are limited to $1,000; total contributions by individuals to all such candidates are limited to $25,000; contributions by "political action committees" are limited to $5,000 per candidate; major party candidates for the presidential nomination may receive matching public funds for individual contributions up until the moment of nomination; major party nominees are eligible to receive a federal campaign subsidy ($29.4 million in 1980), on condition that no further private contributions are accepted. The Supreme Court overturned other provisions of the reform bills in 1976, ruling, for example, that candidates could spend unlimited amounts of their personal wealth on their own campaigns.

†During a recent Duke University forum on the nominating process, held at the Wilson Center, former President Gerald Ford estimated that he had to spend 20 percent of his time in 1976 seeking Republican nomination.
"After they've chewed up a few, you get your pick of what's left," was the caption of this 1980 Herblock cartoon. The number of presidential primaries doubled between 1968 and 1980, but early contests remained decisive.

From Herblock on All Fronts, New American Library, 1980.

though receiving only a plurality of the primary vote. Of the 16 million Democratic votes cast in all of the 1976 state primary elections, Jimmy Carter, the eventual Democratic nominee, received only 6 million.

As the last three elections demonstrated, the new system can sometimes produce candidates who lack firm political alliances with party chiefs—and hence lack the political assets needed to govern. Political scientist Jeanne Kirkpatrick, currently U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, has pointed out that Jimmy Carter’s chief opponents in 1976—Birch Bayh, Henry Jackson, Hubert Humphrey, and Morris Udall—“shared among them the support of virtually all of the established groups within the Democratic party and the leadership of the Democratic party, its elected public officials, and its state party officers. Jimmy Carter had none of the leaders’ support, and yet he was able to move through this [reformed] process successfully all the way to the White House.”

By no means does the above compilation exhaust the list of the side effects of recent reform. Almost all of the tinkering produced unintended consequences, particularly among Democrats, and almost all of it enhanced the power of well-organized subgroups at the expense of the political party, the one American institution capable of wringing consensus out of diverse fac-

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Taking into account the positive achievements of the past 20 years—which means no return to bossism, no attempts to "prune" certain elements from the electorate, no stacking of the deck against "outsiders"—the worst effects of the presidential campaign reforms can be corrected. In seeking solutions, we should aim for simplicity.

Representative Morris Udall (D.-Ariz.), once a candidate for President, has proposed, for example, that all primaries be held on the first Tuesday of March, April, May, and June of the election year, with the conventions taking place immediately thereafter. Shortening the total length of the campaign, increasing the number of states being contested at any given time, and putting one month between each round of primaries would introduce an element of stability by reducing the importance of momentum generated by one or two early victories. This reform should give an advantage to candidates with established reputations, thus encouraging—or allowing—those already in positions of authority to run for the Presidency.

Getting Leaders

A simple means of ensuring that presidential nominees have the support of congressional leaders and other party notables would be to appoint as a matter of course all governors, U.S. Senators, and U.S. Representatives as convention delegates (in 1980, only 45 of the 3,331 delegates to the Democratic Convention were Congressmen or Senators), and to reserve a sizable bloc of delegates (perhaps as many as one-third of the total) to be chosen outside the primary system by committees of the state party organizations.

This would increase the authority of the party's established leadership without closing off the possibility of outside challenges. It would still be virtually impossible to deny the nomination to a candidate who scored solid victories in most of the primaries, but the nominee would have to reach out to other leaders within the party, thus building a political foundation for effective governance. Should there be no clearly overwhelming winner in the early caucuses and primaries, new candidates would still be able to enter the race late in the primary season and have a realistic chance of victory at the convention.

There is no easy way to fix the seriously flawed system of campaign financing. Congress enacted many of the finance reforms during the peculiar atmosphere of Watergate, and, seen in retrospect, Congress overreacted. Some of the consequences are
already clear. The ceilings on individual contributions to candidates have increased the importance of middlemen—notably, mass-mail specialists and the 2,500 registered “political action committees” sponsored by corporations, labor unions, and interest groups. All this, combined with the fragmentation of the pre-nomination financing system, and the ceilings on the amount of money that political parties may donate to candidates during the general election, has further loosened the hold of parties on officeholders and candidates. When Congress weighs in with a new set of reforms—there have been more proposals than I can enumerate in this space—it should keep in mind the possible third, fourth, and fifth order consequences of its actions.

Taken as a whole, the reforms of the 1960s and ’70s helped to ease the American political system through a period of turmoil. Newly enfranchised groups were absorbed peaceably, sometimes belatedly, into the electorate. While some confusion ensued, the net result has been to make the political process more open. The reformist impulse was both expedient and fundamentally correct.

Yet, in some respects, democracy’s gain has been leadership’s loss. Any democratic system depends on rules, and those rules must promote both legitimacy (do the people approve?) and governability (can our leaders lead?). We have learned during the past two decades how difficult it is to devise reforms that enhance the former without undermining the latter. It is time now to redress the balance.

But new rules are no panacea. The stresses of the past two decades have given us a political culture that encourages both confrontation and the cult of personality; to some extent, it has also fostered civic selfishness. The common good has often been forgotten in single-interest politics and the angry, if sometimes idealistic, pursuit of group entitlements. The health of American democracy depends, in the end, on the willingness of individual citizens and their politicians to accept the need for compromise and self-restraint.
Religion in America

During the past few years, opinion surveys have elicited what the Gallup Organization has called "new signs of vitality" in American religious life. A decline since 1955 in overall church/synagogue attendance has been arrested. (Forty percent of Americans attend services in a typical week.) The proportion of Americans who say that religious faith can help solve national problems (65 percent) has begun to rise for the first time since the mid-1960s. So has the proportion of those who express "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in organized religion as an institution (66 percent). More and more Americans have apparently "turned inward," perhaps tacitly acknowledging the failure of a consumer society to imbue their lives with meaning.

Such responses to polls may be signs of a religious revival. If so, we do not know whether it is deep or shallow: The world, as presented in such statistics, is two-dimensional.

By all accounts, however, America's major religious "families," for widely varying reasons, have undergone profound changes during the past two decades. The initial stresses and transformations identified by a handful of academics during the 1950s and '60s—Nathan Glazer, for example, in American Judaism (1957); Jeffrey Hadden in The Gathering Storm in the Churches (1969)—have fostered trends that preoccupy scholars and clergy alike.

A disorientation among American Catholics has received considerable attention from scholars and journalists, in part because so much of it can be linked to a single event: the Second Vatican Council, beginning in 1962. The liturgical overhaul and doctrinal facelift brought about by Vatican II had been anticipated by Catholic intellectuals, in America as in Europe. But such modifications, implemented fairly suddenly, estranged many laymen on both sides of the Atlantic even as some Catholic liberals sought more sweeping change.

The specific concerns of America's Jewish community have
not been as frequently aired in the non-Jewish press. One of
these is a lingering preoccupation with identity. "A social group
with clearly marked boundaries exists," wrote Nathan Glazer in
the early 1950s, "but the source of the energies that hold [it]
separate, and of the ties that bind it together, has become com-
pletely mysterious." Lately, the trend toward Jewish-Gentile
intermarriage, the low Jewish birth rate, and the muted revival
of anti-Semitism have prompted new worries.

The tangled landscape of present-day Protestantism is the
most difficult to depict. Its elements are so diverse that one
must question most popular generalizations. One trend is clear.
Most of the major Protestant denominations—the ones com-
monly referred to as the "mainline" or "liberal" churches—have
experienced sharp reversals since the high tide of their vigor and
prosperity during the 1950s.

Until recently, mainline Protestantism might have been de-
defined as the Protestantism most in the public eye, the one that
conformed to popular visions of what American religion should
be (and always has been). Its prestige was sustained by the bet-
ter known theologians, the better known seminaries, and many
of the most prominent clergy and laymen. Yet the mainline
churches—Episcopal, Presbyterian, Congregational, et al.—
have suffered significant declines in their memberships for rea-
sons that are not fully understood.

Numerous congregations were torn by bitter, public dissen-
sion over such issues as civil rights, the Vietnam War, and the
New Morality. The political activism of some clergymen alien-
ated many churchgoers. Ecumenism encouraged "dialogue"
among the various denominations, sometimes leading to a de-
emphasis of confessional distinctions—and loyalties. "In a free
society," historian Martin E. Marty has written, "it is question-
able whether many would take pains to continue to belong to
groups that give them few reasons for adherence. When the
Mainliners minimized their reasons, Americans began to take
their quests to other locales." One result has been continued ex-
pansion of evangelical Christianity.

These and other issues are addressed in the three essays that
follow.
PROTESTANTISM AND THE EVANGELICALS

by Cullen Murphy

The most important development within American Protestantism since the early 1970s has been the ascendancy of the evangelicals, a phenomenon that most journalists have described only in political terms, thereby contributing generously to public misunderstanding of the forces behind the evangelical "revival."

Many Americans seem to believe that the expansion of political activity by evangelical Protestants, widely noted during the 1976 and 1980 presidential campaigns, is unprecedented. Public opinion researchers, operating without much historical perspective, at first predicted (and then interpreted as radically "new") a tide of Protestant support for "born again" candidates for public office and for "moral" legislation in the areas of education (e.g., prayer in the schools) and family life (e.g., a constitutional amendment to ban abortion). Much of the credit, or blame, for this mobilization went to a network of organizations representing the so-called evangelical Right, symbolized by the Rev. Jerry Falwell's Virginia-based Moral Majority, Inc.

In fact, even if Falwell and his energetic allies did not exist, evangelical Protestants in large numbers would be politically active—in a variety of causes. This activity is nothing new. During the 19th century, northern Presbyterians (to cite but one group) joined with other evangelicals to lead crusades against slavery, urban vice, and alcohol; they were firm proponents of a tax-supported public school system. Social historians have long known that an individual's participation in politics often varies directly with the intensity of his religious commitment. The commitment of evangelicals to their beliefs has always been strong. The political surge that struck outsiders as "new" during the 1970s primarily reflected the great numerical increase in the community of evangelical Christians.*

*The word evangelical (from the Greek evangelion, or "good news") referred in the 18th century, and refers now, to Christians of whatever denomination who are determined to rest their faith and religious practice on the authority of the Bible; who believe that the New Testament promises eternal life through a morally transforming experience of the Holy Spirit that Jesus described to Nicodemus as being "born again"; and who are, for these reasons, intensely committed to missionary work ("evangelism"), both in their own towns and neighborhoods and around the world.
Yet, since the 1980 election, many groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Jewish Committee, have seemed genuinely alarmed by developments within American Protestantism. Their spokesmen, eyes fixed on the new evangelical Right, tend to cast all evangelicals into a sinister heap called “Fundamentalists.” They bring to their analysis of Fundamentalism the same condescension that H. L. Mencken and Frederic Lewis Allen popularized during the 1920s (Fundamentalists, Mencken wrote, “are everywhere where learning is too heavy a burden for mortal minds”), while forgetting that Fundamentalism is merely a subculture within “mainstream” evangelicalism, a relatively young and extreme movement within an older, moderate one. The insistence of Fundamentalists on the literal “inerrancy” of the Bible in all matters and their implacable hostility toward virtually all of modern culture amount to a caricature of most evangelicals’ beliefs—just as Elmer Gantry is a caricature of most Fundamentalists.

If politicians and journalists are confused by the intricate mosaic of evangelical Protestantism, so are many evangelicals baffled by all the fuss. For whatever their personal political orientation—old liberal, new conservative, or young radical—a large proportion of America’s evangelical Protestants have resisted, as their forebears always did, pressure from an ardent few for the formation of an explicitly Christian political program or party.

A 12-Ring Show

The recent surge of publicity has at least turned the spotlight on the continuing growth of evangelical Christianity. At the end of the 1970s, pollster George Gallup conducted a survey of America’s religious beliefs and practices. That poll, which was published by Christianity Today, beginning in December 1979, indicated that at least 20 percent of Americans age 18 or older—some 31 million people—considered themselves to be evangelicals. One out of five adults described himself as either a Pentecostal or a “charismatic.” Some 30 percent of those polled professed to have had a “life-changing” experience involving faith in Jesus Christ. Almost 40 percent believed the Bible to be free of error, although Gallup doubted whether all of those polled understood the Fundamentalist interpretation of iner-
During the 1980 campaign, Ronald Reagan attended a prayer meeting organized by Fundamentalist Jerry Falwell. One speaker asserted that God “doesn’t hear the prayers of Jews,” prompting this Oliphant cartoon.

rancy he had in mind. While firm data are impossible to come by, given the dispersion of evangelicals among scores of denominations, some estimates suggest that one-half of all Protestants may be considered evangelical Christians.

These numbers are startling, but the fact is that evangelical movements in the United States have been expanding steadily, at a rate not much changed since the 1930s. Dean M. Kelley’s Why Conservative Churches Are Growing (1972) was but one of scores of books and articles, generally unheralded outside the larger Protestant community, that noted and analyzed the trend. Theologically conservative churches, Kelley wrote, performed most effectively that “indispensable” function of religion: providing meaning for people as individuals and as members of society. They were effective, and growing, precisely because they laid heavy demands for discipline upon their converts.

As Kelley predicted, the decline of the better known Protestant denominations, many of whose leaders championed “Modernist” views of Scripture, theology, and ethics and often exacted little in the way of religious commitment from their followers, has proceeded apace in this country. During the 10 years ending in 1980, the membership of the United Methodist Church declined by 11.4 percent; that of the United Presbyterian Church fell by 23 percent. The Episcopal Church shrank by 16.9 percent; the Christian Churches by 22.6 percent.
Theological Modernists still predominate in the leadership of these old-line Protestant denominations (and of their ecumenical umbrella, the National Council of Churches). Many of them have been all too ready to encourage the myth that all evangelical Protestants, particularly those who are both politically conservative and born again, are rather backward types. They know full well, however, that the accelerating decline of liberal Christianity stems less from a revival of Fundamentalism than from three other factors:

1. The proliferation of large urban and suburban evangelical congregations within their own denominations. (All but a handful of the prominent Presbyterian pastors in New England today, for example, were educated at evangelical Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary.)

2. The rapid expansion of old-line denominations that have always been theologically conservative, such as the Southern Baptists, the Churches of Christ, the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, and most branches of the Mennonites.

3. The emergence of large urban congregations among younger evangelical denominations, such as the Nazarenes, the Assemblies of God (to which President Reagan's Interior Secretary, James Watt, belongs), and the Christian Reformed Church.

These trends suggest what sociologists and historians have only begun to confirm: that the old demographic stereotype of evangelicals as primarily Southern, rural, and ill-educated—"the people that time forgot"—is obsolete.

Indeed, it was never accurate. While detailed sociological studies of evangelical congregations are few, the pattern of evangelical growth indicates that born-again Christians mirror the rest of the U.S. population in many key characteristics. In particular, they share other Americans' aspirations for upward mobility. Historians of 18th- and 19th-century revivalism have shown that evangelical fervor was not confined to, or led by, the working classes; in fact, those most active in revivals tended to be merchants, doctors, factory owners.

The Fundamentalist image persists. Yet anyone who peers into the vast tent of evangelical faith will find a lively 12-ring show in progress, with true Fundamentalists holding the attention of only part of the crowd.

In one circle are perhaps a half-million "peace-church" conservatives, both noisy and quiet ones, anchored by a commitment to biblical ethics. This commitment has been characteristic of Mennonites since the Protestant Reformation and of Quakers and Brethren since the Puritan and Pietist awakenings in 17th-century England and Germany. The great majority of
these peace-church Christians remain firmly evangelical; indeed, their sense of identification with evangelicals of other orientations has lately strained their tradition of "separateness." Following the antiwar protests of the 1960s, some peace-church activists joined Fundamentalists and a few Wesleyans in the radical coalition that publishes Jim Wallis's *Sojourners* magazine in Washington, D.C. Others have supported Ronald Sider's Philadelphia-based Evangelicals for Social Action.

In another ring, more than two million strong, are a company of Arminian conservatives, descended from Alexander Campbell's 19th-century Disciples of Christ. The Disciples incorporated elements from virtually every other evangelical tradition: the Wesleyan doctrines of free will and free grace; the Baptist call for the immersion of adult believers; the Anglican custom of the Lord's Supper every Sunday. Their heirs can be found in several 20th-century extensions, particularly the Churches of Christ. The sectarian rhetoric of this denomination—"the reconstituted embodiment of the true church of the apostolic age"—sometimes suggests that its members think they are the only people under the tent. But they don't, really.

**The "Mainline" Myth**

In a third circle moves a group of denominations and institutions rooted in the immigrant experience: upwards of three million people in the Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod, with German and Scandinavian roots; nearly a half-million Dutch Calvinists in the Christian Reformed Church; a bewildering variety of both free-church and Lutheran Scandinavians and Finns; and assorted Italian, Romanian, Ukranian, and German Baptists. Throughout the 20th century, the Dutch Calvinists have given intellectual leadership to evangelical political activism. They remain concentrated in Michigan, particularly around Holland and Grand Rapids. (Grand Rapids is the home of Calvin College and of three major evangelical publishing firms.)

In a fourth ring are the lively black Pentecostals, who constitute perhaps one-quarter of the 16 million Christian blacks in this country. They maintain a network of independent churches (ranging from storefronts to vast congregations in Houston, Detroit, Chicago), radio ministries, and close-knit denominations. The largest black Pentecostal denomination, the 1.5-million-member Church of God in Christ, is "progressive" across the board, championing fair-housing laws on the one hand and the ordination of women on the other.

All of the rings are filled: by German Pietists, who estab-
A FAILURE OF NERVE?

Among the many reasons adduced for the relative decline of America's liberal Protestant churches is the erosion of their specifically religious character. In a controversial October 1978 Harper's essay, political scientist Paul Seabury weighed developments within the 2.8-million-member Episcopal Church:

As early as 1966, when a commission of the Episcopal Church chaired by [Harvard's president] Nathan Pusey began its assessment of Episcopalian theological training, it was already apparent that large numbers of ministers and priests chafed at the routines of parish work. . . . The excitement lay outside the institutional church, and it was unlikely that even a church with a history of political moderation could fail to be dazzled by it.

In such times it was by no means certain which of many contradictory gusts should set the direction of the weather vane. What would be the marching orders? Civil rights? Poverty? Whose poverty? Colonialist exploitation? The Vietnam war? All these crusades found eager recruits among [clergy] who had come to doubt the significance of the unchanging church in a violently changing society.

It was not only that such church activists turned attention to all these secular and fashionable causes—their license the greater due to the prevailing political passivity of local congregations. Their hands also turned to the refashioning of the institutional church from within. Here, in a "revolution from above," the Episcopal Church also began to incorporate and accommodate the other gentler, introspective styles and causes of the Sixties, which were of the self-indulgent, rather than radical-activist mode: guitar liturgies, rap sessions, light shows. These were designed to effect within the church a new emphasis upon loving and caring, even at the expense of belief and Christian commitment. (So it was—a bit further down the road—that when Barbara Walters interviewed the first woman ordained as a priest under new dispensation, the colloquy went: "Reverend Means, do you consider yourself to be a woman of strong religious faith?" The response: "No, Barbara, I do not. But I do believe in caring, and that's what religion is all about, isn't it?")

By the late 1960s, national church authorities were dispensing millions of dollars of missionary funds collected from parishes and dioceses to radical political movements across the land—Black Power groups, migrant farm workers, Afro-American thespians, native American organizers, Puerto Rican nationalists, Marxist documentary-film producers, and Third World liberation movements. . . .

The "failure of nerve" in the churches is manifest in the conception that the world should set the agenda for the Church. The irony is that, since the world changes its agenda capriciously, the Church becomes directionless.

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lished themselves in the New World during the 1720s, and whose emphasis on inward spirituality was a major impetus behind the "Great Awakening" of the mid-18th century and still influences many evangelical congregations; by Baptists, notably the 14 million members of the Southern Baptist Convention, America's strongest evangelical movement and the largest Protestant denomination in the country (a statistic that should prompt some commentators to reassess exactly what they mean by "mainline"); by the black evangelicals, chiefly Methodists and Baptists, who together with black Pentecostals account for perhaps 25 percent of all evangelical Christians.

Old Landmarks?

The Adventists have a brightly lit place under the tent. Their millenarian traditions suffused many groups—Joseph Smith's band of Latter-Day Saints, the Jehovah's Witnesses—but the only ones today within the true evangelical tradition are the Seventh-Day Adventists and three or four smaller sects. There are Wesleyans and conservative Calvinists, both dating back to colonial times. And nearby is a growing group of white Pentecostals. Both black and white Pentecostals share many of the beliefs of other evangelicals but have one distinctive element: "speaking in tongues."*

Suffice it to say that none of these groups fits the Fundamentalist mold. Fundamentalism—occupying the final ring inside the tent—only emerged as a significant force within evangelicalism toward the end of World War I, in independent congregations and a handful of tiny new Baptist, Presbyterian, and Brethren denominations. It flourished chiefly in the cities of the East and Middle West, its temper, style, and program shaped in the public battles of the early 1920s against Darwinism and historical criticism of Scripture. Then as now, Fundamentalists wanted the world to think they were the only ones who guarded the "old landmarks." They insisted on the divine inspiration of every word of the Bible, declared it without error in all matters, and embraced the teachings of John Nelson Darby's Plymouth Brethren concerning the imminent Second Coming of Christ.

Moody Bible Institute (founded in Chicago during the

*Pentecostals believe that an experience of ecstatic, automatic speech in a mysterious nonhuman language is the God-given sign of baptism in the Holy Spirit. A form of Pentecostalism, often called "charismatic," has been sweeping through many Roman Catholic and liberal Protestant congregations since the late 1950s. Zealous missionary work has made Pentecostalism the dominant force in Third World Protestantism. The two largest Christian congregations in the world are Pentecostal groups located in Seoul, South Korea, and São Paulo, Brazil.
1880s) became after the turn of the century the most important of Fundamentalism's many centers. A network of similar institutions—Philadelphia College of the Bible, Dallas Theological Seminary, the Bible Institute of Los Angeles, Biblical Seminary in New York City, Northwestern Bible Institute in Minneapolis—sustained the Fundamentalist movement in every part of the nation.*

Some of the movement's latter-day adherents share with conservative Presbyterians and Southern Baptists the leadership of the National Organization of Evangelicals (established in 1942). Both in that body, and as faculty members at the burgeoning evangelical seminaries, these "post-Fundamentalists" (as some call them) persist in a determination to impose their brand of militant biblicism upon the whole of evangelical Christendom.

In 1976, shortly before his retirement as editor of Christianity Today, Harold Lindsell published a volume called The Battle for the Bible, asserting that anyone who denies that Scripture is free of "factual, historical, scientific, or other errors" cannot truly be an evangelical. In taking this position, Lindsell ignored the virtually unanimous reliance of 19th-century Protestants upon the Bible as the authority for "Christian faith and practice," if not necessarily for history or science. Lindsell's book sparked debate inside nearly every evangelical community. When the controversy began to surface in the daily press, Fundamentalists joined with journalists in labeling their opponents "liberals" or "Modernists," when in fact they usually represented the traditional evangelical perspective.

Such was the situation when, in 1979, Jerry Falwell, pastor of the sprawling, 13,000-member Thomas Road Baptist Church in Lynchburg, Virginia, launched the Moral Majority. Unnoticed at the time was the extent to which other Fundamentalists, not to mention traditional evangelicals, disavowed his efforts.

Evangelicals, Fundamentalist or not, are a diverse lot. What this brief summary cannot provide is a sense of the bewildering

*More than any other evangelical movement, the Fundamentalists seized on the new communications technologies. Beginning in the 1920s, radio airwaves were crowded with the messages of Charles E. Fuller and others. While the first religious TV star was actually Catholic Bishop Fulton J. Sheen, Fundamentalists today dominate "televangelism." However, despite estimates by religious broadcasters and even the New York Times and Wall Street Journal that as many as 130 million Americans watch religious television programs every Sunday morning, the actual figure may be only 40 million—and falling, according to A. C. Nielsen estimates. Pentecostal faith healer Oral Roberts remains the nation's most popular TV preacher, followed by Robert Schuller, Rex Humbard, Jimmy Swaggart, and Jerry Falwell. Falwell's "Old-Time Gospel Hour" drew fewer than 1.5 million viewers weekly in November 1980, despite his own organization's estimate that the audience is 10 times greater. See William Morris, "The Birth of a Media Myth," Atlantic (June 1981).
internal diversity within each of the 12 major evangelical groups, from Pietists to Pentecostals. (The peace-church group, for example, includes about 20 separate religious bodies, including a dozen Mennonite sects.) These evangelical families are tied together—and, more importantly, to each other—by webs of nondenominational “para-church” organizations: Christian liberal arts and Bible colleges, publishing houses, radio and television ministries, family vacation camps, women’s fellowships, businessmen’s associations, and so on. Evangelical coalitions are resilient, comfortable with diversity, and successful in maintaining loyalties over long periods of time.

**Wesley’s People**

The history of the Wesleyans illustrates the persistence over two centuries of a complex, organizationally fragmented, but nevertheless coherent religious culture. The first society of “Methodists” (as Wesleyans were derisively called) was founded in England by John Wesley (1703–91), the son of an Anglican clergyman. Wesley opposed Calvinist predestinarian doctrines and was firmly committed to the idea of Christian perfection: Beyond the experience of being born again lay the possibility of a “second moment” of grace that brought purity of heart—eradication of the impulse to sin inherited from the Fall of Adam. Under the leadership of Francis Asbury, whom Wesley sent from England as a lay preacher, Methodism flowered in America during the Revolutionary era. In 1784, Asbury organized most American Wesleyans into the Methodist Episcopal Church.

Dogmatic distinctions were probably less critical to Methodism’s success in America than was the transmission to the new nation of (a) a distinctive style of religious discipline, piety, and evangelistic passion; (b) the system of moving pastors frequently and making each responsible for a “circuit” of congregations—crucial at a time when the American frontier was expanding and clergymen were scarce; and (c) Wesley’s commitment to social justice for the poor and oppressed. This last consideration, in the American environment, made Methodists champions of political democracy.

Asbury quickly learned how to develop evangelical cooperation in a pluralistic religious culture. This is evident in his association with Philip Otterbein’s German-speaking United Brethren, resulting in the spread of Wesleyan doctrines among Reformed and Lutheran Germans in the Susquehanna Valley. This produced several Wesleyan sects, including Jacob Albright’s Evangelical Association, whose merger in the 20th century with
the United Brethren presaged the affiliation of both with the United Methodist Church.

The diversification of the larger Wesleyan movement proceeded. The "Republican Methodists" split off in 1794, protesting the authority of bishops. A half-century later, disagreements over the issue of slavery prompted the secession first of the abolitionist "Wesleyan Methodists" and then of the "Free Methodists," both concentrated in upstate New York.

A Common Heritage

Meanwhile, a "holiness" movement emerged, whose advocates believed that Methodist churches had forsaken Wesley's original emphasis on spiritual perfection. During and after the Civil War, it spread to other denominations, deeply influencing many Quakers, and eventually giving rise to several "anti-sectarian" sects, the most notable being the Church of God (Anderson, Indiana). It also paved the way for the welcome that American Methodists gave to William Booth's thoroughly Wesleyan Salvation Army, which arrived in New York City in 1880.

A full-scale debate over the doctrine of Christian perfection preoccupied American Methodists during the following two decades. It produced a half-dozen denominations that now constitute the backbone of the Wesleyan holiness movement, the strongest being the 500,000-member Church of the Nazarene.

While Wesleyanism's organizational diversity denies John Wesley's dream of catholicity, the enduring loyalty of the movement's many factions to his doctrines of holiness and free grace is remarkable. Evangelical Wesleyans today include not only those in the many independent denominations but also many clergy and a growing number of congregations within the 9.6-million-member United Methodist Church.

The kaleidoscopic character of American evangelicalism often makes it difficult to perceive the movement as a whole. At any given moment, of course, one can discern well-defined boundaries demarcating a variety of evangelical forces. Yet, over time, the boundaries shift. Upstart groups merge into a somnolent mainstream. New groups take their place. Clergy and lay people move from one congregation to another. Schisms and mergers alter the landscape. For all of these reasons, those who would interpret the present status of evangelical Protestantism in light of its past, or would project its future on the basis of the present, should be prudent. And they should bear several things in mind.

One is the persistence of evangelical interest in issues that...
demand a moral response. The sectarian impulse (be it manifested in a withdrawal from worldly affairs or an unwillingness to cooperate with other Christians) has only rarely been an important barrier to evangelical social concern. The Mennonites offer an example. They have clung for 400 years to their convictions that Christian citizenship is in "two kingdoms," the heavenly one being primary, and that they must live at peace with all lawful authorities, even evil ones. The Mennonites are reputedly a classic example of sectarian withdrawal.

Yet virtually all of them identify readily with theological conservatives in the other peace churches and strive for a common stand with other evangelicals on both religious and social issues. Mennonites are among the leaders of the radical evangelical Left, championing unilateral disarmament as well as the "right to life." They have financed agricultural projects in impoverished areas of the Third World.

At more than 100 evangelical liberal arts colleges around the country—from Presbyterian Whitworth College in Spokane to Southern Baptist Wake Forest University in North Carolina and Christian Reformed Calvin College in Grand Rapids—faculties keep Christian social and political strategies constantly in the forefront of their students' attentions. The ecumenical evangelical magazine Christianity Today (circulation: 185,000), perhaps the world's most influential religious journal, performs a similar function. Most evangelicals share the conviction, grounded in the Old Testament and revitalized in the New, that they must demonstrate their faith through the exercise of justice and com-

A Methodist circuit preacher roams the Western frontier in the early 19th century.

Library of Congress.
passion toward other human beings.

The preoccupation of the media with the evangelical Right diverts attention from the great majority in the middle. It also slights the ethical action of black evangelicals, who never have separated the social from the spiritual gospel, or their earthly from their heavenly hopes. Whether white or black, evangelical Christians feel themselves bound, as Jesus and the Apostles were, to advance justice by bearing crosses, not swords. For the most part, they do not embrace the neo-Marxist analysis of the economic order, or accept the inevitability of violence as do the proponents of radical "theologies of liberation" now being offered to the oppressed peoples of the world. On this point, they stand alongside Pope John Paul II.

What the leaders of the many evangelical movements—and their congregations—need right now, some say, is more knowledge of the real history of conservative Protestantism in this country. Without this knowledge, and the confidence it engenders, the moderate majority may find it difficult to sustain a middle course. Many moderate evangelicals are insufficiently aware of their own churches’ past to recognize the incongruity of the doctrines now described by others as being in line with the old evangelical traditions. From the radical Right, they hear a crassly nationalist appeal for political involvement. From religious and secular neoconservatives in the social sciences, they hear that religious values are best maintained when enshrined in, and enforced by, the laws of the land.

Evangelicals in the 19th century marched to a different drum. They embraced the American experiment in religious liberty, believing that Christian values would most readily triumph in a society that allowed no legal constraints upon religious choice—if only Christians would practice what they preached. Those values would prevail, they insisted, not by force or political pressure but by the persuasiveness of the Bible’s moral message, and by the love that God’s spirit, through faith, would implant in the hearts of those who were born again. This tradition, which is not that of the Moral Majority or the neoconservatives or the neo-Marxists, is the common heritage of the vast majority of evangelical Protestants.
The map above depicts denominational concentrations by county. Some 219 religious groups are active in the United States according to the Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches (1981). These range from the 50-million-member Roman Catholic Church to the 175-member General Six-Principle Baptists (established in Rhode Island in 1653). America’s religious diversity is real—but also somewhat exaggerated. Thus, of the nation’s 133 million church members, nearly 75 percent are Catholic, Baptist, or Methodist. Three-quarters of the 76 million U.S. Protestants belong to the Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, or Presbyterian families. (The fifth-largest Protestant denomination, the 2.8-million-member Episcopal Church, will soon be overtaken by the sixth-largest denomination, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, one of the most rapidly growing conservative churches in the United States.) The smallest 200 of the 219 religious groups account for less than five percent of total church membership. Jews do not appear on the map because they do not make up 25 percent or more of any single U.S. county’s population. More than one-half of the estimated six million U.S. Jews live in five metropolitan areas: New York (two million), Los Angeles (500,000), Philadelphia (300,000), Chicago (250,000), and Miami (225,000). More than 60 percent of all Americans are formally affiliated with some religious body.
Socioeconomic differences continue to set America's religious families apart from one another. With regard to education, for example, Jews (above) still outpace all other groups. Indeed, Jewish women are twice as likely to attend graduate school as Catholic men. Catholic-Protestant educational differences (below) have narrowed, particularly among the young. The same pattern is evident in employment. Catholics moved from blue-collar to white-collar jobs faster than did Protestants in the 1950–70 period. Today, proportionately more Catholics than Protestants have incomes of $25,000 or more.
Presidential Vote by Religion, 1952-76

Jews voted Republican in large numbers and Independent in 1968. Catholics, with a significant minority voting Democratic, nominated Hubert Humphrey in 1968. The religious vote was highly polarized in 1972, with Jews and Catholics voting Democratic and Protestants voting Republican.

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Religion in America

Party Affiliation by Religion During the 1976
A CATHOLIC
ROMANCE WITH MODERNITY

by Jay P. Dolan

On October 11, 1962, Pope John XXIII solemnly convened the Second Vatican Council. Roman Catholicism has not been the same since. In the United States, nuns have traded in their religious habits for skirts, slacks, and Gucci bags. Priests appear in public dressed in shirt and tie; many of them openly differ with church authorities on such issues as birth control and divorce. Lay people occupy prominent positions in religious services. English has replaced Latin as the language of worship.

So much is clear even to the most casual readers of newspapers. In the words of Pope John XXIII, the church has been "bringing herself up-to-date," coming to grips with issues first raised during the 18th-century Enlightenment. As he put it in his opening speech at Vatican II, the church "must ever look to the present, to the new conditions and new forms of life." Theological discovery, he maintained, should be pursued "through the methods of research and the literary forms of modern thought." Scholars took the pope at his word, producing such works as Raymond E. Brown's The Birth of the Messiah: A Commentary on the Infancy Narratives in Matthew and Luke (1977) and Edward C. Schillebeeckx's Jesus: An Experiment in Christology (1979). Catholicism appeared ready to embrace the modern world.

In America, Catholics twice before fell in love with modernity and both times—first during the 1790s and again during the 1890s—they came away repentant. The question is thus unavoidable: Is the current situation a flirtation or a marriage?

The American Revolution altered the lives of all Americans. For one group in particular—the small community of 25,000 Roman Catholics, most of them of English or Irish stock—the difference was especially dramatic. Catholics had long been discriminated against politically, professionally, and socially, but the revolution of 1776 changed all that. New laws and new state constitutions soon gave Catholics religious and political freedom. Catholics could now vote, even run for office, and they jumped quickly into politics. In Maryland and Pennsylvania,
where the majority of them lived, Catholics wielded considerable power.

In the egalitarian atmosphere of the 1780s, relations between Catholics and Protestants became more cordial. They attended services in each other’s churches, sometimes out of necessity (there were not enough priests or ministers), more often out of a genuine interest and curiosity. Mixed marriages were common. Protestants gave money and land for the construction of Catholic churches.

But the republican revolution did more for Catholics than improve their standing in the community. It also influenced the way they thought about their church. And during the 1780s, they began to articulate an understanding of Roman Catholicism that was unique in Western Christendom.

The chief spokesman for this new vision was John Carroll. Born in Upper Marlboro, Maryland, Carroll was educated in Flanders, where he was accepted into the religious order of priests known as the Jesuits. He returned to the colonies in 1774 and soon emerged as an eloquent spokesman for a uniquely American church.

Central to Carroll’s idea of Roman Catholicism in the
United States was a desire that American Catholics be as independent of foreign influence as possible. He urged Rome to grant the U.S. church “that ecclesiastical liberty which the temper of the age and of our people requires.” On some matters, church authorities eventually relented. Thus, rather than appoint a foreigner to head the church in the United States, Pope Pius VI allowed the American clergy to elect their own bishop. The man they elected in May 1789 was John Carroll.

A Call for English

American Catholics also wanted their church to reflect the spirit of the new nation, not mirror the ethos of some foreign country. A native-born clergy was crucial. As Carroll put it, the U.S. church needed men “accustomed to our climate and acquainted with the tempers, manners, and government of the people, to whom they are to dispense the ministry of salvation.” To foster an American clergy, John Carroll founded a school, Georgetown Academy (1789), now Georgetown University.

A further aspect of republican Catholicism was its insistence on religious toleration and the separation of church and state. This was essentially the reverse of the traditional European view, but it came naturally to American Catholics, who knew that if any religion were “established” as a state-supported church in the United States, it would not be theirs.

Enlightenment thought influenced American Catholics profoundly. The Enlightenment demanded faith—faith in the power of reason and understanding. In the realm of religion, such convictions required that doctrine and worship be both intelligible and reasonable; that belief and learning be reconciled. The Catholic Enlightenment, led by European intellectuals such as Joseph Berington (with whom Carroll corresponded), embraced this position, although its spokesmen acknowledged that Enlightenment principles and Christian doctrine were not always compatible.

Carroll’s insistence on the “independence” of the American church was in part a point of principle, in part a consequence of his own experience: His order, the Jesuits, had been suppressed by the pope in 1773. Most of the priests in colonial America were Jesuits.

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RELIGION IN AMERICA

The most visible manifestation of such Reform Catholicism in the United States was the desire to have worship services celebrated in English. "Latin is an unknown Tongue, and in this Country, still more than yours," Carroll wrote to an English colleague in 1784. A vernacular liturgy was never officially adopted, but the use of English in church services was common. Publicly, Carroll was careful to avoid a rift with Rome on the issue; privately, he considered the continued use of Latin an obstacle "to a much more general Diffusion of our Religion, particularly in N. America."

Another effect of the Enlightenment was the democratization of local church government. Under a trustee system, laymen elected by parishioners presided over the temporal affairs of the parish. They collected pew rents, managed the finances, and paid the pastor's salary. Widespread but by no means universal, the trustee system was an attempt to adapt an old church to a new culture. As one Charleston trustee put it, American Catholics must "rear a National American Church, with liberties consonant to the spirit of the Government, under which they live."

In sum, by 1790, the leaders of America's small Catholic community—it numbered about 35,000, the equivalent of a large urban parish in France or Germany, less than one percent of the U.S. population—had envisioned a republican blueprint for their church and begun to build.

"Excesses of Democracy"

Bit by bit, for a variety of reasons, the unfinished edifice began to crumble. First, the election of bishops by the clergy ceased at the turn of the century; Rome began to appoint its own candidates. The vernacular liturgy was the next to go. The trustee system—an occasional source of unseemly quarrels between priests and laymen—faded more slowly, but by the 1850s the European model of clerical supremacy in the parish was again the norm.

Why did American Catholics abandon their republican views? One factor was the conservative reaction that swept through the new nation during the 1790s as Alexander Hamilton and other influential Federalists entertained second thoughts about the beneficial effects of popular democracy. For John Carroll, the turning point appears to have been his ordination as Bishop of Baltimore in 1790. After that, he became more preoccupied with maintaining his own authority. The "excesses of democracy" rekindled his loyalty to Rome, leading him to do all...
he could to prevent, as he put it, "disunion with the Holy See."

A second factor—it would prove decisive—was the influx of large numbers of Europeans, priests and immigrants.

The American church had long suffered from a chronic shortage of priests, and Bishop Carroll needed reinforcements. He got them from France, Germany, and Ireland. By 1795, eight out of 10 priests in the United States were foreign-born. When it came time in 1808 to select bishops for the new dioceses of Boston, New York, Bardstown (Kentucky), and Philadelphia, not one of the men chosen was American.

The Cloak of Americanism

These foreign-born priests generally shared a medieval conception of authority and an exaggerated sense of loyalty to the pope. They were not inclined to adjust their ways to those of a frontier society. The influence of the foreign clergy swelled as Irish and German Catholics began arriving in the United States in large numbers. By 1850, Roman Catholicism had become the largest single denomination in the country (as it still is), numbering more than 1.6 million members. Some 70 percent of the faithful were recent immigrants.

The transformation of American Catholicism into an immigrant Catholicism precluded any further efforts by Anglo-American liberals to fashion a republican church. The overwhelming concern now was simply to meet the spiritual needs of the newcomers. Between 1830 and 1860, the number of churches increased from 230 to 2,385; the number of priests also expanded 10-fold, from 232 to 2,235. As an immigrant institution, the American Catholic church was wedded to the cultures of the Old World; it had become, in a way, "foreign," and was thus a convenient target throughout the 19th century for some Protestant reactionaries—Know-Nothings, for example, and, later, the American Protective Association.

Certainly, the Catholic population was now "different"—politically and socially—from the rest of America. Where the old Anglo-American Catholic nucleus had comprised men and women who in many respects shared the outlook of their Protestant compatriots, the immigrants seemed incapable of conforming to the "national average." They were less likely than other Americans to become farmers, more likely to be unskilled laborers; they had less education, were more likely to live in cities and join the Democratic Party.

They were also extremely loyal to their national churches, with the result that the external aspect of Catholicism varied
AMERICAN CATHOLICS: SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS

By ethnic background:
- Italian
- Hispanic
- Irish
- German
- Black
- Polish
- Other

Clergy and Religious:

Attend Mass once a week or more:


OPINION ON MAJOR CHURCH ISSUES, 1980

<table>
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<th>AGREE</th>
<th>DISAGREE</th>
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<td>47</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
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<td>In general, I approve of the changes in the Catholic Church since Vatican II</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>23</td>
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markedly from neighborhood to neighborhood. It required a strong hierarchy to maintain order and discipline. That task was abetted by immigrant Catholics' uncommonly strong allegiance to the papacy—a suspicious loyalty in the eyes of many non-Catholics, and one that appeared especially threatening after Pope Pius IX's proclamation of papal infallibility in 1870.

For all of these reasons, American Catholics had become something of a people apart by the mid-19th century. Even today Catholic/non-Catholic differences persist, most notably in politics, in the job market, and in opinions on certain social issues.

**Helping the Workers**

American-born Catholic intellectuals such as Orestes Brownson recognized the danger of foreignness and, during the 1860s, urged their coreligionists to put on the cloak of Americanism. American-born priests such as New Yorkers Isaac Hecker (founder of the Paulist fathers) and Richard Burtsell echoed this sentiment. Like their 18th-century counterparts, these men called for an English liturgy, democracy in church government, and openness in Catholic theology to new intellectual discoveries. But such thinking, did not gain much support at the time from working-class Catholic communities.

During the 1880s, however, the situation began to change somewhat, and for the second time in history, a number of American Catholic leaders fell in love with modernity.

Historians are fond of picking out watersheds in history, those epochal moments when an old order dies and a new order takes its place. Unquestionably, the last quarter of the 19th century was such a time in American history. Here, one finds the beginnings of modern industrial America—steel, coal, oil, and the infrastructure and factories that they spawned. With big business came labor unions. And, in the realm of ideas, the Darwinian revolution forced people to reconsider not only the origins of man but the evolution of civilization itself. All of this had a considerable impact on American Catholicism.

The most enduring influence centered on the church's attitude toward labor. In some European countries, notably France, Catholic workers were abandoning the church in large numbers because of its hierarchy's long-time identification with the ruling elite. This never happened in the United States. From the very beginning of the labor movement, prominent church leaders stood behind workers.

James Cardinal Gibbons (1834–1921) was the most famous Catholic opponent of the "mail-clad power of hard and obsti-
nate monopolies." Born in the United States of Irish parents, Gibbons returned to Ireland with his family but immigrated to the United States at the age of 18, settling in New Orleans. He was ordained a priest in 1861 and began his ministry in Baltimore, the city of his birth. Seven years later, he was named bishop of the mission territory of North Carolina. Less than a decade after that, in 1877, he was appointed the Archbishop of Baltimore. During the next 44 years, he was America's leading Catholic churchman, a strong administrator, and at times a cunning ecclesiastical politician.

Gibbons intervened in 1887 when it looked as if the Vatican would condemn the Knights of Labor, the only national labor union in the United States. (Church authorities were upset by the union's ritual of initiation involving secret oaths modeled after those of the Masons.) Called to Rome to accept a Cardinal’s hat, Gibbons used the occasion to intervene on behalf of the Knights, the majority of whom were Catholic laborers. His point of view prevailed.

"Onward Movement of the Mind"

This second romance with modernity did not end at the Catholic "social gospel" (embodied not only in support for labor and wage legislation but also in church-run hospitals, poorhouses, and a growing network of charitable societies). Numerous Catholic leaders also pressed the church "to fit herself to a constantly changing environment, to the character of every people, and to the wants of every age," as Bishop John Lancaster Spalding of Peoria, Illinois, wrote in 1888. Led by Spalding, Archbishop John Ireland of St. Paul, Minnesota, and other like-minded clerics, Catholic liberals pursued a rapprochement between the church and the "onward movement of the mind."

A few Catholic intellectuals were prominent apologists for the Darwinian theory of evolution. Chief among them was Father John A. Zahm, a professor of physics and chemistry at the University of Notre Dame and the most able Catholic scientist of his day. On the lecture platform and later in his book, Evolution and Dogma (1896), Zahm vigorously defended Darwinism and advanced the idea of a theistic evolution that "admits the existence of God, and the development under the action of His Providence of the universe and all it contains."

Enthusiasm for the "new learning" prompted the founding of scholarly journals, such as the American Catholic Quarterly Review. Opposing the Balkanization of the church into ethnic enclaves, liberal Catholics also pushed for the Americanization
of the immigrants. They urged an ecumenical posture toward other religions and were lukewarm at best in their support for parochial schools—which by 1900 were educating about 900,000 children. Running schools was properly the state's business, they believed, and public schools were a force for Americanization. (Most historians agree, however, that the parochial schools did just as good a job in this regard.)

The liberal point of view, though ardently propounded, was a minority one, and to most of America's 10 million Catholics, it was also irrelevant. The church in 1895 was a sprawling enterprise, administered by 14 archbishops and 73 bishops. The hierarchy was chiefly concerned about dealing with a new influx of Catholic immigrants from Eastern Europe and Italy, and few prelates had much time to think seriously about "reform." Of those who did, many, including Bishop Bernard McQuaid of Rochester, opposed the liberals. The Vatican ultimately came out on their side. In 1899, Pope Leo XIII condemned what he called "Americanism," the desire to have "a church in America different from that which is in the rest of the world."
Pope Leo, however, never grappled with the more delicate issue of theological "Modernism"—of interpreting the old truths of Catholicism in the light of contemporary scholarship. He left that to his successor, Pius X. It did not take long for the new pontiff to reveal his thinking. In 1907, Pius published his famous anti-Modernist encyclical, *Pascendi*. In the pope's opinion, Modernism could lead to a corruption of traditional Catholic doctrine, and in a narrow sense, he was right. Such avowed Modernists as biblical scholar Alfred Loisy in France and Jesuit George Tyrrell in England were using modern historical and critical methods to analyze traditional Catholic teachings. In the process, they sometimes reached conclusions that were at odds with Catholic belief. Loisy, for example, contested the idea that Jesus Christ had intended to found a church and asserted that Christ was not conscious of himself as a divine being.

**The Council and After**

There was more at stake than theological orthodoxy. The basic question was what orientation Catholics should take toward a changing world. Should Catholic scholars attempt to reconcile traditional church teachings with modern thought and culture? Should they attempt to come to terms with the revolutionary developments in 19th-century science and scholarship? The pope, unequivocally, said no.

While Modernism was predominantly a European movement, its influence was felt in the United States; so, too, was the pope's condemnation. With *Pascendi*, the lights went out for American Catholic intellectuals. A few priests, such as William L. Sullivan, left the church. Others, like John Zahm, turned to less controversial pursuits. (Zahm started writing travel guides to South America.) Catholic seminarians were prohibited from attending classes at secular universities. Before long, a Jesuit priest, George Bull, was able to write that "research cannot be the primary object of Catholic graduate school, because it is at war with the whole Catholic life of the mind."

The Catholic social gospel remained a solitary symbol of progressive thought. To some conservative prelates, such as William Cardinal O'Connell of Boston, even this was suspect: Suffering was good for the soul. This view did not survive the Great Depression, when the church hierarchy, strongly backed by the Vatican, threw itself into the task of organizing relief.

The contemporary Catholic revival began almost imperceptibly during the late 1940s and early '50s as scattered critics lamented the "ghetto mentality" and intellectual stagnation.
THINKING IT OVER

Whether American Catholics could accept "modernity" was a clear challenge during the 18th century, when modernity meant the Enlightenment, and again during the 19th, when it meant evolutionism. But in the present "postmodern" world, the challenge is more ambiguous. If modernity means confidence in the power of reason to solve all questions, or in the power of evolution to achieve unlimited progress, modernity itself is out of date. Many Americans, Catholic or not, are more apprehensive than exhilarated about the prospects for the future.

Less ambiguous is the question of how American Catholicism must relate itself to the general culture of the nation. Here a real shift has taken place. When Catholics in the United States were chiefly poor, immigrant laborers, the formation of ghetto-like subcultures was almost inevitable. World War II and the events of the subsequent decade burst the ghettos open and thrust Catholics into the mainstream of American life. The rise of John F. Kennedy to the Presidency symbolized the eligibility of Catholics for the highest positions of affluence and power. In this regard, Vatican II, with its moderate accommodationism, did little more than ratify what had already in this country become a fact of life. Nothing could have forced American Catholics to favor a European-style union of church and state. Nor could church authorities have easily prevented the vernacular from being introduced into the liturgy before long.

Because Catholics in this country are by now immersed in the general culture, it is inevitable that they will take part in the various movements that pulsate through the land. They will take up causes that seem urgent and, feeling quite at home in America, will feel free to join in popular protest movements—as has already happened in the case of the civil-rights movement, the peace movement, and the ecology movement.

In this new situation, the church will have to be sufficiently flexible and permissive to accommodate groups having different orientations nurtured by conservative Catholicism. Father John Cavanaugh, President of Notre Dame, put the question most poignantly: "Where are the Catholic Salks, Oppenheimers, Einsteins?" In 1955, historian John Tracy Ellis published a celebrated essay, "American Catholics and the Intellectual Life," wherein he criticized American Catholics for their "failure to make a notable mark" in the world of scholarship.

Other signs of an awakening were not hard to find. The writings of progressive European theologians such as Karl Rahner,
tions. A measure of "loyal opposition" to official teaching from within the church is probably inevitable. But American Catholics can hardly define themselves simply in terms of what they reject in the teaching of their own church. To be a Catholic, if it means anything, implies a fundamental solidarity with a perennial tradition and with a faith community that transcends national frontiers.

For reasons that are historically understandable, liberal Catholics of the recent past have been preoccupied with the problem of getting out from under what they see as repressive "authority." Liberalism teaches Catholics how to reject, but not how to cherish, their own past; how to embrace, but not how to critique, the secular. Many Catholics, who in adolescence or young adulthood experienced the shock of Vatican II, have yet to learn how a church that changes can be revered and loved. Having won the battle against authoritarianism, they will have to ask themselves how, with their new freedom, they can make a distinctively Catholic contribution to America.

Serious contemplation of this question may deter Catholics from infatuation or hasty marriage with modernity. It may make them, in theology, conscious of the limits of pure reason and of the depth of the mystery of God. It may give them, in worship, an appreciation of the rich symbolism of their tradition as a needed supplement to the gregarious hymn-singing recently borrowed from free-church Protestantism. In biblical interpretation, Catholics may again be prompted, as their forebears were, to go beyond the findings of historical-critical scholarship in order to experience the power of God's word. In church-state relations, they may be led to reaffirm the importance of religion as an essential support to public order and morality. Generally speaking, Catholics will be well advised to tap their own religious heritage in order to enrich what is sound, and correct what is amiss, in the successive waves of modernity that break upon us.

—Avery Dulles, S.J.

Father Dulles, a former Wilson Center Fellow, is a theologian at the Catholic University of America.
had once condemned. Since 1962, worship services have undergone a major overhaul. The Catholic social gospel, never abandoned, has been given new force and a global mission. Relations between the Roman church and other denominations have warmed dramatically, partly as a result of Vatican II's acknowledgement of "the right to religious freedom." Catholic scholars such as Richard McBrien and Raymond Brown have endorsed a theological method that emphasizes a historical and critical interpretation of both the Bible and tradition. Biblical scholar George MacRae underlined the meaning of this shift: "The affirmations of the Bible," he wrote, "are in varying ways conditioned by the limitation of time, culture, human understanding, literary expression, and all the factors that make up what is called the historical relativity of the various biblical books."

A World Church

Underlying all of this was the most fundamental change of all: As Karl Rahner has noted, since Vatican II Catholicism has become "a world Church whose individual churches exist with a certain independence in their respective cultural spheres, inculcated, and no longer a European export." The thriving, indigenous church in Africa is the best evidence for Rahner's thesis.

Admittedly, in religion as in politics, the ideological pendulum is again swinging toward conservatism. This is evident in Pope John Paul II's efforts to order priests out of politics, to maintain a celibate clergy, and to control faculty appointments in Catholic theological schools. In my opinion, the pendulum may continue to swing, but the hands of the clock itself cannot be pushed back.

First, the impact of Vatican II has not been limited to the United States; it is worldwide. Trying to contain it in one place will not prevent its resurgence in another. Besides, in contrast to the situation during the 1780s and 1880s, a church council itself fostered this new relationship between church and culture, between ancient truths and the modern mind.

Furthermore, Catholics today realize, far more than their predecessors did, that the church is flexible. Whatever else Vatican II did, Garry Wills has written, "it let out the dirty little secret. It forced upon Catholics, in the most startling symbolic way, the fact that the Church changes." No one school of theological interpretation can any longer claim a monopoly on truth.

Finally, the 50 million American Catholics are a more highly educated group of people than were their immigrant
predecessors. In terms of education, occupation, and income, the demographic profile of U.S. Catholics today more nearly resembles that of white, Northern Protestants. (The exception here is the nation's Hispanic Catholic population, concentrated in the American Southwest. This is the fastest growing segment of U.S. Catholics—but also the poorest, the most rural, and the least educated.) The vast majority are middle-class Americans searching for meaning in the world of the late 20th century. They want (and need) intelligible answers, not authoritarian pronouncements, to questions involving family life, moral behavior, and religious belief. It is difficult to imagine them settling for anything less.

To claim that the situation is different this time around may seem overly optimistic, especially when a theological conservative is pope. But this is 1981, not 1907. The pope is not the church; rather, as the Second Vatican Council expressed it, the church is "the people of God." Catholics raised during the last 25 years believe this profoundly. They may disagree with church authorities—over divorce, birth control, abortion—but when they do, they generally do not break with the faith. Nor do church authorities expel them from the flock. As Archbishop John R. Roach of St. Paul–Minneapolis said last November, "We would regard the use of contraceptives as a deviation from the moral law [but] if you do [use contraceptives] you are not excluded from unity with the church."

Recent Gallup polls reveal that the rise in church attendance among Catholics in recent years has been most dramatic among young adults between the ages of 18 and 29. This is the group that came of age after Vatican II. In The Search for America's Faith (1980), George Gallup, Jr. and David Poling asserted that "a vital new spirit is flowing through the Catholic community. The conflict/crisis mood of a decade ago has yielded to a new flowering of faith and a new confidence about being a Catholic in America." Fundamental to this new spirit is a more open, more positive stance toward modern culture. What this means for the future of Catholicism in the United States is unclear. Having caught up with the modern world, the church must now keep up with it.
Since the late 1960s, American Jews have been uneasy. This uneasiness is surprising; perhaps it is unwarranted. After all, probably no Jewish community in world history has been, at the same time, so numerous, so prosperous, so influential, so secure, as have American Jews during the past 30 years. American Jews have surpassed in these respects the remarkable position achieved by the Jews of Germany in the Weimar Republic. Taking account of their much smaller numbers (one percent of the German population, against almost three percent of the American), German Jews were, if anything, more distinguished than American Jews in scholarship, science, and culture, and probably more prosperous. But as events demonstrated, they were far from politically secure.

In contrast, American Jews live in a society in which, in truth, there are no strangers. The United States is unique among the great nations of the world in the degree to which it refuses to define itself in ethnic or religious or national terms, as our basic founding documents make clear. In practice, of course, it took almost two centuries before the promises of these documents were fully realized. But, since 1965, theory and practice have become one in the United States.

This established, we return to the question: Why the uneasiness? Does it simply reflect a paranoia created by the events of the past, the ingrained fear of persecution, the expectation of renewed massacres, because of a 2,000-year history in which persecution and disaster have been the norm? Perhaps. But there are more immediate explanations.

To give legitimate reasons—legitimate, in the sense of being understandable, rationally based on evidence—is not easy. This is so, in part, because if one predicts difficulties, one's readers—Jews and observers of Jews—easily leap to the worst, since the Holocaust, after all, is only 35 years in the past. Nothing like that, to my mind, will happen in America; it is inconceivable. I do not even believe that there is any chance that the United States will revert to the racism and anti-Semitism of the past that made possible the rigid two-caste system in the South, the
incarceration of the Japanese-American population during World War II, or the massive exclusion of Jews from broad reaches of the economy. The course this country set in the mid-1960s is secure and firmly fixed. I see no withdrawal.

But one cause of Jewish uneasiness is what has happened as we have moved on this course toward creating a more equal, multiracial society. A statistical standard to test for discrimination in employment and education has rapidly grown and has been widely accepted by federal, state, and local administrators. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Civil Rights Commission, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance of the Department of Labor, and other government agencies now require employers and institutions of education to report on the number of blacks, Hispanic-Americans, American Indians, and Asian-Americans they employ, promote, admit to educational programs, and the like. Government agencies take action on the basis of these reports.

One can see why this rapidly spreading development is a problem for all Americans, for our polity is built on individual rights, not group rights, and we all share a certain repugnance when forced to report on, or be judged on the basis of, our race, ethnic origins, or religion. But why should this be a special problem for Jews?

There are a number of reasons, and each is rooted in a distinctive part of American Jewish experience.

**Once at the forefront of the civil-rights movement, many Jews are now divided over affirmative action. If the “underrepresented” merit help, do the “overrepresented” deserve blame?**
First, Jews have long committed themselves unreservedly to a colorblind (or religion-blind or national origins-blind) approach to rooting out discrimination. When Jews developed political influence in New York and other states, they were the most vigorous fighters for state legislation that banned employers and schools from seeking information on race, religion, or ethnicity and from acting on such information. To see a value one holds dear undergo a transformation into its opposite—and the shift from colorblindness to color consciousness could be seen as no less than that—was a deeply upsetting experience.

Second, as a result of this change, Jewish organizations discovered that long-term alliances they had taken for granted with other civil-rights groups were broken. It was and is truly agonizing for many Jewish liberals (and most Jews are liberal) to decide on their position on these issues—and many Jews, because they are lawyers, civil-rights activists, judges, community leaders, must take positions. No position they come to makes them happy. Many found that principles they held deeply and considered liberal were now attacked as conservative, reactionary, or even racist.

Third, Jews were themselves more deeply split on civil-rights issues than any other group was, another cause of discomfort. This split, which divides Jews almost evenly, was at work during the hotly contested 1976 New York primary for Democratic Senator, when Jews had to choose between Bella Abzug and Daniel P. Moynihan. What troubled many was Moynihan’s perceived conservative position on black issues, and blacks’ unfavorable attitude toward him. The issue was not whether to vote for a Jewish candidate or not. Jews have generally voted for the more liberal candidate, regardless of race or religion. The more liberal candidate is, to Jews, the “Jewish” candidate.

Of course, Jews are not different from other citizens in dividing on these difficult issues, but they divide with greater intensity. For in taking a position, they make a judgment about their entire political past. They decide whether they were right...

Nathan Glazer, is professor of education and sociology at Harvard University and coeditor of The Public Interest. Born in New York City, he received a B.S.S. from City College (1944) and a Ph.D. from Columbia (1962). His books include The Lonely Crowd (with David Riesman and Reuel Denney, 1950), American Judaism (1957), Beyond the Melting Pot (with Daniel P. Moynihan, 1963), and Affirmative Discrimination (1976). Adapted from The Third Century: America as a Post-Industrial Society, edited by Seymour Martin Lipset, with the permission of the publishers, Hoover Institution Press. Copyright © 1979 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University.
or wrong in fighting so vigorously and consistently for the colorblind position and whether in doing so they were simply promoting their individual and group interests—for Jews are "overrepresented" in the occupations most often at the center of disputes over quotas and affirmative action: medicine, law, higher education. In taking their position, they also decide who are their allies and their enemies; they question their basic political outlook; and they find, if they oppose quotas, that they are now allied with groups they have never been allied with before. This is uncomfortable as well as surprising.

**Fighting for Israel**

A clash of loyalties thus divides Jews on affirmative action. There is a second clash of loyalties, one that is potentially more serious: between loyalty to Israel and what are considered Israel's interests, and loyalty to the United States and what are conceived of as American interests.

Israel has become the pre-eminent issue in American Jewish life, to a degree that could not have been envisaged in 1948, or 1957, or 1966. Newspapers, the mass media generally, political candidates (especially presidential candidates) are aware of how important Israel is to American Jews. What is not often realized is how relatively new is the absolute predominance of Israel in American Jewish concerns.

In the early postwar period, the Jewish community of Israel amounted to only six percent of the Jewish people. Within individual Jewish communities, including that of the United States, Zionism had been a minority movement. Jewish organizations fought over how much of the money raised for Jewish causes should go to Israel and how much to other claimants. Jews in other countries who were in distress (particularly those who emerged from the concentration camps of Europe and the Jews of Arab lands) had a strong claim to Jewish charitable funds. Domestic needs—synagogues, temples, schools, hospitals, social service agencies—also rated high among Jewish priorities.

The exclusive and overwhelming concern of American Jews with Israel dates from the Six Day War of 1967, when it appeared at first that Israel might be defeated and its Jewish inhabitants massacred. American Jews discovered then that Israel meant much more to them than they realized. Everything possible was done to save Israel. Political pressure was mobilized, large sums of money were raised in a surprisingly short time, and thousands of U.S. volunteers left to fight. If in the past it was possible for some Jews to separate their commitment to Ju-
daism from their commitment to Israel, after 1967 this was no longer possible.

Israel has become the Jewish religion for American Jews. To those who think in terms of Christianity—and perhaps to some Jews, too—that may sound blasphemous or heretical. How can anything of this world be absolutized to the point where it becomes the central theme of religion, while "other-worldly" themes are put aside? That, I would argue, is a rather non-Jewish way of looking at religion.

The Jewish religion has always been linked to a single people. Among the great religions, it is perhaps unique in this respect. Judaism is inconceivable without Jews, the actual and living people. Christianity is quite conceivable without the adherence of any particular ethnic group, as is Islam. After the Holocaust, this apparently archaic feature of the Jewish religion became very modern again. The most creative Jewish theologian on the North American continent, Emil Fackenheim, emphasizes in his theology the centrality of the physical survival of the Jewish people—particularly in the aftermath of a diabolical effort, which enjoyed considerable success, to destroy them.

One can thus make an argument out of Jewish theology and history that the Jewish commitment to Israel has something of a religious character. The problem is that Israel is a state, as well as the Zion whose restoration God promised to the Jews. And therein hangs a potential difficulty that Jews have only recently become aware of—one that can only become more serious with time, it appears to me. The difficulty is the potential conflict between loyalty to the United States and loyalty to Israel.

Put so bluntly, it may appear that I am manufacturing problems out of thin air. After all, there is no danger that the United States and Israel will be on opposite sides in a war, a fate that German-Americans and Japanese-Americans had to confront. But in all other respects, the problem of Israel sharply raises the question of dual loyalty. Israel evokes a much deeper and more emotional commitment by American Jews than I think any homeland ever has from another American ethnic group.* After all, Israel is unique in that it is threatened not only with defeat and the loss of territories but with annihilation up to, one assumes, the massacre of its inhabitants.

If American Jews were an uninfluential group, it would perhaps not matter much that they are deeply committed to the survival of Israel. Jews make up less than three percent of the

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*I use "homeland" for Israel even though, of course, few American Jews have come from there. Many—perhaps most—have relatives there, and it takes the place of a homeland in sentiment, religion, and ideology.
FLYING OFF INTO SPACE

The growing concern among American Jews over the high incidence of Jewish-Gentile intermarriage seems justified by the available statistics. But Hillel Halkin, an American-born Israeli writer, regards intermarriage as a “side issue.” In Letters to an American Jewish Friend (1977), he defined what he saw as the ‘real problem’:

For every Jew who intermarries in America today there are several more who might have and did not by sheer accident, and who are for all practical purposes lost to the Jewish community as well. For every Jewish molecule that combines with a non-Jewish one to form an identifiably new compound, other pairs simply fly off into space by themselves. Who does not know such American Jews? They belong to that vague, totally assimilated, outer margin of the American Jewish population whose invisibility is a sign that it is shapeless but not small.

They were born Jews; many were raised as such (a Bar Mitzvah, two or three years of Hebrew school, an annual family seder, Hanukkah gifts at Christmas time); many of their friends may be Jews; but this is as far as their Jewishness goes. Which is not to say that they have any wish to hide it. On the contrary, it would no more occur to them to do so than it would to join a synagogue or teach their children Hebrew, since being Jewish is too trivial a thing in their eyes to be worth either denying or affirming. They are no more ashamed of their Jewish names than are other Americans of their Polish or Italian ones, and no more conscious of them either. They may react to Jews who are more Jewish than themselves and to the issues that concern them with varying degrees of sympathy or disdain, but rarely with any great interest.

They are Americans of Jewish descent, and if they happen to be married to other such Americans, this is because the sociological probabilities of its happening are high. They will be lower for their children, who are not being raised as Jews at all, and still lower for their grandchildren, while the chances of either generation finding its way back to Jewish life one day will be slim, for nothing in their upbringing will have remotely inclined them that way.

How many such Jews are there in America today? This is anybody’s guess since statistically they exist only by an unreliable process of elimination, that is, by subtracting the supposed number of affiliated Jews from the supposed American Jewish population as a whole. And yet knowledgeable estimates do not vary that much, the figures most commonly cited being between 20 and 30 percent. And one thing is clear: Whatever the number, it is rapidly growing, at least as quickly as the rate of intermarriage, with which it shares the same patterns of distribution and ultimately the same causes.

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ATTITUDES TOWARD AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, 1980

"Students from disadvantaged social backgrounds should be given preferential treatment in college admissions."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AGREE</th>
<th>DISAGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All college freshmen</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>62.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish freshmen</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
<td>68.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Higher Education Research Institute, University of California, Los Angeles.

A typical pollster's random sample of 1,500 Americans includes few Jews (they make up less than three percent of the population) and so precludes a reliable breakdown of Jewish opinion on many issues. One survey of Jews and non-Jews conducted in 1980 (above) confirmed the conventional wisdom: Jews are less likely than others to support "affirmative action." Yet far fewer Jewish college freshmen opposed affirmative action in 1969. Jewish "self-identification" tends to decline in mixed-marriage households (below). Three-quarters of the children of mixed-marriage couples receive no formal religious instruction.

INTERMARRIAGE AND JEWISH IDENTITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious and cultural objects in the home</th>
<th>Own, use, or display</th>
<th>Own but do not use</th>
<th>Do not own</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mezuzah</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>54.7%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabbath candle</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menorah</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>66.9%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seder plate</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish prayer book</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S. population, and that proportion is declining. But despite their relatively small numbers in this country, there are enough of them (about six million) and they are prominent enough, owing to their disproportionately high distribution in business, public office, the professions, and the academy, that they matter politically. Yet there are not enough of them to matter decisively. It is an odd position to be in, and if the needs of American foreign policy dictate the withdrawal of active support for Israel (as such needs have for many of our leading allies anxious to ensure continued supplies of oil from Israel's Arab foes), what will American Jews do—and what will their fellow citizens think of them?

The Risks of Exceptionality

There is yet a third conflict of loyalties, more internal to the Jewish community and the Jewish religion, that in some sense underlies these first two. Both in the first conflict, over group rights and individual rights, and the second conflict, over support for American national interests and Israeli interests, there is fear among American Jews of standing out, of appearing exceptional. Jews on the whole do not think it to their advantage to have it pointed out how successful they have been in entering esteemed and rewarding professions, or how special and distinctive is their support for Israel.

But then an underlying question emerges: How can Jews protect themselves from exceptionality and its risks as long as they are identifiably Jews? This issue came up in Central Europe during the 19th century, as Jews escaped the ghettos and became successful. One answer—at the time it appeared somewhat eccentric—was proposed by Theodore Herzl, who said that the Jews could only avoid the dangers of their position by leaving Europe to live in a state of their own. A rather more popular answer, in behavior if not in ideology, was assimilation. There were a great number of conversions to Christianity, a great number of intermarriages.

Arthur Ruppin, the great sociologist of European Jewry in the earlier part of this century, documented the amazing flight into intermarriage in Germany, Austria, and Hungary, where some 30 to 40 percent of young Jews were marrying non-Jews. While it is doubtful that the deliberate intention of those who intermarried was indeed to make their people disappear as a distinct entity, assimilation appealed to many Jews as a solution to the "Jewish problem."

The course of events in the United States has been quite dif-
different, until recently. Among the Jewish immigrants from Germany, the dominant group of American Jews until 1880, there was admittedly a good deal of conversion and intermarriage. But Jews from Eastern Europe, who today make up the overwhelming part of American Jews, seemed peculiarly resistant to both. They might abandon the practice of the Jewish religion, but this was less conversion than the embrace of an alternative secular faith—socialism or rationalism, say, which often seemed to the outside world as Jewish as Judaism itself.

But the past decade has seen some changes. Conversion is not yet the issue, and perhaps may never be—though it is odd, and perhaps more than odd, that President Carter's Cabinet contained three members (Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal, Energy Secretary James Schlesinger, and Defense Secretary Harold Brown) who were born Jews but who converted to Christianity during the course of their careers. Yet conversion is not much talked about and not much in evidence statistically.

**Diminishing Numbers**

The main issue of the Jewish demographic future is now posed by intermarriage and low birth rates. Until the 1950s, intermarriage by U.S. Jews as a whole was low. In the late 1960s and 1970s, it became remarkably widespread, with some 20 percent of young Jews marrying non-Jews. This figure is not surprising when one realizes that almost all young American Jews go away to college (as early as 1953, one of six American Jews had a degree, compared to one of 20 other Americans) and meet non-Jews. Jews also go on to postgraduate training disproportionately. In 1969, young Jews (25 to 34 years old) already had an average of more than 16 years of education. The figure for Italian- and Irish-Americans was about 12.5 years.

What happens to the children of intermarried couples? To begin with, studies show that the intermarried have fewer children than Jews in general have. There is some reason to think that a substantial proportion of children of the intermarried are raised as Jews (perhaps as many as one-half), but there is little question that their identity as Jews is less strong than that of the offspring of two Jewish parents.* Thus, intermarriage inevitably reduces the number who will identify themselves as Jews in future generations.

*According to one recent study, only about one-half of Jewish men who marry non-Jewish women say that they intend to give their children Hebrew names or have them Bar (or Bat) Mitzvahed. Jewish women who marry non-Jewish men are even less likely to stress their children's Jewish identity. See Egon M. Mayer, "Processes and Outcomes in Marriages Between Jews and Non-Jews," American Behavioral Scientist, April 1980.
As significant as intermarriage is U.S. Jews' overall low birthrate. For decades—certainly since the 1950s—the Jewish birthrate has been remarkably low. Only Japanese-Americans match Jews among ethnic groups in the paucity of children they bear. The percentage of Jews in the American population has been dropping since the mid-1920s, when it reached a peak of about four percent. If the Jewish percentage today was what it was in the mid-1920s, there would be nine million American Jews instead of six.

Undoubtedly, the extended time spent in education, leading to later marriage and later childbearing, has been a factor. Perhaps another, related, is the concentration of Jews in the professions. Higher education, attendance at the better colleges, and concentration in the well-paying professions (law and medicine more than teaching or nursing) has made Jews prosperous. Indeed, Thomas Sowell, the economist who has been studying American ethnicity, presents figures to show that Jewish family incomes are 72 percent above the U.S. average. Affluence correlates with lower birth rates, among all ethnic groups.

Jews proportionately may have more weight—economically, politically, and culturally—than do other groups. But there is no question that there are many fewer of them than there would be if they were not so well educated, so mobile, so
prosperous. And, of course, this kind of social mobility also tends to reduce commitment to tradition and identification with Jewish causes. If Jews were less successful, they would certainly be better Jews.

Rabbis have long thundered against conversion and intermarriage. Other Jewish leaders are now beginning, more hesitantly, to discuss the birthrate and to project how many Jews there will be in the United States by the end of the century and beyond. Certainly, there will be fewer than there are now.

A Question of Survival

There are many reasons why a call for marriage within the group and for a higher birthrate cannot be issued forcefully, or, if issued, has little impact. The main one is that marriage and children are seen as individual choices, which should not be affected by ideology or religion. The second is that it is very hard to present demands affecting marriage and having children as religious imperatives rather than as being crudely nationalist, or even worse, racist. The Jewish religion is a peculiar one. Our common contemporary image of religion is universalist, divorced from given groups; the indissoluble and essential link between Jewish people and the Jewish religion is not understood or accepted by Jews raised in an American environment. Here and now, religion is seen as a personal choice, as little constrained as one’s choice of marriage partner.

This underlying conflict, then, is between loyalties, to individual choice, individual happiness, individual development, personal expression, wherever it leads, and to traditional group demands, rooted in an ancient religion but now, because of the general decline of faith, stripped of the dignity religion is capable of giving them. It is not easy to express or make credible the purely religious component in the notion that there should be more Jews—particularly when there are clearly explainable nationalist and practical reasons for more Jews (the strength of Israel, the strength of the American Jewish community as an active supporter of Israel). Indeed, the strictly religious requirements that have evolved over many centuries to define a Jew, and that have the force of state support in Israel (e.g., a child born of a non-Jewish mother is legally not a Jew in Israel), are now attacked by many critics of Zionism and Israel—Jewish and non-Jewish—as racist, and it is a rare American Jew who knows enough, or is clear enough, about these issues to counter this devastating charge.

Loyalty to Jews and Judaism, I am convinced, simply can-
not be made parallel to other American ethnic loyalties. Jews may say they oppose affirmative action just as Italians and Poles do, or that they support Israel just as Greeks support Greece and the Irish Ireland. But something more is at stake: an ancient history that has linked people and religion and made Jews exceptional everywhere. We do not see among Jews in America today any large-scale, reasoned attack on the maintenance of this exceptionality, as occurred among German Jews in the 19th century. But there has been a silent departure, on a surprisingly large scale, from the actions that will sustain this people and religion.

This departure has occurred not because "it is hard to be a Jew." It has never been easier in the United States. But individual choice, modern culture, and the difficulty of justifying an ancient faith in an individualistic and modern society, all contribute to the reduction of the number of Jews.

The three conflicting loyalties that I have addressed are the issues facing American Jews, and they cannot be wished away. But American values—which Jews hold as closely as any other Americans—suggest solutions, none easy.

Somewhere in the American commitment to individual rights on the one hand and equality on the other, there are answers to the conflicts between these two values; somewhere in the long American commitment to democracy and the independence of small nations, there are ways of reconciling distinctive Jewish political interests and larger American foreign policy interests. One can also find in the tradition of American tolerance for diversity a place for the Jewish people and religion, however individual Jews manage to iron out the conflict between individualism and modernity on the one hand, and tradition and community on the other.

The answers that emerge may seem not like answers to everybody but only as defeats. I emphasize my own values when I say that if, in each case, individual and group choices of distinctive values are respected, America's third century should turn out as well for American Jews as the first two have.
"The religious history of the American people [is] one of the grandest epics in the history of mankind. The stage is continental in size, and the cast is produced by the largest trans-oceanic migration and the most rapid continental dispersion of people the world has ever seen."

As Sydney E. Ahlstrom proceeds to show in his two-volume *A Religious History of the American People* (Yale, 1972, cloth; Doubleday, 1975, paper), a traveler making his way from Boston to the Carolinas as early as 1700 would have encountered Congregationalists, Baptists, Presbyterians, and Quakers; Dutch, German, and French Reformed; Swedish, Finnish, and German Lutherans; Mennonites and radical Pietists; Anglicans and Roman Catholics; some Jews; and a few Rosicrucians.

The distinctive patterns of American religion were shaped, in part, by the New World's distance from Europe, Ahlstrom notes. The Puritans transferred their faith in Britain as an "Elect Nation" to the settlements they founded in New England. By 1893, their descendants, including Congregationalist Josiah Strong, were championing the United States as a new Rome, destined to "Anglo-Saxonize" the world. New England Calvinism, Ahlstrom believes, gave American religion a tone, an establishment, and a moral consensus, and he laments its long decline as a dominant cultural force.

If Ahlstrom overstates the pre-eminence of New England Puritanism, Martin E. Marty's *Righteous Empire* (Dial, 1970, cloth; Harper, 1977, paper) constitutes a partial antidote. In recounting the Protestant quest for a "kingdom of God" in America, Marty frequently ventures beyond New England to the "overlooked Protestants." He depicts the unease with which Anglo-Saxons sometimes viewed the ethnic Protestants further south. Many were of two minds about the growing number of black Christians: "It was feared that [blacks] would get ideas of freedom if they read about Moses leading God's people out of slavery in Egypt." But others saw religion as a valuable tool of the slave-holder: "The Gospel," wrote one Northern clergyman in 1836, "teaches [the slave] obedience to God, and faithfulness to the interests of his earthly master."

Still, Marty's focus is "mainline" Protestantism. The evangelical strain in American Protestantism has other chroniclers. In *Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform* (Univ. of Chicago, 1978, cloth; 1980, paper), William G. McLoughlin identifies successive periods of religious "awakening" in America, beginning with the "Puritan revitalization" (1610-40), followed by the "First Great Awakening" (1730-60), and concluding with what he believes to be a "Fourth Great Awakening" that began in 1960. Now as before, he writes, Americans "are in a difficult period of reorientation, seeking an understanding of who we are, how we relate to the rest of the universe."

Evangelicals have often channeled fervor into "good works," as Timothy Smith demonstrates in *Revivalism and Social Reform* (Abingdon,
1957; Johns Hopkins, rev. ed., 1980, paper only). From its pre-Civil War emphasis on personal spirituality and public morality (e.g., temperance, abolition), revivalism evolved into a search for the causes of human suffering and a campaign to reconstruct social and economic relations upon a Christian pattern.

By the end of the 19th century, according to Henry May, in Protestant Churches and Industrial America (Harper, 1949; Octagon, 1963), some radical Christians, in the name of the "Social Gospel," were calling for paper money and state ownership of communications industries.

Richard Quebedeaux brings the story of The Worldly Evangelicals (Harper, 1980, paper) up to date. In this compact survey, he takes in the current evangelical scene from Billy Graham to the left-wing People's Christian Coalition to sex manuals for the born again.

George Marsden's long-awaited Fundamentalism and American Culture 1870–1925 (Oxford, 1980) has been deservedly praised as a careful unraveling of the tangled roots of a movement that gave shape to much of 20th-century evangelicalism. Marsden punctures the conventional wisdom. He argues, for example, that in the debate of the 1920s over evolution, the Fundamentalists were not "anti-science." Rather, Marsden shows, they were mistakenly "judging the standards of the later scientific revolution by the standards of the first—the revolution of Bacon and Newton. In their view, science depended on fact and demonstration. Darwinism, so far as they could see, was based on neither."

Wilson Carey McWilliams's The Idea of Fraternity in America (Univ. of Calif., 1973, cloth & paper), though sometimes prolix, remains the finest account of a still-raging conflict between the Protestant ideal of a covenant ("the fraternity of the Elect," unwaveringly committed to specified values and goals) and the Lockeian notion of contract (an agreement to form a political society). The American predilection for a politics of "interest-balancing," McWilliams says, has always clashed with Reformation religion's notion of a substantive "common good" that does not admit of compromise.

Jews and Catholics have typically shunned the Protestant idea of covenant, largely because it has usually been defined so as to exclude Jews and Catholics. Protestant nativism, a recurring phenomenon in American religious history, is the subject of Ray Billington's The Protestant Crusade 1800–1860 (Macmillan, 1938; Times Books, 1976, paper).

Billington traces periodic flare-ups of "No Popery" sentiment back to Tudor England. The Puritans of Massachusetts and the Anglicans of Virginia, he notes, "had seen the constant plot and counter-plot of the reigns of Elizabeth and James I when Catholic forces threatened to invade their land." Cut off from the mother country, American Protestants were largely unaffected by the "liberal currents" that gradually nurtured a spirit of toleration in the Old World.

There is a sore need for a new general history of Catholicism in America. John Tracy Ellis's standard American Catholicism (Univ. of Chicago, 1956; 2nd ed., 1969, cloth & paper) has certain virtues, not the least of them its reminder that the Catholics were "here first." (Some 35,000 Catholic Indians, converted by Spanish missionaries, were living in New Mexico as the Puritan Plymouth Colony was getting underway.) But Ellis's book is too heavily
devoted to institutional history and hierarchical biography. Thomas McAvoy's *A History of the Catholic Church in the United States* (Univ. of Notre Dame, 1969) is a good supplement but quite dated.

A highly regarded interpretive survey of changes in the American Catholic church since Vatican II is David O'Brien's *The Renewal of American Catholicism* (Oxford, 1972, cloth; Paulist, 1974, paper). For an insider's account of the council itself, one cannot improve on the pseudonymous Xavier Rynne's wry, sometimes acid letters *Letters from Vatican City* (Farrar, 1963); *The Second Session* (Farrar, 1964); *The Third Session* (Farrar, 1965); and *The Fourth Session* (Farrar, 1966). Many of these letters originally appeared in *The New Yorker*.

The best guides to Catholic sensibilities and political tendencies are Andrew M. Greeley's *The American Catholic: A Social Portrait* (Basic, 1977, cloth; 1978, paper) and Mary Hanna's *Catholics and American Politics* (Harvard, 1979). Greeley begins with several "givens": that American Catholics are predominantly lower-middle-class, blue-collar workers; that they are politically conservative; that Catholic priests are unhappy in their vocations; that Catholic support for parochial schools is waning. "Every one of the above propositions," he states, "is demonstrably false."

The most exciting new studies of U.S. Catholics have been social histories of ethnic groups for whom religious faith has been an inducement to cultural cohesion. Representative of this genre are Victor Greene's *For God and Country: The Rise of Polish and Lithuanian Consciousness in America, 1860-1910* (State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1975) and Humbert S. Nelli's *The Italians in Chicago 1880-1930* (Oxford, 1970; 1973, cloth & paper).

Arguably the best single social history of ethnic religiosity is Irving Howe's stirring story of American Judaism, *World of Our Fathers* (Harcourt, 1976, cloth; Simon & Schuster, 1977, paper). The first recorded arrival of Jews in what is now the United States occurred in September 1654 when a French ship, the *St. Charles*, sailed into New York harbor with 23 Jewish refugees from South America. By 1780, some 3,000 Jews were living in the 13 colonies.

Howe's account starts with the massive influx of (primarily) East European Jews beginning in the 1880s. "Once past initial barriers," Howe writes, "the Jews were allowed an entry into social and economic life on terms more favorable than any they had dreamed of. [All that America] asked was that the Jews surrender their collective self."

Two important anthologies provide glimpses of Jewish life in the United States from the end of World War II (where Howe leaves off) up through the 1960s. *The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group* (Free Press, 1958; Greenwood, 1977), edited by Marshall Sklare, dispels the myth of American Jewry as a homogeneous community. Cleavages persist, alone or in combination: by ethnic origin (Spain and Portugal, Germany, Eastern Europe, the Middle East), occupational status (professional, entrepreneurial, working class) and religious identification (Orthodox, Conservative, Reform).

*The Ghetto and Beyond* (Random, 1969), edited by Peter Rose, includes essays on the Jewish mother, anti-Semitism, Jewish political radicalism, the Jewish novelist, and other themes by such prominent writers as...
Several basic reference books on American religion are published annually. The American Jewish Year Book (American Jewish Committee and the Jewish Publication Society of America) contains current information on worldwide Jewish populations, civic organizations, and specialized periodicals, as well as reflective essays on such topics as "Jewish Survival: The Demographic Factors" and "Soviet Jewry since the Death of Stalin." The yearbook brims with statistical orts. One learns, for example, that there are three times as many Jews in Muscatine, Iowa (100), as there are in all of China.

Less ambitious is the Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches (Abingdon), produced by the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. The volume includes membership and financial data for some 219 religious bodies.


George Gallup, Jr. and David Poling’s The Search for America’s Faith (Abingdon, 1980) presents an analysis of opinion polls conducted by the authors as they sought to determine whether Americans’ apprehensions about the state of organized religion “are a prelude to spiritual disaster or the final darkness before the dawn of a sparkling new day.” Gallup and Poling are optimistic. They detect strong satisfaction among Americans with their particular religious preference (self-esteem is strongest among the rapidly growing Mormons) and a surge toward “orthodoxy” (as opposed to fringe cults).

Many books appeared during the 1960s and ’70s on the growth of non-Judeo-Christian religions (and “para-religions”) in the United States. A handful of these are works of real distinction. Among them: Robert Ellwood’s Alternative Altars: Unconventional and Eastern Spirituality in America (Univ. of Chicago, 1979). In this critical survey, Ellwood discerns an impulse toward Eastern spirituality since the days of Thoreau and Emerson.

A more straightforward overview of new religious and quasi-religious movements in the United States—from the Hare Krishnas to the Human Potential Movement—is contained in The New Religious Consciousness (Univ. of Calif., 1976, cloth & paper), edited by Charles Y. Glock and Robert N. Bellah.

If any general impression emerges from all of these books, it is of an American religious melting pot whose elements refuse to melt. As historian Philip Schaff noted in 1854, the United States, if nothing else, offers “a motley sampler of all church history.”

—John A. Coleman, S.J.
WAR SINCE 1945
by Michael Carver
Putnam’s, 1981
322 pp.$14.95

Chief of Britain’s Defense Staff from 1973 to 1976, Field Marshall Lord Carver is a fine specimen of that fairly rare breed, the soldier-intellectual. The armed conflicts he dissect in this volume of succinct critiques have their roots in the dissolution of the British, French, or Japanese empires; he deliberately excludes perhaps the most significant conflict since 1945—the Chinese Civil War, which brought Mao Zedong and the Communists to power in 1949. For the most part, Carver shuns sweeping generalizations. Still, he labels the British success in Malaya “the perfect exemplar of . . . counter-insurgency warfare”—while avoiding, unlike many military historians, meaningless comparisons with the peculiar U.S. failure in Vietnam. And he condemns Britain’s withdrawal from oil-rich Aden (Yemen) in 1967 as a loss of nerve costly to Western prosperity. France’s two military disasters—Indochina and Algeria—each took more lives, Carver notes, than did Britain’s six post-colonial campaigns. (But, then, France was more reluctant to yield to the winds of change and abandon its possessions.) In a curiously titled chapter, “American Adventures,” Carver provides one of the best concise appraisals of the Vietnam War’s escalation, showing a fellow soldier’s sympathy for General William Westmoreland. His summary of the Arab-Israeli wars, “Conventional Clashes,” is equally impressive, but he touts the efficacy of tank warfare too forcefully, particularly in light of the devastating effectiveness of antitank missiles during the 1973 October War. His major conclusion: “All these wars show that a quick reaction with sufficient force at the start may save a lot of trouble later.”

—Alistair Horne (81)
Nobel Prize winners in literature have, recently, been subjected to a rather odd ordeal—speculation by critics on who should have received the prize instead. A brilliant Greek poet (Odysseus Elytis, 1979) or Italian novelist (Eugenio Montale, 1975) is thus dubbed "unknown" and compared with established English-language writers. The case was no different last year. Czeslaw Milosz, a Pole, may have far fewer readers in America than, say, Graham Greene, but he has long been recognized internationally by critics and fellow poets. Thirty years of exile (he now teaches at Berkeley) have not diminished Milosz's stature as the grand old man of Polish literature. Polish writers consider a pilgrimage to California to see Milosz essential to their education. Without sacrificing the universal quality of great art, his poems remain uniquely Polish. As early as 1945, Milosz asked, What is poetry which does not save/ Nations or people? But he learned that his task cannot be fulfilled: We were permitted to shriek in the tongue of dwarfs and demons/ But pure and generous words were forbidden. Leaving his country made him no happier: Ill at ease in the tyranny, ill at ease in the republic,/ in the one I longed for freedom, in the other for the end of corruption. He finally found satisfaction by combining philosophy and art: Who would have guessed that, centuries later, I would invent again the dispute over universals?

—Zbigniew Lewicki

One of the great "received ideas" of our time is that Vietnam and Watergate transformed relations between the press and Presidents into an undeclared, unrelenting war. After a close, two-year look at activities in and around the White House pressroom, political scientists Grossman and Kumar find otherwise. The pressures for collaboration are as strong as the antagonisms. Each side needs the other. In the theory and practice of the "leak," as well as in reporters' care and feeding of sources and in the determination of what is,
and what is not, news, the symbiosis between the executive branch and the "Fourth Estate" is apparent. Most Presidents have decried their treatment by the press. (Lyndon Johnson once accused Dan Rather and CBS of being "out to get us any way Bill Paley can."). But the authors' examination of 25 years of presidential news coverage by the New York Times and Time magazine, as well as 10 years of CBS broadcasts, reveals a "consistent pattern of favorable coverage of the President," with sympathetic stories outnumbering critical pieces by two to one. An interesting statistic—although unlikely to stop the complaints.

—James Deakin ('80)

LONG ENGAGEMENTS: More sophisticated in approach than the best-selling Passages (1977) by Gail Sheehy, this analysis of how the Japanese adjust to middle age covers strikingly similar terrain. Plath, an anthropologist at the University of Illinois, mixes four oral autobiographies of middle-aged Japanese men and women with stories from four contemporary novels and with short essays bearing on Japanese society. Shoji, a former "suicide cadet," talks resignedly of the changes in his life. Separated, after World War II, from the Army and the martial ethos he so highly valued, he tried politics and then teaching. "Of course," he reflects, "an educator may have to deal with messy human relations, but he does not need to betray himself with professional cunning and trickery." Ironically, he ends up selling real estate, a job he once would have scorned as fostering materialism and spiritual decline. Adjusting to the stresses of a changing society while preserving "the core images of self that hold together a person's portfolio of identities" is a problem faced by all four narrators. They are sustained by "long engagements"—their relationships with friends, co-workers, and relatives. Plath's book ranks with Ronald Dore's Shinohata (1980) as a readable and persuasive portrayal of contemporary life in Japan's dynamic society. But
one's dominant impression is of the variety of ways in which people preserve meaning and individuality as they age—even in a culture so often perceived as group-dominated and conformist.

—John Creighton Campbell ('81)

With the economy a top priority of the current U.S. administration, foreign remedies for curing the "American disease" are attracting a large audience. One of the most dramatic of these is the rubble-to-riches course engineered by West Germany after World War II. More important than demilitarization, denazification, and democratization of the Reich was the U.S. gamble on a little-known German professor, Ludwig Erhard, as chief of the recovery. Erhard's "social market economy" medicine was at first distasteful to a long-regimented people, but the resulting economic "miracle" (Wirtschaftswunder) cemented the democratic institutions of the Federal Republic. Instead of socialist nationalization of industry and full employment, Erhard favored capitalist competition, cushioned by a generous welfare system. His goal was full production, supported by tax breaks and other incentives for industry. It was accepted by labor, which exhibited unusual restraint in wage negotiations and a willingness to work hard in exchange for job security and a say in company management. Government also abetted the recovery and subsequent boom with its strictly balanced, noninflationary budgets. Hartrich, a journalist and economic consultant, makes a compelling story of Germany's passage from its tragic prewar "geopolitical" preoccupations to more benign and successful "ecopolitical" ventures. Conservatives will find, in the success of West Germany's unabashed capitalism, affirmation of their faith; but liberals would not be wrong in pointing out that this was, as well, "capitalism with a conscience."

—Konrad H. Jarausch ('80)
CURRENT BOOKS

NEW TITLES

History

RUSSIA IN THE AGE OF CATHERINE THE GREAT
by Isabel de Madariaga
Yale, 1981
698 pp. $40

Catherine the Great (1729–96), pictured by many historians as a cruel, tyrannical woman of monstrous appetites, receives far more sympathetic treatment here. De Madariaga, a University of London historian, argues that the Empress, enthroned by a 1762 military coup, brought her subjects reasonable government and greater personal freedom. In the spirit of the Nakaz (Instructions) of 1767, her distillation of Enlightenment texts, she promoted the concepts of British law (which the Russian judiciary never fully digested), broadened the franchise for municipal elections, and established a number of social services. The Empress still believed that some must rule and some obey. While loosening the bondage of the serf to the landlord, she felt that it was logical to restrict Ukrainian peasants' freedom of movement: Russia's food output, after all, depended on a stable peasant population in the wheat-growing Ukraine. Abroad, Catherine's victories were significant; she took Poland and the Crimea—and gained access to the Black Sea. Her shrewdness and fair-mindedness degenerated into impatience and intolerance in old age, but her profound love of Russia remained.

GRANT: A Biography
by William S. McFeely
Norton, 1981
592 pp. $19.95

Recognizing early on that Ulysses lacked business sense, Jesse Grant got his son into West Point, because, McFeely explains, "he did not know what else to do with him." McFeely, a historian at Mount Holyoke College, develops the unflattering thesis that the course of Grant's varied career was shaped less by great brilliance or understanding than by fortune, which often smiled on him. When Captain Grant retired after the Mexican War (1846–48), he struggled to make a go of farming. The Union's disintegration was his salvation. In war, Grant's instincts worked; he became Lincoln's first winning general and
Prosperous and powerful, Florence of the early 15th century emerged supreme among the Tuscan city-states. A booming textile industry (wool and silk) and trade network extending from northern Europe to the Levant brought fortunes to many of its manufacturers, bankers, and merchants. With so many "agents of demand," writes Goldthwaite, a Johns Hopkins historian, a great local market for the decorative arts developed. The affluent citizen channeled his surplus wealth not only into bronzes and frescoes but also into monuments and palaces, believing, along with the Florentine engineer Alberti that "we erect great structures that our posterity may suppose us to have been great persons." Scrutinizing all aspects of the Florentine building industry—from patron to stonemason—Goldthwaite shows how widely this great construction effort distributed the city's wealth, albeit slowly and unevenly. Workmen's wages tripled between the 14th and 16th centuries (though much of this increase was absorbed by rising food prices). Most prosperous artisans attained middle-class status, and architects, once considered simple craftsmen, now took their places, alongside Donatello and Botticelli, as artists.

THE BUILDING OF RENAISSANCE FLORENCE: An Economic and Social History by Richard A. Goldthwaite Johns Hopkins, 1981 459 pp. $27.50

From The Building of Renaissance Florence.

the hero of Appomattox. In 1868, the nation awarded its hero the Presidency, a position for which Grant was sadly ill-suited. The graft and inefficiency of his administration became legend, and Grant's weak efforts to bring ex-slaves into the American mainstream revealed a flaw in character, a reluctance to take unpopular action. Elected by the common man, Grant was manipulated into backing economic policies (such as tight money) that made the Republican Party the bastion of established wealth. But his White House record was partly redeemed, in McFeely's opinion, by his frank Memoirs, completed just a week before his death and regarded by historians as the best recollections ever penned by a U.S. President. Self-knowledge is of value—even when it comes too late.
The revival of scholarly interest in "Ike"—the General who directed D-Day, the President who eased us through the '50s—will receive a further boost with the publication of these diaries. This selection, edited by historian Ferrell, opens with Eisenhower's assignment to the Philippines in 1935, his uneasy relationship with Douglas MacArthur, his difficulty in understanding the Filipino mind ("no lack of intelligence, but... unaccustomed to the requirements of administrative and executive procedures"). Throughout, Eisenhower's assessments of colleagues and subordinates reveal slight interest in personality, except as it touches on the more important areas of performance. Finding the right person for the slot, balancing the "flashy... type of adventurer" against the "methodical, ritualistic person"—this he considered the "real job of the commander," and perhaps suggests why Ike may be remembered more as a manager than as a tactician. His eyes were always on the "big picture"—and on those charged with managing its endless details. In the White House, he worried that excessive and inappropriate defense spending could leave the nation "broke" and still poorly defended. The diaries of this modest, dutiful man show he possessed the first requirement of the good observer: self-effacement. But his gaze was seldom fixed upon himself. ("Father died this morning. Nothing I can do but send a wire.") The inner Ike remains hidden.

Contemporary Affairs

PRICES AND QUANTITIES: A Macroeconomic Analysis
by Arthur M. Okun
Brookings, 1981
367 pp. $19.95 cloth, $7.95 paper

The putative failure of Keynesian economics to deal with the "stagflation" of the 1970s drove many economists to supply-side theory, but not the late Arthur Okun, of the Brookings Institution. While Okun concedes in this posthumously published book that traditional macroeconomic strategies did not stop inflation, even with the decade's several recessions, his analysis suggests no greater suc-
cess for the new conservative formulas. The reason: Today’s market is ruled by an “invisible handshake”—a tacit agreement among business, labor, and consumers to disregard temporary economic conditions. During recessions, many companies no longer cut wages or fire workers; they have found it too costly to rehire when conditions improve. Consumers reluctant to “shop around,” in effect, agree to let businesses pass along expenses. All parties concur that price adjustments based on cost increases are fair, while those based on demand fluctuations are unfair. Thus, wages and prices rise, even when business is bad. Okun contends that the federal government could control stagflation with such measures as the reduction of indirect taxes (e.g., sales taxes) and adoption of his proposed “tax-based income policy” (rewarding workers who accept smaller wage gains with tax breaks). But he sees little hope of the country’s going this route. The more likely scenario for the 1980s: “deep and prolonged” recession, or a “protracted period of rigid mandatory wage and price controls.” Either, explains Okun, may cancel the “handshake.”

In 1948, President Harry Truman remarked (naively) that Joseph Stalin “is a decent fellow but he’s a prisoner of the Politburo.” Just as American analyses of the Soviet system have grown more sophisticated over the past three decades, Soviet politics has become far more complex—as the mixed diagnoses by the 15 eminent scholars who contributed to this volume make clear. Harvard’s Adam Ulam argues that Soviet communism is now the mere servant of Russian nationalism; Stanford’s Alexander Dallin stresses that nationalism does not provide a “master key to an understanding of Soviet conduct”; and Columbia’s Bialer maintains that nationalism cannot be separated from ideology. Bialer points to paradoxes: Economic strains and the consequent need to import grain and technology have forced the Soviet Union to...
ward accommodation with the West, but growing military strength has encouraged it to expand its influence around the world. Beneath such inconsistency lies a fundamental shift among Soviet leaders: Having long coerced their people in order to bring about social change, they now do so in order to arrest it. Thus, Bialer reasons, of all industrialized nations, the USSR is "undoubtedly the most frozen, conservative, and Victorian," even as its leaders continue to ally Russia with "liberation" movements elsewhere. Brezhnev's Soviet Union has become a nation at once reactionary and revolutionary.

THE U.S. COAL INDUSTRY:
The Economics of Policy Choice
by Martin B. Zimmerman
MIT, 1981
205 pp. $25

A vital product whose market drastically declined after World War II, American coal has been making a steady recovery since the early 1960s. Spurring the upsurge has been Americans' rapidly rising consumption of electricity, for which coal is the most popular fuel (ahead of nuclear power). But the comeback has had a geographic twist. In 1960, some 95 percent of U.S. coal was mined east of the Mississippi; by the year 2000, if current projections hold true, more than 50 percent will come from the West. Federal restrictions on sulfur dioxide emission are largely responsible for the shift, writes Zimmerman, an MIT energy management specialist. Though the environmental costs of its mining (mainly, strip mining) will be high, and though its heating value is considerably lower than that of Appalachian coal, only "clean" Western coal easily meets the federal standard. Sticking with the present federal limits could cost Americans $5.4 billion in added processing and transportation in 1985 alone. And Easterners will suffer the brunt of the increase. Neither coal nor nuclear power competes with oil for most energy markets, so their accelerated development is unlikely to affect U.S. oil imports. But tradeoffs will have to be made between environmental goals and sufficient production of electricity using coal and nuclear power.
Since World War I, English writers have sought stylistic solutions to problems created by the great rift with pre-1914 experience—particularly the surfacing of feelings submerged in the Victorian consciousness. Preserving the reticence of the earlier age, the Anglo-Irish novelist Elizabeth Bowen (1899–1973) managed to create people thoroughly modern in morals, if quite traditional in manners. Says a character in her 1930s story, "The Man of the Family": "But I honestly believe that manners (or people not having them) undermine happiness far quicker than morals." Like Jane Austen, Bowen believed that polite constraints ("life with the lid on") heightened rather than deadened feeling. Her own cultivated reticence led to precise, evocative descriptions of setting and social milieu. Perhaps ironically, some of her best stories were written in London during the unmannerly chaos of World War II: life with the lid blown off. Combining the Gothic genre with the city-under-siege theme, she created tales of horror and psychological insight. A Londoner in "Sunday Afternoon" is asked, while visiting Ireland, if the bombing is really so frightening. "Yes," he replies. "But as it does not connect with the rest of life, it is difficult, you know, to know what one feels. One's feelings seem to have no language for a thing so preposterous." But Bowen's wartime stories deny this: She found the exact words for a thing so preposterous.

The theme of The Treasure of Sierra Madre is only a recent variation on one from The Arabian Nights. And Antar, a sixth-century Arabian poet-warrior resembles, in many striking particulars, the earlier legendary Irish hero, Cuchulainn. Such borrowings, argues Ranelagh, lecturer in English and folklore at the University of Maryland, are part of the early, extensive cross-fertiliza-
tion between Eastern and Western literature and folk traditions. Created in the ancient civilizations of India, Egypt, Greece, Persia, Sumeria, and Judea, many plots, motifs, and character types were assimilated into the rich Arabic folk tradition and then transmitted to Europe. Nor was the commerce strictly literary. The development of European knighthood—its military style and social code—owed much to the East-West exchange. Romance, so closely bound to chivalry, filtered into southern France from Muslim Spain late in the 11th century, and passion, the engine of romance, was but "one of the refinements of living which the West was happy to adopt from the superior Arabic civilization."

Chaucer, Boccaccio, Shakespeare, and Cervantes were indebted to a number of Arabian innovations, including rhyme. The Arabs, by inventing and legitimizing tales as literature, are to be credited, Ranelagh maintains, "with having fixed the shape of 'the fiction of the world'."

VOLTAIRE: A Biography
by Haydn Mason
Johns Hopkins, 1981
194 pp. $14.95

Like Candide, his most famous fictional creation, Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet, 1694–1778) was troubled by the world’s bigotry, tyranny, and cruelty. To portray this witty (if often anguished) philosophe, British historian Mason relies more on Voltaire’s voluminous correspondence than on his published works. Voltaire’s early popularity at Louis XIV’s court was soon diminished by his inability “to treat his enemies with reasoned scorn.” “His brilliance was well recognized,” Mason writes, “but the Académie looked for an assurance of respectability, any hopes of which were unremittingly destroyed by a succession of indiscretions large and small.” Moving between the elegant life in Paris and monastic solitude, Voltaire found his greatest happiness after his 1759 purchase of Ferney, an estate close to the Swiss border. He set up a stocking factory and watchworks and turned a “rude wilderness” into a thriving community. Voltaire the deist and supporter of enlightened despotism is remembered less,
concludes Mason, than "the Voltairean spirit, preaching tolerance and intellectual freedom, hating oppression."

Scholars have reconstructed William Shakespeare's life and character from the merest fragments. Of the Bard's handwriting, for example, no more than six signatures and two small words ("by me") are extant—only 13 letters of the alphabet. In this handsome volume, laden with facsimile plates, Schoenbaum, a professor of Renaissance studies at the University of Maryland, has pulled all of the documentary and pictorial evidence together: Shakespeare's last will and testament, deeds and depositions, portraits authentic and spurious, a physician/astrologer's eyewitness account of "Macbeth," and much more. In his learned, lively commentary, Schoenbaum covers a wide area. One chapter is devoted to 18th- and 19th-century forgers. The most brazen of these was William-Henry Ireland, who, in 1794–95, gave his credulous father, "an antiquarian collector with magpie tendencies," a treasure trove—Shakespearean IOUs, a letter to Anne Hathaway (with lock of bardic hair), a pen-and-ink self-portrait, and an entirely new play, Vortigern. The London debut of Vortigern was cut short after the discovery that Ireland's "finds" were all fakes. Schoenbaum's latest effort makes a fine companion to his William Shakespeare: A Compact Documentary Life (1977).

Taking science to the layman, Gribbin formulates a reply to the creationists' version of the origins of man and the universe. In the beginning, argues the Cambridge astrophysicist, was the Big Bang; then followed the expansion of the universe and the formation of the galaxies. Surveying the "mainstream of cur-
rent scientific thinking," he sees a link between "precursors to life" that exist in space and the origins of life on Earth. Recent advances in radio astronomy have revealed the presence of prebiotic compounds in space, which, scientists postulate, can create life. Gribbin hypothesizes that life originated in Darwin's "warm little ponds" on comets that subsequently fell to Earth or, alternatively, that falling comets "seeded" the Earth with prebiotic chemicals. Both scenarios would explain advanced life on a relatively young planet. The language of DNA, common to all living organisms, suggests descent from one ancestor. Indeed, studies show that 99 percent of human genetic material matches that of the chimpanzee. Drawing from such diverse fields as quantum mechanics, genetics, and paleontology, Genesis is evolutionary theory on the grandest scale.

If technology is to improve the human condition—and not all 25 contributors to this collection are certain it can—policymakers and citizens in general must first understand what technology really is. Political scientist Harvey Brooks urges us to recognize that technology is not merely the raw machinery but also "the public knowledge that underlies" it and the ways it can be used. Ten essays explore technology's influence on culture, politics, and economics. Historian Theodore Roszak sounds the most pessimistic note: We in the so-called advanced world have exchanged cultural variety and richness for a numbing and uniform mechanized environment. Economist Gunnar Myrdal, more positive about technology's benefits, nevertheless sees great problems in its transfer to the underdeveloped world. These include the dangers of too-rapid urbanization and of training foreign technicians in developed countries, where the realities of their native societies are easily forgotten. The remaining chapters focus on government institutions. Physicist Barry Casper examines the record of the U.S. Congress's Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA). Created in 1972 to supply in-house expertise ("on tap, not on top," remarked one Congressman), OTA has been all but ignored by the real centers of policy-shaping, the congressional committees. Congress has steered the office away from military and space considerations. Casper's advice: Involve the best scientific experts in policy formulation—and then heed their counsel.

The disciples of the Greek Orphic mystery cult in the sixth century B.C. were possibly not the first thinkers, and certainly not the last, to believe that mathematics "works" because the universe itself is harmonious, musical, mathematic, but others have argued, less grandly, that it works because man makes it work. This genial difference of opinion, along with other issues in the history and philosophy of the discipline, receives clear and intelligent exposition from Davis and Hersh, mathematicians themselves. Mathematicians, whatever their persuasion, have always cherished the rigorous proof, "the ritual and delight of pure reason." In a field with so many concrete applications, in science and cybernetics, the purists still concern themselves most with the beauty and elegance of a proof. The greatest mathematicians have usually worked in near-isolation, their work often becoming incomprehensible to later generations. (Many of Newton's writings suffered this fate.) Similarly idiosyncratic is the thought process: Einstein said that he always began with visual images ("and some of muscular type") and that only later did words and algebraic signs come into play. Davis and Hersh have made an important, esoteric field more accessible to readers still daunted by checkbook computations.
CURRENT BOOKS

PAPERBOUNDS


Samuel Johnson (1709–84) was not merely the great talker of Boswell’s Life—though that distinction alone would have sufficed to immortalize the good “Doctor.” Clifford’s biography of his middle years shows Johnson finally publishing (at 40) an essay under his own name. Then came the torrent: the Dictionary of the English Language; the Rambler; the Idler; essays; a novel; a play—works that redeemed the years spent as an indolent student and ill-paid hack for Gentleman’s Magazine. But even as a young man, writes Clifford, a specialist in 18th-century literature, Johnson saw “all human actions as moral choices or social dilemmas.” The definitions in the Dictionary often expressed his own strong biases. Thus, “excise” was “a hateful tax levied upon commodities and adjudged not by the common judges of property, but wretches hired by those to whom excise is paid.” The Doctor’s essays in the Literary Magazine excoriated British colonialism, popular among his compatriots. Yet he considered himself a Tory and therefore an adherent “to the ancient constitution of the state, and the apostolical hierarchy of the Church of England.” Bringing him to the eve of his friendship with Boswell, Clifford shows how Johnson struggled through bouts of despair and torpor to become the renowned writer and conversationalist.


Since the 16th century, medical diagnosis in the West has relied, in curiously exclusive succession, on three sources—the patient’s own testimony of symptoms and discomfort; the physicians’ observations and interpretations; the readings of various instruments. In the 17th and 18th centuries, doctors depended so completely on patients’ descriptions that physical examinations were rare; some even felt confident to diagnose by mail. In the 19th century, equipped with a growing array of instruments (the stethoscope, the ophthalmoscope), doctors probed more and considered the patient less. In doing so, they unwittingly set the stage for their own trivialization in the diagnostic process. Faced with unquestioning public and professional faith in quantifiable, machine-produced data, today’s physician now worries about becoming little more than a mechanic. Evidence provided by medical technology has relegated to possible insignificance the patient’s words, his emotional state, his social situation—and also the physician’s direct observations and intuitions. Recognizing the importance of objective data, Reiser, a physician and historian of medicine at Harvard, sees the reinstatement of the two older forms of diagnosis as a crucial step toward humanizing and improving the practice of medicine.


In Pasadena’s Rose Bowl, and its parade of floats and clowns, as in massive productions of Wagnerian opera, the legacy of Greek and Roman theater survives. Archaeologist Bieber, who died in 1978, traces the rise and development of the dramatic form in ancient Greece—from its origins in the Dionysian festivals through the great Sophoclean tragedies and the irreverent Aristophanic comedies. Translations of Greek drama ap...
CURRENT BOOKS


Appeared in Rome as early as the third century B.C., and while Romans preferred farce, Seneca's tragedies endured and provided models for Shakespeare. Rich illustrations show the striking difference between the simple Greek theaters and the more ornate Roman structures. This contrast reflects the aesthetic distance "between creative art and elevated spirit on one side, and of show business... and adaptation of inherited forms on the other."

UNSETTLING EUROPE. By Jane Kramer. Vintage, 1981. 217 pp. $4.95

Kramer, a New Yorker writer, pokes behind statistics to tell the stories of individual "casualties and survivors" of the postwar European migrations. In addition to migrant workers, many of the newcomers "whom Europe never expected to accommodate" were political refugees from former British and French colonies; painful reminders of an imperial past, they often received cool treatment. In London, officials were told to channel the influx of "New Commonwealth citizens" (a euphemism for "colored") into neighborhoods shaded green on a special "resettlement map." Akabar Hassan, an Indian merchant from Uganda and a proud British subject, had no sooner arrived in London in 1972 than he was asked "whether he had ever considered the Outer Hebrides as a place to live."

BROTHERLY LOVE. By Daniel Hoffman. Vintage, 1981. 176 pp. $5.95

Shaping America's past to the long narrative poem has proved a difficult challenge to many of our strongest poets. Hoffman has focused his effort on William Penn, "the Great Peace Maker," a figure of both legend and history. Considering Benjamin West's painting, Wm. Penn's Treaty with the Indians 1681, the poet asks how few... have ever read or ever wondered/What, exactly what, in truth, was promised and agreed to...? Original documents threaded through the narrative give us an answer: The Indians received needles, shoes, tobacco, rum; the white men, the Indians' hunting grounds. Even before there was a Philadelphia/There was a Philadelphia lawyer, Hoffman observes. At first the Quaker settlers, having suffered in England, are eager to live peaceably. But when it appears that King Charles II, In all things profligate! may have twice given! the same wilderness once to Penn, and once to Lord Baltimore, fighting breaks out between Quakers and Maryland Catholics. The scramble for land quickly erodes Quaker restraint. Thomas Penn (William's son) forces the Indians to cede their lands on the forks of the Delaware, and, by 1756, bounties are offered for Indian scalps. Hoffman has combined the considerable resources of his art (precision, resonance, wit) and strong historical documentation to retell the familiar story of brotherly love gone sour.
Two hundred years ago this October, America’s freedom was secured at the Battle of Yorktown. It is seldom remembered that this victory—and perhaps America’s independence—could not have been achieved without the aid of France. The army that Louis XVI sent to the New World in 1780 revived the faltering rebel cause and provided George Washington with the military superiority needed to engage Britain’s Lord Cornwallis in decisive battle. This fall, 1,200 French and American citizens will re-enact the French army’s journey from New England to the battleground near the Chesapeake and join 3,000 others in commemorating the Yorktown bicentennial. Here, historian Stanley J. Idzerda describes the alliance and the reactions of the French as they encountered America and its people for the first time.

in early 1778, midway between the beginning of the American Revolution at Lexington and Concord and its military climax at the Battle of Yorktown, the American struggle was faltering. “Our affairs,” wrote General George Washington, “are in a more distressed, ruinous, and deplorable condition than they have been since the commencement of the war... The common interests of America are moldering and sinking into irretrievable ruin if a remedy is not soon applied.”

The remedy was on its way. As early as 1776, the French had been secretly supplying more than 90 percent of the young American rebel army’s gunpowder and many of its muskets, cannon, uniforms, and tents.

Without this help, it is doubtful that the Americans could have beaten the British general, “Gentleman Johnny” Burgoyne, at Saratoga, New York, capturing him, his sizable personal baggage train, and all of his 6,000 troops.
This impressive victory in October 1777 convinced Louis XVI’s government that the Americans would make a worthy ally against his old enemies, the British.

Benjamin Franklin, the American minister to France, had exploited his great popularity as a scientist to prepare the way with diplomacy. In February 1778, Louis XVI’s ministers finally signed a formal treaty of alliance with the Americans. The French promised “not to lay down their arms until the Independence of the United States shall have been formally or tacitly assured.”

Even earlier, dozens of idealistic French noblemen, including the Marquis de Lafayette (his given name was Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert du Motier), had sailed off on their own to join the fight. Aboard ship en route to America, Lafayette wrote to his wife Adrienne that “the welfare of America is intimately connected with the happiness of all mankind; she will become the respectable and safe asylum of virtue, integrity, tolerance, equality, and a peaceful liberty.”

Lafayette’s irate father-in-law had persuaded the French government to issue an order for Lafayette’s arrest before he left, convinced that his son-in-law’s adventure was foolhardy and politically risky for France. Lafayette’s escape only excited popular support for the American cause. The French, particularly the aristocracy, had been enthusiastic supporters.
from the beginning—and not only out of enmity for Britain. France was caught up in the heady spirit of the Enlightenment, and the rebellious English colonies seemed to have become a laboratory for testing the new political theories of Rousseau, Montesquieu, Voltaire, and the other philosophes.

**First Failures**
Montesquieu's grandson joined the French expeditionary force that finally went to America. So did dozens of other young aristocrats. "The Americans are the hope of the human race, they will become its model," wrote the French Finance Minister, Turgot. Turgot raised an awesome $50 million to meet the French commitment to America, even though he personally opposed the alliance because of the expense.

Of course, the American Revolution attracted not only idealists but scoundrels and adventurers as well. Silas Deane, an American diplomat in Paris, was besieged by "dukes, marquesses, and even bishops, counts and chevaliers without number, all of whom are jealous, being out of employ here or having friends they wish to advance in the cause of liberty." He signed up so many French nobles for American service that Henry Laurens, the president of the Continental Congress, sighed, "Silas Deane can't resist anyone who calls himself a chevalier."

The new alliance ripened very slowly. Two months after the treaty was signed, the Comte d'Estaing left France with 16 warships and 4,000 troops, intending to join in General John Sullivan's attack on the British base at Newport, Rhode Island. But the French had no sooner encountered the British fleet in the waters off the town than a hurricane scattered both fleets. D'Estaing sailed off to Boston to refit his storm-battered squadron, then made for the French West Indies, leaving his American allies stranded and exposed on Newport Island. A year later, he came north to assist an American assault on Savannah. That adventure, too, ended in failure.

**Elegance vs. Rusticity**
The Americans began to wonder if the French truly meant business. General Sullivan wrote that the French "desertion" had raised "every voice against the French nation, revived all those ancient prejudices against the faith and sincerity of that people, and inclined them most heartily to curse the new alliance."

D'Estaing was no less disillusioned. He reported to Paris that in America "one must fawn, to the height of insipidity, over every little republican who regards flattery as his sovereign right... hold command over captains who are not good enough company to be permitted to eat with their general officers, and have some colonels who are innkeepers at the same time."

Finally, in April 1780, more than two years after the signing of the treaty, word came from Paris that 10
ships of the line and 30 transports bearing some 6,000 French soldiers would arrive under the command of a veteran of many European campaigns, the Comte de Rochambeau.

The most striking news was that, unlike d’Estaing’s fleet, Rochambeau’s forces would be placed under the direct command of George Washington and were committed to stay in America indefinitely. The King also designated his troops “auxiliaries.” According to the military protocol of the day, this meant that they must yield in all honors of battle to the Americans. Louis XVI’s only desire, Rochambeau’s instructions read, was that his general “shall cooperate effectively to deliver them [the Americans] for all time from the yoke and tyranny of the English.”

Both sides were nervous—this would be the first sustained contact between French troops and the Americans. Before the expeditionary force left France, Gérard de Rayneval, first secretary of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, predicted in a memorandum that “the galanterie [elegance] and the légérété [levity] of the French soldiers, in contrast with the rusticity and the austerity of the colonists, would end in bloody conflicts.”

For their part, the Americans were concerned that their allies would be put off by the rebels’ lack of refinement and by their weak, bedraggled army. When Washington dispatched General William Heath to greet the French, Lafayette, who had been in America for three years and had become Washington’s confidant, sent Heath his own epaulets to make a “proper” uniform and advised him to show the French only the best—
dressed Continental troops.

"In the fighting way they shall see that we are equal to any thing," La-fayette wrote, "but for what con-cerns dress, appearance & c. we must cheat a little." No wonder he was worried: The French would arrive wearing white uniforms with color-ful facings. Their cavalry unit, Lau-zun's Legion, boasted tall fur hats and tiger-skin saddlecloths.

The French arrived at Newport, now abandoned by the British, on July 11. They found a nearly deserted town and received a guarded recep- tion. "A coldness and reserve appear to me to be characteristic of the American nation... They seem little suited to inspire enthusiasm in others," a French officer wrote. It was an inauspicious beginning.

Birthday Dancing

But the atmosphere changed quickly when the inhabitants wit- nessed the behavior of the troops. Unlike the British (who simply took what supplies they needed) or the unruly American troops (who paid in unreliable Continental paper cur-rency when they paid at all), the French purchased their provisions with gold and silver. The rank and file was tightly disciplined and quar- tered outside the town. Most of the French officers were lodged as paying—and charming—guests in Newport homes. They sealed their popularity by constantly entertain-ing, even throwing a ball to celebrate Washington's birthday.

Enemies, not Friends?

The French remained in Newport for almost a year, at first recovering from their two-month sea voyage, then waiting out the New England winter. Finally, in a May 1781 con- ference at Wethersfield, Connecticut, Washington and Rochambeau de-cided to join forces and attack the British stronghold at New York City. It was held by 10,000 troops under Sir Henry Clinton, the British command-er for all of North America. They also hoped to persuade the Comte de Grasse, who had replaced d'Estaing as commander of the French fleet in the West Indies, to sail north to help.

On June 10, the French set out to join Washington's troops at New Rochelle, New York. They marched about 15 miles each day, their engineers going before them filling potholes in the roads to permit passage of their long baggage trains and preparing the bakeries that were built for every bivouac. With 60-pound packs, full uniform, powdered

An American soldier made this etching on his powderhorn of his Revolutionary War comrades bringing a horse-drawn artillery piece to the battlefield.
The Marquis de Lafayette was named a general in the American army at age 19.

hair, and bands playing, the proud Soissonais, Saintonge, Royal Deux-Ponts, and Bourbonnais regiments astonished the New Englanders along the route. "A finer body of men was never in arms," a Hartford newspaper commented.

Among the French, Comte Axel Fersen noted that the admiring civilians not only sold supplies to the British foe but also "overcharge us mercilessly; in their business dealing with us we are treated like enemies, not friends. Their greed is unequalled; money is their God." However, the idealism of the French usually led them to overlook such behavior.

The two armies finally met at New Rochelle on July 5. There was little fraternization then or later. Rochambeau always kept his enlisted men apart from the American army to avoid disputes and to reduce opportunities for desertion. While officers did exchange visits between the two camps, the language barrier was impassable for all but a few.

A Small Lie

Several differences did stand out immediately. The French were appalled by the Americans' cuisine, as they would be throughout their stay in America. "Their cooking gives them little trouble," wrote Abbé Robin, a chaplain in Rochambeau's army. "They are satisfied to broil their meat and cook their corn-cake in the ashes." But the Abbé also noted that the Americans often wore comfortable linen breeches and fringed hunting shirts, which he termed "very satisfactory." The French commanders, he commented, had "forgotten that troops are intended for action and not for show."

There were other surprises. "These people are at the end of their resources," Rochambeau wrote de Grasse. "Washington does not have the troops he counted on; I believe, though he is hiding it, that he has not 6,000 men." Comte Deux-Ponts said it more plainly: "They told us at Newport that the American army had 10,000 men. It has only 2,500 or 3,000, but that is not a very big lie for the Americans." His estimate was about right. Yet the French generally admired the Americans even if their number was small. Comte de Bourg found it "incredible that troops almost naked and poorly paid... should behave so well on the march and under fire."

Neither army had the chance to show its mettle in New York City, however. The allies did not have enough troops to undertake a siege, and the French were wary of Washington's untraditional, opportunistic
tactics. When an exploratory thrust at the northern end of Manhattan Island failed, Washington and Rochambeau agreed to march to Virginia to confront the other British army in the colonies, a smaller force campaigning in the South under Lord Cornwallis.

Lafayette was already in Virginia with a small force of Continentals, "not strong enough even to get beaten," as he wrote to Washington. He tailed Cornwallis through the Virginia Tidewater, hoping to make it appear to the dispirited local citizenry that the British were retreating. Finally, on Clinton's orders, Cornwallis moved to Yorktown, an old Virginia tobacco port on a peninsula flanked by the York and James rivers. Washington told Lafayette to do his best to keep the British force from leaving. The French fleet under de Grasse was already on its way to block off Chesapeake Bay.

No Money, No Clothes

The combined armies started south, the 2,500 American veterans gazing at the well-dressed and well-fed French troops, usually finding a good deal to praise in what they saw. Joseph Rouse wrote home to Connecticut: "We have six thousand French join Genl Washington ... & as good looking soldiers as can be. They look much better than our lousy army who have Neither money nor close, God Bless the State of Connecticut, you noes what I mean."

When they came to fords, the Americans just pushed across the stream pell-mell, while the French drew up in ranks and first removed their shoes and stockings.

Skirmish at Sea

Both armies were proud of themselves, but when the Americans came to Philadelphia in August, they slogged through town in clouds of dust, with no ceremony. The French stopped outside the city, changed into dress uniform, and marched in with their bands playing. An American soldier commented, "They stepped as though on edge. They are a dreadful proud nation."

On September 5, a full week before the allied troops began to pour into the Yorktown region, the British Admiral Thomas Graves suddenly appeared at the mouth of the Chesapeake with 19 warships. It was a serious threat: If Graves could drive the French fleet away, Cornwallis could escape from the peninsula by sea or across the York River, and the possibility of a major allied victory would be lost.

The 24 French ships under de Grasse slipped their cables and sailed out from their Chesapeake moorings to meet the British. After four hours of fierce cannon fire and intricate maneuvering for position, the cautious Graves broke off the engagement. The fleets stayed within sight of each other for five days, but Graves eventually withdrew and sailed for New York. Each side had lost several hundred men.

The Battle of the Capes, as it was called, was only a skirmish by the standards of the day—Washington called it "a partial engagement"—but it may have been the most decisive naval battle in American history. The British Navy's withdrawal sealed Cornwallis's fate.

Ten days later, French engineers,
along with the French-born General Louis Duportail's American engineers (whose motto, *Essayons*, is still on the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' escutcheon) began the preparations for the siege. Drawn directly from Sebastien de Vauban's 17th-century texts on military engineering, the plan called for digging long "parallel" trenches, the first 800 yards from the enemy, the second 550 yards closer with, finally, a third only 100 yards from the British lines. From here, the assault on Yorktown would be launched.

**Cannonade**

Reinforced by fresh troops from the French fleet and by numerous American militia units picked up along their route south, the allied armies now numbered 9,500 Americans and 7,800 French. Cornwallis had only 6,000 British troops and Hessian mercenaries.

Thousands of men on the allied side were set to digging each night, and armed troops occupied the trenches during the day. On October 9, the Franco-American bombardment began; ultimately, 150 pieces of artillery came to be trained on the British positions. On October 13 alone, 3,600 rounds were fired into Yorktown, a fortified space about 500 yards deep and 1,200 yards long. Red-hot shot from the cannon set Cornwallis's few ships in the York River on fire, and cannon balls shattered Yorktown's houses. Even the French were awe-stricken.

The British later remembered only a constant earthquake, the deafening noise, and "men lying everywhere who were mortally wounded and whose heads, arms, and legs had been shot off."

On the allied side, the honor of the French and American officers was at stake in this, their first major engagement together. Usually, an enlisted man was posted in the trench to "call the shots": When he shouted "shell!" everyone ducked for cover. The British artillery lobbed "fused bombs" over the lines, which sprayed hundreds of small iron balls when they exploded and could cause heavy casualties.

Most American officers made a point of not budging when artillery fire rained down on their positions. Colonel Alexander Hamilton even objected to Henry Knox that calling
The allies concentrated their efforts on the southeast edge of Yorktown, where the flat terrain gave Cornwallis few natural defenses. The Americans occupied the position of honor on the right side of the allied line; the British lines on the day of the surrender are outlined in red.

The shots was “unsoldierly.” On one occasion, nevertheless, a shell came over, and Hamilton jumped behind Knox for cover. “Now,” said General Knox, “what do you think about crying ‘shell,’ Mr. Hamilton? And don’t try to make a breastwork out of me again!”

Under cover of almost a week of bombardment, the allies had nearly finished the second parallel. But they had to take Redoubts 9 and 10 shielding the British lines. These outposts were well built, with stout palisades and ramparts protected by deep ditches and sharpened staves. They dominated the allied approach trenches.

The allied commanders decided to attack at night. Only bayonets would be used—in the dark, the attackers might sacrifice surprise by firing prematurely and might even shoot one another. When it was suggested that the experienced French troops do this dangerous work, Lafayette was outraged. “With my [American] riflemen we are accustomed to taking all positions with the bayonet alone!” he lied to the Comte Villerébresme. Finally, it was decided that the Americans would attack one of the outposts, the French the other.

The allied officers vied for the honor of leading the “forlorn hope,” the 40 assault troops who would be the first to go into the ditch and over the top of the rampart. Lafayette wanted to give the American command to his aide, Colonel Gimat, but Alexander Hamilton insisted that he had seniority and Washington agreed.
On the French side, the command went to Comte Deux-Ponts. At the last minute, officers and soldiers who had volunteered for the mission and been turned down rushed up to join the assault anyway.

At seven o'clock on the evening of October 14, a signal gun fired and the attack began. Within a few minutes, the Americans had swarmed over Redoubt 10 and captured it. The French were staging a formal assault, which took a bit longer. The troops lined up in battle formation as sappers pushed ahead to breach the British defenses with explosives. Lafayette sent a taunting message to his French confrères, "I am in my redoubt. Where are you?" Soon, the French were in their redoubt, too.

The taking of the two outposts was the only major action of the siege, but it left 24 killed and wounded on the American side and 92 on the French. If one stands before the rebuilt fortifications today and imagines attacking them at night with only a musket in hand, one realizes what courage the assault required.

A Day of Humiliation

The capture of the redoubts was the last straw for Cornwallis. He had lost 600 men; 1,500 others in his swampy, fever-ridden camp were not fit for duty. There was little hope of escape or timely reinforcement. The French fleet barred the way by sea. Clinton had promised to relieve Cornwallis from New York but was slow in making preparations. (He didn't sail until five days later, the day of the formal surrender.)

On the morning of October 17 a redcoated boy stood on top of the British parapet and beat "a parley" on his drum. The guns fell still; in the eerie silence, a British officer came across the field with a message from Cornwallis, asking for terms of surrender. He proposed that all of the nearly 6,000 British troops at Yorktown be sent back to Europe on their word to stay there.

The Americans were not ready to be so generous. One British frigate was permitted to sail off to New York with a small group of American loyalists and British officers who swore not to take up arms against America again. The rest of the garrison was to march out with colors cased and arms reversed, a humiliating condition by the standards of the day but one the Americans insisted upon: General Lincoln had suffered the same disgrace when he surrendered Charleston to the British in 1780.

It Was All Over

On October 19, the British garrison's band played "The World Turned Upside Down" as the redcoated soldiers filed between the mile-long lines of French and American troops. The British ignored the tattered Americans, wanting to believe that it was only the French who had beaten them. General Charles O'Hara, filling in for a suddenly "ill" Cornwallis, galloped up to Rochambeau and offered him Cornwallis's sword. But the French commander nodded gravely in the direction of General Washington as the proper recipient, and the British were forced to surrender to the Americans. To drive the point home, Lafayette ordered the American band to strike up "Yankee Doodle."

When Lord North, George III's Prime Minister, heard about the fate of Cornwallis months later, he staggered as if mortally struck by a musket ball, waving his arms and moaning again and again, "Oh God! It's all over!" Indeed, the King finally allowed North to resign, as he
At Yorktown on October 19, 1781, General Washington, shown on the far right, with Rochambeau backed by the French officers on the left, awaited the formal British surrender. General Benjamin Lincoln is shown on horseback, at center.

had long requested, as a result of the Yorktown fiasco. North was a leader of the weakening war faction in Parliament. To the battle's victors, however, its significance was not immediately clear. Washington and Rochambeau began planning another campaign the day after the surrender.

A peace treaty was nearly two years away, but Lord North was right. The Yorktown campaign proved decisive. There was no significant battle or campaign in America after that date. In March 1782, the British Parliament agreed to cease hostilities. Nearly all of the French troops sailed home from Boston 10 months later, on Christmas Eve. Their efforts had tipped the balance; a peace treaty acknowledging the independence of America was guaranteed. When the Treaty of Versailles was finally signed in September 1783, Lafayette wrote to his wife, "Humanity has won its battle, Liberty now has a country."

Americans have always remembered Lafayette and returned his admiration. They have named over 100 cities and towns in his honor. But America's gratitude to the French evaporated when the two nations had a few minor naval battles in the late 1790s. France was again at war with Britain and tried to prevent America from trading with the former mother country. The experience left many Americans soured on their former allies.

The French, by contrast, retained their fondness for America. Indeed,

*When General John J. "Black Jack" Pershing came to France's aid with the American Expeditionary Force during World War I, it was the Marquis alone whom he invoked as he stepped on French soil: "Lafayette, we are here."
the idealism that drove Lafayette and other young aristocrats to volunteer for American service was undiminished, moving many of them to support the Revolution that broke out in their own country. By casting their votes with the revolutionaries on August 4, 1789, to abolish feudal privileges, Lafayette and his followers in the National Assembly helped to bury the ancien régime.

Later, they were appalled by the bloody excesses of the radicals. Some lost their heads on the guillotine during the Terror. Lafayette, a widely revered elder statesman, held a number of military posts until Louis XVI was deposed in 1793. The radicals then moved to arrest him, and he fled to Austria, not returning home until seven years later.

Some of the French aristocrats who had fought in America opposed their own country’s revolution from the beginning. Comte Axel Fersen was dragged from his horse and nearly trampled to death as he tried to protect Queen Marie-Antoinette from the mob that captured her as she attempted to escape from France. But almost all of the veterans, whatever they felt about events in their own country, were proud of their service in America.

When these officers had their portraits painted after the war, if they wore any decoration it was the Order of the Cincinnati. This was the sign of membership in a society of French and American officers formed at the close of the Revolution. It depicts the figure of Renown offering the Roman citizen-soldier Cincinnatus a laurel, the reward earned by those who have risked everything for the republic; below is the American eagle.

In 1801, after winning every possible honor as Napoleon’s Chief of Staff, Marshall Berthier acknowledged that of all the decorations he had received, he had been “most flattered at getting the little eagle of the Order of the Cincinnati.” He had played an important part in America’s war for independence as an aide to Rochambeau, and, like most men of his time, he was concerned about the opinion of posterity.

He knew that as instruments of liberty for a young republic on the shores of North America, the French had changed the fate of mankind.
REFLECTIONS

A Return to Camelot

In imperial Rome, patricians sought prestige by displaying the art and erudition of the Greeks. At the court of the Romanov tsars, aristocrats copied the manners and speech of Enlightenment France. During the 19th century, Englishmen rediscovered the Middle Ages—and the notion of chivalry. Suddenly, knights in armor appeared by the hundreds in literature and art. Wealthy landowners refurbished old castles and erected new ones. Tournaments were held. Heraldry flourished. Gentlemen adopted chivalry as a code of conduct that soon permeated the ethos of elite boarding schools, the army, and the newly founded Boy Scouts. Here, Mark Girouard, a British scholar, describes that rebirth of chivalry—and its death amid the carnage of World War I.

by Mark Girouard

During the first few months of 1912, a new play, Where the Rainbow Ends, was running to packed audiences of parents and children at the Savoy Theater in London. The play featured an endangered damsel and a chivalrous St. George in shining armor. "Dear English maid," he declared, "remember though you see me not that I am ever with you—your faithful guardian knight."

In April of that year, the Titanic ripped open her hull on an iceberg in the North Atlantic. As the great ship sank, the order went out: "Women and children first." Gentlemen escorted ladies to their lifeboats. Colonel John Jacob Astor handed in his young bride, smiled, touched his cap, and turned away to go down with the ship.

The following July, a tournament took place in the Empress Hall at Earl's Court. The Duke of Marlborough and five other armored "knights" josted in pairs with wooden lances. Queen Alexandra and Winston Churchill were in the audience.

Knights in armor, St. George, maidens in distress, chivalrous and gallant gentlemen—the occurrence of all these themes in different contexts within the same year is more than coincidence. A thin but genuine thread connects the Duke of Marlborough at Earl's Court and John Jacob Astor on the Titanic. The latter
was dying like a gentleman, and how gentlemen lived and died in 1912 was partly determined by the way they believed knights had lived and died.

All English gentlemen knew that they must be brave, show no sign of panic or cowardice, be courteous to women and children, be loyal to their comrades, and meet death without flinching. They knew it because they had learned the code of the gentleman in a multitude of different ways—through example, through what they had been taught at school or by their parents, and through endless stories of chivalry, daring, knights, and gallantry.

What is meant by chivalry?

It was the code of conduct that evolved for the knights of the Middle Ages—that is to say, for an elite and largely hereditary class of European warrior-nobles. Fighting was deemed a necessary and indeed glorious activity, but its potential barbarity was softened by putting leadership into the hands of men committed to high standards of behavior. These standards derived from an amalgamation of Christianity with the pre-Christian traditions of the warrior bands of Northern Europe. The ideal knight was brave, loyal, true to his word, courteous, generous, and merciful. His failure to meet accepted standards meant dishonor, to which death was preferable.

In England, medieval chivalry and most of its trappings had disappeared by the beginning of the 17th century. Much had happened to bury the chivalric tradition. The literature, art, and architecture of classical Greece and Rome and of Renaissance Italy had provided an alternative culture that dominated most aspects of Western European civilization. Revolutions in science and in philosophy had upset the me-
dieval world view.

Moreover, chivalry had little relevance to ordinary gentlemen who lived in security and comfort and left war to the professionals. What meaning could chivalry have for the average Georgian lord busily planting gardens, enclosing commons, looking for an heiress to marry, or cementing political alliances? In his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), Edmund Burke wrote that "the age of chivalry is gone."

Yearning for Authority

In fact, even as he lamented, chivalry was on its way back. Curiously enough, the 18th-century glorification of reason and intellect had helped bring this about. It had led to a new attitude toward history, based on a critical study of original documents, monuments, and artifacts.

The Middle Ages—and chivalry—benefited from this new approach. Antiquarians began to study medi-
vial buildings. Bishop Thomas Percy published medieval ballads and poems in his Reliques of Ancient English Poetry (1765), and medieval literature was seriously discussed in Thomas Warton's three-volume History of English Poetry (1774–81).

As early as 1759, Richard Hurd, later to become Bishop of Worcester, spoke up for chivalry in his Moral and Political Dialogues: "Affability, courtesy, generosity, veracity, these were the qualifications most pre-
tended to by the men of arms, in the days of pure and uncorrupted chivalry." Hurd was later taken up by King George III and frequently invited to Windsor Castle.

George III (1738–1820) was a natural conservative. He instinctively re-
avered ancient institutions, above all the church and the monarchy. He distrusted change and resisted any increase in democracy at home. During the first half of his reign, this made him very unpopular.

The French Revolution brought about a great transformation—not in King George's own views but in the way these were regarded by his subjects. The overthrow of the traditional structure of society in France, the violence that ensued, above all, the executions of Louis XVI and Marie-Antoinette in 1793, produced in England a new loyalty to authority and existing institutions.

A Feudal Revival

All of this affected English attitudes toward the Middle Ages. An age when kingship was revered and the church was at its most powerful became increasingly attractive to lords, gentry, and clergymen whose counterparts across the Channel were going to the guillotine. It was tempting to romanticize the Middle Ages as an age of simple faith and loyalties and the source of much that now appeared both sacred and threatened. Castles ceased to be con-
sidered picturesque relics or products of ignorance and violence; they began to be seen as proud symbols of authority and tradition.

George III, like much of the aristocracy, began to take an interest in castles. In 1800, he appointed James Wyatt to be his personal architect, and everything Wyatt built for George III was Gothic. Between 1800 and 1814, £150,000 was spent on "Gothicizing" the state apartments at Windsor, inside and out.

Wyatt's most remarkable work for the King was at Kew, where the 18th-century tradition had been to build royal lodges and palaces in Greco-Roman style. By commissioning a Gothic castle on the banks of the Thames in Kew Gardens, George III deliberately reversed this. His new "lodge," bigger than many medieval castles, consisted of a great square block embellished by corner towers and numerous turrets and battlements.

George IV eventually tore down the castle at Kew—he had never got on with his father—but he was nonetheless aware of the symbolic value of medievalism. Indeed, his coronation in 1821 was far more magnificent than was George III's. Foreigners, according to Sir Walter Scott, were "utterly astonished and delighted to see the revival of feudal dresses and feudal grandeur." One may safely infer that Walter Scott, author of dozens of chivalric poems and romances, was delighted too.

Sir Walter Scott (1771–1832) had been brought up in Edinburgh, in a predominantly Whig society of lawyers, academics, and professionals who accepted the 18th-century view of chivalry as absurd. Yet, emotionally, Scott responded instinctively to the Middle Ages even if, intellectually, he was always apologizing for them.

As a child, when he should have been in bed, he would sit up reading...
Shakespeare by the light of the fire. At the age of 13, he once forgot his dinner because he was so absorbed in his first reading of Percy’s Reliques. He and his friend John Irving used to wander over the countryside making up romantic tales.

Scott’s first novel, Waverley, appeared in 1814. It was an instant success, as were most of Scott’s many books. Fewer than a third of them, including Ivanhoe (1820), Quentin Durward (1823), and The Talisman (1825), were set in the Middle Ages, but of these Ivanhoe was the most successful, especially in England.

Merrie England

Scott gave his readers a Walter Scott version of the Middle Ages that captured their imagination because it was presented so vividly and seemed to express certain virtues that Scott’s contemporaries felt their own age badly needed. It was a world where, as Scott wrote in one of his early poems,

Strength was gigantic, valour high
And wisdom soared beyond the sky
And beauty had such matchless beam
As lights not now a lover’s dream.

He described castles complete with drawbridges, iron-studded gates, and portcullises; smoke-blackened, armor-hung halls; Christmas feasting, with Yule logs and Lords of Misrule; maypoles and the whole concept of Merrie England; tilts, tournaments, and knights with ladies’ favors pinned to their helmets; Richard Coeur de Lion, Robin Hood and his merry men, Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table.

By the time of his death, Scott was the Western world’s most famous living author. He had encouraged aristocrats and country gentlemen to build castles and cram their halls with weapons and armor; made young girls thrill at the thought of gallant knights, loyal chieftains, and faithful lovers; and spurred young men on to romantic gestures and dashing deeds.

Squelching to Glory

It was inevitable that someone would give a tournament. Ever since Scott had described the tournament at Ashby-de-la-Zouche in Ivanhoe, the public had been kept tournament-conscious. Ivanhoe was immediately dramatized. Five versions of it were running concurrently in London theaters during 1820.

In 1827, the tournament moved modestly from the stage to the country house, in the form of a jousting party given by Viscount Gate at Firle Park in Sussex. Local Sussex gentlemen cantered up and down, poking lances at one another. The ladies amused themselves with archery.

In August of 1838, the Court Journal published a rumor that Lord Eglinton was going to hold a tournament at his estate near Glasgow. Within a few weeks, the rumor had been confirmed. Lord Eglinton was an amiable, rich, sporting young Tory earl. What exactly led him into chivalric spectacle has never been established.

That autumn, would-be knights came to a meeting in Samuel Pratt’s flourishing armor showroom in London. Pratt was in charge of all the arrangements. In addition to armor for the knights, he was prepared to sell or hire crests, horse armor and equipment, pavilions, tents, shields, banners, lances, swords, and outfits for squires and pages. (Pratt’s bill for Lord Glenlyon, who appeared at the tournament as the Knight of Gael, came to a hefty £34 9s 6d.) Meanwhile, the general public was in a
On the morning of August 28, 1839, the sun shone brightly. Half a mile below Eglinton Castle, the greensward of the park was gay with the tents and pavilions of the 13 knights. And from every direction, by coach, by carriage, on foot or horse, poured endless streams of farmers, gentlemen, peasants, pickpockets, burgheers, policemen, shepherds, lords, and ladies. At least 100,000 people came to Eglinton that day.

As the opening feature, all the knights and officers of the tournament were to escort a Queen of Beauty from the castle to the lists. The procession was scheduled to leave at 12 o'clock, but it took three hours longer than expected to prepare the participants. All but one or two of the knights had come with a sizeable retinue. Lord Glenlyon was escorted by 78 officers and men of his Atholl Highlanders.

Just after three o'clock as the procession was at last ready to start, and the Queen of Beauty prepared to mount her snow white palfrey, there was a clap of thunder. Rain began to fall in torrents. It continued for the rest of the day.

At once, the gold and the gaiety vanished, and the whole glittering scene turned to mud. The colorful crowd on the slopes and in the stands was transformed into what one onlooker compared to an enormous field of mushrooms, as all who had them put up their umbrellas.

Up at the castle, the procession began to squelch miserably through the puddles. Lord Londonderry rode in front protecting his coronet and robes under an enormous green umbrella. The procession was a fiasco, and the tilting even worse. The jester made jokes that nobody laughed at. The knights slithered through the mud and missed each other.

In the grandstand, expressions of horror appeared on the faces of the occupants: The roofs of the pavilions had failed to keep out the rain. Cold water was falling in buckets down the necks of lords and ladies.

The Eglinton tournament became a source of much amusement. Yet reactions were by no means unanimous. Roughly speaking, commentators fell into three groups: those who mercilessly ridiculed Lord Eglinton and his friends; those who claimed that the tournament had been a great success; and those who defended chivalry, but without the medieval trimmings.

In his *Broad Stone of Honour* the Wilson Quarterly/Autumn 1981

Pomp yielded to rainy circumstance at the 1839 Eglinton tourney.
Kenelm Digby had already attacked the supposition that “tournaments and steel panoply, and coat-arms, and aristocratic institutions” were essential to chivalry; rather, they were only “accidental attendants upon it.” The real point of chivalry, he believed, was that it was an attitude toward life, not a matter of fancy dress. Digby was not alone. Chivalry was far from dead. Indeed, by the 1850s, the images of chivalry had been absorbed into the pattern of everyday life. Knights in armor jostled each other on the walls of the Royal Academy; knights in literature were two a penny. But knights in armor were now as likely to suggest moral struggles as military battles, as likely to symbolize modern gentlemen as depict medieval heroes. Chivalry was working loose from the Middle Ages. One comes across it, directly or indirectly, in the notion of “sportsmanship,” in the plots of children’s books, and in the behavior expected of upper-class lads at Britain’s elite boarding schools.

### Cricket vs. Poaching

In 1852, G.E.L. Cotton went from Rugby, the school that the venerable but strong-willed Dr. Thomas Arnold had fashioned according to his own notions of character-building and self-discipline, to become headmaster of Marlborough. Marlborough, founded in 1843, had got off to a bad start. A feeble headmaster, a brutal staff, and appalling living conditions had led to a mass rebellion in 1851. Cotton transformed the school. He used two tried Arnoldian methods: He established a responsible sixth form (the seniors) to run the school outside of class, and he recruited a “devoted band of young men” as masters.

But, in addition, as the school historian put it, “the organization of games which was due to his initiation was in some ways still more potent. . . . A civilized out-of-door life in the form of cricket, football, and wholesome sports, took the place of poaching, rat-hunting, and poultry-stealing.”

### Entering the Lists

For a headmaster actively to encourage sports as a means of improving the character of his boys was something new. The climate was changing in England, thanks in part to popular books such as *Euphranor* (whose author, Edward Fitzgerald, praised Eton for teaching its boys to “sublime their Beefsteak into Chivalry in that famous Cricketfield of theirs by the side of old Father Thames”) as well as to Thomas Hughes’s and Charles Kingsley’s “muscular Christianity.”

Hughes was much the youngest of that movement’s leaders—only 25 when it was launched in 1848—and he seemed to the others the epitome of what a young, ardent, Christian gentleman should be. In 1857, he produced his own view of the purpose of a public school in *Tom Brown’s Schooldays*. His novel had gone into at least 50 different editions and reprints by the end of the century.

Hughes overlaid his vivid memories of his own experiences at Rugby with the philosophy of life he had evolved in the 15 years since he left the school. He drew liberally from Thomas Carlyle: Strength of intellect was useless, even dangerous, without strength of character. But *Tom Brown’s Schooldays* went beyond Carlyle in suggesting that the best way to moral prowess was physical prowess.
The theme of the book is how Tom Brown, a strong, brave boy with a natural affinity for the underdog, is enrolled by Dr. Arnold in the "band of brothers" who use their toughness to fight for God. As his character develops, he proves himself, not just by prowess at football and cricket, by bravely enduring bullying, and by sticking up for a smaller boy in a knock-down fight with "Slogger" Williams; he also kneels down to say his prayers in a hostile dormitory, looks after and encourages clever but sickly little George Arthur, and finally, hardest of all, gives up the use of "cribs"—word-for-word translations of Greek and Latin texts.

The language of chivalry never obtrudes into the cheerful mixture of slang and breeziness in which the book is written; only occasionally, in terms such as "fellowship" and "band of brothers," does one sense it. But in the illustrated edition that first appeared in 1869, the obvious chivalric implications of the book are allowed to surface.

Thus, in the final illustration, Tom's Visit to the Tomb of Dr. Arnold, Tom, now a young undergraduate, has hurried back from a holiday in Scotland on hearing of Arnold's death and is standing by his tomb in Rugby chapel. He is, of course, in ordinary dress. But the blanket over his shoulder suggests a military cloak, and his attitude—pensive, bare-headed, one leg forward—is in the tradition of Sir Galahad. He is a young knight in mufti, keeping vigil before entering the battles of life.

From the 1850s onward, Cotton's example of Marlborough and the attitude expressed in Tom Brown's Schooldays began to spread to other public schools, and many new schools were founded in Marlborough's image. Games were enthusiastically furthered by headmasters as a way of training character. The inevitable end was that they became compulsory. By the 1880s, games were arguably more important than studies.

Being a sportsman, being a gentleman, and being chivalrous so overlapped that it is scarcely surprising to find sport using terms and practices derived from chivalry. Victorians competed for shields and took part in golf or tennis "tournaments." Opposing teams were described as "entering the lists" or "throwing down the gauntlet."

Even football (soccer) jerseys seem to have had chivalric origins. Distinctive athletic clothes appeared in the early or mid-1840s. According to the account of "An Old Rugbeian," published in 1848, the new jerseys were "of various colours and patterns, and wrought with many curious devices, which on their first introduction were accompanied by mottoes... as, for instance, Cave Adsum [Look out, here I am]."

In Sir Walter Scott's account of the tournament in Ivanhoe, "the gigantic Front-de-Boeuf, armed in sable armor, wore on a white shield a black bull's head, half defaced by the numerous encounters which he had undergone, and bearing the arrogant motto, Cave Adsum."

Baden-Powell's Boys

It is still widely believed that the Duke of Wellington said "The Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton." He never said anything of the sort. But most Englishmen embraced the sentiment.

In 1908, Sir Robert (later Lord) Baden-Powell observed that football was "a grand game for developing a lad physically and also morally, for he learns to play with good temper and unselfishness, to play in his
Baden-Powell was tremendously jolly, tough to the verge of ruthlessness, not in the least conventional, and a firm believer in the duty of the white races (the British in particular) to lead the rest of the world. These qualities had sustained him as he led the defense of Mafeking during the Boer War, and these qualities made him a national hero when the siege ended in 1900.

As a soldier, he had always been somewhat scornful of conventional military discipline. What interested him were the tactics of reconnaissance and guerrilla warfare, and the effect that these had in developing resourceful and independent soldiers. He had written two books on the subject, *Reconnaissance and Scouting* (1884) and *Aids to Scouting* (1889). Eventually, he started to work out a system of training for boys. The Boy Scouts was officially launched in 1908.

Scouting and chivalry were the two dominant elements. Scouting derived largely from Baden-Powell's own experiences in Africa. It involved what now makes up most people's image of the Boy Scouts: tents, campfires, billycans, slouch hats, staffs, knots, signs, patrols with animal names, little boys rubbing two sticks together to make fire.

But chivalry was equally important. This was made clear in Baden-Powell's best-selling *Scouting for Boys*, which first came out in fortnightly parts in 1908, and thereafter went into innumerable editions. Chapter VII was devoted to "The Chivalry of the Knights," and a Knight's Code was given, in nine rules, ostensibly as laid down by King Arthur.

The various rules were enlarged on in sections on Honour, Courtesy,
Loyalty, Fair Play, Obedience, Discipline, Humility ("Don't Swagger"), and so on. "A knight (or Scout) is at all times a gentleman," Baden-Powell wrote. "So many people seem to think that a gentleman must have lots of money. That does not make a gentleman. A gentleman is anyone who carries out the rules of chivalry of the knights."

Baden-Powell was thinking mainly of working-class boys in the cities when he developed his ideas. His movement aimed not only to improve the physique of its boys by physical exercise in the open air but also to improve their character by inoculating them with the code of the Victorian gentleman. Chivalry, he believed, was not an aristocratic preserve; it was for "the people" too.

Bullying Belgium

Back during the 1820s, Dr. Thomas Arnold had let off a blast against chivalry, saying that "it sets up the personal allegiance to the chief above allegiance to God and law." By the end of the century, chivalry had helped make loyalty one of the most admired virtues: loyalty to queen and country; loyalty to the regiment or school; loyalty of gentlemen to one another and to their code.

The emotional charge behind all this was enormous, but, as Arnold had seen, it had its dangers.

During the 19th century, the upper class and much of the middle class had been increasingly encouraged to believe that there was no more glorious fate than to die fighting for one's country. Of course, the fight had to be for a good cause. But one of the effects of imperialism had been to imbue very large numbers of people of diverse backgrounds with an almost-religious faith in Britain and its growing empire as the great force for good in the world.

The onset of World War I merely reinforced this idea. Certainly Britain would not stand idly by as Germany invaded "little Belgium" in August 1914. Rather, as Baden-Powell put it, England was going to "give the big bully a knockout blow."

Such stout-hearted optimism stemmed in part from loss of memory. Britain's most recent conflict, the Boer War (1898–1902), had been its costliest since the Napoleonic wars; some 22,000 British or colonial troops had been killed. But, a dozen years after it ended, the war's costs and its unhappier episodes were beginning to fade in people's minds.

Indeed, London writers and politicians recalled the South African fighting in terms of the successful relief of Kimberley and Mafeking, "a gentleman's war," "a very pleasant time for a young fellow." The chief
military lesson—that a combination of trench warfare and modern weaponry was likely to result in bloody stalemate—had been forgotten.

When the military men predicted that the conflict with Germany would be short and decisive, few skeptics were heard. Since the great majority of young Englishmen had had no exposure to combat, there was nothing to stop them from thinking of it simply as a noble experience involving all that they had been taught to exalt—glory, honor, and chivalry.

**End of an Illusion**

"War declared by England," Patrick Gray, a schoolboy still at Rugby, wrote in his diary on August 5 (he was to go to the front in 1917, and be killed almost at once); "intense relief, as there was an awful feeling that we might dishonor ourselves."

All of those who had been at public schools knew exactly what was expected of them. But so, outside of the public schools, did all Boy Scouts, past and present, all Cadets, all members of boys' clubs and boys' brigades, all readers of the right adventure stories in the right magazines. Giant forces of loyalty to King and country were ready to be triggered off. When Lord Kitchener made his first call for volunteers, they came by the hundreds of thousands, filling the streets outside the recruiting offices with queues of patient, cheerful faces.

The Great War probably produced more English poetry than any other. There were poets at home and even more poets on the front. Their poems were published in the *Times* and other dailies, in the weeklies, in anthologies by the dozen, and in hundreds of individual volumes. Chivalric themes permeated them in terms of knights, vigils, Galahads, and Holy Grails, or in terms of sportsmen and playing the game.

Chivalry also appeared in prose in the stories by Arthur Machen for the *London Evening News*, especially in "The Bowman," which came out on September 29, 1914. "The Bowman" succeeded beyond most authors' dreams—much to Machen's embarrassment. It tells how a British soldier, facing a German attack, remembers and repeats a motto that he had seen under figures of St. George on the plates of a restaurant: "Adsit Anglis Sanctus Georgius." In front of the trench in which he is standing, he suddenly sees "a long line of shapes, with a shining about them." The day is saved; "the grey
men were falling by thousands." He finally realizes that St. George has brought in his own bowmen to help the English.

Soon reports began to circulate in England of officers who had seen St. George, of arrow wounds having been found in dead Germans.

Sir Henry Newbolt's *Book of the Happy Warrior* came out in 1917. It told the story of chivalry and was clearly intended to inspire boys in wartime England with chivalrous enthusiasms. The chapter about Agincourt was sportingly titled "France v. Gentlemen of England." Metaphors of sport were carried over into action: On at least two occasions British troops going over the top kicked a football as they advanced into No Man's Land.

There are times when the Great War seems like a nightmare parody of the Eglinton Tournament. The knights of England, young, brave, dashing, and handsome, line up to proceed to the tournament. They are filled with ardor for the fight, escorted by loyal yeomanry, longing to do great deeds and win honor for themselves, their King, and their lady-loves. Trumpets blow, attendant bards recite heroic poetry, and all is ready for the glorious combat.

Then the rain starts falling, and so do the artillery shells. The pretty French landscape disintegrates into a wasteland of mud, craters, ruins, corpses, and barbed wire.

By the end of 1914, millions of troops were living waterlogged in holes, burrows, and ditches, often on top of their own dead, amid the filth and squalor. There, many of them died, and there, the notion of chivalry died with them. As a dominant code of elite conduct in England, it never recovered from the Great War, partly because the war itself was such a shatterer of illusions, partly because the conflict helped produce a new world in which the necessary conditions for chivalry were absent.

So many deaths, such vast movements of people, such huge expenditures of money could not but have cataclysmic effects on the structure of British society.

By Armistice Day 1918, eight-and-one-half million men had been killed on both sides. The tsarist government of Russia had collapsed and been replaced by a Bolshevik regime. Germany was left defeated, impoverished, and resentful. In England, the generals' blunders and the war's frightful butchery brought into serious question the qualifications of the upper classes to lead. War conditions had brought higher wages and greater political power at home for the working classes. The old prewar order was shattered. England would never be the same.
We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer's telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editors' requests for comment.

The New Germans

Re "West Germany" [WQ, Summer 1981]:

Thirty-six years after the Nazi regime and the division of Germany, it is no longer possible to speak in traditional terms of a "German character." West German culture in the 1950s was marked by a set of clear cut decisions bound to the immediate postwar experience—decisions to break with past totalitarianism and to confront the present dictatorships in East Germany and Eastern Europe.

But anti-totalitarianism gave way, by the end of the '60s, to hopes of worldwide détente and violent demands for social and political change by younger people in general (and student protestors in particular). This has led to the overlapping of two different (generational) ethos—one focused on economic reconstruction and political stability, the other involving a feverish search for postindustrial, "alternative" forms of existence.

In the '80s, we have to expect new waves of Ohne-mich [a German social-reformist citizens' lobby] opposition outside the "established" party system (and at its radical fringe). This does not mean, however, a danger of a relapse into pre-democratic or neo-Nazi traditions; rather, we observe an estrangement from, and sometimes violent hostility to, the liberal "system" as such, in the name of radical, plebiscitarian democracy.

It is not only because of the economic crisis that West Germany's political stability will be put to serious tests. West Germany remains haunted by her sensitive geographical position at the juncture of East and West, communism and democracy, totalitarianism and liberal views. In such a situation, two positive assets of West German democracy can as yet be stressed: the complete absence of a communist mass party (and of extremist movements with any voting strength) and the presence of a strong pro-West democratic opposition party (the Christian Democratic Union) polling more votes than any other liberal-conservative party in Europe.

Karl Dietrich Bracher
Seminar für Politische Wissenschaft
University of Bonn

Let the Utilities Work

"Energy: 1945-1980" [WQ, Spring 1981] focused on the history of oil and gas supply in the United States. These sources provide three-quarters of our present energy supplies. But they are dwindling resources that must be augmented by our plentiful coal and nuclear power—currently providing 17 and four percent, respectively, of our energy.

The only means of using the nuclear energy and a principal means of using coal is through generation of electricity. In fact, electricity's use of primary energy has risen from 15 percent of the total during World War II to 31 percent today. By the year 2000, this percentage should reach 45 to 55 percent through greater use of coal and nuclear energy. If we are to have adequate supplies. But this may not occur because of what has happened to our electric utilities.

In the last decade, they have been transformed from growth-oriented organizations ready to market their often superior product to financially weak and anti-growth-minded companies. The ravages of continued inflation, now at a double digit rate, coupled with sharply higher fuel costs and greatly increased environmental regulations have left them unable to expand as the nation requires. The state utility commissions, which set
rates for electricity, have found it politically impossible to keep utility profits at a viable level. Consequently, borrowing through new issues of common stock or bonds has become prohibitively expensive. The result: a shortage of funds to finance new construction for the 10 years or so before it can generate revenue.

In these circumstances, few utilities find it possible to promote the many uses of electricity that are the best economic choices to replace oil and gas: the electric heat pump for space heating and cooling, electric furnaces for steel making, electrified mass transit, and, eventually, the electric car.

The authors of "Energy: 1945—1980" have the answer to this dilemma, as they do to our other energy problems: Government must either let a free market determine prices and supply, or central planning and control must be made to function properly. To date in the electrical sector, we have had neither.

Bill Bradley  
United States Senate

Family Farms  
and Foreign Policy

Re "Agriculture in America" [WQ, Summer 1981]:

I grew up in Minnesota on a highly diversified independent enterprise we would now call a subsistence farm. There were six million such places in the United States in the 1930s.

My parents’ farm was typical, growing and selling everything from a small flock of chickens to a small dairy and a garden. They depended on divine guidance and stood by that venerable American rural ethic dignifying work and an independent spirit.

Technology has changed all that. With the advent of modern methods, sideline farming gave way to specialization. The ‘rugged individualism’ of my parents’ generation was devastated by the oil embargo of 1973, the formation of OPEC, the grain embargoes.

While we must pay attention to problems associated with fragile land and water reserves, we have not paid much attention to the rising role of nationalism in the world and the attendant impact on our own independence. There was a time when four or five superpowers, like the
leaders of the Congress at the time, could pretty well call the shots. This is no longer true. The world is an imperfect and unruly place, and it is time that leaders start looking at it as a common marketplace, not as a dumping ground or economic security threat.

This will call for a major restructuring of our foreign policymaking machinery to provide for a more satisfactory method of sharing risks in trade matters.

Bob Bergland  
President, Farmland-Eaton World Trade  
Arlington, Va.

Mr. Bergland was U.S. Secretary of Agriculture from 1977 to 1981.

The Disaster on the Horizon

John Stuart Mill once observed something to the effect that disaster always hangs on the horizon but the nearer we come to it the further it recedes. Your three articles on "Agriculture in America" suggest that the reason we never seem to meet disaster on that horizon, at least, is because we are alerted to its presence and have, so far, the wit and resources to avoid it. So far, so good.

John T. Schlebecker  
Curator, Division of Extractive Industries  
The National Museum of American History  
Washington, D.C.

Public TV:  
One Answer to Tyranny?

As an avid fan of public television and a "heavy reader" (as contrasted with "heavy viewer"), I was eager to read Stuart Shorenstein's article ["Does Public Television Have a Future?" WQ, Winter 1981]. I wish you would communicate a point to him for me.

When cable TV begins to offer viewers 80 channels, it will have reached the stage historically that commercial radio reached a decade ago. Radio proved that mere proliferation of channels does not in and of itself provide the listener with diversity of programming.

Public television's pride in offering "alternatives" to commercial TV programming is proved valid by National Public Radio (NPR), which is filling significant gaps in listener service in radio's multi-channel environment. NPR is the last bastion for classical music lovers. It may become the last bastion for jazz lovers, as well. (Here in New York City, we have witnessed the demise of an all-jazz radio station despite its many fans.)

It seems to me that public television and public radio exist, like democracy, to protect their constituencies from the tyranny of the majority.

Natalie Maynard  
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WNED  
New York City

Corrections

Owing to a misunderstanding during the editorial process, the review of David Montgomery's Beyond Equality that appeared over my name [WQ, Summer 1981] differed substantially from what I wrote. The differences are significant enough that I do not believe that authorship of the review should be attributed to me.

Barbara J. Fields

The WQ apologizes to co-editors Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell for garbling the price and authorship of The Crisis in Economic Theory ["Current Books," WQ, Summer 1981]. The Crisis in Economic Theory, edited by Kristol and Bell (published by Basic), is $14.95 in cloth and $4.95 in paper.
CURRENT FELLOWS

WILLI PAUL ADAMS, Professor of North American History, Free University of Berlin
VASSILY P. AKSYONOY, Novelist, Ann Arbor, Michigan
GEORGE MORRISON CARSTAIRS, former Vice Chancellor, University of York, United Kingdom
GERMÁN COLMENARES, Professor of History, Universidad del Valle, Colombia
ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, former Director, Policy and Planning, U.S. Department of Energy
PETE DANIEL, Historian, Washington, D.C.
LUIGI EINAUDI, Director, Policy and Coordination, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, U.S. Department of State
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In 1968, the Congress established the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars as an international institute for advanced study and the nation's official "living memorial" to the 28th President, "symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relation between the world of learning and the world of public affairs."

The Center opened in October 1970 and was placed in the Smithsonian Institution under its own presidentially appointed board of trustees. Its chairmen of the board have been Hubert H. Humphrey, William J. Baroody, Sr., and, currently, Max M. Kampelman.

Open annual competitions have brought more than 350 Fellows to the Center since 1970. All Fellows carry out advanced research, write books, and join in seminars and dialogues with other scholars, public officials, members of Congress, newsmen, business and labor leaders. The Center is housed in the original Smithsonian "castle" on the Mall in the nation's capital. Financing comes from both private sources and an annual congressional appropriation. The Center—and The Wilson Quarterly—seek diversity of scholarly enterprise and of points of view.