THE WILSON QUARTERLY
AUTUMN 1976
A NATIONAL REVIEW
OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION

WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
Smithsonian Institution Building Washington D.C.
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Published in January, April, July, and October by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution Building, Washington, D.C. 20560. Copyright 1976 by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Subscription rate: one year, $12. Foreign subscriptions, add $2 postage per year. Single copies available upon request, $4.50. Application to mail at second-class postage rates is pending at Washington, D.C. and additional mailing offices. Editorial offices, Smithsonian Institution Building, Washington, D.C. 20560. Send changes of address and all subscription correspondence to The Wilson Quarterly, P.O. Box 2450, Greenwich, Conn. 06830.

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A few words of introduction.

The Wilson Quarterly is designed to bring the world of scholars and specialists to the intelligent lay reader. Throughout the magazine, the editors draw on the advice of Wilson Center Fellows, former Fellows, and other leading scholars at major universities. Our aim is to provide an authoritative overview of current ideas and research on matters of public policy and general intellectual interest.

As a group, of course, scholars have no monopoly on wisdom or even rational analysis. But the better scholars have something special to say to all of us. They refresh our thinking, surprise us with new data, occasionally remind us of old truths and new paradoxes lost in the daily hubbub of the press and television. Their more powerful ideas eventually help shape our perceptions, our politics, and our lives. They are the women and men whose work the Quarterly's editors seek out for review or publication.

We compile the "Periodicals" survey to alert the reader to noteworthy articles in specialized journals. We examine more than 400 such publications; we plan to expand our coverage to include more reports from major research centers here and abroad, from Congressional committees and foundations. We group the longer essays—on Economic Growth, Brazil, the American Revolution, in this issue—with brief critiques of the relevant background books to provide a cross-section of current thinking on the subject at hand. We invite counter-arguments and amplification in the form of Letters to the Editor. For the "Current Books" section, the editors focus on good titles that the reader otherwise might miss; we see no point in duplicating the selections in Time, Newsweek, or Saturday Review.

Finally, we keep some flexibility. In this issue, for example, we reprint Russell Lynes's 1949 social analysis, "Highbrow, Lowbrow, Middlebrow." Mr. Lynes put new words into the American language, and afforded his readers some wry amusement. Not a bad combination now and then.

Peter Braestrup
Federal tax and spending policies are abetting a huge transfer of wealth from the Northeast and Midwest to the fast-growing southern and western “sunbelt” states, according to National Journal computations. The people of the economically stagnating Northeast and Great Lakes states are paying out vastly more in federal taxes than they receive in federal outlays—a “balance of payments” deficit in fiscal 1975 amounting to $18.6 billion for the five Great Lakes states ($62.2 billion paid vs. $43.6 billion received) and some $10 billion for the mid-Atlantic states.

This money flow has existed for years; it only became a cause for alarm around 1970 when the steady shift of population, economic investment, and jobs to the South and West accelerated sharply. While black migration from South to North has fallen off dramatically since 1970, white out-migration from the Northeast and Midwest has continued, leaving the older regions burdened with a disproportionate share of the nation’s low-income, poorly educated population. Ralph R. Widner, president of the Academy for Contemporary Problems, sees the big northern cities with their burden of poor people as “the nation’s new cottonfields.” Others, like Ralph L. Schlosstein, of the Congressional Joint Economic Committee staff, cite the North’s higher labor and energy costs, aging plant and equipment, and predict a “self-feeding decline” for the older regions.

Some proposed remedies: shifting federal contract and payroll expenditures to high-unemployment areas, increased revenue sharing, federal aid to promote private investment in depressed regions. In addition, the Joint Economic Committee urges federal regional economic policies to supplement Washington’s traditional efforts designed to stimulate or restrain the national economy as a whole.
"A Political Party Known as COPE"

An American labor party could have emerged from the mass unionism of the 1930s but it did not happen—and it's not going to happen. Barbash, a University of Wisconsin economist, traces early American unionism from its anti-industrial and anti-capitalist origins to the New Deal era, when labor leaders like the coal miners’ John L. Lewis turned their backs on class theory and embarked on “political collective bargaining” in Congress and the state legislatures. So successful were these pressure-group tactics, argues Barbash, that even the class-conscious leaders of the CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) unions were unwilling or unable to create a genuine labor party. Why? Because young labor militants were reluctant to risk gains made under the New Deal for the “vague pie-in-the-sky of third-party politics,” because union leaders now had a role in the Democratic party, and because Marxist activists were ultimately driven out of big labor.

Since the 1940s, American unions have come to resemble their West European counterparts in some ways. The AFL-CIO maintains permanent political action organizations; it pushes Congress and the White House on domestic and foreign policy. “We have a political party and it’s known as COPE (Committee on Political Education),” AFL-CIO president George Meany once noted. Such efforts are likely to increase as labor seeks to stave off erosion of its gains in the face of slower economic growth and environmental pressures. No separate labor party will result, Barbash predicts, because union leaders fear isolation from the American middle class, and the Republicans and Democrats would co-opt the most palatable parts of any separate labor party program anyway.

"Why So Few Women Hold Public Office: Democracy and Sexual Roles"

After 50 years of full citizenship, few American women hold public office today. Rutgers political scientist Lee surveyed 301 men and women who were active participants in local politics in four middle- and upper-income suburbs of Westchester County, New York. Her “regrettable conclusion” is that the percentage of women elected to office is unlikely to increase substantially in the future “unless radical changes occur in current sexual role assignments.” Annual per family income in the communities surveyed ranged from $13,000 in Tuckahoe to $42,500 in Scarsdale. (Eastchester with $20,000 and Bronxville with $27,000 were in between.)
Lee found that what inhibits activist women in these communities from competing with men for political office has little to do with distaste for politics, lack of zeal, or reluctance to commit time and effort. Rather, the big factor was constraint imposed by child-rearing—a constraint felt by men as well as women. (Of women surveyed who had children at home, 5.3 percent had run for local public office, as against 26.1 percent with no children at home who had done so. For men it was 21.5 percent as against 38.9 percent.) Lee found women also shy away from seeking office because they see it as an inappropriate form of political activity (as distinct from helping others win election), because they fear others (both men and women) would disapprove, and because they fear sex discrimination (74.7 percent predicted they would not be accepted by men). Lee sees some signs of change: Not only do Louis Harris polls show women no longer opposing efforts to advance women's rights, but there has been a sharp increase in women candidates for Congress, from 26 in 1970 to 34 in 1972 and 46 in 1974.

A New Look at Eisenhower

Dwight Eisenhower, as President, was a mediocrity, a political innocent who avoided decisions, delegated too much authority to subordinates, and devoted his energies to the golf course. For two decades, this was the conventional wisdom among academics and newsmen analyzing the Eisenhower years. Columnist William V. Shannon, for example, wrote (in 1958) that "the Eisenhower era is the time of the great postponement." In a 1962 poll of scholars ranking the Presidents, historian Arthur M. Schlesinger put Eisenhower at the bottom of the "average" category, between Andrew Johnson and Chester A. Arthur. But during the '70s, many commentators—some of them, like I.F. Stone, writing from a Left perspective—have found things to admire. Why? Notre Dame historian De Santis observes that "the most important single thing about Eisenhower was that we did not go to war while he was President." Ike ended the Korean War in six months and reduced military spending. This "rehabilitation" of Eisenhower is also uncovering new character strengths. Garry Wills has described him as "a political genius." Author Richard Rhodes calls him "a brilliant man" with a "phenomenal memory." Other revisionist studies show him keeping a tight rein on Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and withholding public condemnation of Senator Joseph McCarthy because he sincerely believed it would damage the dignity of the presidential office. The author concludes that the Eisenhower presidency "will always be associated with prosperity, abundance, and peace, no mean accomplishment."
Badmouthing the Bureaucracy

Samuelson, a Washington writer for the Financial Times of London, challenges the revived election-year notions that the federal bureaucracy has grown enormously in the past decade; that federal workers are grossly overpaid; that the government could be more effective and less costly if it were reorganized. In fact, Samuelson notes, federal civilian employment has grown by about 25 percent (to 2,786,000) since 1947, leaving the ratio of federal workers to total U.S. population lower than it was 29 years ago. State and local government employment, however, has grown 150 percent (to 10.1 million) since 1952. Average pay for federal workers rose by a higher percentage between 1955 and 1973 than the average for all workers in the private economy. But this disparity was caused largely by the proliferation of programs (space, air traffic control systems) requiring trained professionals. Samuelson concedes that some middle managers are overpaid but insists the trouble "lies not with the pay system, but with useless agencies and useless jobs." Creating new bureaucratic conglomerates (like the Department of Transportation) will not reduce the size of government or make the bureaucracy more responsive. It could even make things worse. New agencies, born of crisis or crusading zeal, can be "an invitation to payroll-padding, exaggerated job descriptions, and bureaucratic empire-building."

America's World View

Abroad, the United States was the embodiment of liberty and progress in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Today, "egalitarianism," not liberty, flavors the rhetoric of spokesmen for the new emerging nations. Brzezinski, a Columbia professor and recent foreign policy advisor to Jimmy Carter, seeks to analyze America's growing sense of estrangement.

Third World leaders, he writes, seek to gain a bigger share of the world's economic wealth, not to further individual freedom. Americans see this drive as an unwarranted claim on their own hard-won affluence, and Brzezinski warns of a coming mood of "philosophical isolation without precedent in American history."
Yet, it would be tragic, he argues, to view the current turbulent world scene simply as a struggle between "liberal democracy and various forms of despotic statism." For a variety of reasons, the general trend in the non-Western world is toward statist economic systems far different from America's workable mix of private enterprise, corporate ownership, and indirect government control. But Washington can ill afford to indulge its sense of philosophical alienation with economic isolationism, especially as American consumption of mineral resources depends increasingly on Third World supplies.

Brzezinski warns against developing a "siege mentality." American economic, military, and political strength, he notes, remains central to global stability and progress. And the American message—stressing liberty and a healthy pluralism—is still valid; it can be the basis for a "new and more diversified international system."

Learning to Cope With Terrorism

International terrorism is clearly on the rise and cannot be regarded as a passing phenomenon. During the two decades prior to 1969 an annual average of 5 aircraft hijackings occurred; in the early 1970s, writes Pierre, an American arms control and European security specialist at the Council on Foreign Relations, more than 60 took place each year. The past six years have seen more than 500 major acts of international terrorism, including at least 65 kidnappings. Why? Terrorism works. Palestinian "freedom fighters" and their allies have won partial success in achieving traditional terrorist goals—the appearance of strength, worldwide publicity for a cause, erosion of the authority of an enemy state (Israel), freedom for imprisoned comrades. In Latin America, where kidnapping foreign diplomats and executives for ransom has become endemic, terrorists in Uruguay and Argentina have gained similar psychological successes, plus the money to buy more arms.

The counter-terrorist record is dismal. At the U.N., many African and Arab nations refuse to regard terrorism as an international offense. States which traditionally provide safe haven for plane hijackers refuse to sign international anti-hijacking agreements. The author suggests both prevention and deterrence—easing real grievances and encouraging dissidents to seek attention without resort to terror, coupled with more effective counter-terrorist activities (sharing intelligence, imposing sanctions against countries that harbor terrorists, etc.).

Pierre warns, however, that terrorism "could become a new form of warfare" employed by countries seeking to pursue foreign policy objectives without the risk of conventional military confrontation.
FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

The Necessity
Of Helsinki


The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was inevitable, writes Russell, principal U.S. negotiator for the initial "Declaration on Principles" signed in Helsinki August 1, 1975. It was a necessary element in the "process of detente." Failure to conclude an agreement would have raised serious doubts about the viability of detente, something for which neither Washington nor Moscow wished to take the blame. As Russell notes, most U.S. reaction to the final conference document ranged from tepid to frigid; George Ball calling it "a defeat for the West." One criticism is that it constituted a recognition of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe without any real *quid pro quo*. In rebuttal, Russell contends that "the USSR failed in large part to achieve the kind of language it originally sought"; the document, in fact, "does . . . nothing to recognize existing frontiers in Europe."

Indeed, the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviet Union's justification for intervention in sister socialist states, can no longer be invoked without violating the Helsinki Declaration on Principles. Also favoring the West is that section which deals with humanitarian and cultural matters, such as reunification of families and better treatment of journalists. No longer can Eastern nations charge "interference" when such matters are raised, Russell argues.

Admiral Mahan Revisited

"Seapower and Political Influence" by Hedley Bull, in *Adelphi Papers* (Spring 1976), International Institute for Strategic Studies, 18 Adam St., London WC2N 6AL.

What political purposes does sea power now serve? And, given the current restraints on the use of force by the major nuclear powers, how can sea power be used by the United States or Russia as an instrument of foreign policy in peacetime? For Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), the father of modern naval theory, sea power served two main purposes—protecting commerce and bringing military force to bear in distant waters to help allies or deter enemies. Admiral Mahan's nineteenth century concept of "mastery of the sea," however, may no longer make sense for either the United States or the Soviet Union.

Command of the sea now involves not only the ocean's surface but the subsurface and the air as well. Such mastery, says Bull, professor of international relations at Australia's National University, is likely to be "less absolute, more limited in scope and duration, than in Mahan's day." Although a big navy still seems to provide strategic flexibility (e.g., Polaris submarines), visible strength, and a worldwide
The author suggests that henceforth "opportunities for the diplomatic use of naval forces, at least for the great powers, may be severely circumscribed."

The super powers inhibit each other; Bull argues that the 1962 Cuban missile crisis "scenario" could not recur today; the history of recent crises, notably in the eastern Mediterranean, shows that the United States "acts differently" when Soviet naval forces are present. A more generous international consensus concerning the limits of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, together with impending legal curbs on traditional freedoms on the high seas (to fish, to pollute, to exploit the seabed) impose psychological and political obstacles to the free use of naval power. Bull suggests that Third World nations, in particular, are developing a maritime "territorial imperative," often backed up by inexpensive missile-carrying smallcraft; these threats may deprive the Big Navy of its traditional pervasiveness and purpose.

**Technological Surprises**


Colonel Viksne's detailed analysis of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War argues once again that for every innovation in warfare there is ultimately a countermeasure. In the 1967 Sinai campaign, Israeli tanks ranged far ahead of their artillery support in daring forays against disorganized Arab defenders who lacked effective, portable anti-tank weapons. In 1973, rashly using similar tactics, Israel lost between 40 and 44 percent of its tanks, half of them to Soviet-supplied anti-tank rockets in the hands of Egyptian and Syrian infantry.

A more striking turn-around occurred at sea, where Israeli vessels armed with sea-skimming Gabriel missiles (range 15 miles) overwhelmed Egyptian Komar and Osa-class boats firing Soviet Styx missiles (range 31 miles). Of the 6 Styx missiles fired by the Egyptians during the 1967 fighting, 4 sank the Israeli destroyer *Eilat* and the other 2 sank an Israeli merchantman. In the October 1973 war, Arab naval vessels fired about 50 Styx missiles without scoring any hits largely because the Israelis used metallic "chaff" to confuse enemy radar. Once within range, Gabriel missiles sank at least eight Komar and Osa boats, leaving Israeli local command of the sea.

On the other hand, Israeli inability to counter Soviet radar and guidance systems with older, U.S.-built electronic devices resulted in heavy aircraft losses (105—including 6 helicopters), almost half of them to a radar-guided Soviet 23 mm cannon which proved extremely effective against Israeli aircraft diving to evade SA-6 missiles. An added footnote to the 1973 war of technologies—each side admitted to shooting down several of its own planes because of an inability to identify friendly aircraft or exercise control in contested airspace.
Turning Points
For America

MIT economist Thurow looks at what lies ahead for the economy in America's third century and finds some serious problems obscured by current misconceptions. Contrary to popular belief, he contends, economic growth has not brought us more leisure time, but less: "American families are working more and more, with fewer and fewer hours at home." (Hours of paid work by women have increased substantially.) Another 1950s prediction—that the United States would develop a "service economy" and a white-collar society—has also proved wrong. (The only real growth service industries have been health and education; both require large capital investment. And distinctions between white- and blue-collar workers have become so blurred as to be meaningless.) Thurow denies that the "so-called energy crisis" represents a significant "turning point in economic history." Energy, he says, has only stopped becoming cheaper. (The price of a barrel of oil, in terms of hours worked to earn the money necessary to buy it, is the same now as it was in 1968.)

While waiting for the world of the futurists to arrive, Americans may soon see semi-socialist Sweden surpassing the United States in its real average standard of living, or per-capita gross national product (Sweden's annual growth rate substantially surpasses the United States' 3 percent), to be followed soon by Denmark, Switzerland and West Germany. Public realization that the American economy is performing poorly will generate demands for drastic change. Thurow predicts some form of wage-indexing (a cost-of-living escalator for all workers) or guaranteed jobs within the next 15 to 20 years if nothing else solves the inflation-unemployment dilemma now imposed by "oligopolistic big business and big labor." Either remedy, he says, would mean major, controversial changes in the economy.

A New Ethic
For Business?

Bethlehem Steel won the contract to supply rails for Russia's Trans-Siberian Railroad (begun in 1891) after Charles M. Schwab presented a $200,000 necklace to the mistress of Czar Alexander's nephew. Schwab's gift provoked no burst of outrage, says Guzzardi, yet far less crass sales inducements are now universally denounced when used by U.S.
Guzzardi argues that American business is being unfairly condemned for failing to adhere to "new and sweeping principles of conduct" that are as yet ill-defined. A new ethic, he says, is being imposed by Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission in an "erratic and inequitable application of existing but inadequate statutes." Critics in the business community accuse the SEC of exceeding its 1933 Congressional mandate calling for disclosure of all "material" information about a publicly owned company—that is, only information of significance to an investor. The SEC seems to regard all "improper acts" as "material." Moreover, critics charge, the Commission claims power to impose sanctions for falsification of financial records—an authority more appropriately left with the Justice Department, the IRS, or state district attorneys.

More recently, Guzzardi says, the SEC seems to have discovered a distinction between payments made to government officials overseas to procure special and unjustified favors, and those made to persuade low-level government officials to perform their duties (customs officials, for example) in a timely fashion. Guzzardi urges the Commission to continue in this direction and resist Congressional demands for even broader disclosure. What is needed, he writes, "is legislation that will be clear about what is legal and what is not."

**Industry and The Small Town**

Rural communities suffering from the twin woes of unemployment and inflation often try to attract new industry as a cure for economic anemia. Professor Summers makes a strong case against the "multiplier theory," which holds that new economic activity always generates a net local increase in jobs and income.

His evidence is a recent University of Wisconsin study on the impact of 700 manufacturing plants established in 245 rural communities in 34 states between 1945 and 1973. Summers shows that anticipated new revenue frequently leaks away (employees in the new industries decide to live or shop in other communities or they quit existing jobs in the community to work in the new plant). The multiplier effect fails to materialize because existing local industries are either unequipped to provide needed materials and services, or don't have to expand to meet demand. Local government is unable to convert private-sector growth into new public revenue; property assessments increase, primarily in residential areas, bringing greater tax burdens for disgruntled homeowners and farmers who had been promised by civic leaders that new industry meant tax relief.

While revenues failed to grow as hoped, towns sometimes made
more costly concessions to new industry than was wise (buying land, improving sites with roads and utility connections). And when new residents moved in, attracted by new job opportunities, the costs to the town of providing services were greater than the net tax revenues generated, especially if new water and sewerage facilities were needed. The worst error? Overestimating population growth and building facilities for people who never arrived.

**Distinctions, Not Differences**

"Why Bosses Turn Bitchy" by Rosabeth Moss Kanter, in *Psychology Today* (May 1976), P.O. Box 2990, Boulder, Colo. 80302.

Why don't more women seek or find career success? Is it because of personality differences between the sexes—an unconscious avoidance of success or inability to handle power? Not at all, says Kanter, an associate professor of sociology at Brandeis. The answer lies in opportunity, power, and tokenism. “Lack of opportunity to succeed, not a personality style that shuns success, is often what separates the unambitious from the climbers—and the women from the men.” The author finds no convincing research evidence that men and women differ in their leadership styles, or that people who work for women have lower morale. A successful boss must have real power (which comes from enjoying influence in the higher, usually male echelons of the organization) to back up decisions and thus insure the confidence of subordinates. The petty, domineering female boss usually lacks such power; she tries, instead, to coerce employees into supporting her. When women do get real power, whether in politics or business, they perform just as well—or badly—as men do. Obvious “tokenism” in hiring or promotion, whether racial or sexual, implies management’s lack of trust and forces the token employee to cope with stereotypes (women nurses often “test” male nurses to see if they will side with female coworkers against other men). Greater success for women will come, not from changing their personalities or attitudes, Kanter argues, but from interrupting self-perpetuating cycles of blocked opportunity and tokenism.

**Meaningful Jobs For the Unfulfilled**


America’s universities are producing too many qualified applicants for a shrinking job market, and the situation is likely to get worse. (The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts an annual “surplus” of 140,000 college graduates by 1980.) Berger, a sociology professor at Long Island University, rejects various proposed solutions: lowered retirement age, prolonged education, government manipulation of both the job market
and the educational institutions that supply it. She likewise opposes a shift to technical and vocational training (the National Planning Association says that of all jobs available, 80 percent involve essentially routine tasks requiring no particular skills).

A realistic solution, Berger argues, must take account of those who regard education as a tool for self-discovery. When bonded with the New Consciousness, celebrated in 1970 in Charles Reich's best-selling *The Greening of America*, the revived Enlightenment goal of "self-fulfillment" requires that work not only be safe, well paid, and of short daily duration, but also that it be "nonmanual, nonroutine, and nonmonotonous; interesting, creative, challenging, and capable of providing personal meaning..."

The author predicts that Washington will eventually be compelled to supplement a private sector incapable of producing enough "meaningful and fulfilling" jobs for the college-trained. The jobs must relate to social goals—such as better health, education, recreation, and environmental protection. Such "people work," Berger concludes, could mean new agencies for community development, political participation, and "intergroup conflict resolution," not meaningless bureaucracies.

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**RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT**

*A Forecast of Suffering*


A historical process of "demographic transition" from high birth and death rates to low birth and death rates has brought relatively stable populations to North America and most of Europe. A comparable process is not occurring in many undeveloped countries. Although death rates have fallen, thanks to better medical care, birth rates remain high. Echols, former head of the Population Reference Bureau, suggests that the current "momentum of population growth" is too strong for the demographic transition to be completed in the poorer countries without a temporary return to higher death rates.

Echols examines three 100-year projections: (a) if present worldwide fertility rates remain constant, and average human life expectancy remains at the current 55 years, world population could theoretically reach 24 billion by 2075—a near impossibility because of higher death rates from starvation; (b) if fertility rates fall to a level of one-for-one "population replacement" by 2025, and mortality rates remain stable, world population will almost double (to 8 billion) by 2050, then fall to about 7 billion by 2075—but Echols notes that reducing fertility to
"replacement" levels in 50 years would mean halving the lowest population increase achieved anywhere in recent years; (c) if fertility decreases to replacement level by 2025, while higher mortality rates in the poorer, hungrier countries gradually cut average world life expectancy from 55 years in 1975 to 45 in 2025, world population will stabilize for the following 50 years, while mortality slowly decreases and life expectancy rises to 63. This last projection suggests a stable world population of about 6 billion by 2075 but, says Echols, the price will be "terrible suffering for the less developed Southern Hemisphere."

Conserving Energy: A Blunt Instrument

"Energy conservation is a solution in search of a problem," writes Professor Eugene Bardach, of Berkeley's Graduate School of Public Policy. The alleged benefits of energy conservation include reducing America's vulnerability to oil embargoes, saving the environment, and protecting the welfare of future generations. But none of these worthy goals, Bardach argues, is best achieved by reducing energy consumption.

The appropriate U.S. response to the threat of another Arab oil embargo consists of an oil stockpile, import quotas (which can automatically reduce fuel consumption if Washington permits prices to rise), and the counter-threat of military intervention. Environmental degradation can best be prevented by regulation and pollution taxes—not by invoking conservation measures with environmental protection as a side-benefit. Assuring energy for future generations, says Bardach, requires a "technological solution" that will be found through an effort spurred by rising energy prices. The solution will not be found simply by agreeing with those conservationists who reject all energy proposals that appear to fail their "net-energy-yield" standard (which specifies that energy sources should be developed only if they will yield more energy than is consumed in their development).

E = Time + $

"Some Thoughts on New Energy Sources" by Bertram Wolfe, in Nuclear News (May 1976), 244 E. Ogden Ave., Hinsdale, Ill. 60521.

Recent public debate on America's energy problems has tended to focus on issues of safety with little concern over whether advanced technology can actually produce a new energy system (nuclear, solar, or whatever) in time to avoid serious economic and social dislocations. Wolfe, a General Electric nuclear power specialist, examines a number of energy proposals and finds that none avoid significant economic and
technical problems (e.g., possible seismic effects in geothermal power; the accident potential in solar power transmitted from space).

Wolfe argues that conditions existing in the 1950s and '60s no longer prevail—that the size and cost of central power stations and the time required to build them have since increased (from $50 million to $500 million, and from 2 or 3 years to 7 to 10). Now, several decades must elapse before there is any impact from development—from "base technology" through the experimental and demonstration stages—of a new power system. This time frame exceeds the normal professional lifetime of engineers, scientists, and perhaps even of industrial and governmental organizations set up to implement such programs. Other hurdles are current public antipathy to new technology and the dearth of established financing institutions to underwrite the high costs. Wolfe urges frank discussion of the difficulties, costs, and dangers of proceeding with the most promising new energy system (nuclear breeder reactors), as well as "the dangers of not proceeding."

The Solar Potential

Solar energy might seem to be the perfect solution to our energy problems—it is "everlastingly abundant" and completely benign to the environment. But sunpower has inherent limitations, Faltermayer says. It cannot be stored for long or transported far (unless converted to electricity). More serious is "the high cost of gathering the sun's free energy." Equipping a house to use it is an investment few can afford: it requires bulky "collectors" (which absorb solar energy and transfer it to air or water circulating inside them) and energy storage equipment and an alternate energy back-up unit to use when the sun is not out. "Solar energy generally turns out to be more expensive than conventional fuels . . . in some cases ten times as expensive." But with fossil fuels becoming more costly, solar energy is today economically viable in a few specific situations, most notably in heating and cooling buildings and heating water. Sunpower might grow into "the biggest economic development since the automobile revolution," but first equipment prices must come down and equipment efficiency must go up.

Another promising application of solar energy is the generation of electricity, still restricted by the high cost of the system's basic component, the photovoltaic cell (current price—$17 per watt). Noting that solar energy already has a "small and valid commercial role," the author calls on the federal government to drop the billion-dollar subsidies and tax breaks for the industry now being discussed in Washington. The proper federal role is limited research and enforcement of industrial standards, while state and local governments amend zoning laws and grant tax incentives.
Recent controversial decisions by West Germany and France to sell nuclear fuel facilities to Brazil and Pakistan may mark the collapse of American hopes for halting nuclear weapons proliferation. Why? The plants and technology required to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium for use as fuel in nuclear power plants can also produce material for atomic bombs.

Writing in *Foreign Affairs*, Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff urges the United States to persuade other nuclear exporters to control future uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities. Instead of exporting such potentially dangerous plants, these countries should be asked to share new multinational facilities in the United States and Europe, which would provide complete nuclear fuel service to their reactor customers on a cheap, reliable basis. As an inducement to give up their lucrative sales of enriching and reprocessing equipment, the Europeans and Canadians should be offered a larger share of power reactor sales, now dominated by the United States. And, Ribicoff writes, the United States should be prepared to suspend all sales of enriched uranium fuel to those exporter nations that refuse to join in meaningful nonproliferation plans.

But Paul L. Jaskow, an MIT economist, argues that the threat of a unilateral U.S. embargo on exports of enriched nuclear fuel to Europe no longer means much. The United States now enjoys a commanding lead in fuel enrichment facilities; but two West European consortiums will have enrichment plants in operation in the next two to six years.

To curb the spread of nuclear weapons, says Jaskow, the United States must first understand “the realities of the international nuclear energy industry as it exists today and as it is evolving.” The United States should insist that importing countries in the Third World sign safeguards agreements and submit to international inspection. But Washington should recognize that the U.N.’s International Atomic Energy Agency by itself is presently incapable of an effective watchdog role and has no real enforcement powers.


*The Wilson Quarterly/Autumn 1976*
Social Exclusion
In Crime Control


In affluent, urbanized Japan, the crime rate has declined to a 25-year low, and the downward trend continues. Comparable statistics indicate there are four times as many serious crimes per capita in the United States as there are crimes (of any sort) in Japan. Even drug-related crimes, once a serious Japanese problem, are on the wane; hard-drug arrests, proportionately, are only half as frequent as in the United States. Why this unexpected contrast? Bayley, a professor of international relations at the University of Denver, argues that Japan, historically, has allowed informal groups, such as relatives, neighbors, coworkers, and employers, to dictate an individual’s behavior, and that the Japanese, unlike Americans, welcome such authority. Thus, the stable, homogeneous Japanese population refrains from behavior that might offend lifelong associates because, writes Bayley, social exclusion is “the greatest calamity” that could befall the offender. Even Japanese policemen are expected to lecture compliant and subservient suspects, and no stigma attaches to any informer.

The result is a criminal justice system almost three times more efficient than its American counterpart in terms of court convictions per 100 known offenses (35 vs. 13). It seems to follow that the roots of American criminal behavior lie in cherished American values—individualism, mobility, privacy, a suspicion of both authority and of law enforcement that is exercised primarily by governmental bodies. Thus, according to Bayley, “it is questionable” whether America’s criminal justice system can achieve greater efficiency.

Evolution Versus
The Book of Genesis


Evolution, dormant as a public issue since the Scopes “monkey trial” of 1925, is again causing controversy. In 1969, for example, the California Board of Education issued guidelines stating that the Book of Genesis presents a reasonable explanation for the origin of life and should get “equal time” with evolution in the classroom. The critics of evolutionary dogma tend to be middle-class citizens, often with technical training—not religious fundamentalists or “rural folk from Appalachia,” writes Cornell professor Dorothy Nelkin. But they are threatening to block a “20-year effort to modernize the pre-college science curriculum in the public schools.” Two federally funded text-
book series have provoked particular opposition. They are the Biological Sciences Study (which depicts evolution as the basis of modern biological research) and "Man: A Course of Study" (MACOS), a social sciences program which draws analogies between human and animal behavior. (Funding for MACOS was cut off in 1974 pending a review, after criticism from members of Congress.)

Three themes pervade the science-textbook controversies, Nelkin says. First, the books' opponents are disillusioned with science and feel it threatens traditional values: "If young people are taught they are like animals long enough, they'll soon begin to act like them." Second, critics resent the influence that an "elite corps of unelected professional academics" exert in their local schools. Finally, they oppose the meritocratic values of science as threats to more egalitarian, pluralistic American values.

**Racial Politics**

_In Castro's Cuba_

Between 1959 and 1972, the United States received almost half a million Cuban immigrants—almost all of them white. In this study, Aguirre, doctoral candidate in sociology at Ohio University, assays the political and social forces that have discouraged emigration of blacks, who comprise over a quarter of Cuba's population but in 1970 made up only 2.6 percent of the emigre community. Aguirre rejects the common explanation that blacks were the most "mercilessly exploited" group in pre-revolutionary Cuba, have benefited most from Fidel Castro's new order, and are therefore less inclined to leave. The author describes blacks as achieving socio-economic parity with whites before Castro took power in 1959. However, he notes that the first people to flee Communist Cuba were overwhelmingly white and well off. Once settled in the United States, these people sent money and encouragement to their relatives—also white—making it easier for the latter to join the exodus. Thus, from the beginning, patterns developed which worked against blacks.

Black emigration has also been restrained by the Castro government's emphasis on the politics of race. Havana claims that Cuban society is now free of racism and America is steeped in anti-black bias. The Cuban black has accepted this official ideology to the point that migration is seen as "a loss of his national identity." This dogma also makes Cuban authorities unable to accept a black person's request to emigrate as a "reasonable, logical and moral decision"—thereby discouraging requests to leave and slowing their approval.
**Faculty Women: A Political Profile**

Since 1970, there has been a steady increase in the proportion of women on American college faculties; now 37 percent of the teachers under 30 are female. Women teaching the social sciences tend to be more "radical"; but otherwise "men and women [teachers] differ little in their general social and political orientations," according to broad surveys by Ladd, a University of Connecticut political scientist, and Lipset, a Stanford sociologist. The sharpest male-female differences concern teaching and research. Forty-six percent of the women, compared to 34 percent of the men, "strongly agree" that teaching effectiveness, not scholarly publication, should be the primary criterion for promotion. One-third of the men and only one-fourth of the women believe that good teaching requires involvement in research. Actual behavior reflects these views with 61 percent of the women and less than 50 percent of the men declaring they had not published anything in the past two years.

Male and female faculty members hold remarkably similar views on political and social issues (63 percent of both groups voted for George McGovern in 1972; 31 percent of the men and 33 percent of the women had a positive attitude toward President Ford; 31 percent of the women and 29 percent of the men said big corporations should be taken out of private ownership and run in the public interest; 58 percent of both groups favored legalizing marijuana; and only a small proportion—27 percent of the men and 20 percent of the women—opposed the hiring of homosexual teachers).

While more women teachers than men regard most American colleges as "racist" (51 percent vs. 40 percent), only a small percentage of women (26 percent) favor "preferential" hiring for women and blacks. Thus, the authors conclude, the growing presence of women on college faculties has not greatly increased the preexisting liberalism of the teaching profession or reduced faculty support for competitive, meritocratic standards.

**Why Those SAT Scores Dropped**

Since 1962, there has been a steady decline in average Scholastic Aptitude Test scores of high-school seniors. Zajonc, a psychology professor at the University of Michigan, sees a significant association between variations in individuals' aggregate test scores and variations in patterns of "family configuration" (the number of children and the
order of their birth). He concludes that a reversal of the downward trend in SAT scores will soon appear.

Research findings, Zajonc writes, show intellectual performance improves with decreasing family size, except in one-parent homes; test scores reflect even the temporary absence of a parent. Firstborn children perform better than later children, especially when intervals between births are relatively short. Long spacing between siblings benefits the later child by permitting development in a more “mature” environment. The only child suffers from the lack of opportunity to teach younger siblings—a handicap affecting last-born children, too.

Thus, some of the decline in SAT scores may be attributed to a steady fall in the percentage of first children born between 1947 and 1962 (from 42 percent to 27 percent), resulting in fewer children taking the SAT who have the intellectual advantages of being firstborn. The proportion of first children has been steadily increasing since 1963, and children born in that year, who will take the SAT in 1980, already show improved scholastic performance.

Future Limits

On Leisure

"The Future of Free Time” by Alexander Szalai, in Futures (June 1976), IPC Science and Technology Press Ltd., 32 High St., Guildford, Surrey, England GU1 3EW.

There are signs that even as free time increases, it is becoming less free. Reporting on last April’s Second World Congress on Free Time and Self-Fulfillment in Brussels, Szalai, an economist at Karl Marx University, Budapest, writes that recent concentration by unions and employers on easing the daily grind often resulted in 30-60-minute reductions in the work day that people easily frittered away. However, past reductions in both work day and work week (to seven or eight hours on the job, five days a week) have changed popular demands. Instead of further reductions in the workday, employees want longer weekends and vacations.

“The future seems to belong to the accumulated use of free time,” says Szalai, who notes that a worker allowed to trade a 30-minute reduction in his eight-hour day for “accumulated time off” could enjoy an extra three weeks of paid vacation every year. Such practices, if widespread could have a profound impact on tourism, sports, and other leisure industries. But few forms of leisure can be enjoyed without commercially produced goods and services. In socialist, planned economies, such goods and services—from ski boots to bathing suits, books, movies, and dance halls—are available only if government planners provide them. In capitalist countries, Szalai predicts, environmental concerns will probably increase government curbs on the unfettered enjoyment of added leisure (e.g., limits on the use of motor vehicles or on public access to wilderness areas).
PATTERNS

TV and the Elections

"Political Campaigns: TV Power Is a Myth" by Thomas E. Patterson and Robert D. McClure, in Psychology Today (July 1976), P.O. Box 2990, Boulder, Colo. 80302.

Patterson and McClure puncture some fashionable assumptions about television's influence in American elections. The authors, both political scientists at Syracuse University, analyzed every televised political commercial and network weekday evening newscast during the 1972 Nixon-McGovern contest. They also interviewed more than 600 voters—at the start, midway, and end of the campaign to determine television's impact. Conclusions: In 1972, the networks ignored major issues and the candidates' personal qualifications for the Presidency, devoting most of their film coverage to campaign hoopla.

For example, during the last two months of the campaign ABC, CBS, and NBC each devoted a cumulative total of about five minutes of evening news time to facts about George McGovern's leadership and personal experience, good or bad. And as a three-network average, only 3 percent of the available news minutes were given to the two candidates' highly dissimilar stands on such matters as inflation, welfare, and Vietnam.

In contrast, paid political commercials did convey information to voters on issues, sometimes to the detriment of the sponsoring candidate. But the authors conclude that most voters are immune to political TV advertising aimed solely at "image-building." Those already committed to a candidate because of party affiliation or ideology cannot be converted through television. And, most voters who are undecided 60 days before election day ultimately base their choice on long perceived self-interest, rather than late exposure to a media blitz.

The Newspapers' Suburban Problem


Economic analysis of the press is rare. Welles, a New York contributing editor, notes the eroding markets of metropolitan newspapers (the public's broadest source of news) and singles out the prestigious New York Times, which faces "inescapable long-term contraction."

Even more than other big city papers, the once-complacent Times has suffered from the steady exodus of middle-class readers, retail advertisers, and corporate employers to the suburbs. During 1970-75, the paper's advertising lineage dropped from 77 million to 69 million; daily
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circulation from 908,500 to 828,000; net pre-tax income from $19.7 million to $4.6 million. Although the Times is read in 27 percent of Manhattan’s households, it now reaches only 12 percent of the homes in the suburbs, where growing local media have wooed away many former Times loyalists. Moreover, many major national advertisers, like General Foods, have switched to television, further weakening the Times—and other urban newspapers.

The New York Times Company’s profitable subsidiaries—magazines, radio stations, and Florida newspapers—account for 76 percent of its profits, and keep the corporation going; overall profits are expected to rise this year. New suburban editions are underway. Over the long haul, Welles sees “repackaging” the Times as a nationally distributed, elite paper, competing with the rich Wall Street Journal and the news magazines, as a possible, albeit risky, solution. But for all good urban papers, he indicates, the shift of the “economic center of gravity from city to suburbs” remains an unpublicized, long-range threat to the nation’s quality news coverage.

No News Is Good News?


California television stations virtually ignored the 1974 gubernatorial contest between Democrat Edmund G. Brown, Jr. and his underdog Republican challenger, Houston Flournoy. Political reporter Leary discloses that six major television stations in four principal metropolitan areas of California devoted just 2 percent (6 out of 257 hours) of their total news time from September 4 to the November 5 election to the campaign, and one-third of that coverage was provided by one station (KNBC-Los Angeles).

Broadcasters happily went along with Brown’s decision to avoid television exposure and close questioning on sensitive campaign issues (the death penalty, victimless crime, marijuana). Brown reluctantly agreed to debate Flournoy, but only on condition that the two sign a formal agreement limiting broadcast coverage of their joint appearances. The agreement stipulated no full-length broadcast of the first debate. Four of the other five debates could be shown in full only in one area and only on a single, designated station. As a result, only one debate was shown statewide and the others were telecast by smaller stations in areas outside major population centers. Radio reproduction was prohibited and television news reports were limited to “normal news coverage” (two-minute excerpts, at most).

Why did no commercial broadcaster protest? Because California television managers abhor political stories as inherently dull and bad for ratings, Leary charges; television distorted the campaign and served to erode, rather than support, the democratic process.

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Can the mass media, by endorsing a particular candidate, persuade a significant number of voters to switch their votes? Florida State University political scientist Erikson studies the 1964 presidential election and answers yes, in limited situations. In 1964, traditionally Republican newspapers endorsed Democratic nominee Lyndon Johnson, over his GOP rival, Senator Barry Goldwater, by 42 to 35 percent (23 percent remained neutral). Erikson analyzed 1960 and 1964 voting patterns in 223 northern counties where single local newspapers, mostly Republican, held near monopolies. When one of these newspapers endorsed the incumbent President, Johnson's share of the vote in its circulation area exceeded the Democratic share in 1960 by about 5 percent. The gain occurred regardless of which candidate the monopoly paper had endorsed in 1960. Moreover, this change was true to some extent again in 1972 but not in the 1968 election. Erikson suggests as a possible generalization that "newspapers may be more powerful forces in highly ideological contests" such as 1964 (Goldwater-Johnson) and 1972 (Nixon-McGovern), than in more "normal" elections such as 1968. Even so, he writes, if a heavily Republican press can persuade even a few of its Republican readers to vote Democratic, its long-term influences in behalf of Republican candidates may be greater than previous projections have indicated—although this influence cannot be measured with any precision.

For almost 60 years, American military writers and historians have credited a General Oskar von Hutier with devising the innovative battlefield tactics that nearly won victory for Imperial Germany in World War I. Alfoldi, assistant archivist of the U.S. Army Military History Research Collection, discloses that the "Hutier tactics," so widely extolled, were not devised by General Hutier; his role in the 1914-18 struggle is scarcely noted by German historians. Why was it, then, that the Paris magazine L'Illustration in June 1918 called Hutier "Germany's new strategic genius," and later that month the New York Times Mid-Week Pictorial described him as "one of the most successful of the German commanders"? And how did Hutier's prestige and reputation survive to the point that his famous "tactics" became part of the curriculum in American military schools and the noted Ameri-
can combat historian S.L.A. Marshall called him (in 1940) the father of blitzkrieg tactics? It is true, Alfoldi explains, that when Germany's chief of staff, Erich Ludendorff, launched his surprise offensive in Flanders on March 21, 1918, his spectacular initial successes came with the advance of Hutier's Eighteenth Army, which gained 39 kilometers in just four days. But Hutier (and other German commanders) used new infiltration tactics evolved by Ludendorff as part of a defensive doctrine for trench warfare. Crediting Hutier with all this was the work of Allied print media, beginning with the French, who, Alfoldi suggests, needed an enemy "genius" to explain a shocking setback and preferred one with a French name and Huguenot ancestors.


Stage producers, directors, and playwrights often criticize the theaters in which they work. Joseph Papp, producer of New York's Shakespeare Festival, has called the elaborate National Arts Center at Ottawa "a bad theater," while Tennessee Williams refers to New York's Circle in the Square as a "gymnasium." The Helen Hayes and the Morosco, both built before 1920 and slated for demolition, rate as satisfactory, says Bloom, a New York City architect. "The sightlines and acoustics are good and the relationship between the auditorium and stage is such that one is easily drawn into the event."

Generally, there have been three approaches to theater design. First, an innovative architect takes a visionary approach and, too often, overwhelms theatrical effectiveness with his own technical virtuosity (e.g., the Dallas Theater Center by Frank Lloyd Wright and Paul Baker). A second approach is that motivated by the philosophies of stage directors, and the success of the outcome depends on the "buoyancy and vitality of the original idea" (e.g., Jacques Copeau's Vieux Colombier in Paris). These theaters usually work well only under the influence of the original creator. A third approach, a kind of "consensus eclectic," inspires most theater construction. Building codes rather than aesthetics have the strongest influence on design. These theaters, though uninspired, tend to provide good sightlines and silent air conditioning. Largely overlooked in theater architecture, says Bloom, is "the relating of spectators to performers so that both feel deep commitment to the event." One way to achieve it, he suggests, is to study the few existing successful theaters before they are demolished.
**Rediscovering**

*The Noble Savage*

Although many scholars have studied vanishing primitive cultures, few have asked why civilized man is so fascinated nowadays by what Europeans used to call “savage cultures.” Woodcock, editor of *Canadian Literature*, writes that Portuguese voyages to Africa and the discovery of America first brought Europeans into contact with primitive peoples. They were regarded as inferior pagan beings, “as unspoiled children to be converted into imitation Christian gentlemen,” or simply exploited for commercial purposes (the ivory trade and slavery). Parallel to these derogatory attitudes, there emerged among rationalist thinkers in the late seventeenth century the romantic cult of the Noble Savage. Real knowledge percolated slowly into Europe from the reports of travelers, missionaries, and traders. Then came Charles Darwin’s *The Descent of Man* (1871) and the slow development of anthropology.

Not until early in the twentieth century was primitive man seen “as the representative of a complex, valid way of life contemporaneous with our own, neither intrinsically inferior nor necessarily improvable.” Woodcock says such recognition came about largely through shifts in perception among Western artists and intellectuals: Picasso, who discovered African art and in 1907 painted the pioneer work of cubism, *Les Demoiselles d’Avignon*—like primitive art, a projection of inner visions; Sir James Frazier, whose 12-volume *The Golden Bough* (1907) revealed a worldwide network of common mental constructions—including the mythologizing habit we share with primitives; and the pioneering field studies by Anglo-Polish anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski in the Trobriand Islands of the western Pacific. The lure of the primitive, says Woodcock, lies both in a desire to find what is common to all societies and “in a pointless nostalgia for peoples and ways of existence that our greed for land and resources has destroyed.”

**Rewriting**

*Uncle Tom*

No American novel has generated more controversy than Harriet Beecher Stowe’s *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*. Much of the recent debate centers on the role of “Uncle Tom” as a symbolic figure in black American history. A major critical effort to rescue Mrs. Stowe’s novel and its chief character from opprobrium has been underway, says Riggio, professor of English at the University of Connecticut, but scholars have
yet to explain adequately “how a book whose avowed and successful purpose was to champion an oppressed people came to stand as a major symbol of that oppression.” One neglected clue in the “eccentric popular history” of *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* lies in its role in Southern Reconstruction fiction, notably in the best-selling work of Thomas Dixon, of North Carolina.

Dixon’s novel *The Leopard’s Spots* (1902) sold over a million copies. It was intended as a white Southern response to *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, but rather than reëmphasize the theme of black-white reconciliation that permeates the “Uncle Remus” stories of Joel Chandler Harris and other “New South” writers, Dixon created an archetypal black man who was “a genetically inferior, oversexed animal whose minute intelligence directs itself toward one goal—the wives and daughters of the white man.”

Dixon carried Mrs. Stowe’s story forward to 1900. He transformed the cruel, white overseer, Simon Legree, into a Reconstruction politician and finally sent him home to New England to become a capitalist who exploits the white working class. He created a new character, Tom Camp, a one-legged Confederate veteran and Bible-quoting Christian who experienced a crisis of faith when liberated blacks raped and killed one of his daughters. Dixon, according to Riggio, portrayed “a white Uncle Tom, a poor white crucified both psychologically and economically by the black man under the tutelage of an industrialized Simon Legree. It is an image to which many, North and South, responded—and still do.”

**SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY**


Proposals to set international boundaries at 200 nautical miles from a nation’s coast have the advantage of simplicity but little else to recommend them, says Hedberg, Princeton professor emeritus of geology. There is no logical or natural basis for the currently proposed 200-mile limit; as applied to petroleum and other mineral resources, such a boundary would be unacceptable to many countries. The United States, Russia, and China, for example, would lose large, potentially valuable areas of their continental slopes, whereas others, like Chile, Peru, and Portugal, would receive huge tracts of ultra-deep ocean bed more appropriately assigned to an international regime.

Hedberg proposes a “geomorphic” boundary formula based on the continental margin—“the base of that slope that marks the outer
limit or base of the continent (or island).” A clear international boundary would be drawn by the coastal nation within the margins of a “boundary zone” extending oceanward from the approximate base of the slope for an internationally agreed distance (Hedberg recommends at least 100 kilometers—54 nautical miles). Such a boundary zone would bypass uncertainties in defining the precise location of the base of the slope and allow the final boundary to be drawn by simple straight lines connecting fixed points of latitude and longitude. Hedberg suggests that the boundary concept be used only to set a national/international division of rights to mineral resources beneath the oceans (requiring drilling or mining and fixed installations on the ocean floor), not to settle more complicated jurisdiction over oceanic waters for navigational purposes or fishing rights.

Profile of the proposed delineation of a boundary between coastal state and international jurisdictions.

**Plumbing**

**The Depths**


Until about two years ago, most scientists believed that the deep seas—those regions between 200 meters and the ocean floor—contained little life. Low temperatures, absence of light, high pressures, and limited food and oxygen all indicated an extremely inhospitable environment. But today, writes Mosaic editor Abell, “improved sampling devices and some persistent scientists” are bringing to the surface “an
astounding variety of deep sea animals"—such as *G. Ingens*, a shrimp-like crustacean that lives off the California coast at depths of 1,000-2,000 meters. Deep-sea ecosystems produce no food. (No light means no plants and no photosynthesis.) But some experts believe that fish carcasses are a major source of food in the depths, where “food is like rain, coming down in drizzles or cloudbursts.”

Scientists are also studying links between the deep seas and our own food supplies. For instance, bluefin tuna often swim down to 400 meters to feed. How do pollution and heavy fishing of these predators affect the deep seas as a stable link in our food chain? How do creatures survive in deep water that has only 5 percent of the oxygen content of surface water?

Two new devices are facilitating research: a sled-like contraption which dredges a meter-wide swath of ocean floor, and the “box corer,” which raises a much smaller sample of floor sediment to the surface intact. Much American research is conducted in laboratories onshore, but scientists are attempting research in the ocean depths using deep-diving craft and remote-controlled equipment.


The interplay between science and politics in the United States is analyzed in this essay by Lyons, dean of the faculty at Dartmouth College. With the President and Congress asking scientists for advice about an increasingly technical world, the “imperatives of science” influence politics. But politics influences science too—supposedly “value-free” technical advisors become partisans as they ally themselves with politicians and government agencies to vie for research subsidies. This two-way relationship, combined with a traditional American decentralization of authority, insures that “nothing that can be strictly termed ‘science policy’ emerges from the American political system.” The confusion is heightened by the scientific community’s tenuous presence in the White House, writes Lyons. President Ford is creating a small scientific staff in his office. In 1973, a much larger White House advisory group was abolished by Richard Nixon, who felt its functions were better performed at other agencies. The fragmented Congressional committee system also contributes to lack of direction. Any science bill comes under the purview of not one but many committees, and usually reflects the political priorities of committee members. The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) has tried to bring order to the whole question of science policy by defining it as two functions: “science in policy” (scientific advice to decision-makers), and “policy for science” (government support for research). Not surprisingly, the AAAS favors placing a Council of Science and Technology Advisors in the White House to oversee both functions.
RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

A Draught of Human Experience


Kennedy, a Catholic priest and psychologist, argues that the old authoritarian Catholic culture is dying and that today’s priest must find the meaning of his ministry from within human experience. “A well-developed personal identity is indispensable to effective pastoral ministry,” Kennedy writes, yet many priests continue to think of themselves “in the third person,” unable to discover who they are apart from their clerical role.

The typical priest chases after the “abstraction” of what a good priest should be, constantly pitting himself against his own sense of guilt or unworthiness. When most priests have no close personal relationships in their lives, how can they hope to understand the people to whom they minister? Kennedy asks. “The clerical life lends itself to the spiritual equivalent of one-night stands.”

Kennedy suggests that most decisions to join the priesthood have been rooted in a highly obsessive-compulsive Catholic culture which stresses a “pervasive need to do good and to do well, to avoid guilt and be approved.”

Those values were sustained by the authoritarianism of the Church, and today that authoritarianism (as distinct from the authority of the Church) is breaking down. Kennedy dates the collapse of authoritarianism to the issuance of the 1968 Papal Encyclical Humanae Vitae—“a document that failed to match human experience.”

Catholics today have “developed a new trust in their own experience”; they are no longer oriented to enormous guilt, he writes. Thus, the future strength of the Church’s ministry depends on the priest’s willingness to “put aside the authoritarian clerical mode . . . and build a new declericalized style of ministry in service that matches the theological rhetoric about the Church as a servant.”

Reassessing the Rhythm Method

“New Dimensions of Parenthood” by Bernard Häring, in Theological Studies (Mar. 1976), P.O. Box 1703, Baltimore, Md. 21203.

Recent medical research may compel the Roman Catholic Church to reexamine its endorsement of the “rhythm method” as an appropriate means of contraception.

Catholic approval of the rhythm method relies on the assumptions that the average life of the human spermazoa is only 72 hours, that
the female ovum lives only 24 hours, and that it is only during this time that fertilization can take place.

These assumptions may be faulty. While it has been recognized that viable sperm can exist in the uterus and fallopian tube for up to five days, it now appears that both sperm and ova may survive even longer. Moreover, writes Haring, a moral theologian at Rome’s Academia Alfonsiana, studies now indicate that the marriage of “overripe” sperm and ova sharply increase the likelihood of spontaneous abortions or defective children.

When fertilization occurs through intercourse taking place three or more days after ovulation, he notes, the frequency of abortion is 24 percent compared with an average occurrence of 7.8 percent. The incidence of fetal abnormality is also greater. When sperm are deposited in the vagina more than four days before ovulation, and fertilization occurs, the frequency of spontaneous abortion increases in proportion to the time interval and increases enormously if the interval is more than eight days.

Haring stops just short of indicting the rhythm method as “birth control” in the most pejorative sense, namely, prevention of birth by means of spontaneous abortion. To Haring, it seems “shocking” that rhythm, recently endorsed again by the Church, should in application produce a vast number of zygotes (fertilized eggs not yet implanted in the wall of the womb) lacking the vitality for survival.

 Interruption of the life process between fertilization and implantation, he says, lacks the “gravity or malice” that attends abortion of an individualized embryo. But Haring concludes that the new medical evidence (already forwarded to the Vatican) disqualifies the rhythm method—at least in its traditional, publicized form—as a safe and morally indifferent method of birth control, for its openness to procreation is not openness to safe and healthy human life.

Identifying with The Oppressed

“Identifying with The Oppressed” by Paul Abrecht, in *Christianity and Crisis* (Aug. 16, 1976), 537 West 121st St., New York, N.Y. 10027.

U.S. Christians are having trouble identifying themselves with the “cause of world justice,” writes Abrecht, executive secretary of the Working Group on Church and Society of the World Council of Churches.

U.S. churches contributed through the missionary movement to the process of national liberation in Africa and Asia. But now, when the Third World’s poor and oppressed are demanding social justice and human dignity, the United States finds itself labeled the enemy of political and economic change: “We appear more and more as the opponent of the revolutionary liberation process that we helped
The theological conservative attributes this to the ingratitude of the poor. The ethical radical lays it to the loss of spiritual and moral dynamic that comes of corruption and too much wealth and power. Abrecht finds both reactions too simplistic.

There is a great need for a "kind of Christian comprehension that is able to hold together the tragic aspects of the U.S. future: that of a well-meaning nation that has discovered the dilemmas and contradictions of power and [is thereby] freed from anxieties that might lead it to hold on to its powers at all costs." The rich nations are not only threatened with the loss of their wealth, but by their very incapacity to join the struggle of the oppressed they also "show their loss of moral direction and the danger of their perishing in spiritual confusion."

Abrecht argues that without a new clarity of spiritual vision, practical action remains a mere escape. And we should not, as we emerge from innocence, be tempted to despair, self-pity, or fear for our future, because the result will be paralysis and even greater difficulty in finding creative approaches to social change.

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"Mao Tse-Tung's Leadership Style" by Lucian W. Pye, in Political Science Quarterly (Summer 1976), Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025.

"By all standards, Mao Tse-tung belongs in the company of the few great political men of our century," writes Lucian Pye, a China scholar at MIT. In this psychological profile, Pye attributes Mao's greatness to "his extraordinary ability to understand, evoke, and direct human emotions. . . ." Mao appreciated the universal need to worship and be worshipped, and used it to achieve near absolute reverence from some 800 million Chinese. Mao himself recognized conflicts in his own character—in a letter to his wife he once described himself as being part "monkey" (impish, unpredictable) and part "tiger" (fierce and respected). Such psychological ambivalence may explain his political inconsistency, Pye says.

The author cites Mao's fascination with the Marxist concept of contradiction, whereby opposing forces interplay with each other and eventually transform one another. Belief in this "unity of opposites" allowed Mao to shift his political stance constantly. His mind preferred "the abstraction of policy over concrete details," yet he attacked formal schooling and "booklearning." While praising the wisdom of the masses, he lived isolated from them. Mao could both relish political
conflict and be hypersensitive to personal criticism. Mao liked to take big risks in politics: the rush to collectivize in 1955, the Cultural Revolution, and the Nixon visit are good examples. Avoiding day-to-day administration, his style was to withdraw for extended periods, reflect on solutions, and then suddenly intervene with his own ideas.

Maoism and Chinese Oil

China's fast-growing petroleum industry—315 million barrels produced in 1972, increasing by 20-25 percent annually—has attracted attention in the West especially since the 1973-74 energy crisis. Most specialists look at China's oil exports potential. But it is more valuable to observe Maoist principles of economic development, argues Jessica Leatrice Wolfe, a graduate student in business administration at Berkeley. The Chinese appear to have exempted the oil industry from certain ideological constraints; they are importing en masse foreign-developed processing techniques and equipment, bypassing Mao's maxims of national self-reliance and "technical democracy" (the mass application of human muscle to improve production). "Self-reliance emerges greatly diluted," Wolfe comments. "The Chinese are in fact increasingly dependent on foreign technological imports." Furthermore, the author suggests, this deviation may widen existing political and ideological cleavages. However, the Chinese still follow Mao's idea of "simultaneous development" of complementary economic sectors. The petroleum industry's growth is geared to the expansion of agriculture (which uses more and more petroleum products as mechanization progresses), the economy's infrastructure (roads, pipelines, etc.), finance capital, domestic consumption, and exports. And China is beginning to use oil as an instrument of foreign policy, selling to Japan to keep Tokyo from buying from Moscow, and to Southeast Asia nations as a gesture of friendship.

Nation-Building in Nkrumah's Ghana

What is the armed forces' role in an ethnically fragmented society? J. Bayo Adekson, a Nigerian doctoral candidate at Brandeis University, examines the experience of Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah (1957-66). When Nkrumah became prime minister in March 1957, he recognized that tribalism (there are four major ethnic groups in Ghana) could seriously threaten national unity. He thought a well-trained national
army—loyal only to the regime—could maintain order in the new society and aid "the more positive task of nation-building" through civic action.

Nkrumah moved to give more equitable representation in the army's ranks to the various tribes, at the same time de-emphasizing old tribal loyalties. "There should be no reference to Fantis, Ashantis, Ewes, Gas, Dagaombas, 'strangers' and so forth," Nkrumah wrote. "We should call ourselves Ghanaians." The soldierly virtues were later proclaimed as applicable to the entire society as Nkrumah, through regimentation and sustained ideological education, sought to build a "militantly nationalistic, supra-ethnic culture—a kind of military socialism."

But by 1962, Nkrumah had gone on the political defensive. He reversed his nationalist policies and deliberately fostered ethnic differences in the military and elsewhere to divide his political foes. Gradually, tribalism revived. In the Army's 1966 anti-Nkrumah coup, the original plotters, all Ewes, added an Ashanti, a Ga, and a Fante only at the last moment. Nkrumah's last ditch supporters were almost all northerners, whom he had favored with top army and police posts, or members of Nkrumah's own tribe, the Nzima.

**Hanoi's General Looks Back**

In early 1975, Senior General Van Tien Dung co-ordinated North Vietnam's battle forces—first in the opening attacks on the Central Highlands, then, in the climactic push on Saigon in April 1975 that ended the Vietnam War. Dung describes the unexpectedly swift "Great Spring Victory" in a 40,000-word series of articles in Hanoi's *Nhan Dan* newspaper. Predictably, his vivid, spirited account is laced with tributes to the late Ho Chi Minh, Communism, and the wisdom of the Politburo. But he also makes clear the Politburo's great relief at Washington's crucial failure to react to the initial North Vietnamese capture of Phuoc Binh in January 1975. He jibes at South Vietnamese President Thieu, cites Saigon's declining morale and weaponry, but also implicitly recognizes past South Vietnamese tenacity, and the decimation of the Viet Cong. Indeed, Dung, in passing, seems to contrast Hanoi's 1975 triumph with past battlefield disappointments—at Tet in 1968, in Laos in 1971, and in the 1972 Easter offensive. And unlike Western commentators, he rarely mentions General Vo Nguyen Giap, the victor of Dienbienphu, long described as the "mastermind" of Hanoi's war against the Americans and their Saigon allies.
Rethinking the "Inevitable"

Opening the governments of Italy and France to indigenous Communist participation would seem to be an idea "whose time has come." Yet what is the commitment of those parties to the principles of parliamentary democracy? Arkes, a professor of political science at Amherst, says the evidence indicates that their commitment is "rooted in nothing more substantial than a reading of the current alignment of political forces." Were the French and Italian Communists truly committed, logic "should lead them to condemn the nature of the Soviet regime and break off their connection with the . . . Soviet party." Moreover, Arkes finds that little assessment has been made by those who advocate sharing power with the Communists of the proposals put forth by the two leading West European Communist parties. He suggests, for example, that even the relatively limited nationalization schemes of the French party would retard Common Market integration and encourage links with the statist economies of Eastern Europe.

Should Washington accept the inevitable and open a dialogue with the Western Communist parties so as to weaken their dependence on Moscow? Arkes says no: "In the coldest calculus of realism," U.S. interests might be better served if the French and Italian parties were to become more dependent on Moscow because nothing would be more likely to restore the cohesion of the non-Communist parties in the West.

Changing Elites And Policy Shifts

Do major changes in government policy occur when newcomers take power? Some theoretical studies of Communist systems indicate succession causes policy change; others say it does not. Concerning democratic systems, however, academics generally agree that election results rarely disturb the slow movement of policy shifts. Valerie Bunce, a political science doctoral candidate at the University of Michigan, compared budgetary allocations for specific fields (primarily health, education, and welfare) in 16 Communist and non-Communist countries before and after each changing of the guard between 1950 and 1972. Her conclusions: "Elite turnover" seems to be a major cause of rapid budgetary shifts, especially in Communist countries where there are strong intra-party competition and frequent changes in leadership. Policy stagnation occurs in both Communist and non-Communist countries where one leader and one party have long dominated the government—as in India, West Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria.
Resources and Economic Growth

The future costs and availability of oil and other minerals essential to the American economy have not loomed large as issues in the 1976 Presidential campaign. The "energy crisis" of 1973–74 has faded from public attention, leaving a legacy of higher fuel prices, a national 55 m.p.h. speed limit, and a lingering uneasiness, perhaps, about the long-term exhaustion of the earth's finite resources. Forecasts by the specialists vary widely. There are optimists like Geologist James Boyd who see technological solutions; pessimists like Systems Analyst Dennis Meadows, co-author of The Limits to Growth; and those in between like Nuclear Physicist Alvin Weinberg. In a lively "evening dialogue" earlier this year at the Wilson Center, these three men and their audience examined major issues that crop up in discussions of resources and the future. We present an abbreviated transcript of their debate, then excerpts from essays by Walt W. Rostow, Henry C. Wallich, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff on the long-range outlook.

THE AMERICAN FUTURE: A DIALOGUE

JAMES BOYD: That the question of the future availability of mineral resources has to be asked at all reflects basic misconceptions in what is currently the conventional wisdom.

The question arises, first, from a failure to comprehend the magnitude of resources available to human development; second, from a general lack of knowledge of how we use resources; and third, from a few isolated failures to provide certain minerals when and where they are needed.
It is our concentration on the size of known reserves of raw materials in relation to the rate of their consumption that has led us to believe that our resources will be exhausted within a relatively short period of time. This confusion of economic and geologic measurements has blurred our view of the real situation, and is more likely to impede material growth than is the state of the natural resources themselves.

Therefore, I think it is important that we lay the foundations for discussion on a sounder premise.

The first principle is that all materials are used for the properties they display. We do not use copper because it is copper, but because it has the properties of electrical and heat conductivity, corrosion resistance, malleableness, and appearance. We do not use natural petroleum because it is oil, but because it provides energy.

The exhaustion of natural petroleum resources does not mean that our needs cannot be met by energy obtained from more abundant sources. I know of no function of current industrial society that cannot be performed by more than one material.

There are functions that cannot be performed as efficiently
with interchanged materials as they might be, because the right material or process has not yet been discovered. But as technology changes, the operating number of interchangeable materials increases.

Recent developments in technology have already made important strides in this direction. Processes that did not exist a few years ago except in the most imaginative minds now make the use of certain "new" materials very practical.

The ability to interchange materials gives a new order of magnitude to the estimated size of resources available to us in the earth's crust.

Although the accessible parts of the earth's crust and oceans are only a small part of the total mass of the earth, they are enormously large. The United States Geological Survey and the Battelle Memorial Institute have calculated that within a kilometer of the surface of the earth (within reach of modern extractive technology) there are about 400 trillion metric tons of usable materials.

The entire world consumption of sand, gravel, oil, coal, and metals is only on the order of 22 billion tons a year. At this rate, we should be able to support ourselves for at least 20,000 years—enough time, it would seem, to adjust our institutions and population growth to the resources that are available.

ALVIN M. WEINBERG: Two conflicting views dominate current perceptions of man's long-term future.

The "catastrophists" believe that the earth's resources will soon be exhausted, and that this will lead to a collapse of society. The "cornucopians" argue that most of the essential raw materials are infinite; that as society exhausts one raw material, it will turn to lower grade, inexhaustible substitutes; that eventually society will subsist on renewable resources, and on those elements that are practically infinite, such as iron and aluminum. According to this view, we will ultimately settle into a steady state of substitution and recycling.

It seems to me that there is a convenient way to place these views in perspective.

About 80 percent of all the molecules we take out of the earth and use is fossil fuel.

How much of this fuel is there in the earth's crust? There are about 25 parts per million. We have here an extraordinary situation: man's whole technological civilization is based on an addiction to a material [fossil fuel], an addiction that really can't be broken.
There is more of this fossil-fuel material in the earth's crust, but most of it is so finely dispersed that it would take more energy to extract it than we would get by burning it. That is the energy crisis in a very oversimplified nutshell.

The fossil fuels present a unique problem of scarcity as far as our mineral supply is concerned. But if we turn to the next material that man uses—the metals—we find a very different situation.

We find that 86 percent of all the metal atoms that the United States uses is iron. The next most common is aluminum, which makes up 8 percent of all the metal atoms used. Aluminum is the most abundant material metal in the earth's crust. Now when one speaks of digging out the first kilometer of the earth's crust, one isn't sifting through to find something that's very difficult to find.

Well, what about copper? My calculations are that, if our rate of consumption of this material continues at less than three times the current rate, we have millions and millions of years worth of available copper, essentially everywhere.

What about mercury? Mercury is by no means an abundant material, and the United States alone consumes about 2,000 tons of it a year. Judging from its crustal abundance, the price of mercury will undoubtedly rise very high. The issue, then, is: How essential is mercury to the pursuit of happiness and to the conduct of our technological civilization?

Of the 2,000 tons of mercury used by the United States in 1968, the largest fraction went for the production of caustic and chlorine. Do we have to use mercury for this purpose? The answer is no.

The diaphragm cell is an alternative that was in wide use before the mercury cell was introduced, and still accounts for 70 percent of the U.S. production of caustic and chlorine. This cell requires relatively common materials—concrete for the cell body, asbestos for diaphragm, and copper and graphite for electrodes.

The conclusion that can be drawn from these illustrations is that, as far as mineral resources are concerned, this society is primarily based on materials that are present in very large quantities and at high concentrations. For those elements that are not present in high concentration, there are, on the whole, large possibilities for substitution.

It seems very evident that any estimate of the long-term future of the world must depend upon the realization of some kind of energy source other than the fossil fuels.
But are there any minerals whose long-term situations seem as touchy as that of the fossil fuels? Phosphorus is one that H. G. Wells pointed out a long time ago in *The Spectacle of Life* [1931]. There is no substitute for phosphorus. And there are other scarce ones: the trace elements that are required for agriculture, possibly beryllium, and silver.

Well, without silver, the quality of photography will almost certainly diminish because silver halide constitutes the light-sensitive emulsion on most film. As far as the quality of life is concerned, however, I think that of those I have mentioned, phosphorus and the trace elements are the only ones we really need to worry about.

I view the present stage of the world, in which we’re using up the fossil fuels at such a terrible rate, as Stage I. I see Stage III as the Age of Substitutability—the age visualized by Jim Boyd when he speaks of the development of functional mineral substitutes.

The real problem, as I see it, is how we go from Stage I to Stage III without foundering.

It has often been argued that the market system will be sufficient to carry us over. I’m not sure.

The market system is obviously failing to produce the needed transition in the case of fossil fuels. Yet I don’t think it will be quite so inefficient in the transition from bauxite to clay as our main source of aluminum because the difference in price between these two will be much less.

I think we have to be careful not to confuse the specific bad situation represented by energy with other situations where the means of substitution are broader and offer more grounds for optimism.

**DENNIS L. MEADOWS:** My goal this evening is simply to describe a point of view sufficiently distant from Alvin Weinberg’s so that there will be some room for debate. Time pressures will force me to be a bit more dogmatic and extreme than is my custom.

I believe that, over the next 30 or 50 years, mineral-resources scarcity will influence Western economic and political institutions toward drastic reductions in material growth rates and in the options open to our society.

Problems will arise, not because we will have exhausted the last atom of useful material from beneath the surface of the earth, but because the irrational institutions, the short-sighted political goals, and the illogical geographical boundaries
which the "cornucopians" view as temporary irrationalities are likely to persist for many decades.

Resource availability is not a question of whether there are molecules of a specific element beneath the surface of the earth. Resources are available, in a pragmatic sense, only when those molecules that do exist can be located, extracted, refined, distributed, and manufactured into a diverse set of useful products—at a cost that society can afford.

Moreover, resource availability involves questions of equity. The provision of adequate resources for 10 or 20 percent of the global population is not going to be sufficient. And as we look at the political, economic, technical, and geological factors that produce resources, we see an intensification of several institutional attributes that are likely to cause a great deal of trouble.

The first reason for concern about our ability to ensure a steady flow of natural resources is the extremely long delays involved in the process of technological change and resource substitution. The shift from wood to coal as the dominant U.S. energy source required 60 years. The shift from coal to oil and gas required a similar period. There is no reason to believe that the move from oil and gas to other sources of energy will be any faster.

Indeed, rising environmental concern and the scarcity of capital are likely to slow down the adaptive process. It may require 20 years or more to establish the technical feasibility of a new [nuclear power] technology like fusion.*

A decade more may elapse before proven scientific principles are demonstrated in a technology that is commercially attractive.

Then several decades more may elapse before society has been able to amass the capital required to employ the technology on a wide scale. Even if the capital and technical knowledge were available in infinite supply, decades of slow accommodation and change would be required to effect the shifts in employment opportunities and economic power implied by a substantial change from one resource technology to another.

*Unlike the process of nuclear fission, which involves the splitting of atomic nuclei (the heavy isotopes of uranium or plutonium), nuclear fusion combines naturally repulsive nuclei (generally, heavy hydrogen isotopes extracted from water) to form heavier nuclei (i.e., helium), thus releasing enormous quantities of energy. Still in the highly experimental stage as a source of power, the fusion process is thought to offer these advantages: high efficiency, abundant fuel, greater safety, little radioactive waste, and no thermal pollution.
Yet delays would not in themselves produce the negative results I project if they were not coupled to the short "time horizon" of most government agencies and corporations responsible for resource policy.

Decision-making in corporations is conditioned by interest rates which encourage a gross indifference to costs and benefits not realized within five years.

With political institutions, the spectre of the next election prevents the implementation of any policy that may return great benefits over the long term but that also forces costs on important interest groups over the short term. The fact of Congress legislating a reduced price for petroleum at the instant when all agree that raised prices are required to spur exploration, promote conservation, stimulate development of alternate energy sources, and reduce imports can only be understood as an effort to gain favor with the electorate.

Even bureaucrats not subject to election have a short time perspective. An Assistant Secretary of the Interior once pointed out that the average term in office of someone at his rank is about 21 months. The first 6 months are spent trying to figure out what's going on, the next 9 months are spent doing something, and the last 6 months are spent trying to figure out where the next job will be. So there is very little incentive to sit down and develop long-term programs.

When you couple the long delays we require with the inescapably short time horizon of almost everybody who is making the decisions, when you recognize that those policies which produce desirable long-term results typically are relatively painful in the short term, you see that we're locked into a dilemma—a dilemma that virtually guarantees more resource problems like the energy crisis. The dilemma is ignored by many because we have developed a set of myths about resources and resource availability that sustain our confidence in the ultimate efficacy of short-term policies.

The first is the myth of the top mile of the earth's crust. There is an enormous amount of various mineral elements in the top mile of the earth's crust. But there is also an enormous amount of crust. As soon as one has to start sifting through the crust and disposing of it in some way that does not interfere with other important economic or biological functions, the capital costs become so high that most materials in the crust are not available to us.

Oil shale provides a very nice illustration. There is an enormous amount of oil shale in the top two or three hundred
RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

feet of the earth's crust. But the problem of shale waste disposal may block that resource from ever being available.

Another myth is that of the "need for regional interdependence." To assume that interdependence benefits everyone is to treat reality in terms of rather narrow economic criteria. In fact, what governs the international flows of oil, metals, and other resources has much more to do with personal ego, institutional power, conflict, and the relationships among different nations than with economic factors. It is that political reality, not the economic one, that is likely to govern many of the resource flows in the future.

Third, there is the myth about the price system. It is asserted that price change will always call forth new substitutes and new practices that will permit us to shift quickly and smoothly from one resource to another without any decline in our options, or perhaps even in our material standard of living. But as I have pointed out, the determinants of the price system are geared to the short-term consequences of an action. Thus, price changes simply provide no signal about the long-term forces at work in determining resource availability.

The energy system again provides an excellent example. During the 1950s, this country should have begun the development of new technologies and the design of new institutions that could provide energy after oil and gas are depleted. However, during that period, the economic system produced a declining price for exactly those [oil] resources that were most rapidly diminishing.

It has been argued that declining energy prices in the 1950s were an anomaly produced by interference in the "normal" market system by Congress and the Federal Power Commission. However, I believe such anomalies are, in fact, the standard outcome. There will always be interference in price and production by shortsighted interest groups as a resource approaches depletion. The pure price system is likely to disappear for any resource just at the point where economists have led us to believe it would call forth the economies, substitutes, and technological advances required for adaptation to scarcity.

The final myth is reflected in the method typically used to determine how much of some substitute material will become economically available at a small rise in cost. Most calculations have assumed that substitutes could be sold at future, and higher, prices, but produced at current price levels.

The fallacy is illustrated by a set of calculations that were performed to assess the substitutability of oil shale liquids
for conventional oil. When oil was selling for around $3 a barrel, the Atlantic Richfield staff calculated that they could make a profit from oil shale liquids if they could be sold for $5 per barrel. However, once oil went to $5 per barrel, the same forces that had brought it to that level also affected the costs of labor, capital, and energy. As a result, the break-even point for oil shale calculated by ARCO rose to $10 per barrel. Of course, oil now sells for that price, but the break-even price for oil shale is now expected to be up around $20 per barrel.

The myth has been to assume that resource prices rise in isolation from other inputs in the economy. In fact, resource depletion sets in motion a broad set of economic and social forces producing price rises in many parts of the economy.

The above notwithstanding, I do not believe it is physically necessary for the limited physical endowment of this earth to intrude on our development. The materials that are available easily could, in some utopian system free of institutional and political constraints, provide us with a full spectrum of clothing, jobs, transportation, shelter, and recreational opportunities. But until we can figure out some way to attain that utopia, I think we are well advised to be very concerned about the impact of resource scarcity on our progress in attaining social and economic goals.

JAMES H. BILLINGTON, moderator, Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: It seems to me there are two interconnected questions raised by what has been said: How specific is the problem of energy? And how can we in fact manage the change from Stage I to Stage III, the Age of Substitutability?

MEADOWS: I don't find myself being very reassured by the statement that energy is a special case. I think that the forces which are giving us so much difficulty in the energy system are latent in the other industries as well.

I strongly agree with the notion that we study each individual material and see what kind of problems it poses. But I think it is probably true of iron, aluminum, copper, etc.—as it is true of energy—that as we turn towards more distant, more diffuse deposits or as we are forced to use deposits that, in the process of extraction, produce undesirable environmental consequences, the energy cost and the capital costs of securing them will increase.
WEINBERG: Well, the essential message that I have been trying to put across is that, for 95 percent of the metals that man uses, these cost increases will not be large.

How much is a large increase? I don’t know. I suppose, from a cosmic point of view, multiplying the cost of extracting a mineral by a factor of two is not a large increase. However, I will concede that if that factor were applied in a hurry, then it would be a large increase.

BILLINGTON: I haven’t heard any ringing sounds of endorsement, yet, for the free-market system as the means of taking us to Stage III. What alternatives would you propose? The Soviet Union, with its centrally planned system, seems to have considerable difficulty with the kind of materials substitution you describe. If you say the only question is how we get from here to there, what are your models?

MEADOWS: Well, I don’t know the answer to that question. But I’ve spent a good deal of time thinking about it and, although I can’t give a precise recipe, I think I know some ingredients of recipes that are more likely to be successful.

The first ingredient clearly involves a deliberate, societal shift toward placing an intrinsic value on conservation and zero material energy growth—deliberate because, although this shift may in fact be mandated by economic factors, the signals that the economic system will provide as impetus will always come too late to avoid serious problems.

WEINBERG: I think that in many instances the market system will work better than you think. Right now, for instance, there is talk of mining clay instead of bauxite in Alabama to get aluminum.

What worries me is whether the free-market system will work in the case of energy as well.

CLARENCE D. LONG, U.S. Representative (D., Maryland): I don’t see that energy is any different from the metals. There are all kinds of sources of energy. There is petroleum, there is coal, there is the sun, there is nuclear energy, geothermal energy, and there are possibilities of hydrogen energy [nuclear fusion], at least in theory, that are almost breathtaking. All of these are substitutes, depending on the costs.

How can we talk about the exhaustibility of energy? I don’t think we can talk very much about the future because I’m sure
that within the next 10 or 20 years new energy sources will be developed that may make our discussion here seem a little naive.

MEADOWS: I would like to correct an impression that is sometimes engendered by the use of the word “inexhaustible.” There are certain fuels—geothermal heat and higher molecular weights of hydrogen [used in nuclear fusion], for example—that can provide an infinite amount of energy, in the sense that we can never exhaust them. But this doesn’t mean that we will ever have an infinite amount of energy. In fact, I suspect that we will never again have as much energy as we’ve had over the last couple of decades.

WEINBERG: Are you saying that society, 10 years from now, won’t be using more energy than we are using today?

MEADOWS: I’m saying that the United States will be forced to accept a per-capita energy consumption level lower than it has today, even if it begins to make use of “inexhaustible” sources of energy. These sources may be inexhaustible, but there are very serious rate constraints associated with their environmental impact, the amount of heat they release, and their requirements for exhaustible materials such as metal and land.

We have no reason to believe that these “ultimate” sources of energy will give us an infinite amount of electric power. Nor do we have any cause to expect that the capital costs will be as low as our power costs have been over the last couple of decades; they may be much higher.

Yet I hope we begin to use these ultimate sources of energy. I think they’re our only hope.

LONG: Aren’t we perhaps fortunate to have a limit to economic growth in the form of available energy? Suppose we had an absolute abundance of energy to the extent that energy became almost a free good. I doubt very much whether our problems would be solved.

One of these problems, of course, is pollution. The Japanese are living in conditions now that may suggest our own future condition. I understand that they have 50 times the concentration of population that we have, and that they are basically living in filth.

I think we have to consider the problem of heat. I read somewhere that if we ever have all the energy we want, we
might heat up the atmosphere, melt the polar ice caps, and flood most of our coastal cities. I don’t know whether that is a joke or a real possibility, but more intelligent people than I mention it as a consideration.

I think other problems may arise in the form of the social strains that seem to accompany unlimited growth. When you live in a little house in the woods, you can fight with your wife, you can play the radio all night, you can hold wild parties, and nobody complains. But when you live in an apartment house, there have to be rules: no radio-playing after 11 o’clock, no wild parties, no pets. The complications of life increase enormously as the population becomes more concentrated.

If we eliminated every restraint to economic growth, I think we would get a population growth that would surprise even Malthus. And I think it would mean the end of democratic society as we know it.

MEADOS: I think that’s a fairly important remark.

Implicit in the question, “Will mineral shortages impede growth?” there seems to be the assumption, “to stop growth is bad.” But thus far we’ve discussed only material growth—growth in the massive consumption of materials and energy.

I think we should devote some of our intellectual resources to the question of whether material growth shouldn’t indeed be stopped, recognizing that this might not immediately be an appropriate choice for all of mankind, but that it might be a very appropriate choice here in this country.

Instead of blindly lashing out to try to sustain growth on all fronts as our mineral resources approach depletion, we should consider the possibility that we are now being presented with an option: Do we continue to measure growth simply by Btu [British thermal unit]? Or do we direct ourselves along a path where growth as a social dimension is the goal?

ETIENNE VAN DE WALLE, Professor of Demography, University of Pennsylvania, and Wilson Center Fellow: My studies have centered on the demographic changes that occurred in Europe during the nineteenth century, so I must disclaim any special insight into the future. Yet, as we attempt to predict the future of the high fertility rate that prevails in much of the world today, a knowledge of the past may help us.

During a remarkably short span of time—between 1880 and 1900, in most of Europe—there occurred a rapid and pervasive social change, as country after country abandoned
its high rate of marital fertility and adopted contraception on a wide scale.

I am optimistic that the same change will take place in the rest of the world. Fertility rates are decreasing even now; and if the Western experience of the nineteenth century tells us anything, it is that this trend is contagious, irreversible, and rapid once it has started. Fertility rates are now on the decline in much of Asia—including China—and in parts of Latin America. And the fertility rate in the West is lower than it has ever been. (It won't be long, I think, before the alarmists cry that we are moving toward extinction.)

Although an end to the population explosion is likely only in the long run, and the population of the world will greatly expand before the momentum of that explosion is spent, the steady improvement of contraceptive technology and a spreading awareness of the financial advantages of the small family are bound to triumph in time.

BOYD: I'm delighted that there is another optimist here.

We don't have to solve our energy problems all at once. Bit by bit we can build a new energy system. Granted, we don't have the technology to gather solar energy and distribute it by power lines. But every household in the United States could be heating its water by solar energy.

We have got to challenge ourselves to solve our problems.

CHESTER L. COOPER, Director, Washington Office of the Institute for Energy Analysis: Gentlemen, the question is no longer whether mineral shortages will impede growth. We've answered that. They won't. The question is will institutional problems impede growth?

Mr. Boyd suggests that there are constraints because of social problems. Dennis Meadows surprises me a bit because I think he has shifted his focus, at least as I remember it, from physical limits to growth to institutional limits to growth. Yet he hasn't really answered the question. Alvin Weinberg, by fudging a little on his Stage II, hasn't really given us much nourishment, either. Where do we go from here? Are we studying the wrong questions?

WEINBERG: Chet, you know as well as I do that none of us can answer the hard questions. So we talk about the easy ones.

Is the market system adequate to deal with the transitions
from one kind of material to another?

It has been notably successful in shifting from magna type iron ore to taconite. When magna types were being used at the Mesabi range [in Minnesota], people had no idea that the shift to taconite would be relatively easy.

On the other hand, when substitutions are very capital intensive and involve very large shifts, such as the transition from Saudi Arabian or Alaskan oil to shale or synthetic oil, there seem to be enormous institutional problems.

Yet I don’t think we will have answers to your question except through further study. One study that I think ought to be undertaken is an examination of those instances where the market system has been successful in allowing mineral substitutions and those instances where it has not.

MEADOWS: I’d like to get back to the problem of injecting a long-term perspective into our current institutions.

We have to have a goal. Perhaps we should redirect some of the energy that is being poured into our Bicentennial celebration toward an examination of where the hell we’re going in the next 100 years. There should be a plan, there should be many plans, debates about plans.

We need institutions, vested with a responsibility for the future, that can start thinking about these questions and that can present ideas without political interference on the part of short-term thinkers. The Office of Technology Assessment in the Congress was established [in 1972] to investigate the social consequences of various technologies. And there is now under consideration a “Policy Institute” for Congress that would cut across committee boundaries and be responsible for contributing a long-term perspective on committee legislation. These are some examples.

There is a lot of methodological work to be done. We will never be able to predict the future, but we can certainly develop techniques for organizing information in an objective way that will enable us to rule out certain outcomes and focus our attention on those that are desirable and feasible.

WEINBERG: Yet it seems to me that the energy problem has preoccupied us with the future in a way that is too explicit and terribly constricting.

I was with Federal Energy Administration at the time of the [1973-74] oil crisis, when President Nixon set the goal of “energy independence by 1980.” He was told that that was
impossible; so it was then changed to "energy independence by 1985." We could argue whether or not that was a good goal, but it was the goal, nevertheless.

The Federal Energy Administration then took up the task of attempting to foresee the future to 1985. We set up a computer model which cost millions and millions of dollars and, so help me, we came out with projections of what the future to 1985 would be. These were incorporated into the Project Independence report.

There was only one difficulty: the entire exercise depended upon the selection of one number which would represent elasticity of demand. That number was entered as -.756.*

Well, the conclusion was drawn that energy demand is very sensitive to price; and the administration policy since that time has been to assume that if prices are raised, the energy problem goes away. It seems obvious to me that that policy stems from the use of -.756 as the energy demand coefficient.

Now the whole exercise is being done over again. This time it's been decided that -.756 was too large and that maybe the number should be -.4 [meaning that gasoline demand is only about half as sensitive to price increases as the FEA originally thought].

I think this example shows that we can depend too much upon this kind of explicit modeling for seeing the future. We are not endowed with the capacity to foresee the future. We are expecting more from our techniques than we can get.

JAIME BENITEZ, Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico:
It seems to me that the obstacles to attainment of Stage III are more emotional and cultural than intellectual and rational.

Twenty years ago, Dr. Weinberg came to Puerto Rico to develop a program of nuclear sciences at the University of Puerto Rico that would help prepare the overcrowded island to deal with its enormous energy problem. Yet, to a large extent, Puerto Rico has been unable to implement the science of nuclear energy because of a strong emotional reaction to

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*Elasticity of demand is a concept used to show how changes in price affect the amount of demand. This is expressed through what is called a coefficient of elasticity. It is calculated as follows:

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\text{Demand elasticity} = \frac{\text{Percentage change in quantity of demand}}{\text{Percentage change in price}}
\]

When the result is expressed as a negative (-), this means that the demand has decreased and the price has increased. If a coefficient of -.756 is used, as was the case with the FEA, this means that reduction of demand follows closely when price increases.
what happened more than 30 years ago at Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

I think it is fair to say that there is a real hostility to the development of nuclear energy—a hostility that is to a large degree irrational, but that is also an expression of environmental concern.

I would like to ask Dr. Weinberg if he thinks we will ever be able to realize a nuclear energy system, given this emotional hostility.

JOHN F. SEIBERLING, U.S. Representative (D., Ohio): I am one of those people who have that “irrational” attitude toward nuclear energy—only I prefer to describe it as a realistic concern. Given the possibilities of nuclear sabotage, the hijacking of nuclear materials, and, within a decade or so, the manufacture of plutonium bombs by politically primitive countries, is the world ready for the nuclear energy system that you, Dr. Weinberg, and others seem to think is necessary to meet our problems? The question bothers me, and it bothers many other members of Congress, too.

WEINBERG: Will the anxiety over nuclear energy deny the nuclear option to us? Possibly.

Do I think this a proper course? My answer is a very strong no, because if we look at the options that are available to us, we find that there is risk in all of them.

MIHAIO MARKOVIC, Member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences, Belgrade, and Wilson Center Fellow: Do you think fusion is going to work?

WEINBERG: Well, I've been in the fusion business for about 30 years—ever since it began. During tests, some of my colleagues have said to me, “We’re going to get fusion. It’s going to work.” And my response has been, “Okay, I'll bet you a dollar it won’t.” I collected on that bet in 1957, and again in 1959, and I've collected ever since.

I guess my basic feeling is that the problem of developing a fusion system is so immensely difficult, that if I were asked whether fusion will work in my lifetime, I would be prepared to bet half my fortune that it won't. If I were asked whether it will ever work—well, ever is a long time, but it just looks very difficult to me....
THE AMERICAN FUTURE: OTHER VOICES

As the preceding dialogue makes clear, arguments over “resources and growth” policy hinge partly on opposing views of man’s future access to the earth’s finite resources—such as metals and fossil fuels. The “cornucopians” predict that, thanks to man’s technical ingenuity, such resources (or adequate substitutes) will prove ample in the long run. The pessimists fear that high development costs and environmental damage preclude an easy transition to an “Age of Substitutability.” During the dialogue, most speakers seemed to agree on one point: political barriers to any timely world consensus on “growth” policies are perhaps the biggest immediate problems. Such matters are examined below by Walt W. Rostow, Henry C. Wallich, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff in excerpts from Growth in America (Greenwood Press, 1976), edited by Chester L. Cooper, a former Fellow, and comprising 12 essays prepared for conferences sponsored by the Wilson Center.

The Value of The Limits to Growth
by Walt W. Rostow

The most searching international task we face—and this includes Japan and Western Europe—is our common relations with the parts of the world that have come late to the industrial revolution. The problem here is a long-range version of what we are beginning to feel in energy, food, and raw materials. It is the problem posed in The Limits to Growth and other projections that demonstrate that trees do not grow to the sky.

Although I am fully aware of its technical inadequacies and the lack of data to fill the terms of its equations, I have not joined in criticisms of The Limits to Growth for a particular reason. To achieve the kind of international cooperation required to deal with the tasks ahead will require profound adjustments in the way men and governments think and act.
Walt Whitman Rostow, 60, is professor of economic history at the University of Texas. He served as Special Assistant to President Johnson (1966-69) and formerly taught economic history at MIT. His best-known work is *The Stages of Economic Growth* (1960).

Henry Christopher Wallich, 62, is one of the eight Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Until he joined the Fed's Board in 1974, he had been a professor of economics at Yale since 1951 and a columnist for *Newsweek* since 1965. He was a member of President Eisenhower's Council of Economic Advisers (1959-61).

Eugene Bertram Skolnikoff, 48, is director of the Center for International Studies at MIT, where he has taught political science off and on since 1952. Also an engineer and inventor, he holds a patent on electronic circuits.

And this takes time. With all its weaknesses, *The Limits to Growth* has made a contribution to that change in perspective. Surely the long-run task will be to find the way to some more or less stable but dynamic equilibrium between man and his physical environment; and we must do so after two centuries of relatively uninhibited expansion in population and production, with all the habits of mind and action that experience carried with it. Surely it is possible, if we are not wise, to produce yet another grandiose cycle in man's affairs and so act as to disintegrate the industrial civilizations we have built. And surely, to avoid that outcome, we must design policies that permit the latecomers to move forward for a time as the presently more advanced societies go about dealing with the tasks of the search for quality.

In confronting together these questions, the nations that entered industrialization earlier and later each have serious grounds for complaint against one another. The latecomers can complain of the profligate use of finite natural resources in the past by the more advanced and their current disproportionate absorption of such resources. As representatives of the less industrialized nations stare at the computer readouts, they are bound to ask: Why should we be denied the stage of high mass consumption, whose costs and limitations are mainly perceived by those who take its blessings for granted? Why should we be denied the uncertain adventure of experimenting with high levels of per-capita income beyond?

The more advanced nations also have cause for complaint. The latecomers have eagerly absorbed the benefits of modern medicine and public health, but they have been extremely
laggard in investing political, administrative, and physical capital in measures of population control. Some, indeed, have looked to vast increases in population as a future source of power in the world. Why should the more advanced nations permit themselves to be dragged down by such undisciplined self-indulgence?

Now, in fact, the world is not neatly divided, as conventional rhetoric suggests, between rich and poor nations. The so-called developing nations lie along a wide spectrum, whether that spectrum is defined in terms of the measurable but ambiguous index of GNP per capita or the harder-to-measure (but more basic) index of the degree to which they have absorbed efficiently the pool of modern technology. It is a long stretch from Yemen, or even Haiti, to Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico; and there is a sense in which India and China (at not much more than $100 per capita) are technologically more advanced than Venezuela (at, say, $1,000 per capita). Moreover, the incidence of the relative shortage of foodstuffs and raw materials will vary: some developing nations will, on balance, benefit from the agricultural and raw-material resources they command; others will suffer from rising import prices, if not absolute shortages.

Nevertheless, despite these real complexities, there is latent in the world as it is a most dangerous potential confrontation between the more developed and less developed nations as they come to perceive the limits within which they will both have to work out their destinies: the more developed confronting the possibility of absolute reductions in income per capita; the less developed, the possibility that tragedy and decline might well set in before they attain the levels of Western Europe, North America, and Japan. As these shadows fall over the minds of men, we could see emerge a desperate scramble in a more intense version of the mercantilist spirit as nations once again contest for sources of foodstuffs and raw materials and markets. In a nuclear age, the outcome of such a return to a kind of last-ditch mercantilism could bring with it catastrophe greater, even, than that which the semi-knowledgeable computers project from the present pace of population increase, industrialization, and pollution.

It will evidently take a remarkable and sustained effort by men and governments at different stages of growth to avoid such catastrophe and find the terms of cooperation that will permit them to bring the human race from where it is to a relatively stable, if dynamic, relationship to its physical environ-
RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

ment. Such terms, if they are found, must evolve from pro-
tracted joint study of the facts. The only procedural rule that
has a chance of taking the human race through in reasonable
safety is Jean Monnet's dictum for Europe and the Atlantic:
"Bring men together to examine and solve a common problem,
not to negotiate." But also there will—and must—be negotia-
tions.

Could Growth Be Stopped?

by Henry C. Wallich

Suppose there existed a national will to prevent further
increases in GNP. To begin with, it would become immediately
apparent that that is not really what we had in mind so long
as population is still growing. To combine a constant GNP with
rising population implies a decline in per-capita income. Pre-
sumably, then, halting GNP growth would have to mean halting
GNP per-capita growth.

With no great effort of the imagination, one can today
visualize population growth being brought to a halt. But if
nothing else happens, zero population growth (ZPG) would
accelerate rather than retard per-capita growth. The main
reason is that new savings would no longer have to be devoted,
in part, to equipping the additions to the labor force with new
tools. The stock of capital per worker would rise more rapidly
than before. Thus, halting per-capita growth would be more
demanding under these conditions.

It takes a greater effort of the imagination to visualize a
prohibition on an increase in the capital stock. People appar-
ently want to save in order to provide for their old age, and
the more they do so, the richer they get. This saving is one of
the principal sources of growth. One can visualize a fiscal sys-
tem in which the government absorbs all new savings by bor-
rowing and neutralizes them by expenditure on public con-
sumption. The savers would still have their claims that they
could draw down in old age, but the stock of physical capital
would not increase.

Even this, however, would not kill off all growth. As physi-
cal assets employed in production wear out, they must be re-
placed. If there is technological progress, they will be replaced,
RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

at no higher cost, by more efficient equipment. Growth thus could proceed without new saving. If the new technologies are resource-saving or environment-protecting, it might indeed be difficult to persuade people that this kind of growth should not be allowed to go forward solely in order to enforce a rigorous zero growth policy. And in the unlikely event that government succeeded in stopping all forms of growth of productive enterprises, it might still be possible for ingenious individuals to engage in private growth-oriented activities on the do-it-yourself system.

Growth is likely to prove a hardy plant. Attempts to stop it will turn out not only misguided but futile. Operating from the pragmatic expectation that growth is here to stay, a sensible policy should try to guide it in a manner that would neutralize the threats that growth supposedly carries. The question before us, in other words, is how to grow safely.

It is unlikely that agreement will be reached about the risks of continued growth. That debate has been going on since Malthus, and there will always be occasions to cry wolf. However persuasive the contrary case, it will never be possible to prove that some particular wolf will not actually arrive and stay.

Economists contend that depletion of low-cost resources will be gradual, that it will manifest itself in price increases, which will stimulate production, substitution, and resource-saving research, and eventually, if necessary, discontinuation of use. Many economists probably believe that this equilibrating process can go on indefinitely, except possibly with regard to population growth and the associated need for reproducible primary products, principally food. It is in fact immaterial whether we visualize this process as occurring within a context of continued growth or of a steady state. Unless the equilibrium mechanism functions, total exhaustion of resources and the environment will occur in a context of stability as well as of growth. The difference is only one of time. The strict logic of those who foresee doomsday requires a shrinkage of economic activity to some minimum that would be sustainable on the basis of recycling after the original supplies of natural resources have been fully used up.

Economists cannot predict what precise course events will take. What they can do is to make sure that the adjustment mechanisms are in good operating order. Prices must be free to give their signals. Markets must be capable of responding to the signals. Where markets do not operate properly—and
this may frequently be the case—devices must be introduced to make them operational. With these mechanisms in place, we can allow events to take their course with confidence. If the school that believes continuing growth is possible is right, the mechanisms will channel this growth and shift resource use in directions that insure continuity. If the opposite side is right, the same mechanisms will so increase costs on all sides that continued growth eventually becomes impossible. This would occur, however, not in the form of catastrophe and collapse. Rather, it would be a gradual slowing and eventual phasing out of growth into a stationary state. The question of which side is correct can be left for events to decide. Immediate action should be directed not toward the futile effort to halt growth, but toward improving the mechanisms that will make growth safe, if it does continue.

Is Policy Possible?

by Eugene B. Skolnikoff

Within societies, as within the global system, a process of fragmentation is and has been underway—a fragmentation closely related to numbers, to erosion of accepted assumptions and values, to new awareness of individual possibilities, to disappearance of old power blocs and sources of legitimacy, and to confusion in a new world of exploding technology little understood and seemingly autonomous. Harold Isaacs has said it well:

We are experiencing on a massively universal scale a convulsive ingathering of men in their numberless groupings of kinds—tribal, racial, ethnic, religious, national.

... This fragmentation of man is one of the great pervasive facts of contemporary human affairs. It forms part of one of our many pervasive great paradoxes: the more global our science and technology, the more tribal our politics; the more we see of the planets, the less we see of each other. The more it becomes apparent that man cannot decently survive with his separateness, the more separate he becomes.
It is a matter of argument, and research, as to the causes of this fragmentation. Certainly part of the motivation, as Isaacs says, is a search for security and identity in an increasingly complex and impersonal world. There is no reason to think that the continued growth of population and complexity of life will do other than stimulate this drive toward tribalism.

Coupled with the interdependence of modern society and with the erosion or disappearance of old assumptions, tribalism creates enormous strains on a political process. These ethnic or religious or national tribes no longer accept the simple notion of elites, nor are they any longer willing to give up voluntarily their claims for participation in social decision-making, nor can a society operate by ignoring them. And communication between them becomes more difficult as cultural development diverges. The result is growing competition and conflict—and less, rather than more, unity of purpose, just when physical realities call for the opposite.

Perhaps this fragmentation is the necessary prelude to a new, higher form of integration, but there is little other than idle hope to sustain such a prediction. Rather it is much more likely to be one of the societal characteristics with which political processes will increasingly have to cope. It goes to the heart of politics, since these groups will be battling for their share of power. And thus it will add greatly not only to the agenda of politics but also to the background noise and conflict within which the process will have to work.

The legitimacy of the political authority is at stake unless the often strident new demands for participation are met. But participation is usually inimical to efficiency because of: increased competition for resources among more groups, increased time necessary for resolution of issues, difficulties of communication, and varying levels of competence and information.

The information needed for planning—the nonquantitative indicators or projections that the market does not produce—is not necessarily available or understood or is contentious. How should preferences be determined when needed? Questionnaires? Ad hoc elections? Instantaneous electronic feedback systems? Under what conditions and with what information?

And the growing importance of external events may mean planning bodies have only a portion of the subject actually under their control.
Regulatory agencies and mechanisms also share these problems and have some of their own: public interest in the subject (and hence in the agency) wanes, reducing public pressure and awareness; the only groups consistently interested, and thus able to exert continuous pressure or to infiltrate, are those to be regulated; often the commercial interests to be regulated are able to organize political and economic power more effectively than the more diffuse groups affected by the commercial interests; the original political objectives and setting that led to a particular regulatory institution may have changed, but the statutory base and historical development make change exceedingly difficult; and the knowledge on which to base regulatory decisions is often uncertain and controversial.

The problems inherent in bureaucracy itself must be added to all of these, especially since a concomitant to increased complexity and scale in society is expanded bureaucracy. The difficulties of generating adequate information and analysis, of modifying the status quo, of integrating action, of developing competence, of providing a sense of participation, of influencing permanent bureaucracies, and of reaching effective and timely decisions are all well known and grow along with bureaucratic expansion. The situation is further complicated by the growing need for more international bureaucracies, which tend to be far less satisfactory than U.S. domestic bureaucracies.

Finally, the information and analysis problem must be stressed. The increased scale and complexity of society and of its artifacts, especially their technological complexity, greatly multiplies the difficulty of providing adequate, comprehensible, and timely information for decision-making. Society is much more vulnerable to the parochial views of small groups able to understand facets of the issues, and the difficulty of developing alternative policy choices is enormously compounded. Informed public debate over the consequences of planning choices becomes rare, at best.

Thus, the great benefit of the market for self-regulation must increasingly be sacrificed because it is not adequate to serve social goals. But the capability of political institutions to carry out the planning and regulation thereby required is also in question.
At the 1976 meeting of the Club of Rome, founder Aurelio Peccei (former managing director of Olivetti) told the scholars and businessmen in his "invisible college" that the report they had commissioned from Dennis L. Meadows and coworkers at MIT for the Club’s "Project on the Predicament of Mankind" had "served its purpose" of "getting the world's attention" focused on the threat to humanity of continued uncontrolled expansion of population and industry.

To say the least. Since 1972, that report, published as THE LIMITS TO GROWTH by Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, and William W. Behrens III (Universe Books, with Potomac Associates), has reportedly sold more than 2 million copies worldwide (375,000 in U.S. cloth and paper editions). LIMITS helped to spawn dozens of new books on growth (pro, con, exponential, sustainable, zero) and has been responsible for a renewal of interest in early Doomsday writers. These include, most notably, T. R. Malthus, the British parson-economist whose pessimistic study, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION, first published in 1798 (newly reissued by Penguin in paper, 1976), contains the prediction that the world would exhaust its food supply as its peoples multiplied. Attacked and defended then as later, the essay was described by Karl Marx as "nothing but a sensational pamphlet... yet what a stimulus was produced by this libel on the human race!" In November 1972, in the course of the heated new debate on growth, Garrett Hardin, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, noting the attacks of latter-day critics, wrote: "Malthus has been buried again. This is the 174th year in which that redoubtable economist has been interred. We may take it as certain that anyone who has to be buried 174 times cannot be wholly dead."

David Ricardo (1772-1823), a contemporary of Malthus, is another classical economist whose gloomy ideas on resource scarcity and its effects, as developed in his numerous books, are widely discussed in connection with the work of the Meadowses and of Jay W. Forrester, the MIT systems analyst who describes his pioneer model for the Club of Rome project in WORLD DYNAMICS (Cambridge, Mass.: Wright-Allen Press, 1971).

Forrester's computer model WORLD I provided the basis for the Meadowses' WORLD II, which produced the latter's conclusions that then current rates of economic and population growth, if continued, even with advanced technology would lead to catastrophe shortly after the year 2100. Both models are challenged on technical and other grounds by a research team at the University of Sussex in England in MODELS OF DOOM, edited by H.S.D. Cole, et al. (Universe Books, 1973).


Still other writers dealt with specific topics such as population increase, food
problems, depletion of nonrenewable resources, industrial growth and pollution.

**The Limits to Growth** can be seen as providing a kind of New Testament for the environmental movement of the late 1960s and the early 1970s. This period saw the publication of a number of forceful sermons on man's misuse of Earth, such as Gordon Rattray Taylor's *The Doomsday Book* (Fawcett, 1971, paper); Barry Commoner's *The Closing Circle* (Knopf, 1971, cloth; Bantam, 1972, paper); Roberto Vacca's *The Coming Dark Age* (Rutgers, 1973, cloth; Doubleday, 1974, paper); Peter Schrag's *The End of the American Future* (Simon & Schuster, 1973); Robert Heilbroner's *An Inquiry into the Human Prospect* (Norton, 1974, cloth & paper); Paul R. and Anne H. Ehrlich's *The End of Affluence: A Blueprint for Your Future* (Ballantine, 1974, paper); and the works of microbiologist René Dubos and economists Barbara Ward and E. F. Schumacher.

Schumacher's *Small Is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered* was published in England and later reprinted in the United States (Harper, 1973, paper, 1975, cloth) in response to word-of-mouth acclaim. The author questions many Western assumptions, including the widespread belief that the ultimate production techniques have been mastered and now need only be transferred intact to developing nations. His plea for thinking small shapes his discussion of foreign aid, nuclear energy, education, and patterns of industrial organization and ownership.

In *Only One Earth: The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet* (Norton, 1972, cloth & paper) Ward's views were joined with Dubos's strong holistic philosophy in a study prepared for the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm. Their joint conclusion:

> "An acceptable strategy for planet Earth must explicitly take account of the fact that the natural resource most threatened with pollution, most exposed to degradation, most liable to irreversible damage is not this or that plant or biome or habitat, not even the free airs or the great oceans. It is man himself."

Less impassioned writers have devoted themselves to sorting out problems and dangers and suggesting what can be done, through planned growth, to spread technological benefits without undue damage to man and his environment.

One of these is Sterling Brubaker. Among cautiously optimistic general studies none reads better than his lucid *To Live on Earth: Man and His Environment in Perspective* (Johns Hopkins, with Resources for the Future, 1972). Another Johns Hopkins book, *Energy, Economic Growth, and the Environment*, edited by Sam H. Schurr, also holds out hope for moderate growth with minimal damage, provided some technical and institutional "fixes" are made. The authors of this collection of papers from the Washington research center, Resources for the Future, look closely at such immediate problems as the possible impact of environmental standards on the availability (reduced) and cost (increased) of petroleum and examine new legislative, administrative, and judicial processes to reconcile long-range energy policy with other U.S. domestic and international goals.

Individual titles in the specific areas of population and food production and distribution are numerous and best sought in individual bibliographies. Technical books that deal separately with energy sources—oil, natural gas, timber; nuclear, solar, geothermal—are also numerous and easy to locate in libraries and bookstores.

There are, however, a number of


The most recent report to the Club of Rome, edited by Jan Tinbergen, winner of the 1969 Nobel Prize for economics, contrasts quite sharply to the Club's 1972 LIMITS TO GROWTH. In RIO: RE-SHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER (Dutton, 1976, cloth & paper), scholars of several nationalities see hope in the possibilities for controlled "organic" growth as opposed to exponential growth fostered by the uncontrolled play of market forces. Like other writers, however, they too stress the need for attention to institutional change in order to cope on a world basis with the growth/resource conundrum.

EDITOR'S NOTE. Chester L. Cooper of the Institute for Energy Analysis and Harold J. Barnett, professor of economics at Washington University, a 1976 Fellow, were among those providing advice on this book list.
Larger than the continental United States (minus Alaska), Brazil is Washington's biggest, richest, and, increasingly, most independent ally in Latin America. The map outlines the country's principal regions, ranging from the empty Amazon lowlands to the bustling, more temperate South.
Brazil

People in the United States, as James Reston once pointed out, will do almost anything for Latin America except read about it. Unless there is a coup in Chile, or Señora Perón flees Buenos Aires, it seems the Norteamericanos are not interested. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's two trips to Latin America this year got little attention, although he was visiting an area of growing concern to U.S. business and diplomacy. One of the countries he visited was Brazil, the biggest, most powerful nation to the South, and no longer a "client" of Washington on the world scene. Scholarly research continues to produce new insights into Brazil's history and current affairs. Here, Political Scientist Robert Packenham analyzes contemporary Brazil; and Historian Leslie Rout examines Brazil's 300-year experience with race and slavery, so different from our own.

YANKEE IMPRESSIONS AND BRAZILIAN REALITIES

by Robert A. Packenham

Since 1964, when the military took power for the first time in the twentieth century, two impressions of Brazil have been growing in the United States. Businessmen and State Department officials, in particular, have seen in Brazil a growing industrial juggernaut, an emerging regional power, a new force in Third World politics, and the strongest pillar of stability and anti-Communism in Latin America.

On the other hand, liberal politicians, journalists, intellectuals, and many religious and humanitarian groups have tended to see a military junta, appalling repression and torture, the erosion of national sovereignty, and a growing gap between rich and poor.
Each of these images contains elements of truth, and yet each is seriously flawed. Partly this is true because Brazil is constantly changing: today's Brazil is not the same as yesterday's, even in the vast Amazon region or on Rio's spectacular beaches; and tomorrow's Brazil will be something else again. Moreover, as in the United States, there is incredible variety and diversity.

Brazil's population is close to 110 million and growing at a rate of 3 percent per year. Its land area takes up half of South America; it is bigger than the United States minus Alaska. The city of São Paulo, population 8 million, with its skyscrapers and urban sprawl is the biggest industrial center in the southern half of the world. Yet in the arid Northeast (population 35 million), estimates of per capita income range from $50 to $150 per year, roughly equivalent to that of India.

The population is largely descended from the Indians, the Portuguese settlers, and African slaves. It is one-third “mixed,” one-half “European,” one-tenth black, with some Japanese immigrants to round it out. Yet with this diversity there is also considerable unity and coherence in terms of the common Portuguese language, Catholic religion, and strong national Luso-Brazilian culture and identification.

The Economic Boom

Between 1968 and 1974, economic growth in Brazil averaged 10 percent per year, one of the highest increases in the world during that period. The growth in GNP slid to 5 percent in 1975; it will probably decline further this year due partly to the oil crisis (Brazil imports 75 percent of its oil). Even so, with its new factories, its urban pollution, traffic jams, and steel mills, Brazil seems to the untutored eye almost ready to join the ranks of the “developed” nations.

How has such phenomenally rapid growth been accomplished? Some of the main elements have been tough wage policies (reducing inflation from over 100 percent per year in 1964 to 30–35 percent today); innovative monetary de-
Brasilia
tives such as "indexing" to compensate for inflation domestically and internationally; strong reliance on free enterprise; hospitality to foreign technology and investment (mainly U.S., West German, Canadian, Swiss) in automaking, food products, pharmaceuticals, machinery; a ban on strikes; emphasis on exports (of iron ore, soybeans, sugar, coffee, shoes); assigning technocrats, not military men, to guide the economy.

This economic "miracle" has primarily benefited the urban middle and upper-middle classes. In 1960, Brazil ranked 14th among 52 nations in terms of "income inequality." On the basis of 1970 census data, that inequality (as measured by reported wages) has worsened. In 1970 the richest 20 percent of the population got 46 percent of the income and the bottom 20 percent got only 3 percent. Data on urban-rural and regional disparities are less reliable, but all indications are that here, too, inequalities have grown. In the rural areas, the ratio between the income of the richest 10 percent of the population and that of the poorest 10 percent is 15 to 1. In urban areas, the contrast is far greater: 50 to 1. In São Paulo or Rio, a white-collar manager or technocrat with a Ph.D. can earn roughly what his U.S. or West German counterpart earns; but a common laborer earns about 7 percent of what his U.S. counterpart makes.

The Gravest Political Liability

The regime's political repression affects many persons indirectly through intimidation, but directly (through incarceration, torture, and exile) only a very small number, mostly in the urban middle class. Economic inequalities, on the other hand, affect the vast majority of the population—the migrants to the teeming favelas (urban slums), the blue-collar class, the back-country peasants. One can argue, therefore, that income inequalities are Brazil's most severe political liability.

We know that the size of the pie has grown dramatically: Brazil's GNP was about 250 percent greater in 1975 than in 1957. We also know that the pie is being sliced more unequally; but we do not know for sure if the amount of pie available to each group is less, more, or the same. Studies by the Berkeley economist, Albert Fishlow, a critic of Brazilian policy, and by the Brazilian economist, Carlos Geraldo Langoni, who has tended to support government policies, converge in suggesting

*Less "unequal" were, surprisingly, South Africa, India, Portugal, and Paraguay. More unequal than Brazil were Guatemala, Mexico, the Philippines.

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that most social classes have more than they had a decade ago.

But studies by the Intersyndical Department of Socioeconomic Statistics and Studies (DIEESE), a union-financed research organization in São Paulo, indicate a 30 percent decrease in the real purchasing power of working groups in 1964-74. Their data also indicate that in 1965 the average blue-collar worker could buy his family's basic monthly food needs with the wages received for 87 hours of work, whereas in 1975 it took 151 hours of work to buy the same.

In sum, the information is contradictory and uncertain. We know the "haves"—the skilled workers, technicians, entrepreneurs—are much better off; and we know that there is some variation among regions and industries in living standards. But as is so often the case, we do not know for sure whether most of the "have nots" are now better or worse off than they were in 1960 or 1964.

**Does Growth Mean Inequalities?**

President Ernesto Geisel's regime and "Chicago-school" economists (such as Langoni) contend that income concentration is a natural and inevitable consequence of rapid growth at Brazil's stage of development: *crescer é concentrar* ("to grow is to concentrate income"). According to this view, to try to "share the wealth" would reduce the economy's momentum and result only in "dividing the misery." Eventually, it is argued, the new wealth will trickle down.

But many critics, including Fishlow, contend that the striking concentration of Brazil's income could be alleviated if the government defined development in more "social" terms and spent more in the countryside on schools and amenities. To these critics, "trickle down" will never do the job.

Recently, the regime's leaders have taken public cognizance of growing social disparities and have pledged to do something about them. President Garrastazú Médici said in 1970 that "the economy is doing well, but the people are not doing so well." At the beginning of his term in 1974, the current President, Ernesto Geisel, agreed, and has since begun some modest remedies: increased aid to the desperately poor Northeast farm regions, greater outlays for health care and social security, more progressive and strictly enforced taxation. How sustained and effective these measures will be remains to be seen.

Since the 1964 overthrow of João Goulart, a leftish, rather
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>1494</td>
<td>Spain and Portugal divide the world in the Treaty of Tordesillas.</td>
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<td>1500</td>
<td>Portugal's Pedro Alvares Cabral discovers Brazil.</td>
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<td>1532</td>
<td>First permanent Portuguese settlement in Brazil.</td>
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<td>1538</td>
<td>First known shipment of slaves arrives from Africa.</td>
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<td>1565</td>
<td>Founding of Rio de Janeiro.</td>
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<td>1695</td>
<td>Gold discovered in Minas Gerais.</td>
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<td>1727</td>
<td>Introduction of coffee in Brazil.</td>
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<td>1822</td>
<td>Prince Pedro declares Brazil's independence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>Slave trade abolished.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>Freeing of all children born to slaves.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>Slavery abolished.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>The emperor dethroned; the republic established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>Brazil declares war on Germany and joins the allies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Revolution brings Getúlio Vargas to power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Establishment of Dictator Vargas's <em>Estado Novo</em>.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>Brazil declares war on the Axis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945-46</td>
<td>Vargas ousted; democratic constitution promulgated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Brasilia designated as the nation's capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>João Goulart becomes President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Goulart deposed by military. Humberto Castelo Branco elected President by a purged Congress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Coup gives Costa e Silva dictatorial power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>General Garrastazú Médici named President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>General Ernesto Geisel, Médici's choice, elected President.</td>
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</tbody>
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BRAZIL

inept figure, Brazil has been run by a coalition of generals, with most daily decisions delegated to civilian technocrats. Like many other non-Communist regimes in the Third World, Brazil's is an "authoritarian," not "totalitarian," regime. That is, it is characterized by a "ruling mentality," not by a full-blown, highly articulate ideology; by a certain limited pluralism, rather than government penetration of all aspects of social life; and by low public participation, rather than "mass mobilization" (as in Castro's Cuba).

Not Totalitarian, Not Democratic

If Brazil's regime is less than totalitarian, it is also far from democratic. As Harvard's Samuel P. Huntington notes, the key features are:

¶ The ultimate source of power is in the top leadership (that is, the 200 general officers) of the armed forces. This, in effect, is the constituent power of Brazil.

¶ Within the government, power is centralized in the President, who is the dominant influence in the appointment of officials and the shaping of public policy.

¶ On a territorial basis, power is highly centralized in the national executive with state governments being reduced to such a subordinate role that Brazil can no longer be thought of as a federal system in any meaningful sense of the word.

¶ The power of the national executive has also been extended into and over labor unions, employer associations, universities, and other associative and corporate bodies which might become nuclei of political opposition.

¶ Civil liberties are severely restricted; the political rights of many active political figures have been suspended; *habeas corpus* is inoperative; the press is subject to censorship, which is perhaps more exasperating for its unpredictability than for its severity; arbitrary arrests occur; prisoners have been mistreated, tortured, and, at times, killed while in custody.

¶ Political participation is limited, and the organs for participation, the political parties, are weak. The President is formally elected by an electoral college but actually chosen by the top military leaders.

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Policy-making is dominated by the bureaucracy—civil and military—with Congress playing a marginal role.

Yet the Brazilian military is not monolithic. Although military leaders tend to unite when their interests are threatened, there are also large fissures within the armed forces. The navy is more conservative than the army or air force; young officers tend to be more radical than older ones; there are four regional military commands whose leaders differ in their commitment to liberal values, nationalism, development, security. Ideologies vary—“authoritarian” versus “liberal” politics, free trade versus protectionism, social conservatism versus “reform” versus “radicalism.”

Not All Generals Are Alike

Nor has the post-1964 “Revolutionary” period been all of a piece. True, the presidents have been generals, but their philosophies and bases of political support have varied.

The first Revolutionary President, General Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco, was a liberal who hoped to return the country to constitutionalism; but when the opposition candidates did well in the October 1965 gubernatorial elections, the linha dura (hard-line) faction of the military reacted. Its leaders forced the regime to abolish the existing political party structure and to replace direct popular election of presidents with the (elite) electoral college system.

President Castelo Branco’s successor, General Arturo da Costa e Silva, pledged to “humanize the Revolution.” He did not succeed. In 1967–68, various opposition groups, mainly urban, staged demonstrations; intellectuals and students challenged the government. In December 1968, in what amounted to an internal right-wing coup, the hard-liners forced through a new Institutional Act; it closed down Congress (until 1970), suspended habeas corpus, imposed press censorship, and set the stage for indiscriminate arrests and police harassment. Thus ensued perhaps the most sombre period in Brazil's political history. Radicalized students and clergy supported Maoist and Castroist splinter groups (without the encouragement of the clandestine Moscow-line Brazilian Communist Party) who staged bank robberies, terrorist bombings, and kidnappings of Western diplomats. The military reacted with midnight arrests and torture; in two years, “order” was restored.

President Garrastazú Médici, who took over in late 1969,
acquired a certain popularity, in part because he shrewdly identified himself with Brazil's popular championship soccer team and led mass celebrations of its victory in the World Cup soccer games in 1970. The first meaningful election since 1965 was held in November 1974, and the opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) did well, actually gaining control of three important state legislatures and increasing their minority representation in the federal Congress. More important, Médici's successor, Ernesto Geisel, a military liberal, was able to rebuff pressure to annul the results. In August 1975, however, after a year of this distensão política (political relaxation), the hard-liners staged a comeback. They exploited revelations of Communist election activity and of corruption on the part of several legislators to declare an end to distensão, a slogan whose future remains in doubt.

The Futility of Torture

Another word on torture. Perhaps as many as 300 persons have been killed, several thousand tortured, several tens of thousands arrested and detained, and millions intimidated by military and civilian police actions. Although it is hard to convince the apprehensive Brazilian Right on this point, the torture no longer serves any purpose; the Brazilian Left, never as well organized as its counterpart in Chile, is today a shambles. As in Portugal under Salazar, the national Communist party is small and deep underground.

In 1969–70, the national leaders may well have encouraged and coordinated the torture. Today the situation is more complicated. At least one cabinet minister has publicly criticized torture, and others, including Commerce Minister Severo Gomes, are known to have tried to stop it. President Geisel is apparently trying to contain the evil. But this is more difficult than it may seem. The four regional army commanders are politically powerful; they supervise crackdowns on dissidents and control the special police. The police appeal to service loyalties and unity in the face of “subversives.” “We were here when you needed us [1969–70],” they remind the leadership. They claim their methods are still needed to prevent a new surge of terrorism. Many hardliners agree. By accepting torture as a weapon against their enemies in the past, the regime’s leaders unleashed a force now difficult to stop.

The penetration of Brazil by external influences, particularly through foreign investment and loans from the United
States, has also been much criticized. In some important ways, Brazil has indeed become more constrained by the external economic environment. Total foreign investment has trebled since 1964. The foreign debt has increased fivefold. The post-1968 emphasis on exports has contributed to the economic boom but also to dependence on external markets.

However, in other ways, Brazil is much stronger vis-à-vis the outside world than it was in 1964. In 1964, the United States supplied nearly half of the total foreign capital in Brazil; today, the relative share is down to around 30 percent, while the investments coming from countries like France, Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada have increased significantly. This diversification of sources of foreign capital means greater bargaining power for Brazil.

Although the private economic sector remains relatively weak, and the foreign-owned multinationals have become stronger, the Brazilian public sector has also become much stronger. Indeed, there are growing complaints from Brazilian businessmen that this “state capitalism” is both inefficient and discouraging to local private investment. The government dominates precisely those elements of the national economy that are most vital for national security and for broader economic development—steel, oil, communications, transport.

A New Strength Abroad

The economic boom, fueled in part by foreign investment, has given Brazil far greater influence on the international scene. The confidence of its leaders and diplomats has never been higher. “No country can escape its destiny,” observed the late J. A. de Araújo Castro, a distinguished Brazilian ambassador and former envoy to Washington. “Fortunately or unfortunately, Brazil is condemned to greatness. . . . Small mediocre solutions are neither appropriate nor interesting to Brazil. We have to think big. . . .” Brazil’s foreign policy goal, he added, was to “neutralize all external factors which might limit its national power.”

One of those external factors has been the United States. Increasingly, there are differences between the United States and Brazil on international matters. Among them:

Brazil supports a national territorial boundary ranging up to 200 miles offshore; the United States has long opposed such extensive jurisdiction.

In the early 1970s, Brazil led the Third World fight against
stronger U.N. population-control policy statements, sought by the United States and the West.

More importantly, Brazil recognized the Soviet-supported faction in the 1975 Angolan civil war, voted in the United Nations with the Arabs to equate Zionism with "racism," and concluded an agreement with West Germany to import atomic power reactors—all moves which the United States sought to prevent.

When Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Brazil last February, he was careful not to exert pressure or offend Brazilian leadership. He hailed Brazil's "concern for human rights" and agreed to a system of regular high-level meetings between Brazil and the United States—the only Latin American country so singled out. What the Brazilians gave Kissinger in return for these accolades remains unknown, but their increasing independent foreign policy continues. The United States finds it now must woo Brazil, not take her support for granted, as in the past.

As it has helped Brazil abroad, so the economic boom, now fading, has helped keep the more radical opposition to the regime from gaining widespread middle-class support. Moreover, despite all the inequalities, thanks to traditional ties of mutual obligation between factory boss and worker, farmer and farmhand, Western-style "revolutionary" class consciousness has yet to develop.

Nor has racial solidarity developed among blacks. What does it mean to be black in Brazil, where slavery was banned less than 100 years ago? In Brazil, with its large mixed population, there are infinite gradations of "color." Brazilians prefer to define race in economic or social terms; "Money whitens the skin," as do education and job status. These gradations soften conflict and curb racial polarization.

But the bottom of the socio-economic pyramid is far blacker than the top; and there is pervasive social prejudice against "people of color" ("gente de cor"). With a different history of race relations and patterns of slavery, and lacking the egalitarian traditions of the United States, Brazil is unlikely to undergo a civil-rights struggle like that of blacks in this country. However, increasing industrialization and education are likely to stir new awareness and new demands among have-not blacks and whites alike.
RACE AND SLAVERY IN BRAZIL

by Leslie B. Rout, Jr.

Exactly when the first black slaves were disembarked in Brazil is unknown, but the earliest recorded shipment from Africa to Brazil was made in 1538 by Lopes Bixorda, a slave dealer in the capitania [province] of Bahia, eight years after the Portuguese discovery of Brazil. Finally, in response to a petition of Bahian landlords, King João IV of Portugal decreed in 1549 that each planter could import up to 120 slaves. The mass importation of blacks began from that date, and the flow would continue for 300 years.

Slavery in Brazil stemmed from the early perception by the Portuguese of Africans as useful and comparatively inexpensive labor. The Portuguese became acquainted with the black man during the period of Moorish rule (711-1249 A.D.) in Spain and Portugal. By the mid-sixteenth century, the Portuguese had already become the major suppliers of blacks for colonial Spanish America. Once it appeared that the indigenous Indians could not be effectively utilized in the canefields and sugar mills of Bahia and Pernambuco, it was only natural that a proven workman, the sub-Saharan African, would be thrown into the breech. Gradually, black slaves were utilized in an increasing number of diverse occupations, and their numbers grew correspondingly. By 1819, 66 percent of the total population of the capitania of Maranhão consisted of enslaved blacks and mulattoes; in Goias, the figure was 42.5 percent, in Alagoas, 38.3 percent, São Paulo, 32.6 percent, Bahia, 30.8 percent, and Rio Grande do Sul, 30.6 percent. In sum, by the end of the colonial period, African slavery in Brazil had become a nationwide phenomenon absolutely essential to the economy.

In contrast, black slavery was introduced in Anglo-Saxon
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North America in 1619, and the previous experience of the Jamestown colonists with African peoples had probably been nonexistent. While it is true that black slaves could have been found in virtually all the 13 colonies prior to 1776, nowhere did the number of bondsmen exceed 30 percent of the aggregate population except in South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia, and possibly Maryland. Free whites could be found to perform most forms of manual work; forced labor was a critical necessity only on tobacco, rice, and indigo plantations.

Given these contrasts in epoch and socio-economic development, it was only natural that slavery in colonial Brazil and the United States displayed many fundamental differences. Reputable scholars have long sought to compare the two systems of slavery and, even as they noted the differences, have generalized that slavery in Brazil was more humane than its counterpart in the southern United States. Alas, nothing could be further from the truth.

**Standards and Prices**

If the hapless black came across the Atlantic to Brazil from Portuguese depots in Angola, Moçambique, or Cape Verde, he had usually been baptized and branded to show that the proper excise taxes had been paid. Captives dispatched from Gulf of Guinea stations often had these functions performed only after they had completed the Atlantic passage. In any event, the newly disembarked black man was classified as a peça da Índia (piece of India), or some fraction of that ambiguous standard.

The ideal peça was a male in good health, somewhere between the ages of 15 and 35, standing five feet, six or seven inches tall. Actual conformity to this standard was rare, and so slave shippers had to fashion more adaptable criteria in offering captives to prospective customers. Two males between the
ages of 35 and 45 came to equal one peça, while three youths, 8 to perhaps 15 years old, were the equivalent of two peças. Any number of elderly, sick, or deformed slaves might also equal one peça. Since the female slaves could not perform the heavy mine and field labor desired, they generally sold for less than males.

Nevertheless, the African slave was not only a human tool or beast of burden; he represented at once both labor and capital. The Brazilian colonial economy was geared to the production of raw materials for Portugal. Colonial initiative in creating iron-making, textile, and gold-manufacturing industries was vetoed by the crown, and since there were virtually no banks, the slave often became the unit of value. Hence, Pascoal de Silva Guimares in eighteenth century Minas Gerais might have had many gold coins, but he was rich because he possessed a retinue of 3,000 slaves. The possession of blacks became a hedge against inflation, for the slaves could always be exchanged for some material object.

The newly landed slave was called a bogal, a term implying that he spoke no Portuguese. A captive who either understood Portuguese or displayed a familiarity with Lusitanian customs might be labeled a ladino, and as such was more valuable. Slaves were also categorized according to their supposed place of origin. Those blacks allegedly emanating from Angola, the mouth of the Congo River, or Moçambique were referred to as bantus; these were the slaves most commonly found in Brazil. More highly regarded were those shipped from the Cape Verde–Portuguese Guinea region, while the top quality were healthy captives from Gulf of Guinea ports, commonly referred to as Minas.

Throughout the seventeenth century, the price of slaves rose steadily. With the discovery of gold in Minas Gerais about 1695, slave prices spiraled sharply higher; responding to colonial complaint, the Portuguese government placed a ceiling of 160,000 reis (or $ US 200-250) per peça on newly landed slaves. This effort at price control was a futile gesture: by 1718, peças identified as Minas were selling in Rio de Janeiro for up to 360,000 reis.

The decline of the gold-mining industry after 1770, plus the preference in European markets for sugar from the Caribbean, were crippling blows to the Brazilian economy. The price of slaves in Pernambuco fell as low as 100,000 reis in 1787, but a boom in cotton production and a temporary recovery for Brazilian sugar resulted in partial stabilization around 1800. By 1810
the general price for good quality peças was again climbing upward to 300,000 reis.

**The Variety of Slave Occupations**

Pedro de Magalhães de Gandavo, who visited Brazil during the sixteenth century, proffered the following advice to future Portuguese immigrants:

As soon as persons who intend to live in Brazil become inhabitants of the country, however poor they may be, if each one obtains two pairs of one-half dozen slaves . . . he then has the means for sustenance.

Given the three to five million blacks subsequently imported into the colony, it would appear that the Luso-Brazilians took this counsel to heart. No other area of the New World received more slaves. But Magalhães de Gandavo never could have envisioned the multiplicity of occupations in which Africans would be used. Not only were they field hands, domestics, peddlers, miners, bodyguards, skilled laborers, and objects of sexual gratification, but also soldiers, overseers, and thieves. In Minas Gerais, blind whites had their slaves beg for them; both there and in Bahia, females were rented to brothels. In some cases whites lived off the proceeds gathered from renting their blacks to entrepreneurs, and occasionally slaves owned other slaves, thereby obtaining money while laboring for someone else.

The very diversity of labor performed by slaves had a tremendous impact on the kind of tasks free persons in Brazil regarded as fitting. Like the Spaniard, the Portuguese immigrant to the New World felt that he was a fidalgo, or “son of somebody.” This sentiment made manual labor abhorrent, and as the English writer Robert Southey laconically reported of late eighteenth century Brazil, “never is it seen [that] a white man . . . [will] taken an agrarian instrument in his hands.” This disdain for physical exertion extended to modes of personal travel. Only slaves and free colored walked; persons of any social stature either rode horses or were carried about in sedan chairs or hammocks. In the city of Salvador, horse-drawn carts and carriages did not supplant the sedan chair as the favored means of locomotion until 1850.

At no time prior to 1822 did the Brazilian clergy as a group
question the legitimacy of the African slave trade. That the Roman Catholic church in Portuguese America would have done so was unlikely, since the crowned heads of Portugal exercised the powers of padroado (patronage) over it, and the slave trade was a state-sanctioned industry. Probably most clergymen agreed that slave labor was absolutely vital, and if the Indian were to be saved, then the African had to suffer.

In 1758, Father Manoel Ribeira da Rocha published a tract condemning the Atlantic slave trade as being "against all divine and human law." But Bishop José Joaquim da Cunha de Azevedo of Bahia published in 1809 a sophisticated justification of both slavery and the Atlantic slave trade, and another priest, Junario de Cunha Mattos, became a tiger in defense of these institutions during the early years of Brazil's political independence. Throughout the colonial era individual clerics and religious orders owned slaves, while agricultural lands owned by the Church produced wealth—thanks to the sweat of their human properties.

A Mélange of Beliefs

What the Church did conceive to be its primary mission was the conversion of the African to Catholic Christianity. Yet, provided in many cases with only a smattering of Christian doctrine, millions of blacks simply intermixed Catholic and African religious beliefs. The African deities (orishas) became identified with various Christian saints, and modified in their nature under the influence of fresh waves of slave importations from different sections of sub-Saharan Africa. The emerging mélange of beliefs and practices became known as macumbá in Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco, where bantu bondsmen seem to have been more numerous. In Bahia and other areas where Yoruba influence predominated, the amalgam of rites was called candomblé.

The Luso-Brazilian reaction to candomblé and macumbá varied considerably. Some slave masters permitted the dances and chants which were inevitably a part of the ceremonies, believing that such activities helped make the slave more content with his lot. Others would not allow their slaves to participate, so such services had to be conducted in secret. Particularly in towns, ecclesiastical authorities tried to ensure that the "new Christians" did not relapse into the paganism of their ancestors. Some city councils banned public celebrations (i.e., religious singing, dancing) by all colored persons. It is very
easy to visualize the slave at Mass, the crucifix in one hand and a fetiche in his pocket. He was probably not certain which artifact would provide him with the greatest aid and comfort; and given his subordinate social position, there was no reason to take any chances.

Slavery in the Northeast

The history of colonial Brazil's slave-supported economy is a record of shifts from one export product to another. The most important was cane sugar, which was shipped to Europe from 1546 on. Grown first in what is now São Paulo state, sugar-cane came to be cultivated primarily on the northeastern seaboard. The capitâncias of Pernambuco and Bahia became the chief centers, but Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo, Paraíba, and Rio Grande do Norte were also significant producers. Between 1600 and 1700 some 2,925,000 tons of sugar were exported, but during the last quarter of the seventeenth century West Indian sugar began to replace the Brazilian product in European markets. By 1700, prices had fallen as much as 90 percent, and planters in Bahia and Pernambuco began moving their slaves to the gold fields of western Bahia, Minas Gerais, and Mato Grosso. Prices for Brazilian sugar remained low through the eighteenth century until the disruptive slave rebellion in sugar-rich Saint-Domingue (now the Dominican Republic) suddenly sparked a new demand for the Brazilian product in Europe.

Slaves and Sugar

The problems of profit, production, and work regimen suggest that life on a colonial sugar plantation was less than the idyll that some writers have pictured it to be. In Pernambuco, sugar lords estimated that a labor force of at least 100 slaves was necessary for the effective operation of the plantation; and if a reasonable profit was to accrue, this labor force must annually produce about 1,138 pounds of refined sugar. With refined sugar selling for the equivalent (then) of £ per pound, the larger planters enjoyed high profits and splendidous living. A seventeenth century traveler to Brazil was astounded to find one such senhor de engenho living on his plantation with all the trappings of oriental pomp. He even ate his meals "to the music of an orchestra of 30 comely negro wenches, presided over by a European bandmaster."

In the sugarcane country, certain labor conditions were
standard. During the harvest season, work began before dawn and, except for two meals, continued long after dark. After the cane was harvested and processed, there were boxes and crates to be made, rum or cane brandy to be distilled, and new fields to be planted. Controversy exists as to the adequacy of the slave's diet, but most scholars agree that manioc bread, corn gruel, perhaps a scrap of salted beef, or a few vegetables was the most field hands could expect to get.

The prevailing philosophy of slave utilization in the northeast sugar country did not encourage benevolence. Fresh shiploads of slaves could easily be obtained from Angolan or Gulf of Guinea stations and shipped to Brazil. Hence, the common practice was to work a slave to the limit of his capabilities, and after he had died, fled, or injured himself severely, buy a fresh replacement. During the eighteenth century an increasing number of senhores de engenho took up permanent residence in towns. As a result, the direction of the labor force was in the hands of an overseer, often a mulatto, whose interest in the slaves' welfare was likely to be slight.

More fortunate were the bondsmen living in towns like Salvador, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, or Porto Seguro. Here one would find slave porters and stevedores, assorted domestics, prostitutes, and some skilled craftsmen. There were also numerous males and females employed as day-laborers, whose major obligation was to supply their owners with an agreed-upon sum of money. Possessed of some freedom of movement and a choice of jobs unavailable in rural areas, the urban slave was undoubtedly better off than his plantation counterpart. Furthermore, those involved in the money economy (shoemakers, barbers, etc.) had much better prospects for purchasing their liberty than cane cutters or mill hands.

One may conclude that although the field hands (the largest body of captives) were indeed the “hands and feet of the Senhores de Engenho,” individually they meant as much to the latter as a pair of boots, a horse, or a yoke of oxen.

**Slavery in Minas Gerais**

Major gold strikes were made in the contemporary states of Minas Gerais (1695), Goias (1715, 1730, 1734), Mato Grosso (1718–19), and western Bahia (1719–20). Production was done almost entirely by manual labor, and after 1770 it declined rapidly: between 1691 and 1820, roughly 926,100 kilograms (1,019 U.S. tons) of gold were reportedly obtained.
When news of the first gold strike in 1695 reached Portugal, thousands of peasants and ne'er-do-wells departed the homeland and joined Brazilian vagrants, plantation owners, and frontiersmen in the mining camps of Minas Gerais. But “the work of the mines was the work of Negroes,” and to them went the actual task of digging. Slaves possessed of stamina were especially sought after, and in this regard, captives from the Gulf of Guinea were much preferred to either bantus or Indians. Between 1728 and 1748, at least 99,000 blacks were shipped to Salvador from the Guinea Coast and then overland, or by sea (via Rio de Janeiro) to the gold fields. During the eighteenth century over half a million slaves were shipped into the mineral-producing zones of the Brazilian interior.

Digging for gold was a curse for the slave. Those involved in placer mining worked constantly in water, often entirely nude, exposed to the sun, rain, and cold. Those in underground galleries had to contend with changes in temperature, the release of gases, frequent accidents, and various forms of respiratory ailments. The toll in the lives of bondsmen is said to have reached 7,000 annually, a figure which does not seem extreme in the light of observations made by several authors:

In the space of a year, 100 slaves died [in a gold mine in Goias], something which never happened to the [slaves of] plantation landlords. . . . The high death rate of African males in the gold mines was reflected in the new introduction of slaves which was continually being made. . . . The mines, insatiable . . . absorbed all the human mass brought in by the traffic.

Paradoxically, in the absence of a large number of white women, female captives of color here enjoyed unaccustomed opportunities for social and financial advancement. In Brazil the keeping of Negroid mistresses was a common practice; in the gold fields, Luso-Brazilians believed that sleeping with a Mina woman brought good luck. Indeed, some priests preached that a Luso-Brazilian committed no sin if he kept slave concubines, and one priest who argued otherwise was run out of town. A royal alvará (decree) of 1704 forbade female slaves to wear silk, gold jewelry, or facial makeup, but in Minas Gerais, this decree became still another that was generally honored with noncompliance. The gold rush in eighteenth century Minas Gerais resulted in the death of thousands of male slaves, but
for a while the mulata was queen, and a few mulatas were able to parlay their physical attractions into freedom and wealth.

The second greatest source of mineral wealth obtained during the eighteenth century was precious stones. Lisbon first sold the diamond monopoly in 1740, and to prevent the smuggling of precious stones out of the diamond district around Tijuco allowed the purchaser to bring in only 600 registered slaves. In the diamond diggings there was supposed to be one overseer for every eight slaves, but no really effective means was discovered to eliminate theft. One diabolical security measure was to force a slave suspected of having swallowed diamonds to engulf large doses of Malaga black pepper, a substance having an awesome purgative effect.

**Slavery in Northern and Southern Brazil**

In the capitania of Grão Pará-Maranhão, Indians constituted the bulk of the servile labor force; thus there were continuing clashes between the Jesuits, who sought to protect the indigenous Indians, and the Luso-Brazilian settlers, who wanted them as laborers. Both the Jesuits and the settlers would have preferred to have had African bondsmen, but sugarcane did not prosper in the region, and neither gold nor precious stones were to be found in the rivers and streams. Under these conditions, Grão Pará-Maranhão whites had little money to buy Africans, and many of those they did obtain were infirm or rebellious souls who could not be sold elsewhere.

The situation did not begin to change significantly until the Companhia Geral do Grão Pará e Maranhão began making regular slave deliveries in 1755. There had been perhaps 12,000 to 13,000 African slaves landed at Belém (Grão Pará) between 1692 and 1750; by 1782 an additional 30,000 had been disembarked. A few of these saw service as stockmen, cowboys, and domestics, but after 1750 most of them became field hands in the growing coffee and cacao plantations. Here, as elsewhere, slaveholders exhibited an ambivalent attitude toward the health of their properties. In 1792, for example, the idea of vaccinating slaves was rejected because officials in Belém insisted that Negroid skin was too thick to penetrate!

Further south in Maranhão, the Companhia Geral do Grão Pará e Maranhão was also responsible for economic development, but in this case the produce was not coffee but cotton. By 1818, exports from São Luís reached $4 million annually, and between 1757 and 1823 at least 42,000 Africans arrived in order to
cultivate the product that made Dixie famous. This sudden prosperity was not without a price; during the eighteenth century Maranhão became known as the place where slaves were most harshly treated. Available information suggests that Sundays were generally days of work. Domestics and favored concubines may have been able to extract extra privileges, "but the greater part [were] treated as slaves, that is, with little to eat and much work." By 1819, 66 percent of Maranhão's population consisted of Negroid slaves, a situation which doubtless heightened white fears and hence contributed to the territory's reputation among blacks as a species of hell on earth.

In the extreme south was the capitania of Rio Grande do Sul, a region long considered too cold for Africans. After 1700, a popular practice among slave owners in Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro was to banish rebellious slaves to Rio Grande, which became known as a land of "vile masters and vile slaves." As in Maranhão, economic growth did not commence until late in the eighteenth century. Cattle raising had steadily gained in importance, with Indian or mixed-blood cowboys tending the expanding herds. According to the 1775 census, there were 20,000 inhabitants (not counting hostile Indians), a fourth of whom were black and mulatto slaves working chiefly as domestics and stockmen. After 1780, however, the meat-packing industry in the towns of Porto Alegre and Pelotas began growing rapidly, and in two decades Rio Grande became the chief source of salted beef for Brazilian tables. This growth necessitated a rapid augmentation of the number of slaves. By 1814 the capitania's inhabitants numbered perhaps 70,655 souls of whom 30.1 percent were slaves, and 90 percent of these were committed to permanent service in the charqueadas, or meat-packing plants.

Slavery in Rio Grande do Sul was unique in that the mass of the unfree labor force was urban and industrial. The charqueada bondsmen worked a minimum of 12 hours a day, beginning about midnight and ending at noon. The critical factor in the system's harshness was that charqueada slaves worked all year round, there being no rainy or slack season that would significantly vary the rhythm of work. Perhaps the worst torture of all was that with slave costs high, the emancipation of charqueada workers was relatively uncommon.

According to Caio Prado Júnior, the small number of African slaves originally in Maranhão and Rio Grande do Sul, plus the sudden and rapid influx of a predominantly male slave population, prevented the creation of a mulatto contingent such
as existed in northeastern Brazil. In both places, the Brazilian scholar argues, "the blacks were blacker, the whites whiter," and hence a harsher form of slavery developed. A more plausible explanation is that the affluent white elements in Maranhão and Rio Grande do Sul were conscious of the opulence which had characterized the earlier booms in gold, diamonds, and sugar elsewhere. Increasing demand for meat and cotton signaled the arrival of their opportunity to cash in. To insure their owners' prosperity, the captive laborers had to toil harder and faster. It is little wonder, then, that African slaves wanted no part of Maranhão or Rio Grande do Sul.

**Slavery Resistance and Rebellion**

Naturally, a great number of blacks rebelled against their masters, and intimidating punishments were deemed necessary. A few defiant souls were actually thrown alive into burning furnaces, and the novena (nine days of whippings), the thumb screw, the iron collar, the stocks, and metal weights were commonly employed. What some owners discovered, however, was that mental cruelty could produce a kind of servility that physical brutality alone might not. One Bahian planter who could not prevent his slaves from committing suicide finally solved the problem by digging up the bodies of several of those who had killed themselves, and hacking off their limbs. Thereupon he informed the assembled captives that if they chose to end their lives he would also mutilate them, and thus when they were reborn, they would come back minus an arm, hand, or leg.

Slaves, resisting, usually resorted to suicide or, more often, flight. Apprehending fugitives was a serious problem in colonial Brazil. The chief security agent, the capitão-do-mato (bush captain), sold his services to a group of slaveholders and received a bounty for each slave recaptured. The capitão-do-mato was generally a free black or mulatto—who but a colored person would make the best catcher of another black or mulatto? Furthermore, slave-catching put freed Negroids to work and enlisted them in the system. The capitães were known for their relentlessness and cruelty.

A few escaped slaves took up residence in urban areas, where they tried to pass as free persons. Most, however, sought to reach remote settlements of fugitive slaves, or quilombos. Easily the most famous and largest of these was Palmares, situated in the present state of Alagoas and established per-
haps as early as 1612. Beginning in 1630, Palmares withstood at least 20 major attacks or sieges by the Dutch, the Portuguese, and Brazilian settlers before succumbing in 1695. At its height, Palmares encompassed some 10 subdivisions, and 20,000–30,000 persons lived within its confines. It would remain the largest independent settlement of blacks in the New World until Haitian sovereignty was recognized in 1804.

Other than Palmares, the largest quilombos were established in the mountains and wooded areas near several of the larger towns in Minas Gerais. An estimated 20,000 ex-captives were said to have inhabited these settlements, and they were considered “a plague scattered about the remote areas and without remedy.” Fugitives sallying from these hideouts kidnapped and killed whites and made the roads unsafe. When Lisbon finally agreed to finance a major campaign, Bartolomeu Bueno do Pardo attacked and destroyed a “quasi-kingdom of fugitive negroes” (1757), reportedly returning with 3,900 pairs of ears as proof. Subsequent attacks temporarily removed the quilombo menace to white rule in Minas Gerais.

For some slaves, however, the solution was planned rebellion. In both 1719 and 1724 slaves in Vila Rica de Ouro Preto, capital of Minas Gerais, plotted a giant insurrection, but these schemes collapsed because Angolan and Guinea Coast blacks could not agree as to which group would have supreme power after white rule was overthrown. Another conspiracy, formed by slaves in the town of São João del Rei (Minas Gerais) and fugitives from a nearby quilombo, called for a surprise attack during church services on Maundy Thursday (April 15), 1756. The execution of both whites and mulattoes was intended, but the conspiracy was discovered and crushed. Several rebellions were also attempted in Maranhão, but the best known was an Afro-Indian revolt which took place in the town of São Thomé in 1773. The rebels were annihilated.

The sugar-growing northeast also was the scene of serious challenges to white authority. In 1807, 1809, 1813, and 1816, Muslim-led slaves made determined efforts to seize local political control. The 1807 plot was scotched by informers, but both the 1809 and the 1813 uprisings resulted in the deaths of white planters and overseers, as pitched battles swirled around the city of Salvador. The 1816 affair began on seven plantations in the sugar-rich Recôncavo district, and reached “frightening proportions” before it was quelled, with hundreds of suspects and prisoners later executed, flogged, or deported to penal colonies in Africa.
The evidence of slave resistance to Luso-Brazilian hegemony should not be construed as proof that all African captives hated their masters or planned to kill them. Some slaves were simply overawed and submitted meekly, while others chose to drown their discontent in alcohol or the mysticism and frenzy of macumba or candomblé. The lesson is that during the colonial period, a significant number of bondsmen (usually African-born) refused to reconcile themselves to white rule. Their continuing flights, conspiracies, and attacks did not effect a breakdown of the slave system, but it meant that the authorities could not afford to relax.

**Emancipation for Individuals**

The only significant organizations of colored people that worked to effect the release of slaves were the black and mulatto lay brotherhoods, or irmãndades, the first of which was founded about 1639. These were religious organizations created to strengthen the spirit of Christianity among persons of African origin, and were divided along racial and even tribal lines. Many irmãndades assessed their membership an annual sum specifically for the emancipation of members or for the liberation of other deserving bondsmen.

While the work of the irmãndades stood as the best example of cooperation among Negroid peoples in colonial Brazil, most manumissions were accomplished by self-purchase or through owner benefaction. In the first case, the master and the bondsman agreed upon a price for the latter’s freedom, and when this sum was paid the bondsman was awarded a carta de alforria (letter of liberation). Most manumissions were gratuitous awards. Trusted retainers, slave concubines, and illegitimate mulatto offspring could often expect liberation in a will, or on a church holiday or a birthday, and a few even received small bequests of land or money.

But Brazilian manumissive customs also had their dark side. Many cartas de alforria were given to the sick, the aged, and the crippled, and for these persons release from bondage was a death sentence. If a freedman demonstrated disrespect for his ex-owner, he could be reenslaved. Another common practice was conditional release. For example, a slave would be freed in his master’s will, but with the provision that he continue serving the master’s heirs for life, or for a specified number of years. Under these strictures, the bondsman was only semi-free; his descendants gained the final step to emancipation.
Many of those released had neither skills nor resources, and were bound to be ravaged by the new realities they had to face. For example, except for barbers and midwives, many slaves with skills found that they could not meet the standards of proficiency required for admittance to craft guilds. Socially, the emancipated found themselves in a state of limbo, for many whites did not recognize the colored person's change in status.

The Status of Free Negroes

When the situation of freed persons of color in colonial Brazil is discussed, the question of which persons were freed takes on special relevance. Most capitâncias did not, unfortunately, separate blacks and mulattoes in their censuses, so our information is limited, but the tremendous disproportion between the numbers of free blacks and free mulattoes requires some explanation. As I noted, white fathers often emancipated their bastard mulatto offspring. Furthermore, any mixed-blood was more likely to be Brazilian-born and acquainted with Luso-Brazilian linguistic and cultural predilections. Thus when opportunities for freedom presented themselves, the mulatto was most likely to be able to exploit them. One scholar has pointed out that among Luso-Brazilians, allowing light-complexioned slaves to perform the same heavy labor as blacks was considered disgraceful, while another has stressed the notion that "a light mulatto . . . even as a slave was more likely to receive acceptance from the white community than a free black man."

Overall, the mass of emancipated mixed-bloods and blacks possessed neither money nor powerful patrons. So society allotted to them the proletarian tasks which no one else desired. By working hard at these occupations and obeying the laws, the optimum most people of color (except for certain paramours) could expect to achieve in their lifetime was the ownership of a few slaves or a small shop. But these goals could not be gained without a good deal of physical exertion, and in colonial Brazil manual labor was performed only by blacks and slaves. Rather than "disgrace" themselves in this regard, an unusual number of freed mulattoes preferred to be vagrants. For many free persons of various skin hues, banditry, diamond smuggling, or other criminal activities were preferable; they offered the prospect of both greater financial gain and avoidance of taxes and militia service.

Legal bars and court decisions were notoriously color-oriented. In Brazil, the ticket to clerical, civil, or administrative
appointments was proof of “cleanliness of blood” (*limpeza de sangue*), and since all persons of African origin were slaves or descendants of slaves, they were inherently “unclean.”

The regionally promulgated ordinances most clearly revealed the obsession of the ruling whites with preventing Negroid social ascension. In 1719, the Count of Assumar, chief official in São Paulo and Minas Gerais, prohibited all blacks and mulattoes from owning either slaves or stores. In 1734, the governor of Rio Grande do Norte implored João V to ban mulattoes from holding any office or entering militia service. Nevertheless, it was Dom Luís de Almeida Lavradio, Viceroy of Brazil (1769–77), who approached the ultimate in upholding the principle of white supremacy. He refused to allow mulatto militia officers to approach him to pay their respects, and on the word of some Indians he relieved of command a capitão-mor (captain) who was suspected of being a mulatto. Possibly his most extreme act was his deposition of an Indian chief in 1771 for marrying a black woman. In ordering the red man’s removal, Almeida Lavradio declared that the marriage was proof of the chief’s mental derangement.

**Black vs. White vs. Brown**

Probably the most famous nonwhites to reach positions of status in colonial Brazil were Antônio Vieira, a Jesuit priest and court advisor; João Fernandes Vieira, a governor in both Paraíba and Angola; and Henrique Dias, a black soldier who was knighted in 1652. Unquestionably of critical importance was the fact that Fernandes Vieira and Dias were the most heroic figures to emerge from the 1645–54 “War of Divine Liberation” against the Dutch in Pernambuco. Both Vieiras were European-born; in any case, no other known mulatto became governor in Brazil, and Dias was the only Brazilian black ever to be knighted. The other acknowledged nonwhites to receive civil appointments were a small group of blacks and mulattoes, chiefly in Minas Gerais, who were granted minor posts primarily because no white man would perform the chores which the jobs entailed. But too many royal dispensations would ultimately have undermined the principle of white supremacy, and such a development was unthinkable.

Acceptable pigmentation plus wealth and influence were necessary for persons who hoped to obtain the *limpeza-de-sangue* document. But how dark one could be and still “pass” varied from region to region.
An incident reported by the Englishman Henry Koster and the French artist Jean Rugendas is the following:

In conversing on one occasion with a man of color who was in my service, I asked if a certain capitão-mor was not a mulatto man; he answered, "He was, but he is not now." I begged him to explain, when he added: "Can a capitão-mor be a mulatto man?"

This exchange has been cited as proof that unusual opportunities for social ascent existed for mulattoes in colonial Brazil. In fact, these mixed-bloods were consistently held up for ridicule and derision by the Europeans. All the mulatto could do in retaliation was to vent his rage and frustration on those darker than himself. Perhaps Koster and Rugendas should have asked themselves instead: Did Luso-Brazilians consider the capitão-mor in question to be white?

There were, however, a few mulattoes who realized that spurning the black man and accepting white domination was not likely to allow many of them to penetrate the upper echelons of Brazilian society. In 1798, a group of mulatto tailors, engravers, and militiamen in Salvador plotted to overthrow Portuguese rule and ostensibly to create a republic in which there would be equality of opportunity for all races. Nevertheless, as Lucas Dantas, one of the ringleaders, constantly emphasized, the primary goal was the abolition of distinctions between whites and mulattoes, rather than broad legal and social equity. Thus, as any cynic could have predicted, the only black invited to participate not only refused, but betrayed the uprising.

**Brazil Today**

Colonial Brazil became the independent Brazilian Empire in 1822. Slavery ended in 1888. In 1889, the nation became a republic. Yet, in 1976, Brazil remains a place where the mulatto still strives to separate himself socially from the black, while the white man holds them both to be inferior.

Then as now, a mulatto with straight hair, money, and a fair complexion will marry a white woman, even one with less education and lower social status. For the attractive mixed-blood female, a white lover is generally better than a black husband. As Donald Pierson noted in *Negroes in Brazil*, the fruit of such a liaison might be illegitimate, but it would have
a lighter skin. Thus, the mother could claim that she was “cleansing (i.e., whitening) her race.” Brazilian thinkers like Nina Raimundo Rodrigues and Manuel de Oliveira Lima and several North American authors have hailed this practice, bestowing upon it the vague but appealing name: branqueamento (the whitening process).

In Brazil, it has been the haphazard acceptance of the mulatto that has been the most conspicuous aspect of racial relations since the days of slavery. But the growth of industrialization and the increasing urbanization have had fundamental impact. Afro-Brazilians represent roughly 40 percent of the total population. Some of them are beginning to free themselves from the psychological slavery implicit in the silent acceptance of white supremacy. One observes a more aggressive spirit among blacks and browns in the industrial cities of the south and southeast. Afro-Brazilian university students may not say “Black is Beautiful,” but they no longer look in the mirror and curse their kinky hair. Slowly, the Brazilian racial outlook is changing. But how the Afro-Brazilians, 330 years after their ancestors were first transported to the New World, will proceed to work out their future, no one can say.
Brazil. Many North Americans think of the Amazon, Carnaval in Rio, Brazil's highrise architecture, the samba, dictators, coffee. Although the number of books in English on Brazilian subjects has grown rapidly, filling 62 pages of the Hispanic American Historical Review in a recent two-part series by Thomas E. Skidmore on the historiography of Brazil, U.S. readers still do not have much general knowledge of the world's fifth largest nation.

A good reading list starts with broad histories and cultural surveys, followed by books on politics, race, regions, the military, and selections from Brazil's own vivid literature.

But, first, back to coffee. Its importance in Brazilian history, shaping both rural society and economic growth, cannot be overstated. No work in English matches Affonso de Escragnolle Taunay's 15-volume HISTORIA DO CAFE NO BRASIL. Taunay's work is described in LATIN AMERICA: A Guide to the Historical Literature edited by Charles C. Griffin (Univ. of Tex., 1971) as "vast, indispensable, poorly organized, and unindexed"; understandably, the 15 tomes have yet to be translated from Portuguese.

There is, however, among books available in English, E. Bradford Burns's A HISTORY OF BRAZIL (Columbia, 1971, cloth & paper) to take the reader in one volume through the full sweep of events from Portuguese discovery in 1500 to the 1960s. This narrative of exploration, war, slavery, the coffee trade, industrial development, and often brutal politics can be paired with Charles Wagley's AN INTRODUCTION TO BRAZIL (Columbia, 1963, 1970, cloth & paper).

Wagley, a noted cultural anthropologist and a pioneer among American scholars of Brazil, analyzes rural and urban society in terms of race, class, region, religion, the arts. In the latest edition's final chapter, "If I Were a Brazilian," Wagley views uncontrolled urban growth and runaway inflation and concludes: "I would be confused. Before my eyes would be the great Brazilian dilemma posed by a Brazilian proverb—'Brazil is rich but Brazilians are poor.'"

Riches there have always been, as the classic COLONIAL BACKGROUND OF MODERN BRAZIL by Caio Prado, Júnior (Univ. of Calif., 1967, cloth & paper) makes plain. THE GOLDEN AGE OF BRAZIL, 1695-1750 is Charles Boxer's vivid account of the gold and diamond boom—55 years of hunting and digging treasure (Univ. of Calif., 1962).

Political upheaval has also been chronic in Brazil. Probably the best narrative in English covering the period from the first unsuccessful attempt to establish a republic in 1788-92 to the military overthrow of President João Goulart is A HISTORY OF MODERN BRAZIL, 1889-1964 by José Maria Bello, published in Portuguese in 1940 and later translated and revised for publication by Stanford (1966). The English edition has good maps and a helpful chronology. More recent books covering briefer periods are Thomas E. Skidmore's POLITICS IN BRAZIL, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy (Oxford, 1969, cloth, 1967, paper); Alfred C. Stepan's THE MILITARY IN POLITICS: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, 1971); and a collection of articles on the present-day situation...
BACKGROUND BOOKS: BRAZIL

edited by Stepan entitled AUTHORITY.

The Skidmore study opens with the 1930 coup d'état that ended the “old Republic” (proclaimed at the overthrow of the monarchy in 1889) and closes with the revolt that ended the 1946 Republic. Stepan's own book treats the military as a political institution and analyzes the military role in the turbulent period before 1964. The essays in the volume edited by Stepan deal largely with the subsequent military regimes.

Another collection of essays, BRAZIL IN THE SIXTIES, edited by Riordan Roett (Vanderbilt, 1972) covers the political setting (including Brazilian-American relations), the general economy and, more specifically, agricultural policy (the statistics inevitably suffer from obsolescence), change in such areas as education, the middle class, and the Church, and social protest in the novel and the theater.

BRAZIL AND THE GREAT POWERS, 1930-39; The Politics of Trade Rivalry by Stanley E. Hilton (Univ. of Tex., 1975) treats the special case of U.S.-German rivalry for Brazilian support in the period prior to World War II. Hilton rebuts Marxist historians who interpret Franklin D. Roosevelt's “Good Neighbor policy” as beneficial primarily to U.S. business; he shows that the Brazilians, far from being duped, often outsmarted the Americans as President Vargas played his cards well against both FDR and Adolf Hitler.

BRAZILIAN CULTURE: An Introduction to the Study of Culture in Brazil by Fernando de Azevedo, published originally in Portuguese in 1950 and translated into English by W. Rex Crawford (Macmillan, 1950; Hafner, 1971, facsimile ed.), looks at the social structure of Brazil from the early days to the end of World War II from an anthropologist’s viewpoint.

Azevedo’s findings are extended in several more specialized studies that cover race, the plantation system, the distinctive regions, the peasantry, and the coming of industrial civilization.

Among these, a short book by Marvin Harris, PATTERNS OF RACE IN THE AMERICAS, summarizes anthropologists' studies of racial relationships in Brazil compared to those in several other Latin American nations and the United States (Walker, 1964, cloth; Norton, 1974, paper). A more recent title, NEITHER BLACK NOR WHITE: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States by Carl Degler (Macmillan, 1971) covers this ground in greater detail. A third book, hard going for the nonspecialist but perhaps the most thorough of the three is Fernandes Florestan’s THE NEGRO IN BRAZILIAN SOCIETY (Univ. of Calif., 1969, cloth; Atheneum, 1971, paper).

Warren Dean’s RIO CLARO: A Brazilian Plantation System, 1820-1920 (Stanford, 1976) traces the growth of plantation society in a county in southern Brazil that was for a century one of the centers of coffee production. Dean is principally interested in the black slave labor force, which was finally replaced by Swiss, German, and Italian immigrants after the (violent) abolition of slavery in the 1880s.

RIO GRANDE DO SUL AND BRAZILIAN REGIONALISM, 1822-1930 by Joseph LeRoy Love (Stanford, 1971) is a detailed analysis of the politics of the cattle-raising state in Brazil’s far South that has long been the cradle of politicians and leaders; it was from Rio Grande do Sul’s estancias that Getúlio Vargas rode with several “provisional corps” of gaiás to power in 1930.

Richard M. Morse’s FROM COMMUNITY TO METROPOLIS: A Biography of São Paulo (Univ. of Fla., 1958;
Octagon, 1971) is the first significant attempt at Brazilian urban history. It explains the dynamism of the city southwest of Rio de Janeiro whose population grew from less than half a million people in 1940 to nearly 6 million in 1970.

Familiar to most students of Latin America is T. Lynn Smith's BRAZIL: People and Institutions, first published in 1946 and now in its fourth edition (La. State Univ., 1972), a comprehensive, readable text on the sociology of the country. Smith's recent BRAZILIAN SOCIETY (Univ. of N. M., 1975) focuses more narrowly on the sociology of development, with emphasis on migration to the cities from the countryside after 1940. His migrants are former members of the hard-pressed farmer class described in Shepard Forman's THE BRAZILIAN PEASANTRY (Columbia, 1975), a study that includes information on marketing, land ownership, and the culture, politics, and policies that combine to keep the peasant, like his urban brother in the teeming favelas of Rio and São Paulo, in grinding poverty.

The facts of history, of politics, of social structure and modernization, and the analyses built upon these facts by scholars, helpful as they are, do not explain everything. But Brazil has a powerful literature, fortunately increasingly available in fine translations, that provides a sense of the life and character of Brazilians.

MODERN BRAZILIAN SHORT STORIES, translated and introduced by William L. Grossman (Univ. of Calif., 1967), includes one by João Guimarães Rosa, a diplomat, poet, and novelist (THE DEVIL TO PAY IN THE BACKLANDS) whom many Brazilians consider their most important contemporary writer. This tale of a luckless, mysterious fisherman and his family on the Amazon, "The Third Bank of the River," conveys in a few pages the ironic tone of much Brazilian prose.

Elizabeth Bishop, a prize-winning American poet, who has lived long in rural Brazil, has compiled AN ANTHOLOGY OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRAZILIAN POETRY (Wesleyan, 1972), in English translations by W. S. Merwin, Richard Wilbur, James Wright, and others, including Miss Bishop herself. She and her coeditor Emanuel Brasil observe:

"Poets and poetry are highly thought of in Brazil. Among men, the name of poet is sometimes used as a compliment or term of affection, even if the person referred to is a businessman or politician, not a poet at all. One of the most famous twentieth-century Brazilian poets, Manuel Bandeira, was presented with a permanent parking space in front of his apartment house in Rio de Janeiro, with an enamelled sign POETA—although he never owned a car and didn't know how to drive."

EDITOR'S NOTE. Leslie B. Rout, Jr. (see page 74), Joan R. Dassin, assistant professor of English at Amherst College, and Riordan Roett, director of Latin American Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of International Studies, recommended these selections.

The Wilson Quarterly/Autumn 1976
The American Revolution

The nation's bicentenary has spurred a number of leading scholars to take another look at the American Revolution. Some have uncovered new data on social and economic life in colonial America. Others have sought anew to explain the Revolution's causes and effects, its leaders' strengths and weaknesses. Here, Sociologist Robert Nisbet discusses the Revolution's social impact; in a second essay, Historian Merrill Peterson analyzes the contrasting roles of the Revolution's principal thinkers, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, two political allies who became ideological foes, and then, in old age, were reconciled.

THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE REVOLUTION
by Robert Nisbet

Was there in fact an American Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century? By this, I mean a revolution involving sudden, decisive, and irreversible changes in social institutions, groups, and traditions, in addition to the war of liberation from England that we are more likely to celebrate.

Clearly, this is a question that generates much controversy. There are scholars whose answer to the question is strongly negative. Indeed, ever since Edmund Burke's time there have been students to declare that revolution in any precise sense of the word did not take place—that in substance the American Revolution was no more than a group of Englishmen fighting on distant shores for traditionally English political

rights against a government that had sought to exploit and tyrannize. According to this argument, it was a war of restitution and liberation, not revolution; the outcome, one set of political governors replacing another. This view is widespread in our time and is found as often among ideological conservatives as among liberals and radicals.

At the opposite extreme is the view that a full-blown revolution did indeed take place. This is clearly what John Adams believed: "The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people; a change in their religious sentiments, of their duties and obligations. . . . This radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments, and affectations of the people, was the real American Revolution." And Samuel Adams, more radical in ideology and hence more demanding in defining revolution, asked rhetorically, "Was there ever a revolution brought about, especially one so important as this, without great internal tumults and violent convulsions?"

If there was a genuine revolution in America, we shall find it not in the sphere of ideological tracts—which history demonstrates may or may not yield actual revolution—but rather in the social sphere.

Whether we follow Tocqueville and Taine in seeing centralization and collectivization of political power as the principal consequence of revolution, or more radical historians in seeing individual liberty and welfare as the chief consequence, it is invariably the impact on the intermediate social sphere—on the ties to land, kindred, class, estate, and servitude of one kind or another—that is at the heart of the matter.

Consider the French Revolution. Scholars may differ among themselves as to whether, in the final analysis, it was the individual with his rights and liberties or the political state with its

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* Hippolyte Adolphe Taine (1828-93), French philosopher and historian.
† That is, intermediate between individual and state.
centralized power and national solidarity that had the greater triumph. But what is unmistakably clear is that the whole complex of social authorities, allegiances, and functions, so largely the heritage of the medieval period, was vitally changed during the French Revolution. The real essence of this revolution was not its Reign of Terror, formidable as that was, but the legislation enacted by successive French revolutionary governments—legislation that profoundly affected the nobility, the traditional family, the corporate nature of property, the laws of primogeniture and entail, the place of religion in society, the guilds, and other groups.

Such changes in intermediate society can be seen vividly in other modern revolutions—in some degree in the Puritan Revolution of seventeenth century England, in far greater degree in the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, and in our own time in some of the new nations in the non-Western world.

Now, it is worth stressing that the social sphere is commonly "feudal" in nature when we find it being assaulted by the hammer blows of revolution. Feudalism invites revolution because it virtually consecrates inequality—the prime cause of revolution everywhere. It succumbs rather easily because of its seeming inability to command wide loyalties and because it is unable, by its nature, to mobilize the necessary military power quickly and effectively. Feudalism’s characteristic diffusion and decentralization of power results in an inability to draw upon a central power in crises. Marxists have told us much about how capitalism and its associated political structures are subject to revolution. But, in truth, all the revolutions of modern history have been launched against systems more nearly feudal than capitalist. It may well be that the overriding effect of modernization in both its economic and political manifestations is to sterilize the revolutionary impulse.

Feudalism in America

In light of these observations, let us now consider the American Revolution. Was there in the colonies a social order that can reasonably be called feudal?

Can conflicts originating in inequality, in social class, property, and religion be discerned in America in whatever degree, analogous to the conflicts leading up to the English, French, and Russian revolutions?

Finally, can substantial changes, effected politically, within revolutionary circumstances, be found taking place in the social
structure of America during the two decades following the out-
break of war with England?

The answer to these questions is yes.

An American "feudal stage" has often been denied or
effaced by historians in their stress on the homogeneous
middle-class character of American colonial history. But there
was indeed a solid substructure of feudalism in the American
colonies.

Feudalism has less to do with knights, castles, and duke-
doms than with the "ties of dependence" uniting individuals of
all classes into a society. I am inclined to think that a feu-
dal system necessarily emerges whenever a relatively small number
of persons seek to live in a new territory with great expanses
of land to be had by the well-off or energetic, where ties with a
central authority are weak or absent, where localism is en-
forced by topography as well as custom, and where landed
property tends to create the fundamental rights and privileges
in society. Certainly by the mid-1700s the American colonies
met these feudal criteria, no matter how loath we may be to
apply them to the Pilgrims and others of established historical
fancy, who we are prone to believe left all European history
behind when they came to the New World.

A Land-based Class System

In the colonies, land counted for a very great deal. And
where a social system is rooted in the land, land-hunger is the
common and abiding accompaniment—a hunger that directs
itself particularly to large manorial estates.

Nearly three million acres in New York alone were oc-
cupied by large, essentially manorial, estates. The Van Rens-
selaer manor on the Hudson measured some 24 by 20 miles.
The Fairfax estate in Virginia had, at the height of its prosper-
ity, some six million acres. There were very large estates in the
Carolinas, and in most of the other colonies as well—New Eng-
land alone forming the exception. How could there not have
been a substantial admixture of feudalism where such land
holdings existed, assuming, as we have every right to assume,
the survival of customs, conventions, and authorities brought
to the New World from the Old?

From these great manorial holdings in America sprang a
class system that was a vivid, if today often minimized, feature
of colonial life. Feudal in essence, it had the large landowners
at the top. As Richard Morris has pointed out, families such as
the Livingstons, De Lanceys, and Schuylers had a place in the social hierarchy and in politics not a bit different from that enjoyed in England at the time by such members of the nobility as the Duke of Bedford, the Marquess of Rockingham, and Lord Shelburne. Below the landed class fell tenant farmers, artisans, mechanics, small freeholders, laborers, indentured servants, and the very large class of Negro slaves.

There was little rhetoric in colonial times about homogeneity and equality when it came to classes as distinct in their powers and privileges as some of these were. Indeed, Jackson Turner Main has concluded, in his *The Social Structure of Revolutionary America*, that the long-term tendency was "toward greater inequality, with marked class distinctions." Class lines were discernible in the cities as well. A great deal of the inbreeding and the close social and political solidarity found in eighteenth century England existed, and was surely increasing in intensity, in pre-revolutionary America.

An established religion—a "state church"—is another aspect of life that is feudal in root and connotation. In most of the colonies, religious establishment existed in one degree or other. Congregationalism reigned in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecticut, and the Church of England in a number of other colonies. Yet in none, so far as I can ascertain, did a majority of the people actually profess the established faith.

Is it difficult to suppose widespread resentment on the part of the majority at the thought of paying taxes to support a church to which they did not belong and may even have detested? Even where taxes were light and only randomly collected, the symbolic aspect was important. Presbyterians, Lutherans, Baptists, and Methodists in Virginia were bound to have resented paying taxes in support of the Church of England and a clergy notoriously given to sloth and drink.

**Laws of Inheritance**

Where feudalism exists in any degree, so do the customs of primogeniture and entail, the first granting the inheritance of fixed property only to the oldest son, the second fixing land firmly to family line. These customs existed throughout Europe and were also familiar to the colonists. When the Revolution broke out, only two colonies had abolished primogeniture, only one had abolished entail.

Some historians of the American Revolution belittle the effect in the colonies of the laws of primogeniture and entail
and of religious establishment because contemporary research into the records of that time finds evidence of only infrequent legal recourse or attempted recourse. But the comparative study of social movements makes plain enough that there is little correlation between the symbolic importance attached to issues and their measurable incidence. Think only of abortion and busing in our own day!

The same can be said of the significance attributed to the economic prosperity experienced in the colonies for decades before the war with England. Given this prosperity, it is sometimes argued, social tensions could not have been severe. Again, however, we learn from the study of revolutions that there is nothing so calculated to focus attention upon social resentments and raise popular expectations and demands as a period of relative economic prosperity.

An Inevitable Revolution?

Would there have been a social revolution in America—bringing changes to such institutions as property, family, religion, and social class—if the war with England had not broken out? Would internal social tensions themselves have led to revolution?

My own guess, and it can only be that, is that no such revolution would have occurred without a precipitating war in which ideological values were strong.

Quite probably the social changes we see in the American Revolution would have occurred, albeit more slowly, under the spur of rising pressures during the next century. In fact, this did happen in Canada. But who can be sure in these matters?

If war was the necessary precipitating factor in the American social revolution, let it be remembered that war has accompanied each of the other major Western revolutions of modern times. The link between war and revolution is both existentially and historically close, especially when war is either intense or prolonged. Both destroy traditional authorities, classes, and types of wealth; both create new kinds of power, rank, and wealth. With much reason, conservatives have been as suspicious of war as of revolution. It was, after all, in the wake of war that revolutionary changes occurred in ancient Athens at the end of the fifth century B.C., and in the Rome of Augustus. Almost all the intensity of the French Revolution burst upon the French people in war and under the justification of war emergency.
Now let us consider the changes which took place so suddenly in traditional American social institutions and values—changes fully meriting the label "revolutionary."

First, there is the relation between land and the family. Although discontent with the laws of primogeniture and entail had certainly existed for a long time, only Pennsylvania and Maryland had abolished the former and only South Carolina the latter, prior to the outbreak of the revolutionary war. Yet within a single decade of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, all but two states abolished entail, and in these two, entail had become relatively insignificant in any case. Within another five years, primogeniture had become illegal in every state and all had established some form of partible inheritance. Only two states, North Carolina and New Jersey, failed to include daughters as well as sons in the new laws of inheritance. Elsewhere full equality became the rule.

We may not be inclined today to regard the abolition of primogeniture and entail as a revolutionary change in social structure. But looking back a half-century into American history, Tocqueville spoke of society being "shaken to its center" by the adoption of that legislation.

Tocqueville was already steeped in the comparative aspects of the study of revolution, if only by virtue of the obsessive influence of the French Revolution; he knew very well indeed that strong family systems everywhere are rooted in the continuity of family property. He also knew that the best possible prescription for the individualization and, in time, the economic rootlessness of a population is the separation of kinship from this foundation. Not only does the law of partible inheritance make it difficult for families to preserve their ancestral domains, Tocqueville pointed out, but it soon deprives them of the desire to attempt the preservation. Historians of our own day echo Tocqueville's view (although with far greater documentation). One need reflect but a moment on the incentives—to land speculators, not to mention to the heirs—that would have stemmed from this abolition.

How simple it was for France to effect similar changes two decades later! Only a single act by a single body of lawmakers was required, such was the centralization that had been wrought by French monarchs and then confirmed by the revolutionary assembly. The same can be said of analogous Russian changes following the Bolshevik triumph. How remarkable, then, that in America one of the most telling acts of equaliza-
tion known in social history was effected virtually in unison by 13 different legislatures. To say, as many American students of the Revolution have said, that laws of primogeniture and entail mattered little, that they were at best hardly more than vestigial memories, scarcely fits the swift and uniform eradication of these laws by the state legislatures.

Nor should we overlook the revolutionary impact of the confiscations of large Tory-owned estates, with shares of these holdings going to American patriots. The exact number of acres involved is less significant than the fact of confiscation and distribution. For an appropriate parallel in our own day we should have to imagine state confiscation of a substantial number of large "disloyal" business corporations, with ownership of shares turned over to loyal citizens. The sense of revolutionary acquisition among the citizens in that day of overwhelmingly landed wealth must have been substantial.

Religious Freedom

It was inevitable that the shocks of the war with England would produce revolutionary consequences in the religious realm as well. Agitation for release from the exactions of religious establishment could hardly help but become part of the act of war against England in those colonies where the Church of England was established. And this agitation was bound to have reverberations even in colonies where the Congregational church was established.

True, the laws pertaining to religion were not everywhere overthrown in a single spasm. In parts of New England, disestablishment did not occur until the nineteenth century. Nor was there by any means firm agreement among the leaders of the revolutionary war as to its desirability. John Adams and others had serious misgivings on the matter, and the Baptists and Quakers who had begun to work for religious freedom before the Revolution found considerable opposition to their labors. The historical fact is, however, that religious liberty did become a matter of burning concern to a great many Americans during the Revolution. Its importance is evidenced by responses to the Constitution when this document was given to the states for ratification.

The lack of any safeguards for liberty of faith at once struck critics in all sections. The Virginia Convention proposed an amendment guaranteeing freedom of
conscience. North Carolina's Convention seconded the proposal, adopting the same language. . . . In the first Congress attention was directed to the oversight by James Madison, and the required guarantee was made the first constitutional amendment proposed to the nation.ª

Of all the consequences of the American Revolution, undoubtedly the most heralded in other parts of the world was the firm establishment of religious freedom. Tocqueville was but one of many who thought this creation the most remarkable of American achievements.

The Great Contradiction

There remains the deeply troubling question posed by the presence of Negro slaves in America. At the time of the Revolution, there were about a half-million slaves in the 13 colonies—most of them in the South, but a fair number, perhaps 55,000, in the North. It would be splendid indeed if we could say that under the principles of liberty and equality proclaimed by the American founders these slaves were given their freedom. Obviously, we cannot. But it by no means follows that the position of the Negro in America was insulated from revolutionary thought and action.

In 1774, the Continental Congress decreed an “American Association” (that is, a nonimportation agreement) pertaining to slavery, and the prohibition on slave-trading seems to have held up throughout the war. In July 1774, Rhode Island enacted a law that thenceforth all slaves brought into the colony should be freed. The law's preamble, which begins as follows, is instructive:

Whereas the inhabitants of America are generally engaged in the preservation of their own rights and liberties, among which that of personal freedom must be considered as the greatest, and as those who are desirous of enjoying all the advantages of liberty themselves should be willing to extend personal liberty to others . . .

Delaware prohibited importation in 1776, Virginia in 1778, and Maryland in 1783 (for a term of years), with North Carolina imposing a higher tax on each Negro imported. States where

there were few slaves proceeded under the stimulus of the Revolution to effect the immediate or gradual abolition of slavery itself. In short, the planting of the seeds of abolitionism was one of the major acts of the American Revolution.

**Freedom and Slavery**

True, a case can be made that war with England only hardened the determination of many southerners to maintain the institution of slavery. There can be no doubt that the eagerness with which a good many southern plantation owners entered the war sprang from the fear that an English victory would bring emancipation of the slaves. And a great many blacks saw, and had every reason to see, more hope of freedom with the British than with American plantation owners.

Yet even so, we cannot miss the strong tide of abolitionism that rose during this period. The minds of the men who led the Revolution and its war were sensitive and humane. The contrast between the principles of freedom and equality on the one hand and the presence of a half-million black slaves on the other no more escaped men like Jefferson and Adams than it did Edmund Burke and other Whigs in England. It is precisely the awareness of this contrast that marks the real beginning of the long and tragic story of black liberation in America, a story that would have its next great episode in the Civil War and that would still be unfolding during the 1960s.

The American Revolution failed the Negro. Nevertheless, as Bernard Bailyn has written, “as long as the institution of slavery lasted, the burden of proof would lie with its advocates to show why the statement that ‘all men are created equal’ did not mean precisely what it said: all men, ‘white or black.’” And Benjamin Quarles, whose study of the Negro in the American Revolution is the most detailed investigation of the subject yet made, has written:

The American Revolution touched all classes in society, even Negroes. On the eve of the conflict, the same religious and political idealism that stirred the resistance to Britain deepened the sentiment against slavery. . . . Ultimately the colored people of America benefited from the irreversible commitment of the new nation to the principles of liberty and equality.

Now I want to turn to a very different aspect of the subject: the justly celebrated moderateness of spirit of the American
Revolution. A revolution did indeed occur in America, one involving social structures and values. Why, then, did no Terror, no Thermidor, no military dictatorship make its appearance, as has been the case in European revolutions?

We cannot doubt that the idea of equality was buoyant in America; we need look only at the many pamphlets written and circulated before and during the revolutionary war. Nor can we doubt that significant sections of the American people were bound to have felt the impact of laws directed at slavery, established religion, traditional inheritance of property, and, to a lesser extent, the expropriation of estates. These are explosive issues, and they ordinarily arouse the deepest passions. How do we account, then, for the widespread spirit of acceptance of the Revolution in America, a spirit shared by conservatives, liberals, and radicals, a spirit characterized by consensus and continuity?

**Dispersion and Division**

Some historians speak of a "spirit" of moderation and pragmatism in America that contrasts with the ideological passions of Europe. This does not, however, carry us very far. Looking at the subsequent history of America, from the War of 1812 through the Civil War to World Wars I and II, and bearing in mind the fierce ideological passions that have flared often enough in our history, it would be risky to appeal to any such embedded spirit.

Other historians properly refer to the temper of the leadership that America was fortunate to have during the Revolution. We cannot fail to see the restraint, responsibility, and wisdom of such men as John Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Dickinson, Franklin, Hamilton, and others, and I would not for a moment dismiss their importance. But how did such a restrained and moderate leadership survive throughout the Revolution? After all, the English and French revolutions began in moderation, and something of the same can be said of the Russian if we consider the Kerensky government the first phase of that revolution, yet they eventually succumbed to ever more radical and zealous leaders.

Any answer to so complex a question must be offered in the spirit of hypothesis. And it is in that spirit that I present the following possible explanations:

First, the American Revolution was, by virtue of the nature of colonial America, a dispersed revolution. There was nothing
in America comparable to a London, Paris, or Moscow, no large city steeped in historical traditions of turbulence and occasional revolt. Tensions rooted in social and economic conditions certainly existed in New York and Boston, and possibly in our other cities; but there was not, and there could not have been, the cumulative disorder or the air of incipient revolt known to have existed in the great European cities.

Nor was there in America, either before or after the Revolution, the centralization of political power that England, France, and Russia knew so well. The French and Russian revolutions, especially, must be seen against a background of long-developing governmental centralization. Each of the European revolutions was a focused revolution, which made it easy for the sudden passions of the ideologues or the crowd to be translated into acts that could affect the entire country.

In America, we must look to the 13 separate colonies or states to find the vital elements of the social revolution. Certainly, there was communication among the colonies and states; but it was communication among separate, independent, and proud political societies. It was this dispersion and decentralization of power that moderated passion and inclination so far as the nation as a whole was concerned. The vital principle of countervailing power—of intermediate authority, of division of rule—operated to reduce, at least for a long time, the national impact of intellectual and social movements arising in any one part of the nation.

Second, religion remained a strong force in American society. Plural in manifestation and closely connected with locality and region, it did not easily mix with political passions. Admittedly, religion as a cultural force seems to have declined somewhat during the eighteenth century; but once the symbols of establishment were removed, evangelical religions began to transform the religious landscape. We could not explain the immense burst of religiosity in the 1820s and later—carrying with it the birth of many new faiths and lasting through the century—if the seeds of it had not been present earlier.

In America, religious values and aspirations consumed psychic energy that might otherwise have gone into political ideology. In France, as students of the French Revolution from Edmund Burke to Hannah Arendt have observed, it was with religious passion translated into political action that the Jacobins dealt with government and society. In the English Revolution, by the time it was under way, the line between re-
Religion and political evangelism was very thin indeed. In the twentieth century, Marxism has become the substitute for established religion in Russia and wherever it prevails.

How very different was the American experience: In America, as was not the case in France or Russia, revolution never had a chance to become God.

A Nation of Joiners

Third, and closely related to the first two factors, is the idea of voluntary association. Our reputation for being a nation of joiners was made early; and neither the fact nor the reputation could have been possible had it not been for an American attitude toward association vitally different from any attitude easily discernible in most European countries at the time. The hatred of internal associations by the French revolutionaries—a hatred manifest not only in the destruction of the guilds, monasteries, and other bodies deriving from the past, but also in the explicit prohibition of almost all new associations—never existed in the United States. No specific constitutional provision guaranteed freedom of association; but, given the guarantees of freedom of assembly and petition, and the strong social and cultural roots of the phenomenon, voluntary associations thrived.

This suggests again that a great deal of passion that would surely have gone into political movements was directed elsewhere—that is, into the innumerable intermediate associations which, along with local, regional, and religious loyalties, made the American social landscape very different from the French in the nineteenth century.

Fourth, post-revolutionary America had few if any of the politically important class divisions found in Europe. True, the colonies did have very distinct social classes, and these were almost certainly becoming more distinct before the Revolution. It was the war with England that significantly changed the pattern of social class in America.

Although most wealthy, educated, and socially influential Americans sided with Britain in one degree or another, and most members of the lower classes chose the side of the Continental Congress, there were altogether too many exceptions in each instance to give a distinct character of class conflict to the war.

All serious students of social class, including Karl Marx, have noted the vital importance of conflict—conflict that is
political in character and ideological in thrust—in shaping and hardening classes. Had the upper class in America solidly opposed the war instead of supplying most of its leaders, and had the lower class alone supported the war, the outcome (assuming war would have taken place at all) would almost certainly have been a class structure like that of Western Europe, with ideological conflict to match. That this did not occur in America—much to the dismay of Marxists later—is, it would seem, a result of the “accident” of the war against England. For, with tenant farmers, indentured servants, and even Negroes frequently to be found on the rebel side, and with the rebel leaders coming from the upper classes of New England and the South, only the slightest “class-angling” of the revolutionary war was possible.

**The American Brand of Intellectuals**

Fifth, I would adduce the absence of an intellectual class in America at the time of the Revolution as one of the prime reasons for the lack of political ferocity both during and after the Revolution.

I am referring, of course, to the class of political intellectuals of which the Philosophes in France—who had much to do not only with setting the intellectual background of the revolution in France but also with giving that revolution the special ideological ferocity it came to have by 1791—were such iridescent examples. This class may be said to have begun with the politically minded humanists of the Italian Renaissance. It grew steadily in size during the succeeding centuries. We properly include in it not only the humanists and their successors, the Philosophes, but also, later, the revolutionists of 1848 (to be found in just about all coffee houses on the continent), Saint-Simonians, Fourierists, positivists, and, eventually, anarchists, socialists, and communists. Its dominant characteristics are, and have been, social rootlessness, an adversary position toward polity, and a fascination with power and its uses. The capacity of this class for ideological fanaticism, for the sacrifice of life and institution alike in the name of principle, and even for outright blood-lust and terror is well known.

This kind of class was lacking in America before and during the Revolution. There were indeed men and women of extraordinary intellect and learning; but for a Jefferson or an Adams or a Dickinson, learning—even great learning in phi-
philosophy and the arts—could be compatible with a strong sense of membership in society. It did not invite alienation or revolt.

The intellectual leaders of the American Revolution were generally businessmen or landowners; they had a stake in society. It is inconceivable that either a Jefferson or a Hamilton could have renounced what Burke called the "wisdom of expediency" in the interest of pursuing an abstract principle. No American leader could have contemplated mass executions or imprisonments with delight, as did the millennialist intellectuals of 1649, 1793, and 1917. At no point in the American Revolution, or in its aftermath, do we find any Committee of Public Safety after the French fashion, any Council of the People's Commissars, any Lilburnes, Robespierres, or Lenins. Nothing so completely gave the American Revolution its distinctive character as the absence of the European species of political intellectual. It is only in the present century that we have seen this species coming into prominence in America.

In conclusion, I would argue, then, that there was indeed an American Revolution in the full sense of the word—a social, moral, and institutional revolution that affected major changes in the character of American society—as well as a war of liberation from England that was political in nature.

The line from the social revolution of the 1770s to the civil rights revolution of the 1960s is a direct one. It is a line that passes through the Civil War—itself certainly not without revolutionary implication—and through a host of changes in the status of Americans of all races, beliefs, and classes. The United States has indeed undergone a process of almost permanent revolution. I can think of no greater injustice to ourselves, as well as to the makers of revolution in Philadelphia, than to deny that fact and to allow the honored word revolution to be preempted today by spokesmen for societies which, through their congealed despotisms, have made real revolution all but impossible.
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson first met in June 1775 at the Second Continental Congress in Philadelphia. The war had begun. Incipient revolutionary governments were in being in both Massachusetts and Virginia. But whether American independence would be declared or won, whether the continent would be united, and what the ultimate course of this revolution would be no one could tell. Adams and Jefferson, finding that they thought alike on the great questions before Congress, quickly became friends and coadjutors.

Whatever their later differences, neither ever doubted “the perfect coincidence” of their principles and politics in 1775-76. Both had risen to positions of revolutionary leadership in their respective provinces. Adams was the veteran of the two. Jefferson was still a young law student in Virginia when Adams, in 1765, made his political debut with the celebrated Instructions of the Town of Braintree, declaring Parliament's Stamp Act unconstitutional. Born in 1735, eight years before Jefferson, he had been longer engaged in the colonial resistance to Great Britain, had served conspicuously in the First Continental Congress, and was widely recognized, along with his cousin Samuel Adams and Patrick Henry and Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, as one of the foremost leaders of the American cause. Thus in the early relationship of the two men Adams was clearly the senior partner. Jefferson deferred to him and would continue to do so for many years.

The Virginian’s reputation had gone before him to Congress. Since his entrance into the House of Burgesses in 1769 as a 26-year-old delegate from western Albemarle County, Jefferson had sided with the party of Henry and Lee and made something of a name for himself as a draftsman of legislative papers championing American rights. His writings were known and admired, Adams later said, for “their peculiar felicity of

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expression." After a few weeks' acquaintance, he noted with approval the judgment of a fellow delegate that Jefferson was "the greatest rubber off of dust" to be met with in Congress—a man of learning and science as well as a forthright politician.

In debate on the floor of the House, where Adams excelled, Jefferson seldom uttered a word. The legend grew up, even before they were in their graves, that Jefferson had been "the pen" and Adams "the tongue" (Washington, of course, "the sword") of American independence. "Though a silent member of Congress," Adams recalled, "Jefferson was so prompt, frank, explicit, and decisive upon committees and in conversation... that he soon seized upon my heart." They saw a good deal of each other on committees, and Adams said that Jefferson agreed with him in everything. It is not surprising, then, that he came to regard Jefferson in the light of a political protégé, and such was the Virginian's cordiality and esteem that he returned the favor with every appearance of discipleship.

The course of experience that brought these two men to Philadelphia in 1775 was in some respects similar. Both were first sons in the succession of several generations of hardy independent farmers—Adams at Braintree in the shadow of Boston, Jefferson in the Virginia up-country where his father had been among the earliest settlers. However far they strayed, they always returned to their birthplace as the best place of all, finally dying there, and for all the honors heaped upon them, claimed to cherish the title of "farmer" above any other. Both attended the provincial college—Harvard in Massachusetts, William and Mary in Virginia—and then prepared for the bar. Beginning with the Institutes of Lord Coke, the Whig champion against the Stuart kings, they mastered the entire history of English law, which provided the foundation of their political opinions. Both men made their provincial reputations at the bar; they were practicing lawyers before they were politicians, but as the Revolution came on they were forced to abandon their profession and neither ever really returned to it.

Adams and Jefferson were preeminently students, not only of law but of history and philosophy and literature, both ancient and modern. They were avid readers—and readers with a purpose. Fragmentary notes on what they read appear in their surviving "commonplace books." While their personal tastes varied, many of the same names—Cicero, Sidney, Locke, Bolingbroke, Montesquieu, Hume—turn up in the early reports of their reading. If Jefferson was more consciously a student of the Enlightenment, exalting nature and reason against mystery

The Wilson Quarterly/Autumn 1976
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and authority, Adams also felt its liberating influence.

Being studious men in love with their books, their families, and their firesides, both were rather reluctant politicians. For several years after the Stamp Act controversy, Adams wavered between Boston and Braintree, repeatedly forswore the noisy political world of Sam Adams for the quiet, along with the fortune, of his profession, and only finally surrendered himself to the revolutionary movement in 1773. Jefferson, although he grew up in a society where government was the responsibility of the class to which he belonged, experienced the same ambivalence and, unlike Adams, never overcame it.

These similarities of background and interest were undoubtedly important in laying the basis of friendship; more important in the longer run of history, however, were differences of temperament, of intellectual style and outlook, of social and political experience, which were less apparent in 1775 than they would be 15 or 20 years later.

Adams the Calvinist

Adams was a latter-day son of New England Puritanism. Although he shook off the theological inheritance from the fathers, he cherished the Puritan past and rather than replace the original model of a Christian commonwealth—John Winthrop’s “city upon a hill”—he sought to transform it into a model of virtuous republicanism. The Puritans had come to Massachusetts Bay to worship as they pleased, and however noble their ideal it was not an ideal of religious or political freedom. Yet in his first published essay, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law; 1765, Adams reconstructed the Puritan past into a legend of republican beginnings, thereby conscripting it in the cause of revolution. “It was not religion alone, as is commonly supposed, but it was a love of universal liberty . . . ,” he wrote, “that projected, conducted, and accomplished
the fundamental institutions established by the Puritans—congregations, schools, militia, and town meetings—must remain the pillars of the community, and no government, republican or whatever, could survive unless it was ordered on "the perfect plan of divine and moral government."

The strain of Calvinism, which thus entered into Adams's republican vision, colored his theory of human nature. "Sin," although wrenched from its old theological associations, remained a prominent word in his political vocabulary, roughly translated as human weakness and selfishness. Reading Montesquieu through Calvinist lenses, Adams deemed austerity of morals and manners indispensable to republican government. "But," he said in 1776, "there is so much rascality, so much venality and corruption, so much avarice and ambition . . . among all ranks and degrees of men even in America, that I sometimes doubt whether there is public virtue enough to support a republic." He was a doubting republican at the starting gate, one for whom the American Revolution carried the heavy burden, added to everything else, of moral regeneration after the old Puritan vision.

Jefferson the Humanist

Now to all this, Jefferson, virtually untouched by the Puritan dispensation, presents a sharp contrast. Virginia had no legend of pure and noble beginnings, nothing peculiarly edifying in its past, no glorious heritage to preserve. And to be a revolutionary there was to be an enemy, if not of religion, then of the established Anglican church which dominated the landscape. Unlike Adams, for whom the New England church was an ally, Jefferson came to the Revolution as a man alienated from the traditional religious culture of his community. Taking his moral and political directives from the modern philosophy of the Enlightenment, Jefferson felt no need to maintain the centrality of religion in human affairs. Indeed it was one of the missions of the Enlightenment to retire God to the wings and place man at the center of the stage. Destiny was no longer controlled by Providence but by Nature. Man was inherently good, seeking his own happiness through the happiness of others, and with the progress of knowledge Nature would answer all his purposes. Civil education was required, but not churchly discipline. Religious restraints, even the hope of Heaven and the fear of hell, were unnecessary; in so far as they were supported by
civil government they were unjust. Just as morality had no certain dependence on religion, religion was of no concern to the state. As Jefferson would write in the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, “our civil rights have no dependence on our religious opinions, more than our opinions in physics or geometry.”

With this view Adams could not agree. For him the American Revolution was a continuation under new auspices of an old quest for a pure and righteous commonwealth, while for Jefferson it looked to the liberation of the individual from all conceptions of higher moral authority embodied in church or state.

The Rough and the Smooth

The friendship between Adams and Jefferson was a triumph of will over seeming incompatibilities of personal temperament and intellectual style. Neither man, one short and stout, the other tall and lean, could have seen himself reflected in the other. Adams was warm and contentious, Jefferson cool and agreeable. Adams was impulsive and careless, Jefferson deliberate and precise. Adams was a gyroscope of shifting moods; his nerves, as Mercy Warren once told him, were “not always wound up by the same key.” Jefferson’s nerves, together with the compass of his mind, were amazingly steady. Adams always wore his heart on his sleeve and perceived the world about him as a drama in which he was the central character.

Jefferson, while not an insensitive man, approached the world through his reason and concealed his inner feelings behind an almost impenetrable wall of reserve. Adams, by his own confession, was “a morose and surly politician.” Jefferson, if seldom a happy politician, proved amiable and sanguine. He was more impressed by the scope than by the limits of human possibilities. “My temperament is sanguine,” he would later tell Adams. “I steer my bark with Hope in the head, leaving Fear astern.”

Adams, finding himself awkward and churlish in social intercourse, supposed the fault lay in the New England character, which he contrasted with “the art and address” of the southern gentlemen he met in Congress. Jefferson, of course, while not at all typical of the southern breed, possessed “art and address” in abundance, including those qualities of subtlety, grace, and refinement so conspicuously lacking in Adams. A friend of his youth remarked that he had “a little capillary vein of satire”
meandering about in his soul which was as powerful as it was sudden. The Swiftian rapier did not suit Jefferson. He disapproved of satire and hid what little humor he had under "the pale cast of thought." What was ludicrous in life was cause for regret rather than amusement. Expecting so much of men, and nations too, he could not laugh at their follies, least of all at his own. To Jefferson's lofty idealism his friend opposed an obsessive realism, alternately stern or satiric as befit his mood. While there was something endearing in Adams's robust honesty—and Jefferson found it—it inevitably offended men with feelings scarcely less tender than his own and contributed to that unpopularity of which he would constantly complain.

The New Englander was, basically, an insecure person. His yearnings for fame, his notorious vanity and airs of conceit, grew from massive layers of self-doubt. In early manhood (occasionally afterwards) he kept a diary—another mark of his Puritan heritage—which was filled with upbraiding, self-catechizing questions, and self-improving resolutions. As late as his 37th year, he could admonish himself: "Beware of idleness, luxury, and all vanity, folly, and vice!" Half his life had run out, and what a poor, insignificant atom he was! "Reputation," he often told himself, "ought to be the perpetual subject of my thoughts, and aim of my behavior."

At last, with the onrush of revolution, he resolved to pursue reputation by power rather than by fortune. He found, as did Jefferson, new scope for his abilities. But even at the height of political achievement, he was plagued by anxieties. "I begin to suspect that I have not much of the grand in my composition," he confided to his ever-understanding wife Abigail in 1777. Then and later he felt that his services and sacrifices were unappreciated. "I have a very tender, feeling heart," he wrote. "The country knows not, and never can know, the torments I have endured for its sake." In time, he became morbid on the subject.

Jefferson was rarely afflicted in this way. He was an Epicurean, though of sober mien, to whom emotional torment and self-flagellation were alien. Never in his life did he keep a personal diary. He kept records of everything—gardens, the weather, Indian languages—except the state of his soul. His self-possession, his easy, almost bland, sense of personal security left little room for inner questioning. Unlike the Yankee commoner, he did not have to scratch or fight his way to power. The road had been blazed for him by his father; in a sense, it went with his social position. He could therefore feel relaxed.
about it. Although endowed with a normal amount of ambition, it never became an obsession. Political power in itself held no charms for him. He often said that nature had destined him for the tranquil pursuits of the arts and sciences. None of the heroes of his early life—certainly not the Enlightenment trinity of Bacon, Newton, and Locke—was associated with political power. If such power were taken away from him, it would have caused Jefferson no regrets; in fact, it would have afforded a welcome release to his talents in other and, he thought, better directions. Adams, who committed himself fully to the career and the fame of a founding father, had no such reserves to fall back on.

Two Paths to Revolution

The fact that one man came to the Revolution through Massachusetts politics, the other in Virginia, also made a difference. For Adams the torch had been ignited by James Otis's constitutional argument against the writs of assistance in 1761; for Jefferson it was Patrick Henry's celebrated speech against the Stamp Act.

The true cause of the Revolution in Massachusetts, Adams believed, was "the conspiracy against liberty" hatched at the conclusion of the Great War by the local "court party" of Governor Francis Bernard, Thomas Hutchinson, and the brothers Andrew and Peter Oliver. It was this junto of high officials, not king and Parliament, that first plotted to tax Massachusetts with the base aim of increasing their own fortunes, securing their independence of the legislature, and establishing a local oligarchy. The enemy, then, was less the British government abroad than it was a corrupt Tory party at home.

This vivid sense of an internal struggle between "court" and "country" parties—one that threw Adams back into the political world of Walpole and Bolingbroke—was lacking in Virginia. There no Tory party threatened; notwithstanding factional quarrels at Williamsburg, the gentry stuck together, as they always had, and ruled without challenge except from the mother country. In Jefferson's mind, Britain was the culprit and no residue of affection, such as Adams would continue to feel, remained in him after 1776. Moreover, the popular agitation which radical Whigs used to stoke the revolutionary furnace in Massachusetts raised in Adams fears of upheaval from below.

Jefferson expressed no such fears. On the contrary, he
thought Virginia could use a little of the "leveling spirit." And the southern aristocrat went on to become the legendary apostle of democracy, while the northern bourgeois acquired the reputation of an apologist for order and hierarchy. Finally, because the war began in Massachusetts and the resources of the continent were wanted for her defense, Adams sought a strong confederation melting the states "like separate parcels of metal, into one common mass," while Jefferson, with other Virginians and the great majority of Congress, saw neither the urgency nor the wisdom of this. As the war progressed, Adams changed his mind, only to return to his earlier opinion a decade later.

Whatever may have been the cause of the American Revolution, the major issue in debate was the constitutional authority of Great Britain over the colonies. As Whigs of a more or less radical stamp, Adams and Jefferson tended to think alike on the issue and, barring small details, reached the same conclusions. What they sought in 1775 and earlier was not independence but reconciliation on the terms of the British constitution; yet as their theory of the constitution was in direct conflict with the regnant theory in Britain, the arguments they advanced unraveled the imperial relationship, forcing the ultimate choice of submission or independence. Jefferson addressed the issue in A Summary View of the Rights of British America, published in 1774, while Adams's most labored constitutional argument appeared in the Novanglus essays of 1774-75.

The polemics offered two versions of the same theory of the empire and of American rights within it. From the beginning of the contest with the mother country, the Americans had attempted to find some halfway house between total submission to the authority of Parliament, which British opinion demanded, and its total rejection. Generally, the line had been drawn between external and internal legislation, Parliament having authority in one sphere, as in the regulation of trade, but not in the other. Any line offered difficulties in theory as well as in practice, however. Since they were not represented in Parliament, the colonists claimed that it could not legislate for them, and the tradition of the English constitution lent support to the claim. But the new Whig theory of parliamentary supremacy, stemming from the Revolution of 1688, buttressed by the conventional political wisdom that rejected any idea of two sovereign authorities in the same state—the specter of imperium in imperio—proved trouble-
some for the Americans.

Jefferson and Adams, therefore, repudiated the authority of Parliament altogether and set forth a new theory of the empire as a commonwealth of equal self-governing states owing allegiance to a common king.

Jefferson reached this position by way of the argument that the Americans were the sons of expatriated men who had possessed the *natural* right "of going in quest of new habitations, and of there establishing new societies, under such laws and regulations as to them shall seem most likely to promote public happiness." This right being natural, the colonists were as free as if they had returned to a state of nature; but, said Jefferson, they voluntarily chose to submit themselves to the British monarch, "who was thereby made the central link connecting the several parts of the empire thus newly multiplied."

Adams's reasoning was similar. America was a discovered, not a conquered, country; the first settlers had a natural right, which they exercised, to set up their own governments and enact their own laws consistent with their obligations to the king. These obligations, in the Massachusetts case, were contained in a royal charter, a *compact* with the king. Partly because of the crucial role of this compact in the history of Massachusetts, for which there was no equivalent in Virginia, Adams's argument was more historical and legalistic than Jefferson's. But both appealed to the past in the defense of rights that were basically moral and, in the final analysis, must be justified on the law of nature.

It is difficult to say just when Adams and Jefferson gave up the hope of reconciliation and became advocates of independence. For several months after the fighting began, both supported armed resistance as a means of bringing Britain to her senses and winning a settlement on American terms. But Britain proved incorrigible.

Adams later claimed that he was the constant advocate of independence from the reassembling of Congress after the August recess of 1775. Yet in January of the new year he said that independence was "utterly against my inclinations" and a few weeks later stated his position as "reconciliation if practicable and peace if attainable," quickly adding that he thought both impossible. Jefferson's posture was much the same. Reconciliation was his desire, but rather than submit to British pretensions to legislate for America he would "sink the whole island in the ocean."
Neither man, it seems fair to say, rushed into independence, but both were willing to risk it and, further, to demand it if resistance within the empire failed of solution. There were sound political reasons for soft-pedaling independence in the winter of 1775-76. The delegates of the middle colonies, in particular, were firmly opposed to the ultimate step. Independence could not be declared until a public opinion had been created for it up and down the continent. This was the work of Thomas Paine’s Common Sense early in the new year. With a popular political rhetoric neither Adams nor Jefferson commanded, Paine transformed independence from a frightful bugaboo to a captivating vision.

“Every post and every day rolls in upon us,” Adams rejoiced in May. “Independence like a torrent.” His principal concern at this time was for the establishment of new constitutional governments in all the colonies, which would make independence a fait accompli and also ensure the maintenance of civil order. Congress finally passed his and Lee’s resolution for this purpose—“a machine to fabricate independence”—on May 15. Three weeks later it debated the Virginia resolution calling upon Congress to declare the 13 colonies free and independent states.

Drafting a Declaration

Although the vote was postponed, a five-man committee was appointed to prepare a declaration of independence. Rather surprisingly, Jefferson found himself named at the head of the committee whose leading members were Benjamin Franklin and Adams. Jefferson’s later testimony was that the committee asked him to draft the proposed paper. Adams, on the other hand, remembered a conversation in which Jefferson tried to persuade him to do it. He demurred for three reasons: “Reason first—You are a Virginian, and a Virginian ought to appear at the head of this business. Reason second—I am obnoxious, suspected, and unpopular. You are very much otherwise. Reason third—You can write ten times better than I can.” If the conversation actually occurred, Adams later found reason to regret his decision. In time the authorship of the Declaration of Independence gave Jefferson an éclat with the public that all of Adams’s revolutionary services could not match, and he resented it.

Jefferson showed both Adams and Franklin a rough draft of the Declaration, and neither had much to suggest in the
way of changes. From the committee the final draft went to Congress on June 28. There, after voting the Virginia resolution for independence on July 2, the delegates debated Jefferson's handiwork for two and one-half days. Many changes were made, nearly all of them for the worse, in his opinion. He was especially incensed by the elimination of the angry paragraph indicting the king for waging "cruel war against human nature itself" by forcing on the colonies the traffic in African slaves.

Adams doubtless supported his friend on this question, as on every other. He was "the colossus" in the debate, Jefferson later said—the Declaration's "pillar of support on the floor of Congress, its ablest advocate and defender against the multifarious assaults it encountered." And even after some of Adams's aspersions on the document came to public notice decades later, Jefferson generously praised "the zeal and ability" with which he had fought for "every word" of it in Congress.

**July 2, Adams's "Fourth"**

Oddly enough, neither man sent up any huzzahs upon the adoption of the Declaration of Independence. Adams thought the landmark decision had been taken earlier, on July 2. That was the crucial action; Jefferson's paper only declared it. He wrote to Abigail: "The second day of July, 1776, will be the most memorable epocha in the history of America. I am apt to believe it will be celebrated by succeeding generations as the great anniversary festival. It ought to be commemorated, as the day of deliverance, by solemn acts of devotion to God Almighty. It ought to be solemnized with pomp and parade . . . from one end of the continent to the other, from this time forward, forevermore." He prophesied the celebrity of American independence with future generations but was off the mark as to the anniversary date. Obviously, neither he nor Jefferson fully appreciated in 1776 the power of words, great words, to symbolize action and to become its monument.

For several months the two congressmen had been turning their thoughts to the creation of new governments in the colony-states. It was, Adams declared, "a time when the greatest lawgivers of antiquity would have wished to live. How few of the human race have ever enjoyed an opportunity of making an election of government—more than of air, soil, or climate—for themselves or their children!" Jefferson also felt the chal-
The creation of new government, he said, "is the whole object of the present controversy." But no one responded more eagerly or more soberly to the challenge than Adams. Months before independence was declared he had been calling for the formation of new governments. All the books he had read on the theory and practice of government now found immediate application, and he went back to reread them. There was no more agreeable employment than researches "after the best form of government," he said. Politics was "the divine science" —"the first in importance"—and, while centuries behind most other sciences, he hoped that in this ripening "age of political experiments" it would overtake the rest.

The Thoughts of John Adams

When several southern delegates came to Adams in the early months of 1776 seeking advice on the planning of new state governments, he wrote out his ideas in a brief epistolary essay which was so much admired that he consented to its publication, anonymously, under the title Thoughts on Government, in a Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend. Adams later said that the letter was written to counteract the "too democratic" plan of government loosely advanced by that "disastrous meteor," Thomas Paine, in Common Sense.

Adams began by insisting on the importance of the form of government, then went on to show that the republican form is the best. Borrowing from Montesquieu's theory on the unique spirit appropriate to the different forms of government, agreeing that the spirit of republics is virtue, Adams reasoned that since the practice of virtue produces the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people, a republic is the best form of government. A virtuous people makes a republic possible; its survival makes the cultivation of virtue necessary.

But what is a republic? Adams always had trouble defining it. It is "an empire of laws, and not of men," he said. But this described the principle of constitutionalism, not the form of government, and implied that a government of unjust laws, laws against natural right, might be republican. At other times Adams said a republic is a government in which the people have "an essential share" in the sovereign power.

Nearly all the American Whigs in 1776 favored republican government. The issue was how popular, how democratic, these new republics should be. And here Adams, as compared to Paine, or even Jefferson, took a moderate position. In his view,
and by either of his definitions, the British government was a type of republic, one in which the three pure forms—monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—were ingeniously balanced in king, lords, and commons. Unlike Jefferson and so many others whose admiration for the British constitution sank in the decade before the Revolution, Adams venerated it to the end of his days as "a masterpiece." Unfortunately, it was not made for the government of colonies; independence came about because the Americans were denied the most valuable part of the constitution, democratic representation.

Holding these views, Adams experienced some difficulty formulating a conception of American republicanism detached from the British model. He was not alone in this; certain categories and dogmas of the British constitution survived in Jefferson's mind too. But for Adams the problem increased rather than lessened after 1776, and compared to his mature political theory, Thoughts on Government was a democratic document. It followed from the definition of a republic that the constitution should be so contrived as to secure an impartial "government of laws."

The representative assembly should be an exact portrait in miniature of the interests among the people at large. Because of the wide distribution of property in America, at least in New England, this would ensure substantial democracy. But no government in a single assembly could long preserve the freedom and happiness of the people. Absolute power, from whatever source derived, must inevitably grow corrupt and tyrannical. And so Adams called for an upper house to check the lower and a first magistrate with an unqualified negative on the legislature. He also called for an independent judiciary, rotation in office, annual elections, and so on, which were the clichés of old Whig political science.

Jefferson could cheerfully endorse most of what Adams recommended. The differences between them at this time did not fundamentally concern the form or structure of government but the extent of the government's commitment to the ideals of freedom and equality declared in the country's birthright.

On balance, Adams was more interested in restoring order than in promoting reform. Even as he advocated republican government, he was beset by fears for its success from the want of virtue in the people. There was so much littleness and selfishness, so much disrespect for rank and status, so much luxury and avarice and talent for political corruption, even in
New England, that wise and honest men might soon look to the security of a monarch.

Jefferson had a more consoling philosophy for a republican, one which assumed the virtue of the people from an innate moral sense in every man and diminished the role of the state in the regulation of human affairs. With his image of a naturally beneficent and harmonious society—an image derived from philosophy rather than experience—government simply did not have for him the preëminent importance Adams assigned to it.

The Jeffersonian View

Its primary purpose was to secure individuals in their natural rights and thereby to liberate them for action in society. In Jefferson's view, government should be absorbed into society, becoming truly self-government; Adams believed that society must be absorbed into government, reproduced in it, and regulated by it.

Theories of human nature help to explain the difference. Adams, although he thought Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Mandeville had painted human nature too black, without any color of benevolence, nevertheless felt that "self-love" was the dominant passion in men and that government must deal with it. Jefferson, in opposition to these philosophers, believed that the moral sense, in which all men were equal, naturally led them to seek the good of others and to live justly in society. He regarded man primarily as a social animal, naturally made for society; Adams regarded man as a political animal, constantly competing for power.

Both men drafted constitutions for their native states. When he was in Congress in the spring of 1776, Jefferson sent his for Virginia to the revolutionary convention meeting in Williamsburg. It arrived too late for serious consideration, however; and had it arrived earlier, Jefferson's plan might not have received that consideration, for it was widely at variance with the conservative constitution adopted for Virginia. Except that it stripped away all semblance of monarchical power, the new government was like the old. It did not in any way alter the distribution of power in Virginia society. It continued the freehold suffrage qualification under which one-third or more of the adult white males were disenfranchised; the unequal system of representation which favored the East over the West—"old" Virginia over "new" Virginia; and it consolidated the
oligarchical power of the local authorities, the county courts.

Jefferson's plan also contained conservative features. He was as eager as Adams, for instance, to divide the legislative power and to secure through an upper house, or senate, a kind of aristocratic check on the annually elected popular assembly. But he had difficulty finding a logical basis for differentiating the two houses of a consistently republican legislature. He had at first thought of life appointment of senators, then quickly rejected it, as he also rejected the solution that would be adopted in several of the new state constitutions of founding the lower house on numbers (population) and the upper on property. Finally, he decided on election of the senators by the popular body for staggered terms of nine years, yet was unhappy with this solution.

Jefferson's draft constitution also embodied a number of far-reaching institutional reforms: absolute religious freedom, the replacement of Virginia's bloody criminal code with one framed on humane and enlightened standards, the abolition of laws of entail and primogeniture (together with other measures intended to diffuse landed property among the mass of people), and the mitigation of slavery. The Virginia Constitution of 1776 neither embodied these reforms nor envisioned them. It contained no article for future amendment or revision.

Jefferson became a declared enemy of the Virginia Constitution. Repeatedly, over many years, he tried to replace it with a more democratic instrument, but failed. Partly because of his concern over the course of the Revolution in Virginia, he retired from Congress in September 1776, returned home, and immediately entered the General Assembly in Williamsburg. For several years, he worked to secure fundamental reforms.

He was not a flaming radical at this time, or at any time. He was a committed revolutionist, rather far to the left on the political spectrum in America. But he would not go to radical lengths to secure his objectives—his personal temperament precluded that—and he was still struggling to escape the chrysalis of the English Whig tradition, as his dilemma about the senate makes clear. What is remarkable about Jefferson, however, in contradistinction to Adams, was his capacity for political growth and adaptation. His vision was forward, and he grew in democratic directions with his age and country. He came to realize that even his own ideas for Virginia's government in 1776 fell short of the principles of the Revolution. "In truth," he reflected, "the abuses of monarchy had so much filled the space
of political contemplation, that we imagined everything republican which was not monarchy. We had not yet penetrated to the mother principle that 'governments are republican only in proportion as they embody the will of the people, and execute it.'"

If Jefferson failed to become the republican solon of Virginia, Adams was largely successful in Massachusetts. In the fall of 1779, during an interlude between diplomatic missions abroad, he was elected by his Braintree constituents to represent them in a constitutional convention. The citizens of Massachusetts had previously rejected a constitution offered by the legislature; and part of the significance of the convention was that it would be elected by the people for the specific purpose of framing a fundamental law, which would then be referred to them for approval or disapproval. The Massachusetts constitutional convention of 1779-80 thus gave finished form to the process by which a people may establish a government with their own consent.

"Equally Free and Independent"

In the convention, Adams was given the responsibility of submitting a working draft; and since few changes were made in it, either in committee or on the floor, the honor of the Massachusetts Constitution belonged to him. Although it seemed designed to make as little change as possible in the customary frame of government, it was a more elaborate document than any of the constitutions Jefferson drafted for Virginia. There was more than literary significance in Adams's phrasing of certain principles generally shared with Jefferson. Thus he wrote "all men are born equally free and independent," which, as Adams knew, was not the same as saying "all men are created (or born) equal." The convention substituted Jefferson's more egalitarian accent.

With regard to the frame of government, Adams followed the main outlines of his *Thoughts on Government*. The legislature would be in three parts, the house, the senate, and the governor, as Adams conceived the British one to be. The governor would be popularly elected, which he had not proposed in 1776, and vested with large powers including an absolute negative on the laws. The convention gave him only a qualified negative, or suspensive veto; but in the creation of a strong executive, overriding the antimonarchical sentiments of the Revolution, the Massachusetts Constitution was unique in its
time. Increasingly, Adams viewed the executive power as the mainstay of a balanced constitution, and he thought the trimming of the governor's negative the only serious error of the convention.

He solved the problem of the senate by proportioning its membership to the amount of taxes paid in the several electoral districts, that is to say, basing it on property. The wealthier the district, the more power it would have in the senate. In addition to its relevance for the Whig theory of balance, the solution conformed to the favorite axiom of James Harrington, "power always follows property," which Adams said was "as infallible a maxim in politics as that action and reaction are equal in mechanics."

Adams was in France, on a second diplomatic mission, when the Massachusetts Constitution was ratified. Henceforth his career in the American Revolution was on the European stage, where he worked in the shadow of the eminent Dr. Franklin to secure the money, arms, and friends necessary to win the war and establish American independence.

Jefferson, meanwhile, served as Governor of Virginia during two difficult years, 1779 and 1781, which ended in the humiliation of the government and the virtual prostration of the state by British troops. He retired to Monticello under a cloud and, stung by criticism of his leadership, resolved never to return to public life. He and Adams occasionally exchanged letters about the affairs of war and the seemingly desperate cause of confederation, letters that are proof of political friendship, though not of personal intimacy. Had Jefferson kept his resolution, the friendship would have expired with the war; but he did not, in part because of the tragedy of his wife's death, and in 1784 he and Adams were back in harness together.

A 50-Year Friendship

The Revolution did not end in 1776 or 1783; it was given a new turn by the French Revolution, and the Jeffersonian "Revolution of 1800" settled its destiny in the American polity. Adams and Jefferson were participants, indeed the chief ideological standard-bearers—at first as political allies, later as political foes—in this entire sweep of democratic revolution. The revolution that had been the basis of the friendship gradually tore it apart, leaving it in tatters in 1800.

Yet the friendship was restored in 1812, as partisan and ideological passions receded, mainly through the friendly medi-
iation of Dr. Benjamin Rush. Himself a signer of the Declaration of Independence, Rush seemed to think the reconciliation of these American patriarchs a national responsibility. "I consider you and [Mr. Jefferson] as the North and South Poles of the American Revolution," he told Adams. "Some talked, some wrote, and some fought to promote and establish it, but you and Mr. Jefferson thought for us all."

The story of their friendship has an appealing human interest, of course, and the later correspondence between them, when they were both retired from the public stage, stands as a literary monument of the age. More important than the story or the correspondence, however, was the dialogue of ideas through which these two philosopher-statesmen carried forward the ongoing search for the meaning and purpose of the American Revolution.

Adams and Jefferson died within hours of each other on the 50th anniversary of American independence, July 4, 1826. The full significance of what they had thought, of what they had contributed to the founding of the nation, and, above all, of their reconciliation was thus dramatically enforced on the public mind.

Eulogizing the deceased patriots in Boston's Faneuil Hall, Daniel Webster declared: "No two men now live, fellow-citizens, perhaps it may be doubted whether any two men have ever lived, in one age, who, more than those we commemorate, have impressed their own sentiments, in regard to politics and government, on mankind, infused their own opinions more deeply into the opinions of others, or given a more lasting direction to the current of human thought."

With the passing of Adams and Jefferson, the curtain fell on the nation's revolutionary age. But, as Webster said, their work and their wisdom had not perished with them. The revolutionary dialogue of 50 years between Adams and Jefferson was an enduring legacy to American liberty.
BACKGROUND BOOKS

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Time remains to wind up the Bicentennial year with a good look at the American Revolution. What to choose to read is, however, a question of some difficulty.

Over the years, American and British historians writing on aspects of the Revolution have created a body of work overwhelming in its variety and scope. No entirely satisfactory single study exists, whether it be George Bancroft’s pioneering 10-volume A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, from the Discovery of the American Continent (Little, Brown, 1834-75; abridged edition edited by Russel B. Nye, Univ. of Chicago, 1966, cloth & paper) or the latest, two-volume exercise, A NEW AGE NOW BEGINS: A People’s History of the American Revolution by Page Smith (McGraw-Hill, 1976).

These sweeping narratives are surprisingly alike in some ways. But where Bancroft, the founding father of American history, writes stirringly of battles in “drum and bugle” style, Smith, equally fascinated by war, is down-to-earth modern. Example: “The most pressing issue before the [second Continental] Congress was the appointment of a commander in chief for the army at Boston. Artemas Ward was too fat, Israel Putnam too old, William Heath too inexperienced.”

A determined reader can probably do best by going first to primary sources and following up with several books that examine segments of the story or concentrate on particular interpretations of events in America and Britain.

Contemporary diaries and letters from ordinary citizens and soldiers of the revolutionary era can be sampled in the nearly 200 volumes of EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION and THE FIRST AMERICAN FRONTIER (Arno, 1968-71). Other books offer telling selections of such correspondence along with the major public documents from the pens of the eighteenth century Americans who wrote—and wrote well—even as they charted a course for their new country.


As a setting for the contemporary papers, no better brief chronological introduction to the period can be found than Edmund S. Morgan’s THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC: 1763-1789 (Univ. of Chicago, 1956, cloth & paper). More detailed but not unwieldy are John Richard Alden’s narrative, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Knopf, 1969, cloth & paper), and his THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1775-1783 (Harper & Row, 1954, cloth & paper); the latter, limited specifically to the war years, follows the ebb and flow of the military campaigns of Washington and his foes.

The conflicting currents of political belief in colonial America are described in several books. One, Hannah Arendt’s rigorous ON REVOLUTION (Viking, 1963, cloth & paper), considers the character of the American Revolution as...
Background Books: The American Revolution

Part of the larger phenomenon of revolution in modern history and stresses its continuing relevance to the world.

The Colonial Background of the American Revolution: Four Essays in American Colonial History by Charles McLean Andrews (Yale, 1924, cloth & paper), a short volume by the father of modern scholarship on early America, portrays the changing, increasingly awkward relationships between Britain and the colonists during the century and a half before the rebellion. The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution by Bernard Bailyn (Harvard, 1967, cloth & paper) tells how expectations brought from Britain by the colonists shaped their responses to such measures as the Stamp Act and were in turn altered by subsequent events.

Works that stress the world political climate before and during the American Revolution are The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III by Sir Lewis Namier (London: Macmillan, 1960, cloth; St. Martin's, 1961, paper), in two volumes for the reader with ample time and strong interest, and The Age of Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800 edited by R. R. Palmer (Princeton, 1959), also in two volumes. Vol. I seeks to place the American Revolution in the context of contemporary reformist impulses in Europe.


Another book that, like the Morgans', treats the background of the Revolution more broadly than its title suggests is The Boston Tea Party by Benjamin Woods Labaree (Oxford, 1964, cloth & paper). It provides a full account of the tea trade and American resistance to imposition of the Townshend Acts, as well as those "three short hours on a cold December night in 1773" when a small band of men in Boston Harbor "precipitated a reaction that led with little pause to the Declaration of Independence."

How that great document was drafted is described in Carl Lotus Becker's book, first published in 1922, The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas (Knopf, 1942, cloth; Random House/Vintage, 1958, paper). It discusses the Declaration's antecedents in the eighteenth century's prevailing philosophy of "natural rights" and provides close textual analysis of the Declaration itself. Becker's critique of the document's literary qualities—he speaks of "the high seriousness, a kind of lofty pathos" of Jefferson's sentences—has yet to be matched.

The reader who wants to know more about American society at the time the nation was evolving would do well to begin with Jackson Turner Main's The Social Structure of Revolutionary America, 1760-1781 (Princeton, 1965, cloth & paper). Main uses tax rolls and other data to show sharp economic differences among the colonists and describes early American class distinctions and styles of living. A next step might be the bulky American Education: The Colonial Experience by Lawrence A. Cremin (Harper & Row, 1970, cloth & paper). It encompasses...
the era's entire cultural and social development—in households, churches, business, politics, but most of all in schools and colleges, from 1607 to 1783.

**THE LOYALISTS IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, 1766-1783** by Robert McCluer Calhoon (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973) is useful for understanding the war's backyard opponents.

**THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770-1823** by David Brion Davis (Cornell, 1975, cloth & paper) deals with the apathy or antipathy encountered by abolitionists of the time.

Merrill Jensen's **THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: An Interpretation of the Social-Constitutional History of the American Revolution, 1774-1781** (Univ. of Wis., 1940) is fairly difficult reading for the nonspecialist. It is, however, the definitive work on the establishment of the United States' first, shaky national government. Easier to read is the follow-up narrative of the postwar Confederation period by Andrew C. McLaughlin, **THE CONSTITUTION, 1783-1789** (Harper, 1905, cloth; Macmillan, 1962, paper).

The economic forces at play throughout the revolutionary era figure to some degree in the work of most historians; the first to focus mainly on those forces was the controversial Charles A. Beard. In **AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES** (Macmillan, 1935, cloth; Free Press, 1965, paper), he argues that the Constitution was the product of conservative interests, "principally . . . four groups of personality interests which had been adversely affected under the Articles of Confederation: money, public securities, manufacturers, and trade and shipping." His interpretation is today considered at best oversimplified. A revisionist view—rather hard reading—can be had in Forrest McDonald's **WE THE PEOPLE: The Economic Origins of the Constitution** (Univ. of Chicago, 1958, cloth & paper), a close examination of the complexity of economic interests at work in the hammering out of the nation's enduring charter.

Finally, there is **ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION**, a collection of original articles edited by Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson (Univ. of N.C., 1973, cloth; Norton, 1973, paper). Bernard Bailyn, Rowland Berthoff, Richard Maxwell Brown, H. James Henderson, Jack P. Greene, William G. McLaughlin, Edmund S. Morgan, John Murrin, and John Shy were asked to summarize "for educated readers the results of their studies in aspects of the Revolution best understood by them and for which they have gained the respect of their professional colleagues."

Taking up such themes as violence in the 1760s and '70s, the effects of the war on the civilian population, voting blocs in the Continental Congress, and the role of religion, they fulfill the hope expressed in the opening chapter that "when all the [Bicentennial] medallions have been struck, the pageantry performed, the commercial gimmicks exploited, and the market-tested hackwork published," these essays might help to explain "what, in the context of the knowledge now available, the American Revolution was all about and what bearing it should have on our lives."

**EDITOR'S NOTE.** Jack P. Greene, professor of history at the Johns Hopkins University and a 1974-75 Fellow, and Forrest C. Pogue, director of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Institute for Historical Research of the Smithsonian Institution, gave advice on this bibliography.
MEN OF THE REVOLUTION

Their Lives:


JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME. Dumas Malone. 5 vols. (Little, Brown, 1948, 1970, cloth & paper)

JOHN ADAMS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. Catherine Drinker Bowen. (Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1950, cloth; Grosset & Dunlap, 1957, paper)


THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN. This work, translated from the French in which diplomat Franklin wrote it, was first published in London in 1793. The Library of Congress now has 135 cards in its catalog for editions published since—including one edited by Leonard W. Labaree (Yale, 1964).

Their Letters:


THE DIARIES OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, 1748-1799. Edited by J. C. Fitzpatrick. 4 vols. (Houghton, Mifflin, 1925)


THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON. Edited by Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke. 22 vols. to date. (Columbia, 1961-76)*

THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON. Edited by Julian P. Boyd. 19 vols. to date. (Princeton, 1950)*

* These and a number of other collections of writings by famous and lesser-known revolutionary figures are being edited and published under the sponsorship of the National Historical Publications and Records Commission.
CURRENT BOOKS

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L of C 75-4408
ISBN 0-691-07575-1

Democratic control of government is impossible without widespread comprehension of governing technicalities. The federal budget overwhelms the citizen who would understand how the President manages the spending of some $400 billion yearly. Since publication in 1975 of Fisher's overview, major changes have been incorporated in the bureaucratic-legislative processes he describes. Nevertheless, Fisher's work remains exemplary for its comprehensiveness, painstaking clarification of concepts, and avoidance of unnecessary jargon. The book is also an invaluable source on the conflicts with Congress generated by President Nixon. Among other matters, its author explains how Nixon's men contrived to impound monies in a "prospective sense" that "gave precedence to an Administration recommendation, not yet enacted, over a public law already on the books and funded by Congress."

—Joaquín Romero-Maura

ADVENTURE, MYSTERY, AND ROMANCE: Formula Stories as Art and Popular Culture
By John G. Cawelti
Univ. of Chicago, 1976
336 pp. $15
L of C 75-5077
ISBN 0-226-09866-4

Can fiction ground out according to a formula (detective novels, romances, Westerns) have artistic merit? University of Chicago professor Cawelti, a founder of the Popular Culture Association, argues that the key to quality lies in the degree to which formula stories, like tribal myths, affirm things as they are; resolve tensions, conflicts, and ambiguities; permit fantasy exploration of taboos; or help readers to absorb changes in social custom. Viewed thus, early detective fiction supported the nineteenth century's bourgeois order. Later, mystery writer Dashiell Hammett's lone detectives symbolized the individual's resistance to the breakdown of morality in big cities.

—Thomas Cripps
DEAN ACHESON: The State Department Years
By David S. McLellan
Dodd, Mead, 1976
480 pp. $17.50
L of C 76-9482
ISBN 0-396-07313-1

In this study by political scientist David McLellan, Dean Acheson emerges as an arrogant rationalist, whose close associations with Justices Brandeis, Holmes, and Frankfurter reinforced his natural resistance to suffering fools—and enthusiasts—lightly. His character assured that as Under Secretary (1945-47) and Secretary of State (1949-53) he would be at the center of controversies. Among Acheson's achievements, McLellan emphasizes the development of a strategic foundation for U.S. policy toward Russia and his NATO diplomacy. Among Acheson's failures: his inability during the Korean War to separate vital from peripheral strategic interests. The author achieves admirable analytic balance despite the fact that key documents for 1950-53 remain classified and unavailable.

—Samuel F. Wells, Jr.

RUSSIAN LITERATURE TRIQUARTERLY
Edited by Carl R. and Ellendea Proffer
Ardis (2901 Heatherway, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48104)
$6 vol., $15.95 yearly
ISSN 0-88233-881

One would think that every major work of Russian literature had long since been made accessible in translation to American readers. Not so. But in 1971 two enterprising scholars, working from their living room, did something about it. The Proffers produce three bound volumes a year of translations of Russian prose and poetry. Their startling "finds" so far include stories by Nobel Prize-winner Ivan Bunin and poems by the gifted young émigré Joseph Brodsky. The current volume is a compilation of writings by Russian "futurists." Coming up: a collection of two centuries of satire, and works by the long-suppressed "fantastic realist" Mikhail Bulgakov.

—S. Frederick Starr

JAPAN AND CHINA: From War to Peace, 1894-1972
By Marius B. Jansen
Rand McNally, 1975
547 pp. $13.95
L of C 74-19516

This product of 20 years' research and reflection by a leading U.S. scholar owes its existence to his belief, shared by many, that East Asia will remain "the sharpest test for American understanding and wisdom in the last quarter of this century." His comprehensive and incisive description of the intricate political and cultural interplay between China and Japan as they responded to the impact of the Western world covers the dramatic
period from the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 to Premier Tanaka’s visit to Chou En-lai in 1972. Both the Japanese and the Chinese still have a long way to go to attain as integrated a view of their own recent histories as Jansen achieves.

—Toru Haga

A NATION OF BEHAVIORS
By Martin E. Marty
Univ. of Chicago, 1976
239 pp. $8.95
L of C 76-7997

Old ways of defining ourselves religiously are breaking down. Even the Catholic-Protestant-Jew distinctions, still central to most U.S. thinking as late as the 1950s, have lost importance. With a sensitive ear for current language, Marty, a professor of religious history at Chicago, suggests that Americans are using a new sixfold typology: Mainline Religion; Evangelicalism and Fundamentalism; Pentecostal-Charismatic Religion; New Religions (including those of Asian origin); Ethnic Religion (including African); and Civil Religion. These designations, which reflect differences in religious social behavior rather than avowed beliefs, tell us little we do not already know. But Marty’s overall picture of the American religious scene will affect evaluations and policies as ecumenical institutions, representing chiefly mainline religion, are supplemented by new approaches to cooperation among much more diverse groups.

—John B. Cobb, Jr.

DIANYING: An Account of Films and the Audience in China
By Jay Leyda
MIT, 1972, 515 pp. $6.95
L of C 78-175719
ISBN 0-262-12046-1

When Leyda’s Chinese wife Si-lan in 1958 received an invitation to work as a choreographer in China, he accompanied her to Peking where they spent most of 1959–64 and he undertook the task of examining the Chinese film archive. From his work emerged two books: *Films Beget Films*, a classic on the use made of archive footage in various countries, and *Dianying*, which takes its title from the Chinese word for movies, literally “electric shadows.” Some readers may be put off by the long synopses of popular Chinese films. But many social and political clues are embedded in this material, and future historians will no doubt thank Leyda.

—Erik Barnouw
NEW TITLES

Contemporary Affairs

At the behest of the Council on Foreign Relations, Rustow and Mugno, both of City University of New York, have produced a minor miracle: a clear picture of OPEC's origins, actions, and prospects. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries formed in 1960 gradually wrested control of Middle East oil from the multinational corporations and suddenly, in 1973–74, forced a “five-fold increase in price” that shook the West. The oil cartel has shrewdly focused on “price solidarity,” ignoring its members’ political differences. In the West, “vacillations in U.S. policy” have “delayed development of alternatives to oil.” Rustow and Mugno think that the OPEC nations and the oil companies may continue to prosper but the OPEC elites must acquire new wisdom to match new riches.

Edited by black economist Mabel M. Smythe, this is a hefty up-to-date version of the 1966 American Negro Reference Book (John P. Davis, ed.). Thirty chapters by 39 contributors begin with John Hope Franklin’s “A Brief History”; cover changes in legal status and population distribution of blacks; and describe the black role in the U.S. economy, politics, education, diplomacy, agriculture, the professions, protest groups, the theater, music, arts, letters, the media, the military, foundations, sports, and organized religion—both the established churches and offshoots from African religious traditions. The emphasis on youth and women is strong; a list of “black women of achievement” ranges from well-known actresses to doctors and lawyers to Doris Turner, executive vice-president of New York’s District 1199, Drug and Hospital Worker’s Union—the highest-ranking woman officer in the American labor movement today.

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ASIA'S NEW GIANT: How the Japanese Economy Works
Edited by Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky
$19.95 cloth, $10.95 paper
L of C 75-42304

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN JAPAN
Edited by Richard E. Caves and Masu Uekusa
$9.95 cloth, $3.50 paper
L of C 75-44509

HOW JAPAN'S ECONOMY GREW SO FAST: The Sources of Postwar Expansion
Edited by Edward F. Denison and William K. Chung
$10.95 cloth, $4.95 paper
L of C 76-10836

The first, "granddaddy" volume to emerge from a major Brookings Institution study of the Japanese economy begun in 1972 describes a nation that in less than 25 years after defeat in World War II became the Number Three industrial power in the world. The 23 scholars who collaborated on the Patrick/Rosovsky work deliver what the subtitle promises: an explanation of how Japan's economy works. To quote the foreword by the late Kermit Gordon: "Vast and detailed literature on the Japanese economy does exist, but it is in the Japanese language and well-nigh inaccessible to the Western world." Asia's New Giant fills the gap. Among its authors' observations: Japan's "historical experience and value system have resulted in an economic ideology favoring "harmonious government-business relations," emphasizing "group rather than individual" and "national rather than personal" welfare. Japan's annual growth rate of 8.8 percent from 1953 to 1971 exceeded by 4.6 percentage points the average of 10 other developed nations, including the United States and West Germany. Five sources of growth—capital, application of new knowledge to production, changes in employment and hours of work, reallocation of resources away from agriculture and nonagricultural self-employment, economies of scale (caused chiefly by market growth inside Japan)—all made individual contributions larger than in any of the other countries during the same period. Equipping a nation of 100 million people with modern household appliances pushed Japan's production of electric washers from 461,000 in 1955 to 4,204,000 in 1972, of electric vacuum cleaners from 51,000 to 3,454,000. Despite labor shortages, pollution, urban congestion, vulnerability to increased costs of oil and food imports, the Japanese economy, the authors conclude, can be expected to continue to grow—though less rapidly than in the past. Readers in search of even more information on industrial organization and productivity than the New Giant book provides will find it in the Caves/Uekusa and Denison/Chung sequels. Both offer explanatory tabular and graphic material from specialized researches.
CURRENT BOOKS

FILM: THE DEMOCRATIC ART
By Garth Jowett
Little, Brown, 1976
518 pp. $19.95
L of C 75-3241
ISBN 0-316-47370-7

Among "new forms of communication media," Jowett claims, film "did the most" to help transform the United States from a nation of isolated, farm-oriented communities into a relatively homogeneous urbanized society. His long, well-documented analysis contributes to the study of mass media (in contrast to more traditional models of historical causation) as spurs to social change. He gives scant attention to documentary or educational films. Hollywood as a force shaping the average American's expectations and willingness to alter his life, the make-up of movie audiences, the economics of the moving picture industry, attempts at private and public censorship of films—these are Jowett's meat. His book is more comprehensive than another with a similar theme, Robert Sklar's Movie-Made America: A Social History of American Movies (1975).

ALLENDE'S CHILE: The Political Economy of the Rise and Fall of the Unidad Popular
By Stefan De Vylder
Cambridge, 1976
251 pp. $13.95
L of C 72-2779
ISBN 0-521-21046-1

ALLENDE'S CHILE
Edited by Philip O'Brien
Praeger, 1976
296 pp. $20
L of C 75-23087

STRUGGLE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE: Politics and Rural Labor in Chile, 1919-1973
By Brian Loveman
Ind. Univ., 1976
251 pp. $12.50
L of C 74-6521
ISBN 0-253-35565-6

Of these three books dealing variously with the recent Chilean experience, two focus exclusively on the turbulent Allende years, 1970-73. De Vylder, lecturer at the Stockholm School of Economics, describes the conflicts among factions of the ruling Unidad Popular coalition and evaluates Salvador Allende's neo-Marxist economic policy, finding in its errors and defeats an explanation for Chile's middle-class counter-revolution. Fact-laden and concise, De Vylder's study outdistances most of the essays in the uneven collection edited by O'Brien, a lecturer in economics at the University of Glasgow. The exception is Alex Nove's calm discussion of Allende's economics; the other essays are sociological in approach, Marxist in outlook, often didactic in tone. One is titled "Was the United States Responsible for the Chilean Coup?" (answer: no, the U.S. role was far less important than that of the domestic Right). California political scientist Loveman's portrayal of the long rural class struggle offers much new, original material on the history of Chile's problems of poverty and exploitation, which Allende sought in vain to solve.
THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER: The Story of the Survivors’ Unprecedented Lawsuit
By Gerald Stern
Random House, 1976
274 pp. $8.95
L. of C 75-40554
ISBN 0-394-40390-8

Courtroom drama seldom reveals the tedious drudgery of workaday lawyering. Remarkably, Washington attorney Gerald M. Stern manages in this book to wring suspense from a case that never came to trial but is significant for demonstrating beyond question the capacity of the U.S. legal system “to respond, to create new precedent,” to provide compensation for those who survive another’s reckless act “physically unharmed but mentally scarred.” Stern shared—and shares with his readers—the anguish of those who survived the much publicized 1972 Buffalo Creek (W.Va.) dam-break disaster. The case consumed his energies and passion for almost three years before the Pittston Company ultimately settled for $13.5 million, out of court, rather than risk further adverse publicity and greater financial loss in a jury trial.

History

ATLAS OF EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: The Revolutionary Era 1760-1790
157 pp. $100 to Dec. 31, 1976, $125 thereafter
L. of C 75-2982
ISBN 0-691-04634-4

Maps will speak only when questioned, as historian Marc Bloch once said about archaeological documents. The makers of this atlas (editors and scholars associated with the Newberry Library, the Institute of Early American History and Culture, and Princeton University Press) did ask questions—about population figures, roads, customs districts, the location of taverns, academies, printers, and so on, through a wealth of statistics and specific detail. The result of their 15 years of effort is a sweeping political, religious, cultural, economic, military, racial, and social history of the three decades when the American colonies became a nation. Two hundred eighty-six newly drawn maps prod the reader in his turn to raise questions about early America he had never thought to ask before; the accompanying text provides most of the answers. Bibliographic material, in part critical, is included in the text. There is appropriate emphasis on an area largely overlooked in this Bicentennial year—the West Indies, an integral part of Britain’s American empire where many of the naval battles of the War of Independence were fought.
CURRENT BOOKS

THE DAMNABLE QUESTION: A Study in Anglo-Irish Relations
By George Dangerfield
Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1976
400 pp. $14.95
L of C 76-3456
ISBN 0-316-17200-6

In elegant prose, George Dangerfield, a distinguished English historian, provides a compelling account of the evolution of the "Irish problem" from 1800 until the Anglo-Irish treaty in 1921. Concentrating on the years 1912 to 1921, he terms the Easter Rebellion of 1916 "a point of no return." The brutal British reaction to the Dublin uprising converted a minority revolutionary movement into a popular cause. The settlement of 1921 divided Ireland and, Dangerfield contends, left "no chance" as the revolution in the South continued "to test the concept of an Irish Republic for a United Ireland"—the only solution that might have worked.

URBAN SLAVERY IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTH 1820–
1860: A Quantitative History
By Claudia Dale Goldin
Univ. of Chicago, 1976
168 pp. $12.95
L of C 75-2887
ISBN 0-226-30104-4

For decades historians have agreed that slavery in the cities of the American South gradually diminished because the conditions of urban life made the use of slaves expensive and inefficient. Goldin rejects this assumption as uncritical acceptance of arguments made by white laborers who were rivals for jobs in the slavery era. Reexaming the question, she finds instead that the costs of keeping slaves in cities ran no higher than in the country, that slaves worked well apart from their masters without the threat of the lash, and that urban slave prices were comparable to those in rural regions. In short, slavery before the Civil War was not simply a rural phenomenon but flourished in the cities as well. Goldin's econometrical approach, using such prosaic data as price indexes, demonstrates again the worth of continued reexamination of the history of slavery in America.

GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY
IN THE WILSON ERA:
The U.S. Navy in Haiti,
1915–1916
By David Healy
Univ. of Wis., 1976
268 pp. $15
L of C 75-32074

Implicit in this compact monograph are some parallels to recent U.S. interventions overseas. David Healy of the University of Wisconsin (Milwaukee) shows that Woodrow Wilson, despite his calls for spreading democracy and self-government, treated the Caribbean as an American lake and the Haitians as children in need of guidance. The principal instruments of his paternalism were U.S. Navy officers, who took on unwonted
roles in supervising the political and diplomatic affairs of Haiti and attempting with limited success to guide its citizens toward stability and democratic rule.

George Catlett Marshall, who led the U.S. Army in World War II and as Secretary of State fathered the Marshall Plan to rebuild postwar Europe, never wrote his autobiography. But soon after World War I, he set down his experiences as chief of operations of the U.S. First Infantry Division and later chief of operations of the U.S. First Army during its last offensives in France. A copy of his manuscript found in 1941 has only now been published. Because Marshall believed that military men should not write anything that might stir controversy, his memoir tends to avoid personalities and second-guessing on command decisions. But the reader gets a vivid impression of the pressures on a top staff officer as he moves troops into combat and keeps them supplied—and a better understanding of Marshall himself, a man of some warmth and humor, glimpsed as he was learning the lessons of leadership he would apply so well in later conflicts.

Covering the rise and fall of Senator Joseph McCarthy, University of Illinois historian Fried shows how the Red-baiting Senator from Wisconsin was perceived by his opponents, how they variously dealt with him, and how procedure, tradition, and the fragmentation of power in the Senate long paralyzed his disapproving colleagues. This detailed chronicle starts with the 1948 Tydings subcommittee investigations of McCarthy’s charges of Communism-in-Government and ends with the anticlimactic Senate vote for censure in December 1954. Democratic Minority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson mustered the necessary votes against Republican McCarthy only by insisting that “the real issue” was bad manners, i.e., whether the world’s “greatest deliberative body” would “permit [a Senator’s] abuse of a duly appointed committee.”
HENRY WALLACE, HARRY TRUMAN, AND THE COLD WAR
By Richard J. Walton
Viking, 1976, 400 pp. $10
L of C 76-17540
ISBN 0-670-36859-8

Richard J. Walton, author of Cold War and Counter-Revolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy, offers a provocative view of how the United States might have fared if the voters had chosen Henry Wallace instead of Harry Truman in 1948. He contends that Wallace, though admittedly a poor politician, was correct in claiming that Americans could not purchase reliable friends with foreign aid, that containment of Communism would cost much blood and treasure, that NATO would divide the world into hostile camps, and that Truman's stability-oriented diplomacy would cause former colonial peoples to view the United States as their enemy. Walton's analysis is based almost exclusively on the Wallace archives and his own dovish view of the U.S. experience in Vietnam.

Arts & Letters

THE EUROPEAN VISION OF AMERICA
By Hugh Honour
$17.50 cloth, $12 paper
L of C 75-33892
ISBN 0-910386-26-9

ABROAD IN AMERICA: Visitors to the New Nation 1776-1914
Edited by Marc Pachter and Frances Wein
Addison-Wesley, 1976, 347 pp.
$17.95 cloth, $7.95 paper
L of C 75-39942
ISBN 0-201-00031-8

If ever two books were meant for each other, these are. Hugh Honour's catalog for the Cleveland Museum's exhibit and the Pachter/Wein volume for the National Portrait Gallery's 1976 show of works by and pictures of famous visitors to the United States should be shelved together and savored for their contrasts. Vision describes in text and 339 illustrations the romantic notions held by European artists and writers concerning the faraway New World. Abroad is more about what the land and its people over the years have looked like up close: To philosopher François-Jean Marquis de Chastellus, writing in the 1780s of the few young American adults who lived with their parents: "In a nation which is in a permanent state of growth, everything ... divides and multiplies." To Sholom Aleichem (1859-1916), the immigrant Yiddish writer famous for his resilient humor: "It's a free country. You can bloat up from hunger, drop dead on the street—no one will stop you." To painter John Butler Yeats, who left Dublin (and his poet son) in 1907 to visit New York and stayed on until his death in 1922: "Hope, the great divinity, is domiciled in America."
COLLECTED POEMS, 1956-1976
By David Wagoner
Ind. Univ., 1976
301 pp. $12.50
L of C 75-28915
ISBN 0-253-11245-1

Dry Sun, Dry Wind was Wagoner’s first, admired book, published 20 years ago. Plain spoken, the early poems about a carefully observed natural world and man’s physical relationship to it, reprinted here, raise echoes of contemporary British nature poets, notably Ted Hughes. Much of the later work takes its idiom from Northwest Indian stories of grizzly bears becoming men, of the secret spirits of great forests. Wagoner’s is a calm and watchful vision of parts of America like Dungeness Bay where, at dusk, he writes, the sanderlings alight: “On sea-wrack floating in the final ripples/ Lightly, scarcely touching, and now telling/ This night, Here, and this night coming/ Here, where we are, . . . / Here is the place.”

REFLECTIONS ON ESPIONAGE: The Question of Cupcake
By John Hollander
Athenaeum, 1976, 79 pp. $8.95
L of C 75-33826
ISBN 0-689-10704-8

Part of this book-length poem appeared in Poetry in 1974, other portions in the Carolina Quarterly and the Ohio Review, exciting readers and reviewers who were struck by Hollander’s elegant use of a master-spy code-named “Cupcake” as spokesman for modern man. Cupcake worries about his coworkers (“Aspirin,” “Steampump,” “Artifact”), knows that his life is (if he can live it) the cover his work provides, says that “Transmitting the truth is always a problem./ Facts we can encipher, and they then become/ Sendable messages; why do not the truths/ Climb obediently into disguises,/ Learn their lines well and be off?”

A RIVER RUNS THROUGH IT and Other Stories
By Norman Maclean
Univ. of Chicago, 1976
217 pp. $7.95
L of C 75-20895
ISBN 0-226-5005-1

Tender, well-wrought, in places so funny they ought to be read aloud to friends, the three autobiographical stories in this book are the first fiction published by their 74-year-old author, a retired professor of English. He recreates a rich Western landscape of rowdy frontier towns, harsh mountains, and idyllic trout streams. Maclean’s people are fine: his Scotch Presbyterian minister-father to whom dry-fly fishing was a second religion, his mother, the reckless younger brother he loved but could not help, and the characters he calls back to life from his own early
days in Montana logging camps and the firefighting Forest Service—the rangers, the cook who was "fancy with cards," the sawyer who supported himself as a pimp in the winter months in any town that had a good Carnegie Library where, off duty, he could read to his heart's content.

"Torn from the rib of John Locke, America presents a more complicated relationship between literature and liberalism [than Europe]," Irving Howe writes in his introduction to this anthology. The list of New Republic "back of the book" contributors reads like an honor roll of writers in English for the years since 1914. Howe credits the magazine's editors, especially during "its early best days" and later under Edmund Wilson's literary editorship, with assuming that "liberalism has the responsibility for creating conditions of freedom and generosity in which literature may flourish." So here are poems or prose by Frost, Auden, Nabokov, Yeats, Dos Passos, the Stalinist Michael Gold, and others who did not share the New Republic's political biases—as well as many now famous writers who, off and on, did.

Everybody talks about it, but it took the deputy head of the climate project at the National Center for Atmospheric Research and his writer-editor wife to bring this systematic "world weather alert" to the public. They review the observations of experts: that relative stability of global climate in the 1950s and '60s has given way in this decade to natural climatic instability expected to continue into the 1980s; that inadvertent climate modification caused by heat pollution and the effect of chlorofluorocarbons and other substances on the earth's ozone layer pose real but not fully understood dangers; that deliberate climate modification, such as cloud-seeding to modify Atlantic hurricanes and
Pacific typhoons, could have undesirable physical and political results. Schneider's "Genesis strategy" calls for governments to devise plans now to circumvent possible future climatological disaster and crop failure, as did the Pharaoh in the Old Testament story when Joseph warned him to store foodstuffs for lean years ahead.

**BEAUTIFUL SWIMMERS:**
The discovery of toxic traces of the pesticide Kepone in Chesapeake Bay shellfish adds poignancy to the reading of this book. For the Smithsonian's William W. Warner writes so that one cares about the ecology of the continent's largest estuary, the zoology of his "beautiful swimmers," the blue crabs, and the fortunes of the men who catch the "sooks" (female crabs) and "Jimmies" (males) in pots all over the Bay when the waters are warm, or in winter by dredging in Hampton Roads. Warner's scientific and technical information is engaging: "Crabs moult every three to five days when they are tiny, but the interval spaces out to twenty to fifty days as they grow large" and the process becomes more difficult, "requiring as much as three hours of labored wriggling for big crabs." He has a keen ear for the talk of Chesapeake Bay watermen: "'Crabs is fonny,' said Captain Lester. 'Say that again,' said his son, somewhat sourly." Drawings by Consuelo Barnes Hanks enhance the book's beauty and usefulness.

**COMPUTER POWER AND HUMAN REASON:**
This controversial study by an MIT computer specialist excited such interest that his San Francisco publisher (whose textbooks usually do not attract public attention) had to print a total of 60,000 copies shortly after publication. Professor Weizenbaum really writes two books in one. He first describes a computer "program" in terms comprehensible to the layman. In the second, contentious (and somewhat disjointed) segment, he explains his famed ELIZA program, which simulates the learning of a language, and attacks what he considers misinterpretation of it by psychologists and others.
New Books By Fellows and Former Fellows


GROWTH IN AMERICA. Edited by Chester L. Cooper. Greenwood, 1976.


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CURRENT BOOKS

PAPERBOUNDS

THE PRACTICE OF DEATH. By Eike-Henner W. Kluge. Yale, 1976. 250 pp. $3.95 (cloth, $11.50)

Why is abortion a policy issue for both Republicans and Democrats in this election year? How does "private ownership" apply to suicide? Is "seneicide" ever justifiable? In this plainly written textbook for Yale's medical ethics series, Kluge, a professor of philosophy at the University of Victoria (Canada), devotes 100 pages to current abortion arguments; he analyzes fallacies in logic and explores interesting moral nooks and crannies (for example, the rights of the putative father-to-be). Other questions relating to the practice of death (all dying that is not natural or accidental) are examined in the light of positions held by moral traditionalists and by adherents of "the new morality" (ethical relativism).

A moderate traditionalist himself, Kluge holds that absolute value attaches to personhood, which is based on the "potential of awareness," which is, in turn, determined by neurological development or condition. Only on this basis, he argues, can judgments be made as to whether suicide, seneicide, euthanasia, infanti-icide, or abortion constitute murder.


Editor-in-chief of Parent's Magazine Press, writer, and reviewer, Mrs. Lanes understands what makes good books for children as Lewis Carroll understood the imaginations of the young. Her sensible, witty essays celebrate authors and illustrators as diverse as Kate Greenaway and E. B. White, Arthur Rackham and Maurice Sendak. She calls Theodor Suess (The Cat in the Hat) Geisel a "physician to the psyche of the beleaguered modern child." Writing about mass-market nonliterature for children, she wonders what can follow "books that double as blocks" and others with magnetic pages and quotes a mordant British author: "Kids like bangs. What about a book that explodes?" Part post-mortem, part social history is her essay entitled "Who Killed St. Nicholas?" about the once popular children's magazine for which Kipling wrote his Mowgli stories and President Theodore Roosevelt a piece on "What We Expect of American Boys."

CHINA: A Resource and Curriculum Guide. Edited by Arlene Posner and Arne J. de Keijzer. Univ. of Chicago reprint, 1976. 279 pp. $3.95

Many outside the classroom will find this teachers' guide valuable. Included are sources of materials, such as films, on China; an annotated booklist; information about periodicals, special reports, Asian Studies centers, summer courses; and an introduction by Edwin O. Reischauer.


Neither a dictionary nor a glossary, but an inquiry into a vocabulary. Keywords "in two connected senses," says Williams, "are significant, binding words in certain activities and their interpretation" and "significant,
indicative words in certain forms of thought." His 155 short essays are conceptual biographies of words from "aesthetic" to "work" ("our most general word for doing something, and for something done") that dissolve confusion as they unravel obscure meanings.

THE DECISION TO GO TO THE MOON: Project Apollo and the National Interest. By John M. Logsdon. Univ. of Chicago, 1976. 187 pp. $3.95

The cloth edition of Logsdon's book appeared in 1970 when debate over the usefulness and even the morality of costly space exploration (in view of pressing U.S. problems on earth) was raging. Now that Mars has been probed, the book's continued usefulness lies not in its particular argument (strongly pro-space) but in its step-by-step reconstruction of the Kennedy Administration's use of science as a basis for policy.

WINDSINGER. By Frances Gillmor. Univ. of N. Mex., 1976. 218 pp. $2.95

Regional publishers often discover or reissue minor classics such as this 1930 novel about a Navajo "wind singer." Gillmor's story is based on an actual occurrence in 1922 when the Navajos fled their hogans and moved with their sheep to the high mesas because a man who had been struck by lightning told them a great flood was coming. The author, a white woman, writes movingly of her hero, one of the tribal singers to whom, the Navajos believe, the gods lend healing chants, and of his marriage to Clear-Eyed One. She evokes a landscape that N. Scott Momaday, the Navaho writer, calls "true to my own experience" of the reservation.


"Excellent books are slippery things," runs a line in the introduction to this memoir about the great Russian poet Osip Mandelstam, whose widow describes his life from the day they met, May 1, 1919 (he told her that the victorious Bolsheviks had made a "hetacomb of corpses") to May 1, 1938, when he was arrested for the last time and sent from Stalin's Moscow to prison and then the labor camp where he died, probably in 1940. Years later, with Mandelstam's work in print only in the West, she wrote, in Russia: "In a sense we really do live in a pre-Gutenberg era; more and more people read poetry in the manuscript copies that circulate all over [the Soviet Union]. All the same, I am sorry I shall never see a book."


Humanists once frowned upon economists as practitioners of the science of avarice—the "pig science," Carlyle called it. With admirable clarity, Kirzner shows how modern economics developed from the moment in the nineteenth century when economists first studied subject matter other than "wealth" to the time when they began to look at society from a special point of view, which sees the "economic" as one aspect of almost every human activity. Analyses of Lord Robbins and Ludwig von Mises highlight this reprint of the 1960 cloth edition.
Highbrow, Lowbrow, Middlebrow

by Russell Lynes

When Editor Russell Lynes published his light-hearted analysis in the February 1949 Harper's, Harry S. Truman had just been elected President in his own right, Gerald Ford was a freshman in Congress, and the median U.S. family income was $3,107. At the top of the best-seller list were Lloyd Douglas's religious novel, The Big Fisherman, and Dwight D. Eisenhower's Crusade in Europe. Television was still a novelty.

Tongue in cheek, Lynes sought to gauge the social significance of "taste" in the postwar era. He gave Americans a shorthand way of classifying themselves according to cultural consumption, and "Highbrow, Lowbrow, Middlebrow" remains part of the language. "Apparently, I touched a nerve," Lynes wrote later, "and that is precisely what I meant to do." Life, the 1949 king of the visual media, quickly rebroadcast Lynes's assessment, adding a pictorial chart. We present in 1976 a slightly condensed version of the Harper's article and the April 11, 1949 Life socio-diagram. Lynes adds a postscript; he suggests that competitive American taste, however changed in many outward aspects, has left the rules of the game much as they were in 1949.

The old structure of the upper class, the middle class, and the lower class is on the wane. It isn't wealth or family that makes prestige these days. It's high thinking.

Our heroes now are not the Carnegies or the Morgans but the intellectuals—the atomic scientists, the cultural historians, the writers, the commentators, the thinkers of global thoughts who, we assume for lack of another faith, know better than anyone else how we should cope with what we call with new resonance "our national destiny." What we want are oracles, and the best substitutes we can find are the intellectuals. Einstein makes headlines as
Millikan never did. Toynbee's popularity is to be reckoned with as Spengler's never was. Even Calvert whiskey has selected as Man of Distinction [for its ads] more artists, architects, writers, and commentators than it has industrialists or financiers. What we are headed for is a sort of social structure in which the highbrows are the elite, the middlebrows are the bourgeoisie, and the lowbrows are *hoi polloi*.

For the time being this is perhaps largely an urban phenomenon, and the true middlebrow may readily be mistaken in the small community for a genuine highbrow. But the pattern is emerging with increasing clarity, and the new distinctions do not seem to be based either on money or on breeding. It is true that most highbrows are in the ill-paid professions, notably the academic, and that most middlebrows are at least reasonably well off. Only the lowbrows can be found in about equal percentages at all financial levels.

There may be a time, of course, when the highbrows will be paid in accordance with their own estimate of their worth, but that is not likely to happen in any form of society in which creature comforts are in greater demand than intellectual uplift. Like poets they will have to be content mostly with prestige.

While this social shift is still in its early stages, let us assume a rather lofty position, examine the principal categories with their subdivisions and splinter groups, and see where we ourselves are likely to fetch up in the new order.

**The Highbrows**

The highbrows come first. Edgar Wallace, who was certainly not a highbrow himself, was asked by a newspaper reporter in Hollywood some years ago to define one. "What is a highbrow?" he said. "A highbrow is a man who has found something more interesting than women."

Presumably at some time in every man's life there are things he finds more interesting than women; alcohol, for example, or the World Series. Mr. Wallace has only partially defined the highbrow. Brander Matthews came closer when he said that "a highbrow is a person educated beyond his intelligence," and A. P. Herbert came closest of all when he wrote that "a highbrow is the kind of person who looks at a sausage and thinks of Picasso."

It is this association of culture with every aspect of daily life, from the design of his razor to the shape of the bottle that holds his sleeping pills, that distinguishes the highbrow from the middlebrow or the lowbrow. Spiritually and intellectually, the highbrow inhabits a precinct well up the slopes of Parnassus, and his view of the cultural scene is from above. His vision pinpoints certain lakes and quarries upon which his special affections are concentrated—a perturbed lake called Rilke or a deserted quarry called Kierkegaard—but he believes that he sees them, as he sees the functional design of his razor, always in relation to the broader cultural scene. There is a certain air of omniscience about the highbrow, though that air is in many cases the thin variety encountered on the tops of high mountains from which the view is extensive but the details are lost.

You cannot tell a man that he is a lowbrow any more than you can tell a woman that her clothes are in bad taste. But a highbrow does not mind being called a highbrow. He has worked hard, read widely, traveled far, and listened attentively in order to satisfy his curiosity and establish his squatter's rights in this little

*The Wilson Quarterly/Autumn 1976*

corner of intellectualism. And he does not care who knows it. This is true of both kinds of highbrows—the militant, or crusader, type and the passive, or dilettante, type. These types in general live happily together; the militant highbrow carries the torch of culture, the passive highbrow reads by its light.

"Intellectual Marines"

The carrier of the torch makes a profession of being a highbrow and lives by his calling. He is most frequently found in university and college towns, a member of the liberal-arts faculty, teaching languages (ancient or modern), the fine arts, or literature. His spare time is often devoted to editing a magazine which is read mainly by other highbrows, ambitious undergraduates, and the editors of middlebrow publications in search of talent. When he writes for the magazine himself (or for another "little" magazine) it is usually criticism of criticism of criticism. He leaves the writing of fiction and poetry to others more bent on creation than on what has been created. For the highbrow is primarily a critic and not an artist—a taster, not a cook. He is often more interested in where the arts have been and where they are going than in the objects themselves. He is devoted to the proposition that the arts must be pigeonholed and that their trends should be plotted, or as W. H. Auden puts it—

Our intellectual marines,
Landing in Little Magazines,
Capture a trend.

This gravitation of the highbrows to the universities is fairly recent. In the Twenties, when the little magazines were devoted to publishing experimental writing rather than criticism of exhumed experimental writing, the highbrows flocked to Paris, New York, and Chicago. The transatlantic review, transition, and the little Review, of the lower-case era of literature, were all published in Paris; BROOM was published in New York; Poetry was (and still is) published in Chicago. The principal little magazines now, with the exception of Partisan Review, a New York product but written mostly by academics, are published in the colleges—the Kenyon Review, the Sewanee Review, the Virginia Quarterly, and so on—and their flavor reflects this.

But this does not mean that highbrows do not prefer the centers in which cultural activities are the most varied and active, and these are still London, Paris, New York, and, more recently, Rome. Especially in the fine arts, the highbrow has a chance to make a living in the metropolis where museums are centered and where art is bought and sold as well as created. This is also true of commercial publishing, in which many highbrows find suitable, if not congenial, refuge.
But no matter where they may make their homes, all highbrows live in a world which they believe is inhabited almost entirely by philistines—those who through viciousness or smugness or the worship of materialism gnaw away at the foundations of culture. And the highbrow sees as his real enemy the middlebrow, whom he regards as a pretentious and frivolous man or woman who uses culture to satisfy social or business ambitions; who, to quote Clement Greenberg in Partisan Review, is busy “devaluing the precious, infecting the healthy, corrupting the honest and stultifying the wise.”

It takes a man who feels strongly to use such harsh words, but the militant highbrow has no patience with his enemies. He is a serious man who will not tolerate frivolity where the arts are concerned. It is part of his function as a highbrow to protect the arts from the culture-mongers, and he spits venom at those he suspects of selling the Muses short.

The fact that nowadays everyone has access to culture through schools and colleges, through the press, radio, and museums disturbs him deeply: for it tends to blur the distinctions between those who are serious and those who are frivolous. “Culturally what we have,” writes William Phillips in Horizon, “is a democratic free-for-all in which every individual, being as good as every other one, has the right to question any form of intellectual authority.” To this Mr. Greenberg adds, “It becomes increasingly difficult to tell who is serious and who not.”

Needed: An Elite?

The highbrow does not like to be confused, nor does he like to have his authority questioned, except by other highbrows of whose seriousness he is certain. The result is precisely what you would expect: the highbrows believe in, and would establish, an intellectual elite, “a fluid body of intellectuals . . . whose accepted role in society is to perpetuate traditional ideas and values and to create new ones.” Such an elite would like to see the middlebrow eliminated, for it regards him as the undesirable element in our, and anybody else’s, culture.

“It must be obvious to anyone that the volume and social weight of middlebrow culture,” Mr. Greenberg writes, “borne along as it has been by the great recent increase in the American middle class, have multiplied at least tenfold in the past three decades. This culture presents a more serious threat to the genuine article than the old-time pulp dime novel . . . ever has or will. Unlike the latter, which has its social limits clearly marked out for it, middlebrow culture attacks distinctions as such and insinuates itself everywhere. . . .”

Muses or Masses

By no means are all highbrows so intolerant, or so ambitious for authority. Many of them, the passive ones, are merely consumers totally indifferent to the middlebrows or supercilious about them. Others endeavor to widen the circle of those who can enjoy the arts in their purest forms. Many museums, colleges, and publishing houses are at least partly staffed by highbrows who exert a more than half-hearted effort to make the arts exciting and important to the public. But in his heart of hearts, nearly every highbrow believes with Ortega y Gasset that “the average citizen [is] a creature incapable of receiving the sacrament of art, blind and deaf to pure beauty.” When, for example, the Metropolitan Museum planned to
expand its facilities a few years ago, an art dealer who can clearly be classified as a highbrow remarked: "All this means is less art for more people."

**Highbrow Habitat**

The real highbrow's way of life is as intellectualized as his way of thinking, and as carefully plotted. He is likely to be either extremely self-conscious about his physical surroundings and creature comforts or else sublimely, and rather ostentatiously, indifferent to them.

If he affects the former attitude, he will within the limits of his income surround himself with works of art. If he cannot afford paintings, he buys drawings. Color reproductions, except as casual reminders tucked in the frame of a mirror, are beneath him. The facsimile is no substitute in his mind for the genuine, and he would rather have a slight sketch by a master, Braque or Picasso or even Jackson Pollock, than a fully realized canvas by an artist he considers not quite first-rate. Drawings by his friends he hangs in the bathroom.

His furniture, if it is modern, consists of identifiable pieces by Aalto or Breuer or Mies van der Rohe or Eames; it does not come from department stores. If he finds modern unsympathetic, he will tend to use Biedermeier or the more "entertaining" varieties of Victorian, which he collects piece by piece with an eye to the slightly eccentric. If he has antiques, you may be sure they are not maple; the cult of "early American" is offensive to him.

The food that he serves will be planned with the greatest care, either very simple (a perfect French omelette made with sweet butter) or elaborate recipes from *Wine and Food* magazine published in London and edited by André Simon. If he cannot afford a pound of butter with every guinea fowl, he will in all probability resort to the casserole and peasant cookery with the sparer parts of animals and birds seasoned meticulously with herbs that he gets from a little importer in the wholesale district. His wine is more likely to be a "perfectly adequate little red wine" for eighty-nine cents a half-gallon than an imported French vintage. (Anybody with good advice can buy French wines, but the discovery of a good domestic bottle shows perception and educated taste.) He wouldn't dream of washing his salad bowl. His collection of phonograph records is likely to bulk large at the ends and sag in the middle—a predominance of Bach-and-before at one end and Stravinsky, Schönberg, Bartók, and New Orleans jazz at the other. His radio, if he has one, is turned on rarely; he wouldn't have a television set in the house.

**Sublime Indifference**

The highbrow who disregards his creature comforts does it with a will. He lives with whatever furniture happens to come his way in a disorganized conglomeration of Victorian department store and Mexican bits and pieces. He takes care of his books in that he knows where each one is no matter in what disorder they may appear. Every other detail of domestic life he leaves to his wife, of whose taste he is largely unaware, and he eats what she gives him without comment. If he is a bachelor, he eats in a cafeteria or drugstore and sometimes spills soup on the open pages of his book. He is oblivious to the man who sits down opposite him, and, if Edgar Wallace is right, to the woman who shares his table. He is not a man without passions, but they have their place. Dress is a matter of indifference to him.
The highbrows about whom I have been writing are mainly consumers and not creators—editors, critics, and dilettantes. The creative artists who are generally considered highbrows—such men as T. S. Eliot, E. M. Forster, Picasso, and Stravinsky—seem to me to fall in another category, that of the professional man who, while he may be concerned with communicating with a limited and perhaps largely highbrow audience, is primarily a doer and not a done-by. When Eliot or Forster or Picasso or Stravinsky sits down at his worktable, I do not know whether he says to himself, “I am going to create Art,” but I very much doubt if that is what is in his mind. He is concerned rather with the communication of ideas within the frame of a poem, novel, a painting, or a ballet suite, and if it turns out to be art (which many think it frequently does) that is to him a product of creation, an extra dividend of craftsmanship, intelligence, and sensibility. But when this happens he is taken up by the highbrow consumer—and his reputation will be every bit as carefully guarded by the highbrows as a hundred shares of Standard Oil of New Jersey by the middlебrows. He will be sold—at a price decided upon by the highbrows—to the middlebrows, who are natural gamblers in the commodities of culture.

**Essential Purists**

In a sense it is this determination of par that is the particular contribution of the highbrow. Others may quarrel with his evaluations, but the fact remains that unless there were a relatively small group of self-appointed intellectuals who took it upon themselves to ransack the studios of artists, devour the manuscripts of promising writers, and listen at the keyholes of young composers, many talented men and women might pass unnoticed and our culture be the poorer.

The highbrows are saddened by the writers and painters who have set out to be serious men, as Hemingway did, and then become popular by being taken up by the middlebrows. They even go so far as to say that a story published in *Partisan Review* is a better story than if it were published in *The New Yorker* or *Harper’s Bazaar*.

This attitude, which is the attitude of the purist, is valuable. The ground in which the arts grow stays fertile only when it is fought over by both artists and consumers, and the phalanx of highbrows in the field can be counted on to keep the fray alive.

**The Lowbrow**

The highbrow’s friend is the lowbrow.

The highbrow enjoys and respects the lowbrow’s art—jazz, for instance—which he is likely to call a spontaneous expression of folk culture. The lowbrow is not interested, as the middlebrow is, in pre-empting any of the highbrow’s function. In fact, he is almost completely oblivious of the highbrow unless he happens to be taken up by him—as many jazz musicians, primitive painters, and ballad writers have been—and then he is likely to be flattered, a little suspicious, and somewhat amused. A creative lowbrow like the jazz musician is a prominent citizen in his own world, and being taken up by the highbrows has very little effect on his social standing therein. He is tolerant of the highbrow, whom he regards as somewhat odd and out-of-place in a world in which people do things and enjoy them without analyzing why or worrying about their cultural implications.

The lowbrow doesn’t give a hang about art qua art. He knows what he
likes, and he doesn’t care why he likes it—which implies that all children are lowbrows. The word “beautiful,” which has long since ceased to mean anything to the highbrow, is a perfectly good word to the lowbrow. Beautiful blues, beautiful sunsets, beautiful women, all things that do something to a man inside without passing through the mind, association without allusions, illusions without implications. The arts created by the lowbrow are made in the expression of immediate pleasure or grief, like most forms of jazz; or of usefulness, like the manufacturing of a tool or a piece of machinery or even a bridge across the Hudson.

Live and Let Live

The form, to use a highbrow phrase, follows the function. When the lowbrow arts follow this formula (which they don’t always do), then the highbrow finds much in them to admire, and he calls it the vernacular. When, however, the lowbrow arts get mixed up with middlebrow ideas of culture, then the highbrow turns away in disgust. Look, for example, at what happened to the circus, a traditional form of lowbrow art. They got in fancy it up, and now its special flavor of authenticity is gone—all wrapped up in pink middlebrow sequins. This is not to say that the lowbrow doesn’t like it just as much as he ever did. It is the highbrow who is pained.

Part of the highbrow’s admiration for the lowbrow stems from the lowbrow’s indifference to art. This makes it possible for the highbrow to blame whatever he doesn’t like about lowbrow taste on the middlebrow. If the lowbrow reads the comics, the highbrow understands; he is frequently a connoisseur of the comics himself. But if he likes grade-B double features, the highbrow blames that on the corrupting influence of the middlebrow money-bags of Hollywood. The lowbrow consumer, whether he is an engineer of bridges or a bus driver, wants to be comfortable and to enjoy himself without having to worry about whether he has good taste or not. It doesn’t make any difference to him that a chair is a bad Grand Rapids copy or an eighteenth century fauteuil so long as he’s happy when he sits down. He doesn’t care whether the movies are art, or the radio improving, so long as he has fun while he’s giving them his attention.

It wouldn’t occur to him to tell a novelist what kind of book he should write, or a movie director what kind of movie to make. If he doesn’t like a book he ignores it; if he doesn’t like a movie he says so, whether it is a “Blondie” show or Henry V. If he likes jive or square-dancing, he doesn’t worry about whether they are fashionable or not. If other people like the ballet, that’s all right with him, so long as he doesn’t have to go himself. In general the lowbrow attitude toward the arts is live and let live. Lowbrows are not philistines. One has to know enough about the arts to argue about them with highbrows to be a philistine.

The Middlebrows

The popular press, and also much of the unpopular press, is run by the middlebrows, and it is against them that the highbrow inveighs.

They divide themselves into two groups: the upper-middlebrows and the lower-middlebrows. It is the upper-middlebrows who are the principal purveyors of highbrow ideas and the lower-middlebrows who are the principal consumers of what the upper-middlebrows pass along to them.

Many publishers, for example, are upper-middlebrows—as are most edu-
Pandering Publishers?

The highbrow suspects that the publisher does not pace his book-lined office contriving ways to serve the muses and that these same muses have to wait their turn in line until the balance sheet has been served. He believes that the publisher is really happy only when he can sell a couple of hundred thousand copies of a novel about a hussy with a horsewhip or a book on how to look forty when forty-five. To the highbrow he is a tool to be cultivated and used, but not to be trusted.

The conscientious publisher, for instance, believes in the importance of literature and the dignity of publishing as a profession. He spends a large part of his time on books that will not yield him a decent return on his investment. He searches out writers of promise; he pores over the "little" magazines (or pays other people to); he leafs through hundreds and hundreds of pages of manuscript. He advises writers, encourages them, coaxes them to do their best work; he even advances them money. But he is not able to be a publisher at all (unless he is willing to put his personal fortune at the disposal of financially naive muses) if he does not publish to make money. In order to publish slender volumes of poetry he must also publish fat volumes of historical romance, and in order to encourage the first novel of a promising young writer he must sell tens of thousands of copies of a book by an old hand who grinds out one best seller a year. He must take the measure of popular taste and cater to it at the same time that he tries to create a taste for new talent. If he is a successful publisher he makes money, lives comfortably, patronizes the other arts, serves on museum boards and committees.

The Upper-Middlebrow

The upper-middlebrow consumer takes his culture seriously, as seriously as his job allows, for he is gainfully employed. In his leisure hours he reads Toynbee or Sartre or Osbert Sitwell's serialized memoirs. He goes to museum openings and to the theater and he keeps up on the foreign films. He buys pictures, sometimes old masters if he can afford them, sometimes contemporary works. He has a few etchings and lithographs, and he is not above an occasional color reproduction of a van Gogh or a Cézanne. If, however, his own son were to express an interest in being an artist, he would be dismayed.

His house is tastefully decorated, sometimes in the very latest mode, a model of the modern architect's dream of functionalism, in which case he can discourse on the theory of the open plan and the derivations of the international style with the zest and uncertain vocabulary of a convert. If his house is "traditional" in character, he will not put up with
On April 11, 1949, Life popularized Lynes's analysis, adding a chart (reproduced above, with minor changes) and an essay by Winthrop.
**LOW-BROW ARE CLASSIFIED ON CHART**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRINKS</th>
<th>READING</th>
<th>SCULPTURE</th>
<th>RECORDS</th>
<th>GAMES</th>
<th>CAUSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A glass of &quot;adequate titre&quot; red wine</td>
<td>&quot;Little magazines,&quot; criticism of literature</td>
<td>Calder</td>
<td>Bach and before, live and after</td>
<td>Go</td>
<td>Art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A very dry Martini with lemon peel</td>
<td>Solid fiction: the better novels, quality magazines</td>
<td>Maillot</td>
<td>Symphonies, concerts, operas</td>
<td>The Game</td>
<td>Feminist parenthesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourbon and ginger ale</td>
<td>Book club selections, mass circulation magazines</td>
<td>Front yard sculpture</td>
<td>Light opera, popular favorites</td>
<td>Bridge</td>
<td>P.T.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer</td>
<td>Pulp, comic books</td>
<td>Pastel sculpture</td>
<td>Jukebox</td>
<td>Cigars</td>
<td>The Lodge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sargeant defending the "faddish," fussy highbrows who, he argued, saved America from total inundation by "cultural sewage."

*The Wilson Quarterly/Autumn 1976*
Grand Rapids copies of old pieces; he will have authentic ones. He, or his wife, will ransack secondhand shops for entertaining bibelots and lamps or a piece of Brussels carpet for the bedroom. He never refers to curtains as “drapes.” He talks about television as potentially a new art form, and he listens to the Saturday afternoon opera broadcasts. His library contains a few of the more respectable current best sellers, which he reads out of “curiosity” rather than interest. (Membership in any sort of book club he considers beneath him.) There are a few shelves of first editions, some of them autographed by friends who have dined at his house, some of them things (like a presentation copy of Jürgen) that he “just happened to pick up” and a sampling of American and British poets. There is also a shelf of paper-bound French novels—most of them by nineteenth century writers. The magazines on his table span the areas from Time and the New Yorker to Harper’s and the Atlantic, with an occasional copy of the Yale and Partisan Reviews, and the Art News.

Uncertain Patrons

From this it can be seen that he supports the highbrows—buys some of the books they recommend and an occasional picture they have looked upon with favor—and contributes to organized efforts to promote the arts both by serving on boards and shelling out money. In general, he is modest about expressing his opinion on cultural matters in the presence of highbrows, but takes a slightly lordly tone when he is talking to other middlebrows. If he discovers a “little” painter or poet, the chances are excellent that the man has already been discovered and promoted by a highbrow or by an upper-middlebrow entrepreneur (art dealer or publisher). Once in a while he will take a flyer on an unknown artist, and hang his picture inconspicuously in the bedroom. He takes his function as a patron of the arts seriously, but he does it for the pleasure it gives him to be part of the cultural scene. If he does it for “money, fame, power, or prestige,” as Virginia Woolf says he does, these motives are so obscured by a general sense of well-being and well-meaning that he would be shocked and surprised to be accused of venality.

The Lower-Middlebrow

If the upper-middlebrow is unsure of his own tastes, but firm in his belief that taste is extremely important, the lower-middlebrow ardently believes that he knows what he likes. Yet his taste is constantly susceptible to the pressures that put him in knickerbockers one year and rust-colored slacks the next. Actually he is unsure about almost everything, especially about what he likes. This may explain his pronouncements on taste, which he considers an effete and questionable virtue, and his resentment of the arts; but it may also explain his strength.

When America and Americans are characterized by foreigners and highbrows, the middlebrows are likely to emerge as the dominant group in our society—a dreadful mass of insensible backslappers, given to sentimentality as a prime virtue, the willing victims of slogans and the whims of the bosses, both political and economic.

The picture painted by middlebrow exploiters of the middlebrow, such as the advertisers of nationally advertised brands, is strikingly similar to that painted by the highbrow; their attitudes and motives are quite different (the highbrow paints with a snarl, the advertiser with a gleam),
but they both make the middlebrow out to be much the same kind of creature. The villain of the highbrow and the hero of the advertisers is envisaged as "the typical American family"—happy little women, happy little children, all spotless or sticky in the jam pot, framed against dimity curtains in the windows or decalcomania flowers on the cupboard doors. Lower-middlebrowism is a world pictured without tragedy, a world of new two-door sedans and Bendix washers and reproductions of hunting prints over the living-room mantel. It is a world in which the ingenuity and patience of the housewife are equaled only by the fidelity of her husband and his love of home, pipe, and radio. It is a world that smells of soap. But it is a world of ambition as well, the constant striving for a better way of life—better furniture, bigger refrigerators, more books in the bookcase, more evenings at the movies. To the advertisers this is Americanism; to the highbrows this is the dead weight around the neck of progress.

Improving the Self

The lower-middlebrows are not like this, of course, and unlike the highbrows and the upper-middlebrows, whose numbers are tiny by comparison, they are hard to pin down. They live everywhere rubbing elbows with lowbrows in apartment houses, in row houses all alike from the outside except for the planting, in large houses at the ends of gravel driveways, in big cities, in medium cities and suburbs, and in small towns, from Boston to San Francisco, from Seattle to Jacksonville. They are the members of the book clubs who read difficult books along with racy and innocuous ones. They are the course-takers who swell the enrollments of adult education classes in everything from "The Technique of the Short Story" to "Child Care." They are the people who go to hear the lectures that swarm out from New York lecture bureaus with tales of travel on the Dark Continent and panaceas for saving the world from a fate worse than capitalism. They eat in tea shoppes and hold barbecues in their backyards. They are hell-bent on improving their minds as well as their fortunes. They decorate their homes under the careful guidance of Good Housekeeping and the Ladies' Home Journal, or, if they are well off, of House and Garden, and are subject to fads in furniture so long as these don't depart too radically from the traditional and the safe, from the copy of Colonial and the reproduction of Sheraton.

Women in Charge

In matters of taste, the lower-middlebrow world is largely dominated by women. They select the furniture, buy the fabrics, pick out the wallpapers, the pictures, the books, the china. Except in the selection of his personal apparel and the car, it is almost infra dig for a man to have taste; it is not considered quite manly for the male to express opinions about things which come under the category of "artistic."

Nonetheless, as a member of the school board or the hospital board he decides which design shall be accepted when a new building goes up. The lower-middlebrows are the organizers of the community fund, the members of the legislature, the park commissioners. They pay their taxes and they demand services in return. There are millions of them, conscientious stabilizers of society, slow to change, slow to panic. But they are not as predictable as either the highbrows or the bosses, political or economic, think they are. They
can be led, they can be seduced, but they cannot be pushed around. Highbrow, lowbrow, upper-middlebrow, and lower-middlebrow—the lines between them are sometimes indistinct, as the lines between upper class, lower class, and middle class have always been in our traditionally fluid society. But gradually they are finding their own levels and confining themselves more and more to the company of their own kind.

If Highbrows Ruled
The highbrows would like, of course, to eliminate the middlebrows and devise a society that would approximate an intellectual feudal system in which the lowbrows do the work and create folk arts, and the highbrows do the thinking and create fine arts. All middlebrows, presumably, would have their radios taken away, be suspended from society until they had agreed to give up their subscriptions to the Book-of-the-Month, turned their color reproductions over to a Commission for the Dissolution of Middlebrow Taste, and renounced their affiliation with all educational and other cultural institutions whatsoever. They would be taxed for the support of all writers, artists, musicians, critics, and critics-of-criticism whose production could be certified “serious”—said writers, artists, musicians, and critics to be selected by representatives of qualified magazines with circulations of not more than five thousand copies.

But the highbrows haven’t a chance; things have gone too far. Everybody but the genuine lowbrow (who is more wooed than wedded by the highbrow) is jockeying for position in the new cultural class order. Life magazine, sensing the trend, has been catching us up on the past of Western Civilization in sixteen-page, four-color capsules. Mademoiselle walks off with the first prizes in the annual short-story contests. The Pepsi-Cola Company stages the most elaborate and highest-paying art competition in the country. Even Partisan Review runs full-page ads in the New York Times Book Review. The Book-of-the-Month Club ships out copies of Toynbee’s A Study of History as “dividends.”

If life for grandmother was simple in its social distinctions, life is becoming equally simple for us. The rungs of the ladder may be different, it may even be a different ladder, but it’s onward and upward just the same....

POSTSCRIPT

A 1976 COMMENTARY
by Russell Lynes

In the nearly 30 years since “Highbrow, Lowbrow, Middlebrow” was published, the highbrow has changed his costume and his whiskers several times, the middlebrows have hared off after a succession of “ops” and “pops” and “Decos” and “Mary Hartman” (twice), and the lowbrows have found Archie Bunker and CB radios and game shows with which to amuse and identify themselves. The lines of my arbitrary categories have become even.
more indistinct than they were in 1949. But, I believe, the basic pattern still has some validity, or, if not the pattern, at least the underlying bed of nails which is taste. The adaption and exercise of taste will, I expect, always be a serious social game as long as taste is regarded as a guide to status and people are convinced that there are durable standards of “good taste” and that “bad taste” is what their inferiors have.

The highbrows in the 1950s, you will recall, had a rather rough time of it. It was the decade of the McCarthy investigations, of Adlai Stevenson’s two defeats as a candidate for President, and, perhaps, worst of all, the arrival of television—a symbol of mass middlebrowism. It was, moreover, the era of Sputnik I and the shocked clamor for more scientific training. While that incident ultimately gave a good many intellectuals an improved bargaining position, it was not the humanists, the preceptors of taste, who benefited. The Eisenhower years did not supply the highbrows with the opportunities that the election of Kennedy seemed to offer, if only briefly. And, despite Lady Bird Johnson’s efforts to continue to hold high the torch of culture, her husband was barely tolerant of what highbrows considered her well-intentioned flirtation with the arts.

During the 1960s it was fashionable to take note of “the cultural explosion.” Vastly expensive cultural centers burgeoned in cities across the land, and it was generally agreed that culture was good for the community and hence good for business. Culture, you might say, was regarded as civic Geritol. Community theaters popped up like toadstools, many with the beneficence of the Ford Foundation. Established art museums were crowded as never before; new ones appeared by the dozens, and commercial art galleries multiplied at a rate almost as breathtaking as the prices of the wares in which they dealt. High in the Berkshires (the home of Tanglewood, Music Mountain, Jacob’s Pillow), where I was born and which used to be dairy country, there were suddenly more violinists than there were cows, or so it seemed.

The highbrows found all this confusing. Obviously they could not oppose public enthusiasm for the arts, at least not to the point of wishing to turn off the faucet that dripped gold into their pockets. They did not want to put a crimp in anything that supported the avant garde, though they persisted in passionate disputes about the problems of mass culture vs. high culture. Moreover, they now had to protect their flanks, not just from the middlebrows, but from the activist young, the members of the dissident counter-culture who thought that the highbrows were just as responsible for America’s sins as the bankers. Some adult highbrows tried to identify themselves with the young radicals only to discover that they were not wanted and not considered trustworthy. And, since everybody now had beards and refused to dress according to the old rules, how could a poor highbrow tell who were friends and who were enemies, who was serious, who not?

The upper-middlebrows, on the other hand, felt a surge of
aesthetic adrenalin. To serve on the board of the local opera company became every bit as socially desirable as being on the executive committee of the Community Chest. If anything, the caste structure of tastefulness that I adumbrated in my 1949 essay became strengthened. In some respects, the line between highbrows and upper-middlebrows became blurred; but the line between upper- and lower-middlebrows grew sharper and more social. As a result, service on the boards of artistic institutions has made new demands on their members. They are not only expected to be made of money (or know where to find it) but to be culturally “hip” as well. Keeping up with what’s “in” is as important as being socially “in” oneself, and, now, when the arts change with a rapidity unknown before, being upper-middlebrow involves considerable psychic strain.

As I look at the chart, which a Life editor and I concocted over innumerable cups of coffee 27 years ago, it strikes me, as it must you, that what was highbrow then has become distinctly upper-middlebrow today. Who regards an Eames chair as highbrow now? Or ballet, or an unwashed salad bowl or a Calder “stabile”? They have all become thoroughly upper-middlebrow, and what was upper has become lower. Only the lowbrow line of the chart still makes spiritual if not literal sense. Today television would find itself at all levels of the chart in ways too obvious to define. The “pill” has taken glamor out of Planned Parenthood as an upper-middlebrow cause, and Art is now their cause instead, and so on. It is a game anyone can play. Even if the shapes of the pieces have changed, and the board looks quite different, the basic rules seem to me much the same as they always were—and as insolent.
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